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Title: The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Volume 2 (of 5)
Author: Thomas Hobbes
Editor: Sir William Molesworth
Release date: June 24, 2024 [eBook #73906]
Language: English
Original publication: London: John Bohn, 1839
Credits: Emmanuel Ackerman, KD Weeks and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from images made available by the HathiTrust Digital Library.)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES, VOLUME 2 (OF 5) ***
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THE
ENGLISH WORKS
OF
THOMAS HOBBES.
LONDON:
C RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN’S LANE.
THE
ENGLISH WORKS
OF
THOMAS HOBBES
OF MALMESBURY;
NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED
BY
SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART.
---
VOL. II.
---
LONDON:
JOHN BOHN,
HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.
---
MDCCCXLI.
PHILOSOPHICAL RUDIMENTS
CONCERNING
GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY.
BY
THOMAS HOBBES
OF MALMESBURY.
TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
WILLIAM EARL OF DEVONSHIRE,
MY MOST HONOURED LORD.
---
MAY IT PLEASE YOUR LORDSHIP,
It was the speech of the Roman people, to whom the name of _king_ had
been rendered odious, as well by the tyranny of the Tarquins as by the
genius and decretals of that city; it was the speech, I say, of the
public, however pronounced from a private mouth, (if yet Cato the censor
were no more than such): _that all kings are to be reckoned amongst
ravenous beasts_. But what a beast of prey was the Roman people; whilst
with its conquering eagles it erected its proud trophies so far and wide
over the world, bringing the Africans, the Asiatics, the Macedonians,
and the Achæans, with many other despoiled nations, into a specious
bondage, with the pretence of preferring them to be denizens of Rome! So
that if Cato’s saying were a wise one, it was every whit as wise, that
of Pontius Telesinus; who flying about with open mouth through all the
companies of his army in that famous encounter which he had with Sylla,
cried out: that _Rome herself as well as Sylla, was to be razed; for
that there would always be wolves and depredators of their liberty,
unless the forest that lodged them were grubbed up by the roots_. To
speak impartially, both sayings are very true: that _man to man is a
kind of God_; and that _man to man is an arrant wolf_. The first is
true, if we compare citizens amongst themselves; and the second, if we
compare cities. In the one, there is some analogy of similitude with the
Deity; to wit, justice and charity, the twin sisters of peace. But in
the other, good men must defend themselves by taking to them for a
sanctuary the two daughters of war, deceit and violence: that is, in
plain terms, a mere brutal rapacity. Which although men object to one
another as a reproach, by an inbred custom which they have of beholding
their own actions in the persons of other men, wherein, as in a mirror,
all things on the left side appear to be on the right, and all things on
the right side to be as plainly on the left; yet the natural right of
preservation, which we all receive from the uncontrolable dictates of
necessity, will not admit it to be a vice, though it confess it to be an
unhappiness. Now that with Cato himself, a person of so great a renown
for wisdom, animosity should so prevail instead of judgment, and
partiality instead of reason, that the very same thing which he thought
just in his popular state, he should censure as unjust in a monarchical;
other men perhaps may have leisure to admire. But I have been long since
of this opinion; that there was never yet any more than vulgar prudence,
that had the luck of being acceptable to the giddy people; but either it
hath not been understood, or else having been so hath been levelled and
cried down. The more eminent actions and apothegms, both of the Greeks
and Romans, have been indebted for their eulogies not so much to the
_reason_, as to the _greatness_ of them; and very many times to that
prosperous usurpation, (with which our histories do so mutually upbraid
each other), which as a conquering torrent carries all before it, as
well public agents as public actions, in the stream of time. Wisdom,
properly so called, is nothing else but this: _the perfect knowledge of
the truth in all matters whatsoever_. Which being derived from the
registers and records of _things_; and that as it were through the
conduit of certain definite appellations; cannot possibly be the work of
a sudden acuteness, but of a well-balanced reason; which by the
compendium of a word, we call _philosophy_. For by this it is that a way
is opened to us, in which we travel from the contemplation of particular
things to the inference or result of universal actions. Now look, how
many sorts of things there are, which properly fall within the
cognizance of human reason; into so many branches does the tree of
philosophy divide itself. And from the diversity of the matter about
which they are conversant, there hath been given to those branches a
diversity of names too. For treating of figures, it is called
_geometry_; of motion, _physic_; of natural right, _morals_; put
altogether, and they make up _philosophy_. Just as the British, the
Atlantic, and the Indian seas, being diversely christened from the
diversity of their shores, do notwithstanding all together make up _the
ocean_. And truly the geometricians have very admirably performed their
part. For whatsoever assistance doth accrue to the life of man, whether
from the observation of the heavens or from the description of the
earth, from the notation of times, or from the remotest experiments of
navigation; finally, whatsoever things they are in which this present
age doth differ from the rude simpleness of antiquity, we must
acknowledge to be a debt which we owe merely to geometry. If the moral
philosophers had as happily discharged their duty, I know not what could
have been added by human industry to the completion of that happiness,
which is consistent with human life. For were the nature of human
actions as distinctly known as the nature of _quantity_ in geometrical
figures, the strength of _avarice_ and _ambition_, which is sustained by
the erroneous opinions of the vulgar as touching the nature of _right_
and _wrong_, would presently faint and languish; and mankind should
enjoy such an immortal peace, that unless it were for habitation, on
supposition that the earth should grow too narrow for her inhabitants,
there would hardly be left any pretence for war. But now on the
contrary, that neither the sword nor the pen should be allowed any
cessation; that the knowledge of the law of nature should lose its
growth, not advancing a whit beyond its ancient stature; that there
should still be such siding with the several factions of philosophers,
that the very same action should be decried by some, and as much
elevated by others; that the very same man should at several times
embrace his several opinions, and esteem his own actions far otherwise
in himself than he does in others: these, I say, are so many signs, so
many manifest arguments, that what hath hitherto been written by moral
philosophers, hath not made any progress in the knowledge of the truth;
but yet hath took with the world, not so much by giving any light to the
understanding as entertainment to the affections, whilst by the
successful rhetorications of their speech they have confirmed them in
their rashly received opinions. So that this part of philosophy hath
suffered the same destiny with the _public ways_, which lie open to all
passengers to traverse up and down: or the same lot _with highways and
open streets_, some for divertisement, and some for business; so that
what with the impertinences of some and the altercations of others,
those ways have never a seed time, and therefore yield never a harvest.
The only reason of which unluckiness should seem to be this; that
amongst all the writers of that part of philosophy there is not one that
hath used an idoneous principle of tractation. For we may not, as in a
circle, begin the handling of a science from what point we please. There
is a certain clue of reason, whose beginning is in the dark; but by the
benefit of whose conduct, we are led as it were by the hand into the
clearest light. So that the principle of tractation is to be taken from
that darkness; and then the light to be carried thither for irradiating
the doubts. As often therefore as any writer doth either weakly forsake
that clue, or wilfully cut it asunder; he describes the footsteps, not
of his progress in science, but of his wanderings from it. And from this
it was, that when I applied my thoughts to the investigation of natural
_justice_, I was presently advertised from the very word justice, (which
signifies a steady will of giving every one his _own_), that my first
enquiry was to be, from whence it proceeded that any man should call
anything rather his _own_, than _another man’s_. And when I found that
this proceeded not from nature, but consent; (for what nature at first
laid forth in common, men did afterwards distribute into several
_impropriations_); I was conducted from thence to another inquiry;
namely, to what end and upon what impulsives, when all was equally every
man’s in common, men did rather think it fitting that every man should
have his inclosure. And I found the reason was, that from a community of
goods there must needs arise contention, whose enjoyment should be
greatest. And from that contention all kind of calamities must
unavoidably ensue, which by the instinct of nature every man is taught
to shun. Having therefore thus arrived at two maxims of human nature;
the one arising from the _concupiscible_ part, which desires to
appropriate to itself the use of those things in which all others have a
joint interest; the other proceeding from the _rational_, which teaches
every man to fly a contra-natural dissolution, as the greatest mischief
that can arrive to nature: which principles being laid down, I seem from
them to have demonstrated by a most evident connexion, in this little
work of mine, first, the absolute necessity of leagues and contracts,
and thence the rudiments both of moral and of civil prudence. That
appendage which is added concerning the regiment of God, hath been done
with this intent; that the dictates of God Almighty in the law of
nature, might not seem repugnant to the written law, revealed to us in
his word. I have also been very wary in the whole tenour of my
discourse, not to meddle with the civil laws of any particular nation
whatsoever: that is to say, I have avoided coming ashore, which those
times have so infested both with shelves and tempests. At what expense
of time and industry I have been in this scrutiny after truth, I am not
ignorant; but to what purpose, I know not. For being partial judges of
ourselves, we lay a partial estimate upon our own productions. I
therefore offer up this book to your Lordship’s, not favour, but censure
first; as having found by many experiments, that it is not the credit of
the author, nor the newness of the work, nor yet the ornament of the
style, but only the weight of reason, which recommends any _opinion_ to
your Lordship’s favour and approbation. If it fortune to please, that is
to say, if it be sound, if it be useful, if it be not vulgar; I humbly
offer it to your Lordship, as both my glory and my protection. But if in
anything I have erred, your Lordship will yet accept it as a testimony
of my gratitude; that the means of study, which I enjoyed by your
Lordship’s goodness, I have employed to the procurement of your
Lordship’s favour. The God of heaven crown your Lordship with length of
days, in this earthly station; and in the heavenly Jerusalem with a
crown of glory.
Your Honour’s most humble,
and most devoted Servant,
THOMAS HOBBES.
-------
THE AUTHOR’S
PREFACE TO THE READER.
Reader, I promise thee here such things, which ordinarily promised
do seem to challenge the greatest attention, (whether thou regard
the dignity or profit of the matter treated, or the right method of
handling it, or the honest motive and good advice to undertake it,
or lastly the moderation of the author,) and I lay them here before
thine eyes. In this book thou shalt find briefly described the
duties of men: first, as men; then as subjects; lastly, as
Christians. Under which duties are contained, not only the elements
of the laws of nature and of nations, together with the true
original and power of justice; but also the very essence of
Christian religion itself, so far forth as the measure of this my
purpose could well bear it.
Which kind of doctrine, excepting what relates to Christian
religion, the most ancient sages did judge fittest to be delivered
to posterity, either curiously adorned with verse, or clouded with
allegories, as a most beautiful and hallowed mystery of royal
authority; lest by the disputations of private men it might be
defiled. Other philosophers in the mean time, to the advantage of
mankind, did contemplate the faces and motions of things; others,
without disadvantage, their natures and causes. But in after times,
Socrates is said to have been the first who truly loved this civil
science; although hitherto not thoroughly understood, yet glimmering
forth as through a cloud in the government of the commonweal: and
that he set so great a value on this, that utterly abandoning and
despising all other parts of philosophy, he wholly embraced this, as
judging it only worthy the labour of his mind. After him comes
Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and other philosophers, as well Greek as
Latin. And now at length all men of all nations, not only
philosophers but even the vulgar, have and do still deal with this
as a matter of ease, exposed and prostitute to every mother-wit, and
to be attained without any great care or study. And, which makes
mainly for its dignity, those who suppose themselves to have it, or
are in such employment as they ought to have it, do so wonderfully
please themselves in its _idea_, as they easily brook the followers
of other arts to be esteemed and styled ingenuous, learned, skilful,
and what you will, except prudent: for this name, in regard of civil
knowledge, they presume to be due to themselves only. Whether
therefore the worth of arts is to be weighed by the worthiness of
the persons who entertain them, or by the number of those who have
written of them, or by the judgment of the wisest; certainly this
must carry it, which so nearly relates to princes, and others
engaged in the government of mankind; in whose adulterate species
also the most part of men do delight themselves, and in which the
most excellent wits of philosophers have been conversant. The
benefit of it, when rightly delivered, that is, when derived from
true principles by evident connection, we shall then best discern,
when we shall but well have considered the mischiefs that have
befallen mankind from its counterfeit and babbling form. For in
matters wherein we speculate for the exercise of our wits, if any
error escape us, it is without hurt; neither is there any loss, but
of time only. But in those things which every man ought to meditate
for the steerage of his life, it necessarily happens that not only
from errors, but even from ignorance itself, there arise offences,
contentions, nay, even slaughter itself. Look now, how great a
prejudice these are; such and so great is the benefit arising from
this doctrine of morality truly declared. How many kings, and those
good men too, hath this one error, that a tyrant king might lawfully
be put to death, been the slaughter of! How many throats hath this
false position cut, that a prince for some causes may by some
certain men be deposed! And what bloodshed hath not this erroneous
doctrine caused, that kings are not superiors to, but administrators
for the multitude! Lastly, how many rebellions hath this opinion
been the cause of, which teacheth that the knowledge whether the
commands of kings be just or unjust, belongs to private men; and
that before they yield obedience, they not only may, but ought to
dispute them! Besides, in the moral philosophy now commonly
received, there are many things no less dangerous than those, which
it matters not now to recite. I suppose those ancients foresaw this,
who rather chose to have the science of justice wrapped up in
fables, than openly exposed to disputations. For before such
questions began to be moved, princes did not sue for, but already
exercised the supreme power. They kept their empire entire, not by
arguments, but by punishing the wicked and protecting the good.
Likewise subjects did not measure what was just by the sayings and
judgments of private men, but by the laws of the realm; nor were
they kept in peace by disputations, but by power and authority. Yea,
they reverenced the supreme power, whether residing in one man or in
a council, as a certain visible divinity. Therefore they little
used, as in our days, to join themselves with ambitious and hellish
spirits, to the utter ruin of their state. For they could not
entertain so strange a fancy, as not to desire the preservation of
that by which they were preserved. In truth, the simplicity of those
times was not yet capable of so learned a piece of folly. Wherefore
it was peace and a golden age, which ended not before that, Saturn
being expelled, it was taught lawful to take up arms against kings.
This, I say, the ancients not only themselves saw, but in one of
their fables they seem very aptly to have signified it to us. For
they say, that when Ixion was invited by Jupiter to a banquet, he
fell in love, and began to court Juno herself. Offering to embrace
her, he clasped a cloud; from whence the Centaurs proceeded, by
nature half men, half horses, a fierce, a fighting, and unquiet
generation. Which changing the names only, is as much as if they
should have said, that private men being called to councils of
state, desired to prostitute justice, the only sister and wife of
the supreme, to their own judgments and apprehensions; but embracing
a false and empty shadow instead of it, they have begotten those
hermaphrodite opinions of moral philosophers, partly right and
comely, partly brutal and wild; the causes of all contentions and
bloodsheds. Since therefore such opinions are daily seen to arise,
if any man now shall dispel those clouds, and by most firm reasons
demonstrate that there are no authentical doctrines concerning right
and wrong, good and evil, besides the constituted laws in each realm
and government; and that the question whether any future action will
prove just or unjust, good or ill, is to be demanded of none but
those to whom the supreme hath committed the interpretation of his
laws: surely he will not only show us the highway to peace, but will
also teach us how to avoid the close, dark, and dangerous by-paths
of faction and sedition; than which I know not what can be thought
more profitable.
Concerning my method, I thought it not sufficient to use a plain and
evident style in what I have to deliver, except I took my beginning
from the very matter of civil government, and thence proceeded to
its generation and form, and the first beginning of justice. For
everything is best understood by its constitutive causes. For as in
a watch, or some such small engine, the matter, figure, and motion
of the wheels cannot well be known, except it be taken insunder and
viewed in parts; so to make a more curious search into the rights of
states and duties of subjects, it is necessary, I say, not to take
them insunder, but yet that they be so considered as if they were
dissolved; that is, that we rightly understand what the quality of
human nature is, in what matters it is, in what not, fit to make up
a civil government, and how men must be agreed amongst themselves
that intend to grow up into a well-grounded state. Having therefore
followed this kind of method, in the first place I set down for a
principle, by experience known to all men and denied by none, to
wit, that the dispositions of men are naturally such, that except
they be restrained through fear of some coercive power, every man
will distrust and dread each other; and as by natural right he may,
so by necessity he will be forced to make use of the strength he
hath, toward the preservation of himself. You will object perhaps,
that there are some who deny this. Truly so it happens, that very
many do deny it. But shall I therefore seem to fight against myself,
because I affirm that the same men confess and deny the same thing?
In truth I do not; but they do, whose actions disavow what their
discourses approve of. We see all countries, though they be at peace
with their neighbours, yet guarding their frontiers with armed men,
their towns with walls and ports, and keeping constant watches. To
what purpose is all this, if there be no fear of the neighbouring
power? We see even in well-governed states, where there are laws and
punishments appointed for offenders, yet particular men travel not
without their sword by their sides for their defences; neither sleep
they without shutting not only their doors against their fellow
subjects, but also their trunks and coffers for fear of domestics.
Can men give a clearer testimony of the distrust they have each of
other, and all of all? Now, since they do thus, and even countries
as well as men, they publicly profess their mutual fear and
diffidence. But in disputing they deny it; that is as much as to
say, that out of a desire they have to contradict others, they
gainsay themselves. Some object that this principle being admitted,
it would needs follow, not only that all men were wicked, (which
perhaps though it seem hard, yet we must yield to, since it is so
clearly declared by holy writ), but also wicked by nature, which
cannot be granted without impiety. But this, that men are evil by
nature, follows not from this principle. For though the wicked were
fewer than the righteous, yet because we cannot distinguish them,
there is a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating,
subjugating, self-defending, ever incident to the most honest and
fairest conditioned. Much less does it follow, that those who are
wicked, are so by nature. For though from nature, that is, from
their first birth, as they are merely sensible creatures, they have
this disposition, that immediately as much as in them lies they
desire and do whatsoever is best pleasing to them, and that either
through fear they fly from, or through hardness repel those dangers
which approach them; yet are they not for this reason to be
accounted wicked. For the affections of the mind, which arise only
from the lower parts of the soul, are not wicked themselves; but the
actions thence proceeding may be so sometimes, as when they are
either offensive or against duty. Unless you give children all they
ask for, they are peevish and cry, aye, and strike their parents
sometimes; and all this they have from nature. Yet are they free
from guilt, neither may we properly call them wicked; first, because
they cannot hurt; next, because wanting the free use of reason they
are exempted from all duty. These when they come to riper years,
having acquired power whereby they may do hurt, if they shall
continue to do the same things, then truly they both begin to be,
and are properly accounted wicked. Insomuch as a wicked man is
almost the same thing with a child grown strong and sturdy, or a man
of a childish disposition; and malice the same with a defect of
reason in that age when nature ought to be better governed through
good education and experience. Unless therefore we will say that men
are naturally evil, because they receive not their education and use
of reason from nature, we must needs acknowledge that men may derive
desire, fear, anger, and other passions from nature, and yet not
impute the evil effects of those unto nature. The foundation
therefore which I have laid, standing firm, I demonstrate, in the
first place, that the state of men without civil society, which
state we may properly call the state of nature, is nothing else but
a mere war of all against all; and in that war all men have equal
right unto all things. Next, that all men as soon as they arrive to
understanding of this hateful condition, do desire, even nature
itself compelling them, to be freed from this misery. But that this
cannot be done, except by compact, they all quit that right they
have to all things. Furthermore, I declare and confirm what the
nature of compact is; how and by what means the right of one might
be transferred unto another to make their compacts valid; also what
rights, and to whom they must necessarily be granted, for the
establishing of peace; I mean, what those dictates of reason are,
which may properly be termed the laws of nature. And all these are
contained in that part of this book which I entitle _Liberty_.
These grounds thus laid, I show further what civil government, and
the supreme power in it, and the divers kinds of it are; by what
means it becomes so; and what rights particular men, who intend to
constitute this civil government, must so necessarily transfer from
themselves on the supreme power, whether it be one man or an
assembly of men, that, except they do so, it will evidently appear
to be no civil government, but the rights which all men have to all
things, that is, the rights of war will still remain. Next I
distinguish the divers kinds of it, to wit, monarchy, aristocracy,
democracy; and paternal dominion, and that of masters over their
servants. I declare how they are constituted, and I compare their
several conveniences and inconveniences, each with other.
Furthermore, I unfold what those things are which destroy it, and
what his or their duty is, who rule in chief. Last of all, I
explicate the natures of law and of sin; and I distinguish law from
counsel, from compact, from that which I call right. All which I
comprehend under the title of _Dominion_.
In the last part of it, which is entitled _Religion_, lest that
right, which by strong reason, in the preceding discourse, I had
confirmed the sovereign powers to have over their subjects, might
seem to be repugnant to the sacred Scriptures; I show, in the first
place, how it repugns not the divine right, for as much as God
overrules all rulers by nature, that is, by the dictates of natural
reason. In the second, forasmuch as God himself had a peculiar
dominion over the Jews, by virtue of that ancient covenant of
circumcision. In the third, because God doth now rule over us
Christians, by virtue of our covenant of baptism. And therefore the
authority of rulers in chief, or of civil government, is not at all,
we see, contrary to religion.
In the last place, I declare what duties are necessarily required
from us, to enter into the _kingdom of heaven_. And of those I
plainly demonstrate, and conclude out of evident testimonies of holy
writ according to the interpretation made by all, that the
obedience, which I have affirmed to be due from particular Christian
subjects unto their Christian princes, cannot possibly in the least
sort be repugnant unto Christian religion.
You have seen my method: receive now the reason which moved me to
write this. I was studying philosophy for my mind sake, and I had
gathered together its first elements in all kinds; and having
digested them into three sections by degrees, I thought to have
written them, so as in the first I would have treated of _body_ and
its general properties; in the second of _man_ and his special
faculties and affections; in the third, of _civil government_ and
the duties of subjects. Wherefore the first section would have
contained _the first philosophy_, and certain elements of physic; in
it we would have considered the reasons of _time_, _place_, _cause_,
_power_, _relation_, _proportion_, _quantity_, _figure_, and
_motion_. In the second, we would have been conversant about
_imagination_, _memory_, _intellect_, _ratiocination_, _appetite_,
_will_, _good_ and _evil_, _honest_ and _dishonest_, and the like.
What this last section handles, I have now already showed you.
Whilst I contrive, order, pensively and slowly compose these
matters; (for I only do reason, I dispute not); it so happened in
the interim, that my country, some few years before the civil wars
did rage, was boiling hot with questions concerning the rights of
dominion and the obedience due from subjects, the true forerunners
of an approaching war; and was the cause which, all those other
matters deferred, ripened and plucked from me this third part.
Therefore it happens, that what was last in order, is yet come forth
first in time. And the rather, because I saw that, grounded on its
own principles sufficiently known by experience, it would not stand
in need of the former sections. Yet I have not made it out of a
desire of praise: although if I had, I might have defended myself
with this fair excuse, that very few do things laudably, who are not
affected with commendation: but for your sakes, readers, who I
persuaded myself, when you should rightly apprehend and thoroughly
understand this doctrine I here present you with, would rather
choose to brook with patience some inconveniences under government,
(because human affairs cannot possibly be without some), than
self-opiniatedly disturb the quiet of the public; that, weighing the
justice of those things you are about, not by the persuasion and
advice of private men, but by the laws of the realm, you will no
longer suffer ambitious men through the streams of your blood to
wade to their own power; that you will esteem it better to enjoy
yourselves in the present state, though perhaps not the best, than
by waging war endeavour to procure a reformation for other men in
another age, yourselves in the meanwhile either killed or consumed
with age. Furthermore, for those who will not acknowledge themselves
subject to the civil magistrate, and will be exempt from all public
burthens, and yet will live under his jurisdiction, and look for
protection from the violence and injuries of others, that you would
not look on them as fellow-subjects, but esteem them for enemies and
spies; and that ye rashly admit not for God’s word all which, either
openly or privately, they shall pretend to be so. I say more
plainly, if any preacher, confessor, or casuist, shall but say that
this doctrine is agreeable with God’s word, namely, that the chief
ruler, nay, any private man may lawfully be put to death without the
chief’s command, or that subjects may resist, conspire, or covenant
against the supreme power; that ye by no means believe them, but
instantly declare their names. He who approves of these reasons,
will also like my intentions in writing this book.
Last of all, I have propounded to myself this rule through this
whole discourse. First, not to define aught which concerns the
justice of single actions, but leave them to be determined by the
laws. Next, not to dispute the laws of any government in special,
that is, not to point which are the laws of any country, but to
declare what the laws of all countries are. Thirdly, not to seem of
opinion, that there is a less proportion of obedience due to an
_aristocracy_ or _democracy_ than a _monarchy_. For though I have
endeavoured, by arguments in my tenth chapter, to gain a belief in
men, that monarchy is the most commodious government; which one
thing alone I confess in this whole book not to be demonstrated, but
only probably stated; yet every where I expressly say, that in all
kind of government whatsoever there ought to be a supreme and equal
power. Fourthly, not in anywise to dispute the positions of divines,
except those which strip subjects of their obedience, and shake the
foundations of civil government. Lastly, lest I might imprudently
set forth somewhat of which there would be no need, what I had thus
written I would not presently expose to the public. Wherefore I got
some few copies privately dispersed among some of my friends; that
discrying the opinions of others, if any things appeared erroneous,
hard, or obscure, I might correct, soften and explain them.
These things I found most bitterly excepted against. That I had
made the civil powers too large; but this by ecclesiastical
persons. That I had utterly taken away liberty of conscience; but
this by sectaries. That I had set princes above the civil laws;
but this by lawyers. Wherefore I was not much moved by these men’s
reprehensions, as who in doing this, did but do their own
business; except it were to tie those knots somewhat faster.
But for their sakes who have a little been staggered at the
principles themselves, to wit, the nature of men, the authority or
right of nature, the nature of compacts and contracts, and the
original of civil government; because in finding fault they have not
so much followed their passions, as their common-sense, I have
therefore in some places added some annotations, whereby I presumed
I might give some satisfaction to their differing thoughts. Lastly,
I have endeavoured to offend none, beside those whose principles
these contradict, and whose tender minds are lightly offended by
every difference of opinions.
Wherefore, if ye shall meet with some things which have more of
sharpness, and less of certainty than they ought to have, since they
are not so much spoken for the maintenance of parties as the
establishment of peace, and by one whose just grief for the present
calamities of his country may very charitably be allowed some
liberty; it is his only request to ye, Readers, ye will deign to
receive them with an equal mind.
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THE INDEX.
---
OF LIBERTY.
CHAP. PAGE
1. Of the state of men without civil society 1
2. Of the law of nature concerning contracts 14
3. Of the other laws of nature 29
4. That the law of nature is a divine law 59
OF DOMINION.
5. Of the causes and first original of civil 63
government
6. Of the right, whether we consider it in an 71
assembly or in one person, which he hath who is
endued with supreme authority
7. Of the three kinds of government, Democracy, 92
Aristocracy, and Monarchy
8. Of the right which lords and masters have over 108
their servants
9. Of the right which parents have over their 114
children, and of a kingdom paternal
10. A comparison of the three kinds of government, 126
each with other, according to the inconveniences
of each one
11. The places and examples of Scripture concerning 143
the right of government, which make for proof of
the foresaid doctrines
12. Of the inward causes which dissolve all civil 149
government
13. Of the duties of those men who sit at the helm of 165
state
14. Of laws and sins 182
OF RELIGION.
15. Of God’s government by nature 201
16. Of his government by the old covenant 226
17. Of his government by the new covenant 250
18. Of those things which are necessary for our 298
entrance into the kingdom of heaven
PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS
OF
A TRUE CITIZEN.
---
LIBERTY.
---
CHAPTER I.
OF THE STATE OF MEN WITHOUT CIVIL SOCIETY.
1. The Introduction. 2. That the beginning of civil society is from
mutual fear. 3. That men by nature are all equal. 4. Whence the
will of mischieving each other ariseth. 5. The discord arising
from comparison of wits. 6. From the appetite many have to the
same thing. 7. The definition of _right_. 8. A right to the end,
gives a right to the means necessary to that end. 9. By the
right of nature, every man is judge of the means which tend to
his own preservation. 10. By nature all men have equal right to
all things. 11. This right which all men have to all things, is
unprofitable. 12. The state of men without civil society, is a
mere state of war: the definitions of _peace_ and _war_. 13. War
is an adversary to man’s preservation. 14. It is lawful for any
man, by natural right, to compel another whom he hath gotten in
his power, to give caution of his future obedience. 15. Nature
dictates the seeking after peace.
[Sidenote: Introduction.]
The faculties of human nature may be reduced unto four kinds; bodily
strength, experience, reason, passion. Taking the beginning of this
following doctrine from these, we will declare, in the first place,
what manner of inclinations men who are endued with these faculties
bear towards each other, and whether, and by what faculty they are
born apt for society, and to preserve themselves against mutual
violence; then proceeding, we will shew what advice was necessary to
be taken for this business, and what are the conditions of society,
or of human peace; that is to say, (changing the words only), what
are the fundamental _laws of nature_.
[Sidenote: That the beginning of mutual society is from fear.]
2. The greatest part of those men who have written aught concerning
commonwealths, either suppose, or require us or beg of us to
believe, that man is a creature born fit[1] for society. The Greeks
call him πολιτικον; and on this foundation they so build up the
doctrine of civil society, as if for the preservation of peace, and
the government of mankind, there were nothing else necessary than
that men should agree to make certain covenants and conditions
together, which themselves should then call laws. Which axiom,
though received by most, is yet certainly false; and an error
proceeding from our too slight contemplation of human nature. For
they who shall more narrowly look into the causes for which men come
together, and delight in each other’s company, shall easily find
that this happens not because naturally it could happen no
otherwise, but by accident. For if by nature one man should love
another, that is, as man, there could no reason be returned why
every man should not equally love every man, as being equally man;
or why he should rather frequent those, whose society affords him
honour or profit. We do not therefore by nature seek society for its
own sake, but that we may receive some honour or profit from it;
these we desire primarily, that secondarily. How, by what advice,
men do meet, will be best known by observing those things which they
do when they are met. For if they meet for traffic, it is plain
every man regards not his fellow, but his business; if to discharge
some office, a certain market-friendship is begotten, which hath
more of jealousy in it than true love, and whence factions sometimes
may arise, but good will never; if for pleasure and recreation of
mind, every man is wont to please himself most with those things
which stir up laughter, whence he may, according to the nature of
that which is ridiculous, by comparison of another man’s defects and
infirmities, pass the more current in his own opinion. And although
this be sometimes innocent and without offence, yet it is manifest
they are not so much delighted with the society, as their own vain
glory. But for the most part, in these kinds of meeting we wound the
absent; their whole life, sayings, actions are examined, judged,
condemned. Nay, it is very rare but some present receive a fling as
soon as they part; so as his reason was not ill, who was wont always
at parting to go out last. And these are indeed the true delights of
society, unto which we are carried by nature, that is, by those
passions which are incident to all creatures, until either by sad
experience or good precepts it so fall out, which in many it never
happens, that the appetite of present matters be dulled with the
memory of things past: without which the discourse of most quick and
nimble men on this subject, is but cold and hungry.
Footnote 1:
_Born fit._] Since we now see actually a constituted society among
men, and none living out of it, since we discern all desirous of
congress and mutual correspondence, it may seem a wonderful kind
of stupidity, to lay in the very threshold of this doctrine such a
stumbling block before the reader, as to deny _man to be born fit
for society_. Therefore I must more plainly say, that it is true
indeed, that to man by nature, or as man, that is, as soon as he
is born, solitude is an enemy; for infants have need of others to
help them to live, and those of riper years to help them to live
well. Wherefore I deny not that men (even nature compelling)
desire to come together. But civil societies are not mere
meetings, but bonds, to the making whereof faith and compacts are
necessary; the virtue whereof to children and fools, and the
profit whereof to those who have not yet tasted the miseries which
accompany its defects, is altogether unknown; whence it happens,
that those, because they know not what society is, cannot enter
into it; these, because ignorant of the benefit it brings, care
not for it. Manifest therefore it is, that all men, because they
are born in infancy, are born unapt for society. Many also,
perhaps most men, either through defect of mind or want of
education, remain unfit during the whole course of their lives;
yet have they, infants as well as those of riper years, a human
nature. Wherefore man is made fit for society not by nature, but
by education. Furthermore, although man were born in such a
condition as to desire it, it follows not, that he therefore were
born fit to enter into it. For it is one thing to desire, another
to be in capacity fit for what we desire; for even they, who
through their pride, will not stoop to equal conditions, without
which there can be no society, do yet desire it.
But if it so happen, that being met they pass their time in relating
some stories, and one of them begins to tell one which concerns
himself; instantly every one of the rest most greedily desires to
speak of himself too; if one relate some wonder, the rest will tell
you miracles, if they have them; if not, they will feign them.
Lastly, that I may say somewhat of them who pretend to be wiser than
others: if they meet to talk of philosophy, look, how many men, so
many would be esteemed masters, or else they not only love not their
fellows, but even persecute them with hatred. So clear is it by
experience to all men who a little more narrowly consider human
affairs, that all free congress ariseth either from mutual poverty,
or from vain glory, whence the parties met endeavour to carry with
them either some benefit, or to leave behind them that same
εὐδοκιμεῖν, some esteem and honour with those, with whom they have
been conversant. The same is also collected by reason out of the
definitions themselves of _will_, _good_, _honour_, _profitable_.
For when we voluntarily contract society, in all manner of society
we look after the object of the will, that is, that which every one
of those who gather together, propounds to himself for good. Now
whatsoever seems good, is pleasant, and relates either to the
senses, or the mind. But all the mind’s pleasure is either glory,
(or to have a good opinion of one’s self), or refers to glory in the
end; the rest are sensual, or conducing to sensuality, which may be
all comprehended under the word _conveniences_. All society
therefore is either for gain, or for glory; that is, not so much for
love of our fellows, as for the love of ourselves. But no society
can be great or lasting, which begins from vain glory. Because that
glory is like honour; if all men have it no man hath it, for they
consist in comparison and precellence. Neither doth the society of
others advance any whit the cause of my glorying in myself; for
every man must account himself, such as he can make himself without
the help of others. But though the benefits of this life may be much
furthered by mutual help; since yet those may be better attained to
by dominion than by the society of others, I hope no body will
doubt, but that men would much more greedily be carried by nature,
if all fear were removed, to obtain dominion, than to gain society.
We must therefore resolve, that the original of all great and
lasting societies consisted not in the mutual good will men had
towards each other, but in the mutual fear[2] they had of each
other.
Footnote 2:
_The mutual fear._] It is objected: it is so improbable that men
should grow into civil societies out of fear, that if they had
been afraid, they would not have endured each others looks. They
presume, I believe, that to fear is nothing else than to be
affrighted. I comprehend in this word _fear_, a certain foresight
of future evil; neither do I conceive flight the sole property of
fear, but to distrust, suspect, take heed, provide so that they
may not fear, is also incident to the fearful. They who go to
sleep, shut their doors; they who travel, carry their swords with
them, because they fear thieves. Kingdoms guard their coasts and
frontiers with forts and castles; cities are compact with walls;
and all for fear of neighbouring kingdoms and towns. Even the
strongest armies, and most accomplished for fight, yet sometimes
parley for peace, as fearing each others power, and lest they
might be overcome. It is through fear that men secure themselves
by flight indeed, and in corners, if they think they cannot escape
otherwise; but for the most part, by arms and defensive weapons;
whence it happens, that daring to come forth they know each
other’s spirits. But then if they fight, civil society ariseth
from the victory; if they agree, from their agreement.
[Sidenote: That men by nature are all equal.]
3. The cause of mutual fear consists partly in the natural equality
of men, partly in their mutual will of hurting: whence it comes to
pass, that we can neither expect from others, nor promise to
ourselves the least security. For if we look on men full-grown, and
consider how brittle the frame of our human body is, which
perishing, all its strength, vigour, and wisdom itself perisheth
with it; and how easy a matter it is, even for the weakest man to
kill the strongest: there is no reason why any man, trusting to his
own strength, should conceive himself made by nature above others.
They are equals, who can do equal things one against the other; but
they who can do the greatest things, namely, kill, can do equal
things. All men therefore among themselves are by nature equal; the
inequality we now discern, hath its spring from the civil law.
[Sidenote: Whence the will of mischieving each other ariseth.]
4. All men in the state of nature have a desire and will to hurt,
but not proceeding from the same cause, neither equally to be
condemned. For one man, according to that natural equality which is
among us, permits as much to others as he assumes to himself; which
is an argument of a temperate man, and one that rightly values his
power. Another, supposing himself above others, will have a license
to do what he lists, and challenges respect and honour, as due to
him before others; which is an argument of a fiery spirit. This
man’s will to hurt ariseth from vain glory, and the false esteem he
hath of his own strength; the other’s from the necessity of
defending himself, his liberty, and his goods, against this man’s
violence.
[Sidenote: The discord arising from comparison of wits.]
5. Furthermore, since the combat of wits is the fiercest, the
greatest discords which are, must necessarily arise from this
contention. For in this case it is not only odious to contend
against, but also not to consent. For not to approve of what a man
saith, is no less than tacitly to accuse him of an error in that
thing which he speaketh: as in very many things to dissent, is as
much as if you accounted him a fool whom you dissent from. Which may
appear hence, that there are no wars so sharply waged as between
sects of the same religion, and factions of the same commonweal,
where the contestation is either concerning doctrines or politic
prudence. And since all the pleasure and jollity of the mind
consists in this, even to get some, with whom comparing, it may find
somewhat wherein to triumph and vaunt itself; it is impossible but
men must declare sometimes some mutual scorn and contempt, either by
laughter, or by words, or by gesture, or some sign or other; than
which there is no greater vexation of mind, and than from which
there cannot possibly arise a greater desire to do hurt.
[Sidenote: From the appetite many have to the same thing.]
6. But the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other,
ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to
the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in
common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must
have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword.
[Sidenote: The definition of right.]
7. Among so many dangers therefore, as the natural lusts of men do
daily threaten each other withal, to have a care of one’s self is so
far from being a matter scornfully to be looked upon, that one has
neither the power nor wish to have done otherwise. For every man is
desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but
chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and this he
doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a
stone moves downward. It is therefore neither absurd nor
reprehensible, neither against the dictates of true reason, for a
man to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his body and
the members thereof from death and sorrows. But that which is not
contrary to right reason, that all men account to be done justly,
and with right. Neither by the word _right_ is anything else
signified, than that liberty which every man hath to make use of his
natural faculties according to right reason. Therefore the first
foundation of natural right is this, that _every man as much as in
him lies endeavour to protect his life and members_.
[Sidenote: A right to the end gives also a right to the means.]
8. But because it is in vain for a man to have a right to the end,
if the right to the necessary means be denied him, it follows, that
since every man hath a right to preserve himself, he must also be
allowed a right _to use all the means, and do all the actions,
without which he cannot preserve himself_.
[Sidenote: By the right of nature, every man is judge of the means
which tend to his preservation.]
9. Now whether the means which he is about to use, and the action he
is performing, be necessary to the preservation of his life and
members or not, he himself, by the right of nature, must be judge.
For if it be contrary to right reason that I should judge of mine
own peril, say, that another man is judge. Why now, because he
judgeth of what concerns me, by the same reason, because we are
equal by nature, will I judge also of things which do belong to him.
Therefore it agrees with right reason, that is, it is the right of
nature that I judge of his opinion, that is, whether it conduce to
my preservation or not.
[Sidenote: By right of nature, all men have equal right to all
things.]
10. Nature hath given to _every one a right to all_; that is, it was
lawful for every man, in the bare state of nature,[3] or before such
time as men had engaged themselves by any covenants or bonds, to do
what he would, and against whom he thought fit, and to possess, use,
and enjoy all what he would, or could get. Now because whatsoever a
man would, it therefore seems good to him because he wills it, and
either it really doth, or at least seems to him to contribute
towards his preservation, (but we have already allowed him to be
judge, in the foregoing article, whether it doth or not, insomuch as
we are to hold all for necessary whatsoever he shall esteem so), and
by the 7th article it appears that by the right of nature those
things may be done, and must be had, which necessarily conduce to
the protection of life and members, it follows, that in the state of
nature, to have all, and do all, is lawful for all. And this is that
which is meant by that common saying, _nature hath given all to
all_. From whence we understand likewise, that in the state of
nature profit is the measure of right.
Footnote 3:
_In the bare state of nature._ This is thus to be understood: what
any man does in the bare state of nature, is injurious to no man;
not that in such a state he cannot offend God, or break the laws
of nature; for injustice against men presupposeth human laws, such
as in the state of nature there are none. Now the truth of this
proposition thus conceived, is sufficiently demonstrated to the
mindful reader in the articles immediately foregoing; but because
in certain cases the difficulty of the conclusion makes us forget
the premises, I will contract this argument, and make it most
evident to a single view. Every man hath right to protect himself,
as appears by the seventh article. The same man therefore hath a
right to use all the means which necessarily conduce to this end,
by the eighth article. But those are the necessary means which he
shall judge to be such, by the ninth article. He therefore hath a
right to make use of, and to do all whatsoever he shall judge
requisite for his preservation; wherefore by the judgment of him
that doth it, the thing done is either right or wrong, and
therefore right. True it is therefore in the bare state of nature,
&c. But if any man pretend somewhat to tend necessarily to his
preservation, which yet he himself doth not confidently believe
so, he may offend against the laws of nature, as in the third
chapter of this book is more at large declared. It hath been
objected by some: if a son kill his father, doth he him no injury?
I have answered, that a son cannot be understood to be at any time
in the state of nature, as being under the power and command of
them to whom he owes his protection as soon as ever he is born,
namely, either his father’s or his mother’s, or him that nourished
him; as is demonstrated in the ninth chapter.
[Sidenote: The right of all to all is unprofitable.]
11. But it was the least benefit for men thus to have a common right
to all things. For the effects of this right are the same, almost,
as if there had been no right at all. For although any man might say
of every thing, _this is mine_, yet could he not enjoy it, by reason
of his neighbour, who having equal right and equal power, would
pretend the same thing to be his.
[Sidenote: The state of men without society is a state of war.]
12. If now to this natural proclivity of men, to hurt each other,
which they derive from their passions, but chiefly from a vain
esteem of themselves, you add, the right of all to all, wherewith
one by right invades, the other by right resists, and whence arise
perpetual jealousies and suspicions on all hands, and how hard a
thing it is to provide against an enemy invading us with an
intention to oppress and ruin, though he come with a small number,
and no great provision; it cannot be denied but that the natural
state of men, before they entered into society, was a mere war, and
that not simply, but a war of all men against all men. [Sidenote:
The definition of war and peace.]For what is WAR, but that same time
in which the will of contesting by force is fully declared, either
by words or deeds? The time remaining is termed PEACE.
[Sidenote: War is an adversary to man’s preservation.]
13. But it is easily judged how disagreeable a thing to the
preservation either of mankind, or of each single man, a perpetual
war is. But it is perpetual in its own nature; because in regard of
the equality of those that strive, it cannot be ended by victory.
For in this state the conqueror is subject to so much danger, as it
were to be accounted a miracle, if any, even the most strong, should
close up his life with many years and old age. They of America are
examples hereof, even in this present age: other nations have been
in former ages; which now indeed are become civil and flourishing,
but were then few, fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty, and deprived of
all that pleasure and beauty of life, which peace and society are
wont to bring with them. Whosoever therefore holds, that it had been
best to have continued in that state in which all things were lawful
for all men, he contradicts himself. For every man by natural
necessity desires that which is good for him: nor is there any that
esteems a war of all against all, which necessarily adheres to such
a state, to be good for him. And so it happens, that through fear of
each other we think it fit to rid ourselves of this condition, and
to get some fellows; that if there needs must be war, it may not yet
be against all men, nor without some helps.
[Sidenote: That by the right of nature, it is lawful for any man to
compel him whom he hath in his power, to give him caution
for his future obedience.]
14. Fellows are gotten either by constraint, or by consent; by
constraint, when after fight the conqueror makes the conquered serve
him, either through fear of death, or by laying fetters on him: by
consent, when men enter into society to help each other, both
parties consenting without any constraint. But the conqueror may by
right compel the conquered, or the strongest the weaker, (as a man
in health may one that is sick, or he that is of riper years a
child), unless he will choose to die, to give caution of his future
obedience. For since the right of protecting ourselves according to
our own wills, proceeded from our danger, and our danger from our
equality, it is more consonant to reason, and more certain for our
conservation, using the present advantage to secure ourselves by
taking caution, than when they shall be full grown and strong, and
got out of our power, to endeavour to recover that power again by
doubtful fight. And on the other side, nothing can be thought more
absurd, than by discharging whom you already have weak in your
power, to make him at once both an enemy and a strong one. From
whence we may understand likewise as a corollary in the natural
state of men, that _a sure and irresistible power confers the right
of dominion and ruling over those who cannot resist_; insomuch, as
the right of all things that can be done, adheres essentially and
immediately unto this omnipotence hence arising.
[Sidenote: Nature dictates the seeking after peace.]
15. Yet cannot men expect any lasting preservation, continuing thus
in the state of nature, that is, of war, by reason of that equality
of power, and other human faculties they are endued withal.
Wherefore to seek peace, where there is any hopes of obtaining it,
and where there is none, to enquire out for auxiliaries of war, is
the dictate of right reason, that is, the law of nature; as shall be
showed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER II
OF THE LAW OF NATURE CONCERNING CONTRACTS.
1. That the law of nature is not an agreement of men, but the
dictate of reason. 2. That the fundamental law of nature, is to
seek peace, where it may be had, and where not, to defend
ourselves. 3. That the first special law of nature, is not to
retain our right to all things. 4. What it is to quit our right:
what to transfer it. 5. That in the transferring of our right,
the will of him that receives it is necessarily required. 6. No
words but those of the present tense, transfer any right. 7.
Words of the future, if there be some other tokens to signify
the will, are valid in the translation of right. 8. In matters
of free gift, our right passeth not from us through any words of
the future. 9. The definition of contract and compact. 10. In
compacts, our right passeth from us through words of the future.
11. Compacts of mutual faith, in the state of nature are of no
effect and vain; but not so in civil government. 12. That no man
can make compacts with beasts, nor yet with God without
revelation. 13. Nor yet make a vow to God. 14. That compacts
oblige not beyond our utmost endeavour. 15. By what means we are
freed from our compacts. 16. That promises extorted through fear
of death, in the state of nature are valid. 17. A later compact
contradicting the former, is invalid. 18. A compact not to
resist him that shall prejudice my body, is invalid. 19. A
compact to accuse one’s self, is invalid. 20. The definition of
swearing. 21. That swearing is to be conceived in that form
which he useth that takes the oath. 22. An oath superadds
nothing to the obligation which is made by compact. 23. An oath
ought not to be pressed, but where the breach of compacts may be
kept private, or cannot be punished but from God himself.
[Sidenote: That the law of nature is not an agreement of men, but
the dictate of reason.]
1. All authors agree not concerning the definition of _the natural
law_, who notwithstanding do very often make use of this term in
their writings. The method therefore wherein we begin from
definitions and exclusion of all equivocation, is only proper to
them who leave no place for contrary disputes. For the rest, if any
man say that somewhat is done against the law of nature, one proves
it hence; because it was done against the general agreement of all
the most wise and learned nations: but this declares not who shall
be the judge of the wisdom and learning of all nations. Another
hence, that it was done against the general consent of all mankind;
which definition is by no means to be admitted. For then it were
impossible for any but children and fools, to offend against such a
law; for sure, under the notion of mankind, they comprehend all men
actually endued with reason. These therefore either do nought
against it, or if they do aught, it is without their own consent,
and therefore ought to be excused. But to receive the laws of nature
from the consents of them who oftener break than observe them, is in
truth unreasonable. Besides, men condemn the same things in others,
which they approve in themselves; on the other side, they publicly
commend what they privately condemn; and they deliver their opinions
more by hearsay, than any speculation of their own; and they accord
more through hatred of some object, through fear, hope, love, or
some other perturbation of mind, than true reason. And therefore it
comes to pass, that whole bodies of people often do those things
with the greatest unanimity and earnestness, which those writers
most willingly acknowledge to be against the law of nature. But
since all do grant, that is done by _right_, which is not done
against reason, we ought to judge those actions only _wrong_, which
are repugnant to right reason, that is, which contradict some
certain truth collected by right reasoning from true principles. But
that which is done _wrong_, we say it is done against some law.
Therefore _true reason_ is a certain _law_; which, since it is no
less a part of human nature, than any other faculty or affection of
the mind, is also termed natural. Therefore the _law of nature_,
that I may define it, is the dictate of right reason,[4] conversant
about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the
constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies.
Footnote 4:
_Right reason._] By right reason in the natural state of men, I
understand not, as many do, an infallible faculty, but the act of
reasoning, that is, the peculiar and true ratiocination of every
man concerning those actions of his, which may either redound to
the damage or benefit of his neighbours. I call it peculiar,
because although in a civil government the reason of the supreme,
that is, the civil law, is to be received by each single subject
for the right; yet being without this civil government, in which
state no man can know right reason from false, but by comparing it
with his own, every man’s own reason is to be accounted, not only
the rule of his own actions, which are done at his own peril, but
also for the measure of another man’s reason, in such things as do
concern him. I call it true, that is, concluding from true
principles rightly framed, because that the whole breach of the
laws of nature consists in the false reasoning, or rather folly of
those men, who see not those duties they are necessarily to
perform towards others in order to their own conservation. But the
principles of right reasoning about such like duties, are those
which are explained in the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth,
and seventh articles of the first chapter.
[Sidenote: That the fundamental law of nature, is to seek peace
where it may be had, and, where not, to defend
ourselves.]
2. But the first and fundamental law of nature is, _that peace is to
be sought after, where it may be found; and where not, there to
provide ourselves for helps of war_. For we showed in the last
article of the foregoing chapter, that this precept is the dictate
of right reason; but that the dictates of right reason are natural
laws, that hath been newly proved above. But this is the first,
because the rest are derived from this, and they direct the ways
either to peace or self-defence.
[Sidenote: The first special law of nature is, that our rights to
all things ought not to be retained.]
3. But one of the natural laws derived from this fundamental one is
this: _that the right of all men to all things ought not to be
retained; but that some certain rights ought to be transferred or
relinquished_. For if every one should retain his right to all
things, it must necessarily follow, that some by right might invade,
and others, by the same right, might defend themselves against them.
For every man by natural necessity endeavours to defend his body,
and the things which he judgeth necessary towards the protection of
his body. Therefore war would follow. He therefore acts against the
reason of peace, that is, against the law of nature, whosoever he
be, that doth not part with his right to all things.
[Sidenote: What it is to quit our right: what to convey it.]
4. But he is said to part with his right, who either absolutely
renounceth it, or conveys it to another. He absolutely renounceth
it, who by some sufficient sign or meet tokens declares, that he is
willing that it shall never be lawful for him to do that again,
which before _by right_ he might have done. But he conveys it to
another, who by some sufficient sign or meet tokens declares to that
other, that he is willing it should be unlawful for him to resist
him, in going about to do somewhat in the performance whereof he
might before _with right_ have resisted him. But that the conveyance
of right consists merely in not resisting, is understood by this,
that before it was conveyed, he to whom he conveyed it, had even
then also a right to all; whence he could not give any new right;
but the resisting right he had before he gave it, by reason whereof
the other could not freely enjoy his rights, is utterly abolished.
Whosoever therefore acquires some right in the natural state of men,
he only procures himself security and freedom from just molestation
in the enjoyment of his primitive right. As for example, if any man
shall sell or give away a farm, he utterly deprives himself only
from all right to this farm; but he does not so others also.
[Sidenote: The will of the receiver must necessarily be declared,
before the right be conveyed.]
5. But in the conveyance of right, the will is requisite not only of
him that conveys, but of him also that accepts it. If either be
wanting, the right remains. For if I would have given what was mine
to one who refused to accept of it, I have not therefore either
simply renounced my right, or conveyed it to any man. For the cause
which moved me to part with it to this man, was in him only, not in
others too.
[Sidenote: Words convey not, except they relate to the time
present.]
6. But if there be no other token extant of our will either to quit
or convey our right, but only words; those words must either relate
to the present or time past; for if they be of the future only, they
convey nothing. For example, he that speaks thus of the time to
come, _I will give to-morrow_, declares openly that yet he hath not
given it. So that all this day his right remains, and abides
to-morrow too, unless in the interim he actually bestows it: for
what is mine, remains mine till I have parted with it. But if I
shall speak of the time present, suppose thus; _I do give or have
given you this to be received to-morrow_: by these words is
signified that I have already given it, and that his right to
receive it to-morrow is conveyed to him by me to-day.
[Sidenote: Words of the future suffice to convey, if other
testimonies of our will be not wanting.]
7. Nevertheless, although words alone are not sufficient tokens to
declare the will; if yet to words relating to the future there shall
some other signs be added, they may become as valid as if they had
been spoken of the present. If therefore, as by reason of those
other signs, it appear that he that speaks of the future, intends
those words should be effectual toward the perfect transferring of
his right, they ought to be valid. For the conveyance of right
depends not on words, but, as hath been instanced in the fourth
article, on the declaration of the will.
[Sidenote: In matters of free gift, words of the future convey no
right.]
8. If any man convey some part of his right to another, and doth not
this for some certain benefit received, or for some compact, a
conveyance in this kind is called a gift or free donation. But in
free donation, those words only oblige us, which signify the present
or the time past; for if they respect the future, they oblige not as
_words_, for the reason given in the foregoing article. It must
needs therefore be, that the obligation arise from some other tokens
of the will. But, because whatsoever is voluntarily done, is done
for some good to him that wills it; there can no other token be
assigned of the will to give it, except some benefit either already
received, or to be acquired. But it is supposed that no such benefit
is acquired, nor any compact in being; for if so, it would cease to
be a free gift. It remains therefore, that a mutual good turn
without agreement be expected. But no sign can be given, that he,
who used future words toward him who was in no sort engaged to
return a benefit, should desire to have his words so understood as
to oblige himself thereby. Nor is it suitable to reason, that those
who are easily inclined to do well to others, should be obliged by
every promise, testifying their present good affection. And for this
cause, a promiser in this kind must be understood to have time to
deliberate, and power to change that affection, as well as he to
whom he made that promise, may alter his desert. But he that
deliberates, is so far forth free, nor can be said to have already
given. But if he promise often, and yet give seldom, he ought to be
condemned of levity, and be called not a donor, but doson.
[Sidenote: The definition of contract and covenant.]
9. But the act of two, or more, mutually conveying their rights, is
called a _contract_. But in every contract, either both parties
instantly perform what they contract for, insomuch as there is no
trust had from either to other; or the one performs, the other is
trusted; or neither perform. Where both parties perform presently,
there the contract is ended as soon as it is performed. But where
there is credit given, either to one or both, there the party
trusted promiseth after-performance; and this kind of promise is
called a _covenant_.
[Sidenote: In covenants, we pass away our rights by words signifying
the future.]
10. But the covenant made by the party trusted with him who hath
already performed, although the promise be made by words pointing at
the future, doth no less transfer the right of future time, than if
it had been made by words signifying the present or time past. For
the other’s performance is a most manifest sign that he so
understood the speech of him whom he trusted, as that he would
certainly make performance also at the appointed time; and by this
sign the party trusted knew himself to be thus understood; which
because he hindered not, was an evident token of his will to
perform. The promises therefore which are made for some benefit
received, which are also covenants, are tokens of the will; that is,
as in the foregoing section hath been declared, of the last act of
deliberating, whereby the liberty of non-performance is abolished,
and by consequence are obligatory. For where liberty ceaseth, there
beginneth obligation.
[Sidenote: Covenants, in the state of nature, are in vain and of
none effect: not so in civil government.]
11. But the covenants which are made in contract of mutual trust,
neither party performing out of hand, if there arise[5] a just
suspicion in either of them, are in the state of nature invalid. For
he that first performs, by reason of the wicked disposition of the
greatest part of men studying their own advantage either by right or
wrong, exposeth himself to the perverse will of him with whom he
hath contracted. For it suits not with reason, that any man should
perform first, if it be not likely that the other will make good his
promise after; which, whether it be probable or not, he that doubts
it must be judge of, as hath been showed in the foregoing chapter in
the ninth article. Thus, I say, things stand in the state of nature.
But in a civil state, when there is a power which can compel both
parties, he that hath contracted to perform first, must first
perform; because, that since the other may be compelled, the cause
which made him fear the other’s non-performance, ceaseth.
Footnote 5:
_Arise._] For, except there appear some new cause of fear, either
from somewhat done, or some other token of the will not to perform
from the other part, it cannot be judged to be a just fear; for
the cause which was not sufficient to keep him from making
compact, must not suffice to authorize the breach of it, being
made.
[Sidenote: That no man can make compacts with beasts; neither with
God, without revelation.]
12. But from this reason, that in all free gifts and compacts there
is an acceptance of the conveyance of right required: it follows
that no man can compact with him who doth not declare his
acceptance. And therefore we cannot compact with beasts, neither can
we give or take from them any manner of right, by reason of their
want of speech and understanding. Neither can any man covenant with
God, or be obliged to him by vow; except so far forth as it appears
to him by Holy Scriptures, that he hath substituted certain men who
have authority to accept of such-like vows and covenants, as being
in God’s stead.
[Sidenote: Nor yet vow to God.]
13. Those therefore do vow in vain, who are in the state of nature,
where they are not tied by any civil law, except, by most certain
revelation, the will of God to accept their vow or pact, be made
known to them. For if what they vow be contrary to the law of
nature, they are not tied by their vow; for no man is tied to
perform an unlawful act. But if what is vowed, be commanded by some
law of nature, it is not their vow, but the law itself which ties
them. But if he were free, before his vow, either to do it or not do
it, his liberty remains; because that the openly declared will of
the obliger is requisite to make an obligation by vow; which, in the
case propounded, is supposed not to be. Now I call him the obliger,
to whom any one is tied; and the obliged, him who is tied.
[Sidenote: Compacts oblige not beyond our utmost endeavours.]
14. Covenants are made of such things only as fall under our
deliberation. For it can be no covenant without the will of the
contractor. But the will is the last act of him who deliberates;
wherefore they only concern things _possible_ and _to come_. No man,
therefore, by his compact obligeth himself to an impossibility. But
yet, though we often covenant to do such things as then seemed
possible when we promised them, which yet afterward appear to be
impossible, are we not therefore freed from all obligation. The
reason whereof is, that he who promiseth a future, in certainty
receives a present benefit, on condition that he return another for
it. For his will, who performs the present benefit, hath simply
before it for its object a certain good, equally valuable with the
thing promised; but the thing itself not simply, but with condition
if it could be done. But if it should so happen, that even this
should prove impossible, why then he must perform as much as he can.
Covenants, therefore, oblige us not to perform just the thing itself
covenanted for, but our utmost endeavour; for this only is, the
things themselves are not in our power.
[Sidenote: In what manner we are freed from compacts.]
15. We are freed from covenants two ways, either by performing, or
by being forgiven. By performing, for beyond that we obliged not
ourselves. By being forgiven, because he whom we obliged ourselves
to, by forgiving is conceived to return us that right which we
passed over to him. For forgiving implies giving, that is, by the
fourth article of this chapter, a conveyance of right to him to whom
the gift is made.
[Sidenote: Promises forced from us through fear of death, are valid
in the state of nature.]
16. It is a usual question, whether compacts extorted from us
through fear, do oblige or not. For example, if, to redeem my life
from the power of a robber, I promise to pay him 100_l._ next day,
and that I will do no act whereby to apprehend and bring him to
justice: whether I am tied to keep promise or not. But though such a
promise must sometimes be judged to be of no effect, yet it is not
to be accounted so because it proceedeth from fear. For then it
would follow, that those promises which reduced men to a civil life,
and by which laws were made, might likewise be of none effect; (for
it proceeds from fear of mutual slaughter, that one man submits
himself to the dominion of another); and he should play the fool
finely, who should trust his captive covenanting with the price of
his redemption. It holds universally true, that promises do oblige,
when there is some benefit received, and when the promise, and the
thing promised, be lawful. But it is lawful, for the redemption of
my life, both to promise and to give what I will of mine own to any
man, even to a thief. We are obliged, therefore, by promises
proceeding from fear, except the civil law forbid them; by virtue
whereof, that which is promised becomes unlawful.
[Sidenote: A latter compact contradicting the former, is invalid.]
17. Whosoever shall contract with one to do or omit somewhat, and
shall after covenant the contrary with another, he maketh not the
former, but the latter contract unlawful. For he hath no longer
right to do or to omit aught, who by former contracts hath conveyed
it to another. Wherefore he can convey no right by latter contracts,
and what is promised is promised without right. He is therefore tied
only to his first contract, to break which is unlawful.
[Sidenote: A promise not to resist him that prejudices my body is
invalid.]
18. No man is obliged by any contracts whatsoever not to resist him
who shall offer to kill, wound, or any other way hurt his body. For
there is in every man a certain high degree of fear, through which
he apprehends that evil which is done to him to be the greatest; and
therefore by natural necessity he shuns it all he can, and it is
supposed he can do no otherwise. When a man is arrived to this
degree of fear, we cannot expect but he will provide for himself
either by flight or fight. Since therefore no man is tied to
impossibilities, they who are threatened either with death, (which
is the greatest evil to nature), or wounds, or some other bodily
hurts, and are not stout enough to bear them, are not obliged to
endure them. Furthermore, he that is tied by contract is trusted;
for faith only is the bond of contracts; but they who are brought to
punishment, either capital or more gentle, are fettered or strongly
guarded; which is a most certain sign that they seemed not
sufficiently bound from non-resistance by their contracts. It is one
thing, if I promise thus: if I do it not at the day appointed, kill
me. Another thing, if thus: if I do it not, though you should offer
to kill me, I will not resist. All men, if need be, contract the
first way, and there is need sometimes. This second way, none;
neither is it ever needful. For in the mere state of nature, if you
have a mind to kill, that state itself affords you a right; insomuch
as you need not first trust him, if for breach of trust you will
afterwards kill him. But in a civil state, where the right of life
and death and of all corporal punishment is with the supreme, that
same right of killing cannot be granted to any private person.
Neither need the supreme himself contract with any man patiently to
yield to his punishment; but only this, that no man offer to defend
others from him. If in the state of nature, as between two realms,
there should a contract be made on condition of killing if it were
not performed, we must presuppose another contract of not killing
before the appointed day. Wherefore on that day, if there be no
performance, the right of war returns, that is a hostile state, in
which all things are lawful, and therefore resistance also. Lastly,
by the contract of not resisting, we are obliged, of two evils to
make choice of that which seems the greater. For certain death is a
greater evil than fighting. But of two evils it is impossible not to
choose the least. By such a compact, therefore, we should be tied to
impossibilities; which is contrary to the very nature of compacts.
[Sidenote: The compact of self-accusation is invalid.]
19. Likewise no man is tied by any compacts whatsoever to accuse
himself, or any other, by whose damage he is like to procure himself
a bitter life. Wherefore neither is a father obliged to bear witness
against his son, nor a husband against his wife, nor a son against
his father, nor any man against any one by whose means he hath his
subsistence; for in vain is that testimony which is presumed to be
corrupted from nature. But although no man be tied to accuse himself
by any compact, yet in a public trial he may by torture be forced to
make answer. But such answers are no testimony of the fact, but
helps for the searching out of truth; so that whether the party
tortured his answer be true or false, or whether he answer not at
all, whatsoever he doth, he doth it by right.
[Sidenote: The definition of an oath.]
20. Swearing is a speech joined to a promise, whereby the promiser
declares his renouncing of God’s mercy, unless he perform his word.
Which definition is contained in the words themselves, which have in
them the very essence of an oath, to wit, _so God help me_, or other
equivalent, as with the Romans, _do thou Jupiter so destroy the
deceiver, as I slay this same beast_. Neither is this any let, but
that an oath may as well sometimes be affirmatory as promissory; for
he that confirms his affirmation with an oath, promiseth that he
speaks truth. But though in some places it was the fashion for
subjects to swear by their kings, that custom took its original
hence, that those kings took upon them divine honour. For oaths were
therefore introduced, that by religion and consideration of the
divine power, men might have a greater dread of breaking their
faiths, than that wherewith they fear men, from whose eyes their
actions may lie hid.
[Sidenote: The swearing must be conceived in that fashion which he
uses who takes it.]
21. Whence it follows that an oath must be conceived in that form,
which he useth who takes it; for in vain is any man brought to swear
by a God whom he believes not, and therefore neither fears him. For
though by the light of nature it may be known that there is a God,
yet no man thinks he is to swear by him in any other fashion, or by
any other name, than what is contained in the precepts of his own
proper, that is (as he who swears imagines) the true religion.
[Sidenote: Swearing adds nothing to the obligation which is by
compact.]
22. By the definition of an oath, we may understand that a bare
contract obligeth no less, than that to which we are sworn. For it
is the contract which binds us; the oath relates to the divine
punishment, which it could not provoke, if the breach of contract
were not in itself unlawful; but it could not be unlawful, if the
contract were not obligatory. Furthermore, he that renounceth the
mercy of God, obligeth himself not to any punishment; because it is
ever lawful to deprecate the punishment, howsoever provoked, and to
enjoy God’s pardon if it be granted. The only effect therefore of an
oath is this; to cause men, who are naturally inclined to break all
manner of faith, through fear of punishment to make the more
conscience of their words and actions.
[Sidenote: An oath is not to be pressed, but where the breach of
contract can either be kept private, or not be punished
but from God alone.]
23. To exact an oath where the breach of contract, if any be made,
cannot but be known, and where the party compacted withal wants not
power to punish, is to do somewhat more than is necessary unto
self-defence, and shews a mind desirous not so much to benefit
itself, as to prejudice another. For an oath, out of the very form
of swearing, is taken in order to the provocation of God’s anger,
that is to say, of him that is omnipotent, against those who
therefore violate their faith, because they think that by their own
strength they can escape the punishment of men; and of him that is
omniscient, against those who therefore usually break their trust,
because they hope that no man shall see them.
-------
CHAPTER III.
OF THE OTHER LAWS OF NATURE.
1. The second law of nature, is to perform contracts. 2. That trust
is to be held with all men without exception. 3. What injury is.
4. Injury can be done to none but those with whom we contract.
5. The distinction of justice into that of men, and that of
actions. 6. The distinction of commutative and distributive
justice examined. 7. No injury can be done to him that is
willing. 8. The third law of nature, concerning ingratitude. 9.
The fourth law of nature, that every man render himself useful.
10. The fifth law, of mercy. 11. The sixth law, that punishments
regard the future only. 12. The seventh law, against reproach.
13. The eighth law, against pride. 14. The ninth law, of
humility. 15. The tenth, of equity, or against acceptance of
persons. 16. The eleventh, of things to be had in common. 17.
The twelfth, of things to be divided by lot. 18. The thirteenth,
of birthright and first possession. 19. The fourteenth, of the
safeguard of them who are mediators for peace. 20. The
fifteenth, of constituting an umpire. 21. The sixteenth, that no
man is judge in his own cause. 22. The seventeenth, that umpires
must be without all hope of reward from those whose cause is to
be judged. 23. The eighteenth, of witnesses. 24. The nineteenth,
that there can no contract be made with the umpire. 25. The
twentieth, against gluttony, and all such things as hinder the
use of reason. 26. The rule by which we may presently know,
whether what we are doing be against the law of nature or not.
27. The laws of nature oblige only in the court of conscience.
28. The laws of nature are sometimes broke by doing things
agreeable to those laws. 29. The laws of nature are
unchangeable. 30. Whosoever endeavours to fulfil the laws of
nature, is a just man. 31. The natural and moral law are one.
32. How it comes to pass, that what hath been said of the laws
of nature, is not the same with what philosophers have delivered
concerning the virtues. 33. The law of nature is not properly a
law, but as it is delivered in Holy Writ.
[Sidenote: The second law of nature, to perform contracts.]
1. Another of the laws of nature is, to _perform contracts_, or _to
keep trust_. For it hath been showed in the foregoing chapter, that
the law of nature commands every man, as a thing necessary, to
obtain peace, to convey certain rights from each to other; and that
this, as often as it shall happen to be done, is called a contract.
But this is so far forth only conducible to peace, as we shall
perform ourselves what we contract with others shall be done or
omitted; and in vain would contacts be made, unless we stood to
them. Because therefore to stand to our covenants, or to keep faith,
is a thing necessary for the obtaining of peace; it will prove, by
the second article of the second chapter, to be a precept of the
natural law.
[Sidenote: That faith is to be kept with all men without exception.]
2. Neither is there in this matter any exception of the persons with
whom we contract; as if they keep no faith with others, or hold that
none ought to be kept, or are guilty of any other kind of vice. For
he that contracts, in that he doth contract, denies that action to
be in vain; and it is against reason for a knowing man to do a thing
in vain; and if he think himself not bound to keep it, in thinking
so he affirms the contract to be made in vain. He therefore who
contracts with one with whom he thinks he is not bound to keep
faith, he doth at once think a contract to be a thing done in vain,
and not in vain; which is absurd. Either therefore we must hold
trust with all men, or else not bargain with them; that is, either
there must be a declared war, or a sure and faithful peace.
[Sidenote: Injury defined.]
3. The breaking of a bargain, as also the taking back of a gift,
(which ever consists in some action or omission), is called an
injury. But that action or omission is called unjust; insomuch as an
injury, and an unjust action or omission, signify the same thing,
and both are the same with breach of contract and trust. And it
seems the word _injury_ came to be given to any action or omission,
because they were _without right_; he that acted or omitted, having
before conveyed his right to some other. And there is some likeness
between that which in the common course of life we call _injury_,
and that which in the Schools is usually called _absurd_. For even
as he who by arguments is driven to deny the assertion which he
first maintained, is said to be brought to an absurdity; in like
manner, he who through weakness of mind does or omits that which
before he had by contract promised not to do or omit, commits an
injury, and falls into no less contradiction than he who in the
Schools is reduced to an absurdity. For by contracting for some
future action, he wills it done; by not doing it, he wills it not
done: which is to will a thing done and not done at the same time,
which is a contradiction. An injury therefore is a kind of absurdity
in conversation, as an absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation.
[Sidenote: An injury can only be done to him with whom we contract.]
4. From these grounds it follows, that an injury can be done to no
man[6] but him with whom we enter covenant, or to whom somewhat is
made over by deed of gift, or to whom somewhat is promised by way of
bargain. And therefore damaging and injuring are often disjoined.
For if a master command his servant, who hath promised to obey him,
to pay a sum of money, or carry some present to a third man; the
servant, if he do it not, hath indeed damaged this third party, but
he injured his master only. So also in a civil government, if any
man offend another with whom he hath made no contract, he damages
him to whom the evil is done; but he injures none but him to whom
the power of government belongs. For if he who receives the hurt
should expostulate the mischief, he that did it should answer thus:
_what art thou to me; why should I rather do according to your than
mine own will, since I do not hinder but you may do your own, and
not my mind?_ In which speech, where there hath no manner of
pre-contract passed, I see not, I confess, what is reprehensible.
Footnote 6:
_Injury can be done to no man, &c._] The word _injustice_ relates
to some law: _injury_, to some person, as well as some law. For
what is unjust, is unjust to all; but there may an injury be done,
and yet not against me, nor thee, but some other; and sometimes
against no private person, but the magistrate only; sometimes also
neither against the magistrate, nor any private man, but only
against God. For through contract and conveyance of right, we say,
that an injury is done against this or that man. Hence it is,
which we see in all kind of government, that what private men
contract between themselves by word or writing, is released again
at the will of the obliger. But those mischiefs which are done
against the laws of the land, as theft, homicide, and the like,
are punished, not as he wills to whom the hurt is done, but
according to the will of the magistrate; that is, the constituted
laws.
[Sidenote: The distinction of justice into that of men and actions.]
5. These words, _just_ and _unjust_, as also _justice_ and
_injustice_, are equivocal; for they signify one thing when they are
attributed to persons, another when to actions. When they are
attributed to actions, _just_ signifies as much as what is done with
right, and _unjust_, as what is done with injury. He who hath done
some just thing, is not therefore said to be a _just_ person, but
_guiltless_; and he that hath done some unjust thing, we do not
therefore say he is an _unjust_, but _guilty_ man. But when the
words are applied to persons, _to be just_ signifies as much as to
be delighted in just dealing, to study how to do righteousness, or
to endeavour in all things to do that which is just; and _to be
unjust_ is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be
measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit. So
as the justice or injustice of the mind, the intention, or the man,
is one thing, that of an action or omission another; and innumerable
actions of a just man may be unjust, and of an unjust man, just. But
that man is to be accounted just, who doth just things because the
law commands it, unjust things only by reason of his infirmity; and
he is properly said to be unjust, who doth righteousness for fear of
the punishment annexed unto the law, and unrighteousness by reason
of the iniquity of his mind.
[Sidenote: The distinction of commutative and distributive justice,
examined.]
6. The justice of actions is commonly distinguished into two kinds,
commutative and distributive; the former whereof, they say, consists
in arithmetical, the latter in geometrical proportion; and that is
conversant in exchanging, in buying, selling, borrowing, lending,
location and conduction, and other acts whatsoever belonging to
contractors; where, if there be an equal return made, hence, they
say, springs a commutative justice: but this is busied about the
dignity and merits of men; so as if there be rendered to every man
κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, more to him who is more worthy, and less to him that
deserves less, and that proportionably; hence, they say, ariseth
distributive justice. I acknowledge here some certain distinction of
equality: to wit, that one is an equality simply so called; as when
two things of equal value are compared together, as a pound of
silver with twelve ounces of the same silver: the other is an
equality _secundum quod_; as when a thousand pounds is to be divided
to a hundred men, six hundred pounds are given to sixty men, and
four hundred to forty, where there is no equality between six
hundred and four hundred; but when it happens that there is the same
inequality in the number of them to whom it is distributed, every
one of them shall take an equal part, whence it is called an equal
distribution. But such like equality is the same thing with
geometrical proportion. But what is all this to justice? For neither
if I sell my goods for as much as I can get for them, do I injure
the buyer, who sought and desired them of me; neither if I divide
more of what is mine to him who deserves less, so long as I give the
other what I have agreed for, do I wrong to either. Which truth our
Saviour himself, being God, testifies in the Gospel. This therefore
is no distinction of justice, but of equality. Yet perhaps it cannot
be denied but that justice is a certain equality, as consisting in
this only; that since we are all equal by nature, one should not
arrogate more right to himself than he grants to another, unless he
have fairly gotten it by compact. And let this suffice to be spoken
against this distinction of justice, although now almost generally
received by all; lest any man should conceive an injury to be
somewhat else than the breach of faith or contract, as hath been
defined above.
[Sidenote: No injury can be done to him that is willing.]
7. It is an old saying, _volenti non fit injuria_, the willing man
receives no injury; yet the truth of it may be derived from our
principles. For grant that a man be willing that that should be done
which he conceives to be an injury to him; why then, that is done by
his will, which by contract was not lawful to be done. But he being
willing that should be done which was not lawful by contract, the
contract itself (by the fifteenth article of the foregoing chapter)
becomes void. The right therefore of doing it returns; therefore it
is done by right; wherefore it is no injury.
[Sidenote: The third law of nature, of ingratitude.]
8. The third precept of the natural law is, _that you suffer not him
to be the worse for you, who, out of the confidence he had in you,
first did you a good turn; or that you accept not a gift, but with a
mind to endeavour that the giver shall have no just occasion to
repent him of his gift_. For without this, he should act without
reason, that would confer a benefit where he sees it would be lost;
and by this means all beneficence and trust, together with all kind
of benevolence, would be taken from among men, neither would there
be aught of mutual assistance among them, nor any commencement of
gaining grace and favour; by reason whereof the state of war would
necessarily remain, contrary to the fundamental law of nature. But
because the breach of this law is not a breach of trust or contract,
(for we suppose no contracts to have passed among them), therefore
is it not usually termed an injury; but because good turns and
thanks have a mutual eye to each other, it is called _ingratitude_.
[Sidenote: The fourth law of nature, that every man render himself
useful.]
9. The fourth precept of nature is, _that every man render himself
useful unto others_: which that we may rightly understand, we must
remember that there is in men a diversity of dispositions to enter
into society, arising from the diversity of their affections, not
unlike that which is found in stones, brought together in the
building, by reason of the diversity of their matter and figure. For
as a stone, which in regard of its sharp and angular form takes up
more room from other stones than it fills up itself, neither because
of the hardness of its matter can it well be pressed together, or
easily cut, and would hinder the building from being fitly
compacted, is cast away, as not fit for use: so a man, for the
harshness of his disposition in retaining superfluities for himself,
and detaining of necessaries from others, and being incorrigible by
reason of the stubbornness of his affections, is commonly said to be
useless and troublesome unto others. Now, because each one not by
right only, but even by natural necessity, is supposed with all his
main might to intend the procurement of those things which are
necessary to his own preservation; if any man will contend on the
other side for superfluities, by his default there will arise a war;
because that on him alone there lay no necessity of contending; he
therefore acts against the fundamental law of nature. Whence it
follows, (which we were to show), that it is a precept of nature,
that every man accommodate himself to others. But he who breaks this
law may be called _useless_ and troublesome. Yet Cicero opposeth
_inhumanity_ to this _usefulness_, as having regard to this very
law.
[Sidenote: The fifth law of nature, of mercifulness.]
10. The fifth precept of the law of nature is, _that we must forgive
him who repents and asks pardon for what is past, having first taken
caution for the time to come_. The pardon of what is past, or the
remission of an offence, is nothing else but the granting of peace
to him that asketh it, after he hath warred against us, and now is
become penitent. But peace granted to him that repents not, that is,
to him that retains a hostile mind, or that gives not caution for
the future, that is, seeks not peace, but opportunity; is not
properly peace, but fear, and therefore is not commanded by nature.
Now to him that will not pardon the penitent and that gives future
caution, peace itself it seems is not pleasing: which is contrary to
the natural law.
[Sidenote: The sixth law, that punishments only regard the future.]
11. The sixth precept of the natural law is, _that in revenge and
punishments we must have our eye not at the evil past, but the
future good_: that is, it is not lawful to inflict punishment for
any other end, but that the offender may be corrected, or that
others warned by his punishment may become better. But this is
confirmed chiefly from hence, that each man is bound by the law of
nature to forgive one another, provided he give caution for the
future, as hath been showed in the foregoing article. Furthermore,
because revenge, if the time past be only considered, is nothing
else but a certain triumph and glory of mind, which points at no
end; for it contemplates only what is past, but the end is a thing
to come; but that which is directed to no end, is vain: that revenge
therefore which regards not the future, proceeds from vain glory,
and is therefore without reason. But to hurt another without reason,
introduces a war, and is contrary to the fundamental law of nature.
It is therefore a precept of the law of nature, that in revenge we
look not backwards, but forward. Now the breach of this law is
commonly called _cruelty_.
[Sidenote: The seventh law of nature, against slander.]
12. But because all signs of hatred and contempt provoke most of all
to brawling and fighting, insomuch as most men would rather lose
their lives (that I say not, their peace) than suffer slander; it
follows in the seventh place, that it is prescribed by the law of
nature, that no man, either by deeds or words, countenance or
laughter, _do declare himself to hate or scorn another_. The breach
of which law is called _reproach_. But although nothing be more
frequent than the scoffs and jeers of the powerful against the weak,
and namely, of judges against guilty persons, which neither relate
to the offence of the guilty, nor the duty of the judges; yet these
kind of men do act against the law of nature, and are to be esteemed
for contumelious.
[Sidenote: The eighth law, against pride.]
13. The question whether of two men be the more worthy, belongs not
to the natural, but civil state. For it hath been showed before
(Chap. I. Art. 3) that all men by nature are equal; and therefore
the inequality which now is, suppose from riches, power, nobility of
kindred, is come from the civil law. I know that Aristotle, in his
first book of Politics, affirms as a foundation of the whole
political science, that some men by nature are made worthy to
command, others only to serve; as if lord and servant were
distinguished not by consent of men, but by an aptness, that is, a
certain kind of natural knowledge or ignorance. Which foundation is
not only against reason, (as but now hath been showed), but also
against experience. For neither almost is any man so dull of
understanding as not to judge it better to be ruled by himself, than
to yield himself to the government of another; neither if the wiser
and stronger do contest, have these always or often the upper hand
of those. Whether therefore men be equal by nature, the equality is
to be acknowledged; or whether unequal, because they are like to
contest for dominion, it is necessary for the obtaining of peace,
_that they be esteemed as equal_; and therefore it is in the eighth
place a precept of the law of nature, _that every man be accounted
by nature equal to another_; the contrary to which law is _pride_.
[Sidenote: The ninth law, of humility.]
14. As it was necessary to the conservation of each man that he
should part with some of his rights, so it is no less necessary to
the same conservation that he retain some others, to wit, the right
of bodily protection, of free enjoyment of air, water, and all
necessaries for life. Since therefore many common rights are
retained by those who enter into a peaceable state, and that many
peculiar ones are also acquired, hence ariseth this ninth dictate of
the natural law, to wit, that what rights soever any man challenges
to himself, he also grant the same as due to all the rest; otherwise
he frustrates the equality acknowledged in the former article. For
what is it else to acknowledge an equality of persons in the making
up of society, but to attribute equal right and power to those whom
no reason would else engage to enter into society? But to ascribe
_equal things to equals_, is the same with giving things
_proportional_ to _proportionals_. The observation of this law is
called _meekness_, the violation πλεονεξὶα; the breakers by the
Latins are styled _immodici et immodesti_.
[Sidenote: The tenth law of equity, or against acceptance of
persons.]
15. In the tenth place it is commanded by the law of nature, _that
every man in dividing right to others, shew himself equal to either
party_. By the foregoing law we are forbidden to assume more right
by nature to ourselves, than we grant to others. We may take less if
we will; for that sometimes is an argument of modesty. But if at any
time matter of right be to be divided by us unto others, we are
forbidden by this law to favour one more or less than another. For
he that by favouring one before another observes not this natural
equality, reproaches him whom he thus undervalues: but it is
declared above, that a reproach is against the laws of nature. The
observance of this precept is called _equity_; the breach, _respect
of persons_. The Greeks in one word term it προσωποληψία.
[Sidenote: The eleventh law, of things to be had in common.]
16. From the foregoing law is collected this eleventh, _those things
which cannot be divided, must be used in common if they can, and if
the quantity of the matter permit, every man as much as he lists;
but if the quantity permit not, then with limitation, and
proportionally to the number of the users_. For otherwise that
equality can by no means be observed, which we have showed in the
foregoing article to be commanded by the law of nature.
[Sidenote: The twelfth law, of things to be divided by lot.]
17. Also what cannot be divided nor had in common, it is provided by
the law of nature, which may be the twelfth precept, _that the use
of that thing be either by turns, or adjudged to one only by lot;
and that in the using it by turns, it be also decided by lot, who
shall have the first use of it_. For here also regard is to be had
unto equality: but no other can be found but that of lot.
[Sidenote: The thirteenth law, of birthright and first possession.]
18. But all lot is twofold, _arbitrary_ or _natural_.
_Arbitrary_ is that which is cast by the consent of the contenders,
and it consists in mere chance, as they say, or fortune. _Natural_
is primogeniture, in Greek κληρονομια, as it were, given by lot; or
first possession. Therefore the things which can neither be divided
nor had in common, must be granted to the first possessor; as also
those things which belonged to the father are due to the son, unless
the father himself have formerly conveyed away that right to some
other. Let this therefore stand for the thirteenth law of nature.
[Sidenote: The fourteenth law, of the safety of those who are
mediators for peace.]
19. The fourteenth precept of the law of nature is, _that safety
must be assured to the mediators for peace_. For the reason which
commands the end, commands also the means necessary to the end. But
the first dictate of reason is peace; all the rest are means to
obtain it, and without which peace cannot be had. But neither can
peace be had without mediation, nor mediation without safety. It is
therefore a dictate of reason, that is, a law of nature, that we
must give all security to the mediators for peace.
[Sidenote: The fifteenth law, of appointing an umpire.]
20. Furthermore because, although men should agree to make all these
and whatsoever other laws of nature, and should endeavour to keep
them, yet doubts and controversies would daily arise concerning the
application of them unto their actions, to wit, whether what was
done were against the law or not, which we call the question of
right; whence will follow a fight between parties, either-sides
supposing themselves wronged: it is therefore necessary to the
preservation of peace, because in this case no other fit remedy can
possibly be thought on, that both the disagreeing parties refer the
matter unto some third, and oblige themselves by mutual compacts to
stand to his judgment in deciding the controversy. And he to whom
they thus refer themselves, is called an arbiter. It is therefore
the fifteenth precept of the natural law, _that both parties
disputing concerning the matter of right, submit themselves unto the
opinion and judgment of some third_.
[Sidenote: The sixteenth law, that no man be judge in his own
cause.]
21. But from this ground, that an arbiter or judge is chosen by the
differing parties to determine the controversy, we gather that the
arbiter must not be one of the parties. For every man is presumed to
seek what is good for himself naturally, and what is just only for
peace sake and accidentally; and therefore cannot observe that same
equality commanded by the law of nature, so exactly as a third man
would do. It is therefore in the sixteenth place contained in the
law of nature, _that no man must be judge or arbiter in his own
cause_.
[Sidenote: The seventeenth law, that arbiters must be without all
hope of reward from the parties whose cause is to be
judged.]
22. From the same ground follows in the seventeenth place, _that no
man must be judge, who propounds unto himself any hope of profit or
glory from the victory of either part_: for the like reason sways
here, as in the foregoing law.
[Sidenote: The eighteenth law, of witnesses.]
23. But when there is some controversy of the fact itself, to wit,
whether that be done or not which is said to be done, the natural
law wills that the arbiter trust both parties alike, that is,
because they affirm contradictories, that he believe neither. He
must therefore give credit to a third, or a third and fourth, or
more, that he may be able to give judgment of the fact, as often as
by other signs he cannot come to the knowledge of it. The eighteenth
law of nature therefore enjoins arbiters and judges of fact, _that
where firm and certain signs of the fact appear not, there they rule
their sentence by such witnesses as seem to be indifferent to both
parts_.
[Sidenote: The nineteenth law, that no contract is to be made with
the judge.]
24. From the above declared definition of an arbiter may be
furthermore understood, _that no contract or promise must pass
between him and the parties whose judge he is appointed, by virtue
whereof he may be engaged to speak in favour of either part, nay, or
be obliged to judge according to equity, or to pronounce such
sentence as he shall truly judge to be equal_. The judge is indeed
bound to give such sentence as he shall judge to be equal, by the
law of nature recounted in the 15th article: to the obligation of
which law nothing can be added by way of compact. Such compact
therefore would be in vain. Besides, if giving wrong judgment he
should contend for the equity of it, except such compact be of no
force, the controversy would remain after judgment given: which is
contrary to the constitution of an arbiter, who is so chosen, as
both parties have obliged themselves to stand to the judgment which
he should pronounce. The law of nature therefore commands the judge
to be disengaged, which is its nineteenth precept.
[Sidenote: The twentieth law, against gluttony and such things as
hinder the use of reason.]
25. Furthermore, forasmuch as the laws of nature are nought else but
the dictates of reason; so as, unless a man endeavour to preserve
the faculty of right reasoning, he cannot observe the laws of
nature; it is manifest, that he who knowingly or willingly doth
aught whereby the rational faculty may be destroyed or weakened, he
knowingly and willingly breaks the law of nature. For there is no
difference between a man who performs not his duty, and him who does
such things willingly as make it impossible for him to do it. But
they destroy and weaken the reasoning faculty, who do that which
disturbs the mind from its natural state; that which most manifestly
happens to drunkards, and gluttons. We therefore sin, in the
twentieth place, against the law of nature by drunkenness.
[Sidenote: The rule by which a man may presently know, whether what
he is about to act be against the law of nature or not.]
26. Perhaps some man, who sees all these precepts of nature derived
by a certain artifice from the single dictate of reason advising us
to look to the preservation and safeguard of ourselves, will say
that the deduction of these laws is so hard, that it is not to be
expected they will be vulgarly known, and therefore neither will
they prove obliging: for laws, if they be not known, oblige not, nay
indeed, are not laws. To this I answer, it is true, that hope, fear,
anger, ambition, covetousness, vain glory, and other perturbations
of mind, do hinder a man, so as he cannot attain to the knowledge of
these laws whilst those passions prevail in him: but there is no man
who is not sometimes in a quiet mind. At that time therefore there
is nothing easier for him to know, though he be never so rude and
unlearned, than this only rule, that when he doubts whether what he
is now doing to another may be done by the law of nature or not, he
conceive himself to be in that other’s stead. Here instantly those
perturbations which persuaded him to the fact, being now cast into
the other scale, dissuade him as much. And this rule is not only
easy, but is anciently celebrated in these words, _quod tibi fieri
non vis, alteri ne feceris_: _do not that to others, you would not
have done to yourself_.
[Sidenote: The laws of nature oblige only in the court of
conscience.]
27. But because most men, by reason of their perverse desire of
present profit, are very unapt to observe these laws, although
acknowledged by them; if perhaps some, more humble than the rest,
should exercise that equity and usefulness which reason dictates,
the others not practising the same, surely they would not follow
reason in so doing: nor would they hereby procure themselves peace,
but a more certain quick destruction, and the keepers of the law
become a mere prey to the breakers of it. It is not therefore to be
imagined, that by nature, that is, by reason, men are obliged to the
exercise of all these laws[7] in that state of men wherein they are
not practised by others. We are obliged yet, in the interim, to a
readiness of mind to observe them, whensoever their observation
shall seem to conduce to the end for which they were ordained. We
must therefore conclude, that the law of nature doth always and
everywhere oblige in the internal court, or that of conscience; but
not always in the external court, but then only when it may be done
with safety.
Footnote 7:
_The exercise of all these laws._ Nay, among these laws some
things there are, the omission whereof, provided it be done for
peace or self-preservation, seems rather to be the fulfilling,
than breach of the natural law. For he that doth all things
against those that do all things, and plunders plunderers, doth
equity. But on the contrary, to do that which in peace is a
handsome action, and becoming an honest man, is dejectedness and
poorness of spirit, and a betraying of one’s self, in the time of
war. But there are certain natural laws, whose exercise ceaseth
not even in the time of war itself. For I cannot understand what
drunkenness or cruelty, that is, revenge which respects not the
future good, can advance toward peace, or the preservation of any
man. Briefly, in the state of nature, what is just and unjust, is
not to be esteemed by the actions but by the counsel and
conscience of the actor. That which is done out of necessity, out
of endeavour for peace, for the preservation of ourselves, is done
with right, otherwise every damage done to a man would be a breach
of the natural law, and an injury against God.
[Sidenote: The laws of nature are sometimes broken by an act
agreeable to those laws.]
28. But the laws which oblige conscience, may be broken by an act
not only contrary to them, but also agreeable with them; if so be
that he who does it, be of another opinion. For though the act
itself be answerable to the laws, yet his conscience is against
them.
[Sidenote: The laws of nature are immutable and eternal.]
29. _The laws of nature are immutable and eternal_: what they
forbid, can never be lawful; what they command, can never be
unlawful. For _pride_, _ingratitude_, _breach of contracts_ (or
_injury_), _inhumanity_, _contumely_, will never be lawful, nor the
contrary virtues to these ever unlawful, as we take them for
dispositions of the mind, that is, as they are considered in the
court of conscience, where only they oblige and are laws. Yet
actions may be so diversified by circumstances and the civil law,
that what is done with equity at one time, is guilty of iniquity at
another; and what suits with reason at one time, is contrary to it
another. Yet reason is still the same, and changeth not her end,
which is peace and defence, nor the means to attain them, to wit,
those virtues of the mind which we have declared above, and which
cannot be abrogated by any custom or law whatsoever.
[Sidenote: He who endeavours to fulfil the laws of nature, is just.]
30. It is evident by what hath hitherto been said, how easily the
laws of nature are to be observed, because they require the
endeavour only, (but that must be true and constant); which whoso
shall perform, we may rightly call him _just_. For he who tends to
this with his whole might, namely, that his actions be squared
according to the precepts of nature, he shows clearly that he hath a
mind to fulfil all those laws; which is all we are obliged to by
rational nature. Now he that hath done all he is obliged to, is a
just man.
[Sidenote: The natural law is the same with the moral.]
31. All writers do agree, that the natural law is the same with the
moral. Let us see wherefore this is true. We must know, therefore,
that good and evil are names given to things to signify the
inclination or aversion of them, by whom they were given. But the
inclinations of men are diverse, according to their diverse
constitutions, customs, opinions; as we may see in those things we
apprehend by sense, as by tasting, touching, smelling; but much more
in those which pertain to the common actions of life, where what
this man commends, that is to say, calls _good_, the other
undervalues, as being evil. Nay, very often the same man at diverse
times praises and dispraises the same thing. Whilst thus they do,
necessary it is there should be discord and strife. They are,
therefore, so long in the state of war, as by reason of the
diversity of the present appetite, they mete good and evil by
diverse measures. All men easily acknowledge this state, as long as
they are in it, to be evil, and by consequence that peace is good.
They therefore who could not agree concerning a present, do agree
concerning a future good; which indeed is a work of reason; for
things present are obvious to the sense, things to come to our
reason only. Reason declaring peace to be good, it follows by the
same reason, that all the necessary means to peace be good also; and
therefore that modesty, equity, trust, humanity, mercy, (which we
have demonstrated to be necessary to peace), are good manners or
habits, that is, virtues. The law therefore, in the means to peace,
commands also good manners, or the practice of virtue; and therefore
it is called _moral_.
[Sidenote: Whence it comes to pass, that what hath been said
concerning the law, is not the same with what hath been
delivered by philosophers concerning the virtues.]
32. But because men cannot put off this same irrational appetite,
whereby they greedily prefer the present good (to which, by strict
consequence, many unforseen evils do adhere) before the future; it
happens, that though all men do agree in the commendation of the
foresaid virtues, yet they disagree still concerning their nature,
to wit, in what each of them doth consist. For as oft as another’s
good action displeaseth any man, that action hath the name given of
some neighbouring vice; likewise the bad actions which please them,
are ever intituled to some virtue. Whence it comes to pass that the
same action is praised by these, and called virtue, and dispraised
by those, and termed vice. Neither is there as yet any remedy found
by philosophers for this matter. For since they could not observe
the goodness of actions to consist in this, that it was in order to
peace, and the evil in this, that it related to discord, they built
a moral philosophy wholly estranged from the moral law, and
unconstant to itself. For they would have the nature of virtues
seated in a certain kind of mediocrity between two extremes, and the
vices in the extremes themselves; which is apparently false. For _to
dare_ is commended, and, under the name of _fortitude_ is taken for
a virtue, although it be an extreme, if the cause be approved. Also
the quantity of a thing given, whether it be great or little, or
between both, makes not liberality, but the cause of giving it.
Neither is it injustice, if I give any man more of what is mine own
than I owe him. The laws of nature, therefore, are the sum of
_moral_ philosophy; whereof I have only delivered such precepts in
this place, as appertain to the preservation of ourselves against
those dangers which arise from discord. But there are other precepts
of _rational_ nature, from whence spring other virtues; for
temperance, also, is a precept of reason, because intemperance tends
to sickness and death. And so fortitude too, that is, that same
faculty of resisting stoutly in present dangers, and which are more
hardly declined than overcome; because it is a means tending to the
preservation of him that resists.
[Sidenote: The law of nature is not properly a law, but as it is
delivered in Holy Scripture.]
33. But those which we call the laws of nature, (since they are
nothing else but certain conclusions, understood by reason, of
things to be done and omitted; but a law, to speak properly and
accurately, is the speech of him who by right commands somewhat to
others to be done or omitted), are not in propriety of speech laws,
as they proceed from nature. Yet, as they are delivered by God in
holy Scriptures, as we shall see in the chapter following, they are
most properly called by the name of laws. For the sacred Scripture
is the speech of God commanding over all things by greatest right.
-------
CHAPTER IV.
THAT THE LAW OF NATURE IS A DIVINE LAW.
1. The natural and moral law is divine. 2. Which is confirmed in
Scripture, in general. 3. Specially, in regard of the
fundamental law of nature in seeking of peace. 4. Also in regard
of the first law of nature in abolishing all things to be had in
common. 5. Also of the second law of nature, concerning faith to
be kept. 6. Also of the third law, of thankfulness. 7. Also of
the fourth law, of rendering ourselves useful. 8. Also of the
fifth law, concerning mercy. 9. Also of the sixth law, that
punishment only looks at the future. 10. Also of the seventh
law, concerning slander. 11. Also of the eighth law, against
pride. 12. Also of the ninth law, of equity. 13. Also of the
tenth law, against respect of persons. 14. Also of the eleventh
law, of having those things in common which cannot be divided.
15. Also of the twelfth law, of things to be divided by lot. 16.
Also of appointing a judge. 17. Also of the seventeenth law,
that the arbiters must receive no reward for their sentence. 18.
Also of the eighteenth law, concerning witnesses. 19. Also of
the twentieth law, against drunkenness. 20. Also in respect of
that which hath been said, that the law of nature is eternal.
21. Also that the laws of nature do pertain to conscience. 22.
Also that the laws of nature are easily observed. 23. Lastly, in
respect of the rule by which a man may presently know, whether
what he is about to act, be against the law of nature, or not.
24. The law of Christ is the law of nature.
[Sidenote: The natural and moral law is divine.]
1. The same law which is _natural_ and _moral_, is also wont to be
called _divine_, nor undeservedly; as well because reason, which is
the law of nature, is given by God to every man for the rule of his
actions; as because the precepts of living which are thence derived,
are the same with those which have been delivered from the divine
Majesty for the _laws_ of his heavenly kingdom, by our Lord Jesus
Christ, and his holy prophets and apostles. What therefore by
reasoning we have understood above concerning the law of nature, we
will endeavour to confirm the same in this chapter by holy writ.
[Sidenote: Which is confirmed in Scripture, in general.]
2. But first we will shew those places in which it is declared, that
the divine law is seated in right reason. Psalm xxxvii. 30, 31: _The
mouth of the righteous will be exercised in wisdom, and his tongue
will be talking of judgment: the law of God is in his heart._
Jeremiah xxx. 33: _I will put my law in their inward parts, and
write it in their hearts._ Psalm xix. 7: _The law of the Lord is an
undefiled law, converting the soul._ Verse 8: _The commandment of
the Lord is pure, and giveth light unto the eyes._ Deuteron. xxx.
11: _This commandment, which I command thee this day, it is not
hidden from thee, neither is it far off, &c._ Verse. 14: _But the
word is very nigh unto thee in my mouth, and in thine heart, that
thou mayest do it._ Psalm cxix. 34: _Give me understanding, and I
shall keep thy law._ Verse 105: _Thy word is a lamp unto my feet,
and a light unto my paths._ Prov. ix. 10: _The knowledge of the holy
is understanding._ Christ the law-giver, himself is called (John i.
1): _the word_. The same Christ is called (verse 9): _the true
light, that lighteth every man that cometh in the world_. All which
are descriptions of right reason, whose dictates, we have showed
before, are the laws of nature.
[Sidenote: Specially in regard of the fundamental law of nature in
seeking of peace.]
3. But that that which we set down for the fundamental law of
nature, namely, that peace was to be sought for, is also the sum of
the Divine law, will be manifest by these places. Rom. iii. 17:
_Righteousness_, which is the sum of the law, is called _the way of
peace_. Psalm lxxxv. 10: _Righteousness and peace have kissed each
other._ Matth. v. 9: _Blessed are the peace-makers, for they shall
be called the children of God._ And after St. Paul, in his sixth
chapter to the Hebrews, and the last verse, had called Christ (the
legislator of that law we treat of), _an High-priest for ever after
the order of Melchisedec_: he adds in the following chapter, the
first verse: _This Melchisedec was king of Salem, priest of the most
high God_, &c. (Verse 2): _First being by interpretation king of
righteousness, and after that also king of Salem, which is, king of
peace_. Whence it is clear, that Christ, the King, in his kingdom
placeth righteousness and peace together. Psalm xxxiv. 14: _Eschew
evil and do good; seek peace and pursue it._ Isaiah ix. 6, 7: _Unto
us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and the government shall
be upon his shoulder, and his name shall be called Wonderful,
Counsellor, the Mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of
Peace._ Isaiah lii. 7: _How beautiful upon the mountains are the
feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace, that
bringeth good tidings of good, that publisheth salvation, that saith
unto Sion, thy God reigneth!_ Luke ii. 14: In the nativity of
Christ, the voice of them that praised God, saying, _Glory be to God
on high, and in earth peace, good-will towards men._ And Isaiah
liii. 5: the Gospel is called the _chastisement of our peace_.
Isaiah lix. 8: Righteousness is called the _way of peace_. _The way
of peace they know not, and there is no judgment in their goings._
Micah v. 4, 5, speaking of the Messias, he saith thus: _He shall
stand and feed in the strength of the Lord, in the majesty of the
name of the Lord his God, and they shall abide, for now shall he be
great unto the end of the earth; and this man shall be your peace_,
&c. Prov. iii. 1, 2: _My son, forget not my law, but let thine heart
keep my commandments; for length of days, and long life, and peace,
shall they add to thee._
[Sidenote: Also in regard of the first law of nature, in abolishing
all things to be had in common.]
4. What appertains to the first law of abolishing the community of
all things, or concerning the introduction of _meum_ and _tuum_; we
perceive in the first place, how great an adversary this same
community is to peace, by those words of Abraham to Lot (Gen. xiii.
8, 9): _Let there be no strife, I pray thee, between thee and me,
and between thy herdmen and my herdmen; for we be brethren. Is not
the whole land before thee? Separate thyself, I pray thee from me._
And all those places of Scripture by which we are forbidden to
trespass upon our neighbours: as, _Thou shalt not kill_, _thou shalt
not commit adultery_, _thou shalt not steal_, &c. do confirm the law
of distinction between _mine_ and _thine_; for they suppose _the
right of all men to all things_ to be taken away.
[Sidenote: Also of the second law of nature, concerning faith to be
kept.]
5. The same precepts establish the second law of nature, of keeping
trust. For what doth, _Thou shalt not invade another’s right_,
import, but this? _Thou shalt not take possession of that, which by
thy contract ceaseth to be thine_: but it is expressly set down?
Psalm xv. 1: to him that asked, _Lord who shall dwell in thy
tabernacle?_ it is answered (verse 4): _He that sweareth unto his
neighbour, and disappointeth him not._ And Prov. vi. 12: _My son, if
thou be surety for thy friend, if thou have stricken thy hand with a
stranger, thou art snared with the words of thy mouth._
[Sidenote: Also of the third law, of thankfulness.]
6. The third law concerning gratitude, is proved by these places.
Deut. xxv. 4: _Thou shalt not muzzle the ox, when he treadeth out
the corn_: which St. Paul (1 Cor. ix. 9) interprets to be spoken of
men, not oxen only. Prov. xvii. 13; _Whoso rewardeth evil for good,
evil shall not depart from his house._ And Deut. xx. 10, 11: _When
thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim
peace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and
open unto thee, then it shall be that all the people that is found
therein, shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee._
Prov. iii. 29: _Devise not evil against thy neighbour, seeing he
dwelleth securely by thee._
[Sidenote: Also of the fourth law, of rendering ourselves useful.]
7. To the fourth law of accommodating ourselves, these precepts are
conformable: Exod. xxiii. 4, 5: _If thou meet thine enemy’s ox, or
his ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again.
If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee, lying under his burden,
and wouldst forbear to help him, thou shalt surely help with him._
Also (verse 9): _Thou shalt not oppress a stranger._ Prov. iii. 30:
_Strive not with a man without a cause, if he have done thee no
harm._ Prov. xv. 18: _A wrathful man stirreth up strife; but he that
is slow to anger, appeaseth strife._ Prov. xviii. 24: _There is a
friend that sticketh closer than a brother._ The same is confirmed,
Luke x, by the parable of the Samaritan, who had compassion on the
Jew that was wounded by thieves; and by Christ’s precept (Matth. v.
39): _But I say unto you that ye resist not evil; but whosoever
shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also._
[Sidenote: Also of the fifth law, concerning mercy.]
8. Among infinite other places which prove the fifth law, these are
some: Matth. vi. 14, 15: _If you forgive men their trespasses, your
heavenly Father will also forgive you: but if you forgive not men
their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses._
Matth. xviii. 21, 22: _Lord how oft shall my brother sin against me,
and I forgive him? Till seven times? Jesus saith unto him; I say not
till seven times, but till seventy times seven times_; that is,
_toties quoties_.
[Sidenote: Also of the sixth law, that punishment only looks at the
future.]
9. For the confirmation of the sixth law, all those places are
pertinent which command us to shew mercy, such as Matth. v. 7:
_Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy._ Levit. xix.
18: _Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children
of thy people._ But there are, who not only think this law is not
proved by Scripture, but plainly disproved from hence; that there is
an eternal punishment reserved for the wicked after death, where
there is no place either for amendment or example. Some resolve this
objection by answering, that God, whom no law restrains, refers all
to his glory, but that man must not do so; as if God sought his
glory, that is to say, pleased himself in the death of a sinner. It
is more rightly answered, that the institution of eternal punishment
was before sin, and had regard to this only, that men might dread to
commit sin for the time to come.
[Sidenote: Also of the seventh law, concerning slander.]
10. The words of Christ prove this seventh: (Matth. v. 22): _But I
say unto you, that whosoever is angry with his brother without a
cause, shall be in danger of the judgment; and whosoever shall say
unto his brother_ Racha, _shall be in danger of the council; but
whosoever shall say, thou fool, shall be in danger of hell-fire_.
Prov. x. 18: _He that uttereth a slander, is a fool._ Prov. xiv. 21:
_He that despiseth his neighbour, sinneth._ Prov. xv. 1: _Grievous
words stir up anger_. Prov. xxii. 10: _Cast out the scorner, and
contention shall go out, and reproach shall cease._
[Sidenote: Also of the eighth, against pride.]
11. The eighth law of acknowledging equality of nature, that is, of
humility, is established by these places: Matth. v. iii: _Blessed
are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven._ Prov.
vi. 16-19: _These six things doth the Lord hate, yea, seven are an
abomination unto him. A proud look_, &c. Prov. xvi. 5: _Every one
that is proud, is an abomination unto the Lord; though hand join in
hand, he shall not be unpunished._ Prov. xi. 2: _When pride cometh,
then cometh shame; but with the lowly is wisdom._ Thus Isaiah xl. 3:
(where the coming of the Messias is shewed forth, for preparation
towards his kingdom): _The voice of him that cried in the
wilderness, was this: Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight
in the desert a highway for our God. Every valley shall be exalted,
and every mountain and hill shall be made low_: which doubtless is
spoken to men, and not to mountains.
[Sidenote: Also of the ninth, of equity.]
12. But that same equity, which we proved in the ninth place to be a
law of nature, which commands every man to allow the same rights to
others they would be allowed themselves, and which contains in it
all the other laws besides, is the same which Moses sets down
(Levit. xix. 18): _Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself._ And
our Saviour calls it _the sum of the moral law_: Matth. xxii. 36-40:
_Master, which is the great commandment in the law? Jesus said unto
him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with
all thy soul, and with all thy mind; this is the first and great
commandment; and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy
neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and
the prophets._ But to love our neighbour as ourselves, is nothing
else but to grant him all we desire to have granted to ourselves.
[Sidenote: Also the tenth, against respect of persons.]
13. By the tenth law respect of persons is forbid; as also by these
places following: Matth. v. 45: _That ye may be children of your
Father which is in heaven; for he maketh the sun to rise on the
evil, and on the good_, &c. Coloss. iii. 11: _There is neither Greek
nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian or Scythian,
bond or free, but Christ is all, and in all._ Acts x. 34: _Of a
truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons._ 2 Chron. xix.
7: _There is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor respect of
persons, nor taking of gifts._ Ecclesiasticus xxxv. 12: _The Lord is
Judge, and with him is no respect of persons._ Rom. ii. 11: _For
there is no respect of persons with God._
[Sidenote: Also of the eleventh law, of having those things in
common which cannot be divided.]
14. The eleventh law, which commands those things to be held in
common which cannot be divided, I know not whether there be any
express place in Scripture for it or not; but the practice appears
every where, in the common use of wells, ways, rivers, sacred
things, &c.; for else men could not live.
[Sidenote: Also of the twelfth, of things to be divided by lot.]
15. We said in the twelfth place, that it was a law of nature, that
where things could neither be divided nor possessed in common, they
should be disposed by lot. Which is confirmed, as by the example of
Moses who, by God’s command (Numb. xxvi. 55), divided the several
parts of the land of promise unto the tribes by lot: so (Acts i. 24)
by the example of the Apostles, who received Matthias before Justus
into their number, by casting lots, and saying, _Thou, Lord, who
knowest the hearts of all men, show whether of these two thou hast
chosen_, &c. Prov. xvi. 33: _The lot is cast into the lap, but the
whole disposing thereof is of the Lord._ And, which is the
thirteenth law, the succession was due unto Esau, as being the first
born of Isaac; if himself had not sold it (Gen. xxv. 33), or that
the father had not otherwise appointed.
[Sidenote: Also of appointing a judge.]
16. St. Paul, writing to the Corinthians (1 Epist. vi), reprehends
the Corinthians of that city for going to law one with another
before infidel judges, who were their enemies: calling it a fault,
that they would not rather take wrong, and suffer themselves to be
defrauded; for that is against that law, whereby we are commanded to
be helpful to each other. But if it happen the controversy be
concerning things necessary, what is to be done? Therefore the
Apostle (verse 5) speaks thus: _I speak to your shame. Is it so,
that there is not one wise man among you, no, not one that shall be
able to judge between his brethren?_ He therefore, by those words,
confirms that law of nature which we called the fifteenth, to wit,
where controversies cannot be avoided; there by the consent of
parties to appoint some arbiter, and him some third man; so as
(which is the sixteenth law) neither of the parties may be judge in
his own cause.
[Sidenote: Also of the seventeenth law, that the arbiters must
receive no reward for their sentence.]
17. But that the judge or arbiter must receive no reward for his
sentence, which is the seventeenth law appears, Exod. xxiii. 8:
_Thou shalt take no gift; for the gift blindeth the wise, and
perverteth the words of the righteous._ Ecclesiasticus xx. 29:
_Presents and gifts blind the eyes of the wise._ Whence it follows,
that he must not be more obliged to one part than the other; which
is the nineteenth law; and is also confirmed, Deut. i. 17: _Ye shall
not respect persons in judgment, ye shall hear the small as well as
the great_; and in all those places which are brought against
respect of persons.
[Sidenote: Also of the eighteenth, concerning witnesses.]
18. That in the judgment of fact witnesses must be had, which is the
eighteenth law, the Scripture not only confirms, but requires more
than one. Deut. xvii. 6: _At the mouth of two witnesses, or three
witnesses, shall he that is worthy of death be put to death._ The
same is repeated Deut. xix. 15.
[Sidenote: Also of the twentieth law, against drunkenness.]
19. Drunkenness, which we have therefore in the last place numbered
among the breaches of the natural law, because it hinders the use of
right reason, is also forbid in Sacred Scripture for the same
reason. Prov. xx. 1: _Wine is a mocker, strong drink is raging,
whosoever is deceived thereby is not wise._ And Prov. xxxi. 4, 5:
_It is not for kings to drink wine, lest they drink and forget the
law, and pervert the judgment of any of the afflicted._ But that we
might know that the malice of this vice consisted not formally in
the quantity of the drink, but in that it destroys judgment and
reason, it follows in the next verse: _Give strong drink to him that
is ready to perish, and wine to those that be heavy of heart. Let
him drink and forget his poverty, and remember his misery no more._
Christ useth the same reason in prohibiting drunkenness (Luke xxi.
34): _Take heed to yourselves, lest at any time your hearts be
overcharged with surfeiting and drunkenness._
[Sidenote: Also in respect of that which hath been said, that the
law of nature is eternal.]
20. That we said in the foregoing chapter, the law of nature is
eternal, is also proved out of Matth. v. 18: _Verily I say unto you,
till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise
pass from the law_; and Psalm cxix. 160: _Every one of thy righteous
judgments endureth for ever._
[Sidenote: Also that the laws of nature do pertain to conscience.]
21. We also said, that the laws of nature had regard chiefly unto
conscience; that is, that he is just, who by all possible endeavour
strives to fulfil them. And although a man should order all his
actions so much as belongs to external obedience just as the law
commands, but not for the law’s sake, but by reason of some
punishment annexed unto it, or out of vain glory; yet he is unjust.
Both these are proved by the Holy Scriptures. The first (Isaiah lv.
7): _Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his
thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy
upon him; and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon._ Ezek.
xviii. 31: _Cast away from you all your transgressions whereby you
have transgressed, and make you a new heart and a new spirit; for
why will you die, O House of Israel?_ By which, and the like places,
we may sufficiently understand that God will not punish their deeds
whose heart is right. The second, out of Isaiah xxix. 13, 14: _The
Lord said, forasmuch as this people draw near me with their mouth,
and with their lips do honour me, but have removed their hearts far
from me, therefore I will proceed_, &c. Matth. v. 20: _Except your
righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and
Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven._
And in the following verses, our Saviour explains to them how that
the commands of God are broken, not by deeds only, but also by the
will. For the Scribes and Pharisees did in outward act observe the
law most exactly, but for glory’s sake only; else they would as
readily have broken it. There are innumerable places of Scripture in
which is most manifestly declared, that God accepts the will for the
deed, and that as well in good as in evil actions.
[Sidenote: Also that the laws of nature are easily observed.]
22. That the law of nature is easily kept, Christ himself declares
(Matth. xi. 28, 29, 30): _Come unto me_, &c. _Take my yoke upon you,
and learn of me_, &c.; _for my yoke is easy, and my burden light_.
[Sidenote: Lastly, in respect of the rule by which a man may
presently know, whether what he is about to act be
against the law of nature, or not.]
23. Lastly, the rule by which I said any man might know, whether
what he was doing were contrary to the law or not, to wit, what thou
wouldst not be done to, do not that to another; is almost in the
self-same words delivered by our Saviour (Matth. vii. 12):
_Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto
you, do you even so to them._
[Sidenote: The law of Christ is the law of nature.]
24. As the law of nature is all of it divine, so the law of Christ
by conversion (which is wholly explained in the v. vi. and vii.
chapters of St. Matthew’s Gospel), is all of it also (except that
one commandment, of not marrying her who is put away for adultery;
which Christ brought for explication of the divine positive law,
against the Jews, who did not rightly interpret the Mosaical law)
the doctrine of nature. I say, the whole law of Christ is explained
in the fore-named chapters, not the whole doctrine of Christ; for
faith is a part of Christian doctrine, which is not comprehended
under the title of a law. For laws are made and given in reference
to such actions as follow our will; not in order to our opinions and
belief, which being out of our power, follow not the will.
DOMINION.
---
CHAPTER V.
OF THE CAUSES AND FIRST BEGINNING OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT.
1. That the laws of nature are not sufficient to preserve peace. 2.
That the laws of nature, in the state of nature, are silent. 3.
That the security of living according to the laws of nature,
consists in the concord of many persons. 4. That the concord of
many persons is not constant enough for a lasting peace. 5. The
reason why the government of certain brute creatures stands firm
in concord only, and why not of men. 6. That not only consent,
but union also, is required to establish the peace of men. 7.
What union is. 8. In union, the right of all men is conveyed to
one. 9. What civil society is. 10. What a civil person is. 11.
What it is to have the supreme power, and what to be a subject
12. Two kinds of cities, natural, and by institution.
[Sidenote: That the laws of nature suffice not for the conservation
of peace.]
1. It is of itself manifest that the actions of men proceed from the
will, and the will from hope and fear, insomuch as when they shall
see a greater good or less evil likely to happen to them by the
breach than observation of the laws, they will wittingly violate
them. The hope therefore which each man hath of his security and
self-preservation, consists in this, that by force or craft he may
disappoint his neighbour, either openly or by stratagem. Whence we
may understand, that the natural laws, though well understood, do
not instantly secure any man in their practice; and consequently,
that as long as there is no caution had from the invasion of others,
there remains to every man that same primitive right of self-defence
by such means as either he can or will make use of, that is, a right
to all things, or the right of war. And it is sufficient for the
fulfilling of the natural law, that a man be prepared in mind to
embrace peace when it may be had.
[Sidenote: That the laws of nature, in a state of nature, are
silent.]
2. It is a trite saying, that all laws are silent in the time of
war, and it is a true one, not only if we speak of the civil, but
also of the natural laws, provided they be referred not to the mind,
but to the actions of men, by chap. iii. art. 27. And we mean such a
war, as is of all men against all men; such as is the mere state of
nature; although in the war of nation against nation, a certain mean
was wont to be observed. And therefore in old time, there was a
manner of living, and as it were a certain economy, which they
called ληστρικὴν, living by rapine; which was neither against the
law of nature (things then so standing), nor void of glory to those
who exercised it with valour, not with cruelty. Their custom was,
taking away the rest, to spare life, and abstain from oxen fit for
plough, and every instrument serviceable to husbandry. Which yet is
not so to be taken, as if they were bound to do thus by the law of
nature; but that they had regard to their own glory herein, lest by
too much cruelty they might be suspected guilty of fear.
[Sidenote: That the security of living according to the laws of
nature, consists in the agreement of many.]
3. Since therefore the exercise of the natural law is necessary for
the preservation of peace, and that for the exercise of the natural
law security is no less necessary; it is worth the considering what
that is which affords such a security. For this matter nothing else
can be imagined, but that each man provide himself of such meet
helps, as the invasion of one on the other may be rendered so
dangerous, as either of them may think it better to refrain than to
meddle. But first, it is plain that the consent of two or three
cannot make good such a security; because that the addition but of
one, or some few on the other side, is sufficient to make the
victory undoubtedly sure, and heartens the enemy to attack us. It is
therefore necessary, to the end the security sought for may be
obtained, that the number of them who conspire in a mutual
assistance be so great, that the accession of some few to the
enemy’s party may not prove to them a matter of moment sufficient to
assure the victory.
[Sidenote: That the agreement of many is not constant enough to
preserve a lasting peace.]
4. Furthermore, how great soever the number of them is who meet on
self-defence, if yet they agree not among themselves of some
excellent means whereby to compass this, but every man after his own
manner shall make use of his endeavours, nothing will be done;
because that, divided in their opinions, they will be a hinderance
to each other; or if they agree well enough to some one action,
through hope of victory, spoil, or revenge, yet afterward, through
diversity of wits and counsels, or emulation and envy, with which
men naturally contend, they will be so torn and rent, as they will
neither give mutual help nor desire peace, except they be
constrained to it by some common fear. Whence it follows that the
consent of many, (which consists in this only, as we have already
defined in the foregoing section, that they direct all their actions
to the same end and the common good), that is to say, that the
society proceeding from mutual help only, yields not that security
which they seek for, who meet and agree in the exercise of the
above-named laws of nature; but that somewhat else must be done,
that those who have once consented for the common good to peace and
mutual help, may by fear be restrained lest afterwards they again
dissent, when their private interest shall appear discrepant from
the common good.
[Sidenote: Why the government of some brute creatures stands firm in
concord alone, and not so of men.]
5. Aristotle reckons among those animals which he calls politic, not
man only, but divers others, as the ant, the bee, &c.; which, though
they be destitute of reason, by which they may contract and submit
to government, notwithstanding by consenting, that is to say,
ensuing or eschewing the same things, they so direct their actions
to a common end, that their meetings are not obnoxious unto any
seditions. Yet is not their gathering together a civil government,
and therefore those animals not to be termed political; because
their government is only a consent, or many wills concurring in one
object, not (as is necessary in civil government) one will. It is
very true, that in those creatures living only by sense and
appetite, their consent of minds is so durable, as there is no need
of anything more to secure it, and by consequence to preserve peace
among them, than barely their natural inclination. But among men the
case is otherwise. For, first, among them there is a contestation of
honour and preferment; among beasts there is none: whence hatred and
envy, out of which arise sedition and war, is among men; among
beasts no such matter. Next, the natural appetite of bees, and the
like creatures, is conformable; and they desire the common good,
which among them differs not from their private. But man scarce
esteems anything good, which hath not somewhat of eminence in the
enjoyment, more than that which others do possess. Thirdly, those
creatures which are void of reason, see no defect, or think they see
none, in the administration of their commonweals; but in a multitude
of men there are many who, supposing themselves wiser than others,
endeavour to innovate, and divers innovators innovate divers ways;
which is a mere distraction and civil war. Fourthly, these brute
creatures, howsoever they may have the use of their voice to signify
their affections to each other, yet want they that same art of words
which is necessarily required to those motions in the mind, whereby
good is represented to it as being better, and evil as worse than in
truth it is. But the tongue of man is a trumpet of war and sedition:
and it is reported of Pericles, that he sometimes by his elegant
speeches thundered and lightened, and confounded whole Greece
itself. Fifthly, they cannot distinguish between _injury_ and
_harm_; thence it happens that as long as it is well with them, they
blame not their fellows. But those men are of most trouble to the
republic, who have most leisure to be idle; for they use not to
contend for public places, before they have gotten the victory over
hunger and cold. Last of all, the consent of those brutal creatures
is natural; that of men by compact only, that is to say, artificial.
It is therefore no matter of wonder, if somewhat more be needful for
men to the end they may live in peace. Wherefore consent or
contracted society, without some common power whereby particular men
may be ruled through fear of punishment, doth not suffice to make up
that security, which is requisite to the exercise of natural
justice.
[Sidenote: That not only consent, but union also, is required to
establish the peace of men.]
6. Since therefore the conspiring of many wills to the same end doth
not suffice to preserve peace, and to make a lasting defence, it is
requisite that, in those necessary matters which concern peace and
self-defence, there be but one will of all men. But this cannot be
done, unless every man will so subject his will to some other one,
to wit, either man or council, that whatsoever his will is in those
things which are necessary to the common peace, it be received for
the wills of all men in general, and of every one in particular. Now
the gathering together of many men, who deliberate of what is to be
done or not to be done for the common good of all men, is that which
I call a _council_.
[Sidenote: What union is.]
7. This submission of the wills of all those men to the will of one
man or one council, is then made, when each one of them obligeth
himself by contract to every one of the rest, not to resist the will
of that one man or council, to which he hath submitted himself; that
is, that he refuse him not the use of his wealth and strength
against any others whatsoever; for he is supposed still to retain a
right of defending himself against violence: and this is called
_union_. But we understand that to be the will of the council, which
is the will of the major part of those men of whom the council
consists.
[Sidenote: In union, the right of all men is transferred to one.]
8. But though the will itself be not voluntary, but only the
beginning of voluntary actions; (for we will not to will, but to
act); and therefore falls least of all under deliberation and
compact; yet he who submits his will to the will of another, conveys
to that other the right of his strength and faculties. Insomuch as
when the rest have done the same, he to whom they have submitted,
hath so much power, as by the terror of it he can conform the wills
of particular men unto unity and concord.
[Sidenote: What civil society is.]
9. Now union thus made, is called a city or civil society; and also
a civil person. For when there is one will of all men, it is to be
esteemed for one person; and by the word _one_, it is to be known
and distinguished from all particular men, as having its own rights
and properties. Insomuch as neither any one citizen, nor all of them
together, (if we except him, whose will stands for the will of all),
is to be accounted a city. A _city_ therefore, (that we may define
it), is _one person_, whose will, by the compact of many men, is to
be received for the will of them all; so as he may use all the power
and faculties of each particular person to the maintenance of peace,
and for common defence.
[Sidenote: What a civil person is.]
10. But although every city be a civil person, yet every civil
person is not a city; for it may happen that many citizens, by the
permission of the city, may join together in one person, for the
doing of certain things. These now will be civil persons; as the
companies of merchants, and many other convents. But cities they are
not, because they have not submitted themselves to the will of the
company simply and in all things, but in certain things only
determined by the city, and on such terms as it is lawful for any
one of them to contend in judgment against the body itself of the
sodality; which is by no means allowable to a citizen against the
city. Such like societies, therefore, are civil persons subordinate
to the city.
[Sidenote: What it is to have the supreme power, what to be
subject.]
11. In every city, that man or council, to whose will each
particular man hath subjected his will so as hath been declared, is
said to have the _supreme power_, or _chief command_, or _dominion_.
Which power and right of commanding, consists in this, that each
citizen hath conveyed all his strength and power to that man or
council; which to have done, because no man can transfer his power
in a natural manner, is nothing else than to have parted with his
right of resisting. Each citizen, as also every subordinate civil
person, is called the _subject_ of him who hath the chief command.
[Sidenote: Two kinds of cities, natural, and by institution.]
12. By what hath been said, it is sufficiently showed in what manner
and by what degrees many natural persons, through desire of
preserving themselves and by mutual fear, have grown together into a
civil person, whom we have called a _city_. But they who submit
themselves to another for fear, either submit to him whom they fear,
or some other whom they confide in for protection. They act
according to the first manner, who are vanquished in war, that they
may not be slain; they according to the second, who are not yet
overcome, that they may not be overcome. The first manner receives
its beginning from natural power, and may be called the natural
beginning of a city; the latter from the council and constitution of
those who meet together, which is a beginning by institution. Hence
it is that there are two kinds of cities; the one natural, such as
the paternal and despotical; the other institutive, which may be
also called political. In the first, the lord acquires to himself
such citizens as he will; in the other, the citizens by their own
wills appoint a lord over themselves, whether he be one man or one
company of men, endued with the command in chief. But we will speak,
in the first place, of a city political or by institution; and next,
of a city natural.
-------
CHAPTER VI.
OF THE RIGHT OF HIM, WHETHER COUNCIL OR ONE MAN
ONLY, WHO HATH THE SUPREME POWER IN THE CITY.
1. There can no right be attributed to a multitude out of civil
society, nor any action to which they have not under seal
consented. 2. The right of the greater number consenting, is the
beginning of a city. 3. That every man retains a right to
protect himself according to his own free will, so long as there
is no sufficient regard had to his security. 4. That a coercive
power is necessary to secure us. 5. What the sword of justice
is. 6. That the sword of justice belongs to him, who hath the
chief command. 7. That the sword of war belongs to him also. 8.
All judicature belongs to him too. 9. The legislative power is
his only. 10. The naming of magistrates and other officers of
the city belongs to him. 11 Also the examination of all
doctrines. 12. Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable. 13. That the
command his citizens have granted is absolute, and what
proportion of obedience is due to him. 14. That the laws of the
city bind him not. 15. That no man can challenge a propriety to
anything against his will. 16. By the laws of the city only we
come to know what theft, murder, adultery, and injury is. 17.
The opinion of those who would constitute a city, where there
should not be any one endued with an absolute power. 18. The
marks of supreme authority. 19. If a city be compared with a
man, he that hath the supreme power is in order to the city, as
the human soul is in relation to the man. 20. That the supreme
command cannot by right be dissolved through their consents, by
whose compacts it was first constituted.
[Sidenote: There can no right be attributed to a multitude,
considered out of civil society; nor any action, to which
they have not given their particular consents.]
1. We must consider, first of all, what a multitude[8] of men,
gathering themselves of their own free wills into society, is;
namely, that it is not any one body, but many men, whereof each one
hath his own will and his peculiar judgment concerning all things
that may be proposed. And though by particular contracts each single
man may have his own right and propriety, so as one may say _this is
mine_, the other, _that is his_; yet will there not be anything of
which the whole multitude, as a person distinct from a single man,
can rightly say, this is _mine_, more than another’s. Neither must
we ascribe any action to the multitude, as its own; but if all or
more of them do agree, it will not be an action, but as many actions
as men. For although in some great sedition, it is commonly said,
that the people of that city have taken up arms; yet is it true of
those only who are in arms, or who consent to them. For the city,
which is one person, cannot take up arms against itself. Whatsoever,
therefore, is done by the multitude, must be understood to be done
by every one of those by whom it is made up; and that he, who being
in the multitude, and yet consented not, nor gave any helps to the
things that were done by it, must be judged to have done nothing.
Besides, in a multitude not yet reduced into one person, in that
manner as hath been said, there remains that same state of nature in
which all things belong to all men; and there is no place for _meum_
and _tuum_, which is called dominion and propriety, by reason that
that security is not yet extant, which we have declared above to be
necessarily requisite for the practice of the natural laws.
Footnote 8:
_Multitude, &c._] The doctrine of the power of a city over its
citizens, almost wholly depends on the understanding of the
difference which is between a multitude of men ruling, and a
multitude ruled. For such is the nature of a city, that a
multitude or company of citizens not only may have command, but
may also be subject to command; but in diverse senses. Which
difference I did believe was clearly enough explained in the first
article; but by the objections of many against those things which
follow, I discern otherwise. Wherefore it seemed good to me, to
the end I might make a fuller explication, to add these few
things.
By multitude, because it is a collective word, we understand more
than one: so as a multitude of men is the same with many men. The
same word, because it is of the singular number, signifies one
thing; namely, one multitude. But in neither sense can a multitude
be understood to have one will given to it by nature, but to each
a several; and therefore neither is any one action whatsoever to
be attributed to it. Wherefore a multitude cannot promise,
contract, acquire right, convey right, act, have, possess, and the
like, unless it be every one apart, and man by man; so as there
must be as many promises, compacts, rights, and actions, as men.
Wherefore a multitude is no natural person. But if the same
multitude do contract one with another, that the will of one man,
or the agreeing wills of the major part of them, shall be received
for the will of all; then it becomes one person. For it is endued
with a will, and therefore can do voluntary actions, such as are
commanding, making laws, acquiring and transferring of right, and
so forth; and it is oftener called the people, than the multitude.
We must therefore distinguish thus. When we say the people or
multitude wills, commands, or doth anything, it is understood that
the city which commands, wills and acts by the will of one, or the
concurring wills of more; which cannot be done but in an assembly.
But as oft as anything is said to be done by a multitude of men,
whether great or small, without the will of that man or assembly
of men, that is understood to be done by a subjected people; that
is, by many single citizens together; and not proceeding from one
will, but from diverse wills of diverse men, who are citizens and
subjects, but not a city.
[Sidenote: The beginning of a city is the right of the major part
agreeing.]
2. Next, we must consider that every one of the multitude, by
whose means there may be a beginning to make up the city, must
agree with the rest, that in those matters which shall be
propounded by any one in the assembly, that be received for the
will of all, which the major part shall approve of; for otherwise
there will be no will at all of a multitude of men, whose wills
and votes differ so variously. Now, if any one will not consent,
the rest, notwithstanding, shall among themselves constitute the
city without him. Whence it will come to pass, that the city
retains its primitive right against the dissenter; that is, the
right of war, as against an enemy.
[Sidenote: That every man retains a right of protecting himself
according to his own judgment, as long as he is not
secured.]
3. But because we said in the foregoing chapter, the sixth article,
that there was required to the security of men, not only their
consent, but also the subjection of their wills in such things as
were necessary to peace and defence; and that in that union and
subjection the nature of a city consisted; we must discern now in
this place, out of those things which may be propounded, discussed,
and stated in an assembly of men, all whose wills are contained in
the will of the major part, what things are necessary to peace and
common defence. But first of all, it is necessary to peace, that a
man be so far forth protected against the violence of others, that
he may live securely; that is, that he may have no just cause to
fear others, so long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men
altogether safe from mutual harms, so as they cannot be hurt or
injuriously killed, is impossible; and, therefore, comes not within
deliberation. But care may be had, there be no just cause of fear;
for security is the end wherefore men submit themselves to others;
which if it be not had, no man is supposed to have submitted himself
to aught, or to have quitted his right to all things, before that
there was a care had of his security.
[Sidenote: That a coercive power is necessary for security.]
4. It is not enough to obtain this security, that every one of those
who are now growing up into a city, do covenant with the rest,
either by words or writing, _not to steal_, _not to kill_, and to
observe the like laws; for the pravity of human disposition is
manifest to all, and by experience too well known how little
(removing the punishment) men are kept to their duties through
conscience of their promises. We must therefore provide for our
security, not by compacts, but by punishments; and there is then
sufficient provision made, when there are so great punishments
appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a greater evil to
have done it, than not to have done it. For all men, by a necessity
of nature, choose that which to them appears to be the less evil.
[Sidenote: What the sword of justice is.]
5. Now, the right of punishing is then understood to be given to any
one, when every man contracts not to assist him who is to be
punished. But I will call this right, _the sword of justice_. But
these kind of contracts men observe well enough, for the most part,
till either themselves or their near friends are to suffer.
[Sidenote: That the sword of justice belongs to him who hath the
chief command.]
6. Because, therefore, for the security of particular men, and, by
consequence, for the common peace, it is necessary that the right of
using the sword for punishment be transferred to some man or
council; that man or council is necessarily understood by right to
have the supreme power in the city. For he that by right punisheth
at his own discretion, by right compels all men to all things which
he himself wills; than which a greater command cannot be imagined.
[Sidenote: That the sword of war belongs to him also.]
7. But in vain do they worship peace at home, who cannot defend
themselves against foreigners; neither is it possible for them to
protect themselves against foreigners, whose forces are not united.
And therefore it is necessary for the preservation of particulars,
that there be some one council or one man, who hath the right to
arm, to gather together, to unite so many citizens, in all dangers
and on all occasions, as shall be needful for common defence against
the certain number and strength of the enemy; and again, as often as
he shall find it expedient, to make peace with them. We must
understand, therefore, that particular citizens have conveyed their
whole right of war and peace unto some one man or council; and that
this right, which we may call _the sword of war_, belongs to the
same man or council, to whom the sword of justice belongs. For no
man can by right compel citizens to take up arms and be at the
expenses of war, but he who by right can punish him who doth not
obey. Both swords therefore, as well this of war as that of justice,
even by the constitution itself of a city and essentially do belong
to the chief command.
[Sidenote: The power of judicature belongs to him.]
8. But because the right of the sword, is nothing else but to have
power by right to use the sword at his own will, it follows, that
the judgment of its right use pertains to the same party; for if the
power of judging were in one, and the power of executing in another,
nothing would be done. For in vain would he give judgment, who could
not execute his commands; or, if he executed them by the power of
another, he himself is not said to have the power of the sword, but
that other, to whom he is only an officer. All judgment therefore,
in a city, belongs to him who hath the swords; that is, to him who
hath the supreme authority.
[Sidenote: The legislative power is his also.]
9. Furthermore, since it no less, nay, it much more conduceth to
peace, to prevent brawls from arising than to appease them being
risen; and that all controversies are bred from hence, that the
opinions of men differ concerning _meum_ and _tuum_, _just_ and
_unjust_, _profitable_ and _unprofitable_, _good_ and _evil_,
_honest_ and _dishonest_, and the like; which every man esteems
according to his own judgment: it belongs to the same chief power to
make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by
which every man may know what may be called his, what another’s,
what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what
evil; that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoided in
our common course of life. But those rules and measures are usually
called the civil laws, or the laws of the city, as being the
commands of him who hath the supreme power in the city. And the
_civil laws_ (that we may define them) are nothing else but _the
commands of him who hath the chief authority in the city, for
direction of the future actions of his citizens_.
[Sidenote: That the naming of magistrates and officers belongs to
him also.]
10. Furthermore, since the affairs of the city, both those of war
and peace, cannot possibly be all administered by one man or one
council without officers and subordinate magistrates; and that it
appertaineth to peace and common defence, that they to whom it
belongs justly to judge of controversies, to search into
neighbouring councils, prudently to wage war, and on all hands
warily to attend the benefit of the city, should also rightly
exercise their offices; it is consonant to reason that they depend
on, and be chosen by him who hath the chief command both in war and
in peace.
[Sidenote: The examination of doctrine belongs to him likewise.]
11. It is also manifest, that all voluntary actions have their
beginning from, and necessarily depend on the will; and that the
will of doing or omitting aught, depends on the opinion of the good
and evil, of the reward or punishment which a man conceives he shall
receive by the act or omission: so as the actions of all men are
ruled by the opinions of each. Wherefore, by evident and necessary
inference, we may understand that it very much concerns the interest
of peace, that no opinions or doctrines be delivered to citizens, by
which they may imagine that either by right they may not obey the
laws of the city, that is, the commands of that man or council to
whom the supreme power is committed, or that it is lawful to resist
him, or that a less punishment remains for him that denies, than for
him that yields obedience. For if one command somewhat to be done
under penalty of natural death, another forbid it under pain of
eternal death, and both by their own right, it will follow that the
citizens, although innocent, are not only by right punishable, but
that the city itself is altogether dissolved. For no man can serve
two masters; nor is he less, but rather more a master, whom we
believe we are to obey for fear of damnation, than he whom we obey
for fear of temporal death. It follows therefore that this one,
whether man or court, to whom the city hath committed the supreme
power, have also this right; that he both judge what opinions[9] and
doctrines are enemies unto peace, and also that he forbid them to be
taught.
Footnote 9:
_Judge what opinions, &c._ There is scarce any principle, neither
in the worship of God nor in human sciences, from whence there may
not spring dissensions, discords, reproaches, and by degrees war
itself. Neither doth this happen by reason of the falsehood of the
principle, but of the disposition of men, who, seeming wise to
themselves, will needs appear such to all others. But though such
dissensions cannot be hindered from arising, yet may they be
restrained by the exercise of the supreme power, that they prove
no hindrance to the public peace. Of these kinds of opinions,
therefore, I have not spoken in this place. There are certain
doctrines wherewith subjects being tainted, they verily believe
that obedience may be refused to the city, and that by right they
may, nay ought, to oppose and fight against chief princes and
dignities. Such are those which, whether directly and openly, or
more obscurely and by consequence, require obedience to be given
to others beside them to whom the supreme authority is committed.
I deny not but this reflects on that power which many, living
under other government, ascribe to the chief head of the Church of
Rome, and also on that which elsewhere, out of that Church,
bishops require in their’s to be given to them; and last of all,
on that liberty which the lower sort of citizens, under pretence
of religion, do challenge to themselves. For what civil war was
there ever in the Christian world, which did not either grow from,
or was nourished by this root? The judgment therefore of
doctrines, whether they be repugnant to civil obedience or not,
and if they be repugnant, the power of prohibiting them to be
taught, I do here attribute to the civil authority. For since
there is no man who grants not to the city the judgment of those
things which belong to its peace and defence, and it is manifest
that the opinions which I have already recited do relate to its
peace; it follows necessarily, that the examination of those
opinions, whether they be such or not, must be referred to the
city; that is, to him who hath the supreme authority.
[Sidenote: Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable.]
12. Last of all, from this consideration, that each citizen hath
submitted his will to his who hath the supreme command in the city,
so as he may not employ his strength against him; it follows
manifestly, that whatsoever shall be done by him who commands, must
not be punished. For as he who hath not power enough, cannot punish
him naturally, so neither can he punish him by right, who by right
hath not sufficient power.
[Sidenote: That he hath an absolute dominion granted him by his
citizens, and what proportion of obedience is due unto
him.]
13. It is most manifest by what hath been said, that in every
perfect city, that is, where no citizen hath right to use his
faculties at his own discretion for the preservation of himself, or
where the right of the private sword is excluded; there is a supreme
power in some one, greater than which cannot by right be conferred
by men, or greater than which no mortal man can have over himself.
But that power, greater than which cannot by men be conveyed on a
man, we call _absolute_.[10] For whosoever hath so submitted his
will to the will of the city, that he can, unpunished, do any thing,
make laws, judge controversies, set penalties, make use at his own
pleasure of the strength and wealth of men, and all this by right;
truly he hath given him the greatest dominion that can be granted.
This same may be confirmed by experience, in all the cities which
are or ever have been. For though it be sometimes in doubt what man
or council hath the chief command, yet ever there is such a command
and always exercised, except in the time of sedition and civil war;
and then there are two chief commands made out of one. Now, those
seditious persons who dispute against absolute authority, do not so
much care to destroy it, as to convey it on others: for removing
this power, they together take away civil society, and a confusion
of all things returns. There is so much obedience joined to this
absolute right of the chief ruler, as is necessarily required for
the government of the city, that is to say, so much as that right of
his may not be granted in vain. Now this kind of obedience, although
for some reasons it may sometimes by right be denied, yet because a
greater cannot be performed, we will call it _simple_. But the
obligation to perform this grows not immediately from that contract,
by which we have conveyed all our right on the city; but immediately
from hence, that without obedience the city’s right would be
frustrate, and by consequence there would be no city constituted.
For it is one thing if I say, _I give you right to command what you
will_; another, if I say, _I will do whatsoever you command_. And
the command may be such, as I would rather die than do it.
Forasmuch, therefore, as no man can be bound to will being killed,
much less is he tied to that which to him is worse than death. If
therefore I be commanded to kill myself, I am not bound to do it.
For though I deny to do it, yet the right of dominion is not
frustrated; since others may be found, who being commanded will not
refuse to do it; neither do I refuse to do that, which I have
contracted to do. In like manner, if the chief ruler command any man
to kill him, he is not tied to do it; because it cannot be conceived
that he made any such covenant. Nor if he command to execute a
parent, whether he be innocent or guilty and condemned by the law;
since there are others who being commanded will do that, and a son
will rather die than live infamous and hated of all the world. There
are many other cases in which, since the commands are shameful to be
done by some and not by others, obedience may by right be performed
by these, and refused by those; and this without breach of that
absolute right which was given to the chief ruler. For in no case is
the right taken away from him, of slaying those who shall refuse to
obey him. But they who thus kill men, although by right given them
from him that hath it, yet if they use that right otherwise than
right reason requires, they sin against the laws of nature, that is,
against God.
Footnote 10:
_Absolute._] A popular state openly challengeth absolute dominion,
and the citizens oppose it not. For, in the gathering together of
many men, they acknowledge the face of a city; and even the
unskilful understand, that matters there are ruled by council. Yet
monarchy is no less a city than democraty; and absolute kings have
their counsellors, from whom they will take advice, and suffer
their power, in matters of greater consequence, to be guided but
not recalled. But it appears not to most men, how a city is
contained in the person of a king. And therefore they object
against absolute command: first, that if any man had such a right,
the condition of the citizens would be miserable. For thus they
think; he will take all, spoil all, kill all; and every man counts
it his only happiness, that he is not already spoiled and killed.
But why should he do thus? Not because he can; for unless he have
a mind to it, he will not do it. Will he, to please one or some
few, spoil all the rest? First, though by right, that is, without
injury to them, he may do it, yet can he not do it justly, that
is, without breach of the natural laws and injury against God. And
therefore there is some security for subjects in the oaths which
princes take. Next, if he could justly do it, or that he made no
account of his oath, yet appears there no reason why he should
desire it, since he finds no good in it. But it cannot be denied,
but a prince may sometimes have an inclination to do wickedly. But
grant then, that thou hadst given him a power which were not
absolute, but so much only as sufficed to defend thee from the
injuries of others; which, if thou wilt be safe, is necessary for
thee to give; are not all the same things to be feared? For he
that hath strength enough to protect all, wants not sufficiency to
oppress all. Here is no other difficulty then, but that human
affairs cannot be without some inconvenience. And this
inconvenience itself is in the citizens, not in the government.
For if men could rule themselves, every man by his own command,
that is to say, could they live according to the laws of nature,
there would be no need at all of a city, nor of a common coercive
power. Secondly, they object, that there is no dominion in the
Christian world absolute. Which, indeed, is not true; for all
monarchies, and all other states, are so. For although they who
have the chief command, do not all those things they would, and
what they know profitable to the city; the reason of that is, not
the defect of right in them, but the consideration of their
citizens, who busied about their private interest, and careless of
what tends to the public, cannot sometimes be drawn to perform
their duties without the hazard of the city. Wherefore princes
sometimes forbear the exercise of their right; and prudently remit
somewhat of the act, but nothing of their right.
[Sidenote: That he is not tied to observe the laws of the city.]
14. Neither can any man give somewhat to himself; for he is already
supposed to have what he can give himself. Nor can he be obliged to
himself; for the same party being both _the obliged_ and _the
obliger_, and the obliger having power to release the obliged, it
were merely in vain for a man to be obliged to himself; because he
can release himself at his own pleasure, and he that can do this is
already actually free. Whence it is plain, that the city is not tied
to the civil laws; for the civil laws are the laws of the city, by
which, if she were engaged, she should be engaged to herself.
Neither can the city be obliged to her citizen; because, if he will,
he can free her from her obligation; and he will, as oft as she
wills; for the will of every citizen is in all things comprehended
in the will of the city; the city therefore is free when she
pleaseth, that is, she is now actually free. But the will of a
council, or one who hath supreme authority given him, is the will of
the city: he therefore contains the wills of all particular
citizens. Therefore neither is he bound to the civil laws; for this
is to be bound to himself; nor to any of his citizens.
[Sidenote: That no man can challenge a propriety in aught against
him who hath the supreme power.]
15. Now because, as hath been shown above, before the constitution
of a city all things belonged to all men; nor is there that thing
which any man can so call his, as any other may not, by the same
right, claim as his own; for where all things are _common_, there
can be nothing _proper_ to any man; it follows, that _propriety_
received its beginning[11] when cities received their’s, and that
that only is _proper_ to each man, which he can keep by the laws and
the power of the whole city, that is, of him on whom its chief
command is conferred. Whence we understand, that each particular
citizen hath a _propriety_ to which none of his fellow-citizens hath
right, because they are tied to the same laws; but he hath no
propriety in which the chief ruler (whose commands are the laws,
whose will contains the will of each man, and who by every single
person is constituted the supreme judge) hath not a right. But
although there be many things which the city permits to its
citizens, and therefore they may sometimes go to law against their
chief; yet is not that action belonging to civil right, but to
natural equity. Neither is it concerning what[12] by right he may do
who hath the supreme power, but what he hath been willing should be
done; and therefore he shall be judge himself, as though (the equity
of the cause being well understood) he could not give wrong
judgment.
Footnote 11:
_Propriety received its beginning, &c._] What is objected by some,
that the propriety of goods, even before the constitution of
cities, was found in fathers of families, that objection is vain;
because I have already declared, that a family is a little city.
For the sons of a family have a propriety of their goods granted
them by their father, distinguished indeed from the rest of the
sons of the same family, but not from the propriety of the father
himself. But the fathers of divers families, who are subject
neither to any common father nor lord, have a common right in all
things.
Footnote 12:
_What by right he may do, &c._] As often as a citizen is granted
to have an action of law against the supreme, that is, against the
city, the question is not in that action, whether the city may by
right keep possession of the thing in controversy, but whether by
the laws formerly made she would keep it; for the law is the
declared will of the supreme. Since then the city may raise money
from the citizens under two titles, either as tribute, or as debt;
in the former case there is no action of law allowed, for there
can be no question whether the city have right to require tribute;
in the latter it is allowed, because the city will take nothing
from its citizens by fraud or cunning, and yet if need require,
all they have, openly. And therefore he that condemns this place,
saying, that by this doctrine it is easy for princes to free
themselves from their debts, he does it impertinently.
[Sidenote: It is known by the civil laws what theft, murder,
adultery, and injury are.]
16. Theft, murder, adultery, and all injuries, are forbid by the
laws of nature; but what is to be called _theft_, what _murder_,
what _adultery_, what _injury_ in a citizen, this is not to be
determined by the natural, but by the civil law. For not every
taking away of the thing which another possesseth, but only another
man’s goods, is theft; but what is our’s, and what another’s, is a
question belonging to the civil law. In like manner, not every
killing of a man is murder, but only that which the civil law
forbids; neither is all encounter with women adultery, but only that
which the civil law prohibits. Lastly, all breach of promise is an
injury, where the promise itself is lawful; but where there is no
right to make any compact, there can be no conveyance of it, and
therefore there can no injury follow, as hath been said in the
second chapter, Article 17. Now what we may contract for, and what
not, depends wholly upon the civil laws. The city of Lacedæmon
therefore rightly ordered, that those young men who could so take
away certain goods from others as not to be caught, should go
unpunished; for it was nothing else but to make a law, that what was
so acquired should be their own, and not another’s. Rightly also is
that man everywhere slain, whom we kill in war or by the necessity
of self-defence. So also that copulation which in one city is
matrimony, in another will be judged adultery. Also those contracts
which make up marriage in one citizen, do not so in another,
although of the same city; because that he who is forbidden by the
city, that is, by that one man or council whose the supreme power
is, to contract aught, hath no right to make any contract, and
therefore having made any, it is not valid, and by consequence no
marriage. But his contract which received no prohibition, was
therefore of force, and so was matrimony. Neither adds it any force
to any unlawful contracts, that they were made by an oath or
sacrament;[13] for those add nothing to the strengthening of the
contract, as hath been said above, Chap. II. Art. 22. What therefore
theft, what murder, what adultery, and in general what injury is,
must be known by the civil laws; that is, the commands of him who
hath the supreme authority.
Footnote 13:
_That they were made by an oath or sacrament, &c._] Whether
matrimony be a sacrament, (in which sense that word is used by
some divines), or not, it is not my purpose to dispute. Only I
say, that the legitimate contract of a man and woman to live
together, that is, granted by the civil law, whether it be a
sacrament or not, is surely a legitimate marriage; but that
copulation which the city hath prohibited is no marriage, since it
is of the essence of marriage to be a legitimate contract. There
were legitimate marriages in many places, as among the Jews, the
Grecians, the Romans, which yet might be dissolved. But with those
who permit no such contracts but by a law that they shall never be
broke, wedlock cannot be dissolved; and the reason is, because the
city hath commanded it to be indissoluble, not because matrimony
is a sacrament. Wherefore the ceremonies which at weddings are to
be performed in the temple, to bless, or, if I may say so, to
consecrate the husband and wife, will perhaps belong only to the
office of clergymen; all the rest namely, who, when, and by what
contracts marriages may be made, pertains to the laws of the city.
[Sidenote: The opinion of those who would constitute a city, where
there should not be any one endued with absolute power.]
17. This same supreme command and absolute power, seems so harsh to
the greatest part of men, as they hate the very naming of them;
which happens chiefly through want of knowledge, what human nature
and the civil laws are; and partly also through their default, who,
when they are invested with so great authority, abuse their power to
their own lust. That they may therefore avoid this kind of supreme
authority, some of them will have a city well enough constituted, if
they who shall be the citizens’ convening, do agree concerning
certain articles propounded, and in that convent agitated and
approved, and do command them to be observed, and punishments
prescribed to be inflicted on them who shall break them. To which
purpose, and also to the repelling of a foreign enemy, they appoint
a certain and limited return, with this condition, that if that
suffice not, they may call a new convention of estates. Who sees not
in a city thus constituted, that the assembly who prescribed those
things had an absolute power? If therefore the assembly continue, or
from time to time have a certain day and place of meeting, that
power will be perpetual. But if they wholly dissolve, either the
city dissolves with them, and so all is returned to the state of
war: or else there is somewhere a power left to punish those who
shall transgress the laws, whosoever or how many soever they be that
have it; which cannot possibly be without an absolute power. For he
that by right hath this might given, by punishments to restrain what
citizens he pleaseth, hath such a power as a greater cannot possibly
be given by any citizens.
[Sidenote: The notes of supreme authority.]
18. It is therefore manifest, that in every city there is some one
man, or council, or court, who by right hath as great a power over
each single citizen, as each man hath over himself considered out of
that civil state; that is, supreme and absolute, to be limited only
by the strength and forces of the city itself, and by nothing else
in the world. For if his power were limited, that limitation must
necessarily proceed from some greater power. For he that prescribes
limits, must have a greater power than he who is confined by them.
Now that confining power is either without limit, or is again
restrained by some other greater than itself; and so we shall at
length arrive to a power, which hath no other limit but that which
is the _terminus ultimus_ of the forces of all the citizens
together. That same is called the supreme command; and if it be
committed to a council, a supreme council, but if to one man, the
supreme lord of the city. Now the notes of supreme command are
these: to make and abrogate laws, to determine war and peace, to
know and judge of all controversies, either by himself, or by judges
appointed by him; to elect all magistrates, ministers, and
counsellors. Lastly, if there be any man who by right can do some
one action, which is not lawful for any citizen or citizens to do
beside himself, that man hath obtained the supreme power. For those
things which by right may not be done by any one or many citizens,
the city itself can only do. He therefore that doth those things,
useth the city’s right; which is the supreme power.
[Sidenote: If the city be compared with a man, he who hath the
supreme command is in order to the city, as the human
soul is to the man.]
19. They who compare a city and its citizens with a man and his
members, almost all say, that he who hath the supreme power in the
city is in relation to the whole city, such as the head is to the
whole man. But it appears by what hath been already said, that he
who is endued with such a power, whether it be a man or a court,
hath a relation to the city, not as that of the head, but of the
soul to the body. For it is the soul by which a man hath a will,
that is, can either will or nill; so by him who hath the supreme
power, and no otherwise, the city hath a will, and can either will
or nill. A court of counsellors is rather to be compared with the
head, or one counsellor, whose only counsel (if of any one alone)
the chief ruler makes use of in matters of greatest moment: for the
office of the head is to counsel, as the soul’s is to command.
[Sidenote: That the supreme power cannot by right be dissolved by
their consents, by whose compacts it was constituted;]
20. Forasmuch as the supreme command is constituted by virtue of the
compacts which each single citizen or subject mutually makes with
the other; but all contracts, as they receive their force from the
contractors, so by their consent they lose it again and are broken:
perhaps some may infer hence, that by the consent of all the
subjects together the supreme authority may be wholly taken away.
Which inference, if it were true, I cannot discern what danger would
thence by right arise to the supreme commanders. For since it is
supposed that each one hath obliged himself to each other; if any
one of them shall refuse, whatsoever the rest shall agree to do, he
is bound notwithstanding. Neither can any man without injury to me,
do that which by contract made with me he hath obliged himself not
to do. But it is not to be imagined that ever it will happen, that
all the subjects together, not so much as one excepted, will combine
against the supreme power. Wherefore there is no fear for rulers in
chief, that by any right they can be despoiled of their authority.
If, notwithstanding, it were granted that their right depended only
on that contract which each man makes with his fellow-citizen, it
might very easily happen that they might be robbed of that dominion
under pretence of right. For subjects being called either by the
command of the city, or seditiously flocking together, most men
think that the consents of all are contained in the votes of the
greater part; which in truth is false. For it is not from nature
that the consent of the major part should be received for the
consent of all, neither is it true in tumults; but it proceeds from
civil institution: and is then only true, when that man or court
which hath the supreme power, assembling his subjects, by reason of
the greatness of their number allows those that are elected a power
of speaking for those who elected them; and will have the major part
of voices, in such matters as are by him propounded to be discussed,
to be as effectual as the whole. But we cannot imagine that he who
is chief, ever convened his subjects with intention that they should
dispute his right; unless weary of the burthen of his charge, he
declared in plain terms that he renounces and abandons his
government. Now, because most men through ignorance esteem not the
consent of the major part of citizens only, but even of a very few,
provided they be of their opinion, for the consent of the whole
city; it may very well seem to them, that the supreme authority may
by right be abrogated, so it be done in some great assembly of
citizens by the votes of the greater number. But though a government
be constituted by the contracts of particular men with particulars,
yet its right depends not on that obligation only; there is another
tie also towards him who commands. For each citizen compacting with
his fellow, says thus: _I convey my right on this party, upon
condition that you pass yours to the same_: by which means, that
right which every man had before to use his faculties to his own
advantage, is now wholly translated on some certain man or council
for the common benefit. Wherefore what by the mutual contracts each
one hath made with the other, what by the donation of right which
every man is bound to ratify to him that commands, the government is
upheld by a double obligation from the citizens; first, that which
is due to their fellow-citizens; next, that which they owe to their
prince. Wherefore no subjects, how many soever they be, can with any
right despoil him who bears the chief rule of his authority, even
without his own consent.
-------
CHAPTER VII
OF THE THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT, DEMOCRACY,
ARISTOCRACY, MONARCHY.
1. That there are three kinds of government only, democracy,
aristocracy, monarchy. 2. That oligarchy is not a diverse form
of government distinct from aristocracy, nor anarchy any form at
all. 3. That a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate
monarchy. 4. That there cannot be a mixed state, fashioned out
of these several species. 5. That democracy, except there be
certain times and places of meeting prefixed, is dissolved. 6.
In a democracy the intervals of the times of meeting must be
short, or the administration of government during the interval
committed to some one. 7. In a democracy, particulars contract
with particulars to obey the people: the people is obliged to no
man. 8. By what acts aristocracy is constituted. 9. In an
aristocracy the nobles make no compact, neither are they obliged
to any citizen or to the whole people. 10. The nobles must
necessarily have their set meetings. 11. By what acts monarchy
is constituted. 12. Monarchy is by compact obliged to none for
the authority it hath received. 13. Monarchy is ever in the
readiest capacity to exercise all those acts which are requisite
to good government 14. What kind of sin that is, and what sort
of men are guilty of it, when the city performs not its office
towards the citizens, nor the citizens towards the city. 15. A
monarch made without limitation of time hath power to elect his
successor. 16. Of limited monarchs. 17. A monarch, retaining his
right of government, cannot by any promise whatsoever be
conceived to have parted with his right to the means necessary
to the exercise of his authority. 18. How a citizen is freed
from subjection.
[Sidenote: There are three kinds of government only; democracy,
aristocracy, and monarchy.]
1. We have already spoken of a city by institution in its genus; we
will now say somewhat of its species. As for the difference of
cities, it is taken from the difference of the persons to whom the
supreme power is committed. This power is committed either to _one
man_, or _council_, or some _one court_ consisting of many men.
Furthermore, a council of many men consists either of all the
citizens, insomuch as every man of them hath a right to vote, and an
interest in the ordering of the greatest affairs, if he will
himself; or of a part only. From whence there arise three sorts of
government; the one, when the power is in a council where every
citizen hath a right to vote; and it is called a _democracy_. The
other, when it is in a council, where not all, but some part only
have their suffrages; and we call it an _aristocracy_. The third is
that, when the supreme authority rests only in one; and it is styled
a _monarchy_. In the first, he that governs is called δῆμος, the
_people_; in the second, the _nobles_; in the third, the _monarch_.
[Sidenote: Oligarchy is no state of a city distinct from
aristocracy; neither is anarchy any state at all.]
2. Now, although ancient writers of politics have introduced three
other kinds of government opposite to these; to wit, _anarchy_ or
confusion to _democracy_; _oligarchy_, that is, the command of some
few, to _aristocracy_, and _tyranny_ to _monarchy_; yet are not
these three distinct forms of government, but three diverse titles
given by those who were either displeased with that present
government or those that bare rule. For men, by giving names, do
usually not only signify the things themselves, but also their own
affections, as love, hatred, anger, and the like. Whence it happens
that what one man calls a _democracy_, another calls an _anarchy_;
what one counts an _aristocracy_, another esteems an _oligarchy_;
and whom one titles a _king_, another styles him a _tyrant_. So as
we see, these names betoken not a diverse kind of government, but
the _diverse opinions_ of the subjects concerning him who hath the
supreme power. For first, who sees not that _anarchy_ is equally
opposite to all the aforenamed forms? For that word signifies that
there is no government at all, that is, not any city. But how is it
possible that _no city_ should be the species of _a city_?
Furthermore, what difference is there between an _oligarchy_, which
signifies the command of a _few_ or _grandees_, or an _aristocracy_,
which is that of the _prime_ or _chief heads_, more than that men
differ so among themselves, that the same things seem not good to
all men? Whence it happens that those persons, who by some are
looked on as the _best_, are by others esteemed to be the _worst_ of
all men.
[Sidenote: That a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate
monarchy.]
3. But men, by reason of their passions, will very hardly be
persuaded that a _kingdom_ and _tyranny_ are not diverse kinds of
cities; who though they would rather have the city subject to one
than many, yet do they not believe it to be well governed unless it
accord with their judgments. But we must discover by reason, and not
by passion, what the difference is between a king and a tyrant. But
first, they differ not in this, that a tyrant hath the greater
power; for greater than the supreme cannot be granted; nor in this,
that one hath a limited power, the other not; for he whose authority
is limited, is no king, but his subject that limits him. Lastly,
neither differ they in their manner of acquisition; for if in a
democratical or aristocratical government some one citizen should,
by force, possess himself of the supreme power, if he gain the
consent of all the citizens, he becomes a legitimate monarch; if
not, he is an enemy, not a tyrant. They differ therefore in the sole
exercise of their command, insomuch as he is said to be a king who
governs well, and he a tyrant that doth otherwise. The case
therefore is brought to this pass; that _a king_, legitimately
constituted in his government, if he seem to his subjects to rule
well and to their liking, they afford him the appellation of a
_king_; if not, they count him a _tyrant_. Wherefore we see a
_kingdom_ and _tyranny_ are not diverse forms of government, but one
and the self-same monarch hath the name of a _king_ given him in
point of honour and reverence to him, and of a _tyrant_ in way of
contumely and reproach. But what we frequently find in books said
against tyrants, took its original from Greek and Roman writers,
whose government was partly democratical, and partly aristocratical,
and therefore not tyrants only, but even kings were odious to them.
[Sidenote: That there can no mixed state be formed out of these
forenamed kinds of government.]
4. There are, who indeed do think it necessary that a supreme
command should be somewhere extant in a city; but if it should be in
any one, either man or council, it would follow, they say, that all
the citizens must be slaves. Avoiding this condition, they imagine
that there may be a certain form of government compounded of those
three kinds we have spoken of, yet different from each particular;
which they call a _mixed monarchy_, or _mixed aristocracy_, or
_mixed democracy_, according as any one of these three sorts shall
be more eminent than the rest. For example, if the naming of
magistrates and the arbitration of war and peace should belong to
the King, judicature to the Lords, and contribution of monies to the
People, and the power of making laws to all together, this kind of
state would they call a _mixed monarchy_ forsooth. But if it were
possible that there could be such a state, it would no whit
advantage the liberty of the subject. For as long as they all agree,
each single citizen is as much subject as possibly he can be: but if
they disagree, the state returns to a civil war and the right of the
private sword; which certainly is much worse than any subjection
whatsoever. But that there can be no such kind of government,[14]
hath been sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing chapter, art.
6-12.
Footnote 14:
_But that there can be no such kind of government._] Most men
grant, that a government ought not to be divided; but they would
have it moderated and bounded by some limits. Truly it is very
reasonable it should be so; but if these men, when they speak of
moderating and limiting, do understand dividing it, they make a
very fond distinction. Truly, for my part, I wish that not only
kings, but all other persons endued with supreme authority, would
so temper themselves as to commit no wrong, and only minding their
charges, contain themselves within the limits of the natural and
divine laws. But they who distinguish thus, they would have the
chief power bounded and restrained by others: which, because it
cannot be done but they who do set the limits must needs have some
part of the power, whereby they may be enabled to do it, the
government is properly divided, not moderated.
[Sidenote: That democracy, except it have certain times and places
of meeting prescribed, is dissolved.]
5. Let us see a little now, in the constituting of each form of
government what the constitutors do. Those who met together with
intention to erect a city, were almost in the very act of meeting, a
democracy. For in that they willingly met, they are supposed obliged
to the observation of what shall be determined by the major part;
which, while that convent lasts, or is adjourned to some certain
days and places, is a clear democracy. For that convent, whose will
is the will of all the citizens, hath the supreme authority; and
because in this convent every man is supposed to have a right to
give his voice, it follows that it is a democracy, by the definition
given in the first article of this chapter. But if they depart and
break up the convent, and appoint no time or place where and when
they shall meet again, the public weal returns to anarchy and the
same state it stood in before their meeting, that is, to the state
of all men warring against all. The people, therefore, retains the
supreme power, no longer than there is a certain day and place
publicly appointed and known, to which whosoever will may resort.
For except that be known and determined, they may either meet at
divers times and places, that is, in factions, or not at all; and
then it is no longer δῆμος, _the people_, but a dissolute multitude,
to whom we can neither attribute any action or right. Two things
therefore frame a democracy; whereof one, to wit, the perpetual
prescription of convents, makes δῆμον, _the people_; the other,
which is a plurality of voices, τὸ κράτος, or _the power_.
[Sidenote: In democracy, the intervals of the times of convening
must be short, or the administration of the government
committed to some one.]
6. Furthermore, it will not be sufficient for the people, so as to
maintain its supremacy, to have some certain known times and places
of meeting, unless that either the intervals of the times be of less
distance, than that anything may in the meantime happen whereby, by
reason of the defect of power, the city may be brought into some
danger; or at least that the exercise of the supreme authority be,
during the interval, granted to some one man or council. For unless
this be done, there is not that wary care and heed taken for the
defence and peace of single men, which ought to be; and therefore it
will not deserve the name of a city, because that in it, for want of
security, every man’s right of defending himself at his own pleasure
returns to him again.
[Sidenote: In a democracy, particulars contract with particulars to
obey the people: the people is obliged to no man.]
7. Democracy is not framed by contract of particular persons with
the _people_, but by mutual compacts of single men each with other.
But hence it appears, in the first place, that the persons
contracting must be in being before the contract itself. But the
_people_ is not in being before the constitution of government, as
not being any person, but a multitude of single persons; wherefore
there could then no contract pass between the people and the
subject. Now, if after that government is framed, the subject make
any contract with the people, it is in vain; because the people
contains within its will the will of that subject, to whom it is
supposed to be obliged; and therefore may at its own will and
pleasure disengage itself, and by consequence is now actually free.
But in the second place, that single persons do contract each with
other, may be inferred from hence; that in vain sure would the city
have been constituted, if the citizens had been engaged by no
contracts to do or omit what the city should command to be done or
omitted. Because, therefore, such kind of compacts must be
understood to pass as necessary to the making up of a city, but none
can be made (as is already shewed) between the subject and the
people; it follows, that they must be made between single citizens,
namely, that each man contract to submit his will to the will of the
major part, on condition that the rest also do the like. As if every
one should say thus: I give up my right unto the people for your
sake, on condition that you also deliver up yours for mine.
[Sidenote: By what acts an aristocracy is framed.]
8. An _aristocracy_ or council of nobles endowed with supreme
authority, receives its original from a democracy, which gives up
its right unto it. Where we must understand that certain men
distinguished from others, either by eminence of title, blood, or
some other character, are propounded to the people, and by plurality
of voices are elected; and being elected, the whole right of the
people or city is conveyed on them, insomuch as whatsoever the
people might do before, the same by right may this court of elected
nobles now do. Which being done, it is clear that the people,
considered as one person, its supreme authority being already
transferred on these, is no longer now in being.
[Sidenote: In an aristocracy the nobles make no contract, nor are
they obliged to any citizen, or to the whole people.]
9. As in democracy the people, so in an aristocracy the court of
nobles is free from all manner of obligation. For seeing subjects
not contracting with the people, but by mutual compacts among
themselves, were tied to all that the people did; hence also they
were tied to that act of the people, in resigning up its right of
government into the hands of nobles. Neither could this court,
although elected by the people, be by it obliged to anything. For
being elected, the people is at once dissolved, as was declared
above, and the authority it had as being a person, utterly
vanisheth. Wherefore the obligation which was due to the _person_,
must also vanish, and perish together with it.
[Sidenote: The nobles must necessarily have their set meetings.]
10. _Aristocracy_ hath these considerations, together with
_democracy_. First, that without an appointment of some certain
times and places, at which the court of nobles may meet, it is no
longer a court, or one person, but a dissolute multitude without any
supreme power. Secondly, that the times of their assembling cannot
be disjoined by long intervals without prejudice to the supreme
power, unless its administration be transferred to some one man. Now
the reasons why this happens, are the same which we set down in the
fifth article.
[Sidenote: By what acts a monarchy is framed.]
11. As an _aristocracy_, so also a _monarchy_ is derived from the
power of the _people_, transferring its right, that is, its
authority on one man. Here also we must understand, that some _one_
man, either by name or some other token, is propounded to be taken
notice of above all the rest; and that by a plurality of voices the
whole right of the people is conveyed on him; insomuch as whatsoever
the people could do before he were elected, the same in every
respect may he by right now do, being elected. Which being done, the
people is no longer one _person_, but a rude multitude, as being
only one before by virtue of the supreme command, whereof they now
have made a conveyance from themselves on this one man.
[Sidenote: That the monarch is by compact obliged to none for the
authority he hath received.]
12. And therefore neither doth the monarch oblige himself to any for
the command he receives. For he receives it from the people; but as
hath been shewed above, the people, as soon as that act is done,
ceaseth to be a _person_; but the _person_ vanishing, obligation to
the _person_ vanisheth. The subjects therefore are tied to perform
obedience to the monarch, by those compacts only by which they
mutually obliged themselves to the observation of all that the
people should command them, that is, to obey that _monarch_, if he
were made by the _people_.
[Sidenote: A monarch is ever in the readier capacity to exercise all
those acts which are requisite to well governing.]
13. But a _monarchy_ differs as well from an _aristocracy_ as a
_democracy_, in this chiefly; that in those there must be certain
set times and places for deliberation and consultation of affairs,
that is, for the actual exercise of it in all times and places. For
the people or the nobles not being _one natural person_, must
necessarily have their meetings. The _monarch_, who is one by
nature, is always in a present capacity to execute his authority.
[Sidenote: What kind of sin that is, and what sort of men are guilty
of it, when the city performs not its office to the
citizens, nor the citizens towards the city.]
14. Because we have declared above, (in art. 7, 9, 12), that they
who have gotten the _supreme command_, are by no compacts obliged to
any man, it necessarily follows, that they can do no _injury_ to the
subjects. For _injury_, according to the definition made in chap.
III. art. 3, is nothing else but a breach of contract; and therefore
where no contracts have part, there can be no injury. Yet the
people, the nobles, and the monarch may diverse ways transgress
against the other laws of nature, as by cruelty, iniquity,
contumely, and other like vices, which come not under this strict
and exact notion of _injury_. But if the subject yield not obedience
to the supreme, he will in propriety of speech be said to be
_injurious_, as well to his fellow-subjects, because each man hath
compacted with the other to obey; as to his _chief ruler_, in
resuming that right which he hath given him, without his consent.
And in a _democracy_ or _aristocracy_, if anything be decreed
against any _law of nature_, the city itself, that is, the civil
person sins not, but those subjects only by whose votes it was
decreed; for sin is a consequence of the natural express will, not
of the political, which is artificial. For if it were otherwise,
they would be guilty by whom the decree was absolutely disliked. But
in a _monarchy_, if the _monarch_ make any decree against the _laws
of nature_, he sins himself; because in him the civil will and the
natural are all one.
[Sidenote: A monarch made without limitation of time, may elect his
successors.]
15. The people who are about to make a _monarch_, may give him the
_supremacy_ either simply without limitation of time, or for a
certain season and time determined. If simply, we must understand
that he who receives it, hath the self-same power which they had who
gave it. On the same grounds, therefore, that the _people_ by right
could make him a monarch, may he make another monarch. Insomuch as
the _monarch_ to whom the command is simply given, receives a right
not of _possession_ only, but of _succession_ also; so as he may
declare whom he pleaseth for his successor.
[Sidenote: Of limited monarchs.]
16. But if the power be given for a time limited, we must have
regard to somewhat more than the bare gift only. First, whether the
_people_ conveying its authority, left itself any right to meet at
certain times and places, or not. Next, if it have reserved this
power, whether it were done so as they might meet before that time
were expired, which they prescribed to the monarch. Thirdly, whether
they were contented to meet only at the will of that temporary
monarch, and not otherwise. Suppose now the _people_ had delivered
up its power to some one man for term of life only; which being
done, let us suppose in the first place, that every man departed
from the council without making any order at all concerning the
place, where after his death they should meet again to make a new
election. In this case, it is manifest by the fifth article of this
chapter, that the _people_ ceaseth to be a _person_, and is become a
dissolute multitude; every one whereof hath an equal, to wit, a
natural right to meet with whom he lists at divers times, and in
what places shall best please him; nay, and if he can, engross the
supreme power to himself, and settle it on his own head. What
monarch soever, therefore, hath a command in such a condition, he is
bound by the _law of nature_, set down in chap. III. art. 8, _of not
returning evil for good_, prudently to provide that by his death the
city suffer not a dissolution; either by appointing a certain day
and place, in which those subjects of his, who have a mind to it,
may assemble themselves, or else by nominating a successor; whether
of these shall to him seem most conducible to their common benefit.
He therefore, who on this foresaid manner hath received his command
during life, hath an absolute power, and may at his discretion
dispose of the succession. In the next place, if we grant that the
_people_ departed not from the election of the _temporary monarch_,
before they decreed a certain time and place of meeting after his
death; then the monarch being dead, the authority is confirmed in
the people, not by any new acts of the subjects, but by virtue of
the former right. For all the supreme command, as _dominion_, was in
the people; but the use and exercise of it was only in the temporary
monarch, as in one that takes the benefit, but hath not the right.
But if the _people_ after the election of a _temporary monarch_,
depart not from the court before they have appointed certain times
and places to convene during the time prescribed him; as the
dictators in ancient times were made by the people of Rome; such an
one is not to be accounted a monarch, but the prime officer of the
people. And if it shall seem good, the people may deprive him of his
office even before that time; as the people of Rome did, when they
conferred an equal power on Minutius, master of the horse, with
Quintus Fabius Maximus, whom before they had made dictator. The
reason whereof is, that it is not to be imagined, that he, whether
man or council, who hath the readiest and most immediate power to
act, should hold his command on such terms, as not to be able
actually to execute it; for command is nothing else but a right of
commanding, as oft as nature allows it possible. Lastly, if the
_people_ having declared a _temporary monarch_, depart from the
court on such terms, as it shall not be lawful for them to meet
without the command of the monarch, we must understand the people to
be immediately dissolved, and that his authority, who is thus
declared, is absolute; forasmuch as it is not in the power of all
the subjects to frame the city anew, unless he give consent who hath
now alone the authority. Nor matters it, that he hath perhaps made
any promise to assemble his subjects on some certain times; since
there remains no _person_ now in being, but at his discretion, to
whom the promise was made. What we have spoken of these four cases
of a _people_ electing a _temporary monarch_, will be more clearly
explained by comparing them with an _absolute monarch_ who hath no
heir-apparent. For the people is lord of the subject in such a
manner, as there can be no heir but whom itself doth appoint.
Besides, the spaces between the times of the subjects’ meeting, may
be fitly compared to those times wherein the monarch sleeps; for in
either the _acts_ of commanding cease, the _power_ remains.
Furthermore, to dissolve the convent, so as it cannot meet again, is
the death of the _people_; just as sleeping, so as he can never wake
more, is the death of a man. As therefore a king who hath no heir,
going to his rest so as never to rise again, that is, dying, if he
commit the exercise of his regal authority to any one till he awake,
does by consequence give him the succession; the _people_ also
electing a _temporary monarch_, and not reserving a power to
convene, delivers up to him the whole dominion of the country.
Furthermore, as a king going to sleep for some season, entrusts the
administration of his kingdom to some other, and waking takes it
again; so the people having elected a _temporary monarch_, and
withal retaining a right to meet at a certain day and place, at that
day receives its supremacy again. And as a king who hath committed
the execution of his authority to another, himself in the meanwhile
waking, can recal this commission again when he pleaseth; so the
_people_, who during the time prescribed to the _temporary monarch_
doth by right convene, may if they please deprive the monarch of his
authority. Lastly, the king, who commits his authority to another
while himself sleeps, not being able to wake again till he whom he
entrusted give consent, loses at once both his power and his life;
so the people, who hath given the supreme power to a temporary
monarch in such sort as they cannot assemble without his command, is
absolutely dissolved, and the power remains with him whom they have
chosen.
[Sidenote: A monarch retaining his right of government, cannot, by
any promise whatsoever, be conceived to have parted with
his right to the means necessary to the exercise of his
authority.]
17. If the monarch _promise_ aught to any one or many subjects
together, by consequence whereof the exercise of his power may
suffer prejudice, that _promise_ or _compact_, whether made by oath
or without it, is null. For all _compact_ is a conveyance of right,
which by what hath been said in the fourth article of the second
chapter, requires meet and proper signs of the will in the conveyer.
But he who sufficiently signifies his will of retaining the end,
doth also sufficiently declare that he quits not his right to the
means necessary to that end. Now he who hath promised to part with
somewhat necessary to the supreme power, and yet retains the power
itself, gives sufficient tokens that he no otherwise promised it,
than so far forth as the power might be retained without it.
Whensoever therefore it shall appear, that what is promised cannot
be performed without prejudice to the power, the promise must be
valued as not made, that is, of no effect.
[Sidenote: By what means a subject is freed from his subjection.]
18. We have seen how subjects, nature dictating, have obliged
themselves by mutual compacts to obey the supreme power. We will see
now by what means it comes to pass, that they are released from
these bonds of obedience. And first of all, this happens by
_rejection_, namely, if a man cast off or forsake, but convey not
the _right of his command_ on some other. For what is thus rejected,
is openly exposed to all alike, catch who catch can; whence again,
by the right of nature, every subject may heed the preservation of
himself according to his own judgment. In the second place, if the
kingdom fall into the power of the enemy, so as there can no more
opposition be made against them, we must understand that he who
before had the supreme authority, hath now lost it: for when the
subjects have done their full endeavour to prevent their falling
into the enemy’s hands, they have fulfilled those contracts of
obedience which they made each with other; and what, being
conquered, they promise afterwards to avoid death, they must with no
less endeavour labour to perform. Thirdly, in a monarchy, (for a
democracy and aristocracy cannot fail), if there be no successor,
all the subjects are discharged from their obligations; for no man
is supposed to be tied he knows not to whom; for in such a case it
were impossible to perform aught. And by these three ways, all
subjects are restored from their civil subjection to that liberty
which all men have to all things; to wit, natural and savage; for
the natural state hath the same proportion to the civil, (I mean,
liberty to subjection), which passion hath to reason, or a beast to
a man. Furthermore, each subject may lawfully be freed from his
subjection by the will of him who hath the supreme power, namely, if
he change his soil; which may be done two ways, either by
permission, as he who gets license to dwell in another country; or
command, as he who is banished. In both cases, he is free from the
laws of his former country; because he is tied to observe those of
the latter.
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CHAPTER VIII.
OF THE RIGHTS OF LORDS OVER THEIR SERVANTS.
1. What lord and servant signify. 2. The distinction of servants,
into such as upon trust enjoy their natural liberty, and slaves,
or such as serve being imprisoned or bound in fetters. 3. The
obligation of a servant arises from the liberty of body allowed
him by his lord. 4. Servants that are bound, are not by any
compacts tied to their lords. 5. Servants have no propriety in
their goods against their lord. 6. The lord may sell his
servant, or alienate him by testament 7. The lord cannot injure
his servant. 8. He that is lord of the lord, is lord also of his
servants. 9. By what means servants are freed. 10. Dominion over
beasts belongs to the right of nature.
[Sidenote: What lord and servant are.]
1. In the two foregoing chapters we have treated of an _institutive_
or _framed_ government, as being that which receives its original
from the consent of many, who by contract and faith mutually given
have obliged each other. Now follows what may be said concerning a
_natural_ government; which may also be called _acquired_, because
it is that which is gotten by power and natural force. But we must
know in the first place, by what means the right of dominion may be
gotten over the persons of men. Where such a right is gotten, there
is a kind of a little kingdom; for to be a _king_, is nothing else
but to have dominion over many persons; and thus a great family is a
kingdom, and a little kingdom a family. Let us return again to the
state of nature, and consider men as if but even now sprung out of
the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity,
without all kind of engagement to each other. There are but three
ways only, whereby one can have a dominion over the person of
another; whereof the first is, if by mutual contract made between
themselves, for peace and self-defence’s sake, they have willingly
given up themselves to the power and authority of some man, or
council of men; and of this we have already spoken. The second is,
if a man taken prisoner in the wars, or overcome, or else
distrusting his own forces, to avoid death, promises the conqueror
or the stronger party his _service_, that is, to do all whatsoever
he shall command him. In which contract, the good which the
vanquished or inferior in strength doth receive, is the grant of his
life, which by the right of war in the natural state of men he might
have been deprived of; but the good which he promises, is his
service and obedience. By virtue therefore of this promise, there is
as absolute service and obedience due from the vanquished to the
vanquisher, as possibly can be, excepting what repugns the divine
laws; for he who is obliged to obey the commands of any man before
he knows what he will command him, is simply and without any
restriction tied to the performance of all commands whatsoever. Now
he that is thus tied, is called a _servant_; he to whom he is tied,
a _lord_. Thirdly, there is a right acquired over the person of a
man by generation; of which kind of acquisition somewhat shall be
spoken in the following chapter.
[Sidenote: The distinction of servants, into such as upon trust
enjoy their natural liberty, and slaves, or such as serve
being imprisoned or fettered.]
2. Every one that is taken in the war, and hath his life spared him,
is not supposed to have contracted with his lord; for every one is
not trusted with so much of his natural liberty, as to be able, if
he desired it, either to fly away, or quit his service, or contrive
any mischief to his lord. And these serve indeed, but within prisons
or bound within irons; and therefore they were called not by the
common name of _servant_ only, but by the peculiar name of _slave_;
even as now at this day, _un serviteur_, and _un serf_, or _un
esclave_ have diverse significations.
[Sidenote: The obligation of a servant ariseth from that freedom
which is granted him by his lord.]
3. The obligation therefore of a _servant_ to his _lord_, ariseth
not from a simple grant of his life; but from hence rather, that he
keeps him not bound or imprisoned. For all obligation derives from
contract; but where there is no trust, there can be no contract, as
appears by chap. ii. art. 9; where a compact is defined to be the
promise of him who is trusted. There is therefore a confidence and
trust which accompanies the benefit of pardoned life, whereby the
_lord_ affords him his corporal liberty; so that if no obligation
nor bonds of contract had happened, he might not only have made his
escape, but also have killed his lord who was the preserver of his
life.
[Sidenote: Servants that are bound, are not obliged to their lord by
any contract.]
4. Wherefore such kind of _servants_ as are restrained by
imprisonment or bonds, are not comprehended in that definition of
_servants_ given above; because those serve not for the contract’s
sake, but to the end they may not suffer. And therefore if they fly,
or kill their _lord_, they offend not against the laws of nature.
For to bind any man, is a plain sign that the binder supposes him
that is bound, not to be sufficiently tied by any other obligation.
[Sidenote: Servants have no propriety in their goods against their
lord.]
5. The lord therefore hath no less dominion over a servant that is
not, than over one that is bound; for he hath a supreme power over
both, and may say of his servant no less than of another thing,
whether animate or inanimate, _this is mine_. Whence it follows,
that whatsoever the servant had before his servitude, that
afterwards becomes the lord’s; and whatsoever he hath gotten, it was
gotten for his lord. For he that can by right dispose of the
_person_ of a man, may surely dispose of all those things which that
_person_ could dispose of. There is therefore nothing which the
servant may retain as his own against the will of his lord; yet hath
he, by his lord’s distribution, a propriety and dominion over his
own goods: insomuch as one servant may keep and defend them against
the invasion of his fellow-servant, in the same manner as hath been
shewed before, that a subject hath nothing properly _his own_
against the will of the supreme authority, but every subject hath a
propriety against his fellow-subject.
[Sidenote: The lord may sell his servant, or alienate him by
testament.]
6. Since therefore both the servant himself, and all that belongs to
him are his lord’s, and by the right of nature every man may dispose
of his own in what manner he pleases; the lord may either sell, lay
to pledge, or by testament convey the dominion he hath over his
servant, according to his own will and pleasure.
[Sidenote: The lord cannot be injurious to his servant.]
7. Furthermore, what hath before been demonstrated concerning
subjects in an _institutive_ government, namely, that he who hath
the supreme power can do his subject no injury; is true also
concerning _servants_, because they have subjected their will to the
will of the Lord. Wherefore, whatsoever he doth, it is done with
their will; but no injury can be done to him that willeth it.
[Sidenote: He that is lord of the lord, is lord also of his
servants.]
8. But if it happen that the _lord_, either by captivity or
voluntary subjection, doth become a _servant_ or _subject_ to
another, that other shall not only be lord of him, but also of his
_servants_; supreme lord over these, immediate lord over him. Now
because not the servant only, but also all he hath, are his lord’s;
therefore his servants now belong to this man, neither can the
mediate lord dispose otherwise of them than shall seem good to the
supreme. And therefore, if sometime in civil governments the lord
have an absolute power over his servants, that is supposed to be
derived from the right of nature, and not constituted, but slightly
passed over by the civil law.
[Sidenote: By what means servants are freed.]
9. A servant is by the same manner freed from his servitude, that a
subject in an institutive government is freed from his subjection.
First, if his lord enfranchise him; for the right which the servant
transferred to his lord over himself, the same may the lord restore
to the servant again. And this manner of bestowing of liberty is
called _manumission_; which is just as if a city should permit a
citizen to convey himself under the jurisdiction of some other city.
Secondly, if the lord cast off his servant from him; which in a city
is _banishment_; neither differs it from _manumission_ in effect,
but in manner only. For there, liberty is granted as a favour, here,
as a punishment: in both, the dominion is renounced. Thirdly, if the
servant be taken prisoner, the old servitude is abolished by the
new; for as all other things, so servants also are acquired by war,
whom in equity the lord must protect, if he will have them to be
his. Fourthly, the servant is freed for want of knowledge of a
successor, the lord dying (suppose) without any testament or heir.
For no man is understood to be obliged, unless he know to whom he is
to perform the obligation. Lastly, the servant that is put in bonds,
or by any other means deprived of his corporal liberty, is freed
from that other obligation of contract. For there can be no contract
where there is no trust, nor can that faith be broken which is not
given. But the _lord_ who himself serves another, cannot so free his
_servants_, but that they must still continue under the power of the
supreme; for, as hath been shewed before, such servants are not his,
but the supreme lord’s.
[Sidenote: The dominion over beasts is by the right of nature.]
10. We get a right over irrational creatures, in the same manner
that we do over the persons of men; to wit, by force and natural
strength. For if in the state of nature it is lawful for every one,
by reason of that war which is of all against all, to subdue and
also to kill men as oft as it shall seem to conduce unto their good;
much more will the same be lawful against brutes; namely, at their
own discretion to reduce those to servitude, which by art may be
tamed and fitted for use, and to persecute and destroy the rest by a
perpetual war as dangerous and noxious. Our dominion therefore over
beasts, hath its original from the _right of nature_, not from
_divine positive right_. For if such a right had not been before the
publishing of the Sacred Scriptures, no man by right might have
killed a beast for his food, but he to whom the divine pleasure was
made manifest by holy writ; a most hard condition for men indeed,
whom the beasts might devour without injury, and yet they might not
destroy them. Forasmuch therefore as it proceeds from the right of
nature, that a beast may kill a man, it is also by the same right
that a man may slay a beast.
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CHAPTER IX.
OF THE RIGHT OF PARENTS OVER THEIR CHILDREN, AND
OF HEREDITARY GOVERNMENT.
1. Paternal dominion ariseth not from generation. 2. Dominion over
infants belongs to him or her who first hath them in their
power. 3. Dominion over infants is originally the mother’s. 4.
The exposed infant is his, from whom he receives his
preservation. 5. The child that hath one parent a subject, and
the other a sovereign, belongs to him or her in authority. 6. In
such a conjunction of man and woman, as neither hath command
over the other, the children are the mother’s, unless by compact
or civil law it be otherwise determined. 7. Children are no less
subject to their parents, than servants to their lords and
subjects to their princes. 8. Of the honour of parents and
lords. 9. Wherein liberty consists, and the difference of
subjects and servants. 10. There is the same right over subjects
in an hereditary government, which there is in an institutive
government. 11. The question concerning the right of succession
belongs only to monarchy. 12. A monarch may by his will and
testament dispose of his supreme authority: 13. Or give it, or
sell it. 14. A monarch dying without testament, is ever supposed
to will that a monarch should succeed him: 15. And some one of
his children: 16. And a male rather than female: 17. And the
eldest rather than the younger: 18. And his brother, if he want
issue, before all others. 19. In the same manner that men
succeed to the power, do they also succeed to the right of
succession.
[Sidenote: Paternal dominion ariseth not from generation.]
1. SOCRATES _is a man, and therefore a living creature_, is right
reasoning; and that most evident, because there is nothing needful
to the acknowledging of the truth of the consequence, but that the
word _man_ be understood; because _a living creature_ is in the
definition itself of _a man_, and every one makes up the proposition
which was desired, namely this, _man is a living creature_. And
this, _Sophroniscus is Socrates’ father, and therefore his lord_, is
perhaps a true inference, but not evident; because the word _lord_
is not in the definition of _a father_: wherefore it is necessary,
to make it more evident, that the connexion of _father_ and _lord_
be somewhat unfolded. Those that have hitherto endeavoured to prove
the dominion of a parent over his children, have brought no other
argument than that of _generation_; as if it were of itself evident,
that what is begotten by me is mine; just as if a man should think,
that because there is a triangle, it appears presently, without any
further discourse, that its angles are equal to two right. Besides,
since dominion, that is, supreme power is indivisible, insomuch as
no man can serve two masters; but two persons, male and female, must
concur in the act of generation; it is impossible that dominion
should at all be acquired by generation only. Wherefore we will,
with the more diligence, in this place inquire into the original of
_paternal government_.
[Sidenote: Dominion over infants belongs to him who first hath them
in his power.]
2. We must therefore return to the state of nature, in which, by
reason of the equality of nature, all men of riper years are to be
accounted equal. There _by right of nature_ the conqueror is lord of
the conquered. By the right therefore of _nature_, the dominion over
the infant first belongs to him who first hath him in his power. But
it is manifest that he who is newly born, is in the _mother’s_ power
before any others; insomuch as she may rightly, and at her own will,
either breed him up or adventure him to fortune.
[Sidenote: Dominion over infants is originally the mother’s.]
3. If therefore she breed him, because the state of nature is the
state of war, she is supposed to bring him up on this condition;
that being grown to full age he become not her enemy; which is, that
he obey her. For since by natural necessity we all desire that which
appears good unto us, it cannot be understood that any man hath on
such terms afforded life to another, that he might both get strength
by his years, and at once become an enemy. But each man is an enemy
to that other, whom he neither obeys nor commands. And thus in the
state of nature, every woman that bears children, becomes both a
_mother_ and a _lord_. But what some say, that in this case the
_father_, by reason of the pre-eminence of sex, and not the _mother_
becomes _lord_, signifies nothing. For both reason shows the
contrary; because the inequality of their natural forces is not so
great, that the man could get the dominion over the woman without
war. And custom also contradicts not; for women, namely Amazons,
have in former times waged war against their adversaries, and
disposed of their children at their own wills. And at this day, in
divers places women are invested with the principal authority;
neither do their husbands dispose of their children, but themselves;
which in truth they do _by the right of nature_; forasmuch as they
who have the supreme power, are not tied at all (as hath been
shewed) to the civil laws. Add also, that in the state of nature it
cannot be known who is the _father_, but by the testimony of the
_mother_; the child therefore is his whose the mother will have it,
and therefore her’s. Wherefore original dominion over _children_
belongs to the _mother_: and among men no less than other creatures,
the birth follows the belly.
[Sidenote: The exposed infant is his that preserves him.]
4. The dominion passes from the mother to others, divers ways.
First, if she quit and forsake her right by _exposing_ the child. He
therefore that shall bring up the child thus exposed, shall have the
same dominion over it which the mother had. For that life which the
mother had given it, (not by _getting_ but _nourishing_ it), she now
by _exposing_ takes from it. Wherefore the obligation also which
arose from the benefit of life, is by this exposition made void. Now
the preserved oweth all to the preserver, whether in regard of his
education as to a _mother_, or of his service as to a _lord_. For
although the mother in the state of nature, where all men have a
right to all things, may recover her son again, namely, by the same
right that anybody else might do it; yet may not the son rightly
transfer himself again unto his mother.
[Sidenote: The son of a subject and chief, is his that commands.]
5. Secondly, if the mother be taken prisoner, her son is his that
took her; because that he who hath dominion over the person, hath
also dominion over all belonging to the person; wherefore over the
son also, as hath been shewed in the foregoing chapter, in the fifth
article. Thirdly, if the mother be a subject under what government
soever, he that hath the supreme authority in that government, will
also have the dominion over him that is born of her; for he is lord
also of the mother, who is bound to obey him in all things.
Fourthly, if a woman for society’s sake give herself to a man on
this condition, that he shall bear the sway; he that receives his
being from the contribution of both parties, is the _father’s_, in
regard of the command he hath over the _mother_. But if a woman
bearing rule shall have children by a subject, the children are the
_mother’s_; for otherwise the woman can have no children without
prejudice to her authority. And universally, if the society of the
male and female be such an union, as the one have subjected himself
to the other, the children belong to him or her that commands.
[Sidenote: In such a conjunction of male and female, as neither hath
the commanding power over the other, the children are the
mother’s; except by pact or civil law it be otherwise
determined.]
6. But in the state of nature, if a man and woman contract so, as
neither is subject to the command of the other, the children are the
mother’s, for the reasons above given in the third article, unless
by pacts it be otherwise provided. For the _mother_ may by pact
dispose of her right as she lists; as heretofore hath been done by
the Amazons, who of those children which have been begotten by their
neighbours, have by pact allowed them the _males_, and retained
_females_ to themselves. But in a civil government, if there be a
contract of marriage between a man and woman, the children are the
_father’s_; because in all cities, to wit, constituted of _fathers_,
not _mothers_ governing their families, the domestical command
belongs to the man; and such a contract, if it be made according to
the civil laws, is called matrimony. But if they agree only to lie
together, the children are the _father’s_ or the _mother’s_
variously, according to the differing civil laws of divers cities.
[Sidenote: Children are no less subject to their parents, than
servants to their lords, and subjects to their city.]
7. Now because, by the third article, the _mother is originally lord
of her children_, and from her the father, or somebody else by
derived right; it is manifest that the children are no less subject
to those by whom they are nourished and brought up, than servants to
their lords, and subjects to him who bears the supreme rule; and
that a parent cannot be injurious to his son, as long as he is under
his power. A son also is freed from subjection in the same manner as
a subject and servant are. For _emancipation_ is the same thing with
_manumission_, and _abdication_ with _banishment_.
[Sidenote: Of the honour due to parents and lords.]
8. The _enfranchised son_ or _released servant_, do now stand in
less fear of their _lord_ and _father_, being deprived of his
natural and lordly power over them; and, if regard be had to true
and inward honour, do honour him less than before. For _honour_, as
hath been said in the section above, is nothing else but the
estimation of another’s power; and therefore he that hath least
power, hath always least _honour_. But it is not to be imagined,
that the _enfranchiser_ ever intended so to match the _enfranchised_
with himself, as that he should not so much as acknowledge a
benefit, but should so carry himself in all things as if he were
become wholly his equal. It must therefore be ever understood, that
he who is freed from subjection, whether he be a _servant_, _son_,
or some _colony_, doth promise all those external signs at least,
whereby superiors used to be honoured by their inferiors. From
whence it follows, that the precept of _honouring our parents_,
belongs to the law of nature, not only under the title of
_gratitude_, but also of _agreement_.
[Sidenote: Wherein liberty doth consist; and the difference between
subjects and servants.]
9. What then, will some one demand, is the difference between a
_son_, or between a _subject_ and a _servant_? Neither do I know
that any writer hath fully declared what _liberty_ and what
_slavery_ is. Commonly, to do all things according to our own
fancies, and that without punishment, is esteemed to be _liberty_;
not to be able to do this, is judged _bondage_; which in a civil
government, and with the peace of mankind, cannot possibly be done;
because there is no city without a command and a restraining right.
_Liberty_, that we may define it, is nothing else but _an absence of
the lets and hindrances of motion_; as water shut up in a vessel is
therefore not at liberty, because the vessel hinders it from running
out; which, the vessel being broken, is made _free_. And every man
hath more or less _liberty_, as he hath more or less space in which
he employs himself: as he hath more _liberty_, who is in a large,
than he that is kept in a close prison. And a man may be free toward
one part, and yet not toward another; as the traveller is bounded on
this and that side with hedges or stone walls, lest he spoil the
vines or corn neighbouring on the highway. And these kinds of lets
are external and absolute. In which sense all _servants_ and
_subjects_ are _free_, who are not fettered and imprisoned. There
are others which are arbitrary, which do not absolutely hinder
motion, but by accident, to wit, by our own choice; as he that is in
a ship, is not so hindered but he may cast himself into the sea, if
he will. And here also the more ways a man may move himself, the
more _liberty_ he hath. And herein consists civil _liberty_; for no
man, whether _subject_, _son_, or _servant_, is so hindered by the
punishments appointed by the _city_, the _father_, or the _lord_,
how cruel soever, but that he may do all things, and make use of all
means necessary to the preservation of his life and health. For my
part therefore I cannot find what reason a mere _servant_ hath to
make complaints, if they relate only to want of _liberty_; unless he
count it a misery to be restrained from hurting himself, and to
receive that life, which by war, or misfortune, or through his own
idleness was forfeited, together with all manner of sustenance, and
all things necessary to the conservation of health, on this
condition only, that he will be ruled. For he that is kept in by
punishments laid before him, so as he dares not let loose the reins
to his will in all things, is not oppressed by servitude, but is
governed and sustained. But this privilege free subjects and sons of
a family have above servants in every government and family where
servants are; that they may both undergo the more honourable offices
of the city or family, and also enjoy a larger possession of things
superfluous. And herein lies the difference between a _free subject_
and a _servant_, that he is _free_ indeed, who serves his city only;
but a _servant_ is he, who also serves his fellow-subject. All other
liberty is an exemption from the laws of the city, and proper only
to those that bear rule.
[Sidenote: There is the same right in an hereditary, which there is
in an institutive government.]
10. A _father_ with his _sons_ and _servants_, grown into a civil
person by virtue of his paternal jurisdiction, is called a _family_.
This _family_, if through multiplying of _children_ and acquisition
of _servants_ it becomes numerous, insomuch as without casting the
uncertain die of war it cannot be subdued, will be termed an
_hereditary kingdom_. Which though it differ from an _institutive
monarchy_, being acquired by force, in the original and manner of
its constitution; yet being constituted, it hath all the same
properties, and the right of authority is everywhere the same;
insomuch as it is not needful to speak anything of them apart.
[Sidenote: The question concerning the right of succession belongs
only to monarchy.]
11. It hath been spoken, by what right supreme authorities are
constituted. We must now briefly tell you, by what right they may be
continued. Now the right by which they are continued, is that which
is called the right of _succession_. Now because in a _democracy_
the supreme authority is with the _people_, as long as there be any
subjects in being, so long it rests with the same person; for the
people hath no successor. In like manner in an _aristocracy_, one of
the nobles dying, some other by the rest is substituted in his
place; and therefore except they all die together, which I suppose
will never happen, there is no succession. The query therefore of
the right of succession takes place only in an _absolute monarchy_.
For they who exercise the supreme power for a time only, are
themselves no _monarchs_, but _ministers_ of state.
[Sidenote: A monarch may dispose of the command of his government by
testament:]
12. But first, if a monarch shall by testament appoint one to
succeed him, the person appointed shall succeed. For if he be
appointed by the _people_, he shall have all the right over the city
which the _people_ had, as hath been showed in chap. VII. art. 11.
But the people might choose him; by the same right therefore may he
choose another. But in an _hereditary kingdom_, there are the same
rights as in an _institutive_. Wherefore every monarch may by his
will make a _successor_.
[Sidenote: Or give it away, or sell it.]
13. But what a man may transfer on another by testament, that by the
same right may he, yet living, give or sell away. To whomsoever
therefore he shall make over the supreme power, whether by gift or
sale, it is rightly made.
[Sidenote: A monarch dying without testament, is ever understood to
will that a monarch should succeed him:]
14. But if living he have not declared his will concerning his
successor by testament nor otherwise, it is supposed, first, that he
would not have his government reduced to an anarchy or the state of
war, that is, to the destruction of his subjects; as well because he
could not do that without breach of the laws of nature, whereby he
was obliged to the performance of all things necessarily conducing
to the preservation of peace; as also because, if that had been his
will, it had not been hard for him to have declared that openly.
Next, because the right passeth according to the will of the father,
we must judge of the _successor_ according to the signs of his will.
It is understood therefore, that he would have his subjects to be
under a _monarchical_ government, rather than any other, because he
himself in ruling hath before approved of that state by his example,
and hath not afterward either by any word or deed condemned it.
[Sidenote: And some one of his children:]
15. Furthermore, because by natural necessity all men wish them
better, from whom they receive glory and honour, than others; but
every man after death receives honour and glory from his children,
sooner than from the power of any other men: hence we gather, that a
father intends better for his children than any other person’s. It
is to be understood therefore, that the will of the father, dying
without testament, was that some of his children should succeed him.
Yet this is to be understood with this proviso, that there be no
more apparent tokens to the contrary: of which kind, after many
successions, custom may be one. For he that makes no mention of his
_succession_, is supposed to consent to the customs of his realm.
[Sidenote: And a male rather than female:]
16. Among children the males carry the pre-eminence; in the
beginning perhaps, because for the most part, although not always,
they are fitter for the administration of greater matters, but
specially of wars; but afterwards, when it was grown a custom,
because that custom was not contradicted. And therefore the will of
the father, unless some other custom or sign do clearly repugn it,
is to be interpreted in favour of them.
[Sidenote: And of the males, the eldest rather than the younger:]
17. Now because the sons are equal, and the power cannot be divided,
the eldest shall succeed. For if there be any difference by reason
of age, the eldest is supposed more worthy; for nature being judge,
the most in years (because usually it is so) is the wisest; but
other judge there cannot be had. But if the brothers must be equally
valued, the succession shall be _by lot_. But _primogeniture_ is a
natural lot, and by this the eldest is already preferred; nor is
there any that hath power to judge, whether by this or any other
kind of lots the matter is to be decided. Now the same reason which
contends thus for the first-born son, doth no less for the
first-born daughter.
[Sidenote: And his brother, if he want issue, before all others.]
18. But if he have no children, then the command shall pass to his
brothers and sisters; for the same reason that the children should
have succeeded, if he had had them. For those that are nearest to us
in nature, are supposed to be nearest in benevolence. And to his
brothers sooner than his sisters, and to the elder sooner than the
younger; for the reason is the same for these, that it was for the
children.
[Sidenote: In the same manner that men succeed to the power, do they
also succeed to the right of succession.]
19. Furthermore, by the same reason that men succeed to the power,
do they also succeed to the right of succession. For if the
first-born die before the father, it will be judged that he
transferred his right of succession unto his children; unless the
father have otherwise decreed it. And therefore the nephews will
have a fairer pretence to the succession, than the uncles. I say all
these things will be thus, if the custom of the place (which the
father by not contradicting will be judged to have consented to) do
not hinder them.
-------
CHAPTER X.
COMPARISON BETWEEN THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT
ACCORDING TO THEIR SEVERAL INCONVENIENCES.
1. A comparison of the natural state with the civil. 2. The
conveniences and inconveniences of the ruler and his subjects
are alike. 3. The praise of monarchy. 4. The government under
one, cannot be said to be unreasonable in this respect, namely,
because one hath more power than all the rest. 5. A rejection of
their opinion, who say, that a lord with his servants cannot
make a city. 6. Exactions are more grievous under a popular
state, than a monarchy. 7. Innocent subjects are less exposed to
penalties under a monarch, than under the people. 8. The liberty
of single subjects is not less under a monarch, than under a
people. 9. It is no disadvantage to the subjects, that they are
not all admitted to public deliberations. 10. Civil
deliberations are unadvisedly committed to great assemblies, by
reason of the unskilfulness of the most part of men: 11. In
regard of eloquence: 12. In regard of faction: 13. In regard of
the unstableness of the laws: 14. In regard of the want of
secrecy. 15. That these inconveniences adhere to democracy,
forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with the esteem of wit.
16. The inconveniences of a city arising from a king that is a
child. 17. The power of generals is an evident sign of the
excellence of monarchy. 18. The best state of a city is that,
where the subjects are the ruler’s inheritance. 19. The nearer
aristocracy draws to monarchy, the better it is; the further it
keeps from it, the worse.
[Sidenote: A comparing the state of nature with the civil.]
1. What _democracy_, _aristocracy_, and _monarchy_ are, hath already
been spoken; but which of them tends most to the preservation of the
subjects’ peace and procuring their advantages, we must see by
comparing them together. But first let us set forth the advantages
and disadvantages of a city in general; lest some perhaps should
think it better, that every man be left to live at his own will,
than to constitute any society at all. Every man indeed out of the
state of civil government hath a most entire, but unfruitful
liberty; because that he who by reason of his own liberty acts all
at his own will, must also by reason of the same liberty in others
suffer all at another’s will. But in a constituted city, every
subject retains to himself as much freedom as suffices him to live
well and quietly; and there is so much taken away from others, as
may make them not to be feared. Out of this state, every man hath
such a right to all, as yet he can enjoy nothing; in it, each one
securely enjoys his limited right. Out of it, any man may rightly
spoil or kill another; in it, none but one. Out of it, we are
protected by our own forces; in it, by the power of all. Out of it,
no man is sure of the fruit of his labours; in it, all men are.
Lastly, out of it, there is a dominion of passions, war, fear,
poverty, slovenliness, solitude, barbarism, ignorance, cruelty; in
it, the dominion of reason, peace, security, riches, decency,
society, elegancy, sciences, and benevolence.
[Sidenote: The gains and losses of the ruler and his subjects are
alike.]
2. Aristotle, in his seventh book and fourteenth chapter of his
_Politics_, saith, that there are two sorts of governments;
whereof the one relates to the benefit of the _ruler_, the other
to that of the _subjects_. As if where _subjects_ are severely
dealt with, there were one, and where more mildly, there were
another form of government. Which opinion may by no means be
subscribed to; for all the profits and disprofits arising from
government are the same, and common both to the _ruler_ and the
_subject_. The damages which befall some particular subjects
through misfortune, folly, negligence, sloth, or his own luxury,
may very well be severed from those which concern the ruler. But
those relate not to the government itself, being such as may
happen in any form of government whatsoever. If these same happen
from the first institution of the city, they will then be truly
called the inconveniences of government; but they will be common
to the ruler with his subjects, as their benefits are common. But
the first and greatest benefit, peace and defence, is to both; for
both he that commands, and he who is commanded, to the end that he
may defend his life makes use at once of all the forces of his
fellow-subjects. And in the greatest inconvenience that can befall
a city, namely, the slaughter of subjects arising from anarchy,
both the commander and the parties commanded are equally
concerned. Next, if the ruler levy such a sum of vast moneys from
his subjects, as they are not able to maintain themselves and
their families, nor conserve their bodily strength and vigor, the
disadvantage is as much his as theirs, who, with never so great a
stock or measure of riches, is not able to keep his authority or
his riches without the bodies of his subjects. But if he raise no
more than is sufficient for the due administration of his power,
that is a benefit equally to himself and his subjects, tending to
a common peace and defence. Nor is it imaginable which way
_public_ treasures can be a grievance to _private_ subjects, if
they be not so exhausted as to be wholly deprived from all
possibility to acquire, even by their industry, necessaries to
sustain the strength of their bodies and minds. For even thus the
grievance would concern the ruler; nor would it arise from the
ill-institution or ordination of the government, because in all
manner of governments subjects may be oppressed; but from the
ill-administration of a well-established government.
[Sidenote: The praise of monarchy.]
3. Now that _monarchy_, of the foresaid forms of _democracy_,
_aristocracy_, and _monarchy_, hath the pre-eminence, will best
appear by comparing the conveniences and inconveniences arising in
each one of them. Those arguments therefore, that the _whole_
universe is governed by _one_ God; that the ancients preferred the
monarchical state before all others, ascribing the rule of the gods
to one Jupiter; that in the beginning of affairs and of nations, the
decrees of princes were held for laws; that paternal government,
instituted by God himself in the creation, was monarchical; that
other governments were compacted by the artifice of men[15] out of
the ashes of monarchy, after it had been ruined with seditions; and
that the people of God were under the jurisdiction of kings:
although, I say, these do hold forth _monarchy_ as the more eminent
to us, yet because they do it by examples and testimonies, and not
by solid reason, we will pass them over.
Footnote 15:
_Compacted by the artifice of men, &c._] It seems the ancients who
made that same fable of Prometheus, pointed at this. They say that
Prometheus, having stolen fire from the sun, formed a man out of
clay, and that for this deed he was tortured by Jupiter with a
perpetual gnawing in his liver. Which is, that by human invention,
which is signified by Prometheus, laws and justice were by
imitation taken from monarchy; by virtue whereof, as by fire
removed from its natural orb, the multitude, as the dirt and dregs
of men, was as it were quickened and formed into a civil person;
which is termed aristocracy or democracy. But the author and
abettors being found, who might securely and quietly have lived
under the natural jurisdiction of kings, do thus smart for it;
that being exposed still to alteration, they are tormented with
perpetual cares, suspicions, and dissensions.
[Sidenote: The government of one cannot be said to be evil in this
respect, namely, because one hath more power than all the
rest.]
4. Some there are, who are discontented with the government under
_one_, for no other reason but because it is under _one_; as if it
were an unreasonable thing, that _one_ man among so many should so
far excel in power, as to be able at his own pleasure to dispose of
all the rest. These men, sure, if they could, would withdraw
themselves from under the dominion of _one_ God. But this exception
against _one_ is suggested by envy, while they see one man in
possession of what all desire. For the same cause, they would judge
it to be as unreasonable if a _few_ commanded, unless they
themselves either were, or hoped to be of the number. For if it be
an unreasonable thing that all men have not an equal right, surely
an aristocracy must be unreasonable also. But because we have showed
that the state of equality is the state of war, and that therefore
inequality was introduced by a general consent; this inequality,
whereby he whom we have voluntarily given more to, enjoys more, is
no longer to be accounted an unreasonable thing. The inconveniences
therefore which attend the dominion of _one_ man, attend his
_person_, not his _unity_. Let us therefore see whether brings with
it the greater grievances to the subject, the command of _one_ man,
or of _many_.
[Sidenote: Rejection of their opinion, who say that a lord with his
servants cannot make a city.]
5. But first we must remove their opinion, who deny that to be any
city at all, which is compacted of never so great a number of
servants under a common lord. In the ninth article of the fifth
chapter, a city is defined to be _one person_ made out of _many
men_, whose will by their own contracts is to be esteemed as the
wills of them all; insomuch as he may use the strength and faculties
of each single person for the public peace and safety. And by the
same article of the same chapter, _one person_ is that, when the
wills of many are contained in the will of one. But the will of each
servant is contained in the will of his lord; as hath been declared
in the fifth article of the eighth chapter; so as he may employ all
their forces and faculties according to his own will and pleasure.
It follows therefore that that must needs be a city, which is
constituted by _a lord and many servants_. Neither can any reason be
brought to contradict this, which doth not equally combat against a
city constituted by _a father and his sons_. For to a lord who hath
no children, _servants_ are in the nature of _sons_; for they are
both his honour and safeguard; neither are _servants_ more subject
to their _lords_, then _children_ to their _parents_, as hath been
manifested above in the fifth article of the eighth chapter.
[Sidenote: The exactions are more grievous under command of the
people, than under the monarch.]
6. Among other grievances of supreme authority one is, that the
ruler, beside those monies necessary for public charges, as the
maintaining of public ministers, building, and defending of castles,
waging wars, honourably sustaining his own household, may also, if
he will, exact others through his lust, whereby to enrich his sons,
kindred, favourites, and flatterers too. I confess this is a
grievance, but of the number of those which accompany all kinds of
government, but are more tolerable in a _monarchy_ than in a
_democracy_. For though the monarch would enrich them, they cannot
be many, because belonging but to one. But in a _democracy_, look
how many demagogues, that is, how many powerful orators there are
with the people, (which ever are many, and daily new ones growing),
so many children, kinsmen, friends, and flatterers are to be
rewarded. For every of them desire not only to make their families
as potent, as illustrious in wealth, as may be, but also to oblige
others to them by benefits, for the better strengthening of
themselves. A _monarch_ may in great part satisfy his officers and
friends, because they are not many, without any cost to his
subjects; I mean without robbing them of any of those treasures
given in for the maintenance of war and peace. In a _democracy_,
where many are to be satisfied, and always new ones, this cannot be
done without the subject’s oppression. Though a _monarch_ may
promote unworthy persons, yet oft times he will not do it; but in a
_democracy_, all the popular men are therefore supposed to do it,
because it is necessary; for else the power of them who did it,
would so increase, as it would not only become dreadful to those
others, but even to the whole city also.
[Sidenote: Innocent subjects are less obnoxious to punishment under
a monarch, than under the people.]
7. Another grievance is, that same perpetual fear of death, which
every man must necessarily be in while he considers with himself,
that the ruler hath power not only to appoint what punishments he
lists on any transgressions, but that he may also in his wrath and
sensuality slaughter his innocent subjects, and those who never
offended against the laws. And truly this is a very great grievance
in any form of government, wheresoever it happens; for it is
therefore a grievance, because it is, not because it may be done.
But it is the fault of the ruler, not of the government. For all the
acts of Nero are not essential to monarchy; yet subjects are less
often undeservedly condemned under _one ruler_, than under the
_people_. For kings are only severe against those who either trouble
them with impertinent counsels, or oppose them with reproachful
words, or control their wills; but they are the cause that that
excess of power which one subject might have above another, becomes
harmless. Wherefore some Nero or Caligula reigning, no men can
undeservedly suffer but such as are known to him, namely, courtiers,
and such as are remarkable for some eminent charge; and not all
neither, but they only who are possessed of what he desires to
enjoy. For they that are offensive and contumelious, are deservedly
punished. Whosoever therefore in a _monarchy_ will lead a retired
life, let him be what he will that reigns, he is out of danger. For
the ambitious only suffer; the rest are protected from the injuries
of the more potent. But in a popular dominion, there may be as many
Neros as there are orators who soothe the _people_. For each one of
them can do as much as the _people_, and they mutually give way to
each other’s appetite, as it were by this secret pact, _spare me
to-day and I’ll spare thee to-morrow_, while they exempt those from
punishment, who to satisfy their lust and private hatred have
undeservedly slain their fellow-subjects. Furthermore, there is a
certain limit in private power, which if it exceed, it may prove
pernicious to the realm; and by reason whereof it is necessary
sometimes for _monarchs_ to have a care, that the common weal do
thence receive no prejudice. When therefore this power consisted in
the multitude of riches, they lessened it by diminishing their
heaps; but if it were in popular applause, the powerful party,
without any other crime laid to his charge, was taken from among
them. The same was usually practised in _democracies_. For the
Athenians inflicted a punishment of ten years’ banishment on those
that were powerful, merely because of their powers, without the
guilt of any other crime. And those who by liberal gifts did seek
the favour of the common people, were put to death at Rome, as men
ambitious of a kingdom. In this _democracy_ and _monarchy_ were
even; yet differed they much in fame. Because fame derives from the
people; and what is done by many, is commended by many. And
therefore what the _monarch_ does, is said to be done out of envy to
their virtues; which if it were done by the _people_, would be
accounted policy.
[Sidenote: Single persons have no less liberty under a monarch, than
under the people.]
8. There are some, who therefore imagine _monarchy_ to be more
grievous then _democracy_, because there is less liberty in that,
than in this. If by liberty they mean an exemption from that
subjection which is due to the laws, that is, the commands of the
_people_; neither in _democracy_, nor in any other state of
government whatsoever, is there any such kind of liberty. If they
suppose liberty to consist in this, that there be few laws, few
prohibitions, and those too such, that except they were forbidden,
there could be no peace; then I deny that there is more liberty in
_democracy_ than _monarchy_; for the one as truly consisteth with
such a liberty, as the other. For although the word _liberty_ may in
large and ample letters be written over the gates of any city
whatsoever, yet is it not meant the _subject’s_, but the _city’s_
liberty; neither can that word with better right be inscribed on a
city which is governed by the _people_, than that which is ruled by
a _monarch_. But when private men or subjects demand liberty, under
the name of liberty they ask not for liberty, but _dominion_; which
yet for want of understanding they little consider. For if every man
would grant the same liberty to another, which he desires for
himself, as is commanded by the law of nature; that same natural
state would return again, in which all men may by right do all
things; which if they knew, they would abhor, as being worse than
all kinds of civil subjection whatsoever. But if any man desire to
have his single freedom, the rest being bound, what does he else
demand but to have the _dominion_? For whoso is freed from all
bonds, is lord over all those that still continue bound. Subjects
therefore have no greater liberty in a _popular_, than in a
_monarchical_ state. That which deceives them, is the equal
participation of command and public places. For where the authority
is in the people, single subjects do so far forth share in it, as
they are parts of the people ruling; and they equally partake in
public offices, so far forth as they have equal voices in choosing
magistrates and public ministers. And this is that which Aristotle
aimed at, himself also through the custom of that time miscalling
dominion liberty. (_Polit._ lib. vi. cap. 2.) _In a popular state
there is liberty by supposition; which is a speech of the vulgar, as
if no man were free out of this state._ From whence, by the way, we
may collect, that those subjects who in a _monarchy_ deplore their
lost liberty, do only stomach this, that they are not received to
the steerage of the commonweal.
[Sidenote: It is no disadvantage to the subjects, that they are not
all admitted to the public deliberations.]
9. But perhaps for this very reason, some will say that a _popular_
state is much to be preferred before a _monarchical_; because that
where all men have a hand in public businesses, there all have an
opportunity to shew their wisdom, knowledge, and eloquence, in
deliberating matters of the greatest difficulty and moment; which by
reason of that desire of praise which is bred in human nature, is to
them who excel in such-like faculties, and seem to themselves to
exceed others, the most delightful of all things. But in a monarchy,
this same way to obtain praise and honour is shut up to the greatest
part of subjects; and what is a grievance if this be none? I will
tell you: to see his opinion, whom we scorn, preferred before ours;
to have our wisdom undervalued before our own faces; by an uncertain
trial of a little vain glory, to undergo most certain enmities (for
this cannot be avoided, whether we have the better or the worse); to
hate and to be hated, by reason of the disagreement of opinions; to
lay open our secret councils and advices to all, to no purpose and
without any benefit; to neglect the affairs of our own family:
these, I say, are grievances. But to be absent from a trial of wits,
although those trials are pleasant to the eloquent, is not therefore
a grievance to them; unless we will say, that it is a grievance to
valiant men to be restrained from fighting, because they delight in
it.
[Sidenote: Civil deliberations are unadvisedly committed to many, by
reason of the unskilfulness of most men:]
10. Besides, there are many reasons, why deliberations are less
successful in great assemblies than in lesser councils. Whereof one
is, that to advise rightly of all things conducing to the
preservation of a commonweal, we must not only understand matters at
home, but foreign affairs too. At home, by what goods the country is
nourished and defended, and whence they are fetched; what places are
fit to make garrisons of; by what means soldiers are best to be
raised and maintained; what manner of affections the subjects bear
towards their prince or governors of their country; and many the
like. Abroad, what the power of each neighbouring country is, and
wherein it consists; what advantage or disadvantage we may receive
from them; what their dispositions are both to us-ward, and how
affected to each other among themselves; and what counsel daily
passeth among them. Now, because very few in a great assembly of men
understand these things, being for the most part unskilful, that I
say not incapable of them, what can that same number of advisers
with their impertinent opinions contribute to good counsels, other
than mere lets and impediments?
[Sidenote: By reason of their eloquence:]
11. Another reason why a great assembly is not so fit for
consultation is, because every one who delivers his opinion holds it
necessary to make a long-continued speech; and to gain the more
esteem from his auditors, he polishes and adorns it with the best
and smoothest language. Now the nature of eloquence is to make
_good_ and _evil_, _profitable_ and _unprofitable_, _honest_ and
_dishonest_, appear to be more or less than indeed they are; and to
make that seem _just_ which is _unjust_, according as it shall best
suit with his end that speaketh: for this is to persuade. And though
they reason, yet take they not their rise from true principles, but
from vulgar received opinions, which for the most part are
erroneous. Neither endeavour they so much to fit their speech to the
nature of the things they speak of, as to the passions of their
minds to whom they speak; whence it happens, that opinions are
delivered not by right reason, but by a certain violence of mind.
Nor is this fault in the _man_, but in the nature itself of
_eloquence_, whose end, as all the masters of rhetoric teach us, is
not truth (except by chance), but victory; and whose property is not
to inform, but to allure.
[Sidenote: By reason of faction:]
12. The third reason why men advise less successfully in a great
convent is, because that thence arise _factions_ in a commonweal;
and out of _factions_, seditions and civil war. For when equal
orators do combat with contrary opinions and speeches, the conquered
hates the conqueror and all those that were of his side, as holding
his council and wisdom in scorn, and studies all means to make the
advice of his adversaries prejudicial to the state: for thus he
hopes to see the glory taken from him, and restored unto himself.
Furthermore, where the votes are not so unequal, but that the
conquered have hopes, by the accession of some few of their own
opinion, at another sitting to make the stronger party, the chief
heads do call the rest together; they advise a part how they may
abrogate the former judgment given; they appoint to be the first and
earliest at the next convent; they determine what, and in what order
each man shall speak, that the same business may again be brought to
agitation; that so what was confirmed before by the number of their
then present adversaries, the same may now in some measure become of
no effect to them, being negligently absent. And this same kind of
industry and diligence which they use to _make_ a people, is
commonly called a _faction_. But when a _faction_ is inferior in
votes, and superior, or not much inferior in power, then what they
cannot obtain by craft and language, they attempt by force of arms;
and so it comes to a civil war. But some will say, these things do
not necessarily, nor often happen. He may as well say, that the
chief parties are not necessarily desirous of vain glory, and that
the greatest of them seldom disagree in great matters.
[Sidenote: By reason of the unsettledness of the laws:]
13. It follows hence, that when the legislative power resides in
such convents as these, the laws must needs be inconstant; and
change, not according to the alteration of the state of affairs, nor
according to the changeableness of men’s minds, but as the major
part, now of this, then of that _faction_, do convene. Insomuch as
the laws do float here and there, as it were upon the waters.
[Sidenote: For want of secrecy.]
14. In the fourth place, the counsels of great assemblies have this
inconvenience; that whereas it is oft of great consequence that they
should be kept secret, they are for the most part discovered to the
enemy before they can be brought to any effect; and their power and
will is as soon known abroad, as to the _people_ itself commanding
at home.
[Sidenote: These inconveniences do adhere to democracy, forasmuch as
men are naturally delighted with an opinion of wit.]
15. These inconveniences, which are found in the deliberations of
great assemblies, do so far forth evince _monarchy_ to be better
than _democracy_, as in _democracy_ affairs of great consequence are
oftener trusted to be discussed by such like committees, than in a
_monarchy_. Neither can it easily be done otherwise. For there is no
reason why every man should not naturally mind his _own private_,
than the _public_ business, but that here he sees a means to declare
his eloquence, whereby he may gain the reputation of being ingenious
and wise, and returning home to his friends, to his parents, to his
wife and children, rejoice and triumph in the applause of his
dexterous behaviour. As of old, all the delight Marcus Coriolanus
had in his warlike actions, was to see his praises so well pleasing
to his mother. But if the _people_ in a democracy would bestow the
power of deliberating in matters of war and peace, either on one, or
some very few, being content with the nomination of magistrates and
public ministers, that is to say, with the authority without the
ministration; then it must be confessed, that in this particular
_democracy_ and _monarchy_ would be equal.
[Sidenote: The inconveniences of government proceeding from a king
who is a child.]
16. Neither do the conveniences or inconveniences which are found to
be more in one kind of government than another, arise from hence,
namely, because the government itself, or the administration of its
affairs, are better committed to one than many; or on the other
side, to many than to some few. For government is the _power_, the
administration of it is the _act_. Now the _power_ in all kinds of
government is equal; the _acts_ only differ, that is to say, the
_actions_ and _motions_ of a commonweal, as they flow from the
deliberations of many or few, of skilful or impertinent men. Whence
we understand, that the conveniences or inconveniences of any
government depend not on him in whom the authority resides, but on
his officers; and therefore nothing hinders but that the commonweal
may be well governed, although the _monarch_ be a woman, or youth,
or infant, provided that they be fit for affairs who are endued with
the public offices and charges. And that which is said, _woe to the
land whose king is a child_, doth not signify the condition of a
monarchy to be inferior to a popular state; but contrariwise, that
by accident it is the grievance of a kingdom, that the _king being a
child_, it often happens, that many by ambition and power intruding
themselves into public councils, the government comes to be
administered in a _democratical_ manner; and that thence arise those
infelicities, which for the most part accompany the _dominion of the
people_.
[Sidenote: The power of generals is an argument of the excellency of
monarchy.]
17. But it is a manifest sign that the most absolute _monarchy_ is
the best state of government, that not only kings, but even those
cities which are subject to the _people_ or to _nobles_, give the
whole command of war to one only; and that so absolute, as nothing
can be more. Wherein, by the way, this must be noted also; that no
king can give a general greater authority over his army, than he
himself by right may exercise over all his subjects. _Monarchy_
therefore is the best of all governments in the camps. But what else
are many commonwealths, than so many camps strengthened with arms
and men against each other; whose state, because not restrained by
any common power, howsoever an uncertain peace, like a short truce,
may pass between them, is to be accounted for the state of nature;
which is the state of war.
[Sidenote: The best state of a commonweal, is that where the
subjects are the ruler’s inheritance.]
18. Lastly, since it was necessary for the preservation of ourselves
to be subject to some _man_ or _council_, we cannot on better
condition be subject to any, than one whose interest depends upon
our safety and welfare; and this then comes to pass, when we are the
inheritance of the ruler. For every man of his own accord endeavours
the preservation of his inheritance. But the lands and monies of the
subjects are not only the prince’s treasure, but their bodies and
wildy minds. Which will be easily granted by those, who consider at
how great rates the dominion of lesser countries is valued; and how
much easier it is for men to procure money, than money men. Nor do
we readily meet with any example that shows us when any subject,
without any default of his own, hath by his prince been despoiled of
his life or goods, through the sole licentiousness of his authority.
[Sidenote: Aristocracy is so much better, by how much it approaches
nearer to monarchy; the worse, by how much it is more
distant from it.]
19. Hitherto we have compared a _monarchical_ with a _popular_
state; we have said nothing of _aristocracy_. We may conclude of
this, by what hath been said of those, that that which is
hereditary, and content with the election of magistrates; which
transmits its deliberations to some few, and those most able; which
simply imitates the government of _monarchs_ most, and the _people_
least of all; is for the subjects both better and more lasting than
the rest.
-------
CHAPTER XI.
PLACES AND EXAMPLES OF SCRIPTURE OF THE RIGHTS
OF GOVERNMENT, AGREEABLE TO WHAT HATH
BEEN SAID BEFORE.
1. The beginning of institutive government from the consent of the
people. 2. Judicature and wars depend on the will of supreme
commanders. 3. That they who have the chief authority, are by
right unpunishable. 4. That without a supreme power there is no
government, but anarchy. 5. That from servants and sons there is
a simple obedience due to their lords and parents. 6. Absolute
authority proved by most evident places, as well of the New as
the Old Testament.
[Sidenote: The beginning of institutive government from the consent
of the people.]
1. We have, in the sixth chapter and the second article, so derived
the original of institutive or political government from the consent
of the multitude, that it appears they must either all consent, or
be esteemed as enemies. Such was the beginning of God’s government
over the Jews instituted by Moses, (Exod. xix. 5-8): _If ye will
obey my voice indeed_, &c. _Ye shall be unto me a kingdom of
priests_, &c. _And Moses came and called the elders of the people_,
&c. _And all the people answered, and said: All that the Lord hath
spoken we will do._ Such also was the beginning of Moses’s power
under God, or his vicegerency, (Exod. xx. 18-19): _And all the
people saw the thunderings and lightenings, and the noise of the
trumpet_, &c. _And they said unto Moses, speak thou unto us, and we
will hear._ The like beginning also had Saul’s kingdom, (1 Sam. xii.
12, 13): _When ye saw that Nahash king of the children of Ammon came
out against you, ye said unto me, nay, but a king shall reign over
us, when the Lord your God was your king. Now therefore behold the
king whom ye have chosen, and whom ye have desired._ But the major
part only consenting, and not all; for there were certain _sons of
Belial_, who said, (1 Sam. x. 27), _How shall this man save us? And
they despised him_; those who did not consent, were put to death as
enemies. And the people said unto Samuel (1 Sam. xi. 12): _Who is he
that said, shall Saul reign over us? Bring the men, that we may put
them to death._
[Sidenote: The power of judicature, and determination of wars,
depend on the will of the supreme officer.]
2. In the same sixth chapter, the sixth and seventh articles, I have
showed that all _judgment_ and _wars_ depend upon the will and
pleasure of him who bears the supreme authority; that is to say, in
a _monarchy_, on a monarch or king; and this is confirmed by the
people’s own judgment. 1 Sam. viii. 20; _We also will be like all
the nations, and our king shall judge us, and go out before us, and
fight our battles._ And what pertains to _judgments_, and all other
matters whereof there is any controversy, whether they be _good_ or
_evil_, is confirmed by the testimony of King Solomon, (1 Kings iii.
9): _Give therefore thy servant an understanding heart to judge thy
people, that I may discern between good and evil._ And that of
Absolom, (2 Sam. xv. 3): _There is no man deputed of the king to
hear thee._
[Sidenote: They who have the supreme authority are by right
unpunishable.]
3. That kings may not be punished by their subjects, as hath been
showed above in the sixth chapter and the twelfth article, King
David also confirms; who, though Saul sought to slay him, did
notwithstanding refrain his hand from killing him, and forbade
Abishai, saying, (1 Sam. xxvi. 9): _Destroy him not; for who can
stretch forth his hand against the Lords anointed, and be innocent?_
And when he had cut off the skirt of his garment, (1 Sam. xxiv. 6):
_The Lord forbid_, saith he, _that I should do this thing unto my
master the Lord’s anointed, to stretch forth mine hand against him_.
And (_2 Sam._ i. 15) commanded the Amalekite, who for his sake had
slain Saul, to be put to death.
[Sidenote: That without a supreme power there is no government, but
confusion.]
4. That which is said in the seventeenth chapter of _Judges_, at the
sixth verse: _In those days there was no king in Israel, but every
man did that which was right in his own eyes_: as though where there
were not a _monarchy_, there were an _anarchy_ or confusion of all
things: may be brought as a testimony to prove the excellency of
monarchy above all other forms of government; unless that by the
word _king_ may perhaps be understood not _one man_ only, but also a
_court_; provided that in it there reside a supreme power. Which if
it be taken in this sense, yet hence it may follow, that without a
supreme and absolute power (which we have endeavoured to prove in
the sixth chapter) there will be a liberty for every man to do what
he hath a mind, or whatsoever shall seem right to himself; which
cannot stand with the preservation of mankind. And therefore in all
government whatsoever, there is ever a supreme power understood to
be somewhere existent.
[Sidenote: That servants and sons owe their lords and parents simple
obedience.]
5. We have, in chap. VIII. art. 7 and 8, said that _servants_ must
yield a simple obedience to their _lords_, and in chap IX. art. 7,
that _sons_ owe the same obedience to their _parents_. Saint Paul
says the same thing concerning servants (Coloss. iii. 22): _Servants
obey in all things your masters according to the flesh, not with
eye-service, as men-pleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing
God._ Concerning sons (Colos. iii. 20): _Children obey your parents
in all things, for this is well-pleasing unto the Lord._ Now as we
by simple obedience understand all things which are not contrary to
the laws of God; so in those cited places of St. Paul, after the
word _all things_, we must suppose, _excepting those which are
contrary to the laws of God_.
[Sidenote: The absolute power of princes proved by most evident
testimonies of the Scripture, as well New as Old.]
6. But that I may not thus by piecemeal prove the right of princes,
I will now instance those testimonies which altogether establish the
whole power; namely, that there is an absolute and simple obedience
due to them from their subjects. And first out of the New Testament:
Matth. xxiii. 2, 3: _The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses’ seat;
all therefore, whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do.
Whatsoever they bid you_ (says Christ) _observe_, that is to say,
_obey simply_. Why? Because they _sit in Moses’ seat_; namely, the
_civil magistrate’s_, not Aaron, the priest’s. Rom. xiii. 1, 2: _Let
every soul be subject to the higher powers; for there is no power
but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God; whosoever
therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and
they that resist, shall receive to themselves damnation._ Now
because the powers that were in St. Paul’s time, were ordained of
God, and all kings did at that time require an absolute entire
obedience from their subjects, it follows that such a power was
ordained of God. 1 Peter ii. 13-15: _Submit yourselves unto every
ordinance of man for the Lord’s sake, whether it be to the king as
supreme, or unto governors as unto them that are sent by him for the
punishment of wicked doers, and for the praise of them that do well;
for so is the will of God._ Again St. Paul to Titus, (chap. iii. 1):
_Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, to
obey magistrates, &c._ What principalities? Was it not to the
principalities of those times, which required an absolute obedience?
Furthermore, that we may come to the example of Christ himself, to
whom the kingdom of the Jews belonged by hereditary right derived
from David himself; he, when he lived in the manner of a subject,
both paid tribute unto Cæsar, and pronounced it to be due to him,
Matth. xxii. 21: _Give unto Cæsar_ (saith he) _the things which are
Cæsar’s, and unto God the things which are God’s_. When it pleased
him to show himself a king, he required entire obedience, Matth.
xxi. 2, 3: _Go_ (said he) _into the village over against you, and
straight-way ye shall find an ass tied, and a colt with her; loose
them, and bring them unto me; and if any man say aught unto you, ye
shall say the Lord hath need of them_. This he did therefore by the
right of being lord, or a king of the Jews. But to take away a
subject’s goods on this pretence only, because _the Lord hath need
of them_, is an absolute power. The most evident places in the Old
Testament are these: Deut. v. 27: _Go thou near, and hear all that
the Lord our God shall say; and speak thou unto us all that the Lord
our God shall speak unto thee, and we will hear it, and do it._ But
under the word _all_, is contained absolute obedience. Again to
Joshua (Joshua i. 16-18): _And they answered Joshua, saying, all
that thou commandest us, we will do; and whithersoever thou sendest
us, we will go; according as we hearkened unto Moses in all things,
so will we hearken unto thee; only the Lord thy God be with thee, as
he was with Moses; whosoever he be that doth rebel against thy
commandment, and will not hearken unto thy words in all that thou
commandest him, he shall be put to death._ And the parable of the
bramble (Judges ix. 14, 15): _Then said all the trees unto the
bramble, Come thou and reign over us. And the bramble said unto the
trees, If in truth ye anoint me king over you, then come and put
your trust in my shadow; and if not, let fire come out of the
bramble, and devour the cedars of Lebanon._ The sense of which words
is, that we must acquiesce to their sayings, whom we have truly
constituted to be kings over us, unless we would choose rather to be
consumed by the fire of a civil war. But the regal authority is more
particularly described by God himself, in 1 Sam. viii. 9, &c.: _Show
them the right of the king that shall reign over them, &c. This
shall be the right of the king that shall reign over you; he will
take your sons, and appoint them for himself, for his chariots, and
to be his horsemen, and some shall run before his chariots, &c. And
he will take your daughters to be confectionaries, &c. And he will
take your vineyards, and give them to his servants, &c._ Is not this
power absolute? And yet it is by God himself styled the _king’s
right_. Neither was any man among the Jews, no not the _high-priest_
himself, exempted from this obedience. For when the king, namely,
Solomon, said to Abiathar the priest (1 Kings ii. 26, 27): _Get thee
to Anathoth unto thine own fields; for thou art worthy of death; but
I will not at this time put thee to death, because thou barest the
ark of the Lord God before David my father, and because thou hast
been afflicted in all wherein my father was afflicted. So Solomon
thrust out Abiathar from being priest unto the Lord_; it cannot by
any argument be proved, that this act of his displeased the Lord;
neither read we, that either Solomon was reproved, or that his
person at that time was any whit less acceptable to God.
-------
CHAPTER XII.
OF THE INTERNAL CAUSES TENDING TO THE DISSOLUTION
OF ANY GOVERNMENT.
1. That _the judging of good and evil belongs to private persons_ is
a seditious opinion. 2. That _subjects do sin by obeying their
princes_ is a seditious opinion. 3. That _tyrannicide is lawful_
is a seditious opinion. 4. That _those who have the supreme
power are subject to the civil laws_ is a seditious opinion. 5.
That _the supreme power may be divided_ is a seditious opinion.
6. That _faith and sanctity are not acquired by study and
reason, but always supernaturally infused and inspired_, is a
seditious opinion. 7. That _each subject hath a propriety or
absolute dominion of his own goods_ is a seditious opinion. 8.
Not to understand the difference between the people and the
multitude, prepares toward sedition. 9. Too great a tax of
money, though never so just and necessary, prepares toward
sedition. 10. Ambition disposeth us to sedition. 11. So doth the
hope of success. 12. Eloquence alone without wisdom, is the only
faculty needful to raise seditions. 13. How the folly of the
common people, and the elocution of ambitious men, concur to the
destruction of a common-weal.
[Sidenote: That the judgment of good and evil belongs to private
persons, is a seditious opinion.]
1. Hitherto hath been spoken, by what causes and pacts commonweals
are constituted, and what the rights of princes are over their
subjects. Now we will briefly say somewhat concerning the causes
which dissolve them, or the reasons of seditions. Now as in the
motion of natural bodies three things are to be considered, namely,
_internal disposition_, that they be susceptible of the motion to be
produced; the _external agent_, whereby a certain and determined
motion may in act be produced; and the _action itself_: so also in a
commonweal where the subjects begin to raise tumults, three things
present themselves to our regard; first, the _doctrines_ and the
_passions_ contrary to peace, wherewith the minds of men are fitted
and disposed; next, their quality and condition who solicit,
assemble, and direct them, already thus disposed, to take up arms
and quit their allegiance; lastly, the manner how this is done, or
the _faction_ itself. But one and the first which disposeth them to
sedition, is this, _that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to
each single man_. In the state of nature indeed, where every man
lives by equal right, and has not by any mutual pacts submitted to
the command of others, we have granted this to be true; nay, proved
it in chap. I. art. 9. But in the civil state it is false. For it
was shown (chap. VI. art. 9) that the civil laws were the rules of
_good_ and _evil_, _just_ and _unjust_, _honest_ and _dishonest_;
that therefore what the legislator commands, must be held for
_good_, and what he forbids for _evil_. And the legislator is ever
that person who hath the supreme power in the commonweal, that is to
say, the monarch in a monarchy. We have confirmed the same truth in
chap. XI. art. 2, out of the words of Solomon. For if private men
may pursue that as good and shun that as evil, which appears to them
to be so, to what end serve those words of his: _Give therefore unto
thy servant an understanding heart, to judge thy people, that I may
discern between good and evil_? Since therefore it belongs to kings
to discern between _good_ and _evil_, wicked are those, though
usual, sayings, _that he only is a king who does righteously_, and
_that kings must not be obeyed unless they command us just things_;
and many other such like. Before there was any government, _just_
and _unjust_ had no being, their nature only being relative to some
command: and every action in its own nature is indifferent; that it
becomes _just_ or _unjust_, proceeds from the right of the
magistrate. Legitimate kings therefore make the things they command
just, by commanding them, and those which they forbid, unjust, by
forbidding them. But private men, while they assume to themselves
the knowledge of _good_ and _evil_, desire to be even as kings;
which cannot be with the safety of the commonweal. The most ancient
of all God’s commands is, (Gen. ii. 17): _Thou shalt not eat of the
tree of knowledge of good and evil_: and the most ancient of all
diabolical temptations, (Gen. iii. 5): _Ye shall be as gods, knowing
good and evil_; and God’s expostulation with man, (verse 11): _Who
told thee that thou wert naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof
I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?_ As if he had said, how
comest thou to judge that nakedness, wherein it seemed good to me to
create thee, to be shameful, except thou have arrogated to thyself
the knowledge of _good and evil_.
[Sidenote: That subjects do sin in obeying their princes, is a
seditious opinion.]
2. Whatsoever any man doth against his conscience, is a sin; for he
who doth so, contemns the law. But we must distinguish. That is my
sin indeed, which committing I do believe to be my sin; but what I
believe to be another man’s sin, I may sometimes do that without any
sin of mine. For if I be commanded to do that which is a sin in him
who commands me, if I do it, and he that commands me be by right
lord over me, I sin not. For if I wage war at the commandment of my
prince, conceiving the war to be unjustly undertaken, I do not
therefore do unjustly; but rather if I refuse to do it, arrogating
to myself the knowledge of what is just and unjust, which pertains
only to my prince. They who observe not this distinction, will fall
into a necessity of sinning, as oft as anything is commanded them
which either is, or seems to be unlawful to them: for if they obey,
they sin against their conscience; and if they obey not, against
right. If they sin against their conscience, they declare that they
fear not the pains of the world to come; if they sin against right,
they do, as much as in them lies, abolish human society and the
civil life of the present world. Their opinion therefore who teach,
_that subjects sin when they obey their prince’s commands which to
them seem unjust_, is both erroneous, and to be reckoned among those
which are contrary to civil obedience; and it depends upon that
original error which we have observed above, in the foregoing
article. For by our taking upon us to judge of _good_ and _evil_, we
are the occasion that as well our obedience, as disobedience,
becomes sin unto us.
[Sidenote: That tyrannicide is lawful, is a seditious opinion.]
3. The third seditious doctrine springs from the same root, that
_tyrannicide is lawful_; nay, at this day it is by many divines, and
of old it was by all the philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero,
Seneca, Plutarch, and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek and
Roman anarchies, held not only lawful, but even worthy of the
greatest praise. And under the title of _tyrants_, they mean not
only monarchs, but all those who bear the chief rule in any
government whatsoever; for not Pisistratus only at Athens, but those
Thirty also who succeeded him, and ruled together, were all called
_tyrants_. But he whom men require to be put to death as being _a
tyrant_, commands either by right or without right. If without
right, he is an enemy, and by right to be put to death; but then
this must not be called the _killing a tyrant_, but an _enemy_. If
by right, then the divine interrogation takes place: _Who hath told
thee that he was a tyrant? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I
commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?_ For why dost thou call
him a _tyrant_, whom God hath made a _king_, except that thou, being
a private person, usurpest to thyself the knowledge of _good_ and
_evil_? But how pernicious this opinion is to all governments, but
especially to that which is _monarchical_, we may hence discern;
namely, that by it every _king_, whether good or ill, stands exposed
to be condemned by the judgment, and slain by the hand of every
murderous villain.
[Sidenote: That even they who have the supreme power are subject to
the civil laws, is a seditious opinion.]
4. The fourth opinion adversary to civil society, is their’s who
hold, _that they who bear rule are subject also to the civil laws_.
Which hath been sufficiently proved before not to be true, in chap
VI. art. 14, from this argument: that a city can neither be bound to
itself, nor to any subject; not to itself, because no man can be
obliged except it be to another; not to any subject, because the
single wills of the subjects are contained in the will of the city;
insomuch that if the city will be free from all such obligation, the
subjects will so too; and by consequence she is so. But that which
holds true in a city, that must be supposed to be true in a man, or
an assembly of men who have the supreme authority; for they make a
city, which hath no being but by their supreme power. Now that this
opinion cannot consist with the very being of government, is evident
from hence; that by it the knowledge of what is _good_ and _evil_,
that is to say, the definition of what is, and what is not against
the laws, would return to each single person. Obedience therefore
will cease, as oft as anything seems to be commanded contrary to the
civil laws, and together with it all coercive jurisdiction; which
cannot possibly be without the destruction of the very essence of
government. Yet this error hath great props, Aristotle and others;
who, by reason of human infirmity, suppose the supreme power to be
committed with most security to the laws only. But they seem to have
looked very shallowly into the nature of government, who thought
that the constraining power, the interpretation of laws, and the
making of laws, all which are powers necessarily belonging to
government, should be left wholly to the laws themselves. Now
although particular subjects may sometimes contend in judgment, and
go to law with the supreme magistrate; yet this is only then, when
the question is not what the magistrate may, but what by a certain
rule he hath declared he would do. As, when by any law the judges
sit upon the life of a subject, the question is not whether the
magistrate could by his absolute right deprive him of his life; but
whether by that law his will was that he should be deprived of it.
But his will was, he should, if he brake the law; else his will was,
he should not. This therefore, that a subject may have an action of
law against his supreme magistrate, is not strength of argument
sufficient to prove, that he is tied to his own laws. On the
contrary, it is evident that he is not tied to his own laws; because
no man is bound to himself. Laws therefore are set for Titius and
Caius, not for the ruler. However, by the ambition of lawyers it is
so ordered, that the laws to unskilful men seem not to depend on the
authority of the magistrate, but their prudence.
[Sidenote: That the supreme power may be divided, is a seditious
opinion.]
5. In the fifth place, _that the supreme authority may be divided_,
is a most fatal opinion to all commonweals. But diverse men divide
it diverse ways. For some divide it, so as to grant a supremacy to
the civil power in matters pertaining to peace and the benefits of
this life; but in things concerning the salvation of the soul they
transfer it on others. Now, because justice is of all things most
necessary to salvation, it happens that subjects measuring justice,
not as they ought, by the civil laws, but by the precepts and
doctrines of them who, in regard of the magistrate, are either
private men or strangers, through a superstitious fear dare not
perform the obedience due to their princes; through fear falling
into that which they most feared. Now what can be more pernicious to
any state, than that men should, by the apprehension of everlasting
torments, be deterred from obeying their princes, that is to say,
the laws; or from being just? There are also some, who divide the
supreme authority so as to allow the power of war and peace unto one
whom they call a _monarch_; but the right of raising money they give
to some others, and not to him. But because monies are the sinews of
war and peace, they who thus divide the authority, do either really
not divide it at all, but place it wholly in them in whose power the
money is, but give the name of it to another: or if they do really
divide it, they dissolve the government. For neither upon necessity
can war be waged, nor can the public peace be preserved without
money.
[Sidenote: That faith and holiness are not acquired by study and
reason, but are ever supernaturally infused and inspired,
is a seditious opinion.]
6. It is a common doctrine, _that faith and holiness are not
acquired by study and natural reason, but are always supernaturally
infused and inspired into men_. Which, if it were true, I understand
not why we should be commanded to give an account of our faith; or
why any man, who is truly a Christian, should not be a prophet; or
lastly, why every man should not judge what is fit for him to do,
what to avoid, rather out of his own inspiration, than by the
precepts of his superiors or right reason. A return therefore must
be made to the private knowledge of _good_ and _evil_; which cannot
be granted without the ruin of all governments. This opinion hath
spread itself so largely through the whole Christian world, that the
number of apostates from natural reason is almost become infinite.
And it sprang from sick-brained men, who having gotten good store of
holy words by frequent reading of the Scriptures, made such a
connexion of them usually in their preaching, that their sermons,
signifying just nothing, yet to unlearned men seemed most divine.
For he whose nonsense appears to be a divine speech, must
necessarily seem to be inspired from above.
[Sidenote: That single subjects have any propriety or absolute
dominion over their own goods, is a seditious opinion.]
7. The seventh doctrine opposite to government, is this; _that each
subject hath an absolute dominion over the goods he is in possession
of_: that is to say, such a _propriety_ as excludes not only the
right of all the rest of his fellow-subjects to the same goods, but
also of the magistrate himself. Which is not true; for they who have
a _lord_ over them, have themselves no _lordship_, as hath been
proved chap. viii. art. 5. Now the magistrate is lord of all his
subjects, by the constitution of government. Before the yoke of
civil society was undertaken, no man had any _proper right_; all
things were _common_ to all men. Tell me therefore, how gottest thou
this _propriety_ but from the magistrate? How got the magistrate it,
but that every man transferred his right on him? And thou therefore
hast also given up thy right to him. Thy _dominion_ therefore, and
_propriety_, is just so much as he will, and shall last so long as
he pleases; even as in a family, each son hath such _proper_ goods,
and so long lasting, as seems good to the father. But the greatest
part of men who profess civil prudence, reason otherwise. We are
equal, say they, by nature; there is no reason why any man should by
better right take my goods from me, than I his from him. We know
that money sometimes is needful for the defence and maintenance of
the public; but let them who require it, show us the present
necessity, and they shall receive it. They who talk thus know not,
that what they would have, is already done from the beginning, in
the very constitution of government; and therefore speaking as in a
dissolute multitude and yet not fashioned government, they destroy
the frame.
[Sidenote: Not to know the difference between a people and a
multitude, prepares to sedition.]
8. In the last place, it is a great hindrance to civil government,
especially monarchical, that men distinguish not enough between a
_people_ and a _multitude_. The _people_ is somewhat that is _one_,
having _one will_, and to whom _one action_ may be attributed; none
of these can properly be said of a multitude. The _people_ rules in
all governments. For even in _monarchies_ the _people_ commands; for
the _people_ wills by the will of _one man_; but the multitude are
citizens, that is to say, subjects. In a _democracy_ and
_aristocracy_, the citizens are the _multitude_, but the _court_ is
the _people_. And in a _monarchy_, the subjects are the _multitude_,
and (however it seem a paradox) the king is the _people_. The common
sort of men, and others who little consider these truths, do always
speak of a _great number_ of men as of the _people_, that is to say,
the _city_. They say, that the _city_ hath rebelled against the
_king_ (which is impossible), and that the _people_ will and nill
what murmuring and discontented subjects would have or would not
have; under pretence of the _people_ stirring up the _citizens_
against the _city_, that is to say, the _multitude_ against the
_people_. And these are almost all the opinions, wherewith subjects
being tainted do easily tumult. And forasmuch as in all manner of
government majesty is to be preserved by him or them, who have the
supreme authority; the _crimen læsæ majestatis_ naturally cleaves to
these opinions.
[Sidenote: Too great a tax of money, though never so just and
necessary, disposeth men to sedition.]
9. There is nothing more afflicts the mind of man than _poverty_, or
the want of those things which are necessary for the preservation of
life and honour. And though there be no man but knows, that riches
are gotten with industry, and kept by frugality, yet all the poor
commonly lay the blame on the evil government, excusing their own
sloth and luxury; as if their private goods forsooth were wasted by
public exactions. But men must consider, that they who have no
patrimony, must not only labour that they may live, but fight too
that they may labour. Every one of the Jews, who in Esdras’ time
built the walls of Jerusalem, did the work with one hand, and held
the sword in the other. In all government, we must conceive that the
hand which holds the sword, is the _king_ or _supreme council_,
which is no less to be sustained and nourished by the subjects’ care
and industry, than that wherewith each man procures himself a
private fortune; and that _customs_ and _tributes_ are nothing else
but their reward who watch in arms for us, that the labours and
endeavours of single men may not be molested by the incursion of
enemies; and that their complaint, who impute their poverty to
public persons, is not more just, than if they should say that they
are become in want by paying of their debts. But the most part of
men consider nothing of these things. For they suffer the same thing
with them who have a disease they call an _incubus_; which springing
from gluttony, it makes men believe they are invaded, oppressed, and
stifled with a great weight. Now it is a thing manifest of itself,
that they who seem to themselves to be burthened with the whole load
of the commonweal, are prone to be seditious; and that they are
affected with change, who are distasted at the present state of
things.
[Sidenote: Ambition disposeth men to sedition:]
10. Another noxious disease of the mind is theirs, who having little
employment, want honour and dignity. All men naturally strive for
honour and preferment; but chiefly they, who are least troubled with
caring for necessary things. For these men are invited by their
vacancy, sometimes to disputation among themselves concerning the
commonweal, sometimes to an easy reading of histories, politics,
orations, poems, and other pleasant books; and it happens that hence
they think themselves sufficiently furnished both with wit and
learning, to administer matters of the greatest consequence. Now
because all men are not what they appear to themselves; and if they
were, yet all (by reason of the multitude) could not be received to
public offices; it is necessary that many must be passed by. These
therefore conceiving themselves affronted, can desire nothing more,
partly out of envy to those who were preferred before them, partly
out of hope to overwhelm them, than ill-success to the public
consultations. And therefore it is no marvel, if with greedy
appetites they seek for occasions of innovations.
[Sidenote: So doth hope of success.]
11. _The hope of overcoming_ is also to be numbered among other
seditious inclinations. For let there be as many men as you will,
infected with opinions repugnant to peace and civil government; let
there be as many as there can, never so much wounded and torn with
affronts and calumnies by them who are in authority; yet if there be
no _hope of having the better of them_, or it appear not sufficient,
there will no sedition follow; every man will dissemble his
thoughts, and rather content himself with the present burthen than
hazard a heavier weight. There are four things necessarily requisite
to this _hope_. Numbers, instruments, mutual trust, and commanders.
To resist public magistrates without a great number, is not
sedition, but desperation. By instruments of war, I mean all manner
of arms, munition, and other necessary provision: without which
number can do nothing. Nor arms neither, without mutual trust. Nor
all these, without union under some commander, whom of their own
accord they are content to obey; not as being engaged by their
submission to his command; (for we have already in this very
chapter, supposed these kind of men not to understand being obliged
beyond that which seems right and good in their own eyes); but for
some opinion they have of his virtue, or military skill, or
resemblance of humours. If these four be near at hand to men grieved
with the present state, and measuring the justice of their actions
by their own judgments; there will be nothing wanting to sedition
and confusion of the realm, but one to _stir up_ and _quicken them_.
[Sidenote: Eloquence alone without wisdom is the only faculty
needful to raise seditions.]
12. Sallust’s character of Cataline, than whom there never was a
greater artist in raising seditions, is this: _that he had great
eloquence, and little wisdom_. He separates _wisdom_ from
_eloquence_; attributing this as necessary to a man born for
commotions; adjudging that as an instructress of peace and
quietness. Now eloquence is twofold. The one is an elegant and clear
expression of the conceptions of the mind; and riseth partly from
the contemplation of the things themselves, partly from an
understanding of words taken in their own proper and definite
signification. The other is a commotion of the passions of the mind,
such as are _hope_, _fear_, _anger_, _pity_; and derives from a
metaphorical use of words fitted to the passions. That forms a
speech from true principles; this from opinions already received,
what nature soever they are of. The art of that is logic, of this
rhetoric; the end of that is truth, of this victory. Each hath its
use; that in deliberations, this in exhortations; for that is never
disjoined from _wisdom_, but this almost ever. But that this kind of
powerful _eloquence_, separated from the true knowledge of things,
that is to say, from wisdom, is the true character of them who
solicit and stir up the people to innovations, may easily be
gathered out of the work itself which they have to do. For they
could not poison the people with those absurd opinions contrary to
peace and civil society, unless they held them themselves; which
sure is an ignorance greater than can well befall any wise man. For
he that knows not whence the laws derive their power, which are the
rules of _just_ and _unjust_, _honest_ and _dishonest_, _good_ and
_evil_; what makes and preserves peace among men, what destroys it;
what is _his_, and what _another’s_; lastly, what he would have done
to himself, that he may do the like to others: is surely to be
accounted but meanly wise. But that they can turn their auditors out
of fools into madmen; that they can make things to them who are
ill-affected, seem worse, to them who are well-affected, seem evil;
that they can enlarge their hopes, lessen their dangers beyond
reason: this they have from that sort of eloquence, not which
explains things as they are, but from that other, which by moving
their minds, makes all things to appear to be such as they in their
minds, prepared before, had already conceived them.
[Sidenote: How the folly of the common people, and the eloquence of
ambitious men, concur to the dissolution of a
commonweal.]
13. Many men, who are themselves very well affected to civil
society, do through want of knowledge co-operate to the disposing of
subjects’ minds to _sedition_, whilst they teach young men a
doctrine conformable to the said opinions in their schools, and all
the people in their pulpits. Now they who desire to bring this
disposition into act, place their whole endeavour in this: first,
that they may join the ill-affected together into _faction_ and
_conspiracy_; next, that themselves may have the greatest stroke in
the _faction_. They gather them into _faction_, while they make
themselves the relators and interpreters of the counsels and actions
of single men, and nominate the persons and places to assemble and
deliberate of such things whereby the present government may be
reformed, according as it shall seem best to their interests. Now to
the end that they themselves may have the chief rule in the
_faction_, the _faction_ must be kept in a _faction_; that is to
say, they must have their secret meetings apart with a few, where
they may order what shall afterward be propounded in a general
meeting, and by whom, and on what subject, and in what order each of
them shall speak, and how they may draw the powerfullest and most
popular men of the _faction_ to their side. And thus when they have
gotten a faction big enough, in which they may rule by their
eloquence, they move it to take upon it the managing of affairs. And
thus they sometimes oppress the commonwealth, namely, where there is
no other faction to oppose them; but for the most part they rend it,
and introduce a civil war. For _folly_ and _eloquence_ concur in the
subversion of government, in the same manner (as the fable hath it)
as heretofore the daughters of Pelias, king of Thessaly, conspired
with Medea against their father. They going to restore the decrepit
old man to his youth again, by the counsel of Medea they cut him
into pieces, and set him in the fire to boil; in vain expecting when
he would live again. So the common people, through their folly, like
the daughters of Pelias, desiring to renew the ancient government,
being drawn away by the _eloquence_ of ambitious men, as it were by
the witchcraft of Medea; divided into _faction_ they consume it
rather by those flames, than they reform it.
-------
CHAPTER XIII.
CONCERNING THE DUTIES OF THEM WHO BEAR RULE.
1. The right of supreme authority is distinguished from its
exercise. 2. The safety of the people is the supreme law. 3. It
behoves princes to regard the common benefit of many, not the
peculiar interest of this or that man. 4. That by safety is
understood all manner of conveniences. 5. A query, whether it be
the duty of kings to provide for the salvation of their
subjects’ souls, as they shall judge best according to their own
consciences. 6. Wherein the safety of the people consists. 7.
That discoverers are necessary for the defence of the people. 8.
That to have soldiers, arms, garrisons, and moneys in readiness,
in time of peace, is also necessary for the defence of the
people. 9. A right instruction of subjects in civil doctrines,
is necessary for the preserving of peace. 10. Equal
distributions of public offices conduces much to the
preservation of peace. 11. It is natural equity, that monies be
taxed according to what every man spends, not what he possesses.
12. It conduceth to the preservation of peace, to keep down
ambitious men. 13. And to break factions. 14. Laws whereby
thriving arts are cherished and great costs restrained, conduce
to the enriching of the subject. 15. That more ought not to be
defined by the laws, than the benefit of the prince and his
subjects requires. 16. That greater punishments must not be
inflicted, than are prescribed by the laws. 13. Subjects must
have right done them against corrupt judges.
[Sidenote: The right of supreme authority is distinguished from its
exercise.]
1. By what hath hitherto been said, the _duties_ of citizens and
subjects in any kind of government whatsoever, and the _power_ of
the supreme ruler over them are apparent. But we have as yet said
nothing of the _duties_ of rulers, and how they ought to behave
themselves towards their subjects. We must then distinguish between
the _right_ and the _exercise_ of supreme authority; for they can be
divided. As for example, when he who hath the _right_, either cannot
or will not be present in judging trespasses, or deliberating of
affairs. For kings sometimes by reason of their age cannot order
their affairs; sometimes also, though they can do it themselves, yet
they judge it fitter, being satisfied in the choice of their
officers and counsellors, to exercise their power by them. Now where
the _right_ and _exercise_ are severed, there the government of the
commonweal is like the ordinary government of the world; in which
God, the mover of all things, produceth natural effects by the means
of secondary causes. But where he to whom the right of ruling doth
belong, is himself present in all judicatures, consultations, and
public actions, there the administration is such, as if God, beyond
the ordinary course of nature, should immediately apply himself unto
all matters. We will therefore in this chapter summarily and briefly
speak somewhat concerning their _duties_, who exercise authority,
whether by their own or other’s right. Nor is it my purpose to
descend into those things, which being diverse from others, some
princes may do, for this is to be left to the political practices of
each commonweal.
[Sidenote: The safety of the people is the supreme law.]
2. Now all the duties of rulers are contained in this one sentence,
_the safety of the people is the supreme law_. For although they who
among men obtain the chiefest dominion, cannot be subject to laws
properly so called, that is to say, to the will of men, because to
be chief and subject, are contradictories; yet is it their _duty_ in
all things, as much as possibly they can, to yield obedience unto
right reason, which is the natural, moral, and divine law. But
because dominions were constituted for peace’s sake, and peace was
sought after for safety’s sake; he, who being placed in authority,
shall use his power otherwise than to the safety of the people, will
act against the reasons of peace, that is to say, against the laws
of nature. Now as the safety of the people dictates a law by which
princes know their _duty_, so doth it also teach them an art how to
procure themselves a benefit; for the power of the citizens is the
power of the city, that is to say, his that bears the chief rule in
any state.
[Sidenote: It is the duty of princes to respect the common benefit
of many, not the peculiar interest of this or that man.]
3. By the people in this place we understand, not one civil person,
namely, the city itself which governs, but the multitude of subjects
which are governed. For the city was not instituted for its own, but
for the subjects’ sake: and yet a particular care is not required of
_this_ or _that_ man. For the ruler (as such) provides no otherwise
for the safety of his people, than by his laws, which are universal;
and therefore he hath fully _discharged_ himself, if he have
thoroughly endeavoured by wholesome constitutions to establish the
welfare of the most part, and made it as lasting as may be; and that
no man suffer ill, but by his own default, or by some chance which
could not be prevented. But it sometimes conduces to the safety of
the most part, that wicked men do suffer.
[Sidenote: By safety is understood all manner of benefits.]
4. But by _safety_ must be understood, not the sole preservation of
life in what condition soever, but in order to its happiness. For to
this end did men freely assemble themselves and _institute_ a
government, that they might, as much as their human condition would
afford, live delightfully. They therefore who had undertaken the
administration of power in such a kind of government, would sin
against the law of nature, (because against their trust, who had
committed that power unto them), if they should not study, as much
as by good laws could be effected, to furnish their subjects
abundantly, not only with the good things belonging to life, but
also with those which advance to delectation. They who have acquired
dominion by arms, do all desire that their subjects may be strong in
body and mind, that they may serve them the better. Wherefore if
they should not endeavour to provide them, not only with such things
whereby they may live, but also with such whereby they may grow
strong and lusty, they would act against their own scope and end.
[Sidenote: Query, whether it be the duty of kings to provide for the
salvation of their subjects’ souls, as they shall judge
best in their own consciences.]
5. And first of all, princes do believe that it mainly concerns
_eternal salvation_, what opinions are held of the Deity, and what
manner of worship he is to be adored with. Which being supposed, it
may be demanded whether chief rulers, and whosoever they be, whether
one or more, who exercise supreme authority, sin not against the law
of nature, if they cause not such a doctrine and worship to be
taught and practised, or permit a contrary to be taught and
practised, as they believe necessarily conduceth to the _eternal
salvation_ of their subjects. It is manifest that they act against
their conscience; and that they will, as much as in them lies, the
eternal perdition of their subjects. For if they willed it not, I
see no reason why they should suffer (when being supreme they cannot
be compelled) such things to be taught and done, for which they
believe them to be in a damnable state. But we will leave this
difficulty in suspense.
[Sidenote: Wherein the safety of the people consists.]
6. The benefits of subjects, respecting this life only, may be
distributed into four kinds. 1. That they be defended against
foreign enemies. 2. That peace be preserved at home. 3. That they be
enriched, as much as may consist with public security. 4. That they
enjoy a harmless liberty. For supreme commanders can confer no more
to their civil happiness, than that being preserved from foreign and
civil wars, they may quietly enjoy that wealth which they have
purchased by their own industry.
[Sidenote: That discoverers are necessary for the defence of the
people.]
7. There are two things necessary for the people’s defence; _to be
warned and to be forearmed_. For the state of commonwealths
considered in themselves, is natural, that is to say, hostile.
Neither if they cease from fighting, is it therefore to be called
peace; but rather a breathing time, in which one enemy observing the
motion and countenance of the other, values his security not
according to the pacts, but the forces and counsels of his
adversary. And this by natural right, as hath been showed in chap.
II. art. 11, from this, that contracts are invalid in the state of
nature, as oft as any just fear doth intervene. It is therefore
necessary to the defence of the city, first, that there be some who
may, as near as may be, _search into_ and _discover_ the counsels
and motions of all those who may prejudice it. For _discoverers_ to
ministers of state, are like the beams of the sun to the human soul.
And we may more truly say in vision political, than natural, that
the sensible and intelligible species of outward things, not well
considered by others, are by the air transported to the soul; that
is to say, to them who have the supreme authority: and therefore are
they no less necessary to the preservation of the state, than the
rays of the light are to the conservation of man. Or if they be
compared to spider’s webs, which, extended on all sides by the
finest threads, do warn them, keeping in their small holes, of all
outward motions; they who bear rule, can no more know what is
necessary to be commanded for the defence of their subjects without
_spies_, than those spiders can, when they shall go forth, and
whither they shall repair, without the motion of those threads.
[Sidenote: To have soldiers, arms, garrisons, and money in readiness
in time of peace, is necessary for the people’s defence.]
8. Furthermore, it is necessarily requisite to the people’s defence,
that they be _forearmed_. Now to be forearmed is to be furnished
with soldiers, arms, ships, forts, and monies, before the danger be
instant; for the lifting of soldiers and taking up of arms after a
blow is given, is too late at least, if not impossible. In like
manner, not to raise forts and appoint garrisons in convenient
places before the frontiers are invaded, is to be like those country
swains, (as Demosthenes said), who ignorant of the art of fencing,
with their bucklers guarded those parts of the body where they first
felt the smart of the strokes. But they who think it then seasonable
enough to raise monies for the maintenance of soldiers and other
charges of war, when the danger begins to show itself, they consider
not, surely, how difficult a matter it is to wring suddenly out of
close-fisted men so vast a proportion of monies. For almost all men,
what they once reckon in the number of their goods, do judge
themselves to have such a right and propriety in it, as they
conceive themselves to be injured whensoever they are forced to
employ but the least part of it for the public good. Now a
sufficient stock of monies to defend the country with arms, will not
soon be raised out of the treasure of imposts and customs. We must
therefore, for fear of war, in time of peace hoard up good sums, if
we intend the safety of the commonweal. Since therefore it
necessarily belongs to rulers, for the subjects’ safety to discover
the enemy’s counsel, to keep garrisons, and to have money in
continual readiness; and that princes are, by the law of nature,
bound to use their whole endeavour in procuring the welfare of their
subjects: it follows, that it is not only lawful for them to send
out spies, to maintain soldiers, to build forts, and to require
monies for these purposes; but also not to do thus is unlawful. To
which also may be added, whatsoever shall seem to conduce to the
lessening of the power of foreigners whom they suspect, whether by
slight or force. For rulers are bound according to their power to
prevent the evils they suspect; lest peradventure they may happen
through their negligence.
[Sidenote: A right instruction of subjects in civil doctrines, is
necessary for the preserving of peace.]
9. But many things are required to the conservation of inward
peace; because many things concur (as hath been showed in the
foregoing chapter) to its perturbation. We have there showed, that
some things there are, which dispose the minds of men to sedition,
others which move and quicken them so disposed. Among those which
dispose them, we have reckoned in the first place certain perverse
doctrines. It is therefore the duty of those who have the chief
authority, to root those out of the minds of men, not by
commanding, but by teaching; not by the terror of penalties, but
by the perspicuity of reasons. The laws whereby this evil may be
withstood, are not to be made against the persons erring, but
against the errors themselves. Those errors which, in the
foregoing chapter, we affirmed were inconsistent with the quiet of
the commonweal, have crept into the minds of ignorant men, partly
from the pulpit, partly from the daily discourses of men, who, by
reason of little employment otherwise, do find leisure enough to
study; and they got into these men’s minds by the teachers of
their youth in public schools. Wherefore also, on the other side,
if any man would introduce sound doctrine, he must begin from the
_academies_. There the true and truly demonstrated foundations of
civil doctrine are to be laid; wherewith young men, being once
endued, they may afterward, both in private and public, instruct
the vulgar. And this they will do so much the more cheerfully and
powerfully, by how much themselves shall be more certainly
convinced of the truth of those things they profess and teach. For
seeing at this day men receive propositions, though false, and no
more intelligible than if a man should join together a company of
terms drawn by chance out of an urn, by reason of the frequent use
of hearing them; how much more would they for the same reason
entertain true doctrines, suitable to their own understandings and
the nature of things? I therefore conceive it to be the duty of
supreme officers, to cause the true elements of civil doctrine to
be written, and to command them to be taught in all the colleges
of their several dominions.
[Sidenote: Equal distribution of public burthens conduceth much to
the preservation of peace.]
10. In the next place we showed, that grief of mind arising from
_want_ did dispose the subjects to sedition; which want, although
derived from their own luxury and sloth, yet they impute it to those
who govern the realm, as though they were drained and oppressed by
public pensions. Notwithstanding, it may sometimes happen that this
complaint may be just; namely, when the burthens of the realm are
unequally imposed on the subjects; for that which to all together is
but a light weight, if many withdraw themselves it will be very
heavy, nay, even intolerable to the rest: neither are men wont so
much to grieve at the burthen itself, as at the inequality. With
much earnestness therefore men strive to be freed from taxes; and in
this conflict the less happy, as being overcome, do envy the more
fortunate. To remove therefore all just complaint, it is the
interest of the public quiet, and by consequence it concerns the
duty of the magistrate, to see that the public burthens be equally
borne. Furthermore, since what is brought by the subjects to public
use, is nothing else but the price of their bought peace, it is good
reason that they who equally share in the peace, should also pay an
equal part, either by contributing their monies or their labours to
the commonweal. Now it is the law of nature, (by art. 15, chap.
III), that every man in distributing right to others, do carry
himself equal to all. Wherefore rulers are, by the natural law,
obliged to lay the burthens of the commonweal equally on their
subjects.
[Sidenote: It is natural equity, that monies be taxed according to
what every man spends, not to what he possesseth.]
11. Now in this place we understand an equality, not of money, but
of burthen; that is to say, an equality of reason between the
burthens and the benefits. For although all equally enjoy peace, yet
the benefits springing from thence are not equal to all; for some
get greater possessions, others less; and again, some consume less,
others more. It may therefore be demanded, whether subjects ought to
contribute to the public according to the rate of what they gain, or
of what they spend: that is to say, whether the persons must be
taxed, so as to pay contribution according to their wealth; or the
goods themselves, that every man contribute according to what he
spends. But if we consider, where monies are raised according to
wealth, there they who have made equal gain, have not equal
possessions, because that one preserves what he hath got by
frugality, another wastes it by luxury, and therefore equally
rejoicing in the benefit of peace, they do not equally sustain the
burthens of the commonweal: and on the other side, where the goods
themselves are taxed, there every man, while he spends his private
goods, in the very act of consuming them he undiscernably pays part
due to the commonweal, according to, not what he hath, but what by
the benefit of the realm he hath had: it is no more to be doubted,
but that the former way of commanding monies is against equity, and
therefore against the duty of rulers; the latter is agreeable to
reason, and the exercise of their authority.
[Sidenote: It conduces to the preservation of peace, to depress the
ambitious.]
12. In the third place we said, that that trouble of mind which
riseth from _ambition_, was offensive to public peace. For there are
some, who seeming to themselves to be wiser than others, and more
sufficient for the managing of affairs than they who at present do
govern, when they can no otherwise declare how profitable their
virtue would prove to the commonweal, they show it by harming it.
But because ambition and greediness of honours cannot be rooted out
of the minds of men, it is not the duty of rulers to endeavour it;
but by constant application of rewards and punishments they may so
order it, that men may know that the way to honour is not by
contempt of the present government, nor by factions and the popular
air, but by the contraries. They are good men who observe the
decrees, the laws, and rights of their fathers. If with a constant
order we saw these adorned with honours, but the factious punished
and had in contempt by those who bear command, there would be more
ambition to obey than withstand. Notwithstanding, it so happens
sometimes, that as we must stroke a horse by reason of his too much
fierceness, so a stiff-necked subject must be flattered for fear of
his power; but as that happens when the rider, so this when the
commander is in danger of falling. But we speak here of those whose
authority and power is entire. Their duty, I say, it is to cherish
obedient subjects, and to depress the factious all they can; nor can
the public power be otherwise preserved, nor the subjects’ quiet
without it.
[Sidenote: And to dissolve factions.]
13. But if it be the duty of princes to restrain the factious, much
more does it concern them to dissolve and dissipate the factions
themselves. Now I call a _faction_, a multitude of subjects gathered
together either by mutual _contracts_ among themselves, or by the
power of some one, without his or their authority who bear the
supreme rule. A _faction_, therefore, is as it were a city in a
city: for as by an union of men in the state of nature, a city
receives its being, so by a new union of subjects there ariseth a
_faction_. According to this definition, a multitude of subjects who
have bound themselves simply to obey any foreign prince or subject,
or have made any pacts or leagues of mutual defence between
themselves against all men, not excepting those who have the supreme
power in the city, is a _faction_. Also favour with the vulgar, if
it be so great that by it an army may be raised, except public
caution be given either by hostages or some other pledges, contains
_faction_ in it. The same may be said of private wealth, if it
exceed; because all things obey money. Forasmuch therefore as it is
true, that the state of cities among themselves is natural and
hostile, those princes who permit factions, do as much as if they
received an enemy within their walls: which is contrary to the
subjects’ safety, and therefore also against the law of nature.
[Sidenote: Laws whereby gaining arts are cherished and great
expenses restrained, do conduce much to the enriching of
the subject.]
14. There are two things necessary to the enriching of the subjects,
_labour_ and _thrift_; there is also a third which helps, to wit,
the _natural increase of the earth and water_; and there is a fourth
too, namely, _the militia_, which sometimes augments, but more
frequently lessens the subjects’ stock. The two first only are
necessary. For a city constituted in an island of the sea, no
greater than will serve for dwelling, may grow rich without sowing
or fishing, by merchandize and handicrafts only; but there is no
doubt, if they have a territory, that they may be richer with the
same number, or equally rich being a greater number. But the fourth,
namely, _the militia_, was of old reckoned in the number of the
gaining arts, under the notion of _booting_ or _taking prey_; and it
was by mankind, dispersed by families before the constitution of
civil societies, accounted just and honourable. For preying is
nothing else but a war waged with small forces. And great
commonweals, namely, that of Rome and Athens, by the spoils of war,
foreign tribute, and the territories they have purchased by their
arms, have sometimes so improved the commonwealth, that they have
not only not required any public monies from the poorer sort of
subjects, but have also divided to each of them both monies and
lands. But this kind of increase of riches is not to be brought into
rule and fashion. For the militia, in order to profit, is like a
die; wherewith many lose their estates, but few improve them. Since
therefore there are three things only, _the fruits of the earth and
water_, _labour_, and _thrift_, which are expedient for the
enriching of subjects, the duty of commanders in chief shall be
conversant only about those three. For the first those laws will be
useful, which countenance the arts that improve the increase of the
earth and water; such as are _husbandry_ and _fishing_. For the
second all laws against idleness, and such as quicken industry, are
profitable; as such whereby the _art of navigation_, by help whereof
the commodities of the whole world, bought almost by labour only,
are brought into one city; and the _mechanics_, under which I
comprehend all the arts of the most excellent workmen; and the
_mathematical sciences_, the fountains of navigatory and mechanic
employments, are held in due esteem and honour. For the third those
laws are useful, whereby all inordinate expense, as well in meats as
in clothes, and universally in all things which are consumed with
usage, is forbidden. Now because such laws are beneficial to the
ends above specified, it belongs also to the office of supreme
magistrates to establish them.
[Sidenote: That more ought not to be determined by the laws, than
the benefit of prince and subjects require.]
15. The liberty of subjects consists not in being exempt from the
laws of the city, or that they who have the supreme power cannot
make what laws they have a mind to. But because all the motions and
actions of subjects are never circumscribed by laws, nor can be, by
reason of their variety; it is necessary that there be infinite
cases which are neither commanded nor prohibited, but every man may
either do or not do them as he lists himself. In these, each man is
said to enjoy his liberty; and in this sense liberty is to be
understood in this place, namely, for that part of natural right
which is granted and left to subjects by the civil laws. As water
inclosed on all hands with banks, stands still and corrupts; having
no bounds, it spreads too largely, and the more passages it finds
the more freely it takes its current; so subjects, if they might do
nothing without the commands of the law, would grow dull and
unwieldy; if all, they would be dispersed; and the more is left
undetermined by the laws, the more liberty they enjoy. Both extremes
are faulty; for laws were not invented to take away, but to direct
men’s actions; even as nature ordained the banks, not to stay, but
to guide the course of the stream. The measure of this liberty is to
be taken from the subjects’ and the city’s good. Wherefore, in the
first place, it is against the charge of those who command and have
the authority of making laws, that there should be more laws than
necessarily serve for good of the magistrate and his subjects. For
since men are wont commonly to debate what to do or not to do, by
natural reason rather than any knowledge of the laws, where there
are more laws than can easily be remembered, and whereby such things
are forbidden as reason of itself prohibits not of necessity, they
must through ignorance, without the least evil intention, fall
within the compass of laws, as gins laid to entrap their harmless
liberty; which supreme commanders are bound to preserve for their
subjects by the laws of nature.
[Sidenote: That greater punishments must not be inflicted, than are
prescribed by the laws.]
16. It is a great part of that _liberty_, which is harmless to civil
government and necessary for each subject to live happily, that
there be no penalties dreaded but what they may both foresee and
look for; and this is done, where there are either no punishments at
all defined by the laws, or greater not required than are defined.
Where there are none defined, there he that hath first broken the
law, expects an indefinite or arbitrary punishment; and his fear is
supposed boundless, because it relates to an unbounded evil. Now the
law of nature commands them who are not subject to any civil laws,
by what we have said in chap. III. art. 11, and therefore supreme
commanders, that in taking revenge and punishing they must not so
much regard the past evil as the future good; and they sin, if they
entertain any other measure in arbitrary punishment than the public
benefit. But where the punishment is defined; either by a law
prescribed, as when it is set down in plain words that _he that
shall do thus or thus, shall suffer so and so_; or by practice, as
when the penalty, not by any law prescribed, but arbitrary from the
beginning, is afterward determined by the punishment of the first
delinquent; (for natural equity commands that equal transgressors be
equally punished); there to impose a greater penalty than is defined
by the law, is against the law of nature. For the end of punishment
is not to compel the will of man, but to fashion it, and to make it
such as he would have it who hath set the penalty. And deliberation
is nothing else but a weighing, as it were in scales, the
conveniences and inconveniences of the fact we are attempting; where
that which is more weighty, doth necessarily according to its
inclination prevail with us. If therefore the legislator doth set a
less penalty on a crime, than will make our fear more considerable
with us than our lust, that excess of lust above the fear of
punishment, whereby sin is committed, is to be attributed to the
legislator, that is to say, to the supreme; and therefore if he
inflict a greater punishment than himself hath determined in his
laws, he punisheth that in another in which he sinned himself.
[Sidenote: Subjects must have right restored to them against corrupt
judges.]
17. It pertains therefore to the harmless and necessary _liberty_ of
subjects, that every man may without fear enjoy the rights which are
allowed him by the laws. For it is in vain to have _our own_
distinguished by the laws from _another’s_, if by wrong judgment,
robbery, or theft, they may be again confounded. But it falls out
so, that these do happen where judges are corrupted. For the fear
whereby men are deterred from doing evil, ariseth not from hence,
namely, because penalties are set, but because they are executed.
For we esteem the future by what is past, seldom expecting what
seldom happens. If therefore judges corrupted either by gifts,
favour, or even by pity itself, do often forbear the execution of
the penalties due by the law, and by that means put wicked men in
hope to pass unpunished: honest subjects encompassed with murderers,
thieves, and knaves, will not have the liberty to converse freely
with each other, nor scarce to stir abroad without hazard; nay, the
_city_ itself is dissolved, and every man’s right of protecting
himself at his own will returns to him. The law of nature therefore
gives this precept to supreme commanders, that they not only do
righteousness themselves, but that they also by penalties cause the
judges, by them appointed, to do the same; that is to say, that they
hearken to the complaints of their subjects; and as oft as need
requires, make choice of some extraordinary judges, who may hear the
matter debated concerning the ordinary ones.
-------
CHAPTER XIV.
OF LAWS AND TRESPASSES.
1. How law differs from counsel. 2. How from covenant. 3. How from
right. 4. Division of laws into divine and human: the divine
into natural and positive; and the natural into the laws of
single men and of nations. 5. The division of human, that is to
say, of civil laws into sacred and secular. 6. Into distributive
and vindicative. 7. That distributive and vindicative are not
species, but parts of the laws. 8. All law is supposed to have a
penalty annexed to it. 9. The precepts of the decalogue of
honouring parents, of murder, adultery, theft, false witness,
are civil laws. 10. It is impossible to command aught by the
civil law contrary to the law of nature. 11. It is essential to
a law, both that itself and also the lawgiver be known. 12.
Whence the lawgiver comes to be known. 13. Publishing and
interpretation are necessary to the knowledge of a law. 14. The
division of the civil law into written and unwritten. 15. The
natural laws are not written laws; neither are the wise
sentences of lawyers nor custom laws of themselves, but by the
consent of the supreme power. 16. What the word sin, most
largely taken, signifies. 17. The definition of sin. 18. The
difference between a sin of infirmity and malice. 19. Under what
kind of sin atheism is contained. 20. What treason is. 21. That
by treason not the civil, but the natural laws are broken. 22.
And that therefore it is to be punished not by the right of
dominion, but by the right of war. 23. That obedience is not
rightly distinguished into active and passive.
[Sidenote: How law differs from counsel.]
1. They who less seriously consider the force of words, do sometimes
confound _law_ with _counsel_, sometimes with _covenant_, sometimes
with _right_. They confound _law_ with _counsel_, who think that it
is the duty of monarchs not only to give ear to their _counsellors_,
but also to obey them; as though it were in vain to take _counsel_,
unless it were also followed. We must fetch the distinction between
_counsel_ and _law_, from the difference between _counsel_ and
_command_. Now _counsel_ is a _precept_, in which the reason of my
obeying it is taken from _the thing itself which is advised_; but
_command_ is a _precept_, in which the cause of my obedience depends
on _the will of the commander_. For it is not properly said, _thus I
will and thus I command_, except the will stand for a reason. Now
when obedience is yielded to the laws, not for the thing itself, but
by reason of the adviser’s will, the law is not a _counsel_, but a
_command_, and is defined thus: _law is the command of that person,
whether man or court, whose precept contains in it the reason of
obedience_: as the precepts of God in regard of men, of magistrates
in respect of their subjects, and universally of all the powerful in
respect of them who cannot resist, may be termed their laws. _Law_
and _counsel_ therefore differ many ways. _Law_ belongs to him who
hath power over them whom he adviseth; _counsel_ to them who have no
power. To follow what is prescribed by _law_, is _duty_; what by
_counsel_, is _free-will_. _Counsel_ is directed to his end, that
receives it; _law_, to his that gives it. _Counsel_ is given to none
but the willing; _law_ even to the unwilling. To conclude, the right
of the _counsellor_ is made void by the will of him to whom he gives
counsel; the right of the _law-giver_ is not abrogated at the
pleasure of him who hath a _law_ imposed.
[Sidenote: How it differs from a covenant.]
2. They confound _law_ and _covenant_, who conceive the laws to be
nothing else but certain ὁμολογήματα, or forms of living determined
by the common consent of men. Among whom is Aristotle, who defines
_law_ on this manner; Νόμός ἐστι λόγος ὡρισμένος καθ’ ὁμολογίαν
κοινὴν πόλεως, μγνύων πῶς δεῖ πράττειν ἕκαστα: that is to say, _law
is a speech, limited according to the common consent of the city,
declaring every thing that we ought to do_. Which definition is not
simply of _law_, but of the _civil law_. For it is manifest that the
_divine laws_ sprang not from the consent of men, nor yet the _laws
of nature_. For if they had their original from the consent of men,
they might also by the same consent be abrogated; but they are
unchangeable. But indeed, that is no right definition of a _civil
law_. For in that place, a city is taken either for one civil
person, having one will; or for a multitude of men, who have each of
them the liberty of their private wills. If for one person, those
words _common consent_ are ill-placed here; for _one_ person hath no
_common consent_. Neither ought he to have said, _declaring_ what
was needful to be done, but _commanding_; for what the city
declares, it commands its subjects. He therefore by a city
understood a multitude of men, declaring by common consent (imagine
it a writing confirmed by votes) some certain forms of living. But
these are nothing else but some mutual contracts, which oblige not
any man (and therefore are no laws) before that a supreme power
being constituted, which can compel, have sufficient remedy against
the rest, who otherwise are not likely to keep them. Laws therefore,
according to this definition of Aristotle, are nothing else but
naked and weak contracts; which then at length, when there is one
who by right doth exercise the supreme power, shall either become
_laws_ or _no laws_ at his will and pleasure. Wherefore he confounds
_contracts_ with _laws_, which he ought not to have done; for
contract is _a promise_, law a _command_. In contracts we say, _I
will do this_; in laws, _do this_. Contracts oblige us;[16] laws tie
us fast, being obliged. A _contract_ obligeth of _itself_; the _law_
holds the party obliged by virtue of the universal _contract_ of
yielding obedience. Therefore in _contract_, it is first determined
what is to be done, before we are obliged to do it; but in _law_, we
are first obliged to perform, and what is to be done is determined
afterwards. Aristotle therefore ought to have defined a _civil law_
thus: _a civil law is a speech limited by the will of the city,
commanding everything behoveful to be done_. Which is the same with
that we have given above, in chap. VI. art. 9: to wit, _that the
civil laws are the command of him, whether man or court of men, who
is endued with supreme power in the city, concerning the future
actions of his subjects_.
Footnote 16:
_Contracts oblige us._] _To be obliged_, and _to be tied being
obliged_, seems to some men to be one and the same thing; and that
therefore here seems to be some distinction in words, but none
indeed. More clearly therefore, I say thus: that a man is obliged
by his contracts, that is, that he ought to perform for his
promise sake; but that the law ties him being obliged, that is to
say, it compels him to make good his promise for fear of the
punishment appointed by the law.
[Sidenote: How it differs from right.]
3. They confound _laws_ with _right_, who continue still to do
what is permitted by _divine right_, notwithstanding it be
forbidden by _the civil law_. That which is prohibited by the
_divine law_, cannot be permitted by the _civil_; neither can that
which is commanded by the _divine law_, be prohibited _by the
civil_. Notwithstanding, that which is permitted by the _divine
right_, that is to say, that which may be done by _divine right_,
doth no whit hinder why the same may not be forbidden by the
_civil laws_; for _inferior laws_ may restrain the liberty allowed
by the _superior_, although they cannot enlarge them. Now _natural
liberty_ is a right not constituted, but allowed by the laws. For
the _laws_ being removed, our _liberty_ is absolute. This is first
restrained by the _natural_ and _divine laws_; the residue is
bounded by the _civil law_; and what remains, may again be
restrained by the _constitutions_ of particular towns and
societies. There is great difference therefore between _law_ and
_right_. For law is _a fetter_, right is _freedom_; and they
differ like contraries.
[Sidenote: The division of laws into divine and human; and of the
divine into natural and positive; and of the natural into
those laws of single men, and those of nations.]
4. All _law_ may be divided, first according to the diversity of its
authors into _divine_ and _human_. The _divine_, according to the
two ways whereby God hath made known his will unto men, is twofold;
_natural_ or _moral_, and _positive_. _Natural_ is that which God
hath declared to all men by his _eternal word_ born with them, to
wit, their _natural reason_; and this is that law, which in this
whole book I have endeavoured to unfold. _Positive_ is that, which
God hath revealed to us by _the word of prophecy_, wherein he hath
spoken unto men as a man. Such are the laws which he gave to the
Jews concerning their government and divine worship; and they may be
termed the _divine civil laws_, because they were peculiar to the
civil government of the Jews, his peculiar people. Again, _the
natural law_ may be divided into that of _men_, which alone hath
obtained the title of the _law of nature_; and _that of cities_,
which may be called _that of nations_, but vulgarly it is termed the
_right of nations_. The precepts of both are alike. But because
cities once instituted do put on the personal proprieties of men,
that _law_, which speaking of the duty of single men we call
_natural_, being applied to whole cities and nations, is called the
_right of nations_. And the same elements of _natural law and
right_, which have hitherto been spoken of, being transferred to
_whole cities_ and _nations_, may be taken for the elements of the
_laws_ and _right of nations_.
[Sidenote: The division of human, that is to say, civil laws into
secular and sacred.]
5. All _human law_ is _civil_. For the state of men considered out
of civil society, is hostile; in which, because one is not subject
to another, there are no other laws beside the dictates of natural
reason, which is the divine law. But in civil government the city
only, that is to say, that man or court to whom the supreme power of
the city is committed, is the legislator; and the laws of the city
are civil. _The civil laws_ may be divided, according to the
diversity of their subject matter, into _sacred_ or _secular_.
_Sacred_ are those which pertain to religion, that is to say, to the
ceremonies and worship of God: to wit, what persons, things, places,
are to be consecrated, and in what fashion; what opinions concerning
the Deity are to be taught publicly; and with what words and in what
order supplications are to be made; and the like; and are not
determined by any divine positive law. For the _civil sacred laws_
are the _human laws_ (which are also called _ecclesiastical_)
concerning _things sacred_; but _the secular_, under a general
notion, are usually called the _civil_ laws.
[Sidenote: Into distributive and vindicative.]
6. Again, the _civil law_ (according to the two offices of the
legislator, whereof one is to judge, the other to constrain men to
acquiesce to his judgments) hath two parts; the one _distributive_,
the other _vindicative_ or _penal_. By the _distributive_ it is,
that every man hath his proper rights; that is to say, it sets forth
rules for all things, whereby we may know what is properly our’s,
what another man’s; so as others may not hinder us from the free use
and enjoyment of our own, and we may not interrupt others in the
quiet possession of their’s; and what is lawful for every man to do
or omit, and what is not lawful. _Vindicative_ is that, whereby it
is defined what punishment shall be inflicted on them who break the
law.
[Sidenote: Distributive and vindicative are not two species of the
laws.]
7. Now _distributive_ and _vindicative_ are not two several
_species_ of the laws, but two _parts_ of the same law. For if the
law should say no more, but (for example) _whatsoever you take with
your net in the sea, be it yours_, it is in vain. For although
another should take that away from you which you have caught, it
hinders not but that it still remains yours. For in the state of
nature where all things are common to all, _yours_ and _others_ are
all one; insomuch as what the law defines to be _yours_, was _yours_
even before the law, and after the law ceases not to be _yours_,
although in another man’s possession. Wherefore the law doth
nothing, unless it be understood to be so _yours_, as all other men
be forbidden to interrupt your free use and secure enjoyment of it
at all times, according to your own will and pleasure. For this is
that which is required to a propriety of goods; not that a man may
be able to use them, but to use them alone; which is done by
prohibiting others to be an hinderance to him. But in vain do they
also prohibit any men, who do not withal strike a fear of punishment
into them. In vain therefore is the law, unless it contain both
parts, that which _forbids_ injuries to be done, and that which
_punisheth_ the doers of them. The first of them, which is called
_distributive_, is _prohibitory_, and speaks to all; the second,
which is styled _vindicative_ or _penary_, is _mandatory_, and only
speaks to public ministers.
[Sidenote: All law is supposed to have a penalty annexed to it.]
8. From hence also we may understand, _that every civil law hath a
penalty annexed to it_, either explicitly or implicitly. For where
the penalty is not defined, neither by any writing, nor by example
of any who hath suffered the punishment of the transgressed law,
there the penalty is understood to be arbitrary; namely, to depend
on the will of the legislator, that is to say, of the supreme
commander. For in vain is that law, which may be broken without
punishment.
[Sidenote: The precepts of the Decalogue of honouring parents, of
murder, adultery, theft, false witnesses, are the civil
laws.]
9. Now because it comes from the civil laws, both that every man
have _his proper right_ and distinguished from _another’s_, and also
that he is forbidden to invade another’s rights; it follows that
these precepts: _Thou shalt not refuse to give the honour defined by
the laws, unto thy parents_: _Thou shalt not kill the man, whom the
laws forbid thee to kill_: _Thou shalt avoid all copulation
forbidden by the laws_: _Thou shalt not take away another’s goods,
against the lords will_: _Thou shalt not frustrate the laws and
judgments by false testimony_: are civil laws. The natural laws
command the same things, but implicitly. For the law of nature (as
hath been said in chap. III. art. 2) commands us to _keep
contracts_; and therefore also to perform obedience, when we have
covenanted obedience, and to abstain from another’s goods, when it
is determined by the civil law what belongs to another. But all
subjects (by chap. VI. art. 13) do _covenant_ to obey his commands
who hath the supreme power, that is to say, the civil laws, in the
very constitution of government, even before it is possible to break
them. For the law of nature did oblige in the state of nature; where
first, because nature hath given all things to all men, nothing did
properly belong to another, and therefore it was not possible to
invade another’s right; next, where all things were common, and
therefore all carnal copulations lawful; thirdly, where was the
state of war, and therefore lawful to kill; fourthly, where all
things were determined by every man’s own judgment, and therefore
paternal respects also; lastly, where there were no public
judgments, and therefore no use of bearing witness, either true or
false.
[Sidenote: It is not possible to command aught by the civil law,
contrary to the laws of nature.]
10. Seeing therefore our obligation to observe those laws is more
ancient than the promulgation of the laws themselves, as being
contained in the very constitution of the city; by the virtue of the
natural law which forbids breach of covenant, the law of nature
commands us to keep all the civil laws. For where we are tied to
obedience before we know what will be commanded us, there we are
universally tied to obey in all things. Whence it follows, that no
civil law whatsoever, which tends not to a reproach of the Deity,
(in respect of whom cities themselves have no right of their own,
and cannot be said to make laws), can possibly be against the law of
nature. For though the law of nature forbid theft, adultery, &c; yet
if the civil law command us to invade anything, that invasion is not
theft, adultery, &c. For when the Lacedæmonians of old permitted
their youths, by a certain law, to take away other men’s goods, they
commanded that these goods should not be accounted other men’s, but
their own who took them; and therefore such surreptions were no
thefts. In like manner, copulations of heathen sexes, according to
their laws, were lawful marriages.
[Sidenote: It is essential to a law, that both it and the legislator
be known.]
11. It is necessary to the essence of a law, that the subjects be
acquainted with two things: first, what man or court hath the
supreme power, that is to say, the right of making laws; secondly,
what the law itself says. For he that neither knew either to whom or
what he is tied to, cannot obey; and by consequence is in such a
condition as if he were not tied at all. I say not that it is
necessary to the essence of a law, that either one or the other be
perpetually known, but only that it be once known. And if the
subject afterward forget either the right he hath who made the law,
or the law itself, that makes him no less tied to obey; since he
might have remembered it, had he a will to obey.
[Sidenote: Whence the legislator is known.]
12. _The knowledge of the legislator_ depends on the subject
himself; for the right of making laws could not be conferred on any
man without his own consent and covenant, either expressed or
supposed; expressed, when from the beginning the citizens do
themselves constitute a form of governing the city, or when by
promise they submit themselves to the dominion of any one; or
supposed at least, as when they make use of the benefit of the realm
and laws for their protection and conservation against others. For
to whose dominion we require our fellow subjects to yield obedience
for our good, his dominion we acknowledge to be legitimate by that
very request. And therefore ignorance of the power of making laws,
can never be a sufficient excuse; for every man knows what he hath
done himself.
[Sidenote: Promulgation and interpretation are necessary to the
knowledge of a law.]
13. _The knowledge of the laws_ depends on the legislator; who must
publish them; for otherwise they are not laws. For law is the
command of the law-maker, and his command is the declaration of his
will; it is not therefore a law, except the will of the law-maker be
declared, which is done by _promulgation_. Now in _promulgation_ two
things must be manifest; whereof one is, that he or they who publish
a law, either have a right themselves to make laws, or that they do
it by authority derived from him or them who have it; the other is
the sense of the law itself. Now, that the first, namely, published
laws, proceed from him who hath the supreme command, cannot be
manifest (speaking exactly and philosophically) to any, but them who
have received them from the mouth of the commander. The rest
believe; but the reasons of their belief are so many, that it is
scarce possible they should not believe. And truly in a
_democratical_ city, where every one may be present at the making of
laws if he will, he that shall be absent, must believe those that
were present. But in _monarchies_ and _aristocracies_, because it is
granted but to few to be present, and openly to hear the commands of
the _monarch_ or the _nobles_, it was necessary to bestow a power on
those few of publishing them to the rest. And thus we believe those
to be the _edicts_ and _decrees_ of princes, which are propounded to
us for such, either by the writings or voices of them whose office
it is to publish them. But yet, when we have these causes of belief;
that we have seen the prince or supreme counsel constantly use such
_counsellors_, _secretaries_, _publishers_, and _seals_, and the
like arguments for the declaring of his will; that he never took any
authority from them; that they have been punished, who not giving
credit to such like promulgations have transgressed the law; not
only he who thus believing shall obey the _edicts_ and _decrees_ set
forth by them, is everywhere excused, but he that not believing
shall not yield obedience, is punished. For the constant permission
of these things is a manifest sign enough and evident declaration of
the commander’s will; provided there be nothing contained in the
_law_, _edict_, or _decree_, derogatory from his supreme power. For
it is not to be imagined that he would have aught taken from his
power by any of his officers, as long as he retains a will to
govern. Now the _sense_ of the _law_, when there is any doubt made
of it, is to be taken from them to whom the supreme authority hath
committed the _knowledge of causes_ or _judgments_; for to _judge_,
is nothing else than by _interpretation_ to apply the _laws_ to
particular cases. Now we may know who they are that have this office
granted them, in the same manner as we know who they be that have
authority given them to publish laws.
[Sidenote: The civil law divided into written and unwritten.]
14. Again the _civil law_, according to its two-fold manner of
publishing, is of two sorts, _written_ and _unwritten_. By
_written_, I understand that which wants a voice, or some other sign
of the will of the legislator, that it may become a law. For all
kind of laws are of the same age with mankind, both in nature and
time; and therefore of more antiquity than the invention of letters,
and the art of writing. Wherefore not a _writing_, but a _voice_ is
necessary for a _written law_; this alone is requisite to the
_being_, that to the _remembrance_ of a law. For we read, that
before letters were found out for the help of memory, that _laws_,
contracted into metre, were wont to be sung. The _unwritten_, is
that which wants no other publishing than the voice of nature or
natural reason; such are the _laws of nature_. For the natural law,
although it be distinguished from the civil, forasmuch as it
commands the will; yet so far forth as it relates to our actions, it
is civil. For example, this same, _thou shalt not covet_, which only
appertains to the mind, is a natural law only; but this, _thou shalt
not invade_, is both natural and civil. For seeing it is impossible
to prescribe such universal rules, whereby all future contentions,
which perhaps are infinite, may be determined; it is to be
understood that in all cases not mentioned by the _written laws_,
the _law of natural equity_ is to be followed, which commands us to
distribute equally to equals; and this by the virtue of the _civil
law_, which also punisheth those who knowingly and willingly do
actually transgress the _laws of nature_.
[Sidenote: That the natural laws are not written laws, neither are
the sentences of lawyers or customs laws of themselves,
but by the consent of the supreme power.]
15. These things being understood, it appears, first, that the _laws
of nature_, although they were described in the books of some
philosophers, are not for that reason to be termed _written laws_:
and that the writings of the interpreters of the laws, were no laws,
for want of the supreme authority; nor yet those _orations of the
wise_, that is to say, _judges_, but so far forth as by the consent
of the supreme power they part into custom; and that then they are
to be received among the _written laws_, not for the custom’s sake,
(which by its own force doth not constitute a law), but for the will
of the supreme commander; which appears in this, that he hath
suffered his _sentence_, whether equal or unequal, to pass into
custom.
[Sidenote: What the word _sin_, taken in its largest sense,
signifies.]
16. _Sin_, in its largest signification, comprehends every _deed_,
_word_, and _thought_ against right reason. For every man, by
reasoning, seeks out the means to the end which he propounds to
himself. If therefore he reason right, that is to say, beginning
from most evident principles he makes a discourse out of
consequences continually necessary, he will proceed in a most direct
way. Otherwise he will go astray, that is to say, he will either
_do_, _say_, or _endeavour_ somewhat against his proper end; which
when he hath done, he will indeed in reasoning be said to have
_erred_, but in action and will to have _sinned_. For _sin_ follows
_error_, just as the _will_ doth the _understanding_. And this is
the most general acception of the word; under which is contained
every _imprudent_ action, whether against the law, as to overthrow
another man’s house, or not against the law, as to build his own
upon the sand.
[Sidenote: The definition of sin.]
17. But when we speak of _the laws_, the word _sin_ is taken in a
more strict sense, and signifies not every thing done against right
reason, but that only which is _blameable_; and therefore it is
called _malum culpæ_, the evil of fault. But yet if anything be
culpable, it is not presently to be termed _a sin_ or _fault_; but
only if it be blameable with reason. We must therefore enquire what
it is to be _blameable with reason_, what _against reason_. Such is
the nature of man, that every one calls that _good_ which he
desires, and _evil_ which he eschews. And therefore through the
diversity of our affections it happens, that one counts that _good_,
which another counts _evil_; and the same man what now he esteemed
for _good_, he immediately after looks on as _evil_: and the same
thing which he calls _good_ in himself, he terms _evil_ in another.
For we all measure _good_ and _evil_ by the pleasure or pain we
either feel at present, or expect hereafter. Now seeing the
prosperous actions of enemies, because they increase their honours,
goods, and power; and of equals, by reason of that strife of honours
which is among them; both seem and are _irksome_, and therefore
_evil_ to all; and men use to repute those _evil_, that is to say,
to _lay some fault_ to their charge, from whom they receive _evil_;
it is impossible to be determined by the consent of single men, whom
the same things do not please and displease, what actions are, and
what not to be blamed. They may agree indeed in some certain general
things, as that _theft_, _adultery_, and the like are _sins_; as if
they should say that all men account those things _evil_, to which
they have given names which are usually taken in an _evil_ sense.
But we demand not whether theft be a sin, but what is to be termed
theft; and so concerning others, in like manner. Forasmuch therefore
as in so great a diversity of censurers, what is by reason blameable
is not to be measured by the reason of one man more than another,
because of the equality of human nature; and there are no other
reasons in being, but only those of _particular men_, and that of
the _city_: it follows, that the _city_ is to determine what _with
reason is culpable_. So as a _fault_, that is to say, a _sin_, is
that which a man does, omits, says, or wills, against the reason of
_the city_, that is, contrary to the laws.
[Sidenote: The difference between a sin of infirmity and malice.]
18. But a man may do somewhat against the laws through human
infirmity, although he desire to fulfil them; and yet his action, as
being against the laws, is rightly blamed, and called a _sin_. But
there are some who _neglect_ the laws; and as oft as any hope of
gain and impunity doth appear to them, no conscience of contracts
and betrothed faith can withhold them from their violation. Not only
the deeds, but even the minds of these men are against the laws.
They who sin only through infirmity, are _good men_ even when they
sin; but these, even when they do not sin, are wicked. For though
both the action and the mind be repugnant to the laws, yet those
repugnances are distinguished by different appellations. For the
irregularity of the action is called ἀδίκημα, _unjust deed_; that of
the mind ἀδικὶα and κακὶα, _injustice_ and _malice_; that is the
infirmity of a disturbed soul, this the _pravity_ of a sober mind.
[Sidenote: Under what kind of sin atheism is contained.]
19. But seeing there is no sin which is not against some law, and
that there is no law which is not the command of him who hath the
supreme power, and that no man hath a supreme power which is not
bestowed on him by our own consent; in what manner will he be said
to sin, who either denies that there is a God, or that he governs
the world, or casts any other reproach upon him? For he will say:
_that he never submitted his will to God’s will, not conceiving him
so much as to have any being: and granting that his opinion were
erroneous, and therefore also a sin, yet were it to be numbered
among those of imprudence or ignorance, which by right cannot be
punished_. This speech seems so far forth to be admitted, that
though this kind of sin be the greatest and most hurtful, yet is it
to be referred to sins of imprudence;[17] but that it should be
excused by imprudence or ignorance, is absurd. For the atheist is
punished either immediately by God himself, or by kings constituted
under God; not as a subject is punished by a king, because he keeps
not the laws; but as one enemy by another, because he would not
accept of the laws; that is to say, by the right of war, as the
giants warring against God. For whosoever are not subject either to
some common lord, or one to another, are enemies among themselves.
Footnote 17:
_Yet is it to be referred to sins of imprudence._] Many find fault
that I have referred atheism to imprudence, and not to injustice;
yea by some it is taken so, as if I had not declared myself an
enemy bitter enough against atheists. They object further, that
since I had elsewhere said that it might be known _there is a God_
by natural reason, I ought to have acknowledged that they sin at
least against the law of nature, and therefore are not only guilty
of imprudence, but injustice too. But I am so much an enemy to
atheists, that I have both diligently sought for, and vehemently
desired to find some law whereby I might condemn them of
injustice. But when I found none, I inquired next what name God
himself did give to men so detested by him. Now God speaks thus of
the atheist: _The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God_.
Wherefore I placed their sin in that rank which God himself refers
to. Next I show them to be enemies of God. But I conceive the name
of an enemy to be sometimes somewhat sharper, than that of an
unjust man. Lastly, I affirm that they may under that notion be
justly punished both by God, and supreme magistrates; and
therefore by no means excuse or extenuate this sin. Now that I
have said, that it might be known by natural reason _that there is
a God_, is so to be understood, not as if I had meant that all men
might know this; except they think, that because Archimedes by
natural reason found out what proportion the circle hath to the
square, it follows thence, that every one of the vulgar could have
found out as much. I say therefore, that although it may be known
to some by the light of reason that there is a God; yet men that
are continually engaged in pleasures or seeking of riches and
honour; also men that are not wont to reason aright, or cannot do
it, or care not to do it; lastly, fools, in which number are
atheists, cannot know this.
[Sidenote: What the sin of treason is.]
20. Seeing that from the virtue of the covenant, whereby each
subject is tied to the other to perform absolute and universal
obedience (such as is defined above, chap. VI. art. 13) to the city,
that is to say, to the sovereign power, whether that be one man or
council, there is an obligation derived to observe each one of the
civil laws; so that that covenant contains in itself all the laws at
once; it is manifest that the subject who shall renounce the general
covenant of obedience, doth at once renounce all the laws. Which
trespass is so much worse than any other one sin, by how much to sin
_always_, is worse than to sin _once_. And this is that sin which is
called _treason_; and it is a word or deed whereby the citizen or
subject declares, that he will no longer obey that man or court to
whom the supreme power of the city is entrusted. And the subject
declares this same will of his by deed, when he either doth or
endeavours to do violence to the sovereign’s person, or to them who
execute his commands. Of which sort are traitors, regicides, and
such as take up arms against the city, or during a war fly to the
enemy’s side. And they show the same will in word, who flatly deny
that themselves or other subjects are tied to any such kind of
obedience, either in the whole, as he who should say that we must
not obey him (keeping the obedience which we owe to God entire)
simply, absolutely, and universally; or in part, as he who should
say, that he had no right to wage war at his own will, to make
peace, enlist soldiers, levy monies, elect magistrates and public
ministers, enact laws, decide controversies, set penalties, or do
aught else without which the state cannot stand. And these and the
like words and deeds are treason by the natural, not the civil law.
But it may so happen, that some action, which before the civil law
was made, was not treason, yet will become such if it be done
afterwards. As if it be declared by the law, that it shall be
accounted for a sign of renouncing public obedience, that is to say,
for treason, if any man shall coin monies, or forge the privy-seal;
he that after that declaration shall do this, will be no less guilty
of treason than the other. Yet he sins less, because he breaks not
all the laws at once, but one law only. For the law by calling that
treason which by nature is not so, doth indeed by right set a more
odious name, and perhaps a more grievous punishment on the guilty
persons; but it makes not the sin itself more grievous.
[Sidenote: Treason breaks not the civil, but the natural law.]
21. But that sin, which by the law of nature is treason, is a
transgression of the natural, not the civil law. For since our
obligation to civil obedience, by virtue whereof the civil laws are
valid, is before all civil law, and the sin of treason is naturally
nothing else but the breach of that obligation; it follows, that by
the sin of treason that law is broken which preceded the civil law,
to wit, the natural, which forbids us to violate covenants and
betrothed faith. But if some sovereign prince should set forth a law
on this manner, _thou shalt not rebel_, he would effect just
nothing. For except subjects were before obliged to obedience, that
is to say, not to rebel, all law is of no force. Now the obligation
which obligeth to what we were before obliged to, is superfluous.
[Sidenote: And therefore is punished not by the right of
sovereignty, but by the right of war.]
22. Hence it follows, that _rebels_, _traitors_, and all others
_convicted of treason_, are punished not by _civil_, but _natural_
right; that is to say, not as _civil subjects_, but as _enemies to
the government_; not by the _right of sovereignty_ and _dominion_,
but by the _right of war_.
[Sidenote: Obedience not rightly distinguished into active and
passive.]
23. There are some who think that those acts which are done against
the law, when the punishment is determined by the law itself, are
expiated, if the punished willingly undergo the punishment; and that
they are not guilty before God of breaking the natural law,
(although by breaking the civil laws, we break the natural too,
which command us to keep the civil), who have suffered the
punishment which the law required; as if by the law the fact were
not prohibited, but a punishment were set instead of a price,
whereby a license might be bought of doing what the law forbids. By
the same reason they might infer too, that no transgression of the
law were a sin; but that every man might enjoy the liberty which he
hath bought by his own peril. But we must know, that the words of
the law may be understood in a two-fold sense. The one as containing
two parts, (as hath been declared above in art. 7), namely, that of
absolutely prohibiting, as, _thou shalt not do this_; and revenging,
as, _he that doth this, shall be punished_. The other, as containing
a condition, for example, _thou shalt not do this thing, unless thou
wilt suffer punishment_; and thus the law forbids not simply, but
conditionally. If it be understood in the first sense, he that doth
it sins, because he doth what the law forbids to be done; if in the
second, he sins not, because he cannot be said to do what is
forbidden him, that performs the condition. For in the first sense,
all men are forbidden to do it; in the second, they only who keep
themselves from the punishment. In the first sense, the vindicative
part of the law obligeth not the guilty, but the magistrate to
require punishment; in the second, he himself that owes the
punishment, is obliged to exact it; to the payment whereof, if it be
capital or otherwise grievous, he cannot be obliged. But in what
sense the law is to be taken, depends on the will of him who hath
the sovereignty. When therefore there is any doubt of the meaning of
the law, since we are sure they sin not who do it not, it will be
sin if we do it, howsoever the law may afterward be explained. For
to do that which a man doubts whether it be a sin or not, when he
hath freedom to forbear it, is a contempt of the laws; and therefore
by chap. III. art. 28, a sin against the law of nature. Vain
therefore is that same distinction of _obedience_ into _active_ and
_passive_; as if that could be expiated by penalties constituted by
human decrees, which is a sin against the law of nature, which is
the law of God; or as though they sinned not, who sin at their own
peril.
RELIGION
---
CHAPTER XV.
OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY NATURE.
1. The proposition of the following contents. 2. Over whom God is
said to rule by nature. 3. The word of God threefold; reason,
revelation, prophecy. 4. The kingdom of God twofold; natural,
and prophetic. 5. The right whereby God reigns, is seated in his
omnipotence. 6. The same proved from Scripture. 7. The
obligation of yielding obedience to God, proceeds from human
infirmity. 8. The laws of God in his natural kingdom, are those
which are recited above in chapters II. III. 9. What honour and
worship is. 10. Worship consists either in attributes or in
actions. 11. And there is one sort natural, another arbitrary.
12. One commanded, another voluntary. 13. What the end or scope
of worship is. 14. What the natural laws are concerning God’s
attributes. 15. What the actions are whereby naturally we do
give worship. 16. In God’s natural kingdom, the city may appoint
what worship of God it pleaseth. 17. God ruling by nature only,
the city, that is to say, that man or court who under God hath
the sovereign authority of the city, is the interpreter of all
the laws. 18. Certain doubts removed. 19. What sin is in the
natural kingdom of God; and what treason against the Divine
Majesty.
[Sidenote: The proposition of the following contents.]
1. We have already in the foregoing chapters, proved both by reason
and testimonies of holy writ, that the estate of nature, that is to
say, of absolute liberty, such as is theirs who neither govern nor
are governed, is an anarchy or hostile state; that the precepts
whereby to avoid this state, are _the laws of nature_; that there
can be no civil government without a sovereign; and that they who
have gotten this sovereign command, must be obeyed simply, that is
to say, in all things which repugn not the commandments of God.
There is this one thing only wanting to the complete understanding
of all civil duty, and that is, to know which are the laws and
commandments of God. For else we cannot tell whether that which the
civil power commands us, be against the laws of God, or not; whence
it must necessarily happen, that either by too much obedience to the
civil authority we become stubborn against the divine Majesty; or
for fear of sinning against God we run into disobedience against the
civil power. To avoid both these rocks, it is necessary to know the
divine laws. Now because the knowledge of the laws depends on the
knowledge of the kingdom, we must in what follows speak somewhat
concerning the _kingdom of God_.
[Sidenote: Over whom God is said to reign:]
2. _The Lord is king, the earth may be glad thereof_; saith the
psalmist, (Psalm xcvii. 1). And again the same psalmist, (Psalm
xcix. 1): _The Lord is king, be the people never so impatient; he
sitteth between the cherubims, be the earth never so unquiet_; to
wit, whether men will or not, God is the king over all the earth;
nor is he moved from his throne, if there be any who deny either his
_existence_ or his _providence_. Now although God govern all men so
by his power, that none can do anything which he would not have
done: yet this, to speak properly and accurately, is not to reign.
For he is said to reign, who rules not by _acting_, but _speaking_,
that is to say, by _precepts_ and _threatenings_. And therefore we
count not inanimate nor irrational bodies for subjects in the
kingdom of God, although they be subordinate to the divine power;
because they _understand not the commands and threats_ of God: nor
yet the atheists, because they believe not that there is a God; nor
yet those who believing there is a God, do not yet believe that he
rules these inferior things: for even these, although they be
governed by the power of God, yet do they not acknowledge any of his
_commands_, nor stand in awe of his _threats_. Those only therefore
are supposed to belong to God’s kingdom, who acknowledge him to be
the governor of all things, and that he hath given _his commands_ to
men, and appointed _punishments_ for the transgressors. The rest we
must not call subjects, but enemies of God.
[Sidenote: The word of God threefold; reason, revelation, prophesy.]
3. But none are said to govern by _commands_, but they who openly
declare them to those who are governed by them. For the _commands_
of the rulers, are the _laws_ of the ruled; but _laws_ they are not,
if not perspicuously published, insomuch as all excuse of ignorance
may be taken away. Men indeed publish their laws by _word_ or
_voice_; neither can they make their will universally known any
other way. But God’s _laws_ are declared after a threefold manner:
first, _by the tacit dictates of right reason_; next, by _immediate
revelation_, which is supposed to be done either by a supernatural
voice, or by a vision or dream, or divine inspiration; thirdly, by
the _voice of one man_, whom God recommends to the rest, as worthy
of belief, by the working of true miracles. Now he whose voice God
thus makes use of to signify his will unto others, is called a
_prophet_. These three manners may be termed the _threefold word of
God_, to wit, the _rational word_, the _sensible word_, and _the
word of prophecy_. To which answer the three manners whereby we are
said to hear God; _right reasoning_, _sense_, and _faith_. God’s
_sensible word_ hath come but to few; neither hath God spoken to men
by revelation, except particularly to some, and to diverse
diversely; neither have any laws of his kingdom been published on
this manner unto any people.
[Sidenote: The kingdom of God two-fold: natural, and prophetic.]
4. And according to the difference which is between the _rational
word_ and the _word of prophecy_, we attribute a two-fold kingdom
unto God: _natural_, in which he reigns by the dictates of right
reason; and which is universal over all who acknowledge the divine
power, by reason of that rational nature which is common to all: and
_prophetical_, in which he rules also by the _word of prophecy_;
which is peculiar, because he hath not given positive laws to all
men, but to his peculiar people and some certain men elected by him.
[Sidenote: The right whereby God governs, is seated in his
omnipotence.]
5. God in his _natural kingdom_ hath a right to rule, and to punish
those who break his laws, from his sole _irresistible power_. For
all right over others is either from _nature_, or from _contract_.
How the right of governing springs from _contract_, we have already
showed in chap. VI. And the same right is derived from _nature_, in
this very thing, that it is not by nature taken away. For when by
nature all men had a right over all things, every man had a right of
ruling over all as ancient as nature itself. But the reason why this
was abolished among men, was no other but mutual fear, as hath been
declared above in chap. II. art. 3; reason, namely, dictating that
they must forego that right for the preservation of mankind; because
the equality of men among themselves, according to their strength
and natural powers, was necessarily accompanied with war; and with
war joins the destruction of mankind. Now if any man had so far
exceeded the rest in power, that all of them with joined forces
could not have resisted him, there had been no cause why he should
part with that right, which nature had given him. The right
therefore of dominion over all the rest would have remained with
him, by reason of that excess of power whereby he could have
preserved both himself and them. They therefore whose power cannot
be resisted, and by consequence God _Almighty_ derives his right of
sovereignty from the _power_ itself. And as oft as God punisheth or
slays a sinner, although he therefore punish him because he sinned,
yet may we not say that he could not justly have punished or killed
him although he had not sinned. Neither, if the will of God in
punishing may perhaps have regard to some sin antecedent, doth it
therefore follow, that the right of afflicting and killing depends
not on _divine power_, but on _men’s sins_.
[Sidenote: The same proved from Scripture.]
6. That question made famous by the disputations of the ancients:
_why evil things befal the good, and good things the evil_: is the
same with this of ours; _by what right God dispenseth good and evil
things unto men_; and with its difficulty it not only staggers the
faith of the vulgar concerning the divine Providence, but also
philosophers, and which is more, even of holy men. Psalm lxxiii. 1,
2, 3: _Truly God is good to Israel, even to such as are of a clean
heart; but as for me, my feet were almost gone, my steps had well
nigh slipped. And why? I was grieved at the wicked; I do also see
the ungodly in such prosperity._ And how bitterly did Job
expostulate with God, that being _just_ he should yet be afflicted
with so many calamities! God himself with open voice resolved this
difficulty in the case of Job, and hath confirmed his right by
arguments drawn not from Job’s sin, but from his own power. For Job
and his friends had argued so among themselves; that they would
needs make him guilty, because he was punished; and he would reprove
their accusation by arguments fetched from his own innocence. But
God, when he had heard both him and them, refutes his expostulation,
not by condemning him of injustice or any sin, but by declaring his
own power, (Job xxxviii. 4): _Where wast thou_ (says he) _when I
laid the foundation of the earth, &c._ And for his friends, God
pronounces himself angry against them (Job. xlii. 7): _Because they
had not spoken of him the thing that is right, like his servant
Job._ Agreeable to this is that speech of our Saviour’s in the man’s
case who was born blind: when his disciples asking him whether he or
his parents had sinned, that he was born blind, he answered, (John
ix. 3): _Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents; but that the
works of God should be manifest in him._ For though it be said,
(Rom. v. 12), _that death entered into the world by sin_: it follows
not but that God by his right might have made men subject to
diseases and death, although they had never sinned; even as he hath
made the other animals mortal and sickly, although they cannot sin.
[Sidenote: The obligation of yielding obedience unto God, proceeds
from human infirmity.]
7. Now if God have the right of sovereignty from his power, it is
manifest that the _obligation_ of yielding him obedience lies on men
by reason of their weakness.[18] For that _obligation_ which rises
from contract, of which we have spoken in chap. II. can have no
place here; where the right of ruling, no covenant passing between,
rises only from nature. But there are two species of _natural
obligation_. One, when liberty is taken away by corporal
impediments, according to which we say that heaven and earth, and
all creatures, do obey the common laws of their creation. The other,
when it is taken away by hope or fear, according to which the
weaker, despairing of his own power to resist, cannot but yield to
the stronger. From this last kind of obligation, that is to say,
from fear or conscience of our own weakness in respect of the divine
power, it comes to pass that we are obliged to obey God in his
natural kingdom; reason dictating to all, acknowledging the divine
power and providence, _that there is no kicking against the pricks_.
Footnote 18:
_By reason of their weakness._] If this shall seem hard to any
man, I desire him with a silent thought to consider, if there were
two Omnipotents, whether were bound to obey. I believe he will
confess that neither is bound. If this be true, then it is also
true what I have set down; that men are subject unto God, because
they are not omnipotent. And truly our Saviour admonishing Paul,
who at that time was an enemy to the Church, that he should not
kick against the pricks; seems to require obedience from him for
this cause, because he had not power enough to resist.
[Sidenote: The laws of God in his natural kingdom, are those which
are above set down in chaps. II. III.]
8. Because the _word of God_, ruling by nature only, is supposed to
be nothing else but right reason, and the laws of kings can be known
by their _word_ only; it is manifest that the laws of God, ruling by
nature alone, are only the _natural laws_; namely, those which we
have set down in chaps. II. and III. and deduced from the dictates
of reason, _humility_, _equity_, _justice_, _mercy_; and other
_moral virtues_ befriending _peace_, which pertain to the discharge
of the duties of men one toward the other; and those which right
reason shall dictate besides, concerning the honour and worship of
the Divine Majesty. We need not repeat what those _natural laws_ or
_moral virtues_ are; but we must see what honours and what divine
worship, that is to say, what _sacred laws_ the same _natural
reason_ doth dictate.
[Sidenote: What honour and worship are.]
9. Honour to speak properly, is nothing else but an opinion of
another’s _power_ joined with _goodness_; and to _honour_ a man, is
the same with highly esteeming him: and so honour is not in the
party _honoured_, but in the _honourer_. Now three passions do
necessarily follow _honour_ thus placed in opinion; _love_, which
refers to _goodness_; _hope_ and _fear_, which regard _power_. And
from these arise all outward actions, wherewith the powerful are
appeased and become propitious; and which are the effects, and
therefore also the natural signs of honour itself. But the word
_honour_ is transferred also to those outward effects of _honour_;
in which sense, we are said to _honour_ him, of whose power we
testify ourselves, either in word or deed, to have a very great
respect; insomuch as _honour_ is the same with _worship_. Now
_worship_ is an outward act, the sign of inward honour; and whom we
endeavour by our homage to appease if they be angry, or howsoever to
make them favourable to us, we are said to _worship_.
[Sidenote: Worship consists either in attributes, or in actions.]
10. All signs of the mind are either _words_ or _deeds_; and
therefore all _worship_ consists either in _words_ or _deeds_. Now
both the one and the other are referred to three kinds; whereof the
first is _praise_, or _public declaration of goodness_; the second a
_public declaration of present power_, which is to _magnify_,
μεγάλυνειν; the third is a _public declaration of happiness_, or of
_power secure also for the future_, which is called μακαρισμὸς. I
say that all kinds of honour may be discerned, not in _words_ only,
but in _deeds_ too. But we then praise and celebrate in _words_,
when we do it by way of proposition, or _dogmatically_, that is to
say, by _attributes_ or _titles_; which may be termed praising and
celebrating _categorically_ and _plainly_; as when we declare him
whom we honour to be _liberal_, _strong_, _wise_. And then in
_deeds_, when it is done by _consequence_ or by _hypothesis_ or
supposition; as by _thanksgiving_, which supposeth _goodness_; or by
_obedience_, which supposeth _power_; or by _congratulation_, which
supposeth _happiness_.
[Sidenote: And there is one sort natural, and another arbitrary.]
11. Now whether we desire to praise a man in _words_ or _deeds_, we
shall find some things which signify honour with all men: such as
among _attributes_, are the general words of _virtues_ and _powers_,
which cannot be taken in ill sense; as _good_, _fair_, _strong_,
_just_, and the like: and among _actions_, _obedience_,
_thanksgiving_, _prayers_, and others of that kind, by which an
acknowledgment of virtue and power is ever understood. Others, which
signify honour but with some, and scorn with others, or else
neither; such as in _attributes_, are those words, which, according
to the diversity of opinions, are diversely referred to virtues or
vices, to honest or dishonest things. As that a man slew his enemy,
that he fled, that he is a philosopher, or an orator, and the like;
which with some are had in honour, with others in contempt. In
_deeds_, such as depend on the custom of the place, or prescriptions
of civil laws; as in saluting to be bareheaded, to put off the
shoes, to bend the body, to petition for anything standing,
prostrate, kneeling, forms of ceremony, and the like. Now that
_worship_ which is always and by all men accounted honourable, may
be called _natural_; the other, which follows places and customs,
_arbitrary_.
[Sidenote: One commanded, another voluntary.]
12. Furthermore, _worship_ may be enjoined, to wit, by the _command_
of him that is worshipped, and it may be _voluntary_, namely, such
as seems good to the worshipper. If it be _enjoined_, the actions
expressing it do not signify honour, as they signify actions, but as
they are _enjoined_: for they signify _obedience_ immediately,
obedience _power_; insomuch as _worship enjoined_ consists in
obedience. _Voluntary_ is honourable only in the nature of the
actions; which if they do signify honour to the beholders, it is
_worship_, if not, it is _reproach_. Again, _worship_ may be either
_public_ or _private_. But _public_, respecting each single
worshipper, may not be _voluntary_; respecting the city, it may. For
seeing that which is done voluntarily, depends on the will of the
doer, there would not one worship be given, but as many worships as
worshippers; except the will of all men were united by the command
of one. But _private_ worship may be _voluntary_, if it be done
secretly; for what is done openly, is restrained either by laws or
through modesty; which is contrary to the nature of a _voluntary_
action.
[Sidenote: What the end or aim of worship is.]
13. Now that we may know what the _scope_ and _end_ of _worshipping_
others is, we must consider the cause why men delight in worship.
And we must grant what we have showed elsewhere; that _joy_ consists
in this, that a man contemplates virtue, strength, science, beauty,
friends, or any _power_ whatsoever, as being, or as though it were
his own; and it is nothing else but a _glory_ or triumph of the
mind, conceiving itself honoured, that is to say, loved and feared,
that is to say, having the services and assistances of men in
readiness. Now because men believe him to be powerful, whom they see
honoured, that is to say, esteemed powerful by others; it falls out
that honour is increased by worship; and by the opinion of power
true power is acquired. His _end_ therefore, who either commands or
suffers himself to be worshipped, is, that by this means he may
acquire as many as he can, either through love or fear, to be
obedient unto him.
[Sidenote: What the natural laws are concerning God’s attributes.]
14. But that we may understand what manner of _worship_ of God
_natural reason_ doth assign us, let us begin from his _attributes_.
Where first, it is manifest that _existence_ is to be allowed him;
for there can be no will to honour him, who, we think, hath no
being. Next, those philosophers who said, that God was the world or
the world’s soul, that is to say, a part of it, spake unworthily of
God; for they attribute nothing to him, but wholly deny his being.
For by the word _God_ we understand the _world’s cause_. But in
saying that the _world is God_, they say _that it hath no cause_,
that is as much as _there is no God_. In like manner, they who
maintain the world not to be created, but eternal; because there can
be no cause of an eternal thing, in denying _the world to have a
cause_, they deny also that _there is a God_. They also have a
wretched apprehension of God, who imputing idleness to him, do take
from him the government of the world and of mankind. For say, they
should acknowledge him omnipotent; yet if he mind not these inferior
things, that same thread-bare sentence will take place with them:
_quod supra nos, nihil ad nos_; what is above us, doth not concern
us. And seeing there is nothing for which they should either love or
fear him, truly he will be to them as though he were not at all.
Moreover, in _attributes_ which signify _greatness_ or _power_,
those which signify some finite or limited thing, are not signs at
all of an honouring mind. For we honour not God worthily, if we
ascribe less _power_ or _greatness_ to him than possibly we can. But
every finite thing is less than we can; for most easily we may
always assign and attribute more to a finite thing. No _shape_
therefore must be assigned to God, for all _shape_ is _finite_; nor
must he be said to be conceived or comprehended by imagination, or
any other faculty of our soul; for whatsoever we conceive is
_finite_. And although this word _infinite_ signify a conception of
the mind, yet it follows not that we have any conception of an
_infinite thing_. For when we say that a thing is _infinite_, we
signify nothing really, but the impotency in our own mind; as if we
should say, we know not whether or where it is limited. Neither
speak they honourably enough of God, who say we have an _idea_ of
him in our mind: for an idea is our conception; but conception we
have none, except of a _finite_ thing. Nor they, who say that he
hath _parts_, or that he is some certain _entire_ thing; which are
also attributes of _finite_ things. Nor that he is in any place; for
nothing can be said to be in a _place_, but what hath _bounds_ and
_limits_ of its greatness on all sides. Nor that he is _moved_ or
_is at rest_; for either of them suppose a _being in some place_.
Nor that there are many Gods; because not many infinites.
Furthermore, concerning _attributes of happiness_, those are
unworthy of God which signify _sorrow_; (unless they be taken not
for any passion, but, by a metonomy, for the effect); such as
_repentance_, _anger_, _pity_. Or _want_; as _appetite_, _hope_,
_concupiscence_, and that _love_ which is also called _lust_; for
they are signs of _poverty_; since it cannot be understood that a
man should _desire_, _hope_, and _wish_ for aught, but what he wants
and stands in need of. Or any _passive faculty_; for _suffering_
belongs to a limited power, and which depends upon another. When we
therefore attribute a _will_ to God, it is not to be conceived like
unto ours, which is called _a rational desire_; (for if God
_desires_, he _wants_, which for any man to say, is a contumely);
but we must suppose some resemblance which we cannot conceive. In
like manner when we attribute _sight_ and other _acts of the sense_
to him, or _knowledge_, or _understanding_, which in us are nothing
else but a tumult of the mind, raised from outward objects pressing
the organs; we must not think that any such thing befalls the Deity;
for it is a sign of power _depending_ upon some other, which is not
the most blessed thing. He therefore who would not ascribe any other
titles to God than what reason commands, must use such as are either
_negative_, as _infinite_, _eternal_, _incomprehensible_, &c.; or
_superlative_, as _most good_, _most great_, _most powerful_, &c.;
or _indefinite_, as _good_, _just_, _strong_, _creator_, _king_, and
the like; in such sense, as not desiring to declare what he is;
(which were to circumscribe him within the narrow limits of our
phantasy); but to confess his own admiration and obedience, which is
the property of humility and of a mind yielding all the honour it
possibly can do. For reason dictates one name alone which doth
signify the _nature_ of God, that is, _existent_, or simply, _that
he is_; and one in _order_ to, and in _relation_ to us, namely
_God_, under which is contained both _King_, and _Lord_, and
_Father_.
[Sidenote: What those actions are, whereby naturally we do give
worship.]
15. Concerning the _outward actions_ wherewith God is to be
worshipped, as also concerning his _titles_; it is a most general
command of reason, that they be signs of a mind yielding honour.
Under which are contained in the first place, _prayers_.
“Qui fingit sacros auro vel marmore vultus,
Non facit ille deos; qui rogat, ille facit.”
For _prayers_ are the signs of hope; and hope is an acknowledgment
of the divine _power_ or _goodness_.
In the second place, _thanksgiving_; which is a sign of the same
affection, but that _prayers go before_ the benefit, and _thanks
follow it_.
In the third, _gifts_, that is to say, _oblations_ and _sacrifices_;
for these are _thanksgivings_.
In the fourth, _not to swear by any other_. For a man’s oath is an
imprecation of his wrath against him if he deceive, who both knows
whether he do or not, and can punish him if he do, though he be
never so powerful; which only belongs to God. For if there were any
man from whom his subjects’ _malice_ could not lie hid, and whom no
human power could resist, plighted faith would suffice without
swearing; which broken, might be punished by that man. And for this
very reason there would be no need of an oath.
In the fifth place, _to speak warily of God_; for that is a sign of
_fear_, and _fear_ is an acknowledgment of _power_. It follows from
this precept, _that we may not take the name of God in vain, or use
it rashly_; for either are inconsiderate. _That we must not swear,
where there is no need_; for that is in vain. But need there is
none, unless it be between cities, to avoid or take away contention
by force, which necessarily must arise where there is no faith kept
in promises: or in a city, for the better certainty of judicature.
Also, _that we must not dispute of the divine nature_; for it is
supposed _that all things in the natural kingdom of God are inquired
into by reason only_, that is to say, out of the principles of
natural science. But we are so far off by these to attain to the
knowledge of the nature of God, that we cannot so much as reach to
the full understanding of all the qualities of our own bodies, or of
any other creatures. Wherefore there comes nothing from these
disputes, but a rash imposition of names to the divine Majesty
according to the small measure of our conceptions. It follows also,
(which belongs to the right of God’s kingdom), that their speech is
inconsiderate and rash, who say, _that this or that doth not stand
with divine justice_. For even men count it an affront that their
children should dispute their right, or measure their justice
otherwise than by the rule of their commands.
In the sixth, _whatsoever is offered up in prayers, thanksgivings,
and sacrifices, must in its kind be the best and most betokening
honour_; namely, _prayers_ must not be rash, or light, or vulgar,
but beautiful, and well composed. For though it were absurd in the
heathen to worship God in an image, yet was it not against reason to
use poetry and music in their churches.
Also _oblations must be clean, and presents sumptuous_; and such as
are significative either of submission or gratitude, or
commemorative of benefits received. For all these proceed from a
desire of honouring.
In the seventh, _that God must be worshipped not privately only, but
openly and publicly in the sight of all men_; because that worship
is so much more acceptable, by how much it begets honour and esteem
in others; as hath been declared before in art. 13. Unless others
therefore see it, that which is most pleasing in our worship
vanisheth.
In the last place, _that we use our best endeavour to keep the laws
of nature_. For the undervaluing of our master’s command, exceeds
all other affronts whatsoever; as on the other side, obedience is
more acceptable than all other sacrifices.
And these are principally the natural laws concerning the worship of
God; those, I mean, which reason dictates to every man. But to whole
cities, every one whereof is one person, the same natural reason
further commands an _uniformity of public worship_. For the actions
done by particular persons, according to their private reasons, are
not the city’s actions; and therefore not the city’s worship. But
what is done by the city, is understood to be done by the command of
him or them who have the sovereignty; wherefore also together with
the consent of all the subjects, that is to say, _uniformly_.
[Sidenote: In the natural kingdom of God, the city may appoint what
worship it pleaseth.]
16. The _natural laws_ set down in the foregoing article concerning
the divine worship, only command the giving of natural signs of
honour. But we must consider that there are two kinds of signs; the
one _natural_; the other done upon _agreement_, or by express or
tacit composition. Now because in every language the use of _words_
and _names_ come by appointment, it may also by appointment be
altered; for that which depends on and derives its force from the
will of men, can by the will of the same men agreeing be changed
again or abolished. Such _names_ therefore as are _attributed_ to
God by the appointment of men, can by the same appointment be taken
away. Now what can be done by the appointment of men, that the city
may do. The city therefore by right, that is to say, they who have
the power of the whole city, shall judge what _names_ or
_appellations_ are more, what less _honourable_ for God; that is to
say, what doctrines are to be held and professed concerning the
nature of God and his operations. Now actions do signify not by
men’s appointment, but naturally; even as the effects are signs of
their causes. Whereof some are always signs of scorn to them before
whom they are committed; as those whereby the body’s uncleanness is
discovered, and whatsoever men are ashamed to do before those whom
they respect. Others are always signs of honour, as to draw near and
discourse decently and humbly, to give way or to yield in any matter
of private benefit. In these actions the city can alter nothing. But
there are infinite others, which, as much as belongs to honour or
reproach, are indifferent. Now these, by the institution of the
city, may both be made signs of honour, and being made so, do in
very deed become so. From whence we may understand, that we must
obey the city in whatsoever it shall command to be used for a sign
of honouring God, that is to say, for _worship_; provided it can be
instituted for a sign of honour; because that is a sign of honour,
which by the city’s command is used for such.
[Sidenote: God ruling by nature only, the city, that is to say, that
man or court which under God hath the sovereignty, is the
interpreter of all the laws.]
17. We have already declared which were the laws of God, as well
sacred as secular, in his government by the way of nature only. Now
because there is no man but may be deceived in reasoning, and that
it so falls out that men are of different opinions concerning the
most actions; it may be demanded further, whom God would have to be
the _interpreter of right reason_, that is to say, of his laws. And
as for the _secular_ laws, (I mean those which concern justice and
the carriage of men towards men), by what hath been said before of
the constitution of a city, we have demonstratively showed it
agreeable to reason, that all _judicature_ belongs to the city; and
that _judicature_ is nothing else but an _interpretation of the
laws_; and by consequence, that every where cities, that is to say,
those who have the sovereign power, are the _interpreters of the
laws_. As for the _sacred_ laws, we must consider what hath been
before demonstrated in chap. V. art. 13, that every subject hath
transferred as much right as he could on him or them who had the
supreme authority. But he could have transferred his right of
judging the manner how God is to be honoured; and therefore also he
hath done it. That he could, it appears hence; that the manner of
honouring God before the constitution of a city, was to be fetched
from every man’s _private reason_. But every man can subject his
_private_ reason to the reason of _the whole city_. Moreover, if
each man should follow his own reason in the _worshipping_ of God,
in so great a diversity of worshippers one would be apt to judge
another’s worship uncomely, or impious; neither would the one seem
to the other to honour God. Even that therefore which were most
consonant to reason, would not be a _worship_; because that the
nature of _worship_ consists in this, that it be the _sign of inward
honour_. But there is no sign, but whereby somewhat becomes known to
others; and therefore is there no sign of honour, but what seems so
to others. Again, that is a true sign, which by the consent of men
becomes a sign; therefore also that is honourable, which by the
consent of men, that is to say, by the command of the city, becomes
a sign of honour. It is not therefore against the will of God,
declared by the way of reason only, to give him such signs of honour
as the city shall command. Wherefore subjects can transfer their
right of judging the manner of God’s worship, on him or them who
have the sovereign power. Nay, they must do it; for else all manner
of absurd opinions concerning the nature of God, and all ridiculous
ceremonies which have been used by any nations, will be seen at once
in the same city. Whence it will fall out, that every man will
believe that all the rest do offer God an affront; so that it cannot
be truly said of any, that he worships God; for no man worships God,
that is to say, honours him outwardly, but he who doth those things,
whereby he appears to others for to honour him. It may therefore be
concluded, that the _interpretation_ of all laws, as well _sacred_
as _secular_, (God ruling by the way of _nature_ only), depends on
the authority of the city, that is to say, that man or counsel to
whom the sovereign power is committed; and that whatsoever God
commands, he commands by his voice. And on the other side, that
whatsoever is commanded by them, both concerning the manner of
honouring God, and concerning secular affairs, is commanded by God
himself.
[Sidenote: Certain doubts removed.]
18. Against this, some man may demand, first, whether it doth not
follow that the city must be obeyed, if it command us directly to
affront God, or forbid us to worship him? I say, it does not follow,
neither must we obey. For to affront, or not to worship at all,
cannot by any man be understood for a manner of worshipping. Neither
also had any one, before the constitution of a city, of those who
acknowledge God to rule, a right to deny him the honour which was
then due unto him; nor could he therefore transfer a right on the
city of commanding any such things. Next, if it be demanded whether
the city must be obeyed, if it command somewhat to be said or done,
which is not a disgrace to God directly, but from whence by
reasoning disgraceful consequences may be derived; as for example,
if it were commanded to worship God in an image, before those who
account that honourable: truly it is to be done.[19] For worship is
instituted in sign of honour; but to worship him thus, is a sign of
honour, and increaseth God’s honour among those who do so account of
it. Or if it be commanded to call God by a name, which we know not
what it signifies, or how it can agree with this word _God_; that
also must be done. For what we do for honour’s sake, (and we know no
better), if it be taken for a sign of honour, it is a sign of
honour; and therefore if we refuse to do it, we refuse the enlarging
of God’s honour. The same judgment must be had of all the
_attributes_ and _actions_ about the merely rational worship of God,
which may be controverted and disputed. For though this kind of
commands may be sometimes contrary to right reason, and therefore
sins in them who command them; yet are they not against right
reason, nor sins in subjects; whose right reason, in points of
controversy, is that which submits itself to the reason of the city.
Lastly, if that man or counsel who hath the supreme power, command
himself to be worshipped with the same _attributes_ and _actions_,
wherewith God is to be worshipped; the question is, whether we must
obey? There are many things, which may be commonly attributed both
to God and men; for even men may be _praised_ and _magnified_. And
there are many actions, whereby God and men may be worshipped. But
the significations of the _attributes_ and _actions_ are only to be
regarded. Those _attributes_ therefore, whereby we signify ourselves
to be of an opinion, that there is any man endued with a sovereignty
independent from God, or that he is immortal, or of infinite power,
and the like; though commanded by princes, yet must they be
abstained from. As also from those _actions_ signifying the same; as
prayer to the absent; to ask those things which God alone can give,
as rain and fair weather; to offer him what God can only accept, as
oblations, holocausts; or to give a worship, than which a greater
cannot be given, as sacrifice. For these things seem to tend to this
end, that God may not be thought to rule; contrary to what was
supposed from the beginning. But genuflection, prostration, or any
other act of the body whatsoever, may be lawfully used even in civil
worship; for they may signify an acknowledgment of the civil power
only. For divine worship is distinguished from civil, not by the
motion, placing, habit, or gesture of the body, but by the
declaration of our opinion of him whom we do worship. As if we cast
down ourselves before any man, with intention of declaring by that
sign that we esteem him as God, it is divine worship; if we do the
same thing as a sign of our acknowledgment of the civil power, it is
civil worship. Neither is the _divine worship_ distinguished from
_civil_, by any action usually understood by the words λατρεία and
δουλεία; whereof the former marking out the _duty_ of servants, the
latter their _destiny_, they are words of the same action in degree.
Footnote 19:
_Truly it is to be done._] We said in art. 14 of this chapter,
that they who attributed limits to God, transgressed the natural
law concerning God’s worship. Now they who worship him in an
image, assign him limits. Wherefore they do that which they ought
not to do. And this place seems to contradict the former. We must
therefore know first, that they who are constrained by authority,
do not set God any bounds; but they who command them. For they who
worship unwillingly, do worship in very deed: but they either
stand or fall there, where they are commanded to stand or fall by
a lawful sovereign. Secondly, I say it must be done, not at all
times and everywhere, but on supposition that there is no other
rule of worshipping God, beside the dictates of human reason; for
then the will of the city stands for reason. But in the kingdom of
God by way of covenant, whether old or new, where idolatry is
expressly forbid, though the city commands us to worship thus, yet
must we not do it. Which, if he shall consider, who conceived some
repugnancy between this and art. 14, will surely cease to think so
any longer.
[Sidenote: What is sin in the natural kingdom of God, and what
treason against the divine majesty.]
19. From what hath been said may be gathered, that God reigning by
the way of natural reason only, subjects do sin, first if they break
the moral laws; which are unfolded in chapters II. and III.
Secondly, if they break the laws or commands of the city, in those
things which pertain to justice. Thirdly, if they worship not God
κατὰ τὰ νόμικα Fourthly, if they confess not before men, both in
words and deeds, that there is one God most good, most great, most
blessed, the Supreme King of the world and of all worldly kings;
that is to say, if they do not worship God. This fourth sin in the
natural kingdom of God, by what hath been said in the foregoing
chapter in art. 2, is the _sin of treason against the Divine
Majesty_. For it is a denying of the Divine Power, or _atheism_. For
sins proceed here, just as if we should suppose some man to be the
sovereign king, who being himself absent, should rule by his
viceroy. Against whom sure they would transgress, who should not
obey his viceroy in all things; except he usurped the kingdom to
himself, or would give it to some other. But they who should so
absolutely obey him, as not to admit of this exception, might be
said to be guilty of treason.
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CHAPTER XVI.
OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD UNDER THE OLD COVENANT.
1. Superstition possessing foreign nations, God instituted true
religion by the means of Abraham. 2. By the covenant between God
and Adam, all dispute is forbidden concerning the commands of
superiors. 3. The manner of the covenant between God and
Abraham. 4. In that covenant is contained an acknowledgment of
God, not simply, but of him who appeared unto Abraham. 5. The
laws unto which Abraham was tied, were no other beside those of
nature, and the law of circumcision. 6. Abraham was the
interpreter of the word of God, and of all laws among those that
belonged to him. 7. Abraham’s subjects could not sin by obeying
him. 8. God’s covenant with the Hebrews on Mount Sinai. 9. From
thence God’s government took the name of a kingdom. 10. What
laws were by God given to the Jews. 11. What the word of God is,
and how to be known. 12. What was held the written word of God
among the Jews. 13. The power of interpreting the word of God,
and the supreme civil power, were united in Moses while he
lived. 14. They were also united in the high-priest, during the
life of Joshua. 15. They were united too in the high-priest
until king Saul’s time. 16. They were also united in the kings
until the captivity. 17. They were so in the high-priests after
the captivity. 18. Denial of the Divine Providence, and
idolatry, were the only treasons against the Divine Majesty
among the Jews; in all things else they ought to obey their
princes.
[Sidenote: Superstition possessing foreign nations, God instituted
the true religion by the means of Abraham.]
1. Mankind, from conscience of its own weakness and admiration of
natural events, hath this; that most men believe God to be the
invisible maker of all invisible things; whom they also fear,
conceiving that they have not a sufficient protection in themselves.
But the imperfect use they had of their reason, the violence of
their passions did so cloud them, that they could not rightly
worship him. Now the fear of invisible things, when it is severed
from right reason, is superstition. It was therefore almost
impossible for men, without the special assistance of God, to avoid
both rocks of _atheism_ and _superstition_. For this proceeds from
fear without right reason; that, from an opinion of right reason
without fear. _Idolatry_ therefore did easily fasten upon the
greatest part of men; and almost all nations did worship God in
images and resemblances of finite things; and they worshipped
spirits or vain visions, perhaps out of fear calling them devils.
But it pleased the Divine Majesty, as we read it written in the
sacred history, out of all mankind to call forth Abraham, by whose
means he might bring men to the true worship of him; and to reveal
himself supernaturally to him, and to make that most famous covenant
with him and his seed, which is called the _old covenant_ or
_testament_. He therefore is the head of true religion; he was the
first that _after the deluge taught, that there was one God, the
Creator of the universe_. And from him the _kingdom of God by way of
covenants_, takes its beginning. _Joseph. Antiq. Jews_, lib. I..
cap. 7.
[Sidenote: By the covenant between God and Adam, all dispute is
forbidden concerning the commands of superiors.]
2. In the beginning of the world God reigned indeed, not only
naturally, but also _by way of covenant_, over Adam and Eve; so as
it seems he would have no obedience yielded to him, beside that
which natural reason should dictate, but _by the way of covenant_,
that is to say, by the consent of men themselves. Now because this
_covenant_ was presently made void, nor ever after renewed, the
original of God’s _kingdom_ (which we treat of in this place) is not
to be taken thence. Yet this is to be noted by the way; that by that
precept of not eating of the tree of _the knowledge of good and
evil_, (whether the judicature of good and evil, or the eating of
the fruit of some tree were forbidden), God did require a most
simple obedience to his commands, without dispute whether that were
_good_ or _evil_ which was commanded. For the fruit of the tree, if
the command be wanting, hath nothing in its own nature, whereby the
eating of it could be morally _evil_, that is to say, _a sin_.
[Sidenote: The manner of the covenant between God and Abraham.]
3. Now the covenant between God and Abraham was made in this manner,
(Gen. xvii. 7, 8): _I will establish my covenant between me and
thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an
everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee and to thy seed after
thee. And I will give unto thee and to thy seed after thee, the land
wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an
everlasting possession; and I will be their God._ Now it was
necessary to institute some sign, whereby Abraham and his seed
should retain the memory of this covenant; wherefore _circumcision_
was added to the covenant, but yet as a sign only, (verse 10, 11):
_This is my covenant which ye shall keep between me and thee, and
thy seed after thee; every man-child among you shall be circumcised,
and ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin; and it shall be
a token of the covenant between me and you._ It is therefore
covenanted, that Abraham shall acknowledge God to be his God and the
God of his seed, that is to say, that he shall submit himself to be
governed by him; and that God shall give unto Abraham the
inheritance of that land wherein he then dwelt but as a pilgrim; and
that Abraham, for a memorial sign of this covenant, should take care
to see himself and his male seed _circumcised_.
[Sidenote: In that covenant is contained an acknowledgment of God,
not simply, but of him who appeared unto Abraham.]
4. But seeing that Abraham, even before the covenant, acknowledged
God to be the Creator and King of the world; (for he never doubted
either of the _being_ or the _providence_ of God); how comes it not
to be superfluous, that God would purchase to himself with a price
and by _contract_ an obedience which was due to him by nature;
namely, by promising Abraham the land of Canaan, upon condition that
he would receive him for his God; when by the right of nature he was
already so? By those words therefore, _to be a God unto thee and to
thy seed after thee_, we understand not that Abraham satisfied this
_covenant_ by a bare acknowledgment of the power and dominion which
God had naturally over men, that is to say, by acknowledging God
indefinitely, which belongs to _natural reason_; but he must
definitely acknowledge him, who said unto him, (Gen. xii. 1, 2):
_Get thee out of thy country; &c._ (Gen. xiii. 14): _Lift up thine
eyes, &c._: who appeared unto him, (Gen. xviii. 1, 2), in the shape
of three celestial men; and (Gen. xv. 1), in a _vision_; and (verse
13), in a _dream_, which is _matter of faith_. In what shape God
appeared unto Abraham, by what kind of sound he spake to him, is not
expressed. Yet it is plain that Abraham believed that voice to be
the voice of God and a true revelation, and would have all his to
worship him, who had so spoken unto him, for God the Creator of the
world; and that his faith was grounded on this, not that he believed
_God to have a being_ or _that he was true_ in his promises, that
which all men believe, but that he doubted not him to be God, whose
voice and promises he had heard, and that the _God_ of Abraham
signified not simply _God_, but _that God which appeared unto him_;
even as the worship, which Abraham owed unto God in that notion, was
not the worship of _reason_, but of _religion_ and _faith_, and that
which not reason, but God had _supernaturally_ revealed.
[Sidenote: The laws to which Abraham was tied were no other, but
those of nature and that of circumcision.]
5. But we read of no laws given by God to Abraham, or by Abraham to
his family, either then or after, secular or sacred; excepting the
commandment of _circumcision_, which is contained in the _covenant_
itself. Whence it is manifest, that there were no other laws or
worship, which Abraham was obliged to, but the laws of nature,
rational worship, and circumcision.
[Sidenote: Abraham among his own was the interpreter of the word of
God and of all laws.]
6. Now Abraham was the _interpreter_ of all _laws_, as well sacred
as secular, among those that belonged to him; not merely naturally,
as using the laws of nature only, but even by the form of the
covenant itself; in which obedience is promised by Abraham, not for
himself only, but for his seed also; which had been in vain, except
his children had been tied to obey his commands. And how can that be
understood, which God says (Gen. xviii. 18, 19): _All the nations of
the earth shall be blessed in him; for I know him, that he will
command his children and his household after him, and they shall
keep the way of the Lord to do justice and judgment_: unless his
children and his household were supposed to be obliged to yield
obedience unto his commands?
[Sidenote: Abraham’s subjects could not sin in obeying him.]
7. Hence it follows, that Abraham’s subjects could not sin in
obeying him, provided that Abraham commanded them not to deny God’s
_existence_ or _providence_, or to do somewhat expressly contrary to
the honour of God. In all other things, _the word of God_ was to be
fetched from his lips only, as being the interpreter of all the
_laws_ and _words_ of God. For Abraham alone could teach them who
was the God of Abraham, and in what manner he was to be worshipped.
And they who after Abraham’s death were subject to the sovereignty
of Isaac or Jacob, did by the same reason obey them in all things
without sin, as long as they acknowledged and professed _the God_ of
Abraham to be their God. For they had submitted themselves _to God_
simply, before they did it to Abraham, and to Abraham before they
did it to the God of Abraham: again, to the God of Abraham, before
they did it to Isaac. In Abraham’s subjects therefore, to deny God
was the only _treason against the divine Majesty_; but in their
posterity, it was also treason _to deny the God of Abraham_, that is
to say, to worship God otherwise than was instituted by Abraham, to
wit, in images made with hands,[20] as other nations did; which for
that reason were called _idolaters_. And hitherto, subjects might
easily enough discern what was to be observed, what avoided in the
commands of their princes.
Footnote 20:
_In images made with hands._ In chap. XV. art. 14, there we have
showed such a kind of worship to be irrational. But if it be done
by the command of a city, to whom the written word of God is not
known nor received, we have then showed this worship (in article
18) to be rational. But where God reigns by way of covenant, in
which it is expressly warned not to worship thus, as in the
covenant made with Abraham; there, whether it be with or without
the command of the city, it is ill done.
[Sidenote: God’s covenant with the Hebrews at Mount Sinai.]
8. To go on now, following the guidance of the holy Scripture; the
same _covenant_ was renewed (Gen. xxvi. 3, 4) with Isaac; and (Gen.
xxviii. 13, 14) with Jacob; where God styles himself not simply God,
whom nature doth dictate him to be, but distinctly the _God of
Abraham and Isaac_. Afterward being about to renew the same
_covenant_ by Moses with the whole people of Israel, (Exod. iii. 6):
_I am_, saith he, _the God of thy Father, the God of Abraham, the
God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob._ Afterward, when that people,
not only the freest, but also the greatest enemy to human
subjection, by reason of the fresh memory of their Egyptian bondage,
abode in the wilderness near mount Sinai, that _ancient covenant_
was propounded to them all to be renewed in this manner (Exod. xix.
5, 6): _Therefore if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my
covenant_, (to wit, that covenant which was made with Abraham, Isaac
and Jacob); _then shall ye be a peculiar treasure unto me, above all
people; for all the earth is mine, and ye shall be to me a kingdom
of priests, and an holy nation. And all the people answered
together, and said_, (verse 8) _All that the Lord hath spoken, will
we do._
[Sidenote: From thence God’s government was called a kingdom.]
9. In this covenant, among other things, we must consider well the
appellation of _kingdom_, not used before. For although God, both by
_nature_ and by _covenant_ made with Abraham, was their king, yet
owed they him an obedience and worship only natural, as being his
subjects; and religious, such as Abraham instituted, as being the
subjects of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, their natural princes. For
they had received no _word of God_ beside the natural word of right
reason; neither had any _covenant_ passed between God and them,
otherwise than as their wills were included in the will of Abraham,
as their _prince_. But now by the covenant made at Mount Sinai, the
consent of each man being had, there becomes an _institutive kingdom
of God_ over them. That _kingdom of God_, so renowned in Scriptures
and writings of divines, took its beginning from this time; and
hither tends that which God said to Samuel, when the Israelites
asked a king (1 Sam. viii. 7): _They have not rejected thee, but
they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them_; and that
which Samuel told the Israelites (1 Sam. xii. 12): _Ye said unto me,
nay, but a king shall reign over us, when the Lord your God was your
king_; and that which is said, Jer. xxxi. 31: _I will make a new
covenant_, &c. _although I was an husband unto them_; and the
doctrine also of Judas Galilæus, where mention is made in _Josephus’
Antiq. of the Jews_, (Book xviii. chap. 2), in these words: _But
Judas Galilæus was the first author of this fourth way of those who
followed the study of wisdom. These agree in all the rest with the
Pharisees, excepting that they burn with a most constant desire of
liberty; believing God alone to be held for their Lord and prince;
and will sooner endure even the most exquisite kinds of torments,
together with their kinsfolks and dearest friends, than call any
mortal man their Lord._
[Sidenote: What laws were by God given to the Jews.]
10. The right of the kingdom being thus constituted by way of
_covenant_, let us see in the next place, what _laws_ God propounded
to them. Now those are known to all, to wit, the _decalogue_, and
those other, as well _judicial_ as _ceremonial laws_, which we find
from the twentieth chapter of Exodus to the end of Deuteronomy and
the death of Moses. Now of those _laws_, delivered in general by the
hand of Moses, some there are which oblige _naturally_, being made
by God, as the _God of nature_, and had their force even before
Abraham’s time. Others there are which oblige by virtue of the
_covenant_ made with Abraham, being made by God as the God of
Abraham, which had their force even before Moses’s time, by reason
of the former _covenant_. But there are _others_ which oblige by
virtue of that covenant only, which was made last with the people
themselves; being made by God, as being _the peculiar_ king of the
Israelites. Of the first sort are all the precepts of the decalogue
which pertain unto manners; such as, _honour thy parents_, _thou
shalt not kill_, _thou shalt not commit adultery_, _thou shalt not
steal_, _thou shalt not bear false witness_, _thou shalt not covet_;
for they are the laws of nature. Also the precept of not taking
_God’s name in vain_; for it is a part of natural worship, as hath
been declared in the foregoing chapter (art. 15). In like manner the
second commandment, of not worshipping by way of any image made by
themselves; for this also is a part of natural religion, as hath
been showed in the same article. Of the second sort is the first
commandment of the decalogue, _of not having any other Gods_; for in
that consists the essence of the _covenant_ made with Abraham, by
which God requires nothing else, but that he should be his God, and
the God of his seed. Also the precept of _keeping holy the Sabbath_;
for the sanctification of the seventh day is instituted in memorial
of the six days’ creation, as appears out of these words (Exod.
xxxi. 16-17): _It is a perpetual covenant_, (meaning _the Sabbath_),
_and a sign between me and the children of Israel for ever; for in
six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the seventh day he
rested, and was refreshed._ Of the third kind are the _politic_,
_judicial_, and _ceremonial laws_; which only belonged to the Jews.
The _laws_ of the first and second sort written in _tables of
stone_, to wit, the _decalogue_, was kept in the _ark_ itself. The
rest written in the _volume_ of the whole law, were laid up in _the
side of the ark_, (Deut. xxxi. 26). For these, retaining the faith
of Abraham, might be changed; those could not.
[Sidenote: What the word of God is, and how to be known.]
11. All God’s _laws_ are _God’s word_; but all _God’s word_ is not
his _law_. _I am the Lord thy God which brought thee out of the land
of Egypt_, is the word of God; it is no law. Neither is all that,
which for the better declaring of _God’s word_ is pronounced or
written together with it, instantly to be taken for _God’s word_.
For, _Thus saith the Lord_, is not the voice of God, but of the
preacher or prophet. All that, and only that, is the word of God,
which a true prophet hath declared God to have spoken. Now the
writings of the prophets, comprehending as well those things which
God, as which the prophet himself speaks, are therefore called the
word of God, because they contain the word of God. Now because all
that, and that alone, is the _word of God_, which is recommended to
us for such by a true prophet, it cannot be known what _God’s word_
is, before we know who is the true prophet; nor can we believe
_God’s word_, before we believe the prophet. Moses was believed by
the people of Israel for two things; his _miracles_ and his _faith_.
For how great and most evident miracles soever he had wrought, yet
would they not have trusted him, at least he was not to have been
trusted, if he had called them out of Egypt to any other worship
than the worship of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob their
fathers. For it had been contrary to the _covenant_ made by
themselves with God. In like manner two things there are; to wit,
_supernatural prediction of things to come_, which is a mighty
miracle; and _faith in the God of Abraham, their deliverer out of
Egypt_; which God proposed to all the Jews to be kept for marks of a
true prophet. He that wants either of these, is no prophet; nor is
it to be received for God’s word, which he obtrudes for such. If
faith be wanting, he is rejected in these words, (Deut. xiii. 1, 2,
3, 4, 5): _If there arise among you a prophet or a dreamer of
dreams, and giveth thee a sign, or a wonder; and the sign or the
wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go
after other gods, &c. that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams shall
be put to death._ If prediction of events be wanting, he is
condemned by these, (Deut. xviii. 21, 22): _And if thou say in thine
heart, how shall we know the word which the Lord hath not spoken?
When a prophet speaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow
not nor come to pass, that is the thing which the Lord hath not
spoken; but the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously._ Now, that
that is the word of God which is published for such by a true
prophet; and that he was held to be a true prophet among the Jews,
whose faith was true, and to whose predictions the events answered;
is without controversy. But what it is, to follow other gods, and
whether the events which are affirmed to answer their predictions,
do truly answer them or not, may admit many controversies;
especially in predictions which obscurely and enigmatically foretel
the event; such as the predictions of almost all the prophets are;
as who saw not God apparently, like unto Moses, but _in dark
speeches, and in figures_. (Numb. xii. 8). But of these we cannot
judge, otherwise than _by the way of natural reason_; because that
judgment depends on the prophet’s interpretation, and on its
proportion with the event.
[Sidenote: What was held for the written word of God among the
Jews.]
12. The Jews did hold the book of the whole law, which was called
_Deuteronomy_, for _the written word of God_; and that only
(forasmuch as can be collected out of sacred history) until the
captivity. For this book was delivered by Moses himself to the
priests, to be kept and laid up in the side of the ark of the
covenant, and to be copied out by the kings; and the same a long
time after, by the authority of king Josiah (2 Kings xxiii. 2),
acknowledged again for _the word of God_. But it is not manifest,
when the rest of the books of the Old Testament were first received
into canon. But what concerns the prophets, Isaiah and the rest,
since they foretold no other things than what were to come to pass,
either in or after the captivity, their writings could not at that
time be held for prophetic; by reason of the law cited above (Deut.
xviii. 21, 22), whereby the Israelites were commanded not to account
any man for a true prophet, but him whose prophecies were answered
by the events. And hence peradventure it is, that the Jews esteemed
the writings of those whom they slew when they prophesied, for
prophetic afterward; that is to say, for the word of God.
[Sidenote: The power of interpreting the word of God, and the
supreme civil power, were united in Moses while he
lived.]
13. It being known what laws there were under _the old covenant_,
and what _word of God_ received from the beginning; we must
furthermore consider, with whom the authority of judging, whether
the writings of the prophets arising afterward were to be received
for the _word of God_; that is to say, whether the events did answer
their predictions or not; and with whom also the authority of
interpreting the laws already received, and the written word of God,
did reside: which thing is to be traced through all the times and
several changes of the commonwealth of Israel. But it is manifest
that this power, during the life of Moses, was entirely in himself.
For if he had not been the _interpreter of the laws and word_, that
office must have belonged either to _every private person_, or to a
_congregation_ or _synagogue_ of many, or to the _high-priest_ or to
other _prophets_. First, that that office belonged not to private
men, or any congregation made of them, appears hence; that they were
not admitted, nay, they were prohibited with most heavy threats, _to
hear God speak_, otherwise than by the means of Moses. For it is
written, (Exod. xix. 24, 25): _Let not the priests and the people
break through, to come up unto the Lord, lest he break forth upon
them. So Moses went down unto the people, and spake unto them._ It
is further manifestly and expressly declared, upon occasion given by
the rebellion of Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, and the two hundred and
fifty princes of the assembly, that neither private men nor the
congregation should pretend that God had spoken by them, and by
consequence that they had the right of _interpreting God’s word_.
For they contending, that God spake no less by them than by Moses,
argue thus, (Numbers xvi. 3): _Ye take too much upon you, seeing all
the congregation are holy, every one of them, and the Lord is among
them. Wherefore then lift ye up yourselves above the congregation of
the Lord?_ But how God determined this controversy, is easily
understood by verses 33 and 35 of the same chapter, where _Corah,
Dathan, and Abiram went down alive into the pit, &c. And there came
out fire from the Lord, and consumed the two hundred and fifty men
that offered incense._ Secondly, that Aaron the high-priest had not
this authority, is manifest by the like controversy between him
(together with his sister Miriam) and Moses. For the question was,
whether God spake by Moses only, or by them also; that is to say,
whether Moses alone, or whether they also were _interpreters of the
word of God_. For thus they said, (Numb. xii. 2): _Hath the Lord
indeed spoken only by Moses? Hath he not also spoken by us?_ But God
reproved them; and made a distinction between Moses and other
prophets, saying, (verse 6, 7, 8): _If there be a prophet among you,
I the Lord will make myself known unto him in a vision, and will
speak unto him in a dream: my servant Moses is not so, &c. For with
him will I speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, and not in dark
speeches, and the similitude of the Lord shall he behold. Wherefore
then were ye not afraid to speak against my servant Moses?_ Lastly,
that _the interpretation of the word of God_ as long as Moses lived,
belonged not to any other prophets whatsoever, is collected out of
that place which we now cited, concerning his eminency above all
others; and out of natural reason, for as much as it belongs to the
same prophet, who brings the commands of God, to unfold them too;
but there was then no other _word of God_, beside that which was
declared by Moses. And out of this also, that there was no other
prophet extant at that time, who prophesied to the people, excepting
the seventy elders who prophesied by _the spirit_ of Moses. And even
that Joshua, who was then Moses’ servant, his successor afterward,
believed to be injuriously done, till he knew it was by Moses’
consent; which thing is manifest by text of Scripture, (Numb. xi.
25): _And the Lord came down in a cloud, &c. and took of the spirit
that was upon Moses, and gave it unto the seventy elders._ Now after
it was told that they prophesied, Joshua said unto Moses, _Forbid
them, my lord._ But Moses answered: _Why enviest thou for my sake?_
Seeing therefore Moses alone was the messenger of God’s word, and
that the authority of interpreting it pertained neither to _private
men_, nor to _the synagogue_, nor to the _high-priest_, nor to other
_prophets_; it remains that Moses alone was _the interpreter of Gods
word_, who also had the supreme power in civil matters; and that the
conventions of Corah with the rest of his complices against Moses
and Aaron, and of Aaron with his sister against Moses, were raised,
not for the salvation of their souls, but by reason of their
ambition and desire of dominion over the people.
[Sidenote: They were also united in the high-priest, during the life
of Joshua.]
14. In Joshua’s time _the interpretation of the laws_, and _of the
word of God_, belonged to Eleazar the high-priest; who was also,
under God, their absolute king. Which is collected, first of all,
out of the _covenant itself_; in which the commonwealth of Israel is
called a _priestly kingdom_, or, as it is recited in 1 Peter ii. 9,
a _royal priesthood_. Which could in no wise be said, unless by the
institution and _covenant_ of the people, the regal power were
understood to belong to the _high-priest_. Neither doth this repugn
what hath been said before, where Moses, and not Aaron, had the
kingdom under God. Since it is necessary, when one man institutes
the form of a future commonwealth, that one should govern the
kingdom which he institutes during his life, (whether it be
_monarchy_, _aristocracy_, or _democracy_); and have all that power
for the present, which he is bestowing on others for the future.
Now, that Eleazar the priest had not only _the priesthood_, but also
the _sovereignty_, is expressly set down in Joshua’s call to the
administration. For thus it is written (Numb, xxvii. 18, 19, 20,
21): _Take thee Joshua the son of Nun, a man in whom is the Spirit,
and lay thine hand upon him, and set him before Eleazar the priest,
and before all the congregation, and give him a charge in their
sight; and thou shalt put some of thine honour upon him, that all
the congregation of the children of Israel may be obedient; and he
shall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall ask counsel for him
after the judgment of Urim, before the Lord; at his word shall they
go out, and at his word shall they come in, and all the children of
Israel with him, even all the congregation. Where to ask counsel of
God for whatsoever is to be done_, that is, _to interpret God’s
word_, and in the name of God to command in all matters, belongs to
Eleazar; and _to go out_ and _to come in at his word_, that is to
say, to obey, belongs both to Joshua and _to all the people_. It is
to be observed also, that that speech, _part of thy glory_, clearly
denotes that Joshua had not a power equal with that which Moses had.
In the meantime it is manifest, that even in Joshua’s time the
supreme power and authority of interpreting the word of God, were
both in one person.
[Sidenote: They were also united in the high-priest, until king
Saul’s time.]
15. After Joshua’s death follow the times of the Judges until king
Saul; in which it is manifest that the right of the _kingdom_
instituted by God, remained with the _high-priest_. For the
_kingdom_ was by covenant _priestly_, that is to say, God’s
government by priests. And such ought it to have been, until that
form, with God’s consent, were changed by the people themselves;
which was not done before that requiring a king God consented unto
them, and said unto Samuel (1 Sam. viii. 7): _Hearken unto the voice
of the people in all that they say unto thee; for they have not
rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign
over them._ The supreme civil power was therefore _rightly_ due by
God’s own institution to the high-priest; but _actually_ that power
was in the prophets, to whom (being raised by God in an
extraordinary manner) the Israelites, a people greedy of prophets,
submitted themselves to be protected and judged, by reason of the
great esteem they had of prophecies. The reason of this thing was,
because that though penalties were set and judges appointed in the
institution of God’s priestly kingdom; yet, the right of inflicting
punishment depended wholly on private judgment; and it belonged to a
dissolute multitude and each single person to punish or not to
punish, according as their private zeal should stir them up. And
therefore Moses by his own command punished no man with death; but
when any man was to be put to death, one or many stirred up the
multitude against him or them, by divine authority, and saying,
_Thus saith the Lord._ Now this was conformable to the nature of
God’s peculiar kingdom. For there God reigns indeed, where his laws
are obeyed not for fear of men, but for fear of himself. And truly,
if men were such as they should be, this were an excellent state of
civil government; but as men are, there is a coercive power (in
which I comprehend both right and might) necessary to rule them. And
therefore also God, from the beginning, prescribed laws by Moses for
the future kings (Deut. xvii. 14-20). And Moses foretold this in his
last words to the people, saying (Deut. xxxi. 29): _I know that
after my death ye will utterly corrupt yourselves, and turn aside
from the way that I have commanded you_, &c. When therefore
according to this prediction there arose another generation (Judges
ii. 10-11) _who knew not the Lord, nor yet the works which he had
done for Israel, the children of Israel did evil in the sight of the
Lord, and served Balaam_; to wit, they cast off God’s government,
that is to say, that of the _priest_, by whom God ruled; and
afterward, when they were overcome by their enemies and oppressed
with bondage, they looked for God’s will, not at the hands of the
_priest_ any more, but of the prophets. These therefore _actually_
judged Israel; but their obedience was _rightly due_ to the
high-priest. Although therefore the priestly kingdom, after the
death of Moses and Joshua, was without power; yet was it not without
right. Now that the _interpretation of God’s word_ did belong to the
same high-priest, is manifest by this; that God, after the
tabernacle and the ark of the covenant was consecrated, spake no
more in Mount Sinai, but in the tabernacle of the covenant, from the
propitiatory which was between the _cherubims_, whither it was not
lawful for any to approach except the high-priest. If therefore
regard be had to the _right_ of the kingdom, the supreme civil power
and the authority of interpreting God’s word were joined in the
high-priest. If we consider the _fact_, they were united in the
prophets who judged Israel. For as _judges_, they had the civil
authority; as _prophets_, they interpreted God’s word. And thus
every way hitherto these two powers continued inseparable.
[Sidenote: They were united in the kings, until the captivity.]
16. Kings being once constituted, it is no doubt but the _civil
authority_ belonged to them. For the kingdom of God by the way of
priesthood (God consenting to the request of the Israelites) was
ended; which Hierom also marks, speaking of the books of Samuel.
Samuel, says he, Eli being dead and Saul slain, declares the old law
abolished. Furthermore, the oaths of the new priesthood and new
sovereignty in Zadok and David, do testify that the right, whereby
the _kings_ did rule, was founded in the very concession of the
people. The priest could rightly do whatsoever every man could
rightly do himself; for the Israelites granted him _a right_ to
_judge_ of all things, and to _wage war_ for all men; in which two
are contained all right whatsoever can be conceived from man to man.
_Our king_ say they (1 Sam. viii. 20) _shall judge us, and go out
before us, and fight our battles_. _Judicature_ therefore belonged
to the kings. But to _judge_ is nothing else, than by _interpreting_
to apply the _laws_ to the _facts_. To them therefore belonged the
interpretation _of laws_ too. And because there was no other written
word of God acknowledged beside the _law of_ Moses, until the
captivity; the authority _of interpreting God’s word_ did also
belong to the kings. Nay, forasmuch as the word of God must be taken
for a law, if there had been another written word beside the
Mosaical law, seeing the interpretation of laws belonged to the
kings, the interpretation of it must also have belonged to them.
When the book of Deuteronomy, in which the whole Mosaical _law_ was
contained, being a long time lost was found again; _the priests_
indeed asked counsel of God concerning that book, but not by their
own authority, but by the commandment of Josiah; and not immediately
neither, but by the means of Holda the prophetess. Whence it appears
that the authority of admitting books for the word of God, belonged
not to the priest. Neither yet follows it, that that authority
belonged to the prophetess; because others did judge of the
prophets, whether they were to be held for true or not. For to what
end did God give signs and tokens to all the people, whereby the
true prophets might be discerned from the false; namely, the event
of predictions, and conformity with the religion established by
Moses; if they might not use those marks? The authority therefore of
admitting books for _the word of God_, belonged to the king; and
thus that book of the law was approved, and received again by the
authority of king Josiah; as appears by the second book of the
Kings, chap, xxii. xxiii.: where it is reported that he gathered
together all the several degrees of his kingdom, _the elders,
priests, prophets, and all the people; and he read in their ears all
the words of the covenant_; that is to say, he caused that
_covenant_ to be acknowledged for the _Mosaical covenant_; that is
to say, _for the word of God_; and to be again received and
confirmed by the Israelites. The civil power therefore, and the
power of discerning God’s word from the words of men, and of
interpreting God’s word even in the days of the kings, was wholly
belonging to themselves. Prophets were sent not with authority, but
in the form and by the right of proclaimers and preachers, of whom
the hearers did judge. And if perhaps these were punished who did
not listen to them plainly, teaching easy things; it doth not thence
follow, that the kings were obliged to follow all things which they,
in God’s name, did declare were to be followed. For though Josiah,
the good king of Judah, were slain because he obeyed not the word of
the Lord from the mouth of Necho king of Egypt; that is to say,
because he rejected good counsel though it seemed to come from an
enemy; yet no man I hope will say that Josiah was, by any bond
either of divine or human laws, obliged to believe Pharaoh Necho
king of Egypt, because he said _that God had spoken to him_. But
what some man may object against kings, that for want of learning
they are seldom able enough to interpret those books of antiquity,
in the which God’s word is contained; and that for this cause, it is
not reasonable that this office should depend on their authority; he
may object as much against the priests and all mortal men; for they
may err. And although priests were better instructed in nature and
arts than other men, yet kings are able enough to appoint such
interpreters under them; and so, though kings did not themselves
interpret the word of God, yet the office of interpreting them might
depend on their authority. And they who therefore refuse to yield up
this authority to kings, because they cannot practice the office
itself, do as much as if they should say, that the authority of
teaching _geometry_ must not depend upon kings, except they
themselves were geometricians. We read that kings have prayed for
the people; that they have blessed the people; that they have
consecrated the temple; that they have commanded the priests; that
they have removed priests from their office; that they have
constituted others. Sacrifices indeed they have not offered; for
that was hereditary to Aaron and his sons. But it is manifest, as in
Moses’ lifetime, so throughout all ages, from king Saul to the
captivity of Babylon, that the priesthood was not a maistry, but a
ministry.
[Sidenote: The same were united in the priests, after the
captivity.]
17. After their return from Babylonian bondage, the _covenant_ being
renewed and signed, _the priestly kingdom_ was restored to the same
manner it was in from the death of Joshua to the beginning of the
kings; excepting that it is not expressly set down, that the
returned Jews did give up the right of sovereignty either to Esdras,
by whose direction they ordered their state, or to any other beside
God himself. That reformation seems rather to be nothing else, than
the bare promises and vows of every man, to observe those things
which were written in the book of the law. Notwithstanding, (perhaps
not by the people’s intention), by virtue of the _covenant_ which
they then renewed, (for the covenant was the same with that which
was made at Mount Sinai), that same state was a _priestly kingdom_;
that is to say, the supreme civil authority and the sacred were
united in the priests. Now, howsoever through the ambition of those
who strove for the priesthood, and by the interposition of foreign
princes, it was so troubled till our Saviour Jesus Christ’s time,
that it cannot be understood out of the histories of those times,
where that authority resided; yet it is plain, that in those times
the power _of interpreting God’s word_ was not severed from the
supreme civil power.
[Sidenote: Among the Jews, the denial of the Divine providence and
idolatry, were the only treasons against the Divine
Majesty: in all other things they ought to obey their
princes.]
18. Out of all this, we may easily know how the Jews, in all times
from Abraham unto Christ, were to behave themselves in the commands
of their _princes_. For as in kingdoms merely human, men must obey a
subordinate magistrate in all things, excepting when his commands
contain in them some treason; so in the kingdom of God, the Jews
were bound to obey their _princes_, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses,
the _priest_, the _king_, every one during their time in all things,
except when their commands did contain some treason against _the
Divine Majesty_. Now treason against the Divine Majesty was, first,
_the denial of divine providence_; for this was _to deny God to be a
king by nature_: next, _idolatry_, or the worship not of other, (for
there is but one God), but of strange Gods; that is to say, a
worship though of one God, yet under other _titles_, _attributes_,
and _rites_, than what were established by Abraham and Moses; for
this was to _deny the God of Abraham_ to be their king _by covenant_
made with Abraham and themselves. In all other things they were to
obey. And if a king or priest, having the sovereign authority, had
commanded somewhat else to be done which was against the laws, that
had been his sin, and not his subject’s; whose duty it is, not to
dispute, but to obey the commands of his superiors.
-------
CHAPTER XVII.
OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY THE NEW COVENANT.
1. The prophecies concerning Christ’s dignity. 2. The prophecies
concerning his humility and passion. 3. That Jesus was that
Christ. 4. That the kingdom of God by the new covenant, was not
the kingdom of Christ, as Christ, but as God. 5. That the
kingdom by the new covenant is heavenly, and shall begin from
the day of judgment. 6. That the government of Christ in this
world was not a sovereignty, but counsel, or a government by the
way of doctrine and persuasion. 7. What the promises of the new
covenant are, on both parts. 8. That no laws are added by
Christ, beside the institution of the sacraments. 9. Repent ye,
be baptized, keep the commandments, and the like forms of
speech, are not laws. 10. It pertains to the civil authority, to
define what the sin of injustice is. 11. It pertains to the
civil authority, to define what conduces to the peace and
defence of the city. 12. It pertains to the civil authority, to
judge (when need requires) what definitions and what inferences
are true. 13. It belongs to the office of Christ, to teach
morally, not by the way of speculation, but as a law; to forgive
sins, and to teach all things whereof there is no science,
properly so called. 14. A distinction of things temporal from
spiritual. 15. In how many several sorts the word of God may be
taken. 16. That all which is contained in Holy Scripture,
belongs not to the canon of Christian faith. 17. That the word
of a lawful interpreter of Holy Scriptures, is the word of God.
18. That the authority of interpreting Scriptures, is the same
with that of determining controversies of faith. 19. Divers
significations of a Church. 20. What a Church is, to which we
attribute rights, actions, and the like personal capacities. 21.
A Christian city is the same with a Christian Church. 22. Many
cities do not constitute one Church. 23. Who are ecclesiastical
persons. 24. That the election of ecclesiastical persons belongs
to the Church, their consecration to pastors. 25. That the power
of remitting the sins of the penitent, and retaining those of
the impenitent, belongs to the pastors; but that of judging
concerning repentance belongs to the Church. 26. What
excommunication is, and on whom it cannot pass. 27. That the
interpretation of Scripture depends on the authority of the
city. 28. That a Christian city ought to interpret Scriptures by
ecclesiastical pastors.
[Sidenote: The prophecies concerning Christ’s dignity.]
1. There are many clear prophecies extant in the Old Testament
concerning our Saviour Jesus Christ, who was to restore the kingdom
of _God_ by a new covenant; partly foretelling his regal _dignity_,
partly his _humility and passion_. Among others concerning his
dignity, these. God, blessing Abraham, makes him a promise of his
son Isaac; and adds (Gen. xvii. 16): _And kings of people shall be
of him._ Jacob blessing his son Judah (Gen. xlix. 10): _The
sceptre_, quoth he, _shall not depart from Judah_. God to Moses
(Deut. xviii. 18): _A prophet_, saith he, _will I raise them up from
among their brethren, like unto thee, and will put my words in his
mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him;
and it shall come to pass, that whosoever will not hearken unto my
words, which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him_.
Isaiah (Isai. vii. 14): _The Lord himself shall give thee a sign;
Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and shall call his
name Emmanuel._ The same prophet (Isaiah ix. 6): _Unto us a child is
born, unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his
shoulders; and his name shall be called wonderful, counsellor, the
mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace._ And again
(Isaiah xi. 1-5): _There shall come forth a rod out of the stem of
Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots; the spirit of the
Lord shall rest upon him_, &c.; _He shall not judge after the sight
of his eyes, neither reprove after the hearing of his ears; but with
righteousness shall he judge the poor_, &c.; _And he shall smite the
earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips
shall he slay the wicked_. Furthermore in the same Isaiah (chapters
li. to lxii.), there is almost nothing else contained but a
description of the coming and the works of Christ. Jeremiah (Jerem.
xxxi. 31): _Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a
new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah._
And Baruch (Bar. iii. 35-37): _This is our God_, &c. _Afterward did
he show himself upon earth, and conversed with men._ Ezekiel (Ezek.
xxxiv. 23-25): _I will set up one shepherd over them, and he shall
feed them; even my servant David. And I will make with them a
covenant of peace_, &c. Daniel (Dan. vii. 13-14): _I saw in the
night visions; and behold one like the Son of Man came with the
clouds of heaven, and came to the ancient of days; and they brought
him near before him; and there was given him dominion, and glory,
and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve
him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion_, &c. Haggai (Haggai
ii. 6-7): _Yet once it is a little while, and I will shake the
heaven, and the earth, and the sea, and the dry land; and I will
shake all nations; and the desire of all nations shall come._
Zachariah, under the type of Joshua the high-priest (Zach. iii. 8):
_I will bring forth my servant the branch_, &c. And again (Zach. vi.
12): _Behold the man whose name is the Branch._ And again (Zach. ix.
9): _Rejoice greatly O daughter of Zion, shout O daughter of
Jerusalem; behold thy king cometh to thee; he is just, having
salvation._ The Jews moved by these and other prophecies, expected
Christ their king to be sent from God; who should redeem them, and
furthermore bear rule over all nations. Yea, this prophecy had
spread over the whole Roman empire; which Vespasian too, though
falsely, interpreted in favour of his own enterprises; _that out of
Judea should come he that should have dominion_.
[Sidenote: The prophecies of Christ’s humility and passion.]
2. Now the prophecies of _Christ’s humility and passion_, amongst
others are these: (Isaiah liii. 4): _He hath borne our griefs, and
carried our sorrows; yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God,
and afflicted_; and by and by (verse 7): _He was oppressed, he was
afflicted, yet he opened not his mouth; he is brought as a lamb to
the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearer is dumb, so opened
he not his mouth_, &c. And again (verse 8): _He was cut out of the
land of the living; for the transgression of my people was he
stricken_, &c. (Verse 12): _Therefore I will divide him a portion
with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong;
because he hath poured out his soul unto death, and he was numbered
with the transgressors, and he bare the sin of many, and made
intercession for the transgressors._ And that of Zachariah (Zach.
ix. 9): _He is lowly, riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal
of an ass._
[Sidenote: That Jesus was the Christ.]
3. In the reign of Tiberius Cæsar, Jesus our Saviour, a Galilean,
began to preach; the son, as was supposed, of Joseph; declaring to
the people of the Jews, that the kingdom of God expected by them was
now come, and that himself was a _king_, that is to say, the Christ;
explaining the _law_, choosing _twelve apostles_ and _seventy
disciples_, after the number of the _princes_ of the tribes, and
seventy elders (according to the pattern of Moses) to the ministry;
_teaching the way of salvation_ by himself and them; purging the
temple, doing great signs, and fulfilling all those things which the
prophets had foretold of Christ to come. That this man, hated of the
Pharisees, whose false doctrine and hypocritical sanctity he had
reproved; and by their means, of the people accused of unlawful
seeking for the kingdom, and crucified; was the true _Christ_ and
_king_ promised by God, and sent from his Father to renew the _new
covenant_ between them and God; both the evangelists do show,
describing his genealogy, nativity, life, doctrine, death, and
resurrection; and by comparing the things which he did with those
which were foretold of him, all Christians do consent to.
[Sidenote: That the kingdom of God by the new covenant, was not the
kingdom of Christ, as Christ, but as God.]
4. Now from this, that _Christ_ was sent from God his Father to make
a _covenant_ between him and the people, it is manifest, that though
Christ were equal to his Father according to his nature, yet was he
inferior according to the right of the kingdom. For this office, to
speak properly, was not that of a king, but of a viceroy; such as
Moses’ government was; for the kingdom was not his, but his
_Father’s_. Which Christ himself signified when he was baptized as a
subject, and openly professed when he taught his disciples to pray,
_Our Father, thy kingdom come_, &c.: and when he said (Matth. xxvi.
29): _I will not drink of the blood of the grape, until that day
when I shall drink it new with you in the kingdom of my Father._ And
St. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 22-24): _As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall
all be made alive; but every man in his own order; Christ the first
fruits; afterward they that are Christ’s, who believed in his
coming; then cometh the end when he shall have delivered up the
kingdom to God even his Father._ The same notwithstanding is also
called the _kingdom of Christ_: for both the mother of the sons of
Zebedee petitioned Christ, saying (Matth. xx. 21): _Grant that these
my two sons may sit, the one on thy right hand, the other on thy
left, in thy kingdom_: and the thief on the cross (Luke xxiii. 42):
_Lord remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom_: and St. Paul
(Ephes. v. 5): _For this know ye, that no whoremonger_, &c. _shall
enter into the kingdom of God, and of Christ_: and elsewhere (2 Tim.
iv. 1): _I charge thee before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, who
shall judge the quick and dead at his appearing, and his kingdom_,
&c.: (verse 18): _And the Lord shall deliver me from every evil
work, and will preserve me unto his heavenly kingdom_. Nor is it to
be marveled at, that the same kingdom is attributed to them both;
since both the Father and the Son are the same God; and the new
covenant concerning God’s kingdom, is not propounded in the name of
the _Father_; but in the name of the _Father_, of the _Son_, and of
the _Holy Ghost_, as of one God.
[Sidenote: That the kingdom of God by the new covenant is heavenly,
and begins from the day of judgment.]
5. But the kingdom of God, for restitution whereof Christ was sent
from God his Father, takes not its beginning before his second
coming; to wit, from the day of judgment, when he shall come in
majesty accompanied with his angel. For it is promised the apostles,
that in the kingdom of God they shall judge the twelve tribes of
Israel, (Matth. xix. 28): _Ye which have followed me in the
regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his
glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones judging the twelve
tribes of Israel_: which is not to be done till the day of judgment.
Christ therefore is not yet in the throne of his majesty; nor is
that time, when Christ was conversant here in the world, called a
kingdom, but a _regeneration_; that is to say, a renovation or
restitution of the kingdom of God, and a calling of them who were
hereafter to be received into his kingdom. And where it is said
(Matth. xxv. 31-32): _When the Son of man shall come in his glory,
and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne
of his glory, and before him shall be gathered all nations; and he
shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his
sheep from the goats_: we may manifestly gather that there will be
no local separation of God’s subjects from his enemies, but that
they shall live mixed together until Christ’s second coming. Which
is also confirmed by the comparison of the kingdom of heaven with
wheat mingled with darnell, and with a net containing all sorts of
fish. But a multitude of men, enemies and subjects, living
promiscuously together, cannot properly be termed a kingdom.
Besides, the apostles, when they asked our Saviour, whether he would
at that time when he ascended into heaven, restore the kingdom unto
Israel; did openly testify, that they then, when Christ ascended,
thought the kingdom of God not to be yet come. Furthermore, the
words of Christ, _My kingdom is not of this world_: and, _I will not
drink_, &c. _till the kingdom of God come_: and, _God hath not sent
his Son into the world, to judge the world, but that the world
through him might be saved_: and, _If any man hear my words, and
keep them not, I judge him not; for I came not to judge the world,
but to save the world_: and, _Man, who made me a judge or divider
between you?_ and the very appellation of _the kingdom of heaven_
testifies as much. The same thing is gathered out of the words of
the prophet Jeremiah, speaking of the kingdom of God by the new
covenant (Jer. xxxi. 34): _They shall teach no more every man his
neighbour; saying, Know the Lord. For they shall all know me, from
the least of them to the greatest of them, saith the Lord_: which
cannot be understood of a kingdom in this world. The kingdom of God
therefore, for the restoring whereof Christ came into the world; of
which the prophets did prophecy, and of which praying we say, _Thy
kingdom come_; if it is to have subjects locally separated from
enemies, if judicature, if majesty, according as hath been foretold;
shall begin from that time, wherein God shall separate the sheep
from the goats; wherein the apostles shall judge the twelve tribes
of Israel; wherein Christ shall come in majesty and glory; wherein
lastly, all men shall so know God, that they shall not need to be
taught; that is to say, at Christ’s second coming, or the day of
judgment. But if the kingdom of God were now already restored, no
reason could be rendered why Christ, having completed the work for
which he was sent, should come again; or why we should pray, _Thy
kingdom come_.
[Sidenote: The government of Christ in this world was not a
sovereignty, but counsel, or a government by way of
doctrine and persuasion.]
6. Now, although the kingdom _of God_ by Christ to be established
with a _new covenant_, were heavenly; we must not therefore think,
that they, who believing in Christ would make that covenant, were
not so to be governed here on the earth too, as that they should
persevere in their faith and obedience promised by that covenant.
For in vain had the kingdom of heaven been promised, if we were not
to have been led into it; but none can be led, but those who are
directed in the way. Moses, when he had instituted the _priestly
kingdom_, himself though he were no priest, yet ruled and conducted
the people all the time of their peregrination, until their entrance
into the promised land. In the same manner is it our Saviour’s
office, (whom God in this thing would have like unto Moses), as he
was sent from his Father, so to govern the future subjects of his
heavenly kingdom in this life, that they might attain to and enter
into that; although the kingdom were not properly his, but his
Father’s. But the government whereby Christ rules the faithful ones
in this life, is not properly a _kingdom_ or _dominion_, but a
_pastoral charge_, or _the right of teaching_; that is to say, God
the Father gave him not a power to judge of _meum_ and _tuum_, as he
doth to the kings of the earth; nor a _coercive power_, nor
_legislative_; but of showing to the world, and teaching them _the
way and knowledge of salvation_; that is to say, of preaching and
declaring what they were to do, who would enter into the kingdom of
heaven. That Christ had received no power from his Father to judge
in questions of _meum_ and _tuum_, that is to say, in all questions
of right among those who believed not, those words above cited do
sufficiently declare: _Man, who made me a judge or divider between
you?_ And it is confirmed by reason. For seeing Christ was sent to
make _a covenant_ between God and men; and no man is obliged to
perform obedience before the contract be made; if he should have
judged of questions of _right_, no man had been tied to obey his
sentence. But that the discerning of right was not committed to
Christ in this world, neither among the faithful nor among infidels,
is apparent in this; that that right without all controversy belongs
to princes, as long as it is not by God himself derogated from their
authority. But it is not derogated before the day of judgment; as
appears by the words of St. Paul, speaking of the day of judgment (1
Cor. xv. 24): _Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up
the kingdom to God even the Father, when he shall have put down all
rule, and all authority, and power._ Secondly, the words of our
Saviour reproving James and John, when they had said (Luke ix. 54):
_Wilt thou that we call for fire from heaven, that it may consume
them?_ (namely the Samaritans, who had denied to receive him going
up to Jerusalem): and replying (verse 56), _The Son of man is not
come to destroy souls, but to save them_; and those words: _Behold I
send you as sheep among wolves_; _Shake off the dust of your feet_;
and the like; and those words, _God sent not his Son into the world,
to judge the world, but that the world through him might be saved_;
and those: _If any man hear my words, and keep them not, I judge him
not; for I came not to judge the world_, &c.: do all show, that he
had no power given him to condemn or punish any man. We read indeed,
that _the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to
the Son_; but since that both may, and must be understood of the day
of future judgment, it doth not at all repugn what hath been said
before. Lastly, that he was not sent to make new laws, and that
therefore by his office and mission he was no legislator properly so
called, nor Moses neither, but a bringer and publisher of his
Father’s laws, (for God only, and neither Moses nor Christ, was a
king by covenant), is collected hence; that he said, _I came not to
destroy_, (to wit, the laws before given from God by Moses, which he
presently interprets), _but to fulfil_; and, _He that shall break
one of the least of these commandments, and shall teach men so, he
shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven_. Christ therefore
had not a royal or sovereign power committed to him from his Father
in this world, but councillary and doctrinal only; which himself
signifies, as well then when he calls his apostles not hunters, but
fishers of men; as when he compares the kingdom of God to a grain of
mustard-seed, and to a little leaven hid in meal.
[Sidenote: What the promises of the new covenant are on both parts.]
7. God promised unto Abraham, first, a numerous seed, the possession
of the land of Canaan, and a blessing upon all nations in his seed,
on this condition; that he and his seed should serve him: next, unto
the seed of Abraham according to the flesh, _a priestly_ kingdom, a
government most free, in which they were to be subject to no human
power, on this condition; that they should serve the God of Abraham
on that fashion which Moses should teach: lastly, both to them and
to all nations, a heavenly and _eternal_ kingdom, on condition that
they should serve the God of Abraham on that manner which Christ
should teach. For by _the new_, that is to say, _the Christian
covenant_, it is covenanted on men’s part, to serve the God of
Abraham _on that manner which Jesus should teach_: on God’s part,
_to pardon their sins, and bring them into his celestial kingdom_.
We have already spoken of the quality of the _heavenly_ kingdom,
above in art. 5; but it is usually called, sometimes the _kingdom of
heaven_, sometimes the _kingdom of glory_, sometimes the _life
eternal_. What is required on men’s part, namely, to serve God as
Christ should teach, contains two things; _obedience to be performed
to God_, (for this is to serve God); and _faith in Jesus_, to wit,
that we believe _Jesus to be that Christ who was promised by God_;
for that only is the cause why his doctrine is to be followed,
rather than any other’s. Now in holy Scriptures, _repentance_ is
often put instead of _obedience_; because Christ teacheth
everywhere, that with God the will is taken for the deed; but
_repentance_ is an infallible sign of an obedient mind. These things
being understood, it will most evidently appear out of many places
of sacred Scripture, that those are the conditions of _the Christian
covenant_ which we have named; to wit, giving remission of sins and
eternal life on God’s part; and repenting and believing in Jesus
Christ, on men’s part. First, the words, (Mark i. 15): _The kingdom
of God is at hand; Repent ye and believe the gospel_, contain the
whole covenant. In like manner those (Luke xxiv. 46-47): _Thus it is
written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the
dead the third day; and that repentance and remission of sins should
be preached in his name among all nations, beginning at Jerusalem._
And those (Acts iii. 19): _Repent and be converted, that your sins
may be blotted out when the times of refreshing shall come_, &c. And
sometimes one part is expressly propounded, and the other
understood, as here (John iii. 36): _He that believeth in the Son,
hath everlasting life; He that believeth not the Son, shall not see
life, but the wrath of God abideth on him_: where _faith_ is
expressed, _repentance_ not mentioned; and in Christ’s preaching
(Matth. iv. 17): _Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand_:
where _repentance_ is expressed, _faith_ is understood. But the
parts of this _new contract_ are most manifestly and formally set
down there, where a certain ruler, bargaining as it were for the
kingdom of God, asketh our Saviour (Luke xviii. 18): _Good Master,
what shall I do to inherit eternal life?_ But Christ first propounds
one part of the price, namely, observation of the commandments, or
obedience; which when he answered that he had kept, he adjoins the
other, saying (verse 22): _Yet lackest thou one thing; Sell all that
thou hast, and distribute to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure
in heaven; and come, follow me._ This was matter of _faith_. He
therefore not giving sufficient credit to Christ and his heavenly
treasures, went away sorrowful. The same covenant is contained in
these words (Mark xvi. 16): _He that believeth and is baptized,
shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned_: where
_faith_ is expressed, _repentance_ is supposed in those that are
baptized. And in these words (John iii. 5): _Except a man be born
again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom
of heaven_: where, _to be born of water_, is the same with
regeneration, that is to say, conversion to Christ. Now that
_baptism_ is required in the two places cited just before, and in
divers others, we must understand, that what _circumcision_ was to
the _old covenant_, that _baptism_ is to the _new_. Seeing therefore
that was not of the essence, but served for a memorial of the _old
covenant_, as a ceremony or sign, (and was omitted in the
wilderness); in like manner this also is used, not as pertaining to
the essence, but in memory and for a sign of the _new covenant_
which we make with God. And provided the will be not wanting, the
act through necessity may be omitted; but _repentance_ and _faith_,
which are of the essence of the _covenant_, are always required.
[Sidenote: There are no laws added by Christ, beside the institution
of the sacraments.]
8. In the _kingdom_ of God after this life, there will be _no laws_;
partly, because there is no room for laws, where there is none for
sins; partly, because laws were given us from God, not to direct us
in heaven, but unto heaven. Let us now therefore inquire what laws
Christ established not himself; for he would not take upon him any
legislative authority, as hath been declared above in art. 6; but
propounded to us for his Father’s. We have a place in Scripture,
where he contracts all the laws of God published till that time,
into two precepts. (Matth. xxii. 37, 38, 39, 40): _Thou shalt love
the Lord thy God with all thine heart, with all thy soul, and with
all thy mind; this is the greatest and first commandment. And the
second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On
these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets._ The first
of these was given before by Moses in the same words (Deut. vi. 5);
and the second even before Moses; for it is the natural law, having
its beginning with rational nature itself: and both together is the
sum of all laws. For all the laws of divine natural worship, are
contained in these words, _Thou shalt love God_; and all the laws of
divine worship due by the _old covenant_, in these words, _Thou
shalt love thy God_, that is to say, _God_, as being the peculiar
_King of Abraham_ and his seed; and all the laws natural and civil,
in these words, _Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself._ For he
that loves God and his neighbour, hath a mind to obey all laws, both
divine and human. But God requires no more than a mind to obey. We
have another place where Christ interprets the laws, namely, the
fifth, sixth, and seventh entire chapters of St. Matthew’s Gospel.
But all those laws are set down either in the _decalogue_ or in the
_moral law_, or are contained in _the faith of Abraham_; as that law
of not putting away a wife is contained in _the faith of Abraham_.
For that same, _two shall be one flesh_, was not delivered, either
by Christ first, or by Moses, but by Abraham, who first preached the
creation of the world. The laws therefore which Christ contracts in
one place, and explains in another, are no other than those to which
all mortal men are obliged, who acknowledge the God of Abraham.
Beside these, we read not of any law given by Christ, beside the
institution of the sacraments of _baptism_ and the _eucharist_.
[Sidenote: That these and the like forms, repent, be baptized, keep
the commandments, are not laws.]
9. What may be said then of these kind of precepts, _Repent_, _Be
baptized_, _Keep the Commandments_, _Believe the Gospel_, _Come unto
me_, _Sell all that thou hast_, _Give to the poor_, _Follow me_; and
the like? We must say that they are not _laws_, but a calling of us
to the faith: such as is that of Isaiah (lv. 1): _Come; buy wine and
milk without money and without price._ Neither if they come not, do
they therefore sin against any law, but against prudence only;
neither shall their infidelity be punished, but their former sins.
Wherefore St. John saith of the unbeliever, _The wrath of God
abideth on him_; he saith not, _The wrath of God shall come upon
him_. And, _He that believeth not, is already judged_; he saith not,
_shall be_ judged, but _is already_ judged. Nay, it cannot be well
conceived, that remission of sins should be a benefit arising from
_faith_, unless we understand also on the other side, that the
punishment of sins is an hurt proceeding from _infidelity_.
[Sidenote: It belongs to the civil authority, to define what the sin
of injustice is.]
10. From hence, that our Saviour hath prescribed no distributive
laws to the subjects of princes, and citizens of cities; that is to
say, hath given no rules whereby a subject may know and discern what
is _his own_, what _another man’s_, nor by what forms, words, or
circumstances a thing must be _given_, _delivered_, _invaded_,
_possessed_, that it may be known by right to belong to the
_receiver_, _invader_, or _possessor_: we must necessarily
understand that each single subject (not only with unbelievers,
among whom Christ himself denied himself to be a _judge_ and
_distributor_, but even with Christians) must take those rules from
his city, that is to say, from that man or council which hath the
supreme power. It follows therefore, that by those laws; _Thou shalt
not kill_, _Thou shalt not commit adultery_, _Thou shalt not steal_,
_Honour thy father and mother_; nothing else was commanded, but that
subjects, and citizens, should absolutely obey their princes in all
questions concerning _meum_ and _tuum_, _their own_ and _others’
right_. For by that precept, _Thou shalt not kill_, all slaughter is
not prohibited; for he that said, _Thou shalt not kill_, said also,
(Exod. xxxv. 2): _Whosoever doth work upon the sabbath, shall be put
to death_. No, nor yet all slaughter, the cause not being heard; for
he said, (Exod. xxxii. 27): _Slay every man his brother, and every
man his companion, and every man his neighbour._ (Verse 28): _And
there fell of the people about three thousand men._ Nor yet all
slaughter of an innocent person; for Jephtha vowed (Judges xi. 31):
_Whosoever cometh forth, &c. I will offer him up for a burnt
offering unto the Lord_; and his vow was accepted of God. What then
is forbidden? Only this: that no man kill another, who hath not _a
right_ to kill him; that is to say, that no man kill, unless it
belong to him to do so. The law of Christ therefore concerning
killing, and consequently all manner of hurt done to any man, and
what penalties are to be set, commands us to obey the city only. In
like manner, by that precept, _Thou shalt not commit adultery_, all
manner of copulation is not forbidden; but only that of lying with
_another man’s wife_. But the judgment, which is another man’s wife,
belongs to the city; and is to be determined by the rules which the
city prescribes. This precept therefore commands both male and
female to keep that faith entire, which they have mutually given
according to the statutes of the city. So also by the precept, _thou
shalt not steal_, all manner of invasion or secret surreption is not
forbidden; but of _another man’s only_. The subject therefore is
commanded this only, that he invade not nor take away aught which
the city prohibits to be invaded or taken away; and universally, not
to call anything _murder_, _adultery_, or _theft_, but what is done
contrary to the civil laws. Lastly, seeing Christ hath commanded us
to _honour our parents_, and hath not prescribed with what rites,
what appellations, and what manner of obedience they are to be
honoured; it is to be supposed that they are to be honoured with the
will indeed, and inwardly, as kings and lords over their children,
but outwardly, not beyond the city’s permission, which shall assign
to every man, as all things else, so also _his honour_. But since
the nature of justice consists in this, that every man have his own
given him; it is manifest, that it also belongs to a Christian city
to determine what is justice, what injustice, or a sin against
justice. Now what belongs to a city, that must be judged to belong
to him or them who have the sovereign power of the city.
[Sidenote: It belongs to civil authority, to define what conduces to
the peace and safety of the city.]
11. Moreover, because our Saviour hath not showed subjects any other
laws for the government of a city, beside those of nature, that is
to say, beside the command of obedience; no subject can privately
determine who is a public friend, who an enemy, when war, when
peace, when truce is to be made, nor yet what subjects, what
authority and of what men, are commodious or prejudicial to the
safety of the commonweal. These and all like matters therefore are
to be learned, if need be, from the city, that is to say, from the
sovereign powers.
[Sidenote: It belongs to the civil authority, to judge, when need
requires, what definitions and what inferences are true.]
12. Furthermore, all these things, to build castles, houses,
temples; to move, carry, take away mighty weights; to send securely
over seas; to contrive engines, serving for all manner of uses; to
be well acquainted with the face of the whole world, the courses of
the stars, the seasons of the year, the accounts of the times, and
the nature of all things; to understand perfectly all natural and
civil rights; and all manner of sciences, which, comprehended under
the title of philosophy, are necessary partly to live, partly to
live well; I say, the understanding of these (because Christ hath
not delivered it) is to be learnt from reasoning; that is to say, by
making necessary consequences, having first taken the beginning from
experience. But men’s reasonings are sometimes right, sometimes
wrong; and consequently, that which is concluded and held for a
truth, is sometimes truth, sometimes error. Now errors, even about
these philosophical points, do sometimes public hurt, and give
occasions of great seditions and injuries. It is needful therefore,
as oft as any controversy ariseth in these matters contrary to
public good and common peace, that there be somebody to judge of the
reasoning, that is to say, whether that which is inferred, be
rightly inferred or not; that so the controversy may be ended. But
there are no rules given by Christ to this purpose, neither came he
into the world to teach _logic_. It remains therefore that the
judges of such controversies, be the same with those whom God by
nature had instituted before, namely, those who in each city are
constituted by the sovereign. Moreover, if a controversy be raised
of the accurate and proper signification, that is, the definition of
those names or appellations which are commonly used; insomuch as it
is needful for the peace of the city, or the distribution of right,
to be determined; the determination will belong to the city. For
men, by reasoning, do search out such kind of definitions in their
observation of diverse conceptions, for the signification whereof
those appellations were used at diverse times and for diverse
causes. But the decision of the question, whether a man do reason
rightly, belongs to the city. For example, if a woman bring forth a
child of an unwonted shape, and the law forbid to kill a man; the
question is, whether the child be a man. It is demanded therefore,
what a man is. No man doubts but the city shall judge it, and that
without taking an account of Aristotle’s definition, that man is a
rational creature. And these things, namely, _right_, _policy_, and
_natural sciences_, are subjects concerning which Christ denies that
it belongs to his office to give any precepts, or teach any thing
beside this only; that in all controversies about them, every single
subject should obey the laws and determinations of his city. Yet
must we remember this, that the same Christ, as God, could not only
have taught, but also commanded what he would.
[Sidenote: It belongs to the office of Christ, to teach morality,
not as a speculation, but as a law; to forgive sins, and
to teach all things whereof there is no science properly
so called.]
13. The sum of our Saviour’s office was, to teach the way and all
the means of salvation and eternal life. But justice and civil
obedience, and observation of all the natural laws, is one of the
means to salvation. Now these may be taught two ways; one, as
_theorems_, by the way of natural reason, by drawing right and the
natural laws from human principles and contracts; and this doctrine
thus delivered, is subject to the censure of civil powers. The
other, as laws, by divine authority, in showing the will of God to
be such; and thus to teach, belongs only to him to whom the will of
God is supernaturally known, that is to say, to Christ. Secondly, it
belonged to the office of Christ to forgive sins to the penitent;
for that was necessary for the salvation of men who had already
sinned. Neither could it be done by any other. For remission of sins
follows not repentance naturally, as a debt; but it depends, as a
free gift, on the will of God supernaturally to be revealed.
Thirdly, it belongs to the office of Christ to teach all those
commandments of God, whether concerning his worship, or those points
of faith which cannot be understood by natural reason, but only by
revelation; of which nature are those, _that he was the Christ_;
_that his kingdom was not terrestrial, but celestial_; _that there
are rewards and punishments after this life_; _that the soul is
immortal_; _that there should be such, and so many sacraments_; and
the like.
[Sidenote: A distinction of things temporal from spiritual.]
14. From what hath been said in the foregoing chapter, it is not
hard to distinguish between things _spiritual_ and _temporal_. For
since by _spiritual_, those things are understood, which have their
foundation on the authority and office of Christ, and, unless Christ
had taught them, could not have been known; and all other things are
temporal; it follows, that the definition and determination of what
is _just_ and _unjust_, the cognizance of all controversies about
the _means of peace_ and _public defence_, and the examination of
doctrines and books in all manner of _rational science_, depends
upon _the temporal right_; but those which are _mysteries of faith_,
depending on Christ’s word and authority only, their judgments
belong to _spiritual right_. But it is reason’s inquisition, and
pertains to _temporal right_ to define what is _spiritual_, and what
_temporal_; because our Saviour hath not made that distinction. For
although St. Paul in many places distinguish between _spiritual_
things and _carnal_ things; and call (Rom. viii. 5: 1 Cor. xii.
8-10) those things _spiritual_, which are of the _spirit_, to wit,
the _word of wisdom_, _the word of knowledge_, _faith_, _the gift of
healing_, _the working of miracles_, _prophecy_, _divers kind of
tongues_, _interpretation of tongues_; all supernaturally inspired
by the Holy Ghost, and such as the _carnal_ man understands not, but
he only who hath known the mind of Christ (2 Cor. ii. 14-16); and
those things _carnal_, which belong to worldly wealth (Rom. xv. 27);
and the men _carnal men_ (1 Cor. iii. 1-3): yet hath he not defined,
nor given us any rules whereby we may know what proceeds from
natural reason, what from supernatural inspiration.
[Sidenote: The word of God many ways taken.]
15. Seeing therefore it is plain that our Saviour hath committed to,
or rather not taken away from _princes_, and those who in each city
have obtained the sovereignty, the supreme authority of judging and
determining all manner of controversies about _temporal_ matters; we
must see henceforth to whom he hath left the same authority in
matters _spiritual_. Which because it cannot be known, except it be
out of _the word of God_ and _the tradition of the Church_, we must
enquire in the next place what _the word of God is_, what _to
interpret it_, what a _Church_ is, and what _the will and command of
the Church_. To omit that the _word of God_ is in Scripture taken
sometimes for the _Son of God_, it is used three manner of ways.
First, most properly for that which God hath spoken. Thus,
whatsoever God spake unto Abraham, the patriarchs, Moses, and the
prophets, our Saviour to his disciples, or any others; is _the word
of God_. Secondly, whatsoever hath been uttered by men on the motion
or by command of the Holy Ghost; in which sense we acknowledge the
Scriptures to be the _word of God_. Thirdly, in the New Testament
indeed, the _word of God_ most frequently signifies the doctrine of
the gospel, or the _word concerning God_, or _the word of the
kingdom of God_ by Christ. As where it is said (Matth. iv. 23) that
Christ preached the _gospel of the kingdom_: where the apostles are
said to preach _the word of God_ (Acts xiii. 46): where the _word of
God_ is called _the word of life_ (Acts v. 20): _of the word of the
gospel_ (Acts xv. 7): _the word of faith_ (Rom. x. 8): _the word of
truth_, that is to say, (adding an interpretation) _the gospel of
salvation_, (Eph. i. 13): and where it is called _the word of the
apostles_; for St. Paul says (2 Thess. iii. 14): _If any man obey
not our word_, &c. Which places cannot be otherwise meant than of
_the doctrine evangelical_. In like manner, where the word of God is
said to be _sown_, _to increase_, and _to be multiplied_ (Acts xii.
24: and xiii. 49): it is very hard to conceive this to be spoken of
the _voice of God_ or _of his apostles_; but of their doctrine,
easy. And in this third acception is all that _doctrine of the
Christian faith_, which at this day is preached in pulpits and
contained in the books of divines, _the word of God_.
[Sidenote: All things contained in the Scripture, belong not to the
canon of Christian faith.]
16. Now the sacred Scripture is entirely _the word of God_ in this
second acception, as being that which we acknowledge to be inspired
from God; and innumerable places of it, in the first. And seeing the
greatest part of it is conversant either in the prediction of the
_kingdom of heaven_, or in prefigurations before the incarnation of
Christ, or in evangelization and explication after; the sacred
Scripture is also _the word of God_, and therefore the canon and
rule of all _evangelical doctrine_, in this third signification;
where _the word of God_ is taken for _the word concerning God_, that
is to say, for _the gospel_. But because in the same Scriptures we
read many things political, historical, moral, physical, and others
which nothing at all concern the mysteries of our faith; those
places, although they contain true doctrine, and are the canon of
such kind of doctrines, yet can they not be the canon of the
mysteries of Christian religion.
[Sidenote: The word of a lawful interpreter of Scriptures, is the
word of God.]
17. And truly, it is not the dead voice or letter of _the word of
God_, which is the canon of Christian doctrine; but a true and
genuine determination. For the mind is not governed by Scriptures,
unless they be understood. There is need therefore of an interpreter
to make the Scriptures canon, and hence follows one of these two
things; that either the word of the interpreter is the word of God,
or that the canon of Christian doctrine is not the word of God. The
last of these must necessarily be false; for the rule of that
doctrine which cannot be known by any human reason, but by divine
revelation only, cannot be less than divine; for whom we acknowledge
not to be able to discern whether some doctrine be true or not, it
is impossible to account his opinion for a rule in the same
doctrine. The first therefore is true, _that the word of an
interpreter of Scriptures is the word of God_.
The authority of interpreting Scriptures, is the same with that of
determining controversies of faith.
18. Now that interpreter whose determination hath the honour to be
held for _the word of God_, is not every one that translates the
Scriptures out of the Hebrew and Greek tongue, to his Latin auditors
in Latin, to his French in French, and to other nations in their
mother tongue; for this is not to interpret. For such is the nature
of speech in general, that although it deserve the chief place among
those signs whereby we declare our conceptions to others, yet cannot
it perform that office alone without the help of many circumstances.
For the living voice hath its interpreters present, to wit, time,
place, countenance, gesture, the counsel of the speaker, and himself
unfolding his own meaning in other words as oft as need is. To
recall these aids of interpretation, so much desired in the writings
of old time, is neither the part of an ordinary wit, nor yet of the
quaintest, without great learning and very much skill in antiquity.
It sufficeth not therefore for interpretation of Scriptures, that a
man understand the language wherein they speak. Neither is every one
an authentic interpreter of Scriptures, who writes comments upon
them. For men may err; they may also either bend them to serve their
own ambition; or even resisting, draw them into bondage by their
forestallings; whence it will follow, that an erroneous sentence
must be held for _the word of God_. But although this might not
happen, yet as soon as these commentators are departed, their
commentaries will need explications; and in process of time, those
explications expositions; those expositions new commentaries,
without any end. So as there cannot, in any written interpretation
whatsoever, be a canon or rule of Christian doctrine, whereby the
controversies of religion may be determined. It remains, that there
must be some canonical interpreter, whose legitimate office it is to
end controversies begun, by explaining the word of God in the
judgments themselves; and whose authority therefore must be no less
obeyed, than theirs who first recommended the Scripture itself to us
for a canon of faith; and that one and the same person be _an
interpreter of Scripture_, and a _supreme judge of all manner of
doctrines_.
[Sidenote: Divers significations of a Church.]
19. What concerns the word _ecclesia_, or Church, originally it
signifies the same thing that _concio_ or a congregation does in
Latin; even as _ecclesiastes_ or churchman, the same that
_concionator_ or preacher, that is to say, he who speaks to the
congregation. In which sense we read in the Acts of the Apostles, of
a _Church confused_, and of a _lawful Church_ (Acts xix, 32-39):
that, taken for a concourse of people meeting in way of tumult;
this, for a convocated assembly. But in holy writ by a _Church of
Christians_, is sometimes understood the assembly, and sometimes the
Christians themselves, although not actually assembled, if they be
permitted to enter into the congregation and to communicate with
them. For example, _Tell it to the Church_, (Matth. xviii. 17), is
meant of a Church assembled; for otherwise it is impossible to
_tell_ any thing to the Church. But _He laid waste the Church_,
(Acts viii. 3), is understood of a Church not assembled. Sometimes a
Church is taken for those who are baptized, or for the professors of
the Christian faith, whether they be Christians inwardly or
feignedly; as when we read of somewhat said or written to the
Church, or said, or decreed, or done by the Church. Sometimes for
the elect only, as when it is called _holy and without blemish_
(Ephes. v. 27). But the elect, as they are militant, are not
properly called a Church; for they know not how to assemble; but
they are a _future Church_, namely, in that day when severed from
the reprobate they shall be triumphant. Again, a Church may be
sometimes taken for all Christians collectively; as when Christ is
called _the head of his Church_ (Ephes. v. 23); and _the head of his
body the Church_ (Coloss. i. 18). Sometimes for its parts; as _the
Church of Ephesus_, _the Church which is in his house_, _the seven
Churches_, &c. Lastly, a Church, as it is taken for a company
actually assembled, according to the divers ends of their meeting,
signifies sometimes those who are met together to deliberate and
judge; in which sense it is also called a council and a synod;
sometimes those who meet together in the house of prayer to worship
God, in which signification it is taken in the 1 Cor. xiv. 4, 5, 23,
28, &c.
[Sidenote: What a Church is, to whom we attribute rights, actions,
and the like appellations proper to a person.]
20. Now a _Church_, which hath personal rights and proper actions
attributed to it, and of which that same must necessarily be
understood, _Tell it to the Church_, and _he that obeys not the
Church_, and all such like forms of speech, is to be defined so as
by that word may be understood a multitude of men, who have made a
new covenant with God in Christ, that is to say, a multitude of them
who have taken upon them the sacrament of baptism; which multitude
may both lawfully be called together by some one into one place,
and, he so calling them, are bound to be present either in person or
by others. For a multitude of men, if they cannot meet in assembly
when need requires, is not to be called _a person_. For a Church can
neither speak, nor discern, nor hear, but as it is a congregation.
Whatsoever is spoken by particular men, (to wit, as many opinions
almost as heads), that is the speech of one man, not of the Church.
Furthermore, if an assembly be made, and it be unlawful, it shall be
considered as null. Not any one of these therefore who are present
in a tumult, shall be tied to the decree of the rest; but specially
if he dissent. And therefore neither can such a Church make any
decree; for then a multitude is said to decree somewhat, when every
man is obliged by the decree of the major part. We must therefore
grant to the definition of a Church, to which we attribute _things
belonging to a person_, not only a possibility of assembling, but
also of doing it lawfully. Besides, although there be some one who
may lawfully call the rest together; yet if they who are called, may
lawfully not appear; which may happen among men who are not subject
one to another; that same _Church_ is not _one person_. For by what
right they, who being called to a certain time and place do meet
together, are _one Church_; by the same, others flocking to another
place appointed by them, are _another Church_. And every number of
men of one opinion is a Church; and by consequence, there will be as
many Churches as there are divers opinions; that is to say, the same
multitude of men will at once prove to be _one_, and _many
Churches_. Wherefore a Church is not one, except there be a certain
and known, that is to say, a lawful power, by means whereof every
man may be obliged to be present in the congregation, either himself
in person, or by proxy; and that becomes _one_, and is capable of
_personal_ functions, by the union of a lawful power of convocating
synods and assemblies of Christians; not by uniformity of doctrine;
and otherwise it is a multitude, and _persons_ in the plural,
howsoever agreeing in opinions.
[Sidenote: A Christian city is the same with a Christian Church.]
21. It follows what hath been already said by necessary connexion,
that _a city of Christian men_ and a _Church_ is altogether the same
thing, of the same men, termed by two names, for two causes. For the
_matter of a city_ and a _Church_ is one, to wit, the same Christian
men. And the _form_, which consists in a lawful power of assembling
them, is the same too; for it is manifest that every subject is
obliged to come thither, whither he is summoned by his _city_. Now
that which is called a _city_, as it is made up of _men_, the same,
as it consists of _Christians_, is styled a _Church_.
[Sidenote: Many cities do not constitute one Church.]
22. This too is very coherent with the same points: _if there be
many Christian cities, they are not altogether personally one
Church_. They may indeed by mutual consent become one _Church_, but
no otherwise than as they must also become one city. For they cannot
assemble but at some certain time, and to some place appointed. But
persons, places, and times, belong to civil right; neither can any
subject or stranger lawfully set his foot on any place, but by the
permission of the city, which is lord of the place. But the things
which cannot lawfully be done but by the permission of the city,
those, if they be lawfully done, are done by the city’s authority.
The _universal Church_ is indeed one _mystical body_, whereof Christ
is the head; but in the same manner that all men together,
acknowledging God for the ruler of the world, are one kingdom and
one city; which notwithstanding is neither one _person_, nor hath it
one common action or determination. Furthermore, where it is said
that _Christ is the head of his body the Church_, it manifestly
appears that that was spoken by the Apostle of the elect; who, as
long as they are in this world, are a _Church_ only in _potentia_;
but shall not actually be so before they be separated from the
reprobate, and gathered together among themselves in the day of
judgment. The Church of Rome of old was very great, but she went not
beyond the bounds of her empire, and therefore neither was she
_universal_; unless it were in that sense, wherein it was also said
of the city of Rome, _Orbem jam totum victor Romanus habebat_; when
as yet he had not the twentieth part of it. But after that the civil
empire was divided into parts, the single cities thence arising were
so many Churches: and that power which the Church of Rome had over
them, might perhaps wholly depend on the authority of those
Churches, who having cast off the emperors, were yet content to
admit the doctors of Rome.
[Sidenote: Who are clergymen.]
23. They may be called _churchmen_, who exercise a public office in
the Church. But of offices, there was one a _ministery_, another a
_maistery_. The offices of the _ministers_, was to serve tables, to
take care of the temporal goods of the Church, and to distribute, at
that time when all propriety of riches being abolished they were fed
in common, to each man his portion. The _maisters_, according to
their order, were called some _apostles_, some _bishops_, some
_presbyters_, that is to say, _elders_; yet not so, as that by the
name of _presbyter_, the _age_, but the office might be
distinguished. For Timothy was a _presbyter_, although a young man.
But because for the most part the _elders_ were received into the
_maistership_, the word, denoting age, was used to signify the
office. The same _maisters_, according to the diversity of their
employments, were called some of them _apostles_, some _prophets_,
some _evangelists_, some _pastors_ or _teachers_. And the
_apostolical_ work indeed was universal; the _prophetical_, to
declare their own revelations in the Church; the _evangelical_, to
preach or to be publishers of the gospel among the infidels; that of
the _pastors_, to teach, confirm, and rule the minds of those who
already believed.
[Sidenote: The election of churchmen belongs to the Church; their
consecration to the pastors.]
24. In the election of churchmen two things are to be considered;
the election of the persons, and their _consecration_ or
institution, which also is called _ordination_. The first twelve
apostles Christ himself both elected and ordained. After Christ’s
ascension, Matthias was elected in the room of Judas the traitor;
the Church, which at that time consisted of a congregation of about
one hundred and twenty men, choosing two men: _and they appointed
two_, Joseph and Matthias: but God himself by lot approving of
Matthias. And St. Paul calls these twelve _the first and great
apostles_; also the apostles _of the circumcision_. Afterward were
added two other apostles, Paul and Barnabas; ordained indeed by the
doctors and prophets of the Church of Antioch (which was _a
particular Church_) by the imposition of hands; but elected by the
command of the Holy Ghost. That they were both apostles, is manifest
in Acts xiii. 2, 3. That they received their apostleship from hence,
namely, because they were separated, by command of the spirit, for
the work of God from the rest of the prophets and doctors of the
Church of Antioch, St. Paul himself shows; who calls himself, for
distinction sake (Rom. i. 1), _an apostle separated unto the Gospel
of God_. But if it be demanded further, _by what authority_ it came
to pass, that that was received for the command of the Holy Ghost,
which those prophets and doctors did say proceeded from him; it must
necessarily be answered, _by the authority of the Church of
Antioch_. For the prophets and doctors must be examined by the
Church, before they be admitted. For St. John (1 Epist. iv. 1)
saith: _Believe not every spirit; but try the spirits, whether they
are of God; because many false prophets are gone out into the
world_. But by what Church, but that to which that epistle was
written? In like manner St. Paul (Gal. ii. 14) reproves the Churches
of Galatia, because they Judaized; although they seemed to do so by
the authority of Peter. For when he had told them, that he had
reprehended Peter himself in these words: _If thou being a Jew,
livest after the manner of Gentiles, and not as do the Jews; why
compellest thou the Gentiles to live as do the Jews_: not long after
he questions them, saying (Gal. iii. 2): _This only would I learn of
you: received ye the Spirit by the works of the law, or by the
hearing of faith?_ Where it is evident, that it was Judaism which he
reprehended the Galatians for, notwithstanding that the apostle
Peter compelled them to Judaize. Seeing therefore it belonged to the
Church, and not to Peter, and therefore also not to any man, to
determine what doctors they should follow; it also pertained to the
authority of the Church of Antioch, to elect their prophets and
doctors. Now, because the Holy Ghost separated to himself the
apostles Paul and Barnabas by the imposition of hands from doctors
thus elected, it is manifest, _that imposition of hands and
consecration_ of the prime doctors in each Church, belongs to the
doctors of the same Church. But _bishops_, who were also called
_presbyters_, although all presbyters were not bishops, were
ordained sometimes by _apostles_; for Paul and Barnabas, when they
had taught in Derbe, Lystra, and Iconium, ordained _elders_ in every
Church (Acts xiv. 23): sometimes by other bishops; for Titus was by
Paul left in Crete, that he should ordain _elders_ in every city
(Tit. i. 5). And Timothy was advised (1 Tim. iv. 14) _Not to neglect
the gift that was in him, which was given him by prophecy with the
laying on of the hands of the presbytery_. And he had rules given
him concerning the election of _presbyters_. But that cannot be
understood otherwise, than of the ordination of those who were
elected by the Church; for no man can constitute a doctor in the
Church, but by the Church’s permission. For the duty of the apostles
themselves was not to command, but to teach. And although they who
were recommended by the apostles or presbyters, were not rejected,
for the esteem that was had of the recommenders; yet seeing they
could not be elected without the _will_ of the Church, they were
also supposed elected by the _authority_ of the Church. In like
manner ministers, who are called _deacons_, were _ordained_ by the
apostles; yet _elected_ by the Church. For when the seven deacons
were to be elected and ordained, the apostles elected them not: but,
_look ye out_, say they (Acts vi. 3, 5, 6), _among you, brethren,
seven men of honest report, &c.: and they chose Stephen, &c.: and
they set them before the apostles_. It is apparent therefore by the
custom of the primitive Church under the apostles, that the
_ordination_ or _consecration_ of all churchmen, which is done by
_prayer_ and _imposition of hands_, belonged to the _apostles_ and
_doctors_; but the _election_ of those who were to be consecrated,
_to the Church_.
[Sidenote: The power of remitting sins to the penitent, and
retaining those of the impenitent, belongs to the
pastors; but judgment of the repentance, to the Church.]
25. Concerning the power of _binding_ and _loosing_, that is to say,
of _remitting_ and _retaining of sins_; there is no doubt but it was
given by Christ to the pastors then yet for to come, in the same
manner as it was to the present apostles. Now the apostles had all
the power _of remitting of sins_ given them, which Christ himself
had. _As the Father hath sent me_, says Christ, (John xx. 21), _so
send I you_; and he adds (verse 23): _Whose soever_ _sins ye remit,
they are remitted; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are
retained_. But what _binding_ and _loosing_, or _remitting_ and
_retaining of sins_, is, admits of some scruple. For first, to
_retain_ his sins, who being baptized into remission of sins, is
truly penitent, seems to be against the very covenant itself of the
New Testament; and therefore could not be done by Christ himself,
much less by his pastors. And to _remit_ the impenitent, seems to be
against the will of God the Father, from whom Christ was sent to
convert the world and to reduce men unto obedience. Furthermore, if
each pastor had an authority granted him to _remit_ and _retain_
sins in this manner, all awe of princes and civil magistrates,
together with all kind of civil government would be utterly
destroyed. For Christ hath said it, nay even nature itself dictates,
that _we should not fear them who slay the body, but cannot kill the
soul; but rather fear him, who can cast both soul and body into
hell_ (Matth. x. 28). Neither is any man so mad, as not to choose to
yield obedience rather to them who can remit and retain their sins,
than to the powerfulest kings. Nor yet on the other side is it to be
imagined, that _remission of sins_ is nothing else but an exemption
from ecclesiastical punishments. For what evil hath excommunication
in it, beside the eternal pains which are consequent to it? Or what
benefit is to be received into the Church, if there were salvation
out of it? We must therefore hold, _that pastors have power truly
and absolutely to forgive sins; but to the penitent: and to retain
them; but of the impenitent_. But while men think that to repent, is
nothing else, but that every one condemn his actions and change
those counsels which to himself seem sinful and blameable; there is
an opinion risen, that there may be repentance before any confession
of sins to men, and that repentance is not an effect, but a cause of
confession. And thence the difficulty of those, who say that the
sins of the penitent are already forgiven in baptism, and theirs who
repent not, cannot be forgiven at all, is against Scripture, and
contrary to the words of Christ, _whose soever sins ye remit_, &c.
We must therefore, to resolve this difficulty, know in the first
place, that a true acknowledgment of sin is repentance. For he that
knows he hath sinned, knows he hath erred; but to will an error, is
impossible; therefore he that knows he hath sinned, wishes he had
not done it; which is to repent. Further, where it may be doubtful
whether that which is done be a sin or not, we must consider, that
repentance doth not precede confession of sins, but is subsequent to
it: for there is no repentance but of sins acknowledged. The
penitent therefore must both acknowledge the fact, and know it to be
a sin, that is to say, against the law. If a man therefore think,
that what he hath done is not against the law, it is impossible he
should repent of it. Before repentance therefore, it is necessary
there be an application of the facts unto the law. But it is in vain
to apply the facts unto the law without an interpreter: for not the
words of the law, but the sentence of the law-giver is the rule of
men’s actions. But surely either one man, or some men are the
interpreters of the law; for every man is not judge of his own fact,
whether it be a sin or not. Wherefore the fact, of which we doubt
whether it be a sin or not, must be unfolded before some man or men;
and the doing of this is confession. Now when the interpreter of the
law hath judged the fact to be a sin, if the sinner submit to his
judgment and resolve with himself not to do so any more, it is
repentance; and thus, either it is not true repentance, or else it
is not antecedent, but subsequent to confession. These things being
thus explained, it is not hard to understand what kind of power that
of _binding_ and _loosing_ is. For seeing in remission of sins there
are two things considerable; one, the _judgment_ or _condemnation_
whereby the fact is judged to be a sin; the other, when the party
condemned does acquiesce and obey the sentence, that is to say,
repents, _the remission of the sin_; or, if he repent not, _the
retention_: the first of these, that is to say, the judging whether
it be a sin or not, belongs _to the interpreter of the law_, that
is, the _sovereign judge_; the second, namely, remission or
retention of the sin, _to the pastor_; and it is that, concerning
which the power _of binding_ and _loosing_ is conversant. And that
this was the true meaning of our Saviour Christ in the institution
of the same power, is apparent in Matth. xviii. 15-18, thus. He
there speaking to his disciples, says: _If thy brother sin against
thee, go and tell him his fault between him and thee alone_. Where
we must observe by the way, that _if thy brother sin against thee_,
is the same with, _if he do thee injury_; and therefore Christ spake
of those matters which belonged to the civil tribunal. He adds; _if
he hear thee not_, (that is to say, if he deny that he hath done it,
or if having confessed the fact, he denies it to be unjustly done),
_take with thee yet one or two; and if he refuse to hear them, tell
it to the Church_. But why to the Church, except that she might
judge whether it were a sin or not? But if _he refuse to hear the
Church_; that is, if he do not submit to the Church’s sentence, but
shall maintain that to be no sin, which she judges to be a sin; that
is to say, if he repent not; (for certain it is, that no man repents
himself of the action which he conceives not to be a sin); he saith
not, _Tell it to the apostles_; that we might know that the
definitive sentence in the question, whether it were a sin or not,
was not left unto them; but to the Church. _But let him be unto
thee_, says he, _as an heathen, or publican_; that is, as one out of
the Church, as one that is not baptized, that is to say, as one
whose _sins are retained_. For all Christians were baptized into
remission of sins. But because it might have been demanded, who it
was that had so great a power, as that of withholding the benefit of
baptism from the impenitent; Christ shows that the same persons, to
whom he had given authority to baptize the penitent into the
remission of sins, and to make them of heathen men Christians, had
also authority to retain their sins who by the Church should be
adjudged to be impenitent, and to make them of Christian men
heathens: and therefore presently subjoins: _Verily I say unto you,
whose soever sins ye shall bind upon earth, they shall be bound also
in heaven; and whose soever sins ye shall loose upon earth, they
shall be loosed also in heaven_. Whence we may understand, that the
power of binding and loosing, or of remitting and retaining of sins,
which is called in another place the power of the keys, is not
different from the power given in another place in these words
(Matth. xxviii. 19): _Go, and teach all nations, baptizing them in
the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost_. And
even as the pastors cannot refuse to baptize him whom the Church
judges worthy, so neither can they retain his sins whom the Church
holds fitting to be absolved, nor yet remit his sins whom the Church
pronounceth disobedient. And it is the Church’s part to judge of the
sin, the pastor’s to cast out or to receive into the Church those
that are judged. Thus St. Paul to the Church of Corinth (1 Cor. v.
12): _Do not ye judge_, saith he, _of those that are within?_ Yet he
himself pronounced the sentence of excommunication against the
incestuous person. _I indeed_, saith he (verse 3), _as absent in
body, but present in Spirit_, &c.
[Sidenote: What excommunication is, and on whom it cannot pass.]
26. The act of retaining sins is that which is called by the Church
_excommunication_, and by St. Paul _delivering over to Satan_. The
word _excommunication_ sounding the same with ἀποσυάγωγον poiein],
_casting out of the synagogue_, seems to be borrowed from the
Mosaical law; wherein they who were by the priest adjudged leprous,
were commanded (Levit. xiii. 46) to be kept apart out of the camp,
until by the judgment of the priest they were again pronounced
clean, and by certain rites, among which the washing of the body was
one, were purified. From hence in process of time it become a custom
of the Jews, not to receive those who passed from Gentilism to
Judaism, supposing them to be unclean, unless they were first
_washed_; and those who dissented from the doctrine of the
synagogue, they cast out of the synagogue. By resemblance of this
custom, those that came to Christianity, whether they were Jews or
Gentiles, were not received into the Church without baptism; and
those that dissented from the Church, were deprived of the Church’s
communion. Now, they were therefore said _to be delivered over to
Satan_, because all that was out of the Church, was comprehended
within his kingdom. The end of this kind of discipline was, that
being destitute for a time of the grace and spiritual privileges of
the Church, they might be humbled to salvation; but the effect in
regard of secular matters, that _being excommunicated_, they should
not only be prohibited all congregations or churches, and the
participation of the mysteries, but as being contagious they should
be avoided by all other Christians, even more than heathen. For the
apostle allowed to accompany with heathen; but with these, _not so
much as to eat_ (1 Cor. v. 10-11). Seeing then the effect of
_excommunication_ is such, it is manifest, in the first place, that
_a Christian city cannot be excommunicated_. For a Christian city is
a Christian Church, (as hath been declared above, in art. 21), and
of the same extension; but a Church cannot be excommunicated. For
either she must excommunicate herself, which is impossible; or she
must be excommunicated by some other Church; and this, either
_universal_ or _particular_. But seeing _an universal Church_ is no
_person_, (as hath been proved in art. 22), and therefore neither
acts nor does any thing, it cannot _excommunicate_ any man; and a
particular Church by excommunicating another Church, doth nothing.
For where there is not one common congregation, there cannot be any
excommunication. Neither if some one Church (suppose that of
Jerusalem), should have excommunicated another, (suppose that of
Rome), would it any more have excommunicated this, than herself: for
he that deprives another of his communion, deprives himself also of
the communion of that other. Secondly, _no man can excommunicate the
subjects of any absolute government all at once, or forbid them the
use of their temples or their public worship of God_. For they
cannot be excommunicated by a Church, which themselves do
constitute. For if they could, there would not only not remain a
Church, but not so much as a _commonweal_, and they would be
dissolved of themselves; and this were not _to be excommunicated_ or
_prohibited_. But if they be excommunicated by some other Church,
that Church is to esteem them as heathen. But no _Christian Church_,
by the doctrine of Christ, can forbid the heathen to gather together
and communicate among themselves, as it shall seem good to their
cities; especially if they meet to worship Christ, although it be
done in a singular custom and manner: therefore also not the
_excommunicated_, who are to be dealt with as heathen. Thirdly, _a
prince who hath the sovereign power, cannot be excommunicated_. For
by the doctrine of Christ, neither one nor many subjects together
can interdict their prince any public or private places, or deny him
entrance into any assembly whatsoever, or prohibit him the doing of
what he will with his own jurisdiction. For it is treason among all
cities, for any one or many subjects jointly to arrogate to
themselves any authority over the whole city. But they who arrogate
to themselves an authority over him who hath the supreme power of
the city, do arrogate the same authority over the city itself.
Besides, a sovereign prince, if he be a Christian, hath this further
advantage; that the city whose will is contained in his, is that
very thing which we call a Church. The _Church_ therefore
excommunicates no man, but whom it excommunicates by the authority
of the prince. But the prince excommunicates not himself; his
subjects therefore cannot do it. It may be indeed, that an assembly
of rebellious citizens or traitors may pronounce the sentence of
excommunication against their prince; but not _by right_. Much less
can one prince be excommunicated by another; for this would prove
not an excommunication, but a provocation to war by the way of
affront. For since that is not one Church, which is made up of
citizens belonging to two absolute cities, for want of power of
lawfully assembling them, (as hath been declared before, in art.
22); they who are of one Church are not bound to obey another, and
therefore cannot be excommunicated for their disobedience. Now, what
some may say, that princes, seeing they are members of the universal
Church, may also by the authority of the universal Church be
excommunicated, signifies nothing: because _the universal Church_,
(as hath been showed in art. 22), is not _one person_, of whom it
may be said that _she acted, decreed, determined, excommunicated,
absolved_, and the like personal attributes; neither hath she any
governor upon earth, at whose command she may assemble and
deliberate. For to be guide of the universal Church, and to have the
power of assembling her, is the same thing as to be governor and
lord over all the Christians in the world; which is granted to none,
but God only.
[Sidenote: The interpretation of Scripture depends on the authority
of the city.]
27. It hath been showed above in art. 18, that the authority of
_interpreting the Holy Scriptures_ consisted not in this, that the
interpreter might without punishment expound and explicate his
sentence and opinion taken thence unto others, either by writing or
by his own voice; but that others have not a right to do or teach
aught contrary to his sentence; insomuch as _the interpretation_ we
speak of, is the same with _the power of defining_ in all manner of
controversies to be determined by sacred Scriptures. Now we must
show that that power belongs to each Church; and depends on his or
their authority who have the supreme command, provided that they be
Christians. For if it depend not on the civil authority, it must
either depend on the opinion of each private subject, or some
foreign authority. But among other reasons, the inconveniences that
must follow private opinions, cannot suffer its dependance on them.
Of which this is the chief; that not only all civil obedience would
be taken away (contrary to Christ’s precept); but all human society
and peace would be dissolved (contrary to the laws of nature). For
seeing every man is his own interpreter of Scripture, that is to
say, since every man makes himself judge of what is pleasing and
displeasing unto God; they cannot obey their princes, before that
they have judged whether their commands be conformable to the word
of God, or not. And thus either they obey not, or they obey for
their own opinion’s sake; that is to say, they obey themselves, not
their sovereign; civil obedience therefore is lost. Again, when
every man follows his own opinion, it is necessary that the
controversies which rise among them, should become innumerable and
indeterminable; whence there will breed among men, who by their own
natural inclinations do account all dissensions an affront, first
hatred, then brawls and wars; and thus all manner of peace and
society would vanish. We have furthermore for an example, that which
God under the old law required to be observed concerning the book of
the law; namely, that it should be transcribed and publicly used;
and he would have it to be the canon of divine doctrine, but the
controversies about it not to be determined by private persons, but
only by the priests. Lastly, it is our Saviour’s precept, that if
there be any matter of offence between private persons, they should
_hear the Church_. Wherefore it is the Church’s duty to define
controversies; it therefore belongs not to private men, but to the
Church to interpret Scriptures. But that we may know that the
authority of _interpreting God’s Word_, that is to say, of
determining all questions concerning God and religion, belongs not
to any foreign person whatsoever; we must consider, first, what
weight such a power has in the minds of the citizens, and their
actions. For no man can be ignorant that the voluntary actions of
men, by a natural necessity, do follow those opinions which they
have concerning good and evil, reward and punishment. Whence it
happens, that necessarily they would choose rather to obey those, by
whose judgment they believe that they shall be eternally happy or
miserable. Now, by whose judgment it is appointed what doctrines are
necessary to salvation, by their judgment do men expect their
eternal bliss or perdition; they will therefore yield them obedience
in all things. Which being thus, most manifest it is, that those
subjects, who believe themselves bound to acquiesce to a foreign
authority in those doctrines which are necessary to salvation, do
not _per se_ constitute a city, but are the subjects of that foreign
power. Nor therefore, although some sovereign prince should by
writing grant such an authority to any other, yet so as he would be
understood to have retained the civil power in his own hands, shall
such a writing be valid, or transfer aught necessary for the
retaining or good administration of his command. For by chap. II.
art. 4, no man is said _to transfer his right, unless he give some
proper sign, declaring his will to transfer it_. But he who hath
openly declared his will to keep his sovereignty, cannot have given
a sufficient sign of transferring the means necessary for the
keeping it. This kind of writing therefore will not be a sign of
will, but of ignorance in the contractors. We must consider next,
how absurd it is for a city or sovereign to commit the ruling of his
subjects’ consciences to an enemy; for they are, as hath been showed
above in chap. V. art. 6, in an hostile state, whosoever have not
joined themselves into the unity of one person. Nor contradicts it
this truth, that they do not always fight: for truces are made
between enemies. It is sufficient for an hostile mind, that there is
suspicion; that the frontiers of cities, kingdoms, empires,
strengthened with garrisons, do with a fighting posture and
countenance, though they strike not, yet as enemies mutually behold
each other. Lastly, how unequal is it to demand that, which by the
very reason of your demand you confess to be the right of another. I
am the interpreter of Scriptures to you, who are the subject of
another state. Why? By what covenants passed between you and me? By
divine authority. Whence known? Out of holy Scripture: behold the
book, read it. In vain, unless I may also interpret the same for
myself. That interpretation therefore doth by right belong to me,
and the rest of my private fellow-subjects; which we both deny. It
remains therefore that in all _Christian Churches_, that is to say,
in all _Christian cities_, the _interpretation_ of sacred Scripture,
that is to say, the right of determining all controversies, depends
on and derives from the authority of that man or council, which hath
the sovereign power of the city.
[Sidenote: A Christian city must interpret Scriptures by clergymen.]
28. Now because there are two kinds of controversies: the one about
spiritual matters, that is to say, questions of faith, the truth
whereof cannot be searched into by natural reason; such are the
questions concerning _the nature and office of Christ_, _of rewards
and punishments to come_, _of the sacraments_, _of outward worship_,
and the like: the other, about questions of human science, whose
truth is sought out by natural reason and syllogisms, drawn from the
covenants of men, and definitions, that is to say, significations
received by use and common consent of words; such as are all
questions of right and philosophy; for example, when in matter of
right it is questioned, whether there be _a promise_ and _covenant_,
or not, that is nothing else but to demand whether such words,
spoken in such a manner, be by common use and consent of the
subjects _a promise_ or _covenant_; which if they be so called, then
it is true that a contract is made; if not, then it is false: that
truth therefore depends on the compacts and consents of men. In like
manner, when it is demanded in philosophy, whether the same thing
may entirely be in divers places at once; the determination of the
question depends on the knowledge of the common consent of men,
about the signification of the word _entire_. For if men, when they
say a thing is entirely somewhere, do signify by common consent that
they understand nothing of the same to be elsewhere; it is false
that the same thing is in divers places at once. That truth
therefore depends on the consents of men, and by the same reason, in
all other questions concerning _right_ and _philosophy_. And they
who do judge that anything can be determined, contrary to this
common consent of men concerning the appellations of things, out of
obscure places of Scripture; do also judge that the use of speech,
and at once all human society, is to be taken away. For he who hath
sold a whole field, will say he meant one whole ridge; and will
retain the rest as unsold. Nay, they take away reason itself; which
is nothing else but a searching out of the truth made by such
consent. This kind of questions, therefore, need not be determined
by the city by way of interpretation of Scriptures; for they belong
not to God’s _Word_, in that sense wherein _the Word of God_ is
taken for the _Word concerning God_; that is to say, for the
_doctrine of the gospel_. Neither is he who hath the sovereign power
in the Church, obliged to employ any _ecclesiastical doctors_ for
the judging of any such kind of matters as these. But for the
deciding of questions of faith, that is to say, _concerning God_,
which transcend human capacity, we stand in need of a divine
blessing, (that we may not be deceived at least in necessary
points), to be derived from Christ himself by the imposition of
hands. For, seeing to the end we may attain to eternal salvation we
are obliged to a supernatural doctrine, and which therefore it is
impossible for us to understand; to be left so destitute as that we
can be deceived in necessary points, is repugnant to equity. This
infallibility our Saviour Christ promised (in those things which are
necessary to salvation) to his apostles until the day of judgment;
that is to say, to the apostles, and pastors succeeding the
apostles, who were to be consecrated _by the imposition of hands_.
He therefore, who hath the sovereign power in the city, is obliged
as a Christian, where there is any question concerning _the
mysteries of faith_, to interpret the Holy Scriptures by _clergymen_
lawfully ordained. And thus in Christian cities, the judgment both
of _spiritual_ and _temporal matters_ belongs unto the civil
authority. And that man or council who hath the supreme power, is
head both of _the city_ and _of the Church_; for a _Church_ and _a
Christian city_ is but one thing.
-------
CHAPTER XVIII.
CONCERNING THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NECESSARY FOR
OUR ENTRANCE INTO THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN.
1. The difficulty propounded concerning the repugnancy of obeying
God and men, is to be removed by the distinctions between the
points necessary and not necessary to salvation. 2. All things
necessary to salvation, are contained in faith and obedience. 3.
What kind of obedience that is, which is required of us. 4. What
faith is, and how distinguished from profession, from science,
from opinion. 5. What it is to believe in Christ. 6. That that
article alone, that Jesus is the Christ, is necessary to
salvation; is proved from the scope of the evangelists. 7. From
the preachings of the apostles. 8. From the easiness of
Christian religion. 9. From this also, that it is the foundation
of faith. 10. From the most evident words of Christ and his
apostles. 11. In that article is contained the faith of the Old
Testament. 12. How faith and obedience concur to salvation. 13.
In a Christian city, there is no contradiction between the
commands of God and of the city. 14. The doctrines which this
day are controverted about religion, do for the most part relate
to the right of dominion.
[Sidenote: The difficulty propounded concerning the repugnance of
obeying God and men, is to be removed by the distinction
between the points necessary, and not necessary to
salvation.]
1. It was ever granted, that all authority _in secular matters_
derived from him who had the sovereign power, whether he were one
man or an assembly of men. That the same _in spiritual matters_
depended on the authority of the _Church_, is manifest by the lastly
foregoing proofs; and besides by this, that all Christian cities are
Churches endued with this kind of authority. From whence a man,
though but dull of apprehension, may collect, that in _a Christian
city_, that is to say, in a city whose sovereignty belongs to a
Christian prince or council, _all power, as well spiritual as
secular, is united under Christ_, and therefore it is to be obeyed
in all things. But on the other side, _because we must rather obey
God than men_, there is a difficulty risen, how obedience may safely
be yielded to them, if at any time somewhat should be commanded by
them to be done which Christ hath prohibited. The reason of this
difficulty is, that seeing God no longer speaks to us by Christ and
his prophets in open voice, but by the holy Scriptures, which by
divers men are diversely understood; they know indeed what princes
and a congregated Church do command; but whether that which they do
command, be contrary to the word of God or not, this they know not;
but with a wavering obedience between the punishments of temporal
and spiritual death, as it were sailing between Scylla and
Charybdis, they often run themselves upon both. But they who rightly
distinguish between the things necessary to salvation, and those
which are not necessary, can have none of this kind of doubt. For if
the command of the prince or city be such, that he can obey it
without hazard of his eternal salvation, it is unjust not to obey
them; and the apostle’s precepts take place (Col. iii. 20-22):
_Children obey your parents in all things: servants in all things
obey your masters according to the flesh._ And the command of Christ
(Matth. xxiii. 2-3): _The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses’ chair;
all things therefore whatsoever they command you, that observe and
do._ On the contrary, if they command us to do those things which
are punished with eternal death, it were madness not rather to
choose to die a natural death, than by obeying to die eternally: and
then comes in that which Christ says (Matth. x. 28): _Fear not them
who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul._ We must see,
therefore, what all those things are, which are necessary to
salvation.
[Sidenote: All things necessary to salvation, are contained in faith
and obedience.]
2. Now all things necessary to salvation are comprehended in two
virtues, _faith_ and _obedience_. The latter of these, if it could
be perfect, would alone suffice to preserve us from damnation; but
because we have all of us been long since guilty of disobedience
against God in Adam, and besides we ourselves have since actually
sinned, _obedience_ is not sufficient without _remission of sins_.
But this, together with our entrance into the kingdom of heaven, is
the reward of _faith_; nothing else is requisite to salvation. For
the kingdom of heaven is shut to none but sinners, that is to say,
those who have not performed due _obedience_ to the laws; and not to
those neither, if they believe the necessary articles of the
Christian faith. Now, if we shall know in what points obedience doth
consist, and which are the necessary articles of the Christian
faith; it will at once be manifest what we must do, and what abstain
from, at the command of cities and of princes.
[Sidenote: What kind of obedience that is, which is required of us.]
3. But by obedience in this place is signified not _the fact_, but
the _will_ and _desire_ wherewith we purpose, and endeavour as much
as we can, to obey for the future. In which sense the word
_obedience_ is equivalent to _repentance_; for the virtue of
repentance consists not in the sorrow which accompanies the
remembrance of sin; but in our conversion into the way, and full
purpose to sin no more; without which that sorrow is said to be the
sorrow not of a penitent, but a desperate person. But because they
who love God cannot but desire to obey the divine law, and they who
love their neighbours cannot but desire to obey the moral law; which
consists (as hath been showed above in chap. III.) in the
prohibition of _pride_, _ingratitude_, _contumely_, _inhumanity_,
_cruelty_, _injury_, and the like offences, whereby our neighbours
are prejudiced; therefore also _love_, or _charity_, is equivalent
to the word _obedience_. Justice, also, which is a constant will of
giving to every man his due, is equivalent with it. But that _faith_
and _repentance_ are sufficient for salvation, is manifest by the
covenant itself of baptism. For they who were by Peter converted on
the day of _Pentecost_, demanding him, what they should do: he
answered (Acts ii. 38): _Repent and be baptized every one of you, in
the name of Jesus, for the remission of your sins._ There was
nothing therefore to be done for the obtaining of baptism, that is
to say, for to enter into the kingdom of God, but _to repent and
believe in the name of Jesus_; for the kingdom of heaven is promised
by the covenant which is made in baptism. Furthermore, by the words
of Christ, answering the lawyer who asked him what he should do to
inherit eternal life (Luke xviii. 20): _Thou knowest the
commandments: Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery_,
&c.: which refer to obedience; and (Mark x. 21): _Sell all that thou
hast, and come and follow me_: which relates to faith. And by that
which is said: _The just shall live by faith_; not every man, but
the _just_; for _justice_ is the same disposition of will which
_repentance and obedience_ are. And by the words of St. Mark (i.
15): _The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand;
repent ye, and believe the gospel_; by which words is not obscurely
signified, that there is no need of other virtues for our entrance
into the kingdom of God, excepting those of _repentance and faith_.
The obedience therefore which is _necessarily_ required to
salvation, is nothing else but _the will_ or _endeavour_ to obey;
that is to say, of doing according to the laws of God; that is, the
moral laws, which are the same to all men, and the civil laws; that
is to say, the commands of sovereigns in _temporal_ matters, and the
ecclesiastical laws in _spiritual_. Which two kinds of laws are
divers in divers cities and Churches, and are known by their
promulgation and public sentences.
[Sidenote: What faith is, and how distinguished from profession,
from science, and from opinion.]
4. That we may understand what the _Christian faith_ is, we must
define _faith_ in general; and distinguish it from those other acts
of the mind, wherewith commonly it is confounded. The object of
_faith_ universally taken, namely, _for that which is believed_, is
evermore a _proposition_, that is to say, a speech affirmative or
negative, which we grant to be true. But because propositions are
granted for divers causes, it falls out that these kind of
concessions are diversely called. But we grant propositions
sometimes, which notwithstanding we receive not into our minds; and
this either for a time, to wit, so long, till by consideration of
the consequences we have well examined the truth of them, which we
call _supposing_; or also simply, as through fear of the laws, which
is to _profess_, or _confess_ by outward tokens; or for a voluntary
compliance sake, which men use out of civility to those whom they
respect, and for love of peace to others, which is _absolute
yielding_. Now the propositions which we receive for truth, we
always grant for some reasons of our own; and these are derived
either from the _proposition itself_, or from the _person
propounding_. They are derived from the _proposition itself_, by
calling to mind what things those words, which make up the
proposition, do by common consent usually signify. If so, then the
assent which we give, is called _knowledge_ or _science_. But if we
cannot remember what is certainly understood by those words, but
sometimes one thing, sometimes another seem to be apprehended by us,
then we are said to think. For example, if it be propounded that
_two and three make five_; and by calling to mind, that the order of
numeral words is so appointed by the common consent of them who are
of the same language with us, (as it were, by a certain contract
necessary for human society), that _five_ shall be the name of so
many unities as are contained in two and three taken together, a man
assent that this is therefore true, because two and three together
are the same with five: this assent shall be called knowledge. And
to know this truth is nothing else, but to acknowledge that it is
made by ourselves. For by whose will and rules of speaking the
number || is called two, ||| is called three, and ||||| is called
five; by their will also it comes to pass that this proposition is
true, _two and three taken together make five_. In like manner if we
remember what it is that is called _theft_, and what _injury_; we
shall understand by the words themselves, whether it be true that
_theft is an injury_, or not. _Truth_ is the same with a _true
proposition_; but _the proposition is true_ in which the _word
consequent_, which by logicians is called _the predicate_, embraceth
_the word antecedent_ in its amplitude, which they call _the
subject_. And to _know truth_, is the same thing as to _remember_
that it was made by ourselves by the very usurpation of the words.
Neither was it rashly nor unadvisedly said by Plato of old, _that
knowledge was memory_. But it happens sometimes, that words although
they have a certain and defined signification by constitution, yet
by vulgar use either to adorn or deceive, they are so wrested from
their own significations, that to remember the conceptions for which
they were first imposed on things, is very hard, and not to be
mastered but by a sharp judgment and very great diligence. It
happens too that there are many words, which have no proper,
determined, and everywhere the same signification; and are
understood not by their own, but by virtue of other signs used
together with them. Thirdly, there are some words of things
unconceivable. Of those things, therefore, whereof they are the
words, there is no conception; and therefore in vain do we seek for
the truth of those propositions, which they make out of the words
themselves. In these cases, while by considering the definitions of
words we search out the truth of some proposition, according to the
hope we have of finding it, we think it sometimes true, and
sometimes false; either of which apart is called _thinking_, and
also _believing_; both together, _doubting_. But when our reasons,
for which we assent to some proposition, derive not from the
_proposition itself_, but from the _person propounding_, whom we
esteem so learned that he is not deceived, and we see no reason why
he should deceive us; our assent, because it grows not from any
confidence of our own, but from another man’s knowledge, is called
_faith_. And by the confidence of whom we do believe, we are said
_to trust them_, or _to trust in them_. By what hath been said, the
difference appears, first, between _faith_ and _profession_; for
that is always joined with inward assent; this not always. That is
an inward persuasion of the mind, this an outward obedience. Next,
between _faith_ and _opinion_; for this depends on our own reason,
that on the good esteem we have of another. Lastly, between _faith_
and _knowledge_; for this deliberately takes a proposition broken
and chewed; that swallows it down whole and entire. The explication
of words, whereby the matter enquired after is propounded, is
conducible to knowledge; nay, the only way _to know_, is by
_definition_. But this is prejudicial to _faith_; for those things
which exceed human capacity, and are propounded to be believed, are
never more evident by explication, but, on the contrary, more
obscure and harder to be credited. And the same thing befalls a man,
who endeavours to demonstrate _the mysteries of faith_ by natural
reason, which happens to a sick man, who will needs chew before he
will swallow his wholesome but bitter pills; whence it comes to
pass, that he presently brings them up again; which perhaps would
otherwise, if he had taken them well down, have proved his remedy.
[Sidenote: What it is to believe in Christ.]
5. We have seen therefore what it is _to believe_. But what is it
_to believe in Christ_? Or what proposition is that, which is the
object of our faith in Christ? For when we say, _I believe in
Christ_, we signify indeed whom, but not what we believe. Now, _to
believe in Christ_ is nothing else but to believe that Jesus is the
Christ, namely, he who according to the prophecies of Moses and the
prophets of Israel, was to come into this world _to institute the
kingdom of God_. And this sufficiently appears out of the words of
Christ himself to Martha (John xi. 25-27): _I am_, saith he, _the
resurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he were
dead, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth in me,
shall never die. Believest thou this? She saith unto him, yea, Lord,
I believe that thou art the Christ the Son of God, which should come
into the world._ In which words, we see that the question,
_believest thou in me_, is expounded by the answer, _thou art the
Christ_. To believe in Christ therefore is nothing else but to
believe Jesus himself, saying that he is the Christ.
[Sidenote: That that article alone, that Jesus is the Christ, is
necessary to salvation, is proved out of the scope of the
evangelists.]
6. _Faith_ and _obedience_ both necessarily concurring to salvation,
what kind of obedience that same is, and to whom due, hath been
showed above in art. 3. But now we must enquire what _articles of
faith_ are requisite. And I say, that to a Christian[21] there is no
other article of faith requisite as _necessary_ to salvation, but
only this, _that Jesus is the Christ_. But we must distinguish, as
we have already done before in art. 4, between _faith_ and
_profession_. _A profession_, therefore, of more articles, if they
be commanded, may be necessary; for it is a part of our _obedience_
due to the laws. But we enquire not now what _obedience_, but what
_faith_ is necessary to salvation. And this is proved, first, out of
the scope of the Evangelists, which was, by the description of our
Saviour’s life, to establish this one article: and we shall know
that such was the scope and counsel of the Evangelists, if we
observe but the history itself. St. Matthew (chap. i.), beginning at
his genealogy, shows that Jesus was of the lineage of David, born of
a virgin: chap, ii., that he was adored by the _wise men_ as king of
the Jews; that Herod for the same cause sought to slay him: chap.
iii., iv., that his kingdom was preached both by John the Baptist
and himself: chapters v. vi. vii., that he taught the laws, not as
the Scribes, but as one having authority: chapters viii. ix., that
he cured diseases miraculously: chap. x., that he sent his apostles,
the preachers of his kingdom, throughout all the parts of Judea to
proclaim his kingdom: chap. xi., that he commanded the messengers,
sent from John to enquire whether he were the Christ or not, to tell
him what they had seen, namely, the miracles which were only
compatible with Christ: chap. xii., that he proved and declared his
kingdom to the Pharisees and others by arguments, parables, and
signs; and the following chapters to xxi., that he maintained
himself to be the Christ against the Pharisees: chap. xxi., that he
was saluted with the title of king, when he entered into Jerusalem:
chaps. xxii., xxiii., xxiv., xxv., that he forewarned others of
_false Christs_; and that he showed in parables what manner of
kingdom his should be: chaps. xxvi. xxvii., that he was taken and
accused for this reason, because he said he was a king; and that a
title was written on his cross, _this is Jesus the king of the
Jews_: lastly, chap. xxviii., that after his resurrection, he told
his apostles that all power was given unto him both in heaven and in
earth. All which tends to this end; that we should believe Jesus to
be the Christ. Such therefore was the scope of St. Matthew in
describing his gospel. But such as his was, such also was the rest
of the Evangelists; which St. John sets down expressly in the end of
his gospel (John xx. 31): _These things_, saith he, _are written,
that ye may know that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living
God_.
Footnote 21:
_I say, that to a Christian._] Although I conceive this assertion
to be sufficiently proved by the following reasons, yet I thought
it worth my labour to make a more ample explication of it; because
I perceive that being somewhat new, it may possibly be distasteful
to many divines. First therefore, when I say this article, _that
Jesus is the Christ_, is necessary to salvation; I say not that
faith only is necessary, but I require justice also, or that
obedience which is due to the laws of God; that is to say, a will
to live righteously. Secondly, I deny not but the profession of
many articles, provided that that profession be commanded by the
Church, is also necessary to salvation. But seeing faith is
internal, profession external, I say that the former only is
properly faith; the latter a part of obedience; insomuch as that
article alone sufficeth for inward belief, but is not sufficient
for the outward profession of a Christian. Lastly, even as if I
had said that true and inward repentance of sins was only
necessary to salvation, yet were it not to be held for a paradox;
because we suppose justice, obedience, and a mind reformed in all
manner of virtues to be contained in it. So when I say that the
faith of one article is sufficient to salvation, it may well be
less wondered at; seeing that in it so many other articles are
contained. For these words, _Jesus is the Christ_, do signify that
Jesus was that person, whom God had promised by his prophets
should come into the world to establish his kingdom; that is to
say, that Jesus is the Son of God, the creator of heaven and
earth, born of a virgin, dying for the sins of them who should
believe in him; that he was Christ, that is to say, a king; that
he revived (for else he were not like to reign) to judge the
world, and to reward every one according to his works (for
otherwise he cannot be a king); also that men shall rise again,
for otherwise they are not like to come to judgment. The whole
symbol of the apostles is therefore contained in this one article.
Which, notwithstanding, I thought reasonable to contract thus;
because I found that many men for this alone, without the rest,
were admitted into the kingdom of God, both by Christ and his
apostles; as the thief on the cross, the eunuch baptized by
Philip, the two thousand men converted to the Church at once by
St. Peter. But if any man be displeased that I do not judge all
those eternally damned, who do not inwardly assent to every
article defined by the Church, and yet do not contradict, but, if
they be commanded, do submit: I know not what I shall say to them.
For the most evident testimonies of Holy Writ, which do follow, do
withhold me from altering my opinion.
[Sidenote: By the apostles’ sermons.]
7. Secondly, this is proved by the preaching of the apostles. For
they were the proclaimers of his kingdom; neither did Christ send
them to preach aught but the kingdom of God (Luke ix. 2: Acts x.
42). And what they did after Christ’s ascension, may be understood
by the accusation which was brought against them (Acts xvii. 6-7):
_They drew Jason_, saith St. Luke, _and certain brethren unto the
rulers of the city, crying, these are the men that have turned the
world upside down, and are come hither also, whom Jason hath
received; and these all do contrary to the decrees of Cæsar, saying
that there is another king, one Jesus_. It appears also, what the
subject of the apostle’s sermon was, out of these words (Acts xvii.
2-3): _Opening and alleging out of the Scriptures_ (to wit, of the
Old Testament) _that Christ must needs have suffered and risen again
from the dead; and that this Jesus is the Christ_.
[Sidenote: By the easiness of Christian religion.]
8. Thirdly, by the places, in which the easiness of those things,
which are required by Christ to the attaining of salvation, is
declared. For if an internal assent of the mind were necessarily
required to the truth of all and each proposition, which this day is
controverted about the Christian faith, or by divers churches is
diversely defined; there would be nothing more difficult than the
Christian religion. And how then would that be true (Matth. xi. 30):
_My yoke is easy and my burden light_; and that (Matth. xviii. 6):
_little ones do believe in him_; and that (1 Cor. i. 21): _it
pleased God by the foolishness of preaching, to save those that
believe_? Or how was the thief hanging on the cross sufficiently
instructed to salvation, the confession of whose faith was contained
in these words: _Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy
kingdom_? Or how could St. Paul himself, from an enemy, so soon
become a doctor of Christians?
[Sidenote: By this, that it is the foundation of faith.]
9. Fourthly, by this, that that article is the foundation of faith;
neither rests it on any other foundation. Matth. xxiv. 23, 24: _If
any man shall say unto you, Lo here is Christ, or he is there;
believe it not. For there shall arise false Christs and false
prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders_, &c. Whence it
follows, that for the faith’s sake which we have in this article, we
must not believe any signs and wonders. Gal. i. 8: _Although we or
an angel from heaven_, saith the apostle, _should preach to you any
other gospel, than what we have preached; let him be accursed_. By
reason of this article, therefore, we might not trust the very
apostles and angels themselves, and therefore, I conceive, not the
Church neither, if they should teach the contrary. 1 John iv. 1-2:
_Beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they
are of God; because many false prophets are gone out into the world.
Hereby know ye the spirit of God; every spirit that confesseth Jesus
Christ is come in the flesh, is of God_, &c. That article therefore
is the measure of the spirits, whereby the authority of the doctors
is either received, or rejected. It cannot be denied, indeed, but
that all who at this day are Christians, did learn from the doctors
that it was Jesus, who did all those things whereby he might be
acknowledged to be the Christ. Yet it follows not, that the same
persons believed that article for the doctor’s or the Church’s, but
for Jesus’ own sake. For that article was before _the Christian
Church_, (Matth. xvi. 18), although all the rest were after it; and
the Church was founded upon it, not it upon the Church. Besides,
this article, that _Jesus is the Christ_, is so fundamental, that
all the rest are by St. Paul (1 Cor. iii. 11-15) said to be built
upon it: _For other foundation can no man lay, than that which is
laid; which is Jesus Christ_; that is to say, that _Jesus is the
Christ. Now if any man build upon this foundation, gold, silver,
precious stones, wood, hay, stubble; every man’s work shall be made
manifest; if any man’s work abide, which he hath built thereupon, he
shall receive a reward; if any man’s work shall be burnt, he shall
suffer loss, but he himself shall be saved._ From whence it plainly
appears, that by _foundation_ is understood this article, _that
Jesus is the Christ_: for gold, and silver, precious stones, wood,
hay, stubble, whereby the doctrines are signified, are not built
upon the person of Christ: and also, that false doctrines may be
raised upon this foundation; yet not so as they must necessarily be
damned who teach them.
[Sidenote: By the plain words of Christ and his apostles.]
10. Lastly, that this article alone is needful to be inwardly
believed, may be most evidently proved out of many places of holy
Scripture, let who will be the interpreter. John v. 39: _Search the
Scriptures; for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are
they which testify of me._ But Christ meant the Scriptures of the
Old Testament only; for the New was then not yet written. Now, there
is no other testimony concerning Christ in the Old Testament, but
that an eternal king was to come in such a place, that he was to be
born of such parents, that he was to teach and do such things
whereby, as by certain signs, he was to be known. All which testify
this one thing; that Jesus who was so born, and did teach and do
such things, was the Christ. Other faith then was not required to
attain eternal life, besides this article, John xi. 26: _Whosoever
liveth and believeth in me, shall never die._ But to believe in
Jesus, as is there expressed, is the same with believing that Jesus
was the Christ. He therefore that believes that, shall never die;
and by consequence, that article alone is necessary to salvation.
John xx. 31: _These are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is
the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing, ye might have life
through his name._ Wherefore he that believes thus, shall have
eternal life; and therefore needs no other faith. 1 John iv. 2:
_Every spirit, that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the
flesh, is of God._ And 1 John v. 1: _Whosoever believeth that Jesus
is the Christ, is born of God._ And verse 5: _Who is he that
overcometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of
God?_ If therefore there be no need to believe anything else, to the
end a man may be _of God, born of God, and overcome the world_, than
that Jesus is the Christ; that one article then is sufficient to
salvation. Acts viii. 36-37: _See, here is water; what doth hinder
me to be baptized? And Philip said, If thou believest with all thine
heart, thou mayest. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus
Christ is the Son of God._ If then this article being believed with
the whole heart, that is to say, with inward faith, was sufficient
for baptism; it is also sufficient for salvation. Besides these
places, there are innumerable others, which do clearly and expressly
affirm the same thing. Nay, wheresoever we read that our Saviour
commended the faith of any one, or that he said, _thy faith hath
saved thee_, or that he healed any one for his faith’s sake; there
the proposition believed was no other but this, _Jesus is the
Christ_, either directly or consequently.
[Sidenote: In this article is contained the faith of the Old
Testament.]
11. But because no man can believe _Jesus to be the Christ_, who,
when he knows that by Christ is understood that same king, who was
promised from God by Moses and the prophets for to be the king and
Saviour of the world, doth not also believe Moses and the prophets;
neither can he believe these, who believes not that God is, and that
_he governs the world_; it is necessary, that the faith of God and
of the Old Testament be contained in this faith of the New. Seeing
therefore that atheism, and the denial of the Divine Providence,
were the only treason against the Divine Majesty in the kingdom of
God by nature; but idolatry also in the kingdom of God by the old
covenant; now in this kingdom, wherein God rules by way of a new
covenant, apostacy is also added, or the renunciation of this
article once received, that Jesus is the Christ. Truly other
doctrines, provided they have their determination from a lawful
Church, are not to be contradicted; for that is the sin of
disobedience. But it hath been fully declared before, that they are
not needful to be believed with an _inward faith_.
[Sidenote: How faith and obedience do concur to salvation.]
12. _Faith_ and _obedience_ have divers parts in accomplishing the
salvation of a Christian; for this contributes the _power_ or
_capacity_, that the _act_; and either is said to justify in its
kind. For Christ forgives not the sins of all men, but of the
_penitent_ or the _obedient_, that is to say, the _just_. I say not
the _guiltless_, but the _just_; for _justice_ is a will of obeying
the laws, and may be consistent with a sinner; and with Christ, the
will to obey is obedience. For not every man, but _the just shall
live by faith_. _Obedience_ therefore _justifies_, because it
_maketh just_; in the same manner as temperance maketh temperate,
prudence prudent, chastity chaste; namely, essentially; and puts a
man in such a state, as makes him capable of pardon. Again, Christ
hath not promised forgiveness of sins to all just men; but only
_those of them who believe him to be the Christ_. _Faith_ therefore
_justifies_ in such a sense as a judge may be said to _justify_, who
_absolves_, namely, by the _sentence_ which _actually_ saves a man;
and in this acception of justification (for it is an equivocal term)
_faith alone_ justifies; but in the other, _obedience only_. But
neither obedience alone, nor faith alone, do _save_ us; but both
together.
[Sidenote: In a Christian city there is no contrariety between the
command of God, and of the city.]
13. By what hath been said hitherto, it will be easy to discern what
the duty of Christian subjects is towards their sovereigns; who, as
long as they profess themselves Christians, cannot command their
subjects to deny Christ, or to offer him any contumely: for if they
should command this, they would profess themselves to be no
Christians. For seeing we have showed, both by natural reason and
out of holy Scriptures, that subjects ought in all things to obey
their princes and governors, excepting those which are contrary to
the command of God; and that the commands of God, in a Christian
city, concerning _temporal affairs_, that is to say, those which are
to be discussed by human reason, are the laws and sentence of the
city, delivered from those who have received authority from the city
to make laws and judge of controversies; but concerning spiritual
matters, that is to say, those which are to be defined by the holy
Scripture, are the laws and sentences of the city, that is to say,
the Church, (for a Christian city and a Church, as hath been showed
in the foregoing chapter, art. 10, are the same thing), delivered by
pastors lawfully ordained, and who have to that end authority given
them by the city; it manifestly follows, that in a Christian
commonweal obedience is due to the sovereign in all things, as well
_spiritual_ as _temporal_. And that the same obedience, even from a
Christian subject, is due in all _temporal matters_ to those princes
who are no Christians, is without any controversy; but in _matters
spiritual_, that is to say, those things which concern God’s
worship, some Christian Church is to be followed. For it is an
hypothesis of the Christian faith, that God speaks not in things
supernatural but by the way of Christian interpreters of holy
Scriptures. But what? Must we resist princes, when we cannot obey
them? Truly, no; for this is contrary to our civil covenant. What
must we do then? Go to Christ by martyrdom; which if it seem to any
man to be a hard saying, most certain it is that he believes not
with his whole heart, _that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the
living God_; for he would then desire to be dissolved, and to be
with Christ; but he would by a feigned Christian faith elude that
obedience, which he hath contracted to yield unto the city.
[Sidenote: The doctrines which this day are controverted about
religion, do for the most part belong to the right of
dominion.]
14. But some men perhaps will wonder, if (excepting this one
article, that Jesus is the Christ, which only is necessary to
salvation in relation to internal faith) all the rest belong to
obedience; which may be performed, although a man do not inwardly
believe, so he do but desire to believe, and make an outward
profession, as oft as need requires, of whatsoever is propounded by
the Church; how it comes about that there are so many tenets, which
are all held so to concern our faith, that except a man do inwardly
believe them, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven. But if he
consider that, in most controversies, the contention is about human
sovereignty; in some, matter of gain and profit; in others, the
glory of wits: he will surely wonder the less. The question about
_the propriety of the Church_, is a question about the _right of
sovereignty_. For it being known what a _Church_ is, it is known at
once to whom the rule over Christians doth belong. For if every
Christian city be that Church, which Christ himself hath commanded
every Christian, subject to that city, to hear; then every subject
is bound to obey his city, that is to say, him or them who have the
supreme power, not only in _temporal_, but also in _spiritual
matters_. But if every Christian city be not that Church, then is
there some other Church more universal, which must be obeyed. All
Christians therefore must obey that Church, just as they would obey
Christ, if he came upon earth. It will therefore rule either by the
way of monarchy, or by some assembly. This question then concerns
the _right of ruling_. To the same end belongs the question
concerning _infallibility_. For whosoever were truly and internally
believed by all mankind, that he could not err, would be sure of all
dominion, as well _temporal_ as _spiritual_, over all mankind,
unless himself would refuse it. For if he say that he must be obeyed
in _temporals_, because it is supposed he cannot err, that right of
dominion is immediately granted him. Hither also tends the privilege
of interpreting Scriptures. For he to whom it belongs to interpret
the controversies arising from the divers interpretations of
Scriptures, hath authority also simply and absolutely to determine
all manner of controversies whatsoever. But he who hath this, hath
also the command over all men who acknowledge the Scriptures to be
the word of God. To this end drive all the disputes about _the
power of remitting and retaining sins_; or _the authority of
excommunication_. For every man, if he be in his wits, will in all
things yield that man an absolute obedience, by virtue of whose
sentence he believes himself to be either saved or damned. Hither
also tends the power of _instituting societies_. For they depend on
him by whom they subsist, who hath as many subjects as monks,
although living in an enemy’s city. To this end also refers the
question concerning the _judge of lawful matrimony_. For he to whom
that judicature belongs, to him also pertains the knowledge of all
those cases which concern the inheritance and succession of all the
goods and rights, not of private men only, but also of sovereign
princes. And hither also in some respect tends the _virgin life of
ecclesiastical persons_; for unmarried men have less coherence than
others with civil society. And besides, it is an inconvenience not
to be slighted, that princes must either necessarily forego the
priesthood, which is a great bond of civil obedience; or have no
hereditary kingdom. To this end also tends the _canonization of
saints_, which the heathen called _apotheosis_. For he that can
allure foreign subjects with so great a reward, may bring those who
are greedy of such glory, to dare and do anything. For what was it
but an honourable name with posterity, which the Decii and other
Romans sought after; and a thousand others, who cast themselves upon
incredible perils? The controversies about _purgatory_, and
_indulgences_, are matter of gain. The questions of _free-will_,
_justification_, and _the manner of receiving Christ in the
sacrament_, are philosophical. There are also questions concerning
some rites not introduced, but left in the Church not sufficiently
purged from Gentilism. But we need reckon no more. All the world
knows that such is the nature of men, that dissenting in questions
which concern their _power_, or _profit_, or _pre-eminence of wit_,
they slander and curse each other. It is not therefore to be
wondered at, if almost all tenets, after men grew hot with
disputings, are held forth by some or other to be _necessary_ to
salvation and for our entrance into the kingdom of heaven. Insomuch
as they who hold them not, are not only condemned as guilty of
disobedience; which in truth they are, after the Church hath once
defined them; but of infidelity: which I have declared above to be
wrong, out of many evident places of Scripture. To which I add this
one of Saint Paul’s (Rom. xiv. 3, 5): _Let not him that eateth,
despise him that eateth not, and let not him that eateth not, judge
him that eateth; for God hath received him. One man esteemeth one
day above another, another esteemeth every day alike. Let every man
be fully persuaded in his own mind._
END OF VOL. II.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transcriber’s Note
In the summary of Chapter XIII, the last article is misnumbered as
‘13’, rather than ‘17.’ On p. 221, a reference to article 13 in
Chapter V almost certainly should have been to the 12th article of
that chapter.
Other errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been
corrected, and are noted here. The references are to the page and
line in the original.
3.1 ζῶον πολιτικ[ο/ό]ν Replaced.
5.5 that same [ἐυ/εὐ]δοκιμεῖν Replaced.
56.14 Prov. xxii. 10[)]: Removed.
99.31 For being e[r/l]ected, the people is at once Replaced.
dissolved
102.20 make him a mona[a/r]ch Replaced.
106.31 have obliged themsel[u/v]es Replaced.
147.5 the will of God[.] Added.
196.3 The defin[in]ition of sin. Removed.
196.32 to which th[a/e]y have given Replaced.
197.28 ἀδ[ι/ί]κημα Stress
added.
228.3 concern[-/ing] the commands Added.
238.20 that is[ to] say Added.
272.25 _the word[ of] faith_ Added.
283.34 (verse 2[2/3]) Replaced.
285.7 and their[’]s who repent not Removed.
312.8 in the Old Test[i/a]ment Replaced.
316.31 the rule over Christ[ai/ia]ns Transposed.
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