Roman Catholic opposition to Papal Infallibility

By W. J. Sparrow-Simpson

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Title: Roman Catholic opposition to Papal Infallibility

Author: W. J. Sparrow-Simpson

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ROMAN CATHOLIC OPPOSITION TO PAPAL INFALLIBILITY ***

ROMAN CATHOLIC OPPOSITION TO
PAPAL INFALLIBILITY

ROMAN CATHOLIC
OPPOSITION TO
PAPAL INFALLIBILITY

BY W. J. SPARROW SIMPSON
CHAPLAIN OF ST MARY’S HOSPITAL, ILFORD

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
1909

PREFACE

The following pages have been written to show the difficulties
experienced by Roman Catholics in assenting to the doctrine of Papal
Infallibility. No attempt is here made to write a complete account of
the Vatican Council. Indeed, many subjects discussed in that Assembly
are entirely omitted. Our interest is with one doctrine alone. What is
attempted is, simply to sketch the inner history of Roman opposition to
the dogma in different countries and several centuries, until and after
the memorable Decree of 18th July 1870. We are simply concerned to show
the process by which a very considerable section of Bishops, priests,
and laity in the Roman Church were constrained to pass from one belief
to its opposite.

The literature of the subject is, of course, immense. A considerable
part of the details here recorded have never appeared in English
before. They lie buried in enormous German treatises, or in the vast
official Acta of the Council; or in the documentary collections of
Cecconi, Von Schulte, Friedrich, Friedberg, and many others; or in
scattered pamphlets and periodicals to which access is now by no means
easily obtained.

The materials for a history of the opposition to the doctrine have
of recent years largely increased. All the principal actors in the
Vatican disputes have, by this time, passed away; and a large series of
biographies have placed at our disposal private letters never published
while they lived.

But it will be obvious that an Ultramontane biographer of a Bishop
who vehemently opposed the doctrine may be gravely perplexed between
the conflicting claims of history and of edification. His loyalty to
truth, his reverence for the personage of whom he writes, his regard
for living authority, with its tremendous powers to revise, cancel,
or condemn, his proper disinclination to scandalise the faithful
by rigorous records of episcopal unbelief, or to reveal the family
disunions before an incredulous world--are elements which, when they
coexist, may, even in the sincerest mind possibly blend together in
very various proportions. At any rate the biographies of certain great
French Bishops of the Vatican struggle manifest marked reluctance and
hesitation in recording fully the facts. And even when the facts have
been fairly fully recorded, the English translator has--for whatever
reasons--condensed them, we had almost said mutilated them, beyond
recognition.

The recently published selection of Lord Acton’s letters has increased
our knowledge of his attitude toward the Infallibility Decree; but the
entire omission of correspondence during ten most critical years of the
struggle suggests, what other considerations endorse, that there is yet
considerably more remaining unrevealed.

Still, with whatever drawbacks, the resources at a writer’s disposal
to-day are vastly greater than they were some years ago.

Accordingly the following pages are written under a strong sense that
the material is ample, that the history of the minority has never yet
for English people been fully told, and with a desire to supply the
omission.

It should be added that the adverse criticisms herein repeated are
almost entirely derived from Roman Catholic sources, and are, as far
as possible, given in the actual words. Protestant criticism has been
systematically excluded. The object being simply to describe how the
doctrine of Pontifical Infallibility appeared; what difficulties,
intellectual, historic, and moral, it created; what fierce and
desperate strife its increasing ascendency awakened; how, and with what
results, moral and intellectual, it was finally regarded, not by the
outer world, nor by other religious communions, but by clergy and laity
within the limits of the Roman Catholic Church.

Since these pages have passed through the press, Turmel’s _Histoire
du Dogme de la Papauté_ has been placed upon the Roman Index of
prohibited books (5th July 1909). It is therefore among that lengthy
list of modern writings which no member of the Roman Obedience may
“dare to read or retain.” The interests of edification are conceived
by Authority as incompatible with those of historical research. Such
procedure deprives the historian of that freedom to report results
without which history cannot be written.

The author desires to express his deep indebtedness to the kindness
of the Reverend Darwell Stone, Librarian of the Pusey House, who has
read through the proof sheets of this book. He is of course in no way
responsible for its contents; but it has been the greatest privilege to
have the encouragement and aid of so critical and learned an adviser.

* * * * *

NOTE.--The number of Bishops who, though resident in Rome, absented
themselves from the Vatican Council on the day of the Decree is
variously given on page 268 as 91, on page 271 as 70, and on page 281
as more than 80. It will be noticed that these variations are due to
the authors quoted; the first being that given by Quirinus; the second
by the letter of the Opposition to the Pope; the third by Dr Newman.

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

The following list of books has been compiled, partly to show the
editions to which references have been made, and partly as a help
to study. It is, of course, needless to say that such a list has no
pretensions whatever to completeness.

ACTA. _Concil. Vaticani. Collectio Lacensis._ T. vii. 1892.
ACTON. _History of Freedom._
” _Sendschreiben an einen Deutschen Bischof._ 1870.
ALZOG. _History of the Church._
ANONYMOUS. _Pourquoi le Clergé Français est Ultramontane._ 1879.
” _Ce qui se passe au Concile._ 1870.
AQUINAS. _Opuscula Selecta._ Paris. 4 vols. 1884.
” _In Sententiis._ 3 vols. Parma Edit.
ARGENTRE, D’. _Elementa Theologica._ Paris. 1702.
AUGUSTINE. _Works._ Gaume’s Edition.

BARRAL. _Defense des Libertés de l’Eglise Gallicane._ 1817.
BAUNARD. _Hist. du Card. Pie._ 2 vols. Paris. 1886.
BAUSSET, Card. _Histoire de Bossuet._ 4 vols.
BELLARMINE. _De Controversiis._ Works. 11 vols. Paris. 1874.
BERGIER. _Dict. de Théologie._ 12 vols. Paris. 1876.
BERRINGTON & KIRK. _Faith of Catholics._ 1830.
BILLUART. _De Ecclesia._
BONNECHOSE. _Hist. C. Constance._
BOSSUET. _Works._ Ed. F. Lachat. 30 vols. Paris. 1864.
BOTALLA. _Infallible Authority of the Pope._
BOURGEOIS ET CLERMONT. _Rome et Napoleon._ 3 vols. 1907.
BRYCE. _Biographical Studies._
BUTLER. _Historical Memorials of the English Catholics._
_Cambridge Modern History_--_French Revolution._

CARSON. _Reunion Essays._ 1903.
CECCONI. _Histoire du Concile du Vatican._ French transl. 4 vols.
1887.
CHAUVIN. _Le Père Gratry._ 1901.
CHOUPIN L. _Valeur des Decisions Doctrinale._ 1908.
CHRISMANN. _Regula Fidei Catholicæ._ 1854.
CHRISTOPHE. _Histoire de la Papauté, pendant le XIV. Siècle._ 3 vols.
1853.
CLIFFORD, Lord. _Letters to the Earl of Winchelsea._
COBB, G. F. _Few Words on Reunion._ 1869.
CONSALVI, Card. _Mémoires._ 2 vols. Cretineau-Joly. 1864.
_Correspondant._ 10th Feb. 1906. Articles by Thureau
Dangin.
CYPRIAN. Ed. Hartel. 3 vols.

DECHAMPS. _L’Infallibilité et le Concile Général._ 1869.
DENZINGER. _Enchiridion._ 1854.
DÖLLINGER & REUSCH. _Die Selbstbiographie des Cardinals Bellarmin._
” . _Declarations and Letters._
DUCHESNE. _Beginnings of the Temporal Power of the Pope._ 1908.
DUPANLOUP. _Observations._ 1869.
” . _Lettre sur le futur Concile Œcuménique adressée par Mgr.
L’Évêque d’Orléans au clergé de son Diocese._ 1868.
” . See Chapon. _Mgr. Dupanloup et la Liberté._ 1889.
and _Revue du Clergé Français_. 1st May 1909, p. 375.

FESSLER. _True and False Infallibility._ 1871.
FLEURY. _Histoire Ecclesiastique._ Avignon. 1777.
FOISSET. _C. de Montalembert._
FOLLENAY. _Vie de C. Guibert._ 2 vols.
FOULON. _Darboy._ 1889.
FRANZELIN. _De Traditione._
FRIEDBERG. _Aktenstücke._ 1876.
FRIEDRICH. _Documenta ad illustrandum Conc. Vat._ 2 vols. 1871.
” _Döllinger. Sein Leben._ 3 vols. Munchen. 1899.
” _Tagebuch._ 1871.

GALLITZIN. _Defence of Catholic Principles._
GARNIER. _Liber Diurnus._
GASQUET. _Lord Acton and his Circle._
GERSON. _De Auferibilitate Papæ ab Ecclesia._
” . _Life by Schwab._ 1859.
GHILARDI. _Torquemada De Plenitudine Potestatis R. P._ 1870.
GLADSTONE. _Vaticanism._
GOSSELIN. _Temporal Power of the Pope in the Middle Ages._
Transl. by Kelly of Maynooth. 2 vols. 1853.
GOYAU. _L’Allemagne religieuse._ 5 vols. 1905.
GRANDERATH. _Vatican Council._ 3 vols.
GRATRY. _Letters._
GREGOROVIUS. _Roman Journals._
GRISAR. _Lainez-Disputationes Tridentinae._ 2 vols. 1886.
GUERANGER. _De la Monarchie Pontificate._ 1870.
GUETTÉE. _Histoire de l’Eglise de France._ 12 vols. 1856.
GUILLERMIN. _Vie de Mgr. Darboy._ 1888.

HALIFAX, Lord. In _Nineteenth Century_. May 1901.
HASENCLEVER. _Das neue Dogma von der Unfehlbarkeit des Papstes._ 1872.
HEFELE. _Conciliengeschichte._ First Edition. 1855.
Second Edition.
French translation. 12 vols. _Goschler and Delarc._ 1859.
English translation. 5 vols. from 2nd edition. 1872.
(By Clark & Oxenham.)
” _Honorius und das sechste Allgemeine Concil._ 1870.
HEFELE’S letters will be found in _Schulte. Altkatholicismus and
Revue internationale de Theologie_ (pp. 485–506). 1908.
HOHENLOHE. _Memoirs._ 2 vols.
HURTER. _Compendium Theologiæ Dogmaticæ._ 3 vols. 5th edition. 1885.
HUSENBETH. _Life of Milner._ 1862.

IRENÆUS. Ed. Harvey. 2 vols. 1857.

JANUS. _The Pope and the Council._ Rivingtons. 1869.
JEROME. _Ad Rufinum. De Script Eccles._
JERVIS. _Hist. Ch. France._ 2 vols. 1872.
” _The Gallican Church and the Revolution._ 1882.
JOURDAIN. _Hist. Univ. Paris._

KEENAN. _Controversial Catechism._ 17th thousand. 1860.
KETTELER. _Le Concile Œcuménique._ Tr. Bélet. (?) 1869.
” _Liberté Antorité, Église._ Tr. Bélet. 1862.
” _Das unfehlbare Lehramt des Papstes._ 1871.
_Knabenbauer in Luc._
KRAUTHEIMER. _Catechism of the Catholic Religion._ 1845.

LAGRANGE. _Hist. de Dupanloup._ 3 vols.
LAMENNAIS. _Œuvres Complètes._ 14 vols. Paris. 1836.
” _Correspondance._ Ed. Forgues. 2 vols. 1863.
LANGEN. _Das Vat. Dogma._ 5 vols. 1870, etc.
LAYMAN (Rom. Cath.). _Reasons why a Roman Catholic cannot
accept the doctrine of Papal Infallibility as defined by
the Vatican Council._ 1876.
LENORMANT. _Les Origines de l’Histoire._
LETO (POMPANIO). _Eight Months at Rome._ 1876.
LICHTENBERGER. _Encyclopédie des Sciences Religieuses._ 12 vols.
LIDDON. _Life of Pusey._ 4 vols.
LIEBERMANN. _Institutiones Theologicæ._ 5 vols. 1831.
LUZERNE, DE, Card. _Works._ Migne. 6 vols.

MAISTRE, J. DE. _Œuvres._ 8 vols. Bruxelles. 1845.
MANNING. _Pastoral._ 1867.
” _Petri Privilegium._
MARET. _Du Concile Général._ 2 vols. 1870.
MARIN. _De l’Infallibilité Doctrinale._ 1870.
MARTIN, CONRAD. _Dogmatik._
MELCHIOR, CANO. _Opera._ 3 vols. Rome. 1890.
MICHELIS. _Der häretische Charakter des Infallibilitätslehre._ 1872.
MILNER. _End of Religious Controversy._ Ed. 2. 1819.
MOZLEY. _Essay on Development._
MURRAY. _Tractatus de Ecclesia Christi._ 3 vols in six parts. 1862.

NEWMAN. _Letter to Bishop Ullathorne_--_Standard Newspaper._
7th April 1870.
” _Letter to Duke of Norfolk._
NIELSEN. _Geschichte des Papstthums._ 2 vols. 1880.

OLLIVIER (EMILE). _L’Eglise et L’Etat._ 2 vols.
ORSI. _De irreformabili Romani Pontificis in definiendis Fidei
controversiis judicio._ 3 vols. Rome. 1739.

PALLAVICINI. _Hist. C. Trent._
PASTOR. _History of the Popes._ English translation. 1891.
PERRAUD, A. Le P. _Gratry ses Derniers Jours._ 1872.
PERRON, DU, Card. _Les Ambassades et Negotiations._ Paris. 1623.
PERRONE. _De Traditione._
PHILLIPPS, AMBROSE DE LISLE. _Union Review._ 1866.
PIUS IX. _Brief to Archbishop of Munich._ See ACTA, _Conc. Vat._
PULLER. _Primitive Saints and Roman Church._
PURCELL. _Life of Manning._
” _Life of Ambrose de Lisle Phillipps._ 2 vols. 1900.

QUIRINUS. _Letters from Rome on the Council._ 1870.

REINKENS. _Ueber die Einheit der katholischen Kirche._ 1877.
” _Kniefall und Fall des Bischof Ketteler._ 1877.
REUSCH. _Letters in Schulte Altkatholicismus._
REVIEW. _Dublin._ 1869.
” _Home and Foreign._ 1863.
” _Rambler._ 1862.
_Revue des Deux Mondes._ 1858.
RICHERIUS. _Vindiciæ Doctrinæ Majorum._ 1683.
ROSIÈRE. _Liber Diurnus._ 1869.
RUDIS. _Petra Romana._ 1869.
RUMP. _Die Unfehlbarkeit des P._ 1870.
RYDER. _Idealism in Theology._ 1867.

SALMON. _Infallibility._
SCHULTE. _Der Altkatholicismus._ 1887.
SCHWANE. _Histoire du Dogme._ 6 vols. References to the
French translation of the _Dogmengeschichte_.
SICARD. _L’Ancien Clergé de France._ 3 vols.

_Tablet, the._ 1869.
THEINER. _Acts of the Council of Trent._
THUREAU DANGIN. _La Renaissance Catholique en Angleterre an
xix Siècle._ 3 vols. 1906.
TURMEL. _Hist. Théol. Positive._ 1906.
” _Histoire du Dogme de la Papauté._ Paris. 1908.

ULLATHORNE (Bp.). _Letter on the Rambler._ 1862.
” _Autobiography._ 2 vols.
” _Expostulation._
” _Döllingerites._
_L’Univers._ 1869.

VERON, FRANCIS. _Regula Fidei._ Ed. Sebastian Brunner. 1857.
VEUILLOT L. _Rome pendant le Concile._
VINCENT of Lerins. _Commonitorium._

WARD (BERNARD). _Dawn of the Catholic Revival._ 2 vols. 1909.
” (W.). _Life of Wiseman._ 2 vols. 1900.
” (W. G.). _Essays on the Church’s Doctrinal Authority._
WATERWORTH. _Council of Trent._ 1848.
WORDSWORTH, CH. _Miscellanies._ 3 vols. 1879.

CONTENTS

PAGE

I. THE EVIDENCE OF SCRIPTURE 1

II. THE AGE OF THE FATHERS 9

III. THE CASE OF HONORIUS 31

IV. THE SCHOLASTIC PERIOD 48

V. THE AGE OF THE REFORMING COUNCILS 55

VI. THE COUNCIL OF TRENT 66

VII. CARDINAL BELLARMINE 72

VIII. THE SORBONNE 79

IX. BOSSUET 85

X. OPPOSITION AMONG ROMAN CATHOLICS IN ENGLAND 98

XI. ULTRAMONTANISM IN FRANCE 143

XII. DARBOY, DUPANLOUP, MARET, GRATRY AND
MONTALEMBERT 157

XIII. OPPOSITION IN GERMANY--DÖLLINGER 188

XIV. HOHENLOHE AND FRIEDRICH 207

XV. THE IMMEDIATE PREPARATIONS 217

XVI. THE OPENING OF THE VATICAN COUNCIL 229

XVII. THE VATICAN DECISION 238

XVIII. THE MINORITY AFTER THE VATICAN DECREE 275

XIX. THE INFALLIBILITY DOCTRINE 340

XX. WHERE ARE THE INFALLIBLE DECISIONS? 356

INDEX 371

ROMAN CATHOLIC OPPOSITION TO PAPAL INFALLIBILITY

CHAPTER I

THE EVIDENCE OF SCRIPTURE

Those who do not identify history with heresy will always desire to
know how a Christian affirmation of the present compares with the past.
Whatever validity faith may attach to the teaching of the Church of
to-day, there must be reasons and reasons which demand and justify an
enquiry into the doctrine of other ages. If serious discrepancies would
cause perplexity, unforeseen harmonies would confirm. In any case the
refusal to examine is not the product of a genuine faith. For, after
all, history is, if on one side human, on another divine. Moreover,
the actual development of human thought must be of profoundest living
interest. This enquiry, then, must be undertaken in reference to the
doctrine of Papal Infallibility. For it is, in a large portion of
modern Christian life, an existing affirmation. The question is, What
relation does the doctrine bear to the facts of History? And obviously,
first of all, what does Scripture say?

The Ultramontane, so far as he founds the doctrine on Scripture
language, finds it chiefly in the words of our Lord to St Peter:
“I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not; and when thou art
converted, strengthen thy brethren.”[1] Now seeing that this dogma of
Papal Infallibility would be, if true, no less than fundamental, it is
necessary to dwell at length on the asserted scriptural witness to the
same. For those who believe that fundamental Christian truth must be
traceable to the records of Revelation must test each doctrine by what
is told them there. And we are here concerned with the express words
of Christ. And the issues which depend on a right understanding of the
Redeemer’s words are, as all Christians will acknowledge, momentous.

[1] Luke xxii. 32.

The Roman interpretation of this passage maintains the following
points:--

1. That Christ here confers on Peter an exclusive prerogative, on the
ground of Peter’s superior position;

2. That this prerogative is infallible insight;

3. That thereby he was enabled to give infallible instructions to his
brethren;

4. That this prerogative extends to all Peter’s successors and to none
but those--the prerogative being as exclusive in its range as it was in
its origin.

There is, however, another interpretation which has been in substance
and in many details accepted by members of the Roman Church, and which
is unable to find any of these doctrines in the words of Christ.

There are clearly four points to be considered: Christ’s Prayer;
Peter’s Faith; Peter’s Brethren; Peter’s Successors.

i. _First, then, Christ’s Prayer: I have prayed for thee._

1. Certainly it was an _exclusive_ prayer. Satan hath desired to have
you, collectively; but I have prayed for thee, Peter, individually.
Christ here prays for the one: for the others, on this occasion, He
does not pray.

Does not this imply, asks the Ultramontane, the superiority of the
individual thus selected and distinguished? Does not Christ here place
the security of the many in the security of the one? If the leader and
chief is protected, those who follow him and obey him will be secure.
This exposition labours under the double defect of assuming a theory of
Peter’s supremacy and of ignoring the historical circumstances which
prompted Christ’s words. That the prayer was exclusive is true. But
exclusive petition does not necessarily imply the greater superiority
of the person prayed for; it may equally well imply his greater need.
Remembering that Peter alone was on the verge of a triple denial, no
wonder he became the object of an exclusive prayer. If his confident
self-reliance, together with his impulsive temperament, laid him
open to perils from which the Twelve were exempt, what else could
his Master do than offer special intercession for him? To build a
theory of permanent prerogative as universal teacher on the fact of
Christ’s exclusive petition is therefore to forget that the historic
circumstances, which elicited our Lord’s concern, suggest a totally
different explanation.

2. Moreover, while we are reminded that Christ’s prayer was exclusive,
we should also be reminded that it was _conditional_.

It seems at first sight a natural outcome of Christian piety to assume
that whatever Christ prayed for was certain to come to pass. Is it not
written, “I know that thou hearest me always”? But the effectiveness
of Christ’s prayers must take into account our human independence. To
say that the prayer of Christ must necessarily realise its design, is
really to reduce mankind to a mechanism upon which the Spirit plays.
But this is false to Christian teaching and human experience. The
prayers of Christ are invariably conditional upon the human response.
They demand human co-operation. The prayer for Peter unquestionably
implies that the resources needed to discharge his function would
be placed at his disposal, provided that he yielded his will to the
offered grace. But that Peter would invariably fulfil the essential
conditions, Christ’s petition does not affirm and cannot even suggest.
It cannot mean unconditional security, exemption from the liabilities
of human weakness and imperfection, apart from all considerations of
personal effort and moral state.

ii. _The second object for our analysis is Peter’s Faith--and here
two points arise:--What is meant by “faith” and what is meant by
“fail.”_

1. Now when our Lord says “faith,” the meaning is in general not
difficult to ascertain. The faith which, if present, could remove
mountains, or, if absent, hinders His merciful works, is plainly not
so much an intellectual assent to a number of propositions, as a moral
relation to a Person; a devotion to Himself, demanding qualities, not
only of the intellect, but also of the affections and of the will.
It is a quality inseparable from love. It may exist in many varying
degrees.

2. What, then, is meant by “fail”? The Greek term here translated
“fail” sometimes describes an eclipse, which to the primitive
imagination suggested death, much as we talk of the dying day. “Thou
art the same and thy years shall not fail,”[2] means shall not cease,
or come to an end.

[2] Heb. i. 12.

3. Accordingly, by “a faith which should not fail,” our Lord described
a personal devotion to Himself, which should never cease to exist. But
we must carefully distinguish between the inward quality of faith and
its outward expressions. St Peter, in the subsequent denial, failed;
not in his inward belief, but its outward expression. The failure
was not in his thoughts but in his words. As a fact, his outward
expressions of faith were not protected from error. He said exactly
what his intellect contradicted, what he knew was false. The natural
inference is that the prayer of Christ was concerned with Peter’s
inward spiritual state, not with the outward phrases. A very able Roman
writer saw this plainly enough. Consequently, he says, Christ demanded
here for Peter _two_ privileges--not merely one: first, that he should
never lose his faith; secondly, that as Pope he should never teach
anything contrary to the faith. That is what the Ultramontane position
would require. But that is exactly what did not happen at the denial.
The prayer of Christ did not secure St Peter from false expressions.
Nor did it secure Peter’s personal devotion from a temporary eclipse.
But even if Peter’s dogmatic insight remained unclouded, that would
help his brethren comparatively little if his official utterances could
be mistaken. And it was expressly in his utterances that he did fail.

iii. _The third theme for analysis is the Strengthening his Brethren._

1. Now to strengthen is to give support. It is employed several times
by St Paul. As when he says: “I long to see you, that I may impart unto
you some spiritual gift, to the end ye may be _established_.”[3] He
says he sent Timothy “to establish you, and to comfort you concerning
your faith.”[4] He speaks of “stablishing your hearts unblameable in
holiness”;[5] prays that God will “comfort your hearts and stablish
you in every good word and work”;[6] and says “the Lord is faithful,
who shall stablish you, and keep you from evil.”[7] So St Peter desires
that God would “stablish, strengthen, settle”[8] the Christian; and
says that Christians are “established in the present truth.”[9] The
Revelation of St John again says: “Be watchful and strengthen the
things which remain, which are ready to die.”[10]

[3] Rom. i. 11.

[4] 1 Thess. iii. 2.

[5] 1 Thess. iii. 13.

[6] 2 Thess. ii. 17.

[7] 2 Thess. iii. 3.

[8] 1 Peter v. 10.

[9] 2 Peter i. 12.

[10] Apoc. iii. 2.

This scriptural use of the term “strengthen,” or “stablish,” shows
conclusively that any kind of moral support may be intended. The
strengthening may be that which Divine Grace supplies; or that which
comes from the knowledge of the Truth; or that which comes from the
encouragement of Christian ministers. But in no solitary instance is
there any suggestion of infallibility as essential to enable one to
be a strengthener. Thus, “when thou art converted, strengthen thy
brethren,” would naturally mean, When thou hast by repentance recovered
from thine own moral infirmity, do thou become a moral support to the
impulsive and the weak. It is a merciful promise to St Peter before his
sin, of restoration to Apostleship after the sin had been committed.
It suggests that even through the denial he may gain a humility and
self-knowledge which may enlarge his sympathies and increase his
strength. It is all in the moral rather than in the purely intellectual
sphere.

2. But further: The utterance, “strengthen thy brethren,” is a
command and not a promise. We cannot infer, from a duty enjoined, its
invariable fulfilment. Otherwise, we are all perfect: For this command
is laid upon us all. Moreover, whatever Peter may have done, what is
certain is that at Antioch he did not strengthen his brethren. All
human analogy would suggest a more or less imperfect human endeavour to
fulfil a divinely appointed ideal.

iv. _The fourth and last point for consideration is Peters
Successors._

1. Now, first, our Lord does not mention them. They are not mentioned
even by implication. There is no necessary implication, unless we
assume, _à priori_, as some Roman writers do, that such a prerogative
could not be restricted to a single generation, nor to the Apostolic
Age;[11] and therefore that the function of Peter in strengthening his
brethren must be continued to his successors to the end of time. But
by no process of interpretation can this be derived from the words
of Christ. It can be read into them: it cannot be read out of them.
Whether false or true, it is certainly not what our Lord has said.

[11] So Vat. C., cf. _Knabenbauer in Luc._

Moreover, since the prerogative here conferred on Peter was the
prerogative of sympathy learnt by the humiliations of failure, not the
gift of Infallibility, its perpetuation among his successors could not
confer upon them what it did not confer on him. If our exposition of
this prayer of Christ be correct, the extension of the prerogative over
a series of successors would be doubtless morally valuable but of no
dogmatic use.

2. Moreover, if the words, “strengthen thy brethren,” apply to Peter’s
successors, so do the words “when thou art converted.” Bellarmine
himself saw this, and was disturbed by it. He suggested that
“converted” must not be understood as moral renovation and repentance,
but as an adverb equivalent to, “in turn,” as if the passage ran--I
have strengthened thee, do thou in thy turn strengthen thy brethren. Or
else it might mean--so it was suggested--Having turned your attention
to them, exercise your Infallibility. But even if the sentence, “when
thou art converted,” bore no allusion to Peter’s denial, still no
possible exegesis can justly elicit the Infallibility of his successors
out of the injunction “strengthen thy brethren.” Peter’s successors
would be thereby ordered to bestow moral support upon their weaker
brethren. But whether they would obey this command and fulfil it with
more invariable exactitude than he to whom it was spoken, is a question
of historical investigation and not of _à priori_ theory.

* * * * *

The preceding exposition has been very largely derived from Roman
Catholic sources; from the writings of Bossuet, Bishop of Meaux,
opposing, in behalf of the Church of France, the Ultramontanism of
the seventeenth century; of Barral, Archbishop of Tours, in the early
nineteenth century; of Bishop Maret, and of Gratry, just before the
Vatican Council of 1870; of Döllinger, prior to the rupture with Rome;
of Archbishop Kenrick of St Louis, in the speech which he intended
to deliver in the Vatican Council, in exercise of his divine right
as a Bishop, but whose delivery was prevented by the closure of the
discussion.

CHAPTER II

THE AGE OF THE FATHERS

Roman writers have differed greatly in their view of the Patristic
evidence for Papal Infallibility. Some have found very little definite
statement in the Fathers, upon which they thought it wise, at any rate
in controversy, to rely.

Cardinal Bellarmine[12] makes but scanty appeal for this doctrine to
the Age of the Fathers. He contents himself with asserting first that
the Patriarchal Churches of Constantinople, Alexandria, and Antioch
have been presided over by heretics, whereas Rome has been exempt from
this calamity;[13] and secondly, he observes that Popes have passed
judgment on heresies apart from any Council, and that their decisions
have been accepted. This asserted exemption of the Roman Church from
heresy he claims as identical with impossibility of heresy; and
this acceptance of decisions as an acknowledgment of Infallibility.
Bellarmine’s meagre use of the Patristic period to prove the doctrine
of Papal Infallibility is strikingly contrasted with his ample use
of the same to prove the primacy or the authority of the Roman See.
And this difference of appeal in the two cases means a capacity to
distinguish between authority and Infallibility.

[12] See _Controv._

[13] Cf. Turmel, _Hist. Théol. Positive_, p. 303.

Other writers have seen Infallibility implied in every recognition of
authority or primacy; in every judicial sentence of the Roman See.

A third section of Roman theologians has been definitely unable to
discover the doctrine anywhere in the Patristic period. Among the more
critical and historically-minded of recent Roman writers there is a
belief in the doctrine, independent of any evidence for it in the
Age of the Fathers; indeed often coupled with an acknowledgment that
the period does not yield to their scrutiny instances either of its
recognition as a principle, or of its exercise as a fact. Advancing to
the Patristic times with the definition of Infallibility as given in
the Vatican Decree, they affirm that one essential condition of its
exercise is deliberate intention to instruct the Universal Church.
All instruction not given with that express intention is entirely
outside the range of Infallibility. Evidently the great mass of
judicial decisions, appeals to Rome, recognitions of its authority,
praises of its impartiality and rectitude, assertions of the danger
of disobedience to its words, have nothing to do with the doctrine of
Infallibility; and are acknowledged by this school of Roman writers to
be no proof of the doctrine’s existence. This recent Roman attitude
involves an entirely different estimate of Patristic evidence from that
formerly prevalent among the Ultramontanes. It brings the Ultramontane
curiously round to agreement with the opposite school as to the actual
contents of the Patristic period. There is far less readiness to-day
than formerly to assume that inferences which appear to a modern
Ultramontane necessarily obviously involved in a statement or a claim,
were really actually seen and understood and accepted among the
primitive writers by whom the statement or claim was made. This is a
sign of a more historic spirit, and therefore exceedingly hopeful.

Of course the doctrine’s recognition as a theory is separable from
its exercise as a fact. Many Roman Catholic writers have not only
maintained that during the Age of the Fathers no case occurs of its
exercise; but that the principles advocated demonstrate that it was
not even recognised as a theory, since by those very principles it is
actually excluded. Roman opponents of the doctrine have also pointed
out that no profession of belief in the infallibility of the Church can
be adduced to prove belief in the infallibility of the Pope for the
simple reason that many Roman theologians who believed the former have
rejected the latter.

All that can be done in a limited space is to select the chief examples
of the Patristic teaching; and then to show how the Ultramontanes and
their opponents employed them.

* * * * *

1. A crucial instance is the famous language of St Irenæus:--

“It is within the power of all, who may wish to see the truth,
to contemplate clearly the tradition of the Apostles manifested
throughout the world in every Church; and we are able to enumerate
those whom the Apostles appointed to be Bishops in the churches, and
their successors, quite down to our time, who neither taught nor
knew anything like what these [heretics] rave about. Yet surely if
the Apostles had known any hidden mysteries, which they were in the
habit of teaching to the perfect apart and privily from the rest,
they would have taken special care to deliver them to those to whom
they were also committing the churches themselves.... But because
it would be too long in such a volume as this, to enumerate the
successions of all the churches, we point to the tradition of the
very great and very ancient and universally known Church which was
founded and established at Rome by the two most glorious Apostles,
Peter and Paul;--we point, I say, to the tradition which this Church
has from the Apostles, and to her faith proclaimed to man, which
comes down to our time through the succession of her Bishops.... For
to this Church, on account of its more influential pre-eminence, it
is necessary that every church should resort--that is to say, the
faithful who are from all quarters; and in this Church the tradition,
which comes from the Apostles, has ever been preserved by those who
are from all quarters.”[14]

[14] St Irenæus, III. iii. pp. 1–2, trans. F. Puller, p. 20.

This classic passage, says a Roman writer,[15] proves how universal
was the belief in the Sovereign Pontiff’s Infallibility. It does not
merely state a fact: it enunciates a principle. Accordance with the
traditional doctrine of the Church of Rome is here stated to be the
duty of all churches. But how could this be so, unless the Pope was
the infallible organ of Apostolic teaching? The holy martyr calls,
says another, the faithful of the entire Christian world to the Roman
Church, that they may drink in the Apostolic truth without fear of
error or misleading.[16] What else is this but infallible authority?[17]

[15] Botalla, i. p. 79.

[16] Perrone, p. 38.

[17] Cf. Bellarmine, p. 267.

On the other side a Roman historian of dogmas writes:--

“Irenæus was not contemplating the case of contradictions between
churches founded by the Apostles.... There existed at that period
complete agreement in faith and doctrine. Consequently, the Fathers
had no cause to consider a case of disagreement between Apostolic
churches.”[18]

[18] Schwane, _Histoire du Dogme_, i. p. 667.

According to the French Bishop Maret,[19] the principle laid down
by Irenæus is an appeal to tradition manifested in all the Apostolic
churches. He considers that truth is to be found in the tradition
manifested in all the Apostolic foundations. But for the sake of
brevity it is enough to consult the tradition of the Roman Church.
Maret acknowledges a primacy in the Roman Church, but cannot believe
that Irenæus would disallow the rightfulness of consulting the
tradition of the Universal Church in which Irenæus himself considers
the Truth is found.

[19] Maret, _Du Concile Général_, ii. p. 110.

Gratry, in his famous letters during the Vatican Council, goes further
than this, for he quotes the sequel to the passage of Irenæus, and
underlines the statement which shows that the principle which this
primitive writer considers Catholic is an appeal to the ancient
Churches (plural) and by no means exclusive appeal to one.

“... It is not then necessary to seek elsewhere the truth, since it
is easily found _in the Church, the Apostles_ having made _of the
Church_ a rich bank, in which they have amassed all the treasures of
truth; so that every man, whosoever will, can draw from her the water
of life.... Thus if a dispute should arise relative to a detail of
tradition, should we not have recourse to _the most ancient Churches_
(_nonne oporteret_ in antiquissimas recurrere Ecclesias, _in quibus
Apostoli conversati sunt_) in which the Apostles themselves have
lived, and learn from them immediately what is certain and clear upon
the question?”[20]

[20] Gratry’s second letter.

Upon this passage Gratry observes:--

“The reader has here before him the whole doctrine of St Irenæus upon
this subject. This doctrine is perfectly clear. It is almost the same
as that of Tertullian, who says: ‘Run over the Apostolic Churches,
in which are found the chairs of the Apostles, upon which are
seated the Bishops who succeeded them, in which are still read their
authentic letters, each echoing the voice and representing the face
of its author. Is Achaia near to thee? Thou hast Corinth. Art thou
near Macedonia? Thou hast Philippi; thou hast the Thessalonians. If
thou canst travel into Asia, thou hast Ephesus. If thou art near to
Italy, thou hast Rome, where we can find also authority at hand.’”

The thesis of St Irenæus, adds Gratry, is this:--We must bring back
heretics “to the tradition of the Apostles, which, by their successors,
is preserved in the Churches.” And “when there is any doubt, we must
have recourse to the Ancient Churches.”

* * * * *

2. In the case of St Cyprian (A.D. 250) special difficulties arise
owing to controversies on the actual text. We can only set down the
chief passage and afterwards indicate the use made of his principles by
Roman opponents of Infallibility.

“And although after His resurrection He assigns equal power to all
His Apostles, ... nevertheless, in order to make the unity manifest,
He _established one Chair and_ by His own authority appointed the
origin of that same unity beginning from one. Certainly the rest of
the Apostles were that which Peter _also_ was, endued with equal
partnership, both of honour and office, but the beginning sets out
from unity, _and Primacy is given to Peter, that one Church of Christ
and one Chair may be pointed out; and all are pastors and one flock
is shown, to be fed by all the Apostles with one-hearted accord_,
that one Church of Christ may be pointed out.... He that holds not
this unity of the Church, does he believe that he holds the faith?
He, who strives and rebels against the Church, _he who deserts the
Chair of Peter on which the Church was founded_, does he trust that
he is in the Church?”[21]

[21] Cyprian, _De Unit._ 4.

Whether the passages underlined are Cyprian’s or unauthorised
interpolations, is the critical difficulty. They appear in the earlier
printed editions, not, however, without editorial misgivings. But the
modern critical text[22] omits them. Many Roman theologians do the
same. Leo XIII. himself omits them in his Encyclical on the unity of
the Church. On the other hand, their genuineness is still asserted by
certain Protestant and Roman writers. In any case all that they affirm
is a Primacy. No modern Romanist of the historical school would quote
them as affirming infallibility. Under these circumstances perhaps
it will be best to confine attention to words whose genuineness no
one disputes. The Ultramontane emphasised Cyprian’s statements on the
Primacy: the opposing school, his statements on Episcopal equality. The
former quoted “the principal Church, whence sacerdotal unity arose”;
the latter “the episcopate is one, it is a whole, in which each enjoys
full possession”; and again, “the rest of the Apostles were that which
Peter was, endowed with equal partnership, both of honour and office.”

[22] Text of the _Vienna Corpus_, ed. Hartel.

Minority Bishops asserted in the Vatican Council, on the ground of
these two passages, that Ecclesiastical power was divinely entrusted
to Peter and to the other Apostles; and that it was derived from them
to their successors by Divine institution. Accordingly the minority
complained that the exclusive consideration of Papal authority was
irreconcilable with Catholic truth and Cyprianic principles. The
equal authority of the episcopate deserved and required an equal
exposition.[23] Cyprian’s inference from St Matt. xvi. 18 was that
“the Church should be built upon the Bishops, and that every act of the
Church should be guided by them as presidents.”[24]

[23] Friedrich, _Documenta_.

[24] _Ep._ xxxiii.

And this is the principle upon which Cyprian acts. After assembling the
local Bishops and forming their own decision, Cyprian wrote to Stephen,
Bishop of Rome, in the following terms:--

“These considerations, dear brother, we bring home to your conscience
out of regard to the office we hold in common, and to the simple
love we bear you. We believe that you, too, from the reality of
your religious feeling and faith, approve what is religious as well
as true. Nevertheless, we know there are those who cannot readily
part with principles once imbibed, or easily alter a view of their
own, but who, without hurting the bond of peace and concord between
colleagues, hold to special practices once adopted among them, and
herein we do no violence to any one and impose no law. For, in the
administration of the Church each several prelate has the free
discretion of his own will--having to account to the Lord for his
action.”[25]

[25] _Ep._ xlvii. 3.

Quoting Cyprian’s own words St Augustine repeats the passage from a
letter:--

“For neither did Peter whom the Lord chose first, and on whom He
built His Church, when Paul afterwards disputed with him about
circumcision, claim or assume anything and arrogantly to himself,
so as to say that he held the primacy, and should rather be obeyed
by newcomers. Nor did he despise Paul because he had before been a
persecutor of the Church, but he admitted the counsel of truth, and
readily assented to the legitimate grounds which Paul maintained;
giving us thereby a pattern of concord and patience, that we should
not pertinaciously love our own opinions, but should rather account
as our own any true and rightful suggestions of our brethren and
colleagues for the common health and weal.”[26]

[26] Cyprian, _Ep._ lxxi.

Upon this Augustine’s comment is:--

“Here is a passage in which Cyprian records what we also learn in
Holy Scripture, that the Apostle Peter, in whom the primacy of the
Apostles shines with such exceeding grace, was corrected by the later
Apostle Paul, when he adopted a custom in the matter of circumcision
at variance with the demand of truth....[27]

“Wherefore the holy Cyprian, whose dignity is only increased by his
humility, who so loves the pattern set by Peter as to use the words;
‘giving us thereby a pattern of concord and patience, that we should
not pertinaciously love our own opinions, but should rather account
as our own any true and rightful suggestions of our brethren and
colleagues for the common health and weal’--he, I say, abundantly
shows that he was most willing to correct his own opinion, if any
one should prove to him that it is as certain that the baptism of
Christ can be given by those who have strayed from the fold, as that
it could not be lost when they strayed.... Nor should we ourselves
venture to assert anything of the kind were we not supported by the
unanimous authority of the whole Church--to which he himself would
unquestionably have yielded, if at that time the truth of this
question had been placed beyond dispute by the investigation and
decree of a General Council. For if he quotes Peter as an example for
his allowing himself quietly and peacefully to be corrected by one
junior colleague, how much more readily would he himself, with the
Council of his Province, have yielded to the authority of the whole
world, when the truth had been thus brought to light? For, indeed, so
holy and peaceful a soul would have been more ready to assent to the
arguments of any single person who could prove to him the truth; and
perhaps he even did so, though we have no knowledge of the fact.”[28]

[27] Augustine, _De Baptismo_, II. i. 2.

[28] Augustine, _De Baptismo_, II. iv. p. 5.

To Cardinal Bellarmine, Jesuit of the sixteenth century, the persistent
refusal of Cyprian to accept the Pope’s teachings appeared very grave
indeed. Cyprian, says Bellarmine, was not a heretic, because those
who say that the Pope can err are not even yet considered manifestly
heretics. But whether Cyprian did not commit a mortal sin in disobeying
the Pope, Bellarmine is not sure. On the one hand, Cyprian sinned
in ignorance. Thinking the Pope in serious error, he was obliged to
disobey; for no man ought to go against his conscience--and a Council
of eighty Bishops agreed with him. On the other hand, he appears to
have mortally sinned, for he disobeyed an apostolic precept, and
refused to submit to the judgment of his superior.

Archbishop Kenrick’s dogmatic inference from these facts in the Vatican
Council was as follows:--

“When Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, held mistaken views as to the
rebaptism of heretics upon their return to the Church, and had
strenuously defended them against the Roman Pontiff Stephen,
Augustine considered him to be justified: because the matter in
question had not yet been elucidated by the authority of a General
Council. Thus Augustine did not regard as decisive the Roman
Pontiff’s opinion which had already condemned this error, and by
which, according to my opponents, the dispute had been already
infallibly determined. Augustine therefore was ignorant of the
doctrine of Pontifical Infallibility. Had he acknowledged it, it must
have followed that Cyprian was not only indefensible for his conduct,
but had actually incurred condemnation for heresy.”

* * * * *

3. From the writings of St Augustine probably no phrase has been more
often quoted in behalf of papal inerrancy than that in which, referring
to the Pelagian controversy, he says:--

“Already on this matter two Councils have sent to the Apostolic See,
whence also answers have been received. The cause is finished, would
that the error were also finished.”[29]

[29] St Aug. Serm. cxxii. Gaume, v. 930.

In other words, says a Roman writer,[30] Pope Innocent I. has
determined the matter. The Pontifical Decree has settled that the truth
is on Augustine’s side. Could it do so unless it were infallible? To
another writer this inference is indisputably clear.[31]

[30] Botalla, i. p. 77.

[31] Perrone, p. 43.

It is, however, more than questionable whether this exposition would
satisfy Roman critical writers of to-day. For they do not claim
Pope Innocent’s reply to the African Bishops as an exercise of
Infallibility. Thus Augustine’s criticism is no evidence of his belief
in Innocent’s inerrancy.

“St Augustine and all his century,” says a Bishop of the Roman
Church, “like the centuries before him, placed the supreme authority,
the authority which cannot fail, not in the Pope alone, but in the
Pope and the Episcopate.”[32]

[32] Maret, i. p. 161.

Nevertheless, the passage was appealed to by the Ultramontanes in
the Vatican struggle. They assigned to St Augustine the statement:
“Rome has spoken, the cause is finished.” This was the form in which
Augustine’s sentiments were commonly quoted for centuries. Gratry’s
criticism upon it represents the opposition.

“Rome has spoken, the cause is finished. It is certain that this
formula of St Augustine possesses something decisive and absolute
about it like an axiom. It says everything. ‘Rome has spoken, the
cause is finished.’ Rome has spoken; all is said, the rest is of no
consequence.

“But the objection to this is that St Augustine never said that at
all.”

Gratry then quotes the passage as it actually occurs. To Gratry’s mind
the real words do not even imply that the judgment of Rome by itself is
everything; while the misquoted formula does.[33]

[33] Second letter.

* * * * *

4. Constantly appealed to again are the words of St Jerome.

“I know that the Roman faith praised by the Apostle’s voice does not
accept suggestion of such a kind. Although an angel taught otherwise
than that which has been once proclaimed, strengthened by the
authority of St Paul, it could not change.”[34]

[34] _Ad Rufinum_, ii.

“Upon this rock I know that the Church is builded. I entreat you,
authorise me by your letters either to assert or not to assert three
substances. I shall not fear to assert three substances if you order
me.”[35]

[35] _Ep. ad Damasum_, ii. p. 131.

Here, then, St Jerome is found affirming that the Roman Church cannot
fail, and that he who accepts its instruction cannot be misguided.[36]

[36] Perrone, p. 42.

On the other hand, Bishop Bossuet appeals to Jerome’s own account of
Pope Liberius that he was induced to endorse heresy, and that, overcome
by the weariness of exile, he subscribed to heretical error.[37] The
question, therefore, arises whether Jerome would not have feared to
follow an example which he so describes. Can he who so describes
Liberius have believed that he who accepts papal instruction cannot be
misguided?

[37] Bossuet, xxii. p. 227. Jerome, _De Script. Eccles. and Chronicon_.

* * * * *

5. Another example is the striking utterance of Pope Gelasius.

“This it is against which the Apostolic See is greatly on its
guard, that the glorious confession of the Apostle, since it is the
security of the world, should not be defiled by the least error
or contagion.[38] For if--which God avert, and we trust cannot
happen--such a misfortune should occur, how could we venture to
resist any error, or how should we be able to correct the wandering?”

[38] Bossuet, xxii. p. 277.

Gelasius teaches here, said Bellarmine, that the Apostolic See cannot
err. For since the security of the world depends upon its utterances,
if it were to err the whole world would be in error with it.[39]

[39] _Works_, ii. p. 83.

Bossuet, on the other hand, replied as follows: A Roman Synod addressed
to Bishops the question: How could they correct the error of the people
if they were in error themselves? This was not an encouragement to
think themselves infallible, but a warning to take precautions against
being deceived. Similarly Gelasius claims that consciousness of the
disastrous results which would attend its deception has deepened the
cautiousness of the Roman See. To infer, however, from the character
of the results, the impossibility of the occurrence is, says Bossuet,
the utterly illogical conclusion that what ought not will not be. The
dangerous character of the results which would follow from deception
of the Roman See do not prove the impossibility of its occurrence. All
they prove is the urgent necessity for care and deliberation. And this
is what Gelasius implies. For his language is--“which God avert, we
trust it cannot happen.” But this is the language of prayer and piety;
it is not the certainty of a truth revealed. Gelasius has every hope
that, contingently on compliance with the necessary conditions, this
disaster will not be permitted to take place. But we may not transpose
hope into fact. Tested by history, urges Bossuet, individual occupants
of the Roman See have grievously misled the Church. Liberius and
Honorius, as far as in them lay, did actually deceive the world. Yet
the world was not deceived: for other remedies exist against calamities
such as these. The language of Gelasius is one of the most magnificent
from the Roman See. But it is the language of a pious confidence, not a
dogma of the immutable faith.

* * * * *

6. The classic expression of the proper method, according to the
Ancient Church, for distinguishing Catholic Faith from falsehood, is
the famous Canon of St Vincent of Lerins. We propose to summarise his
principles, and then to record their controversial use within the Roman
Communion.

“Moreover, in the Catholic Church itself all possible care must be
taken that we hold that faith which has been believed everywhere
always by all. For that is truly and in the strictest sense Catholic,
which, as the name itself and the reason of the thing declare,
comprehends all universally.

“This rule we shall observe if we follow universality, antiquity,
consent. We shall follow universality if we confess that one faith
to be true, which the whole Church throughout the world confesses;
antiquity, if we in no wise depart from those interpretations which
it is manifest were notoriously held by our holy ancestors and
fathers; consent, in like manner, if in antiquity itself we adhere
to the consentient definitions and determinations of all, or at least
of almost all priests and doctors.”[40]

[40] _Commonitorium_, ii.

Vincent’s famous Canon states the appeal to tradition in a triple form:
in relation to place and time and persons. The test of a doctrine’s
apostolic character is its universality in place and time. That which
commands a consent virtually coextensive with the Church’s existence,
across the entire world geographically, and across the entire Christian
ages historically, constitutes the Catholic Faith.

Vincent’s application of this test to several instances shows alike its
clearness and its use.

i. First Case--If the Local oppose the Universal.

“What, then, will a Catholic Christian do if a small portion of the
Church have cut itself off from the communion of the universal faith?

“What, surely, but prefer the soundness of the whole body to the
unsoundness of a pestilent and corrupt member?”

ii. Second Case--If the Modern oppose the Ancient.

“What if some novel contagion seek to infect not merely an
insignificant portion of the Church, but the whole?

“Then it will be his care to cleave to antiquity, which at this day
cannot possibly be seduced by any fraud of novelty.

“To preach any doctrine therefore to Catholic Christians other than
what they have received never was lawful, never is lawful, never will
be lawful.”

Thus according to Vincent the Christian obligation is to keep
that deposit of doctrine which is committed to our trust. And
this obligation rests in general on the Universal Church, and in
particular on the whole body of pastors whose duty it is to possess
and communicate to others a complete knowledge of religion. Vincent
considers the transmission of the Faith in its integrity the function
not exclusively of the pastors, but also of the entire community of the
Universal Church. His famous often quoted words must be quoted once
again, for it would be impossible to express his theory in better terms
than his own.

“Keep the Deposit. What is the Deposit? That which has been entrusted
to thee, not that which thou hast thyself devised: a matter not of
wit but of learning; not of private adoption but of public tradition;
a matter brought to thee, not put forth by thee, wherein thou art
bound to be not an author but a keeper, not a teacher but a disciple,
not a leader but a follower.... Let that which formerly was believed,
though imperfectly apprehended, as expounded by thee be clearly
understood. Let posterity welcome, understood through thy exposition,
what antiquity venerated without understanding. Yet teach still the
same truths which thou hast learned, so that while thou speakest
newly, thou speakest not what is new.”

Nothing can be stronger than St Vincent’s sense of the substantial
immutability of the Faith. Nor is there any finer exposition than his
of the principle of identity. What is perhaps even more remarkable,
considering the period when he wrote, is his recognition that the
principle of immutability requires to be balanced by the principle of
progress. We have in his pages the earliest statement of the principles
of theological development, drawn with a wonderful insight into its
nature and limitations.

“But some one will say, perhaps--Shall there then be no _progress_
in the Christian Church? Certainly all possible progress.... Yet on
condition that it be real progress, _not alteration_ of the Faith. For
progress requires that the subject be enlarged in itself, alteration
that it be _transformed into something else_. The intelligence, then,
the knowledge, the wisdom, as well of individual as of all, as well of
_one man_ as of _the whole Church_, ought in the course of ages and
centuries, to increase and make much and vigorous progress; _but yet
only in its own kind_; _i.e._, in the same doctrine, in the same sense,
and in the same meaning.”

Thus, according to Vincent, there may be all possible progress
consistent with substantial identity. And the method by which the
progress of the Church of the present day is safeguarded and controlled
is perpetual reversion to the primitive type; any substantial deviation
from which is a sign of variation from the truth.

The Romanist opponent of Papal Infallibility laid the greatest
stress on St Vincent’s principle, while the Ultramontane attempted
a distinction between implicit and explicit truth. Grant that the
Catholic faith must be contained in the original deposit of Revelation,
must its recognition have been explicit from the first?[41] The Canon
of St Vincent was asserted to be true in an affirmative sense, but
not in a negative. Whatever satisfies the test of universality was
undoubtedly part of the Catholic faith; but it did not follow that a
doctrine which failed to fulfil this test was therefore uncatholic.

[41] _Franzelin. De Trad._ p. 295.

This distinction carried no conviction to a very large minority in the
Roman Church, partly because the doctrine in question did not satisfy
the test of universality, even in the nineteenth century, and partly
because of the doctrine’s intrinsic character. They failed to see how
a doctrine which explicitly affirmed the Pope’s independence of the
Church’s consent could be a legitimate outcome of, and implicitly
contained within, the principle of consent, which is the negative of
that independence. Vincent placed the whole stress on universality and
consent. The Ultramontane considered the Pope’s utterance infallible
without that universality and consent. To the Roman opponents of
the Vatican view these two theories seemed mutually exclusive. They
could not reconcile the Vincentian Canon with the Vatican claim, nor
reject St Vincent’s demand that progress must retain substantial
identity. They remembered how Bishop Bossuet, intellectually the
head of the seventeenth-century Church in France, had claimed for
the Roman Catholic Church the distinctive glory of immutability--the
_quod semper_ of St Vincent--as contrasted with the variations of
Protestantism.[42]

[42] Bossuet, _Premier Avertisement aux Protestants_.

In the Vatican Council itself the Bishops appealed repeatedly to the
Canon of St Vincent as a proof that the Infallibility doctrine formed
no portion of the Catholic faith. Bishop Maret had already affirmed in
the treatise which he sent to all the members of the Council that the
principles of St Vincent can never legitimately issue in a system of
absolute Infallibility and monarchy of each individual Pope. Bishop
Hefele said that

“when differences on matters of faith arose in the primitive Church
appeal was made to the Apostolic Churches, Rome, Alexandria, Antioch;
and that only was dogmatically propounded to the faithful, which was
universally believed. None of the ancients ever imagined that an
infallible decision of controversies could be obtained by any shorter
method at the hands of any single individual. On the contrary,
Vincent said, let us follow universality, antiquity, consent.”[43]

[43] Friedrich, _Documenta_, ii. p. 121.

Another Bishop urged that according to the principle of St Vincent no
definition could be made without moral unanimity. We have no proof,
said another Bishop, least of all from the first five centuries. And
if nothing can ever be defined except that which has been believed
always everywhere and by all, by what right can we defend the Papal
Infallibility? None but the Bishops, said another, can testify whether
a doctrine is held always everywhere and by all. Consequently, he, and
others with him, demurred to the opinion that a Pope’s utterance could
be infallible without the consent of the episcopate.

More emphatic still was the statement of the American Archbishop
Kenrick:--

“The famous writer, Vincent of Lerins, in his golden treatise the
_Commonitorium_, which has been highly esteemed for the last fourteen
centuries ... gives the rule by which a believer should guide himself
when conflicting opinions arise among the Bishops: namely, that
nothing is to be considered of Catholic faith which has not been
acknowledged always everywhere and by all. When the Bishops disagree
Vincent affirms that antiquity and universality are to be followed.
He makes no reference to the Roman Pontiff whose opinion, according
to the Pontifical Party, instantly determines all controversies
of faith. This theory assuredly Vincent never heard of. And his
contemporaries entirely agreed with him.”

The authors of Janus made an equally strong appeal to St Vincent of
Lerins.

“If the view of Roman Infallibility had existed anywhere in the
Church at that time, it could not have been possibly passed over
in a book exclusively concerned with the question of the means for
ascertaining the genuine Christian doctrine. But the author keeps to
the three notes of universality, permanence, and consent, and to the
Ecumenical Councils.”[44]

[44] Janus, p. 89.

* * * * *

7. What was the true relation of the Pope and the Council to each
other? How was it understood in primitive times? Did the Collective
Episcopate regard itself as subordinated, with no independent judgment
of its own, to decisions of the Roman authority? Or was the Council
conscious of possessing power to accept or refuse the papal utterances
brought before it?[45] Bossuet maintained that the treatment of Papal
Letters by the early General Councils afforded convincing proof against
their belief in any theory of papal inerrancy. The famous letter of Leo
to Flavian was laid before the Council of Chalcedon in the following
terms:--“Let the Bishops say whether the teaching of the 318 Fathers
[the Council of Nicea] or that of the 150 [Constantinople] agrees
with the letter of Leo.” Nor was Leo’s letter accepted until its
agreement with the standards of the former Ecumenical Councils had been
ascertained.

[45] Bossuet, _Defence_, i. p. 80.

The very signatures of the subscribing Bishops bear this out--“The
letter of Leo agrees,” says one, “with the Creed of the 318 Fathers
and of the 150 Fathers, and with the decisions at Ephesus under St
Cyril. Wherefore I assent and willingly subscribe.”[46] Thus the act
of the Episcopate at Chalcedon was one of critical investigation and
authoritative judgment, not of blind submission to an infallible voice.
The theologian, Bellarmine, and the historian, Baronius, both strong
advocates of the papal authority, contradict one another on this point.
Baronius asserts that the Bishops regarded the letter of Leo as the
rule and guide in faith which all churches must accept. Bellarmine,
however, perplexed by the episcopal investigation which undeniably
the letter endured, suggested that Leo’s letter to the Council was
not intended as a final definition, but as a general advice for the
Bishops’ assistance.

[46] _Ibid._ ii. p. 38.

Bossuet points out that this happy solution is refuted by the simple
fact that Leo wrote to Flavian before any Council was even thought
of.[47] It illustrates Bellarmine’s uncritical ingenuity. And since
Baronius acknowledges the authoritative character of Leo’s letter, and
Bellarmine the reality of its scrutiny by the Bishops, the obvious
conclusion is that both the papal authority and the consent of the
Universal Council are elements in producing a dogma of the Faith.
Accordingly, the Pope’s decision, taken by itself apart from the
consent of the Church, is not infallible. Bossuet claims that Leo’s own
teaching endorses this, for he wrote the following words: “The things
which God had formerly defined by our ministry, He confirmed by the
irreversible consent of the entire brotherhood.”

[47] Bossuet, _Defence_, i. p. 81.

To sum up the procedure of the early Church in a question of faith:
Bishop Flavian first declared what was of faith as the local Bishop.
Leo at Rome endorsed it and gave his definition. After this definition
came the examination of the question in the General Council, and
judgment was ultimately given. After the definition had been approved
by the judgment of the Bishops no further room for doubt or dispute
remained.[48]

[48] _Ibid_. ii. p. 41.

The impression made upon a Roman writer by Roman research for proof of
Infallibility in the writings of the Fathers may be gathered from the
following significant passage:

“To sum up. The defenders of the dogma of Infallibility discover
valuable hints in history. But they also encounter difficulties.
After systematising against the Gallican School the grounds of their
belief, they endeavoured to meet the difficulties which required to
be solved. These difficulties came from many sources. They came from
Councils which on various occasions constituted themselves judges of
teaching sent from Rome. They came from certain teachers who opposed
other works to the doctrinal decisions of Popes. But they came, above
all, from Popes themselves who were not always at the level required
of their mission, and at times allowed themselves to be ensnared with
error.”[49]

[49] Tunnel, _Hist. Théol. Positive_, p. 309.

Primitive evidence for Papal Infallibility is then admitted by some
Roman writers to be meagre and disappointing.[50] A curious instance
of this is found in the theologian, Melchior Cano. He says that the
quotations given by St Thomas from St Cyril of Alexandria afford a much
clearer evidence for this doctrine than that in any other patristic
writer. But when he sought for the original passages they were not to
be found. “This is the work of the heretics,” he exclaims indignantly.
“They have mutilated the writings, and erased everything that concerned
pontifical authority.” So Melchior Cano. To-day, however, it is
universally acknowledged that these passages were interpolations by
which St Thomas Aquinas was deceived. Thus Melchior Cano’s clearest
evidence is nothing else than a simple forgery.

[50] Melchior Cano, _Op._ lib. v. cap. v.

CHAPTER III

THE CASE OF HONORIUS

The case of Pope Honorius naturally occupied the attention of Roman
Catholics more than any other instance of papal pronouncements, because
it presented peculiar difficulties to the advocates of Infallibility.
The literature created by this single case within the Roman Communion
is enormous. We shall but represent its actual historical position in
the development of the subject, if we treat it at considerable and even
disproportionate length. For in reality it is no solitary incident. It
reaches out into the Universal Councils of the Church. It shows the
early conception of the relation between Council and Pope; what the
Collective Episcopate thought of the nature of a papal definition of
faith; what subsequent Popes thought of a predecessor’s pronouncement.

To understand it we must revert to the conditions of Christian thought
when the first four General Councils were completed. The Incarnation
was then interpreted to involve two natures united in one Person. But
the inferences which this statement required were not yet clearly
thought out. The difficulty of the period was to allow full scope to
the human nature in Christ. If there was one Person in Christ, then
there must be one will, and that will manifestly divine. Accordingly
it was supposed that His human nature had no human will. The relation
of the divine to the human in Christ was thought to resemble that of
the soul to the body, in such a way that the human nature was but a
will-less passive instrument under the absolute control of the will
which was divine.

This is the Monothelite heresy. It is a heresy of a disastrous kind,
for it virtually denies the reality of the Incarnation. If the Son
of God took a will-less human nature, then He did not take our human
nature at all. For the will is essential to the perfection of our
nature.

Now the Monothelite heresy was widely prevalent in the East: the real
leader and chief promoter being Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople.
Acting under his influence, Cyrus, Patriarch of Alexandria, published
in 633 a document asserting the existence of only one will in Christ.
This was earnestly opposed by Sophronius, afterwards Patriarch of
Jerusalem, who entreated Cyrus to cancel the objectionable statement,
and visited Sergius with a view to enlist his support. This he
naturally failed to obtain. But Sergius, with more subtlety than
frankness, being in fact alarmed at the sensation produced by the
heresy in Catholic minds, proposed as a compromise that both the
assertion of one energy in Christ, and the counter-assertion of two
energies should be abandoned. Sophronius consented. Sergius then wrote
his famous diplomatic letter to Honorius of Rome, giving his own
version of the controversy, explaining that in the interests of peace
it was desirable that both expressions should be discouraged. To speak
of “one energy” in Christ seemed strange to many, and offended them
because it seemed to deny the duality of nature in our Lord; while the
expression “two energies” offended others, because it would follow that
there were two contradictory wills in Christ. Sergius then explained
his theory by the illustration that as the body is controlled by
the soul, so is the human nature in Christ controlled by His Divine
Will--an illustration which certainly ought to have opened Honorius’s
eyes, even if the proposal to abandon the orthodox expression, “two
energies,” did not already alarm him. Now this letter of Sergius was
condemned by the Sixth General Council. But this same letter Honorius
approved.

Honorius replied that he learns from Sergius’s letter that new
controversies have been stirred up by a certain Sophronius, a monk, now
Bishop of Jerusalem, against “our brother, Cyrus of Alexandria, who
taught converts from heresy the doctrine of one energy in Christ.” He
is glad to hear that this expression, “one energy,” has been abandoned,
because it “might give offence to the simple.” Honorius, however,
asserts for himself “we confess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ,”
and explains that there was no diverse or conflicting will in the
human nature of Christ; no conflict that is of the flesh against the
spirit. He says that we may not erect into dogmas of the Church the
statements that in Christ there is one energy or two, since neither the
New Testament nor the Councils have so taught. He says, further, that
he desires to reject everything which as a novelty of expression might
cause uneasiness in the Church. He is quite aware that the expression
“two energies” might be considered Nestorian, and “one energy”
Eutychian. Accordingly, he “exhorts” Sergius to avoid both expressions
and to keep to the already sanctioned phrases.

This letter of Honorius was utilised in the East to justify the
Monothelite heresy--the existence of one will in Christ. Honorius died
shortly after its publication (638). His successor, John IV., defended
Honorius’s orthodoxy on the ground that, since Sergius’s enquiry was
concerned only with our Lord’s humanity, the reply was similarly
restricted to the same. A later successor, Martin I., held a Synod at
the Lateran in 649, in which the two Patriarchs, Cyrus of Alexandria
and Sergius of Constantinople, were both condemned as Monothelites;
and in which, without any allusion to Honorius, it was affirmed that
the coexistence of two wills in Christ was a necessary consequence
of the co-existence of the two natures, human and divine. In 680 was
held the Sixth General Council with a view to reconcile and reunite
the East with the West. To this Council Pope Agatho sent a letter
reaffirming the orthodox doctrine of two natural wills and operations,
and declaring that his Church had, by the grace of God, never erred
from the Apostolic Tradition nor submitted to heretical innovations.
This letter the Council received and adopted; and proceeded to condemn
as heretical the writings of his predecessor, Honorius, upon whom they
gave judgment as well as upon the two Patriarchs of Alexandria and
Constantinople. After reading the letter of Sergius to Pope Honorius
and that of Honorius to Sergius, the Council pronounced judgment in the
following terms:--

“We find that these documents are quite foreign to the Apostolic
dogmas, also to the declarations of the holy Councils, and all the
Fathers of repute; therefore we entirely reject them, and execrate
them as hurtful to the soul. But the names of these men must also
be thrust forth from the Church, namely, that of Sergius, who first
wrote on this impious doctrine; further, that of Cyrus of Alexandria,
etc.... We anathematise them all. And along with them, it is our
unanimous decree that there shall be expelled from the Church and
anathematised Honorius, formerly Pope of Old Rome, because we found
in his letter to Sergius that in all respects he followed his view
and confirmed his impious doctrines.”

This conclusion was followed up by burning the heretical letters,
including that of Pope Honorius. It is significant that when the
Council were about to proceed to pronounce the Anathemas, George,
Patriarch of Constantinople, was anxious to secure the omission of his
predecessors’ name, but the majority overruled him. So the sentence was
uttered, “Anathema to the heretic Sergius, to the heretic Cyrus, to the
heretic Honorius.”

The announcement of these decisions was made not to Pope Agatho, for
he had died; but to his successor, Leo II. Leo accepted the decisions
of Constantinople. He has carefully examined the Acts of the Council
and found them in harmony with the declarations of faith of his
predecessor, Agatho, and of the Synod of the Lateran. He anathematised
all these heretics, including his predecessor, Honorius, “who so far
from aiding the Apostolic See with the doctrine of the Apostolic
Tradition, attempted to subvert the faith by a profane betrayal.”

This condemnation of Honorius was reiterated by two more Ecumenical
Councils. It recurs in the papal Profession of Faith uttered by each
Pope on his accession down to the eleventh century. This formula is
contained in the _Liber Diurnus_, a volume which has had a remarkable
history. The _Liber Diurnus_ is a collection of ancient documents
relating to the Papal Office, forms of faith, and other formulas, which
were in use in the Roman Church probably from the sixth to the eleventh
centuries. The collection was made in Rome itself. At what precise date
the formulas therein contained ceased to be in use the learned appear
unable to say.

The _Liber Diurnus_ disappeared from sight and almost from memory. Its
very existence seemed uncertain. In the middle of the seventeenth
century Holstein, afterwards librarian of the Vatican, found the MS. at
Rome.[51] Another MS. was found in the Jesuit College of Clermont in
Paris. Holstein prepared an edition for the press. It should have seen
the light in 1650.[52] Nothing was wanting but approval of the censors.
The approval was, however, refused, and the copies were consigned to
imprisonment in the Vatican. The reason for this suppression is given
by the liturgical writer, Cardinal Bona:[53]--

[51] Rosière, xxxix.

[52] _Ibid_. xviii.

[53] _Ibid_. cxiii.

“Since in the Profession of Faith by the Pope elect, P. Honorius is
condemned as having given encouragement to the depraved assertions
of heretics--if these words actually occur in the original and there
is no obvious means of remedying such a wound--it is better that the
work should not be published--_præstat non divulgari opus_.”[54]

[54] _Ibid_. cxiii.

Such was Cardinal Bona’s opinion and advice.

Another learned writer, P. Sirmond, in a letter to Holstein, expressed
himself with still more remarkable frankness:--

“It appears to me not so astonishing,” said Sirmond, “that the
Greek Monothelites should attempt to identify Honorius with their
error, as it seems extraordinary that the Romans themselves, in the
newly elected Pope’s Profession of Faith, should have branded the
name of Honorius together with the authors of heretical ideas, such
as Sergius, etc., for having given encouragement to the depraved
assertions of heretics. And yet such are the terms of that Profession
of Faith, as I found it among the ancient formulas of the Roman
Church. And this is the only reason which deterred me from producing
an edition of it, notwithstanding my promise to Cardinal S.”[55]

[55] Rosière, cxiv.

The suppression of Holstein’s edition created a sensation among the
learned men of France. “The _Liber Diurnus_,” wrote Launoy, “has been
printed in Rome several years, and is detained by the masters of the
Papal Court and the Inquisitors. These men cannot bear the light of
ancient truth.”[56] However, in the year 1680, the Jesuit writer,
Garnier, published an edition of the work. Whatever his motive may
have been and it is still disputed, he was summoned to Rome to give
an explanation, and died on the way.[57] However, the mischief was
out, and from that time authorised publication became easy. The great
scholar, Mabillon, printed the work without let or hindrance, and the
comparative indifference of the world exemplified the maxim that an
institution which has survived a fact will also survive its publication.

[56] _Ibid_. xlix. lvii.

[57] _Ibid_. lx. lxi.

Such, then, appear to be the historic facts, stated as objectively as
we can state them.

We now proceed to give the various Roman explanations. “It is,” says
Hefele,[58] the learned historian of the Councils, “in the highest
degree startling, even scarcely credible, that an Ecumenical Council
should punish with anathemas a Pope as a heretic.” Certainly from an
Ultramontane standpoint it must be so. And this perplexity has led to a
curious and instructive variety of conflicting solutions from the days
of Cardinal Bellarmine down to the present time.

[58] _History of the Councils_, i. p. 181. (Engl. trans.).

1. First explanation: It was boldly asserted in the seventeenth century
that Pope Honorius was not condemned at all. The historian, Baronius,
made himself responsible for this view, and Bellarmine followed him.
No doubt the documents as we possess them affirm the contrary; but
then they must have been interpolated and falsified. The reasons given
for this procedure are that the Council of the Lateran over which
Pope Martin presided condemned the Monothelites, but did not mention
Honorius. Also that the Ecumenical Council of Constantinople could not
possibly have condemned Honorius as a heretic; for that would make
them contradict Pope Agatho’s letter, to the effect that the Apostolic
Church had never strayed from the path of the Apostolic Tradition,
nor yielded to the perversions of heretical novelties. Either,
therefore, the Council’s words are falsified, or the letter of Agatho
is falsified, or the Council and Agatho disagree. But no one asserts
this last, and no one has ever suggested the second, therefore the
first alternative is the one to be maintained. Bellarmine shows grounds
to mistrust those fraudulent Greeks. He gives numerous instances of
forgery. Baronius conjectures that a heretical Bishop, finding his own
name in the Council’s list of the condemned, quietly erased it and
substituted that of Pope Honorius.

Bossuet[59] thinks the mere recital of these conjectures sufficient
refutation, and deplores that so learned a man should be dishonoured
by these fictions. Sceptical criticism so utterly unfounded would, if
universally applied, destroy the foundation of all historic certainty.

[59] _Works_, V. xvii. p. 67.

A recent Roman writer (1906) says that the theory of Bellarmine and
Baronius offers valuable advantage, that is to the Ultramontane, but is
attended by enormous difficulties.[60] For, if the fraudulent Greeks
interpolated the Acts of the Council, who interpolated the letter of
Leo II. in which he accepts its conclusion and condemns Honorius by
name? Accordingly the solution dear to Bellarmine and Baronius has been
abandoned by the strongest advocates of Papal Infallibility.

[60] Turmel, _Hist. Théol. Positive_, p. 315.

2. A second explanation admitted that Honorius was condemned, but
asserted that he was only condemned in his private capacity, as an
individual theologian, and not as Pope.

One obvious advantage of this theory was that at any rate it did no
violence to historic documents. It encouraged no universal scepticism
as to sources. Bellarmine himself suggested it as an alternative
to those who could not be satisfied with discrediting wholesale on
suspicion the long series of documents. But Bellarmine did not like the
theory; for he held that although the opinion that a Pope can err as a
private teacher is probable, yet the opposite opinion was more probable
still. However, for those whom it might assist, there it was. All that
the Council meant to say was that Honorius by his private letters
promoted heresy.

Private letters! echoes Bossuet[61] scornfully. When, then, is a
decision given, _ex cathedra_, unless when the successor of St Peter,
being consulted by the entire East, should suppress a deadly error and
strengthen his brethren? Or did he prefer to be deceived, when, being
so interrogated, he did not reply under these conditions in which he
knew that he could not be deceived?

[61] Bossuet, t. xxi. p. 76.

A recent Roman writer[62] assures us that the opinion that the letter
of Honorius was compiled as a private theologian has never been
enthusiastically received, never achieved a real success. Its partisans
have been few in number and authority.

[62] Turmel, _Hist. Théol. Positive_, p. 76.

“To allow that a Pope had been solemnly charged with heresy even as
a private doctor was too much for the infallibilists. On the other
hand, the Gallicans could not forget Bossuet’s retort. ‘When can a
Pope have cause to speak _ex cathedra_ if not when consulted by the
entire East?’”[63]

[63] Turmel, _Hist. Théol. Positive_, p. 317.

3. A third explanation of the case of Honorius is that he was condemned
for heresy, but mistakenly; the Council being in error on a question
of fact. Bellarmine proposes this as an alternative solution to
those who cannot be induced to believe that the Decrees of the Sixth
General Council have been interpolated and corrupted. It may be said
that Honorius was actually condemned by the Council as a heretic, but
that they acted on false information. If infallible in doctrine, they
were not infallible in questions of fact. If the reader objects, and
interposes an enquiry whether Bellarmine understands Honorius’s letter
better than an Ecumenical Council understood him, the ready reply is
that Pope Agatho said that his See had never strayed. Pope Agatho
understood the letter of Honorius better than the Greeks assembled
in the Council. If you ask why, then, didn’t the legates of Agatho
resist the condemnation, Bellarmine answers that this was diplomatic.
They acquiesced to avert a greater evil; namely, continuance of false
doctrine. Thus, according to Bellarmine, to secure the condemnation
of the Monothelite heresy, the legates sanctioned the condemnation of
a Pope for heresy--apparently on the principle of two evils prefer
the less--with consequences, however, which Bellarmine does not seem
to have thought out. If the reader still persists, in his incredulous
temper, to ask, Why, then, did Pope Leo in his letter after the Council
also condemn Honorius? it is suggested that you can say that Leo
followed the legates of Agatho; he preferred to let sleeping dogs lie.
But we are not bound, says Bellarmine, to follow Leo. We may follow
Agatho. For you see that whether Honorius erred is, after all, a
question of fact: and in questions of fact even Popes may differ.

This theory appeared congenial to some in the sixteenth century.
But then it received an unexpected application, being utilised by
the Jansenists to justify their treatment of papal decisions with
respectful incredulity. Whether certain doctrines were or were not
contained within the pages of Jansenius’s great book was not a question
of faith but of fact. Consequently it was enough to adopt towards any
papal assertions on the subject an attitude of external deference while
maintaining unchanged one’s inward convictions.

This application opened the eyes of papal theologians to the dangerous
character of the theory. It became, says Turmel,[64] almost invariably
abandoned among defenders of Papal Infallibility.

[64] Turmel, _Hist. Théol. Positive_, p. 32.

But, after all, was the Universal Council mistaken in the
interpretation it placed upon the theological contents of Honorius’s
letter? Upon this question Roman writers have been sharply divided.
This was the defence set up for him by his immediate successor, but
obviously not accepted by the long line of his successors who condemned
him; nor by the Ecumenical Council which pronounced its judgment upon
him; nor by the two other Ecumenical Councils which followed.

Honorius’s successor, Agatho, indeed asserted that his See had never
deflected from the way of truth, and that the Roman Pontiffs had
obeyed the injunction laid upon Peter to strengthen his brethren.
This language was accepted by the Fathers of the Sixth Council. But
what they understood by it, said Bossuet, can be readily gathered
from the following single fact: they approved the teaching of Agatho,
but they condemned the teaching of Honorius. Manifestly they did not
endorse the theory that no Roman Pontiff had ever deflected from the
faith, or that his decisions deserved the unquestioning submission of
Christendom. All that the Council could have assented to was that as
a general fact the truth was held in Rome; without pronouncing any
opinion as to the invariable fidelity of individual Popes. If Agatho
meant more than this, he was, said Bossuet, mistaken in a question of
fact. His statement must be set beside that of Leo II., who affirmed
that Honorius, “instead of suppressing the flame of heretical views by
his apostolic authority, encouraged it by his neglect.”

The immediate successors of Honorius passed over his error and spared
his memory. This was natural. For his pontificate was exemplary in
other respects; he died in the peace of the Church; he had not acted
with evil intentions; nor was he pertinacious in defence of his error;
nor did anything in the condition of the Western Church require a
public refutation of his error. But in the East it was otherwise.
The Monothelites publicly supported themselves under his authority.
Accordingly, the Sixth Council felt compelled to condemn Honorius also,
as having in all things followed the lines of Sergius and promoted his
dangerous teaching. Thus the Council’s reply to Agatho’s letter on the
invariability of his See was an announcement that they had condemned
his predecessor.

Bellarmine boldly asserts that in any case Honorius’s letters contain
no heresy. He only forbade the use of the terms, “one will,” or “two
wills” in Christ, a course which, according to the same writer, only
shows his prudence. The critical words, “Wherefore we confess one will
in our Lord Jesus Christ,” are, as his explanation shows, a reference
exclusively to Christ’s human nature. What he meant was that in Christ
as man there were not two conflicting wills of the flesh and the spirit.

Bossuet replied that probably Honorius was not heretical in his private
convictions. But he very badly instructed the Patriarchs who consulted
him; and he secured peace at the price of silence as to the Orthodox
Faith. He spoke disparagingly of the teaching of Sophronius, Patriarch
of Jerusalem, who maintained the Catholic Truth upon the subject, and
favourably of Cyrus of Alexandria, who propagated the false doctrine.
His language suggests heretical explanation. It was most unsuited to
the special occasion and the requirements of the Church. It failed to
give any definite guidance on the doctrine in question; and, by its
vague and general terms, promoted the very error which ought to have
been suppressed.

Perhaps the ablest Roman criticism on the contents of Honorius’s
letter is that of the historian Hefele. It should be read in the form
in which he published it prior to the alterations which the Vatican
Council forced upon his historical expositions. “Honorius,” says
Hefele,[65] “did not grasp the matter aright at the very beginning.”
He argued briefly but inappropriately that where there is one Person
there is only one Worker and therefore only one Will. He said that
in our ordinary corrupted nature there are certainly two wills, that
of the flesh and that of the spirit, but that the former is only a
consequence of the Fall, and therefore could not exist in Christ. “So
far Honorius was quite on the right way; but he did not accurately
draw the inferences.” He ought now to have said: Hence it follows
that in Christ, since He is God and man, there exists, together with
His Divine Will, only the incorrupt human will. But Honorius kept the
human will entirely out of account. He thought that to maintain the
co-existence of two distinct wills in Christ would compel the admission
of two contradictory wills. He ought to have answered Sergius, You are
quite right in saying we must not ascribe two contrary wills to Christ;
but, nevertheless, there are in Christ two wills, the divine and the
incorrupt human.[66] Instead of which Honorius asserted: “We confess
one will of our Lord Jesus Christ.” Hefele, even after the Vatican
decision, felt constrained to describe this statement as “the unhappy
sentence which, literally taken, is quite Monothelite.”[67]

[65] _History of the Councils_, p. 32.

[66] _History of the Councils_, p. 36.

[67] _Ibid._ p. 54.

Hefele also was unable to accept the excuse for this language,
proposed by Honorius’s immediate successor, to the effect that, being
consulted only on the manhood of Christ, there was no occasion to
speak of anything else than the human will. This interpretation Hefele
characterises as _suavior quam verior_. For it is simply untrue that he
was consulted only on the contents of Christ’s human will. Sergius did
not ask whether we ought to acknowledge in Christ a will of the flesh
and a will of the spirit. He asked nothing at all on this subject, but
asserted that in Christ there can be only one will. Hefele’s conclusion
accordingly was that Honorius encouraged heresy by enjoining silence on
the orthodox expression, “two energies,” and still more by the unhappy
expression, “We confess one will in our Lord Jesus Christ.”[68]

[68] _Ibid._ p. 58.

But even then, Hefele is constrained by his historic insight to
recognise that the Sixth Ecumenical Council thought much more seriously
of Honorius’s errors than Hefele himself does; especially as controlled
by the Vatican Council. After recalling the association of Honorius
with Sergius and others, and the exact language of the condemnation,
Hefele says:--

“From all this it cannot be doubtful in what sense Pope Honorius was
anathematised by the Sixth Ecumenical Council, and it is equally
beyond doubt that the Council judged much more severely respecting
him than we have done.”[69]

[69] _History of the Councils_, p. 184.

Into the significance of this difference of judgment Hefele does not
enter. But apart from all enquiry whether the estimate of an Ecumenical
Council outweighs that of an individual theologian, apart from the
question of the accuracy of their decision, there lie the theological
principles which this severity of judgment on a papal utterance
involved. Such condemnation obviously assumes a certain conception
of the value and authority of papal decisions. Hefele said that “It
is in the highest degree startling, even scarcely credible, that an
Ecumenical Council should punish with anathema a Pope as a heretic.”
And on Ultramontane presuppositions so it is. Does not this, together
with the evident difficulty which a modern Romanist experiences in
bringing himself to accept this Ecumenical decision, betray a singular
deviation from the principles of an earlier age? That which seems
to-day “in the highest degree startling, even scarcely credible,”
did it appear in that light to the age in which it was decreed? Did
the startled representatives of the Apostles shrink away in silent
amazement at their own audacity, abashed before the horror of the
Catholic world? Or did not the Pope of the period assent to their
decrees as being in no way conflicting with Catholic principles?

4. A fourth explanation of the fact has been proposed. It is
acknowledged that Honorius was condemned, but asserted that he was not
charged with heresy, but only with imprudence.

This was the theory of Father Garnier, the Jesuit, editor of the _Liber
Diurnus_. An admirable summary of his opinions is given by Turmel in
his _Histoire de la Théologie Positive_.[70]

[70] Page 317.

Garnier read the Council’s sentence that Honorius “followed the false
doctrines of the heretics.” This means, says Garnier, that he failed
in courage to oppose them. If Honorius was declared excommunicated and
anathematised, this only meant that he had made himself congenial to
heretics by imposing silence on certain expressions, not that he had
sanctioned heretical ideas. If the Council ordered his letters to be
burnt, as tending to the same impiety as those of Sergius, this did
not mean that they were necessarily heretical. A writing may tend to
impiety by its omissions just as much as by its positive assertions.
Garnier then faced the great difficulty that the Council proclaimed
Anathema to Sergius and to Honorius.... Anathema to all heretics.
Anathema to all who have taught or teach one will and one energy in
our Lord Jesus Christ. Surely, this time, Honorius is included among
the heretics. Garnier is quite equal to the occasion. Granted that the
Pope was anathematised simultaneously with the Monothelite, yet it does
not follow that the motive of his condemnation was the same. Garnier,
therefore, says Turmel, closed the Acts of the Sixth Ecumenical Council
with the conviction that Honorius was nowhere condemned for heresy,
but simply for his imprudence.

The theory of Garnier, says Turmel, has met with an approval in the
theological world, which has only increased with the passage of time.
It became the favourite defence of Honorius down to the eve of the
Council of the Vatican.

CHAPTER IV

THE SCHOLASTIC PERIOD

From the case of Honorius we may pass clean away to _the Scholastic
period_, when the great systematic theologians were gathering into
consolidated form the developments of the Middle Ages. Six hundred
years have elapsed since Honorius was condemned by the Episcopate. The
relation of Papal to Episcopal power has greatly changed. To contrast
the theology of the thirteenth century with that of the seventh is
to realise a different atmosphere. Many elements contributed to the
enormous increase of papal influence. The Mohammedan conquests and the
isolation of the Apostolic Churches of the East left the Roman spirit
to develop its governmental tendencies, unbalanced, unchecked by those
more primitive conceptions which it was the mission of the unchanging
East to retain. The calamitous severance between the East and West must
have had disastrous influence on the proportionate development of Papal
and Episcopal power.

The growth also of the temporal power of the Roman See falls within
this period. It is neither our purpose nor permitted by our limits
to dwell much on this aspect of papal claims. Yet a reference to the
subject is necessary, because the growth of temporal power contributed
to the general influences of the Papacy on the mediæval mind, and to no
inconsiderable confusion between the secular and spiritual spheres.
The learned work of Gosselin,[71] Superior of the Seminary of St
Sulpice in 1850, on the power of the Pope in the Middle Ages, shows how
naturally the temporal authority grew out of the circumstances of the
period.

[71] Translated by Kelly of Maynooth, 2 vs., 1853.

The temporal sovereignty of the Roman See arose simply out of the
necessities of the Roman People, who, being abandoned by the Empire,
intrusted their temporal interests to the papal guardianship. Neither
Charlemagne nor Pepin were the founders of the temporal sovereignty;
they were but its protectors and promoters. It was founded in the
legitimate consent of a helpless and forsaken people. But, being once
founded, loftier reasons were gradually created to justify and explain
it. Archbishop Fénelon’s opinion, which Gosselin quotes and accepts,
was that the deposition of princes by the Pope in the Middle Ages was
based in the belief that none but Catholics could rule over Catholic
nations. Consequently, a contract between Prince and People was
implied: their loyalty depending on his fidelity to Religion. Therefore
the Church neither made temporal rulers nor unmade them; but when
consulted by the people, the Pope decided cases of conscience arising
from a contract and an oath of fidelity. But this power to determine
when consulted, easily slid into an assertion and a claim of a loftier
character. The double effect of excommunication on the religious and
the temporal status of the victim naturally led to endless confusion:
it exalted the possessor of this two-fold power to a height which
earlier ages would have considered simply amazing. It was a principle
universally admitted in the time of Gregory VII. that excommunication
entailed the loss of all civil rights. Consequently, says Fleury, when
Gregory VII., adopting novel maxims, and carrying them to greater
lengths, openly asserted that, as Pope, he had the right to depose
all sovereigns who were rebellious to the Church, and grounded these
pretensions on the power of excommunication, his opponents had no
defence to make. Conceding the principle that excommunication involves
temporal results, Gregory was invincible. But the consequence was a
vast extension of the papal authority.

And of course this vastly extended authority affected the weight of
every papal claim. Gosselin’s study of the temporal power of the Papacy
is exceedingly interesting as an illustration of development. It shows
how easily developments may be defended on theological theories with
which those developments had really nothing whatever to do. It shows
how little we can trust ultimate developments merely on the ground of
their existence; as if prevalence and legitimacy were invariably one
and the same. It shows the insecurity of assuming that the theories by
which developments are supported are necessarily the causes by which
they were produced.

The Episcopate still retained in the year 1300 its dignity, as the
ultimate court of appeal when in Council assembled; but the Papacy
had made gigantic strides from the conditions of its tenure in the
Cyprianic age. The Vincentian test of Catholic doctrine by identity
with the past was being exchanged for submission to a living authority
in Rome. The ancient appeal to the Universal Church was being exchanged
for a theory which identified the Roman Communion with the Catholic
Church. A strong and dangerous tendency had arisen to substitute _à
priori_ conceptions of the appropriate for appeal to ancient facts.
Speculative theories of ecclesiastical principle were being made a
substitute, in Scripture reading, for real interpretation. Theories
were read into apostolic utterances from which they could by no
critical ingenuity be derived.

The greatest theologian of the Roman Church, St Thomas Aquinas, is an
embodiment of mediæval theories of papal claims. He died in 1274. The
treatise, _De Regimine Principum_, whether his or not, was universally
ascribed to him in former days, and possessed for many centuries
the weight of his name and authority. It represents, at any rate,
the prevailing mediæval view. By an obvious misuse of the metaphor
that the Pope is the Head of the Church, it draws the inference that
from the Head all understanding descends to the Body. In the Pope is
the plenitude or fulness of all grace; for he alone confers plenary
indulgence on all sinners, so that the words originally applied
to Christ are also applicable to him: “of his fulness have all we
received.” Certainly those who accepted habitually this view were being
prepared for the conclusion that the Church was the passive recipient
of the Pope’s infallible utterances.

And yet it by no means follows that St Thomas Aquinas drew the
infallibilist inferences, still less that he taught the Vatican
doctrine. It is acknowledged by a recent Roman theologian[72] that
while the theology of the Middle Ages on the primacy attained in him
its climax, yet he has not developed the doctrine systematically. In
point of fact, from an infallibilist standpoint, he still leaves much
to be desired. He taught that “we must not believe that the governor
of the Universal Church should wish to deceive anybody, specially in
those matters which the whole Church receives and approves.”[73] And he
argued from this in behalf of the validity of indulgences which the
Pope preached and caused to be preached. But this passage of Aquinas
obviously admits of more than one construction. It is general and
vague. It does not necessarily ascribe to the Pope any Infallibility at
all. It affirms that it would be wrong to credit the Pope with a desire
to deceive. It infers that indulgences possess validity because the
Pope proclaims them, but also because it is a matter which the whole
Church receives and approves. The infallibilist writer Schwane[74]
urges that we must not infer from the phrase “which the whole Church
receives” that the Pope’s Infallibility depends on the Church’s
consent. But it seems perfectly clear that to St Thomas’s mind the
reception and approval by the whole Church of the doctrine in question
was precisely that which gave stability to the papal utterance about
it. He does not write as if the Church’s consent was a necessary sequel
to a papal decree. In point of fact, if this were so, any reference
to the Church’s consent might seem superfluous, since it could add
nothing to the validity of the Pope’s instructions. But in Aquinas’s
argument for indulgences the elements are two: the Church’s reception
and approval of the doctrine, and the papal utterance. And these are
mutually supporting.

[72] Schwane, _Hist. Dogm._ v. p. 321.

[73] _In Sententiis_, 4 Disc. 20, a. 17.

[74] _Hist. Dogm._ v. p. 321.

Elsewhere Aquinas says:--

“If any one rejected a decision after it had been made by the
authority of Universal Church, he would be considered a heretic.
And that authority chiefly [principaliter] resides in the Supreme
Pontiff.”[75]

[75] _Summa_, 2, 2, Q. 11, a, 2, ad. 3.

But the exact force of his language is among his interpreters a matter
of dispute.

Bossuet held that the language of St Thomas on Papal Infallibility is
capable of a construction not widely different from that of the School
of Paris.[76] At any rate the idea of an Infallibility completely
independent of any endorsement by the consent of the Church is foreign
to his mind. If, however, in spite of this the Ultramontane claims him
still, then appeal must be made from St Thomas to the Fathers of an
earlier period.[77]

[76] Bausset, _Hist. de Bossuet_, ii. p. 399.

[77] Bossuet, xxi. p. 494.

The value of St Thomas’s theological inferences on the subject has been
challenged within the Roman Church on the ground that he relied upon
falsified authorities. Pope Urban IV., intending to assist Aquinas’s
studies, sent him a collection of assorted extracts from the Fathers,
calculated to refute the errors of the Gentile world. Aquinas utilised
this collection, confessedly, says Schwane,[78] without much critical
endeavour to sift the true character of the extracts. The importance
of the passages may be gathered from the fact already mentioned that
the theologian Melchior Cano, contemporary of the Council of Trent,
considered them to be the strongest evidence from the early Church
in behalf of Infallibility. Now it is admitted that this collection
of extracts is not genuine. “It appears,” says Schwane, himself an
Ultramontane, “that the compiler permitted himself to add here and
there explanations.” Other passages he “developed.” Schwane contends
that he has not absolutely falsified any; but admits that he ascribed
to St Cyril words which cannot be found in the writings preserved
to us. Schwane suggests that, possibly, for all that, they might be
genuine. Turmel is much less sanguine about this possibility. That
Aquinas utilised his authorities in all sincerity is indisputable.
It is also indisputable that he was deceived. This was urged very
forcibly by Janus and Gratry before the Vatican Decisions.

[78] _Hist. Dogm._ v. p. 333.

Some maintained that he would have arrived in any case at the same
conclusion. Others said that inferences from falsified premises
mistaken for the faith of saints awaken serious doubt as to their
validity. It was also urged, and probably with truth, that these
extracts were not the basis of his doctrine on the primacy. Still it
was felt that they contributed to advance ideas. It is an unwholesome
pedigree, especially when a Roman theologian calls these forged
authorities the strongest passages in the patristic evidences.

CHAPTER V

THE AGE OF THE REFORMING COUNCILS

The development of theories of papal power may next be traced in
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Pursuing the method adopted
hitherto, we will endeavour to describe the facts as objectively as
possible, and then to relate the criticisms to which they have given
rise within the Roman obedience.

1. With the fourteenth century (1305) the Popes transferred their
residence from Rome to Avignon. There they continued for seventy
years. It was to the papal prestige a period of unmixed calamity. The
authority of the Church was subordinated to France. Rome made numerous
overtures to secure the Popes’ return. Europe at large was jealous of
the French preponderating influence; and France was naturally reluctant
to lose its ascendancy.

But the “Babylonish Captivity of the Papacy,” with its inevitable
effect on theories of papal power, was to be followed by a worse
disaster: the Great Schism of forty years (1378–1417). On the death of
Gregory XI. in 1378 the Cardinals had before them a great alternative:
either to elect an Italian and so secure residence in Rome, or to elect
a Frenchman and so continue the residence at Avignon. The Conclave met
in Rome, and was furiously beset by magistrates and people, demanding
a Roman or at least an Italian Pope. External pressure resulted in a
hurried election and the production of Urban VI. The Cardinals declared
him canonically elected and treated him for some months as actual Pope.
Then, under pretext that they had acted under compulsion, partly, it
is said, disgusted by the new Pope’s brutality, many Cardinals fled
from Rome, declared their election void, and appointed Robert of Geneva
Pope, as Clement VII. Men have enquired, men still enquire, how should
this double election be esteemed? Which was the genuine Pope? Was the
election of Urban canonical? Was it the result of intimidation? If the
latter, does the subsequent acknowledgment by the Cardinals cancel
irregularities? Or was Clement the real Pope?[79] This is one of the
problems of history.

[79] Christophe, _Histoire de la Papauté, pendant le XIV. Siècle_, iii.
p. 36.

The historian Pastor sides with Urban VI.[80] The pretext that he
was elected under compulsion will not hold for a moment; for all the
Cardinals took part in his coronation, and assisted afterwards in his
ecclesiastical functions. They gave him homage as Pope and proclaimed
him to the world. Catherine of Sienna told them plainly, “If what
you say were as true as it is false, must you not have lied when you
proclaimed him lawful Pope?”[81] In any case Christendom was now
divided into two obediences. This lasted for forty years. The most
learned canonists differed on the question which of the two was the
Vicar of Christ. Distinguished teachers and saintly people were found
on either side, in equally good faith; and a Roman writer declares
himself unable to characterise either with the title of Antipope.[82]
Nations were divided, so were cities and universities, into Urbanists
and Clementines. Urban and Clement both died, but each received
successors. It looked as if Christendom might witness a double headship
becoming part of the permanent constitution of the Church. It was the
glory of France, and, in particular, of the famous University of Paris,
then at the height of its power, to intervene and take steps in behalf
of unity. It was now A.D. 1400. The Avignon line was now represented
by Peter de Luna, entitled Benedict XIII.; the Italian line by Angelo
Corario, entitled Gregory XII. Christendom was scandalised by their
mutual excommunications.

[80] Pastor, i. p. 119.

[81] _Ibid._ i. p. 131.

[82] Christophe, _Histoire de la Papauté, pendant le XIV. Siècle_, iii.
p. 37.

The state of the Church was deplorable. Gregory asserted that as
Pope he was above law; Benedict that no appeal from a Pope was
permissible.[83] This, says Bossuet, was the first time in Christendom
that a Pope ventured expressly to condemn all appeals from his
authority.[84] A recent historian of the Papacy says:--

[83] Bossuet, _Defense_, i. p. 567.

[84] _Ibid._ ii. p. 325.

“The amount of evil wrought by the Schism of 1378, the longest known
in the history of the Papacy, can only be estimated when we reflect
that it occurred at a moment when thorough reform in ecclesiastical
affairs was a most urgent need. This was now utterly out of the
question; and indeed all evils which had crept into ecclesiastical
life were infinitely increased. Respect for the Holy See was also
greatly impaired, and the Popes became more than ever dependent on
the temporal power, for the Schism allowed each Prince to choose
which Pope he would acknowledge. In the eyes of the people the simple
fact of a double Papacy must have shaken the authority of the Holy
See to its very foundations. It may truly be said that these fifty
years of Schism prepared the way for the great Apostasy of the
sixteenth century.”[85]

[85] Pastor, i. p. 142.

Through all this crisis, the Sorbonne, the theological faculty of the
University of Paris, was the strenuous advocate of the doctrine that
the supreme authority in Christendom was the Council, not the Pope.
They declared that things were come to such a pass, through the Schism,
that on all sides men did not hesitate publicly to affirm that it was
purely indifferent whether there were two Popes or twelve. Gerson, the
celebrated Chancellor of the University of Paris, reassured men by
asserting that the ultimate authority in Christendom was the entire
Church and not the Pope. This teaching implies a denial of Papal
Infallibility: and with this teaching the entire Church in France was
identified.

The perplexity of the situation forced upon men’s attention certain
neglected aspects of ecclesiastical truth. It compelled them to
consider, what resources, apart from the Pope, did the Church
possess? The rival Pontiffs scandalising Christendom by their selfish
indifference, as it appeared, to the Church’s real interests,
challenged reflection on the relation between the Papacy and the
Church. Yet where was the authority competent to intervene? Theories
of papal power had greatly developed since the age of Honorius. The
Pope’s practical ascendancy was very different from that which existed
eight hundred years before. Habitual acquiescence in large practical
assumptions made it harder now than in earlier times to find the true
solution. The problem, therefore, absorbed the gravest attention of the
ablest theologians of the day.

The Pope, said Gerson, is removable by his own voluntary
abdication.[86] This was historically exemplified in the case of Pope
Celestine, who, while he abdicated the Papacy, is elevated among the
saints. And if removable by his own act, he must be also removable by
the Church, or by its representative, a General Council. For since
he can give his Spouse a writing of divorcement, she must possess an
equal liberty. Moreover, no office, dignity, or ministry, exists except
for the edification and good of the community. Many cases may arise in
which the Church will not be edified unless the Pope either abdicates
or is deposed. There is no contradiction between this principle and the
legitimate sense of the injunction--“Touch not Mine Anointed!” If the
Greeks were willing to return to unity conditionally on the removal of
the existing Pope, Gerson has no hesitation in saying that for the sake
of so great a blessing this concession should be made.

[86] Gerson, _De Auferibilitate Papæ ab Ecclesia_.

From discussion men advanced to action. The two Colleges of Cardinals
united, and summoned a Council of the Church to be held at Pisa in
1409. The significance of the Council of Pisa lies in its assumption
of superiority over Popes. The trend of several centuries had been the
other way. Now the balance of power was asserted and employed. The
explicit intention of the Council was the healing of the Schism and the
reforming of the Church alike in its head and members.[87] It declared
its action necessary and lawful, and pledged itself not to dissolve
until it had effected a real reformation. It discussed at full length
the respective claimants to the Roman See; and decided that Peter de
Luna and Angelo Corario, named in their respective obediences Benedict
XIII. and Gregory XII., were both schismatics, and were hereby deposed.
This deposition of Pope by Council was hitherto unexampled.

[87] Bonnechose, _C. Const._ i. p. 40.

The Roman See was now declared to be vacant, and then the Council
proceeded to fill the vacancy by the creation of a new Pope under title
of Alexander V.

It is generally admitted that this creation was unwise because
premature. Its success depended on the consent of Christendom. And
since neither Benedict nor Gregory would resign, it resulted in a
triple obedience. To the Italian and Avignonese lines was now added
the Pisan.[88] Alexander V. vainly denounced those “two monstrous sons
of perdition”; and then, after an exemplary pontificate of ten months,
died at Bologna, and was replaced by the notorious and unfortunate,
Balthasar Cossa, Master of Bologna, who assumed the style of John
XXIII. Between these three Popes there followed the routine of mutual
anathema and excommunication, which continued to lower the dignity of
the Papacy in the esteem of Europe. Thus the Council of Pisa failed to
heal the afflicted Church, or remedy the Schism.

[88] Baronius, _Annals_.

In the Council of Constance, 1414, the attempt was made again. Briefly,
after numerous struggles John XXIII., Benedict XIII., and Gregory XII.,
were all declared deposed, and eventually this sentence, through the
influence of the Emperor Sigismund, prevailed. A new Pope was created
in the person of Martin V. The three obediences were reunited, and the
peace of the Church restored.

The main interest of this Council, however, lies in its famous
declaration. It claimed to be an Ecumenical Council, legitimately
assembled with the authority of the Holy Spirit, representing
the Catholic Church, having its power direct from Jesus Christ.
Accordingly, to its decision in matters of faith as well as in other
things, persons of whatever rank, including papal, are subordinate.

“This holy Synod of Constance, being a General Council, lawfully
assembled in the Holy Spirit, and representing the Church militant,
has received immediately from Jesus Christ a power to which all
persons of whatever rank and dignity, not excepting the Pope
himself, are bound to submit in those matters which concern the
faith; the extirpation of the existing Schism; and the reformation of
the Church in its head and its members.”

“Whosoever, be his dignity what it may, without excepting the Pope,
shall obstinately refuse to obey the statutes, ordinances, and
precepts of the present Council, or of any other General Council
lawfully assembled, shall be subjected, unless he repent, to
proportionate penance, and punished according to his deserts” (etc.).

2. So far, then, for the details of history. We are next to follow
the criticisms of theological schools within the Roman Communion upon
the facts. Bellarmine, the Jesuit theologian, was a Cardinal in 1600.
While claiming for the Pope a supremacy and Infallibility, in the
most uncompromising terms, and with a fulness and clearness hitherto
unexampled, he was naturally challenged to harmonise his theories with
the facts of the Councils of the fifteenth century.

It was argued that the Council of Constance possessed an ecumenical
character. Now either this claim is legitimate or it is not. If it
is, we must accept its principles, which affirm that an Ecumenical
Council has its authority direct from Christ, and that all, of whatever
rank, including papal, are subjected to its decisions. If it is not,
then its work in deposing John XXIII., Gregory XII., and Benedict
XIII., and in replacing them by Martin V. is invalid, and cannot be
sustained. Consequently, the whole line of Martin’s successors is also
illegitimate.

Bellarmine denied that Constance was an Ecumenical Council. For, he
said, it included only a third of the Church, one obedience out of
three. He denied also that its election of Martin V. was thereby
invalidated. An assembly may have power to elect, but not to define
in matters of faith. Constance possessed exceptional power in an
exceptional time. For a doubtful Pope is no Pope at all.

With regard to the ecumenical character of the Council of Constance,
Bossuet replied to Bellarmine that his criticism upon it did not go far
enough. For the Council described itself as a general Synod assembled
in the Holy Spirit, rightly and justly summoned, opened, and enacted.
Now this account of itself is either a simple truth, or a blasphemous
assumption. Its opponents dare not venture to call it the latter.

It is also quite misleading to say, as Bellarmine does, that the
Council of Constance represented only one out of three obediences. As
a matter of fact, the vast majority of Christendom was represented
there. The adherents of Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII. had by that
time dwindled to relative insignificance. The great nationalities, the
theological faculties, the religious orders, were all on the Council’s
side. If insignificant fractions, with Popes of doubtful claims, still
remained for a period aloof, this did not seriously affect the claims
of Constance to a representative character in Christendom. Still less
is it possible that their claim to authority as assembled in the Holy
Ghost, and constituting a General Council, can be condemned as a
falsehood and a blasphemy.

Bellarmine himself admitted that the Council of Basle decided with the
Legate’s consent that the Council is above the Pope, which is certainly
_now_ considered erroneous. Now! echoes Bossuet: that is a sign of
novelty. And by whom? By a private theologian. Is, then, the opinion of
a private teacher to be set above the unanimous decree of a Universal
Council presided over by the Legates of the Apostolic See?[89]

[89] Bossuet, t. xxi. p. 57.

The argument that these Councils possessed exceptional power in an
exceptional time was, according to Bossuet,[90] refuted by the Councils
themselves. No doubt the Assembly of Constance declared its mission to
be the termination of the Schism, and the union and reformation of the
Church in its head and members--a temporary work. But it also affirmed
that it was the duty of all men of whatever rank and condition, even
papal, to submit to the authority not only of this Council, but also
of every other General Council lawfully assembled. Thus the supremacy
of the Council is asserted to be not a mere temporary expedient to
solve exceptional difficulties, but an inherent characteristic of the
Universal Church in this representative form of self-expression.

[90] _Works_, t. xxi. p. 551.

Bellarmine’s second main argument against the Council of Constance was
that Pope Martin V. never confirmed its decrees. This involved two
points: a speculative theory of the nature of papal confirmation; and
also a question of fact. Bossuet replied to the speculative theory that
confirmation of the acts of a Council did not imply what Bellarmine
supposed; for Popes have often confirmed the acts and decrees of their
predecessors, which certainly on Ultramontane principles could not
be interpreted as imparting to them a validity not possessed before.
Confirmation merely meant acceptance, assent. Beyond it lay the further
enquiry: What is the inherent value of a Universal Council’s decree
apart from papal acceptance? Bossuet would answer that question one
way, Bellarmine another. And in so doing each would have his followers;
for each represented schools of thought within the Roman Communion.

Then as to the question of fact:

Bellarmine’s assertion that Martin V. did not accept the decisions
of Constance is, according to Bossuet, particularly unfortunate. For
Martin V. was, as Cardinal Colonna, present through the sessions
of Pisa and of Constance, and influential in passing the Council’s
claims to be ecumenical and assembled in the Holy Spirit. And yet this
Cardinal, without any revocation of this opinion, was elected to the
Papal See. Martin’s own mind on the authority of General Councils is
sufficiently clear. All that Bellarmine found to urge was that Martin
said he confirmed what had been done _conciliariter_; that is, says
Bellarmine, in the proper way, as Councils should: which he interpreted
to mean, after careful examination into facts--a condition which was
not fulfilled at Constance. And, therefore, Martin did not intend to
confirm this claim.

Bossuet considered that nothing could exceed the feebleness of the
argument. The Roman Pontiffs, says Bossuet, have never spoken of
the Council of Constance without veneration; have never passed any
adverse criticism upon it. Paul V. had its proceedings published by
the Vatican, complete, on a level of authority with the Council of
Nicea.[91]

[91] Bossuet, _Works_, t. xxi. p. 53.

The long struggle of the fifteenth century between two conceptions of
Ecclesiastical Authority--that which placed the ultimate decision in
the Collective Episcopate, and that which placed it in the solitary
Voice--issued, on the whole, to the advantage of the latter. However
great the services which the reforming Council rendered to Christendom,
and great undoubtedly they were, yet the blunders perpetrated by them,
and their ultimate collapse, seriously compromised their rightful
claims. The Papacy had learnt lessons it was never likely to forget,
and the following period was instinctively a period of self-protection
and recovered authority. Wonderful as it seems, even the characters of
Alexander VI., Julius II., and Leo X. did not prevent an advance of the
papal power over the limits which it occupied in the previous period.
None of these individuals asserted their Infallibility. Their interests
were elsewhere. Pope Hadrian VI. was successor to Leo X. As Professor
of Theology at Louvain, he published the following observations on
Infallibility:--

“If by the Roman Church is understood its head, that is the Pope, it
is certain that it can err, even in those matters which concern the
Faith, by publishing heresy in its decisions and decrees. For many
Roman Pontiffs have been heretics. Of recent times it is reported
that Pope John XXII. publicly taught, declared, and commanded to be
believed by all, that purified souls do not have the clear vision of
God before the Final Judgment.”

Bossuet calls the reader’s attention to Pope Hadrian’s view of the
Papacy.[92] How clearly he taught, and held as indisputable, that the
Pope could be a heretic not only in his private capacity, but in his
official decisions and decrees! How emphatically he rejects what his
predecessor “publicly taught, declared, and commanded to be believed by
all!” Whether any explanation of the teaching of Pope John XXII. can
be attempted is not to the point. In any case the fact remains that
Hadrian VI. held these ideas of Papal Fallibility. And if he wrote this
as a theologian, before his elevation to the Papacy, there is no trace
that he ever retracted his doctrine, as he must have done had he come
to think it erroneous. On the contrary, he published it after becoming
Pope (1522).

[92] _Works_, i. p. 37.

CHAPTER VI

THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

The next crisis between papal and episcopal theories of authority is
reached in the _Council of Trent_. The primary purpose of that Assembly
was to reply to those without, rather than to determine opinions within
the Roman Communion. But the effort to formulate their own convictions
disclosed sharply contested theories within. The conflict of opposing
schools became particularly conspicuous when the Sacrament of Orders
came up for consideration in November 1562. The century and a half
between Constance and Trent had somewhat diminished the impression of
the Schism. Teaching on the supremacy of the Council over the Pope was
naturally less emphatic now than in those disastrous days. Yet the
school which considered the Pope supreme, and that which considered the
Collective Episcopate to hold that high position, coexisted within the
Roman Body; just as the entire previous development would lead us to
expect. In the Council Chamber of Trent, from the lips of Bishops, both
theories are sharply stated.

On the papal side it was claimed that consecration to the Episcopate
confers orders but not jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the authority to
govern the Christian flock. And it was argued that a Bishop does not
necessarily possess jurisdiction. He possesses jurisdiction when the
flock has been assigned to him. But, said the papal advocates, it is
the Pope who gives to the Bishop his flock. Consequently, it is the
Pope who confers the jurisdiction.

The real basis of this theory is the opinion that all jurisdiction
was originally conferred by Christ upon St Peter; that it belongs
exclusively to him and his successors; that the plenary jurisdiction
of St Peter was transmitted, but not that of the other Apostles. The
papal advocates in the Council of Trent frankly stated their anxiety
to protect the papal power. If the Pope in conveying jurisdiction was
only instrumental, then the plenitude of power was not really his. But
whatever the Bishops are, the Pope must be the source of all authority.
It was even asserted that Bishops are superior to priests not by divine
right, but by papal permission. The Pope, it was declared, had power
to deprive, transfer, or depose the Bishops at will, as might seem to
him expedient for the Universal or the local Church. So, at least, a
Bishop said. We shall see this theory bearing fruits in France in the
days of Napoleon. Another Bishop even proclaimed that our Lord baptized
St Peter only among the Apostles, while Peter baptized the rest, and
created them Bishops of the Church.

On the other side, the theory of supreme episcopal right, commission,
and authority was firmly and widely maintained. Consecration, it was
affirmed, conferred jurisdiction as well as orders. Indeed jurisdiction
is essential to the episcopal function; and consecration cannot confer
an inadequate mutilated power. In jurisdiction we should distinguish
the capacity and its exercise. The capacity is bestowed direct by
Christ in consecration; the particular sphere of its exercise is
accidental and subordinate. Appeal was made to the Council of Constance
in support of this. Accordingly, Bishops are Vicars of Christ. They are
also successors of the Apostles. All the Apostles received jurisdiction
direct from Christ. The Bishops are their true successors, therefore
their right is divine. The divine right of the Pope can be rested on no
other ground than on his succession to St Peter. By an equal reason the
Bishops are successors of the Apostles. Christ did not only institute
Peter and his successors, but also the Apostles and theirs. In the
primitive Church, so Bishops argued at Trent, the papal theory did not
exist. For Titus and Timothy were appointed by St Paul, and others by
the other Apostles, without any authority from or reference to the
Supreme Pontiff. Indeed the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven were given to
St Peter, but not to him alone.

Between these conflicting schools others endeavoured to mediate. A
member of the Council thought it almost sacrilege to go on discussing
the Pope’s authority when they had no mandate so to do. Another
pleaded that no discussion should be held on episcopal jurisdiction.
The condemnation of either opinion would be the repudiation of many
accredited teachers. Another deprecated controverted points. What,
he exclaimed, will the heretics say when they hear that we, after
fifteen hundred years, are enquiring by what right Bishops exist? These
questions should be avoided as encouraging heretics and scandalising
Catholics. The proper theme for the Council’s consideration was rather,
How is the episcopal office to be rightly discharged? This is what the
world expects the Council to decide. Thus he recalled them to practical
reform. Vainly did the presiding Legate remind them that the Council
was called to condemn heretics, not to discuss matters controverted
among Catholics.

But party feeling was very strong. A Spanish Bishop ventured to
observe that the Canon of Nicaea (4) on Episcopal consecration made no
reference whatever to the Pope. This created an uproar. The Italian
Bishops shouted, “Anathema, burn him, he is a heretic.”

The meeting closed in indescribable confusion. When the subject was
resumed, on the following day, the Legates expressed themselves firmly
resolved to maintain the dignity of the Council, even if necessary by
dissolving the Assembly. The Cardinal de Lorraine, head of the Bishops
from France, supported the Legates. He is said to have observed that
if such an insult had been offered to a French Bishop, he would have
left the Council with all the French contingent and returned to France.
Cardinal de Lorraine made no secret of his adherence to the principles
of the French Church.

“I am a Gallican,” he said in a letter to Rome, “brought up in the
University of Paris, in which the authority of a General Council is
esteemed superior to that of a Pope, and they who hold the contrary
are condemned as heretics. In France the Council of Constance is
throughout considered Ecumenical.”[93]

[93] Richerius, _Vindiciæ Gall._ p. 13.

It is said that if the question had been pressed by the presiding
Legates to a division, they could have obtained a majority. But they
could not have obtained, on the disputed points, anything approaching
unanimity. Accordingly, the controversy on the source of episcopal
jurisdiction was left finally undetermined. So far as the Decisions
of Trent are concerned there was nothing on this matter to prohibit
retention of the ancient view.

There was an anxiety in Rome not to push things to antagonism and
division. An historian of the Council says that the Pope advised the
Legates that nothing should be defined without the Bishops’ unanimous
consent:[94] a maxim to which constant appeal was made from the Age
of Trent to that of the Vatican.[95] The appeal was natural, for this
maxim harmonised with the principle that the ultimate decision in faith
rested with the Collective Episcopate.

[94] _Pallavicini_, XIX. ii.

[95] Cf. Bossuet, xxi. p. 24.

Since Spanish and French opposition in the Council of Trent frustrated
any endorsement of Italian theories of jurisdiction, it is clear what
would have been the result of any attempt to make decrees on papal
authority. No further addition was made in this direction. Belief in
the supreme authority of the Council in matters of faith was left, so
far as Trent was concerned, exactly where it was before. It remained
the conviction of the Church in France.

The correspondence between Rome and the Legates at Trent has never been
published yet. Members of the Council of the Vatican asked permission
to see it, but Theiner, librarian of the Vatican, was not allowed
to show the documents. Lord Acton[96] says that Theiner deemed the
concealment prudent.

[96] _Hist. Freedom_, p. 431.

Whether that opinion is correct or not, and it has been disputed, what
is certain is that if a comparison be made between the relation of
Pope and Council at Trent and at the Vatican, a vast development of
papal authority will be found in the later period, and a corresponding
diminution of the independent action of the Collective Episcopate. It
will be sufficient here to note that at Trent the claims of minorities
were respected; that nothing was passed without moral unanimity;
that the Bishops framed the regulations by which they were to be
controlled; that no methods of procedure were imposed upon them from
without; that the Roman Pontiff of that day made no attempt to force
new dogmas on large and reluctant minorities. These comparisons were
made within the Roman Church, when the later Assembly had shown its
character.

CHAPTER VII

CARDINAL BELLARMINE

Nothing can better illustrate the development of thought on the
papal power after the Council of Trent than the theories of Cardinal
Bellarmine. A nephew of one Pope and friend of another, a Jesuit,
resident in Rome, a Cardinal in 1600, he strikingly represents the
extreme tendencies of the Italian School. He put forth to the world in
his volumes of _Controversies_ a systematic and elaborated conception
of supremacy and Infallibility certainly unsurpassed.

The supremacy of Peter is upheld on the ground that our Lord said to
him in the Apostles’ presence, “Feed my sheep.” In this injunction
all sheep must be included. And therefore the Apostles themselves are
sheep whom Peter must feed. While the Apostles, it may be admitted,
derive their jurisdiction direct from Christ, the Bishops receive it
direct from the Pope. Confirmation of this principle is sought in the
relation of Moses to the Elders, and also in the monarchical character
of the Church’s constitution. According to Bellarmine, it is essential
to the monarchical idea that all authority reside in one, and from
that one be communicated to others. The Bishops are not successors of
the Apostles; since the latter were not ordinary but extraordinary and
delegated pastors, and as such have no successors at all. From these
principles the relation of the Collective Episcopate, or Ecumenical
Council, to the Pope may be readily imagined. Existing theories as to
Papal Infallibility are grouped by Bellarmine as four. First, that
the Pope, even with an Ecumenical Council, can be a heretic and teach
heresy, and has actually so done. This is the opinion of Lutheran
and Calvinist. Secondly, that the Pope, if he speak apart from an
Ecumenical Council, can be a heretic and teach heresy, and has actually
done so. This is the Parisian view, held by Gerson and Pope Hadrian
VI. Thirdly, that the Pope cannot possibly, under any circumstances,
be a heretic nor teach heresy. For this opinion Bellarmine only quotes
one writer (Pighius), of whom Bossuet observes that nobody endorses
his absurdities. Fourthly, that the Pope, whether he can be a heretic
or not, cannot define anything heretical to be believed by the whole
Church. This Bellarmine calls the most prevalent opinion of nearly all
Catholics. He admits that various advocates of it interpolate various
conditions of its exercise, such as consultation with his advisers,
mature reflection, and so forth. But he thinks that they would deny
that these conditions can ever be unfulfilled; on the ground that God
who designs the end must also arrange the means.

Of these four opinions Bellarmine proceeds to pronounce the first
heretical. The second he will not venture to term actually heretical,
because its advocates are, so far, tolerated by the Church. This
audacious statement should be read in the light of the entire previous
history of Christendom. Yet Bellarmine holds it erroneous, and
proximate to heresy; and that it might deservedly be declared heretical
by a decision of the Church. The third opinion he pronounces probable,
but not certain.

The last is most certain, and to be taught. He supports it by
asserting that no appeal is ever permissible from a Pope to a General
Council; that not only the Pope himself is inerrable in matters of
faith, but even the particular Roman Church in Italy cannot err.
This opinion at least is pious and most probable; although not so
certain that the contrary can be called heretical. But, even with
this, Bellarmine does not feel that his wonderful construction is yet
secure. Accordingly he asserts that it is probable, and may be piously
believed, not that the Pontiff cannot officially err, but even that
as a particular individual he cannot be a heretic, or pertinaciously
believe anything contrary to the faith. This appears to Bellarmine
essential to protect the Pope’s official Infallibility. For how, he
asks, could a Pope, if inwardly heretical, strengthen his brethren in
faith and teach the truth? No doubt the Almighty could extort a true
confession from the heart of a heretic just as He put true words in the
mouth of Balaam’s ass. But, to Bellarmine’s reflection, this procedure
would be violent, and hardly in accord with that Providential Wisdom
which sweetly disposeth all things.

After this elevation of papal authority to the highest height, there
necessarily follows a corresponding depreciation of the value of the
Collective Episcopate and its utterances in Council assembled. General
Councils, before the Pope confirms their decisions, may err, unless
the Fathers in defining follow the Pope’s instructions. He is aware
that the School of Paris, and all who maintain the supremacy of the
Council over the Pope, will reject this. The Parisian Doctors hold
that a General Council cannot err even apart from papal confirmation.
But if it could not err then it would be final; and if so, where
would be space for papal confirmation? Accordingly Bellarmine could
not possibly endorse their view. He knows that his opponents will
retort: General Councils anathematise those who contradict; they do not
restrain their anathemas until the Pope has confirmed them. Bellarmine
answers: They must certainly mean that their anathemas are conditional
on the Pope’s endorsement!

What forces Bellarmine to these eccentricities is his opinion that no
authority was given by Christ to the Universal Church but only to St
Peter. Consequently, if the General Council represent the Universal
Church, yet it cannot possess what the entire Body did not receive.
To Bellarmine’s view the Supreme Pontiff is simply and absolutely
above the Universal Church, and above the General Council; so that no
judgment on earth can be superior to his. If the objection be urged
that on this theory the Church is left in case of trouble without a
remedy: Bellarmine answers, No; there is the divine Protection. We may
pray God to convert the Pope, or to take him away before he ruins the
Church.

It is certainly one of the ironies of history that the volume of
_Controversies_, in which these theories are contained, was placed
on the Index by Pope Sixtus V. as deficient, in certain respects, in
the regard which a Catholic owed to the Holy Father. In the curiously
self-laudatory pages of Bellarmine’s _Autobiography_ there still
survives his own comment on this act of papal authority. He informs
us that in the year 1591 Gregory XIV. was reflecting what he ought
to do with the Vulgate edited by Sixtus V. There were not wanting
men of importance who held that the use of this edition ought to be
publicly prohibited. But Bellarmine suggested, in the Pope’s presence,
that correction was better than prohibition. Thus the honour of Pope
Sixtus would be saved, and the book produced in an emended form. He
advised, therefore, a republication after correction, with a preface
stating that in the first edition various errors, typographical and
other, had, through haste, crept in. Thus, says Bellarmine, he did
Pope Sixtus good in return for evil. For Sixtus placed Bellarmine’s
work on _Controversies_ upon the Index of Prohibited Books, because it
rejected the direct dominion of the Pope over the whole world. But,
when Pope Sixtus was dead, the Congregation of Sacred Rites ordered the
prohibition of Bellarmine’s work to be erased.[97]

[97] Cf. Döllinger und Reusch, _Die Selbstbiographie des Cardinals
Bellarmin_, p. 38, and notes pp. 106–111.

The theories of Roman theologians made great advances in the sixteenth
century. But it is curious to note that some of the most extreme are
yet considered inadequate and defective by papal writers since the
Vatican Decrees. Torquemada was a theologian devoted to the enhancement
of the Apostolic See.[98] For him the plenitude of power existed in
the Pope alone. Was it not written there shall be one fold and one
shepherd? For him all the other Apostles derived their jurisdiction
from St Peter. And, accordingly, all Bishops derive their jurisdiction
immediately from the Pope, and not from Christ. But notwithstanding all
this, Torquemada does not come up to Ultramontane requirements. The
German infallibilist, Schwane, is not satisfied with him as an advocate
of Papal Infallibility.

[98] Ghilardi, _De Plenitudine Potestatis, R.P._ p. 15.

“Infallibility of the Pope,” says Schwane, “could not be passed
over in silence by a papal theologian as eminent as Torquemada.
Nevertheless, he has not realised this doctrine in all its
purity.”[99]

[99] _Hist. Dogm._, v. p. 377.

Torquemada, it appears, had such regard for papal freedom of will that
he could not deny the possibility of its erroneous exercise, even in
the discharge of the highest papal function. But while admitting that
the Pope might err in an official utterance to the whole Church, he
evaded the disastrous consequence to the doctrine of Infallibility by
affirming that such a misuse of authority would constitute the Pope a
heretic, and, as such, _ipso facto_, Pope no longer. Thus he secures
the Papal Infallibility by maintaining the self-deposition of any Pope
who teaches erroneously.

Schwane remarks acutely enough that Torquemada’s defence of Papal
Infallibility virtually places the supreme decision not in the Pope but
in a General Council of the Church. For it manifestly tends to ascribe
to General Councils the right to revise all papal dogmatic decrees,
in order to ascertain whether they are heretical or not; whether they
proceed from one who is really Pope, or from one who, having taught
erroneously, is not Pope at all.

To avoid these dangerous tendencies Torquemada, according to Schwane,
ought to have denied the possibility of the Pope’s misuse of free will
in his _ex cathedra_ pronouncements; and this on the ground that the
promises of Christ cannot fail to secure their own fulfilment, and
must accordingly override the metaphysical possibility of mistake.
This theory of the unconditional character of Christ’s promises, of
the almost mechanical necessity of their realisation, irrespective of
the human will and human compliance, constantly meets us in recent
Ultramontane developments. Torquemada, however, knew nothing about all
this, or did not see his way to accept such theories. There remain,
therefore, grave discrepancies, according to recent Roman writers,
between this papal theologian of the sixteenth century--papal though
indeed he was,--and the doctrine as it shaped itself in the Vatican
Decrees. This inadequacy of its defenders, as judged by the standard of
the nineteenth century decision, is a not unimportant feature in the
doctrine’s development.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SORBONNE

During the seventeenth century Ultramontanism found its principal
obstruction in the Church of France, its principal support in the
Jesuit Society. The progress of the theory roughly corresponded with
the vicissitudes of this powerful community. The League against the
succession in France exchanged monarchical and Gallican sentiments for
Republican and Ultramontane. The theories of political independence and
ecclesiastical absolutism flourished for a time. Ultramontanism even
controlled for a time the very stronghold of Gallican doctrine--the
Sorbonne itself. But this cannot be rightly regarded as anything more
than a transient politically affected phase. The Sorbonne returned to
its ancient loyalties. It possessed no longer the same authority and
weight as in the disastrous days of the great Schism; but it still
imposed a powerful check on the theories of the Ultramontane. Its
influence was often compromised, sometimes counterbalanced, by the
Jesuit Society which, supported by an Italian Queen Regent during the
minority of Louis XIII., was enabled to effect gradual encroachments
upon the ancient University, by founding colleges and, ultimately,
granting degrees, even in Paris itself.[100] Cardinal Richelieu,
rebuilder and lavish patron of the Sorbonne though he was, could,
nevertheless, for political reasons, encourage the Jesuit foundations;
on the pretext that rival educational establishments sharpened the wits
of both. Thus the first half of the century witnessed the perpetual
efforts of the Sorbonne to strengthen the theological principles of the
French Church, and to exclude the Ultramontane, thwarted or weakened
by the influence of the Jesuit exercised through the Palace. Jesuit
confessors directed the Royal consciences, and made them inaccessible
to the protests of the Sorbonne. Again and again theological
discussions were suspended or suppressed by royal authority, at the
secret instigation of this powerful community. A notable instance is
found in the experiences of the celebrated Edmond Richer, the learned
Syndic of the Sorbonne, in the opening years of the seventeenth
century. Richer had been in early youth a member of the League, and, as
such, a Republican and an Ultramontane; but his matured reflections led
him to embrace the historic principles of the Church of France, and to
become a truceless foe of the Jesuits, and of the Ultramontane opinions
with which they were at the time identified. In the year 1606 he
distinguished himself by republishing the works of Chancellor Gerson.
In 1611 the opposing School proposed for discussion at a Dominican
Convent in Paris, before an illustrious assembly, including royal
personages, the Papal Nuncio, and Cardinal du Perron, the following
thesis:--(1) That the Roman Pontiff cannot err in faith and morals; (2)
that the Council is in no case superior to the Pope.[101] Richer, as
Syndic of the Sorbonne, protested. The forbearance of the Gallicans was
sorely tried by such contradictions to the principles of their fathers.
Ultimately it was arranged that a member of the Sorbonne, Claudius
Bertin, should advocate the Gallican side. Bertin began with the
syllogism: Whatever contradicts an Ecumenical Council is heresy. Your
thesis--the Council is in no case superior to the Pope--contradicts the
Ecumenical Council of Constance, therefore it is heresy. At this the
Papal Nuncio grew visibly indignant. Bertin’s opponent mildly answered:
“Do not say this assertion is heretical; it is enough to call it
misleading, erroneous.” He disclaimed any desire to offend the Faculty
of Paris. He only desired to ascertain the truth. And where in all the
world could this question be discussed if not within this most famous
University? Here Richer, the Syndic, interposed. The Sorbonne had
always held the Council of Constance as Ecumenical, and, accordingly,
that its decision on the supremacy of the Council over the Pope was a
matter of faith.

[100] Cf. Jourdain, _Hist. Univ. Paris_.

[101] Richerius, _Vindiciæ Gall._

The discussion was resumed, but ultimately, at Cardinal du Perron’s
request, and evidently in the Ultramontane interests, brought to an
abrupt conclusion. The Parliament of Paris followed this up with an
injunction prohibiting the Dominicans from disputes on the Pope’s
Infallibility.

The Jesuits were so enraged by Richer’s action that from that day
forward they never gave him peace. They were powerful enough to secure
his dismissal from office. But he was a person more easily dismissed
than suppressed. He wrote a pamphlet on ecclesiastical and political
power, to show that the Church is a monarchy, but its government an
aristocracy; for neither the Pope nor the other Bishops can decide
matters of importance without the guidance of a Council. The infallible
authority in matters of faith rests, he taught, with the Universal
Council as representing the Universal Church. This work offended
Cardinal du Perron, who could not see how proper regard for monarchy
was consistent with the view that aristocracy was naturally the highest
form of government.[102] Meanwhile Richer retired contentedly into
studious quietude, where he composed his great work on the Councils,
published after his death. But his enemies could not let him rest. He
says that he could not venture beyond the gates of the College lest
the satellites of the Roman authorities should fall upon him.[103]
From the treatment measured out to him he sees that the Roman Curia is
resolved to obliterate the ancient doctrine of the School of Paris,
and to allow no man to speak of the true government of the Church, or
the independence of the State, without branding him as a heretic or
schismatic.[104] It is said that Richer was forced by menaces to sign
a recantation of his views of papal power. Whatever he signed, the
independent statements of his own literary _Testament_ remain to show
his real convictions.

[102] Letter to Casaubon, _Les Ambassades et Negotiations_, p. 694.

[103] Richer’s _Testament_, p. 3.

[104] Richerius, _Vindiciæ Doctrinæ Majorum_, p. 2.

“I, Edmond Richer ... in the 53 year of my life ... seated in my
library, sound in body and mind, write this latin codicil in the form
of a Testament.”[105]

[105] _Ibid._ p. 11.

He then appeals to his defence of the ancient principles in the
Disputations of 1611; and recalls the persecutions he has undergone:
how it was said that a vow to assassinate him would be most acceptable
to God, or that if he were snared and sent to Rome he would soon
find out whether the Pope possessed the temporal sword.[106] Men do
not realise, says Richer, how grievously these theories compromise
the Apostolic See. For more than twenty years he has been beset by
enemies. And yet they are the true principles of Church government,
transmitted by the Fathers, restored in the Councils of Constance and
Basle, which are being attacked through him.[107] The example of Richer
is intended as a warning to frighten the theologians of Paris from
maintaining the doctrine of their fathers. Accordingly whatever his
malicious opponents may contrive at this day, or may hereafter contrive
against him, he prays that he may have the grace to forgive and the
fortitude to resist. In this unhappy age in which truth is diminished
among the children of men he registers his emphatic rejection of
the theory that the Pope is the absolute infallible ruler of the
Church.[108]

[106] _Ibid._ p. 14.

[107] Richerius, _Vindiciæ Doctrinæ Majorum_, p. 14.

[108] _Ibid._ 16–17.

Undoubtedly this was the faith in which Richer died.[109]

[109] A.D. 1629.

Another instance of the teaching of the French Church occurs in a
book by Francis Veron, entitled _The Rule of Faith_, or a separation
of those matters which are of Catholic faith from those that are
not. Veron was Doctor of Theology in Paris, and died in 1646.[110]
He quotes the doctrine of Trent and Florence. Trent committed him to
the recognition of the Roman Church as the Mother and Mistress of all
Churches; to the belief that the Roman Pontiff is Peter’s successor
and Vicar of Christ; and to the duty of obedience to his commands. The
Council of Florence described the Pope as Head of the whole Church, and
as Father and Teacher of all Christians; and affirmed him to possess
a plenary power, such as is recognised in the Acts of the Ecumenical
Councils, and in the canons. So much, then, Veron acknowledges as of
faith. But nothing beyond this is of faith, because the Church has
asserted nothing more. He lays particular stress on the language of
Florence, because Greek and Latin were therein met in conclave.

[110] Ed. Sebastian Brunner, 1857, p. 145.

“Accordingly,” Veron’s conclusion is that, “it is not of faith
that the Roman Pontiff, in his teaching, whether in a particular
Council, or in a Provincial Synod, even if he address the Universal
Church, or when, as they say, he speaks _ex cathedra_, supposing
him to teach apart from a Universal Council, is the supreme judge
of controversies, or is infallible; nor that what is so defined is
of faith, unless the conviction of the Universal Church otherwise
declare it.”[111]

[111] _Veron. Regula Fidei._ Ed. Sebastian Brunner, 1857, p. 146.

According to the doctrine of Trent it is the Church alone whose
function it is to determine the true meaning and interpretation of Holy
Scripture. No theologian hitherto, says Veron, not even Bellarmine
himself, has ventured to assert that the Pope’s Infallibility is of
faith.[112] Bellarmine admits that the theory that the Pope, if he
venture to define even as Pope apart from a General Council, may fall
into heresy, was held by no less a personage than the theologian who
afterwards became Pope Hadrian VI.[113] Bellarmine admits also that
this theory is not heretical, for its advocates are tolerated by the
Church. If Bellarmine, nevertheless, labels this same theory proximate
to heresy, this is his individual view and in Veron’s judgment
unjustifiable. As to further discussion, Veron deprecates it. He writes
as a Catholic teacher and not in a scholastic or speculative way.

[112] _Ibid_, p. 147.

[113] _Ibid._ p. 147.

“Since the Catholic Church teaches nothing concerning this matter,
[of Papal Infallibility] neither need I.”[114] What is true is that
whatever issues from so high an authority is to be received with great
regard.

[114] _Ibid._ p. 148.

CHAPTER IX

BOSSUET

The struggle between the Sorbonne and the Jesuits was no mere
struggle between a theological school and a religious community. The
universities held, in the theological controversies of those days,
a position with which nothing modern exactly corresponds. They were
exponents of the religious conceptions of the Church. They derived
from it their principles and returned to it their inferences and
suggestions. The Sorbonne was not an isolated school of independent
theological speculators. It represented, generally speaking, the
mind of the Church in France. Of course universities might utter
conflicting decisions. But it is peculiarly true of the Sorbonne that
it represented the indigenous as opposed to the imported theology
of France. While the Ultramontane was Italian in origin, a foreign
product, like the Jesuit, and under foreign control, the Sorbonne
was typical of the traditions of the Church within the Kingdom. Its
sentiments were endorsed by the Bishops. Political incidents occasioned
the famous collective expression of the traditional convictions of the
French Church in the Assembly of Clergy in 1682. That Assembly arose
out of an unexpected collision between Louis XIV. and Pope Innocent
XI., in a question of the relation between the Church and the State.
The King already possessed over a portion of France the power, fully
recognised at Rome, to appoint to vacant benefices and to be recipient
of the revenues during a vacancy. But he now sought to make this
privilege co-extensive with the realm. The Bishops acquiesced with
the exception of two--Pavilion of Aleth, and Caulet of Pamiers. Pope
Innocent took their view, and upheld them against their respective
Metropolitans. Thereupon Louis XIV. summoned an Assembly of Bishops
and of selected Priests who, without hesitation, yielded to the King’s
desires. The personage selected to preach the sermon at the opening
of this Assembly was Bossuet, incomparably the most important in this
stage of French theological thought.

The selection testifies to the general conviction. Bossuet was highly
valued alike by the King and by the Bishops. But he had a most delicate
and difficult task before him. He must preach in a manner, if that were
possible, to conciliate the temporal power, the episcopal power, and
the papal power at Rome. He must be true to the traditional convictions
of the Gallican Church, and yet not alienate the Gallicans from the
Papacy, nor, if possible, offend the Pope. He must balance the temporal
and spiritual power in such a manner as to satisfy Innocent without
alienating the King. And never did Bossuet exhibit greater courage and
dexterity.[115] In his famous sermon, which was on Unity, he described
the primacy of St Peter, and the divine selection of the one to be
the centre of Unity. He set the occupants of the Roman See very high,
but he did not hesitate to speak of occasions when one or two of the
Popes had not sustained with sufficient constancy, or had inadequately
explained the doctrines of the Faith.[116] He even mentioned the one
whom a Universal Council had condemned. This would be painful to the
School of Infallibility, but it was the accepted doctrine of Catholic
France. But Bossuet’s magnificent conception of twelve centuries of
unity, and his strenuous appeal to do nothing by which that record
might be broken, or that unity endangered, must have tended greatly to
conciliate and set the tone for the subsequent discussions. So far as
to his first task--the papal power.

[115] Bossuet, t. xi. p. 588.

[116] Bossuet, t. xi. p. 596.

He was no less strong on the power of the Episcopate. The jurisdiction
bestowed on Peter was also bestowed by Christ upon the Twelve.[117]
He said the same thing to all the Apostles.[118] Their Commission
was also immediate, direct from Christ. “One cannot imagine a power
better established nor a mission more immediate.” “It was manifestly
the intention of Jesus Christ to bestow primarily upon one that which
He ultimately willed to bestow upon many.”[119] The relation of the
Pope to the Episcopate is not that he is lord over the Bishops, but
one of their number, as says St Bernard.[120] The power of the Holy
See has nothing above it, says Bossuet, except the entire Catholic
Church.[121] In the calamitous times when the Pope claimed the
allegiance of Christendom, it was the Episcopate, urged the preacher,
which terminated the Schism and restored the Pope. They must firmly
maintain these principles which the Gallican Church had found in the
traditions of the Universal Church; and which the French Universities,
particularly that of Paris, had taught with the full knowledge of the
Roman See.

[117] _Ibid._ p. 599.

[118] _Ibid._ p. 600.

[119] _Ibid._ p. 600.

[120] _Ibid._ p. 618.

[121] _Ibid._ p. 620.

On the relation of the temporal to the spiritual power Bossuet said:--

“Woe to the Church when these two jurisdictions begin to regard each
other with a jealous eye.[122] Ministers of the Church and ministers
of kings are both alike ministers of the King of kings, although
diversely established. Why do they not remember that these functions
are united, that to serve God is to serve the State, and to serve the
State is to serve God? But authority is blind; authority ever aims
at exalting itself, at extending itself; authority considers itself
degraded when reminded of its limitations.”

[122] Bossuet, t. xi. p. 623.

The Assembly ordered this sermon to be printed. The King was satisfied
with it. Bossuet had conciliated two of the three departments, the
Crown and the Episcopate. It remained to be seen how the sermon would
be regarded at Rome. Bossuet sent the sermon with an explanatory letter
to a friendly Cardinal.

“I must tell your Eminence,” he wrote, “that I was forced to speak of
the liberties of the Gallican Church. You will at once realise what
that involved. I set before myself two things--the one, to do this
without derogating from the true dignity of the Holy See; the other,
to explain the Gallican principles as the Bishops understood them,
and not as they are understood by the magistrates.”[123]...

“The sensitive ears of Romans ought to be respected. And I have done
so most readily. Three points might wound them, namely--the temporal
independence of the royal power; episcopal jurisdiction received
immediately from Jesus Christ; and the authority of the Councils.

“You are well aware that in France we speak plainly on these
matters, and I have endeavoured so to speak that, without wronging
the doctrine of the Gallican Church, I might at the same time avoid
offending the majesty of Rome. More than this cannot be expected of
a Gallican Bishop whom circumstances compel to deal with points like
these.”[124]

[123] _Ibid._ p. 291.

[124] _Works_, vol. xi. p. 292.

Bossuet’s sermon, says his biographer, was received at Rome with
approval, real or affected.[125] The Assembly, however, was less
successful. Subservient to the will of the temporal power, they
made proposals which Rome rejected. But this antagonism between the
Gallican Church and Rome led the Assembly to its reassertion of
Gallican principles, in the four famous Articles of 1682. To Bossuet
was ultimately entrusted the delicate task of formulating the Gallican
belief as to the limits of the papal power. Bossuet, representing
the Church of France, denied the doctrine of Papal Infallibility.
He believed that permanence in the truth was promised to the Roman
See as distinguished from its temporary occupant. He maintained that
although the Pope himself might be in error, yet that error would not
be inherent in the Roman See, and would be corrected by the Church in
Council. Above the Pope was the Universal Church. If the Roman See
were in error on the faith, it would be brought back to the truth by
the other Churches. Rome would quickly perceive its error, and would
never fall into heresy or schism. But he denied that Infallibility
could be attributed to the occupant of the Roman See. This view was the
traditional conviction of the Church of France. Accordingly, when the
Assembly formulated its Declaration on the limits of papal power, it
expressed itself by Bossuet’s aid in the four Articles to the following
effect:--

[125] Cardinal Bausset, _Hist. de Bossuet_, p. 136.

1. That the Pope could not release subjects from obedience to the
temporal power.[126]

[126] Jervis, _Hist. Ch. France_, ii. p. 50.

2. That the Decrees of Constance on the supreme authority of the
Council remain in full force in Christendom.

3. That the independence of the Church of France must be maintained.

4. That the decisions of the Pope are not infallible.

“The Pope has the principal place in deciding questions of faith,
and his decrees extend to every Church and all Churches; but,
nevertheless, his judgment is not irreversible, until confirmed by
the consent of the Church.”

Here, then, is the essential point on the subject of Infallibility.
It resides in the Universal Church, and not in the occupant of a
particular See. As to this doctrine, says an able French historian,
there was no real diversity of opinion in France. There existed
indeed an Ultramontane party which, countenanced by certain powerful
protectors, possessed a varying influence;[127] but it never won
the consent of the clergy in France, which at all times showed the
strongest antipathy to Ultramontane ideas. The Declaration was signed
by thirty-four Archbishops and Bishops of the Church of France. It
experienced, says Bossuet’s biographer, himself a Cardinal of the
Roman Church, no opposition in the Kingdom.[128] It did but reaffirm
a doctrine which had been at all times dear to the University and
theological Faculty of Paris.

[127] Guettée, xi. p. 85.

[128] Bausset, ii. p. 188.

But if this Declaration of the Assembly was congenial throughout France
it was otherwise in Rome. “The Pope appointed a congregation to frame
a censure of the propositions.”[129] Italian writers composed attacks
upon them. One in particular was dedicated to Innocent XI., “Lord of
Rome and of the World, only Keeper of the Keys of Heaven and Earth and
Paradise, Infallible Oracle of the Faith.” This provoked the comment of
Arnauld:

[129] Jervis, _Gallican Ch._ ii. p. 52.

“I pity the Holy See for possessing such defenders. It is a terrible
judgment of God upon the Church if Rome adopts such methods of
defence against the Bishops of France.”[130]

[130] Guettée, xi. p. 87.

Bossuet’s correspondents in Rome sent him most unfavourable reports of
the probable action of the Pope.

Bossuet expressed himself very freely on the situation in a letter to
the Monastery of La Trappe:--

“The affairs of the Church are in an evil plight. The Pope
openly threatens us with denunciations and even with new
Decrees. Well-intentioned mediocrity in high places is a grave
misfortune.”[131]

[131] Bossuet, Letter 110, t. xxvi. p. 313.

“Your letter,” wrote Bossuet to another correspondent, “presents a
picture of the present state of the Roman Court which positively
alarms me. Does Bellarmine really hold the chief place there? Has he
become their tradition? Where are we if this is the case, and if the
Pope is disposed to condemn whatever that author condemns? Hitherto
they have never ventured to do it. They have never made this attack
on the Council of Constance, nor on the Popes who have approved it.
What shall we answer heretics when they confront us with this Council
and its decrees, repeated at Basle with the express approval of
Eugenius IV., and with all the other confirmatory acts of Rome? If
Eugenius IV. did well in his authentic approval of these decrees, how
can people attack them? And if he did wrong, what becomes, men will
ask, of his Infallibility? Shall we have to elude these difficulties
and escape the authority of these Decrees, and of so many others both
ancient and modern, by the scholastic distinctions and miserable
subtleties of Bellarmine? Must we assert with him and with Baronius
that the Acts of the Sixth Council and the Letters of St Leo have
been falsified? Will the Church, which has hitherto silenced heresy
with solid reasons, have no better defence than these pitiful
prevarications? May God preserve us from it.”[132]

[132] Bossuet’s letter to M. Dirois.

Happily, says Cardinal Bausset, feeling at Rome quieted down; and
Innocent XI. was “providentially diverted from censuring the doctrine
of France. He restricted himself to rewarding, with more generosity
than judgment, the numerous writers who attacked the Assembly of
1682.”[133] Not venturing to condemn the four Articles, he showed
his displeasure by refusing Bulls to its members if nominated to
Bishoprics. Louis XIV. retaliated by refusing to allow any Bishop to
accept the papal Approval. This lasted through the pontificates of
Innocent XI. and Alexander VIII. Innocent XII., says Cardinal Bausset,
demanded and obtained letters of apology from the former deputies of
the Assembly. They expressed their concern at his resentment, but in
vague and general terms capable of various interpretations, and without
any suggestion of abandoning their traditional convictions.

[133] Bausset, _Hist. de Bossuet_, ii. p. 197.

But when Clement XI. attempted, on the strength of these letters,
to induce Louis XIV. to suppress the Assembly’s propositions, Louis
replied that Innocent XII. understood that his wisdom lay in not
attacking principles regarded in France as fundamental and primitive,
and held unaltered by the French Church over many centuries. His
Holiness, said the King, is too enlightened to declare heretical
what the Church of France maintains. “Innocent XII. did not ask me
to abandon them,” added Louis. “He knew that such a demand would be
useless.” And there the matter stayed. Clement XI. acquiesced, like
his predecessors, in the independence of the Church in France from
Ultramontane opinions.

The attack on the principles of the Church of France led Bossuet to
write his greatest work--_The Defence of the Declaration_.[134] Since
the chief responsibility for producing the Declaration had fallen upon
him, it became naturally his duty to defend it. From the year of the
Assembly onward to the end of his life, some twenty years, he devoted
an immensity of labour to its compilation. More than once proposals
were made to publish, but reasons of State made it prudent not to
offend the Pope, and the book never appeared during Bossuet’s life. The
MS. was left to Louis XIV., and in 1745 was printed. It is impossible
in a limited space to give an adequate idea of the character of this
monumental work. It is written in terse and vigorous Latin. It occupies
two large 8vo. volumes of some 750 pages each. Suffice it to say that
the most powerful refutation of Papal Infallibility ever published
came from the pen of the most distinguished Bishop of the Church in
France; from one who lived and died in communion with the Roman See.
Authority never passed a censure on this work. Bossuet’s Defence
powerfully influenced belief in the Church in France. Many instances
can be produced to show that it guided and taught the teachers of that
Church down to the time of the Vatican Council itself. These volumes
have proved the storehouse whence the most telling opposition to
Ultramontanism has been derived.

[134] Cf. Jervis, _Gallican Ch._ ii. p. 56.

Now the special interest is that this _Defence of the_ Gallican
_Declaration_ was never condemned at Rome. Here is what Pope Benedict
XIV., 1748, said about it:--

“In the time of our immediate predecessor, Clement XII., it was
seriously debated whether this work ought not to be proscribed; but
it was finally determined that no censure should be passed upon
it. This decision was arrived at, not only out of regard for the
author’s memory, who in other respects so worthily served the cause
of religion, but also out of just apprehension of provoking fresh
dissertations and renewing the dispute.”[135]

[135] Jervis, _Church of France_, ii. p. 59.

A striking testimony to the powerful effect of Bossuet’s treatise when
it first appeared is that of his learned opponent, Cardinal Orsi:--

“I have heard, not only at Rome, but also in many other places,
a great many persons, distinguished alike for their character,
learning, and ability, declare, after careful study of this work of
Bossuet, that the Roman theologians had better abandon the defence of
so hopeless a cause; that it would be nobler if they would confess
it frankly, since they do not see what answer they can make with any
prospect of success to the historical evidence which Bossuet has
collected.”[136]

[136] Bausset, ii. p. 427. Orsi, _De irref. R. P. jud._ Preface t. i. d.

Bossuet’s personal conviction on Infallibility was the doctrine of
the fourth Article of the Assembly’s Declaration. He held that it
requires the consent of the Church to make a papal decision on faith
unalterable. He declared that whatever men may assert in theory, when
it comes to practice, the final decision will inevitably depend on
the consent of the Universal Church. This, says Cardinal Bausset, is
exactly what occurs whenever the Ultramontanes are forced within their
last entrenchments. Infallibility of the Pope ends by being only that
of the Church.[137]

[137] _Ibid._ ii. p. 197.

Bossuet attached very little importance to objections about the
practical inconvenience of Papal Fallibility.[138] To his mind it was
perfectly futile to argue that, if we must wait for the consent of
the Church to a pontifical decree, we should be leaving the minds of
the faithful in suspense. He considers that the true remedy is not to
extend the papal power, but to exercise more faith in the Holy Spirit
and the Catholic Church. It is no disparagement to the Pope if the
Church be placed above him.[139]

[138] Bossuet, i. p. 112.

[139] _Ibid._ i. p. 113.

Similarly, the _à priori_ argument that submission of the intellect
must be due when the Pope defines a doctrine, otherwise faith would
vacillate; and that such submissions can only be justified when the
authority cannot err; leaves Bossuet unmoved, except to protest against
the underlying assumption that unqualified submission is due.

Bossuet’s survey of history from the Apostolic Age to his own time,
Scripture, Fathers, Councils, Theologians, confirmed him in the truth
of the principles of the Church in France. The ultimate and therefore
irreversible decision in faith depended on the Collective Episcopate,
and on that only; as voicing the belief of the Universal Church.

“What benefit to the Church,” he exclaims in a striking passage,
“can exist in that doubtful authority, which the Church has not
yet affirmed, of a Pope’s _ex cathedra_ decisions? We live in the
seventeenth century of the Catholic Church, and not yet are orthodox
and saintly men agreed about that Infallibility. To say nothing of
the Councils of Constance and of Basle, saintly and learned men are
opposed to it. And if many private individuals clamour greatly,
and pour forth imprudent censures against them, yet neither the
Catholic Church nor Rome itself passes any condemnation upon them.
Three hundred years we have controverted it with impunity. Has the
Church waited for peace and security down to this our age, until the
seventeenth century is almost at an end? Plainly, then, the security
of pious souls must rest in the consent of the Universal Church. It
cannot be that they should acquiesce in the doubtful Infallibility
of the Roman Pontiff.... A doubtful Infallibility is not that
Infallibility which Christ bestowed. If He had granted it at all He
would have revealed it to His Church from the very beginning. He
would not have left it doubtful, inadequately revealed, nor useless
for want of an indisputable tradition.”[140]

[140] Bossuet, t. xxi. p. 129.

What made the Pope’s advocacy of Ultramontane ideas additionally
distressing to Bossuet and others was that in their presentation of
Catholic Truth to Protestants no mention whatever had been made of
Papal Infallibility as pertaining in any way to Catholic principles.
In Bossuet’s famous _Exposition de la Doctrine Catholique_, written
expressly to explain the fundamental Catholic Dogmas to men of other
Communions, he had spoken of “the authority of the Holy See and of
the Episcopate,” thus acknowledging a double power.[141] He said that
it was not necessary to speak of matters disputed in the theological
schools because they formed no part in the Catholic Faith. And this
Exposition was published with papal approbation.[142] It had been
singularly effective in commending the Roman Church to its opponents,
and in gaining their submission. But if it was known that the Pope
resented these principles, still more, if he openly ventured to condemn
them as errors approximate to heresy, Protestant converts could hardly
fail to retort: We submitted to the Church on the distinct assertion
that no Catholic was required to believe either in the Infallibility
of the Pope or in his right to depose kings.[143] In that case we
have been misguided and deceived. It is, exclaimed thoughtful French
Catholics looking across to England, precisely these doctrines which
are the principal cause of the persecution of Catholics there.[144]

[141] _Ibid._ vol. xiii. pp. 103, 104.

[142] _Ibid._ p. 104.

[143] Guettée, _Histoire de l’Eglise de France_, xi. p. 94.

[144] _Ibid._ p. 95.

The publication of Bossuet’s great work in 1745 may have given
considerable strength to Catholicism in France of an Anti-Roman
type; but other treatises show that the clergy of France were being
persistently trained in similar ideas. The theological principles
inculcated with the authority of the Archbishop of Lyons in 1784 in
the seminaries of his diocese include the following propositions: The
Roman Pontiff even when speaking _ex cathedra_, in matters of faith
and morals, can be deceived; Bishops possess jurisdiction direct from
Christ and not from the Roman Pontiff; the authority of the Roman
Pontiff is inferior to that of a General Council. The principles taught
at the same period in the diocese of Rouen were similar.[145]

[145] Sicard, _L’Ancien Clergé de France_, i. p. 425, n.

CHAPTER X

OPPOSITION AMONG ROMAN CATHOLICS IN ENGLAND

The struggle of Catholic _versus_ Ultramontane in the Roman Communion
in England finds forcible expression in the famous letter of the
distinguished Roman Catholic layman, Sir John Throgmorton, in 1790:--

“He laid stress,” says a Roman writer, “on the fact that ever since
the day of Pius V.’s excommunication of Elizabeth, ‘the English
Catholics have been divided into two parties. The “Papistic” party,
on the one hand, upheld and maintained all the pretensions of the
Court of Rome, and were supported by all the influence of that Court,
sometimes by briefs from the Popes themselves.... The other party
consisted and still consists of the descendants of the old Catholic
families, and a respectable portion of the clergy who, true to the
religion of their ancestors, have uniformly ... protested against the
usurped authority of the Court of Rome.’ He denied that the original
cause of the difference--the question whether or no the Pope had the
power to depose sovereigns--represented adequately the distinction
between the two parties. The deposing power was no longer maintained
by any one; but the ‘Papistic’ party still remained, and taught the
Infallibility of the Pope and urged all his claims. He called on
English Catholics to dissociate themselves from this party and its
teaching.”[146]

[146] Quoted in W. Ward’s _Life of Wiseman_, i. p. 513.

The London Romanist clergy selected a Bishop of Catholic as opposed
to Ultramontane convictions. Rome refused, however, to accept their
selection, and the English Catholics submitted. Here is an illustration
of the method by which the older principles were to be suppressed.[147]
Nevertheless the older principles remained. The Roman body in
England continued to maintain its anti-Roman ideas. This appears
incontestably in their appeal to Parliament for removal of their
political disabilities, under which they had suffered terribly since
the days of Elizabeth. These political disabilities were the Nemesis
of the unfortunate action of the Papacy against Queen Elizabeth, and
of the theories on the relation between spiritual and temporal power
advocated by Roman writers of that period. The penal laws against the
Roman Communion in England were the product of fear, being in design
defensive against political results of Roman teaching. However, in
course of time, none too soon, nobler and juster counsels began to
prevail, and the time approached when all the impartial desired the
removal of restrictions and penalties which were formed on principles
of brutality and retaliation happily growing obsolete. But to secure
the removal of penal legislation, it was necessary for the Romanists
in England to reassure the public opinion that they were not bound by
theories from Rome irreconcilable with English loyalty.

[147] Quoted in W. Ward’s _Life of Wiseman_, i. p. 515.

When accordingly in the year 1788 a Committee of English Romanists
was formed to appeal to Parliament for the removal of Roman
disabilities,[148] the petitioners declared that it was a duty which
they owed to their country, as well as themselves, to protest in a
formal and solemn manner against doctrines which constituted no
part of their principles, religion, or belief.[149] Among these they
rejected the theory that excommunicated princes may be deposed or
murdered by their subjects. They declared that no ecclesiastical power
whatever can absolve subjects from allegiance to lawful temporal
authority.[150] They wrote: “We believe that no act that is in itself
immoral or dishonest can ever be justified by or under colour that
it is done either for the good of the Church or in obedience to any
ecclesiastical power whatever.”[151] And--what now particularly
concerns us here--they said: “We acknowledge no Infallibility in the
Pope.”

[148] See Butler, _Historical Memoirs of the English Catholics_, vol.
ii. p. 115ff.

[149] See Butler, _Historical Memoirs of the English Catholics_, vol.
ii. p. 117.

[150] _Ibid._ p. 118.

[151] _Ibid._ p. 119.

This protestation of the Roman Catholics of England brought about the
passing of the Relief Act of 1791. The representative character of the
document may be realised from the fact that it was signed by all the
four Vicars Apostolic; that is by all the highest Roman authorities in
England, by 240 priests; and in all by 1,523 members of the Anglo-Roman
body, among whom most of the educated and influential laity were
included. It would be interesting to ascertain what proportion the 240
priests bore to the total number of Roman clergy in this land. Accurate
statistics are not easily obtained. The Committee of English Romanists
claimed that the total number of Roman priests in England did not
exceed 260. Berington, in 1780, estimated the number as nearer 360,
of whom 110 were ex-Jesuits. From these figures it would appear that,
if the Jesuits are left out, nearly the whole body of Roman Clergy in
England, including their four Bishops, committed themselves frankly to
rejection of Papal Infallibility.[152]

[152] Bernard Ward, _Dawn of the Catholic Revival_, i. p. 151.

Dr Milner describes it, indeed, as “drawn up in ungrammatical language,
with inconclusive reasoning and erroneous theology.”[153] And a vicar
apostolic who first signed it afterwards withdrew his signature.[154]
On the other hand, an influential section of the Communion placed the
document in the British Museum, “that it may be preserved there as a
lasting memorial of their political and moral integrity.”[155]

[153] Cf. Husenbeth’s _Life of Milner_, p. 23.

[154] _Ibid._ p. 24.

[155] Cf. Gladstone, _Vaticanism_, p. 47.

The history of Irish Roman belief is similar. An Act for their relief
was passed in 1793. It contains an oath which states that “it is not an
article of the Catholic Faith, neither am I thereby required to believe
or profess that the Pope is infallible.”[156]

[156] _Ibid._ p. 48.

In an address to Protestants of the United Empire in 1813 by a Roman
Catholic writer (Charles Butler), anti-Roman prejudice is reassured
by the terms of the oath taken by Irish Roman Catholics:[157] “In the
oath taken by the Irish Roman Catholics they swear that ‘it is not an
article of the Catholic faith, and that they are not thereby bound to
believe or profess that the Pope is infallible.’”[158]

[157] Gladstone, _Vaticanism_, p. 218.

[158] _Ibid._ p. 230.

No less unmistakable is the language of a Roman Catholic Bishop in
England in 1822:--

“Bellarmine and some other divines, chiefly Italians, have believed
the Pope infallible, when proposing _ex cathedra_ an article of
faith. But in England or Ireland I do not believe that any Catholic
maintains the Infallibility of the Pope.”[159]

[159] Bishop Baine’s Defence, quoted in Gladstone, _Vaticanism_, p. 48.

The Pastoral Address of the Irish Bishops to their clergy and laity
in 1826 declared that it is “not an article of the Catholic faith,
neither are they thereby required to believe that the Pope is
infallible.”[160]

[160] Gladstone, _Vatican Decrees_, vol. xliii. ed. 1875.

Accordingly, a Roman Catholic nobleman, Lord Clifford, writing to
reassure the English peers on the Maynooth Endowment Bill, could say
in 1845: “It is not an article of Catholic faith that the Pope is
infallible even in matters of faith.”[161]

[161] Letters to the Earl of Winchelsea, p. 15.

There is not the slightest reason to doubt the sincerity of the
Romanist statements. They were not misrepresenting their convictions to
improve their circumstances. They genuinely believed these principles.
They claimed as Catholics an independence from Romanising views.

When Dr Wiseman (afterwards Cardinal) was nominated by the Pope to the
London District in 1847, nearly all the clergy, says Wilfred Ward,
“were sufficiently imbued by the conservative and national spirit to
be opposed to his energetic scheme of reform.”[162] They viewed with
distaste his “Romanising” proclivities. Trained in the College in
Rome, having spent years under the Pope’s immediate direction, Wiseman
returned to England bent on propagating that “papistic spirit” against
which the older English Roman Catholics, as represented by Sir John
Throgmorton, had so vigorously protested.[163] The introduction of
the Jesuit and other religious Orders was Wiseman’s work, and it was
repugnant to the temper and prejudices of the old Romanist families
in England. But Rome approved, and Wiseman persisted. Then came the
re-establishment of the Roman Hierarchy in England, the elevation of
Wiseman to the Cardinalate, and his return to England as Archbishop
of Westminster. Then the Tractarian movement gave new life to the
Anglican Church; but it also contributed new distinction and new
strength to the Roman Communion. Converts like Faber threw themselves,
with the convert’s proverbial intensity, into the most extreme of
Roman devotions, legends, and principles; much to the amazement and
disgust of the old-fashioned Romans, who found themselves regarded with
coldness and indifference, as half-Catholic, at Rome, while the zealous
converted extremists basked in the sunshine of Rome’s approval. There
is no little irony in the situation. The Vicar Apostolic of the London
district warned Newman on his conversion against “books of devotion
of the Italian School.”[164] Faber reproduced the most Italianised
lives of the saints. Bishop Ullathorne of Birmingham, himself of old
Roman family, considered these Italian compositions unsuited to this
country. Newman, as Superior of the Oratory, wrote to Faber, describing
them as “unsuited to England and unacceptable to Protestants.”[165]
Accordingly the publications ceased. But Wiseman’s exertions to promote
Ultramontanism within the Roman Communion continued, and were most
successful. Here is a letter of approval written to the Cardinal from
influential quarters in Rome:--

[162] _Life of Wiseman_, i. p. 515.

[163] _Ibid._ p. 512.

[164] _Life of Wiseman_, ii. p. 221.

[165] _Ibid._ p. 223.

“I can say that you have been the instrument under God, to _Romanise_
England.... You have been able to change the whole feeling of the
rising clergy, and to instil into the laity what Roman principles
they possess.”[166]

[166] 1859.

But if Wiseman “changed the feeling of the rising clergy,” this was
not done without desperate struggles on the part of the older clergy.
Wiseman, whose insight into human nature was of the scantiest, chose
as his coadjutor, with the right of succession, Bishop Errington.
Errington belonged to the older school. The Chapter of Westminster
agreed with him. Accordingly Wiseman found himself opposed by the
Chapter, with the Coadjutor-Bishop as their leader. The contest
which followed was, says Wilfred Ward, “the turning point in the
controversy between the conservative policy and that of the new
Ultramontanism.”[167] It was no merely personal struggle, but a
struggle of principles. On the other side, Wiseman pushed forward
Manning, whom the Pope sent from Rome and placed as Provost over the
entire Chapter of Westminster.

[167] _Life of Wiseman_, ii. p. 321.

Into the details of the struggle we cannot go. But Errington and
Manning fought for opposing principles. Manning, says Wilfred Ward,
with his “fixed ideas and firm determination.”[168] As to Errington:
“iron determination and persistency were stamped on face and figure.”
“Both men of strong will with utterly opposite ideals and aims.”[169]
Errington had none of the tactful discretion of the diplomatist in
his constitution, and was no match for the subtlety of Manning. And
ultimately, on Wiseman’s appeal to Rome, Errington was removed by the
Pope from the position of Coadjutor, and lost his right of succession
to the Archbishopric of Westminster. The main charge against him was
that he was anti-Roman in sympathies.[170] Great was the rejoicing
among the Ultramontanes at this victory. The succession of Bishop
Errington was their greatest fear.

[168] _Ibid._ ii. p. 265.

[169] _Ibid._ p. 254.

[170] _Ibid._ p. 332.

“I cannot conceive a greater misfortune,” wrote a high authority from
Rome to Cardinal Wiseman, “than your being followed by Dr Errington,
who, I feel certain, if he ever become Archbishop of Westminster,
will do all he can to undo what has been done, and will be a
constant source of annoyance to the Holy See.”[171]

[171] _Life of Wiseman_, p. 331.

Father Faber wrote in similar strains:--

“If [Dr Errington] returns to Westminster as Archbishop, the Holy See
will have to reckon that it will take fifty, if not a hundred, years
to restore England to the pitch of Ultramontanism which she has now
reached.”[172]

[172] _Ibid._ p. 370.

On Wiseman’s death the older Catholic party made one more struggle for
supremacy. The Chapter of Westminster, notwithstanding that Manning
presided, longed for a Bishop of the older school. Accordingly, their
then selected candidates were Bishop Errington, Bishop Grant, and
Bishop Clifford. The insertion of Errington’s name was considered by
the Pope as a personal insult. In the interests of their own aims it
was certainly unwise; for it rendered the Pope disinclined to listen to
any of the Chapter’s suggestions.[173] As for Bishop Clifford, Manning
denounced him in a private letter to Rome as a worldly Catholic, _i.e._
opposed to the Ultramontanes; and he sided against Infallibility
afterwards in the Vatican Council. As for Bishop Grant, Manning wrote:--

[173] _Life of Manning_, ii. p. 206.

“I cannot for a moment even fear that the Holy See would accept any
one of these names. I wish,” added Manning, conscious of the critical
nature of the struggle for the future of Ultramontanism in England,
“I wish that the Holy Father would reserve the Archbishopric in
perpetuity to the Holy See. For it is perfectly certain that whoever
comes, it is a question of a change of policy. It is Tories out and
Whigs in, with all the consequences.”[174]

[174] _Ibid._

Manning’s prophetic instinct proved correct. Pius IX. paused,
reflected, took advice, and ultimately, not however without
considerable misgivings, set aside all three of the Chapter’s
nominations, and on his own authority appointed Manning.[175] Now
Manning led the English Ultramontanes in the Council of the Vatican.

[175] 1865.

But the task of Romanising the English Catholics was no easy thing. The
_literature_ of the Roman Communion in England and Ireland during the
eighteenth and early nineteenth century shows how thoroughly saturated
they were with Catholic as contrasted with Ultramontane convictions.
It is difficult to obtain that literature in its genuine and original
form to-day; for of course all works reprinted since 1870 have been
altered into conformity with Vatican ideas. In some cases the process
of reducing to conformity was begun at an earlier date. It is therefore
with works printed before 1870 that we are now concerned.

1. For example, in the well-known Roman manual of theology by
Berrington and Kirk, entitled the _Faith of Catholics_, confirmed
by Scripture, and attested by the Fathers of the first five
centuries--with St Vincent’s maxim on the title-page (“that which has
been believed always everywhere,” etc.)--we find the following teaching
on Infallibility:--

“It is no article of Catholic Faith to believe that the Pope is
himself infallible, separated from the Church, even in expounding the
Faith: by consequence, Papal definitions or decrees, in whatever form
pronounced, taken exclusively from a General Council or acceptance
of the Church, oblige no one under pain of heresy to an interior
assent.”[176]

[176] Page 165.

This teaching, found in the edition of 1830, now disappears.

2. Delahogue was Professor in Dublin where his theological works
were published in several volumes in 1829. The type of instruction
then given in an Irish seminary to students of Roman theology may be
understood from the fact that Delahogue asserts that the doctrine that
the Roman Pontiff, even when he speaks _ex cathedra_, is possessed of
the gift of inerrancy or is superior to General Councils may be denied
without loss of faith or risk of heresy or schism.

To justify this position appeal is made among others to Cardinal Perron
who, although himself a supporter of the doctrine of papal inerrancy,
assured King James I. that the question was not a hindrance to
Ecclesiastical Reunion; since whichever view his Majesty might adopt he
would none the less on either side be recognised as Catholic.

Delahogue appealed also to the fact that no reference to Papal
Infallibility occurs in the Creed of Pius IV. Bossuet’s famous
exposition affirmed that matters disputed in the schools of theology,
and invidiously brought forward by Calvinistic doctors, were no part of
the Catholic Faith; and Bossuet’s Exposition was endorsed by a brief
of Innocent XI. Delahogue also pointed out that inferences from the
figurative comparison of the relation between the Pope and the Church
to that between the human head and body must be drawn with discretion.
The effect of decapitation upon the human body differs from that of
the death of a Pope upon the Church. Indeed the latter is essentially
the same in spite of a long interregnum, or a schism, or a doubtful
succession of forty years. Similarly, it does not follow that an _ex
cathedra_ fallacious utterance would be the Church’s ruin.

3. De Lisle, who was received into the Roman Communion at the age of
fifteen, in 1825, was moulded in the Roman convictions as held in
England at that date. Forty years later he recorded his faith in the
following words:--

“We are far from claiming for the Papacy any separate Infallibility
distinct from that which all Catholics are bound to believe in, as
the prerogative of the _Universal Church_. Those who make so novel
a claim must reconcile it with the grave facts of ecclesiastical
history.... And we believe that with those facts undenied and not
disproved it would be impossible for the Church to define any such
theories to be articles of faith.”[177]

[177] Ambrose Lisle Phillipps, _Union Review_, May 1866, p. 95.

The following year De Lisle repeated his convictions on Infallibility
in a letter to Father Ryder, afterwards Superior of the Birmingham
Oratory.

“I will tell you my own belief, as to that attribute of Holy Church,
which a learned Bishop pronounced accurate and orthodox. First of
all, I believe Infallibility to be a _conjunctive_ and _collective_
attribute of the _whole Catholic Church_ according to the words of
Holy Church in her Collect, ‘God by whose Spirit the whole body
of the Church is governed and sanctified.’ In other words, the
infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit is given to the whole Church
in its collective capacity, to the Laity as well as the Clergy. To
the latter especially in their collective capacity as the teachers.
To the former as the recipients of that teaching, giving them an
instinctive apprehension of what is or is not in conformity with the
traditional teaching of the Church. Now in this view of the matter,
no one, whether pastor or layman, has any _separate personal_ gift of
the infallible guidance of the Holy Spirit, but it is given to all
collectively in order to enable them _safely to keep_ and _rightly
to apprehend_ the Deposit of Faith.... Now it follows from my view
that all Catholics--from the Pope downwards to the meanest baptized
layman--all are under the infallible guidance of the Holy Spirit,
as long as all, in their respective positions, whether as Teachers
or Believers, are acting and believing according to the unchangeable
Deposit, for the preservation and right understanding of which the
power of _binding and loosing_ and of _feeding_ the whole flock has
been conferred upon the supreme Pastor.”[178]

[178] 1867. De Lisle, _Life_, ii. pp. 36, 37.

4. Milner’s _End of Religious Controversy_ was written to explain the
Roman tenets to Protestants and to remove misapprehensions.[179]

[179] Milner, _End of Religious Controversy_, ed. 2, 1819, p. 150.

“When any fresh controversy arises in the Church, the fundamental
maxim of the Bishops and Popes to whom it belongs to decide upon
it, is, not to consult their own private opinion or interpretation
of Scripture but to enquire _what is and ever has been the doctrine
of the Church_ concerning it. Hence their cry is and ever has been
on such occasions, as well in her Councils as out of them: _So we
have received; so the Universal Church believes: let there be no new
doctrine; none but what has been delivered down to us by Tradition_.
The Infallibility, then, of our Church is not a power of telling
all things past, present, and to come, such as Pagans ascribed to
their oracles; but merely the aid of God’s Holy Spirit to enable
her truly to decide what her faith is and has ever been, in such
articles as have been made known to her by Scripture and tradition.
This definition furnishes answer to divers other objections and
questions.... The Church does not decide the controversy concerning
the Conception of the Blessed Virgin, and several other disputed
points, because she sees nothing absolutely clear and certain
concerning them, either in the written or the unwritten word, and
therefore leaves her children to form their own opinions concerning
them. Finally his Lordship, with other controversialists, objects
against the Infallibility of the Catholic Church, that its advocates
are not agreed where to lodge this prerogative, some ascribing it to
the Pope, others to a General Council, or to the Bishops dispersed
throughout the Church. True, schoolmen discuss some such points; but
let me ask his Lordship whether he finds any Catholic who denies or
doubts that a General Council, with the Pope at its head, or that the
Pope himself, issuing a doctrinal decision which is received by the
great body of Catholic Bishops, is secure from error? Most certainly
not, and hence he may gather where all Catholics agree in lodging
Infallibility.”

Milner’s view of Catholicism is that if we would know what is of faith,
we must ask what is and ever has been the doctrine of the Church. A
dogma cannot be something new. It must be what has been universally
believed from the beginning. Tried by this test, he finds that the
Immaculate Conception is an opinion, not a doctrine of the Church;
that individuals are free to form their own opinion concerning it,
because there was nothing absolutely clear and certain about it either
in the written or the unwritten word; that Papal Infallibility was a
matter of scholastic discussion, a theory of theologians, but that the
Infallibility of the Church was a matter which no Catholic doubted.

5. Gallitzin’s rejection of Papal Infallibility is even more emphatic.

“Although I have plainly told the Protestant minister that the
Infallibility of the Pope is no part of the Catholic Creed, a mere
opinion of some divines, an article nowhere to be found in our
professions of faith, in our creeds, in our catechisms, etc., yet
the Protestant minister most ungenerously and uncandidly brings it
forward, over and over again, as an article of the Catholic faith;
and takes his opportunity from this forgery of his own to abuse the
Catholic Church.”[180]

[180] Gallitzin, _Defence of Catholic Principles_. See _Papal
Infallibility_, by a Roman Catholic layman, 1876, p. 16.

6. Another exposition of the Roman faith for English-speaking people
is the famous book called _Keenan’s Catechism_. It is entitled
_Controversial Catechism, or Protestantism Refuted and Catholicism
Established_. The edition of 1860 is described as the third edition,
and in its seventeenth thousand. It bears the imprimatur of four Roman
Bishops, two of them being Vicars Apostolic. In these approbations we
are assured that “the sincere searcher after truth will here find a
lucid path opened to conduct him to its sanctuary; while the believer
will be hereby instructed and confirmed in his faith.” From 1846 to
1860 it was being largely circulated throughout England, Scotland, and
Ireland.

The book contains the following question and answer:--

“(_Q._) Must not Catholics believe the Pope in himself to be
infallible?

(_A._) This is a Protestant invention: it is no article of the
Catholic faith: no decision of his can oblige under pain of heresy,
unless it be received and enforced by the teaching body, that is by
the bishops of the Church.”

_Keenan’s Catechism_ has since 1870 appeared with alterations. The new
edition is, as the preface justly remarks, “more than a mere reprint.”
As issued in 1896, it rightly styles itself a “revised edition.” The
question and answer just quoted have of course now disappeared. They
are replaced by a series of ten enquiries, with answers giving exactly
the contrary doctrine. The first of these runs as follows:--

“(_Q._) What do Catholics believe concerning the Infallibility of the
Pope?

(_A._) That the visible Head of the Church on earth received
from Christ the same prerogative of Infallibility which we have
shown above to be necessary to and belong to the Church by divine
institution.”[181]

[181] Page 111.

Thus what was formerly denounced as a Protestant invention is now
affirmed as a Catholic truth.

The earlier revisers of _Keenan’s Catechism_ contented themselves with
quiet substitution of the new doctrine for the old without further
explanation. But the later revisers have felt that something more
was necessary to justify the change. Accordingly they inserted the
following:--

“(_Q._) But some Catholics before the Vatican Council denied the
Infallibility of the Pope, which was also formerly impugned in this
very Catechism.

(_A._) Yes; but they did so under the usual reservation--‘in so far
as they then could grasp the mind of the Church, and subject to her
future definitions’--thus _implicitly_ accepting the dogma; had they
been prepared to maintain their own opinion contumaciously in such
case they would have been Catholics only in name.”

That is to say, that teaching endorsed by Catholic Bishops is delivered
under the reservation that the opposite may be true; that this is the
usual reservation, applicable therefore to all Episcopal teaching;
that no certainty exists in the Roman Communion whether instruction
now being given as Catholic may not be upset and reversed by some
future definition; (in which case what is its authoritative value
and its relation to truth?) and that the Roman Bishops who endorsed
Keenan’s first edition implicitly accepted the dogma which they
explicitly denied. I am most anxious not to exaggerate. But this
seems an intellectual and a moral confusion. There is something wrong
with a cause which requires such a defence. But this is not all. For
the revised edition goes on to enquire, “Were there any other dogmas
defined by the Church which had been controverted before decision?”
This is answered in the affirmative. “Nearly every definition of dogma
by the Church had been preceded by a period of controversy, in which
theologians ranked themselves on different sides.” Then the question is
asked:--

“(_Q._) Can you name any Controversies on fundamental dogma on
which the Church pronounced in the same way as she did on Papal
Infallibility at the Vatican Council?

(_A._) Yes. The Divinity of Christ was not formally defined till the
first Council of Nicæa (325).”

Some other instances having been given, we then reach the Question--

“(_Q._) What do you conclude from these observations?

(_A._) That the definition of the Infallibility of the Pope as a
dogma of primitive Christian Revelation has historically run a course
similar to the definition of many other fundamental articles of the
Catholic Faith.”

The implications of this assertion are worth considering. A parallel
is drawn between the attitude of Catholics towards the two doctrines
of Papal Infallibility and of the Divinity of Jesus Christ. They have
historically, it is said, run a similar course. Now we ask just this:
Were those Bishops who endorsed _Keenan’s Catechism_ Catholics or not?
There is only one possible reply: Yes, they were. They lived and died
in the Communion of the Roman Church. It was then possible to be a
Catholic before 1870 and yet deny this doctrine of Papal Infallibility.
But was it ever possible to be a Catholic while denying the other
doctrine, the Divinity of Jesus Christ? There is only one answer that
can be given. Assuredly it was not. Explicit denial of the Divinity
of our Lord must indisputably _ipso facto_ exclude from Catholicity,
and must have had this effect at any stage in the development of
Christendom. Consequently the parallel between the course which these
two doctrines have historically pursued is simply misleading and
untrue. Indeed the assertion grievously misrepresents the evidence. A
real parallel would require that as the doctrine of Papal Infallibility
was disputed by Roman Catholics for many hundreds of years, and openly
described as a mere opinion of the Schools which might be taken or left
without detriment to Catholicity--indeed controversially deprecated
as an invention of opponents, ungenerously and uncandidly ascribed
to the Catholic Church, while its acceptance and rejection were both
tolerated by the Church itself--similar experience awaited the doctrine
of the Divinity of Christ. But not one iota of this holds good with
the Divinity of Christ. Our Lord’s Divinity was never disputed by
Catholics, never openly described as a mere opinion of the schools; its
rejection never was or could be tolerated by the Church for a single
hour. No doubt there were imperfect expressions in the ante-Nicene
period, but there was no silence on this doctrine in the primitive
Church. The Arian was not an implicit Catholic, inwardly prepared to
accept what he outwardly denied. Nor would he have been grateful for
this explanation of his attitude. He never was a Catholic at all.
Moreover, if the character of the two doctrines be considered, it
is inevitable to ask whether the doctrine of Papal Infallibility is
fundamental in the Christian Faith. If it be fundamental after the
Church has defined it, it was fundamental before the definition. A
doctrine does not become fundamental through the Church’s definition,
but through its own intrinsic character. It therefore remains
unaccounted for that a fundamental of the Christian Faith should be
described as a Protestant invention, and such description sanctioned by
Catholic Bishops, and tolerated by Rome.

It is really incredible that a critically or historically trained
intellect could venture on so daring and unhistoric a parallel. Such
uncritical defence not only fails to secure its design, but suggests
an insecurity in the Church’s belief in the Divinity of her Lord. Such
defence is necessitated by the school which is constrained to condemn
what it previously taught, and to teach what it once condemned; but the
necessity for such defence betrays the character of the doctrine which
requires it.

The historical evidence, which might be considerably increased, shows
that English Romanists in general did not hold Papal Infallibility
even as a private opinion; that, on the contrary, they maintained
principles by which that opinion is excluded; that they believed in
the Infallibility of the Church, but placed that Infallibility in the
Collective Episcopate whether assembled or dispersed.

7. Even in the great College of Maynooth itself an Irish Roman Catholic
Professor could publish as late as 1861 such words as these:--

“That the Universal Church is infallible in its belief and profession
of faith, that the body of pastors is infallible in teaching, are
two dogmas of Catholic faith. That the Infallibility of the Chief
Pontiff is a revealed truth, and therefore definable, as of Catholic
faith, is to me personally perfectly clear. Nevertheless, since it
belongs to the Church alone to determine what is essential to belief,
and since that dogma has never yet been in that manner proposed to
be believed, they who genuinely hold the contrary are by no means or
only in the least degree (unless indeed some other ground be shown)
to be considered alien from the Catholic Faith.”[182]

[182] Murray, _Tractatus de Ecclesia Christ._ ii. (1), p. 171.

Here we have striking indications of a change. The Ultramontane
influence is recognised, although not submitted to; Papal Infallibility
is acknowledged as a private opinion of the teacher, but the contrary
opinion is, with reserve, recognised to be legitimate. This utterance
from Maynooth becomes more intelligible when it is remembered that
Cardinal Cullen, trained in Rome and nominated Primate of Ireland by
Pius IX., was now presiding over that Communion in Dublin. Cullen, says
Ollivier, responded admirably to the confidence which Pius IX. placed
in him.[183]

[183] Ollivier, _L’Eglise et L’Etat_, ii. p. 9.

“The Romanised Cullen,” says another, “whom the Pope forced as
Primate on the Irish Bishops, with the same view as he imposed
Manning on the English Bishops, is of course an Infallibilist.”[184]

[184] _Quirinus_, p. 290.

_Journalism_ in England took no unimportant part in the struggle
between Catholic and Ultramontane. That most paradoxical extremist, the
convert Ward, was appointed by Wiseman in 1862 editor of the _Dublin
Review_.[185] Ward’s ideal in his Roman days was spiritual dictatorship
of the most absolute character.[186] He said he wanted pontifical
decrees every morning for breakfast with his newspaper. And Manning
encouraged him. Manning shut his eyes to Ward’s exaggerations and
rejoiced in his uncompromising tone.

[185] Thureau Dangin, ii. p. 336.

[186] _Ibid._ p. 343.

“What we need,” he wrote, “is incisive assertion of the loftiest
truths. I am persuaded that boldness is prudence, and that our danger
lies in half truths.”[187]

[187] _Ibid._

So blessed and sanctioned, Ward went straight ahead. The Ultramontanism
of the _Dublin Review_ must have been gall and bitterness to the
old-fashioned English Romanist.

While Ward and the _Dublin Review_, supported by Manning, pushed
papal absolutism to the furthest extremes, Lord Acton and the series
of journals with which he was connected, such as the _Rambler_ and
the short-lived but brilliant _Home and Foreign Review_, recalled the
Catholic mind to the facts of History. Abbot Gasquet’s estimate of the
_Dublin Review_ and the _Rambler_ is significant.

“The _Dublin Review_ and the _Rambler_ were conducted upon lines
wholly divergent. In historical matters the policy of the _Dublin
Review_ appears to have been to avoid as far as possible facing
unpleasant facts in the past, and to explain away, if it could not
directly deny, the existence of blots in the ecclesiastical annals of
the older centuries. The _Rambler_, on the other hand, held the view
that the Church had nothing to lose and much to gain by meeting facts
as they were.”[188]

[188] Gasquet, _Lord Acton and his Circle_, p. xxxix.

The refusal to face the facts, the resolve to manipulate them in
the interests of edification, was characteristic of an extensive
controversial school of which the _Dublin Review_ was a vigorous and
extreme exponent. It was done deliberately, on principle, prompted by
a profound distrust of history. Lord Acton’s criticisms[189] on this
uncritical method of advancing truth are inimitable.

[189] “Ultramontanism,” _Home and Foreign Review_, iii. p. 173, 1863.

“A particular suspicion rested on history, because, as the study
of facts, it was less amenable to authority and less controlled by
interest than philosophical speculation. In consequence partly of the
denial of historical certainty, and partly of the fear of it, the
historical study of dogma in its original sources was abandoned, and
the dialectical systematic treatment preferred.”[190]

As to the treatment of History: “First, it was held, the interests
of religion, which are opposed to the study of history, require that
precautions should be taken to make it innocuous where it cannot be
quite suppressed. If it is lawful to conceal facts or statements, it
is equally right to take out their sting when they must be brought
forward. It is not truth, but error, which is suppressed by this
process, the object of which is to prevent a false impression being
made on the minds of men. For the effect of those facts or statements
is to prejudice men against the Church, and to lead them to false
conclusions concerning her nature. Whatever tends to weaken this
adverse impression contributes really to baffle a falsehood and
sustain the cause of truth. The statement, however true in its own
subordinate place, will only seem to mislead in a higher order of
truth, where the consequences may be fatal to the conscience and
happiness of those who hear it without any qualification. Words,
moreover, often convey to the uninstructed mind ideas contrary to
their real significance, and the interpretation of facts is yet
more delusive.... For the object is not the discovery of objective
truth, but the production of a right belief in a particular mind....
It is the duty of the son to cover the shame of his father; and the
Catholic owes it to the Church to defend her against every adverse
fact as he would defend the honour of his mother. He will not coldly
examine the value of testimony, or concede any point because it
is hard to meet, or assist with unbiassed mind in the discovery
of truth before he learns what its bearing may be. Assured that
nothing injurious to the Church can be true, he will combat whatever
bears an unfavourable semblance with every attainable artifice and
weapon.”[191]

[190] “Ultramontanism,” _Home and Foreign Review_, p. 175.

[191] _Ibid._ p. 177.

An Anglican writer has given us a terse expression of the same idea:
The Deity, we are told, cannot alter the past. But the ecclesiastical
historian can and does.[192]

[192] Inge, _Truth and Falsehood in Religion_, p. 41.

With all the instinct of self-preservation, the Ultramontane mistrusted
and resented the historical School. Cardinal Wiseman wrote in a
Pastoral[193] a severe denunciation of the journal which Acton edited.
To the Cardinal, the _Home and Foreign Review_ seemed characterised by
“the absence for years of all reserve and reverence in its treatment of
persons or of things deemed sacred.” He wrote with great severity on
what appeared to him its “habitual preference of uncatholic to Catholic
instincts, tendencies, and motives.”

[193] Cf. Bishop Ullathorne. Letter on the _Rambler_, 1862, p. 3.

Acton[194] admitted in his reply that “a very formidable mass of
ecclesiastical authority and popular feeling was united against
certain principles or opinions which, whether rightly or wrongly,
are attributed to us.” He then proceeded to give an account of the
principles which ought to govern the attitude of Catholics towards
modern discoveries.

[194] Acton, _History of Freedom_, p. 446.

“A political law or a scientific truth may be perilous to the
morals or the faith of individuals, but it cannot on this ground be
resisted by the Church. It may at times be a duty of the State to
protect freedom of conscience, yet this freedom may be a temptation
to apostasy. A discovery may be made in science which will shake the
faith of thousands, yet religion cannot refute it or object to it.
The difference in this respect between a true and a false religion
is, that one judges all things by the standard of their truth, the
other by the touchstone of its own interests.”[195]

[195] _Ibid._ p. 449.

And this led Acton to pronounce a severe criticism on methods of
defence prevalent in the Roman Catholic Church of the day. He said that
in reaction from the unscrupulous attacks of the eighteenth century, a
school of apologists had arisen dominated by the opinion that nothing
said against the Church could be true. Their only object was defence.
“They were often careless in statement, rhetorical and illogical in
argument, too positive to be critical and too confident to be precise.”
“In this school,” he continues, “the present generation of Catholics
was educated.” And he complains that “the very qualities which we
condemn in our opponents, as the natural defences of error, and the
significant emblems of a bad cause, came to taint both our literature
and our policy.” Meanwhile, learning had passed on beyond the vision of
such apologists, and the apologists have, so far as effectiveness is
concerned, collapsed before it.

“Investigations have become so impersonal, so colourless, so free
from the prepossessions which distort truth, from predetermined aims
and foregone conclusions, that their results can only be met by
investigations in which the same methods are yet more completely and
conscientiously applied.”[196]

[196] Acton, _History of Freedom_, p. 452.

Resort to suppressive methods is, Acton was profoundly persuaded,
suicidal as well as immoral. It argues either a timid faith which
fears the light, or a false morality which would do evil that good
might come. “How often have Catholics involved themselves in hopeless
contradiction, sacrificed principle to opportunity, adapted their
theories to their interest, and staggered the world’s reliance on their
sincerity by subterfuges which entangle the Church in the shifting
sands of party warfare, instead of establishing her cause on the solid
rock of principles!”[197]

[197] Acton, _History of Freedom_, p. 454.

This noble appeal was unfortunately denounced by Bishop Ullathorne
of Birmingham in a Pastoral wholly devoted to its refutation. What
particularly disturbed the Bishop’s mind was the distinction which
Acton drew between a true and a false religion: that one judged all
things by the standard of their truth, the other by the touchstone of
its own interests. It appeared to Ullathorne[198] that

[198] _Pastoral_ (1862), p. 9.

“to say that the Church cannot refute or object to a discovery which
will shake the faith of thousands; meaning thereby to deny her right
to examine that discovery after her own methods, and by the union of
science with faith in her theology, to ascertain whether and how far
that discovery be true, ... is to deny to the Church her mission to
prove all things, and to hold fast that which is good. It is to deny
her the mission of teaching to avoid oppositions of science falsely
so called, and of protecting those thousands of souls from having
their faith shaken by the erroneous deductions which men of science
are too apt to draw from those real discoveries which can never
conflict with faith.”

Thus was Acton misunderstood. And Bishop Ullathorne concluded
by condemning the journal as “containing propositions which are
respectively subversive of the faith, heretical, approaching to heresy,
erroneous, derogatory to the teaching of the Church, and offensive to
pious ears.”[199]

[199] _Ibid._ p. 42. A.D. 1862.

Notwithstanding this severe rebuke Acton continued to persevere.

The suppression of Lord Acton’s brilliant but short-lived _Home and
Foreign Review_ illustrates the restraints imposed upon an independent
historian by the necessity of submission to the opinions of Roman
Congregations, such as that of the Index. It was in the year 1863, when
his periodical was some four years old, that Pius IX. issued a Brief to
the Archbishop of Munich in which he affirmed that

“it is not enough for learned Catholics to receive and venerate
the dogmas of the Church, but there is also need that they should
submit themselves to the doctrinal decisions of the pontifical
congregations.”

This Papal Brief made no reference to Lord Acton or to the _Home and
Foreign Review_, but it vitally affected the principles upon which
that periodical had been throughout its short existence of four years
conducted. For its principles were these:--

“To reconcile freedom of enquiry with implicit faith, and to
discountenance what is untenable and unreal, without forgetting the
tenderness due to the weak, or the reverence rightly claimed for
what is sacred. Submitting without reserve to infallible authority,
it will encourage a habit of manly investigation on subjects of
scientific interest.”

This means a claim for freedom in the province of opinion, and a
right to the fearless assertion of historic truth. But how was it
possible to reconcile that freedom with the literary decisions of
such a Congregation as that of the Index? Consequently Lord Acton
wrote a signed article in the _Review_, bearing the significant title,
“Conflicts with Rome.” It is written with admirable self-command and
dignity, with the frankest confession of loyalty to truth from whatever
sources derived, and under a solemn sense of the impossibility of
reconciling the encroachment of Roman Authority with the independence
essential to historic science. In a powerful sketch of the case
of Lamennais, he shows how the extreme assertion of unlimited
authority easily led by reaction to total loss of faith; and how the
disparagement of human reason in the supposed interests of authority
really undermines the foundation upon which all things human--that
authority itself included--must necessarily rest. On the other side he
draws a striking picture of the general attitude of Roman authority
toward modern thought. He says, that in dealing with literature--

“the paramount consideration of Rome had been the fear of scandal.
Historical investigations, if they offered perilous occasion to
unprepared and unstable minds, were suppressed”--upon which he
remarks that “the true limits of legitimate authority are one thing,
and the area which authority may find it expedient to attempt to
occupy, is another. The interests of the Church are not necessarily
identical with those of the ecclesiastical government. One of the
great instruments for preventing historical scrutiny had long been
the Index of Prohibited Books, which was accordingly directed, not
against falsehood only, but particularly against certain departments
of truth. Through it an effort had been made to keep the knowledge
of ecclesiastical history from the faithful, and to give currency
to a fabulous and fictitious picture of the progress and action of
the Church. The means would have been found quite inadequate to the
end, if it had not been for the fact that, while society was absorbed
by controversy, knowledge was only valued so far as it served a
controversial purpose. Every party in those days virtually had its
own prohibitive Index, to brand all inconvenient truths with the note
of falsehood. No party cared for knowledge that could not be made
available for argument.”

This suppression of uncongenial fact was less possible in the German
Universities, where the Roman Catholic teacher was placed amidst
perfect freedom of enquiry, and where “the system of secrecy or
accommodation was rendered impossible by the competition of knowledge
in which the most thorough exposition of the truth was sure of the
victory.” The teacher in this environment “was obliged often to draw
attention to books lacking the Catholic spirit but indispensable to the
deeper student.” The condition of things in Italy and in Germany was
widely different.

“While in Rome it was still held that the truths of Science need not
be told if, in the judgment of Roman theologians, they were of a
nature to offend faith, in Germany Catholics vied with Protestants in
publishing matter without being diverted by the consideration whether
it might serve or injure their cause in controversy, or whether it
was adverse or favourable to the views which it was the object of the
Index to protect.”

Yet for a while Rome had tolerated many things. “Publications were
suffered to pass unnoted in Germany, which would have been immediately
censured if they had come forth beyond the Alps or the Rhine.” German
philosophers were indeed denounced at Rome, but German historians
escaped censure. The reason was, according to Lord Acton, plain:--

“The philosopher cannot claim the same exemption as the historian.
God’s handwriting exists in history independently of the Church, and
no ecclesiastical exigence can alter a fact. The divine lesson has
been read, and it is the historian’s duty to copy it faithfully and
without ulterior views.”

But this toleration of independence in the realm of facts was now
abruptly terminated by authority. The Pope’s letter to the Archbishop
of Munich affirmed the view that Catholic writers are not bound only
by those decisions of the Infallible Church which regard articles of
faith. They must also submit to the theological decisions of the Roman
congregations, and to the opinions which are commonly received in
the schools; and it is wrong, though not heretical, to reject those
decisions or opinions.

In a word, therefore, the Brief affirms that the common opinions and
explanations of Catholic divines ought not to yield to the progress of
secular science, and that the course of theological knowledge ought
to be controlled by the decrees of the Index. Confronted with this
Declaration of Authority, Lord Acton professed himself resolved “to
interpret the words as they were really meant, and not to elude their
consequence by subtle distinctions, to profess adoption of maxims which
no man who holds the principles of the _Review_ can accept in their
intended signification.” In this Brief--“It is the design of the Holy
See not, of course, to deny the distinction between dogma and opinion,
... but to reduce the practical recognition of it among Catholics to
the smallest possible limits.”

Consequently, the question arose, what future was possible for the
_Home and Foreign Review_? Continued existence on unaltered principles
meant reiteration of principles denounced at Rome.

“The periodical reiteration of rejected propositions would amount
to insult and defiance, and would probably provoke more definite
measures; and thus the result would be to commit authority yet more
irrevocably to an opinion which might otherwise take no deep root,
and might yield ultimately to the influence of time.”

That this change of mind on the part of authority would be anything
else than the far-off outcome of a process indefinitely slow, Lord
Acton did not for a moment suppose. He acknowledged that the line taken
by Pius IX. expressed the general sentiment of the large majority of
Catholics of the age. And in Lord Acton’s view of the case, if new
truth is to gain recognition from authority, it

“must first pervade the members in order that it may reach the head.
While the general sentiment of Catholics is unaltered, the course
of the Holy See remains unaltered too. As soon as that sentiment
is modified, Rome sympathises with the change. The ecclesiastical
government, based upon the public opinion of the Church, and acting
through it, cannot separate itself from the mass of the faithful, and
keep pace with the progress of the instructed minority. It follows
slowly and warily, and sometimes begins by resisting and denouncing
what in the end it thoroughly adopts.... The slow, silent, indirect
action of public opinion bears the Holy See along, without any
demoralising conflict or dishonourable capitulation. This action it
belongs essentially to the graver scientific literature to direct.”

Meantime, Lord Acton’s lot is cast in the period when truth is resisted
and denounced. Hitherto forbearance has been extended to the minority.
But this is the case no longer. “The adversaries of the Roman theory
have been challenged with the summons to submit.”

“In these circumstances, there are two courses which it is impossible
to take. It would be wrong to abandon principles which have been well
considered and are sincerely held, and it would also be wrong to
assail the authority which contradicts them. The principles have not
ceased to be true, nor the authority to be legitimate, because the
two are in contradiction.”

Accordingly, Lord Acton’s practical solution is as follows:--

“Warned, therefore, by the language of the Brief, I will not provoke
ecclesiastical authority to a more explicit repudiation of doctrines
which are necessary to secure its influence upon the advance of
modern science.... I will sacrifice the existence of the _Review_
to the defence of its principles, in order that I may continue the
obedience which is due to legitimate ecclesiastical authority with
an equally conscientious maintenance of the rightful and necessary
liberty of thought.”

From that date accordingly the _Home and Foreign Review_ ceased to
exist. The expiration of a periodical may be an exceedingly small
incident in literary activity, but the principles involved in this
incident are of primary importance. Lord Acton’s indomitable belief in
the ultimate prevalence of historical truth, when the present tyranny
of ignorance should be overpast, is worthy of all regard. The dignified
surrender, coupled with frank reassertion of unaltered conviction, is
most significant. He bows to an authority which has transgressed its
limits, and which rejects to-day what it must of necessity at length
believe. His theory that the truth must pervade and possess the members
in order that it may reach the head, must have sounded strangely in
Italian ears. A silence explicitly self-imposed, lest authority,
if further provoked, should commit itself irrevocably to positions
fatal to its own best interests, is impressive and pathetic; but
certainly it suggests thoughts on the limits of authority incompatible
with Ultramontane assumptions. While this subsiding into silence
would prevent the irretrievable mischief of imprudent authoritative
declarations, it would, at the same time, delay the enlightenment of
the ignorant majority, and so delay the enlightenment of the head.
Worse still, such silence, if widespread, must disable the Church from
meeting the needs of modern thought, and from coping with, still more
from guiding, the educated world. Wherever the system of secrecy and
accommodation is rendered impossible, by the competition of knowledge
in which the most thorough exposition of the truth is sure of the
victory, there such methods as those advocated in the Brief, or
practised in submission to its dictation, must be fatal to the Church’s
wider influence. We may reverence the individual self-suppression, but
nothing can be more profoundly discouraging than the fatal conflict of
authority with historic truth. Even Lord Acton’s faith could only hope
that authority might ultimately acknowledge the principles upon whose
suppression it was for the present actively engaged. Thus the Church,
in his view, was committed to a fruitless conflict with truths to which
it must at last surrender. It was destined evermore to oppose all truth
for which the ignorance of the majority precluded recognition; to
silence its prophets and hereafter adorn their sepulchres; to denounce
as injurious what it would one day embrace as true; if, indeed, the
slowly increasing enlightenment of the general body of the devout shall
ultimately remove the prejudices of the head. Certainly the prospect
was scarcely one to cheer. It shows impressively the tremendous strain
which the encroachment of authority over the province of opinion placed
upon the faith of its noblest sons.

Bishop Ullathorne viewed the successive collapse of Acton’s journals
with a natural satisfaction.

“The unsound taint,” he wrote, “was brought to England by certain
young laymen, pupils of Dr Döllinger or others associated with him,
and exhibited itself in the later numbers of the _Rambler_ after it
passed into their hands, in the _Home and Foreign Review_, the _North
British Review_, and the _Chronicle_. But the Catholics of this
country repelled the poison, and these publications dropped rapidly
one after another into their grave.”[200]

[200] _Expostulation_, p. 5.

Meanwhile, on the other side, Ward’s ambition was to demonstrate
“how extensive is the intellectual captivity imposed by God on every
loyal Catholic.”[201] And there is no possibility to doubt which of
the two schools was congenial to Roman authority. For the editor of
the _Dublin Review_ was rewarded with expressions of papal approval,
while Lord Acton’s literary ventures were one after another brought
to untimely ends.[202] But the thing that flourished, the work upon
whose eccentricities and extravagances Roman authority looked with
favour, was the Apologetic of Ward in the _Dublin Review_. Utterly
unhistorical as it assuredly was, more Ultramontane than Rome itself,
carrying recent development to unprecedented excess, and exhibiting
exactly those characteristics of wilful blindness to uncongenial
facts which roused so justly Acton’s moral indignation, Ward’s Essays
were nevertheless the approved and sanctioned type of Roman doctrine
and Roman defence offered for the edification and guidance of Roman
Catholics in this land. There is something exceedingly tragic in the
suppression of Acton’s plea for sincerity and moral rectitude, coupled
with the encouragement given to the reckless and painfully superficial
utterances of the _Dublin Review_.

[201] _Essays on the Church’s Doctrinal Authority_, pp. 20, 34.

[202] Cf. _Church Times_, 26th July 1907.

The English Romanists as a body were scared by Ward’s extravagance.
And to none were his methods more repugnant than they were to John
Henry Newman. By a singular grace, Newman escaped the convert’s
proverbial temptation--that of carrying new beliefs to all possible
extremes. He had affinities with the _Dublin Review_ and with Lord
Acton’s Journals. But he was keenly conscious of the defects of both.
He thought the one lacking in regard for authority, the other in
reverence for fact. He was very far from identifying himself with
either.

When Ward attempted to enlist Newman in his Infallibility campaign,
Newman’s characteristic sincerity did not attempt to conceal the
repugnance with which he viewed the proposal.

“As to writing a volume on the Pope’s Infallibility it never so
much as entered into my thought. I am a controversialist, not a
theologian, and I should have nothing to say about it. I have ever
thought it likely to be true, never thought it certain. I think,
too, its definition inexpedient and unlikely; but I should have no
difficulty in accepting it, were it made. And I don’t think my reason
will ever go forward or backward in the matter.”[203]

[203] 1866, Thureau Dangin, iii. p. 111; Purcell, _Manning_, ii. p. 321.

But Newman despaired of inducing his fellow Romanists to attend to
history.

“Nothing would be better,” he wrote, “than a historical review. But
who would bear it? Unless one doctored all one’s facts one would be
thought a bad Catholic. The truth is, there is a keen conflict going
on just now between two parties--one in the Church, one out of it;
and at such seasons extreme views alone are in favour, and a man who
is not extravagant is thought treacherous. I sometimes think of King
Lear’s daughters, and consider that they, after all, may be found
the truest who are in speech more measured.”[204]

[204] See _Guardian_ article, 6th June 1906, from _the Month_ of
January 1903.

Hence it was that Ward’s vehement and exaggerated Ultramontanism drew
down upon him one of the severest rebukes which Newman perhaps ever
wrote. He told Ward that it was wholly uncatholic in spirit, and was
constituting a church within the Church. Ward comically observed that
after such a letter he must take a double dose of chloral if he meant
to sleep.

Newman also wrote a reassuring letter to Pusey, expressing his belief
that there was no fear of a decree of Papal Infallibility, except in
so limited a form as practically to leave things as they were.[205]
But when the Vatican Council was already met, and the probabilities
that the dominant party might succeed in reducing to fixity what had
hitherto been a theological opinion, at the most, became more and more
convincing, Newman wrote to his Bishop in a very different and very
anxious strain:--

[205] _Life of Pusey_, iv. p. 128.

“Why should an insolent, aggressive faction be allowed to make the
heart of the just sad, whom the Lord hath not made sorrowful? I pray
those early doctors of the Church whose intercession would decide
the matter (Augustine, Ambrose, and Jerome; Athanasius, Chrysostom,
and Basil) to avert this great calamity. If it is God’s will that
the Pope’s Infallibility be defined, then it is God’s will to throw
back the times and moments of the triumph which He has destined for
His kingdom, and I shall feel that I have but to bow my head to His
inscrutable Providence.”[206]

[206] _Standard_, 7th April 1870; Salmon, _Infallibility_, p. 22;
Thureau Dangin, iii. p. 124.

This memorable sentence, the most memorable of any from the Roman
Communion in England, was written in the full confidence of privacy to
his own Diocesan, Ullathorne, Roman Bishop of Birmingham. Somehow it
came to light, and appeared in the public press. The publication, never
explained, has been called a culpable indiscretion.[207] But whatever
it be called, it assuredly represents the writer’s most profound
conviction, uttered with perfect frankness. Here, as to his Father
in Christ, he reveals his soul. Trusted and confided in as he was by
individuals on either side within the Roman body; by Ward and Faber
on the one hand, and by Lord Acton on the other; profoundly intimate
with modern thought and religious conceptions beyond the Roman pale; he
anticipates disastrous consequences to the Church, and to the world, if
the Infallibility theory be decreed.

[207] Thureau Dangin, iii. p. 124.

Bishop Ullathorne[208] would undoubtedly receive this confidence
with perfect sympathy. For, although a believer of the doctrine, he
had himself, as a student, been taught the opposite at Downside.
Indeed, his own fidelity to Ultramontane ideas was so challenged that
he thought it advisable to seek a special interview with the Pope,
and assure him, at the time of the Vatican Decrees. But, naturally,
Newman’s letter not only produced a great sensation when it appeared
in the public press; it also deepened the distrust with which the
partisans of Infallibility regarded him. We can well understand how
one who wrote with so manifest an anxiety to stand by the historic
past, and to avoid extremes, was regarded with suspicion from Rome by
pronounced and uncompromising Ultramontanes.

[208] _Autobiography_, p. 41. Cf. Purcell, _Manning_, ii. p. 439.

As always in great movements, so with the doctrine of Papal
Infallibility, much depended on commanding personalities. And no figure
in the conflict of 1870 is more conspicuous than that of Archbishop
Manning. It was not for his learning or intellectual depth or piety
that he held so remarkable a place in promoting Ultramontane opinions.
But there is no doubt that, whether outside the Council or within, he
arrested universal attention. No man was more completely identified
with the doctrine than he; and identified with it in its extremest
form. No paradox alarmed him; he shrank from no inference, however
strange. Bellarmine would have been proud of him as in many ways a
worthy successor to his own _à priori_ methods. It is impossible
to mistake the temperament which produced the two famous Pastorals
launched by Manning for the instruction of English Romanists in 1867
and 1869.

He has already, and this is very significant, formulated the doctrine
practically in the same phrases in which it appeared in the Vatican
Decree: “Declarations of the Head of the Church apart from the
Episcopate are infallible.”[209] “Judgments _ex cathedra_ are, in
their essence, judgments of the Pontiff apart from the episcopal body,
whether congregated or dispersed.”[210]

[209] _Pastoral_ (1867), p. 23.

[210] _Ibid_. (1869), p. 142.

This doctrine, he is certain, the Church has always believed and
taught. History awakens no doubts, creates no problems, to Manning’s
mind. Everywhere he contemplates, both exercised and admitted, papal
inerrancy. His theory is that the stages of the doctrine have been
three: simple belief, analysis, definition. In the first period, belief
in the Church’s and the Pope’s inerrancy pervaded all the world. Thus
he thinks that the condemnation of Pelagianism by Innocent I. (418)
was regarded as infallible from the first moment of its promulgation.
As for Honorius, there is not the slightest reason for misgivings:
“heretical he could not be.” We have his letters. They prove his
Catholicity. The papal acts of the primitive ages imply infallibility,
according to Manning, “and in almost all cases explicitly declare
it.”[211] The exercise of authority is everywhere to him Infallibility.
Thus the Archbishop presented the English Romanist with a sketch of
the first ages pervaded by a calm, unchallenged faith in the Pope’s
Infallibility.

[211] _Pastoral_ (1867), p. 40.

The second period in the doctrine’s progress is that of analysis and
contention. And here Manning pours unqualified contempt on the Gallican
view. Gallicanism was Manning’s peculiar and special abomination.

“Gallicanism,” he said, “is rationalism; that which the Gospel cast
out; that which grew up again in mediæval Christendom. Gallicanism is
no more than a transient and modern opinion which arose in France,
without warrant or antecedent, in the ancient theological schools
of the great French Church; a royal theology, as suddenly developed
and as parenthetical as the Thirty-nine Articles; affirmed only by a
small number out of the numerous Episcopate of France....

“To this may be added, that the name of Bossuet escaped censure only
out of indulgence, by reason of his good services to the Church: and
that even the lawfulness of giving absolution to those who defend the
Gallican Articles has been gravely questioned.”[212]

[212] _Ibid._ p. 41.

In Manning’s view of history, Gallicanism was a disease engendered by
the corruptions of the old French Monarchy.

The third period in the progress of Infallibility is the period of
definition. This is certain to come. It is merely a question of time.

Thus, according to Manning, the doctrine of Papal Infallibility is
no more of an innovation than the doctrine of our Lord’s Divinity at
Nicæa. It is true that he is conscious of a possible objection lurking
in suspicious minds.

“If any one shall answer that these evidences do not prove the
Infallibility of the Pope speaking _ex cathedra_, they will lose
their labour.

“I adduce them,” he continues, “to prove the immemorial and universal
practice of the Church in having recourse to the Apostolic See as the
last and certain witness and judge of the Divine tradition of faith.”

But Manning’s real interests were not in endeavours to ascertain what
history declares. The sole duty of the believer was absolute submission
to the authority of the existing Church, irrespective of past
teachings. The assumption that what is taught to-day corresponds with
what always has been, was made, and must not be challenged. Hence the
famous identification of history with heresy, for which Manning made
himself responsible. His assurance of the doctrine is so unassailable
that he can scarcely tolerate the enquiry, Is it true?

“The question is not,” he writes, “whether the doctrine be true,
which cannot be doubted; or definable, which is not open to doubt;
but whether such a definition be opportune, that is, timely and
prudent.”[213]

[213] _Pastoral_ (1867), p. 119.

Or again, more emphatically still if possible--

“With the handful of Catholics who do not believe the Infallibility
of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, speaking _ex cathedra_, we will not
now occupy ourselves. But the opinion of those who believe the
doctrine to be true, but its definition to be inopportune deserves
full and considerate examination.”

That the doctrine is opportune, said Manning, followed at once from the
fact that it was true. God has revealed it. “Can it be permitted to us
to think that what He has thought it opportune to reveal, it is not
opportune for us to declare?” If it be said that many revealed truths
are not defined, Manning answers, Yes, but “this revealed truth has
been denied.” “If the Infallibility of the visible Head of the Church
had never been denied, it might not have been necessary to define it
now.” Thus the prospect of a coming definition is held _in terrorem_
over the heads of any who do not silently acquiesce in the doctrine
being taught. Manning could scarcely ignore the fact that this denial
of Infallibility was no new thing in the Roman Church. His answer to
this is equally significant.

“We are told by objectors that the denial is far more ancient
and widespread: that only makes the definition all the more
necessary.”[214] “In England, some Catholics are stunned and
frightened by the pretentious assumption of patristic learning and
historical criticism of anonymous writers, until they doubt, or
shrink in false shame from believing a truth for which their fathers
died.”[215]

[214] _Pastoral_ (1867), p. 40.

[215] _Ibid._ p. 41.

One would like to know how this sounded to the old Catholic families
of England, to Bishops such as Errington or Clifford, to those
whose fathers had assured the English Government on oath that Papal
Infallibility formed no part of the faith of Catholics.

Manning indeed saw a host of practical reasons why the inerrancy
doctrine should be decreed: because this truth has been denied;
because, if not decreed, the error will henceforward appear to be
tolerated, or at least left in impunity; because this denial of what
Manning called “the traditional belief of the Church” was an organised
opposition to the prerogatives of the Holy See; “because it is needed
to place the Pontifical Acts of the last 300 years, both in declaring
the truth, as in the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, and in
condemning errors, as in the long series of propositions condemned in
... Jansen and others, beyond cavil or question”; because it was openly
said that the pastors of the Church are not unanimous, therefore “it is
of the highest moment to expose and extinguish this false allegation,
so boldly and invidiously made by heretics and schismatics of every
name.”

The dogma was necessary also to justify the believer’s attitude
toward the Pope. Faith, argued Manning, requires the Infallibility
of the teacher of truth. If the teacher be fallible, our certainty
cannot be Divine. If the Pope be fallible, we cannot be certain that
the doctrines propounded by him--the Immaculate Conception, for
instance--are of faith. “The treatise of Divine Faith is therefore
incomplete so long as the Infallibility of the proponent is not fully
defined.”

Thus a theoretical system requires completion which nothing but this
dogma can give; for which, therefore, this dogma must be created.
Moreover, Manning scorns what he calls “the incoherence of admitting
a supremacy and denying its infallible action.” We have here a
reminiscence of De Maistre. There is the same theorising tendency. Two
dominant ideas are found throughout. The one, that the doctrine is
required to secure the completion of an _à priori_ view. The other,
that it will be practically a singularly useful asset. Therefore we
must have it. It is not the theologian, it is the ecclesiastical
statesman who speaks in this. The centralisation of power, concentrated
in one supreme individual, easily accessible, prompt to reply, was
Manning’s ideal. He contrasted it with the slow, deliberate method of
Universal Assemblies. Errors would have time to spread, with fearful
rapidity, before this heavy machinery could be brought effectively into
operation. Statesmen would frustrate its assembling. If the Pope be
personally infallible, apart from the Episcopate, “why,” asks Manning
quite naturally,

“why is he bound to take a means which demands an Ecumenical Council,
or a world-wide and protracted interrogation, with all the delays and
uncertainties of correspondence, when, by the Divine order, a certain
means in the Apostolic See is always at hand?”

Assertion--vigorous, uncompromising, sweeping--was not only the bent
of Manning’s disposition; it was also cultivated on principle. What
the English people wanted, according to the Archbishop of Westminster,
was neither compromise nor accommodation. “Downright truth, boldly
and broadly stated, like the ring of true metal, wins their
confidence.” When Gladstone described him as “the oracle,” Manning
replied, “He shall not find me ambiguous.” Thus he prided himself
on the quality of aggressive speech. Among his favourite phrases is
the term--“it is certain.” Six times in one page, applied to all
manner of things--historical interpretations, future probabilities,
indiscriminately. No shade of distinction exists. There might be no
such thing conceivable as hesitation in the universe. He seems to
grow, if possible, increasingly sharp, incisive, uncompromising, as his
words speed on.

“The Ultramontane opinion is simply this, that the Pontiff, speaking
_ex cathedra_ on faith or morals, is infallible. In this there are no
shades or moderations. It is simply aye or no.”

Of qualifications, of restrictions, nothing is said. It is all
sweepingly universal. Yet with all his heart, he says, he desires
to find a mode of conciliation--“but not a _via media_ which is
the essential method of falsehood.” Of the philosophic temper, the
balancing of opposing truths, the holding truths unreconciled, through
faith in their ultimate yet hitherto undiscovered synthesis, there is
not a shadow in these amazing Pastorals.

Nothing can surpass the confidence with which Manning expressed his
ideas of the work which the Council would effect.

“It is certain that upon a multitude of minds who are wavering and
doubtful ... the voice of a General Council will have great power.
The Council of Trent,” he tells us, “fixed the epoch after which
Protestantism never spread. The next General Council will probably
date the period of its dissolution.”[216]

[216] _Pastoral_ (1867), p. 90.

Not less singular, especially when read in the light of Manning’s
incessant polemical correspondence on the doctrine, is the picture
which he has drawn of the state of the Roman Church in this crisis.

There is universal excitement, he says, in the outer world, caused by
the assembling of the Council at Rome; “not, indeed, within the unity
of the Catholic Church, where all is calm in the strength of quiet and
of confidence, but outside in the political and religious world”--the
calm of the _Dublin Review_, for instance, and the passionate rhetoric
of Ward.

Manning further predicts that if this doctrine were defined, it
would be at once received throughout the world with “universal joy
and unanimity.” Nothing can prove more clearly than these words
how completely the theory with which he was identified fired his
imagination, and warped his judgment.

Manning entirely failed to carry the English Romanists with him. The
English Bishops at Rome elected Grant, not Manning, as their candidate
for the Commission of Faith. And the Archbishop was adopted by the
Italians. He complained of his English colleagues, that “of those
who ought to have defended Infallibility not one spoke. The laity
were averse and impatient They would not read.”[217] Some, however,
did read, among them Lord Acton, who characterised those Pastorals
as “elaborate absurdities.” They were read also by De Lisle, who was
amazed at Manning’s theory on the case of Honorius.

[217] Purcell, ii. p. 454.

“Archbishop Manning denies that Honorius fell into heresy, but in
denying this he appears to me to injure the Catholic cause, for
he denies history, and what is worse, sets himself up against a
General Council which is universally received, and which in this very
particular was solemnly confirmed by Pope Leo II., Honorius’s next
successor but one.”[218]

[218] _Life of De Lisle_, ii. p. 73.

Most significant is the contrast of type between Manning and Newman
within the Communion of Rome.

“Manning,” says Thureau Dangin, “like other converts in the ardour
of their new faith, and in reaction against the Protestant spirit
from which he had escaped, considered that he could not go too far in
conceptions designated ‘Ultramontane.’ The personal attractiveness
of Pius IX., who manifested a fatherly confidence in him, the
authority which thus accrued to him in the government of the Church,
the storm of controversy before and after the Vatican Council--all
confirmed him in this attitude. He was more concerned to extend
Infallibility than to determine its limits. He seemed to make it
a duty of conscience and a point of honour to offend the English
Catholics by presenting in uncompromising terms precisely those
features of Italian doctrine which scandalised them most. He was well
aware of his unpopularity, and consoled himself with an application
of the text, If I pleased men I should not be the servant of Christ.”

However, Manning pleased men, at least in Rome, where the larger
sympathies of Newman were most distasteful, and where a hardy official
went so far as to describe him as more Anglican than the Anglicans, and
the most dangerous man in England.

Meanwhile Manning is found denouncing the English Jesuits to Rome as
sympathisers with a watered version of Catholicism. Thus the Roman
Catholics in England were being thoroughly schooled in Ultramontanism,
and the Jesuits themselves Romanised by a convert from another Church.

The conclusions to which our investigations lead are: that the Roman
Communion in England during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was
Catholic in sentiment as opposed to Ultramontane; that the process of
change was wrought by Italian influence, imposing Italianised Bishops
upon a reluctant community, and by the suppression of the organs of
independent thought, especially those which did not revise the facts
of history in the interests of edification; that this conversion of
the Roman body to Ultramontane ideas necessitated a rewriting of the
English Roman literature, which was done on a very extensive scale,
and constantly without any acknowledgment of the changes introduced
into the author’s opinions; that this process of infiltration was
vigorously resisted, and continued incomplete down to the Council of
1870, in which Irish and English Bishops openly opposed the theories of
papal prerogatives which their Italianised rulers had laboured to force
upon them.

CHAPTER XI

ULTRAMONTANISM IN FRANCE

1. A powerful if unintentional contribution to Ultramontanism was
Napoleon’s reconstruction of the French Episcopate.

The nineteenth century found the Church of France in a desperate
condition. Overthrown by the Revolution, and deprived of its
possessions and its sanctuaries, many of its Royalist Bishops were
refugees in England from a form of government which they abhorred;
and the Pope himself (Pius VI.) died, a captive of the Revolution, in
French territory (1799).[219] But with the new century Napoleon rose
to power. He saw that, in spite of the dominant Atheism, France was
Catholic at heart; and resolved upon a restoration of the Catholic
Church. Accordingly he sided with the Papacy. But since the exiled
prelates were notoriously hostile to the Revolution, being zealous
adherents of the old Monarchy, he was convinced that their readmission
would provoke social disorder and irreconcilable strife. On this ground
he required Pope Pius VII. to make a clean sweep of the entire French
Episcopate, either by their resignation or their deprivation.[220] This
was to be followed by a complete reconstruction of the dioceses, and
reappointment to the newly-constituted Sees. Fifty diocesan Bishops
were henceforward to exist, together with twelve Archbishops, while
more than half the ancient Gallican Episcopate was to be entirely swept
away. Against this revolutionary proposal Pius VII. protested, but he
protested in vain. The master of France was inexorable, and Pius was
compelled to yield. Cardinal Consalvi,[221] the Papal Secretary, says
that he vainly urged that the deposition of one hundred French Bishops
without condemnation was unprecedented in the annals of Christendom,
that nothing could be more ruinous to the famous Gallican liberties.
But the iron will of Napoleon broke through all remonstrances, and
the Pope was compelled to require the French Bishops to place their
resignation in his hands.[222]

[219] Jervis, iii. p. 323.

[220] _Ibid._

[221] Consalvi, _Mémoires_, i. p. 345.

[222] Jervis, p. 363.

Some complied. Some delayed and temporised. Others refused. The
refugees in England replied that, holding their episcopal commission
from the Holy Spirit, who had constituted them rulers in the Church
of God, they could not submit to the Pope’s requirements.[223]
Nevertheless, their existence was ignored, and the combined power of
Pius VII. and Napoleon Bonaparte carried this ecclesiastical revolution
into effect.

[223] _Ibid._ p. 373.

Napoleon reserved to himself the right of appointment to the newly
constituted Sees.[224] This unprecedented act of supreme authority[225]
was, of course, altogether distinct from Infallibility; but it formed
a precedent for almost limitless submission, and promoted a spirit
of resignation to authority, which afterwards exhibited itself in
the province of dogmatic truth, and contributed indirectly not a
little to the passing of the Vatican Decree. It also shook the whole
constitution of the Church of France. Its effect on Gallican ideas was
naturally great.

[224] _Ibid._ p. 362.

[225] Lord Acton calls it “the most arbitrary act ever done by a
Pope.”--_Hist. Freedom_, p. 323.

The French Minister Ollivier goes so far as to maintain that the Roman
Court, in spite of its persistent efforts, would only have secured
uncertain advantage if the French Revolution had not come to its
aid.[226]

[226] Ollivier, i. p. 280.

But still down to 1870 the French Government retained in its control
the right of nominating the Bishops. And this right it exercised
independently of the papal desires. Pronounced Gallicans were elevated
to the Episcopate in spite of Pius IX.’s objections. At times, when his
concurrence was delayed, pressure was instantly brought to bear from
France. And that pressure it was not prudent to resist; for at that
period France was the protector of the Papacy.

It is sometimes said that the old Gallicanism perished in the French
Revolution. This is misleading. The Church and the Monarchy had stood
together, and the overthrow of the one broke the power of the other.
In the altered circumstances the papal claim over monarchs became
practically impossible. It was never denied at Rome, but it was not
asserted. It was left discreetly in the background, and consequently
the old Gallican political protest became meaningless. But the old
spiritual principles were re-affirmed in France in 1820 by Cardinal
de la Luzerne with not less vigour and frankness than in the days of
Bossuet.

The independence of the temporal power from papal authority, says
Cardinal Luzerne,[227] is a question which he does not intend to
discuss. Not because he has the slightest doubt upon the subject; on
the contrary, the complete independence of the temporal power is of
all the Gallican maxims that to which he is personally most strongly
attached. He deplores from the depth of his heart that the Popes ever
asserted the opposite principle. Their pretensions have been disastrous
to the Catholic Church, and particularly so to the Holy See. But his
reason for not discussing the subject is that the Gallican principle
finds hardly any opponents even in Italy. Since Italian writers do not
attack it there is no need to defend.

[227] _Works_ (Migne’s ed.), ii. 14.

But on the question of Papal Infallibility he feels constrained
to express his strong adhesion to the Gallican doctrine.[228] The
partisans of Infallibility affirm that when the Pope, taking the
necessary precautions, speaks officially, he is infallible, and
his decisions are unalterable laws for all the Church. That is the
Ultramontane opinion. We, on the contrary, says Cardinal Luzerne, do
not believe the Holy Father to be infallible. We believe that when he
acts as Pope his decisions ought to be respected; but his dogmatic
decrees, however worthy of regard, are not infallible, and only
exact an outward submission, but not an inward assent until they are
endorsed by the acceptance of the Universal Church. Papal decisions
have weight--some more, some less. They are not equal in authority, and
none of them are infallible. The Ultramontane system, that the Pope is
infallible when he speaks officially, sins against the truth in the
essential point of novelty.[229] Gallicanism, if it had a political
side, was essentially ecclesiastical and spiritual. Its political
interest was to protect the rights and claims of a national Church. It
regarded the Church of each people as a definite entity, although of
course merged in the unity of the Universal Church. But this was not
the fundamental principle of the Gallican idea. The heart and centre of
their contention lay in the rights of the Collective Episcopate, as
contrasted with the claims of the Papacy. And the whole of the struggle
which issued in the Vatican Assembly of 1870 was a struggle between
these two conceptions of spiritual authority.

[228] _Works_, ii. p. 37.

[229] _Ibid._ p. 38.

The extent to which the old Gallican principles prevailed in France of
the early nineteenth century may be gathered from Bergier’s Theological
Dictionary, which was the French popular encyclopedia of theology, and
obtained a great circulation.

“_Infallibilist_--The name sometimes given to those who maintain
that the Pope is infallible,--that is to say, that when he addresses
to the entire Church a dogmatic decree, a decision on a point of
doctrine, it cannot happen that this decision should be false or
subject to mistake. This is the ordinary opinion of Ultramontane
theologians.”[230]

[230] Bergier, _Dictionnaire de Théologie_ (1850).

Then after summarising Bossuet’s teaching, the article concludes that,
since it is an essential function of the pastors of the Church to
witness to the universal faith, the witness of the sovereign Pontiff
taken by itself cannot produce the same degree of moral certitude which
results from a very considerable number of concurrent witnesses. As
head of the Universal Church, the sovereign Pontiff is undoubtedly well
informed as to the general belief and is its principal witness; but his
witness, united to that of a vast multitude of Bishops, possesses quite
a different force than when it is alone.

* * * * *

2. There were the Ultramontane writers in France, who contributed
vastly to the propagation of Roman ideas.

One of the pioneers of Ultramontane development was Joseph de Maistre.
Connected for some time in the first half of the nineteenth century
with the Court of St Petersburg, he had all the instincts of the
diplomatist; and his religious ideal was to see modern Christian
society under the absolute control of the political papal dictatorship
of the Middle Ages. Manning once ventured the remark that Gratry was no
theologian. It has been said with far more accuracy that De Maistre was
neither an historian nor a theologian, but rather one who transferred
to the province of ecclesiastical control the principles and methods
of diplomatic procedure. He was a man of remarkable vigour and
pertinacity; a man of logic in his way, pushing relentlessly to extreme
conclusions on the basis of a brilliant assumption; audacious in his
assertions, and confident with an unsurpassed serenity.

The movements of modern thought, the aspirations towards larger
freedom, were to De Maistre thoroughly repugnant.

“The audacious race of Japhet,” he writes, “has never ceased to
advance towards what it describes as liberty; that is, towards a
state in which the governed is governed as little as possible, and is
always on guard against its masters.”

Such was his attitude towards European progress and development. This
was written in 1844, and may doubtless be partly explained by the
time; but this was the spirit in which he approached the doctrine
of papal authority. And the method in which he attempted to advance
the Ultramontane opinions may be gathered from such examples as the
following.

If the Gallican School set the Council above the Pope, as the final
judge in matters of faith, De Maistre entirely depreciates the
significance of Ecumenical Councils. His estimate of their value as
compared with his valuation of the Papacy is almost contemptuous.
Councils are, in his view, periodical or intermittent exhibitions
of sovereignty. They are extremely rare, purely accidental, without
any regularity of recurrence; easier to assemble in primitive days
when the extent of Christendom was comparatively small. But in modern
times an Ecumenical Council is a mere chimera. It would take five or
six years to arrange. If the objection is made, Why were all these
Councils held if the decision of the Pope sufficed? De Maistre adopts
for his reply the following--“Don’t ask me; ask the Greek Emperors,
who would have these Councils assembled, and who convoked them and
demanded the consent of the Popes, and raised all this useless fracas
in the Church.” De Maistre goes further still. Quoting the opinion of
Hume on the Council of Trent, that “it is the only General Council
which has been held in an age truly learned and inquisitive,” and
“that no one expects to see another General Council until the decay
of learning and the progress of ignorance shall again fit mankind
for these great impostures”; he calmly observes that while in its
spirit this is a “reflexion brutale,” yet in its substance it is
worthy of consideration. Hume is right to this extent: that “the more
the world becomes enlightened the less it will think of holding a
General Council.” The world, he adds, has become too great for General
Councils, which appear better adapted for the youth of Christianity.
He admits that a Council may, indeed, be serviceable, and that perhaps
the Council of Trent did what only a Council could do. But he is so
exceedingly jealous of its possible interference with the absolute
sovereignty of the Pope that he can find no more than this in its
favour; except to conclude this portion of his remarks with a curiously
incongruous protestation of his perfect orthodoxy on the subject
of General Councils. Thus De Maistre’s Ultramontane proclivities
completely blinded him to the true nature of this form of Catholic
self-expression. We should not gather from his depreciative words that
the Spirit of God had anything to do with the Councils of Christendom.
It is singular, moreover, that a leader of modern Extremist views
should have written in this strain only twenty-six years before the
Vatican Council.

De Maistre’s treatment of the case of Honorius forms a most curious
psychological study. The condemnation of Honorius by a General Council
was to the Gallican School a conclusive proof that the Church which
so expressed itself knew nothing of Ultramontane opinions on Papal
Infallibility. De Maistre has a theory which we believe is entirely
his own. He draws from imagination an account of what Honorius might,
from an Ultramontane standpoint, be expected to have said if he had
been living at the time, and had entered into the deliberations of the
Council which condemned him. Here is the speech which Honorius, it
appears, ought to have made:--

“My brothers, God has undoubtedly abandoned you, since you dare to
judge the Head of the Church who is established to pass judgment upon
you. I have no need of your assembling to condemn Monothelitism. What
can you say that I have not said already? My decisions are sufficient
for the Church. I dissolve this Council by withdrawing from it.”

De Maistre could scarcely forget that the successor of Honorius, who
on his theory ought to have made some protest against the Council’s
audacious treatment of their predecessor, omitted to make any. This
is met with the remark that if certain successors of Honorius do
not appear to have roused themselves against “the Hellenisms of
Constantinople,” their silence only proves their humility and their
prudence, and has no dogmatic weight. The facts meanwhile continue
what they are. The fact that the successors of Honorius for centuries
went on reiterating his condemnation is not mentioned by De Maistre.
But, as he truly says, the facts meanwhile continue what they are. Yet
he implies that they do not. For he then suggests that perhaps the
Acts of the Sixth Council have been falsified. The possibility of such
dishonesty in ancient times is illustrated from the letters of Cicero.
The application is then delicately left for the reader to make. As for
the author, “Quant à moi, je n’ai pas le temps de me livrer à l’examen
de cette question superflue.”

De Maistre’s argument for Papal Infallibility is a political argument
pure and simple. All true government in human society is monarchy. And
the ultimate decision in the political order must be regarded as an
infallible decision. The sovereign power cannot permit the laws to be
called in question. What sovereignty is in the political order, the
same is infallibility in the spiritual. We only demand, therefore, for
the Church the same prerogative of finality which we demand for the
State.[231]

[231] _Du Pape_, p. 20.

Readers of Mozley on _Development_ will remember his crushing reply to
this transparent sophism.

“It is indeed absurd,” writes Mozley, “to expect that the mind should
be satisfied with it, because what the mind wants is to believe what
is true; and this argument does not touch the question of truth
or error in the doctrines themselves decided on by this ultimate
authority. It tells us the fact that they are decided on, and no
more. It views the Church simply as a polity, and professes to apply
the same principles to it which belong to other polities; and, wholly
omitting its prophetical office of teaching truth, makes it impose
its dogmas on us on the same principle on which the State imposes
Acts of Parliament.”[232]

[232] Mozley, _Essay on Development_, p. 126.

This contribution to Ultramontanism received a criticism, also from the
Roman Bishop Maret, just on the eve of the Vatican Council.

“These weaknesses,” says Maret, “of an able mind may remind us that
the true seat of sovereignty and infallibility in the Church is not
to be reached by logic but by appeal to Scripture and Tradition.
Joseph de Maistre has not recognised this necessity. If he had not
been a partisan dominated by a pre-conceived theory based on insecure
foundations, he would have realised that a writer’s first duty was to
make a careful study of the General Councils, if he would understand
the Church’s constitution. And this he has most inadequately
done.”[233]

[233] Maret, ii. p. 313.

Here then, said a contemporary French critic,[234] we have the
doctrine of infallible authority humanised and rationalised. But the
contradiction is too gross to permit this solution of the problem
to be taken literally. The _tour de force_ is too puerile. We
decline to believe that De Maistre was altogether duped by it. It is
impossible that he could not have seen the huge abyss which separates
Infallibility, as the Church understands it, from civil sovereignty
and final judicial appeal. The former not only demands submission, but
assent, belief. The second only imposes respect and exterior obedience,
without involving any interior conviction or belief; without
preventing discussion, contradiction, and reversal by subsequent
legislation.

[234] _Revue des deux Mondes_ (1858), p. 643.

The ability of De Maistre is everywhere acknowledged. But he is a
crowning illustration of error by excess. He is afflicted, as the same
critic said, with the malady of logical intemperance. He is a victim
of his own love of paradox. His passionate, masterful desire to push
everything to the most extreme conclusions lands one on the brink of an
intellectual abyss frightful to contemplate. He escapes with acrobatic
agility where in all reason he ought to fall, and would fall, if his
passion did not sustain him; where certainly calmer men must fall.[235]

[235] _Revue des deux Mondes_ (1858), p. 630. Cf. Lenormant’s opinion
of Joseph de Maistre: “Il avait plus de talent que de science, et
surtout de bon sens, et pour ma part, je ne me rangerai jamais parmi
ses disciples.”--_Les Origines de l’Histoire_, i. p. 67, _n._

In addition to De Maistre, there was Lamennais--a philosopher rather
than a theologian; clever, acute, impassioned, rhetorical; a sort of
French Tertullian. In profound mistrust of human reason, he threw
himself with emotional violence into the work of exalting authority as
the one refuge and salvation against error. Unbalanced and extreme in
all he did, he ended in an equally violent reaction against the very
authority which he had laboured to exalt. But the moral of the change
was lost upon his countrymen. Scandalised by his apostasy, they clung
to his earlier ideals, and continued to maintain what the master had
forsaken. He lived in discredit and died in distress, after mournfully
witnessing the wide extension of an Extremist school, which he had
devoted his best years to create, but was totally unable to restrain.

* * * * *

3. A third important factor was the _political pressure_ exerted by the
French Government upon the Church. The influence of Napoleon promoted
the very last thing he desired, “for a Church, pinched, policed, and
bullied by the State, was inevitably thrown back upon the support of
the Papacy.”[236]

[236] Cf. Cambridge Modern History. _French Revolution_, ix. p. 771.

From this despotic treatment at home the Church naturally turned its
eyes towards Rome. Rome, with its troubles and misfortunes, grew
more dear. A whole school of deeply religious and saintly men arose
in France, filled with enthusiastic devotion to the See of Peter.
Lacordaire--whether defending the cause of religious education, or
submitting himself to an adverse decision from Rome when his master
Lamennais broke away, or re-establishing the order of Dominicans
in France, or advocating the papal authority in the Cathedral at
Paris--produced an immense effect in enlisting the sympathies of men
with Rome. The gifted Montalembert,--eloquent, imaginative, threw
the weight of his power and high position into the papal cause, and
became among laymen recognised leader of Roman interests. The great
Bishop Dupanloup, warmest-hearted of men, impulsively gave the movement
an indiscriminating blessing, and brought upon himself numerous
expressions of papal gratitude.

None of these were far-sighted men; none of them realised in the least
the ultimate drift of the authority they so powerfully advanced.
Lacordaire died before the question of Infallibility came within the
council chamber of the Church; but Montalembert and Dupanloup alike
beheld the prospect with consternation, and expressed their vehement
disapproval.

* * * * *

4. Another element which is said to have contributed to make the French
priests as a body largely Ultramontane was the despotic power of the
French Episcopate. Probably no Bishops in Christendom were such
autocrats as the French. The account given by the French statesman
Ollivier, which is confirmed from other sources, represents the
ordinary priest as subjected to a virtual slavery. If the despotic
power of the French Bishops over their priests was to some extent
moderated by piety, yet anxiety to maintain their authority constantly
issued in acts of pitiless severity. The greater portion of the
French priests were dismissible at will, without judicial process, or
adequate opportunity for self-defence. Ollivier considers the causes of
dismissal to have been frequently quite insufficient. One Bishop alone
removed one hundred and fifty priests in a single month, and the State
declined to interfere. Under these circumstances the Pope intervened.
He took the part of the priests against the Bishop, and asserted the
right of the inferior clergy to appeal to himself. From that moment,
says Ollivier, Ultramontanism, hitherto forlorn enough, pervaded the
mass of the priesthood. Down-trodden by a Gallican Episcopate, the
priest hastened to proclaim the infallibility of a Pope by whom his own
superiors might be the more effectively controlled. Ultramontanism grew
to be a passion in the clerical world. And this movement from beneath
affected the Episcopate. Either they were driven on by the force of
the stream, or left stranded without the general sympathy. Ollivier
says that whereas, in the past, men spoke of Gallican independence, it
became a commonplace of Vaticanism to speak of French docility.[237]

[237] Ollivier, i. p. 300. See also the anonymous pamphlet, “Pourquoi
le Clergé Français est Ultramontane” (1879).

* * * * *

5. Another impressive step in the direction of Papal Infallibility
was taken in 1854 by Pius IX. when he declared the theory that the
Blessed Virgin Mary was immaculately conceived to be a dogma of the
Church. This theory--rejected by St Bernard and by St Thomas, “a thesis
of a theological school of the Middle Ages,” opposed by the Dominican
order--was pronounced by Pius, on his sole authority, not with the
concurrence of a Council of Christendom, to be of faith. And to this
decree the entire Roman Communion submitted. No such act had occurred
in the Church before. And although this act could bear constructions
not involving Infallibility, for the Gallican might ascribe its
validity to the tacit consent of the Church, yet it powerfully promoted
the Infallibility view; and it was constantly appealed to as a
practical exercise of infallible authority and a justification for the
Vatican Decrees of 1870.

Thus, if the doctrine of the Infallibility of the Church as opposed to
that of the Pope was formerly the prevalent belief in France, as the
independence of the Church of France diminished, the authority of Rome
increased. The pressure of episcopal authority over the priests led the
latter to magnify the distant authority of the Pope as a balance to
local control; and while the Bishops resented, the priests desired an
increase of papal power. Meanwhile the Roman See, wherever practicable,
filled places of influence with Ultramontanes. The whole weight of the
Jesuit teaching was thrown unitedly, persistently, and with tremendous
force, in all these schools into the scale of Infallibility.

CHAPTER XII

DARBOY, DUPANLOUP, MARET, GRATRY, AND MONTALEMBERT

The Archbishop of Paris in 1870 was Mgr. Darboy. The records of his
See had been recently a series of ghastly tragedies. His immediate
predecessors were Quélen, Affre, Sibour, and Cardinal Morlot. Only
the last had died a natural death. Affre was shot on the barricades,
and Sibour assassinated by one of his own priests. Darboy himself was
destined to be added to the same terrible list. He was shot in prison
during the Commune in 1871. His religious sympathies were the reverse
of Ultramontane.

“By his early theological training, by mental tendencies, and not
less by the traditions of the Diocese and See of Paris, Mgr. Darboy,”
says a biographer, “was devoted to the ancient principles of the
Church of France.”[238]

[238] Guillermin, p. 124.

Darboy strove to maintain the ancient rights and authority of the
Episcopate, and made no secret of his repugnance to--nay, he openly
rejected--the theory that the Roman Pontiff possessed direct and
immediate authority over every separate diocese. And, while he was
a strong supporter of the Pope’s temporal power, he held to the
time-honoured principle, that no papal document could be published in
France without State permission. His great position and remarkable
gifts of caution and self-control made him a power to be reckoned
with, whether in France or at Rome. In the Vatican he was disliked
and feared, as one of the strongest obstructors to Ultramontane
conceptions. Napoleon III., who appointed him Archbishop, requested
Pius IX. to raise him to the Cardinalate. The Pope would neither
refuse nor consent. But he gave expression to his disgust in a private
letter[239] to Darboy, rebuking him in the severest terms for holding
opinions injurious to the papal authority. Darboy replied, with
dignity and self-control, that he had no desire to offend. But he gave
no suggestion of any change of mind. “I avoid argument,” he wrote,
“because I do not desire to argue with a superior on the basis of a
letter containing inaccurate statements of fact, and imparting to me
words which I have not spoken.” This was in the autumn of 1865.

[239] 26th October 1865.

In the June of 1867 the Archbishop went to Rome in order to bring about
an understanding. Shortly after his arrival he had an audience with the
Pope. The audience began with a long and awkward silence, interrupted
at length by Darboy, who observed that he was ready to hear the Pope’s
orders, unless the Pope preferred that the Archbishop should speak
first. Pius then requested Darboy to speak, which he did, explaining
at considerable length the position of things in his diocese. Pius
expressed himself contented; and Darboy returned to Paris, where he
gave an account of this interview to his assembled clergy, to whom he
was closely united both in opinion and sympathy.

However, the incident was by no means closed. In August 1868 the Pope’s
letter of 1865 appeared in a Canadian newspaper, and was shortly copied
and circulated all over France. The effect of the publication of one of
the severest rebukes which a modern Bishop has received from Rome was
naturally injurious to the Archbishop’s authority. Darboy expostulated
with Cardinal Antonelli. His explanations to the Pope, he said,
appeared sufficient, if not complete. At any rate, no further allusion
to the subject had been made in subsequent correspondence with the Holy
See. Darboy had left Rome with the impression that an understanding was
secured, or the subject set aside. And behold, suddenly the letter of
1865 had been drawn out of its privacy and thrown into full publicity.
Now, since the letter was highly unfavourable, it was clear that the
publication was not his doing. The act did not look like courage, and
had all the drawbacks of indelicacy.

Antonelli replied diplomatically that the incident was very
regrettable, especially since the motives prompting this exposure
could hardly be described as they deserve. But, while concurring in
the Archbishop’s condemnation of the act, he was bound to add that the
Pope was innocent of it and in no way responsible. Darboy considered
this to be an extremely unsatisfactory evasion, and wrote again,
indicating that suspicion attached to certain officials. Antonelli
answered that the officials entrusted with correspondence at Rome
were above suspicion. He admitted, however, that the Nuncio at Paris
received a copy of the letter, with permission to show it to the French
Minister of Worship in case of necessity. It was not, however, likely
that he had availed himself of this permission, or that he had been so
indiscreet as to publish it. Antonelli suggested that possibly the
perpetrator was an ecclesiastic resident in Paris; but how a copy of
the Pontifical letter could have been secured, he was unable to explain.

Expostulations from the French Government failed in eliciting any less
unsatisfactory reply. Vague suspicions and unproved possibilities were
all that the Archbishop received. No real apology was ever given; no
attempt made to repair the mischief done. But sincere relations of
mutual confidence between the Archbishop and the Holy See were made
from that time forward exceedingly difficult. It appears that Manning
was commissioned at Rome to intervene. He visited Paris in the autumn
of 1868, and assured Darboy of the Pope’s “paternal sentiments”
towards him. He suggested that a conciliatory overture from the
Archbishop would be well received at Rome. Darboy declined. After
Napoleon’s advocacy of his claims to the Cardinalate any such step
would seem nothing better than the promptings of self-interest. Thus
the Archbishop reserved unimpaired his freedom of expression. Before
leaving Paris, to attend the Vatican Council, he gave utterance to
his convictions once again, in a pastoral letter to his Diocese.[240]
Dealing with disquieting anticipations of coming dogmas; new articles,
likely to be imposed on Catholics, which hitherto no man had been
required to believe; assertions that the minority would be treated as
an opposition, and speedily suppressed; Darboy seized the opportunity
of re-affirming the ancient principles:--

[240] _Eight Months at Rome_, Appendix, p. 268.

“If the Ecumenical Council orders explicit belief in matters hitherto
open to denial without charge of heresy, it must be because these
matters were already certain and generally acknowledged. For in
these questions, Bishops are witnesses who testify, not authors who
discover. The conditions essential to an article of faith are: that
it be revealed by God; and that it be contained in the Deposit which
the Christian centuries have faithfully guarded and transmitted one
to another without alteration. Now it is incredible that five or
six hundred Bishops will affirm in the face of the world that they
have found in the convictions of their respective Churches that
which is not there. If, then, they propose in Council truths to be
believed, it is because these truths already exist in the evidence of
Tradition, and in the common instructions of Theology; and thus that
they are not something new.”

What Darboy meant by these guarded words, and what his clergy
understood him to mean, is beyond dispute. The theory of Papal
Infallibility was not contained in the traditions of the Diocese and
See of Paris. The contrary theory had prevailed. The Archbishop went to
Rome with a full intention of saying so--and he said it.

When Darboy arrived in Rome, he was speedily admitted to an audience
with the Pope. He was one of the few to whom this privilege was given.
The Pope had decided not to give special audiences before the Council
assembled. But the Archbishop of Paris could not well be left out. The
very security and existence of the Council depended, humanly speaking,
entirely on the goodwill of France. Accordingly the Archbishop of
Paris had to be received. It was a difficult interview. Darboy
complained of the publicity given to the letter of 1865, which, being
confidential, ought never to have been yielded to general curiosity,
by persons surrounding the Pope. Moreover, the letter contained
inaccuracies and errors. The Archbishop said that he had refrained
from a public defence, partly from reluctance to correct the assertions
of his spiritual chief, partly because such defence would be open to
misconstruction as prompted by personal ambition.

The Pope, who thoroughly appreciated the allusion in these last words,
replied sympathetically; adding that he would not henceforth believe
any accusation against the Archbishop. He also expressed his gratitude
for the security which the Imperial protection afforded him.

2. Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, was in the year 1868 at the height of
his reputation. No warmer advocate of papal rights existed in France.
In youthful fervour he had written a thesis on behalf of Infallibility,
a theory, however, which he had long since abandoned in favour of
the French traditional view. That which more than anything else had
confirmed this reversion to history was the issue of the Syllabus of
1864, which was to his mind a republication of obsolete mediævalism,
most unsuited to the requirements of modern thought. For Dupanloup
was in keen sympathy with modern ideas; and this example of the
possible exercise of unlimited authority discouraged and alarmed him,
as indeed it did most of the leaders of the Church in France. With
this disconcerting fact before their eyes, nothing could be further
from their desires than to extend an authority already so imprudently
exerted. Distrust of infallible pretensions, decided preference for the
older Gallican theory, accordingly, widely prevailed.

Dupanloup had no suspicion that the Vatican Council would determine
the doctrine of Papal Infallibility. He was able, so late as 1868, to
write to the clergy of his diocese a glowing, re-assuring letter on
the coming assembly. It is an affectionate pastoral utterance, whose
logical cohesion must not be too closely inspected. He is persuaded
that all is well, and he says so in various forms. He assures his
clergy that, according to Catholic principles, Bishops united in
council with the Pope “decide questions as witnesses of the faith of
their Churches, as judges by Divine right.” He is convinced that this
traditional principle will be maintained. Catholics have no cause to
fear. A Council is a sublime union of authority with liberty. This
will be illustrated in the coming events in Rome. He appeals with
impassioned eagerness to the separated Eastern Churches, and to the
Protestant communities, to seize this golden occasion for unity.
In his glowing vision the Council is invested with all the graces
of considerateness and caution: it becomes the means of re-uniting
Christendom--a work of pacification and of light.

The condition of the Church in France at the time when the assembling
of the Vatican Council was proclaimed may be partly ascertained from
some extremely important and trustworthy sources.[241] Cardinal
Antonelli sent a circular to the Nuncios in December 1868, asking for
periodical reports on the attitude of Governments towards the Council;
on the conduct of Bishops relative to the same; on the general bearing
of non-Catholics; on the opinions of the Press, books and pamphlets
issued upon the subject; and on the desires and requirements of each
country. The Apostolic Nuncio in Paris induced four ecclesiastics
privately to undertake this task, and a careful and elaborate memoir
was the result. The report states that the section of the Press
commonly called Ultramontane, such as the _Monde_ and the _Univers_,
wrote on the Council daily, but offended many by their general tone and
the length to which they went.

[241] Cecconi, iii. p. 187.

The French clergy are described as pious and reciting their
breviaries, but in education poor. As to the general condition in
France, Catholics are divided into two classes: Catholics pure
and simple, and liberal Catholics. These latter are the object of
preference to the Government. They fear that the Council will proclaim
the dogmatic Infallibility of the Pope. The assertion circulates that
if the Pope is declared infallible it will be necessary to change the
language of the Creed from “I believe in the Church” to “I believe in
the Pope.” But the great majority of Catholics submit by anticipation
to whatever the Council may proclaim. They admire the courageous
convocation of the Council in such stormy, revolutionary times. They do
not conceal from themselves that the Sovereign Pontiff, by a sentiment
of august reserve, may not desire to take the initiative in a matter
affecting him so personally. But they hope that the Fathers of the
coming Council will define it by acclamation. This report was sent
privately by the Paris Nuncio to Cardinal Antonelli in Rome. To the
astonishment of its four compilers, it appeared, substantially, shortly
after, in the pages of the _Civilta Cattolica_, the more or less
official Roman journal under Jesuit influence. This discovery that they
were being merely utilised as reporters for an Italian magazine, and
that their confidential communications were published in print, under
the heading “Correspondence from France,” so disgusted the compilers
that the Nuncio had to tell Antonelli that they declined to continue.
They feared, not unnaturally, that recognition of authorship in France
might lead to serious results for themselves. This article led to an
able French reply,[242] which accused the Roman publishers of having
printed exclusively in the interests of the Ultramontanes, and of
eliminating everything adverse to the designs of a certain party in
the Church. They had issued in this Italian magazine an Ultramontane
manifesto by no means concurrent with the material of the original
report. The article in the _Civilta Cattolica_ does not, said the
critic, report what actually exists in France, but what Rome desires to
find existing. France and its Government are persuaded that the opinion
of sole Papal Infallibility is not accepted by the vast majority of
French clergy, whether priests or bishops; and they have the right to
hope that the Church in council assembled will have the wisdom to avoid
the theme.

[242] By Emile Ollivier.

But this pronouncement of the Italian journal filled Dupanloup with
consternation. The high position of the journal was beyond dispute. The
vast distinction between its definite and extravagant utterances and
the vague generalities of the Pope’s own statement was equally obvious.
And yet, situated as they were in Rome, could the editors have dared to
publish such assertions if entirely destitute of official recognition?
Dupanloup’s grief was great. Yet for a time he was silent. Meanwhile a
storm of controversy broke out. Writings for and against Infallibility
appeared in all directions.

The Ultramontane doctrine was defended by Dechamps, Archbishop of
Mechlin, afterwards appointed by the Pope Primate of Belgium.[243] The
Belgian Episcopate was small but united; only six attended the Vatican
deliberations. But they were altogether Ultramontane, being appointed
direct from Rome. Dechamps defended the theory of Papal Infallibility
chiefly on _à priori_ grounds. He maintained that a doctrinal
authority, Divinely established, _ought_ to be infallible. Unless it
makes this claim, such authority cannot be Divinely established. For
that which may deceive us, or leave us in error, cannot be Divine. He
endorsed the principle of De Maistre, that Infallibility is a necessary
consequence of supremacy. One who pronounces absolute dogmatic
decisions, and addresses them to all the faithful and the entire
Catholic Episcopate, without requesting the consent, either direct or
indirect, of the Episcopate, but rather commanding them to publish and
carry out his decisions, forbidding them to infringe them, or rashly
oppose them, under penalty of _de facto_ excommunication, is personally
infallible. Otherwise his dogmatic constitutions are a tyrannical
usurpation of the rights of the Episcopate. And, since Dechamps does
not admit the possibility of the latter alternative, he reaches quite
satisfactorily his own conclusion.

[243] May 1869.

Thus, to the Archbishop’s mind, the Infallibility of the Holy See is
an indisputable truth, based on revelation, contained in the written
and traditional Word of God. It is inseparably bound up with truths
which are of faith. Venturing into the department of history, the
author believes that Pope Honorius miscalculated, through inability
to foresee the results of his diplomatic endeavours, but committed
no theological error. He insinuates a suspicion that the Greeks have
falsified the Acts of the Sixth Council. They have so often done this
sort of thing. During the first fourteen centuries the Infallibility
of the Papal See was, according to Dechamps, never called in question.
That Bishops opposed the Pope, he admits. But only those who sided
with the Pope constituted the Church. The doctrine is, he assures his
readers, incontestably Catholic. A man can be a heretic in the sight of
God without being so in the sight of the Church. He is a heretic if he
rejects a truth which he knows to be revealed although not defined.
There is to Dechamps only one truth in all the Gospel affirmed with
the same superabundant clearness as Papal Infallibility, and that is
the real presence in the Eucharist. Do not therefore let us hesitate
to define this truth, which forms the basis of the Divine constitution
of the Church--a truth which Scripture conclusively reveals, and which
twenty centuries have glorified.

This treatise was highly commended at Rome. Pius himself congratulated
Dechamps on the sagacity and erudition with which he had refuted the
cavils of opponents.

3. Then Mgr. Maret, Bishop of Sura, published his book: probably the
most measured, learned, and conciliatory statement of the ancient
doctrine which the French Church had seen since the days of Bossuet.

Maret’s two scholarly volumes were not written for the multitude. They
could only appeal to the few. They form a long historical treatise
on the relation between the Papacy and the Episcopate. History, as
understood by Maret, shows in the Church a monarchy limited by an
aristocracy: a Pope regulated by Bishops. The jurisdiction of the
Episcopate is not derived from the Papacy but from Christ. Maret
disclaims any intention of diminishing the real prerogatives of the
Apostolic See:[244] but he is bound to assert historic truth. History
shows that there were Bishops in the early Church who did not derive
their jurisdiction from St Peter. If Antioch can be traced to him, the
Asiatic Churches are traced to St John. It can be proved that numerous
Bishops have held their mission neither directly nor indirectly from
the Roman See. Their institution is not by Divine right an exclusive
papal prerogative.

[244] Maret, _Le Concile_, ii. p. 9.

Episcopal jurisdiction being direct from Christ, all Bishops assembled
in council possess an equal right. The Infallibility of the Church is
collective, not individual; not to be sought in the isolated utterances
of the one, but in the concurrent testimony of the entire Episcopate.
Bellarmine, the leading advocate of the opposite school, is implicated
by his theory, according to Maret, in insoluble difficulties. For he
admits that, for an utterance to become infallible, there are certain
conditions to be fulfilled, such as serious and prolonged reflection
and consultation with the Pope’s advisers. If these were neglected
the result would be insecure. But, conscious that this conditional
Infallibility diminishes its worth, Bellarmine asserts that an
ill-advised definition is impossible; since the Almighty, having willed
the end, must also will the means. The precarious character of such
_à priori_ constructions is to Maret sufficiently self-evident. The
scriptural evidence points the other way. Our Lord, says Maret, did
not cause His prayer to preserve St Peter from a lamentable defect
of faith: for God respects man’s freedom. At the most solemn hour
in all time--that when the mystery of universal salvation was being
accomplished--the chief of the Apostolic College denies his Master
thrice. If he quickly recovered, wept bitterly, and grew deeper in
love, the analogy would be, not the preservation of his successors
from defects of faith, but their speedy recovery; that inconsistencies
in papal decisions should be transient, and not permanently affect
their loyalty to the truth. Whatever may be said about the letter of
Honorius, what is absolutely certain is that he did not strengthen
his brethren. Often in the Councils of the Church a papal utterance
has been placed before the Bishops. If this utterance were in itself
infallible, the only reasonable attitude would be passive obedience
and blind submission. This is not the attitude of true judges, such as
the Bishops have been traditionally regarded.

Maret complains that the doctrine that Infallibility resides in the
Collective Episcopate is sometimes disparaged as Gallican; whereas
it is by no means restricted to the Church of France, although it
possesses there its principal exponents. Modern Ultramontanism is to
Maret a lamentable phenomenon, greatly promoted by the ill-regulated
influence of such extremists as Lamennais and Joseph de Maistre. It
involves a treatment of history which but for _à priori_ theories would
be inconceivable.

In the midst of this increasing storm Dupanloup wrote, in reference
to his former vision: “Ah! I had drawn an ideal of a Council full of
charity, zeal, and love: and behold, all of a sudden appears a scene of
lamentable disputes.” But still he published nothing until Manning’s
Pastoral appeared, and that provoked him to public protest. It was
November 1869 when Dupanloup circulated his _Observations_, and into
its pages he put his whole mind and heart.

It was natural, said the Bishop to his clergy, that filial piety should
desire to adorn a father with all gifts and all prerogatives; but,
congenial as these instincts were to filial piety, the definition of a
dogma demanded other considerations than sentiment. Journalism, in the
pages of the _Civilta Cattolica_, had assumed the right to anticipate
theological decisions; and declarations of faith in the personal and
separate Infallibility of the Pope were being elicited from the most
simple-minded and unqualified. It was actually being taught--the
reference is to Manning--that the Pope was infallible “apart from
the episcopal body whether united or dispersed.” In reply to these
extremists, Dupanloup did not reject the doctrine categorically: he
confined himself to the assertion that its definition was inopportune.
Yet he marshalled such an array of difficulties and objections as to
imply much more than the inopportuneness of definition.

Dupanloup declares that he cannot believe that Pius IX. has assembled
the Council to define his own Infallibility. This was never mentioned
in the Pope’s address as one of the grounds for its convocation. The
purpose, according to Pius IX., was to remedy the existing evils in
the Church and in social life. Was it credible, asked Dupanloup, that
in the midst of the many urgent problems here suggested and implied, a
novel, unexpected, and profoundly complex and thorny question was to
be thrown in the way, to ruin the prospects of unity, and to provide
the world with scenes of a painfully discordant type? Doubtless, he
continued, men would assure him that a principle was at stake:--

“A principle!” echoed Dupanloup; “even granting that were so, I
answer, Is it then essential to the life of the Church that this
principle should become a dogma of faith? How, then, explain the fact
that the Church has lived for eighteen centuries without defining a
principle essential to her existence? How explain the fact that she
has formulated all her doctrine, produced her teachers, condemned all
heresies, without this definition?”

Accordingly the Bishop denies that there can be any necessity. It is
the Church which is infallible, he says, and the Infallibility of
the Church has been to this hour sufficient for all religious needs.
Dupanloup earnestly recalled the Ultramontanes to earlier principles
which long prevailed in Christendom. The principle to be observed in
defining doctrine is that given by Pius IV. to the Council of Trent:
Let nothing be defined without unanimous consent. Dupanloup remembers
well that when he was in Rome, in 1867, Pius IX., in discussing the
projected Council, was most solicitous that subjects which might
divide the Episcopate should not be brought before it. And in a recent
reply to some English ministers as to terms of reunion, the Pope had
spoken of papal supremacy, but not a word of Infallibility. If certain
journalists still proclaim this theory and expect to intimidate the
Bishops into silence, Dupanloup’s reply is, They neither know Pius IX.
nor the Episcopate.

Dupanloup’s transparent sincerity none will doubt. But in face of the
facts at our disposal, it is singular that he was so little able to
read the signs of the times, or to estimate the forces at the disposal
of the Infallibilist party. It is clear that he proposed to go to Rome
totally ignorant of the issues before him, frankly disbelieving that
Infallibility would come within conciliar discussion. It is clear that
whatever service he had rendered to the papal cause, he was not in the
confidence of Pius IX. But that this doctrine was the deliberate aim
for which the Council was gathered is probably now a settled conviction
with serious students of history. It is simply incredible that so
far-sighted a Curia as that of Rome was suddenly led by impulse to the
formulation of a dogma most momentous yet quite unforeseen.

If Dupanloup pronounced the dogma of Papal Infallibility most
inopportune, it was partly because he understood sympathetically the
conditions of religious life outside the Roman Communion, and knew
that nothing in the world could be less calculated to win. He wrote
most forcibly on the futility of inviting, as the Pope had done, the
Oriental Bishops of the separated Churches to attend a Council,
while preparing to erect a higher barrier than ever against their
reception. Could anything, he asks, be less persuasive than this?
“There is already a division between us: we will make it an abyss.
You already deny the Supremacy; we require you to accept the personal
Infallibility!” Dupanloup is aware that certain recent converts
ardently desire this doctrine. But he knows also Protestants desiring
to become converts whom the doctrine will effectively repel.

But it is in reference to the difficulties which the dogma must create
within the Communion accepting it that Dupanloup is, perhaps, most
impressive.

1. He sees that grave difficulties must attend the attempt to
distinguish papal utterances which are infallible from those which are
not. What are the precise conditions of an utterance _ex cathedra_?
It is generally assumed that all pontifical utterances have not
this character. Does it depend upon external conditions, such as
the person or body to whom it is directed, whether an individual, a
local Communion, or the Universal Church? Is it subjected to internal
conditions; and if so, what? Must the Pope reflect, study, pray,
take counsel; if so, with whom? Or need he merely speak? Must his
utterance assume a written form, or will verbal message be enough? Is
the Pope infallible if he addresses the whole Church but acts under
intimidation? And if fear disqualifies infallible deliverance, does
not also perverseness, imprudence, passion? Or will the partisans of
Infallibility say that the Almighty allows the former, but miraculously
prevents the latter? And will it be easy to determine what constitutes
constraint?

2. Then again he sees historical difficulties in the way. The
definition of Infallibility must be retrospective. If the Pope be
decreed infallible now, it follows that he must have been equally
infallible from the beginning. The same character must rest on all
decisions across eighteen centuries complying with the conditions
essential to its exercise. Is the Council to make the application of
the principle to the past, and investigate this theological field of
history. Dupanloup recoils from the prospect of such investigations;
nor is he happy about their effect upon the doctrine itself. Augustine
taught that, after the judgment of Rome, there remained the Council
of the Universal Church. This affirms the principle that, after the
decision of the Pope, the decision of the Church is essential to a
definition of faith. And Dupanloup manifestly held the same.

3. But difficulties increase. The Infallibility of the individual seems
inconsistent with the Divinely constituted function of the Episcopate
as judge and witness to the Faith. The whole principle of the Christian
centuries has been that the collective testimony of the Episcopate is
the ultimate expression in matters of faith. Bishops, says Dupanloup,
are judges as to what the faith really is. They have always decided
in Councils as true judges. The very expressions affixed with their
signatures prove it. “Ego judicans, ego definiens, subscripsi.” Such
was the formula. _Was_--but when Dupanloup wrote these sentences he
had not anticipated the introduction of a novel form at the Vatican
Assembly. A change of theory is appropriately accompanied by a change
of phrase. Meanwhile the Bishop pursues his argument. If Papal
Infallibility is independent of the Episcopate, then the essential
prerogative of the latter would be done away. What defining power
is left for the Bishops to exert? They can give, we are told, their
sentence in the form of a simple assent. But will they be free to give
their assent or to withhold it? Not in the least. They will be under
an obligation to assent. But no doctrine would depend on their assent.
For, on the Ultramontane theory, the Pope’s decision would bind all
consciences of itself, independently of all episcopal approbation. But
in that case, how could it any longer be maintained, as it has been
maintained hitherto, that Bishops are real judges as to what is of
faith?

Dupanloup’s protest and adverse criticism on the dogma of Infallibility
were delivered, as may readily be believed, with profound distress,
and prompted by nothing but a painful sense of duty. He says that he
is well aware of the hostile constructions which will be placed upon
his words, of the disloyalty with which he will be charged. Yet such
accusations will be as untrue as they are unjust.

“I dare to say,” he writes, “that the Church of France has given such
proofs of its devotion to Rome as give it the right to be heard, and
the right to be believed, when it speaks of its attachment to the
Holy See.”

And he brings his letter to a close with words of sanguine expectation,
soon to be piteously refuted by experience.

“I am persuaded that as soon as I have touched that sacred land, and
reverenced the tomb of the Apostles, I shall feel myself far from the
battle in a region of peace, in a midst of an assembly controlled by
a father and composed of brethren.”

Dupanloup, says Quirinus in the well-known _Letters from Rome_--

“attacked the opportuneness with such a powerful array of testimonies
in his famous Pastoral that every one saw clearly that the doctrine
itself was involved, though he never entered in so many words on the
theological question.”[245]

“If Dupanloup says that he does not discuss Infallibility but
opportuneness,” observes a shrewd critic[246] writing against him
from Rome, “yet two-thirds of the letter are directed against
Infallibility itself; for if the errors ascribed to the Popes were
historic, such a definition would not only be inopportune but false.”

[245] _Letters from Rome_, p. 255.

[246] Nardi in Cecconi, iv. p. 544.

Why, then, it will be asked, did Dupanloup conduct his antagonism on
the basis of opportuneness rather than on that of truth? It was simply
because the opponents of Papal Infallibility, the German Episcopate
in particular, refused to commit themselves unanimously to the latter
position. They knew, of course, that they were greatly in the minority,
and they believed that they could secure a numerical strength on the
basis of opportuneness, which they could not expect on that of explicit
rejection. And in the first instance their impression was correct. The
position served its purpose for several months. It drew adherents to
the opposition. “It provided waverers with a comparatively innocent
method of resistance.”[247] It left an easy loophole for escape in case
the pressure at Rome became too strong. It gave its advocates immunity
from graver accusations, to which they would be liable if the doctrine
were decreed. It would be safer afterwards to be able to plead, “I did
not assert its falsity, I only thought it inopportune.”

[247] _Letters from Rome_, p. 255.

But however much the plea of the inopportune might increase at the
beginning the party’s numerical strength, it involved it ultimately and
fundamentally in the most incurable weakness. The plea of inopportunism
is in the long-run an untenable plea. As Quirinus says:--

“A minority may be invincible on the ground of dogma, but not on
that of expediency. Everything can be ventured to oppose a false
doctrine, but not to hinder an imprudent or premature definition of a
truth.”[248]

[248] Page 256.

It laid them open to Manning’s retort, “When was it ever inopportune to
proclaim the truth?” It was the acid of such criticism which dissolved
the apparent unity of the opposition. For it challenged the minority to
say outright whether they believed the doctrine or denied its truth.
And to do the latter in Rome under such conditions was no easy thing.
Here was the fatal weakness by which the opposition came to grief. We
may wonder what might have been the course of events had the opposition
taken the bolder and stronger line.

Dupanloup knew perfectly that the publication of these searching
criticisms on the doctrine proposed involved nothing less than the
sacrifice of his popularity among the entire Ultramontane section of
his Church. That however he could bear with comparative equanimity.
Popularity had come to him: he never sought it. But what distressed him
greatly was that his action would sadden Pius IX. True that the Bishop
expressly confined himself to the question of opportunism, and that he
pledged himself beforehand to accept the Council’s decisions, whatever
those decisions might be. Nevertheless, in his memorable words, “I go
as a judge and a witness of the faith,” he had formulated a conception
of the episcopal function which was not only ancient and world-wide,
but irreconcilable with the theory of Papal Infallibility.

It was Dupanloup’s great desire to be supported by Newman’s teaching
and authority; and to be accompanied by him as his theologian at the
Council in Rome. Newman, however, says Thureau Dangin,[249] declined
a proposal which he felt would displease Pius IX. But the Bishop
had Newman’s perfect sympathy. The clergy of the diocese sent him
assurances of loyal devotedness. Montalembert wrote in fervid terms of
admiration. And Gratry’s famous incisive letters on the controversy
added much to the intellectual support of Dupanloup’s work.

[249] _Correspondant_, 10th February 1906.

Dupanloup’s public declaration of opposition roused on every side
the strongest emotions. Louis Veuillot, journalist, the extreme of
Ultramontanes, editor of the _Univers_, declared this attack to be
“most unexpected, and more important than any, owing to the position
of its author.”[250] It was to his mind much more serious than the
efforts of Döllinger. The Catholic Bishop had provided poisonous
arguments for an infidel press. Dupanloup penned impulsively a vigorous
and impassioned reply, in which he applied to the journalist the title
given in the Apocalypse to Satan--the accuser of the brethren. He
could have tolerated Veuillot’s personalities, but not his doctrinal
exaggerations. From dogmatic assertions of the crudest extremest kind,
which had appeared in his pages during the previous year, the Bishop
selected the following examples: Veuillot declared that Ecumenical
Councils never had so much authority as the Decrees of the Holy See.
Dupanloup asks whether that applies to the Nicene proclamation of
the Divinity of Christ. Veuillot misinterpreted the text “Lo, I am
with you always”--you collectively (for it is in the plural) into you
singular--that is, “you, the Pope.” He further declared that when the
Pope thought God thought in him; that the Pope represented God on
earth; that to the Pope applied the text, “This is my God and I will
praise Him, my Father’s God, and I will glorify Him.” Veuillot further
declared that God would stone the human race with the débris of the
Vatican.

[250] Cecconi, iv. p. 483.

Whether one who perpetrated these eccentricities of doctrine and
interpretation and prediction could be trusted as a qualified exponent
of Catholic truth was to Dupanloup more than manifest. But nevertheless
Veuillot was in France an accredited leader of the Ultramontanes, a
fervid champion of Papal Infallibility.

Dupanloup’s courageous attitude enlisted the devoted admiration of
opponents of Papal Infallibility. No one testifies to this more
forcibly than Montalembert. Montalembert--who curiously combined a
profound belief in mediæval legend with the advanced opinions of the
liberal politician, denying the Church’s right to employ coercive
measures, which Rome maintains, yet advocating vigorously the temporal
claims of the Papacy--was a Catholic of the ancient type: the born
antagonist of the modern Ultramontane, while yielding to none in
devotion to the Roman See. But his admiration for Dupanloup’s outspoken
words was unbounded.

“No doubt,” wrote Montalembert, “you greatly admire the Bishop of
Orleans, but you would admire him vastly more if you could realise
the depth into which the French clergy has sunk. It exceeds anything
which would have been considered possible in the days when I was
young.... Of all the strange events which the history of the Church
presents, I know none which equals or surpasses this rapid and
complete transformation of Catholic France into a vestibule of the
antechambers of the Vatican.”[251]

[251] Lord Acton, _Vatican Council_, p. 58.

4. To Dupanloup’s support came Gratry, priest of the Oratory, member
of the Academy, Professor of Moral Theology at the Sorbonne. Gratry is
certainly one of the most attractive personalities of the period. A
refined and beautiful character, tender and sympathetic; he combined,
as a contemporary acknowledged,[252] the imagination of a poet with the
gifts of a metaphysician.

[252] Baunard, _Hist. Card. Pie_, p. 371.

Gratry’s famous letters attacked the Ultramontanes on the historical
side. It is manifestly essential to the Infallibilist position that no
solitary instance should be produced of a Pope officially defending
heresy. Gratry therefore took the case of Honorius. “Heretical he
cannot be,” said the Ultramontane, as represented by Manning. “And
yet,” replies Gratry, “he was condemned as such by three Ecumenical
Councils in succession.”

Here is the language of the first of these:--

Anathema to the heretic Cyrus.
Anathema to the heretic Honorius.
Anathema to the heretic Pyrrhus.

Two other Ecumenical Councils repeated this condemnation of Honorius.
The solemn profession of faith recited by successive Popes for
centuries on the day of their election repeated this condemnation. It
was mentioned in all the Roman Breviaries until the sixteenth century.
Then a significant change took place. The name of Honorius disappears.
They have simply suppressed his condemnation. These things are now said
otherwise, “for the sake of brevity”! The _Liber Diurnus_ contained
the papal profession of faith. “As Pope Honorius is condemned in the
profession of faith of the new Pontiffs,” says Cardinal Bona, “it is
better not to publish this work.” “That is to say,” exclaims Gratry,
“behold a fact which overwhelms us. Let us prevent its being known.”

The maxim that truth may be suppressed in the interests of religion
roused Gratry’s boundless indignation. Gratry himself had heard an
Italian Prelate defend on this principle the condemnation of Galileo.

“Yes, undoubtedly,” said the Bishop, “Galileo was right, and his
judges knew perhaps that he was right; that he had discovered
the true laws of astronomy: but at that time this too dangerous
truth would have scandalised the faithful. This is the reason they
condemned him, and they did right.”

Gratry’s strenuous protest is worth recording:--

“Had then the Catholic religion--had the Word of God--need of this
monstrous imposture in a solemn judgment? O ye men of little faith,
of low minds, of miserable hearts, have not your cunning devices
become the scandal of souls? The very day that the grand science of
Nature dawned upon the world, you condemned it. Be not astonished if
men, before pardoning you, expect of you a confession, penitence,
profound contrition, and reparation for your fault.”

The omission from the Roman Prayer Book of historic facts acknowledged
until the sixteenth century was, to Gratry’s mind, an equally miserable
illustration of indefensible principles. “Never was there in history a
more audacious forgery, a more insolent suppression of the weightiest
facts.” The systematic suppression of facts antagonistic to the Pope’s
absolute sovereignty and separate Infallibility ought, urged Gratry, to
prevent us from proclaiming before God and man theories supported by
such a method.

“This was the reason that Dupanloup had spoken. From God he will
receive his reward. And all those who, notwithstanding these
arguments and these facts, are bold enough to go further and
pronounce judgment in the dark, will have to render an account before
the tribunal of God. Absolute certainty is here a necessity. For
the smallest doubt here demands by Divine right the most rigorous
forbearance.”

Louis Veuillot, the journalist, editor of _L’Univers_, criticised
Gratry with an inimitable mixture of worldly wisdom, insolent banter,
and pious resignation.[253] He had fondly hoped that Gratry’s friends,
either by piety or prudence, would have diverted him from an enterprise
which could only issue in odium or ridicule. However, needs must that
offences come. To deny Infallibility in presence of a Council met to
proclaim the unvarying faith of the Church, to deny it by attacks
on the Prayer Book, was a masterpiece among mistakes. Nobody ever
accused Gratry of possessing any ecclesiastical learning or independent
power. Loss of faith explains many things. Needs must that offences
come. As to the contents of the book, it was _Janus réchauffé_.
Gratry would never convince the human mind with his Protestant,
Gallican, free-thinking ideas. Gratry is described as being as
innocent as a new-born babe, as having studied nothing, read nothing,
but passionately advocating what others have told him. And yet this
innocence is surprising in an Academician, formerly of the Oratory,
author of a book on logic. This innocent is, moreover, a priest.
Strangers have brought him papers which say that his Mother has told
him lies; and he takes them for angels and believes them. But Gratry
is also a mathematician; and all mathematicians have some curious
twist in the brain. Just as Laplace the mathematician had no need of
the hypothesis of God in his world, so Gratry the mathematician has
no need of the hypothesis of the Pope in his conception of the Church.
Gratry ought to have submitted these angels who instructed him to the
test of holy water. We know these angels of his. One of them is called
_Janus_. That serpent has deceived the dove. Gratry has taken Germanism
for science--just as it came from Germany. Inaccurate mathematician!
Incurable infancy!

[253] Louis Veuillot, _Rome pendant le Concile_, p. 156.

So Veuillot railed and ridiculed. And Veuillot obtained letters of
papal approval for his defence of the faith.

Gratry’s four letters were read with avidity through France; they were
circulated in Rome, and translated into English. Four editions appeared
in a single year. They roused the keenest emotions on either side.
They were denounced. They were applauded. Meantime the shrewd observer
wondered what the end would be, should this controverted opinion become
translated into the province of necessary belief.[254] Episcopal
condemnations were freely issued. The Archbishop of Mechlin descended
to personalities, recommending Gratry to confine his attention to
philosophy, and to cease to scandalise Christendom with erroneous ideas
and outrages against the Holy See. Another Bishop wrote in terms which
show how profoundly men’s passions were stirred, that the Bishop of
Orleans, secretly acting with an ability worthy of a better cause,
had only too successfully roused both cultured and popular circles,
disturbed the high regions of diplomacy, and attacked the hopes and
convictions of the Catholic world. Döllinger, Maret, and Dupanloup
were a triumvirate of agitators, to whom was now added that insulter
of the Roman Church, the Abbé Gratry.[255] The Oratory, anxious for
its safety, repudiated all connection with its former associate.[256]
The unfortunate priest was the victim of the grossest attacks and
suspicions. A few--but very few--ventured openly to support him. The
Hungarian Prelate, Strossmayer,[257] had the courage to strengthen him.
Strossmayer had read Gratry’s defence of Dupanloup with the greatest
joy. Fervid indiscretion was bringing the gravest perils upon the
Church, and the crisis called for the most energetic resistance. May
Gratry go on and prosper! But such Episcopal encouragements were few.

[254] Cf. Ollivier, ii. p. 57.

[255] _Acta_, p. 1425.

[256] _Acta_, p. 1382.

[257] _Ibid._ p. 1383.

On the other hand, the Bishop of Strasburg endeavoured to suppress the
circulation in the usual mediæval way. He condemned the letters of
Gratry as containing false propositions, scandalous, insulting to the
Holy Roman Church, opening the way to errors already condemned, rash,
and bordering upon heresy. He prohibited the reading, circulating,
or possession of these letters either by clergy or faithful in his
diocese.[258]

[258] _Ibid._ p. 1393 (February 1870).

5. Montalembert, ruined though he was in health by an incurable malady,
was roused by this reticence among the men who secretly approved, and
came to Gratry’s support. “Since the strong do not support their own
champion,” said Montalembert, “the sick must needs rise from their beds
and speak.”[259]

[259] Ollivier, ii. p. 63.

“I venture to say that you will not find ... in my ... speeches
or writings a single word in conformity with the doctrines or
pretensions of the Ultramontanes of the present day; and that for an
excellent reason--which is, that nobody had thought of advocating
them or raising them, during the period between my entrance into
public life and the advent of the Second Empire. Never, thank Heaven,
have I thought, said, or written anything favourable to the personal
and separate Infallibility of the Pope such as men seek to impose
upon us.”[260]

“How was it possible,” wrote Montalembert, “to foresee in 1847
that the Liberalism of Pius IX., welcomed as it was by Liberals
everywhere, would ever become the pontificate represented and
embodied in such journals as the _Univers_ and the _Civilta_? Who
could possibly anticipate the triumph of the theologian-advocates of
absolute power; the novel Ultramontanism, which, began by destroying
our liberties and traditional ideas, and closes by sacrificing
justice and truth, reason and history, wholesale before the idol
which they have enstated in the Vatican?”[261]

[260] Montalembert’s letter, _Acta Vatican Council_, p. 1358.

[261] _Acta_, p. 1386 (February 1870).

If this word “idol” appears too strong, Montalembert would appeal to a
letter written to him by Mgr. Sibour, Archbishop of Paris, in 1853.

“The new Ultramontane School,” wrote Archbishop Sibour, “involves
us in a double idolatry--an idolatry of the temporal power, and
an idolatry of the spiritual. When, like myself, you made strong
profession of Ultramontanism, you did not understand things so.
We maintained the independence of the spiritual power against the
exaggerated claims of the temporal. But we respected the constitution
of the State and of the Church. We did not abolish all grades of
power, all ranks, all reasonable discussion, all lawful resistance,
all individuality, all freedom. The Pope and the Emperor were not
respectively the Church and the State.

“Undoubtedly there are occasions when the Pope can act independently
of all regulations designed for ordinary procedure; occasions when
his power is as extensive as the needs of the Church.... The older
Ultramontanes were aware of this, but they did not convert an
exception into a rule. The new Ultramontanes have pushed everything
to extremes, and have argued extravagantly against all independence,
whether in the State or in the Church.

“If such systems were not calculated to compromise the deepest
interests of religion in the present, and still more in the future,
one might silently despise them. But when one forecasts the evils
which they will bring upon us, it is hard to be silent and to submit.
You have, therefore, done well, sir, to condemn them.”

Montalembert’s abandonment of the Ultramontanes is strikingly described
by Ollivier, the head of the Government in France. According to
Ollivier, what Montalembert sought in the Ultramontane propaganda was
simply the removal of civil constraints and the liberty of the Church.
But when men sought to impose upon him the Infallibilist doctrines of
Joseph de Maistre, whose work he had commended without understanding,
he found that he had unconsciously promoted the very opinions which he
abhorred. The absolute monarchy of the Pope he simply disbelieved and
rejected. Yet he saw the forces which he had inspired with enthusiastic
devotion to the Papacy advancing the doctrine of Papal Infallibility.
Therefore he gathered what strength remained, on his dying bed, in a
final protest against any such decree. He was permitted to die before
experiencing the necessity to submit--_Felix opportunitate mortis_.[262]

[262] Ollivier, i. p. 451.

Pius IX.’s own estimate of Montalembert was very severe. He described
him, after his death, as only half a Catholic, whose mortal enemy was
pride.

The Italian historian of the Vatican Council, Cecconi, Archbishop of
Florence, is more just. Cecconi says that those who knew the deeply
Catholic sentiments of Montalembert, unfortunately entangled though
they were with magnificent Utopias on liberty, will not credit him
with uncatholic extremes. He rendered to the Church most signal
services. If he was sometimes deceived, this was due, not to want of
intelligence, but of theological learning. When the alternative lay
between liberty and religion, he did not hesitate. “I love liberty
more than all the world,” he said, “and religion more than liberty.”
When asked what he would do if Infallibility were defined, he answered
without hesitation, “I should submit.” “But how would you reconcile
your ideas with such a definition?” “I should impose silence on my
reasonings. If my difficulties remained, assuredly the good God does
not order me to understand, but simply to submit, as I do to other
dogmas.” Such was an Italian estimate.[263]

[263] Cecconi, ii. p. 445. Cf. Foisset, _C. de Montalembert_, p. 103.

Dupanloup reached Rome. He found himself, preceded by a mass of hateful
incriminations and ridiculous calumnies.[264] He was said in English
Roman papers to be in league with Napoleon against the Holy See.

[264] Lagrange, iii. p. 152. Cf. _Tablet_ (1869).

Dupanloup’s generous nature was profoundly wounded. To the clergy of
the diocese who expressed their loyal sympathy with him, he replied:--

“You see a Bishop who, during a life already long, has given manifest
proofs of his devotion to the Church and to the Holy See; but who,
because one day in a momentous question he has said what he believed
to be the true interest of religion and of the Papacy, becomes
suddenly the object of all the insults and indignities against which
you protest: so far has passion prevailed where it ought not to
exist. But what does it matter? There are in life hours marked out
for grave and painful duties.”[265]

[265] _Ibid._ p. 153.

Dupanloup’s house in Rome became a centre of activity for the Bishops
of the minority. He was the animating spirit of the French opposition,
while Darboy, Archbishop of Paris, was the controlling influence.[266]
The French Episcopate possessed no unity, and quickly divided into
two opposing parts. Endeavours were made to hold them together. But
the two French Cardinals represented contrary opinions. Cardinal
Mathieu, Archbishop of Besançon, was a member of the opposition. But
his conduct manifested a lack of qualities essential to a leader.
Cardinal Bonnechose, Archbishop of Rouen, on the contrary, was a
decided Ultramontane. And Pius placed him on the important Committee of
Suggestions. So the two Cardinals pulled different ways. When Cardinal
Mathieu laboured to unite the Bishops of the French Church, Cardinal
Bonnechose adroitly consulted Antonelli, who, acting on the maxim
“divide and conquer,” advised that the Pope was opposed to meetings of
larger numbers than fifteen or twenty. Cardinal Mathieu consequently
left Rome in disgust, and went to spend Christmas in Besançon. However,
in spite of great discouragements, an international committee of the
opposition Episcopate was formed, which materially strengthened their
forces.

[266] Lagrange, iii. p. 156.

CHAPTER XIII

OPPOSITION IN GERMANY--DÖLLINGER

Ignatius von Döllinger became Professor at Munich in 1825. In a mixed
University, where Protestant and Roman teachers addressed their
students in close proximity, and Schelling taught Philosophy while
Möhler lectured on Symbolism, and Klee on the Fathers, a knowledge of
modern thought, an abandonment of obsolete methods, became natural
and necessary among Roman Catholic advocates. The stricter Italian
School looked with grave misgivings on these Liberal tendencies and
looser ways. But circumstances rendered this larger freedom more
or less inevitable. It is curious to reflect that Döllinger began
life as an Ultramontane, under the influence of the works of that
paradoxical extremist Joseph de Maistre; for whom Lord Acton professed
a distant regard, coupled with a devout determination to exclude the
contributions of the entire school from the pages of his journals.
Döllinger’s change from the Roman to the Catholic standpoint was
the outcome of independent critical and historical study. Cold and
critical by nature, essentially intellectual, he was endowed with
enormous vigour and insatiable desire for learning. His intention
was to write a history of the Papacy. He found the approaches choked
with legend. “Many of these were harmless, others were devised for
a purpose; and he fixed his attention more and more on those which
were the work of design.”[267] The question raised by the mediæval
fables of the Papacy became theologically of grave concern: “How far
the persistent production of spurious matter had permanently affected
the genuine constitution and theology of the Church?” From the fables,
Döllinger advanced to the forged decretals. He studied “the long train
of hierarchical fictions which had deceived men like Gregory VII.,
St Thomas Aquinas, and Cardinal Bellarmine.”[268] “And it was,” says
Acton, “the history of Church government which so profoundly altered
his position.” Existing ecclesiastical developments had to be tested
by the past; their value disentangled from the fictitious elements
which contributed to produce them. The famous Canon of St Vincent of
Lerins, the appeal to antiquity, universality, and consent, came to
have increasing worth in Döllinger’s mind. “He took the words of St
Vincent,” says Acton,[269] “not merely for a flash of illumination, but
for a scientific formula and guiding principle.” At first insensibly,
but more and more definitely, Döllinger diverged from the axioms of the
Ultramontanes. Catholic he continued to be throughout, and to the very
last; but historical knowledge seemed to him impossible to combine with
the popular Roman theories of the day. Under his intellectual rule the
Munich School acquired immense ascendancy. It became the recognised
centre of ecclesiastical learning, Catholic yet critical. And,
above his colleagues, Döllinger became the adviser of the Church in
Germany.[270] Montalembert attended lectures there, and Acton, rejected
at Cambridge, found a home in Döllinger’s house at Munich.

[267] Acton, _History of Freedom_, p. 418.

[268] _Ibid._ p. 420.

[269] _Ibid._ p. 388.

[270] Goyau, _L’Allemagne Religieuse_, ii. p. 89.

The theological principles of Ignatius von Döllinger could scarcely be
in the year 1868 unknown in Rome. For five-and-forty years he had been
a teacher in Ecclesiastical History, and his reputation was European.
But he was not invited to take any part in the theological preparations
for the Vatican Council. An Italian writer[271] indeed assures us that

[271] Cecconi, ii. p. 329.

“in the number of those whom the Pope intended to invite was,
contrary to the advice of some, the celebrated historian
Döllinger.... But the Sovereign Pontiff was informed, on the
authority of statements perhaps somewhat inexact, that Döllinger
would refuse the invitation; and accordingly Pius IX. did not give
effect to his intention.”

The explanation is unconvincing and superfluous. The presence of
Döllinger on a theological commission in Rome at the Pope’s request
is scarcely thinkable. There were few learned members of the Roman
Communion whom Pius IX. would welcome less in Rome. But the minority
earnestly desired his presence.[272] Cardinal Schwarzenberg wrote to
Antonelli that the consulting theologians selected for the preparatory
commissions were not, so far as Germany was concerned, up to the
necessary level. Doubtless their merits were considerable, but their
learning was small. They were not qualified to do justice to the
difficult problems which would have to be submitted to them. They were
chosen, so far as the dogmatic section was concerned, exclusively from
one School. The Universities of Munich, Bonn, Tübingen, Fribourg,
included many eminent men, who were, however, omitted, much to
Schwarzenberg’s astonishment. He noted in particular the absence of
Hefele and Döllinger. But while Schwarzenberg wrote in this honest,
impulsive way, Antonelli was in receipt of letters of another type from
the Bavarian Nuncio, Meglia. According to the Nuncio, among the more
hopeful and moderate German Professors was Dieringer of Bonn, who had
been proposed for three bishoprics, including the Archiepiscopal See
of Cologne. True, he had recently somewhat compromised his reputation
by an attack on the Jesuit Kleutgen; but the Nuncio regarded this as
a momentary aberration--the general opinion being that at fifty-six
Dieringer was not likely to belie his past. To mix him with theologians
in the Eternal City would place him more completely at the disposal of
the Roman cause. Another promising person was the historian Hefele.
True, that his History of the Councils contained some hazardous
remarks; but the Nuncio evidently felt secure of him. “Now,” adds
Meglia, “it is very noticeable that no member of the German party of
_savants_ has been invited to Rome, and the result is that they are in
a great state of irritation. It would be, therefore, prudent to meet
this by a careful selection from the more moderate among them.” As
a result of this communication, Pius invited Dieringer, Hefele, and
others: thus, the _Augsburg Gazette_ observed, correcting the Italian
monotony by an infusion of elements very necessary to give vitality.
So Döllinger was left out. But he was by no means unoccupied. He was
engaged in writing the five articles, criticising and condemning the
Infallibility doctrine from an historical point of view, which appeared
anonymously in March 1869 in the _Augsburg Gazette_. These articles
attracted a great attention, and were regarded with profound disgust
in Rome. In three months’ time appeared the volume entitled _The
Pope and the Council, by Janus_. _Janus_, as the preface assured the
reader, was the production of several writers; but, as Friedrich[273]
tells us, under Döllinger’s control. _Janus_ was an expansion of the
five articles in the _Augsburg Gazette_. The purpose of _Janus_ was to
demonstrate that, according to ancient Catholic principles, the chief
exponent of the faith in Christendom was the Collective Episcopate; and
therefore that the Council stood supreme above the Pope. Leo himself
acknowledged that his treatise could not become a rule of faith until
confirmed by the assent of the Episcopate. The process by which these
principles were reversed is ascribed partly to the ever-increasing
ascendancy of the papal power, to which in the long development of
centuries many things contributed. The historical evolution was not
without protests and reactions, but forged documents, accepted by
uncritical ages as correct, misled even such theologians as St Thomas.

[272] _Ibid._ ii. p. 331.

[273] Friedrich, _Döllinger_, iii. p. 485.

Various influences tended to advance the conception of the Pope’s
Infallibility. There was the influence of the theologians after St
Thomas, whose great authority seemed sufficient, but whose opinion
was founded on fictitious documents. There was the influence of the
Inquisition, which, wherever it was dominant, rendered instruction
in the ancient conception impossible. There was the influence of the
_Index_, which meant the suppression of criticism and the conversion of
historical literature into partisan productions for the maintenance of
Ultramontane opinions. The publication of certain books, such as the
_Liber Diurnus_, containing historic statements impossible to reconcile
with Papal Infallibility, was prevented, and impressions already
printed were destroyed, confessedly because they could not be utilised
in the controversial interests of the Italian theories. Alterations
were made in the Breviary in the direction of Papal Infallibility. The
fact that Pope Honorius had been condemned as a heretic by Councils was
now left out. But more than many influences, the powerful Order of the
Jesuits contributed to the advancement of the theory. It was congenial
to their whole spirit. Accustomed to the principle of blind obedience;
themselves exhorted and in turn exhorting others to the sacrifice
of the intellect; they identified themselves with this doctrine,
protected it, and promoted it with tremendous effect. Since the days of
Bellarmine, their theologian, they gave it the benefit of their entire
concurrence.

So then, according to _Janus_, through the co-operation of many foreign
elements, the ancient principle is found completely reversed; and
whereas in primitive centuries the Council, the Collective Episcopate,
was the supreme exponent, in the later it was the Pope. This, says
_Janus_, is no true development. It is rather a transformation. The
verdict of History is against this doctrine entirely.

“For thirteen centuries an incomprehensible silence on this
fundamental article reigned throughout the whole Church and her
literature.”

“To prove the dogma of Papal Infallibility from Church History
nothing less is required than a complete falsification of it.”

The advocates of Papal Infallibility could not avoid the discussion of
the serious problem which their theory entailed, namely, _under what
conditions_ is the Pope infallible? They found, says _Janus_, on closer
inspection, papal decisions which contradicted the doctrines either of
their predecessors or of the Church. _Janus_ gives numerous instances.
It became necessary, therefore, to specify some distinctive marks by
which the product of Infallibility might be recognised. Accordingly,
since the sixteenth century there grew up the famous view that papal
judgments, when pronounced _ex cathedra_, were infallible. The remarks
of _Janus_ on this point ought to be given as far as may be in the
writers’ words.

The writers acknowledge that “the distinction between a judgment
pronounced _ex cathedra_ and a merely occasional or casual utterance
is a perfectly reasonable one,” not only in the case of a Pope, but in
the case of any teacher. Every teacher will at times speak offhand,
and at times speak officially and deliberately. “No reasonable man
will pretend that the remarks made by a Pope in conversation are
definitions of faith.” But beyond this the distinction has no meaning.
Every official utterance of a Pope must be an _ex cathedra_ utterance.
When a Pope speaks publicly on a point of doctrine, he has spoken
_ex cathedra_; for he was questioned as Pope, and has answered as
Pope. To introduce other conditions, such as whether he is addressing
an individual, or a local Communion, or the entire Church, is to
make purely arbitrary distinctions which are really prompted by the
existence of certain inconvenient papal decisions inconsistent with the
theory of his Infallibility.

This question, “Which of the papal decisions are infallible?” is
indeed momentous to the Roman churchman. The authors of _Janus_ are
profoundly disturbed, for instance, to know whether the doctrines of
the Syllabus produced under Pius IX. in 1864 are or are not included
among infallible utterances.

No one will now deny that it was an act of discretion on the part of
the authors of this book to produce it under the veil of anonymity.
They would allow no opportunity, so the readers were informed, of
transferring the discussion from the sphere of objective and scientific
investigation into the alien region of personal invective.

The sensation created by its appearance was very great. The _Dublin
Review_,[274] among other expressions, declared that the writers of
_Janus_ had excluded all possibility of mistake as to whether they
were Catholics. They had “shown that they are just as much and just
as little Catholics as are Dean Stanley and Professor Jowett.” “Janus
is an openly anti-Catholic writer.” The _Dublin Review_ laid it down
that “the Ultramontane doctrine exhibits certainly most singular
harmony with the whole past course of ecclesiastical history”; but
it manifested considerable embarrassment in determining what papal
utterances there were which were really issued _ex cathedra_. “There
have undoubtedly been very many _ex cathedra_ acts not formally
addressed to the whole Church,” said the _Dublin Review_, but omitted
to add by what characteristics infallible utterances might be known.
Meanwhile _Janus_ was called an almost incredible instance of
controversial effrontery.

[274] Vol. xiv. N.S. (1870), p. 194.

Döllinger’s Dublin critic affirmed that--

“in real truth, through the whole post-Nicene period, Pontifical
dogmatic letters issued _ex cathedra_ are no less undeniable and
no less obtrusive matters of historical fact than are Ecumenical
Councils themselves; they meet the student at every page.”

The _Dublin Review_ forms a very low estimate of the intellectual
power exhibited in _Janus_. According to that authority, it was “very
difficult to suppose that so indubitably and extensively learned a man
as Dr Döllinger can be mixed up with so poor and feeble a production.”
These criticisms were followed by another article, entitled _Janus and
False Brethren_. Here the reviewer fulminates against the writers of
_Janus_.

“There are enemies and traitors in the camp. It is not from
Protestants only, but from men kneeling at the same altars as himself
that the Catholic has to dread the poisoning of his faith.”

“In number indubitably these false brethren constitute no more than a
small and insignificant clique. But they are energetic, zealous, and
restless; and though their intellectual power is sometimes absurdly
overrated, they comprise one or two really able and learned men in
their number.”

The general opinion at Rome was that the book was certainly composed
by the Munich School, and the immense historical teaching pointed
to one individual, known for his life-long familiarity with Papal
history.[275] Renewed efforts were made by opponents of Infallibility
to induce Döllinger to reside during the Council in Rome. Cardinal
Schwarzenberg did all that lay within his power. Strossmayer, one of
the most eloquent members of the Council, declared that Döllinger’s
presence was urgently necessary. Maret, the learned author of the
volumes defending a modified Gallican view, entreated Döllinger
to overcome his reluctance and render this service to the Church.
“Although without official place,” wrote Maret, “your knowledge and
advice would greatly influence a multitude of unenlightened and
undecided minds.” Bishop Dupanloup thought much the same.

[275] Friedrich, iii. p. 489.

Döllinger, however, thought otherwise. He came to the conclusion that
he could be of more real service to the cause through the Press.[276]

[276] Friedrich, iii. p. 518.

Döllinger’s massive learning and extraordinary abilities constituted
him naturally the leader in Germany against the Ultramontane proposals;
but it must never be forgotten that he was only the leader. Behind
him was a vast body of Bavarian and German approval. Meetings and
protests and petitions against an Infallibility decree sprang up all
over Germany.[277] Munich, Coblentz, Berlin, and many other cities
pleaded vigorously for the older convictions. A very serious anonymous
protest[278] circulated through the Bavarian Kingdom in May 1869.
It solemnly emphasised the momentous character of the impending
conflict. Two antagonistic principles were engaged in final strife for
supremacy: on the one hand, Papal absolutism; on the other, the genuine
Catholicism. The principles of the Syllabus declared that the Church
had the right to resort to coercion, and possessed direct power even in
temporal affairs. Liberty of conscience and liberty of the Press were
denied to be human rights. Were these principles to be erected by Papal
Infallibility into dogmas of faith? Was Christendom to witness the
triumph of absolutism and a new Ultramontane confession?

[277] Documents in Cecconi, iii. p. 312 ff.

[278] _Ibid._ p. 315.

* * * * *

An address[279] was sent by the Catholics of Coblentz to the Bishop of
Treves, dissociating themselves altogether from the doctrine of Papal
Infallibility.

[279] _Ibid._ p. 326.

“A distinguished religious Order is concentrating all its forces
upon this project. To be silent would imply approval. As Catholics,
they feel constrained to protest to their Bishop that the ideas and
hopes of this party, who call themselves the only true Catholics, are
not and never can be theirs. The coming Council would do the Church
great service if it would suppress the _Index_ of prohibited books.
To punish the errors of Catholic writers by placing their names on
the _Index_ is neither worthy of the spirit nor the dignity of the
Church, and is hurtful to the real interests of the advancement of
truth.”

This address from the Catholics of Coblentz drew from the dying
Montalembert[280] words of impassioned admiration. All his old
eloquence and fire for a moment re-appeared. His end, he said, was
near. He believed himself possessed of the impartiality which is the
privilege of death. His body is already a ruin, but his spirit lives;
and he turns with a thrill of joy to the Catholics of Coblentz. Their
protest is sound from beginning to end. He could willingly endorse
every line of it. His only sorrow is that a similar spirit does not
animate the French; akin to that which filled them in the first half of
the nineteenth century.

[280] Documents in Cecconi, iii. p. 339.

The Bavarian Foreign Minister, Prince Hohenlohe[281] issued enquiries
to the Faculties of Theology in the Bavarian Universities. The
Professors were requested in particular to explain what criteria
existed for the discernment of an infallible decree.

[281] _Memoirs_, i. p. 328.

The Faculty of Wurtzburg replied[282] that, so far as the faithful
were concerned, it did not much matter whether a definition of faith
were formulated by the Pope after consultation with the Bishops
(as in 1854) or by an Assembly of Bishops directed by him. It is
all the same to the individual believer. If one has to recognise a
human authority in matters of faith, it is as easy to yield to the
decision of one as to that of a thousand. Which of these two Christ
had ordained, this Faculty did not discuss. They thought, however,
that a kind of Infallibility existed in any court of final appeal, and
must in a manner be possessed by the Pope. As to the signs whereby an
infallible decree might be distinguished from fallible utterances,
various opinions of theologians were given. Some maintained that deep
and exhaustive study of Scripture and Tradition was an essential
preliminary. No decree could possess Infallibility unless addressed
to the entire Church. They recognised that if the coming Council were
to define Papal Infallibility, it would be necessary to make certain
modifications in the Catechisms of the Church; but they did not
consider that the necessary alterations would be very profound.

[282] Cecconi, iii. p. 479.

The Munich theologians[283] replied in a very different strain. They
said that no certain criticism was universally acknowledged whereby a
decree which was infallible could be distinguished from those which
were not. Twenty different opinions were held and disputed about it. If
the Council at Rome undertakes a definition of Papal Infallibility, it
had better determine also the nature and conditions of its exercise.
Otherwise endless disputes and similar insecurity will remain. The
Bavarian Catechisms spoke only of the Infallible Authority of the
Church--that is, of the Pope, together with the entire Episcopate.
There existed indeed a Jesuit Catechism, recently introduced into a
number of dioceses, which affirmed that the authority of the Church
is expressed either by the Pope or by a Council approved by him. But
this modification was obviously designed to transfer the privilege
of Infallibility entirely and exclusively to the Pope. Manifestly
therefore a revolutionary alteration would have to be made in the
diocesan Catechisms if Papal Infallibility were decreed.

[283] Cecconi, iii. p. 524.

That a doctrine contrary to Papal Infallibility was being taught as
Catholic, under sanction of Episcopal Authority, in Germany in the
first half of the nineteenth century is indisputable. Liebermann’s
theological writings were published in five volumes at Mainz. The third
edition was in 1831. It was first published with the _imprimatur_ of
the Vicar-General of Mainz in 1819.

Liebermann was a distinguished personage in his day. He became Superior
of the Seminary at Mainz and Canon of the Cathedral, afterwards
Vicar-General of Strasburg. His _Institutiones Theologicæ_,[284] became
the standard work in many seminaries in France, Belgium, Germany and
America.

[284] Lichtenberger, _Encyclopédie des Sciences Religieuses_.

Liebermann’s doctrine is:--

“It is certain from the principles of the Catholic Faith that the
supreme Pontiff has the chief place in determining controversies of
Faith; and that his judgment, if the consent of the Church be added,
is irreformable. But whether his judgment is infallible before the
Church’s consent is a matter open to dispute among Catholics without
detriment to their Catholicity.”[285]

[285] Liebermann, _Institutiones Theologicæ_, ii. p. 540.

To this proposition Liebermann adds:--

“Although there are many saintly and learned men among Catholics,
who in their regard for the See of Peter have taught or still are
teaching that the Roman Pontiff when he speaks _ex cathedra_ cannot
err; yet there have always existed very many other theologians
who have taught the opposite, and these the Church none the less
considers to be pious and earnest defenders of the Faith. Therefore,
this question is of the number of those which may be disputed without
detriment to Catholicity.”

His conclusion is that:--

“accordingly the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff cannot be
urged against heretics, nor utilised to establish the Catholic
Faith....[286] Nor can it be adduced, even by those who are fully
convinced of its truth, as a test principle. For nothing can
be employed as a basis of divine Faith which is not in itself
indisputable. Neither can that be made the rule of faith which itself
forms no portion of the faith.”[287]

[286] Page 542.

[287] Page 543.

The _Catechism of the Catholic Religion_ by Krautheimer,[288] approved
by the Bishop of Mainz in 1845, contains the following question and
answer:--

[288] Page 87.

“Do we believe that, as a consequence of this primacy, the Pope is
infallible and may decide as Christ Himself; as the non-Catholics
allege?

“No. The Pope possesses in controversies of faith only a judicial
decision which can only become an article of faith when the Church
gives its concurrence.”

This and similarly worded books of instruction had been recently
withdrawn in parts of Germany through Ultramontane influence, and
replaced by a Jesuit Catechism.

Philip Neri Chrismann was a Franciscan monk, and reader in Theology and
Ecclesiastical History. His _Rule of Catholic Faith_ was republished
at Wurzburg in Bavaria, with the permission and approval of his
ecclesiastical superiors in 1854. In this work on Dogmatic Theology he
gives an exposition of the Infallibility of the Church, its nature and
restrictions, without any reference to the Pope. At the close of the
volume he gives a list of Adiaphora, or things indifferent, in which he
observes that

“although the greatest reverence, obedience and submission be due
to the Supreme Pontiff yet he is not favoured with the special
privilege of inerrancy which was given by Christ our Lord only to the
Church.”[289]

[289] Chrismann, _Regula Fidei_, p. 319.

Indeed, the majority of the faithful, and above all the Bishops and
clergy, did not share in Germany the Ultramontane views.[290] The
theological faculties of Tübingen and Munich were firmly attached to
the Episcopal conception, and thereby equally opposed to the autocratic
Roman idea. Hefele at Tübingen had pronounced, as a historian, hardly
less distinctly than Döllinger at Munich.

[290] Ollivier, i. p. 424.

Before obeying the summons to attend the Vatican Council, an _Assembly
of German Bishops_ was held at _Fulda_ (September 1869).[291] Some
twenty Bishops were present. There was Melchers, Archbishop of Cologne,
who presided; there was Döllinger’s Diocesan, Scherr, Archbishop of
Munich, well acquainted with the historian’s principles, and no more
an Ultramontane than Döllinger himself; there was Ketteler, Bishop
of Maintz, in whose diocese the recognised Catechism had for years
instructed the faithful to reject Papal Infallibility, and who became
one of the most persistent opponents of the doctrine to the very last
in Rome, and in the Pope’s own presence; there was Conrad Martin,
afterwards an Infallibilist, but at present known as author of a widely
disseminated handbook in which the doctrine was denied; and there was
Hefele, Bishop elect of Rottenburg, whose _History of the Councils_
told heavily against the Ultramontanes.

[291] Cecconi, iv. p. 155.

The German Episcopate was under no illusions as to the introduction
of this doctrine into the coming deliberations in Rome. Accordingly
they set other subjects aside[292] to discuss the question. It was
declared that a question so momentous required the production of proofs
from Tradition; proofs of such a kind as to satisfy fully the demands
of criticism, while leaving opponents full liberty of speech. They
proceeded to examine the opportuneness of any definition. On the one
side it was declared that Councils hitherto had only passed decisions
on questions of urgent necessity. Now the present subject presented
no such necessity. There existed no danger, either to the purity of
the Faith, or to the peace of the Church. Viewed relatively to the
Oriental Churches, a definition would be altogether inopportune.
Eastern Christians admit a primacy of honour, and might be induced
to admit a primacy of jurisdiction. But they hold with such tenacity
to the ancient traditions that it was hopeless to imagine they would
ever assent to Papal Infallibility. The same consideration holds with
reference to Protestants. And also for the Catholics of Germany the
dogma would be dangerous.

[292] Cecconi, ii. p. 459.

On the other hand, a member of the Assembly urged that by many people
the dogma was desired; that the opposition must not be exaggerated;
that the number of German Catholics was relatively few; that the
promulgation of the Immaculate Conception dogma already involved
implicitly that of Papal Infallibility.[293]

[293] _Ibid._ iv. p. 160.

In the following discussion Bishop Hefele spoke with strongest
emphasis.[294] He had never believed in Papal Infallibility. He had
studied the history of the Church for thirty years; but nothing could
be found for Papal Infallibility in the ancient Church. It could not be
rightly discussed as merely inopportune, for it simply was not true.
These assertions were opposed. Eventually a petition was sent to the
Pope, declaring the doctrine inopportune by a majority of fourteen
Bishops out of nineteen.[295] Then, as a curiously incongruous sequel
to their own grave anxieties, the Bishops set themselves to the work
of re-assuring the German Catholics in a Pastoral[296] which declared
that an Ecumenical Council would not impose a new dogma, a dogma
not contained in Scripture and Apostolic Tradition; that they were
confident that no obstacle would be placed either to the liberty or
duration of discussion in the Council’s deliberations. The Pastoral,
said a contemporary writer[297]--

[294] Friedrich, ii. p. 190.

[295] Cecconi, ii. p. 462.

[296] _Ibid._ iii. p. 372.

[297] Quirinus, _Letters from Rome_, p. 36.

“contains a promise, worded with all the distinctness that could
be desired, that, so far as it depends on the votes of the German
Bishops, the yoke of the new articles of faith shall not be laid on
the German nation.”

When the King of Bavaria read the Pastoral, he congratulated the
Bishops on the line adopted, and expressed a hope that a similar spirit
would prevail in the approaching deliberations in Rome.[298]

[298] _Acta_, p. 1201.

On the other hand, a distinguished Prelate[299] compared the opponents
of Infallibility to the possessed at Gadara; and described them as
crying piteously, “What have we to do with thee, Vicar of Christ?” No
one, he said, would be deprived of freedom of thought or expression in
the coming Council. No conflict of opinions would be there; nor any
parties, as in a political assembly.

[299] _Acta_, p. 1296 (November 1869).

Döllinger, as _Janus_ shows, was the victim of no illusions as to the
main purpose to which the Vatican Council would be directed. Whatever
impressions might exist in France or elsewhere, the student of History
did not misinterpret the steady direction of events, the persistent
intention of the dominant influences in the Church. And, although
permitted no official work among the theologian consultors of the
Council, he placed at the disposal of the Bishops the conclusions of
his historical learning, in his Considerations respecting the question
of Papal Infallibility.[300]

[300] See _Declarations and Letters_ (October 1869).

Döllinger insisted that the principle by which the Church had
been hitherto controlled in matters of faith was the principle of
immutability. To demonstrate that a doctrine was not the conviction of
the entire Church, that it was not logically included as an undeniable
sequence in the original Deposit of Revealed Truth, was hitherto
regarded as a conclusive demonstration that such doctrine could never
be raised to the dignity of a dogma of the Church. Döllinger contended
that on this principle the case for Papal Infallibility was already
adversely determined. In the Eastern Church no voice had ever been
heard to ascribe dogmatic Infallibility to the Pope. The doctrine did
not arise within the West until the thirteenth century. It renders the
history of Christendom for the first thousand years an incomprehensible
enigma: for history exhibits Christendom toiling by painful, circuitous
methods to secure what, if the Popes were infallible, might have been
gained in the simplest way, from the utterances of a solitary voice
in Rome. Nor is it possible, argued Döllinger, to account for the
transference of infallible authority from the Church to the Pope, as a
process of legitimate development. The new theory is the negation of
the old. The ancient doctrine was that the Divine guidance is given to
the Church collectively. It is the Church, as a whole, which cannot
fall away. But the Ultramontane theory reverses this. It asserts that
Divine guidance is given not to the Church collectively, but to one
individual person; that Infallibility is his alone--a prerogative in
which the Collective Episcopate has no share; that from him alone
the Church receives light and truth. This is not development. It is
negation. Among the Scripture passages to which Infallibilists chiefly
appealed was the exhortation to strengthen his brethren. But this is
an exhortation, not a promise. “It is a violent perversion to turn an
admonition to duty into a promise of the invariable fulfilment of that
duty.” Still less can this exhortation be transferred as a promise
to his successors, when it was only a personal admonition. It was,
moreover, an exhortation which Peter himself did not invariably fulfil.
Far from strengthening the Church at Antioch in the faith, he rather
perplexed it by his dissimulation.

Döllinger contended that the historical growth of belief in the theory
of Papal Infallibility was sufficiently instructive. When proposed to
the Council of Trent, it was withdrawn by the legates who proposed it;
because they recognised that a number of the Bishops disapproved it.
Since that time the influence of the Jesuits and the Inquisition had
steadily extended the theory, for they made the presentation of any
other doctrine in books or teaching impossible in Italy, Spain, and
Portugal. Every attempt to test the theory by historical criticism had
been put upon the _Index_ and suppressed, with the solitary exception
of Bossuet and Cardinal de la Luzerne.

CHAPTER XIV

HOHENLOHE AND FRIEDRICH

In April 1869 Prince Hohenlohe[301] issued a circular, composed chiefly
by Döllinger, to the Bavarian Legations, calling their attention to the
certainty that Infallibility would be discussed, and the probability
that it would be passed at the approaching Vatican Council; and
requesting them to consult the various Governments in which they
were located as to the advisability of some concerted action on the
part of the European Powers. This step was taken on the ground that
the Infallibility of the Pope goes far beyond the domain of purely
religious questions, and has a highly political character; inasmuch as
the power of the Papacy over all princes’ and people’s secular affairs
would thereby be defined, and elevated into an article of faith.

[301] _Memoirs_, i. p. 326.

The Austrian Government replied to the circular that it would be
inconsistent for nations accepting the principles of religious liberty
to offer a system of preventive and restrictive measures against a
movement so deeply grounded in the constitution of the Church as the
assembling of a General Council. It was scarcely to be supposed that
Bishops of the Catholic world could fail to take with them to Rome an
accurate acquaintance with the practical necessities of the age. Should
the approaching Council invade the province of political affairs, it
will then be time for the Governments to take such measures as the
case may need. This chilling response made Prince Hohenlohe extremely
indignant. He declared that he had never proposed preventive or
restrictive measures, but asked what attitude the Governments proposed
to adopt toward the Council. To delay until a decree was passed would
leave the Government no power except to protest.

“We believe,” he wrote,[302] “that we are not mistaken when we
maintain that not one of the Austrian Bishops will attempt to oppose
the proclamation of the dogma of Infallibility. In this dogma lies
the future of Ultramontanism; in it lies the kernel of the absolutist
organisation of the hierarchy. It is the crowning of the work for
which the Ultramontane party has been striving for years; and no
Bishop will dare to move a step in opposition to this aim. The
hierarchy will come out of the Council stronger and more powerful,
and begin the battle against modern civilization with renewed
strength.”

[302] _Memoirs_, p. 338.

Unsupported, however, by the Austrian and other Governments, the
Bavarian could, of course, do nothing.

“The Bavarian Government,” wrote Hohenlohe,[303] “has thereby,
indeed, forfeited the sympathy of the Society of Jesus, if indeed it
ever had it; but it has won the approval of all good Catholics who
are not under the influence of that Society.”

[303] _Ibid._ p. 356.

Bismarck declared that the movement in Bavaria had resulted in
increasing caution and conciliatoriness in Rome. Prince Hohenlohe was
in intimate contact with Rome and its affairs through his brother
the Cardinal, who fully concurred with his antipathy to things
Ultramontane. Most instructive are the confidential utterances of the
Cardinal to the statesman, lamenting the dominant influences on the eve
of the Vatican Council.

“Perhaps the Holy Father is still deliberating,” writes the Cardinal
in September 1869, about two months before the Council opened, “but
I doubt it. With all my respect for the Supreme Head of the Church,
my obedience will be put to a severe test. I trust that God will help
me. I often ask myself, What shall I do in these storms?”

He feels himself isolated, and deliberately ignored by the ruling
authorities. He writes that Döllinger could come to live with him in
Rome. He will receive into his own house any trustworthy theologian
to assist him while the Council proceeds. The Jesuits, he says, have
raised the question of Infallibility as a standard.

“The Pope is charmed with the idea, without the least notion what the
Jesuit party is saying and doing. Touched by their devotion, he in
his blindness embraces the whole Order as the saviour of his honour
in the (quite unnecessarily raised) question of his Infallibility....
The Infallibility question has thrown Pius IX. so completely into the
arms of the Jesuits, that of all his plans and ideas against them not
a trace remains. The good fathers know that they can keep a firm hold
on Pius IX. only if he is driven into a corner and _must_ fly to them
for help.”

It was arranged that Friedrich should go to Rome as Cardinal
Hohenlohe’s theologian; but that he was to live at the Cardinal’s
was to be kept profoundly secret. “He should give some other reason,
such as that he wants to see Rome, or the like. You will understand
that better than I can tell you,” says the Cardinal to his
statesman-brother.[304] Meanwhile Prince Hohenlohe was with Döllinger
in Munich. He was there when Döllinger received an autograph letter
from the King of Bavaria, praising his pamphlet against Infallibility.
The Cardinal wrote again from Rome[305] to say:--

[304] _Memoirs_, p. 369.

[305] November 1869.

“There will be many a sharp tussle, and I fear the Ultramontane party
will have the majority. They are impudent and reckless, and though
at the present moment the Pope is somewhat out of humour, owing to
various manifestations, such as Dupanloup, etc., yet I think that at
the crucial moment the impudent party will endeavour to outshout all
the others.”[306]

[306] _Ibid._ p. 375

But the helplessness of the opposition is curiously illustrated in the
same letter. Cardinal Schwarzenberg, a strong advocate of the minority,
wanted greatly to get Döllinger to Rome; yet he could not decide to
send for him as his theologian. Cardinal Hohenlohe wanted greatly to
receive the German Bishops at his house every week, yet he could not
make up his mind to do it. He is afraid the Pope would forbid them to
assemble at his house. By February 1870 difficulties increased vastly.
“The situation,” wrote Döllinger to Hohenlohe “becomes more grave and
threatening.” It was just announced that the Archbishop of Munich
intended to go over to the Infallibilists. Friedrich was by this time
lodged with Cardinal Hohenlohe in Rome, who was “managing to keep him
in spite of all enemies.”[307] “Stupidity and fanaticism,” wrote the
Cardinal, “are dancing a Tarantella together, accompanied by such
discordant music that one can hardly see or hear.”

[307] _Ibid._ ii. 3.

Friedrich is, of course, a violent partisan, and no more capable of
historical impartiality than Veuillot or Manning. At the same time
much may be ascertained from each. Friedrich kept a diary through the
critical months of the sessions in Rome, which he afterwards published.
He had access to numerous distinguished personages. He exerted, in his
characteristically German and professorial manner, no inconsiderable
influence on the theology of his master. He met everybody in the
Cardinal’s rooms. Accustomed to the freedom of a German University,
with unlimited access to literature of every kind, Friedrich finds
himself in a city under mediæval restrictions. Modern theology of an
anti-Infallibilist type could scarcely be obtained at all in Rome, nor
could it be smuggled into the city through the post, nor printed in
Rome, nor could it be found in the libraries to which Friedrich had
access. Letters were opened in the post, or permanently detained, as
the authorities chose. The police were ecclesiastical officials acting
in the interests of the Ultramontanes. Dressel, a learned German,
editor of an edition of the _Apostolic Fathers_, was visited in Rome
by a police officer, and informed that he must leave the city for
having written letters to the _Augsburg Gazette_, in collaboration with
Professor Friedrich. Dressel protested that he had done nothing of the
kind. The only answer was that such were his orders from the Vatican.
Dressel appealed to Cardinal Hohenlohe; also, and more effectively, to
the Prussian Ambassador, who made such emphatic moves that the papal
police did not venture on any further steps against him.

Veuillot, who was then in Rome, got the following criticisms on
Cardinal Hohenlohe and Professor Friedrich published in his journal,
_L’Univers_, which he edited in France.

“The Governor of the Eternal City, who is also head of the police has
at length discovered the source of the indiscretions by which the
secrets of the Council have been betrayed. Suspicion had long rested
on Abbé Friedrich, whom Cardinal Hohenlohe brought from Bavaria as
his theologian during the Council. The Abbé, in spite of protection
from the Bavarian Legation, has been compelled to leave Rome,
Cardinal Hohenlohe himself being anxious to dismiss an ecclesiastic
who had betrayed his confidence. It was reported in Rome that the
instigator of these deplorable disloyalties was Prince Hohenlohe,
President of the Bavarian Government.”

Meanwhile Friedrich, neither expelled nor dismissed, was quietly
residing in Rome and copying this extract into his diary, with the
thoughtful reflection: “I wonder what part I am destined to play in
an Ultramontane history of the Vatican Council.” Thus Friedrich heard
and saw many things. He heard Bishop Hefele, on a visit to Cardinal
Hohenlohe, say that for thirty years he had sought for evidence on
Infallibility, and had never found it. To the same house Hefele
returned another day with a copy of his pamphlet against Honorius. The
chief value of the work to Friedrich’s mind consisted in the fact that,
as Bishop, Hefele did not repudiate German theology.

Friedrich’s own line of action if the doctrine became decreed was
perfectly clear. He had no intention of bowing before the storm,
or of yielding an external acquiescence to that which he inwardly
discredited. A criticism which appeared in the _Univers_ indicated, in
the plainest terms, the future alternatives awaiting the adherents of
_Janus_, and indeed the opposition in general.

“Are they decided,” asked Veuillot, “to remain Catholics after the
Definition? If they say no, their Catholicity is already condemned.
If yes, they are preparing for themselves an act of faith and
obedience scarcely reasonable. For they now affirm that the doctrine
is contrary to the facts of history. Will they believe that black
is white because the Council says so, investing it with a power to
convert the false into true?”

Friedrich agreed with Veuillot to this extent, that history cannot be
reversed by a conciliar decision. But Friedrich did not attempt to
conceal his conviction that the Vatican Council was not Ecumenical.
The regulations imposed upon it, from without, by the papal power,
infringed its freedom of action, and kept it at the mercy of the
majority. To his mind there was little interest or importance in
the speeches delivered in the Council, since the initiative and the
moving power lay elsewhere. He wrote dissertations, for the Cardinal
Hohenlohe’s instruction, contrasting the principles of the earlier
Councils with the modern regulations. He affirmed that, according to
ancient precedent, the right of introducing subjects lay with the
Council itself, and not with the Papal See; that the Council and not
the Pope possessed the power to define. But he saw that his own career
as Professor of Theology was at an end, if the Ultramontanes should
succeed. To continue in his former capacity would be in that case to
incur the reproach: “You are a cowardly hypocrite, a liar; for you
speak against what you know to be the witness of scientific history.”

We owe to Friedrich the following letter, in which an Oriental Bishop
who had ventured to sign a protest in Rome against the Infallibilist
theory, makes an abject recantation:--

“Most Holy Father,[308] I entreat you to listen with condescension
and benevolence to the humblest of your beloved sons and the
humblest of Bishops, who ventures, prostrate before your feet, to
address a few words to your Holiness. I confess that I signed my
name to the Appeal which was presented to you, most clement Father,
by certain Oriental Bishops, entreating you with all humility and
reverence not to yield to a request signed by the majority of
Bishops that the Vatican Council should be directed to define the
Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff. I signed my name to the Appeal,
chiefly on the ground of the difficulties which such a decree of
such a kind might create among schismatics if misunderstood and
misinterpreted; also on the ground of the difficulty in reconciling
with such a definition the facts about Pope Honorius. But I had no
other ground of objection than these. I was not actuated by any
other human or less honourable motive; nor by party spirit; nor, as
certain ill-disposed persons have maliciously insinuated, and which
God forbid, by any hostile or disrespectful sentiment either toward
yourself, most Holy Father, or towards the Apostolic Roman See, which
is the fortress of truth and of religion, the immortal centre of
our glory. Nevertheless, considering that certain newspapers have
most unreasonably inferred from this Appeal that the Orientals were
hostile towards the Roman Pontiff and the Holy See; considering also
that other newspapers have made it an opportunity for advancing and
strengthening the so-called Gallican views, identifying us with
them, whereas we have never really had anything in common; whereas,
both as teacher in theology and as Bishop, I have always held and
taught the belief that the judgment of the Sovereign Pontiff,
speaking _ex cathedra_ as universal doctor by the institution of
Jesus Christ, and as head of the Immaculate Church, must be actually
irreformable; having accordingly studied the subject more deeply and
the consequences involved; having also made myself familiar with the
replies to the exaggerated and blamable tracts of the priest Gratry,
particularly the excellent and solid refutation recently composed
by Father Ramière of the Society of Jesus; finally having had the
good fortune to meet with a very ancient manuscript of a history
composed by a Nestorian, containing a convincing exculpation of Pope
Honorius from all error in faith: for these reasons and for other
conscientious motives, I feel myself constrained to affirm, most
Holy Father, not only that belief in the inerrancy of the Sovereign
Pontiff when deciding _ex cathedra_ in matters of faith and morals,
is mine, and that I have always held it, but also that under the
circumstances it appears to me reasonable, by no means dangerous--on
the contrary, very advisable--that the Universal Council should
dogmatically determine that the Infallibility or supreme authority
exercised by the Sovereign Pontiff as universal doctor of the Church
is of the institution of Christ, is founded in Holy Scripture and
in Tradition, consequently that it is of faith. I declare it in the
simplicity of my heart. This is demanded by truth and theological
thought. This is demanded by the pure doctrine of the Roman Church.
This by great good fortune I imbibed in my youth in its purest
source, the Roman College of the Propaganda itself. This I have
defended. It is demanded by the opposition of men of malignant
intentions against the Holy See. It is demanded by the intolerable
violence of the enemies of our religion and of the Holy Roman See.
It is demanded by our love and our reverence for the Sovereign
Pontiff and the Holy See. It is demanded by our honour. Finally it is
demanded by the authority of many doctors, and, in the words of St
Augustine, by the entire Catholic Church.”

Signed by the Chaldee Archbishop KHAYATH.[309]
_March 1._

[308] From Friedrich’s _Tagebuch_.

[309] Friedrich, _Tagebuch_, p. 319.

Friedrich continued to reside in Rome till the 13th of May. Some time
before this he felt that his work was done. He was anxious to leave. “I
neither will nor can be any longer,” he wrote, “a witness in this place
to the oppression of the Church.”

In a farewell visit to the Archbishop of Munich, Scherr congratulated
Friedrich on his ability to return home, and expressed a wish that
he could do the same. The Archbishop took the opportunity of sending
a message to Döllinger, advising him to restrain his energies. The
Bishops had done and were doing their duty. Scherr strongly impressed
upon Friedrich the necessity of making his influence felt with Cardinal
Hohenlohe. If only a Cardinal resident in Rome itself had but the
courage to utter an emphatic _non placet_ in the Council, the Bishops
would be greatly strengthened to follow suit. Friedrich disowned the
possession of any such influence as the Archbishop ascribed to him, but
promised to report to the Cardinal the Archbishop’s desires. Friedrich
left Rome with a strong foreboding that personal Infallibility would
certainly be defined.

CHAPTER XV

THE IMMEDIATE PREPARATIONS

When Pius IX. had finally resolved on assembling a Council he proceeded
without delay to the necessary preparations. These preparations may
be classified as twofold: those within the Roman Communion, and those
relating to other religious bodies.

1. The internal preparations were largely entrusted to a Commission of
Cardinals, selected for that purpose. The Cardinals reported to the
Pope upon the following points.

First came the important problem, to determine who were qualified for
membership in a Council of the Church. The Episcopate, of course,
without all doubt. But did this apply only to Bishops possessing
diocesan jurisdiction, or did it include those who possessed no
definite See? It was urged that the latter were just as really Bishops
as the former, and that their omission might raise disputes on the
Council’s validity. It was accordingly decided that, with the Pope’s
approval, titular Bishops as well as diocesan were qualified for seats
in the coming Assembly.

The case of Abbots and generals of religious Orders was considered
next. If these did not possess episcopal authority, they possessed at
least a real, a semi-episcopal jurisdiction; being themselves superiors
over a considerable multitude, and also exempt from episcopal control.
This quasi-episcopal position was considered by the Congregation to
qualify them for admission to the Vatican Council. These decisions were
of great significance, as they added, it is said, almost two hundred
votes.[310]

[310] Friedrich, _Döllinger_, iii. p. 206ff.

Secondly, as to regulations for procedure,[311] the Cardinals
asserted that the Pope alone had the right to introduce matters for
discussion. Otherwise, argued the Cardinals, the Council would become
a constitutional chamber. But a Council is only summoned to discuss
what the Pope desires to have discussed; not to introduce their
individual conceptions of what ought to be done. If any reminiscences
of the principles of Constance, Pisa, and Basle floated before the
Cardinals’ memories; if any distant echo of their predecessors’
intention to reform the Church in its head and members haunted them;
it was instantly condemned by the theory now introduced. By way of
dispelling the possible objection that the Pope might omit important
matters, the Cardinals observed that it is an unlikely thing, that it
must be left to Providence, and that you cannot expect perfection in
human affairs. Whatever, therefore, the Bishops desire to introduce for
conciliar discussion, they must report it, not to the Council, but to
the Pope or to his representative; and the Pope will determine whether
its introduction is desirable or not. The Cardinals recommend that a
Commission should be created for this purpose.

[311] Cecconi, i. p. 165.

In the third place, it was thought desirable that four permanent
Commissions should be formed: one on faith; one on discipline; one on
religious orders; one on missions. It was suggested that two-thirds of
the members should be chosen by the Bishops and one-third by the Pope.
Pius, however, decided that the selection should be entirely left to
the Bishops.

Another question creating no inconsiderable discussion was whether
the Bishops should be required to pronounce a profession of faith.
The problem was whether the dogma of the Immaculate Conception should
be included. It was contained in no existing formula of faith. Some
were adverse to its introduction. Others thought it impossible for the
Council to ignore the existence of this dogma. Some again held that
since the dogma had already been declared by the Pope, there could be
no necessity to insert it in a Council’s decree. For this reason it
ought to be recited in the profession of faith. Nevertheless it was
held wiser not to introduce it, for fear of producing upon the Bishops
a bad impression. Accordingly it was decided to fall back on the Creed
of the Council of Trent.

In the Commission a discussion was also held on the burning question of
pontifical Infallibility. Two questions were raised: Was it definable?
was it opportune? The former was answered in the affirmative. So was
the latter, but with the proviso that it ought not to be proposed by
the Holy See, except at the request of the Bishops. Accordingly no
further mention was made of the subject in the Cardinal’s report.
Nevertheless they did not cease to study it.

2. The external preparation for the Council, beyond the limits of the
Roman body, consisted in a series of letters and announcements to the
other Churches of Christendom.

Three Papal letters were issued in reference to the Council’s actual
assembling.[312]

[312] Cecconi, i. p. 379.

First the Bull summoning the Bishops of the Roman Communion [29th June
1869], together with the Abbots, and all persons qualified either
by right or privilege; requiring them, and exhorting them by their
fidelity to the Roman See, and under the penalties appointed for
disobedience, to attend at the Vatican on 8th December.

Was it accident or design which twice over introduced into this letter
the famous phrase _majorem Dei gloriam_? Certainly it was not accident
which omitted from the enumeration of the Council’s uses and purposes
all reference to the problem of pontifical Infallibility, and rested
content with a general allusion to the wise ordering of those things
which pertain to defining dogmas of faith.

A second letter[313] was directed to the Bishops of the Oriental rite
not in communion with the Apostolic See. In this letter a solicitude
is expressed for all Christians everywhere; more especially for those
Churches which were formerly united with the Apostolic See, but now by
the machinations of the Author of all schisms are unhappily parted.
The Oriental Bishops are entreated to come to this General Synod, as
their fathers came to that of Florence--in order to be reunited to the
Apostolic See, which is the centre of Catholic truth and unity.

[313] Cecconi, i. p. 387 (8th September 1868).

Another letter[314] was directed to all Protestants and other
non-Catholics. They are aware that Pius has thought it desirable to
summon all Catholic Bishops to a Council at Rome. He is confident that
this will issue to the greater glory of God. He calls upon them to
reconsider whether they are following the way presented by Christ. No
community can form a part of the Catholic Church if visibly severed
from Catholic unity. Such communities are destitute of that Divinely
constituted authority which insures against variation and instability.
Accordingly he exhorts and beseeches them to return to the one fold of
Christ.

[314] _Ibid._ p. 390 (13th September 1868).

The replies of the Oriental Churches claim independence and equality.
The Greek Patriarch at Constantinople declared that the Oriental Church
would never consent to abandon the doctrine which it held from the
Apostles, transmitted by the Holy Fathers, and the eight Ecumenical
Councils. The Ecumenical Council is the supreme tribunal to which all
Bishops, Patriarchs, and Popes are subjected.

The Armenian Patriarch criticised the Pope’s action with severity;
asserted that the principles of equality and apostolic brotherhood had
not been observed by the Pope. The rank which the Canons ascribe to
the Papal See only give him the right to address personal letters to
the Bishops and Synods of the East, but not to impose upon them his
will by encyclicals in the tone of a master. The Armenian Patriarch
wrote to the Catholicos of Ecmiazin to say that “the Patriarch of the
Roman Church--Pius IX.” had sent a letter, announcing a Council. The
Catholicos replied that the tone of the Pope’s letter gave no hope that
union would be realised: for it did not acknowledge the chief Pastors
of the Eastern Church as equals in honour and dignity. And yet they are
successors of the Apostles. They have received the same authority from
the Holy Spirit as the Roman Patriarch.

The attitude of the German Protestants was uncompromising. The Nuncio
in Bavaria wrote to Antonelli that the Germans regarded the invitation
as an insult. There might be individual conversions, but certainly
not a general return. The common opinion was: the Pope invites us
graciously to put ourselves at the mercy of the Council; but the bird
which has escaped rejoices in its liberty. There existed a vague,
indeterminate desire for unity, but entire diversity as to the basis
for its realisation; and the personal interest of the Pastors was
against unity.

From Berlin came this criticism on the Pope’s letter: “We hold it
impossible to find in this letter the least indication of really
conciliatory spirit on the basis of evangelical truth.” The Protestants
assembled at Worms declared that the principal cause of the divisions
which they deplored was the spirit and action of the Jesuit Society.
This Society which, according to their view, was the deadly foe of
Protestantism, stifled all freedom of thought, and dominated the
entire existing Roman Church. If the permanent union and well-being
of Christendom was to be secured, hierarchical pretensions must be
laid aside. Elsewhere the resolution was passed to ignore the Pope’s
invitation, as being merely a matter of form.

An American Presbyterian reply to the Pope’s letter said, that while
firmly convinced that the unity of the Church is the will of Christ,
they felt it a duty to state the reasons why they cannot unite in the
deliberations of the coming Council. It is not that they reject a
single article of the Catholic Religion. They are no heretics. They
accept the Apostles’ Creed and the doctrinal decisions of the first
six General Councils. But they cannot assent to the doctrines of the
Council of Trent. The barrier which this Council has erected between
them and Rome is insurmountable.

Certainly nothing was further from the Pope’s intentions than to invite
members or representatives of any other Communion to discussion. All he
intended was to advise them to profit by this occasion, to submit and
secure their eternal salvation. If, said Pius, they would only seek
with all their hearts, they would easily lay aside their preconceived
opinions, and return to their Father from whom they have so unhappily
departed. He would receive them with paternal benevolence. And then,
with a scarcely diplomatic allusion to the prodigal who had wasted his
substance in riotous living, Pius declared he would rejoice to say,
“These my sons were dead and are alive again; they were lost, and are
found.”[315]

[315] Cecconi, ii. p. 304.

In the English Church opinion was divided as to the manner and spirit
in which the Pope’s letter should be met. Bishop Wordsworth of
Lincoln[316] replied in a Latin letter. He assumed that the English
Church was included in the letter addressed to all Protestants; and
accepted the title in the sense of protesting against errors contrary
to the Catholic Faith. He resented the tone and temper of the Pope’s
appeal; the judgment implied on the validity of the English Episcopate;
protested that we have never seceded from the Catholic Church, nor
separated willingly even from the Church of Rome; criticised in
particular the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, as an instance of
indisputable variation; and added certain unhappy exegetical remarks of
an apocalyptic character on the relation between Rome and Babylon. This
line of response probably represented no inconsiderable element at the
period at which it was written.

[316] _Miscellanies Lit. and Religious_, i. p. 330, in Latin; transl.
p. 344.

On the other hand, a section existed in the English Church, keenly
alive to its local deficiencies, and possessed with strong and
enthusiastic aspirations for corporate reunion. In their opinion,
faults of taste and assumptions due to Italian ignorance or other
points of view, might well be overlooked, if not condoned, in the
interests of what appeared to be a genuine desire for unity. A
resentful and criticising spirit seemed only calculated to frustrate
all hope of better things. The magnificence of the coming Assembly,
the grandeur of its scale, the regions it involved, the Churches
it included, captivated their imaginations. Whatever might be the
individual view of the relative position of the separated portions of
the great Christian family, such a gathering as this must enlist their
respect, their sympathy, and their prayers. They pleaded earnestly
for corporate reunion. As the separation was corporate, so must the
reconciliation be. They insisted as strenuously as any other members of
the Anglican Communion on the impossibility under present circumstances
of doing anything else than remain where they are.[317]

[317] G. F. Cobb, _Few Words on Reunion_ (1869), p. 6.

“You require us, for instance, to say--not formally indeed, but in
effect--that we have no priest and no sacraments; whilst it is quite
plain to us that our present Episcopate is in all respects the true
and lineal descendant of the Apostolic Mission in this land. You
require us to renounce communion with the Church of England on the
ground that she is heretical; we, on the other hand, are convinced
that there is nothing in her _authorised_ teaching which you do not
yourselves teach in your own pulpits and Catechisms. That she is
actually separated from the centre of visible Catholic unity is a
fact deplorable indeed, but too patent to be questioned; that she is
wilfully, avowedly, and therefore guiltily schismatical we utterly
deny; to say that we ourselves are schismatics is simply to give
the lie to the most cherished longing of our hearts. No! we _must_
remain where God has placed us, loyal to our own Communion and to our
own Episcopate, loyal at the same time (in spirit) to yours: if we
are not of the _body_ of your Church, we belong at any rate to its
_soul_.”

After this vigorous declaration of principles and loyalty the
reunionist felt justified in confessing the defects within the Anglican
Communion of which he was painfully conscious.

“Need we, after all, be so very angry at being classed with
Protestants--if it be true that we have been so--when at least
half our brother Churchmen rejoice at it, and are never tired of
proclaiming to the world that we are a Protestant Church, a creation
of the sixteenth century, specially commissioned to wage war with the
Papal anti-Christ to the end of time? Even regarding our Communion
from the most favourable point of view, can we say that she has done
very much during the centuries of her separation from the Holy See
towards vindicating her Catholicity even in the Anglican sense of
the word? Does she present herself to her Catholic brethren on the
Continent in any very marked contrast to the Protestant sects?”

Thus there was at least in certain directions within the Anglican
Communion a distinct readiness to respond to any overtures for unity.
There was in addition a very wide-spread interest in the coming
Council, not unmixed with curiosity and anxiety as to the steps which
might be taken to bring the severed sections of Christendom nearer
together.

By far the most penetrating and profound on the Anglican side was Dr
Pusey. Perfectly clear and sure of his position, whole-hearted in his
devotion to his own Communion, he insisted that the English Church must
be treated collectively: as a portion of the Church Catholic, to be
reunited; not as individuals, to be absorbed. He was in correspondence
with the Bishop of Orleans and the Archbishop of Paris. With this aim
he wrote his Eirenicon, Is Healthful Reunion Impossible? The Belgian
Jesuit De Buck corresponded with Bishop Forbes of Brechin. The Jesuit
Father

“was certain that at Rome there was no wish for Infallibility.” He
“maintained that every one at Rome was astonished to hear that the
Anglican Bishops did not consider the command to attend the Council
as addressed to them.”[318]

[318] Liddon’s _Life of Pusey_, iv. p. 186.

Attempts were made by Newman to induce Pusey to visit Rome; or at
least to get up a big petition and present it to the Holy See;[319]
quietly observing at the same time that the sort of petition which
he had in view “cuts off the subscribers to it from the existing
Establishment;”[320] Newman also suggested that no Anglican Bishops
should go. Pusey replied by enquiring why should not Newman himself go
to Rome for the Council. Dupanloup invited him as his theologian. But
Newman declined, on the pretext that he was not a theologian, and would
only be wasting his time in matters which he did not understand.[321]

[319] Page 155.

[320] Page 182.

[321] Page 161.

Not unnaturally, Pusey’s penetrating criticism was:--

“If they invited any, it should be Bishops. Theologians go to
accompany their Bishops. They have ignored our Bishops, and ask any
of us whom they may ask informally, because they will deliberately
withhold all acknowledgement of the slightest basis upon which we can
treat as a Church.”[322]

“I have no doubt,” Pusey added, “that the invitation to Rome is given
in the hope that the imposing spectacle presented by the Council may
bring about individual conversions of English Churchmen more or
less learned or well known. But what can we expect when they invited
the great Greek Church simply to submit? I expect nothing under the
present Pope.”[323]

“The difficulty of treating is this, that we have two entirely
distinct objects: we, corporate reunion upon explanation of certain
points where they have laid down a _minimum_ and upon a large range
beyond it; they, individual conversions or the absorption of us.”

[322] Page 180.

[323] Liddon’s _Life of Pusey_, iv. p. 181.

Meanwhile, Pusey prepared an edition of Cardinal Torquemada’s great
work, against the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, originally
composed for use at the Council of Basle at the instigation of Pope
Paul III. This edition Pusey dedicated to the Council about to be held
in Rome. He sent copies to Rome for the Bishop of Orleans, and other
members of the Council. These were returned from Rome with _refusé_
written upon them.[324] Pusey wrote to Newman to enquire what this
meant. Newman answered that he was certain that the Bishop to whom the
books were sent would not be guilty of such incivility; and suggested
a suspicion that the Roman police would not pass a book with Pusey’s
name. This suspicion proved correct. Newman wrote again: “I had a very
kind letter from Bishop Clifford, telling me that neither he nor the
Bishop of Orleans had refused my book, and asking me to send it to him
at Clifton.”[325] But these despotic methods of government at the end
of the nineteenth century were hardly conducive to the advancement
of mutual understanding, or indeed to the interests of truth. The
movements at Rome were watched by Pusey with ever-deepening sorrow:--

[324] Page 190.

[325] Page 192.

“Manning’s is a strange lot,” he wrote “with, I should have thought,
but a very moderate share of learning, by throwing himself into
the tide, to seem to be at the head of a movement which should
revolutionise the Church. It is a mysterious lot, one which one would
not like for oneself. The composition of the Congregation on Dogma
has discouraged us. Those whom we should have had most confidence in,
Mgrs. Dupanloup and Darboy, omitted, and Manning in it. It is utterly
hopeless to send any propositions to a Congregation in which Manning
should be a leading member. I am told that he has been impressing the
Council, or at least important Bishops, with the idea that hundreds
of thousands of the English would join the Roman Communion if the
Infallibility were declared.”[326]

[326] Liddon’s _Life of Pusey_, iv. p. 189.

Pusey’s biographers say that

“as the meetings of the Council went on, Pusey had really very little
hope of any wise result.”[327]

[327] Page 190.

“In all later issues of his third Eirenicon, Pusey altered the title
from ‘Is Healthful Reunion Possible?’ to a form which embodied his
future attitude towards the Roman question--‘Healthful Reunion, as
conceived possible before the Vatican Council.’”[328]

[328] Page 193.

CHAPTER XVI

THE OPENING OF THE VATICAN COUNCIL

The Council of the Vatican was opened on the Feast of the Immaculate
Conception (8th December 1869).[329] There was significance in the
selection of the day. That very day, fifteen years before, Pius IX. had
proclaimed a new dogma on the Virgin; and, as a fervid prelate assured
him, he who had declared the Virgin immaculate was now to be proclaimed
by her infallible. The Council was held in the South Transept of St
Peter’s, and at the opening service seven hundred and two members were
present.[330] So large an Assembly had never been held before. The
proportions of the two opinions were roughly between four and five
hundred Infallibilists and between one and two hundred opponents of the
doctrine.

[329] _Acta._

[330] _Ibid._

Meetings of the Council were of two kinds: the ordinary Congregations,
at which none but members and officials were permitted to be present,
while the proceedings were secret; the Public Sessions, at which the
public were admitted, and the Decrees proclaimed. Of the former kind
there were in all eighty-nine, of the latter four. Only two, however,
of the Public Sessions declared matters decreed: for the first was
entirely occupied with ceremonial, and at the second (6th January)
no Decrees were ready; it was accordingly devoted to recitals of the
Creed of the Council of Trent. The Pope was never present except at the
four Public Sessions. He exerted his influence without compromising his
dignity.

The secrecy of the proceedings was thoroughly in accordance with the
Italian disposition. Every official and member of the Council was
sworn to observe it. But the regulation proved ineffective, partly
because the Pope himself released certain members of the majority from
the necessity of its observance, and partly because the incessant
discussions in unofficial assemblies of the Bishops could not easily
escape publicity. Much information leaked out in various directions and
appeared in print.

The influence of Pius IX. upon the Council was exercised partly
through official documents. Three important papers[331] were issued
by him to the Council during its early period: The Constitution on
Procedure (18th December 1869); on Election to the Papacy in case of a
Vacancy (1st January 1870); on Absolving from Ecclesiastical Censures
(15th January 1870). The significance of the last may be measured
by the following description. Its effect was “to cancel episcopal
encroachments on the Papal authority.”[332] The second was intended to
prevent any assertion of power by the Council in case the Pope might
die.

[331] _Acta._

[332] Ollivier, i. p. 460.

But far the most important of these three Constitutions was that
which regulated the Council’s procedure (_multiplices inter_). This
remarkable document asserted that the right of proposing subjects for
discussion belonged to the Papal See, but that the Pope nevertheless
desired and exhorted the Bishops to give in their proposals to a
Congregation appointed for that purpose. The value of the concession
was qualified by the fact that the Congregation in question was
selected entirely by the Pope, and was composed of Ultramontanes.

All the officers of the Council, including the five Presidents, were
appointed by the Pope on his own authority; and their names were given
in this Decree. The details of procedure were also therein defined. No
Bishop was to leave without the Pope’s permission.

This certainly was a striking document. The French statesman, Ollivier,
says that “its novelty, its boldness, its audacity is only realised
when compared with the proceedings at Trent.”[333] At Trent the
Regulations were determined by the Bishops themselves.

[333] Ollivier, i. p. 466.

When the Vatican Council began its work, several Bishops, including
the Archbishop of Paris, attempted to protest against the restrictions
imposed upon them; but the presiding Cardinal suppressed all objections
with a declaration that the Pope had so ordained, and that his
decisions could not be called in question. To this declaration the
minority submitted. Thereby in effect they acknowledged the Pope’s
power to determine the Regulations. This has been called “the first of
the feeblenesses, or to speak more indulgently, the resignations of the
minority.”[334]

[334] _Ibid._ ii. pp. 21–23.

The actual product of the Vatican Council consists of two Dogmatic
Constitutions known respectively by their opening words as the
Constitution Dei Filius and the Constitution Pastor Æternus. Of these
the former was proclaimed in the third Public Session, the latter in
the fourth Public Session. The contents of the former are the doctrine
of God, of Revelation, of Faith, and of the relation between Faith and
Reason. The latter contains the Ultramontane theory of the Papacy, and
especially the dogma of the Pope’s Infallibility. It is with this last
subject exclusively that we are concerned.

This subject of Papal Infallibility was not mentioned among the causes
for which the Council was assembled, nor was it introduced into the
discussion for the first three months. During that period the Bishops’
attention was devoted to discussions on faith; the discipline of
the clergy; the project of the compilation of a new Catechism, for
universal use, in place of all local Catechisms in the Roman body.
Matters such as these occupied the first twenty-eight Congregations.
But progress was excessively slow: partly owing to the reluctance of
the minority to proceed, under fear of what the future would produce,
and under dislike of various extreme measures proposed to them. It
seems clear that the Roman authorities had not anticipated so much
persistent opposition. At the end of three months, minority-Bishops
said with relief, “We have done nothing, and that is a great deal.” The
Dogmatic Constitution on faith was expected to be ready for the second
Public Session on 6th January. But when the date arrived the doctrine
was not ready. Consequently the entire Session was occupied by formal
recitation of the Tridentine Creed.

In January 1870 the crisis became acute when Manning and other members
of the Vatican Council presented the Pope with an Address, urging him
to declare his own Infallibility.

Upon this Döllinger wrote his “Few Words” to the _Augsburg Gazette_.
He pointed out with all possible emphasis the magnitude of the
suggested revolution. He declared that Papal Infallibility had never
been believed hitherto--believed, that is, with the faith due to a
divine revelation. Between the faith due to a truth divinely revealed
through the Church, and the acceptance of a theological theory, the
difference is immense. Hitherto there had been conjectures, opinions,
probabilities, even human certainty in individual minds as to Papal
Infallibility; but never that divine faith which is the response of
the Catholic to the doctrine of the Church. Döllinger added that while
the Infallibilists’ Address spoke of the Pope being infallible when
instructing the entire Church, it was historically clear that all papal
utterances on doctrine during the first twelve hundred years were
directed to individuals or local communities.

The effect of this urgent appeal to historic certainties was very
considerable. Archbishop Scherr, Döllinger’s diocesan, had a very
uneasy time in consequence at the hands of the Jesuits and the majority
in Rome. Although his personal conviction and sympathy were with the
learned historian, he could not help a certain human self-pity, and he
is said to have sighed, “What a comfort it would be if only Döllinger
would expire!” But the vigorous old Professor seemed in no way likely
to comply with the archiepiscopal wishes.

A further stage in Vatican procedure was reached when Pius IX. imposed
upon the Council, on 22nd February 1870, a new series of Regulations
which were designed to accelerate progress, and to drive things forward
to their intended conclusion.

These _New Regulations_ as to procedure were introduced into the
Council without its consultation or consent. They were simply imposed
upon the Council, from without; by the same authority which directed
everything without personally appearing. The main features of the
New Regulations are two. The first rule authorised the Presidents to
control any individual speaker who in their opinion wandered from
the point. Another rule gave the Presidents power, at the request
of ten Fathers and with the approval of the majority, to closure the
discussion. This second Regulation involved tremendous possibilities.
It placed the minority entirely at the mercy of the majority. It
thereby determined a principle more momentous still--namely, that
Decrees of Faith could be imposed on the Church by mere majority of
votes. Hitherto the minority had taken refuge in the principle that no
opinion could be elevated into a dogma of faith without the Council’s
moral unanimity. The existence of an opposition so extensive as between
one hundred and two hundred Bishops rendered the Church secure on
that theory from the imposition of the Ultramontane conception of
papal prerogatives. But the New Regulations swept that plea of moral
unanimity entirely away. Whatever was the intention of its propounders,
its effect is clear; and that effect was disastrous to the men who
clung to what they regarded as the ancient truth. Naturally the
depression of the minority was profound.

Döllinger wrote a very powerful criticism upon these New
Regulations.[335] He characterised the existing Roman Synod as the
first in history in which instructions as to procedure had been
imposed upon the Bishops without their co-operation or approval.
The New Regulations concentrated all real power in the hands of the
presiding Cardinals and the Commission of Suggestions, so that the
Council itself, as opposed to these, had neither power nor will.
Equally momentous was the fact that doctrine was to be determined by
majorities. This was an intrusion of parliamentary forms into synodical
procedure--with this tremendous difference: that whereas laws passed
by majorities are subject to subsequent revision and recall, dogmatic
resolutions are, if the Council be really ecumenical, irrevocable
and valid for all future time. The Infallibilist majority would
naturally accept the dogmatic proposals introduced by the Commission
of Suggestions; for that Commission, which alone possessed the
privilege of introducing doctrine into the Council, and of determining
what amendments should be admitted, and the form which those
amendments should take, consisted of the most pronounced advocates of
Infallibility. And this decision by majorities was utterly alien to
the traditional methods of Christendom. “For eighteen hundred years,”
said Döllinger, “it has been held as a principle of the Church that
decrees concerning faith and doctrine should be adopted by at least
moral unanimity.” And this because Bishops at a Council are primarily
witnesses to the faith which they and their Churches have received;
secondly, judges to examine whether the conditions of universality,
perpetuity, and consent are fulfilled by a given doctrine; whether it
is really a universal doctrine of the whole Church, and a constituent
portion of the original Deposit divinely intrusted to the Church’s
keeping, and therefore a doctrine which every Christian must affirm.
Consequently the judicial function of the episcopate cannot exclude the
past. It extends across all history.

[335] Reusch, _Declarations and Decrees._

“A Council only makes dogmatic decrees on things already universally
believed in the Church, as being testified by the Scriptures and by
Tradition, or which are contained, as evident and clear deductions,
in the principles which have been already believed and taught.
Should, for example, the Infallibility of a single individual be
put in the place of the freedom from error of the whole Church,
as formerly believed and taught, this would be no development nor
explanation of what was hitherto implicitly believed, nor is it a
deduction that follows with logical necessity, but simply the very
opposite of the earlier doctrine, which thereby would be subverted.”

Döllinger contended further that all theologians agree that the
ecumenical character of a Council depends, among other essential
conditions, upon the possession of real freedom. Real freedom does not
consist in mere immunity from physical force. Fear, ambition, avarice,
as effectually destroy true freedom as bodily constraint. Moreover,
urged Döllinger, even if a Council be ecumenical in its vocation, it
does not follow that it is also ecumenical in its procedures or in its
conclusions. “It is still necessary that the authority which stands
ever above every Council--the testimony of the whole Church--should
come forward and decide.”

This was Döllinger’s final protest before the decision.[336] A Bishop
of the majority replied by prohibiting theological students in his
diocese from attending Döllinger’s lectures. Pius congratulated the
Bishop on this action, and wished that others would follow his example;
which however they declined to do. A war of pamphlets followed.
Döllinger was attacked in a party newspaper as having by his recent
writings placed himself outside the Catholic Church. Hötzl,[337]
a Franciscan lecturer on theology, afterwards Bishop of Augsberg,
published a pamphlet entitled, “Is Döllinger a Heretic?” This was too
much for the King of Bavaria. He expressed in a birthday letter the
earnest hope that Döllinger might long be spared in undiminished mental
and bodily powers to the service of religion and of learning. Hötzl’s
imprudent act awakened so many demonstrations of sympathy and approval
towards Döllinger that it was thought wise to transfer Hötzl to Rome.

[336] Friedrich, iii. p. 541.

[337] _Ibid._ p. 543.

It was impossible, of course, that these New Regulations, involving for
the minority such tremendous possibilities, should be tamely acquiesced
in without a protest. The protest came, partly in the form of written
appeals to the Pope, and partly in speeches in the Congregation. One
of the ablest orators in the Council, the brilliant Strossmayer,
being called to order by the President, uttered against the Rules the
following impassioned criticism:--

“I am persuaded that the perpetual and unmistakable rule of faith
and tradition always was and always must remain that nothing could
be passed without morally unanimous consent. A Council which ignored
this rule, and attempted to define dogmas of faith and morals by a
numerical majority, binding thereby the conscience of the Catholic
world under penalties of eternal life and death, would, according
to my most profound conviction, have transgressed its lawful
bounds.”[338]

[338] Lord Acton, _Vatican Council_, p. 92.

As Strossmayer uttered the closing words the Council Chamber was filled
with the wildest tumult, says Lord Acton, and the Session was broken
up.[339]

[339] _Ibid._ p. 92.

Written protests were sent to the Pope against the New Regulations
by the minority, but no relief was given. What were they now to do?
They had complained, on ground of conscience, that the freedom of the
Council was impaired. This complaint affected the Council’s validity.
Could they reasonably continue their work within it? On the other
hand, no actual Decree was threatened as yet. Was it wise to withdraw
before the repulsive doctrine was introduced? The instincts of caution
prevailed over bolder and more resolute lines. The minority protested,
but submitted.[340]

[340] Friedrich, iv. p. 764.

CHAPTER XVII

THE VATICAN DECISION

If the actual subject of Infallibility had not yet entered the Council
for discussion, it was anxiously or eagerly debated in every mind.
As far back as the beginning of the year (28th January 1870), a
petition[341] under the instigation of Archbishop Manning was sent to
the Commission on Faith, entreating that the doctrine of Infallibility
might be brought before the Council. This petition for a Decree on
Papal Infallibility was based upon the following grounds. It was, they
said, opportune and necessary, because, according to the universal and
constant tradition of the Church, papal decrees of doctrine could not
be reformed; because some who gloried in the name of Catholic were
presuming to teach that deferential submission to papal authority was
sufficient; that one might acquiesce in silence without inward mental
consent, or might at any rate accord a merely provisional assent
until the Church itself endorsed or modified the decree in question.
This independence was, they considered, injurious and subversive of
authority. Prevalent disputes made definition a positive necessity.
If the Vatican Council, thus challenged, neglected to testify to
Catholic Faith, the Catholic world would fall into uncertainty, and the
heretical world would rejoice. Various local synods, moreover, had
already passed resolutions for Papal Infallibility.

[341] _Acta_, p. 923.

Petitions were also issued on the other side. Copies of a circular
had reached them requesting the definition of Papal Infallibility.
Accordingly they are constrained to address the Pope. This is not
a time in which the rights of the Apostolic See are questioned by
Catholics, and it is undesirable to add to the doctrines of the Council
of Trent. The difficulties which the writings of the Fathers, and the
genuine documents and facts of history suggest to many minds, on the
subject of Infallibility, preclude the definition of this doctrine as a
truth divinely revealed, until the difficulties have been removed. They
implore the Pope not to impose such discussions upon them.[342]

[342] _Acta_, p. 944.

This was in January. Nothing was immediately done. But _on the 6th of
March_ a notice was sent to the members individually, informing them
that, in response to the appeal of many Bishops, the Pope had consented
to the introduction of Papal Infallibility into the Council. They were
accordingly requested to send in their written remarks within ten days.

Accordingly written criticisms were sent in to the Commission on Faith.
And it is to this fact that we owe a large portion of our knowledge
of the actual argument employed by Infallibilists by the minority
in the Council. For their criticisms were condensed and printed for
distribution among the members, and copies of this have survived the
Council.[343] This is all the more important since the proceedings
of the Council were nominally secret, and no official report of the
speeches was ever given to the world, and the actual minutes are buried
in the Vatican archives. A Jesuit German writer[344] on the Council
has had access to these, and has given extracts and accounts of them;
but no complete account has ever yet appeared. Meanwhile great value
must attach to the printed criticisms of the doctrine. These, as was
natural, are chiefly the work of the opposition. Some one hundred and
thirty-nine Bishops replied, of whom nearly one hundred were against
the decree. Its advocates contented themselves with general expressions
of approval. The opposition to the proposed definition was begun by the
criticisms of Cardinal Rauscher.

[343] Friedrich, _Documenta_.

[344] Granderath.

Rauscher said that the question was not whether the instructions of
the Pope should be obeyed, but whether they must be received with the
faith due to God. The salvation of souls and the honour of the Council
demand that the greatest caution should be exercised before imposing
this upon the faith of Christian people. He confessed himself, although
prepared to defend what the Council might decree, unable to solve the
difficulties which would arise. To those already persuaded conviction
would not be difficult. But Bishops in Austria and Germany would have
a difficult time. “The subterfuges employed by not a few theologians
in the case of Honorius would only expose the writers to derision.”
To propound such sophistries appears to him unworthy alike of the
episcopal office and of the subject in question, which ought to be
treated in the fear of God. Even prudence would prohibit the use of
such artifices.[345]

[345] Friedrich, _Documenta_.

Bishop Ketteler, Bishop of Maintz, urged that according to the
principle observed by the Fathers and sanctioned by Councils, dogmatic
decrees should only be resorted to under imperative necessity. In many
districts the doctrine of Papal Infallibility was almost or altogether
unknown to the faithful. Were it decreed, many Catholics in this age of
indifference would remain within the Church without believing it, to
the grave detriment of Religion.

Bishop Hefele said that if the error of Gallicanism consisted in
separating the Church from the Pope, the present proposal committed the
converse error of separating the Pope from the Church. We Catholics can
accept neither of these extreme positions. Moreover we have been told
that the subject of Infallibility is the Church; we are now told that
it is the Pope. But it is difficult to see how these two subjects can
be united, unless the one renders the other superfluous, and indeed
excludes it. The theory of Papal Infallibility seemed to him founded
neither in Scripture nor in History. The letter of Leo to Flavian was
not accepted by the fourth Ecumenical Council because it came from an
infallible writer, but because it contained an apostolic doctrine; nor
was it accepted until the doubts of certain Bishops had been removed.

Another Bishop declared that if such Infallibility were dogmatically
defined, the result in his own diocese, where not a trace of Tradition
upon the subject existed, would be grievous losses to the Church. Nor
could he personally profess himself convinced of it.

Melchers, Archbishop of Cologne, was prepared to accept Papal
Infallibility as his personal belief, but was unable to assent to its
erection into a dogma; for he could see no necessity. The authority
of the Holy See was never greater than in modern times. And it is
neither customary nor expedient to impose new dogmatic decrees without
necessity. The subject of Papal Infallibility in particular is a
controverted subject. Many learned and orthodox persons considered its
dogmatic definition impossible, owing to the serious difficulties
presented by history and the writings of the Fathers: the facts showing
that there had never been unanimity or universality of consent on this
matter in Christendom. Nor was it easy to see how a definition could
be composed which would not leave space for numerous uncertainties and
controversies as to its meaning and application to past and future
events. And, among men disposed to accept the opinion, there were many
destitute of that certainty of conviction which is an indispensable
pre-requisite for imposing the doctrine, without grave moral injury,
upon others as essential to be believed under penalty of eternal
damnation. There was no hope of real unanimous consent; for it was
impossible to deny that a large proportion of the Bishops was adverse
to the definition. And hitherto in the Church of God it had never been
the custom, nor is it lawful, to establish new dogmatic definitions
without moral unanimity among the Bishops assembled in Council.

Another Bishop insisted emphatically that no consideration ought to
move men to create an article of faith, except only a clear knowledge
that God has revealed it, and that it is certainly contained in
Scripture or Tradition. For a Bishop to vote this doctrine merely out
of regard for the Holy See would be a mortal sin. There was no constant
Tradition for Infallibility. On the contrary, the opposite opinion
appears in numberless records. St Augustine is particularly clear, and
seems to have had no conception whatever of the doctrine. Bossuet’s
_Exposition_ could not possibly have been approved when the doctrine
prevailed, for he only mentions the primacy.

Another, who protests his abhorrence of all endeavours to detract from
the primacy of the Pope, was yet constrained to plead that nothing
should be said in this Council either concerning the pre-eminence
of the Roman Pontiff over the entire Church and General Council, or
concerning his Infallibility.

Another Bishop protested that this ascription to the Pope of absolute
or unconditional Infallibility, separate, _i.e._ independent of
the consent of the Episcopate--personal, that is to say, uttered
at will--is neither opportune nor lawful: not opportune, for it
will involve souls and religion in innumerable difficulties; not
lawful, because founded on no certain argument either of Scripture,
or Tradition, or Councils; and because it would revolutionise the
constitution which Christ has imposed upon His Church.

Next came a witness from the Irish Catholics. This Bishop said that
although during the last thirty-one years before the Council assembled
the doctrine of the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff had been
taught in the Irish schools, and he himself during fifteen years had
inculcated it upon the young ecclesiastics entrusted to his care; yet
for two hundred years it had always been taught in the schools that the
decrees of the Roman Pontiff were not irreformable, except with the
consent, either expressed or tacit, of the Episcopate. Therefore this
doctrine of personal Infallibility of Roman Pontiffs could not reach
the people and sink into the minds of the faithful laity. Moreover,
a denial of personal Infallibility had been publicly made when the
Irish Bishops were interrogated by the English Government. Nor was any
censure to this day ever uttered against the doctrine which prevailed
in Ireland. The Irish Catechisms had always taught the Infallibility of
the Church, meaning the Bishops or teaching body in agreement with the
Pope.

Sixteen other Bishops joyfully accept the doctrine, and declare it
supported by the entire Dominican Order. Twenty-five others did the
same.

Another Bishop declared that the series of three texts commonly
quoted on behalf of Papal Infallibility (“Thou art Peter.”... “I have
prayed for thee” ... “Feed My sheep”) could not possibly prove that
the authority to teach and the privilege of Infallibility were given
exclusively to St Peter, for another series of texts exists in which
the Apostles collectively with St Peter are made recipients of the
same authority (“Go ye therefore ... teaching them ... I will pray
the Father, and He will send you another Comforter ... Receive ye
the Holy Ghost”). Who will dare to say that the Apostles and their
successors received nothing in these words? Who does not see that all
power was directly bestowed upon them all? Now, since the Bishops are
successors of the Apostles, and receive direct from Christ a definite
share in the government of the Church, it is impossible to allow that
the entire and absolute authority and power to rule and teach, coupled
with the privilege of Infallibility, belong to the Pope alone. Such
power must reside in the Pope together with the Episcopate, as the
successor of Peter and the Apostles. If the Pope possesses a principal
portion of authority, yet it is essentially limited by the rights of
the Episcopate, which are equally Divine. Thus it cannot be absolute.
We hold it for certain, this Bishop continued, that by no argument
from the first five centuries of the Church can the Infallibility
of the Pope be established. The early centuries never recognised
absolute infallible teaching power in the Pope alone; but in the entire
Episcopate, of which he was the head. If nothing is definable which
does not conform to the test of universality from the beginning, how
can Infallibility of the Pope ever become defined?

Another Bishop asserted that nothing more mischievous than this
unfortunate proposition could be conceived; nothing more dangerous
to the authority of the Church and the Holy See. It was not right to
separate either the head from the body nor the body from the head in
the discussion of this doctrine. Infallibility was a prerogative of
the entire body of the Church. The difficulties which the doctrine
of Papal Infallibility create were endless and almost insoluble.
The consequences of a definition would be bad and dangerous. It was
therefore to be hoped that the Pope will, of his own accord, set this
cause of discord aside. Many of the Fathers of the Vatican Council were
persuaded that such an example of humility and self-denial on the part
of the Pope would really increase the authority of the Apostolic See,
and render the name of Pius IX. glorious in the annals of the Church.

Another member of the Council--Bishop Clifford, one of the three
candidates proposed by the Chapter for the Archbishopric of
Westminster, and who therefore, if the will of the Roman Catholics
in England had not been overruled by Pius IX., might have been in
Manning’s place--declared that the definition of this opinion as of
faith would be the greatest hindrance to the conversion of Protestants
and a stone of stumbling to many Catholics. What good it could produce
he was unable to see. It would be especially disastrous in England; for
at the time of the Catholic emancipation from civil disabilities the
Bishops and theologians were publicly questioned by Parliament whether
English Catholics believed that the Pope could impose definitions on
faith and morals apart from the consent, either tacit or express, of
the Church. All the Bishops, among them the predecessor of the present
Archbishop of Dublin, together with the theologians, replied that
Catholics did not maintain this doctrine. This statement was entered
in the Parliamentary Acts. On the strength of these assertions,
Parliament admitted the English Catholics to civil liberty. How will
Protestants believe that Catholics are loyal to their honour and good
faith if they see them acquiring political advantage by professing
that Papal Infallibility is no part of the Catholic religion, and
afterwards, when those advantages are secured, departing from their
public profession and asserting the contrary?

* * * * *

Bishop Purcell, an American Bishop, was of opinion that a definition of
Papal Infallibility would be not only inopportune but also dangerous.
It would, if passed, effectually frustrate conversions in the United
States. Bishops in controversy with Protestants will be unable to
refute them: for Protestants will say, “Hitherto this doctrine was, so
you asserted, an optional opinion in the Church; now you declare it to
be a dogma of the faith. Either therefore your former assertion was
untrue, or the doctrine of the Church has suffered variation. In which
case, what becomes of your objection to Protestant variations?”

Another Bishop, on the contrary, maintained that the definition was
not only opportune, but also necessary, in order to deepen reverence
for highest authority, and to suppress the systematic rebellion which
is very widely spread. He desires that a Canon should be formulated to
anathematise all who hold the opposite view.

Another Bishop declared that he could see no necessity for any
definition. If there were, eighteen centuries would not have elapsed
without one or other of the Councils defining it. Nor could he see
the least utility. They who will not hear the Church certainly
will not hear the Pope. In the present discussion now raging evil
influences daily increase. There were many facts of history better
buried in oblivion, which this discussion proclaims abroad. So much
for the opportuneness of the dogma. What if the doctrine itself be
without secure foundation? Quite recently the Bishop had vowed never
to interpret Holy Scripture except in accordance with the unanimous
consent of the Fathers. Now, previously to the Council, he had always
interpreted the text “I have prayed for thee” in the sense of Papal
Infallibility. But having begun to examine for himself, for the
purposes of the Council, he finds that nearly all the extracts from the
earlier Fathers given in theological manuals in behalf of Infallibility
(as in the works of St Alphonso, Perrone, and others) are either
inaccurate, or derived from forgeries. What the extracts from the early
Fathers prove is primacy. They do not prove Infallibility.

Conciliar definitions, says another Bishop, ought not to be imposed
by superior numerical force, but by intellectual persuasion. In the
Council of Trent so great was the deference accorded to the minority
that a decision was postponed for several years because thirty-seven of
the Fathers declined to concur with the opinion of the majority.

Another Bishop affirmed that in his view a definition of Infallibility
would be the suicide of the Church. Quite recently, certain Anglicans,
who six months ago came over to Catholic unity, returned at once to
Anglicanism, on reading the Archbishop of Westminster’s imprudent
Pastoral.

Bishop Kenrick made a very lengthy and elaborate protest. He appealed
to Augustine’s defence of Cyprian’s opposition to Pope Stephen.
Augustine manifestly was ignorant of pontifical Infallibility,
otherwise he could not possibly have argued as he did. The oft-quoted
phrase, “Peter has spoken by Leo,” signified nothing more when
originally uttered by the Bishops at Chalcedon than that Leo’s
doctrine agreed with their own convictions. In the Sixth Council
at Constantinople, the Archbishop of Constantinople, in reference
to the Letters of Pope Agatho, asked for copies to compare with
the traditional testimonies of that Patriarchate; after which he
would give his reply. Accordingly the Archbishop compared the papal
letters; and, finding that their contents harmonised with the Eastern
teaching, accepted them. Moreover, supreme papal authority does not
include Infallibility. Kenrick considered great differences to exist
between the dogma of Immaculate Conception and that of pontifical
Infallibility. The latter invades the rights of the Episcopate, and
imposes upon the faithful the necessity of believing that Roman Bishops
have never erred in matters of faith, a statement which indisputable
facts of history appear to refute; and also of believing that Roman
Bishops will never err in future, which indeed we hope, but are unable
to believe as a certainty of the faith. The rule to be followed is,
that no innovation should be accepted in the Church; that nothing
should be required of the faithful, except that which has been believed
always everywhere and by all.

When the ten days’ interval was passed, and the Council resumed its
work, there was manifested on the part of the authorities a decided
hesitation. This was due not to the protests of the minority, or to
any force in their numbers or their arguments. It was the outcome of
political rather than ecclesiastical causes. For Italy aspired to
become a consolidated kingdom, with its capital at Rome. The entire
mediæval inheritance of the Papacy, the States of the Church, could
not be held by any force at the Pope’s disposal; and might, but for
external protection, be at any moment swept away. That protection was
provided by France. French soldiers guarded the city, kept the Italians
out, and rendered the continuance of the Council possible. The armed
intervention of France was described by the Archbishop of Paris[346]
as a necessary expedient but not a permanent solution. It provided a
temporary security, during which the Vatican Council was held. It is
impossible not to admire the sagacity which seized the occasion. A
little later, and it could not have been done. But security depended on
French goodwill.

[346] Guillermin, _Darboy_, p. 206.

“If any one dreams,” said Antonelli, “that there exists for us any
human help, except the forces of France, he must be blind.”[347]

[347] Bourgeois et Clermont, _Rome et Napoleon_, iii. p. 322 (1907).

But France at this critical moment showed signs of uneasiness. It felt
that its protection was being utilised for the promotion of theories
which it strongly disliked.[348] Count Daru, head of the French
Ministry, sent an emphatic protest to Rome, in which he declared that
the adoption of Ultramontane theories could not but alienate from
Catholicism many whom it would be a duty to win. The Holy See was
making the relation between the Church and the State more difficult and
strained. In particular, the work of the French Ministry was thereby
made exceedingly difficult. They would soon have to discuss in the
Chamber the presence of French troops in papal territory. How can their
presence be justified if the Pope rejects the principles of liberty
which are essential to the very existence of modern Governments? The
writer confesses that he was personally placed in a position most
discouraging to a devoted adherent of the Roman cause. Public opinion
in France was already amazed to find the Council imprisoned within
the limits of a programme which invaded the freedom of the Bishops.
Nothing could be more opposed to the ancient rules of the Church. Never
had the Holy See hitherto restricted, or rather suppressed, the lawful
independence which Councils have always possessed in forming their own
Congregations and choosing their own officials and regulating their own
procedure. The history of these great Assemblies offers no precedent
for the forms imposed to-day; and we have only too much reason to
say that deliberations so arranged and conducted will only result in
resolutions not to the real interest of the Church.[349]

[348] Ollivier, ii. p. 89.

[349] Ollivier, ii. p. 90.

We can well understand that the receipt of such a letter, from such a
source, caused great uneasiness in the Papal Court. No wonder if, at
the critical moment, when everything seemed in their grasp, they yet
hesitated and delayed. The question to be determined at Rome was, What
did this manifesto mean? Was this present attitude serious? a prelude
to actions more serious still?[350] No wonder if Pius temporised, and
diverted the attention of his Council for the moment to other themes.
So the subject of faith was reintroduced. However, on 11th April, a
telegram was received in Rome: “Daru resigned. Ollivier succeeds him.
Council free.” That is to say, of course, free from a papal point of
view.

[350] _Ibid._ ii. p. 245.

The fact was, that although Napoleon III. had no desire to promote
the extension of papal power, yet in the weakness of the monarchy and
increasingly republican tendencies of France, he could not afford to
offend the Ultramontanes. He was therefore compelled by a cruel irony
to protect the Pope, and enable him to reach the summit of absolute
power. Withdrawal from Rome while its Episcopate was assembled
would be a declaration of hostility to Catholicism upon which France
dared not venture.[351] Accordingly, the political obstruction being
now removed, the Presiding Legate informed the Council that many
Bishops had petitioned the Pope to forego the consideration of all
other subjects, and to proceed at once to the discussion of Papal
Infallibility; and to these petitions the Pope had assented.

[351] Ollivier, i. p. 391.

To realise the situation fully it is now necessary to fix attention
on a select and powerful body at work behind the Council--the famous
Commission of Suggestions. This was a select Committee of twenty-five,
including Cardinals, Patriarchs, Archbishops, all appointed by the
Pope; their momentous function being to receive and criticise all
suggestions of subjects upon which the Council might deliberate.
Nothing could enter the Council at all until endorsed by this
Commission.

It was pointed out by Infallibilists that the members of the Commission
of Suggestions represented all portions of the Catholic world: to which
the minority replied that whatever the geographical distribution, all
opinions were excluded except one. This was not exactly accurate.
But within the chosen twenty-five were such advanced Ultramontanes
as Cullen, Archbishop of Dublin; Spalding, Archbishop of Baltimore;
Manning, Archbishop of Westminster; Dechamp, Archbishop of Mechlin;
Conrad Martin, Bishop of Paderborn; Valerga of Jerusalem; Cardinals de
Angelis and Bonnechose; to say nothing of Antonelli.

An important member of the Commission of Suggestions was Guibert,
Archbishop of Tours. When consulted by Pius IX. on the desirability of
a Council, he had confined himself in his reply to practical affairs.
There is a studious and, says his biographer,[352] deliberate silence
on the theme of Pontifical Infallibility. The theory was his personal
belief. He thought that, were it otherwise, the Church would be
inadequately furnished for arresting heresies, since General Councils
are intermittent and occasional. “But whether it is opportune to make
a dogma of this truth--that,” he wrote in 1870, “is by no means clear
to me.” At the same time he added that he would not have the least
repugnance to subscribe to such a decree. Accordingly Guibert, who was
thoroughly understood in Rome and highly valued, was nominated member
of the Commission of Suggestions.

[352] Follenay, _Vie de Cardinal Guibert_, ii. p. 421.

Guibert himself gave the following interesting account[353] of their
deliberations at the critical hour when the subject of Infallibility
was brought before them. The Congregation met in a chamber of the
Vatican under the papal apartments. Cardinal Patrizzi presided.
Guibert, as one of the senior Archbishops, was placed next to the
Cardinals.

[353] _Ibid._ p. 423.

“The time had come for the famous question of Infallibility to
be submitted to the Congregation for proposals. Its decision was
anxiously expected. The Pope himself had given orders that he should
be informed of our decision immediately afterwards.

“Cardinal Patrizzi, after opening the subject, proceeded to
interrogate, according to custom, the prelates of the least
distinguished rank. They had mostly prepared their reply, and before
voting delivered a thesis on the authority of Holy Scripture, the
Fathers, etc. These discourses were pronounced or read in Latin.
When my turn came, not being accustomed to write much, I had no
prepared discourse, and being unused to talk in Latin, should have
had great difficulty in giving exact expression to my thoughts in
that language. I could, indeed, have given my vote in Latin, but I
desired to preface it with some statements by way of explanation.
I therefore begged the presiding Cardinal to allow me to speak in
French, which was a language familiar to all the Congregation,
and which would greatly facilitate my explanations. The Cardinal
willingly consented, and, I may add that many of my colleagues,
being in the same predicament, afterwards followed my example. They
seemed to attach some importance to what I was about to say. I was
far from desiring to oppose the definition for which people yearned.
I was by no means in with the opposition, but I had never manifested
enthusiasm for it as many others did.

“I began with the profession of faith in the Pope’s Infallibility.
I affirmed that this belief had been mine throughout my life. I had
been taught it in childhood, and as a student I was admitted into a
society where this belief was held without reserve. I had taught it
myself as Superior of the Seminary of Ajaccio. In short, I never had
the least doubt about the doctrine, and I was inclined to defend it
in every way. But the question before them now was whether it was
opportune for the Council to discuss its dogmatic definition. If this
question had been raised some years before I should have asked that
no discussion should be held.... I hold that it would not have been
opportune to discuss the subject some years ago. It would have been
even dangerous, for it would have needlessly disturbed the minds
of men, and have exposed to challenge an authority which more than
any other should remain above discussion. But things are different
to-day. The subject has taken possession of the public Press, and
violent passions have been roused by its discussion. Deplorable
divisions have been encouraged. The faithful are everywhere
disturbed. Even Governments are uneasy; and, with various motives,
concern themselves with this important matter. Things have come to
such a pass that it is essential to bring the discussion to an end.
We are no longer free to keep silence. Peace will only be restored
by a definition of that which Catholics have believed to the present
day. We must therefore treat the subject; and, I would add, must
decide in the affirmative. For otherwise, in the face of existing
circumstances, if this subject be not discussed, serious harm will
be done to the faithful. Governments will not have the respect they
should for the Holy See, and the authority of the Pope will be
depreciated.

“While I was delivering my speech,” adds Guibert, in a most
significant conclusion to this account, “I was watching Cardinal
Antonelli, who was seated opposite. And I saw him give indications of
approval each time I emphasised my opinions. My discourse produced a
considerable effect upon my colleagues. It seemed to be new light,
assisting and strengthening those who were irresolute on the proper
course to pursue. Prelates who spoke after me did me the honour to
base themselves upon the reasons I had propounded, and the conclusion
of our meeting was that the subject should be laid before the Council.

“As soon as our deliberations were ended, the Cardinals went to the
Pope and reported to him all the incidents. They said that, thanks
to the Archbishop of Tours, a favourable vote had been obtained. The
Holy Father expressed his keen satisfaction.”[354]

[354] Follenay, _Vie de Cardinal Guibert_, ii. p. 426.

Such was Guibert’s important share in promoting the great result. If
his health gave way in Rome and compelled him to leave before the issue
was determined, he could well be spared, for he had done his work. It
was appropriate that so influential a mover in the Congregation of
Proposals should afterwards be selected for the Archbishopric of Paris,
and the rank of Cardinal.

But to whom should the task be intrusted of introducing the great
subject into the Council itself? There was a personage singularly
fitted for this difficult work. One of the most active spirits in
Rome was Mgr. Pie, Bishop of Poitiers. His antecedents were, from a
curialist standpoint, irreproachable. He was, says his Ultramontane
biographer, “very Roman.” Already he had laboured to propagate the
distinctive Roman doctrines in five provincial Councils in France; had
taught the Infallibilist opinion twenty years; had suggested suitable
theologians of the proper school for preliminary service in Rome.
The Bishop of Poitiers had impressed upon his clergy his theory of
the relation of Mary to the Councils of the Church. The Council of
Jerusalem, he informed them, was “honoured with her presence,” and she
had never been absent from the Council Chambers since. He suggested as
a fruitful subject for spiritual reflection, “Mary and the Councils.”
The Vatican Assembly deserved better than any to be associated with
her name, for was it not opened on the Festival of her Immaculate
Conception? Mgr. Pie had known perfectly well at least a year that
Pontifical Infallibility was bound to come up for discussion in the
Vatican deliberations. While still residing in his own episcopal
city, his Roman correspondents had informed him that the preliminary
Commission in Rome was entirely agreed on the definability and
opportuneness of the doctrine. And he himself had publicly repudiated
the notion that Papal Infallibility depended for its completeness upon
at least the tacit consent of the Episcopate. That the Bishop’s own
silence and that of his colleagues conferred upon Peter’s doctrinal
utterances a value not obtainable from Christ’s promise, and from the
help of the Spirit, was to Mgr. Pie unthinkable. And he administered
a public rebuke to Bishop Maret, the learned advocate of the opposite
view, through the medium of a sermon on the text, “the servant of God
must be teachable.”[355] The superb confidence of Mgr. Pie greatly
impressed the statesman Ollivier,[356] who said that there was nothing
like it on the other side.

[355] _Acta_, p. 1263.

[356] Ollivier, i. p. 411.

Mgr. Maret replied to the sermon, and the preacher issued a
rejoinder.[357] But the strength of the Bishop of Poitiers did not
lie in argument. He had no learning to measure with that of Maret.
He was given to rhetorical and fervid declamation; whereas Maret was
measured, historical, deliberate. Bishop Pie accordingly escaped from
further discussion in a letter to his clergy, in which he registered a
resolution not to allude again to the recent work of a prelate whose
character he admired, but whose errors he lamented. Refutation was, he
maintained, superfluous, since Maret only repeated his mistakes; and in
fact answers to the work were appearing daily. At the same time Bishop
Pie cannot resist asserting that the work of Bishop Maret deserves
all theological censures short of formal heresy. To which he adds a
prediction, fully justified by events, that Maret would abandon his
errors and submit himself to the judgment of the Church.

[357] _Acta_, p. 1277.

Already in Rome this “advocate of Roman doctrines in their extremest
form”[358] had acted consistently with these antecedents. He had been
long since cordially received by the Pope, and warmly commended for
his diocesan utterances. The special honour had been his of selection
to the important Commission on Faith by almost the highest number of
votes. Already he had preached in Rome, and told his hearers that they
had sown much and reaped little, since two or three false lights had
misguided men and disturbed the vision even of the wise. Nevertheless
he bade them be of good courage. For two or three new definitions of
principle would make their children more powerful for good than they
themselves had ever been.

[358] Ollivier, i. p. 415.

It is true that the diocese of Poitiers was by no means free from
tendencies of the opposite school. The Bishop received from Catholics
of his own flock letters filled with objections against these Roman
doctrines with which for twenty years he had indefatigably laboured to
feed them. Accordingly, for a while, he steered a diplomatic course
between the opposing extremes. When the majority presented a petition,
asking the Pope to introduce forthwith the question of Pontifical
Infallibility into the Council’s discussions, Mgr. Pie was not to be
found among the petitioners. There were reasons for this precaution.
The immediate introduction of the theme would violate the logical
development of thought. For certainly the Church itself should be
considered before the subject of the Pope. While, therefore, the Bishop
of Poitiers was widely remote from sympathy with those who desired the
doctrine’s indefinite postponement and ultimate suppression, he fully
sympathised with the desire to set the doctrine in its logical place.
He thought it would be stronger there than it possibly could be if torn
out of its context, and arbitrarily and disconnectedly introduced.
Hence he did not explicitly associate himself at first with this
urgency movement of the majority. He shared their belief but not their
impatience.

However, tactful and sagacious as ever, and keenly alive to the
direction in which the stream of popularity flowed with increasing
volume, Mgr. Pie was much too prudent to oppose a lengthy reluctance
to the wishes of his intimate partisans. His conversion to the view,
that so urgent a matter required immediate treatment, was shortly
announced. He adopted the vulgar reproach against the minority: “what
they labelled inopportune they have rendered inevitable.” He identified
himself with the irritating assertion that the responsibility for the
definition was due to its opponents. Of that, he said, he had not the
slightest doubt. He was now to influence the Council itself. To whom
could the task of introducing the pontifical claims into the Council
be better intrusted than to him? An Infallibilist who had not signed
the petition for Infallibility would be more calculated to disarm
opposition. The Bishop’s friends in France were enchanted. An episcopal
colleague just returning from Lourdes wrote to him enthusiastically in
terms redolent of the ardent piety of that place: “The Pope has said to
Mary, You are immaculate. And now Mary answers the Pope, And you are
infallible.”

The Bishop of Poitiers set about his speech. He walked with Pius IX.
himself in the gardens of the Vatican. He spent much time in serious
discussion with the Jesuit theologians Schrader and Franzelin. Such
were the influences at work upon his imagination. It was a delicate
task, as his Ultramontane biographer justly observes, to introduce such
a subject before an Assembly so divided. To do it to the satisfaction
of the opposing extremes was of course impossible. The speech of an
hour and five minutes, in which this great theory was launched upon the
Council, received the sharpest criticism of learned Germany, and the
warmest congratulations of the majority and the presiding Cardinals. On
the following day the Pope himself alighted from his carriage to meet
the orator, and expressed the liveliest satisfaction. “_Bene scripsisti
de me_,” said Pius IX.--an allusion, observes the biographer, to the
words which our Lord was reported to have spoken to St Thomas Aquinas,
in commendation of his theological labours. In course of time the
orator was raised to the Cardinalate.

Nothing can better reveal the effect of this announcement on the
minority than the terms in which the Archbishop of Paris denounced it
in a letter to Cardinal Antonelli,[359] the Papal Secretary of State.

[359] Quirinus, p. 854.

“This discussion of Papal Infallibility before all the other
questions which must necessarily precede it, this reversal of the
proper and regular procedure of the Council, this impulsive haste in
a subject of the utmost delicacy, which by its very nature required
deliberation and calm--all this,” said the Archbishop, “was not
only illogical, absurd, incredible, but it plainly betrayed before
the world a resolve to coerce the Council, and was, to describe it
correctly, utterly inconsistent with the freedom of the Bishops. To
persist in this design would be nothing less than a scandal before
the whole world. Those who advocate such excesses are plainly blind
to considerations of prudence. There is such a thing as a justice and
public good faith which cannot be wounded with impunity.

“I say from the depth of inner conviction,” exclaimed the
Archbishop,[360] that if decrees are passed by such methods as these,
occasion will be given for the gravest suspicions as to the validity
and freedom of the Vatican Council.

“That decrees _can_ be passed this way is indisputable,” he added.
“You can do anything by force of numbers against reason and against
right. But there is the sequel to be considered. It is then that
troubles will arise for yourselves and for the Church.”

[360] _Ibid._ p. 856.

Now the writer of this fervid denunciation was conspicuous for
acuteness, tact, reserve, discretion, self-control. What it meant for
such a nature to speak this way may be imagined. Nothing can better
show the intense strain on the feelings of the minority than the fire
and passion in this utterance of one of the coldest of their number.

* * * * *

The Archbishop’s warning produced no practical effect.

A French pamphlet,[361] entitled “The Freedom of the Council and
Infallibility,” said to be the work of the Archbishop of Paris, gives
an extremely powerful description of the situation in Rome, from
the minority standpoint, on the 1st of June. Only fifty copies were
printed, and it was intended exclusively for circulation among the
Cardinals.

[361] Friedrich, _Documenta_.

“Wide-spread complaints exist,” says the writer, “that the Council
is not free. This is momentous, for it affects its ecumenicity. Some
indeed assure us that all is well since the Pope is free. This is
not the Catholic conviction, and will only satisfy one side. It is
useless to bid us observe a respectful silence. The integrity of
history must be secured against party spirit. Moreover we have now
reached the second period of the Council’s activities.

“From the very beginning Papal Infallibility has been the main
affair. To-day it has become the only interest. The time for
concealment is past. The Council has only been assembled for this
end. And now the Pope has postponed all other considerations and
proceeds to throw this doctrine suddenly and irregularly into their
midst. This is an amazing act of sovereign authority, a sort of _coup
d’état_. Nevertheless, it has been throughout the aim, although the
secret aim, of the Assembly at the Vatican. The majority declares the
doctrine to be urgently necessary. But why this urgency? A question
which without peril to the Church has waited eighteen hundred
years might possibly still afford to wait, at least for months.
Precipitation, urgency, are unbecoming in a problem demanding above
all things the calm gravity, deliberateness, freedom, which alone
befit representatives of an eternal Church. The probability of an
interruption of the Council before anything is decreed is a miserable
subterfuge. Is it really believed that the majority is accidental and
could not be counted upon again?

“What appears to us most serious in this _coup d’état_ is not so much
the disordering of the Council’s regular work, as the proof thereby
displayed of an arbitrary and absolute will, determined to override
everything in order to secure an end long since designed although
long concealed.

“Certainly those who urge the Holy Father to such extremes take
upon themselves a most tremendous responsibility. Considering the
circumstances (especially the doubts already raised as to the
Council’s freedom), under which they have demanded and secured an
exercise of supreme authority, placing so many venerable Bishops
in the dilemma of a struggle with the Pope or with their own
consciences, we cannot refrain from the enquiry, What future do they
expect will await this assembly of the Vatican?

“The Council has now resumed its labours under new Regulations.
Undoubtedly these will facilitate rapidity. But the aim of a Council
is not rapidity, but truth. If the speed is increased, it is at
the price of the freedom of the Bishops; at the price of real
deliberation; of the dignity and security of the Church. The new
Regulations on Procedure had provoked a protest from one hundred
Bishops of the minority: they feel themselves burdened by intolerable
restrictions. They find themselves completely under the control of
the Presidents, of the Commissions, of the majority. And behind all
these there is the perpetual intervention of the Pope himself. The
Presidents control absolutely the order of the day, the length of the
Sessions, the regularity of meetings, the intervals for the study of
documents. The Council, under such dominion, has no life of its own,
and no power of initiative. It has no liberty. Is there,” asks the
writer, “any deliberative assembly in Europe or America similarly
restricted? And yet the necessity of freedom is more imperative here
than in any assembly in the world, considering the eternal interests
here involved.

“The minority feel themselves still more crippled by the power of
numbers. There exists a majority and a minority; unequal in numerical
strength, but far more equal considering the Churches which they
represent. The composition of this majority raises serious thoughts.
The Council includes, besides diocesan Bishops, whose right alone is
indisputable, Bishops with no diocese; Vicars Apostolic, dependent
on Rome and removable at will; Cardinals who are not Bishops and
some not even priests; superiors of religious Orders.” According to
the author, the proportion whose right of membership was uncertain
amounted to 195. “Moreover the preponderance of Italian influence is
shown in the fact that it is represented by 276 Bishops, while all
the rest of Europe has only 265. A considerable proportion of Bishops
are being maintained by the Pope, which increases the difficulties of
real independence.

“If it be said that decision by majorities is the method of all
deliberative assemblies, the answer is, that this is not true of a
Universal Council of the Church; least of all can it be permissible
with an Assembly so constituted as that of the Vatican. Creation
of dogmas by such a method is impossible. It has never been done
in the Church. And, accordingly, the protest of a hundred Bishops
declares that moral unanimity alone can determine dogmatic questions.
So serious they declare is this matter that unless their protest
against the New Regulations be attended to, and that without delay,
their consciences will be burdened with intolerable difficulties. A
hundred Bishops say this. And they have secured no reply whatever.
The perplexities resulting from this treatment may be well imagined.
Certainly the function of an Episcopal minority in a Council is no
sinecure. Some desired at once to withdraw altogether. Others, and
these the more numerous, were reluctant to take this final step.
Which of the two was the wiser course the future will show.”

The author complains still further of pressure exerted from without; of
ordinary priests encouraged by Roman influences to make declarations
in favour of Infallibility against their Bishops--a sort of novel
Presbyterianism in which the Bishop’s testimony to the faith is
superseded by a section of his clergy. More serious still is the
personal intervention of the Pope. A powerful moral pressure is brought
to bear upon the Bishops by Pius IX. Bellarmine wrote a courageous
letter to Clement VIII., counselling him not to influence the assembled
theologians with the weight of his personal opinions, nor to bestow his
favours and coveted distinctions exclusively upon those who thought
as he did, but to leave all men in these serious discussions to the
unimpeded expression of his own belief. Certainly Pius IX. had met
with other advisers, and Bellarmine has no equivalent in the Vatican
of to-day. Semi-official papers ascribed to the Pope a sentiment of
dignified reserve on the question of his Infallibility. But, as a fact,
every movement in that direction has received papal blessings and
encouragement. An astonishing number of briefs has been issued from the
secretariat of latin letters. Each tract in favour of Infallibility is
commended. Thus the subject before the Council is prejudged, and the
minority bishops themselves indirectly attacked.

The author’s conclusion is that the character of the Council is
seriously compromised, and its freedom more than questionable.

_The general discussion_[362] of Infallibility began on the 13th of
May, and continued to the 3rd of June. No less than sixty-four Bishops
desired to speak upon it. Their names are known, but their speeches,
with few exceptions, are only known in fragments. They all exist of
course in the shorthand reports stored in the Vatican archives, but
they have not yet appeared. This remains for a future historian.
Meanwhile, we know fairly well what Manning said, and we have in full
the speech of the Archbishop of Paris.

[362] _Acta_; Ollivier, ii. p. 279.

The Archbishop of Paris discussed three points: the introduction, the
contents, and the results of this proposed decree. Two facts might show
whether its introduction into the Council was in accordance with the
principles and dignity of such an Assembly.

One fact was, that while Papal Infallibility was obviously the real
object for which the Vatican Council was assembled (as indeed the
creation of a new dogma is the most momentous act a Council can
perform), nevertheless this momentous subject was never mentioned in
the official documents. And this omission was natural. For the Catholic
world had no desire for a settlement of the question; nor was there any
real ground for meddling with what had hitherto always been a subject
of free enquiry among theologians.

The second fact was the introduction of the subject into the Council
completely out of its logical and natural order. It was not logical to
begin the doctrine on the Church with a definition on the Papacy; for
the Infallibility of the Church must clearly be considered prior to
that of the Pope.

So far as to its introduction. As to its subject matter: the substance
of the formula before the Council contained ambiguous expressions, and
was full of difficulty. Under what conditions is this Infallibility
supposed to be exercised? By what external signs can we rest assured
that the Pope is discharging the office of supreme teacher of
Christendom? Is the consent of the Episcopate required or not? If
it is, then men are fighting a shadow, for this is the doctrine
universally received; if it is not required, then they are introducing
an unheard-of and intolerable innovation. But when a formula free from
ambiguities has been discovered, then two conditions must be fulfilled:
First, the formula, when discovered, must be proved by solid arguments
from Scripture, from the Fathers, from the Councils. It must be shown
that no important historic incidents conflict with it, that no papal
act refutes it. The Archbishop referred to the Council of Constance
as an example in which the statement that “every lawfully convoked
Ecumenical Council representing the Church derives its authority
immediately from Christ, and every one, the Pope included, is subject
to it in matters of faith,” was unanimously decreed. The Italian
School, of course, would deny the ecumenical character of this decree.
“That,” says the Archbishop of Paris, “I do not admit.” Moreover, in
any case it would show the common opinion of the Bishops. All these
questions, urged Darboy, would have to be considered and weighed.
Until the necessary proofs are forthcoming nothing can rightfully be
done. There is no peril in delay. But to impose irrevocably on the
consciences of the faithful a decree with precipitation, and without
absolute certainty, would be the gravest peril that can be conceived.

As to the practical results of such a decree the Archbishop observed
that Papal Infallibility was offered as a means for strengthening
authority and unity in the Church. But it must be remembered that the
ideal of authority in Christendom is not that which our imagination
or our reason represents as most desirable; but that which Christ has
established and our fathers maintained to this day. It is not our
function to reconstruct the Church after our taste, or to alter the
conditions of divine ordaining. Now the Church has never been without
its essential elements. But it has never had a definition of Papal
Infallibility. Such definition cannot therefore be essential. Nor have
men the right to argue that the Church’s unity would be firmer if
authority were stronger. An institution may be ruined by over-pressure.
Excessive concentration may paralyse its functions rather than perfect
them.

Then, again, the remedy for the evils of the world is not to be found
in Papal Infallibility. This doctrine will not draw to the Church the
alienated majority; nor give the Church its rightful place of influence
among the nations. The world is sick and perishing, not for want of
knowing the truth, but for want of love for it. If it reject the truth
now when presented by the collective testimony of the Church, it will
not any the more accept it because affirmed by one infallible voice.
And what is the value of a proclamation if it is not received? of an
anathema where the formulating authority is not acknowledged?

The Archbishop evidently spoke with constraint. His measured,
diplomatic utterances suggest the firmness and caution of one desirous
not unnecessarily to offend yet resolute to speak his mind. He told
the Council that he had delivered his conscience, so far as was
allowed him; that if he were to say all he would outrun the limits of
discretion. He concluded by proposing, first, to postpone the scheme as
having been introduced in a manner unworthy of the Council; secondly,
to reconsider more carefully the nature and limits of Infallibility;
and, finally, to set aside the subject altogether as fraught with
dangerous results to Christendom.

The Congregations were occupied with daily lengthy speeches for and
against the doctrine of Infallibility from 13th May to 3rd June. On
3rd June the Presidents produced a petition signed by many Bishops,
requesting that the debate might be closed. The Council was accordingly
invited to express its opinion, and the large majority decided that the
time for closure was come. Thus again the minority were defeated.

Little more remained to be done. The special discussion followed. But
the matter was approaching its close. The minority grew more spiritless
and anxious for self-protection. The intense heat of the Roman summer
told fearfully on the health of Bishops accustomed to northern climes.
Appeals to the Pope for adjournment until autumn were rejected. The
futility of protracted discussion became convincingly clear to the
minority no less than to the majority.[363] A desperate attempt was
made by some French Bishops (Dupanloup and the Archbishop of Paris)
to induce the Emperor Napoleon to request the Pope, in the name of
humanity and reason, to prorogue the Council until October. But before
the reply could arrive the minority abandoned the struggle.[364]

[363] Ollivier, ii. p. 329.

[364] _Acta_, p. 756.

Many Bishops resigned their turn to speak. A movement for closure
arose, instigated chiefly by Manning: at first resisted, the minority
gradually acquiesced.

Ultimately, amid general approval, the presiding Cardinal declared
the discussion closed. On the 13th of July the proposition of Papal
Infallibility was put to the vote.[365] The President announced that
601 Fathers had voted. Of these 451 were in favour, 88 against, and 62
favourable conditionally.[366]

[365] _Acta_, p. 758.

[366] _Ibid._ p. 760.

The Legates further announced that the conditional votes would be
taken into consideration, and reported upon in the next Congregation.
Ninety-one Bishops also abstained from voting, although in Rome at
the time.[367] When the members re-assembled on Saturday, 16th July,
a report was made on the conditional votes and the amendments; but so
far from anything being done to conciliate the minority, the wording of
the decree was made somewhat more uncompromising than before. To the
definition voted on the 13th, that the decrees of the Roman Pontiff
were irreformable of themselves, it was now added “and not by consent
of the Church,” thus emphasising still more strongly that the dogmatic
authority of the Papacy was independent of the entire Episcopate.[368]
After this stupendous achievement the Presidents informed the Bishops
that, although the Council was not prorogued, a general permission
was granted them to return to their dioceses until 11th November (St
Martin’s Day).[369]

[367] Quirinus, p. 778.

[368] Ollivier, ii. p. 337.

[369] _Acta._

The final Public Session at which the Pope proposed to convert the
formula into dogma of faith was fixed for Monday, 18th July. There
was for the minority certainly no time to lose. They made one last
attempt.[370] On the Saturday evening a deputation of the opposition,
including two Cardinals and the Archbishops of Paris and Milan, went
to the Vatican and sought an audience with the Pope. After waiting
an hour, they were admitted at nine o’clock.[371] The Archbishop
of Paris was their representative. In his own name, and in that
of his associates, he declared his submission to the doctrine of
Infallibility, but requested the insertion of the phrase, “relying on
the testimony of the Churches.” This phrase would have acknowledged
that the witness of the Church and of the Episcopate was essential
to any doctrine which claimed to be part of the Catholic faith.[372]
It would have made the dogma much less difficult to many members of
the Roman Church. It would have relieved the strange and incredible
isolation in which the new formula had placed the Pope--as apart from,
independent of, the universal consciousness of Christendom. It would
have suggested that the Pope represented and voiced the collective
conviction of the Church, on whose testimony he was relying. But this
was not the Ultramontane idea. And there is no occasion for surprise if
Pius IX. rejected it. One more appeal was made to him. Ketteler,[373]
Bishop of Maintz, threw himself on his knees before the Pope, and
with his eyes full of tears implored Pius to make some concession
which would restore peace to the Church and to the Episcopate. It is a
striking scene. Two conceptions of the Church are embodied in these two
men: in Pius, the modern Ultramontane conception of absolute authority
centralised and condensed in one individual; in his suppliant, the
ancient Cyprianic conception of authority residing in the Collective
Episcopate. In the attitude of the two men, the historian may see the
old vainly pleading with the new for permission to exist; lifelong
believers reduced to self-contradiction as the price of permission to
remain. It was this scene which provoked a Roman contemporary[374] to
say:--

[370] Ollivier, ii. p. 341.

[371] Quirinus, p. 800.

[372] Ollivier, ii. p. 341.

[373] _Ibid._ ii. p. 342; Quirinus, p. 801.

[374] Quirinus, p. 802.

“Pius is firm and immovable, smooth and hard as marble, infinitely
self-satisfied, merciless and ignorant, without any understanding of
the mental conditions and needs of mankind, without any notion of the
character of foreign nations, but as credulous as a nun.”

Frustrated in that last appeal, the deputation returned to their party.
A meeting was held very late on the Saturday night.[375] What should
the minority do? The bolder spirits proposed that they should attend
the Public Session, and openly repeat their rejection of the doctrine.
But the bolder spirits were few. Many shrank from such resolute action.
They held it inconsistent with respect for the Pope to pronounce a
public protest in his presence at the final Session when the doctrine
would be proclaimed. They had misgivings as to the number who had the
courage for such a stand. Diminishing numbers added point to this
misgiving. Many Bishops had already left the city, others were going.
Was it prudent to appear in protest shorn of their real numerical
strength? Moreover, there were personal anxieties and fears. What if in
the Public Session their protest was over-ruled? The determination of
the majority to decree the dogma at any cost was now beyond dispute.
Illusion was impossible. The formidable anathema attached to the decree
might in another forty-eight hours apply to themselves. They were very
uneasy in the papal precincts. They would infinitely prefer to take
refuge in the safety of their own cathedral cities, far away from the
entanglements, oppressive atmosphere, moral as well as physical, in
Rome. Consequently caution prevailed. They composed a letter to the
Pope, the last of their many futile protestations, couched in terms
of deference, but registering their continued allegiance to their
ancient principles. And by Sunday evening most of the seventy Bishops,
representatives of some of the most illustrious Sees in Christendom,
had left the city, and hastened away beyond the territorial dominions
of Rome.

[375] Ollivier, ii. p. 343.

The last letter of the defeated minority called the Pope’s attention
to the number of disapproving prelates.[376] To the eighty-eight
who voted in the negative must be added the sixty-two others who
expressed themselves dissatisfied; and, beyond these, another seventy
who absented themselves, although present in Rome, and others still
who had already left the city. The large element of disapproval would
be obvious to the Pope, and also to the world. Since the hour when
they recorded their vote against the doctrine, nothing had happened
to change their opinion: on the contrary, much to strengthen it.
Accordingly they now renew and endorse their declaration. Under these
circumstances they have resolved to absent themselves from the Public
Session of the 18th; their reverence for the Holy See not permitting
them to proceed to an open refusal of a doctrine by which the Pope was
personally affected. They would therefore leave the city and return to
their dioceses with expressions of unaltered faith and obedience.

[376] _Acta_, p. 994.

Among the signatures to this letter are the names of Cardinal
Schwarzenberg; Darboy, Archbishop of Paris; Scherr, Archbishop of
Munich; Kenrick, Archbishop of St Louis; Strossmayer, Bishop of
Sirmium; Bishop Maret, Bishop Clifford of Clifton, Bishop Dupanloup,
Bishop Hefele.[377]

[377] _Ibid._ p. 995.

This final letter of disapproval, which sixty of the Bishops signed,
was of course technically valueless. All speeches, protests, and
letters count for nothing compared with the actual formal decision. If
any protest were to have validity, it must be made precisely where the
minority had not the courage to make it--in the Council at the final
Session; to frustrate the impending decree. Yet, if it is strictly
true that the dogma was passed with practical unanimity of all present,
on the value of that unanimity opinions will legitimately differ.

The conduct of the minority has been not unnaturally severely
criticised. They grew feeble, says Ollivier,[378] the head of the
French ministry, just in proportion as actions ought to have taken
the place of words. Their arguments in their last consultation were
weakness itself. Not to renew their protest in the Public Session
was virtually to cancel the protest already made. It insured for the
decree just that unanimity which its advocates desired, and which its
opponents knew that it did not possess. It was a confession that they
dared not utter Yes or No.[379]

[378] Ollivier, ii. p. 341.

[379] _Ibid._ p. 343.

Before Dupanloup left the city he sent the Pope a letter[380]
suggesting one last expedient for averting the evils which a decree of
Infallibility would involve. Let the Pope personally decline to confirm
the decree. Let him say in the Public Session that he thankfully
recognises the remarkable tribute to the prerogatives of his See,
in the votes of so numerous an assembly of Bishops; nevertheless,
considering the circumstances, and after mature reflection, he believes
it more in accordance with apostolic wisdom and prudence to withhold
his definite approval until a less disturbed and more propitious
time. Dupanloup assured the Pope that this manœuvre would solve the
problem, release men unexpectedly at the last moment from incalculable
misfortunes, astonish the world, and win universal reverence and
admiration. This singular epistle terminated with a promise to preserve
inviolable silence on the advice which he ventured to give.

[380] _Acta_, p. 993.

The night passed. Early on the morning of the eventful 18th of July,
Dupanloup’s reflections were interrupted by a sudden exclamation from
his travelling companion, Archbishop Haynald, who sat at the opposite
corner of the carriage. “Monseigneur,” said Haynald, “we have made a
great mistake.” Dupanloup had no heart for further discussion. He made
a sign that he wished to say his Office. Archbishop Haynald was right.
If, as Dupanloup told the clergy, Bishops united in council with the
Pope “decide questions as witnesses of the faith of their Churches, as
judges by divine right”[381] it would seem to be not only their right,
but their very awful duty and inalienable responsibility to allow
no sentiment of respect for the office of another to silence their
convictions and frustrate their decisions. Thus it is true that the
minority melted away, and that the ultimate proclamation was made with
practical unanimity; but this was due to a regard for sentiment which
was, under the circumstances, wholly out of place. The Bishop who told
his diocese that the definition of such prerogatives demanded other
considerations than sentiment or filial piety, could not consistently
withdraw his testimony to the faith of the Church just in the most
critical moment that ever awaited him.

[381] _Letter to his Clergy_ (1868), p. 11.

Meanwhile in Rome the final declaration was made. In the presence of
his faithful majority, in the midst of one of the fiercest storms ever
known to break across the city, accompanied by thunder and lightning,
while rain poured in through the broken glass of the roof close to the
spot where the Pope was standing, Pius IX. read in the darkness, by the
aid of a candle, the momentous affirmation of his own Infallibility.
Variously explained by friend and foe, the storm and the darkness
are by the one compared to the solemn legislation on Sinai; by the
other to tokens of divine displeasure and approaching desolation. But
whatever constructions were placed upon the circumstance, the dogma
decreed indisputably declared that--

“The Definition affirms that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks
_ex cathedra_--that is, when in discharge of the office of Pastor
and Doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme Apostolic
Authority, he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be
held by the Universal Church, by the divine assistance promised to
him in Blessed Peter--is possessed of that Infallibility with which
the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for
defining doctrine regarding faith and morals. And that, therefore,
such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves
and not from the consent of the Church.”[382]

[382] See Manning’s _Pastoral_ (1870): _The Vatican Council and its
Definition_, p. 57.

For a few more meetings the diminished Council lingered on.[383] The
eighty-seventh Congregation was held on 13th August, when the total
of Bishops present was reduced to 136. Two further Sessions were
held on 23rd August and 1st of September, when the numbers dwindled
still further to 127 and 104. But for all real purposes the Council
met no more after the fourth Public Session and the proclamation of
Infallibility.

[383] _Acta_, p. 763.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE MINORITY AFTER THE VATICAN DECREE

The 18th of July 1870 is from any point of view one of the most
critical days in the history of the Papacy. It is the transition
from old Catholicism into new. It is the consummation of a theory of
spiritual authority; the centralising and condensing of all power
in one individual. It is not in the least the necessary or the
logical conclusion of the principle of authority: for the expression
of authority, either through the Collective Episcopate or through
reception by the Universal Church, is just as consistent and just as
logical; and has the additional advantage of corresponding with the
primitive facts of Christian history.

The 18th of July was also a momentous date in the annals of the Roman
temporal power. On the very next day began the Franco-Prussian War.
From that date onwards the tragedy of conflict precluded any meeting
of German and French Bishops in Council at Rome. The Council was
necessarily interrupted, its resumption indefinitely postponed. The
disaster to France meant the recalling of the French troops from
Rome. Then followed the capture of the city by United Italy, and the
establishment of the Italian Throne at the gates of the Vatican. The
temporal power of the Papacy vanished like a dream, and Pius IX.
considered himself a prisoner within the Vatican precincts. The canon
of the Castle of St Angelo announced the entry of King Humbert, and
various convents and palaces were seized and confiscated for secular
departments and imperial uses.

A curious Italian comment on the opposition in the French Episcopate
may be found in the diary of Cardinal Pitra, a learned member of the
Benedictine Order, resident during the Council in Rome. Cardinal Pitra
was librarian of the Vatican, and placed himself in that capacity
at the disposal of the Bishops. If he kept aloof from the intrigues
of every kind which, says his biographer, were then so numerous, he
kept a careful diary of the events in which he displays himself as a
decided Ultramontane. He even adopted the paradox that the passing
of the new decree would diminish rather than increase the abyss
between the Eastern Churches and Rome. But Pitra’s comments after the
French retreat illustrates contemporary feeling. He thought that the
Franco-German War, which immediately broke out, was providentially
designed to prevent concerted action between the Bishops of these two
countries. When the Italians entered Rome one of their first acts was
to destroy the villa where Dupanloup during the Council had resided.
This was, according to Pitra, because Providence desired to efface the
reminders of opposition. Pitra traced the course of the war, and noted
how the soldiers advanced through Metz, Rheims, Paris, and Orleans--all
Gallican cities; whereas they did not reach Besançon, Dijon, and
Marseilles--all Ultramontane Episcopates. “We are here,” murmurs the
Cardinal, “witnesses to the preliminaries of the Judgment Day.”

Cecconi, Archbishop of Florence, who collected many documents
concerned with the struggle, relates that Pius IX. used to distinguish
three periods of the Council: the preparations; the assemblies; the
conclusion. Of these, the first period was Satanic, the second Human,
the third Divine.[384]

[384] Baunard, _Histoire du Cardinal Pie_, p. 353.

But before a minority Bishop could assent to the new Decree, there were
questions to be faced and answered; questions which he must answer
in his own behalf, and which also he was certain to find assailing
him, whether from his Clergy or Laity, who like himself had hitherto
deprecated the doctrine or disbelieved it. There was the question,
perhaps, first of all, Is this Council ecumenical? Is it a true
exponent of the Universal Church? There are Councils of many kinds,
with varying degrees of authority, legitimately responded to with
varying degrees of respect. Is this Council of the highest kind--that
which possesses a real and absolute finality? This question was widely
debated within the Roman body. It was said by high authorities in the
Roman Communion that the Vatican Council did not fulfil the conditions
of freedom essential to the creation of a dogma of the faith. Many
writers of the period assert this; some in the most impassioned terms.
Hefele emphatically declared it. Some affirmed that moral unanimity was
essential to representation of the Universal Church. Such unanimity, it
was notorious, the vote for Infallibility did not possess. Accordingly
there was no rush of the defeated Bishops into immediate acquiescence.
On the contrary, there was suspense, uncertainty, delay. Individual
isolated Bishops took no decided steps. They waited to see what others
would do, what time would produce, what thought and reflection might
suggest.

Fessler, indeed, late Secretary of the Vatican Assembly, assured them
that their course was clear. He drew a sketch of the conduct which he
considered would be ideal for a perplexed Bishop under these trying
circumstances.

“If even up to ... the last General Congregation before the Solemn
Session a Bishop is not satisfied as to all his difficulties, or if
he thinks it better that the decision should not yet be pronounced
on such and such a doctrine, he may, in the interval between the
last General Congregation and the Solemn Session, acquire a full
conviction on the subject by discoursing with other theologians, by
study of the subject and by prayer, and may thus overcome his last
difficulties, and see that it is well that the definition should be
made.”

This portion of Fessler’s advice was not much use since it appeared
subsequently to the final Session. Whether the advice to “acquire a
full conviction” in the interval between the last General Congregation
and the Solemn Session would have been very valuable, may be judged
from the fact that the interval for “discourse with other theologians,”
“study and prayer,” was two days. The subsequent struggles will show
what the minority Bishops thought of acquiring a full conviction in two
days.

Should, however, the best use of the interval prove unavailing,
Fessler’s advice was as follows:--

“Nay, even if he cannot attain this full conviction and insight into
the matter by any exertion of his own, he will wait for the decision
of the Council with a calm trust in God, without himself taking part
in it, because up to this point he lacks the necessary certainty of
conviction. When, however, the Council by its decision puts an end to
the matter, then at length his Catholic conscience tells him plainly
what he must now think, and what he must now do; for it is then
that the Catholic Bishop, whom hitherto unsolved difficulties have
kept from participation in the Public Session, and from the solemn
voting, says: ‘_Now_ it is undoubtedly certain that this doctrine
is revealed by God, and is therefore a portion of the Catholic
faith, and therefore I accept it on faith, and must now proclaim it
to my clergy and people as a doctrine of the Catholic Church. The
difficulties which hitherto made it hard for me to give my consent,
and to the perfect solution of which I have not even yet attained,
_must_ be capable of a solution; and so I shall honestly busy myself
with all the powers of my soul to find their solution for myself, and
for those whose instruction God has confided to my care.’”

Fessler omits all recognition of the possibility that men if placed
in a dilemma between Authority and History may choose the latter. The
effect of the Decree on many Bishops was not in the least to compel
the confession, ‘_Now_ it is undoubtedly certain that this doctrine is
revealed’: rather it was to awaken the criticism, now it is profoundly
uncertain whether this Council is ecumenical.

Such is Fessler’s advice to Bishops who doubted the truth of the
doctrine. To those who only considered its definition inopportune his
counsel was:--

“Those Bishops who in the last General Congregation voted with the
_non placets_, only because they really thought it was not a good
thing, not necessary, not for the benefit of souls in countries
well known to them, and who for this reason abstained from taking
part in this decision, may after the solemn decision, if they think
it advisable, represent to the faithful of their dioceses the
position which they previously adopted towards the doctrine, in
order that their conduct may not be misunderstood. But they must
now themselves unhesitatingly accept the doctrine which has been
decided, and make it known to their people in its true and proper
bearings, without reserve, and in such a manner that the injurious
effects which they themselves apprehended may be as much as possible
obviated and removed; for it is not permitted to the Bishop, as the
divinely-appointed teacher of the clergy and people, to be silent
about or to withhold a doctrine of the Faith revealed by God, because
he apprehends or thinks that some may take offence at it. Nay, rather
it is his business so prudently to bring it about in the declaration
of that doctrine, that its true sense and import may hereafter be
clearly represented, all erroneous misrepresentations of it be
excluded, the reasons for the decision of the doctrine brought out
plainly, and all objections to it zealously met and answered.”[385]

[385] Fessler, _True and False Infallibility_, p. 21.

No one gave greater weight to the obvious difficulties which the
methods employed at Rome had created for the Decree, no one formulated
them with more simplicity and frankness than Dr Newman. His letters
showed how he laboured to suggest plausible grounds for assent to the
new Decree, while leaving the ecumenical character of the Council for
future solution. And, remembering that these letters were addressed
to the believers and not to the outer world, nothing can show more
strikingly than the arguments which Dr Newman employs, the profound
perplexity into which many Romanists were thrown.

In a letter[386] written six days after the Decree was passed he says:--

[386] See Letter to Duke of Norfolk, pp. 96, 97, 98, 99.

“I saw the new Definition yesterday, and am pleased at its
moderation--that is, if the doctrine is to be defined at all.
The terms are vague and comprehensive; and personally I have no
difficulty in admitting it. The question is, Does it come to me with
the authority of an Ecumenical Council?

“Now the _primâ facie_ argument is in favour of its having that
authority. The Council was legitimately called; it was more largely
attended than any Council before it....

“Were it not then for certain circumstances under which the Council
made the definition, I should receive that definition at once.

“Even as it is, if I were called upon to profess it, I should be
unable, considering it came from the Holy Father and the competent
local authorities, at once to refuse to do so. On the other hand, it
cannot be denied that there are reasons for a Catholic, till better
informed, to suspend his judgment on its validity.

“We all know that ever since the opening of the Council there has
been a strenuous opposition to the definition of the doctrine; and
that, at the time when it was actually passed, more than eighty
Fathers absented themselves from the Council, and would have nothing
to do with its act. But if the fact be so, that the Fathers were not
unanimous, is the definition valid? This depends upon the question
whether unanimity at least moral is or is not necessary for its
validity? As at present advised I think it is....

“Certainly Pius IV. lays great stress on the unanimity of the
Fathers in the Council of Trent.... Far different has been the case
now--though the Council is not yet finished. But if I must now at
once decide what to think of it, I should consider that all turned on
what the dissentient Bishops now do.

“If they separate and go home without acting as a body, if they act
only individually or as individuals, and each in his own way, then I
should not recognise in their opposition to the majority that force,
firmness, and unity of view, which creates a real case of want of
moral unanimity in the Council....”

But it is impossible not to feel that dogmas which men are recommended
to accept on such extenuating pleas, dogmas whose irregularity is
acknowledged so long as their validity is saved, dogmas which depend
for their acceptance on the melting away of the episcopal minority,
were evidently straining the faith of Catholics almost to breaking
point, or they would never have been defended in such a manner. Here
is nothing of the devout thankfulness for fuller enlightenment, or the
triumph of truth; nothing of the glad recognition of a decision guided
by the Holy Ghost. Newman could never have treated the Nicene Council
as he did the Vatican. Behind these endeavours, to prevent secession or
schism, lies Newman’s recorded conviction in his letter to Ullathorne.

Newman’s theory that the ecumenical character of the Council might be
ascertained from its ultimate acceptance, that acquiescence on the part
of the defeated minority would atone for any irregularities in the
passing of the Decree, by no means carried conviction to many of the
perplexed. The nature of the doctrine decreed seemed to exclude this
kind of defence. For if the utterances of the Pope are infallible of
themselves, and not from the consent of the Episcopate, it is difficult
to base that Infallibility upon episcopal consent. Instead of waiting
to see what the Episcopate might do it would appear more appropriate
to consider what the Pope had done. And in another letter written
within the same anxious month this is precisely the view which Newman
takes.[387]

[387] See Letter to Duke of Norfolk, p. 98.

“I have been thinking over the subject which just now gives you and
me, with thousands of others, who care for religion, so much concern.

“First, till better advised, nothing shall make me say that a
mere majority in a Council, as opposed to a moral unanimity, in
itself creates an obligation to receive its dogmatic Decrees. This
is a point of history and precedent, and, of course, on further
examination I may find myself wrong in the view which I take of
history and precedent; but I do not, cannot see, that a majority in
the present Council can of itself _rule_ its own sufficiency without
such external testimony.

“But there are other means by which I can be brought under the
obligation of receiving a doctrine as a dogma.”

And he proceeds to enumerate uninterrupted tradition, Scripture
inference, etc. And then he propounds the theory that “the fact of
a legitimate Superior having defined it, may be an obligation in
conscience to receive it with an internal assent.... In this case
I do not receive it on the word of the Council, but on the Pope’s
self-assertion.”

This he supports by an appeal to the historic authority which the Pope
has actually exercised, and to

“the consideration that our merciful Lord would not care so little
for His elect people, the multitude of the faithful, as to allow
their visible Head and such a large number of Bishops to lead them
into error; and an error so serious, if an error.”

No one can fail to be impressed with Newman’s painful consciousness
of the Council’s indefensible irregularities; with his refusal to
acknowledge a powerful majority as equivalent to moral unanimity;
with his desire to see if the dogma cannot be accepted on other
grounds than the Council’s authority, and in particular on the Pope’s
self-assertion. All this would, of course, be absolutely unconvincing
to any adherent of the ancient conception that the supreme authority
is not to be found in the Pope’s self-assertion, but in the Collective
Episcopate. But it manifests profound misgivings about the Vatican
Council and its methods. The thought that the merciful Lord would
not permit His people to be led into error on so serious a subject
depends for its value on the solemn question, whether the gifts of
God are in any way conditional. If the transmission of grace depends
upon conformity to conditions so also does the transmission of truth.
If human co-operation is necessary to the achievement of human
enlightenment, then the neglect of compliance with these conditions,
the refusal of that co-operation, will be attended with serious losses
which the merciful Lord must not be expected to prevent. The graver the
misgivings created by the coercive methods of the Vatican majority, the
more urgent becomes the enquiry, whether their refusal to comply with
the true conditions of conciliar freedom would not be punished by the
nemesis of a misleading Decree. Newman’s misgivings on the Council’s
integrity cancel his appeal to the thought of the mercifulness of
our Lord. This, at any rate, is what many within the Roman Communion
undoubtedly felt. They did not believe in the rightfulness of expecting
Providence to nullify the perverseness and self-will of an overwhelming
majority.

Subtle, attractive, bearing in every line of it the distinctive
impress of his wonderful personality, Newman’s defence is remarkable
rather as a _tour de force_ than for argumentative solidity. Newman’s
personal assent to the dogma was indisputably complete. He said,
indeed, all that it was possible to say. But even his brilliant genius
could scarcely efface the effect of his own letter written to Bishop
Ullathorne before the dogma was passed.

“Moreover,” he wrote, “a letter of mine became public property. That
letter ... was one of the most confidential I ever wrote in my life.
I wrote it to my own Bishop under a deep sense of the responsibility
I should incur were I not to speak out to him my whole mind. I put
the matter from me when I had said my say, and kept no proper copy
of the letter. To my dismay I saw it in the public prints: to this
day I do not know, nor suspect, how it got there. I cannot withdraw
it, for I never put it forward, so it will remain on the columns of
newspapers whether I will or not; but I withdraw it as far as I can
by declaring that it was never meant for the public eye.”

Certainly it needed no assurance from the writer to convince us that
this letter was not designed for publicity. It is equally impossible
not to feel that in that letter we have the writer’s mind in its full
expression. The very fact that it was never meant for the public eye
means that it was written without that caution and restraint imposed
by watchful critics and extremist partisans always ready to pounce
upon Newman and denounce him as a minimiser at Rome. Thus we have his
frankest declaration here. And that declaration was much too frank to
be convenient. It naturally hampered him now that the doctrine was
decreed. A certain inconsistency was required of him, and is reflected
in his letters. Before the Council decreed he wrote[388] of the
disputed doctrine, “I have ever thought it likely to be true; never
thought it certain.” After the decision he wrote:[389] “For myself,
ever since I was a Catholic, I have held the Pope’s Infallibility as a
matter of theological opinion; at least I see nothing in the definition
which necessarily contradicts Scripture, Tradition, or History.”
Before the decision he wrote: “If it is God’s will that the Pope’s
Infallibility be defined, then it is God’s will to throw back the times
and moments of the triumph which He has destined for His kingdom.”
After the decision he wrote: “For myself I did not call it inopportune,
for times and seasons are known to God alone ... nor in accepting as a
dogma what I had ever held as a truth, could I be doing violence to any
theological view or conclusion of my own.”[390] No one will scrutinise
too closely, or make exacting demands of rigorous self-identity, in
letters written in the strain of so vast a change as that which the new
Decree had wrought. Yet the various statements are part of the evidence
to the effect produced, by the doctrine, upon the gifted mind then
straining all its efforts to reassure the unsettled and retain them in
the fold.

[388] Thureau Dangin, Letter to Ward, iii. p. 119.

[389] Letter to Duke of Norfolk, p. 99.

[390] Letter to Duke of Norfolk, p. 17.

The second great question to be answered was, Does the Infallibility
Dogma accord with History? Upon this subject Roman writers were greatly
divided. Some asserted boldly that Papal Infallibility had always been
held in the Church. Manning stated this in its extremest form. The
doctrine had always been of divine faith. Newman was quite unable to
accept this view, and supported Gladstone in rejecting it.

“Newman,” says Ambrose De Lisle, in a letter to Gladstone,
“considers your reply to Archbishop Manning’s contention that Papal
Infallibility was always held as a dogma of divine faith complete,
and that you are triumphant in your denial of it--but, he adds,
that is nothing to me. I conclude,” says De Lisle,[391] “because he
deduces it, and holds that the Church has deduced it in these latter
days out of the three texts he quotes in his letter to the Duke of
Norfolk.”

[391] _Life of De Lisle_, ii. p. 48.

According to this view then of Newman, Papal Infallibility was not to
be sought in history. It would not be found in the age, for instance,
of the Fathers--an age which Newman knew profoundly. It has slowly
dawned upon the self-consciousness of the Church, and come to be
realised that it possessed this organ of infallible utterance. Thus the
necessity for squaring the Vatican Decree with History was entirely
dispensed with. The principle of development was utilised to facilitate
its acceptance and explain the apparent anomalies.

The Pope said Newman is “heir by default” to the ecumenical hierarchy
of the fourth century. What was then ascribed to all the Bishops is now
ascribed exclusively to him. Precisely so. But by what right? Newman
does not say. The possibility of development in excess, a perverse
development, is not discussed.

Thus the new Decree was, according to Newman, if De Lisle rightly
interprets him, a deduction from three texts, of which the chief
undoubtedly was, “I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not.” No
perpetual unvarying tradition could be claimed for it. But the Church
makes inferences from Scripture, and comes to realise, what once it did
not realise, that the Roman Pontiff is infallible.

Newman’s theory of the relation of Papal Infallibility to History
greatly perplexed some whom it was designed to help.

“I confess that would not satisfy me,” wrote De Lisle....[392] “I am
far from going to all lengths with the Archbishop (Manning) yet ... I
hold ... that Papal Infallibility restricted as it is by the Vatican
Definition, was always a part of Divine Revelation.... I maintain
that it was always believed by the orthodox....”

[392] _Life of De Lisle_, ii. p. 48.

Newman once wrote: “Whether the minute facts of history will bear me
out in this view I leave to others to determine.” This distressed a
student of history such as Lord Acton. “Döllinger,” said Acton, “would
have feared to adopt a view for its own sake, without knowing how it
would be borne out by the minute facts of history.”[393]

[393] _History of Freedom_, p. 408.

There were able and learned members of the Roman Communion to whom
it was impossible to take refuge in Newman’s theory, that this was a
case of legitimate development. The Catholic consciousness of early
ages presented a theory out of which Papal Infallibility could never
legitimately grow. For the primitive conception was the negative,
they held, of such a view. The primitive theory, as the Councils of
the Church made plain, placed the final authority in the Collective
Episcopate. The transference of this authority from the entire body
to one individual was to them no true development at all, but a
dislocation in the Church’s original constitution. It really meant
requiring one organ to discharge the functions of another; depriving
the original organ of what had hitherto constituted its essential
function. And this alteration or reversal of functions was beyond the
legitimate power of any authority to make. It was indeed admitted to
be a claim of vital character. Pius IX. declared the doctrine to be
the very essence and basis of Catholicity. Strange, men thought, that
this essence and basis had remained unrealised for many centuries
in the Church’s consciousness. And when it was said, in reply, that
practically the Pope had exercised this Infallibility, and that its
exercise had met with a practical recognition and acceptance, Roman
writers answered at once, “No; this is not true.” Undoubtedly the papal
discussions have been accepted and believed. But hitherto there has
always been space for belief that their validity depended not on their
own inherent weight, but on the consent of the Church.

Professor Schulte, for instance, declared that though a Catholic born
and bred, he had never believed in Papal Infallibility; nor could he
find any authority for the July Decree either in Scripture, or in the
Fathers, or in any other source of historical information.

Fessler endeavoured to crush this resistance by labelling it private
judgment. He says of Schulte that he “refuses to accept the definition
_de fide_ of an Ecumenical Council; he cares nothing for the authority
of the living teaching Church; only for what he thinks he finds in
Scripture, in the Fathers, and in other genuine ancient sources. This
is the way to forsake the Catholic Church altogether. Every one is to
follow his own guidance, his own private judgment.”[394]

[394] Fessler, p. 24.

Expressed in such a form it seems a _reductio ad absurdum_. Surely the
individual may be mistaken? And in the multitude of counsellors there
is wisdom. Professor This on one side, the Episcopate on the other:
can we doubt which to follow? Why then should not the professor make a
sacrifice of his intellect? Because if you destroy a man’s confidence
in his historic judgment in one instance, you ruin its validity in all
others. Now, since it is by such a judgment that Christianity itself
is accepted, to bid a man disparage his own judgment of history, is to
undermine the very basis of his religion.

Men found themselves, therefore, placed by the Decree in a very
terrible dilemma. An ecumenical decision must be true. But history
appears to refute it. To accept the decision is to contradict the fact
of history. To accept history is to reject authority. That was the
difficulty. But no man can without grievous loss abandon what appears
to him the truth. Others endeavour to reconcile Catholics to the new
Decree by extenuating the greatness of the change. Bishop Ullathorne
informed his people that “the Pope always wielded this Infallibility,
and all men knew this to be the fact. What practical change, then, has
the definition made?”[395] Yet the same writer could urge[396] that the
character of the age, and the opposition within the Church, “rendered
it all the more important that the Pope should be armed with that full
strength.” It was then a great practical change. And this is what many
Romans felt. There was something naïve in the simplicity with which
Ullathorne wrote:[397] “The Infallibility leaves all things as before,
excepting that now it is a term of communion.” Leaves all things as
before! except that formerly men could disbelieve it and openly deny
it, while now it is a term of communion, and to disbelieve is to be
cast out. Ullathorne clearly found it beyond his power to give any
satisfaction to the intelligence of his people. It amounted to a demand
of blind assent to the hitherto discredited.

[395] _Döllingerites_, p. 14.

[396] _Expostulation_, p. 50.

[397] _Döllingerites_, p. 15.

It remains to trace the attitude of the minority toward the new Decree.
As a whole they give the impression of having been crushed, almost
stunned. The dreamlike rapidity of the movements during these last six
months; the sudden forcible erection of a hitherto controvertible and
controverted opinion into an essential element of the Eternal Faith;
the consequent intellectual and moral reversions demanded of them,
left them in a state of complete disorganisation and confusion. Their
collective inability in Rome to resist in the final Public Session;
their opinion that such resistance would be incompatible with the
respect due to the papal office, form conclusive evidence beforehand
of their inability to continue a permanent resistance when isolated
in their different dioceses. The individual Bishop was a lesser power
than the Bishops assembled. He was separated in his diocese from the
support of like minded prelates. And, if released from the immediate
pressure of papal influence, he was incapacitated for anything like
concerted action. As Bishop, he lived and spoke alone. Communication
was difficult owing to war. International Meetings were impossible.
Meanwhile the solitary Bishop was beset by all the local influences
which the Nuncios, and Jesuits and other religious orders, knew so
thoroughly well how to wield. Rome, it has been said, disbelieved in
the capacity of the opposition to stand firm; and Rome had calculated
with profound insight and accuracy.

Several fugitive Bishops took the precaution before they left Rome of
sending a letter of submission[398] to the coming Decree.

[398] _Acta_, p. 993.

The Archbishop of Cologne explained to the Pope that having given a
qualified vote on 13th July he cannot conscientiously vote Yes on 18th
July. Accordingly, with great distress, and out of reverence for the
Pope, he will avail himself of the permission to depart: adding that he
submits himself to what the Council is about to decree.

The Archbishop of Maintz wrote a similar apology. To oppose, in the
Public Session, was repugnant to his feelings: nothing, therefore,
remained but to depart; except to add that he submitted himself to the
Council’s Decree, just as if he had remained to vote approval.

Before submission to the new dogma, the question was discussed, What
constitutes promulgation of a Decree? Such discussion was quite in
keeping with precedent. The Decrees of Trent had been discussed before
they were admitted into the Church of France. Was any collective
acceptance necessary, before the dogma could become obligatory upon
the consciences of the faithful? True that Infallibility had been
passed at Rome; but the Vatican Council was not closed--it was only
adjourned. Did the decisions of a Council become obligations until the
Council itself had finished its work? Questions of this character were
argued at considerable length in the hope of some loophole or relief.
They were, however, promptly crushed by a letter from the watchful
Antonelli[399] to the Brussel’s Nuncio to the effect that the Decree
was _ipso facto_ binding on the Catholic world, and needed no further
publication. This cut away the hope to which some Bishops clung, that
they would not be required to take open action in cases where they knew
acceptance of the doctrine to be morally impossible.

[399] 11th August. Ollivier, ii. p. 375; Schulte, p. 108.

I. AMONG THE FRENCH ROMANISTS

1. The Archbishop of Paris voted,[400] consistently with his entire
attitude, against the doctrine of Papal Infallibility, on the critical
day, 13th July. In the interview on Saturday 16th, he prefaced his
expostulations with a promise to submit; but he also resolved to absent
himself from the Public Session, and wrote to the Pope to say that he
should not be present. On Sunday the 17th he saw the Pope again, and
said farewell. No allusion was made to the events of the morrow, or to
the Council’s voting. Pius confined himself to benevolent generalities,
on the devotion of the Archbishop and clergy of Paris to the interests
of the Church and of the Holy See.[401] The Pope and the Archbishop
corresponded subsequently; but they never met again. Darboy left Rome
when the Session was held, and returned home to his diocese. There
he found everything in confusion, for the war against Prussia was
declared. But he assembled his clergy at once, and commended them for
refusing to be swayed by rumours which were necessarily unreliable,
since those who spoke about the Council were not its members, while
those who were its members had not the right to speak.[402] If there
had been diversities of opinion in the Council on certain questions,
these diversities were concerned less with the intrinsic value of the
questions than with the losses or gains which their discussion might
involve. With these, and similar generalities, he dismissed them.
Further discussion and conference was prevented by the Franco-Prussian
War, but it is clear that Darboy took no steps whatever to coerce his
priests into explicit confession of the new decree or to enquire into
their individual convictions.

[400] Acton, p. 997.

[401] Guillermin, p. 254.

[402] Foulon, p. 469; Guillermin, p. 257.

But it was evident that Rome was more than discontented with the
Archbishop’s indifference. It was desired that he should renew his
assurances of personal belief, and exhibit some interest in the
conversion of the reluctant. In February 1871 Bishop Maret wrote to the
Archbishop of Paris[403] to say that he had sent in his own submission
in the previous November.

[403] Guillermin, p. 259.

“I am glad to hear it,” replied the Archbishop. “As for myself,
separated from the world for five months by the siege of Paris, I
have been unable to ascertain what was happening, or to correspond
with my colleagues or with Rome. I have therefore done nothing;
although I have given no one the right to doubt my opinions. Indeed
the Pope knows them. He has my letter of 18th July. It was not so
much the basis of the Decree as the question of its opportuneness
which made us hesitate. All the world knows this; and, for my
own part, I said it in full Council. It seems, therefore, to me
superfluous to affirm to-day that I accept the Decree. It would be
even misleading; for it would give grounds to the suggestion that I
withheld my adherence to the present time--which is false. Still,
if the Holy Father wishes, for the sake of people in general, that
such a declaration should be made, it is a formality to which I will
unhesitatingly yield.”[404]

[404] Guillermin, p. 259.

The Archbishop found it prudent to take this course. In March 1871,
he sent to the Pope a statement of sincere assent to the Decree.[405]
He said that the War had prevented correspondence hitherto, and that
his declaration might seem superfluous. But, as he hears that the Pope
desires it, he hastens to gratify the wish. It was chiefly the question
of opportuneness--he does not say entirely--which had prompted his
opposition.

[405] _Acta_, p. 997.

Pius IX. replied--but none too effusively. The Archbishop had been
for years mistrusted and disliked in Rome, for the independence of
his actions, his determination to govern his diocese himself, and his
rejection of ultramontane convictions. It was scarcely to be expected
that cordiality could exist in the very moment of his defeat. And his
submission even now, was to say the least, somewhat curt. It stated
the fact: no less, but no more. It is not the letter a man could write
who believed himself to be the privileged recipient of a precious
revelation of God’s truth. It was the bare submission to a dictate
which could not be avoided except by expulsion. The Pope replied that
he was consoled by the Archbishop’s sincere assent to the dogmatic
definition of the Ecumenical Council of the Vatican. He trusts
that the Archbishop will hasten to propound to his people what he
professes himself to believe. With this, the Pope sends his apostolic
benediction. Newman once accused Pusey of discharging an olive branch
from a catapult; Pius IX. seems here to illustrate the art of conveying
a rebuke through the instrumentality of a blessing. It is one of the
ironies of this story that the letter was never received.[406] These
were the days of the Commune. The brave Archbishop, after exhibiting
the most striking fortitude, was shot in prison. He never had the
opportunity to read, or act upon, the Pope’s advice. To his place, but
not to his principles, succeeded Archbishop Guibert, who had so greatly
assisted the aims of Pius IX. by recommending, in the Select Committee
of Proposals, that the new doctrine should be introduced with the
Council’s deliberations. So the old order changed.

[406] Foulon, p. 505.

2. Dupanloup,[407] Bishop of Orleans, voted against the doctrine on
the 13th of July, and left for his diocese rather than be present at
the Public Session when the dogma was decreed. He wrote a letter of
submission on 18th February 1871. He says that he has been prevented
from writing by the Franco-Prussian War. Hearing that His Holiness
desires to know his attitude to the constitution of 18th July, he
wishes to say that he has no difficulty in the matter.

[407] Acton, p. 999.

“I only wrote and spoke,” he says, “against the opportuneness of the
definition. As to the doctrine I always held it not only in my heart,
but in public writings.... I have no difficulty in again declaring
my adhesion; only too happy if I can thereby offer Your Holiness any
comfort in the midst of his heavy trials.”

Since his return from Rome he has written to his diocese that the
conflicts of the Church are not like those of the world.

These assertions of Dupanloup as to his unvarying faith may possibly
explain why a distinguished fellow-countryman and head of the French
Government[408] could describe him in such terms as these: “everything
about him indicates the irresistible dominion of impressions. So
convinced is he of being in the right that he fails to be accurate to
his demonstrations. He is a most imperious advocate of liberty, and
always under the influence of preconceptions.”

[408] Ollivier, i. p. 443.

3. Gratry may be taken next: Gratry--whose famous four letters had
focussed in brilliant light the difficulties, the contradictions, the
adverse facts, the ignorant methods, the falsified documents. Men
wondered what steps the former priest of the Oratory would now take;
now that the thing that he feared had come to pass, and the incredible
was decreed. Gratry had endured much mental agony. “His own peace would
certainly have been better insured,” says his biographer,[409] “had he
not been interrupted in that later contemplative study of Christian
philosophy by which he hoped to do somewhat to make his fellowmen less
unhappy, less unfit. But he was urged as a matter of conscience to
enter the turmoil of polemical strife, a strife more cruel to one who
retained his childlike simplicity, his love of truth, and his boundless
charity, to the last hour of life.”

[409] Adolphe Perraud, _Le P. Gratry ses Derniers jours, son Testament
Spirituel_ (1872), p. 43.

Gratry was very ill of the malady which killed him; and it was not
until November 1871, that he wrote[410] (evidently questioned by
Guibert, the new Archbishop of Paris):

[410] _Acta_, p. 1405.

“Had I not been very ill and unable to write a letter I should have
long since sent you my congratulations. I desire at least to-day, my
lord, to say simply what it appears to me there was no necessity to
say, namely that, like all my brethren in the priesthood, I accept
the decrees of the Vatican Council. I cancel everything contrary
to the decrees which I may have written on this subject before the
decision.”[411]

[411] _Acta_, p. 1405.

The Archbishop sent a kindly reply to the effect that he had never
doubted Gratry’s docility.

“By such noble and generous examples we harmonise our conduct with
our convictions, and prove to the world that we are sincere in
maintaining that the light of faith is superior to that of our feeble
and vacillating reason.”

But how about the facts of history? Gratry effaced his interpretation;
but he could not cancel the facts. How abandon his former convictions?
That is precisely what Gratry’s colleagues required him to explain. An
explanation, therefore, he attempted to give. To those who reproved him
for accepting without reservation the Council’s decrees, he explains
that, before the Decision, he argued in accordance with his conscience
and his right; since the Decision, he had not said a word.

“Since the Decision, and immediately after it, I had two interviews
with my Archbishop, Mgr. Darboy.[412] We were agreed both in words
and in faith. He granted me my position in the Church of Paris, and
my office of Professor of Theology at the Sorbonne. I was therefore
at unity with my Bishop. That was obvious. It continued for nearly
a year. Therefore, strictly speaking, no one has any right to
question me; not even Mgr. Darboy’s successor. To require of me a
public declaration would seem like revising the acts of his glorious
predecessor and martyr for the faith. It is for this last reason most
of all that those among my friends who urged me most to publish some
declaration surprised and saddened me. I have constantly answered
them that I have nothing to say, and nothing to write upon this
subject.”

[412] Guillermin, _Vie de Mgr. Darboy_, p. 261.

But, on reflecting that there was no necessity to cling tenaciously to
strict rights, if an assurance would remove his brethren’s anxiety,
Gratry wrote to his new Archbishop a letter of submission. That, he
says, was easy. What would not have been easy was to say:--

“I have been a member and a soldier of the Catholic Church for
half a century, but now comes an Ecumenical Council which I do
not acknowledge. I therefore separate from its Communion. To
contradict, at a single stroke, all my life, and deny all my deepest
convictions--do you blame me for not doing that?”

If they object that this was not an Ecumenical Council since it was
not free, Gratry replies that he is unable to deny its validity, and
therefore he must submit to its decisions. Then, Gratry asks himself,
what the great historic luminaries of the Church of France, Fénelon
and Bossuet, would have done under the circumstances. Had Montalembert
survived, he would certainly have submitted, as his own words prove:
resolved, come what may, and cost what it may, never to transgress the
inviolable limits of unity. But what of Gratry’s letters? Strongly
worded remonstrances had reached him on this. How could he cancel his
letters and their unanswerable demonstrations? how contradict himself?
how overthrow truths which he has firmly established, and re-establish
the falsehoods which he has overthrown? To this difficult enquiry
Gratry’s answer was:--

“I mean to overthrow none of the truths which I may have established
in these letters. I mean to restore no falsehood therein denounced.
But I admit that these letters may contain mistakes; and that it is
those mistakes which I mean to efface.”

A distinguished Bishop, strongly opposed to the contents of the
letters, had been advising him that he could maintain a considerable
portion of his letters. All that was necessary was to cancel what
contradicted the Decree.

Is it too much to say that this explanation is shorn of all the
reasoning force and historic cogency of the famous letters? If words
have any meaning, Gratry’s entire conception of Honorius, and the
attitude of the Councils towards him, left no room for the Vatican
Dogma. The explanation reveals nothing so plainly as profound
intellectual perplexity.

Gratry also wrote an explanatory letter to M. Legouvé, a colleague in
the French Academy.

“I opposed inspired Infallibility; the Council’s decree has rejected
inspired Infallibility. I opposed personal Infallibility; the
Decree affirms official Infallibility. Some writers of the School
which I consider exaggerated did not wish for Infallibility _ex
cathedra_, which seemed to them too narrow a restriction: the Decree
affirms Infallibility _ex cathedra_. I almost feared a scientific
Infallibility, a political and governmental Infallibility: but the
Decree only affirms doctrinal Infallibility, in matters of faith and
morals.

“All this does not mean that I made no mistakes in my opposition.
Doubtless I have made mistakes, both on this subject and on others;
but as soon as I recognise my error I cancel it, without feeling
thereby humiliated.”

This letter was not printed until 1907. And it appears that Gratry
wrote still further explanations which have not been published yet.
A recently printed letter of Charles Perraud contains the following
important postscript:--

“Father Gratry bids me say that he has just finished a little work
in which he explains his reasons and above all the limits of his
submission to the Council’s decree. He had already given a summary
of these explanations in a letter to M. Legouvé (who unhappily will
not agree to publish it, I cannot imagine why). I was not with
Father Gratry when he sent his letter to the Archbishop of Paris.
I regret exceedingly that he began with that, whereas he ought to
have begun by publishing the writing which I have recently been
reading. It contains definitions and distinctions of very great
significance, especially in a matter where every shade of meaning
has its distinctive worth. They are altogether mistaken who suppose
that Father Gratry has treated with contempt the historic evidence.
God give him time to say on this matter all that I know he desires to
say.”

But this document, without which the complete story of Gratry’s
submission cannot be told, has never been permitted to see the light.
For whatever reason, Adolphe Perraud, Gratry’s literary executor and
biographer, withheld it from history.

But Gratry did not long survive the passing of the new Decree. “And,”
says his biographer, “most assuredly the trials of this period
shortened his days.”[413]

[413] Perraud, p. 44.

II. AMONG ENGLISH SPEAKING ROMANISTS

Archbishop Kenrick of St Louis represented opposition in the American
Church. During the Council he had warmly supported Dupanloup against
American Ultramontanes.

“Many among us,” he wrote,[414] “believe that Ecclesiastical history,
the history of the Popes, the history of the Councils, and the
Tradition of the Church, are not in harmony with the new doctrine.
Therefore we think it most inopportune to define as a dogma of faith
an opinion which seems to us a novelty in the Church, destitute of
solid foundation in Scripture and Tradition, and contradicted by
indisputable evidence.”

[414] _Acta_, p. 1375, 2nd May 1870.

In his speech which the closure of June prevented from being delivered,
but which he printed[415] and circulated, he was more emphatic still.

[415] Friedrich’s _Documenta_, p. 210.

“I dare to affirm that the opinion as expressed in the Schema is not a
doctrine of the faith, and never can become such by any definition even
of a Council.”

On the 13th of July Archbishop Kenrick voted in the negative, signed
the protest of the 17th, and with the body of the opposition fled away.
Having thus registered his informal and useless protest he accepted the
new Decree. This surrender provoked a letter from Lord Acton asking the
Archbishop for the grounds of his submission. History has preserved the
pages of Kenrick’s reply.[416] He said that “sufficient time seems to
have elapsed to allow the Catholic world to decide whether or not the
decree of the Council was to be accepted.” The greater number of the
Bishops, some to the Archbishop’s surprise, had already yielded assent.
As for himself--

[416] Schulte, _Der Altkatholicismus_, p. 267.

“I could not defend the Council or its action; but I always professed
that the acceptance of either by the Church would supply its
deficiency. I accordingly made up my mind to submit to what appeared
inevitable, unless I were prepared to separate myself at least in
the judgment of most Catholics from the Church.”

His act of submission “was one of pure obedience, and was not grounded
on the removal of my motives of opposition to the decrees, as referred
to in my speech, and set forth in my pamphlets.” He hears from Rome
that the Pope requires him to retract his pamphlets. “This I shall not
do, no matter what the consequences may be.”

For intellectual justification in this submission Kenrick appealed to
Newman’s theory of Development. If it justified Newman in becoming a
Catholic, “I thought that it might justify me in remaining one.” To
this the Archbishop added the following memorable sentence:--

“Notwithstanding my submission, I shall never teach the doctrine of
Papal Infallibility so as to _argue_ from Scripture or Tradition in
its support, and shall leave to others to explain its compatibility
with the facts of Ecclesiastical history to which I referred in my
reply. As long as I may be permitted to remain in my present station
I shall confine myself to administrative functions, which I can do
the more easily without attracting attention, as for some few years
past I have seldom preached.”

His whole experience, he says, has taught him that there can be no
liberty in any future sessions of the Council; and this is warning
enough to Bishops that they must not handle roughly the delicate
matters on which they have to decide.

The records of intellectual servitude present few more painful
documents than this. Whether one regards the doctrine, the Archbishop,
or the facts of history, such an attitude bristles with intellectual
if not moral inconsistencies. He thinks acceptance by the Church will
redeem the doctrine from conciliar defects: but the essence of the
doctrine is Infallibility apart from the Church’s consent. As Bishop he
is a witness to the Faith: yet he observes in silence, and registers
one by one the submission of other Bishops. He accepts what he will not
proclaim, and cannot defend. Meanwhile, the facts of history continue,
as before, demonstrably irreconcilable with the New Decree. The sole
virtue by which everything else is supposed to be redeemed is the
virtue of submission. Theories such as this can only exist as a dark
background to enhance the moral and spiritual superiority of sincere
unbelief and genuine schism; or to warn for ever against the disastrous
consequences which follow such exercises of authority as that which
produced the Vatican Decree.

III. AN ITALIAN INSTANCE

_Cardinal Hohenlohe_

The “Memoirs” of Prince Hohenlohe include numerous confidential letters
from his brother, Cardinal Hohenlohe, who was resident in Rome during
the Council of the Vatican. The Cardinal had no sympathy whatever with
the attempt to elevate the theory into a dogma of the Faith.

His repugnance to the proceedings at the Vatican took also a practical
shape. “I go as little as possible to the Meetings of the Council,” he
wrote; adding a private wish that the Jesuits might stick fast in the
morass of their operations. Their activities, however, increased. On
the eve of the great Decision, Cardinal Hohenlohe wrote the following
remarkable words:--

“To-day is to take place the sitting in which the Pope will proclaim
the doctrine of Infallibility. The Bishops of the minority are
leaving; some of them went yesterday evening, among others the
Archbishop of Munich; others go away to-night. They will not be
present at the sitting, and have sent in a protest. I am not very
well, and I, too, am not going to the sitting. This morning I wrote
a few lines to Cardinal Schwarzenberg, which I here transcribe,
of course in the strictest confidence, because they make clear my
sentiments.... ‘If on the question of Infallibility I declare myself
entirely in agreement with Cardoni[417] I would yet have voted _non
placet_, since the question is not opportune, and was not treated
_conciliariter_, and I will have neither part nor lot in the guilt of
this unhappy measure, which has caused so many souls to stumble in
the faith. But further, the Council is no longer a Council. We may
admit that it was convened _legaliter_, but from the moment when the
_methodus_ was imposed upon us, the _conciliar_ composition of this
unhappy assembly was at an end.’

“So much for my letter to Cardinal Schwarzenberg. It is sad enough
that one has to speak so, but I am pierced in the innermost depths of
my soul with such intense pain, that I could hardly bear it if I had
not the consolation of the Holy Mass.”

[417] An advocate of the infallibilist theory.

Cardinal Hohenlohe says that he had been taught to believe that papal
decisions _ex cathedra_ were infallible. What is clear is that the
Council contributed nothing to a belief which he held as a theological
opinion, and not as a dogma of faith. A letter from the Pope’s private
secretary expressed regret at his absence from the Decision on 18th
July. Hohenlohe replied that he had always believed in Infallibility.

Quoting this reply, in a letter to his brother, the Cardinal added,
confidentially:--

“There is nothing here about the Council and dogmatic constitution,
nor did I even write that to the Pope, but only to Mgr. Cenni
(the private secretary), without in the least instructing him to
communicate it to his Holiness. So long as I am unconvinced of the
validity of the Council, so long can I do no more, since I shall
yet have to give an account before God, and I would not get into an
unpleasant situation there.”

Prince Hohenlohe was not less discouraged than the Cardinal. What
particularly grieved him was the lack of moral courage in the German
Bishops. To others and to himself it seemed a

“disgraceful apostasy of the German Bishops, seeing that after
they had pledged themselves, before their departure from Rome, to
decide nothing about the Dogma of Infallibility without previously
taking council together, they should nevertheless have submitted
individually.

“When one views the moral ruin, the complete lack of honour among the
Bishops, one shudders at the influence which the Jesuitical element
in the Church can exert on human nature.”

It is natural to enquire what overt action the advocates of these views
and its sympathisers in the Roman body would adopt. The excommunication
of Döllinger roused still further feeling; and an important meeting
of political opponents of things ultramontane was held in Berlin.
There was among them a strong desire for action of some kind, and for
emphatic opposition. But Prince Hohenlohe disapproved.

“I demonstrated,” he says, “that it was necessary above all things
for us to remain in the Catholic Church. So long as we had no
Bishops, no clergy, and no congregations, but only a number of
cultured laymen, we could not talk of an old Catholic Church. It was
a case of waiting till the Pope should die, and then there was hope
of a better spirit in the Catholic Church. If we left the Church--and
this might be the result of any serious step--the Catholic Church
would lose so many reasonable men to no purpose.” It was therefore
decided to remain quiet. “I do not think,” Prince Hohenlohe wrote,
“that the agitation will produce any great results. Interest in the
person and fate of Döllinger, for it is nothing more, does not make a
reformation. Interest in dogmatic subtleties no longer exists.”

The Prince recorded his personal convictions in the following
memorandum:--

“I am of opinion that the Concilium Vaticanum of 1869–1870 is in no
way ecumenical, and that the time will come when the Infallibility
of the Pope proclaimed therein will be pronounced heresy. But as the
Bishops collectively and almost all the clergy have accepted the
doctrine set forth, he who denies the doctrine must secede from the
Catholic Church.... I have, therefore, refrained from expressing
my opinion openly, especially as I believe that the Old Catholic
Community cannot remain where it now stands, but will be driven
further.... So far as I am concerned, I wish the Catholic Church to
reform herself. That can and will be done only with the co-operation
of her Bishops. This co-operation will not take place until the
moment has come for the assembling of a really Ecumenical Council.
Even if this is an empty hope, it in no case alters my present
opinion. In this case the Catholic Church is doomed to fall, and then
other forms of religion will be constituted, which we need not now
discuss. In the meantime I have this hope, and therefore am waiting.
Hence I remain a member of the Church, without going over to the
Ultramontanes.”

IV. IN GERMANY

1. Hefele, Bishop of Rottenburg, formerly Professor of Theology in
the University of Tübingen, and learned, perhaps above any man then
living, in the Councils of the Church, was held in high reputation for
his history of the Councils, which is still the best modern authority
on the subject. He was well known as the reverse of ultramontane.
Twelve years before the Vatican Council assembled he stated the facts
about Pope Honorius in such a manner as to show that history absolutely
forbade the ascription to a Pope of the attribute of Infallibility.

Being consecrated Bishop at the end of 1869 he had a place in the
Vatican Assembly, where he was most active in opposition. Just in the
critical hour of the Infallibility debate he published (in April, 1870)
at Naples, since Papal regulations prevented its publication in Rome,
a forcible pamphlet on the case of Pope Honorius, and his treatment by
the Sixth General Council. Hefele now declared that Honorius “set aside
the distinctively orthodox technical term for the two wills, human and
Divine, in Christ; sanctioned the distinctively technical term of the
Monothelite heresy; and commended this double error to the acceptance
of the faithful.” Further, he maintained that the sixth Ecumenical
Council had claimed the right to pass judgment on this authoritative
Papal decision, and to pass anathema upon the Pope as a teacher of
heresy. Finally, he maintained that from the fifth to the eleventh
century each Pope in his consecration oath had made a declaration which
involved two things: first, that a Council can condemn a Pope for
heresy, and secondly, that Honorius was rightly so condemned for having
supported an error by his decree on faith.

This emphatic rejection of Infallibility was circulated among the
members of the Council in Rome, with intention to prevent the doctrine
from being decreed.

Hefele also wrote from Rome to Döllinger, complaining that the
majority interfered with the minority’s freedom of speech; that the
Pope’s personal interventions and criticisms on the minority made their
independent action exceedingly difficult; that these experiences were
diminishing the courage, if not the numbers, of the opposition; that
it was difficult to know what movement to take when a halter was round
your neck; that hardly anybody dared openly to say what their ultimate
intentions were; that the majority meanwhile confidently assured them
that the Pope would settle everything, and that then the alternative
would be submission or excommunication.

On the 13th of July Hefele voted in the negative. On the 17th he signed
the protest and then returned to his diocese without waiting for the
Public Session. In a letter to Döllinger he attempted to justify this.
He said that from the number of negative votes on the 13th of July
he had hoped that many Bishops would remain for a final protest in
the Public Session of the 18th. But in the general exodus this hope
evaporated. He acknowledged that the written protest sent to the Pope
was weak, because destitute of formal validity. It could not possibly
avert the public definition of the Decree. As for himself he feels that
his duty is clear. He has been in consultation with his Chapter and
his Theological Faculty. He cannot accept the new dogma, as it stands,
without the necessary limitations. He knows that Rome may suspend him,
and excommunicate him. Meantime he has been urging upon another Bishop
that disbelief in the Council’s validity is not heretical. His own line
consists in quiescence, so long as Rome does not actively intervene.
What else to do he does not know in the least. At any rate to hold
as Divinely revealed what is not true is for him simply impossible
(September 1870). He can no more conceal from himself in Rottenburg,
than he could in Rome, that the new dogma is destitute of any true
rational, Scriptural, or traditional foundations. It is injurious to
the Church in incalculable ways. The Church has suffered no severer and
deadlier wound of modern times than that inflicted on the 18th of July.
Yet he can see no way of escape. He writes repeatedly to Döllinger;
complains that Dupanloup persists in asking questions, but will not
say what he intends to do. Meanwhile, Hefele is being worried and
baited on every side. Appeals pour in from France and America, urging
submission. He is certain that a schism would have no chance. The world
is too indifferent, and the opposition too dispersed. There is nothing
for it but submission, or exclusion. On the other hand, it is to him
indisputably clear that the final session of the Vatican Council had no
ecumenical character. Romanism and Jesuitism have altered the nature
of the Catholic Church. Hefele’s letters become still more piteous.
His troubles are increasing. His own diocese is turning against him.
He had not believed it possible that the dogma could so pervade his
diocese. Even his oldest friends are turning against him. Rome also
is improving the occasion. He is refused the usual faculties, so that
people in all parts of the diocese cannot get married, and the local
clergy are utilising this to set the people against him. What on earth
is he to do? He gives way to lamentations. The position of a deprived
and excommunicated Bishop is to him abhorrent--one he could hardly
tolerate. At an earlier stage it was open to him to resign, and gladly
would he lay down an office which has made him such an oppressed and
unhappy man. He must resign or yield.

Which of the two it will ultimately be it is not by this time
difficult to predict. Hefele can see no glimmer of hope in any distant
development. It is not to be expected that the Constitution Pastor
Eternus will be revoked by a future Pope, or the fourth session of the
Vatican Council pronounced invalid. The utmost that can be looked for
is a further explanation. By this time he is the only German Bishop
who has not published the Constitution. He cannot adequately express
his grief that Döllinger should see no escape from suspension or
excommunication. Is there no compromise with the Archbishop possible?
He utters wild and useless laments over the Synod of German Bishops
at Fulda. Oh, what might not have been done in Germany if only the
Bishops at Fulda had stood firm! Yet he took no steps against them.
Then he ends with deploring Döllinger’s own impending fate. To think
that Döllinger, so long the champion of the Catholic Church and its
interests, the first of the German theologians, should be suspended or
excommunicated; and that by an Archbishop who has not done a thousandth
part of the service that Döllinger had done! That is terrible! The
conclusion was now quite plain. Döllinger’s replies were useless, and
Hefele proceeded to publish the Vatican Decree.

It remained, and this was more difficult, to revise the case of
Honorius in the light of the new dogma. In the second edition of his
“History of the Councils,” Hefele observes:

“We always were of the opinion that Honorius was quite orthodox
in thought, but, especially in his first letter, he has unhappily
expressed himself in a Monothelite fashion.” This opinion he still
retained, “even if ... as a result of repeated new investigation of
this subject, and having regard to what others have more recently
written in defence of Pope Honorius, I now modify or abandon many
details of my earlier statements, or in particular, form a milder
judgment of the first letter of Honorius.”

Still, even now, his historic sense constrains him to speak of the “the
unhappy sentence, ‘accordingly we acknowledge one will of our Lord
Jesus Christ,’ which taken literally is quite Monothelite.” Still he is
constrained to say, “Honorius ought to have answered.” And as for the
Monothelites themselves, “the fact that the Pope gave utterance to this
their primary proposition must have given essential assistance to their
cause.”

2. Melchers, Archbishop of Cologne, professed himself in the Council
ready to accept the dogma as a personal belief; but he accumulated
many arguments to show the extreme unwisdom of enforcing it upon the
Church, especially in the existing state of sharply-divided opinion.
On the critical 13th of July he gave a conditional vote. His own
subsequent compliance was, therefore, comparatively easy. It was
entirely another matter to restore unity to his diocese.[418] Back
in his diocese he called the German Bishops together at Fulda. Only
nine arrived, but they agreed to take measures to impose the doctrine
upon the recalcitrant. It became the Archbishop’s function to reduce
to submission the Theological Faculty of Bonn, among others the
distinguished professors, Langen and Reusch.

[418] See pp. 241, 242.

3. The interview between the Archbishop of Cologne and Professor Reusch
has been recorded.

The Archbishop told the Professor that the highest authority had
spoken, and submission was his duty. The Professor replied that his
convictions would not allow it. The Archbishop retorted that he laid
too much stress on his convictions. Reusch replied that he dared not
go against them. The Archbishop restated the duty of submission to
authority; the Professor said that he could only leave his convictions
to the judgment of God.

But, persisted the Archbishop, the Council was free and ecumenical,
and the definition unquestionably valid. He acknowledged that he had
himself implored the Pope not to allow the discussion to begin; but the
majority thought otherwise. And, added the Archbishop, with a happy
inspiration, you know that the doctrine has been recently taught in
the Catechism of this diocese. Until now, replied Reusch, the opposite
doctrine has been taught in all the schools, in a book bearing the
episcopal _imprimatur_. The Archbishop could only reply that the book
would be altered now, and that its author had already conformed. But,
objected the Professor, if the opposite has been taught up to the 18th
of last July, it cannot be a heresy.

The Archbishop could only enquire whether the Professor would make any
concession of any kind. He said he would avoid contradiction, and study
further. The Archbishop pointed out that Rome would never be satisfied
with that. Do you wish, he asked, to die without the Sacraments?
The interview was adjourned, and then resumed, but fruitlessly.
The Archbishop recommended him to go into retreat. The Professor
doubted whether this could alter facts of history. His reward was
excommunication.

Reusch’s reflections on the interview with his Archbishop show
what resistance cost him. “How painful it was, he wrote, although
I continued calm and the Archbishop always friendly, you can well
imagine. But I formed a gloomier opinion of his narrow-mindedness
than ever before.” Melcher’s insistence on the duty of unlimited
intellectual submission left, so far as Reusch could see, no room for
reason. It provoked the criticism that the Archbishop would credit
four Persons to the Trinity if a papal constitution demanded it. But
for himself, Reusch wrote in terms almost of despair. That he might no
longer pursue his mission as a teacher was hard enough. That he might
no more discharge his priestly functions, nor obtain absolution and
communion was terrible. But yet he would be more unhappy still if these
had been obtained at the price of assenting to the dogma. And Reusch
uttered his grief in the words of Ecclesiastes:--

“Wherefore I praised the dead which are already dead more than the
living which are yet alive. Yea, better is he than both they, which
hath not yet been, who hath not seen the evil work that is done under
the sun.”

There remained, however, a work for Reusch to do. He found within the
old Catholic communion a freedom to retain unaltered the faith which,
up to that year, he had taught within the communion of Rome.

4. The fate of Langen, Theological Professor of Bonn, was somewhat
similar to that of Reusch. When asked for his assent to the new
Decree, Langen contended that the University statutes secured him his
office conditionally on assent to the decisions of Trent; and that
no alteration of these conditions could be made without approval of
the Government. The Archbishop overruled this contention, and Langen
declined to submit. Like Reusch, he was excommunicated. Langen has left
behind him a history of the Roman See, and an extremely learned and
exhaustive history of interpretation of the Scripture-texts usually
adduced in behalf of the papal claims. Both these works display that
Langen could not accept the new definition without falsifying the facts
of history.

5. Another German rejection of the doctrine is that of Dr
Hasenclever.[419]

[419] 1872.

“With countless other companions in faith I find myself reduced by
the Papal Decree of 18th July 1870 to the alternative of either
denying against my conscience the ancient faith as I received it, and
on the basis of which I have remained for five and twenty years in
the Catholic Church, or of placing myself in hopeless antagonism to a
justly revered authority through refusal to submit.”

Undoubtedly the principle is true that when the Church has once
spoken all uncertainty is taken away; but no less undoubted is the
principle that where a contradiction exists, a manifest deviation from
tradition, it is impossible that it is the Church which has spoken. It
is impossible, he says, for him to bring into harmony the new teaching
on the Pope’s Infallibility with the Catholic Faith taught him by the
Tridentine and Roman Catechism.

The constitution of the Church, he argued, differs from that of a
State, for while the latter may assume at various periods a democratic,
an aristocratic, a monarchical form--the former must maintain its
self-identity. This principle of identity and continuity is, he
acknowledges, recognised in the Anglican Church which, while uncertain
of the validity of its claims, he admits, is thereby distinguished
from the Protestant types. But his sympathies are with the principle
that the constitution of the Church cannot change its form. He is as
opposed to a spiritual dictatorship as to Protestantism itself. Is it
possible that the conception of supreme authority in the Church which
has held good for eighteen hundred years, is no longer decisive? So men
enquired in amazement when the news of the schemes of the Roman Curia
began to circulate. That some reforms should be necessary was natural
enough; but that a radical change must be made in the constitution of
the supreme teaching body--this was incredible even to many of the
blindest followers of the Curia. The Church has never exhibited a trace
of uncertainty on the method of securing finality in a question of
faith. It has been through the Collective Episcopate united with its
chief. In the Collective Episcopate as representative of Christendom at
large, the Church has acknowledged the apostolic teaching office, the
witness to its faith, the judge of error. The mission of a Universal
Council is to give collective testimony to the faith of the Fathers.
This collective testimony might be voiced through the Holy See, but it
is impossible to discover in Revelation a basis for the theory that the
collective testimony is not valid until the Holy See endorses it. The
ancient principle is to rest in the testimony of all churches:--

“Ecumenical Councils,” says Alzog, speaking of the early centuries,
“the real representatives of the Catholic spirit, were in these ages
of burning controversy the decisive authority, the supreme tribunal
which ended all dogmatic disputes. And,” adds Hasenclever, “it was
exactly when this principle became challenged by another that the
risk of schism appeared.”

Moreover, a mathematical formula may illustrate the effect of the papal
claim on the Episcopate. If _a_+_b_=_a_ then _b_=_0_; or, at any rate,
is a practically negligible quantity.

Hasenclever complains that he can nowhere obtain a direct response
to the question, How is it that innumerable treatises and works of
all kinds approved by the Church have hitherto affirmed that Papal
Infallibility is no part of the Catholic Faith? What particularly
scandalised him was the sudden condemnation, by placing on the Index,
books which have been for a considerable period accepted authorities
within the Church. He failed to see that to bestow sanction publicly
upon a treatise, and afterwards to pronounce it heretical, was
consistent with the maintenance of an unchanged faith. Moreover, if
Papal Infallibility had been the traditional principle, the entire
history of the Church must have presented a very different appearance
from what it does. Where, he asks, is any faith in an infallible Pope
exhibited in the Church during the Arian struggles? Certainly the
Bishops of the Sixth Ecumenical Council conducted matters on somewhat
different lines from those suggested to us by infallibilists to-day.
They treated the Pope Honorius just as they would have treated any
other heretic. And his successors did the same. The infallibilist
falls into Scylla if he escapes Charybdis. When entreated to make
a sacrifice of his intellect to this demand of the Vatican Decree,
Hasenclever can only reply that such sacrifice paralyses the innermost
depths of personal existence. To him it is nothing less than a suicidal
suppression of that characteristic which raises us into resemblance
to God. Those who cannot bring themselves to this abandonment of
their human dignity will be constrained to say, in spite of all the
seductions of superficial and sophistic reasonings, that the doctrine
of the personal infallibility of the Pope stands in irreconcilable
contradiction with the actual faith of the Catholic Church; and,
accordingly, it is impossible that a real Ecumenical Council should
have decreed it.

6. But these were minor incidents. The religious attention of Germany
centred on Döllinger at Munich. On 17th July Archbishop Scherr of
Munich left Rome with the minority. On the 18th the new dogma was
proclaimed. On the 19th Archbishop Scherr was back in Munich again.
On the 21st the Theological Faculty, headed by Döllinger, met him.
Scherr’s criticisms of the Roman procedure, says Döllinger’s German
biographer, Friedrich, confirmed them in the views of the Council which
they had already taken. But, said Scherr, Rome has spoken. There was
nothing for it but submission. The Theological Faculty were totally
unprepared for the Archbishop’s surrender. Upon Döllinger it created
the most painful impression. He knew that the Archbishop’s convictions,
better judgments, sympathies, were all on the other side; and that,
like the other Bishops of the minority, he had abandoned the Council
because he could neither bring himself to acquiesce silently in the
proclamation of what he deprecated, nor summon courage to protest for
what he had hitherto believed. The feebleness of the Archbishop’s
excuses, the frank condemnation pronounced by him on the methods
by which the result had been secured, only set in stronger light
the incongruity of his submission. Naturally they served to confirm
Döllinger still more in his opinion of the absence of real freedom in
the Council Chamber at St Peter’s.

Dr Liddon, who was in Munich on 29th July, gave the following account
of Döllinger some ten days after the passing of the Decree:--

“A large amount of our conversation, of course, turned on the
Council and the Definition; and he speaks with the most entire
unreserve. He says that the great danger now is lest the Bishops of
the minority, being separated from each other, and exposed to the
powerful influences which can be brought to bear on them, should
gradually acquiesce. Nothing would be worse for the cause of the
Church in Germany than the spectacle of such submission to a purely
external and not really competent authority (he dwells much on the
scheme _de concilio_, as completely destroying the freedom, and so
the authority, of the Council), with a notorious absence of any
internal assent. The Archbishop of Munich is very anxious. He told Dr
Döllinger that the deputation which went to the Pope, begging him to
spare the Church, nearly carried its point.”

It is clear from this and other sources that the Archbishop of Munich,
if left to himself, had no desire to proceed to extremities with the
opponents of the Decree. But Döllinger fully realised, ever since
the first mention of Infallibility as a subject for decision, that
excommunication lay before him if the Decree was passed. Archbishop
Scherr found himself reluctantly driven to the painful task of
imposing on the theologians a reversal of belief similar to that
which he had himself undergone. Rome was determined that the Munich
stronghold of the minority should be brought into line with the new
Decree. The Archbishop was made the instrument for effecting this. He
wrote a letter to the Munich Faculty of Theology, in which he said
that harassing doubts widely prevailed as to the attitude which the
Theological Faculty meant to adopt toward the Vatican Council. It was
his duty as Archbishop to set these doubts at rest. As for himself,
he frankly owned that, during the deliberation at Rome, he gave
utterance to his own opinion with all the positiveness of a conviction
attained after mature consideration. “But,” he added, “I never intended
to retain this conviction of mine if the decision should turn out
differently.” Accordingly he invites the Theological Faculty to follow
suit. The faculty, as a body, complied. But neither Friedrich nor
Döllinger. The Archbishop waited two months. Then he wrote entreating
Döllinger to conform. To this Döllinger replied that assent to the
recent Decree would require him to refute his lifelong historical
teaching. He would have to declare that his doctrine hitherto was
false and perverted. In the face of his public declarations no one
would believe in the sincerity of his submission. All the world would
consider the transition a hypocritical instance of convictions denied
from fear and personal interest. In the terribly painful situation
into which recent events had brought him, Döllinger asked for further
delay. This was granted, but, of course, to no purpose. Just in this
hour of critical suspense, when the decisive step must be taken, came
the piteous appeal from Hefele. Was no compromise with the Archbishop
possible? That Döllinger, the first of German theologians, should be
suspended or even excommunicated; and that by an Archbishop who had not
done a thousandth part of the service Döllinger had rendered to the
Church! This was terrible. Hefele’s letter gave Döllinger what he calls
the first completely sleepless night in his life. But it could not
alter his convictions. Döllinger sent his answer in to the Archbishop.
He took his definite and final stand on the ancient principles. He
could do no other. Döllinger said, in his reply, that the Jesuits, in
advancing their scheme of papal absolutism, assured their adherents and
disciples, and convinced many, even Bishops, that the noblest Christian
heroism consists in the sacrifice of the intellect, and in surrendering
one’s mental judgment and self-acquired knowledge and power of
discernment to an infallible papal _magisterium_ as the only sure
source of religious knowledge. This, in his opinion, was to elevate
mental sloth to the dignity of a meritorious sacrifice, and to renounce
the rights and the claims of history.

The question of Papal Infallibility was an historical question, which
must be tested by historical investigation; by the patient scrutiny
of facts in the centuries past. If this doctrine were true, it would
assuredly be not merely one truth among many, but the actual foundation
of the rest. How could the basal principle have been obscured through
centuries?

“We are still,” wrote Döllinger to the Archbishop, “waiting the
explanation how it is that, until 1,830 years had passed, the
Church did not formulate into an article of faith a doctrine which
the Pope, in a letter addressed to your Grace, calls the very
foundation principle of Catholic faith and doctrine? How has it been
possible that for centuries the Popes have overlooked the denial of
this fundamental article of faith by whole countries and in whole
theological schools? And was there a unity of the Church when there
was a difference in the very fundamentals of belief? And--may I
further add--how is it then that your Grace yourself resisted so
long and so persistently the proclamation of this dogma? You answer,
because it was not opportune. But can it ever be ‘inopportune’ to
give believers the key to the whole building of faith, to proclaim
the fundamental article on which all others depend? Are we not now
all standing before a dizzy abyss which opened itself before our eyes
on the 18th July?” Döllinger concluded with a deliberate and emphatic
rejection of the new Decree: “As a Christian, as a theologian, as a
historian, as a citizen, I cannot accept this doctrine.”

Döllinger’s biographer assures us that this reply to the Archbishop
of Munich brought Döllinger hundreds of letters, telegrams, addresses
from Germany, Austria, and Italy, in congratulation for his firmness
and strength. The Archbishop was in great perplexity. He sent a
telegram to Rome asking what his next move should be. Antonelli replied
promptly and curtly that the whole affair was exclusively within the
Archbishop’s jurisdiction. This cut off all delay and all retreat.
Archbishop Scherr was thus driven forward from Rome, and reluctantly
forced to take the final step. A protest signed by forty-three Catholic
professors against episcopal tyranny was naturally without effect.
So also was an appeal with many thousands of signatures. Theological
students in Munich diocese were now forbidden to attend his lectures;
and he was informed that although the Archbishop could not prevent
his lecturing, yet he could only continue to do so in open opposition
to his Bishop. This was followed a fortnight later by his formal
excommunication, in which his biographer, Friedrich, was included.[420]

[420] 17th April 1871. See _Declarations_, p. 113.

The exasperation at Munich is shown in a strongly worded protest[421]
issued at Whitsuntide 1871, in which the signatories declare themselves
confirmed in refusing the Vatican Decree by the duty, which neither
Popes nor Bishops can dispute, of abiding in loyalty to the ancient
faith even though an angel should teach them otherwise. It has been
hitherto no doctrine of the Church, no part of Catholic faith, that
every Christian possesses in the Pope an absolute overlord and
master, to whom he is directly and immediately subjected, and whose
decisions in faith and morals he is bound under penalty of eternal
damnation to obey. It is notoriously no part of the teaching of the
Church hitherto that the gift of Infallibility is entrusted to one
individual. Peter speaks unmistakably to us in Scriptures through his
deeds and his words and his letters; but all these breathe a totally
different spirit from that of papal absolutism. The German minority
Bishops show their bewilderment in their Pastoral letters. For none
of them can induce themselves to follow Manning and the Jesuits in
interpreting the Decrees in their natural obvious meaning. Moreover,
the undersigned deplored that the Bishops are not ashamed to answer
the conscientious outcry of their own dioceses with invectives against
reason and learning. In previous centuries, when Bishops resorted to
excluding a man from the Church, they did so on the ground of the
novelty and untraditional character of his teaching. It was reserved
for the present generation to see, what eighteen centuries have never
beheld, a man condemned and excluded precisely because he clings to
a doctrine which his fathers in the Church have taught him; refuses
to change his faith as a cloak might be exchanged. That an unjust
excommunication can only injure its inflicters--not the individual upon
whom it is inflicted--is the universal teaching of the Fathers. Such
excommunications are as invalid and ineffective as they are unjust.
They cannot deprive the believer of the means of grace, nor a priest of
his right to dispense them.

[421] Von Schulte, _Der Altkatholicismus_, pp. 16–22.

Such was the strain in which the Munich protest was written. Among
the signatures which follow are those of Döllinger, Lord Acton, and
Reinkens, afterwards Bishop of the Old Catholic Communion. The German
Catholics, whom the Decree of Infallibility had excluded, gathered to
form the Old Catholic Community.

Döllinger confesses that he had no hope whatever that under the next
or one of the next Popes any important or essential change would
be made for the better, since the order of the Jesuits formed the
soul and sovereign of the whole Roman Church. Formerly there were
counterbalancing influences: powerful religious orders, full of
vitality, correcting the tendencies of the followers of Loyola. But
these had become either powerless shadows, or satellites of the Jesuit
dominating body.

“The tendency of events since 1870 was shown,” said Döllinger, “in
the solemn proclamation of Liguori as Doctor of the Church:--

“A man whose false morals, perverse worship of the Virgin, constant
use of the grossest fables and forgeries, make his writings a
storehouse of errors and falsehoods. In the whole range of Church
history I do not know a single example of such a terrible and
pernicious confusion.”

The public papers repeatedly announced Dr Döllinger’s reconciliation
with the Roman Communion. On one occasion he replied:--

“This is now the fourteenth time that my submission has been
announced by Ultramontane papers; and it will often occur again. Rest
assured that I shall not dishonour my old age with a lie before God
and man.”

Ten years after the Vatican Decision, Döllinger received a pathetic,
imploring appeal from a lady of high social position, entreating him
to rescue himself from the everlasting destruction which his exclusion
would entail, and to have mercy on his own unhappy soul.

Döllinger’s answer is memorable:--

“I am now in my eighty-first year, and was a public teacher of
theology for forty-seven years, during which long period no censure,
nor even a challenge that I should defend myself, or make a better
explanation, has ever reached me from ecclesiastical dignitaries,
either at home or abroad. I had _never_ taught the new Articles of
Faith advanced by Pius IX. and his Council.... Then came the fatal
year, 1870.... It was in vain that I begged them to let me remain
by the faith and confession to which I had hitherto been faithful
without blame and without contradiction. Yesterday still orthodox,
I was to-day a heretic worthy of excommunication; not because I had
changed my teaching, but because others had considered it advisable
to undertake the alteration, and to make opinions into Articles of
Faith.”

But why not make a sacrifice of his intellect:--

“Because,” says Döllinger, “if I did so in a question which is for
the historical eye perfectly clear and unambiguous, there would
then be no longer for me any such thing as historical truth and
certainty; I should then have to suppose that my whole life long I
had been in a world of dizzy illusion, and that in historical matters
I am altogether incapable of distinguishing truth from fable and
falsehood.”

But this would undermine his whole confidence in historic fact, and
thereby shatter the foundation of his religion. For it is on historic
facts that Christianity itself reposes. Prior to the historic problem
of the Papacy is the historic problem of the Apostolic times. “I must
first be convinced that the principal events narrated in the Gospels
and the Acts of the Apostles are essentially true and inviolable.” And
to destroy confidence in historic judgment in one case is to ruin its
validity in all others.

Archbishop Scherr was succeeded in the diocese of Munich in 1878 by Von
Steichele, a former pupil of Döllinger, and attached to him by feelings
of the deepest veneration. Von Steichele made overtures for Döllinger’s
reconciliation with the Papacy. He wrote in 1879 a delightful letter:--

“With the thankfulness of a pupil to a venerable teacher; with
the respect of a disciple for the honoured bearer of the richest
knowledge; with the love of an anxious Bishop for the brother who
unhappily is not yet at one with him in things of highest moment.”

Döllinger sent a frank but decided reply. Return was impossible. He
said that his excommunication had been unjust, his treatment unexampled
in the history of the Church. The mediæval theory of excommunication
rendered the individual liable to bodily harm. It would appear that
this theory was not obsolete; for the chief of the police had warned
him to be on his guard, as they had knowledge that an act of violence
was plotted against him. Friedrich says elsewhere that the house in
which he and Döllinger lived, was specially protected by the police
for a year after the excommunication. These dangers, said Döllinger,
were long since past. But he could not enter again into relationship
with the authors of these actions. He had long ago challenged his
former colleagues to know how they reconciled acceptance of the Vatican
expositions with their conscience and their knowledge of the facts:--

“The answer was always an evasive one, or an embarrassed shrug of the
shoulder. They said that this was a question of detail, which the
individual priest or layman did not need to enter into. Or they said
that the very essence and merit of believing consisted precisely in
giving oneself up blindly and implicitly to the powers that be, and
in leaving it to them to settle any contradictions that might exist.
I do not need to tell you what an impression deplorable subterfuges
of this kind have made upon me.”

This was Döllinger’s final attitude toward the Roman Communion up to
the last moment of consciousness on earth. He never by any act of will
deviated from testimony to the Church’s traditional Faith, in which
the theory of Papal Infallibility was not included. To the end of his
days he held that this theory could not possibly be reconciled with the
broad facts of Christian history.

V. LORD ACTON’S SUBMISSION

The new decree was profoundly uncongenial to the mind of Lord Acton.
He had already expressed his sense that recent developments of papal
authority were inconsistent with the earlier principles of Christendom,
and disastrous alike to freedom of investigation, and to the real
interests of the Church. Manning’s theories on papal sovereignty
were a trial to Lord Acton’s historical intellect. Manning simply
reproduced the mediæval exaggerations of temporal power which had done
incalculable mischief ever since Boniface VIII. endorsed them in his
struggle with France.

“You are certainly not too severe on Manning’s elaborate
absurdities,” wrote Lord Acton;[422] “I had no idea he had gone so
far.... It is impossible to exaggerate the danger of such doctrines
as his. I wish you would take the line of Catholic indignation a
little.”

[422] _Lord Acton and his Circle_, pp. 211, 212, 215.

While the Council sat, Lord Acton was in Rome, where popular
opinion ascribed the Articles in the _Augsburg Gazette_ to his
instrumentality. “People do not venture to proceed against Acton,”
wrote Gregorovius;[423] “but it is known that he writes, and that he
pays highly for the materials that are supplied him.”

[423] _Roman Journals_, p. 356.

Archbishop Manning had positive knowledge that Lord Acton was
in constant communication with Mr Gladstone, supplying him with
information hostile to the Council; “poisoning his mind,” as Archbishop
Manning phrases it, against Papal Infallibility and the Pope’s friends
and supporters. Lord Acton, as a friend and disciple of Dr Döllinger,
had great influence with the German Bishops, who, for the most part
belonged to the Opposition; and was also on confidential terms with
Mgr. Darboy, Archbishop of Paris, and with the Bishop of Orleans, and
had not a little to do with bringing into closer union the Bishops of
France and Germany. He was also active in furnishing the Opposition
with Dr Döllinger and Professor Friedrich’s historical criticisms of
the Papacy. Lord Acton, as Manning knew well,[424] did more than any
other man, except the Bishop of Orleans, in exciting public feeling,
especially in Germany and England, against the Vatican Council.

[424] Purcell’s _Manning_, ii. p. 434.

When, therefore, the Vatican Decree was passed and the process of
reducing objectors to uniformity began, it was scarcely probable that
Lord Acton would be left unchallenged. Nor did he continue silent. He
published a sketch of the history of the Vatican Council[425] which,
while confined strictly to facts, must have been supremely distasteful
to the victorious side. When he said that Pius was bound up with the
Jesuits; made them a channel for his influence and became himself an
instrument of their designs; when he gave illustrations of authority
overriding history, and the unscrupulous suppression of uncongenial
facts; when he quoted at length Montalembert’s emphatic letter on
the transformation of Catholic France into an anti-chamber of the
Vatican--he was recording what was calculated to advance the other
side. Yet, of course, the registration of adverse facts is a different
province from personal belief.

[425] Acton, _Vatican Council_. München (1871).

But Acton went so far as to describe the Infallibility doctrine as
independent of reason or history.

“The sentiment,” he wrote,[426] “on which Infallibility is founded
could not be reached by argument, the weapon of human reason;
but resided in conclusions transcending evidence, and was the
inaccessible postulate rather than the demonstrable consequence of a
system of religious faith.” The opponents were, according to Acton,
“baffled and perplexed by the serene vitality of a view which was
impervious to proof....

“No appeal to revelation or tradition, to reason or conscience,
appeared to have any bearing whatever on the issue.”

[426] _History of Freedom_, pp. 512, 513.

This persistent attempt to render authority independent of evidence
was, if especially prominent in the Infallibility disputes, a deeply
seated and long existing disease. It pervaded the theological school
then dominant in Rome, but it had, according to Acton, exerted its
baneful influence over the Roman Church for centuries. The Jesuit
theologian, Petavius, in the seventeenth century supported existing
authority at the expense of the past.

“According to Petavius, the general belief of Catholics at a given
time is the word of God, and of higher authority than all antiquity
and all the Fathers. Scripture may be silent, and tradition
contradictory, but the Church is independent of both. Any doctrine
which Catholic divines commonly assert, without proof, to be
revealed, must be taken as revealed.... In this way, after Scripture
had been subjugated, tradition itself was deposed; and the constant
belief of the past yielded to the general conviction of the present.
And as antiquity had given way to universality, universality made way
for authority.”

Thus in Acton’s view the dominant school in the Roman Church were
resolved that “authority must conquer history.” He went so far as to
say that:--

“Almost every writer who really served Catholicism fell sooner or
later under the disgrace or the suspicion of Rome.” Also that “the
division between the Roman and the Catholic elements in the Church
made it hopeless to mediate between them.”

Acton’s description of the Vatican Assembly itself could only leave one
conclusion as to its methods and impartiality, on the reader’s mind. He
records how the Bishops on arriving in Rome, were “received with the
assurance that nobody had dreamt of defining Infallibility, or that,
if the idea had been entertained at all, it had been abandoned.” He
records the Pope’s assurance that “he would sanction no proposition
that could sow dissension among the Bishops.” He asserts that the
freedom of the Bishops was taken away by the regulations of the Bull
_Multiplices inter_ imposed upon them without their consent, and with
refusal even to allow their protests to be uttered. He says that many
Bishops were “bewildered and dispirited,” by the character of these
Regulations. He says:--

“It was certain that any real attempt that might be made to prevent
the definition could be overwhelmed by the preponderance of those
Bishops whom the modern constitution of the Church places in
dependence on Rome.”

He reveals his sympathies in the strongest way by pouring out his moral
indignation on the minority Bishops for their weakness.

“They showed no sense of their mission to renovate Catholicism....

“They were content to leave things as they were, to gain nothing if
they lost nothing, to renounce all premature striving for reform
if they could succeed in avoiding a doctrine which they were as
unwilling to discuss as to define.”

The contemplation of all this causes Acton to write:--

“The Church had less to fear from the violence of the majority than
from the inertness of their opponents. No proclamation of false
doctrines could be so great a disaster as the weakness of faith
which would prove that the power of recovering the vital force of
Catholicism was extinct in the Episcopate.”

And then Acton traces the gradual tightening of the cords as the feeble
and unhappy minority are more and more overcome. The new Regulations
determined that decrees should be carried by majority. They could not
be accepted by the minority without virtual admission that the Pope
must be infallible. For

“If the act of a majority of Bishops in the Council, possibly not
representing a majority in the Church, is infallible, it derives its
Infallibility from the Pope.”

“But it was a point which Rome could not surrender without giving up
its whole position. To wait for unanimity was to wait for ever, and
to admit that a minority could prevent or nullify the dogmatic action
of the Papacy was to renounce Infallibility. No alternative remained
to the opposing Bishops but to break up the Council.”

This was exactly where their courage failed them. They protested, but
submitted. And here comes Acton’s judgment on their submission:--

“They might conceivably contrive to bind and limit dogmatic
Infallibility with conditions so stringent as to evade many of the
objections taken from the examples of history; but in requiring
submission to Papal Decrees on matters not Articles of Faith,
they were approving that of which they knew the character, they
were confirming without let or question a power they saw in daily
exercise, they were investing with new authority the existing Bulls,
and giving unqualified sanction to the Inquisition and the Index, to
the murder of heretics and the deposing of kings. They approved what
they were called on to reform, and solemnly blessed with their lips
what their hearts knew to be accursed.”

The effect of this moral feebleness on the Roman authorities was, says
Acton, that

“the Court of Rome became thenceforth reckless in its scorn of the
opposition, and proceeded in the belief that there was no protest
they would not forget, no principle they would not betray, rather
than defy the Pope in his wrath. It was at once determined to bring
on the discussion of Infallibility.”

Lord Acton’s objections to the Infallibility school were clearly of
a triple character. In relation to History: it betrayed a resolve
to instate Authority independently of proof. It was the product of
indifference to fact. “The serene vitality of a view impervious to
proof,” could only shock and distress a profound veneration for the
actual. To those who build on facts such disregard for evidence must
appear as building without foundation. In relation to method: if the
origin of the doctrine was insecure, no less unsatisfactory was the
method by which it was decreed. Acton’s description makes the Decree
the product of cowardly weakness on the one side, and unscrupulous
coercion on the other. The spiritual value of the result obtained might
be measured by the immorality of the means employed. It could not, it
did not, enlist his loyalty or command his reverence. In relation to
results: plainly Acton did not believe that the limitless exaltation
of Authority was beneficial, or that it could lead to anything but
results disastrous to the real interests of the Church. The severity
of his judgment on the minority, for investing with new Authority
the Papal Decree, was born of a deep conviction that already, on
countless occasions, that Authority had proved excessive, injurious
to the advance of truth, and the freedom of the individual. It is
probably quite correct that Acton’s objections were more on the moral
and political or social side than on the strictly theological. But his
sharp distinction between the Catholic and the Roman elements within
the Church is really a distinction in dogmatic principles. And nothing
can exceed his loathing for principles commonly known as Ultramontane.
Acton and Manning stand at the opposite poles in their anticipations of
the results of the dogma of Infallibility.

But Lord Acton went far beyond all this. He wrote a letter[427]
to a German Bishop reproaching the minority with inconsistency in
discontinuing their opposition after the Infallibility Decree was
published. In this letter he gives the actual language of the leaders
of the minority, and concludes--

[427] _Sendschreiben an einen Deutschen Bischof_ (September 1870).

“The Council is thus judged by the lips of its most able members.
They describe it as a conspiracy against truth and rights. They
declare that the new dogmas were neither taught by the Apostles nor
believed of the Fathers.”

This letter was described by the _Dublin Review_[428] as “an open and
decisive revolt against the Church.”

[428] N.S. vol. xvi. (1871), p. 212.

Yet it does not appear that the writer was challenged to express his
adhesion to the new Decree. But Lord Acton’s letters during this period
are yet to be published. Abbot Gasquet[429] omits all the critical
years from 1869–1874. Lord Acton, however, did not ultimately escape
unchallenged. He was not in Manning’s Diocese or we may feel fairly
certain that the Archbishop of Westminster would have pounced upon him.

[429] _Lord Acton and his Circle._

Meantime Mr Gladstone argued that the Vatican Decrees involved
political consequences adverse to modern freedom.[430] The Church’s
power to employ coercion was asserted by the Syllabus, and acknowledged
by Newman.[431] Now that such consequences could be drawn from the
Vatican Decrees Lord Acton did not dream of denying.[432] Gladstone’s
argument could not be met by denial. And, of course, the whole
sympathies of Acton’s mind were with Gladstone so far as repudiation
of the use of coercive force in religion is concerned. Nothing in
the world roused Acton’s moral indignation more than Inquisition and
Liguori’s ethics. He admitted with characteristic sincerity that
“Gladstone had not darkened the dark side of the question.” All
he could answer was that it does not follow that inferences which
_can_ be drawn _will_ actually be made. He held that “the Council
did not so directly deal with these matters as to exclude a Catholic
explanation.” The Council had not so acted “that no authentic gloss
or explanation could ever put those perilous consequences definitely
out of the way.” This was certainly a curious defence of an Ecumenical
Decree. It does not exclude a Catholic explanation. But this was all
he could say. He could not even say what that true explanation was;
for on that ground his own authorities might reject him. “I could not
take my stand, for good or evil, as an interpreter of the Decrees,
without risk of authoritative contradiction.” This attitude, says
Acton, “was no attack on the Council, although it was an attack on
Ultramontanism.”[433]

[430] _Vaticanism_, p. 77.

[431] _Ibid._ p. 77.

[432] Gasquet, _Lord Acton and his Circle_, p. 366.

[433] Gasquet, _Lord Acton and his Circle_, p. 366.

But Lord Acton proceeded to defend the Council in the _Times_
newspaper[434] from Mr Gladstone’s inferences.

[434] 24th November 1874.

“I affirmed that the apprehension of civil danger from the Vatican
Council overlooks the infinite subtlety and inconsistency with which
men practically elude the yoke of official uniformity in matters of
opinion.”

And, as an illustration of this infinite subtlety in eluding authority,
he quoted the example of Archbishop Fénelon, who “while earning
admiration for his humility under censure [by the Pope] had retained
his former views unchanged.” Fénelon wrote:--[435]

[435] _Pastoral_ (1699).

“I accept this Brief ... simply absolutely and without shadow of
reserve. God forbid that I should ever be remembered except as a
pastor who believed it his duty to be more docile than the humblest
of his sheep, and who placed no limit to his submission.”

Three weeks later Fénelon wrote to a friend:--

“I acknowledge no uncertainty either as to the correctness of my
opinions throughout or as to the orthodoxy of the doctrine which I
have maintained.... Unless competent persons rouse themselves in Rome
the faith is in great danger.”

It was no more than natural, after such public letters, that Lord Acton
should be called in question by the authorities of his Communion. It
was asserted in the Roman Church that he did not believe the Vatican
Decrees. Manning wrote to enquire what construction he placed upon
them in order that the minds of the multitude might be reassured. A
curious and very instructive correspondence[436] ensued. Lord Acton
took advice as to the answer he should give.

[436] _Lord Acton and his Circle_, pp. 359, 360, 364.

“The great question is,” he wrote privately to a friend, “whether
I ought to say that I _submit_ to the acts of this as of other
Councils, without difficulty or examination (meaning that I feel no
need of harmonising and reconciling what the Church herself has not
yet had time to reconcile and to harmonise), or ought not the word
_submit_ to be avoided, as easily misunderstood.”

After further reflection Lord Acton proposed to say:--

“I do not reject--which is all the Council requires under its
extreme sanctions. As the Bishops who are my guides have accepted
the decrees, so have I. They are a law to me as much as those at
Trent, not from any private interpretation, but from the authority
from which they come. The difficulties about reconciling them with
tradition, which seem so strong to others, do not disturb me a
layman, whose business it is not to explain theological questions,
and who leaves that to his betters.[437]

“Manning ... says he must leave the thing in the hands of the Pope,
as everybody tells him I don’t believe the Vatican Council. He means,
it seems to me, that he simply asks Rome to excommunicate me--a thing
really almost without example and incredible in the case of a man
who has not attacked the Council, who declares that he has not, and
that the Council is his law, though private interpretations are not,
whose Diocesan has, after enquiry, pronounced him exempt from all
anathema.”[438]

[437] _Ibid._ p. 364.

[438] _Ibid._ p. 368.

Against Lord Acton no further action was taken. The disastrous effect
of the excommunication of Döllinger may have made Authority cautious
in the exercise of this deadly weapon. Acton indeed submitted; but
Manning’s misgivings seem more than justified. It is difficult to
define the sense in which Acton became a believer in the new Decree.
“He remained all his life,” says Bryce,[439] “a faithful member of the
Roman Communion, while adhering to the views which he advocated in
1870.”

[439] _Biographical Studies_, pp. 385, 386.

It is quite true that Acton was not an Anglican; he was still less a
Protestant. He never joined the old Catholic movement, and is said to
have dissuaded his friends from taking that course. But it is certain
that he was never an Ultramontane. The distinction he drew between
Catholic and Roman elements in the Church helps to explain his own
position. He was a Catholic as opposed to the modern Roman type.

If, as Pius IX. asserted, Catholic and Ultramontane are synonymous,
then Acton’s position was precarious. But their identity is what he
persistently and firmly denied. He considered Ultramontanism as an
unhappy and mischievous influence perverting truths and ignoring
history, speculative in its origin, and injurious in its results. He
was well aware, his historic insight made it clearer to him than to
many, that the school he resented was a long-standing disease; that
its presence could be traced for centuries, if in a less pronounced
and virulent form than to-day. But the long-standing nature of the
disease did not shake his faith in the certainty of a remedy, and a
removal sooner or later. He did not, it has been well said, identify
the long-lived with the eternal.

Sooner or later then, Ultramontanism, according to Acton’s views, was
destined to pass away. It was no more than a temporary, if protracted,
disease from which the Church must at length recover. Meanwhile,
therefore, he held to his post, accepting the present discomfiture in
the hope of better days; waiting until this tyranny be overpast. He
had no thought of departure. The Roman Communion was the Church of his
birth and of his devotional affinities. He spoke of it reverentially as
“the Church whose communion is dearer to me than life.”[440] He would
never have left it of his own accord. But, while wholly identified
with the ancient Catholic conceptions, he absolutely repudiated the
principles of the Ultramontane. By what process he retained his place
while Döllinger was exiled seems not altogether clear. Acton felt
acutely the possibility that, like Döllinger, he also might be cast out.

[440] Letter to the _Times_.

Whether wisdom or prudence or diplomacy refrained from him and let
him alone, there at any rate he lived and died. But the legitimacy
or consistency of his position was the theme of a fierce and bitter
controversy in the Roman journals after he was dead.

So the great struggle in the Roman Communion between the episcopal and
the papal conceptions of Authority, the collective and the individual,
came to an end. Every Bishop of the minority submitted. This is
a magnificent tribute to the power of Rome. It held its defeated
Episcopate in unbroken unity. Only the old Catholic movement created
an independent community. But when the motives are considered which
induced the minority to yield, the strongest principle appears to be
the maintenance of external unity. The abler minds resisted, after
the Decree was known, so long as resistance was possible. Only when
the presence of threatened excommunication drew them to an ultimate
decision, the Bishops submitted, with what grace they could, to a
Decree which they dared no longer resist. But the submission is, even
then, cautious, reluctant, and reserved. In some instances it is
yielded in a tone of curtness or asperity. In other instances, with
comments and explanations, in private letters, wholly inconsistent
with genuine faith. It is difficult to find in a single minority
submission the joyous devotion which is surely due to a heaven-sent
revelation of eternal truth. They do not accept the doctrine as a
blessed enlightenment, but rather as a heavy burden to which they
are unwillingly obliged to coerce their priests. They do not appear
like men whose intensity of conviction enables them to say:--“It
seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us.” They would infinitely
sooner ask no questions, if Rome would only let them. They are driven
to excommunicate others, much against their will, for continuing to
hold what they themselves had taught them, and were, until recently,
inwardly persuaded was true. It is a painful and unattractive sight.
In the frankness of confidential utterances after the event they
owned with manifest sincerity that they did not believe the Decision
valid, nor the Doctrine part of the Historic Faith. But, being forced
by Authority to choose between submission and excommunication, they
mostly preferred submission. The choice is intelligible. They loved
the Church. Taught to regard its limits as practically identical with
those of the Kingdom of Heaven--yet certain that history contradicted
what they were now required to believe, they were placed in the
terrible dilemma of loyalty to reason against religious interest, or
to religious interest against their reason. The issue was solemn
whichever side they chose. But the prior question which the alternative
raises is this: “What is the spiritual value of an Absolute Authority
which inflicted such an awful dilemma upon its own devoted sons?”

CHAPTER XIX

THE INFALLIBILITY DOCTRINE

It is essential to the completeness of our exposition that we should
analyse the doctrine itself which the Vatican Council decreed. The
Vatican affirmation is that, under certain circumstances, the Pope is
infallible, or divinely protected from error in his official utterances
on faith and morals to the whole Church. We will omit for the present
the limitations and confine our attention solely to the Council’s
statement that the Pope’s Infallibility is “that with which God was
pleased to endow His Church.” Thus Papal Infallibility is considered
co-extensive with the Church’s Infallibility.

But what is Infallibility? It does not imply the granting of a new
revelation. It is concerned with the exposition of a revelation already
given. It is not equivalent to Inspiration, such as the Apostles
possessed. It is merely “assistance by which its possessor is not
permitted to err whether in the use of the means for investigating
revealed truth or in proposing truth for human acceptance.”[441] It is,
according to Newman,[442] simply an external guardianship, keeping its
recipient off from error: “as a man’s guardian angel, without enabling
him to walk, might, on a night journey, keep him from pitfalls in his
way.” It is a guardianship saving its recipient “from the effects of
his inherent infirmities, from any chance of extravagance, or confusion
of thought.”

[441] Hurter, _Compendium Theol. Dogm._ i. p. 283.

[442] Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, p. 117.

Any serious study of Infallibility must realise that the question is
only part of a vastly larger subject, namely, the relation of the human
will to the Divine. To describe Infallibility as “an assistance by
which the Church is not permitted to err, whether in the use of the
means for investigating revealed truth, or in proposing truth to man’s
acceptance”[443] is to assume a theory of divine coercion which awakens
some of the profoundest psychological and dogmatic problems. It has
well been said that “two conditions are required for an authoritative
decision: the use of natural means, and a special Providence directing
that use. If the former condition be absent, the latter is simply
impossible.”[444] But what is constantly forgotten in discussions on
Infallibility is this conditional nature of all divine assistance.
It is constantly assumed that the divine assistance will overrule,
even in the absence of compliance with what are acknowledged to be
duties on the part of the recipient. There is an obvious simplicity,
there seems an edifying piety, in saying that this endowment is an
assistance by which the recipient is “not permitted to err.” But this
deliverance from error cannot be independent of the recipient’s will,
and irrespective of his receptivity.

[443] Hurter, i. p. 283.

[444] _Nineteenth Century_ (May 1901), p. 742.

Suppose, for instance, Infallibility to be located in a Council. It
cannot act independently of certain conditions. It might be thwarted by
fear or external constraint. Nor are merely external conditions alone
essential. There must be inward freedom to preserve its own normal
course. Many Roman Catholics complained that the Vatican Council was
so seriously hampered, by regulations imposed upon it from without,
that conciliar freedom was thereby made impossible. The overruling
of a large minority by force of numbers simply shook the faith of
many devoted sons of the Roman Church. They experienced the greatest
difficulty, almost insuperable, in crediting its Infallibility. Yet,
from their point of view, the Council was legitimate in its inception,
and in its constitution ecumenical. Now, if a Council, with such
beginnings, can nevertheless suggest these misgivings to Roman minds,
may not similar misgivings arise over a papal utterance?

Suppose then Infallibility located in a single individual: he must
comply with certain conditions. Are those conditions purely external,
concerned alone with outward formalities? Or do they include moral
qualities and inward state? What is the authority in revelation for
the assertion that a divine assistance so completely overrules a
personality that he is “not permitted to err.” The illustration of
the guardian angel preventing a fall is an illustration of external
coercion, in which the will of the guided has no share. He is simply
upheld in spite of himself. Is this the case with the Pope in the
exercise of his Infallibility? Is the Pope’s capacity to discharge so
awful a function absolutely independent of his moral and spiritual
state? Is there a suspension of the liability to self-will? Does the
personal equation go for nothing? Is it really credible that any
other person placed where Pius was would have said the same? Do the
antecedents, the temperament, the mental furniture, in no way affect
the utterance? Grant as large a margin as we may to the action and
control of this “Divine Assistance,” yet still beyond that margin
must be a residuum where the human individuality comes into play,
and shares in producing the final result. Hence a possibility must
always exist, and it cannot be evaded, that, in a given instance,
notwithstanding compliance with external formalities, the inward
essential conditions were not fulfilled; and consequently the result
was not infallible. Do what you will, it is impossible in human affairs
to avoid this element of insecurity, unless the human instrument be
reduced to a mere mechanism upon which the Spirit plays as it pleases.

What then is the Infallibility of the Church? This is precisely what
the Council assumes as known, and does not explain. The Infallibility
of the Church has never been authoritatively defined. It has been
treated, of course, by theologians, but never formulated by the Church.
Hence the minority in the Vatican Council pleaded that this subject
should first be discussed: as indeed the logical order appeared to
demand.

All doctrine on the Church’s Infallibility will vary according as its
basis is purely _à priori_ and theoretical, or historical. These are
the two methods which distinguish all Christian thinking. We may start
from the ideal, and infer that this is what the Almighty must have
created, or we may begin with the actual, and draw our principles from
the facts.

Now the prevalent method in modern Roman theology is the theoretical
as contrasted with the critical and historical. This method is not
confined to certain extremists. It saturates the theological writings
through and through. Starting with an ideal of the divine purposes,
it is assumed that the Almighty must have constituted the Church in
a certain way; that He must have endowed it with certain prerogatives
and certain authorities and certain safeguards and certain supremacies;
because those prerogatives and so forth are, in the writer’s ideal
view, necessary to the Church’s achievement of certain ends. Then with
this ideal already in possession, controlling the imagination, and
determining the mind what it is to discover, advance is made to the
actual, to Scripture and to History; with the result that these are
found to confirm anticipations--not it is true without difficulties,
nor without feats of agility to the bystanders simply amazing, but yet
to the complete satisfaction of the writer’s mind. Nevertheless, the
result is blindness to historical reality. No one has expressed this
better than F. Ryder writing against an extremist in 1867, but in words
which accurately describes a conviction widely prevalent in the Roman
obedience.

“It is notorious that in some minds the craving for ideal
completeness is so strong as to overpower from time to time their
sense of truth, and under the influence of this craving, without any
conscious dishonesty, they are unable to read either in the past or
present world of experience anything but what, according to their
preconceived notions, should be. Such minds, as we might expect, have
a strong instinctive dislike for historical studies.”[445]

[445] Ryder, _Idealism in Theology_, p. 5.

If instead of theoretical inferences from an ideal, we take the
critical and historic way, very different conclusions may be reached
as to Infallibility. If the promises of Christ, “Lo, I am with you
always,” “He shall guide you into all truth,” are interpreted in the
absence of Roman preconceptions, it is evident that they do not
necessarily commit our Lord to the Ultramontane conclusions. They may
mean, they appear to mean, something quite other than that. Indeed
these Ultramontane conceptions appear to be not derived from but read
into them. At any rate what Infallibility exists in Christendom should
be ascertained from the facts of Christian history. An existence of
well-nigh two thousand years must certainly yield a safer basis for
inferences, as to the contents of the promises of Christ, than an _à
priori_ theory of things which seems to us ideal.

The Infallibility of the Church is commonly asserted by Roman writers
to be twofold. It is distinguished as active and passive: corresponding
to the familiar division between the Church as teacher, and the Church
as taught. Active Infallibility is the prerogative of teaching without
liability to mislead. Passive Infallibility is the advantage of being
taught without liability to be misled. Thus for all practical purposes
the Infallibility of the Church would mean the Infallibility of the
Episcopate. The laity being reduced to a position of mere receptivity,
having no active share in the maintenance and perpetuation of Tradition.

Whether this conception is philosophic or historical is alike open
to serious doubt. In the first place, the Church is an organism, a
totality, which cannot be, except in theory, severed into merely
active and merely passive parts. After all, there is such a thing
as the collective Christian consciousness--the mind of the Church,
which overrides all barriers of practical convenience, such as the
distinction between teacher and taught. If history be regarded, it is
impossible to doubt that the laity has been no mere passive recipient,
but largely a controller of forms of devotion; and forms of devotion
are, after all, expressions of the rule of faith. The control which
the laity had exercised over doctrines and creeds and formulas of truth
is historically indisputable. Instances are recorded when it is said
that the heart of the people was truer than the lips of the priests.

_The Infallibility of the Episcopate_ has been variously asserted and
denied by Roman theologians since the Vatican Decree. Schwane,[446] for
instance, asserts that the Episcopate assembled in Council possesses
no greater authority than when it is dispersed. Individually they are
not infallible, nor are they so collectively. Hurter,[447] on the
contrary, maintains the opposite view. The Episcopate is the recipient
of Infallibility. The Bishops are heirs to this Apostolic prerogative
because they are the Apostles’ legitimate successors. By the consent
of all antiquity, Bishops are successors of the Apostles. As St Jerome
says: “Bishops occupy among us the Apostles’ place.” Accordingly,
Hurter maintains that the Episcopate is infallible not only when
assembled in Council but also when dispersed; if it teach anything
unanimously as of faith.

[446] _Hist. Dogm._ v. p. 461.

[447] _Compendium_, i. p. 271ff.

This doctrine he bases first on the promises of Christ, which apply
equally to the Episcopate in either condition. Secondly, on the belief
of Antiquity, which regarded a doctrine as heretical if conflicting
with the unanimous consent of the dispersed Episcopate. Many heresies
were condemned, without assembling an Ecumenical Council, simply by
the unanimity of the Bishops. Thirdly, the doctrine is confirmed by
the improbabilities which would follow the other view. For unless the
dispersed Episcopate be infallible it would follow that it has hardly
ever exercised its prerogative, since Ecumenical Councils are very
rare. Moreover, were it only infallible when assembled, its prerogative
would depend for its exercise on permission from the secular powers;
which might, and actually did, prevent their assembling. Hurter,
therefore, teaches the Infallibility of the Episcopate whether
collected or dispersed.

It certainly must be allowed that Hurter’s view is far more helpful
to the papal doctrine than Schwane’s depreciation of the Episcopate.
For, if the Episcopate possesses no Infallibility what becomes of that
Infallibility wherewith, according to the Vatican statement, Christ
has endowed His Church, and with which the prerogative of the Pope
is compared and equalised? It is, of course, no function of ours to
adjust conflicting Roman estimates of episcopal power. But it is of
the greatest interest to all reflective Christian minds to compare the
teachings of to-day with the conceptions of antiquity.

The doctrine of the Infallibility of the Episcopate, when unanimous,
means, if strictly analysed, that each particular Church is summed
up and represented in its chief pastor, who voices the collective
consciousness of his people, and bears witness to the Tradition which
he has inherited and is transmitting. The testimony of the entire
Episcopate when unanimous would naturally represent the Church’s
mind. The Infallibility of the Episcopate could in the nature of the
case only exist on condition of their unanimity. It could not hold
in conflicting testimonies to contrary traditions. Hence the ancient
conviction that the dogmatic decisions of an Ecumenical Council must
of necessity be morally unanimous, otherwise they could not claim
ecumenicity. Few Roman writers of last century have enforced this more
strongly than Dr Newman. After the Vatican Decree he wrote:--

“First, till better advised, nothing shall make me say that a mere
majority in a Council, as opposed to a moral unanimity in itself,
creates an obligation to receive its dogmatic decrees.”[448]

[448] Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, p. 98.

Newman, however, lived to be informed that the notion of moral
unanimity was a piece of Gallicanism.[449]

[449] Postscript, p. 151.

The prevalent Roman theory of to-day is that the decision in General
Councils does not depend on the majority of votes, but always on that
part which sides with the Pope. It has been considered possible that
all the Bishops united in Council without the Pope might be deceived,
and fall into erroneous doctrine. He would then exercise his function
of strengthening his brethren in the faith.

The Roman doctrine is that the Infallibility of Councils does not
depend upon the subsequent consent and acceptance by the Church. Now
many Councils and Assemblies of Bishops have been held in Christendom.
Some are infallible, and some are not. How can we distinguish the
Ecumenical Infallible Council from assemblies which do not possess
this great prerogative? Does it depend upon the presence of the entire
Episcopate? Manifestly not. Several of the Councils acknowledged as
Ecumenical or Universal consisted of a comparatively small proportion
of the entire Episcopate. To this and similar enquiries the modern
Ultramontane returns the answer that the character of a Council depends
neither on its numbers, nor its majorities, nor its acceptance by the
Church; but simply and solely on its endorsement by the Pope.

Now, given the existing condition of Roman developments, the absolutism
of their monarchical system, the practical utility of this answer is
undeniable. But its assumptions are obvious. It assumes the identity
of the Roman Communion and the Catholic Church. It excludes all the
Oriental Churches. Beyond all this is its absolutely unhistoric
character. It is impossible with regard for history to claim that
the ecumenical character of the first four Councils rest on papal
consent and approval. The ancient test of a Council’s ecumenical
and irreversible character was certainly acceptance by the entire
Episcopate. The fragment of the Episcopate which happened to
assemble in any particular place could not of itself give complete
representation to the consciousness of the Universal Church. The
endorsement or approval of the Roman Bishop unquestionably added
great weight; but was certainly not regarded as a substitute for
the authority which a Council acquired from universal endorsement
by the entire Episcopate. Until this acceptance was secured, the
ecumenical infallible character of a Council must, of necessity, remain
uncertain. For the Supreme Council is the Episcopate. And until the
entire Episcopate has given its assent, the Council has not become a
supreme expression of the mind of Christendom. This, of course, is
what the modern Ultramontanes would not admit. It would not agree with
the modern condensation and embodiment of all authority in a single
individual Bishop at Rome. But it is the doctrine of antiquity, and it
is that maintained by all the Oriental Churches.

The substitution of papal endorsement for episcopal unanimity as
the test of an Ecumenical Council can only be termed a tremendous
revolution in the constitution of the Catholic Church.

III

The Infallibility of the Pope is no mere isolated dogma, separable
from a system without detriment to the remainder: it is the final
conclusion and crown of a theory of absolute authority; the completion
of a whole process of centralisation of power in the hands and control
of a monarchy. It is significant to note that the three theories which
assign Infallibility to the Church, to the Episcopate, to the Pope,
are respectively democratic, aristocratic, monarchical. The Roman
instinct, the Imperial tendency, has shown itself in grasping, with an
undeniable tenacity and grandeur of conception, the monarchical view.
The whole drift of Roman development for centuries had been towards
centralisation. Power after power became gradually appropriated and
placed under the exclusive control of the central rule. Often this
was done with the full consent, even at the instigation of the ruled.
It was at times prompted by their loyalty and devotion. At other
times it was reluctantly yielded to an authority which men had not
the power to resist. Out of all this accumulation of prerogatives a
speculative theory of primacy naturally grew. Texts were quoted in
defence, but they are not really the basis: nor is it possible by any
rigorous interpretation to derive the theory out of them. No mind
which was a stranger to the historic Roman evolution could arrive at
the Ultramontane conclusions. We may take exposition of the giving of
the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven as an example. And we quote it more
especially because Hurter’s compendium is the seminarist’s guide _par
excellence_. In its theories thousands of the Roman priesthood have
been, and are being trained. The keys of the kingdom, says Hurter,
signify authority; full authority in the matter which the keys concern.
The keys of a city, consigned to a victor, symbolise absolute control
of what is therein. The keys of a house, entrusted to a servant by
the master, make him the dispenser to all within the house. The keys
bestowed on Peter signify the full power of jurisdiction over the
Universal Church. For He who bestows them possesses all power in heaven
and earth. And “whatsoever” signifies power supreme, independent,
universal, unlimited. Now mankind may be bound in three respects: law,
sin, and penalty. Consequently this “whatsoever” must be a promise of
plenary power of three kinds: legislative, power to bind; judicial,
power in regard to sin; coercive, power to punish. Now such a primacy
as this, urges Hurter,[450] not unnaturally, requires Infallibility.
If the Roman Pontiff possesses authority it is in order to secure
unity in the truth. If so, he ought to possess the means to that end.
He ought to have the power to require not only external deference but
internal assent to his teaching. Unless he has this authority he cannot
prevent disagreement. For where there is no obligation to assent there
is permission to disagree. Moreover, he must have authority universal
over every individual. Otherwise how can he maintain the Church in
unity? Now to do all this he ought to be infallible. He cannot require
internal assent to his teachings unless he is. He cannot discharge
the functions which Hurter assigns him without it. He must possess an
absolute final irreversible power to define and demand the submission
of conscience, and this entirely independently of the Church’s consent.

[450] Hurter, i. p. 348.

So the mighty fabric becomes theoretically complete. The actual
concentration of power at Rome requires to be justified. To justify
it there must be added the further endowment of Infallibility. He
ought to have it, therefore he has. Can anything better illustrate
the craving after systematic completeness than this the marvellous
construction of an ideal of absolute authority, for which the attribute
of Infallibility appears logically necessary, to make the stupendous
system quite complete?

The relation of the Pope’s Infallibility to that of the entire
Episcopate has been left by the Vatican Decision in great confusion.
It may, of course, be said that time has not yet elapsed sufficient
to allow a proper readjustment of various truths. It appears to be
still acknowledged that all antiquity is committed to belief in the
Infallibility of the entire Episcopate, whether assembled or dispersed.
It appears to be also affirmed that the Pope alone is infallible
whatever the Bishops may think. If the Pope’s authority can render the
minority infallible, what becomes of the Infallibility of the entire
Episcopate?

The question which Newman puts in the mouths of the Irish Bishops of
1826 is greatly to the point:--

“How,” they would ask, “can it ever come to pass that a majority
of our order should find it their duty to relinquish their prime
prerogative, and to make the Church take the shape of a pure
monarchy?”[451]

[451] Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, p. 13.

The real effect of the Vatican Decree upon the entire Episcopate is to
deprive them of their prime prerogative. The Collective Episcopate is
not for the modern Roman the ultimate voice of the Church. But for the
ancients, for the contemporaries of St Vincent of Lerins, for instance,
this is exactly what it was. The fierceness of the struggle in the
Vatican was due to a consciousness that it was a struggle for existence
between two antagonistic conceptions of ecclesiastical authority--the
episcopal and the papal. The victory of absolute monarchy has reduced
the Episcopate to a shadow of its primitive self. The entire Episcopate
of the Roman obedience may indeed now be assembled as listeners to the
one infallible voice; but their prime prerogative has been transferred
to another, and lost to themselves. The Vatican Decree indeed
maintains the paradox that exclusive papal authority enhances that of
the Bishops; and, without conscious irony, appeals to the language
of Gregory the Great: “Then am I truly honoured when others are not
denied the honour due to them.” But Gregory said this when repudiating
a title which would have exalted him above his fellow Bishops. Pius
IX. repeated it precisely when asserting a prerogative which exalts
him to a height of unapproachable isolation. Henceforth the submissive
Episcopate will accept what the lonely voice affirms. They will add to
his Infallibility the lustre of their deference and obedience. But they
will add nothing whatever to the intrinsic character of his decision.
For, according to the new Decree, he is infallible independently of the
Bishops and in spite of them. They may add, as it has been admirably
said, a certain pomp and solemnity to the papal definitions, but they
can in no wise affect their validity. “They are but as the assistants
at High Mass, who contribute in no way to the essence of the sacrifice
or sacrament.”[452]

[452] Lord Halifax, _Nineteenth Century_ (May 1901), p. 741.

When Papal Infallibility is considered in relation to the Church at
large it is obvious that it presents a wholly different object for
their contemplation. Infallibility viewed as residing in an entire
Community, or as expressed by the entire Episcopate of the Catholic
Church, makes an utterly different impression on the believing mind.
There is a certain vagueness, an almost impersonal character, in a
distributed Infallibility, quite different from that embodied in a
single individual. This has been admirably expressed by Father Ryder
in a passage, which although published three years before the Vatican
Council, has not lost its force and applicability.

“Theologians,” wrote Father Ryder,[453] “would not be anxious to add
the same qualifications when speaking of the Church’s Infallibility”
[_i.e._, as when speaking of that of the Pope] “for the obvious
reason that though as Ultramontanes they might hold that as regards
pronouncements _de fide_, the Pope was on an equality with the Church
in Council, they had no idea of denying that the Church possesses
an Infallibility, not merely when she puts on her robes of prophecy
but inherent in her very vital action, which the Pope by himself
does not; that as Perrone says ... clearly speaking of the Church
dispersed, she is our infallible guide _viva voce et praxi_, which
the Pope is not; that the human authority of the Church, founded
on numbers, holiness, wisdom, etc., being infinitely greater than
the human authority of a Pope, who need be neither wise nor holy;
the Church might settle without provoking doubt, and still less
opposition, a number of border questions, which the Pope could
not. The Ultramontane theologians had narrowed the base, so to
speak, of ecclesiastical authority; they had made it centre in an
individual, subject to numberless accidents of individual temper and
circumstance; and therefore it was of vital importance that they
should distinguish sharply the Divine from the human element, the
objects as to which they claimed for the Pope certain Infallibility,
from those as to which they could not prove that he was not fallible.
They had to meet numberless historical objections, plausible at
least, grounded upon the apparent mispronouncements of Popes in
_materiâ fidei_, and they dared not undertake the defence of more
than it was necessary for their position to defend, or than they
could defend satisfactorily.”[454]

[453] _Idealism in Theology._

[454] _Idealism in Theology_, p. 31.

This passage draws out with remarkable force the distinction between
the Infallibility of an institution and that of an individual. It
raises the question whether the two can ever really be entirely
identical in scope. It therefore suggests that uncertainties attend
upon the Vatican statement of their equivalency. Can the Infallibility
of a world-wide Communion be the same as that embodied in a single
individual? Certainly in any case the impression created upon the
devout by the one cannot be the same as that created by the other. Men
will inevitably expect and demand from an individual Infallibility what
they will never dream of acquiring from a collective.

CHAPTER XX

WHERE ARE THE INFALLIBLE DECISIONS?

Nearly forty years have elapsed since the recognition of the
Infallibility of the head of that vast Communion. The dogma was
pushed through admittedly to enable authority to meet by the rapidity
of its decisions the speed of modern life. Authority, however, with
admirable discretion, has not once availed itself of its newly
decreed prerogative within the last fifty years. Since Pius IX.
expired, authority has spoken many times; but never once on the
levels of unalterable decree. Certainly this development of history
is very different from the future, as the advocates of 1870 pictured
it. The practical utility of the new Decree has been, if any,
purely retrospective, historic. It applies, according to the Roman
theologians, to utterances prior to that decision, not since. What the
future may produce it is impossible to say. Whether a long series of
supreme irreversible pronouncements are yet to issue, or whether the
supreme prerogative will be kept in abeyance is a speculative enquiry
of the greatest interest.

It has been the function of Roman writers, since the passing of
the Vatican Decree, to apply the definition as a test to the papal
utterances of nineteen hundred years, in order to ascertain which of
those utterances comply with its requirements, which of those are
infallible, and which are not. The prerogative must, of course, if
true to-day be true of all the Christian centuries. Infallibility
must be co-extensive with the existence of the Papacy. Consequently
the papal utterances of all history must be sifted and classified in
accordance with the Vatican Definition. It remains therefore for us
to ascertain from Roman writers the outcome of their research, and to
learn from them upon what precise occasions they consider that a Pope
has complied with the conditions necessary to give his pronouncement
this supreme unalterable authority.

The conditions required to make a papal utterance infallible are
variously described. Bishop Fessler, who as Secretary of the Vatican
Council, may be presumed, as being the Pope’s selection, to have
understood the papal mind, and whose position indisputably afforded
him peculiar, if not unique, advantages, has laid it down that the
tests of an infallible papal utterance are two. The first is that the
subject-matter must be a doctrine of faith or morals; the second, that
the Pope must express his intention, by virtue of his supreme teaching
power, of declaring this particular doctrine a component part of the
truth necessary to salvation revealed by God, and as such to be held by
the whole Church. This was Secretary Fessler’s declaration[455] almost
immediately after the Decision, and published expressly to reassure and
conciliate the alarmed and offended.

[455] Fessler, _True and False Infallibility_, p. 51.

More usually in recent Roman theological works the conditions are
somewhat more elaborately analysed as being four in number.

1. First, as concerns the utterer. He must speak as Pope, and not as
a theologian. That is he must exercise his supreme authority over
Christians.

2. Secondly, as to the substance of the utterance. It must be a
doctrine of faith or morals.

3. Thirdly, concerning the form of the utterance. It must not be merely
advice or warning, but dogmatic definition. It must definitely intend
to terminate a controversy, and to pronounce a final sentence upon it.

4. Finally, as to the recipients. While it need not necessarily be
addressed to all believers, and may indeed be directed to a single
individual, yet it must be virtually intended for every member of the
Universal Church; because it is defining something essential to be
believed.

These four restrictions which appear to be generally acknowledged more
or less by Roman writers, are obviously very powerful sifters of papal
decrees. They exclude wholesale entire classes of papal utterances from
possessing any sort of claim to the supreme authority.

Thus, for example, one theologian says:--

“Neither in conversation, nor in discussion, nor in interpreting
Scripture or the Fathers, nor in consulting, nor in giving his
reasons for the point which he has defined, nor in answering letters,
nor in private deliberations, supposing he is setting forth his own
opinion, is the Pope infallible.”[456]

[456] Billuart, ii. p. 110.

Fessler himself excludes from the range of Infallibility: papal actions
in general, for actions are not utterances; all that the Popes have
said in daily life; books of which they may be the authors; ordinary
letters; utterances of Popes either to individuals or to the whole
Church, even in their solemn rescripts, made by virtue of their
supreme power of jurisdiction in issuing disciplinary laws or judicial
decrees. None of these, according to Bishop Fessler, are dogmatic papal
definitions or utterances of infallible authority.[457]

[457] Fessler, p. 65.

Newman appears to have thought that Fessler’s tendency was to underrate
the Vatican Decree.

“Theological language,” wrote Newman, “like legal, is scientific,
and cannot be understood without the knowledge of long precedent and
tradition, nor without the comments of theologians. Such comments
time alone can give us. Even now Bishop Fessler has toned down the
newspaper interpretations (Catholic and Protestant) of the words of
the Council, without any hint from the Council itself to sanction him
in doing so.”[458]

[458] Letter in 1874. _Life of De Lisle_, ii. p. 42.

Newman, however, did not apparently consider Fessler’s statements just
quoted as a case of underestimation, for in the following year he
himself gave a similar restriction of the range of Infallibility.

“Even when the Pope is _in_ the Cathedra Petri, his words do
not necessarily proceed from his Infallibility. He has no wider
prerogative than a Council, and of a Council Perrone says: ‘Councils
are not infallible in the reasons by which they are led, or on which
they rely in making their definition, nor in matters which relate to
persons, nor to physical matters which have no necessary connection
with dogma.’

“Supposing a Pope has quoted the so-called works of the Areopagite
as if really genuine, there is no call on us to believe him; nor,
again, when he condemned Galileo’s Copernicanism, unless the earth’s
immobility has a ‘necessary connection with some dogmatic truth,’
which the present bearing of the Holy See towards that philosophy
virtually denies.”[459]

[459] Letter to Duke of Norfolk, pp. 115, 116.

“And again his Infallibility is not called into exercise unless
he speaks to the whole world; for if his precepts, in order to be
dogmatic, must enjoin what is necessary to salvation, they must
be necessary for all men. Accordingly ... orders to particular
countries or classes of men have no claim to be the utterances of his
Infallibility.”[460]

[460] Newman, Letter to Duke of Norfolk, p. 120.

This treatment of the Vatican Decree is an exercise of what Newman
calls “the principle of minimising,” which he considers “so necessary
for a wise and cautious theology.”[461]

[461] _Ibid._ p. 120.

A still further condition is introduced by Newman to qualify the
character of papal decisions. There is the doctrine of intention. The
Pope, urges Newman,

“could not fulfil the above conditions of an _ex cathedra_ utterance
if he did not actually _mean_ to fulfil them.... What is the worth of
a signature if a man does not consider what he is signing? The Pope
cannot address his people East and West, North and South, without
meaning it; ... nor can he exert his apostolical authority without
knowing that he is doing so; nor can he draw up a form of words
and use care, and make an effort in doing so accurately, without
intention to do so.”

Newman himself applied this principle of intention to the case of
Honorius.

“And therefore no words of Honorius proceeded from his prerogative of
infallible teaching, which were not accompanied with the intention of
exercising that prerogative.”[462]

[462] _Ibid._ p. 108.

That, of course, must apply to every individual for whom the infallible
prerogative is claimed. The classification of papal utterances is
accordingly involved in the doctrine of intention. It will be necessary
in every case to ascertain what the Pope’s intentions were. Now of all
intricate and desperately difficult problems none surpass the doctrine
of intention. No wonder then if there will be discordant verdicts among
the theologians, and a large element of insecurity.

Following upon this analysis of the theoretical conditions requisite
for infallible utterances comes the practical enquiry, to what
particular papal decrees do these conditions really apply? Upon what
precise occasions did the Pope bestow upon the Church the advantages
of his Infallibility? This is a question upon which theologians are
much more reticent. They deal at considerable length with the necessary
conditions which such an utterance would require, but many among them
refrain from all practical application. They do not indicate which
among the immense collections of papal documents really possesses
this supreme distinction. Newman, indeed, says that the Pope “has
for centuries upon centuries had and used that authority which the
Definition now declares ever to have belonged to him.”[463] According
to this assertion the Pope has not only possessed this power, but “used
it.” The implication appears to be that since he has possessed it for
centuries upon centuries he has used it frequently. Newman, however,
quotes with approval the statement that “the Papal Infallibility is
comparatively seldom brought into action.”[464] Indeed, he himself
observes:--

[463] Letter to Duke of Norfolk, p. 128.

[464] _Ibid._ p. 125.

“Utterances which must be received as coming from an Infallible Voice
are not made every day, indeed they are very rare; and those which
are by some persons affirmed or assumed to be such, do not always
turn out what they are said to be.”[465]

[465] Letter to Duke of Norfolk, p. 81.

Fessler again speaks of “the form ... which the Pope usually adopts
when he delivers a solemn definition _de fide_.”[466] And yet the
result of his application of the tests of an infallible utterance is
that he “finds only a few.”[467]

[466] Fessler, p. 92.

[467] _Ibid._ p. 53.

To be still more precise. There is no unanimity as to occasions when an
infallible decree was given. Many writers on Infallibility give no list
at all. Those who attempt it differ widely, but agree in regarding them
as excessively few. The Secretary of the Vatican Council tells us that
he found only a few, but he did not tell us which they are. This is
perfectly intelligible. He wrote in the same year in which the Decree
was made, and certainly there had been no time to investigate or apply
the tests with any assurance of accuracy; and it was most prudent and
commendable not to attempt the dangerous task of committing himself to
a definite list which might sooner or later have been overthrown. As
Newman said: “Those which are by some persons affirmed or assumed to
be such, do not always turn out what they are said to be.” More recent
writers have felt themselves justified by lapse of time in indicating
which the infallible utterances are. Whether on Roman principles the
time has really come for indicating them with any confidence may be
open to question. The varieties in the lists would seem to suggest a
negative. They appear to vary from eight instances down to one. Of
course the compilers of the lists may contend that their researches
are not yet completed. The investigation of utterances extending over
well-nigh two thousand years may well require considerable time. The
judgment may be regarded as still in suspense. But so far as lists are
given us they vary within the limits already stated.

Cardinal Franzelin, writing in 1875, gives some examples of utterances
whose Infallibility he regards as certain. They are four in number.

1. The Dogmatic Constitutions of the Council of Constance against
Wiclif and Hus, confirmed by Martin V.

2. The Constitution _exsurge_ of Leo X. against Luther.

3. The Constitution of Clement XI. against the Jansenists--the Bull
_Unigenitus_.

4. The Constitution _Auctorem Fidei_ of Pius VI. against the Synod of
Pistoia; wherein many pre-positions are condemned with various degrees
of censure.

Franzelin by no means limits Infallibility to these four utterances.
But these are all that he gives as illustrations of its exercise. And
of these he says with perfect confidence: “It is not lawful for any
Catholic to deny that these are infallible definitions.”[468]

[468] Franzelin, _De Traditione_, p. 123.

A more recent writer, Lucien Choupin,[469] repeats Franzelin’s list,
and gives four other utterances in addition:--

[469] _Valeur des Decisions Doctrinales et Disciplinaires du
Saint-Siège_ (1908).

1. The Decree of the Immaculate Conception.

2. The Dogma of Papal Infallibility.

Pius IX. is affirmed to have infallibly decreed his own Infallibility.

It is noteworthy that Choupin’s two chief instances belong to the
pontificate of Pius IX. Historical research enables the same writer to
add two more.

3. The condemnation of the five propositions of Jansen by Innocent X.
in 1653.

4. The Constitution of Benedict XII. in 1336.

This last affirms that departed saints who need no further cleansing
possess an immediate intuitive vision of the divine nature.[470]

[470] Denzinger, _Enchiridion_, § 456.

To these many theologians, says Choupin, add the _Encyclical Quanta
Cura_ of Pius IX. in 1864.

On the other hand, Carson in his _Reunion Essays_ says:--

“These four conditions so narrow the extent of the Petrine
prerogative that it is difficult to point with certainty to more than
one, or at most two, papal pronouncements, and declare them, with the
consent of all, to be infallible.

“The Bull _Ineffabilis Deus_, defining the Immaculate Conception,
may be considered, as we have seen, to be a definition of doctrine
about whose Infallibility there cannot well be any question. The
tome of Pope Leo the Great on the Incarnation, sent by him to the
Council of Chalcedon, and accepted by the assembled fathers as the
echo of Peter’s voice, may perhaps be placed on the same footing.
Beyond these two ecumenical utterances on points of doctrine, we
cannot assert with any assurance that the prerogative of Papal
Infallibility has been exercised from the day of Pentecost to the
present time.”[471]

[471] Carson’s _Reunion Essays_, p. 91.

Certainly if the intrinsic value of a document be any witness to its
Infallibility no papal utterance has better claim to be an instance
of that stupendous prerogative than the famous letter of Leo the
Great to Flavian. But yet some theologians omit it from their list
of Infallibility, and here a writer who inserts it as one of two can
only do so with a hesitating “perhaps.” Remembering the theological
defences of Leo’s letter we can see the reason for this uncertainty.
Theologians have felt themselves constrained by the historic facts to
admit that the Council of Chalcedon examined the contents of Leo’s
letter, and, that having satisfied themselves of its character, they
then proceeded to endorse it, and to declare that Peter spoke by Leo.
But this procedure is not thinkable in the case of an infallible
document. Accordingly it was supposed that Leo never meant to speak
infallibly, but only to suggest the lines upon which the Council
should proceed. But this defence removed the letter from the region of
inerrable authority. Hence the most that could be said about it was a
mere perhaps.

The question has to be faced, What authority do these lists of
infallible utterances possess? They possess the authority of the
various theologians who have compiled them. But they possess no more
than that authority. No infallible list of infallible utterances has
yet appeared. And surely whatever theories men may invent, it must
still be true that the only final way to determine whether a papal
utterance be infallible is whether it has secured the consent of the
Church.

It is, of course, acknowledged by Roman writers, that after a careful
application of the four tests it may still be disputed, and still
remain uncertain whether the particular utterance is or is not a case
of Infallibility. In this event the rule must be that, so long as any
uncertainty exists, after serious enquiry, there is no infallible
decision.[472] Fessler, however, adds that where uncertainty remains,
the subordinate authorities will ask the highest authority what his
intention was in such an utterance. If the utterer expires before
answering, Fessler does not inform us what the enquirer is to do. Is a
subsequent Pope an infallible judge of his predecessor’s intentions?
This we are not told. Fessler’s translator, however, adds a remark of
considerable importance.

[472] Hurter, i. p. 407.

“Of course Bishop Fessler is here understood as meaning that this
fresh explanation of the definition must be provided with all the
marks which are necessary to prove the presence of a real definition.”

III

Our study of the subject may be closed with a few reflections.

What impresses us perhaps chiefly is the meagreness of the result. Upon
this point Newman observed:--

“It has been objected to the explanation I have given ... of the
nature and range of the Pope’s Infallibility as now a dogma of the
Church, that it was a lame and impotent conclusion of the Council,
if so much effort was employed as is involved in the convocation
and sitting of an Ecumenical Council in order to do so little. True
if it were called to do what it did and no more; but that such was
its aim is a mere assumption. In the first place it can hardly be
doubted that there were those in the Council who were desirous of
a stronger definition; and the definition actually made, as being
moderate, is so far the victory of those many bishops who considered
any definition on the subject inopportune. And it was no slight
point of the proceedings in the Council, if a definition was to be,
to have effected a moderate definition. But the true answer to the
objection is that which is given by Bishop Ullathorne. The question
of the Pope’s Infallibility was not one of the objects professed in
condemning the Council; and the Council is not yet ended.”[473]

[473] Newman’s Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, p. 154.

The moderate character of the Definition which Newman notes is indeed
conspicuous, when compared with the extravagant statements of Manning
and Ward, of Veuillot and the _Univers_.

An Infallibility, whose range is possibly limited to one solitary
utterance in nineteen hundred years, is very different from the ideal
of perpetual irreversible decisions of almost daily occurrence as
described by Ward. Very different also from rapid termination of
controversies which Manning considered so necessary to our progressive
age. And there is reason to believe that the decision, although at
first accepted by the Extremists with the wildest joy, was on maturer
reflection viewed with considerable disappointment.

But this moderation has recently been viewed as a sign of truth.
Certainly Manning would never have argued that it was. A _via media_
between two extremes, upheld as ideal, would have been, indeed it was,
Manning’s detestation.

And if the Vatican Decree is moderate relatively to a school of
extravagance, it is no less stupendous relatively to a school of
antiquity. Judged by the conceptions of St Vincent of Lerins the dogma
is not moderate, it is most extreme. If some who anticipated and feared
something much more pronounced acquiesced in the actual dogma with
comparative relief, a very different estimate will be formed by those
whose standard of moderation is the doctrine of antiquity.

If the total advantage hitherto reaped from Papal Infallibility be
compared with that which the Church has gained from its Ecumenical
Councils, the balance is heavily on the side of the more ancient
method of ascertaining and formulating Christian tradition. Whatever
the solitary Infallible Voice may pronounce in the future, it has done
exceedingly little in the past, even on Roman estimates. Those who
consider the Immaculate Conception the only instance of an irreversible
papal decision can scarcely deny that no comparison exists between
this and the work of the Council of Nicæa. This is, of course, no
argument against its truth. It is not for a moment produced with that
design. But it is an argument against the value of numerous pretexts
which instigated many of the most influential personages who helped
to push this doctrine through. It shows that they were controlled
by totally erroneous conceptions. It shows much more than this. The
familiar controversial statements that the early Popes could not have
spoken as they did, had they not been conscious that they possessed
Infallibility, and a right accordingly to demand unconditional interior
submission, and intellectual assent, are shown by Roman interpretation
of the Vatican Dogma to be absolutely valueless. And all this shows
that a profound confusion has existed in Roman minds between Authority
and Infallibility. If this distinction had been sharply realised, many
of the arguments by which the doctrine was unsupported could never have
been employed.

The meagreness of the issue is in curious contrast with the magnitude
of the battle, and the tremendous character of the affirmation. The
question can hardly be evaded, Was it really in the Church’s interest
to impose belief in a prerogative whose exercise is admittedly so
uncertain? Is it permissible to be a Roman Catholic while affirming
that Papal Infallibility has never yet been exercised? If it is,
Where is the dogmatic gain? If it is not, Where are the indisputable
decisions? And what is its practical utility? Its strongest advocates,
as Manning, so Roman writers themselves affirm, viewed the subject
rather as statesmen than as theologians. They upheld it, not so much
for theoretic completeness, as because it would strengthen the Church’s
resources, and enable it the better to meet the age. And yet the
prerogative has never since been utilised.

The practical effect so far has been to alienate more grievously than
ever the separated Churches of the East. Was this in the real interests
of Christendom? It may be that, somewhat exhausted by this terrific
strife, authority is recruiting itself, and will some day utilise
its new prerogative with tremendous results; that it is meanwhile
treasuring up its new resources against a day of need. But so far as
the historic development has hitherto advanced, it is a theoretic
rather than a practical victory. It possesses all the intellectual
problems of a new, precarious, and bewildering dogma, without the
practical gains of a prerogative manifestly and constantly utilised in
the service of mankind.

INDEX

Acton, Lord, 70, 117 and _sqq._, 326 and _sqq._

Agatho, 34, 38, 40, 42

Alexander V., 59, 60

Alzog, 315

American Presbyterians, attitude of, 222

Anglican Church, attitude of, 223

Antonelli, Cardinal, 159, 163 and _sqq._, 190, 249, 254, 259,
292, 320

_À priori_ and _à posteriori_ methods, 343

---- basis of Papal Infallibility, 351 and _sqq._

Aquinas, St Thomas, 30, 51 and _sqq._

Articles (Four) of 1682, 89 and _sqq._, 93

Augustine, St, 17, 18, 19, 20, 173, 247

Authority in the Church, monarchical theory of, 72, 350 and
_sqq._;
two theories of, 64, 66, 269, 288;
seat of Authority, the Church, 81, 83, 94, 95, 108, 109, 156,
173, 192 and _sqq._, 206, 269, 288, 315, 346.
See also Infallibility of Church, Episcopate, Vincent of
Lerins.

Baine’s Defence, 101

Baronius, 28, 37, 60

Barral, 8

Basle, Council of, alluded to by Bossuet, 95

Bellarmine, 7, 9, 12, 18, 28, 29, 38 and _sqq._, 60 and _sqq._,
72 and _sqq._, 168, 263

Benedict XIII., claims to be above appeal, 57

Bergier’s _Theological Dictionary_, 147

Bertin, 81

Bona, Cardinal, 36

Bossuet, 8, 20 and _sqq._, 26, 28, 29, 38 and _sqq._, 53, 57, 62
and _sqq._, 70, 73, 85 and _sqq._;
His sermon on Unity, 86 and _sqq._;
_Defence of the Declaration_, 93 and _sqq._;
_Exposition_, 96, 107

Botalla, 12, 19

Butler, Charles, 100, 101

Catherine of Sienna, 56

Cecconi, 185, 186, 190, 197, 277

Chrismann, 201

Church. See Authority, Infallibility of the Church, Episcopate,
Tradition

_Civilta Cattolica_, the, 164, 165, 169, 184

Clement VII., 56 and _sqq._

---- XI., 92, 93

Clifford, Bishop, 227, 245, 271

---- Lord, 102

Commission of Suggestions, 251 and _sqq._

Constance, Council of, 60, 61;
alluded to by Bertin, 81;
by Richer, 83;
by Bossuet, 91, 95;
by Darboy, 265

Constitution on Procedure, 230

Council, 28–31, 33–40, 42, 45, 59–66, 74, 77, 83, 95, 348 and
_sqq._;
authority of, 58, 74

Cyprian, St, 14 and _sqq._

Cyrus, Patriarch of Alexandria, 32–34, 43

Darboy, Archbishop, 157 and _sqq._, 187, 265 and _sqq._, 271,
292 and _sqq._

Daru, Count, 249, 250

Dechamps, Archbishop, 165

_Defence of the Declaration_, 93, 94

Delahogue, 107

Development, theory of, 287;
development and immutability of the Faith, 24 and _sqq._, 205

Dieringer, 191

Döllinger, 8, 188 and _sqq._, 209, 210, 232 and _sqq._, 316 and
_sqq._

Dupanloup, Bishop, 154 and _sqq._, 162 and _sqq._, 169 and
_sqq._, 271, 272, 295

Ecumenical Councils, De Maistre’s depreciation of, 148 and
_sqq._

Ecumenicity, test of, 348 and _sqq._

Episcopate, 15, 28, 29, 31, 50, 64, 66, 173, 244, 346 and
_sqq._;
Bossuet on, 87, 95

Errington, Bishop, 104, 105

Eugenius IV., alluded to by Bossuet, 91

Faith, nature of, 4

_Faith of Catholics_, the, 106

Fénelon, theory on temporal and spiritual power, 49

Fessler, 277 and _sqq._, 289, 357 and _sqq._, 362, 365

Flavian, Leo’s letter to, 28, 29

Florence, Council of, 83

_Franzelin_, 25

Friedrich, 210 and _sqq._, 318, 321

Galileo, 180, 359

Gallicanism, 134, 146, 157

Gallitzin, 110

Gasquet, Abbot, 117

Gelasius, 21, 22

German Protestants, attitude of, 221

Gerson, Chancellor, 58, 73

Gosselin, 49, 50

Gratry, 8, 13, 19, 20, 54, 177, 179, 296 and _sqq._

Gregory VII., 49

---- XII., 57 and _sqq._

Gregory the Great _v._ Papal Infallibility, 353

Guibert, Archbishop, 251 and _sqq._, 295

Gladstone, 101

Hadrian VI., 65, 73

Hasenclever, 314 and _sqq._

Haynald, Archbishop, 273

Hefele, Bishop, 26, 37, 43 and _sqq._, 191, 202, 241, 271, 277,
307 and _sqq._

Hohenlohe, Cardinal, 208 and _sqq._, 303

----, Prince, 207 and _sqq._, 305 and _sqq._

Honorius, 22, 32, 33, 35 and _sqq._, 39 and _sqq._, 46, 134,
168, 360;
De Maistre on, 150;
Gratry on, 179

Hurter, 346 and _sqq._

Husenbeth, 101

Immaculate Conception, 229, 248, 255

Implicit and explicit truth, 25

Infallibility, not conferred on St Peter, 7, 8;
Infallibility and authority, 9, 15, 17;
Infallibility of the Church, 77, 94, 110, 111, 115, 168 and
_sqq._, 343.
See Authority

----, Papal, 21, 42;
works out as Infallibility of the Church, 77, 94;
officially denied in Lyons and Rouen, 97;
by English Roman Catholics of eighteenth century, 100;
by _Faith of Catholics_, 106;
nature of Infallibility, 340 and _sqq._;
conditions of its exercise, 357 and _sqq._, cf. 11;
parallel drawn between dogma of Christ’s Divinity and that of
Infallibility, 113 and _sqq._;
doctrine of intention, 360, 361

----, Carson’s list of Infallible utterances, 364

----, Choupin’s list, 363

----, Franzelin’s list, 363

---- and the Council of Trent, 70;
the question not mentioned at beginning of the Vatican
Council, 232, 238

Infallibility, Romanist utterances on:--
Acton, 327 and _sqq._, 333
Aquinas, 30, 51 and _sqq._
Baine, 101
Bellarmine, 73
Bossuet, 89 and _sqq._
Butler, 101
Clifford, 102, 245
Council of Constance, 60, 61
Darboy, 161, 265, 266, 292
Dechamps, 165
Delahogue, 107
Döllinger, 320 and _sqq._
Dupanloup, 162, 170 and _sqq._
Gallitzin, 110
Gratry, 179 and _sqq._
Gregory the Great, 353
Guibert, 251 and _sqq._
Hadrian VI., 65, 84
Hefele, 204, 212, 241, 307
_Janus_, 193
_Keenan’s Catechism_, 111 and _sqq._
Kenrick, 247, 302
Khayath, 213, 215
Krautheimer, 201
Liebermann, 200
De Lisle, 108
Luzerne, 146
Maret, 167 and _sqq._
Melchers, 241, 311
Milner, 110
Munich, Theological Faculty of, 199
Murray, 115, 116
Newman, 282 and _sqq._, 359 and _sqq._
Pie, 255
Purcell, 246
Ryder, 354 and _sqq._
Schulte, 289
Sorbonne, 58
Torquemada, 77; cf. 94, 108
Veron, 84
Wurtzburg, Theological Faculty of, 198, 199

Innocent I., 19

Intention, doctrine of, 360, 361

Irenæus, St, 11 and _sqq._

_Janus_, 27, 54, 182, 192, 193;
_Dublin Review_ on, 195

Jerome, St, 20, 21

John IV., 33

---- XXIII., 60

_Keenan’s Catechism_, 111 and _sqq._

Kenrick, Archbishop, 8, 18, 27, 247, 271, 300 and _sqq._

Ketteler, Bishop, 240, 269

Khayath, Bishop, 213 and _sqq._

Krautheimer, 201

Lacordaire, 154

Lamennais, 153, 169

Langen, 313

Legouvé, 299, 300

Leo II., 35, 38, 40

---- XIII., 15

---- the Great, 364, 365

Letters, three, issued by Pius IX. before the Council, 220 and
_sqq._

_Liber Diurnus_, 35, 36

Liberius, 20, 21, 22

Liebermann, 200 and _sqq._

Liguori, 323

Lisle, A. P. de, 108, 109, 286, 287

Lorraine, Cardinal de, 69

Luzerne, Cardinal, 145 and _sqq._

Maistre, Joseph de, 147 and _sqq._;
Lenormant on, 153

Manning, 104 and _sqq._, 133 and _sqq._, 232

Maret, Bishop, 8, 12, 13, 19, 26, 152, 167, 256, 271, 293

Martin I., 34, 38

---- V., 60 and _sqq._

Melchers, 241, 311

Melchior, Cano, 30, 53

Milner’s _End of Religious Controversy_, 109

Monothelite heresy, 32, 33 and _sqq._

Montalembert, 154, 178, 183 and _sqq._, 198

Murray’s _Tractatus de Ecclesia Christi_, 115, 116

Napoleon and reconstruction of French Episcopate, 143 and _sqq._

---- III., 250

Newman, 130 and _sqq._, 177, 226, 280 and _sqq._, 348, 359 and
_sqq._, 366

_New Regulations_, the, 253 and _sqq._

Nicea, Canon of, on Episcopal consecration, 69

Oriental Churches, attitude of, 221

Orsi, Cardinal, 94

Pastor, 56, 57

Patrizzi, Cardinal, 252 and _sqq._

Paul, St, 5, 12, 16, 20

Perron, Cardinal du, 80 and _sqq._, 107

Perrone, 12, 19, 20

Peter, St, 2 and _sqq._, 12, 14, 16, 17, 67, 68, 72, 75, 86, 87,
167, 168, 244

Pie, Bishop, 255 and _sqq._

Pighius, 73

Pisa, Council of, 59

Pitra, Cardinal, 276

Pius IX., his three letters before the Council, 220 and _sqq._;
his character, 269

Purcell, Bishop, 246

Pusey, 225 and _sqq._

Quirinus, 174 and _sqq._

Quotations from Holy Scripture:--
St Luke xxii. 32, p. 2
Rom. i. 11, p. 5
1 Thess. iii. 2; iii. 13, p. 5
2 Thess. ii. 17; iii. 3, p. 6
Heb. i. 12, p. 4
1 Pet. v. 10, p. 6
2 Pet. i. 12, p. 6
Rev. iii. 2, p. 6

Rauscher, Cardinal, 240

Reusch, 311 and _sqq._

Richelieu, Cardinal, 79

Richer, 69, 80, 81

Ryder, 344, 354

Schism, Great, 55, and _sqq._

Schwane, 12, 51, 52, 53, 76, 77, 346

Schwarzenberg, 190 and _sqq._, 271

Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople, 32 and _sqq._

Sibour, 184

Sirmond, 36

Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, 32, 33, 43

Sorbonne, 58, 79 and _sqq._

Stephen, Bishop of Rome, 16, 18

Strossmayer, Bishop, 183, 237, 271

Temporal and spiritual power, 49, 50, 207 and _sqq._;
Bossuet on, 88, 89;
Sibour on, 184;
Fénelon on, 49

Tertullian, 13

Throgmorton, Sir John, 98 and _sqq._, 102

Torquemada, 76, 77 and _sqq._

Tradition, Christian, 13, 22, 24, 50

Trent, Council of, 66, and _sqq._, 70;
appealed to by Veron, 83

Truth, test of. See Vincent of Lerins

Turmel, 30, 38–41, 46, 53

Ullathorne, Bishop, 103, 121, 128, 132, 284, 290

Ultramontane methods of controversy, 262, 325

Ultramontanism, Acton on, 336

Universities, position of in the Church, 85

Urban VI., 56 and _sqq._

Validity of Decrees not imparted by Papal confirmation, 63

Vatican Council, Infallibility not mentioned at the beginning of
it, 232, 238

Veron’s _Rule of Faith_, 83, 84

Veuillot, 177, 181

Vincent of Lerins, St, 22 and _sqq._, 50, 189, 367

Ward, 116, 117, 129

----, Bernard, 100

----, W., 98

Will, relation of human and divine, 341 and _sqq._

Wiseman, Cardinal, 102–104, 119

PRINTED AT THE EDINBURGH PRESS
9 AND 11 YOUNG STREET

Transcriber’s Note

Some inconsistencies in spelling, hyphenation, and punctuation have
been retained.

This file uses _underscores_ to indicate italic text.

Small capitals changed to all capitals.

“Papautè” changed to “Papauté” in multiple places (Histoire de la
Papauté)

p. ix: changed “einem” to “einen” (Sendschreiben an einen Deutschen
Bischof)

p. ix: changed “de” to “du” (Hist. du Card. Pie.)

p. x: changed “Memoires” to “Mémoires” (Consalvi, Card. Mémoires.)

p. x: changed “addressée” to “adressée” (Lettre sur le futur Concile
Œcuménique adressée)

p. xi: changed “Allemayne” to “Allemagne” (L’Allemagne religieuse)

p. xi: changed “Tridentince” to “Tridentinae” (Disputationes
Tridentinae)

p. xi: changed “Rufinium” to “Rufinum” (Ad Rufinum. De Script Eccles.)

p. xiii: changed “Bischop” to “Bischof” (Kniefall und Fall des Bischof
Ketteler)

p. xiii: changed “Doctrines” to “Doctrinæ” (Vindiciæ Doctrinæ Majorum)

p. 9: changed “Theol” to “Théol” (Hist. Théol. Positive)

p. 121: changed “ilustrates” to “illustrates” (Foreign Review
illustrates the restraints)

p. 127: changed “trangressed” to “transgressed” (which has transgressed
its limits)

p. 144: changed “Memoires” to “Mémoires” (Consalvi, Mémoires.)

p. 190: changed “li.” to “ii.” in footnote (Ibid. ii. p. 331.)

p. 200: changed “Religreuses” to “Religieuses” (Encyclopédie des
Sciences Religieuses)

p. 215: changed “inbibed” to “imbibed” (I imbibed in my youth)

p. 277 (footnote 384): changed “de” to “du” (Histoire du Cardinal Pie)

p. 279: inserted closing single-quote (God has confided to my care.’”)

p. 279: changed “advisible” to “advisable” (if they think it advisable)

p. 301: changed “Altkathliusmus” to “Altkatholicismus” (Schulte, Der
Altkatholicismus)

p. 315: changed “reponse” to “response” (direct response to the
question)

p. 316: changed “apearance” to “appearance” (a very different
appearance)

p. 317: changed “precedure” to “procedure” (of the Roman procedure)

p. 326: added section V name “LORD ACTON’S SUBMISSION”, from printed
page header

p. 332: changed “Bishof” to “Bischof” (an einen Deutschen Bischof)

p. 364 (footnote 470): changed “Encheiridior” to “Enchiridion”

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