The Project Gutenberg eBook of Yoga
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,
you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
before using this eBook.
Title: Yoga
as philosophy and religion
Author: Surendranath Dasgupta
Release date: August 13, 2024 [eBook #74250]
Language: English
Original publication: LONDON: KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., LTD, 1924
Credits: Richard Tonsing and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK YOGA ***
YOGA
AS PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIONS
BY
SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA
M.A., PH.D.(CAL.), PH.D.(CANTAB.)
AUTHOR OF “A HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY”, ETC.
_Professor of Philosophy, Presidency College, Calcutta_
_Late Professor of Sanskrit, Chittagong College_
_Late Lecturer in the University of Cambridge_
LONDON:
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., LTD
NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON & CO.
1924
YOGA AS PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION
Printed in Great Britain at
_The Mayflower Press, Plymouth_, William Brendon & Son, Ltd.
AS A HUMBLE TOKEN
OF DEEPEST REGARD AND GRATEFULNESS
TO THE
MAHARAJA SIR MANINDRACHANDRA NUNDY
K.C.I.E
WHOSE NOBLE CHARACTER AND SELF-DENYING CHARITIES
HAVE ENDEARED HIM TO THE PEOPLE OF BENGAL
AND
WHO SO KINDLY OFFERED ME HIS WHOLE-HEARTED
PATRONAGE IN
ENCOURAGING MY ZEAL FOR LEARNING AT A TIME
WHEN I WAS IN SO GREAT A NEED OF IT
PREFACE
This little volume is an attempt at a brief exposition of the
philosophical and religious doctrines found in Patañjali’s _Yoga-sūtra_
as explained by its successive commentaries of Vyāsa, Vācaspati, Vijñāna
Bhikshu, and others. The exact date of Patañjali cannot be definitely
ascertained, but if his identity with the other Patañjali, the author of
the Great Commentary (_Mahābhāshya_) on Pāṇini’s grammar, could be
conclusively established, there would be some evidence in our hands that
he lived in 150 B.C. I have already discussed this subject in the first
volume of my _A History of Indian Philosophy_, where the conclusion to
which I arrived was that, while there was some evidence in favour of
their identity, there was nothing which could be considered as being
conclusively against it. The term Yoga, according to Patañjali’s
definition, means the final annihilation (_nirodha_) of all the mental
states (_cittavṛtti_) involving the preparatory stages in which the mind
has to be habituated to being steadied into particular types of
graduated mental states. This was actually practised in India for a long
time before Patañjali lived; and it is very probable that certain
philosophical, psychological, and practical doctrines associated with it
were also current long before Patañjali. Patañjali’s work is, however,
the earliest systematic compilation on the subject that is known to us.
It is impossible, at this distance of time, to determine the extent to
which Patañjali may claim originality. Had it not been for the labours
of the later commentators, much of what is found in Patañjali’s
aphorisms would have remained extremely obscure and doubtful, at least
to all those who were not associated with such ascetics as practised
them, and who derived the theoretical and practical knowledge of the
subject from their preceptors in an upward succession of generations
leading up to the age of Patañjali, or even before him. It is well to
bear in mind that Yoga is even now practised in India, and the
continuity of traditional instruction handed down from teacher to pupil
is not yet completely broken.
If anyone wishes methodically to pursue a course which may lead him
ultimately to the goal aimed at by Yoga, he must devote his entire life
to it under the strict practical guidance of an advanced teacher. The
present work can in no sense be considered as a practical guide for such
purposes. But it is also erroneous to think—as many uninformed people
do—that the only interest of Yoga lies in its practical side. The
philosophical, psychological, cosmological, ethical, and religious
doctrines, as well as its doctrines regarding matter and change, are
extremely interesting in themselves, and have a definitely assured place
in the history of the progress of human thought; and, for a right
understanding of the essential features of the higher thoughts of India,
as well as of the practical side of Yoga, their knowledge is
indispensable.
The Yoga doctrines taught by Patañjali are regarded as the highest of
all Yogas (_Rājayoga_), as distinguished from other types of Yoga
practices, such as _Haṭhayoga_ or _Mantrayoga_. Of these _Haṭhayoga_
consists largely of a system of bodily exercises for warding off
diseases, and making the body fit for calmly bearing all sorts of
physical privations and physical strains. _Mantrayoga_ is a course of
meditation on certain mystical syllables which leads to the audition of
certain mystical sounds. This book does not deal with any of these
mystical practices nor does it lay any stress on the performance of any
of those miracles described by Patañjali. The scope of this work is
limited to a brief exposition of the intellectual foundation—or the
theoretical side—of the Yoga practices, consisting of the philosophical,
psychological, cosmological, ethical, religious, and other doctrines
which underlie these practices. The affinity of the system of Sāṃkhya
thought, generally ascribed to a mythical sage, Kapila, to that of Yoga
of Patañjali is so great on most important points of theoretical
interest that they may both be regarded as two different modifications
of one common system of ideas. I have, therefore, often taken the
liberty of explaining Yoga ideas by a reference to kindred ideas in
Sāṃkhya. But the doctrines of Yoga could very well have been compared or
contrasted with great profit with the doctrines of other systems of
Indian thought. This has purposely been omitted here as it has already
been done by me in my _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Systems of
Indian Thought_, the publication of which has for long been unavoidably
delayed. All that may be expected from the present volume is that it
will convey to the reader the essential features of the Yoga system of
thought. How far this expectation will be realized from this book it
will be for my readers to judge. It is hoped that the chapter on “Kapila
and Pātañjala School of Sāṃkhya” in my _A History of Indian Philosophy_
(Vol. I. Cambridge University Press, 1922) will also prove helpful for
the purpose.
I am deeply indebted to my friend Mr. Douglas Ainslie for the numerous
corrections and suggestions regarding the English style that he was
pleased to make throughout the body of the manuscript and the very warm
encouragement that he gave me for the publication of this work. In this
connection I also beg to offer my best thanks for the valuable
suggestions which I received from the reviser of the press. Had it not
been for these, the imperfections of the book would have been still
greater. The quaintness and inelegance of some of my expressions would,
however, be explained if it were borne in mind that here, as well as in
my _A History of Indian Philosophy_, I have tried to resist the
temptation of making the English happy at the risk of sacrificing the
approach to exactness of the philosophical sense; and many ideas of
Indian philosophy are such that an exact English rendering of them often
becomes hopelessly difficult.
I am grateful to my friend and colleague, Mr. D. K. Sen, M.A., for the
kind assistance that he rendered in helping me to prepare the index.
Last of all, I must express my deep sense of gratefulness to Sir
Ashutosh Mookerjee, Kt., C.S.I., etc. etc., and the University of
Calcutta, for kindly permitting me to utilize my _A Study of Patañjāli_,
which is a Calcutta University publication, for the present work.
S. N. DASGUPTA.
PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, CALCUTTA,
_April, 1924_.
CONTENTS
BOOK I. YOGA METAPHYSICS:
CHAPTER PAGE
I. PRAKṚTI 1
II. PURUSHA 13
III. THE REALITY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 31
IV. THE PROCESS OF EVOLUTION 40
V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CATEGORIES 48
VI. EVOLUTION AND CHANGE OF QUALITIES 64
VII. EVOLUTION AND GOD 84
BOOK II. YOGA ETHICS AND PRACTICE:
VIII. MIND AND MORAL STATES 92
IX. THE THEORY OF KARMA 102
X. THE ETHICAL PROBLEM 114
XI. YOGA PRACTICE 124
XII. THE YOGĀṄGAS 132
XIII. STAGES OF SAMADHI 150
XIV. GOD IN YOGA 159
XV. MATTER AND MIND 166
APPENDIX 179
INDEX 188
YOGA AS PHILOSOPHY
AND RELIGION
BOOK I. YOGA METAPHYSICS
CHAPTER I
PRAKRTI
However dogmatic a system of philosophical enquiry may appear to us, it
must have been preceded by a criticism of the observed facts of
experience. The details of the criticism and the processes of
self-argumentation by which the thinker arrived at his theory of the
Universe might indeed be suppressed, as being relatively unimportant,
but a thoughtful reader would detect them as lying in the background
behind the shadow of the general speculations, but at the same time
setting them off before our view. An Aristotle or a Patañjali may not
make any direct mention of the arguments which led him to a dogmatic
assertion of his theories, but for a reader who intends to understand
them thoroughly it is absolutely necessary that he should read them in
the light as far as possible of the inferred presuppositions and inner
arguments of their minds; it is in this way alone that he can put
himself in the same line of thinking with the thinker whom he is willing
to follow, and can grasp him to the fullest extent. In offering this
short study of the Pātañjala metaphysics, I shall therefore try to
supplement it with such of my inferences of the presuppositions of
Patañjali’s mind, which I think will add to the clearness of the
exposition of his views, though I am fully alive to the difficulties of
making such inferences about a philosopher whose psychological, social,
religious and moral environments differed so widely from ours.
An enquiry into the relations of the mental phenomena to the physical
has sometimes given the first start to philosophy. The relation of mind
to matter is such an important problem of philosophy that the existing
philosophical systems may roughly be classified according to the
relative importance that has been attached to mind or to matter. There
have been chemical, mechanical and biological conceptions which have
ignored mind as a separate entity and have dogmatically affirmed it to
be the product of matter only.[1] There have been theories of the other
extreme, which have dispensed with matter altogether and have boldly
affirmed that matter as such has no reality at all, and that thought is
the only thing which can be called Real in the highest sense. All matter
as such is non-Being or Māyā or Avidyā. There have been Nihilists like
the Śūnyavādi Buddhists who have gone so far as to assert that neither
matter nor mind exists. Some have asserted that matter is only thought
externalized, some have regarded the principle of matter as the
unknowable Thing-in-itself, some have regarded them as separate
independent entities held within a higher reality called God, or as two
of his attributes only, and some have regarded their difference as being
only one of grades of intelligence, one merging slowly and imperceptibly
into the other and held together in concord with each other by
pre-established harmony.
Underlying the metaphysics of the Yoga system of thought as taught by
Patañjali and as elaborated by his commentators we find an acute
analysis of matter and thought. Matter on the one hand, mind, the
senses, and the ego on the other are regarded as nothing more than two
different kinds of modifications of one primal cause, the Prakṛti. But
the self-intelligent principle called Purusha (spirit) is distinguished
from them. Matter consists only of three primal qualities or rather
substantive entities, which he calls the Sattva or intelligence-stuff,
Rajas or energy, and Tamas—the factor of obstruction or mass or inertia.
It is extremely difficult truly to conceive of the nature of these three
kinds of entities or Guṇas, as he calls them, when we consider that
these three elements alone are regarded as composing all phenomena,
mental and physical. In order to comprehend them rightly it will be
necessary to grasp thoroughly the exact relation between the mental and
the physical. What are the real points of agreement between the two? How
can the same elements be said to behave in one case as the conceiver and
in the other case as the conceived? Thus Vācaspati says:—
“The reals (guṇas) have two forms, viz. the determiner or the perceiver,
and the perceived or the determined. In the aspect of the determined or
the perceived, the guṇas evolve themselves as the five infra-atomic
potentials, the five gross elements and their compounds. In the aspect
of perceiver or determiner, they form the modifications of the ego
together with the senses.”[2]
It is interesting to notice here the two words used by Vācaspati in
characterising the twofold aspect of the guṇa viz. _vyavasāyātmakatva_,
their nature as the determiner or perceiver, and _vyavaseyātmakatva_,
their nature as determined or perceived. The elements which compose the
phenomena of the objects of perception are the same as those which form
the phenomena of the perceiving; their only distinction is that one is
the determined and the other is the determiner. What we call the
psychosis involving intellection, sensing and the ego, and what may be
called the infra-atoms, atoms and their combinations, are but two
different types of modifications of the same stuff of reals. There is no
intrinsic difference in nature between the mental and the physical.
The mode of causal transformation is explained by Vijñāna Bhikshu in his
commentary on the system of Sāṃkhya as if its functions consisted only
in making manifest what was already there in an unmanifested form. Thus
he says, “just as the image already existing in the stone is only
manifested by the activity of the statuary, so the causal activity also
generates only that activity by which an effect is manifested as if it
happened or came into being at the present moment.”[3] The effects are
all always existent, but some of them are sometimes in an unmanifested
state. What the causal operation, viz. the energy of the agent and the
suitable collocating instruments and conditions, does is to set up an
activity by which the effect may be manifested at the present moment.
With Sāṃkhya-Yoga, sattva, rajas and tamas are substantive entities
which compose the reality of the mental and the physical.[4] The mental
and the physical represent two different orders of modifications, and
one is not in any way superior to the other. As the guṇas conjointly
form the manifold without, by their varying combinations, as well as all
the diverse internal functions, faculties and phenomena, they are in
themselves the absolute potentiality of all things, mental and physical.
Thus Vyāsa in describing the nature of the knowable, writes: “The nature
of the knowable is now described:—The knowable, consisting of the
objects of enjoyment and liberation, as the gross elements and
the perceptive senses, is characterised by three essential
traits—illumination, energy and inertia. The sattva is of the nature of
illumination. Rajas is of the nature of energy. Inertia (tamas) is of
the nature of inactivity. The guṇa entities with the above
characteristics are capable of being modified by mutual influence on one
another, by their proximity. They are evolving. They have the
characteristics of conjunction and separation. They manifest forms by
one lending support to the others by proximity. None of these loses its
distinct power into those of the others, even though any one of them may
exist as the principal factor of a phenomenon with the others as
subsidiary thereto. The guṇas forming the three classes of substantive
entities manifest themselves as such by their similar kinds of power.
When any one of them plays the rôle of the principal factor of any
phenomenon, the others also show their presence in close contact. Their
existence as subsidiary energies of the principal factor is inferred by
their distinct and independent functioning, even though it be as
subsidiary qualities.”[5] The Yoga theory does not acknowledge qualities
as being different from substances. The ultimate substantive entities
are called guṇas, which as we have seen are of three kinds. The guṇa
entities are infinite in number; each has an individual existence, but
is always acting in co-operation with others. They may be divided into
three classes in accordance with their similarities of behaviour (śīla).
Those which behave in the way of intellection are called _sattva_, those
which behave in the way of producing effort of movement are called
_rajas_, and those which behave differently from these and obstruct
their process are called _tamas_. We have spoken above of a primal cause
_prakṛti_. But that is not a separate category independent of the guṇas.
Prakṛti is but a name for the guṇa entities when they exist in a state
of equilibrium. All that exists excepting the purushas are but the guṇa
entities in different kinds of combination amongst themselves. The
effects they produce are not different from them but it is they
themselves which are regarded as causes in one state and effects in
another. The difference of combination consists in this, that in some
combinations there are more of sattva entities than rajas or tamas, and
in others more of rajas or more of tamas. These entities are continually
uniting and separating. But though they are thus continually dividing
and uniting in new combinations the special behaviour or feature of each
class of entities remains ever the same. Whatever may be the nature of
any particular combination the sattva entities participating in it will
retain their intellective functions, rajas their energy
functions, and tamas the obstructing ones. But though they retain
their special features in spite of their mutual difference
they hold fast to one another in any particular combination
(_tulyajātīyātulyajātīyaśaktibhedānupātinaḥ_, which Bhikshu explains as
_aviśesheṇopashṭambhakasvabhāvāḥ_). In any particular combination it is
the special features of those entities which predominate that manifest
themselves, while the other two classes lend their force in drawing the
minds of perceivers to it as an object as a magnet draws a piece of
iron. Their functionings at this time are undoubtedly feeble
(_sūkshmavṛttimantaḥ_) but still they do exist.[6]
In the three guṇas, none of them can be held as the goal of the others.
All of them are equally important, and the very varied nature of the
manifold represents only the different combinations of these guṇas as
substantive entities. In any combination one of the guṇas may be more
predominant than the others, but the other guṇas are also present there
and perform their functions in their own way. No one of them is more
important than the other, but they serve conjointly one common purpose,
viz. the experiences and the liberation of the purusha, or spirit. They
are always uniting, separating and re-uniting again and there is neither
beginning nor end of this (_anyonyamithunāḥ sarvve naishāmādisamprayogo
viprayogo vā upalabhyate_).
They have no purpose of their own to serve, but they all are always
evolving, as Dr. Seal says, “ever from a relatively less differentiated,
less determinate, less coherent whole, to a relatively more
differentiated, more determinate, more coherent whole”[7] for the
experiences and liberation of purusha, or spirit. When in a state of
equilibrium they cannot serve the purpose of the purusha, so that state
of the guṇas is not for the sake of the purusha; it is its own
independent eternal state. All the other three stages of evolution, viz.
the liṅga (sign), aviśesha (unspecialised) and viśesha (specialised)
have been caused for the sake of the purusha.[8] Thus Vyāsa writes:—[9]
“The objects of the purusha are no cause of the original state
(_aliṅga_). That is to say, the fulfilment of the objects of the purusha
is not the cause which brings about the manifestation of the original
state of prakṛti in the beginning. The fulfilment of the objects of the
purusha is not therefore the reason of the existence of that ultimate
state. Since it is not brought into existence by the need of the
fulfilment of the purusha’s objects it is said to be eternal. As to the
three specialised states, the fulfilment of the objects of the purusha
becomes the cause of their manifestation in the beginning. The
fulfilment of the objects of the purusha is not therefore the reason for
the existence of the cause. Since it is not brought into existence by
the purusha’s objects it is said to be eternal. As to the three
specialised states, the fulfilment of the objects of the purusha being
the cause of their manifestation in the beginning, they are said to be
non-eternal.”
Vācaspati again says:—“The fulfilment of the objects of the purusha
could be said to be the cause of the original state, if that state could
bring about the fulfilment of the objects of the purusha, such as the
enjoyment of sound, etc., or manifest the discrimination of the
distinction between true self and other phenomena. If however it did
that, it could not be a state of equilibrium,” (_yadyaliṅgāvasthā
śabdādyupabhogam vā sattvapurushānyatākhyātim vā purushārtham
nirvarttayet tannrvarttane hi na sāmyavasthā syāt_). This state is
called the prakṛti. It is the beginning, indeterminate, unmediated and
undetermined. It neither exists nor does it not exist, but is the
principium of almost all existence. Thus Vyāsa describes it as “the
state which neither is nor is not; that which exists and yet does not;
that in which there is no non-existence; the unmanifested, the noumenon
(lit. without any manifested indication), the background of all”
(_niḥsattāsattam niḥsadasat nirasat avyaktam aliṅgam pradhānam_).[10]
Vācaspati explains it as follows:—“Existence consists in possessing the
capacity of effecting the fulfilment of the objects of the purusha.
Non-existence means a mere imaginary trifle (e.g. the horn of a hare).”
It is described as being beyond both these states of existence and
non-existence. The state of the equipoise of the three guṇas of
intelligence-stuff, inertia and energy, is nowhere of use in fulfilling
the objects of the purusha. It therefore does not exist as such. On the
other hand, it does not admit of being rejected as non-existent like an
imaginary lotus of the sky. It is therefore not non-existent. But even
allowing the force of the above arguments about the want of phenomenal
existence of prakṛti on the ground that it cannot serve the objects of
the purusha, the difficulty arises that the principles of Mahat, etc.,
exist in the state of the unmanifested also, because nothing that exists
can be destroyed; and if it is destroyed, it cannot be born again,
because nothing that does not exist can be born; it follows therefore
that since the principles of mahat, etc., exist in the state of the
unmanifested, that state can also affect the fulfilment of the objects
of the purusha. How then can it be said that the unmanifested is not
possessed of existence? For this reason, he describes it as that in
which it exists and does not exist. This means that the cause exists in
that state in a potential form but not in the form of the effect.
Although the effect exists in the cause as mere potential power, yet it
is incapable of performing the function of fulfilling the objects of the
purusha; it is therefore said to be non-existent as such. Further he
says that this cause is not such, that its effect is of the nature of
hare’s horn. It is beyond the state of non-existence, that is, of the
existence of the effect as mere nothing. If it were like that, then it
would be like the lotus of the sky and no effect would follow.[11]
But as Bhikshu points out (_Yoga-vārttika_, II. 18) this prakṛti is
not simple substance, for it is but the guṇa reals. It is simple only
in the sense that no complex qualities are manifested in it. It is the
name of the totality of the guṇa reals existing in a state of
equilibrium through their mutual counter opposition. It is a
hypothetical state of the guṇas preceding the states in which they
work in mutual co-operation for the creation of the cosmos for giving
the purushas a chance for ultimate release attained through a full
enjoyment of experiences. Some European scholars have often asked me
whether the prakṛti were real or whether the guṇas were real. This
question, in my opinion, can only arise as a result of confusion and
misapprehension, for it is the guṇas in a state of equilibrium that
are called prakṛti. Apart from guṇas there is no prakṛti (_guṇā eva
prakṛtiśabdavācyā na tu tadatiriktā prakṛtirasti. Yoga-vārttika_, II.
18). In this state, the different guṇas only annul themselves and no
change takes place, though it must be acknowledged that the state of
equipoise is also one of tension and action, which, however, being
perfectly balanced does not produce any change. This is what is meant
by evolution of similars (_adṛśapariṇāma_). Prakṛti as the equilibrium
of the three guṇas is the absolute ground of all the mental and
phenomenal modifications—pure potentiality.
Veṅkaṭa, a later Vaishṇava writer, describes prakṛti as one ubiquitous,
homogeneous matter which evolves itself into all material productions by
condensation and rarefaction. In this view the guṇas would have to be
translated as three different classes of qualities or characters, which
are found in the evolutionary products of the prakṛti. This will of
course be an altogether different view of the prakṛti from that which is
described in the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, and the guṇas could not be considered
as reals or as substantive entities in such an interpretation. A
question arises, then, as to which of these two prakṛtis is the earlier
conception. I confess that it is difficult to answer it. For though the
Vaishṇava view is elaborated in later times, it can by no means be
asserted that it had not quite as early a beginning as 2nd or 3rd
century B.C. If _Ahirbudhnyasamhitā_ is to be trusted then the
_Shashṭitantraśāstra_ which is regarded as an authoritative Sāṃkhya work
is really a Vaishṇava work. Nothing can be definitely stated about the
nature of prakṛti in Sāṃkhya from the meagre statement of the _Kārikā_.
The statement in the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ is, however, definitely in favour
of the interpretation that we have adopted, and so also the
_Sāṃkhya-sūtra_, which is most probably a later work. Caraka’s account
of prakṛti does not seem to be the prakṛti of _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ for here
the guṇas are not regarded as reals or substantive entities, but as
characters, and prakṛti is regarded as containing its evolutes, mahat,
etc., as its elements (_dhātu_). If Caraka’s treatment is the earliest
view of Sāṃkhya that is available to us, then it has to be admitted that
the earliest Sāṃkhya view did not accept prakṛti as a state of the
guṇas, or guṇas as substantive entities. But the _Yoga-sūtra_, II. 19,
and the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ support the interpretation that I have adopted
here, and it is very curious that if the Sāṃkhya view was known at the
time to be so different from it, no reference to it should have been
made. But whatever may be the original Sāṃkhya view, both the Yoga view
and the later Sāṃkhya view are quite in consonance with my
interpretation.
In later Indian thinkers there had been a tendency to make a compromise
between the Vedānta and Sāṃkhya doctrines and to identify prakṛti with
the avidyā of the Vedāntists. Thus Lokācāryya writes:—“It is called
prakṛti since it is the source of all change, it is called avidyā since
it is opposed to knowledge, it is called māyā since it is the cause of
diversion creation (_prakṛtirityucyate vikārotpādakatvāt avidyā
jñānavirodhitvāt māyā vicitrasṛshṭikaratvāt_).”[12] But this is
distinctly opposed to the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ which defines avidyā as
_vidyāviparītaṃ jñānāntaraṃ avidyā_, i.e. avidyā is that other knowledge
which is opposed to right knowledge. In some of the Upanishads,
_Svetāśvatara_ for example, we find that māyā and prakṛti are identified
and the great god is said to preside over them (_māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ
vidyāt māyinaṃ tumaheśvaraṃ_). There is a description also in the
Ṛgveda, X. 92, where it is said that (_nāsadāsīt na sadāsīt tadānīṃ_),
in the beginning there was neither the “Is” nor the “Is not,” which
reminds one of the description of prakṛti (_niḥsattāsattaṃ_ as that in
which there is no existence or non-existence). In this way it may be
shown from _Gītā_ and other Sanskrit texts that an undifferentiated,
unindividuated cosmic matter as the first principle, was often thought
of and discussed from the earliest times. Later on this idea was
utilised with modifications by the different schools of Vedāntists, the
Sāṃkhyists and those who sought to make a reconciliation between them
under the different names of prakṛti, avidyā and māyā. What avidyā
really means according to the Pātañjala system we shall see later on;
but here we see that whatever it might mean it does not mean prakṛti
according to the Pātañjala system. _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, IV. 13, makes
mention of māyā also in a couplet from _Shashṭitantraśāstra_;
_guṇānāṃ paramaṃ rūpaṃ na dṛshṭipathamṛcchati
yattu dṛshṭipathaṃ prāptaṃ tanmāyeva sutucch akaṃ._
The real appearance of the guṇas does not come within the line of our
vision. That, however, which comes within the line of vision is but
paltry delusion and Vācaspati Miśra explains it as follows:—Prakṛti is
like the māyā but it is not māyā. It is trifling (_sutucchaka_) in the
sense that it is changing. Just as māyā constantly changes, so the
transformations of prakṛti are every moment appearing and vanishing and
thus suffering momentary changes. Prakṛti being eternal is real and thus
different from māyā.
This explanation of Vācaspati’s makes it clear that the word māyā is
used here only in the sense of illusion, and without reference to the
celebrated māyā of the Vedāntists; and Vācaspati clearly says that
prakṛti can in no sense be called māyā, since it is real.[13]
CHAPTER II
PURUSHA
We shall get a more definite notion of prakṛti as we advance further
into the details of the later transformations of the prakṛti in
connection with the purushas. The most difficult point is to understand
the nature of its connection with the purushas. Prakṛti is a material,
non-intelligent, independent principle, and the souls or spirits are
isolated, neutral, intelligent and inactive. Then how can the one come
into connection with the other?
In most systems of philosophy the same trouble has arisen and has caused
the same difficulty in comprehending it rightly. Plato fights the
difficulty of solving the unification of the idea and the non-being and
offers his participation theory; even in Aristotle’s attempt to avoid
the difficulty by his theory of form and matter, we are not fully
satisfied, though he has shown much ingenuity and subtlety of thought in
devising the “expedient in the single conception of development.”
The universe is but a gradation between the two extremes of potentiality
and actuality, matter and form. But all students of Aristotle know that
it is very difficult to understand the true relation between form and
matter, and the particular nature of their interaction with each other,
and this has created a great divergence of opinion among his
commentators. It was probably to avoid this difficulty that the
dualistic appearance of the philosophy of Descartes had to be
reconstructed in the pantheism of Spinoza. Again we find also how Kant
failed to bring about the relation between noumenon and phenomenon, and
created two worlds absolutely unrelated to each other. He tried to
reconcile the schism that he effected in his _Critique of Pure Reason_
by his _Critique of Practical Reason_, and again supplemented it with
his _Critique of Judgment_, but met only with dubious success.
In India also this question has always been a little puzzling, and
before trying to explain the Yoga point of view, I shall first give some
of the other expedients devised for the purpose, by the different
schools of Advaita (monistic) Vedāntism.
I. The reflection theory of the Vedānta holds that the māyā is without
beginning, unspeakable, mother of gross matter, which comes in
connection with intelligence, so that by its reflection in the former we
have Īśvara. The illustrations that are given to explain it both in
_Siddhāntaleśa_[14] and in _Advaita-Brahmasiddhi_ are only cases of
physical reflection, viz. the reflection of the sun in water, or of the
sky in water.
II. The limitation theory of the Vedānta holds that the all-pervading
intelligence must necessarily be limited by mind, etc., so of necessity
it follows that “the soul” is its limitation. This theory is illustrated
by giving those common examples in which the Ākāśa (space) though
unbounded in itself is often spoken of as belonging to a jug or limited
by the jug and as such appears to fit itself to the shape and form of
the jug and is thus called _ghaṭāvacchinna ākāśa_, i.e. space as within
the jug.
Then we have a third school of Vedāntists, which seeks to explain it in
another way:—The soul is neither a reflection nor a limitation, but just
as the son of Kuntī was known as the son of Rādhā, so the pure Brahman
by his nescience is known as the jīva, and like the prince who was
brought up in the family of a low caste, it is the pure Brahman who by
his own nescience undergoes birth and death, and by his own nescience is
again released.[15]
The _Sāṃkhya-sūtra_ also avails itself of the same story in IV. 1,
“_rājaputtravattattvopadeśāt_,” which Vijñāna Bhikshu explains as
follows:—A certain king’s son in consequence of his being born under the
star Gaṇḍa having been expelled from his city and reared by a certain
forester remains under the idea: “I am a forester.” Having learnt that
he is alive, a certain minister informs him. “Thou art not a forester,
thou art a king’s son.” As he, immediately having abandoned the idea of
being an outcast, betakes himself to his true royal state, saying, “I am
a king,” so too the soul realises its purity in consequence of
instruction by some good tutor, to the effect—“Thou, who didst originate
from the first soul, which manifests itself merely as pure thought, art
a portion thereof.”
In another place there are two sūtras:—(1) _niḥsaṅge’pi uparāgo
vivekāt_. (2) _japāsphaṭikayoriva noparāgaḥ kintvabhimānaḥ_. (1) Though
it be associated still there is a tingeing through non-discrimination.
(2) As in the case of the hibiscus and the crystal, there is not a
tinge, but a fancy. Now it will be seen that all these theories only
show that the transcendent nature of the union of the principle of pure
intelligence is very difficult to comprehend. Neither the reflection nor
the limitation theory can clear the situation from vagueness and
incomprehensibility, which is rather increased by their physical
illustrations, for the cit or pure intelligence cannot undergo
reflection like a physical thing, nor can it be obstructed or limited by
it. The reflection theory adduced by the _Sāṃkhya-sūtra_,
“_japāsphiṭikayoriva noparāgaḥ kintvabhimānaḥ_,” is not an adequate
explanation. For here the reflection produces only a seeming redness of
the colourless crystal, which was not what was meant by the Vedāntists
of the reflection school. But here, though the metaphor is more suitable
to express the relation of purusha with the prakṛti, the exact nature of
the relation is more lost sight of than comprehended. Let us now see how
Patañjali and Vyāsa seek to explain it.
Let me quote a few sūtras of Patañjali and some of the most important
extracts from the _Bhāshya_ and try, as far as possible, to get the
correct view:—
(1) _dṛgdarśanaśaktyorekātmateva asmitā_ II. 6.
(2) _drashṭā dṛśimātraḥ śuddho’pi pratyayānupaśyaḥ_ II. 20.
(3) _tadartha eva drśyasya ātmā_ II. 21.
(4) _kṛtārthaṃ prati nashṭamapyanashṭaṃ tadanyasādhāraṇatvāt_ II. 22.
(5) _Svasvāmiśaktyoḥ svarūpopalabdhihetuḥ saṃyogah_ II. 22.
(6) _tadabhāvāt saṃyogābhāvo hānaṃ taddṛśeḥ kaivalyaṃ_ II. 25.
(7) _sattvapurushayoḥ śuddhisāmye kaivalyaṃ_ III. 25.
(8) _citerapratisaṃkramāyāstadākārāpattau svabuddhisaṃvedanaṃ_ IV. 22.
(9) _sattvapurushayoratyantāsaṅkīrṇayoḥ pratyayāvśesho bhogaḥ
parārthatvāt svārthasaṃyamāt purushajñānam_ III. 35.
(1) The Ego-sense is the illusory appearance of the identity of the
power as perceiver and the power as perceived.
(2) The seer though pure as mere “seeing” yet perceives the forms
assumed by the psychosis (_buddhi_).
(3) It is for the sake of the purusha that the being of the knowable
exists.
(4) For the emancipated person the world-phenomena cease to exist, yet
they are not annihilated since they form a common field of experience
for other individuals.
(5) The cause of the realisation of the natures of the knowable and
purusha in consciousness is their mutual contact.
(6) Cessation is the want of mutual contact arising from the destruction
of ignorance and this is called the state of oneness.
(7) This state of oneness arises out of the equality in purity of the
purusha and buddhi or sattva.
(8) Personal consciousness arises when the purusha, though in its nature
unchangeable, is cast into the mould of the psychosis.
(9) Since the mind-objects exist only for the purusha, experience
consists in the non-differentiation of these two which in their natures
are absolutely distinct; the knowledge of self arises out of
concentration on its nature.
Thus in _Yoga-sūtra_, II. 6, dṛik or purusha the seer is spoken of as
śakti or power as much as the prakṛti itself, and we see that their
identity is only apparent. Vyāsa in his _Bhāshya_ explains _ekātmatā_
(unity of nature or identity) as _avibhāgaprāptāviva_, “as if there is
no difference.” And Pañcaśikha, as quoted in _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, writes:
“not knowing the purusha beyond the mind to be different therefrom, in
nature, character and knowledge, etc., a man has the notion of self, in
the mind through delusion.”
Thus we see that when the mind and purusha are known to be separated,
the real nature of purusha is realised. This seeming identity is again
described as that which perceives the particular form of the mind and
thereby appears, as identical with it though it is not so
(_pratyayānupaśya—pratyayāni bauddhamanupaśyati tamanupaśyannatadātmāpi
tadātmaka iva pratibhāti_, _Vāysa-bhāshya_, II. 20).
The purusha thus we see, cognises the phenomena of consciousness after
they have been formed, and though its nature is different from conscious
states yet it appears to be the same. Vyāsa in explaining this sūtra
says that purusha is neither quite similar to the mind nor altogether
different from it. For the mind (_buddhi_) is always changeful,
according to the change of the objects that are offered to it; so that
it may be said to be changeful according as it knows or does not know
objects; but the purusha is not such, for it always appears as the self,
being reflected through the mind by which it is thus connected with the
phenomenal form of knowledge. The notion of self that appears connected
with all our mental phenomena and which always illumines them is only
duo to this reflection of purusha in the mind. All phenomenal knowledge
which has the form of the object can only be transformed into conscious
knowledge as “I know this,” when it becomes connected with the self or
purusha. So the purusha may in a way be said to see again what was
perceived by the mind and thus to impart consciousness by transferring
its illumination into the mind. The mind suffers changes according to
the form of the object of cognition, and thus results a state of
conscious cognition in the shape of “I know it,” when the mind, having
assumed the shape of an object, becomes connected with the constant
factor purusha, through the transcendent reflection or identification of
purusha in the mind. This is what is meant by _pratyayānupaśya_
reperception of the mind-transformations by purusha, whereby the mind
which has assumed the shape of any object of consciousness becomes
intelligent. Even when the mind is without any objective form, it is
always being seen by purusha. The exact nature of this reflection is
indeed very hard to comprehend; no physical illustrations can really
serve to make it clear. And we see that neither the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ nor
the sūtras offer any such illustrations as Sāṃkhya did. But the
_Bhāshya_ proceeds to show the points in which the mind may be said to
differ from purusha, as well as those in which it agrees with it. So
that though we cannot express it anyhow, we may at least make some
advance towards conceiving the situation.
Thus the _Bhāshya_ says that the main difference between the mind and
purusha is that the mind is constantly undergoing modifications, as it
grasps its objects one by one; for the grasping of an object, the act of
having a percept is nothing but its own undergoing of different
modifications, and thus, since an object sometimes comes within the
grasp of the mind and again disappears in the subconscious as a saṃskāra
(potency) and again comes into the field of the understanding as smṛti
(memory), we see that it is pariṇāmi or changing. But purusha is the
constant seer of the mind when it has an object, as in ordinary forms of
phenomenal knowledge, or when it has no object as in the state of
nirodha or cessation. Purusha is unchanging. It is the light which
remains unchanged amidst all the changing modifications of the mind, so
that we cannot distinguish purusha separately from the mind. This is
what is meant by saying _buddheḥ pratisaṃvedī purushaḥ_, i.e. purusha
reflects or turns into its own light the concepts of mind and thus is
said to know it. Its knowing is manifested in our consciousness as the
ever-persistent notion of the self, which is always a constant factor in
all the phenomena of consciousness. Thus purusha always appears in our
consciousness as the knowing agent. Truly speaking, however, purusha
only sees himself; he is not in any way in touch with the mind. He is
absolutely free from all bondage, absolutely unconnected with prakṛti.
From the side of appearance he seems only to be the intelligent seer
imparting consciousness to our conscious-like conception, though in
reality he remains the seer of himself all the while. The difference
between purusha and prakṛti will be clear when we see that purusha is
altogether independent, existing in and for himself, free from any
bondage whatsoever; but buddhi exists on the other hand for the
enjoyment and release of purusha. That which exists in and for itself,
must ever be the selfsame, unchangeable entity, suffering no
transformations or modifications, for it has no other end owing to which
it will be liable to change. It is the self-centred, self-satisfied
light, which never seeks any other end and never leaves itself. But
prakṛti is not such; it is always undergoing endless, complex
modifications and as such does not exist for itself but for purusha, and
is dependent upon him. The mind is unconscious, while purusha is the
pure light of intelligence, for the three guṇas are all non-intelligent,
and the mind is nothing but a modification of these three guṇas which
are all non-intelligent.
But looked at from another point of view, prakṛti is not altogether
different from purusha; for had it been so how could purusha, which is
absolutely pure, reperceive the mind-modifications? Thus the _Bhāshya_
(II. 20) writes:—
“Well then let him be dissimilar. To meet this he says: He is not quite
dissimilar. Why? Although pure, he sees the ideas after they have come
into the mind. Inasmuch as purusha cognises the ideas in the form of
mind-modification, he appears to be, by the act of cognition, the very
self of the mind although in reality he is not.” As has been said, the
power of the enjoyer, purusha (_dṛkśakti_), is certainly unchangeable
and it does not run after every object. In connection with a changeful
object it appears forever as if it were being transferred to every
object and as if it were assimilating its modifications. And when the
modifications of the mind assume the form of the consciousness by which
it is coloured, they imitate it and look as if they were manifestations
of purusha’s consciousness unqualified by the modifications of the
non-intelligent mind.
All our states of consciousness are analysed into two parts—a permanent
and a changing part. The changing part is the form of our consciousness,
which is constantly varying according to the constant change of its
contents. The permanent part is that pure light of intelligence, by
virtue of which we have the notion of self reflected in our
consciousness. Now, as this self persists through all the varying
changes of the objects of consciousness, it is inferred that the light
which thus shines in our consciousness is unchangeable. Our mind is
constantly suffering a thousand modifications, but the notion of self is
the only thing permanent amidst all this change. It is this self that
imports consciousness to the material parts of our knowledge. All our
concepts originated from our perception of external material objects.
Therefore the forms of our concepts which could exactly and clearly
represent these material objects in their own terms, must be made of a
stuff which in essence is not different from them. But with the
reflection of purusha, the soul, the notion of self comes within the
content of our consciousness, spiritualising, as it were, all our
concepts and making them conscious and intelligent. Thus this seeming
identity of purusha and the mind, by which purusha may be spoken of as
the seer of the concept, appears to the self, which is manifested in
consciousness by virtue of the seeming reflection. For this is that
self, or personality, which remains unchanged all through our
consciousness. Thus our phenomenal intelligent self is partially a
material reality arising out of the seeming interaction of the spirit
and the mind. This interaction is the only way by which matter releases
spirit from its seeming bondage.
But the question arises, how is it that there can even be a seeming
reflection of purusha in the mind which is altogether non-intelligent?
How is it possible for the mind to catch a glimpse of purusha, which
illuminates all the concepts of consciousness, the expression
“_anupaśya_” meaning that he perceives by imitation (_anukāreṇa
paśyati_)? How can purusha, which is altogether formless, allow any
reflection of itself to imitate the form of buddhi, by virtue of which
it appears as the self—the supreme possessor and knower of all our
mental conceptions? There must be at least some resemblance between the
mind and the purusha, to justify in some sense this seeming reflection.
And we find that the last sūtra of the Vibhūtipāda says:
_sattvapurushayoḥ śuddhisāmye kaivalyaṃ_—which means that when the
sattva or the preponderating mind-stuff becomes as pure as purusha,
kaivalya or oneness is attained. This shows that the pure nature of
sattva has a great resemblance to the pure nature of purusha. So much
so, that the last stage preceding the state of kaivalya, is almost the
same as kaivalya itself, when purusha is in himself and there are no
thoughts to reflect. In this state, we see that the mind can be so pure
as to reflect exactly the nature of purusha, as he is in himself. This
state in which the mind becomes as pure as purusha and reflects him in
his purity, does not materially differ from the state of kaivalya, in
which purusha is in himself—the only difference being that the mind,
when it becomes so pure as this, becomes gradually lost in prakṛti and
cannot again serve to bind purusha.
I cannot refrain here from the temptation of referring to a beautiful
illustration from Vyāsa, to explain the way in which the mind serves the
purposes of purusha. _Cittamayaskāntamaṇikalpaṃ sannidhimātropakāri
dṛśyatvena svaṃ bhavati purushasya svāminaḥ_ (I. 4), which is explained
in _Yoga-vārttika_ as follows: _Tathāyaskāntamaṇiḥ svasminneva
ayaḥsannidhīkaraṇamātrāt śalyarishkarshaṇākhyam upakāram kurvat
purushasya svāminaḥ svam bhvati bhogasādhanatvāt_, i.e. just as a magnet
draws iron towards it, though it remains unmoved itself, so the
mind-modifications become drawn towards purusha, and thereby become
visible to purusha and serve his purpose.
To summarise: We have seen that something like a union takes place
between the mind and purusha, i.e. there is a seeming reflection of
purusha in the mind, simultaneously with its being determined
conceptually, as a result whereof this reflection of purusha in the
mind, which is known as the self, becomes united with these conceptual
determinations of the mind and the former is said to be the perceiver of
all these determinations. Our conscious personality or self is thus the
seeming unity of the knowable as the mind in the shape of conceptual or
judgmental representations with the reflections of purusha in the mind.
Thus, in the single act of cognition, we have the notion of our own
personality and the particular conceptual or perceptual representation
with which this ego identifies itself. The true seer, the pure
intelligence, the free, the eternal, remains all the while beyond any
touch of impurity from the mind, though it must be remembered that it is
its own seeming reflection in the mind that appears as the ego, the
cogniser of all our states, pleasures and sorrows of the mind and one
who is the apperceiver of this unity of the seeming reflection—of
purusha and the determinations of the mind. In all our conscious states,
there is such a synthetic unity between the determinations of our mind
and the self, that they cannot be distinguished one from the other—a
fact which is exemplified in all our cognitions, which are the union of
the knower and the known. The nature of this reflection is a
transcendent one and can never be explained by any physical
illustration. Purusha is altogether different from the mind, inasmuch as
he is the pure intelligence and is absolutely free, while the latter is
non-intelligent and dependent on purusha’s enjoyment and release, which
are the sole causes of its movement. But there is some similarity
between the two, for how could the mind otherwise catch a seeming
glimpse of him? It is also said that the pure mind can adapt itself to
the pure form of purusha; this is followed by the state of kaivalya.
We have discussed the nature of purusha and its general relations with
the mind. We must now give a few more illustrations. The chief point in
which purusha of the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala differs from the similar
spiritual principle of Vedānta is, that it regards its soul, not as one,
but as many. Let us try to discuss this point, in connection with the
arguments of the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala doctrine in favour of a separate
principle of purusha. Thus the _Kārikā_ says: _saṃghātaparārthatvāt
triguṇādiviparyyayādadhishthānāt purusho’sti bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalyārthaṃ
pravṛtteśca_,[16] “Because an assemblage of things is for the sake of
another; because there must be an entity different from the three guṇas
and the rest (their modifications); because there must be a
superintending power; because there must be someone who enjoys; and
because of (the existence of) active exertion for the sake of
abstraction or isolation (from the contact with prakṛti) therefore the
soul exists.” The first argument is from design or teleology by which it
is inferred that there must be some other simple entity for which these
complex collocations of things are intended. Thus Gauḍapāda says: “In
such manner as a bed, which is an assemblage of bedding, props, cotton,
coverlet and pillows, is for another’s use, not for its own, and its
several component parts render no mutual service, and it is concluded
that there is a man who sleeps upon the bed and for whose sake it was
made; so this world, which is an assemblage of the five elements, is for
use and there is a soul, for whose enjoyment this body, another’s
consisting of intellect and the rest, has been produced.”[17]
The _second argument_ is that all the knowable is composed of just three
elements: first, the element of sattva, or intelligence-stuff, causing
all manifestations; second, the element of rajas or energy, which is
ever causing transformations; and third, tamas, or the mass, which
enables rajas to actualise. Now such a prakṛti, composed of these three
elements, cannot itself be a seer. For the seer must be always the same
unchangeable, actionless entity, the ever present, ever constant factor
in all stages of our consciousness.
_Third argument_: There must be a supreme background of pure
consciousness, all our co-ordinated basis of experience. This background
is the pure actionless purusha, reflected in which all our mental states
become conscious. Davies explains this a little differently, in
accordance with a simile in the _Tattva-Kaumudī_, _yathā rathādi
yantrādibhiḥ_, thus: “This idea of Kapila seems to be that the power of
self-control cannot be predicted of matter, which must be directed or
controlled for the accomplishment of any purpose, and this controlling
power must be something external to matter and diverse from it. The
soul, however, never acts. It only seems to act; and it is difficult to
reconcile this part of the system with that which gives to the soul a
controlling force. If the soul is a charioteer, it must be an active
force.” But Davies here commits the mistake of carrying the simile too
far. The comparison of the charioteer and the chariot holds good, to the
extent that the chariot can take a particular course only when there is
a particular purpose for the charioteer to perform. The motion of the
chariot is fulfilled only when it is connected with the living person of
the charioteer, whose purpose it must fulfil.
_Fourth argument_: Since prakṛti is non-intelligent, there must be one
who enjoys its pains and pleasures. The emotional and conceptual
determinations of such feelings are aroused in consciousness by the
seeming reflection of the light of purusha.
_Fifth argument_: There is a tendency in all persons to move towards the
oneness of purusha, to be achieved by liberation; there must be one for
whose sake the modifications of buddhi are gradually withheld, and a
reverse process set up, by which they return to their original cause
prakṛti and thus liberate purusha. It is on account of this reverse
tendency of prakṛti to release purusha that a man feels prompted to
achieve his liberation as the highest consummation of his moral ideal.
Thus having proved the existence of purusha, the _Kārikā_ proceeds to
prove his plurality: “_janmamaraṇakaraṇānāṃ pratiniyamādayugapat
pravṛtteśca purushabahutvaṃ siddhaṃ traiguṇyaviparyyayācca_.” “From
the individual allotment of birth, death and the organs; from
diversity of occupations and from the different conditions of the
three guṇas, it is proved that there is a plurality of souls.” In
other words, since with the birth of one individual, all are not born;
since with the death of one, all do not die; and since each individual
has separate sense organs for himself; and since all beings do not
work at the same time in the same manner; and since the qualities of
the different guṇas are possessed differently by different
individuals, purushas are many. Patañjali, though he does not infer
the plurality of purushas in this way, yet holds the view of the
sūtra, _kṛtārthaṃ prati nashṭamapyanashṭaṃ tadanyasādhāraṇatvāt_.
“Although destroyed in relation to him whose objects have been
achieved, it is not destroyed, being common to others.”
Davies, in explaining the former _Kārikā_, says: “There is, however, the
difficulty that the soul is not affected by the three guṇas. How can
their various modifications prove the individuality of souls in
opposition to the Vedāntist doctrine, that all souls are only portions
of the one, an infinitely extended monad?”
This question is the most puzzling in the Sāṃkhya doctrine. But careful
penetration of the principles of Sāṃkhya-Yoga would make clear to us
that this is a necessary and consistent outcome of the Sāṃkhya view of a
dualistic universe.
For if it is said that purusha is one and we have the notion of
different selves by his reflection into different minds, it follows that
such notions as self, or personality, are false. For the only true being
is the one, purusha. So the knower being false, the known also becomes
false; the knower and the known having vanished, everything is reduced
to that which we can in no way conceive. It may be argued that according
to the Sāṃkhya philosophy also, the knower is false, for the pure
purusha as such is not in any way connected with prakṛti. But even then
it must be observed that the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view does not hold that the
knower is false but analyses the nature of the ego and says that it is
due to the seeming unity of the mind and purusha, both of which are
reals in the strictest sense of the term. Purusha is there justly called
the knower. He sees and simultaneously with this, there is a
modification of buddhi (mind); this seeing becomes joined with this
modification of buddhi and thus arises the ego, who perceives that
particular form of the modification of buddhi. Purusha always remains
the knower. Buddhi suffers modifications and at the same time catches a
glimpse of the light of purusha, so that contact (_saṃyoga_) of purusha
and prakṛti occurs at one and the same point of time, in which there is
unity of the reflection of purusha and the particular transformation of
buddhi.
The knower, the ego and the knowable, are none of them false in the
Sāṃkhya-Yoga system at the stage preceding kaivalya, when buddhi becomes
as pure as purusha; its modification resembles the exact form of purusha
and then purusha knows himself in his true nature in buddhi; after which
buddhi vanishes. The Vedānta has to admit the modifications of māyā, but
must at the same time hold it to be unreal. The Vedānta says that māyā
is as beginningless as prakṛti yet has an ending with reference to the
released person as the buddhi of the Sāṃkhyists.
But according to the Vedānta philosophy, knowledge of ego is only false
knowledge—an illusion as many imposed upon the formless Brahman. Māyā,
according to the Vedāntist, can neither be said to exist nor to
non-exist. It is _anirvācyā_, i.e. can never be described or defined.
Such an unknown and unknowable māyā causes the Many of the world by
reflection upon the Brahman. But according to the Sāṃkhya doctrine,
prakṛti is as real as purusha himself. Prakṛti and purusha are two
irreducible metaphysical remainders whose connection is beginningless
(_anādisaṃyoga_). But this connection is not unreal in the Vedānta sense
of the term. We see that according to the Vedānta system, all notions of
ego or personality are false and are originated by the illusive action
of the māyā, so that when they ultimately vanish there are no other
remainders. But this is not the case with Sāṃkhya, for as purusha is the
real seer, his cognitions cannot be dismissed as unreal, and so purushas
or knowers as they appear to us to be, must be held real. As prakṛti is
not the māyā of the Vedāntist (the nature of whose influence over the
spiritual principle cannot be determined) we cannot account for the
plurality of purushas by supposing that one purusha is being reflected
into many minds and generating the many egos. For in that case it will
be difficult to explain the plurality of their appearances in the minds
(buddhis). For if there be one spiritual principle, how should we
account for the supposed plurality of the buddhis? For we should rather
expect to find one buddhi and not many to serve the supposed one
purusha, and this will only mean that there can be only one ego, his
enjoyment and release. Supposing for argument’s sake that there are many
buddhis and one purusha, which reflected in them, is the cause of the
plurality of selves, then we cannot see how prakṛti is moving for the
enjoyment and release of one purusha; it would rather appear to be moved
for the sake of the enjoyment and release of the reflected or unreal
self. For purusha is not finally released with the release of any number
of particular individual selves. For it may be released with reference
to one individual but remain bound to others. So prakṛti would not
really be moved in this hypothetical case for the sake of purusha, but
for the sake of the reflected selves only. If we wish to avoid the said
difficulties, then with the release of one purusha, all purushas will
have to be released. For in the supposed theory there would not really
be many different purushas, but the one purusha appearing as many, so
that with his release all the other so-called purushas must be released.
We see that if it is the enjoyment (_bhoga_) and salvation (_apavarga_)
of one purusha which appear as so many different series of enjoyments
and emancipations, then with his experiences all should have the same
experiences. With his birth and death, all should be born or all should
die at once. For, indeed, it is the experiences of one purusha which
appear in all the seeming different purushas. And in the other
suppositions there is neither emancipation nor enjoyment by purusha at
all. For there, it is only the illusory self that enjoys or releases
himself. By his release no purusha is really released at all. So the
fundamental conception of prakṛti as moving for the sake of the
enjoyment and release of purusha has to be abandoned.
So we see that from the position in which Sāṃkhya and Yoga stood, this
plurality of the purushas was the most consistent thing that they could
think of. Any compromise with the Vedānta doctrine here would have
greatly changed the philosophical aspect and value of the Sāṃkhya
philosophy. As the purushas are nothing but pure intelligences they can
as well be all-pervading though many. But there is another objection
that, since number is a conception of the phenomenal mind, how then can
it be applied to the purushas which are said to be many?[18] But that
difficulty remains unaltered even if we regard the purusha as one. When
we go into the domain of metaphysics and try to represent Reality with
the symbols of our phenomenal conceptions we have really to commit
almost a violence towards it. But we must perforce do this in all our
attempts to express in our own terms that pure, inexpressible, free
illumination which exists in and for itself beyond the range of any
mediation by the concepts or images of our mind. So we see that Sāṃkhya
was not inconsistent in holding the doctrine of the plurality of the
purushas. Patañjali does not say anything about it, since he is more
anxious to discuss other things connected with the presupposition of the
plurality of purusha. Thus he speaks of it only in one place as quoted
above and says that though for a released person this world disappears
altogether, still it remains unchanged in respect to all the other
purushas.
CHAPTER III
THE REALITY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD
We may now come to the attempt of Yoga to prove the reality of an
external world as against the idealistic Buddhists. In sūtra 12 of the
chapter on kaivalya we find: “The past and the future exist in reality,
since all qualities of things manifest themselves in these three
different ways. The future is the manifestation which is to be. The past
is the appearance which has been experienced. The present is that which
is in active operation. It is this threefold substance which is the
object of knowledge. If it did not exist in reality, there would not
exist a knowledge thereof. How could there be knowledge in the absence
of anything knowable? For this reason the past and present in reality
exist.”[19]
So we see that the present holding within itself the past and the future
exists in reality. For the past though it has been negated has really
been preserved and kept in the present, and the future also though it
has not made its appearance yet exists potentially in the present. So,
as we know the past and the future worlds in the present, they both
exist and subsist in the present. That which once existed cannot die,
and that which never existed cannot come to be (_nāstyasataḥ saṃbhavaḥ
na cāsti sato vināsāḥ_, _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, V. 12). So the past has not
been destroyed but has rather shifted its position and hidden itself in
the body of the present, and the future that has not made its appearance
exists in the present only in a potential form. It cannot be argued, as
Vācaspati says, that because the past and the future are not present
therefore they do not exist, for if the past and future do not exist how
can there be a present also, since its existence also is only relative?
So all the three exist as truly as any one of them, and the only
difference among them is the different way or mode of their existence.
He next proceeds to refute the arguments of those idealists who hold
that since the external knowables never exist independently of our
knowledge of them, their separate external existence as such may be
denied. Since it is by knowledge alone that the external knowables can
present themselves to us we may infer that there is really no knowable
external reality apart from knowledge of it, just as we see that in
dream-states knowledge can exist apart from the reality of any external
world.
So it may be argued that there is, indeed, no external reality as
it appears to us. The Buddhists, for example, hold that a blue
thing and knowledge of it as blue are identical owing to the maxim
that things which are invariably perceived together are one
(_sahopalambhaniyamādabhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ_). So they say that
external reality is not different from our idea of it. To this it
may be replied that if, as you say, external reality is identical
with my ideas and there is no other external reality existing as
such outside my ideas, why then does it appear as existing apart,
outside and independent of my ideas? The idealists have no basis
for the denial of external reality, and for their assertion that
it is only the creation of our imagination like experiences in
dreams. Even our ideas carry with them the notion that reality
exists outside our mental experiences. If all our percepts and
notions as this and that arise only by virtue of the influence of
the external world, how can they deny the existence of the
external world as such? The objective world is present by its own
power. How then can this objective world be given up on the
strength of mere logical or speculative abstraction?
Thus the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, IV. 14, says: “There is no object without the
knowledge of it, but there is knowledge as imagined in dreams without
any corresponding object; thus the reality of external things is like
that of dream-objects, mere imagination of the subject and unreal. How
can they who say so be believed? Since they first suppose that the
things which present themselves to us by their own force do so only on
account of the invalid and delusive imagination of the intellect, and
then deny the reality of the external world on the strength of such an
imaginary supposition of their own.”
The external world has generated knowledge of itself by its own
presentative power (_arthena svakīyayāgrāhyaśaktyā vijñānamajani_), and
has thus caused itself to be represented in our ideas, and we have no
right to deny it.[20] Commenting on the _Bhāshya_ IV. 14, Vācaspati says
that the method of agreement applied by the Buddhists by their
_sahopalambhaniyama_ (maxim of simultaneous revelation) may possibly be
confuted by an application of the method of difference. The method of
agreement applied by the idealists when put in proper form reads thus:
“Wherever there is knowledge there is external reality, or rather every
case of knowledge agrees with or is the same as every case of the
presence of external reality, so knowledge is the cause of the presence
of the external reality, i.e. the external world depends for its reality
on our knowledge or ideas and owes its origin or appearance as such to
them.” But Vācaspati says that this application of the method of
agreement is not certain, for it cannot be corroborated by the method of
difference. For the statement that every case of absence of knowledge is
also a case of absence of external reality cannot be proved, i.e. we
cannot prove that the external reality does not exist when we have no
knowledge of it (_sahopalambhaniyamaśca vedyatvañca hetū
sandigdhavyatirekatayānaikāntikau_) IV. 14.
Describing the nature of grossness and externality, the attributes of
the external world, he says that grossness means the pervading of more
portions of space than one, i.e. grossness means extension, and
externality means being related to separate space, i.e. co-existence in
space. Thus we see that extension and co-existence in space are the two
fundamental qualities of the gross external world. Now an idea can never
be said to possess them, for it cannot be said that an idea has extended
into more spaces than one and yet co-existed separately in separate
places. An idea cannot be said to exist with other ideas in space and to
extend in many points of space at one and the same time. To avoid this
it cannot be said that there may be plurality of ideas so that some may
co-exist and others may extend in space. For co-existence and extension
can never be asserted of our ideas, since +hey are very fine and subtle,
and can be known only at the time of their individual operation, at
which time, however, other ideas may be quite latent and unknown.
Imagination has no power to negate their reality, for the sphere of
imagination is quite distinct from the sphere of external reality, and
it can never be applied to an external reality to negate it. Imagination
is a mental function, and as such has no touch with the reality outside,
which it can by no means negate.
Further it cannot be said that, because grossness and externality can
abide neither in the external world nor in our ideas, they are therefore
false. For this falsity cannot be thought as separable from our ideas,
for in that case our ideas would be as false as the false itself. The
notion of externality and grossness pervades all our ideas, and if they
are held to be false, no true thing can be known by our ideas and they
therefore become equally false.
Again, knowledge and the external world can never be said to be
identical because they happen to be presented together. For the method
of agreement cannot by itself prove identity. Knowledge and the knowable
external world may be independently co-existing things like the notions
of existence and non-existence. Both co-exist independently of one
another. It is therefore clear enough, says Vācaspati, that the
certainty arrived at by perception, which gives us a direct knowledge of
things, can never be rejected on the strength of mere logical
abstraction or hair-splitting discussion.
We further see, says Patañjali, that the thing remains the same though
the ideas and feelings of different men may change differently about
it.[21] Thus A, B, C may perceive the same identical woman and may feel
pleasure, pain or hatred. We see that the same common thing generates
different feelings and ideas in different persons; external reality
cannot be said to owe its origin to the idea or imagination of any one
man, but exists independently of any person’s imagination in and for
itself. For if it be due to the imagination of any particular man, it is
his own idea which as such cannot generate the same ideas in another
man. So it must be said that the external reality is what we perceive it
outside.
There are, again, others who say that just as pleasure and pain
arise along with our ideas and must be said to be due to them so the
objective world also must be said to have come into existence along
with our ideas. The objective world therefore according to these
philosophers has no external existence either in the past or in the
future, but has only a momentary existence in the present due to our
ideas about it. That much existence only are they ready to attribute
to external objects which can be measured by the idea of the moment.
The moment I have an idea of a thing, the thing rises into existence
and may be said to exist only for that moment and as soon as the
idea disappears the object also vanishes, for when it cannot be
presented to me in the form of ideas it can be said to exist in no
sense. But this argument cannot hold good, for if the objective
reality should really depend upon the idea of any individual man,
then the objective reality corresponding to an idea of his ought to
cease to exist either with the change of his idea, or when he
directs attention to some other thing, or when he restrains his mind
from all objects of thought. Now, then, if it thus ceases to exist,
how can it again spring into existence when the attention of the
individual is again directed towards it? Again, all parts of an
object can never be seen all at once. Thus supposing that the front
side of a thing is visible, then the back side which cannot be seen
at the time must not be said to exist at all. So if the back side
does not exist, the front side also can as well be said not to exist
(_ye cāsyānupasthitā bhāgaste cāsya na syurevaṃ nāsti pṛshṭhamiti
udaramapi na gṛhyeta._ _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, IV. 16). Therefore it must
be said that there is an independent external reality which is the
common field of observation for all souls in general; and there are
also separate “Cittas” for separate individual souls (_tasmāt
svatantro’rthaḥ sarvapurusasādhdāraṇaḥ svatantrāṇi ca cittāni
pratipurushaṃ, pravarttante_, _ibid._). And all the experiences of
the purusha result from the connection of this “Citta” (mind) with
the external world.
Now from this view of the reality of the external world we are
confronted with another question—what is the ground which underlies the
manifold appearance of this external world which has been proved to be
real? What is that something which is thought as the vehicle of such
qualities as produce in us the ideas? What is that self-subsistent
substratum which is the basis of so many changes, actions and reactions
that we always meet in the external world? Locke called this substratum
substance and regarded it as unknown, but said that though it did not
follow that it was a product of our own subjective thought yet it did
not at the same time exist without us. Hume, however, tried to explain
everything from the standpoint of association of ideas and denied all
notions of substantiality. We know that Kant, who was much influenced by
Hume, agreed to the existence of some such unknown reality which he
called the Thing-in-itself, the nature of which, however, was absolutely
unknowable, but whose influence was a great factor in all our
experiences.
But the _Bhāshya_ tries to penetrate deeper into the nature of this
substratum or substance and says: _dharmisvarūpamātro hi dharmaḥ,
dharmivikriyā eva eshā dharmadvārā prapañcyate_, _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, III.
13. The characteristic qualities form the very being itself of the
characterised, and it is the change of the characterised alone that is
detailed by means of the characteristic. To understand thoroughly the
exact significance of this statement it will be necessary to take a more
detailed review of what has already been said about the guṇas. We know
that all things mental or physical are formed by the different
collocations of sattva of the nature of illumination (_prakāśa_),
rajas—the energy or mutative principle of the nature of action
(_kriyā_)—and tamas—the obstructive principle of the nature of inertia
(_sthiti_) which in their original and primordial state are too fine to
be apprehended (_gunānāṃparamaṃ rūpaṃ na dṛshṭipathamṛcchati_,
_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, IV. 13). These different guṇas combine in various
proportions to form the manifold universe of the knowable, and thus are
made the objects of our cognition. Through combining in different
proportions they become, in the words of Dr. B. N. Seal, “more and more
differentiated, determinate and coherent,” and thus make themselves
cognisable, yet they never forsake their own true nature as the guṇas.
So we see that they have thus got two natures, one in which they remain
quite unchanged as guṇas, and another in which they collocate and
combine themselves in various ways and thus appear under the veil of a
multitude of qualities and states of the manifold knowable (_te
vyaktasūkshmā guṇātmānaḥ_ [IV. 13] ... _sarvamidaṃ guṇānāṃ
sanniveśaviśeshamātramiti paramārthato guṇātmānaḥ_, _Bhāshya_, _ibid._).
Now these guṇas take three different courses of development from the ego
or ahaṃkāra according to which the ego or ahaṃkāra may be said to be
sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa. Thus from the sāttvika side of the ego by a
preponderance of sattva the five knowledge-giving senses, e.g. hearing,
sight, touch, taste and smell are derived. From the rajas side of ego by
a preponderance of rajas the five active senses of speech, etc., are
derived. From the tamas side of ego or ahaṃkāra by a preponderance of
tamas are derived the five tanmātras. From which again by a
preponderance of tamas the atoms of the five gross elements—earth,
water, fire, air and ether are derived.
In the derivation of these it must be remembered that all the three
guṇas are conjointly responsible. In the derivation of a particular
product one of the guṇas may indeed be predominant, and thus may bestow
the prominent characteristic of that product, but the other two guṇas
are also present there and perform their functions equally well. Their
opposition does not withhold the progress of evolution but rather helps
it. All the three combine together in varying degrees of mutual
preponderance and thus together help the process of evolution to produce
a single product. Thus we see that though the guṇas are three, they
combine to produce on the side of perception, the senses, such as those
of hearing, sight, etc.; and on the side of the knowable, the individual
tanmātras of gandha, rasa, rūpa, sparśa and śabda. The guṇas composing
each tanmātra again harmoniously combine with each other with a
preponderance of tamas to produce the atoms of each gross element. Thus
in each combination one class of guṇas remains prominent, while the
others remain dependent upon it but help it indirectly in the evolution
of that particular product.
CHAPTER IV
THE PROCESS OF EVOLUTION
The evolution which we have spoken of above may be characterised in two
ways: (1) That arising from modifications or products of some other
cause which are themselves capable of originating other products like
themselves; (2) That arising from causes which, though themselves
derived, yet cannot themselves be the cause of the origination of other
existences like themselves. The former may be said to be slightly
specialised (_aviśesha_) and the latter thoroughly specialised
(_viśesha_).
Thus we see that from prakṛti comes mahat, from mahat comes ahaṃkāra,
and from ahaṃkāra, as we have seen above, the evolution takes three
different courses according to the preponderance of sattva, rajas and
tamas originating the cognitive and conative senses and manas, the
superintendent of them both on one side and the tanmātras on the other.
These tanmātras again produce the five gross elements. Now when ahaṃkāra
produces the tanmātras or the senses, or when the tanmātras produce the
five gross elements, or when ahaṃkāra itself is produced from buddhi or
mahat, it is called _tattvāntara-pariṇāma_, i.e. the production of a
different tattva or substance.
Thus in the case of _tattvāntara-pariṇāma_ (as for example when the
tanmātras are produced from ahaṃkāra), it must be carefully noticed
that the state of being involved in the tanmātras is altogether
different from the state of being of ahaṃkāra; it is not a mere change
of quality but a change of existence or state of being.[22] Thus
though the tanmātras are derived from ahaṃkāra the traces of ahaṃkāra
cannot be easily followed in them. This derivation is not such that
the ahaṃkāra remains principally unchanged and there is only a change
of quality in it, but it is a different existence altogether, having
properties which differ widely from those of ahaṃkāra. So it is called
tattvāntara-pariṇāma, i.e. evolution of different categories of
existence.
Now the evolution that the senses and the five gross elements can
undergo can never be of this nature, for they are viśeshas, or
substances which have been too much specialised to allow the evolution
of any other substance of a different grade of existence from
themselves. With them there is an end of all emanation. So we see that
the aviśeshas or slightly specialised emanations are those which being
themselves but emanations can yet yield other emanations from
themselves. Thus we see that mahat, ahaṃkāra and the five tanmātras are
themselves emanations, as well as the source of other emanations. Mahat,
however, though it is undoubtedly an aviśesha or slightly specialised
emanation, is called by another technical name liṅga or sign, for from
the state of mahat, the prakṛti from which it must have emanated may be
inferred. Prakṛti, however, from which no other primal state is
inferable, is called the aliṅga or that which is not a sign for the
existence of any other primal and more unspecialised state. In one sense
all the emanations can be with justice called the liṅgas or states of
existence standing as the sign by which the causes from which they have
emanated can be directly inferred. Thus in this sense the five gross
elements maybe called the liṅga of the tanmātras, and they again of the
ego, and that again of the mahat, for the unspecialised ones are
inferred from their specialised modifications or emanations. But this
technical name liṅga is reserved for the mahat from which the aliṅga or
prakṛti can be inferred. This prakṛti, however, is the eternal state
which is not an emanation itself but the basis and source of all other
emanations.
The liṅga and the aliṅga have thus been compared in the _Kārikā_:
“_hetumadanityamavyāpi sakriyamanekāśritaṃ liṅgaṃ
sāvayavam paratantraṃ vyaktaṃ viparītamavyaktaṃ_.”
The liṅga has a cause, it is neither eternal nor universal, but mobile,
multiform, dependent, determinate, and possesses parts, whereas the
aliṅga is the reverse. The aliṅga or prakṛti, however, being the cause
has some characteristics in common with its liṅgas as distinguished from
the purushas, which are altogether different from it.
Thus the _Kārikā_ says:
“_triguṇamaviveki vishayaḥ sāmānyamacetanaṃ prasavadharmi
vyaktaṃ tathā pradhānaṃ tadviparītastathā pumān_.”
The manifested and the unmanifested _pradhāna_ or _prakṛti_ are both
composed of the three guṇas, non-intelligent, objective, universal,
unconscious and productive. Soul in these respects is the reverse. We
have seen above that prakṛti is the state of equilibrium of the guṇas,
which can in no way be of any use to the purushas, and is thus held to
be eternal, though all other states are held to be non-eternal as they
are produced for the sake of the purushas.
The state of prakṛti is that in which the guṇas completely overpower
each other and the characteristics (_dharma_) and the characterised
(_dharmī_) are one and the same.
Evolution is thus nothing but the manifestation of change, mutation, by
the energy of rajas. The rajas is the one mediating activity that breaks
up all compounds, builds up new ones and initiates original
modifications. Whenever in any particular combination the proportion of
sattva, rajas or tamas alters, as a condition of this alteration, there
is the dominating activity of rajas by which the old equilibrium is
destroyed and another equilibrium established; this in its turn is again
disturbed and again another equilibrium is restored. Now the
manifestation of this latent activity of rajas is what is called change
or evolution. In the external world the time that is taken by a paramāṇu
or atom to move from its place is identical with a unit of change.[23]
Now an atom will be that quantum which is smaller or finer than that
point or limit at which it can in any way be perceived by the senses.
Atoms are therefore mere points without magnitude or dimension, and the
unit of time or moment (_kshaṇa_) that is taken up in changing the
position of these atoms is identical with one unit of change or
evolution. The change or evolution in the external world must therefore
be measured by these units of spatial motion of the atoms; i.e. an atom
changing its own unit of space is the measure of all physical change or
evolution.
Each unit of time (_kshaṇa_) corresponding to this change of an atom of
its own unit of space is the unit-measure of change. This instantaneous
succession of time as discrete moments one following the other is the
notion of the series of moments or pure and simple succession. Now the
notion of these discrete moments is the notion of time. Even the notion
of succession is one that does not really exist but is imagined, for a
moment comes into being just when the moment just before had passed so
that they have never taken place together. Thus Vyāsa in III. 52, says:
“_kshaṇatatkramayornāsti vastusamāhāraḥ iti buddhisamāhāraḥ
muhūrttāhorātrātrādayaḥ_.” _Sa tvayaṃ kālaḥ vastuśūnyo’pi
buddhinirmāṇaḥ._ The moments and their succession do not belong to the
category of actual things; the hour, the day and night, are all
aggregates of mental conceptions. This time which is not a substantive
reality in itself, but is only a mental concept, represented to us
through linguistic usage, appears to ordinary minds as if it were an
objective reality.
So the conception of time as discrete moments is the real one, whereas
the conception of time as successive or as continuous is unreal, being
only due to the imagination of our empirical and relative consciousness.
Thus Vācaspati further explains it. A moment is real (_vastupatitaḥ_)
and is the essential element of the notion of succession. Succession
involves the notion of change of moments, and the moment is called time
by those sages who know what time is. Two moments cannot happen
together. There cannot be any succession of two simultaneous things.
Succession means the notion of change involving a preceding and a
succeeding moment. Thus there is only the present moment and there are
no preceding and later moments. Therefore there cannot be any union of
these moments. The past and the future moments may be said to exist only
if we speak of past and future as identical with the changes that have
become latent and others that exist potentially but are not manifested.
Thus in one moment, the whole world suffers changes. All these
characteristics are associated with the thing as connected with one
particular moment.[24]
So we find here that time is essentially discrete, being only the
moments of our cognitive life. As two moments never co-exist, there is
no succession or continuous time. They exist therefore only in our
empirical consciousness which cannot take the real moments in their
discrete nature but connects the one with the other and thereby imagines
either succession or continuous time.
Now we have said before, that each unit of change or evolution is
measured by this unit of time _kshaṇa_ or moment; or rather the units of
change are expressed in terms of these moments or _kshaṇas_. Of course
in our ordinary consciousness these moments of change cannot be grasped,
but they can be reasonably inferred. For at the end of a certain period
we observe a change in a thing; now this change, though it becomes
appreciable to us after a long while, was still going on every moment,
so, in this way, the succession of evolution or change cannot be
distinguished from the moments coming one after another. Thus the
_Yoga-sūtra_ says in IV. 33: “Succession involving a course of changes
is associated with the moments.” Succession as change of moments is
grasped only by a course of changes. A cloth which has not passed
through a course of changes through a series of moments cannot be found
old all at once at any time. Even a new cloth kept with good care
becomes old after a time. This is what is called the termination of a
course of changes and by it the succession of a course of changes can be
grasped. Even before a thing is old there can be inferred a sequence of
the subtlest, subtler, subtle, grossest, grosser and gross changes
(_Tattvavaiśāradī_, IV. 33).[25]
Now as we have seen that the unit of time is indistinguishable from the
unit of change or evolution, and as these moments are not co-existing
but one follows the other, we see that there is no past or future
existing as a continuous before or past, and after or future. It is the
present that really exists as the manifested moment; the past has been
conserved as sublatent and the future as the latent. So the past and
future exist in the present, the former as one which has already had its
manifestation and is thus conserved in the fact of the manifestation of
the present. For the manifestation of the present as such could not have
taken place until the past had already been manifested; so the
manifestation of the present is a concrete product involving within
itself the manifestation of the past; in a similar way it may be said
that the manifestation of the present contains within itself the seed or
the unmanifested state of the future, for if this had not been the case,
the future never could have happened. So we see that the whole world
undergoes a change at one unit point of time, and not only that but it
conserves within itself all the past and future history of cosmic
evolution.
We have pointed out before that the manifestation of the rajas or energy
as action is what is called change. Now this manifestation of action can
only take place when equilibrium of a particular collocation of guṇas is
disturbed and the rajas arranges or collocates with itself the sattva
and tamas, the whole group being made intelligible by the inherent
sattva. So the cosmic history is only the history of the different
collocations of the guṇas. Now, therefore, if it is possible for a seer
to see in one vision the possible number of combinations that the rajas
will have with sattva and tamas, he can in one moment perceive the past,
present or future of this cosmic evolutionary process; for with such
minds all past and future are concentrated at one point of vision which
to a person of ordinary empirical consciousness appears only in the
series. For the empirical consciousness, impure as it is, it is
impossible that all the powers and potencies of sattva and rajas should
become manifested at one point of time; it has to take things only
through its senses and can thus take the changes only as the senses are
affected by them; whereas, on the other hand, if its power of knowing
was not restricted to the limited scope of the senses, it could have
grasped all the possible collocations or changes all at once. Such a
perceiving mind whose power of knowing is not narrowed by the senses can
perceive all the finest modifications or changes that are going on in
the body of a substance (see _Yoga-sūtra_, III. 53).
CHAPTER V
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CATEGORIES
The Yoga analysis points to the fact that all our cognitive states are
distinguished from their objects by the fact of their being intelligent.
This intelligence is the constant factor which persists amidst all
changes of our cognitive states. We are passing continually from one
state to another without any rest, but in this varying change of these
states we are never divested of intelligence. This fact of intelligence
is therefore neither the particular possession of any one of these
states nor that of the sum of these states; for if it is not the
possession of any one of these states it cannot be the possession of the
sum of these states. In the case of the released person again there is
no mental state, but the self-shining intelligence. So Yoga regarded
this intelligence as quite distinct from the so-called mental states
which became intelligent by coming in connection with this intelligence.
The actionless, absolutely pure and simple intelligence it called the
purusha.
Yoga tacitly assumed a certain kind of analysis of the nature of these
mental states which sought to find out, if possible, the nature of their
constituent elements or moments of existence. Now in analysing the
different states of our mind we find that a particular content of
thought is illuminated and then passed over. The ideas rise, are
illuminated and pass away. Thus they found that “movement” was one of
the principal elements that constituted the substance of our thoughts.
Thought as such is always moving. This principle of movement, mutation
or change, this energy, they called rajas.
Now apart from this rajas, thought when seen as divested of its sensuous
contents seems to exhibit one universal mould or form of knowledge which
assumes the form of all the sensuous contents that are presented to it.
It is the one universal of all our particular concepts or ideas—the
basis or substratum of all the different shapes imposed upon itself, the
pure and simple. Sattva in which there is no particularity is that
element of our thought which, resembling purusha most, can attain its
reflection within itself and thus makes the unconscious mental states
intelligible. All the contents of our thought are but modes and
limitations of this universal form and are thus made intelligible. It is
the one principle of intelligibility of all our conscious states.
Now our intellectual life consists in a series of shining ideas or
concepts; concepts after concepts shine forth in the light of the pure
intelligence and pass away. But each concept is but a limitation of the
pure shining universal of our knowledge which underlies all its changing
modes or modifications of concepts or judgments. This is what is called
pure knowledge in which there is neither the knower nor the known. This
pure object—subjectless knowledge differs from the pure intelligence or
purusha only in this that later on it is liable to suffer various
modifications, as the ego, the senses, and the infinite percepts and
concepts, etc., connected therewith, whereas the pure intelligence
remains ever pure and changeless and is never the substratum of any
change. At this stage sattva, the intelligence-stuff, is prominent and
rajas and tamas are altogether suppressed. It is for this reason that
the buddhi or mind is often spoken of as the sattva. Being an absolute
preponderance of sattva it has nothing else to manifest, but it is its
pure-shining self. Both tamas and rajas being mostly suppressed they
cannot in any way affect the effulgent nature of this pure shining of
contentless knowledge in which there is neither the knower nor the
known.
But it must be remembered that it is holding suspended as it were within
itself the elements of rajas and tamas which cannot manifest themselves
owing to the preponderance of the sattva.
This notion of pure contentless consciousness is immediate and abstract
and as such is at once mediated by other necessary phases. Thus we see
that this pure contentless universal consciousness is the same as the
ego-universal (_asmitāmātra_). For this contentless universal
consciousness is only another name for the contentless unlimited,
infinite of the ego-universal. A quotation from Fichte may here be
useful as a comparison. Thus he says in the introduction to his _Science
of Ethics_: “How an object can ever become a subject, or how a being can
ever become an object of representation: this curious change will never
be explained by anyone who does not find a point where the objective and
subjective are not distinguished at all, but are altogether one. Now
such a point is established by, and made the starting point of our
system. This point is the Egohood, the Intelligence, Reason, or whatever
it may be named.”[26] The _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, II. 19, describes it as
_liṅgamātram mahattatvaṃ sattāmātre mahati ātmani_, and again in I. 36
we find it described as the waveless ocean, peaceful infinite pure
egohood. This obscure egohood is known merely as being. This mahat has
also been spoken of by Vijñāna Bhikshu as the manas, or mind, as it has
the function of assimilation (_niścaya_). Now what we have already said
about mahat will, we hope, make it clear that this mahat is the last
limit at which the subject and the object can be considered as one
indistinguishable point which is neither the one nor the other, but the
source of both.
This buddhi is thus variously called _mahat_, _asmitāmātra_, _manas_,
_sattva_, _buddhi_ and _liṅga_, according to the aspects from which this
state is observed.
This state is called mahat as it is the most universal thing conceivable
and the one common source from which all other things originate.
Now this phase of sattva or pure shining naturally passes into the other
phase, that of the Ego as knower or Ego as subject. The first phase as
mahat or asmitāmātra was the state in which the sattva was predominant
and the rajas and tamas were in a suppressed condition. The next moment
is that in which the rajas comes uppermost, and thus the ego as the
subject of all cognition—the subject I—the knower of all the mental
states—is derived. The contentless subject-objectless “I” is the passive
sattva aspect of the buddhi catching the reflection of the spirit of
purusha.
In its active aspect, however, it feels itself one with the spirit and
appears as the ego or subject which knows, feels and wills. Thus
Patañjali says, in II. 6: _dṛgdarśanaśaktyorekātmateva asmitā_, i.e. the
seeming identity of the seer and the perceiving capacity is called
asmitā-ego. Again in _Bhāshya_, I. 17, we have _ekātmikā saṃvidasmitā_
(knowledge as one identical is asmitā) which Vācaspati explains as _sā
ca ātmanā grahītrā saha buddhirekātmikā saṃvid_, i.e. it is the feeling
of identity of the buddhi (mind) with the self, the perceiver. Thus we
find that the mind is affected by its own rajas or activity and posits
itself as the ego or subject as activity. By reason of this position of
the “I” as active it perceives itself in the objective, in all its
conative and cognitive senses in its thoughts and feelings and also in
the external world of extension and co-existence; in the words of
Pañcaśikha (II. 5) thinking the animate and inanimate beings to be the
self, man regards their prosperity as his own and becomes glad, and
regards their adversity as his own and is sorry. Here the “I” is posited
as the active entity which becomes conscious of itself, or in other
words the “I” becomes self-conscious. In analysing this notion of
self-consciousness we find that here the rajas or element of activity or
mobility has become predominant and this predominance of rajas has been
manifested by the inherent sattva. Thus we find that the rajas side or
“I as active” has become manifested or known as such, i.e. “I” becomes
conscious of itself as active. And this is just what is meant by
self-consciousness.
This ego or self-consciousness then appears as the modification of the
contentless pure consciousness of the mind (_buddhi_); it is for this
reason that we see that this self-consciousness is but a modification of
the universal mind. The absolute identity of subject and object as the
egohood is not A part of our natural consciousness, for in all stages of
our actual consciousness, even in that of self-consciousness, there is
an element of the preponderance of rajas or activity which directs this
unity as the knower and the known and then unites them as it were. Only
so far as I distinguish myself as the conscious, from myself as the
object of consciousness, am I at all conscious of myself.
When we see that the buddhi transforms itself into the ego, the subject,
or the knower, at this its first phase there is no other content which
it can know, it therefore knows itself in a very abstract way as the
“I,” or in other words, the ego becomes self-conscious; but at this
moment the ego has no content; the tamas being quite under suppression,
it is evolved by a preponderance of the rajas; and thus its nature as
rajas is manifested by the sattva and thus the ego now essentially knows
itself to be active, and holds itself as the permanent energising
activity which connects with itself all the phenomena of our life.
But now when the ego first directs itself towards itself and becomes
conscious of itself, one question which naturally comes to our mind is,
“Can the ego direct itself towards itself and thus divide itself into a
part that sees and one that is seen?” To meet this question it is
assumed that the guṇas contain within themselves the germs of both
subjectivity and objectivity (_guṇānāṃ hi dvairūpyaṃ vyavasāyātmkatvam
vyavaseyātmakatvaṃ ca. Tattvavaiśāradī_, III. 47); the guṇas have two
forms, the perceiver and the perceived. Thus we find that in the ego the
quality of the guṇas as the perceiver comes to be first manifested and
the ego turns back upon itself and makes itself its own object. It is at
this stage that we are reminded of the twofold nature of the guṇas.
It is by virtue of this twofold nature that the subject can make itself
its own object; but as these two sides have not yet developed they are
still only abstract and exist but in an implicit way in this state of
the ego (_ahaṃkāra_).
Enquiring further into the nature of the relation of this ego and the
buddhi, we find that the ego is only another phase or modification of
the buddhi; however different it might appear from buddhi it is only
an appearance or phase of it; its reality is the reality of the
buddhi. Thus we see that when the knower is affected in his different
modes of concepts and judgments, this too is to be ascribed to the
buddhi. Thus Vyāsa writes (II. 18) that perception, memory,
differentiation, reasoning, right knowledge, decision belong properly
to mind (buddhi) and are only illusorily imposed on the purusha
(_grahaṇadhāraṇohāpohatattvajñānābhiniveśā buddhau varttamānā purushe
adhyāropitasadbhāvāḥ_).
Now from this ego we find that three developments take place in three
distinct directions according to the preponderance of sattva, rajas or
tamas.
By the preponderance of rajas, the ego develops itself into the five
conative senses, vāk (speech), pāṇi (hands), pāda (feet), pāyu (organ of
passing the excreta) and upastha (generative organ). By the
preponderance of sattva, the ego develops itself into the five cognitive
senses—hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell; and by a preponderance of
tamas it stands as the bhūtādi and produces the five tanmātras, and
these again by further preponderance of tamas develops into the
particles of the five gross elements of earth, water, light, heat, air
and ether.
Now it is clear that when the self becomes conscious of itself as object
we see that there are three phases in it: (i) that in which the self
becomes an object to itself; (ii) when it directs itself or turns as the
subject upon itself as the object, this moment of activity which can
effect an aspect of change in itself; (iii) the aspect of the
consciousness of the self, the moment in which it perceives itself in
its object, the moment of the union of itself as the subject and itself
as the object in one luminosity of self-consciousness. Now that phase of
self in which it is merely an object to itself is the phase of its union
with prakṛti which further develops the prakṛti in moments of
materiality by a preponderance of the inert tamas of the bhūtādi into
tanmātras and these again into the five grosser elements which are then
called the _grāhya_ or perceptible.
The sattva side of this ego or self-consciousness which was hitherto
undifferentiated becomes further differentiated, specialised and
modified into the five cognitive senses with their respective functions
of hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell, synchronising with the
evolution of the prakṛti on the tanmātric side of evolution. These again
individually suffer infinite modifications themselves and thus cause an
infinite variety of sensations in their respective spheres in our
conscious life. The rajas side of the ego becomes specialised as the
active faculties of the five different conative organs.
There is another specialisation of the ego as the manas which is its
direct instrument for connecting itself with the five cognitive and
conative senses. What is perceived as mere sensations by the senses is
connected and generalised and formed into concepts by the manas; it is
therefore spoken of as partaking of both the conative and the cognitive
aspects in the _Sāṃkhya-kārikā_, 27.
Now though the modifications of the ego are formed successively by the
preponderance of sattva, rajas and tamas, yet the rajas is always the
accessory cause (_sahakāri_) of all these varied collocations of the
guṇas; it is the supreme principle of energy and supplies even
intelligence with the energy which it requires for its own conscious
activity. Thus Lokācāryya says in his _Tattvatraya_: “the tāmasa ego
developing into the material world and the sāttvika ego developing into
the eleven senses, both require the help of the rājasa ego for the
production of this development” (_anyābhyāṃ ahaṃkārābhyām
svakāryyopajanane rājasāhaṃkūraḥ sahakārī bhavati_); and Barabara in his
_Bhāshya_ writes: “just as a seed-sprout requires for its growth the
help of water as instrumental cause, so the rājasa ahaṃkāra (ego) works
as the accessory cause (_sahakāri_) for the transformations of sāttvika
and tāmasa ahaṃkāra into their evolutionary products.” The mode of
working of this instrumental cause is described as “rajas is the mover.”
The rājasa ego thus moves the sattva part to generate the senses; the
tamas part generating the gross and subtle matter is also moved by the
rajas, agent of movement. The rājasa ego is thus called the common cause
of the movement of the sāttvika and the tāmasa ego. Vācaspati also says:
“though rajas has no separate work by itself yet since sattva and tamas
(which though capable of undergoing modification, do not do their work)
are actionless in themselves, the agency of rajas lies in this that it
moves them both for the production of the effect.”[27] And according as
the modifications are sāttvika, tāmasa or rājasika, the ego which is the
cause of these different modifications is also called vaikārika, bhūtādi
and taijasa. The mahat also as the source of the vaikārika, taijasa and
bhūtādi ego may be said to have three aspects.
Now speaking of the relation of the sense faculties with the sense
organs, we see that the latter, which are made up of the grosser
elements are the vehicle of the former, for if the latter are injured in
any way, the former are also necessarily affected.[28]
To take for example the specific case of the faculty of hearing and its
organ, we see that the faculty of hearing is seated in the ether
(_ākāśa_) within our ear-hole. It is here that the power of hearing is
located. When soundness or defect is noticed therein, soundness or
defect is noticed in the power of hearing also. When the sounds of
solids, etc., are heard, then the power of hearing located in the hollow
of the ear stands in need of the resonance produced in the ākāśa of the
ear.
This sense of hearing, then, having its origin in the principle of
ahaṃkāra, behaves like iron, and is drawn by the sounds originated and
located in the mouth of the speaker acting as loadstone, and transforms
them into its own successive modifications (_vṛtti_) and thus senses the
sounds of the speaker. And it is for this reason that for every living
creature, the perception of sound in external space in the absence of
defects is never void of authority. Thus Pancasikha also says, as quoted
in _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, III. 41:
“To all those whose organs of hearing are situated in the same place (at
different times) the ākāśa sustaining the sense of hearing is the same.”
The ākāśa, again, in which the power of hearing is seated, is born out
of the soniferous tanmātra, and has therefore the quality of sound
inherent in itself. It is by this sound acting in unison that it takes
the sounds of external solids, etc. This then proves that the ākāśa is
the substratum of the power of hearing, and also possesses the quality
of sound. And this sameness of the situation of sound is an indication
of the existence of ākāśa as that which is the substratum of the
auditory power (_śruti_) which manifests the sounds of the same class in
ākāśa. Such a manifestation of sound cannot be without such an auditory
sense-power. Nor is such an auditory power a quality of pṛthivī (earth),
etc., because it cannot be in its own self both the manifestor and the
manifested (_vyahṅgya_ and _vyañjaka_), _Tattvavaiśāradī_, III. 41. It
is the auditory power which manifests all sounds with the help of the
ākāśa of the sense organ.
The theory of the guṇas was accepted by many others outside the
Sāṃkhya-Yoga circle and they also offered their opinions on the nature
of the categories.
There are thus other views prevalent about the genesis of the senses, to
which it may be worth our while to pay some attention as we pass by.
The sāttvika ego in generating the cognitive senses with limited powers
for certain specified objects of sense only accounted for their
developments from itself in accompaniment with the specific tanmātras.
Thus
sāttvika ego + sound potential (śabda-tanmātra) = sense of hearing.
sāttvika ego + touch potential (śparś-tanmātra) = sense of touch.
sāttvika ego + sight potential (śrūpa-tanmātra) = sense of vision.
sāttvika ego + taste potential (vasa-tanmātra) = sense of taste.
sāttvika ego + smell potential (gandha-tanmātra) = sense of smell.
The conative sense of speech is developed in association with the sense
of hearing; that of hand in association with the sense of touch; that of
feet in association with the sense of vision; that of upastha in
association with the sense of taste; that of pāyu in association with
the sense of smell.
Last of all, the manas is developed from the ego without any
co-operating or accompanying cause.
The Naiyāyikas, however, think that the senses are generated by the
gross elements, the ear for example by ākāśa, the touch by air and so
forth. But Lokācāryya in his _Tattvatraya_ holds that the senses are not
generated by gross matter but are rather sustained and strengthened by
it.
There are others who think that the ego is the instrumental and that the
gross elements are the material causes in the production of the senses.
The view of the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ is, I believe, now quite clear since we
see that the mahat through the asmitā generates from the latter (as
differentiations from it, though it itself exists as integrated in the
mahat), the senses, and their corresponding gross elements.
Before proceeding further to trace the development of the bhūtādi on the
tanmātric side, I think it is best to refer to the views about the
supposed difference between the Yoga and the views of the Sāṃkhya works
about the evolution of the categories. Now according to the Yoga view
two parallel lines of evolution start from mahat, one of which develops
into the ego, manas, the five cognitive and the five conative senses,
while on the other side it develops into the five grosser elements
through the five tanmātras which are directly produced from mahat
through the medium ahaṃkāra.
Thus the view as found in the Yoga works may be tabulated thus:—
Prakṛti
|
Mahat or Asmitāmātra
|
+----------+---------+
| |
Asmitā Tanmātras--5
| |
---+--- ---------+--------
11 senses 5 gross elements
The view of the Śaṃkhya works may be tabulated thus:--
Prakṛti
|
Mahat
|
Ego
|
+-----------+--------+
| |
11 senses 5 Tanmātras
|
5 gross elements
The place in the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ which refers to this genesis is that
under _viśeshāviśeshaliṅgamātrāliṅgāni guṇaparvāṇi_, II. 19. There it
says that the four bhūtas are ether, air, fire, water and earth. These
are the viśeshas (specialised modifications) of the unspecialised
modifications the tanmātras of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. So
also are the cognitive senses of hearing, touch, eye, tongue, and nose
and the conative senses of speech, hand, feet, anus and the generative
organ. The eleventh one manas (the co-ordinating organ) has for its
object the objects of all the above ten senses. So these are the
specialised modifications (_viśeshas_) of the unspecialised (aviśesha)
asmitā. The guṇas have these sixteen kinds of specialised modifications
(_viśeshapariṇāma_). The six unspecialised modifications are the sound
tanmātra, touch tanmātra, colour tanmātra, taste tanmātra and smell
tanmātra. These tanmātras respectively contain one, two, three, four,
and five special characteristics. The sixth unspecialised modification
is asmitāmātra. These are the six aviśesha evolutions of the pure being,
the mahat. The category of mahat is merely a sign beyond the aviśeshas
and it is there that these exist and develop.
In this _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ the fully specialised ones, viśeshas, the
grosser elements are said to have been derived from the tanmātras and
the senses and manas, the faculty of reflection are said to have been
specialised from the ego or asmitā. The tanmātras, however, have not
been derived from the ego or asmitā here. But they together with asmitā
are spoken of as the six slightly specialised ones, the five being the
five tanmātras and the sixth one being the ego. These six aviśeshas are
the specialisations of the mahat, the great egohood of pure Be-ness. It
therefore appears that the six aviśeshas are directly derived from the
mahat, after which the ego develops into the eleven senses and the
tanmātras into the five gross elements in three different lines.
But let us see how _Yoga-vārttika_ explains the point here:—
“But like the senses the tanmātras are also special modifications of the
ahaṃkāra having specially modified characteristics such as sound, touch,
etc., why, therefore, are they not mentioned as special modifications
(_viśeshas_)? The answer is that those only are mentioned as special
modification which are ultimate special modifications. The tanmātras are
indeed the special modifications of the ego, but they themselves produce
further special modifications, the bhūtas. The aviśeshas are explained
as the six aviśeshas. The tanmātras are generated from the tāmasa
ahaṃkāra gradually through sound, etc. The category of mahat which is
the ground of all modifications, called also the buddhi, has six
evolutionary products called the aviśeshas. Though the mahat and the
prakṛti may also be regarded as the root-causes out of which the
tanmātras have evolved, yet the word aviśesha is used as a technical
term having a special application to the six aviśeshas only.” The
modifications of these are from the buddhi through the intermediate
stage of the ahaṃkāra, as has been explained in the _Bhāshya_, I. 45.
Thus we see that the _Yoga-vārttika_ says that the _Bhāshya_ is here
describing the modifications of buddhi in two distinct classes, the
aviśeshas and the viśeshas; and that the mahat has been spoken of as the
source of all the aviśeshas, the five tanmātras and the ego; strictly
speaking, however, the genesis of the tanmātras from mahat takes place
through the ego and in association with the ego, for it has been so
described in the _Bhāshya_, I. 45.
Nāgeśa in explaining this _Bhāshya_ only repeats the view of
_Yoga-vārttika_.
Now let us refer to the _Bhāshya_ of I. 45, alluded to by the
_Yoga-vārttika_: “The gradual series of subtler causes proceeds up to
the aliṅga or the prakṛti. The earth atom has the smell tanmātra as its
subtle cause; the water atom has the taste tanmātra; the air atom the
touch tanmātra; the ākāśa atom the sound tanmātra; and of these ahaṃkāra
is the subtle cause; and of this the mahat is the subtle cause.” Here by
subtle cause (_sūkshma_) it is upādānakāraṇa or material cause which is
meant; so the _Bhāshya_ further says: “It is true that purusha is the
subtlest of all. But yet as prakṛti is subtler than the mahat, it is not
in that sense that purusha is subtler than prakṛti for purusha is only
an instrumental cause of the evolution of mahat, but not its material
cause.” I believe it is quite clear that ahaṃkāra is spoken of here as
the _sūkshma anvayikārana_ of the tanmātras. This anvayikāraṇa is the
same as upādāna (material cause) as Vācaspati calls it. Now again in the
_Bhāshya_ of the same _sūtra_ II. 19 later on we see the liṅga or the
mahat is the stage next to prakṛti, it is differentiated from it though
still remaining integrated in the regular order of evolution. The six
aviśeshas are again differentiated while still remaining integrated in
the mahat in the order of evolution (_pariṇāmakramaniyama_).
The mahat tattva (liṅga) is associated with the prakṛti (aliṅga). Its
development is thus to be considered as the production of a
differentiation as integrated within the prakṛti. The six aviśeshas are
also to be considered as the production of successive differentiations
as integrated within the mahat.
The words _saṃsṛshṭa vivicyante_ are the most important here for they
show us the real nature of the transformations. “_Saṃsṛshtā_” means
integrated and “_vivicyante_” means differentiated. This shows that the
order of evolution as found in the Sāṃkhya works (viz. mahat from
prakṛti, ahaṃkāra from mahat and the eleven senses and the tanmātras
from ahaṃkāra) is true only in this sense that these modifications of
ahaṃkāra take place directly as differentiations of characters in the
body of mahat. As these differentiations take place through ahaṃkāra as
the first moment in the series of transformations it is said that the
transformations take place directly from ahaṃkāra; whereas when stress
is laid on the other aspect it appears that the transformations are but
differentiations as integrated in the body of the mahat, and thus it is
also said that from mahat the six aviśeshas—namely, ahaṃkāra and the
five tanmātras—come out. This conception of evolution as differentiation
within integration bridges the gulf between the views of Yoga and the
Saṃkhya works. We know that the tanmātras are produced from the tāmasa
ahaṃkāra. This ahaṃkāra is nothing but the tāmasa side of mahat roused
into creative activity by rajas. The sāttvika ahaṃkāra is given as a
separate category producing the senses, whereas the tamas as bhūtādi
produces the tanmātras from its disturbance while held up within the
mahat.[29]
Nāgeśa in the _Chāyā-vyākhyā_ of II. 19, however, follows the Sāṃkhya
explanation. He says: “The five tanmātras having in order one, two,
three, four and five characteristics are such that the preceding ones
are the causes of the succeeding ones. The śabdatanmātra has only the
characteristic of sound, the sparśatanmātra of sound and touch and so
on.... All these tanmātras are produced from the tāmasa ahaṃkāra in the
order of śabda, sparśa, etc.” This ignores the interpretation of the
_Vyāsā-bhāshya_ that the tanmātras are differentiations within the
integrated whole of mahat through the intermediary stage of the tāmasa
ahaṃkāra.
CHAPTER VI
EVOLUTION AND CHANGE OF QUALITIES
The order of the evolution of the tanmātras as here referred to is as
follows:—
Bhūtādi (tāmasa ahaṃkāra)
|
Śabdatanmātra
|
Sparśatanmātra
|
Rūpatanmātra
|
Rasatanmātra
|
Gandhatanmātra
The evolution of the tanmātras has been variously described in the
Purāṇas and the Smṛti literature. These divergent views can briefly be
brought under two headings: those which derive the tanmātras from the
bhûtas and those which derive them from the ahaṃkāra and the bhûtas from
them. Some of these schools have been spoken of in the Barabara Muni’s
commentary on the _Tattvatraya_—a treatise on the Rāmānuja
Philosophy—and have been already explained in a systematic way by Dr. B.
N. Seal. I therefore refrain from repeating them needlessly. About the
derivation of the tanmātras all the other Sāṃkhya treatises, the
_Kārikā_, the _Kaumudī_, the _Tattvavaiśāradī_, the _Sūtra_ and
_Pravacana-bhāshya_, the _Siddhāntacandrikā_, _Sūtrārthabodhinī_, the
_Rajamārtaṇḍa_ and the _Maṇiprabhā_ seem to be silent. Further speaking
of the tanmātras, Vijñāna Bhikshu says that the tanmātras exist only in
unspecialised forms; they therefore can be neither felt nor perceived in
any way by the senses of ordinary men. This is that indeterminate state
of matter in which they can never be distinguished one from the other,
and they cannot be perceived to be possessed of different qualities or
specialised in any way. It is for this that they are called tanmātras,
i.e. their only specialization is a mere thatness. The Yogins alone
perceive them.
Now turning towards the further evolution of the grosser elements from
the tanmātras, we see that there are great divergences of view here
also, some of which are shown below. Thus Vācaspati says: “The earth
atom is produced from the five tanmātras with a predominance of the
smell tanmātra, the water atom from the four tanmātras excepting the
smell tanmātra with a preponderance of the taste tanmātra, and so on”
(I. 44).
Thus here we find that the ākāśa atom (aṇu) has been generated simply by
the ākāśa tanmātra; the vāyu atom has been generated by two tanmātras,
śabda and sparśa, of which the sparśa appears there as the chief. The
tejas atom has been developed from the śabda, sparśa and rûpa tanmātras,
though the rûpa is predominant in the group. The ap atom has been
developed from the four tanmātras, śabda, sparśa, rûpa and rasa, though
rasa is predominant in the group, and the earth or kshiti atom has been
developed from the five tanmātras, though the gandha tanmātra is
predominant in the group.
Now the _Yoga-vārttika_ agrees with Vācaspati in all these details, but
differs from him only in maintaining that the ākāśa atom has been
generated from the śabda tanmātra with an accretion from bhūtādi,
whereas Vācaspati says that the ākāśa atom is generated simply by the
ākāśa tanmātra.[30]
Nāgeśa, however, takes a slightly different view and says that to
produce the gross atoms from the tanmātras, an accretion of bhūtādi as
an accompanying agent is necessary at every step; so that we see that
the vāyu atom is produced from these three: śabda + sparśa + accretion
from bhūtādi. Tejas atom = śabda + śparśa + rūpa + accretion from
bhūtādi. Ap atom = śabda + śparśa + rūpa + rasa + accretion from
bhūtādi. Kshiti atom = śabda + śparśa + rūpa + rasa + gandha + accretion
from bhūtādi.
I refrain from giving the _Vishṇu Purāṇa_ view which has also been
quoted in the _Yoga-vārttika_, and the view of a certain school of
Vedāntists mentioned in the _Tattva-nirūpaṇa_ and referred to and
described in the _Tattvatraya_, as Dr. B. N. Seal has already described
them in his article.
We see thus that from bhūtādi come the five tanmātras which can be
compared to the Vaiśeshika atoms as they have no parts and neither
grossness nor visible differentiation.[31] Some differentiation has of
course already begun in the tanmātras, as they are called śabda, śparśa,
rūpa, rasa and gandha, which therefore may be said to belong to a class
akin to the grosser elements of ākāśa, vāyu, tejas, ap and kshiti.[32]
The next one, the paramāṇu (atom), which is gross in its nature and is
generated from the tanmātras which exist in it as parts
(_tanmātrāvayava_) may be compared with the trasareṇu of the
Vaiśeshikas. Thus the _Yoga-vārttika_ says: “this is called paramāṇu by
the Vaiśeshikas. We however call the subtlest part of the visible earth,
earth atoms” (IV. 14). The doctrine of atoms is recognised both in the
_Yoga-sūtrās_ (I. 46) and the _Bhāshya_ (III. 52, IV. 14, etc.).
Whether Sāṃkhya admitted the paramāṇus (atoms) or not cannot be
definitely settled. The _Sāṃkhya-kārikā_ does not mention the paramāṇus,
but Vijñāna Bhikshu thinks that the word “_sūkshma_” in _Kārikā_, 39,
means paramāṇus (_Yoga-vārttika_, IV. 14). Though the word paramāṇu is
not mentioned in the _Kārikā_, I can hardly suppose that Sāṃkhya did not
admit it in the sense in which Yoga did. For it does not seem probable
that Sāṃkhya should think that by the combination of the subtle
tanmātras we could all at once have the bigger lumps of bhūta without
there being any particles. Moreover, since the Yoga paramāṇus are the
finest visible particles of matter it could not have been denied by
Sāṃkhya. The supposition of some German scholars that Sāṃkhya did not
admit the paramāṇus does not seem very plausible. Bhikshu in
_Yoga-vārttika_, III. 52, says that the guṇas are in reality Vaiśeshika
atoms.
The third form is gross air, fire, water, etc., which is said to belong
to the mahat (gross) class. I cannot express it better than by quoting a
passage from _Yoga-vārttika_, IV. 4: “The _Bhāshya_ holds that in the
tanmātras there exists the specific differentiation that constitutes the
five tanmātras, the kshiti atom is generated and by the conglomeration
of these gross atoms gross earth is formed. So again by the combination
of the four tanmātras the water atom is formed and the conglomeration of
these water atoms makes gross water.”
“It should be noted here: since the _Bhāshya_ holds that the tanmātras
of sound, etc., are of the same class as the corresponding gross
elements it may be assumed that the combining tanmātras possess the
class characteristics which are made manifest in gross elements by
hardness, smoothness, etc.” Bhikshu holds that since Sāṃkhya and Yoga
are similar (_samānatantra_) this is to be regarded as being also the
Sāṃkhya view.
There is, however, another measure which is called the measure of parama
mahat, which belongs to ākāśa for example.
Now these paramāṇus or atoms are not merely atoms of matter but they
contain within themselves those particular qualities by virtue of which
they appear, as pleasant, unpleasant or passive to us. If we have
expressed ourselves clearly, I believe it has been shown that when the
inner and the outer proceed from one source, the ego and the external
world do not altogether differ in nature from the inner; both have been
formed by the collocation of the guṇas (_sarvamidaṃ guṇānāṃ
sanniveśaviseshamātram_). The same book which in the inner microcosm is
written in the language of ideas has been in the external world written
in the language of matter. So in the external world we have all the
grounds of our inner experience, cognitive as well as emotional,
pleasurable as well as painful. The modifications of the external world
are only translated into ideas and feelings; therefore these paramāṇus
are spoken of as endowed with feelings.
There is another difference between the tanmātras and the paramāṇus. The
former cannot be perceived to be endowed with the feeling elements as
the latter. Some say, however, that it is not true that the tanmātras
are not endowed with the feeling elements, but they cannot be perceived
by any save the Yogins; thus it is said: _tanmātrāṇāmapi
parasparavyāvṛttasvabhāvatvamastyeva tacca yogimātragamyam_. The
tanmātras also possess differentiated characters, but they can be
perceived only by the Yogins; but this is not universally admitted.
Now these paramāṇus cannot further be evolved into any other different
kind of existence or tattvāntara.[33] We see that the paramāṇus though
they have been formed from the tanmātras resemble them only in a very
remote way and are therefore placed in a separate stage of evolution.
With the bhūtas we have the last stage of evolution of the guṇas. The
course of evolution, however, does not cease here, but continues
ceaselessly, though by its process no new stage of existence is
generated, but the product of the evolution is such that in it the
properties of the gross elements which compose its constitution can be
found directly. This is what is called _dharmapariṇāma_, as
distinguished from the _tattvāntara-pariṇāma_ spoken above. The
evolution of the viśeshas from the aviśeshas is always styled
tattvāntara-pariṇāma, as opposed to the evolution that takes place among
the viśeshas themselves, which is called _dharmapariṇāma_ or evolution
by change of qualities. Now these atoms or paramāṇus of kshiti, ap,
tejas, marut or ākāśa conglomerate together and form all sentient or
non-sentient bodies in the world. The different atoms of earth, air,
fire, water, etc., conglomerate together and form the different animate
bodies such as cow, etc., or inanimate bodies such as jug, etc., and
vegetables like the tree, etc. These bodies are built up by the
conglomerated units of the atoms in such a way that they are almost in a
state of combination which has been styled _ayutasiddhāvayava_. In such
a combination the parts do not stand independently, but only hide
themselves as it were in order to manifest the whole body, so that by
the conglomeration of the particles we have what may be called a body,
which is regarded as quite a different thing from the atoms of which it
is composed. These bodies change with the different sorts of change or
arrangement of the particles, according to which the body may be spoken
of as “one,” “large,” “small,” “tangible” or “possessing” the quality of
action. Some philosophers hold the view that a body is really nothing
but the conglomeration of the atoms; but they must be altogether wrong
here since they have no right to ignore the “body,” which appears before
them with all its specific qualities and attributes; moreover, if they
ignore the body they have to ignore almost everything, for the atoms
themselves are not visible.
Again, these atoms, though so much unlike the Vaiśeshika atoms since
they contain tanmātras of a different nature as their constituents and
thus differ from the simpler atoms of the Vaiśeshikas, compose the
constituents of all inorganic, organic or animal bodies in such a way
that there is no break of harmony—no opposition between them;—but, on
the contrary, when any one of the guṇas existing in the atoms and their
conglomerations becomes prominent, the other guṇas though their
functions are different from it, yet do not run counter to the prominent
guṇas, but conjointly with them, help to form the specific modification
for the experiences of the purusha. In the production of a thing, the
different guṇas do not choose different independent courses for their
evolution, but join together and effectuate themselves in the evolution
of a single product. Thus we see also that when the atoms of different
gross elements possessing different properties and attributes coalesce,
their difference of attributes does not produce confusion, but they
unite in the production of the particular substances by a common
teleological purpose (see _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, IV. 14).
We thus see that the bodies or things composed by the collocation of the
atoms in one sense differ from the atoms themselves and in another are
identical with the atoms themselves. We see therefore that the
appearance of the atoms as bodies or things differs with the change of
position of the atoms amongst themselves. So we can say that the change
of the appearance of things and bodies only shows the change of the
collocation of the atoms, there being always a change of appearance in
the bodies consequent on every change in the position of the atoms. The
former therefore is only an explicit appearance of the change that takes
place in the substance itself; for the appearance of a thing is only an
explicit aspect of the very selfsame thing—the atoms; thus the _Bhāshya_
says: _dharmisvarūpamātro hi dharmaḥ, dharmivrikriyā eva eshā
dharmadvārā prapañcyate_, i.e. a dharma (quality) is merely the nature
of the dharmin (substance), and it is the changes of the dharmin that
are made explicit by the dharmas.[34] Often it happens that the change
of appearance of a thing or a body, a tree or a piece of cloth, for
example, can be marked only after a long interval. This, however, only
shows that the atoms of the body had been continually changing and
consequently the appearance of the body or the thing also had been
continually changing; for otherwise we can in no way account for the
sudden change of appearance. All bodies are continually changing the
constituent collocation of atoms and their appearances. In the smallest
particle of time or kshaṇa the whole universe undergoes a change. Each
moment or the smallest particle of time is only the manifestation of
that particular change. Time therefore has not a separate existence in
this philosophy as in the Vaiśeshika, but it is only identical with the
smallest amount of change—viz. that of an atom of its own amount of
space. Now here the appearance is called the dharma, and that particular
arrangement of atoms or guṇas which is the basis of the particular
appearance is called the dharmin. The change of appearance is therefore
called the dharma-pariṇāma.[35]
Again this change of appearance can be looked at from two other aspects
which though not intrinsically different from the change of appearance
have their own special points of view which make them remarkable. These
are _lakshaṇa-pariṇāma_ and _avasthā-pariṇāma_. Taking the particular
collocation of atoms in a body for review, we see that all the
subsequent changes that take place in it exist in it only in a latent
way in it which will be manifested in future. All the previous changes
of the collocating atoms are not also lost but exist only in a sublatent
way in the particular collocation of atoms present before us. For the
past changes are by no means destroyed but are preserved in the peculiar
and particular collocation of atoms of the present moment. For had not
the past changes taken place, the present could not appear. The present
had held itself hidden in the past just as the future is hidden within
the present. It therefore only comes into being with the unfolding of
the past, which therefore exists only in a sublatent form in it.
It is on account of this that we see that a body comes into being and
dies away. Though this birth or death is really subsumed the change of
appearance yet it has its own special aspect, on account of which it has
been given a separate name as lakshaṇa-pariṇāma. It considers the three
stages of an appearance—the unmanifested when it exists in the future,
the manifested moment of the present, and the past when it has been
manifested—lost to view but preserved and retained in all the onward
stages of the evolution. Thus when we say that a thing has not yet come
into being, that it has just come into being, and that it is no longer,
we refer to this lakshaṇa-pariṇāma which records the history of the
thing in future, present and past, which are only the three different
moments of the same thing according to its different characters, as
unmanifested, manifested and manifested in the past but conserved.
Now it often happens that though the appearance of a thing is constantly
changing owing to the continual change of the atoms that compose it, yet
the changes are so fine and infinitesimal that they cannot be marked by
anyone except the Yogins; for though structural changes may be going on
tending towards the final passing away of that structure and body into
another structure and body, which greatly differs from it, yet they may
not be noticed by us, who can take note of the bigger changes alone.
Taking therefore two remarkable stages of things, the difference between
which may be so notable as to justify us in calling the later the
dissolution or destruction of the former, we assert that the thing has
suffered growth and decay in the interval, during which the actual was
passing into the sublatent and the potential was tending towards
actualization. This is what is called the avasthā-pariṇāma, or change of
condition, which, however, does not materially differ from the
lakshaṇa-pariṇāma and can thus be held to be a mode of it. It is on
account of this that a substance is called new or old, grown or decayed.
Thus in explaining the illustration given in the _Bhāshya_, III. 13:
“there is avasthā-pariṇāma. At the moments of cessation the potencies of
cessation become stronger and those of ordinary experience weaker.” The
_Yoga-vārttika_ says: “The strength and weakness of the two potencies is
like the newness or oldness of a jug; growth and decay being the same as
origination and decease, there is no difference here from
_lakshaṇa-pariṇāma_.”
It is now time for us to examine once more the relation of dharmin,
substance, and dharma, its quality or appearance.
Dharmin, or substance, is that which remains common to the latent (as
having passed over or _śānta_), the rising (the present or _udita_) and
the unpredicable (future or _avyapadeśya_) characteristic qualities of
the substance.
Substance (take for example, earth) has the power of existing in the
form of particles of dust, a lump or a jug by which water may be
carried. Now taking the stage of lump for examination we may think of
its previous stage, that of particles of dust, as being latent, and its
future stage as jug as the unpredicable. The earth we see here to be
common to all these three stages which have come into being by its own
activity and consequent changes. Earth here is the common quality which
remains unchanged in all these stages, and so relatively constant among
its changes as particles, lump and jug. This earth therefore is regarded
as the dharmin, characterised one, the substance; and its stages as its
dharma or qualities. When this dharmin, or substance, undergoes a change
from a stage of lump to a stage of jug, it undergoes what is called
_dharma-pariṇāma_ or change of quality.
But its dharma, as the shape of the jug may be thought to have itself
undergone a change—inasmuch as it has now come into being, from a state
of relative non-being, latency or unpredicability. This is called the
lakshaṇa-pariṇāma of the dharma or qualities as constituting a jug. This
jug is again suffering another change as new or old according as it is
just produced or is gradually running towards its dissolution, and this
is called the avasthā-pariṇāma or change of condition. These three,
however, are not separate from the dharma-pariṇāma, but are only aspects
of it; so it may be said that the dharmin or substance directly suffers
the dharma-pariṇāma and indirectly the lakshaṇa and the
avasthā-pariṇāma. The dharma, however, changes and the lakshaṇa-pariṇāma
can be looked at from another point of view, that of change of state,
viz. growth and decay. Thus we see that though the atoms of kshiti, ap,
etc., remain unchanged, they are constantly suffering changes from the
inorganic to plants and animals, and from thence again back to the
inorganic. There is thus a constant circulation of changes in which the
different atoms of kshiti, ap, tejas, vāyu and ākāśa remaining
themselves unchanged are suffering dharma-pariṇāma as they are changed
from the inorganic to plants and animals and back again to the
inorganic. These different states or dharmas (as inorganic, etc.),
again, according as they are not yet, now, or no longer or passed over,
are suffering the lakshaṇa-pariṇāma. There is also the avasthā-pariṇāma
of these states according as any one of them (the plant state for
example) is growing or suffering decay towards its dissolution.
This circulation of cosmic matter in general applies also to all
particular things, such as the jug, the cloth, etc.; the order of
evolution here will be that of powdered particles of earth, lump of
earth, the earthen jug, the broken halves of the jug, and again the
powdered earth. As the whole substance has only one identical evolution,
these different states only happen in order of succession, the
occurrence of one characteristic being displaced by another
characteristic which comes after it immediately. We thus see that one
substance may undergo endless changes of characteristic in order of
succession; and along with the change of characteristic or dharma we
have the lakshaṇa-pariṇāma and the avasthā-pariṇāma as old or new, which
is evidently one of infinitesimal changes of growth and decay. Thus
Vācaspati gives the following beautiful example: “Even the most
carefully preserved rice in the granary becomes after long years so
brittle that it crumbles into atoms. This change cannot happen to new
rice all on a sudden. Therefore we have to admit an order of successive
changes” (_Tattvavaivśāradī_, III. 15).
We now see that substance has neither past nor future; appearances or
qualities only are manifested in time, by virtue of which substance is
also spoken of as varying and changing temporally, just as a line
remains unchanged in itself but acquires different significances
according as one or two zeros are placed on its right side.
Substance—the atoms of kshiti, ap, tejas, marut, vyoman, etc., by
various changes of quality appear as the manifold varieties of cosmical
existence. There is no intrinsic difference between one thing and
another, but only changes of character of one and the same thing; thus
the gross elemental atoms like water and earth particles acquire various
qualities and appear as the various juices of all fruits and herbs. Now
in analogy with the arguments stated above, it will seem that even a
qualified thing or appearance may be relatively regarded as substance,
when it is seen to remain common to various other modifications of that
appearance itself. Thus a jug, which may remain common in all its
modifications of colour, may be regarded relatively as the dharmin or
substance of all these special appearances or modifications of the same
appearance.
We remember that the guṇas, which are the final substratum of all the
grosser particles, are always in a state of commotion and always
evolving in the manner previously stated, for the sake of the experience
and final realisation of the parusha, the only object or end of the
prakṛti. Thus the _Bhāshya_, III. 13, says: “So it is the nature of the
guṇas that there cannot remain even a moment without the evolutionary
changes of dharma, lakshaṇa and avasthā; movement is the characteristic
of the guṇas. The nature of the guṇas is the cause of their constant
movement.”
Although the pioneers of modern scientific evolution have tried to
observe scientifically some of the stages of the growth of the inorganic
and of the animal worlds into the man, yet they do not give any reason
for it. Theirs is more an experimental assertion of facts than a
metaphysical account of evolution. According to Darwin the general form
of the evolutionary process is that which is accomplished by “very
slight variations which are accumulated by the effect of natural
selection.” And according to a later theory, we see that a new species
is constituted all at once by the simultaneous appearance of several new
characteristics very different from the old. But why this accidental
variation, this seeming departure from the causal chain, comes into
being, the evolutionists cannot explain. But the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala
doctrine explains it from the standpoint of teleology or the final goal
inherent in all matter, so that it may be serviceable to the purusha. To
be serviceable to the purusha is the one moral purpose in all prakṛti
and its manifestations in the whole material world, which guide the
course and direction of the smallest particle of matter. From the
scientific point of view, the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala doctrine is very much in
the same position as modern science, for it does not explain the cause
of the accidental variation noticed in all the stages of evolutionary
process from any physical point of view based on the observation of
facts.
But it does much credit to the Pātañjala doctrines that they explain
this accidental variation, this _avyapadeśyatva_ or unpredicability of
the onward course of evolution from a moral point of view, that of
teleology, the serviceability of the purusha. They found, however, that
this teleology should not be used to usurp the whole nature and function
of matter. We find that the atoms are always moving by virtue of the
rajas or energy, and it is to this movement of the atoms in space that
all the products of evolution are due. We have found that the difference
between the juices of Coco-nut, Palm, Bel, Tinduka (Diospyros
Embryopteries), Āmalaka (Emblic Myrobalan) can be accounted for by the
particular and peculiar arrangement of the atoms of earth and water
alone, by their stress and strain; and we see also that the evolution of
the organic from the inorganic is due to this change of position of the
atoms themselves; for the unit of change is the change in an atom of its
own dimension of spatial position. There is always the transformation of
energy from the inorganic to the organic and back again from the
organic. Thus the differences among things are solely due to the
different stages which they occupy in the scale of evolution, as
different expressions of the transformation of energy; but virtually
there is no intrinsic difference among things _sarvaṃ sarvātmakaṃ_; the
change of the collocation of atoms only changes potentiality into
actuality, for there is potentiality of everything for every thing
everywhere throughout this changing world. Thus Vācaspati writes: “The
water possessing taste, colour, touch and sound and the earth possessing
smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound suffer an infinite variety of
changes as roots, flowers, fruits, leaves and their specific tastes and
other qualities. The water and the earth which do not possess these
qualities cannot have them, for we have proved that what is non-existent
cannot come into being. The trees and plants produce the varied tastes
and colours in animals, for it is by eating these that they acquire such
richness of colour, etc. Animal products can again produce changes in
plant bodies. By sprinkling blood on it a pomegranate may be made as big
as a palm” (_Tattvavaiśaradī_, III. 14).
Looked at from the point of view of the guṇas, there is no intrinsic
difference between things, though there are a thousand manifestations of
differences, according to time, place, form and causality. The
expressions of the guṇas, and the manifestations of the transformations
of energy differ according to time, place, shape, or causality—these are
the determining circumstances and environments which determine the modes
of the evolutionary process; surrounding environments are also involved
in determining this change, and it is said that two Āmalaka fruits
placed in two different places undergo two different sorts of changes in
connection with the particular spots in which they are placed, and that
if anybody interchanges them a Yogin can recognise and distinguish the
one from the other by seeing the changes that the fruits have undergone
in connection with their particular points of space. Thus the _Bhāshya_
says: “Two Āmalaka fruits having the same characteristic genus and
species, their situation in two different points of space contributes to
their specific distinction of development, so that they may be
identified as this and that. When an Āmalaka is brought from a distance
to a man previously inattentive to it, he naturally cannot distinguish
this Āmalaka as being the distant one which has been brought before him
without his knowledge. But right knowledge should be competent to
discern the distinction; and the sūtra says that the place associated
with one Āmalaka fruit is different from the place associated with
another Āmalaka at another point of space; and the Yogin can perceive
the difference of their specific evolution in association with their
points of space; similarly the atoms also suffer different modifications
at different points of space which can be perceived by Īśvara and the
Yogins” (_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, III. 53).
Vācaspati again says: “Though all cause is essentially all effects yet a
particular cause takes effect in a particular place, thus though the
cause is the same, yet saffron grows in Kāśmīra and not in Pāñcāla. So,
the rains do not come in summer, the vicious do not enjoy happiness.
Thus in accordance with the obstructions of place, time, animal form,
and instrumental accessories, the same cause does not produce the same
effect. Though as cause everything is essentially everything else, yet
there is a particular country for a particular effect, such as Kāśmīra
is for saffron. Even though the causes may be in other countries such as
Pāñcāla, yet the effect will not happen there, and for this reason
saffron does not manifest itself in Pāñcāla. So in summer there are no
rains and so no paddy grows then” (_Tattvavaiśāradī_, III. 14).
We see therefore that time, space, etc., are the limitations which
regulate, modify and determine to a certain extent the varying
transformations and changes and the seeming differences of things,
though in reality they are all ultimately reducible to the three guṇas;
thus Kāśmīra being the country of saffron, it will not grow in the
Pāñcāla country, even though the other causes of its growth should all
be present there;—here the operation of cause is limited by space.
After considering the inorganic, vegetable and animal kingdoms as three
stages in the evolutionary process, our attention is at once drawn to
their conception of the nature of relation of plant life to animal life.
Though I do not find any special reference in the _Bhāshya_ to this
point, yet I am reminded of a few passages in the _Mahābhārata_, which I
think may be added as a supplement to the general doctrine of evolution
according to the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala philosophy as stated here. Thus the
_Mahābhārata_ says: “Even the solid trees have ether (ākāśa) in them
which justifies the regular appearance of flowers and fruits. By heat
the leaves, the bark, flowers and fruits become withered, and since
there is withering and decay in them, there is in them the sensation of
touch. Since by the sound of air, fire and thunder the fruits and
flowers fall away, there must be the sense of hearing in them. The
creepers encircle the trees and they go in all directions, and since
without sight there could not be any choice of direction, the trees have
the power of vision. By various holy and unholy smells and incenses of
various kinds the trees are cured of their diseases and blossom forth,
therefore the trees can smell. Since they drink by their roots, and
since they get diseases, and since their diseases can be cured, there is
the sense of taste in the trees. Since they enjoy pleasure and suffer
pain, and since their parts which are cut grow, I see life everywhere in
trees and not want of life” (_Sāntiparva_, 184).
Nīlakaṇṭha in his commentary goes still further and says that a hard
substance called vajramaṇi also may be called living. Here we see that
the ancients had to a certain extent forestalled the discovery of Sir J.
C. Bose that the life functions differed only in degree between the
three classes, the inorganic, plants and animals.
These are all, however, only illustrations of dharma-pariṇāma, for here
there is no radical change in the elements themselves, the appearance of
qualities being due only to the different arrangement of the atoms of
the five gross elements. This change applies to the viśeshas only—the
five gross elements externally and the eleven senses internally. How the
inner microcosm, the manas and the senses are affected by
dharma-pariṇāma we shall see hereafter, when we deal with the psychology
of the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala doctrine. For the present it will suffice to
say that the citta or mind also suffers this change and is modified in a
twofold mode; the patent in the form of the ideas and the latent, as the
substance itself, in the form of saṃskāras of subconscious impressions.
Thus the _Bhāshya_ says: “The mind has two kinds of characteristics,
perceived and unperceived. Those of the nature of ideas are perceived
and those inherent in the integral nature of it are unperceived. The
latter are of seven kinds and may be ascertained by inference. These are
cessation of mental states by samādhi, virtue and vice, subconscious
impressions, change, life-functioning, power of movement, and energy”
(III. 15).
This dharma-pariṇāma as we have shown it, is essentially different from
the satkāraṇavāda of the aviśeshas described above. We cannot close this
discussion about evolution without noticing the Sāṃkhya view of
causation.
We have seen that the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala view holds that the effect is
already existent in the cause, but only in a potential form. “The
grouping or collocation alone changes, and this brings out the
manifestation of the latent powers of the guṇas, but without creation of
anything absolutely new or non-existent.” This is the true satkāryyavāda
theory as distinguished from the so-called satkāryyavāda theory of the
Vedāntists, which ought more properly to be called the satkāraṇavāda
theory, for with them the cause alone is true, and all effects are
illusory, being only impositions on the cause. For with them the
material cause alone is true, whilst all its forms and shapes are merely
illusory, whereas according to the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala doctrine all the
appearances or effects are true and are due to the power which the
substance has of transforming itself into those various appearances and
effects _yogyatāvacchinnā dharmiṇaḥ śaktireva dharmaḥ_ (III. 14). The
operation of the concomitant condition or efficient cause serves only to
effect the passage of a thing from potency to actualisation.
Everything in the phenomenal world is but a special collocation of the
guṇas; so that the change of collocation explains the diversity of
things. Considered from the point of view of the guṇas, things are all
the same, so excluding that, the cause of the diversity in things is the
power which the guṇas have of changing their particular collocations and
thus assuming various shapes. We have seen that the prakṛti unfolds
itself through various stages—the mahat called the great being—the
ahaṃkāra, the tanmātras called the aviśeshas. Now the liṅga at once
resolves itself into the ahaṃkāra and through it again into the
tanmātras. The ahaṃkāra and the tanmātras again resolve themselves into
the senses and the gross elements, and these again are constantly
suffering thousands of modifications called the dharma, lakshaṇa, and
avasthā-pariṇāma according to the definite law of evolution
(_pariṇāmakramaniyama_).
Now according to the Saṃkhya-Pātañjala doctrine, the śakti—power,
force—and the śaktimān—the possessor of power or force—are not different
but identical. So the prakṛti and all its emanations and modifications
are of the nature of substantive entities as well as power or force.
Their appearances as substantive entities and as power or force are but
two aspects, and so it will be erroneous to make any such distinction as
the substantive entity and its power or force. That which is the
substantive entity is the force, and that which is the force is the
substantive entity. Of course for all practical purposes we can indeed
make some distinction, but that distinction is only relatively true.
Thus when we say that earth is the substantive entity and the power
which it has of transforming itself into the produced form, lump, or jug
as its attribute, we see on the one hand that no distinction is really
made between the appearance of the earth as jug and its power of
transforming itself into the jug. As this power of transforming itself
into lump or jug, etc., always abides in the earth we say that the jug,
etc., are also abiding in the earth; when the power is in the potential
state, we say that the jug is in the potential state, and when it is
actualised, we say that the jug has been actualised. Looked at from the
tanmātric side, the earth and all the other gross elements must be said
to be mere modifications, and as such identical with the power which the
tanmātras have of changing themselves into them. The potentiality or
actuality of any state is the mere potentiality or actuality of the
power which its antecedent cause has of transforming itself into it.
CHAPTER VII
EVOLUTION AND CHANGE OF QUALITIES
Prakṛti, though a substantive entity is yet a potential power, being
actualised as its various modifications, the aviśeshas and the viśeshas.
Being of the nature of power, the movement by which it actualises itself
is immanent within itself and not caused from without. The operation of
the concomitant conditions is only manifested in the removal of the
negative barriers by which the power was stopped or prevented from
actualising itself. Being of the nature of power, its potentiality means
that it is kept in equilibrium by virtue of the opposing tendencies
inherent within it, which serve to obstruct one another and are
therefore called the āvaraṇa śakti. Of course it is evident that there
is no real or absolute distinction between the opposing force (_āvaraṇa
śakti_) and the energising force (_kāryyakarī śakti_); they may be
called so only relatively, for the same tendency which may appear as the
_āvaraṇa śakti_ of some tendencies may appear as the _kāryyakarī śakti_
elsewhere. The example chosen to explain the nature of prakṛti and its
modifications conceived as power tending towards actuality from
potentiality in the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ is that of a sheet of water enclosed
by temporary walls within a field, but always tending to run out of it.
As soon as the temporary wall is broken in some direction, the water
rushes out of itself, and what one has to do is to break the wall at a
particular place. Prakṛti is also the potential for all the infinite
diversity of things in the phenomenal world, but the potential tendency
of all these mutually opposed and diverse things cannot be actualised
together. Owing to the concomitant conditions when the barrier of a
certain tendency is removed, it at once actualises itself in its effect
and so on.
We can only expect to get any effect from any cause if the necessary
barriers can be removed, for everything is everything potentially and it
is only necessary to remove the particular barrier which is obstructing
the power from actualising itself in that particular effect towards
which it is always potentially tending. Thus Nandī who was a man is at
once turned into a god for his particular merit, which served to break
all the barriers of the potential tendency of his body towards becoming
divine, so that the barriers being removed the potential power of the
prakṛti of his body at once actualises itself in the divine body.
The _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ (III. 14) mentions four sorts of concomitant
conditions which can serve to break the barrier in a particular way and
thus determine the mode or form of the actualisations of the potential.
These are (1) ākāra, form and constitution of a thing; deśa, place, (3)
kāla, time; thus from a piece of stone, the shoot of a plant cannot
proceed, for the arrangement of the particles in stone is such that it
will oppose and stand as a bar to its potential tendencies to develop
into the shoot of a plant; of course if these barriers could be removed,
say by the will of God, as Vijñāna Bhikshu says, then it is not
impossible that the shoot of a plant might grow from a stone. By the
will of God poison may be turned into nectar and nectar into poison, and
there is no absolute certainty of the course of the evolutionary
process, for God’s will can make any change in the direction of its
process (_avyavasthitākhilapariṇāmo bhavatyeva_, III. 14).
According to the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala theory dharma, merit, can only be
said to accrue from those actions which lead to a man’s salvation, and
adharma from just the opposite course of conduct. When it is said that
these can remove the barriers of the prakṛti and thus determine its
modifications, it amounts almost to saying that the modifications of the
prakṛti are being regulated by the moral conditions of man. According to
the different stages of man’s moral evolution, different kinds of merit,
dharma or adharma, accrue, and these again regulate the various physical
and mental phenomena according to which a man may be affected either
pleasurably or painfully. It must, however, be always remembered that
the dharma and adharma are also the productions of prakṛti, and as such
cannot affect it except by behaving as the cause for the removal of the
opposite obstructions—the dharma for removing the obstructions of
adharma and adharma for those of dharma. Vijñāna Bhikshu and Nāgeśa
agree here in saying that the modifications due to dharma and adharma
are those which affect the bodies and senses. What they mean is possibly
this, that it is dharma or adharma alone which guides the
transformations of the bodies and senses of all living beings in general
and the Yogins.
The body of a person and his senses are continually decaying and being
reconstructed by refilling from the gross elements and from ahaṃkāra
respectively. These refillings proceed automatically and naturally; but
they follow the teleological purpose as chalked out by the law of karma
in accordance with the virtues or vices of a man. Thus the gross insult
to which the sages were subjected by Nahusha[36] was so effective a sin
that by its influence the refilling of Nahusha’s body and the senses was
stopped and the body and senses of a snake were directly produced by a
process of refilling from the gross elements and ahaṃkāra, for providing
him with a body in which he could undergo the sufferings which were his
due owing to the enormity of his vice. Thus by his vicious action the
whole machinery of prakṛti was set in operation so that he at once died
and was immediately reborn as a snake. In another place Vācaspati “the
virtuous enjoys happiness” as an illustration of the cause of dharma and
adharma as controlling the course of the development of prakṛti. We
therefore see that the sphere of merit and demerit lies in the helping
of the formation of the particular bodies and senses (from the gross
elements and ahaṃkāra respectively) suited to all living beings
according to their stages of evolution and their growth, decay, or other
sorts of their modifications as pleasure, pain, and also as illness or
health. Thus it is by his particular merit that the Yogin can get his
special body or men or animals can get their new bodies after leaving
the old ones at death. Thus _Yoga-vārttika_ says: “Merit by removing the
obstructions of demerit causes the development of the body and the
senses.”
As for Īśvara I do not remember that the _Bhāshya_ or the sūtras ever
mention Him as having anything to do with the controlling of the
modifications of the prakṛti by removing the barriers, but all the later
commentators agree in holding him responsible for the removal of all
barriers in the way of prakṛtis development. So that Īśvara is the root
cause of all the removal of barriers, including those that are affected
by merit and demerit. Thus Vācaspati says (IV. 3): _Īśvarasyāpi
dharmādhishṭhānārthaṃ pratibandhāpanaya eva vyāpāro_, i.e. God stands as
the cause of the removal of such obstacles in the prakṛti as may lead to
the fruition of merit or demerit.
_Yoga-vārttika_ and Nāgeśa agree in holding Īśvara responsible for the
removal of all obstacles in the way of the evolution of prakṛti. Thus
Bhikshu says that God rouses prakṛti by breaking the opposing forces of
the state of equilibrium and also of the course of evolution (IV. 3).
It is on account of God that we can do good or bad actions and thus
acquire merit or demerit. Of course God is not active and cannot cause
any motion in prakṛti. But He by His very presence causes the obstacles,
as the barriers in the way of prakṛti’s development, to be removed, in
such a way that He stands ultimately responsible for the removal of all
obstacles in the way of prakṛti’s development and thus also of all
obstacles in the way of men’s performance of good or bad deeds. Man’s
good or bad deeds “puṇyakarma,” apuṇyakarma, dharma or adharma serve to
remove the obstacles of prakṛti in such a way as to result in
pleasurable or painful effects; but it is by God’s help that the
barriers of prakṛti are removed and it yields itself in such a way that
a man may perform good or bad deeds according to his desire. Nīlakaṇṭha,
however, by his quotations in explanation of 300/2, _Śāntiparva_, leads
us to suppose that he regards God’s will as wholly responsible for the
performance of our good or bad actions. For if we lay stress on his
quotation “He makes him do good deeds whom He wants to raise, and He
makes him commit bad deeds whom He wants to throw down,” it appears that
he whom God wants to raise is made to perform good actions and he whom
God wants to throw downwards is made to commit bad actions. But this
seems to be a very bold idea, as it will altogether nullify the least
vestige of freedom in and responsibility for our actions and is
unsupported by the evidence of other commentators. Vijñāna Bhikshu also
says with reference to this śruti in his _Vijñānamṛta-bhāshya_, III. 33:
“As there is an infinite _regressus_ between the causal connection of
seed and shoot, so one karma is being determined by the previous karma
and so on; there is no beginning to this chain.” So we take the
superintendence of merits and demerits (_dharmādhispṭhānatā_) by Īśvara
to mean only in a general way the help that is offered by Him in
removing the obstructions of the external world in such a manner that it
may be possible for a man to perform practically meritorious acts in the
external world.
Nīlakaṇṭha commenting on the Yoga view says that “like a piece of
magnet, God though inactive, may by His very presence stir up prakṛti
and help His devotees. So the Yoga holds that for the granting of
emancipation God has to be admitted” (_Śāntiparva_, 300/2).
In support of our view we also find that it is by God’s influence that
the unalterable nature of the external world is held fast and a limit
imposed on the powers of man in producing changes in the external world.
Thus Vācaspati in explaining the Bhāshya (III. 45) says: “Though capable
of doing it, yet he does not change the order of things, because another
earlier omnipotent being had wished the things to be such as they were.
They would not disobey the orders of the omnipotent God.”
Men may indeed acquire unlimited powers of producing any changes they
like, for the powers of objects as they change according to the
difference of class, space, time and condition, are not permanent, and
so it is proper that they should act in accordance with the desire of
the Yogin; but there is a limit to men’s will by the command of God—thus
far and no further.
Another point in our favour is that the Yoga philosophy differs from the
Sāṃkhya mainly in this that the purushārtha or serviceability to the
purusha is only the aim or end of the evolution of prakṛti and not
actually the agent which removes the obstacles of the prakṛti in such a
way as to determine its course as this cosmical process of evolution.
Purushārtha is indeed the aim for which the process of evolution exists;
for this manifold evolution in its entirety affects the interests of the
purusha alone; but that does not prove that its teleology can really
guide the evolution on its particular lines so as to ensure the best
possible mode of serving all the interests of the purusha, for this
teleology being immanent in the prakṛti is essentially non-intelligent.
Thus Vācaspati says: “The fulfilment of the purpose of the purusha is
not also the prime mover. God has the fulfilment of the purpose of the
purusha as His own purpose, for which He behaves as the prime mover. The
fulfilment of the purpose of the purusha may be regarded as cause only
in the sense that it is the object in view of God, the prime mover.”[37]
The Sāṃkhya, however, hopes that this immanent purpose in prakṛti acts
like a blind instinct and is able to guide the course of its evolution
in all its manifold lines in accordance with the best possible service
of the purusha.
The Pātañjala view, as we have seen, maintains that Īśvara removes all
obstacles of prakṛti in such a way that this purpose may find scope for
its realisation. Thus _Sūtrārthabodhinī_, IV. 3, of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha
says: “According to atheistic Sāṃkhya the future serviceability of
purusha alone is the mover of prakṛti. But with us theists the
serviceability of purusha is the object for which prakṛti moves. It is
merely as an object that the serviceability of the purusha may be said
to be the mover of the prakṛti.”
As regards the connection of prakṛti and purusha, however, both Sāṃkhya
and Pātañjala agree according to Vijñāna Bhikshu in denying the
interference of Īśvara; it is the movement of prakṛti by virtue of
immanent purpose that connects itself naturally with the purusha.
Vijñāna Bhikshu’s own view, however, is that this union is brought about
by God (_Vijñānāmṛta-bhāshya_, p. 34).
To recapitulate, we see that there is an immanent purpose in prakṛti
which connects it with the purushas. This purpose is, however, blind and
cannot choose the suitable lines of development and cause the movement
of Prakṛti along them for its fullest realisation. Prakṛti itself,
though a substantial entity, is also essentially of the nature of
conserved energy existing in the potential form but always ready to flow
out and actualise itself, if only its own immanent obstructions are
removed. Its teleological purpose is powerless to remove its own
obstruction. God by His very presence removes the obstacles, by which,
prakṛti of itself moves in the evolutionary process, and thus the
purpose is realised; for the removal of obstacles by the influence of
God takes place in such a way that the purpose may realise its fullest
scope. Realisation of the teleology means that the interests of purusha
are seemingly affected and purusha appears to see and feel in a manifold
way, and after a long series of such experiences it comes to understand
itself in its own nature, and this being the last and final realisation
of the purpose of prakṛti with reference to that purusha all connections
of prakṛti with such a purusha at once cease; the purusha is then said
to be liberated and the world ceases for him to exist, though it exists
for the other unliberated purushas, the purpose of the prakṛti with
reference to whom has not been realised. So the world is both eternal
and non-eternal, i.e. its eternality is only relative and not absolute.
Thus the _Bhāshya_ says the question “whether the world will have an end
or not cannot be directly answered. The world-process gradually ceases
for the wise and not for others, so no one-sided decision can be true”
(IV. 33).
BOOK II. ETHICS AND PRACTICE
CHAPTER VIII
MIND AND MORAL STATES
The Yoga philosophy has essentially a practical tone and its object
consists mainly in demonstrating the means of attaining salvation,
oneness, the liberation of the purusha. The metaphysical theory which we
have discussed at some length, though it is the basis which justifies
its ethical goal, is not itself the principal subject of Yoga
discussion, and is only dealt with to the extent that it can aid in
demonstrating the ethical view. We must now direct our attention to
these ethical theories. Citta or mind always exists in the form of its
states which are called vṛttis.[38] These comprehend all the manifold
states of consciousness of our phenomenal existence. We cannot
distinguish states of consciousness from consciousness itself, for the
consciousness is not something separate from its states; it exists in
them, passes away with their passing and submerges when they are
submerged. It differs from the senses in this, that they represent the
functions and faculties, whereas citta stands as the entity containing
the conscious states with which we are directly concerned. But the citta
which we have thus described as existing only in its states is called
the kāryyacitta or citta as effect as distinguished from the kāraṇacitta
or citta as cause. These kāraṇacittas or cittas as cause are
all-pervading like the ākāśa and are infinite in number, each being
connected with each of the numberless purushas or souls (_Chāyāvyākhyā_,
IV. 10). The reason assigned for acknowledging such a kāraṇacitta which
must be all-pervading, as is evident from the quotation, is that the
Yogin may have knowledge of all things at once.
Vācaspati says that this citta being essentially of the nature of
ahaṃkāra is as all-pervading as the ego itself (IV. 10).
This kāraṇacitta contracts or expands and appears as our individual
cittas in our various bodies at successive rebirths. The kāraṇacitta is
always connected with the purusha and appears contracted when the
purusha presides over animal bodies, and as relatively expanded when he
presides over human bodies, and more expanded when he presides over the
bodies of gods, etc. This contracted or expanded citta appears as our
kāryyacitta which always manifests itself as our states of
consciousness. After death the kāraṇacitta, which is always connected
with the purusha, manifests itself in the new body which is formed by
the āpūra (filling in of prakṛti on account of effective merit or
demerit that the purusha had apparently acquired). The formation of the
body as well as the contraction or expansion of the kāraṇacitta as the
corresponding kāryyacitta to suit it is due to this āpūra. The Yoga does
not hold that the citta has got a separate fine astral body within which
it may remain encased and be transferred along with it to another body
on rebirth. The citta being all-pervading, it appears both to contract
or expand to suit the particular body destined for it owing to its merit
or demerit, but there is no separate astral body (_Tattvavaiśāradī_, IV.
10). In reality the karaṇacitta as such always remains vibhu or
all-pervading; it is only its kāryyacitta or vṛtti that appears in a
contracted or expanded form, according to the particular body which it
may be said to occupy.
The Sāṃkhya view, however, does not regard the citta to be essentially
all-pervading, but small or great according as the body it has to
occupy. Thus Bhikshu and Nāgeśa in explaining the _Bhāshya_, “others
think that the citta expands or contracts according as it is in a bigger
or smaller body, just as light rays do according as they are placed in
the jug or in a room,” attributes this view to the Sāṃkhya
(_Vyāsabhāshya_, IV. 10, and the commentaries by Bhikshu and Nāgeśa on
it).[39]
It is this citta which appears as the particular states of consciousness
in which both the knower and the known are reflected, and it comprehends
them both in one state of consciousness. It must, however, be remembered
that this citta is essentially a modification of prakṛti, and as such is
non-intelligent; but by the seeming reflection of the purusha it appears
as the knower knowing a certain object, and we therefore see that in the
states themselves are comprehended both the knower and the known. This
citta is not, however, a separate tattva, but is the sum or unity of the
eleven senses and the ego and also of the five prāṇas or biomotor forces
(_Nāgeśa_, IV. 10). It thus stands for all that is psychical in man: his
states of consciousness including the living principle in man
represented by the activity of the five prāṇas.
It is the object of Yoga gradually to restrain the citta from its
various states and thus cause it to turn back to its original cause, the
kāraṇacitta, which is all-pervading. The modifications of the
kāraṇacitta into such states as the kāryyacitta is due to its being
overcome by its inherent tamas and rajas; so when the transformations of
the citta into the passing states are arrested by concentration, there
takes place a backward movement and the all-pervading state of the citta
being restored to itself and all tamas being overcome, the Yogin
acquires omniscience, and finally when this citta becomes as pure as the
form of purusha itself, the purusha becomes conscious of himself and is
liberated from the bonds of prakṛti.
The Yoga philosophy in the first chapter describes the Yoga for him
whose mind is inclined towards trance-cognition. In the second chapter
is described the means by which one with an ordinary worldly mind
(_vyutthāna citta_) may also acquire Yoga. In the third chapter are
described those phenomena which strengthen the faith of the Yogin on the
means of attaining Yoga described in the second chapter. In the fourth
chapter is described kaivalya, absolute independence or oneness, which
is the end of all the Yoga practices.
The _Bhāshya_ describes the five classes of cittas and comments upon
their fitness for the Yoga leading to kaivalya. Those are I. _kshipta_
(wandering), II. _mūḍha_ (forgetful), III. _vikshipta_ (occasionally
steady), IV. _ekāgra_ (one-pointed), _niruddha_ (restrained).
I. The _kshiptacitta_ is characterised as wandering, because it is being
always moved by the rajas. This is that citta which is always moved to
and fro by the rise of passions, the excess of which may indeed for the
time overpower the mind and thus generate a temporary concentration, but
it has nothing to do with the contemplative concentration required for
attaining absolute independence. The man moved by rajas, far from
attaining any mastery of himself, is rather a slave to his own passions
and is always being moved to and fro and shaken by them (see
_Siddhānta-candrikā_, I. 2, _Bhojavṛtti_, I. 2).
II. The mūḍhacitta is that which is overpowered by tamas, or passions,
like that of anger, etc., by which it loses its senses and always
chooses the wrong course. Svāmin Hariharāraṇya suggests a beautiful
example of such concentration as similar to that of certain snakes which
become completely absorbed in the prey upon which they are about to
pounce.
III. The vikshiptacitta, or distracted or occasionally steady citta, is
that mind which rationally avoids the painful actions and chooses the
pleasurable ones. Now none of these three kinds of mind can hope to
attain that contemplative concentration called Yoga. This last type of
mind represents ordinary people, who sometimes tend towards good but
relapse back to evil.
IV. The one-pointed (ekāgra) is that kind of mind in which true
knowledge of the nature of reality is present and the afflictions due to
nescience or false knowledge are thus attenuated and the mind better
adapted to attain the nirodha or restrained state. All these come under
the saṃprajñāta (concentration on an object of knowledge) type.
V. The nirodha or restrained mind is that in which all mental states are
arrested. This leads to kaivalya.
Ordinarily our minds are engaged only in perception, inference,
etc.—those mental states which we all naturally possess. These ordinary
mental states are full of rajas and tamas. When these are arrested, the
mind flows with an abundance of sattva in the saṃprajñāta samādhi;
lastly when even the saṃprajñāta state is arrested, all possible states
become arrested.
Another important fact which must be noted is the relation of the actual
states of mind called the vṛttis with the latent states called the
saṃskāras—the potency. When a particular mental state passes away into
another, it is not altogether lost, but is preserved in the mind in a
latent form as a saṃskāra, which is always trying to manifest itself in
actuality. The vṛttis or actual states are thus both generating the
saṃskāras and are also always tending to manifest themselves and
actually generating similar vṛttis or actual states. There is a
circulation from vṛttis to saṃskāras and from them again to vṛttis
(_saṃskārāḥ vṛttibhiḥ kriyante, saṃskāraiśca vṛttayaḥ evaṃ
vṛttisaṃskāracakramaniśamāvarttate_). So the formation of saṃskāras and
their conservation are gradually being strengthened by the habit of
similar vṛttis or actual states, and their continuity is again
guaranteed by the strength and continuity of these saṃskāras. The
saṃskāras are like roots striking deep into the soil and growing with
the growth of the plant above, but even when the plant above the soil is
destroyed, the roots remain undisturbed and may again shoot forth as
plants whenever they obtain a favourable season. Thus it is not enough
for a Yogin to arrest any particular class of mental states; he must
attain such a habit of restraint that the saṃskāra thus generated is
able to overcome, weaken and destroy the saṃskāra of those actual states
which he has arrested by his contemplation. Unless restrained by such a
habit, the saṃskāra of cessation (_nirodhaja saṃskāra_) which is opposed
to the previously acquired mental states become powerful and destroy the
latter, these are sure to shoot forth again in favourable season into
their corresponding actual states.
The conception of avidyā or nescience is here not negative but has a
definite positive aspect. It means that kind of knowledge which is
opposed to true knowledge (_vidyāviparītaṃ jñānāntaramavidyā_). This is
of four kinds: (1) The thinking of the non-eternal world, which is
merely an effect, as eternal. (2) The thinking of the impure as the
pure, as for example the attraction that a woman’s body may have for a
man leading him to think the impure body pure. (3) The thinking of vice
as virtue, of the undesirable as the desirable, of pain as pleasure. We
know that for a Yogin every phenomenal state of existence is painful
(II. 15). A Yogin knows that attachment (_rāga_) to sensual and other
objects can only give temporary pleasure, for it is sure to be soon
turned into pain. Enjoyment can never bring satisfaction, but only
involves a man further and further in sorrows. (4) Considering the
non-self, e.g. the body as the self. This causes a feeling of being
injured on the injury of the body.
At the moment of enjoyment there is always present suffering from pain
in the form of aversion to pain; for the tendency to aversion from pain
can only result from the incipient memory of previous sufferings. Of
course this is also a case of pleasure turned into pain
(_pariṇāmaduḥkhatā_), but it differs from it in this that in the case of
pariṇāmaduḥkha pleasure is turned into pain as a result of change or
pariṇāma in the future, whereas in this case the anxiety as to pain is a
thing of the present, happening at one and the same time that a man is
enjoying pleasure.
Enjoyment of pleasure or suffering from pain causes those impressions
called saṃskāra or potencies, and these again when aided by association
naturally create their memory and thence comes attachment or aversion,
then again action, and again pleasure and pain and hence impressions,
memory, attachment or aversion, and again action and so forth.
All states are modifications of the three guṇas; in each one of them the
functions of all the three guṇas are seen, contrary to one another.
These contraries are observable in their developed forms, for the guṇas
are seen to abide in various proportions and compose all our mental
states. Thus a Yogin who wishes to be released from pain once for all is
very sensitive and anxious to avoid even our so-called pleasures. The
wise are like the eye-ball. As a thread of wool thrown into the eye
pains by merely touching it, but not when it comes into contact with any
other organ, so the Yogin is as tender as the eye-ball, when others are
insensible of pain. Ordinary persons, however, who have again and again
suffered pains as the consequence of their own karma, and who again seek
them after having given them up, are all round pierced through as it
were by nescience, their minds become full of afflictions, variegated by
the eternal residua of the passions. They follow in the wake of the “I”
and the “Mine” in relation to things that should be left apart, pursuing
threefold pain in repeated births, due to external and internal causes.
The Yogin seeing himself and the world of living beings surrounded by
the eternal flow of pain, turns for refuge to right knowledge, cause of
the destruction of all pains (_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, II. 15).
Thinking of the mind and body and the objects of the external world as
the true self and feeling affected by their change is avidyā (false
knowledge).
The modifications that this avidyā suffers may be summarised under four
heads.
I. The ego, which, as described above, springs from the identification
of the buddhi with the purusha.
II. From this ego springs attachment (_rāga_) which is the inclination
towards pleasure and consequently towards the means necessary for
attaining it in a person who has previously experienced pleasures and
remembers them.
II. Repulsion from pain also springs from the ego and is of the nature
of anxiety for its removal; anger at pain and the means which produces
pain, remains in the mind in consequence of the feeling of pain, in the
case of him who has felt and remembers pain.
IV. Love of life also springs from the ego. This feeling exists in all
persons and appears in a positive aspect in the form “would that I were
never to cease.” This is due to the painful experience of death in some
previous existence, which abides in us as a residual potency (_vāsanā_)
and causes the instincts of self-preservation, fear of death and love of
life. These modifications including avidyā are called the five kleśas or
afflictions.
We are now in a position to see the far-reaching effects of the
identification of the purusha with the buddhi. We have already seen how
it has generated the macrocosm or external world on the one hand, and
manas and the senses on the other. Now we see that from it also spring
attachment to pleasure, aversion from pain and love of life, motives
observable in most of our states of consciousness, which are therefore
called the _klishṭa vṛtti_ or afflicted states. The five afflictions
(false knowledge and its four modifications spoken above) just mentioned
are all comprehended in avidyā, since avidyā or false knowledge is at
the root of all worldly experiences. The sphere of avidyā is all false
knowledge generally, and that of asmitā is also inseparably connected
with all our experiences which consist in the identification of the
intelligent self with the sensual objects of the world, the attainment
of which seems to please us and the loss of which is so painful to us.
It must, however, be remembered that these five afflictions are only
different aspects of avidyā and cannot be conceived separately from
avidyā. These always lead us into the meshes of the world, far from our
final goal—the realisation of our own self—emancipation of the purusha.
Opposed to it are the vṛttis or states which are called unafflicted,
aklishṭa, the habit of steadiness (_abhyāsa_) and non-attachment to
pleasures (_vairāgya_) which being antagonistic to the afflicted states,
are helpful towards achieving true knowledge. These represent such
thoughts as tend towards emancipation and are produced from our attempts
to conceive rationally our final state of emancipation, or to adopt
suitable means for this. They must not, however, be confused with
puṇyakarma (virtuous action), for both puṇya and pāpa karma are said to
have sprung from the kleśas. There is no hard and fast rule with regard
to the appearance of these klishṭa and aklishṭa states, so that in the
stream of the klishṭa states or in the intervals thereof, aklishṭa
states may also appear—as practice and desirelessness born from the
study of the Veda-reasoning and precepts—and remain quite distinct in
itself, unmixed with the klishṭa states. A Brahman being in a village
which is full of the Kirātas, does not himself become a Kirāta (a forest
tribe) for that reason.
Each aklishṭa state produces its own potency or saṃskāra, and with the
frequency of the states their saṃskāra is strengthened which in due
course suppresses the aklishṭa states.
These klishṭa and aklishṭa modifications are of five descriptions:
pramāṇa (real cognition), viparyyaya (unreal cognition), vikalpa
(logical abstraction and imagination), nidrā (sleep), smṛti (memory).
These vṛttis or states, however, must be distinguished from the six
kinds of mental activity mentioned in _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, II. 18: grahaṇa
(reception or presentative ideation), dhāraṇa (retention), ūha
(assimilation), apoha (differentiation), tattvajñāna (right knowledge),
abhiniveśa (decision and determination), of which these states are the
products.
We have seen that from avidyā spring all the kleśas or afflictions,
which are therefore seen to be the source of the klishṭa vṛttis as well.
Abhyāsa and vairāgya—the aklishṭa vṛttis, which spring from precepts,
etc., lead to right knowledge, and as such are antagonistic to the
modification of the guṇas on the avidyā side.
We know also that both these sets of vṛttis—the klishṭa and the
aklishṭa—produce their own kinds of saṃskāras, the klishṭa saṃskāra and
the aklishṭa or prajñā saṃskāra. All these modifications of citta as
vṛtti and saṃskāra are the dharmas of citta, considered as the dharmin
or substance.
CHAPTER IX
THE THEORY OF KARMA
The vṛttis are called the mānasa karmas (mental work) as different from
the bāhya karmas (external work) achieved in the exterior world by the
five motor or active senses. These may be divided into four classes: (1)
kṛshṇa (black), (2) śukla (white), (3) śuklakṛshṇa (white and black),
(4) aśuklākṛshṇa (neither white nor black). (1) The kṛshṇa karmas are
those committed by the wicked and, as such, are wicked actions called
also adharma (demerit). These are of two kinds, viz. bāhya and mānasa,
the former being of the nature of speaking ill of others, stealing
others’ property, etc., and the latter of the nature of such states as
are opposed to śraddhā, vīrya, etc., which are called the śukla karma.
(2) The śukla karmas are virtuous or meritorious deeds. These can only
occur in the form of mental states, and as such can take place only in
the mānasa karma. These are śraddhā (faith), vīrya (strength), smṛti
(meditation), samādhi (absorption), and prajñā (wisdom), which are
infinitely superior to actions achieved in the external world by the
motor or active senses. The śukla karma belongs to those who resort to
study and meditation. (3) The śuklakṛshṇa karma are the actions achieved
in the external world by the motor or active senses. These are called
white and black, because actions achieved in the external world, however
good (śukla) they might be, cannot be altogether devoid of wickedness
(kṛshṇa), since all external actions entail some harm to other living
beings.
Even the Vedic duties, though meritorious, are associated with sins, for
they entail the sacrificing of animals.[40]
The white side of these actions, viz.: that of helping others and doing
good is therefore called dharma, as it is the cause of the enjoyment of
pleasure and happiness for the doer. The kṛshṇa or black side of these
actions, viz. that of doing injury to others is called adharma, as it is
the cause of the suffering of pain to the doer. In all our ordinary
states of existence we are always under the influence of dharma and
adharma, which are therefore called vehicles of actions (_āśerate
sāṃsārikā purushā asmin niti āśayaḥ_). That in which some thing lives is
its vehicle. Here the purushas in evolution are to be understood as
living in the sheath of actions (which is for that reason called a
vehicle or āśaya). Merit or virtue, and sin or demerit are the vehicles
of actions. All śukla karma, therefore, either mental or external, is
called merit or virtue and is productive of happiness; all kṛshṇa karma,
either mental or external, is called demerit, sin or vice and is
productive of pain.
(4) The karma called aśuklakṛshṇa (neither black nor white) is of those
who have renounced everything, whose afflictions have been destroyed and
whose present body is the last one they will have. Those who have
renounced actions, the karma-sannyāsis (and not those who belong to the
sannyāsāśrama merely), are nowhere found performing actions which depend
upon external means. They have not got the black vehicle of actions,
because they do not perform such actions. Nor do they possess the white
vehicle of actions, because they dedicate to Īśvara the fruits of all
vehicles of action, brought about by the practice of Yoga.
Returning to the question of karmāśaya again for review, we see that
being produced from desire (_kāma_), avarice (_lobha_), ignorance
(_moha_), and anger (_krodha_) it has really got at its root the kleśas
(afflictions) such as avidyā (ignorance), asmitā (egoism), rāga
(attachment), dvesha (antipathy), abhiniveśa (love of life). It will be
easily seen that the passions named above, desire, lust, etc., are not
in any way different from the kleśas or afflictions previously
mentioned; and as all actions, virtuous or sinful, have their springs in
the said sentiments of desire, anger, covetousness, and infatuation, it
is quite enough that all these virtuous or sinful actions spring from
the kleśas.
Now this karmāśaya ripens into life-state, life-experience and
life-time, if the roots—the afflictions—exist. Not only is it true that
when the afflictions are rooted out, no karmāśaya can accumulate, but
even when many karmāśayas of many lives are accumulated, they are rooted
out when the afflictions are destroyed. Otherwise, it is difficult to
conceive that the karmāśaya accumulated for an infinite number of years,
whose time of ripeness is uncertain, will be rooted out! So even if
there be no fresh karmāśaya after the rise of true knowledge, the
purusha cannot be liberated but will be required to suffer an endless
cycle of births and rebirths to exhaust the already accumulated
karmāśayas of endless lives. For this reason, the mental plane becomes a
field for the production of the fruits of action only, when it is
watered by the stream of afflictions. Hence the afflictions help the
vehicle of actions (karmāśaya) in the production of their fruits also.
It is for this reason that when the afflictions are destroyed the power
which helps to bring about the manifestation also disappears; and on
that account the vehicles of actions although existing in innumerable
quantities have no time for their fruition and do not possess the power
of producing fruit, because their seed-powers are destroyed by
intellection.
Karmāśaya is of two kinds. (1) Ripening in the same life
_dṛshṭajanmavedanīya_. (2) Ripening in another unknown life. That puṇya
karmāśaya, which is generated by intense purificatory action, trance and
repetition of mantras, and that pāpa karmāśaya, which is generated by
repeated evil done either to men who are suffering the extreme misery of
fear, disease and helplessness, or to those who place confidence in them
or to those who are high-minded and perform tapas, ripen into fruit in
the very same life, whereas other kinds of karmāśayas ripen in some
unknown life.
Living beings in hell have no dṛshṭajanma karmāśaya, for this life is
intended for suffering only and their bodies are called the
bhoga-śarīras intended for suffering alone and not for the accumulation
of any karmāśaya which could take effect in that very life.
There are others whose afflictions have been spent and exhausted and
thus they have no such karmāśaya, the effect of which they will have
to reap in some other life. They are thus said to have no
adṛshṭa-janmavedanīya karma.
The karmāśaya of both kinds described above ripens into life-state,
life-time and life-experience. These are called the three ripenings or
vipākas of the karmāśaya; and they are conducive to pleasure or pain,
according as they are products of puṇyakarmāśaya (virtue) or pāpa
karmāśaya (vice or demerit). Many karmāśayas combine to produce one
life-state; for it is not possible that each karma should produce one or
many life-states, for then there would be no possibility of experiencing
the effects of the karmas, because if for each one of the karmas we had
one or more lives, karmas, being endless, space for obtaining lives in
which to experience effects would not be available, for it would take
endless time to exhaust the karmas already accumulated. It is therefore
held that many karmas unite to produce one life-state or birth (jāti)
and to determine also its particular duration (āyush) and experience
(bhoga). The virtuous and sinful karmāśayas accumulated in one life, in
order to produce their effects, cause the death of the individual and
manifest themselves in producing his rebirth, his duration of life and
particular experiences, pleasurable or painful. The order of undergoing
the experiences is the order in which the karmas manifest themselves as
effects, the principal ones being manifested earlier in life. The
principal karmas here refer to those which are quite ready to generate
their effects. Thus it is said that those karmas which produce their
effects immediately are called primary, whereas those which produce
effects after some delay are called secondary. Thus we see that there is
continuity of existence throughout; when the karmas of this life ripen
jointly they tend to fructify by causing another birth as a means to
which death is caused, and along with it life is manifested in another
body (according to the dharma and adharma of the karmāśaya) formed by
the prakṛtyāpūra (cf. the citta theory described above); and the same
karmāśaya regulates the life-period and experiences of that life, the
karmāśayas of which again take a similar course and manifest themselves
in the production of another life and so on.
We have seen that the karmāśaya has three fructifications, viz. jāti,
āyush and bhoga. Now generally the karmāśaya is regarded as ekabhavika
or unigenital, i.e. it accumulates in one life. Ekabhava means one life
and ekabhavika means the product of one life, or accumulated in one
life. Regarded from this point of view, it may be contrasted with the
vāsanās which remain accumulated from thousands of previous lives since
eternity, the mind, being pervaded all over with them, as a fishing-net
is covered all over with knots. This vāsanā results from memory of the
experiences of a life generated by the fructification of the karmāśaya
and kept in the citta in the form of potency or impressions (saṃskāra).
Now we have previously seen that the citta remains constant in all the
births and rebirths that an individual has undergone from eternity; it
therefore keeps the memory of those various experiences of thousands of
lives in the form of saṃskāra or potency and is therefore compared with
a fishing-net pervaded all over with knots. The vāsanās therefore are
not the results of the accumulation of experiences or their memory in
one life but in many lives, and are therefore called anekabhavika as
contrasted with the karmāśaya representing virtuous and vicious actions
which are accumulated in one life and which produce another life, its
experiences and its life-duration as a result of fructification
(vipāka). This vāsanā is the cause of the instinctive tendencies, or
habits of deriving pleasures and pains peculiar to different animal
lives.
Thus the habits of a dog-life and its peculiar modes of taking its
experiences and of deriving pleasures and pains are very different in
nature from those of a man-life; they must therefore be explained on the
basis of an incipient memory in the form of potency, or impressions
(saṃskāra) of the experiences that an individual must have undergone in
a previous dog-life.
Now when by the fructification of the karmāśaya a dog-life is settled
for a person, his corresponding vāsanās of a previous dog-life are at
once revived and he begins to take interest in his dog-life in the
manner of a dog; the same principle applies to the virtue of individuals
as men or as gods (IV. 8).
If there was not this law of vāsanās, then any vāsanā would be revived
in any life, and with the manifestation of the vāsanā of animal life a
man would take interest in eating grass and derive pleasure from it.
Thus Nāgeśa says: “Now if those karmas which produce a man-life should
manifest the vāsanās of animal lives, then one might be inclined to eat
grass as a man, and it is therefore said that only the vāsanās
corresponding to the karmas are revived.”
Now as the vāsanās are of the nature of saṃskāras or impressions, they
lie ingrained in the citta and nothing can prevent their being revived.
The intervention of other births has no effect. For this reason, the
vāsanās of a dog-life are at once revived in another dog-life, though
between the first dog-life and the second dog-life, the individual may
have passed through many other lives, as a man, a bull, etc., though the
second dog-life may take place many hundreds of years after the first
dog-life and in quite different countries. The difference between
saṃskāras, impressions, and smṛti or memory is simply this that the
former is the latent state whereas the latter is the manifested state;
so we see that the memory and the impressions are identical in nature,
so that whenever a saṃskāra is revived, it means nothing but the
manifestation of the memory of the same experiences conserved in the
saṃskāra in a latent state. Experiences, when they take place, keep
their impressions in the mind, though thousands of other experiences,
lapse of time, etc., may intervene. They are revived in one moment with
the proper cause of their revival, and the other intervening experiences
can in no way hinder this revival. So it is with the vāsanās, which are
revived at once according to the particular fructification of the
karmāśaya, in the form of a particular life, as a man, a dog, or
anything else.
It is now clear that the karmāśaya tending towards fructification is the
cause of the manifestation of the vāsanās already existing in the mind
in a latent form. Thus the Sūtra says:—“When two similar lives are
separated by many births, long lapses of time and remoteness of space,
even then for the purpose of the revival of the vāsanās, they may be
regarded as immediately following each other, for the memories and
impressions are the same” (_Yoga-sūtra_, IV. 9). The _Bhāshya_ says:
“the vāsanā is like the memory (smṛti), and so there can be memory from
the impressions of past lives separated by many lives and by remote
tracts of country. From these memories the impressions (saṃskāras) are
derived, and the memories are revived by manifestation of the
karmāśayas, and though memories from past impressions may have many
lives intervening, these interventions do not destroy the causal
antecedence of those past lives” (IV. 9).
These vāsanās are, however, beginningless, for a baby just after birth
is seen to feel the fear of death instinctively, and it could not have
derived it from its experience in this life. Again, if a small baby is
thrown upwards, it is seen to shake and cry like a grown-up man, and
from this it may be inferred that it is afraid of falling down on the
ground and is therefore shaking through fear. Now this baby has never
learnt in this life from experience that a fall on the ground will cause
pain, for it has never fallen on the ground and suffered pain therefrom;
so the cause of this fear cannot be sought in the experiences of this
life, but in the memory of past experiences of fall and pain arising
therefrom, which is innate in this life as vāsanā and causes this
instinctive fear. So this innate memory which causes instinctive fear of
death from the very time of birth, has not its origin in this life but
is the memory of the experience of some previous life, and in that life,
too, it existed as innate memory of some other previous life, and in
that again as the innate memory of some other life and so on to
beginningless time. This goes to show that the vāsanās are without
beginning.
We come now to the question of unigenitality—ekabhavikatva—of the
karmāśaya and its exceptions. We find that great confusion has occurred
among the commentators about the following passage in the _Bhāshya_
which refers to this subject: The _Bhāshya_ according to Vācaspati in
II. 13 reads: _tatra dṛshṭajanmavedanīyasya niyatavipākasya_, etc. Here
Bhikshu and Nāgeśa read _tatrādṛshṭajanmavedanīyasya niyatavipākasya_,
etc. There is thus a divergence of meaning on this point between
_Yoga-vārttika_ and his follower Nāgeśa, on one side, and Vācaspati on
the other.
Vācaspati says that the dṛshṭajanmavedanīya (to be fructified in the
same visible life) karma is the only true karma where the karmāśaya is
ekabhavika, unigenital, for here these effects are positively not due to
the karma of any other previous lives, but to the karma of that very
life. Thus these are the only true causes of ekabhavika karmāśaya.
Thus according to Vācaspati we see that the adṛshṭajanmavedanīya karma
(to be fructified in another life) of unappointed fruition is never an
ideal of ekabhavikatva or unigenital character; for it may have three
different courses: (1) It may be destroyed without fruition. (2) It may
become merged in the ruling action. (3) It may exist for a long time
overpowered by the ruling action whose fruition has been appointed.
Vijñāna Bhikshu and his follower Nāgeśa, however, say that the
dṛshṭajanmavedanīya karma (to be fructified in the same visible life)
can never be ekabhavika or unigenital for there is no bhava, or previous
birth there, whose product is being fructified in that life, for this
karma is of that same visible life and not of some other previous bhava
or life; and they agree in holding that it is for that reason that the
_Bhāshya_ makes no mention of this dṛshṭajanmavedanīya karma; it is
clear that the karmāśaya in no other bhava is being fructified here.
Thus we see that about dṛshṭajanmavedanīya karma, Vācaspati holds that
it is the typical case of ekabhavika karma (karma of the same birth),
whereas Vijñāna Bhikshu holds just the opposite view, viz. that the
dṛhṭajanmavedanīya karma should by no means be considered as ekabhavika
since there is here no bhava or birth, it being fructified in the same
life.
The adṛshṭajanmavedanīya karma (works to be fructified in another life)
of unfixed fruition has three different courses: (I) As we have observed
before, by the rise of _aśuklākṛshṇa_ (neither black nor white) karma,
the other karmas—_śukla_ (black), _kṛshṇa_ (white) and _śuklakṛshṇa_
(both black and white)—are rooted out. The śukla karmāśaya again arising
from study and asceticism destroys the kṛshṇa karmas without their being
able to generate their effects. These therefore can never be styled
ekabhavika, since they are destroyed without producing any effect. (II)
When the effects of minor actions are merged in the effects of the major
and ruling action. The sins originating from the sacrifice of animals at
a holy sacrifice are sure to produce bad effects, though they may be
minor and small in comparison with the good effects arising from the
performance of the sacrifice in which they are merged. Thus it is said
that the experts being immersed in floods of happiness brought about by
their sacrifices bear gladly particles of the fire of sorrow brought
about by the sin of killing animals at sacrifice. So we see that here
also the minor actions having been performed with the major do not
produce their effects independently, and so all their effects are not
fully manifested, and hence these secondary karmāśayas cannot be
regarded as ekabhavika. (III) Again the adṛshṭajanmavedanīya karma (to
be fructified in another life) of unfixed fruition (_aniyata vipāka_)
remains overcome for a long time by another adṛshṭajanmavedanīya karma
of fixed fruition. A man may for example do some good actions and some
extremely vicious ones, so that at the time of death, the karmāśaya of
those vicious actions becoming ripe and fit for appointed fruition,
generates an animal life. His good action, whose benefits are such as
may be reaped only in a man-life, will remain overcome until the man is
born again as a man: so this also cannot be said to be ekabhavika (to be
reaped in one life). We may summarise the classification of karmas
according to Vācaspati in a table as follows:—
Karmāśaya
|
+-------------------+--------------------+
| |
Ekabhavika Anekabhavika
| |
Niyata Vipāka Aniyatavipāka
(of fixed fruition). |
| Adṛshṭajanmavedanīya
+------+--------------------+ |
| | |
Dṛshṭajanmavedanīya Adṛshṭajanmavedanīya |
|
+----------------+----------+-----+
| | |
(Destruction) (Merged in the (To remain
effect of the overcome by
major action.) the influence
of some other
action.)
Thus the karmāśaya may be viewed from two sides, one being that of fixed
fruition and the other unfixed fruition, and the other that of
dṛshṭajanmavedanīya and adṛshṭajanmavedanīya. Now the theory is that the
niyatavipāka (of fixed fruition) karmāśaya is always ekabhavika, i.e. it
does not remain separated by other lives, but directly produces its
effects in the succeeding life.
Ekabhavika means that which is produced from the accumulation of karmas
in one life in the life which succeeds it. Vācaspati, however, takes it
also to mean that action which attains fruition in the same life in
which it is performed, whereas what Vijñāna Bhikshu understands by
ekabhavika is that action alone which is produced in the life
immediately succeeding the life in which it was accumulated. So
according to Vijñāna Bhikshu, the niyata vipāka (of fixed fruition)
dṛshṭajanmavedanīya (to be fructified in the same life) action is not
ekabhavika, since it has no bhava, i.e. it is not the production of a
preceding life. Neither can it be anekabhavika; thus this
niyatavipākadṛshṭajanmavedanīya action is neither ekabhavika nor
anekbhavika. Whereas Vācaspati is inclined to call this also ekabhavika.
About the niyatavipāka-adṛshṭajanmavedanīya action being called
ekabhavika (unigenital) there seems to be no dispute. The
aniyatavipāka-adṛshṭajanmavedanīya action cannot be called ekabhavika as
it undergoes three different courses described above.
CHAPTER X
THE ETHICAL PROBLEM
We have described avidyā and its special forms as the kleśas, from which
also proceed the actions virtuous and vicious, which in their turn again
produce as a result of their fruition, birth, life and experiences of
pleasure and pain and the vāsanās or residues of the memory of these
experiences. Again every new life or birth is produced from the
fructification of actions of a previous life; a man is made to perform
actions good or bad by the kleśas which are rooted in him, and these
actions, as a result of their fructification, produce another life and
its experiences, in which life again new actions are earned by virtue of
the kleśas, and thus the cycle is continued. When there is pralaya or
involution of the cosmical world-process the individual cittas of the
separate purushas return back to the prakṛti and lie within it, together
with their own avidyās, and at the time of each new creation or
evolution these are created anew with such changes as are due according
to their individual avidyās, with which they had to return back to their
original cause, the prakṛti, and spend an indivisible inseparable
existence with it. The avidyās of some other creation, being merged in
the prakṛti along with the cittas, remain in the prakṛti as vāsanās, and
prakṛti being under the influence of these avidyās as vāsanās creates as
modifications of itself the corresponding minds for the individual
purushas, connected with them before the last pralaya dissolution. So we
see that though the cittas had returned to their original causes with
their individual nescience (_avidyā_), the avidyā was not lost but was
revived at the time of the new creation and created such minds as should
be suitable receptacles for it. These minds (buddhi) are found to be
modified further into their specific cittas or mental planes by the same
avidyā which is manifested in them as the kleśas, and these again in the
karmāśaya, jāti, āyush and bhoga, and so on; the individual, however, is
just in the same position as he was or would have been before the
involution of pralaya. The avidyās of the cittas which had returned to
the prakṛti at the time of the creation being revived, create their own
buddhis of the previous creation, and by their connection with the
individual purushas are the causes of the saṃsāra or cosmic
evolution—the evolution of the microcosm, the cittas, and the macrocosm
or the exterior world.
In this new creation, the creative agencies of God and avidyā are thus
distinguished in that the latter represents the end or purpose of the
prakṛti—the ever-evolving energy transforming itself into its
modifications as the mental and the material world; whereas the former
represents that intelligent power which abides outside the pale of
prakṛti, but removes obstructions offered by the prakṛti. Though
unintelligent and not knowing how and where to yield so as to form the
actual modifications necessary for the realisation of the particular and
specific objects of the numberless purushas, these avidyās hold within
themselves the serviceability of the purushas, and are the cause of the
connection of the purusha and the prakṛti, so that when these avidyās
are rooted out it is said that the purushārthatā or serviceability of
the purusha is at an end and the purusha becomes liberated from the
bonds of prakṛti, and this is called the final goal of the purusha.
The ethical problem of the Pātañjala philosophy is the uprooting of this
avidyā by the attainment of true knowledge of the nature of the purusha,
which will be succeeded by the liberation of the purusha and his
absolute freedom or independence—kaivalya—the last realisation of the
purusha—the ultimate goal of all the movements of the prakṛti.
This final uprooting of the avidyā with its vāsanās directly follows the
attainment of true knowledge called prajñā, in which state the seed of
false knowledge is altogether burnt and cannot be revived again. Before
this state, the discriminative knowledge which arises as the recognition
of the distinct natures of purusha and buddhi remains shaky; but when by
continual practice this discriminative knowledge becomes strengthened in
the mind, its potency gradually grows stronger and stronger, and roots
out the potency of the ordinary states of mental activity, and thus the
seed of false knowledge becomes burnt up and incapable of fruition, and
the impurity of the energy of rajas being removed, the sattva as the
manifesting entity becomes of the highest purity, and in that state
flows on the stream of the notion of discrimination—the recognition of
the distinct natures of purusha and buddhi—free from impurity. Thus when
the state of buddhi becomes almost as pure as the purusha itself, all
self-enquiry subsides, the vision of the real form of the purusha
arises, and false knowledge, together with the kleśas and the consequent
fruition of actions, ceases once for all. This is that state of citta
which, far from tending towards the objective world, tends towards the
kaivalya of the purusha.
In the first stages, when the mind attains discriminative knowledge, the
prajñā is not deeply seated, and occasionally phenomenal states of
consciousness are seen to intervene in the form of “I am,” “Mine,” “I
know,” “I do not know,” because the old potencies, though becoming
weaker and weaker are not finally destroyed, and consequently
occasionally produce their corresponding conscious manifestation as
states which impede the flow of discriminative knowledge. But constant
practice in rooting out the potency of this state destroys the potencies
of the outgoing activity, and finally no intervention occurs in the flow
of the stream of prajñā through the destructive influence of phenomenal
states of consciousness. In this higher state when the mind is in its
natural, passive, and objectless stream of flowing prajñā, it is called
the dharmamegha-saṁādhi. When nothing is desired even from dhyāna arises
the true knowledge which distinguishes prakṛti from purusha and is
called the dharmamegha-samādhi (_Yoga-sūtra_, IV. 29). The potency,
however, of this state of consciousness lasts until the purusha is
finally liberated from the bonds of prakṛti and is absolutely free
(kevalī). Now this is the state when the citta becomes infinite, and all
its tamas being finally overcome, it shines forth like the sun, which
can reflect all, and in comparison to which the crippled insignificant
light of objective knowledge shrinks altogether, and thus an infinitude
is acquired, which has absorbed within itself all finitude, which cannot
have any separate existence or manifestation through this infinite
knowledge. All finite states of knowledge are only a limitation of true
infinite knowledge, in which there is no limitation of this and that. It
absorbs within itself all these limitations.
The purusha in this state may be called the emancipated being,
jīvanmukta. Nāgeśa in explaining _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, IV. 31, describing the
emancipated life says: “In this jīvanmukta stage, being freed from all
impure afflictions and karmas, the consciousness shines in its
infirmity. The infiniteness of consciousness is different from the
infiniteness of materiality veiled by tamas. In those stages there could
be consciousness only with reference to certain things with reference to
which the veil of tamas was raised by rajas. When all veils and
impurities are removed, then little is left which is not known. If there
were other categories besides the 25 categories, these also would then
have been known” (_Chāyāvyākhyā_, IV. 31).
Now with the rise of such dharmamegha the succession of the changes of
the qualities is over, inasmuch as they have fulfilled their object by
having achieved experience and emancipation, and their succession having
ended, they cannot stay even for a moment. And now comes absolute
freedom, when the guṇas return back to the pradhāna their primal cause,
after performing their service for the purusha by providing his
experience and his salvation, so that they lose all their hold on
purusha and purusha remains as he is in himself, and never again has any
connection with the buddhi. The purusha remains always in himself in
absolute freedom.
The order of the return of the guṇas for a kevalī purusha is described
below in the words of Vācaspati: The guṇas as cause and effect involving
ordinary experiences samādhi and nirodha, become submerged in the manas;
the manas becomes submerged in the asmitā, the asmitā in the liṅga, and
the liṅga in the aliṅga.
This state of kaivalya must be distinguished from the state of
mahāpralaya in which also the guṇas return back to prakṛti, for that
state is again succeeded by later connections of prakṛti with purushas
through the buddhis, but the state of kaivalya is an eternal state which
is never again disturbed by any connection with prakṛti, for now the
separation of prakṛti from purusha is eternal, whereas that in the
mahāpralaya state was only temporary.
We shall conclude this section by noting two kinds of eternity of
purusha and of prakṛti, and by offering a criticism of the prajñā state.
The former is said to be perfectly and unchangeably eternal (_kūṭastha
nitya_), and the latter is only eternal in an evolutionary form. The
permanent or eternal reality is that which remains unchanged amid its
changing appearances; and from this point of view both purusha and
prakṛti are eternal. It is indeed true, as we have seen just now, that
the succession of changes of qualities with regard to buddhi, etc.,
comes to an end when kaivalya is attained, but this is with reference to
purusha, for the changes of qualities in the guṇas themselves never come
to an end. So the guṇas in themselves are eternal in their changing or
evolutionary character, and are therefore said to possess evolutionary
eternity (_pariṇāminityatā_). Our phenomenal conception cannot be free
from change, and therefore it is that in our conception of the released
purushas we affirm their existence, as for example when we say that the
released purushas exist eternally. But it must be carefully noted that
this is due to the limited character of our thoughts and expressions,
not to the real nature of the released purushas, which remain for ever
unqualified by any changes or modifications, pure and colourless as the
very self of shining intelligence (see _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, IV. 33).
We shall conclude this section by giving a short analysis of the prajñā
state from its first appearance to the final release of purusha from the
bondage of prakṛti. Patañjali says that this prajñā state being final in
each stage is sevenfold. Of these the first four stages are due to our
conscious endeavour, and when these conscious states of prajñā
(supernatural wisdom) flow in a stream and are not hindered or
interfered with in any way by other phenomenal conscious states of
pratyayas the purusha becomes finally liberated through the natural
backward movement of the citta to its own primal cause, and this
backward movement is represented by the other three stages.
The seven prajñā stages may be thus enumerated:—
I. The pain to be removed is known. Nothing further remains to be known
of it.
This is the first aspect of the prajñā, in which the person willing to
be released knows that he has exhausted all that is knowable of the
pains.
II. The cause of the pains has been removed and nothing further remains
to be removed of it. This is the second stage or aspect of the rise of
prajñā.
III. The nature of the extinction of pain has already been perceived by
me in the state of samādhi, so that I have come to learn that the final
extinction of my pain will be something like it.
IV. The final discrimination of prakṛti and purusha, the true and
immediate means of the extinction of pain, has been realised.
After this stage, nothing remains to be done by the purusha himself. For
this is the attainment of final true knowledge. It is also called the
para vairāgya. It is the highest consummation, in which the purusha has
no further duties to perform. This is therefore called the kārya vimukti
(or salvation depending on the endeavour of the purusha) or jīvanmukti.
After this follows the citta vimukti or the process of release of the
purusha from the citta, in three stages.
V. The aspect of the buddhi, which has finally finished its services to
purusha by providing scope for purusha’s experiences and release; so
that it has nothing else to perform for purusha. This is the first stage
of the retirement of the citta.
VI. As soon as this state is attained, like the falling of stones thrown
from the summit of a hill, the guṇas cannot remain even for a moment to
bind the purusha, but at once return back to their primal cause, the
prakṛti; for the avidyā being rooted out, there is no tie or bond which
can keep it connected with purusha and make it suffer changes for the
service of purusha. All the purushārthatā being ended, the guṇas
disappear of themselves.
VII. The seventh and last aspect of the guṇas is that they never return
back to bind purusha again, their teleological purpose being fulfilled
or realised. It is of course easy to see that, in these last three
stages, purusha has nothing to do; but the guṇas of their own nature
suffer these backward modifications and return back to their own primal
cause and leave the purusha kevalī (for ever solitary). _Vyāsa-bhāshya_,
II. 15.
Vyāsa says that as the science of medicine has four divisions: (1)
disease, (2) the cause of disease, (3) recovery, (4) medicines; so this
Yoga philosophy has also four divisions, viz.: (I) Saṃsāra (the
evolution of the prakṛti in connection with the purusha). (II) The cause
of saṃsāra. (III) Release. (IV) The means of release.
Of these the first three have been described at some length above. We
now direct our attention to the fourth. We have shown above that the
ethical goal, the ideal to be realised, is absolute freedom or kaivalya,
and we shall now consider the line of action that must be adopted to
attain this goal—the _summum bonum_. All actions which tend towards the
approximate realisation of this goal for man are called kuśala, and the
man who achieves this goal is called kuśalī. It is in the inherent
purpose of prakṛti that man should undergo pains which include all
phenomenal experiences of pleasures as well, and ultimately adopt such a
course of conduct as to avoid them altogether and finally achieve the
true goal, the realisation of which will extinguish all pains for him
for ever. The motive therefore which prompts a person towards this
ethico-metaphysical goal is the avoidance of pain. An ordinary man feels
pain only in actual pain, but a Yogin who is as highly sensitive as the
eye-ball, feels pain in pleasure as well, and therefore is determined to
avoid all experiences, painful or so-called pleasurable. The
extinguishing of all experiences, however, is not the true ethical goal,
being only a means to the realisation of kaivalya or the true self and
nature of the purusha. But this means represents the highest end of a
person, the goal beyond which all his duties cease; for after this comes
kaivalya which naturally manifests itself on the necessary retirement of
the prakṛti. Purusha has nothing to do in effectuating this state, which
comes of itself. The duties of the purusha cease with the thorough
extinguishing of all his experiences. This therefore is the means of
extinguishing all his pains, which are the highest end of all his
duties; but the complete extinguishing of all pains is identical with
the extinguishing of all experiences, the states or vṛttis of
consciousness, and this again is identical with the rise of prajñā or
true discriminative knowledge of the difference in nature of prakṛti and
its effects from the purusha—the unchangeable. These three sides are
only the three aspects of the same state which immediately precede
kaivalya. The prajñā aspect is the aspect of the highest knowledge, the
suppression of the states of consciousness or experiences, and it is the
aspect of the cessation of all conscious activity and of painlessness or
the extinguishing of all pains as the feeling aspect of the same
nirvīja—samādhi state. But when the student directs his attention to
this goal in his ordinary states of experience, he looks at it from the
side of the feeling aspect, viz. that of acquiring a state of
painlessness, and as a means thereto he tries to purify the mind and be
moral in all his actions, and begins to restrain and suppress his mental
states, in order to acquire this nirvīja or seedless state. This is the
sphere of conduct which is called Yogāṅga.
Of course there is a division of duties according to the advancement of
the individual, as we shall have occasion to show hereafter. This
suppression of mental states which has been described as the means of
attaining final release, the ultimate ethical goal of life, is called
Yoga. We have said before that of the five kinds of mind—kshipta, mūḍha,
vikshipta, ekāgra, niruddha—only the last two are fit for the process of
Yoga and ultimately acquire absolute freedom. In the other three, though
concentration may occasionally happen, yet there is no extrication of
the mind from the afflictions of avidyā and consequently there is no
final release.
CHAPTER XI
YOGA PRACTICE
The Yoga which, after weakening the hold of the afflictions and causing
the real truth to dawn upon our mental vision, gradually leads us
towards the attainment of our final goal, is only possible for the last
two kinds of minds and is of two kinds: (1) samprajñāta (cognitive) and
(2) asamprajñāta (ultra-cognitive). The samprajñāta Yoga is that in
which the mind is concentrated upon some object, external or internal,
in such a way that it does not oscillate or move from one object to
another, but remains fixed and settled in the object that it holds
before itself. At first, the Yogin holds a gross material object before
his view, but when he can make himself steady in doing this, he tries
with the subtle tanmātras, the five causes of the grosser elements, and
when he is successful in this he takes his internal senses as his object
and last of all, when he has fully succeeded in these attempts, he takes
the great egohood as his object, in which stage his object gradually
loses all its determinate character and he is said to be in a state of
suppression in himself, although devoid of any object. This state, like
the other previous states of the samprajñāta type, is a positive state
of the mind and not a mere state of vacuity of objects or negativity. In
this state, all determinate character of the states disappears and their
potencies only remain alive. In the first stages of a Yogin practising
samādhi conscious states of the lower stages often intervene, but
gradually, as the mind becomes fixed, the potencies of the lower stages
are overcome by the potencies of this stage, so that the mind flows in a
calm current and at last the higher prajñā dawns, whereupon the
potencies of this state also are burnt and extinguished, the citta
returns back to its own primal cause, prakṛti, and purusha attains
absolute freedom.
The first four stages of the samprajñāta state are called _madhumatī_,
_madhupratīka_, _viśoka_ and the _saṃskāraśesha_ and also
_vitarkānugata_, _vicārānugata_, _ānandānugata_ and _asmitānugata_. True
knowledge begins to dawn from the first stage of this samprajñāta state,
and when the Yogin reaches the last stage the knowledge reaches its
culminating point, but still so long as the potencies of the lower
stages of relative knowledge remain, the knowledge cannot obtain
absolute certainty and permanency, as it will always be threatened with
a possible encroachment by the other states of the past phenomenal
activity now existing as the subconscious. But the last stage of
asamprajñāta samādhi represents the stage in which the ordinary
consciousness has been altogether surpassed and the mind is in its own
true infinite aspect, and the potencies of the stages in which the mind
was full of finite knowledge are also burnt, so that with the return of
the citta to its primal cause, final emancipation is effected. The last
state of samprajñāta samādhi is called saṃskāraśesha, only because here
the residua of the potencies of subconscious thought only remain and the
actual states of consciousness become all extinct. It is now easy to see
that no mind which is not in the ekāgra or one-pointed state can be fit
for the asamprajñāta samādhi in which it has to settle itself on one
object and that alone. So also no mind which has not risen to the state
of highest suppression is fit for the asamprajñāta or nirvīja state.
It is now necessary to come down to a lower level and examine the
obstructions, on account of which a mind cannot easily become
one-pointed or ekāgra. These, nine in number, are the following:—
Disease, languor, indecision, want of the mental requirements necessary
for samādhi, idleness of body and mind, attachment to objects of sense,
false and illusory knowledge, non-attainment of the state of
concentrated contemplation, unsteadiness and unstability of the mind in
a samādhi state even if it can somehow attain it. These are again seen
to be accompanied with pain and despair owing to the non-fulfilment of
desire, physical shakiness or unsteadiness of the limbs, taking in of
breath and giving out of it, which are seen to follow the nine
distractions of a distracted mind described above.
To prevent these distractions and their accompaniments it is necessary
that we should practise concentration on one truth. Vācaspati says that
this one truth on which the mind should be settled and fixed is Īśvara,
and Rāmānanda Sarasvatī and Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha agree with him. Vijñāna
Bhikshu, however, says that one truth means any object, gross or fine,
and Bhoja supports Vijñāna Bhikshu, staying that here “one truth” might
mean any desirable object.
Abhyāsa means the steadiness of the mind in one state and not complete
absence of any state; for the Bhāshyakāra himself has said in the
samāpattisūtra, that samprajñāta trance comes after this steadiness. As
we shall see later, it means nothing but the application of the five
means, śraddhā, vīrya, smṛti, samādhi and prajñā; it is an endeavour to
settle the mind on one state, and as such does not differ from the
application of the five means of Yoga with a view to settle and steady
the mind (_Yoga-vārttika_, I. 13). This effort becomes firmly rooted,
being well attended to for a long time without interruption and with
devotion.
Now it does not matter very much whether this one truth is Īśvara or any
other object; for the true principle of Yoga is the setting of the mind
on one truth, principle or object. But for an ordinary man this is no
easy matter; for in order to be successful the mind must be equipped
with śraddhā or faith—the firm conviction of the Yogin in the course
that he adopts. This keeps the mind steady, pleased, calm and free from
doubts of any kind, so that the Yogin may proceed to the realisation of
his object without any vacillation. Unless a man has a firm hold on the
course that he pursues, all the steadiness that he may acquire will
constantly be threatened with the danger of a sudden collapse. It will
be seen that vairāgya or desirelessness is only the negative aspect of
this śraddhā. For by it the mind is restrained from the objects of
sense, with an aversion or dislike towards the objects of sensual
pleasure and worldly desires; this aversion towards worldly joys is only
the other aspect of the faith of the mind and the calmness of its
currents (_cittaprasāda_) towards right knowledge and absolute freedom.
So it is said that the vairāgya is the effect of śraddhā and its product
(_Yoga-vārttika_, I. 20). In order to make a person suitable for Yoga,
vairāgya represents the cessation of the mind from the objects of sense
and their so-called pleasures, and śraddhā means the positive faith of
the mind in the path of Yoga that one adopts, and the right aspiration
towards attaining the highest goal of absolute freedom.
In its negative aspect, vairāgya is of two kinds, apara and para. The
apara is that of a mind free from attachment to worldly enjoyments, such
as women, food, drinks and power, as also from thirst for heavenly
pleasures attainable by practising the vedic rituals and sacrifices.
Those who are actuated by apara vairāgya do not desire to remain in a
bodiless state (_videha_) merged in the senses or merged in the prakṛti
(_prakṛtilīna_). It is a state in which the mind is indifferent to all
kinds of pleasures and pains. This vairāgya may be said to have four
stages: (1) Yatamāna—in which sensual objects are discovered to be
defective and the mind recoils from them. (2) Vyatireka—in which the
senses to be conquered are noted. (3) Ekendriya—in which attachment
towards internal pleasures and aversion towards external pains, being
removed, the mind sets before it the task of removing attachment and
aversion towards mental passions for obtaining honour or avoiding
dishonour, etc. (4) The fourth and last stage of vairāgya called
vaśīkāra is that in which the mind has perceived the futility of all
attractions towards external objects of sense and towards the pleasures
of heaven, and having suppressed them altogether feels no attachment,
even should it come into connection with them.
With the consummation of this last stage of apara vairāgya, comes the
para vairāgya which is identical with the rise of the final prajñā
leading to absolute independence. This vairāgya, śraddhā and the abhyāsa
represent the unafflicted states (aklishṭavṛtti) which suppress
gradually the klishṭa or afflicted mental states. These lead the Yogin
from one stage to another, and thus he proceeds higher and higher until
the final state is attained.
As vairāgya advances, śraddhā also advances; from śraddhā comes vīrya,
energy, or power of concentration (_dhāraṇā_); and from it again springs
smṛti—or continuity of one object of thought; and from it comes samādhi
or cognitive and ultra-cognitive trance; after which follows prajñā,
cognitive and ultra-cognitive trance; after which follows prajñā and
final release. Thus by the inclusion of śraddhā within vairāgya, its
effect, and the other products of śraddhā with abhyāsa, we see that the
abhyāsa and vairāgya are the two internal means for achieving the final
goal of the Yogin, the supreme suppression and extinction of all states
of consciousness, of all afflictions and the avidyā—the last state of
supreme knowledge or prajñā.
As śraddhā, vīrya, smṛti, samādhi which are not different from vairāgya
and abhyāsa (they being only their other aspects or simultaneous
products), are the means of attaining Yoga, it is possible to make a
classification of the Yogins according to the strength of these with
each, and the strength of the quickness (_saṃvega_) with which they may
be applied towards attaining the goal of the Yogin. Thus Yogins are of
nine kinds:—
(1) mildly energetic, (2) of medium energy, (3) of intense energy.
Each of these may vary in a threefold way according to the mildness,
medium state, or intensity of quickness or readiness with which the
Yogin may apply the means of attaining Yoga. There are nine kinds of
Yogins. Of these the best is he whose mind is most intensely engaged and
whose practice is also the strongest.
There is a difference of opinion here about the meaning of the word
saṃvega, between Vācaspati and Vijñāna Bhikshu. The former says that
saṃvega means vairāgya here, but the latter holds that saṃvega cannot
mean vairāgya, and vairāgya being the effect of śraddhā cannot be taken
separately from it. “Saṃvega” means quickness in the performance of the
means of attaining Yoga; some say that it means “vairāgya.” But that is
not true, for if vairāgya is an effect of the due performance of the
means of Yoga, there cannot be the separate ninefold classification of
Yoga apart from the various degrees of intensity of the means of Yoga
practice. Further, the word “saṃvega” does not mean “vairāgya”
etymologically (_Yoga-vārttika_, I. 20).
We have just seen that śraddhā, etc., are the means of attaining Yoga,
but we have not discussed what purificatory actions an ordinary man must
perform in order to attain śraddhā, from which the other requisites are
derived. Of course these purificatory actions are not the same for all,
since they must necessarily depend upon the conditions of purity or
impurity of each mind; thus a person already in an advanced state, may
not need to perform those purificatory actions necessary for a man in a
lower state. We have just said that Yogins are of nine kinds, according
to the strength of their mental acquirements—śraddhā, etc.—the requisite
means of Yoga and the degree of rapidity with which they may be applied.
Neglecting division by strength or quickness of application along with
these mental requirements, we may again divide Yogins again into three
kinds: (1) Those who have the best mental equipment. (2) Those who are
mediocres. (3) Those who have low mental equipment.
In the first chapter of Yoga aphorisms, it has been stated that abhyāsa,
the application of the mental acquirements of śraddhā, etc., and
vairāgya, the consequent cessation of the mind from objects of
distraction, lead to the extinction of all our mental states and to
final release. When a man is well developed, he may rest content with
his mental actions alone, in his abhyāsa and vairāgya, in his dhāraṇā
(concentration), dhyāna (meditation), and samādhi (trance), which may be
called the jñānayoga. But it is easy to see that this jñānayoga requires
very high mental powers and thus is not within easy reach of ordinary
persons. Ordinary persons whose minds are full of impurities, must pass
through a certain course of purificatory actions before they can hope to
obtain those mental acquirements by which they can hope to follow the
course of jñānayoga with facility.
These actions, which remove the impurities of the mind, and thus
gradually increase the lustre of knowledge, until the final state of
supreme knowledge is acquired, are called kriyāyoga. They are also
called yogāṅgas, as they help the maturity of the Yoga process by
gradually increasing the lustre of knowledge. They represent the means
by which even an ordinary mind (_vikshiptacitta_) may gradually purify
itself and become fit for the highest ideals of Yoga. Thus the _Bhāshya_
says: “By the sustained practice of these yogāṅgas or accessories of
Yoga is destroyed the fivefold unreal cognition (_avidyā_), which is of
the nature of impurity.” Destruction means here disappearance; thus when
that is destroyed, real knowledge is manifested. As the means of
achievement are practised more and more, so is the impurity more and
more attenuated. And as more and more of it is destroyed, so does the
light of wisdom go on increasing more and more. This process reaches its
culmination in discriminative knowledge, which is knowledge of the
nature of purusha and the guṇas.
CHAPTER XII
THE YOGĀṄGAS
Now the assertion that these actions are the causes of the attainment of
salvation brings up the question of the exact natures of their operation
with regard to this supreme attainment. Bhāshyakara says with respect to
this that they are the causes of the separation of the impurities of the
mind just as an axe is the cause of the splitting of a piece of wood;
and again they are the causes of the attainment of the supreme knowledge
just as dhaṛma is the cause of happiness. It must be remembered that
according to the Yoga theory causation is viewed as mere transformation
of energy; the operation of concomitant causes only removes obstacles
impeding the progress of these transformations in a particular
direction; no cause can of itself produce any effect, and the only way
in which it can help the production of an effect into which the causal
state passes out of its own immanent energy by the principles of
conservation and transformation of energy, is by removing the
intervening obstacles. Thus just as the passage of citta into a happy
state is helped by dharma removing the intervening obstacles, so also
the passage of the citta into the state of attainment of true knowledge
is helped by the removal of obstructions due to the performance of the
yogāṅgas; the necessary obstructions being removed, the citta passes
naturally of itself into this infinite state of attainment of true
knowledge, in which all finitude is merged.
In connection with this, Vyāsa mentions nine kinds of operation of
causes: (1) cause of birth; (2) of preservation; (3) of manifestation;
(4) of modification; (5) knowledge of a premise leading to a deduction;
(6) of otherness; (7) of separation; (8) of attainment; (9) of upholding
(_Vyāsabhāshya_, II. 28.)
The principle of conservation of energy and transformation of energy
being the root idea of causation in this system, these different aspects
represent the different points of view in which the word causation is
generally used.
Thus, the first aspect as the cause of birth or production is seen when
knowledge springs from manas which renders indefinite cognition definite
so that mind is called the cause of the birth of knowledge. Here mind is
the material cause (_upādāna kāraṇa_) of the production of knowledge,
for knowledge is nothing but manas with its particular modifications as
states (_Yoga-vārttika_, II. 18). The difference of these positive cause
from _āptikāraṇa_, which operates only in a negative way and helps
production, in an indirect way by the removal of obstacles, is quite
manifest. The _sthitikāraṇa_ or cause through which things are preserved
as they are, is the end they serve; thus the serviceability of purusha
is the cause of the existence and preservation of the mind as it is, and
not only of mind but of all our phenomenal experiences.
The third cause of the _abhivyaktikāraṇa_ or manifestation which is
compared to a lamp which manifests things before our view is an
epistemological cause, and as such includes all sense activity in
connection with material objects which produce cognition.
Then come the fourth and the fifth causes, vikāra (change) and pratyaya
(inseparable connection); thus the cause of change (_vikāra_) is
exemplified as that which causes a change; thus the manas suffers a
change by the objects presented to it, just as bile changes and digests
the food that is eaten; the cause of pratyaya[41] is that in which from
inseparable connection, with the knowledge of the premise (e.g. there is
smoke in the hill) we can also have inferential knowledge of the other
(e.g. there is fire in the hill). The sixth cause as otherness
(_anyatva_) is that which effects changes of form as that brought about
by a goldsmith in gold when he makes a bangle from it, and then again a
necklace, is regarded as differing from the change spoken of as vikāra.
Now the difference between the gold being turned into bangles or
necklaces and the raw rice being turned into soft rice is this, that in
the former case when bangles are made out of gold, the gold remains the
same in each case, whereas in the case of the production of cooked rice
from raw by fire, the case is different, for heat changes paddy in a far
more definite way; goldsmith and heat are both indeed efficient causes,
but the former only effects mechanical changes of shape and form,
whereas the latter is the cause of structural and chemical changes. Of
course these are only examples from the physical world, their causal
operations in the mental sphere varying in a corresponding manner; thus
the change produced in the mind by the presentation of different
objects, follows a law which is the same as is found in the physical
world, when the same object causes different kinds of feelings in
different persons; when ignorance causes forgetfulness in a thing, anger
makes it painful and desire makes it pleasurable, but knowledge of its
true reality produces indifference; there is thus the same kind of
causal change as is found in the external world. Next for consideration
is the cause of separation (_viyoga_) which is only a negative aspect of
the positive side of the causes of transformations, as in the gradual
extinction of impurities, consequent upon the transformation of the
citta towards the attainment of the supreme state of absolute
independence through discriminative knowledge. The last cause for
consideration is that of upholding (_dhṛti_); thus the body upholds the
senses and supports them for the actualisation of their activities in
the body, just as the five gross elements are the upholding causes of
organic bodies; the bodies of animals, men, etc., also employ one
another for mutual support. Thus the human body lives by eating the
bodies of many animals; the bodies of tigers, etc., live on the bodies
of men and other animals; many animals live on the bodies of plants,
etc. (_Tattvavaiśāradī_, II. 28). The four kinds of causes mentioned in
Śaṅkara’s works and grammatical commentaries like that of Susheṇa, viz.:
utpādya, vikāryya, āpya and saṃskāryya, are all included within the nine
causes contained mentioned by Vyāsa.
The yogāṅgas not only remove the impurities of the mind but help it
further by removing obstacles in the way of attaining the highest
perfection of discriminative knowledge. Thus they are the causes in a
double sense (1) of the dissociation of impurities (_viyogakāraṇa_); (2)
of removing obstacles which impede the course of the mind in attaining
the highest development (_āptikāraṇa_).
Coming now to the yogāṅgas, we enumerate them thus:—restraint,
observance, posture, regulation of breath, abstraction, concentration,
meditation and trance: these are the eight accessories of Yoga.
It must be remembered that abhyāsa and vairāgya and also the five means
of attaining Yoga, viz.: śraddhā, vīryya, etc., which are not different
from abhyāsa and vairāgya, are by their very nature included within the
yogāṅgas mentioned above, and are not to be considered as independent
means different from them. The parikarmas or embellishments of the mind
spoken of in the first chapter, with which we shall deal later on, are
also included under the three yogāṅgas dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi. The
five means śraddhā, vīryya, smṛti, samādhi and prajñā are said to be
included under asceticism (_tapaḥ_) studies (_svādhyāya_) and devotion
to God of the niyamas and vairāgya in contentment.
In order to understand these better, we will first give the definitions
of the yogāṅgas and then discuss them and ascertain their relative
values for a man striving to attain the highest perfection of Yoga.
I. Yama (restraint). These yama restraints are: abstinence from injury
(ahiṃsā); veracity; abstinence from theft; continence; abstinence from
avarice.
II. Niyama (observances). These observances are cleanliness,
contentment, purificatory action, study and the making of God the motive
of all action.
III. Āsanas (posture). Steady posture and easy position are regarded as
an aid to breath control.
IV. Regulation of breath (prāṇāyāma) is the stoppage of the inspiratory
and expiratory movements (of breath) which may be practised when
steadiness of posture has been secured.
V. Pratyāhāra (abstraction). With the control of the mind all the senses
become controlled and the senses imitate as it were the vacant state of
the mind. Abstraction is that by which the senses do not come in contact
with their objects and follow as it were the nature of the mind.
VI. Dhāraṇā (concentration). Concentration is the steadfastness of the
mind applied to a particular object.
VII. Dhyāna (mediation). The continuation there of the mental effort by
continually repeating the object is meditation (dhyāna).
VIII. Samādhi (trance contemplation). The same as above when shining
with the light of the object alone, and devoid as it were of itself, is
trance. In this state the mind becomes one with its object and there is
no difference between the knower and the known.
These are the eight yogāṅgas which a Yogin must adopt for his higher
realisation. Of these again we see that some have the mental side more
predominant, while others are mostly to be actualised in exterior
action. Dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi, which are purely of the samprajñāta
type, and also the prāṇāyāma and pratyāhāra, which are accessories to
them, serve to cleanse the mind of impurities and make it steady, and
can therefore be assimilated with the parikarmas mentioned in Book I.
Sūtras 34–39. These samādhis of the samprajñāta type, of course, only
serve to steady the mind and to assist attaining discriminative
knowledge.
In this connection, it will be well to mention the remaining aids for
cleansing the mind as mentioned in _Yoga-sūtra_ I., viz. the cultivation
of the habits of friendliness, compassion, complacency and indifference
towards happiness, misery, virtue and vice.
This means that we are to cultivate the habit of friendliness towards
those who are happy, which will remove all jealous feelings and purify
the mind. We must cultivate the habit of compassion towards those who
are suffering pain; when the mind shows compassion (which means that it
wishes to remove the miseries of others as if they were his own) it
becomes cleansed of the stain of desire to do injury to others, for
compassion is only another name for sympathy which naturally identifies
the compassionate one with the objects of his sympathy. Next comes the
habit of complacency, which one should diligently cultivate, for it
leads to pleasure in virtuous deeds. This removes the stain of envy from
the mind. Next comes the habit of indifference, which we should acquire
towards vice in vicious persons. We should acquire the habit of
remaining indifferent where we cannot sympathise; we should not on any
account get angry with the wicked or with those with whom sympathy is
not possible. This will remove the stain of anger. It will be clearly
seen here that maītrī, karuṇā, muditā and upekshā are only different
aspects of universal sympathy, which should remove all perversities in
our nature and unite us with our fellow-beings. This is the positive
aspect of the mind with reference to abstinence from injuring ahiṃsā
(mentioned under yamas), which will cleanse the mind and make it fit for
the application of means of śraddhā, etc. For unless the mind is pure,
there is no scope for the application of the means of making it steady.
These are the mental endeavours to cleanse the mind and to make it fit
for the proper manifestation of śraddhā, etc., and for steadying it with
a view to attaining true discriminative knowledge.
Again of the parikarmas by dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and saṃprajñāta samādhi and
the habit of sympathy as manifested in maitrī, karuṇā, etc., the former
is a more advanced state of the extinction of impurities than the
latter.
But it is easy to see that ordinary minds can never commence with these
practices. They are naturally so impure that the positive universal
sympathy as manifested in maitrī, etc., by which turbidity of mind is
removed, is too difficult. It is also difficult for them to keep the
mind steady on an object as in dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and samādhi, for only
those in advanced stages can succeed in this. For ordinary people,
therefore, some course of conduct must be discovered by which they can
purify their minds and elevate them to such an extent that they may be
in a position to avail themselves of the mental parikarmas or
purifications just mentioned. Our minds become steady in proportion as
their impurities are cleansed. The cleansing of impurities only
represents the negative aspect of the positive side of making the mind
steady. The grosser impurities being removed, finer ones remain, and
these are removed by the mental parikarmas, supplemented by abhyāsa or
by śraddhā, etc. As the impurities are gradually more and more
attenuated, the last germs of impurity are destroyed by the force of
dhyāna or the habit of nirodha samādhi, and kaivalya is attained.
We now deal with yamas, by which the gross impurities of ordinary minds
are removed. They are, as we have said before, non-injury, truthfulness,
non-stealing, continence, and non-covetousness; of these non-injury is
given such a high place that it is regarded as the root of the other
yamas; truthfulness, non-stealing, continence, non-covetousness and the
other niyamas mentioned previously only serve to make the non-injury
perfect. We have seen before that maitrī, karuṇa, muditā and upekshā
serve to strengthen the non-injury since they are only its positive
aspects, but we see now that not only they but other yamas and also the
other niyamas, purity, contentment, asceticism, studies and devotion to
God, only serve to make non-injury more and more perfect. This
non-injury when it is performed without being limited or restricted in
any way by caste, country, time and circumstances, and is always adhered
to, is called mahāvrata or the great duty of abstinence from injury. It
is sometimes limited to castes, as for example injury inflicted by a
fisherman, and in this case it is called anuvrata or restricted ahiṃsā
of ordinary men as opposed to universal ahiṃsā of the Yogins called
mahāvrata; the same non-injury is limited by locality, as in the case of
a man who says to himself, “I shall not cause injury at a sacred place”;
or by time, when a person says to himself, “I shall not cause injury on
the sacred day of Caturdaśī”; or by circumstances, as when a man says to
himself, “I shall cause injury for the sake of gods and Brahmans only”;
or when injury is caused by warriors in the battle-field alone and
nowhere else. This restricted ahiṃsā is only for ordinary men who cannot
follow the Yogin’s universal law of ahiṃsā.
Ahiṃsā is a great universal duty which a man should impose on himself in
all conditions of life, everywhere, and at all times without restricting
or qualifying it with any limitation whatsoever. In _Mahābhārata
Mokshadharmādhyāya_ it is said that the Sāṃkhya lays stress upon
non-injury, whereas the Yoga lays stress upon samādhi; but here we see
that Yoga also holds that ahiṃsā should be the greatest ethical motive
for all our conduct. It is by ahiṃsā alone that we can make ourselves
fit for the higher type of samādhi. All other virtues of truthfulness,
non-stealing only serve to make non-injury more and more perfect. It is
not, however, easy to say whether the Sāṃkhyists attached so much
importance to non-injury that they believed it to lead to samādhi
directly without the intermediate stages of samādhi. We see, however,
that the Yoga also attaches great importance to it and holds that a man
should refrain from all external acts; for however good they may be they
cannot be such as not to lead to some kind of injury or hiṃsā towards
beings, for external actions can never be performed without doing some
harm to others. We have seen that from this point of view Yoga holds
that the only pure works (śuklakarma) are those mental works of good
thoughts in which perfection of ahiṃsā is attained. With the growth of
good works (śuklakarma) and the perfect realisation of non-injury the
mind naturally passes into the state in which its actions are neither
good (śukla) nor bad (aśukla); and this state is immediately followed by
that of kaivalya.
Veracity consists in word and thought being in accordance with facts.
Speech and mind correspond to what has been seen, heard and inferred.
Speech is for the purpose of transferring knowledge to another. It is
always to be employed for the good of others and not for their injury;
for it should not be defective as in the case of Yudhishṭhira, where his
motive was bad.[42] If it prove to be injurious to living beings, even
though uttered as truth, it is not truth; it is sin only. Though
outwardly such a truthful course may be considered virtuous, yet since
by his truth he has caused injury to another person, he has in reality
violated the true standard of non-injury (_ahiṃsā_). Therefore let
everyone first examine well and then utter truth for the benefit of all
living beings. All truths should be tested by the canon of non-injury
(_ahiṃsā_).
Asteya is the virtue of abstaining from stealing. Theft is making one’s
own unlawfully things that belong to others. Abstinence from theft
consists in the absence of the desire thereof.
Brahmacaryya (continence) is the restraint of the generative organ and
the thorough control of sexual tendencies.
Aparigraha is want of avariciousness, the non-appropriation of things
not one’s own; this is attained on seeing the defects of attachment and
of the injury caused by the obtaining, preservation and destruction of
objects of sense.
If, in performing the great duty of non-injury and the other virtues
auxiliary to it, a man be troubled by thoughts of sin, he should try to
remove sinful ideas by habituating himself to those which are contrary
to them. Thus if the old habit of sins opposed to virtues tend to drive
him along the wrong path, he should in order to banish them entertain
ideas such as the following:—“Being burnt up as I am in the fires of the
world, I have taken refuge in the practice of Yoga which gives
protection to all living beings. Were I to resume the sins which I have
abandoned, I should certainly be behaving like a dog, which eats its own
vomit. As the dog takes up his own vomit, so should I be acting if I
were to take up again what I have once given up.” This is called the
practice of _pratipaksha bhāvān_, meditating on the opposites of the
temptations.
A classification of sins of non-injury, etc., may be made according as
they are actually done, or caused to be done, or permitted to be done;
and these again may be further divided according as they are preceded by
desire, anger or ignorance; these are again mild, middling or intense.
Thus we see that there may be twenty-seven kinds of such sins. Mild,
middling and intense are each again threefold, mild-mild, mild-middling
and mild-intense; middling-mild, middling-middling and middling-intense;
also intense-mild, intense-middling and intense-intense. Thus there are
eighty-one kinds of sins. But they become infinite on account of rules
of restriction, option and conjunction.
The contrary tendency consists in the notion that these immoral
tendencies cause an infinity of pains and untrue knowledge. Pain and
unwisdom are the unending fruits of these immoral tendencies, and in
this idea lies the power which produces the habit of giving a contrary
trend to our thoughts.
These yamas, together with the niyamas about to be described, are called
kriyāyoga, by the performance of which men become fit to rise gradually
to the state of jñānayoga by samādhi and to attain kaivalya. This course
thus represents the first stage with which ordinary people should begin
their Yoga work.
Those more advanced, who naturally possess the virtues mentioned in
Yama, have no need of beginning here.
Thus it is said that some may begin with the niyamas, asceticism,
svādhyāya and devotion to God; it is for this reason that, though
mentioned under the niyamas, they are also specially selected and spoken
of as the kriyāyoga in the very first rule of the second Book.
Asceticism means the strength of remaining unchanged in changes like
that of heat and cold, hunger and thirst, standing and sitting, absence
of speech and absence of all indications by gesture, etc.
Svādhyāya means the study of philosophy and repetition of the syllable
“Aum.”
This Īśvarapraṇidhāna (devotion to God) is different from the
Īśvarapraṇidhāna mentioned in _Yoga-sūtra_, I. 23, where it meant love,
homage and adoration of God, by virtue of which God by His grace makes
samādhi easy for the Yogin.
Here it is a kind of kriyāyoga, and hence it means the bestowal of all
our actions upon the Great Teacher, God, i.e. to work, not for one’s own
self but for God, so that a man desists from all desires for fruit
therefrom.
When these are duly performed, the afflictions become gradually
attenuated and trance is brought about. The afflictions thus attenuated
become characterised by unproductiveness, and when their seed-power has,
as it were, been burnt up by the fire of high intellection and the mind
untouched by afflictions realises the distinct natures of purusha and
sattva, it naturally returns to its own primal cause prakṛti and
kaivalya is attained.
Those who are already far advanced do not require even this kriyāyoga,
as their afflictions are already in an attenuated state and their minds
in a fit condition to adapt themselves to samādhi; they can therefore
begin at once with jñānayoga. So in the first chapter it is with respect
to these advanced men that it is said that kaivalya can be attained by
abhyāsa and vairāgya, without adopting the kriyāyoga (_Yoga-vārttika_,
II. 2) kriyāyogas. Only śauca and santosha now remain to be spoken of.
Śauca means cleanliness of body and mind. Cleanliness of body is brought
about by water, cleanliness of mind by removal of the mental impurities
of pride, jealousy and vanity.
Santosha (contentment) is the absence of desire to possess more than is
necessary for the preservation of one’s life. It should be added that
this is the natural result of ceasing to desire to appropriate the
property of others.
At the close of this section on the yamas and niyamas, it is best to
note their difference, which lies principally in this that the former
are the negative virtues, whereas the latter are positive. The former
can, and therefore must, be practised at all stages of Yoga, whereas the
latter being positive are attainable only by distinct growth of mind
through Yoga. The virtues of non-injury, truthfulness, sex restraint,
etc., should be adhered to at all stages of the Yoga practice. They are
indispensable for steadying the mind.
It is said that in the presence of a person who has acquired steadiness
in ahiṃsā all animals give up their habits of enmity; when a person
becomes steady in truthfulness, whatever he says becomes fulfilled. When
a person becomes steady in asteya (absence of theft) all jewels from all
quarters approach him.
Continence being confirmed, vigour is obtained. Non-covetousness being
confirmed, knowledge of the causes of births is attained. By steadiness
of cleanliness, disinclination to this body and cessation of desire for
other bodies is obtained.
When the mind attains internal śauca, or cleanliness of mind, his sattva
becomes pure, and he acquires highmindedness, one-pointedness, control
of the senses and fitness for the knowledge of self. By the steadiness
of contentment comes the acquisition of extreme happiness. By steadiness
of asceticism the impurities of this body are removed, and from that
come miraculous powers of endurance of the body and also miraculous
powers of the sense, viz. clairaudience and thought-reading from a
distance. By steadiness of studies the gods, the ṛshis and the siddhas
become visible. When Īśvara is made the motive of all actions, trance is
attained. By this the Yogin knows all that he wants to know, just as it
is in reality, whether in another place, another body or another time.
His intellect knows everything as it is.
It should not, however, be said, says Vācaspati, that inasmuch as the
saṃprajñāta is attained by making Īśvara the motive of all actions, the
remaining seven yogāṅgas are useless. For the yogāṅgas are useful in the
attainment of that mental mood which devotes all actions to the purposes
of Īśvara. They are also useful in the attainment of saṃprajñāta samādhi
by separate kinds of collocations, and samādhi also leads to the
fruition of saṃprajñāta, but though this meditation on Īśvara is itself
a species of Īśvarapraṇidhāna, saṃprajñāta Yoga is a yet more direct
means. As to the relation of Īśvarapraṇidhāna with the other aṅgas of
Yoga, Bhikshu writes:—It cannot be asked what is the use of the other
disciplinary practices of the Yoga since Yoga can be attained by
meditation on Īśvara, for meditation on Īśvara only removes ignorance.
The other accessories bring about samādhi by their own specific modes of
operation. Moreover, it is by help of meditation on Īśvara that one
succeeds in bringing about samādhi, through the performance of all the
accessories of Yoga; so the accessories of Yoga cannot be regarded as
unnecessary; for it is the accessories which produce dhāraṇa, dhyāna and
samādhi, through meditation on God, and thereby salvation; devotion to
God brings in His grace and through it the yogāṅgas can be duly
performed. So though devotion to God may be considered as the direct
cause, it cannot be denied that the due performance of the yogāṅgas is
to be considered as the indirect cause.
Āsanas are secured when the natural involuntary movements cease, and
this may be effected by concentrating the mind on the mythological snake
which quietly bears the burden of the earth on its head. Thus posture
becomes perfect and effort to that end ceases, so that there is no
movement of the body; or the mind is transformed into the infinite,
which makes the idea of infinity its own and then brings about the
perfection of posture. When posture has once been mastered there is no
disturbance through the contraries of heat and cold, etc.
After having secured stability in the Āsanas the prāṇāyāmas should be
attempted. The pause that comes after a deep inhalation and that after a
deep exhalation are each called a prāṇāyāma; the first is external, the
second internal. There is, however, a third mode, by means of which,
since the lungs are neither too much dilated nor too much contracted,
total restraint is obtained; cessation of both these motions takes place
by a single effort, just as water thrown on a heated stone shrivels up
on all sides.
These can be regulated by calculating the strength of inhalation and
exhalation through space, time or number. Thus as the breathing becomes
slower, the space that it occupies also becomes smaller and smaller.
Space again is of two kinds, internal and external. At the time of
inhalation, the breath occupies internal space, which can be felt even
in the soles of hand and feet, like the slight touch of an ant. To try
to feel this touch along with deep inhalation serves to lengthen the
period of cessation of breathing. External space is the distance from
the tip of the nose to the remotest point at which breath when inhaled
can be felt, by the palm of the hand, or by the movement of any light
substance like cotton, etc., placed there. Just as the breathing becomes
slower and slower, the distances traversed by it also becomes smaller
and smaller. Regulations by time is seen when the attention is fixed
upon the time taken up in breathing by moments, a moment (_kshaṇa_) is
the fourth part of the twinkling of the eye. Regulation by time thus
means the fact of our calculating the strength of the prāṇāyāma the
moments or kshaṇas spent in the acts of inspiration, pause and
respiration. These prāṇāyāmas can also be measured by the number of
moments in the normal duration of breaths. The time taken by the
respiration and expiration of a healthy man is the same as that measured
by snapping the fingers after turning the hand thrice over the knee and
is the measure of duration of normal breath; the first attempt or
udghāta called mild is measured by thirty-six such mātrās or measures;
when doubled it is the second udghāta called middling; when trebled it
is the third udghāta called intense. Gradually the Yogin acquires the
practice of prāṇāyāma of long duration, by daily practice increasing in
succession from a day, a fortnight, a month, etc. Of course he proceeds
first by mastering the first udghāta, then the second, and so on until
the duration increases up to a day, a fortnight, a month as stated.
There is also a fourth kind of prāṇāyāma transcending all these stages
of unsteady practice, when the Yogin is steady in his cessation of
breath. It must be remembered, however, that while the prāṇāyāmas are
being practised, the mind must be fixed by dhyāna and dhāraṇā to some
object external or internal, without which these will be of no avail for
the true object of Yoga. By the practice of prāṇāyāma, mind becomes fit
for concentration as described in the _sūtra_ I. 34, where it is said
that steadiness is acquired by prāṇāyāma in the same way as
concentration, as we also find in the _sūtra_ II. 53.
When the senses are restrained from their external objects by pratyāhāra
we have what is called pratyāhāra, by which the mind remains as if in
its own nature, being altogether identified with the object of inner
concentration or contemplation; and thus when the citta is again
suppressed, the senses, which have already ceased coming into contact
with other objects and become submerged in the citta, also cease along
with it. Dharaṇa is the concentration of citta on a particular place,
which is so very necessary at the time of prāṇāyāmas mentioned before.
The mind may thus be held steadfast in such places as the sphere of the
navel, the lotus of the heart, the light in the brain, the forepart of
the nose, the forepart of the tongue, and such like parts of the body.
Dhyāna is the continuance or changing flow of the mental effort in the
object of dharaṇa unmediated by any other break of conscious states.
Samādhi, or trance contemplation, results when by deep concentration
mind becomes transformed into the shape of the object of contemplation.
By pratyāhāra or power of abstraction, mind desists from all other
objects, except the one on which it is intended that it should be
centred; the Yogin, as he thus abstracts his mind, should also try to
fix it upon some internal or external object, which is called dhāraṇā;
it must also be noticed that to acquire the habit of dhāraṇā and in
order to inhibit the abstraction arising from shakiness and unsteadiness
of the body, it is necessary to practise steadfast posture and to
cultivate the prāṇāyāma. So too for the purpose of inhibiting
distractions arising from breathing. Again, before a man can hope to
attain steadfastness in these, he must desist from any conduct opposed
to the yamas, and also acquire the mental virtues stated in the niyamas,
and thus secure himself against any intrusion of distractions arising
from his mental passions. These are the indirect and remote conditions
which qualify a person for attaining dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and samādhi. A man
who through his good deeds or by the grace of God is already so much
advanced that he is naturally above all such distractions, for the
removal of which it is necessary to practise the yamas, the niyamas, the
āsanas, the prāṇāyāma and pratyāhara, may at once begin with dhāraṇā;
dhāraṇā we have seen means concentration, with the advancement of which
the mind becomes steady in repeating the object of its concentration,
i.e. thinking of that thing alone and no other thing; thus we see that
with the practice of this state called dhyāna, or meditation, in which
the mind flows steadily in that one state without any interruption,
gradually even the conscious flow of this activity ceases and the mind,
transformed into the shape of the object under concentration, becomes
steady therein. We see therefore that samādhi is the consummation of
that process which begins in dhāraṇā or concentration. These three,
dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi, represent the three stages of the same
process of which the last one is the perfection; and these three are
together technically called saṃyama, which directly leads to and is
immediately followed by the samprajñāta state, whereas the other five
yogāṅgas are only its indirect or remote causes. These three are,
however, not essential for the asamprajñāta state, for a person who is
very far advanced, or one who is the special object of God’s grace, may
pass at once by intense vairāgya and abhyāsa into the nirodha state or
state of suppression.
As the knowledge of samādhi gradually dawns through the possession of
saṃyama, so is the saṃyama gradually strengthened. For this saṃyama also
rises higher and higher with the dawning of prajñāloka or light of
samādhi knowledge. This is the beginning, for here the mind can hold
saṃyama or concentrate and become one with a gross object together with
its name, etc., which is called the savitarka state; the next plane or
stage of saṃyama is that where the mind becomes one with the object of
its meditation, without any consciousness of its name, etc. Next come
the other two stages called savicāra and nirvicāra when the mind is
fixed on subtle substances, as we shall see later on.
CHAPTER XIII
STAGES OF SAMĀDHI
Saṃprajñāta samādhi (absorptive concentration in an object) may be
divided into four classes, savitarka, nirvitarka, savicāra and
nirvicāra.
To comprehend its scope we must first of all understand the relation
between a thing, its concept, and the particular name with which the
concept or thing is associated. It is easy to see that the thing
(_artha_), the concept (_jñāna_), and the name (_śabda_) are quite
distinct. But still, by force of association, the word or name stands
both for the thing and its concept; the function of mind, by virtue of
which despite this unreality or want of their having any real identity
of connection they seem to be so much associated that the name cannot be
differentiated from the thing or its idea, is called vikalpa.
Now that state of samādhi in which the mind seems to become one with the
thing, together with its name and concept, is the lowest stage of
samādhi called savitarka; it is the lowest stage, because here the gross
object does not appear to the mind in its true reality, but only in the
false illusory way in which it appears associated with the concept and
the name in ordinary life. This state does not differ from ordinary
conceptual states, in which the particular thing is not only associated
with the concepts and their names, but also with other concepts and
their various relations; thus a cow will not only appear before the mind
with its concept and name, but also along with other relations and
thoughts associated with cows, as for example—“This is a cow, it belongs
to so and so, it has so many hairs on its body, and so forth.” This
state is therefore the first stage of samādhi, in which the mind has not
become steady and is not as yet beyond the range of our ordinary
consciousness.
The nirvitarka stage arises from this when the mind by its steadiness
can become one with its object, divested of all other associations of
name and concept, so that it is in direct touch with the reality of the
thing, uncontaminated by associations. The thing in this state does not
appear to be an object of my consciousness, but my consciousness
becoming divested of all “I” or “mine,” becomes one with the object
itself; so that there is no such notion here as “I know this,” but the
mind becomes one with the thing, so that the notion of subject and
object drops off and the result is the one steady transformation of the
mind into the object of its contemplation. This state brings home to us
real knowledge of the thing, divested from other false and illusory
associations, which far from explaining the real nature of the object,
serves only to hide it. This samādhi knowledge or prajñā is called
nirvitarka. The objects of this state may be the gross material objects
and the senses.
Now this state is followed by the state of savicārā prajñā, which dawns
when the mind neglecting the grossness of the object sinks deeper and
deeper into its finer constituents; the appearance of the thing in its
grosser aspects drops off and the mind having sunk deep, centres in and
identifies itself with the subtle tanmātras, which are the constituents
of the atoms, as a conglomeration of which the object appeared before
our eyes in the nirvitarka state. Thus when the mind, after identifying
itself with the sun in its true aspect as pure light, tends to settle on
a still finer state of it, either by making the senses so steady that
the outward appearance vanishes, or by seeking finer and finer stages
than the grosser manifestation of light as such, it apprehends the
tanmātric state of the light and knows it as such, and we have what is
called the savicāra stage. It has great similarities with the savitarka
stage, while its differences from that stage spring from the fact that
here the object is the tanmātra and not the gross bhūta. The mind in
this stage holding communion with the rūpa tanmātra, for example, is not
coloured variously as red, blue, etc., as in the savitarka communion
with gross light, for the tanmātric light or light potential has no such
varieties as different kinds of colour, etc., so that there are also no
such different kinds of feeling of pleasure or pain as arise from the
manifold varieties of ordinary light. This is a state of feelingless
representation of one uniform tanmātric state, when the object appears
as a conglomeration of tanmātras of rūpa, rasa or gandha, as the case
might be. This state, however, is not indeterminate, as the nirvitarka
stage, for this tanmātric conception is associated with the notions of
time, space and causality, for the mind here feels that it sees those
tanmātras which are in such a subtle state that they are not associated
with pleasures and pains. They are also endowed with causality in such a
way that from them and their particular collocations originate the
atoms.
It must be noted here that the subtle objects of concentration in this
stage are not the tanmātras alone, but also other subtle substances
including the ego, the buddhi and the prakṛti.
But when the mind acquires the complete habit of this state in which it
becomes identified with these fine objects—the tanmātras—etc., then all
conceptual notions of the associations of time, space, causality, etc.,
spoken of in the savicāra and the savitarka state vanish away and it
becomes one with the fine object of its communion. These two kinds of
prajñā, savicāra and nirvicāra, arising from communion with the fine
tanmātras, have been collocated under one name as vicārānugata. But when
the object of communion is the senses, the samādhi is called
ānandānugata, and when the object of communion is the subtle cause the
ego (_asmitā_), the samādhi is known as asmitānugata.
There is a difference of opinion regarding the object of the last two
varieties of samādhi, viz. ānandānugata and asmitānugata, and also about
the general scheme of division of the samādhis. Vācaspati thinks that
_Yoga-sūtra_ I. 41 suggests the interpretation that the saṃprajñāta
samādhis may be divided into three different classes according as their
objects of concentration belong to one or other of the three different
planes of grāhya (external objects), grahaṇa (the senses) and grahītṛ
(the ego). So he refers vitarka and vicāra to the plane of grāhya
(physical objects and tanmātras), ānandānugata to the plane of grahaṇa
(the senses) and asmitānugata to the plane of grahītṛ. Bhikshu, however,
disapproves of such an interpretation. He holds that in ānandānugata the
object of concentration is bliss (ānanda) and not the senses. When the
Yogin rises to the vicārānugata stage there is a great flow of sattva
which produces bliss, and at this the mind becomes one with this ānanda
or bliss, and this samādhi is therefore called ānandānugata. Bhikshu
does not think that in asmitānugata samādhi the object of concentration
is the ego. He thinks that in this stage the object of concentration is
the concept of self (_kevalapurushākārā saṃvit_) which has only the form
of ego or “I” (_asmītyetāvanmātrākāratvādasmitā_).
Again according to Vācaspati in addition to the four varieties of
savitarka, nirvitarka, savicāra and nirvicāra there are two varieties of
ānandanugata as sānanda and nirānanda and two varieties of asmitānugata
as sāsmita and nirasmita. This gives us eight different kinds of
samādhi. With Bhikshu there are only six kinds of samādhi, for he admits
only one variety as ānandānugata and one variety as asmitānugata.
Bhikshu’s classification of samādhis is given below in a tabular form
(see Vācaspati’s _Tattvavaiśāradī_ and _Yoga-vārttika_, I. 17, 41, 42,
43, 44).
samprajñāta samādhi
|
+---------------------+----------------------+
| |
sthūlavishayaka sūkshma vishayaka
(vitarkānugata) |
samādhi +--------+-----+--------------+
+-------------------+ | | |
| | | ānanda asmitā
1. savitarka 2. nirvitarka | or purusha
(with associations (without association |
of name and concept of name) | 5. (ānandānugata) 6. (asmitānugata)
of the object) |
|
tanmātra
vicārānugata
samādhi
|
+---------------+--------------+
| |
3. savicāra 4. nirvicāra
(with association of (without association
name and concept of name, etc. )
of the tanmātras)
Through the nirvicāra state our minds become altogether purified and
there springs the prajñā or knowledge called ṛtambharā or true; this
true knowledge is altogether different from the knowledge which is
derived from the Vedas or from inferences or from ordinary perceptions;
for the knowledge that it can give of Reality can never be had by any
other means, by perception, inference or testimony, for their
communication is only by the conceptual process of generalisations and
abstractions and these can never help us to affirm anything about things
as they are in themselves, which are altogether different from their
illusory demonstrations in conceptual terms which only prevent us from
knowing the true reality. The potency of this prajñā arrests the potency
of ordinary states of consciousness and thus attains stability. When,
however, this prajñā is also suppressed, we have what is called the
state of nirvīja samādhi, at the end of which comes final prajñā leading
to the dissolution of the citta and the absolute freedom of the purusha.
Samādhi we have seen is the mind’s becoming one with an object by a
process of acute concentration upon it and a continuous repetition of it
with the exclusion of all other thoughts of all kinds. We have indeed
described the principal stages of the advancement of samprajñāta Yoga,
but it is impossible to give an exact picture of it with the symbolical
expressions of our concepts; for the stages only become clear to the
mental vision of the Yogin as he gradually acquires firmness in his
practice. The Yogin who is practising at once comes to know them as the
higher stages gradually dawn in his mind and he distinguishes them from
each other; it is thus a matter of personal experience, so that no
teacher can tell him whether a certain stage which follows is higher or
lower, for Yoga itself is its own teacher.
Even when the mind is in the samprajñāta state it is said to be in
vyutthāna (phenomenal) in comparison with the nirodha state, just as the
ordinary conscious states are called vyutthāna in comparison with the
samprajñāta state; the potencies of the samprajñāta state become weaker
and weaker, while the potencies of the nirodha state become stronger and
stronger until finally the mind comes to the nirodha state and becomes
stable therein; of course this contains within itself a long mental
history, for the potency of the nirodha state can become stronger only
when the mind practises it and remains in this suppressed condition for
long intervals of time. This shows that the mind, being made up of the
three guṇas, is always suffering transformations and changes. Thus from
the ordinary state of phenomenal consciousness it gradually becomes
one-pointed and then gradually becomes transformed into the state of an
object (internal or external), when it is said to be undergoing the
samādhi pariṇāma or samādhi change of the samprajñāta type; next comes
the change, when the mind passes from the samprajñāta stage to the state
of suppression (_nirodha_). Here also, therefore, we see that the same
dharma, lakshṇa, avasthāpariṇāma which we have already described at some
length with regard to sensible objects apply also to the mental states.
Thus the change from the vyutthāna (ordinary experience) to the nirodha
state is the dharmapariṇāma, the change as manifested in time, so that
we can say that the change of vyutthāna into nirodha has not yet come,
or has just come, or that the vyutthāna state (ordinary experience)
exists no longer, the mind having transformed itself into the nirodha
state. There is also here the third change of condition, when we see
that the potencies of the samprajñāta state become weaker and weaker,
while that of the nirodha state becomes stronger and stronger. These are
the three kinds of change which the mind undergoes called the dharma,
lakshaṇa and avasthā change. But there is one difference between this
change thus described from the changes observed in sensible objects that
here the changes are not visible but are only to be inferred by the
passage of the mind from one state to another.
It has been said that there are two different kinds of qualities of the
mind, visible and invisible. The visible qualities whose changes can be
noticed are conscious states, or thought-products, or percepts, etc. The
invisible ones are seven in number and cannot be directly seen, but
their existence and changes or modifications may be established by
inference. These are suppression, characterisation, subconscious
maintenance of experience, constant change, life, movement and power or
energy.
In connection with samprajñāta samādhi some miraculous attainments are
described, which are said to strengthen the faith or belief of the Yogin
in the processes of Yoga as the path of salvation. These are like the
products or the mental experiments in the Yoga method, by which people
may become convinced of the method of Yoga as being the true one. No
reasons are offered as to the reason for these attainments, but they are
said to happen as a result of mental union with different objects. It is
best to note them here in a tabular form.
─────────────────────────────────┬────────┬────────────────────────────
Object of Saṃyama. │Saṃyama.│ Attainment.
─────────────────────────────────┼────────┼────────────────────────────
(1) Threefold change of things │Saṃyama.│
as dharma, lakshaṇa and │ │
avasthāpariṇāma. │ │
(2) The distinctions of name, │ „ │Knowledge of the sounds of
external object and the │ │ all living beings.
concept which ordinarily │ │
appears united as one. │ │
(3) Residual potencies saṃskāra │ „ │Knowledge of previous life.
of the nature of dharma │ │
and adharma. │ │
(4) Concepts alone (separated │ „ │Knowledge of other minds.
from the objects). │ │
(5) Over the form of body. │ „ │Disappearance (by virtue of
│ │ perceptibility being
│ │ checked).
(6) Karma of fast or slow │ „ │Knowledge of death.
fruition. │ │
(7) Friendliness, sympathy, and │ „ │Power.
compassion. │ │
(8) Powers of elephant. │ „ │Power of elephant.
(9) Sun. │ „ │Knowledge of the world (the
│ │ geographical position of
│ │ countries, etc.).
(10) Heavens. │ „ │Knowledge of the heavenly
│ │ systems.
(11) Pole star. │ „ │Knowledge of its movements.
(12) Plenus of the navel. │ „ │Knowledge of the system of
│ │ the body.
(13) Base of the throat. │ „ │Subdual of hunger and
│ │ thirst.
(14) Tortoise tube. │Saṃyama.│Steadiness.
(15) Coronal light. │ „ │Vision of the perfected
│ │ ones—the knowledge of the
│ │ seer, or all knowledge by
│ │ prescience.
(16) Heat. │ „ │Knowledge of the mind.
(17) Purusha. │ „ │Knowledge of purusha.
(18) Gross nature subtle │ „ │Control over the element
pervasiveness and │ │ from which follows
purposefulness. │ │ attenuation, perfection of
│ │ the body and
│ │ non-resistance by their
│ │ characteristics.
(19) Act, substantive appearance,│ „ │Mastery over the senses;
egoism, pervasiveness and │ │ thence quickness of mind,
purposefulness of │ │ unaided mental perception
sensation. │ │ and mastery over the
│ │ pradhāna.
─────────────────────────────────┴────────┴────────────────────────────
These vibhūtis, as they rise with the performance of the processes of
Yoga, gradually deepen the faith _śraddha_ of the Yogin in the
performance of his deeds and thus help towards his main goal or ideal by
always pushing or drawing him forward towards it by the greater and
greater strengthening of his faith. Divested from the ideal, they have
no value.
CHAPTER XIV
GOD IN YOGA
After describing the nature of karmayoga, and the way in which it leads
to jñānayoga, we must now describe the third and easiest means of
attaining salvation, the bhaktiyoga and the position of Īśvara in the
Yoga system, with reference to a person who seeks deliverance from the
bonds and shackles of avidyā.
Īśvara in the Yoga system is that purusha who is distinguished from all
others by the fact of his being untouched by the afflictions or the
fruits of karma. Other purushas are also in reality untouched by the
afflictions, but they, seemingly at least, have to undergo the
afflictions and consequently birth and rebirth, etc., until they are
again finally released; but Īśvara, though he is a purusha, yet does not
suffer in any way any sort of bondage. He is always free and ever the
Lord. He never had nor will have any relation to these bonds. He is also
the teacher of the ancient teachers beyond the range of conditioning
time.
This nature of Īśvara has been affirmed in the scriptures and is
therefore taken as true on their authority. The authority of the
scriptures is again acknowledged only because they have proceeded from
God or Īśvara. The objection that this is an argument in a circle has no
place here, since the connection of the scriptures with Īśvara is
beginningless.
There is no other divinity equal to Īśvara, because in the case of such
equality there might be opposition between rival Īśvaras, which might
result in the lowering in degree of any of them. He is omniscient in the
highest degree, for in him is the furthest limit of omniscience, beyond
which there is nothing.
This Īśvara is all-merciful, and though he has no desires to satisfy,
yet for the sake of his devotees he dictates the Vedas at each evolution
of the world after dissolution. But he does not release all persons,
because he helps only so far as each deserves; he does not nullify the
law of karma, just as a king, though quite free to act in any way he
likes, punishes or rewards people as they deserve.
At the end of each kalpa, he adopts pure body from his sattva, which is
devoid of any karmāśaya, and thus communicates through it to all his
devotees and dictates the Vedas. Again at the time of dissolution this
body of pure sattva becomes submerged in prakṛti; and at the time of its
submersion, Īśvara wishes that it might come forth again at the
beginning of the new creation; thus for ever at each new creation the
pure sattva body springs forth and is submerged again into prakṛti at
the time of the dissolution of the universe.
In accepting this body he has no personal desires to satisfy, as we have
said before. He adopts it only for the purpose of saving mankind by
instructing them as to knowledge and piety, which is not possible
without a pure sattvamaya body; so he adopts it, but is not affected in
any way by it. One who is under the control of nescience cannot
distinguish his real nature from nescience, and thus is always led by
it, but such is not the case with Īśvara, for he is not in any way under
its control, but only adopts it as a means of communicating knowledge to
mankind.
A Yogin also who has attained absolute independence may similarly accept
one or more pure sattvamaya nirmāṇa cittas from asmitāmātra and may
produce one citta as the superintendent of all these. Such a citta
adopted by a true Yogin by the force of his meditation is not under the
control of the vehicles of action as is the case with the other four
kinds of citta from birth, oshadhi, mantra and tapas.
The praṇava or oṃkāra is his name; though at the time of dissolution,
the word of praṇava together with its denotative power becomes submerged
in the prakṛti, to reappear with the new creation, just as roots shoot
forth from the ground in the rainy season. This praṇava is also called
svādhyāya. By concentration of this svādhyāya or praṇava, the mind
becomes one-pointed and fit for Yoga.
Now one of the means of attaining Yoga is Īśvarapraṇidhāna, or worship
of God. This word, according to the commentators, is used in two senses
in the first and the second books of the Pātañjala Yoga aphorisms. In
the first book it means love or devotion to God as the one centre of
meditation, in the second it is used to mean the abnegation of all
desires of the fruits of action to Īśvara, and thus Īśvarapraṇidhāna in
this sense is included under kriyāyoga. This dedication of all fruits of
action to Īśvara, purifies the mind and makes it fit for Yoga and is
distinguished from the Īśvarapraṇidhāna of the first book as the bhāvanā
of praṇava and Īśvara in this that it is connected with actions and the
abnegation of their fruits, whereas the latter consists only in keeping
the mind in a worshipful state towards Īśvara and his word or name
praṇava.
By devotion (bhakti) Īśvara is drawn towards the devotee through his
nirmāṇa citta of pure sattva and by his grace he removes all
obstructions of illness, etc., described in I. 30, 31, and at once
prepares his mind for the highest realisation of his own absolute
independence. So for a person who can love and adore Īśvara, this is the
easiest course of attaining samādhi. We can make our minds pure most
easily by abandoning all our actions to Īśvara and attaining salvation
by firm and steady devotion to Him. This is the sphere of bhaktiyoga by
which the tedious complexity of the Yoga process may be avoided and
salvation speedily acquired by the supreme grace of Īśvara.
This means is not, however, distinct from the general means of Yoga,
viz. abhyāsa and vairāgya, which applies to all stages. For here also
abhyāsa applies to the devotion of Īśvara as one supreme truth and
vairāgya is necessarily associated with all true devotion and adoration
of Īśvara.
This conception of Īśvara differs from the conception of Īśvara in the
Rāmānuja system in this that there prakṛti and purusha, acit and cit,
form the body of Īśvara, whereas here Īśvara is considered as being only
a special purusha with the aforesaid powers.
In this system Īśvara is not the superintendent of prakṛti in the sense
of the latter’s remaining in him in an undifferentiated way, but is
regarded as the superintendent of dharma and adharma, and his agency is
active only in the removal of obstacles, thereby helping the
evolutionary process of prakṛti.
Thus Īśvara is distinguished from the Īśvara of Saṅkara Vedānta in this
that there true existence is ascribed only to Īśvara, whereas all other
forms and modes of Being are only regarded as illusory.
From what we have seen above it is clear that the main stress of the
Yoga philosophy is on the method of samādhi. The knowledge that can be
acquired by it differs from all other kinds of knowledge, ordinary
perception, inference, etc., in this that it alone can bring objects
before our mental eye with the clearest and most unerring light of
comprehensibility in which the true nature of the thing is at once
observed. Inferences and the words of scriptures are based on concepts
or general notions of things. For the teaching of the Vedas is
manifested in words; and words are but names, terms or concepts formed
by noting the general similarities of certain things and binding them
down by a symbol. All deductive inferences are also based upon major
propositions arrived at by inductive generalisations; so it is easy to
see that all knowledge that can be acquired by them is only generalised
conceptions. Their process only represents the method by which the mind
can pass from one generalised conception to another; so the mind can in
no way attain the knowledge of real things, absolute species, which are
not the genus of any other thing; so inference and scripture can only
communicate to us the nature of the agreement or similarity of things
and not the real things as they are. Ordinary perception also is not of
much avail here, since it cannot bring within its scope subtle and fine
things and things that are obstructed from the view of the senses. But
samādhi has no such limitations and the knowledge that can be attained
by it is absolutely unobstructed, true and real in the strictest sense
of the terms.
Of all the points of difference between Yoga and Sāṃkhya the admission
of Īśvara by the former and the emphasis given by it to the Yoga
practice are the most important in distinguishing it from the latter. It
seems probable that Īśvara was traditionally believed in the Yoga school
to be a protector of the Yogins proceeding in their arduous course of
complete self-control and absorptive concentration. The chances of a
person adopting the course of Yoga practice for the attainment of
success in this field does not depend only on the exertions of the
Yogin, but upon the concurrence of many convenient circumstances such as
physical fitness, freedom from illnesses and other obstacles. Faith in
the patronage of God in favour of honest workers and believers served to
pacify their minds and fill them with the cheerful hope and confidence
which were so necessary for the success of Yoga practice. The
metaphysical functions which are ascribed to Īśvara seem to be later
additions for the sake of rendering his position more in harmony with
the system. Mere faith in Īśvara for the practical benefit of the Yogins
is thus interpreted by a reference to his superintendence of the
development of cosmic evolution. Sāṃkhya relied largely on philosophical
thinking leading to proper discrimination as to the difference between
prakrti and purusha which is the stage immediately antecedent to
emancipation. There being thus no practical need for the admission of
Īśvara, the theoretical need was also ignored and it was held that the
inherent teleological purpose (_purushārthatā_) of prakṛti was
sufficient to explain all the stages of cosmic evolution as well as its
final separation from the purushas.
We have just seen that Sāṃkhya does not admit the existence of God, and
considers that salvation can be obtained only by a steady perseverance
in philosophical thinking, and does not put emphasis on the practical
exercises which are regarded as essential by the Yoga. One other point
of difference ought to be noted with regard to the conception of avidyā.
According to Yoga, avidyā, as we have already explained it, means
positive untrue beliefs such as believing the impure, uneternal, sorrow,
and non-self to be the pure eternal, pleasure and the self respectively.
With Sāṃkhya, however, avidyā is only the non-distinction of the
difference between prakṛti and purusha. Both Sāṃkhya and Yoga admit that
our bondage to prakṛti is due to an illusion or ignorance (avidyā), but
Sāṃkhya holds the akhyāti theory which regards non-distinction of the
difference as the cause of illusion whereas the Yoga holds the
anyathākhyāti theory which regards positive misapprehension of the one
as the other to be the cause of illusion. We have already referred to
the difference in the course of the evolution of the categories as held
by Sāṃkhya and Yoga. This also accounts for the difference between the
technical terms of prakṛti, vikṛti and prakṛti-vikṛti of Sāṃkhya and the
viśesha and aviśesha of the Yoga. The doctrine of dharma, lakshaṇa and
avasthāpariṇāma, though not in any way antagonistic to Sāṃkhya, is not
so definitely described as in the Yoga. Some scholars think that Sāṃkhya
did not believe in atoms as Yoga did. But though the word paramāṇu has
not been mentioned in the _Kārikā_, it does not seem that Sāṃkhya did
not believe in atoms; and we have already noticed that Bhikshu considers
the word sūkshma in _Kārikā_ 39 as referring to the atoms. There are
also slight differences with regard to the process involved in
perception and this has been dealt with in my _Yoga philosophy in
relation to other Indian systems of thought_.[43] On almost all other
fundamental points Sāṃkhya and Yoga are in complete agreement.
CHAPTER XV
MATTER AND MIND
In conclusion it may be worth while saying a few words as to theories of
the physical world supplementary to the views that have already been
stated above.
Gross matter, as the possibility of sensation, has been divided into
five classes, according to their relative grossness, corresponding to
the relative grossness of the senses. Some modern investigators have
tried to understand the five bhūtas, viz. ākāśa, marut, tejas, ap and
kshiti as ether, gaseous heat and light, liquids and solids. But I
cannot venture to agree when I reflect that solidity, liquidity and
gaseousness represent only an impermanent aspect of matter. The division
of matter from the standpoint of the possibility of our sensations, has
a firm root in our nature as cognising beings and has therefore a better
rational footing than the modern chemical division into elements and
compounds, which are being daily threatened by the gradual advance of
scientific culture. This carries with it no fixed and consistent
rational conception as do the definitions of the ancients, but is a mere
makeshift for understanding or representing certain chemical changes of
matter and has therefore a merely relative value.
There are five aspects from which gross matter can be viewed. These are
(1) sthūla (gross), (2) svarūpa (substantive), (3) sūkshma (subtle), (4)
anvaya (conjunction), (5) arthavattva (purpose for use). The sthūla or
gross physical characteristics of the bhūtas are described as follows:—
Qualities of Earth—Form, heaviness, roughness, obstruction, stability,
manifestation (vṛtti), difference, support, turbidity, hardness and
enjoyability.
Ap—Smoothness, subtlety, clearness, whiteness, softness, heaviness,
coolness, conservation, purity, cementation.
Tejas—Going upwards, cooking, burning, light, shining, dissipating,
energising.
Vāyu—Transverse motion, purity, throwing, pushing, strength, movability,
want of shadow.
Ākāśa—Motion in all directions, non-agglomeration, non-obstruction.
These physical characteristics are distinguished from the aspects by
which they appeal to the senses, which are called their svarūpas. Earth
is characterised by gandha or smell, ap by rasa or taste, tejas by rūpa,
etc. Looked at from this point of view, we see that smell arises by the
contact of the nasal organ with the hard particles of matter; so this
hardness or solidity which can so generate the sensibility of gandha, is
said to be the svarūpa of kshiti. Taste can originate only in connection
with liquidity, so this liquidity or sneha is the svarūpa or nature of
ap. Light—the quality of visibility—manifests itself in connection with
heat, so heat is the svarūpa of fire. The sensibility of touch is
generated in connection with the vibration of air on the epidermal
surface; so this vibratory nature is the svarūpa of air.
The sensibility to sound proceeds from the nature of
obstructionlessness, which belongs to ākāśa, so this obstructionlessness
is the svarūpa of ākāśa.
The third aspect is the aspect of tanmātras, which are the causes of the
atoms or paramāṇus. Their fourth aspect is their aspect of guṇas or
qualities of illumination, action, inertia. Their fifth aspect is that
by which they are serviceable to purusha, by causing his pleasurable or
painful experiences and finally his liberation.
Speaking of aggregation with regard to the structure of matter, we see
that this is of two kinds (1) when the parts are in intimate union and
fusion, e.g. any vegetable or animal body, the parts of which can never
be considered separately. (2) When there are such mechanical aggregates
or collocations of distinct and independent parts _yutasiddhāvayava_ as
the trees in a forest.
A dravya or substance is an aggregate of the former type, and is the
grouping of generic or specific qualities and is not a separate
entity—the abode of generic and specific qualities like the dravya of
the Vaiśeshika conception. The aspect of an unification of generic and
specific qualities seen in parts united in intimate union and fusion is
called the dravya aspect. The aggregation of parts is the structural
aspect of which the side of appearance is the unification of generic and
specific qualities called the dravya.
The other aggregation of yutasiddhāvayava, i.e. the collocation of the
distinct and independent parts, is again of two kinds, (1) in which
stress may be laid on the distinction of parts, and (2) that in which
stress is laid on their unity rather than on their distinctness. Thus in
the expression mango-grove, we see that many mangoes make a grove, but
the mangoes are not different from the grove. Here stress is laid on the
aspect that mangoes are the same as the grove, which, however, is not
the case when we say that here is a grove of mangoes, for the expression
“grove of mangoes” clearly brings home to our minds the side of the
distinct mango-trees which form a grove.
Of the gross elements, ākāśa seems especially to require a word of
explanation. There are according to Vijñāna Bhikshu and Nāgeśa two kinds
of ākāśa—kāraṇa (or primal) and kārya (atomic). The first or original is
the undifferentiated formless tamas, for in that stage it has not the
quality of manifesting itself in sounds. This kāraṇa later on develops
into the atomic ākāśa, which has the property of sound. According to the
conception of the purāṇas, this karyākāśa evolves from the ego as the
first envelope of vāyu or air. The kāraṇakāśa or non-atomic ākāśa should
not be considered as a mere vacuum, but must be conceived as a positive,
all-pervasive entity, something like the ether of modern physicists.
From this ākāśa springs the atomic ākāśa or kāryākāśa, which is the
cause of the manifestation of sound. All powers of hearing, even though
they have their origin in the principle of egoism, reside in the ākāśa
placed in the hollow of the ear. When soundness or defect is noticed
therein, soundness or defect is also noticed in the power of hearing.
Further, when of the sounds working in unison with the power of hearing,
the sounds of solids, etc., are to be apprehended, then the power of
hearing located in the hollow of the ear requires the capacity of
resonance residing in the substratum of the ākāśa of the ear. This sense
of hearing, then, operates when it is attracted by the sound originated
and located in the mouth of the speaker, which acts as a loadstone. It
is this ākāśa which gives penetrability to all bodies; in the absence of
this, all bodies would be so compact that it would be difficult to
pierce them even with a needle. In the _Sāṃkhya-sūtra_ II. 12, it is
said that eternal time and space are of the nature of ākāśa. So this
so-called eternal time and space do not differ from the one
undifferentiated formless tamas of which we have just spoken. Relative
and infinite time arise from the motion of atoms in space—the cause of
all change and transformation; and space as relative position cannot be
better expressed than in the words of Dr. B. N. Seal, as “totality of
positions as an order of co-existent points, and as such it is wholly
relative to the understanding like order in time, being constructed on
the basis of relations of position intuited by our empirical or relative
consciousness. But there is this difference between space order and time
order:—there is no unit of space as position (_dik_) though we may
conceive time, as the moment (_kshaṇa_) regarded as the unit of change
in the causal series. Spatial position (_dik_) results only from the
different relations in which the all-pervasive ākāśa stands to the
various finite objects. On the other hand, space as extension or locus
of a finite body, or deśa, has an ultimate unit, being analysable into
the infinitesimal extension quality inherent in the guṇas of
prakṛti.”[44]
Citta or mind has two degrees: (1) the form of states such as real
cognition, including perception, inference, competent evidence, unreal
cognition, imagination, sleep and memory. (2) In the form in which all
those states are suppressed. Between the stage of complete outgoing
activity of ordinary experience (_vyutthāna_) and complete suppression
of all states, there are thousands of states of infinite variety,
through which a man’s experiences have to pass, from the vyutthāna state
to the nirodha. In addition to the five states spoken of above, there is
another kind of real knowledge and intuition, called prajñā, which dawns
when by concentration the citta is fixed upon any one state and that
alone. This prajñā is superior to all other means of knowledge, whether
perception, inference or competent evidence of the Vedas, in this, that
it is altogether unerring, unrestricted and unlimited in its scope.
Pramāṇa, we have seen, includes perception, inference and competent
evidence. Perception originates when the mind or citta, through the
senses (ear, skin, eye, taste and nose) is modified by external objects
and passes to them, generating a kind of knowledge about them in which
their specific characters become more predominant.
Mind is all-pervasive and can come in touch with the external world, by
which we have the perception of the thing. Like light, which emits rays
and pervades all, though it remains in one place, the citta by its
vṛttis comes in contact with the external world, is changed into the
form of the object of perception and thus becomes the cause of
perception; as the citta has to pass through the senses, it becomes
coloured by them, which explains the fact that perception is impossible
without the help of the senses. As it has to pass through the senses, it
undergoes the limitations of the senses, which it can avoid, if it can
directly concentrate itself upon any object without the help of the
senses; from this originates the prajñā, through which dawns absolute
real knowledge of the thing; unhampered by the limitations of the senses
which can act only within a certain area or distance and cannot cognize
subtler objects.
We see that in ordinary perception our minds are drawn towards the
object, as iron is attracted by magnets. Thus Bhikshu says in explaining
_Vyāsa-bhāshya_ IV. 17:—
“The objects of knowledge, though inactive in themselves, may yet draw
the everchanging cittas towards them like a magnet and change them in
accordance with their own forms, just as a piece of cloth is turned red
by coming into contact with red lac.” So it is that the cittas attain
the form of anything with which they come in touch and there is then the
perception that that thing is known. Perception (_pratyaksha_) is
distinguished from inference, etc., in this, that here the knowledge
arrived at is predominantly of the specific and special characters
(_viśesha_) of the thing and not of its generic qualities us in
inference, etc.
Inference proceeds from inference, and depends upon the fact that
certain common qualities are found in all the members of a class, as
distinguished from the members of a different class. Thus the qualities
affirmed of a class will be found to exist in all the individual members
of that class; this attribution of the generic characters of a class to
the individual members that come under it is the essence of inference.
An object perceived or inferred by a competent man is described by him
in words with the intention of transferring his knowledge to another;
and the mental modification, which has for its sphere the meaning of
such words, is the verbal cognition of the hearer. When the speaker has
neither perceived nor inferred the object, and speaks of things which
cannot be believed, the authority of verbal cognition fails. But it does
not fail in the original speaker, God or Īśvara, and his dictates the
Śāstras with reference either to the object of perception or of
inference.
Viparyyaya or unreal cognition is the knowledge of the unreal as in
doubt—a knowledge which possesses a form that does not tally with the
real nature of the thing either as doubt or as false knowledge. Doubt
may be illustrated by taking the case of a man who sees something in dim
light and doubts its nature. “Is it a wooden post or a man?” In nature
there is either the wooden post or the man, but there is no such fact or
entity which corresponds with doubt: “Is it a wooden post or a man?”
Knowledge as doubt is not cognition of a fact or entity. The illusion of
seeing all things yellow through a defect of the eye (as in jaundice)
can only be corrected when the objects are seen in their true colours.
In doubt, however, their defective nature is at once manifest. Thus when
we cannot be sure whether a certain thing is a post or a man, we know
that our knowledge is not definite. So we have not to wait till the
illusoriness of the previous knowledge is demonstrated by the advent of
right knowledge. The evil nature of viparyyaya is exemplified in avidyā
nescience, asmitā, rāga, etc.[45]
Viparyyaya is distinguished from vikalpa—imagination—in this, that
though the latter is also unreal knowledge its nature as such is not
demonstrated by any knowledge that follows, but is on the contrary
admitted on all sides by the common consent of mankind. But it is only
the learned who can demonstrate by arguments the illusoriness of vikalpa
or imagination.
All class notions and concepts are formed by taking note only of the
general characters of things and associating them with a symbol called
“name.” Things themselves, however, do not exist in the nature of these
symbols or names or concepts; it is only an aspect of them that is
diagrammatically represented by the intellect in the form of concepts.
When concepts are united or separated in our thought and language, they
consequently represent only an imaginary plane of knowledge, for the
things are not as the concepts represent them. Thus when we say
“Caitra’s cow,” it is only an imaginary relation for, strictly speaking,
no such thing exists as the cow of Caitra. Caitra has no connection in
reality with the cow. When we say purusha is of the nature of
consciousness, there is the same illusory relation. Now what is here
predicated of what? Purusha is consciousness itself, but in predication
there must always be a statement of the relation of one to another. Thus
it sometimes breaks a concept into two parts and predicates the one of
the other, and sometimes predicates the unity of two concepts which are
different. Thus its sphere has a wide latitude in all thought-process
conducted through language and involves an element of abstraction and
construction which is called vikalpa. This represents the faculty by
which our concepts are arranged in an analytical or synthetical
proposition. It is said to be _śabdajñānānupāti vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ_,
i.e. the knowledge that springs from relating concepts or names, which
relating does not actually exist in the objective world as it is
represented in propositional forms.
Sleep is that mental state which has for its objective substratum the
feeling of emptiness. It is called a state or notion of mind, for it is
called back on awakening; when we feel that we have slept well our minds
are clear, when we have slept badly our minds are listless, wandering
and unsteady. For a person who seeks to attain communion or samādhi,
these desires of sleep are to be suppressed, like all other desires.
Memory is the retaining in the mind of objects perceived when perception
occurs by the union of the cittas with external objects, according to
the forms of which the cittas are transformed; it retains these
perceptions, as impressions or saṃskāras by means of its inherent tamas.
These saṃskāras generate memory, when such events occur as can manifest
them by virtue of associations.
Thus memory comes when the percepts already known and acquired are kept
in the mind in the form of impressions and are manifested by the
udbodhakas or associative manifestors. It differs from perceptions in
this that the latter are of the nature of perceiving the unknown and
unperceived, whereas the former serves to bring before the mind percepts
that have already been acquired. Memory is therefore of percepts already
acquired by real cognition, unreal cognition, imagination, sleep and
memory. It manifests itself in dreams as well as in waking states.
The relation between these states of mind and the saṃskāras is this that
their frequency and repetition strengthens the saṃskāras and thus
ensures the revival of these states.
They are all endowed with sukha (pleasure), duḥkha (pain) and moha
(ignorance). These feelings cannot be treated separately from the states
themselves, for their manifestations are not different from the
manifestation of the states themselves. Knowledge and feeling are but
two different aspects of the modifications of cittas derived from
prakṛti; hence neither can be thought separately from the other. The
fusion of feeling with knowledge is therefore here more fundamental than
in the modern tripartite division of mind.
In connection with this we are to consider the senses whose action on
the external world is known as “perceiving,” “grahaṇa,” which is
distinguished from “pratyaksha,” which means the effect of “perceiving,”
viz. perception. Each sense has got its special sphere of work, e.g.
sight is of the eye, and this is called their second aspect, viz.
svarūpa. Their third aspect is of “asmitā” or ego, which manifests
itself through the senses. Their fourth aspect is their characteristic
of guṇas, viz. that of manifestation (_prakāśa_), action (_kriyā_) and
retention (_sthiti_). Their fifth aspect is that they are set in motion
for purusha, his experiences and liberation.
It is indeed difficult to find the relation of manas with the senses and
the cittas. In more than one place manas is identified with cittas, and,
on the other hand, it is described as a sense organ. There is another
aspect in which manas is said to be the king of the cognitive and motor
senses. Looked at in this aspect, manas is possibly the directive side
of the ego by which it guides the cognitive and conative senses in the
external world and is the cause of their harmonious activity for the
experience of purusha. As a necessary attribute of this directive
character of manas, the power of concentration, which is developed by
prāṇāyāma, is said to belong to manas. This is the rajas side of manas.
There is another aspect of manas which is called the anuvyavasāya or
reflection, by which the sensations (ālocana) are associated,
differentiated, integrated, assimilated into percepts and concepts. This
is possibly the sāttvika side of manas.
There is another aspect by which the percepts and concepts are retained
(_dhāraṇa_) in the mind as saṃskāras, to be repeated or revealed again
in the mind as actual states. This is the tamas side of manas.
In connection with this we may mention ūha (positive argumentation),
apoha (negative argumentation) and tattvajñāna (logical conclusion)
which are the modes of different anuvyavasāyas of the manas. Will, etc.,
are to be included with these (_Yoga-varttikā_, II. 18). Looked at from
the point of view of cittas, these may equally be regarded as the
modifications of cittas.
The motives which sustain this process of outgoing activity are false
knowledge, and such other emotional elements as egoism, attachment,
aversion, and love of life. These emotional elements remain in the mind
in the germinal state as power alone; or they exist in a fully operative
state when a man is under the influence of any one of them; or they
alternate with others, such as attachment or aversion; or they may
become attenuated by meditation upon opposites. Accordingly they are
called respectively prasupta, udāra, vicchinna or tanu. Man’s minds or
cittas may follow these outgoing states or experiences, or gradually
remove those emotions which are commonly called afflictions, thus
narrowing their sphere and proceeding towards final release.
All the psychic states described above, viz. pramāṇa, viparyyaya, etc.,
are called either afflicted or unafflicted according as they are moved
towards outgoing activity or are actuated by the higher motive of
emancipation by narrowing the field of experiences gradually to a
smaller and smaller sphere and afterwards to suppress them altogether.
These two kinds of motives, one of afflictions that lead towards
external objects of attachment and aversion or love of life, and the
other which leads to striving for kaivalya, are the sole motives which
guide all human actions and psychic states.
They influence us whenever suitable opportunities occur, so that by the
study of the Vedas, self-criticism or right argumentation, or from the
instruction of good men, abhyāsa and vairāgya may be roused by vidyā.
Right knowledge and a tendency towards kaivalya may appear in the mind
even when a man is immersed in the afflicted states of outgoing
activity. So also afflicted states may appear when a man is bent upon or
far advanced in those actions which are roused by vidyā or the tendency
towards kaivalya.
It seems that the Yoga view of actions, or karma, does not deprive man
of his freedom of will. The habit of performing particular types of
action only strengthens the corresponding subconscious impressions or
saṃskāras of those actual states, and thus makes it more and more
difficult to overcome their propensity to generate their corresponding
actual states, and thus obstructs the adoption of an unhampered and free
course of action. The other limitation to the scope of the activity of
his free will is the vāsanā aspect of the saṃskāras by which he
naturally feels himself attached by pleasurable ties to certain
experiences and by painful ones to others. But these only represent the
difficulties and impediments which come to a man, when he has to adopt
the Yoga course of life, the contrary of which he might have been
practising for a very long period, extending over many life-states.
The free will is not curbed in any way, for it follows directly from the
teleological purpose of prakṛti, which moves for the experience and
liberation of purusha. So this motive of liberation, which is the basis
of all good conduct, can never be subordinated to the other impulse,
which goads man towards outgoing experiences. But, on the other hand,
this original impulse which attracts man towards these ordinary
experiences, as it is due to the false knowledge which identifies
prakṛti with purusha, becomes itself subordinate and loses its influence
and power, when such events occur, which nullify false knowledge by
tending to produce a vision of the true knowledge of the relation of
prakṛti with purusha. Thus, for example, if by the grace of God false
knowledge (avidyā) is removed, true knowledge at once dawns upon the
mind and all the afflictions lose their power.
Free will and responsibility for action cease in those life-states which
are intended for suffering from actions only, e.g. life-states of
insects, etc.
APPENDIX
SPHOṬAVĀDA
Another point to be noted in connection with the main metaphysical
theories of Patañjali is the Sphoṭa theory which considers the relation
of words with their ideas and the things which they signify. Generally
these three are not differentiated one from the other, and we are not
accustomed to distinguish them from one another. Though distinct yet
they are often identified or taken in one act of thought, by a sort of
illusion. The nature of this illusory process comes to our view when we
consider the process of auditory perception of words. Thus if we follow
the _Bhāshya_ as explained by Vijñāna Bhikshu we find that by an effect
of our organs of speech, the letters are pronounced. This vocal sound is
produced in the mouth of the speaker from which place the sound moves in
aerial waves until it reaches the ear drum of the hearer, by coming in
contact with which it produces the audible sound called dhvani
(_Yoga-vārttika_, III. 17). The special modifications of this dhvani are
seen to be generated in the form of letters (_varṇa_) and the general
name for these modifications is nāda. This sound as it exists in the
stage of varṇas or letters is also called varṇa. If we apply the word
śabda or sound in the most general sense, then we can say that this is
the second stage of sound moving towards word-cognition, the first stage
being that of its utterance in the mouth of the speaker. The third stage
of śabda is that in which the letters, for example, g, au, and ḥ, of the
word “gauḥ” are taken together and the complete word-form “gauḥ” comes
before our view. The comprehension of this complete word-form is an
attribute of the mind and not of the sense of hearing. For the sense of
hearing senses the letter-forms of the sound one by one as the
particular letters are pronounced by the speaker and as they approach
the ear one by one in air-waves. But each letter-form sound vanishes as
it is generated, for the sense of hearing has no power to hold them
together and comprehend the letter-forms as forming a complete
word-form. The ideation of this complete word-form in the mind is called
sphoṭa. It differs from the letter-form in this that it is a complete,
inseparable, and unified whole, devoid of any past, and thus is quite
unlike the letter-forms which die the next moment after they originate.
According to the system of Patañjali as explained by the commentators,
all significance belongs to this sphoṭa-form and never to the letters
pronounced or heard. Letters when they are pronounced and heard in a
particular order serve to give rise to such complete ideational
word-images which possess some denotation and connotation of meaning and
are thus called “sphoṭas,” or that which illuminates. These are
essentially different in nature from the sounds in letter-forms
generated in the senses of hearing which are momentary and evanescent
and can never be brought together to form one whole, have no meaning,
and have the sense of hearing as their seat.
_The Vaiśeshika view._—Saṅkara Miśra, however, holds that this “sphoṭa”
theory is absolutely unnecessary, for even the supporters of sphoṭa
agree that the sphoṭa stands conventionally for the thing that it
signifies; now if that be the case what is the good of admitting sphoṭa
at all? It is better to say that the conventionality of names belongs to
the letters themselves, which by virtue of that can conjointly signify a
thing; and it is when you look at the letters from this aspect—their
unity with reference to their denotation of one thing—that you call them
a pada or name (_Upaskāra_, II. 2, 21). So according to this view we
find that there is no existence of a different entity called “name” or
“sphoṭa” which can be distinguished from the letters coming in a
definite order within the range of the sense of hearing. The letters
pronounced and heard in a definite order are jointly called a name when
they denote a particular meaning or object.
_Kumārila’s view_:—Kumārila, the celebrated scholar of the Mīmāṃsa
school, also denies the sphoṭa theory and asserts like the Vaiśeshika
that the significance belongs to the letters themselves and not to any
special sphoṭa or name. To prove this he first proves that the
letter-forms are stable and eternal and suffer no change on account of
the differences in their modes of accent and pronunciation. He then goes
on to show that the sphoṭa view only serves to increase the complexity
without any attendant advantage. Thus the objection that applies to the
so-called defect of the letter-denotation theory that the letters cannot
together denote a thing since they do not do it individually, applies to
the name-denotation of the sphoṭa theory, since there also it is said
that though there is no sphoṭa or name corresponding to each letter yet
the letters conjointly give rise to a sphoṭa or complete name
(_Ślokavārttika_, Sphoṭavāda, śl. 91–93).
The letters, however, are helped by their potencies (saṃskāras) in
denoting the object, or the meaning. The sphoṭa theory has, according to
Kumārila and Pārthasārathi, also to admit this saṃskāra of the letters
in the manifestation of the name or the śabda-sphoṭa, whereas they only
admit it as the operating power of the letters in denoting the object or
the thing signified. Saṃskāras according to Kumārila are thus admitted
both by the sphoṭa theorists and the Kumārila school of Mīmāṃsa, only
with this difference that the latter with its help can directly denote
the object of the signified, whereas the former have only to go a step
backwards in thinking their saṃskāra to give rise to the name or the
śabda-sphoṭa alone (_Nyāyaratnākara_, Sphoṭavāda, śl. 104).
Kumārila says that he takes great pains to prove the nullity of the
sphoṭa theory only because if the sphoṭa view be accepted then it comes
to the same thing as saying that words and letters have no validity, so
that all actions depending on them also come to lose their validity
(_Ślokavārttika_, Sphoṭavāda, śl. 137).
_Prabhākara._—Prabhākara also holds the same view; for according to him
also the letters are pronounced in a definite order; though when
individually considered they are momentary and evanescent, yet they
maintain themselves by their potency in the form of a pāda or name, and
thus signify an object. Thus Śāliknātha Miśra says in his _Prakaraṇa
Pañcikā_, p. 89: “It is reasonable to suppose that since the later
letters in a word are dependent upon the perception of a preceding one
some special change is wrought in the letters themselves which leads to
the comprehension of the meaning of a word.... It cannot be proved
either by perception or by inference that there is any word apart from
the letters; the word has thus for its constituents the letters.”
_Śabara._—The views of Kamārila and Prahhākara thus explicated are but
elaborate explanations of the view of Śabara who states the whole theory
in a single line—_pūrvavarṇajanitasaṃskārasahito’ntyo varṇaḥ
pratyāyakaḥ_.
“The last letter together with the potency generated by the preceding
letters is the cause of significance.”
_Mahābhāshya and Kaiyaṭa._—After describing the view of those who are
antagonistic to the sphoṭa theory it is necessary to mention the
Vaiākaraṇa school which is in favour of it; thus we find that in
explaining the following passage of Mahābhāshya,
“What is then a word? It is that which being pronounced one can
understand specific objects such as those (cows) which have tail, hoofs,
horns, etc.”
Kaiyata says: “The grammarians think that denotation belongs to words,
as distinct from letters which are pronounced, for if each of the
letters should denote the object, there would be no need of pronouncing
the succeeding letters....”
The vaiyakaraṇas admit the significant force of names as distinguished
from letters. For if the significant force be attributed to letters
individually, then the first letter being quite sufficient to signify
the object, the utterance of other letters becomes unnecessary; and
according to this view if it is held that each letter has the generating
power, then also they cannot do it simultaneously, since they are
uttered one after another. On the view of manifestation, also, since the
letters are manifested one after another, they cannot be collected
together in due order; if their existence in memory is sufficient, then
we should expect no difference of signification or meaning by the change
of order in the utterance of the letters; that is “_sara_” ought to have
the same meaning as “_rasa_.” So it must be admitted that the power of
signification belongs to the sphoṭa as manifested by the nādas as has
been described in detail in _Vākyapadīya_.
As the relation between the perceiving capacity and the object of
perception is a constant one so also is the relation between the sphoṭa
and the nāda as the manifested and the manifestor (_Vākyapadīya_ 98).
Just as the image varies corresponding to the variation of the
reflector, as oil, water, etc., so also the reflected or manifested
image differs according to the difference of the manifestor (_Vāk._
100). Though the manifestation of letters, propositions and names occurs
at one and the same time yet there seems to be a “before and after”
according to the “before and after” of the nāda utterances (_Vāk._ 102).
That which is produced through the union and disunion (of nādas or
dhvanis) is called sphoṭa, whereas other sound-perceptions arising from
sounds are called dhvanis (_Vāk._ 103). As by the movement of water the
image of a thing situated elsewhere also appears to adopt the movement
of the water and thus seems to move, so also the sphoṭa, though
unchanging in itself, yet appears to suffer change in accordance with
the change of nāda which manifests it (_Vāk._ 49). As there are no parts
of the letters themselves so the letters also do not exist as parts of
the name. There is again no ultimate or real difference between names
and propositions (_Vāk._ 73). It is only in popular usage that they are
regarded as different. That which others regard as the most important
thing is regarded as false here, for propositions only are here regarded
as valid (_Vāk._ 74). Though the letters which manifest names and
propositions are altogether different from them, yet their powers often
appear as quite undifferentiated from them (_Vāk._ 89). Thus when
propositions are manifested by the cause of the manifestation of
propositions they appear to consist of parts when they first appear
before the mind. Thus, though the pada-sphoṭa or the vākya-sphoṭa does
not really consist of parts, yet, as the powers of letters cannot often
be differentiated from them, they also appear frequently to be made up
of parts (_Vāk._ 91).
_The Yoga View._—As to the relation of the letters to the sphoṭa,
Vācaspati says, in explaining the _Bhāshya_, that each of the letters
has the potentiality of manifesting endless meanings, but none of them
can do so individually; it is only when the letter-form sounds are
pronounced in succession by one effort of speech that the individual
letters by their own particular contiguity or distance from one another
can manifest a complete word called the sphoṭa. Thus owing to the
variation of contiguity of distance by intervention from other
letter-form sounds any letter-form sound may manifest any meaning or
word; for the particular order and the association of letter-form sounds
depend upon the particular output of energy required in uttering them.
The sphoṭa is thus a particular modification of buddhi, whereas the
letter-form sounds have their origin in the organ of speech when they
are uttered, and the sense of hearing when they are heard. It is well to
note here that the theory that the letters themselves have endless
potentiality and can manifest any word-sphoṭas, according to their
particular combinations and recombinations, is quite in keeping with the
main metaphysical doctrine of the Pātañjala theory.
_Vākya-sphoṭa._—What is said here of the letter-form sounds and the
śabda-sphoṭas also applies to the relation that the śabda-sphoṭas bear
to propositions or sentences. A word or name does not stand alone; it
always exists as combined with other words in the form of a proposition.
Thus the word “tree” whenever it is pronounced carries with it the
notion of a verb “asti” or “exists,” and thereby demonstrates its
meaning. The single word “tree” without any reference to any other word
which can give it a propositional form has no meaning. Knowledge of
words always comes in propositional forms; just as different letter-form
sounds demonstrate by their mutual collocation a single word or
śabda-sphoṭa, so the words also by their mutual combination or
collocation demonstrate judgmental or propositional significance or
meaning. As the letters themselves have no meaning so the words
themselves have also no meaning; it is only by placing them side by side
in a particular order that a meaning dawns in the mind. When single
words are pronounced they associate other words with themselves and thus
appear to signify a meaning. But though a single word is sufficient by
association with other words to carry a meaning, yet sentences or
propositions should not be deemed unnecessary for they serve to
specialise that meaning (_niyamārthe anuvādaḥ_). Thus “cooks” means that
any subject makes something the object of his cooking. The mention of
the subject “Devadatta” and the object “rice” only specialises the
subject and the object. Though the analysis of a sentence into the words
of which it is constituted is as imaginary as the analysis of a word
into the letter-form sounds, it is generally done in order to get an
analytical view of the meaning of a sentence—an imaginary division of it
as into cases, verbs, etc.
_Abhihitānvayavada and Anvitābhidhānavāda._—This reminds us of the two
very famous theories about the relation of sentences to words, viz. the
“Abhihitānvayavāda” and the “Anvitābhidhānavāda.” The former means that
words themselves can express their separate meanings by the function
abhidhā or denotation; these are subsequently combined into a sentence
expressing one connected idea. The latter means that words only express
a meaning as parts of a sentence, and as grammatically connected with
each other; they only express an action or something connected with
action; in “sāmānaya”, “bring the cow”—“gām” does not properly mean
“gotva” but “ānayanānvitagotva,” that is, the bovine genus as connected
with bringing. We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing
verb and vice versa—(Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, Cowell).
_The Yoga point of view._—It will be seen that strictly speaking the
Yoga view does not agree with any one of these views though it
approaches nearer to the Anvitābhidhāna view than to the Abhihitānvaya
view. For according to the Yoga view the idea of the sentence is the
only true thing; words only serve to manifest this idea but have
themselves no meaning. The division of a sentence into the component
word-conceptions is only an imaginary analysis—an afterthought.
_Confusion the cause of verbal cognition._—According to Patañjali’s view
verbal cognition proceeds only from a confusion of the letter-form
sounds (which are perceived in the sense of hearing), the śabda-sphoṭa
which is manifested in the buddhi, and the object which exists in the
external world. These three though altogether distinct from one another
yet appear to be unified on account of the saṅketa or sign, so that the
letter-form sounds, the śabda-sphoṭa, and the thing, can never be
distinguished from one another. Of course knowledge can arise even in
those cases where there is no actual external object, simply by virtue
of the manifesting power of the letter-form sounds. This saṅketa is
again defined as the confusion of words and their meanings through
memory, so that it appears that what a word is, so is its denoted
object, and what a denoted word is, so is its object. Convention is a
manifestation of memory of the nature of mutual confusion of words and
their meanings. This object is the same as this word, and this word is
the same as this object. Thus there is no actual unity of words and
their objects: such unity is imaginary and due to beginningless
tradition. This view may well be contrasted with Nyāya, according to
which the convention of works as signifying objects is due to the will
of God.
INDEX
_abhihitānvayavāda_, 186
abhiniveśa, 101, 104
_abhivyaktikāraṇa_, 133
abhyāsa, 100, 101, 126, 128, 129, 130, 138, 143, 149, 162, 177
Absorption, 102
Abstraction, 135, 136, 148, 154, 174
Accessories, 135, 137, 145
Accidental variation, 77
_acit_, 162
Actual, 73
Actuality, 83
adharma, 85, 86, 88, 102, 106, 162
adhikārin, 123
adṛshṭajanmavedanīya, 112
_adṛshṭa-janmavedanīya karma_, 105, 110, 111
advaita, 14
_Advaita-Brahmasiddhi_, 14
Afflictions, 100, 103, 104, 105, 123, 124, 128, 143, 173 n., 176, 177,
178
Agent, 4
Aggregation, 168
Agreement, 33
ahaṃkāra, 38, 40, 41, 53, 56, 58, 61, 82, 86, 87, 93
ahaṃkāra-sāttvika, rājasa, tāmasa, 55
ahiṃsā, 136, 138, 139, 144
_Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā_, 10
akhyāti, 164
aklishṭa, 101
aklishṭavṛtti, 128
_aliṇga_, 7, 41, 42, 62, 118
_anādisaṃyoga_, 28
_anāśrita_, 29 n.
anekabhavika, 107, 112, 113
Anger, 141
_anirvācyā_, 28
aniyatavipāka, 112
aniyatavipāka-adṛshṭajanmavedanīya, 113
antaḥkaraṇa, 43 n.
_anukāreṇa paśyati_, 21
anupaśya, 21
anuvrata, 139
anuvyavasāya, 176
anvaya, 166, 167
anvayikāraṇa, 61
_anvitābhidhānavāda_, 186
anvitābhidhānavāda, Yoga view, near to, 186
_anyābhyāṃ ahaṃkārābhyām svakāryyopajanane rājasāhaṃkāraḥ
sahakārībhavati_, 55
anyathākhyāti, 164, 173 n.
_anyatvakāraṇa_, 134
_anyonyamithunāḥ sarvve naishāmādisamprayogo viprayogo vā úpalabhyate_,
7
aṅga, 145
aṇu, 43 n., 65
ap, 74, 75, 166, 167
ap atom, 65, 66
apara vairāgya, 127, 128
aparigraha, 141
_apavarga_, 29
apoha, 101, 176
Appearance, 36
apuṇya karma, 88
Aristotle, 1, 13
_artha_, 150
arthavattva, 166, 167
_arthena svakīyayā grāhyaśaktyā vijñānamajani_, 33
asamprajñāta, 124, 149
asamprajñāta samādhi, 125
Asceticism, 136, 139, 142, 144
asmitā, 51, 59, 100, 104, 118, 153, 154, 172, 175
asmitā-ego, 51
_asmitāmātra_, 50, 51, 59, 160
_asmitānugata_, 125, 153, 154
_asmītyetāvanmātrākāratvādasmitā_, 153
Assimilation, 101
Association of ideas, 37
asteya, 141, 144
Astral body, 93
aśukla, 140
aśuklākṛshṇa, 102, 103, 111
Atheistic, 90
Atomic change as unit of time, 43
Atoms, 4, 38, 39, 43, 65, 72, 74, 77, 81, 152, 167;
continual change, 71
Attachment, 99, 100, 176, 177
Avariciousness, 136, 141
avasthā, 76
avasthāpariṇāma, 71, 73, 82, 156, 165
Aversion, 98, 176, 177
_avibhāgaprāptāviva_, 17
avidyā, 2, 11, 12, 97, 99, 100, 101, 104, 114, 115, 116, 120, 123, 128,
131, 159, 172, 173 n., 178;
its definition, 11;
uprooting of, 115, 116
avidyā of yoga and Sāṃkhya, 164
aviśesha, 7, 7 n., 40, 41, 60, 61, 62, 81, 82, 84, 165
_aviśesheṇopashṭambhakasvabhāvāḥ_, 6
aviveka, 173 n.
_avyapadeśyatva_, 77
_avyavasthitākhilapariṇamo bhavatyeva_, 85
_ayutasiddhāvayava_, 69
_ādisamprayoga_, 7
ākāra, 85
ākāśa, 14, 43 n., 56, 57, 58, 68, 80, 93, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170
ākāśa, two kinds of, 168
ākāśa atom, 65, 66;
Bhikshu and Vācaspati on, 65
ākāśa tanmātra, 66
ālocana, 176
āmalaka, 77, 78, 79
ānanda, 153,154
ānandānugata, 125, 153, 154
_āptikāraṇa_, 133, 135
āpūra, 93
_āpyakāraṇa_, 135
āsana, 136, 145
āśaya, 103
_āśerate sāṃsārikā purushā asminniti āśayaḥ_, 103
āvaraṇa śakti, 84
āyush, 105, 106, 115
Barabara muni, 64
bāhya karma, 102
Beginningless, 28
Behaviour, 6
Bel, 77
Benares, 11 n.
bhakti, 161
bhaktiyoga, 159, 161
bhava, 110
_bhavishyadvyaktikamanāgataṃanudbhūtavyaktikamatītam svavyāpāropārūḍhaṃ
varttamānaṃ trayaṃ caitadvastu jñānasya jñeyam yadi caitat svarūpato
nābhavishyannedaṃ nirvishayaṃ jñānamudapatsyata tasmādatītamanāgataṃ
svarūpato’stīti_, 31 n.
_Bhāshya_, 16, 17, 18, 19, 33, 61, 62, 67, 71, 76, 78, 80, 91, 95, 99,
109, 110, 131
bhāvanā, 161
Bhikshu, 6, 9, 12 n., 43 n., 45 n., 46 n., 50, 65, 67, 85, 86, 88, 90,
94, 109, 110, 112, 126, 129, 145, 153, 168
_bhoga_, 29, 105, 106, 115
bhoga-śarīra, 105
Bhoja, 126
Bhojavṛtti, 95
bhrama, 173 n.
bhūta, 60, 69, 166
bhūtādi, 54, 56, 58, 63, 64;
accretion from, 65, 66
Biological, 2
Birth, 133, 161
Body, sattvamaya, 160
Bondage, 19
Brahmacaryya, 141
Brahman, 27, 28, 139
Breath, 146, 147
Breath regulation, 135, 136
_buddheḥ pratisaṃvedi purushaḥ_, 19
_buddhi_, 16, 18, 21, 27, 28, 40, 51, 52, 61, 115, 116, 118, 152, 173
n.
Buddhist, 33, 45 n.
Buddhists, their theory of _sahopalambhaniyama_ refuted, 33
Caitra, 173
Caraka, 11
Caste, 139
Categories of existence, 41
Category, 6, 117
Caturdaśī, 139
Causal activity, 4
Causal operation, 4
Causal transformation, 4
Causality, 152
Causation, 132, 133;
Sāṃkhya view of, 81
Cause, 79, 81, 85, 133, 134;
nine kinds of, 133
Cessation, 19
Change, 43, 44;
Buddhist and Yoga idea contrasted, 45 n.;
units of, 45, 46
Changeful, 18
Characterised, 37
Characteristic, 37
_Chāyā-vyākhyā_, 63, 93
Chemical, 2
Chowkhamba, 11 n.
Circumstance, 139
cit, 15, 162
citta, 36, 81, 92, 93, 94, 96, 101, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 125, 132,
147, 154, 161, 175;
different forms of, 92, 93;
different states of, 170;
its nature, 94
_cittamayaskāntamaṇikalpaṃ sannidhimātropakāri dṛśyatvena svaṃ bhavati
purushasya svāminaḥ_, 22
_cittaprasāda_, 127
Clairaudience, 144
Class-characteristics, 4 n.
Cleanliness, 136, 143, 144
Coco-nut, 77
Co-existence, 34
Cognitive states, 48
Coherent, 7, 37
Collocation, 37
Commentary, 4
Compassion, 137
Complacency, 137
Compounds, 3, 166
Conceived, 3
Conceiver, 3
Concentration, 17, 94, 95, 96, 123, 126, 128, 135, 136, 147, 148, 150,
152, 153, 155, 163, 170
Concept, 150, 162, 173
Conceptual, 23, 25
Concomitant causes, 85
Condensation, 10
Conscious-like, 19
Consciousness, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 45, 92, 93, 122, 149, 151, 154, 173
Consciousness contentless, 50
Conscious states, 17
Conservation, 132, 133
Contact, 27, 29 n.
Contemplation, 97
Contentment, 136, 139, 144
Continence, 136, 139, 141, 144
Contrary, 141
Co-operation, 5
Cosmic evolution, 47
Cosmic matter, 74
Country, 139
Creation, 114, 115, 160, 161
_Critique of Judgment_, 14
_Critique of Practical Reason_, 14
_Critique of Pure Reason_, 14
Davies, 25
Decision, 53
Demerit, 86, 87, 88, 93, 102, 103
Denotation, 7 n.
deśa, 85, 170
Descartes, 13
Desire, 141
Determinate, 7
Determined, 3, 37
Determiner, 3
Devotion, 139, 142, 145, 161
dhāraṇā, 101, 128, 130, 135, 136, 137, 138, 145, 147, 148, 176
dharma, 42, 71, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 101, 103, 106, 162
dharmamegha-samādhi, 117
_dharmapariṇāma_, 69, 71, 74, 80, 81, 156, 165
dharmin, 71, 73, 74, 76
_dharmisvarūpamātro hi dharmaḥ, dharmivikriyā eva eshā dharmadvārā
propañcyate_, 37, 71
dharmī, 42
_dhātu_, 11
_dhṛtikāraṇa_, 135
dhyāna, 117, 130, 135, 136, 138, 139, 145, 147, 148
Difference, 33
Differentiated, 7, 37, 62
Differentiation, 53, 66, 101
dik, 170
Discrimination, 8, 116, 120, 164
Distractions, 126, 148
Doubt, 172
_drashṭā dṛśiṃātraḥ śuddho’pi pratyayānupaśyaḥ_, 16
dravya, 4 n., 29 n., 168
Droṇa, 140 n.
_dṛgdarśanaśaktyorekātmateva asmitā_, 16, 51
dṛk, 17
_dṛkśakti_, 20
dṛshṭajanma karmāśaya, 105
_dṛshṭajanmavedanīya_, 105, 110, 112
duḥkha, 175
dvesha, 104
Earth, 167
Effect, 81, 82, 85, 132
Efficient cause, 82
Ego, 3, 4, 27, 28, 38, 42, 51, 52, 53, 60, 61, 99, 152, 153, 175;
a modification of buddhi, 53;
evolution in three lines from, 54;
three kinds of, 55
Egohood, 50, 124
Ego-universal, 50
ekabhavika, 105, 110, 111, 112
ekabhavikatva, 109
_ekāgra_, 95, 96, 123, 126
ekātmatā, 17
_ekātmikā saṃvidasmitā_, 51
ekendriya, 128
Elements, 3, 166
Emancipation, 164
Energy, 3, 5, 8, 132
Enjoyment, 28, 29
Equilibrium, 6, 7, 8, 9, 42, 43, 87
Error, 173 n.
Eternal, 8, 91
Eternity, two kinds of, 118
Ethics, 92
European, 10
Evolutes, 11
Evolution, 7, 39, 40, 41, 43, 45, 46, 47, 62, 65, 69, 72, 76, 81, 84,
87, 89, 114;
as change, 43;
as change of qualities and as derivation of categories, 69;
definite law of, 82;
its limitations by time and space, 79;
measured by units of spatial motion, 44;
of manas, 55;
of the senses, 54;
of categories, difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga view, 58–62;
of similars, 10
Evolutionary process, 77, 85, 91
Exhalation, 146
Existence as capacity of effecting, 8
Expiratory, 136
Extension, 34
Externality, 34
External reality, 34;
Buddhist objection to, 32;
has more than a momentary existence, 36;
its ground, 36;
not due to imagination, 35;
not identical with our ideas, 35
External world, 31;
refutation of Buddhist objections, 33
Faith, 102
Fichte, 50
Fisherman, 139
Force, 82
Freedom, 123, 125, 127;
of will, 177
Friendliness, 137
Future, 31, 32, 46, 72
Gaṇḍa, 15
gandha, 38, 152, 167
gandha-tanmātra, 58, 64
Gauḍapāda, 24
Generalisation, 154
Generic, 168
_ghaṭāvacchinna ākāśa_, 14
_Gītā_, 12
_Gītābhāshya_, 4 n.
Goal, 115, 121, 124, 127, 129
God, 2, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 115, 136, 139, 142, 143, 145, 148, 149,
161, 163, 164, 172, 178, 187
Gold, 134
grahaṇa, 101, 153, 175
_grahaṇadhāraṇohāpohatattvajñānābhiniveśā buddhau varttamānā purushe
adhyāropitasadbhāvāḥ_, 53
grahītṛ, 153
grāhya, 54, 153
Gross elements, derivation of, 65 _et seq._
Grossness, 34
_guṇā eva prakṛtiśabdavācyā na tu tadatiriktā prakṛtirasti_, 10
_guṇānāṃ hi dvairūpyaṃ vyavasāyātmkatvam vyavaseyātmakatvaṃca_, 53
_guṇānāṃ paramaṃ rūpaṃ na dṛshṭipathamṛcchati, yattu drshṭipathaṃ
prāptam tanmāyeva sutucchakaṃ_, 12, 37
guṇas, 3, 4 n., 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 24, 26, 37, 38, 39, 42, 53, 76, 78,
81, 82, 98, 101, 118, 120, 121, 131, 155, 167, 170
guṇas, three classes, 5;
as causal effect, 6;
evolution of the cognitive and conative senses and tanmātras, 38;
identity of qualities and substances, 5;
relative preponderance of, 7;
special affinity of each class, 6;
special behaviour of each class of, 6;
their atomic qualities consistent with their all-pervasiveness, 43
n.;
their common purpose, 7;
their co-operation, 38;
their mode of combination, 6;
their mode of mutual operation, 5;
their mode of evolution, 7;
their nature as feelings, 68;
their twofold nature, 53;
their threefold course of development, 38;
their want of purpose in the state of equilibrium, 7;
two classes of their evolution, _aviśesha_ and _viśesha_, 40
Hariharāraṇya, 96
Heaven, 86 n.
_hetumadanityamavyāpi sakriyamanekāśritaṃ liṅgaṃ sāvayavamparatantraṃ
vyaktaṃ viparītamavyaktaṃ_, 42
Hibiscus, 15 n.
hiṃsā, 140, 141
_History of Hindu Chemistry_, 7 n., 63 n., 170 n.
Horn of a hare, 8
Hume, 37
Idealistic Buddhists, 31
Ignorance, 141, 145
Illumination, 5
Illusion, 173 n.;
of Yoga and Sāṃkhya, 164
Illusive, 28
Imagination, 34
Immanent purpose, 90
Independence, 95, 128, 134
Indeterminate, 8
India, 14
Indra, 86 n.
Inertia, 3, 5, 8, 37, 167
Inference, 1, 2, 81, 96, 154, 156, 162, 163, 170, 171
Infra-atomic, 3
Infra-atoms, 4
Inhalation, 146
Injury, 139
Inorganic, 74
Inspiratory, 136
Intellection, 6
Intelligence, 2, 48
Intelligence-stuff, 3, 8, 49
Iron, 6
Īśvara, 14, 79, 87, 88, 90, 103, 126, 144, 145, 159, 160, 161, 162,
164, 172;
removal of barriers, 87
Īśvarakṛshṇa, 7 n.
Īśvarapraṇidhāna, 142, 145, 161
_Īśvarasyāpi dharmādhisṭhānārthaṃ pratibandhāpanaya eva vyāpāro_, 87
_janmamaraṇakaraṇānāṃ pratiniyamādayugapat pravṛtteśca purushabahutvam
siddhaṃ traiguṇyaviparyyayācca_, 26
_japāsphaṭikayoriva noparāgaḥ kintvabhimānaḥ_, 15
_jāti_, 105, 106, 115
Jealousy, 143
jīva, 14
jīvanmukta, 117
jīvanmukti, 120
jñāna, 150
jñānayoga, 130, 142, 143, 159
Judgmental, 23
kaivalya, 22, 23, 27, 31, 95, 96, 116, 118, 121, 122, 139, 140, 142,
143, 177
kalpa, 160
Kant, 14, 37
Kapila, 25
karma, 86, 98, 117, 159, 160, 177;
its classification and divergence of views, 109–113
karma-sannyāsin, 103
karmāśaya, 103, 104, 105, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 115, 160
karmayoga, 159
karuṇā, 137, 138, 139
Kaumudī, 64
kāla, 85
kāma, 104
kāraṇa, 168
kāraṇacitta, 93
_kārikā_, 7 n., 11, 24, 26, 42, 64, 165
Kārya, 168
kārya vimukti, 120
kāryya citta, 92
kāryyakarī śakti, 84
Kāśmīra, 79
_kevalapurushākārā saṃvit_, 153
kevalī, 117, 118
kirātā, 101
kleśa, 99, 100, 104, 114
klishṭa, 128
klishṭavṛtti, 100
Knowable, 5, 27, 32, 38
Knower, 27, 50
Knowledge, different kinds of, differentiated, 163
Known, 27
_kriyā_, 37, 175
kriyāyoga, 129, 130, 142, 143, 161
krodha, 104
kṛshṇa, 102, 103, 111
kṛshṇa karma, 103, 111
_kṛtārthaṃ prati nashṭamapyanashṭaṃ tadanyasādhāraṇatvāt_, 26
_kshaṇa_, 43, 44, 45, 46 n., 146, 170
_kshaṇabhaṅguram_, 12 n.
_kshaṇapracayāśraya_, 46 n.
_kshaṇapratiyogi_, 46 n.
_kshaṇatatkramayornāsti vastusamāhāraḥ iti buddhisamāhāraḥ
muhūrttāhorātrātrādayaḥ. sa tvayaṃ kālaḥ vastuśūnyo’pi
buddhinirmāṇah_, 44
_kshipta_, 95, 122
kshiti, 74, 75, 166
kshiti atom, 66
kuntī, 14, 15 n.
kuśala, 121
kuśalī, 121
kūṭastha nitya, 118
lakshaṇa, 76, 82
lakshaṇa-pariṇāma, 71, 72, 73, 74, 156, 165
Latent, 46, 73, 81, 96, 108
_laukikamāyeva_, 12 n.
liberation, 7, 25, 167, 175, 177
Light, 167
Limitation theory, 14, 15
liṅga, 7, 41, 42, 51, 62, 118
_liṅgamātram mahattatvaṃ sattāmātre mahati ātmani_, 50
_lobha_, 104
Locke, 37
Lokācāryya, 11, 55, 58
Lotus, 9
_madhumatī_, 125
_madhupratīka_, 125
Magnet, 6, 89, 171
mahat, 9, 11, 40, 41, 42, 51, 56, 58, 59, 61, 82;
its potential existence in prakṛti, 9
_Mahābhārata_, 15 n., 80, 140
mahāpralaya, 118
mahāvrata, 139
maitrī, 137, 138, 139
manas, 40, 51, 55, 60, 81, 100, 118, 133, 175, 176
Manifested, 72
mantra, 161
Many, 27, 28
_Maṇiprabhā_, 65
marut, 75, 166
Mass, 3
Material cause, 61, 81
Matter, 2, 3, 166
mānasa karma, 102
mātrā, 146
māyā, 2, 11, 12, 14, 27, 28
_māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt māyinaṃ tu maheśvaraṃ_, 11
_māyeva_, 12 n.
Mechanical, 2
Meditation, 102, 135, 136, 145, 148, 149, 161, 176
Memory, 53, 98
Mental, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 37, 48
Mental states, analysis of, 48
Merit, 85, 86, 87, 88, 93, 103
Metaphysics, 30
Method of agreement, 33, 35;
of difference, 33
Mind, 2, 3, 18, 19, 81;
its seven qualities, 156
Mind-modification, 20, 22;
-transformations, 18
_moha_, 104, 175
_Mokshadharmādhyāya_, 140
Moment, 44, 45
Momentary, 12, 35
Moral, 2
Moral ideal, 26
Movement, 48
muditā, 137, 139
_mūḍha_, 95, 122
Nahusha, 86
Naiyāyika, 58
Name, 150, 173;
and thing, 173
Nandī, 85
_na tu kshaṇātiriktaḥ kshaṇikaḥ padārthaḥ kaścidishyate taistu
kshaṇamātrasthāyyeva padārthaḥ ishyate_, 45 n.
_Naturalism and agnosticism_, 2 n.
Natural selection, 76
Nāgeśa, 61, 63, 66, 86, 87, 94, 107, 109, 117, 168
Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, 90, 126
_nāsadāsīt na sadāsīt tadānīm_, 12
_nāstyasataḥ saṃbhavaḥ na cāsti sato vināśāḥ_, 31
Nectar, 85
Nescience, 14, 15, 97, 99;
its different forms, 172 n.
nidrā, 101
Nihilists, 2
_niḥsaṅge’pi uparāgo vivekāt_, 15
_niḥsattāsattam niḥsadasat nirasat avyaktam aliṅgam pradhānam_, 8
niḥsattāsattaṃ, 12
nirasmitā, 153
nirmāṇa citta, 160, 161
nirānanda, 153
nirodha, 19, 96, 118, 149, 155, 156, 170
_nirodhaja saṃskāra_, 97
nirodha samādhi, 139
_niruddha_, 95, 123
nirvicāra, 149, 153, 154
nirvīja, 122, 125
nirvīja samādhi, 154
nirvitarka, 150, 151, 153, 154
niścaya, 50
niyama, 136, 139, 142, 143, 148
niyata vipāka, 112
niyatavipākadṛshṭajanmavedanīya, 113
Nīlakaṇṭha, 80, 88, 89
Non-being, 2
Non-covetousness, 139, 144
Non-discrimination, 15
Non-distinction, 173 n.
Non-existence, 8, 12
Non-injury, 139, 140, 144;
its classification, 141
Non-stealing, 139
Noumenon, 8, 14
Observance, 135, 136
oṃkāra, 161
Omniscience, 95
oshadhi, 161
Pain, 98, 121, 122, 126, 137, 142
Palm, 77
Pantheism, 13
Pañcaśikha, 17, 52, 103 n.
parama mahat, 68
paramāṇu in Sāṃkhya and Yoga, 43 n., 66, 67, 165, 167
para vairāgya, 120, 127, 128
parikarma, 129, 130, 135, 137
pariṇāma, 98
_pariṇāmaduḥkhatā_, 98
_pariṇāmakramaniyama_, 62, 82
pariṇāmi, 19
pariṇāminityatā, 119
Past, 31, 32, 46, 72
Patañjali, 1, 2, 5 n., 16, 26, 30, 35, 51, 119
Patent, 81
pāda, 54
Pāñcāla, 79
pāṇi, 54
pāpa karma, 100
pāpakarmāśaya, 105
Pātañjala, 1, 12, 90, 115
pāyu, 54, 58
Perceived, 3
Perceiver, 3
Percept, 19
Perception, 3, 53, 96, 154, 162, 170, 171, 175
Permanent, 21
Phenomena, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 95
Phenomenal, 29, 84, 125, 155
Philosopher, 2
Philosophical, 2
Physical, 2, 3, 4, 5, 37, 166
_Physical, Chemical and Mechanical Theories of the Ancient Hindus_, 63
n.
Plant: its possession of life and senses, 80
Plato, 13
Pleasure, 98
Plurality, 26–29, 30
Poison, 85
Posture, 135, 136, 145
Potency, 19, 82, 96, 98, 101, 106, 116, 124, 125, 154, 155;
destroying other potencies, 117
Potential, 9, 32, 73, 77, 83, 84, 85
Potentiality, 5, 83, 84
Potentials, 3
Power, 82
pradhāna, 118
prajñā, 102, 116, 117, 120, 122, 125, 126, 128, 136, 151, 154, 170,
171;
its seven stages, 119–120
prajñāsaṃskāra, 101
prajñāloka, 149
prakāśa, 37, 175
prakṛti, 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 16, 17, 22, 25, 27, 28, 29, 40, 41,
42, 54, 59, 62, 77, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94, 95, 114,
115, 117, 118, 120, 122, 125, 143, 152, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165,
170, 173 n., 175, 177, 178;
as undifferentiated cosmic matter, 12;
as equilibrium of dharma and dharmī, 42;
avidyā and vāsanā lie merged in it, 114;
different views of, 10, 11;
different from avidyā, 12;
evolution of the second category of asmitā, 51;
its difference from māyā, 12;
its difference from purusha, 20;
its first evolutionary product, mahat, 50, 51;
its goal, 116;
its identity with guṇa reals, 9;
its relation with guṇas, 6;
its similarity with purusha, 20;
Lokācāryya’s view of, 11;
nature in the state of equilibrium, 8;
refilling from, 86;
roused by God, 87;
Venkaṭa’s view of, 10
prakṛtilīna, 127
_prakṛtivikṛti_, 7 n.
_prakṛtiṛityucyate vikārotpādakatvāt avidyā jñānavirodhitvāt māyā
vicitrasṛshṭikaratvāt_, 11
prakṛtyāpūra, 106
pralaya, 114
pramāṇa, 101, 170, 176
praṇava, 161
prāṇāyāma, 136, 137, 145, 146, 147, 148, 175
prasupta, 176
_pratipaksha bhāvanā_, 141
_pratisambandhī_, 46 n.
pratiyogī, 46 n.
pratyāhāra, 136, 137, 147, 148
pratyaksha, 171, 175
pratyaya, 119, 134
_pratyayakāraṇa_, 133
_pratyayaṃ bauddhamanupaśyati tamanupaśyannatadātmāpi tadātmaka iva
pratibhāti_, 17
_pratyayānupaśya_, 17, 18
_Pravacana-bhāshya_, 64
_prāmāṇyaniścaya_, 134 n.
Pre-established harmony, 2
Present, 31, 32, 46, 72
Presentative ideation, 101
Presentative power, 33
Pride, 143
Primal, 3
Primal cause, 3, 6
pṛthivī, 57
Psychological, 2
Psychology, 81
Psychosis, 3, 16
puṇya, 100
puṇya karma, 88, 100
puṇya karmāśaya, 105
Purāṇa, 64
Purification, 138
Purificatory, 129, 130, 136
Purity, 139
purusha, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 16, 17, 19, 23, 28, 29, 42, 48, 53, 61, 76,
89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 100, 104, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 125,
131, 133, 143, 154, 159, 162, 164, 173, 173 n., 175, 177, 178;
arguments in favour of its separate existence, 24;
contrast with vedantic Brahman, 26;
different from the mental states, 17;
fulfilment of its objects, 7, 8;
its connection with prakṛti real, 28;
its final separation from prakṛti, 118;
its permanence, 21;
its plurality, 26–30;
its reflection in the mind, 18;
its relation with concepts and ideas, 49;
its similarity with sattva, 49;
meaning determined from the sūtras, 16, 17;
nature of its reflection in buddhi, 21, 22
purushārtha, 89
purushārthatā, 120, 164;
its relation with avidyā, 115
pūrvadeśa, 43 n.
rajas, 3, 4, 5, 6, 24, 37, 40, 43, 47, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 62, 95, 96,
116, 175
Rarefaction, 10
rasa, 38, 152
rasa-tanmātra, 58, 64
Ray, P. C., 7 n., 63 n., 170 n.
Rādhā, 14, 15 n.
rāga, 97, 99, 104, 172
_Rājamārtaṇda_, 65
_rājaputtravattattvopadeśāt_, 15
rājasa, 38
Rāmānuja, 64, 162
Realisation, 137
Reality, 2, 4, 30, 118, 154
Reals, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 28
Reason, 50
Reasoning, 53
Rebirth, 93, 107
Reflection, 18, 28
Reflection theory, 14, 15
Release, 28, 29, 123, 128
Religious, 2
Reperception, 18
Restraint, 135, 136
Retention, 101
Right knowledge, 53
rūpa, 38, 65, 152, 167
rūpa tanmātra, 57, 64
Ṛgveda, 11
ṛshi, 144
ṛtambharā, 154
_sadṛśapariṇāmā_, 10
sahakāri, 55
_sahopalambhaniyama_, 33
_sahopalambhaniyamaś ca vedyatvañca hetū
sandigdhavyatirekatayānaikāntikau_, 34
_sahopalambhaniyamādabhedo nilataddhiyoḥ_, 32
Salvation, 145, 159, 162
samādhi, 81, 96, 102, 118, 122, 124, 126, 128, 130, 135, 136, 137, 140,
142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 149, 151, 153, 155, 161, 162;
classification of, 153, 154
samādhipariṇāma, 155
samāna tantra, 67
samprajñāta, 96, 124, 125, 126, 137, 144, 149, 153, 155, 156
samprajñāta samādhi, 138, 145, 150, 154
_sampratyaya_, 134 n.
_saṃghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyyayādadhishṭhānāt purusho’sti
bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalyārthaṃ pravṛtteśca_, 24
saṃsāra, 115, 121
saṃskāra, 19, 81, 96, 98, 101, 108, 109, 125, 174, 176, 177
_saṃskārāḥ vṛttibhiḥ kriyante saṃskāraiśca vṛttayaḥ evaṃ
vṛttisaṃskāracakram aniśamāvarttate_, 97
saṃskāraśesha, 125
_saṃskāryyakāraṇa_, 135
_saṃsṛshṭā vivicyante_, 62
_saṃvega_, 129
saṃyama, 149, 157
_saṃyoga_, 27, 29 n.
sannyāsāśrama, 103
santosha, 143
saṅketa, 187
Sarasvatī Rāmānanda, 126
_sarvaṃ sarvātmakaṃ_, 77
satkāraṇavāda, 81
satkāryyavāda, 81
sattva, 3, 4, 5, 6, 22, 24, 37, 38, 40, 43, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55,
56, 96, 116, 143, 144, 153, 160, 161
_sattvapurushayoḥ śuddhisāmye kaivalyaṃ_, 16, 22
_sattvapurushayoratyantāsaṅkīrṇayoḥ pratyayāviśesho bhogaḥ parārthatvāt
svārthasamyamāt purushajñā, nam_, 16
savicāra, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154;
prajñā, 151
savitarka, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154
_sā ca ātmanā grahītrā saha buddhirekātmikā saṃvid_, 51
_sāmānya guṇa_, 29 n.
Sāṃkhya, 4, 7 n., 10, 11, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29, 29 n., 30, 58, 62, 67,
89, 90, 94, 140, 164, 165;
Jaina influence on, 94 n.
_Sāṃkhya-kārikā_, 55, 56 n., 67
Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala, 24, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82, 85
Sāṃkhya philosophy, 4 n.
_Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāshya_, 4 n.
_Sāṃkhya-sūtra_, 11, 15, 169
_Sāṃkhya-Yoga_, 4, 26, 27, 50 n., 57
Sāṃkhyists, 12
sānanda, 153
sāttvika, 38, 56
sāttvikaahaṃkāra, 63
_Science of Ethics_, 50
Seal, Dr. B. N., 7, 37, 63 n., 66–169
Seeming reflection, 22, 23
Seer, 17, 19, 23, 24, 28, 47, 51
Self, 8, 18, 21, 26, 49, 51, 54
Self-consciousness, 52, 54
Self-control, 24
Self-intelligent, 3
Self-subsistent, 36
Sensation, 166
Sense, 141
Sense faculties, 56
Sense organs, 56
Senses, 3, 40, 41, 47, 54, 60, 86, 87, 100, 102, 135, 147, 167, 171;
divergent views about their evolution, 57
Separation, 29 n.
Sex restraint, 144
_Shashṭitantraśāstra_, 10, 12
siddha, 144
_Siddhānta-candrikā_, 65, 95
_Siddhāntaleśa_, 14
Sign, 7, 41
Simultaneous revelation, 33
Sins, 103
Sleep, 174
smṛti, 19, 64, 101, 102, 108, 126, 128, 136
Social, 2
Soul, 13, 14, 24, 25
Sound, 169
Space, 79, 146, 152;
as relative position, 169
Space order, 170
sparśa, 38, 65
sparśâtanmātra, 57, 64
Specialised, 7, 8
Specific, 168
sphoṭavāda, 178–187;
_Kumāril’s view_, 181;
Mahābhāshya and Kaiyaṭa, 182;
Prabhākara, 182;
Śabara’s view, 182;
_Vaiśeshika view_, 180;
Vākya-sphoṭa, 185;
_Yoga view_, 184
Spinoza, 13
Spirits, 7, 13
Spiritual principle, 24, 28
_sthiti_, 37, 175
_sthitikāraṇa_, 133
sthūla, 166
sthūlavishayaka, 154
Strength, 102
Studies, 136, 139
Subconscious, 81
Sub-latent, 46, 73
Substance, 4 n., 29 n., 40, 47, 73, 74, 76, 81, 168;
its nature, 37
Substantive entities, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 82, 84
Substratum, 36, 37, 49
Succession, 44, 45
_summum bonum_, 121
Susheṇa, 135
_sutucchaka_, 12
_sūkshma_, 61, 67, 166, 167
sūkshmavishayaka, 154
_sūkshmavṛttimantaḥ_, 6
Sūtra, 15, 17, 22, 26, 31, 62, 64, 108, 137, 147
_Sūtrārthabodhinī_, 65, 90
svarūpa, 166, 167, 175
svādhyāya, 136, 142, 161
_Svetāśvatara_, 11
Sympathy, 137, 138
śabda, 38, 65, 150
_śabdajñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ_, 174
śabda-tanmātra, 57, 64
_śabdādīnām mūrttisamānajātīyānām_, 66 n.
śakti, 17, 82, 83
śaktimān, 82, 83
Śaṅkara, 4 n., 135, 162
śānta, 73
_Sānti-parva_, 80, 88, 89
śāstra, 172
śauca, 143, 144
śīla, 6
śraddhā, 102, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 135, 138, 158
śruti, 57
śukla, 102, 111, 140, 175
śukla karma, 103, 140
śukla karmāśaya, 111
śuklakṛshṇa, 102, 111
Śūnyavādi Buddhists, 2
_svalpasaṅkaraḥ saparihāraḥ sapratyavamarshaḥ_, 103 n.
_svasvāmiśaktyoḥ svarūpopalabdhihetuḥ saṃyogaḥ_, 16
_tadartha eva drśyasya ātmā_, 16
_tadabhāvāt saṃyogābhāvo hānaṃ taddṛśeḥ kaivalyaṃ_, 16
taijasa, 56
tamas, 3, 4, 5, 6, 37, 39, 40, 43, 47, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 94, 95,
117, 169, 176
tanmātra, 38, 40, 42, 54, 59, 61, 65, 66, 67, 70, 82, 83, 124, 151, 167
tanmātras, evolution of grosser elements from, 65;
their difference from paramānus, 68;
their evolution, _et seq._, 64;
their relation to ahaṃkāra, 40, 41
tanmātrāvayava, 66
_tanmātrāṇāmapi parasparavyārvṛttasvabhāvatvamastyeva tacca
yogimātragamyam_, 68
tanu, 176
_tapaḥ_, 136
tapas, 161
_tasmāt svatantro’rthaḥ sarvapurushasādhāraṇaḥ svatantrāṇi ca cittāni
pratipurushaṃ, pravarttante_, 36
Taste, 167
_tatradṛshṭajanmavedanīyasya niyatavipākasya_, 109
tattva, 40, 94
tattvajñāna, 101, 176
_Tattva-kaumudī_, 25, 56 n., 103 n.
_Tattva-nirūpaṇa_, 66
_Tattvatraya_, 11 n., 55, 58, 64, 66
_Tattvavaiśāradī_, 3 n., 5 n., 9 n., 33 n., 46, 53, 56 n., 64, 75, 78,
79, 93, 135, 154
tattvāntara, 68
_tattvāntara-pariṇāma_, 40, 41, 69
tāmasa, 38, 56
tāmasa ahaṃkāra, 60, 62
_te vyaktasūkshmā guṇātmānaḥ ... sarvamidaṃ guṇānāṃ
Sanniveśaviśeshamātramiti paramārthato guṇātmānaḥ_, 38
tejas, 65, 75, 166, 167
tejas atom, 66
Teleological, 86, 121
Teleology, 24, 76, 77, 89
Temptation, 141
Theft, 136, 141
Theists, 90
Theories, 2
Thing, 150
Thing-in-itself, 2, 37
Thought, 2
Time, 79, 139, 152, 169;
as discrete moments, 44;
as unit of change, 43;
element of imagination in, 44;
unit of, 46;
order, 170
Tinduka, 77
Trance, 135, 136, 143;
Trance-cognition, 95
Transcendent, 18
Transformations, 20, 24
trasareṇu, 66
_triguṇamaviveki vishayaḥ sāmānyamacetanaṃ prasavadharmi vyaktaṃ tathā
pradhānaṃ, tadviparītastathā pumān_, 42
Truth, 141
Truthfulness, 139, 140, 144
_Tulyajātīyātulyajātīyaśaktibhedānupātinaḥ_, 6
udāra, 176
udbodhaka, 174
udghāta, 146, 147
udita, 73
Ultimate state, 7
Unafflicted, 176
Understanding, 19
Undetermined, 8
Undifferentiated, 12, 162
Unindividuated, 12
Universe, 1, 13;
a product of guṇa combinations, 37
Unknowable, 2, 37
Unmanifested, 4, 8, 72
Unmediated, 8
Unpredicable, 73
Unreal, 28
Unspecialised, 7
Unwisdom, 142
Upanishads, 11
upastha, 54, 58
upādāna, 61
upādāna kāraṇa, 61, 133
upekshā, 137, 139
_utpādyakāraṇa_, 135
uttaradeśa, 43 n.
ūha, 101, 176
vaikārika, 56
vairāgya, 100, 101, 127, 129, 130, 135, 136, 143, 149, 162, 177
Vaiśeshika, 43 n., 71, 168
Vaiśeshika atoms, 70
vaishṇava, 10
Vanity, 143
vaśīkāra, 128
_vastupatitaḥ_, 44
_vastusāmye cittabhedāt tayor vibhaktaḥ panthāḥ_, 35 n.
Vācaspati, 3, 5 n., 8, 12, 32, 33, 35, 44, 46 n., 51, 55, 62, 65, 66,
67, 75, 78, 87, 89, 93, 109, 110, 112, 118, 126, 129, 144, 153, 154
vāk, 54
_Vākyapadīya_, 183
vāsanā, 99, 106, 108, 114, 116, 177;
contrasted with karmāśaya, 107
Vāyu, 167
Vāyu atom, 65
Vedas, 154, 160, 162, 170, 177
Vedānta, 11, 14, 24, 27, 28, 29, 162
Vedāntism, 14
Vedāntists, 12, 26, 66, 81
Vedic, 103
Vehicles of actions, 103
Venkaṭa, 10
Veracity, 136, 140
Verbal cognition, cause of, 186;
view of Nyāya, 187
vibhu, 43 n.
_vibhu parimāṇa_, 29 n.
vibhūti, 158
Vibhūtipāda, 22
vicāra, 153
vicārānugata, 125, 153
vicchinna, 176
Vice, 86, 87
_videha_, 127
vidyā, 177
_vidyāviparītam jñānāntaraṃ avidyā_, 11, 97
_Vijñanāmṛta-bhāshya_, 88, 90
Vijñāna Bhikshu, 4, 15
vikalpa, 101, 150, 173, 174
_vikārakāraṇa_, 133
_vikāryyakāraṇa_, 135
_vikṛti_, 7 n., 165
_vikshipta_, 95, 123
vikshiptacitta, 96, 130
vipāka, 105, 107
viparyyaya, 101, 172, 173, 176
_viprayoga_, 7
Virtue, 86
_Vishṇu Purāṇa_, 66
viśesha, 7, 7 n., 40, 59, 81, 84, 165, 171
_viśeshapariṇāma_, 60
_viśeshāviśeshaliṅgamātrāliṅgāniguṇaparvāṇi_, 59
visokā, 125
vitarka, 153
vitarkānugata, 125, 154
_viyoga_, 29 n.
_viyogakāraṇa_, 134, 135
vīryya, 102, 126, 128, 135, 136
Vomit, 141
_Vṛtti_, 56, 92, 96, 97, 101, 102, 122, 171
vyaṇgya, 57
vyaṅjaka, 57
vyatireka, 128
_vyavasāyātmakatva_, 3
_vyavaseyātmakatva_, 3
Vyāsa, 5, 7, 8, 8 n., 22, 53, 121, 133, 135
_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, 3 n., 5 n., 7 n., 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 33, 36, 37,
43 n., 50, 56, 58, 59, 60, 66 n., 68 n., 70, 71 n., 79, 84, 85, 94,
99, 101, 117, 119, 121, 133, 171
vyoman, 75
vyutthāna, 155, 156, 170
_vyutthāna citta_, 95
Ward, 2 n.
Wicked, 102
World-phenomena, 16
World-process, 91
_yadyaliṅgāvasthā śabdādyupabhogaṃ vā sattvapurushānyatākhyātim vā
purushārtham nirvarttayet tannrvarttane hi na sāmyāvasthā syāt_, 8
Yama, 136, 138, 139, 142, 143, 148
Yatamāna, 127
_yathā rathādi yantradibhiḥ_, 25
_yathāyaskāntamaṇiḥ svasminneva ayaḥsannidhīkaraṇamātrāt
śalyanishkarshaṇākhyam upakāram kurvat purushasya svāminaḥ svam
bhavati bhogasādhanatvāt_, 22
_ye cāsyānupasthitā bhāgaste cāsya na syurevaṃ nāsti pṛshṭhamiti
udaramapi na gṛhyeta_, 36
Yoga, 14, 29, 48, 62, 89, 96, 122, 123, 124, 129, 130, 131, 140, 144,
147, 155, 162, 177;
its points of difference with Sāṃkhya, 163–165
Yoga metaphysics, 1
_Yoga philosophy in relation to other Indian systems of thought_, 165
Yoga system, 2
Yoga theory, 5
yogāṅga, 122, 130, 131, 132, 135, 136, 144, 145, 149
_Yoga-sūtra_, 5 n., 11, 17, 35 n., 43 n., 45, 47, 108, 117, 142, 153
_Yoga-vārttika_, 4 n., 6 n., 9, 10, 12 n., 22, 29 n., 43 n., 45 n., 60,
61, 65, 66, 67, 87, 110, 126, 127, 129, 134 n., 143, 154, 176
Yogins, 79, 87, 95, 97, 98, 121, 125, 127, 128, 129, 136, 139, 143,
147, 153, 155, 156, 158, 160;
nine kinds of, 129
_yogyatāvacchinnā dharmiṇaḥ śaktireva dharmaḥ_, 82
Yudhishṭhira, 140
_yutasiddhāvayaba_, 168
-----
Footnote 1:
See Ward’s _Naturalism and Agnosticism_.
Footnote 2:
Vācaspati’s _Tattvavaiśāradī_ on the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, III. 47.
Footnote 3:
_Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāshya_, I. 120.
Footnote 4:
It is indeed difficult to say what was the earliest conception of the
guṇas. But there is reason to believe, as I have said elsewhere, that
guṇa in its earliest acceptance meant qualities. It is very probable
that as the Sāṃkhya philosophy became more and more systematised it
was realised that there was no ultimate distinction between substance
and qualities. In consequence of such a view the guṇas which were
originally regarded as qualities began to be regarded as substantive
entities and no contradiction was felt. Bhikshu in many places
describes the guṇas as substantive entities (_dravya_) and their
division into three classes as being due to the presence of three
kinds of class-characteristics. This would naturally mean that within
the same class there were many other differences which have not been
taken into account (_Yoga-vārttika_, II. 18). But it cannot be said
that the view that the guṇas are substantive entities and that there
is no difference between qualities and substances is regarded as a
genuine Sāṃkhya view even as early as Śaṅkara. See _Ghābhāshya_, XIV.
5.
Footnote 5:
See _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ on Patañjali’s _Yoga-sūtras_, II. 18, and
Vācaspati’s _Tattvavaiśāradī_ on it.
Footnote 6:
See Bhikshu’s _Yoga-vārttika_, II. 18.
Footnote 7:
_History of Hindu Chemistry_, Vol. II, by P. C. Ray, p. 66.
Footnote 8:
The usual Sāṃkhya terms as found in Iśvarakṛshṇa’s _Kārikā_, having
the same denotation as aviśesha and viśesha, are _prakṛtivikṛti_ and
_vikṛti_.
Footnote 9:
_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, II. 19.
Footnote 10:
_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, II. 19.
Footnote 11:
_Tattvavaiśāradī_, II. 19.
Footnote 12:
_Tattvatraya_, p. 48 (Chowkhamba edition), Benares.
Footnote 13:
Bhikshu in his _Yoga-vārttika_ explains “_māyeva_” as “_laukikamāyeva
kshaṇabhaṇguram_” evanescent like the illusions of worldly experience.
Footnote 14:
_Siddhāntalleśa_ (Jīveśvara nirūpaiṇa).
Footnote 15:
Princess Kuntī of the Mahābhārata had a son born to her by means of a
charm when she was still a virgin. Being afraid of a public scandal
she floated the child in a stream; the child was picked up by the wife
of a carpenter (Rādhā). The boy grew up to be the great hero Karṇa and
he thought that he was the son of a carpenter until the fact of his
royal lineage was disclosed to him later in life.
Footnote 16:
_Kārikā_ 17.
Footnote 17:
Gauḍapāda’s commentary on _Kārikā_ 17.
Footnote 18:
Purusha is a substance (_dravya_) because it has independent existence
(_anāśrita_) and has a measure (_vibhu parimāṇa_) of its own. So it
always possesses the common characteristics (_sāmānya guṇa_) of
substances, contact (_saṃyoga_), separation (_viyoga_) and number
(_saṃkhyā_). Purusha cannot be considered to be suffering change or
impure on account of the possession of the above common
characteristics of all substances. _Yoga-vārttika_, II. 17.
Footnote 19:
Thus the _Bhāshya_ says:
_bhavishyadvyaktikamanāgataṃanudbhūtavyaktikamatītaṃ
svavyāpāropārūḍhaṃ varttamānaṃ trayaṃ, caitadvastu jñānasya jñeyaṃ
yadi caitat svarūpato nābhavishyannedaṃ nirvishayaṃ jñānamudapatsyata
tasmādatītamanāgataṃ svarūpato’ stīti_.
Footnote 20:
_Tattvavaiśāradī_, IV. 14.
Footnote 21:
_Vastusāmye cittabhedāt tayor vibhaktaḥ panthāḥ._ _Yoga-sūtra_, IV.
15.
Footnote 22:
“_Tattvāntara-pariṇāma_” means the evolution of a wholly new category
of existence. Thus the tanmātras are wholly different from the ego
from which they are produced. So the atoms are wholly different from
the tanmātras from which they are produced, for the latter, unlike the
former, have no sense-properties. In all combinations of atoms, there
would arise thousands of new qualities, but none of the products of
the combination of atoms can be called a tattvāntara, or a new
category of existence since all these qualities are the direct
manifestations of the specific properties of the atoms.
Footnote 23:
_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, III. 52, says that the smallest indivisible part of a
thing is called a paramāṇu. Vijñāna Bhikshu in explaining it says that
paramāṇu here means guṇa, for if a thing say a stone is divided, then
the furthest limit of division is reached when we come to the
indivisible guṇas. But if the prakṛti is all-pervading (_vibhu_) how
can the guṇas be atomic? Bhikshu says (_Yoga-vārttika_, III. 52) in
reply that there are some classes of guṇas (e.g. those which produce
mind _antaḥkaraṇa_ and _ākāśa_) which are all-pervading, while the
others are all atomic. In Bhikshu’s interpretation a moment is to be
defined as the time which a guṇa entity takes to change its own unit
of space. Guṇas are thus equivalent to the Vaiśeshika paramāṇus.
Bhikshu, however, does not deny that there are no atoms of earth,
water, etc., but he says that where reference is not made to these
atoms but to guṇa atoms for the partless units of time can only be
compared with the partless guṇas. But Vācaspati does not make any
comment here to indicate that the smallest indivisible unit of matter
should mean guṇas. Moreover, _Yoga-sūtra_, I. 40, and _Vyāsa-bhāshya_,
I. 45, speak of _paramāṇu_ and _aṇu_ in the sense of earth-atoms, etc.
Even Bhikshu does not maintain that paramāṇu is used there in the
sense of atomic guṇa entities. I could not therefore accept Bhikshu’s
interpretation that paramāṇu here refers to guṇa. Paramāṇu may here be
taken in the sense of material atoms of earth, water, etc. The atoms
(paramāṇu) here cannot be absolutely partless, for it has two sides,
prior (_pūrvadeśa_) and posterior (_uttaradeśa_).
Footnote 24:
Bhikshu regards the movement of a guṇa of its own unit of space as the
ultimate unit of time (_kshaṇa_). The whole world is nothing else but
a series of _kshaṇas_. This view differs from the Buddhist view that
everything is momentary in this that it does not admit of any other
thing but the _kshaṇas_ (_na tu kskaṇātiriktaḥ kshaṇikaḥ padārthaḥ
kaścidishyate taistu kskaṇamātrasthāyyeva padārthaḥ ishyate_.
_Yoga-vārttika_, III. 52).
Footnote 25:
There is a difference of opinion as regards the meaning of the word
“_kshaṇapratiyogi_” in IV. 33. Vācaspati says that it means the
growth associated with a particular _kshaṇa_ or moment
(_kshaṇapracayāśraya_). The word _pratiyogī_ is interpreted by
Vācaspati as related (_pratisambandhī_). Bhikshu, however, gives a
quite different meaning. He interprets _kshaṇa_ as “interval” and
pratiyogī as “opposite of” (_virodhī_). So “_kshaṇapratiyogī_” means
with him “without any interval” or “continuous.” He holds that the
sūtra means that all change is continuous and not in succession.
There is according to his interpretation no interval between the
cessation of a previous character and the rise of a new one.
Footnote 26:
Nothing more than a superficial comparison with Fichte is here
intended. A large majority of the texts and the commentary literature
would oppose the attempts of all those who would like to interpret
Sāṃkhya-yoga on Fichtean lines.
Footnote 27:
_Tattvakaumudī_ on _Sāṃkhya-kārikā_, 25.
Footnote 28:
_Tattvavaiśāradī_, III. 41.
Footnote 29:
This was first pointed out by Dr. B. N. Seal in his _Physical,
Chemical and Mechanical Theories of the Ancient Hindus_ in Dr. P. C.
Ray’s _Hindu Chemistry_, Vol. II.
Footnote 30:
_Yoga-vārttika_, I. 45.
Footnote 31:
I have already said before that Bhikshu thinks that the guṇas (except
the all-pervading ones) may be compared to the Vaiśeshika atoms. See
_Yoga-vārttika_, III. 52.
Footnote 32:
Cf. _Vyāsa-bhāshya_—“_sabdādīnāṃ mūrttisamānajátīyānāṃ_,” IV. 14.
Footnote 33:
_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, II. 19.
Footnote 34:
_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, III. 13.
Footnote 35:
_Ibid._
Footnote 36:
Nahusha an earthly king became Indra the king of the gods by the
fruition of his virtues, but on account of gross misdeeds fell from
Heaven and was turned into a snake.
Footnote 37:
_Tattravaiśāradī_, IV, 3.
Footnote 38:
I have translated both citta and buddhi as mind. The word buddhi is
used when emphasis is laid on the intellective and cosmical functions
of the mind. The word citta is used when emphasis is laid on the
conservative side of mind as the repository of all experiences,
memory, etc.
Footnote 39:
If this is a Sāṃkhya doctrine, it seems clearly to be a case of Jaina
influence.
Footnote 40:
Compare Pañcaśikha, _svalpasaṇkaraḥ saparihāraḥ sapratyavamarshaḥ_,
_Tattvakaumudī_, 2.
Footnote 41:
Pratyaya is explained in _Yoga-vārttika_, II. 28, as _sampratyaya_ or
_prāmāṇyaniścaya_.
Footnote 42:
Yudhishṭhira led falsely Droṇa to believe that the latter’s son was
dead by inaudibly muttering that it was only an elephant having the
same name as that of his son that had died.
Footnote 43:
This book has, however, not yet been published.
Footnote 44:
Dr. Ray’s _Hindu Chemistry_, Vol. II, p. 81.
Footnote 45:
Avidyā manifests itself in different forms: (1) as the afflictions
(_kleśa_) of asmitā (egoism), rāga (attachment), dvesha (antipathy)
and abhiniveśa (self-love); (2) as doubt and intellectual error; (3)
as error of sense. All these manifestations of avidyā are also the
different forms of viparyyaya or bhrama (error, illusion, mistake).
This bhrama in Yoga is the thinking of something as that which it is
not (_anyathākhyāti_). Thus we think the miserable worldly existence
as pleasurable and attribute the characteristics of prakṛti to purusha
and vice versa. All afflictions are due to this confusion and
misjudgment, the roots of which stay in the buddhis in all their
transmigrations from one life to another. Sāṃkhya, however, differs
from Yoga and thinks that all error (_avidyā_ or _bhrama_) is due only
to non-distinction between the true and the untrue. Thus
non-distinction (_aviveka_) between prakṛti and purusha is the cause
of all our miserable mundane existence. Avidyā and aviveka are thus
synonymous with Sāṃkhya.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES
● Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained.
● Used numbers for footnotes, placing them all at the end of the last
chapter.
● Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK YOGA ***
Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will
be renamed.
Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright
law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works,
so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United
States without permission and without paying copyright
royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part
of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™
concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark,
and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following
the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use
of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for
copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very
easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation
of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project
Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may
do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected
by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark
license, especially commercial redistribution.
START: FULL LICENSE
THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free
distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full
Project Gutenberg™ License available with this file or online at
www.gutenberg.org/license.
Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg™
electronic works
1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg™
electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all
the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or
destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in your
possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a
Project Gutenberg™ electronic work and you do not agree to be bound
by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person
or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be
used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few
things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg™ electronic works
even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See
paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works if you follow the terms of this
agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg™
electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.
1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the
Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection
of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works. Nearly all the individual
works in the collection are in the public domain in the United
States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the
United States and you are located in the United States, we do not
claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing,
displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as
all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope
that you will support the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting
free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg™
works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the
Project Gutenberg™ name associated with the work. You can easily
comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the
same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg™ License when
you share it without charge with others.
1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are
in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States,
check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this
agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing,
distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any
other Project Gutenberg™ work. The Foundation makes no
representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any
country other than the United States.
1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other
immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg™ License must appear
prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg™ work (any work
on which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the
phrase “Project Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed,
performed, viewed, copied or distributed:
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you
are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws
of the country where you are located before using this eBook.
1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is
derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not
contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the
copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in
the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are
redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply
either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or
obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg™
trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is posted
with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any
additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms
will be linked to the Project Gutenberg™ License for all works
posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the
beginning of this work.
1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg™
License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg™.
1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
Gutenberg™ License.
1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including
any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access
to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg™ work in a format
other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official
version posted on the official Project Gutenberg™ website
(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense
to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means
of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original “Plain
Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must include the
full Project Gutenberg™ License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg™ works
unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
access to or distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works
provided that:
• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
the use of Project Gutenberg™ works calculated using the method
you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed
to the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark, but he has
agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid
within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are
legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty
payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in
Section 4, “Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation.”
• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™
License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all
copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue
all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg™
works.
• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of
any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of
receipt of the work.
• You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.
1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project
Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different terms than
are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing
from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of
the Project Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set
forth in Section 3 below.
1.F.
1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project
Gutenberg™ collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg™
electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may
contain “Defects,” such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate
or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other
intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or
other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or
cannot be read by your equipment.
1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the “Right
of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
Gutenberg™ electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGE.
1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you
received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium
with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you
with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in
lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person
or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second
opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If
the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing
without further opportunities to fix the problem.
1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO
OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of
damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement
violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the
agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or
limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or
unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the
remaining provisions.
1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
providing copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in
accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the
production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses,
including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of
the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this
or any Project Gutenberg™ work, (b) alteration, modification, or
additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg™ work, and (c) any
Defect you cause.
Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg™
Project Gutenberg™ is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It
exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations
from people in all walks of life.
Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg™’s
goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg™ collection will
remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
and permanent future for Project Gutenberg™ and future
generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see
Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.
Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit
501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification
number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by
U.S. federal laws and your state’s laws.
The Foundation’s business office is located at 809 North 1500 West,
Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up
to date contact information can be found at the Foundation’s website
and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact
Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation
Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without widespread
public support and donations to carry out its mission of
increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest
array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations
($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
status with the IRS.
The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations
where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND
DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular state
visit www.gutenberg.org/donate.
While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
approach us with offers to donate.
International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation
methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other
ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To
donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate.
Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg™ electronic works
Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project
Gutenberg™ concept of a library of electronic works that could be
freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and
distributed Project Gutenberg™ eBooks with only a loose network of
volunteer support.
Project Gutenberg™ eBooks are often created from several printed
editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in
the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not
necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper
edition.
Most people start at our website which has the main PG search
facility: www.gutenberg.org.
This website includes information about Project Gutenberg™,
including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.
