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Title: The autobiography of a seaman
Author: Thomas Cochrane
Compiler: George Butler Earp
Contributor: William B. Jackson
Release date: February 8, 2026 [eBook #77890]
Language: English
Original publication: London: Richard Bentley, 1859
Credits: MWS, KD Weeks and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
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THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SEAMAN.
VOL. II.
LONDON
PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO.
NEW-STREET SQUARE
THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SEAMAN.
BY
THOMAS, TENTH EARL OF DUNDONALD, G.C.B.
ADMIRAL OF THE RED, REAR-ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET,
ETC. ETC.
[Illustration]
VOLUME THE SECOND.
=Second Edition.=
LONDON:
RICHARD BENTLEY, NEW BURLINGTON STREET,
=Publisher in Ordinary to Her Majesty.=
1861.
_The right of translation is reserved._
CONTENTS
OF
THE SECOND VOLUME.
--------------
CHAPTER XXIV.
A NAVAL STUDY FOR ALL TIME.
Charts, &c., supplied by the present Government.—Refused by
a former Government.—Alteration made in the Charts.—Mr.
Stokes’s Affidavits.—Letter to Sir John Barrow.—Singular
Admiralty Minute.—Second Letter to Sir John Barrow.—The
Charts again Refused.—My Departure for Chili.—Renewed
Application to the Admiralty.—Kindness of the Duke of
Somerset.—Difference of Opinion at the Admiralty Page 1
CHAP. XXV.
A NAVAL STUDY—_CONTINUED_.
French Hydrographic Charts.—One tendered by me to the
Court.—Rejected by the President.—Grounds for its
rejection.—The object of the rejected Chart.—Would have
proved too much, if admitted.—Rejection of other Charts
tendered by me.—Mr. Stokes’s Chart.—Its Fallacy at first
sight.—Judge Advocate’s Reasons for Adopting it.—Its
Errors detected by the President, and exposed
here.—Probable Excuse for the Error.—Imaginary Shoal on
the Chart.—Falsification of Width of Channel.—Lord
Gambier’s Voucher for Stokes’s Chart.—Stokes’s Voucher for
its Worthlessness.—Stokes’s Chart in a National point of
View.—Taken Advantage of by the French 15
CHAP. XXVI.
A NAVAL STUDY—_CONTINUED_.
The Evidence of Officers present in Basque Roads.—Admiral
Austen’s Opinions confirmatory of my Statements.—Fallacy
of alleged Rewards to myself, in place of these
Persecutions.—Treatment of my eldest Son, Lord
Cochrane.—Letter from Capt. Hutchinson confirmatory of the
Enemy’s Panic.—A Midshipman near taking the
Flag-ship.—Evidence of Capt. Seymour, conclusive as to
Neglect, which was the Matter to be inquired into, in not
sending Ships to attack.—Attempt to Weather his
Evidence.—Capt. Malcolm’s Evidence confirmatory of Capt.
Seymour’s.—Capt. Broughton’s Testimony proves the complete
Panic of the Enemy, and the Worthlessness of their
Fortifications.—Lord Gambier declares them Efficient on
Supposition arising from Hearsay.—Enemy unable to fight
their Guns.—The imaginary Shoal.—A great Point made of
it.—Mr. Fairfax’s Map.—Lord Gambier on the Explosion
Vessels.—Contradicted by Mr. Fairfax.—Contrast of their
respective Statements.—Fairfax’s Evasions.—His Letter to
the _Naval Chronicle_.—These Matters a Warning to the
Service 40
CHAP. XXVII.
CONDUCT OF THE COURT-MARTIAL.
Lord Gambier’s Defence.—Second Despatch ignoring the
First.—Attempt of the Court to stop my Evidence.—Evidence
received because opposed to mine.—I am not permitted to
hear the Defence. The Logs tampered with.—Lord Gambier’s
Defence aimed at me under an erroneous Imputation.—My
Letter to the Court confuting that Imputation.—Admiralty
Accusation against Lord Gambier on my Refusal to accuse
his Lordship.—His Insinuations against me uncalled
for.—Assumes that I am still under his Command.—Enemy
escaped from his own Neglect.—The Shoals put in the Chart
to excuse this.—Attempt to impute blame to me and Captain
Seymour.—The Truth proved by Captain Broughton that Lord
Gambier had no Intention of Attacking.—Lord Howe’s Attack
on the Aix Forts.—Clarendon’s Description of Blake. 82
CHAP. XXVIII.
THE VOTE OF THANKS.
My Motion for Minutes of Court-martial.—Mr. Tierney’s
Opinion respecting them.—Mr. Whitbread’s Views.—The
Minutes indispensable.—Mr. Wilberforce on the same
point.—Lord Grey’s Opinion of the Ministry.—The Vote of
Thanks leaves out my Name, yet the Credit of the Affair
given to me.—Inconsistency of this.—I impugn the Decision
of the House.—Sir Francis Burdett’s Opinion.—Mr.
Windham’s.—Lord Mulgrave turns round upon me.—His
Lordship’s Misrepresentations.—Yet admits the Service to
be “Brilliant.”—Lord Mulgrave Rebuked by Lord
Holland.—Earl Grosvenor’s Views.—Lord Melville hits upon
the Truth, that I, being a Junior Officer, was left
out.—Vote of Thanks in Opposition to Minutes.—The Vote,
though carried, damaged the Ministry 104
CHAP. XXIX.
REFUSAL OF MY PLANS FOR ATTACKING THE FRENCH FLEET IN THE SCHELDT.
Refused Permission to Rejoin my Frigate.—-I am regarded as a
marked Man.—No Secret made of this.—Additional cause of
Offence to the Ministry.—The Part taken by me on the
Reform Question, though Moderate, resented.—Motion for
Papers on Admiralty-Court Abuses.—Effect of the
System.—Modes of evading it.—Robberies by
Prize-Agents.—Corroborated by George Rose.—Abominable
System of Promotion.—Sir Francis Burdett committed to the
Tower.—Petitions for his Liberation intrusted to me.—Naval
Abuses.—Pittances doled out to wounded Officers.—Sinecures
cost more than all the Dockyards.—My Grandmother’s
Pension.—Mr. Wellesley Pole’s Explanation.—Overture to
quit my Party.—Deplorable Waste of Public Money.—Bad
Squibs.—Comparison with the present Day.—Extract from
_Times_ Newspaper 126
CHAP. XXX.
MY PLANS FOR ATTACKING THE FRENCH COAST REFUSED, AND MYSELF
SUPERSEDED.
Plans for Attacking the French Coast submitted to the First
Lord, the Right Honourable Charles Yorke.—Peremptorily
ordered to join my Ship in an inferior Capacity.—My
Remonstrance.—Contemptuous Reply to my Letter.—Threatened
to be superseded.—Mr. Yorke’s Ignorance of Naval
Affairs.—Result of his Ill-treatment of me.—My Reply
passed unnoticed, and myself Superseded 151
CHAP. XXXI.
VISIT TO THE ADMIRALTY COURT AT MALTA.
The Maltese Admiralty Court.—Its extortionate Fees, and
consequent Loss to Captors.—My Visit to Malta.—I possess
myself of the Court Table of Fees.—Ineffectual Attempts to
arrest me.—I at length Submit, and am carried to Prison.—A
mock Trial.—My Defence.—Refuse to answer Interrogatories
put for the purpose of getting me to criminate myself.—Am
sent back to Prison.—Am asked to leave Prison on Bail.—My
Refusal, and Escape.—Arrival in England 166
CHAP. XXXII.
NAVAL LEGISLATION HALF A CENTURY AGO.
Inquiry into the State of the Navy.—Condition of the
Seamen.—The real Cause of the Evil.—Motion relative to the
Maltese Court.—Its extortionate Charges.—My own Case.—A
lengthy Proctor’s Bill.—Exceeds the Value of the
Prize.—Officers ought to choose their own Proctors.—Papers
moved for.—Mr. Yorke’s Opinion.—Sir Francis Burdett’s.—My
Reply.—Motion agreed to.—Captain Brenton’s
Testimony.—French Prisoners.—Their Treatment.—Ministers
refuse to inquire into it.—Motion on my
Arrest.—Circumstances attending it.—My right to demand
Taxation.—The Maltese Judge refuses to notice my
Communications.—Afraid of his own Acts.—Proceedings of his
Officers illegal.—Testimony of eminent Naval
Officers.—Proclamation on my Escape.—Opinion of the
Speaker adverse.—Mr. Stephen’s erroneous Statement.—Motion
Objected to by the First Lord.—My Reply 181
CHAP. XXXIII.
OPENING OF PARLIAMENT, 1812.
Sir Francis Burdett’s Address seconded by me.—Employment of
the Navy.—Naval Defences.—The Address rejected.—Curious
Letter from Captain Hall.—Perversion of Naval Force in
Sicily.—A Nautico-military Dialect.—Uselessness of our
Efforts under a false System, which excludes Unity of
Purpose 215
CHAP. XXXIV.
MY SECRET PLANS.
My Plans submitted to the Prince of Wales.—Negotiations
thereon.—A modified Plan submitted, which came to
nothing.—Inconsiderate Proposition.—Recent Report on my
Plans.—Opinions of the Commissioners.—Plans probably known
to the French.—Faith kept with my Country in spite of
Difficulties.—Injurious Results to myself both Abroad and
at Home.—Opposition to my Plans inexplicable.—Their Social
Effect.—The Subject of Fortifications: these greatly
overrated.—-Reasons why.—The Navy the only Reliance 227
CHAP. XXXV.
NAVAL AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS IN PARLIAMENT.
Sinecures.—Admiralty Expenses ill directed.—What might be
done with small Means.—Flogging in the Army and Navy
attributable to a bad System: nevertheless,
indispensable.—National Means wrongly applied.—Injurious
Concessions to the French.—Denied by the
Government.—Explanations of my Parliamentary Conduct on
the Dissolution of Parliament.—Letter to my
Constituents.—Appointment of Officers by Merit instead of
political Influence the true Strength of the Navy.—My
Re-election for Westminster.—Address to the
Electors.—Ministerial Views.—Treatment of an Officer.—My
Interference 246
CHAP. XXXVI.
MY MARRIAGE.
Romantic Character of my Marriage.—Unforeseen
Difficulties.—Family Results 269
CHAP. XXXVII.
NAVAL ABUSES.
Greenwich Hospital.—Droits of Admiralty.—Pensions.—My
Efforts fruitless.—Contradiction of my Facts.—The
Manchester Petition.—Naval Debates.—Resolutions
thereon.—Mr. Croker’s Reply.—Remarks thereon.—Sir Francis
Burdett.—My Reply to Mr. Croker.—Resolutions negatived
without a Division.—Sir Francis Burdett’s Motion.—Mr.
Croker’s Explanation.—-His Attack on me confirming my
Assertions.—The Truth explained.—Another unfounded
Accusation.—Official Claptrap of his own Invention.—My
Reply.—Its Confirmation by Naval Writers.—Lord
Collingwood’s Opinion.—My Projects adopted in all
important Points.—Official Admissions.—The Result to
myself 273
CHAP XXXVIII.
THE STOCK-EXCHANGE TRIAL.
Necessity for entering on the Subject.—Lord Campbell’s
Opinion respecting it.—Lord Brougham’s Opinion.—His late
Majesty’s.—My Restoration to Rank.—Refusal to
Reinvestigate my Case.—The Reasons given.—Extract from
Lord Brougham’s Works.—My first Knowledge of De
Berenger.—How brought about.—The Stock-Exchange
Hoax.—Rumours implicating me in it.—I return to Town in
consequence.—My Affidavit.—Its Nature.—Improbability of my
Confederacy.—My Carelessness of the Matter.—De Berenger’s
Denial of my Participation.—Remarks thereon.—Significant
Facts.—Remarks on the alleged Hoax common on the
Stock-Exchange 317
CHAP. XXXIX.
Admiralty Influence against me.—Appointment of Mr. Lavie as
Prosecutor.—The Trial.—Crane, the Hackney
Coachman.—Indecision of his Evidence.—Lord Ellenborough’s
Charge, and unjustifiable Assumptions.—Report of the Trial
falsified; or rather made up for the Occasion.—Evidence,
how got up.—Proved to be positive Perjury.—This confirmed
by subsequent Affidavits of respectable Tradesmen.—Another
Charge in Store for me, had not this succeeded.—The chief
Witness’s Conviction.—His subsequent Transportation and
Liberation.—Affidavits of my Servants, Thomas Dewman, Mary
Turpin, and Sarah Bust.—My second Affidavit.—Appeal from
my Conviction refused.—Expulsion from the House.—Minority
in my Favour. 344
CHAP. XL.
Remarks on Lord Ellenborough’s Directions.—Proofs of this
Fallacy.—His Assumption of things not in Evidence, and
unwarrantable Conjectures, in positive Opposition to
Evidence.—His Desire to Convict obnoxious Persons.—Leigh
Hunt, Dr. Watson, and Hone.—Lord Ellenborough a Cabinet
Minister at the time of my Trial.—My Conviction a
ministerial Necessity.—Vain Attempts to get my Case
reheard.—Letter to Lord Ebrington.—The Improbability of my
Guilt.—Absurdity of such Imputation.—Letter of Sir Robert
Wilson.—Letter of the late Duke of Hamilton.—Mr. Hume’s
Letter.—Causes for my Persecution.—Treatment of the
Princess Charlotte, who fled to her Mother’s
Protection.—Sympathy of the Princess for my Treatment—My
Popularity increased thereby.—Mine really a State
Prosecution.—Restoration of Sir Robert Wilson.—My
Restoration incomplete to this Day 372
APPENDICES 401
DIRECTIONS TO THE BINDER.
Chart A _to face page_ 15
” B ” 101
” C ” 24
” D ” 37
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SEAMAN.
---------------------
CHAPTER XXIV.
A NAVAL STUDY FOR ALL TIME.
CHARTS, ETC., SUPPLIED BY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT.—REFUSED BY A FORMER
GOVERNMENT.—ALTERATION MADE IN THE CHARTS.—MR. STOKES’S
AFFIDAVITS.—LETTER TO SIR JOHN BARROW.—SINGULAR ADMIRALTY
MINUTE.—SECOND LETTER TO SIR JOHN BARROW.—THE CHARTS AGAIN
REFUSED.—MY DEPARTURE FOR CHILI.—RENEWED APPLICATION TO THE
ADMIRALTY.—KINDNESS OF THE DUKE OF SOMERSET.—DIFFERENCE OF OPINION
AT THE ADMIRALTY.
It will be asked, “How is it that the matters recorded in the present
volume are, after the lapse of fifty years, for the first time made
public?”
The reply is, that it was not till after the publication of the
preceding volume that I have been enabled to place the subject in a
comprehensible point of view[1], and that only through the high sense of
justice manifested by the late and present First Lords of the Admiralty,
in furnishing me with charts and logs, access to which was prohibited by
former Boards of Admiralty. On several previous occasions the attempt
has been made, but from the obstinate refusal of their predecessors to
afford me access to documents by which alone truth could be elicited, it
has not hitherto been in my power to arrive at any more satisfactory
result than that of placing my own personal and unsupported statements
in opposition to the sentence of a court-martial.
-----
Footnote 1:
This concession will, in the future narrative, render necessary a
slight recapitulation of some matters contained in the previous
volume, but not to any appreciable extent.
-----
The necessary materials being now conceded, in such a way as to enable
me to prepare them for publication in detail, it is, therefore, for the
first time in my power to vindicate myself. A brief recapitulation of
former refusals, as well as of the manner in which I became possessed of
such documentary testimony as will henceforth exhibit facts in a
comprehensive point of view, is desirable, as placing beyond dispute
matters which would otherwise be incredible.
My declaration previous to the court-martial—that it was in my capacity
as a member of the House of Commons alone that I intended to oppose a
vote of thanks to Lord Gambier, on the ground that no service had been
rendered worthy of so high an honour—will be fresh in the remembrance of
the reader[2]; and also that when, at the risk of intrenchment on the
privilege of Parliament, the Board of Admiralty called upon me
officially to accuse his lordship, I referred them to the logs of the
fleet for such information relative to the attack in Aix Roads as they
might require[3];—it nevertheless became evident that I was regarded as
his lordship’s prosecutor! though, _throughout the trial, excluded from
seeing the charts before the Court, hearing the evidence,
cross-examining the witnesses, or even listening to the defence!_[4]
-----
Footnote 2:
See my conversation with Lord Mulgrave, vol. i. pp. 345, 346.
Footnote 3:
See my letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty, vol. i. p. 408.
Footnote 4:
See Minutes of Court-martial, p. 228.
-----
On the acquittal of Lord Gambier, the ministry did not submit the vote
of thanks to Parliament till six months afterwards, viz. in the session
of the following year, 1810. To myself, however, the consequences
were—as Lord Mulgrave had predicted—immediate; bringing me forthwith
under the full weight of ministerial displeasure. The Board of Admiralty
prohibited me from joining the _Impérieuse_ in the Scheldt.
The effect of this prohibition in a manner so marked as to be
unmistakeable as to its cause, produced on my mind a natural anxiety to
lay before the public the reasons for a proceeding so unusual, and, as a
first step, I requested of the Board permission to inspect the charts
upon which—_in opposition to the evidence of officers present at the
attack_—the decision of the court-martial had been made to rest. The
request was evaded, both then and afterwards, even though persisted in
up to the year 1818, when it was officially _denied_ that the original
of the most material chart was in the possession of the Admiralty. Even
inspection of _a copy admitted to be in their possession_ was refused.
An assertion of this nature might be dangerous were not ample proof at
hand.
It having come to my knowledge, from certain affidavits filed in the
Court of Admiralty by Mr. Stokes, the master of Lord Gambier’s flagship,
on whose chart the acquittal of Lord Gambier had been based—that, _after
the lapse of eight years from the court-martial!_ material alterations
had been made _by permission of the Board itself and under the direction
of one of its officers_—I naturally became suspicious that the charts
might otherwise have been tampered with; the more so, as neither at the
court-martial, nor at any period subsequent to it, had I ever been
allowed to obtain even a sight of the charts in question.
The very circumstances were suspicious. On the application for
head-money to the Court of Admiralty in 1817, the Court had refused to
receive Mr. Stokes’s chart, on account of its palpable incorrectness. On
this, Mr. Stokes applied to the Admiralty for permission _to alter his
chart_! The permission was granted, and in this altered state it was
received by the Court of Admiralty, which, on Mr. Stokes’s authority,
decreed that the head-money should be given _to the whole fleet_,
contrary to the Act of Parliament, _instead of the ships which alone had
taken part in the destruction of the enemy’s vessels_.
Fearful that material erasures or additions had been made, I once more
applied to the Board for permission to _inspect_ the alterations. The
request was again refused, though my opponents had been permitted to
make what alterations and erasures they pleased.
The following are extracts from the above-mentioned affidavits of Mr.
Stokes:—
Extract from the affidavit, sworn before the High Court of Admiralty on
the 13th of November, 1817, of Thomas Stokes, master of the
_Caledonia_, as to the truth of the MSS. chart, upon which the
acquittal of Lord Gambier was based; _before_ the Court of Admiralty
rejected his chart, and _before_ the alterations were made.
“And this deponent maketh oath that the annexed paper writing marked
with the letter A, being a chart of Aix Roads, _is a true copy[5]
made by this deponent_ of an original French chart found on board
the French frigate _L’Armide_ in September, 1806, which _original
chart is now in the Hydrographic Office in the Admiralty_, and by
comparing the same with the original chart he is enabled to depose,
and _does depose that the said chart is correct and true_, and that
the soundings therein stated accurately describe the soundings at
low water, to the best of his judgment and belief.”
Extract from a second affidavit, sworn by Mr. Stokes, before the High
Court of Admiralty, on the 17th of April, 1818, _after_ the Court
had refused to admit his chart from its incorrectness; and _after_
the alterations had been made!
“Appeared personally, Thomas Stokes, master in the Royal Navy, and made
oath that the original MSS. chart found on board the French frigate
_L’Armide_, and marked A, annexed to his affidavit of the 13th of
November, 1817, were delivered at the Hydrographic Office at the
Admiralty, and this deponent for _greater convenience of reference!
inserted a scale of a nautic mile!!_ the original manuscript chart
having only a scale of French toises; that in inserting a scale of a
nautic mile, this deponent _had allowed a thousand French toises to
a nautic mile_, and that Mr. Walker, the Assistant-Hydrographer,
accordingly made the erasures which now appear on the face of the
chart!” &c.
-----
Footnote 5:
The original was neither produced at the court-martial nor before the
Court of Admiralty. A far greater and more deliberate error will
appear in a future chapter.
-----
In these affidavits Mr. Stokes first distinctly swore that his chart,
copied from a French MSS. was _correct_; 2ndly—when detected by the
Court of Admiralty—that it was _incorrect_; 3rdly—that the original was
_deposited in the Hydrographic Office at the Admiralty_.
My application to Sir John Barrow, then Hydrographer to the Admiralty,
was as follows:—
“May 4th, 1818.
“SIR,—As it appears by the affidavit of which I enclose a copy that
two charts of Aix Roads, the one stated to be a copy of the other,
were deposited in the Hydrographic Office, and that the one
_purporting to be the copy_ has been delivered up for the purpose of
being exhibited as evidence on the part of my opponents in a cause now
pending in the High Court of Admiralty, and as it further appears that
_an alteration_ in the last-mentioned chart was made by Mr. Stokes,
and a further alteration by Mr. Walker, Assistant-Hydrographer, I have
to request that the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners will be
pleased to permit me to see the other or original chart of Mr. Stokes
still remaining at the Hydrographic Office, in order that I may be
enabled to judge for myself of the nature and effect of the
alterations now acknowledged to have been made on the charts. The
reasonableness of this request will, I presume, be manifest to their
Lordships, and the more especially, seeing that my opponents _are not
only allowed similar access, but have been permitted to withdraw one
of the said charts for the purpose of exhibiting it in evidence_,
notwithstanding that a variation from the original has been avowedly
made therein.
I have, &c.,
“COCHRANE.
“Sir John Barrow, Hydrographer, &c.”
To this request Sir John Barrow, on the 6th of May, returned the
following refusal:—
“As Mr. Stokes’s charts have been restored to him, and _a copy_ made
for the use of the office, I am directed to acquaint your Lordship
that my Lords cannot comply with your request in respect _to the
original chart_, and as to _the copy_ of the chart made in this office
and now remaining here, their Lordships _do not feel themselves at
liberty to communicate it_.
“I have the honour, &c.
“JOHN BARROW.”
This refusal was accompanied by the following copy of a minute from the
Admiralty: in which it was pretended that Stokes had only _lent_ the
original chart to the Hydrographer’s office, _to be copied for the use
of the Hydrographic Department_—though it had been made use of to acquit
an admiral, to the rejection of the charts of the fleet, as will
presently be seen.
“Mr. Stokes _lent_ the original chart to the Hydrographer’s office, to
be copied for the _use of that department_.
“Mr. Stokes then went abroad.
“On his return he applied for his chart, which being _mislaid_ they
gave him the _copy_.
“Stokes, finding the alteration objected to in a court of law, applied
about a month since for his own chart, the _original_ of which was
_restored to him_, copy being made.”—23, 141, 147.
To this singular communication and minute I returned the subjoined
reply:—
“13, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden.
18th May, 1818.
“SIR,—Your letter of the 6th of May was delivered to me as I was going
out of town, consequently I had no opportunity of referring to
documents which I have since consulted, in order to refute the
statements which the Lords of the Admiralty appear to have received.
“You inform me, by command of their Lordships, that ‘it appears by a
report from the Hydrographer that Mr. Stokes had become possessed of
the original chart which he _lent_ to the Hydrographer’s office for
the use of that department.’ This appears to imply that Mr. Stokes
became possessed of the original chart at the time of the attack in
the _Charente_ under Lord Gambier, whereas Mr. Stokes made oath that
it was taken from the _Armide_ in 1806, two years and a half previous
to the attack in question. As it does not appear from the Minutes of
the court-martial on Lord Gambier that the original chart was then
produced, and as it is not now forthcoming in the cause now pending in
the Court of Admiralty, I am compelled to disbelieve its existence, or
at least to believe that it underwent material alterations after it
came into Mr. Stokes’s possession. The original ought to have been
exhibited with the copy at the trial of Lord Gambier, and both either
were or ought to have been filed in the office of the Admiralty with
the Minutes of the proceedings; but whether _either_ are so filed
their Lordships _have not permitted me to ascertain_.
“If the original were filed, it could not afterwards have been ‘_lent_
by Mr Stokes to the Hydrographer’s office to be copied for the use of
that department.’ Even had the copy only been filed—sworn as it was by
Mr. Stokes ‘_to be correct!_’ there could have been no necessity—if
Mr. Stokes was deemed worthy of belief—for the Hydrographer to _borrow
the original_. _Eight years_ having elapsed since the court-martial on
Lord Gambier, you inform me that ‘Mr. Stokes on his return from abroad
applied for his chart accordingly, which chart happening to be
mislaid, he was furnished _with the copy_ in question,’ viz. that
‘made for the use of the Hydrographer’s department.’ It is important
to observe that _this is completely at variance with the affidavit_ of
Mr. Stokes, who swears that ‘_he himself made the copy_,’ and that
‘_both the copy and the original were delivered at the Hydrographic
Office!_’ It cannot fail to be observed, that to ‘deliver’ a chart at
the Hydrographic Office, and to ‘_lend_ a chart to be copied for the
use of that department’—the language of the letter before me—are
different expressions, conveying widely different meanings.
“It is also material to observe that it is strange alterations _at
all_ should have been made on a chart represented to be a _copy_ of an
_original_, and exhibited as evidence in a court of law. That such
original _is not forthcoming_ is a very material and a very
_suspicious circumstance_. If it be true, or if there really be any
other chart than that which is described as a copy and _admitted_ to
be altered, I may fairly infer that such altered copy differs so
materially and so fraudulently from the original, or that the
original—so called—is itself so palpable a fabrication, or has so
obviously been altered, that Mr. Stokes and his employers _do not dare
to exhibit it in a court of law_; and have withdrawn it from the
Hydrographer’s office for the purpose of suppressing so convincing a
proof of the fraud practised on Lord Gambier’s trial.
“Exclusive of the glaring contradiction between the statements of Mr.
Stokes on the court-martial, and that which you have been commanded to
make to me, when it is considered that Mr. Stokes is detected in
_having altered_ a document which he exhibits in a court of law as a
correct copy of an original, and that he is no sooner detected than he
endeavours to defend the alteration by declaring that it proceeded
from the Hydrographer’s office, where the _original was deposited_;
and that upon such defence leading to an application for leave to
inspect the _original_, answer is made that such original _had merely
been borrowed of Mr. Stokes_, and had been returned to him _at his own
request_, and that request, too, made in consequence of the alteration
in the alleged copy _having been detected_—it is impossible not to
infer a juggle between Mr. Stokes, the Hydrographic Office, and others
whom I shall not here undertake to name, for the purpose of defeating
the ends of justice.
“COCHRANE.
“Sir John Barrow, Hydrographer, &c.”
Receiving no reply to this letter, I subsequently addressed the
following to the Secretary of the Admiralty.
“9, Bryanstone Street, Portman Square,
2nd July, 1818.
“SIR,—I feel it proper to inclose to you, as Secretary of the
Admiralty, a copy of an affidavit, accompanied by a general outline of
the chart of Basque Roads, the originals of which are filed in the
High Court of Admiralty, by which their Lordships will clearly
perceive that five more ships of the line _might_ and _ought_ to have
been taken or destroyed, had the enemy been attacked between daybreak
and noon on the 12th of April. And I have to request, Sir, that you
will have the goodness to lay these documents before their Lordships
(as well as the inclosed printed case which they have already partly
seen in manuscript), with my respectful and earnest desire that their
Lordships may be pleased to cause the facts therein set forth to be
verified by comparing them with the original documents, logs, charts,
and records in their Lordships’ possession. I am the more solicitous
that the present Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty should adopt
this mode of proceeding, as it will enable them decisively to judge on
a subject of great national importance, and also to ascertain (what a
portion of the public know) that it is not by false evidence from
amongst the lower class of society alone that my character has been
assailed, in order not only to perpetuate the concealment of neglect
of duty, but to prevent an exposure of the perjury, forgery, and fraud
by which that charge was endeavoured to be refuted.
“I beg, Sir, that you will assure their Lordships on my part, that as
a deep sense of public duty alone induced me formerly to express a
hope that the thanks of Parliament might not be pressed for the
conduct of the affair in Basque Roads, so, in addition to that
feeling, which made me disregard every private interest, I have formed
a fixed determination never, whilst I exist, to rest satisfied until I
expose the baseness and wickedness of the attempts made to destroy my
character, which I value more than my life.
“As the affidavits of Captains Robert Kerr and Robert Hockings (which,
as well as my own, are filed in the High Court of Admiralty) may
immediately be made the subject of indictment in a court of law, and
as the proceedings in the Admiralty Court have been put off under the
pretence of obtaining further evidence in support of the
mis-statements of these officers and the claim of Lord Gambier, I have
respectfully to request that when the Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty shall have instituted an inquiry into the logs, charts, and
documents, and ascertained the conduct of the before-named officers,
they will be pleased to cause public justice to be done in a matter
involving the character of the naval service so deeply.
“If, Sir, through their Lordships’ means, a fair investigation shall
take place, it will be far more gratifying than any other course of
proceeding.
“I have the honour to be, &c. &c.,
“COCHRANE.
“Jno. Wilson Croker, Esq., Secretary, &c., Admiralty.”
After the above correspondence I gave up, as hopeless, all further
attempts to obtain even so much as a sight of the charts without which
any public explanation on my part would have been unintelligible.
In the year 1819—when nearly ruined by law expenses, fines, and
deprivation of pay—in despair moreover, of surmounting the unmerited
obloquy which had befallen me in England—I accepted from the Chilian
government an invitation to aid in its war of independence; and removed
with Lady Cochrane and our family to South America, in the vain hope of
finding, amongst strangers, that sympathy which, though interested,
might, in some measure compensate for the persecutions of our native
land.[6] I will not attempt to describe the agonised feelings of this
even temporary exile under such circumstances from my country, in whose
annals it had been my ambition to secure an honourable position. No
language of mine could convey the mental sufferings consequent on
finding aspirations—founded on exertions which ought to have justified
all my hopes—frustrated by the enmity of an illiberal political faction,
which regarded services to the nation as nothing when opposed to the
interests of party.
-----
Footnote 6:
The malice of offended faction pursued me even to this remote part of
the globe, in the shape of a “Foreign Enlistment Act” (59th George
III. cap. 69). This Act was introduced by the Attorney-General, Sir
Samuel Shepherd, for the express purpose of preventing any one from
assisting the South American States then at war with Spain; the Act
being thus especially levelled at me, though injuriously driven from
the service of my own country.
-----
On my return to England, from causes which will appear in the sequel,
the subject of the charts was not again officially renewed.
Latterly, however, considering that at my advanced age there was a
probability of quitting the world with the stigma attached to my memory
of having been the indirect cause of bringing my commander-in-chief to a
court-martial—though in reality the charges were made by the Admiralty—I
determined to make one more effort to obtain those documents which alone
could justify the course I had deemed it my duty to pursue. In the hope
that the more enlightened policy of modern times might concede the boon,
which a former period of political corruption had denied, I applied to
Sir John Pakington, late First Lord of the Admiralty, for permission to
inspect such documents relative to the affair of Aix Roads as the Board
might possess.
Permission was kindly and promptly granted by Sir John Pakington; but
Lord Derby’s ministry going out of office before the boon could be
rendered available, it became necessary to renew the application to the
successor of the Right Honourable Baronet, viz. his Grace the Duke of
Somerset, who as promptly complied with the request. The reader may
judge of my surprise on discovering, in its proper place, bound up
amongst the Naval Records, in the usual official manner, the _very chart
the possession of which had been denied by a former Board of Admiralty_!
The Duke of Somerset, moreover, with a consideration for which I feel
truly grateful, ordered that whatever copies of charts I might require,
should be supplied by the Hydrographic Office; so that by the kindness
of Captain Washington, the eminent hydrographer to the Board, tracings
of the suppressed charts have been made, and are now appended to this
volume. His grace further ordered that the logs of Lord Gambier’s fleet
should be submitted to the inspection of Mr. Earp, with permission to
make extracts; an order fully carried out by the courtesy of Mr.
Lascelles, of the Record Office, to the extent of the logs in his
possession.
It is, therefore, only after the lapse of fifty-one years and in my own
eighty-fifth year,—a postponement too late for my peace, but not for my
justification,—that I am, from official documents, and proofs deduced
from official documents which were from the first and still are in the
possession of the Government, enabled to remove the stigma before
alluded to, and to lay before the public such an explanation of the
fabricated chart, together with an Admiralty copy of the chart itself,
as from that evidence shall place the whole matter beyond the
possibility of dispute. It will in the present day be difficult to
credit the existence of such practices and evil influences of party
spirit in past times as could permit an Administration, even for the
purpose of preserving the _prestige_ of a Government to claim as a
glorious victory! a neglect of duty which, to use the mildest terms, was
both a naval and a national dishonour.
The point which more immediately concerns myself is, however, this:—that
the verdict founded on this fabricated chart, together with the
subsequent official enmity directed against me in consequence of my
determination to oppose the vote of thanks to Lord Gambier, was
persevered in year after year, till it reached its climax in the
consequences of that subsequent trial which was made the pretext for
driving me from the navy, in defiance of remonstrance at the Board of
Admiralty itself. I have not long been aware of the latter fact. Admiral
Collier has recently informed me that Sir W.J. Hope, then one of the
Naval Lords of the Admiralty, told him that considering the sentence
passed against me cruel and vindictive, he refused to sign his name to
the decision of the Board by which my name was struck off the Navy List.
CHART A.
Tracing from the official French Chart of the isles of Ré and d’Olleron.
Tendered to the Court-Martial by Lord COCHRANE, and rejected.
[Illustration:
_Soundings in feet at Low Water Springs_
London: Richard Bentley: 1860.
]
CHAP. XXV.
A NAVAL STUDY—_continued_.
FRENCH HYDROGRAPHIC CHARTS.—ONE TENDERED BY ME TO THE COURT.—REJECTED BY
THE PRESIDENT.—GROUNDS FOR ITS REJECTION.—THE OBJECT OF THE REJECTED
CHART.—WOULD HAVE PROVED TOO MUCH, IF ADMITTED.—REJECTION OF OTHER
CHARTS TENDERED BY ME.—MR. STOKES’S CHART.—ITS FALLACY AT FIRST
SIGHT.—JUDGE ADVOCATE’S REASONS FOR ADOPTING IT.—ITS ERRORS DETECTED
BY THE PRESIDENT, AND EXPOSED HERE.—PROBABLE EXCUSE FOR THE
ERROR.—IMAGINARY SHOAL ON THE CHART.—FALSIFICATION OF WIDTH OF
CHANNEL.—LORD GAMBIER’S VOUCHER FOR STOKES’S CHART.—STOKES’S VOUCHER
FOR ITS WORTHLESSNESS.—STOKES’S CHART IN A NATIONAL POINT OF
VIEW.—TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF BY THE FRENCH.
The charts to which the reader’s attention is invited are those alluded
to in the last chapter, as having, after the lapse of fifty-one years,
been traced for me by Captain Washington, by the order of his Grace the
Duke of Somerset. The subject being no longer of personal but of
historical interest, there can be no impropriety in laying before the
naval service, for its judgment, materials so considerately supplied by
the present First Lord of the Admiralty.
CHART A
is a correct tracing of Aix Roads from the _Neptune François_, a set of
charts issued by the French Hydrographical Department—bound in a volume,
and supplied for the use of the French navy previous to 1809[7]; copies
from the same source being at that period supplied under the auspices of
the Board of Admiralty for the use of British ships on the French
coasts—these, in fact, forming the only guides available at that period.
-----
Footnote 7:
Sets of these charts, bound as described, were found on board the
grounded ships captured in the afternoon of the 12th of April, and
were therefore available for the purposes of the court-martial, had it
been deemed expedient to consult them.
-----
Chart A shows a clear entrance of two miles, without shoal or hindrance
of any kind, between Ile d’Aix and the Boyart Sand; the soundings close
to the latter marking thirty-five feet at low water, with from thirty to
forty feet in mid-channel. The chart shows, moreover, a channel leading
to a spacious anchorage between the Boyart and Palles Sands, marking
clear soundings at low water of from twenty to thirty feet close to
either sand, with thirty feet in mid-channel. In this anchorage
line-of-battle-ships could not only have _floated_, without danger of
grounding, but could have effectively operated against the enemy’s
fleet, even in its entire state before the attack, wholly out of range
of the batteries on Ile d’Aix, as will hereafter be corroborated by the
logs and evidence of experienced officers present in the attack, and
therefore practically acquainted with the soundings. To a naval eye, it
will be apparent that, by gaining this anchorage, it would not at any
time have been difficult for the British force to have interposed the
enemy’s fleet between itself and the fortifications on Ile d’Aix in such
a way as completely to neutralise the fire of the latter.
Further inspection of the chart will indicate an inner anchorage, called
_Le Grand Trousse_, to which any British vessel disabled by the enemy’s
ships—two only of which, out of thirteen, remained afloat,—might have
retired with safety to an anchorage capable of holding a fleet—the
soundings in _Le Grand Trousse_ marking from thirty to forty feet at low
water. Between these anchorages it will be seen on the chart that there
is no shoal, nor any other danger whatever.[8]
-----
Footnote 8:
This anchorage was plainly marked on the French charts supplied to the
British ships, as deposed to by the officers present in the action.
(See the evidence of Captain Broughton, _Minutes_, p. 222, and that of
Captain Newcomb, p. 198). The correctness of the chart furnished by me
being thus clearly established in evidence.
-----
The rise of tide marked on the chart was from ten to twelve feet[9],
consequently amply sufficient _on a rising tide_ for the two-deckers and
frigates to have been sent to the attack of the enemy’s ships aground on
the Palles Shoal, as testified by the evidence of Captains Malcolm and
Broughton.[10] The flood-tide making about 7·0 A.M. gave assurance of
abundant depth of water by 11·0 A.M., which is the time marked in the
Commander-in-chief’s log[11] as that of _bringing the British ships to
an anchor!_ in place of forwarding them to the attack of ships on shore!
-----
Footnote 9:
In reality, from eighteen to twenty feet, at spring tides, as appeared
from the testimony of various officers, Admiral Stopford amongst
others. Even Mr. Stokes marked on his chart a rise of twenty-one feet,
so that there was abundance of water for the operation of ships of the
largest class. The defence of the Commander-in-chief was, that there
was not sufficient water at half-flood to float the ships!
Footnote 10:
See pp. 58 and 63.
Footnote 11:
Erroneously, according to the logs of the other ships.
-----
This chart was tendered by me to the Court, in explanation of my
evidence. It was, however, rejected, because I could not _produce the
French hydrographer to prove its correctness!_ though copies of a
similar chart, as has been said, were furnished to British ships for
their guidance! Being thus repudiated, my chart was flung contemptuously
under the table, and neither this nor any other _official_ chart was
afterwards allowed to corroborate the facts subsequently testified by
the various officers present in the action, they being imperatively
ordered to base their observations on the chart of Mr. Stokes alluded to
in the last chapter, as having been—eight years after the
court-martial—pronounced by the Court of Admiralty so incorrect as to
require material alteration before it could be put in evidence in a
court of law! To this point we shall presently come.
A singular circumstance connected with the rejected chart should rather
have _secured its reception_, viz. that it was taken by my own hands out
of the _Ville de Varsovie_ French line-of-battle ship shortly before she
was set fire to, and therefore its authenticity, as having been
officially supplied by the French government for the use of that ship,
was beyond doubt or question. I also produced two similar charts, on
which were marked the places of the enemy’s ships aground at daylight on
the 12th of April, as observed from the _Impérieuse_, the only vessel
then in proximity. The positions of the grounded vessels are marked on
Chart B.
The manner of the rejection by the Court—at the suggestion of the
Judge-Advocate—of the chart tendered by me, is worthy of note.
PRESIDENT.—“I think your lordship said just now, that you thought
there was water enough for ships of any draught of water?”
LORD COCHRANE.—“Yes.”
PRESIDENT.—“Have you _an authenticated chart_, or any evidence that
can be produced to show that there is _actually_ such a depth of
water?”
LORD COCHRANE (_putting in the charts_).—“It was _actually_ from the
soundings we had going in, provided the tide does not fall more than
twelve feet, which I am not aware of. I studied the chart of Basque
Roads for some days before. The rise of the tide, as I understand from
that, is from ten to twelve feet. It is so mentioned in the French
chart. I have no other means of judging.”[12]
_Judge-Advocate._—“THIS CHART IS NOT EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT,
BECAUSE HIS LORDSHIP CANNOT PROVE ITS CORRECTNESS!!”
PRESIDENT.—“_No! It is nothing more than to show upon what grounds his
lordship forms his opinion on the rise and fall of the tide!!_”[13]
-----
Footnote 12:
This was fully corroborated by Captain Malcolm, when, having said that
“there were _no obstacles_ to prevent the frigates and some ships of
the line from going into Aix Roads, he was asked by the President, “if
he made known to the Commander-in-chief that by keeping close to the
Boyart Shoal the ships _might have gone in?_”
The reply was in every way remarkable.
CAPTAIN MALCOLM.—“I do not know that I mentioned this to the
Commander-in-chief. _The charts showed it._”—_Minutes_, p. 214. A
complete corroboration of the correctness of my charts tendered to but
rejected by the Court; though as these had been supplied under the
sanction of the Admiralty, it was out of the question to reject them
as the basis of evidence, inasmuch as there could be none other of a
reliable nature.
Footnote 13:
The following extract from my evidence, and the singular remark from
Admiral Young, are extracted from the minutes of the court-martial.
“The Commander-in-chief had the same charts as I was in possession of,
and from these I formed my conclusion with respect to the anchorage.
In reconnoitring the enemy’s fleet, _so near as to induce him to open
a fire from almost his whole line_, I reported to the
Commander-in-chief the ruinous state of Ile d’Aix, _the inner
fortifications being completely blown up and destroyed_. There were
only 13 guns mounted.”
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“Will you consider, my Lord Cochrane, before you go on,
HOW FAR THIS IS RELEVANT”!!!—_Minutes_, p. 58.
My assertion of the fact that the Commander-in-chief’s charts were
identical with my own, as having come from the Admiralty, was
considered _irrelevant_, because, had they been put in, or mine not
rejected, there could have been no doubt of the result of the
court-martial.
-----
It was not put in for any purpose of the kind—for I had expressly said
that I had no opinion as to the rise and fall of the tide, except as
marked on the French official charts. The object of my putting in those
charts was to _show the truth of the whole matter before the Court_. The
president, however, flung the chart under the table with as much
eagerness as the Judge-Advocate had evinced when objecting to its
reception in evidence.[14]
-----
Footnote 14:
It is a singular circumstance that notwithstanding the chart was flung
under the table and rejected by the Court, I found it _bound up
amongst the Admiralty records_!
-----
The object of the chart was in fact to prove, as indeed _was
subsequently proved_ by the testimony of eminent officers, and _would_
have been proved even by the ships’ logs had they been consulted, that
there was plenty of channel room to keep clear of the batteries on Ile
d’Aix, together with abundant depth of water[15]; and that the
commander-in-chief, in ordering all the ships to _come to an anchor_, in
place of sending a portion[16] of the British ships to the attack of the
enemy’s vessels aground on the north-west part of the Palles Shoal, on
the morning of the 12th of April, had displayed a “_mollesse_”—as it was
happily termed by Admiral Gravière—unbecoming the Commander-in-chief of
a British force, superior in numbers, and having nothing to fear from
about a dozen guns on the fortifications of Aix; which, had the ships
been sent in along the edge of the Boyart, could have inflicted no
material damage, either by shot or shell.[17]
-----
Footnote 15:
The ships which were sent in though too late were untouched by shot or
shell. For the depth of water they found on going in, see page 71.
Footnote 16:
My signals were, “_half the fleet_ can destroy the enemy.” Then, “the
_frigates alone_ can destroy the enemy.” Yet in his defence Lord
Gambier assumed that I had signalled for the fleet at a time when, as
he alleged, it could not have floated for want of water?
Footnote 17:
See Captain Malcolm’s evidence, page 58. Also Captain Godfrey’s, of
the _Etna_, who “_thinks_ some of the enemy’s shot went over them”
(_Minutes_, p. 173), but admits that not a mast, yard, or even a
rope-yarn was touched.
-----
These were precisely the points which the ministry did not want proved,
and which—as will presently be seen—the Court was no less anxious to
avoid proving. Had the French chart been received in evidence, as it
ought to have been—I do not say mine, but those on board the flagship
itself, or indeed _any copy_ supplied by the Admiralty to the fleet—a
vote of thanks to Lord Gambier would have been _impossible_, and with
the impossibility would have vanished the Government _prestige_ of a
great victory gained by their commander-in-chief, under their
auspices.[18]
-----
Footnote 18:
“I was furnished by Lord Cochrane with a French chart, _and considered
it a good one_.”—_Evidence of Captain Newcomb_, p. 199.
I had for several years been in the possession of official French
charts, which, in my previous cruises, had not been found defective,
and from those charts I had at all times drawn my conclusions with
respect to the depth of water, or other circumstances which related to
the navigation on the enemy’s coast.”
PRESIDENT.—“The coast of the enemy, I suppose you mean?”
LORD COCHRANE.—“I refer to the French coast.”
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“When did you discover that there was this anchorage in
deep water?”
LORD COCHRANE.—“I have said that in going in I found the soundings
correct, and that, in fact, I had such confidence in the chart, that I
had said to Admiral Keates, when we were off there, and to Admiral
Thornborough, that there _could be no difficulty in going in there and
destroying the enemy’s fleet_. I took the chart on board Admiral
Thornborough’s ship.”—See my Letter to Admiral Thornborough, vol. i.
p. 195.—_Lord Cochrane’s Evidence_, p. 57.
-----
The French official chart being thus adroitly got rid of by the
Judge-Advocate, the other charts tendered by me to mark the positions of
the enemy’s ships aground shared the like fate, though not open to the
same objection. The exactness of the positions was moreover confirmed by
the evidence of Mr. Stokes, the master of the _Caledonia_, Lord
Gambier’s flagship; though his chart, substituted for those in use
amongst the British ships, was in direct contradiction to his oral
evidence.
The positions, of the ships aground as marked on my charts, were as
follows.
The _Ocean_, three-decker, bearing the flag of Admiral Allemand, and
forming a group with three other line-of-battle ships close to her, lay
aground on the north-west edge of the Palles Shoal, nearest the deep
water, where even a gun-boat, had it been sent whilst they lay on their
bilge, could have so perforated their bottoms, that they could not have
floated with the rising tide. All were immoveably aground, and were
therefore incapable of opposition to an attacking force[19]; whilst each
of the group of three lay so much inclined towards each other as to
present the appearance of having their yards locked together.[20] They
had, in fact, drifted with the same current, into the same spot, and
being nearly of the same draught of water, had grounded close to each
other. The one separate was a vessel of less draught than these, and had
gone a little further on the shoal.
-----
Footnote 19:
“Till _about noon_, the _Ocean_, three-decker, was _heeling
considerably, and appeared to me to be heaving her guns
overboard_.”—_Captain Malcolm_ (_Minutes_, p. 209). She escaped about
two o’clock P.M., just before I advanced in the _Impérieuse_, lest all
should escape.
-----
The correctness of these positions, as marked on my chart, was
completely confirmed by Mr. Stokes, master of the flag-ship, in his oral
evidence as subjoined.
QUESTION.—“State the situation of the enemy’s fleet on the morning of
the 12th of April.”
MR. STOKES.—“At daylight I observed _the whole of the enemy’s ships,
except two of the line, on shore_. Four of them _lay in group_, or lay
together on the western part of the Palles Shoal. The three-decker
(_L’Océan_, flagship) was _on the north-west edge_ of the Palles
Shoal, with her broadside flanking the passage; _the north-west point
nearest the deep water_.”[20]—(_Minutes_, page 147.)
-----
Footnote 20:
“I _think_ their yards were not locked.”—_Evidence of Mr. Fairfax_,
_Minutes_, p. 144. It was, however, _so nearly_, that Mr. Fairfax, a
witness carefully in Lord Gambier’s interest, could only _think_ about
it. He reluctantly admitted that all lay “_within a ship’s length of
each other_,” and ships lying aground on their bilge inclined towards
each other at an angle of thirty degrees are—if not locked
together—completely incapable of resistance.
-----
This was the truth as to the positions of the grounded ships which
escaped; these being referred to in Mr. Stokes’s evidence precisely as
marked on my rejected chart. That is, his evidence showed, in
corroboration of my chart, the _utter helplessness of an enemy which a
British admiral refrained from attacking, though aground_!
The French charts produced by me being thus rejected, those in the
possession of the Commander-in-chief not produced, and those connected
with the fleet not being called for, the court decided to rely upon two
charts professedly constructed for the occasion by the master of the
_Caledonia_, Mr. Stokes, and the master of the fleet, Mr. Fairfax,
_neither of whom was present in the attack_.[21]
-----
Footnote 21:
It is a remarkable fact that many of the witnesses chiefly relied on
by the Commander-in-chief, in confirmation of his having done his
duty, _had not been in Aix Roads at all_, and could therefore have no
knowledge of anything, except their remaining inactive with the fleet
whilst the enemy’s ships were warping off. Mr. Stokes was of this
number; yet all were questioned on points known only to officers
intimately acquainted with Aix Roads, and present at the action. But
for the court to adopt _exclusively_, as will presently be seen, a
chart constructed by a man who admitted that an important portion had
been laid down _from hearsay_, was monstrous; the more so, as the
official charts, would have shown the truth.
-----
* * * * * * *
CHART C
was tendered to the Court by Mr. Stokes, the master of Lord Gambier’s
flag-ship _Caledonia_.
CHART C.
Constructed by M^r Stokes for the purposes of the Court Martial, and
exclusively adopted, though it narrows the channel to Aix Roads to _one
mile_ only, the official French Charts marking _two miles_.
[Illustration:
SKETCH OF D’AIX ANCHORAGE.
London: Richard Bentley, 1860.
]
This chart professed to show, and was sworn to by Mr. Stokes as showing,
the positions of the enemy’s ships aground _on the morning of the 12th
of April_, before the _Ocean_ three-decker, together with a group of
three outermost ships near her, had been permitted by the delay of the
Commander-in-chief to warp off and escape. Instead, however, of placing
these on his chart as they lay helplessly aground “nearest the deep
water” as _he had sworn in his evidence_, they were placed in on the
other side of the sand, in the positions occupied _after their escape!_
and _to this Mr. Stokes swore as their_ position _when first driven
ashore_! The _Ocean_ three-decker, and group in particular, which,
according to Mr. Stokes’s oral evidence, must, as already stated, have
been an easy prey to a gunboat had such been sent on the first quarter
instead of the last quarter flood, was thus placed on his chart where no
vessel could have approached them![22]
-----
Footnote 22:
Mr. Stokes, moreover swore, in his evidence, that the _Ocean_
three-decker lay _on the north-west edge of the Palles Shoal_, and
that the group lay on the _western_ part of the same shoal, though the
latter observation was incorrect, as the group lay around the Ocean,
which formed a part of it. On his chart these vessels are placed to
the SOUTH-EAST of the shoal, and _the remainder_ nearly DUE EAST!!
That is, in place of being “_nearest the deep water_,” where they were
easily attackable, they were placed on the chart “_farthest from the
deep water_,” where they were not attackable. He swore too that they
lay with their broadsides “_flanking the passage_” to Aix Roads. On
his chart, not one of them “flanks the passage,” but all are made to
_flank the opposite direction_; so that they could not have fired on
any British ship which might have been sent in.
-----
This falsehood on Mr. Stokes’s chart, in opposition to his oral evidence
just given, as well as to the evidence of other officers, formed one of
the principal grounds of Lord Gambier’s acquittal; and it was for this
end that the official French charts presented by me for the information
of the court were rejected by the judge-advocate.
On the presentation of Mr. Stokes’s chart to the court, the subjoined
colloquy took place as to the methods adopted in its construction.
MR. BICKNELL.—“Produce a chart or drawing of the anchorage at Isle
d’Aix, with the relative positions of the British and French fleets,
and other particulars, on and previous to the 12th of April last.”
_The Witness produced it._
MR. BICKNELL.—“Did you prepare this drawing, and from what documents,
authorities, and observations; and are the several matters delineated
therein accurately delineated, to the best of your knowledge and
belief?”
MR. STOKES.—“I prepared that _drawing_ (Chart C), partly from the
knowledge I gained in sounding to the southward of the Palles Shoal,
and the anchorage of the Isle of Aix.[23] _The outlines of the chart
are taken from the Neptune François_, and the position of the enemy’s
fleet from Mr. Edward Fairfax, and from the French captain of the
_Ville de Varsovie_, and the British fleet from my own observation.”
The distance between the sands was copied from a French MS. which will
be produced, and that _I take it_ is correct.
MR. BICKNELL.—“Are the matters and things therein accurately
described?”
MR. STOKES.—“They are.”
PRESIDENT (_inspecting Mr. Stokes’s chart_).—“There was a large chart
you lent me?”
MR. STOKES.—“That is the chart I allude to. This chart I produce as
containing the _various positions_.”
JUDGE-ADVOCATE (_to the President_).—“THIS CHART IS PRODUCED TO SAVE A
GREAT DEAL OF TROUBLE!!” (_Minutes_, pp. 23, 24.)
-----
Footnote 23:
In his subsequent evidence Mr. Stokes admitted that he had _never
sounded there at all_ previous to the action!
QUESTION.—“Had you any knowledge of that anchorage previous to the
12th of April?”
MR. STOKES.—“NONE WHATEVER!”—_Minutes_, p. 148.
He swears that everything on his chart is _accurately described_—then,
that “the distance between the sands,” which was one of the most
important points of the court-martial, _was copied from a French MS.!_
the name of whose author he does not think proper to communicate, nor
does the court ask him! nor was any MSS. produced in Court. Yet, as
master of the Admiral’s flagship, Mr. Stokes must have navigated her
by the French charts supplied by the Admiralty, though these when
tendered by me to the Court had been rejected. The fleet could, in
fact, have had no other for its guidance, as no British survey of Aix
Roads was in existence. Such charts were surely a better guide in any
case than an anonymous MSS.
-----
No doubt—the trouble of confirming the Commander-in-chief’s neglect of
duty in not following up a manifest advantage, as would have been shown
had the court allowed the _Neptune François itself_ to have been put, in
evidence; for it would have shown a clear passage of _two miles_ wide,
extending beyond reach of shot, instead of the _one mile_ passage in Mr.
Stokes’s “_accurate outlines_” of the French chart, and no shoal where
he had marked only twelve feet of water![24] That the president should
have allowed this to pass, after having himself detected the imposition
practised on the court, is a point upon which I will not comment.
-----
Footnote 24:
Compare charts A and C.
-----
Mr. Stokes further admitted his chart to be valueless, as regarded the
position of the enemy’s fleet ashore, for he said that position was
taken “_from Mr. Edward Fairfax and the captain of the Ville de
Varsovie_”, and the British fleet _from “his own observations._” That
is, he confessed to know nothing but from hearsay as to the position of
_the enemy’s fleet_, the important object before the court; but only of
the position _of the British fleet_, lying at anchor nine miles from the
enemy’s fleet ashore, a matter with which the court had nothing to do;
he being all the time on board the flagship, at that distance. Yet the
court insisted on this chart being _exclusively_ referred to throughout
the court-martial![25] It is strange that such a chart should have been
used at all, when the charts of the fleet were available, but more
strange that, when the court saw the two miles passage in the French
chart was reduced to little more than _one mile_ in Mr. Stokes’s chart,
he was not even asked the reason why he had not conformed to the scale
of the French chart, _to the correctness of the outlines of which he had
sworn_!
-----
Footnote 25:
The President thus dictated to Captain Beresford:—“Captain Beresford
_must_ say whether the ships are marked on _that_ chart (Mr. Stokes’s)
as they appeared to him.” Captain Beresford took no notice of the
order.
Captain Bligh was less independent when asked to vouch for the
accuracy of Mr. Stokes’s chart. He “_thinks_ the enemy’s ships, on the
morning of the 12th, were as there represented, though Mr. Stokes, in
contradiction to his own chart, had sworn _that they were not so
marked, but only those that were destroyed_!”
When asked if the ships aground could have annoyed the British ships
had they been sent in? Captain Bligh replied, “I _think_ they were
capable of annoying the British ships.”—_Minutes_, p. 154. He,
however, immediately afterwards stated that the ships “were not within
reach of the guns of the British squadron.”
Captain Kerr “_thinks_ the situation of the enemy’s fleet on the
morning of the 12th was marked on Mr. Stokes’s chart _as nearly as it
can be_. There were seven sail-of-the-line ashore, and two
afloat.”—_Minutes_, p. 166. What had the numbers ashore or afloat to
do with their exact position? A palpable evasion of the question was
permitted by the court.
-----
But the most glaring contradiction of Mr. Stokes’s chart is this: he
swore to his chart as truly depicting the positions of the _Ocean_ and
other grounded ships, as they lay _on the morning of the 12th of April,
which was the point before the Court_; but being further questioned,
reluctantly admitted that he had marked the _Ocean as she lay on the
13th of April_, viz. _on the following day when an attack was made on
her by the bomb vessel!_ though he had just sworn to the positions of
the ships on the chart as being those _on the morning of the 12th_,
immediately after having run ashore to escape destruction.
The fact was, as will be seen on inspection of the chart, that _not one_
of the ships under the cognizance of the court is marked on Stokes’s
chart as they lay on the morning of the 12th, which position, and not
that on the 13th, was the subject of inquiry. Though as already said
this misrepresentation was detected by the President, the court
nevertheless persisted in the exclusive use of Mr. Stokes’s chart
throughout the trial, in accordance with the suggestion of the
Judge-Advocate, that it was produced to “_save a great deal of
trouble_.”
The President thus commented on the manifest contradiction.
PRESIDENT.—“I observe in the chart I had from you the situation of the
_Ocean_ particularly is _not marked on the 12th. She is marked on the
13th as advanced up the Charente!_”
MR. STOKES.—“The _only ships_ marked on the chart _on the 12th are
those that were destroyed_. The reason I marked her on the 13th is,
that a particular attack was made on her by the bombs. _I observed her
from the mizentop of the Caledonia_[26], and I _also had an
observation from an officer_, so that I have no doubt her position is
put down within a cable’s length.” (_Minutes_ p. 147.)
-----
Footnote 26:
Nine miles off. This answer shows most forcibly the nature of the data
on which Mr. Stokes’s chart was constructed.
-----
There is something in this evidence almost too repugnant for
observation. Mr. Stokes first swore that his chart accurately described
the positions of the enemy’s ships ashore on the _morning of the 12th_.
He then admitted that the most material ship of the enemy’s fleet was
marked as she lay _on the 13th_!! On this mis-statement being detected
by the president, he then swore that the only ships marked on the 12th
were _those which were destroyed_, viz. _on the evening and night of the
12th!_—a matter foreign to the subject of inquiry; which was _how the
ships lay on the morning of the 12th, and whether Lord Gambier was to
blame for refraining from attacking them at that particular time_? So
that the positions of the enemy’s ships aground on the morning of the
12th, according to Mr. Stokes’s own admission, _were not marked on his
chart at all!_ though he had sworn to this very chart _as giving those
positions accurately to the best of his knowledge and belief_; and with
the full knowledge that their position on the _morning_ of the 12th,
when they were helplessly aground, was the point before the court,—not
their position _in the evening_, and on the following day after their
escape to a spot where the British ships could not have pursued them.
The fact is, Mr. Stokes swore to their positions _after their being
warped off in consequence of the British fleet being prematurely brought
to an anchor_—as being their positions _previous to their escape!_ which
was the matter of inquiry before the court, viz. as to whether the
Commander-in-chief had not committed a neglect of duty in permitting
them to escape _by the rising tide_, when and before when the British
force _could have operated with every advantage in its favour_. The
court had nothing whatever to inquire about with regard to the ships
which were _destroyed_, respecting which there could be no question; the
subject of inquiry being whether the escape of the _other_ ships run
ashore from terror of the explosion vessels on the night of the 11th,
and _still ashore_ on the morning of the 12th, ought to have been
prevented.
Not so much as one of the ships marked on Mr. Stokes’s chart formed part
of the “group” to which he had sworn, in his oral evidence, as lying on
the “western and northernmost edge of the Palles Shoal, _nearest the
deep water_, all of which escaped towards the Charente, where he truly
enough placed the _Ocean_ three-decker, but as she lay on the 13th
instead of the 12th, he having sworn to the truth of his chart as
showing her position on the morning of the 12th! It was a desperate
venture, and can only be accounted for by the supposition that, in
reality, Mr. Stokes had never seen the chart to which he was swearing.
It was no wonder, as proved in the first chapter, that Mr. Stokes
applied to the Admiralty for permission to _alter his chart_ before
producing it in a court of law, where it must have fallen under my
inspection!
I will indeed so far exonerate Mr. Stokes from a portion of blame, by
declaring my belief that he never had looked at the chart to which he
had sworn. There is little question in my mind but that this chart had
been fabricated under the auspices of Mr. Lavie, Lord Gambier’s
solicitor, the only hope of success consisting in affirming a false
position for the grounded ships; the chart being then given to Stokes
for paternity. Had it been otherwise, Stokes could not possibly have
sworn to a chart in diametrical opposition to his oral evidence, which
truly stated that on the morning of the 12th, the _Ocean_ and group lay
on “_the north-west edge of the Palles shoal, nearest the deep water_,”
where they were easily attackable. On his chart they were placed on the
_opposite side of the shoal!_ where no ship could have got near them.
Lord Gambier no doubt saw the mistake committed by the evidence of his
Master, and adroitly relieved him from the dilemma, by putting a
question of a totally different nature. With this course the court
complacently complied, notwithstanding that the president had detected a
discrepancy so glaring.
Another material point on Mr. Stokes’s chart was his marking _a shoal_
between the Boyart and the Palles Sands, where Capt. Broughton and
others present in the action, who _actually sounded there_, testify in
corroboration of the French chart to there being _no shoal
whatever_.[27] Yet Mr. Stokes marks only from twelve to sixteen feet, in
the deepest part. That this statement was a misrepresentation on the
part of Mr. Stokes, is proved by Lord Gambier himself, who, in his
defence, says that “Mr. Stokes found on this bar or bank from _fourteen
to nineteen feet”_ (_Minutes_, p. 134). When closely questioned on the
point, Mr. Stokes deposed to these soundings as “_having been reported
to him to have been found_”! (_Minutes_, p. 150.) The _Neptune François_
gives from twenty to thirty feet at low water, which was no doubt
correct.
-----
Footnote 27:
See p. 68.
-----
But even had there been only nineteen feet of water Mr. Stokes again
forgot his chart when he gave _oral_ evidence that “the rise of tide in
Aix Roads is _twenty-one_ feet, which is more than we ever found in
Basque Roads” (_Minutes_, p. 150). I had put the rise of tide at _twelve
feet_ only, so that by the oral evidence of Mr. Stokes there was
abundance of water for the British force to have operated with full
effect.
A still further falsification of the chart was, that it reduced the
channel by which the British fleet must have passed to the attack to
little more than _a mile_ in width, in defiance of the fact that on all
the official French charts the minimum distance between the Boyart Sand
and the fortifications on Ile d’Aix was nearly _two miles_, and that
Admiral Stopford, the second admiral in command, confirmed the
correctness of the French charts so far as to admit a width of _a mile
and a half_. The object of Mr. Stokes’s statement was to prove the
danger to which, in a channel _only a mile wide_, the British ships
would have been exposed from the batteries on Ile d’Aix had they been
sent to the attack. To this end was the chart no doubt produced, and as
narrowing the channel to a mile only—to meet the occasion—gave a colour
to this view, his chart was accepted by the court, whilst the French
charts which _marked two miles_, were rejected.
A yet more flagrant contradiction is—that within pistol shot of the
_western_ and _north-western_ edge of the Palles Shoal, where Mr. Stokes
first truly swore “the _Ocean_ three-decker and a group of four lay
_aground_ on the morning of the 12th,” he has placed _the attacking
British ships_, where their logs show that they never touched the
ground, notwithstanding that they took up their positions on a _falling
tide_. If they could float in safety much more could other ships have
done so at 11 A.M on _a rising tide?_ How such a manifest discrepancy
could have passed without comment from any member of the court-martial,
is a point which is not in my power to explain.
Such are some of the leading features of this famous chart, upon which
the acquittal of Lord Gambier was made to rest, though the chart was
admittedly constructed—not from personal observation, otherwise than
from the mizentop of the _Caledonia_, nine miles off—but from unofficial
sources—from an anonymous manuscript, and _even from hearsay_!
Yet Lord Gambier did not scruple to introduce this chart for the
guidance of the court, in the following terms:
“I have to call the attention of the Court to the plan drawn by Lord
Cochrane of the position of the enemy’s ships as they _lay aground on
the morning of the 12th of April_, and to that position marked upon
the chart verified by Mr. Stokes; the former laid down from uncertain
data, the latter _from angles measured and other observations made on
the spot_[28]; the difference between the two is too apparent to
escape the notice of the Court, and the respective merits of these
charts will not, I think, admit of a comparison.” (_Minutes_, p. 133.)
-----
Footnote 28:
See note, p. 26.
-----
This statement was made by Lord Gambier in face of the admission
previously made by Mr. Stokes, that his observations were taken from the
mizentop of the _Caledonia_, three leagues off—that he had never sounded
in Aix Roads—that the soundings were only reported to him, the name of
the reporter being omitted—and that he had only marked upon his chart,
“_the ships that were destroyed_” on the evening and during the night of
the 12th, the destruction, in fact, not being complete till the morning
of the 13th.
This contradiction is so important to a right comprehension of what
follows, that I will, at the risk of prolixity, bring into one focus Mr.
Stokes’s admissions as to his _data_ for the construction of his chart.
“I prepared that drawing partly from the knowledge I gained _in
sounding_ to the southward of the Palles Shoal. The outlines of the
chart are taken from the _Neptune François_ (narrowed from two miles
to one!). The positions of the enemy’s fleet are from Mr. Fairfax and
the captain of the _Ville de Varsovie_. For the distance between the
sands I must refer the court to a chart _which I copied from a French
manuscript_!” (_Minutes_, pp. 23, 24.)
For this confused jumble from unauthoritative sources, the French charts
were rejected as not being trustworthy, and Lord Gambier did not
hesitate to endorse Mr. Stokes’s fabrication as being “from angles
measured and other observations taken on the spot;” whilst by this act
he decried the use of the French charts by which his own fleet had been
guided!
Comment, whether on Lord Gambier’s statement or on Mr. Stokes’s
involuntary contradiction thereof in his oral evidence, is superfluous.
If such were wanted, it must be sought for in the fact already adduced
in the first chapter, viz. that, in 1817 and 1818, Mr. Stokes, when
conscious that his fabrication must become public, and that it might
fall into my hands, thought it prudent to make affidavit before the
Court of Admiralty that this chart, produced at the court-martial nine
years before, _was incorrect_, and _therefore required alteration!!_ for
which purpose the Admiralty gave him back his chart, though this, as
already observed, remains to this day bound up amongst the Admiralty
records. The affidavits of Mr. Stokes will be in the remembrance of the
reader.
In a national point of view, Mr. Stokes’s chart has another and even
more important feature. A comparison between the French chart and that
produced by Mr. Stokes will show that the latter narrowed the entrance
to Aix Roads—which on the French charts is two miles wide—to one mile,
and that it filled a space with shoals where scarcely a shoal existed.
Of the imaginativeness of Mr. Stokes in this respect, the French
Government appears to have taken a very justifiable naval advantage,
calculated to deter any British admiral in future from undertaking in
Aix Roads offensive operations of any kind.
A chart of the Aix Roads based on a modern French chart has recently
been shown me, as on the point of being issued by the Board of
Admiralty, on which chart the main channel between Ile d’Aix and the
Boyart sand is laid down according to charts copied from fabricated
charts produced on Lord Gambier’s court-martial, and not according to
the hydrographic charts of the _Neptune François_. The comparatively
clear anchorage shown in the new chart is also filled with Mr. Stokes’s
imaginary shoals! the result being that no British admiral, if guided by
the new chart, would trust his ships in Aix Roads _at all_, though both
under Admiral Knowles and at the attack in 1809 British ships found no
difficulty whatever from want of water, or other causes, when once
ordered in.
CHART D.
Constructed by M^r Fairfax and produced for the guidance of the Court
Martial. Like Stokes’s Chart, it narrows the channel to Aix Roads from
_two miles_ to _one mile_ though also like him professing to be an exact
outline of the French Official Chart.]
[Illustration: London Richard Bentley, 1860]
The solution of the matter is not difficult. For the purpose of
deterring a future British fleet from entering Aix Roads, the modern
French Government appears to have followed the chart of Mr. Stokes in
place of their former official chart; and the British Admiralty, having
no opportunity of surveying the anchorage in question, has copied this
modern French chart; so that in future the fabrications of Mr. Stokes or
rather I should say, the ingenuity of Lord Gambier’s solicitor, or
whoever may have palmed the chart on Mr. Stokes, will form the best
possible security to one of the most exposed anchorages on the Atlantic
coast of France. Assuredly no British Admiral, with the new chart in his
hands,—should such be issued—would for a moment think of operating in
such an anchorage as is there laid down, notwithstanding that former
British fleets have operated in perfect safety so far as soundings were
concerned.
CHART D
was constructed by Mr. Fairfax, the Master of the Fleet, and was used by
the Court as confirmatory of Mr. Stokes’s chart, agreeing with it, in
fact, on nearly every point; a circumstance not at all extraordinary, as
in his examination Mr. Stokes first says that “his _marks_ arose from
the knowledge he gained in sounding in the anchorage of Aix” (_Minutes_,
p. 23), whilst Mr. Fairfax swore that he “GAVE MR. STOKES THE
MARKS.”!![29] A fact subsequently proved by Mr. Stokes, who admitted
that he had “_never sounded there at all._” The credibility of either
witness may be left to the reader’s judgment.
-----
Footnote 29:
I GAVE MR. STOKES THE MARKS!!! and I have all the different angles _in
my pocket_, with the different soundings! (_Mr. Fairfax’s Evidence,
Minutes_, p. 140.) This evidence is truly wonderful. Yet the Court
made no comment! and I was excluded from listening to the evidence!
-----
In one respect, the chart of Mr. Fairfax might have been considered by
those interested to be an improvement on that of Mr. Stokes. The latter
gentleman had narrowed the _two mile_ channel of the French charts to a
_little more than a mile_, but the chart of Mr. Fairfax reduces it to _a
mile_ only!
Mr. Fairfax’s chart was introduced to the Court with the same flourish
as had been that of Mr. Stokes.
MR. FAIRFAX.—“This chart shows the state of the enemy’s ships at
daylight on the 12th of April. _This chart is correct_, except that
the head of the _Calcutta_ is placed by the engraver _too far to the
southward_. It should have been about N.W. by compass, and the head of
the three decker _Ocean_ is to the eastward, but _not sufficiently far
to the northward by compass_.”
Not much correctness here, but abundance of misrepresentation. Mr.
Fairfax is very particular about the positions of the _heads_ of the
grounded ships, but, like Mr. Stokes, not at all particular to a league
or two as to where they lay aground. For instance, he is very sensitive
about the position of the _Ocean’s_ head, yet the _Ocean_ herself is
_not to be found on his chart_!! though the names of other enemy’s ships
aground, not far from where she had lain before her escape, are given,
to mark the care with which the chart had been constructed!
I will not in this place make any further observations upon Mr.
Fairfax’s chart, this being identical with that of Mr. Stokes. The
exposure of the one in the next chapter will serve for the confutation
of the other. The reader will, from what has been stated, be able to
form a pretty correct idea as to why—in, and subsequently to
1809—inspection of these charts was refused to me. At that period it was
in vain that I published explanations, which, without access to the
charts, were incomprehensible to the public; my unsupported
declarations, as has been said, falling to the ground unheeded, even if
they were not the cause of attributing to me malicious motives towards
the commander-in-chief, after his acquittal by sentence of a
court-martial. But for the consideration of his Grace the Duke of
Somerset a stigma must have followed me to the grave. It is now
otherwise, and I am content to leave the matter to the judgment of
posterity. I must, however, remark, that neither the charts of Mr.
Stokes or Mr. Fairfax were shown to me on the court-martial, though
shown to nearly every other witness, one—Capt. Beresford—being told that
he “_must_” base his observations on those charts. Had they been shown
to me, I should in an instant have detected their fallacy.
CHAP. XXVI.
A NAVAL STUDY—(continued).
THE EVIDENCE OF OFFICERS PRESENT IN BASQUE ROADS.—ADMIRAL AUSTEN’S
OPINIONS CONFIRMATORY OF MY STATEMENTS—FALLACY OF ALLEGED REWARDS TO
MYSELF, IN PLACE OF THESE PERSECUTIONS.—TREATMENT OF MY ELDEST SON
LORD COCHRANE.—LETTER FROM CAPT. HUTCHINSON COMFIRMATORY OF THE
ENEMY’S PANIC.—A MIDSHIPMAN NEAR TAKING THE FLAG-SHIP.—EVIDENCE OF
CAPT. SEYMOUR, CONCLUSIVE AS TO NEGLECT, WHICH WAS THE MATTER TO BE
INQUIRED INTO, IN NOT SENDING SHIPS TO ATTACK.—ATTEMPT TO WEATHER
HIS EVIDENCE.—CAPT. MALCOLM’S EVIDENCE CONFIRMATORY OF CAPT.
SEYMOUR’S.—CAPT. BROUGHTON’S TESTIMONY PROVES THE COMPLETE PANIC OF
THE ENEMY, AND THE WORTHLESSNESS OF THEIR FORTIFICATIONS.—LORD
GAMBIER DECLARES THEM EFFICIENT ON SUPPOSITION ARISING FROM
HEARSAY.—ENEMY UNABLE TO FIGHT THEIR GUNS.—THE IMAGINARY SHOAL.—A
GREAT POINT MADE OF IT.—MR. FAIRFAX’S MAP—LORD GAMBIER ON THE
EXPLOSION VESSELS.—CONTRADICTED BY MR. FAIRFAX.—CONTRAST OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE STATEMENTS.—FAIRFAX’S EVASIONS.—HIS LETTER TO THE “NAVAL
CHRONICLE.”—THESE MATTERS A WARNING TO THE SERVICE.
The matters related in the preceding chapter will appear yet more
extraordinary when contrasted with, and confirmed by, the evidence of
eminent officers present in the action of Aix Roads; that is, of such
officers commanding ships as were permitted to give their testimony, for
those who were suspected of not approving the Commander-in-chief’s
conduct, _were not summoned to give evidence before the court-martial_!
In one instance—that of Captain Maitland, of the _Bellerophon_, whose
opinions on the subject had been freely expressed—this gallant officer
was ordered to join the squadron in Ireland, so as to render his
testimony unavailable.
To a gallant officer still living, Admiral Sir Francis William Austen,
K.C.B., who was present in Basque Roads, but, like other eminent
officers, _not examined on the court-martial_, I am indebted for a
recently-expressed opinion as to the causes why the majority of the
enemy’s ships were suffered to escape beyond reach of attack, as well as
of the persecution which I afterwards underwent, in consequence of my
conscientious opposition to a vote of thanks to the Commander-in-chief.
The following is an extract from the gallant Admiral’s letter:—
“I have lately been reading your book, the ‘Autobiography of a
Seaman,’ and cannot resist the desire I feel of stating how much
pleasure I derived from its perusal, especially of that part which has
reference to the movements of the fleet in the Mediterranean from 1798
to 1800. Having been serving for the greater part of those years on
that station, your narrative excited in my mind a vivid recollection
of former times—as it were living that part of my life over again.
“With reference to the latter part of the volume which details the
proceedings in the attack on the enemy’s squadron in the Charente, I
wish to say as little as possible which may inculpate the conduct of
the Commander-in-chief, to whom, as you probably know, I owe a debt of
gratitude for his kindness to me.
“But at the same time I cannot but admit that he appears to me to have
acted injudiciously. It would have been far better had he moved the
squadron to a position just out of reach of the batteries on Isle
d’Aix, when he would have been able to see the position of the enemy’s
ships, and thus have decided for himself whether they could have been
attacked without needless risk, and not have been compelled to form
his determination entirely on the report of others.[30]
Footnote 30:
Who were more interested in the failure of the action than its
success, from the fact shown in the first volume of the ill-feeling
manifested towards me in consequence of my being a junior officer
temporarily appointed, though against my own will, and after all
others had declined the enterprise.
“Had he done so, it seems probable that he would have seen things in a
different point of view, and decided to send in a force sufficient to
have captured or destroyed the whole.
“I must, in conscience, declare that I do not think you were properly
supported, and that had you been so the result would have been very
different. _Much of what occurred I attribute to Lord Gambier’s being
influenced by persons about him who would have been ready to sacrifice
the honour of their country to the gratification of personal dislike
to yourself, and the annoyance they felt at a junior officer being
employed in the service._[31]
“I will only add that I consider your services in the _Speedy_,
_Pallas_, and _Impérieuse_ will entitle you to the warmest thanks of
your country, as well as to the highest honours which have been
awarded for similar services. Instead of which, you have in numerous
instances been persecuted in the most cruel and unrelenting manner.
“I desire to subscribe myself, with much respect and esteem,
“My dear Lord Dundonald,
“Yours very faithfully,
“FRANCIS W. AUSTEN.
“Admiral the Earl of Dundonald.”
-----
Footnote 31:
Though I had suggested the plan, after all other suggestions had
failed to satisfy the Board of Admiralty.
-----
If anything could alleviate the remembrance of the bitter persecutions
originating with this one-sided court-martial, it is an unsolicited
expression of opinion like that of the gallant Admiral Austen, whose
name, for evident reasons, was _not_ included in the list of those
summoned to give testimony on that remarkable occasion. That other
gallant officers still living entertain similar sentiments, I make no
doubt, for the simple reasons that, as honourable men, it is impossible
for them to entertain other opinions. What would have been the result of
the court-martial had such testimony as that of Admiral Austen been
permitted, may safely be left to public decision.
The gallant Admiral and the naval public at large will perhaps be
surprised to learn that my persecutions have not ceased at this day.
Despite my restoration to rank and honours, my banner has never been
restored to its place in Henry the Seventh’s Chapel, the unjust fine
inflicted on me in 1814 has never been remitted, nor other rights
withheld during my forced expulsion from the Navy conceded; the excuse
being want of precedent, though with that of the gallant Sir Robert
Wilson fresh in the archives of the nation.[32]
Footnote 32:
This fact, together with the particulars of Sir Robert Wilson’s
restoration, was obligingly communicated to me by that distinguished
patriot Joseph Hume, together with a letter expressive of his surprise
that my restoration had not been rendered complete. This letter and
the enclosures will be given in another place.
A few words may here be devoted to a point intimately connected with
this subject. In several reviews on the first volume of this work, the
public has been told of the handsome rewards which have been bestowed
for my services. The reader will perhaps be scarcely prepared to learn,
in answer to such statements, that with the exception of the ordinary
good service pension granted for general service in 1844, thirty-five
years after the action in Aix Roads, I never in my life received a
recompense from my country in any shape, the Order of the Bath alone
excepted. For my services in the _Pallas_, that of destroying three
heavily-armed French corvettes at the embouchure of the Garonne, and
cutting out the _Tapageuse_—all performed in one day—not a shilling was
awarded to myself, officers, and crew, though in the late war with
Russia I have been told that the destruction of a Russian gunboat was
scrupulously paid for. For my services on the coast of Catalonia in the
_Impérieuse_, to which Lord Collingwood testified that, single-handed, I
had stopped the advance of a French army, not a farthing was conceded,
whilst the thanks of Lord Collingwood were the only expressions of the
kind ever awarded for what English historians have eulogised even more
highly than did his Lordship.
For the partial destruction of the enemy’s fleet in Aix Roads not a
farthing was given to myself, officers, or crew; but nine years
afterwards, when told that I might take my share of head-money with the
rest of the fleet, I replied by refusing both the offer and the money,
on the ground that the ships only which took part in the action had a
right to it.
The reader will pardon this brief digression, which has arisen from
Admiral Austen’s allusions to the persecutions unworthily inflicted on
me, and I have chosen the opportunity to set the public right on a
subject which has been much misapprehended, to the detriment of myself
and family. Neither directly nor indirectly have my services throughout
my whole career ever cost the country a _penny_ beyond the ordinary pay
and the ordinary good service pension to which my rank entitled me; nor
did any of my family ever receive a place under government, other than
that to which they have risen in the ordinary course of naval
promotion.[33] After this positive assurance on my part, I feel
confident that the portion of the press which has expressed an opinion
that “I had been amply rewarded for my services,” will do me the justice
to acknowledge an unintentional error.
Footnote 33:
My third son is a post-captain, and my youngest a commander in the
navy, both having won their rank by services in action. With regard to
my eldest son, Lord Cochrane, the public shall judge of the favour
shown to him on my account. He was originally placed in the navy, in
which he served four years, but was driven from the service by the
animosity excited by the imputations against his father. After this he
entered the army, in which he served eighteen years. He was engaged
throughout the Canadian rebellion, and subsequently for eight
consecutive years in the pestilential climate of China during the war.
He there served under Lord Clyde, acted as aide-de-camp to
Major-General D’Aguilar, and subsequently as Quartermaster-General.
His health having at length broken down under the arduous nature of
his duties—he having been, as I have reason to believe, the only
officer who remained for so long a period on a station proverbially
unhealthy—he was ordered home on sick leave, and had to undergo the
unusual mortification of being periodically, and that too at short
intervals, ordered to appear before the Medical Board in London. This
was actual persecution, nor did it cease till Major-General D’Aguilar
himself went to the Horse Guards and remonstrated against such conduct
being pursued towards an officer whom he had sent home as being worn
out by eight consecutive years’ hard duty. On my son’s asking for an
unattached majority _by purchase_, he was told that his length of
service, from 1833 to 1851, was insufficient, notwithstanding that he
gave the precedent of earlier promotion in the case of an officer who
had married the daughter of the Master-General of the Ordnance, and
who got his majority in eleven years. Finding no prospect of
promotion, my son sold out, quitting the army as a captain, as the
state of his health did not warrant him in returning to his regiment.
I adduce this as a specimen of the kind of reward bestowed on me or my
family.
Since the receipt of Admiral Austen’s letter, I have been favoured with
another, from Capt. Hutchinson, who, at the time of the action in Aix
Roads, was a lieutenant in the _Valiant_, one of the two line-of-battle
ships reluctantly sent to the assistance of the _Impérieuse_, when
engaged single-handed with three of the enemy’s ships. Captain
Hutchinson was, therefore, in action throughout the whole affair, but,
like Admirals Austen and Maitland, _was not summoned to give evidence on
the court-martial_.
Capt. Hutchinson’s letter, whether in point of fact or ability, deserves
to be put on record as a proof that when naval officers have the
opportunity of speaking their minds on any subject connected with their
noble profession, there are few amongst them who will let self-interest
outweigh the honour of the service. So complete is the information
voluntarily given by Capt. Hutchinson, with whom I have not the pleasure
of being even personally acquainted, that it might have saved me much of
the lengthened critical explanation into which my sense of duty to the
naval service, as well as to my own reputation, has compelled me to
enter. As a further corroboration of my own proofs, written before the
reception of Capt. Hutchinson’s letter, I can only tell that gallant
officer how highly I appreciate it, and shall be surprised if the rest
of my brother officers do not form the same judgment.
Cumberland House, Chilham, Canterbury,
June 8th, 1860.
“MY LORD,
“I have read, with very great interest, the first volume of your
Autobiography, and if the second is not yet published, it is possible
that what I have to communicate may be of some service in any further
notice you may give of the attack upon the French fleet in Aix Roads.
I would not otherwise have taken the liberty of writing merely to
express the interest taken in your Memoirs, since I can only entertain
_that_ in common with every naval officer who has any true love for
his profession, and of esteem for those who have so eminently adorned
it by their gallantry and skill.
“I was fifth or junior lieutenant of the _Valiant_, on the mortifying
occasion above mentioned, and can bear testimony _to the indignation
which pervaded the whole fleet in witnessing the total want of
enterprise, and even common sense of duty, which then permitted so
many of the enemy’s ships to escape, when they were entirely at our
mercy_.
“I have, however, to mention some circumstances which may throw light
upon the mystified despatch of Lord Gambier, which certainly surprised
all those who were present. In the first place, Lord Gambier can have
given no _positive_ orders to Capt. Bligh of the _Valiant_ to _attack_
the French ships which were aground at the time indicated in the
despatch, for after we had anchored off the Boyart Shoal, Capt. Bligh,
seeing you go in with the _Impérieuse_ _unsupported_ (after waiting
some time, expecting to be _ordered_ by the Commander-in-chief to
assist you) went in his gig on board the _Caledonia_ to _volunteer his
services_. Lord Gambier expressed himself greatly obliged, but said
some other ship must accompany, upon which Capt. Bligh selected the
_Revenge_, from regard for Capt. Kerr, who had been acting for him in
the _Valiant_ some time before, when he had occasion to go on leave of
absence for private affairs.
“We accordingly ran in, as your Lordship has detailed, and I have
nothing to remark as to what followed but one circumstance, of which
your Lordship does not appear to have been aware. No doubt you would
have observed that on the evening of the 12th the crews of the _Ocean_
and two other enemy’s line-of-battle ships near her, were evidently
_flying from them in a panic, numerous boats from the shore assisting
in conveying them from the ships_.
“This was so apparent that our Captain, Bligh, went in his gig, with
two other Captains, as soon as it was dark, to reconnoitre these
ships, with a view to take possession of them with boats, if they were
deserted.
“These Captains returned, however, reporting that they had found them
surrounded by boats, &c., and that, consequently, they could not be
attacked. In the morning, however, no boats were near them, nor were
any persons seen stirring on board them; and it was not till about ten
o’clock, I think, that the crews, _finding that we had not taken
possession, took courage, ventured to return on board their ships, and
immediately began to warp them out of our reach_.
“Captain Bligh was a man of the firmest nerve I ever knew, and
therefore I can only suppose that the boats he saw were still engaged
carrying the crews on shore, though I believe it was at least ten
o’clock at night when he went to reconnoitre, and I know we were
greatly puzzled at the time to account for the presence of these
boats. As a proof that these ships _were_ totally deserted that night,
I need only refer your Lordship to the account of Admiral Gravière,
quoted by you, where he says, ‘_The panic was so great, that ships
which had not even been attacked were abandoned by their crews_.’
“But, my Lord, we heard soon after this disgraceful affair, by means
of some French vessel which had been boarded or taken, that such was
the case. I do not now perfectly recollect _how_ this information
reached us, but we had no doubt of the fact at the time, it being only
in accordance with our own observations and conjectures. I exceedingly
regret that I did not make note of this at the time, but the belief in
the fact of the crews having deserted those three ships was so general
and undoubted, that it never occurred to me that it might be
questioned.
“The report went further, and added one singular circumstance—that
there was _one_ man who _did_ remain when all the remainder of the
crews had quitted. This was a quarter-master on board the _Ocean_,
who, indignant at the cowardly desertion of the ships, _hid himself_,
when the crews were ordered to quit, and this was the salvation of
that three-decker and the two other ships, in a very extraordinary
way. A little midshipman belonging to one of our smaller vessels (I
believe a brig) had been sent in a jolly-boat that night with a
message to another ship, and having delivered it, instead of returning
immediately to his own vessel, he proposed to his men to go and look
at the French ships from which the crews had been seen to fly. His men
of course were willing, and they approached cautiously _very near_ to
the three-decker (the night was very dark) before they could observe
any stir on board or around her. They were then suddenly hailed by the
quarter-master before mentioned with a loud “Qui vive!” Of course the
poor little midshipman took it for granted that the ship was occupied
by more than that one man, and he hastily retreated, glad to escape
capture himself; but had he known the truth, _that little midshipman,
with his jolly-boat and four men, might have taken possession of a
three-decker and two seventy-fours_!
“This seems more like a story of romance than an actual occurrence,
and I greatly regret that I did not then make note of every name and
circumstance, which at this distance of time I cannot call to mind,
but I have never entertained any doubts as to the facts here detailed,
and I have always mentioned them in speaking of that most
unsatisfactory affair of Basque Roads. Admiral Gravière’s account is a
positive confirmation of what we observed and fully believed as to the
abandonment of the ships, and I only wonder that he should not have
mentioned the noble conduct of the quarter-master.
“Admiral Gravière, however, would probably not have heard of the
approach of the boat, and the quarter-master himself would not perhaps
have reflected upon the possible danger the ships were in from the
approach of only _one little boat_; yet if he had not been there to
hail that boat, it is more than probable that the little midshipman
would have continued cautiously to approach, till he discovered that
the ships were entirely deserted, and he would either have ventured to
take possession himself, or would certainly have returned to report
the circumstance, and a proper force would have been despatched to
take advantage of the abandonment, if it had been found to be as he
reported.
“It was the supposed abandonment of the ships, indeed, which induced
him to approach them at all, and it was this also which induced Capt.
Bligh to reconnoitre. These, my Lord, are the only circumstances I had
to communicate, and no doubt they will be in some degree interesting,
though not wholly satisfactory, from my inability to establish the
perfect correctness and truth of them. I _have_ not, and never _had_,
any doubt myself, though I am by no means inclined to believe
cock-and-bull stories. Of one thing I am very certain, that there was
a universal conviction, that, but for the ingenious ruse adopted by
your lordship of _running in singly with the Impérieuse, and then
making a signal of distress, or rather of want of assistance, nothing
whatever would have been effected against the French fleet_.
“I remain, my Lord,
“Your very obedient servant,
“CHAS. HUTCHINSON, Capt. R.N.
“The Right Honble. the Earl of Dundonald.”
To return to the testimony of eminent officers at the court-martial, by
which evidence Admiral Austen and Captain Hutchinson will be pleased to
find their disinterested opinions corroborated.
The first evidence adduced shall be that of another distinguished
officer, also still living, viz. Admiral Sir George Francis Seymour,
K.C.B., G.C.H., who commanded the _Pallas_ frigate at the action in Aix
Roads, and remained by me when the line-of-battle ships left the roads
on the morning of the 13th of April.[34]
-----
Footnote 34:
See vol. i. p. 392.
-----
An attempt was made to stop the evidence of Captain Seymour nearly at
its commencement, by Lord Gambier remarking that he had “_no further
questions to propose to Captain Seymour_;” who however promptly asked
whether he was not “bound by his oath to relate _every circumstance_
within his knowledge, respecting the proceedings of the fleet.”
(_Minutes_, p. 190.)
To this pertinent query the President replied; “If the questions that
_are asked you_ should not seem to embrace all the circumstances _to
which it refers_, you are still bound to relate them.” (_Minutes_, p.
190.)
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“From what period am I to give my answer?”
_President._—“From the time of your being _sent in to attack the
enemy_, and your having remained there.”
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“_Without going back to the 11th?_”
PRESIDENT.—“No! _I take it from your going in on the 12th._”
(_Minutes_, p. 193.)
The President thus authoritatively stopped Captain Seymour from saying a
single word relative to the neglect of the Commander-in-chief in not
having sent ships to the attack before the _Ocean_ and group floated
away, as the _Pallas_ and the other vessels were withheld until the
_afternoon of the 12th_. This, however, did not prevent Captain Seymour
from taking the course which he had evidently proposed to himself.
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“I think the ships _might_ have floated in sooner; that
they might have come in on the last half of the flood-tide.”[35]
PRESIDENT.—“How much sooner would that have been than the time they
actually did go in?”
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“At eleven o’clock.”
PRESIDENT.—“What time did the line-of-battle ships go in?”
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“Within a short time after two o’clock.” (_Minutes_, p.
193.)
-----
Footnote 35:
Which rose as high as the last quarter of the ebb tide, when two
line-of-battle ships were sent in and remained without grounding.
-----
These three hours made all the difference in the result of the action,
and were in fact the point of inquiry before the court. At eleven
o’clock the whole fleet came to an anchor in Little Basque Roads,
instead of detaching a force to attack the enemy, as Captain Seymour
testifies they _might_ have done. The French ships were at that time
helplessly aground. Seeing the British fleet come to an anchor, the
enemy took heart, and strained every nerve to warp off, in which, being
unmolested, they succeeded—by throwing their guns and stores
overboard—and soon after _one o’clock_ had _effected their escape_.
At _two o’clock_—seeing me go in with the _Impérieuse_, in order to
prevent the other ships from escaping also, and rightly appreciating the
risk I was running single-handed, the Commander-in-chief then, but not
till then, reluctantly sent in two line-of-battle ships and some
frigates, and this only after repeated signals—the final one necessarily
being _in want of assistance_. So that _no attack_ was made on the
enemy’s ships till _after_ the escape of the _Ocean_, and all those
nearest the deep water, though these were most easily attackable; nor
would any attack have been made _at all_, but for my last signal. Had
Admiral Seymour been permitted to speak to this point, his evidence
would have been most conclusive, as the President must have seen when he
ordered the witness to speak only as to what occurred _after_ he was
sent in; that is, after the French ships had escaped, which was the
subject of inquiry, about which Admiral Seymour was thus ordered to say
nothing!
This forms, in fact, the history of the whole affair; three French ships
only being attacked in the afternoon, after all the outermost had been
quietly permitted to heave off and escape during the morning, and with a
rising tide in favour of the British force. Captain Seymour’s highly
honourable pertinacity in giving the above important opinion as to what
was clearly the duty of the Commander-in-chief at _eleven o’clock_,
after he had been cautioned by the President not to speak of anything
which occurred previous to _two o’clock_, when the _Pallas_ was sent in,
will be regarded—as it deserves to be regarded—in the light of truth and
honour holding itself superior to power. For the sake of the service no
less than for that of Admiral Seymour, I am proud to record this
instance in which self-interest weighed nothing in comparison with the
interest of the country, and the service which Captain Seymour evidently
considered to be at stake.
This reply of Captain Seymour took the Court by surprise, as opening the
very point sought to be avoided. This led to the subjoined angry
remonstrance from Admiral Young.
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“The general question is not meant to subject the
general conduct of the Commander-in-chief to the opinions of all the
officers serving under his command. If you think the two ships
(_Revenge_ and _Valiant_) not going in so early as you think they
might have floated to be an instance of neglect, it is your duty to
state it, that we may _inquire into it_, and hear _any other evidence_
upon it.”
The tendency and peculiarity of this remark to Captain Seymour, is
worthy of note. It more than insinuates that he was incapable of forming
a correct judgment, and plainly tells him that his evidence will go for
nothing, but “_to hear any other evidence_” upon it. A perusal of the
minutes of the court-martial will show the meaning of this expression,
viz. that when any officer in command spoke his mind on the subject, the
next witness was a master or other inferior officer _to contradict his
evidence_. For this purpose masters and others were recalled over and
over again—which is one of the most curious features of the
court-martial.
Captain Seymour had said nothing about the _two ships_, but that _the
ships_—meaning the British line-of-battle ships—might have gone in to
the attack at _eleven o’clock_, and thus replied to the insinuation.
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“I have already stated that I cannot say it was
misconduct. I STATE THE FACT AND LEAVE THE COURT TO JUDGE.”
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“You state an opinion that _the fleet_ would have
floated in at eleven o’clock.”
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“Yes, THAT THERE WAS WATER ENOUGH.”
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“Is that all you mean to say, that there would have
been water enough for them to have floated in?”
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“Yes. That is all I _have_ said.”
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“When you say that the ships of the line would have
floated in at eleven o’clock, do you mean to speak to the depth of
water alone?”
CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“I confine myself to the _meaning of the words_, that
there WOULD HAVE BEEN WATER ENOUGH FOR THE LINE-OF-BATTLE SHIPS TO
HAVE FLOATED IN. That is what I mean to say. With regard to the
opposition they would have met with, THE COURT HAVE AS MUCH BEFORE
THEM AS I HAVE.”[36] (_Minutes_, p. 195.)
-----
Footnote 36:
Two ships of the enemy’s line afloat, viz. the _Foudroyant_ and
_Cassard_!! “These,” said Lord Gambier in his defence, “_must have
entirely crippled every one of our ships in their approach through so
narrow a channel_. Besides which, _some of the grounded ships were
upright!!_ and could have brought their guns to bear on the entrance.”
(Lord Gambier’s Defence, _Minutes_, p. 125.) Two enemy’s ships, both
of which made sail for the Charente the moment the escaped ships had
got off, “_must have entirely crippled_” a powerful British
squadron!!!
-----
That is, in Captain Seymour’s opinion, the fleet ought to have proceeded
to the attack at eleven o’clock instead of then coming to an anchor, and
by that act, giving the enemy’s ships aground ample time to warp off and
escape, which they would not otherwise have attempted; a point on which
all French writers agree.
Attention must here be drawn to Admiral Young’s constantly repeated
expression “_floated in_.” The expression appears to have been used, not
more to prevent Captain Seymour from using any other, than to convey the
idea that there was no room in the Channel for operations, but that the
ships, if sent to the attack, must have _floated_ or _drifted_ in,
exposed to the fire of the enemy, had Lord Gambier directed them so to
do!
At the conclusion of Captain Seymour’s evidence, so clear and so
conclusive, the Commander-in-chief had the bad taste to remark that he
“_did not consider it of the least consequence_!” (_Minutes_, p. 196.)
An opinion in which posterity will assuredly not coincide.
I must here repeat that I was not permitted to be present in the court
during the examination of the witnesses, _or to know who had been
summoned to appear_, the evidence of Captain Seymour, and that of
several other eminent officers, would not have been taken at all, had I
not contrived to ascertain the names of those summoned. Finding that
most of these had either not been present in the action, or were known
to be in the interest of the Commander-in-chief, I went on the half deck
of the _Gladiator_, and wrote a note to the Court, pointing out the
unfairness of such proceeding, and naming other officers who ought to be
examined. They were _then_ summoned, and their evidence will be
conclusive to the reader, as it ought to have been to the Court, and
would have been so had not the Court itself been picked by the
Government, _i.e._ principally composed of officers who had been ordered
to hoist their flags to qualify them for sitting on the court-martial,
which, being ended, they were ordered again to strike their flags!
As a contrast to the evidence of Captain Seymour, I will turn to that of
three officers who were _not present in the action_, and in fact, do not
appear to have been in Aix Roads at all, either before or after it;
though without a minute knowledge of those Roads they could not be
competent to give even a general opinion on the subject. Without reason
assigned—as indeed it was not in their power to assign any—each thus
delivered his testimony.
QUESTION (_put to each in succession_).—“Was everything in your
judgment done that could be done, to effect the destruction of the
enemy’s ships?”
CAPT. BURLTON.—“I _think_ there was.”
CAPT. BALL.—“I _think_ there was everything done.”
CAPT. NEWMAN.—“Perfectly so.”
QUESTION.—“From the time the Commander-in-chief arrived in Basque
Roads to the time of your quitting it, can you state any instance of
neglect, misconduct, or inattention on his part to the public
service?”
CAPT. BURLTON.—“I know of none.”
CAPT. BALL.—“No; I cannot.”
CAPT. NEWMAN.—“None.”
Widely different was the testimony of Captain Malcolm of the
_Donegal_—the late Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm—-whose love of truth,
like that of Captain Seymour, was not to be fettered by negatives in
reply to leading questions. Captain Malcolm thus spoke of the only two
enemy’s ships afloat, _Foudroyant_ and _Cassard_, which two ships Lord
Gambier in his defence said “_must have entirely crippled_” the whole
British force, had it attempted to pass the channel leading to Aix
Roads.
“When those ships quitted their stations there was then _no obstacle_
to prevent the small ships from going in; by which I mean the
_frigates_, or even SEVENTY-FOURS. The fire from Isle d’Aix they
nearly _avoid_ by keeping near the Boyart.” (Capt. Malcolm’s evidence,
_Minutes_, pp. 208, 209.)
Lord Gambier had stated in his defence that he refrained from sending in
the ships on account of the danger from the fire of the fortifications.
Mr. Stokes supported this view by swearing that the ships would have
been “within point-blank range of shot.” The assertion of Captain
Malcolm that they would be nearly out of reach of shot, which was true,
was _malapropos_, though not to be shaken by the testimony of an
inferior officer. It was therefore dangerous to recal Mr. Stokes in
opposition to so high an authority as Captain Malcolm; Captain Kerr was
consequently recalled whilst Captain Malcolm _was under examination!_ to
say that his ship was _once_ hit from the batteries. After which
extraordinary interruption Captain Malcolm was suffered to proceed with
his testimony.
PRESIDENT.—“Was the enemy’s three-decker in a situation on the morning
of the 12th to have done any mischief to ships that had been sent in?”
CAPT. MALCOLM.—“Till about noon she was heeling considerably, _and
appeared to me to be throwing her guns overboard_. When she righted,
she could have annoyed ships coming in.”
QUESTION.—“At what time did the three-decker remove from the situation
where you saw her on shore _heeling_?”
CAPT. MALCOLM.—“About two o’clock. I took no note of the time.”
QUESTION.—“Would you have sent ships in before the two ships were
removed and the three decker got off?”
CAPT. MALCOLM.—“Had it appeared to me that there was no other chance
of destroying those ships _but by such an attack_, I certainly think
it _ought to have been made_. It was understood that they must all
again ground in the mouth of the Charente where it was the _received
opinion_ they could be attacked by bombs, gun-vessels, and fire-ships
again, _without risk_.”
QUESTION.—“Upon the whole, are you of opinion that, of all the French
ships which got ashore on the night of the 11th of April, any more
could have been destroyed than were destroyed had the British ships
been earlier sent in on the 12th of April to attack them?”
CAPT. MALCOLM.—“Had they been attacked by the British ships, in my
opinion _they could not have been warped off from the shore, as it was
necessary to lay out anchors to heave them off_. Those that were not
aground had always the option of running further up the Charente. It
should be understood that it must have been at the risk of our fleet,
as I have already mentioned.” (_Minutes_, pp. 209 to 211).
Of course, every naval combat must be at the risk of fleets; such risk,
in my judgment, forming the chief object in building fleets for the
purpose of encountering it. But the risk to a whole squadron from two
ships afloat, and a three-decker ashore, “_heeling over, and throwing
her guns overboard_,” is what no brave seaman would ever take into
consideration. The chief risk, as has been alleged by Lord Gambier, was
from the fire of the batteries on Ile d’Aix, which he had shortly before
pronounced “_no obstacle_.” What this was, may be judged from the fact
that Captain Seymour, in the _Pallas_, Captain Woolfe, in the _Aigle_,
and myself in the _Impérieuse_, lay for two days in this formidable
position without loss of any kind.
The reply to the next question put to Captain Malcolm ought to have been
conclusive with the Court.
QUESTION.—“_Would you, had you commanded the British fleet, have sent
in ships to attack the enemy’s ships on shore?_”
CAPT. MALCOLM.—“The moment that the two ships quitted their defensive
position the risk was then small of sending ships, and, OF COURSE, I
WOULD HAVE SENT THEM IN INSTANTLY.” (_Minutes_, p. 212.)
This was spoken like a seaman. No greater contrast can be set in
juxtaposition with such evidence than that of the chartmaker Stokes, the
master of Lord Gambier’s flagship, who, though of no higher rank than
that of a warrant officer, was gravely consulted as to what, in his
opinion, was the Commander-in-chief’s duty!!
The subjoined evidence of Mr. Stokes is very curious, not only from its
effrontery in contradiction of superior officers, but in its own flat
and unblushing contradiction to itself. The portion of Mr. Stokes’s
evidence placed in a double column is truly wonderful; but it is more
wonderful that any tribunal should have so far forgot itself as to act
upon it.
“The ships would have been at half range of shell and point-blank
shot.” (_Minutes_, p. 148.)
“They would have remained under the fire of the enemy’s batteries till
the tide floated them to the southward of the Palles Shoal; but this
retreat, in my opinion, they would not have been able to have gained.”
(P. 148.)
“If we had made the attack on the morning of the 12th, we should have
sacrificed our own ships without making any impression on the enemy,
or destroying _any_ of their ships.” (P. 148.)
“The enemy’s ships were _fast on the ground_ with their sterns to the
westward; and they _could not bring their guns to bear on the ships
that attacked them_. Had the French ships _grounded with their
broadsides flanking the passage, they could not have been attacked
with the least prospect of success_.” (P. 151.)
“I told Sir H. Neale that perhaps we might destroy _some_ of their
ships, but that we should sacrifice our own.”[37] (P. 151.)
“The three decker lay with her _broadside flanking the passage_. They
all three could have fired with _complete effect on any ships that
might approach_!!!” (P. 149.)
“Had four sail of the line run into Aix Roads when Lord Cochrane made
the signal, the whole fire of Isle d’Aix, as well as the fire of the
_Foudroyant_, _Cassard_, and _Ocean, three-decker_, would _have been
directed on them_!!” (P. 152.)
-----
Footnote 37:
This was said with the full knowledge that when “our own” were
reluctantly sent in, _no damage was sustained_. To use Lord Gambier’s
own words in making his defence, “_Not one, even of the smallest of
our vessels employed, has been disabled from proceeding on any service
that might have become necessary._” (_Minutes_, p. 138.)—A
circumstance not at all expected by the country when the destruction
of the enemy’s fleet was required.
-----
The only comment here necessary is, that nothing in the evidence
volunteered by Titus Oates in former years displayed greater effrontery.
The evidence of the other chartmaker Fairfax is almost as astounding.
QUESTION.—“Would ships of the line sent in have been within range of
shells and shot from the enemy’s batteries?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“From every chart I have seen they certainly would.”
QUESTION.—“Could any of the enemy’s ships before they run up the
Charente have _annoyed and raked_ (!!) any of the king’s ships that
might have been sent to attack them?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“_They certainly lay in a favourable place for it._”[38]
(_Minutes_, p. 144.)
QUESTION.—“Had even two or three ships of the line been sent in to
attack those two ships, were _any of the enemy’s ships aground(!)_ in
a position to annoy our ships, either in the anchorage or in their
approach to it?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“_Some of them certainly were._” (P. 145.)
QUESTION.—“If a part of the fleet had gone into Aix Roads when the
_Impérieuse_ made the first signal, must it have remained within three
quarters of a mile of the batteries till the ebb made?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“_They might have shifted with the flood!_” (P. 146.)
-----
Footnote 38:
This reply is very characteristic. He knew, as Stokes swore, that the
“_enemy’s ships were aground with their sterns to the westward_,” and
that not only could they not return a fire, but that a broadside from
a British ship must have gone clean through them from stern to bow;
but, unlike Stokes, he would not swear that ships in such a position
could have “_annoyed and raked the king’s ships_.” The enemy’s ships
were merely “_in a favourable place for it!!_” And so they were, had
they been _afloat_ instead of helplessly _ashore_, heeling over at an
angle of thirty degrees.
-----
The ingenuity of Mr. Fairfax in avoiding straightforward answers to
embarrassing questions is remarkable. He was one of Lord Gambier’s tract
distributors spoken of in the first volume, but though he had no
objection to construct an imaginary chart to serve his chief, his
conscience would not permit him to swear to its contents. Nevertheless
such evasion ought not to have been tolerated by any tribunal. Yet on
the charts and evidence of Stokes and this man was the result of the
court-martial made to rest, in opposition to the testimony of officers
of standing and character.
The opinion of another eminent officer, Captain Broughton of the
_Illustrious_, will be even more to the purpose.
PRESIDENT.—“From the first attack on the ships of the enemy on the
evening of the 11th of April to the time of your leaving Basque Roads,
according to your judgment, was everything done that could be done to
effect the destruction of the enemy’s ships?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I think it would have been more advantageous _if the
line-of-battle ships, frigates, and small vessels had gone in at half
flood_, which I take to be at about _eleven o’clock_ A.M. or
_twelve_.”[39]
-----
Footnote 39:
Precisely the time at which Lord Gambier ordered the fleet to come
to an anchor, after it had been got under weigh with every
indication of proceeding to an attack.
-----
“The French admiral and two more got off and made sail towards the
river, very soon after the two that were afloat.”
QUESTION.—“By the French admiral you mean the _Ocean_?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“Yes.”
QUESTION.—“As the two ships that remained at anchor did not change
their position till about noon, and the _Ocean_ continued in her
position till about the same time, if the British fleet had been
ordered in at eleven o’clock, which you thought would have been the
proper time——”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I would rather say between eleven and twelve, which,
in my judgment, was more advantageous.”
QUESTION.—“Would not the ships sent in have been exposed to the fire
of the _two ships_ that remained at anchor, the French Admiral’s ship,
and the batteries of Isle d’Aix, at the same time?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“Certainly; but I conceive they were partly _panic
struck_, and on the appearance of a force coming in might have been
induced to cut their cables, and try to make their escape up the
river.” (_Minutes_, pp. 219-221.)
There was not much to be feared from a “_panic-struck_” enemy, with only
two ships afloat out of thirteen, eleven being on shore. Yet those who
peruse the minutes of the court-martial will marvel to find these two
ships set up as bugbears to a British fleet.
I will next adduce Captain Broughton’s testimony as to the trifling
opposition to be anticipated from the batteries on Isle d’Aix, which
three weeks previous to the action had been pronounced “_no obstacle_”
by the Commander-in-chief, in his letter to the Admiralty[40], but were
now considered formidable enough to prevent a British fleet from passing
within two miles of them!
Footnote 40:
See vol. i. p. 342.
It may here be remarked that Captain Broughton was well acquainted with
these batteries, from having previously been here under Admiral Keats,
as they were familiar to me from having been employed on the same spot
under Admiral Thornborough, and having, in fact, engaged the _Minerve_
frigate under their fire[41], which I held so cheap as not to consider
them or their ineffectual fire worthy attention. As Admiral Austen well
remarks—all Lord Gambier knew respecting them was from the reports of
others, who had not even ventured closely to reconnoitre the batteries.
The report of Captain Broughton, who had reconnoitred them, was not
acted upon.
-----
Footnote 41:
See vol. i. p. 191.
-----
PRESIDENT.—“In your services in Basque Roads had you any opportunity
of making observations upon the state of the enemy’s fortifications on
Isle d’Aix?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“Yes, I had.”
PRESIDENT.—“Narrate those observations.”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I was on board the _Amelia_ when she was ordered to
dislodge the enemy from the Boyart Shoal, and, being _nearly within
gunshot_[42], I observed the fortifications. They appeared to me in a
very different state to what I observed them when serving two or three
years before under Sir Richard Keats. I thought they were repairing
the works from the quantity of _rubbish that was thrown up_; and I
counted on a semicircular battery which commanded the roadstead where
the enemy lay between _fourteen and twenty guns_, I am not positive as
to the exact number. There was a small battery lower down, nearer the
sea. I do not know the exact number of guns; there might be _six_ or
_nine_, I suppose. What I had before taken to be a block-house above
the semicircular battery seemed to have _no guns whatever_; it
appeared to be a barrack for containing the guard. I thought from this
observation that the fortifications of the island, at least in that
part, were _not so strong as we supposed_, and I reported my opinion
to that effect to Lord Gambier.”
-----
Footnote 42:
Mr. Stokes said the ships going in must have been “_at half range of
shell and point blank shot_!” (_Minutes_, p. 148.) Mr. Stokes’s
observation was taken “from the mizentop of the _Caledonia_;” that
of Captain Broughton from actual exposure to the fire of the
batteries.
-----
PRESIDENT.—“Are those the only guns you observed on Isle d’Aix that
could bear upon the anchorage?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“They were all that I observed; there might be more.”
QUESTION.—“Did it appear to you that the enemy was constructing new
works in front of the old ones, and nearer to the sea?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I think the _rubbish_ was the remains of the old
works that _had been taken down_.
PRESIDENT.—“Would your Lordship wish to ask any questions on the
subject?”
LORD GAMBIER.—“I would wish Capt. Broughton to point out on the chart
the situation of the _Amelia_ when he was on board her and made those
observations?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“The south point of Isle d’Aix was just shut in with
Fouras Castle, and I think the bearing was nearly S.E. and by E. when
it was open. When it was touching the point we were JUST OUT OF
GUNSHOT FROM BOTH SIDES. THEY FIRED AT US FROM BOTH SIDES, BUT THE
SHOT DID NOT REACH US.” (_Minutes_, pp. 218, 219.)
This was decisive, and in his defence, the Commander-in-chief thus
attempted to evade the facts which had been officially reported to him
by Captain Broughton. To contradict them was impossible.
“With respect to the force of the Aix batteries, I apprehend what
appeared to Lord Cochrane and to the master of his ship as ruins of
the fort were, in fact, materials for _improving or increasing the
work_! Indeed, can it be natural to _suppose_ that the enemy, who are
so active in forming batteries wherever they can be useful, and whose
engineers are considered to be equal to any, would, of all moments,
choose that for dismantling or blowing up works when they expected
those works would be most required; for it is very certain the enemy
was as fully apprised of _our intentions of attacking their fleet as
myself_!!![43] And it will perhaps be considered less likely that the
enemy should _weaken their defences_ on Isle d’Aix, _raised evidently
for the protection of their fleet_, when at the same time they were
endeavouring to form others on the Boyart Shoal as a protection for
it.” (_Minutes_, p. 135.)
-----
Footnote 43:
Lord Gambier had just before written to the Admiralty that an attempt
with fireships would be “_hazardous if not desperate_.” He had no
intention of attacking otherwise. And after the enemy’s ships had been
driven ashore by the explosion vessels, Captain Broughton testifies to
Lord Gambier’s expressions that he did not intend to make any attack,
as the object of their destruction seemed to be already accomplished.
That is, neither before nor after the action did he intend to make any
attack with the fleet, nor would he have done so unless a partial
attack had been forced on him by my signal on the _afternoon_ of the
12th of April.
-----
There was no “_supposition_” in the matter, nor any necessity for
hypothesis, in face of the fact that the fortifications were for the
most part _débris_, or as Captain Broughton termed them, a mass of
“_rubbish_.” No one said that they had been “_blown up_” or that the
enemy were _weakening their defences_! The fact is, that only a month
before the action Lord Gambier had himself set the matter at rest, by
writing to the Admiralty as follows:—“The advanced work between the
Isles of Aix and Oleron, I _find_ was injured in its foundation, and is
in no state of progress, _it is therefore no obstacle to our bombarding
the enemy’s fleet_[44],” yet it was now an “obstacle” to even attempt
attacking ships on shore; and Lord Gambier condescended to resort to the
just quoted assertions, in contradiction to his own letter to the
Admiralty.
-----
Footnote 44:
See vol. i. page 342.
-----
On the utter worthlessness of the batteries, as calculated to impede the
operations of a British fleet, there was abundant evidence before the
Court, as will be seen on an examination of the minutes of the
court-martial, such testimony confirming the correctness of Lord
Gambier’s letter to the Admiralty on the 11th of March, and completely
disproving his Lordship’s contradictory assumptions in his extraordinary
defence read to the Court.
Captain Broughton was next examined with reference to the imaginary
shoal, which forms so conspicuous an object on Mr. Stokes’s chart (C).
“If the ships had been damaged in masts and rigging, considering the
direction and strength of the wind at that time, was there any place
those ships could have retired to?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I think as the wind was north-westerly and
northerly, they might have found safe anchorage and protection in what
is called in the French chart I had on board “_Le Grand Trousse_” (see
Chart A), _where there is thirty or forty feet of water_ OUT OF RANGE
OF SHOT OR SHELLS IN ANY DIRECTION.”
QUESTION.—“How many ships would you have thought it necessary to send
into Aix Roads to attack the enemy?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I should think _five or six ships_ of the least
draught of water.”
“I conjecture that the _discomfited_ French squadron _would have made
very little resistance_.”
“From the situation in which the enemy were, _not having recovered
from the fright of the night before, I think our loss would have been
very little_, as few of the French ships were in a situation to FIGHT
THEIR GUNS!!”
QUESTION.—“Do you know that from the anchorage in Aix Roads to the
anchorage you have just now described, that _there is_ A BAR GOES
ACROSS?”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“No! I do not know anything of it; I _sounded_ from
the wreck of the _Varsovie_ to that anchorage, and FOUND NO SHOAL
THERE!!”
PRESIDENT.—“_That is not the place!_ It _is_ marked in _some_ of the
charts that between the Boyart and the tail of the Pallas there _is_ a
bar!”
CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I _sounded as I came in from the fleet_ BUT DID NOT
FIND ANY BAR.” (_Minutes_, pp. 221-233.)
The extraordinary conduct of the President in saying “_That is not the
place_” and then that “in _some_ of the charts there _is_ a bar,” in the
place which was “_not_ the place,” needs no comment. The evidence of
Captain Broughton, who _had_ sounded there, should have been fatal to
the chart of Mr. Stokes, who _had not_ by his own admission taken
soundings. The fact was, that this bar, made for the occasion, formed
one of the main points in the Commander-in-chief’s defence, and Mr.
Stokes’s chart was retained in spite of the testimony of those who, from
having sounded, could alone know anything of the matter.
But Mr. Stokes shall first _prove_ and then disprove his imaginary _bar
or shoal_.
Notwithstanding that Mr. Stokes admitted that his knowledge of the
supposed shoal between the Palles and the Boyart was only founded on an
anonymous French MS., he subsequently forgot the admission, and swore to
his own _personal knowledge of the minutest particulars_ connected with
the imaginary shoal!!
LORD GAMBIER.—“Is there not a bank between the Boyart and the Palles
Shoal?”
MR. STOKES.—“Yes.”
“What water is there generally upon that bank at low water?”
MR. STOKES.—“From _twelve to sixteen feet in the deepest part_, but
that part is _very narrow_.”
“If there are only _sixteen feet_, line-of-battle ships could not pass
over it at all times?”
MR. STOKES.—_No[45], not until nearly two-thirds flood._ You must
reckon on going over that part at _twelve feet_.”
-----
Footnote 45:
It is marked on Mr. Stokes’s chart that the rise of tide is
_twenty-one feet_.
-----
“To get to the anchorage, it _is_ necessary to pass over the bank just
mentioned?”
MR. STOKES.—“IT IS.”
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“Is there a channel of sixteen feet all across?”
MR. STOKES.—“_There is a channel of sixteen feet all across_, but that
is _narrow_. There are about the middle of it patches of twelve feet.”
PRESIDENT.—“_There is_ no going into the channel of sixteen feet
without, in _some instances_, passing over that of twelve feet?”
MR. STOKES.—“You _may_ go over the channel of sixteen feet, but _it is
so narrow_ that I should calculate going over that part which is _only
twelve feet_.”
PRESIDENT.—“It is _so intricate_, you _must_ count on passing over
some part with only _twelve feet_?”
MR. STOKES.—“I should calculate on going over part of the twelve feet,
because _it is so narrow_, it is _difficult to hit_ the passage of
_sixteen feet_.”[46]
-----
Footnote 46:
Yet Captain Broughton had “hit” it, and that without finding any shoal
at all!
-----
This is pretty minute for a man who was not present in the action, who
confessed that he was “ignorant of the distance between the sands,” and
had, in fact, “never sounded there at all,” that his survey had been
made from the mizentop of the _Caledonia_, nine miles off, and that he
had his information from Mr. Fairfax and an “anonymous French MS.,”
which was not even produced in Court, nor demanded by the Court, so that
it is not known to this day who was the author of that MS., or, indeed,
whether it ever existed; a matter which, from its non-production, I do
not hesitate to doubt.
The President was, however, bent on confirming Mr. Stokes’s shoal, but
the result was most unfortunate. In order further to substantiate the
alleged fact, Captain Woolfe of the _Aigle_, which vessel was present
during the action, thus replied to an interrogation on the point.
“I think _four or five sail of the line_ might have lain clear of the
enemy’s batteries. I lay there with the _Pallas_ and _fifteen or
sixteen brigs, gun-brigs, cutters, and schooners_!” (_Minutes_, p.
86.)
PRESIDENT.—“_Would the casting your eye upon this chart_ (Stokes’s)
_give you a clearer comprehension!!!_”
CAPT. WOOLFE.—“No! I have it all in my mind. _I received orders to
assist Mr. Stokes on a survey._
PRESIDENT.—“What was the report of the depth of water at any
particular time of tide in the situation _I have pointed out between
the Palles and the Boyart, if you can recollect it_?”
CAPT. WOOLFE.—“Mr. Stokes said HE HAD FOUND DEEPER WATER AND A LITTLE
MORE ROOM FARTHER TO THE SOUTHWARD.”
Is it not wonderful that in face of such facts, the Court should have
acted on Mr. Stokes’s chart or his evidence? Where Mr. Stokes had found
“_deeper water_” he had marked on his chart a shoal, on which no admiral
in his senses would have trusted a frigate, though the _Revenge_ and
_Valiant_ line-of-battle ships, with five or six frigates had found
plenty of water, and, whilst destroying two enemy’s ships, remained
there through a whole tide without grounding! The following are extracts
from the logs of the ships present.
“3·0 p.m. Shortened sail and anchored _in 7 fathoms_, near the outer
ship of the enemy, _Valiant_ in company.” (_Log of the_ Pallas.)
“3·30. Came to with the best bower _in 6 fathoms_.” (_Log of_
Valiant.)
“4·0. Anchored _in 5½ fathoms_.” (_Log of_ Unicorn.)
“3·30. Anchored _in_ 7 _fathoms_.” (_Log of_ Indefatigable.)
“2·30. Anchored _in_ 6 _fathoms_.” (_Log of_ L’Aigle.)
The subjoined evidence of Mr. Spurling, the master of the _Impérieuse_,
will render further allusion to the subject unnecessary.
“Where we anchored, which was _out of the reach of shot and shell_, we
lay _in five and a half fathoms at low water_. Three or four cables’
length _nearer_ to the Pallas Shoal than we lay, was a good berth for
three or four sail of the line to anchor in five and a half or six
fathoms _dead low water_. The marks for such anchorage I took myself.”
“I know this from my own observation. It was marked on the French
chart, but I did not choose to trust it, but wished to prove it. The
lead was kept going the whole of the time on both sides.”
PRESIDENT.—“What water did you find in working out between the tail of
the Pallas Shoal and the shoal towards the Boyart, when working to and
fro?”
“_From six and a half to seven fathoms._”
“Did you make any observation before you began to engage?”
“Yes. On the morning of the 12th I was desired by Lord Cochrane to lay
a buoy on the Boyart Shoal, which I did in _six and a half fathoms
water_, a sufficient distance to allow _any ship_ to tack round that
buoy.”
The reader must not imagine that I am too minutely descending into
particulars. I am writing history—naval history—in which Lord Gambier is
nothing—myself less, except as unavoidably connected with the
proceedings of the court-martial. I have no wish to speak of Lord
Gambier where it can be avoided. The subject is, however, one in which
the nation is collectively interested, and the national, no less than
naval character, involved. Now that the justice of the Duke of Somerset
has given me the means of incontrovertible explanation, I am personally
gratified in availing myself of it; but I repeat that my object is now,
as it ever was, national; and having at length those means, it is my
duty, no less than my pleasure, to use them as a warning to future
generations of the noble service to which I have the honour to belong.
I must reluctantly turn for a moment to the evidence founded on Mr.
Fairfax’s chart (D). First premising, that when Mr. Fairfax was asked to
“state the situation of the enemy’s ships at noon,” he replied, that “at
_eleven o’clock_ he went down below, and did not come up again till near
two.” (_Minutes_, p. 143). That is, during the whole of the three hours’
delay, and the consequent escape of the grounded ships, which
constituted the question before the Court, Mr. Fairfax had been, by his
own voluntary admission, in his berth, recovering himself from the
fatigues of the previous night.
During these three hours, as has been said, the _Océan_, three-decker,
and the three other line-of-battle ships had _quietly hove off_, and
were running into the Charente. This was proved by the concurrent
testimony of _all_ the witnesses, and their escape formed the neglect,
if any, of the Commander-in-chief. Yet Mr. Fairfax unblushingly
testified that his chart showed their position on the morning of the
12th, and that when at two o’clock he returned from his _three hours’
nap_, the enemy’s ships were “NEARLY IN THE SAME POSITION as when he
went below at _eleven o’clock_!” All the other witnesses, without
exception, stating the fact that they had warped off and escaped beyond
reach! Yet the Court made no comment on Mr. Fairfax’s evidence.
When pressed to describe their position more minutely, Mr. Fairfax, with
real or assumed indignation, replied, “_I have described them in the
chart produced by me_.” The Court complacently declined further
question, and Mr. Fairfax thus escaped the struggle between his chart
and the truth, which had so much embarrassed Stokes, who had not the
sagacity to perceive that his silence would have been more acceptable
than his volubility.
Mr. Fairfax’s minute description of the “nearly same position” of the
ships which had _escaped while he was below!_ is yet more extraordinary.
“Were any of the enemy’s ships aground lying so close together as to
have the yards of two of them locked together?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“By perspective those near the _Tonnerre_ seemed to be
_very close_. If you draw a line they appear in one.”
PRESIDENT.—“The question is, whether these two ships were lying so
close together that their masts and yards might be locked in, or
whether they were distinct?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“They were _distinct at night_!”
“Were you in any situation which enabled you to determine that they
were _not_ near each other?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“No; it was prior (_i. e._ before daylight) that I
distinguished them separate.”
“Can you determine _how far_ they were asunder?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“I should think a ship’s length from each other, _those
three_.”
Yet even the reluctant vision of Mr. Stokes, at a distance of nine
miles, could perceive _at daylight_ four of the enemy’s vessels lying
helplessly “in a group.” Mr. Fairfax—from whom a straightforward answer
could not be got—said, when pressed, that amidst _pitch_ darkness, and
by “_perspective_,” he could plainly distinguish them as distinct from
each other; and was thus, with difficulty, made to tell almost the truth
as to how they lay when driven ashore on the preceding night. He could
see in the darkness that their yards were not locked together, but they
were only “a ship’s length from each other”—a distinction almost without
a difference.
The whole affair was made to turn on the evidence of these two masters,
Stokes and Fairfax, who unhesitatingly contradicted in that evidence the
testimony of the most experienced officers present in the action, though
the latter, had it not been for my pertinacity, as before described,
_would not have been allowed to give evidence before the Court_. It has
been shown that the charts of Messrs. Stokes and Fairfax were used to
the exclusion of the actual charts of the enemy’s coast supplied under
sanction of the Admiralty itself, because there were none more reliable
in existence.
It would be easy to extract from the evidence of Fairfax much more to
the same effect; but the subject is nauseating, and the naval reader
may, if he choose, search the _Minutes_ of the court-martial for
himself. The young officer could scarcely occupy himself more
profitably, if he wish to become acquainted with the practice of the
service fifty years ago.
A short extract from Mr. Fairfax’s evidence relative to the explosion
vessel and the _Mediator_ is necessary, as Lord Gambier avowed in his
defence that the “explosion vessels _failed in their object_;” and to
corroborate this, Mr. Fairfax falsely placed on his chart the spot where
the explosion took place, in a false position, in order to confirm to
the _eye_ of the Court the asseverations of the Commander-in-chief in
his defence. Like Mr. Stokes, Mr. Fairfax swore the _truth_ in his
evidence in contradiction to his chart.
The assertion of the Commander-in-chief in his defence, with regard to
the explosion vessels, is as follows:—
“The explosion vessels, conducted by Lord Cochrane, _failed in their
object_, as will be seen with reference to the _small chart_ which I
now deliver into Court. (Mr. Fairfax’s chart D.) This points out where
two of them blew up. The situation in which, and the time when, those
vessels blew up, _proved prejudicial to the enterprise in several
respects_.... In fact, had not Captain Wooldridge and some of the
other officers, wholly disregarding the explosion, taken their
fireships in _a proper direction_ for the enemy, it is more than
probable that _none of them would have produced any effect on the
enemy’s fleet_.” (Lord Gambier’s Defence, _Minutes_, p. 124.)
Lord Gambier uttered this with the full knowledge that NOT A SINGLE
FIRESHIP DID TAKE EFFECT ON THE ENEMY’S FLEET, a fact which his lordship
openly states in another part of his defence; so prematurely were the
fireships kindled, and so badly were they directed. That Captain
Wooldridge took his fireship in “a proper direction,” is wholly
disproved by the very man upon whose chart his lordship relies; viz.
Fairfax, who states in his evidence that _after_ the explosion had taken
place he “_hailed the Mediator_ to ALTER HER COURSE, OR SHE WOULD MISS
THE FRENCH FLEET!!
I am sorry to bring such evidence as the subjoined to confute the
unfounded assertions of a British admiral, but justice to myself leaves
me no alternative.
QUESTION.—“Do you recollect when and where the explosion vessel blew
up on the night of the 11th of April?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“She was about _two cables’ length from the Lyra_. The
_Lyra_ is marked in the chart produced by me, as well as the explosion
vessel. _When she blew up the fire vessels all seemed to steer for
that point_. I hailed four of them and the _Mediator_, and _desired
the Mediator to steer south-east, or else she would miss the French
fleet_.”
Here Mr. Fairfax proved; 1st, that the explosion-vessel took effect
before a single fireship was kindled. 2ndly, that the _Mediator_ was
steering in a _wrong direction_, not a “_proper direction_,” as alleged
by Lord Gambier. 3rdly, and that therefore the boom was destroyed before
the _Mediator_ could have got near it. The _Mediator’s_ log is, however,
luckily amongst the Admiralty records, and is carried up to the time the
ship was set on fire, viz. 9·30 P.M., but not a word is said of breaking
any boom, or even coming in contact with one, though had she done so the
shock must have shook her from stem to stern. The subjoined are the
_Mediator’s_ last log entries previous to her being set on fire.
“8·30 P.M. Cut the cable and made sail for the French squadron.
“9·30. _Set the ship on fire._”
The preceding extract from Mr. Fairfax is taken from the “_revised_”
minutes. He says: “_When the explosion vessel blew up all the
fire-vessels seemed to steer from that point_.What he really said was,
“_I was below at the time of the first explosion!_ which I supposed was
some shells bursting in the top, but I got on deck time enough to see
her blow up!” This was expunged, and the above version substituted. The
fact was, as every seaman will comprehend in a moment, that there was
not a grain of powder, or a single shell, anywhere but in _a mass in the
hold_, and this, as a matter of course, exploded _in an instant_! I do
not say that Mr. Fairfax can be accused of this perversion of his
evidence, as it was evidently the work of the person who _revised_ the
minutes for publication by a Portsmouth bookseller.
The _Mediator’s_ log was taken out of her previously to her being set on
fire, and is subsequently continued up to midnight, two hours and a half
afterwards, but still not a word is mentioned of coming in contact with
a boom. This should be conclusive on the subject, and it is not my fault
that a fact beyond dispute, must necessarily disprove the asseverations
of the Commander-in-chief in his defence before the court-martial.
These, however, are both facts. Let the reader make the most of them.
Yet in his letter to the Admiralty of April 14th, Lord Gambier stated
that “the weight of the _Mediator_ broke the boom,” in that letter also
ignoring the effect of the explosion vessels altogether. His Lordship
says, in his defence, that they were _signals for the fireships_!! The
subjoined are his Lordship’s words:—“Their explosion was to point out
_the proper time for the officers commanding the fireships to set fire
to their respective vessels_, and to intimidate and prevent the enemy
from towing off the fireships.”[47] Three explosion vessels fitted at an
enormous cost for ammunition, &c., to do that which a signal rocket
could have done as well!! If the explosion vessels did not strike terror
into the enemy assuredly nothing did, for at page 125 of his defence he
admits that “_not one of the enemy’s ships was actually destroyed by
means of fireships_.”
Footnote 47:
_Minutes_, p. 123.
This perseverance on the part of the Commander-in-chief in persisting
that the explosion vessels “failed in their object,” though according to
his own admission that the fireships failed also, was attempted to be
corroborated by the evidence of Mr. Fairfax, but in a different way,
viz. by swearing that she blew up at too great a distance from the enemy
to produce any effect at all!
PRESIDENT.—“To the best of your judgment, what was the distance of the
explosion vessel from the enemy when she blew up?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“About a mile.”
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—-“What sort of a night was it?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“Very dirty, and blowing strong. The _Lyra_ was pitching
bows under.”
“Was the night light or dark?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“_Very dark at intervals._”
“How then did you, in a _very dark night_, ascertain that the
explosion vessel blew up _within a mile_ of the enemy?”
MR. FAIRFAX.—“By her computed distance from us in the _Lyra_, judging
the distance she was from the enemy.” [_Minutes_, p. 177.)
At first sight, these questions on the part of the Court seem impartial,
but their object was to make Mr. Fairfax say that she might have been
_more_ than a mile from the enemy, as appears from the subsequent
evidence. Mr. Fairfax would not say this. He, however, placed her on his
chart on this _“very dark” night near the Boyart shoal_, and not _close
to the Ile of Aix and the boom_, where Captain Proteau, who was lying
under the lee of the boom, says she blew up.
Unfortunately for the veracity of Mr. Fairfax on this point, he had
previous to the trial unwittingly written a letter to the editor of the
_Naval Chronicle_, evidently not for publication, but in explanation of
a chart. The editor of the _Naval Chronicle_, however, published the
explanatory remarks, which are in complete contradiction to Mr.
Fairfax’s evidence on the court-martial—in fact, this portion of the
letter tells the truth in the following language:—
“I have it from good authority that the fuses on board one of the
explosion vessels only burned six minutes and a half, instead of
twenty.[48] Had they burned twelve minutes longer _nothing could have
been better placed_! I saw the French ships with lights up
_immediately after the explosion, before any of the fireships got
near_!!—EDWARD FAIRFAX.” (_Naval Chronicle for 1809_, vol. xxii. p.
49.)
-----
Footnote 48:
This is incorrect. They were calculated to burn twelve minutes, and
exploded in about half that time.
-----
With this glaring contradiction between his evidence and his previous
_honest_ assertion to the editor of the _Naval Chronicle_, I take my
leave of Mr. Fairfax and the subject, being quite content to rest my
character on the contradictory evidence of those suborned to serve the
cause of an administration in want of the prestige of a victory, at the
expense of truth and even common sense, had such been relied on in the
investigation.
I will conclude with the remark, that had I been permitted access to the
charts _before the lapse of fifty-one years_ from the date of the
action—or could I after the court-martial have prevailed on Parliament
to investigate the matter, by demanding the production of the minutes of
the court-martial before voting thanks to the Commander-in-chief, the
Administration of that corrupt day would never have dared to treat me as
an officer maligning my Commander-in-chief unjustly, nor to have
followed up their malignity to its final consummation of driving me from
the British Navy, on the imputation of an offence of which I had not the
smallest cognisance, as will by and by appear as plainly, and I trust as
satisfactorily, as do these extraordinary revelations concerning a
court-martial which will stand a beacon and a warning to the naval
service as long as that service may exist. God grant that the records of
that noble service to the latest day of its existence may never again be
sullied in like manner!
CHAP. XXVII.
CONDUCT OF THE COURT-MARTIAL.
LORD GAMBIER’S DEFENCE.—SECOND DESPATCH IGNORING THE FIRST.—ATTEMPT
OF THE COURT TO STOP MY EVIDENCE.—EVIDENCE RECEIVED BECAUSE
OPPOSED TO MINE.—I AM NOT PERMITTED TO HEAR THE DEFENCE.—THE
LOGS TAMPERED WITH.—LORD GAMBIER’S DEFENCE AIMED AT ME UNDER AN
ERRONEOUS IMPUTATION.—MY LETTER TO THE COURT CONFUTING THAT
IMPUTATION.—ADMIRALTY ACCUSATION AGAINST LORD GAMBIER ON MY
REFUSAL TO ACCUSE HIS LORDSHIP.—HIS INSINUATIONS AGAINST ME
UNCALLED FOR.—ASSUMES THAT I AM STILL UNDER HIS COMMAND.—ENEMY
ESCAPED FROM HIS OWN NEGLECT.—THE SHOALS PUT IN THE CHART TO
EXCUSE THIS.—ATTEMPT TO IMPUTE BLAME TO ME AND CAPTAIN
SEYMOUR.—THE TRUTH PROVED BY CAPTAIN BROUGHTON THAT LORD GAMBIER
HAD NO INTENTION OF ATTACKING.—LORD HOWE’S ATTACK ON THE AIX
FORTS.—CLARENDON’S DESCRIPTION OF BLAKE.
The most damnatory point connected with the court-martial is—that on
finding me inflexible with regard to the vote of thanks to Lord Gambier,
the Board of Admiralty ordered his lordship, AFTER HIS RETURN TO
ENGLAND, to _write a second despatch containing fresh details of the
action_! thus superseding the first despatch written by himself as
Commander-in-chief at the time of the action!!
With this extraordinary demand Lord Gambier appears to have gladly
complied on the 10th of May, 1809; so that there are two despatches
(Appendix A, _written on the spot_, and B, _written in England_), the
first highly praising me for what I neither did nor intended to do—the
second IGNORING MY SERVICES ALTOGETHER!! In fact, only mentioning me by
name, as _lying “about three miles from the enemy.”_ One step more in
the second despatch, viz. that I was not in Aix Roads at all! would only
have been in keeping with the assertion just quoted. Were not these
contradictory documents now adduced, the denial of such an act by
suppressing all mention of it in the despatches would be incredible.
Nevertheless, I fearlessly assert, that to my personal conduct of the
explosion vessel was solely attributable the panic produced in the
enemy’s fleet, and that such conduct was one of the most desperate acts
on record. There, however, they are—printed in the Appendix at the end
of this volume. The naval reader may regret their reproduction, as I do,
for the sake of the service, but he can no more ignore them than I can
pass them over.
There is nothing like this in the records of the British or any other
naval service, and the reasons for a precedent so unusual must
themselves have been extraordinary. It is clear to me, that from the
order of the Board of Admiralty to the Commander-in-chief to make a
second report of the action in Aix Roads the court-martial took its cue.
This may be a harsh conclusion, and perhaps would be so were it not
corroborated by circumstances, not the least significant of which was,
that the Commander-in-chief’s official report had been long before
_published in the Gazette_! No naval reason to invalidate this official
report was alleged, or could have existed.
During my examination before the Court I alluded to the fact of having
“reported to the Commander-in-chief the ruinous state of the Ile of Aix,
it having the _inner fortifications completely blown up and destroyed_.
This I not only ascertained from the deck of the _Impérieuse_ with
perfect precision as to the side towards us, but also as to the opposite
side, from personal observations made from the main-topgallant
mast-head. There were thirteen guns mounted.” (_Minutes_, p. 58.)
This evidence, if admitted, and its truth was fully proved by the
testimony of other officers, completely confirmed Lord Gambier’s
previous statement to the Admiralty, that “_the fortifications were no
obstacle_.” But now it was expedient that these fortifications should
constitute the bugbear which, as was asserted, would have destroyed any
British ships sent in to attack the enemy’s ships aground! and that the
issue of the court-martial mainly rested on establishing the formidable
character of the fortifications, a second despatch was called for. When,
in my evidence, I was explaining to the Court the little danger to be
apprehended from these fortifications—one of the principal points before
the Court, Admiral Young stopped me with the query, “Will you consider,
my Lord Cochrane, before you go on, HOW FAR THIS IS RELEVANT?”
On my insisting upon further explanation the Judge-Advocate attempted to
stop me, by demanding—“CAN THIS RELATE TO THE QUESTION ASKED?” The
President—seeing that I would not be stopped—remarked—“_Lord Cochrane
states this as his reason for not taking a particular line of conduct_.”
I stated it for no purpose of the kind, but to show that opposition from
such fortifications was hardly worth taking into consideration, and thus
continued:—
“I have felt that if I had answered ‘_Yes_’ or ‘_No_’ to all the
questions which had been put to me, I ought to be hung, and that if a
court-martial were held upon me and only the answers ‘_Yes_’ or ‘_No_’
appeared to those questions, I _should_ be hung for them.”
JUDGE-ADVOCATE.—“_I believe nobody has desired your Lordship to answer
merely ‘Yes’_ or ‘_No_!’”
A still more striking instance of the animus of the Court was the
following attempted stoppage of Captain Beresford’s evidence.
CAPT. BERESFORD.—“The only thing I know with respect to the _Calcutta_
being fired, was by a conversation between Lord Cochrane and myself in
the presence of Captain Bligh, Captain Maitland, and others.”
PRESIDENT.—“_Is this strictly evidence, Mr. Judge-Advocate?_”
JUDGE-ADVOCATE.—“_Yes! I should think it is_; BECAUSE I CONCEIVE IT IS
TO AFFECT THE EVIDENCE OF LORD COCHRANE!!!” (_Minutes_, p. 163.)
At the present day such proceedings in any tribunal would be thought
impossible. There, however, they are on record—showing that the
openly-avowed object of the court-martial was the suppression and
invalidation of my evidence by any means that could be brought to bear,
rather than an inquiry into the conduct of the Commander-in-chief on the
merits of the case.
One point more must be noticed, relative to the manner in which the
Court was conducted. Having reason to believe, as has been shown, that
the inquiry was being directed against myself, I was naturally anxious
to be present at the reading of the Commander-in-chief’s defence, in
order to judge how far I might thereby stand affected. With this view I
presented myself at the Court on the fifth day of the inquiry, when it
was known that the defence would be made.
To my surprise the Court saw fit to refuse the privilege.
PRESIDENT.—“All the witnesses must withdraw.”
LORD COCHRANE.—“With all due respect to the Court, in some former
courts-martial the witnesses have been permitted to hear the defence.”
PRESIDENT.—“_I never heard such a thing in my life._ The Court have
ruled the point.”
LORD COCHRANE.—“The case of Admiral Harvey is a case in point.”
PRESIDENT.—“Lord Cochrane, the Court have determined the contrary.”
“(_Lord Cochrane withdrew_”.) (_Minutes_, p. 105.)
One of my reasons for wishing to be present was to ascertain what use
would be made of the logs of the small vessels present in the action; it
being quite clear from circumstances which had come to my knowledge that
some of these had been tampered with. As such an assertion may readily
be doubted, it must be confirmed.
When Mr. Earp inspected the logs at the Record Office, several, for the
date of the action, were found missing from the log books. One—the log
of a line of battle ship—_had been torn out and was put back loose_!
This, however, is after-knowledge, I will rather rest the matter on
circumstances at the time.
When the master of the _Beagle_ was under examination, the subjoined
conversation took place:—
PRESIDENT (_to the Master_).—“Were these things written (in the log)
day by day as they occurred?”
MASTER.—“Yes; everything was written every day at twelve o’clock.”
“Then what is called the log of the 6th of April _was_ written on the
6th of April?”
MASTER.—“Yes.”
“And what is inserted here as of the 7th, _was_ written on the 7th in
this book?”
MASTER.—“Yes.”
“Is this the identical book into which it was copied from the board?”
MASTER.—“Yes.”
“And there never was any other log-book kept?”
MASTER.—“No.”
“Who kept this?”
MASTER.—“I kept it myself.”
PRESIDENT.—“It is written so fair and so neat that _it bears every
mark of being a fair copy_!”
JUDGE-ADVOCATE.—“_I tell the gentleman I am sure no imputation rests
upon him!_”
PRESIDENT.—“No; _not the least_!”[49] (_Minutes_, pp. 30, 31.)
-----
Footnote 49:
Inspection of more than one of the logs can leave no doubt, from the
neatness of the handwriting, that those relating to the date of the
action had been recopied, and could not have been written from day to
day; which from the difference in the pen and other little
circumstances must have shown itself as in other logs. In one instance
portions of the signal book have been transcribed into the ship’s log.
G.B. EARP.
-----
It was nevertheless a fact that it _had_ been tampered with, as was
unwittingly elicited by Mr. Bicknell from the same witness.
QUESTION.—“You say, on your oath, that you believe everything in this
log to be correct.”
MASTER.—“Yes.”
QUESTION.—“How does it happen that the signals of the _Impérieuse_ are
inserted in the margin of the log amongst the columns, and _not in the
body of the log_?”
MASTER.—“I wrote that _at the same time the log was written_!”
“Why did you not put it in the body of the log in the narrative?”
MASTER.—“_I made a mistake!_ in copying it from the log-board!”
(_Minutes_, pp. 29, 30.)
It will thus be seen that my most material testimony was attempted to be
stopped by the Court as “irrelevant;”—that the Judge-Advocate gave as a
reason for receiving testimony _really irrelevant_, that it _ought_ to
be received because “_it would affect the evidence of Lord
Cochrane_;”—that garbled logs were resorted to—that the whole
proceedings were directed against me, and carefully in favour of Lord
Gambier, by leading questions which abound in almost every page, that I
was not allowed to be present whilst the witnesses were under
examination, so that I had no opportunity of cross-examining them in my
own vindication—a right granted to every man by the constitution of his
country; and that I was _refused admission_ to the Court during the
delivery of Lord Gambier’s defence, _by the Judge-Advocate himself_! a
most unusual course, that defence being full of the most injurious
insinuations against my honour, though these were not borne out by
evidence. In short, I was refused admission to the Court, though I
quoted a precedent _not two months old_, in support of my right to be
present—a right the more important to me if only from the fact of Lord
Gambier having written a second despatch relative to the action in Aix
Roads, in which despatch my services were altogether omitted,
notwithstanding his lordship’s praises of my conduct in his first
despatch written on the spot, where everything had transpired under his
own observation.
I must now briefly advert to his lordship’s defence, but only so far as
personally concerns myself.
Lord Gambier stated at the outset of his defence, that he had been
compelled to demand a court-martial in consequence of “the insinuations
thrown out against him by Lord Cochrane, which not only compromised his
own honour, but that of brave officers and men serving under his
command.” (_Minutes_, p. 105.)
I never threw out against his lordship a single insinuation, nor does
one exist, either on the records of the Court or elsewhere. I merely
told Lord Mulgrave, as narrated in the first volume, that I did not
consider Lord Gambier’s services worthy of a vote of thanks from
Parliament, and that on this ground, as bound by public duty to my
constituents, I should resist it. As will presently be seen, this was
also the opinion of many eminent men in Parliament, and on the same
ground too—that of public duty. If I committed any offence in this, it
was that of refusing to have my name coupled with that of Lord Gambier
in the vote of thanks, and resisting an offer of an independent squadron
and a regiment[50], not to persist in my determination of opposing it.
-----
Footnote 50:
See vol. i. p. 404.
-----
That my objection to the vote of thanks to Lord Gambier included any of
the officers serving under him was a gratuitous assumption to secure
sympathy for himself. As I have shown, the opinions of those officers
present in the action, whose opinions were to be relied on, were
_anything but in Lord Gambier’s favour_. Not a single word did I utter
against any officer; though, on the ninth and last day of the
court-martial, it was with the greatest difficulty, and _after a
positive refusal_, that I succeeded in getting a denial of Lord
Gambier’s unfounded assertion attached to the Minutes. It will be better
to give the whole transaction.
The Right Honourable Lord Cochrane called in.
PRESIDENT.—“Lord Cochrane, I have received the note which you
addressed to me, and have taken the sense of the Court upon it. The
decision of the Court is, that as the matter to which your lordship
refers _does not at all bear upon the trial of Lord Gambier they
cannot enter into it_.”
LORD COCHRANE.—“I would request, sir, that that letter may appear as
an official letter to you, and that it may be entered upon the
Minutes.”
PRESIDENT.—“The Court will take that into their consideration.”
The Court was cleared.
The Court was re-opened at one o’clock.
PRESIDENT.—“Lord Cochrane, the Court have taken into their
consideration the note you addressed to them, and have agreed that it
shall be attached to the Minutes.”
The letter was read, and is as follows:—
“August 4, 1809.
“SIR,—Having learnt from my brother officers that a report has gone
abroad that I censured, in general terms, the conduct of the officers
employed in the Road of Aix, on the 12th of April, I wish to have an
opportunity to declare the truth on oath; considering reports of that
nature highly injurious to the service of our country. I am also
desirous to lay before the Court the orders given to the fireships for
their guidance, as these will tend to elucidate and clear some of
those who consider that blame has been imputed to them.
“I have the honour to be, sir,
“Your most obedient humble servant,
“COCHRANE.
“Admiral Sir Roger Curtis, President.”
Let the reader mark that expression of the president, “_it does not at
all bear upon the trial of Lord Gambier!_” Though the very first
sentence of Lord Gambier’s defence was an accusation of myself upon an
assumption for which there was no foundation whatever. Nothing but fear
of a parliamentary debate caused that letter to be attached to the
Minutes.
So clumsily was this accusation made against me, that Lord Gambier,
despite the unwarrantable assumption just quoted, subsequently admitted
my objection to the vote of thanks to have _been solely aimed at
himself_, and not, as he had just said, at the officers and men of the
fleet. Here are his lordship’s words:—
“Lord Cochrane _warned_ the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty
that if this measure (the vote of thanks) were attempted he should, if
standing alone, oppose it; thus, without specifically objecting to
thanks being given for the service performed, directing his hostility
_personally at me_.” (_Minutes_, p. 107.)
That is—I should not have objected to a vote of thanks to the officers
and men of the fleet, but only to himself _personally_. Yet in the same
breath he accused me of traducing the officers and men of the fleet;
with the intention, no doubt, of sheltering himself under the pretence
of my having traduced them also. Could anything be more puerile? I gave
no other “_warning_” to Lord Mulgrave than that which Lord Gambier
correctly stated, and that I certainly did give, but without a word
which could give rise to the slightest imputation on the officers and
men of the fleet.
The fact is, that I never accused Lord Gambier at all, _not even to Lord
Mulgrave_, to whom I only expressed an intention of opposing a
parliamentary vote of thanks. It was the Board of Admiralty who accused
him. Here are their accusations in full:—
“_By the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c._
“Whereas Admiral the Right Hon. Lord Gambier has, by his letter to our
Secretary, of the 30th of May, 1809, requested that his conduct, as
Commander-in-chief of the Channel Fleet employed in Basque Roads,
between the 17th day of March and the 29th day of April, 1809, may be
inquired into by a court-martial:
“And whereas, by the log-books and minutes of signals of the
_Caledonia_, _Impérieuse_, and other ships employed on that service,
_it appears to us_ that the said Admiral Lord Gambier, on the 12th
day of the said month of April, the enemy’s ships being then on
shore, and the signal having been made that they could be destroyed,
did, for a considerable time, neglect or delay taking effectual
measures for destroying them: We, therefore, in compliance with his
lordship’s request, and _in consequence of what appears in the said
log-books and minutes of signals_, think fit that a court-martial
shall be assembled for the purpose of examining into his lordship’s
conduct, and trying him for the same: We send you herewith his
lordship’s said letter, and also his letter of the 10th of the said
month therein referred to, together with an attested copy of a
letter of our Secretary, dated the 29th of last month, and addressed
to Lord Cochrane, and his lordship’s reply thereto, with the
log-books and minutes of signals above-mentioned: and we do hereby
require and direct you to assemble a court-martial on Monday the
19th day of this month (if the witnesses shall be then ready, and if
not then ready, as soon after as they shall be so) to try the said
Admiral the Right Hon. Lord Gambier, for his conduct in the instance
hereinbefore mentioned; and also to inquire into his whole conduct
as Commander-in-chief of the Channel Fleet employed in Basque Roads,
between the 17th day of March and the 29th day of April, 1809, and
to try him for the same accordingly.—Given under our hands the 5th
day of June, 1809.
(Signed) “MULGRAVE.
“R. BICKERTON.
“WM. DOMETT.
“R. MOORSOM.
“To Sir Roger Curtis, Bart., Admiral
of the White, and Commander-in-chief
of his Majesty’s ships and vessels
at Spithead and in Portsmouth
Harbour.
“By Command of their Lordships,
“W.W. POLE.”
There is nothing here from which it can be inferred that—to use Lord
Gambier’s own words in his defence—I had driven him “to defend himself
against the _loose and indirect accusations_ of an officer so much his
inferior in rank.” I had made no accusation whatever against him, having
merely and only declared that the service rendered was not worth the
thanks of Parliament; the frequency of such thanks for trifling service
being at that period so notorious as to become subject for sarcasm, as
will appear in the next chapter. Had Lord Gambier construed my
parliamentary opposition rightly, he might have thanked me for saving
him from himself, and would have done so, had not his peculiar failing,
vanity, demanded an ovation for services which under evil advice he had
prevented from being fully consummated. So far from accusing Lord
Gambier, _I was ordered by the Admiralty to do so_, and refused, to my
own detriment[51]; telling the Board _to go to the logs of the fleet,
and frame their own accusations, if they had any_. Yet, even this
consideration did not prevent Lord Gambier from giving utterance to the
following bombast;—
-----
Footnote 51:
See vol. i. p. 407.
-----
“Whether Lord Cochrane supposed that he might with impunity endeavour
to lower me in the opinion of my country and of my sovereign, signal
marks of whose favour had at that instant been exclusively conferred
upon himself,—whether his Lordship thought to _raise his own
reputation at the expense of mine_,—and whether he expected that his
threat would intimidate me to silence, I know not.” (_Minutes_, p.
108.)
How could I “raise my own reputation” at the expense of Lord Gambier,
who had, in his first despatch, said that my conduct in the action of
Aix Roads “could not be exceeded by any feat of valour hitherto achieved
by the British navy;” though in his second despatch, substituted for the
first after his return to England, and that too by order of the Board of
Admiralty, he only remembered that I “lay with my ship about three miles
from the enemy!” His lordship was not once within gunshot of the enemy,
whilst my frigate was throughout engaged, and for some time
single-handed, against two line-of-battle ships, and a fifty gun ship,
the _Calcutta_, which I captured.
So far from “raising my reputation at the expense of Lord Gambier’s,” I
voluntarily stated on the court-martial, that “the feelings of Lord
Gambier for the honour and interest of his country were as strong as my
own.” (_Minutes_, p. 40.) For which mark of good nature, his lordship
said in his defence, that even “in the present proceedings, Lord
Cochrane stands in a situation only as an officer _under my command_!”
(_Minutes_, p. 107) the meaning of which evidently was that I ought not
to say anything but by order. The expression could not have had any
other meaning.
I will not enter further into Lord Gambier’s unfounded recriminations
upon myself, further than to remark, that even had they any foundation,
in no way did they bear upon the subject of the trial, much less were
they in any way connected with his defence to the inquiry as to _why it
was, that with a favourable wind, a rising tide, and plenty of water, he
had refrained from attacking eleven ships helplessly ashore, allowing
all but three to escape? This was the inquiry before the court, which,
departing from the subject of inquiry, connived at its being substituted
for recriminations on me for accusing Lord Gambier—though I had never
done so._
Upon the real point Lord Gambier in his defence wisely abstained from
trusting himself, except in such terms as the following. “_If_ he had
sent in any ships, and they should have been necessitated to remain a
whole tide in the Roads of Aix; _if_ they had been crippled in going in;
_if_ the wind, which was favourable for carrying them in, should not
have shifted so as to bring them out again; and that even, _if_ the wind
were fair and they should lose their foremasts, the crews would not have
been able to get the ships before the wind.” To this, I will add that
“_if_,” instead of conjuring up these absurd dangers to be apprehended
from an enemy of whom Lord Gambier had said to Captain Broughton, that
they were “_already destroyed_,” his Lordship had sent in ships to
finish the work, the court-martial would never have been heard of, and
he would have enjoyed a legitimate triumph. I was not his enemy. Those
who persuaded him not to second my efforts were so unquestionably.
Quitting these “_ifs_,” and calculations of possible risk and
conjectural disasters, one or two points professionally connected with
the defence remained to be noticed.
Lord Gambier knew, that during the ebb and rising tide, the enemy’s
ships ashore were preparing to warp off with the flood, and he also knew
that the only two enemy’s ships at anchor, the _Foudroyant_ and
_Cassard_, which at the court-martial were converted into bugbears to
the whole British fleet, would be prepared in case of the attack which
they naturally expected, to cut or slip, and so run for the mouth of the
Charente as they did, the moment the ships aground had warped off and
escaped.
When the British fleet weighed from Basque Roads, the enemy was, as
Captain Broughton testified “_panic struck_.” When, in place of
proceeding straight on to the attack, the British ships _came to an
anchor_ in Little Basque Roads, the enemy, as their own writers declare,
considered “_la mollesse de Lord Gambier_” an unexpected stroke of good
luck, and set energetically to work to warp off their ships from the
bank on which they were stranded. As Captain Broughton rightly says, had
the frigates and smaller vessels been _then_ sent in, and a
demonstration only made of others ready to follow, the destruction of
the whole must have been complete. This is neither a matter of naval
tactics nor science, but a commonplace consequence. It was this which
caused Captain Malcolm to say, “Had it appeared to me that there was no
other chance of destroying them, but by such an attack, _I certainly
think it ought to have been made_.” (_Minutes_, p. 211.) And again, “Had
they been attacked by the British ships, they could not, in my opinion,
_have been warped off from the shore_, as to do so, it was necessary to
lay out anchors to heave them off.” (_Ibid._) There are no “_ifs_” or
contingent disasters in Captain Malcolm’s opinion, which, as Captain
Hutchinson pertinently remarks, was that of every officer in the fleet.
But even after the enemy’s ships had escaped, and the two at anchor, the
_Foudroyant_ and _Cassard_ _had_ run for the Charente, the
Commander-in-chief allowed an hour and a half to escape before a single
ship was sent into the inner roads, nor would any have been sent at all
had not I taken the _Impérieuse_ in alone, and then hoisted the signal
“in want of assistance.” Had not this been done, not a single ship of
the enemy’s fleet would have been destroyed, unless from the
impossibility of getting her again afloat, and I am not aware that any
such instance occurred.
To excuse this neglect, the hypothesis of banks and shoals, in the
charts of Messrs. Stokes and Fairfax was resorted to, for they neither
existed in the French charts, nor in reality. Coupled with this was the
alleged danger of point blank shot from the dilapidated batteries!
“Scarcely,” says Lord Gambier, “had the _Cæsar_ reached Aix Roads,
before she grounded, and _lay in a perilous situation exposed to the
point blank shot of the batteries_.” (_Minutes_, p. 128.) Unfortunately
for this hypothesis, a careful search in the _Cæsar’s_ log shows that
_she was never once touched by shot or shell!!_ and that in place of
grounding in Aix Roads, she grounded on the Boyart Sand—on her way to
Aix Roads—and that she lay there beyond the reach of shot; thus proving
what other officers testified, viz. that there was plenty of room in the
channel to avoid shot. The _Cæsar_ only went a few feet too far, and
came off next morning without damage of any kind.
A still less worthy part of the defence was, in laying the fault on
myself and Captain, now Admiral Seymour, of the _Pallas_ that nothing
more was done. “Lord Cochrane,” says the Commander-in-chief, “_remained_
in the Road of Aix, during the 13th and 14th, accompanied by the
_Pallas_, sloops and gun-brigs, but nothing was attempted by those two
frigates.” (_Minutes_, p. 129.) The fact was, that in the fight with the
line-of-battle ships destroyed on the evening of the 12th, before any
assistance came, the _Impérieuse_ was severely damaged, so much so, as
to occupy the whole of the 13th in repairs. This was why Admiral Seymour
so gallantly stood by us, and the 14th was occupied in vain attempts
even then to get a force sent in. Had Admiral Seymour run the _Pallas_
alone amongst the line-of-battle ships which remained, at the mouth of
the Charente, he would not have earned the high reputation he now
enjoys. But when Lord Gambier threw out this questionable insinuation,
he forgot to mention that Admiral Stopford lay at a short distance with
two line-of-battle ships and half a dozen frigates, besides having our
two frigates and all the smaller vessels under his command. Had Admiral
Stopford been asked why, with such a force under his orders, he remained
inactive, the reply would have not been to the Commander-in-chief’s
credit. Admiral Stopford would not have been a spectator only, could he
have helped himself.
I now quit this miserable subject for ever. The real fact is, that from
over-persuasion of those who were jealous of a junior officer
originating and being appointed to carry out plans deemed impossible by
others, Lord Gambier declined to second my efforts, as Admiral Austen
has plainly said in his letter previously quoted, the fact being as
completely confirmed by Captain Hutchinson. This decision of his
lordship was no doubt arrived at, when a council of officers were
summoned on board the flag-ship, on the morning of the 12th, at which
time the enemy’s fleet was lying helplessly ashore.
That, after such council, his Lordship never intended to make _any
attack at all_ on the French ships, is proved _beyond question_, by the
subjoined testimony of Captain Broughton.
“A ship or two might have been placed, in my opinion against the
batteries on the southern part of Ile d’Aix, so as to take off their
fire AND SILENCE THEM. I mentioned to Sir H. Neale, when the signal
was made for all captains in the morning, that I thought _they were
attackable_—speaking of the confused state in which the French ships
appeared to be at the time.”
“_I heard my Lord Gambier the same morning say_ (at this council) _it
had been his intention to have gone against the batteries I now speak
of, but as the enemy were on shore he did not think it necessary to
run any unnecessary risk of the fleet when the object of their
destruction seemed to be already obtained_.” (_Minutes_, pp. 221,
222.)
That is, he admits my exertions to have destroyed the French fleet,
(which was not destroyed—all except three ships having escaped) and
plainly tells Captain Broughton that _he will do nothing more_! This
should for ever decide the point.
If, however, proof be still wanted of the utter worthlessness of any
opposition in the power of the enemy to offer, whether by fortifications
or ships, it is to be found in the following statement at the close of
Lord Gambier’s defence:—
“I conclude by observing that the service actually performed has been
of great importance, as well in its immediate effects as in its
ultimate consequences; for the Brest fleet is so reduced as to be no
longer effective. It was upon this fleet the enemy relied for the
succour and protection of their West India colonies, and _the
destruction of their ships was effected in their own harbour, in sight
of thousands of the French. I congratulate myself and my country that
this important service has been effected, under Providence, with the
loss only of ten men killed, thirty-five wounded, and one missing._
NOT EVEN ONE OF THE SMALLEST OF OUR VESSELS EMPLOYED HAS BEEN DISABLED
FROM PROCEEDING ON ANY SERVICE THAT MIGHT HAVE BECOME NECESSARY.”
(_Minutes_, p. 138.)
By this voluntary admission of Lord Gambier I am willing to be
judged—feeling certain that posterity will be as fully convinced of the
inability of the enemy to inflict material damage on our ships, as was
Lord Gambier himself, according to his own testimony, as quoted in the
above passage. As Lord Gambier truly says, no damage worth mentioning
_was_ done to any of our ships, to which I shall add, that at no period
after the enemy’s ships were driven ashore were they in a condition to
inflict damage. This his lordship not only admits, but _proves_, in the
concluding paragraph of his defence, and yet the whole point of the
trial is made to rest on the surmise that had Lord Gambier done
_anything_ against the enemy’s ships aground, _the destruction of the
British force must have been the consequence_. That is, _by doing
nothing the enemy’s ships were destroyed; though by doing anything our
own would have been in danger_!!!
The subjoined chart B will show, at a glance, the whole affair.
CHART B
---
ISLE D’AIX AND LES PALLES,
Being a tracing from the official French Chart, and showing the
positions of the enemy’s ships as they lay ashore on the morning of the
12th of April 1809, previous to their escape.
[Illustration: London: Richard Bentley: 1860.]
A. _Ocean_ three-decker and group on the north-west edge of the Palles
Shoal. These were permitted to escape.
B. _Calcutta_, captured by the _Impérieuse_ and set on fire.
C. _Ville de Varsovie_, hauled down her colours to the assisting
ships. Afterwards burned.
D. _Tonnerre_, ditto, ditto.
The last three were destroyed _on the falling tide_, but no others!
These being the only enemy’s ships which, after the escape of the
other four, remained assailable.
E. The position taken up by the _Impérieuse_, she being at the time of
the arrival of the assisting force engaged with the _Calcutta_, and
with the other two ships.
F. Position of the British ships sent in after the _Ocean_ and group
had warped off, viz. within pistol shot of the sand on which the
escaped ships lay till 1 p.m. aground.
The best comment, perhaps, on the whole affair of Aix Roads is what had
previously been effected with a less force than that under Lord Gambier,
and when the fortifications were perfect. The subjoined historical facts
should for ever put an end to all controversy on the subject, and at the
same time to the untenable defence set up at this memorable
court-martial.
“A well-planned and vigorous attack on the coast of France being in
1757 much desired, with a view to give a decisive blow to the marine
of that kingdom (_the very purpose for which Lord Gambier was sent,
and which Lord Mulgrave especially impressed on me_), a fleet was
ordered to be got in readiness, under the command of Sir E. Hawke,
Rear-Admiral Knowles being appointed second in command. On the 20th of
September the fleet made the Island of Oleron, and Sir E. Hawke
ordered the Vice-Admiral to proceed to Basque Road, to stand in _as
near_ to Ile d’Aix as the pilot would carry him, with such ships of
his division as he thought necessary, and _to batter the fort, until
the garrison should either abandon it or surrender_.”
“On the 22nd of September the fleet entered the bay called the Road of
Basque, between the islands of Rhé and Oleron. _About eight the next
morning_ Admiral Knowles in the _Neptune_, with the _Magnanime_,
_Barfleur_, _America_, _Alcide_, _Burford_, and _Royal William_, _made
sail towards Aix_. Captain Howe (_afterwards Earl Howe_) in the
_Magnanime_ led the van. At _half-past twelve_ the fort upon the
island began to fire, but he continued to advance without exchanging a
single shot, continually urging his pilot to lay his ship as close to
the fort as possible. _He dropped his anchor under the very walls._ It
was, however, near an hour before the fort struck its colours.”
(_Biographical Memoir of Earl Howe in the Naval Chronicle_, vol. i.
1799; see also _Campbell’s Lives of the Admirals_.)
This was the very fort, only now _in ruins_,—or to use Lord Gambier’s
words, “_no obstacle, from the dilapidated condition of the
fortifications_”—that his lordship adduced as a reason for not
endangering the British fleet by exposing the ships to its fire. Admiral
Harvey had perhaps Lord Howe’s exploit in his mind’s eye when he told
Lord Gambier to his face that “had Nelson been there, he would not have
waited for fire-ships, but would have dashed at once at the enemy;” an
assertion of which there can be no doubt, though poor Harvey was
dismissed the service for this and similar opinions.
Another extract, from Lord Clarendon’s remarks on Admiral Blake, shall
close the subject.
“He despised those rules which had been long in practice, to _keep his
ship and men out of danger, which had been held in former times a
point of great ability and circumspection; as if the principal art
requisite in the captain of a ship had been to be sure to come home
safe again_! He was the first man who brought ships to contemn
_castles on shore_, which had been thought ever very formidable, and
were discovered by him to _make a noise only, and to fright those who
could be rarely hurt by them_.” (CLARENDON’S _History of the
Rebellion_.)
CHAP. XXVIII.
THE VOTE OF THANKS.
MY MOTION FOR MINUTES OF COURT-MARTIAL.—MR. TIERNEY’S OPINION RESPECTING
THEM.—MR. WHITBREAD’S VIEWS.—THE MINUTES INDISPENSABLE.—MR.
WILBERFORCE ON THE SAME POINT.—LORD GREY’S OPINION OF THE
MINISTRY.—THE VOTE OF THANKS LEAVES OUT MY NAME, YET THE CREDIT OF
THE AFFAIR GIVEN TO ME.—INCONSISTENCY OF THIS.—I IMPUGN THE DECISION
OF THE HOUSE.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT’S OPINION.—MR. WINDHAM’S.—LORD
MULGRAVE TURNS ROUND UPON ME.—HIS LORDSHIP’S MISREPRESENTATIONS.—YET
ADMITS THE SERVICE TO BE “BRILLIANT.”—LORD MULGRAVE REBUKED BY LORD
HOLLAND.—EARL GROSVENOR’S VIEWS.—LORD MELVILLE HITS UPON THE TRUTH,
THAT I, BEING A JUNIOR OFFICER, WAS LEFT OUT.—VOTE OF THANKS IN
OPPOSITION TO MINUTES.—THE VOTE, THOUGH CARRIED, DAMAGED THE
MINISTRY.
From this time forward I never trod the deck of a British ship of war at
sea, as her commander, till thirty-nine years afterwards I was appointed
by her present most gracious Majesty to command the West India squadron;
the greater portion of the interval being marked by persecution of which
the court-martial on Lord Gambier was only the starting-point.
The commencement of the parliamentary session in 1810, was remarkable
for its votes of thanks, and the refusal of all information which might
justify them. This led Lord Milton to declare in the House of Commons,
that “votes of thanks, from their frequency, had lost their value, and
ceased to be an honour. They had got so much into the habit of voting
thanks that it was almost an insult not to vote them.” (Feb. 1st.)
On the 25th of January 1810, Lord Grenville adverted in the House of
Lords to notice of motion for a vote of thanks to Lord Gambier, for
_his_ services in destroying the enemy’s ships in Basque Roads; and
observed that as the last intimation on the journals respecting Lord
Gambier was his arrest, it would be necessary that the _Minutes_ of the
court-martial should be laid before the House, in order to enable it to
judge of the necessity for a vote of thanks. To this Lord Mulgrave
strongly objected, on the ground that it “would appear as if it was
wished to retry the case.” Laying the sentence of acquittal only before
the House, said his lordship, would be “sufficient to render their
proceedings regular, and would answer all the purposes of the noble
lord.” With this the House was obliged to be content, though how that
sentence had been obtained the reader is now made aware.
On the 29th of January, in pursuance of notice previously given, I made
a motion for the production of the _minutes of the court-martial_ in the
House of Commons; as being, from the extraordinary discrepancy between
the nature of the evidence and the sentence, absolutely necessary, in
order to enable members fairly and impartially to decide whether the
thanks in contemplation of ministers _were due_ to Lord Gambier for the
part he took in what had been by them denominated a victory in Basque
Roads.[52]
-----
Footnote 52:
The action took place in Aix Roads. The only victory gained by Lord
Gambier in Basque Roads was that of bringing his ships to anchor there
whilst the enemy’s ships were quietly heaving off from the banks on
which they had been driven, nine miles distant from the fleet.
-----
In support of this production of the minutes, I adverted to a previously
expressed opinion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Perceval),
that Lord Gambier had been honourably acquitted, but that an officer’s
having done no wrong _did not entitle him to the thanks of the House_;
which, if bestowed on trifling, or, indeed, on any but brilliant
achievements, would dwindle into contempt, even with those on whom they
should be conferred. Votes of thanks were already lightly esteemed in
the Navy, and I pledged myself—if the House would insist on the
production of the minutes—to prove that “Lord Gambier’s defence was
contradicted by itself—by his lordship’s official letters—and by his own
witnesses; many of whom, as to essential facts, were at variance with
themselves and with each other.” Lastly, I undertook to prove to the
House, that the chart of the 12th of April was “in a most material point
false—and in every respect a fabrication.”
I will not inflict on the reader a recapitulation of the long discussion
which followed, but the opinions of some whose names are to this day
held in respect are too much to the point to be passed over. The opinion
expressed by Mr. Tierney is so remarkable that I shall give it entire as
reported.
“The question was not as to the noble lord’s (Gambier) innocence, but
as to his claim to a most distinguishing reward. The honours of the
House were high things, dear and valuable; but dear only because they
implied merit, valuable only because that merit must be rare. Honours
too frequently bestowed lost their value, and became signs of nothing
but the weakness which lavished them, or the worthlessness on which
they were to be thrown away.
“He would vote for the minutes, but in his vote he begged to be
understood as merely calling for matter to enable him to shape his
opinion. He could mean no slight to Lord Gambier. He respected his
lordship’s character. He had some opportunities of hearing him spoken
of, and it was always in a high strain of praise and estimation. But
he had never understood that Lord Gambier took _any share_ of the
merit of the achievement to himself. _He had not approached the French
fleet nearer than seven miles._ Ministers had praised Lord Gambier for
discretion; _he hoped they had not intended this_ as an instance in
the enumeration of its proofs.
“It became the House to be cautious of being prodigal of honours
entrusted to their distribution. Lord Cochrane ought to be heard; his
judgment and character, his signal gallantry and signal honours[53]
deserved the serious attention of the House. Even his feelings, led as
they were, perhaps, astray by an excess of strength and sensibility,
deserved all the attention which could be paid to them.”
-----
Footnote 53:
The red ribbon.
-----
The opinions of Mr. Whitbread are no less remarkable. Sir C. Hamilton
had said that the reason why no more ships were destroyed was solely
attributable _to me!_ and that he would engage to prove it to the
House.[54] Mr. Wynne also declared, on behalf of the Ministry, that the
evidence was _all on Lord Gambier’s side!_ and opposed to it only my
solitary evidence. This called up Mr. Whitbread, whose remarks are
reported as follows:—
-----
Footnote 54:
He however omitted so to do.
-----
“The noble lord (Cochrane) had done wrong in returning any answer to
the application of the Admiralty.[55] He ought to have told them, as a
member of the House of Commons, he had no answer whatever to make; and
if they thought the logs _inconclusive_ why did they not manfully come
down and try the question in that House?
“The hon. gentleman (Mr. Wynne) talked of the injustice of trying an
officer in that House! Must not the merits of every officer be
inquired into when it is proposed to confer on him a vote of thanks?
Was he not _then_ on his trial? Was not that a species of trial to
which any officer must necessarily be exposed before he could receive
the high honour of the thanks of Parliament? After a court-martial, by
which Lord Gambier had been acquitted, did it follow, as a matter of
necessity that they must grant him the thanks of that House? He
presumed this by no means followed.
“What then was the situation to which the House was reduced? The noble
lord (Cochrane) had committed himself more than he had ever heard man
do in that House to prove his statements respecting the conduct of
Lord Gambier. And now a member (Sir C. Hamilton) came forward and said
that the duty intrusted to Lord Cochrane had not been properly
executed, and that if it had been he might have done far more injury
to the enemy’s ships. The hon. baronet (Hamilton) said that at the
time Lord Cochrane was in command, and made signals to the vessels
employed under him, ‘_some of them obeyed and others disobeyed_ the
instructions they received, and that those who disobeyed were
ultimately successful, whilst those who obeyed at the moment failed.’
The worthy baronet also added that ‘those who _disobeyed_ the signals
were promoted, whilst those who _obeyed_ were not.’ What would become
of the subordination of our Navy if our officers were to be informed,
in any one instance, that those who obeyed the instructions of their
superior officer were to be _passed by_, while those who disobeyed his
signals _might expect to be promoted_![56]
“From the disagreeable situation in which the House was placed on both
sides, he thought they must unavoidably have the _Minutes_.”
-----
Footnote 55:
Demanding the reasons for my opposition to the vote of thanks. See
vol. i. p. 404.
Footnote 56:
This admission by a ministerial partisan was true. It was chiefly
owing to this that the fireships, to use Lord Gambier’s words, “failed
to take effect on the enemy’s ships;” viz. by kindling them where they
drifted on the shoals or went wide of the enemy’s fleet.
-----
Various other opinions were expressed. Mr. Wilberforce thought
acquiescence in my motion for the production of the minutes “most
important, as throwing a _stigma on all the members of the
court-martial_;” which was true enough, one of my objects being to show
that the influence of a corrupt government had been used to vitiate a
tribunal upon which the very safety of the Navy depended. How far I
should have succeeded in this may be left to the reader’s judgment.[57]
-----
Footnote 57:
See Lord Grey’s expressions, _infra_.
-----
Mr. Ponsonby would not agree to the motion because its adoption would be
a violation of the fundamental principles of jurisprudence. Sir Francis
Burdett said, that “Lord Gambier’s plan seemed to be a desire _to
preserve his fleet_—my plan, to destroy the enemy’s fleet. He had never
heard that the articles of war held out an instruction to preserve the
fleet. What if Nelson, at the Nile or Trafalgar, had acted on this
principle? He had never heard that Lord Gambier, in the affair of Basque
Roads, pretended to have done any hard, or even important service. His
only merit seemed to consist in what he omitted to do.”
Having thus been put on my defence by direct accusation on the part of a
Ministerial supporter that I had not done my duty, I implored the House
to give me an opportunity, not only of defending myself, but of laying
bare matters of more importance to the country than either my judgment
or character. I again pledged myself to prove all I had asserted, and to
stake everything that was valuable to man on the issue, at the same time
telling the House that, if the minutes were granted, I would expose such
matters as might make the country tremble for its safety—and entreating
it well to consider that there was another tribunal to which it was
answerable, that of posterity, which would try all our actions and judge
impartially.
Neither argument nor a sense of justice availed, and the word
“_sentence_” was substituted for “_Minutes_,” in an amendment carried by
a large majority of the faction, in that day dependent on and wielded by
Ministers—of whose general conduct Lord Grey, in the opening debate of
the session, thus thought it necessary to express himself:—“He was glad
to find from the humble and chastened tone of Ministers that they
_appeared to feel some remorse for the numerous miseries which, by their
imbecility and misconduct they had inflicted on their country. Had it
been otherwise, he should have supposed the Almighty vengeance was
hanging over this nation, and that therefore the hearts of its rulers
had been hardened in proportion as their understandings were darkened._”
This merited censure from one of the great lights of that day and of all
time, passed unheeded in the conduct of the session, which outdid its
predecessors in acts of subserviency to the faction in power by whose
supremacy it was felt that the rotten-borough interest could alone
maintain itself against the national execration which was now beginning
to make itself heard.
At the conclusion of the preliminary debate, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer rose to move a vote of thanks to Lord Gambier for _his eminent
services in destroying the French fleet_ in the Basque Roads! My name,
as having effected anything, was _purposely and very ingeniously left
out!_ but warm thanks were accorded to those who directed the
fireships,—not against the enemy, but against the banks of the Boyart
and Palles shoals!
The passage in the vote of thanks is curious: “for their gallant and
highly meritorious conduct on this glorious occasion, _particularly
marked by the brilliant and unexampled success of the difficult and
perilous mode of attack by fireships, conducted under the immediate
direction of Captain Lord Cochrane_!” Yet Lord Gambier stated in his
defence, “The success of the first part of the enterprise arose from the
terror excited by the _appearance_ of the fireships! _as they failed in
the principal effect they were intended to produce_.” (_Minutes_, p.
131.) If the House had been in the possession of the minutes of the
court-martial, would they have voted thanks to officers of whom the
Commander-in-chief says that they “_failed in their object_”? Not a word
of thanks to me for having conducted it, but to the Commander-in-chief,
then twelve miles off, his only merit consisting in coming three miles
nearer, anchoring out of gunshot—and to men whom a ministerial supporter
had praised by saying they had been promoted for “_disobeying my
signals_!” And this though the First Lord of the Admiralty had offered
me his own regiment—a squadron of frigates, with _carte blanche_ to do
what I pleased with them—and a vote of thanks, conjointly with Lord
Gambier, if I would not offer any opposition!
The value of such a vote under such circumstances had been rightly
estimated, even by those who acquiesced in it. The value of the service
rendered was paltry, in comparison with what it ought to have been; and
the vote, either to myself or my superiors, would have been worthy of
it. I had from the first refused to have my name coupled with such
pretence, as a fraud on national honours.
Yet, leaving me altogether out of the vote of thanks, so long as thanks
were voted, and giving them to the Commander-in-chief and the officers
under “my immediate direction,” was a specimen of party spite so
transparent that it could deceive nobody. The Chancellor of the
Exchequer, either ashamed of his subject, or forgetting the purpose in
hand, most unaccountably gave me in his harangue _the credit of the
whole affair_! He could only have done this from two motives. Either he
was too much a gentleman to permit his personal honour to be trampled
under foot by his colleagues, or he could not have read the vote of
thanks till he came to it at the conclusion of his speech. There is,
however, a third hypothesis. The subjoined eulogy might have been
pronounced to blind the House.
“The attack having thus recommenced on the night of the 13th
successively[58] was followed up on the next day by the noble lord
(Cochrane)[59] with peculiar gallantry. The consequence was that no
less than three sail of the line and a fifty-gun ship were completely
destroyed. The House would not, therefore, he trusted, be disposed to
refuse its thanks _for eminent services when performed under such
great peril and risk_, whilst the enemy were possessed of the
protection of their own batteries[60], and other advantages which they
could bring into play for the security of their own vessels. _It was
an enterprise of great and peculiar hazard and difficulty._ The result
had been highly injurious to the enemy, and had the effect of not only
disabling but of removing the enemy’s whole squadron from the
possibility of being for a considerable time available for the
purposes of the naval campaign. _Was not this an object of great
magnitude?_”
-----
Footnote 58:
There was no attack at all on the night of the 13th, for all the ships
taken were destroyed on the afternoon and night of the 12th.
Footnote 59:
No such thing. I followed up nothing on the 14th, except trying to
evade Lord Gambier’s signals of recall. A pretty clear proof that the
Chancellor had never even read the despatches, and less the minutes of
the court-martial!
Footnote 60:
About which I did not trouble myself, and by which the _Impérieuse_
was not once hit.
-----
From this speech it is clear that the Chancellor of the Exchequer
considered that the whole success was attributable to my exertions, and
it is no less apparent that he contemplated my being included in the
vote of thanks.
Then why leave me out of the vote of thanks, and give thanks to those
who had nothing to do with this “_work of great magnitude_?”
Lord Mulgrave made no such blunder in the House of Lords, nor even
mentioned my name _except in terms of reprobation_—possibly because I
refused his lordship’s temptation of a squadron and a regiment to hold
my peace! Yet it may be that the Chancellor of the Exchequer made no
mistake. His eulogy might have been merely intended to appeal to the
popular ear, whilst contemptuously excluding me from the vote. Be this
as it may, the trick succeeded, and my voice was drowned amidst the
clamour of faction, as were the voices of those who supported me in the
House.
Still I was not disposed to allow the vote to pass without further
protest. I again warned the House that “even their verdict was not
conclusive upon character, but that there was another tribunal to which
even that House was amenable, and that the public would one day exercise
a judgment, even though the House might shrink from a just decision. I
inquired what portion of Lord Gambier’s exploit merited thanks, or what
had been the nature of his exploit? He lay at a distance—never brought
his fleet to the place of action, or even within danger, and yet for
such supineness he was to receive the highest honours of his country!
The ground taken by ministers was frivolous—that where the subordinates
admittedly deserved the praise, the superiors must receive it. The
public _would one day read the minutes, though the House would not. The
public would judge from the facts, though the House would not. The
public would not submit to have its eyes bound because the House chose
to keep theirs shut._ Let a single reason be adduced for this vote of
thanks, and I was ready to vote for it—but the _reasons_ which had been
obtruded on the House were unworthy the name of _arguments_.”
Sir John Orde, of all the supporters of the ministry, gave the only
honest reason for his vote in favour of Lord Gambier, though probably
his argument might not pass current at the present day. It was this:—“As
thanks to his Lordship have been proposed, I shall vote for them,
because I entertained this opinion of Lord Gambier’s conduct before the
prorogation of Parliament, _and their Lordships of the Admiralty
appeared to do the same_!!” Poor Sir John! He must have had better
reasons for his arguments than arguments for his reasons.
A few more reasonable opinions than that of worthy Sir John shall be
transcribed _verbatim_, and first those of Sir Francis Burdett:—
“Sir Francis Burdett wished to know whether the service of Lord
Gambier was worth the thanks of Parliament, even admitting it to have
all the value attributed to it by anything but the unblushing and
profuse spirit of ministerial favouritism.[61] He would not ask
whether, on the other hand, there was not the full and decided
testimony of a man competent to give his judgment, and of whose
admirable valour and good fortune the House and the nation had but one
opinion? He felt that in making these observations he might be
treading on perilous ground. He was probably bringing on himself some
charitable retorts, particularly those of a gentleman whose charity
was of a very peculiar nature. But he was careless about such remarks;
for though he deprecated that person’s charity, he would not shun but
would rather court his hostility.[62]
“Had there been anything said to make out a reason of the vote
demanded? Where was the evidence of the Commander-in-chief’s
_intrepidity or skill? Of that boldness which bursts its way through
all obstacles? Of that genius before which obstacles vanish?_ In place
of this, the House was insulted with a dry catalogue of negatives, and
an account as to how the noble Admiral inspected the action _at a
distance of seven miles_.[63] The question had been treated lightly;
but levity was unbecoming the grave matter for their deliberation.”
-----
Footnote 61:
Lord Gambier had recently been a colleague of the Lords of the
Admiralty.
Footnote 62:
Mr. Croker, who did not, however, respond to the challenge of my
excellent colleague. Had he done so, the House would, no doubt, have
been highly amused at the result. But Mr. Croker was “wise in his day
and generation.”
Footnote 63:
Nine.
-----
Mr. Windham said:—
“The thanks of that House did not deserve to be lavished on any man,
unless his services were of that rank which forced itself into
universal report and universal admiration. It was not to be evolved in
some obscure process of official chemistry, not to be drawn out under
bundles of obscure records, not to be elicited by any keen, cunning,
recondite, subtilising process[64] beyond the practice or perception
of the general mass of mankind. To be praised, it must be known; to
become matter of thanks, it must be matter of public fact.
In voting thanks it was time to pause. These old rewards had become
worthless. It had been said that nothing was left but the peerage, and
even of that high honour ministers had been most lavish. This was the
natural process when there was no distinct scale of merit and reward.
It was high time to stop. They had in their hands the great provision
for national virtue. They had the honours of the country intrusted to
them, and it became them as legislators not to suffer its streams to
be idly diverted, nor to be prodigally and profusely poured forth to
slake the thirst of undeserving ambition, still panting, still
insatiable.”
-----
Footnote 64:
Alluding to the court-martial.
-----
Argument and fact were alike unavailing, and Sir John Orde’s
extraordinary reasons and opinions prevailed. To 161 of the Admiralty
opinion, only 39 could be found alive to a true sense of legislative
dignity or functions.
A few remarks on what passed in the House of Lords, where similar thanks
were voted, are necessary.
Lord Mulgrave said that it was with great surprise that he first heard
that a noble lord serving under the noble Admiral, and a member of
another House, had intimated his intention to oppose the vote of the
House of Commons, on the ground that his commander had not done his duty
to _the utmost_. Lord Mulgrave, of course, alluded to my conversation
with him nine months before, though I never said anything of the kind to
his Lordship. What I said was, “that the Commander-in-chief had not done
anything deserving the thanks of Parliament.” Had the _Minutes_ been
allowed to be produced in either House, this would have been proved
beyond question, in spite of the _sentence of acquittal_, which was
alone laid on the table.
Lord Mulgrave was no less unjust in attempting to convince the peers
that I had done nothing but carry out _Lord Gambier’s plan of
fireships_; referring them to Lord Gambier’s letter of March 19th, 1809,
in which, instead of recommending an attack by fireships, Lord Gambier
had denounced such an attempt as “_hazardous, if not desperate_,”[65] as
would have appeared had the minutes of the court-martial been laid
before them.
-----
Footnote 65:
See Lord Gambier’s letter, Vol. I. p. 342.
-----
Mine, as explained in the first volume, was not an attack by fireships
alone, for such an attack could only have ended in the boarding of the
fireships by the enemy’s row-boats, and the murdering of the crews. It
was an attack by means of explosion-vessels, which should impress the
enemy with the idea that every fireship was similarly charged, so as to
have the effect of deterring them from boarding, and thus, the
fireships, had they been properly directed, must have done their work in
spite of the enemy’s row-boats.
Yet Lord Mulgrave followed Lord Gambier in this “_suppressio veri_.” On
the very day Lord Gambier had _not_ recommended the use of
fireships—though Lord Mulgrave’s speech would lead the House, in the
absence of the minutes of the court-martial, to infer that he _had_
recommended their use—the Commander-in-chief had stated that an attack
with fireships would be “_hazardous, if not desperate_.” A curious way,
truly, of recommending the use of fireships; though, had he recommended
them, they would have been of no use without the explosion-vessels, the
terror created by which formed the very essence of my plan, and was the
sole cause even of the trifling success gained. Again, said Lord
Mulgrave:—
“Lord Cochrane arrived at Plymouth. He had on a former occasion been
employed in blockading Rochefort, and was acquainted with the coasts.
He was, therefore, consulted, and _spoke with greater confidence of
the success of the attempt than those who wrote from that quarter_, It
was not, however, merely the zeal and _desire of execution_ he showed,
but also the talent he displayed in meeting the objections _started by
naval men_, which induced the Admiralty to employ his Lordship.”
This representation was thoroughly incorrect. So far from there being
any “desire of execution” on my part, I tried every means in my power to
avoid being intrusted with the execution of my own—not Lord
Gambier’s,—plans as Lord Mulgrave insinuated. He, however, unconsciously
admitted that other naval men “started” such objections, that they could
not be got to undertake an attack with fireships, and therefore the duty
was _thrust_ on me, with the addition of the explosion-vessels I had
suggested, thus convincing the Admiralty Board that an attack, on my
plan, was both easy of execution and certain in its result. Lord
Mulgrave’s expression of “those who wrote from that quarter,” viz Lord
Gambier, showed that the Commander-in-chief had _no confidence_ in
fireships. Neither had I, unless accompanied by my plan of
explosion-vessels.
Still persisting that this was an attack by fireships merely, Lord
Mulgrave told the House that it was nothing new, which was the case, if
the explosion-vessels were left out, but that—
“In the course of the last century there were two services performed
by fireships; the first in 1702 at Vigo, and the second off Minorca in
1792. But _what was the present service_? Recollect, a fleet protected
by _shoals and currents_, in sight of their own coast, and in presence
of their countrymen. _Nothing in the annals of our Navy was more
brilliant!_”
Who, then, performed that “_brilliant_” service, than which nothing
could be more satisfactory? Lord Mulgrave told the House that Lord
Gambier did, _whilst lying with his fleet nine miles off_, and
reluctantly sending two line-of-battle ships and some frigates to my
“assistance,” when almost too late to rescue me from the dilemma into
which, in sheer despair of anything being done, I had voluntarily
rushed, with the determination that if my frigate was sacrificed, while
he was calmly looking on, he should take the consequences, and what they
would have been I need not say. It was this act of mine, and this only,
which caused the paltry service to be effected of destroying two
line-of-battle ships and a store ship, instead of the whole enemy’s
fleet!
Lord Mulgrave’s statements were severely rebuked by Lord Holland:—
“Lord Holland represented in strong terms the light in which ministers
placed themselves before Parliament and the country by coming forward,
so hastily in the first instance to procure thanks, and then suddenly
sending Lord Gambier to a court-martial _with the thanks on their
lips_. He thought that in a case of parliamentary thanks the case
should be _clear and strong_ to receive such a reward. What said Lord
Cochrane in his reply to the Admiralty?[66] ‘_Look at and sift the
log-books!_ and not ask me for accusations.’ He (Lord Holland)
condemned the precipitancy of ministers, who by their measures had
endeavoured to _stultify the House as they had already stultified
their own administration_.
“After sending Lord Gambier through the ordeal of a court-martial,
Lord Mulgrave now came down, pronounced his praises, and called upon
the House to vote him their thanks! It was not in this manner that the
French government conducted itself towards their admirals and
generals. They instituted a very severe inquiry as to this affair at
Basque Roads, and many of their commanders were most severely
punished.[67] They did not give thanks to General Monnet for his
defence of Flushing, but, on the contrary, censured his conduct most
severely.[68]
“If the barren thanks of both Houses of Parliament were _often to be
voted in this way, they would soon cease to be of any value_. The
noble Lord (Mulgrave) had said a great deal about the battle of
Talavera, and the resistance made to the vote of thanks in that
instance. Now it did not appear to him (Lord Holland) that the battle
of Talavera could have anything to do with the action of Basque Roads
or with the conduct of Lord Gambier. But if resistance to the vote of
thanks to Lord Wellington were adduced as a proof of party motives, it
might well be considered a proof of party spirit on the other side to
bring forward motions of thanks for services of such a description as
were those of Lord Gambier.”
-----
Footnote 66:
See Vol. I. p. 408.
Footnote 67:
For having, as Buonaparte afterwards said (see Vol. I. p. 421),
suffered themselves to be terrified by the explosion-vessels, so as to
take every fireship for one, and then to run their ships ashore in
order to avoid the impending danger; this result forming the very
essence of my plan. Poor Captain Lafon of the _Calcutta_ was shot,
_not for surrendering to Lord Gambier’s fleet_, but to the
_Impérieuse_ frigate under my command, she being a vessel of inferior
force to the _Calcutta_.
Footnote 68:
Though he had thwarted, but not so effectively as he might have done,
the powerful armament mentioned at the commencement of the next
chapter.
-----
The remarks of other noble lords were more to the purpose:—
“Earl Grosvenor did not think the services of Lord Gambier of such a
nature as to require the particular thanks of the House. He thought
such should only be given on very signal and important victories.
Nobody could doubt they were due to Lord Howe for his victory on the
1st of June, to Lord Duncan for his victory at Camperdown; to Lord St.
Vincent for his glorious achievements near the cape which gave him his
title, or to the immortal Nelson for the splendid exploits with which
he had adorned our naval history. These were things which spoke for
themselves, and nobody could doubt the propriety of voting thanks, as
it were, by acclamation. He thought, however, _the services of Lord
Gambier were of a very inferior description, and called for no such
reward_.”
“Earl Darnley had no objection to the vote of thanks, but at the same
time he thought the present vote one of the efforts now too often
resorted to _to throw a false lustre on the Government_. To compare
the services rendered by Lord Gambier at Basque Roads with the battles
of the Nile or Trafalgar would be the height of presumption!”
Lord Darnley was right; the vote itself, no less than the assumption of
victory, where, through the pusillanimity of the Commander-in-chief,
none had been achieved, had no other object than to “throw a false
lustre upon a Government” powerful in rotten-borough influence, but
justly mistrusted by all besides, whether in Parliament or out of it.
Because I acted practically and conscientiously on these sentiments, I
have been marked through life an object of party malevolence.
However dexterous might be the ministerial legerdemain which could
convert into victory the admitted intention of the Commander-in-chief
_not to fight_,[69] Lord Melville alone exposed the real secret of the
matter:—
Footnote 69:
See Captain Broughton’s Evidence, p. 95.
“Lord Melville conceived the Admiralty to have acted extremely wrong
in giving to Lord Cochrane a command so contrary to the usual rules of
the service, and which must have been so galling and disgusting to the
feelings of other officers in Lord Gambier’s fleet. He respected as
much as any man could the zeal, intrepidity, and enterprise of Lord
Cochrane, but it was wrong to presume that these qualities were
wanting in officers of that fleet of superior standing to his
Lordship. Such a selection naturally put Lord Cochrane upon attempting
enterprises whereby great glory might be obtained.”
Here lies the gist of the whole matter. Had I devised the plan of
attack, and had the Board of Admiralty acceded to my earnest wish, and
left it to my seniors to execute, or had I persisted in my determination
to refuse a command which the Admiralty literally forced upon me, all
would have been well. Even had Lord Mulgrave fulfilled his promise of
satisfying the _amour-propre_ of the fleet—which he neither did nor
intended to do—all might have been well. As it was, I was exposed to the
full amount of hostility which formed my reason for declining the
command in the first instance.
It was felt—as Admiral Austen plainly says—by the officers of the fleet
in Basque Roads, that a decisive victory would elevate me in national
estimation over my seniors, as it unquestionably would have done. Lord
Gambier was an easy man, and the “shoal and current” bugbear was
successfully used to bring the fleet to an anchor in place of going on
to the attack, he knowing no better, and having taken no trouble to
ascertain the fact; in short, confining himself to mere blockade. This
was the fault of the Commander-in-chief, but it did not justify him in
bringing forward charts made up for the purpose of proving imaginary
dangers from ruined fortifications and shoals where none existed.[70]
Nor did it justify the evidence of influenced witnesses to _prove_
danger—in defiance of his Lordship’s own admission that _no ship
suffered injury_![71] It did not justify his Lordship in assuming many
things in his defence, which were not in evidence at all, and many more
things that were totally at variance with the evidence contained in the
minutes. To have declined pushing an advantage to victory, in deference
to the jealousy of senior officers, was one thing; to trump up a story
of _an old storeship breaking up a boom of more than a mile in lineal
extent, and moored with a hundred anchors, was another_.
-----
Footnote 70:
See Captain Broughton’s evidence, p. 64.
Footnote 71:
See Lord Gambier’s defence, p. 100.
-----
It will now be seen why the Government of that day refused the
production of _“minutes”_ of the court-martial, almost every page of
which would have rendered the defence of the Commander-in-chief—or
rather that of his solicitor, Mr. Lavie, for I will do Lord Gambier the
justice of believing that he did not write the defence read to the Court
by the Judge-Advocate—untenable for a moment. That the Ministry of that
corrupt day should have resorted to such a subterfuge can, however,
scarcely add to the contempt with which history already regards them.
I told the House of Commons that “_posterity would judge their acts_.”
Here, then, is matter for that judgment. That it was not made public at
the time arose from two causes. First, that in those days the bulk of
the press was influenced by the Ministry; and a jackal howl, from one
end of the kingdom to the other, would have been—and was, the reward of
my pains. Secondly, that until his Grace the Duke of Somerset gave me, a
few months since, the chart and other official materials requisite to
lay the matter before posterity, it was not in my power to do so;
except, as on my previous attempts at justification, by assertions,
which would have had no more effect on the public mind than now would
those of the factions which persecuted me. As I belonged to no party in
the House, I found no friends but the few who, like myself, stood alone
in their independence of party. Those were themselves disorganised, and
deceived by the well-timed eulogy of the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
into the belief that the vote of thanks included me also. The numbers of
the independent party were, however, as nothing compared to the
organised masses in power, or eager to place themselves in power. The
debate was felt to have most seriously damaged the party to whom I was
politically opposed, and that party ever afterwards made me a mark for
their revenge. In this brief sentence may my whole subsequent history be
comprised.
CHAP. XXIX.
REFUSAL OF MY PLANS FOR ATTACKING THE FRENCH FLEET IN THE SCHELDT.
REFUSED PERMISSION TO REJOIN MY FRIGATE. I AM REGARDED AS A MARKED
MAN.—NO SECRET MADE OF THIS.—ADDITIONAL CAUSE OF OFFENCE TO THE
MINISTRY.—THE PART TAKEN BY ME ON THE REFORM QUESTION, THOUGH
MODERATE, RESENTED.—MOTION FOR PAPERS ON ADMIRALTY COURT
ABUSES.—EFFECT OF THE SYSTEM.—MODES OF EVADING IT.—ROBBERIES BY
PRIZE AGENTS.—CORROBORATED BY GEORGE ROSE.—ABOMINABLE SYSTEM OF
PROMOTION.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT COMMITTED TO THE TOWER.—PETITIONS FOR
HIS LIBERATION INTRUSTED TO ME.—NAVAL ABUSES.—PITTANCES DOLED OUT TO
WOUNDED OFFICERS.—SINECURES COST MORE THAN ALL THE DOCKYARDS.—MY
GRANDMOTHER’S PENSION.—MR. WELLESLEY POLE’S EXPLANATION.—OVERTURE TO
QUIT MY PARTY.—DEPLORABLE WASTE OF PUBLIC MONEY.—BAD
SQUIBS.—COMPARISON WITH THE PRESENT DAY.—EXTRACT FROM “TIMES”
NEWSPAPER.
Just at the period of the court-martial on Lord Gambier, great national
expectations were excited by the combined military and naval expedition
to Walcheren, under the Earl of Chatham and Sir Richard Strachan. The
object of this armament, the most formidable England had ever sent
forth, was the capture or destruction of the French fleet in the
Scheldt, and of the arsenals and dockyards of Flushing, Terneuse, and
Antwerp, at the latter of which ports Buonaparte was carrying on naval
works with great vigour.
The force employed for this purpose comprised 40,000 troops, 35
sail-of-the-line, 2 fifty gun-ships, 3 forty-four gun-ships, 18
frigates, and nearly 200 smaller vessels, besides dockyard craft; the
first portion of the expedition quitting the Downs on the 28th of July,
1809, and anchoring the same evening near the coast of Walcheren.
To the reader acquainted with the views expressed in the first volume of
this work, it will not be surprising that I viewed the departure of this
force with regret; as had one half of the troops been placed, as
suggested in my letter to Lord Mulgrave, on the islands of the French
coast, and had half the frigates alone been employed, as had been the
_Impérieuse_ and other vessels in the Mediterranean, not a man could
have been detached from Western France to the Spanish peninsula, from
which the remaining portion of the British army might have driven the
French troops already there.
Full of these views, and knowing that short work might be made of the
Walcheren expedition, so as to liberate both the naval and military
force for service elsewhere, I laid before the Admiralty a plan for
destroying the French fleet and the Flemish dockyards, somewhat
analogous to that which would have proved completely effectual in Basque
Roads, had it been followed up by the Commander-in-chief. My new plan
had, moreover, received an important addition from the experience there
gained, and was now as formidable against fortifications as against
fleets.
The first measure of indignation against me for my late services to my
country was the summary rejection of my plan, and not only this, but a
refusal by Admiralty letter, given elsewhere, to proceed to the Scheldt
to join my frigate, which had been sent there under the temporary
command of the Hon. Captain Duncan, a most excellent and gallant
officer.
Of the disastrous failure of the Walcheren expedition—the destruction of
a large portion of the army by disease—and the retreat of the remainder,
I shall not speak; these matters being already well known to the student
of English history. I will, however, assert—and the assertion will be
borne out by the plan of attack submitted by me to the Admiralty—that
had my recommendation been adopted, even though not carried out under my
own supervision, nothing could have saved the French fleet in the
Scheldt from a similar fate to that which had befallen their armament in
Aix Roads. Even—as with the disaster in Aix Roads fresh in remembrance,
is probable—had the French fleet in the Scheldt taken refuge above
Antwerp, it could only have placed itself in a _cul-de-sac_; whilst
there was ample military and naval force to operate against the
dockyards and fortifications during the period that my appliances for
the destruction of the enemy’s fleet were in progress; for I in no way
wished to interfere with the operations of the general or admiral
commanding, but rather to conduct my own operations independently of
extraordinary aid from either.
The cost of this plan to the nation would have been ten rotten old
hulks, some fifty thousand barrels of powder, and a proportionate
quantity of shells. The cost of the expedition, which failed—in addition
to the thousands of lives sacrificed—was millions; and the millions
which followed by the prolongation of the war, by the refusal of the
Admiralty to put in operation any naval expedition calculated to effect
a beneficial object—who shall count? So much for war when conducted by
cabinets! But I was now a marked man, and the Government evidently
considered it preferable that the largest force which England had ever
despatched from her shores should incur the chance of failure in its
object, than that the simple and easily applied plans of a junior
post-captain should again jeopardise the reputation of his
Commander-in-chief.
It was very curious that whilst this animosity was being directed
against me in my professional capacity, I had shortly before received
from His Majesty George the Third the highest decoration of the order of
the Bath for my professional services!
So little secret did the Government make of their determination not to
employ me again, that the public press regarded this determination as a
settled matter. It was nothing that I had been instrumental in
destroying the fleet so much dreaded by our West India merchants and the
nation generally, or that I had offered to serve the French fleet in the
Scheldt in the same way. I was now an obnoxious man, and the national
expenditure of millions for defeat, was by the ministry of that day
deemed preferable to cheap victory if achieved by a junior officer, to
whom the Chancellor of the Exchequer—whilst denying him thanks for the
service—had attributed the destruction of a fleet quite as formidable as
the one in the Scheldt.
It may be scarcely credible to the present age that the Government
should have openly announced such a determination. On the principle
adopted throughout this work, of adducing nothing without proof, it will
be necessary to place the preceding facts beyond dispute. From one of
the most talented periodicals of the time I extract the following
passage: “The worst injury which the radical reformers have done the
country, has been _by depriving it of Lord Cochrane’s services, and
withdrawing him from that career_ which he had so gloriously begun.”[72]
The pretence was, that I had _withdrawn myself!_ at the time I was
entreating the Admiralty to permit me to return to my frigate! This
matter will shortly be made very clear.
Footnote 72:
Ed. An. Reg. vol. iv. p. 107.
One grave cause of offence to the Ministry, in addition to my
determination to oppose the vote of thanks to Lord Gambier, had been the
part I took at the famous meeting; held at the Crown and Anchor in the
Strand. For a junior naval officer in that day to associate with such
persons as Sir Francis Burdett and Major Cartwright was bad enough, but
that he should _act_ with them was a thing unheard of in the naval
service.
At this meeting many irritating things were said, though not by me. The
late trial of the Duke of York was freely handled, and Colonel Wardle,
the principal promoter of it, held up to public admiration. The
“borough-mongering faction,” as it was forcibly termed by Sir Francis
Burdett, was painted as involving the country in perpetual misfortune,
and consigning to hopeless imprisonment all who ventured to expose their
practices; whilst, it was said, even His Majesty could not carry on his
fair share of government, being compelled to choose his ministers from a
faction which not only oppressed the people, but controlled the King
himself.
The resolutions moved by good old Major Cartwright at this celebrated
meeting were at that time regarded as treason, though at the present day
sound doctrine, viz. that “so long as the people were not fairly
represented corruption must increase—our debts and taxes accumulate—our
resources be dissipated—the native energy of the people be depressed,
and the country be deprived of its best defences. The remedy was only to
be found in the principles handed down to us by the wisdom and virtue of
our forefathers, in a full and fair representation of the people in
Parliament.”
This was perfectly true, and singularly enough, after the lapse of
fifty-one years, the very same question forms the principal feature of
the present session of Parliament, the debates on the subject in our day
differing very little from their predecessors of half a century ago, if
we may credit the following picture from a _Times_ leader of April 23rd
last. “Call Reform what you will, it is almost anything you please,
except legislation. _The belligerent parties will fight and cheat one
another, and both together will cheat the people!_”
If after a battle of fifty years the people have not achieved the
victory which early Reformers began, I have some right to call on the
public to estimate the amount of obloquy which befell myself for my
volun- *tary enrolment amongst the combatants on their side; and in the
belief that the public of the present day will do my memory that justice
which through life has been denied me, I shall not shrink from laying
these matters before them. If such a picture of our present legislators
be truly drawn, what must have been that of the faction against which I
had to contend?
The speech made by me at the Crown and Anchor was very moderate, and
indeed was spoken of by the ministerial organs as expressing less of the
spirit of faction than any which had been delivered on that day. The
worst part of it, so far as I can recollect, was that generally
recorded, that “I hoped the time would come when ministers would not be
employed all day in thinking what they were to cavil about all night,
and all night in useless debate—whereby the real business of the country
was neglected; so much so indeed, that when the newspapers had reached
me abroad, I felt ashamed at the manner in which the government of my
country was conducted.”
I had even gone further in moderation, though the Ministry did not know
it, viz. by observing to Sir Francis Burdett that I thought he was going
_too far_. His reply was characteristic. “My dear Lord Cochrane you
don’t know ministers. If you wish to get anything from them, you must go
for a great deal more than you want. Even then you will get little
enough.” “Oh!” replied I, “if those are your tactics, go on, I’ll
follow.”
The real grievance was, however, my support of the motions in Parliament
which arose from the meetings at the Crown and Anchor. Mr. Madocks
distinctly charged the Ministry with trafficking in seats, offering to
prove to the House that Lord Castlereagh had, through the agency of the
Honourable Mr. Wellesley, been instrumental in purchasing for Mr.
Quintin Dick the borough of Cashel; and that when in the matter of the
Duke of York Mr. Dick had determined to vote according to his
conscience, Lord Castlereagh intimated to that gentleman the necessity
of voting with the Government, or resigning his seat, which was
accordingly done. The Ministry declined to accept the challenge.[73]
Footnote 73:
The defence to these charges consisted of what was termed eloquence,
but which was nothing but empty declamation, without the slightest
attempt at argument. The subjoined effort of Mr. Canning on this very
occasion is a specimen:—
“Good God! was this the time to suppose that the character of the
House of Commons was lost, and that the most hazardous experiments
should be made to restore it! It was the character and influence of
that House which achieved all our blessings! and distinguished the
character and condition of this country from that of any other country
in the world! Was the source from which such blessings flowed to be
stigmatised as a sink of corruption?”
Even at the present day this is amusing.
The subsequent motion of Mr. Curwen went further. But I must not forget
that I am writing my autobiography, and not political history; I never
made pretensions to parliamentary eloquence, and shall not inflict on
the reader my humble efforts, excepting only those connected with the
naval service.
On the 19th of February I moved for certain papers relative to the
conduct of the Admiralty Court, and as my speech on that occasion was
sufficiently comprehensive, I will adduce it with some slight
explanations indicative of the practices which at that time were in full
operation:—
“If these papers are granted it will be in my power to expose a system
of abuses in the Admiralty Court unparalleled in this country, even
exceeding those prevalent in Spain under the infamous administration
of Godoy.
“The whole navy of England was, by the existing system, compelled to
employ one individual to carry on its business before the Admiralty
Court; a person perhaps in whose competence or honesty they might have
no confidence. But admitting his ability and integrity to be
unquestionable, still the thing was preposterous. Would any man like
to employ an attorney who at the same time did business for the other
side? Was such a regulation consistent with equity or common sense?
“Even the personal liberty of naval officers was answerable for some
seizures, the produce of which notwithstanding went to the Crown, and
the most abominable compromises sometimes took place. Whether the
profits of these compromises found their way into the pockets of any
particular individual I was not absolutely sure, but had evidence to
presume that this was the fact. What indeed could be the design of
confining the captors to one proctor, except that secrecy as to these
questionable transactions may be preserved.”
One case was my own. In the first volume of this work is narrated the
capture of the _King George_ privateer, or pirate, for which seizure by
any vessel of war a reward of 500_l._ had been issued. The _King George_
in part actually belonged to parties connected with the Maltese
Admiralty Court. As her condemnation was unavoidable, she was condemned
as a _droit_ to the Crown; and costs to the extent of 600_l._ were
decreed against myself, officers, and crew, for having taken her! A
subject which will hereafter have to be further alluded to.
The effect of this system was to indispose officers to look after
prizes, and thus many an enemy’s vessel was suffered to escape. One of
my reasons for harassing the French on the coasts of Languedoc and
Catalonia was, that it appeared more advantageous to effect something of
service to the country, than to take prizes for no better end than to
enrich the officers of the Maltese Admiralty Court, and at the same time
to be ourselves condemned in costs for our trouble.
Some curious stories might be told of the effect of the system. It was
my own practice, when any money was captured in a prize, to divide it
into two portions, first, the Admiral’s share, and next our own. We then
buried the money in a sand-bank, in order that it might not be in our
possession; and, as opportunity occurred, it was afterwards taken up,
the Admiral’s share being transmitted to him, our share was then
distributed at the capstan, in the usual proportions. As I never made
any secret of my own transactions, the Maltese officials regarded me
with perfect hatred; they, no doubt, honestly believing that by
appropriating our own captures to our own use, we were cheating them out
of what they had more right to than ourselves! By their practices they
appeared to entertain one idea only, viz. that officers were appointed
to ships of war for the sole purpose of enriching them!
In a case narrated in the first volume, where I had, in Caldagues Bay,
taken thirteen vessels laden with corn for the French army in Barcelona,
after having sunk two small ships of war protecting them—we sold the
corn vessels and their cargo to the Spaniards for a trifle, dividing the
dollars amongst us, after sending Lord Collingwood his share. We
afterwards took the vessels of war after raising them to Gibraltar,
where I purchased one as a yacht. Had I sent those corn vessels to
Malta, and had them condemned there—in place of obtaining anything for
the capture, a heavy bill of costs for the condemnation of such small
vessels would have greatly exceeded the sum realised by their sale.
To return to my address to the House:—
“The Navy was paralysed by this corrupt system. The most insignificant
vessels were condemned at an expense equal to that of the largest, so
that the condemnation of a fishing lugger might be swelled up to the
expense of condemning an Indiaman, the labour of capture ending in
nothing but putting money into the proctor’s pocket. As an instance
within my own knowledge, Moses Griffin, a Jew agent at one of the
outports, received two thirds out of the produce of a vessel, the
remaining third being the whole share distributed for admiral,
captain, inferior officers, petty officers, seamen, and marines. What
was the effect of such a system but to paralyse the Navy? It prevented
exertion on the part of the officers. Could it possibly be necessary
to have 120 ships of the line in commission to blockade twenty-three
ships of the enemy, if proper exertions were made. To insure alacrity
in harassing the shipping and commerce of the enemy, the abuses of the
Admiralty must be stopped, and nothing else would be effectual.”
A more startling practice was the following:—
“The commerce of the enemy was carried on to an immense extent by a
system of licenses, which permitted the enemy to trade where they
pleased. These licenses, issued by us, _formed an article of common
sale_ in Hamburgh and other places, and by means of such licenses the
enemy’s ships were seen coasting along by hundreds in perfect
security, even filling the river Thames, contrary to the Navigation
Act! We were thus raising up sailors for Buonaparte, _to whose
commerce and navy our ministers were the best friends_.”
My representations were met by Sir William Scott, the Judge of the
Admiralty Court, with the inquiry as to “how that Court could possibly
be answerable for the accounts of the agents on which I had founded my
invectives? Lord Cochrane was a prompt accuser, but an unfortunate one,
and he pledged his credit these accusations would prove as unfortunate
as any that had preceded them.”
Unluckily for Sir William Scott’s allusion to my “unfortunate habit of
making unfounded accusations,” Mr. Rose, the treasurer of the Navy, got
up and officially confirmed my statements, by admitting the abuses
complained of!
“This evil,” said Mr. Rose, “had been so strongly represented to him,
that soon after he had become treasurer to the Navy he had bestowed
many days and nights in its investigation. The result was, that _he
had before him no less than 153 cases, nine out of which were now
before the judge of the Admiralty Court_ (Sir W. Scott himself!) _in
consequence of the enormous charges which their accounts contained_.
In one case the charges of an agent at Portsmouth, who had 62,000_l._
to distribute, _amounted to 9462l., of which 1200l. was stated to be
for postage_!”
Mr. Rose recommended me to alter my motion, and to move for papers
relative to a particular ship. I took this advice and moved for
documents relating to two vessels, which was carried. Sir William Scott,
however, never forgave me.
On the 9th of March, when these papers were laid before the House, I
moved for others in order to elucidate them. This gave rise to another
debate, in which some curious facts were brought to light by Colonel
Wardle:—
“In the Navy Pay Office it was usual to promote junior clerks over the
heads of men who were many years their seniors in the service. One
junior clerk, eleven years in the office, was promoted to a place of
300_l._ a year, over the heads of senior clerks from twenty-seven to
thirty years in the service. In another case a gentleman was obliged
to retire against his will on 170_l._ per annum, and a _boy of
fourteen_ was appointed to his situation _with a raised salary_, and
over the heads of many senior clerks. The Secretary of the Sick and
Hurt Office was pensioned off at his full salary of 500_l._, and an
assistant appointed in his stead _with a salary of 1000l._!!”
On the 12th of March, my respected colleague, Sir Francis Burdett, than
whom a purer patriot never breathed, moved that Mr. Gale Jones should be
discharged from Newgate, to which prison he had been committed by order
of the House, for placarding a handbill, the contents of which were
construed into a violation of the privileges of the House. Sir
Francis—conceiving that the people had privileges as well as those
claiming to be their representatives, or rather that the popular voice
constituted the power of their representatives—demanded the release of
Mr. Jones, on the ground that the House possessed no privilege to commit
a man for asserting his right to discuss its measures, and that neither
legally nor constitutionally could such privilege exist.
The debate which ensued, not coming within the scope of this work, may
be omitted. Suffice it to say that Sir Francis published in _Cobbett’s
Weekly Register_ a revised account of his speech, in which he declared
that the House of Commons sought to set aside Magna Charta and the laws
of England by an order founded on their own irresponsible power.
Accompanying this revised speech was a letter addressed by Sir Francis
to his constituents of Westminster; and these coupled together the House
chose to construe into a breach of their privileges also. The result, as
every one knows, was a motion for the committal of Sir Francis Burdett
to the Tower.
My worthy colleague, however, refused to surrender. As there was no
knowing to what lengths the despotism of the House might extend, a
rumour of breaking into the honourable Baronet’s house being prevalent,
a number of his friends, myself amongst them, assembled at his residence
in Piccadilly to see fair play; but one morning, during our absence, an
officer, armed with the Speaker’s warrant, forcibly entered, and Sir
Francis was carried off to the place of his imprisonment.
It is quite unnecessary to detail these circumstances, as they are well
known to every reader of English history. On the day after my excellent
colleague’s capture the electors of Westminster held a meeting in Palace
Yard, and adopted a petition which fell to my lot to present to the
House.
The petition went even farther than had Sir Francis, by denouncing the
House as “prosecutor and juror, judge and executioner,” and denying its
right to exercise these combined offices. It taunted the House with
evading the offer of a member to prove at the bar that two of the
ministers had been distinctly charged with the sale of a seat on their
benches, and that such practices were “as notorious as the sun at
noonday.” They therefore prayed not only for the release of their
member, but for a reform of the House itself, “as the only means of
preserving the country from despotism.”
To have committed the whole of the electors of Westminster for adopting
such a petition would have been inconvenient. To have committed me for
presenting it would have been scarcely less dangerous, as depriving
Westminster of both its representatives. The predominant feeling in the
House appeared to be that of astonishment that a naval officer should
dare to meddle with such matters. One member opposed its reception at
all, another begged me to withdraw it, which I refused to do; and,
therefore, the House adopted the only possible alternative of “ordering
it to lie on the table.” The feeling towards myself may be conceived.
A similar petition from the freeholders of Middlesex was presented by
Mr. Byng, and denounced by Mr. Perceval as a “deliberate and
unparalleled insult to the House;” the petition denying the right of the
House to imprison Sir Francis, and accusing Mr. Perceval and Lord
Castlereagh by name as openly trafficking in seats; the petitioners
further declaring that the presence of Sir Francis Burdett in the House
was necessary to “enforce his plan of reform.” Angry debate followed,
but neither Sir Francis nor Mr. Jones were released till the following
month of June.
On the 11th of May Mr. Croker proposed a vote for the ordinances of the
Navy, when I embraced the opportunity of making what was at the time
termed “one of the most remarkable speeches ever delivered in that
House.” The speech indeed was remarkable—not for its eloquence, for it
had none, but for some very awkward statistics which _my enforced
leisure_ had enabled me to collect and arrange. And let me here remark,
that when my parliamentary speeches are adduced, the object is to give a
faithful picture of the condition as well of the House as of the Navy at
that period, not as specimens of an eloquence to which I had no
pretension. My parliamentary efforts, such as they are, are on record,
and the reproduction of a portion may save both myself and the reader
the trouble of further dilating thereon.
One besetting sin of the Administration was the bestowal of pensions,
which was carried on to a wonderful extent. Wives, daughters, distant
relatives, &c., of all sorts of people who had votes or influence
claimed a pension as a matter of right. Another besetting sin of the
Government was doling out pittances scarcely sufficient for the support
of life to those who had fought and bled for their country.
Bearing this in mind, the reader will readily comprehend the following
“remarkable” address—as it has been termed by historical writers—to the
House of Commons:—
“An admiral, worn out in the service, is superannuated at 410_l._ a
year, a captain at 210_l._, a _clerk of the ticket office retires on_
700_l._ _a year!_ The widow of Admiral Sir Andrew Mitchell has _one
third_ of the allowance given to the widow of a Commissioner of the
Navy!
“I will give the House another instance. Four daughters of the gallant
Captain Courtenay have 12_l._ 10_s._ each, the daughter of Admiral Sir
Andrew Mitchell has 25_l._, two daughters of Admiral Epworth have
25_l._ each, the daughter of Admiral Keppel 24_l._, the daughter of
Captain Mann, who was killed in action, 25_l._, four children of
Admiral Moriarty 25_l._ each. That is—thirteen daughters of admirals
and captains, several of whose fathers fell in the service of their
country, receive from the gratitude of the nation a sum _less than
Dame Mary Saxton, the widow of a commissioner_.
“The pension list is not formed on any comparative rank or merit,
length of service, or other rational principle, but appears to me to
be dependent on parliamentary influence alone. Lieutenant Ellison, who
lost his arm, is allowed 91_l._ 5_s._, Captain Johnstone, who lost his
arm, has only 45_l._ 12_s._ 6_d._, Lieutenant Arden, who lost his arm,
has 91_l._ 5_s._, Lieutenant Campbell, who lost his leg, 40_l._, and
poor Lieutenant Chambers, who lost both his legs, has only 80_l._,
_whilst Sir A.S. Hamond retires on_ 1500_l._ _per annum_. The brave
Sir Samuel Hood, who lost his arm, has only 500_l._, _whilst the late
Secretary of the Admiralty retires, in full health, on a pension of_
1500_l._ _per annum_!
“To speak less in detail, 32 flag officers, 22 captains, 50
lieutenants, 180 masters, 36 surgeons, 23 pursers, 91 boatswains, 97
gunners, 202 carpenters, and 41 cooks, in all 774 persons, cost the
country 4028_l._ _less than the nett proceeds of the sinecures of
Lords Arden_ (20,358_l._), _Camden_ (20,536_l._), _and Buckingham_
(20,693_l._).
“All the superannuated admirals, captains, and lieutenants put
together, have but 1012_l._ more than Earl Camden’s sinecure alone!
All that is paid to the wounded officers of the whole British navy,
and to the wives and children of those dead or killed in action, do
not amount by 214_l._ to as much as Lord Arden’s sinecure alone, viz.
20,358_l._ What is paid to the mutilated officers themselves is _but
half as much_!
“Is this justice? Is this the treatment which the officers of the Navy
deserve at the hands of those who call themselves His Majesty’s
Government? Does the country know of this injustice? Will this too be
defended? If I express myself with warmth I trust in the indulgence of
the House. I cannot suppress my feelings. Should 31 commissioners,
commissioners’ wives, and clerks have 3899_l._ more amongst them _than
all the wounded officers of the Navy of England_?
“I find upon examination that the Wellesleys receive from the public
34,729_l._, _a sum equal to 426 pairs of lieutenants’ legs, calculated
at the rate of allowance of Lieutenant Chambers’s legs. Calculating
for the pension of Captain Johnstone’s arm, viz. 45l., Lord Arden’s
sinecure is equal to the value of 1022 captains’ arms! The Marquis of
Buckingham’s sinecure alone will maintain the whole ordinary
establishment of the victualling department at Chatham, Dover,
Gibraltar, Sheerness, Downs, Heligoland, Cork, Malta, Mediterranean,
Cape of Good Hope, Rio de Janeiro, and leave 5460l. in the Treasury.
Two of these comfortable sinecures would victual the officers and men
serving in all the ships in ordinary in Great Britain, viz. 117 sail
of the line, 105 frigates, 27 sloops, and 50 hulks. Three of them
would maintain the dockyard establishments at Portsmouth and
Plymouth._ The addition of a few more would amount to as much as the
whole ordinary establishments of the royal dockyards at Chatham,
Woolwich, Deptford, and Sheerness; whilst the sinecures and offices
executed wholly by deputy would more than maintain the ordinary
establishment of all the royal dockyards in the kingdom!
“Even Mr. Ponsonby, who lately made so pathetic an appeal to the good
sense of the people of England against those whom he was pleased to
term demagogues, actually receives, for having been _thirteen months
in office_, a sum equal to nine admirals _who have spent their lives
in the service of their country_; three times as much as all the
pensions given to all the daughters and children of all the admirals,
captains, lieutenants, and other officers who have died in indigent
circumstances, or who have been killed in the service!”
This portion of the speech, true in every figure, was not incorrectly
termed “remarkable;” and it made an enemy of every sinecurist named, as
I had afterwards but too good reason to know. Nevertheless, the
Administration had made a mistake. I was not permitted to be employed
_afloat_, and was determined to effect all the good I could for the
naval service by advocating its interests _ashore_.
But the worst was yet to come. My very excellent grandmother, of whom I
have spoken in the first volume of this work in terms feebly expressive
of her worth, had a pension of 100_l._ for the services of her gallant
husband, Captain Gilchrist; and _though she had been dead eight years_,
some patriotic individual had been _drawing her pension, as though she
were still living_! Given, a hundred dead widows, with a pension of
100_l._ each, and some one was at the national expense the richer by
10,000_l._ per annum!
On this point, I thus proceeded, no doubt to the intense disgust of the
party enjoying the defunct pensions:—
“From the minute expenses noticed in the naval estimate, viz. for
oiling clocks, killing rats, and keeping cats, I suppose that great
care has been taken to have everything correct. It was, therefore,
with great surprise that I found the name of my worthy and respected
grandmother, the widow of the late Captain Gilchrist of the navy,
continuing on the list as receiving 100_l._ per annum, _though she
ceased to exist eight years ago_!”
Notwithstanding the unanswerable argument of my grandmother’s pension,
and the equally unanswerable comparison of sinecures and naval
rewards—the Secretary of the Admiralty, Mr. Wellesley Pole, considered
that he satisfactorily replied to both, by pronouncing my statements
“inaccurate, and my complaints inconsistent! As to the pensions to the
children of admirals, Lord Cochrane must know very well that _the widow
or children of an admiral were not entitled, strictly speaking, to any
pension_!”
In his defence to the sinecures of his own family, Mr. Wellesley Pole
was even more infelicitous:—
“Lord Cochrane has thought proper to make an attack on the Wellesley
family, of which I am a member. He asserts that the Wellesleys receive
from the public no less than 34,000_l._ a year in sinecure places, and
then makes a calculation of _the number of arms and legs which that
sum would compensate_. In answer to this, I must observe that no
member of the Wellesley family, _except the noble lord at the head of
it_, possesses any sinecure. That noble lord certainly did, many years
ago, receive the _reversion_ of a sinecure which had since fallen in,
when he was about to go to a distant part of the world, in a most
arduous and important public situation. He was at that time in a
delicate state of health, and had a large family!”
That is, Mr. Wellesley Pole confirmed my calculation of the arms and
legs. Though one sinecure had “fallen in,” he neither said when, nor
what other sinecures had since accrued to the head of the family. His
general reply to the matter is curious even at the present day. Mr.
Wellesley Pole proceeded:—
“There is a considerable degree of eccentricity in the noble lord’s
manner, but at the same time he has so much good British stuff about
him, and so much knowledge of his profession, that he will always be
listened to with great respect. It is, therefore, the more to be
lamented that he does not follow the dictates of his own good
understanding, instead of being guided _by the erroneous advice, and
adopting the wild theories of others_. Let me advise him that
_adherence to the pursuits of his profession_, of which he is so great
an ornament, will tend more to his own honour and to the advantage of
his country, than a perseverance in _the conduct which he has of late
adopted, conduct which can only lead him into error_, and make him the
dupe of those who use the authority of his name to advance their own
mischievous purposes.”
This overture was unmistakable. If I would quit Sir Francis Burdett,
sell my constituents, and come over to the ministerial side, the
Government would—despite the affair of Lord Gambier—put me in the way of
advancement. If I did not forsake my party, the high professional
character drawn by Mr. Wellesley Pole would avail me nothing—not even to
get employed again! I need scarcely say that the overture,—politely
insinuating, as it did, that I was to be bought—was rejected on my part.
The remainder of my speech consisted of a contrast between this reckless
extravagance in pensions and sinecures, and the petty saving which
rendered the Navy useless:—
“Such are some of the pretended savings by which, when any are made,
the country is duped. Were there a prospect of success, I could point
out some savings better worthy attention. By adopting canvass of a
better quality, a saving equal to the additional income-tax imposed by
the Whigs may be made, equal, in fact, to one fourth of the Navy. The
remaining three fourths of the ships will be more effectual than the
whole, as their velocity would be increased by upwards of half a mile
in seven, and they would thus be enabled to capture those vessels
which at present escape from them all. The enemy distinguish our ships
of war from foreign ships by the colour of the wretched canvass, and
run away the moment they perceive our black sails rising above the
horizon, a circumstance to which they owe their safety, even more than
to its open texture. I have observed the meridian altitude of the sun
through the foretopsail, and by bringing it to the horizon through the
foresail, have ascertained the latitude as correctly as I could have
done otherwise. The paltry increase of cost will be more than
compensated by the superior strength of the canvass, on which depend
the safety of the ship and the preservation of all the lives on board.
“I shall, no doubt, hear it urged that a remedy is about to be
applied, and so it has ever since I can remember, but remedies at
public boards are sought in vain.”
To comprehend the preceding statements, it may be necessary to observe
that we had at that time more than 1000 ships of war of all classes
afloat, and that from the general bad character of their sailing and
equipment, the enemy, who had little more than a tenth of the number,
fairly laughed at us. Under any circumstances, the waste of money was
deplorable, but under the corrupt system by which worthless ships were
then introduced into the Navy, to which subject allusion is made in the
first volume, it was utter paralysation of every natural effort.
The amount of obloquy these efforts to raise the condition of the naval
service brought on me, amongst persons who held that afloat or ashore
the duty of a naval officer was implicit obedience to the ministry of
the day, will be readily understood. Reply to my statements being
impossible, the ministerial organs made me the subject of numerous bad
squibs, one of which is subjoined:—
“You fight so well and speak so ill, Your case is somewhat odd,
Fighting abroad you’re quite _at home_, Speaking at home—_abroad_;
Therefore your friends, than hear yourself, Would rather of you hear;
And that your name in the _Gazette_, Than _Journals_, should appear.”
The wit is somewhat obtuse, but the feeling here expressed was no doubt
sincere. The Ministers indeed began to suspect that they had committed
an error in preventing me from joining my ship, and shortly afterwards
attempted to repair it by ordering me immediately to sea! With what
effect will appear in the next chapter.
To the credit of the present age, wilful corruption has passed away, but
false economy still prevails. It is only six years ago that we commenced
a war without a single gun-boat, the only description of vessel that
could operate with effect in the enemy’s waters. The consequence was
that nothing was effected. At the close of the war we built gun-boats by
the score, but now that they may be required for the defence of our own
coasts, only to find them so rotten, as to be in danger of crumbling
under the concussion arising from their own fire.
In the absence of a more assignable reason, it may be assumed that they
have been cheaply built, for it cannot for a moment be supposed that the
disaster arose from want of proper supervision. The subjoined extract
from a leading article of the _Times_ of April 25th, 1860, will tell the
story better than I can, and by that the public will see that the vice
of what may be termed extravagant saving is not yet extinct:—
“Five years ago we were compelled to denounce the management of our
military and naval establishments. The public and the Government have
long since done us justice in this matter, the former by demanding
that ‘the system’ which paralysed the efforts of Englishmen should be
at once reformed, the latter by setting about those reforms with more
or less activity. We have now, most unwillingly, to return to the
charge, and to lay before our readers a sad history of mismanagement
and waste.
“At this time, we are told, there are forty-seven gunboats, besides
mortar vessels, hauled up at Haslar yard. All the world remembers the
pæan which was sung over this miniature fleet. Christened with
coquettish little names, the gunboats, built according to the newest
model and commanded by gallant young officers, were the pets and the
pride of the country. It was told how after the war they were all
drawn up ready for use on the shortest notice, how they could be
brought down to the water in less than an hour, and the enemy
confronted in less than a week with an extempore fleet as formidable
as any that could issue from Cherbourg. Twenty-two, we are told, have
been repaired at a great cost, and, with the exception of coppering,
are fit for launching. Nine vessels are under repair, fourteen are
waiting examination. These repairs began more than three years ago,
and have been continued at intervals to the present time. It will
appear singular that vessels built only in 1854 and 1855 should so
soon require such extensive reconstruction. Very quietly do these
repairs seem to have been carried on. The decay has been attributed to
the fact that the gunboats had been stripped of their copper, and
placed high and dry in a current of air. But now it is announced that
the decay must be attributed to another cause. Some gunboats which had
been kept afloat have been hauled up, and have been found to be ‘far
more defective than those stored beneath the sheds, and the only
conclusion which can be arrived at is that the whole of our gunboats
afloat are unfit for service.’ They have been constructed with the
most reckless disregard to the quality of the material. If those which
have been examined are a sample of the whole, we are at this moment
without an efficient gunboat. Scarcely a sound piece of wood can be
seen about them, every part bearing marks of ‘sap,’ and some of the
ribs are completely enveloped with it; the pressure of the hand on
their frame crumbles it to dust. Much more to this effect is given in
our Naval Intelligence. The copper bolts, also, which should have gone
through and been clinched on each side, ‘were found to have been
changed into short ends of about two inches, driven in on each side;’
a fact which, if correct, convicts either the builders or their
workmen of a deliberate and most disgraceful fraud.
“It may be that _the Government price was too low, and it is said that
the only two sound vessels were built by a firm which lost money by
their construction_. But that cannot be an excuse for the others. The
public will demand a searching and unsparing inquiry into these
delinquencies, and if it should appear that men holding a foremost
position in the community have been guilty of such malpractices, they
should be duly exposed and punished.”
CHAP. XXX.
MY PLANS FOR ATTACKING THE FRENCH COAST REFUSED, AND MYSELF SUPERSEDED.
PLANS FOR ATTACKING THE FRENCH COAST SUBMITTED TO THE FIRST LORD, THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE CHARLES YORKE.—PEREMPTORILY ORDERED TO JOIN MY SHIP
IN AN INFERIOR CAPACITY.—MY REMONSTRANCE.—CONTEMPTUOUS REPLY TO MY
LETTER.—THREATENED TO BE SUPERSEDED.—MR. YORKE’S IGNORANCE OF NAVAL
AFFAIRS.—RESULT OF HIS ILL-TREATMENT OF ME.—MY REPLY PASSED
UNNOTICED, AND MYSELF SUPERSEDED.
It has already been stated that the _Impérieuse_ frigate under my
command had been placed by the Admiralty under the orders of the
Honourable Captain Duncan, son of the distinguished admiral of that
name, as acting-captain; but that permission to resume her command in
the Scheldt had been refused on my application to rejoin her; no doubt
with the intention of preventing me from effecting anything more which
might become obnoxious to another admiral.
Now that my presence in the House of Commons had become inconvenient,
the Admiralty affected to consider that _I was unjustifiably absenting
myself from my ship!_ and an intimation was given that I must join her
_within a week_!
So far from my absence being voluntary, _it had been forced_ upon me
from the necessity of attending the court-martial and an acting-captain
was to be put in my place. When I found that this step was determined
on, I asked that Captain Duncan might be appointed, knowing that he
would carry out my views in the management of a crew to which I was
attached, as from long and arduous service they were attached to me. But
notwithstanding this temporary appointment, I was anxiously urging on
the Board of Admiralty the necessity of further operations in which it
was my earnest wish to bear a part.
The correspondence which took place with the Admiralty will not only
show this, but the record may prove useful in case of future wars.
On the 7th of June, 1810, I transmitted the subjoined letter to the Hon.
Charles Yorke, who had succeeded Lord Mulgrave as First Lord of the
Admiralty:—
“London, 7th June, 1810.
“SIR,—When I had the honour to present myself to you the other day, I
used the freedom to submit to your judgment the mode by which the
commerce of the enemy might, in my humble opinion, be greatly injured,
if not completely ruined, and that such mode, whilst assisting the
present, would be providing for the future, exigencies of the State.
The subject has pressed itself so forcibly on my attention, that I am
induced to address you by letter, which is perhaps the best means to
avoid engaging too much of your time.
“Passing over the points I then noticed as a stimulus to the Navy,
which, unfortunately for this country, though for the benefit of our
inveterate foe, is checked and restrained in its operations, I shall
beg permission to call your attention to other parts of the subject I
had then the honour to introduce.
“I am the more impelled to the intrusion by the intelligence recently
received of the islands of Las Medas on the coast of Catalonia having
been taken by the French, who were doubtlessly influenced by the
motive _that ought to actuate us to possess ourselves of the islands
on the coast of France_, or such of them as tend to aid her best
interests.
“In the present state of our Navy, the French rest in the fullest
confidence of assured security, and are, therefore, entirely at our
mercy, as regards the objects in my contemplation.
“In the present state of French security, L’Ile Groa at the mouth of
the Loire, and L’Ile Dieu on the coast of Brittany, may be easily
seized by 800 men, in defiance of any opposition; and by a _coup de
main_ a fourth part of that number would be sufficient. These islands
would afford safe anchorage to our cruisers, with the wind on shore,
and when, in the winter season, it is dangerous to approach them.
“The islands at the entrance of the port of Marseilles could be taken
by 100 men, and their importance is demonstrable by their situation.
United with the possession of one of the Hières, they would enable us
to cut off the communication between that part of France which
consumes the commodities of Italy, and thus the trade of Leghorn and
Genoa—once of importance to us—would be lost to our enemy, who now
exclusively enjoys it.
“The port of Bayonne, whence the French supply their dockyards at
Rochefort and Brest with timber, may be rendered useless by sinking a
few old vessels laden with stones. In like manner the anchorage of Ile
d’ Aix might be destroyed—the passages in the entrance of the Garonne
rendered impracticable—and that of Mamusson filled up.
“Proceeding on a more extensive scale, Belle Isle offers itself to
particular notice, and would be a most valuable acquisition, as it
gives shelter at all times to shipping. At Cette—commanding the
entrance of the canal through which the whole produce of Italy and the
shores of the Mediterranean are transported to the north of the French
empire—the locks might be seized on with facility, and held or blown
up, in defiance of the whole power of Buonaparte now in France. The
island of Elba might be reduced with as little difficulty, and as it
contains two excellent harbours, and protects the anchorage in the
Piombia passage, it is well calculated to interrupt all intercourse
between the Roman, Italian, and Tuscan States. Were it in our hands at
this moment, it would be an invaluable depôt for our manufactures,
which, on cutting off the trade with France, would be in the greatest
demand throughout the whole of Italy. It was given up at the
termination of the last war in ignorance—as may be presumed—of the
great advantage which it affords in this respect.
“I need not suggest to you, Sir, that if the measures on which I have
thus slightly touched were carried into effect, it would—even should
the enemy be disposed to disturb us—require a large portion of the
force _intended for the subjugation of Spain_, to be diverted from its
purpose. If these measures were to be followed up by a flying naval
expedition of trifling extent, and with comparatively only a handful
of troops, the enemy might be held in check, or at any rate their
plans elsewhere would be frustrated in part, and the remainder must
become insignificant from perplexity and embarrassment.
“I submit to you, Sir, that were it not for our naval superiority, and
a few thousand troops were at Buonaparte’s disposal, our coasts would
not be safe—the vessels in our ports would be swept away—and very
possibly the ports themselves laid in ashes. As we have at least
physical powers, and more honourable incitements than Buonaparte to
aid our energies and direct our objects, we ought bravely to pursue
all that he would dare to attempt.
“If, Sir, these points should appear to interest you, and you should
think it necessary to require of me further detail or information, I
shall be happy to wait on you for that purpose at any time you may be
pleased to name. I had intended to bring this subject before the
House, but a variety of obvious reasons showed me the propriety of
addressing you in the first instance.
“I have the honour, &c.,
“COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Charles Yorke.”
In reply to this letter, I was told by Mr. Yorke that the acting-captain
had been appointed to the _Impérieuse_ for _“my accommodation”!!_
instead of Captain Duncan having been appointed from the necessity
before mentioned! Mr. Yorke concluded his letter with a peremptory order
for me to proceed to sea within a week:—
“Admiralty, June 8th, 1810.
“MY LORD,—I had the honour this morning of receiving your Lordship’s
letter of yesterday, communicating your Lordship’s opinions on various
points of service connected with operations on the French coast in the
Bay as well as in the Mediterranean, which appear to be nearly of the
same effect with those which I had the honour of hearing from your
Lordship personally some days ago.
“I beg to return you my thanks for this communication of your
sentiments, and have now to inform you that as your Lordship’s ship,
the _Impérieuse_, is now nearly ready for sea, and destined for the
Mediterranean, and as _the period of the session of Parliament during
which your Lordship has been accommodated with an acting-captain to
command the frigate in your absence (!) has now nearly reached its
close_, I presume that it is your intention to join her without loss
of time, and to proceed in her to join Sir Charles Cotton, who will no
doubt employ your Lordship in the annoyance of the enemy and in the
protection of our Allies in the manner best suited to the exigencies
of the service.
“I request that your Lordship will have the goodness to inform me as
early as you can _on what day next week it is your intention to join
your ship_, as His Majesty’s service will not admit of her sailing
being much longer postponed.
“I have the honour, &c.,
“C. YORKE.
“Capt. Lord Cochrane.”
The assertion that an acting-captain had been appointed to the
_Impérieuse_ for my accommodation as a member of Parliament was
monstrous, for after the court-martial was ended I begged to be allowed
to join her; first, soon after the Walcheren expedition sailed, and
again when it failed to satisfy the national expectations; even then
offering to destroy the enemy’s fleet as had been done in Aix Roads. I
afterwards asked permission to view the siege of Flushing as a spectator
only, and _was refused_, the refusal being fortunately still in my
possession:—
“Admiralty, Oct. 11th, 1809.
“MY DEAR LORD,—I have mentioned your request to the Naval Lords at the
Board, and find it cannot be complied with.
“I am, my dear Lord,
“Your very faithful servant,
“MULGRAVE.
“The Lord Cochrane.”
Notwithstanding Mr. Yorke’s version of the reason of my absence from the
_Impérieuse_, I determined to make one more effort for permission to
carry out my plans for harassing the enemy’s coast, and thereby
preventing them from forwarding troops to Spain. My object was to get
two or three frigates and a few troops under my command. Had I been able
to accomplish this, what had been effected with the _Impérieuse_ alone
on the coast of Catalonia will be my excuse for saying, that such a
force would have been the most valuable aid to the British army in the
Peninsula.
Preferring, therefore, the service which I was desirous to render to my
country to my own wounded feelings, I addressed another letter to Mr.
Yorke:—
“London, June 11th, 1810.
“SIR,—In acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 8th I confess
much embarrassment. The measures submitted to your judgment were, in
my humble opinion, of great national importance. They had in view to
weaken the hands of our enemy and strengthen our own. I therefore
indulged in the hope that they would have received your countenance
and support.
“It must have been apparent to you, Sir, that I did not offer them on
light grounds, nor without calculated certainty of success in the
event of their prosecution. I flattered myself with the hope of being
employed in the execution of a service on which my previous
observations would have enabled me to act with confidence.
“But although, Sir, you are pleased to thank me for my communication,
you pass over in silence the objects it embraced; and do away with
even the expressions of courtesy bestowed on it by asking ‘on what day
_in this week_ it was my intention to join my ship, as His Majesty’s
service would not admit of her sailing being much longer postponed;’
thus leaving me to conclude that in taking the liberty of approaching
you I had trespassed too far, and that to prevent my importunities in
future you had deemed it advisable to order me to join my ship, and
further, to join Sir Charles Cotton, who, you signify, ‘would no doubt
employ me in the annoyance of the enemy, and in the protection of our
Allies, in the manner best suited to the exigencies of the service.’
“I have throughout life been accustomed to do my duty to the utmost of
my power, and my anxiety to render the performance of it acceptable to
my country, whilst it stimulated me to inform myself on the best means
for that purpose, may have led me to intrude on those with whom alone
rests the power of encouraging my expectations. Yet I might have
imagined that my motives would sufficiently plead my excuse. On the
present occasion I had an additional inducement in addressing myself
in the first instance to you, Sir, instead of the House of Commons. I
felt that I was paying the respect due to the First Lord of the
Admiralty.
“It appears, however, that I have inadvertently offended, and am sorry
for it, as the public interest may be injured by the step I have
taken. I should have been gratified had you done me the honour to call
for details of the sketch which I laid before you, when I should have
been happy to supply a properly digested plan by which I propose to
secure the objects there shadowed forth.
“Had this plan, been brought under your consideration, I may venture
to say that you would have directed it to be carried into execution;
and I should have envied any person whom you might have honoured with
the charge of it, however much I might have regretted the refusal to
permit me to share in it, I should nevertheless have cheerfully
rendered every information required of me, or that I might have
conceived necessary.
“I have now no alternative than to submit to the wisdom of the House
the propositions you have thought proper to reject, or rather suffer
them to die away without further notice. I do not pride myself on the
accuracy of my judgment, but may be allowed to understand those
matters that come under my own immediate observation better than those
who have had no experience in such kind of warfare.
“The capture of Los Medas by the French has confirmed me in the
opinions I gave to Lord Mulgrave on my last _reconnaissance_ of Ile
d’Aix, and which I had the honour to state to you in my last. I again
submit that a similar course pursued by His Majesty’s Government
towards France would distract the purposes of Buonaparte, and injure
him infinitely more than any other step likely to be taken. The
capture of even one of the islands enumerated in my former letter
would be felt by him much as we should feel if a French force were to
capture the Isle of Wight.
“In another part of your letter you say that I have been
‘_accommodated with an acting-captain to command the frigate during my
absence_.’ I have to assure you that it was an accommodation I never
solicited, and one which, far from conveying a favour, was extremely
painful to my feelings, as it prevented my going on a service which I
was extremely desirous of witnessing. I even made an application to
Lord Mulgrave for permission to be a spectator only of the scene of
Flushing, so as to avail myself of the opportunity to acquire
information about the Scheldt and its environs, but was refused,
although others not connected with the service obtained leave to
proceed there.
“In conclusion, I beg permission to say that I have yet some objects
of moment to bring forward in Parliament, and that as there is no
enterprise given to the _Impérieuse_, I have no wish that she should
be detained for me one moment.
“I have the honour, &c.,
“COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Chas. Yorke.
“P.S. Your letter, Sir, is marked ‘private,’ which I consider as
applying solely to the destination of the _Impérieuse_, and, of
course, shall be silent on that subject.”
The reply of the First Lord was that it was “_neither his duty nor his
inclination to enter into controversy with me!_” A proof how the
interests of a nation may suffer from the political pique of a single
man in power. Not an individual of the Ministry considered me incapable
of carrying into execution, even with an insignificant force, the plans
foreshadowed; yet they were treated with contemptuous silence, and a
command to proceed immediately on a subordinate service.
“Admiralty, June 12th, 1810.
“MY LORD,—I have had the honour this morning of receiving your
Lordship’s letter of yesterday. _As I do not conceive it either my
public duty so it is by no means my private inclination to be drawn
into any official controversy with your Lordship, either in your
capacity of captain of a frigate in His Majesty’s service or of a
member of Parliament_.
“For this reason I must beg to decline replying to several parts of
your Lordship’s letter, in which you appear to have much misconceived
my meaning, as expressed in my former letter, or to observe upon the
turn and direction which your Lordship is pleased to endeavour to give
to our correspondence.
“I have thought it proper to lay the two letters which I have received
from your Lordship, being on points of service, before the Board of
Admiralty for their consideration; and have only now to request to be
distinctly informed whether or not it is your Lordship’s intention to
join your ship, the _Impérieuse_, now under orders for foreign
service, and nearly ready for sea, as soon as Parliament shall be
prorogued.
“I shall be much pleased to receive an answer in the affirmative,
because I should then entertain hopes that your activity and gallantry
might be made available for the public service. I shall be much
concerned to receive an answer in the negative, because in that case I
shall feel it to be my duty to consider it as your Lordship’s wish to
be superseded in the command of the _Impérieuse_.
“I am, my Lord,
“Your most obedient servant,
“C YORKE.
“Capt. Lord Cochrane.”
A more unjust order from a lay Lord of the Admiralty than this, to join
the _Impérieuse_ and proceed on foreign service, was never issued from
the Admiralty.
As a lay Lord, he was wholly ignorant of naval affairs, but nevertheless
refused _even to listen_ to the advice of an experienced sea-officer,
who had at least seen some service, and was therefore capable of
offering an opinion. In place of this he ordered me to sea, without the
semblance of promotion in any shape, or even the offer of a larger ship.
I had nevertheless received the warm thanks of Lord Collingwood for—as
his Lordship expressed it—having with a single frigate stopped a French
army from penetrating into Eastern Spain. With the same inadequate means
I had kept the whole coast of Languedoc in alarm, so as to prevent any
combination of troops on the Spanish frontier, this voluntary service
being executed in such a way as to induce Lord Collingwood to write to
the Admiralty, that “_my resources seemed to have no end_.” Weighed down
with fatigue and anxiety I had returned home, in the hope of relaxation,
when the Admiralty, even before there had been time to pay off my ship,
ordered me to prepare plans for destroying the French fleet in Aix
Roads, Lord Gambier having plainly told them that, if he made the
attempt, “it must be at _their peril and not his_.” I prepared those
plans, with the addition of a novel element in naval warfare, and drove
ashore the French fleet, which afterwards became a wreck, in spite of
the want of proper co-operation on the part of the Admiral who had
hesitated to attack them.
On my return to England I had been offered by Lord Mulgrave the thanks
of Parliament in conjunction with the Commander-in-chief, but refused to
couple my name with his. After all these services, for which I never
received reward nor thanks—except the red ribbon of the Bath from the
hands of my sovereign—another First Lord ordered me to proceed to sea
_in a week_, and that in a capacity as subordinate as the one occupied
before any of these services had been performed! nay, more, in spite of
my pointing out to him, how, with a trifling force, I could do far more
than I had done—a proposition which he treated with contemptuous
silence. There is nothing worse in the records of the Admiralty even at
that period.
Nevertheless, this ill-treatment determined me not to shrink from my
duty, though I was resolved that Mr. Yorke should neither get an
affirmative nor a negative from me as to joining the frigate. If the
command of the _Impérieuse_, under the orders of Sir Charles Cotton,
were forced upon me I would take it, but of this the Admiralty should be
the judges—not I. Had Lord Collingwood lived to reach England the
Admiralty would not have ventured to thrust such a command upon me after
my services of the previous three years and my plans for future
operations, which, as I have once or twice said, would have saved
millions spent on prolonged strife in the Peninsula.
In the vain hope that the national welfare would, on calm deliberation,
rise superior to petty official spite, I again addressed Mr Yorke as
follows:—
“Portman Square, June 14th, 1810.
“SIR,—When I had the honour to present to you in writing those ideas
that I had previously communicated verbally, it was far from my views
and contrary to my intention to draw you into any unofficial
correspondence. My solicitude to see the interests of my country
promoted and the power of the enemy reduced were my only objects. I
presumed that amidst the pressure of business any hints thrown out in
desultory conversation might escape your memory, but that committed to
paper they would meet your consideration. This was my chief reason for
addressing you by letter.
“As a member of Parliament I never harboured a wish to intrude myself
on your notice. I know that as a captain of a frigate I do not possess
any consequence, and am conscious that I never assumed any. But, Sir,
I submit that if information promising essential benefit to the State
is procured, the source from which it flows, however insignificant, is
not of the least moment.
“With an impression which I must lament, Sir, that you decline
entering on those parts of my letter which alone prevailed with me to
trouble you, I regret having done so. I am not in the habit of
entreaty, but when the public service is to be advanced entreaty
becomes a duty. I trust, therefore, that you will pardon me if I
repeat the hope that you will be pleased to regard the subject in a
more favourable light, and examine the grounds and principles on which
my opinions are founded. I feel convinced that any other officer
possessed of the knowledge necessary to form his judgment will tell
you that the measures I have proposed may _to a certainty and with
great ease be carried into execution_; and that the enemy would, in
consequence, be entirely crippled in his best resources.
“Had I been fortunate enough to receive the least encouragement from
you I should have brought forward other objects than those noticed.
Amongst these is one that has reference to the coast of Catalonia,
where the maritime towns are occupied by troops of the enemy just
sufficient to keep the peasantry in awe and exact from them
provisions. These, by possessing the open batteries, the French convey
coastways in fishing boats and small craft to their armies, which,
from the scarcity of cattle, fodder, and the state of the roads, they
could not obtain by any other means.
“The few troops stationed along the coast for these purposes might be
seized and brought off with a trifling force employed in the way I
have indicated. As a proof of this, the aid-de-camp of General Lechu,
and a whole company were brought off by the marines and crew of the
_Impérieuse_ alone, to whom they surrendered, well knowing that had
they left the battery they would have been put to death in detail by
the oppressed and irritated Spaniards.
“I am thankful, Sir, for your kindness in laying my letters before the
Lords Commissioners. The flattering terms in which you speak of my
humble abilities also demand my acknowledgment; and, whilst again
tendering them to the service of my country, I beg permission to say
that it is the first wish of my heart and the highest aim of my
ambition to be actively employed in my profession, and that from
former associations I prefer the _Impérieuse_ to every other frigate
in the Navy. But as she is to proceed immediately on foreign service,
I fear it is impossible for me to be in readiness to join her within
the time specified.
“I have the honour, &c.,
“COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Chas. Yorke.”
To this letter no reply was vouchsafed, and the Honourable Captain
Duncan was confirmed in the command of the _Impérieuse_, which in the
_following month_ sailed to join Sir Charles Cotton off Toulon.
Parliament being prorogued within a few days after the date of the last
letter, I had no opportunity of bringing the subject before the House.
On the publication of the first volume, it was said by some gentlemen of
the press, when kindly reviewing its contents, that something more might
have been said of that excellent and gallant admiral, Lord Collingwood.
This, I admit, would have been an easy task as regards the gossip of
others relative to his Lordship, but that is not the principle upon
which this work is conducted, every incident therein having befallen
myself personally.
The fact was, that though I had the good fortune to serve under Lord
Collingwood, it had never been my lot to serve with him. His Lordship’s
first act on joining him was, as is narrated in the first volume, to
appoint me as the successor of the officer in command of the squadron in
the Ionian Islands. Shortly after my arrival at Corfu, I fell in—as has
also been said in the first volume—during a cruise with a number of
enemy’s vessels _bearing the commandant’s license to trade_! and in
spite of the license captured and sent them to Malta for condemnation.
The commandant, as shown in the first volume, hereupon denounced me to
Lord Collingwood _as an unfit person to command a squadron_. I was
immediately afterwards recalled, and, as the reader knows, was
subsequently employed in harassing the French and Spanish coasts,
without further personal intercourse with his Lordship, except when
paying a flying visit to the fleet blockading Toulon.
CHAP. XXXI.
VISIT TO THE ADMIRALTY COURT AT MALTA.
THE MALTESE ADMIRALTY COURT.—ITS EXTORTIONATE FEES, AND CONSEQUENT LOSS
TO CAPTORS.—MY VISIT TO MALTA.—I POSSESS MYSELF OF THE COURT TABLE
OF FEES.—INEFFECTUAL ATTEMPTS TO ARREST ME.—I AT LENGTH SUBMIT, AND
AM CARRIED TO PRISON.—A MOCK TRIAL.—MY DEFENCE.—REFUSE TO ANSWER
INTERROGATORIES PUT FOR THE PURPOSE OF GETTING ME TO CRIMINATE
MYSELF.—AM SENT BACK TO PRISON.—AM ASKED TO LEAVE PRISON ON BAIL.—MY
REFUSAL AND ESCAPE.—ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND.
At the commencement of 1811, finding that, in place of anything being
awarded to the _Impérieuse_ for numerous prizes taken in the
Mediterranean, the Maltese Admiralty Court had actually brought me in
debt for vicious condemnation, I determined to go to Malta, and insist
on the fees and charges thereon being taxed according to the scale upon
which the authority of the Court in such matters was based.
It is not my intention to enter generally into the nature of the demands
made by the Maltese Court, but rather to point out the manner in which,
after realisation of the prize funds, costs were inflicted on the
officers and crews of ships of war, till little or nothing was left for
distribution amongst the captors. This will give a good idea of the
practices which prevailed; preventing officers from harassing the
coasting trade of the enemy, as the expenses of condemning small craft
were ruinous, being for the most part the same as those charged by the
Court for the condemnation of large vessels.
One of the customs of the Court was as follows: to charge as fees _one
fourth_ more than the fees of the High Court of Admiralty in England;
this one fourth was practically found to amount in some cases to _one
half_, whilst any scale of charges by which the conduct of the Court was
guided, remained inaccessible to the captors of prizes.
The principal officer of the Court in this department was a Mr. Jackson,
who held the office of Marshal. This officer, however, though resident
in Malta, performed his duty of marshal by deputy, for the purpose of
enabling him also to exercise the still more profitable office of
proctor, the duties of which he performed in person. The consequence was
that every prize placed in his hands as proctor had to pass through his
hands as marshal! whilst as proctor it was further in his power to
consult himself as marshal as often as he pleased, and to any extent he
pleased. The amount of self-consultation may be imagined. Right
profitably did Mr. Proctor Jackson perform the duty of attending and
consulting himself as Mr. Marshal Jackson!
Subjoined is an extract from the charges of Proctor Jackson for
attending himself as Marshal Jackson:—
Cro. reals. sc.
Attending (as proctor) in the registry and 2 0 0
bespeaking a monition
Paid (himself as marshal) for said monition under 9 0 0
seal, and extracting
Copy of said monition for service 2 0 0
_Attending the Marshal!_ (himself) _and feeing and 2 0 0
instructing him to execute the same!_
_Paid the Marshal_ (himself) _for service of said 2 0 0
monition!_ (on himself)
_Certificate of service!_ (on himself) 1 0 0
_Drawing and engrossing affidavit of service!_ (on 2 0 0
himself)
_Oath thereto, and attendance!_ (on himself) 2 2 3
By what ingenious process Marshal Jackson managed to administer the oath
to himself as Proctor Jackson I know not, but the above charges are
actual copies from a bill in my possession, the said bill containing
_many hundred_ similar items besides. Some idea of its extent may be
formed from the statement that, previously to a debate on the subject, I
pasted together an exact copy the different sheets of which the bill of
charges was composed, formed them into a huge roll, and, amidst the
astonishment and laughter of the House of Commons, one day unrolled it
along the floor of the House, when it reached from the Speaker’s table
to the bar!!
In addition to this multitude of fees and charges, the Marshal also
claimed, and received as his own especial perquisite, _one half per
cent_ on the inspection of prizes, _one per cent_ for their
appraisement, and _two and a half per cent_ on the sale. This, with _one
fourth_ added as aforesaid, made just _five per cent_ on all captures
for the Marshal’s perquisite alone, irrespective of his other fees;
which, being subjected to no check, were extended according to
conscience. So that, for every amount of prizes to the extent of
100,000_l._ the Marshal’s share, as a matter of course, would be
5000_l._, wholly irrespective of other fees of Court calculated on a
similar scale. When numerous other officials had to be paid in like
manner, also without check on their demands, it scarcely needs to be
said that such prizes as were usually to be picked up by ships of war on
the Mediterranean coast entailed positive loss on their captors; the
result, as has been said, being that officers avoided taking such
prizes, and thus the enemy carried on his coasting operations with
impunity. In other words, the most important object of war—that of
starving out the enemy’s coast garrisons—was suspended by the
speculations of a colonial Admiralty Court!
Foiled in procuring redress in the House of Commons, where my statements
were pooh-poohed by the representatives of the High Court of Admiralty
as rash and without proof, I determined on procuring, by any means
whatever, such proof as should not easily be set aside.
Embarking, therefore, in my yacht _Julie_, one of the small French ships
of war captured at Caldagues and afterwards purchased by me, as narrated
in the first volume, I set sail for the Mediterranean.
On arriving at Gibraltar I considered it prudent to quit my yacht,
fearing that so small a vessel might fall a prey to the French cruisers,
and embarked on board a brig-of-war bound to Malta.
My first demand upon the Admiralty Court on arriving at that place was,
that the prize accounts of the _Impérieuse_ and _Speedy_ should be taxed
according to the authorised table of fees. This revision was refused.
Entering the Court one day when the Judge was not sitting, I again
demanded the table of fees from Dr. Moncrieff, then Judge-Advocate, who
denied that he knew anything about them. As by Act of Parliament they
ought to have been hung up in the Court, I made careful search for them,
but without success. Entering the Judge’s robing-room unopposed, I there
renewed the search, but with no better result, and was about to return
tableless; when, having been directed to a private closet, I examined
that also, and there, wafered up behind the door of the Judge’s
retiring-chamber, was the Admiralty Court table of fees! which I
carefully took down, and reentered the Court in the act of folding up
the paper, previously to putting it in my pocket.
Dr. Moncrieff instantly saw what I had got, and rose from his seat with
the intention of preventing my egress. Reminding him that I had no cause
of quarrel with or complaint towards him, I told him that guarding the
Judge’s water-closet formed no part of his duties as Judge-Advocate; and
that it was rather his place to go and tell the Judge that I had taken
possession of a public document which ought to have been suspended in
Court, but the possession of which had been denied. He seemed of the
same opinion, and suffered me to depart with my prize; this in half an
hour afterwards being placed in the possession of a brother-officer who
was going over to Sicily, and promised to take charge of it till my
arrival at Girgenti.
This “Rape of the Table,” as it was termed in a poem afterwards written
on the occasion by my secretary and friend, Mr. Wm. Jackson, caused
great merriment, but the Judge, Dr. Sewell, was furious, not perhaps so
much at the invasion of his private closet, as at losing a document
which, when laid before the House of Commons in connexion with the fees
actually charged, would infallibly betray the practices of the Maltese
Court. A peremptory demand was accordingly made of me for the
restoration of the table, this being met by my declaration that it was
not in my possession. The Judge, believing this to be untrue, though in
fact the tables were in Sicily, finally ordered me to be arrested for an
insult to the Court!
The duty of arresting me devolved on my friend in duplicate, Mr. Marshal
Mr. Proctor Jackson. I reminded him that the Court was not sitting when
the alleged offence was committed, and therefore it could be no insult.
I further cautioned him that his holding the office of proctor rendered
that of marshal illegal, and that if he dared to lay a finger on me, I
would treat him as one without authority of any kind, so that he must
take the consequences, which might be more serious to himself personally
than he imagined.
The proctor-marshal, well knowing the illegality of his double office,
which was not known—much less officially confirmed in England—prudently
declined the risk, on which the Judge ordered the deputy marshal, a man
named Chapman, to arrest me. Upon this I informed Chapman that his
appointment was illegal also, first as holding the office of deputy
marshal to an illegally constituted person, and secondly, from his also
exercising the duplicate office of deputy auctioneer—the auctioneer
being a sinecurist resident in London!! So that if, as deputy marshal
combined with deputy auctioneer, he ventured to arrest me, he too must
put up with the consequences.[74]
Footnote 74:
The Tory organs in England said that I threatened to shoot Chapman. I
need hardly say that this was a gratuitous falsehood. With the
exception of the silly duel narrated in the first volume, I never
either harmed, or intended to harm, a man in my life, otherwise than
in action. The fact was, both these Maltese officials were illegally
appointed, and they knew it. The officers and crews of the ships of
war present had but too much experience of their selfish conduct, and
were as well pleased as myself at the success of my method of keeping
their natural enemies at bay, so that the _pseudo_-marshals were in
reality frightened at their own warrants.
This went on for many days, to the great amusement of the fleet in
harbour, no one being willing to incur the risk of arresting me, though
I walked about Malta as usual, Chapman following me like a shadow. At
length the Judge insisted on the deputy marshal-auctioneer arresting me
at all risks, on pain of being himself committed to prison for neglect
of carrying out the orders of the Court. Finding himself in this
dilemma, Chapman resigned his office.
On this a man named Stevens, unconnected with any other official
position, was appointed in a proper manner; and all the legal
formalities being carefully entered into, I no longer resisted, as that
would have been resistance to law.
The manner in which the arrest was made showed a spirit of petty
malevolence quite in keeping with the dispositions of men who were
making enormous fortunes by plundering the officers and crews of His
Majesty’s ships of war. I was on a visit to Percy Fraser, the naval
commissioner, when the newly appointed deputy marshal who had watched me
in was announced, and on entering told me he was come to arrest me. On
demanding his credentials, I found them to be signed by Mr. Proctor
Jackson, and as I wanted this proof of his acting as marshal illegally,
admitted myself satisfied with them.
The deputy marshal then requested me to accompany him to an inn, where I
might remain on parole. I told him that I would do nothing of the kind,
but that if he took me anywhere it must be to the town gaol, to which
place he then requested me to accompany him. My reply was:—“No. I will
be no party to an illegal imprisonment of myself. If you want me to go
to gaol, you must carry me by force, for assuredly I will not walk.”
As the room was full of naval officers, all more or less victims of the
iniquitous system pursued by the Maltese Court, the scene caused some
merriment. Finding me inflexible, the Vice-admiralty official sent—first
for a carriage, and then for a piquet of Maltese soldiers, who carried
me out of the room on the chair in which I had been sitting. I was then
carefully deposited in the carriage, and driven to the town gaol.
The apartments assigned for my use were the best the place afforded, and
were situated on the top story of the prison, the only material
unpleasantness about them being that the windows were strongly barred.
The gaoler, a simple worthy man, civilly inquired what I would please to
order for dinner. My reply was:—“Nothing!—that, as he was no doubt
aware, I had been placed there on an illegal warrant, and would not pay
for so much as a crust; so that if I was starved to death, the Admiralty
Court would have to answer for it.”
At this declaration the man stood aghast, and shortly after quitted the
room. In about an hour he returned with an order from Mr. Marshal
Jackson to a neighbouring hotel-keeper, to supply me with whatever I
chose to order.
Thus armed with _carte-blanche_ as to the _cuisine_, I ordered dinner
for six; under strict injunctions that whatever was prized in Malta, as
well in edibles as in wines, should be put upon the table. An intimation
to the gaoler that he would be the richer by the scraps, and to the
hotel master to keep his counsel for the sake of the profits, had the
desired effect; and that evening a better-entertained party (naval
officers) never dined within the walls of Malta gaol.
This went on day after day, at what cost to the Admiralty Court I never
learned nor inquired; but, from the character of our entertainment, the
bill when presented must have been almost as extensive as their own
fees. All my friends in the squadron present at Malta were invited by
turns, and assuredly had no ward-room fare. They appeared to enjoy
themselves the more heartily, as avenging their own wrongs at the
expense of their plunderers.
At length the Admiralty authorities thought it high time to decide what
was to be done with me. It was now the beginning of March, and I had
been incarcerated from the middle of February without accusation or
trial. It was evident that if I were imprisoned much longer, I might
complain of being kept out of my place in Parliament, and what the
electors of Westminster might say to this, or what the House of Commons
itself might say, were questions seriously to be pondered by men whose
titles to office were unconfirmed. They had at length discovered that I
had committed no offence beyond the fact of having been seen to fold up
and put in my pocket a piece of dirty paper, but what that paper might
be, or where it was, there was no evidence whatever.
At length they hit upon a notable expedient for getting rid of me, viz.
to get His Excellency the Governor to ask me to give up the table of
fees. This I declined, telling His Excellency that as I had been
incarcerated illegally I would not quit the prison without trial.
It was accordingly determined that I should be put on my trial, the
puzzle being as to what offence I should be accused of. The plan, as I
afterwards found, was to interrogate me, and thus to entrap me into
becoming my own accuser.
On the 2nd of March I was taken to the Court-house, accompanied by the
naval commissioner Mr. Fraser, Captain Rowley the naval officer in
command, and nearly all the commanding officers in port.
Two clerks, one a German and the other a Maltese, were said to have
deposed to “seeing a person, whom they believed to be Lord Cochrane,
with a folded paper.” On the strength of this evidence, the following
charge was made out:—“That I had entered _the Registry_ of the Admiralty
Court, and had there taken down the table of charges; that I had held up
the same, so as to cause it to be seen by the King’s Advocate, Dr.
Moncrieff, and had then put it in my pocket, and walked away.”[75]
Footnote 75:
This charge contained a wilful falsehood, viz. that the table of fees
was hung in “the Registry;” the perversion of truth being proved by
the remarks in Parliament of the King’s Advocate, Sir John Nicholls,
on the authority of the Maltese Court, as follows:—
“Lord Cochrane went to the court-room of the Vice-Admiralty, for the
purpose of comparing the charges in his bills with the table of
established fees, which, according to Act of Parliament, ‘should be
suspended in some conspicuous part of the Court.’ After looking for it
in vain in the Court, _and in the Registry_, whither he was first
directed by His Majesty’s Advocate, he was told that he might see it
affixed on a door leading to the adjoining room. The table was
certainly not in its place—but it was as certainly not concealed!”
(_Speech of Sir J. Nicholls in the House of Commons, June 6th, 1811._)
It was equally false that the King’s Advocate directed me where to
look for the table of fees; the whole affair having taken place as
narrated in this chapter.
To this I replied that “there must be an error, for as the Act of
Parliament ordered that the table of charges should be displayed in open
Court, it could not possibly have been the paper which I saw in the
Judge’s water-closet. That the paper showed by me to Dr. Moncrieff was
folded up, so that he was necessarily ignorant of its purport or
contents. Finally, I denied having taken down the table of charges, as
established by Act of Parliament, from the Court-room.” After this reply
I demanded to be confronted with my accuser, for the purpose of
cross-examining him.
This the Judge would not allow, but said he should consider my denial in
the light of a plea of “not guilty.” He then put to me a series of
interrogatories, for the purpose of getting me to criminate myself; but
to these I refused to reply in any way, merely repeating my assurance
that his Honour must have made a mistake, it being highly improbable
that the lost table of fees should have been hung anywhere but in open
Court, as the Act of Geo. II. prescribed, viz.: _in an open, visible,
and accessible place_, which his Honour’s retiring-closet was not. Dr.
Sewell then admitted that the charges entered on the table of fees _had
not been ratified by the King in Council!_ and that he had therefore not
caused them to be suspended in open Court, according to the Act. On
which declaration I protested against the whole proceedings as illegal.
Finding that nothing could be done, the Judge then _asked me to go at
large on bail!_ This I flatly refused, alleging myself to be determined
to remain where I was, be the consequence what it might, till the case
should be decided on its merits. At this unexpected declaration the
Court appeared to be taken aback, but as I refused to be bailed, the
Judge had no alternative but to remand me back to prison.[76]
-----
Footnote 76:
As it may be useful to note the despotic practices of our foreign
tribunals in those days, I will transcribe a portion of the Judge’s
speech on this occasion, as correctly reported at the time. On my
demanding to cross-examine the witnesses against me, Dr. Sewell said:—
“The present course was the one practised on these occasions. He would
not allow any but a direct answer to the charge made, and if that
contained no crime, he should himself be responsible.”
He then said that he must administer to Lord Cochrane certain
interrogatories, and on Lord Cochrane persisting in demanding his
accuser or accusers, in place of replying to the questions, _the Judge
peremptorily required answers_.
In place of giving these, I denied the competence of the Court to take
cognizance of a criminal charge, asserting that it was not a Court of
Record; and that on a pretended accusation made by witnesses who could
not be produced, I had been arrested, imprisoned in the common gaol,
and publicly criminated, without being permitted to clear myself by
being placed face to face with my accusers, &c. &c.
-----
On arriving there, my friends were of opinion that the affair had been
carried far enough, and that I should apologise for taking the table of
charges, and send for it to Girgenti. To this counsel I refused to
listen, as I wanted the tables for exhibition in the House of Commons,
and would in no way compromise the matter.
On this the senior naval officer, Captain Rowley, said to me:—“Lord
Cochrane, you must not remain here; the seamen are getting savage, and
if you are not out soon they will pull the gaol down, which will get the
naval force into a scrape. Have you any objection to making your
escape?” “Not the least,” replied I, “and it may be done; but I will
neither be bailed, nor will I be set at liberty without a proper trial.”
In short, it was then arranged that my servant, Richard Carter, should
bring me some files and a rope; that I should cut through the iron bars
of the window; and that when everything was in readiness, on the first
favourable night, a boat should be manned at the sallyport, and that I
should be taken across to Sicily, to pick up the table of fees at
Girgenti.
Some three or four nights were occupied in cutting through the bars, the
marks being concealed in the day-time by filling up the holes with a
composition. When all was in readiness, my friends and I held our last
_symposium_ at the expense of the Admiralty Court. The gaoler was
purposely made very tipsy, to which he was nothing loth; and about
midnight, having first lowered my bedding into the streets, to be
carried off by some seamen under the direction of my servant, I passed a
double rope round an iron bar, let myself down from the three-story
window, pulled the rope after me, so that nothing might remain to excite
suspicion, and bade adieu to the merriest prison in which a seaman was
ever incarcerated.
On arriving at the harbour I found the _Eagle’s_ gig in readiness, and
several brother-officers assembled to take leave of me. The night was
dark, with the sea smooth as glass, it being a dead calm. When pulling
along the island we came up with the English packet, which had sailed
from Malta on the previous day, she having been since becalmed. As she
was bound to Girgenti, to pick up passengers and letters from Naples,
nothing could be more opportune; so, dismissing the gig, I went on
board, and was on my way to England, doubtless, before I was missed from
my late involuntary domicile at Malta. I had thus a manifest advantage
in those days of slow transit, viz. that of arriving in England a month
before news of my escape from Malta could be sent home by the
authorities of the Admiralty Court.
As I afterwards learned, nothing could exceed the chagrin of the
Admiralty officials at having lost, not only their table of charges, but
their prisoner also. No one had the slightest suspicion that I had gone
to sea, and that in a man-of-war’s boat. Yet nothing could better show
the iniquitous character of the Maltese Admiralty Court than the fact
that my escape was planned in conjunction with several naval officers
present in harbour who lent me a boat and crew, for the purpose; the
whole matter being previously known to half the naval officers present
with the squadron, and, after my escape, to not a few of the seamen, all
of whom must have been highly amused at the diligent search made for me
the next day throughout Valetta, but still more at the _reward offered
for those who aided me in escaping_. Yet not a word transpired as to the
direction I had taken, or the time occupied in searching for me on the
island might have been turned to better account by an endeavour to
intercept me at Gibraltar, where I remained long enough to dispose of my
yacht, and amuse the garrison with a narrative of my adventures since I
left the Rock two months before!
CHAP. XXXII.
NAVAL LEGISLATION HALF A CENTURY AGO.
INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF THE NAVY.—CONDITION OF THE SEAMEN.—THE REAL
CAUSE OF THE EVIL.—MOTION RELATIVE TO THE MALTESE COURT.—ITS
EXTORTIONATE CHARGES.—MY OWN CASE.—A LENGTHY PROCTOR’S BILL.—EXCEEDS
THE VALUE OF THE PRIZE.—OFFICERS OUGHT TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN
PROCTORS.—PAPERS MOVED FOR.—MR. YORKE’S OPINION.—SIR FRANCIS
BURDETT’S.—MY REPLY.—MOTION AGREED TO.—CAPTAIN BRENTON’S
TESTIMONY.—FRENCH PRISONERS.—THEIR TREATMENT.—MINISTERS REFUSE TO
INQUIRE INTO IT.—MOTION ON MY ARREST.—CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING IT.—MY
RIGHT TO DEMAND TAXATION.—THE MALTESE JUDGE REFUSES TO NOTICE MY
COMMUNICATIONS.—AFRAID OF HIS OWN ACTS.—PROCEEDINGS OF HIS OFFICERS
ILLEGAL.—TESTIMONY OF EMINENT NAVAL OFFICERS.—PROCLAMATION ON MY
ESCAPE.—OPINION OF THE SPEAKER ADVERSE.—MR. STEPHEN’S ERRONEOUS
STATEMENT.—MOTION OBJECTED TO BY THE FIRST LORD.—MY REPLY.
On my return from the Mediterranean, having no prospect of employment, I
devoted myself assiduously in Parliament to the course I had marked out
for myself, viz. the amelioration of the condition of the naval service;
whether by originating such measures of my own accord, or assisting
others who had the same object in view.
At this period it was the custom to compel naval officers on foreign
stations, in whatever part of the world located, to draw bills for their
pay. The consequence was that the bills had to be sold at a discount
sometimes amounting to 35 and 40 per cent, the whole of the loss falling
on the officers negotiating the bills.
A motion to place officers of the navy upon the same footing as officers
of the army was made by Captain Bennet, and strenuously opposed by the
First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Yorke, as an innovation on _old rules
and customs_, which, when once sanctioned, no one could tell where it
might stop.
Upon this I inquired “what greater difficulty there could be in paying
officers of the navy abroad than in paying officers of the army? There
were consuls at all the foreign stations, who could certify what the
rate of exchange really was. Under the present system, to my own
knowledge, officers on the Gibraltar station were 25 per cent, or a
fourth of their scanty pay, out of pocket, and it was with great
difficulty that they could provide themselves with proper necessaries.”
The effect of these remarks was, that Sir C. Pole moved as an amendment
that a Committee should be appointed to inquire into the state of the
navy generally, and this was seconded by Admiral Harvey.
The debate having taken this turn gave me the opportunity of entering
more minutely into particulars. I will transcribe my remarks from the
reports of the time:—
“LORD COCHRANE said an increase of pay to the seamen in the navy would
be of little advantage to them, so long as the present system
continued. He had in his hands a list of ships of war in the East
Indies. The _Centurion_ had been there eleven years—the _Rattlesnake_,
fourteen years, came home the other day, with only one man of the
first crew—the _Fox_ frigate, under the command of his brother, had
been there fifteen years—the _Sceptre_ eight years—the _Albatross_
twelve, &c. Not one farthing of pay had been given all that period to
all those men. He had made a calculation on the _Fox_ frigate, and
supposing only one hundred of the men returned, there would be due to
the crew 25,000_l._, not including the officers. What became of these
sums all the while? The interest ought to be accounted for to
Government or to the seamen themselves. The _Wilhelmina_ had been ten
years, the _Russell_ seven years, the _Drake_ six years, of which the
men would be exiles from England for ever, and another vessel four
years. Nothing would be of greater service than the frequently
changing the stations of ships, which might be done without any
inconvenience, and even with much advantage to the East-India
Company’s ships.
“The seamen, said Lord Cochrane, from the want of their pay, had no
means of getting many necessaries of the utmost consequence to their
health and comfort. They drew less prize-money under the existing acts
than formerly. He instanced a vessel, the proceeds of which came to
355_l._; by the present mode of distribution the seaman would receive
13_s._ 5½_d._, whilst by the old mode he would have received 15_s._
1½_d._ From the officers’ share there was deducted in all 75 _per
cent_, allowing only 10 per cent for the prize courts.
“The Minister had exultingly asked, what had become of the commerce of
France? But he would undertake to show him, before he was 48 hours on
the coast of France, at least 200 sail of the enemy’s vessels. If they
were to pay more liberally the Judges of the Admiralty Courts, and
operate a proper reformation in them, he would undertake to say that
they might score off at least one third of the present ships of the
navy. Ministers said there were no vessels on the coast of France, but
he said there were; and, if they would go with him, he would show them
how they could be got at.
“He rather thought that the inattention of Government to the
profligate waste of the public money, arose from their unwillingness
to believe anything contrary to their own crude notions on these
subjects. He stated, and he begged the House to attend to it, for it
was as important as the subject of Mrs. Clarke, that in the reign of
James the Second the pay of a captain of a first-rate was 80_l._ more
than at present. King William, when he came over with his Dutch
troops, whom he was much more anxious to attend to than he was to
attend to his subjects here, took up his pen and cut off one half of
the pay. So much for foreign troops; but still, taking the advance of
prices into view, King William left it far better than it is now. His
Lordship then again called the attention of the House to the extent to
which the French coasting trade was carried on, and observed that it
could not be checked, unless greater encouragement were given to the
captains. If he commanded a ship on the French coast, by keeping at a
good distance he might go to sleep, but in order to intercept those
coasting vessels the captain must be on deck watching all night. It
was impossible officers would do this merely to put money into the
pockets of those who practised in the Admiralty Courts.
“MR. YORKE said that at this late period of the session it would be
impossible to enter upon a subject of such detail. As to ships being
detained so long upon foreign and distant stations, it was much to be
regretted, but it was often unavoidable.”
These were singular reasons for not entertaining a subject of such
importance. According to Mr. Yorke, it was too late in the session to
conduct the war successfully, whilst the other evil complained of could
only be “regretted!”
For want of better argument, I was accused of insinuating that without
the chance of prize-money officers would lose a great incentive to duty.
I only took human nature as I found it, and it is not in human nature to
exercise unremitting vigilance and exertion without the hope of reward;
much less that unceasing vigilance, by night as well as day, requiring
almost constant presence on deck to intercept an enemy’s coasting trade,
carried on almost solely in the night, when the enemy felt secure of our
vessels being run out to sea, from want of motive to remain in shore.
On the 6th of June I entered on the subject of the Maltese Court of
Admiralty. As the debate in the House is sufficiently explicit, previous
comment is unnecessary.
_“Vice-Admiralty Court of Malta._
“Lord Cochrane rose to make the motion of which he had given notice.
The noble lord began by stating that he had before had occasion to
trouble the House on this subject, but he then failed in his attempt
to obtain justice, on the ground that there was not sufficient
evidence of the facts stated to warrant the House in entertaining his
motion. He had since, however, personally been at Malta, and had
procured such a chain of evidence, that if the House should now be
pleased to entertain his motion, he had no doubt but he should be able
to lay before them such a connected string of evidence of flagrant
abuses in the Vice-Admiralty Court at that island, as would astonish
all who heard it.
“He would undertake to prove that, if the Court of Admiralty at home
would do their duty, one third of the naval force now employed in the
Mediterranean would be sufficient for all purposes for which it was
employed there, and that a saving might be made in the naval service
alone of at least five millions sterling a year. If the Committee for
which he moved last year had been granted, the evidence to prove this
might now have been before the House.”
There was no question at the time, and many naval officers are yet
living to confirm the assertion, that the rapacity of the Admiralty
Courts and their extravagant charges for adjudication and condemning
prizes did prevent the interception and capture of the majority of the
numerous small vessels employed in the coasting trade of the enemy, this
forming to him the most vital consideration, as the means of
provisioning his armies. At the commencement of the war, the capture of
large vessels coming from distant parts with valuable cargoes gave so
much prize-money as to render both officers and crews careless about a
little exertion more or less, but when the enemy’s foreign trade was
destroyed nothing remained to be looked after but small craft, and as
the Admiralty Court charges had increased in an inverse ratio to the
worthlessness of small craft, few would run the risk of looking after
them, with the certainty of small gain, and the more than probability of
being brought in debt for their pains. The consequence was, that little
or no destruction was offered to the enemy’s coasting trade, which,
important as it was to him for subsistence, ought to have been far more
so to us, as its destruction would have deprived him of the means of
subsistence.
Between the years 1803 and 1807, the naval establishment was increased
from 200 to 600 vessels of war, notwithstanding which the coasting
commerce of the enemy still went on, and it should have been obvious
that when the navy was increased to upwards of 1000 ships, _nothing more
was done_. The amusement of cutting out coasting vessels when under the
protection of batteries ceased to operate as an incentive. The logs of
frigates showed that their commanders avoided the risk of keeping their
ships in contiguity with the shore _at night_, and secured a good
night’s rest for their men by running into the offing. Hence the enemy’s
coasting convoys proceeded by night, and in the day ran into some port
or other place of protection. The result in the frigates’ daily
journal,—“Employed _as usual_,” was no less true than comprehensive.
For telling such truths as these, an outcry was raised against me for
depreciating the character of officers! The case was my own. I took
prizes in the Mediterranean and elsewhere by dozens, for which neither
my officers nor crews got anything, the proceeds being swallowed up by
the Admiralty Courts. I then turned to harassing the coast armies and
forts of the enemy, without hope of reward, deeming this kind of
employment the most honourable to myself, and the most advantageous to
my country. So far from my pointing out the effect on the mind of
officers in general being a reflection on their honour, it was only
creditable to their common sense. They could not reasonably be expected
to sacrifice their rest and that of their crews, or to run their ships
into danger and themselves into debt, for the exclusive emolument of the
Courts of Admiralty! I have no hesitation in asserting that had the
Ministry diminished the navy one half, and given the whole cost of the
other half to the Admiralty Court officials in lieu of their charges,
the remaining ships would of themselves have turned the course of the
war, and their commanders would have reaped fortunes.[77]
-----
Footnote 77:
In February, 1811, I pointed out to the House of Commons the monstrous
fact that 107 ships of the line were in commission to watch 23!
(Hansard, vol. xv.)
-----
These remarks will enable the naval reader to comprehend what follows.
They are not intended so much for a history of past maladministration as
a beacon for the future.
“The noble lord then read a letter from a captain of a vessel at the
Cape of Good Hope, complaining ‘that the officers of ships of war were
so pillaged by those of the Vice-Admiralty Courts, that he wished to
know how they could be relieved; whether they could be allowed the
liberty to send their prizes home, and how far the jurisdiction of the
Vice-Admiralty Court extended; for that the charges of that court were
so exorbitant, it required the whole amount of the value of a good
prize to satisfy them. In the case of one vessel that was sold for
11,000 rupees, the charges amounted to more than 10,000. This was the
case at Penang, Malacca, and other places, as well as at the Cape.’ He
would not, however, wish to dwell on this, but put it to the feelings
of the House, whether naval officers had any stimulus to do even their
duty, when the prizes they took would not pay the fees of the
Vice-Admiralty Courts merely for condemning them? It had been stated
the other day at some meeting or dinner by a very grave personage, the
Lord Chancellor, that the ships of France were only to be found in our
ports. If that statement were believed by Ministers, he should be glad
to know why we at this moment kept up 140 sail of the line, and
frigates and sloops of war in proportion to that number.”
What follows is very curious, as establishing the magnitude of the
charges for adjudication in the Vice-Admiralty Courts. The bill for the
condemnation of the _King George_ privateer, the first vessel taken by
the _Impérieuse_, had brought me 600 crowns in debt, and was of such
magnitude that I had an exact copy made of it, and pasted continuously
together. The result will be gathered from what follows.
“His Lordship then produced the copy of a Proctor’s Bill in the island
of Malta, which he said measured six fathoms and a quarter, and
contained many curious charges. [_The unrolling this copy caused a
general laugh, as it appeared long enough to reach from one end of the
house to the other._] This Proctor, the noble lord said, acted in the
double capacity of Proctor and Marshal; and in the former capacity
feed himself for consulting and instructing himself as counsel, jury,
and judge, which he himself represented in the character of Marshal;
so that all those fees were for himself in the one character, and paid
to the same himself in the other. He then read several of the fees,
which ran thus:—for attending the Marshal (himself) 2 crowns, 2 scudi,
and 2 reals; and so on, in several other capacities in which he
attended, consulted, and instructed himself, were charged several fees
to the same amount. An hon. member, not then in the house, had last
year opposed the motion he had brought forward, for a Committee to
inquire into this subject; but, on seeing these articles of this his
own Proctor’s bill, his Lordship flattered himself that the hon.
member would now join in the support of the present motion. The noble
lord said he had produced the copy of the bill to show the length of
it. He then showed the original; and to show the equity and moderation
of the Vice-Admiralty Court, he read one article where, on the
taxation of a bill, the Court, for deducting fifty crowns, charged
thirty-five crowns for the trouble in doing it. A vessel was valued at
8608 crowns, the Marshal received one per cent for delivering her, and
in the end the net proceeds amounted to no more than 1900 crowns out
of 8608—all the rest had been embezzled and swallowed up in the Prize
Court. He was sorry, he said, to trespass on the time of the House, on
a day when another matter of importance was to come before them. He
pledged himself, however, that no subject could be introduced more
highly deserving their serious attention and consideration.”
I am not sure that by late treaties prize-money in future wars is not in
effect abolished, though how treaties can exist during war I am not
aware. If this be so, or anything like the spirit of such an
arrangement, certain I am that the prestige of our navy is gone till the
old system is restored. The United States Government has, I am told, had
the good sense not to conform to any arrangement of the kind. If my life
be longer spared I may in a future volume revert to this subject.
However, even as the matter now stands, something must be captured, and
I would suggest as a remedy for this enormous Admiralty Court evil to
assimilate the regulations of those courts to the courts of law. Pay the
judges and officials as other judges and officials are paid. Permit
officers of the navy to choose their own proctors, as suitors in other
courts choose their own attorneys. It is not honourable to the
Government nor just to those serving under its authority, to compel
officers to place the litigation of all prizes—even detained neutrals—in
the hands of one individual, who, under the name of proctor, may have
hundreds of causes in hand at the same time. The detention of a neutral
may compromise a captain’s fortune in the event of an unfavourable or
hurried decision, for in such cases the liability to damages falls
exclusively on captains, the admirals and crews having no
responsibility. For my own part, as it was neither my bounden public
duty, nor safe to my personal interests, to interfere with neutrals, I
avoided their detention, however apparently flagrant the violation of
their nominal neutrality.
“He (Lord C.) would not trouble them with anything concerning himself,
because he trusted he had a remedy elsewhere. The noble lord then
stated that altering or regulating the fees established by the King in
council, for the island of Malta, was contrary to Act of Parliament,
that when he went to Malta five years ago he found the fees very
exorbitant; and, in order to prove to the House that the fees demanded
now were fees which had been altered since the table of fees was sent
out, the noble lord mentioned an instance of thirteen small vessels
which had been taken by the gallant Captain Brenton, who lately lost
his arm in the service, being brought into the Vice-Admiralty Court
for condemnation; the charge made for doing that act (which must be
done before the prizes could be sold) was 3767 crowns; but on a severe
remonstrance from Captain Brenton, the Judge deducted 3504 crowns, and
was glad to accept 263 crowns instead of 3767, rather than have a
noise made about it in England.
“He (Lord C.) could assure the House the subject was well worthy their
attention; and, if the Lords of the Admiralty knew all the
circumstances, he was confident that, instead of opposing, they would
support his motion. He meant to accuse the Judge, the Marshal, and the
Registrar of the Court with abuse of their offices, and concluded by
moving, ‘That there be laid before this House, 1. Copy of the
Commission or Appointment of Dr. Sewell to officiate as Judge of the
Vice-Admiralty Court of Malta. 2. Copy of the Commission or
Appointment of Mr. John Jackson to the office of Marshal to the said
Court. 3. List of the Proctors officiating in the said Court, with the
dates of their admission. 4. Copy of the Appointment of Mr. Locker to
execute the office of Registrar of the said Court. 5. Copies of the
several deputations given by the Registrar and the Marshal of the said
Court to their respective deputies to the end of February last;
together with the notifications of those appointments to the High
Court of Admiralty, or the Board of Admiralty, with the reasons
assigned for such nominations or appointments. 6. Copies of any
representations made to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty
regarding the incompatibility of the situations of Proctor and
Marshal, united at Malta in the person of Mr. Jackson, and the
consequent correspondence with the Court of Admiralty, or the Judge of
the Court of Admiralty, on that subject. 7. Copy of any Table of Fees
established by His Majesty in Council, and furnished to the Courts of
Vice-Admiralty under the Act of 45 Geo. III. c. 72, or any other Act
of Parliament. 8. Copy of the Table of Fees by which the charges were
made on the suitors in the Court at Malta. 9. Copy of the Authority by
virtue of which the Judges of the Vice-Admiralty Courts are empowered
to alter or amend the Table aforesaid; or to make any other Table of
Fees, to regulate the charges incurred by the suitors in that Court.
10. Copies of Official Demands made, or Official Correspondence which
has taken place, between the Judge of the Vice-Admiralty Court at
Gibraltar, or at Malta, and the High Court of Admiralty, or the Judge
of the High Court of Admiralty, requiring or regarding a Table of Fees
to be sent for the guidance of those Courts, or either of them. 11.
List of the number of vessels that have been prosecuted in the Court
of Vice-Admiralty at Malta, and which have been liberated on payment
of costs and damages or otherwise. 12. Copies of the Appointments
which —— Wood, Esq., late Secretary to Lord Viscount Castlereagh,
holds in the island of Malta.’
“MR. YORKE said that he did not mean to object to the production of
the greater part of the papers moved for by the noble lord. His motion
seemed to charge with extortion the persons connected with the
Admiralty Court at Malta; and certainly the _prima facies_ appeared to
justify it, and some reform might be necessary in some of the
departments, which induced him to acquiesce in the general features of
the noble lord’s motion; but some difficulty might exist in the
production of one or two of the papers he moved for, as they possibly
implicated some private correspondence which it would be improper to
produce. Many of the papers moved for must be brought from Malta, and
therefore it would be impossible that the investigation could take
place this session; and he hoped the noble lord would, on examination,
if he found just ground, persevere in his motion, as it was certainly
highly improper for the dignity of the House and the due management of
the affairs of the country that a remedy should not be applied to
those evils, if they existed.
“SIR JOHN NICHOLL (King’s Advocate), while he admitted with the First
Lord of the Admiralty, that the case, as it stood at present called
for inquiry, thought proper at the same time to state, in the absence
of his learned friend (Sir W. Scott), that he had no control over the
Vice-Admiralty Court of Malta in matters of prize. The appeal lay to
the King in Council, and his learned friend was not in the smallest
degree responsible. If the abuses charged by the noble lord existed,
they ought to be corrected; but his doubt was as to the means. His
Majesty in Council had authority to correct abuses as to fees, &c.;
but no application, as far as he knew, had been made in that quarter.
It was the fashion now to come to Parliament in such cases. As to the
character of the Judge of the Prize Court at Malta, he not having been
in the habit of corresponding with him could not undertake to speak
positively to that point. Having practised with him for some time at
the same bar, he had every reason to believe that he was a man of
talent and integrity, and the noble lord knew that he was not wanting
in spirit to execute what he thought right. He was absent, and he was
a Judge—and no prejudices ought to be admitted against him till he had
an opportunity of being heard in his defence. He hoped the noble lord
was under a misapprehension. The regulation of the fees had been
probably left to the Judge because he himself could hardly have any
interest in augmenting them. They could hardly fall below 2000_l._, to
which sum only he was entitled out of them. From the failure of the
noble lord in substantiating charges made by him on former occasions,
it might be fairly inferred that accusations preferred by him might
possibly turn out to be unfounded.
“SIR FRANCIS BURDETT said he should have made no observation on the
subject, after having seconded the motion, but from what had fallen
from the right hon. gentleman who had just sat down, that his noble
colleague had not substantiated the charges he formerly brought
forward. The reason of this was obvious; the noble lord had never had
an opportunity given him to substantiate his charges. He had pledged
himself to prove them at the bar of the House, but his motion for a
committee was negatived.
“MR. ROSE said that when abuses in the Vice-Admiralty Courts abroad
were detected, measures were always taken to rectify them, and
proceedings were at present pending _against three of those courts_.
But he defied the noble lord to point out any impropriety in the
Admiralty Courts at home. After the minutest investigation, he could
not find a single ground of complaint against the officers of that
Court. The proctor for the navy was remarkable for his attention and
integrity, and his charges were more moderate than those of any other
proctor. The interests of the officers of the navy were as well
attended to as those of any individual. The noble lord had failed in
two charges on former occasions. He had brought charges against the
Admiralty Court, and against the Government for the treatment of the
prisoners of war. Both were utterly unfounded. The prisoners, as had
been found on inquiry, were even more healthy than our militia
regiments.
“MR. LYTTLETON said the right honourable gentleman who had spoken last
_allowed abuses existed_; he did not know whether it was so or not,
but he knew several officers of the navy of the highest character who
complained loudly that there were, and this was in his opinion good
ground for granting the present motion.
“LORD COCHRANE stated that, having complained to the Admiralty here of
a grievance in being obliged to submit to exorbitant charges in the
prosecution of a prize cause at Malta, the opinions of the Attorney
and Solicitor-General, and other lawyers, had been put into his hands,
purporting that his plan was to apply to the Judge at Malta. He wrote
to the Judge accordingly, who referred him to the Proctor, as he did
not choose to enter into private correspondence with suitors in causes
before him. He then wrote to the Proctor, who sent for answer that it
was unprecedented to demand a bill to be taxed that had been paid so
long ago as 1808; so that he thought his having got the money a good
reason for not parting with it. He then wrote to the Judge but got no
answer, and this was the redress he got in the quarter where the crown
law officers had advised him to apply. The noble lord further
observed, that in opposition to the act of the 45th of the King, the
Judge at Malta had not only established but altered the table of fees.
An allusion was made to the spirited conduct of the Judge; but he had
affidavits of Captain Maxwell and others, who were present, that the
Judge had admitted that he had no proof of the crime for which he
(Lord C.) had been sent to gaol. Against him, however, he would
proceed in another way, unless he should find it necessary to call for
the interference of the House to bring this Judge home. He had
consulted lawyers, and understood that he could not proceed against
him till he came to this country. As to his former charges, he had
been denied the opportunity of proving them. He concluded by repeating
his charges of extortion, &c., against the Judge and Marshall.
“MR. WHITBREAD said that if the official correspondence did not clear
up the case, he would move for further papers if no one else did.
“Some alterations were then made in the motion, in consequence of a
difference of opinion as to the construction of the 45th of the King,
relative to the establishment of tables of fees in the Prize Courts,
after which they were all carried.”
Notwithstanding the admission of the First Lord of the Admiralty that
the papers were necessary, and that they were produced, it is scarcely
creditable that the Government subsequently refused to act in the
matter, thus turning a deaf ear to proofs that the enactments of the
Legislature were defeated by the rapacity of distant Admiralty Courts,
which continued to impound without scruple the rewards which the
Legislature had decreed for effective exertion.
The naval reader who may wish to know more respecting the extortionate
fees of these courts may refer generally to Capt. Brenton’s “Life of
Lord St. Vincent.” I will extract one passage. He says (vol. ii. p.
166):—“Lord Cochrane made a statement of some facts to this effect in
the House of Commons, but he might have gone much further. The proctor’s
bill for a prize taken by the _Spartan_, when my brother commanded her,
was 1025_l._, which, when refused payment and taxed, _was reduced to
285l!_”
Capt. Brenton thought “I might have gone much further.” So I might, but
with as little effect. Even the facts I did state were impudently denied
or shamelessly defended.
On the 14th of June an attack was made upon me by the Secretary of the
Treasury, on account of some remarks which I had deemed it my duty to
make on the condition of the French prisoners at Dartmoor. In
consequence of circumstances which had come to my knowledge, I visited
that prison and _was refused admittance_ the moment my name was
announced. This did not, however, prevent my surveying the prison from
an eminence on the exterior: this cursory inspection confirmed the
information I had received.
“MR. ROSE observed that it would appear from these documents that the
total number of French prisoners remaining in England amounted to
45,939, and that the returns of the sick were 321. The number on
parole were 2710; and the sick 165. This statement, he conceived,
would be a sufficient answer to the imputations of negligence upon the
part of the Government which had been thrown out by a noble lord.
“LORD COCHRANE referred to the manner in which he had been reproached
by Mr. Rose’s pointed address, and thought it incumbent upon him,
considering the repeated assertions of that hon. member, that he was
unable to prove facts which he had stated to the House, to justify his
conduct in having given notice of a motion relative to the prison in
Dartmoor; but in which he did not persevere, for reasons very
different from those assigned by the right hon. gentleman. His
Lordship had never asserted that which he could not establish. The
time that had elapsed would sufficiently evidence his reluctance to
bring the matter to the knowledge of the public, fearing that a
disclosure might add to the misfortunes of his countrymen in France.
“Having received many letters stating the condition of the prisoners
of war at Dartmoor to be truly deplorable, he determined to
investigate the subject; and, having had occasion to go to Exeter, he
proceeded to Launceston and other depôts, whence he obtained the
intelligence, and, being satisfied that the complaints had some
foundation, he went to Dartmoor; but was refused admittance, even in
his capacity as a member of Parliament (a laugh). Though members might
laugh, he thought members of Parliament should be entitled to
admission there, or to any other prison in the kingdom. Having
contributed to place many individuals there, he applied for permission
to see the interior, but was refused leave, except to look through a
grating into the outer courtyard. He found the climate of the prison
accurately and faithfully described, and he was the more anxious to
see the interior, owing to the refusal directly given him. He inquired
the reason for building a depôt in such a barren, elevated, and
extraordinary situation, and was told that it was for the purpose of
attracting inhabitants. He proceeded to Plymouth, where he obtained a
plan of the prison, which fully corroborated one complaint, that the
health of the prisoners had suffered by exposure to heavy rains whilst
standing in an open space for several hours receiving provisions
issued at a single door; the cooking-room being several hundred feet
from the prison, which then contained six thousand prisoners, divided
into messes of six; consequently one thousand were soaked through in
the morning attending for their breakfast, and one thousand more at
dinner. Thus a third were constantly wet, many without a change of
clothes. He was told, however, that they gambled or sold them. On his
second visit to Dartmoor his Lordship, being again refused admittance,
began to explore the exterior, and found, by a very peculiar
coincidence, that the manure from this prison had been placed on the
only spot in Devon whence the stercoraceous matter of the depôt could
descend on a neighbouring and elevated estate belonging to the
Secretary of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent (Mr. Tyrwhitt). Had
such a circumstance happened in the island of Walcheren to an estate
of the Secretary of Louis Napoleon, he would not have been surprised.
The prison of Dartmoor was built in the most inclement part of all
England, on the top of the highest mountain in Devonshire, involved in
perpetual rains and eternal fog. That the prison was not built there
on a principle of economy might be seen by inspecting the contracts
for provisions, coals, and necessaries furnished at Dartmoor and at
Plymouth. He thought he calculated a difference of more than seven
thousand pounds a year on the provisions alone. It might be very
proper, he imagined, that prisoners should not be collected in great
numbers at Plymouth, but he asserted that Dartmoor depôt ought not to
have been placed upon the top of the highest and most barren range of
mountains in Devonshire, where it is involved in constant fog, and
deluged with perpetual rain. He had relinquished his intention of
entering into the matter, because he received assurances that the
situation of the prisoners would be immediately attended to. He would
abstain from remarking upon the manner in which Mr. Rose had taken him
by surprise, and wrested from him those facts in his own defence. Had
he brought that matter forward voluntarily, his Lordship would have
cleared the House, to prevent publicity.”
Capt. Brenton, in his “Life of Lord St. Vincent,” when speaking of the
treatment of our prisoners of war, bore testimony to the truth of my
representations, which Mr. Rose had so emphatically denied:—
“The charge of sick and wounded prisoners of war fell into the hands
of a set of villains, whose seared consciences were proof against the
silent but eloquent pleading of their fellow-creatures—sick and
imprisoned for no crime, in a foreign land, far away from their
friends and relations.” (Vol. ii. p. 165.)
No one supposed the Government to be guilty of the matters complained
of, but they refused to inquire into the conduct of those who were,
thereby protecting them in their iniquity. I saw at Dartmoor old and
_recently mutilated_ bulls, covered with dust and gore, driven along the
road towards the prison, leaving tracks of blood behind! Thus the
contract for supplying the prisoners with _ox beef_ was fulfilled by
some partisan of the government, who had _sublet_ his contract to a
Devon butcher. It was not always in those days that a contract was given
to the tradesman who fulfilled it.
On the 18th of July I brought forward a motion on the subject of my
arrest at Malta:—
“_Conduct of the Vice-Admiralty Court at Malta.—Arrest of Lord
Cochrane._
“LORD COCHRANE rose and said:—
“SIR,—The delay that has taken place since my return to England, and
the legal authorities that I have consulted, will, I trust, evidence
that I trespass on your attention with reluctance, relative to the
conduct of the Judge and members of the Court of Vice-Admiralty at
Malta; partly from a desire to avoid the possibility of private
motives being imputed to me, but chiefly from a conviction that
Parliament should not interfere in matters cognisable in the courts of
justice.
“How far, under the last impression, I am warranted in calling upon
this House to exercise an authority in the present instance, will
appear by the opinions of Sir A. Piggott, Mr. Holroyd, Mr. Leach, and
of another learned gentleman who is not now in his place. ‘Process of
the Courts,’ says Sir A. Piggott, ‘does not extend to Malta: there is
no mode whilst they are abroad to compel appearance to actions here.’
The answers of the other learned gentlemen being the same in
substance, I need not detain you by reading them.
“Three years have passed since I memorialised the Admiralty on this
subject; it cannot therefore be said that I have acted with
precipitation. Indeed, I have had time enough to reflect, and I do
assure you that I am fully aware of the responsibility which I shall
incur if I fail in establishing whatever accusations I bring against a
judge presiding in one of His Majesty’s courts, and against those
acting under his authority; but furnished as I am with original
documents, having the signatures of the judge and members of the
Court, I am not inclined to shrink from the task of proving their
violation of the Acts on your table, especially of the 37th, 38th,
39th, and 41st sects. of the 45th of his present Majesty, c. 72. The
first of which empowers the King in Council alone to make or alter a
table of fees to regulate the charges in Courts of Vice-Admiralty, and
yet the members of the Court of Malta fabricated one for themselves,
which the judge subsequently altered by affixing a note in his own
hand, abolishing the table _in toto_, except by reference to certain
unascertained charges made in a distant court, which were not set
forth. This note is as follows: ‘At a meeting of all the members of
the court shortly after its arrival, for the purpose of settling what
should be considered as reasonable fees, it was agreed, that in no
instance they should exceed the proportion of one third more than
those paid for similar services in the High Court of Admiralty in
England,’ signed ‘J. Sewell;’ who thus assumed the authority of the
King in Council, in open violation of the 37th, and in contempt and
defiance of the penalties enacted by the 38th and 39th sections, which
declare that ‘receiving or taking any fee or fees beyond those
specified in the table aforesaid,’ that is, the table authorised by
the King in Council, shall be punished by the loss of office; and
further, ‘demanding or receiving any sum or sums of money other than
the fees aforesaid shall be deemed and taken to be extortion and a
misdemeanour at law, and shall be punished under and by virtue of this
Act.’ Words cannot convey a more distinct prohibition, and yet I hold
in my hand demonstration of an opposite line of conduct being pursued
by the Court. This is not all; the law directs that the ‘Table of
Fees, authorised as aforesaid, shall be suspended in some conspicuous
part of the Court in which the several judges of the Vice-Admiralty
Court shall hold their courts.’ At Malta, however, it was concealed,
first, during five years in a drawer, and when taken therefrom in
consequence of loud complaints on the subject of their charges, it was
affixed, not ‘in some conspicuous part of the Court,’ not in the Court
at all, but on the door of a private room behind the Registry, where
suitors could have no access to it.
“Sir, The fabricating, altering, and concealing the table of fees is,
perhaps, the least profligate part of their conduct. What will the
House think when they find that John Jackson the marshal, who, to the
knowledge of the judge, _acts also as proctor in defiance of the law_,
is in the constant habit of charging his clients of the navy for
attending, feeing, consulting, instructing, and admonishing himself,
and this in the very teeth of the 41st section, which enacts that ‘No
registrar or deputy-registrar, marshal or deputy-marshal, of or
belonging to any of His Majesty’s Courts of Vice-Admiralty, shall,
either directly or indirectly, or himself or themselves, or by any
agent or agents, or any person or persons whomsoever, act or be
concerned in any manner whatsoever, either as an advocate or proctor.’
Mr. Jackson’s charges are so ingenious that I must beg leave to read a
few of them. ‘Attending in the Registry and bespeaking a monition, two
crowns; paid for the said monition, under seal and extracting, nine
crowns; copy of the said monition for service, two crowns; attending
the marshal (himself, observe) and instructing him to serve the same,
two crowns; paid the marshal for service of said monition, two crowns;
certificate of service, one crown; drawing and engrossing an affidavit
of service, two crowns; oath thereto and attendance, two crowns, two
reals, and three scudi.’ How exact! ten shillings and two-pence three
farthings for an oath that he had attended on himself with a monition!
One of these bills was taxed by the deputy registrar, who admitted
these iniquitous charges. Yes, Sir, they were allowed and admitted by
Stevens, the deputy registrar, who treats his friends with Burgundy
and Champagne out of the proceeds of captures made by the navy, from
which fund, John Locker, the sinecure registrar, like the sinecure
registrar at home, also derives his unmerited emoluments. I ask, is it
fit that the reward granted by His Majesty and the legislature to the
navy, for the toil and risk which they undergo in making captures from
the enemy, should be thus appropriated?
“That I had a right to demand the taxation of such a bill as that
which I have shown there can be no doubt, even if I could not produce
the opinion of His Majesty’s Attorney-General to that effect. Yes, the
opinion of Sir V. Gibbs, and of the Solicitor-General, signed also
Charles Robinson, William Battine, T. Jarvis, to all of whom the
memorial which I presented to the Admiralty was referred in April,
1809. ‘The expenses,’ say these learned gentlemen, ‘in this case do
not appear to have been brought to the knowledge of the Court so as to
have given the judge an opportunity of exercising his judgment upon
them; that would be the proper mode of redress for grievances of this
description.’
‘Thus instructed, I addressed the judge on my return to Malta, in
February last, soliciting that he would be pleased to direct my bill
to be taxed, to which he returned the following answer, addressed on
His Majesty’s service:—‘My Lord, In reply to your letter of
yesterday’s date, I beg leave to refer you to your proctor for the
information you are desirous of, it not being the practice of the
Vice-Admiralty Court here, any more than the Court of King’s Bench in
England, to enter into private correspondence with suitors on the
subject of their suits or of any matters connected with them. Signed
J. Sewell.’
“It appeared extraordinary that I should be referred to the person
complained of, as judge in his own cause. Still, however, in
compliance with Dr. Sewell’s advice, I directed my agent to make the
application, and the following, as might have been anticipated, was
the ingenious gentleman’s reply:—‘Sir, My bill in this case having
been delivered to you so long ago as the 8th of August 1808, and
having been paid by you soon after, I was a good deal surprised at
your note, received yesterday, informing me that Lord Cochrane wishes
to have the said bill taxed, and therefore I beg that you will apprise
his Lordship that it is a thing quite unprecedented to tax a bill
which is paid. I should have supposed that the advice I gave his
Lordship, not to proceed in this cause, would have exempted me from
the suspicion of having made unwarrantable charges. Signed John
Jackson.’ As the unwarrantableness of the charges did not rest on
suspicion, I wrote to Mr. Jackson myself, who answered:—‘I humbly
conceive that your Lordship is not now entitled to demand a copy of
your account, and therefore I beg that you will excuse me from
complying with such demand.’ I next required him to submit my account
for taxation, this he also declined as follows:—‘My Lord, In reply to
your letter of this day, I have to inform you that I cannot consent to
open an account that was closed two years ago, and that is my only
objection to my bill in the cause of King George being taxed, which I
hope your Lordship, on reflection, will see to be a reasonable
objection.’ I confess I did not consider the lapse of two years to be
any objection at all, particularly as I was absent from Malta when the
bill was paid, and no earlier opportunity had offered to call for a
revision of the charges; for this reason, and fortified with the
opinion of the learned gentleman opposite (Sir V. Gibbs) about a month
afterwards, I again addressed Dr. Sewell on the subject, who, so far
from ‘exercising his judgment’ on the marshal’s iniquitous bill of
costs, did not condescend to take the slightest notice of my
communication, though furnishing him with extracts from Mr. Jackson’s
written refusals. Neither did the judge reply to a note delivered to
him on the following day.
“Being thus excluded from the ‘proper mode of redress for grievances
of this description,’ I proceeded to the court-room of the
Vice-Admiralty for the purpose of comparing the charges contained in
numerous bills in my possession with the established fees, which I was
instructed by the Acts of Parliament, ‘should be suspended in some
conspicuous part of the Court,’ every part of which I searched in
vain; neither was the table in the Registry, where His Majesty’s
Advocate directed me to look for it, who, on my returning into Court
again, to make further inquiry, said that I would find it affixed on a
door leading to the adjoining room.
“That mutilated paper, concealed contrary to law, I was accused of
having taken down and carried away from a place where it could not
have been affixed, except in defiance of these statutes, and in
contempt of justice. That, Sir, was the paper for which I was followed
through the streets of Malta for the space of a week by the deputy
auctioneer, styled in the judge’s warrant and attachments by the title
of ‘deputy marshal,’ but who, in fact, never had an authority from the
marshal; perhaps, because the marshal was conscious of having vitiated
his powers by the illegal acts of which he was guilty, and thus
thought to escape the consequences which might arise from the acts of
his nominal deputy. So loosely are things conducted in that Court!
Surely no reasonable man can blame me for refusing to be taken to gaol
by the deputy auctioneer. Indeed, Chapman admits, in his affidavit of
the 24th of February, that my objection was to his want of authority;
for, I naturally concluded that unless he was an officer of the Court
his acts might be disowned, and thereby the guilty would escape
punishment.
“That this was the view which I took of the case, will appear by my
offering no resistance to James Houghton Stevens, who was appointed on
Chapman’s nominal resignation; I say, Sir, that I offered no
resistance, for, by refusing to walk to gaol, I did no more than
decline, by an act of my own, to contribute to illegal proceedings.
“It is not my intention to trouble the House at length relative to
this affair, which is of trifling importance compared with the
mischiefs that arise from the system of plunder and abuse practised in
the Courts of Vice-Admiralty. However, it may not be improper to
mention that I was conducted by the keeper of the gaol to a place with
a broken window barred with iron, furnished with an old chair, and a
close-stool in the corner. From this, however, I was removed, as the
judge began to fear the consequences of his illegal acts; and on the
third day, being brought from the keeper’s room to the Court of
Vice-Admiralty, there, without an accuser, except the judge, that
learned and worshipful gentleman attempted in the absence of proof to
administer a long string of interrogatories, which I, of course,
refused to answer, and thereby furnished what might be construed by
him into evidence of my having taken away his illegal table. Being
further pressed and threatened, I delivered a protest in writing,
‘against the illegal warrant issued by William Stevens, an examiner
and interpreter to the Vice-Admiralty Court of Malta, registered
merchant, commission broker, and notary public, calling himself deputy
registrar of the Court, and professing to act under an appointment of
John Locker, sinecure registrar, and further against the illegal
endeavours to execute the warrant by John Chapman, deputy auctioneer,
acting for and on behalf of —— Wood, late private secretary to Lord
Castlereagh, a non-resident, enjoying an income of about seven
thousand pounds sterling per annum, derived from the sale of prizes
and the goods of merchants trading to Malta, but calling himself
deputy marshal of the Vice-Admiralty Court, and professing to act
under an appointment from John Jackson, proctor and marshal, contrary
to law; and farther against all acts of the said John Jackson, in the
capacity of marshal, by himself or his deputy, and against John
Locker, sinecure registrar, and William Stephens, calling himself
deputy registrar: John Locker having, under the signature of William
Stephens, taxed bills of fees and expenses of the Court of
Vice-Admiralty, wherein the fees of the said John Locker and William
Stephens in their capacity of registrar, deputy registrar, examiner,
interpreter, &c. &c. &c., are made and examined by themselves, and in
which various illegal charges were allowed and suffered to be made by
John Jackson, as proctor, for attending, feeing, consulting, and
instructing himself as marshal; in which double capacity he acts, in
defiance of the 41st and of the 45th Geo. III. chapter 72.’ And
further, I solemnly protested John Sewell, styling himself judge of
the aforesaid Court, for refusing, by letter dated the 13th January,
1811, to order satisfaction to be given by the said John Jackson,
referring to him a judge in his own cause; and likewise for not having
given any answers to official letters delivered to him, bearing date
the 19th and 20th of February, 1811, on the same subject. And further,
I protested against the said John Sewell, for not complying with the
Act of Parliament, which directs that ‘a table of fees shall be
suspended in some conspicuous part of the Court, in which the several
judges of the Court of Vice-Admiralty hold their sittings.’
“Sir, The judge at first refused to receive any protest, but
afterwards did so; and afterwards I was re-committed to prison, not
for contempt of court, but for the old accusation of not having
complied with certain warrants addressed to a person styled deputy
marshal, who never had an authority to act as such. That no proof
existed of my having taken the table of fees will appear from the
following affidavit of Commodore Rowley, Commissioner Fraser, and
Captain Murray Maxwell, of the navy:—
“Be it known to all persons whomsoever it may concern that on the 2nd
day of March, in the year of our Lord 1811, personally came and
appeared before me the undersigned notary-public Percy Fraser,
commissioner of His Majesty’s navy, resident in the island of Malta,
Charles Rowley, Esq., captain of His Majesty’s ship _Eagle_, and
Murray Maxwell, Esq., captain of His Majesty’s ship _Alceste_, and
solemnly made oath that on the aforesaid 2nd day of March, whilst the
Court of Vice-Admiralty of the said island of Malta was sitting, they
severally and distinctly heard John Sewell, LL.D. the judge thereof,
and whilst sitting in his judicial chair, admit in open Court, and in
the presence of divers persons there assembled, to the Right
Honourable Lord Cochrane that there existed no proof in the aforesaid
court of his said Lordship’s having taken down the paper in question,
by the judge aforesaid called the table of fees.
(Signed) Percy Fraser, C. Rowley, Murray Maxwell.’
‘On the second day of August, 1811, the aforegoing attestation was
duly sworn at Malta, where stamps are not used, before me, Chas. Edw.
Fenton, Notary-Public.’
“Notwithstanding the confession of the judge in open Court thus
attested, I remained unnoticed three days longer in the public gaol,
where I now clearly saw that it was the intention of the judge to
detain me until the packet had sailed for England, and probably until
she returned to Malta with instructions. I therefore wrote to the
Governor, who, having consulted Messieurs Moncreiff, Forrest, and
Bowdler, three gentlemen of the law, sent me their opinion, that His
Excellency should not interfere with a Court, acting, as they were
pleased to call it, under His Majesty’s authority, although in
violation of the law. I addressed the President also, who said, that
the Courts of Malta could not interpose. Indeed, had it been
otherwise, little good could have been expected from an appeal to
these Courts, which are still governed by the iniquitious and
oppressive code of Rhoan, to the disgrace of all the ministers who
have ruled since the surrender of the island to England. Sir, The
Maltese stipulated then that a constitution securing property and
rights should be granted, and trial by jury; but these have been
denied, and examinations are still taken, and sentence pronounced,
with shut doors, by their judges, whose appointments are during
pleasure. I do not impute blame to His Excellency the Governor, for
whom I have a high respect, yet I must say that the system of blending
the military and civil authority cannot fail to become oppressive.
Ministers have no better excuse for this union of power contrary to
the express stipulations of the inhabitants of the island, than a
despicable petition signed by the dependents on Government, and
shamelessly transmitted and received as the voice of the people! Being
furnished with an affidavit that the judge did not intend to proceed
in the matter on the next Court day, I resolved, as the door was
locked and guarded, to get out by the window, which I according
effected; and the following proclamation was issued for my
apprehension, in which I am designated by as many names as if I had
been a notorious thief:—
ce “‘ESCAPE OF LORD COCHRANE.
“‘Whereas, the Honourable Thomas Cochrane, esquire, otherwise the
Honourable Sir Thomas Cochrane, Knight Companion of the most
Honourable Order of the Bath, commonly called Lord Cochrane, escaped
out of the custody of James Houghton Stevens, the Deputy Marshal of
the Vice-Admiralty Court of this Island, from the prison of the
Castellanea during the course of last night. This is to give notice,
that whoever will apprehend or cause to be apprehended the said Lord
Cochrane, and deliver him into the custody of the said Deputy Marshal,
shall receive a reward of Two Thousand Scudis currency of Malta, and
that whoever will give such information as may lead to the
apprehension of any person, or persons, who was or were aiding and
assisting the said Lord Cochrane in such his escape, shall receive
upon such conviction, if only one person was so aiding and assisting,
the sum of One Thousand Scudis, or if more persons than one were so
aiding and assisting, then upon the conviction of each of such persons
the sum of Five Hundred Scudis, notwithstanding that in such latter
case the person so giving information shall himself have been aiding
and assisting to the said escape. Witness my hand, this sixth day of
March, 1811.—JAS. H. STEVENS, Deputy-Marshal. No. 188 Strada Stretta.’
“Now, Sir, although the treatment which I received is altogether
foreign to the main point, yet I am desirous to learn from you as
Speaker of this House, whether my imprisonment was or was not a breach
of the privilege of parliament?”
THE SPEAKER.—I do not know whether the House expects me to reply to
the questions which the noble lord has put to me, perfectly new as one
appears to be; but, as far as my information goes, I will give it, if
the House thinks fit that I should do so. (Hear, hear!) With respect
to the privileges of the House, I know of no means of enforcing its
privileges, but in the usual way, from time immemorial, by its own
officers; and I never knew one instance of any officer having been
sent across the seas at the instance of any member, on a complaint of
insult offered to him personally. (Hear, hear!) So much for the
question of privilege. In the next place I never knew an instance in
which any member of parliament, properly before a court of justice,
was at liberty to treat with impunity the proceedings of that court,
or to say that what was done in respect to himself was done in
contempt, or that could authorise him to say that the privileges of
parliament were infringed in his person for such conduct.
LORD COCHRANE.—Sir: It was at first my intention, to have moved an
address to the Prince Regent, to recall the judge, registrar, and
marshal, to answer for their conduct and proceedings, contrary to the
express words of acts of parliament; but on consideration, and in
compliance with the suggestion of the First Lord of the Admiralty, I
have thought it better to move, “That a committee be appointed to
examine, into the conduct of the judge, registrar, and marshal, and
their deputies, of the Court of Vice-Admiralty at Malta, for the
violation of the 37th, 38th, 39th, and 41st sections of the 45th, Geo.
3, cap. 72.”
MR. P. MOORE seconded the motion, not from any knowledge of its
merits, but thinking that if the matter of charge was not inquired
into it would reflect upon the House.
MR. STEPHEN could not avoid applauding the benevolent motive of the
honourable gentleman who had seconded the poor outcast of the noble
lord. With respect to the conduct of the learned judge alluded to, he
was satisfied it was the opinion of the House that he had done nothing
amiss—that the dignity of his office required that he should exert his
authority after the direct insult that the noble lord had offered to
the court. The charge against the noble lord was for taking down the
public document of the court, a charge which he had not denied, nay,
indeed, the noble lord had exhibited what he termed a fac-simile of
the table of fees, and so closely imitated, that the very impression
of the wafers—the document itself, and its smoke-dried appearance,
seemed to proclaim its originality. The conduct of the noble lord,
when required to answer for this contempt, was not merely that he
refused to obey the monition, but that he pulled out a pistol, and
threatened to shoot any man who attempted to execute it upon him.
Chapman, the officer, therefore (and the fact was confirmed by two
witnesses), thought it not prudent to execute a warrant at the point
of a pistol, and had not the courage to act. The noble lord had stated
that he refused to answer interrogatories, and that he made a protest
against the proceedings of the court. It was not regular for the court
to receive protest arraigning its proceedings, and upon the inquiry it
did not think there was sufficient grounds for discharging the noble
lord from his arrest. If, however, he was aggrieved, there was a
channel through which he might have had redress, without coming to the
House, by appearing before the Privy Council, and stating his charges
against Dr. Sewell, who would, if proved, be removed. But should there
not have existed, in the executive government, a disposition to
redress the noble lord’s grievances, then it would have been open for
him to appeal to the House, but to come at the end of the session was
not very regular. Dr. Sewell was a person of correct conduct, and
unlikely to act with injustice to any individual.
MR. YORKE objected to the motion on three grounds: first, because the
case was one of the _most frivolous_ ones he had ever met with;
secondly, because the noble lord, if he had just cause for complaint,
should have made it at the Admiralty, and that Board would have
investigated the complaint; and thirdly, because the complaint,
instead of being made by the noble lord, was by his own showing a
complaint against himself. He had this to state to the noble lord,
that if he had not been an officer on half-pay he would have heard
from the Board of Admiralty in a different way. With respect to the
marshal exercising the office of proctor, in conjunction, he would
recommend an inquiry to be made, as it was contrary to the express
provisions of the Act of Parliament. But with respect to the noble
lord’s case it was, he must repeat it, one of the most frivolous cases
ever brought before Parliament.[78]
-----
Footnote 78:
That is, the First Lord agreed with my statements, but objected to
inquiry because I moved for it!
-----
“Mr. Rose,” said his lordship in reply, “has expressed his persuasion
that the interests of the navy are best protected by being in the care
of the king’s proctor; that is,” continued his lordship, “under the
absolute control of one man, who, in addition to the management of his
majesty’s business in two courts, and the monopoly of libelling and
prosecuting to condemnation all the captures made by the navy,
possesses also the exclusive privilege of conducting the numerous and
intricate litigations which have arisen of late years out of the
seizure of neutrals; causes in which not only the property detained is
at stake, but all that a captor possesses is answerable for the costs
of suit and demurrage, which, if he is unable to pay, he may be thrown
into gaol, not for errors or misconduct of his own, but owing to
neglect arising from confusion in an office where there have formerly
been from 1800 to 2000 causes in progress at one and the same time; an
evil which, unfortunately for the country, is working its remedy in a
way highly prejudicial to its best interests. Let me ask, would the
right honourable gentlemen opposite exert themselves with zeal, if
every motion they made subjected them to risk of costs, damages, and
imprisonment? They would not sit on these soft cushions unless they
were amply paid, although it is easier to do so than to make captures
on the enemy’s coast. How would they like to be compelled, as the navy
is, to employ one attorney to conduct all their affairs, even if he
had not their opponent’s interests also to promote, as is the case
with the procurator-general? Will such management of their affairs
encourage the navy to impede suspicious commerce in neutral bottoms?
And if the condemnation of a boat costs as much as the condemnation of
a ship, is not the capture of the enemy’s coasting commerce virtually
discouraged?
“Nothing,” he continued, “can better demonstrate the effect which the
dread of fraud and neglect in the procurator’s office has on the
exertions of the navy, than an account before the House, by which it
appears, that the numbers of causes belonging to the whole navy
amounted only to ninety-two, including droits of the Admiralty and
Crown; while about three dozen privateers, possessing the inestimable
privilege of employing counsel of their own choice, had actually
110,—not injudicious captures, but such as had been sanctioned by the
decisions of the lower courts. The navy are told, by a public minute
in the procurator-general’s office, 6 that it is the king’s proctor’s
particular desire, in respect to his bills, first, that in all
successful cases they should be made out moderately; secondly, that in
unsuccessful cases they should contain those fees only which are
allowed on taxation.’ Permit me,” said Lord Cochrane, to ask what fees
he is entitled to that are disallowed on taxation; and permit me to
ask the treasurer, who is desirous to remove the misconception that
prevails in the navy, if he thinks that were the commanding officers
all compelled to employ one tailor, (the chancellor’s for instance,)
that it would be quite satisfactory to learn, whilst there was a
certainty of their cloth being damaged, that being cut and sewed by
old women it was made up cheaper, as might be ascertained by a minute
behind the shop-board; ‘that it was the master tailor’s particular
desire, in respect to his bills, first, that the old ladies should be
moderate in their cabbaging if the coat fitted; and secondly, if
spoilt, that they should take only what they could get,’ would not
persons thus restricted, and desirous of expedition or care, stimulate
the old ladies by a dram; and would not they quit one job and take up
another? Would the interests of all be best protected thus?”
Lord Cochrane instanced a case of capture, wherein the captor had a
balance of 11_l._ 14_s._ against him in the prize courts, after the
prizes were condemned. He stated a case wherein 63_l._ were deducted
from a bill upon taxation, and the same sum to a farthing charged for
taxing it; and he asked the attorney-general, whether he did, or did
not, receive twenty-two guineas out of the pockets of the navy for
every cause which came before the Court of Appeals, though he had
attended but once there since the court commenced sitting in November.
“Is this,” said he, “one of the law charges which the treasurer has no
occasion to disapprove of? And does he think it right that the
procurator, the boasted guardian of the interests of the navy, should
not only pay the attorney-general for staying away, but fee another
for coming to court, and performing his duty? I have passed nearly
twenty years in the navy. Having been constantly employed until
lately, I have had full opportunity to be acquainted with the feelings
of those with whom I have mixed, and I believe that, unless the laws
and regulations made to guide the Courts of Admiralty are reformed,
captures will soon cease to be made. Were that done, the enemy would
then suffer the loss of all the trade which is of such importance to
France and her dependent states. Two thirds of our present naval
establishment would be quite sufficient for the purposes of blockade,
and all others; nay, I am clearly of opinion, that if the courts were
reformed, it would be a benefit to our country if one third of our
ships were converted into fire-wood. I am sure that the First Lord of
the Admiralty would not vote against the production of papers and full
investigation, if he knew the extent of the evil. He has, however, no
means personally to become acquainted with the facts, and there are
but few who will venture to inform him.”
The motion was negatived without a division.
CHAP. XXXIII.
OPENING OF PARLIAMENT, 1812.
SIR FRANCIS BURDETT’S ADDRESS SECONDED BY ME.—EMPLOYMENT OF THE
NAVY.—NAVAL DEFENCES.—THE ADDRESS REJECTED.—CURIOUS LETTER FROM
CAPT. HALL.—PERVERSION OF NAVAL FORCE IN SICILY.—A NAUTICO-MILITARY
DIALECT.—USELESSNESS OF OUR EFFORTS UNDER A FALSE SYSTEM, WHICH
EXCLUDES UNITY OF PURPOSE.
The opening of the session of 1812 was in many ways remarkable. The
speech of the Prince Regent, read by the Lords Commissioners, made
everything _couleur de rose_, both as regarded our foreign wars and
domestic policy. Notwithstanding that we were on the brink of war with
America, both Houses were assured that the affair of the _Chesapeake_
had been “finally adjusted, though other, discussions were not yet
brought to a close.” The finances were represented as being in a
flourishing condition, and His Royal Highness had no doubt of the
liberal disposition of Parliament “to sustain the country in the great
contest in which it was engaged.”
The hollowness of these representations was met by Lord Grenville, who
contrasted it with the “critical circumstances of the times, and the
present alarming state of the country. The framers of the speech, said
his Lordship, were the very men who by their obstinate blindness had
brought the country to the brink of ruin, but who, in the midst of the
distresses they had themselves occasioned, still held forth the same
flattering and fallacious language. He would protest against a
continuance of those measures which had brought such calamities upon the
country. People might choose to close their eyes, but the force of truth
must dispel the wilful blindness.”
Lord Grey similarly denounced the policy which was “the source of
present and impending calamities. Yet these very complications were
brought forward in assertion that the system of the government had
contributed to the security, prosperity and honour of the country!” &c.
&c.
In the House of Commons an unusual circumstance occurred. After the
speech had been read by the Speaker, Lord Jocelyn was rising to move the
usual complimentary address, but Sir Francis Burdett, having risen at
the same time, first caught the eye of the Speaker, who decided that Sir
Francis was in possession of the House.
One of the honourable baronet’s cutting speeches followed, in which he
denounced the Ministers as an “oligarchy of rotten-boroughmongers”—who
alike imposed upon the people and the Prince Regent. “A system of
taxation had been created which ruined many and oppressed all. This
fiscal tyranny being carried to its height, the lower orders had been
reduced to a state of pauperism—whilst the desperate resistance which
such pauperism was calculated to produce was kept down by the terrors of
a military force. Depôts, barracks, and fortifications had been
established in all quarters, and foreign mercenaries, who had been
unable to defend their own country, had been brought over to protect the
native land of courage and patriotism, or rather to protect its rulers
against an indignant and oppressed people, and to support the scandalous
invasions of the liberty of the press, and the severe punishments with
which those who ventured to express popular opinions were visited by the
courts of justice.”
This interruption by Sir Francis took the House by surprise, but still
greater was its astonishment when the honourable baronet proposed, in
place of the ordinary address to the Prince Regent, a memorial of
remonstrance, laying before his Royal Highness all the instances of
misgovernment and oppression—of infringement of the public liberty, and
accumulation of abuses, which had been characteristic of the system
pursued by Government for many years past.
As a matter of course, the address proposed by Sir Francis was read by
the Speaker, amidst the ill-concealed dismay of those most affected by
it. I then rose to second the address, denouncing the impolicy of the
war, and more still the way in which it was conducted, so far as the
policy of ministers was concerned. The subjoined is from the usual
reports of the period.
“LORD COCHRANE rose for the purpose of seconding the address of the
honourable baronet. He agreed with the speech delivered in the name of
the Prince Regent, that a high tribute was due to the bravery of our
army in Portugal, and to the conduct of the Commander-in-Chief, but he
would deny that the war in the Peninsula would come to speedy or
successful conclusion. The forces of Great Britain there were
insufficient to cope with those Buonaparte could bring against us as
soon as he had completed the subjugation of Spain and obtained command
of its resources. Of this, we were quiet spectators. To what was our
army indebted for its success and for maintaining itself in Portugal,
but to the unproductiveness of that country. Every credit was due to
Lord Wellington for his conduct of affairs, but even his lordship
expected little from the Portuguese, who were dragged to the army more
like slaves than soldiers, to support, they did not know what. At
Peniche he had seen ten thousand of them collected, almost naked, and
in want of every necessary.
“The Portuguese were themselves despots. The dungeons of the
Inquisition were full of victims, and the British minister, who formed
part of the Regency, was lately under the necessity of retiring from
Lisbon that he might not appear to countenance arrests and
imprisonments which he could not approve. He would not scruple to
assert that the Portuguese government was obnoxious to every class of
society in that country. Nay, farther, that both in Sicily and in
Portugal the British name was detested, because of the support which
this country gave to the respective governments of each with all their
oppressive abuses.
“With regard to Sicily, he thought that the real purpose of ministers
was not so much to keep the French out of that island as to keep the
people subject to one of the most despotic governments in existence.
With regard to Portugal, which was considered of such importance, he
would ask, How long would our army defend that country? Only till the
French had made themselves masters of Spain, and then it would be
compelled to retire within its fortified lines, the whole extent of
which could not afford grass enough to feed bullocks for six weeks’
subsistence of the troops alone. He would assert, as a fact,
extraordinary as it might appear, that even at present the bullocks
and flour for the supply of Lord Wellington’s troops passed through
the French army with licenses from the interior of Spain. This was a
notorious fact, and he would leave the House to make reflections upon
it.
“The noble lord then adverted to that part of the honourable baronet’s
proposed address, which referred to the internal state of the country,
and professed his concurrence with the greater portion of the
sentiments therein contained. All must own that the freedom of the
people had been greatly encroached upon, particularly by the
oppressive mode of levying taxes, the produce of which, he regretted
to say, was grossly misapplied. No part of a man’s house was free from
the visits of the tax-gatherer, and a man could not remove articles
that had paid duty on importation, without a permit, even so much as a
dozen of wine. The noble lord trusted that a committee would be
appointed to take both the conduct of the war, and the state of the
nation into consideration.
“Lord Cochrane then adverted to that part of the speech which referred
to the naval defences of the country, and maintained that our naval
force was not rendered efficient in annoying the enemy. Commanding the
seas, as this country did, our navy ought to be employed in
threatening the coast of France in all directions, by which means
Buonaparte would be compelled to keep his armies at home, instead of
sending them to be _fed, clothed, and paid by our allies!_ for the
purpose of their own subjugation. Were the gigantic naval force of
England used as it ought to be, _the whole force of France, vast as it
was, would prove inadequate to the defence of its widely extended
shores_. Perhaps demonstrations of attack might prove sufficient. If
the enemy despised these, it would _then_ be, as at this moment _it
was_, easy to destroy everything on the French coasts, for England
could, in spite of all the efforts of the enemy, being a force to any
given point far superior to anything the enemy could assemble for our
annoyance, and thus we might effect most powerful diversions.”
The address proposed by Sir Francis and seconded by myself was, of
course, unsuccessful. The mover of the address originally intended was
Lord Jocelyn, who, when I had concluded, made not a word of allusion to
any part of the speeches of Sir Francis or myself, beyond stating that
“_he wholly disapproved of all we had said_.” Such was legislation in
those days, that the arguments of those who did not belong to the ruling
faction were not listened to, much less answered. Lord Jocelyn’s
address, which was only an echo of the Lords Commissioners’ speech, had,
however, to be proposed as _an amendment_ to that of Sir Francis, and
was carried without a division.
The feeling towards myself for having—as was said—“thought fit to
countenance Sir Francis”—needs not be animadverted on. Yet I had given
some good advice as to the way in which our naval power was frittered
away to no purpose. English historians, by their silence on this point,
appear to have little conception as to the extent of the evil.
As in seconding the address of Sir Francis Burdett, I had mentioned
Sicily, I will give a remarkable example of the way in which war was
carried on in that quarter _against the French_! The reader may deduce
from that why I was not permitted to put my plans of harassing the
French coast into execution.
The following letter is from Captain Robert Hall, commanding what was
singularly enough called the “_army flotilla_” at Messina. The document
is a curious one, and may do something towards enlightening future
English historians:—
“Messina, Jan. 14, 1812.
“MY DEAR LORD,—It is so long since I heard of you, and being
disappointed at not seeing you in this country, as the papers gave us
reason to believe, that I must take the liberty of asking you how you
are. We were led to expect you in the Mediterranean with a flying
squadron, but I am sorry to see there is _now_ no probability of it.
“I am serving here in an _amphibious_ kind of way—having the rank of
brigadier to command an ‘_army flotilla!_’ but why it should be an
‘army’ one I cannot find out, though I have well considered the matter
_for the last eighteen months_.
“There is _an immense naval establishment here of a hundred and forty
vessels of different descriptions quite independent of the
Admiral!_[79] These are maintained by the British Government, at an
expense of at least 140,000_l._ per annum. I have, in fact, lessened
its expense by 60,000_l._ a year, merely by reducing the pay of the
seamen to the standard of our own, though they have been paid at
double the rate of English sailors, whilst the _padrones_ of gunboats,
taken from the streets, _are paid more than our lieutenants_.
-----
Footnote 79:
I had only asked for three or four handy frigates to carry out my
plans, and indeed, could not have employed more with effect, as
being under my entire supervision.
-----
“It is a singular thing that this establishment cannot be thrown into
its proper channel—the navy. The island of Zante has another flotilla
of 60,000 dollars a month to protect it, and the commandant of the
barren rock of Lissa—not content with his gunboats—sent in, the other
day, a serious memorial, stating the necessity of defending his
island, by placing gunboats _all round it_, wherever there were no
guns on shore! If this flotilla mania should reach our West India
Islands, what will be the consequence? At least, I should think as
army matters are conducted, an expense equal to one half that of the
whole navy! It is the duty of officers to serve where they are
ordered, but this mixture of services is, I believe, altogether new,
and may, if followed up, be fatal to the independent spirit of the
navy. If that spirit perishes all ardour is gone, and we shall be like
some foreign countries where the services are mixed—neither the one
thing nor the other.
“My Lord, I believe you know me. You may therefore guess my feelings,
after _eighteen years’ service_, to be ordered to serve under a person
_who is a perfect stranger to the service to which I belong_. What do
you think of an order to make a passage to Zante in the dead of winter
by _sailing close to the land in the Gulf of Tarento_? It is too
ridiculous—and really deserves the consideration of the Admiralty.
“If we can combine our naval and military tactics, it will be a
greater effort of human ingenuity than has hitherto been devised. We
may then dispense with the rapidity of our manœuvres and ‘_march in
ordinary time_.’ Figure to yourself _eighteen subalterns of different
regiments commanding divisions of the flotilla_! When I took it out to
sea, they were all sea-sick, and——about the decks! Each of these
subalterns received _seventeen and sixpence a day for this
extraordinary and fatiguing service_;—nearly three times as much as a
lieutenant in the navy!
“Endeavour, my Lord, to reconcile the meaning of such an
establishment, glancing your eye at the same moment on the manner of
conducting the flotilla establishment at Cadiz. We have at this moment
_more troops on the Faroe line, than the French have in both
Calabrias_—independent of those which, under our nautico-military
chief, sacrificed our friends in Catalonia.
Yet there is a sad outcry here. We tell the Sicilians that they mean
to murder us all, and there is no doubt their will is good enough.[80]
Numerous are the remonstrances against sending a single soldier out of
the island. The firm and manly mind of Lord William Bentinck was proof
to this outcry, and it is to be regretted that circumstances did not
admit of this zealous and active officer accompanying the expedition
himself. Nothing can equal my respect for Lord William Bentinck as a
soldier and a gentleman, but I must say with old Neptune, when jealous
of the interference of some _“long shore” Deity_,
‘Non illi imperium pelagi sævumque tridentem
Sed mihi—sorte datum est.’
What end, what purpose, can it answer, to put a naval establishment
under the command of a person who acknowledges that he does not know
how to use it? As it was formed under the auspices of my Lord
Mulgrave, this arrangement may probably have been made with a view of
simplifying naval matters. For example, my Lord, the long sentence of
“_back the main topsail_,” might be more readily expressed by the
short word “_halt_!” “Filling and making sail,” according to the
strength of wind, might be called “_marching in quick or ordinary
time_!” Instead of boatswain’s mates to “_march off_” the different
“_detachments_” of the watch, it would, according to our present
system, be more regular to “_march them off with corporals_!” though
in squally weather this might be inconvenient. In short, there might
be many improvements. The _army officer_ appointed to command one of
our vessels mislaid what he called the “_route given him by the
Quarter-Master-General_!” “_lost his way_,” as he expressed it, and
got ashore in the Gulf of Squillace. On his exchange he reported to me
that “the night was _so dark, he could not see the rock on which the
vessel ran_!” and that when fast, “_a board broke in her bottom_, so
that the water ran in so fast, he could not _scoop it out_ again! Thus
it is, that Mr. Bull is humbugged. For my part, I have remonstrated
repeatedly on the folly of this establishment, and it only remains
with me to serve where I am ordered.
“Of the politics of this country the public journals will have
informed your Lordship. We are certainly doing nothing in the way of
amelioration, and all parties seem discontented. The newfangled
constitution strikes too much home to be popular amongst those who
profited by the old system. Our views are certainly for the prosperity
of Sicily, yet no Sicilian thinks so. They dislike us, and I believe
they know not why. Some of the knowing ones appear apprehensive of our
assuming the government altogether; and urge their fears of our
treating them as we do the Irish Catholics! The French partisans, of
course, make the most of this state of things.
“It is to be hoped that Buonaparte’s failure in Russia will blast his
other prospects, or Sicily will be his in a short time, if we do not
oblige the Government to adopt some energetic measures. If they would
only put the troops we have here on shore in Calabria, there would be
no necessity for gunboats. They would excite an immediate
insurrection, and would throw plenty of grain, of which we are in
want, into Sicily. But if the Sicilian troops should intend running
away on the approach of a French regiment—as they did formerly—we had
better remain and _colonise_ at Messina.
“Your Lordship’s faithful servant,
“ROBERT HALL.
“The Lord Cochrane.”
-----
Footnote 80:
See my speech on the address of Sir Francis Burdett.
-----
The above will show the useless manner in which our best naval force and
officers were employed—no less than their testimony to their own
uselessness. Yet with upwards of a thousand ships in commission, we had
no naval enemy to oppose, and persisted in employing our seamen anywhere
but on the enemy’s coast! For simply urging the common sense employment
of our numerous navy, and a proper investigation into the minor details
which crippled its action, I was regarded as a common disturber of the
ministerial peace.
Yet it had not been my intention to throw blame on the Admiralty, but
simply on _the system_ under which they continued to act, but which, for
all practical purposes, had become obsolete. The Admiralty, whatever
might be its wish, was unable to do its work for want of some one of
high professional skill and resolute character, whose business it should
be authoritatively to investigate the efficiency of naval
establishments, and personally to superintend investigation alike into
inefficiency and suggested improvements. Had this been done, many evils,
hidden from the knowledge of successive Admiralties, would be perceived
and remedied.
The Admiralty, even as at present constituted, is not sufficiently
numerous to execute so many and such varied duties, even though the
ability of the members comprised all professional knowledge, and that
their industry was indefatigable. The overwhelming pressure of detail
renders inquiry into, and deliberation on, important matters
impracticable, whilst on minor matters it is prohibitory, and thus
abuses remain unremedied, because unperceived.
The Board, at all times within my recollection, has been one of
reference to persons in inferior departments. These persons pronounce
_an unquestioned verdict_ on all matters referred to them; their reports
remaining concealed under a rule adopted to avoid trouble or
correspondence, the framers of the rule not anticipating that such
concealment may be fraught with the most injurious consequences to the
navy, whilst it may shield from exposure the most self-interested and
flagrant impositions.
This, however, is not the place to enter on a subject, the ramifications
of which have penetrated into every department, till beyond the control
of the most patriotic and unflinching; who, with all their pains, can
only arrive at the one fact, that the whole system requires renovation,
which, as it is nobody’s business, is never undertaken.
So long, however, as such a system exists, so long shall we be in danger
of being taken unawares by powers fully alive to the importance of unity
of purpose and action. To such a system we have nothing to oppose in
case of emergency but our own embarrassment.
CHAP. XXXIV.
MY SECRET PLANS.
MY PLANS SUBMITTED TO THE PRINCE OF WALES.—NEGOTIATIONS THEREON.—A
MODIFIED PLAN SUBMITTED, WHICH CAME TO NOTHING.—INCONSIDERATE
PROPOSITION.—RECENT REPORT ON MY PLANS.—OPINIONS OF THE
COMMISSIONERS.—PLANS PROBABLY KNOWN TO THE FRENCH.—FAITH KEPT WITH
MY COUNTRY IN SPITE OF DIFFICULTIES.—INJURIOUS RESULTS TO MYSELF
BOTH ABROAD AND AT HOME.—OPPOSITION TO MY PLANS INEXPLICABLE.—THEIR
SOCIAL EFFECT.—THE SUBJECT OF FORTIFICATIONS: THESE GREATLY
OVERRATED.—REASONS WHY.—THE NAVY THE ONLY RELIANCE.
Soon after my return from the Mediterranean, I had the honour of laying
before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, a new and most formidable
method of attacking and destroying an enemy’s fleet, and of performing
other warlike operations on a large scale. His Royal Highness was
pleased to refer the plans laid before him to a Secret Committee,
consisting of the late Duke of York, as president, Lord Keith, Lord
Exmouth, and the two Congreves, one of whom, Sir William, was the
celebrated inventor of the rocket which bears his name.
These officers—as stated to me in a private letter from Lord Keith, who
took a warm interest in the matter—gave it as their opinion that under
the circumstances detailed in my explanatory paper, such a mode of
attack would be irresistible, and the effect of the power and means
proposed, infallible; adding, however, that if the plan was divulged, it
might become perilous to our Colonial possessions; an observation marked
by no little foresight, _for had the same plan been known to the rebels
in the late Indian mutiny, not a European in India would have escaped_.
The Prince Regent and the Duke of York fully concurred with the
Committee in the destructive character of the plans submitted, for their
consideration as well as in the danger of divulging them. His Royal
Highness sending for me to Carlton House, commanded secresy on my part.
I told His Royal Highness that my plans were only known to Sir Alexander
Cochrane, and to my uncle, Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, who had, in fact
written out for me the papers which had been laid before His Royal
Highness, but that I would obey his injunctions, and had no fear of my
relatives disclosing so important a secret. The investigation being
secret, of course no official report was made on the subject.
Not long after this interview Lord Melville signified to me his
intention to put in execution _a portion_ of my plans, and requested my
attendance at the Admiralty for the purpose of conferring on the
subject. To this partial execution of the project I of course demurred,
as unfair to the invention and necessarily incomplete in operation,
whilst development of a portion might give the enemy such an insight of
the whole as would enable him to turn it against ourselves on a large
scale; his lordship, nevertheless, did not seem inclined to give way,
and I quitted the Admiralty without having been enabled to arrive at any
satisfactory conclusion.
Lord Melville having mentioned to Lord Keith the result of our
interview, Lord Keith urged me to acquiesce in the First Lord’s views,
adding, that he was too well acquainted with the soundness of my plans
to doubt the practicability of destroying with a portion only the
enemy’s ships in Genoa harbour and the outer roads of Toulon. His
lordship further urged that a success once achieved, the popular voice
would place it in my power to enforce the execution of the more
destructive portion of the invention within the enemy’s inner harbours.
In deference to Lord Keith’s opinion I at once prepared a plan of attack
on the outer roads of Toulon, in accordance with the views of Lord
Melville. That communication, omitting the essential parts of the plan,
I now subjoin.
“12 Portman Square, May 12th, 1812.
“MY LORD,—In consequence of the conversation I had the honour of
holding with your Lordship yesterday, and of your desire that I should
state what force would be required for carrying into execution the
plan submitted for the destruction of the Toulon fleet, I beg to
submit the following arrangements as applicable _to this particular
object_.[81]
-----
Footnote 81:
Viz. as not having reference to the execution of the whole.
-----
“One seventy-four.
“Two 38-gun frigates.
“Two 18-gun brigs.
“Two cutters or schooners.
“The above force is requisite as an escort, and to protect the boats.
“In order to ensure success, although one-half will probably be
sufficient, the subjoined will be necessary.
[Here follow particulars.]
“As your Lordship permitted me to recommend such officers as I thought
best calculated for this service, I beg leave to name the following:—
“Captain Robert Baine.
“Sir Thomas Staines, now of the _Hamadryad_.
“Captain Johnstone, now commanding the _Avenger_, if he has not
sailed; and if he has—
“Captain Hall, now commanding the gunboats at Messina, and lastly
“The Honourable Lieutenant Napier, now in the Mediterranean.
“My late first Lieutenant, Travers, now in the _Impérieuse_, to be
first of whatever ship your Lordship may be pleased to assign to me,
which, in order further to conceal the enterprise, may, if your
Lordship should think proper, be placed under the command of my
brother Captain Archibald Cochrane, late of the _Fox_ frigate. I can
furnish him confidentially with all the necessary instructions, so
that I might at once proceed to Lisbon, apparently in a private
capacity, so as to disarm suspicion.
“I have taken the liberty of submitting the names of the above
officers to your Lordship, because I am well acquainted with their
characters and zeal for the service, and am sure that whatever is
undertaken by them will first be well weighed, and then executed with
determination.
“The above operation is calculated _without the assistance of troops_,
but if your Lordship wish to _secure_ the ships, instead of
_destroying_ them, 4000 troops should be embarked at Messina[82] as
though under the destination of Catalonia, and having been shifted
into the ships of war now blockading Toulon, should be held in
readiness to be disembarked in the peninsula of Cape Cepet, the
heights of which may be held, although not yet fortified, against any
force that may be brought against them. When I was last there, with
Lord Collingwood’s fleet, I stood particularly close in, within point
blank range of shot, and there were not sufficient men in any of the
batteries to train more than one gun at a time—indeed, they appeared
merely to be stationed there to take charge of the stores. There was
neither smoke in the chimneys of the barrack-rooms, nor was there a
door or window open, though the weather was extremely hot.
“If the operations are to be extended along the coasts, your Lordship
will see the propriety of embarking 300 marines on board the
seventy-four, and 100 in each of the frigates.
“The expense of the expedition will be _within three months’ cost of
that of the blockading force_, and half the stores enumerated may
accomplish the service.
“I have, &c. &c.
“COCHRANE.
“The Right Honourable Lord Melville, &c. &c.”
-----
Footnote 82:
How well these could have been spared is evident from Capt. Hall’s
letter, see page 221.
-----
Inconsiderable as was the expense, in comparison with other armaments
producing little or no result, Lord Melville hesitated to incur it; or
rather, as I have reason to believe, his lordship was overruled by the
ill-feeling against me at the Admiralty, as the concurrence of the Board
would have placed me in command of a squadron, with my flag flying in a
line-of-battle ship. This was evidently considered too high a position
for one who had been for three years kept unemployed from political and
personal dislike, was evidently not to be thought of, and the project
after long fruitless expectation was dropped.
I then proposed to conduct a similar expedition against Flushing, but
this also was declined. As, however, public dissatisfaction began to
manifest itself, Lord Melville informed me that I might make an attempt
on Toulon _on a small scale_! In other words, that I might, “on a small
scale,” show the enemy how to put my plans in operation against
ourselves _on a large scale_! The permission was so preposterous,
besides being not altogether free from the suspicion that failure would
be more acceptable than success, I declined it, notwithstanding the
renewed recommendation of Lord Keith to close with Lord Melville’s
offer. As at this time only a few sail of the line remained at Toulon, I
hesitated to comply, considering that the result of destroying these
would have been badly compensated by the disclosure of the means whereby
their destruction had been effected.
Soon after the accession of William IV. I submitted my plans to His
Majesty’s consideration, and being himself a practical seaman, His
Majesty at once admitted their importance and honoured me with personal
interviews on the subject, at which I explained my methods of putting
them in execution under various circumstances. His Majesty was further
pleased to observe that I ought to be rewarded as well for the plans as
for the secrecy which had been observed, yet not the slightest reward
did I ever reap for the invention or for having kept my secret out of
pure love to my country, a motive which will be better appreciated when
subsequent temptations to divulge it come to be shown.
An incontrovertible proof of the efficiency of the plans submitted by me
to various ministries is on record in the shape of a report _from a
comparatively recent commission_, one of the commissioners—who ranks
amongst the highest in his profession—_being still living_. As from the
non-employment of those plans on any occasion, an opinion may have gone
abroad that their destructive character is illusory, I feel myself
justified in dispelling the illusion by subjoining the report.
Towards the close of 1846, when the late Lord Auckland was at the
Admiralty, suspicion being excited as to the motives and intentions of
the then French government, another commission was appointed, to decide
upon a mode of trying my inventions in a way to satisfy the public as to
their efficacy, and at the same time to preserve secresy. This being
found impracticable, the trial was never made, but the commission
proceeded to report on the plans. The members were Sir Thomas Hastings,
Sir J.F. Burgoyne, and Lieut.-Col. Colquhoun.
The subjoined is their report, addressed to the then Master of the
Ordnance and forwarded to me by Lord Auckland.
“Ordnance Office, Jan. 16, 1847.
“MY LORD,—In conformity with your Lordship’s instructions, we, the
undersigned, have met to consider and report on the secret war plans
of Vice-Admiral the Earl of Dundonald, transmitted to us by the First
Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of Auckland.
“These plans may be classed under three heads:—
“1st. One, on which an opinion may be formed without experiment, for
concealing or making offensive warlike operations; and we consider
that, under many particular circumstances this method of his Lordship
may be made available as well by land as by sea, and we therefore
suggest that a record of this part of Lord Dundonald’s plans should be
deposited with the Admiralty, to be made use of when in the judgment
of their Lordships the opportunity of employing it may occur.
“2nd. One on which experiments would be required before a satisfactory
conclusion could be arrived at.
“3rd. Nos. 1 and 2 continued for the purpose of hostile operations.
“After mature consideration, we have resolved that it is not desirable
that any experiments should be made. We assume it to be possible that
the plan _contains power for producing the sweeping destruction the
inventor ascribes to it_; but it is clear this power could not be
retained exclusively by this country, because its first employment
would develope its principle and application. The last observation
applies equally to plan No. 1.
“We considered in the next place, how far the adoption of the proposed
secret plans would accord with the feelings and principles of
civilised warfare. We are of unanimous opinion that plans Nos. 2 and
3, would not do so.
“We therefore recommend that, as hitherto, plans Nos. 2 and 3 _should
remain concealed_. We feel that _great credit is due to Lord Dundonald
for the right feelings which prompted him not to disclose his secret
plans when serving in war as naval Commander-in-Chief of the forces of
other nations, under very trying circumstances, in the conviction that
those plans might eventually be of the highest importance to his own
country_.
“We have only to add that we have sealed up, under one cover all the
papers which have been submitted to our consideration by the First
Lord of the Admiralty and the Earl of Dundonald, and our
correspondence with the latter in another—both of which we have marked
‘secret.’
“With regard to the disposal and future custody of these papers, we
await instructions from your Lordship, or the Earl of Auckland, to
whom we propose this letter should—after your Lordship has perused
it—be transmitted.
“We have the honour to be,
“Your Lordship’s obedient servants,
“THOMAS HASTINGS, Capt. R.N., and
Principal Storekeeper.
“J.F. BURGOYNE.
“J.S. COLQUHOUN, Lieut.-Col. R.A.
“To the Marquis of Anglesey, K.G. and K.C.B.”
Let the public now judge of the nature and value of those plans—of the
merit of never having disclosed them, though exposed to severely trying
circumstances, and also whether they are impracticable.
I have been told, on indubitable authority that during the late war with
Russia an interchange of warlike plans took place between the English
and French Governments. It was further pointed out to me but the other
day, that a French journal of high authority had remarked to this
effect, “_should a war arise between England and France, the latter
power would bring warlike engines into play to which rifled cannon were
a trifle_.” From this I make little doubt but that my plans _are_ known
to the French Government, and if so, whenever they are applied, the
people of this country will find them no “trifle”—for as the report just
adduced infers, no power on earth can stand against them. It is one of
my most bitter reflections that such plans have been utterly thrown away
as regards our own nation, and that from the imprudence of Governments
they may one day be turned against my own country.
In the late war with Russia, I twice offered these plans to the
Government. The first time they were declared “_inexpedient!_” The
second time I offered to _conduct them myself_, either against Cronstadt
or Sebastopol—old as I was—the forts of Cronstadt being especially open
to their application. As regarded Sebastopol, the question was put to me
whether I would instruct two engineer officers in applying them? My
answer was, “No, I have offered to risk my own life and reputation on
their efficacy, but will not impart my mode of applying them to others,
who may not, either from preconceived notions or professional jealousy
of naval inventions, comprehend them.”
Had I not adduced the report of the last committees appointed to examine
the plans, this might be thought the bombast of an old admiral whose
physical vigour had outlived his judgment. I flatter myself, however,
that more years of sharp experience than usually falls to the lot, even
of admirals, has fixed my judgment of warlike operations too firmly to
be shaken even by age. I repeat that should those plans ever be turned
against ourselves, the English public will be in a condition to
pronounce an opinion on that point.
The report of the committee gives me great credit for _not having made
use of those plans elsewhere_. As before stated, I promised the Prince
Regent never to divulge them except for the honour and advantage of my
own country, and although driven from the profession of my choice I did
not forget my promise.
It may be permitted me to add that when, in 1820, I came with four ships
before the Castles of Callao, it was perfectly well known to me that
money and property considerably exceeding in value a million sterling,
besides all the plate in Lima, had been sent to these castles for
security. I could, with the aid of a small portion of my plans only, and
in spite of opposition, have possessed myself of this treasure in an
hour, and my share could not have been less than half a million
sterling.
Let posterity judge of my conduct, as compared with the blind enmity of
those who persecuted me wrongfully. Yet there was every inducement to
employ my own plans for my own benefit. When I entered the service of
the South American States, my private income, never large, and entirely
of my own creation, had been wholly wasted by the expenses consequent on
forced litigation and in defending myself from an iniquitous
prosecution. For more than four years I had been deprived of my
professional income, and at forty years of age found myself thrown on
the world to seek the means of making provision for myself and an
increasing family.
Had I been indifferent to the welfare of my own country, my position, as
Commander-in-Chief of the squadrons of Chili and Peru, and afterwards of
the Brazilian squadron, would have enabled me to amass an immense
fortune, by putting an early end to the wars of those countries through
the adoption of secret plans, as the Governments of those states
expected. For not having done so, they manifested their displeasure and
declined to pay me the stipulated rewards for what I effected towards
their liberation.
It was forcibly urged upon me by the South American governments that the
unjust deprivation of rank and honour in my own country released me from
any obligation to obey the injunction of secresy which had been imposed
upon me, and that I ought to profit from my own discovery, by applying
it to the ample opportunities before me. I can safely say, that love of
country, alone restrained me from listening to their temptations, and
that I did not yield to the great necessities of my position is now one
of the proudest consolations of my life.
Yet I repeat—and the assertion will one day be confirmed—that these
plans afford the infallible means of securing at one blow our maritime
superiority and of thereafter maintaining it in perpetuity—of at once
commencing and terminating war by one conclusive victory. A hundred
millions employed in war could not complete the ruin of our maritime
opponents so effectually as could be done by the simple methods
indicated in my plans; and that too in spite of the apparently
formidable fortifications and other defences of ports and roadsteads.
The expenditure of millions in the construction of such works on the
coasts of any country would be in vain, when any hostile power in
possession of the knowledge of such means of attack, could at a trifling
cost and with the utmost facility accomplish in a few hours any
assignable amount of destruction without impediment from such costly but
really impotent safeguards. Still more easily might this country protect
itself by destroying at one blow the marine of an enemy, and that by a
process which our most eminent engineer officers—as has been seen—have
pronounced infallible.
It is somewhat singular—that, notwithstanding my admitted experience, as
demonstrated by the acts and success of my early life, and
notwithstanding the destructive character of my plans as certified by
committees of the most eminent men to be found in both services, _I have
never, throughout my whole life, been officially consulted on the means
of defence of this country!_
This cannot have been accidental. It is not probable that any prime
minister should consider himself so well up in naval matters as to
despise my experience. Nor is it probable that he should prefer
consulting officers who never saw a shot fired in actual warfare,—as was
frequently the case previous to the Russian war,—to the opinions of one
whom committees of the highest professional character had declared to be
the inventor of plans which would totally change the aspect of war, and
supersede every known system of warlike operations.
When the dominion of the sea, the existence of our mercantile marine,
and the peace of Europe were—_as they are at this moment_—in question,
it is nevertheless difficult to conceive this extraordinary
inconsistency. Still there is the fact. None to whom my plans have been
submitted, have ever pretended to throw doubt on their efficacy. Some,
it is true, have said, “For heaven’s sake, don’t encourage such
plans,—what is to become of us?” What? Universal peace: for after their
disclosure not a man would be found to engage in war except for defence
of his country, when, as was said of the cholera by an eminent French
surgeon, “_Il cadavreisera le monde_.”
What can have been the cause of such neglect and contumely as I have
suffered, under the full knowledge that such a secret was in my power?
There can only have been two causes,—unmerited personal aversion without
reason, or want of political courage to put my plans in execution.
Whether of the two causes be accepted, they form the highest compliment
which was ever paid to man, viz. _that no amount of neglect or
persecution could induce me to betray my country_. The report of the
committee paid me the compliment which is at least my right, and how
great a compliment it is, futurity may one day unexpectedly have to
decide.
No doubt to use such powers for ambitious purposes would be wicked; but
what guarantee have we that if in the possession of ambitious nations,
they may not be turned against us. To use them in the defence of order
and civilisation would be praiseworthy, but to let the world know that
we are at all times prepared to use them against aggression, would be a
protection of the best interests of mankind no less than of our own.
Such knowledge can only be dangerous to those who have cause to fear it,
but to those possessing it it is power, strength, and safety.
The public is now in possession of all material circumstances connected
with the subject, except the plans themselves, which, for obvious
reasons, are, it is to be hoped, _still secret_.
I am not certain whether—were the plans disclosed—the advantage would
not be in favour of publicity. Such disclosure would demonstrate that
there could be no security in coast defences and other stationary
asylums, on the construction of which it is now proposed to expend so
many millions of the public money. It would show the inexpediency of an
expenditure of ten—which may mean twenty—millions for the construction
of forts and harbours, instead of applying half the amount to remodel
and renovate the navy. The disclosure might have the effect of
preventing useless expenditure, and of averting the danger of future
parsimonious naval administration, by leading to the adoption of
essential measures of nautical improvement, by which alone the safety of
the country can be preserved.
The disclosure of these plans would also have the effect of binding over
nations to keep the peace. Still less would the English public
countenance the extravagant and inefficient projects devised for the
protection of their insular position, open at all points, and only to be
protected by a superior naval force, which shah avert danger on the
first menace.
As the subject of fortifications is now uppermost in every man’s mind, I
will venture a few remarks on my experience of this mode of defence.
A story is told of the Duke of Wellington which embraces the whole
subject. On his appointment as Warden of the Cinque Ports, the
inhabitants of Dover, well known for their keen scent of a profitable
job, applied to the Duke for an increase of their fortifications,
already a stupendous monument to the folly of those who have added to
them.
The Duke’s reply was the perfection of military wisdom. “_The
fortifications of Dover would be, no doubt, very useful if an enemy came
in that way, but I don’t think he would! They might also be very useful
if an enemy went out that way, but I don’t think he would!_” In that
sentence is comprised the whole subject of fortifications, unless
erected specifically for the defence of a dockyard or an arsenal, as at
Portsmouth, Plymouth, &c. It is true that in his last years the Duke
retracted his opinion in some degree, but I could never learn the
reasons he assigned for so doing.
Why should an enemy go to a coast fortification when he can land miles
away from it? I will take the instance of the Dover fortifications,
which are amongst the most stupendous in this country. What is there to
prevent an enemy from landing at Walmer, where there is nothing to
oppose him but the six popguns in the flower garden of the Castle? He
may effect a debarkation there at all times of the tide, in any wind and
almost in any weather. The distance from the fortifications of Dover is
little short of seven miles. By making a strong feint by sea on Dover,
the garrison could not quit their works to prevent the disembarkation at
Walmer, for if they did the feint would be turned into a real attack.
Neither, when the disembarkation had been effected, would they be likely
to quit their works for the purpose of harassing the invaders, for so
surely as they marched out for this purpose a sufficient portion of the
enemy would march in. The whole would simply amount to this, that the
garrison, say 10,000 or 20,000, would be cut off from communication with
the army elsewhere, and would thus be completely neutralised. Lastly,
when disembarked at Walmer, the fortifications of Dover could not in the
slightest degree interrupt the enemy’s communications by sea. Nothing
but an efficient navy could do that; and with an efficient navy the
disembarkation at Walmer would never be attempted. All this is plain
enough; for, after all, military tactics are founded on common sense,
and the amount of common sense decides their superiority.
Where fortifications are the key to a province, frequently advisable to
capture them, and this may be an easier matter than military men in
general are willing to admit. Of course, if they sit down before
fortifications _secundum artem_, the matter is one merely of time and
calculation, as we have learned at Sebastopol.
When on the coast of Chili I captured a province with 120 men only, and
that by storming its fortifications. These were thirteen in number, and
were garrisoned by 2000 men. I was accused of rashness for the attempt;
yet no more doubted the fact of my success than I doubted the reality of
the attack. It was simply a matter of well matured deliberation and
calculation, in which, of course, the panic of the enemy formed an
important item. The result was that I did not lose a man, whilst the
enemy’s killed and wounded amounted to more in number _than my whole
force_! With this in addition to my former experience it perhaps will
not be wondered at that my respect for fortifications is by no means
great, though my respect for an efficient navy _is_ excessive.
Full discussion of this matter would, however, require more space than
can here be devoted to it, and should my life be spared I will on a
future occasion enter more extensively into this and other cognate
subjects. Were I now to do so, I am afraid public faith in some of its
newly cherished fortifications would be materially shaken, and will
therefore refrain from so doing, in the hope that improvements in our
navy, the only true basis of national safety, will render such remarks
unnecessary.
In short, immovable stations of defence as a protection against
invasion, are not only costly and of doubtful utility, but a _reliance
on them_ is, in my mind, an indication of a declining state. It is
little short of national imbecility to suppose that because we erect
imposing fortifications an enemy _will come to them!_ when he can
operate elsewhere without the slightest regard to them; and the more so,
as the common experience of warfare will tell him that numerous
fortifications are in the highest degree national weakness, by splitting
up into detail the army which ought to be in the field against him, but
who are compelled to remain and take care of their fortifications. Yet
_half the sum_ required for fortifications as defences in case of war,
would suffice to place the navy in a condition of affording far more
effectual protection. There is no security equal to that which may be
obtained _by putting it out of the power of an enemy to execute hostile
intentions_. This can never be effected by forts, but may be
accomplished by the adoption of proper measures, which I shall at
present refrain from commenting on.
CHAP. XXXV.
NAVAL AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS IN PARLIAMENT.
SINECURES.—ADMIRALTY EXPENSES ILL DIRECTED.—WHAT MIGHT BE DONE WITH
SMALL MEANS.—FLOGGING IN THE ARMY AND NAVY ATTRIBUTABLE TO A BAD
SYSTEM: NEVERTHELESS, INDISPENSABLE.—NATIONAL MEANS WRONGLY
APPLIED.—INJURIOUS CONCESSIONS TO THE FRENCH.—DENIED BY THE
GOVERNMENT.—EXPLANATIONS OF MY PARLIAMENTARY CONDUCT ON THE
DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT.—LETTER TO MY CONSTITUENTS.—APPOINTMENT OF
OFFICERS BY MERIT INSTEAD OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE THE TRUE STRENGTH
OF THE NAVY.—MY RE-ELECTION FOR WESTMINSTER.—ADDRESS TO THE
ELECTORS.—MINISTERIAL VIEWS.—TREATMENT OF AN OFFICER.—MY
INTERFERENCE.
At the commencement of the session of 1812, it became known that His
Royal Highness the late Duke of Cambridge had voluntarily given up a
military emolument of nearly 5000_l._ a-year. The patriotism which moved
His Royal Highness to relinquish a lucrative command which had dwindled
into a sinecure, was too conspicuous to be lost sight of, not only on
account of his disinterestedness, but because there was hope this
practical specimen of reform, proceeding from so high a quarter, might
be brought to bear on others in such a way as to induce them to emulate
the example.
On the 23rd of January, I therefore moved for a copy of His Royal
Highness’s letter of resignation, for the purpose of grounding thereon a
resolution expressive of the opinion of the House on the subject, at the
same time intimating to sinecure-holders in general the desirableness of
imitating the magnanimity of the royal duke. The effort was, however, in
vain.
On the 23rd of February, a question was raised by Mr. Bankes respecting
the payment of 2790_l._ a-year to the Secretary of the Prince of Wales,
as paymaster of widows’ pensions. A former report on a committee of the
House had pronounced this office a perfect sinecure, of no public
utility whatever, and that the office of deputy-paymaster was little
better, the whole business being transacted by a clerk in the War Office
at a salary of 100_l._ a-year. The reply of Mr. Perceval (then Prime
Minister) to this statement was “that there was more danger to the
country _from declamations against sinecures than from the sinecures
themselves_!”
On this occasion I supported the _retention_ of the sinecure, on the
ground that the abolition of so insignificant a sum might _deceive the
public into a belief that their interests were watched in that House_.
The House had suffered the reports of various committees on the subject
to lie dormant for thirty years, and now wished to abolish _three only_
out of the long list of sinecures, which their committees had declared
to be useless and burdensome to the country. It was the bounden duty of
the House to have pronounced _on the whole class_, and not partially.
They ought to have enumerated the sinecures to be abolished, and thus
put it out of the power of ministers to exercise any discretion on the
subject; instead of singling out a comparatively insignificant place
from a long list of enormous sinecures, upon which the House had not so
much as expressed an opinion, notwithstanding the numerous
representations of its committees.
On the motion of the First Lord (the Right Hon. C. Yorke) that a sum of
upwards a million should be granted for the contingent expences of the
Admiralty, I spoke as follows:—
“LORD COCHRANE hoped, that, as a deviation from mere detail was
allowed when the army estimates were in a committee, it would not be
entirely out of course to offer a few general remarks while the supply
of the navy was before the House; not with a view to oppose the supply
for the ordinary establishment of the navy, but as to the proper
application of the enormous sums granted for that service generally.
“To this nothing could, in his opinion, contribute more than that the
Board of Admiralty should not be considered as a _mere appendage to
the minister of the day, and be displaced by every agitation of the
political system_—whereby misapplication of means was rendered
perpetual; for, just as the members acquired some knowledge of their
complicated duties, and of the powers they ought to direct against the
enemy, they were then displaced, to make room for others of _no
experience_.
“The observations which he had to address to the chairman related
chiefly to the means of annoying the enemy, which means the Government
possessed in a right disposal of the naval force of the country. This
was at present totally useless, except for the purpose of passive
blockades. Had 5000 men, with attendant naval transports, been kept in
readiness in such a central situation as Minorca, for instance, it
would have been impossible for the French to have made any progress on
the eastern side of the Peninsula; for no sooner should the enemy have
laid siege to Tarragona, Valencia, Alicant, or any other place on the
Mediterranean coast of Spain, than their affairs might have been
reversed at the other extremity. Rosas, for instance, was within
_twelve hours’ sail_ of Minorca, and about eighteen from Alicant,
whereas on the other hand it was _twenty-five days’ march_ at least
from Alicant to Rosas.
“Comparing the respective populations of Britain and France, it was
impossible to think of carrying on an equal warfare in the Peninsula.
A greater number of men than all the British who were at present
there, must perish before it could be possible to drive out the
French. The desultory nature of naval warfare was, in his opinion, the
best calculated for that purpose, and for this we had the highest
authorities in ancient and modern times. If the French, with a
contemptible flotilla, could keep this country in alarm, what was our
gigantic navy not capable of doing? The whole of France lay at the
mercy of the British ministry. Had the enemy a naval superiority, and
only 10,000 disposable troops, on what part of the shores of England
could people repose in tranquillity?
“The war as at present conducted could not possibly have a successful
termination. It was a great misfortune that the House of Commons
listened to nothing which was beyond the sphere of their own
knowledge; and when any professional man, like himself, rose up to
give information, _party_ was immediately thrown in his teeth;
_factious motives_ were instantly imputed, however pure his wishes for
the good of his country. He put it to the committee, whether the whole
force of this country was not on the alert, and almost concentrated on
the coasts of Kent and Sussex, when an invasion was threatened by a
contemptible flotilla of the enemy; and if so, what might not be done,
if the gigantic naval power of England was to threaten the enemy’s
shores? It was his sincere opinion, that the whole coast of France was
completely at the mercy of His Majesty’s ministers.
“The noble lord next adverted to the coasting trade carried on by
France, and which it was in our power to destroy. That trade existed
to an extent almost incredible. It was in our power to dismantle their
batteries,—to blow up their towers,—and, above all, to destroy that
chain of signal-posts, by which a telegraphic communication was kept
up from Flushing to Bayonne, and from the south-east point of Spain to
Venice. Each of those signal-posts could be successfully attacked by
ten men, as, except in a few situations, they were exposed, and seldom
had above two or three maimed soldiers to conduct them. He had no
interest whatever in forcing those observations on the attention of
the committee, and he hoped the right hon. gentleman would not think
them altogether unworthy of his consideration. He should not, he said,
at that time attempt to say more; but he trusted that members who were
far more capable to do justice to the subject than he could pretend to
be, would turn it in their minds, and bring the subject forward, or
that His Majesty’s ministers would investigate the truth and act
accordingly. In either case he was certain attention to the hints he
had thus thrown out could not fail of being attended by the most
beneficial results to the country. He did not think ministers, in not
having attended to the subject, were so much to blame as the House
itself, for they were, or ought to be, the guardians of the public
purse; but he was sorry to say, the practice of the House was _to vote
estimates to a very great amount, without at all troubling themselves
to inquire how those estimates were applied_.
“Besides the signal-posts he had mentioned, there were placed along
the whole coast of Spain many small parties of soldiers in churches,
convents, and other buildings, for the purpose of keeping the people
of the maritime towns in awe, and passing along supplies to the
armies, which supplies it was in our power to intercept, as the only
practicable military road was within a pistol-shot of the margin of
the sea. The smallest assistance would encourage the people to rise
upon them; but without such assistance they are afraid to do so,
knowing that the French would burn their houses, violate their wives,
and murder themselves. This he had seen them do.
“During all the time he was off Catalonia, the French had barely
sufficient force to defend themselves against the natives, and in
every enterprise which they undertook they were foiled. It was
notorious, however, to all the world, that the attention of ministers
was always engaged exclusively on one or two objects, and that they
never took an extended view of things. If our commander on that coast
had had discretionary powers to supply Figueras, which was the key of
Catalonia, with provisions, it could not have been taken by force, for
it was impregnable. If Government would only act in a proper way, it
was impossible that Buonaparte could go on a twelvemonth longer.
“The noble lord then referred to the American war: had ministers
during that war, instead of marching large armies through the country,
only transported 10,000 men from one place to another, they would soon
have laid waste the whole sea-coast, and the country must have
submitted.
“MR. HUTCHINSON deprecated the species of warfare recommended by the
noble lord, which he thought would not be productive of the effects he
expected.
“LORD COCHRANE, in explanation, defended the system which he had
recommended, as peculiarly calculated to injure the enemy’s coasting
trade, which was the great nursery of his seamen.
“After a few questions from Admiral Markham and Mr. Tierney, as to the
decrease in the estimates, and replies from Mr. Yorke, the resolution
was agreed to, as were also the other usual annual resolutions
relating to the navy.”
As the subject of flogging in the army and navy forms a prominent
subject in the present day, I may be pardoned for putting my own views,
then and now, on record. On the 13th of March, on the motion for the
third reading of the Mutiny Bill, Sir Francis Burdett, in a speech
distinguished for humanity and eloquence, animadverted on the punishment
of flogging in the army and navy, as a system derogatory to our country,
where the principles of liberty, of humanity, and of civilisation were
better understood and practised than in any other country.
On this occasion, I delivered my sentiments as follows:—
“Lord COCHRANE hoped that, by degrees, this punishment might in due
time be abolished, but declared that it was impracticable to govern
any large body of men without having the power of recourse to it. He
believed, however, that much of the mischief which arose from the
punishment of flogging, especially in the navy, had been caused by the
influence of that House. Great parliamentary interest had enabled the
first families in the kingdom to force their children into the
service, when too young to understand the nature of the authority
entrusted to them. Many of them insisted on their decks being as clean
and as shining as the floor of a drawing-room, and that their kitchen
utensils should be scoured as bright as silver, with a variety of
other useless and fantastic commands; and if such commands were not
obeyed, they flogged severely those who had those articles in charge.
“The discipline of the navy depended on the commanding officer of each
ship; and if they continued to flog for such offences, the navy must
suffer. Gentlemen might think otherwise, but he knew it to be true,
and he was afraid they would be convinced of it too soon. The family
interest he had alluded to prevailed also, to such a degree, that even
the Lords of the Admiralty had lists made out, and when an officer
went to offer his services, or to solicit promotion for services
performed, he was asked—‘Are you recommended by my Lady this, or Miss
that, or Madam t’other?’ and if he was not, he might as well have
stayed at home.
“He could not, however, vote for the motion. It would be better to
look to those to whom power was entrusted, than to take away the power
of punishing altogether. If it were so taken away, it would ruin the
service. The best seamen in the navy would say so, and if put to the
vote among the sailors, he was sure the decision would be in favour of
the present mode of punishment; but they would at the same time tell
the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that they ought to be
commanded by persons of experience, and not by young men appointed by
parliamentary or any other influence. He hoped he should see the
practice of flogging abolished, while the power of inflicting it was
suffered to remain.”
Good seamen are thoroughly aware that they have nothing to fear from a
judicious and well-regulated captain, a man of sense, who knows his duty
and that of those under him. Such captains have indeed no difficulty in
manning their ships, whilst those in whom the men have no confidence
find difficulty. Good men on board ship stand as little in awe of the
cat as do the good people ashore—who make so much fuss about what they
cannot possibly understand. Amongst many hundreds of men there are
always some vagabonds, who, were it not for the fear of punishment,
would throw their whole work on the hands of others. On such men
reasoning has no effect, nor have good seamen any sympathy with them. On
the contrary, they would rather see them compelled to do their duty by
the dread, or even the application of the lash, than be obliged to do
the work of lazy men in addition to their own.
Landsmen also forget that a naval officer cannot get rid of a worthless
vagabond. He has to account for him to the Admiralty. Were it possible
to give an officer power to turn such over the side, as a landsman can
turn away an unprofitable servant, and he would have no occasion for the
lash. But so long as he is obliged to retain such men, he must secure
their obedience by the only means which will control them.
On the 16th of March came on one of those questions which added so
materially to our national debt. Lord Castlereagh proposed a sum of two
millions sterling as a subsidy to Portugal. He declared that the
circumstances of Portugal were so much improved, and her troops
exhibited so much valour, that he did not expect any opposition to the
measure. This was, however, opposed by several members, on the ground of
impoverishing ourselves by a system which did not produce the results
the nation had a right to expect. By myself it was not opposed, but I
embraced the opportunity of giving my opinion to the following effect:—
“LORD COCHRANE considered Portugal to be defensible against the French
arms chiefly at the lines of Torres Vedras, which were so strong as
not to require so great an army as we had there, and which gave us a
free communication with the sea; whereas our operations were conducted
on a much more extensive scale between Ciudad Rodrigo and
Badajoz,—places which, if we got possession of them both, were not
tenable unless we had a force perfectly capable of coping with the
French forces in the open field. Both these places stood on plains,
and the French, it should be recollected, were much superior to us in
the number of their cavalry, and had often brought a much larger
general force into the field.
“The war would be much less expensive, were the lines of Torres Vedras
considered as the true defence of Portugal; by which means, instead of
our keeping 60,000 or 70,000 men in Portugal, comparatively idle, or,
at least, not in a state of military activity, we might detach just
now, as we might have done before, a portion of our army to Cadiz, and
raise the blockade of that city. A small portion of our army might
also be sent to Catalonia, where they might reverse all the success of
the enemy; and we might act all along the margin of the Mediterranean
with the best effect. There were numerous small forts on the coast
which we might get possession of, and thereby command all the
neighbouring country. We might have done much on the whole eastern
side of Spain—at Valencia particularly, and might probably retake
Barcelona. All this was not only useful, but practicable at a much
smaller expense than our present system. Thus we might have constantly
checked and counteracted the objects of the French.
“This suggestion he did not make as his own. It had been the
recommendation of others as well as his, and seemed obvious to
anybody. For the principles on which it was founded he had the
advantage of great authority, which he quoted. He declared that he saw
nothing in the war to occasion our despair, if we conducted it on
principles by which we might be enabled entirely to clear the
sea-coast, and have, at the same time, a large proportion of our army,
now in Portugal, disposable at home or elsewhere, for such objects as
we desired to obtain. The vote for the two millions might, if
applicable to these views, prove very beneficial; for no service could
be more important than to sweep the French, as we might do with one
effort, from the neighbourhood of Cadiz, and clear the whole
Mediterranean coast from their intrusion.
“The resolution was then put and carried.”
On the 4th of May, I gave notice of a motion for an account of the
quantity of French silks imported into this country under licence. The
effect of this system has on one or two occasions been brought under the
notice of the reader, as encouraging the French Navy, by encouraging
their shipping whilst our own laboured under every species of
discouragement.
On the statement of Mr. Rose, Vice-President of the Board of Trade, that
he had no objection to the motion, I then said that, if agreeable to the
House, I would at once proceed with it, and adverted to the fact that
large quantities of French silks were openly exposed for sale in this
country to the prejudice of our manufacturers, to whom not the slightest
concession was offered in return. Whether rightly or wrongly, it was the
established policy of the legislature to prevent the importation of
French manufactured goods, but the licence to do so to a small extent
had been construed into a licence to import to any amount, and that
without the necessary introduction through the Custom-house. I had been
credibly informed that silks, to the value of several hundred thousand
pounds, were at that moment lying in the river, whilst the only clause
in the licences under which these goods were suffered to be imported,
and which went to secure any reciprocity whatever to this country, was
one requiring that sugar or coffee, to the value of 5_l._ per ton
burden, should be exported in lieu of these rich manufactured goods of
the enemy. If this were the policy of our ministry at the present period
of unexampled distress to the manufacturing interests, the great
dissatisfaction of the manufacturers was by no means surprising.
The correctness of the statement being denied by Mr. Rose, I remarked
that if no silk goods had really been imported, the return would
effectually show this, and as effectually calm any dissatisfaction that
might prevail. After some further unimportant discussion, the motion was
agreed to.
On the order of the day for the third reading of the Sinecure Offices
Bill (June 15th), I expressed my conviction of the propriety of
abolishing all unnecessary offices during the present state of the
country, feeling persuaded that sinecures were the bond of union which
held parties together in that House, and that if sinecures did not
exist, much more attention would be paid to public expenditure. I did
not so much object to the expense which necessarily devolved on the
public, as to the influence which the power of giving sinecures gave to
the ministry for the time being.
The Parliament being shortly afterwards dissolved, my explanations, to
the electors of Westminster relative to the conduct I had deemed right
to pursue in Parliament were comprised in the following letters:—
“Portman Square, 28th September, 1812.
“GENTLEMEN,—Being conscious that I have not used the trust reposed in
me to my private advantage, or to promote the interests of those with
whom I am connected by the bonds of consanguinity or friendship, and
that I have no personal object to attain, I shall venture to submit my
conduct to the scrutiny it must undergo, on presenting myself with a
view of again becoming one of the representatives of this great city;
an honour which I do not aspire to from a vain notion that I possess
the qualifications requisite to perform its duties, otherwise than by
acting uniformly according to the best of my judgment, uninfluenced by
considerations of a personal nature. Should it appear, however, that I
have erred, I am ready to assign the reasons which have determined my
vote on every occasion.
“It is unnecessary to apprise you, Gentlemen, who are so well
acquainted with the fact, that it is impossible for an individual,
unconnected with either party, to succeed in any measure which has for
its object a diminution of the means of corruption, or, in other
words, the power of rewarding those who are base enough to support men
in office, regardless of their measures. Had the list of places and
pensions, possessed by the members of the House of Commons and their
relations, been granted, which list I moved for shortly after my
return to Parliament, the public would long ago have been convinced
that sinecures ought not to be considered, as they generally are, a
burden of a known amount. It has ever been my opinion that their
abolition alone would relieve the Crown from the thraldom in which it
is held; and restore the depreciating currency, by promoting the
proper inquiry into the general application of the public money,
particularly as to the sums demanded for our enormous and
disproportionate military establishment.
“I have frequently stated, without avail, that simply by enforcing the
acts relative to prize concerns, two-thirds of the navy now employed
would be more efficient than the whole is, under the mortification of
finding the fruits of their toil, and often more, taken for the mere
condemnation of legal captures! History shows, without the example of
the House of Commons, that this is not the way to stimulate men to
undergo fatigue, and encounter that kind of danger, from which no
honour is to be derived. On this subject I have not been able to
induce the House to look at the proofs which I held in my hand, and
offered to produce. I am averse to trespass on your time, though I
feel that I have material points to explain; but these I shall defer
to a more fit opportunity.
“I am, however, anxious to add, that my absence lately, on occasions
when you have had a right to expect my attendance, has been occasioned
solely by ill health, and not by a disposition to tamper with
ministers for employment, even in the execution of important plans
which I had suggested; and which, if prosecuted on a fit scale, would
afford France full employment in her own defence, instead of suffering
her troops to employ themselves in the subjugation of our allies, by
whom they are paid and maintained!
“Whether I am returned to Parliament or not, as soon as I shall have
tried every means to promote measures which, if disclosed at present,
would prove highly prejudicial to the public interests, I pledge
myself to prove to the country, that ten millions sterling may
annually be saved, and that the relative military force of England
will be increased.
“Viewing your exertions in the cause of freedom and the purity of
election with that admiration which they so justly deserve,
“I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,
“Respectively, your obedient servant,
“COCHRANE.”
“Portman Square, Sept. 30, 1812.
“GENTLEMEN,—Since I had the honour of addressing you, by letter, at
your last meeting, I have been informed by the public prints and
otherwise that some gentlemen deemed it a material omission that I had
neglected to state my opinions therein relative to Parliamentary
Reform,—a course which I adapted, perhaps erroneously, as most
respectful to the Committee for promoting the Purity of Election;
under the conviction that they would judge of the future by the past,
and not by professions. Now, however, to clear up this doubt, if any,
after reflection, remains on their minds, I hereby pledge myself to
vote on all occasions for Reform, from a persuasion that the ruin of
the country can be averted by that means only. I will likewise support
every measure for the abolition of sinecures, which form the bond of
union in the House of Commons against the interests of the people.
Indeed, reflection impresses this fact so strongly on my mind, that I
am disposed to think, if the advocates for Parliamentary Reform were
to direct their efforts first against these glaring evils, that an
efficient Reform would not be so far distant as the difference of
sentiments amongst its advocates unhappily indicates.
“As to the Catholic Question, Gentlemen, it is proper to inform you
that so long as its inquisitorial auricular confession and its
principles so favourable to despotism prevailed on the Continent, I
was hostile to it; but that I am now inclined to grant the claims of
the Catholics of Ireland, provided that they are content to receive
the privileges of Englishmen, and to relinquish their predilection in
favour of the jurisdiction of the Pope, which, however, they seem
anxious to establish in that part of these kingdoms.
“Having said thus much on the most important questions that occur to
me, I have only to add, relative to the objection made to a naval
officer being a representative for Westminster (which I conclude is
meant to extend to all other parts of the kingdom) that one half of
the taxes levied on the people of England is disbursed on the navy—for
objects which the ability of all the civil members of Parliament
cannot detect to be erroneous from the inspection of accounts. Neither
are they judges of the means best calculated to give protection to
trade, and annoy the enemy by that mode of warfare to which England
must at last resort.
“I had nearly omitted to notice that I am no advocate for flogging;
although I maintain, from a knowledge of fact, that your fleets could
not be governed at present if the power did not exist,—a power which
will cease to be abused when Parliamentary influence shall cease to
place incompetent persons in command, and that in a great measure
depends upon your exertions.
“I have the honour to be,
“Gentlemen,
“Your most humble obedient servant,
“COCHRANE.”
The concluding paragraph of this letter will bear comment, even in our
day. The appointment of officers to commands ought to be regulated less
by interest than _desert_. The truth of this is now practically admitted
in other departments of the State, but unhappily the Admiralty, to which
is confided our only protection from invasion, is, to a great extent,
looked upon as a ministerial patronage preserve, and to this supposed
necessity the national safety may one day be sacrificed. It has been
urged, in defence of the system, that it is a matter of little
consequence, for that steam having bridged the Channel, invasion is only
a question of a few hours, whoever may be in command of our ships. This
I deny. If our ships are in a fit condition, and properly commanded, it
is as easy to destroy the enemy’s “bridge” as ever it was, and we shall
be as much at liberty to use our own bridge as in former days.
If the Admiralty could be freed from its political trammels, there is no
question but that those who direct its affairs would be generally guided
in their appointments _by merit alone_. That it is not so, is a proof
that, under the unfortunate prevalence of political influence and
patronage, no fair and well-understood system of promotion can be
established. Hence boys and subordinate officers, if destitute of
influence, have no stimulus to acquiring a knowledge of their
profession. Far otherwise, for whatever may be their proficiency or
services, the only certainty they have is that some one with more
influence and perhaps inferior claims may be promoted over their heads.
It is not reasonable to suppose that such a system can produce energetic
captains or admirals, except by accident.
As one ship well officered and manned is more effective than two of an
opposite description, a defined and well-regulated system of promotion
upon which all can rely will cost less to the nation, and become the
most economical as well as the most effective. The true strength of the
navy is not in the multitude of ships, but in the energies and alacrity
of officers and crews; and the repression of these qualities by a false
system of political influence, renders a double force requisite for the
accomplishment of the vital objects of the naval service. This is as
much a waste of power as the system itself is _want of power_.
The necessity of wholesome stimulating encouragement was deeply felt in
the wars consequent on the French Revolution, and it will be felt in
future wars whenever they arise. No one unacquainted with the matter can
imagine how much was lost during those wars from a total disregard of
the fitness of individuals appointed by political influence. The
subordinate officers appointed to ships of war were frequently so
incompetent as to paralyse the exertions even of the most able
commanders, who could not be expected to sustain the fatigue of being
always on deck. For my own part, I was so annoyed by the description of
persons attempted to be palmed upon me, that, as I have somewhere else
said, I preferred going to sea with midshipmen of my own training,
making them perform the duties of lieutenants, rather than run the risk
of receiving such lieutenants as were frequently appointed to situations
in active frigates, through aristocratic or political influence. I am
sorry the names of my midshipmen have for the most part escaped my
memory, but I may point to three of my own making—the late Lord Napier,
Captain Marryat, and the present gallant Admiral Sir Houston Stewart.
These were my officers in Basque Roads, where I had only one lieutenant.
On quitting Plymouth in the _Impérieuse_ to undertake that perilous
duty, I sailed with _one lieutenant only_, to avoid the encumbrance of
persons in whom I feared to repose confidence.
To return to my subject. On my re-election for Westminster, I published
a long address to my constituents. From this I shall only adduce the
following extracts:—
“GENTLEMEN,—Being unable to convey in words the sensations I
experience in reflecting on the manner in which you have returned me
to Parliament, I shall leave it to you, who are capable of such acts,
to estimate my feelings.
“Gentlemen, no part of the cant of the times seems to me more
hypocritical than the declamation by party-men against what they term
the ‘overwhelming influence of the Crown;’ when the fact is notorious
to us all that the ruling faction in Parliament seize the offices of
state and share them amongst themselves. If a doubt as to this truth
exist in the mind of any one, let him reflect on the language of the
parties themselves, ‘Such an administration cannot stand.’ And why,
Gentlemen?—not because the royal protection has been withdrawn, but
because a sufficient number do not agree as to the division of the
spoil. Our liberties in these days are not in danger from violent and
open exercise of regal authority; such acts, being free from the
deception practised by the mock representatives of the people, would
not be tolerated for an instant. No, Gentlemen, it is by the House of
Commons alone that the Constitution is subverted, the prerogatives of
the Crown usurped, the rights of the people trampled upon.
“Gentlemen, I shall not attempt to enumerate the decisions of the late
House of Commons,—these stamp little credit on the memory of the
principal actors, who cannot escape from the contempt of posterity, as
may, from their insignificance, the nameless individuals who composed
their corrupt majorities. The _effects_, however, of this system of
corruption may be thus briefly stated; the prolongation of war, the
increase of the national debt, the depreciation of our currency, the
disappearance of our coin, the stagnation of our commerce, and the
consequent unexampled embarrassment of our manufactures.
“Hurtful, however, as the measures pursued have been, our total
neglect of others has proved still more prejudicial; for whilst France
has inflicted on us the evils of war, intimidating surrounding states
into compliance with her views, we, who have possessed facilities to
direct every portion of our force to unknown points within the
extensive range of 2000 miles of unprotected shore, have never even
made a demonstration with intention to disturb the enemy’s projects
and force him to keep his legions at home, but have left him at full
liberty to prosecute his plans at the expense of our allies, or in the
way most conducive to his interests; and, surely, none could suit him
better than to fix the little army of England in the centre of the
Peninsula, where its movements are not of a desultory nature, and
where, admitting the great ability of its commander, a comparatively
small portion of the enemy’s force is fully adequate to counteract its
_known movements_! What part of these kingdoms would be secure from
attack if the French possessed a naval superiority, with only 20,000
troops at their disposal? It is obvious that there must be in every
district a force equal to that which the enemy could bring against it.
“Gentlemen, I cannot avoid stating a fact to you which I have often
offered to prove at the bar of the late House of Commons, namely, that
whilst our commerce has decreased, that kind of trade which is most
beneficial to a state has augmented on the shores of the enemy, in a
prodigious ratio; and the produce of the northern and southern
provinces is freely interchanged under the protection of the abuses of
our Admiralty Courts, which afford better security than all the
batteries of France. The plain reason for this is, that each of the
numerous coasting vessels must, for the benefit of the court, be
separately condemned, at an expense greater than was formerly demanded
for the adjudication of an Indiaman! Gentlemen, the rapacity of these
courts is frequently not satisfied by appropriating the _whole_
proceeds to themselves, but the captors are compelled _to pay_ an
additional sum for thus performing a service to their country.
Gentlemen, that you may have a correct notion of a proctor’s bill, I
take the liberty of inclosing one for your inspection, which, I assure
you, may be considered very moderate, being only six fathoms and a
quarter long, or thirty-seven feet six inches, whereas I now possess
others that extend to fifty feet; but I prefer sending this to your
committee, as it is the one produced by myself in the House of
Commons, and by the venerable Earl of Suffolk in the House of Lords;
the exhibition of which was pronounced by the present Lord Chancellor
Eldon (the brother of the judge of the Admiralty Court) to be a
species of _mummery_ never before witnessed within those walls, and
altogether unbecoming the gravity of that branch of the legislature.
“The example of the industrious bee demonstrates by the laws of nature
that the drone is not to live at the expense of the community,
notwithstanding what the Whigs have said of sinecures being held by
tenure equal to that of freehold property.”
From the preceding incomplete enumeration of my parliamentary efforts,
it will be apparent that as regarded my profession I had not been idle;
but every step I took appeared to remove me farther from my chance of
being again employed. Notwithstanding that in those days the language of
members frequently passed those bounds which the modern practice of the
House of Commons has prescribed, in no instance, that I am aware of,
could I be accused of intemperate treatment of any subject under
discussion. Independently of the sore point of Lord Gambier’s
court-martial, which was no act of mine—my offending could have been
none other than the one of attempting to rouse the authorities to an
effort for the amelioration of the navy, for objects which under the old
system were notoriously not achieved, viz. _crippling the energies of
the enemy_. It was in the circle of my political opponents considered
that as member for Westminster I had no right to interfere with naval
matters—_because I was a post-captain_!
It is, nevertheless, a singular fact—and one which cannot be said of any
other officer of my then standing as a post-captain—that from 1801 to
1812,—on no occasion, not even for a single day was any vessel of
war—save the one in which my pennant flew—once placed under my command,
or once offered to me, with the single exception of the affair of Basque
Roads, when I was for a few days appointed to organise and make use of a
flotilla of explosion and fireships, the command of which _had been
declined by several other officers to whom it had been proposed_, and
then thrust on me contrary to my inclination.
That one cause of my being thus passed over was my unceasing advocacy of
the navy, admits of no doubt. It must be apparent that my motions
relative to the Courts of Admiralty raised the enmity of all who
profited by their abuses, and these were neither few nor
uninfluential,—that my repeated invectives against sinecures and
pensions arrayed against me all who benefited by them—whether personally
or through their connections. It is, indeed, not too much to say, that
those interested in sinecures and pensions comprised in those days a
majority of the House of Commons, who stood up for their own interest at
the national expense as for a right.
My motion respecting the treatment of French prisoners, and especially
my declaration of the probable motive for erecting the prison of
Dartmoor in a dreary, desolate, and unhealthy position, such as ought
not to have been selected for convicts, served to increase the
ministerial anger. Nor was the evil abated. On a second visit to the
place, I encountered a spectacle which made me ashamed of my country.
The reader will remember the action between the _Pallas_ and _Minerve_
in Basque Roads, as narrated in the first volume. My gallant adversary
in that frigate was Captain Collett, who kept the deck after every one
of his crew had been driven below by our fire, which, as the _Minerve_
had taken the ground, swept her decks. My gallant opponent, however,
kept the deck, or rather stood on a gun, with as much _sang-froid_ as
though we had been firing a salute. On our becoming entangled with the
_Minerve’s_ rigging, he raised his hat, with all the politeness of a
Frenchman of the old school, and bowed to me, a compliment which I
returned. Judge of my surprise, when refused admission into the prison
at Dartmoor, and prowling about its out-offices, at finding my gallant
enemy _located in the stall of a stable_, he having been recently made
prisoner. I promised to use my best endeavour to get him removed, and on
my arrival in London did so. I believe with effect, but to what other
locality has passed from my memory.
There is no necessity to enumerate other matters already familiar to the
reader in order to show the estimation in which I must have been held by
those who opposed what they considered innovations, though they must
have been as well aware of the evils of a rotten system as myself.
CHAP. XXXVI.
MY MARRIAGE.
ROMANTIC CHARACTER OF MY MARRIAGE.—UNFORESEEN DIFFICULTIES.—FAMILY
RESULTS.
The event recorded in this chapter is the most important and the
happiest of my life, in its results,—the “silver lining” to the “cloud,”
viz. my marriage with the Countess of Dundonald. It has been said by a
Scottish writer that “the Cochranes have long been noted for an original
and dashing turn of mind, which was sometimes called genius—sometimes
eccentricity.” How far this may be true of my ancestors, I shall not
stay to inquire. Laying no claim to the genius, I however dispute the
eccentricity in my own case, notwithstanding that appearances, so far as
relates to my past life, may be somewhat against me. Without a particle
of romance in my composition, my life has been one of the most romantic
on record, and the circumstances of my marriage are not the least so.
Early in the year 1812, it was my good fortune to make the acquaintance
of the orphan daughter of a family of honourable standing in the Midland
Counties, Miss Katherine Corbett Barnes. In consequence of the loss of
her parents, the lady had been placed during her minority under the
guardianship of her first cousin, Mr. John Simpson of Portland Place and
also of Fairlorn House, in the county of Kent, of which county he was
then High Sheriff. The story is the old one. Shortly after my
introduction to this lady I made proposals of marriage, and was
accepted.
But here an unexpected difficulty arose. I was at that time residing
with my uncle, the Hon. Basil Cochrane, who had realised a large fortune
in the East Indies. My attachment—though not my engagement—to my
_fiancée_ had by some means reached him, and he at once attempted to
divert my purpose by proposing to me a marriage with the only daughter
of an Admiralty Court official who had realised a very large fortune by
the practices which have already been made familiar to the reader.
I cannot describe the repugnance which I felt even to the proposition,
and pointed out to my uncle the impossibility of marrying the daughter
of one of those persons whom I had so severely denounced; adding that
not only would such a step be a deviation from those principles which
ought to guide a well-regulated mind in the selection of a wife, but
must be destructive of my public character, which would be so clearly
sacrificed for money, that it would render me contemptible to my
constituents, and would prevent my again meriting public confidence. His
reply was brief and caustic. “Please yourself: nevertheless, my fortune
and the money of the wife I have chosen for you, would go far towards
reinstating future Earls of Dundonald in their ancient position as
regards wealth.”
This conversation was communicated to the lady to whom I was affianced,
on whom I urged a consent to a secret marriage,—a proposition in which
she refused to acquiesce. My uncle, however, continuing firm in his
resolves, I at length prevailed upon her to overcome her repugnance, and
we were, on the 8th of August 1812, married at Annan in Scotland.
On my return my uncle again renewed the subject, and one morning, during
our walk he informed me that he had made his will, leaving me one half
his fortune. He, however declared, that compliance with his wish as to
my marriage with the heiress of the Admiralty Court official was
essential to its eventual confirmation. On arguing this, on the same
grounds as before, he observed that some other person of wealth must be
sought for, as his object was to retrieve the family fortune. Meanwhile
he required my assurance that I would not marry without his sanction.
Compliance with this was declined for the best of all reasons, that I
was already married.
The fact of our marriage was not long concealed, and I did not inherit a
shilling of my uncle’s wealth, for which loss however, I had a rich
equivalent in the acquisition of a wife whom no amount of wealth could
have purchased. A yet more singular sequel has to be told. On the
discovery of the marriage, my uncle, though then an old man, also
married, and was easily made to believe that non-payment of a large sum
due to him from Government, on account of some contracts undertaken
before he quitted India, had been delayed on account of my parliamentary
opposition to the Ministry. This may or may not have been the case, but
it induced my uncle to request that our future association might be less
frequent. An intimation followed by the still more questionable course
of his requesting an interview with Lord Liverpool, for the purpose of
informing his lordship of the step he had taken with regard to myself,
and assuring him that he had never countenanced my conduct in
Parliament. Singularly enough, my uncle’s demands upon the Government
were soon afterwards settled.
It was my wish here to have spoken of my wife’s devotedness to me amidst
the many trying circumstances in which, I have been placed. They do not
however, come within the scope of this volume, as regards their
chronological order, I therefore postpone their narration.
CHAP. XXXVII.
NAVAL ABUSES.
GREENWICH HOSPITAL.—DROITS OF ADMIRALTY.—PENSIONS.—MY EFFORTS
FRUITLESS.—CONTRADICTION OF MY FACTS.—THE MANCHESTER PETITION.—NAVAL
DEBATES.—RESOLUTIONS THEREON.—MR. CROKER’S REPLY.—REMARKS
THEREON.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT.—MY REPLY TO MR. CROKER.—RESOLUTIONS
NEGATIVED WITHOUT A DIVISION.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT’S MOTION.—MR.
CROKER’S EXPLANATION.—HIS ATTACK ON ME CONFIRMING MY ASSERTIONS.—THE
TRUTH EXPLAINED.—ANOTHER UNFOUNDED ACCUSATION.—OFFICIAL CLAPTRAP OF
HIS OWN INVENTION.—MY REPLY.—ITS CONFIRMATION BY NAVAL WRITERS.—LORD
COLLINGWOOD’s OPINION.—MY PROJECTS ADOPTED IN ALL IMPORTANT
POINTS.—OFFICIAL ADMISSIONS.—THE RESULT TO MYSELF.
Soon after the commencement of the session of 1813, I made an attempt to
direct the attention of Parliament to the administration of the funds of
Greenwich Hospital, in the hope of restoring them to their legitimate
purpose of rewards for wounds and long service in the navy. At this
period their perversion had become notorious. In place of old retired
seamen, not a few of the wards were occupied, and pensions enjoyed, by
men who had never been in the navy at all, but were thus provided for,
to the exclusion of worn-out sailors, by the influence of patrons upon
whose political interest they had a claim.
As the only way to arrive at the full extent of the evil, in the absence
of definite knowledge as to the specific documents required, I moved in
the House of Commons, on the 11th of March 1813, for _all papers_
relative to the chest at Greenwich.
The motion was met by a suggestion from the Speaker—that “if those
papers _had been_ laid on the table during the present session there
would be no difficulty in granting them, but that if not, I must
_specify_ the particular papers required.” This, of course, I was unable
to do, but gave my reason for the motion as follows.
“LORD COCHRANE then proceeded to express his wish that the state of
the funds in Greenwich Hospital should be known, in order to ascertain
whether they were sufficient to make provision for that great body of
seamen and petty officers who would be entitled to be placed on the
establishment at the conclusion of the present war. The House, he was
satisfied, could have no objection to this information being laid
before them. One of his reasons for moving for it now was, the fact of
his having learned that it was in contemplation to devote the Droits
of the Admiralty to the current services of the year. The noble lord
concluded by moving, ‘That there be laid before this House an account
showing the revenues of Greenwich Hospital and the sources whence they
are derived, also the disbursements for management and the number of
pensioners in each class; distinguishing those maintained within the
hospital from the out-pensioners; also an account of the number
admitted in each year since 1800, and the amount of the pensioners at
that time maintained within and without the hospital.’
“LORD A. HAMILTON seconded the motion.
“THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said it was perfectly new to him that
there was any intention to devote the Droits of Admiralty in the
manner stated by the noble lord. He knew of no right which existed in
His Majesty’s Government to make such an application of those Droits,
and if they were so applied, it must be considered entirely as arising
from an act of royal bounty. The noble lord had adduced no reasonable
ground for the production of the papers for which he had moved.
Whether they were of an objectionable description or not he was unable
to judge; but he could not see why the table of the House was to be
crowded with useless and unnecessary documents. He should, therefore,
move the previous question.”
It was true that my having heard of the intention of the Government with
relation to the Droits of Admiralty might not be a parliamentary ground
for their production, but it was a ground for asking the question. Had
I, however, stated my real motives, the only effect would have been
prompt denial of the fact by all interested in the continuance of the
abuse, which could only be proved by the papers themselves. I therefore
endeavoured to procure them on other grounds.
“LORD COCHRANE persisted in the propriety of the House having before
them the information for which he had moved. There never was a period
at which it was more desirable that some steps should be adopted to
ameliorate the situation of His Majesty’s navy. Those brave men of
which it was composed were subject to the most heartrending
oppressions; and, in his opinion, had every cause to complain of their
situations. After having been released from the labours of a long and
arduous service, they were not, as they richly deserved, suffered to
return to the bosoms of their families, but were kept almost to the
last hour of their existence in a constant and unremitting state of
servitude, unless where they determined to sacrifice that reward which
their country had provided for them as a consolation for the buffeting
they had undergone to purchase their discharge.
“This had frequently been the case; and he had received constant
applications complaining of this species of hardship. Two men had
lately applied to him, who, after a service of seventeen years and a
half, as petty officers, had been sent to perform that most scandalous
of all duties—harbour duty; where there was no distinction whatever
between petty officers and private men; and, who, rather than submit
to be longer disgraced, had expended 80_l._ or 90_l._ each, to obtain
their discharge. These men were entitled to pensions of 12_l._ or
14_l._, a year; and he was convinced that there was not an insurance
office in town that would not have given, at their age, for the sums
they had paid for their discharge, annuities equal to their pensions.
Instead of Greenwich being a source of advantage and reward to aged
seamen it was made a means of recruiting for the navy.
“Unless some alteration was made in this system he should feel it his
duty to move for leave to bring in a bill to limit the service of the
navy. The House, he was convinced, would see the necessity of pointing
out some term at which a seaman’s service was to be brought to a
conclusion, and at which he might have some hope of resting his frame,
after an arduous and gallant service, in the lap of domestic happiness
and retirement. In consequence of the present arrangements, men were
employed who were absolutely incapable of performing their duty, and
in his own ship he had found men who, if he had the power, he would
much rather have discharged than have suffered to remain on board. In
other instances he knew men, who had been invalided three times and
sent into harbour duty, volunteer into active service three times, in
order to avoid that disgrace, and finally die amidst the roar of
battle, when their tottering limbs were scarce able to support them to
their quarters.
“MR. ROSE could not see that any grounds whatever had been laid for
the noble lord’s motion. The statement into which he had entered
tended to censure the practice that at present existed with respect to
the discharge of seamen. He recollected that this subject had been
before under discussion in the House, and that it was then stated that
the present practice had been introduced in order to exempt the men
from the necessity of finding two substitutes, under which they before
laboured. This question, however, had no connection with the motion,
which referred entirely to the management of Greenwich Hospital. He
believed that the affairs of that department were as well and
regularly conducted as any other branch of the public service.
“LORD A. HAMILTON said he understood the noble lord complained of the
present system by which the allowance received by seamen from
Greenwich Hospital was rendered useless to them, in consequence of the
large sums which they were compelled to pay for their release.
“MR. WYNN confessed he could see no connection between the matter of
the speech and the motion itself of the noble lord. As the case,
however, to which he had called the attention of the House, was
undoubtedly hard, it was very desirable that information should be
communicated in some mode.
“The previous question was then put and carried, when LORD COCHRANE
immediately gave notice that he would, that day month, move for leave
to bring in a bill to limit the service of the navy.”
There was not, in fact, much apparent connection between my speech and
the motion, because the Speaker had prohibited me from making the motion
in such a way as would establish the connection. Nevertheless, that both
the House and the Ministry well understood my aim, was evident from the
fact, that the Secretary of the Treasury was sufficiently alarmed by the
attempt which had been made, to induce him to come down to the House
_after I had quitted it_, and at the last moment of its sitting, in
order to defend the Admiralty from the effects of a motion which had
been refused!
“MR. CROKER, before the House adjourned, rose to make a few
observations upon what had fallen from the noble lord in the early
part of the evening, when he did not happen to be present. If,
however, he had correctly understood what had fallen from that noble
lord, he begged leave to say, that the noble lord had been wholly
misinformed with respect to the sums of money taken instead of
substitutes for the navy. The fact was, that the grossest frauds
having been practised upon the poor men under pretence of providing
substitutes for them, the Admiralty had come to the resolution of
receiving a certain sum of money from them, and to find substitutes.”
Notwithstanding the want of connection, Mr. Croker perfectly understood
the point to which I was coming in the end, and hence his taking the
course of flatly contradicting the premises after I had quitted the
House. My early connection with this gentleman has been stated in the
first volume[83], as well as the fact, that believing in his sincerity
as an ardent opponent of administrative abuses of all kinds, I had,
during our acquaintance, without reserve, and in the belief that I had
an able coadjutor, unbosomed to him my views with regard to the abuses
of naval administration. Now that he was in an official position which
required him to defend _all abuses_, and considering that I stood almost
alone in exposing them, he was in possession _of all my plans of
action_! There can, however, be no better proof of the soundness of my
views, than the fact, that although he had previously been made well
aware of my line of argument, he never attempted to meet me by argument,
but always by _flat contradiction of my facts_. We shall presently come
to some remarkable instances of this nature.
-----
Footnote 83:
Page 209.
-----
On the 2nd of June I presented to the House a petition from the
inhabitants of Manchester, a petition complaining of ill usage, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, whilst peaceably assembled to
petition Parliament for a reform. It is unnecessary to advert to these
allegations, as they are now an historical record, but that the people
of Manchester should have selected me as the exponent of their
grievances, only added to the ministerial aversion with which I was
regarded.
On this occasion, an attempt was made by Mr. Bathurst to procure the
rejection of the petition, on the ground that the petitioners, if
aggrieved, “_could seek redress in a court of law, but that the House
could not afford them relief_!” There was something so heartless in such
an attempt that it called up some members by no means hearty in the
popular cause.
“MR. WHITBREAD supported the motion, contending that to men in the
circumstances of the petitioners (some of them being now prisoners for
debt), it was a mere mockery and taunt to tell them that the courts of
law were open to them, where they might bring actions for malicious
prosecutions. It reminded him of a saying of the late Mr. Horne Tooke,
who, on being told that the courts were open to all classes, replied,
“Yes, and so is the London Tavern, if you have money enough.” As the
petition was couched in respectful terms, he thought it would be
setting a bad precedent to reject it; it was usual, even though
Parliament could not interfere, to see the magistrates did not exceed
the bounds of their jurisdiction.
“MR. WYNN observed that the House had been at all times peculiarly
jealous that no obstructions should be given to the exercise of the
right of petitioning; and as the present complaint related to an
alleged obstruction of that nature, it ought to be received.
“The petition was ordered to lie on the table.”
The circumstances which brought upon me the subsequent vengeance of the
Admiralty will be found in two debates which took place in the House of
Commons shortly before its prorogation—the one on the 5th, and the other
on the 8th of July 1813.
As the subject matter of these debates possesses great naval interest,
and as the causes which led to them are not wholly inoperative in our
day, I shall adduce them at some length, not so much for my own
vindication, as in the light of history teaching by example.
The subject matter of the debates being sufficiently included in the
reports of the time, very little comment will suffice.
“LORD COCHRANE rose, pursuant to notice, to bring forward his motion
for increasing the remuneration and limiting the service of seamen. He
thought it was his duty to lay before the House the reasons why our
seamen preferred the _merchant foreign service_[84] to that of their
own country, to enter which they discovered a very great reluctance.
“The facts by which he meant to prove this he had compressed into one
resolution; as he was anxious that when the members of that House
retired from their Parliamentary duties, they might consider these
facts at their leisure, and satisfy themselves as to the correctness
of the statement, in order that when they met again they might have no
hesitation in adopting such propositions, the object of which would be
the redress of those grievances which were the subject of it. As he
did not conceive that any objection could be made to the mode of
proceeding he had adopted, he would not occupy the time of the House
any longer than by reading the resolution. The noble lord then read
the following resolution:—
“‘That the honour of His Majesty’s Crown, the glory and safety of the
country, do, in a great degree, depend on the maintenance, especially
in time of war, _of an efficient naval establishment_:
“‘That during the late and present war with France, splendid victories
have been gained by His Majesty’s fleets and vessels of war, over a
vast superiority in the number of guns and men, and in the weight of
metal:
“‘That these victories thus obtained were acquired by the skill and
intrepidity of the officers, and by the energy, zeal, and valour of
the crews:
“‘That during the present war with the United States of America, His
Majesty’s naval service has, in several instances, experienced defeat,
in a manner and to a degree unexpected by this House, by the
Admiralty, and by the country at large:
“‘That the cause of this lamentable effect is not any superiority
possessed by the enemy, either in skill, valour, nor the well-known
difference in the weight of metal, which heretofore has been deemed
unimportant; but arises chiefly from the decay and heartless state of
the crews of His Majesty’s ships of war compared with their former
energy and zeal; and compared, on the other hand, with the freshness
and vigour of the crews of the enemy:
“‘That it is an indisputable fact, that long and unlimited confinement
to a ship, as well as to any other particular spot, and especially
when accompanied with the diet necessarily that of ships of war, and a
deprivation of the usual recreations of men, seldom fails to produce a
rapid decay of the physical powers, the natural parent, in such cases,
of despondency of mind:
“‘That the late and present war against France (including a short
interval of peace, in which the navy was not paid off) have lasted
upwards of twenty years, and that a new naval war has recently
commenced:
“‘That the duration of the term of service in His Majesty’s navy is
absolutely without any limitation, and that there is no mode provided
for by law for the fair and impartial discharging of men therefrom;
and that, according to the present practice decay, disease, incurable
wounds, or death, can alone procure the release of any seaman of
whatever age or whatever length of service:
“‘That seamen who have become wholly unfit for active service are, in
place of being discharged and rewarded according to their merits and
their sufferings, transferred to ships on harbour duty, where they are
placed under officers wholly unacquainted with their character and
former conduct, who have no other means to estimate them but on the
scale of their remaining activity and bodily strength; where there is
no distinction made between the former petty officer and common
seamen, between youth and age, and where those worn-out and wounded
seamen who have spent the best part of their lives, or have lost their
health in the service of their country, have to perform a duty more
laborious than that of the convict felons in the dockyards—and with
this remarkable distinction, that the labours of the latter have a
known termination:
“‘That though the seamen thus transferred and thus employed have all
been invalided, they are permitted to re-enter ships of war on actual
service; and that such is the nature of the harbour duty, that many,
in order to escape from it, do so re-enter—there being no limitation
as to the number of times of their being invalided, or that of their
re-entering:
“‘That to obtain a discharge from the navy by purchase, the sum of
80_l._ sterling is required by the Admiralty, which, together with
other expenses, amounts to twenty times the original bounty, and is
equal to all that a seaman can save with the most rigid economy during
the average period in which he is capable of service; that this sum is
demanded alike from men of all ages and of all lengths of
servitude—from those pensioned for wounds, and also from those
invalided for harbour duty; thus converting the funds of Greenwich,
and the reward of former services, into a means of recruiting the
navy:
“‘That such is the horror which seamen have of this useless
prolongation of their captivity, that those who are able, in order to
escape from it, actually return into the hands of Government all those
fruits of their toil which formerly they looked to as the means of
some little comfort in their old age:
“‘That, besides these capital grievances—tending to perpetuate the
impress service, there are others worthy the serious attention of this
House; that the petty officers and seamen on board of His Majesty’s
ships and vessels of war though absent on foreign stations for many
years, receive no wages until their return home, and are, of course,
deprived of the comforts which those wages, paid at short intervals,
would procure them; that this is now very severely felt, owing to the
recent practice of postponing declarations of war until long after the
war has been actually begun, by which means the navy is deprived,
under the name of Droits, of the first fruits and greatest proportions
of the prize-money to which they have heretofore been entitled; and
thus, and by the exactions of the Courts of Admiralty, the proportion
of captures which at last devolves to the navy is much too small to
produce those effects which formerly were so beneficial to the
country:
“‘That while their wages are withheld from them abroad, when paid at
home, which, to prevent desertion, usually takes place on the day
before they sail out again, having no opportunity to go on shore, they
are compelled to buy slops of Jews on board, or to receive them from
Government at fifteen per cent. higher than their acknowledged value;
and being paid in bank-notes they are naturally induced to exchange
them for money current in other countries, and which, it is notorious,
they do at an enormous loss:
“‘That the recovery of the pay and prize-money by the widows,
children, or relatives of seamen is rendered as difficult as possible;
and, finally, the regulations with regard to passing of the
examination requisite previous to an admission to the benefits of
Greenwich Hospital, subject the disabled seaman to so many
difficulties, and to such long delays, that, in numerous cases, he is
compelled to beg his way in the pursuit of a boon, the amount of
which, even in the event of loss of both eyes or both arms, does not
equal that of the common board-wages of a footman:
“‘That one of the best and strongest motives to meritorious conduct in
military and naval men is the prospect of promotion; while such
promotion is, at the same time, free of additional expense to the
nation; but that in the British naval service this powerful and
honourable incitement has ceased to exist, seeing that the means of
rewarding merit has been almost wholly withdrawn from naval
commanders-in-chief under whose inspection services are performed; in
fact it is a matter of perfect notoriety that it has become next to
impossible for a meritorious subordinate petty officer or seaman to
rise to the rank of lieutenant; that in scarcely any instance
promotion or employment is now to be obtained in the navy through any
other means than what is called parliamentary interest, that is to
say,—the corrupt influence of boroughs:
“‘That owing to these causes chiefly the crews of his Majesty’s ships
of war have in general become in a very considerable degree worn out
and disheartened and inadequate to the performance, with their wonted
energy and effect, of those arduous duties which belong to the naval
service; and that hence has arisen, by slow and imperceptible degrees,
the enormous augmentation of our ships and men, while the naval force
of our enemies is actually much less than in former years:
“‘That, as a remedy for this alarming national evil, it is absolutely
necessary that the grievances of the navy, some of which only have
been recited above, should be redressed; that a limitation of the
duration of service should be adopted, accompanied with the certainty
of a suitable reward, not subject to any of the effects of partiality;
and that measures should be taken to cause the comfortable situations
in the ordinary of the dockyards, the places of porters, messengers,
&c. &c., in and about the offices belonging to the sea service, the
under-wardens of the naval forests, &c., to be bestowed on meritorious
decayed petty officers and seamen, instead of being, as they now
generally are, the wages of corruption in borough elections:
“‘That this House, convinced that a decrease of energy of character
cannot be compensated by an augmentation of the number of ships, guns,
and men, which is, at the same time a grievous pecuniary burden to the
country, will, at an early period next session, institute an inquiry,
by special committee or otherwise, into the matters above stated, and
particularly with a view to dispensing suitable rewards to seamen;
that they will investigate the state of the fund of Greenwich
Hospital, and ascertain whether it is necessary to apply the Droits of
the Admiralty and the Droits of the Crown as the natural first means
of compensation to those who have acquired them by their valour, their
privations, and their sufferings.’”
“SIR FRANCIS BURDETT seconded the resolution.”
“MR. CROKER thought that, when the noble lord had adopted his present
method of proceeding, he would have acted only consistent with the
courtesy of Parliament had he _given notice_[85] of his intention to
those persons whose duty it might be to take part in any discussion.
The honourable member said he would have felt obliged by any
information the noble lord might have imparted; but though wanting
such, he had come unprepared into the House to meet the noble lord’s
resolution. He should be wanting in his duty if he did not state most
positively, that, excepting the tribute of just praise, which, in the
commencement of his resolution, the noble lord had paid to the
gallantry and heroism of our own seamen, _every other part of it was
liable to the charge of being wholly unfounded in fact_, or very much
indeed exaggerated. The statements those resolutions contained were so
astonishing—true it was _less astonishing when coming from the noble
lord than from any other person_—but still even from him they were so
astonishing, that surely they ought not to have been so suddenly, and
with so little preparation, brought under the consideration of that
House. There was no one but the noble lord who conceived that the
disasters which we had experienced in the course of the present war
with the United States were not to be attributed to a superior force
on the part of the enemy, but to a decay of all ardour in our seamen
in the defence of their country. Was the crew of the _Java_ then, who
had maintained so stubborn a conquest, dispirited? Was the crew of the
_Macedonian_ disheartened and reduced by hard-usage to imbecility and
cowardice? So far was that from being the fact, that it was in the
latter part of the action the spirit of the crew of the _Macedonian_
was most conspicuous, that the spirit of her officers and her brave
commander was most conspicuous. So little broken was the spirit of
that crew which the noble lord had described as utterly heartless and
imbecile, that till the very last they met the attacks of the enemy
with loud and repeated cheers.
“Now for another fact on which the noble lord had formed his
resolution. He had stated that seamen were obliged to purchase their
discharge by no less a sum than 80_l._, no matter what was the
condition of the individual. Now he had to state most positively that
this was not the case.[86] The sum specified might, indeed, be
_required from able seamen_ who wished for their discharge; but the
sum of 40_l._ only was required from ordinary seamen; from ordinary
seamen transferred to harbour duty, only 30_l._; from persons who were
originally landsmen, not more than 20_l._ And he had to state further
that many persons transferred to harbour duty, and considered unfit
for service, were discharged without any consideration whatsoever. The
noble lord had stated formerly in the House the case of a harbour duty
man who had been obliged to pay 80_l._ for his discharge.
“When the noble lord had thought proper to make that statement, he had
answered in his place that he could not take upon him to vouch for the
individual case. He had, however, subsequently been at considerable
pains to discover the particular case alluded to by the noble lord,
and had examined every document in which he thought it could be
traced—but in vain—he could find nothing of the kind; he had then
applied to the member for Bedford to procure for him the name of the
man from the noble lord, but this had not been done, and he had never
had the pleasure of seeing the noble lord since. Now he thought that
under such circumstances the noble lord should have abstained from
receiving the statement unless he was disposed to give the name of the
individual, and thus supply the means of confuting it.
“Our seamen, said the noble lord, were heart-broken; they would indeed
be heart-broken had they heard his resolutions; that was provided
always, though, he retained so much authority with them, as would
impart to his unjust assertions, with respect to them, the power of
inflicting pain which they would once unquestionably have possessed.
They would be heart-broken if the House passed a resolution which
constituted the grossest libel that was ever put forth against them.
Formerly, said the noble lord, they were full of vigour and life under
a better system; now they were deprived of every comfort, penned up on
board of ships which were rendered prisons to them, and their health
injured by defective sustenance.
“Now he had to state an improvement in the condition of those men
whose hardships the noble lord had deplored, which would enable them
to form fair conjectures as to the justice of his statement in
general. A practice had been adopted within these few years of
granting seamen leave of absence on a plan more liberal and better
adapted to promote their comfort than any that had been previously
thought of. When a ship returned from a foreign station, all the men
who had three years pay due to them got leave of absence for three
months, for the purpose of enabling them to visit their friends; if
the individuals were Scotch or Irish the time was prolonged. This
practice was now so well understood, that every ship’s company looked
upon it as a matter of right, and he was ready to say that though ill
effects had been expected to result from it, the expectation had been
found delusive. Several officers had anticipated desertion, others a
relaxation of discipline; but, he was happy to have to state, that so
far from their expectations being answered, the men returned to their
duty with their minds refreshed—new strung, and better fitted for the
toils imposed on them by their duty; and much fewer desertions took
place since the adoption of such a system of indulgence than before
it. He stated this to show what a tissue of false promises, as well as
false inferences, were contained in the resolution of the noble lord.
“The noble lord’s resolution asserted that there was no fair system of
promotion in the navy; that everything was conducted upon a principle
of corruption. Was, then, the commission of the noble lord himself
given him upon such a principle? Did he obtain the red ribbon, which
was before him never given to an individual of his rank, through
corruption? Was it through corruption that a relative of the noble
lord’s had made his way to the top of his profession, and had been
appointed governor of Guadaloupe? Was it through corruption that the
influence of the noble lord had had considerable weight in effecting
the promotion of those persons on whose behalf he had used it? He was
aware that an answer to this last question in the affirmative might be
grounded upon the assumption that the naval acquaintance of the noble
lord were persons of little worth, and such as could owe their
promotion to nothing but corruption. But he who well knew the reverse
would not allow him even this miserable refuge. Was the promotion of
Captain Duncan the effect of corruption? Were the honours which that
gallant officer’s father had obtained the result of corruption? The
friends of the noble lord had felt the benefit of his interference,
and much was it to be wished that it had been confined to promote
their wishes, and through them the interest of the country, and had
never been mischievously exercised on such occasions as the present.
Did not the noble lord recollect, when he had left his ship, that he
had been consulted as to who was the fittest to succeed him, and that
his recommendation had been acted upon?[87] If indeed he had never
left that ship it would have been well for his own reputation, as it
would have been well for the interests of his country. Most heartily
did he wish the noble lord had stayed in her to be serviceable to the
public instead of coming here to be the reverse. The noble lord loved
to deal in generals. He talked loud about corruption, but he wished
him to state who paid and who received the wages of corruption.
“He was conscious that he had spoken with much heat, and hoped for the
indulgence of the House; but he could not say that he had not meant to
reprehend, and that with as much severity as he could use, the conduct
of the noble lord; that he did not mean to set in as strong a light as
possible the futility of those labours for six months’ duration, which
had so engrossed the noble lord, that he had been unable to attend his
parliamentary duties; and which he now imagined would enable him to
call out in triumph to his constituents, ‘Behold, if I have appeared
to desert my duty, I have only appeared to do so; I have not spent my
time in idleness. Here are the fruits of my industry; here is the
operose conclusion of my labours, and the debt you, my constituents,
suppose me to have contracted, you now find fully liquidated.’
“Now, I beg the House to recollect that these accusations of the noble
lord have not been couched in fleeting and evanescent speech, but have
been regularly arranged in a written document, which it is the wish of
the noble lord should be studied by every member in the leisure which
the cessation of parliamentary duty will allow him. The noble lord, I
contend, has taken a very unfair method of conveying his opinion; he
would have acted more fairly in making them the subject of a pamphlet.
If he had done so, I certainly have not much time for writing, but out
of respect for the noble lord, I should certainly have answered him,
and I should have been glad of the opportunity of answering him when I
could have used freely those terms which he had deserved should be
applied to him. I must express my sanguine hope that the house will
not, by adopting such motions as those moved by the noble lord,
sanction the gross libel which they contain against the navy, against
parliament, and against the country. I wish to lay aside all little
considerations to suppose that the resolutions are not meant to apply
more to the persons now engaged in the management of our naval affairs
than their predecessors; but if it be otherwise, still I wish to sink
any feeling that might be supposed to arise in my mind in consequence,
and to answer the noble lord only as the defender of that gallant body
of men who have stood so long forward as our firmest bulwark against
the vileness of our foe, and who are well entitled to the warmest
feeling of gratitude we can cherish towards them. I hope, therefore,
that if the noble lord does dare to push the House to a division, that
he will be left in a minority such as will not merely mark their
sense, but also their indignation.”
-----
Footnote 84:
The American merchant service.
Footnote 85:
I had given notice.
Footnote 86:
The truth of the matter will appear in the second debate.
Footnote 87:
For a refutation of this see chap. vii.
-----
The reader will not fail to observe the way in which the resolution was
met by the Secretary of the Admiralty, Mr. Croker. In defiance of the
fact that the notice required by the regulations of the House _had_ been
given, Mr. Croker openly accused me of discourtesy for _not having given
proper notice_! He then stated that he was “_unprepared_” to meet the
resolution; whilst his next words in the same sentence were, that the
facts set forth in the resolutions were _positive falsehoods, “wholly
unfounded in fact!”_ This being the mode in which Mr. Croker now chose
to meet all unpleasant resolutions relating to the navy when originating
with myself, well knowing that _they could neither be contradicted nor
controverted_!
In order to show the efficiency of our navy, Mr. Croker then instanced
two of our ships, the _Java_ and the _Macedonian_, both of which were in
a high state of discipline; but he did not notice the fact of one of
those which had been defeated by the enemy from the inefficient state of
their crews and the inadequacy of their equipment, to both which facts
numbers of officers now living can testify. I do not know whether I am
justified in bringing forward an anecdote which I have heard from Sir
Charles Napier, who had the misfortune to command one of these miserable
craft; viz. that expecting shortly to engage a United States frigate
which bore down upon him, he sat down and wrote a letter to the
Admiralty in case of his capture or death, informing their lordships
that his frigate had been lost from inefficiency of her crew and
equipment, when, to his surprise, the American sheered off, and he was
in no condition to follow. I have no doubt the gallant admiral will
repeat the anecdote to any one whom it may interest.
Mr. Croker stated, that so far from the Admiralty demanding 80_l._ for
the discharge of a seaman, they only demanded 40_l._, and sometimes not
more than 20_l._ In the course of the debates it will be shown that in
some cases the seamen in reality paid 90_l._ The man who made the former
statements should not have asserted that mine were _false_. Even the
stale trick of “virtuous indignation,” the invariable resort of a
practised orator when he has nothing better to say, was here out of
place, otherwise than to indicate to the partisans of the Government the
course to be pursued.
Further, Mr. Croker himself admitted the bad condition of the navy by
saying, now that it suited his purpose, “_he had to state an improvement
in the condition of the men_.” The instances which he adduced in proof
were unfounded in fact or practice, so that my only way to meet Mr.
Croker’s assertions was of necessity to imitate his example when
commenting on mine, viz. to deny them _in toto_.
Mr. Croker’s allusion to my own career as an instance of promotion apart
from political corruption, was amusing; the inference being that nothing
but actual deeds could possibly command promotion! His adducing the case
of promotion by the exercise of my influence, was pure invention, the
rule of the Admiralty being that _no man, whatever his deserts, should
be promoted on my recommendation_. In the first volume I gave the
instances of Lieut. Parker, my first lieutenant in the _Speedy_, and
Lieut. Haswell in the _Pallas_[88], for neither of whom could I obtain
promotion till, from my presence in the House of Commons, it was no
longer deemed politic to withhold it. Even then, in the case of poor
Parker, a mock promotion was given which proved his ruin and that of his
family, who were afterwards plunged in the lowest depths of poverty.
-----
Footnote 88:
See vol. i. p. 150.
-----
Claptrap of this nature was considered a sufficient reply to my
resolutions, which embraced the whole subject of the abuses of naval
administration. The object was to mislead the House, ignorant as it was
of facts, and to throw doubt on my statements, though these had been
carefully based on the clearest evidence.
The oratorical display of Mr. Croker was met by my excellent colleague
Sir Francis Burdett. As no opportunity has occurred in the course of
this work whereby the reader may judge of the comprehensive nature of
his parliamentary efforts over any to which I could make pretension, I
will adduce the speech of the honourable baronet on this occasion.
“SIR FRANCIS BURDETT said that the honourable secretary had indulged
in a warmth and severity of animadversion which the occasion by no
means justified. His noble friend had asserted much, and the
honourable gentleman had _denied_ much, and that on a very important
subject; _but it remained to be seen who was in error_. He was willing
to admit that the late period of the session rendered the motion
inexpedient; but he conceived that if his noble friend was induced to
withdraw it, he would feel himself in duty bound to bring it forward
at an early period of the ensuing session, when, of course, the
present strong objections to it would be removed.
“The honourable member had taxed his noble friend with exaggeration,
but it was impossible to conceive anything more exaggerated _than the
whole of the honourable gentleman’s speech_. He had stated his noble
friend to have described our seamen as having wholly lost the energy
and valour which had once distinguished them. Now, his noble friend
had never so described them. He had stated that their spirits were
_depressed_ by long confinement and various other hardships, but he
had never stated that their hearts were subdued, or that when brought
into action they did not forget everything, but that they had their
own character and the character of their country to support.
“The honourable baronet then proceeded to contend that as it was not
denied that in some cases the sum of 80_l._ was taken for the
discharge of a seaman, his noble friend’s assertion on that head _had
not been refuted_, and went on to remark on the impropriety of the
harbour-duty men being mixed with convicts (“No, no,” from the
Treasury benches). He knew nothing of the matter, and therefore would
support the inquiry, because the facts stated were of the last
importance, and it ought to be generally known whether they were
correct or incorrect. He hoped his noble friend would not withdraw his
resolutions without giving notice that he would bring them again under
the consideration of the House at an early period of next session.”
“LORD COCHRANE replied. He said he was not displeased at the warmth
with which his proposition had been met. It certainly would be
injurious to no one except to the feelings of certain members of that
House. The honourable secretary had met his statements with individual
instances of gallantry. The existence of these he had not denied. But
he asserted that the physical power of our seamen was decreasing
partly from the length of the war and partly from the system of
harbour-duty established in 1803, from which service decayed seamen
re-entered the navy. He had heard that the system was about to be
changed; and he should be happy to learn from the honourable secretary
that such was the fact.
“The honourable secretary had challenged him to show him an instance
of a petty officer having purchased his discharge from such service.
He would name a William Ford, who had served with him in the
_Impérieuse_, who had done so, Nelson, his coxswain, and a person of
the name of Farley, who had been returned to him and died on board
completely worn out in the service. These were facts which he was
prepared to prove at the bar, as he was all those which had been
denied with so much warmth by the honourable secretary.
“To show further that the crews of British ships of war were unequal
to themselves heretofore, he would relate what was the opinion of a
person not at all likely to be disaffected to the order of things—he
was the son of a bishop, who had taken an American privateer, the crew
of which consisted of only 130 men; and he had declared publicly, that
_he would rather have them than the whole of his own crew, consisting
of 240_. If the honourable secretary doubted this fact, he might
inquire, and he would easily verify it. The noble lord had heard that
the sailors taken prisoners by the Americans had been found running
away into the back settlements; that forty of them had been brought
back by force, and that from the manifestations of this propensity the
exchange of prisoners had been broken off.
“The lateness of the period at which he had brought forward his
resolution had been complained of. He did intend to bring in a bill to
limit the term of service, but circumstances had prevented him; but he
would carry his intention into effect in the next session. With
respect to parliamentary influence, the honourable secretary had asked
whether _he had found it of service to himself in his profession_? He
certainly had not, because _he had never prostituted his vote for that
purpose; but he knew others who had found that influence of great
avail_!! When he again brought forward the subject he should prove all
the facts he had adduced, and he hoped so much ignorance of important
facts would not then be found to prevail. He had chosen the present
form of his motion in order to put his statements on record in a way
not susceptible of misrepresentation.”
“MR. CROKER replied that the Government had at all times been very
watchful over the harbour-duty, but that it had not taken _any new
steps_[89] since the suggestions of the noble lord. He had never heard
of any disposition in the seamen, taken by the Americans, to run away
to the back settlements; nor of forty men being brought back by force.
The exchange of prisoners was broken off in consequence of some wrong
done to the British seamen, and not in consequence of any fault of
theirs.”
The resolution was then negatived without a division.
-----
Footnote 89:
He had just said there was a great improvement in the condition of the
seamen.
-----
Astonished at the result of the debate, which, by negativing my
resolutions without a division, amounted to a decision of the House that
the naval administration of the country required neither amendment nor
even investigation, and that the platitudes of the Secretary of the
Admiralty formed a sufficient answer to the subjects sought to be
inquired into, it was determined by the few independent members of the
House that the subject should be renewed during the present session,
notwithstanding that the prorogation of Parliament was at hand.
Accordingly, Sir Francis Burdett gave notice of a motion respecting
seamen’s wages and prize money, this being the form in which the renewed
debate, on the 8th of July, took place.
“SIR FRANCIS BURDETT called the attention of the House to the motion,
of which he had yesterday given notice, respecting the difficulties
which presented themselves to the obtaining by the relatives of
deceased seamen and marines the proper information and the means of
recovering the wages and prize-money due to them on the ships’ books.
The bonds required of the clerks in the navy pay office, to prevent
them from giving the necessary information, which might be applied
for, were, in his opinion, more calculated to produce fraud and
mischief than to be of any real utility. They would, in fact, be
subject to become the instruments of collusion between the persons in
possession of the means and information, and persons desirous of
converting those means to their own fraudulent views and emolument.
“If these bonds were of real benefit, and operated, as it had been
represented, to prevent imposition, he would ask, why were they not
introduced into other branches of the navy department where the clerks
were as well acquainted with the sums respectively due as in the
pay-office? He could not discover any satisfactory or solid reason for
continuing the practice or confining it to one particular office. It
seemed to him that the best mode both of preventing frauds and of
giving to the relatives of deceased seamen fair and easy opportunities
of ascertaining the amount of what was due to them on the ships’
books, would be to publish the names of such seamen and marines every
six months in the _Gazette_, with the sums due to them respectively at
the time of their death. He concluded with moving ‘That every six
calendar months a list be published in the _Gazette_ of the unclaimed
wages and prize-money due to deceased seamen and marines upon the
books of His Majesty’s ships of war, expressing the places where they
were born.’”
“MR. CROKER said that the honourable baronet had made no statement to
justify the House in agreeing either to the propositions he had
advanced in his speech, or to the motion which he had made. He could
not perceive any ground stated by the honourable baronet for
convincing the House that the practice of which he complained ought to
be altered, and a new system introduced. Was it not right that the
lower clerks should be prevented from disclosing that information
which was in other places _at all times to be had_? Was the Treasurer
of the Navy, the Secretary of the Admiralty, or the Comptroller of the
Navy more obscure than any one of the petty clerks who had entered
into the bonds of which the noble lord had complained? Was it not
their duty to supply the information when duly applied for; and was
there any charge preferred, or any case made out, of their having
refused to do so?”
This mode of meeting the case showed, beyond a doubt, the justice of the
complaint and the necessity for the acquiescence of the House in the
motion of the honourable baronet. Sir Francis complained that bonds were
taken of the clerks, subjecting their securities to penalties and
themselves to dismissal if they gave information of any matters within
their respective departments. Mr. Croker not only admitted but justified
this, on the ground that it was the duty of the Secretary of the
Admiralty and the Comptroller of the Navy to supply the information
“_when duly applied for_.”
Before commencing his attack on me, Mr. Croker curtly informed Sir
Francis that “if he wished to know what became of the wages and
prize-money which remained due to the seamen, he would tell him. It was
_carried to the chest at Greenwich_. The interest was employed in paying
the pensions of meritorious seamen, and the capital was preserved
untouched for the claimants whenever they might appear.”
Had this been in reality the case, Mr. Croker would _gladly have proved
the fact to the House_, as an answer to my previous motion for all
papers relating to Greenwich. In place of so doing, he made it
convenient—as has been shown in a former chapter—to stay away from the
House during the debate on that motion, which it was “his duty” to meet.
After I had quitted the House, he then appeared in his place and said
that my statements were without any foundation in fact, though he had
not listened to them! and could only have heard them at second-hand from
those whose interest it was to misrepresent what I had said. Imagine a
secretary of the treasury pursuing the same course and adopting the same
language in the present day, and the reader will have little difficulty
in arriving at the motives or the accuracy of Mr. Croker’s imaginary
statements, in reply to one who made the Navy his _entire study_, and
was practically acquainted with everything relating to its
administration.
The preceding reply was all that was vouchsafed to the honourable
baronet, Mr. Croker converting the subject into a lengthened attack on
me, a course which the House permitted without question. As the speech
of the Secretary of the Navy admitted of easy refutation, and as—amongst
civilised persons in modern times—it tells far more against himself than
against me, Mr. Croker shall enjoy the benefit of it with posterity.
“He was happy to see the noble lord opposite in his place (Lord
Cochrane), as he would give him the opportunity of making amends for
the mis-statement of which he had been guilty on a former evening. He
could now flatly contradict the noble lord’s assertions in point of
fact, as he had before contradicted them in point of principle. The
first case was that of William Ford. The noble lord had stated that
William Ford had paid 80_l._ for his discharge from harbour-duty. He
had not paid 80_l._ nor any other sum for his discharge. The fact was
directly contrary. William Ford was an able seaman on board the
_Impérieuse_, the very ship commanded by, and which exposed the
ignorance of, the noble lord. Ford’s wife wrote a letter to him
requesting her husband’s release on providing proper substitutes. It
was attended to by the Admiralty and Ford was discharged, having never
been invalided, and having been favoured by those very arrangements on
which the noble lord had founded this charge.
“The next case stated by the noble lord was that of J. Milton, his
coxswain. The assertion made by the noble lord was, that John Milton,
after being invalided for harbour-duty, and a Greenwich pensioner, had
also paid 80_l._ for his discharge.
“Now, what would the House think of the veracity of the noble lord
when he could prove beyond a possibility of doubt that J. Milton was
neither a harbour-duty man nor a Greenwich pensioner? He had also
received a letter from J. Milton’s wife requesting the Board to
discharge her husband upon the usual provision of substitutes being
made. A compliance with the prayer of the letter took place, and her
husband was discharged. He surely, after such misrepresentations,
would not be thought to go too far in maintaining that the noble
lord’s assertions should have little or no weight, since it was so
very clearly proved that he was ignorant of what passed in his own
ship. John Milton, however, after having been discharged, contrived,
through the means of Gawler, whose frauds he himself had detected, to
obtain upon a false certificate _a pension of 12l. a year from
Greenwich_. The fraud was discovered, and the pension was withdrawn.
“But the noble lord did not seem satisfied with exposing his own
ignorance, where he had the best opportunities of being informed; he
went much farther, he exposed his own faults and condemned himself.
The noble lord declared he had discharged sixty men belonging to the
_Pallas_ in consequence of their incapacity, and risked all the
responsibility of the measure at the hazard of a court-martial. If the
noble lord did so, he would tell the noble lord he had done that which
he ought not to have done—he had falsified the books of the ship
entrusted to his honour and care. (Hear, hear.) For the books which he
had signed with his own hand contradicted his positive assertion. The
fact was, that fifteen men only were discharged from the _Pallas_
within the period mentioned by the noble lord; no such entry there
appeared; and he could not have exchanged them for supernumeraries,
because from these books it was seen that only twenty-nine
supernumeraries had been taken on board.”
When I said that Ford had been obliged to pay 80_l._ for his discharge,
instead of the representation being false the amount was much
_understated_. He had been compelled to find _four substitutes, which
cost ninety pounds!_ and was then, as a matter of course, discharged
without further personal payment. The case of Milton was a matter of
veracity between myself and Mr. Croker. I offered to prove to the House
that Milton _had paid nearly 100l._ for _substitutes_, which Mr. Croker
construed into paying _nothing_, for his discharge, an offer which Mr.
Croker did not accept, though he admitted the substitutes! which had
been provided—a fact which he did not attempt to disprove otherwise than
by his own perverted statements. As Mr. Croker himself said “_he had
contradicted_ my main assertion; how _did I get rid of that_?” Not
anticipating an attack on myself, I had not come to the House prepared
with documents, so that the only way in which I could possibly have got
rid of Mr. Croker’s “_contradictions_” would have been to imitate his
example, viz. to convert myself into a bully for the sake of outbullying
him, a resource from which I was, as a gentleman, averse. My reply,
presently to be adduced, will, I have no doubt, be sufficiently
satisfactory to the reader.
Again, Mr. Croker appealed to the House whether my veracity was to be
depended upon, for having stated that Milton was a Greenwich pensioner,
and in the same breath himself stated that _he was one!_ though through,
as he alleged, a false certificate obtained from another man, about
which, if true, I could have known nothing except from Admiralty
investigations, which were kept secret. All I could have known was, that
when Milton’s case was brought under my notice he _was_ a Greenwich
pensioner, which Mr. Croker, when appealing to the House not to trust my
veracity, confirmed by stating “_that he had a pension of 12l. a year
from Greenwich_!”
Mr. Croker’s explanation with regard to Farley was even less to his
credit. My complaint to the House had been that Farley, a man useless
from hard service, had been returned to me on board the _Impérieuse_,
and that he had died completely worn out. As an instance of my want of
veracity, Mr. Croker assured the House that “he was not invalided for
harbour-duty, neither _died in the service_.” The fact was, that the man
was not invalided at all till within a few days of his death, when,
unable to return to his friends, I retained him on board from a motive
of humanity after his discharge, and he _died on board the Impérieuse_.
Mr. Croker spoke truth when he said he “was not invalided for
harbour-duty, and that he did not die in the service;” but he most
unwarrantably concealed truth when he suppressed the circumstances under
which the man _really died_, which were more disgraceful to the nation
than invaliding a worn out man for harbour-duty.
Unworthy as was this course, it was as nothing compared with what fell
from the lips of Mr. Croker in the subsequent portion of his address to
the House; in which address he asserted that my resolutions were “gross
and scandalous libels against the honour, the valour, and the character
of the British navy”—accused me of having traduced the commander of the
_Java_ and _Macedonian_, though the names of either ships or their
commanders had never passed my lips, nor were in my thoughts—and wound
up by asserting that I had _grossly libelled Captain Broke of the
Shannon frigate_!!! though I had never mentioned the name of one or the
other in the House, and only regarded them either in or out of the House
with the highest admiration!
As this would be incredible were I not to introduce Mr. Croker’s own
words, I shall do so without abridgment. 1st, to show the impudence of
the falsehood, and 2ndly, as a really clever tribute to the gallant
Captain Broke, had it been uttered in common honesty and not to get rid
of Sir Francis Burdett’s motion; which was thus converted into a pretext
of vilifying me in such language as no modern House of Commons would for
a moment tolerate.
“Having shown, he trusted, to the satisfaction of the House, the
ignorance and unfounded statement of the noble lord, he could not
suffer the present opportunity to pass by without also showing that
the resolutions lately proposed by his Lordship were gross and
scandalous libels against the honour, the valour, and the character of
the British navy. The noble lord appeared to be peculiarly and most
unseasonably unfortunate both in his mis-statements and libels. It was
not necessary for him to tell either the noble lord or the House that
he alluded to the gallant action fought by the _Shannon_ frigate with
the _Chesapeake_ American frigate. The communication which he was
about to make to the House had not been sought for or prepared by him.
It had presented itself to him as if from a divinity to confute and
confound the noble lord’s misrepresentations and libels, and rescue
the honour of the British navy from unfounded aspersions, and raise
the glory of the British flag still higher than ever. As _he was
coming to the House the official information of that glorious
engagement was put into his hands_!! He should not trouble the House
at any length with the character of Captain Broke, who commanded the
_Shannon_. It would be sufficient for him to say that Captain Broke
was an officer no less distinguished for his indefatigable activity
and unwearied enterprise than for his skill and valour. With many
occasions of making and preserving the valuable prizes which must have
materially contributed to increase his private fortune, he had
uniformly preferred the cause of his country and the good of the
service to his own interests. Cases had even occurred, when, although
he might have fairly preserved his prizes, he rather chose to send
them, with all they contained, to the bottom of the sea than let any
opportunity slip in which his exertions and co-operation could be
useful in another quarter. The action which he fought with the
_Chesapeake_ was in every respect unexampled. It was not—and he knew
it was a bold assertion which he made—to be surpassed by any
engagement which graced the annals of Great Britain; the enemy’s ship
was superior in size, superior in weight of metal, superior in
numbers. She entered into the contest with the previous conviction of
all her superior advantages, and with a confirmed confidence of
victory resulting from that conviction. All this superiority served
but to heighten the brilliancy of Captain Broke’s achievement. What,
continued Mr. Croker, will, or rather what can, the noble lord say
now? Will he persist in still maintaining that the captures made by
the Americans have been caused by the decayed and disheartened state
of our seamen, and not by the enemy’s superiority in numbers and
weight of metal? He begged leave to assure the House, that he had not
introduced the account of the glorious victory gained by Captain Broke
as a single instance of the success of one of our frigates; but it had
come so opportunely to confound the noble lord’s statement and confute
his misrepresentations, that he felt he would be doing an act of
injustice to our gallant officers and seamen, to the House, and to the
country at large were he to pass it over unnoticed, at a moment so
peculiarly fitted and seasonable for its introduction. It was not, he
knew, the day or the hour which could enhance the value and glory of
Captain Broke’s great achievement, nor had he any occasion to
strengthen by its effects his arguments and statements against the
noble lord, for he sincerely believed there could not be any day or
hour in the course of the year in which he would not have more than
ample means of contradicting and disproving such assertions as the
noble lord had made on this occasion. Mr. Croker concluded with
observing that he trusted he had shown not only the impropriety, but
the danger of adopting the motion proposed by the honourable baronet.”
The reader may possibly inquire what this tirade could possibly have to
do with Sir Francis Burdett’s motion? or with anything that I had said?
He may wonder too that the House should have patiently listened for an
hour to an imaginary charge against me _for what I had never said_! and
the Secretary of the Navy’s refutation of a charge _which his own
ingenuity had trumped up_! In our day it could not be that gentlemen by
birth or education should have endured such claptrap, when its object
was to malign one of their own body without a shadow of foundation for
the malice displayed. The history of the period, however, so fully
details the reasons for all this, that I may be spared the trouble of
recapitulating them.
Unpractised in oratorical arts, whether professionally or as the hired
advocate of a faction, my reply may appear tame; yet what it lacked in
eloquence it made up by facts which had been _contradicted_, because
they could not be _impugned_.
“LORD COCHRANE admitted all that could be said of the gallantry of our
seamen; but maintained that a great and a rapid decay had been
produced in their physical powers by the cause to which he had felt it
his duty to call the attention of the House. He was pleased that he
had done so in the form of a resolution which could neither be
misrepresented or misquoted without detection. It was in the
recollection of the House that he had not cast the slightest
reflection either on officers or men, collectively or individually,
although the honourable secretary had chosen to defend them in both
cases. Such a line of conduct might be best calculated to excite a
feeling of disapprobation towards him (Lord Cochrane) in the minds of
those who had not attended to the subject, but it was not an
honourable or a candid mode of proceeding to put _words into his mouth
and then argue to refute them_. He had never mentioned the name of
Captain Broke or alluded to him in the slightest degree, although the
secretary had spared no pains to defend him. Captain Broke had done
his duty; his men proved adequate to the task he had imposed upon
them; but, if his information was correct, the _Shannon_ was the only
frigate on the American station in which the captain would have been
justified in trusting to the physical strength of his crew.
“The honourable secretary seemed to flatter himself, from the exulting
manner in which he had delivered his speech, that he had also
_refuted_ those facts, which he (Lord Cochrane) did state. ‘Ford,’
says he, ‘did not pay 80_l._ for his discharge, or any other sum.’ But
does not the honourable secretary know that this man raised _four
substitutes_, and that he (W. Ford) could not procure them otherwise
than by money?[90] Was not the difficulty of getting seamen such that
the Admiralty demanded four men for the discharge of one? Under such
circumstances it was obvious that the navy was manned not by the
national bounty or the prospect of reward from the service, but out of
the funds of those who had long served their country. The noble lord
pledged himself to establish at the bar of the House every
circumstance stated in the resolutions which he had moved on a former
evening. Ford, he repeated, paid 90_l._ for his discharge—a sum equal
to all that he could have saved during eighteen years’ service! No man
of feeling could justify the continuance of such a practice.
-----
Footnote 90:
He had paid 90_l._ for them, as I had asserted.
-----
“As to the case of Farley, the honourable secretary assured the House
that he was not invalided for harbour-duty, neither had he died in the
service—facts which will not be deemed important when it is known (and
it can be proved) that this respectable petty officer, who had been in
thirteen general actions, and thirty-two years in the navy, was not
invalided until within a few days of his death; and that, unable to
return to his friends, he died on board the _Impérieuse_. Ought not
seamen to be entitled to their discharge before they are reduced to
this state? Can ships be efficient whilst men so debilitated form part
of their crews?
“It is impossible. The honourable secretary laid particular emphasis
on the case of Milton, as above all the most unfounded of his (Lord
Cochrane’s) unfounded assertions. He had discovered that Milton had
received his pension through Gawler, perhaps this was the easiest way;
but he (Lord Cochrane) knew that Milton deserved that pension, having
been wounded under his command. He was the first man who boarded the
_Tapageuse_ in the river of Bordeaux, when that ship’s corvette was
captured by the boats of the _Pallas_ alone. This led him to observe
that the lieutenant of the _Pallas_, who executed this service was not
promoted by the Admiralty until Sir Samuel Hood’s first lieutenant had
brought out another sloop, long afterwards, from the same place with
the boats of a whole squadron—nor, is it probable that he ever would
have obtained the reward of his gallant conduct, unless the Admiralty
had felt that the one could not longer be neglected if the other was
promoted. So much for impartiality! He pledged himself to prove to the
House the literal fact that Milton _had_ served seventeen years, and
_had paid_ nearly 100_l._ for his discharge. Surely such length of
service should entitle seamen to some deduction from so oppressive an
expense! This was not the case, however; neither was there any period
fixed to which they could look forward as the termination of their
compulsory confinement.
“He (Lord Cochrane) did not accuse the present Admiralty of
originating these abuses; possibly they were even ignorant of their
existence. Boards never listen to individuals, and therefore he had
adopted the present mode of calling the attention of parliament and of
the country to the state of the navy. Could any person have believed
that the Admiralty, instead of _decreasing_ the sum to be paid by
meritorious seamen after long service, actually _increase_ the amount?
He wished that the present first lord would look into his father’s
papers, who had it in contemplation to have made many alterations and
improvements in naval affairs, with which he was well acquainted.
Probably had he remained in office the seamen would have had no cause
now to lament the continuance of those evils of which he (Lord
Cochrane) was desirous to inform the House, with a view that they
might investigate the subject.
“Here the noble lord read an extract from a letter he had received
that morning from a seaman’s wife, the mother of a family, and whose
husband was compelled to pay 60_l._ for a discharge, which left their
children without bread. She owed 7_l._ to her doctor, who had written
to Mr. Croker, stating her extraordinary exertions for her family’s
support as the cause of her illness. The husband after a long service
had but 17_l._ remaining; and he was obliged to go down to Plymouth
before he could get his discharge. Was this the situation in which
British sailors should be placed? He was in the judgment of the whole
navy, and he would prove his facts at the bar. If the honourable
secretary had any feelings they ought to wring his breast, and prevent
him from daring to defend such abuses. He would not detain the House
longer than to say that the army was now a model on which to form the
navy—so much had circumstances changed. Their service was limited, and
officers who did gallant acts were rewarded by promotion and brevet.
He named Lieutenant Johnson, who served under his command in the
Basque Roads, as an instance to prove the unwillingness of the
Admiralty to do justice unless by favour.”
“MR. CROKER would not permit the noble lord to _lead the House away!_
by stating that his material facts had not been _disproved_. He (Mr.
Croker) had _contradicted_ his main assertions. The noble lord had not
got _rid of that_; and if he would give him further opportunities he
would give him _an equally satisfactory answer_!
“LORD COCHRANE admitted that the honourable secretary had
_contradicted_ his assertions, but he defied him to _disprove one
word_ contained in his resolution. As the feelings of his brother
officers might be excited by the statement of the honourable secretary
who had stood forward in their defence, though they had not been
attacked, he would again add, that he had not even thought
disrespectfully of any individual to whom the honourable secretary had
alluded. He admired the gallant conduct of Captain Broke, and asserted
that if the Admiralty did their duty no 38-gun frigate of ours need
shrink from a contest with the Americans.
“LORD COCHRANE repelled with scorn the accusation made against him of
endeavouring to excite dissatisfaction in the navy.”
The end of Mr. Croker’s attack on me was fully answered, viz. that of
averting the attention of the House from Sir Francis Burdett’s motion,
which fell to the ground.
So far I have vindicated myself, I will now appeal to authorities far
more reliable than Mr. Croker.
“You may guess my surprise and disappointment on viewing forty-five of
the most filthy creatures that ever were embarked, sent as part of our
complement.”—(_Letter of Lord St. Vincent to Admiral Markham, quoted
by Brenton._)
If such men were sent as part of the complement of the ship of the
commander-in-chief, the public may judge of the description furnished to
private ships of war. Captain Brenton when confirming the above opinion
of Lord St. Vincent, shall describe them.
“I can vouch for the correctness of the above picture of the men who
used to infest our ships. Their personal appearance, in spite of every
attention, was most miserable, particularly the importations at
Plymouth. I remember being ordered on a survey of _some of them in
1811_; and so truly wretched and unlike men did they appear, that I
took portraits of them, which I gave to Captain Nash, of the _Salvador
del Mundo._ _My wonder is that more of our ships were not taken by the
Americans in the late struggle, when it is considered how shamefully
they were manned_”!!—(_Brenton’s St. Vincent_, vol. ii. p. 246.)
Yet for speaking of them in 1813, after our ships were everywhere beaten
by the Americans, I was denounced by Mr. Croker as wanting in veracity!
My arguments all pointed to the reorganisation of a noble service whose
cause of failure was solely attributable to a want of proper ships,
well-trained men, and an armament capable of contending with a nation
which, in this respect, had gone ahead of us.
This is not the place to enter into a description of our disasters in
the American war, or it would be easy for me to show their origin in the
abuses embodied in my resolutions. Nor is it to be wondered at that
seamen who were so ill treated, and who suffered so much in former wars,
should have recounted their sufferings to their descendants, now arrived
at manhood. Which of them, who could obtain a better livelihood, would
be likely, after such a description of the miseries of naval life, to
enter on board an English man-of-war? It was no wonder they preferred
the American service.
Had Mr. Croker been candid, he would, when speaking of the victory of
the _Shannon_, have adduced the fact, which must have been known to the
Admiralty that one-third of the _Chesapeake’s_ crew _were British
seamen_, driven from their own national service by ill-treatment. A man
in Captain Broke’s frigate found his own brother amongst the enemy’s
wounded!
I will adduce the following extracts from Brenton.
“Sir Sidney Smith never spared himself. He was ever present in danger,
and the last to retreat from it. He was equally gallant and
enterprising with his contemporary, Cochrane, but less cautious and
less of a sailor. Both these valuable officers were latterly lost to
the service, because the Admiralty would not, _when they might have
done it_, give them sufficient employment at sea to keep them at
work.” (p. 461.)
“Vernon owed much of his celebrity to his manly and straightforward
dealing in the House of Commons.” (p. 347.)
“The services of the gallant Vernon were rewarded by his _being struck
out of the list by a weak and wicked government_. Vernon was supposed
to have been the author of two pamphlets, reflecting on the conduct of
the Admiralty, and the gallant Admiral very shortly afterwards
received a letter from Mr. Corbett, the secretary, announcing that His
Majesty had been pleased to direct their Lordships _to strike his name
off the list of flag officers_.” (p. 345.)
“If we would have good and faithful seamen to man our ships, we must
give them full and ample remuneration for their services, _with
security from want and penury in old age_. I most earnestly pray God
that the next parliament may have sense and influence enough to listen
to men belonging to our profession who will fearlessly advocate the
cause of our sailors.”—(_Brenton._)
It would not be difficult to multiply these extracts by dozens from
naval writers of this and a subsequent period. These, however, being
well known to students of naval history, need not be recapitulated. The
following extract from a letter of Lord Collingwood, quoted by Brenton,
vol. i. p. 436, embraces the whole subject.
“What day is there that I do not lament the continuance of the war?
Nothing good can happen to us short of peace. Every officer and man of
the fleet is impatient for release from a situation which daily
becomes more irksome to all. I see disgust growing around me very
fast.”
The debates in parliament sealed my fate.
It is, however a remarkable fact, that, notwithstanding my resolutions
respecting the navy were thrown out without a division—that everything I
advanced for the good of the navy was pooh-poohed—and that every fact I
brought forward was flatly denied by Mr. Croker, in his position as
Secretary of the Admiralty—the Government secretly proceeded to adopt
nearly every one of the _reforms which had been originated and advanced
by myself_. Thus instead of _my plans_, my efforts for the removal of
naval abuses became _their plans_!
This would certainly never have been known to me, but for the recent
publication of the “Diaries and Correspondence of the Right Hon. George
Rose,” the Treasurer to the Navy. From this work I will cull a few
extracts. Mr. Rose thus writes:—
“I dined at Lord Mulgrave’s with the Board of Admiralty, to discuss
some points respecting _my plan_ for _ensuring regular_ adjudication
and speedy distribution of the proceeds of prizes.... At the Levee to
day, Mr. Wellesley Pole kissed hands as principal Secretary for
Ireland, and Mr. Croker as his successor as Secretary to the
Admiralty. _I continue to think this last appointment, without any
impeachment of the gentleman’s character_, VERY MUCH TO BE REGRETTED.”
(Vol. ii. p. 411.)
Nothing of the kind, Mr. Rose, Mr. Croker was the only man who could be
found to contradict my facts, and then induce his superiors to act upon
them—to ridicule my plans, and then adopt them. So far from being out of
his place, he was a necessity, since being thoroughly acquainted with
all my plans and aspirations in our days of friendship, he could
effectively defeat my efforts in the House of Commons and profit by them
in Whitehall. Mr. Rose possibly did not suspect the causes for Mr.
Croker’s appointment.
At page 503 of the same work, is an intimation from Mr. Perceval to Lord
Bathurst of “_some future arrangement of the interests of Greenwich
Hospital in prize-money_;” the very subject I had for the first time
introduced into the House under the disadvantage of not knowing what
papers to call for! My motions for the _proper payment of seamen_,
though repudiated in the House, were completely successful in the
Administration, as is shown by the subjoined correspondence between Lord
Melville and Mr. Rose on the subject:—
“Admiralty, September 15th, 1814.
“DEAR ROSE,—I do not trouble you with the inclosed from any special
consideration of the particular case, but as a specimen of a
considerable and increased number which I have of late received. The
circumstance may be accidental, and I have little doubt that the
several instances may be satisfactorily accounted for.... I have no
doubt that real neglect does not occur, but it is very desirable that
there should not be even the appearance of it. On your return to town,
you will probably examine into the subject, with a view to ascertain
whether in the inferior branches of the Pay Office, the business is
conducted to your satisfaction.
“Believe me, &c. &c.
“MELVILLE.”
The business was not conducted to Mr. Rose’s satisfaction, for in his
reply to Lord Melville, he says:—
“I gave the most positive orders, accompanied by strong assurances of
my severe displeasure if they should not be complied with, for
insuring early answers to all applications, and, _finding these
ineffectual_, from not knowing on whom individually to fix blame,
where there was an appearance of neglect, I divided the alphabet
amongst the clerks in the inspection branch, assigning to each certain
letters in it, that I might know with whom the responsibility rested,
who should not perform his duty. That has been followed up by mulcts
and reprimands. At one time I had the whole branch into my room, and
stated to them in the most impressive terms, my fixed determination to
dismiss the first person against whom a well founded complaint should
be made; on which I had _remonstrances for having disgraced the
branch_!
* * * * * * *
“My servants have general orders, never, under any pressure of
business, to refuse admittance to seamen or their relations, or,
indeed, to any poor inquiring person. I have sometimes picked up
stragglers in the country and maintained them till I could ascertain
whether I could be useful to them, _either in getting their
prize-money, or obtaining for them admission to Greenwich
Hospital_!... I have by the aid of a law I brought in, punished
_frauds of every description practised upon the seamen_, even in cases
where _only larger prices have been exacted than ought to have been
paid for articles sold to them_.”
Formidable admissions, truly, despite the virtuous indignation of Mr.
Croker on the supposition that anything could be wrong at the Admiralty.
Yet here, after my attempts at remedying abuses, the Treasurer to the
Navy testifies to the difficulty of seamen obtaining access to the
Admiralty—to their begging about the country in the character of common
tramps for want of their prize-money, whilst even the wounded and aged
required Mr. Rose’s humane intervention to get them a chance of
Greenwich Hospital—to the fact, that frauds of all kinds were practised
upon them—whilst the “_branch which was disgraced_,” by merely being
told of its misconduct, was in the habit of charging to the seamen
“_larger prices than ought to have been paid for articles sold to
them_!!”
I had brought nothing before the House half so bad as this testimony of
the Treasurer of the Navy. Yet for bringing forward what I did on behalf
of the navy, I was, as will presently be seen, hunted on a false
accusation into prison, whilst those who marked me down were quietly
adopting as their own the reforms I had advocated!!
CHAP. XXXVIII.
THE STOCK EXCHANGE TRIAL.
NECESSITY FOR ENTERING ON THE SUBJECT.—LORD CAMPBELL’S OPINION
RESPECTING IT.—LORD BROUGHAM’S OPINION.—HIS LATE MAJESTY’S.—MY
RESTORATION TO RANK.—REFUSAL TO REINVESTIGATE MY CASE.—THE REASONS
GIVEN.—EXTRACT FROM LORD BROUGHAM’S WORKS.—MY FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF DE
BERENGER.—HOW BROUGHT ABOUT.—THE STOCK EXCHANGE HOAX.—RUMOURS
IMPLICATING ME IN IT.—I RETURN TO TOWN IN CONSEQUENCE.—MY
AFFIDAVIT.—ITS NATURE.—IMPROBABILITY OF MY CONFEDERACY.—MY
CARELESSNESS OF THE MATTER.—DE BERENGER’S DENIAL OF MY
PARTICIPATION.—REMARKS THEREON.—SIGNIFICANT FACTS.—REMARKS ON THE
ALLEGED HOAX COMMON ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE.
I now approach a period of my life in which occurred circumstances
beyond all others painful to the feelings of an honourable man. Neglect
I was accustomed to. Despite my efforts to rise superior to the
jealousies of others, it has followed me through life. Exclusion from
professional activity at a period when opportunity for distinction lay
before me, was hard to bear; but I had the consolation of exerting
myself ashore for the benefit of the noble service, in the active duties
of which I was not permitted to participate. But when an alleged offence
was laid to my charge in 1814, in which, on the honour of a man now on
the brink of the grave, I had not the slightest participation, and from
which I never benefited, nor thought to benefit one farthing, and when
this allegation was, by political, rancour and legal chicanery,
consummated in an unmerited conviction and an outrageous sentence, my
heart for the first time sank within me, as conscious of a blow, the
effect of which it has required all my energies to sustain. It has been
said that truth comes sooner or later. But it seldom comes before the
mind, passing from agony to contempt, has grown callous to man’s
judgment. To this principle, I am thankful to say, I have never
subscribed, but have to this hour remained firm in the hope and
confidence that by the mercy of God I shall not die till full and ample
justice of my fellow-men has been freely rendered me.
It may be thought that after the restoration to rank and honours by my
late and present Sovereigns—after promotion to the command of a fleet
when I had no enemy to confront—and after enjoyment of the sympathy and
friendship of those whom the nation delights to honour,—I might safely
pass over that day of deep humiliation. Not so. It is true that I have
received those marks of my Sovereign’s favour, and it is true that from
that day to the present I have enjoyed the uninterrupted friendship of
those who were then convinced, and are still convinced of my innocence;
but _that unjust public sentence has never been publicly reversed, nor
the equally unjust fine inflicted on me remitted_; so that if I would,
it is not in my power to remain silent and be just to my posterity. The
Government of my country has, though often invoked, refused to
re-investigate my case, as impossible in form, and from fear of creating
a precedent. Nevertheless, I will, repugnant as is the subject, re-state
the facts, and, posterity being my judge, have no fear as to the
verdict. The coronet of my ancestors, and the honour of my family, which
will, in the course of nature ere long be committed to the keeping of a
devoted and sensitively honourable son, demand no less at my hands.
It must not, however, be imagined that the recital of leading facts, is
for the first time adopted in pursuance of the dictates of family duty
and affection. Neither would it have been possible to write my
autobiography without entering on this most important and painful
portion of my life, because such an omission would be fatal to my
reputation, as it might be construed into an admission of my
culpability.
At a period before the experience of the present generation, the
circumstances about to be recorded were over and over again submitted to
public judgment, but at a time when the rod of justice was suspended _in
terrorem_ over the public press, which did not venture openly to espouse
my cause on its own merits. Yet even then my efforts were not in vain.
The press, instead of being, as in those days it was, the organ of
ill-concealed public dissatisfaction, has now become the exponent of the
public voice; which, through its medium, is heard and felt throughout
the length and breadth of the land. Though approaching the subject with
distaste, I do so with confidence that my unvarnished tale will not be
told in vain.
For the more ready appreciation of the reader in the present day, as
regards facts, the details of which the lapse of half a century has
nearly obliterated, I may be permitted to introduce the subject by
extracts from the works of two of the most learned and distinguished
lawyers and statesmen of the age in which we live—two noblemen, of whose
learning, of whose judgment and integrity it is unnecessary for me to
say one word, because they are much above my praise, and therefore can
receive no addition from it—viz. Lord Brougham, formerly our Lord High
Chancellor, and Lord Campbell, the present Lard High Chancellor of
England. I will take those of Lord Campbell first, because they embrace
points into which Lord Brougham does not enter, and also because Lord
Campbell, in addition to the dignity which he now adorns, for many years
occupied the same high position as did Lord Ellenborough, when he
presided at the trial to which the reader’s attention is now directed.
Lord Campbell, at page 218, vol. iii. in his valuable work, entitled
“The Lives of the Chief-Justices of England,” says:—
“I have now only to mention some criminal cases which arose before
Lord Ellenborough in later years. Of these, the most remarkable was
Lord Cochrane’s, as this drew upon the Chief-Justice a considerable
degree of public obloquy, and, _causing very uneasy reflections in his
own mind, was supposed to have hastened his end_.”
“Lord Cochrane (since Earl of Dundonald) was one of the most gallant
officers in the English navy, and had gained the most brilliant
reputation in a succession of naval engagements against the French.
Unfortunately for him, he likewise wished to distinguish himself in
politics, and taking the Radical line, he was returned to Parliament
for the city of Westminster. He was a determined opponent of Lord
Liverpool’s Administration; and at popular meetings was in the habit
of delivering harangues of rather a seditious aspect, which induced
Lord Ellenborough to believe that he seriously meant to abet
rebellion, and that he was a dangerous character. But the gallant
officer was really a loyal subject, as well as enthusiastically
zealous for the glory of his country. He had an uncle, named Cochrane,
a merchant[91], and a very unprincipled man, who, towards the end of
the war, in concert with De Berenger, a foreigner, wickedly devised a
scheme by which they were to make an immense fortune by a speculation
on the Stock Exchange.”
“For this purpose they were to cause a sudden rise in the funds, by
spreading false intelligence that a preliminary treaty of peace had
actually been signed between England and France. Everything succeeded
to their wishes; the intelligence was believed, the funds rose, and
they sold on time bargains many hundred thousand pounds of 3 per
cents. before the truth was discovered.”
“It so happened that Lord Cochrane was then in London, was living in
his uncle’s house[92], and was much in his company, but there is now
good reason to believe that he was not at all implicated in the
nefarious scheme. However, when the fraud was detected,—partly from a
belief in his complicity, and partly _from political spite_,—he was
included in the indictment preferred for the conspiracy to defraud the
Stock Exchange.”
“The trial coming on before Lord Ellenborough, the noble and learned
Judge, being himself persuaded of the guilt of all the defendants,
used his best endeavours that they should all be convicted. He refused
to adjourn the trial at the close of the prosecutor’s case, about nine
in the evening, when the trial had lasted twelve hours, and the jury,
as well as the defendants’ counsel, were all completely exhausted and
all prayed for an adjournment. The following day, in summing up,
prompted, no doubt, by the conclusion of his own mind, he laid
_special emphasis on every circumstance which might raise a suspicion
against Lord Cochrane_, and ELABORATELY EXPLAINED AWAY WHATEVER AT
FIRST SIGHT MIGHT SEEM FAVOURABLE to the gallant officer. In
consequence the jury found a verdict of GUILTY against _all_ the
defendants.”
“Next term, Lord Cochrane presented himself in Court to move for a new
trial, but the other defendants convicted along with him did not
attend. He said truly that he had no power or influence to obtain
their attendance, and urged that his application was founded on
circumstances peculiar to his own case. But Lord Ellenborough would
not hear him, because the other defendants were not present. Such a
rule had before been laid down[93], _but it is palpably contrary to
the first principles of justice, and ought immediately to have been
reversed_.”
“Lord Cochrane was thus deprived of all opportunity of showing that
the verdict against him was wrong, and in addition to fine and
imprisonment, he was sentenced to stand in the pillory.[94] Although
as yet he was generally believed to be guilty, the award of this
degrading and infamous punishment upon a young nobleman, a member of
the House of Commons, and a distinguished naval officer, raised
universal sympathy in his favour. The judge was proportionably blamed,
not only by the vulgar, but by men of education on both sides in
politics, and he found upon entering society and appearing in the
House of Lords _that he was looked upon coldly_.
“_Having now some misgivings himself as to the propriety of his
conduct in this affair, he became very wretched._ Nor was the
agitation allowed to drop during the remainder of Lord Ellenborough’s
life, for Lord Cochrane being expelled the House of Commons, _was
immediately re-elected for Westminster_. Having escaped from the
prison in which he was confined under his sentence, he appeared in the
House of Commons. In obedience to the public voice, the part of his
sentence by which he was to stand in the pillory was remitted by the
Crown, and a bill was introduced into Parliament altogether to abolish
the pillory as a punishment, _on account of the manner in which the
power of inflicting it had been recently abused. It was said that
these matters preyed deeply on Lord Ellenborough’s mind and affected
his health. Thenceforth he certainly seemed to have lost the gaiety of
heart for which he had been formerly remarkable._” (Lord Campbell’s
“Lives of the Chief-Justices,” vol. iii. pp. 218, 219, 220.)
-----
Footnote 91:
This is an error. My uncle, an East India merchant, was the Hon. Basil
Cochrane, a highly honourable man, not the one alluded to by Lord
Campbell.
Footnote 92:
It was my uncle Basil with whom I for a time resided.
Footnote 93:
On one special occasion only.
Footnote 94:
This vindictive sentence the Government did not dare carry out. My
high-minded colleague, Sir Francis Burdett, told the Government that
if the sentence was carried into effect, he would stand in the pillory
beside me, when they must look to the consequences. What these might
have been, in the then excited state of the public mind, as regarded
my treatment, the reader may guess.
-----
Such are the recorded opinions of one of the most learned and acute men
of the age, one who now does honour to the judgment-seat of the highest
tribunal of our country; and who, at the time those opinions were given
to the world, held the scarcely less dignified position of Chief-Justice
of England, sitting in the very court in which that cruel sentence—the
unmerited cause of so much misery to me—was pronounced. From such an
authority—as much judicial as historic—may the reader form his own
conclusions.
It is with no less satisfaction that I add the opinions of another
learned and highly gifted peer of the realm, who has also adorned the
dignified office of Lord High Chancellor of England, viz. my friend Lord
Brougham, to whose name, as the untiring advocate of everything
nationally progressive and socially expansive, no testimony of mine
could add weight.
In the year 1844, when I submitted to Her Majesty’s Government how
incomplete I considered the restoration of my honours, I wrote to Lord
Brougham, ever my constant and steadfast friend, to ask his opinion of
the step I was taking. The subjoined was Lord Brougham’s reply:—
“Grafton Street, March 29th, 1844.
“MY DEAR LORD D.—I think, upon the whole, the time is favourable.
“I have well considered the matter as of importance, and have read the
papers through. I don’t think the best way of bringing the subject
before the Duke is to send that correspondence, but rather to make a
statement, and I authorise you distinctly to add to it these two
important facts.
“First, that William IV. only objected to the Bath being restored _at
the same time_ with your rank, and not absolutely at all times.
“Secondly, that your counsel were clearly of opinion that the verdict
as _concerned you was erroneous_, and I always concluded that you had
sacrificed yourself out of delicacy to your uncle, the person really
guilty.
“The restoring you to rank without your honours is too absurd and
unfair. It means ‘we will take all we can get from you in service, and
give you nothing.’
“Yours ever truly,
“H. BROUGHAM.”
No one knew better than His late Majesty, King William the Fourth, the
injustice under which I had laboured, and the causes of the political
spite which had been directed against me. Before His Majesty came to the
throne he warmly interested himself in my behalf, and intimated to Sir
Francis Burdett, that if I were to memorialise the Government, he would
use his influence to procure my restoration. This was accordingly done,
but in vain, His Royal Highness’s influence _then_ proving insufficient
for the purpose, but not so after His Majesty’s accession to the throne.
The following extract of a letter from Sir Francis Burdett, coming
shortly before my restoration to rank, will show the continued interest
taken by His late Majesty and those near him to remove unmerited obloquy
from a brother sailor, notwithstanding the failure of His Majesty’s
previous effort when Duke of Clarence. The same intimation to Sir
Francis Burdett being made, a similar memorial was laid before His
Majesty in Council; this time with effect.
“MY DEAR LORD DUNDONALD,—I went to the Levee on Wednesday to give your
memorial to Greville, the Clerk of the Council, to present—but the
King returned to Windsor immediately after the Levee and no council
was held. Had it been, I can entertain no doubt that your memorial
would have been presented and granted.
“I went to see Greville about it the next day—he was so kind and so
desirous of doing everything in his power to expedite it, even
proposing to take it out of its usual turn, that I cannot but feel
quite satisfied and assured that there will be not a moment’s
unnecessary delay. A little patience and all will be right. I should
like to see you for a day or two, and perhaps may.
“Yours sincerely,
“F. BURDETT.”
My restoration not long afterwards followed, and no one knew better than
His Majesty the justice of reversing the unjust sentence which had so
long and so undeservedly excluded me from a service which from my youth
upwards had been my pride.
I shall ever consider this interference on my behalf as a testimonial
from His late Majesty not only to my innocence, but also to my
unjustifiable persecution, for had he not believed me innocent, His
Majesty would have been the last person to interfere so pertinaciously.
Still less when, on coming to the throne, his former influence had
become authority.
I was not restored to my honours till the reign of Her present Most
Gracious Majesty, and on this restoration being made, I again requested
of Her Majesty’s Ministers a reinvestigation into the causes which led
to my unjust conviction, alleging that my restoration to rank and honour
might be construed into an act of mercy, were not my innocence of the
Stock Exchange hoax fully established. In this sense I addressed the
late Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel. The following was his
Grace’s reply.
“Walmer Castle, Sept. 12th, 1844.
“MY LORD,—I have just received the package from your Lordship,
containing your Lordship’s letter to myself of the 10th inst. and
other papers, which I will peruse with attention according to the
desire and for the purpose expressed in your Lordship’s letter.
“I have the honour to be, &c.
“WELLINGTON.
“Admiral the Earl of Dundonald, &c.”
The reply of Sir Robert Peel was more explicit, and gave as a reason why
my request could not be complied with, that just, or unjust, it was not,
from lapse of time, in the power of the Government to attempt to reverse
a decision in a court of law.
“Whitehall, Nov. 7th, 1844.
“MY LORD,—Her Majesty’s servants have had under their consideration
the letter I received from your Lordship, bearing date the 10th of
September 1844, together with the documents by which that letter was
accompanied.
“On reference to the proceedings which were adopted in the year
1832[95], it appears that previously to the restoration of your
Lordship to your rank in the navy a free pardon under the great seal
was granted to your Lordship, and, adverting to that circumstance, and
to the fact that thirty years have elapsed since the charges to which
the free pardon had reference were the subject of investigation before
the proper judicial tribunal of the country, Her Majesty’s servants
cannot consistently with their sense of public duty advise the Queen
to re-open an inquiry into those charges.
“I beg leave to refer your Lordship to the letter which the Earl of
Haddington, the First Lord of the Admiralty, addressed to your
Lordship in the year 1842—as I am not enabled to make any
communication to your Lordship on the part of Her Majesty’s Government
differing in purport from that letter.
“I have the honour, &c.,
“ROBERT PEEL.
“Admiral the Earl of Dundonald, &c.”
-----
Footnote 95:
My restoration to rank.
-----
Here was the whole secret why I had never been able to obtain an
investigation of my case, and why the Admiralty, which deprived me of
rank and honour, declined to investigate it, notwithstanding that an
appeal from the verdict had been refused by the Court of King’s Bench,
though I had then in court such additional evidence as must have set
aside the verdict, which evidence will shortly be laid before the reader
who will now be in a condition to understand the following explanation
of Lord Brougham, given, under the article “Ellenborough,” in his
“Historic Sketches of British Statesmen in the time of George the
Third.”
“On the bench, it is not to be denied that Lord Ellenborough
occasionally suffered the strength of his political feelings to break
forth and to influence the tone and temper of his observations. That
he ever, upon any one occasion, knowingly deviated one hair’s breadth
in the discharge of his office is wholly untrue. The case which gave
rise to the greatest comment, and even led to a senseless show of
impeachment was Lord Cochrane’s. * * * I must, however, be here
distinctly understood _to deny the accuracy of the opinion which Lord
Ellenborough appears to have formed in this case, and deeply to lament
the verdict of guilty which the jury returned, after three hours’
consultation and hesitation_.
“If Lord Cochrane was at all aware of his uncle Mr. Cochrane
Johnstone’s proceedings, it was the whole extent of his privity to the
fact. Having been one of the counsel engaged in the cause I can speak
with some confidence respecting it, and I take upon me to assert that
Lord Cochrane’s conviction was mainly owing to the extreme repugnance
which he felt to giving up his uncle, or taking those precautions for
his own safety which would have operated against that near relation.
Even when he, the real criminal, had confessed his guilt, by taking to
flight, and the other defendants were brought up for judgment, we, the
counsel, could not persuade Lord Cochrane to shake himself loose from
the contamination by abandoning him.
“Our only complaint against Lord Ellenborough was his Lordship’s
refusal to adjourn after the prosecutor’s case closed, and his
requiring us to enter upon our defence at so late an hour—past nine
o’clock—that the adjournment took place at midnight, and before we
called our witnesses. Of course, I speak of the trial at Guildhall
only. Lord Ellenborough was equally to blame with his brethern in the
Court of King’s Bench for that most cruel and unjustifiable sentence,
which at once secured Lord Cochrane’s re-election for Westminister
when the House of Commons expelled him upon his conviction.
“In 1833, the Government of which I was a member restored this great
warrior to his rank of Admiral in our navy. The country, therefore, in
the event of hostilities, would now have the inestimable benefit of
his services, whom none perhaps ever equalled in heroic courage, and
whose fertility of resources, military as well as naval, place him
high amongst the very first of commanders. That his honours of
knighthood, so gloriously won, should still be withholden is a stain,
_not upon him_, but upon the councils of his country; and after his
restoration to the service, it is as inconsistent and incomprehensible
as cruel and unjust.” (Lord Brougham’s “Historic Sketches.”)
A brief outline of the circumstances which led to the trial will enable
the reader to comprehend the grounds upon which the opinions just quoted
were based.
At the commencement of 1814 I was appointed by my uncle, Sir Alexander
Cochrane, then commanding the British fleet on the North American
station, as his flag-captain; and in the month of February was busily
engaged in getting the _Tonnant_ line-of-battle-ship, then fitting at
Chatham as my uncle’s flag-ship, ready for sea. The presence of Sir
Alexander being imperatively required upon the station, he had
previously quitted England in a frigate; and it had been understood
between my uncle and myself that, on joining him with the _Tonnant_, the
most efficient measures should be adopted to compensate for our late
defeats with the better manned and equipped vessels of the United
States.
Previous to my uncle’s departure at the latter end of 1813, he had, in
pursuance of this object, repeatedly though unsuccessfully applied to
the Admiralty for permission to engage an officer in the Duke of
Cumberland’s regiment of Sharpshooters, as having a reputation not only
for skill in teaching rifle practice, but also for his pyrotechnic
acquirements, as an engineer officer; this proficiency having become
known to Sir Alexander through his brother, who, strongly urged the
employment of the person alluded to, a Captain De Berenger, with whom
Mr. Cochrane Johnstone had been for some time acquainted. It was thus
that I was subsequently brought in contact with a man who eventually
proved my ruin, by involving me in an appearance of complicity in an
attempt to raise the public funds by the dissemination of groundless
news to the prejudice of the Stock Exchange speculators, one of those
common deceptions which, I am told, were then, as now, practised by
parties connected with the transactions of the Stock Exchange.
In the month of January Mr. Cochrane Johnstone invited De Berenger to a
dinner, at which I was present. Towards the close of the evening this
person asked me to step aside with him for the purpose of conversation.
His object was to request me to take him on board the _Tonnant_ in any
capacity, for having failed to obtain the consent of the Admiralty he
would be happy to trust to Sir Alexander’s generosity to employ him in
any situation for which he was qualified. With this view he begged me to
peruse his testimonials as Adjutant of the Duke of Cumberland’s rifle
regiment, as well as other documents of a similar character.
Finding the testimonials satisfactory, I expressed my regret at not
being able to take him in the _Tonnant_ without an appointment, or at
least an order, from the Board of Admiralty; adding, that no person
could possibly have less influence with their Lordships than myself, and
that therefore it was useless for me to apply to them on his behalf,
especially as they had refused the application of Sir Alexander
Cochrane. Knowing, however, that it was the wish of Sir Alexander that
De Berenger should go if possible, I recommended him to exert himself to
secure the influence of those under whom he appeared to have served so
satisfactorily; adding that, if he succeeded, I should have great
pleasure in taking him in the _Tonnant_.
With these prefatory remarks the reader will readily comprehend what
follows:—
About midnight on the 20th of February, according to the current report
of the transactions hereafter to be named, a person calling himself
Colonel de Bourg, aide-de-camp to Lord Cathcart, presented himself at
the Ship Hotel at Dover, representing that he was the bearer of
intelligence from Paris, to the effect that Buonaparte had been killed
by the Cossacks—that the allied armies were in full march for Paris—and
that immediate peace was certain. After this announcement he forwarded
similar intelligence by letter to the Port-Admiral at Deal, with a
view—as was supposed—of its being forwarded to London by telegraph; thus
making the Port-Admiral the medium of communication with the Government.
This person, as was afterwards known to the Stock Exchange only _through
my instrumentality_, was the before-named De Berenger. The intelligence
was false, having been concocted for the purpose of causing a rise in
the public funds.
On the 7th of March, the Committee of the Stock Exchange published an
advertisement offering a reward of two hundred and fifty guineas for the
discovery of the person who had perpetrated the hoax; a report being at
the same time current that the pretended Du Bourg had, on the morning of
the 21st of February, been _traced to my house in Green Street_.
At this time I had joined the _Tonnant_ at Chatham, and was preparing to
sail for the North American station, but on learning the injurious
report above mentioned, and being aware from the ordinary channels of
public intelligence of the nature of the transaction—being moreover
indignant that the perpetrator of the deception should have dared to
visit me, I determined to denounce him, in order that if he were really
the guilty person, his name should be made public at the earliest
possible moment, so that no time might be lost in bringing the matter
home to him.
In pursuance of this determination I obtained leave of absence from the
ship. On my return to town, I found that although the authorities were
ignorant of the name of the person who came to my house on the 21st of
February, public rumour did not hesitate to impute to me complicity in
his transactions, simply from the fact of the suspected person, whoever
he might be, having been there.
To rebut these insinuations was of the first importance. Accordingly I
immediately consulted my legal advisers.
The result was that an affidavit was prepared and submitted to an
eminent barrister, Mr. Gurney, to whom I disclosed every particular
relative to the visit of De Berenger, as well as to my own previous,
though very unimportant transactions, in the public funds. I was advised
by him and my own solicitors to confine myself simply to supplying the
authorities with the name of De Berenger as the person seen in uniform
at my house on the 21st ultimo.
With this suggestion, wisely or unwisely—but certainly in all honesty, I
refused to comply, expressing my determination to account _for all my
acts_ on the 21st of February, even to the entire occupation of my whole
time on that day. Finding me firm on this point, the affidavit was
settled by Mr. Gurney, and sworn to, the name of De Berenger for the
first time thus becoming known to those who were in quest of him. (See
Appendix.)
A circumstance may here be mentioned which has an important bearing on
the subject. My letter to the Admiralty, giving my reasons for asking
leave of absence for the purpose of rebutting the insinuations against
my character, contained most material matter for my exculpation. It was
written to Mr. Secretary Croker, but when I afterwards moved for and
obtained from the House of Commons an order for the production of my
correspondence with the Admiralty, _this letter was not to be found,
though all others asked for were!!_ Had the letter been produced, it
must have had great weight with the House, the adverse decision of which
I mainly ascribe to its nonproduction. Unfortunately, in the haste of
the application, no copy was taken.
I have been particular in recording dates, because it has been
insinuated to my injury that I _had been tardy_ in giving the
information in my power. It is hence my desire to put on record that
_the moment_ the necessity for vindicating myself arose not an hour was
lost by me in giving the Stock Exchange a clue to the offender, if such
De Berenger should turn out to have been.
I will here notice another circumstance, viz. that the very Mr. Gurney
who had advised me in the matter of my affidavit, and to whom I had
unreservedly communicated every circumstance connected with my private
affairs, as well as those connected with the visit of De Berenger, was
afterwards chosen by Mr. Lavie, the _solicitor to the committee, as the
leading counsel for the Stock Exchange at the subsequent trial against
me!_ I simply relate the fact, without comment.
It is not necessary here to weary the reader by the insertion of a
lengthy affidavit, which accounted for every act of mine on the day of
the alleged hoax. The main facts, as relating to the visit of De
Berenger, are these. That early on the morning in question I had gone to
a lamp manufactory in the city, for the purpose of superintending the
progress of some lamps patented by me, and ordered for the use of the
convoy of which I was about to take charge on their voyage to North
America. Whilst thus engaged, my servant came to me with a note, which
had been given to him by a military officer, who was waiting at my house
to see me. Not being able to make out the name, from the scrawling style
in which the note was written, and supposing it to have come from a
messenger from my brother, who was then dangerously ill with the army of
the Peninsula, and of whose death we were in daily expectation of
hearing, I threw down the note, and replied, that I would come as soon
as possible; and, having completed my arrangements at the lamp
manufactory, arrived at home about two hours afterwards, when, to my
surprise, I found De Berenger in place of the expected messenger from my
brother. The reader may gather from my affidavit what occurred at this
interview. (See Appendix.)
The comprehensiveness of the voluntary disclosure contained in the
affidavit has been termed indiscreet, and may have been so, as entering
on much that might be deemed unnecessary. But I had nothing to conceal,
believing it could in no way affect me—nor would it have done so but for
the trickery subsequently resorted to. There was nothing extraordinary
in the document. A poor but talented man—a prisoner within the Rules of
the King’s Bench—came to me in the hope that I would extricate him from
his difficulties by taking him to America in the _Tonnant_. After my
renewed refusal, on professional grounds, De Berenger represented that
he could not return to the Rules in his uniform without exciting
suspicion of his absence. The room happened at the time to be strewed
with clothes, in process of examination, for the purpose of being sent
on board the _Tonnant_, those rejected being thrown aside; and at his
urgent request I lent, or rather gave, him a civilian’s hat and coat to
enable him to return to his lodgings in ordinary costume. This simple
act constituted my offence, and was construed by the Court into
complicity in his fraudulent conduct! though under ordinary
circumstances, and I was aware of no other, it was simply an act of
compassionate good nature.
A very remarkable circumstance connected with this affidavit, and
afterwards proved on the trial, was this—that on De Berenger’s arrival
in town from Dover, he neither went to the Stock Exchange, nor to his
employers, whoever they might be, nor did he take any steps on his
arrival in town to _spread the false intelligence which he had
originated_. He was proved on the trial to have dismissed his
post-chaise at Lambeth—to have taken a hackney-coach—and to have
proceeded straight to my house. The inference is plain, that the man was
frightened at the nature of the mission he had undertaken, and declined
to go through with it, preferring to try once more whether he could not
prevail on me to take him on board the _Tonnant_, where he might remain
till the ship sailed for North America.
Had I been his confederate, it is not within the bounds of credibility
that he would have come in the first instance to my house, and waited
two hours for my return home, in place of carrying out the plot he had
undertaken, or that I should have been occupied in perfecting my lamp
invention for the use of the convoy of which I was in a few days to take
charge, instead of being on _the only spot_ where any advantage to be
derived from the Stock Exchange hoax could be realised, had I been a
participator in it. Such advantage must have been immediate, before the
truth came out, and to have reaped it, had I been guilty, it was
necessary that I should not lose a moment. It is still more improbable,
that being aware of the hoax, I should not have speculated largely for
the special risk of that day.
Neither, had I been his confederate, is it more probable that I should
have declined to take him on board the _Tonnant_, when, by so doing, I
could have effectually concealed him under another name, together with
every trace of the plot, and could have either taken him with me, or
have shipped him in safety to the Continent.
I will here repeat what has been previously stated, that before my
affidavit the committee of the Stock Exchange was ignorant even of the
name of _any_ person, that my affidavit alone disclosed the necessary
information. In other words, _I voluntarily gave the only information
upon which the subsequent trial was based, and this disclosure was so
complete as to leave the Stock Exchange nothing to do but to prosecute
De Berenger_.
Let me ask the common-sense question, whether this was the act of a
guilty person, who by concealing his knowledge could have effectually
prevented all further investigation? Or, to put the question in another
form—would it not have been the act of an insane person, if guilty, to
have denounced another to his own conviction, when by holding his peace
both would have been safe from detection? To have done such an
uncalled-for act, would have been little in accordance with the _acumen_
for which the public had for many years given me credit. In one respect,
my affidavit might have been an error, but it was not the _error of a
guilty man_; viz. in not deferring to the opinion of my legal advisers,
who wished me to confine myself to the single fact that the pretended Du
Bourg had been traced to my house, and that I suspected De Berenger to
be the person.
My fault was, that being conscious—till too late—that nothing in the
whole affair could in any way concern me—I was careless about my
defence—had nothing to do with the brief beyond a few rough notes (see
Appendix)—and never even read it after it was finally prepared for
counsel. This was not the act of a guilty man. Yet, had I been guilty, I
should have had every chance in my favour of acquittal; first, by
concealing the fact that De Berenger was the stranger who came to my
house on the 21st of February, in military uniform—and, without this
voluntary information on my part, the case must have disappeared;
secondly, had I really been guilty, my chance of acquittal would have
been greater than if innocent—because the knowledge of facts which I
must have possessed if guilty, and _could not have possessed_ if
innocent, would have enabled me to make an effectual defence in place of
the aimless defence which was made.
If proof of my non-participation in the hoax were required, it existed,
so far as the statement of such a person was credible, in the
handwriting of De Berenger himself, immediately after my affidavit
disclosing his name in furtherance of the purposes of justice; a
proceeding on my part which might naturally be supposed to embitter him
against me. So far from this being the case, an innate sense of justice
on the part of De Berenger led him to admit even the truth of the
declaration contained in the affidavit as regarded himself.
“13, Green Street, April 27th, 1814.
“SIR,—Having, I trust, given ample time and opportunity to those who
have endeavoured to asperse my character to learn from your own mouth
the circumstances which induced you to call upon me on the 21st of
February last, I feel it now due to myself no longer to delay this my
earnest request, that you will afford me that explanation.
“I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,
(Signed) “COCHRANE.
“Baron de Berenger.”
[De Berenger to Lord Cochrane:—]
“King Street, Westminster, April 27th, 1814.
“MY LORD,—I have the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your
Lordship’s favour, which has this moment been delivered.
“Rest assured, my Lord, that nothing could exceed the pain I felt when
I perceived how cruelly, how unfairly my unfortunate visit of the 21st
of February was interpreted (_which, with its object, is so correctly
detailed in your affidavit_); but my agony is augmented, when I
reflect that acts of generosity and goodness towards an unfortunate
man have been, and continue to be, the accidental cause of much
mortification to you: a fear of increasing the imaginary grounds of
accusation caused me to refrain from addressing you.
“I have the honour, &c.,
“CHAS. RANDOM DE BERENGER.”
The tone of this letter, which, without answering in express terms my
query as to the object of his visit on the 21st of February, declares
the truth of my affidavit as to the same, and also to what occurred
during the short time he remained there.[96] This indisposed me for
further communication with the writer, who, finding such to be the case,
commenced a series of vituperative epistles, the object of which was
evidently the extortion of money. The whole of these letters were
transmitted by me to the public press, without reply or comment, and
were so published at the time.
-----
Footnote 96:
See my affidavit in the Appendix.
-----
A no less important admission emanated from De Berenger. The press had
by some means or other got hold of the fact that this man, whom I had
denounced to the Stock Exchange, was _in communication with certain
members of the Government for the purpose of implicating me_! The
communication does not appear to have resulted in anything further than
was known from my affidavit, and I have reason to know that from fear of
the man’s character, the Government abstained from committing themselves
with him.
“King’s Bench, July 19th, 1814.
“Whereas several newspapers have asserted that I have written to Lord
Sidmouth, whilst others state that I have addressed the committee of
the Stock Exchange, &c. disclosing particulars to prove Lord
Cochrane’s guilt, I feel justified thus solemnly, publicly, and
positively to declare, That, _since my confinement here_, I have
neither written, or otherwise applied, directly or indirectly, to any
of the offices of Government for the purpose of disclosure. That I
have not written to any one on the subject of the 21st of February
last, _since the 11th instant_ (July), excepting one private letter to
Lord Cochrane. That the assertions in the newspapers are totally
false, &c. &c.
“CHARLES RANDOM DE BERENGER.”
The plain inference is, that De Berenger did so _before the trial_, and
whilst he was writing to me that the contents of my affidavit, as
regarded himself, contained the exact truth. That he had such
communication with both Government and Stock Exchange, before the trial,
is beyond doubt, and part of the reasons which warrant my assertion,
that a higher authority than the Stock Exchange was at the bottom of my
prosecution. Deeply degraded as was the man, he affords the strongest
_presumptive_ evidence of my non-participation in the hoax. In the next
chapter I trust to adduce such _positive_ evidence as shall place the
matter beyond doubt.
I do not blame the Judge for not taking these matters into account, for,
confident in my entire innocence, I could not see their importance or
bearing, and did not even communicate them to my solicitor till too
late.
Bitter after-knowledge has however convinced me of the error of
carelessness—even from a consciousness of innocence—when once entangled
in the meshes of law—a word by no means synonymous with justice.
Of the subject of the prosecution itself, I will here say one word. It
was that of one set of stock-jobbers and their confederates trying—by
means of false intelligence—to raise the price of “_time bargains_” at
the expense of another set of stock-jobbers, the losers being naturally
indignant at the successful hoax. The wrong was not then, and still is
not, on the statute-book. Such a case had never been tried before, nor
has it since—and was termed a “conspiracy;” or rather, by charging the
several defendants—of most of whom I had never before heard—in one
indictment, it was brought under the designation of a “conspiracy.” The
“conspiracy”—such as it was—was nevertheless one, which, as competent
persons inform me, has been the practice in all countries ever since
stock-jobbing began, and is in the present day constantly practised, but
I have never heard mention of the energy of the Stock Exchange even to
detect the practice.
I do not make these remarks to palliate deception, even at the expense
of Stock Exchange speculators. My object is, that the present
generation, knowing that in my early life I was imprisoned and fined
1000_l._ for an alleged offence against the Stock Exchange fraternity,
may understand the exact character of the accusation. It is clear that
the influence and vindictiveness with which this most unjustifiable
prosecution was carried out as against me, arose from motives far deeper
than the vindication of stock-jobbing purity, viz. from a desire in more
influential quarters to silence, if possible, an obnoxious political
adversary; the visit of De Berenger to my house, as disclosed by myself,
and his acquaintance with my uncle as before stated, affording a basis
for the accomplishment of this object.
Happily, Providence has implanted in the breast of man an amount of
moral and physical energy proportioned to the wrongs and inflictions he
may be called upon to bear, and, even in my eighty-fifth year, I am
still left sound in mind, and with a heart unbroken, to tell my own
story.
CHAP. XXXIX.
ADMIRALTY INFLUENCE AGAINST ME.—APPOINTMENT OF MR. LAVIE AS
PROSECUTOR.—THE TRIAL.—CRANE, THE HACKNEY COACHMAN.—INDECISION OF
HIS EVIDENCE.—LORD ELLENBOROUGH’S CHARGE, AND UNJUSTIFIABLE
ASSUMPTIONS.—REPORT OF THE TRIAL FALSIFIED; OR, RATHER, MADE UP FOR
THE OCCASION.—EVIDENCE, HOW GOT UP.—PROVED TO BE POSITIVE
PERJURY.—THIS CONFIRMED BY SUBSEQUENT AFFIDAVITS OF RESPECTABLE
TRADESMEN.—ANOTHER CHARGE IN STORE FOR ME, HAD NOT THIS
SUCCEEDED.—THE CHIEF WITNESS’S CONVICTION.—HIS SUBSEQUENT
TRANSPORTATION AND LIBERATION.—AFFIDAVITS OF MY SERVANTS, THOMAS
DEWMAN, MARY TURPIN, AND SARAH BUST.—MY SECOND AFFIDAVIT.—APPEAL
FROM MY CONVICTION REFUSED.—EXPULSION FROM THE HOUSE.—MINORITY IN MY
FAVOUR.
Had I been aware of a very curious coincidence connected with the trial
which followed, my confidence, arising from consciousness of innocence,
would have vanished in an instant; so that instead of indifference about
the result, I should have seen the necessity of meeting every accusation
with the most deliberate caution, supporting the same by every
attainable evidence, in place of no evidence at all.
The fact alluded to is this—that the same Mr. Lavie who had displayed so
much tact on Lord Gambier’s court-martial _was selected as solicitor to
the prosecution in the present case_, to the exclusion of the appointed
solicitor to the Committee of the Stock Exchange! The fact was
significant, as affording additional suspicion that an influence other
and higher than that of the Committee was at work.
As in various publications connected with Lord Gambier’s trial I had
spoken very freely of Mr. Lavie as regarded the fabricated charts,
exposed at the commencement of this volume, there could be no doubt of
his not unreasonable personal animosity towards myself. But when, _after
the trial_, I became for the first time aware that he had been employed
to conduct it, the enigma was solved as to how I, from having
voluntarily given the only information upon which the case could have
originated at all, came to be mixed up in one common accusation with a
number of persons, of most of whose very names I had never before heard.
More than this, it then became but too apparent that from the selection
of Mr. Lavie as prosecuting attorney, I was not so much the subject of a
Stock Exchange prosecution as of the political vindictiveness of which I
have spoken, and which had gone out of the usual course to secure his
services. That there was collusion between a high official at the
Admiralty and the Committee of the Stock Exchange on this point, I do
not hesitate for one moment to assert; nor do I think, from previous
revelations in this work, that many of my readers will be inclined to
differ with me.
I will not, however, dwell upon this matter. Whoever selected Mr. Lavie
had a perfect right so to do, as Mr. Lavie had to accept the conduct of
the case; the result of which is attributable to my being so satisfied
of my own innocence as to decide that an accusation which so little
concerned me ought not to take me from the more important duties in
which I was employed. Had I been aware at the time of Mr. Lavie’s
appointment, I should have known its meaning, and prepared accordingly.
The principal circumstance which was held to have implicated me in the
hoax practised on the Stock Exchange was this:—That (as gathered from my
own voluntary information) De Berenger came to my house on the 21st
February; but that instead of being dressed in a green uniform, as set
forth in my affidavit, he was in scarlet uniform, that being the alleged
costume in which he had disseminated the false intelligence at Dover. If
this point could be proved, it was inferred that I must have had a
motive in wrongly describing the uniform in my affidavit, and that
motive could be none other than my own knowledge of the hoax which had
been perpetrated. How this inference was arrived at will appear in the
sequel.
The main question relied on by the prosecution related to the colour of
De Berenger’s coat, whether _scarlet_ or _green_: the point held by the
Court being, that if _scarlet_, I must have made a false declaration in
my affidavit as to its colour, and therefore must have at least known
how De Berenger had been engaged. A _non sequitur_ truly, but
nevertheless the one relied on for my conviction as one of the
conspirators.
The evidence was this—that when De Berenger arrived from Dover at the
Marsh Gate, Lambeth, he exchanged the post-chaise in which he had been
travelling for a hackney coach, in which he drove to my house,—which was
true enough. The waterman on the stand was called as the first link in
the chain; but as he said “he did not see that he could recollect De
Berenger, having only seen him for half a minute,” (_Report_, p. 120,)
this evidence is not worth commenting on, unless to remark that, failing
to recognise De Berenger in court, the extraordinary course was taken of
pointing him out, and then asking the witness if “he _thought_ he _was
like_ the man who got into the coach?” The reply was “he _thought_ he
was, but he only saw him for half a minute.”—(_Ibid._)
The next witness brought forward was a man named Crane—the hackney
coachman who drove De Berenger. In his examination, Crane did not say a
word about the colour of De Berenger’s coat, but in his
cross-examination swore that he had on a “red coat underneath his great
coat” (_Report_, p. 124). At the same time he stated that De Berenger
had with him “_a portmanteau big enough to wrap a coat in_.” Other
witnesses proved that he had drawn down the sun blinds in the vehicle,
so that he had abundant opportunity to exchange his red coat in which he
appeared at Dover, for the green sharpshooter’s uniform, and this no
doubt he had done. The person of whom the red uniform had been purchased
also deposed, that he had carried it away from his shop in a
portmanteau, so that there was no doubt of the capacity of the latter to
contain the coat. In short, he left London in the uniform of the rifles,
and put on the scarlet uniform at Dover, to assume the pretended rank of
a staff officer. On his return to London he in like manner, no doubt,
changed his uniform by the way.
It has been shown that the waterman who opened the coach-door for De
Berenger refused to identify him, but swore that the person alluded to
had a red coat beneath his military coat. It is also remarkable that the
hackney coachman, Crane, could not be got to identify him, though, like
the waterman, he swore to the red coat. The subjoined is Crane’s
evidence on the subject:—
MR. ADOLPHUS.—“Have you seen that person since that you drove that
morning?”
CRANE.—“Yes; I saw him in King Street, Westminster.” (At the
messenger’s house, where Crane was taken by Mr. Lavie for the purpose
of being identified by this witness.)
MR. ADOLPHUS.—“Do you see him in court?”
CRANE.—“I _think_ this is the gentleman here.”
MR. ADOLPHUS.—“Were you of the same opinion when you saw him in King
Street?”
CRANE.—“When I came down stairs he looked very hard at me.”
MR. ADOLPHUS.—“Did you know him then?”
CRANE.—“Yes: it was _something of the same appearance_, but he had
altered himself very much by his dress.”
MR. RICHARDSON.—“He was pointed out there as being the person in
custody?”
CRANE.—“No: I walked down stairs, and met the gentleman coming up
stairs.”
MR. RICHARDSON.—“You thought you saw a resemblance?”
CRANE.—“Yes, I thought he was _something like_ the same gentleman that
I had carried.”
MR. RICHARDSON.—“You do not pretend to recollect every person you
carry in your hackney coach every day?”
CRANE.—“_No_, but this gentleman that I took from a post chaise and
four: when he got out at Green Street, I saw that he had a red coat
underneath his great coat.”
Thus, neither the waterman nor the hackney coachman would swear to _the
man_, but to a red coat only. I have no hesitation in saying, that in a
court of justice in the present day no weight whatever would have been
attached to such evidence. I will, however, assume that the evidence was
such as to carry weight, and that it was in every respect
unexceptionable, because I shall shortly come to the reason why they
swore to the coat, but not to the man who wore it.
The case against me then stood thus. _One_ witness (the waterman), but
no more, swore to the under coat of a person whom he had seen step from
one vehicle into another; and _one_ witness, but no more (the hackney
coachman) swore to the person whom he brought to my house, as having on
a red coat beneath his military coat, but would not swear positively to
the wearer. It was, however, to support this extraordinary evidence that
my voluntary declaration in my affidavit, of lending De Berenger an old
hat and coat, because he alleged that he could not return to his
lodgings in the King’s Bench in uniform, without exciting suspicion of
his absence from the rules, and thus endangering his securities—was
charged against me as involving confederacy.
On the evidence here adduced—and there was not a tittle beyond it, on
the subject of the coat—the point was held by Lord Ellenborough to be
established that De Berenger stripped off the red coat in my house! and
as it was afterwards found in the river, his lordship charged the jury
in a way which bore the construction of my having been also a
participator in _that act_, though there was not a particle of evidence
on the trial which could give even the shadow of such a conclusion, nor
was there even a pretence on the part of the prosecution that such was
the case. His Lordship’s address to the jury on this head is amongst the
most remarkable that ever fell from the lips of an English judge.
“Now, gentlemen, he (_De Berenger_) is brought to the house of Lord
Cochrane; _further evidence afterwards arises upon the subject of his
being there_. We will at present follow the dress to its conclusion.
George Odell, a fisherman, says, ‘In the month of March, just above
Old Swan Stairs, off against the Iron Wharfs, when I was dredging for
coals, I picked up a bundle which was tied with either a piece of
chimney line or window line in the cover of a chair bottom; there were
two slips of a coat, embroidery, a star, and a piece of silver, with
two figures upon it; it had been sunk with three pieces of lead and
some bits of coal; I gave that which I found to Mr. Wade, the
Secretary of the Stock Exchange; it was picked up on the Wednesday,
and carried there on the Saturday. I picked this up on the 24th of
March.’ _You have before had the animal hunted home, and now you have
his skin_, found and produced as it was taken out of the river, cut to
pieces; the sinking it could have been with no other view than that of
suppressing _this piece of evidence_, and preventing the discovery
which it might otherwise occasion; this makes it the more material to
attend _to the stripping off the clothes which took place in Lord
Cochrane’s house_.”—(_Report_, p. 478.)
That this unwarrantable assumption, based on no evidence whatever, of De
Berenger’s stripping off his clothes at my house, could have anything to
do with a coat found in the river, was positively absurd, and was not
supported by a particle of evidence. Besides which, I had some
reputation for shrewdness, and should not have been likely to tie up the
coat “in an old chair cover, with three pieces of lead and some lumps of
coal!” when the winter’s fire in my grate would in five minutes have
destroyed the coat and its evidence together, had it been “stripped off”
in my house, or had I been a party to its destruction. The position in
which the coat was found, showed where it came from, viz. from the
Southwark side of the river, where De Berenger’s lodgings were.
The Judge thus proceeded:—
“De Berenger must have had that dress with him, whatever it was in
which he had come in the coach, and _it does not appear that he had
any means of shifting himself_. If he had on an aide-de-camp’s uniform
with a star, and so presented himself to Lord C., how could Lord C.
reconcile it to the duties he owed to society, to government, and to
his character as a gentleman, to give him the means of exchanging it?
It must be put on for some dishonest purpose.
“It is for you, gentlemen, to say whether it is possible he should not
know that a man coming so disguised and so habited,—_if he appeared
before him so habited_,—came upon some dishonest errand, and whether
it is to be conceived a person should so present himself to a person
who did not know what that dishonest errand was, and that it was the
very dishonest errand upon which he had so recently been engaged, and
which he is found to be executing in the spreading of false
intelligence for the purpose of elevating the funds. If he actually
appeared to Lord Cochrane stripped of his coat, and with that red coat
and aide-de-camp’s uniform, star and order, which have been
represented to you, he appeared before him rather in the habit of a
mountebank than in his proper uniform of a sharpshooter. This seems
wholly inconsistent with the conduct of an innocent and honest man;
for if he appeared in such an habit, he must have appeared to any
rational person fully blazoned in the costume of that or some other
crime.” (_Report_, pp. 484, 485, 486.)
The preceding quotations from his Lordship’s address to the jury are
taken from the “_revised_” report of the trial. They will appear still
more extraordinary as quoted from the report of the _Times_ newspaper,
taken _verbatim_ at the time. Of this no one acquainted even with
ordinary newspaper reports will doubt the accuracy, and after having
perused it, there will be as little doubt but that the “_revised_”
report was subsequently altered from what really occurred in Court.
The subjoined is the _Times_ report of the Judge’s speech:—
“_Having hunted down the game_, the prosecutors showed _what became of
his skin_, and it was a very material fact that the defendant De
Berenger _stripped himself at Lord Cochrane’s_. HE PULLED HIS SCARLET
UNIFORM OFF THERE, and if the circumstance of its not being green did
not excite Lord Cochrane’s suspicion, what did he think of the star
and medal? It became him on discovering these, as an officer and a
gentleman, to communicate his suspicions of these circumstances. Did
he not ask De Berenger where he had been in this masquerade dress? It
was for the jury to say whether Lord Cochrane did not know where he
had been. This was not the dress of a sharpshooter, but of a
mountebank. HE CAME BEFORE LORD COCHRANE FULLY BLAZONED IN THE COSTUME
OF HIS CRIME!!”
The reader will not fail to perceive that in the _Times_ verbatim
report, which is no doubt correct, the Court in every sentence affirms
my _positive guilt_. In the “_revised_” report, his Lordship is made to
go throughout on the hypothetical “if,” whilst in the revised report of
the trial,—which revised report, I affirm, was made up for the
occasion,—I am represented to have been treated with all proper
fairness! Every evil which followed afterwards was inflicted on the
strength of this revised report, and not on the actual transactions at
the trial, as reported in the daily papers.
This “revised” report was, indeed, a very serious matter for me. From
the reports in the daily papers, which were unquestionably accurate, the
public mind was in a state of great ferment at the unfairness of the
trial as regarded myself, and therefore the prosecution got up the
“revised” report. On its appearance, the Attorney-General said in the
House of Commons (July 20th) “He was glad the period had arrived when
the trial could be read at length, and thus _do away the effect of those
imperfect statements_ (the reports of the daily papers) which _misled
the public mind_.” The Solicitor-General, on the same date, went
farther, and accused me of having in my defence _misrepresented and
misquoted the Judge_, because I had quoted the reports of the daily
papers, not having in fact any other to quote. On the testimony of that
“revised” report further investigation was declined by the Admiralty,
and I was dismissed from the naval service.
On the strength of Crane’s evidence, the Court had held that “_De
Berenger appeared before me blazoned in the costume of his crime—that he
pulled off his scarlet uniform in my presence—and that, if the
circumstance of its not being green did not excite my suspicion, what
did I think of the star and medal?_” It is certain, that, even in the
“revised” report of the trial, these unqualified assertions, which, put
as they were to the jury, were sufficient for my conviction, _are not
supported by one particle of evidence_!!
But more has yet to be said of Crane’s evidence, which led to these
expressions on the part of the Judge. It will admit of little doubt that
a man who would swear to the colour of a coat, and would not swear
positively (by the “revised” report) to the identity of the person who
wore it, must have had cogent reasons for a course so extraordinary.
I will now adduce those reasons:—
It has been stated, that, conscious of my innocence, I took no personal
steps for my defence, beyond forwarding a general statement of a few
lines to my solicitors (see Appendix), that I never even read the
completed brief which they drew up for the guidance of my counsel, nor
was I present in court to suggest questions in cross-examination. After
my conviction, however, it became necessary to seek additional evidence
to support an appeal from the conviction, or an application for a new
trial as against myself.
Lord Ellenborough refused the application, _because all the persons
tried were not present to concur in it_, though the law gave me no power
to compel their attendance. The evidence on which it was grounded,
however, is none the less conclusive because Lord Ellenborough and his
colleagues declined to receive it, or even _to hear it!!_ but in place
of so doing, at once delivered their outrageous sentence against me.
This appeal was grounded on the evidence of several respectable
tradesmen, residing in the neighbourhood of Crane, the hackney coachman,
they voluntarily and unsolicited by me, but as an act of public justice,
going before the Lord Mayor, and making the affidavits from which the
subjoined extracts are taken. Not one of these tradesmen was even known
to me or my solicitors:—
JAMES MILLER, butcher, of Marsh Gate, Lambeth, made affidavit that he
saw De Berenger “get out of the chaise into a hackney coach—that he
was _dressed in green_, with a grey great coat, and that _there was no
red on any part of his dress_.”
JOSEPH RAIMENT, fishmonger, Westminster Bridge Road, made affidavit
that he saw De Berenger “get out of the chaise into the hackney
coach—that his great coat was partly open, and that _the under dress
was dark green, like that of the sharpshooters_.”
CHARLES KING, stable-keeper, Westminster Bridge Road, made affidavit
that he met William Crane accidentally, and asked him what he had been
doing with Sayer?[97] He answered, that “he had been to see De
Berenger, in order to identify him, but _he could not swear to him, as
many faces were alike_.” But he said, using a protestation in the most
horrible language, too gross to repeat—“he would have a hackney coach
_out of them_,” meaning, as deponent believed, the prosecutors. During
this conversation, a person passed dressed in a grey great coat, which
Crane said was just like De Berenger’s, and that he (Crane) did not
see De Berenger’s under-dress, _as his coat was closely buttoned up_.
“Deponent further saith, that after the trial he saw Crane’s father,
who told him that ‘he was _going after the money_’ (meaning the
reward), adding that ‘_his son was considered a first-rate witness!_’
On this deponent asked Crane the elder ‘how he could consider his son
in that light, as he knew very well that had he (deponent) been
examined, he must have _beat him out of Court_.’ To this Crane’s
father replied, ‘that if he had appeared, there was the place where
the clothes were bought, and the post-boy.’ On deponent being severe
in his remarks, the father said, ‘I don’t know what they did with the
boy, _they had him two days locked up in the police officer’s house,
that he might not be tampered with_.’[98] Deponent asked him if there
had been any advances by the opposite party. He said, ‘None.’
“Deponent further saith, that he has seen William Crane since the
trial, and on deponent accusing him of going too far with his
evidence, he said, ‘_he would swear black was white, or anything else,
if he was paid for it_!’
“Deponent further saith, that before the trial, the said William
Crane’s coach and horses _were of a most miserable description, but
that since the trial he has purchased a hackney coach and horses of
the best description_!
“Deponent further saith, that the said William Crane’s general
character _is most infamous_, and his mode of expressing himself _so
obscene and blasphemous_ as to preclude deponent from stating the
exact words made use of by the said William Crane. This deponent
further saith, that Mr. Keir, and the groom of Colonel Taylor, were
present when Crane said that ‘_he would swear black was white, or
anything else, if he was well paid for it_.’”
RICHARD BALDWIN, servant to Mr. Keir, made affidavit “that, on the 2nd
of July, he was present at a conversation between Charles King and
William Crane, when he heard Crane, in reply to King, who had accused
him of having gone too far in his evidence, say that ‘_he would be
damned if he would not swear black was white, or anything else, if any
one would pay him for it_.’”
THOMAS CRITCHFIELD, Westminster Bridge Road, coach-maker, made
affidavit “that he knew William Crane, and that he heard him say,
previously to the said trial, when speaking of his father, that ‘_he
did not care a damn for his father_, that he was twenty-one years of
age, _and should soon have more money than ever his father had_.’
“Deponent further said that _since_ the trial the said William Crane
has been enabled _to purchase a very good hackney coach, with horses
and harness_, though _previous_ to the trial his coach and horses were
of the most miserable description. Deponent lastly saith, that the
said William Crane _is a man of the most infamous character, and this
deponent positively declares that he would not believe him on his
oath_.”
JAMES YEOWELL, of Silver Street, Falcon Square, ticket porter, made
affidavit “that _a few days after the 21st of February_, William Crane
told him that the person whom he took from a post-chaise and four at
the Marsh Gate, was NO OTHER THAN LORD COCHRANE HIMSELF! that he knew
Lord Cochrane as well as he knew him (deponent). That he _had driven
Lord Cochrane from the Opera House, and other places of amusement
twenty times_, and described Lord Cochrane as a tall man, with a long
face and red whiskers.
“Deponent further saith, that after the trial he (deponent) accused
the said William Crane _of perjury_, in having sworn to De Berenger as
the man taken up by him at the Marsh Gate, whereas he had _previously
declared_ before the Stock Exchange Committee that LORD COCHRANE WAS
THE PERSON! Whereupon Crane refused to converse with him further on
the subject.
“This deponent further saith, that having on the same day again met
William Crane, he inquired if he had received the reward offered by
the Stock Exchange Committee, when he, the said William Crane,
admitted that _he had received a part, and expected more_.”
JAMES LOVEMORE, of Clement’s Lane, made affidavit “that he heard the
said James Yeowell interrogate William Crane as to the person of Lord
Cochrane, and that Crane said he knew Lord Cochrane as well as he did
him (Yeowell), and that he had driven Lord Cochrane from the Opera
House and other places of amusement, _twenty times_, and Crane further
declared that _it was Lord Cochrane_ whom he drove from the
post-chaise and four at the Marsh Gate, Lambeth, and described his
Lordship as a tall man with a long face and red whiskers.”
-----
Footnote 97:
A messenger of the Court.
Footnote 98:
The post-boy admitted on the trial that he had several previous
examinations, and that he _received_ 52_l._ _for his evidence_!
-----
Such was a portion only of the facts which I was prepared with in my
appeal to Lord Ellenborough and his colleagues. But, as before said, the
same judge refused to listen to the appeal, not on the ground of my
having no evidence to rebut the perjury of Crane, but because _all the
persons convicted were not present in Court to join in the appeal_. It
was the rule of Court, which I had no power to alter, though, as has
been seen in a recent chapter, Lord Campbell, in his “Lives of the Chief
Justices,” states, that such a case had _only been ruled once, and that
in this case it ought to have been overruled_.
In the two affidavits last adduced there is abundant proof that if the
resource of the _red coat_ had not been adopted, Crane was prepared to
swear that _it was I whom he had driven from the Marsh Gate to my own
house_! the conclusion being that I was the pretended De Berenger. Crane
evidently knew my personal appearance, as did most persons in London,
and said, further, that he knew me from having driven me _twenty times
to the Opera_; the fact being that I was never at the Opera but twice in
my life, and once in the vestibule, when I was refused admittance from
not being in full evening dress, the deficiency consisting in wearing
white pantaloons on a very hot day.
It should be remembered, that Crane stated this before the Committee of
the Stock Exchange _soon after the 21st of February_, i. e., _before_ I
had given the clue to De Berenger in my affidavit as the person who
visited my house on the morning of that day. _After_ I had thus
disclosed the name of De Berenger, the project of proving by the perjury
of Crane that _I was the pretended Du Bourg_, was given up by the
prosecution,—from the dissimilarity of his personal appearance to mine;
and then—_but not till then_—was the equally atrocious perjury of the
_red coat_ resorted to.
Upon the evidence of such a man as Crane was I convicted, and refused an
appeal from the conviction, or a new trial because the defendants to the
indictment were not all in Court!! It was “_a rule of Court_,” which, as
Lord Campbell says, ought to have been in my case overruled, but Lord
Ellenborough refused to hear a word of the abundant evidence _then in my
hand_ and available for my exculpation. Crane’s evidence that De
Berenger had on a red coat, was relied on, but the far more reliable
evidence that the coat was “_green_,” as I had stated, was repudiated.
Crane had boasted that “_he would swear black was white, if well paid
for it_”—and I held in my hand the most reliable evidence that from the
money he had been paid for his perjury, he had bought “_a new coach,
horses, and harness_.” None of these circumstances were allowed to be
received in Court, or even listened to, because all the persons included
in the indictment were not present, though, as Lord Campbell has well
said, the rule of Court in my case ought, under the peculiar
circumstances, to have been overruled.
A few more particulars relative to this _convict_, Crane,—for such was
his subsequent fate,—are necessary to enable the reader to judge of my
prosecution and those who selected this man as their chief witness.
Not long after the trial, the solicitor of Mr. Cochrane Johnstone wrote
me to the following effect relative to a discovery made when too late as
to Crane’s character:—
“This fellow has lately been prosecuted by Mr. Dawson, before the
Commissioners of the Hackney Coach Office, for brutality and general
misconduct. This offence was so flagrant that the _severest
punishment_ was inflicted, and at present he is under a long
suspension. He is a worthless rascal, and if Mr. D. can do your
Lordship any service, you have only to command it.”
Enclosed in the above communication was the following extract from the
_Times_ newspaper of May 25th, 1814:—
“On Friday last, William Crane, driver of the hackney coach No. 782,
was summoned before the Commissioners on a charge of cruelty to his
horses, and for abuse to a gentleman who noticed his conduct. The
circumstances detailed were so shocking as to induce the Commissioners
to observe that they never _heard a more atrocious case_. They would
have inflicted a pecuniary penalty, but as it must necessarily be paid
by his father, they ordered him instead to be suspended from driving
any hackney coach for three months.”
The trial, which resulted in my conviction, _on this very man’s
evidence_, took place on the 8th of June, 1814, _only a fortnight after
his conviction of the atrocity just quoted_! so that at the moment of
giving his evidence this man was himself under punishment for an offence
pronounced by the Commissioners to be “_so shocking that they never
heard of a more atrocious case_”!!! Had this information been available
at the trial, the jury would have paid but small attention to Crane’s
evidence.
Crane was convicted of stealing twenty sovereigns and other property
under circumstances no less atrocious. He was sentenced to
transportation for seven years, but at the expiration of three years
_received a free pardon from the Government on his own petition_.
The subjoined certificate from the officials of Newgate, however, place
his conviction and premature pardon by the Secretary of State in 1830
beyond doubt:—
“Office, Newgate, 23rd October, 1830.
“I do hereby certify that William Crane (aged 33) was committed to
this gaol on the 17th of February, 1826, by J.C. Conant, Esq., for
‘stealing a box, a pair of scissors, and twenty sovereigns, the
property and moneys of William Bucknall;’ tried before Mr. Sergeant
Arabin on the 20th of February, convicted and sentenced to
transportation for seven years, and that he was removed on the 23rd of
March following, on board the _Justitia_ hulk at Woolwich.”
Endorsement at the back of this certificate:—
“William Crane has been discharged from the hulks _on petition to the
Secretary of State_, and is now again driving the coach No. 781,
belonging to his father! Crane’s discharge took place Thursday before
last.
“13th November, 1830.”
(No signature, but evidently a police memorandum.)
These facts will be sufficient to convince the reader of my innocence as
regarded the evidence of Crane, the hackney coachman. Yet his evidence
was laid before the jury as of the highest reliable kind, whilst the
very facts relative to his character, even to his being under conviction
whilst giving his evidence, Lord Ellenborough and his colleagues refused
to hear, because all the parties convicted were not present in Court. It
is scarcely possible to imagine greater injustice and folly, even in
that day.
So little apparent danger was there of the possibility of my being
declared implicated in this hoax, that even my solicitors had not taken
the precaution of summoning my servants to give evidence as to the kind
of dress worn by De Berenger; though during the period he remained in my
house, previous to my arrival from the lamp-maker’s, where, on receiving
his letter, I was busily engaged, and amidst the busy operations of
packing my clothes, and other effects, to be sent on board the
_Tonnant_, he had been seen by nearly all my servants, the selection of
clothing being carried on in the very room in which he was waiting my
return for nearly two hours.
On my appeal to the Court of King’s Bench, I provided myself with the
following affidavits from such of my servants as had come in contact
with De Berenger, whilst waiting at my house:—
“THOMAS DEWMAN, servant to Lord Cochrane, maketh oath, and saith, that
he, this deponent, has lived with branches of Lord Cochrane’s family
for nearly twenty years; that he attended Lord Cochrane last year to
take letters and go on errands, and that he has been in the habit of
going to Mr. King’s manufactory almost every day; that this deponent
was in Lord Cochrane’s house, in Green Street, Grosvenor Square, on
the 21st day of February last, when an officer came in a
hackney-coach, about ten o’clock in the morning; that this deponent
opened the door and spoke to the officer in the coach, who asked if
Lord Cochrane was at home; that this deponent replied he was not, upon
which the officer asked the deponent, if he knew where Lord Cochrane
was gone to, which deponent answered that he believed his Lordship was
gone to breakfast with his uncle in Cumberland Street; that the
officer then asked him if he could let him have a slip of paper and a
pen and ink, which this deponent said he could; that this deponent
then opened the coach door, and the officer came into the house, and
went into the parlour, where this deponent gave him a small slip of
paper, upon which he wrote a few lines by way of note, and desired
this deponent to take the same to Lord Cochrane in Cumberland Street;
that this deponent went immediately into Cumberland Street, but
finding that Lord Cochrane was gone, he returned with the note to the
officer in Green Street; that on his return the officer asked deponent
if he knew where he could find him, that deponent then told the
officer he had been ordered by Lord Cochrane to follow him to Mr.
King’s manufactory with a glass globe, and thought it probable he
might meet with his Lordship there, and if he did not, he would then
go to the Admiralty, where he understood his Lordship was to go that
day; that the officer then took back the note from this deponent,
opened it, and wrote a line or two more, and then re-sealed it and
gave it to deponent, requesting him to take it immediately to Mr.
King’s manufactory, and that if he did not meet with Lord Cochrane
there, he would take the note to the Admiralty, and if his Lordship
had not been at the Admiralty, to leave it there; that on the
officer’s requesting deponent to go to Mr. King’s manufactory, he told
the deponent that his finding Lord Cochrane was of consequence, and
therefore begged deponent to be as expeditious as he could, and, if
necessary, to take a coach; that this deponent did not take a coach,
but went instantly to Mr. King’s manufactory, where he met Lord
Cochrane, and delivered him the note, which he opened in deponent’s
presence; that upon opening the note, Lord Cochrane asked deponent
several times if he knew who the gentleman was that had written it,
and upon deponent’s informing him that he did not, Lord Cochrane made
several inquiries as to his appearance and dress, observing that he
could not make out the whole of the note, or who it came from; to this
deponent answered, that he was an army officer; upon which Lord
Cochrane having torn the note, threw it down, and then said, ‘Very
well, Thomas, I’ll go back;’ that from Lord Cochrane’s manner and
appearance, and the questions he put to deponent, on his delivering
the note, this deponent verily believes that his Lordship did not know
from whom it came. And this deponent further saith, that when the
officer came into Green Street, as above stated, he _was dressed in a
great grey coat, such as the Guards wear, which was buttoned very
close round the body up to the breast, and that such part of the under
coat as he could see was of a dark-green_ colour; that upon the
officer’s coming out of the coach into Lord Cochrane’s house, he
brought with him a sword, and a small leather clothes-bag or
portmanteau, which deponent believes might have held a change of
clothes. That this deponent further saith, that he was hired by his
Lordship at Christmas last to go into the country, and relieve Richard
Carter, his Lordship’s sea-steward; that this deponent left London
about the 25th day of February, and Richard Carter, the sea-steward,
then came to town, for the purpose of accompanying Lord Cochrane to
his ship.
“THOMAS DEWMAN.
“Sworn in Court, June 14th,
“1814. By the Court.”
“MARY TURPIN, cook-maid to Lord Cochrane, maketh oath and saith, that
she went into his Lordship’s service on the 18th day of February last,
and that she was in the house on the 21st day of February, when an
officer came there, and that she was in the kitchen at the time the
coach drove to the door; that she saw an officer alight from the coach
and come into the house; that he arrived a little before nine o’clock;
that this deponent went twice into the parlour while the officer was
there, and doth most positively swear, _that he wore a great grey
coat, buttoned up, with a dark-green collar or facing under it_. That
the officer had with him a dark military cap with a gold band round
it, and also a sword, and a small portmanteau.
“MARY TURPIN.
“Sworn in Court, June 14th,
“1814. By the Court.”
“SARAH BUST, of No. 4, Great Marylebone Street, in the county of
Middlesex, spinster, maketh oath and saith, that she lived a servant
to Lord Cochrane for nearly twelve months, and that she quitted his
service on the evening of the 21st of February last; that she well
remembers an officer coming to his Lordship’s house in Green Street,
on the morning of that day; that the officer sent the man-servant out;
that the officer _had on a grey great coat, which was buttoned up to
the breast_, and that the neck of his under coat or such part as she
could see, was a _dark green_, and he had also with him a military
cap.
“SARAH BUST.
“Sworn at my Chambers,
“June 13th, 1814. Before me,
“S. LE BLANC.”
To this I will append my second affidavit:—
“Sir THOMAS COCHRANE, commonly called Lord Cochrane, one of the
above-named defendants, maketh oath and saith, that the several facts
and circumstances stated in his affidavit, sworn on the 11th day of
March last, before Mr. Graham the Magistrate, are true. And this
deponent further saith, that in addition to the several facts and
circumstances stated in his said affidavit, he deposeth as follows;
that is to say: That he had not, directly or indirectly, any concern
whatever in the formation, or any knowledge of the existence, of an
intention to form the plot charged in the indictment, or any other
scheme or design for affecting the public funds. That the sale of the
pretended omnium, on the 21st day of February, was made in pursuance
of orders given to his broker at the time of the purchase thereof, on
or about the 14th of that month, to sell the same whenever a profit of
one per cent. could be realised: and that those directions were given,
and the sale thereof took place, without any knowledge, information,
hint, or surmise, on the part of this deponent, of any concern or
attempt whatever, to alter the price of the funds; and the said sale
on the 21st took place entirely without this deponent’s knowledge.
That when this deponent returned home from Mr. King’s manufactory on
the 21st of February, which he did directly after the receipt of a
note, he fully expected to have met an officer from abroad, with
intelligence of his brother, who had, by letter to this deponent,
received on the Friday before, communicated his being confined to his
bed, and severely afflicted by a dangerous illness, and about whom
this deponent was extremely anxious; but this deponent found Capt. De
Berenger at his house, in a _grey_ great coat, and a _green_ jacket.
That this deponent never saw the defendants Ralph Sandom, Alex. M’Rae,
John Peter Holloway, and Henry Lyte, or any or either of them, nor
ever had any communication or correspondence with them, or any or
either of them, directly or indirectly. That this deponent, in
pursuance of directions from the Admiralty, proceeded to Chatham, to
join His Majesty’s ship the _Tonnant_, to which he had been appointed
on the 8th day of February last. That the ship was then lying at
Chatham. That, previous to the 8th day of February, this deponent
applied to the Admiralty for leave of absence, which was refused,
until this deponent had joined the said ship, and had removed her down
to Long Reach; that this deponent, in pursuance of those directions,
removed the said ship from Chatham to Long Reach, and after that was
done, viz. on Saturday the 12th day of the said month, this deponent
wrote to the Admiralty to apply for leave of absence for a fortnight,
for the purpose of lodging a specification for a patent, as had been
previously communicated by this deponent to their Lordships; that
leave of absence was accordingly granted for fourteen days, commencing
on the 14th of the said month; that this deponent was engaged in
London, expecting the said specification, till the 28th of the said
month, when the said specification was completed, and this deponent
left town about one o’clock on the morning of the 1st of March, and
arrived at Chatham about daylight on the same morning: that on the 8th
or 9th of the same month of March, this deponent received an
intimation that placards were posted in several of the streets,
stating that a pretended Colonel De Bourg had gone to this deponent’s
house in Green Street; that at the time this deponent received this
intimation, he was on board the said ship at Long Reach, and in
consequence went to Admiral Surridge, the Port Admiral at Chatham, to
obtain leave of absence, which was granted; previous to the receipt of
the leave forwarded by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, this
deponent arrived in London, on the 10th of that month, to the best of
his belief; and that after his trial, he himself, conscious of his own
innocence, and fearing no consequences from a development of his own
conduct, and desiring only to rescue his character from erroneous
impressions, made by misrepresentations in the public prints, he,
without any communication whatever with any other person, and without
any assistance, on the impulse of the moment, prepared the
before-mentioned affidavit, which he swore before Mr. Graham, the
Magistrate, on the 11th; that at the time he made such affidavit, he
had not seen or heard the contents of the Report published by the
Committee of the Stock Exchange, except partial extracts in the
newspapers; that when the deponent understood that the prosecution was
to be instituted against him, he wrote to Admiral Fleming, in whose
service Isaac Davis, formerly this deponent’s servant, then was, under
cover to Admiral Bickerton, at Portsmouth, and that Admiral Bickerton
returned the letter, saying that Admiral Fleming had sailed for
Gibraltar; that this deponent sent his servants, Thomas Dewman, Sarah
Bust, and Mary Turpin, on the trial of his indictment, to prove that
an officer came to this deponent’s house on the morning of the said
21st of February, and to prove the dress that he came in; but that the
said Thomas Dewman only was called, and, as this deponent has been
informed, he was not interrogated as to the dress in which the said
officer came to his house; and this deponent further saith, that had
the said witnesses been examined according to the directions of this
deponent, and who were in attendance on the Court for that express
purpose, they would, as he verily believes, have removed every
unfavourable conclusion respecting this deponent’s conduct, drawn from
the supposed dress in which the said De Berenger appeared before the
deponent on the 21st of February, and on which circumstances much
stress was laid in the charge to the jury, the said De Berenger’s
dress being exactly as stated in this said deponent’s former affidavit
hereinbefore mentioned: and this deponent solemnly and positively
denies, that he ever saw the said De Berenger in a scarlet uniform,
decorated by medals, or other insignia; and he had not the least
suspicion of the said De Berenger being engaged in any plot respecting
the funds, but merely believed he wished, for the reasons stated in
deponent’s former affidavit, to go on board this deponent’s ship, with
a view to obtain some military employment in America; and this
deponent declined complying with his request to send him on board his
ship without permission, or an order from the Admiralty: and this
deponent further saith, that he was in no degree intimate with the
said De Berenger; that he had no personal knowledge of his private or
public character; that he never asked the said De Berenger to his
house, nor did he ever breakfast or dine with this deponent therein,
on any occasion whatsoever; and further, this deponent saith, that he
had been informed, and verily believes, that the jury who tried the
said indictment, and the counsel for the defence, were so completely
exhausted and worn out by extreme fatigue, owing to the Court having
continued the trial without intermission for many hours beyond that
time which nature is capable of sustaining herself without refection
and repose, that justice could not be done to this deponent.”
“COCHRANE.
“Sworn in Court, June 14, 1814.
By the Court.”
With such documents in my hand I was refused a new trial, for reasons
hereafter to be adduced. Of the vindictiveness with which I was pursued,
there can be no better proof than that the other parties convicted on
clear evidence were let off with imprisonment and half the fine
inflicted on myself and Mr. Butt; whilst we, who had nothing to do with
the matter, were fined 1,000_l._ and in addition sentenced to the
barbarous punishment of the pillory. I advisedly say “we,” for I will
here put on record my conscientious belief that Mr. Butt had no more to
do with the hoax than myself. I give this testimony to the memory of a
truly excellent man, whose misfortune it was to have become the dupe of
others, without the least hope of benefit to himself.
It is impossible in an autobiography like the present to go into the
entire case _seriatim_, as it would be easy to bring forward other
proofs as clear as those now adduced. The evidence of Crane was,
however, the important point. I have now laid before the reader the
documents which the Court of King’s Bench declined to entertain, and
have no doubt as to what his decision must be. Whether was it the more
probable, that a man in my position, with nothing to gain by it, should,
in order to commit a fraud, conspire with several other persons of whose
names he had never before heard, and then swear that I did not commit
it—or, that such a man as Crane, at the moment of giving his evidence,
himself under conviction and sentence for a heinous offence, should
swear falsely to the colour of a coat for a pecuniary reward? I, to whom
the public voice, and the rewards of my sovereign, had elevated to an
honourable rank in my profession, or a hackney coachman, under
conviction at the moment of giving his evidence, and known in his own
line of life to have been the most depraved of one of the most depraved
classes of society?
My conviction was followed by expulsion from the House of Commons, and
was voted by a majority of 140 to 44. But that in a House like the one
with which the reader is now well acquainted, _forty-four_ independent
gentlemen should be found to believe in my innocence, in the teeth of
the ministers of the day, of whom Lord Ellenborough was one, the same
ministry being, as personified in Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Croker, is
perhaps as good proof of innocence as could be desired,—certainly as
great as could be expected.
It is with no small pride that I publish the names of the minority.
There are those amongst them whose testimony will weigh with posterity:—
“LIST OF THE MINORITY
WHO VOTED AGAINST THE EXPULSION OF LORD COCHRANE.
Allan, G.
Atherley, A.
Barham, S.
Bennet, Hon. H.
Brand, Hon. T.
Brown, D.
Brydges, Sir E.
Burdett, Sir F.
Burrel, Hon. P.
Butterworth, Jos.
Challoner, R.
Ebrington, Visc.
Flood, Sir F.
Gaskell, B.
Grant, Ch., sen.
Grant, J.P.
Hughes, W.
Lambton, J.
Lloyd, H.
Macginnis, —
Maddox, Wm.
Martin, J.
Mildmay, Sir H.
Mills, Rt.
Montgomery, Sir H.
Moore, P.
Newman, Rt.
Nugent, Lord.
Ossulston, Lord.
Ponsonby, Rt. Hon. G.
Power, R.
Rancliff, Lord.
Rashleigh, Wm.
Richards, Rt.
Ridley, Sir M.
Russell, Lord Wm.
Simpson, G.
Smith, W.
Tavistock, Marq. of
Western, C.
Whitbread, S.
Williams, Sir R.
Wortley, J.
TELLERS.
Lord A. Hamilton.
A. Brown.”
------------------------------------
CHAP. XL.
REMARKS ON LORD ELLENBOROUGH’S DIRECTIONS.—PROOFS OF THIS FALLACY.—HIS
ASSUMPTION OF THINGS NOT IN EVIDENCE, AND UNWARRANTABLE
CONJECTURES, IN POSITIVE OPPOSITION TO EVIDENCE.—HIS DESIRE TO
CONVICT OBNOXIOUS PERSONS.—LEIGH HUNT, DR. WATSON, AND HONE.—LORD
ELLENBOROUGH A CABINET MINISTER AT THE TIME OF MY TRIAL.—MY
CONVICTION A MINISTERIAL NECESSITY.—VAIN ATTEMPTS TO GET MY CASE
REHEARD.—LETTER TO LORD EBRINGTON.—THE IMPROBABILITY OF MY
GUILT.—ABSURDITY OF SUCH IMPUTATION.—LETTER OF SIR ROBERT
WILSON.—LETTER OF THE LATE DUKE OF HAMILTON.—MR. HUME’S
LETTER.—CAUSES FOR MY PERSECUTION.—TREATMENT OF THE PRINCESS
CHARLOTTE, WHO FLED TO HER MOTHER’S PROTECTION.—SYMPATHY OF THE
PRINCESS FOR MY TREATMENT—MY POPULARITY INCREASED THEREBY.— MINE
REALLY A STATE PROSECUTION.—RESTORATION OF SIR ROBERT WILSON.—MY
RESTORATION INCOMPLETE TO THIS DAY.
If such evidence as has been exposed in the last chapter was unreliable,
the use made of it by the Bench was unjustifiable. Crane deposed to De
Berenger’s having with him “a portmanteau big enough to wrap a coat in.”
The person of whom the coat was bought deposed to his taking it away in
this portmanteau, yet the judge—despite the obvious consideration, that
De Berenger could not have gone to Dover in this splendid and ornamented
dress, but must have had some other dress for his journey—charged the
jury that “it did not appear that De Berenger _had the means of shifting
himself_!” He had the means of putting on the red coat at or near Dover,
and what doubt could there be that his portmanteau supplied the means of
again shifting it after his return? The evidence on the trial showed
that shortly before reaching London he _drew down_ the sun-blinds of the
chaise, when there can be no reasonable doubt that he changed it for the
green one in which he went to Dover, and which had been temporarily
placed in the portmanteau. Crane, as has been shown by his own words,
gave his evidence _under the expectation of reward_, and had no doubt
been instructed that a _red coat was the very thing wanted_.
On the evidence of this man Crane, the jury was further charged that De
Berenger not only entered my house in a red uniform, but that it was
also decorated _with a star and medal_! There was nothing in the
testimony of Crane or the waterman, which even related to a star and
medal. They never gave the slightest intimation of De Berenger’s wearing
any such ornaments; but as he appeared to have worn some ornaments of
the kind at Dover, this is _prima facie_ proof that he _had changed_ his
coat on his return, otherwise both Crane and the waterman must have seen
ornaments so conspicuous.
Still a star, like a red coat, was wanted to convict me, and a leading
question to the postboy—who admitted that, _previous_ to the trial, _he
had received 52l.!!!_ was, whether he had seen a star? His reply was
that he had seen something of the kind, but that “_he could not swear
what it was_.” He nevertheless said that he had “opened the
chaise-door,” and therefore must have been within a yard of the star, if
star there were, so that his refusal to swear to it is palpable proof
that De Berenger _wore no star on his return_, this being no doubt on
the red coat in the portmanteau. Yet, said Lord Ellenborough to the
jury, “HE PULLED OFF HIS SCARLET UNIFORM AT LORD COCHRANE’S HOUSE. HE
CAME TO LORD COCHRANE FULLY BLAZONED IN THE COSTUME OF HIS CRIME.”
(_Times’ report of the trial._)
The fact that De Berenger had with him, according to Crane’s evidence,
“a portmanteau big enough to wrap a coat in,” was not laid before the
jury, nor the obvious inference, that he must, beyond doubt, have
conveyed his scarlet coat to Dover in that portmanteau, because a man
whom the Solicitor-General said “_was no fool_,” would not have
committed such an act of folly as _prematurely_ to array himself in so
remarkable a dress, intended for so criminal a purpose.
A circumstance strongly inferential, occurred which went far to prove
that De Berenger _had changed_ his dress before coming to my house. On
the first part of the journey he was proved to have worn a sword,
unquestionably as essential to his assumed character. But before he came
to my house, he had disengaged himself from the sword, for Crane swore
that on entering, he “took out of the chaise a portmanteau and a
_sword_, and went in.” So that, according to the evidence of Crane
himself, the chief witness for the prosecution, _he had made one
material alteration in his appearance_. Why should De Berenger have worn
his sword up to the last stage from Dover, during which he “pulled down
the sunblinds,” and then have taken it off, but for the plain reason
that he could not change his scarlet coat for his green uniform without
first taking off his sword, which he had not replaced, but laid it on
the chaise-seat during the operation. Not a word of this was allowed to
go to the jury, though if—as Lord Ellenborough argued—he had been
regardless of exhibiting himself to me in the false character of a
military officer, he _would hardly have taken off his sword_! These
facts were not only proofs that a partial change of dress had been made,
but that an entire change had been effected, to which the removal of the
sword was absolutely necessary. Had my servants been called upon the
trial, their testimony, as seen in their affidavits contained in the
previous chapter, must have been decisive.
It has been stated, that at the instance of Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, Sir
Alexander Cochrane applied to the Admiralty for permission to engage De
Berenger, and the records of the Admiralty would then, as no doubt they
will now, prove the fact. There was not a word passed on the subject at
the trial, nor any witness brought from the Admiralty to decide the
point. Yet Lord Ellenborough put it to the jury as beyond doubt, _that
it was I or Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, who was also a defendant in the same
prosecution, who applied to Sir Alexander for his engagement_!—thus
making this unfounded but important fact part of his direction to the
jury. Here are the judge’s words:—
“There is no doubt that Sir Alexander Cochrane had, on some
application from Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, _or Lord Cochrane_, applied
for him.” (_Report_, p. 483.)
It is difficult to account for the judge’s motive in making such a
statement, wholly unsupported by evidence. Neither was there even an
attempt to show that I had ever interfered or even interested myself in
any application on De Berenger’s behalf. The fact of Sir Alexander
Cochrane having made the application was most important for my defence,
because it added greatly to the probability of my statement in my
affidavit, and accounted for the conduct of De Berenger in presuming to
call on me to request a passage to America. This Lord Ellenborough
completely neutralised by telling the jury that _it was I_ who applied
to Sir Alexander for his employment; the impression made on the minds of
the jury being, that notwithstanding I disclaimed all knowledge of the
man, I had been on terms of intimacy with him before the application was
made!
The judge then declared as follows:—“But it does not rest there; for he
himself lends to this person the immediate means of concealment,—he lets
him have a hat _instead of his laced cap; and what had such a cap to do
with a sharpshooter’s uniform?_” (_Report_, p. 485.) I had never said a
word about a “laced cap,” nor had I ever seen De Berenger’s cap, for, as
one of my servants testified, it lay in the hall. After this direction
to the jury and my consequent conviction, I made it my business to
ascertain what kind of cap was worn by the adjutant of Lord Yarmouth’s
rifle-_corps_, and, to my great surprise and indignation, discovered
that the regimental head-dress of De Berenger was a black cap _with a
spacious gold band upon it, a long gold tassel pendant, and a death’s
head and marrow-bones in bronze!_—so that sharpshooters _had_ something
to do with laced caps.
Still more extraordinary was the judge’s observation to the jury:—“The
uniform of the rifle-corps is of a bottle-green colour, made to resemble
the colour of trees, that those who wear it may hide themselves in
woods, and escape discovery there.” (_Report_, p. 478.) This was in
direct opposition to the evidence, for Lord Yarmouth had actually
testified in Court that the uniform of the corps was “waistcoat-green,
with _a crimson cape_!”
MR. PARK.—“What is the uniform of your _corps_?”
LORD YARMOUTH.—“The uniform is the waistcoat-green, with a _crimson
cape_.”
MR. PARK.—“A bottle-green, is it not?”
LORD YARMOUTH.—“Some have got it a little darker than others, but it
should be a deep bottle-green, with a _crimson collar_.”
I have merely taken these instances at random, and without comment
further than necessary to enable the reader to comprehend them. As my
judge is no longer here to reply to me, I abstain from comment, however
much it might tend, now that the party spirit which ruined me has died
out, to establish my innocence. Still I cannot refrain from adducing a
few extracts from Lord Campbell’s work, relative to the trials of
politically obnoxious persons.
Lord Ellenborough’s efforts to convict Leigh Hunt of libel, and the
verdict of “Not Guilty” pronounced by an indignant jury, are matters
within the memory of many now living. “Such scandal,” says Lord
Campbell, “was excited by the mode in which Government prosecutions for
libel were now instituted and conducted, that Lord Holland brought the
subject before the House of Lords. The violence of Lord Ellenborough
when opposing Lord Holland’s motion, is foreign to the subject of the
present work. Sir James Mackintosh, who heard it, expressed himself
‘disgusted with its dogmatism.’” (_Lord Campbell_, vol. iii. p. 205.)
The subjoined are Lord Campbell’s remarks when introducing the subject:—
“He did his best to convict Leigh Hunt, then the editor of the
_Examiner_, upon an _ex officio_ information for publishing an article
against the excess to which the punishment of flagellation had been
carried in the army.
“‘Gentlemen;’ said he to the jury, ‘we are placed in a most anxious
and awful situation. The liberty of the country—everything we
enjoy—not only the independence of the nation, but whatever each
individual amongst us prizes in private life, depends upon our
fortunate resistance to the arms of Buonaparte and the force of
France, which I may say is the force of all Europe, combined under
that formidable foe. It becomes us, therefore, to see that there is
not, in addition to the prostrate thrones of Europe, an auxiliary
within this country, and that he has not the aid for the furtherance
of his object _of a British press_.’”
* * * * * * * *
“‘This publication is not to draw the attention of the legislature or
of persons in authority _with a view to a remedy_, but seems intended
to induce the military to consider themselves as more degraded than
any other soldiers in the world, and to make them less ready at this
awful crisis to render the country that assistance without which we
are collectively and individually undone. _I have no doubt but that
this libel has been published with the intention imputed to it, and
that it is entitled to the character given to it in the information._’
“Nevertheless, to the unspeakable mortification of the noble judge,
the jury found a verdict of _Not Guilty_.” (Lord Campbell’s _Lives of
the Chief Justices_, vol. iii. pp. 201-203.)
The following are Lord Campbell’s remarks on the verdict in the seven
days’ trial of Dr. Watson on a charge of high treason. After charging
the jury,
“He asked them whether they would take some refreshment before they
left the bar, when the foreman, in a tone which made the _Chief
Justice’s countenance visibly collapse_, said, ‘My Lord, we shall not
be long.’ Accordingly, after going through the form of withdrawing and
consulting together, they returned and pronounced their verdict, to
which they had long made up their minds—_Not Guilty_.”—(Vol. iii. p.
222.)
The case of Hone, in 1817, is another in point. I know nothing of Hone’s
works, nor of the libels of which he was accused, but Lord Campbell
says, that “he defended himself with extraordinary skill and tact, and
at the end of the first day’s trial was _acquitted_.”
“This being related to the enfeebled Chief Justice, his energy was
revived, and _he swore that, at whatever cost, he would preside in
Court himself, so that conviction might be certain_!” (He did so, and
thus charged the jury:) “‘I will deliver to you my solemn opinion, _as
I am required by Act of Parliament to do_; under the authority of that
Act, and still more, in obedience to my conscience and my God, I
pronounce it to be a MOST IMPIOUS AND PROFANE LIBEL.[99] Hoping and
believing that you are Christians, I doubt not but that your opinion
is the same.’”
-----
Footnote 99:
The italics and capitals are Lord Campbell’s.
-----
The jury almost immediately pronounced a verdict of “NOT GUILTY.”
“Still,” says Lord Campbell, “the Chief Justice was undismayed, and
declared that he would next day proceed with the indictment. This was a
most indiscreet resolution. The whole of Hone’s third trial was a
triumph, the jury plainly intimating their determination to find a
verdict in his favour.... After a similar summing up as on the preceding
day, there was _the like verdict_.... The popular opinion was, that Lord
Ellenborough was killed by Hone’s trial, and he certainly never held up
his head in public after.” (_Lord Campbell_, vol. iii. p. 225.)
These facts prove, that _subsequently to my trial_, whenever Lord
Ellenborough, in a popular case, charged the jury to bring in the
defendant “GUILTY,” the jury made a point of finding “NOT GUILTY.” It
was unfortunate for me that such a course was not previously adopted,
but, perhaps, it may be said, that my case brought about this result.
One most material point connected with the trial cannot be overlooked;
one, in fact, which not only concerned the liberties of obnoxious
persons like myself, but also the liberties of every man in the country.
At the period of my trial, Lord Ellenborough was not only Chief Justice
of the King’s Bench, BUT AT THE SAME TIME A CABINET MINISTER!!! This
terrible combination of incompatible offices was for the first time
under constitutional government effected in the person of Lord
Ellenborough, and, to the credit of subsequent administrations, for the
last time also. No other Chief Justice ever came hot-foot from a Cabinet
Council to decide the fate of an accused person, politically obnoxious
to the Cabinet; the trial going on from day to day, so as to become open
no less to Cabinet than to forensic discussion.
The thing was monstrous, and could only have been acted on in this
instance for the purpose of suppressing, by the expedient just shown,
the rising spirit of public liberty, which the Government was ever on
the watch to keep down. The _Quarterly Review_, when commenting on the
“Life and Correspondence” of Sir Samuel Romilly, thus treats the matter
(No. 132, 1840, page 612):—
“The Whigs, by way of including _all the talents_, had given the Chief
Justice of the King’s Bench (Lord Ellenborough) _a seat in the
Cabinet_, and upon this before unheard-of combination of the judicial
and ministerial characters, this _monstrous attempt to tinge the
ermine of justice with the colour of party_!!”
The chance I had may be readily estimated _with a Cabinet minister for
my judge_, and the Cabinet of which he was a member composed of
ministers to whom I had become deeply obnoxious by determined opposition
to their measures; having, in fact, given them more trouble than any
other of my party, because my knowledge of naval abuses and profligate
expenditure enabled me to expose both. It might, with one of my most
bitter opponents for a judge, have been a still greater marvel had I
been acquitted, than that I was convicted without and in opposition to
evidence. Had Lord Ellenborough possessed a true sense of delicacy, he
would never have presided at that trial. Still less would he have
refused me a new trial when more perfectly prepared; a proceeding no
doubt adopted as the best means of silencing further discussion, which
had begun to harass him personally, and to cause uneasiness to the
ministry. The shortest course, if not the justest, was to screen himself
and them by _immediately_ crushing his adversary. But the injury went
farther than my conviction in the Court of King’s Bench. After my
subsequent expulsion from the House, which, as Lord Brougham rightly
says, “_secured my re-election for Westminster_,” on its adverse note
_hung the fate of the ministry_. Had that vote been in my favour, the
Chief Justice could not have held his seat in the Cabinet, and his
evacuation could scarcely have been otherwise than followed by that of
the whole ministry. Of this, however, there was little danger, the great
bond of adhesion to the Ministry, as has been fully shown in the course
of this work, being the pensions and sinecures so freely distributed
amongst an unreformed House of Commons.
The question, however, became thus one of ministerial existence. Had the
House, as it ought to have done, irrespective of me or my case,
repudiated the anomaly of a Chief Justice holding a seat in the Cabinet,
the retirement of Lord Ellenborough must have been indispensable and
_immediate_. He could not have maintained his political office for an
hour. In place of an individual member being heard in his own defence,
the question really was the right of a Chief Justice to hold a seat in
the Cabinet, or in legal phrase, the issue was, Lord Cochrane _versus_
Lord Ellenborough, the Admiralty, and the Cabinet. In the unreformed
House of Commons Lord Cochrane, as a matter of course, went to the wall,
no one expecting otherwise.
Of the guilt or innocence of the other parties convicted I know nothing,
but this I will say, that, if guilty, there was nothing in their guilt
half so bad as the deliberate malice which on two occasions had
conspired to ruin me. My appointment as flag captain to my uncle was
gall and wormwood to those who, for opposing a vote of thanks to Lord
Gambier, had condemned me to five years’ deprivation of employment, at a
time when my services would have been honourable to myself and
beneficial to my country. I had gained employment in a way beyond their
control, and my unjust conviction of having participated in a trumpery
hoax, which common sense might have convinced them was beneath my
notice, was converted into the means of preventing the future exercise
of my abilities as a naval officer.
I have to apologise to Lord Campbell for the freedom with which I have
used his great work, but though an unjustly maligned man, my reputation
is as dear to me as though no spot had ever rested upon it, and I have
adduced these extracts to show that Lord Ellenborough, in his zeal for
justice, might have possibly mistaken my case. His biographers ascribe
to him pure motives, and I am bound not to set my opinions against those
of his biographers, nor have I done so. But for forty-six years I have
been vainly endeavouring to _get my case reheard_, and much allowance
should be accorded me. I would not ask for mercy, if guilty, but for
increased severity of punishment, as I should most richly deserve. To
demand a hearing of my case was my first public act after my trial. It
shall be my last. That public act was a letter to Lord Ebrington,
deprecating his Lordship’s interference for a mitigation of my
outrageous sentence. The following is a copy of this letter:—
“King’s Bench, July 13th, 1814.
“MY LORD,—Although I claim no right to interfere with the
Parliamentary conduct of any member, or to interfere with the motions
which he may judge proper to originate, yet I owe a duty to myself
which demands that I should apprise your Lordship that the motion of
which you have given notice respecting me, has a tendency to bring
down upon me a greater indignity than any which has been offered to me
by my enemies. I had flattered myself, from a recent note of your
Lordship, that, in your mind, I stood wholly acquitted; and I did not
expect to be treated by your Lordship as an object of mercy, on the
grounds of past services, or severity of sentence. I cannot allow
myself to be indebted to that tenderness of disposition, which has led
your Lordship to form an erroneous estimate of the amount of
punishment due to the crimes of which I have been accused; nor can I
for a moment consent, that any past services of mine should be
prostituted to the purpose of protecting me from any part of the
vengeance of the laws against which I, if at all, have grossly
offended. _If I am guilty, I richly merit the whole of the sentence
which has been passed upon me. If innocent, one penalty cannot be
inflicted with more justice than another._ If your Lordship shall
judge proper to persist in the motion of which you have given notice,
I hope you will do me the justice to read this letter to the House.
“I have, &c.
“COCHRANE.
“The Lord Ebrington.”
Independently, however, of these or any other considerations, I might
point to my previous general services as a naval officer, for which I
had not received public reward of any kind;—to my refusal of a squadron
of frigates, and Lord Mulgrave’s own regiment, if I would consent to a
vote of thanks to Lord Gambier conjointly with myself,—an offer which,
had it been accepted, would have been tantamount to the acquisition of
half a million of prize-money;—to my unceasing opposition in Parliament
to the abuses of the Admiralty Courts and naval administration in
general, in direct opposition to my own pecuniary interests;—to my
rejection of the openly-expressed proposal of the Secretary to the
Admiralty to quit the Radical party, and come over to that of the
Government;—to my anticipated employment on the coasts of the United
States, and the great pecuniary proceeds which there was every reason to
expect as the result of putting my previous experience in practice. I
would then put it to the common sense of the reader, whether the
acquisition of a few paltry hundred pounds—by means of the imputed
frauds on the Stock Exchange, was a likely motive to actuate me in
joining a conspiracy with persons, some of whom I never knew nor heard
of, which, if detected, must have destroyed my future prospects, when on
the eve of an expedition calculated in all human probability to have
raised me above all political enmity? The reply is self-evident.
I would again ask, whether, with a guilty knowledge of the act in which
De Berenger had been engaged, I should have perpetrated the consummate
folly of voluntarily disclosing all that took place on unexpectedly
finding him at my house; this voluntary information on my part affording
the only clue to the case, which could otherwise never have been
developed.
If guilty, such disclosure on my part would have been an act of absolute
insanity. Had I been aware that his asking me for the means of
concealing his uniform,—first, on his representation that, not being a
drill day, he could not appear in it before his colonel, Lord Yarmouth;
and secondly, that he could not return in it to the rules of the King’s
Bench without exciting suspicion that he had been violating the
rules,—is it likely that I should have voluntarily become my own
accuser, when there existed no necessity for me to say a single word, on
the subject. Should I not rather, if guilty, have given him the order to
go on board the _Tonnant_, and thus place both him and myself beyond the
reach of danger?
In place, however, of further vindication of my character as having had
any participation in this wretched hoax, I will, in addition to the
legal opinions already adduced, bring forward others since pronounced by
men in whom the public repose the most implicit confidence.
And first the voluntary statement of a gallant General, who had been
equally ill used with myself, and by the same political adversaries and
clique who persecuted me. I mean Sir Robert Wilson, who happily survived
his persecution, was reinstated in his military rank and honours, and
died honoured and lamented.
“Regent Street, 14th March, 1823.
“MY DEAR LORD,—It has been mentioned to me that a memorandum I once
held with the late Mr. Whitbread on the subject of your persecution,
and which I have frequently repeated, might be a document of some
utility; my compliance with the expressed wish is not an act of
friendship, but of duty and justice to all parties.
“I therefore do affirm, upon my honour, to the accurate truth of the
following statement, being ready, if required, to give it any legal
character of which it may be susceptible:—
“Being at Southall Park in the year 1814, I took an opportunity of
asking Mr. Whitbread for his opinion on the subject of Lord Cochrane’s
trial and sentence, stating to him that as I had been out of England
at the time, I was very imperfectly acquainted with the proceedings;
but feeling much interested about the character of an officer so
eminently distinguished, I was desirous to pin my faith upon his (Mr.
Whitbread’s) judgment; but if, from any political or personal
consideration, he could only give me a partial or half compliance, I
begged him to be silent altogether, as my object was to know the whole
truth, and to be put in possession, for my future guidance, of his
most secret feelings on the transaction.
“Mr. Whitbread replied, that he had no hesitation to acquiesce with my
wish; that there never was a case to which he had given more
attention, or which had caused him more sleepless nights, as he had
been resolved to probe the matter to the bottom, if possible, and come
to a just conclusion. That he had formed his conclusion; and, if they
were the last words he had to utter before appearance in the presence
of the Creator, he should say that _he was convinced that Lord
Cochrane was totally and entirely innocent of the whole or any part of
the offence laid to his charge,—that he felt certain that Lord
Cochrane was in no way privy to the proceedings so far as they related
to any imposition_.
“Mr. Whitbread added, ‘My family know this to be my conscientious
opinion, and _I am persuaded that time will prove it to be the correct
one_[100];’ but, in any case, you have it from a man who has
endeavoured to form it honestly, and also, for that purpose, divested
his mind, as much as possible, of every bias.
“I remain, my dear Lord,
“With much regard, yours,
“R. WILSON.”
-----
Footnote 100:
Not if the “_revised_” report of the trial is consulted; for the
studied appearance of fairness which is there put on might mislead the
reader. But if the _verbatim_ reports of the trial are consulted, as
they appear in the _Times_ and other daily papers, I have no fear of
any amount of criticism, or that anything but my entire innocence will
be made manifest. The _animus_ against me is there so clear, that the
reader would hardly be induced to inquire further.
-----
The following warm-hearted letter was written me by the late Duke of
Hamilton on my appointment to the command of the West India fleet:—
“Hamilton Palace, Jan. 6, 1848.
“MY DEAR LORD,—Your letter of yesterday has awakened the liveliest
sensibilities of my heart. If I ask myself whether they proceed from
the love of justice, or the love of a friend, my reply is, from both.
“The communication you have just made to me is most gratifying; and
the First Lord of the Admiralty has done himself immortal honour in
appointing that naval officer Commander in one hemisphere who had
previously illustrated his name by his most brilliant exploits in the
other. Everything, I think, has now been done to undo the foul
aspersions with which you have been assailed, and I am sure everything
will be now done that will most serve to establish the ability of the
officer and the delicacy of the gentleman.
“I congratulate you most sincerely upon your appointment, and hope you
will meet with difficulties when you arrive at your destination. Don’t
be surprised at my wish. It proceeds from knowing the ample resources
of my friend to overcome them, and his constant desire to sacrifice
everything to duty and honour.
“My good wishes will follow you across the ocean, and reside with you
in your future destinies. Let me have the satisfaction of hearing from
you, and with every sentiment of affectionate regard, believe me to
be, my dear lord, your truly attached friend and cousin,
“C.H. AND B.”
Without multiplying communications of a similar kind, I will merely
adduce a portion of a letter written to me by a gentleman, in whose
opinions and sterling honesty the public has been accustomed to repose
the highest confidence, viz. the late Joseph Hume. The occasion of the
letter was my having consulted him in an attempt to obtain a
re-investigation of my case so late as 1852:—
“Bryanstone Square, May 10, 1852.
* * * * * * * *
“I knew at the time the alleged offence was committed, Mr. Cochrane
Johnstone, and my conviction at the time was, and still is, that you
were the dupe of his cupidity, and suffered from his act. With David
Ricardo, who was the prosecutor on the part of the Stock Exchange on
that occasion, I have often conversed on the subject[101].
“I considered that you were incapable of taking the means resorted to,
and for which you suffered, and was pleased to learn that you had been
restored to your rank. I considered _that act_ a proof that the
Government which had restored you to the rank and honour of your
profession, and had afterwards appointed you to the command in the
West Indies, must have come to the same conclusion; and until the
perusal of your draft petition, I concluded that _you had had all your
arrears paid to you as a tardy, though inadequate, return_ to your
Lordship, whose early exploits did honour to yourself, and gave
additional lustre to the naval service of your country.
“Sir Robert Wilson, acting with me as a friend of the late Queen
Caroline, in our desire to see justice done to her, was, by _a secret
and most unjust decision of the Government of the day, under Lord
Liverpool and Lord Castlereagh_, dismissed from the military service,
of which he had been a distinguished ornament, and had all his honours
taken away. The honour he had received from the Court of Vienna, for
the preservation of the life of a member of that family (in a river in
Flanders) under Colonel, afterwards Lord, Lake, was also taken from
him!!
“The offence of Sir Robert Wilson was his supposed interference in
obstructing the funeral _cortége_ of the late Queen Caroline in its
progress towards the City. The progress was ordered by the Government
to have been by the New Road to Essex. The people obliged Sir Robert
Baker, then at the head of the police and in charge of the escort, to
proceed through the City of London, contrary to the express order of
the King (George the Fourth), and under that suspicion Sir Robert
Wilson was dismissed and unjustly treated.
“I knew that Sir Robert Wilson had arrived from France in company with
Mr. Edward Ellice, and did not reach the house of Mr. Alderman (the
name is illegible) where I was until eight or nine o’clock of the
evening before the funeral. His offence was his accompanying the
funeral along with Sir John Hobhouse, myself, and others; and when the
troops fired on the people at Hyde Park, Sir Robert Wilson endeavoured
to prevent bloodshed. I was present, and heard and saw everything that
passed. For that supposed offence he was cashiered, and remained for
years, as your lordship did, under the disgrace.
“His Majesty, King William, was satisfied of the innocence of Sir
Robert Wilson of the offence charged against him, and he was restored
to the service, and I understood was paid all the arrears of pay and
allowance during his suspension, and afterwards appointed to the
command at Gibraltar. I was pleased at the result, and it would give
me equal pleasure to learn that your application to her Majesty should
be attended with an act of justice to you equally merited.
“I think other instances of restoration to rank, accompanied with
payment of arrears of pay and restoration to all military honours,
will be found if you should adopt the same course to seek justice.
“I remain, &c.
“JOSEPH HUME.
“The Right Hon. the Earl of Dundonald.”
-----
Footnote 101:
Mr. Hume’s statement that David Ricardo was the prosecutor on the part
of the Stock Exchange throws additional light on the selection of Mr.
Lavie, as the _acting prosecutor_ on the trial. As Mr. Ricardo was
selected to manage the prosecution, the transference of his duties to
_a known Admiralty solicitor_, who had once before been successfully
employed against me, requires no comment.
-----
This letter narrates the arbitrary and unjust dismissal of an eminent
officer without trial, without accusation, and without having in any way
rendered himself politically obnoxious, otherwise than to stop the
indiscriminate slaughter of an unarmed people. The act of his dismissal
was one of pure despotism, committed by a ministerial faction, of which
history affords scarcely a redeeming feature. It is not surprising that
I, of all others in the House of Commons the most politically obnoxious
to the same faction, should have been for years selected as the mark for
their unscrupulous hatred. Still less is it probable that men who
regarded and defended place, pensions, and sinecures as a right, would
stick at the practices which have been laid bare in this work, when a
political adversary who exposed their greediness for national plunder
could be crushed. To say more of them, than that they were the men who
crushed Sir Robert Wilson, would be superfluous.
I will add yet one more illustration. At my re-election for
Westminster—the consequence, as Lord Brougham has well said, of the
outrageous treatment to which I had been subjected—an incident occurred
with which my wrongs became indirectly mixed up. Whilst the electors of
Westminster were securing the triumphant return of one who was in
durance, under an infamous sentence, the daughter of the Prince Regent
was flying from Court tyranny.
On the day preceding my re-election, the greatly beloved Princess
Charlotte, then under age, escaped from her father’s protection, and,
having called a hackney coach from the stand at Charing Cross, fled to
her mother’s residence in Connaught Place. The public mind was at the
time in a state of great excitement on account of the vindictive
sentence passed upon me, and the electors of Westminster having
determined to sustain me, every precaution was taken by their leaders to
keep alive the public sentiment.
In the midst of this excitement the flight of the princess became known,
together with the fact that she had been treated by her father with an
amount of unbecoming violence and coercion, and through some of his
acquiescent ministers outraged by an injudicious pressure, the object of
which was to force upon her a marriage to which she had not only a
personal objection, but towards which she had publicly expressed a
decided and insuperable aversion.
Notwithstanding this, the Regent, regardless of his daughter’s feelings,
insisted on proceeding without loss of time with the preparations for
her marriage; and it was on repeating his fixed determination as
regarded her fate, that she took the step of placing herself under her
mother’s protection, the terror inspired by the interview with her
father being such that, without bonnet or shawl, she ran down the back
staircase of Warwick House, and escaped by the servants’ _entrée_.
Not many hours elapsed before the fact of her flight and its cause
became publicly known. This act of political tyranny towards a princess,
who, though so young, had, by her powers of mind and engaging manners
from her childhood, secured the universal affection of the people,
created an amount of sympathy which, coupled with the excitement and
irritation at my outrageous treatment, almost amounted to public frenzy.
The Government became alarmed. Crowds beset the house of her late
Majesty Queen Caroline, where their favourite was safely sheltered. The
carriages of the Royal family and of the ministers, including those of
the Lord Chancellor, Lord Ellenborough, and the Law Officers of the
Crown, were all in attendance, their occupants having been sent to use
their influence with Her Royal Highness to induce her to return, but in
vain. She even refused to see any of the royal family except the Duke of
Sussex, for whom she had sent, as well as for Mr. Brougham, the latter
to advise her in the difficult position in which she had been compelled
to place herself. The advice was to return; but she declared in strong
terms that she could not overcome her repugnance to the violent
treatment she had received, or to the attempt to force her into a
marriage which she held in aversion.
The day following this scene was the day of my re-election for
Westminster. The same overtures were repeated to the princess, but
without making the slightest impression on her wounded feelings. At
length the Duke of Sussex took his niece to the window of the
drawing-room, and drew her attention to the angry multitude assembled
before the house, explaining to her that such was the public sympathy in
her favour, and such the interest the people took in her happiness, that
they would form a shield for her protection against which her oppressors
would scarcely venture to array themselves.
Still the princess remained inexorable, till the danger of continued
public excitement was pointed out to her. She was told by the Duke of
Sussex, that the irritation was twofold, for _that very day was
appointed for the re-election of Lord Cochrane for Westminster, after
the unjust sentence which had been passed upon him, and which also
formed another great cause of public excitement, whilst the two causes
combined_ might lead to a popular outbreak, which it was to be feared
would end in bloodshed, and perhaps in the destruction of Carlton House
itself. It was further urged, that in case of mischief, no small portion
might be laid by ministers to the account of Her Royal Highness.
These considerations sensibly affected the princess, who was moved to
tears, and exclaimed: “POOR LORD COCHRANE! I HEARD THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY
ILL USED BY THEM (meaning her father’s ministers); SHOULD IT EVER BE IN
MY POWER, I WILL UNDO THE WRONG.”
With a magnanimity which her persecutors could neither feel nor
comprehend, the princess then declared her perfect readiness to render
herself a self-sacrifice, in order to prevent the dreadful result which
she felt might be possible; and shortly afterwards returned to Warwick
House, accompanied by her uncle the Duke of York. Her courage and
firmness relieved her from further importunity from her father and his
ministers on the subject of the hateful marriage, which was broken off,
and this noble-minded woman afterwards contracted with the present King
of the Belgians a marriage of affection, approved by the whole country.
Such instances of tyrannical oppression as these will be read with
amazement by the present generation, though there are those yet living
who can corroborate their recital. When even a princess of the blood
royal, the idol of the whole nation, was not exempt from persecution,
what hope had I of escaping ministerial vengeance, backed by a House of
Commons, the majority of which consisted of sinecurists and placemen,
whose fortunes _in esse_ and _in posse_ depended on them subservience to
the place-givers?
It is true, I had with me the sympathy of the public, and this alone
sustained me under such an accumulation of injury. Men do not become
popular for nothing; but I have no hesitation in saying, to the honour
of my constituents, that the injustice done to me by an adverse ministry
gave me far greater popularity than anything I had accomplished in my
professional capacity. For five years my adversaries had taken care that
no fresh achievements in war should be added to my professional
reputation; and it was only when, by my uncle’s favour, I had once more
an opportunity of distinguishing myself in spite of the Admiralty, that
the concentrated malice of the faction I had offended by my pertinacious
opposition in parliament burst on my head in the shape of a prosecution,
in which my judge was a member of the very cabinet to which I was
politically and personally obnoxious.
In a general point of view, there can be no two opinions on the
impropriety of a Cabinet Minister occupying the bench of the highest law
court of the realm. In all State prosecutions—and mine _was_ one—it
would fall to his lot to decide in the Cabinet as to their commencement,
though in my case this was apparently avoided, by the law officers of
the Crown keeping aloof from the proceedings; care, however, being taken
to employ as my prosecutor an attorney of tried shrewdness, having a
personal dislike to myself. A judge thus politically connected had to
leave the Cabinet in order to carry out its decisions, himself presiding
at all trials which might result, adjudging and sentencing the unlucky
offenders; of which mode of prosecution the instances of Leigh Hunt, Dr.
Watson, and Mr. Hone are cases in point, the parties accused being only
saved by the indignant firmness of the juries. Happily, no such
combination of political and judicial offices has occurred since Lord
Ellenborough’s time, nor can it occur, unless some retrograde spirit of
despotism shall again—to use the significant language before quoted from
the _Quarterly Review_—“_tinge the ermine of justice with the colour of
party_.”
A few words in addition are necessary. In Mr. Hume’s letter before
quoted was an enclosure which he had, in his anxiety to procure full
justice for my sufferings, with great difficulty obtained. It is an
enumeration of the tardy steps taken to reinstate Sir Robert Wilson in
the rank, honours, and emoluments of which for eleven years he had been
unjustly deprived by the mere caprice of a political faction.
“_30th October, 1830._—Restoration of his rank submitted to the King.
“_22nd August, 1832._—Sir Robert Wilson claimed the pay of a General
Officer from 27th May, 1825, the time when his commission states his
rank is to be considered as hearing date.
“_8th October, 1832._—Letter of Secretary at War to the Hon. J.
Stewart, recommending Sir Robert Wilson’s claim of pay to the Treasury
_as a special case, considering the act of Royal favour to extend to
pay as well as rank_. The letter also refers to Sir Robert Wilson’s
signal services _hitherto unrewarded_, and adverts to the fact, that
even should the request be granted he will have suffered a
considerable pecuniary penalty in the loss of pay from 1821 to 1825,
although no military tribunal has tried his conduct.
“_16th November, 1832._—Letter of Mr. Stewart, announcing _the
concurrence of the Treasury_, but desiring the opinion of the
Commander-in-Chief to be taken.
“_19th November, 1832._—Letter from Secretary at War to Lord Hill,
acquainting him that he had, in consequence of a communication from
Sir R. Wilson, recommended to the Treasury that _the arrear of back
pay from the date of his restored rank of Lieut.-General should be
allowed_[102], and that the Treasury was inclined to acquiesce in this
recommendation, but requested his Lordship’s concurrence in the first
instance.
“_22nd November, 1832._—Lord Hill’s concurrence.
“_21st December, 1832._—Treasury sanctions the amount of Sir Robert
Wilson’s unattached pay as a general officer from the date of his
commission being included in the estimates of 1833.”
-----
Footnote 102:
The italics in this document are Mr. Hume’s.
-----
It has been said that Sir Robert Wilson’s dismissal from the service
differed from mine, inasmuch as his was a consequence of ministerial
displeasure, whilst mine arose from the verdict of a court of law. How
that verdict was procured, I trust has been satisfactorily shown, and if
so, both Sir Robert Wilson and myself were sufferers from ministerial
displeasure. On the word of a man about (at no distant date) to give an
account to his Maker, I was no more guilty of the act attributed to me,
than Sir Robert Wilson was of the disloyalty attributed to him.
Sir Robert Wilson claimed his back pay as a right consequent on his
unjust deprivation, and obtained it. I have unceasingly done the same,
not from the pecuniary value of the amount due, but from the
consideration that its being withheld still operates as a stigma on my
character and family, which is inconsistent with any restoration to the
service. My efforts have been hitherto without success.
Sir Robert Wilson’s application was recommended to the Treasury as a
“_special case_.” My applications have not been so regarded.
Sir Robert Wilson’s application was further recommended on account of
“_services hitherto unrewarded_.” I will here repeat what has been
stated in a previous chapter, in reply to writers who have assumed that
I had been handsomely rewarded—that on no occasion did I ever receive
the reward of a single shilling for any services which it was my good
fortune to render to my country, beyond the ordinary pay of my rank, and
the good service pension of 300_l._ a-year, conferred upon me by Sir
James Graham, in 1844. Yet Lord Collingwood testified that with a single
frigate I had done the work of an army, by keeping a French army from
overrunning the Mediterranean coast of Spain. Neither for this nor the
destruction of the enemy’s ships in Aix Roads, did I ever receive reward
or thanks.
The reader, who is now well acquainted with my services, can pursue the
subject for himself. With the exception of the Red Ribbon of the Bath,
which as the gift of my sovereign I highly prize, my reward has been a
life of unmerited suffering. Even the stipulations of the South American
Governments, to whom I gave freedom, are violated to this day, from a
conviction that no sympathy will be accorded by the Government of my own
country.
These are the requitals for my “_hitherto unrewarded services_.”
Amongst the curiosities shown to visitors of the Bank of England, there
was, and no doubt is still, a thousand pound bank-note, No. 8202, dated
26th June, 1815, on the back of which are endorsed the following words:—
“MY HEALTH HAVING SUFFERED BY LONG AND CLOSE CONFINEMENT, AND MY
OPPRESSORS BEING RESOLVED TO DEPRIVE ME OF PROPERTY OR LIFE, I SUBMIT
TO ROBBERY TO PROTECT MYSELF FROM MURDER, IN THE HOPE THAT I SHALL
LIVE TO BRING THE DELINQUENTS TO JUSTICE.
(Signed) “COCHRANE.
“King’s Bench Prison, July 3rd, 1815.”
There is the reward bestowed on me by a ministerial faction, memorable
only for its political corruption. With that protest I close the book.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I.
LORD GAMBIER’S FIRST DESPATCH, GIVING ME CREDIT FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE
ATTACK IN AIX ROADS.
_Caledonia_, at anchor in Basque Roads,
April 14th, 1809.
SIR,—The Almighty’s favour to His Majesty and the nation has been
strongly marked in the success He has been pleased to give to the
operations of His Majesty’s fleet under my command; and I have the
satisfaction to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty, that the four ships of the enemy,
named in the margin[103], have been destroyed at their anchorage, and
several others, from getting on shore, if not rendered altogether
unserviceable, are at least disabled for a considerable time.
The arrangement of the firevessels, placed under the direction of
Captain the Right Honourable Lord Cochrane, was made as fully as the
state of the weather would admit, according to his Lordship’s plan, on
the evening of the 11th instant; and at eight o’clock on the same
night they proceeded to the attack under a favourable strong wind from
the northward, and flood tide, preceded by some vessels filled with
powder and shells, as proposed by his Lordship, with a view to
explosion, and led on in the most undaunted and determined manner by
Capt. Wooldridge, in the _Mediator_ fireship, the others following in
succession; but owing to the darkness of the night, several mistook
their course, and failed.
On their approach to the enemy’s ships, it was discovered that a boom
was placed in front of their line for a defence. This, however, the
weight of the _Mediator_ soon broke, and the usual intrepidity and
bravery of British seamen overcame all difficulties, advancing under a
heavy fire from the forts in the Isle of Aix, as well as from the
enemy’s ships, most of which cut or slipt their cables, and from the
confined anchorage got on shore, and thus avoided taking fire.
At daylight the following morning, Lord Cochrane communicated to me,
by telegraph, that seven of the enemy’s ships were on shore, and might
be destroyed. I immediately made the signal for the fleet to unmoor
and weigh, intending to proceed with it to effect their destruction.
The wind, however, being fresh from the northward, and the flood-tide
running, rendered it too hazardous to run into Aix Roads (from its
shallow water), I therefore anchored again at the distance of about
three miles from the forts on the island.
As the tide suited, the enemy evinced great activity in endeavouring
to warp their ships (which had grounded) into deep water, and
succeeded in getting all but five of the line towards the entrance of
the Charente before it became practicable to attack them.
I gave orders to Capt. Bligh, of the _Valiant_, to proceed with that
ship, the _Revenge_, frigates, bombs, and small vessels, named in the
margin,[104] to anchor near the Boyart Shoal, in readiness for the
attack. At twenty minutes past two P.M. Lord Cochrane advanced in the
_Impérieuse_, with his accustomed gallantry and spirit, and opened a
well-directed fire upon the _Calcutta_, which struck her colours to
the _Impérieuse_; the ships and vessels above-mentioned soon after
joined in the attack upon the _Ville de Varsovie_ and _Aquilon_, and
obliged them, before five o’clock, after sustaining a heavy cannonade,
to strike their colours, when they were taken possession of by the
boats of the advanced squadron. As soon as the prisoners were removed
they were set on fire, as was also the _Tonnerre_, a short time after
by the enemy.
I afterwards detached Rear-Admiral the Hon. Robert Stopford, in the
_Cæsar_, with the _Theseus_, three additional fireships (which were
hastily prepared in the course of the day), and all the boats of the
fleet, with Mr. Congreve’s rockets, to conduct the further operations
of the night against any of the ships which lay exposed to an attack.
On the morning of the 13th, the Rear-Admiral reported to me, that as
the _Cæsar_ and other line-of-battle ships had grounded, and were in a
dangerous situation, he thought it advisable to order them all out,
particularly as the remaining part of the service could be performed
by frigates and small vessels only; and I was happy to find that they
were extricated from their perilous situation.
Captain Bligh has since informed me that it was found impracticable to
destroy the three-decked ship, and the others, which were lying near
the entrance of the Charente, as the former, being the outer one, was
protected by three lines of boats placed in advance from her.
This ship and all the others, except four of the line and a frigate,
have now moved up the Charente. If any further attempt to destroy them
is practicable, I shall not fail to use every means in my power to
accomplish it.
I have great satisfaction in stating to their Lordships how much I
feel obliged to the zealous co-operation of Rear-Admiral Stopford,
under whose arrangement the boats of the fleet were placed; and I must
also express to their Lordships the high sense I have of the
assistance I received from the abilities and unremitted attention of
Sir Harry Neale, Bart. the Captain of the Fleet, as well as of the
animated exertions of the captains, officers, seamen, and marines
under my command, and their forwardness to volunteer upon any service
that might be allotted to them; particularly the zeal and activity
shown by the captains of line-of-battle ships in preparing the
firevessels.
I cannot speak in sufficient terms of admiration and applause of the
vigorous and gallant attack made by Lord Cochrane upon the French
line-of-battle ships which were on shore, as well as of his judicious
manner of approaching them, and placing his ship in a position most
advantageous to annoy the enemy and preserve his own ship; which could
not be exceeded by any feat of valour hitherto achieved by the British
navy.
It is due to Rear-Admiral Stopford and Sir Harry Neale, that I should
here take the opportunity of acquainting their Lordships of the
handsome and earnest manner in which both these meritorious officers
had volunteered their services before the arrival of Lord Cochrane to
undertake an attack upon the enemy with fireships; and that, had not
their Lordships fixed upon him to conduct the enterprise, I have full
confidence that the result of their efforts would have been highly
creditable to them.
Not having had it in my power, as yet, to ascertain the conduct of the
officers commanding the fireships, except that of the _Mediator_, I am
under the necessity of deferring to state how far they fulfilled their
duty on this hazardous service in which they were engaged.
I should feel that I did not do justice to the services of Capt.
Godfrey, of the _Etna_, in bombarding the enemy’s ships on the 12th,
and nearly all the day of the 13th, if I did not recommend him to
their Lordships’ notice; and I cannot omit bearing due testimony to
the anxious desire expressed by Mr. Congreve to be employed wherever I
might conceive his services in the management of his rockets would be
useful; some of them were placed in the fireships with effect, and I
have every reason to be satisfied with the artillerymen and others who
had the management of them, under Mr. Congreve’s direction.
I send herewith a return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the
fleet, which, I am happy to observe, is comparatively small. I have
not yet received the returns of the number of prisoners taken, but I
conceive they amount to between 400 and 500. I have charged Sir Harry
Neale with this despatch by the _Impérieuse_, and I beg leave to refer
their Lordships to him, as also to Lord Cochrane, for any further
particulars of which they may wish to be informed.
I have the honour to be, &c.,
(Signed) GAMBIER.
-----
Footnote 103:
_Ville de Varsovie_, of 80 guns; _Tonnerre_, of 74 guns; _Aquilon_, of
74 guns; and _Calcutta_ of 56 guns.
Footnote 104:
_Indefatigable_, _Unicorn_, _Aigle_, _Emerald_, _Pallas_, _Beagle_,
_Etna_ bomb, _Insolent_ gun-brig, _Conflict_, _Encounter_, _Fervent_,
and _Growler_.
-----
_April 15th._—P.S. This morning three of the enemy’s line-of-battle
ships are observed to be still on shore under Fouras, and one of them
is in a dangerous situation. One of these frigates (_L’Indienne_) also
on shore, has fallen over, and they are now dismantling her. As the
tides will be off in a day or two, there is every probability that she
will be destroyed.
Since writing the foregoing, I have learned that the Hon.
Lieut.-Colonel Cochrane (Lord Cochrane’s brother), and Lieut. Bisset,
of the navy, were volunteers in the _Impérieuse_, and rendered
themselves extremely useful, the former by commanding some of her guns
on the main-deck, and the latter in conducting one of the explosion
vessels.
-----------------------
APPENDIX II.
LORD GAMBIER’S SECOND DESPATCH IGNORING MY
SERVICES ALTOGETHER.
London, May 10th, 1809.
SIR,—I have received your letter of the 2nd instant, acknowledging the
receipt of the list, containing the names of the officers and men
employed in the fireships and explosion vessels on the night of the
11th ult., with my observations on the result of my inquiry respecting
their conduct on that occasion; and signifying that you are commanded
by their Lordships to acquaint me, that, in order to have before them
full and complete information of the proceedings of the several ships
employed by me on the various branches of the very important
operations carried on against the enemy’s fleet in Aix Road, it is
their Lordships’ direction that I should call upon Rear-Admiral
Stopford, Captain Bligh, Captain Lord Cochrane, and any other officer
I may have entrusted with any part of that service, to report to me
their proceedings, together with such observations and remarks as they
may have made whilst they were executing my orders against the enemy;
and that I should transmit the same to their Lordships, with any
observations I may think proper to make thereon.
You will be pleased to acquaint their Lordships that I have written to
those officers to make reports to me accordingly, and shall lose no
time in transmitting them to you as soon as they are obtained, but
some time must elapse before they can reach me.
From communications I have since had with their Lordships, I am led to
understand that a more full and detailed account than I have
transmitted of the proceedings of the fleet under my command, during
the whole of its operations in Basque Roads, would be desirable. I
shall, therefore, in making such a statement, endeavour to omit no
incident that may be in any degree connected with those operations, or
serve to elucidate the various movements and proceedings of the fleet,
persuaded that doing so cannot fail to promote the satisfaction which,
in common with the officers and men under my command, I feel upon that
occasion, and on the success which has resulted from it.
Their Lordships are aware that soon after I had taken the anchorage of
Basque Roads, I stated to them the strong position of the enemy’s
fleet in Aix Roads; that their ships were moored in two compact lines,
and the most distant ship of each line within point blank range of the
batteries of Isle d’Aix, explaining, at the same time, that they were
under the necessity of mooring in such close order, not for the
purpose of opposing a more formidable front, but to avoid the shoals
close around the anchorage; and their Lordships will also remember
that I then pointed out the impracticability of destroying them by an
attack with the ships of the line in the position they occupied; but
that I conceived them to be assailable by fireships, having previously
suggested to Lord Mulgrave the expediency of sending out twenty or
thirty vessels for that purpose.
This suggestion was anticipated by their Lordships, and they were
pleased to order twelve sail of fireships to join me, and to direct me
to fit out eight others on the spot. Upon the arrival of Captain Lord
Cochrane, whom their Lordships had ordered me to employ in conducting
the execution of the service to be performed by the fireships, I was
induced, at his suggestion, to add the _Mediator_ to the number.
These preparations were completed on the 11th ultimo at night, and
having previously called on board the _Caledonia_ the commanders and
lieutenants who had volunteered their services, and who had been
appointed by me to command fire vessels, I furnished them with full
instructions for their proceedings in the attack, according to Lord
Cochrane’s plan, and arranged the disposition of the frigates and
small vessels to co-operate in the following manner.
The _Unicorn_, _Aigle_, and _Pallas_, I directed to take a station
near the Boyart Shoal, for the purpose of receiving the crews of the
fireships on their return from the enterprise, to support the boats of
the fleet which were to accompany the fireships, and to give
assistance to the _Impérieuse_, which ship was still further advanced.
The _Whiting_ schooner, _King George_, and _Nimrod_ cutters, were
fitted for throwing rockets, and directed to take a station near the
same shoal for that purpose.
The _Indefatigable_, _Foxhound_, and _Etna_ bomb, were to take a
station as near the fort on the Isle of Aix as possible; the two
former to protect the bomb vessel, whilst she threw shells into the
fort.
The _Emerald_, _Dotterel_, and _Beagle_ sloops, and _Growler_,
_Conflict_, and _Insolent_ gun-brigs, were stationed to make a
diversion at the east end of the Isle of Aix.
The _Redpole_ and _Lyra_ I directed to be anchored by the Master of
the Fleet (one near the Isle of Aix, and the other near the Boyart),
with lights hoisted, to guide the fireships in their course to the
attack; and the boats of the fleet were ordered to assemble alongside
the _Cæsar_, to proceed to assist the fireships, under the
superintendence of Rear-Admiral Stopford.
With these preconcerted movements the fleet was at this time unmoored,
in readiness to render any service that might be practicable; but
being anchored in a strong tide-way, with the wind fresh from the N.W.
upon the weather tide making, it was again moored, to prevent the
ships falling on board each other.
At about half past eight P.M. the explosion vessels and fireships
proceeded to the attack; at half past nine the first explosion vessel
blew up, and at ten most of the fireships were observed to be on fire;
the enemy’s forts and ships firing upon them. Many of the fireships
were seen to drive through their fleet, and beyond the Isle of Aix.
Shortly after daylight, Lord Cochrane, who, in the _Impérieuse_ lay
about three miles from the enemy, made the signal to me by telegraph,
that seven of the enemy’s ships were on shore, and that half the fleet
could destroy them. It was visible from the _Caledonia_ what ships
were aground, and that two or three had made their escape up the
Charente. I immediately ordered the fleet to be unmoored, and at half
past nine weighed and run up nearer to the Isle of Aix, with the view,
when the time of tide should render it advisable, that some of the
line-of-battle ships might proceed to attack the enemy’s ships on
shore; but the wind blowing fresh from the N.N.W. with a flood tide, I
judged it unadvisable to risk any of them at that time in so perilous
a situation. The fleet was therefore anchored. I made the signal for
each ship to prepare, with spare or sheet cables out of the stern
ports, and springs on them, to be in readiness for any of them to go
in that I might judge necessary; in the meanwhile I ordered three
additional fireships to be prepared.
Observing the _Impérieuse_ to advance, and the time of flood nearly
done running, the _Indefatigable_, _Unicorn_, _Aigle_, _Emerald_,
_Pallas_, _Beagle_, _Etna_, and gun-brigs, were ordered, by signal,
into the attack; at 2·20 P.M. the former opened her fire upon the
enemy’s ships aground, and the others as soon after as they arrived
up. I then ordered in the _Valiant_ and _Revenge_ to support them, and
they soon joined in the action.
The enemy’s ship _Calcutta_ struck her colours at 4·10 P.M. and the
_Ville de Varsovie_, and _Aquilon_, in about an hour afterwards; all
three were taken possession of by the boats of the advanced squadron,
and set on fire as soon as the prisoners were removed; a short time
after the _Tonnerre_ was set on fire by the enemy.
Perceiving, towards the close of day, that there were some of the
enemy’s grounded ships lying further up towards the Charente, which
appeared to be exposed to further attack, I sent in the three
additional fireships, and all the boats of the fleet, with Mr.
Congreve’s rockets, accompanied by the _Cæsar_ and _Theseus_, under
the direction of Rear-Admiral Stopford, with discretional orders for
his acting as he should think fit, and according as circumstances
should render it expedient.
On the following day (the 13th) the Rear-Admiral perceiving that
nothing further could be effected by the line-of-battle ships, which
had grounded, as had also some of the frigates, and how imminent the
danger was in which they lay, and being satisfied that the remaining
part of the service could be performed only by frigates and smaller
vessels, he most wisely took advantage of a providential shift of
wind, and returned with the line-of-battle ships to Basque Road.
Captain Bligh, on his return, reported to me that it was found
impracticable to destroy the enemy’s three-decked ship, and others,
which were lying at the entrance of the Charente, as the former (which
was the outer one) was protected by three lines of boats placed in
advance from her.
During the remainder of the 13th the _Etna_ was employed in throwing
shells, the _Whiting_ schooner in firing rockets, and the other small
vessels in firing upon the enemy’s ships on shore when the tide
permitted.
On the 14th, at daylight, I observed three or four of the enemy’s
ships still apparently aground at the mouth of the river. I ordered
Captain Wolfe, of the _Aigle_, to relieve Lord Cochrane in the
_Impérieuse_, in command of the small vessels advanced, and to use his
utmost endeavours to destroy any of the enemy’s ships which were
assailable. At 2·50 the _Etna_ bomb, and small vessels in shore, began
their fire upon the enemy’s ships at the entrance of the Charente, and
continued to do so during the remainder of the day.
On the 15th, in the morning (the day on which I despatched Sir H.
Neale to their Lordships, in the _Impérieuse_), three of the enemy’s
line-of-battle ships were observed to be still aground under Fouras,
and one of them in a dangerous situation; one of their frigates
(_L’Indienne_), also on shore, had fallen over, and the enemy were
dismantling her.
It blew very strong from the westward the whole of the 15th and 16th,
so that no attempt could be made to annoy and harass the enemy; on the
latter day their frigate, which was on shore, was discovered to be on
fire, and blew up soon after.
All the remainder of the enemy’s ships got up the river by the 17th,
except one (a two-decker), which remained aground under the town of
Fouras; in the afternoon of this day it was observed that another of
the enemy’s frigates had got on shore up the river and was wrecked,
which was afterwards confirmed by the master of a neutral vessel from
Rochelle.
On the 19th it blew too violent for any of the small vessels to act
against the enemy; but on the 20th, the _Thunder_ bomb having arrived,
and the weather having become more moderate, I sent her to assist the
_Etna_ in bombarding the enemy’s ship, on shore near Fouras. The
_Etna_ had split her 13-inch mortar on the 15th, consequently had only
her 10-inch effective.
--------------
_State of the Force of the Enemy, transmitted in Lord_ GAMBIER’S _second
Letter to the Hon._ W.W. POLE, _of the 26th March 1809_.
Statement of the enemy’s force moored at Isle d’Aix, anchorage in two
lines very near to each other, in a direction due south from the fort
on Isle d’Aix; the ships in each line not further apart than their own
length, and the most distant ships of the two lines within point blank
shot of the works on that island.
One three-decker Flag at the fore.
Ten two-deckers (one a fifty-gun } One flag at the mizen, and
ship, late _Calcutta_), } one broad pendant.
Four frigates.
(Signed) GAMBIER.
_Caledonia_, in Basque Roads, March 26th, 1809.
_Statement of the names of the enemy’s ships in Aix Roads, previous to
the attack on the 11th April 1809; and of the killed and wounded in
the action of the 12th of April 1809._
_L’Océan_, 120 guns, Vice-Admiral Allemande, Capt. Reland. Repaired in
1806; on shore under Fouras.
_Foudroyant_, 80, Rear-Admiral Gourdon, Captain Henri. Five years old;
on shore under Fouras.
_Cassard_, 74, Capt. Faure, Commodore. Three years old; on shore under
Fouras.
_Tourville_, 74, Capt. La Caille. Old; on shore in the river.
_Regulus_, 74, Capt. Lucas. Five years old; on shore under Madame.
_Patriote_, 74, Capt. Mahee. Repaired in 1803.
_Jemappe_, 74, Capt. Fauvan. On shore under Madame.
_Tonnerre_, 74, Capt. Clément de la Roncière. Nine months old; never at
sea.
_Aquilon_, 74, Capt. Maignon. Old.
_Ville de Varsovie_, 80, Capt. Cuvillier. New; never at sea.
_Calcutta_, 56, Capt. La Fone. Loaded with flour and military stores.
_Frigates._
_Indienne_, Capt. Proteau. On shore near Isle d’Enette, on her
beam-ends.
_Elbe_, Capt. Perrengier.
_Pallas_, Capt. Le Bigot.
_Hortense_, Capt. Allgand.
N.B. One of the three last frigates on shore under Isle Madame.
Return of the killed, wounded, and missing:—Two officers, eight men,
killed; nine officers, 28 wounded; one man missing. Total,—48.
GAMBIER.
_Return of the names of Officers killed, wounded and missing._
_Caledonia_, Mr. Fairfax, Master of the fleet; contusion of the hip.
_Cæsar_, W. Flintoft, Acting-Lieut.; killed.
_Theseus_, R.F. Jewers, Master’s-Mate; severely wounded in the head and
hands by powder in the fireship.
_Impérieuse_, Mr. Gilbert, Surgeon’s Assistant, wounded; Mr. Marsden,
Purser; ditto.
_Revenge_, J. Garland, Lieut.; severe contusion of the shoulder and
side.
_Mediator_, J. Segess, Gunner; killed.
J. Wooldridge, Capt.; very much burnt.
N.B. Clements, Lieut.; slightly burnt.
J. Pearl, Lieut.; ditto.
N.B. The last three blown out of the _Mediator_ after she was set on
fire.
_Gibraltar_, J. Conyers, Master’s Mate; very badly scorched in the face
and hands.
GAMBIER.
Received since the above was written.
_Etna_, R.W. Charston, Midshipman, slightly wounded.
------------------------------------
APPENDIX III.
STATEMENT IN THE ADMIRALTY COURT RESPECTING THE AFFAIR OF AIX ROADS,
SHOWING WHY PART OF THE FLEET ONLY WERE ENTITLED TO HEAD MONEY.
_Ville de Varsovie._
On Friday, the 15th day of December 1815.
On which day Pott appeared for the Honourable Thomas Lord Cochrane,
late Commander of His Majesty’s ship _Impérieuse_, his officers and
crew, in obedience to the monition issued in this cause from this
Right Honourable Court, citing the said Lord Cochrane to appear and
show cause why distribution of the head or bounty money, for the
destruction of the said ship and other French ships of war, should not
be made to and amongst the admirals, captains, officers, and seamen of
all the ships composing the fleet under the command of the Right
Honourable Admiral Lord Gambier, at the time of the attack and
destruction of the said ships, and on behalf of his said parties
objected to such distribution, and in support of such objection
alleged that the said ship, _Ville de Varsovie_, was a French ship of
war—and together with _Le Tonnerre_, _L’Aquilon_, _Calcutta_, and
_L’Indienne_, and several other French ships of war, were in the month
of April, 1809, at anchor in Aix Roads, on the coast of France, and an
expedition was formed under the orders of the Right Honourable Admiral
Lord Gambier for the purpose of endeavouring to capture or destroy the
said French ships of war. That the said expedition consisted of His
Majesty’s line-of-battle ships, _Caledonia_, _Valiant_, _Revenge_,
_Cæsar_, _Theseus_, _Illustrious_, _Gibraltar_, _Donegal_, _Hero_,
_Bellona_, and _Resolution_; His Majesty’s frigates, _Impérieuse_,
_Indefatigable_, _L’Aigle_, _Emerald_, _Pallas_, and _Unicorn_; His
Majesty’s sloops, _Lyra_, _Dotterell_, _Foxhound_, _Redpole_, and
_Beagle_; and His Majesty’s gun-brigs, _Conflict_, _Insolent_,
_Fervent_, and _Growler_; and several bomb vessels, fireships,
explosion vessels, schooners, and cutters, and on the 11th day of the
said month of April, the preparations for that purpose being
completed, and the whole of the said fleet at anchor in Basque Roads,
on the outside of Aix Roads, and distant about six miles from the said
French ships of war, the explosion and firevessels proceeded into Aix
Roads under the immediate command of the said Lord Cochrane, who was
on board one of the same, and he commenced the attack on the enemy
while several of the frigates and sloops, gun-brigs and smaller
vessels also advanced on various points to support them; that in
consequence of such attack seven of the enemy’s ships were driven on
shore, and on the following day, April 12th, His Majesty’s ship
_Impérieuse_, commanded by the said Lord Cochrane, together with His
Majesty’s ships _Valiant_, _Revenge_, and several of the frigates and
smaller vessels, forming the inshore or advanced squadron, proceeded
in and engaged the said enemy’s ships so driven on shore; that about
three o’clock the said day the _Impérieuse_ attacked the _Calcutta_,
one of the said ships, mounting 56 guns, and after an obstinate
resistance she struck her colours to the _Impérieuse_ and was
immediately taken possession of and burnt; that the _Ville de
Varsovie_, mounting 80 guns, and _Aquilon_ and _Tonnerre_, mounting 74
guns each, three more of the enemy’s said ships were also attacked by
the said inshore or advanced squadron, and after sustaining a heavy
cannonade the two former about four o’clock struck their colours, were
taken possession of by the boats of the said inshore squadron, and
burnt, and the _Tonnerre_ was soon afterwards burnt by the enemy to
prevent her from being taken by the British ships.
That in _the evening_ of the said day His Majesty’s ships _Cæsar_ and
_Theseus_, together with some additional fireships were sent into Aix
Roads from the fleet to make a further attack upon the enemy; but the
_Cæsar_ having grounded before she could get within gun shot of the
enemy’s ships, the said two ships returned before daylight next
morning and rejoined the fleet without being able to effect anything
against the enemy; and on a subsequent day _L’Indienne_, another of
the said French ships, mounting 36 guns, which had been driven on
shore by the first attack, was also burnt by the enemy. And the said
Pott further alleged, that during the aforesaid attack and destruction
of the said enemy’s ships, _Calcutta_, _Ville de Varsovie_, _Aquilon_,
and _Tonnerre_; His Majesty’s ship, _Caledonia_, bearing the flag of
the Right Honourable Admiral Lord Gambier, together with the _Cæsar_,
_Theseus_, _Illustrious_, _Gibraltar_, _Donegal_, _Hero_, _Bellona_,
and _Resolution_, remained at anchor in Basque Roads above three miles
distant from the nearest of the enemy’s ships, and were _not within
reach of shot_ and never _were actually engaged with any of the said
ships_; and by reason of the premises the said several line-of-battle
ships are not entitled by law to share in the head or bounty money
payable for the attack and destruction of the said several French
ships of war, and in verification of what he so alleged the said Pott
craved leave to refer to extracts from the log books of the said
line-of-battle ships to be by him exhibited, and to the despatch sent
by the said Lord Gambier to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty,
bearing date 14th April 1809.
Wherefore he prayed the Right Honourable the Judge to reject the claim
of the said ships, _Caledonia_, _Cæsar_, _Theseus_, _Illustrious_,
_Gibraltar_, _Donegal_, _Hero_, _Bellona_, and _Resolution_, and to
decree the several ships of war belonging to the said fleet who were
_actually engaged with the enemy_ to be the only ships legally
entitled to the said head or bounty money, and to direct the
distribution to be made to them and to the said ship _Impérieuse_
accordingly.
------------------------------------
APPENDIX IV
CONFIRMATION OF THE PRECEDING.
It appears by the log-books of the ships and vessels under the command
of Admiral Lord Gambier, in Basque Roads, on the 11th and 12th of
April, 1809, and also by his Lordship’s official letter to the
Admiralty, and by the Minutes of Evidence on his Lordship’s
court-martial, that, in consequence of an attack made on the evening
of the 11th upon the French fleet, then lying at anchor in the Roads
of Aix, by explosion vessels and fireships, under the command of Lord
Cochrane, the greater part of the French ships cut or slipped their
cables and ran on shore.
It further appears that Lord Cochrane in the _Impérieuse_ frigate
remained in an advanced position during the night, and that at
daylight the following morning he made the signal by telegraph to Lord
Gambier (who remained with the fleet at its anchorage in Basque Roads,
at the distance of about six miles from the enemy) that seven of the
enemy’s ships were on shore and might be destroyed.
It further appears that, in consequence of the above-mentioned signal,
or of subsequent signals of a similar or nearly similar purport, Lord
Gambier caused the fleet to unmoor and weigh, either immediately after
the first signal, according to his Lordship’s aforesaid official
letter, or after an interval of some time, according to the evidence
of some of the witnesses on his Lordship’s court-martial: but that he
again caused the fleet to come to an anchor at a distance of more than
three miles from the enemy.
It also appears that Lord Cochrane, in the _Impérieuse_, _without
assistance and without orders_, proceeded to the attack; and that it
was not till after his Lordship had made the signal that the enemy was
superior, which is coupled with the signal of distress, that Lord
Gambier sent in _a part_ of the fleet to his assistance; and it
further appears by his Lordship’s aforesaid official letter, and by a
due comparison of the minutes of evidence on the aforesaid
court-martial, that the _Calcutta_ had surrendered to the _Impérieuse_
before any of the vessels ordered to her assistance had joined.
And it further appears that the ships and vessels which were ordered
to join the _Impérieuse_, in consequence of the last-mentioned signal,
or, according to a further official letter of Lord Gambier, in
consequence of the _Impérieuse_ being observed to advance, did arrive
shortly after the surrender of the _Calcutta_, and joined in the
attack on such others of the enemy’s ships as had not had time to
effect their escape; and it further appears that, in consequence of
such attack by a part of the fleet only, the _Aquilon_ and _Ville de
Varsovie_ were captured and destroyed, and the _Tonnerre_ set on fire
by the enemy.
And, lastly, it appears that the only ships participating in the
attack were the following:—
The _Impérieuse_,
The _Valiant_,
The _Revenge_,
The _Indefatigable_,
The _Unicorn_,
The _Aigle_,
The _Emerald_,
The _Pallas_,
The _Beagle_,
The _Etna_ bomb, and
The _Insolent_, }
_Conflict_, }
_Encounter_, } Gun-Brigs.
_Fervent_, }
_Growler_, }
and that the _Caledonia_, Admiral Lord Gambier,
the _Cæsar_, Rear-Admiral Stopford,
and the _Donegal_,
_Resolution_,
_Theseus_,
_Gibraltar_,
_Illustrious_, and
_Bellona_
remained at anchor with the commander-in-chief, and were _in no
respect_ aiding or assisting in the attack upon the enemy’s ships, or
accessary to their capture or destruction.
_L’Aigle._
[Sidenote: April 12.]
Captain’s log erroneous, and date of the
_Calcutta’s_ striking altered.
_Emerald._
[Sidenote: Captain’s log.]
At 12·30 saw the _Impérieuse_ and _Etna_ bomb open
fire upon the enemy. At 1·30 answered signal 236.
(_Note._—By the _Caledonia’s_ signal, log 336): one
hundred having been added to the numbers that day.
_Growler._
[Sidenote: Ship’s log]
10·30 answered signal 314. Commander went on board
the Admiral. (_Note._—No notice is taken of the
fleet weighing.)
_Conflict._
[Sidenote: Ship’s log.]
Weighed at 11 A.M.
P.M. at 1 made sail for the anchorage of Isle d’Aix.
At 3 came to, and commenced action with the enemy’s
ships on shore. At 4·30 answered signal as per
margin[105] made by _Imp_ \. At 5 observed four of
the enemy’s ships on fire! left off action.
(_Note._—Two of which were not burnt till next day.)
_Indefatigable._
[Sidenote: Captain’s log.]
At 11·40 weighed for signal in company with the
squadron.
[Sidenote: No ship’s or master’s log from March 15 1809!]]
At 12·15 shortened sail to let go the anchor. At 2
P.M. answered signals No. 166 and 366, with compass
signal south. Weighed and made sail in for Isle
d’Aix Roads, to assist H.M.S. _Impérieuse_. _Then
engaged with the enemy’s line-of-battle ships._ At
3·30 shortened sail and came to in seven fathoms
with a spring on the cable, and commenced firing on
the enemy.
_Insolent._
[Sidenote: April 12, Ship’s log.]
At 11·30 weighed for order of the Admiral. At 2 P.M.
anchored in six fathoms. At 3 weighed and _observed
Calcutta had struck_.
_Pallas._
At 12·15 anchored H.M.S. _Caledonia_.
_Revenge._
No Master’s or ship’s log.
No Captain’s log.
Lieut. Garland, who had sent in previous logs has
furnished no account of the proceedings in April
1809 until the 24th, and the date of the
commencement of the said log is obviously altered,
as will clearly appear both as to the month and the
day.
Lieut. Millon, also of the _Revenge_, ends his log
on the 31st of March 1809; although on the
title-page he states it to contain the transactions
of that ship between the 18th of July 1808, and the
19th of July 1809! And the Captain’s certificate
annexed, is dated the 17th of July 1809!
The logs of the other Lieutenants do not appear.
_Etna._
At 11 A.M. the Captain went on board the Admiral’s
ship. Weighed and made sail by signal, as did the
fleet to the southward. At 12, fleet anchored about
three miles from the Isle d’Aix. At 1 the Captain
came on board, steered in for the enemy’s fleet.
_Beagle._
At 11 A.M. starboard and larboard division weighed
with with fleet—standing off and on. Fleet anchored;
the _Impérieuse_ and _Etna_ bore up for the enemy.
At 2·15 _Impérieuse_ made signal to Admiral and
anchored with springs and opened her fire. At 2·30
Admiral made sign to frigates _Pallas_, _L’Aigle_,
_Emerald_, _Unicorn_, _Indefatigable_, _Growler_,
_Encounter_, _Insolent_ and _Conflict_ to anchor in
Charente River.
-----
Footnote 105:
No signal marked on the margin.
-----
--------------
_Extract from the Log-book of H.M.S. Gun-brig Insolent._
April 12th, 1809, P.M.
At 3, weighed and observed _Calcutta_ had struck.
--------------
_Extract from the Signal-book of H.M.S. Caledonia._
April 12th, 1809, P.M.
2·50, _Impérieuse_—General, 208. [Being the signal to close, in
consequence of which, the _Insolent_ weighed as appears by her
log-book at 3 o’clock.]
AFFIDAVIT MADE BY ME, DISCLOSING DE BERENGER AS THE VISITOR TO MY
HOUSE ON THE 21ST OF FEBRUARY 1814.
Having obtained leave of absence to come to Town, in consequence of
scandalous paragraphs in the public papers, and in consequence of
having learnt that hand-bills had been affixed in the streets, in
which (I have since seen) it is asserted that a person came to my
house, No. 13 Green Street, on the 21st day of February, in open day,
and in the dress in which he had committed a fraud, I feel it due to
myself to make the following deposition, that the public may know the
truth relative to the only person seen by me in military uniform at my
house on that day.
COCHRANE.
Dated 13 Green Street, March 11th, 1814.
I, SIR THOMAS COCHRANE, commonly called Lord Cochrane, having been
appointed by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to active
service (at the request, I believe, of Sir Alexander Cochrane) when I
had no expectation of being called on, I obtained leave of absence to
settle my private affairs previous to quitting this country, and
chiefly with a view to lodge a specification to a patent, relative to
a discovery for increasing the intensity of light. That in pursuance
with my daily practice of superintending work that was executing for
me, and knowing that my uncle Mr. Cochrane Johnstone went to the City
every morning in a coach, I do swear on the morning of the 21st of
February (which day was impressed on my mind by circumstances which
afterwards occurred) I breakfasted with him, at his residence in
Cumberland Street, about half-past eight o’clock, and I was put down
by him (and Mr. Butt was in the coach) on Snow-hill about ten o’clock;
that I had been about three quarters of an hour at Mr. King’s
manufactory, at No. 1 Cock Lane, when I received a few lines on a
small bit of paper, requesting me to come immediately to my house; the
name affixed, from being written close to the bottom, I could not
read; the servant told me it was from an army officer, and concluding
that he might be an officer from Spain, and that some accident had
befallen to my brother, I hastened back, and found Captain Berenger,
who, in great seeming uneasiness, made many apologies for the freedom
he had used, which nothing but the distressed state of his mind,
arising from difficulties, could have induced him to do; all his
prospects, he said, had failed, and his last hope had vanished of
obtaining an appointment in America, he was unpleasantly circumstanced
on account of a sum which he could not pay, and if he could that
others would fall upon him for full 8000_l._ He had no hope of
benefiting his creditors in his present situation, or of assisting
himself; that if I would take him with me, he would immediately go on
board and exercise the Sharpshooters (which plan Sir Alexander
Cochrane I knew had approved of[106]); that he had left his lodgings
and prepared himself in the best way his means allowed. He had brought
the sword with him which had been his father’s, and to that and to Sir
Alexander he would trust for obtaining an honorable appointment. I
felt, very uneasy at the distress he was in, and knowing him to be a
man of great talent and science, I told him I would do everything in
my power to relieve him, but as to his going immediately to the
_Tonnant_ with any comfort to himself, it was quite impossible; my
cabin was without furniture, I had not even a servant on board. He
said he would willingly mess anywhere; I told him that the ward-room
was already crowded, and besides, I could not, with propriety, take
him, he being a foreigner, without leave from the Admiralty. He seemed
greatly hurt at this, and recalled to my recollection certificates
which he had formerly shown me from persons in official situations:
Lord Yarmouth, General Jenkinson, and Mr. Reeves, I think, were
amongst the number. I recommended him to use his endeavour to get them
or any other friends to exert their influence, for I had none, adding
that when the _Tonnant_ went to Portsmouth, I should be happy receive
him, and I knew from Sir Alexander Cochrane that he would be pleased
if he accomplished that object. Captain Berenger said that not
anticipating any objection on my part, from the conversation he had
formerly had with me, he had come away with intention to go on board
and make himself useful in his military capacity. He could not go to
Lord Yarmouth or to any other of his friends in this dress (alluding
to that which he had on), or return to his lodgings, where it would
excite suspicion (as he was at that time in the rules of the King’s
Bench), but that if I refused to let him join the ship now, he would
do so at Portsmouth. Under present circumstances however he must use a
great liberty, and request the favour of me to lend him a hat to wear
instead of his military cap. I gave him one which was in a back room
with some things that had not been packed up, and having tried it on,
his uniform appeared under his great coat, I therefore offered him a
black coat that was lying on a chair, and which I did not intend to
take with me; he put up his uniform in a towel, and shortly afterwards
went away, in great apparent uneasiness of mind, and having asked my
leave he took the coach I came in, and which I had forgotten to
discharge, in the haste I was in. I do further depose, that the above
conversation is the substance of all that passed with Captain
Berenger, which, from the circumstances attending it, was strongly
impressed upon my mind; that no other person in uniform was seen by me
at my house on Monday, the 21st of February, though possibly other
officers may have called (as many have done since my appointment); of
this, however, I cannot speak of my own knowledge, having been almost
constantly from home, arranging my private affairs. I have understood
that many persons have called under the above circumstances, and have
written notes in the parlour, and others have waited there, in
expectation of seeing me, and then gone away; but I most positively
swear that I never saw any person at my house resembling the
description and in the dress stated in the printed advertisement of
the members of the Stock Exchange. I further aver, that I had no
concern, directly or indirectly, in the late imposition, and that the
above is all that I know relative to any person who came to my house
in uniform on the 21st day of February, before alluded to. Captain
Berenger wore a grey great coat, a green uniform, and a military cap.
From the manner in which my character has been attempted to be
defamed, it is indispensably necessary to state that my connection in
any way with the funds arose from an impression that in the present
favourable aspect of affairs, it was only necessary to hold stock in
order to become a gainer, without prejudice to anybody; that I did so
openly, considering it in no degree improper, far less dishonourable;
that I had no secret information of any kind, and that had my
expectation of the success of affairs been disappointed, I should have
been the only sufferer. Further, I do most solemnly swear, that the
whole of the omnium on account which I possessed on the 21st day of
February 1814 amounted to 139,000_l._, which I bought by Mr. Fearn (I
think) on the 12th ultimo, at a premium of 28¼; that I did not hold on
that day any other sum on account, in any other stock, directly or
indirectly, and that I had given orders when it was bought to dispose
of it on a rise of 1 per cent, and it actually was sold on an average
at 29½ premium, though on the day of the fraud it might have been
disposed of at 33½. I further swear, that the above is the only stock
which I sold, of any kind, on the 21st day of February, except
2000_l._ in money which I had occasion for, the profit of which was
about 10_l._ Further, I do solemnly depose, that I had no connection
or dealing with any one, save the above mentioned, and that I did not
at any time, directly or indirectly, by myself or by any other, take
or procure any office or apartment for any broker or other person for
the transaction of stock affairs.
COCHRANE.
-----
Footnote 106:
Sir Alexander, previous to his departure, had applied to the Admiralty
for the employment of De Berenger.
-----
------------------------------------
APPENDIX V.
LETTER FROM RICHARD GURNEY, ESQ. TO LORD|COCHRANE.
King’s Bench, Sept. 9th, 1814.
MY LORD,—In replying to your Lordship’s letter of yesterday, I beg to
observe that several applications have been already made to me from
several quarters, for the purpose of obtaining the particulars of the
conversation between the Honourable Mr. Murray, another gentlemen, and
myself, alluded to in your letter, but that I have hitherto refused to
comply with such applications, for reasons which must be sufficiently
obvious to every delicate and honourable mind. Being requested,
however, by your Lordship, to say whether “your name” was said to have
been connected “by De Berenger” with the imposition which he had “in
contemplation,” I can no longer hesitate in giving, to the best of my
recollection, a statement of the facts relating to your Lordship.
A few days before the late trial against your Lordship and others, I
was informed by Mr. Murray, that he was to be examined as a witness on
the approaching trial. I asked him what was the nature of the evidence
he had to give? He replied, that De Berenger had some time ago told
him that he, De Berenger, and Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, had a plan in
contemplation, which would be the means of putting a large sum of
money into each of their pockets: that he joked De Berenger, and asked
him to let him into the secret of the plan: that De Berenger laughed,
and refused to tell him what the plan was, saying it was too good a
thing to be made known.
Mr. Murray added that this conversion with De Berenger took place a
short time previous to the hoax on the Stock Exchange; and that it was
imagined, from a combination of circumstances, that De Berenger must
have had the hoax in view when he spoke of the plan between Mr.
Cochrane Johnstone and himself.
I asked Mr. Murray if your Lordship’s name was mentioned by De
Berenger? He replied, “_Oh, no; nothing was said about Lord
Cochrane_.”
I observed that I was glad of this, as I conceived De Berenger would
certainly have mentioned your name as well as Mr. Cochrane
Johnstone’s, had your Lordship been in the plot.
Mr. Murray rejoined, “_Yes, I think it very probable_.”
The morning after, Mr. Murray, in accidentally recapitulating the
conversation between De Berenger and himself, remarked, that upon
recollection he thought your Lordship’s name was mentioned by De
Berenger, and presently afterwards he observed, that, on
reconsideration, your Lordship’s name certainly was mentioned. I
naturally felt surprised at this statement, it being so contradictory
to that of the preceding day, and took the liberty of observing to Mr.
Murray, that I conceived he would act wrong, however correct his
intentions might really be, to give any evidence respecting your
Lordship, after so strangely forgetting himself as to the only part of
the conversation which could affect your case.
Other conversation passed, but I am not so positive and clear in my
recollection of it as of that which I have detailed to your Lordship.
I have the honour to be, &c.,
RICHARD GURNEY, Jun.
------------------------------------
APPENDIX VI.
LETTER FROM LIEUT. PRESCOTT TO LORD COCHRANE.
King’s Bench, Nov. 28th, 1814.
MY LORD,—Having been requested by your Lordship to commit to writing
the information which I communicated to you some months ago, I have no
hesitation in complying with your request.
The substance of the account which I received from the persons whose
names I mentioned to you, and who may be called upon if required, is,
that they were of the party at a dinner, which was termed, “The Stock
Exchange Dinner,” provided by order of Mr. Harrison, at Davey’s
Coffee-house in the Bench, on the day before the _trial_; at which
dinner the Honourable Alexander Murray was also of the party, which
consisted of seven or eight persons: that after they had dined, and
the bottle had gone briskly round, Harrison said to Mr. Murray (who
was then, and still is, a prisoner for debt) that he would get his
affairs settled; _and as he should receive a large sum from the
Exchange for the conviction of Lord Cochrane, if he (Murray) wanted
50l. he should have it to-morrow; proposing at the same time, “Success
to the Stock Exchange,” which was drunk in claret with loud cheering_:
that this took place in the public coffee-room, before many persons
both in the room and looking in at the windows, the dinner attracting
considerable attention from its style, which was unusual in the Bench:
that Mr. Harrison, in answer to a remark from one of the bystanders,
that the dinner would cost a round sum, said, it did not signify if it
cost 50_l._, as the Stock Exchange would pay for it: that when the
majority of the party had drunk as much as they could or were willing
to drink, Mr. Harrison ordered several full bottles to be placed on
the table; and the task of finishing the wine which remained devolving
at length on the Honourable Alexander Murray, and he being unable to
accomplish it by himself, he went into the lobby of the prison, and
procured two of the turnkeys to assist him.
The further account of one of the persons above alluded to (who
usually messed with Mr. Murray), is, that for some time previous to
the trial Harrison was daily with Mr. Murray, dining and drinking with
him; and that he was present when Harrison visited Mr. Murray,
accompanied by the solicitors, Messrs. H. and R.; on which occasion
Harrison said to Mr. Murray, “Here are the gentlemen who will
accomplish your wishes;” and one of those gentlemen replied, “_Yes,
Mr. Murray, after this trial of Lord Cochrane has past, we will then
attend to your liberation_:”[107] that he heard Mr. Harrison declare
in the lobby, as did many other persons, that he should receive a sum
of money _if he could procure evidence which would convict Lord
Cochrane_; intimating at the same time, that he was induced to offer
his services to the Stock Exchange, in procuring evidence against him,
by his personal antipathy to the whole family of the Cochranes, which
he said would never subside while he breathed; that, subsequent to the
trial, he has _repeatedly heard Mr. Murray express himself sorry for
having appeared in Court against Lord Cochrane, and acknowledge that
he had been the dupe of Harrison_, in persuading him that his
solicitors would undertake the arrangement of his affairs and effect
his liberation, provided he would appear as an evidence against Lord
Cochrane at the trial.[108]
_Shortly before_ the trial I addressed two letters to your Lordship on
the subject of Harrison’s visiting and tampering with Mr. Murray, who
was expected to appear as an evidence against you; but your Lordship
did not answer those letters, nor attend at that time to my
communications. The fact, however, was notorious in the Bench. Of my
own knowledge I have only to add, that on the day of the Stock
Exchange Dinner (as it was called), my attention was attracted by the
noise of the entertainment and the number of people collected; and I
went into the coffee-room and saw the party at the table, as did many
other persons; and towards the close of the evening I saw Mr. Murray
return from the lobby into the coffee-house, accompanied by one of the
turnkeys. It was well known _that Harrison was in a state of extreme
indigence previous to the trial_[109]; but shortly afterwards, I was
present when _he took a considerable number of bank-notes out of his
pocket_, and saw him place a 50_l._ note in the hands of a gentleman,
to remain till an account with Mr. Lewis was investigated. I have also
heard Harrison declare, in the presence of other persons, _that he
would ruin the whole Cochrane family_.
I am your Lordship’s most obedient servant,
THOMAS PRESCOTT.
-----
Footnote 107:
Messrs. H. and R. were Harrison’s solicitors on the trial between him
and the Hon. B. Cochrane, and have since been employed by Mr. Murray,
though they have not effected his liberation.
Footnote 108:
It is due to the unfortunate Mr. Murray to observe, that his yielding
to the arts which appear to have been practised upon him, to induce
him to introduce my name into the evidence he had to give at the
trial, is solely to be attributed to the imbecility of his mind
(naturally good), occasioned by a long-continued habit of excessive
drinking.
Footnote 109:
He was imprisoned for defaming Mr. Cochrane, and afterwards detained
for debt in the King’s Bench, where his acquaintance with Mr. Murray
is supposed to have commenced.
-----
------------------------------------
APPENDIX VII.
MINUTES FURNISHED TO MESSRS. FARRER AND CO. MY SOLICITORS AT THE TRIAL,
AT THEIR OWN REQUEST, AND ENDORSED BY THEM, “LORD COCHRANE’S MINUTES
OF CASE.”
Lord Cochrane was not in habits of intimacy with De Berenger.
De Berenger never broke bread in Lord Cochrane’s house; and never, as
far as Lord Cochrane knows, sat down in it.[110]
Lord Cochrane’s servants never carried a note or letter to De
Berenger, or put any note or letter into the post for him.
De Berenger’s servants never brought any note or letter to Lord
Cochrane, or forwarded any addressed to him.
The only person who came to No. 13 Green Street, on the 21st of
February, in uniform, or the appearance of uniform, was De Berenger.
De Berenger wore a grey great-coat, without any trimming; and had a
green coat, or a coat with a green collar, under it.[111]
De Berenger sent a note to Lord Cochrane, which was delivered to him
at Mr. King’s manufactory, where he was in the daily habit of going.
The Hon. Major Cochrane was dangerously ill, and confined to his bed,
at that time in Spain.[112]
Lord Cochrane was appointed to command the _Tonnant_ but had obtained
leave of absence to draw up and lodge the specification to a patent.
His leave of absence was to expire on the[113] and he did write such
specification, and lodge it on the[114]
The man who happened to open the door to De Berenger had been hired
for the express purpose of going into the country to relieve Lord
Cochrane’s sea-steward, and did so accordingly.
No man whatever lived in Lord Cochrane’s house, except himself and one
or two servants.
The servants, who were discharged, had received a regular month’s
warning, and left in consequence thereof.
On[115] \, Lord Cochrane directed Messrs. Lance and Smallbone to
purchase for him 5000_l._ omnium for money[116]; but on going to the
office[117] with the intention to pay for it, he found that he had
neglected to bring the necessary sum; and having only about 50_l._
with him, he borrowed of Messrs. Fearn, Lance, and Smallbone, a sum
equal to the deficiency, except 200_l._ which was lent to his Lordship
by Mr. Butt.
Mr. Fearn was repaid on the following day[118] by the sale of the
omnium, Lord Cochrane having given orders to sell it, in the event of
his not being able to come into the city, which was the case.
Messrs. Lance and Smallbone repaid themselves, and Lord Cochrane
returned Mr. Butt the 200_l._ when he received the balance on Saturday
the 19th.
-----
Footnote 110:
Neither in Green Street, nor any former residence. See answer to an
anonymous letter, at the end of this publication.
Footnote 111:
See the _second_ of the series of questions which I addressed to my
solicitors, July 25th.
Footnote 112:
At Cambo, in France, on the borders of Spain.
Footnote 113:
28th of February.
Footnote 114:
Ibid.
Footnote 115:
14th of February.
Footnote 116:
Which they did on the 15th.
Footnote 117:
On the 15th.
Footnote 118:
On the 17th.
-----
APPENDIX VIII.
King’s Bench, July 25th, 1814.
GENTLEMEN,—In consequence of what passed in the House of Commons on
Tuesday last, I feel it my duty to call upon you, as my solicitors on
the late trial, for answers to the following questions:—
Did I ever give you, in writing, any other instructions for the brief,
than a few observations contained in one sheet of paper, which was
afterwards endorsed by you, “Minutes of Case”?
Was not the description of De Berenger’s dress as contained in those
minutes, namely, “a grey great-coat, without any trimming, and a green
coat, or a coat with a green collar, under it,” understood by you to
have reference to what could be proved only, and not to imply a doubt
in my mind as to the colour of the under coat, but merely to intimate
that the witnesses might only be able to speak to the colour of the
collar, on account of the body of the coat having been concealed by
the great-coat?
Did not I, at your request, send my servants, Thomas Dewman and Mary
Turpin, to your office to be examined by you preparatory to your
drawing the brief? And were not you previously in possession of my
affidavit, in which the coat worn by De Berenger in my presence on the
21st of February, is sworn to have been green? And were not you aware
that my said servants had also made affidavits that the officer they
saw at my house on that day wore a grey great-coat, buttoned up, with
a green collar underneath?
Did you not particularly question them as to the colour of the
under-coat? Did you not expressly ask them whether it was a red coat?
And whether they could swear that it was not a red coat? which they
could not, because it was worn under a great-coat, which was buttoned
up.
Was it not in consequence of repeated questions that they were induced
to admit that the under-coat might be red? Did either of my servants
admit that any part which he or she SAW of the under-coat was red?
Did you not, in consequence of the examination of my servants, insert
in the brief that the under-coat worn by De Berenger was a red coat
with a green collar?
Did you ever call my attention to _that_ part of the brief, by word or
letter? And do you really believe that I was privy and consenting to
the fact of my counsel being authorised by the brief to admit that
coat to be red, which I uniformly declared to you was green, and which
I had sworn to be green?
Did you read the whole of the brief to me, or merely detached parts?
Did I peruse it myself in your presence, or to your knowledge? Did you
ever, previous to the trial, furnish me with a copy of it?
Did I ever make any alterations in the depositions of the servants, or
in any part of the brief, relative to what they could depose on the
important subject of De Berenger’s dress? Did I ever desire you to
re-examine them on that point?
Did I ever, as far as you know and believe, give instructions to my
counsel? Did I ever attend any consultation? Was not my defence mixed
with Mr. Johnstone’s contrary to my orders? and did you inform me that
Mr. Johnstone’s counsel, and not my own, was to plead my cause?
Was I not, as far as you know and believe, absent from London for near
three weeks, previous to and up to the Monday preceding the trial?
Did you ever call the attention of the counsel, by word or letter, to
the difference between the statement in the brief and the affidavits
of myself and servants, respecting the dress of De Berenger? When did
the counsel, to the best of your belief, discover that difference?
Did I not send my servants to Guildhall on the 8th of June, the first
day of the trial, to be examined? Did I not send you a note by them,
to inform you that I had sent them for that purpose? Did I not send
them again on the second day of the trial? and did I not write to you
on that day, particularly requesting that they might be examined? When
did you receive my second letter? Was it not prior to the close of my
defence? and if subsequent, was it not at least several hours prior to
the close of De Berenger’s defence? Had the counsel, to your
knowledge, resolved at all events not to examine my servants? Did you
communicate to me such their determination? Have you any reason to
believe that I had the least knowledge, prior to the trial being
closed, that my servant would not be, or had not been, examined?
If I had been informed that the counsel had refused to examine them,
might I not have gone into Court, and personally demanded the
examination of my witnesses?
I am, &c.
COCHRANE.
Messrs. Farrer & Co.
--------------
Lincoln’s Inn Fields, Aug. 3, 1814.
MY LORD,—We were duly honoured with your Lordship’s letter of the 25th
ult. requiring our answers to many questions relating to the late
prosecution; but after what has passed, and the communications we have
already made, we hope your Lordship will agree with us in thinking,
that it would be highly improper in us now to answer any more abstract
or partial questions. We have, agreeably to your uncle’s desire, made
out, and now beg leave to inclose you our bill in that business, in
which you will find most of the facts to which your questions relate
stated as they occurred.
We are, &c.
FARRER AND CO.
------------------------------------
APPENDIX IX.
WESTMINSTER ELECTION.—LETTER FROM THE RIGHT HON. RICHARD BRINSLEY
SHERIDAN TO ARTHUR MORRIS, ESQ., HIGH BAILIFF OF WESTMINSTER.
Saville Row, Sunday evening, July 10, 1814.
SIR,—Observing that you have called a meeting to-morrow, to be held in
Palace Yard, to consider of a fit person to fill up the present
vacancy in the representation of the City of Westminster, and having
myself received very earnest applications from numerous and
independent bodies of its inhabitant householders, requiring that I
should meet their wishes by proposing myself as a candidate, I take
the freedom of addressing these lines to you, to say that I absolutely
decline to be put in nomination in opposition to Lord Cochrane.
I send you this my determination without concert or communication with
the respectable persons to whom I have above referred, and towards
whom I must ever continue to give the utmost gratitude.
I trust that I need not declare that I should have felt greatly
honoured by having been again returned the representative of
Westminster; my title to aspire to that distinction is simply that
after more than thirty-one years’ service in Parliament, I can,
without fear of successful contradiction, assert that I never gave a
vote that was not in support of the truth of liberty, and in assertion
of the people’s rights, duly respecting at the same time the just
prerogatives of the Crown, and revering the sacred principles upon
which was founded and maintained the glory and the security of our
unrivalled Constitution.
Holding these opinions, as a public man, have I hitherto sat in the
House of Commons; and never will I accept a seat there but on the sole
condition of being the master of my own vote and voice—the servant
only of my conscience.
As to the present question, which occasions your meeting to-morrow, I
enter not into it. No man feels more the reverence due to the seats of
justice, or the confidence due to the verdicts of juries. But under
the circumstances of an expulsion from the House of Commons, I do not
hesitate to say, that I have a decided opinion that the expelled
member has a right to appeal to his constituents, with a view to the
restitution of his seat and the rescue of his character.
On these grounds, Sir, I will not allow myself to interfere with the
present appeal made on the part of Lord Cochrane, and to which I
conceive him to be so justly entitled.
In adopting this determination, I beg leave distinctly to state, that
I waive my claim to solicit the suffrages of the electors of
Westminster in favour of Lord Cochrane alone.
I have the honour to be, Sir, &c.
RICHARD BRINSLEY SHERIDAN.
------------------------------------
APPENDIX X.
[_The Times_, July 12th, 1814.]
WESTMINSTER MEETING.
Yesterday there was a very numerous meeting at Palace Yard, convened
by the high bailiff, for the purpose of nominating a fit and proper
person to represent the City of Westminster in Parliament.
The high bailiff shortly stated the purpose for which the present
meeting was convened. He had received two letters, which it would be
his duty to read to them. The one was from Lord Cochrane (_loud shouts
of applause_), the other from Mr. Sheridan (cries of “_No Sheridan!_”
and loud expressions of disapprobation from the multitude who supposed
that Mr. Sheridan was offering himself as a candidate).
The letter from Lord Cochrane was first read. He enclosed to the high
bailiff a full and unmutilated account of the defence made by him at
the House of Commons, which he requested him to read to the meeting.
(Many voices called out, “_Read, read!_” while many others, both on
account of the great length of it as well as the danger of publishing
certain passages of it, cried “_No, no!_”).
The high bailiff declined to read it. He then read the letter from Mr.
Sheridan, waiving his claims in favour of Lord Cochrane.
The high bailiff then asked if any gentleman had anything to propose.
SIR F. BURDETT came forward amid the loudest applause. He had on many
occasions witnessed with pleasure the generous feeling and independent
spirit of the electors of Westminster; but he had never on any
occasion witnessed the ebullition of their feelings with such
satisfaction as on the present occasion, as there never was one in
which it was more important. The question now was, whether an innocent
individual (_loud applause_), for so he conceived him to be, should be
destroyed by the machinations of corruption and power, or whether he
should be supported by the voice of his constituents. He hoped that by
the suffrages of the electors of Westminster, that character would be
maintained which he thought had never in any instance been forfeited.
They had heard a letter read from Mr. Sheridan, who had with great
propriety and prudence withdrawn his pretensions, such as they were.
Of the value of that gentleman’s claims and pretensions he would not
now judge; but he thought that it was prudent and polite of him not to
press them at present against the popular feeling and the current of
public opinion. They had heard also a letter from Lord Cochrane, who
wished his defence to be read to them at length. It was not surprising
that the high bailiff should decline reading that statement, or that
no other person should be found bold enough to do so. At a time when
libel was an offence so undefined in its nature that no man knew when
he might be speaking or writing libels, he could not himself say
whether he was not about to speak libels, but that consideration
should not prevent him from speaking the truth. Lord Cochrane had,
however, with that fortitude which he had so often displayed in the
defence of his country, and which had never been more strongly
displayed than during the late trying occasion, ventured boldly to
speak his mind in the House of Commons, and was now ready to incur all
the additional risks of publishing the statement he had there made.
When he had made that statement, the minister of the country, or, as
he should term him, the _nose leader_ of that illustrious and august
body (_a laugh_), not having the power of gagging Lord Cochrane, or
preventing his assertion of his innocence, and knowing well the effect
that such an appeal to the public would naturally produce, rose, in
all the blushing honours of his blue ribbon, to impose silence upon
the corrupt and degraded press that is still suffered to exist in this
country. At the moment when the House of Commons was going to
stigmatise Lord Cochrane with an additional vote conveying censure,
the minister thought that it was not proper that the people should
hear his defence. Lord Cochrane, feeling, however, as a man of honour
must do, that no risk was comparable to the loss of character, wished,
at every hazard, to support his hitherto unsullied character and
reputation. He therefore wished that his address should be read to the
meeting; but the high bailiff must, on such an occasion, be allowed to
exercise his own discretion and judgment. When the uniform conduct of
their chairman was taken into consideration, everybody must be
convinced that his motives were always just and honourable, and
therefore it would be most unhandsome in them to press him to act
contrary to his own judgment in this particular instance. He felt it
now unnecessary to detain the meeting with entering into a detail of
the case: the statement of the noble lord had, however, explained
those circumstances which appeared to require explanation. He should
not now find fault with the jury that tried Lord Cochrane (who were,
as he was informed, very respectable persons); but he should for ever
find fault with that mode of picking out a jury which Lord Cochrane
had called packing them. He did not mean to find fault with the
verdict which they found upon the evidence that was laid before
them—evidence which was so skilfully and so artfully got up against
him by those who had the arrangement of the prosecutor’s case, and
which had been so feebly met by those who undertook the defence of
Lord Cochrane. On such evidence they had found Lord Cochrane guilty of
a fraud of which he was sure that he was as incapable as any gentleman
whom he had then the honour of addressing. The noble lord had
certainly charged the noble and learned judge who tried him with a
false statement of the facts of the case, and with a gross
misdirection to the jury. As Lord Cochrane had been prevented, by the
rules of law from having the opportunity of having his case re-tried,
he now came before the public for the vindication of his character. He
should contend, however, that the rule which was set up against the
granting to his Lordship a new trial was contrary to the law, as the
law never requires a man to do impossibilities. As, however, some of
those who were tried with Lord Cochrane had fled from the country, and
others were evidently not under his control, it was impossible that he
should have been able to bring them all into court at the time he
wished to move for a new trial. The principle, however, that the law
never requires of a man to do impossibilities was maintained on
another occasion with respect to those proceedings. When, on the part
of some others who had been tried with him, an objection had been made
to the indictment as not being sufficiently specific, the answer was,
it was impossible to make it comprehend every point, and that the law
did not require impossibilities. If the law, however, did not require
impossibilities in the one case, neither would it require them in
another (_great applause_). They must all remember what an impression
had been made on the public mind before the trial by the publishing of
evidence, if evidence it could be called, which was given before that
body that designated themselves the Committee of the Stock-Exchange.
He was convinced that almost every man in the court had formed his
opinion from this publication of evidence, before the Stock-Exchange
Committee, before Lord Cochrane had been put upon his trial. He had
heard of what was called the summing up of the noble judge; but his
idea of a summing up was, the statement of all the items on the one
side and on the other, without addition or subtraction, and presenting
to the jury a fair balance. His idea of a judge was that he should be
a person free from passion or strong feeling on the case he was to
try; but that he was to assist the jury by a clear and impartial
statement of the evidence on the one side and on the other.
The noble judge who tried Lord Cochrane was an eloquent person, and,
as he thought, his eloquence on this occasion had been unfortunate for
himself. He thought that he had been as eloquent as an advocate, and
as an impassioned advocate. Indeed, some of his phrases and metaphors
appeared to him more nearly to resemble the language of poetry (_a
laugh_), and would, as he thought, give him fairer pretensions to the
situation of Poet Laureate, than some who had aspired to it
(_laughter_). When he had spoken of “hunting down the chase, and
getting the skin,” it reminded him of the old proverb, “that the man
who sold the lion’s skin, while the lion was yet alive, was himself
killed in the chase.” He believed that Lord Cochrane was not yet
hunted down; but that, on the contrary, he was now turning against his
hunters. It now remained for the electors of Westminster to vindicate
the character of an illustrious person who had rendered great services
to his country (_loud applause_); services which, if he had even been
guilty of the meanness imputed to him, should, as he thought, have
protected him from the degrading infamy which it was now intended to
have inflicted upon him. (“_No, no!_” from many persons, as expressing
a hope that the sentence would not be inflicted.) He should hope that
the malice of his enemies would not prevail; but even if he were to
suffer that degrading punishment, he would confidently look for his
acquittal to the unpacked and uncorrupted verdict of his constituents
and his countrymen at large. He say, that if Lord Cochrane was to
stand in the pillory, he should feel it his duty to attend also (_loud
shouts of applause_, which lasted for many minutes). The disgrace that
might be intended for Lord Cochrane, would, so far from stamping him
with infamy, remove in the public opinion the idea of infamy from the
punishment of the pillory. No man, that had hitherto conceived it an
honour to follow the noble Lord would, for the future, conceive it
infamy to stand in the pillory in which he had stood. It appeared to
him that instead of destroying Lord Cochrane, the infliction of that
part of the sentence would destroy the punishment of the pillory for
the future. If even Lord Cochrane had been guilty of the offence with
which he was charged, would it be supposed that it was for that
offence he had incurred such vengeance, or would it not rather be
supposed that the real crime, which could not be forgiven, was his
bold and independent conduct in the defence of their rights and
liberties? (_applause_). This was a crime as unpardonable in the eyes
of some men as that which is called by religious men the sin against
the Holy Ghost. How marked a difference was there between the
punishment inflicted upon him and the treatment of the most notorious
delinquents and depredators of the public purse. They, forsooth, are
all honest gentlemen, and meant to pay back at some time or another;
and by places and pensions they were often enabled to pay back to the
public out of their own money. This put him in mind of a story he had
once heard of a Scotch gardener, who flourished and grew rich while
his neighbours were failing. One of them, however, having got up very
early in the morning, met him with a cartful of wall-fruit, which he
had stripped from their gardens, and asked him, “Where are you going?”
The Scotchman answered, “I am going back again” (_a laugh_). This was
the case with the great public delinquents: when they were found out,
they were let go back again. He had no doubt but that with the sense
they appeared to entertain, both of the innocence and merits of Lord
Cochrane, they would enable him again to go to the House, not for the
purpose of pruning that hateful system whose branches had extended so
wide, but for the purpose of laying the axe to the root of corruption
(_applause_), in order that a natural and wholesome vegetation might
take its place. He had exerted himself to rescue the property of his
gallant brethren in arms from the gripe of legal harpies; he had acted
with independence in circumstances where it was not easy to act
independently. He thought that a real independent representative, a
man not connected with or swayed by any party, stood in rather a
forlorn and difficult situation. Having said so much, he should leave
the case of Lord Cochrane to their decision; to them he should commit
not his life, for that he had freely and often risked for honour at
the cannon’s mouth, but that immortal part, which was far dearer to a
man of honour than his life, his reputation and his character. To them
he now confidently made his appeal, and he trusted that he should not
be disappointed. After a few more observations, he concluded by moving
the following resolution:—
“Resolved, that in the opinion of this meeting, Lord Cochrane is
perfectly innocent of the offence for which he has been sentenced to
receive an infamous punishment.”
MR. WISHART seconded the motion. Great pains, he said, had been taken
to trace one part of the route of De Berenger; but not so much with
respect to the other. He did not think that the witnesses on the trial
were perjured; but Berenger might have brought the coat along with him
in the bundle which he held in his hand. Lord Cochrane came forward
like an innocent man, and stated all that he knew of the transaction;
nor could it be reasonably inferred that he was implicated in the
fraud because Berenger came to his house. The rule of the Court had
placed Lord Cochrane in a most difficult and perplexing situation; a
rule wholly unknown to the best times of the constitution. Judges thus
took the law in their own hands, and encroached upon the functions of
Parliament. He did not intend to arraign the conduct of the jury,
though the verdict of the juries who had condemned Russell and Sidney
had been subsequently reversed (_loud applause_), because it had been
improperly obtained, and the memory of those illustrious patriots
would remain embalmed in the recollections of the latest posterity.
Many judges had been an ornament to the country that gave them birth,
such as Sir M. Hale, Lord Camden, and others; and would to God judges
like them always presided in the seat of justice. Every man who was
actuated by a cause of justice, or by the feeling of humanity, would
pour the balm of consolation into the wounded spirit of the noble
Lord, who had deserved so well of his country, and who, from some, at
least, of his countrymen, had met with such an ungrateful return.
MAJOR CARTWRIGHT said there was nothing in any part of the evidence
which warranted the learned lord (Ellenborough) in stating that De
Berenger came to the house of Lord Cochrane emblazoned in all the
costume of his crime. Such an assertion would only be accounted for
upon the supposition, that in his charge to the jury he had trusted
rather to his memory than to his notes. The evidence against Lord
Cochrane was like a grain of sand in one hand, while that in his
favour was like Westminster Abbey in the other (_loud and reiterated
applause_).
MR. WALKER thought that it was the duty of the noble Lord’s
constituents to replace him in his situation as Member for Westminster
(_shouts of applause_).
MR. ALDERMAN WOOD, when he first heard of the charge against Lord
Cochrane, had said he was innocent, and that he had not the heart nor
the disposition to commit a fraud (_applause_). After the trial he was
of the same opinion, and everything that had since taken place
contributed still more to strengthen that belief. He had heard from
one of the jury (who had assured him that others of that jury were of
the same sentiment), that had the evidence since produced been brought
forward upon the trial, or had Lord Cochrane been in Court and made
his own defence, it would have been impossible to have found him
guilty (_bursts of applause_). If necessary, he could bring the
individual alluded to before them (“_Bravo, bravo!_”). When he first
heard of the result of the trial, he, as an elector of Westminster,
had been turning in his mind whom it might be proper to propose for
their representative. He was happy to think that now there was no
opportunity for any deliberation of that kind, for the electors of
Westminster would do justice to an injured character, and return him
by their verdict to that House from which he had been expelled (_loud
applause_). The resolution was then put and carried by acclamation.
SIR F. BURDETT then moved the second resolution:—
“That it is therefore the opinion of this meeting, that Lord Cochrane
is a proper person to represent the City of Westminster in Parliament,
and that he be put in nomination at the ensuing election.”
This was seconded by MR. STURCH, and carried unanimously, and with
great applause.
SIR F. BURDETT then moved the third:—
“That a Committee be appointed for the purpose of carrying into effect
the foregoing resolutions, with power to add to their number.”
This was also agreed to, and Sir Francis proposed several names, among
which were Mr. Alderman Wood, Mr. Brooks, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Jones
Burdett, &c.
The Hon. Baronet next moved the fourth resolution:—
“That a subscription be entered into to defray the expenses of the
ensuing election, toward which it is the bounden duty of every elector
and friend to purity of election to contribute.”
It was seconded by MR. WISHART, who said that as the City of
Westminster had set an honourable example in returning members free of
expense, it became their character to continue the practice: but their
treasury was not inexhaustible, and he hoped that every friend to the
purity of election would come forward and contribute on this occasion
(_applause_).
MAJOR CARTWRIGHT moved the fifth resolution:—
“Resolved—That the thanks of this Meeting be given to Sir Francis
Burdett, and the forty-three honourable members who voted against the
expulsion of Lord Cochrane.”
Sir F. Burdett returned thanks; and, after a vote of thanks to the
high bailiff, the meeting broke up.
------------------------------------
APPENDIX XI.
[_The Morning Chronicle_, July 18th, 1814.]
WESTMINSTER ELECTION.
On Saturday last, in pursuance of the notice of the high bailiff, a
numerous body of the Westminster electors met at the porch of St.
Paul’s, Covent Garden, to choose a fit person to represent their city in
Parliament. At ten o’clock proclamation was made and the writ read, when
SIR F. BURDETT came forward on the hustings, and, addressing the
electors, said, that in pursuance to the unanimous resolutions of the
electors of Westminster in Palace Yard, he had appeared to put in
practice that which was unanimously determined on at that time, by
putting in nomination the person whom they had then determined to be
worthy to represent them. And such was the effect which that unanimous
expression of opinion had produced, that, almost for the first time,
they were not faced by any Court candidate; for such was the weight that
it carried, that it had imposed silence in all quarters (_applause_). It
would ill become him to detain them long from that great purpose—great
it was, for it was the purpose of doing justice and maintaining the
oppressed which they were that day assembled to accomplish, but he
thought it his duty to add a few words on so novel and important an
occasion (_marks of approbation_). The assembly of that day presented
the most august spectacle to the mind of man—it was the image of a free
people—of a body of free men, appealed to in the last resort, from all
minor and inferior jurisdictions, by an oppressed individual—oppressed
by corrupt machinations and artful combinations. From whatever cause
this oppression arose, it was enough that he was oppressed, and that he
had appealed from his oppressors to the justice of the people at
large—for the character by which the people of England was most
distinguished was the love of justice (_applause_). It was needless to
attempt to display any of the merits peculiar to Lord Cochrane, because
whatever these merits or demerits, if any such existed (of which he, Sir
F.B. was not aware), were of little consequence. It was not in the view
of personal merits or demerits, but in the defence of a man oppressed
unjustly, as they believed—in support of justice, that they were called
on to give their suffrages on this occasion. Though idle reports or
malignant artifices had been played off against Lord Cochrane, even had
they not carried in themselves their own refutation, they would have had
no weight with the electors of Westminster. Free bodies of electors had
always shown a disposition to support the oppressed, and particularly in
the case of that individual whose apostacy had done such injury to the
cause of liberty, and who had always been thought by those who knew him
intimately, to have been unprincipled—John Wilkes. In that case, despite
of all dislike to the character of the man, he was maintained because he
was an object of oppression, and because he had avowed those principles
of public liberty which could never fail to vibrate in the hearts of the
people of England (_loud applause_). We had lately had amongst us the
great sovereigns of distant states, to whom we had shown that respect
and kindness which they claimed, from the regard they had shown to human
liberty and human happiness; when, had they appeared in their artificial
characters of princes only, they might have passed unheeded without any
marks of our affection and regard (_applause_). He regretted that they
had now departed from this country without seeing what he (Sir F.B.)
then saw, and which outshone all the shows and entertainments (_a
laugh_) with which, as a mark of respect, they had been justly
entertained—the spectacle of a free people in the act of maintaining an
oppressed fellow-citizen against the arm of corruption and power
(_applause_). Such a spectacle as this no other nation on the earth
could afford....
We had heard a great deal lately about hoaxes, especially of that in
which my Lord Cochrane had been so innocently and unfortunately
implicated. We have been told of a trial by jury, who are supposed to be
impartial men, taken at random; now my Lord Cochrane has been tried—tho’
I think no blame attaches to the jury who tried him, who, I think, under
the circumstances did their duty—not by a jury of the country, but by a
packed and selected jury. There is no greater hoax than to try a man by
such a jury (_applause and laughter_),—and to tell him he had been tried
by a jury of his country. We have been told that the judge should not
only be impartial, and sit on the bench as a stone, with no feeling, but
with all judgment, but that he should be a counsel for the prisoner.
What sort of counsel for Lord Cochrane was my Lord Ellenborough? (_Loud
laughter and applause_). Indeed my Lord Cochrane has been the most
hoaxed of any man (_applause_).
That very morning he (Sir F. Burdett) had been looking into a newspaper
which was famous for hoaxing, and which formerly produced the fabricated
French news—he meant the _Morning Post_ (_a laugh_). In that paper there
was a paragraph, stating that the Princess Charlotte was delighted at
her residence at Carlton House, and was highly gratified to see her old
friends about her. This he should conceive was somewhat of a hoax (_a
laugh_). It was given out to the public that those gew-gaws in the
parks, that the childish amusement of squibs and crackers, were all
intended solely for the delight of the British public, which public, by
the way, would have to pay all the expenses out of its own pockets. Was
not this a hoax? (_A laugh._) But there was one still greater. There was
a large body of placemen who grow rich with the public money, and yet
were so fastidiously delicate that they could not endure that any
peculator of a different stamp should associate with them. Those
immaculate persons who thus lived by the public purse chose to call
themselves the representatives of the people of England. He trusted that
the example set by the City of Westminster would spread through every
part of the kingdom, and that the corrupt would be taught that England
was not to be so represented. If other places would act like
Westminster, and return their members to Parliament not only without
expense, but without the least solicitation, in that case Corruption
would receive, if not her death-blow, yet such a wound as would prevent
her from ever re-assuming an influence pernicious to the best interests
of the country. He would now propose to them Sir Thomas Cochrane,
commonly called Lord Cochrane; as a fit representative to serve them in
Parliament (_great applause_).
MR. STURCH seconded the motion. He had never had any personal or
political connection with Lord Cochrane till he visited his Lordship in
prison; and he should support his Lordship because he was persuaded that
he had been condemned on imperfect evidence, and because the severity of
his sentence was such as to astonish the whole nation.
The high bailiff then put the question, which was carried with
acclamations and unanimously, and the high bailiff then declared Lord
Cochrane to be elected (_loud applause_).
ALDERMAN WOOD next addressed the meeting. He began by alluding to some
newspapers which had called his conversation with the juryman
_chit-chat_. He denied that it was _chit-chat_; it was a solemn
assertion made by a gentleman in the name of himself and some of his
fellow-jurors. He begged the electors to dismiss from their minds these
calumnies which had appeared respecting Lord Cochrane’s treatment of his
father. He had made the most anxious inquiries into that matter, and had
gone late last night to gain more particular information; and he was
able to assure them positively that Lord Cochrane had always been
distinguished for his kindness, generosity, and attention to his poor
unfortunate father. It was evident that there existed somewhere a very
vindictive feeling towards Lord Cochrane. As a proof, he would mention
that order of the Secretary of State which directed that the punishment
of the pillory should take place on the 10th of August (cries of “_No
Pillory_”). Now it had always been usual to leave the time to the
discretion of the Sheriff, who never inflicted this punishment at so
early a period after the sentence. If he himself were Sheriff he should
refuse to obey such an order; and should content himself with alleging
that the time appointed did not suit him (_great applause_). The worthy
Alderman concluded by an allusion to the paragraph concerning the
Princess Charlotte. He had reason to know, that in spite of all that
high satisfaction which she was said to feel in her own residence, she
had made three attempts to escape (_laughter and applause_).
The usual thanks followed, and the meeting dispersed.
------------------------------------
APPENDIX XII.
[Cobbett’s _Political Register_, July 30th, 1814.]
RE-ELECTION OF LORD COCHRANE.
In consequence of the unanimous return of his Lordship to fill his
seat in Parliament, as one of the representatives for the City of
Westminster, the following letters passed between his Lordship and Mr.
Brooks, Treasurer of the Westminster Committee. It is a fact, perhaps
not generally known, that, with the exception of one or two
newspapers, the London journals have thought proper to refuse giving
publicity to this correspondence. Such, indeed, is the degraded state
of our press, that the editor of a Sunday paper, in giving his
Lordship’s letter, omitted several of the most striking passages in
it, which, as was done in publishing his defence, he supplied with
stars!
Committee-room, King Street, Covent Garden,
July 16th, 1814.
MY LORD,—I am directed by the Committee of Electors of Westminster,
appointed at the general meeting held in New Palace Yard, on Monday
the 11th instant, to acquaint your Lordship that you were this morning
nominated as a fit and proper person to fill the vacancy in the
representation of the City of Westminster in Parliament, occasioned by
your Lordship’s expulsion; and that you were immediately re-elected,
without opposition, and with the most lively expressions of universal
approbation. The Committee further direct me to convey to your
Lordship their sincere congratulations on an event so happily
demonstrative of the sense which your constituents entertain of the
accusation which has been brought against you, _and of the very
extraordinary proceedings by which it has been followed up_; and to
assure your Lordship that it affords them the highest gratification to
find that you are able to oppose to the envenomed shafts of malice and
party spirit the impenetrable shield of conscious innocence. They
rejoice to see that the prejudices occasioned by gross and shameless
misrepresentation are fast wearing away from the public mind; and they
trust that the time is near when your Lordship’s character will appear
as fair and unblemished in the view of every individual in the British
empire, as it now does in the eyes of the electors of Westminster.
I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship’s most faithful and obedient servant,
SAMUEL BROOKS, _Chairman_.
To Lord Cochrane.
------------------
King’s Bench, July 18th, 1814.
SIR,—Amongst all the occurrences of my life, I can call to memory no
one which has produced so great a degree of exultation in my breast as
this, which, through a channel which I so highly esteem, has been
communicated to me, that, after all the machinations of corruption
(bringing into play her choicest agents) have been able to effect
against me, the citizens of Westminster have, with unanimous voice,
pronounced me worthy of continuing to be one of their representatives
in Parliament. Merely to be a member of the House of Commons (as now
made up) is something too meagre to be a gratification to me; but when
I reflect on that love of country, that devotion to freedom, that
soundness of judgment, that unshaken adherence to truth and justice
which have invariably marked the proceedings of the citizens of
Westminster, and when I further reflect that it is of Sir Frances
Burdett whom they have now, for the third time, made me the colleague,
how am I to express, on the one hand, my gratitude towards them, and,
on the other, the contempt which I feel for all the distinctions of
birth, and for all the wealth, and all the decorations which ministers
and kings have it, under the present system, in their power to bestow.
With regard to the case, the agitation of which has been the cause of
this, to me, most gratifying result, I am in no apprehension as to the
opinions and feelings of the world, and especially of the people of
England, who, though they may be occasionally misled, are never
deliberately cruel or unjust. Only let it be said of me:—the
_Stock-Exchange_ have accused; _Lord Ellenborough_ has charged for
guilty; the _Special Jury_ have found that guilt; the _Court_ have
sentenced to the pillory; the _House of Commons_ have expelled; and
the _Citizens of Westminster_ HAVE RE-ELECTED. Only let this be the
record placed against my name, and I shall be proud to stand in the
Calendar of Criminals all the days of my life. In requesting you, sir,
to convey these my sentiments to my constituents at large, I cannot
refrain from begging you, and the other gentlemen of the committee, to
accept my particular and unfeigned thanks.
I am, Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,
COCHRANE.
To Samuel Brooks, Esq., Chairman of the Committee
of the Electors of Westminster.
------------------------------------
APPENDIX XIII.
TO THE ELECTORS OF WESTMINSTER.
King’s Bench, Aug. 10th, 1814.
GENTLEMEN,—It is fresh in your recollection that when Lord Ebrington,
contrary to my opinion, which was conveyed by letter to his Lordship,
and at my request read by him to the House, made his motion for a
remission of that part of the sentence which was to have been executed
this day, Lord Castlereagh was empowered to state that the Prince
Regent had already done that which it was the object of Lord
Ebrington’s motion to effect. You will also remember that Lord
Castlereagh, instead of immediately making his communication, and
preventing an unnecessary, and consequently improper discussion,
withheld it from the House for a considerable time, and thus afforded
the Attorney and Solicitor-General and himself an opportunity of
making a new and violent assault upon my character and conduct.
Although many of their arguments had been previously refuted, and
others were well answered at the time, yet it was impossible for those
honourable Members who entertained a favourable opinion of me to
answer every accusation which the Solicitor-General and others brought
forward by surprise. It remains, therefore, for me to offer some
observations in my own defence, in which my reason will appear for
having suffered some delay to occur in the execution of this important
duty.
In the course of the Solicitor-General’s speech he asserted that, in
my defence, I had mis-stated the circumstances of the transaction, and
had charged my solicitors with a gross dereliction of duty. I shall
show that I have neither mis-stated circumstances nor made any
unfounded accusation. He further asserted that he would take upon
himself to say that the brief had been drawn up from my own
instructions. The fact is, I have never denied that I gave
instructions for the brief. It is true, however, that I gave no
specific instructions to counsel, and attended no consultation; but it
is obvious that without some instructions or some information from me
to my solicitors there could have been no brief at all. My solicitors
themselves applied to me for written instructions, and I, of course,
furnished them with such particulars as occurred to me on the subject,
which are written on one sheet of paper, and might have been written
on one page. This paper is indorsed by my solicitors, “Lord Cochrane’s
Minutes of Case,” and may be seen in my possession.[119]
-----
Footnote 119:
It was discovered by His Majesty’s law officers that these few
hints, or “Minutes of Case,” given to my solicitors, at their own
solicitation, preparatory to drawing the brief, furnish a
contradiction to my assertion in the House, that _I gave no
instructions to counsel_. I was desirous of giving these learned
gentlemen the full benefit of the discovery by making them public,
when I published this Address to the Electors of Westminster, but
was prevented by a suggestion that the Address, with the other
important documents annexed, were already too long for a
communication to the newspapers; and so the editor of one of those
prints appears to have thought, for he omitted two very important
and inoffensive paragraphs. As the same reasons no longer exist, I
insert the “Minutes of Case” between the Address and the questions
to the solicitors.
-----
I apprehend that it was the duty of my solicitors to have sent me a
copy of the brief, which, however, they did not; and I repeat that,
previous to the trial, I never read it. It appears that they
particularly called my attention to an unimportant circumstance which
they had inserted in the brief, or the examinations attached, in
consequence of an erroneous communication from my servant, who had
confounded the circumstances of two different occurrences.[120] This
was the “one particular” which the Solicitor-General says that I
myself corrected. I admitted that this error was expunged by my
authority, and opposite the four lines which contained it, is written,
“Read this to Lord Cochrane,” which I think is an argument that the
greater part of the brief was not read to me; particularly as there
are twelve lines expunged in another place, opposite which my name
does not appear. My solicitors, however, assert, that though I did not
read the brief myself, they read the greater part of it to me; and on
their assertion I will admit that they did so, though I have no
recollection of the fact. But if it could be shown that they drew my
attention to every line of the brief, except only to that one most
important point, the description of De Berenger’s dress, which
immediately follows the four lines expunged, I still think that they
were guilty of very reprehensible negligence. In my affidavit, which
was before them, and was introduced into the brief, the coat worn by
De Berenger is sworn to have been _green_; and in the examinations
attached to the brief it is stated to have been _red_. It is
impossible that this most important difference could have escaped
their observation, and yet it is true that they never called my
attention to it. I may affirm, without fear of being again
contradicted, that I did not know that the dress of De Berenger, which
I had sworn to be green, was in any part of the brief, much less in
the examinations of my servants, described to be red; because it is
impossible, unless I had been absolutely insane, that I should not
only have been satisfied with a brief which authorised my counsel to
contradict my own affidavit, but have been anxious to send my servants
into court to give evidence against me.
-----
Footnote 120:
See this explained, in the answer to an anonymous letter, at the
end.
-----
If my solicitors actually read this part of the brief to me, it was
obvious that I was not giving that attention which a man conscious of
guilt naturally would have given. The word “RED,” if I had heard it,
must have instantly excited my particular notice. But “if the
difference between red and green escaped my observation,” what did my
solicitors “think”[121] of it? My accusers chiefly depended for my
conviction on proving that De Berenger appeared before me in the red
coat in which he committed the fraud. Is it possible that one of my
solicitors should have read it to me and not have said, “You observe,
Lord Cochrane, that this is contradictory to your affidavit?” To have
read it to me without a pause, and have suffered it to pass without
observation, is, I think, as negligent as not to have read it at all;
and is wholly irreconcileable with the assertion of Mr. Abercrombie,
that both parts of the brief were read over to me with the utmost
care.
-----
Footnote 121:
In more than one account of Lord Ellenborough’s charge, his Lordship
was represented to have said, “If the difference between red and
green escaped Lord Cochrane’s observation, what did he think of the
star and medallion?”
-----
If, in my defence in the House of Commons, I did not state the manner
in which I apprehend the difference between the brief and the
affidavit originated, it was because I could not have stated it
without throwing the more blame on my solicitors than I felt inclined
to do. I have been challenged by the Attorney-General to unseal the
lips of my solicitors and counsel. My solicitors, however, did not
wait for me to unseal their lips, as is evident by what is called the
counter-statement, with which they thought proper to furnish Mr.
Abercrombie and others; and I think it rather unreasonable to require
me to unseal the lips of my counsel to qualify them to give evidence
against me, when I could not succeed in unsealing their lips on the
trial to speak one word in my behalf. My own counsel, Mr. Topping and
Mr. Scarlett, whom I fully expected would have advocated my cause,
never spoke in my defence. In saying this, however, I cast no blame on
those gentlemen, because I have no doubt that, under the circumstances
then known to them, they acted as they thought best. Neither do I mean
to blame Mr. Serjeant Best (the counsel for Mr. Johnstone), who,
contrary to my expectation and direction, defended my cause in
conjunction with that of his own client. He made as able a speech as
any advocate could have done, with the information he possessed, and
under his then circumstances; but he intimated at the time, and
afterwards authorised me to assert, that he was not able to do justice
to the cause; and it is a just ground of complaint, that after Mr.
Serjeant Best had been exhausted by fifteen hours’ close attention and
confinement, he was not allowed a few hours to recover himself and
prepare for the defence.
To return: I do, however, accept the daring of the Attorney-General,
and freely release my solicitors and counsel from every obligation of
secresy.[122] I might perhaps have done this sooner, but the delay has
not been occasioned by any doubt in my mind as to the propriety of the
step, or fear of the consequences. I thought, however, after the
statement which has been circulated by my solicitors, that it was my
duty, in the first place, to put to them certain questions, which I
was not aware would have occasioned much delay; but after a lapse of
nearly a fortnight, they wrote to inform me, that they thought it
would be improper to answer those questions. I now lay them before the
public.
-----
Footnote 122:
I have not learnt that any of these gentlemen have made any
disclosures in consequence of this release.
-----
I particularly authorise the counsel employed for the defence, to
state their reasons for determining to defend me conjointly with Mr.
Johnstone, contrary to the opinion of Mr. Adam expressed on the 6th of
May, contrary to their own opinion expressed on the 24th of May, and
contrary to my opinion and direction expressed on the 29th of May; and
I also particularly authorise them to assign the reason for their
opinion, that no witnesses ought to be examined on my part[123]; and
especially their reasons for not examining my servants on the subject
of De Berenger’s dress, notwithstanding my earnest desire to have them
examined. I am also willing, nay, I am anxious, that Mr. Serjeant Best
should state, whether, when he admitted that the coat was red, and not
green, he did not imagine that I had sworn falsely by design? I know
that in his speech he attributed my description of the coat to error
only, but I am anxious to know whether he did so from his feelings as
a man or his sense of duty as an advocate? Until I am better informed,
I shall incline to the opinion that he was actuated by the latter
feeling only; because, if he really imagined that he had to defend an
innocent man, I do think that he would not, without previously
communicating with me on the subject, have had recourse to the
dangerous expedient of admitting that to be _red_ which I have sworn
to be _green_, however embarrassed he might have been by the confusion
of his brief, or exhausted by the fatigue and long confinement which
he had undergone.
-----
Footnote 123:
From an item in my solicitor’s bill, dated June 6th, only two days
before the trial, I extract the following: “Attending a consultation
at Mr. Serjeant Best’s chambers, when your case was fully
considered, and all the counsel were decidedly of opinion that you
must be defended jointly with the other defendants; and the counsel
recommended your servants being in attendance on the trial, although
they still remained of opinion that neither they nor any other
witness ought to be examined on your part.” In a subsequent item,
dated June 7th, the day before the trial, I am represented to have
acquiesced; not, however, in the non-examination of my witness, but
in the _joint defence_. It appears, however, that I held out to the
last; and if I did acquiesce, it was then high time to do so,
otherwise, in all probability, I should not have been defended at
all.
-----
I stated in the House of Commons that I gave no instructions to
counsel, and attended no consultation. I now see the folly of this
negligence; for if I had personally attended to my interests, and
conferred with my advocates on the subject, I have no doubt that I
should have fully convinced them of my innocence. I believe that,
subsequent to the trial, there is not a single individual with whom I
have conferred on the subject who has not left me with that
impression.
To come now to the manner in which the error in the brief originated,
I have no hesitation in acknowledging that I am at issue with my
solicitors on that point. Their account is, that two of my servants,
whom I had sent to their office to be examined as to the evidence they
could give on the trial, admitted that De Berenger wore a _red_ coat
with a green collar. My servants, on the contrary, assure me that they
did not, and could not, admit that it was a red coat; because, when
they saw De Berenger, he wore a great-coat buttoned up, and they
neither saw the body nor the skirts of the under coat; but the collar,
and so much of the breast as they saw, were green: but they admit,
that on being questioned by my solicitors, whether they could swear
that it was not a red coat; they confessed that they could not, and
admitted that it might be red, and that the green which they saw might
be green facings to a military coat: but they have constantly declared
that no part which they saw was red, and they deny that they ever
admitted that they saw any red.
My solicitors were in possession of their previous affidavits,
describing De Berenger to have worn a grey great-coat buttoned up, and
a coat with a green collar underneath. I shall not deny that my
solicitors considered the admissions of the servants to amount to an
acknowledgment that the coat was red; but I shall ever believe that
such admissions actually went no further than that, since they did not
see the body of the coat, it might, for aught they knew, be red—and
possibly, that they supposed it was red, because the wearer having a
sword and military cap, they conceived him to be an army officer. The
description which my solicitors introduced into the brief, in
consequence of this examination, namely, a red coat with a green
collar, neither accords with my description nor with the coat actually
worn by De Berenger on his way from Dover, which, as proved by the
witnesses on the trial, was either wholly scarlet, or turned up with
yellow.
If I had been a party to the fraud, and had sworn falsely as to the
colour of the coat, I doubtless might also have been wicked enough to
have endeavoured to suborn the servants to perjure themselves in my
behalf; but I should hardly have ventured to send them to my
solicitors to be examined on the subject, without previously
instructing them myself: and it can hardly be supposed, that if they
had been on their guard from any previous instructions of mine, that
my solicitors, in the common course of examination, would have
obtained from them any evidence which militated against my own
statement. I should naturally, too, have felt some anxiety to know the
result of their examination; yet the truth is, that I never asked them
a single question on their return from the solicitor’s office. Indeed,
if I had questioned them as narrowly as one may suppose a guilty man
who had sent his servants on a guilty errand of so much danger and
importance would have questioned them, I should in all probability
have discovered whether they had or had not executed that errand to my
satisfaction. At all events, I should have been anxious to know the
result of their examination as entered in the brief; and if it be true
that it was actually read to me by my solicitor, I must, under such
circumstances, have lent too attentive an ear to have suffered the
ruinous word _red_ to have escaped my observation. I must, too, have
shown certain symptoms of uneasiness on hearing that word, which could
not have escaped the observation of the reader, particularly as the
contradiction between that word and my oath must have been present to
his mind. And lastly, with the knowledge that the brief contained a
flat and fatal contradiction to my own affidavit out of the mouths of
my own servants, I should hardly have suffered it to have gone to my
counsel in that state; and then have pressed, in the way in which I
did press, to have those servants examined at the trial.
How my solicitors could admit so fatal a contradiction into the brief,
without drawing my attention to it immediately by letter, it is for
them to explain; yet they admit that they never wrote to me on the
subject. They very quietly, however, inserted it, and let it remain in
the brief until I should happen to discover it; which, as I have
pretty clearly proved, never did happen previous to the trial. It was
on the second day of the trial, and not before, that, to my very great
surprise, I discovered in a newspaper the admission of my counsel in
contradiction to my affidavit. “Yet,” says the Attorney-General,
“there was no mistake and no surprise: if there had, the Judges would
have dispensed with their rule, and granted a new trial: but, no!
there was nothing of that sort here.”
In whatever way my solicitors took the examination of my servants on
the subject of De Berenger’s dress, it is indisputable that nothing
can justify their neglect in not immediately drawing my attention to
the difference between the result of that examination and the
statement in my own affidavit. “It never can be permitted,” said the
Solicitor-General, “that a person accused should try in the first
instance how far he could go without his own witnesses; and then,
should the result prove unfavourable, how far he could go with them.”
How unjust this observation is, as applied to me, is well known to my
solicitors—they well know how anxious I was to have my witnesses
brought forward _in the first instance_. Those witnesses would and
could conscientiously have sworn to the green collar, which would have
sufficiently corroborated the description in my affidavit, as it never
was pretended that De Berenger wore a green collar to his scarlet
coat.
It was asked by the Attorney-General “if the servants could have
confirmed the affidavit, where was the advocate who could have been
stupid enough to hesitate to produce them?” It is possible, however,
that advocates may be prejudiced, may be mistaken, and may be misled
by their brief.[124]
-----
Footnote 124:
It is also possible that they may be compelled to attempt the
exercise of their duty when incapacitated by faintness and fatigue.
-----
I hope that it will now appear to be satisfactorily proved, not only
that I did not see De Berenger in his scarlet coat, but that he did
not come to my door, nor _even enter the hackney-coach in that
dress_.—(See the annexed affidavits.)
In reply to the Solicitor-General’s observation, that I had sought to
establish my own innocence by recrimination upon the Judge and Jury, I
shall at present merely ask the learned gentleman whether he is of
opinion that a like sentence for a like offence would have been passed
on any nobleman or member of Parliament on his side of the House?
Would a punishment which, according to the unfortunate admission of
the Attorney-General, is calculated “to bow down the head with
humiliation ever after,” together with fine and imprisonment, and the
privation of every office and honour, have been thought little enough
for a ministerial defendant on such a charge? And if the candour of
the learned gentleman impels him to answer in the negative, is it not
fair to inquire whether he thinks that such an one would even have
been convicted on similar evidence? The Attorney-General observed,
“that he was glad that the period had arrived when the trial could be
read at length, and thus do away the effect of those imperfect
statements which misled the public mind.” Reserving my remarks on the
trial for a future opportunity, I shall at present just ask the
Attorney-General how it comes that he, who is so anxious that the
public mind should not be misled, should have made the unfounded
assertion, that I not only pocketed a large sum of money by the fraud,
but put off absolute ruin? Such an assertion is the more inexcusable
in the Attorney-General, who had every facility of obtaining more
correct information. His own broker could have told him that the
Omnium which I possessed on the 19th of February, when the fraud must
have been in agitation, could have been sold on that day at 27⅝. The
average cost was 27⅞; so that the whole loss on the 139,000_l._
Omnium, if sold on that day, would not have amounted to above 400_l._
And when it is considered that the result of my previous speculations
was a gain of 4,200_l._ received, and 830_l._ in the hands of my
broker, how does the Attorney-General make it out that I had so
embarrassed myself by such speculations, as to have no other than
fraudulent means of escaping absolute ruin? Besides, I can assure the
learned gentleman, if he is not already apprised of the fact, that if
I had held the Omnium till the 1st, 3rd, or 4th of March, I should
have sold it at a profit; and if I had held it till the settling-day,
when I must of necessity have sold it, I should not have lost half the
sum I had previously gained. But if upon the whole I had lost a few
hundreds, or even thousands, how would the Attorney-General be
justified in inferring my absolute ruin? It is well known that I had
been more successful at sea than almost any other officer of my
standing in the navy, and that I have constantly lived, not only
within my income, but at less expense than almost any other person of
my rank in society. On what grounds, therefore, is the
Attorney-General warranted in representing me as a person in such
desperate circumstances as to be obliged to have recourse to the
lowest knavery in order to avert absolute ruin?
With respect to the other assertion, that I pocketed a large sum of
money in consequence of the transactions of the 21st of February, did
not the learned lawyer know that the Stock Exchange Committee had
seized not only 1,700_l._ of my money, which was my actual profit from
that day’s sale, but also a further sum of 770_l._ to answer their
exaggerated calculation of that profit? and that the aforementioned
sum of 830_l._ was also lost through the proceedings of that
Committee? If the learned gentleman knew nothing of all this, I can
only observe, that he ought to have informed himself on the subject
before he made such statements in the House of Commons.
I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen, with great respect,
Your most obedient and faithful servant,
COCHRANE.
------------------------------------
APPENDIX XIV.
ADDRESSES FROM PAISLEY.
Canal Street, Paisley, Aug. 18th, 1814.
SIR,—By inserting the following addresses to Lord Cochrane and the
electors of Westminster, you will oblige your readers in this place.
Accustomed as we have been to the acts of the abettors of corruption,
it is with a mixture of pity and contempt we have witnessed the
eagerness with which they have endeavoured to heap every sort of
contumely upon Lord Cochrane’s head. Thanks to his numerous friends,
they have in this instance been wretchedly disappointed, and though he
has been stripped of those honours which “the breath of kings can
bestow,” he still retains what they have not the power to give or take
away—the applause and admiration of his grateful countrymen.
Yours, with great respect,
JOHN M’NAUGHT.
W. Cobbett, Esq.
At a meeting of a number of inhabitants of Paisley, in the Salutation
Inn, upon August the 5th, 1814, for the purpose of celebrating the
triumph of Lord Cochrane, the following addresses to the Electors of
Westminster, and to Lord Cochrane, were agreed to:—
TO THE ELECTORS OF WESTMINSTER.
GENTLEMEN,—The times in which we live have been denominated a new era.
They have produced so many extraordinary and marvellous events, that
we cannot help thinking the designation just; but such has been their
effect on the public mind, that we almost cease to wonder at anything,
however extraordinary. Were it not for this apathy, this callous
effect, scarcely anything in modern times would have made a deeper
impression than the trial and condemnation of your representative,
Lord Cochrane. In spite, however, of this disadvantage, we rejoice to
find that this event has produced the very impression it ought to have
made; it has produced an impression at once calculated to confound the
malice of his enemies, to cheer the heart of every patriot, and to
cherish that spirit of justice and independence which has long been
dear to every Briton.
Allow us, therefore, to congratulate you and our country on the signal
triumph which justice has obtained in your re-election of Lord
Cochrane,—an election which could only proceed from a universal
consciousness of the innocence of his Lordship, and which has placed
that innocence on an immovable foundation. You have had many struggles
with corruption, in all of which you have appeared as illustrious
examples to mankind. In this last instance you have, if possible,
surpassed yourselves; you have appeared as the focus of justice; it
has been your prerogative to give the public feeling effect.
We would by no means be understood to insinuate anything to the
prejudice of the jury which tried his Lordship. Trial by jury we hold
so sacred and invaluable that we deprecate any reflection that would
seem to throw a shade on so glorious an institution; but we may freely
observe that, like every other human institution, it must be liable to
abuse. We can easily imagine that a jury may be placed in such
circumstances as to be rendered absolutely incapable of knowing the
truth; a villanous arrangement of the evidence to be produced, a
malicious and undue influence on the part of the judge, &c. may
deceive a jury, and produce as much evil under the forms of law, as
private vengeance could inflict. But while it is said that Lord
Cochrane was tried and condemned by a special jury, it will also be
said that he was tried by the electors of Westminster; he was tried by
his country and acquitted.
We conclude by expressing our hope that whenever the hydra of
corruption shall put forth her head, you will be found at your posts,
ready to strike it off, or inflict a mortal wound; the times are still
ominous, and the nation has its eyes fixed on you; we trust that you
will not relax in your vigilance till malice and injustice hide their
diminished heads, and innocence no longer find its only solace in
heart corroding grief.
We are, gentlemen, &c.
JOHN M’NAUGHT, _Chairman_.
--------------
TO LORD COCHRANE.
MY LORD,—There is such a dissonance between conscious innocence and
imputed guilt, that an upright mind must necessarily be confounded on
receiving an atrocious charge; and even when the falsehood of the
charge is made apparent, the recollection of it is often so bitter,
and its consequences so injurious, as almost to equal the pangs and
the deserved punishment of real guilt. Your case, my Lord, is one of a
singular complexion. Trained in the paths of honour, habituated to
patriotic deeds and high exploits, and possessing in an eminent degree
that noble disinterestedness, that open frankness peculiar to a naval
life, to you the recent charge must have been extremely galling.
Convinced of your innocence, permit us to approach your Lordship to
express the interest we have taken in that extraordinary affair. When
the charge was first preferred, we considered its improbability so
great as to require the strongest evidence to make it good. We rejoice
to find such evidence was wanting; nay, more, the lofty spirit of
independence, the keen sense of honour, which you manifested
throughout the whole affair; your astonishing address before the House
of Commons, and subsequent illustrations, has destroyed every vestige
of guilt, and placed your Lordship’s innocence in the most
advantageous point of view. The universal sentiment in your favour,
but especially the admirable conduct of the electors of Westminster,
have raised you to a higher eminence than that from which you had
fallen. You were, indeed, guilty of a crime,—a crime unpardonable in
the eyes of corruption; you had dictated energy and efficiency to
warlike measures; you sought the glory and happiness of your country,
you sought for justice to your associates in war; was it then to be
wondered at that malice should make you a favourite mark? No, my Lord;
but thanks to this enlightened age, her shafts have been diverted in
their course, and by their obliquity have centred in herself.
My Lord, allow us to conclude by expressing our confidence that the
circumstances which have called forth this address will, if possible,
strengthen your habits, and elevate your patriotic views, that when
the time arrives for resuming public functions, you will be found the
same intrepid, fearless champion of public and private right you have
ever been.
Accept, my Lord, the assurance of our regard,
JOHN M’NAUGHT, _Chairman_.
------------------------------------
APPENDIX XV.
ADDRESS FROM CULROSS.
_Address presented to Lord Cochrane by the inhabitants of Culross._
We, the inhabitants of the royal burgh of Culross and neighbourhood,
beg leave to offer your Lordship our heartfelt congratulations on
being re-elected a member to serve in the House of Commons for one of
the first cities in the kingdom; which event may be considered as the
verdict of the last tribunal to whom you had appealed from the charges
lately preferred against you. While the firmness with which you met
those charges has called forth our highest admiration, we rejoice that
they have now been so clearly proved to be unfounded, and that the
cloud which threatened your destruction has been dispelled. In the joy
everywhere diffused on this occasion, none can more cordially
participate than the inhabitants of Culross; and we beg to assure your
Lordship of their unabated attachment to, and respect for, the family
of Dundonald.
Calling to mind the many heroic actions your Lordship has performed in
your country’s cause, we look forward with confidence to a renewal of
your ardent and gallant exertions for her advantage, notwithstanding
the persecutions you are now suffering. And we sincerely hope that in
defiance of party and faction, you shall again shine forth an ornament
to your profession, an honour to your country, and the boast of this
place, the ancient residence of your noble family.
We beg also to express our wish that your Lordship may speedily forget
those sufferings an honourable mind must sustain whilst struggling
against gross and unfounded accusations.
Signed in the presence and by the appointment of the meeting,
W. MELVILLE, B.
JOHN CAW, _Secretary_.
------------------------------------
APPENDIX XVI.
LORD COCHRANE’S ANSWER TO ADDRESS FROM CULROSS.
King’s Bench, Aug. 18th, 1814.
SIR,—I take the earliest opportunity which the pressure of my affairs
afforded me of conveying to my much-respected friends of Culross my
heartfelt thanks for the interest they take in my character and
welfare, and for the truly gratifying manner in which they have
demonstrated their feelings, which are at once an honour to themselves
and to me. You may, with great truth, assure our respectable townsmen
that their unfeigned congratulations on my re-election add greatly to
the satisfaction which I derive from that triumphant event; and that
whatever may be the value of my actions, the motives in which they
originate ever have been, and ever shall be, such as may claim the
reward of their good opinion. I send you a newspaper containing the
letter of De Berenger, by which you will perceive that my enemies have
now an agent even within the confines of my prison. But I shall
eventually triumph over all their machinations.
------------------------------------
APPENDIX XVII.
ADDRESS OF THE INHABITANTS OF KIRKALDY TO THE ELECTORS OF WESTMINSTER.
Kirkaldy, Sept. 8th, 1814.
In consequence of previous intimation, a considerable number of the
well-disposed and respectable inhabitants of Kirkaldy assembled at the
Wellington Inn here, for the purpose of forming a congratulatory
address to the honourable, free and independent electors of
Westminster, on their re-election of the Right Honourable Lord
Cochrane; when the following was publicly read and approved of;
ordered to be signed by the chairman in the name of the meeting, and
transmitted by the secretary to the Honourable Sir Francis Burdett,
Baronet.
WILLIAM DAVIDSON _in the Chair_.
GENTLEMEN,—In imitation of the very respectable inhabitants of
Paisley, we now presume to step forward to congratulate you on the
laudable and praiseworthy step you have lately taken in re-electing
the Right Honourable Lord Cochrane as one of your members for
Westminster, whom the base time-servers of the day had, through wicked
and deceitful means, unwarrantably deprived of his seat in Parliament.
Not satisfied with this, his Lordship’s enemies pushed matters so far
as to obtain a sentence of pillory, fine, and imprisonment, as if he
had been a common felon; nay, more,—deprive him of those laurels he
had so magnanimously won, and so justly merited at the hand of his
country. His Lordship’s firmness and praiseworthy resignation under
these uncommon sufferings we cannot too much admire and respect; and
we fondly hope that, notwithstanding all these afflictions, his
innocence will soon be confirmed by the exposure of those base
intriguers and their intrigues, to the utter confusion of all
time-serving placemen and their confederate hirelings. We rejoice that
his Lordship possesses laurels more noble and lasting, which it is not
in the power of princes nor their advisers to bestow or take away. We
also trust that when his Lordship shall assume his honourable seat he
will be more emboldened than heretofore, in conjunction with your
other Honourable Member Sir Francis Burdett, in opposing corruption
and its abettors, till the nation, roused from its lethargy, shall
unite in behalf of all those who have been unjustly wronged; and thus
will our little happy island outvie and triumph over all her enemies,
both at home and abroad.
Gentlemen, we hope and flatter ourselves that you will have no cause
to lament the re-election of your Right Honourable Member; we have no
doubt his Lordship will be proud of the honour you have done him, as
it cannot but attach him more closely to you and to the interests of
the nation. We know that many thousands in Great Britain rejoice at
the step you have taken, and the victory obtained by his Lordship, who
nevertheless are afraid to show themselves lest, like some of old,
they are put out of the Synagogue. We still hope, however, that the
stigma cast on his Lordship’s friends, instead of intimidating them
will rather embolden them to come forward and publicly declare the
sense they have of his Lordship’s innocence. That the honourable and
praiseworthy electors of Westminster may prosper and succeed in all
their laudable undertakings, and long enjoy the distinguished services
of their able and truly honourable representatives; and when they
shall have done their duty in their day and generation, that others in
succession may fill their place who shall equal them in abilities and
fortitude, is the ardent wish of this meeting.
Signed by appointment,
WILLIAM DAVIDSON, _Chairman_.
------------------------------------
APPENDIX XVIII.
[_The Times_, July 13th, 1814.]
SIR,—A constant reader of your journal takes the liberty of inquiring
whether any measures have been adopted on the Stock Exchange to put a
stop to that illicit practice of time-bargaining, which could alone
present a sufficient temptation to the authors of the late imposition,
and will, if not abolished, continue to hold out similar inducements
to the commission of similar frauds. To punish the invention of false
news, with the particular view to affect the funds, and yet to suffer
such practices in the funds as are both of themselves illegal, and
also give occasion to the invention of the falsehoods, must appear to
every one to be highly preposterous; in fact, the invention of false
news and time-bargaining, must be considered but as different parts of
the same act; they sprung up together—have grown and thriven
together—and, whatever some may suppose, are of no very recent birth.
Lord Cochrane has, in truth, been found guilty of that which has been,
in a less degree perhaps, practised without disgrace almost every week
in the year upon ’Change, namely, a conspiracy to affect the price of
Stock, by the invention and circulation of false news; and if it was
necessary for the noble conspirator and his friends to put in motion a
greater apparatus than usual for the execution of their plans, they
have only thereby facilitated the means of detection, and proved their
want of dexterity in such enterprises, while the hackneyed jobbers,
managing their repeated impositions with less ostentation, are, in
length of time, enabled to effect much greater mischief, as the mildew
does more harm to the hopes of an honest husbandman than a
thunderstorm.
Of the sentence passed upon Lord Cochrane, I shall say little; but as
the most offensive part of it is matter of feeling and of character
connected with feeling, I think that the characters and feelings of
those at whose expense the imposition was chiefly successful, should
have been likewise taken into consideration. If they are men immersed
in habits of that nature of which Lord Cochrane’s offence only
constituted a single act, I say that they had not a right to require,
or to be gratified by, so severe a sentence as if they had come into
court wholly unconnected with such proceedings in their own persons.
What I have to demand, therefore, is, whether the gentlemen of the
Stock Exchange, with this notable example of punishment before their
eyes, have any idea of adopting some new system,—of forming some new
resolution against those usages which have hitherto prevailed among
them, but have never till now been visited by so tremendous a
sentence? If they have not, I think it a pity that the learned judge
who passed the late sentence did not endeavour to awaken their caution
by some warning of the danger of persevering in those courses which
had led in the passing instance to so calamitous a result; in short,
an officer in the public service has fallen by a conviction for
conspiring with others to raise the funds; the public has therefore a
right to expect from all those connected with the sale of national
property some general expression of their detestation of that offence
of which Lord Cochrane has been convicted. Have they, or the major
part of them, seemed by their general practice to consider it to be a
crime till they came to suffer by it themselves, from any alien to
their profession? Then they raised clamours about it, no doubt. I ask
farther whether the Committee who advertised for evidence against Lord
Cochrane mean to stop at the exposure of this single offence? or
whether they are resolved, as in justice they ought to be, to hunt out
and eject from the Stock Exchange all time-bargainers, hoaxers,
bangers, and other practisers of fraud, for the raising or lowering of
the funds? Or, if these are too powerful to be attacked, whether they
mean at least simply to date a new era from Lord Cochrane’s
conviction, to proclaim an amnesty of the past, and to give notice
that in future hoaxing, banging, and everything that leads to the
illegal practice of time-bargaining, as well as time-bargaining
itself, shall be no longer practised among them with impunity? I call
upon these gentlemen of the Committee particularly to explain to the
nation what, in their opinion, ought to be the future regulations of
stock-jobbing from this time, when a public example is to be made of
one, who, to say the worst of him, has only carried the old practice
to the utmost extent of its limits. I call, Sir, upon the members of
the Stock Exchange, universally, for an answer to these queries,
founded upon facts of which none of them can deny the existence; and I
further denounce prospectively against them, that, if they will make
no rules for themselves, Parliament will interfere, and either make
some for them, or will at least vivify the old ones by such means of
discovery as themselves have used, when they have been the dupes. In
expectation of a reply,
I remain. Sir, &c.
BYRSA.
To the Editor of _The Times_.
------------------------------------
APPENDIX XIX.
[_The Champion_, Sunday, July 3rd, 1814.]
THE PRETENSIONS OF THE LAWYERS, AND THE
SENTENCE ON LORD COCHRANE.
After referring to the pretension of lawyers to being held infallible,
the article continues: “It has, we believe, been urged by the lawyers
that, as the verdict of a jury is to be considered the voice of the
people, the latter can have no right to rejudge their own decisions,
but the idleness of the plea is evident. It most frequently happens
that the verdict of the jury is but a small part of the legal
proceedings in any particular case. A jury may be so trammelled by
technicalities, imposed upon them in peremptory language; they may be
so overpowered by a violent charge, or so confused by a subtle one,
that their decision cannot, in fairness, be regarded but as the result
of an overwhelming influence, leaving them, at least as they fancy,
without an alternative; so that, after all, what have we but an
emanation from an official quarter—tinctured with the interests, the
prejudices, the passions, and the corruptions of a ministerial
officer—in the natural existence of which the framers of our
constitution believed, and the effects of which they desired to check
by the healthy and unperverted sense of men who, being taken from
common conditions, were likely to be animated solely by feelings for
the common advantage. But when the verdict of the jury—however it may
be induced—is pronounced, can it be said that the most important part
of the business is over? No, certainly not. The sentence is to come,
which, in many of the most weighty cases, as affecting the welfare of
society and the safety of persons, is left entirely to the discretion
of the Judge, so that here there is unbounded room for the exercise of
his disposition, whatever it may be. If he be an ill-tempered and
vindictive savage, and be, from political or personal motives,
irritated against the unfortunate individual who is at his disposal,
he may sentence him to a punishment which, as applied to the offence,
shall outrage public feeling by its cruelty, and public justice by a
prostitution of its penalties to gratify private resentments. Has he
ambitious views, which lead him to seek the favour of the court? He
may, as the professed guardian of morals, do them the fatal injury, by
apologising, in the language of authority, and with all the imposing
adjuncts of a dignified and grave station, for those crimes, which, as
practised by persons of the highest rank, have the most extensive
influence in the way of example. These are mischiefs which, under the
cover of legal proceedings, _may_ be perpetrated on the country; and
it is evident, from their very nature, that we can have no security
against them but in the vigilance of the public’s observation of
whatever passes in the courts of law, and their firmness in expressing
their opinion on its propriety.
_Secondly._ Experience fully supports this reasoning. English history
shows that the worst enormities of abused power have been committed
through the medium of the Judges. To no other class of official
persons is half the execration owing, that is justly due to the
lawyers for their frequent perversions of both law and justice in a
base subserviency to the temporary feelings and purposes of guilty
rulers. And, be it remembered that the most abominable of their
proceedings have had the sanction of a jury’s verdict, procured by
such means as have already been suggested; either by direct
intimidation, or by drawing close an artificial network of legal
complications and restrictions, which leave to jurymen about as much
freedom of finding as he has of motion who is placed with his face
close to a wall, and told to jump backwards or forwards, which he
pleases.
_Thirdly._ But perhaps the character and conduct of those who are at
present Judges are calculated to inspire an unlimited confidence in
_them_, however distrustful of the profession, and anxious as to its
functions, we have reason to be. This is, in some respects, a delicate
inquiry, and, indeed, an almost unnecessary one, for the vigilance of
the people as to the discharge of public duties should never be
permitted to slumber through reposing on personal qualities. It is,
then, only the arrogant and dictatorial tone of pretension, held by
the satellites of Westminster Hall, that induces us to bestow a line
on those of any one of our present administrators of the laws. We are
told, in the most fulsome terms, that they are incorruptible,—that it
is the boast of British justice to be clean-handed, &c. &c. This
boast, as rested on a contempt of actual bribery, need be no singular
one in these days. Who now takes bribes from individuals? No one, we
venture to affirm, above the station of a Custom House officer.
Perhaps in no department of the public service could a pecuniary
consideration for infidelity be more conveniently given and received
than in the military: a military man, of inferior rank, and slender
hopes, has often an opportunity of giving the most decided advantage
to the enemy, by acting traitorously, and the reward would never be
wanting; yet who ever hears of such an act of baseness? When was there
ever an instance of it in the army? Why then should a Lord Chief
Justice, with an income of twenty thousand pounds a year, be highly
complimented on a virtuous self-denial, which he only shares with the
subaltern who starves on four and sixpence a day? His Lordship’s
claims to peculiar confidence and honour must be of a rare kind to be
valid. He must represent to us in his behaviour the exalted attribute
of justice—simple, impartial, purified from passion, partaking of the
nature of a heavenly presidency, rather than of power vested in a
frail and feverish being, liable to be misled by his interests and
habits, and every now and then to be carried away to the strangest
lengths by a storm of anger. If Lord Ellenborough aspires to deserve
this, the best praise that can be bestowed on one in his exalted
station, his ambition is of the proper kind; but without meaning to
convey any imputation against his integrity, we must even take the
liberty of telling him plainly what the public think—that as yet he
has by no means entitled himself to it. His boisterous vulgarisms in
the House of Lords; his impatient fretfulness with counsel,
particularly shown in cases where defendants may be supposed obnoxious
to the palace, or to himself personally; the extraordinary views he
takes of moral questions, so favourable to certain princely
profligacies; and the unqualified terms of his charges in those trials
that are calculated to rouse political feelings and partialities, are
circumstances that have made a strong impression on the public mind.
People, therefore, without indecently denying his honesty, are much
inclined to doubt his discretion; and it must be admitted, that his
Lordship’s temper is not precisely of that poised and regulated kind
which would be the best plea for an exemption in his favour from that
popular superintendence and judgment of his conduct, the exercise of
which he finds so irksome, and which his friends represent as so
indecorous.
Having thus vindicated the right of the people to express their
sentiments freely on the conduct of the Judges, as on that of any
other public men, we shall shortly exercise it by joining in the
general disapprobation which the sentence recently pronounced against
Lord Cochrane has excited. We never remember any sentiment to prevail
more universally than this now does: the firmest believers in his
Lordship’s guilt are loud in their reprobation of that part of his
punishment which includes the exposure of the person of a naval
officer, whose gallantry in the service of his country has been of the
most devoted kind, on a stage of infamy which is trodden by the
miscreant whose crime is not to be named. The public feeling has
received a shock by this unexpected award, from which it will not soon
recover; and surely it must be censured as highly indiscreet, to have
turned the horror that ought to have been engrossed by the crime,
entirely against the punishment with which it has been visited.
It is not our intention to enter at all on the question of Lord
Cochrane’s guilt or innocence; it would be very wrong in every point
of view to do this at present. His Lordship has signified his
intention of defending himself before the House of Commons, and of
explaining what he affirms are the misconceptions on which the verdict
of the jury was founded. The public will listen attentively to his
second appeal; but, in the meantime, we shall confine ourselves
strictly to those circumstances which are sufficient to justify the
general condemnation of the sentence passed on his Lordship, although
the decision of the jury be confirmed.
In the first place, admitting that the evidence may have been such as
to compel a conviction, yet there are evident features of extreme
hardship in Lord Cochrane’s situation when put on his trial, and when
brought up for judgment, which enlist sympathy in his behalf, and make
it possible that matters of alleviation, affecting _his case only_,
may have been concealed by the harsh formalities of the practice of
the Court. The law concerning conspiracy is enough to make every
individual tremble for his own safety. Through mistake or malice, an
innocent man may be included in one indictment with several guilty
ones—he is compelled to take his trial with them; the testimony that
proves their crime raises a prejudice against him; it is almost
conviction to him to have his name called over with theirs; the chain
of evidence becomes complicated, and where are jurymen to be found
sufficiently clear-headed to mark exactly the connection between the
facts sworn to and each of a dozen accused persons? If there is a
hostile disposition towards the innocent individual existing in the
breast of any in court, who may have an opportunity of influencing the
jury, how shall he escape being involved in the deserved fate of those
with whom he has been confounded? If, after his conviction, he
prepares himself with evidence suited to remove the misconceptions by
which his guilt has been presumed, he is granted or denied the
opportunity of bringing it forward, according to the conduct of
others, over whom he has no control, and who, in consequence of his
innocence, and their guilt, have an interest directly the reverse of
his. Should they abscond he is denied a new trial, although he
presents himself fearlessly to meet its result. These are rules which
Sir W. Garrow, the Attorney-General, calls the perfection of wisdom;
to common understandings they seem the perfection of hardship. But
what legal absurdity or cruelty, that has given way to the growing
intelligence of society, has not been so eulogised and pertinaciously
defended by the lawyers of the day!
Lord Cochrane, it is clear, has been thus placed in a situation
extremely disadvantageous to him as an accused person, and the public
sentiment is roused in indignant alarm at the condemnation of an
individual to the punishment of the pillory (a punishment more severe
than that of death to one in his Lordship’s situation of life), who
complains in touching terms of hardships, which, to common
understandings, involve palpable injustice, and which are of a nature
to render any innocent person unable to establish his innocence. It
would have been but prudent in the judge to have avoided raising this
popular feeling against the sentence of the Court, by keeping it more
within the bounds of moderation. Its odious severity sets every one on
scrutinising the soundness of the conviction, and the justice of the
legal rules applied to his Lordship’s case.
The further regards that influence the public to this strong
commiseration of Lord Cochrane, and disapprobation of his sentence,
are the unsuitableness of the latter for infliction on one of his
Lordship’s condition, and, we had almost said, its ingratitude, with
reference to his very distinguished past services. It is very certain
that justice may be as much violated by a disproportionate punishment,
as by the offence against which it is awarded; and when we consider
that Lord Cochrane is one of the most esteemed officers of the navy,
that his courage is of the true Nelsonic kind, that he is a member of
Parliament, and a man of rank, the disgrace of the pillory to him must
be deemed a thousand times worse than the mere infliction of death,
for with this latter his Lordship has been familiar. Now, without
meaning to extenuate the crime of spreading false news to raise the
public funds, we may say that the state of the general feeling and
practice in the country does not at present warrant that a punishment
worse than death shall be pronounced against him, who, after the long
forbearance of justice, is first convicted of this offence. Statesmen
of high name and station are shrewdly suspected to gamble in the
funds, and this practice also is illegal;—since such loose and
improper feelings as to what is honourable prevail, it would have been
but fair, at the first interference of the arm of the law, to have
permitted it to fall more lightly.
Lord Cochrane’s politics are of a kind to excite the displeasure of
the Court against him; one of his relations has STIRRED IN BEHALF OF
THE PRINCESS OF WALES, and, we believe, he has himself made, or
assisted, some little scrutiny into LORD ELLENBOROUGH’S PERQUISITES OF
OFFICE. These are considerations by which the Lord Chief-Justice will
indignantly disclaim being at all influenced; but we say that he ought
to have been influenced by them, inasmuch as they rendered his
situation towards the accused extremely delicate.
------------------------------------
APPENDIX XX.
[_The Champion_, a London Weekly Journal, Saturday, July 9th, 1814.]
_The Case of Lord Cochrane._
Lord Cochrane’s case is pregnant with the most weighty interests and
most touching considerations. Every subject of this country who has
access to a knowledge of the facts is bound, as a matter of positive
duty, to investigate its merits, with a view to behaving afterwards,
according to the means arising out of his condition, in the best way
calculated to assist the vindication of what his conviction shall tell
him to be justice, as it relates to the public and to the party. It
contains the most forcible appeal to every one distinctly to bring his
opinion to bear on it, that the irresistible strength of the popular
sentiment may either furnish to an injured person his remedy, or
solemnly confirm the disputed decision of the tribunal which has
adjudged him guilty of a serious offence. On one side, the common
feelings of humanity, as well as a regard for the national honour and
the general welfare, as composed of the safety of individuals, are
warmly excited, that an innocent man should not be suffered to perish,
to sink down and be overwhelmed in the gulf of infamy and ruin, in the
sight of us all standing around him, while he in vain cries to us for
help, and extends his arms to us for protection. If Lord Cochrane
shall be left by his countrymen to be sacrificed pursuant to his
sentence, and if there shall nevertheless appear to be good grounds
for disbelieving his guilt, we must blush for England; considering the
advantages which its people possess, they would be more disgraced by
the occurrence among them of a calamity of this kind, than the French
were by the murder of the Calas family,—we had almost said than by the
wholesale murders of the revolution, which were committed by a few
wretches possessed of power, whose atrocities were stupidly submitted
to by an ignorant and debased nation. The judges and others officially
concerned in convicting and punishing Lord Cochrane, have not by any
means their characters implicated in the correctness of these
proceedings to the same degree that the national character is
implicated in the conduct which its people shall now adopt between the
parties. A Court, during the judicial process, which only lasts a few
hours, may be misled by some great error; the administration of the
law must be regulated by prescribed forms, and these, however
generally useful, will often become hardships in their application to
particular cases;—the accused party may not be prepared with all the
evidence bearing on his cause, or may mar it by his injudicious
conduct, or his employed advocate may take a wrong view of what is for
the interest of his client. These possibilities should render us
cautious in attributing an erroneous judgment and unmerited sentence
to corrupt motives existing in the tribunal from whence they proceed;
but they also abundantly prove how much depends on holding no official
decision whatever exempt from scrutiny. We are astonished when we hear
such a man as Mr. Wilberforce declare that it is improperly disgracing
a court of law to submit the correctness of its proceedings to public
investigation; that gentleman, for whom we have the greatest respect,
is even averse to the interference of the House of Commons to
discharge such a duty, although facts of acknowledged difficulty and
of a nature to excite the keenest sympathy, thrust themselves on the
most superficial observation, forcing doubt, and, therefore, demanding
deliberation. This, if we understand him right, he does not deny, but
in their very teeth would acquiesce silently and impassively in what
has been done, lest, as he says, _we should throw reproach on the
administration of justice_—“the purest among the pure,”—the “fairest
among the fair,” and so forth. Does, then, Mr. Wilberforce forget,
that not only is the House of Commons legally competent to judge of
every act of authority up to the very highest, but that the real
superiority of this country’s political condition, and the conscious
feeling which we all have of the value of our constitution are to be
traced to its _exercise_ of this right. What should we have been if
this doctrine as to the indelicacy of scrutinising the conduct of
public functionaries had been always adopted? What enormities have
been the consequence of its temporary prevalence? Then, again, how can
it escape his acuteness that, as no human institution or person is
infallible, none ought to claim or receive an exemption from a
superintending cognisance? Farther, admitting, as he must when put to
it, that the Courts may pronounce wrong judgments, will he affirm that
they will be more disgraced by having the injurious effects of these
prevented by timely interference, than by an acquiescence in that
worst of all calamities and disgraces, the punishment of innocence?
This is the point which is so unaccountably overlooked by those who
take Mr. Wilberforce’s view of the question; they think, or at least
by their arguments would seem to think, that the correction of an
error is more disgraceful to the party who is wrong than its
perpetration; they do not seem to understand that the most honourable
thing that can be said of the institutions of any country, is that, as
a whole, they render it impossible that there should be any wrong
without a redress, an evil without a remedy,—and that each of these
institutions derives a respectability and strength from this general
eulogium, of a far more legitimate and lasting kind, than can result
from an impunity which tends to foster its worst errors and assist its
progress towards destruction.
We have said enough to show that, in our opinion, the House of Commons
ought to have conducted for itself an inquiry into Lord Cochrane’s
case; more particularly when facts were laid before it which raised
grave doubts of his Lordship’s guilt in the minds of some of its most
respectable and impartial members. It is the object of this article to
impress, that it now devolves on the public, and more particularly on
his Lordship’s constituents the electors of Westminster, to
investigate the whole business for themselves, by means of the various
documents and evidence which they can command. Our readers must not
look for these in our weekly sheet; we cannot among our miscellany
furnish them even with a correct outline of the proceedings of the
Court, the debates in the House of Commons, his Lordship’s defence,
and the affidavits supporting it. Most of these, however, are to be
procured, and justice, manliness, and humanity require they should be
attentively considered. We shall proceed to state and justify our own
sentiments on this most interesting affair, as they have been
influenced by the progressive information we have received. This will
be expected of us; but, we repeat, in a case like this, each ought to
investigate and judge for himself. As we have hitherto rested our
remarks on the possibility of Lord Cochrane’s innocence, it is proper
now to add that the voice of the public should now be raised in
defence of their legal authorities, and in reprobation of an indecent
obstinacy of denial, supported by falsehood wearing its most atrocious
features, should inquiry convince them of Lord Cochrane’s guilt.
We are impelled to mention first that, whether properly or improperly,
we previously cherished no particularly favourable opinion of Lord
Cochrane as he was known to the public. He always seemed to us more
likely to throw discredit on the cause of honest politics, by joining
the word reform with hasty, intemperate, and undignified proceedings,
than to accomplish any real good by his efforts, notwithstanding they
were generally directed to the removal of what was wrong. Besides
this, we thought we observed about him too little selection in his
companionships, and too little of what is high-mindedly delicate in
his conduct. We heard of the charge brought against him by the
Stock-Exchange certainly with no disposition to turn from it as
incredible; on the contrary, we leaned, with the majority, to a belief
of his guilt, through the weight of the accusation, and a certain
weakness, arising chiefly from incoherency, in his Lordship’s
inconsiderately published defence. The trial came on, and, by the
reports of it in the newspapers, our original belief was strengthened:
we saw no reason to doubt the propriety of the conviction; we began,
indeed, from what we heard and read, to fancy that Lord Cochrane’s
guilt might be less heavy than that of the others who were included in
the indictment; we suspected that he had not been made privy to the
mysteries of the plot, although he might have culpably connived at
what he knew to be going on, understanding that it would tend to his
advantage, but not perfectly acquainted, nor seeking to be, with all
the particulars.
With this impression on our mind, we at the same time felt that Lord
Cochrane had been exposed to various hardships and disadvantages, in
the course of the legal proceedings against him; and that these were
sufficient to put even innocence in a very precarious situation on its
trial; in short, to justify what an hon. member said in the House—that
he had need to be not only _fully_, but _fortunately_ guiltless, who
should escape conviction under such circumstances. The being included
in an indictment with a number of persons, several of whom he had
never seen, by which the evidence and the jury’s attention were
confused, and an odium was thrown on _all_ the accused should the
guilt of _any_ be proved; the refusal of the judge to attend to the
counsel, when they prayed that the trial might be adjourned before
they commenced the defence, after a sitting of fifteen hours, and when
the jury were incapable of giving close thought to the statement, the
adjournment taking place immediately when the defence was concluded,
by which the prosecutors had given to them a great advantage in
framing the reply; the very fierce and unqualified terms of the
judge’s charge to the jury, putting every fact in the strongest
language against his Lordship, and laying little or no stress on the
other side of the supposition;—all these things combined, constituted,
as we thought, a case of hardship, of which the convicted party might
reasonably complain.
The proceedings after the trial were more unequivocally severe. The
rule of the court, under which Lord Cochrane was refused a new trial,
because others over whom he had no control did not appear with him to
seek it, was plainly inconsistent with justice as distinct from law—at
least, as it operated in this instance; it therefore shocked the
public sense, and raised a strong feeling in favour of the aggrieved
party. It is pleasing to find Mr. Ponsonby, who is not only an eminent
lawyer, but one by no means to be suspected of a disaffected turn,
declare that this rule is as little founded in law as in justice or
reason; that it has, moreover, no ancient custom to plead in its
behalf, but is of very novel introduction. We have some ground, then,
for hoping that this piece of “profound wisdom,” as Sir W. Garrow
luminously termed it, which every one scouts as senseless and cruel,
and which is besides an _innovation_, will shortly give place to a
more liberal, and useful, and _ancient_ form of practice.
The facts contained in Lord Cochrane’s defence, made personally in
court when he was brought up to receive sentence, and which has since
been published in its entire form, threw a new light on many important
points of his case, and gave an explanation, reconciling with his
innocence several matters which served before to prove his guilt. This
is a document which our readers should not fail to peruse.
At last came the sentence, and, in common with all the world, we were
astounded by it. It thunderstruck the prosecutors, who felt abashed
and have petitioned against it; it amazed both sides of the House of
Commons; it disgusted all persuasions of people—those who acquiesced
in as well as those who dissented from the conviction. It seemed of
most forgetful severity, when Lord Cochrane’s naval services were
considered; of most injurious severity when his political conduct was
looked at in connection with the happier fate of certain peculators
and delinquents whose turpitude to the public had nothing to relieve
its atrocity but their subserviency to the court. In short, the
punishment awarded by the judge (we allude to the pillory) appears
almost to everyone over-charged, as it relates to the crime,
unsuitable as it relates to the person convicted, and unseemly as it
relates to him who presided at the trial. It is but fair to notice one
exception, by quoting from Sir Francis Burdett’s speech:—“The sentence
he thought cruel, disgusting, and severe beyond all example. The noble
Lord who was the object of it was the only person he had met with who
was not of this opinion. His Lordship, when he (Sir F. Burdett)
visited him in the King’s Bench Prison, said that he had not to
complain of his sentence, but of his conviction. Were he guilty, the
whole of his punishment, and more than the whole, was justly due to
him.”
We come now to the proceedings in the House of Commons. His Lordship’s
defence there ought certainly, in some way or other, to be got before
the public: with his feelings highly strung and irritated, as it would
seem, in an extraordinary degree, it contained passages reflecting on
the conduct of Lord Ellenborough, which the newspaper reporters were
told in plain terms they would publish at their peril. Lord Cochrane
evidently delivered himself under the almost maddening consciousness
of having been the victim of gross injustice; some of his accusations,
pronounced with great bitterness, it may be found necessary to keep
back; but the narrative and argumentative part of his statement should
certainly be printed. It had a prodigious effect on those who heard
him: several of the most impartial and steady Members declared that,
in their view, it established that there had been on the trial _a
misdirection of the jury by the judge of a most material nature_, and
to the prejudice of his Lordship as one of the accused; they added,
that on the facts which everyone thought told most against his
Lordship, he had shed a totally new light, either by offering to rebut
them with testimony that deserved attentive consideration, or by
explaining circumstances which altered their import, or by showing
with much simplicity and indication of general feeling how they had
been misconceived, and to what unlucky accidents it was owing that
they had operated to his prejudice. Persons whose respectability and
judgment will not be impeached from either side of the House protested
that under the weight of what they had heard they could not sleep on
their pillows were they to vote for Lord Cochrane’s expulsion without
further inquiry: many affirmed that the case had always appeared to
them doubtful, and that now their doubts had become of the most
serious kind. A gentleman who interrupted his Lordship in the course
of his animadversions on the Chief-Justice, avowed that however
injudicious and unfounded these circumstances were, he could not shut
up his opinion from facts so strong as those contained in the defence,
nor could he reconcile it to his conscience to add confirmation to a
verdict of the soundness of which he saw reason to doubt, and
bitterness to a fate which it was more than possible might be
undeserved.
Yet the House voted the expulsion of Lord Cochrane, not however
without a division. Forty-four were for further inquiry, and 140 for
expulsion. On the face of this proceeding it appears that forty-four
intelligent and honest men think that there is at least a strong call
for further investigation, yet Lord Cochrane has been _sentenced to
the pillory_! But if we read the speeches of the Members, we shall
find it by no means follows that the 144 who decided for expulsion,
are satisfied as to his Lordship’s guilt. Mr. Wilberforce, for
instance, speaks of the case as very distressing, and as very painful
to his feelings—but adds that _he deemed it his duty to bow to the
decision of the judge and jury_. Now, this is not an exercise but a
surrender of judgment; and, indeed, we may infer that Mr. Wilberforce
attaches at least doubt to the case, for otherwise he would not regard
it as distressing, but rather as one in which the offender had
deprived himself of every claim to compassion, by shameless obstinacy
and abandoned perjury. It is observable that the propriety of
expulsion was almost invariably rested on the propriety of _supporting
the court of law_, and on the many inconveniences which, as it was
truly enough said, would attend a reinvestigation of the proceedings.
The reader sees that these considerations have no connection with Lord
Cochrane’s guilt or innocence; yet, judging from the temper and
sentiment manifested by the House, we are inclined to believe that it
was these which chiefly produced its decision, and that a very large
proportion of the majority are far from satisfied in their minds that
their late associate has been properly convicted.
For ourselves, we have no hesitation to say, after a most impartial
study of the various documents, that our opinion is changed, and that
from thinking the weight of evidence on the side of Lord Cochrane’s
guilt we now think it on the side of his innocence. This, at least, is
incontestible, that great difficulties were imposed upon him by legal
forms; that the most important facts were misrepresented to his
prejudice on his trial; and that if the charge of the judge was
adopted by the jury as a clue to their decision, they have been
misguided.
The best statement of Lord Cochrane’s defence that we have seen was in
the _Morning Herald_; the reports in the _Times_ and _Chronicle_ gave
no idea of it; but we suppose it will speedily be published in a more
perfect form than any in which it has yet appeared. It makes perfectly
clear that the Chief-Justice’s most important assertion to the jury,
that Lord Cochrane received De Berenger “_in the costume of his
crime_,” is utterly unsupported by any evidence given on the trial,
and that it is in contradiction to several strong probabilities:—it
directs attention to the singular fact that Lord Ellenborough, in some
instances, quoted Lord Cochrane’s voluntary affidavit for proof
against him, and in others denied it all authority and truth:—it does
all but prove that De Berenger’s dress, when he came in the
hackney-coach to Lord Cochrane’s house, was falsely described by the
coachman, and it convicts this witness of other falsehoods, while it
justifies a belief that he may have been actuated by a corrupt desire
for the reward, by showing that he is a convicted ruffian of the
vilest kind:—it satisfactorily accounts for the non-examination of
Lord Cochrane’s servants by counsel on the trial, for whose
examination his Lordship pressed by note when the proceedings were
going on, who would have proved that De Berenger’s dress was not of a
kind to excite suspicions in any breast:—it makes very manifest that
Lord Cochrane has suffered by being joined with others whose guilt
must be presumed; conscious of his own innocence, and therefore
believing theirs, he left to them the trouble of arranging the defence
to the indictment, and neither his wishes nor his interests seem to
have been consulted:—it establishes that he had no connection with De
Berenger’s defence, and gives reason to believe that he was but little
acquainted with his person:—it tenders fresh testimony, on the oaths
of five respectable witnesses, as to the manner in which Lord
Cochrane’s bank-notes found their way into De Berenger’s hands:—in
fine, it mentions a multiplicity of circumstances furnishing
presumption of innocence, and makes it indubitable that the case might
have had much assistance of which it has been from one cause or
another deprived.
(Signed) “ED.”
I have only selected such opinions of the press as may serve to
elucidate what has been advanced. Were I to collect public opinion as
expressed at the time, such collection would far more than exceed this
volume in bulk. If necessary for my fuller defence, it must yet be
adduced, should my life be spared. That my days have been thus far
prolonged, is, under Providence, to be attributed to the skill of my
physician, Dr. Bence Jones, and to the unremitting care and attention of
my constant medical attendant, Mr. Henry Lee, of Savile Row.
DUNDONALD.
END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.
LONDON
PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO.
NEW-STREET SQUARE.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transcriber’s Note
In the Table of Contents, the Appendices were shown to begin on p. 410.
The correct page number is p.401.
Several compound words appeared midline both with and without a hyphen
(e.g. fire-ship/fireship). Where the hyphen appears at a line break, it
is either removed or retained, depending on other instances of the word.
At 222.9 and on the following page, the printer failed to use single
quotes to delimit embedded quotes of words and phrases: ‘_army
flotilla_’, ‘army’, ‘_march in ordinary time_’.
Other errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected,
and are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the
original.
9.8 and so fra[u]dulently from the original Inserted.
31.12 the deep water[”] See p. 32
line 4.
32.24 to nineteen feet[”] Added.
34.3 at 11 [a.m./A.M.] Replaced.
38.4 there at all[.] Added.
59.13 as I have already mentioned.” Added.
77.32 _that point_.[”] What he really said Added.
82.15 NO INTENTION OF ATTACKING[.] Added.
124.13 the production of “_Minutes_[”] Added.
150.30 “It may [h/b]e that Replaced.
220.9 were not listen[d]ed to Removed.
233.19 Lieut.-Col[.] Colquhoun. Added.
271.17 the family fort[n/u]ne. Inverted.
280.4 to lie on the table.[”] Added.
294.3 by long[c o/ co]nfinement Shifted.
303.15 Croker’s own words[ I,/, I] shall do Replaced.
326.6 I shall ever consider this inte[r]ference Inserted.
344.7 HOW GOT UP[.] Added.
370.23 the same mi[m/n]istry Replaced.
413.5 _[I/L]’Océan_, 120 guns Replaced.
419.35 [Caledonia’s/_Caledonia’s_] signal, Italicize.
426.15 he had [“]in contemplation” Probable.
469.10 they have of his Lordship’[s] innocence Italicize.
470.30 in their own persons[.] Added.
472.11 the pretens[i]on of lawyers Inserted.
486.10 Mr. Wilbe[r]force attaches Inserted.
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