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Title: The history of the South African forces in France
Author: John Buchan
Release date: August 11, 2025 [eBook #76673]
Language: English
Original publication: London: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd, 1920
Credits: Brian Coe and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN FRANCE ***
THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN FRANCE
[Illustration: DELVILLE WOOD.]
THE HISTORY OF THE
SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES
IN FRANCE
BY
JOHN BUCHAN
THOMAS NELSON AND SONS, LTD.
LONDON, EDINBURGH, AND NEW YORK
PREFACE.
In the autumn of 1916 I was asked by the Union Government to undertake
the official History of the South African Forces in Europe. At the
time I was serving in France, and had therefore an opportunity to see
something of the Infantry Brigade. For various reasons I was unable to
begin the work until after the signing of the Armistice: since which
date I have had at my disposal all official papers, and have received
the assistance of many South African officers. I desire to express my
gratitude to Major-General Sir H. T. Lukin, Brigadier-General Dawson,
Brigadier-General Tanner, and the various battalion and battery
commanders for the help they have given me. I would especially thank
Major H. P. Mills of the Third Regiment, but for whose unwearying
co-operation the book could not have been written. My aim has been to
tell as simply as possible the story of a great military achievement, to
my mind one of the finest in the whole history of the campaigns; and, at
the same time, to provide a detailed account of the operations of the
infantry and the other services, which, I trust, may be of interest as
a war record both for the men who fought and for the country which sent
them forth.
J. B.
CONTENTS.
I. THE RAISING OF THE BRIGADE 11
II. THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EGYPT 23
III. THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME: DELVILLE WOOD 43
IV. THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME: THE BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT 83
V. THE BATTLE OF ARRAS 104
VI. THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES 128
VII. THE EVE OF THE GREAT GERMAN ATTACK 148
VIII. THE SOMME RETREAT: GAUCHE AND MARRIÈRES WOODS 165
IX. THE BATTLE OF THE LYS 193
X. THE SUMMER OF 1918 216
XI. THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY 228
XII. CONCLUSION 257
APPENDICES.
I. THE HEAVY ARTILLERY 267
II. THE SOUTH AFRICAN SIGNAL COMPANY (R.E.) 279
III. THE MEDICAL SERVICES 317
IV. THE RAILWAYS COMPANIES AND MISCELLANEOUS TRADES COMPANY 333
V. THE CAPE AUXILIARY HORSE TRANSPORT COMPANIES 337
VI. VICTORIA CROSSES WON BY SOUTH AFRICANS DURING THE WAR 341
VII. HONOURS WON BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN FRANCE 349
INDEX 387
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
Delville Wood _Frontispiece_
Major-General Sir Henry Timson Lukin, K.C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O. _Facing page_ 18
“Nancy,” the 4th Regiment Mascot, on the Somme Battlefield ” 46
Lieutenant-Colonel F. A. Jones, C.M.G., D.S.O. ” 54
Longueval Village after the Battle ” 58
Brigadier-General W. E. C. Tanner, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. ” 60
Lieutenant W. F. Faulds, V.C. ” 66
Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Thackeray, C.M.G., D.S.O. ” 70
Brigadier-General Frederick Stewart Dawson, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
A.D.C. ” 102
Second-Lieutenant W. H. Hewitt, V.C. ” 142
Lieutenant-Colonel E. Christian, D.S.O., M.C. ” 170
Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Heal, D.S.O. ” 186
Lieutenant-Colonel D. M. MacLeod, D.S.O., M.C., D.C.M. ” 232
Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. L. Tripp, D.S.O., M.C. ” 276
Lieutenant-Colonel N. Harrison, C.M.G., D.S.O. ” 286
Colonel P. G. Stock, C.B., C.B.E. ” 318
Lieutenant-Colonel F. R. Collins, D.S.O. ” 334
Lieutenant-Colonel G. Helbert, C.B.E. ” 348
LIST OF MAPS.
1. Operations on the Western Frontier of Egypt. _Facing page_ 24
2. Scene of Earlier Operations near Mersa Matruh ” 28
3. The Advance to Agagia and Barrani ” 32
4. Barrani to Sollum ” 36
5. Longueval and Delville Wood ” 56
6. The Fighting before the Butte de Warlencourt ” 92
7. The Scene of the Advance of the South African Brigade
against the Butte de Warlencourt Position ” 96
8. The South African Brigade at the Battle of Arras: First
Stage of the Advance ” 118
9. Battle of Arras: Final Stage of the Advance ” 124
10. The South African Attack at the Third Battle of Ypres ” 134
11. The Third Battle of Ypres ” 146
12. The Positions held by the South African Brigade at the
outset of the German Offensive of 1918 ” 162
13. The Somme Retreat ” 166
14. The Retreat of the South African Brigade ” 174
15. The Fight at Marrières Wood ” 180
16. The Action of the South African Brigade on Messines Ridge ” 198
17. The Scene of the Fighting round Mont Kemmel ” 206
18. The Fighting about Méteren ” 220
19. The Victorious Advance. Operations of the XIII. Corps
up to 11th November 1918 ” 230
20. The South African Attack beyond Beaurevoir, 8th October
1918 ” 234
21. The Advance from Maretz to Reumont ” 238
22. The Fighting for the Crossing of the Selle ” 246
THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN FRANCE.
CHAPTER I.
THE RAISING OF THE BRIGADE.
The Purpose of the Book—South Africa in History—Her Problem
at the Outset of War—General Botha’s Proposal to Furnish a
Contingent for Europe—The Composition of the Brigade—The
Officers—Brigadier-General Lukin—The Heavy Artillery
Batteries—The Field Ambulance—The Medical Services—The
Contingent arrives in England—The Situation at the close of
1915—The Brigade ordered to Egypt.
This book is the tale of a great achievement in war. It is a record of
the deeds of that expeditionary force which represented South Africa
on the front in the West. There were South Africans in many British
battalions, in cavalry regiments, in the Flying Corps, in every auxiliary
service; but here we are concerned only with the contingent which, with
its appurtenances, was the direct contribution of the Union Government to
the main battle-ground. It is a tale to be proud of, for among the many
brigades in that field the South African Infantry Brigade may be said,
without boasting, to have had no superior and not many equals. In the
fellowship of war great deeds go to a common stock, and the credit of
one is the credit of all. But it is permitted to detach the doings of a
single unit, not to make petty comparisons, but to hearten ourselves with
the contemplation of exploits which offer an incontrovertible proof of
manly virtue and civic vigour. In such a spirit let this story be told.
South Africa is no newcomer among the nations, for she has interested the
world for three thousand years. She was the port of Phœnician adventurers
centuries before the birth of Christ; she was the goal of the great
Portuguese captains in the first dawn of the Renaissance; Holland claimed
her when Holland was the first of sea-Powers; she received the flower of
the Huguenots scattered by the French religious wars. During the century
which has elapsed since Britain first acquired an interest in her soil,
she has been the theatre of many wars, as she has been the cradle of many
industries. “From Africa comes always some new thing”—the proverb is as
old as Aristotle; and the ancient continent has not lost her power to
surprise the world. South Africa has had some magic in her to beguile the
hearts of all races, and he who has once been captured by the love of
her wide sun-steeped spaces will never forget them, and, though he leave
her, will assuredly return. For her charm lies in the paradox that she
is long-descended and old; and yet eternally young. Distant as she is
from the main centres of the world, scarcely one of the great crises of
modern history has left her untouched; and it was right, nay inevitable,
that in a war of nations she should play a conspicuous part. She who had
passed through so many furnaces, could not stand aside when that for
which her sons had often fought was challenged, and the hard-won gains
of civilization stood in jeopardy.
* * * * *
Of all the nations of the British Commonwealth she had at the outbreak
of war the most intricate task. Australia and New Zealand, once the
Pacific Islands were cleared, were free to look to Europe; Canada had no
nearer enemy than the Germans in France and Flanders; but South Africa
had foes within and without her gates. She had to contend with internal
revolution and with the enemy across her border, while a thousand miles
off, in German East Africa, there awaited a problem which she must
help to solve. Hence the first business of her Government was her own
security. When on September 8, 1914, General Botha announced that, after
due consideration, he and his colleagues had resolved to carry the war
into German territory, “in the interests of South Africa as well as of
the Empire,” he could not foresee what this most honourable resolution
involved. Germany had been engaged for years in putting temptation in the
way of restless spirits within the Union. In a month Maritz was in revolt
in the north-east part of the Cape Province, and conducted a guerilla
campaign till the end of October, when Brits and Van Deventer drove him
over the German frontier. About the same time, within the confines of
the Union, rebellion broke out under De Wet and Beyers, and it was not
till the close of the year that the treason was crushed by Botha with
firmness and far-sighted humanity. Early in 1915 began that great “drive”
in German South-West Africa which brought the troops of the Union on
12th May to Windhoek, and on 2nd July to Otavifontein, and on 9th July
forced the enemy remnant to an unconditional surrender. Of this campaign
let General Smuts speak: “Not only is this success a notable military
achievement, and a remarkable triumph over very great physical, climatic,
and geographical difficulties. It is more than that, in that it marks in
a manner which history will record for all time the first achievement
of the United South African nation, in which both races have combined
all their best and most virile characteristics, and have lent themselves
resolutely, often at the cost of much personal sacrifice, to overcome
extraordinary difficulties and dangers in order to attain an important
national object.”
[Sidenote: _July 1915._]
General Botha did not rest on his laurels. He saw the great war in its
true perspective, and recognized that no part of it was alien to South
Africa’s interest. She was as intimately concerned in the decision
now being sought on the battlefields of Europe as in clearing her own
borders. He was in the highest sense a patriot, for, while abating
nothing of his loyalty to the land of his birth, he saw that the fortunes
of that land were indissolubly bound up with the fortunes of the British
Commonwealth, and of that civilization which Germany had outraged. Hence,
he could not acquiesce in South Africa’s inaction after the close of the
German South-West campaign. But the old problems were still there. He
dared not denude the country of too many of her most loyal and vigilant
citizens so soon after the Rebellion. Moreover, there remained German
East Africa, where at the moment the British troops were precariously
situated, and it was already becoming clear that South Africa must take
a hand in that campaign. As early as April 1915, the Union Government had
discussed the matter with the Imperial Government, for it was reasonable
to suppose that the troops would return from German South-West Africa
shortly after midsummer, and it was necessary to decide on a plan. In
July the Imperial Government accepted General Botha’s proposal to furnish
a contingent for Europe. South Africa’s exchequer, already depleted by
her local wars, could not undertake the equipment and payment of these
troops throughout the campaign. It was accordingly arranged that the
contingent should be equipped, as far as possible, from stores in hand
and paid by the Union up to the date of their embarkation. Thereafter
they would be paid at the rate of British regular troops,[1] and have the
status of the new service battalions of the British army.
The War Office had asked especially for infantry, and an infantry
contingent was bound to be raised largely from the inhabitants of British
blood. The Dutch had provided mounted troops, who had done fine service
in German South-West, and were to do still finer work the following
year in German East Africa. They were natural light-cavalrymen, and the
infantry service had not for them the same attraction.[2] But throughout
the land there were men who had served in the war of 1899-1902—some
of them old regulars; there were the various volunteer regiments;
and there were many young men in town and country whose eyes turned
naturally towards Europe. Sir Charles Crewe was appointed Director of
Recruiting, and there was no lack of response to the appeal. It was
generally agreed that, considering the smallness of her white population
and the complexity of her other tasks, a brigade of infantry was the
most that South Africa could raise and keep up to strength. The war in
Europe was costly in men; 15 per cent. per month was the estimated rate
of reinforcements required, and in the event of heavy fighting it was
clear that this figure must be exceeded. Accordingly a brigade of four
battalions was decided upon, and at the same time it was resolved to
dispatch to Europe five batteries of Heavy Artillery, a General Hospital,
a Field Ambulance, and a Signal Company to be attached to the Royal
Engineers. The battalions were designed to represent the main divisions
of the Union, and recruits were given the option of joining the regiment
affiliated to their own province.
The four battalions were constituted as follows: the 1st South African
Infantry was the Cape of Good Hope regiment, drawn largely from the “Old
Colony;” the 2nd South African Infantry was the Natal and Orange Free
State regiment; the 3rd South African Infantry was the Transvaal and
Rhodesia regiment; the 4th South African Infantry was the South African
Scottish regiment, recruited from the Scottish regiments existing in the
Union, the 1st and 2nd Transvaal Scottish and the Cape Town Highlanders,
and from the members of the various Caledonian societies. This last
regiment is of special interest to the historian, for it had a long
ancestry. It descended from the 77th (Atholl) Highlanders, through the
Scottish Horse and the Transvaal Scottish regiments, and had, therefore,
something of the continuity in tradition of the old regular Army.[3]
As originally formed it numbered 1,282 of all ranks, of whom 337 were
Scottish born, 258 English, 30 Irish, 13 Welsh, 595 South African, and 49
of other origin. In nearly every company the Scots were stronger than any
other element except the South African born, who, of course, included a
large proportion of men of Scottish descent. We may take the constitution
of the 4th as in other respects typical of all the regiments. It showed
292 men not older than twenty years, 350 between twenty and twenty-five,
232 between twenty-five and thirty, 212 between thirty and thirty-five,
and 196 between thirty-five and forty. Only 344 of the rank and file
were without previous military training; of the rest 64 had been in the
Regular Army, 760 in territorial, volunteer, or irregular units, 97 in
both regulars and irregulars, and 17 in the police. Occupations were
thus represented: mining, 234; agriculture, 69; police and military, 21;
government service, 145; business, 722; and the various professions, 91.
Few of the new brigades were better supplied with men of the right kind
of experience, for many of the old South African irregular corps had
records of which any army might be proud; and no brigade showed a better
standard of physical well-being. It should also be remembered that
the level of education and breeding was singularly high. The Brigade
resembled indeed the famous 51st Division of Highland Territorials, which
was largely a middle-class division. In the slow intricacies of a modern
campaign there is need of intelligence and responsibility and power of
initiative in every man; and these are found at their best among those
who fight not only because they like it, but because they have much to
fight for, and are determined to get the job finished. The possession
of some education and a serious purpose in no way lessens dash and
tenacity in the field. This was the moral of the Highland Territorials
who were given first place in Germany’s catalogue of her most formidable
opponents, and it was also the moral of the South African Brigade.
Sir Charles Crewe was appointed Honorary Colonel of the 1st Battalion,
General Botha of the 2nd, General Smuts of the 3rd, and Colonel Dalrymple
of the 4th. The commanding officers selected were all permanent members
of the Union Defence Force. They were—for the 1st, Lieutenant-Colonel
F. S. Dawson, who was then in command of the 4th South African Mounted
Rifles; for the 2nd, Lieutenant-Colonel W. E. C. Tanner, District
Staff Officer, Pietermaritzburg; for the 3rd, Lieutenant-Colonel
E. F. Thackeray, District Staff Officer, Kimberley; for the 4th,
Lieutenant-Colonel F. A. Jones, D.S.O., District Staff Officer,
Johannesburg. Major J. Mitchell Baker, of the General Staff of the Union
Defence Force, was Brigade Major; Captain A. L. Pepper, Staff Captain;
and Lieutenant-Colonel P. G. Stock, Senior Medical Officer. The depot
of the Brigade was fixed at Potchefstroom, where there existed large
cantonments and all facilities for mobilization.
[Illustration: MAJOR-GEN. SIR HENRY TIMSON LUKIN, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Commanding South African Brigade to December 1916, and 9th Division from
December 1916-February 1918.]
To the command of the Brigade was appointed Brigadier-General Henry
Timson Lukin, C.M.G., D.S.O., the Inspector-General of the Union
Forces. General Lukin was a man of fifty-five, who had had a long and
distinguished record in South African campaigns. He had fought in the
Zulu War, and had been severely wounded at Ulundi. He was in Basutoland
in 1881, and in the Langeberg affair in 1896-7. In the war of 1899-1902
he commanded the artillery at the siege of Wepener, and was thereafter
in charge, first of a mounted column, and then of the 1st Colonial
Division in Cape Colony. In the German South-West campaign he commanded a
mounted column in the northern force under Botha, which marched east from
Walfisch Bay; after Botha’s departure he was entrusted with the details
of the final German surrender; and at the time of his appointment to the
Brigade was the General Commanding the Union Forces in German South-West
Africa. He was the essential fighting man, inured to the hardships of
war; but a life spent in campaigning had in no way impaired his genial
humanity. By virtue of his wide experience and his resourceful temper he
was a commander well fitted for a brigade so varied in composition and
destined to fight on such diverse battle-grounds.
At the same time the five batteries of heavy artillery were assembled.
In the German South-West campaign a Heavy Artillery Brigade, armed with
4.7 and 4-inch naval guns, had been formed at Cape Town, the _personnel_
being drawn from non-commissioned officers of the Royal Marine Artillery
and from the various South African artillery regiments. In June 1915
this Brigade was disbanded, and in July, largely from the old Brigade,
a regiment of heavy artillery was recruited for Europe. Only men of fine
physique and of a standard height of 5 feet 8 inches were accepted,
and the roll was closed when it reached a total of 600. The regiment
contained five batteries, the 1st representing the Western Cape Province,
the 2nd the Eastern Cape Province, the 3rd the Transvaal, the 4th
Kimberley and the Diamond Fields, and the 5th Natal. Before they appeared
on the fighting front the War Office decided that they should be rated
as siege artillery, armed with 6-inch howitzers, and affiliated to the
Royal Garrison Artillery. This involved each battery receiving an R.G.A.
number. The 1st Battery became the 73rd Siege Battery, R.G.A., under
the command of Major Brydon; the 2nd, the 74th, under Major Pickburn;
the 3rd, the 71st, under Major Harrison; the 4th, the 72nd, under Major
Alston; the 5th, the 75th, under Major Tripp.[4]
The 1st South African Field Ambulance was mobilized at Potchefstroom
during August, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Usmar, S.A.M.C., and was
attached to the Infantry Brigade. This was a departure from the usual
practice, for a field ambulance is classed as divisional troops under the
orders of the Assistant-Director of Medical Services in the division, and
a new-formed brigade usually meets its field ambulance for the first time
when it joins its division. The General Hospital mobilized at Wynberg,
its _personnel_ being largely composed of volunteers from the staffs of
No. 1 General Hospital, Wynberg, and No. 2 General Hospital, Maitland,
and included representatives from all the provinces of the Union. It
accompanied the Brigade to England, and provided the staff for the depot
there, and for the South African Military Hospital at Richmond, as well
as for No. 1 South African General Hospital in France.[5]
[Sidenote: _Aug.-Oct. 1915._]
Between the 28th of August and the 17th of October the whole contingent
embarked at Cape Town for England. The Infantry numbered 160 officers and
5,648 other ranks; the Heavy Artillery, 34 officers and 636 other ranks;
and the Signal Company, 6 officers and 198 other ranks. By the beginning
of November all the services were safely established on English soil—the
Infantry being quartered at Bordon, the Field Ambulance at Fleet, and
the Heavy Artillery at Bexhill. For two months the units were busy with
their training, varied by the customary inspections. On 3rd November
the Brigade was reviewed by General Sir Archibald Hunter, the G.O.C.
Aldershot Command, and on the 19th the same officer, accompanied by the
Duke of Atholl, visited the 4th Battalion. On the 9th the South Africans
furnished a detachment for the Lord Mayor’s Show. On the 21st the senior
officers went to France for three days’ duty with the army in the field,
and on 2nd December the Brigade was reviewed by the Queen.
[Sidenote: _Dec. 30._]
It was an obscure and critical moment in the war. The great Russian
retreat had come to an end, but Mackensen had overrun Serbia and driven
the Allies back to the entrenched camp of Salonika. Gallipoli was about
to be evacuated. The ambitious attacks of Loos and Champagne had achieved
no decision. The first instalment of the new British levies had taken
the field; Sir Douglas Haig had replaced Sir John French as the British
Commander-in-Chief, and had begun that elaborate system of training which
was to make his army in two years the most formidable in the world.
The early hopes of the Allies had been dashed, and men were slowly
recognizing that the war was a longer and grimmer business than they had
foreseen. Already there were mutterings of that storm in the west which
in two months time was to break around Verdun. The South African Brigade
was at first attached to the 16th (Irish) Division, and it was expected
that the middle of December would see it in France. But on 7th December
the plans were altered. For its first taste of war the Brigade was to
retrace its course, and return again to the continent which it had left.
On 30th December the four battalions embarked at Devonport for Alexandria.
CHAPTER II.
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EGYPT.
(January-April 1916.)
The Position in Egypt at the close of 1915—The Western
Frontier—Trouble with the Senussi—General Wallace’s attack
on Christmas Day—The Arrival of the South African Brigade at
Alexandria—The Battle of Halazin—The Battle of Agagia—The March
upon Sollum—The exploit of the Armoured Cars—The Brigade leaves
for Europe.
At the close of 1915 the main British force in Egypt was concerned with
the defence of the Suez Canal against a threatened attack by the Turks
from their Syrian bases. The Canal, as Moltke had long before told his
countrymen, was for Britain a vital artery, and Egypt was the key of all
her activities in the Near and Middle East. Suddenly, as is the fashion
in the Orient, a new trouble blew up like a sandstorm in the desert. The
Western frontier, some 700 miles long, adjoined the Italian possessions
in Tripoli; but, though the Treaty of Lausanne had given Italy the
suzerainty of that province, her writ ran feebly in the interior and
her occupation had never been effective beyond the coast-line. When she
declared war on Austria, she was compelled to leave the inland tribes to
their own devices, and, stirred up by German and Turkish agents, they
prepared for mischief. The chief of the Turkish agents was Nuri Bey, a
half-brother of Enver, and about April 1915 a certain Gaafer arrived from
Constantinople with large supplies of money and arms. His instructions
were to mobilize the Arab and Berber tribes of the Libyan plateau for a
dash upon Egypt from the west.
The hope of the Turks in that region lay in the support of the great
Senussi brotherhood. The Senussi form one of those strange religious
fraternities familiar to the student of Northern Africa. Their founder
had been a friend of Britain and had refused to cast in his lot with the
Mahdi. He had preached a spiritual creed which orthodox Islam repudiated,
and his followers had stood outside the main currents of Moslem life,
holding apart from all secular politics, and declining any share in
the propaganda of Pan-Islamism. Their headquarters were the oases of
the Northern Libyan desert, and they looked without disfavour upon the
rule of Britain in Egypt. Their Grand Sheikh, Sidi Ahmed, had at the
outbreak of the war given assurance of friendliness to the Anglo-Egyptian
authorities, and his official representatives dwelt on the banks of the
Nile in good relations with the Government of Cairo.
[Illustration: OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER OF EGYPT.]
But the overtures of Nuri and Gaafer proved too much for the loosely
organized tribesmen of the Senussi, and ultimately for the Grand Senussi
himself. The Egyptian littoral as far as the Tripoli frontier was
sparsely populated, consisting only of a few coastguard stations and the
strip of flat land between the Libyan plateau and the sea. The Khedival
highway, a rough unmacadamized road cut as a relief work during famine,
ran to Sollum on the border, and a railway ran west from Alexandria to
Dabaa. It was only at the north end that the frontier had to be guarded,
where were many little oases linked up by caravan-tracks, for to the
south lay the impassable wastes of the Libyan desert. The possibility
of trouble was suspected in May 1915, but it was not till August that
the first hostile incident took place, when two British submarines,
sheltering from bad weather on the Tripoli coast, were treacherously
fired upon by Arabs, under a white officer. In the first week of November
the crews of the _Tara_ and the _Moorina_, torpedoed by enemy submarines,
landed in Cyrenaica, and were taken captive by the Senussi. On the 6th
of that month, the little port of Sollum was shelled by U-boats, and an
Egyptian coastguard cruiser sunk. After that Sollum and Sidi Barrani were
subjected to repeated attacks by land, and it became necessary to admit a
state of war.
[Sidenote: _Dec. 25, 1915._]
The frontier posts were drawn in to Mersa Matruh, which, with a railway
eighty miles distant and the sea at its door, was well-equipped as a
base to defend the marches. On 11th December Major-General Wallace, in
command of the hastily-collected Western Frontier Force, moved out from
Mersa Matruh and drove the enemy from the Wadi Senaab. On the 13th his
column dispersed with considerable losses some 1,200 Arabs near Beit
Hussein. Towards the end of the month an enemy force of some 5,000, under
Gaafer, concentrated eight miles south-west of Matruh, and on Christmas
Day General Wallace marched against it with two columns, one composed of
English Yeomanry and Australian Light Horse, and the other of the 15th
Sikhs, a battalion of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, and a territorial
battalion of the Middlesex. The action was of the familiar type—a frontal
attack by the infantry, and a wide circling movement by the horse, and it
resulted in a substantial check to the enemy. He lost nearly 500 killed
and prisoners, and most of his transport and supplies, and the Grand
Senussi and his staff retired to Unjeila and Bir Tunis.
But the enemy was checked and not routed, and early in January 1916 he
reappeared in force some twenty-five miles south-west of Matruh. It was
clear that to safeguard the frontier he must be driven westward out of
Egyptian soil and south into the desert, and General Wallace had not at
his command the troops for such an operation. It was at this time that
the South African Brigade arrived in Alexandria.
The contingent had had a fair voyage after the first few days at sea.
Submarines were active in the Mediterranean, and stringent precautions
had to be taken in the way of guards and boat drills, which, combined
with the congestion of the ship, made life on board a Spartan business.
At Malta the Governor, Lord Methuen, was prevented by illness from
greeting his old friends, but he wrote to General Lukin: “South Africa
has been a second home to me. Fourteen years of my life have been spent
there, and you know the love we bear for each other. I look back as the
proudest and happiest time of my life on the helping hand I gave to
General Botha and General Smuts in the formation of your great citizen
army, that true bond of union between Englishmen and Dutchmen. We
little thought how soon and how splendidly you would be called upon to
show its value.” On 10th January the _Saxonia_ reached Alexandria, and
the _Corsican_, bringing the 4th South African Regiment and the Field
Ambulance, arrived three days later. The Brigade encamped under canvas
at Mex Camp, six miles west of the city, where they spent some days in
training and in perfecting the local defences. On 18th January they were
inspected by the G.O.C. of the Forces in Egypt, Lieutenant-General Sir
John Maxwell, who years before had been Military Governor of Pretoria.
“The South African Brigade,” he wrote, “is evidently fit to take its
place alongside the best troops in the army,” and he expressed the hope
that it might soon have the chance of meeting the enemy. His hope was
speedily realized, for next day came orders for part of the Brigade to
move towards the western marches.
[Sidenote: _Jan. 21, 1916._]
An infantry battalion was required at once to reinforce General Wallace
for his attack upon the enemy concentration south-west of Matruh. The
2nd South African Regiment was chosen, and two companies, under Major
Christian, embarked on the afternoon of the 19th on their sixteen-hours
voyage.[6] Next day the remainder of the regiment followed, and by the
evening of the 21st, after a weary time in bucketing little coasters,
the 2nd South Africans, under Lieutenant-Colonel Tanner, were at Matruh
awaiting orders. The whole force moved out next afternoon to Bir Shola,
eighteen miles distant, and the South Africans, still fagged from their
journey, found their first day in the field a high test of endurance.
They bivouacked for the night at Bir Shola, and at six o’clock on the
morning of the 23rd, General Wallace began his preparations for attack.
He disposed his troops in two columns. One on the right, consisting
mainly of infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. R. Gordon, included
the 2nd South Africans, the 15th Sikhs, the 1st Battalion New Zealand
Rifle Brigade, and a squadron of the Duke of Lancaster’s Yeomanry;
the second, echeloned on its left front and moving parallel with it,
consisted of squadrons of the Dorset and Herts Yeomanry, the Royal Bucks
Hussars, and the Australian Light Horse, under Brigadier-General Tyndale
Biscoe.
[Sidenote: _Jan. 23._]
About 8.30, when the infantry were some seven miles from Bir Shola,
the mounted column became engaged with the enemy, who was occupying as
his advanced position a half-moon of ridge, on which he had prepared
trenches not easy to locate. The ground, except for the undulations, was
utterly featureless and treeless, and a morning mirage increased its
difficulty. The mounted column found itself checked, and the infantry
were ordered to attack the enemy centre and left, while the cavalry
covered its left flank and worked round the enemy right. There followed
a stubborn battle, the ground traversed being often no better than a
swamp, owing to the abnormal rains. The 15th Sikhs led, with the 2nd
South Africans in support, and the attack, spread over a mile and a
half of ground destitute of any cover, gave a fine target to the enemy
artillery and machine guns. There were many casualties, and, since the
hostile positions were in the shape of a semicircle, it was impossible
to avoid flanking fire. But the infantry steadily pressed on, and after
the first three-quarters of a mile had been covered, the South Africans,
hitherto in support of the Sikhs, were ordered to extend the attack to
the right. The Senussi were forced back from their forward lines, and
retreated slowly and with much skill the three miles to their main camp
at Halazin, resisting all our efforts to get to close quarters. About
two in the afternoon the Sikhs in the centre, the South Africans on the
right, and the New Zealanders on the left, were close on the main enemy
position, but their flanks were in jeopardy, for the Senussi still kept
their semicircular formation, and their horns threatened envelopment.
Tanner was obliged to leave a company to protect his right flank, and the
reserve battalion of the column, the 1/6th Royal Scots, had to be put in
to avert danger from the same quarter.
[Illustration: SCENE OF EARLIER OPERATIONS NEAR MERSA MATRUH.]
By 2.30 our infantry had broken into the main position, but the mounted
troops on their left were less happily fated. They had been compelled to
give ground, and were now nearly a thousand yards behind, so that Colonel
Gordon had to detach two companies of the New Zealanders to assist the
cavalry and protect his left rear. This proved sufficient, and by 4.30
the Senussi were in retreat, and their camp given to the flames. But the
sun was now low in the west, our horses were too exhausted to pursue,
and the baggage camels of the enemy were allowed to retire unmolested.
Our troops were compelled to bivouac on the ground won—a comfortless
bivouac, for it rained in sheets, and they had no supplies or blankets,
seeing that the transport was bogged in the mud three miles west of Bir
Shola. Mud, indeed, had been the trouble of the day. It had hindered the
cavalry from giving due support to the infantry, and it had deprived the
latter of the Royal Naval Armoured Car Division, which had been detailed
to defend their right flank. The following morning the troops struggled
through the quagmires to Bir Shola, and on the 25th, in better weather,
returned to Matruh.
[Sidenote: _Jan. 25._]
The South Africans had come well out of their baptism of fire. They
had lost in killed, one officer (Captain J. D. Walsh) and seven other
ranks; one officer (Lieutenant W. G. Strannock) and two other ranks died
of wounds; four officers and 102 other ranks were wounded. It must be
remembered that no time to rest had been given them after a fatiguing
voyage, and that they were already weary before the battle began. Yet
all observers bore testimony to the “invincible dash and resolution of
their attack.”[7] In that desert fighting we relied much upon the work of
our airmen, and it is interesting to note that among the most brilliant
members of the Royal Flying Corps attached to the Western Frontier Force
was a South African, Lieutenant van Ryneveld.
* * * * *
The Western Frontier Force was now completely reconstituted. General
Wallace’s health did not permit him to continue in the command, and his
place was taken by Major-General W. E. Peyton, who had commanded the
2nd Mounted Division at Suvla Bay. The 2nd Mounted Brigade replaced the
composite Yeomanry Brigade, and the place of the Sikhs and New Zealanders
was filled by the South African Brigade, which by the middle of February
had arrived in its entirety at Matruh. Sufficient camel transport had
now been provided to make the columns really mobile, and to enable them
to follow up any success.
[Sidenote: _Feb. 20._]
Early in February it became clear that the main Senussi forces were near
Barrani, with a smaller body at Sollum, and that to pacify the country
these forces must be beaten and dispersed. It was difficult to land
troops at Sollum, for the place was commanded by encircling ridges, and,
since it would be necessary to sweep the mines at the entrance to the
harbour, a surprise was impossible. General Peyton accordingly resolved
to attack by land. His object was to occupy Barrani and Sollum, after
which supplies would be available by sea. The problem before him was
largely one of physical difficulties, for the land was almost devoid
of water. An advance depot was established at Unjeila on the 16th of
February, and on 20th February a column under General Lukin moved out
from Matruh with orders to occupy Barrani, as the first stage on the road
to Sollum.
The column consisted of the 3rd South African Regiment, the Dorset
Yeomanry, the Notts Battery, R.H.A., one squadron of the Royal Bucks
Hussars, the 1/6th Royal Scots, and two field ambulances. Its course
lay north of the Khedival highway, practically along the line of an old
Roman road. The scanty wells were as often as not the ruins of Roman
cisterns, so that the new defenders of civilization followed in the steps
of the greatest empire of the past. The weather had changed since the
January fighting at Halazin. Scorching winds and a glaring sun made the
march arduous, but since the route ran close to the sea the men could
refresh themselves with sea-bathing at the different halting places. Bir
Abdih was reached on the afternoon of the 21st, and Unjeila, 32 miles
from Matruh, on the 22nd. Here the 1st South Africans, who had gone on
ahead on the 16th, joined the column, and the greater part of the Royal
Scots remained as garrison. On the 24th Lukin was at Maktil, where his
column rested for a day. The Senussi had been located at Agagia, 14 miles
south-east of Barrani, and it was ascertained from captured Bedouin that
both Nuri and Gaafer were with them.
[Sidenote: _Feb. 25._]
During the 25th, while the troops rested in camp, the enemy was observed
in considerable numbers about three miles to the south, and a good deal
of sniping followed. Lukin had decided to make a night attack, moving off
at 7 p.m.; but Gaafer anticipated him, for about half-past five he opened
on our camp with two field guns and at least one machine gun. Lukin
at once moved forward the Royal Scots on his right, and the 1st South
Africans on his left, with the 3rd South Africans in reserve. The enemy
guns had been located, and were quickly silenced by our artillery, and in
half an hour, with the loss of one man killed and one man wounded, the
threatened assault was frustrated. The incident compelled Lukin to cancel
the orders for the night march, and he resolved to advance against the
enemy at daybreak.
[Sidenote: _Feb. 26._]
A Yeomanry reconnaissance sent out at dawn on the 26th, reported that
Gaafer had evacuated his position of the previous night; and presently we
learned from our aircraft that he was back on his old ground near Agagia.
At 9.30 Lukin moved out his whole force, leaving 300 Royal Scots to guard
his camp. He had now with him six armoured cars, under Major the Duke
of Westminster, which had just arrived. Three-quarters of an hour later
the Yeomanry seized a little hill rather more than two miles north of the
enemy’s position. This enabled us to reconnoitre the field, and at eleven
it was possible to join battle. In the centre the 3rd South Africans,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Thackeray, advanced on a front of about 1,700
yards, with Yeomanry and armoured cars on either flank. The 1st South
Africans formed the general reserve. The guns were brought up to a point
about 4,500 yards from the enemy, but were outranged, and played little
part in the beginning of the action. Presently Lukin moved them to 3,500
yards range, where their shrapnel was more effective.
[Illustration: THE ADVANCE TO AGAGIA AND BARRANI.]
The battle which followed was a model of a successful desert action.
Lukin had his main strength in mounted troops on his right, and it was
his plan that these, when the infantry had broken the enemy, should swing
round his flank and rear, prevent him breaking west, and round up his
retreat. As the 3rd South Africans advanced with admirable steadiness the
enemy opened a heavy fire upon them with rifle and machine gun and more
than one field piece. Then, following his old practice, Gaafer attempted
an encircling movement against our left. Lukin ordered Lieutenant-Colonel
Dawson to send a company of the 1st South Africans to that flank, and so
checked the enemy manœuvre. As soon as this danger was past he withdrew
the squadron of Yeomanry on his left to augment the mounted troops on his
right. The firing line was now within 300 yards of Gaafer’s posts. In
order to gain fire superiority at once, Lukin brought the greater part
of his reserves into the fight, and sent a message to Colonel Souter,
commanding the Yeomanry on his right, that now was the time to push
forward. In a few minutes the company of the 1st South Africans on the
left flank broke into the enemy position, the 3rd South Africans followed
immediately, and presently the whole enemy lines were in our hands.
It was now the turn of the Yeomanry. When Colonel Souter received Lukin’s
message about one o’clock, he resolved to let the enemy retreat get clear
of the sandhills, and then attack it in the open. His pursuit, therefore,
took a line parallel to the enemy’s retirement, and about a thousand
yards to the west of it. The rest is best told in Colonel Souter’s own
words: “About 2 p.m. I saw for the first time the whole retreating force
extend for about a mile, with a depth of 300 to 400 yards. In front
were the camels and baggage, escorted by irregulars, with their proper
fighting force (Mahafizia) and maxims forming their rear and flank
guard. I decided to attack mounted. About 3 p.m. I dismounted for the
last time to give my horses a breather and to make a careful examination
of the ground over which I was about to move. By this time the Dorset
Regiment was complete, and, as the squadron of the Bucks Yeomanry had
gone ahead and could not be found, I attacked with Dorsets alone. The
attack was made in two lines, the horses galloping steadily and well in
hand. Three maxims were brought into action against us, but the men were
splendidly led by their squadron and troop leaders, and their behaviour
was admirable. About 50 yards from the position I gave the order to
charge, and with one yell the Dorsets hurled themselves upon the enemy,
who immediately broke. In the middle of the enemy’s lines my horse was
killed under me, and, by a curious chance, his dying strides brought me
to the ground within a few yards of the Senussi General, Gaafer Pasha.”
This very complete success, due to the perfect co-ordination of infantry
and yeomanry, and General Lukin’s power of prompt decision after the
action had begun, was not gained without severe losses. These were
chiefly among the mounted troops, for when their officers were killed
the men were apt to carry on too far. The infantry casualties—almost all
incurred by the 3rd South Africans—were 1 officer (Lieutenant Bliss)
and 13 other ranks killed, and 5 officers and 98 other ranks wounded.
The capture of Gaafer and his staff deprived the enemy of his principal
general, and two days later Barrani was occupied by us without a blow.
“It was the Battle of Agagia,” General Peyton subsequently wrote, “which
sealed the fate of the combined Turks and Senussi who had contemplated
an attack on Egypt.” The possession of Barrani enabled us to bring to
that port supplies by sea and to make of it a new advanced base. After
the action at Halazin the 2nd South African Regiment had been employed in
furnishing escorts for convoys between Matruh and Unjeila. This task was
now accomplished, and by 8th March the 2nd and 4th Regiments had joined
Lukin at Barrani, together with the rest of the 2nd Mounted Brigade and
two sections of the Hong-Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery. After
their defeat the Senussi had retreated westward towards Sollum, and the
Egyptian Bedouin, notably the Aulad Ali tribes, began to desert in
large numbers and sue for pardon. The time had not yet come, however,
for negotiations. The enemy had occupied his old camp near Sollum, which
had been the Grand Senussi’s headquarters before the campaign began, and
there was the danger that he might receive reinforcements from Tripoli.
It therefore behoved General Peyton to strike again without delay, and to
clear Egyptian soil up to the frontier.
* * * * *
To Sollum there were two routes: one by the Khedival road along the
coast, the other inland by the high ground of the plateau. For military
purposes the latter was to be preferred, for the ridges rise steeply
behind Sollum, and to attack the enemy’s camp from the coast would have
been no light undertaking. It was better to move inland and come upon the
Senussi from the south and south-east. The main problem, as in all desert
warfare, was that of the water supply; but General Peyton’s intelligence
led him to believe that there were sufficient wells by the inland route
to supply his force if it moved in two parts and made careful use of its
reserve water park.
[Illustration: BARRANI TO SOLLUM.]
[Sidenote: _Mar. 9._]
On 9th March a column, under Lukin, left Barrani to secure the plateau
by way of the pass called the Nagb Medean. The troops were the whole
South African Brigade, a squadron of the Dorset Yeomanry, the Hong-Kong
and Singapore Mountain Battery, and a Camel Supply column and train, and
it was arranged that they should be joined later by the Armoured Car
Battery and a company of the Australian Camel Corps. Sollum lay 50 miles
off along the coast, and to turn its encircling escarpment the plan
was to march to Bagbag, and then strike south-west for Bir-el-Augerin,
after which an attempt would be made to seize the passes which led from
the south-east to the Sollum tableland, notably the Nagb Medean and the
Erajib. These passes could not be used by the armoured cars, so it was
arranged that they should go further south by a practicable route, and
join the column when the Medean pass had been taken by the infantry.
General Peyton had planned that the second column, consisting of mounted
troops and camel transport, should leave Barrani two days later than
Lukin, and reach Augerin after the Medean pass had been secured. This
would have concentrated the whole force at Augerin, with its outposts on
the south-eastern scarp of the Sollum plateau, ready to make its final
attack on the enemy’s camp.
[Sidenote: _Mar. 12._]
The water difficulty became serious for Lukin as soon as he left Barrani.
The first night a Roman cistern was found, which gave a fair supply. On
the night of the 10th the column bivouacked on the seashore, where the
Roman wells were found to be silted up with sand, and had to be opened up
by the engineers. On the 11th Bagbag was reached, but the water proved
scanty and infamous, much of it being too sulphurous to be drunk by men
or beasts. The best that could be done was to dig new wells in the sand.
On the morning of the 12th Lukin was at Augerin, and that afternoon the
1st and 4th South Africans made good the Medean pass without opposition,
and were presently joined by the armoured cars.
Now appeared an unexpected difficulty. The Roman cistern at the top of
the Medean pass, which it had been hoped would provide water for the
whole column, proved to be dry, as were the wells at Siwiat further along
the ridge. This compelled General Peyton to revise his plan. Clearly, he
could not send the second column by the same route as the first; indeed,
the water supply made it impossible for the first column in its entirety
to continue on its original line. He therefore made a new disposition of
his forces. Lukin was ordered to push along the top of the escarpment
with the 1st and 4th South Africans, the armoured cars, the Hong-Kong
and Singapore Battery, and a company of the Australian Camel Corps. The
rest of the infantry and the mounted troops were directed to proceed from
Augerin along the coast to the foot of the Halfaia pass. Lukin’s force
carried their water in “fantasies” on camels, and their total supply,
which had to last for forty-eight hours, was limited to eight pints per
man.
[Sidenote: _Mar. 15._]
The movement began on the 13th. At midnight Lukin was four miles from
the Halfaia, the rest of the infantry at Alim Tejdid, and the cavalry
at Bagbag. At daybreak on the 14th the armoured cars moved forward to
the Halfaia pass, which they occupied without opposition. At 9 a.m. we
learned that the enemy had evacuated Sollum the previous evening and was
retiring to the south-west. There was now no obstacle in front of the two
columns, and the mounted troops joined Lukin on the high ground. Next
day, 15th March, General Peyton entered Sollum.
As soon as the news of the enemy’s evacuation reached Lukin, he
dispatched the Duke of Westminster with the armoured cars in pursuit.
The battery consisted of nine cars and one open Ford car mounting a
machine gun, and the total _personnel_ was only thirty-two. They made for
the enemy’s camp at Bir Warr, where a straggler was captured, who was
afterwards to prove a most valuable prize. Dashing along the Tabruk road,
which runs westward into the Libyan desert, they came presently upon the
_débris_ of the retreat. After 23 miles had been covered, the leading
cars, as they turned a bend in the road, came suddenly in view of the
enemy’s camp at the Bir Asisa well a few hundred yards to the south. The
camels were standing loaded, one ten-pounder and two machine guns were in
position, and the enemy masses were just beginning to move. The battery
swung into line and charged. Their machine guns silenced the Turkish
guns, and the shells from the ten-pounder burst far behind them. The
Senussi were surprised and wholly demoralized. Most of them flung down
their rifles and fled. To prevent the escape of the supply train some 50
camels already on the move were shot—in several cases with extraordinary
results, for the unhappy beasts were laden with petrol and bombs, and
blew up under our fire with terrific explosions. At least 50 of the enemy
were killed, 40 prisoners were taken, including 3 Turkish officers, and
all the Senussi guns and much of the supplies were captured. The British
loss in this brilliant affair was one officer slightly wounded.
[Sidenote: _Mar. 17._]
The final exploit in the campaign fell also to the credit of the armoured
cars, and the war has shown few more romantic incidents. It will be
remembered that the previous November the survivors from the _Tara_ and
_Moorina_ had been taken prisoner by Arabs and moved into the interior.
By a coincidence which would scarcely be credited in a work of fiction,
the man captured at Bir Warr proved to have been employed as one of the
guards of the prisoners, and disclosed their whereabouts. The place was
75 miles west of Sollum, and with General Peyton’s consent, the Duke
of Westminster set out on the morning of the 17th to their rescue. He
had with him, besides his cars, a number of motor ambulances. The guide
proved faithful, and after a journey of 120 miles over featureless desert
the prisoners’ camp was found at a place called the Hidden Spring. The
men were naked skeletons, and no language can describe their amazement
and joy at this miraculous rescue. By the morning of the 18th the cars
with the released captives were safely back at Sollum, having travelled
in 24 hours some 300 miles. It was an enterprise which in normal times
would have been considered to belong rather to the realms of wild
romance than to the sober chances of war, and it did signal credit to
the intrepidity and resource of its originator. In the words of Sir John
Maxwell’s dispatch, “to lead his cars through perfectly unknown country
against an enemy of unknown strength was a feat which demanded great
resolution, and which should not be forgotten even in this war, where
deeds of rare daring are of daily occurrence.”[8]
* * * * *
So ended the first invasion of Egypt from the west since the Fatimite
attempt of the tenth century. The occupation of Sollum and the
achievement of the armoured cars put an end to the menace from the
Senussi. In less than a month General Peyton had driven the enemy back
150 miles, had scattered his forces beyond the frontier, had captured
his commander and taken all his guns. If Germany hoped to make of the
Arabs and Bedouin of the Tripoli hinterland a fanatical horde which would
sweep to the gates of Cairo, she had wholly misjudged their temper. To
build up armies from such material was like an attempt to make ropes of
desert sand. Thereafter hostilities degenerated into frontier brigandage
and police patrols. A year later the Grand Senussi, who had been living
in the Siwa oasis, made an attempt to shift his quarters. Major-General
Watson, who then commanded the Western Frontier Force, sent a column
of armoured cars, which on February 3, 1917, broke up his camp, drove
him into the outer deserts, and destroyed for good any little military
prestige that remained to him. The main problem left to the British
Government was that of feeding the starving tribes, for the futile war
had prevented the raising of the usual barley crop. After our humane
fashion we beat the enemy and fed his belongings.
[Sidenote: _April 11._]
On the afternoon of 16th March a parade of all arms was held in Sollum,
and General Peyton thanked his men for the victory which they had won. On
28th March the South African Brigade began its return journey by sea to
Alexandria, and on its arrival there was joined by a draft of 8 officers
and 400 other ranks, under the command of Captain L. W. Tomlinson. On
10th April it was inspected by Sir Archibald Murray, the G.O.C. of
the Forces in Egypt, and next day it received orders to embark for
Marseilles. The three months in North Africa had given it its first field
training in war, and it had emerged with increased physical and moral
strength from the trial. The difficult weather, when hailstorms and great
cold were diversified with long spells of scorching heat, and the weary
and waterless desert marches, had toughened the fibre of every soldier.
It was fortunate that the Brigade had such a preparation, for it was
about to take its place in a classic division on the Western Front, and
to enter one of the most desperate struggles of the campaign.
CHAPTER III.
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME: DELVILLE WOOD.
(April-July 1916.)
The Brigade reaches Flanders and joins the 9th Division—The
Position of the Campaign in the Spring of 1916—First Experience
in the Trenches—The Move to the Somme—The Purpose of the Battle
of the Somme—Successes of the First Day—The Brigade enters
the Line at Bernafay Wood—The 4th Regiment engaged in Trônes
Wood—Death of Lieutenant-Colonel F. A. Jones—The British Attack
of 14th July—Longueval and Delville Wood—The South Africans’
Attack on Delville—The Critical Fourth Day—Colonel Thackeray at
last relieved—The Losses of the Brigade—The Magnitude of the
South African Performance.
[Sidenote: _April 23._]
The transports _Megantic_, _Oriana_, _Scotian_, and _Tintoretto_,
carrying the Brigade, left Alexandria between the 13th and 15th of April,
and reached Marseilles during the night of the 19th, about the same time
as the Russian division dispatched to the aid of France from Vladivostok.
Owing to a case of contagious sickness on board the _Oriana_, the 4th
Regiment and part of the 1st were placed in quarantine, while the
remainder of the troops entrained at once for Flanders. Steenwerck was
reached on the morning of the 23rd, and the 2nd and 3rd Regiments marched
to their billeting area along roads wholly under water. It was the first
sight which the South Africans had of the delectable land in which for
four years the British Army made war. Headquarters were established at
Bailleul, and the Brigade was attached to the 9th (Scottish) Division,
under Major-General W. T. Furse. For three weeks detachments of the
two regiments took their place in the trenches for instruction, and on
11th May the 4th Regiment and the rest of the 1st arrived from their
quarantine at Marseilles. On 14th May the 28th Brigade of the 9th
Division disappeared, being absorbed in other divisions, and the South
African Brigade took its place in the fighting unit to whose glory it was
so worthily to contribute.[9]
The 9th Division belonged to the “First Hundred Thousand” of the
New Army, and at the start was wholly Scottish. The famous Scottish
battalions of the old regulars had drawn their men from every quarter of
Britain; but the 9th Division had few in its ranks who did not hail from
north of the Tweed. It had already made a name for itself at Loos, where,
under Major-General George Thesiger, who fell in the battle, it had
captured the Hohenzollern Redoubt and the ill-omened Fosse 8, and held
the latter till it was utterly outflanked. It had fought in the toughest
part of the whole line, and all the troops, Highland and Lowland, had
borne themselves like veterans. The division had spent the winter in the
Ypres salient as part of Sir Herbert Plumer’s Second Army, and during
the spring had occupied the front around Armentières. It was a proof of
the respect in which the South African Brigade was held by the British
Command that it should be made part of so notable a division; and it was
not less fortunate for the 9th Division that it received a brigade so
competent to sustain its record.
The April of 1916 was a critical month in the Western campaign. On the
9th the first and deadliest stage of the German assault on Verdun had
closed with the failure of the attackers. Pétain’s thin lines had held
their ground; the little city was still inviolate; and, though France
had lost terribly, she had wrecked the plans of her enemy, inflicted
upon him irreparable loss, and by her heroism won that quiet confidence
which is the surest guarantee of victory. When the Imperial Crown Prince
opened the battle, one part of his purpose had been to induce a British
counter-offensive. That counter-offensive did not come, for General
Joffre did not desire it. He preferred to wait until Germany had spent
her strength, and to use the armies of France and Britain in a great
movement against a weakened foe. Our task, therefore, during the first
months of 1916 had been to wait. The duty had been costly, for on our
front the average daily toll of loss in trench fighting was not far
from 1,000. It was a difficult time, for there was no great objective
to quicken the spirit, and those indeterminate months imposed a heavy
strain upon the _moral_ of our troops. Yet the apparent stagnation was
not without its advantage, for it gave the new British Commander-in-Chief
time to complete his field army and perfect its education. When Sir
Douglas Haig took over the supreme command he set himself to the work
which Sir John Moore had undertaken more than a century before. He
had to train his men for a new kind of warfare, and the whole British
front became one vast seminary. To quote from his dispatch at this
date: “During the periods of relief all formations, and especially the
newly-created ones, are instructed and practised in all classes of the
present and other phases of warfare. A large number of schools also exist
for the instruction of individuals, especially in the use and theory of
the less familiar weapons, such as bombs and grenades. There are schools
for young staff officers, and regimental officers, for candidates for
commissions, etc. In short, every effort is made to take advantage of the
closer contact with actual warfare, and to put the finishing touches,
often after actual experience in the trenches, to the training received
at home.”
Moreover, during these months of waiting our strength in munitionment
had grown beyond belief. The Allied offensives of 1915 had failed
largely because there was no sufficient weight of shells and guns behind
them. But by June of 1916 Britain was manufacturing and issuing to the
Western front weekly as much as her whole pre-war stock of land service
munitions. In heavy guns the output in the year had increased six-fold.
The weekly production of machine guns had increased fourteen-fold, and
of rifles three-fold—wholly from home sources. In small-arm ammunition
the output was three times as great, and large reserve stocks had been
accumulated. The production of high explosives was sixty-six times what
it had been in the beginning of 1915, and the supply of bombs for trench
warfare had been multiplied by thirty-three. At last we were providing a
machine which would put our infantry on equal terms with the enemy.
[Illustration: “NANCY,” THE 4TH REGIMENT MASCOT, ON THE SOMME BATTLEFIELD.
(_By permission of the Imperial War Museum._)
The springbok “Nancy” was presented to the Regiment in August 1915 by Mr.
D. M’Laren Kennedy of Driefontein, Orange Free State. She accompanied the
4th to Egypt, and thence to France, where she was with the Brigade in all
its battles. She was wounded in 1917. She died at Hermeton, in Belgium,
on 28th November 1918.]
[Sidenote: _June 14._]
The South African Brigade was inspected on 29th April by Sir Douglas
Haig, and on 4th May by Sir Herbert Plumer. The next two months were
devoted to its initiation in the methods of trench warfare, which were
wholly new to it. During May it held a portion of the front line, and
on 4th June the whole Brigade and the Field Ambulance moved into the
Steenbecque and Morbecque training area. Battalion training was followed
by skeleton Brigade training until 14th June, when orders were received
for the division to move to the Somme. The Brigade was quartered in the
neighbourhood of Ailly-sur-Somme, whence parties of officers and N.C.O.’s
visited the front line in the Maricourt region. Meantime the 2nd and 3rd
Regiments were attached to the 30th Division, to assist in the work of
preparation for the coming attack.
Few men who were then in Picardy will ever forget that strange month
before the great battle opened—the pleasant summer weather, the quiet
of the front, the endless activity of the British hinterland, where
every road was thronged with guns and transport, the curious breathless
sense of expectation. On 23rd June the Brigade moved to Corbie and
Sailly-le-Sec, where it was within a few miles of the line. Next morning,
Saturday, the 24th, in grey, cloudy weather with flying showers of rain,
the main bombardment opened.
The South Africans, as they moved east from Corbie along the Picardy
downs, beheld a landscape which, in the heat and dust of midsummer, must
have recalled their own country. The Somme, with its acres of swamp and
broad lagoons, was not unlike some river of the bushveld. The “tawny
ground,” which Shakespeare’s Henry V. had summoned his men to colour
with their blood, had something of the air of the high-veld—yellow-green
ridges and slopes falling away to an infinite distance. As they topped
the hill behind Méaulte and faced the long lift of land towards Bapaume,
they had the kind of spectacle which is common enough beyond the Vaal.
In the hollows around the water-courses was the light green of crops;
then a great stretch of unfenced country patched with woods, which were
curiously clean-cut like the coppices in the park of a country house. It
was such a view as a man may see from Haenertsberg, looking north towards
the Woodbush. The weather, too, was the soft, shimmering mist which one
meets on the edge of the Berg. Our bombardment had only just begun, and
the countryside was not yet devastated. Fricourt was still a pleasant
woodland village, Bernafay and Trônes were as yet little forests, and the
spire of Mametz church was more than a tooth of masonry.
* * * * *
The story of the Battle of the Somme belongs to history written on a
larger scale than this, for here we are concerned with only a part of
it. But to understand that part it is necessary to grasp the purpose
of the whole action. The enemy was suffering from a lack of immediate
reserves, and the depression of _moral_ due to his failure at Verdun and
the recent successes of Brussilov in Galicia. He had boasted so loudly
of his “war map,” and the amount of conquered territory which he held,
that he dared not resort to the expedient of shortening his long line.
He trusted to the great natural and artificial strength of his positions
in the West to repel the Allies, whatever weight of men and guns might be
brought against him. In no part of the Western front were these positions
stronger than between Arras and the Somme, where he held in the main the
higher ground, and had in the rear many fortified woods and villages
which could be linked together into reserve lines.
The Allies had learned the lesson of the futile offensives of 1915, and
of the long-drawn contest at Verdun. They no longer dreamed of breaking
the enemy’s front by a sudden bound, for they realized the depth of his
fortified zone. They had accepted the principle that an attack should
proceed by stages, with, as a preliminary to each, an elaborate artillery
“preparation;” and they realized, too, that, since the struggle must be
protracted, fresh troops must be used for each stage. Their new plan
was simply attrition on a colossal scale. It was like the mighty head
of water which hydraulic engineers apply to a mountain in order to wash
it away. The governing idea was not a breach in the front, though that
might come incidentally, but such a steady, unrelenting pressure as would
first cripple and then destroy the enemy’s machine. Their method was
that of “limited objectives,” with new troops and a new bombardment for
each phase, and they had certain tactical devices in reserve which they
hoped to apply with good effect at the right moment. To quote what I
have written elsewhere, the scheme might be suggested by the metaphor of
a sea-dyke of stone in a flat country where all stone must be imported.
“The waters crumble the wall in one section, and the free reserves of
stone are used to strengthen that part. But the crumbling goes on, and
to fill the breach stones are brought from other sections of the dyke.
Some day there must come an hour when the sea will wash through the
old breach, and a great length of the weakened dyke will follow in the
cataclysm.” This method of attrition presupposed the continuance of the
war on two fronts. When Russia fell out of line the situation was utterly
changed, and the plan became futile against an enemy with a large new
reservoir of recruitment. But at the time of its inception, uninspired
and expensive as it was, it was a sound plan, and _ceteris paribus_ would
have given the Allies victory before the end of 1917. Even as things
turned out, in spite of the unlooked-for _débâcle_ in the East, the
Battle of the Somme struck a blow at the heart of Germany’s strength from
which she never wholly recovered.
A strategy of active attrition demands a battle, and a battle requires
certain definite objectives. Our aim was to crumble the enemy’s defences
on the Bapaume Ridge so completely that he could not find an alternate
position of equal strength, and would be slowly forced into open warfare.
The British front of attack was from Gommecourt in the north to Maricourt
in the south, whence the French carried the battle across the Somme to a
point opposite the village of Fay. It was Sir Douglas Haig’s intention
to make his main attack between the Ancre and Maricourt, and it is clear
from his dispatch that he regarded the movement of his left wing as a
subsidiary operation. The final campaign of 1918 proved that in this he
judged wrongly, and that the Bapaume Ridge was most vulnerable to a
flanking attack from the north. The effort of the British left on the
first day failed, and thereafter the battle became a stubborn frontal
attack up the slopes from the west. The enemy’s fortress was assaulted on
its most formidable side, and when after six months he admitted defeat
and fell back, he yielded not to any strategical brilliance in our plan,
but to the incomparable valour and tenacity of the Allied troops.
[Sidenote: _July 1._]
On 30th June, the day before the battle began, the South African Brigade,
comprising the four infantry battalions, the 64th Field Company R.E.,
the 28th Brigade M.G. Company, and the South African Brigade Trench
Mortar Battery, moved to Grove Town, a large dump on the outskirts of
Bray, the 9th Division being in general reserve to Sir Walter Congreve’s
XIII. Corps. That night the weather suddenly cleared to a blue midsummer
evening. Next morning, Saturday, 1st July, at half-past seven, under a
cloudless and windless sky, the Allied infantry went over the parapets,
and the battle began.
The result of that day was that the German first line was carried almost
everywhere from the Ancre southward. In no part of the field was the
success more notable than in the area of Congreve’s XIII. Corps, which
took Montauban, and came to the edge of Bernafay Wood. For the next few
days, while our centre was struggling for Ovillers and Contalmaison,
Congreve, on the British right wing, working in co-operation with the
French, was endeavouring to clear the woods of Trônes and Bernafay, which
intervened between the first and second German positions. Bernafay soon
fell; but Trônes Wood, being commanded from the south by the Maltzhorn
Ridge and from the north by the German position at Longueval, was a
hard nut to crack, and though we took most of it, we could not hold it.
The place became a Tom Tiddler’s ground, which neither side could fully
claim, since it was at the mercy of both the British and German artillery
fire. That was the position by the 13th of July, when the capture of
Contalmaison allowed Sir Douglas Haig to begin the second stage of the
action.
[Sidenote: _July 5._]
Meantime the South Africans had entered the fringes of the battle. On the
night of 2nd July the Brigade moved forward to Billon Valley to relieve
the 27th Brigade, which was advancing into the line. On 4th July General
Furse ordered Lukin to relieve the 21st Brigade in divisional reserve,
and the 89th Brigade in the Glatz sector of the front.[10] This relief
was completed by 3.15 a.m. on the morning of 5th July. The position now
was that the 1st and 4th South Africans held the line from the junction
with the French to Briqueterie Trench east of Montauban, the 2nd South
Africans were in divisional reserve at Talus Boise, and the 3rd South
Africans were in support in the old British and German front-line
trenches immediately to the north-west of Maricourt.
The first experience of the South Africans in the battle was the
difficult task of holding a piece of captured front in the face of
heavy enemy shelling. The 27th Brigade had cleared Bernafay Wood on the
night of the 4th, and during the following days the French (General
Nourrisson’s 39th Division of the famous XX. Corps[11]) were assiduously
attacking towards Maltzhorn Farm, while the British right division, the
30th, was labouring to secure the wood of Trônes. The South Africans were
stationary except for the contingent which, as we shall see, assisted the
30th Division in Trônes Wood. Their position was uncomfortable, for they
were close to the angle of our front, where it bent southward, and were
thus exposed to sniping and gun-fire from both front and flank. On the
5th General Lukin began those faithful pilgrimages along the front-line
trenches which from the first marked him out among brigade commanders.
He was on his feet that day for no less than fifteen hours. Next day,
the 6th, there was a great shelling, and the two South African regiments
suffered some twenty casualties, among the killed being Lieutenant
Oughterson at Glatz Redoubt, and Lieutenant W. N. Brown in Chimney
Trench. On the 7th the shelling continued, and that afternoon, in pouring
rain, the relief began of the 1st South Africans by the 18th Manchesters
of the 21st Brigade. That evening came the preliminary orders from
General Headquarters for the second stage of the battle, which for the
9th Division was an attack upon the German line at Longueval.
At dawn on the 8th the only South Africans in the line were the 4th
Regiment, holding the Briqueterie Trench and the section from Dublin
Trench to Dublin Redoubt. The 2nd Regiment, which had been in reserve
at Talus Boise, was ordered to relieve the 12th Royal Scots and the 6th
K.O.S.B. of the 27th Brigade, which were holding a portion of Bernafay
Wood. “A” and “C” Companies were detailed for the task, and the following
day they were joined by “D” Company. During the 10th these companies of
the 2nd South Africans were replaced by two companies of the 4th. The 2nd
during its short time in the line was most severely shelled, and incurred
some 200 casualties, including Captain H. E. Clifford and Lieutenants C.
L. H. Mulcahy, L. Greene, and B. N. Macfarlane, the first two dying of
their wounds.
[Sidenote: _July 10._]
The 4th Regiment, now the only part of the Brigade in the line, was about
to be drawn into the fight for Trônes Wood, where the 30th Division had
made a lodgment on Saturday, the 8th. There were heavy counter-attacks
all through the Sunday, and on Monday, the 10th, an attack was ordered to
clear the place. At 11 p.m., on the 9th, “A” Company of the 4th was sent
to support the 90th Brigade, a platoon was dispatched to the garrison of
the Briqueterie, and the 3rd Regiment was held in reserve at the disposal
of the 30th Division. At dawn on the 10th came the attack, and troops of
the 30th Division, together with “A” Company of the 4th South Africans,
advanced through the southern half of the wood, and reported it clear of
the enemy. But it could not be held. The half-moon of German artillery
positions around it made communication with our rear too perilous, and
the denseness of the covert, cut only by the railway clearings and the
German communication trenches, rendered organized movement impossible
within it. In the afternoon a German counter-attack lost us most of our
gains, and the company of the 4th, when it returned to its trenches,
was subjected to a desperate shelling, in which its commander, Captain
Russell, was mortally wounded.
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL F. A. JONES, C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding
4th Regiment, South African Infantry. Killed at Bernafay Wood, 11th July
1916.]
[Sidenote: _July 11._]
On the 11th the fighting in Trônes continued, and the 4th South Africans,
whose “A” and “C” Companies were in the neighbourhood of Glatz Redoubt,
and whose headquarters and “B” and “D” Companies were in Bernafay Wood,
came under the barrage with which the enemy prepared his counter-attacks.
That day the Brigade suffered a grievous loss in the death from a
shell-splinter of Lieutenant-Colonel F. A. Jones, the commanding officer
of the 4th Regiment. He had served in the old South African War with
the Welsh Regiment, and won the D.S.O., and in German South-West Africa
had been Brigade major to Colonel Beves, commanding the 1st Infantry
Brigade. “Fatty” Jones was beloved throughout the contingent for his gay
and imperturbable temper, his ready humour, and his complete coolness and
gallantry. It was a tragic fate which cut him off on the eve of a battle
for which his whole life had been a preparation. The command of the 4th
Regiment now passed to Major D. M. MacLeod.
On the 13th orders were issued for the attack on the German second line,
and the 4th Regiment was relieved by the 2nd Royal West Surreys and the
7th Middlesex of the 55th Brigade in the 18th Division. That evening
the whole South African Brigade was concentrated at Talus Boise as the
reserve brigade of the 9th Division. Its week in the front line had been
costly. In the 1st Regiment there were 50 casualties, in the 2nd 205, in
the 3rd 91, and in the 4th 191, and these included 7 officers killed and
9 wounded. Almost all the losses were from shell-fire, and the severity
of the German bombardment may be gathered from the fact that the 3rd
Regiment, which was in the support trenches, had 91 losses, mainly among
its working and carrying parties.
[Sidenote: _July 14._]
In the cloudy dawn of Friday, the 14th of July, Haig launched his attack
against a section of the German second position—the four miles of front
from a point south-east of Pozières to Longueval and Delville Wood. It
was the business of Congreve’s XIII. Corps to take Bazentin-le-Grand,
Longueval, and Delville Wood, and to clear Trônes Wood and form a
defensive flank. The result of the day was that we carried all our
objectives from Bazentin-le-Petit to Longueval, a front of over three
miles, and at one moment had all but penetrated the enemy third position
at High Wood. Here we are concerned only with the British right flank,
the attack of the 9th Division against Longueval, and of the 18th
Division, under Major-General Ivor Maxse, on its right at Trônes Wood.
[Illustration: LONGUEVAL AND DELVILLE WOOD.]
This section was beyond doubt the most difficult in the battle-front.
To begin with, we were fighting in a salient, and our attack was under
fire from three sides. This enabled the enemy to embarrass seriously our
communications during the action. In the second place, the actual ground
of attack presented an intricate problem. The land sloped upwards from
Bernafay and Trônes Wood to Longueval village, which was shaped like an
inverted fan, broad at the south end, where the houses clustered about
the junction of two roads, and straggling out to the north-east along the
highway to Flers. Scattered among the dwellings were many little enclosed
gardens and orchards. To the east and north-east of the hamlet stretched
the wood of Delville, in the shape of a blunt equilateral triangle, with
an apex pointing northward. The place, like most French woods, had been
seamed with grassy rides, partly obscured by scrub, and the Germans had
dug lines of trenches along and athwart them. It had been for some days a
target for our guns, and was now a mass of splintered tree-trunks, matted
undergrowth, and shell-holes. The main German positions were to the
north, north-east, and south-east, at a distance of from 50 to 200 yards
from its perimeter, where they had strong entrenchments manned by machine
guns. It was Sir Douglas Haig’s aim to carry Longueval, and make it the
flanking buttress of his new line, from which a defensive flank could be
formed running south-east to the junction with the French. But it was
obvious that the whole of Longueval could not be held unless Delville
were also taken, for the northern part, where the road climbed towards
Flers, was commanded by the wood. Nothing short of the whole village
would make an adequate pivot; and, with the wood still in German hands,
there would be no good leaping-off ground from which to press outward in
the direction of Ginchy and Guillemont.
The attack on Longueval on the morning of the 14th was entrusted to
the 26th Brigade of the 9th Division—the 8th Black Watch and the 10th
Argyll and Sutherlands leading, the 9th Seaforths in support, and the 5th
Camerons in reserve. The 27th Brigade moved behind them to “clean up,”
and the intention of General Congreve was that day to make good Longueval
and also Delville Wood, if the latter should prove practicable—a heavy
task for two brigades. Shortly after dawn Lukin received orders to put a
battalion at the disposal of the 27th Brigade to assist in clearing the
Longueval streets, and the 1st Regiment was sent forward for the purpose.
The 3rd Regiment was also allotted to the 26th Brigade, but this order
was subsequently cancelled.
The assault of the Highlanders was a most gallant performance. They
rushed the trenches outside the village, and entered the streets, where
desperate hand-to-hand fighting took place among the houses, for the
enemy made a resolute defence. Before noon all the west and south-west
part of Longueval was in our hands; but it had become clear that the
place in its entirety could not be held, even if won, until Delville
Wood was cleared. At 1 p.m. General Furse informed Lukin that, as soon
as the other two brigades had taken Longueval, the South Africans should
capture and consolidate the outer edge of Delville Wood. For this purpose
the whole of the Brigade was available with the exception of the 1st
Regiment. Lukin thereupon drew up his orders for the operation. The first
hour suggested for the attack was 5 p.m. that afternoon; the time was
later changed to 7 p.m., and then to 7.30 p.m.; but owing to the fact
that the village was not entirely captured these orders were suspended.
A staff officer of the Brigade, Lieutenant Roseby, was sent forward to
ascertain the position in Longueval; and from his report it was apparent
that the northern part was not in our hands, and that, consequently, it
would be impossible to form up on a line west of Longueval and advance
to the attack from that direction. At a conference with General Furse at
Montauban that evening it was arranged that the attack should take place
at 5 a.m. on the following morning. The orders were that the wood was to
be taken at all costs, and that the advance was to proceed, even if the
26th and 27th Brigades failed to capture the northern part of the village.
[Illustration: LONGUEVAL VILLAGE AFTER THE BATTLE.
(_By permission of the Imperial War Museum._)]
Lukin called together his battalion commanders and gave them
instructions. These were that if, on arrival at Longueval, they found
the northern part still held by the enemy, they should attack Delville
from the south-west corner, moving forward on a one-battalion front.
To the 2nd and 3rd Regiments, the latter leading, was entrusted the
assault, with the 4th Regiment in support. Meantime during that day the
1st Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson, had been heavily engaged
in Longueval. At 2 p.m. it had deployed along the line held by the two
Scottish brigades, having been brought through a severe artillery fire in
eight lines of sections in file without a single casualty. Its business
was to attack the remainder of the village, and its leading companies,
“A” and “B,” reached their first objectives about four o’clock, but were
unable to advance owing to the machine-gun fire from front and flank.
During the night three parties—under Lieutenants Burgess, Henry, and
Bate—were sent out to capture the enemy posts which were checking the
advance, and found that the whole village in its northern part was a
nest of machine guns. On the morning of the 15th, after the other three
regiments had started for Delville Wood, the 1st returned to Lukin’s
command.
[Sidenote: _July 15._]
Two hours before dawn the three other regiments of the Brigade had moved
forward from Montauban. It was a cloudy morning, but as the sun rose
the sky lightened above the Bapaume Ridge, and men noticed amid the
punctual shelling how small birds still sang in the ruined coverts, and
larks rose from the battered ridges. Before them on their right front
lay the shadow which was Delville Wood, and the jumbled masonry, now
spouting like a volcano, which had been the hamlet of Longueval. On the
way orders came from the division to put two companies at the disposal
of the 26th Brigade in Longueval, and accordingly “B” and “C” Companies
of the supporting battalion, the 4th, were instructed to report to the
officer commanding the 5th Camerons there. The rest of the Brigade, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Tanner, who was in charge of the attack, moved over
the broken ground under heavy fire till they were close on the southern
edge of the village.
[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. E. C. TANNER, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Commanding 2nd South African Regiment, and later South African Brigade.]
It was Tanner’s first business to find out the situation. His patrols
reported that the Germans still held the northern part of Longueval
and all the wood adjoining the streets, but that the position in the
rest of the wood was obscure. Some of the 5th Camerons were holding a
trench running into Delville from the south-west corner, and in rear of
this trench the 2nd and 3rd Regiments assembled about six o’clock. In
such a posture of affairs, Lukin’s instructions had been to attack the
wood from the south-west. As the coming action was fought in a narrow
area where the smallest landmark had its importance, it is necessary
to understand the nature of the place. From the road junction in
Longueval there ran nearly due east a long ride which our men called
Princes Street. Subsidiary rides branched off it to the north and south
extending to the perimeter; these were in order from west to east, on
the north side the Strand, Regent Street, and Bond Street; and on the
south side Buchanan Street, Campbell Street, and King Street—an odd
mixture of the nomenclature of London and Glasgow. Another ride, parallel
to Princes Street and about half-way between it and the southern edge,
ran from Buchanan Street to the eastern perimeter, and was named Rotten
Row. Tanner decided to occupy the wood by first clearing the southern
part—that is, the area south of Princes Street—and then pushing north
from Princes Street, and occupying the Strand and the perimeter from its
northern end round to the south-west corner. This would give him the
whole of Delville except the north-west corner, which abutted on the
uncaptured part of Longueval village.
At first the attack moved swiftly. By seven o’clock the 3rd South
Africans, supported by one company of the 2nd, held everything south of
Princes Street. Thereupon Tanner sent the remaining three companies of
the 2nd to occupy the Strand and the northern perimeter. This proved to
be a heavy undertaking. The three weak companies reached their objective,
and found themselves compelled to hold a front of some 1,300 yards on
which it was almost impossible to maintain connection. They were well
supplied with shovels, and did their best to dig themselves in and wire
the ground they had won; but as soon as they reached the edge the whole
wood was violently shelled by the enemy, while machine-gun and rifle fire
broke out from the strong German lines around the perimeter. Meantime,
in the southern and eastern parts, two patrols of the 3rd Regiment, under
the command of Captains Medlicott and Tomlinson, had managed to get to
close quarters with the enemy, and had captured three officers, 135 other
ranks, and a machine gun.
At 2.40 p.m. Tanner reported to Lukin that he had won the whole wood with
the exception of strong points in the north-west abutting on Longueval
and the northern orchards. He had succeeded brilliantly in the first
part of his task, but the problem of Delville was far less to carry the
wood than to hold it. Lukin’s plan had been to thin out the troops in
the wood as soon as the perimeter was reached, leaving it to be held by
small infantry detachments with machine guns. But now came the enemy’s
counter-attack which made this plan impossible, for every available man
was needed to resist the German pressure. About three o’clock elements of
the 6th Bavarian Regiment of the 10th Bavarian Division attacked in force
from the east, but were driven back by rifle-fire. At 4.40 p.m. Tanner
reported that the enemy was also massing for an attack at the northern
end, and at 6.30 he again reported an enemy concentration to the north
and north-east. He informed Lukin that his casualties had been heavy, one
company of the 2nd South Africans having virtually been destroyed, and he
asked for reinforcements. He had already received a company of the 4th
South Africans, and another company of that regiment was sent forward to
reinforce the 3rd South Africans. The 1st Regiment had now returned to
Lukin’s command, and one of its companies was dispatched to reinforce the
2nd. At 7 p.m. Lukin sent a staff officer to obtain full details of the
position in the wood. The officers commanding the 2nd and 3rd Regiments
were urged to see that their battalions, in spite of their fatigue, dug
themselves in, since heavy shell-fire might be expected on the morrow.
This had already been done, for unless the men had been well dug in they
could not have lived where they were. The officer commanding the 1st
Regiment was ordered to detail special carrying platoons to keep up the
supply of ammunition, and to put up a Vickers and a Lewis gun at the
south-west corner of the wood to command the southern edge.
As the sun went down the activity of the enemy’s guns increased, and the
darkness of night was turned by shells and liquid fire into a feverish
and blazing noon. The German rate of fire was often as high as 400 shells
a minute. The position that evening was as follows:—The north-west corner
of the wood was in the enemy’s hands. The north-east corner was held from
left to right by one and a half companies of the 2nd Regiment, with one
company of the 1st in support, and by one company of the 3rd Regiment,
with one company of the 4th in support. The south-east corner was held by
two companies of the 3rd Regiment. The southern face from left to right
was held by one company of the 2nd Regiment and by one company of the
3rd, with one company of the 4th in support. A half company of the 2nd
Regiment held the western third of Princes Street, with two companies
of the 1st forming a defensive flank on the side of the village. The
headquarters of the 2nd and 3rd Regiments were at the junction of
Buchanan Street and Princes Street. Machine guns were in position round
the perimeter—four at the northern apex, four at the eastern end of the
north-eastern face, and two in the eastern half of the southern face. It
will be seen that twelve companies of infantry, now gravely weakened,
were holding a wood little less than a mile square with a long, rambling
perimeter—a wood on which every German battery was accurately ranged, and
which was commanded at close quarters by a semicircle of German trenches.
Moreover, since the enemy held the north-west corner, he had a covered
way of approach into the place. The only reserves of the South African
Brigade were one company of the 1st Regiment and the two companies of the
4th which had been lent to the 26th Brigade, and were due to return the
following morning.
To complete the story of the day, we must record the doings of these
two companies. On the 14th the 18th Division had cleared Trônes Wood,
and established their line up to Maltzhorn Farm. They joined hands with
the 9th Division just west of Waterlot Farm, where, in the ruined sugar
factory, the enemy had a position of great strength. On the morning
of the 15th the 5th Camerons were attacking this point, and the two
companies of the South African Scottish were to be used as troops to
follow and consolidate. Major Hunt, who was in charge of the companies,
sent a platoon from each to occupy the trenches close to the farm, which
they did under heavy fire from the concealed posts to the south and east.
The farm was not taken till the following day, and the work of the South
Africans was therefore less that of consolidation than of protecting the
skirts of the Cameron attack under a heavy German barrage. About six in
the evening an enemy force was detected coming from Guillemont, but this
was checked by our artillery barrage. An hour later the two companies
were ordered to fall back and construct a strong point, and at 2.30 on
the morning of the 16th they were relieved by the Camerons and withdrawn
to the sunken road behind Longueval.
All through the furious night of the 15th the troops in Delville Wood
were working for dear life at entrenchments. At the time it was rumoured
that the South Africans were a little negligent in digging, trusting
rather to their courage and their marksmanship than to trenches. The
criticism was unjust. No soldiers ever worked harder with the spade,
but their task was nearly impossible. In that hard soil, coagulated by
incessant shell-fire, and cumbered with a twisted mass of roots, wire,
and tree trunks, the spade could make little way. Nevertheless, when the
Sunday morning dawned, a good deal of cover had been provided.
[Sidenote: _July 16._]
At 2.35 a.m. Lukin received orders from the division that at all costs
the northern entrance into Longueval must be blocked, and that for this
purpose his Brigade must complete the capture of the northern perimeter
of the wood, and advance westward till they joined hands with the 27th
Brigade. There was a lane called North Street, which was a continuation
of the main street of Longueval from the point where the Flers Road
branched off to the north-east. Between these roads lay an orchard, the
tactical importance of which will be obvious from the map. The plan was
for the 27th Brigade to push north through the village and capture that
orchard and the other enclosures east of North Street, and to join hands
with the South Africans on the Flers Road. This was to be the work of the
11th Royal Scots; while two companies of the 1st South Africans (those
which, as has been already explained, had formed a defensive flank at the
south-west corner of the wood) were to push north from the Princes Street
line. The situation did not allow of a previous artillery bombardment;
but it was arranged that a “preparation” by trench mortars should precede
the infantry attack.
The advance was made at ten on the Sunday morning and failed completely,
since the Royal Scots were held up in their area by a strongly-wired
stone redoubt, and the South Africans by machine-gun fire from the
ominous orchard between the two roads. It was then that Private W. F.
Faulds of the 1st Regiment won the first Victoria Cross which fell to
the lot of the Brigade. Lieutenant Craig had attempted to reach a German
trench with a bombing section, and had fallen severely wounded half-way
between the lines. He was rescued by Private Faulds, who, along with
Privates Baker and Estment, crossed the parapet in broad daylight under a
drenching machine-gun and rifle fire.
After this failure the attacking troops fell back to the trenches
midway in the wood, and for the rest of the day had to endure a steady
concentrated fire to which they had no means of effective reply. It was
hot, dusty weather, and the enemy’s curtain of shells made it almost
impossible to bring up food and water or to remove the many casualties.
That afternoon Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson, commanding the 1st Regiment,
met Lukin in Longueval, and reported that his men were greatly exhausted.
He asked for an early relief; but Lukin could only repeat his divisional
commander’s instructions that at all costs the wood must be held. At the
same time he was so impressed with the signs of strain and fatigue on
the faces of the men that he submitted the matter to General Furse. The
situation, indeed, was becoming desperate. Longueval and Delville had
proved to be far too strongly held to be overrun at the first attack by
one division. At the same time, until they were taken, the objectives of
the battle of the 14th had not been achieved, and the stability of the
whole right wing of our new front was endangered. Fresh troops could not
yet be spared for the work, and the thing must be attempted again by the
same weary and depleted battalions. It was a vicious circle. Longueval
could not be won and held without Delville; Delville could not be won and
held without Longueval; so what strength remained to the 9th Division had
perforce to be divided between two simultaneous objectives.
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT W. F. FAULDS, V.C., 1st Regiment, South African
Infantry.]
That Sunday evening it was decided to make another effort against the
north-west corner next morning. At 10.30 p.m. orders were received to
withdraw all the infantry in Longueval village to a line south of Princes
Street, and all infantry in the wood to the area east of the Strand,
in order that the north-west corner of Delville and the north end of
Longueval might be bombarded. The bombardment was to cease at 2 a.m. on
the morning of Monday, the 17th, when the 27th Brigade and two companies
of the 1st South Africans were to repeat their attack of the Sunday.
Lieutenant-Colonel Tanner, commanding in the wood, was instructed to
order the men of the 2nd Regiment, who were now holding the Strand,
to move slowly forward so as to narrow the front of the 1st Regiment
attacking from Princes Street.
[Sidenote: _July 17._]
The attack was made shortly before dawn, and did not succeed. Once again
machine-gun fire from the fatal enclosures blocked any advance from west
or south. The enemy, too, was in force just inside the angle of the wood.
The 2nd South Africans, moving west from the Strand according to plan,
met with a stubborn resistance, and were forced to fall back to their
original position.
That morning Lukin visited Delville and discussed the position with his
commanding officers. He had now no troops which had not been in action
for at least forty-eight hours. It was the most wearing kind of battle,
for there was rarely a chance of getting to close quarters with the
enemy. Now and then the brilliant marksmanship of the South Africans
was given its opportunity; but for the most part they had to wait under
a continuous machine-gun and artillery fire, contending with a distant
and impalpable foe. Their general was gravely concerned both at the
fatigue of the men and the impossibility of making the wood anything but
a death-trap. On his return to Brigade Headquarters he discussed the
situation on the telephone with General Furse, but could get no hope of
relief or reinforcements. General Congreve’s instructions stood that
Delville must be held at any cost.
There was no change in the situation during the Monday afternoon.
Lieutenant Roseby, the Brigade Intelligence Officer, was sent forward to
get information, and was mortally wounded. During the evening Tanner
was hit, and Lieutenant-Colonel Thackeray, commanding the 3rd Regiment,
succeeded him in charge of the troops in the wood. That afternoon the
news came that the 9th Division was drawing in its left flank, and that
the 3rd Division, under Major-General Aylmer Haldane, was to attack
Longueval that night from the west. About half-past seven Lukin received
orders to take before the next dawn the enemy trench parallel to and 200
yards distant from the south-east edge of the wood. The perimeter facing
this trench was held by two companies of the 3rd South Africans, and
their commanding officer reported that the enemy trench before them was
very strongly manned, and contained several machine guns. He added that
he could not furnish more than 200 men for the attack without endangering
the whole position. On receiving this news General Furse cancelled the
operation. At half-past ten that night the Corps informed Lukin that
as soon as the 3rd Division completed the occupation of the village
they would establish machine guns on the north-west edge of the wood to
protect his men. The attack was to take place at 3.45 a.m. on the 18th,
and was to advance as far east as the Strand.
[Sidenote: _July 18._]
During the night all available reinforcements were pushed up to the
perimeter, where they had to face a strong enemy attack. In the southern
area the Germans advanced as far as Buchanan Street and Princes Street,
and drove the South Africans out of some of their new trenches. A
counter-attack cleared the ground, but only at the cost of heavy
casualties. At a quarter to four the 76th Brigade of the 3rd Division
succeeded in obtaining a footing in the orchard between Flers Road and
North Street. At eight in the morning Thackeray was ordered to send up
patrols to get in touch with this brigade, and directed the company of
the 1st Regiment, then occupying the Strand and the western part of
Princes Street, to move forward for the purpose. They were not seriously
opposed, and presently they joined hands with the 1st Gordons just west
of the orchard.
* * * * *
On that morning, the fourth of the battle, came the crisis for the
defenders of Delville. The arrival of the company of the 1st Regiment
at the outskirts of the wood was the signal for the enemy to open a
bombardment of unprecedented fury. Every part of the area was searched
and smothered by shells, but the fire was most intense around the
perimeter and down the Strand. Major Burges, the officer in command of
the company, was wounded, and shortly afterwards killed. At the same
time the 76th Brigade was driven in, and the Germans began to enter the
wood on the exposed left flank of the South Africans. About nine o’clock
an officer and fifty other ranks were dispatched as reinforcements. All
through the morning the wearied handful, now rapidly thinning, held out
as best they could. Their one relief was when the enemy came on to reap
the fruits of his shelling, for then their admirable rifle-fire took
heavy toll of him.
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL E. F. THACKERAY, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Commanding 3rd South African Regiment.]
About half-past two in the afternoon the position had become desperate.
Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson was ordered to take forward as reliefs all the
men available under his command—a total of 150 from the 1st Regiment.
These men had just been withdrawn after having been continuously in
action for four days; they had had no rest; but their one thought when
they were ordered forward was to get to grips with the enemy. On arriving
at Longueval Dawson placed his men in a trench at the south-east corner
of the village, and went into the wood to find Thackeray. At the same
time the men of the Trench Mortar Battery, numbering three officers and
some eighty other ranks, under Lieutenant Phillips, were brought up from
Montauban and placed at Dawson’s disposal. Dawson found Thackeray in
serious straits. In many parts of the wood the garrisons had been utterly
destroyed, and everywhere north of Princes Street the few survivors had
been forced back. Thackeray was now holding only the south-west corner,
defined by Buchanan Street and the western part of Princes Street. The
wounded filled the trenches, for it was impossible to remove them, since
all the stretcher-bearers of the 3rd Regiment were casualties, and no
men could be spared to take their places. Dawson, acting under Lukin’s
instructions, did his best to cope with the situation. He sent Lieutenant
Phillips and the Trench Mortar Battery men to reinforce Thackeray, and
through the division procured additional stretcher-bearers from the
cavalry, in addition to those from the 1st Regiment.
At 6.5 p.m. that evening came the welcome intelligence that that night
the South Africans would be relieved by the 26th Brigade. But a relief
under such conditions was a slow and intricate business. By midnight the
work had been partially carried out, and portions of the two companies of
the 1st Regiment and the two companies of the 4th were withdrawn.
[Sidenote: _July 20._]
But, as at Flodden, when
“they left the darkening heath
More desperate grew the strife of death.”
The enemy had brought up a new division—the 8th of the 4th (Magdeburg)
Corps—and made repeated attacks against the Buchanan Street line. For
two days and two nights the little remnant under Thackeray clung to
the south-west corner of the wood against impossible odds, and did not
break. The German method of assault was to push forward bombers and
snipers, and then to advance in massed formation simultaneously from the
north, north-east, and north-west. The three attacks on the night of
the 18th were repelled with heavy losses to the enemy; but in the last
of them the South Africans were assaulted on three sides. Thackeray’s
adjutant, Captain M’Donald, had been wounded, and he was left with only
two officers—Lieutenant Garnet Green of the 2nd and Lieutenant Phillips
of the 3rd—to assist him, who, though wounded themselves, were able to
keep on their feet. All through the 19th the gallant handful suffered
incessant shelling and sniping, the latter now from very close quarters.
It was the same on the 20th, but still relief tarried. At last, at six
o’clock that evening, troops of the 76th Brigade in the 3rd Division
were able to take over what was left to us of Longueval and the little
segment of Delville Wood. Thackeray marched out with two officers, both
of whom were wounded, and 140 other ranks, made up of details from all
the regiments of the Brigade. He spent the night at Talus Boise, and next
day joined the rest at Happy Valley.
It is not easy to reproduce the circumstances of a battle so that
a true impression may be made upon the minds of those who have not
for themselves seen the reality of modern war. The six days and five
nights during which the South African Brigade held the most difficult
post on the British front—a corner of death on which the enemy fire
was concentrated at all hours from three sides, and into which fresh
German troops, vastly superior in numbers to the defence, made periodic
incursions only to be broken and driven back—constitute an epoch of
terror and glory scarcely equalled in the campaign. There were positions
as difficult, but they were not held so long; there were cases of as
protracted a defence, but the assault was not so violent and continuous.
The closest parallel is to be found, perhaps, in some of the incidents
at Verdun, and in the resistance of units of the old British regulars at
the point of the Ypres salient in 1914; but even there we shall scarcely
find an equal feat of tenacity, and certainly none superior. Delville
Wood was not finally taken till the 25th of August, a month later, when
the 14th Light Division cleared it for good. The high value set upon it
by the enemy is proved by the fact that he used his best troops against
it—successively the 10th Bavarian Division, the 8th Division of the 4th
Corps, and the 5th of the 3rd Corps. The South Africans measured their
strength against the flower of the German army, and did not draw back
from the challenge. As a feat of human daring and fortitude the fight
is worthy of eternal remembrance by South Africa and Britain, but no
historian’s pen can give that memory the sharp outline and the glowing
colour which it deserves. Only the sight of the place in the midst
of the battle—that corner of splinters and churned earth and tortured
humanity—could reveal the full epic of Delville Wood.
Let us measure it by the stern register of losses. At midnight on 14th
July, when Lukin received his orders, the Brigade numbered 121 officers
and 3,032 men. When Thackeray marched out on the 20th he had a remnant of
143, and the total ultimately assembled in Happy Valley was about 750.
The casualties were—for the 1st Regiment, 558; for the 2nd, 482; for
the 3rd, 771; and for the 4th, 509. These figures included 23 officers
who were killed, 7 who died of wounds, 47 who were wounded, and 15 who
were prisoners or missing. All the commissioned ranks of the 2nd and 3rd
Regiments who were in the wood became casualties, as did all the officers
of the Machine-Gun Company attached to the Brigade.[12] It is such a
record as that of the 1st Coldstream or the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers at
First Ypres. But the price was not paid in vain. The Brigade did what it
was ordered to do, and did not yield until it was withdrawn.
I take two quotations from personal narratives which, better than any
words of mine, reflect the grimness of the battle. One is from Private
J. A. Lawson of the 3rd Regiment. He is describing the fight of Tuesday,
the 18th—the great German attack when the garrison was forced back to the
south-west corner. That morning Thackeray was holding the wood with nine
and a half companies, a strength of about 1,500 men; two days later he
had 140; so we may judge the fury of the conflict.
“Our little party had to wait in their cramped position of
tortured suspense till nearly 3 p.m. for the only relief we now
looked for—the relief afforded by the excitement of desperate
fighting against great odds. The enemy now launched an attack
in overwhelming numbers, amid the continued roar of artillery.
Once more they found us ready—a small party of utterly worn-out
men, shaking off their sleep to stand up in the shallow trench.
As the Huns came on they were mowed down—every shot must have
told. Our rifles smoked and became unbearably hot; but though
the end seemed near, it was not yet. When the Huns wavered
and broke, they were reinforced and came on again. We again
prevailed, and drove them back. Only one Hun crossed our
trench, to fall shot in the heart a few yards behind it. The
lip of our trench told more plainly than words can how near
they were to not failing. Beyond, in No Man’s Land, we could do
something to estimate the cost of their failure.... Exhaustion
now did what shell-fire and counter-attacks had failed to do,
and we collapsed in our trench, spent in body and at last worn
out in spirit. The task we had been set was too great for us.
What happened during the next two hours or so I do not know.
Numbed in all my senses, I gazed vacantly into space, feeling
as if the whole thing had been a ghastly nightmare, out of
which I was now only awaiting complete deliverance. From this
state of coma I was awakened by a shell which exploded just
over me, and instantaneously I passed into unconsciousness.
When I regained consciousness a few minutes after, my first
sensation was that of having been thoroughly refreshed by
sleep. But on moving I found that the fight for me was over....
I tried to rouse my friend, who had fallen face downward beside
me. Getting no response, I lifted his head, calling upon him
by name, but I could not arouse him. I then began with pain
and difficulty to walk down the line. I found that the last
two hours of shelling had done their work—only six remained
alive in the trench. I aroused one sleeper, and told him I had
been badly hit, and was going to try and walk out. He faced me
for a second, and asked me what he was to do. I said there was
nothing to do but carry on, as the orders of Saturday morning
had not been countermanded. His brave ‘Right-o!’ were the last
words I heard there—surely fitting words as the curtain fell
for me.”
The second quotation is from the late Captain Welsh, M.C., D.C.M., who
was then a staff sergeant with the stretcher-bearers. The work of the
Field Ambulance and of the regimental medical officers during these
days deserved the highest praise, and it was due to their gallantry
and resource that the sufferings of the men in the wood were not more
horrible. The weather was now hot sun, now drenching rain, and the task
of getting out the casualties was one long nightmare.
“The road from Longueval to Bernafay Wood was in an
indescribable condition. It was impossible to carry from the
front of the Regimental Aid Posts in Longueval, owing to the
sniping, which was at times very severe and accurate. The
rear was a mass of ruins, wire entanglements, garden fences,
fallen and falling trees, together with every description of
_débris_ and shattered building material. It is one thing to
clear a path along which reinforcements may be brought, but
quite another to make a track on which four men may carry
a stretcher with a modicum of comfort to the patient....
Besides this road there was a narrow sunken lane, which at
first afforded some safety, but later became so pitted with
shell-holes that the bearers were compelled to take to the
open. In addition to these difficulties, it must be remembered
that these roads were shelled heavily day and night. At times
the enemy would put up a barrage with heavy stuff, which meant
that no stretcher-bearing could be done until the fire was
over. Parties who were unfortunate enough to be caught in one
of these barrages spent moments of nerve-racking suspense,
crouching in shell-holes or under banks, or wherever cover
was available. One of the worst experiences of this kind was
when it was decided to shell Longueval once more. Very short
notice was given to clear all the Regimental Aid Posts, and
only two men per stretcher could be spared. Padres, doctors,
and odd men were pressed into service to enable all patients
to be removed. As the party left, the bombardment began on
both sides. Scrambling, pushing, and slipping amid a tornado of
shell-fire, they headed for Bernafay Wood. It was impossible
to keep together, and in the darkness squads easily became
detached and lost touch. The noise of bursting shells was
incessant and deafening, while the continuous sing of the
rifle and machine-gun bullets overhead tried the nerves of the
hardiest. To crown all, it was raining, and the roads were
almost impassable for stretcher work. In fact, had it not been
for the light of the German star shells, the thing could not
have been worked at all. As the night wore on squad after squad
of tired, soaked, and mud-covered men stumbled into Bernafay
Wood. Here came a medical officer covered with grime and mud
from top to toe, carrying a stretcher with a kilted Scot. Then
a tall parson, unrecognizable under a coating of mud, with a
stretcher-bearer as partner, whose orders he obeyed implicitly.
When word was passed round in the morning that all had returned
alive, some were so incredulous that they started an inquiry of
their own.”
I quote, too, from the records of the Field Ambulance a bare summary of a
very gallant deed:—
“On the 18th it was again decided to shell Longueval, in which
Captain Lawrie had established a Regimental Aid Post. It was
found to be quite impossible to move all the stretcher cases,
so he decided to remain behind in his station. The Aid Post was
in a building, and as the Germans were counter-attacking and
our troops going out, the windows and doors were barricaded
with mattresses, furniture, and anything that might stop a
bullet. The bombardment was opened by both British and German
guns, and for about nine hours a hurricane of shells was poured
into the village. By nothing short of a miracle the Regimental
Aid Post was practically the only place that did not get a
direct hit. During the night, dressing the wounded was carried
out under great difficulty, as only a small electric torch or
candle could be used. Captain the Rev. E. Hill, who had also
remained to help, managed to keep up a constant supply of
tea and coffee, apparently from supernatural sources. On the
morning of the 19th a counter-attack was driven well home, and
Captain Lawrie’s party was thus saved from capture.”
There is no more solemn moment in war than the parade of men after
battle. The few hundred haggard survivors of the Brigade in the bright
sunshine in Happy Valley were too weary and broken to realize how great
a thing they had done. Tributes had come to them from high quarters. Sir
Douglas Haig had sent his congratulations. The commander of the Fourth
Army, Sir Henry Rawlinson, had written that “in the capture of Delville
Wood the gallantry, perseverance, and determination of the South African
Brigade deserves the highest commendation.” They had earned the praise of
their own intrepid commanding officers, who had gone through the worst
side by side with their men. “Each individual,” said Tanner’s report,
“was firm in the knowledge of his confidence in his comrades, and was,
therefore, able to fight with that power which good discipline alone can
produce. A finer record of this spirit could not be found than the line
of silent bodies along the Strand over which the enemy had not dared to
tread.” But the most impressive tribute was that of their Brigadier. When
the remnant of his Brigade paraded before him, Lukin took the salute with
uncovered head and eyes not free from tears.
NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN INFANTRY BRIGADE—DELVILLE
WOOD, JULY 1916.
The roll is exclusive of the Machine Gun Company, the Trench Mortar
Battery, the Field Ambulance, and the 64th Field Company Royal Engineers,
all of which took part in the battle.
_Name and Rank._ _Remarks._
Brigadier-General H. T. LUKIN, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Major J. MITCHELL-BAKER, D.S.O.
Captain A. L. PEPPER.
Lieutenant F. R. ROSEBY Died of wounds.
Sec.-Lieutenant F. W. S. BURTON.
1ST REGIMENT.
Lieut.-Col. F. S. DAWSON, C.M.G.
Major F. H. HEAL With transport.
” E. T. BURGES Killed.
Captain G. J. MILLER Killed.
” H. H. JENKINS Wounded.
” P. J. JOWETT Missing (assumed dead).
Lieutenant T. O. PRIDAY (Adjutant) Wounded.
” S. W. E. STYLE Wounded.
” C. B. PARSONS Killed.
” C. F. S. NICHOLSON
” E. A. DAVIES Transport Officer.
” W. S. DENT Wounded.
” J. M. HOLLINGWORTH Missing (assumed dead).
” A. W. CRAIG Wounded.
” L. I. ISSACS
” H. G. CHAPMAN Wounded.
” F. S. ENGLISH
” A. C. HARRISON Wounded.
” W. D. HENRY Wounded and missing
(since prisoner of war).
” W. A. LARMUTH Wounded.
” A. W. LEIFELDT Wounded.
” C. W. REID Wounded.
” W. N. BROWN Killed.
” A. STUCKEY
” E. J. BURGESS Wounded.
Sec.-Lieut. A. C. HAARHOFF Killed.
” A. E. BROWN Killed.
” E. A. L. HAHN Killed.
” W. TEMPANY Wounded.
” P. W. FURMIDGE Wounded.
” C. I. BATE Prisoner.
” R. M. LYNE
Q.M. and Hon. Captain A. C. WEARNER
_Attached._
Chaplain and Captain E. ST. C. HILL
2ND REGIMENT.
Lieut.-Col. W. E. TANNER, C.M.G. Wounded.
Major H. H. GEE Died of wounds.
Captain H. W. M. BAMFORD (Adjt.) Wounded.
” C. R. HEENAN Wounded.
” E. BARLOW Wounded.
” H. E. CLIFFORD Died of wounds.
” W. F. HOPTROFF Killed.
” W. J. GRAY Killed.
Lieutenant H. E. F. CREED Killed.
” L. GREENE Wounded.
” W. J. HILL Killed.
” F. M. DAVIS Wounded.
” C. T. K. LETCHFORD Killed.
” C. L. H. MULCAHY Died of wounds.
” R. BEVERLEY Wounded.
” W. J. PERKINS Wounded.
Sec.-Lieut. T. W. BRU-DE-WOLD Killed.
” E. V. TATHAM Killed.
” A. R. KNIBBS Wounded.
” R. G. MILLER Killed.
” B. N. MACFARLANE Wounded.
” E. C. BRYANT Injured.
” R. P. TATHAM Killed.
” F. G. WALSH Transport officer.
” A. T. WALES Killed.
” G. GREEN Wounded.
” W. H. FLEMMER Died of wounds.
” N. FENIX Wounded.
” J. G. CONNOCK Killed.
Q.M. and Hon. Captain E. A. LEGGE
_Attached._
Chaplain and Captain P. J. WALSHE
3RD REGIMENT.
Lieut.-Col. E. F. THACKERAY, C.M.G. Wounded. (At duty.)
Captain (Acting-Major) J. W. JACKSON Killed.
” R. F. C. MEDLICOTT Prisoner.
” D. R. MACLACHLAN Killed.
” E. V. VIVIAN Wounded.
” L. W. TOMLINSON Wounded.
” A. W. H. M’DONALD (Adjt.) Wounded.
Lieutenant O. H. DE B. THOMAS Wounded and missing
(since prisoner of war).
” J. B. BAKER Wounded.
” A. L. PAXTON Wounded.
” A. M. THOMSON Wounded.
” B. H. L. DOUGHERTY Wounded.
” D. A. PIRIE Prisoner.
” H. M. HIRTZEL Prisoner.
” H. G. ELLIOTT Missing (assumed dead).
” E. J. PHILLIPS Wounded.
Sec.-Lieut. S. B. STOKES Wounded.
” D. JENNER Wounded.
” A. E. BARTON Killed.
” A. E. SHARPE Gassed.
” F. K. ST. M. RITCHIE Prisoner.
” D. M. ABEL Wounded.
” H. W. GOVE Missing (assumed dead).
” C. H. DICK Killed.
” F. H. SOMMERSET Killed.
” A. C. HANKS Died of Wounds.
” S. PEARSON Wounded.
” S. J. GUARD Wounded and prisoner.
” W. SCALLAN Wounded.
” H. N. HEELEY Wounded.
” D. J. W. GOWIE Shell shock.
Q.M. and Hon. Lieut. W. H. CARDING.
_Attached._
Captain S. LIEBSON, S.A.M.C. Wounded.
Chaplain and Captain G. T. COOK Killed.
4TH REGIMENT.
Lieut.-Col. F. A. JONES; C.M.G., D.S.O. Killed.
Major D. M. MACLEOD Wounded.
” D. R. HUNT
Captain E. C. D. GRADY Wounded.
” T. H. ROSS
” C. M. BROWNE (Adjutant) Wounded.
” S. C. RUSSELL Died of wounds.
” W. ANDERSON Shell shock.
” G. E. W. MARSHALL Shell shock.
” F. MCE. MITCHELL Attached 26th Brigade.
Lieutenant A. M. CAMERON Wounded.
” J. L. SHENTON Wounded.
” H. M. NEWSON Prisoner.
” T. FARRELL Gassed.
” C. M. GUEST Staff.
” A. H. BROWN Killed.
” J. WATKINS Wounded.
” R. D. GRIERSON Gassed.
” W. MCLEAN Brigade Staff.
” A. S. TAYLOR Wounded.
” H. G. OUGHTERSON Killed.
” R. B. THORBURN Killed.
” G. SMITH Wounded.
” A. V. CHASE Wounded.
” J. S. FRY Killed.
” A. YOUNG, V.C. Wounded.
Sec.-Lieut. C. S. BELL Killed.
” D. ROSS Killed.
” W. H. KIRBY Wounded.
” C. A. A. MACLEAN Wounded.
” E. F. DALGETY
Q.M. and Hon. Lieut. Z. B. BAYLY.
_Attached._
Major M. B. POWER, S.A.M.C.
Chaplain and Captain S. THOMSON
CHAPTER IV.
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME: THE BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT.
(July-December 1916.)
The Brigade attached to the First Army—In the Trenches at
Vimy—The Difficulties of the Later Stages of the Battle of
the Somme—The Country around The Butte de Warlencourt—The
Brigade enters the Line at Eaucourt l’Abbaye—The Attack of
12th October—The Capture of the Pimple—The Attack of 18th
October—The Fighting of the 18th and 19th—The Brigade withdrawn
to the Arras Area—General Lukin takes Command of the 9th
Division.
[Sidenote: _July 27._]
After the fight at Longueval and Delville Wood the 9th Division left the
Somme and was transferred from the XIII. Corps in the Fourth Army to the
IV. Corps, under Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Wilson, in Sir Charles
Monro’s First Army. The South African Brigade marched to Maricourt on
23rd July, where it entrained for Hengest, and on the 27th arrived in the
Frévillers area, north of the main road between Arras and St. Pol.
[Sidenote: _Aug. 11._]
[Sidenote: _Aug. 23._]
Here its first task was reorganization. Drafts to the number of 40
officers and 2,826 other ranks had been sent from Bordon during July,
and their training had to be completed before they could be absorbed
into the different regiments.[13] On 5th August, the Army Commander,
Sir Charles Monro, inspected the Brigade, which at the moment showed
a parade strength of 62 officers and 2,523 men. On the 11th the King
visited Frévillers and walked down the village street, which was lined
by the 1st Regiment in fatigue dress. By the third week in the month the
Brigade was sufficiently rested and reconstituted to take its place once
again in the front line, and on 23rd August it took over from the 26th
Brigade the Berthonval and Carency sections of the Vimy area. At that
date the Germans held the crown of the celebrated ridge, and the British
front ran along its western slopes. Different battalions of the Brigade
held the first-line trenches until 23rd September, and thereby enlarged
their experience of modern war, for they were enabled to realize for the
first time the discomfort of trench fighting amid perpetual rain. For
the greater part of the time the weather was abominable, the men were
standing in two feet of water, and the last few days it rained so heavily
that the parapets crumbled, and every available man had to be employed on
their repair. It was a foretaste of what awaited them in October.
[Sidenote: _Sept. 13._]
Vimy was a quiet area, for the great battle on the Somme continued; and
this stage was for the Brigade almost barren of incident. The exception
was a raid into the enemy’s trenches on the night of the 13th September,
carried out by parties from “B” and “D” Companies of the 2nd Regiment,
under the command of Lieutenants Lilburn and Walsh. There was a bright
moon occasionally obscured by passing clouds; but the raiding parties
managed to reach the enemy’s side of our wire without being observed. Our
artillery put down a barrage, and under its cover the men doubled across
No Man’s Land and jumped into the German trenches, the barrage lifting
as they arrived there. Prisoners were secured, dug-outs were bombed, and
at a prearranged signal the raiders returned to their lines before the
German barrage began. Their casualties were only two, though one was so
severely wounded that he could not be moved from the German lines. Sir
Charles Monro sent a message to General Lukin to express his admiration
for the way in which the raid had been conducted—the meticulous care
in its preparation, and the gallantry and enterprise displayed in its
execution.
[Sidenote: _Sept. 23._]
[Sidenote: _Oct. 8-9._]
On 23rd September the Brigade was relieved, and on the 25th it moved
to a new training area, that of the Third Army. On 5th October the 9th
Division was restored to the Fourth Army, and on the 7th the South
Africans marched southward to the Somme. Next day, in heavy rain, they
relieved the 141st Brigade of the 47th (London Territorial) Division in
Mametz Wood, now a bleak desolation, and on the 9th moved to High Wood,
where they took over from the 142nd Brigade. The 9th Division was now
side by side with another famous Scottish division, the 15th, and part of
General Pulteney’s III. Corps.
[Sidenote: _Sept. 3._]
Since the 20th of July much had happened on the Somme. The advance of
1st July had carried the first enemy position on a broad front; but
the failure of the attack north of the Ancre had made the breach eight
miles less than the original plan. The advance of 14th July gave us the
second enemy position on a still narrower front—from Bazentin-le-Petit
to Longueval. The danger now was that any further movement might result
in the formation of a sharp and precarious salient; so Haig broadened
the breach by striking out to left and right, taking first Pozières and
the high ground at Mouquet Farm, and then on the other flank Guillemont
and Ginchy. This made the gap in the second enemy line seven miles wide,
and brought us in most places to the highest ground, from which direct
observation could be had over the slopes and pockets to the east. On 3rd
September the Allies everywhere between Thiepval and Estrées were facing
the German third line. At the outset of the battle this third position
had been only in embryo, but before the assault of 14th July it had been
for the most part completed, and by the beginning of September it had
been elaborately fortified, and a fourth position prepared behind it.
The third line was based on a string of fortified villages which lay on
the reverse slopes of the main ridge—Courcelette, Martinpuich, Flers,
Lesbœufs, and Morval. Behind it was an intermediate line, with Le Sars,
Eaucourt l’Abbaye, and Gueudecourt as strong points in it. Further back
lay the newly-made fourth line, just west of the Bapaume-Péronne road,
covering the villages of Sailly-Saillisel and Le Transloy. This was the
line protecting Bapaume, and at the moment the final German prepared
position.
The fighting during July and August had greatly weakened the enemy
forces. All the most famous German units had appeared—the pick of the
Bavarians, the 5th Brandenburgers, and every division of the Guard and
Guard Reserve Corps. The time was ripe early in September for a new
attack which should accelerate the enemy’s decline, and give the British
front a new orientation. Haig’s immediate aim was to break through the
German third line; but his ultimate objective was a thrust north-eastward
across the Upper Ancre, so as to get behind the great slab of unbroken
enemy positions from Thiepval northward. The moment was propitious for a
new blow. The French on the British right had won conspicuous successes;
Brussilov was still pinning down the Austro-German forces on the Eastern
front; Sarrail had just launched an offensive in the Balkans; Rumania
had entered the war, and was pouring troops into Transylvania; and the
recent changes in the German High Command had for the time being slightly
dislocated the machine.
[Sidenote: _Sept. 15._]
[Sidenote: _Sept. 25-26._]
On Friday, 15th September, Haig struck from a point south-east of
Thiepval to Ginchy, with a force the larger part of which, such as the
Guards, the Canadians, and the New Zealanders, was fresh to the Somme
area. He used for the first time the new British tanks, and in one day
advanced to an average depth of a mile on a front of more than six,
taking Courcelette, Martinpuich, and Flers. Only on his right, where
the Guards were faced with an impossible task, was there any serious
check. On 25th September he struck again between Combles and Martinpuich,
and for the second time advanced one mile on a front of six, and took
Morval, Lesbœufs, and Gueudecourt, while on the 26th the right wing of
Sir Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army carried Thiepval and the whole of that
crest. That evening the Allied fortunes in the West had never looked
brighter. The enemy was now back in his fourth line, and had lost all the
advantages of the higher ground. His _moral_ was seriously shaken, and
it appeared as if his great machine was getting out of gear. If heaven
granted a fine autumn there was good hope that a further advance might
drive him from the Bapaume ridge and crumble his whole front between
Arras and Péronne.
That hope was destined to fail. The guns were scarcely silent after
the attack of the 26th when the weather broke, and October was one
succession of tempestuous gales and drenching rains. Now appeared the
supreme difficulty of trench warfare. For three months the Allies had
been slowly advancing, blasting their way forward with their guns before
each infantry attack, and the result was that the fifty square miles of
old battle-ground which lay behind their front lines had been tortured
out of recognition. The little country roads had been wholly destroyed,
and, since they never had much of a bottom, the road-menders had nothing
to build upon. New roads were hard to make, for the chalky soil had been
so churned up by shelling that it had lost all cohesion. In all the area
there were but two good highways, and by the third month of the battle
even these showed signs of wear. The consequence was that there were now
two No Man’s Lands—one between the front lines, and one between the old
enemy front and the front we had won. The second was the bigger problem,
for across it must be brought the supplies of a great army. It was a
war of motor transport, and we were doing what the early Victorians had
pronounced impossible—running the equivalent of steam engines not on
prepared tracks but on high-roads, running them day and night in endless
relays. The problem was difficult enough in fine weather, but when the
rain came it turned the whole land into a morass. Every road became a
watercourse, and in the hollows the mud was as deep as a man’s thighs.
The army must be fed, troops must be relieved, guns must be supplied, so
there could be no slackening of the traffic. Off the roads the ground was
one vast bog, dug-outs crumbled in, and communication trenches ceased
to be. Behind the British front lay six miles of sponge, varied by mud
torrents. It was into such miserable warfare, under persistent rain in a
decomposing land, that the South African Brigade was now flung.
The line of the Fourth Army from a point north-east of Courcelette ran
southward for the most part along the foot of the slopes which culminated
in High Wood, and which were known to us as the Thiepval-Morval ridge.
But a special topographical feature must be noted, for on it depended the
fighting in October. From that ridge a series of spurs descended eastward
into the hollow, one of which specially concerns us—the hammer-headed
spur immediately west of Flers, at the end of which stood the odd tumulus
called the Butte de Warlencourt. Below the eastern edge of this spur lay
the German fourth position. It was a position on reverse slopes, and thus
screened from direct observation, though our command of the high ground
to the west gave us a view of its hinterland. Our own possession of the
heights, great though the advantages were, had this drawback, that our
communications had to descend the reverse slopes, and were thus partly
exposed to the enemy’s observation and long-range fire. The task of Sir
Henry Rawlinson’s Fourth Army in this sector was, therefore, to carry
the spurs, and so get within assaulting distance of the German fourth
line. The spurs were not part of the German main front, but were held
as intermediate positions, every advantage being taken of sunken roads,
of ruins, and of the undulations of the country. They represented for
the fourth German line what Contalmaison had represented for the second;
till they were carried no general assault on the main front could be
undertaken. Further, their capture would relieve our difficulties by
giving us certain cover for our advanced gun positions, and shelter for
the bringing up of supplies.
At first things went well. From Flers north-westward, in front of
Eaucourt l’Abbaye and Le Sars, ran a very strong trench system which we
called the Flers line, and which was virtually a switch connecting the
old German third line, now in our hands, with the intermediate positions
on the spurs. The capture of Flers gave us the south-eastern part of this
line, and during the last days of September and the beginning of October
we won the rest of it. On the 1st of October the 50th and 47th Divisions
carried the Flers line north of Destremont Farm, and the ruined abbey
of Eaucourt, though in the latter remnants of the 6th Bavarian Division
made for some days a stout resistance. On 7th October the 23rd Division
took the village of Le Sars, on the Albert-Bapaume road; but the 47th
Division, on their right, failed to reach the Butte de Warlencourt. These
two divisions were now relieved, and the 15th and the 9th took their
places, with orders to carry the Butte and the German intermediate line.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: _Oct. 9._]
During the day of 9th October the 2nd South African Regiment, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Christian, to the strength of 20 officers and 578
other ranks, took over the portion of the front line to be held by the
Brigade. The relief, with the exception of two posts, was complete by
1.25 a.m. on the 10th, and shortly before daybreak the missing posts
were discovered. During that night a number of wounded, belonging to the
outgoing 141st Brigade, were brought in by the South Africans.
The attention of the reader is now requested to the map opposite page 92.
The boundary of the 9th Division on the left was the road from the Butte
de Warlencourt to Martinpuich, where it ran along the depression of the
ground west of Eaucourt. The South African Brigade was on the left of
the division, and its brigade boundary ran through the ruins of Eaucourt
l’Abbaye, beyond which the 26th Brigade held the front. The 27th Brigade
was in divisional reserve. “B” and “C” Companies of the 2nd Regiment
held the front line, as shown in the map, together with two strong
posts, Nos. 58 and 77, on their left and right fronts respectively. “A”
and “D” Companies were in the support trenches of the old Flers line
running along the south-west, side of Eaucourt l’Abbaye. The German,
front trenches, known to us as Snag and Tail, lay about 1,000 yards
from our front line, and conformed roughly to its shape. Beyond them,
running through the Butte de Warlencourt, was the enemy main intermediate
position, cutting the Albert-Bapaume road beyond Le Sars. The confused
fighting of the past weeks and the constant rains had made the whole
front on both sides indeterminate. Odd lengths of fantastically-named
trenches abounded, and at any one moment it was doubtful which were held
by the Germans and which could be claimed by the British. Sir Henry
Rawlinson’s first task was to clear the ground up to the Butte, which
would bring him directly in front of the German fourth position, running
through Le Transloy and Ligny-Thilloy.
On the left of the South African front, and under their control, stood
the ruins of a mill. The first instructions of the 2nd Regiment were to
link up the posts 58 and 77 with the mill; but owing to the slowness of
the relief this could not be done till the second night, when some 600
yards of trench were dug. During the whole of the 10th and the 11th the
2nd Regiment was heavily shelled; but their casualties were not large. On
the 11th General Furse issued orders for an attack during daylight on the
12th in conjunction with the 26th Brigade on their right, and the 44th
Brigade of the 15th Division on their left. The enemy’s trenches were
accordingly reconnoitred, and a certain number of machine guns located.
So far as could be judged, there was no wire in the immediate vicinity.
Orders were issued to push out a post to the point marked 93, and to link
it up with the mill, but this instruction was presently cancelled. A new
communication trench was dug between Flers trench and the front line.
[Illustration: THE FIGHTING BEFORE THE BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT, BATTLE OF
THE SOMME.]
[Sidenote: _Oct. 12._]
The attack on the 12th was fixed for 2.5 in the afternoon. The assault
was to be carried out on a one-battalion front by the 2nd and 4th
Regiments, the 2nd Regiment leading, with the 3rd and 1st in reserve.
There were two objectives; the first the enemy trenches called Snag and
Tail, and the second the main intermediate line through the Butte de
Warlencourt. The cloudy morning dissolved after midday in a drizzle of
rain. At 2.5, after a well-arranged barrage, the 2nd Regiment crossed the
parapets, closely followed by the 4th, under Major Hunt. One minute after
zero an enemy barrage of exceptional violence began, with the result that
in a quarter of an hour the telephone wires to the front line were cut,
and no reports were received for some time. In the misty weather it was
impossible to see any distance, and the difficulty was increased owing
to a smoke barrage, which we had laid down around the Butte, drifting in
our direction. Presently it appeared that the enemy was following a new
practice. The ground over which we were attacking was a gentle slope,
perfectly suited to machine-gun fire. He had his machine guns placed well
back in prepared positions, and caught our attack at long range. Under
this blast no troops could live, and presently the impetus of the assault
died away, long before the first objective had been obtained.
At 4 p.m. General Lukin received a message from Captain Ross of the 4th
Regiment that he, with some details of the 2nd, was holding a line of
shell-holes and a shallow trench half-way between our old front line and
the first objective, and that in front of him, near the first objective,
was a company of the 4th, while a part of the 2nd seemed to be farther
forward. Lukin had already sent forward a company of the 3rd Regiment
to hold the old front line, and he now ordered two officers’ patrols
from this company to clear up the situation. They reported during the
evening that the Brigade had nowhere reached its first objective. As the
attacking battalions had suffered heavily, and were now more or less
disorganized, Lukin ordered the 3rd Regiment to relieve them, while the
1st was moved up in support. The relief was no light task, owing to the
congested state of the communication trenches, and the difficulty of
obtaining reliable guides; and it was not till after dawn on the 13th
that the 2nd and 4th Regiments were brought back to High Wood.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 13._]
Early on the 13th it was discovered that Lieutenants Pearse and
Donaldson, with about sixty men, had dug themselves in at a very exposed
point near the enemy’s line, and due south of the post at point 93.
Lieutenant-Colonel Thackeray, commanding the 3rd Regiment, instructed
Captain Montgomery, who commanded “C” Company in it, to open up visual
communication with Lieutenant Pearse, and tell him that he could not be
relieved till after dark. This was found to be impossible; but Lieutenant
Cruddas succeeded in reaching the place and ascertaining the exact
position of the party, with the result that they were brought back safely
during the evening. Meantime much work had been done in digging trenches
and establishing what ground had been won. A new trench, afterwards known
as Pearse’s Trench, was dug from our old line to the point which he had
held, and made a jumping-off ground for future operations.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 14._]
Orders were received from the division at 6.15 p.m. to reconnoitre
the deserted strong-point 93, with the object of occupying it. A
patrol, under Lieutenant Mallett, reached it with little opposition,
and found there many signs of German occupation, including a field
and two machine-gun emplacements and a deep dug-out. This place was
soon to become only too familiar to us under the name of the Pimple, a
little mound some 60 feet long, 12 feet wide, and from 12 to 15 feet
high.[14] The patrol did not return till daybreak, so it was impossible
to occupy the Pimple that night; but the 3rd Regiment were instructed
that the following evening, as soon as the dark fell, they must enter
into possession of the place, so that it might be linked up with the
rest of the line. Accordingly, early on the night of the 14th, “B”
Company of the 3rd Regiment, under Captain Sprenger, was detailed for
the work. Lieutenant Mallett led the advance for 400 yards and reached
the mound, which was thereafter garrisoned by a party under Lieutenant
Medlicott. Lieutenant Mallett then entered the trench running from
the Pimple towards the enemy position in Snag and Tail trenches, and
bombed the enemy out of a portion of this till he was driven back by
machine-gun fire and severely wounded. Another party, however, under
Lieutenants Harris and Estill, continued the work, and succeeded in
taking and holding a considerable part of this section of the old German
communications. That night the place was heavily bombed by Germans
moving along the trenches, and soon after dawn on the 15th a working
party was seen approaching. As they were in close order, a Lewis gun was
turned on them, and the squad was dispersed with many casualties. The
garrison of “B” Company continued to hold the Pimple and the captured
trenches until relieved by “A” Company of the 3rd on the night of
the 15th. The casualties during the operation amounted to 3 officers
(Lieutenant Medlicott killed, Captain Sprenger and Lieutenant Mallett
wounded, the latter subsequently dying of his wounds) and 35 other ranks.
It was one of the most gallant exploits during this stage of the battle.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 16-17._]
On the night of the 16th the 3rd Regiment retired to the support line,
and their place in the front trenches was taken by the 1st, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson. Meantime, large working parties had been
employed in widening and deepening the communication trench between
the Pimple and our front line and back to Flers Switch. During the
17th Dawson took his company commanders round the whole trench system,
pointing out the limits of each company’s front and the points to be
attacked, for on that day orders had come from the division for an
assault in the early morning of the 18th against the same objectives
which had been attacked without success on the 12th. Such coaching was
a most needful preliminary, for every hour, under the shelling and the
weather, the landscape was growing more featureless. To the eye it was
only a waste of wrinkled grey mud.
[Illustration: SCENE OF SOUTH AFRICAN BRIGADE’S ADVANCE AGAINST THE BUTTE
DE WARLENCOURT POSITION.]
All that evening and for most of the night heavy rain fell, so that
the trenches and parapets were mere undulations in a quagmire. The
front-line trench being deep and narrow with few fire-steps, it was
difficult for the men to leave it, and realizing this, the company
commanders began getting their troops out more than an hour before the
time fixed for the attack. Zero hour was at 3.40 a.m., and when it came
the three assaulting companies of the 1st Regiment were already for the
most part formed up in No Man’s Land.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 18._]
Keeping as close as they dared to their barrage, the South Africans
advanced, with “C” Company on their left, “B” Company in the centre, and
“A” on the right. They disappeared into the rain, and for several hours
were unheard of. When news came it was news of failure. “C” Company,
under Captain Jenkins, passed the communication trench leading south from
the Pimple, and came to that junction of Tail and Snag trenches which we
called the Nose of the Switch. Here they were held up by wire at the foot
of a steep bank in front of the German line, and were also heavily bombed
from the trenches themselves. The leading platoon was almost entirely
shot down, and though an officer and six men of the following platoon
managed to get into the German trench, they, too, immediately fell. The
only officer left was Captain Jenkins, who was himself wounded; and,
seeing that the enemy line was so strongly held, and that there was no
hope of success for what remained of his company, he ordered the company
sergeant-major to withdraw the survivors to their original line. The
casualties of “C” Company were 69 out of the 100 who crossed the parapet.
The fate of “A” and “B” Companies was still harder, and to understand
it the reader must again turn to the map. The two companies advanced
rapidly behind our barrage and entered Snag Trench, Captain Whiting,
who commanded “B” Company, being mortally wounded half-way across. They
failed, however, to realize that they had reached their objective, and
continued beyond it. The whole place was so battered by shell-fire that
the trench outlines had become obscure. They saw about 600 yards on
their right some of the Highlanders of the 26th Brigade, but they had
now wholly lost touch with their flanks, and the enemy was filtering
in between them and their old front. Lieutenant Stapleton with a few
stragglers succeeded in returning, after killing some twelve Germans and
taking nineteen prisoners; two officers and sixteen other ranks were
captured; but with these exceptions all the men of “A” and “B” Companies
were killed.[15]
At daybreak a gallant attempt was made by Major Ormiston, commanding the
troops on the Pimple, to bomb along the trench leading to the junction
of the Tail and Snag trenches, but it broke down under machine-gun fire
from the German strong-point at the Nose. A block was established about
50 yards up the trench from the Pimple, but no further progress could be
made, since the trench dipped into a hollow, and was wholly commanded by
the Germans at the Nose.
Such was the position on the morning of the 18th. During the night a
company of the 3rd Regiment, under Captain Langdale, had been moved
forward to the front line and put at Dawson’s disposal, and a company of
the 4th Regiment was sent to replace it in the support line. Presently
Langdale took up his position in Pearse’s Trench, and on Dawson’s
instructions sent out a patrol to look for “A” and “B” Companies. The
patrol returned at two in the afternoon, having obtained no information.
The situation, therefore, was that “C” Company had failed in the attack
with heavy losses, and that “A” and “B” Companies had disappeared. The
key of the enemy position was clearly the Nose, and until this could be
thoroughly bombarded progress was impossible. Communications, however,
were so difficult that all day Dawson was asking for the bombardment of
the Nose, and all day our guns were firing on the wrong point.
That afternoon Dawson was ordered to renew the attack at 5.45 p.m. He
decided that “D” Company of his own 1st Regiment should attack from
the Pimple, while Captain Langdale’s Company of the 3rd should advance
from Pearse’s Trench. If the Nose was to be taken it must be attacked
along Snag Trench from the east. Owing to the appalling condition of the
trenches, which were now all but impassable, Captain Langdale advanced
with only one platoon and two Lewis gun teams. He entered Snag Trench
without opposition, and moved along it to the right for some 200 yards,
where he made a block and left a Lewis gun. He then moved westward to
a point about 25 yards from the Nose, where he came upon three German
machine guns in action. He did not feel strong enough to attack them
himself, and after remaining there about an hour withdrew his men to the
original front line. The bombing attack from the Pimple had also failed.
Dawson ordered Captain Langdale to return at once and reoccupy Snag
Trench, and this was done between twelve and one on the morning of the
19th.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 19._]
Meanwhile Lukin had sent forward a company of the 4th Regiment, under
Captain Ross, with instructions to carry out a fresh attack at the
junction of Snag and Tail trenches. Captain Ross reached the front
line about 4 a.m. on the morning of the 19th. At about five o’clock
the enemy launched an assault with bombs and _flammenwerfer_ against
Captain Langdale’s and Captain Ross’s men in Snag Trench, and drove them
out, with heavy casualties to Captain Ross’s company. The leader was
wounded, and Lieutenant Young, V.C., killed. The position now was that
Snag and Tail trenches were held in force by the enemy, and that we were
everywhere back in our old line except on the extreme right, where some
details of the 3rd and 4th Regiments seemed to be on the left flank of
the 26th Brigade.
On the morning of the 19th it was decided to make another attempt to
clear Snag Trench, and for the purpose a company was dispatched from the
3rd Regiment, under Lieutenant Elliott. All that morning the two machine
guns at the Pimple, under Major Ormiston, had enfiladed the trench. It
often happened that small bodies of Germans, unable to stand the strain,
would leave cover and bolt across the open towards the Butte, making
an excellent target for our snipers and machine gunners.[16] By the
afternoon few of the enemy were left in Snag Trench; but the machine
guns were still at the Nose, and our artillery seemed unable to touch
them.
At noon Lieutenant Elliott reported to Dawson, and was instructed to
enter Snag Trench, to get in touch with the 26th Brigade on his right,
and then to work his way towards the Nose and drive out the enemy there.
At five minutes to three Lieutenant Elliott entered Snag Trench without
difficulty, but failed—apparently owing to insufficient bombs—to advance
towards the Nose, beyond which Major Ormiston was waiting to attack as
soon as there was a supporting movement from the east. The thing had
now become hopeless. Dawson had not a single officer or man, with the
exception of his adjutant, fit to make another journey to the front line.
The mud was so thick that rifles, machine guns, and Lewis guns were
constantly jamming, and among the little party on the Pimple there was
not one rifle which could be fired. In many of the trenches the mud was
three feet deep, and the wounded had to be dug out at once before they
suffocated. Every man was utterly exhausted.[17]
[Sidenote: _Oct. 20._]
That night the remnant under Dawson was relieved by the 6th K.O.S.B. from
the 27th Brigade, and early on the morning of the 20th all were back in
High Wood.
So ended the tale of the South Africans’ share in the most dismal of all
the chapters of the Somme, a chapter which, nevertheless, deserves to
rank high in the record of British hardihood. The enemy held his ground
with admirable skill and resolution. The fighting had not the swift pace
and the obvious successes of the earlier battles. We were striving for
minor objectives, and such a task lacks the impetus and exhilaration of
a great combined assault. Often the action resolved itself into isolated
struggles, a handful of men in a mud-hole holding out till their post
was linked up with our main front. Rain, cold, slow reliefs, the absence
of hot food, and often of any food at all, made those episodes a severe
test of endurance and devotion. So awful was the mud that each stretcher
required eight bearers, and at the end battalion runners, though carrying
no arms or equipment, took from four to six hours to cover the thousand
odd yards between the front line and battalion headquarters. To show
the utter exhaustion of the troops, at High Wood after the relief many
men were found lying fast asleep without overcoats or blankets, and
stiff with frost. To add to their discomfort, there was a perpetual and
inevitable confusion of mind. The front was never at any one moment
clearly defined, and officers led and men followed in a cruel fog of
uncertainty. Such fighting could not be other than costly. In the ten
days from the 9th to the 19th October the South African casualties were
approximately 1,150, including 45 officers, 16 of whom were killed.[18]
On 21st October the Brigade, with the exception of the 3rd Regiment,
which was in High Wood in reserve to the 27th Brigade, moved to Mametz
Wood. On the 23rd orders were received that the Brigade would be in
reserve in the attack to be carried out by the 9th Division on the 25th.
Presently these orders were cancelled, and the entire division was taken
out of the line. At the end of the month it moved north to an area south
of the Doullens-Arras road, and became part of Major-General Aylmer
Haldane’s VI. Corps in Sir Edmund Allenby’s Third Army.
[Illustration: BRIG.-GEN. FRED. STEWART DAWSON, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.,
Commanding 1st South African Regiment, and later South African Brigade.]
During November the 1st South African Regiment was in huts at Duisans,
the 2nd at Lattre St. Quentin, the 3rd at Wanquetin, and the 4th billeted
in Arras, where it was engaged in improving the defences of that city.
The other regiments were occupied in training, in the construction of new
roads and cable trenches, and in the other preliminary work necessary
in the area of a coming battle. For it had already been decided by Sir
Douglas Haig that the great thrust of the spring would be from Arras
eastward.
[Sidenote: _Dec. 2._]
November of that year was not the sodden downpour of October. There
were seasons of high wind and sharp frost, which were a grateful relief
after the monotony of the Butte de Warlencourt fighting. On 2nd December
General Lukin was promoted to the command of the 9th Division, with the
rank of Major-General, on General Furse’s appointment as Master-General
of the Ordnance. All South Africans felt their Brigadier’s advancement
to be a personal tribute to the Brigade which he had so gallantly led.
He was succeeded in its command by Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson of the 1st
Regiment, who was succeeded in turn by Major F. H. Heal.
CHAPTER V.
THE BATTLE OF ARRAS.
(January-July 1917.)
The Allied Plan for 1917—Sir Douglas Haig’s Scheme—The Object
of the Arras Battle—The Nature of the German Defences—The
Training of the Brigade—The Attack of Easter Monday—Success
of the 9th Division—The Work of the South African Field
Ambulance—The Attack of 12th April—The Losses of the
Brigade—Transferred to Trescault Section.
In November 1916 a conference of representatives of all the Allied Powers
was held at French General Headquarters, and a plan made for the campaign
of the following year. In 1917 Sir Douglas Haig desired to undertake
a great offensive in Flanders, with a view to clearing the Belgian
coast, for in that area he believed that success would give the highest
strategic reward. But before this movement began it was desirable to
reap the fruits of the Battle of the Somme. In November the enemy was
penned in an awkward salient between the valleys of the Ancre and the
Scarpe. The British Commander-in-Chief proposed early in the spring to
attack this salient simultaneously on two sides—the Fifth Army moving on
the Ancre front, and the Third Army attacking from the north-west about
Arras. At the same time the First Army was to carry the Vimy Ridge,
the possession of which was necessary to secure the left flank of our
operations farther south. So soon as this was completed, the Flanders
campaign would begin with an assault on the Messines Ridge, to be
followed by an attack eastward from the Ypres salient.
The reasons for Sir Douglas Haig’s plan are clear. He was fully aware of
the new great German position which had been preparing during the winter,
and which was known as the Hindenburg or Siegfried Line, and he did not
think it good policy to make a frontal assault upon it. He knew that the
Battle of the Somme had seriously weakened the enemy, and he believed—it
was, indeed, a mathematical certainty—that the tactics of the Somme, if
persisted in during 1917, and supported by a reasonable pressure from the
Russian front, would give the Allies victory before the close of that
year. He wished, therefore, to stage a second battle of the Somme type—to
stage it in an area where its strategic results would be most fruitful;
and to begin it sufficiently early in the season to allow a decision to
be reached before the close of the good weather.
This plan had to be wholly recast. The British and French Governments
decided that Haig must take over a longer front, and before the end of
February 1917 the British right was as far south as a point opposite
the town of Roye. Again, the retreat of the Germans during February and
March 1917 destroyed the salient which Haig had purposed to attack. There
now remained nothing of the preliminary movement as originally planned,
except the carrying of the Vimy Ridge. But a fresh scheme had been
proposed by the French and accepted by the British Government. Under
the new French Commander-in-Chief, Nivelle, an ambitious operation was
conceived on the heights of the Aisne, which, it was trusted, would open
the way to Laon. In this action the old method of limited objectives was
to be relinquished; and Nivelle hoped, by means of his new tactics and by
an unexampled concentration of troops, to break through the enemy lines
on a broad front and restore the war of movement. This attack was fixed
for the middle of April. It would operate against the southern pivot of
the Siegfried zone, and it was arranged that Haig should use his forces
against the northern pillar east of Arras, and should strike a week
before.
The position was, therefore, that the Arras battle, which Haig had
regarded as only a preparation for the main campaign of the season in
Flanders, became the principal task of the British Army during the first
half of 1917. This battle in turn was conceived as an action subsidiary
to the greater effort of the French in the south. It was admittedly an
attack in a region where, except for an unexampled piece of fortune,
great strategic results could scarcely be obtained. The British success
depended upon what the French could do on the Aisne. If Nivelle failed,
then they, too, must fail in the larger strategic sense, however valuable
might be certain of their local gains. If, however, Nivelle succeeded,
the pressure from Arras in the north would beyond doubt greatly
contribute to the enemy’s discomfiture. The danger of the whole plan was
that the issue might be indeterminate and the fighting at Arras so long
protracted, without any decisive success, that the chances of the more
vital Flanders offensive later in the summer would be imperilled. This,
as we shall see, was precisely what happened.
[Sidenote: _Jan. 14, 1917._]
In December 1916 the 9th Division relieved the 35th Division, which was
then holding the trenches in front of Arras. The front held by the South
African Brigade extended now for 1,800 yards northward from the River
Scarpe.[19] For three months they remained in this section, during the
severest winter known in France for many years. For most of December it
rained, and in January and February there came heavy snow and bitter
frost. On 14th January the 9th Division passed from the VI. Corps to
the XVII. Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Fergusson,
and this involved an alteration in the divisional boundaries. The 26th
Brigade, which was holding a line of trenches south of the Scarpe, now
relieved certain Canadian units; and the whole of the new corps front,
since several of its divisions had not yet arrived, was held by the 9th
Division, with all three brigades in line. Early in February the 51st
(Highland Territorial) Division took over the ground held by the 26th
Brigade, and the 34th Division relieved the 27th Brigade, so that the 9th
Division’s front from St. Pancras Trench to the Scarpe was held by the
South Africans.
[Sidenote: _Jan. 3._]
These months were filled with preparations for the great spring attack.
New trenches had to be made and old trenches diverted; headquarters had
to be found for battalions and brigades, and emplacements constructed
for artillery and trench mortars. In addition to this, patrols and
wiring parties were busy every night. On January 3, 1917, a party from
the 3rd South African Regiment, commanded by Lieutenants B. W. Goodwin
and W. F. G. Thomas, made a successful raid on the German trenches. The
men were picked volunteers, who, for the week before, had been thoroughly
trained in the work, so that each knew exactly the task before him.
All had blackened faces, and used only the Zulu language. After our
barrage had drenched the enemy front line the raiders entered the German
trenches, which were found to be very deep and magnificently constructed,
though badly damaged by our gun-fire. Only one prisoner was brought in,
but a number of dug-outs and concrete machine-gun emplacements were
destroyed, and the enemy suffered many casualties.
[Sidenote: _March 4._]
On 4th March the South Africans were relieved by the 26th Brigade, and
marched from Arras to the neighbourhood of Ostreville, where they began
their intensive training for the coming offensive. Their casualties
during the previous three months in the line had been 2 officers and
49 other ranks killed, and 5 officers and 166 other ranks wounded. The
health of the men, considering the severity of the weather, had been
extraordinarily good, and only twenty-eight cases of trench feet were
reported. As was dryly observed, the doubt as to whether they could
stand a northern winter was settled by keeping them continuously in
the trenches. On 5th March Sir Douglas Haig inspected the 1st and 4th
Regiments, and complimented them highly on their smartness; and on 11th
March the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Regiments were inspected by the Colonial
Secretary, Mr. Walter Long.
While the South Africans were beginning their intensive training, the
Germans were completing their retirement from the Bapaume Ridge to
the Siegfried Line. At the hamlet of Tilloy-lès-Mofflaines, on the
Arras-Cambrai road, this line branched off from the old front. Beaurains
was now ours, and Arras was therefore free from its former encirclement
in the south. The German position from the northern pivot of the new
Siegfried Line to Lens was very strong, consisting of three main systems,
each constructed on the familiar pattern of four parallel lines of
trenches studded with redoubts, and linked up by numerous switches. A
special and very powerful switch line ran for 5½ miles from the village
of Feuchy northward across the Scarpe to beyond Thélus, and constituted
what was virtually a fourth line of defence. The whole defensive belt was
from two to five miles deep, but the German High Command were not content
with it. They had designed an independent line running from Drocourt,
south-east of Lens, to the Siegfried Line at Quéant as an alternative
in case of an assault on the Arras salient. Towards the close of March
this position, which was to become famous as the Drocourt-Quéant Switch,
was not complete. It was intended as a protection to Douai and Cambrai,
the loss of which would have made the whole Siegfried system untenable.
But it was designed only as an extra precaution, for there was every
confidence in the mighty ramified defences between Lens and Tilloy and
in the resisting power of the northern Siegfried section. The country
through which the German positions ran was peculiarly suited to their
purpose. It represented the breakdown of the Picardy wolds into the flats
of the Scheldt, the last foothills of the uplands of northern France.
Long, low spurs reach out to the eastward separating the valleys of the
Scarpe, the Cojeul, and the Sensée, and their sides are scored with
smaller valleys—an ideal terrain for a defensive battle.
It will be seen that Sir Douglas Haig had a formidable problem before
him. The immediate key of the area was Vimy Ridge, the capture of
which was necessary to protect the flank of any advance farther south.
It was clear that no strategic result could be obtained unless the
Drocourt-Quéant Switch were breached, and that meant an advance of well
over six miles. But this position was still in the making; and if the
fates were kind, and the first three German systems could be carried at
a rush, there was good hope that the Drocourt-Quéant line would never be
manned, and that the drive of the British, assisted by the great French
attack on the Aisne, might bring them to Douai and Cambrai. It was a
hope, but no more. A result so far-reaching demanded a combination of
fortunate chances, which as yet had not been vouchsafed to us in any
battle of the campaign.
The city of Arras, situated less than a mile inside the British lines,
was, like Ypres, the neck of a bottle, and through it and its environs
went most of the transport for the new battle front. For two years it
had been a place of comparative peace. It had been badly shelled, but
mainly in the autumn and winter of 1914. The cathedral, a poor rococo
edifice, had been destroyed, and looked far nobler in its ruin than it
had ever done in its integrity. The beautiful old Hôtel de Ville had
been wrecked, and much damage had been done among the exquisite Spanish
houses of the Grande Place. Few buildings had altogether escaped, but
the place was still a habitable though a desolated city. Entering it by
the Baudimont Gate on a summer’s day the stranger saw the long white
street running intact towards the railway station, and it was not till he
looked closer that he noted shell marks and broken windows and the other
signs of war. There were many hundreds of civilians still living there,
and children could be seen playing on the pavement. Visitors came often,
for it was the easiest place in all France from which to enter the first
lines. Across the railway, a short walk in communication trenches, or
even on the open road, and you were in the actual battle front west of
Blangy or in the faubourg of St. Sauveur. An inn, the Hôtel de Commerce,
was still open, and men could dine there in comfort before proceeding to
their posts in the line. But up to April 1917 the place had the air of a
tomb. It was like a city stricken with the plague: whole, yet untenanted.
Especially eerie did it seem in the winter twilight, when in the long
echoing streets the only sign of life was an occasional kilted Scot
or South African, or a hurrying peasant woman, and the rumble of the
guns beyond Vimy alone broke the heavy silence. The gaunt ruins of the
cathedral rose like a splendid headstone in a graveyard.
Towards the close of March 1917 Arras awoke to an amazing change. Its
streets and lanes were once more full of life, and the Roman arch of
the Baudimont Gate saw an endless procession of troops and transport.
A city makes a difficult base for a great attack. It must be the route
of advancing infantry and their billeting area, and it is a mark which
the enemy guns can scarcely miss. To minimise this danger the British
generals had recourse to a bold plan. They resolved in this section to
assemble their armies underground. After the fashion of old French towns,
Arras had huge ancient sewers, like those of Paris which may be read
of in _Les Misérables_. A map of them was found, and the underground
labyrinth was explored and enlarged. Moreover, the town had grown over
the quarries from which the older part of it had been built, and these
also were discovered. The result was that a second city was created below
the first, where three divisions could be assembled in perfect security.
The caverns were lit by electricity, plans and sign-posts were put up as
if it had been a Tube railway, and a dressing station with 700 beds was
constructed. Here it was arranged that the greater part of the VI. Corps
should assemble for the attack due east of the city. As a matter of fact
the thing was not needed. The Germans shelled the town intermittently,
but there was no real bombardment, and before Arras could be methodically
destroyed the enemy had been pushed many miles eastward.
[Sidenote: _April 5._]
The South African Brigade, like the other troops of assault, were trained
for the battle with scientific precision. Models in clay of the German
trenches were constructed on the training ground, which was laid out as
near as possible to correspond to the enemy front in depth and breadth.
Here the attack was practised until each man was made familiar with his
proper task. During these days the British artillery was very busy. So
great was the concentration of guns that they could have been placed
wheel to wheel from end to end of the battle front. Various “Chinese”
attacks were organized, as rehearsals and to mislead the enemy. In the
third week of March a systematic cutting of the German wire began, and
our heavy artillery shelled their back areas and communications. On
Thursday, the 5th of April, a steady bombardment opened against all the
main German positions, more especially the great fortress of the Vimy
Ridge. Wonderful counter-battery work was done, and battery after battery
of the enemy was put out of action, located partly by direct observation
from the air, and partly by our new device for sound-identification.
These were for the most part days of clear, cold, spring weather, with
the wind in the north-east; and from dawn to dark our airplanes fought on
their own account a mighty battle. The history of that week must rank as
an epoch in the campaign in the air. It was a time of heavy losses, for
at all costs the foe must be blinded, and the British airmen kept up one
continuous offensive. Forty-eight of our own planes failed to return, and
forty-six of the enemy’s were destroyed or driven down out of control.
The attackers, as was natural, paid the heavier price.
The British front of attack was slightly over twelve miles long, from
Givenchy-en-Gohelle in the north to a point just short of Croisilles in
the south. On the left was the right Corps of Sir Henry Horne’s First
Army—the Canadian Corps under Sir Julian Byng, with one British brigade,
directed against the Vimy Ridge. On their right lay Sir Edmund Allenby’s
Third Army. Its northern Corps, next to the Canadians, was the XVII.,
under Sir Charles Fergusson, with three divisions in line—from left to
right the 51st (Highland Territorial), the 34th, and the 9th; and one,
the 4th, in support. The central Corps was Aylmer Haldane’s VI., with,
in line, the 15th, 12th, and the 3rd Divisions, and the 37th in support.
On the right of the battle was Sir Thomas Snow’s VII. Corps, with the
14th, 56th, and 30th Divisions in line, and the 21st forming a pivot on
the right. It is interesting to note that in its constituents the army of
assault was largely Scottish. Thirty-eight Scots battalions were destined
to go over the parapet—a larger number than the British at Waterloo, and
many times the force that Bruce commanded at Bannockburn.
[Sidenote: _April 6._]
On 13th March the 9th Division had received the plan of attack, and from
5th April onward its divisional guns—269 pieces in all—were busy with
the preliminary bombardment. On Friday, 6th April, the South African
Brigade—with the exception of the 1st Regiment, which was in line—was
inspected by Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts, but lately returned from
his East African campaign. He was deeply impressed by the fine condition
of the men. They had passed through one of the worst winters on record
without losing any of their ardour of spirit or vigour of body. So far
their experience in battle had been bitterly hard—the long-drawn-out
torture of Delville Wood, and the misery of the hopeless struggle at the
Butte de Warlencourt. Now for the first time they were about to engage
in a great forward movement, long and patiently prepared, and amply
supported by artillery. Every man among them was strung to that pitch of
expectation and confidence which is the mood of all successful offensives.
[Sidenote: _April 7._]
A proof of their spirit was given the following day. It was necessary
to identify more carefully the German troops against them, and the
1st Regiment was ordered to carry out a daylight raid. The attempt was
originally timed for eleven in the morning, but it was subsequently
postponed to three in the afternoon. At that hour, under cover of our
barrage, a party of 5 officers and 50 other ranks, under Captain T.
Roffe, crossed our parapets, and reached the German trenches without a
casualty. A large dug-out was found, out of which three Germans of the
8th Bavarian Regiment were taken prisoner. Their object having been
accomplished the party retired, and reached their own lines with the loss
of one killed and three wounded. On their way back, however, a private
with a broken thigh was seen by Lieutenant Scheepers to be lying in front
of the German parapet. He and Captain Roffe went back to help him; but,
coming under heavy fire, were compelled to take cover in a shell-hole in
No Man’s Land, where they remained until, under the cloak of darkness,
they were able to bring in their wounded man.
[Sidenote: _April 8._]
That night the Brigade, less the 1st Regiment, marched from its training
area to Arras, and took up its quarters in the northern outskirts. The
artillery preparation continued to be intense till the next day, Sunday,
8th April, the day originally fixed for the attack. That Sunday the
weather was clear and calm, with a foretaste of spring. A lull seemed to
fall upon the British front, and the ear-splitting din of the past week
died away into sporadic bombardments. It is possible that this sudden
quiet outwitted the enemy. He was perfectly aware of the coming attack,
and he knew its area and objectives. He had expected it each day, and
each day had been disappointed. On the Sunday he began to reply, and
rained shells at intervals into the streets of Arras, but he did little
harm. The troops of attack there were waiting comfortably in cellars and
underground assembly stations. In the late evening the weather changed,
the wind shifted to the west, and blew up to rain and squalls of snow.
During the night there were long spells of quiet, broken by feverish
outbreaks of enemy fire from Vimy to Croisilles. Our own batteries were
for the most part silent.
That night the South Africans began to assemble in the front and support
lines preparatory to their attack. The 9th Division was holding some
1,800 yards of front from the river Scarpe to a point just north of the
Bailleul road. It had the 26th Brigade on its right next the river, the
South Africans in the centre, and the 27th Brigade on its left. Three
objectives had been given to the division, known as the Black, the Blue,
and the Brown lines. The Black Line, from the river Scarpe to Chantecler,
including the village of Laurent-Blangy, represented the last line of
the enemy’s front system, and was approximately 800 yards away from our
own front trenches. To reach this line two, and in places three, trench
lines had to be taken and passed. The Blue Line was 900 yards east of
the first objective, and represented the enemy’s second trench system
on the Arras-Lens railway. The Brown Line, from 800 to 1,000 yards
farther east, was the German third system, running from the village of
Athies to the Point du Jour. To reach the Brown Line a distance of some
2,700 yards had to be traversed. If the Brown Line were taken, General
Lambton’s 4th Division was to pass through the 9th, and capture the Green
Line, including the village of Fampoux—the last German system before the
Drocourt-Quéant Switch.
[Sidenote: _April 9._]
The arrangements for the South African Brigade were that they should
attack on a two-battalion front of 600 yards, with the 4th Regiment
on the left and the 3rd on the right, each battalion attacking on a
two-company front, supported by its two remaining companies, while each
company in turn would be on a two-platoon front. The 2nd Regiment was
in support on the left, and the 1st on the right. When the first two
objectives were taken the two battalions in support were to become the
attacking battalions for the third objective—the Brown Line—while the
two original assaulting battalions remained in support. The 1st Regiment
was under Lieutenant-Colonel Heal, the 2nd under Lieutenant-Colonel
Tanner, the 3rd under Lieutenant-Colonel Thackeray, and the 4th under
Lieutenant-Colonel Christian. Pontoons were thrown across the Scarpe
during the night to facilitate the march of the men to the assembly area;
and the Royal Engineers attached to the Brigade blew twenty-six craters
in No Man’s Land to accommodate the leading waves of the attack. By 2
a.m. on the morning of Easter Monday, 9th April, all four battalions of
the Brigade were in position.
Zero hour was at 5.30 in the morning. At 4 a.m. a drizzle began which
changed presently to drifts of thin snow. It was intensely cold, and it
was scarcely half-light, so the troops waiting for the signal saw before
them only a dark mist flecked with snowflakes. But at the appointed
moment the British guns broke into such a fire as had not yet been
seen on any battle-ground on earth. It was the first hour of the Somme
repeated, but tenfold more awful. As our men went over the parapets they
felt as if they were under the protection of some supernatural power,
for the heaven above them was one canopy of shrieking steel. There were
now no enemy front trenches; there were no second-line trenches; only a
hummocky waste of craters and broken wire, over which our barrage crept
relentlessly.
The great deeds of that day are known to all: how the Canadians at a
bound reached the crest of Vimy; how the 15th Division carried the
Railway Triangle and Feuchy; how the fortress of the Harp fell to the 3rd
Division; how Telegraph Hill fell to the 14th and Observation Hill to the
12th, and Neuville-Vitasse to the 56th. We are here concerned with only
one part of the battle—the doings of the 9th Division, and especially of
the South African Brigade.
At zero hour our barrage opened fifty yards in front of the first German
trenches, and under its cover the 3rd and 4th South African regiments
advanced to the attack. On the left “C” Company (Lieutenant Smith) and
“D” Company (Captain Reid) of the 4th led, followed by “A” Company
(Captain Grady) and “B” Company (Lieutenant Morrison). On the right
“A” Company (Captain Vivian) and “D” Company (Lieutenant Money) of the
3rd led, followed by “B” Company (Lieutenant Elliott) and “C” Company
(Lieutenant Ellis). Close on their heels came the supporting companies
of the 1st and 2nd Regiments, and occupied some trenches just beyond the
German front line, as the supporting point to the attack on the first
objective. The 3rd Regiment, as it crossed the parapet and moved over
No Man’s Land, met with heavy machine-gun fire on its right flank, and
suffered many casualties, including Lieutenant Burrows killed, and
Lieutenants Elliott, Money, Hyde, Gray, Thomas, Van Ryneveld, and Lee
wounded. Our barrage, however, was perfect, and the skilful use of smoke
shells blinded the enemy’s vision. In thirty-four minutes the Black
Line was reached. The 4th Regiment on the left had fewer losses, though
its leading companies had some casualties from approaching too close to
our own barrage. The “mopping-up” detachments, consisting of fifty men
from the 4th Regiment, two platoons from the 1st, and two platoons from
the 2nd, reached the trenches with the first wave, and cleared out the
dug-outs, taking many prisoners, and meeting with little resistance.
[Illustration: SOUTH AFRICAN BRIGADE AT BATTLE OF ARRAS. FIRST STAGE OF
ADVANCE.]
At 7.30 the advance was continued towards the Blue Line, supported not
only by the artillery, but by a creeping barrage of twenty machine guns.
At first sight this was a far more formidable objective, for it included
the cutting of the Arras-Lens railway, and the attackers had to descend a
slope where were a number of wire entanglements not fully destroyed. It
was at this point that most of the casualties occurred, for the passes
through the wire were commanded by snipers on the edge of the railway
cutting. Once down the slope some protection was given by the bank beside
the railway. Mounting this, our men looked down into the cutting, where
the enemy were sheltering from our guns in their dug-outs. Here there
were many machine-gun posts, which, being visible to us, were engaged by
our Lewis guns. There was one awkward incident. The South African attack
had pushed slightly in advance of the 26th Brigade on its right, thus
causing a gap; and the Germans were able to open machine-gun and rifle
fire along the railway. Captain Vivian, however, of the 3rd Regiment,
pushed forward some details of the 26th Brigade who had joined him, and
cleared out the German machine gunners and snipers. The Blue Line, which
lay on the eastern side of the cutting, was then consolidated. Part of it
was a veritable fortress, and in the cutting itself concrete machine-gun
posts had been built. By the time the whole Brigade had reached the
second objective it was just on 10 o’clock.
The attack on the final objective, the Brown Line, was timed to start
at 12.45. The 1st and 2nd Regiments took the place of the 3rd and 4th,
who became the supporting battalions. The 1st Regiment was on the right,
with a strength of 20 officers and 488 other ranks; on the left was
the 2nd, with a strength of 20 officers and 480 other ranks. Punctual
to time the final advance began under the same methodical barrage. The
German wire in the valley just west of the Brown Line was found to be
very strong and untraversable, except through a passage cut by the enemy
and a communication trench. Had there been serious resistance the attack
might have been long delayed at this point, but already there were signs
that the enemy was breaking. Few prisoners were found in the trenches,
but groups were seen to advance from the Green Line and surrender. About
2 o’clock the Brown Line was occupied, where the trenches were found in
almost perfect order, having suffered little from our bombardment.
The work of the South Africans was now accomplished. General Lambton’s
4th Division, about 3 o’clock, moved up and passed through the 9th
Division to the assault of the final Green Line—an operation now tried
for the first time on the British front. Thanks to the admirable
training of both divisions, the experiment was a brilliant success.
Before dark the Green Line had fallen, the strong-post of the Hyderabad
Redoubt was rushed, and Lambton was in Fampoux. This was the apex reached
on the first day of the battle. The right of the XVII. Corps and the left
of the VI. Corps formed a salient on both sides of the Scarpe, the point
of which was facing no prepared position nearer than the Drocourt-Quéant
line.
The record of the 9th Division that day was not excelled by any other
unit in the battle. All three brigades had performed to the full the
tasks allotted to them. They had taken the strength of a brigade in
prisoners—51 officers and 2,088 other ranks; they had taken 7 howitzers,
10 field guns, and 84 machine guns. As regards the South Africans, whose
advance was literally unbroken, the casualties were far less than the
number of prisoners. The enemy was demoralized by our barrage, and then
surprised and routed by the steady infantry pressure behind it. Seven
officers fell—Major H. C. Symmes and Lieutenant Hardwich of the 2nd
Regiment; Lieutenants Godfrey, Burrows, and Lee of the 3rd Regiment; and
Lieutenants Hunt and Dorward of the 4th Regiment. The total casualties
were: in the 1st Regiment, 15 killed and 69 wounded or missing; in the
2nd Regiment, 20 killed and 68 wounded or missing; in the 3rd Regiment,
53 killed and 226 wounded or missing; in the 4th Regiment, 57 killed and
186 wounded or missing. From dawn to dusk the troops were in the highest
spirits. In the words of General Dawson: “The men are on their toes, and
the wounded do not want to leave the fighting line.”
Throughout the day the work of the Field Ambulance was admirably
performed. The advance was so rapid that the task of the
stretcher-bearers was a heavy one, for the distance from the farthest
objective to the nearest collecting post was more than 3,000 yards. Had
the weather been fine, the difficulties would have been great enough,
but the drizzle and sleet showers soon converted the battle area into a
sea of mud. Nevertheless, by working without rest, under the brilliant
direction of Captain Lawrie, before 6 o’clock that evening all the
wounded of the Brigade had been collected and evacuated by the South
African Field Ambulance, who had also dealt with casualties from the
other two brigades of the 9th Division, and from the 34th and 4th
Divisions.
The result of the first day of Arras was that all the enemy’s front
positions had gone, and his final position, short of the Drocourt-Quéant
line, had been breached on a front of 2½ miles. Unfortunately the weather
became his ally. It changed to intense cold and wet, and with the sodden
ground it took long to bring up our guns. He held us up with machine guns
in pockets of the ground, which prevented the use of our cavalry, and
there was no chance of a dramatic _coup de grâce_. The infantry could
only push forward slowly and methodically, and complete the capture of
the remains of his position. We had made a breach, a genuine breach, on
a broad front in his line, but we could not exploit our success owing
to the nature of the ground and the weather. Our remarkable gains,
won at small cost the first day, could only be increased by small
daily additions, for the elaborate preliminaries of Arras could not be
improvised, and the infantry must wait on the advance of the guns.
[Sidenote: _April 10._]
[Sidenote: _April 11._]
Tuesday, 10th April, was spent by the South African Brigade in the Blue
and Black lines, in cleaning rifles and equipment and replenishing
ammunition. The Brigade was then placed at the disposal of the 4th
Division, and early on Wednesday, the 11th, orders were received for it
to relieve the 10th Brigade, which was then holding the Brown Line. That
day Lambton was attacking at noon, and the 1st and 2nd South African
Regiments moved up to a forward post under cover of a ridge 500 yards
behind the Green Line to act in support. The attack of the 4th Division
gained some ground, but failed in its main purpose; and after dark the
1st, 2nd, and 4th South African Regiments took up a position running
north-west from Fampoux, with the 3rd Regiment in reserve. At that moment
the enemy held a line running from south to north from Rœux through the
Chemical Works and the railway station along the Gavrelle road. Behind it
to the east lay the slopes of Greenland Hill.
An attack was ordered for the following day against this position.
The 9th Division was to advance against the line between Rœux and the
roadside inn which lay a thousand yards east of the Hyderabad Redoubt,
with the 15th Division holding the front south of the Scarpe, and the
4th Division to protect the northern flank of the attack. There were two
objectives—the first being the road from the inn to the station; and the
second, the Chemical Works and buildings south of the railway, the wood
called Mount Pleasant, and the village of Rœux. The South African Brigade
on the right and the 27th Brigade on their left were to capture the
first objective, after which the 26th Brigade would advance south of the
railway.
[Sidenote: _April 12._]
At 3 p.m. on the 12th the 1st, 2nd, and 4th South African Regiments
assembled in Fampoux. The enemy was evidently prepared, for though this
movement was carried out in file, with intervals between companies, it
was subjected to a heavy and steady bombardment, which cost us many
casualties.
The prospects of success were not bright. All three brigades of the 9th
Division were very tired, having been hard at work under shell-fire for
three days, and having had no sleep for four nights, three of which
they had spent lying in the snow without blankets and many without
greatcoats. There was no chance of an adequate bombardment, and there
was no time to reconnoitre the ground. The country between Fampoux and
Rœux station was perfectly open, and was commanded in the south by a high
railway embankment and three woods, all of them held by the enemy; while
in the north it sloped gradually to the inn around which the Germans
had organized strong-points. It was impossible, therefore, to prevent
the movement of troops being observed by the enemy. The South African
dispositions were the 1st Regiment on the left and the 2nd on the right,
with two companies of the 4th in support of each. The 3rd Regiment was
held in brigade reserve. As the different companies began to deploy from
the shelter of the houses in the east end of Fampoux they were met with
heavy machine-gun and rifle fire.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF ARRAS. FINAL STAGE OF ADVANCE.]
The attack was timed for 5 p.m., when our guns opened fire. Unfortunately
our barrage dropped some 500 yards east of the starting-point, and behind
the first enemy line of defence, so that the South Africans had a long
tract of open ground to cover before they could come up with it. Our
artillery, too, seemed to miss the enemy machine-gun posts on the railway
embankment, which, combined with the flanking fire from the woods in the
south and the south-east and from the direction of the inn, played havoc
with both the attacking brigades.
[Sidenote: _April 15._]
The result was a failure. A gallant few of the South Africans succeeded
in reaching the station, a point in their objective, where their bodies
were recovered a month later when the position was captured. For the
rest, only one or two isolated parties reached points as much as 200
yards east of the line held by the 4th Division. But as a proof of the
quality of the troops, it should be recorded that before the attack was
brought to a standstill, the casualties of the 2nd Regiment, who went in
400 strong, amounted to 16 officers and 285 men, while the 1st Regiment
lost 2 officers and 203 men, and the 4th, 6 officers and 200 men.[20]
Among the dead were Captain Grady, who commanded “A” Company of the 4th;
and Lieutenants J. M. Ross, Lees, and Porteous. Since the first part of
the assault had failed, the 26th Brigade, which was waiting to advance
on Rœux, was not called upon. That night it took over the line from
the Scarpe to the Hyderabad Redoubt, where it linked up with the 4th
Division, and the South Africans withdrew to the Green Line. They were
finally relieved on the night of the 15th, having, in the three days
since the 12th, suffered 720 casualties.
In the unsuccessful operations in front of Fampoux the Field Ambulance,
which had a collecting station in that village, had a heavy task. The
stretcher-bearers were under constant shell-fire, and Captain Welsh was
mortally wounded on the 12th—an irreparable loss to the unit. Many of the
stretcher-bearers had been working without rest for three days, but they
continued to do their duty till they dropped from sheer exhaustion. The
work of one man, Private R. W. Nelson, deserves special mention. He had
carried continuously from the morning of the 9th, and was already worn
out when the attack opened on the 12th. He worked on steadily, until he
collapsed late in the evening. Nevertheless, he refused to be relieved,
and after a short rest returned to his post, and carried seven cases
before morning.
The Brigade was to have no further part in the long-drawn-out struggle
lasting till far on in May, which the failure of the French attack on
the Aisne compelled us to continue in the Arras area. It was in the
Monchy-Breton district during the latter part of April. On 5th May a
composite battalion, consisting of a company from each of the 1st, 2nd,
and 3rd Regiments, was formed under the command of Major Webber, and
moved to Arras, where it was placed at the disposal of the 27th Brigade.
It took its share in holding the front line till May 14th, when it was
demobilised. On the 13th of that month Sir Edmund Allenby inspected the
Brigade, and congratulated the men on the distinguished part they had
played in the late battle. In June it was in Arras as divisional reserve,
and on 5th June two composite battalions were formed to assist in the
attack on Greenland Hill. That attack, carried out by troops of the XVII.
Corps, was so successful that the supports were not called upon, and
these battalions rejoined their Brigade on the 6th.
Its numbers had now grown sadly thin. It had suffered severe casualties
in April, and there had been the usual wastage from sickness which is
inevitable in any force on active service. It was clear that if the
Brigade was to preserve its identity on the British front it must get
larger reinforcements than it had received in the past. To replace
losses, drafts to the strength of 1,448 had been sent to France between
the end of April and the end of June, but even with these it was gravely
under strength. On 30th June the strength of the different regiments was
as follows: 1st Regiment, 38 officers, 680 other ranks; 2nd Regiment, 37
officers, 601 other ranks; 3rd Regiment, 35 officers, 691 other ranks;
4th Regiment, 39 officers, 818 other ranks.
[Sidenote: _July 28._]
In July the Brigade moved to the Somme area for training, and on the 27th
of that month, along with the rest of the 9th Division, was transferred
to the IV. Corps. On the 28th it relieved the 174th Infantry Brigade in
the Trescault section of the line, north of Havrincourt Wood and along
the Canal du Nord. This was then a quiet region, and beyond a few minor
raids there was no incident to record. During the summer, while the
Brigade was in training, the weather had been all but perfect; but by the
close of July it had broken in a deluge of rain, and August recalled the
October of the past year on the Somme. The great battle had begun in the
north, the fight on which Haig had placed his highest hopes, and with
it had begun that epoch of mists and gales and torrents which were more
fatal to our success than any German tactics.
CHAPTER VI.
THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES.
(July-November 1917.)
The Change in the Military Situation—Haig’s Plan for Third
Ypres—The Nature of the Problem—Von Armin’s Defensive
Tactics—The “Pill-boxes”—The Attack of 31st July—The Attack
of 16th August—The British Front reorganized—The 9th
Division enters the Salient—Its “Pill-box” Tactics—The Night
Assembly—The Attack of 20th September—The Fall of Potsdam
Redoubt—The First Objective gained—The Second Objective
gained—The Difficulties on the Left Flank—The Result of the
Battle—Individual Exploits—The Brigade’s Losses—The Field
Ambulance Work—The Brigade returns to the Salient—Moves to the
Belgian Coast—The Close of Third Ypres.
When, on the last day of July 1917, Sir Douglas Haig launched his attack
in the Ypres salient, the nature of the war had dramatically changed. The
great plan conceived for 1917, of which the Somme had been the logical
preliminary, had proved impossible. This was not due wholly or mainly
to the failure of the ambitious offensive in April at Arras and on the
Aisne. The real cause was the defection of Russia, for, by the failure
of one great partner, the old military coherence of the Alliance had
gone. The beleaguering forces which had sat for three years round the
German citadel were wavering and straggling on the East. The war on two
fronts, which had been Germany’s chief handicap, looked as if it might
change presently to a war on a single front. Whatever victories might
be won during the remainder of 1917, it was now certain that a decisive
blow could not be delivered. The Teutonic League, just when it was
beginning to crumble, had been given a new tenure of life. Up till then
the campaign had been fought on data which were familiar and calculable.
The material and human strength of each belligerent was known, and the
_moral_ of each was confidently assessed. But with the Russian revolution
new factors had suddenly appeared out of the void, and what had seemed
solid ground became sand and quagmire. It was the old Europe which waged
war up till the spring of 1917; but a new Europe had come into being by
midsummer in which nothing could be taken for granted. Everywhere in the
world there was the sound of things breaking.
Haig was compelled to protract the fighting in the Arras area so long
as the French on the Aisne required his aid; but by the end of May
he was free to turn his attention to the plan which, as early as the
previous November, had been his main preoccupation. This was an offensive
against the enemy in Flanders, with the aim of clearing the Belgian
coast and turning the northern flank of the whole German defence system
in the West. It was a scheme which, if successful, promised the most
far-reaching results. It would destroy the worst of the submarine bases;
it would restore to Belgium her lost territory, and thereby deprive
Germany of one of her most cherished bargaining assets; it would cripple
the enemy communications with the depôts of the Lower Rhineland. But time
was the essence of the business. The blow must be struck at the earliest
possible hour, for each week’s delay meant the aggrandisement of the
enemy.
[Sidenote: _June 7._]
Haig’s first business was to clear his flanks for the coming attack, and
on the 7th June, by one of the most perfect operations in the campaign,
he won the Messines-Wytschaete ridge at a single bound. His next step was
the advance east of Ypres. The famous Salient had during three years been
gradually contracted till the enemy front was now less than two miles
from the town. The Germans held all the half-moon of little hills to the
east, which meant that any preparations for attack would be conducted
under their watchful eyes. They were very conscious of the importance
of the position, and the wary general who now commanded their IV. Army
was not likely to be taken by surprise. This was Sixt von Armin, who had
commanded the 4th Corps at the Somme, and had there shown himself one of
the most original and fruitful tacticians on the enemy’s side.
The Battle of Messines was over by the 12th June, but for various reasons
it was not till late in July that the date of the main advance could be
fixed. It was now more than ever a race against time, for the precarious
weather of autumn was approaching; and, unless the advance proceeded
strictly according to time-table, it ran a grave risk of failure. The
high ground east of the Salient must be won in a fortnight to enable
us to move against the enemy bases in West Flanders and clear the
coast-line. The nature of the countryside made any offensive a gamble
with the weather, for the Salient was, after Verdun, the most tortured of
the Western battlefields. Constant shelling of the low ground west of
the ridges had blocked or diverted the streams and the natural drainage,
and turned it into a sodden wilderness. Weather such as had been
experienced on the Somme would make of it a morass where tanks could not
be used, and transport could scarcely move, and troops would be exposed
to the last degree of misery.
The coming attack was much canvassed in Germany beforehand, and von
Armin, having learned the lesson of his defeat at Messines, had prepared
his defences. In Flanders the nature of the ground did not permit of
a second Siegfried Line. Deep dug-outs and concreted trenches were
impossible because of the water-logged soil, and he was compelled to find
new tactics. His solution was the “pill-box.” These were small concrete
forts, sited among the ruins of a farm or in some derelict piece of
woodland, often raised only a yard or two above the ground level, and
bristling with machine guns. The low entrance was at the rear, and the
“pill-box” could hold from eight to forty men. It was easy to make, for
the wooden or steel framework could be brought up on any dark night and
filled with concrete. They were echeloned in depth with great skill,
and, in the wiring, alleys were left so that an unwary advance would be
trapped among them and exposed to enfilading fire. Their small size made
them a difficult mark for heavy guns, and since they were protected by
concrete at least three feet thick, they were impregnable to the ordinary
barrage of field artillery.
Von Armin’s plan was to hold his first line—which was often a mere string
of shell craters—with few men, who would fall back before an assault.
He had his guns well behind, so that they should not be captured in the
first rush, and would be available for a barrage if his opponents became
entangled in the “pill-box” zone. Finally, he had his reserves in the
second line, ready for the counterstroke before the attack could secure
its position. It will be seen that these tactics were admirably suited
for the exposed and contorted ground of the Salient. Any attack would be
allowed to make some advance; but if the German plan worked well, this
advance would be short-lived and would be dearly paid for. Instead of the
cast-iron front of the Siegfried area, the Flanders line would be highly
elastic, but it would spring back into position after pressure with a
deadly rebound.
[Sidenote: _July 31._]
The “preparation” for the battle lasted for the greater part of July, and
every part of the Salient was drenched with our fire. On the last day of
the month came the advance on a front of 15 miles—from the river Lys to
a little north of Steenstraate, the main effort being that of the Fifth
Army, under Sir Hubert Gough, on the 7½ miles between Boesinghe and the
Zillebeke-Zandvoorde road. With the attack the weather broke. Gough’s
purpose was to carry the enemy’s first defences, situated on the forward
slope of the rising ground, and his second position along the crest.
The opening day saw a brilliant success, for everywhere we captured the
first line, and in many parts the second. But the weather prevented the
series of cumulative blows which we had planned. For a fortnight we were
compelled to hold our hand, since till the countryside grew dryer advance
was a stark impossibility.
[Sidenote: _Aug. 16._]
The second stage of the Ypres struggle began on 16th August, when the
Fifth Army attacked the German third position, the Gheluvelt-Langemarck
line, which ran from the Menin road along the second of the tiers of
ridges which rimmed the Salient on the east. These tiers, the highest and
most easterly of which was the famous Passchendaele crest, had the common
features that they all sprang from one southern boss or pillar, the point
on the Menin road marked 64 metres, which we knew as Clapham Junction,
and all, as they ran northward, lost elevation. The attack, which took
place at dawn, made a considerable gap in the German third line, but
it was very far from attaining its main objectives. That day, indeed,
showed at its best von Armin’s new defensive method. The weather was in
his favour, for the air was thick and damp, making airplane observation
difficult, and therefore depriving us of timely notice of the enemy’s
counter-strokes. The ground was sloppy, and made tangled and difficult
with broken woods; and the whole front was sown with “pill-boxes,”
against which we had not yet discovered the proper weapon. The result was
a serious British check. The splendid courage of the Fifth Army had been
largely fruitless. Fine brigades had been hurled in succession against a
concrete wall, and had been sorely battered. The troops felt that they
were being sacrificed blindly; that every fight was a soldiers’ fight,
and that such sledge-hammer tactics were too crude to meet the problem.
For a moment there was a real ebb of confidence in British leadership.
Sir Douglas Haig took time to reorganize his front and prepare a new
plan. He extended Sir Herbert Plumer’s Second Army northward, so that it
should take over the attack on the enemy front on the Menin road. Sorely
tried divisions were taken out of the line, and our whole artillery
tactics were revised. The “pill-box” problem was studied, and a solution
was found, not by miraculous ingenuity, but by patient and meticulous
care. Early in September the weather improved, and the sodden Salient
began slowly to dry. That is to say, the mud hardened into something like
the _séracs_ of a glacier, and the streams became streams again and not
lagoons. But the process was slow, and it was not till the third week of
the month that the third stage in the battle could begin.
[Sidenote: _Sept. 14._]
For this third stage the 9th Division was brought up from the Somme.
It arrived at Brandhoek on 14th September, where it became part of Sir
E. A. Fanshawe’s V. Corps of Sir Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army. The next
few days were spent in careful training for the impending attack. The
terrain over which the advance was to be made was explained to all ranks,
and, as before Arras, clay models were built and part of the training
ground taped off to represent the area of assault for each brigade. No
division had made a more elaborate study of the “pill-box” problem.
Lukin had worked out the subject in detail with the brigadiers who were
to lead the coming assault—General Dawson of the South African Brigade
and General Frank Maxwell, V.C., of the 27th Brigade; and the division
had reached its own conclusions as to the failure of our past efforts.
The objectives set before it had already been attacked fruitlessly more
than once, and the reason of failure seemed to be clear. The enemy came
out of holes and dug-outs behind the attacking wave, and held up the
second wave and isolated the first one. Hence Lukin and his brigadiers
trained their men to stop at every “pill-box,” trench, or dug-out, and
clear out all occupants, the troops behind them passing through them
to a further attack. This leap-frog system was obviously dangerous and
difficult against an irregular and intermittent line, for if part of the
advance stopped the whole front might halt. Again, the men in the second
wave would be apt to halt when they saw the advance in front of them
cease. Nevertheless, in spite of its difficulties, it was beyond doubt
the only method which offered a reasonable chance of success. The 9th
Division also had its own views about artillery methods. The “pill-boxes”
in front of it were carefully reconnoitred and located. In the attack it
was arranged that the field-gun barrage should lengthen on both sides of
a “pill-box,” so that the advancing troops, hugging their barrage, might
get round its unprotected rear. The barrage was to be high-explosive
instead of shrapnel, for the path of the former could be more exactly
noted and closely followed.
[Illustration: THE SOUTH AFRICANS’ ATTACK AT THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES.]
The front allotted to the 9th Division was some 2,000 yards north of
the Ypres-Menin road. Through its centre ran the Ypres-Roulers railway.
On its right was the 2nd Australian Division, and on its left the 55th
Division of West Lancashire Territorials. The 9th Division formed the
right of the Fifth Army. Its attack was to be on a two-brigade front, the
South Africans on the left and the 27th Brigade on the right, while the
26th Brigade was held in reserve. The South Africans were disposed as
follows: the 3rd Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Thackeray, on the
right, and the 1st, under Lieutenant-Colonel Heal, in support; on the
left the 4th Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel MacLeod,[21] supported
by the 2nd, temporarily under Major Cochran. When the first objective
had been taken, the two supporting battalions were to pass through, and
attack the second and third objectives.
The British line at the moment lay on the east side of the Frezenberg
Ridge. The first objective for the South Africans was roughly the line
of the Steenbeek stream.[22] The second was a line running north and
south a little west of the junction of the Ypres-Zonnebeke road and
the Ypres-Roulers railway. This was now the main German position, part
of the great Langemarck-Gheluvelt line. The final objective, known as
the Green Line, was very slightly east of the second, and involved an
advance mainly on the left wing of the attack. The purpose was to win
the ridge which gave observation of Zonnebeke, and which, until it was
captured, hindered all advance further north. The countryside was to the
last degree blind and desperate. Not only was there a stream to cross,
and many yards of swamp to struggle through, but the area included some
of the most formidable “pill-boxes” on the German front, while in the
main enemy line stood the Bremen Redoubt, and the stronghold made out of
Zevenkote village.
[Sidenote: _Sept. 19._]
The starting-point being what it was, a night assembly in such an area
was the most intricate of problems. On 17th September the South Africans
moved into the front line, relieving the 125th Brigade. Wednesday, the
19th, was a clear, blowing day; but about ten o’clock in the evening the
rain began, and fell heavily all that night. During the darkness the
Brigade was getting into position for attack. The black night and the
slippery ground made the whole operation extraordinarily difficult in a
place devoid of communication trenches and honeycombed with shell-holes.
The ground was so cut up that it was possible to move only by duck-board
tracks, and it was hard to get reports back from the different units.
Nevertheless, long before zero hour, the attacking battalions were in
their place.
[Sidenote: _Sept. 20._]
At dawn the drizzle stopped, but a wet mist remained, which blinded our
air reconnaissance. At twenty minutes to six, preceded by a barrage of
high explosive and smoke shells, the attacking troops moved into the
desert of mud. In the dim light, obscured by smoke, it was impossible
to see their objective. The advance had scarcely begun when the German
barrage came down on our old front line, so that the supporting
battalions had to close up as near as possible to the leading troops.
The right battalion, the 3rd Regiment, had “A” Company, under Captain
Vivian, on its right; “B” Company, under Captain Sprenger, in the centre;
and “C” Company, under Captain Ellis, on the left; with “D” Company,
under Captain Tomlinson, in support. Its strength was 20 officers and
617 other ranks. The left battalion, the 4th Regiment, had a strength of
21 officers and 511 other ranks. It had on its left “A” Company, under
Captain Farrell; “B” Company, under Captain McCubbin, in the centre; and
“C” Company, under Major Browne, on its right; with “D” Company, under
Captain Gemmell, in support. Now was seen the value of their careful
training. The 4th Regiment took the strong-points known as Beck House
and Borry Farm in their stride, and by half-past six had reached their
first objective. Seeing the place called Mitchell’s Farm in front of
them, a party went through our own barrage and captured it, killing most
of its garrison. A machine gun across the brook on their left flank
gave trouble, so a platoon, under Second-Lieutenant Saphir, crossed the
stream and took the German post there, bringing back the gun and twenty
prisoners.
In the meantime the left wing of the 3rd Regiment had taken Vampir
Farm and reached its objective. Its right, however, was held up by the
position of the left battalion of the 27th Brigade, the 12th Royal
Scots, who, in their area, had encountered the formidable redoubt
known as Potsdam, which, in addition to other defences, included three
“pill-boxes.” When “A” Company and part of “B” Company of the 3rd
Regiment reached their objective they were too far in advance of their
neighbouring brigade, and were subjected to a heavy enfilading fire
from Potsdam. Captain Vivian of “A” Company immediately organized an
attack on that point, leading the assault in person, but he, together
with Lieutenants Coxen and Newbery, was killed. Captain Sprenger of “B”
Company then collected all the men he could, both from the 3rd Regiment
and the 1st, and with two Lewis guns and one machine gun he advanced by
rushes from shell-hole to shell-hole against the redoubt. This gallant
attack, combined with the pressure of the 27th Brigade from the west,
brought about the fall of the place. The enemy was seen bolting south
towards the Ypres-Roulers railway line, and in a quarter of an hour the
fort was in our hands.
A halt was called for an hour before the attack on the second objective.
After passing Potsdam it had been arranged between Dawson and Maxwell,
with Lukin’s approval, that the area of the South African Brigade
would be extended to the right till it included the northern bank
of the railway. This made it important to clear that northern bank.
Second-Lieutenant Lawrence of the 1st Regiment had accordingly been sent
forward as soon as the attack began, and had met with no opposition till
he came under machine-gun fire on the west side of Potsdam. Finding no
troops near him, he retired till he fell in with some derelict tanks,
when he turned south-east and reached the railway. Here he found some
South Africans, who had become separated from the rest, clearing a
dug-out on the south side of the line. Going eastward he found a large
dug-out, where he took twenty German prisoners and captured three machine
guns. He then found touch with the 12th Royal Scots, which had been his
main object, and rejoined his battalion before the second stage of the
battle began.
Just previous to the opening of this stage Lieutenant-Colonel Heal of
the 1st Regiment saw some men of the 1st and 3rd Regiments, headed
by Sergeant Frohbus, advance through our own barrage against a large
“pill-box” immediately on their front. It was a place which would give
trouble in the next advance, so he joined the party and took command.
On calling on the inmates of the “pill-box” to surrender, some thirty or
forty came out, but the remainder declined to move. All the loopholes
and openings of the structure were closed, but a certain “Mike” Fennessy
of the 3rd Regiment, a Johannesburger whose past career had been largely
outside the confines of the law, managed to get a bomb either through a
ventilator in the roof or through a window which had been blown open by
a grenade. This set fire to the wood lining, and the garrison broke out
and were shot down. Four machine guns were captured in the place.[23] The
doings of this Johannesburger are a comment on the value of the scallawag
in war. As the shepherd said to Dr. John Brown about his dog: “There was
a deep sariousness about him, for he could never get eneuch o’ fechtin’.”
Twice in former battles he had gone over with the first wave, and when
their work was done managed to continue with their successors. At Arras
he actually finished the day with a wholly different division, which he
found had the farthest to go.
The 3rd and 4th Regiments now remained at the first objective and
consolidated the ground, and the two supporting battalions at 7 a.m.
moved against the second objective, the main Langemarck-Gheluvelt line.
The 1st Regiment was on the right with a strength of 20 officers and 546
other ranks, and the 2nd on the left with a strength of 20 officers and
566 other ranks. The task of the 1st Regiment was easy, and it advanced
smoothly towards its second objective. At 7.50 Colonel Heal was able to
report that his section of the main German line had been taken. The
2nd Regiment, however, on his left, had a heavier duty. Mitchell’s Farm
had been previously taken by the 4th, but the enemy was still holding
Waterend Farm, and from beyond the stream was galling their flanks with
machine-gun and rifle fire from the high ground at the place called
Tulip Cottages and Hill 37—all in the area of the 55th Division. Before
them, too, lay the strong Bremen Redoubt and the fortified village of
Zevenkote. Nevertheless, the Bremen Redoubt and Zevenkote were carried,
and with them the second German position. But the situation on his left
made Major Cochran uneasy. The men of West Lancashire were held up by the
enemy at Hill 37, and the South Africans had therefore an exposed flank.
He extended his left, and captured Waterend Farm, together with three
machine guns and seventy prisoners, and thereby found touch with the 55th
Division, and formed a defensive flank. It was not till the afternoon
that the Lancashire troops gallantly stormed Hill 37, which enabled the
South African left to advance to the Green Line, the final objective,
where they held a position consisting mainly of a string of shell-holes.
Meantime there was no word of von Armin’s usual counterstroke. The
troops against us were some of the best in the German Army, part of the
2nd Guard Reserve. But the speed and fury of the advance of the 9th,
the accuracy of their artillery barrage, and the skill with which they
accounted for “pill-box” after “pill-box” had paralyzed the enemy. During
the morning there seemed to be a concentration for a counter-attack near
Bostin Farm, but this was dispersed by our guns. Only small parties
moving from shell-hole to shell-hole advanced, and these never came
nearer than 800 yards. By the evening of that day on nearly all the
British front of attack the final objectives had been reached. The 9th
Division had carried theirs in the record time of three hours.
That day’s battle cracked the kernel of the German defence in the
Salient. It showed only a limited advance, and the total of 3,000
prisoners had been often exceeded in a day’s fighting; but every inch
of the ground won was vital. Few struggles in the campaign were more
desperate or carried out in a more gruesome battlefield. The mass of
quagmires, splintered woods, ruined husks of “pill-boxes,” water-filled
shell-holes, and foul creeks which made up the land on both sides of the
Menin road was a sight which, to the recollection of most men, must seem
like a fevered nightmare. It was the classic soil on which, during the
First Battle of Ypres, the 1st and 2nd Divisions had stayed the German
rush for the Channel. Then it had been a battered but still recognizable
and featured countryside; now the elements seemed to have blended with
each other to make of it a limbo outside mortal experience and almost
beyond human imagining. Only on some of the tortured hills of Verdun
could a parallel be found. The battle of 20th September showed to what
heights of endurance the British soldier can attain. It was an example,
too, of how thought and patience may achieve success in spite of every
disadvantage of weather, terrain, and enemy strength.
[Illustration: SECOND-LIEUTENANT W. H. HEWITT, V.C., 2nd Regiment, South
African Infantry.]
Delville Wood was still for the Brigade the most heroic episode in the
War. But its advance on 20th September must without doubt be reckoned its
most successful achievement up to that date in the campaign. It carried
one of the strongest parts of the enemy’s position, and assisted the
brigades both on its right and left to take two forts which blocked their
way. The day was full of gallant individual exploits. The regimental
commanders led their men not only with skill, but with the utmost dash
and fearlessness. Heal was struck by shrapnel, and once buried by a
shell; Thackeray was twice buried; Cochran was knocked down, but rose
unhurt, though all thought him killed. “The regimental officers,” wrote
Dawson on the 22nd, “were an awful sight this morning, haggard and drawn,
unwashed and unshaven for four days, covered with mud and utterly tired,
but very happy, and exceedingly proud of their men.” One N.C.O. and
two men of the 2nd Regiment took seventy prisoners. Another man of the
2nd Regiment engaged a German in a bayonet duel and killed him; then a
second, whom he also killed; then a third, when each killed the other. In
dealing with the “pill-boxes,” individual courage and initiative were put
to the highest test. It was for such an episode that Lance-Corporal W. H.
Hewitt of the 2nd Regiment was awarded the Victoria Cross. He attacked
a “pill-box” in his section, and tried to rush the doorway, but found a
stubborn garrison within, and received a severe wound. Nevertheless he
managed to reach the loophole, where, in his attempts to insert a bomb,
he was again wounded. Ultimately he got a bomb inside, dislodged the
occupants, and took the place.
[Sidenote: _Sept. 21-22._]
On the 21st there was heavy shelling, but no serious counter-attack
on the 9th Division, though the 55th, on their left, faced and
defeated a strong enemy attempt. Early on the morning of the 22nd
the Brigade was relieved from the front line. Its casualties were not
light. The 1st Regiment had 58 killed (including Captain J. T. Bain
and Second-Lieutenant E. Spyker) and 291 wounded and missing; the 2nd
Regiment had 61 killed (including Captain F. M. Davis, Lieutenant E.
D. Lucas, and Second-Lieutenant A. B. Cooper) and 224 wounded and
missing; the 3rd Regiment had 88 killed (including Captain E. V. Vivian,
Captain and Adjutant A. W. H. M’Donald,[24] and Second-Lieutenants
W. J. Blanchard, C. F. Coxen, N. Cruddas, N. T. Hendry, J. Newbery,
W. P. Sweeney, and D. A. Williams) and 283 wounded and missing;
the 4th Regiment had 56 killed (including Captain D. Gemmell and
Second-Lieutenants B. D. Trethewy, A. Aitken, and W. G. S. Forder) and
197 wounded and missing. One death cast a gloom over the whole division,
and might almost be regarded as a South African loss. General Frank
Maxwell, the gallant commander of the 27th Brigade, was shot by a sniper
on the morning of the 21st. He had won his Victoria Cross at Sanna’s
Post, and had been a familiar figure in South Africa as a member of Lord
Kitchener’s Staff. No one who remembers the old days in Pretoria can
forget Frank Maxwell’s boyish daring and humour. There was no braver man
or better soldier in the British Army.
In recounting the doings of the Brigade in this battle the subsidiary
services must not be forgotten. The Field Ambulance had the hardest
task which they had yet faced, for their posts were under constant
shell-fire. In getting back the walking wounded they were much helped by
the Décauville trains, which were run by a section of the South African
railwaymen. Owing to the impossibility of making dug-outs the wounded,
as they became numerous, had to be dressed in the open, and it was no
light task to attend fifty wounded men on stretchers with shells dropping
around. On the afternoon of the 21st, Captain Lawrie was wounded. About
the same time a squad of Argyll and Sutherland stretcher-bearers was
caught in a barrage, one being killed and another wounded. Sergeant
Edgar of the South African Field Ambulance behaved with great gallantry
in going into the barrage and rescuing the wounded man. In spite of
every difficulty the arrangements worked with wonderful precision, and
no casualties were ever better cared for than those of the Brigade. One
small point may be mentioned to show General Dawson’s careful thought
for his men. During a battle it was his custom to give every officer and
man who came into his headquarters a cup of tea with a tot of rum in it,
and his mess servants entered into the spirit of his instructions, and
dispensed general hospitality. On the night of the 21st, when the four
regiments were relieved in the front line, the Brigade headquarters mess
supplied 690 cups of tea, with a staff of one cook and one waiter and an
equipment of eight teacups and one teapot.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: _Oct. 12._]
[Sidenote: _Oct. 13._]
[Sidenote: _Oct. 23._]
The Brigade was not yet finished with Third Ypres. On 24th September it
left the battle front, and on 4th October it was in the Houlle area,
where for five days it underwent general training. On 10th October
the 9th Division began to concentrate in the forward area of General
Ivor Maxse’s XVIII. Corps with a view to relieving the 48th Division
in line. It thus became again the right division of the Fifth Army. On
12th October it entered the support line, along the canal bank at Ypres.
The battle, in the meantime, had moved slowly. By 25th September we had
won all the interior ridges of the Salient and the southern pillar;
but we were not yet within striking distance of the north part of the
main Passchendaele Ridge. To attain this, we must lie east of Zonnebeke
and the Polygon Wood, at the foot of the final slopes. Haig struck
on the 26th September in fine weather, and took the Polygon Wood and
Zonnebeke village. On 4th October, the very day fixed for a great German
counter-attack, he struck again, and by a little after midday had gained
all his objectives. He broke up forty German battalions, taking over
5,000 prisoners, and now held 9,000 yards of the crest of the ultimate
ridge. On the night of the 13th the 2nd and 4th South African Regiments
moved up to the front line, taking over trenches held by part of the
26th and 27th Brigades, which had been engaged in that attack on the
12th which was foiled by the disastrous weather. The relief was very
difficult, for the whole country had become an irreclaimable bog, and the
mud was beyond all human description. There was intermittent shelling
during the 14th and 15th, and much bombing from enemy planes. On the
night of the 16th the 2nd and 4th Regiments were relieved by the 1st
and 3rd. For five more days the Brigade remained in the front trenches,
taking part in no action, but suffering heavily from the constant
bombardment. Between the 13th and the 23rd of October, when it moved out
of the Salient, it had no less than 261 casualties in killed and wounded.
The 9th Division now relieved the 41st Division in the Nieuport area, and
remained on the Belgian coast till 20th November, a period of welcome
rest. On 15th October Lieutenant-Colonel Tanner, who had commanded the
2nd Regiment since its formation, left the Brigade to take over the
command of the 8th Brigade in the 3rd Division. He was succeeded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Christian.
[Illustration: THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES.]
[Sidenote: _Nov. 6._]
In November the struggle at Ypres reached its close. On Tuesday, the 6th,
the Canadians carried the last fragment of the Passchendaele Ridge, and
wiped out the Salient, where for three years we had been at the mercy of
the German guns. Sir Douglas Haig had not come within measurable distance
of his major purpose, and that owing to no fault of plan, but through the
maleficence of the weather in a terrain where weather was all in all. He
gambled upon a normal August, and he did not get it. The sea of mud which
lapped around the Salient was the true defence of the enemy. Consequently
the battle, which might have had a profound strategic significance
in the campaign, became merely an episode in the war of attrition, a
repetition of the Somme tactics, though conspicuously less successful and
considerably more costly than the fighting of 1916. Yet it will remain in
history as a proof of the superb endurance and valour of the armies of
Britain, fighting under conditions which for horror and misery have not
been surpassed in war.
CHAPTER VII.
THE EVE OF THE GREAT GERMAN ATTACK.
(November 1917-March 1918.)
The New German Tactics—The Experiments at Riga, Caporetto,
and Cambrai—The 9th Division moves to Gouzeaucourt—The South
African Brigade in the Front Line—Hardships of this Period—The
3rd Regiment disbanded—General Lukin leaves the Division—The
Memorial Service at Delville Wood—The Brigade again enters
the Line—The British Scheme of Defence—The Quiet before the
Storm—The Morning of the 21st March.
During the summer months there was a strange quiet on the Eastern front.
The German armies did not advance, though the way seemed plain before
them. But they were not idle. Ludendorff had seen the opportunity
afforded by the downfall of Russia, and believed that long before America
took the field in strength he could deal a decisive blow to the Allies in
the West. He prepared most patiently for this final _coup_, and turned
the whole of his Eastern front into one vast training camp, where picked
divisions were practised in open fighting; for his scheme demanded a
high perfection of discipline and individual stamina. The history of
the war had been the history of new tactical methods devised to break
the strength of entrenched defences. The Allies had tried repeatedly
from Neuve Chapelle onward, each time changing their plan, and at last
at the Somme they seemed to have found a method which, though slow and
laborious in its working, was decisive in its results. But the defection
of Russia put an end to the hopes of this plan, and once again the theory
of war was recast. But while Byng at Cambrai was feeling his way towards
new tactics, Germany had already decided upon a scheme. She had seen
that surprise was essential, and that therefore a laboured artillery
“preparation” was out of the question. She realized, too, that in order
to get the full cumulative effect of a blow, division must follow
division to strike while the iron was hot. If these two things—surprise
and an endless chain of troops of assault—could be found, then it might
be possible to deal the decisive blow within the narrow limits of time
still permitted to her. A break here and a break there meant only a
restricted advance, behind which the enemy’s front grew solid in time, as
concrete hardens with exposure. She therefore aimed not at a breakthrough
in the older sense, but at a general crumbling.
Ludendorff’s plan was based upon the highly specialized training of
certain units, and was a legitimate conclusion from the German use of
“storm troops.” The first point was the absence of any preliminary
massing near the front of attack. Men were brought up by night marches
just before zero hour, and secrecy was thus obtained for the assembly.
Again, there was no long bombardment to alarm the enemy, and the guns
began at the moment when the infantry advanced, the enemy’s back areas
being confused by a deluge of gas shells. The assault was made by picked
troops in open order, or rather in small clusters, carrying light trench
mortars and many machine guns, with the field batteries close behind
them in support. The actual mode of attack, which the French called
“infiltration,” may be likened to a hand, of which the finger-tips are
shod with steel, and which is pushed into a soft substance. The picked
troops at the finger-ends made gaps through which others poured, till
each section of the defence found itself outflanked and encircled. A
system of flares and rockets enabled the following troops to learn where
the picked troops had made the breach, and the artillery came close
behind the infantry. The men had unlimited objectives, and carried iron
rations for several days. When one division had reached the end of
its strength, another took its place, so that the advance resembled a
continuous game of leap-frog.
This method was the opposite of the old German mass attack, which had
seen a succession of hammer-blows on one section of front. It was
strictly the filtering of a great army into a hostile position, so that
each part was turned, and the whole front was first dislocated and
then crumbled. This might be achieved by inferior numbers; but a local
numerical superiority was aimed at to ensure a complete victory by
pushing far behind into unprotected areas. Advance was to be measured
not by metres but by miles, and in any case was to proceed far enough
to capture the enemy’s artillery positions. Obviously the effect would
be cumulative, the momentum of the attack would grow, and, if it was
not stopped in the battle-zone, it would be far harder to stop in the
hinterland. It was no case of an isolated stroke, but of a creeping
sickness, which might demoralize a hundred miles of front. Ludendorff was
confident, for he saw his way presently to a numerical superiority in the
West, and he had devised tactics which must come with deadly effect upon
an enemy prepared to meet only the old methods. But his plan demanded
immediate success. A protracted battle would destroy the picked troops,
and without them the new tactics were futile.
The first experiment was made early in September, when von Hutier
captured Riga. But the true test came in October, when Otto von Below,
with the VI. German Army, broke through the Italian front at Caporetto,
and drove Cadorna behind the Piave. After that there could be no question
of the value of Germany’s plan. One other test, and her certainty
was complete. On 20th November Byng struck at Cambrai, achieving by
means of his tanks a genuine surprise. Ten days later came the German
counterstroke—in two parts. The attack on the British left at Bourlon,
carried out in the old fashion, signally failed. The attack on the
British right between Masnières and Vendhuile, following the new fashion,
as signally succeeded. But the Allied Staffs had not yet grasped the
full meaning of the new method. Caporetto was explained by a breakdown
in Italian _moral_ and Cambrai by defective local intelligence. Neither
explanation was sound, and four months later the armies of France and
Britain read the true lesson in letters of fire.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: _Nov. 20._]
On 20th November the 9th Division moved from the Belgian coast. The
South African Brigade spent some days in rest-billets in the Fruges
area, engaged in training the recruits which had arrived to replace the
casualties of Third Ypres. On the 30th news came of the counterstroke at
Cambrai, and the battalions were ordered to be ready to move at short
notice. On the morning of 1st December they began their long march
southward to the accompaniment of a deluge of rain and a sharp east wind.
The lorries which carried the kits and blankets did not turn up, being
required for some other purpose by the army controlling that area, with
the result that the men passed three nights of bitter weather without
adequate covering. Presently came snow, and then a binding frost, and
when, on 3rd December, the Brigade arrived at Moislains, it was after
three days of weary marches in the worst of weathers and a freezing night
in the train.
[Sidenote: _Dec. 3._]
During the night of the 3rd they were ordered to relieve the 2nd Brigade
of Guards at Gouzeaucourt, nine miles off. The 9th Division became part
of the VII. Corps, under Sir Walter Congreve. By the night of the 4th the
2nd and 4th South African Regiments had taken over a section of the front
line, with the 1st in support and the 3rd in reserve. The line now held
was that established by the Guards Division after their brilliant advance
on 1st December. It consisted of a newly-dug trench on the east slope
of Quentin Ridge, extending from Gauche Wood, on the right, to a point
near the head of Flag Ravine. No communication trenches existed, and in
the right battalion section all approaches to the front line were under
enemy observation. The trenches were neither fire-stepped nor revetted,
and no dug-outs or shelters existed in the forward area. There was also
very little wire, the whole position having been extemporized during
the recent battle. The relief was carried through successfully, and the
commanding officer of a Coldstream battalion wrote to Lieutenant-Colonel
Christian complimenting the 2nd Regiment on its work, adding that the
Guards had long heard of the South Africans’ reputation, and did not wish
to be relieved by better troops.
As attacks on this part of the front were daily expected, the forward
battalions had to detail troops to occupy the immediate support trenches
as “counter-attack forces,” while the reserve battalion constituted a
counter-attack force for the Brigade. The next few weeks were filled with
strenuous work. Material had to be salved or brought up for the defence
of the area, a large number of British and German dead had to be buried,
trenches had to be broadened and deepened, and shelters constructed.
All through December the Brigade was heavily shelled. On the morning of
the 8th, for example, the 2nd Regiment lost by shell-fire Captain E. C.
Bryant and Second-Lieutenants V. S. Dickerson and G. J. S. Mandy killed,
while Second-Lieutenants B. Pope-Hennessy and L. Arnold were wounded.
On the night of the 8th the 2nd and 4th Regiments were relieved by the
1st and 3rd, the 4th becoming the Brigade reserve, while the 2nd formed
the garrison of the support and reserve lines. During the first week the
casualties averaged throughout the Brigade about thirty a day, which
were severe for trench warfare. After that they slackened, but carrying
parties at night continued to suffer heavily. The Brigade, by constant
patrolling, maintained its ascendancy in No Man’s Land, but the German
outposts were exceptionally vigilant. The worst trial was the weather,
which was first frost, then thaw, and then about the middle of the month
a settled frost, which lasted until the New Year.
These violent changes added to the difficulty of the task by causing the
trenches constantly to collapse, and the severity of the climate told
heavily upon troops who had only lately been through a long action, and
had had a peculiarly trying journey from the Belgian coast. Moreover,
a large percentage of the new recruits were less able to withstand
hardships than the older soldiers. Everything that was possible was
done to ensure their comfort. Regimental kitchens were constructed
so that the men could be supplied with hot meals during the night. A
Brigade soup-kitchen was established in the support line under the
superintendence of the chaplains, where men could receive hot soup at any
hour. Nevertheless, during this month of December, the sickness returns
were larger than at any similar period during the history of the Brigade.
The chief malady was trench feet, but by the middle of the month rooms
for the medical care of this ailment had been established at Heudicourt
and Fins, and during rest periods all the men were sent there for
preventive treatment.
[Sidenote: _Jan. 13, 1918._]
[Sidenote: _Jan. 23._]
[Sidenote: _Jan. 31._]
On 13th January the Brigade came out of the line, and for ten days
was billeted in the villages of Moislains, Heudicourt, Fins, and
Sorel-le-Grand. On the 23rd the 2nd and 3rd Regiments moved again into
the line to relieve units of the 26th Brigade, and the 1st and 4th
Regiments followed the next day. The relief was carried out without
casualties. When the Brigade arrived at Heudicourt on 4th December it
numbered 148 officers and 3,621 other ranks. By January 23rd its total
strength had shrunk to 79 officers and 1,661 men. On the last day of
January all four battalions came out of the front trenches, and were
moved to a back area for a much needed month’s rest.
[Sidenote: _Feb. 18._]
That month was spent in training for the great battle which was now
believed to be due in early March. One sad change had perforce to be
made. It had been resolved to reduce the British divisions from a
thirteen battalion to a ten battalion basis, and this meant that one
battalion must disappear from each brigade. General Smuts and General
Lukin, after consultation with General Dawson, decided to disband the
3rd (Transvaal and Rhodesia) Regiment, which had received the smallest
number of recruits during the past twelve months. On 8th February Dawson
visited the battalion to explain the decision. He promised that as far
as possible complete companies would be sent as reinforcements to the
other regiments of the Brigade, and that every assistance would be given
to officers and men who might desire to transfer to outside units.
Accordingly, on 18th February, the 3rd Regiment was finally disbanded,
practically all the officers, N.C.O.’s, and men joining the other South
African regiments.
In the beginning of March General Lukin relinquished the command of
the 9th Division to Major-General Tudor, who formerly commanded the
divisional artillery, and returned home on leave. While at home he was
compelled because of the grave illness of his wife to accept the offer
of a tour of duty in England. He had had more than two years of the most
arduous service, first as brigadier and then as divisional general,
and he left to the profound regret of all his colleagues.[25] It was a
departure that could not be without its element of sadness, especially
for the South Africans, for it meant a break in that continuity of
tradition which they had hitherto preserved. They had begun with Lukin,
and till March 1918 they had been directly or indirectly under Lukin.
These changes were, as it were, symbolical of the change which was coming
over the aspect of the war. The former things were passing away; the
long months of almost static trench warfare were about to give place to
a stormy season, when all maps had to be redrawn and every conception of
war revised. It was the eve of the ultimate phase which at long last was
to determine the issue of the campaign.
[Sidenote: _Feb. 17._]
But before these changes came about one great episode in the past record
of the Brigade was commemorated. On the 17th February all its regiments,
including the vanishing 3rd, took part in a memorial service at Delville
Wood. On the south side of the place towards Longueval a tall wooden
cross had been erected, bearing the inscription: “In Memory of the
Officers and Men of the 1st South African Brigade who fell in Action
in July 1916 in the Battle of the Somme.” Before this cross, among the
shattered tree-stumps, the drumhead service was held, and around in a
square stood details of the four battalions. First came a lament on the
pipes, composed by Pipe-Major Grieve of the 4th Regiment. The service
was conducted by the chaplains of the English, Presbyterian, and Dutch
Churches, and the hymns included the beautiful Dutch version of the
Hundredth Psalm. Sir Douglas Haig wrote to General Lukin:—
“I send you these few lines to greet you and all South Africans
who meet together on Sunday next in honour of those brave men
who, at the call of justice and humanity, came from a distant
continent to fight and die for the principles they held sacred.
The story of the great struggle of July 1916 for the ridge
on which Delville Wood stands, when South Africa played so
conspicuous a part, will live for all time in the history of
our Empire—a perpetual witness to the strength of those common
ideals which bind together all British people. The task of
those who fell in Delville Wood and by their gallant death made
desolation glorious, has not yet been completed; but I feel
confident that those who remain will see to it that their blood
shall not have been shed in vain.”
It was a clear day of frost and bright sunshine, and in the pause of the
hymns, like the sound of breakers heard afar off on a coast, came the
drone of airplanes overhead, and the echo of the now distant guns. That
ceremony was something more than a commemoration of a great thing in the
past. It was a sacrament taken in preparation for a still greater test of
manhood now impending. For before the next month had closed, the enemy
flood had once again poured over the wastes of Delville, and the flower
of the South Africans had fallen in a new Thermopylæ.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: _March 12._]
Early in March the Brigade moved up to the front area, and on the night
of the 12th began to take over from the 116th Brigade of the 39th
Division the sector east of Heudicourt. Ever since the close of 1917 the
Allied Command in the West had been conscious that the situation had
altered. The Germans were able now to resume the offensive at their will,
and the next phase of the campaign must see the Allies on their defence.
Haig and Pétain were aware that large reinforcements could be brought
from the East, which would give Ludendorff a numerical superiority until
such time as the Americans arrived to redress the balance. Nevertheless,
the general temper of the armies of France and Britain was one of
confidence. At the worst they believed that they would have to face a
small preponderance in numbers; but they had faced greater odds at First
Ypres and Verdun, and had held their ground. Let the enemy attack and
break his head against their iron barriers. He would only be the weaker
when the time came for their final advance.
But certain wiser heads among both soldiers and civilians were uneasy.
They knew that the German Staff would make a desperate effort to secure
a decision while they still held their opponents at a disadvantage. The
German defence had been conducted in a long-prepared fortified zone;
the battles of 1917 had given us a new line, in parts only a month or
two old. How, it was asked, would we fare against a resolute assault?
Worst of all, we were deplorably short of men. Haig had not received
during 1917 the minimum levies he had asked for, and had been compelled
to put into the line of battle men imperfectly trained, and to strain
good divisions to breaking point. There were other drawbacks which bore
specially hard upon the British. Up to January 1918 their right wing
had been Sir Julian Byng’s Third Army. Before the middle of that month
the Third Army was moved a little farther north, and the place on its
right taken by Sir Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army from the Ypres area, which
replaced the French in front of St. Quentin. About the 20th the Fifth
Army extended its right as far south as Barisis, across the Oise, thus
making itself responsible for a line of 72,000 yards.
For this new duty Haig had not received proportionate reinforcements. He
had now a front of 125 miles, and he did not dare to weaken his north and
central sections, where, in the case of an attack, he had but little room
to manœuvre. So he was compelled to leave the Fifth Army on his right in
a condition of perilous weakness. Gough on his forty-mile front had no
more than eleven divisions in line, and three infantry and two cavalry
divisions in reserve. His right three divisions were holding 30,000
yards—an average of one bayonet to the yard, while the German average was
four.
There was the further handicap that the Germans from their position
inside the great salient in the west could concentrate with ease a force
of attack, and until the actual assault was made the Allied Command
would not know on which side of the salient the blow would fall. For
Ludendorff’s dispositions would threaten the French in Champagne as much
as the British at St. Quentin. There was still no centralized command,
though the Versailles Council provided something in the nature of a
unified Staff. Hence it would not be easy to arrange for co-operation
with Pétain and for the support of French reserves till the battle had
developed, for the French commander would not unreasonably desire to keep
his reserves at a point where they could be used with equal facility for
St. Quentin or Champagne. Yet it was to French support that Gough must
look in the first instance, since the available British reserves had been
allotted to Byng, and it would take time to bring troops from Plumer and
Horne in the north.
The British Command attempted to atone for its weakness in numbers
by devising defences of exceptional strength. In front, along the
ground held by Byng and Gough, lay the “forward zone” organized in two
sections—a line of outposts to give the alarm and fall back, and a
well-wired line of resistance. In both were a number of skilfully placed
redoubts armed with machine guns, and so arranged that any enemy advance
would be drawn on between them, so as to come under cross fire. The
spaces between the redoubts were to be protected by a barrage of field
guns and corps heavy guns. The line of resistance and the redoubts were
intended to hold out till the last, and to receive no support from the
rear, except for such counter-attacks as might be necessary. The purpose
of this “forward zone” was to break up an advancing enemy, and the
principle of its organization was “blobs” rather than a continuous line.
Behind the “forward zone,” at a distance of from half a mile to three
miles or more, came the “battle zone,” arranged on the same plan, except
that it had no outposts. It was a defence in depth, elaborately wired,
and studded with strong-points. A mile or two in its rear lay the third
and final defensive zone, which in March was little more than a sketch.
The theory of the system was that the “forward zone” would break up the
cohesion of any assault, and that the “battle zone” would be impregnable
against an attack thus weakened. Consequently the alternative positions
in the rear—the third zone and the Péronne bridgehead—were not serious
defences. Considering the small number of men available, it was not
possible to provide any further safeguards in the time. On the “battle
zone” rested the hope of resistance for the Third and Fifth Armies. If it
failed to stand, the situation would be grave indeed, for there were no
prepared defences to fall back upon, and no immediate hope of reserves.
The 9th Division formed the extreme left of the Fifth Army, with, on
its right, the 21st Division under Major-General David Campbell; and on
its left the 47th (London Territorial) Division under Major-General Sir
G. F. Gorringe—the right flank of Byng’s Third Army. The 9th held its
front with two brigades, the 26th on the left and the South Africans on
the right, with the 27th in reserve. The South African sector covered
some 2,000 yards from just north of Quentin Redoubt to just south of
Gauche Wood. The Brigade was distributed in depth—that is to say, it was
responsible not only for the front line, but for all other trench lines
to the depth of about a mile. This made it impossible for it to man the
entire length of its trenches, so its front was held by a series of posts
placed at key positions, and so arranged as to enable their occupants to
cover the whole ground with their fire. As the hour of attack approached,
the “forward zone” was held by the 2nd Regiment on the right and the 1st
on the left, with the 4th Regiment in reserve in the “battle zone.”
To understand the battle which followed, it is necessary to examine
more closely the nature of the Brigade’s position. The country around
Gouzeaucourt is more deeply cut than most of the tableland, with small
valleys and ravines running north by east. The South African “forward
zone” lay west of the village of Villers-Guislain, and was separated
from it by a well-defined hollow. The outpost line had two important
points—Quentin Redoubt on the north, garrisoned by a company of the 1st
Regiment; and Gauche Wood on the south, held by a company of the 2nd
Regiment. The line of resistance ran from near the point called Chapel
Crossing on the railway, along the west side of the Gouzeaucourt valley,
and along the east side of the ruins of Gouzeaucourt. The “battle zone”
began about the same point, and its first line, following the high ground
west of the valley, curved round the western end of Gouzeaucourt. The
reserve line of this zone lay some three-quarters of a mile farther
west, from Chapel Hill along the eastern slope of the ridges north of
Revelon Farm. This was known to the Brigade as the Yellow Line. A few
hundred yards farther back, on the western slopes of the same ridges, lay
the Brown Line, the final line of the “battle zone.” Three miles in the
rear lay what was known as the Green Line, the third zone of defence,
which, as we have seen, was still in embryo. Apart from the posts in the
“forward zone,” the specially fortified areas of resistance for the 9th
Division were—for the 26th Brigade, Gouzeaucourt village and the place
called Queen’s Cross, south-east of Gouzeaucourt; and for the South
Africans, Revelon Farm, and, should that fail, the village of Heudicourt.
[Illustration: POSITIONS HELD BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN BRIGADE AT THE OUTSET
OF THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF 1918.]
[Sidenote: _March 14._]
The first weeks of March saw the dry, bright weather of a Picardy spring.
As early as the 14th our airplanes reported a big concentration well back
in the enemy’s hinterland, and the Third and Fifth Armies were warned
of an approaching battle. The troops on our front waited on the future
with composure. No one, perhaps, either in France or Britain, realized
how much Germany was prepared to stake on this, her last blow, or the
immense asset which her new tactics gave her. They did not know that
Ludendorff had promised his country absolute and complete victory at the
cost of a million and a half losses, and that she had accepted the price.
Many raids undertaken during these days established the arrival of fresh
enemy divisions in line; but they gave us no notion of the real German
strength. One fact however we learned—that Thursday, the 21st March, was
the day appointed for the attack.
The last eight days were the quietest which the South African Brigade
had ever known in the front line, and they had scarcely a casualty. On
Tuesday, the 19th, the weather broke in a drizzle, but it cleared on the
Wednesday, with the result that a thick mist was drawn out of the ground
and muffled all the folds of the downs. That day was spent in an eerie
calm, like the hush which precedes a storm. When the sun set, the men in
the front trenches were looking into heavy fog, which grew thicker as
darkness fell. There was no warning of any enemy movement, scarcely even
a casual shell or the sputter of outpost fire.
[Sidenote: _March 21._]
About 2 a.m. on the morning of the 21st word was passed along our lines
to expect an assault. The “forward zone” was always kept fully manned;
but at half-past four the order went out to man the “battle zone.” Still
the same uncanny silence held, and the same clinging fog, under cover of
which the Germans were methodically pushing up troops into line, till
by dawn on the fifty odd miles of front between Croisilles and the Oise
they had thirty-seven divisions within 3,000 yards of our outposts. Then,
precisely at a quarter to five, the whole weight of their many thousand
guns was released on the British forward and battle zones, headquarters,
communications, and artillery posts, the back areas specially being
drenched with gas, which hung like a pall in the moist and heavy air.
Ludendorff had flung the dice for victory.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE SOMME RETREAT: GAUCHE AND MARRIÈRES WOODS.
(March 21-27, 1918.)
The German Assault—The Fight at Gauche Wood—The Brigade Right
Flank turned—The Fight for Chapel Hill—The Brigade in the
Yellow Line—The Fighting of 22nd March—Loss of Chapel Hill and
Revelon Farm—The Withdrawal to the Green Line—The Situation
on the Evening of the Second Day—Gough decides to abandon the
Péronne Bridgehead—The Retreat of 23rd March—The Dangerous
Position of the 9th Division—General Tudor’s Instructions to
Dawson—The Brigade retires to Marrières Wood—The Fight of
Sunday the 24th—The Brigade cut off—Death of Lieutenant-Colonel
Heal—The Last Stand—The End of the Brigade—The Splendour of the
Achievement—Its Value to the British Defence.
Our artillery replied to the German barrage as well as it might; but no
gunner or machine gunner or observer could see fifty yards before him.
Under the cloak of the mist the vanguards of the enemy were everywhere
cutting the wire and filtering between the Allied strongholds. The
infantry attack was timed differently along the front, in parts beginning
as early as eight o’clock, but by ten in the morning it was general. The
garrisons of the outposts, beaten to the ground by the bombardment and
struggling amid clouds of gas, were in desperate case. In the thick
weather the enemy was beyond the places where the cross-fire of machine
guns might have checked him long before the redoubts were aware of his
presence. The first thing which most of the outposts knew was that the
Germans were in their rear, and they were overwhelmed before they could
send back warning. Even when they had longer notice, the S.O.S. signals
were everywhere blanketed by the fog. Presently the bulk of the outpost
line was gone, and the enemy was well into our forward zone. There the
line of resistance held on gallantly for hours; and long after the main
battle had swept beyond it, messages continued to be received from odd
posts, until that silence came which meant destruction. The havoc wrought
among our communications kept the battle zone in the dark as to what
was happening in front. Often, too, in those mad hours of fog, our guns
received their first news of the assault from the appearance of German
infantry on flank and rear. A little after eleven the brume lightened,
and it was possible to see something of the landscape to the east. With
the lightening came the German airplanes, flying low to attack with
machine guns our troops and batteries. The men in the battle zone waited
with anxious hearts till the shock of the assault should reach them.
[Illustration: THE SOMME RETREAT.]
We have seen that the main outposts of the forward zone held by the South
African Brigade were Quentin Redoubt and Gauche Wood. At the first, where
a company of the 1st Regiment was stationed, there was no attack. The
main enemy shock in that area fell upon the left Brigade of the 21st
Division, and “B” Company of the 2nd South Africans in Gauche Wood. This
company was under the command of Captain Garnet Green, an officer of
the most proven courage and coolness, whose doings at Delville Wood I
have already recounted. He had three strong-points inside the wood and
one in the open on the south-west side; there were also in the wood two
machine guns and a detachment of the Brigade Trench Mortar Battery under
Lieutenant Hadlow. Under cover of the fog the enemy worked his way into
the wood from the east. Second-Lieutenant Kennedy fought his machine-gun
till all his team were killed or wounded, and he himself was wounded and
taken. About 10.15 Captain Green reported that the Germans were in the
wood, but that the strong-points were intact. Presently the enemy began
to creep in from the north, and the two posts in the eastern half, under
Lieutenant Bancroft and Lieutenant Beviss, were overpowered. Bancroft
and most of his men fell, and the rest were wounded and captured, with
the exception of one who rejoined company headquarters. Beviss, with
nearly half his garrison, succeeded in cutting his way through and
reaching Captain Green. The latter, finding that the enemy was on three
sides of him in overpowering numbers, withdrew the garrison of the third
post in the wood to join the fourth post in the open ground to the
south-west. Every yard was fiercely contested, and, since the Germans
exposed themselves recklessly, they lost heavily from Green’s Lewis guns
and rifles. They attempted to dig themselves in on the western edge of
the wood, but our fire was too strong for them and they fell back in
confusion into cover.
The situation was now clear to General Dawson. He directed the fire of
all the guns at his disposal on Gauche Wood. Further, before midday the
mist had lifted and the garrison of Quentin Redoubt on the north were
able to open a heavy flanking fire on the advancing enemy. Throughout
the rest of the day Green, with his little band, was able to maintain
his position on the western and south-western skirts of the wood. The
situation, however, had become very serious farther south. At the first
rush the Germans had forced back the left Brigade of the 21st Division
and taken the cluster of ruined buildings called Vaucellette Farm. This
they used as an assembly position for extending their attacks. The right
flank of the South African Brigade at Gauche Wood was therefore wholly
exposed, and by the early afternoon the enemy had worked his way more
than a mile eastward, reaching the slopes of the little height called
Chapel Hill.
Dawson was in a serious quandary. He had his line intact, except for
the single point of Gauche Wood, which was an outpost of his forward
zone; but with the enemy on Chapel Hill not only was the whole forward
zone turned, but the first part of the battle zone, for this eminence
commanded all the trench system in what was known as the Yellow Line. The
front had now a singular formation, running back sharply from the extreme
point of Quentin Redoubt in the north-east, by the west side of Gauche
Wood to the north side of Chapel Hill, which itself was in the area of
the 21st Division. The two forward battalions of the South Africans, the
1st and the 2nd, were most gravely menaced. After midday came worse news,
for the enemy was reported to be as far west as Genin Well Copse. At
all costs it was necessary to recapture Chapel Hill,[26] so “A” Company
of the 2nd Regiment, which had been reserved for a counter-attack, was
sent early in the afternoon to strengthen the right flank. They found the
Germans holding the trenches on the north ridge of the hill, and could
make no further progress. Meantime the 4th Regiment, which, as we have
seen, was manning the battle zone, was able to bring flanking fire to
bear on the Germans at Genin Well Copse, and this, aided by a detachment
of machine gunners at Revelon Farm, stayed further enemy progress on the
south.
At 3.30 the 2nd Regiment reported that the Germans were concentrating in
large numbers south-west of Vaucellette Farm for a further attack. It
was difficult to check them with artillery, for the guns of the Brigade
at the time were covering not only their own front, but 600 yards of
that of the 21st Division. At half-past five Lieutenant-Colonel MacLeod,
commanding the 4th Regiment, was ordered to send a company to retake
Chapel Hill. “A” Company, under Captain Bunce, was detailed for the
purpose, and by a spirited counter-attack they took the crest as well as
the trenches on the south and south-east slopes, and so enabled posts to
be established linking up the ridge with Genin Well Copse.
During the afternoon orders arrived from the division for a general
retirement of all forward troops to the Yellow Line, and for Brigade
Headquarters to fall back upon Sorel. The reason for this order lay
in the general position of the battle. On the Fifth Army front the
Germans had before midday broken into our battle zone at Ronssoy,
Hargicourt, Templeux, and Le Verguier, and were threatening the valley
of the Omignon. Later came news that the same thing had happened at
Essigny and Maissemy. In the Third Army area the forward zone had gone
at Lagnicourt and Bullecourt, and the fight was being waged in the
battle zone northward from Doignies to the Sensée. Against 19 British
divisions in line Ludendorff had hurled 37 divisions as the first wave,
and before the dark fell not less than 64 German divisions had taken part
in the battle—a number much exceeding the total strength of the British
Army in France. In such a situation the Flesquières salient could not
be maintained, though it had not been seriously attacked, and Byng’s
withdrawal from it meant a corresponding retirement by the 9th Division,
which, except for Gauche Wood, had yielded nothing.
[Sidenote: _March 22._]
Accordingly during the evening and early night the South African Brigade
fell back from the whole forward zone to the Yellow Line, the reserve
position of the battle zone. The general line of the railway east of
Gouzeaucourt was held up till 2 a.m. on the 22nd, and by 5 a.m. the
retirement was complete. During the night the left brigade of the 21st
Division carried out a counter-attack, and re-established itself in the
Yellow Line. By dawn on the 22nd the following was the disposition of
the South Africans. On the left the 1st Regiment held the Yellow Line
with three companies, one platoon of each in the front line, and two in
support. Its fourth company was in the Brown Line, the last line of the
battle zone system. On the right the 4th Regiment was in the Yellow Line
and on Chapel Hill with three companies, and the remaining company at
Revelon Farm. Two companies of the 2nd assisted the 4th in holding the
advance position on Chapel Hill, and the remainder of that battalion was
in the Brown Line. So closed the first day of the battle. The Brigade had
not received the full shock of the German onrush, and its main concern
had been its right flank, where, by the gallant defence of Gauche Wood
and the rapid counter-attack on Chapel Hill, it had checked for the
moment the dangerous enemy infiltration in the area of the 21st Division.
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL E. CHRISTIAN, D.S.O., M.C., Commanding
2nd Regiment, South African Infantry.]
The fog thickened again in the night, and by the dawn of Friday, the
22nd, it was as dense as on the previous morning. The first day of the
battle had by no means fulfilled Ludendorff’s expectations; but he had
time to spare, and had still the chance of complete victory. From the
first light the enemy pressed heavily on the whole battle-front, but
notably at the danger spots which the previous day had revealed in the
line of the Fifth Army. Once again he made no serious attack on the South
African Brigade, except on its right flank, where he laboured to work his
way through it and the left brigade of the 21st Division. He had brought
up a number of light trench mortars, and opened a heavy bombardment on
Chapel Hill, Genin Well Copse, Revelon Farm, and Railton. Dawson had a
most intricate task, for his headquarters were now at Sorel, from which
he had no proper telephone communications; and it was equally hard to
direct the fire of our artillery and to obtain news of the fighting.
He had received during the night the 11th Royal Scots from the 27th
Brigade, which he used in the Brown Line in front of Heudicourt.
Throughout the morning, under cover of a heavy bombardment from artillery
and trench mortars, the Germans gradually closed round Chapel Hill and
Revelon Farm, both of which fell in spite of a most gallant defence. It
was there that Captain Liebson, M.C., the medical officer of the 4th
Regiment, was killed. Shortly after noon orders came from the division
to give up the Yellow Line and fall back upon the Brown, the retirement
to be complete by 4.30, and to be ready to retire later to the Green
Line, three miles in the rear. The Green Line was the third defence
zone, a partly completed line of trenches between Nurlu and Equancourt.
The hour for the second withdrawal was to be announced later, but no
message on the subject ever reached Dawson. Each battalion in the Yellow
Line was directed to leave one section per company as a rearguard
on its retirement to the Brown Line. The first part was carried out
successfully. But as soon as the enemy noticed the withdrawal he advanced
in close formation, and presently had reached the Brown Line in the 21st
Division’s area, had outflanked Heudicourt, and was occupying the high
ground south-west of that village. The retirement of the 4th Regiment
was only made possible by an accurate supporting fire from the 2nd.
Dawson sent his Acting Brigade Major, Captain Beverley, about 3.30, on
horseback, to give the battalions the message about the Green Line, which
he succeeded in doing, after having his horse shot under him. All the
troops had their instructions before five o’clock.
The disposition of the Brigade was now as follows. On the right, at the
quarry on the east of Heudicourt (the old Brigade Headquarters), was “B”
Company of the 2nd, under Captain Green, with one company of the 11th
Royal Scots and a few details of the 21st Division extending the line on
the right. In the centre was the 4th Regiment, and on the left the 1st
Regiment, both in the Brown Line. But the situation was full of peril,
for the Brown Line was hopelessly outflanked on the right, and the enemy
was moving northwards round the south end of Heudicourt. Communication
with headquarters had become impossible, and a heavy responsibility
fell upon the junior commanders, who flung out defensive flanks and
fought rearguard actions with the coolness of veterans. While the guns
were falling back, about thirty enemy airplanes, flying low, kept up a
continual fire on the teams and also on the infantry in the trenches.
Everything depended on whether the German advance could be stayed till
darkness came, and under its cover the various units could reach the
Green Line.
The Brigade Headquarters were at Sorel, and in the dusk the Germans could
be seen in great strength moving westward south of the village. As our
wounded and guns were passing through the place it was vital to defend it
until the retirement was complete. The whole countryside seemed to be in
flames; Heudicourt was spouting like a volcano, and everywhere was the
glare of burning stores and bursting shells. Dawson formed up his Brigade
Headquarters Staff, and put them into the trenches east of Sorel, to give
the guns and wounded time to get clear. About this time Major Cochran,
the brigade major, returned from leave and resumed his duties—duties
which, for the two days left to him on earth, he was to perform with
a noble fidelity. The Headquarters details succeeded in arresting the
enemy’s advance, and, before he had time to reconnoitre or to organize
an attack, the last guns had passed through Sorel, Brigade Headquarters
withdrawing to Moislains. It was here that Lieutenant M. Webb was killed.
Only darkness could save the Brigade, and the darkness was fast falling.
The gravest danger was in the south, for any further enemy advance
there would turn the Green Line. Owing to the Germans moving northward
behind our front it was impossible to keep to the original route of
retirement, and all three units had to withdraw in a northern direction
before striking west. The task of the 1st Regiment on the left was the
least difficult. Under Lieutenant-Colonel Heal, it fell back upon Fins.
Lieutenant-Colonel MacLeod, who commanded the 4th Regiment, was wounded
during the afternoon, and the remnant, under Captain Bunce, moved
along the Brown Line to the Fins-Gouzeaucourt road, and then westward
from Fins. The most difficult operation fell to Lieutenant-Colonel
Christian of the 2nd Regiment, but by a series of providential chances he
extricated a large part of the regiment, following mainly the direction
of the 4th. For “B” Company and its heroic commander, Captain Green,
there was no chance of withdrawal. They were destroyed, fighting to the
last. The details of the Brigade, to the strength of about 650 all ranks,
had, on the 21st, been encamped at Heudicourt under Lieutenant-Colonel
Young. Early on the 22nd they were ordered to fall back upon Nurlu,
where, together with other 9th Division details, they laboured to
improve the Green Line. The Brigade in its retreat passed through these
details, and by about two in the morning of the 23rd had reached the
Green Line and dug a position along the Nurlu-Péronne road south-east of
Moislains.
[Illustration: RETREAT OF SOUTH AFRICAN BRIGADE.]
The South Africans were now in divisional reserve. Their casualties
during the first two days of the battle had been about 900 all ranks.
Two weak companies of the 1st Regiment, under Captains Burgess and Ward,
had become detached in the darkness, and for the next days fought along
with the 26th Brigade. Of the 2nd Regiment, Captain Green and Lieutenants
Bancroft and Terry had been killed, Captains Rogers and Stein wounded
and captured, Lieutenant Beviss was missing, and Captains Jenkins and
Pearse and Lieutenant Sprenger had been wounded. Of the 4th Regiment,
all the senior officers—Lieutenant-Colonel MacLeod, Majors Clerk and
Browne, and the Adjutant, Captain Mitchell, had been wounded. In the
circumstances the withdrawal of the Brigade to the Green Line must be
regarded as a very remarkable feat of arms. For two days they had fought
with their flank turned, and only the tenacity and courage of the men
and the extreme coolness and daring of the junior officers had prevented
a wholesale disaster. At about five in the evening of the 22nd it might
well have seemed that nothing could save them.
While we leave the South Africans secure for the moment in the Green Line
we must note what happened elsewhere that day on the battle-front. Byng
had been the less heavily engaged, and during the day yielded little
ground. The enemy’s main effort was against the Fifth Army, especially
at the three critical points of the Cologne and Omignon valleys and
the Crozat Canal. By midday the canal had been lost, and early in the
afternoon Gough was almost everywhere in the third defensive zone. By
the evening that zone had been broken around Vaux and Beauvois. Our
last reserves had been thrown in, and, save for a French division and
some French cavalry, now heavily engaged on the Crozat Canal, there was
no help available for the hard-pressed Fifth Army. The gaps could not
be stopped, so at all costs our front must withdraw. At 11 p.m. that
night Gough gave orders to fall back to the bridgehead position east of
the Somme, a position which, as we have seen, was not yet completed.
Maxse’s XVIII. Corps was to retire to the river line; Watts’ XIX. Corps
and Congreve’s VII. Corps were to hold the Péronne bridgehead on a line
running from Voyennes through Monchy-Lagache to Vraignes, and thence
continue in the third zone to the junction with the Third Army at
Equancourt. This compelled Byng to fall back to conform, and his front
ran now in the third zone to Hénin-sur-Cojeul, whence the old battle zone
was continued to Fampoux.
The third zone was nowhere a real defence, and presently it was clear
that the Péronne bridgehead was little better. During the thick night,
while the divisions of the Fifth Army, now in the last stages of fatigue,
struggled westward, Gough was faced with a momentous decision. He now
knew the weight of the German attack; his right flank was in desperate
peril; he had no hope of support for several days; and his men strung
out on an immense front had been fighting without rest for forty-eight
hours. If he faced a general engagement on the morrow he might suffer
decisive defeat. There seemed no course open to him but to abandon the
Péronne bridgehead, and fall back behind the river. It was a difficult
decision, for it shortened our time for defending the river line and for
clearing troops and material from the east bank. But the alternative
was certain disaster, and beyond doubt in the circumstances Gough’s
judgment was right. Accordingly, very early on the morning of Saturday,
the 23rd March, instructions were given to Watts to withdraw gradually to
the river line, while Congreve, on his left, was to take up a position
between Doingt and Nurlu. The front of the VII. Corps would now just
cover Péronne on the north, and it would have behind it, flowing from
north to south, the little river Tortille.
[Sidenote: _March 23._]
Saturday, 23rd March, dawned again in fog, and from an early hour it
became clear that the position allotted to Congreve could not be held.
That day von der Marwitz began the most dangerous movement of all—the
attempt to drive a wedge between the Third and Fifth Armies. Very early
in the morning he attacked the Green Line, which was held by details of
the 9th Division. The advance was checked; but the position was clearly
untenable, and the South African details, under Lieutenant-Colonel Young,
fell back to Bouchavesnes, where they again came under Dawson’s orders.
That day the South Africans were nominally in reserve, holding a position
in echelon on the right flank of the 27th Brigade. But a wavering
front, faced by preposterous odds, called every man into the fight,
and presently the Brigade was in the front line again on the right of
the 27th, endeavouring to maintain touch with the 21st Division, which
was compelled to retire by the withdrawal on its right from the Péronne
bridgehead. During the morning Dawson fell back from Moislains, and
took up ground about midday on the ridge south-west of that village,
overlooking the Tortille River, where, during the afternoon, he was
heavily shelled. Once again came the old menace on the right wing. The
21st Division, itself outflanked by the withdrawal farther south, was
again retiring, and presently Dawson’s flank was in the air, and the
enemy in the immediate south was more than a mile behind his front. He
had five tanks as a flank-guard, and he endeavoured to fling out posts
as a defensive flank across the Péronne-Arras road. An officer and
twenty men were sent to occupy the cutting on the summit of the ridge
overlooking Mont St. Quentin. All afternoon the enemy poured down the
slopes along the Péronne-Nurlu road, and before dark fell he had occupied
Moislains and Haute-Allaines.
General Tudor visited Dawson in the evening. The situation of the whole
9th Division under von der Marwitz’s thrust had grown desperate. It
was holding an impossibly long line, and a gap had opened between its
left and Fanshawe’s V. Corps in the Third Army, of which the enemy had
promptly taken advantage, in spite of gallant attempts to fill the breach
made by the 47th London Division and a Brigade of the 2nd. On its right
it was out of touch with the 21st Division; so that that evening it was
holding a salient of high ground with both flanks hopelessly in the air.
There was no other course but to fall back, especially as the retirement
of the 21st Division was by no means at an end. The 1st Regiment had been
moved from the left of the South African Brigade to strengthen the right
flank, but it could not hope to fill the breach, the more as the enemy
was pressing hard from Moislains against this weak spot.
General Tudor told Dawson that instructions had come for the division to
withdraw after dark to a position on the line from Government Farm by
the east of St. Pierre Vaast Wood to the road just west of Bouchavesnes
which led to Cléry. He informed him that Sir Walter Congreve had ordered
that this line must be held “at all costs,” and added that he presumed,
if it was broken, it would be retaken by a counter-attack. These words
of Tudor’s are of importance, for they were Dawson’s charter for the
fighting of the next day. He was also bidden keep in close touch with
the troops on his right—a counsel of perfection hard to follow, for
Gough’s decision on the night of the 22nd involved an indefinite retreat
westward, and in such circumstances a unit which had orders to stand at
all costs must inevitably be left in the void. Dawson saw his commanding
officers, Heal and Christian (the remnants of the 4th had now been
attached to the 2nd), and explained to them the gravity of the position.
Whoever retired, the Brigade must stand.
The withdrawal started at 9.45 p.m., and the last troops had begun their
retreat by 11 p.m. At 3 a.m. on the morning of the 24th all were in
position in the new line. It was not the line which General Tudor had
indicated, for by this time the left brigade of the 21st Division was
more than a mile westward of that front, and if the South Africans were
to stand they must find ground which, at any rate to begin with, was not
hopelessly untenable. Dawson decided to occupy a ridge some 1,500 yards
west of Tudor’s line, so that by throwing back his right flank he might
reduce the gap between him and the 21st to a less dangerous size. His
Brigade Major, Cochran, was sent to prospect the position while it was
still light, and to get into touch with the neighbouring Brigadier of
the 21st, from whom he learned that immediately after dark that brigade
intended to make a further retirement. In the South African withdrawal
some of the posts flung out on the right flank lost their way, and
wandered back to the transport lines. They were destined to be among
the few survivors. During the night touch was obtained with the 21st
Division, which, after retiring, had again advanced. The left flank of
the Brigade was in touch with a company of the 6th K.O.S.B. of the 27th
Brigade. The situation on that flank, however, was far from secure, for
the K.O.S.B. did not know the whereabouts of the rest of their battalion
or of their brigade. Dawson sent out patrols to look for them, but there
was no sign of them anywhere in the countryside.
[Sidenote: _March 24._]
By dawn on Sunday, the 24th, the two regiments of the South Africans
were holding a patch of front which, along with Delville Wood, is the
most famous spot in all their annals. It lay roughly behind the northern
point of Marrières Wood, running north-east in the direction of Rancourt,
a little over two miles north-west of Bouchavesnes village. The ground
sloped eastward, and then rose again to another ridge about 1,000 yards
distant—a ridge which gave the enemy excellent chances for observation
and machine-gun positions. There was one good trench and several bad
ones, and the whole area was dotted with shell-holes. Dawson took up his
headquarters in a support trench some 300 yards in rear of the front
line. The strength of the Brigade was about 500 in all, composed of 478
men from the infantry, one section of the 9th Machine Gun Battery, and
a few men from Brigade Headquarters. The previous day some officers
had joined from the transport lines, and in consequence the number of
officers was out of all proportion to the other ranks. The 2nd Regiment,
for example, with a strength of 110, had no less than fourteen officers.
Dawson’s only means of communication with divisional headquarters was by
runners, and he had long lost touch with the divisional artillery.
[Illustration: THE FIGHT AT MARRIÈRES WOOD.]
The South Africans seemed fated to have their greatest deeds linked
always with some broken woodland. So far the proudest names in their
record were those wraiths of copses, Delville and Gauche. To them must
now be added a third, the splintered desert which had once been the wood
of Marrières. It was a weary and broken little company which waited on
that hilltop in the fog of dawn. During three days the 500 had fought a
score of battles. Giddy with lack of sleep, grey with fatigue, poisoned
by gas and tortured by the ceaseless bombardment, officers and men had
faced the new perils which each hour brought forth with a fortitude
beyond all human praise. But wars are fought with the body as well as
with the spirit, and the body was breaking. Since the 20th of March,
while the men had received rations, they had had no hot food or tea.
Neither they nor their officers had any guess at what was happening
elsewhere. They seemed to be isolated in a campaign of their own, shut
out from the knowledge of their fellows and beyond the hope of mortal
aid. Yet in a sense they were fortunate in their ignorance, for only the
High Command knew how desperate was the position. When Ludendorff on the
Saturday night announced that the first stage of the great battle had
ended and counted his prisoners, he did not exaggerate his success. It
was true that he had not yet broken the British line, but he had worn it
to a shadow, and any hour might see that shadow dissolve.
The South African position was well placed for defence, for it had before
it a long, clear field of fire. But it was a trap from which there could
be no retreat, since all the land to the west was bare to the enemy’s
eyes. Dawson’s 500, on the morning of the 24th, had, each man, 200 rounds
of ammunition and a fair supply of Lewis gun drums. One section, however,
of the Machine Gun Battery had only four belts of ammunition, and three
of the guns with their teams were therefore sent back to the transport
lines at Savernake Wood.
Soon after daylight had struggled through the fog the enemy was seen
massing his troops on the ridge to the east, and about nine o’clock he
deployed for the attack, opening with machine-gun fire, and afterwards
with artillery. Dawson, divining what was coming, sent a messenger back
to the rear with the Brigade records. He had already been round every
part of the position, and had disposed his scanty forces to the best
advantage. At ten o’clock some British guns opened an accurate fire,
not upon the enemy, but upon the South African lines, especially on the
trench where was situated Brigade Headquarters. Dawson was compelled
to move to a neighbouring shell-hole. He sent a man on his last horse,
followed by two runners, to tell the batteries what was happening, but
the messengers do not seem to have reached their goal, and the fire
continued for more than an hour, though happily with few casualties.
After that it ceased, because the guns had retired. One of our heavies
continued to fire on Bouchavesnes, and presently that, too, was silent.
It was the last the Brigade heard of the British artillery.
Meantime the enemy gun-fire had become intense, and the whole position
was smothered in dust and fumes. Men could not keep their rifles clean
because of the débris choking the air. The Germans were now some 750
yards from our front, but did not attempt for the moment to approach
closer, fearing the accuracy of the South African marksmanship. The
firing was mostly done at this time by Lewis guns, for ammunition had to
be husbanded, and the men were ordered not to use their rifles till the
enemy was within 400 yards. He attempted to bring a field gun into action
at a range of 1,000 yards, but a Lewis gunner of the 1st Regiment knocked
out the team before the gun could be fired. A little later another
attempt was made, and a field gun was brought forward at a gallop. Once
again the fire of the same Lewis gunner proved its undoing. The team got
out of hand and men and horses went down in a struggling mass.
This sight cheered the thin ranks of the defence, and about noon came
news which exalted every heart. General Tudor sent word that the 35th
Division, which had arrived at Bray-sur-Somme, under Major-General
Franks, had been ordered to take up position 1,000 yards in rear of the
Brigade. For a moment it seemed as if they still might make good their
stand. But the 35th Division was a vain dream. It was never during that
day within miles of the South Africans. Dawson sent back a report on the
situation to General Tudor.
It was the last communication of the Brigade with the outer world.
At midday the frontal attack had been held, an attack on the south had
been beaten off, and so had a very dangerous movement in the north. The
grass in that parched week was as dry as tinder. The enemy set fire to
it and, moving behind the smoke as a screen, managed to work his way to
within 200 yards of our position in the north. There, however, he was
again checked. But by this time the German thrust elsewhere on the front
was bearing fruit. Already the enemy was in Combles on the north and at
Péronne and Cléry on the south. The 21st Division had gone, and the other
brigades of the 9th Division were being forced back on the South African
left. At about half-past two on that flank an officer with some thirty
men began to withdraw under the impression that a general retirement had
been ordered. As they passed Headquarters, Major Cochran and Captain
Beverley, with Regimental Serjeant-Major Keith of the 4th Regiment, went
out to stop them under a concentrated machine-gun fire. The party at once
returned to the firing-line and were put into shell-holes on the north
flank. Unhappily Cochran was hit in the neck by a machine-gun bullet and
died within three minutes.
Dawson, early in the afternoon, attempted to adjust his remnant. The
enemy now was about 200 yards from his front and far in on his flank
and rear. Major Ormiston took out some twenty-five men as a flank-guard
for the left, in which performance he was dangerously wounded. All
wounded who could possibly hold a rifle were stopped on their way to
the dressing-station, and sent back to the front line, and in no single
instance did they show any reluctance to return. Ammunition was conserved
with a noble parsimony, and the last round was collected from casualties.
But it was now clear that the enemy was well to the west of the Brigade,
for snipers’ fire began to come from that direction. Unless the miracle
of miracles happened the limit of endurance must be reckoned not in
hours but in minutes. For the moment the most dangerous quarter seemed
to be the north, and Lieutenant Cooper of the 2nd Regiment, with twenty
men, was sent out to make a flank-guard in shell-holes 100 yards from
Brigade Headquarters. The little detachment did excellent work, but their
casualties were heavy, and frequent reinforcements had to be sent out to
them. Lieutenant Cooper himself was killed by a fragment of shell.
As it drew towards three o’clock there came a last flicker of hope. The
enemy in the north seemed to be retiring. The cry got up, “We can see
the Germans surrendering,” and at the same time the enemy artillery
lengthened and put down a heavy barrage 700 yards to the west of the
Brigade. It looked as if the 35th Division had arrived, and for a little
there was that violent revulsion of feeling which comes to those who see
an unlooked-for light in darkness. The hope was short-lived. All that had
happened was that the enemy machine guns and snipers to the west of the
Brigade were causing casualties to his troops to the east. He therefore
assumed that they were British reinforcements.
About this time Lieutenant-Colonel Heal, commanding the 1st Regiment, was
killed. He had already been twice wounded in the action, but insisted
on remaining with his men. He had in the highest degree every quality
which makes a fine soldier. I quote from a letter of one of his officers.
“By this time it was evident to all that we were bound to go under, but
even then Colonel Heal refused to be depressed. God knows how he kept
so cheery all through that hell; but right up to when I last saw him,
about five minutes before he was killed, he had a smile on his face and a
pleasant word for us all.”
All afternoon the shell-fire had been terrific. Batteries of 7.7 cm.,
10.5 cm., and 15 cm. were in action, many of them in full view of our
men. A number of light trench mortars were firing against the north-east
corner of our front and causing heavy losses. The casualties had been
so high that the whole line was now held only by a few isolated groups,
and control was impossible. About four o’clock Christian made his way
to Dawson and told him that he feared his men could not hold out much
longer. Every machine gun and Lewis gun was out of action, the ammunition
was nearly gone, the rifles were choked, and the breaking-point had been
reached of human endurance. The spirit was still unconquered, but the
body was fainting.
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL F. H. HEAL, D.S.O., Commanding 1st
South African Regiment. Killed at Marrières Wood, near Bouchavesnes, 24th
March 1918.]
Dawson had still the shadow of a hope that he might maintain his ground
until the dark and then fight his way out. Like all good soldiers in such
circumstances he was harassed by doubts. The Brigade was doomed; even if
the struggle could be protracted till dusk, only a fragment would escape.
Had he wished to withdraw he must have begun in the early morning as soon
as the enemy appeared, for once the battle was joined the position was a
death trap. He had orders from the division to hold his ground “at all
costs”—a phrase often given an elastic interpretation in war, but in this
case literally construed. He wondered whether the stand might be of value
to the British front, or whether it was not a useless sacrifice. He could
only fall back for comfort on his instructions. As he wrote in his diary:
“I cannot see that under the circumstances I had any option but to remain
till the end. Far better go down fighting against heavy odds than that
it should be said we failed to carry out our orders. To retire would be
against all the traditions of the service.”
Some time after 4.15 enemy masses appeared to the east-north-east of
Brigade Headquarters. It was the final attack, for which three fresh
battalions had been brought up, and the assault was delivered in close
formation. There were now only 100 South Africans, some of them already
wounded. There was not a cartridge left in the front line, and very few
anywhere except in the pistols of the officers. Had they had ammunition
they might have held even this last attack; as it was, it could be met
only by a few scattered shots. The South Africans had resisted to the
last moment when resistance was possible; and now they had no weapon.
The Germans surged down upon a few knots of unarmed men. Dawson, with
Christian and Beverley, walked out in front of a group which had gathered
round them, and was greeted with shouts of “Why have you killed so many
of us?” and “Why did you not surrender sooner?” One man said, “Now we
will soon have peace,” at which Dawson shook his head. Before he went
eastward into captivity he was allowed to find Cochran’s body and rescue
his papers.
[Sidenote: _March 26._]
[Sidenote: _March 27._]
The Brigade had ceased to be. It had surrendered—such a surrender as
Sir Richard Grenville made, when the _Revenge_ fought for a day and a
night against the fleets of Spain. Less than 100 unwounded prisoners
fell to the enemy; the rest were killed or crippled or lost, all but the
little group of details and stragglers now in the transport lines. Heal
and Cochran were dead, MacLeod was wounded, Dawson and Christian were
prisoners. The rest of the 9th Division, along with the remnants of the
21st, were now fighting desperately north of the Somme behind Cléry,
struggling to the line from Hem through Trônes Wood to Longueval, where
the 35th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division were to come to their aid.
It will be remembered that two companies of the South Africans had gone
astray on the night of the 22nd and had since been fighting with other
brigades. There were also the parties left behind in the Brown Line on
that date, which had been unable to rejoin their units, and there were
the posts which Dawson had flung out on his right flank on the 23rd, and
which had lost their road in the last withdrawal. These oddments, along
with the details and the transport of the Brigade, collected that evening
half-way between Bray and Maricourt, and on the following day were formed
into a composite battalion of three companies under Lieutenant-Colonel
Young. Each company represented a regiment of the Brigade, No. 1 being
under Captain Burgess, No. 2 under Lieutenant Jenner, and No. 3 under
Lieutenant G. Smith. The fighting strength was some 450 rifles. On the
26th they were ordered to Dernancourt to report to General Kennedy of
the 26th Brigade. They there found the 9th Division holding a line from
that village to south of Albert, and took up a position in trenches and
along the railway embankment south-east of the former place. This ground
they held in spite of furious enemy efforts to dislodge them, until they
were relieved by the Australians on the night of the 27th, when the whole
division was withdrawn from the line.
* * * * *
In all that amazing retreat, when our gossamer front refused to be
broken by the most fantastic odds, no British division did more nobly
than the 9th. It held a crucial position in the line, and only by its
stubborn endurance was a breach between Gough and Byng prevented. Among
the brigades of the 9th, the chief brunt was borne by the South African.
A great achievement is best praised in the language of the commanders
themselves. General Tudor wrote:—
“I think everybody should know how magnificently the South
African Brigade fought. None but the best could have got
through on the 22nd from the Yellow Line with Heudicourt in the
hands of the enemy. They were sadly thinned then, only about
900 rifles all told when they got back, but they left their
mark on the Hun. The story of the magnificent stand made by the
Brigade when afterwards surrounded can only be told by those
who were with it to the last; but this much is certain, that
it was shortage of ammunition alone which made the survivors
surrender. The division will not seem the same again without
them, and it was they who bore the brunt of the fighting of the
9th on the 21st and 22nd.”
Here are Dawson’s words:—
“It is impossible for me to do justice to the magnificent
courage displayed by all ranks under my command during this
action. For the two years I have been in France I have seen
nothing better. Until the end they appeared to me quite
perfect. The men were cool and alert, taking advantage of every
opportunity, and, when required, moving forward over the open
under the hottest machine-gun fire and within 100 yards of the
enemy. They seemed not to know fear, and in my opinion they put
forth the greatest effort of which human nature is capable. I
myself witnessed several cases of great gallantry, but do not
know the names of the men. _The majority, of course, will never
be known._ It must be borne in mind that the Brigade was in an
exhausted state before the action, and in the fighting of the
three previous days it was reduced in numbers from a trench
strength of over 1,800 to 500.”
Let us take the testimony of the enemy. During the German advance,
Captain Peirson, the brigade major of the 48th Brigade of the
16th Division, was taken prisoner. When he was examined at German
Headquarters, an officer asked him if he knew the 9th Division; for, said
he, “We consider that the fight put up by that division was one of the
best on the whole of your front, especially the last stand of the South
African Brigade, which we can only call magnificent.” In the course of
his journey to Le Cateau Captain Peirson was spoken to by many German
officers, all of whom mentioned the wonderful resistance of the South
Africans. There is a more striking tribute still. On the road to Le
Cateau a party of British officers was stopped by the Emperor, who asked
if any one present belonged to the 9th Division. “I want to see a man of
that division,” he said, “for if all divisions had fought like the 9th I
would not have had any troops left to carry on the attack.”
It was no piece of fruitless gallantry. Dawson, as he was tramping
eastwards, saw a sight which told him that his decision had been right,
and that his work had not been in vain. The whole road for miles east
of Bouchavesnes was blocked by a continuous double line of transport
and guns, which proved that the South Africans had for over seven hours
held up not only a mass of German infantry, but all the artillery and
transport advancing on the Bouchavesnes-Combles highway. Indeed, it
is not too much to say that on that fevered Sabbath the stand of the
Brigade saved the British front. It was the hour of von der Marwitz’s
most deadly thrust. While Gough was struggling at the river crossings,
the Third Army had been forced west of Morval and Bapaume, far over our
old battle-ground of the Somme. The breach between the two armies was
hourly widening. But for the self-sacrifice of the Brigade at Marrières
Wood and the delay in the German advance at its most critical point, it
is doubtful whether Byng could ever have established that line on which,
before the end of March, he held the enemy.
“The majority will never be known.” That is the comment which has to be
made after every great episode in war. The names of commanders stand out,
and now and then some single feat of gallantry emerges into light; but
a great thing is achieved not only by the spirit of the leaders, but by
the faithfulness and devotion of those who disappear without record into
the dark, or are remembered only by a wooden cross on an obscure grave.
In that last stand every man of the Brigade “took counsel from the valour
of his heart,” and the glory became less that of the individual than of
the race. Two strong stocks, coming together from the ends of the earth,
had each of them in their blood the spirit that defends lost hopes and is
undismayed by any odds. The kinsfolk of the men who shattered Dingaan’s
hordes and under Andries Potgieter beat off the indunas of Mosilikatse
at Vechtkop, and those who had in their tradition the Ridge of Delhi and
the laager at Rorke’s Drift, joined hands at the wood of Marrières in an
achievement more fateful and not less heroic than any in their splendid
past.
CHAPTER IX.
THE BATTLE OF THE LYS.
(March 27-May 5, 1918.)
The New Brigade—General Tanner takes Command—Ludendorff’s
Strategy in the North—The Weakness of the British Position—The
Attack of 9th April—Von Armin attacks on the 10th—The
Brigade moves into Line—Attached to the 19th Division—The
Counter-attack on Messines—The Situation on the Evening of the
10th—The South Africans forced back from Messines—Plumer’s
General Withdrawal—The Brigade relieved—The Fight for Mont
Kemmel—The Brigade in the Vierstraat Line—The Counter-attack
on Wytschaete—Von Armin’s Failure of the 17th—The Brigade
withdrawn—The Composite Battalion formed—The New South African
Brigade—Attached to the 49th Division—The Attack of 26th
April—The Attack of 29th April—End of the Battle of the Lys—The
Forty-five Days.
[Sidenote: _April 1._]
The old Brigade had come to an end, but the glory which South Africa
had won on the Western front required that without delay it should have
a successor. The story of Marrières Wood, for all its tragedy, was
too great to be permitted to lack a fitting sequel. General Botha, on
behalf of the Union Government, telegraphed to Haig during these days:
“We are watching with appreciation the strenuous efforts which you and
your gallant men are making in this supreme struggle for the liberty of
mankind.” To this the Commander-in-Chief replied: “The fine part already
played by South Africa in this great battle is a symbol of the strength
and unity of purpose that binds together all parts of the British
Empire.” When the composite battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Young,
was withdrawn from the line on the night of 27th March, it marched along
with the rest of the 9th Division to Candas, arriving there on 1st April.
It detrained at Abeele on the morning of the 2nd, and moved into the
Ridgewood area. Every man who could be found was brought from England,
and during the next few days drafts to the number of 17 officers and 945
other ranks arrived. The reorganization of the Brigade was immediately
begun, and General Tanner, the former leader of the 2nd Regiment, came
from the 8th Brigade to its command. The presence of Tanner was in itself
a pledge of continuity in tradition. Presently the Brigade had a strength
of 39 officers and 1,473 other ranks, and the old regiments were once
more in being, the 1st under Lieutenant-Colonel Young, the 2nd under
Captain Jacobs, and the 4th under Captain Reid.
[Sidenote: _April 6._]
By the 6th of April the German thrust towards Amiens had failed, and for
the moment the gate of the Somme was closed. Brought to a standstill,
Ludendorff cast about for a diversion, for he could not permit the battle
to decline into a stalemate, and so lose the initiative. His main purpose
was the same, but he sought to achieve it by a new method. He would
attack the British elsewhere on some part of the front where they were
notoriously weak, and compel Foch to use up his reserves in its defence.
Then, when the Allied “mass of manœuvre” had shrunk, he would strike
again at the weakened door of Amiens. On Ludendorff’s plan the operation
was to be a strictly subsidiary one, designed to prepare the way for the
accomplishment of his main task farther south. He proposed to allot only
nine divisions for the initial stroke, and to choose a battle-ground
where even a weak force might obtain surprising results.
That battle-ground was the area on both sides of the Lys between the La
Bassée Canal and the Wytschaete Ridge. The German Staff were aware that
it had already been thinned to supply ten divisions for the contest in
the south, and that at the moment it was weakly held, mainly by troops
exhausted in the Somme battle. Haig, as we know from his dispatch, had
drawn especially upon this section, since a retreat there would not
imperil the whole front so gravely as would the loss of ground between
La Bassée and Arras. Nevertheless, it was a very real danger-point.
The enemy had the great city of Lille to screen his assembly. Certain
key-points of communications, like Béthune and Hazebrouck, lay at no
great distance behind the British front. The British communications
were poor, and the German were all but perfect. Any advance threatened
the Channel Ports, and might be expected to cause acute nervousness in
the mind of British Headquarters. Reinforcements would be demanded from
Foch, and the place was far enough from the Amiens battle-ground to put
a heavy strain upon the Allied power of reinforcement. Ludendorff’s aim
was by a sharp, short thrust to confuse the Allied plans and absorb
their reserves. If he could break through at once between La Bassée
and Armentières and capture Béthune, he could swing north-westward and
take Hazebrouck and the hills beyond Bailleul, and so compel a general
retirement west of Dunkirk and the floods of the river Aa. But to succeed
he must have a broad enough front. He must take Béthune at once and the
Messines Ridge soon after, for, if the British pillars of the gate at
Givenchy and Messines should stand, his advance would be squeezed into
narrows where even a weak and tired force might hold it.
[Sidenote: _April 8-9._]
On the 8th the South African Brigade moved to hutments along the road
between La Clytte and the little hill of Scherpenberg. On the morning
of Tuesday, 9th April, Ludendorff struck between the Lys and La Bassée
with von Quast’s VI. Army. He broke that part of the line held by the
Portuguese, and in the afternoon had swept over the Lys on a broad front.
But at one vital point he failed. The 55th (West Lancashire) Division
still held the gatepost at Givenchy, and throughout the whole battle that
key position was never yielded by British troops.
[Sidenote: _April 10._]
That night General Tudor instructed Tanner that the South Africans would
be placed at the disposal of the 19th Division, which, along with the
25th and 9th Divisions, was holding the Messines Ridge and the line
just north of the Lys. The corps was the IX., under Lieutenant-General
Sir A. Hamilton Gordon. Next morning, 10th April, at 5.30 a.m., the IV.
German Army, under our old antagonist at Ypres, Sixt von Armin, attacked
from Frelinghien to as far north as Hill 60. Under cover of the fog the
enemy filtered into our positions from Ploegsteert Wood to Messines
along the valleys of the Warnave and Douve streams. By noon he had
taken Ploegsteert village and the south-east part of the wood, and had
got Messines, while farther north he had driven in our line as far as
Hollebeke, and was close on the Wytschaete crest. Ludendorff was striking
hard against the northern pillar of the gate.
At eight that morning the Brigade was ordered to move to a position of
assembly just south of the village of Neuve Eglise, where they formed
part of the reserve of the IX. Corps. During the morning the march was
accomplished, and for the first time the South Africans saw the impact
of war upon a land yet undevastated. Tanner wrote in his diary: “The
sights in that march from La Clytte are never likely to be forgotten by
those who witnessed them. With the falling back of our line that morning
the shelling of the back areas had greatly increased, both in density
and length of range. As a result, a large belt of country previously
unmolested became subjected to a terrifying storm of long-range
projectiles, and the inhabitants, who up to then had been conducting
peacefully their farming operations, were compelled to flee for shelter
beyond the reach of the enemy guns. As we approached Neuve Eglise the
road from Scherpenberg onward presented a constant stream of fugitives,
old men, women, and children, laden with what household goods they could
remove in carts, wheelbarrows, and perambulators. The most pitiable
sights were those of infirm old people being removed in barrows, pushed
or pulled by women and children.” That was a spectacle which British
troops had already seen east of Amiens, and it was not likely to weaken
their determination in the coming battle.
At noon Tanner saw Major-General Jeffreys, commanding the 19th Division,
and received his orders. The enemy had broken through between Messines
and the place called Pick House on the Wytschaete road, and the situation
at the moment was obscure. The South Africans were to counter-attack and
retake that section of the crest of the ridge. The front established by
the Messines victory of June 1917 had been more than two miles east of
the crest, but that morning’s fighting had brought it back generally
to the western slopes. The counter-attack, in which the 57th and 58th
Brigades of the 19th Division were to co-operate, was aimed at recovering
the ridge and its eastern slopes. The area of the South African Brigade
was between Messines village and Lumm’s Farm. Their first objective was
the Messines-Wytschaete road; the second the original British third
defence zone, bending round the village on the east from Bethlehem Farm
in the south to Pick House in the north; and the third the original
battle zone. The defence system in this area had not the elaboration
of that of the Somme, and the second and third objectives may be best
described as the old British third and second lines.
At 5.15 p.m. the South Africans moved from their position of assembly to
the line of the Steenebeek stream, where, at 5.45, they deployed for the
attack. The 1st Regiment was on the right, and directed against Messines
village; the 2nd on the left against the front between the village and
Pick House. The 4th was in support to both battalions, and one of its
companies was allotted to the assistance of the attack of the 1st on
Messines itself. The spring day had clouded over, and there was mist and
a slight drizzle when the infantry advanced. The western slopes of the
ridge were held at the time only by some units of the 19th Division. On
the South African right was the 57th Brigade, and on their left, beyond
Pick House, on the Wytschaete Ridge, the rest of the 9th Division.
[Illustration: ACTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN BRIGADE ON MESSINES RIDGE.]
In the mist it was not easy to keep close touch, and the 1st Regiment
reached the western slopes ahead of the time, so that for a little its
left flank was out of touch with the 2nd. As had been expected our
artillery support proved very weak, and in no way affected the German
machine gunners established in our old strong-points, and their snipers
in shell-holes. As the South Africans approached the crest they were
met by a heavy fire from the outskirts of the village, and from Middle
Farm, Four Huns Farm, and Pick House. Nevertheless, by 6.30 the 2nd
Regiment had won its first objective and crossed the Messines-Wytschaete
road. Presently it had reached the second position, “D” Company, on the
left, capturing Lumm’s Farm with two machine guns, much ammunition, and
part of the garrison, while the right companies, reinforced by part of
the 4th Regiment, took Four Huns Farm, Middle Farm, and Swayne’s Farm,
together with four machine guns and many prisoners. Pick House itself,
however, which consisted of three concrete pill-boxes, was too strongly
held, and Captain Jacobs, commanding the 2nd, was compelled to swing
back his left company to Earl Farm, where it formed a defensive flank
in touch with the 5th South Wales Borderers in the 58th Brigade. Here
it was heavily enfiladed from a strong-point north of Messines and from
Pick House, and early in the night Jacobs took up a crescent-shaped line
astride the Messines-Wytschaete road, with his right resting on Middle
Farm, his left on Petits Puits, and his own headquarters at Hell Farm.
His casualties on the left had been slight, but the companies of the 2nd
on the right had lost some 50 per cent. of their effectives, among them
Lieutenant Pope-Hennessy killed, and Lieutenant Jenner wounded.
In the meantime the 1st Regiment had met the enemy issuing from Messines,
had charged him with the bayonet, and had driven him back well over the
ridge. In the eastern outskirts of the village, however, they were held
up by heavy machine-gun fire from the direction of Bethlehem Farm, and
from various strong-points north of it. One of the latter was captured,
and many prisoners were taken. For an hour there was severe hand-to-hand
fighting, in which many casualties were sustained, all the officers in
the vicinity being either killed or wounded. Among those who fell were
Captain A. E. Ward and Lieutenants Hopgood and Griffiths, while Captains
Burgess, Larmuth, and Tobias, and Lieutenants Lawrence, Neville, Spyker,
Carstens, Christensen, and Clarke were wounded. Captain Burgess, in
especial, gallantly led a small detachment through heavy fire to the
east of the village. Owing to the shortage of men the position soon
became untenable, and what was left of the 1st Regiment was compelled to
withdraw to a line about 100 yards west of Messines. The headquarters of
the 4th Regiment in support had been established at Birthday Farm.
The situation, therefore, on the Wednesday evening was as follows. The
new German line ran from Hollebeke, east of Wytschaete, which was held by
the 9th Division; along the crest of the Messines Ridge, and just west
of the village; through the south-east corner of Ploegsteert Wood, and
west of Ploegsteert village. Farther south the advance was deeper, for
the enemy were north of Steenwerck, north and west of Estaires, just east
of Lestrem and the Lawe River, and then curving south-eastward in front
of the unbroken position at Givenchy. It was a narrow front for a great
advance, for the pillars at Givenchy and the Messines Ridge were still
standing. The safety of the British front depended upon the 55th, the
19th, and the 9th Divisions.
[Sidenote: _April 11._]
Little happened during the night of the 10th. The South Africans retained
their ground, and endeavoured to gain touch with the troops of the 9th
Division about Pick House, while the 4th Regiment took over part of the
line of the depleted 1st. On the morning of the 11th the 108th Brigade
was moved forward in support of the South Africans, and took up a line
along the Steenebeek stream. The South African front at the time ran from
the western skirts of Messines through the Moulin de l’Hospice, then to
Middle Farm and Lumm’s Farm northwards, and back to Petits Puits, with an
outpost at Rommen’s Farm.
Early in the afternoon von Armin attacked with fresh troops, and the
situation north of the Lys became very grave. On the British right the
40th Division was forced well north of Steenwerck. On its left the
34th Division was strongly attacked, and with difficulty succeeded in
holding Nieppe, which, owing to the pressure on the 25th Division from
Ploegsteert, had now become an ugly salient. That afternoon the crest of
the Messines Ridge was lost. The enemy attacked in great force on the
South African left on the line between Middle Farm and Petits Puits,
and drove the 2nd Regiment back to a front parallel to and about 600
yards west of the Messines-Wytschaete road. Captain Jacobs having been
wounded during the morning, Captain L. Greene assumed command, and, with
Lieutenant Thompson of the 4th Regiment, immediately counter-attacked
and regained the lost ground. Presently, however, the enemy succeeded in
working round the left flank, and the South Africans were compelled to
retire to a line 200 yards east of Hell Farm, where they were in touch on
their left with the 5th South Wales Borderers. In this position, in spite
of repeated assaults, they were able to remain during the evening. There
was also trouble on the right, where the 4th Regiment had relieved the
1st. Middle Farm had been strongly assaulted, and our counter-attack had
sustained severe casualties. The 108th Brigade moved up in support, and
for the moment the German advance was arrested.
The loss of the Messines Ridge, though the 9th Division was still
standing south of Hollebeke and at Wytschaete, compelled Plumer to
rearrange his front. Early on the night of the 11th he relinquished
Nieppe, retiring the 34th Division to the neighbourhood of Pont
d’Echelles. This involved the falling back of the 25th and 19th Divisions
to a front about 1,000 yards east of Neuve Eglise and Wulverghem, and the
consequent abandonment of the important point, Hill 63, just north of the
western extremity of Ploegsteert Wood. South of the Lys there had been
heavy fighting. The line of the Lawe had been lost, and by this time the
enemy was in Merville. That night the British front ran from Givenchy to
Locon, west of Merville, west of Neuf Berquin, north of Steenwerck and
Nieppe, east of Neuve Eglise and Wulverghem, west of Messines, and along
the ridge just covering Wytschaete. The gate was open, but it was narrow,
and the gate-posts still held.
[Sidenote: _April 12._]
About four on the afternoon of the 11th orders had been received from
the 19th Division for a general withdrawal. The South Africans were to
fall back to a line from North Midland Farm by Kruisstraat Cabaret and
Spanbroekmolen to Maedelstaede Farm, with the 108th Brigade on their
right and the 57th in reserve along the Neuve Eglise-Kemmel road. About
eight o’clock the Germans were found to be working round the left flank
in the vicinity of L’Enfer, and accordingly two companies of the 1st
Royal Irish Fusiliers from the 108th Brigade were sent to the north
of L’Enfer to obtain touch with the 9th Division. For the rest, the
withdrawal was carried out without incident. By 5 a.m. on the 12th the
South Africans were in their new front.
Up to now the enemy had not used more than sixteen divisions; but on
the morning of Friday, the 12th, he began to throw in his reserves at
a furious pace. Elated by his rapid success, he turned what was meant
as a diversion into a major operation, and dreamed of Boulogne and
Calais. It was Ludendorff’s first blunder, and it was fatal. It saved
the Allied front, but for the moment it all but destroyed the British
army. Our reinforcements were arriving from the south, but they could
only gradually come into line. That day the enemy came very near to
crossing the La Bassée Canal. He made an ugly gap in our line south-west
of Bailleul, which let through detachments, who seized Merris and
Oultersteene north of the railway. He was now close on Bailleul Station,
pushing direct for Hazebrouck, and but for a gallant stand of a brigade
of the 33rd Division, would have been through the breach. In the section
of the 9th and 19th Divisions nothing happened. The enemy, having gained
the Messines Ridge, was apparently content to rest there for a time, and
made no further attack.
[Sidenote: _April 13._]
The South African Brigade was to have been relieved during the night
of the 12th, but the relief was cancelled, since the troops detailed
to take its place had to be used to restore the situation farther
south. During the night Tanner established an outpost line along the
Wulverghem-Wytschaete road. On the morning of Saturday, the 13th, his
outposts reported that the Germans, under cover of the mist, were
massing opposite Kruisstraat Cabaret. They were quickly dispersed by
our artillery, which during the day dealt faithfully with similar
concentrations. That night the Brigade was relieved in line by the 58th,
and withdrew to hutments at La Clytte, where it came once more under the
9th Division.
The stand at Messines by the South Africans played a vital part in the
battle of the Lys. For thirty hours the Brigade delayed the enemy’s
advance, and took heavy toll of him. In the words of the special order of
the IX. Corps, “Its tenacity in the face of superior numbers and heavy
firing undoubtedly relieved a serious situation, and obliged the enemy,
when he was able to occupy the ridge, to be content to stay there during
the whole of the 12th April without any further attempt to advance.”
Major-General Jeffreys, commanding the 19th Division, and Sir A. Hamilton
Gordon, the Corps Commander, bore testimony to the quality of the
exploit. The latter wrote, “I wish to express to the General of the South
African Brigade and to all his officers and men, my appreciation of their
wonderful fighting spirit and most gallant doings in the great fight
which we have been having in the last three days against heavy odds.” Sir
Herbert Plumer wrote that if any unit could be selected for exceptional
praise it was the South African Brigade. Remember that the great majority
of the men were new drafts, who had just arrived from home. Once again
the Brigade had performed what seemed to be its predestined duty in an
action—fighting outside its own area with its flank turned; and, as was
inevitable, it paid a heavy price. For the three days its casualty list
amounted to 639 all ranks; of these 89 were killed, 270 were wounded, and
280 were missing, of whom the majority were afterwards proved to be dead.
Yet, as the men marched back from the line, their spirits seemed to be as
high as when they had entered it.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: _April 14-15._]
The spell of rest was destined to be short. Von Armin was pressing hard
for Mont Kemmel. On the 13th the 29th and 31st Divisions had fought a
most gallant fight in front of Bailleul, where, with the assistance
of the 4th Guards Brigade, they held the line till the 1st Australian
Division could come up and organize positions east of the Forest of
Nieppe. “No more brilliant exploit,” wrote Sir Douglas Haig, “has taken
place since the opening of the enemy’s offensive, though gallant actions
have been without number.” All that day, too, the 33rd and 49th Divisions
were hotly engaged in front of Neuve Eglise. In the evening the enemy
made his way between that village and La Crèche, and so outflanked the
left of the 34th. During the night Plumer withdrew to the high ground
called the Ravelsberg, between Neuve Eglise and Bailleul, and the former
village the following morning passed into German hands. The threat to
Hazebrouck was now acute, for von Armin was on the edge of the line of
upland from Mont des Cats to Kemmel, which commanded all the northern
plain towards the Channel. On Sunday, the 14th, there was a little
respite; but on Monday morning the 19th Division was hard pressed at
Wytschaete, and three fresh German divisions, including the Bavarian
Alpine Corps, attacked our front on the Ravelsberg, and at nine in the
evening entered Bailleul. About that time the remnants of the South
African Brigade were moved to the Reninghelst area, with orders to be
prepared to march at an hour’s notice.
[Sidenote: _April 16._]
In the early hours of Tuesday, the 16th, the British front at Wytschaete
and Spanbroekmolen was attacked in force, with the result that both
places fell. At 8.30 came orders from the 9th Division that the South
Africans should move at once to a position in the Vierstraat line from
Desinet Farm, in the north, to La Polka, just east of Kemmel village.
General Tudor was about to attempt the recapture of Wytschaete. By noon
the South Africans were in position, the 1st Regiment on the right, 250
strong, and the 4th Regiment, with the same strength, on the left; while
the 2nd Regiment, 292 strong, was disposed in the second line along the
whole front in the trenches which were known as Sackville Street.
[Illustration: SCENE OF FIGHTING AROUND MONT KEMMEL.]
At 3.30 in the afternoon Tanner was instructed to send 100 men of the
2nd Regiment to occupy an advanced position between Store Farm and Van
Damme Farm, part of the line from which it was proposed to make the
counterstroke. These men were required to form a garrison there, while
the attack was delivered by the French. Meantime on the left the 26th
Brigade of the 9th Division was to move on Wytschaete. The latter attack
was launched at 7.30 in the evening, but was held up in the north-west of
the village. A quarter of an hour before midnight Tudor ordered Tanner
to place the 4th South Africans under the orders of Colonel Mudie, the
officer commanding the 7th Seaforth Highlanders, in order to assist in
clearing up the situation. At midnight the 1st South Africans and, two
hours later, the 2nd South Africans (less the garrison on the Store-Van
Damme Farm line) were also dispatched to the Seaforths. The 4th Regiment
on its arrival was employed to fill a gap in the line on the north-west
skirts of the village, while the 1st and 2nd Regiments were held in
reserve. Some hours later Captain Farrell, who was now in command of
the 4th, reported that parties of his men had succeeded in entering
Wytschaete, but on account of heavy machine-gun fire and the lack of
touch with their flanks, had been compelled to fall back.
[Sidenote: _April 17._]
Such was the situation on the morning of the 17th. It was for the enemy
the most critical moment, perhaps, in the whole Battle of the Lys. He
had reached his greatest strength, and the British troops were not yet
reinforced at any point within sight of security. That morning von
Armin’s right attacked in the Ypres salient, and wholly failed to break
the Belgian front. At the same time his left, now that the possession
of the Wytschaete Ridge gave him observation over all the land to the
west, assaulted the wooded slopes of Kemmel, the key of the countryside.
After an intense bombardment the German infantry advanced with great
resolution from their new positions at Neuve Eglise and Wulverghem, but
were repulsed at all points with heavy losses by the 34th, 49th, and
19th Divisions. Von Armin’s cherished plan had signally failed. During
the 17th the South African Brigade was temporarily placed under the 26th
Brigade, and the 100 men of the 2nd in the Store-Van Damme Farm line
rejoined their regiment in front of Wytschaete. In that position during
the night the 1st and 2nd South Africans relieved the 4th Regiment and
the 7th Seaforth Highlanders, the 4th returning to the La Polka-Desinet
Farm section, where it came once again under Tanner.
[Sidenote: _April 18._]
[Sidenote: _April 19-20._]
Meantime Tudor had received the 62nd and 64th Brigades from the 21st
Division as reinforcements, and contemplated a further attack upon
Wytschaete. The 64th Brigade relieved the 26th, while the 1st and 2nd
South Africans remained in line under the orders of the former Brigade.
This plan, however, did not mature. During the morning of the 18th, under
cover of mist, the enemy assaulted the position held by the 1st Regiment,
and captured its advanced posts, one officer, Lieutenant Hogg, being
killed, and 48 other ranks missing. Save for this incident the situation
remained unchanged that day. On the 19th 100 men of the 4th Regiment
were detailed to relieve some troops of the 19th Division. On the night
of the 20th, the 4th was relieved in the southern part of the Vierstraat
line and moved into support, while the detachment lent to the 19th
Division rejoined its unit. Early on the morning of the 22nd the 1st and
2nd Regiments were also relieved and moved to Dickebusch, and on the 23rd
the whole Brigade reassembled in the Hopoutre area.
[Sidenote: _April 23._]
It was clear that the reconstructed Brigade could not continue. The
drafts received after the _débâcle_ of 24th March had been used up
in the heavy fighting on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, and further
reinforcements were not forthcoming to build it up to some semblance
of fighting strength. No other course was possible but to organize the
remnants into one battalion. The history of the doings of the South
Africans in France is now the history of this composite unit, which
was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel H. W. M. Bamford, M.C., of the 2nd
Regiment, with Major H. H. Jenkins of the 1st as second-in-command, and
Second-Lieutenant MacFie of the 4th as adjutant. The four companies were
made up of officers, N.C.O’s, and men of the old regiments, and these,
with the drafts arriving from England, brought the battalion to a total
strength of 59 officers and 1,527 other ranks.
The name of the South African Brigade was still to be retained, and the
unit was to include, in addition to the Composite Battalion, the 9th
Scottish Rifles (formerly in the 27th Brigade) and the 2nd Royal Scots
Fusiliers, that famous battalion which at Ramillies had, along with the
Buffs, led the decisive movement, and which at First Ypres had been all
but annihilated. General Tanner was to be the Brigadier. To reconstruct
a new brigade and a new battalion takes time, and while the work was in
process the unfinished product had to be flung into the fight, for the
Battle of the Lys was not over. Ludendorff had dipped too deeply in the
north to withdraw easily. He had incurred great losses without gaining
any real strategical objective, and he could not bring himself to write
off these losses without another effort to pluck the fruit which was
so near his grasp. If he could seize Kemmel Hill, he would broaden his
comfortless salient and win direct observation over the northern plain.
In front of Kemmel was the junction of the British and French lines,
which he regarded as the weakest spot in our front. Accordingly on
Thursday, the 25th April, he struck again for Kemmel.
[Sidenote: _April 25._]
In the early hours of that day a heavy enemy bombardment presaged the
coming attack. At 3.35 a.m. the South African Battalion, which had been
taken over on the 24th by Lieutenant-Colonel Bamford, was warned to be
ready to move at fifteen minutes’ notice. At 5 a.m. von Armin attacked
with nine divisions, five of which were fresh. His purpose was to
capture Kemmel by a direct assault on the French, and by a simultaneous
attack on the British right south of Wytschaete to turn their flank and
separate the two forces. At first he seemed about to succeed. By ten that
morning he had worked his way round the lower slopes and taken Kemmel
village and the hill itself, though isolated French troops still held
out in both places. In the British area the 9th and 49th Divisions were
hotly engaged west of Wytschaete, and before midday the right of the
9th was forced back to Vierstraat. In the afternoon the 21st Division,
farther north, was also attacked, and by the evening the British front
had been compelled to withdraw to positions running from Hill 60 in the
north by Voormezeele and Ridge Wood to the hamlet of La Clytte on the
Poperinghe-Kemmel road, where it linked up with the French.
[Sidenote: _April 26._]
By the next morning supports had arrived, and Plumer made a great effort
to recapture the lost ground. The 25th Division, along with French troops
and elements of the 21st and 49th Divisions, re-entered Kemmel village,
but found themselves unable to maintain it against flanking fire from the
northern slopes of the hill. After midday came the second wave of the
German assault. It failed to make ground owing to the gallant resistance
of the 49th (West Riding) Division, under Major-General Blacklock, and
of troops of the 21st, 30th, 39th, and 9th Divisions, all four of which
had been fighting for five weeks without rest. That afternoon the French
recaptured Locre, on the saddle between Kemmel Hill and the heights
to the west, so that our line in that quarter now ran just below the
eastern slopes of the Scherpenberg, east of Locre, and then south of St.
Jans-Cappel to Méteren.
[Sidenote: _April 27._]
At 2.15 that afternoon General Tanner took over command of the sector
held by the 26th Brigade. He had the 9th Scottish Rifles in line, and
the 8th Black Watch and the 5th Camerons (both of the 26th Brigade)
in support and reserve, for the South African Battalion was still in
divisional reserve at Hopoutre. Presently the Black Watch and the
Camerons were relieved by the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers. The South
African Brigade was for the moment under the command of the G.O.C.
49th Division. Tanner’s line ran roughly from the crossroads called
Confusion Corner, west of Vierstraat, to the southern end of Ridge Wood.
The 9th Division was now back in support, and Tanner had on his right
troops of the 49th, and on his left the 21st. The German attack came at
3 o’clock in the afternoon, and was repulsed with heavy losses; but the
9th Scottish Rifles suffered so gravely that they were relieved by the
2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers. The night passed quietly, and on the 27th the
South African Battalion, with a strength of 23 officers and 707 other
ranks, moved forward and took up position in the La Clytte-Dickebusch
support line. There it remained for two days under considerable
shell-fire, which occasioned some 60 casualties.
[Sidenote: _April 29._]
On the 28th the fighting fell chiefly to the lot of the French at Locre,
and there was no material change in the situation. But on the morning
of Monday, the 29th, after one of the most intense German bombardments
of the war, von Armin attacked the whole front from west of Dranoutre
to Voormezeele. The Allied line at the moment ran round the eastern
base of Mont Rouge, just covering Locre, across the low saddle of the
range to the meadows in front of La Clytte, and thence by Voormezeele to
the Ypres-Comines Canal. The British right was in the neighbourhood of
the crossroads which we called Hyde Park Corner, on the saddle between
the Scherpenberg and Mont Rouge. There lay the 25th Division as far as
the little stream which runs from Kemmel to the Dickebusch Lake. On
its left was the 49th Division as far as Voormezeele, and beyond it
the 21st Division to the canal. Von Armin made three main assaults—the
first against the French to carry Locre and Mont Rouge; the second, at
the junction of the French and the 25th Division, aimed at turning the
Scherpenberg; and the third, between the 49th and 21st Divisions, to turn
the obstacle of Ridge Wood.
The infantry attack was launched at 5 a.m. in a dense mist by at least
eleven divisions—six against the French and five against the British.
It was delivered in mass formation, the density being from six to eight
bayonets to the yard. On the British front no ground was gained at all.
The three divisions in line, with the assistance of troops of the 30th
and 39th Divisions, not only stood firm, but in some cases advanced to
meet the Germans and drove them back with the bayonet. By the end of the
day the single German gain was the village of Locre, which was retaken by
the French the following morning.
The battle of the 29th was a complete and most costly German repulse.
The enemy had attacked with some 80,000 men, and his casualties were at
least a quarter of his strength. The Royal Scots Fusiliers in Tanner’s
brigade had suffered heavily, and the South African Battalion was ordered
to relieve them. The work was complete by four o’clock on the morning
of the 30th. For the next five days the situation was unchanged, for
the fight on the 29th was the last great episode of the Battle of the
Lys. Lieutenant B. W. Goodwin was killed by shell-fire on the 30th, and
throughout the time the South African lines were consistently shelled.
The enemy posted at Kemmel dominated our trenches, and movement during
the day was dangerous. Happily, however, the misty weather and the poor
visibility were on the side of the defence. On the 4th, Second-Lieutenant
E. C. Addison, who had but recently joined, was killed by a shell, and
the total casualties in this part of the line were, approximately, 200.
On the night of the 5th the Battalion was relieved, and moved back
without losses, though a party of guides under Lieutenant Stokes, who
had gone ahead of the main body, was less fortunate. Lieutenant Stokes,
whose gallantry had been conspicuous during the past days, was severely
wounded, and four of his men were killed. The Brigade had now rejoined
the 9th Division.
[Sidenote: _May 5._]
If we take 5th May as marking the close of the Battle of the Lys we may
pause to reflect upon the marvels of the forty-five preceding days.
More history had been crowded into their span than into many a year of
campaigning. They had seen Ludendorff’s great thrust for Amiens checked
in the very moment of success. They had seen the not less deadly push
for the Channel ports held up for days by weak divisions which bent but
did not break, and finally die away with its purpose still far from
achievement. In those forty-five days the South African Brigade had been
twice destroyed as a unit, and in each case its sacrifice had been the
salvation of the British army. At Marrières Wood it delayed the advance
which would have made an irreparable breach between Gough and Byng; on
the ridge of Messines it maintained the northern pillar of our defence
long enough to permit reserves to come up from the south. On 11th April
Haig had issued his famous order, in which he warned his troops that
they were fighting with their backs to the wall, and that every position
must be held to the last man. The veterans of Marrières Wood and the new
drafts of Messines obeyed this command to the letter. When the Composite
Battalion was formed, there were men in it who had been fighting with
Dawson or Tanner since the 21st of March. The few survivors of the
forty-five days had behind them such a record of fruitful service as the
whole history of the War could scarcely parallel.
CHAPTER X.
THE SUMMER OF 1918.
(May-September 1918.)
The Interlude—The Strategic Situation during the Summer—The
Méteren Area—Awaiting the German Attack—The Action of 25th
June—The Capture of Méteren on 19th July—The End of the
Composite Battalion—The Brigade re-formed—Leaves the 9th
Division and joins the 66th.
The summer of 1918 may be regarded as an interlude in the history of the
South African forces in France. The continuity was not broken, for there
was still a titular South African Brigade, commanded by a South African
general; but the old regiments had shrunk to companies, and only one
battalion was South African in its composition. Again, the summer months
were for the northern part of the British line a time of comparative
quiet. The great tides of war had flowed southward, and before May was
out came Ludendorff’s thrust on the Aisne, which drove the French back
upon the Marne and in seventy-two hours advanced the enemy front by more
than thirty miles. In that southern area the German tactics of April
were repeated, and presently von Hutier pressed forward on the right,
and carried the Lassigny hills. Then, after a delay of six weeks, came
the last attack on the Marne, which was to open the way to Paris, and
with it Ludendorff’s final and irretrievable failure. But in the early
summer that consummation could not have been foreseen, and the months of
May, June, and July were an anxious season for the Allied Command. When
Foch became Commander-in-Chief his first problem was to create reserves,
and his second to use just enough of them to hold the enemy. While the
American armies were growing in numbers and efficiency he had to be
ready, with still scanty resources, to face at any moment a new assault
on any one of four sections of his long line. But his defence was not
stagnant; it was as vigilant and aggressive as any attack; and there were
two facts in the situation which might well seem to him of happy augury.
He had devised an answer to the new German tactics, and formed his own
scheme against the day of _revanche_. Again, the German strategy was
clearly fumbling. The Lys had seen the decadence of the original plan,
and the later adventures were blind and irrelevant hammer-blows. Germany,
with waning strength, was being forced to stake all on a last throw; if
that failed, she might soon be helpless before the waxing might of the
Allies.
* * * * *
The Brigade during the summer was with the 9th Division in the area of
Plumer’s Second Army. That front in the north was in no secure position,
for the advance of the enemy in April had brought him too near to certain
vital centres like Béthune and Hazebrouck, and he held the key-point of
Kemmel. It was well within the domain of possibility that the next great
stroke might fall in the north, and the British Army, which had been
actively engaged for nine weeks, was very tired. Hence there could be no
sleeping anywhere on the line between Ypres and Arras. Till the end of
May an attack was hourly expected.
[Sidenote: _May 25._]
From the 10th to the 23rd May the Brigade was busy training in the
Heuringhem area. On the latter date, with the 5th Cameron Highlanders
in place of the 9th Scottish Rifles, it marched to Hondeghem, and next
day relieved the 26th Brigade in the support line, the South African
Battalion, on the left, being available as a counter-attack battalion.
On the 25th, since a German attack seemed to be imminent, it was decided
to hold the 9th Division sector with a two-brigade front: on the left
the 26th Brigade, with two battalions in line and one in support; on
the right the South African Brigade, with one battalion in line, one in
support, and the South African Composite Battalion in divisional reserve
in the village of Thieushoek. The 27th Brigade was at Hondeghem in corps
reserve.
The enemy was believed to be aiming at Mont des Cats, the western end
of the Kemmel range, the possession of which would directly threaten
Hazebrouck and the whole northern plain. At that time our front ran
in this area from Locre by the north of Bailleul and just west of the
village of Méteren to a point half-way between Strazeele and Merris.
The sector taken over by the Brigade lay facing Méteren from the
Méteren-Cassel road to the tiny watercourse called Méteren Becque, which
ran south-east from Flêtre. The defences were organized in two zones.
The front line consisted of sections of trenches covered by an outpost
line between 150 and 200 yards in front of them, in close touch with the
enemy; a support line, with the strong-point of Princboom in it; and a
reserve line based on Flêtre. This forward zone was almost completely
overlooked by the enemy in Méteren, and any movement by day there was
impossible. The second zone, some 2,000 yards in the rear, included the
fortified village of Caestre.
During these days patrols were busy on the quest for prisoners, and from
the intelligence thus gathered it appeared that the German attack was
fixed for the morning of the 29th. Much work was done in strengthening
the defences, and a special battalion was formed of Brigade details,
which was held at Caestre in divisional reserve. But nothing happened on
the 29th. That night the South African battalion moved into the support
line, and on the 1st June it relieved the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers in
the front line.
[Sidenote: _June 2._]
On the South African right lay the Australians, and on the night of 2nd
June they carried out a minor operation in order to straighten their
line; while the South Africans co-operated by a pretended attack on
Méteren. The Australians reached their goal without serious opposition.
A German relief was in progress, and in consequence 5 officers and 250
other ranks, besides many machine guns and trench mortars, were captured.
For the next few days the enemy front was stagnant, and on the night of
the 5th the Brigade was relieved in the front line by the 26th, and moved
back to the Hondeghem area for further training.
On 11th June the Composite Battalion marched to Thieushoek, and that
night relieved the 7th Seaforth Highlanders in divisional reserve. Once
again a German attack threatened. The South African Brigade front was
now held by two battalions, and on the 17th the South African Battalion
relieved the 9th Scottish Rifles, on the right of the front adjoining
Méteren Becque.
The position at Méteren was far from comfortable, and Tanner, after
conferring with the Australians on his right, submitted to General Tudor
a proposal for a further adjustment of the line, which involved an
advance of some 425 yards on a front of 750. The scheme was approved,
but, since full artillery support was necessary, it had to be postponed
till the night of 23rd June. The attack was to be delivered by the 1st
Australian Brigade and by the South African Composite Battalion. Zero
was fixed for half an hour after midnight on the 24th, in order that the
troops should have sufficient time after nightfall to form up, and the
remainder of the short midsummer dark for the consolidation of their
gains.
[Sidenote: _June 24._]
At zero hour an accurate artillery and trench mortar barrage opened on
the German front trenches, and presently lifted a hundred yards. The
attack, moving close to the barrage, succeeded at once, and the German
machine guns were rushed and silenced as soon as they opened fire. Many
small parties of Germans were found in the hedges and cornfields, who
either fled or were quickly overpowered. The objective was soon reached,
and consolidation began, and, with the assistance of a section of the
63rd Field Company R.E., by dawn the new line had been wired across its
whole front. As a result of the operation 29 prisoners and 6 machine
guns were taken, while 36 dead of the enemy were counted. The losses of
the Composite Battalion were 5 men killed, and 2 officers (Lieutenants
Harvey and Uys) and 21 other ranks wounded. The following night the
battalion was relieved by the 5th Camerons, and next day moved back to
Hondeghem.
[Illustration: THE FIGHTING ABOUT MÉTEREN.]
[Sidenote: _June 30._]
There the South Africans remained till the last day of June, when they
came again into the front line to relieve one of the units of the
26th Brigade. At that moment the omens pointed to an elaborate German
offensive on the whole front between the Forest of Nieppe and Ypres,
with the Mont des Cats as one of the main objects of attack. But the
assault tarried, and during the first days of July the front had never
been quieter. This gave us leisure to improve our communication trenches
and link up the outposts of the front line into one continuous trench—a
most necessary work, for it had been resolved to attempt the capture of
Méteren village in the near future, and the task had been entrusted to
the 26th and South African Brigades.
[Sidenote: _July 12._]
[Sidenote: _July 18._]
The 10th of July was at first chosen as the day; but the weather grew
bad, and the operation was postponed. On the night of the 12th the South
African Brigade had been relieved by the 27th, and had returned to
Hondeghem, with orders to be in readiness to move up at short notice. The
two battalions of the Brigade selected for the assault—the South African
Composite Battalion and the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers—rehearsed the
business in complete detail. By the 17th the weather had improved, and on
the night of the 18th the Brigade relieved the 27th in the right sector
of the divisional front, and took up positions of assembly ready to move
on the following day.
[Sidenote: _July 19._]
Zero was fixed for five minutes to eight on the morning of the 19th. At
that hour the troops of assault left the trenches in artillery formation,
and under cover of a smoke and high-explosive barrage rapidly over-ran
the enemy front-line posts and prevented the use of his machine guns. One
or two strong-points held out till they were enveloped on the flanks.
The main attack, admirably led by the section commanders, bore down all
resistance, and both battalions reached their objectives by the appointed
time. One company of the Composite Battalion, which held the line on the
extreme right, south of the point on which the operation hinged, had been
ordered to watch for opportunities to harass the enemy while the main
attack was proceeding, and, when the barrage ceased, to push up patrols
along the front, and, if possible, capture the German trench between
Méteren Becque and the road from Brahmin Bridge to Alwyn Farm. This they
did with complete success, and took many prisoners and seven machine guns.
The main attack, having reached its goal, sent out patrols, who managed
to establish themselves on a point some 200 yards north of the line
between the Gaza crossroads and the Brahmin Bridge road. There was
some stubborn fighting at Alwyn Farm and among the hedges north of it;
but in the afternoon the divisional artillery cleared the place. Under
cover of this outpost line a position in Méteren village and on the
ridge was rapidly established, and one of the most awkward corners of
the British front made secure. During the latter part of the day our
advance lines were heavily shelled, but no counter-attack developed. It
appeared that the Germans had been taken by surprise. They expected only
a gas discharge, and had in many cases put on gas masks, and were wholly
unprepared to resist the rush of our infantry.
[Sidenote: _July 20._]
[Sidenote: _July 30._]
The night passed in comparative quiet. On the morning of the 20th the
Composite Battalion was ordered to test the enemy front on the right of
the division, which seemed to have retired. Fighting patrols were pushed
out, and a line was established some 400 yards farther south. During this
action Captain Scheepers was killed; he had only rejoined the battalion
two days before. The Brigade held their sector until the 24th, when they
moved to the left of the divisional front, where for some days they were
busy in restoring and draining the dilapidated trenches. On the night of
the 30th the Composite Battalion was relieved by the 5th Camerons, and
marched back to a rest area.
The capture of Méteren was a good example of a perfectly planned and
perfectly executed minor action. The captured material consisted of 1
field gun, 13 trench mortars, and 30 machine guns, of which the Composite
Battalion’s share was 10 trench mortars and 23 machine guns. Between 200
and 300 prisoners fell to the Brigade. The casualties of the Composite
Battalion were 130, of whom 27 were killed and 2 died of wounds. Besides
Captain Scheepers, Second-Lieutenants Mackie, Anderson, Douglas, Male,
and Keeley fell, and Lieutenant Mackay was wounded.
[Sidenote: _Aug. 18._]
On 5th August the Composite Battalion was again in the line on the
right of the division, which by now extended beyond Méteren Becque, and
included Le Waton. Little happened for the better part of a fortnight
except patrol work along the Becque. On the 18th the 37th Brigade, with
the 9th Scottish Rifles, attacked and captured the mill of Hoegenacker,
taking 10 officers and 230 men prisoners. By way of retaliation the
Germans heavily shelled the South African front, in spite of which
Sergeant Thompson of the 4th Company of the Composite Battalion, with
five men, raided and captured an enemy post during the morning. That
night the battalion was relieved by the 8th Black Watch, and withdrew
from the front.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: _Aug. 28._]
On the day before the capture of Méteren, Foch on the Marne had delivered
the great counterstroke which decided the issue of the campaign. When on
that morning the troops of Mangin breasted the Montagne de Paris they
had, without knowing it, won the second Battle of the Marne, and with
it the War. The final battle had been joined, and the greatest modern
soldier had entered upon the first stages of that mighty contest, which
in two months’ time was to shatter all Germany’s defences, and enable him
to begin that deadly _arpeggio_ on the whole front from the Moselle to
the North Sea which brought her to her knees. It was fitting that South
Africa should be represented by more than a battalion in the final march
to victory. During August 1,000 reserves arrived at Lumbres from England,
and it was now possible to consider the reorganization of the Brigade.
On the 28th the Composite Battalion marched to Lumbres and prepared
for disbandment. Since its formation on 24th April it had been almost
continually in the line. Seventy-five officers had served with it at one
time or another, and of these 7 had been killed and 11 wounded. Of the
men, 84 had been killed, 27 had died of wounds, 329 had been wounded, and
one was missing. For the operations in which it had taken part it had won
two bars to the Military Cross, three Military Crosses, one Distinguished
Conduct Medal, one bar to the Military Medal, and thirty Military Medals.
The four months had been an interlude in the main story of the South
Africans in France, but an interlude not without its own glory.
On 11th September the Brigade, now re-formed, was withdrawn from the 9th
Division, with which the South Africans had served since their arrival
in France. For the purpose of administration it was transferred to the
VII. Corps, with which it trained till 22nd September. On that day it
joined the 66th Division, which was then attached to the First Army. It
was commanded, as before, by General Tanner, and in addition to the three
infantry battalions contained the Signal Section, the South African Light
Trench Mortar Battery, and the 1st South African Field Ambulance. The
1st Regiment was under the command of Major H. H. Jenkins, the 2nd under
Lieutenant-Colonel H. W. M. Bamford, and the 4th under Lieutenant-Colonel
D. M. MacLeod.
It was not easy for the South Africans to leave the 9th Division, or
for the 9th Division to part with them. Together they had fought in
the bitterest actions of the campaign, and their glory was eternally
intertwined. I quote General Tudor’s farewell letter to Tanner.
“I wish to express to you and to your officers, warrant
officers, N.C.O.’s, and men of the Brigade under your command
my great regret that the exigencies of the service prevented
me seeing you all personally before you were transferred from
the 9th Division, in order to say good-bye. For two and a half
years your Brigade has shared the fortunes of the 9th Division.
At Delville Wood, at Arras, at Ypres, in the Somme retreat, and
finally at Méteren, it has fully contributed in establishing
and maintaining the glorious record of this division. The South
African Brigade bore the brunt of the attack on the divisional
front on March 21, 1918, and its final stand at Bouchavesnes on
24th March, when it held out all day until all ammunition was
exhausted, will live as one of the bravest feats of arms in the
War. The cheery keenness and comradeship with which the South
African Brigade has always worked and fought will be very much
missed by me personally, and by all the 9th Division. We wish
you and your Brigade the best of fortune, and know that you
will always fully maintain the splendid name you have earned.”
The division with which they were now brigaded had come later into
the campaign than the 9th, but it had no mean record behind it. Under
Major-General Neill Malcolm it had done gloriously in the retreat from
St. Quentin, when it had been reduced to a handful. It was re-formed in
the late summer under the command of Major-General H. K. Bethell, and,
besides the South Africans, included the 198th and 199th Brigades, the
units of which had been brought from Salonika. In the 198th Brigade were
the 6th Lancashire Fusiliers, the 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
and the 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers. In the 199th were the 18th King’s
Liverpool Regiment, the 9th Manchesters, and the 5th Connaught Rangers.
The pioneer battalion was the 9th Gloucesters. The War brought the
soldiers of South Africa into comradeship with all varieties of the New
Armies of Britain. Hitherto they had fought side by side with the Scots;
the last stage was to be spent in a fighting fellowship, not less close
and cordial, with the men of Ireland and the North of England.
CHAPTER XI.
THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY.
(September 28-November 11, 1918.)
Foch’s Final Strategy—Progress of the Campaign in August and
September—The End of the Siegfried Zone—The 66th Division
in Action—The Fight of 8th October—The South Africans take
their Objectives—The Fight of 9th October—The Brigade
Captures Bertry, Maurois, and Reumont—The Line of the Selle
reached—The Enemy Position at Le Cateau—Preparation for
the Attack—Lieutenant Hewat’s Exploit—The Battle of 17th
October—South African Captures and Casualties—Splendour of the
Achievement—The Last Stage in the Campaign—Tanner’s Mobile
Column—The Last Shots at Grandrieu—The Armistice.
As the last stage in this record approaches, it is necessary to gather
up the threads of the campaign and observe the position of the great
Allied movement at the time when the South Africans appeared again on
the main front of battle. During the summer months Foch had warded off
Ludendorff’s successive assaults, and had accumulated a reserve, which
at the end of July, by the accession of the American troops, gave him a
final superiority both in men and material over anything which the enemy
could compass. He had also devised a system of tactics which embraced
all that was best in the German plan, and avoided its defects. By his
counterstroke on 18th July against von Boehn’s exposed flank he had
given the _coup de grâce_ to Germany’s offensive, wrested from her the
initiative, and forced her back in some confusion on her defences. But
the final blow could not yet be struck. It was the business of Foch to
keep the battle “nourished,” and at the same time to economize his forces
till the moment came for the grand climax. He had to wear down the enemy
methodically by attacks on limited fronts, ringing the changes over the
whole battle-ground. The possession of abundant reserves and of such a
weapon as his light tanks enabled him to “mount” a new action rapidly
in any sector. After each blow he must stay his hand as soon as serious
resistance developed, and attack instantly in another place. The enemy
would thus be subjected to a constant series of surprises. Before his
reserves could be brought up he would have lost heavily in ground and
men; his “mass of manœuvre” would be needed to fill up the gaps in his
front, and by swift stages that “mass of manœuvre” would diminish. From
8th August to 26th September it was Foch’s task to crumble the enemy
front, destroy the last remnants of his reserves, force him behind all
his prepared defences, and make ready for the final battle which would
give victory.
The tale of that great achievement—one of the greatest in the history
of war—can here only be sketched. The record of a brigade moves for the
most part in the mist; its story is of tactical successes, which may be
only a minute part in the major purpose. Rarely, indeed, does it appear,
like the South Africans at Marrières Wood, in the very centre of the
stage, and the work of a small unit become the key to the strategical
fortunes of an army. On 8th August Haig struck east of Amiens, followed
by Humbert on the 9th, and Mangin on the 18th. On the 21st Byng’s Third
Army moved, and next day Rawlinson’s Fourth Army, and on the 26th Horne’s
First Army astride the Scarpe. By the end of the month we had carried the
Bapaume Ridge, the intermediate position which Ludendorff had hoped to
hold till the coming of winter, when he could retire at leisure behind
the Siegfried zone. On 2nd September the Canadians broke through the
Drocourt-Quéant switch, and turned the Siegfried flank on the north.
Steadily during the next week Haig forced the Germans behind the water
line of the Canal du Nord, and inside the main Siegfried defences. On
12th September Pershing and the Americans far in the south put an end to
the St. Mihiel salient. By the 24th Ludendorff was everywhere back in his
last lines—the “granite wall” which the German army chiefs had told their
countrymen could never be pierced. There he hoped to stand till such time
as winter took the edge from the Allies’ ardour, and disposed them to
compromise.
[Illustration: THE VICTORIOUS ADVANCE. OPERATIONS OF THE XIII. CORPS UP
TO 11TH NOVEMBER 1918.]
He had not reckoned with Foch—nor with Haig, for on the 26th there
began on the Meuse the _arpeggio_ of attack which broke through the
defences prepared during four years, and in six weeks brought Germany
to surrender. On the 27th Haig struck at the main Siegfried zone from
Cambrai to St. Quentin, and his blow was meant to shatter. It is no
secret that the opinion of his Allies and of his own Government was not
favourable to his boldness: even Foch, while he agreed that the plan was
the right one, doubted its feasibility. The British Commander-in-Chief
took upon himself the responsibility of one of the most audacious
operations of the War, and, daring greatly, greatly succeeded. That day
Byng and Horne with the Third and First British Armies crossed the Canal
du Nord, and next day reached the Scheldt Canal. On the 28th, too, the
Belgians and Plumer’s Second Army swept east from Ypres, and Mangin and
Guillaumat opened a new battle between the Ailette and the Vesle. On
the 29th came the main blow at the Siegfried citadel, when Rawlinson’s
Fourth Army, in conjunction with Byng and Débeney, crossed the Scheldt
Canal, and stormed their way far into the fortified zone. In days of wind
and cloud they enlarged this gap till St. Quentin fell, and Cambrai was
utterly outflanked. On 30th October the Australians broke through the
northern part of the Beaurevoir-Fonsommes line, the last of the Siegfried
works, and looked into open country. Between the 27th September and the
7th October Haig had crossed the two great canals, and destroyed all but
the final line of the Siegfried zone, while this final line in one part
had been passed. The time had come for an advance on a broad front which
should obliterate the remnants of the Siegfried works, and with them
Germany’s last hope of a safe winter position. Her nearest refuge would
be the Meuse, and, shepherded by Foch’s unrelenting hand, it was very
certain that her armies would never reach the banks of that fateful river.
[Sidenote: _Sept. 28._]
On 28th September the 66th Division had been transferred to Rawlinson’s
Fourth Army, and by the 5th October it had moved south to the old Somme
area, and was in the neighbourhood of Ronssoy. It was now part of Sir T.
L. Morland’s XIII. Corps, which contained also the 18th, 25th, and 50th
Divisions. Of these, the 25th was composed of troops brought from the
Italian front, and the 50th, like the 66th, of battalions from Salonika
and Palestine. Two of the divisions of the corps were, therefore, made up
largely of men who had malaria in their bones, and there was some doubt
as to how they would stand an autumn campaign in Picardy—a doubt which
was soon to be put at rest. The 18th and 25th Divisions and the South
African Brigade were well seasoned to northern warfare.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 6._]
On 6th October the 66th Division was warned that it would be used
presently in a major operation in which the Fourth and Third Armies would
co-operate. The object was to destroy the remnants of the Beaurevoir
line, and with it the Siegfried zone. The country was the last slopes
of the Picardy uplands, where they break down to the flats of the
Scheldt—wide undulations enclosing broad, shallow valleys. There was
little cover save the orchards and plantations around the farms and
hamlets, but there were many sunken roads, and these, combined with the
perfect field afforded everywhere for machine-gun fire, made it a good
land for rearguard fighting. The XIII. Corps was now the right flank
of the Fourth Army, with the II. United States Corps on its right, and
the British V. Corps on its left. The 66th Division was in the centre
of the corps, and the task specially committed to it was the capture of
Serain. General Bethell attacked with two brigades—the South African on
the right and the 198th on the left, each on a two-battalion front. The
starting-point was a line running north-west and south-east through the
eastern outskirts of Beaurevoir village. In the South African Brigade
the 2nd Regiment was on the right and the 4th on the left, with the 1st
Regiment in support.
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL D. M. MACLEOD, D.S.O., M.C., D.C.M.,
Commanding 4th Regiment, South African Infantry.]
[Sidenote: _Oct. 8._]
It was a wild, wet autumn morning when Byng and Rawlinson advanced on a
seventeen-mile front, from south of Cambrai to Sequehart, while Débeney
extended the battle four miles farther south. Zero hour for the Fourth
Army was 5.10; for the Third Army, 4.30. The South African Brigade had
moved on the 7th into the Siegfried lines at Bony, and by 3.30 a.m. on
the 8th it had occupied its battle position. Unfortunately the assembly
was not completed without loss. A preliminary attack by the 38th and 50th
Divisions on Villers and Villers-Outréaux brought down a retaliatory
barrage from the enemy, and among the wounded was Lieutenant-Colonel
Bamford, the commanding officer of the 2nd Regiment. His place was taken
by Major Sprenger.
The attack at 5.10, covered by a creeping barrage, moved swiftly towards
its goal, and by 7 o’clock the South Africans had their first objective.
The enemy resisted stoutly, and made full use of the sunken roads,
especially at the Usigny ravine, which was in the ground of the 2nd
Regiment. There he disputed every yard with machine guns and snipers,
and did not yield till all his posts had been killed or captured. The
whippet tanks, moving in front of the infantry, were mostly put out of
action by shell-fire at the start, but one arrived opportunely at the
Usigny ravine, and helped to break down the last resistance there. The
2nd Regiment took at this stage nearly 500 prisoners, two anti-tank guns,
seventeen machine guns, and four field-pieces. These last were captured
by a few men under Lieutenant E. J. Brook and Sergeant Hinwood, who
pushed forward and rushed the guns 400 yards south-east of Petite Folie
farm, and then turned them on the retreating enemy. The 4th Regiment on
the left had also to face heavy machine-gun fire, but it swept through
the German position at La Sablonnière and Hamage Farm, taking no less
than thirty-five machine guns.
As soon as the first objective was won the ground was consolidated.
Covering posts were pushed out, and the two regiments were reorganized.
The supporting battalion, the 1st Regiment, had been caught in the early
morning barrage on the railway embankment north of Beaurevoir, and had
suffered 23 casualties. Later it moved east of Beaurevoir, and provided
a platoon to reinforce the 2nd before retiring to brigade reserve. The
losses so far in the assaulting battalions had not been unduly heavy.
The 2nd had suffered most in its commissioned ranks. Lieutenant R. G. A.
M’Carter had been killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bamford, Captain Symons,
Lieutenant Egan, and Second-Lieutenants Giddy, Birrell, Fernie, Roberts,
Gunn, and Francis wounded, the last officer subsequently dying of his
wounds. The 4th had 45 men killed, and 4 officers and 194 men wounded.
[Illustration: SOUTH AFRICANS’ ATTACK.]
The first objective having been taken, the 199th Brigade, according to
plan, took up the attack, leap-frogging the South African and 198th
Brigades, and by 11 a.m. had taken Serain and reached the final line.
For a little its left flank was exposed, for Villers-Outréaux was still
in German hands. By three in the afternoon, however, the V. Corps had
succeeded in carrying that village, and the XIII. Corps was able to
establish itself securely east of Prémont and Serain. It had been a day
of unblemished success. Haig and Débeney had advanced between three and
four miles, and the Siegfried zone had disappeared in a cataclysm. The
enemy was falling back to the Oise and the Selle, and for the moment was
in dire confusion. Every road converging upon Le Cateau was blocked with
troops and transport, and our cavalry were galloping eastward to harass
the retreat. Next day Cambrai fell, and the Germans retired behind the
line of the Selle. The war of positions had ceased, and the combatants
were now in open country.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 9._]
On the 9th Byng and Rawlinson pressed their advantage against the
stricken enemy, who had no position on which he could stand, short of
the Selle river. The South Africans began the day in reserve, the attack
on Maretz being conducted by the 198th and 199th Brigades. By 10 o’clock
Maretz, Avelu, and Elincourt had fallen, and half an hour later the South
Africans passed through the two brigades and moved against the second
objective, a line east of Maurois and Honnechy and Gattignies Wood. There
was some hope that before nightfall the crossings of the Selle might be
seized and the ridge to the east, which, it was clear, were the immediate
objects of the German retreat. But though the enemy was disordered,
he was not in rout, and his machine gunners fought stubborn rearguard
actions. The 2nd Regiment on the right, now under Major Sprenger, came
under heavy fire as soon as it emerged from the eastern skirts of Maretz.
As its left approached Gattignies Wood, it was strongly opposed by
machine guns and snipers, but by the assistance of two armoured cars the
southern part of the wood was cleared. On the right the advance was held
up for half an hour by enemy posts along the Le Cateau railway. To add to
Sprenger’s difficulties, the 4th Regiment, under MacLeod, on his left was
compelled to veer north towards Bertry, since the troops on its left had
fallen slightly behind and got out of touch. He was compelled to bring up
one of his supporting companies, and presently established his line on
the Cambrai railway, where many machine guns and prisoners were taken.
Before him lay the villages of Maurois and Honnechy, which appeared
to be lightly held, since some of the houses were flying white flags.
Sprenger, with three companies in line and one in support, moved through
the village with little opposition, and was received with wild enthusiasm
by the French inhabitants. It was the first time the South Africans had
liberated an area not cleared of its civil population. A little after 1
p.m. he reached his final objective, where he found his flanks exposed,
since he had outrun the general advance.
Meantime MacLeod with the 4th Regiment had had severe fighting. His task
was simple till he reached the northern edge of Gattignies Wood, which
was held in strength by the enemy. By a flanking movement he overcame
the resistance, and pushed on to the south-west skirts of Bertry. This
village was not in the Brigade’s area, but the delay in the advance of
the division on its left made any further movement by the 4th Regiment
impossible till Bertry had been taken. Accordingly Captain Tomlinson,
commanding the left company, swung northwards and occupied the village.
By 4.30 p.m. MacLeod had reached his objective, and pushed outposts to
link up with Sprenger. The Brigade was now established on a line east of
Maurois and Honnechy.
The day had gone so well that it seemed as if more might be accomplished
than had been forecast in the original plan. The cavalry was ordered to
go through and ride for Le Cateau and beyond, in the hope of cutting the
main enemy communications through Valenciennes. By 2 p.m. the Canadian
Cavalry Brigade had gone forward, encircled Reumont, and formed a picket
line beyond it. The South Africans were instructed to make good that
village, and for the purpose Tanner brought up the 1st Regiment under
Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins. By dusk the work was accomplished, and
Jenkins took over from the Canadian cavalry, occupying a line covering
Reumont on the north and east. The more distant objective had proved
impracticable. It was not possible to push through large bodies of
cavalry, owing to the many strongly held machine-gun posts. That night
the front of the 66th Division ran from the western skirts of Escaufourt,
east of Reumont, to the east of Bertry station. For the South Africans
it had been a day of distinguished achievement. The two battalions of
assault had taken 150 prisoners, more than twenty machine guns; several
anti-tank guns, and—at Bertry—a motor car containing a German officer.
Their losses had been light. The 4th Regiment had one officer (Lieutenant
R. Hill) and 23 other ranks killed, and 4 officers and 71 other ranks
wounded. In the 2nd Regiment Second-Lieutenant H. Perry was the only
officer casualty.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 10._]
On the 10th the Brigade was in reserve at Reumont and Maurois, where
it was continuously shelled, the 1st Regiment sustaining some twenty
casualties. That day the divisional advance was conducted by the 198th
and 199th Brigades, who pressed forward to the slopes above the Selle.
By noon they held the spurs overlooking Le Cateau from the west, and had
patrols in the environs of the town itself. But Le Cateau was not to
fall at the first summons. The 66th Division found itself much harassed
by artillery fire from the high ground towards Forest in the north-east,
which overlooked its position. On its right the 25th Division could do
little so long as St. Benin was untaken, and St. Benin was in the area of
the II. United States Corps, whose left division had been checked. The
G.O.C. 25th Division, Major-General Charles, attacked St. Benin in the
afternoon, and drove the enemy across the Selle, but was unable to follow
him owing to the difficulty of the river crossings and the machine-gun
fire from the railway on the eastern bank. In the evening General
Bethell, with the 199th Brigade, attempted to carry the high ground east
of Le Cateau and north-east of Montay. The 5th Connaught Rangers reached
the railway east of the town; the 18th King’s Liverpool Regiment reached
Montay, but found the banks of the Selle heavily wired and could not
cross. General Bethell accordingly withdrew the Connaught Rangers to
the west side of Le Cateau, where they held the line of the Selle as it
passed through the town.
[Illustration: THE ADVANCE FROM MARETZ TO REUMONT.]
That night the II. United States Corps took over St. Benin, and the XIII.
Corps lay north from it for the most part along the western shore of the
Selle. The German 17th Reserve Division had arrived to reinforce the
enemy, and his front along the east bank of the river was very strong.
The wreckage of the fallen bridges had dammed the stream and flooded
the low-lying meadows. It was clear that the forcing of the Selle line
was not a task which could be carried out by the pursuing army “in its
stride,” but required a careful and deliberate plan. For the enemy to
stand awhile on the Selle was a matter of life or death, for otherwise he
could not hope to extricate himself from Foch’s pincers.
* * * * *
It was now the eve of the last great fight of the Brigade—the last,
indeed, of the campaign in the West. To understand it we must note the
configuration of the battle-ground. The valley of the Selle at Le Cateau
has on each side slopes rising to plateau country some 200 feet above
the bed of the river. On the west these slopes mount gently in bare
undulations, but to the east they rise more abruptly, and the country
in that direction is intersected with many orchards and hedges. A spur
running north-east from Montay to Forest gives direct observation up
the valley and over the eastern uplands. The Selle at Le Cateau is from
fifteen to twenty feet wide, and usually about four feet deep, but with
the recent heavy rains it was now rising fast. South of the town it flows
through marshy meadows; in the town itself the banks are bricked up,
and it is spanned by two bridges; farther north towards Montay it runs
through firm pasture land. Le Cateau is a town normally of some 10,000
inhabitants, full of solidly built houses and factories, the greater part
of which are on the slopes east of the river. On its eastern side runs
the railway to Solesmes, which with its embankments and cuttings gave
the enemy a position of exceptional strength. A formidable strong-point
was the railway station and yard, which were bounded on the east by a
bank thirty feet high, while a mound farther east, which could not be
seen from the west bank of the Selle, gave good observation southwards.
The position from the point of view of the defence was all but perfect.
The wiring was everywhere elaborate, the machine-gun posts had been
prepared on a lavish scale, and the buildings and cellars were admirably
adapted for a prolonged resistance. Four enemy divisions held the
place, and two of them were fresh from reserve. The importance which
the German High Command laid upon a stand on the Selle—which they knew
as the “Hermann Line”—was shown by orders captured during our attack.
One, issued by General von Larisch commanding the 54th Corps, announced
that the Army would accept a decisive battle on that line, which must
be held at all costs. An order of an artillery group declared that the
possibility of an armistice being arranged depended on the battle coming
to a standstill on the Selle. Still another artillery order warned the
troops that if the Hermann Line were held, a favourable peace could be
arranged; otherwise there was no prospect of an end to the War. If the
position was vital to the enemy, it was no less vital to the Allies. By
10th September the two main German salients—between the Lys and the Somme
and between the Selle and the Argonne—had become precarious. Ludendorff
had now but the one object, to protect the main lateral railway, from
Lille by Valenciennes and Hirson to Mézières, long enough to permit of
an orderly retreat. If it fell too soon, large parts of his front would
be cut off. It was Haig’s aim to cut that railway as soon as possible by
forcing the Selle and pressing on to Maubeuge across the many rivulets
which drain to the Scheldt from the Forest of Mormal.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 11._]
On 11th October the position was that the XIII. Corps held ground in the
skirts of Le Cateau west of the Selle and along the river line. A frontal
attack was impossible, and the town must be enveloped by its flanks. On
the south the floods were extending, and a crossing place must be sought
well upstream, so the Corps extended its right wing to St. Souplet.
Simultaneously with any advance in the south there must be a movement
on the north to capture the ridge north-east of the town. The immediate
objective was the Solesmes-Le Cateau railway and the easterly ridge; the
ultimate goal the village of Bazuel.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 12-15._]
Several days had to be spent in preliminary work. On the night of the
11th the South African Brigade moved up from Reumont and relieved the
198th and 199th Brigades. The 1st Regiment held the line opposite Le
Cateau with the 2nd and 4th Regiments in support on right and left.
Between the 12th and the 15th the 1st pushed forward north of the town
to the edge of the Selle. It was no easy task, for the western outskirts
were not yet cleared of the enemy, and our positions were dominated by
the high ground on the eastern bank and by the houses in the northern
suburbs. In these days the 1st Regiment suffered some twenty casualties
in officers and men, while a post of one N.C.O. and seven men was
reported as missing. The next task was to establish bridgeheads in the
area of the town itself, and in particular to hold the two ruined
bridges. The capture of one of these was assigned to the 2nd Regiment,
and Major Sprenger on the 15th ordered Second-Lieutenant R. D. Hewat,
with one Lewis gun section and one rifle section, to establish posts
east of the bridge on both sides of the road. Owing to the constant
machine-gun fire the débris of the bridge could not be used, so
Lieutenant Hewat and his men waded across the stream, heavily bombed all
the while by the enemy, and carried out their instructions. During the
16th he was frequently attacked, but with seven survivors he held his
ground, and when the general advance began next morning he was found
engaged against three machine guns. Late that day he rejoined the Brigade
after a most gallant feat of arms, having held out for over thirty-six
hours.
The main attack of the XIII. Corps was fixed for the morning of the 17th.
On the right the 50th Division, under Major-General Jackson, was to cross
at St. Souplet and St. Benin, capture the railway embankment opposite
them and the railway triangle, and then swing north and take the railway
station. Their supporting troops were then to move on Bazuel. The South
African Brigade was to cross the Selle north of the town, seize the
railway, and link up with the 50th north of the railway triangle; and,
in the final stage, swing forward its right and establish itself on the
spur east of Le Cateau. Since the V. Corps on the left was not attacking,
arrangements were made to obscure the enemy observation from the high
ground north-east of Montay by a smoke barrage.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 16._]
Meantime, on the evening of the 16th, the 1st South African Regiment
had attacked at 5.45 p.m. in order to win positions on the eastern
bank, which would enable eight bridges to be thrown across the river,
since it was necessary that the assaulting position should be on that
bank. This work was successfully accomplished by “A” and “B” companies
under Lieutenants Gray and M’Millan. It was found that strong wire
entanglements had been constructed on the east shore, through which
openings had to be cut to permit of the assembly of the assaulting
battalions.
At 8 p.m. that evening the 4th Regiment on the right and the 2nd on the
left—together with “D” Company of the 1st under Captain Thomson, which
had been detailed to follow the 2nd—began to move forwards. The crossing
of the river was slow work, owing to the slender footbridges and the
narrow gaps in the wire. The South Africans, when they reached the east
bank, found themselves in places not fifty yards from the enemy, who
held the railway embankment, and had pushed forward machine-gun outposts
to the riverside road. By 4.30 on the morning of Tuesday the 17th the
assembly was complete, and the South Africans laboured to make their
position secure. They had little time for the work, for zero hour was
approaching and their situation would have been perilous indeed but for
the merciful interposition of the weather. Just before dawn a heavy
mist rose from the valley, blinding the enemy’s eyes, so that most of
his artillery and machine-gun fire passed harmlessly over their heads.
Casualties, however, could not be altogether avoided. Lieutenant M. E.
Whelan, M.C., of the 2nd Regiment was severely wounded, and died on the
following day; and Lieutenant E. J. Brook of the same regiment was
killed, his body, riddled with bullets, being found five yards from a
German machine gun.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 17._]
Zero hour for the 50th Division was 5.20 a.m., for it had much ground to
cover before it could come into line with the 66th. The 151st Brigade
crossed the river with ease, but met with a stubborn resistance at
the station. The 149th Brigade followed for the attack on the second
objective, and found like difficulties at the railway triangle. So soon
as the news came that the 149th was over the Selle, it was time for the
South Africans to advance. The Brigade had taken immense risks in its
assembly, and escaped serious loss partly by the help of the fog, partly
by the very boldness of the hazard, since it lay so close to the enemy
that his fire was ineffective. But it was a welcome relief to officers
and men when at 8.5 a.m. came the order to launch the attack.
The mist was still thick, and no man could see fifty yards before him.
The first wave disappeared into the gloom, and those behind waited long
before they got news of it. From the outset the attack had to face great
belts of single and double apron wire, and heavy machine-gun fire from
both flanks. After a hundred yards had been covered, the South Africans
came upon a sunken road protected by a palisade, where the 4th Regiment
was held up for some time, and suffered many losses. As they approached
the railway they encountered another and more formidable obstacle—a belt
of wire entanglements sixty yards deep. The railway at this point ran in
a deep cutting, the sides of which were studded with machine-gun posts
and rifle-pits. The South Africans rose to the emergency. They found a
shallow trench used by the Germans as a route from the railway cutting
to an outpost; they found a tortuous path through the wire made for the
use of German patrols, where Major Clerk of the 4th Regiment shot the two
sentries on duty; and by these roads slowly and patiently they filtered
through to the railway. It was a magnificent feat of cool resolution,
and it was performed under the most galling fire. Soon they were in the
cutting, where stern fighting took place. It was Ludendorff’s old device
of “infiltration” in miniature, and at 9.15 Captain Jacobs of the 2nd
Regiment reported to Major Sprenger that the first objective had been
reached.
The situation, however, was still full of danger. The first objective was
beyond the railway line; but, since our troops could not dig themselves
in in the open because of machine-gun fire, they were compelled to fall
back to the railway itself, where they had some kind of cover, though the
German field guns were accurately registered on it. Slowly they cleared
the line, and by midday Tanner was able to inform General Bethell that
he held the railway from a point 500 yards north of the railway triangle
to the northern boundary of the XIII. Corps. Meanwhile “D” Company of
the 1st Regiment, which had followed the 2nd, succeeded under great
difficulties in its appointed task of establishing a defensive flank on
the left between the railway and the Selle. Every officer of the company
was wounded during the course of the day. The losses of the assaulting
battalions had been high, and the 1st Regiment was now called upon to
reinforce each with a company, while a little later the remaining company
was sent forward to strengthen the left flank. One battalion of the
198th Brigade was busy clearing up in Le Cateau.
There could be no advance to the second objective yet awhile, for the
50th Division was in difficulties. It had not succeeded in carrying
the railway triangle, and was involved in intricate fighting among the
station buildings, much galled by machine-gun fire from the mound to the
east. The 66th Division was called upon to help, and a battalion of the
198th Brigade was sent south of the town to attack towards the point
where the Bazuel road crosses the railway. The Corps heavy artillery
put down an intense bombardment from 3 p.m. to 3.30 p.m. on the station
and the railway triangle, and it was proposed thereafter to send in the
150th Brigade. But at that moment came an enemy counterstroke against the
junction of the 50th Division and the II. United States Corps, and the
150th Brigade had to be diverted south to restore the broken front. That
evening, after fifteen hours of desperate fighting, the XIII. Corps held
a line along the Arbre de Guise-Le Cateau road, through the east skirts
of Le Cateau, and along the railway line to Baillon Farm, beyond which it
bent back to the Selle. The town had been won, but not the vital ridge to
the east.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 18._]
[Sidenote: _Oct. 19._]
The South African Brigade spent an uneasy night of “standing to.” The
enemy’s bombing patrols were busy, his machine-gun and trench-mortar fire
was accurate and intense, and his artillery fire, with light, heavy, and
gas shells, was unceasing. At 5.30 a.m. on the 18th the 50th Division
again attacked, and carried all its objectives, establishing itself
on the Le Cateau-Catillon road, with outposts east and north-east of
Bazuel. During the afternoon the 66th Division swung forward its right,
and the task originally allotted to the XIII. Corps was completed.
At 5 p.m. orders had been issued for a relief of the South African
Brigade by the 199th, but owing to the lateness of the hour the relief
was cancelled. Unfortunately this cancelling order did not reach “B”
Company of the 1st Regiment till it had withdrawn, and in returning to
the line it lost thirteen killed, while Second-Lieutenant R. MacGregor
was mortally wounded. During the night the 1st Regiment lost also
Second-Lieutenant C. H. Powell killed, while Second-Lieutenant C. H.
Perrem was severely wounded. The final objective of the Brigade was
established about 4.30 a.m. on the morning of the 19th, Captain King of
the 2nd being wounded during the operation.
[Illustration: THE FIGHT FOR THE CROSSING OF THE SELLE.]
Such was the part of the South Africans in the forcing of the Selle, the
last of their great battles. Between the 17th and 20th of October, in
face of a most gallant resistance, Byng, Rawlinson, and Débeney had swept
well beyond the river line and the Oise-Sambre Canal, and the way was
open for Haig’s advance against Valenciennes and the Forest of Mormal.
In the XIII. Corps area five brigades had in three days captured 7,000
yards of prepared positions defended by a difficult water line, had
advanced 6,000 yards, and utterly defeated four German divisions, taking
25 officers, 1,226 men, and 15 guns. In this work the South Africans had
played a pre-eminent part. Between the night of 7th October and the night
of 19th October they had taken prisoner 4 officers and 1,238 other ranks,
and had captured 367 machine guns, 19 trench mortars, 22 field guns, 4
anti-tank guns, and a mass of other equipment. Their casualties were 47
officers and 1,229 men, of whom 6 officers and 184 other ranks were dead.
The achievement on the 17th is worthy to rank with their advance at
Third Ypres as a brilliant feat of offensive warfare, and as such it was
praised by their comrades in arms. Brigadier-General Ian Stewart of the
XIII. Corps Headquarters Staff wrote to Tanner: “I shall always look
on the capture of the railway embankment north of Le Cateau as one of
the most astounding feats of the War. It will be good for South Africa
to know what a brave part her contingent played in the closing chapter
of the Great War, and it is no little honour to have been the foremost
troops of the British Armies in France when the curtain fell on the
greatest tragedy the world has seen.” And when the war was over and the
Brigade about to leave the 66th Division, Major-General Bethell wrote
in his special order of the day: “In after life if any of you are up
against what you imagine to be an impossible task of any description,
call to mind the Boche position on the east bank of the Selle river north
of Le Cateau, or ask some one who was there to depict it to you. Then
remember that the South African Brigade crossed that stream and took
that position, which the enemy thought impregnable to attack from that
direction, and that, on looking back at it from the enemy’s side, it was
hard to understand how the apparently impossible had been done by you.”
* * * * *
The fighting front of the XIII. Corps was now occupied by the 25th and
18th Divisions, and the 50th and 66th Divisions fell back into reserve.
The South African Brigade was in rest billets at Serain till the 2nd
November. Haig was now fairly embarked in open warfare, operating in a
difficult country of large woods, many small villages, and an infinity
of hedged enclosures. His first object was the line from Valenciennes to
the Oise-Sambre Canal along the western edge of the Mormal Forest. The
enemy had a strong water line in the canal and the Scheldt, and a good
defensive position in the forest, but between the northern end of Mormal
and the Scheldt was a gap of ten miles, and if Haig broke through the
gap the position must crumble. On Wednesday, 23rd October, he struck on
a front of fifteen miles, the Fourth Army using two corps, and the Third
Army four. This was the beginning of the last great fight of the British
Army, the Battle of the Rivers, fought in thick mists and drizzling
rain. In two days Rawlinson, Byng, and Horne advanced six miles, and
by the last day of October Haig was through the gap. Elsewhere, on the
long front of the Allies, Débeney, Mangin, and Guillaumat were each some
twenty-three miles from Hirson with an open country before them, and
Gouraud and Pershing had broken the resistance in the tangled area west
of the Meuse, and were ready for the final push on Mézières and Sedan.
Meantime strange things were happening in Berlin. The new ministry which
had come into power in Germany in the early days of October had opened
feverish negotiations, and had made haste to recast the creed which had
hitherto been Germany’s faith. On 27th October Berlin accepted President
Wilson’s terms, which were that the only armistice to be considered must
be one that made impossible the renewal of hostilities on the part of
Germany, and was negotiated by a people’s Government and not by the
Great General Staff. The acceptance of such conditions was tantamount
to an admission of defeat in the field. On Saturday the 26th Ludendorff
resigned his command. The twilight of the gods had fallen upon his old
proud world, and the direction of affairs had gone for good from the
hands of him and his kind.
By now the condition of the German armies was in the last degree
desperate. On 21st March they had had a reserve of eighty fresh
divisions, and during the summer no division was returned to the line
without at least a month of rest and training. By 30th October they had
but one fresh division, and the intervals of rest had shrunk to nine
days. There were divisions on their front which mustered less than 1,000
rifles, and the total shortage of rifles to establishment was not less
than 500,000. Their casualties since March had been some 2,500,000, of
which at least 1,000,000 represented permanent losses. Of the 18,000
pieces of artillery on their front on 15th July, a third had since
been captured or destroyed. Worse still, they had been manœuvred into
a position from which retreat was in the long run impossible. Pershing
and Gouraud were about to cut their main trunk line in the south, and
Haig’s deadly pressure was shepherding them northward into the gap of
Liége, where, unless an armistice intervened, on the scene of their worst
infamies they would suffer a more terrible Sedan.
But it must not be thought that in those days the Allies, and especially
the British, won easy victories. The enemy resisted with a gallantry and
devotion worthy of a more honourable cause. Between the 27th September
and the 11th November our First, Third, and Fourth Armies faced and
defeated sixty-one divisions, of which twenty-one had been twice in
the battle, eight thrice, and two four times. The rearguard actions by
machine-gun posts were often brilliant and almost always resolute, and
the defence of the Selle line, notably at Le Cateau, would have done
credit to any troops. If we had broken through all the great prepared
positions, we were none the less fighting in a country which allowed
strong defences to be improvised, and the enemy did not fail to take
advantage of it.
It should be remembered, too, that he massed his main strength against
the British, for there, if anywhere, he must stand, since Haig was
marching straight for Namur and the one narrow door still open to his
frontiers. In especial he dared not weaken his artillery on that section,
and Haig had to face the bulk of the dwindling complement of German
guns. The shelling in those days seemed to many who had fought through
the War to be the heaviest they had encountered. The South African
Field Ambulance, which, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pringle and Major M.
B. Power,[27] did magnificent work at that stage (it equalled its old
record, for it was not in human power to surpass it), had a difficult
task because of the steady German shell fire, which searched out all
the back areas. As the advance grew faster, it became hard to keep up
with the infantry, and to bring back the wounded expeditiously by ruined
roads and broken bridges over distances unknown in the previous history
of the campaign.
[Sidenote: _Nov. 2-4._]
[Sidenote: _Nov. 7-9._]
On 2nd November the South African Brigade moved forward from Serain.
That day Valenciennes fell to the Canadians under Horne, and next day
the German retreat increased its pace. By Monday the 4th, Pershing, who
in three days had advanced twelve miles, had the southern railway at
Montmédy and Longuyon under his fire. That bolt-hole had been closed.
The time had come for Foch, as it came to Wellington on the evening of
Waterloo, to give the signal for “everything to go in.” On the 4th Haig
attacked on the thirty-mile front between Valenciennes and the Sambre,
and by the next day the Forest of Mormal was behind him. The enemy’s
resistance was finally broken, and his armies were not in retreat but in
flight, with their two wings for ever separated. Through the fifty-mile
pocket between Avesnes and Mézières the whole German forces in the south
must squeeze if they would make good their escape, and the gap was
hourly narrowing. Mangin and Guillaumat were close on Hirson, Gouraud
and Pershing were approaching Mézières, and Haig had the Sambre valley
as an avenue to Namur. Moreover, Foch had still his trump card to play,
the encircling swing of a new American army north of Metz to cut off
the enemy from his home bases. If a negotiated armistice did not come
within the week, there would be a _de facto_ armistice of collapse and
surrender. On the 7th Byng was in Bavai, and on the 8th in front of
Maubeuge. That day Rawlinson took Avesnes, and on the 9th the Guards
entered Maubeuge, while farther north Condé and Tournai were in our
hands. On the 6th Gouraud was in Rethel, and on the 7th Pershing was in
the western skirts of Sedan. On the 6th the German delegates, Erzberger
and his colleagues, left Berlin on their embarrassed journey to Foch’s
headquarters. On the 9th came the revolution in Berlin, and the formation
of a Council of National Plenipotentiaries under Ebert. Next day the
Emperor fled from Main Headquarters to seek sanctuary in Holland.
On the morning of the 8th the South African Brigade was in reserve to the
66th Division at Dompierre, just west of Avesnes. Next day it marched
by Beugnies to Solre-le-Château—an arduous journey, largely over field
tracks, since most roads and bridges had been destroyed by the enemy.
Tanner had been informed by his divisional commander that, owing to the
new situation, it had been resolved to create a mobile column under
his command. This column was to be part of an advanced guard to cover
the Fourth Army front, which guard was to be under Bethell, and was
to include the 5th Cavalry Brigade. Tanner’s force was made up of his
infantry brigade, “B” Battery 331st Brigade R.F.A. with six 18-pounders,
“D” Battery of the same brigade with one section of 4.5 howitzers, the
430th Field Company R.E., “C” Company 100th Machine-gun Battery, two
armoured cars, and two platoons of the XIII. Corps Cyclists. The general
scheme was that the column should move on Beaumont, and cross the stream
there, preceded by the 12th Lancers, while the remainder of the 5th
Cavalry Brigade operated on its southern flank.
[Sidenote: _Nov. 10._]
At 7 a.m. on the morning of Sunday, 10th November—about the time when
the courier of the German delegates was reaching Spa with Foch’s terms
in his pocket—the column moved out from Solre-le-Château on the Beaumont
road, Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Jenkins, with the 1st Regiment, forming
the advanced guard. A culvert a mile to the east had been blown up, and
took some time to repair, so it was 9.30 before the head of the column
reached Hestrud. The 12th Lancers, who were in possession, reported that
the enemy was in considerable force on the high ground north and south
of Grandrieu. Tanner accordingly halted the main body under cover at the
Bois de Madame, and ordered the 1st Regiment after a brief reconnaissance
to deploy for attack in order to clear the way for the column. The attack
of the 1st on a three-company front began at 10.30 with the fording of
the Thure river, the road-bridge having been destroyed. The enemy, part
of the Guard Reserve Corps, opened the sluices of a reservoir upstream,
with the result that the assaulting troops were cut off till the flood
subsided. Presently it became clear that they were facing an organized
rearguard position, strongly held by machine guns, and supported by
artillery.
The flanks of the advance were exposed; and since the bulk of the 5th
Cavalry Brigade had not come up, General Bethell moved forward the 199th
Brigade on the right of the South Africans in the direction of Sivry,
where they were in touch with the 20th Hussars. The instructions of the
advanced guard were to keep close to the enemy, but not to attack if he
was found in a strong position. Accordingly Tanner did not force the
advance, and in the afternoon the 1st Regiment was ordered to dig in.
It was thought likely that the Germans might retreat during the night,
so vigilant patrolling was carried out; but at dawn on the 11th the
situation had not altered. In the meantime the bridge at Hestrud had been
rebuilt by the Engineers.
[Sidenote: _Nov. 11._]
The morning of Monday, 11th November, was cold and foggy, such weather as
a year before had been seen at Cambrai. Very early, while the Canadians
of Horne’s First Army were entering Mons, the 1st Regiment attacked,
but could make little progress, though a patrol under Second-Lieutenant
Cawood managed to gain some ground on the left flank. By 8 o’clock a
considerable advance was made on the right, where the 20th Hussars were
feeling their way through Sivry. At 10 a.m. Tanner received by telephone
the news that an armistice had been signed. “Hostilities,” so ran the
divisional order, “will cease at 11 o’clock to-day, 11th November.
Troops will stand fast on the line reached at that hour, which will be
immediately reported by wire to Headquarters, Fourth Army Advance Guard.
Defensive precautions will be maintained. There will be no intercourse of
any description with the enemy until receipt of instructions.” The news
must have reached the enemy lines earlier, and he signalized its arrival
by increasing his bombardment, as if he had resolved to have no surplus
ammunition left when the hour of truce arrived.
Punctually at 11 o’clock the firing on both sides ceased. There came a
moment of dramatic silence, and then a sound as of a light wind blowing
down the lines—the echo of men cheering on the long battle front. The
meaning of victory could not in that hour be realized by the weary
troops; they only knew that fighting had stopped, and that they could
leave their trenches without disaster. The final “gesture” fell to the
arm which from the beginning of the campaign had been the most efficient
in the enemy service. At two minutes to eleven a machine gun opened about
two hundred yards from our leading troops at Grandrieu, and fired off
a whole belt without a pause. A German machine gunner was then seen to
stand up beside his weapon, take off his helmet, bow, and, turning about,
walk slowly to the rear.
At the hour of armistice the line reached by the advanced guard ran from
Montbliart in the south, west of Sautain, through the Bois de Martinsart,
round the eastern edge of Grandrieu to the western skirts of Cousolre.
It represented the easternmost point gained by any troops of the British
Armies in France. The South Africans had the honour of finishing the War
as the spear-point of the advance to victory.
CHAPTER XII.
CONCLUSION.
The Price of Victory—The Special Strength of the Brigade—An
Example of True Race Integration—The Nation and the Individual.
There is no need to pursue the chronicle of the Brigade through the slow
months of demobilization, till in the following June the bulk of its
members embarked for home in a German liner handed over to Britain under
the terms of peace. When on that grey November morning the guns fell
silent, it had accomplished the task to which it had dedicated itself
in the summer of 1915. It had travelled a long road in the three years.
Brought suddenly, after its short campaign in Egypt, into the thick of
the fiercest struggle in the West, it had performed every duty allotted
to it with whole-hearted devotion and supreme competence. Never more
than a few thousand in numbers, and perpetually short of drafts, it had
won for its country of origin a name in the field as proud as that of
far larger and more populous territories. There is no soldier living who
would deny that in quality the South Africans ranked with the best troops
of any army. Twice by its own self-sacrifice the Brigade had been reduced
to a handful, and had lost all semblance of a unit, and on each occasion
its loss had been the salvation of the British cause. At Delville Wood,
at Marrières Wood, and at Messines it had proved to what heights of
resolution a defence may rise: in attack at Arras, at Third Ypres, and at
Le Cateau it had shown the world, in Napier’s famous words, “with what
majesty the British soldier fights.” The little contingent, one among
some hundred British brigades, occupied small space on the battle-map.
But scale must not be confused with kind; the men of Leonidas were not
the less Spartans because they were only three hundred.
In the long road to victory they had left many of their best by the
wayside. The casualties in France were close on 15,000, nearly 300
per cent. of the original strength. Of these some 5,000 were dead. As
evidence of the fury of the Western campaign, it may be noted that the
South African contingent in East Africa was nearly twice the size of the
forces in France from beginning to end, but its losses were not more
than a quarter of theirs. How many, especially of the younger officers,
whose names are recorded in the earlier actions, survived to advance on
Le Cateau? Yet the amazing thing is that in a Brigade which was so often
severely engaged, and in which the uttermost risks were cheerfully and
habitually taken, any came through the three years’ struggle. There are
men who fought from Agagia to Le Cateau and have now returned to the mine
and the farm to be living witnesses to their miraculous Odyssey.
Wherein lay the peculiar strength of the Brigade? It has been a war of
many marvels. We have seen pasty-faced youths from the slums of cities
toughen into redoubtable soldiers, and boys new from office-stool and
college classroom become on the instant leaders of men and Berserks
in battle. The Brigade had the initial advantage of drawing upon men
of a fine physique, and, in many cases, of practical experience in a
rough and self-reliant life. Its recruits, too, as I have already said,
showed a high average of education, and many who never left the ranks
were well qualified for commissions. They developed rapidly a perfect
_esprit de corps_, which, because they were so few and so far from home,
was more than the solidarity of a fighting unit, and became something
like the spirit of a race and a nation. I do not think a more perfect
brotherhood-in-arms could have been found on any front. Lastly, they were
commanded by officers who had their full confidence and affection. The
successive brigadiers, the battalion and battery commanders, and every
officer understood the meaning of “team-work,” and loved and respected
the troops they led.
There is one quality of the South Africans which deserves especial
mention—I mean their curious modesty. A less boastful body of men never
appeared in arms. They had a horror of any kind of advertisement. No war
correspondent attended them to chronicle their doings; no picturesque
articles in the press enlightened the public at home. That may have
been bad for the Allied cause; but assuredly it was what they wished
themselves. They had in a high degree the traditional British love of
understatement, and no old regular was ever a greater adept at pitching
things in a low key. To talk to them after a hard-fought action was
to hear a tale of quite ordinary and prosaic deeds, in which little
credit was sought for themselves but much given to others. They had
that gentle and inflexible pride which is too proud to make claims, and
leaves the bare fact to be its trumpeter. I believe that to be a quality
of South Africa. She is so ancient a land that she does not need to
brag and hustle like newer peoples, but comports herself with the quiet
good-breeding of long descent. She has been through so many furnaces that
she has won dignity and simplicity. These were most notably the traits of
her forces on the Western front. They feared very little on earth except
the reputation of heroes; and if in this book I have done violence to
that fine tradition, I can only make them my apology and plead the debt
of the historian to truth.
The story which I have endeavoured to tell is to be regarded in the first
place as the achievement of a people—that South African people in which
the union of two race-stocks is in process of consummation. The war
record of South Africa, from whatever angle it is regarded, is one to
be proud of. To the different fronts she contributed over 136,000 white
troops—nearly 10 per cent. of her total white population, and some 20 per
cent. of her male white population. But, great as was her work in other
battle-grounds, to my mind her chief glory is her achievement in France.
The campaigns in German East and South-West Africa might be regarded as
frontier wars, fought for the immediate defence of her borders and her
local interests. But to come into line in the main struggle far away in
Europe meant an understanding of the deeper issues of the Great War.
Her sons in France did not fight in the narrow sense for Britain; they
fought for that liberal civilization of which the British Commonwealth
is the humble guardian; they fought for that South African nation which
could not hope to live till Germany’s challenge to liberty was answered.
There were many in the Brigade who had still quick in their hearts an
affection for the northern islands from which they had sprung; but there
were many to whom Britain was only a faint memory, and many in whom her
name woke no enthusiasm. There were men of Dutch blood who had fought
stoutly against us in the old South African War, and now fought like
crusaders, not for our Empire, but for the greater faith by which alone
that Empire can be justified. All honour to those who were not beguiled
by the chatter of a shallow racialism, which, let it be remembered,
is the eternal foe of nationality; who, without the homely sentiment
and intimate loyalties which inspired the British-born, battled for an
austere faith and an honourable ideal of their country’s future.
Ever since eighteen years ago I had first the privilege to know South
Africa, I have cherished the belief that the Dutch stock there is one of
the finest in the world, and the most akin in fundamentals to our own;
and that the future must bring to the two races some such union in spirit
and in truth as links to-day the “auld enemies” of England and Scotland.
The War has enlarged that hope. Never during its three years was there
a spark of racial feeling in the ranks of the Brigade. No Dutchman ever
cavilled at the appointment of an Englishman; no Englishman or Scot but
gave his full confidence to a Dutch superior. All were South Africans and
citizens of no mean country. The Brigade was a microcosm of what South
Africa may yet become if the fates are kind. It was a living example of
true race integration.
The story may be regarded also as a record of plain human achievement,
of what heights are possible in the “difficult but not desperate” life
of man. To individuals, as to nations, comes at rare intervals the
supreme test of manhood. It is often an open choice: there are excellent
arguments why the smooth rather than the rough road should be taken. The
men of the Brigade enlisted voluntarily, under no conscription of law—not
even under the social coercion of universal recruiting; their pay was
the slender wage of the British regular; they abandoned, most of them,
good prospects in their different callings; there was no reward before
them save honour and a quiet conscience. They made, in another sense
than Dante’s Pope, the _gran rifiuto_, and preferred a rendezvous with
death to comfort and ease. And having chosen, they were wholly resolved
to endure to the end. Such a sacrifice is not made in vain, and against
it the gates of death cannot prevail. The survivors face life with a
new mastery over themselves and their fates, and the remembrance of the
fallen will be a glory and inspiration to the generations to come.
Man cannot live always on the heights. It would not be well if he did,
for the work of the world must be carried on among the flats beneath. But
it is good to know that the hills are there, and it is better to have
once sojourned among them.... In the bushveld under the scarp of the Berg
one may move for days in a parched and thorny land, where the dust hangs
in clouds over the road, and dank thickets fringe unwholesome rivers. But
to the west above the foothills rise green lines of upland, which by day
seem no more than the bare top of a mountain, but at sunset glow like
jewels in the heavens. Such a sight is welcome to the traveller, for it
tells him that somewhere, and not too distant, there is a land of cool
meadows and shining streams; and from that secret country descend the
waters which make fruitful the workaday plains.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I.
THE HEAVY ARTILLERY.
An apology is due for the relegation of so distinguished a service as
the South African Heavy Artillery to an appendix, and for a sketch of a
most honourable record which must necessarily be short and inadequate.
To tell the story fully would involve the rewriting of the history of
the campaign in the West from a special angle; and the point of view of
a siege battery, which in action is stationary though not immobile, and
is on all occasions ancillary to the infantry work, is not the best from
which to follow the main movements of war. The story of a battery, too,
should include many technical matters which cannot properly find their
place in a general history. But it is greatly to be hoped that detailed
records will be published of the different South African artillery units,
such as has already been most admirably prepared for the 71st Battery.
Some of them were engaged in battles in which the Infantry Brigade had no
part, and when the artillery story is added, the South African records
cover almost the whole career of the British Army in France and Flanders.
In particular, the doings of the 73rd Battery at the southern gatepost
during the Battle of the Lys is a fitting accompaniment to the exploits
of the Infantry Brigade at Messines in the north.
We have already seen (Chapter I.) that the five batteries of the old
South African Heavy Artillery Brigade were armed, on arriving in England,
with 6-inch howitzers and affiliated to the Royal Garrison Artillery,
becoming the 73rd, 74th, 71st, 72nd, and 75th Siege Batteries, R.G.A.
In April 1916 a sixth battery, the 125th, was formed. Early in 1918 a
seventh battery, the 542nd, and an eighth, the 496th, were created, but
when they arrived in France they were broken up, and their guns and
_personnel_ distributed, the first between the 75th and the 125th,
and the second between the 72nd and 74th. A ninth battery, the 552nd,
armed with 8-inch guns, was formed in the autumn of 1918, but the War
ended before it could be brought into action. We have therefore to
deal with six siege batteries, which were engaged in France from the
summer of 1916 to the date of the armistice. At first the batteries were
independent units, being allotted to widely separated corps and heavy
artillery groups. It was not till the beginning of 1918 that they were
brought together, and two South African Brigades formed, the 44th and the
50th—the 44th including the 73rd (S.A.), 71st (S.A.), 125th (S.A.), and
20th Batteries; and the 50th, the 74th (S.A.), 72nd (S.A.), 75th (S.A.),
and 275th. It will be convenient to take the doings of each battery
separately up to January 1918, and thereafter to deal with the record of
the two brigades.
THE 73RD SIEGE BATTERY, R.G.A.
This Battery, after its period of training in England, landed at Havre
on May 1, 1916, under the command of Major Walter Brydon. On 9th May it
reached Bienvillers-au-Bois, in the Somme area, where it took up a battle
position under the command of the 19th Artillery Group. On 15th May it
fired its first round for sighting purposes. On 1st July, when the First
Battle of the Somme began, it covered the infantry advance on Gommecourt,
attaining the record of thirty-two rounds in eight minutes with each gun.
On 17th July it moved to the village of Berles-au-Bois, and was engaged
in smashing enemy trenches and counter-battery work in the neighbourhood
of Monchy-au-Bois and Ransart. On 25th August it moved back to Doullens,
and thence to Albert, where it took up position in the ruins of La
Boisselle. Here it supported the attack on Pozières, Courcelette, and
Thiepval; and Major Brydon was wounded while observing for the Battery
in the front trenches. In October it advanced its position to Pozières,
where it suffered considerably from enemy fire, and had its fill of
discomforts from the weather of that appalling winter. In February 1917
Major Brydon returned to duty; and on the 15th of that month two officers
of the Battery, Lieutenant Campion and Second-Lieutenant J. Currie,
advancing with the infantry to the capture of Boom ravine, rallied two
companies whose officers had all been killed, and captured two strong
machine-gun posts. Lieutenant Campion fell in this gallant exploit, and
Second-Lieutenant Currie received the D.S.O.
In March, in a heavy snowfall, the Battery left the Somme and went
north to the Arras area, where, in the Battle of Arras on 9th April,
it supported the attack of the Canadians on Vimy Ridge. By noon the
advance had progressed so far that the Battery was out of range, and
moved forward first to Écurie and then to Thélus. Thélus proved a hot
corner, and the Battery had many casualties, notably on 1st May, Major
Brydon being wounded for the second time. Soon after it was relieved and
retired to Houdain, its first spell out of the line since its arrival
in France. It returned to Thélus on 28th May, Captain P. A. M. Hands
being temporarily in command, and remained there till the last day of
June, when it was transferred to Flanders. Its new position was in the
Ypres salient, at the village of Zillebeke, close to Hill 60, where it
was much exposed to the enemy’s fire, and within 1,000 yards of his
front lines. Owing to this, working parties had to be sent up overnight,
going in single file for over three miles, past such places of proved
unhealthiness as “Hell Fire Corner” and “Shrapnel Corner.” The guns were
in position by the 17th July, and on the 25th Major Brydon came back
from hospital. The Battery was bombed night and day by enemy aircraft,
and had no means of making shell-proof cover, for the water was only two
feet below the surface of the ground. On 29th August it was relieved for
a short space, but it was not till 1st November that it finally left
Zillebeke and the Second Battle of Ypres. During the four months there
it had nine guns put out of action by hostile fire. On 7th October Major
Brydon was gassed, and went to hospital for the third time.
The Battery returned to its old ground at Thélus, which had now become
a quiet area, and on 11th November moved to Liévin, west of Lens.
Here it had comfortable quarters, and was busy preparing positions in
anticipation of an attack. It pulled out for Christmas to Béthune, and on
January 5, 1918, took up position at Loisne, where it received news of
its inclusion in the new 44th (S.A.) Brigade, R.G.A.
THE 71ST SIEGE BATTERY, R.G.A.
The 71st Battery arrived at Havre on April 16, 1916, under the command
of Major H. C. Harrison. It was destined for the impending operations
on the Somme, and its first position was at Mailly-Maillet in the VIII.
Corps area. On 2nd June, however, it was ordered north to Ypres, where
the Canadians at the moment were heavily engaged. On the 18th it returned
to Mailly-Maillet, where it participated in the opening days of the First
Battle of the Somme. On 5th July it moved to Bécordel, and supported the
attack on Mametz Wood, Ovillers, and Contalmaison, and the September
attack on Martinpuich and Flers. On 20th September it moved forward to
Bazentin, where till the close of the year it was engaged in battling
with the problem of the Somme mud. After a short period of rest it was
at Ovillers on January 2, 1917, and during February and March moved
slowly eastward, following the German retreat. In April it was engaged
against the Hindenburg line, and had a share in the fierce fighting
around Bullecourt. In July and August it had a position at Croisilles,
some 2,000 yards from the enemy front. One sector moved north on 31st
August to a position just outside the Menin gate at Ypres, and the rest
of the Battery followed on 15th September. There it took part in the
Third Battle of Ypres, supporting the attack of the South African Brigade
on 20th September, the first occasion when it was in action along with
its own infantry. Its position was badly exposed, and it suffered many
casualties from enemy shell fire and air-bombing, till it was relieved on
22nd October.
Much worn out, it now moved to Liévin, in the Lens area, where for a
little it had a quieter life. On 8th November it handed over its guns
to the 73rd (S.A.) Siege Battery, and with the guns of the latter went
south to Bapaume. Its new position was in the outskirts of Gouzeaucourt,
where, on 20th November, it shared in the Battle of Cambrai. The German
counter-attack of the 30th came very near its position, and during those
stormy days the Battery, under the command of Major P. N. G. Fitzpatrick,
did brilliant work under great difficulties. Unhappily, on 14th December,
at Beaumetz, Major Fitzpatrick was killed by a chance shell. On the 18th
the guns were withdrawn to Beaumetz, and by the end of the month the
Battery was on the front between Béthune and Lens, one section going
to La Bourse, and the other to Beuvry. Here it became part of the 44th
(S.A.) Brigade.
THE 125TH SIEGE BATTERY, R.G.A.
The 125th Battery was first organized on April 4, 1916, under the command
of Major R. P. G. Begbie. It arrived at Havre on 21st July, and reached
the Third Army area on 26th July, during the fourth week of the First
Battle of the Somme. Its position was at Sailly-au-Bois, on the extreme
left of the battle-ground, where its principal targets were the German
batteries at Puisieux, Bucquoy, and Grandcourt. On 19th October it moved
to the eastern edge of Englebelmer Wood, where it was attached to Sir
Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army. Here it “prepared” and participated in the
attack on Beaumont-Hamel on 13th November. It was a difficult task, for
its gun positions were remote from the road, and every 100 lb. shell had
to be carried some 400 yards through a swamp, until eventually a line of
rails was laid. On January 20, 1917, the Battery moved to a new position
on the Auchonvillers road, half a mile north of Mailly-Maillet, where for
the next few weeks it was engaged by enemy batteries and a German heavy
calibre naval gun, and suffered many losses. On 22nd February it moved
into Beaumont-Hamel, where it had better quarters.
On 22nd March, over impossible roads, the Battery moved north to Arras,
where its first position was beside the Faubourg d’Amiens. On the
second day of the battle of Arras it moved east to St. Sauveur, and on
16th April it went forward a mile east of Tilloy-lès-Mofflaines, on
the Arras-Cambrai road. Here it was much exposed, and three days later
it moved back to the wood of Tilloy. For the next month its guns were
constantly in action by day and night. On 11th May it pulled out for a
much needed rest, during which time it received reinforcements which
brought it up to strength. On 18th June it moved to Roclincourt, in the
Oppy section, where the first leave to England was granted. On 21st July
it took up position at Vermelles-lès-Béthune, in the Lens area. Here
it came under the First Army, and from the 15th to the 23rd August was
heavily engaged in supporting the attack of the Canadians on Hill 70,
east of Loos. On the evening of the latter day it moved forward into the
ruins of Loos, and rendered brilliant service in the action of the 24th.
Its cables were constantly cut by shell fire, and on 5th September it had
28 casualties from a deluge of German gas shells. The _personnel_ of
the Battery was withdrawn to rest between the 9th and 21st of September,
but from the latter date till 8th October it resumed its work in that
section. When the four guns were brought back to Béthune, it was found
that not one was fit for further action.
The Battery was now attached to the Belgian Army as one of the thirteen
siege batteries constituting the XIV. Corps Heavy Artillery. Its position
was in the swampy country in the neighbourhood of Steenvoorde and
Oostkerke. On 3rd December it moved to the La Bassée area, and rejoined
the First Army, taking up position at Annequin. On January 9, 1918, there
came a short space of rest near Lillers. Major Begbie handed over the
command to Major J. G. Stewart, and the Battery became part of the 44th
(S.A.) Brigade.
THE 44TH (SOUTH AFRICAN) HEAVY ARTILLERY BRIGADE.
On January 29, 1918, Lieutenant-Colonel T. H. Blew, D.S.O., of the South
African Defence Force, took command of the Brigade, with headquarters
at Beuvry Château. The four batteries were in position east and south
of Béthune. During February and March this was a quiet sector, but the
batteries were busy preparing reserve positions in depth in view of
a possible German attack. From the first day of April the guns were
actively engaged in counter-battery work.
The German assault came on 9th April, and one of its main objectives
was the right pillar of the British front at Givenchy, held by the 55th
Division. All the battery positions of the Brigade, except that of the
125th, had been located by the enemy, who from the early morning drenched
them with high explosives and gas shells. For a time all communications
with Brigade Headquarters were cut. The falling back of the division on
their left allowed the enemy to advance almost up to their gun positions.
The 73rd Battery was in the most hazardous case, and owing to the
shelling it was impossible to bring up motor transport to evacuate its
guns. Major Brydon, who had returned the month before from hospital to
the command of the Battery, was ordered to blow up his guns, but instead
he served out rifles and a couple of machine guns to his men, and bade
them stand to. At one time he had to send the breech-blocks to the rear
for safety, but the attack was stayed before it reached the guns, and the
breech-blocks were brought back. Though wounded and gassed, he refused to
leave his Battery. Finally he was compelled to retire. The men dragged
the guns for nearly a mile under cover of darkness, and by 2 a.m. on
the morning of the 10th a new position had been found, and the Battery
was again in action. The casualties of the Brigade that day were 13 men
killed, and 6 officers and 29 men wounded.
The stand on the 9th checked the enemy for a time, and all batteries
were able to take up less exposed positions. They suffered, however,
from a continuous bombardment, and on the 12th the heroic commander of
the 73rd was killed by a shell. He had left the doctor’s hands when a
severe burst of German fire began, and had hurried forward to see to his
guns. No officer in the British Army had a finer record for gallantry
and devotion to duty. His Battery was known everywhere on the front as
“Brydon’s Battery,” and he was beloved by his men, for his only thought
was for them. During the 9th, though wounded himself, he helped to dress
the other wounded, and when the men at the guns began to show signs of
exhaustion, he himself dealt out rum to them. Finally he went through a
downpour of shells to find a doctor and more dressings. It was one of the
many ironies of the war that he never received the Victoria Cross, for
he won it a dozen times. Let his epitaph be the words of a gunner in his
Battery, who had served with him only a few weeks, and who on the 9th had
his arms and legs shot away. Major Brydon stopped and asked if he could
do anything for him. The dying man raised himself on his stumps. “By God,
Brydon,” he cried, “you are a man. I’m only good for the parson now, but
I’m proud to die under you.”
The 18th of April saw another severe bombardment, when five officers
of the 73rd Battery were gassed—Captain P. A. M. Hands, the second in
command, and Second-Lieutenants Maasdorp and Brown dying of the effects.
This meant a loss to the Brigade, since the 9th, of five officers dead.
The expenditure of ammunition during that period had been enormous: the
71st Battery, for example, fired 11,000 rounds. The Brigade remained on
the same front till the 27th June, when it was brought out to rest. On
the 27th July Lieutenant-Colonel Blew relinquished his command, being
succeeded temporarily by Major E. H. Tamplin, who, on 17th August,
handed over to Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Bennett, formerly commanding the
74th Battery.
On returning to the line on 2nd August, the Brigade took up positions
farther south in the neighbourhood of Hulluch. On the 22nd its
Headquarters were heavily shelled, and one member of the staff was
killed. During August and September the batteries supported the steady
pressure maintained along this sector in anticipation of the German
retirement, all moving to forward positions. On the 2nd October the
enemy fell back three miles to the line of the Haute-Deule Canal, and
the advance of the Fifth Army began. As soon as roads were repaired, the
guns moved up to Douvrin, Hulluch, and Wingles, and on the 12th October
assisted in the capture of Vendin by the 15th Division. Owing to the
difficulty of bridging the many canals, siege batteries could only follow
very slowly, and the Germans were on the line of the Scheldt before they
came again into action. The enemy kept up a heavy bombardment during the
first week of November, and on the night of the 6th the Brigade suffered
its last casualties in the war. The bridging of the Scheldt was in rapid
progress, and the batteries were preparing to advance across the river,
when on the 11th hostilities ceased.
THE 74TH SIEGE BATTERY, R.G.A.
The 74th Battery landed at Havre on April 30, 1916, under the command
of Major Pickburn. It proceeded to Authuille, and on 4th May took
up position at Bienvillers-au-Bois. On the first day of the First
Battle of the Somme its four guns fired 1,733 rounds, supporting the
unsuccessful attack of the infantry at Gommecourt. It then took over
the position of the 73rd Battery, and later on, 27th August, moved to
the Martinsart-Aveluy road for the operations against Thiepval. On 7th
October it was in the orchard at Colincamp, a place without cover and
a favourite target for the enemy. There it spent some desperate weeks.
On 7th November the battery-commander, Major Pickburn, was killed. On
the 20th November the enemy kept up a severe bombardment all day, and
four gunners lost their lives. It was the same on the 29th, when an
armour-piercing shell penetrated to a cellar protected by seven feet
of earth and bricks, and killed the three occupants. The position was
really untenable for a heavy battery, but it was held till early in
December, when a move was made to Auchonvillers. It presently moved to
Gouy-en-Artois, and then to Arras and the Faubourg d’Amiens. In the early
weeks of the year it was at Rivière, opposite Ficheux, and then again in
a suburb of Arras.
In the battle of Arras the Battery supported the advance of the South
African Infantry Brigade, and on the 12th its right section was in the
old German line at Point de Jour, supporting the fighting in the Oppy,
Gavrelle, and Rœux area. At that time they were the farthest forward
siege guns on the British front. There the Battery continued till the
battle died away. Major Tamplin was gassed and returned to England, Major
Murray-MacGregor taking over the command. By 5th July the whole Battery
had moved to the Ypres neighbourhood, where it took up ground on the
canal bank near “Shrapnel Corner.” There, during the first stages of
Third Ypres, it suffered the usual fate of combatants in the Salient.
Major Murray-MacGregor was succeeded in the command by Major G. M.
Bennett. Presently it moved to a position on the Verbranden-Molen road,
and a little later to Hooge. This was its station during the remainder
of the battle. It had many casualties from shell, fire, and gas, and the
reliefs coming by the Menin road had to face an incessant enemy barrage.
The total men available on each shift were only seventeen for all four
guns, and had not three of the guns been knocked out the task would have
been impossible. When at last the Battery was withdrawn, it was reduced
to 1 gun and 70 men.
On 21st December the Battery, now brought up to strength, went back to
the line as part of the 50th (S.A.) Brigade, R.G.A.
THE 72ND SIEGE BATTERY, R.G.A.
The 72nd Battery landed in France on April 21, 1916, under the command
of Major C. W. Alston. Its first position was at Mailly-Maillet, where
with a very short allowance of ammunition it entered upon its field
experience. It was sent to Ypres on 3rd June along with the 71st to
assist the Canadians, where it had some hard fighting, Major Alston being
severely wounded, and Captain A. G. Mullins taking over the command.
Returning to Mailly, it took part in the opening days of the First
Somme, and then moved first to Englebelmer, and then to Authuille. This
last was an excellent position, with a steep bank in front of the guns
and the Ancre in the rear. The Battery remained there for eight months,
until the retirement of the enemy enabled it to advance to Thiepval and
Grandcourt.
On March 22, 1917, it moved to the Arras neighbourhood, taking up ground
near Berthonval Wood, a few miles east of Mont St. Eloi. From this
position the Battery shared in the battle for Vimy, after the fall of
which it moved forward to Souchez, under the northern end of the ridge.
On 30th April it retired to Houdain for its first spell of rest since
it arrived in France. On 12th May it was at Thélus, and four days later
it was transferred to the 1st Canadian Heavy Artillery Group, and took
up position at Zouave valley, near Givenchy, in the Vimy area. There it
remained for three months, supporting the Canadian attack at Lens.
On 25th October the Battery went north with the Canadian Corps to Ypres,
where it relieved the 73rd (S.A.) Siege Battery in a peculiarly unhealthy
spot between Zillebeke and Observatory Ridge. There, during the first
twenty-four hours, it had twelve casualties. On 17th October the command
was taken over by Captain C. P. Ward. On January 11, 1918, after a period
of rest, the Battery took up position behind the Damm Strasse, near
Wytschaete. It was now brigaded with the 50th (S.A.) Brigade.
THE 75TH SIEGE BATTERY, R.G.A.
The 75th Battery reached France on April 24, 1916, under the command of
Major W. H. L. Tripp. It took up its position on the outskirts of the
town of Albert, near the hospital, being attached to the III. Corps. It
participated in the “preparation” for the First Battle of the Somme,
and on 1st July fired 1,312 rounds before noon. On 14th July it moved
to Bécourt Wood, and on the 29th to a position north of Fricourt Wood.
Here it supported the attack of 15th September. On the 21st of that
month it moved to the wood of Bazentin-le-Grand, where it was in touch
with the South African Infantry Brigade during its fight at the Butte de
Warlencourt. On January 29, 1917, it moved back to Albert, and early
in February went south of the Somme into the old French area. There it
advanced as the Germans fell back, crossing the Somme at Péronne on
25th March, and occupying ground successively at Templeux-la-Fosse and
Longavesnes. On 6th April, at St. Emilie, it fired its first shot against
the Hindenburg Line, and remained in that area till the end of June, when
it moved north to Flanders.
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. H. L. TRIPP, D.S.O., M.C.,
Commanding 75th Siege Battery, S.A.H.A., August 1915-January 1918, then
50th (S.A.) Brigade, R.G.A.]
By 13th July all four guns were in position on the
Vlamertinghe-Elverdinghe road, where, owing to the flat country, the
Battery had great difficulty in finding suitable O.P.’s. On the night
of 30th July it moved forward to the bank of the Ypres Canal, where it
supported the opening of the Third Battle of Ypres. Later it advanced
to the Pilckem ridge, where in a much exposed position it supported
the attack on Houthulst Forest and Passchendaele. It was exceptionally
fortunate, for in all the period from 31st July to 20th December it had
only one officer casualty. In the middle of December it went south to the
Zillebeke lake, and on January 11, 1918, it moved to the Damm Strasse,
near Wytschaete. It was now part of the 50th Brigade.
THE 50TH (SOUTH AFRICAN) HEAVY ARTILLERY BRIGADE.
This Brigade was formed during January 1918, under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. L. Tripp, D.S.O., M.C., formerly of the 75th
Battery. On 28th January it was attached to the Australian Corps,
occupying positions between Zillebeke and Wytschaete. On 26th February
it went into General Headquarters Reserve, being encamped near Bailleul.
On 6th March the 496th (S.A.) Siege Battery arrived, and was split up
between the 72nd and 74th Batteries, making these six-gun batteries.
On 10th March the Brigade was ordered to prepare positions behind the
Portuguese divisions, but the orders were cancelled. On 13th March it
was attached to Sir H. Plumer’s Second Army. On the 24th, after the
great German attack had been launched at St. Quentin, it began to move
southwards, and on the 28th was at Neuville St. Vaast during the German
assault on Arras. On the 30th it was attached to the Canadian Corps.
During April the batteries were in position at Roclincourt, to the
north-east of Arras, and settled down to the familiar type of trench
warfare. Since the whole military situation was uncertain at the
moment, much time had to be spent on the preparation of reserve battery
positions. Five series were selected, varying from three to fifteen miles
behind those in use. On 1st May the Brigade was ordered north, the 72nd
and 74th Batteries joining the I. Corps near Mazingarbe, and the others
going to the XIII. Corps, in the vicinity of Hinges. By the 3rd these
orders were changed, and the whole Brigade was sent to Arras to the XVII.
Corps. There it remained till the end of August, engaged in normal trench
warfare. On 7th August Captain E. G. Ridley, M.C., was promoted major in
command of the 74th Battery, to replace Major Bennett, who had gone to
command the 44th Brigade.
On 26th August the Brigade supported the advance of the Canadian Corps
and the 51st Division, which resulted in the capture of Monchy. The
batteries now began to move forward along the Arras-Cambrai road, where
they were engaged in cutting the wire of the Drocourt-Quéant switch. On
1st September the medical officer of the Brigade, Captain G. R. Cowie,
was seriously wounded, and died two days later. On the 2nd the Canadians
carried the Drocourt-Quéant switch, all the guns in the Brigade assisting
in the preliminary bombardment and the subsequent barrage. Next day the
Brigade passed under the XXII. Corps, which held the line of the Sensée,
in order to protect the flank of the Canadian thrust towards Cambrai.
No serious operations took place for more than three weeks; but on the
27th came the great advance of the Canadian and XVII. Corps towards and
beyond Cambrai, and it became clear that a general enemy retirement was
a matter of days. On 3rd October Major Ridley left for England to form a
new 8-inch S.A. battery, and his place in command of the 74th was taken
by Major C. J. Forder. On the 11th the Brigade came under the Canadian
Corps.
On the 12th the batteries advanced, first to Tortequesne, and then to
Estrées and Noyelle. On the 19th they were at Lewarde. On the 20th a
section of the 74th Battery moved to Wallers to support the Canadian
attack. This was the last engagement of the Brigade in the War, for on
the 24th it was placed in army reserve, and remained there till the
armistice on 11th November.
APPENDIX II.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN SIGNAL COMPANY (R.E.)
INCEPTION AND ORGANIZATION—AUGUST-OCTOBER 1915.
At the beginning of the war the service of communications in the Imperial
Army was organized as the Signals Branch of the Corps of Royal Engineers.
This provided and maintained all communications, comprising Telegraphs,
Telephones, Visual Signalling, and Despatch Riders (Horse, Motor-Cycle,
and Cycle). A Signal Service Company, suitably equipped and organized for
its multifarious duties, was provided in war establishments as a part
of the headquarters of each of the higher formations—Division, Corps,
and Army. The development of scientific trench warfare on the Western
Front vastly increased both the importance and the complexity of the
communications of the contending armies; and when, towards the close of
the campaign in German South-West Africa, the composition of the Union
Oversea Contingent was decided, the offer of a Divisional Signal Company
was willingly accepted by the Imperial authorities.
The raising of this Company was entrusted to Major N. Harrison,
Engineer-in-Chief of the Union Post Office, who had acted as Director
of Signals to the Union Forces during the Rebellion and the German
South-West African Campaign. For the acceptance of his recruits Major
Harrison set such a high standard of specialized knowledge, character,
intelligence, and military experience, that the assembling of the two
hundred and thirty men of the original Company occupied the whole of
August and September 1915. Eventually a magnificent body of picked
men were assembled in Potchefstroom Camp fully representative of all
South Africa, from the Zambesi to Cape Town. In view of the technical
nature of the new unit’s duties, it was natural that a high proportion
of the recruits should come from the Transvaal, and particularly the
Witwatersrand. The relative figures were—
Recruited in Transvaal 53.7 per cent.
(Of these, 64 per cent. from Johannesburg.)
Cape 25 ”
Natal 12.7 ”
Orange Free State 6.6 ”
Rhodesia, etc. 2 ”
The standard of physique was very high, and fully correspondent to the
maturity shown by an average age of 28.4 years. The backbone of the
Company consisted of skilled telegraphists and linemen from the Union
Post Office, the majority of whom had served in German South-West Africa,
and in previous wars. The drivers, whose excellent horsemanship impressed
every one at the training centre in England, were recruited mainly from
the farming population, and included many young Dutchmen.
By the beginning of October all the officers, who had been selected from
officials of the engineering branch of the post office and electrical
engineers of the Witwatersrand, had joined, and on the 17th October the
unit, in company with the S.A.M.C. and details of the South African
Brigade and S.A.H.A., sailed for England on the _Kenilworth Castle_, with
a strength of six officers—Major N. Harrison commanding—Lieutenants J.
A. Dingwall, R. H. Covernton, J. Jack, F. H. Michell, F. M. Ross—and 229
other ranks. The Company arrived at Bordon Camp, Hants, on 4th November.
REORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF THE COMPANY IN ENGLAND—NOVEMBER 1915-APRIL
1916.
Owing to the demands of the German East African Campaign, in which the
Union Government was now engaged, there was no prospect of infantry units
for the Western Front beyond the one brigade already in England. As the
South African Brigade would, therefore, constitute only one-third of the
infantry of some Imperial division, the Company could not serve with the
Infantry Brigade in the capacity of a divisional signal company, as
originally contemplated. On the other hand, new army corps were in course
of formation, and corps signal companies had to be raised and trained
for them. A corps signal company requires a high proportion of skilled
technicians in the ranks, and as, owing to the commanding officer’s care
in selecting his recruits, the company possessed such a proportion, the
War Office decided that it should be reorganized in order to form a Corps
Signal Company, and proceed to the Signal Service Training Centre in
Bedford for the necessary specialized training. The Company accordingly
entrained for Hitchin on the 23rd November, and during the next few days
was reorganized.
A Corps Signal Company exists primarily to provide communication between
the headquarters of an army corps and the infantry divisions with their
associated divisional field artilleries which constitute a corps. For
this purpose it staffs and equips a Corps Headquarters Signal Office,
including telephone exchange, telegraph and despatch rider offices;
constructs such telegraph and telephone lines to divisions as may be
necessary or possible; provides operators at the divisional ends of the
lines, and runs and maintains local telephone lines to the different
sections of the corps staff, and to the different units of the corps
troops. The corps troops—which are those units directly commanded by
corps headquarters—though negligible at the beginning of the war,
increased enormously with the development of the Heavy Artillery, the
Flying Corps, and the rest of the complicated technique of modern
position warfare, until finally their communications dwarfed all others.
In addition, the Corps Signal Company acts as a repair workshop, and
issue store for the signal material and apparatus required by all units
and formations within the corps; assists with and correlates their signal
arrangements, and provides electric lighting for corps headquarters.
To provide for the night and day working and the manning of an advanced
headquarters, the Headquarter Section was organized in three reliefs,
each under a sergeant superintendent. To increase the number of lines
which can be simultaneously run out during a general move, both Air
Line and Cable Sections were divided into two detachments, each under
a sergeant or corporal. Each air line detachment carried material for
five miles of poled line on its lorries, and, after training, became
capable of erecting this line at the rate of a mile an hour. Each cable
detachment carried nine miles of cable, and learned to lay this out at
the gallop when necessary, or at a normal rate of three miles an hour
along roads where precautions for the preservation of the line had to be
taken.
On January 17, 1916, all sections were concentrated in order to continue
their training as a company, and billeted in the small villages of
Clifton, Shefford, and Broome, a few miles from Haynes Park. The
following months were spent in continuous unit training, interspersed
with periods of combined training, known as “Signal Schemes.” In these
“schemes” numbers of signal units awaiting their turn for oversea were
organized as armies—imaginary in all except their communications—and
flung a moving network of lines across the Eastern Counties. It was an
extremely valuable and realistic training for mobile warfare. The drawing
of the Company’s mobilization equipment and the completion of the motor
transport, with the A.S.C. _personnel_ to operate it, followed the news
of Verdun, and the day of embarkation for France was eagerly awaited. The
men grew restive at the idea that the Infantry Brigade had already been
in action in Egypt while they were still training in England.
Towards the end of March Major Harrison went to France in order to
acquire the atmosphere of the trenches. During his absence the great
blizzard of 1916 destroyed much of the post office and railway telegraph
systems in the Midlands. All experienced men in the Company were turned
out to assist in repairs, and the order to move to Southampton for
France arrived when 51 Air Line and portions of all cable sections were
scattered on this work up to a radius of forty miles from headquarters.
Nevertheless the Company was assembled in a few hours, and was ready to
move off at noon next day, with its mass of stores packed complete in
all respects. The headquarters and 51 Air Line moving by road in their
lorries, and the cable sections by train from Hitchin, reassembled at
Southampton on the 10th April, and, sailing in the S.S. _Investigator_
with one of the S.A.H.A. batteries, landed at Havre on the 21st.
IN FRANCE: THE FRICOURT SECTOR—APRIL 1916.
After a day at Havre the move was continued—motor transport sections
by road and cable sections by train—to Vignacourt. At this village in
the Somme Valley, between Abbeville and Amiens, the headquarters of the
newly constituted XV. Corps was concentrating under Lieutenant-General
Horne, and Major Harrison, on the 23rd April, was appointed Assistant
Director of Army Signals—_i.e._ Staff Officer for Signals to the Corps
Commander. The Company now became the XV. Corps Signal Company, and
served continuously with that Corps throughout the remainder of the war.
A few days later the Corps moved into line between the III. and XIII.
Corps, becoming a part of the Fourth Army under General Sir H. Rawlinson,
and took over the sector fronting Fricourt and Mametz, between Bécourt
and Carnoy. On the 30th April the Company took over from the XIII. Corps
Signal Company at Heilly, a village on the Ancre, near Corbie. B.F. and
B.G. sections were sent to join the headquarters of the two divisions
in line—the 7th and 21st respectively—and B.F. section proceeded to
Ville-sur-Ancre, where Brigadier-General Napier, commanding the Corps
Heavy Artillery, had his headquarters, and took charge of the Heavy
Artillery’s communications on the 27th April.
The experience of previous battles had shown that, next to an adequate
artillery, the primary technical condition for a successful offensive
was good and reliable communication between the assaulting infantry,
the directing staffs, and the supporting artillery. Overground wires,
no matter how multiplied, failed immediately under the counter-barrage.
Visual signalling, slow at the best, was generally ineffective because
of the smoke and dust of the barrage, the exposure of the _personnel_,
and the unsuitability of the terrain, so faith was now pinned on cables
laid in deep trenches for thousands of yards in rear of the front line,
carrier pigeons, and runners. As soon as the area could be thoroughly
surveyed, a programme of work was drawn up covering:—
(_a_) Reconstruction of and additions to the inadequate open
wire routes in the back area, from Corps headquarters up
to behind Méaulte, Morlancourt, and the Bois des Tailles,
sufficient to cope with the number of units and formations
to be thrown in for the battle, and suitably designed and
located for rapid extension along the probable roads of
the anticipated advance.
(_b_) A complete network of cable trenches extending from the
heads of the open wire routes to the front line, providing
telephone communication down to company and battery command
posts and artillery observation posts.
In the early part of 1916 the deficiencies of technical equipment, in
the supply of materials and of labour, were still great. The Signal
Sections were then equipped for mobile warfare only, and found themselves
carrying out heavy semi-permanent work with scarcely any of the usual
tools and appliances. The work of the Ministry of Munitions had not yet
produced its full fruits in supply, and though the Deputy-Director of
Army Signals—Colonel R. G. Earle—did everything possible to meet the
Company’s requirements, signal material—particularly cable—was scanty,
and deliveries of a hand-to-mouth order. The Labour Corps was then a
thing of the future, and, therefore, the whole of the massive works
required for the offensive—roads, railways, dumps, dug-outs, etc.—had
to be performed by the infantry in their turns out of the line. In such
circumstances there was never enough labour to go round, and it required
all the commanding officer’s tact and persuasiveness to secure the
minimum of digging labour required for the cable trenches; all other
unskilled work had to be thrown on the skilled sappers of the Company,
and to free the outdoor men for construction, the telegraphists, after a
long day at their instruments, had often to spend half the night loading
and off-loading in the forward area masses of cable, poles, and line
material.
Labour for the Heavy Artillery cable trenches was not secured till June,
when two battalions from each division were placed under the direction
of Lieutenant Ross for this work. Digging the trenches and laying cable
were then pressed forward continuously night and day. Much of the work
was only possible at night, as the ground was under direct observation,
and the few skilled sappers available, after working most of the night
with infantry digging parties, had to be turned out again at dawn, day
after day, to take charge of scratch cable-laying parties made up from
the signallers of batteries. The Heavy Artillery allotment for the XV.
Corps in the coming battle was twenty-three batteries, organized in five
groups, and an independent railway battery. The tactical conditions
made the communication problem one of peculiar difficulty, because they
enforced the siting of the batteries in two main clusters—one in the
valley of the Ancre and the other in Happy Valley—both on the extreme
flanks of the Corps’ frontage. Further, owing to the enemy’s tenure of
the Fricourt salient, many batteries, to carry out their work, had to
establish communication with observation posts sited on the opposite
flank of the Corps area to the position of the batteries, and the most
favourable O.P. positions lay far outside the Corps boundaries. The fact
that many of the batteries only took position and settled on their O.P.’s
in the last few days was an additional complication.
When these difficulties had been more or less successfully disposed of
and laying commenced, a minor but vital detail in the material threatened
disaster. The cable coming forward proved to be mainly single D 5—_i.e._
the standard army cable as supplied for overground use in mobile
warfare, when few lines are laid and there is no objection to the earth
constituting the return circuit. The results already known to have been
obtained by the enemy in picking up our messages through earth by means
of sensitive listening telephone apparatus, had already caused the issue
of stringent orders that all lines within 1,600 yards—later increased to
3,000 yards—of the front line must be metallic circuits—_i.e._ each line
had to consist of a pair of insulated wires. Also, owing to inductive
effects when a number of pairs of wires are laid closely parallel to each
other, as in a trench, a conversation over one pair will be heard in the
other circuits unless each pair is twisted. The use of the single cable,
therefore, not only doubled the work of laying (as each line necessitated
two separate wires), but the untwisted pairs so formed would render the
lines noisy and possibly entirely unworkable. Utilizing the frame of a
cable wagon trail, and one of its wheels as a foundation, a machine was
rapidly improvised by the section on which the drums of single cable were
mounted as received, spun into twisted cable, and simultaneously reeled
off on other drums for the laying parties. This apparatus was kept going
and running at high pressure by the section wheeler, Sapper Page, with
a few Artillery Headquarters’ grooms and batmen as his only available
assistants.
By such strenuous efforts the programme was completed, and when the
preparatory bombardment opened, 500 miles of cable had been laid and
joined up in over twenty miles of cable trench, and every battery had
excellent and reliable communication forward to its observation posts
and back to its group commander. Two dug-outs had been constructed on
each flank, into which all O.P. lines were led and terminated on special
switchboards, designed and made up at the Company Headquarters.
Through these O.P. exchanges any battery could be connected to any
O.P. for control of fire, which proved most valuable in the changing
circumstances of the fighting. At that date the establishment of neither
groups nor batteries included switchboards for metallic circuit lines.
The necessary number—over thirty—were improvised in a few days at the
Company workshops out of electric light fittings purchased in Amiens.
Meanwhile the other sections working at similar high pressure had
completed the main communications from Corps Headquarters to the Battle
Headquarters of the divisions, the 7th in dug-outs near Groveton, and
the 21st in dug-outs on the edge of the plateau above Méaulte, and
B.F. section had established and staffed a Corps Advanced Exchange
at Morlancourt. The Carrier Pigeon Service had been organized and
arrangements made for the systematic distribution of pigeons to the
assaulting brigades from the main lofts in Heilly, Albert, and Méaulte,
and the most rapid circulation from the pigeon lofts to all staffs
concerned of information contained in messages brought by the birds
returning from the front line.
A wireless detachment was supplied from Fourth Army Signals, and the
_personnel_ completed by skilled operators selected from the Company. The
Headquarters Station was fixed on the high ground near the Bray-Albert
road on the cable trench between the two O.P. exchanges, and provided
with direct communication to Corps through the underground system, and
mobile stations were attached to the Signals of the attacking divisions.
The Corps Staff Observation Posts in Péronne Avenue trench and the Grand
Stand above Bonte Redoubt were connected by direct lines to the General
Staff at Headquarters in Heilly, about ten miles off, and the special
linemen provided to look after these lines kept them through without
interruption during the attack.
THE SOMME BATTLE—JULY-NOVEMBER 1916.
In the early morning of the 1st July, after a continuous bombardment from
the 25th June, the XV. Corps attacked with the 7th Division on the right,
the 21st on the left, and the 17th in support. Hopes of a decisive
victory ran high, and all signal arrangements for a rapid advance were
in readiness, including the lines necessary to divert communications
to Vivier Mill, outside Méaulte, which was to be the first bound of
the Corps Headquarters, while the cable sections stood by with wagons
packed during the morning. In spite of the gallantry of the infantry
assault—which several of the Company were privileged to witness from the
advanced trenches—by the evening it was clear that no great depth would
be attained.
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL N. HARRISON, C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding
South African Signal Company (R.E.).]
The village of Fricourt was still holding out, and had repulsed a frontal
attack with heavy loss, while the converging attacks of the 7th and 21st
Divisions on the flanks of the salient, which were to have pinched it
out, had carried Mametz, but just failed to link up behind Fricourt. The
III. Corps on our left had taken La Boisselle and entered Ovillers, but
had been driven out again; Montauban had fallen to the XIII. Corps on the
right, but heavy fighting continued. Fricourt was bombarded all night by
heavy howitzers, and deluged with a new gas shell by a brigade of French
75’s, which, together with an additional brigade of heavies, had been
attached to the Corps Heavy Artillery shortly before the battle. When
the infantry advanced next morning the village was found evacuated, and
a party from B.E. section were able to make a preliminary reconnaissance
for pushing forward the artillery routes. Our tenure of the high ground
between Mametz and Montauban was now sufficiently secured, and the
roads Méaulte-Fricourt and Carnoy-Mametz repaired to such an extent as
to permit the advance of the heavy batteries to positions about our
old front line. The artillery moves having thus begun, B.E. section
thenceforward found itself taxed to the limit to keep pace with them.
There were now seven groups to keep in touch, including the two attached
French groups.
It was evident from the map that while the fighting for Mametz Wood
continued, the new centre of observation would be about Pommiers
Redoubt—the highest point of the Mametz-Montauban ridge—and after a hasty
reconnaissance which located our advanced line down the forward slope
about Caterpillar Wood, it was decided to lay a few pairs of armoured
cable up the old German trenches from the new battery positions about
Carnoy and Fricourt. The only armoured cable to be obtained was a portion
of that already laid in the trench between the two O.P. exchanges. A
few signallers having been collected from the batteries, this heavy
armoured cable was recovered from the trench, conveyed forward by wagon,
and again laid out up to Pommiers Redoubt. In doing this work the effect
of the appalling road and traffic conditions which clogged all effort
throughout the Somme was first clearly appreciated. The XV. Corps was
unfortunately placed, in that no main road ran forward through its front.
From beginning to end of the battle, the only traffic artery was the
narrow country by-road from Méaulte to Fricourt, and thence by Mametz to
Montauban.
Such transport conditions bore more hardly on signals than any other
service. With activities spread over the whole area, a very limited
_personnel_ and transport, and ever-changing conditions, which
often stultified by nightfall all the laborious effort of the day,
the difficulty of getting parties to a given spot at a given time,
co-ordinating the supply of materials and labour, controlling the working
parties and switching them to meet emergencies as they arose, was a
splendid schooling in patience, temper, and too often in resignation to
fate. This remained the paramount factor in the Company’s experience
throughout the Somme. As an example, a cable wagon of B.E. section took
its place in a melancholy queue at 7 a.m., and arrived at its working
point near Montauban at 2 p.m., to lay a short line required urgently at
noon, and involving about half an hour’s work. The party returned via
Carnoy in accordance with the traffic circuit, and encountering similar
conditions, reached headquarters near Méaulte at 10 p.m., with horses
and men exhausted. Under the same difficulties, 51 Air Line Section was
engaged in following up the advance with a light open wire route up to
Fricourt, and B.G. and B.F. Sections were worked with the 21st Division
Signals and the Corps Observers respectively.
The commencement of active operations brought the work of the operators
and the despatch riders at headquarters and with the heavy artillery to
a point of extreme pressure, which was maintained with little variation
throughout the following months. Up to two thousand telegrams, and a
larger number still of D.R.L.S. packets, were received or despatched
daily. The telephone exchanges at Corps and Heavy Artillery Headquarters,
with over sixty and thirty connections respectively, worked hard day and
night, handling urgent priority calls; but so keen and expert were the
operators that a service was maintained equal, if not superior, to the
highest civilian standard. The destruction of lines by hostile shelling
and traffic was met by the skilful use of alternative routes and by the
quickness and energy of the maintenance linemen. However, the incessant
strain to which the operators were subjected soon began to affect their
nerves, and before the Company was withdrawn men resting off duty could
be heard answering imaginary calls in their sleep.
On the 10th July B.G. Section, under the command of Lieutenant Covernton,
did a notably fine performance in laying and maintaining lines through
the intense barrages surrounding Mametz Wood. One of the first Valve
Amplifying Listening Sets supplied to the British forces for use in
intercepting enemy messages, by picking up weak leakage or induced
currents through earth or along parallel conductors, had been issued to
the Company for trial. As a large number of enemy cables ran through
Mametz Wood, and some extended to enemy territory behind it, favourable
results seemed probable. Lieutenant Collins took up the set, and tracing
the cables into No Man’s Land, tapped in there. Though, owing to the
excellent discipline of the enemy in obeying the limitations prescribed
for use of wire communication in the front line, no tactical messages
were obtained, this officer afterwards obtained recognition of his
courageous and enterprising efforts.
On the 14th July another general assault secured the line along the ridge
between Bazentin-le-Petit and Longueval. Accordingly, heavy batteries
were moved up as far as Caterpillar Wood in the valley in front of
Montauban, and on the 15th a party of B.E. section reconnoitred for lines
to Bazentin-le-Petit, in which village it was proposed to establish
H.A. Headquarters. The German reaction had, however, already begun, and
the party found the conditions in the village highly unsuited for a
headquarters, so much so that a warm infantry combat was proceeding in
the outskirts. High Wood had to be evacuated as too advanced to hold, and
the memorable struggle of the South African Infantry Brigade for Delville
Wood had begun. Nevertheless, over a mile of ground had been gained,
and the corresponding extension of communications necessarily taxed all
sections to their limit. The advanced headquarters of divisions moved up
to the famous dug-outs in the chalk under the ruins of Fricourt Château,
in which, thirty feet underground, with the amenities of electric light,
panelled walls, and artificial ventilation, the German Staff had dwelt
during the bombardment of the village. A twenty-four wire heavy route
was rapidly constructed by the 4th Army Signals from Méaulte to this
point, and thence to Mametz, in readiness for the advance, and the wire
light route built by the Company was extended by the Air Line Section
past Fricourt, up Death Valley, to Mametz Wood. The next deep advance
was not, however, to occur till two months later, as the corps front was
now becoming a salient, and it was necessary to clear the flanks and
broaden the base of the attack. Therefore, while the Anzac Corps and
III. Corps on the left, and the XIII. Corps succeeded by the XIV. Corps
on the right, hammered away round Pozières and Ginchy respectively, the
XV. Corps was engaged in continuous auxiliary attacks, and its heavy
artillery co-operated largely with the operations of the flanking corps.
This situation did not bring any relaxation to the Signal Company. The
German artillery, whose work behind the front line had been feeble
immediately after the 1st July, had now been heavily reinforced, and the
salient position of the Corps inevitably drew much enfilade fire. One
of the effects was the continuous destruction of lines back to points
thousands of yards from the front. In moving up after the 14th July,
all units had finally passed beyond the buried cables laid down for the
battle. Forward lines were now entirely overground, and if not blown up
by direct hits, were cut by the smallest splinters.
As the month of July wore on the demand for additional forward
communication and the strength of the hostile fire increased. It was
obvious that no satisfactory communication could be secured beyond
Fricourt except by burying, and Major Harrison finally succeeded in
securing a small labour party from the Corps Cyclist Battalion for this
purpose. It was decided to commence by burying sixteen pairs of armoured
cable from the head of the open route at Mametz to Pommiers Redoubt
dug-outs, where there were now Brigade Headquarters and Divisional Report
Centres. The work was entrusted to B.G. Section and proved difficult, not
only because of the maze of old trenches, barbed wire, and shell-holes
through which the cable trench had to go, but also because of the
frequent shelling of Mametz and along the ridge. On the 28th Lieutenant
Covernton, while superintending this work, was badly wounded. Lieutenant
Baker took over B.G. Section, completed the trench, and subsequently
extended the cables to Caterpillar Trench. At the same time, 51 Air
Line Section diverted the open wire route between Fricourt and Mametz,
by constructing a substantial pole route skirting both villages, which
carried eight pairs of twisted D 5 cables hung in slotted boards. This
cable route was not only much less frequently shelled down—a daily
occurrence with the open route—but could be quickly repaired, as the
cable when cut could be rejointed and worked, even if lying on the ground.
This method of substantial poled cable routes could and would have
been used to a greater extent but for the deficiency of material.
The consumption of cable by units in line was appalling. Artillery
Observation Post Lines, laid overground, were badly cut about by shell
fire, and had to be renewed every few days, and sometimes daily. In the
case of the heavy batteries, these lines were often of great length, and
ran to more than one O.P. For instance, the 34th Siege Battery, sited
to the left of Fricourt, had about this period lines out to O.P.’s at
Longueval and at the windmill in front of Bazentin-le-Grand, a total line
length of over eleven miles.
During the comparative lull towards the end of July the shelling of the
Fricourt area became so pronounced that, pending the next general attack,
the headquarters of the divisions in line were moved back to Bellevue
Farm—between Méaulte and Albert—and the opportunity was at once taken to
transfer the Corps Exchange in Fricourt into the dug-outs so vacated.
The Armstrong hut had luckily escaped so far, but several shells had
pitched within a few yards of it, and the operators deserved great credit
for the way they stuck to their duties without the slightest protection
through the periodical shellings. A new route was built by 51 Air Line
from Bellevue Farm to link up this new position with the main forward
route at Vivier Mill, and was calculated on a scale sufficient to meet
requirements in the event of the headquarters of the Corps moving to
Bellevue Farm when the advance resumed.
Throughout the war, but particularly in this earlier period, the
difficulties of Signals did not arise exclusively from the terrain and
from enemy action, but to a great extent from careless and thoughtless
conduct on the part of the other arms. Much damage to lines was done
by cross-country traffic at night, largely unavoidable but much also
avoidable, if a better understanding of the importance of communication
had existed in the non-technical units. When an infantryman found
himself in reserve a few thousand yards behind the front line, and
lacking a piece of cord to fix up his bivouac, cut a few yards out of
a cable which had been strung across the ground in his vicinity, he
did not realize that the line so put out of action might well be the
observation line of a heavy battery, that the damage he had done in a few
seconds might take an over-worked lineman hours to locate and repair,
and that meanwhile the battery would be blinded and his comrades in the
front line deprived of its instant and effective support. A typical
instance occurred on the night of the 3rd July. The group of French 75’s
attached to Corps Heavy Artillery had moved suddenly late in the evening
to support operations at Mametz Wood next morning. Communication was
established through one of the buried trenches by 10 p.m., but an hour
later this and other lines in the trench went full earth. At 3 a.m.,
after tracing the cable inch by inch through a dark night, and tapping in
at intervals as he progressed, the exhausted lineman found that a company
in support had decided that the cable trench would make a good temporary
cook-house, and, of course, had burnt all the twelve pairs of wires in
the trench. To the infinite relief of the H.A. Signal Officer, this
proved to be the only damage done, and the wires were set going again
before dawn and in time for the operations.
Long before the Somme Battle, the exigencies of trench warfare had
altered the original organization of army corps. The corps had ceased to
be a unit composed of specific divisions, and divisions were no longer
affiliated permanently to one corps, but moved at frequent intervals
from quiet sectors to active ones to take part in an offensive, and
after a short period of heavy losses and extreme exertion would be
again withdrawn to another quiet sector or a training area for rest,
recruitment, and refit. Therefore, on a front like the Somme, a
continuous stream of divisions passed through the corps, each taking its
share of the fighting and being in turn relieved. As the Corps Signal
Company, like the brook, “went on for ever,” it had to fit each fresh
division into the frame of the existing communications as they chanced
to stand at the moment, and assist the divisional signals to pick up and
utilize the available lines. The organization had, also, to be elastic
enough to meet the requirements of administering anything from two to
seven divisions simultaneously. During the Somme, nineteen different
divisions passed through the XV. Corps, and as many of them went
through the furnace more than once, there were altogether fifty-three
divisional changes. What work this involved to the Corps Signal Company
in the transferring of lines, the directing of traffic, the continuous
alteration of records, and the supply of material can be readily imagined.
The excellence of the work of the B.E. Section with the Heavy Artillery
was recognized in a communication addressed to Major Harrison, in which
the Corps commander stated that he much appreciated the work done by
Lieutenant Ross and his party, and considered that the work of this
section was typical of the whole South African Signal Company. When
General Horne himself left the Corps at a later date, to take command of
the First Army, he had evidently seen no reason to alter his opinion of
the Company, for in taking leave of the A.D.A.S. he congratulated him on
commanding a unit second to none in France.
The operations continued to be hampered by rain at each of the critical
phases, but by the beginning of September the flanking corps had made
the necessary progress and everything was in readiness for the great
attack of 15th September. The vital importance of secure communication
being fully appreciated by the Staff, the necessary labour was made
available for a considerable buried scheme. A buried water-pipe laid
by the enemy between Longueval and Montauban had been located, and
considerable effort was expended by B.F. section in investigating the
possibility of using this pipe for running cable through. It was finally
decided that its exploitation would not be justified in view of the small
depth of the bury, and the extensive damage already done by shell fire.
The first section of the new bury consisted of a six-foot-deep cable
trench, extending from Pommiers Redoubt _via_ the famous Cosy Corner,
where the Carnoy and Mametz roads join outside Montauban, and thence
to York Trench on the left of Longueval. This trench had nine framed
test points let into the walls every four hundred and forty yards, and
contained forty-five pairs of cable. The accumulation of the necessary
quantities of cable suitable for the work presented great difficulty,
and the trench probably set up a record for the number of different
varieties it contained—from nineteen pair V.I.R., as thick and heavy as
a hawser and supplied on drums weighing over half a ton each, to one
pair G.P. Twin about as stout as a double boot-lace. The actual digging
was done by a battalion of the 7th Division, the work being under the
charge of Lieutenant Collins, assisted by Lieutenant Baker, with B.G.
section and most of the sappers of B.E. and W.W. sections. The mud of the
Somme will go down to history: and as the line of the trenches included
some excellent samples of it, the distribution along the trench of the
heavy cable drums and the pipes for crossing under tracks presented
great difficulties. The jointing, terminating, and testing of the wires
had to be completed against time, and with a limited number of expert
men, as the maintenance of the widespread network for which the Company
was responsible had absorbed many of the best men out of all sections.
The lines were, however, ready in time for the divisions who had moved
Headquarters up again to Fricourt and Pommiers Redoubt, with Advanced
Headquarters at York Trench, and also for the Heavy Artillery, most of
whose batteries took positions along the Mametz-Montauban ridge and in
folds of the forward slope towards Caterpillar Wood and Longueval. To
cope with the steady forward drift of the Corps units, and to provide
another advance maintenance point, a new Corps Forward Exchange was
established in a dug-out at Pommiers, and after the attack B.E. section
staffed this exchange and maintained the area.
The attack on 15th September proved highly successful and not too
costly in life, a depth of over a mile being made good, including the
villages of Courcelette, Martinpuich, and Flers. Communications held
well throughout the day, and the good liaison between infantry and
artillery so secured played an important part in the result. The recently
introduced Power Buzzers for transmitting high-power buzzer signals
through earth to be picked up by Valve Amplifying Receivers at distances
up to three thousand yards, were used with fair success in the advance.
These sets were controlled by the Wireless Section, but the forward
stations were manned by signallers of the attacking battalions. The
comparative inexperience and lack of special training of these signallers
prevented the best being got out of the instruments, but the limited
establishment of the Signal Service prevented any other procedure.
The advance rendered a further extension of the cable trench urgent, but
for the moment suitable cable for a permanent bury was not available.
Another section of trench, however, was dug immediately in order that
units might have the benefit of its protection in running temporary
field cables forward. This section extended from York Trench through
the corner of Delville Wood to Switch Trench, and the digging proved a
gruesome task, as Delville Wood and neighbourhood was a huge graveyard.
In the sides of the trench were visible more than one pitiful reminder
that our heroic comrades of the Infantry Brigade had fought and died
there. To prevent confusion and facilitate maintenance, the left-hand
side of the new trench was assigned to divisions and the right to the
Heavy Artillery, the Headquarters Signals of which prepared and erected
along the trench fixtures for cables in the shape of angle iron high-wire
entanglement pickets, each having a piece of two-inch by two-inch wood
screwed to it with a dozen diagonal slots cut in it for the cable.
The cutting and slotting of so many pieces—upwards of one thousand
five hundred—was a task beyond hand methods, but was accomplished in
three days by obtaining a power-band saw from a factory in Albert,
and connecting it up with the water wheel at Vivier Mill by a belt
extemporized from the driving bands of the cable wagon winding gears.
During this period occurred a noteworthy performance in rapid repair of
cable routes. The main cable trench about midnight received a direct hit
from a large shell, severing all communication; but fortunately a party
of B.E. section was returning down the trench from forward work, and
came on the shell crater soon afterwards. Though already worn out with a
long day’s work and struggling through the mud, they at once started to
dig up the cable ends, sending a man to summon assistance by tapping in
at the next test point in the trench, and succeeded in getting all the
forty-five pairs of wires rejointed and working again in _three hours_.
Liaison lines had grown formidably in numbers. Direct lines were now
demanded not only between Heavy Artillery Headquarters and the Artillery
Headquarters of all divisions in line, but between the divisional
artilleries and the majority of the Heavy Artillery Groups. There had
been a great development of the service of Observation in the shape
of artillery aeroplanes, kite balloons, of which there were now three
sections attached to the Corps and Observation Groups of the R.E. Survey
battalion. Whenever possible lines were now required from these units,
not only to the artillery groups, but to the batteries specially assigned
for counter-battery work. To co-ordinate and render fully effective this
work of the systematic location and destruction or neutralization of
hostile batteries, a special staff, commanded by a colonel, had been
added to the H.A. Headquarters, and this staff, in its turn, required
additional direct lines and communication facilities to enable it to
function promptly and effectively.
The evil luck that, except in the initial push, caused every successful
attack to be followed by broken weather, still held good and hampered
all preparations for the assault on the next entrenched line; but by
herculean efforts the necessary organization for another general attack
on the 25th September was completed. Road conditions up to a certain
point forward were now beginning to improve under the triple influences
of the introduction of Décauville tramways for the conveying of the heavy
ammunition in the forward area, the extension of broad-gauge ammunition
railheads to Fricourt and Caterpillar Wood, and the removal of water
lorries from the roads by the completion of a vast system of pipe lines
extending back to the Ancre and the Somme through which the river water
was pumped after treatment in chlorinating plants.
On the 25th the intermediate German line, including Morval, Lesbœufs,
and Gueudecourt, succumbed, and the Corps front again advanced over a
mile. On the 26th the victory was completed by the Fifth Army’s capture
of Thiepval, and once again the roseate prospect of a great victory and
of reaching Bapaume before winter cheered the tired troops, and kept
the Signal Company’s hands full with preparations for forward moves of
all headquarters. The weather, however, intervened on the side of the
Germans, and breaking decisively on the 26th, remained miserably cold and
wet thenceforward, and largely stultified the heroic efforts repeatedly
made throughout October.
During this period, the heavy batteries of some of the H.A. Group
Headquarters moved up to and in front of Longueval, necessitating the
running of many new cable lines. Permanent cable was laid in the second
section of the main cable trench up to Longueval, and a third section of
trench was dug forwards to the sugar works at Factory Corner in front of
Flers. An experimental trench was started near Longueval, with a trench
excavator loaned by the French, which was, in effect, a small land dredge
mounted on a motor lorry chassis and driven by its engine. This machine
could excavate a cable trench eighteen inches wide and up to seven feet
deep in ordinary soil with ease, but it was immobile on the terrain of
the Somme, and could not be manœuvred except with the assistance of an
artillery caterpillar tractor. Consequent on this trial improved machines
were ordered from America for next year’s campaign, but the Corps Signal
Company did not have the opportunity of using them.
At the end of October the Anzac Corps, under General Birdwood, relieved
the XV. Corps commanded by Sir John Ducane since the departure of General
Horne. As there was then no other Corps Signal Company in France formed
from Colonial troops, it appeared possible that the Company would be
retained in line with the Anzacs. It is no disparagement of the spirit of
the men to state that every one heaved a sigh of relief when it became
known that “K” Corps Signal Company was to take over. In truth, nearly
all were bone-weary and temporarily played out, and every section badly
needed a spell out of the line to reorganize and refit. There had been
no leave granted in the line, and those with ties in England eagerly
anticipated its reopening.
In view of the extensive system to be taken over, the relief by “K” Corps
Signal Company was conducted gradually, and B.E., the last section to
leave the line, did not reach the new headquarters at Long until the
middle of November. Long proved to be a tiny old-world village on the
left bank of the Somme a few miles upstream from Abbeville. A liberal
allotment of leave permits was soon issued, and a batch of men were
sent off daily, while the less fortunate ones overhauled, cleaned, and
repaired equipment, improved billets and horse standings, and carried out
the signal work still required. For Signal Companies in the field there
is no such thing as “complete rest,” even in the rest area.
On Major Harrison’s promotion, Captain Dingwall now assumed the executive
control of the Company, but scarcely had the sections completed their
refit, when orders were suddenly received for the Corps to take over a
portion of the French front in the Péronne sector, with the 4th, 8th,
33rd, and 40th Divisions then in rest.
THE WINTER CAMPAIGN ON THE SOMME—16TH DECEMBER-17TH MARCH.
The move into line commenced on the 3rd December, and was completed on
the 6th. The cable sections, so depleted by the large numbers on leave
that they were unable to fill the saddles of the mounted men, moved with
the Divisional Signal Companies, and were directed—B.E. and B.G. on Bray,
and B.F. on Maricourt.
Headquarters and the air line section joined the Corps Headquarters at
Etinehem, a village on the right bank of the Somme, a mile or so west
of Bray. In their weakened condition all sections had a most strenuous
time taking over communications as released by the French, testing the
routes out, reorganizing the lines and connecting up units as they
arrived. The Corps front extended from the XIV. Corps boundary on the
north at Combles, previously the extreme right of the British line, to
near Bouchavesnes, and ran in front of St. Pierre Vaast Wood, where the
most desperate French attacks in the autumn had, like our own in the
north, been stifled in the mud. The terrain as a whole was of similar
nature and condition to that in the Longueval sector, but the roads were
better, Décauville tramways existed, and best of all, from a signal
point of view, a very fair network of deep cable trenches had been dug
in the forward area. Though the cable used in these “buries”—mainly one
pair lead covered with impregnated paper insulation—proved unreliable
in insulation, and much trouble was caused and many circuits lost
thereby, yet the “buries” proved very useful, and, supplemented by
the construction system of several new open routes in rear, enabled
a communication system to be rapidly completed, sufficient for the
needs of the defensive winter campaign. Corps forward exchanges were
established with the Heavy Artillery Headquarters in excellent French
dug-outs at Bois Louage in front of Maurepas, as at Maricourt, in charge
of B.F. section, and with B.G. section at Bray, where the horse lines
of all cable sections were shortly concentrated. The sappers of B.E.
section remained with H.A. Headquarters under Lieutenant Collins, who
replaced Captain Ross as H.A. Signal Officer, while the latter did duty
at Headquarters during the successive sick leaves of Lieutenant-Colonel
Harrison and Captain Dingwall.
Etinehem proved a most miserable headquarters. The village was much
overcrowded, and the billets so wretched that some of them did not even
afford an adequate shelter from the weather of the most severe winter
known in France for over twenty years. The only redeeming feature of the
place was that its situation on the river enabled the many tons of heavy
signal stores now in the Company’s possession to be brought up the Somme
from Long by barge, so releasing the lorries for urgent construction
work. The pressure of duty on the limited numbers of men available,
as well as the shortage of material, fuel, and of daylight, made it
difficult for some time to improve conditions. Authority for additional
blankets and for the issue of waterproof clothing to the linemen was
obtained, but the poor conditions, the severity of the weather, and the
lowered vitality, due to the lack of a sufficient recuperative period
after the summer campaign, resulted in a heavy and increasing sick list,
reaching forty daily, and the evacuation of considerable numbers to
hospital with pulmonary complaints. This state of affairs, coupled with
difficulties experienced in obtaining reinforcements, kept the Company
much below normal strength for several months.
During December it was understood that the French contemplated launching
an attack against Mont St. Quentin and Péronne, and to this end they
retained a frontage on both banks of the Somme. However, early in January
1917 the project was abandoned, and orders were received for the XV.
Corps to extend its front to the right, taking over to the river by
Cléry, and simultaneously handing over a divisional frontage on the left
to the XIV. Corps. The divisional sectors were taken over successively,
and the move completed by the 22nd January without interference by the
enemy, the Headquarters of divisions in line being established at P.C.
Chapeau and P.C. Jean, ex-French divisional command posts judiciously and
inconspicuously sited under the high bank running parallel to the Somme
bank. H.A. Headquarters with B.E. section moved also to P.C. Chapeau, and
the Corps Forward Exchange at Maricourt was transferred with B.F. section
to Suzanne. This change of frontage was a nasty jar to the Company,
as nearly all the new routes, on which the sections had toiled early
and late to complete the communication scheme for the winter, were now
outside the Corps area, and the same work had to be started afresh in the
bitter frosts of January. The weather, that had been vilely cold and wet
from the beginning of December, now turned to snow and hard frost. The
latter penetrated the ground to such an extent that by the end of the
month all digging became impossible, and work on a buried cable trench
between Ouvrages and Oursel, to provide forward communications for the
33rd Division, had to be suspended. The ex-French bury forward of P.C.
Jean proved very faulty, and a section of twelve pair open-wire heavy
route was put in hand early in February, running forward to Monac, partly
to supplement the bury and partly to carry forward the head of the main
route in anticipation of the advance next spring. The ground was found
to be frozen as hard as concrete to a foot from the surface, and after
ineffectual struggles with picks and crowbars, excavations for the pole
holes were finally blasted with gun-cotton. As the forward end of this
route came under direct observation, the last few hundred yards were run
in cables hung on short stakes, each cable from a small bobbin insulator
nailed to the side of the stake. This method was copied from the French,
who had used it extensively in the area, and proved very satisfactory in
this instance.
In the meantime, aeroplane night-bombing and the shelling of back
areas by long range guns, initiated in the latter stages of the Somme
Battle, had developed to an unpleasant extent. Rarely did a day pass
without some main route suffering from one or other of these agencies,
and the consequent necessity for diverting the limited working parties
from urgent construction to still more urgent repairs. The railheads
of Maricourt and Bray were favourite targets, and again and again the
unfortunate sappers were turned out of their blankets to stumble along a
route in the pitch black night, and then struggle for hours with numbed
fingers to evolve order out of a chaos of tangled wire and broken poles.
This hostile aeroplane activity caused a rapid increase of anti-aircraft
units. Batteries and searchlights were now dotted over the area, and
the installation and maintenance of a separate and complete system of
communication for the Anti-Aircraft Defence of the Corps area was now
added to the Company’s duties, and the H.A. Signal Officer found himself
occupied with communications for the Survey Groups and the installation
of lines to their O.P.’s, and to the Microphone positions of the Sound
Ranging Section now added to the H.A. Counter Battery organization.
Though the duties of the H.A. Signal Officer were somewhat reduced by the
appointment, in January, of a R.E. Signal Officer to each H.A. Group,
the commencement by the enemy of systematic counter battery work, in
imitation of the British methods initiated in the previous year, made
it more than ever difficult to keep the forward lines in continuous
operation. A scheme for the forward extension of the buried system, till
recently used by the French, was prepared under the greatest transport
difficulties, the drums having to be man-handled about half a mile
across country by night, and a portion of the material was got up to
Marrières Wood, next year the scene of the South African Brigade’s fine
stand in the March retreat. But the deep crust of frozen ground prevented
digging, and the important local attack of the 8th Division on the 4th
March on Fritz Trench above Bouchavesnes had to be carried through
without the assistance of the new buried communication, and as most of
the above-ground cables were cut, the first news of the assaulting troops
was brought by pigeon to the Corps Loft at Etinehem. The attack was fully
successful, and the effective use made by the artillery of the excellent
observation secured by it, no doubt expedited the general retirement of
the enemy in this sector.
A few days later symptoms of this retreat became obvious in the shape of
villages burning and large transport movements in the enemy back area.
The general withdrawal began on the 15th March, the enemy falling back
on the Corps front across the Canal du Nord. As the Fourth Army was not
destined to play a part in the spring offensive, it had been heavily
depleted both to swell the concentration northwards in preparation for
the coming Arras battle, and to take over additional ground from the
French, the sector on the XV. Corps right south of the Somme having
been occupied by the III. Corps during February. Apart, therefore, from
the tremendous transport difficulties due to continuous wet weather
succeeding the frost, and the methodical destruction of bridges, roads,
and railways, there was not sufficient strength to press the enemy
closely, but the advance was conducted methodically, touch with the enemy
rearguards on the Corps front being maintained by the Wiltshire Yeomanry
and the Corps Cyclist Battalion until a Cavalry Division could come up.
The Signal Company’s share in the work was first to maintain direct touch
between the Corps Staff and the advanced troops, for which purpose D.R.’s
were attached to the cavalry, but by a special effort of B.E. section
direct telephone communication was soon secured and maintained. Secondly,
the main communication network had to be extended forward at the same
rate as the advance, and, as a counter-attack was very possible, the
full organization for position warfare accompanied the Corps. The Signal
difficulties were doubled on the 25th March, by the sudden withdrawal
from line of the XIV. Corps on the right and the consequent extension of
the already wide Corps frontage which then stretched from Péronne to Le
Transloy.
The Imperial Signal Sections attached for assistance at intervals during
the winter had been withdrawn, and, worst of all, the needs of the
fighting fronts northwards entirely shut off for a time the supply of
line construction material. Consequently, before a single pole or wire
could be erected, it had to be released from service in rear, salvaged,
and transported forward by the company’s lorries over extremely bad and
congested roads. Much heavy material had again to be relayed forward
over tracks impassable to lorries by teams from the cable sections, and
finally carried on the sappers’ shoulders over shell-shattered ground
impassable even for wagons. Under such handicaps, and in the teeth of
continuous blizzards of snow, sleet, and rain, which continued till
the end of April, over forty miles of poled route, including much of
a heavy permanent nature carrying twenty-four wires, was erected, and
two successive moves of the Headquarters of Corps and all subordinate
formations accomplished without any loss of communication. The skill,
endurance, and ready zeal of the A.S.C. Motor Transport drivers attached
to the Company played a great part in the results achieved. They had
never failed to meet the severe calls made upon them from time to time
during the Somme fighting, but now both the distances and the masses of
material to be moved were greater, and the road conditions but little, if
any, better.
Early in April the advance reached its limit, and was definitely held
up in front of La Vacquerie and Havrincourt—outlying strong points of
the Hindenburg Line. On the 17th, Corps Headquarters was established
in hutments and tents near Haute-Allaines, after a short interval at
P.C. Chapeau. Then the weather at last broke, and with a genial spring
sun overhead, a rapidly drying country underfoot, and good news coming
through from the Arras front, life under canvas, even in this devastated
zone, became pleasant.
Little relaxation of effort was possible however. The Germans on their
retreat had accomplished as thorough work in the demolition of signal
communications as in their wanton spoliation of civilian property. As
every house and every fruit tree was destroyed, so was every pole sawn
through when not bodily removed. Scarcely a yard of usable line—cables or
open wire—existed in the new area, and the whole of the immense network
of communications for stationary warfare had to be reconstituted under
continuing supply and transport difficulties, while the hasty work done
in the advance had to be overhauled and made permanent.
Scarcely was this task well under way when orders were received to
prepare signal plans for an offensive and commence the necessary works
as early as possible. The position in regard to materials was alleviated
in May by the organization of a temporary Corps Signal Salvage Unit,
composed of B.F. section, a platoon of a Labour Company, and the
necessary horse and motor Transport under Lieutenant Jack. This made it
possible to push forward work on two heavy open-wire routes, running
from Corps Headquarters, through Nurlu and Fins, and through Sève Wood,
Liéramont, and Heudicourt respectively, with the necessary spur and
lateral routes. To economize cable, which remained very short in supply,
the subsidiary routes were run as far as possible in light iron wire
(60 lb. to the mile), on air line or light hop poles, and considerable
use was made of a light type of French cable with all copper conductors
salvaged in the back area. This use of low resistance conductors, and
the maintaining of good line conditions, made clear speech possible
between O.P.’s and H.A. Headquarters, and on special occasions Corps
Headquarters, a point of great value in securing rapid and effective
counter-battery work. Up to this time all the British field cables,
except D 5—too heavy and too scarce for ordinary forward use—had steel
conductors, and were, therefore, of high resistance, and good speech
could only be obtained on short lines. Plans were also elaborated for a
buried cable scheme covering the area between the front line and heads of
open wire behind Gouzeaucourt and Gonnelieu respectively. The permanent
routes had progressed beyond Fins and Heudicourt, when, towards the end
of May, orders arrived for the XV. Corps to hand over to the III. Corps
and proceed to Villers-Bretonneux. The cable sections of the Company
joined various divisions, and, at the end of May, accompanied them out of
the area to unknown destinations.
The remainder of the Company reached Villers-Bretonneux on the 3rd June,
and settled down very comfortably in this pleasant little town, destined
to be the storm centre of the fighting for Amiens next spring. A small
allotment of leave was obtained, making it possible to send away some
of the men who had now been fifteen months continuously in the field.
The usual refitting proceeded, and opportunity was taken to complete the
reorganization necessitated by certain changes in signal establishments
that had recently taken effect, and by the increasing numbers of valuable
and experienced N.C.O.’s and men who left to take up Imperial commissions
in the various branches of the service. The numbers so lost to the
Company constituted a striking testimony to the high quality of its
_personnel_, and aggregated over eighty before hostilities ceased.
The great and continuing growth in the demands on the Signal Service,
particularly in connection with the Heavy Artillery, had for long unduly
taxed the available _personnel_, and increase in establishments was
overdue. To the Corps Signal Company was, therefore, now added a Heavy
Artillery Headquarters Signal Section, with a strength of one officer
and thirty-seven other ranks. The _personnel_ for this section was
obtained from drafts built up on a nucleus of experienced men, mainly
from R.E. section. At the same time, a signal sub-section of one officer
and twenty-seven other ranks was formed for each H.A. Group, but as H.A.
Groups were frequently moved from Corps to Corps, these sub-sections
were organized from Imperial R.E. _personnel_. The Company Headquarters
Section was also strengthened by the withdrawal of four telegraphists
from each cable section, the vacancies being filled with additional
pioneers. The Signal Section forming part of the Headquarters of S.A.
Infantry Brigade was now affiliated to the Company, and thenceforward
drew its reinforcements therefrom. This Section was originally formed by
Lieutenant F. W. S. Burton of the Union Post Office and the 3rd Regiment
from signallers selected from the infantry battalions. As, however, the
Brigade only chanced to serve for two short periods in the same formation
as the Signal Company, the story of this Signal Section is that of the
Brigade and need not be separately recounted.
The signal instruction for infantry and artillery units, commenced at
Long, and so abruptly suspended by the move into line, had during the
spring become a permanent feature of the Company’s activities. Classes in
Carrier Pigeon work had been immediately resumed at Etinehem, and were
thenceforward carried on till the end of the war under Lieutenant Egleton
and Corporal Jorgenson, with the most valuable results. In the middle
of March the Corps Signal School was reconstituted at Chipilly, with a
separate establishment, and Lieutenant Johnson was seconded as Commandant
with a staff of four Sergeant-Instructors from the Company. The School
then constituted continued to function till after the Armistice, moving
with the Corps from point to point, and many hundreds of officers and men
passed through the six weeks’ courses held at it with a most marked and
beneficial effect to the efficiency of Signal work among the fighting
troops. Lieutenant Johnson’s vacancy was filled by the promotion of
C.Q.M.S. C. H. Ison, whose untiring energy had done much to help the
Company through its difficulties in the past year.
The interlude at Villers was abruptly cut short by orders to move on
the 10th June for a secret destination. As there were no cable sections
to accompany, all _personnel_ travelled in lorries, and the move was
accomplished in two days. The secret was extremely well kept, however,
and not until the convoy actually entered Dunkirk on the 11th was
it realized that the Corps was to take over the Nieuport Sector—the
important bit of line running from the sea along the Yser, which had
been held by the French since the momentous days of the first battle of
Ypres. Corps Headquarters were established on the 11th in the Casino of
Malo-les-Bains, a suburb of Dunkirk, and arrangements for the relief of
the 36th French Corps at once put in hand.
THE BELGIAN COAST AND THE BATTLE OF THE DUNES—NOVEMBER 1917.
Though this sector had been for a long period a quiet one, the German
artillery concentration opposite it was already great, especially in
heavy long range guns, partly because the arc of many of their coast
defence batteries covered more or less of the land front, and for the
most part were already behind concrete emplacements. Normal trenches in
this terrain were impossible, and both sides stood behind breastworks
that in the dunes were merely gabions filled with sand; but here, as
on the Ypres front, the liberal use of concrete by the enemy had given
his front-line troops, as well as his batteries and command posts, the
protection of many “pill-boxes” and concrete shelters of various forms.
For a long period the French had held the sector comparatively lightly;
consequently the whole of the titanic task of mounting a trench warfare
offensive fell on the incoming corps. On such terrain the preparations
presented extreme and unique difficulties, and those of Signals were
enhanced by the fact that not only did the nature of the ground forbid
deep cable buries, but very few shallow ones existed; while the existing
communications—naturally inadequate—were almost entirely open wire to
within four thousand yards of the front line, and sited along roads
certain to be heavily shelled.
British divisions began to arrive in the area on the 15th, bringing the
absent cable sections of the Company with them, and between the 20th
and 23rd the French divisions in line were relieved by the 1st and 32nd
Divisions. Thereafter the Corps Heavy Artillery commenced to move in, the
H.A. Signal Section and B.E. Section proceeding to the late French Heavy
Artillery Headquarters, D.C.A.L. to a small copse about two miles south
of Nieuport, and B.G. Section to Coxyde to prepare for the establishment
of a forward exchange.
After a rapid survey of the area, a communication scheme to meet the
needs of Corps, Divisions, and the Heavy Artillery on a hitherto
unprecedented scale was prepared. Meanwhile the various sections toiled
at the familiar task of connecting up the units that were streaming into
the area daily, and preparing the new Corps Headquarters at Bray-Dunes
Plage—a small watering-place south of La Panne. The H.A. Section had,
even with the assistance of B.E. Section, a particularly strenuous task
in coping with the concentration of eleven groups of “heavies,” and found
it necessary to endeavour to bring into use at once the incomplete French
buries. By an evil stroke of luck, the material ordered for this purpose
was delayed over a fortnight by the truck containing it being railed to
Péronne instead of Dunkirk, owing to the extreme secrecy that enshrouded
the movements of the Corps.
The movement of Corps Headquarters to Bray-Dunes was effected on the 29th
June, having been somewhat expedited by one of the periodical shellings
of Dunkirk by a German long range gun. On the morning of the 27th a
twelve-inch shell dropped on the Corps Offices in the Casino at Malo,
and inflicted a number of casualties—luckily for the Company, it just
missed the Signal Office. A few days later the Heavy Artillery Quarters
moved back to the village of Oost Dunkirk, about six thousand yards from
the line, and occupied the Villa Rosarie. During the first week in July
a considerable increase in hostile shelling was noted, but not to an
alarming extent, though a direct hit on the H.A. sections’ store rooms
put a few telephones _hors de combat_; and no immediate operations were
anticipated.
The enemy, however, had decided to nip our attack in the bud by taking
the initiative himself, and had only delayed to complete a crushing
artillery concentration. Thus about 9.30 a.m. on the 10th July, when
many batteries were not yet in position and many others not yet ready
for action, an intense bombardment dropped over the whole Corps area up
to nine thousand yards behind the front line. With the most admirable
accuracy and thoroughness, every village and battery position was
searched, and every road of approach swept by heavy shell fire. Forward
communications failed almost at once, the bridges across the Yser below
Nieuport were destroyed, the breastwork trenches melted away before the
storm of high explosive, and when the infantry assault was delivered
about 7 p.m. few survivors of the Brigade of the 1st Division that
held the trenches across the Yser in front of Nieuport Bain, remained
to resist, and the German front line was established on the Yser bank
in this sector. On the other flank, at Lombartzyde, the 32nd Division
managed by desperate fighting to retain most of the ground in front of
Nieuport, but the main German object was achieved; the approaches to the
bridgehead were now limited to the single entry of Nieuport, and the
bridgehead itself was so reduced in area as to make a serious attack in
force a very desperate venture.
This day was naturally a most trying one for the Signal _personnel_.
Nearly all wire communication was lost in the first two hours, and all
formations from Corps downwards had to fall back on despatch riders and
runners. Very fine work was done by the Company’s despatch runners on
the shell-swept roads, while the sections strove to patch up and keep
going the vital command lines. Thanks to cool and quick repair work by
the sappers, and to the use of a short piece of cable trench completed
on the previous day, touch was kept with most of the Heavy Artillery
Groups continually throughout the day. The observation lines could not,
however, be kept going, and thus the batteries not put out of action
were blinded, and could not effectively support the infantry across the
river. Oost Dunkirk village suffered heavily, and after nightfall the
H.A. Staff were forced to move into the sand dunes half a mile to the
flank, when temporary cables were run back to the signal office at the
Villa Rosarie, which enjoyed protection in a sandbagged shelter behind
the house. As this shelter was the only place in the village enjoying any
degree of protection, it became during that day and night a temporary
aid post for wounded and a refuge for the few remaining villagers. Amid
these conditions, and deafened by the crashing explosions of the shells
among the houses, the telephonists managed to carry on with wonderful
efficiency for twenty-four consecutive hours. Conditions at Coxyde Signal
Office with B.G. section were very similar.
Much to the general surprise, the attack was not resumed on the following
day, and while every nerve was strained to get the existing lines
restored, work on the new communications began and was pressed forward
night and day. The buried scheme originally planned provided for four
forward trenches, one along the sea coast, one through the dunes, one
partly French and already dug through the polder area, and one consisting
of cable laid in the bed of the Nieuport Canal—all to be connected by a
lateral trench running through H.A. Headquarters, which was to become the
chief maintenance and test point. Lieutenant Collins with B.E. section
and a rapidly increasing number of Imperial sections, loaned from Army
Signals, was entrusted with this work, assisted by Lieutenant Dobson. In
view of the experiences of the 10th, two additional trenches were added
to the plan, one from a main open route junction point behind Coxyde,
forward along the fringe of the dunes to H.A. Headquarters, and the other
along the sea-beach above highwater mark from Corps Headquarters at
Bray-Dunes to the same point.
This latter trench, which contained twenty-five pair dry core cable,
was completed by Lieutenant Hill with skilled cable jointers from 51
Air Line. Labour was made freely available by the Corps Staff, and as
material now came forward rapidly, up to two thousand men a day were
employed on these works. The forward portion of the scheme presented
great difficulty, as the area was now so sown with batteries that it was
almost impossible to trace the trenches so as to avoid battery positions
and the shelling which they attracted. The greater part of the work could
only be done by night because of enemy observation; and, further, time
did not admit of the usual detailed preparation for the working parties.
Nevertheless, all works were completed for the attack; and taking into
account the continuous heavy shelling, with light casualties.
The experiment made on the Somme of using a kite balloon to maintain
communication with the front line, was now repeated; and as a separate
balloon was now placed at the disposal of Second-Lieutenant Wilson and a
visual signalling party, the result was satisfactory.
Though all other preparations were well advanced, including the seclusion
of the 1st Division in a “hush” camp on the coast, where they were
specially rehearsed in landing operations from the sea, the attack was
postponed from date to date, until it finally became evident by the
transfer of a large proportion of the heavy batteries to the Ypres front,
that the slow progress made there owing to weather and “pill-boxes” was
likely to postpone the Nieuport offensive indefinitely.
During the interval, the rival artilleries waged a furious and continuous
duel. The forward buried system, unavoidably shallow from the nature
of the ground, was continuously broken by shell fire. During September
the cable trenches were blown up by direct hits on the average nearly
twice a day. The repairs were most difficult and laborious owing both
to the persistent shelling and the rise of the water level everywhere
after the wet weather of August. Even with the sappers of three cable
sections—B.F., B.E., and A.U. Imperial Cable Section,—and two area Signal
Detachments from the Fourth Army, it became impossible to keep going
satisfactorily the network of forty miles of trenches containing 1,200
miles of cable; and finally the assistance of the Corps Cyclist Battalion
was obtained to dig diversion trenches in the worst shell areas, and a
new trench in the Belgian area in substitution of the cable laid in the
Nieuport Canal, the insulation of which began to fail soon after laying.
During this period the sappers stationed at the forward test points had
a most trying experience. Owing to the frequent breakdowns, they were
perpetually working on the cable trenches by day and by night, employed
in testing and substituting lines. The frequent use of gas shell made
it necessary that at their isolated points they should secure the gas
blankets of their dug-out entrances at night, and this inevitably
produced an atmosphere little inferior to the gas itself. Two concreted
test points in the “polder” area, taken over from the French, were
conspicuous after shelling had destroyed all arboreal cover. The Germans
apparently decided that these were gun positions, and favoured them with
special attention, managing finally to secure three direct hits—two
innocuous, however unnerving to the inmates; but the third on P.C. 6
burst square on the roof, and though only slightly bending the steel
rails embedded in the concrete, killed a sapper of B.F. section inside.
One small dug-out on the canal bank, P.C. 18, disappeared altogether
after an eleven-inch howitzer bombardment of a neighbouring battery, but
fortunately there was no occupant at the time.
Corps Headquarters moved to La Panne at the beginning of September;
but the location had evidently been given away by a spy, as it was
heavily shelled by a long range gun a fortnight later, and consequently
retransferred to Bray-Dunes. Though as the autumn drew on activity in
the sector died down, all ranks had reason to welcome the relief of the
Corps by the XXXVI. French Corps that commenced on the 19th November. On
the 20th the Headquarters of the Company, under Captain Dingwall, who had
been acting as A.W. Signals since September during Lieutenant-Colonel
Harrison’s absence on sick leave, moved to Hinges near Béthune, and
commenced to take over from the XI. Corps—then under orders for Italy—a
sector between Béthune and Armentières.
THE LYS AREA.
After some readjustments of frontage in December, the XV. Corps settled
down to hold the sector in front of the Lys, from Houplines to Laventie,
with the Portuguese Corps on the right and the Anzac Corps on the left.
In January 1918 Corps Headquarters were shifted from Hinges to La
Motte-aux-Bois in front of the Forest of Nieppe, and Heavy Artillery,
with the H.A. and B.E. sections, to Estaires, where 51 Air Line was
already established. A further reorganization of the Company now took
place. As cable sections rarely, if ever, performed the mobile work
for which their horse transport was provided, the decision was reached
to disband one cable section in each Corps, to reduce the strength of
the Corps air line section to forty-two all ranks with one heavy and
two light lorries, and with the surplus _personnel_ so accruing form
an additional air line for each Corps. B.G. section was, accordingly,
converted into the nucleus of the new 91 Air Line Section, to which
Lieutenant Dobson was appointed. At the same time, “Q” Wireless Section
became an integral portion of the Signal Company, and was taken over by
Lieutenant McArthur, with 2nd Lieutenant FitzGeorge as second officer,
the Imperial _personnel_ being rapidly replaced by South Africans. A
second officer was also authorized for the Heavy Artillery Section,
and Lieutenant M. Cohen, who had been attached to a brigade of the 8th
Division since his arrival from England in November 1917, was appointed.
The communications here were such as would serve on a thinly held and
lightly shelled front. Buries were few and becoming inefficient with age;
the light open-wire routes which formed the bulk of the communication
were run close up to the front line. The defection of Russia made it
certain that the Allies would be thrown on the defensive in the spring;
and as the Lys covered Hazebrouck and the direct route to Calais, it was
probable that the sector would become a main front of attack. Ample and
secure communications were, therefore, a first necessity, and a complete
scheme was prepared on a scale of magnitude and thoroughness which
surpassed any previous performance. All trenches were to be seven feet
deep and carry no less than thirty pairs of wires.
Work could not be commenced before the 25th January, owing to the whole
Lys Valley, which is very low lying, becoming water-logged by heavy rain.
At first the labour available was very limited, owing to the urgent
demands for defence works in the battle zone, and for the construction
and wiring of a new emergency line of five trenches on the north bank of
the river. Early in February the labour position improved, and frequently
over one thousand five hundred men were employed simultaneously. The
sappers had a strenuous time, and, but for the assistance of a party
from the Corps Cyclists, who by long association with Signals had become
relatively skilled, could not have kept up the pace. By unremitting
effort the Corps Section of the trenches was completed by the beginning
of March, and a portion of the work originally assigned to divisions
taken over.
While the other sections were so engaged, B.F. was employed on another
section of the scheme in and around Armentières itself. In this town a
considerable underground sewer system existed, and though not comparable
with the underways of Arras, yet these sewers proved extremely valuable
as affording ready-made covered ways for cable. B.F. accordingly spent
two months in laying securely many miles of cable. The new 91 Air Line
Section meanwhile pushed on the necessary additions to the open-wire
routes forward from Corps Headquarters. Hostile artillery activity
began to increase considerably in March, and about the middle of the
month became so marked that from this and other symptoms an immediate
attack was expected. This cut off the supply of labour, but the sappers
were busier than ever in bringing the cables already laid into use by
temporary joints, without waiting for the construction of the test
dug-outs.
This alarm proved for the time false, the offensive commencing instead
on the Third and Fifth Army fronts on the 21st March. The immediate
effect was the withdrawal of all the divisions in the Corps, and their
replacement with exhausted divisions from the south—the 34th and 40th—who
naturally could provide no labour. The greatest anxiety was now felt lest
the communication should not be finished in time, and work was rushed day
and night. With the assistance of the Corps Cyclists temporary sandbagged
test points were erected where the concrete work was still lacking, and
when the storm finally broke on the 9th April practically all cable laid
had been joined up and was working, and three-quarters of the original
scheme had been completed.
The attack began at 4.30 a.m. with an intense bombardment extending back
to and beyond the river, followed by an infantry assault about 7 a.m.,
which immediately broke through the Portuguese on the Corps right. There
were no reserves available to man effectively the new line dug on the
northern bank, and during the afternoon the enemy crossed at Bac St.
Maur, and by 7 p.m. had forced our firing line back behind the signal
test point at Croix de Bac. Communications had held well so far; the 34th
Division was still maintaining its ground on the left round Armentières,
and there was hope of an immediate restoration of the situation by
counter-attack. The lineman at this point—Corporal Shepherd of the H.A.
section—was, therefore, instructed not to destroy the lines, but to
leave them all through, and fall back on the next test point. He did so,
but omitted to put through one of the lines. On ascertaining this when
he reached H.A. headquarters, he voluntarily returned and managed to
re-enter the dug-out, which was now in No Man’s Land, and put the line
through. Though this dug-out passed into the enemy’s hands during the
night, and after a temporary reversal of fortune again next morning,
direct communication from Corps headquarters to troops in Armentières
was maintained over the cables passing through it till afternoon on the
following day, when the evacuation of the town began.
By next morning the Germans had forced the river to Estaires. This town
had been intensely shelled all day, and B.E. Section billet was blown up
early in the morning. Nevertheless, the Corps Exchange was kept going
till a late hour that night by Lieutenant Hill with 51 Air Line and a
party of operators from the Headquarters section.
During the following days, the 10th, 11th, and 12th, the Corps was
steadily driven back by the heavy thrust made by the enemy for
Hazebrouck. The 29th and 31st Divisions and the 4th Guards Brigade were
successively thrown in, but their desperate fighting only succeeded
in slowing the German advance, until the entry into line of the 1st
Australian Division on the night of the 12th, when the enemy was finally
brought to a stop on the edge of the Nieppe Forest. Thereafter the storm
centre shifted gradually to the northward round Kemmel and Messines,
while on the Corps front the battle died down to local combats.
The effort to keep up communications during these days tested every
one to the limit. Units were changing location like figures in a
kaleidoscope, and nearly the whole of the existing system of lines had
passed into the enemy’s hands. However, by the most strenuous efforts,
touch was maintained throughout the retreat, and the good work done was
recognized by the Corps commander; for in a letter addressed to Colonel
Harrison, he conveyed his appreciation of the work carried out by all
ranks of the Company during the recent operations. He added that he
realized that, owing to the untiring energy and devotion to duty shown
by all ranks, a very high standard of communication was maintained, and
thanked all for the efforts made and the results achieved. The general
commanding the Heavy Artillery also made reference in a special order of
the day to the particularly good work done by the H.A. Signal Section,
under Lieutenant Collins, in the following words:—
“That the Heavy Artillery was able to cover the whole Corps
front with its fire during each day, and to withdraw to
fresh positions each night, testifies also to the excellence
of the staff work—especially in connection with telephonic
communication.”
On the 11th Corps Headquarters fell back to Wardrecques, between St.
Omer and Hazebrouck, leaving an advanced Signal Office at La Motte until
the evening of the 12th. During the next few days it became evident that
the front was established again—at any rate temporarily—and the work of
restoring the normal network of communication at once commenced, at first
with great shortage of material, as all forward signal dumps had been
captured.
Captain Dingwall, whose health had suffered under the continuous strain
in France, now left the Company to join L Signal Battalion, and was
replaced by Captain Ross, who was relieved of the Heavy Artillery Section
by Lieutenant Collins. Lieutenant Hill took up duty at headquarters, and
Lieutenant McArthur left the Wireless Section for 51 Air Line.
At this time also Lieutenant-General Sir J. P. Ducane was summoned to
replace Sir Henry Rawlinson on the Versailles Council, and the XV. Corps
was henceforward commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir B. de Lisle. The
departure of General Ducane was much regretted by the Company, as he
had always taken a close interest in communications, and showed keen
appreciation of the work done, as is shown by the following extract from
a letter written by him to Colonel Harrison after the termination of
hostilities:—
“In the many bright spots of the XV. Corps, I have always
maintained, and always will maintain, that the Signal Service
was far away the best Signal Service of any other organization
in France. Not only was there a very thorough grasp of the
work, but always—what was so pleasant to find—there was a
desire to go out of your way to help. It is with the greatest
pleasure that I write to say how much I always appreciate
having the South African Signal Company in the XV. Corps. They
were not only highly efficient in all departments of this
work, but I can honestly say they were the most energetic,
hard-working, well-disciplined, and courteous body of men that
I have come across in my experience of the Army.
“I always felt in dealing with you that nothing was ever too
much trouble for you or your men, and that no matter how
exacting the demands made upon you—and they were often very
heavy indeed—no effort would be spared to carry them through
successfully. Never were we let down during the most trying
times—on the Somme, on the coast, or on the Lys. During the
enemy’s attack on the Lys in April 1918, the truly remarkable
way in which all our communications held out for three days,
till we were compelled to abandon La Motte, greatly facilitated
the exercise of the command of the Corps during those difficult
days, and was an eloquent testimony of the thoroughness and
skill with which the work of preparation had been carried out.”
The final holding up of the Germans at Kemmel on the 28th April made it
possible to commence effective work on the defences at Hazebrouck, and
during the next few months successive lines of trenches and belts of wire
came into existence, and seamed the country as far back as St. Omer.
The Company’s share in these preparations was work on a buried cable
scheme which started early in May, and gradually developed as labour and
material were obtainable, until, when the advance began, a network of
trenches extended across the whole Corps area for 13,000 yards in depth
and 7,000 in breadth, embodying thirty miles of seven-foot deep trench
and nearly 1,200 miles of pair cable. This work, though never tested by
another offensive, was of great value during the prolonged artillery
duel which followed the Battle of the Lys. The open-wire routes were
continuously shelled or bombed down, for in this sector, as on the coast,
aeroplane bombing was a nightly event.
The series of successful minor operations carried out by the Corps in
July and August, including the capture of Méteren, and the devastating
effect of our superior and incessantly active artillery, no doubt
quickened the German decision to evacuate the Lys salient. This
evacuation commenced at the end of August, and thenceforward all ranks
were occupied in the rapid restoration of communications through the
devastated area, now as broad as the old Somme battlefield. An attempt
was made to utilize the old buries laid down by the XV. and other Corps
before the retreat; but these were too effectively destroyed by the
enemy to admit of rapid restoration.
After the successful attack of the Belgian and Second British Armies at
the end of September, in which the XV. Corps co-operated on the right
flank, headquarters were moved to St. Jans-Cappel on the 4th October, and
on the 21st, to Mouvaux, near Tourcoing, following the rapid retreat of
the enemy to the Scheldt. On this occasion a fast piece of work was done
by 91 Air Line and B.E. Cable Section, two lines being completed across
the Lys to the new headquarters—a distance of nearly twenty miles—in one
day.
The Signal portion of the preparations for forcing the passage of the
Scheldt filled the period up to the 10th November; but as the enemy
retired during the night, and the Armistice was proclaimed the following
day, they proved unnecessary.
The Corps was not selected to accompany the advance to the Rhine, and
so it fell to the lot of B.E. Section on the 12th to lay the last and
farthest forward cable in France, from the Scheldt, crossing at Pecq to
an observation point on the eastern side.
APPENDIX III.
THE MEDICAL SERVICES.
When the South African Expeditionary Force was organized on the
termination of the campaign in German South-West Africa, Colonel P. G.
Stock was appointed S.M.O., and in addition to the South African Medical
Corps _personnel_ who volunteered for regimental duties, arranged for
the mobilization of one Field Ambulance and one General Hospital. The
former, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Usmar, S.A.M.C.,
assembled at Potchefstroom with the 1st South African Infantry Brigade;
while the General Hospital was formed at Wynberg, the _personnel_
being largely composed of volunteers from the staffs of No. 1 General
Hospital, Wynberg, and No. 2 General Hospital, Maitland, and included
representatives from each of the four provinces of the Union. It
subsequently provided the _personnel_ for the Depot in England, and the
South African Military Hospital at Richmond, which was afterwards built
and organized.
No hospital equipment was available in South Africa, but the official
Advisory Committee on Voluntary Aid, of which Sir Thomas Smartt was
chairman, met the difficulty by voting £15,000 to purchase it on arrival
in England, and a further £1,500 to augment the equipment taken by the
Field Ambulance.
Both units accompanied the Infantry Brigade to England, the General
Hospital embarking on H.M.T. _Balmoral Castle_ at Cape Town on 25th
September, and the Field Ambulance on H.M.T. _Kenilworth Castle_ on
October 10, 1915. On arrival there, they proceeded to the R.A.M.C. Depot
at Twezeldown, near Aldershot. At the depot the training of the Field
Ambulance proceeded under its own officers, and, with the rest of the
Brigade, it was present at Bordon when her Majesty the Queen reviewed the
troops on December 2, 1915. On 29th December the unit proceeded by route
march to Farnham, there entraining for Devonport, where it embarked on
H.M.T. _Corsican_ for Egypt, Alexandria being reached on January 13, 1916.
In the meantime, the _personnel_ of No. 1 General Hospital—which had been
particularly fortunate in securing the services of some of the leading
surgeons and physicians and most experienced nurses in South Africa—was
temporarily detailed to strengthen the staffs of various Imperial
hospitals in England. On 20th December, however, the unit was reassembled
at Bournemouth, where it took over and staffed the Mont Dore Military
Hospital, which, under an Imperial officer as commandant, had just been
equipped for 520 patients.
In February 1916 the control of the “Grata Quies” Auxiliary Hospital was
transferred to the Mont Dore, which became a “Central Hospital,” and on
April 1, 1916, seventeen additional auxiliary hospitals, situated in the
districts of Poole, Wimbourne, Swanage, Sherbourne, and Yeovil, were
affiliated, increasing the number of beds controlled to over 1,200.
The first patients from overseas were admitted on 8th January, the
majority being medical cases, and although a number of severe cases of
“trench feet” from Gallipoli were taken in, few wounded were received up
to the time the unit left on July 3, 1916, when it proceeded to Aldershot
preparatory to joining the British Expeditionary Force in France.
When the decision to send South African troops to England became known,
a number of prominent South Africans in London formed a committee under
the chairmanship of Lord Gladstone—until recently the Governor-General—to
start a fund for the establishment of a hospital and for the general
comfort of the troops. On the arrival of the contingent in England
this movement received renewed attention, a proposal then being under
consideration to erect huts to accommodate some three hundred patients,
as a South African wing to the Royal Victoria Hospital at Netley. On
further investigation, however, it was found that the site, although in
many respects an ideal one in the summer, would not have been suitable
for South African troops during the winter, and further search had to
be made. Many places and buildings were inspected, and finally a site
in Richmond Park, for which his Majesty the King was graciously pleased
to grant the necessary permission, was selected, and no more beautiful,
convenient, and healthy spot could possibly have been obtained.
[Illustration: COLONEL P. G. STOCK, C.B., C.B.E., D.D.M.S., South African
Forces.]
Much of the success of this hospital was due to the time and care
spent over the plans, and Mr. Allison, the chief architect of the
Office of Works, was always ready to adopt any recommendations made by
Lieutenant-Colonel Stock and the expert sub-committee of officers of No.
1 General Hospital who were dealing with the project. The desire was to
provide 500 beds, but for financial reasons it was decided to start with
300, on the basis of plans which provided for future necessary extensions.
The construction was begun early in March, and on June 16, 1916, the
hospital was formally opened by its patroness, H.R.H. Princess Christian,
being then taken over fully equipped as a gift from South Africans by the
D.D.M.S., London District, on behalf of the Army Council.
On the opening of the hospital, the S.A.M.C. Depot in England was
transferred to Richmond, and a redistribution of the _personnel_ of No.
1 General Hospital carried out, which enabled a South African Staff to
be placed in charge of Richmond without interfering with the efficiency
of the former unit. Major Thornton, the adjutant and registrar of No. 1
South African General Hospital, succeeded Lieutenant-Colonel Stock in
command at Richmond, and Captain Basil Brooke was appointed adjutant and
registrar of No. 1 General Hospital. Before, however, proceeding further
with the history of the South African Hospital at Richmond, it will be
convenient to follow the fortunes of the units which left England.
On January 13, 1916, No. 1 South African Field Ambulance arrived at
Alexandria on H.M.T. _Corsican_, and marched the following day to
Mex Camp, where the rest of the Brigade was encamped. Its history is
included in that of the South African Infantry Brigade, with which it was
associated from this date until the cessation of hostilities.
On the arrival of No. 1 South African General Hospital at Aldershot,
the final touches were given to the unit, and about 400 shipping tons
of stores and equipment drawn, which, by a special arrangement with the
Army Council, had been paid for out of the £15,000 voted by Sir Thomas
Smartt’s Committee in Cape Town.
On 12th July the unit entrained for Southampton, there to embark on
H.M.T. _Huntcraft_. The ship berthed at Havre about 10.30 a.m. on the
13th, and as she was urgently required elsewhere, the unloading at once
commenced; and on the following day the unit—together with its stores and
equipment—left for Abbeville, which was reached on 15th July.
Here it was found that the hospital would be established next to No. 2
Stationary Hospital, an Imperial unit which had been there for some time.
The necessity for not interfering with the ripening harvest considerably
curtailed the choice of a site, the ground allotted being a ploughed
field on the slope of the hills overlooking the valley of the Somme.
Abbeville itself lay about a mile away in the valley, but the railway
station and “triage” were on the far side of the town and must have been
nearly three miles from the hospital.
Some hospital marquees had already been erected, but the layout of the
hospital was greatly handicapped by the cramped area of ground then
available. As the corn was reaped more ground became vacant, and, later
on, by frequent striking and repitching of tents, the hospital gradually
took a more symmetrical and workable shape.
When the unit arrived in France the First Battle of the Somme had begun,
and hospital accommodation was urgently required for the large number
of casualties. So, in the absence of any kind of building, a store tent
was converted into an operating tent; an improvised sterilizing shelter
erected; and within forty-eight hours of arrival patients were admitted
and every available surgeon hard at work.
In those early days the wide surgical experience and considered judgment
of Lieutenant-Colonel Ritchie Thomson proved invaluable. He had accepted
the post of chief surgeon when the hospital was mobilized in South
Africa, and many a sorely wounded man owes his life and limb to his skill
and judgment.
The initial difficulties were many: buildings and engineering services
were almost impossible to obtain, and it was not until the end of
November that the operating block—the first building to be erected—was
completed. All, however, were willing workers, and it was not long before
additional tentage was pitched and Major Merritt had organized the
kitchens, stores, and a hundred and one odd things appertaining to the
Quartermaster’s Department, all of which mean so much to the efficiency
and comfort of any hospital.
Until early in August the hospital was without its own nursing
Sisters—these services being performed by members of the Q.A.I.M.N.S.,
the Canadian Military Nursing Service, and English V.A.D.’s, who did all
that hard work and devotion to duty could do to make up for the shortage
in number. On 5th August, however, Matron Creagh and twenty-one members
of the S.A.M.N.S. arrived from England, and the greatest difficulties in
this respect were over. The nurses’ camp had to be pitched in the wooded
ground of a château some little distance off; but when the storm clouds
rolled up the valley, and the winter rains set in, they had perforce to
be billeted in the town until the huts which were contemplated for them
were completed.
Situated as it was at the advanced base in a convenient position for
their reception, the hospital, during the autumn of 1916, received a
large number of wounded direct from the Somme battlefield. Amongst the
earliest admissions in July 1916 were South Africans wounded at Delville
Wood, and towards the end of July General Lukin was one of the first
officer patients.
The most severely wounded journeyed by specially-fitted hospital barges,
which, from the casualty clearing stations around Corbie, floated down
the Somme to Abbeville, where the patients were disembarked and taken by
motor ambulances to the hospital. The use of barges was restricted to
those cases who were unable to stand the strain of a journey by train.
Usually they travelled in pairs, but on more than one occasion during
the autumn of 1916 patients from six barges were admitted during the
twenty-four hours. Towards the end of 1916 the barges ceased running, as
the winter rains had rendered the passage down the Somme too dangerous,
and they were not again employed, as the advance in the spring of 1917
carried the fighting away from the river.
Fortunately, during the first few weeks after the arrival of the unit in
France, the weather was fine, but even then difficulties were experienced
in regard to the main road leading to the hospital. For part of the way
this was formed by “sleepers,” but as the supply of them gave out beech
planking had to be substituted. This quickly “warped,” and becoming
displaced with the constant traffic, was always a source of trouble, as
the underlying chalk during the dry weather quickly powdered to a fine
dust, and later, when the rains set in, turned into a particularly greasy
form of mud.
As soon as materials and labour became available, the “sleeper track”
was continued, and a large “triage” constructed on which the ambulance
wagons could turn; but it was not until many months later that it
became possible to build a macadamized road connecting the hospital with
the Route d’Amiens. The old entrance was then utilized as an exit for
empty wagons, and the original signboard of the hospital, on which Major
Merritt had painted the Springbok badge, was removed to the new entrance.
Progress was gradually made in the erection of temporary buildings, and
by the end of 1916 there was accommodation in huts for 120 patients. It
was obvious, however, that for that winter at least the majority of beds
would be under canvas, and a particularly successful form of sliding
door with windows at the top was designed; and with the funds available
a local contractor was engaged, who quickly fitted them at each end of
the tented wards. At the same time the Royal Engineers undertook the
installation of stoves and wood flooring, and with doors closed and
the sides of the tents fastened down the tented wards were really most
comfortable. “Duck” boarding also gradually became more plentiful.
During the period July 23, 1916, to December 31, 1916, the total
admissions were 6,436, of whom 3,032 were “battle casualties” and 3,404
“sick.” During the same period 5,719 were “discharged hospital.” Of these
673 were returned to duty; 548 transferred to convalescent depôts; 3,306
evacuated to the United Kingdom; and 1,192 transferred to hospitals at
other bases in France. Five hundred and eighty-eight major operations
were performed; and there were in all, for the same period, 236 deaths,
or—calculated on the number of admissions—a percentage of 3.68. This
comparatively high mortality is explained by the fact that practically
every case admitted to this hospital was seriously wounded—the barges,
from which the large majority of cases were received, only carrying
those cases which were unfit to travel by other means of transport. The
mortality was further increased owing to the fact that this hospital
was the nearest General Hospital to the Somme front, and many moribund
patients were taken off ambulance trains on account of their being too
ill to travel to more distant bases. By the end of the year, in addition
to the operation block, hutted accommodation for 120 patients was
erected, and in the early part of 1917 hutted quarters for the nursing
staff and rooms for officers’, sergeants’, and men’s messes were added,
as well as buildings for part of the quartermaster’s stores.
Early in the year instructions were received from General Headquarters
that the hospital was to be enlarged from 520 beds to a normal capacity
of 1,120 beds, with a “crisis expansion” to 1,500 beds. The hospital
remained on this basis, and during the latter part of 1917, and not
infrequently during 1916, as many as 1,600 to 1,700 patients were
accommodated at one time.
The total admissions for the year 1917 were 19,109, of which 7,613 were
battle casualties and 11,496 were sick. During the same period there were
18,277 discharges. Of this number 2,638 were returned to duty, 4,253
were transferred to convalescent depôts, 8,749 were evacuated to the
United Kingdom, and 2,637 were transferred to hospitals at other bases in
France. One thousand two hundred and ten major operations were performed
during the year 1917. For the same period, including eleven cases brought
in for burial, there were 181 deaths in the hospital. Of these 128
were due to wounds—a percentage of 1.68; and 53 were due to sickness—a
percentage of .46. The death rate from all causes for this year worked
out at .94 per cent.
Promises of hutted accommodation, both for patients and personnel, were
current for at least twelve months. Nothing, however, happened in this
direction, except that an administration block and a new kitchen for the
hospital were built; and in October 1917, with keen remembrances of the
previous winter, it was decided to erect such huts as was possible with
labour supplied by the staff of the hospital. A start was made, with the
idea of housing the men of the company who were over forty years of age,
and a hut was built, using discarded telegraph poles as the principals,
covered with corrugated iron and lined with wood—the lining being bought
from funds provided by the South African Hospital and Comforts Fund at a
cost of, approximately, £120.
Stimulated by the success of the first, the building of the second hut
was then taken in hand; and eventually, with the assistance of the
engineer services, comfortable quarters for all the personnel were
erected. In January 1918 six hospital “Adrian” huts were erected, but
were not completed until the end of March, chiefly owing to the lack
of labour and uncertainty as to whether the hospital would have to
be evacuated. Three double “Nissen” hospital huts were subsequently
added—the last not being quite finished when the armistice was signed.
The erection of a further eight, which would have completed the building
programme of the hospital, was cancelled.
For the first few months all traffic to the hospital had to pass through
a neighbouring hospital—No. 2 Stationary, R.A.M.C.—this being not only
inconvenient, but leading to congestion. Later, a metalled road was made
through the South African Hospital leading to the Amiens road and looping
within the hospital. This meant that traffic was easily managed, and made
the handling of convoys infinitely easier. In the summer of 1918 a tarred
surface was put on to this road, which proved a great help in keeping
down the dust.
The necessity for a special railway siding for the three large hospitals
in this area to avoid the long, rough, and frequently interrupted
journeys by ambulance from and to the main station was also met.
A church was erected within the precincts of the hospital, the cost of
which was defrayed partly by subscriptions received from the patients
and personnel, and partly by a donation of £75 from the South African
Hospital and Comforts Fund, London. It was dedicated in the name of St.
Winifred to the memory of the late staff nurse—Miss Winifred Munro, South
African Military Nursing Service—and as a tribute to her devotion to duty.
In December 1917 the hospital was specially selected for the reception
and treatment of cases of fracture of the femur. Beds for the
accommodation of 200 such cases were provided—50 being reserved for
officers, and 150 for other ranks. The special bed and technique devised
at the hospital were afterwards adopted as the standard for the British
Army.
During the German offensive of 1918 the hospital passed through what was
its period of most intense activity. The medical staff was depleted to
replace casualties in the South African Field Ambulance and other units
in the forward areas, while reinforcements from the male personnel were
sent to the Field Ambulance. Practically all the female nursing staffs
from this district were withdrawn, on account of the enemy advance and
the frequent bombing at night by hostile aeroplanes of the back areas.
Thus the number of medical officers in charge of wards was reduced to
8 instead of the normal 22; the male personnel fell to 188—the normal
establishment being 212; while the female nursing staff, with a normal
establishment of 88, was reduced to 8.
With this depleted staff it would have appeared almost impossible to look
after a normal number of patients, but many more than normal had to be
dealt with during the last week of March, 1,820 being admitted and 2,365
discharged.
Many of these received at the hospital their first medical attention
since leaving the battlefield, and a very large number had to be operated
upon immediately.
This involved teams working in the operating theatre day and night, but
all members of the unit rose to the occasion and worked with a splendid
will and cheerfulness under these trying conditions.
The huts recently erected for accommodating the _personnel_ had to be
evacuated by them to make room for patients, of whom as many as ninety
slightly wounded were packed into one hut on stretchers. The men were
crowded into the remaining three huts, and the overflow slept on the
football field.
Nor did the work end here, for, owing to the threat of hostile air
attacks, it became urgently necessary to dig protective trenches
for patients, sisters, officers, and other ranks, and also to erect
sandbagged revetments around the wards which contained the helpless
patients. Outside assistance at this time was unprocurable, as all labour
was fully employed in the digging of a defensive system at Flixecourt to
protect the town of Abbeville, and the task therefore fell on all ranks
of the _personnel_. Soon after this air alarms became an almost nightly
occurrence, and even when raids did not actually take place, sleep was
broken. But the nursing staff and all inmates of the hospital passed
through this prolonged period of physical and mental strain without
failing to respond adequately to the demands made on them. Though no
definite attack was made by hostile aircraft on the hospital, bombs on
several occasions fell uncomfortably near, one actually falling inside
the grounds. This fortunately buried itself before exploding, and, beyond
tearing the roof of a tent used as a carpenter’s shop, did no damage.
The approach of the enemy and the frequency Of bombing raids made the
retention of cases of fracture of the femur in this hospital inadvisable,
and on that account as many as possible were evacuated to the United
Kingdom, together with the greater portion of the special equipment used
for these cases.
Not long after the last consignment was despatched the Allied offensive
began, and the heavy influx of fractured femur cases—amounting to more
than 150 in the hospital at one time—made it necessary to use improvised
apparatus for dealing with a number increased to this extent, in spite of
the fact that as many of these cases as possible were at once evacuated
to the United Kingdom.
During the months of June and July 1918 the admissions of sick to the
hospital were large, owing to an epidemic of influenza. Since then
admissions steadily increased, both of sick and wounded, due to the
offensive which began in the latter part of July and which continued up
to the signing of the armistice.
During September the admissions reached the figure of 3,276, while in
October they numbered 3,214, and the discharges 3,318. For the period
of January 1 to November 30, 1918, the total admissions were 20,089. Of
these 8,716 were battle casualties, and 11,373 were sick; discharges for
the same period amounted to 19,921. Of these, 4,196 were returned to
duty; 4,229 were transferred to convalescent depôts; 9,028 were evacuated
to the United Kingdom; and 2,468 were transferred to other hospitals in
France.
All the tented wards were equipped with sliding doors, the first of which
were provided out of South African funds. These were made by a French
contractor to our design, and the type was afterwards adopted for all
hospitals in this area. The engineer services eventually supplied the
remainder of the wards with similar doors.
A considerable amount of extra equipment was also provided out of South
African funds, notably, an extra operating table, portable ray apparatus
for use in the fractured femur wards, additional surgical instruments,
and the apparatus necessary for Ionic medication.
The appearance of the hospital grounds improved from year to year, grass
lawns and flower-beds being laid out, and vegetable gardening being
carried on each year on a progressively larger scale.
From the early days of the unit in France a field adjoining the hospital
was available for purposes of recreation, the rent being paid from
hospital funds. During all seasons of the year it was made full use of by
the unit for football, hockey, cricket, and other games. Badminton and
tennis courts were constructed in the officers’ and sisters’ quarters,
and a tennis court was made on ground adjoining the recreation field for
the use of other ranks of the unit.
In June 1917 a surgical team for duty at a casualty clearing station was
provided by the unit, and performed continuous duty in the forward areas
until December of that year. Since then a surgical team performed duty in
the front areas on eight occasions. In addition, nursing sisters from
time to time were detailed for duty on ambulance trains and for nursing
duties and as anæsthetists at casualty clearing stations.
On July 10, 1917, the hospital was honoured by a visit from her Majesty
the Queen and his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales. Her Majesty
inspected three of the wards in the Hospital and the operating theatre
block, and before leaving was graciously pleased to express her entire
satisfaction with the work of the Hospital.
* * * * *
To return to the South African Military Hospital at Richmond. In
September 1916 the Army Council, on its own account, proposed to add to
the accommodation; the Committee, however, considered that, in view of
the fact that the provision of 500 beds had been originally contemplated,
the additional accommodation proposed should be undertaken by the
Committee. This necessitated a further appeal for funds; but, to avoid
delay, Mr. Otto Beit generously gave a very substantial contribution.
Eventually the total donations received from the issue of the second
appeal assured the extension being carried through. The work was pressed
forward, and the extension was opened for patients in February 1917. It
was, however, hardly in use when a demand was made for further beds. This
was met by the Committee converting into wards the quarters originally
built for orderlies, and by renting a neighbouring house as an annex, so
that in April 1917 the total accommodation for patients had increased to
620 beds.
Early in 1918 the War Office, seeing that the Richmond Military Hospital
was almost entirely filled with South African patients, proposed to the
Committee that the South African and the Richmond hospitals should be
amalgamated, the combined hospitals to be known as the South African
Military Hospital. The Committee readily agreed, and the two hospitals
were completely amalgamated on July 1, 1918.
The enlarged hospital provided 1,098 beds; but even this was not
sufficient, and 250 emergency beds were added by billeting patients in
the neighbourhood. In addition, four auxiliary hospitals were attached,
bringing the total number of beds to 1,321, or, including billets, 1,571.
The Park section of the combined hospitals stood on an enclosed site of
about twelve acres, the actual area of the building being about two and
one-third acres. The construction throughout was of timber with felt
and weather-board linings on the outside, and asbestos board-sheeting on
the inside of the walls and ceilings of all wards and principal rooms.
A special feature of this section was the bath ward, with six fire-clay
continuous baths for the treatment of patients suffering from severe
wounds.
The Grove Road extension was a brick building, and consisted for the most
part of modern infirmary wards supplemented by additional wards in old
buildings.
The equipment of the Park section was entirely provided by the Committee,
while that of the Grove Road section was found by the Board of Guardians
and the War Office, and was only where necessary supplemented by the
Committee.
Towards the end of 1916 the Committee offered the privilege of naming a
bed in the hospital to any persons or institutions making a gift of £25,
and of naming a ward for a donation of £600. The appeal resulted in 99
beds and 8 wards being thus named, approximately 265 of the beds being
the gifts of schools in South Africa, the organization for these being
initiated and carried out by Mr. Maskew Miller of Cape Town.
The principal corridors and rooms in the hospital were named after
well-known streets or places in South Africa, all the principal towns
in the Union being represented. The result of this, and of placing the
tablets over the beds, was that familiar names greeted the South African
visitor—a happy idea on the part of the Committee, and one which was much
appreciated by the sick and wounded of the contingent.
The Committee expended approximately £45,000 on building the hospital and
its extensions, and £19,000 on equipment. The former figure, however,
includes a sum of approximately £2,000 expended in erecting a concert
hall and certain workshops, while the latter figure includes considerable
sums spent on replacements. That the money was well spent is shown by
the fact that the hospital was always regarded as one of the model war
hospitals in the United Kingdom.
The medical staff consisted of thirteen officers of the South African
Medical Corps, and eleven civilian practitioners, who for various causes
were not eligible for commissions in the S.A.M.C.
Various changes naturally occurred in the staff owing to interchanges
being effected from time to time with the units in France. When
Lieutenant-Colonel Thornton took over the command he was succeeded as
registrar by Captain Coghlan, S.A.M.C., who in turn was succeeded by
Major J. C. A. Rigby, S.A.M.C. The first quartermaster was Major G.
Merritt, S.A.M.C., who left, however, with No. 1 South African General
Hospital when that unit proceeded to France, his duties being taken over
by Captain Lunney, S.A.M.C. In the autumn of 1917 Captain Lunney relieved
Major Merritt in France, and Major Merritt then returned to Richmond,
where shortly after he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.
The nursing staff under the matron—Miss Jackson, R.R.C.,
Q.A.I.M.N.S.—consisted of 2 assistant matrons, 23 nursing sisters, 55
staff nurses, and 88 probationers, the larger proportion of whom were
South Africans. The trained members of the staff mostly belonged to the
Q.A.I.M.N.S. (Res.), or to the S.A.M.N.S. The subordinate _personnel_
consisted, with a few exceptions, of N.C.O.’s and men who, having been
invalided owing to wounds or sickness in the field, did duty at the
hospital while regaining health and strength.
The hospital also served as the depot for the S.A.M.C. subordinate
_personnel_; and 18 drafts, comprising 423 men, were sent to France as
reinforcements for the First South African General Hospital and the First
South African Field Ambulance.
The number of patients admitted up to October 31, 1918, was 274 officers
and 9,412 other ranks—a total of 9,686. This does not include any
patients admitted to the Richmond Military Hospital prior to the date of
amalgamation. Of the 9,686 patients, 2,628 belonged to Imperial units,
but included a good many South Africans, and 7,058 were members of the
South African Contingent; 8,260 patients were discharged, including 6,230
members of the Contingent.
The total number of operations performed under a general anæsthetic was
2,125, and the number of medical boards held was 1,559.
Most of the swabs and bandages used in the hospital were manufactured in
the South African workrooms, organized by a group of ladies attached to
the South African Comforts Committee. The ladies responsible for these
workrooms made most of the curtains and other similar articles required
to equip the hospital, and undertook most of the mending. Under Mrs.
Friedlander they rendered most valuable assistance to the hospital since
its foundation, and their help was much appreciated by all concerned.
From the very first the Committee spared neither trouble nor money to
provide for the comfort and welfare of the patients. At first the work of
visitation and entertainment was organized under Lady (Lionel) Phillips,
but later it was taken over by the Red Cross sub-committee of the Fund.
For those sufficiently convalescent to enjoy them, every possible variety
of amusement was provided. On four or five nights a week some form of
entertainment was given in the large concert hall, while every week
theatres or places of interest were visited, a special feature being the
river trips arranged by the “African World” War Comforts Service, who
also very generously provided gifts of fruit and other comforts. Further,
in order that nothing should be left undone, Lady Phillips founded a
riverside club in close proximity to the hospital, for the benefit of
those patients sufficiently convalescent to enjoy the delights of its
garden and picturesque river views.
Arrangements for bedside occupational work were, in the early days of the
hospital, made by lady visitors. Material for fancy work and needlework
was generously provided, and the making of regimental crests and other
work of a like nature helped patients to pass in bed many a weary hour
when they were still too weak to be doing the more serious vocational
work.
Shortly after the hospital was opened the problem of dealing with the
permanently disabled men of the Contingent had to be faced. After
negotiations with the War Office, it was arranged that a Vocational
Training School should be established in connection with the hospital. A
commencement was made in November 1916, and the school was finally opened
in February 1917. The scheme involved awakening the men while still in
bed to interest in their future, so that when well enough they might go
to the classrooms and undertake extensive courses of training. The South
African Military Hospital was the first primary hospital in the United
Kingdom in which permanently disabled men, while being restored to the
best possible physical condition, were trained, with due regard to their
disabilities, for a civil career to enable them on discharge from the
army to become self-supporting members of the community. There was what
was perhaps a natural reluctance on the part of the Home Government in
giving sanction to this new venture, which was for many months looked
upon as being at the best an interesting experiment. The New Zealand
authorities, however, quickly saw the advantages of the methods, and in
August 1917 a similar scheme for their hospitals was adopted.
The desirability of training permanently disabled soldiers while still
undergoing hospital treatment was finally endorsed at the Inter-Allied
Conference on Disablement Problems, held in London in May 1918, and
committees were subsequently formed in each Command to organize similar
work throughout the hospitals of the United Kingdom.
The South African Vocational Training Scheme was carried on side by side
with the work of the hospital, and was successful both in improving the
mental attitude—especially of limbless men—and in training many disabled
men of the Contingent who would otherwise have been unproductive to the
community.
The cost of the erection of the workshops—amounting to £2,335—was
borne by the South African Hospital and Comforts Fund and the
Governor-General’s Fund.
Much of the equipment was either given or lent, but about £1,200
had to be expended to obtain such tools and appliances as could not
otherwise be obtained. The latter expenditure was defrayed by the
Governor-General’s Fund. The scheme also necessitated the hiring of four
houses in the vicinity of the hospital for housing students who had been
discharged from hospital; the cost of the equipment of these, amounting
approximately to £1,400, was also met by the two funds.
These hostels were managed by a small committee appointed by the General
Committee. The expenditure on rents, rates, and taxes for the hostels
was shared by the local fund and the Governor-General’s Fund, but all
other expenditure was met by the sub-committee which received through
the High Commissioner the sum of £1 per week for each inmate. This sum
represented a ration allowance of 1s. 9d. per head per diem received
from Defence Votes, the balance being made up by the Governor-General’s
Fund. The Union Government also made itself responsible for the pay and
allowances of the inmates, and entirely relieved the Imperial Government
of all financial responsibility for the period during which the men were
undergoing training after discharge from hospital. The number of crippled
men who attended classes since their commencement was 393. Of these 167
remained on October 31, 1918, and 226 had left. Of those remaining, 112
were out-students—that is, men discharged from hospital—and 55 were
patients still in hospital. The number of out-students dealt with was
215, of whom 103 have left.
The school was at first under the direction of Mr. Charles Bray, but
on his resignation owing to ill-health, Staff-Sergeant Newell, B.Sc.,
of the S.A.M.C., and in civil life on the staff of the Natal Education
Department, was appointed as educational organizer. He was subsequently
granted honorary commissioned rank in the Union Defence Force. The
propaganda work in the wards and the ward teaching were in the hands of
Miss Edith Hill, also of the Natal Education Department.
The hostels for housing out-students were managed by a matron—Mrs.
Lennox, of Lovedale—and a staff of ladies, whose efforts were attended
with every success.
But the success of the school, in spite of many initial difficulties,
was due to the keenness of the men themselves and to the excellent
co-operative work of the whole staff of the hospital, with the result
that in a number of cases of limbless men the earning capacity was
undoubtedly increased as a result of the training they received at
Richmond.
APPENDIX IV.
THE RAILWAYS COMPANIES AND MISCELLANEOUS TRADES COMPANY.
In 1916 the railways, roads, canals, and docks in the British zone in
France were brought under the control of “Transportation,” which was
under the command of Sir Eric Geddes. The War Office appealed to the
Dominions for Railway Operating Sections, or Companies, each consisting
of three officers and 266 men. In South Africa the position was such that
the railways could, at the time, only spare sufficient men to form one
company, but it was arranged to form a second from those not actually in
the railway service but who had railway experience, or were in other ways
fitted for the particular work required of them.
The first company assembled at Potchefstroom in November 1916, under
Captain H. L. Pybus, and the second at Robert’s Heights, Pretoria, under
Captain W. McI. Robinson. Fifty locomotive drivers and a similar number
of firemen and guards formed the backbone of each company, the balance
being composed of traffic controllers, blockmen, signalmen, with the
necessary mechanics and clerical staff to enable each company to operate
as a separate and a complete unit.
Lieutenant-Colonel F. R. Collins—a mechanical superintendent in the
South African Railways—was appointed in command, and left for England in
December 1916, the companies following later under the command of Captain
(Acting Major) Robinson, and arriving at Bordon, Hampshire, in March
1917, at which place the depot was formed.
Both companies arrived in France at the end of March 1917, and were
detailed for light railway work, which was then in its initial stage.
The first section was renumbered “No. 7, South African Light Railway
Operating Company,” and the second, “No. 8, South African Light Railway
Operating Company,” the former being sent to Romarin on the Belgian
border, while the latter proceeded to Savy, in the Arras district.
Twenty-five drivers and a like number of firemen from each company were
transferred to the Broad Gauge, and remained on that work throughout the
war. No. 7 Company stayed at Romarin until the operations in connection
with the taking of Messines Village and Ridge were completed in June
1917, during which time the Ploegsteert Light Railway system was built,
over which the company was responsible for all traffic, the bulk being
ammunition with delivery points at the different batteries. The 8th
Company took over the Light Railway work from Marœuil to the north and
north-east of Arras, whence lines were extended after the Vimy Ridge
operations. In June 1917 both companies proceeded to Audruicq preparatory
to taking up Broad Gauge work, and were designated No. 92 and No. 93
Companies respectively.
During most of this period Lieutenant-Colonel Collins was attached
to Transportation Headquarters, and in May 1917 was appointed
Assistant-Director of Light Railways, Fifth Army, which was then
operating in the Bapaume sector. On the transfer of this Army to Belgium
to take part in the series of operations known as the Third Battle
of Ypres, light railways, in addition to serving batteries and Royal
Engineers, were now required to prepare to follow up any advance. For
this purpose the services of the 92nd and 93rd South African Companies
were loaned to Light Railways, and took their place with five Imperial
Operating Companies in the Fifth Army area. They shared in the operations
up to November 1917, when the offensive ceased.
During this time the 92nd Company was employed on the system north-east
of Ypres, eleven of the members being awarded Military Medals for
individual acts of gallantry and devotion to duty. The 93rd Company
worked from Elverdinghe through Boesinghe to Langemarck, and among
other duties was responsible for the placing of field gun ammunition in
position in front of the field guns on the eastern slopes of the Pilckem
Ridge and in the Steenbecque Valley prior to the attacks during September
and October 1917, which led to the front being advanced to the edge of
the Houthulst Forest. Seven members received the Military Medal during
this time.
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL F. R. COLLINS, D.S.O., Commanding South
African Railway Companies.]
In January 1918 the Fifth Army took over the sector of forty-five miles
on the extreme south of the British front, and, in anticipation of an
enemy offensive, light railway construction on a considerable scale was
undertaken under Lieutenant-Colonel F. Newell. Later, on the division
of this system, Lieutenant-Colonel Collins took over the northern
area—the 92nd and 93rd Companies being ordered south from Belgium. The
93rd arrived early in March and was sent to Noyon, where it remained
until the 23rd, when, retirement being forced by the enemy advance, the
company proceeded by route march to Flexicourt, west of Amiens, and was
employed on the construction of defence works in company with many other
transportation units whose usual employment had been suspended for a like
reason. Later, they were employed on railway construction necessitated
by the altered conditions. In July 1918 the Company Headquarters were
established at Ligny, east of St. Pol, and the operation of the main
trunk lines to Arras was undertaken. The German retreat caused a forward
move, and the company, since November, operated over the section Douai to
Mons inclusive, with headquarters at Somain.
The 92nd Company, after concentrating in Belgium in March for its
projected move south, subsequently cancelled owing to the enemy’s
advance, went to Crombeke and from there assisted in railway
construction and other duties, until in September, when, with Berguette
as headquarters, the operation of the newly-constructed line towards
Merville and later towards Armentières was undertaken. In November the
Company moved forward to Lille, and with headquarters at Tourcoing worked
the section from Tourcoing to Tournai.
In 1917 the South African Union Government consented to the formation of
a Miscellaneous Trades Company for service in France. This company began
to assemble at Potchefstroom in June, and, as recruiting was brisk, it
was able to embark fully organized at Cape Town as early as 25th July,
under the command of Captain C. E. Mason, S.A.E.
Arriving at Bordon on 28th August, the company was given a short
course of training at the Royal Engineers’ Depot there, and sent to
France on 14th October. Here the company was renumbered the 84th
Miscellaneous Trades Company, R.E. (South African), and sent to the
Director-General of Transportation, Chief Mechanical Engineer Department,
Locomotive Workshops, situated at St. Etienne-du-Rouvray, near Rouen,
where five companies of the Royal Engineers, under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Cole, R.E., were already stationed.
These were the largest locomotive workshops attached to the British
Armies in France, and, by reason of its large percentage of skilled
_personnel_, the 84th Company was enabled to take a very considerable
share in the activities of the shops, Captain Mason being appointed
Erecting Works’ Manager, and the N.C.O.’s of the Company in many
instances being entrusted with positions of responsibility. On the recall
of Captain Mason to South Africa, Captain N. S. Weatherley, S.A.E.,
succeeded to the command of the Company. When the armistice was signed in
November 1918, Lieutenant-Colonel Cole ordered a special parade of the
Company, in order to express to all ranks his high appreciation of their
services, which he characterized in the most complimentary terms.
A depot for the companies in France was originally established at
Bordon, and was temporarily under the charge of Lieutenant Arthur, of
the 1st section. Advantage was taken of the Instructional Establishment
at Longmoor to train as many men as possible in the operation of petrol
tractors, which were largely used in place of steam locomotives in the
forward areas on light railways. In June 1917 the depot was taken over
by Captain M. J. Byrne, who, on his transfer to France in July 1918 to
command the 93rd Company, was succeeded by Captain H. E. Greaves, M.C.,
R.E., the depot about the same time being transferred from Bordon to
Longmoor.
APPENDIX V.
THE CAPE AUXILIARY HORSE TRANSPORT COMPANIES.
In February 1917 the Government of the Union of South Africa was asked
by the War Office to raise eight companies of Cape coloured drivers for
service with the Army Service Corps in France. The _personnel_ originally
required was:—
Officers 50
Warrant officers 6
Non-commissioned officers 60
Artificers 131
Drivers 2,316
but this was eventually increased to—
Officers 67
Warrant officers 23
Non-commissioned officers 92
Artificers and drivers 3,482
Towards the end of February Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Anderson (an officer
who had considerable experience in transport work) was asked to take
command, and to arrange for the recruiting and organization of the eight
companies. Kimberley was selected as the most convenient centre for
mobilization, and De Beers Corporation gave the use of its Nos. 1 and 3
Compounds. These had hutting accommodation for approximately two thousand
men. They were provided with a hospital, kitchens, washing-rooms—in
fact everything required—and there is no doubt that the loan of these
compounds not only facilitated mobilization and saved a great deal of
expense, but probably accelerated the departure of the contingent by at
least two months. Lieutenant-Colonel Wynne was appointed camp commandant,
with Captain MacKeurton as paymaster, and Captain Cooper as officer in
charge of the Records, and by the 12th March everything was in readiness
for recruiting to begin.
The results were at first disappointing, as recruiting for the Cape
coloured battalions for service in German East Africa was at this time
being undertaken, and recruiting committees for this purpose were at work
at all the principal centres in South Africa. In addition there were
many questions, such as the appointment of coloured N.C.O.’s, increased
rates of pay, the rejection of all coloured drivers other than Cape
coloured drivers, recognition by the Governor-General’s Fund, and other
details, all of which had to be settled before the Coloured Recruiting
Committees would lend their assistance. There was also a lack of Cape
Auxiliary Horse Transport officers to conduct a special recruiting
campaign. However, these difficulties were soon overcome, and recruiting
proceeded with great rapidity. Johannesburg, where Captain Barlow,
Captain and Chaplain Rogers, and Lieutenant Graham Moore inaugurated a
vigorous recruiting campaign; Cape Town, where Lieutenants Gillam and
Sawyer, Second-Lieutenant Tracey, S.S.M. Simmons, and C.S.M. Creagh met
with considerable success; and Knysna, with Second-Lieutenant Anderson
and C.Q.M.S. Steytler as recruiting officers, each produced five hundred
recruits in a short time.
At the beginning the amount of clerical work entailed was very heavy, the
work being increased owing to the necessity of having to reject a large
number of drivers who were attested but subsequently found unsuitable.
Every officer, warrant officer, and N.C.O., however, assisted the
Records’ officer to such an extent that by the middle of April 1,500 men
were ready to leave for overseas. Unfortunately, shipping could only be
found for 867, and these sailed in the _Euripides_ on the 20th April.
These were shortly followed by drafts under the command of Majors Jenner
and Barnard, and a reinforcement draft under Lieutenant Smith.
On the arrival of the first detachment in France on 23rd May, the
Director of Transport decided that the contingent should release for
other service, and take the place of, the Army Service Corps _personnel_,
forming the following companies:—
No. 22 Auxiliary Horse Transport Company, A.S.C., stationed at
Dunkirk and Calais.
No. 5 Auxiliary Horse Transport Company, A.S.C., stationed at
Boulogne.
No. 2 Auxiliary Horse Transport Company, A.S.C., stationed at
Havre.
No. 8 Auxiliary Horse Transport Company, A.S.C., stationed at
Rouen.
No. 10 Auxiliary Horse Transport Company, A.S.C., stationed at
Rouen.
No. 11 Auxiliary Horse Transport Company, A.S.C., stationed at
Rouen.
Arrangements were also made for a base depot to be established at Havre.
The reorganization was commenced at once, one company of the first
draft going to Calais and the two others to Rouen. As other drafts
arrived they were sent to the base depot for three weeks, where they
were equipped, and went through a course of training before being
distributed to the various A.S.C. companies. Thus by the 31st August the
Cape Auxiliary Horse Transport detachments had released the whole of the
white _personnel_ of six companies of the Army Service Corps, with the
exception of five officers and a certain number of warrant officers and
N.C.O.’s, whose services it was proposed permanently to retain, while
after a few months in France the reorganized companies were all commanded
by officers of the detachment.
Though the men did very excellent work at the base posts, Colonel
Anderson felt that there were strong arguments in favour of them being
moved to divisional trains or Army Auxiliary Horse Transport companies
actually working in the army areas. The arguments in favour of the move
from a South African point of view were unanswerable. The environments
at the base posts were not good, and the work of the men chiefly lay in
the lower quarters of the towns where liquor-sellers and their customary
associates resided. It is greatly to the credit of the men that their
general conduct was exemplary in spite of the adverse conditions under
which many of them worked.
The views of the military authorities in France did not, however,
coincide with those of Colonel Anderson. All the commandants of the bases
at which the companies were employed recommended that they should remain
where they were, and wrote highly of the men’s behaviour, bearing, and
discipline. It was a great disappointment to all that the companies
were not at once employed in the army areas; but a promise was given
that, if reinforcements proved sufficient, an experiment would be made
in employing them nearer to the actual scene of fighting. This was
eventually done, and the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Army Auxiliary Horse Companies
were taken over, the experiment proving an unmitigated success. The work
of these companies consisted in conveying ammunition and supplies to the
firing lines, and transporting metal for the new roads which had to be
constructed as the armies advanced.
Of the other companies which were employed on the lines of communication,
Numbers 2, 5, 8, and 22 Companies were employed at the docks, the bulk of
the work consisting in conveying munitions and supplies from the docks to
the different distributing centres. The work was hard, the hours long,
and the drivers much exposed to weather conditions.
Numbers 10 and 11 Companies were designated as “Forest Companies,” and
were employed almost entirely in hauling logs from the place where they
were felled to dumping centres. In a report on the work in the forests
in France, Lord Lovat, the Director of Forests, wrote that, without
prejudice to other units, he wished to remark on the work done by the
Horse Transport Companies manned by South African (Cape coloured)
_personnel_, who had shown throughout both practical knowledge of the
work and patriotic devotion to duty.
During their stay in France the health of the officers, N.C.O.’s, and men
was much better than could reasonably have been expected. Casualties were
estimated at 1 per cent. per month, but this figure was reduced by half.
APPENDIX VI.
VICTORIA CROSSES WON BY SOUTH AFRICANS DURING THE WAR.
LIEUTENANT (ACTING CAPTAIN) ANDREW WEATHERBY BEAUCHAMP-PROCTOR, D.S.O.,
M.C., D.F.C., No. 84 Squadron, Royal Air Force.
Between August 8, 1918, and October 8, 1918, this officer proved himself
victor in twenty-six decisive combats, destroying twelve enemy kite
balloons, ten enemy aircraft, and driving down four other enemy aircraft
completely out of control.
Between October 1, 1918, and October 5, 1918, he destroyed two enemy
scouts, burned three enemy kite balloons, and drove down one enemy scout
completely out of control.
On October 1, 1918, in a general engagement with about twenty-eight
machines, he crashed one Fokker biplane near FONTAINE and a second near
RAMICOURT; on 2nd October he burnt a hostile balloon near SELVIGNY; on
3rd October he drove down completely out of control an enemy scout near
MONT D’ORIGNY, and burned a hostile balloon; on 5th October, the third
hostile balloon near BOHAIN.
On October 8, 1918, while flying home at a low altitude after destroying
an enemy two-seater near MARETZ, he was painfully wounded in the arm by
machine-gun fire; but, continuing, he landed safely at his aerodrome, and
after making his report was admitted to hospital.
In all, he has proved himself conqueror over fifty-four foes, destroying
twenty-two enemy machines, sixteen enemy kite balloons, and driving down
sixteen enemy aircraft completely out of control.
Captain Beauchamp-Proctor’s work in attacking enemy troops on the ground
and in reconnaissance during the withdrawal following on the battle of
ST. QUENTIN, from March 21, 1918, and during the victorious advance of
our armies commencing on 8th August, has been almost unsurpassed in its
brilliancy, and as such has made an impression on those serving in his
squadron and those around him that will not be easily forgotten.
Captain Beauchamp-Proctor was awarded the Military Cross on June 22,
1918; the Distinguished Flying Cross on July 2, 1918; a bar to the
Military Cross on September 16, 1918; and the Distinguished Service Order
on November 2, 1918.
CAPTAIN WILLIAM ANDERSON BLOOMFIELD, Scouts Corps, South African Mounted
Brigade.
At MLALI, East Africa, on August 24, 1916. For most conspicuous bravery.
Finding that, after being heavily attacked in an advanced and isolated
position, the enemy were working round his flanks, Captain Bloomfield
evacuated his wounded and subsequently withdrew his command to a new
position, he himself being among the last to retire. On arrival at the
new position he found that one of the wounded—No. 2475, Corporal D. M.
P. Bowker—had been left behind. Owing to very heavy fire he experienced
difficulties in having the wounded corporal brought in. Rescue meant
passing over some four hundred yards of open ground, swept by heavy fire,
in full view of the enemy. This task Captain Bloomfield determined to
face himself, and unmindful of personal danger, he succeeded in reaching
Corporal Bowker and carrying him back, subjected throughout the double
journey to heavy machine-gun and rifle fire. This act showed the highest
degree of valour and endurance.
No. 1630, SERGEANT FREDERICK CHARLES BOOTH, South African Forces,
attached Rhodesia Native Regiment.
At JOHANNESBRUCK, near SONGEA, EAST AFRICA, on February 12, 1917. For
most conspicuous bravery during an attack, in thick bush, on the enemy
position. Under very heavy rifle fire, Sergeant Booth went forward alone
and brought in a man who was dangerously wounded. Later, he rallied
native troops who were badly disorganized, and brought them to the firing
line. This N.C.O. has, on many previous occasions, displayed the greatest
bravery, coolness, and resource in action, and has set a splendid example
of pluck, endurance, and determination.
No. 4073, PRIVATE WILLIAM FREDERICK FAULDS, 1st Regiment, South African
Infantry.
At DELVILLE WOOD, France, on July 18, 1916. For most conspicuous bravery
and devotion to duty. A bombing party under Lieutenant Craig attempted
to rush across forty yards of ground which lay between the British and
enemy trenches. Coming under very heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, the
officer and the majority of the party were killed or wounded. Unable to
move, Lieutenant Craig lay midway between the two lines of trenches, the
ground being quite open. In full daylight Private Faulds, accompanied by
two other men, climbed the parapet, ran out, picked up the officer and
carried him back, one man being severely wounded in so doing.
Two days later Private Faulds again showed most conspicuous bravery in
going out alone to bring in a wounded man and carrying him nearly half
a mile to a dressing-station, subsequently rejoining his platoon. The
artillery fire was at the time so intense that stretcher bearers and
others considered that any attempt to bring in the wounded man meant
certain death. This risk Private Faulds faced unflinchingly, and his
bravery was crowned with success.
LIEUTENANT ROBERT VAUGHAN GORLE, “A” Battery, 50th Brigade, Royal Field
Artillery.
For most conspicuous bravery, initiative, and devotion to duty during
the attack at LEDEGHEM on October 1, 1918, when in command of an
eighteen-pounder gun working in close conjunction with infantry. He
brought his gun into action in the most exposed positions on four
separate occasions, and disposed of enemy machine guns by firing over
open sights under direct machine-gun fire at five hundred to six hundred
yards range.
Later, seeing that the infantry were being driven back by intense hostile
fire, he without hesitation galloped his gun in front of the leading
infantry, and on two occasions knocked out enemy machine guns which were
causing the trouble. His disregard of personal safety and dash were a
magnificent example to the wavering line, which rallied and retook the
northern end of the village.
MAJOR (ACTING LIEUTENANT-COLONEL) HARRY GREENWOOD, D.S.O., M.C., 9th
Battalion, King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.
For most conspicuous bravery, devotion to duty, and fine leadership
on October 23-24, 1918. When the advance of his battalion on the 23rd
October was checked, and many casualties caused by an enemy machine-gun
post, Lieutenant-Colonel Greenwood, single-handed, rushed the post and
killed the crew. At the entrance to the village of OVILLERS, accompanied
by two battalion runners, he again rushed a machine-gun post and killed
the occupants.
On reaching the objective west of DUKE’S WOOD, his command was almost
surrounded by hostile machine-gun posts, and the enemy at once
attacked his isolated force. The attack was repulsed, and, led by
Lieutenant-Colonel Greenwood, his troops swept forward and captured the
last objective with one hundred and fifty prisoners, eight machine guns,
and one field gun.
During the attack on the “Green Line,” south of POIX DU NORD, on
24th October, he again displayed the greatest gallantry in rushing a
machine-gun post, and he showed conspicuously good leadership in the
handling of his command in the face of heavy fire. He inspired his men in
the highest degree, with the result that the objective was captured, and
in spite of heavy casualties the line was held.
During the advance on Grand Gay Farm Road, on the afternoon of 24th
October, the skilful and bold handling of his battalion was productive of
most important results, not only in securing the flank of his brigade but
also in safeguarding the flank of the Division.
His valour and leading during two days of fighting were beyond all praise.
CAPTAIN PERCY HOWARD HANSEN, ADJUTANT, 6th (Service) Battalion, the
Lincolnshire Regiment.
For most conspicuous bravery on August 9, 1915, at YILGHIN BURNU,
Gallipoli Peninsula. After the second capture of the “Green Knoll” his
battalion was forced to retire, leaving some wounded behind, owing to
the intense heat from the scrub which had been set on fire. When the
retirement was effected, Captain Hansen, with three or four volunteers,
on his own initiative, dashed forward several times some three hundred
to four hundred yards over open ground into the scrub, under a terrific
fire, and succeeded in rescuing from inevitable death by burning no less
than six wounded men.
LIEUTENANT (ACTING CAPTAIN) REGINALD FREDERICK JOHNSON HAYWARD, M.C.,
Wiltshire Regiment.
Near FREMICOURT, France, on March 21-22, 1918. For most conspicuous
bravery in action. This officer, while in command of a company, displayed
almost superhuman powers of endurance and consistent courage of the
rarest nature. In spite of the fact that he was buried, wounded in the
head, and rendered deaf on the first day of operations, and had his arm
shattered two days later, he refused to leave his men (even though he
received a third serious injury to his head), until he collapsed from
sheer physical exhaustion.
Throughout the whole of this period the enemy were attacking his company
front without cessation, but Captain Hayward continued to move across
the open from one trench to another with absolute disregard of his own
personal safety, concentrating entirely on reorganizing his defences
and encouraging his men. It was almost entirely due to the magnificent
example of ceaseless energy of this officer that many most determined
attacks upon his portion of the trench system failed entirely.
No. 8162, LANCE-CORPORAL WILLIAM HENRY HEWITT, 2nd Regiment, South
African Infantry.
At east of YPRES on September 20, 1917. For most conspicuous bravery
during operations. Lance-Corporal Hewitt attacked a “pill-box” with his
section and tried to rush the doorway. The garrison, however, proved
very stubborn, and in the attempt this non-commissioned officer received
a severe wound. Nevertheless, he proceeded to the loophole of the
“pill-box” where, in his attempts to put a bomb into it, he was again
wounded in the arm. Undeterred, however, he eventually managed to get
a bomb inside, which caused the occupants to dislodge, and they were
successfully and speedily dealt with by the remainder of the section.
SECOND-LIEUTENANT (ACTING CAPTAIN) ARTHUR MOORE LASCELLES, 3rd (attached
14th) Battalion, Durham Light Infantry.
At MASNIÈRES, France, on December 3, 1917. For most conspicuous bravery,
initiative, and devotion to duty when in command of his company in a very
exposed position. After a very heavy bombardment, during which Captain
Lascelles was wounded, the enemy attacked in strong force but was driven
off, success being due in a great degree to the fine example set by this
officer, who, refusing to allow his wound to be dressed, continued to
encourage his men and organize the defence.
Shortly afterwards the enemy again attacked and captured the trench,
taking several of his men prisoners. Captain Lascelles at once jumped on
the parapet, and followed by the remainder of his company, twelve men
only, rushed across under very heavy machine-gun fire and drove over
sixty of the enemy back, thereby saving a most critical situation.
He was untiring in reorganizing the position, but shortly afterwards the
enemy again attacked and captured the trench and Captain Lascelles, who
escaped later. The remarkable determination and gallantry of this officer
in the course of operations, during which he received two further wounds,
afforded an inspiring example to all.
CAPTAIN OSWALD AUSTIN REID, 2nd Battalion, Liverpool Regiment, attached
6th Battalion, Loyal North Lancashire Regiment.
At DIALAH RIVER, Mesopotamia, on March 8-10, 1917. For most conspicuous
bravery in the face of desperate circumstances. By his dauntless courage
and gallant leadership he was able to consolidate a small post with the
advanced troops, on the opposite side of a river to the main body, after
his lines of communication had been cut by the sinking of the pontoons.
He maintained this position for thirty hours against constant attacks by
bombs, machine-gun and shell fire, with the full knowledge that repeated
attempts at relief had failed, and that his ammunition was all but
exhausted. It was greatly due to his tenacity that the passage of the
river was effected on the following night. During the operations he was
wounded.
MAJOR (ACTING LIEUTENANT-COLONEL) JOHN SHERWOOD-KELLY, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Norfolk Regiment, Commanding 1st Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
At MARCOING, France, on November 20, 1917. For most conspicuous bravery
and fearless leading, when a party of men of another unit detailed to
cover the passage of the canal by his battalion were held up on the
near side of the canal by heavy rifle fire directed on the bridge.
Lieutenant-Colonel Sherwood-Kelly at once ordered covering fire,
personally led the leading company of his battalion across the canal,
and, after crossing, reconnoitred under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire
the high ground held by the enemy.
The left flank of his battalion, advancing to the assault of this
objective, was held up by a thick belt of wire, whereupon he crossed to
that flank and with a Lewis-gun team forced his way under heavy fire
through obstacles, got the gun into position on the far side, and covered
the advance of his battalion through the wire, thereby enabling them to
capture the position.
Later, he personally led a charge against some pits from which a heavy
fire was being directed on his men, captured the pits, together with five
machine guns and forty-six prisoners, and killed a large number of the
enemy.
The great gallantry displayed by this officer throughout the day inspired
the greatest confidence in his men, and it was mainly due to his example
and devotion to duty that his battalion was enabled to capture and hold
their objective.
CAPTAIN (ACTING LIEUTENANT-COLONEL) RICHARD ANNESLEY WEST, D.S.O., M.C.,
late North Irish Horse (Cavalry Special Reserve) and Tank Corps.
At COURCELLES and VAULX-VRAUCOURT, France, on August 21, 1918, and
September 2, 1918. For most conspicuous bravery, leadership, and
self-sacrifice. During an attack, the infantry having lost their bearings
in the dense fog, this officer at once collected and reorganized any
men he could find and led them to their objective in face of heavy
machine-gun fire. Throughout the whole action he displayed the most utter
disregard of danger, and the capture of the objective was in a great part
due to his initiative and gallantry.
On a subsequent occasion it was intended that a battalion of light Tanks,
under the command of this officer, should exploit the initial infantry
and heavy Tank attack. He therefore went forward in order to keep in
touch with the progress of the battle, and arrived at the front line
when the enemy were in process of delivering a local counter-attack.
The infantry battalion had suffered heavy officer casualties and its
flanks were exposed. Realizing that there was a danger of the battalion
giving way, he at once rode out in front of them under extremely heavy
machine-gun and rifle fire and rallied the men.
In spite of the fact that the enemy were close upon him, he took charge
of the situation and detailed non-commissioned officers to replace
officer casualties. He then rode up and down in front of them in face of
certain death, encouraging the men and calling to them, “Stick it, men!
Show them fight! and for God’s sake put up a good fight!” He fell riddled
by machine-gun bullets.
The magnificent bravery of this very gallant officer at the critical
moment inspired the infantry to redoubled efforts, and the hostile attack
was defeated.
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL G. HELBERT, C.B.E., Military Staff
Officer, South African Expeditionary Force.]
APPENDIX VII.
LIST OF HONOURS WON BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN FRANCE.
The ranks shown were those held at the date of the bestowal of the
different awards.
Each asterisk denotes an additional mention.
V.C.
Faulds, No. 4073, Private W. F. Infantry.
Hewitt, No. 8162, Lance-Corporal W. H. Infantry.
K.C.B.
Lukin, Major-General Sir H. T. Staff.
C.B.
Lukin, Brigadier-General H. T. Staff.
Tanner, Brigadier-General W. E. C. Staff.
C.M.G.
Dawson, Lieutenant-Colonel F. S. Infantry.
Jones, Lieutenant-Colonel F. A. Infantry.
Pritchard, Colonel S. A. M. S.A.N.L.C.
Tanner, Lieutenant-Colonel W. E. C. Infantry.
Thackeray, Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Infantry.
Thomson, Lieutenant-Colonel G. R. S.A.M.C.
BAR TO D.S.O.
Dawson, Brigadier-General F. S. Staff.
D.S.O.
Baker, Major J. M. Staff.
Bennett, Major G. M. Heavy Artillery.
Blew, Lieutenant-Colonel T. H. Heavy Artillery.
Brydon, Major W. Heavy Artillery.
Bunce, Captain H. Infantry.
Christian, Lieutenant-Colonel E. Infantry.
Cochran, Major F. E. Infantry.
Collins, Lieutenant-Colonel F. R. S. A. Engineers.
Currie, Lieutenant J. Heavy Artillery.
Dawson, Brigadier-General F. S. Staff.
Edwards, Major S. B. Heavy Artillery.
Forbes, Lieutenant E. C. Infantry.
Greene, Captain L. Infantry.
Hands, Major P. A. M. Heavy Artillery.
Harrison, Major H. C. Heavy Artillery.
Harrison, Major N. Signal Coy.
Heal, Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Infantry.
Heenan, Major C. R. Infantry.
Hemming, Major H. S. J. L. Infantry.
Jacobs, Captain L. M. Infantry.
Jenkins, Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Infantry.
Maasdorp, Major L. H. Heavy Artillery.
MacLeod, Lieutenant-Colonel D. M. Infantry.
Mullins, Major A. G. Heavy Artillery.
Murray, Major C. M. S.A.M.C.
Ormiston, Major T. Infantry.
Power, Major M. S. S.A.M.C.
Pringle, Lieutenant-Colonel R. N. S.A.M.C.
Sprenger, Captain L. F. Infantry.
Tanner, Lieutenant-Colonel W. E. C. Infantry.
Thackeray, Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Infantry.
Tomlinson, Captain L. W. Infantry.
Tripp, Major W. H. L. Heavy Artillery.
Ward, Lieutenant-Colonel A. B. S.A.M.C.
Ward, Major C. P. Heavy Artillery.
C.B.E. (MILITARY DIVISION).
Anderson, Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Cape Aux. Horse Transport.
Baker, Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Staff.
Duff, Colonel C. de V. General List.
Helbert, Lieutenant-Colonel G. G. Staff.
Stock, Colonel P. G. S.A.M.C.
Thornton, Lieutenant-Colonel E. N. S.A.M.C.
O.B.E. (MILITARY DIVISION).
Baker, Major H. C. S.A.M.C.
Balfour, Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. S.A.M.C.
Bamford, Lieutenant-Colonel H. W. M. Infantry.
Bowles, Captain E. General List.
Cameron, Captain and Quartermaster C. S. S.A.N.L.C.
Collins, Captain F. S. A. Engineers
Deane, Major R. Infantry.
Emmett, Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. C. S.A.N.L.C.
Fawcus, Lieutenant-Colonel A. S.A.N.L.C.
Geddes, Captain W. L. S.A.N.L.C.
Green, Major J. A. Staff.
Harris, Major J. J. F. Infantry.
Jacobsby, Lieutenant-Colonel J. S.A.N.L.C.
Jenner, Major L. W. Cape Aux. Horse Transport.
Knight, Acting Major R. C. General List.
Lennox, Captain and Chaplain J. S.A.N.L.C.
Long, Captain W. Cape Aux. Horse Transport.
Marshall, Captain H. E. C.C.L.C.
Mills, Major H. P. Infantry.
Pearson, Major M. G. S.A.M.C.
Pepper, Major A. L. Staff.
Rann, Major A. E. Heavy Artillery.
Rigby, Major J. C. A. S.A.M.C.
Ross, Captain F. M. Signal Coy.
Sandes, Major T. L. S.A.M.C.
Sproule, Major H. C.C.L.R.
Thornton, Lieutenant-Colonel E. N. S.A.M.C.
Usmar, Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. S.A.M.C.
Wakefield, Major H. S. General List.
M.B.E. (MILITARY DIVISION).
Balfour, Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. S.A.M.C.
Bowles, Captain E. S. A. Pay Corps.
Coghlan, Captain G. S. S.A.M.C.
Deane, Major R. Infantry.
Ellis, Lieutenant N. N. S. A. Pay Corps.
Jamieson, Captain E. C. K. S. A. Pay Corps.
Kimberley, No. 17409, Reg. Sergt.-Major H. S.A.M.C.
Knibbs, Lieutenant A. R. Staff.
Legge, Captain E. A. Infantry.
Rann, Major A. E. Heavy Artillery.
Sandes, Major T. L. S.A.M.C.
Tucker, Captain W. E. Infantry.
Walker, Captain E. B. Infantry.
Walker, No. X235, Staff Sergeant-Major J. H. Staff.
Whyte, Captain J. E. S.A.N.L.C.
BAR TO M.C.
Green, Lieutenant G. G. Infantry.
King, Captain W. L. Infantry.
Lawrie, Captain M. B. S.A.M.C.
Morrison, Lieutenant R. E. Infantry.
Neille, Lieutenant P. C. Infantry.
Phillips, Second-Lieutenant S. G. Infantry.
Ridley, Captain E. G. Heavy Artillery.
Roffe, Captain T. Infantry.
Smith, Captain W. S.A.M.C.
Ward, Captain A. E. Infantry.
M.C.
Allen, Second-Lieutenant V. W. Infantry.
Backeberg, Second-Lieutenant H. W. Infantry.
Bailey, Lieutenant H. Heavy Artillery.
Bamford, Captain H. W. M. Infantry.
Begbie, Major R. P. G. Heavy Artillery.
Begley, Lieutenant E. R. Infantry.
Beverley, Lieutenant R. Infantry.
Beyers, Captain G. A. S.A.M.C.
Boustead, Second-Lieutenant H. Infantry.
Bower, Second-Lieutenant E. W. Heavy Artillery.
Browne, Captain C. M. Infantry.
Burgess, Captain E. J. Infantry.
Burton, Second-Lieutenant F. W. S. Infantry.
Carding, Lieutenant W. H. Infantry.
Cawood, Second-Lieutenant R. C. Infantry.
Charlton, Captain W. D. Infantry.
Cohen, Lieutenant M. Signal Coy.
Collins, Second-Lieutenant F. Signal Coy.
Connock, Second-Lieutenant C. O. Infantry.
Covernton, Lieutenant R. H. Signal Coy.
Cragg, Second-Lieutenant J. C. Infantry.
Crooks, Lieutenant A. S. Infantry.
Culverwell, Second-Lieutenant D. Heavy Artillery.
Davies, Captain E. A. Infantry.
Dickson, Second-Lieutenant E. G. H. Infantry.
Dingwall, Captain J. A. Signal Coy.
Dobson, Lieutenant F. L. Signal Coy.
Duminy, Second-Lieutenant F. J. van H. Heavy Artillery.
Elias, Lieutenant D. H. Infantry.
Ellis, Captain P. H. Infantry.
English, Second-Lieutenant F. H. Infantry.
FitzGeorge, Lieutenant F. S. L. Signal Coy.
Forbes, Captain A. G. S.A.M.C.
Forbes, Lieutenant L. H. Infantry.
Goodwin, Lieutenant B. W. Infantry.
Gray, Lieutenant S. E. G. Infantry.
Green, Lieutenant A. P. Heavy Artillery.
Green, Second-Lieutenant G. G. Infantry.
Greene, Captain L. Infantry.
Hallack, Lieutenant M. H. Infantry.
Hands, Captain P. A. M. Heavy Artillery.
Harris, Captain and Chaplain H. S. A. Chap. Dept.
Harris, Second-Lieutenant W. E. Infantry.
Hatchard, Second-Lieutenant F. H. F. Infantry.
Heeley, Lieutenant H. N. Infantry.
Hennessy, Second-Lieutenant B. P. Infantry.
Hewat, Second-Lieutenant R. D. Infantry.
Hill, Captain and Chaplain E. St. C. S. A. Chap. Dept.
Hill, Lieutenant J. L. Signal Coy.
Humphrey, Captain J. T. Infantry.
Ingarfield, Lieutenant G. P. Infantry.
Jack, Lieutenant J. Signal Coy.
Keith, No. 2300, Reg. Sergt.-Major P. Infantry.
Kilpin, Second-Lieutenant T. Heavy Artillery.
King, Second-Lieutenant W. L. Infantry.
Kirby, Second-Lieutenant W. H. Infantry.
Kirkham, Captain G. H. Infantry.
Lawrence, Captain H. R. S.A.M.C.
Lawrie, Captain M. B. S.A.M.C.
Leighton, Second-Lieutenant G. A. Infantry.
Lewell, Second-Lieutenant E. Infantry.
Liebson, Captain S. S.A.M.C.
Lunn, Captain W. S. Heavy Artillery.
Maasdorp, Lieutenant A. Heavy Artillery.
Macfarlane, Lieutenant B. N. Infantry.
MacFie, Second-Lieutenant T. G. Infantry.
Mackie, Second-Lieutenant D. C. Infantry.
Maddison, Lieutenant E. A. J. Heavy Artillery.
Marshall, Captain R. B. Infantry.
Martin, Second-Lieutenant H. A. Infantry.
M’Donald, Captain A. W. H. Infantry.
M’Gregor, Major A. M. Heavy Artillery.
M’Intosh, Second-Lieutenant R. Infantry.
M’Lean, Lieutenant W. Infantry.
Mellish, Lieutenant F. W. Heavy Artillery.
Meredith, No. 5755, Reg. Sergt.-Major G. Infantry.
Methven, Second-Lieutenant N. W. Infantry.
Middleton, Lieutenant E. Infantry.
Miller, Second-Lieutenant R. S. Heavy Artillery.
Mitchell, Captain F. McE. Infantry.
Money, Lieutenant A. G. Infantry.
Morrison, Second-Lieutenant R. E. Infantry.
Murray, Second-Lieutenant A. S. Heavy Artillery.
Neille, Second-Lieutenant P. C. Infantry.
Nicholson, Lieutenant C. F. S. Infantry.
Page, Second-Lieutenant P. T. A. Heavy Artillery.
Pentz, Second-Lieutenant H. F. Infantry.
Pepper, Captain A. L. Staff.
Perrem, Second-Lieutenant C. H. Infantry.
Peters, Second-Lieutenant J. Infantry.
Phillips, Second-Lieutenant E. J. Infantry.
Phillips, Second-Lieutenant S. G. Infantry.
Poole, Lieutenant R. P. Signal Coy.
Pougnet, Second-Lieutenant V. N. Infantry.
Rann, Captain A. E. Heavy Artillery.
Reid, Captain E. L. S.A.M.C.
Ridley, Captain E. G. Heavy Artillery.
Roberts, Second-Lieutenant C. W. Infantry.
Roddy, Captain G. Infantry.
Roffe, Captain T. Infantry.
Roper, Captain A. W. F. Heavy Artillery.
Rose-Innes, Second-Lieutenant F. G. Heavy Artillery.
Ross, Captain F. H. Infantry.
Ross, Captain F. M. Signal Coy.
Rushforth, Lieutenant A. H. Heavy Artillery.
Sampson, Captain B. S.A.M.C.
Saphir, Second-Lieutenant M. Infantry.
Scheepers, Second-Lieutenant J. C. Infantry.
Shenton, Lieutenant J. L. Infantry.
Smith, Captain W. S.A.M.C.
Sprenger, Captain L. F. Infantry.
Solomon, Lieutenant A. C. Heavy Artillery.
Stapleton, Lieutenant P. R. Infantry.
Stewart, Lieutenant J. G. Heavy Artillery.
Style, Captain S. W. E. Infantry.
Sumner, Lieutenant H. L. Infantry.
Symons, Captain T. H. Infantry. Infantry.
Morrison, Second-Lieutenant R. E. Infantry.
Murray, Second-Lieutenant A. S. Heavy Artillery.
Neille, Second-Lieutenant P. C. Infantry.
Nicholson, Lieutenant C. F. S. Infantry.
Page, Second-Lieutenant P. T. A. Heavy Artillery.
Pentz, Second-Lieutenant H. F. Infantry.
Pepper, Captain A. L. Staff.
Perrem, Second-Lieutenant C. H. Infantry.
Peters, Second-Lieutenant J. Infantry.
Phillips, Second-Lieutenant E. J. Infantry.
Phillips, Second-Lieutenant S. G. Infantry.
Poole, Lieutenant R. P. Signal Coy.
Pougnet, Second-Lieutenant V. N. Infantry.
Rann, Captain A. E. Heavy Artillery.
Reid, Captain E. L. S.A.M.C.
Ridley, Captain E. G. Heavy Artillery.
Roberts, Second-Lieutenant C. W. Infantry.
Roddy, Captain G. Infantry.
Roffe, Captain T. Infantry.
Roper, Captain A. W. F. Heavy Artillery.
Rose-Innes, Second-Lieutenant F. G. Heavy Artillery.
Ross, Captain F. H. Infantry.
Ross, Captain F. M. Signal Coy.
Rushforth, Lieutenant A. H. Heavy Artillery.
Sampson, Captain B. S.A.M.C.
Saphir, Second-Lieutenant M. Infantry.
Scheepers, Second-Lieutenant J. C. Infantry.
Shenton, Lieutenant J. L. Infantry.
Smith, Captain W. S.A.M.C.
Sprenger, Captain L. F. Infantry.
Solomon, Lieutenant A. C. Heavy Artillery.
Stapleton, Lieutenant P. R. Infantry.
Stewart, Lieutenant J. G. Heavy Artillery.
Style, Captain S. W. E. Infantry.
Sumner, Lieutenant H. L. Infantry.
Symons, Captain T. H. Infantry.
Thomas, Second-Lieutenant W. F. G. Infantry.
Thorburn, Lieutenant W. Infantry.
Unwin, Captain H. W. Heavy Artillery.
Van Ryneveld, Second-Lieutenant T. V. Infantry.
Vincent, Lieutenant S. C. Infantry.
Vivian, Captain E. V. Infantry.
Walker, Captain E. B. Infantry.
Walsh, Second-Lieutenant F. G. Infantry.
Walshe, Captain and Chaplain P. J. S. A. Chap. Dept.
Ward, Lieutenant A. E. Infantry.
Wardill, No. 907, Batt. Sergt.-Major A. J. Heavy Artillery.
Wells, No. 6163, Reg. Sergt.-Major R. Infantry.
Welsh, Captain T. S.A.M.C.
Whales, Second-Lieutenant G. Heavy Artillery.
Whelan, Second-Lieutenant M. E. Infantry.
Wilson, No. 5266, Reg. Sergt.-Major J. Infantry.
Wood, No. 6386, Company Sergeant-Major J. Infantry.
THE ROYAL RED CROSS.
MEMBERS.
Bester, Nursing-Sister H. L. S.A.M.N.S.
Creagh, Matron E. R. S.A.M.N.S.
Fynn, Nursing-Sister M. A. S.A.M.N.S.
Purcell, Matron A. M. Q.A.I.M.N.S. (Res.)
Wessels, Nursing-Sister E. S. S.A.M.N.S.
ASSOCIATES.
Barber, Nursing-Sister M. E. S.A.M.N.S.
Blake, Nursing-Sister E. C. S.A.M.N.S.
Campbell, Nursing-Sister M. H. S.A.M.N.S.
Conyngham, Nursing-Sister A. B. S.A.M.N.S.
Francis, Staff-Nurse G. E. S.A.M.N.S.
Goulden, Nursing-Sister K. S.A.M.N.S.
Loosemore, Nursing-Sister A. H. M. S.A.M.N.S.
Redpath, Staff-Nurse V. M. S.A.M.N.S.
Ross, Nursing-Sister K. S.A.M.N.S.
Tilney, Nursing-Sister M. E. S.A.M.N.S.
Wagstaff, Staff-Nurse B. S.A.M.N.S.
BREVET RANK.
BREVET-LIEUTENANT-COLONEL.
Green, Major J. A. Staff.
Pearson, Major M. G. S.A.M.C.
Purcell, Major (Temp. Col.) J. F., D.S.O. Infantry.
Sandes, Major T. L. S.A.M.C.
BREVET-MAJOR.
Jamieson, Major E. C. K. S. A. Pay Corps.
D.C.M.
Alexander, No. 2471, Sergeant C. G. Infantry.
Beckman, No. 4768, Sergeant G. H. W. Infantry.
Bell, No. 4699, Company Sergeant-Major F. Infantry.
Borland, No. 6016, Reg. Sergt.-Major J. C. Signal Company.
Brown, No. 5258, Company Sergeant-Major D. Infantry.
Cawthorn, No. 5573, Lance-Corporal W. Infantry.
Chapman, No. 689, Corporal R. L. Heavy Artillery.
Craig, No. 902, Corporal J. Infantry.
Dacombe, No. 5099, Batt. Sergt.-Major S. G. Heavy Artillery.
Davis, No. 9996, Battery Sergeant-Major W. Heavy Artillery.
Dewar, No. 3110, Corporal W. R. Infantry.
Dollery, No. 700, Gunner R. N. Heavy Artillery.
England, No. 3558, Sergeant W. J. Infantry.
Fernie, No. 2658, Sergeant G. S. Infantry.
Fisher, No. 5664, Sergeant M. H. Infantry.
Govan, No. 972, Private F. G. Infantry.
Guest, No. 5913, Sergeant W. Heavy Artillery.
Healey, No. 1106, Private W. Infantry.
Hean, No. 11511, Corporal D. McK. Infantry.
Hilson, No. 2179, Sergeant J. C. Infantry.
Hodges, No. 469, Sergeant E. C. Heavy Artillery.
Hogarth, No. 13004, Sergeant F. Infantry.
Hope, No. 5293, Private C. J. Infantry.
Horne, No. S6, Lance-Corporal F. C. Infantry.
Howells, No. 1010, Sergeant W. K. Heavy Artillery.
Hughes, No. 572, Bombardier F. Heavy Artillery.
Hurr, No. 571, Sergeant B. F. Heavy Artillery.
Hutchins, No. 6165, Sergeant F. G. Infantry.
Ison, No. 3161, Coy. Q.M.-Sergeant C. H. Signal Company.
Jordan, No. 8431, Coy. Sergeant-Major A. J. Infantry.
Keit, No. 4916, Coy. Sergeant-Major M. W. Infantry.
Keith, No. 2300, Company Sergeant-Major P. Infantry.
King, No. 5540, Reg. Q.M.-Sergeant M. Infantry.
King, No. 3782, Coy. Sergeant-Major W. L. Infantry.
Lilford, No. 920, Lance-Corporal A. F. Infantry.
Loubser, No. 4152, Private A. J. Infantry.
Mack, No. 15543, Sergeant J. G. Infantry.
Mallett, No. 5575, Sergeant H. F. P. Infantry.
Marshall, No. 2834, Sergeant G. E. Infantry.
Meyer, No. 2299, Sergeant J. W. Infantry.
Mundy, No. 9175, Sergeant P. Infantry.
Naisby, No. 1813, Sergeant J. Infantry.
Prebble, No. 348, Coy. Sergeant-Major E. E. Infantry.
Rodgers, No. 6612, Coy. Sergeant-Major A. F. Infantry.
Rynhoud, No. 12781, Lance-Corporal F. A. Infantry.
Schroeder, No. 10907, Sergeant A. E. Infantry.
Shapcott, No. 4914, Lance-Corporal H. Infantry.
Sinclair, No. 509, Sergeant W. N. Heavy Artillery.
Smith, No. 4087, Sergeant A. Infantry.
Spence, No. S4, Sergeant F. H. Infantry.
Stafford, No. 9089, Private T. Infantry.
Starke, No. 834, Corporal S. J. Infantry.
Stewart, No. 713, Lance-Sergeant T. T. Infantry.
Stuart, No. 7389, Corporal W. Infantry.
Tanner, No. 1607, Private G. G. Infantry.
Thomson, No. 3058, Coy. Sergeant-Major J. M. Infantry.
Townes, No. 5241, Private L. A. Infantry.
Tye, No. 362, Sergeant R. C. Heavy Artillery.
Vlok, No. 429, Private N. J. Infantry.
Walsh, No. 216, Staff-Sergeant L. H. S.A.M.C.
Warman, No. 50, Batt. Sergeant-Major H. G. Heavy Artillery.
Watson, No. 1546, Sergeant J. Heavy Artillery.
Wellensky, No. X633, Private B. Infantry.
Wilkie, No. 3657, Company Sergeant-Major F. Infantry.
BAR TO MILITARY MEDAL.
Black, No. 3309, Sergeant A. J. Infantry.
Cawthorn, No. 5573, Lance-Corporal W. Infantry.
Cole, No. 8334, Private H. J. Infantry.
Cox, No. 588, Corporal H. F. Infantry.
Edgar, No. 68, Sergeant C. W. E. S.A.M.C.
Evans, No. S2, Corporal S. D. Infantry.
Flack, No. 2024, Corporal C. Infantry.
Hoaston, No. 6286, Corporal A. Infantry.
Lang, No. 13287, Corporal B. G. Infantry.
Langlands, No. 5032, Private W. G. Infantry.
MacLachlan, No. 2302, Corporal G. H. Infantry.
M’Gregor, No. 498, Lance-Sergeant D. Infantry.
Pullen, No. 823, Gunner C. E. Heavy Artillery.
St. George, No. 10599, Private R. T. Infantry.
Stober, No. S20, Lance-Corporal F. Infantry.
Willcocks, No. 4979, Corporal W. Infantry.
MILITARY MEDAL.
Adlam, No. 4618, Private C. E. Infantry.
Allen, No. 7018, Sergeant T. H. Infantry.
Allen, No. 5471, Private V. W. Infantry.
Anderson, No. 441, Bombardier H. K. Heavy Artillery.
Arnold, No. 5925, Private C. M. Infantry.
Aupias, No. 2422, Private F. G. Infantry.
Badcoe, No. 550, Sergeant T. J. Infantry.
Bain, No. X282, Sergeant C. S. Signal Company.
Baker, No. 893, Private G. F. Infantry.
Baker, No. 4798, Private G. T. Infantry.
Ballantyne, No. 5329, Lance-Corporal A. Signal Company.
Ballot, No. 1181, Gunner D. W. F. E. Heavy Artillery.
Baragwanath, No. 7958, Private A. J. Infantry.
Barrable, No. 2436, Lance-Sergeant E. M. V. Infantry.
Bayman, No. 3853, Private W. Infantry.
Becker, No. 16871, Private L. D. Infantry.
Bell, No. 4250, Sergeant T. Infantry.
Benson, No. 3871, Sergeant R. H. S.A.M.C.
Bertram, No. 9016, Corporal F. S. Infantry.
Bester, No. 16897, Private C. Infantry.
Bettison, No. 1251, Gunner C. M. Heavy Artillery.
Biccard, No. 1326, Private R. C. Infantry.
Biebuyck, No. 2915, Lance-Corporal M. F. Signal Company.
Black, No. 3309, Lance-Corporal A. J. Infantry.
Black, No. 26, Sergeant S. C. S.A.M.C.
Boden, No. 12, Private T. H. S.A.M.C.
Borchers, No. 14586, Private O. Infantry.
Botha, No. 8548, Private C. Infantry.
Botterill, No. 4865, Corporal H. Infantry.
Bowen, No. 76, Corporal E. J. Infantry.
Bowley, No. 2025, Corporal D. D. H. Infantry.
Brampton, No. 8505, Sergeant T. C. Infantry.
Brand, No. 533, Bombardier T. J. Heavy Artillery.
Brickhill, No. 5570, Coy. Sergt.-Major F. H. Infantry.
Broussow, No. 6896, Private E. J. Infantry.
Brown, No. 10557, Sergeant N. F. Heavy Artillery.
Burgess, No. 265, Gunner S. Heavy Artillery.
Butler, No. 1831, Sergeant J. D. A. Infantry.
Cabrita, No. 133, Lance-Corporal W. M. Engineers.
Calder, No. 3252, Corporal K. Infantry.
Carlson, No. 5170, Private W. Infantry.
Carter, No. 536, Lance-Corporal E. Infantry.
Casey, No. 3464, Corporal T. P. Infantry.
Cawthorn, No. 5573, Lance-Corporal W. Infantry.
Celliers, No. 7379, Private J. D. Infantry.
Christie, No. 697, Gunner J. Heavy Artillery.
Church, No. 2498, Sergeant J. Infantry.
Clarke, No. 629, Gunner A. D. Heavy Artillery.
Clarke, No. 9572, Private W. W. Infantry.
Cleverley, No. 3821, Private F. Infantry.
Cloete, No. 1826, Lance-Corporal S. B. Infantry.
Coaton, No. 1303, Gunner W. H. Heavy Artillery.
Codd, No. 11434, Corporal E. W. Infantry.
Coetzee, No. 12073, Private A. J. P. Infantry.
Coetzee, No. 14633, Lance-Corporal J. D. Infantry.
Cole, No. 8334, Private H. J. Infantry.
Collins, No. 769, Sapper H. P. Engineers.
Collins, No. 9040, Private R. M. Infantry.
Collocott, No. 4269, Sergeant C. D. Infantry.
Conacher, No. 16232, Private A. J. Infantry.
Conradie, No. 32, Private J. A. S.A.M.C.
Cook, No. 427, Private T. Infantry.
Coomber, No. 5303, Sergeant E. L. Infantry.
Cooper, No. 9226, Private C. Infantry.
Cosser, No. X568, Gunner S. C. A. Heavy Artillery.
Cox, No. 588, Corporal H. F. Infantry.
Cragg, No. 698, Lance-Corporal J. B. Infantry.
Croft, No. 8625, Private J. B. Infantry.
Cronje, No. 2290, Private J. J. Infantry.
Cummings, No. 4503, Sergeant A. Infantry.
Cunningham, No. 923, Lance-Sergeant J. J. Infantry.
Cuthill, No. X290, Sapper J. D. Signal Company.
Davenport, No. 54, Lance-Corporal J. Engineers.
Davies, No. 192, Gunner W. A. Heavy Artillery.
Davies, No. 12354, Private W. J. Infantry.
Davis, No. 2022, Corporal C. S. Infantry.
Davis, No. 423, Corporal W. J. Heavy Artillery.
Dawson, No. 228, Lance-Corporal A. E. Engineers.
Dawson, No. 16888, Sergeant J. E. Infantry.
De Beer, No. 13451, Private W. A. Infantry.
Dent, No. 13263, Corporal H. C. Infantry.
Dey, No. 12783, Private H. Infantry.
Dickson, No. 611, Corporal J. Heavy Artillery.
Dignon, No. 10336, Private H. A. Infantry.
Dinnes, No. 3240, Lance-Corporal J. Infantry.
Dixon, No. 3488, Lance-Corporal C. Infantry.
Doig, No. 197, Sapper E. H. Engineers.
Dowaithe, No. 3100, Private R. Infantry.
Doyle, No. 669, Sapper J. R. Engineers.
Duffy, No. 709, Gunner J. Heavy Artillery.
Duncan, No. 1579, Private R. Infantry.
Dunstone, No. 1186, Private S. T. Infantry.
Du Preez, No. 5636, Private F. J. Infantry.
Du Toit, No. 3882, Private J. J. Infantry.
Edgar, No. 68, Sergeant C. W. S.A.M.C.
Edgar, No. 15959, Private H. M. S. Infantry.
Egan, No. 6514, Sapper C. D. Signal Company.
Ellis, No. 1356, Gunner A. W. J. Heavy Artillery.
Ellis, No. 11522, Private G. W. J. Infantry.
Ellwood, No. 7062, Private W. B. M. Infantry.
Erlank, No. X613, Private G. Infantry.
Estment, No. 4787, Lance-Corporal A. Infantry.
Evans, No. 3185, Sergeant J. A. Infantry.
Evans, No. S2, Lance-Corporal S. D. Infantry.
Fairburn, No. 112, Lance-Corporal G. Infantry.
Farmer, No. 17744, Private E. F. C. Infantry.
Fennessy, No. 90, Private C. E. Infantry.
Ferreira, No. X297, Sapper B. P. Signal Company.
Flack, No. 2024, Private C. Infantry.
Flanagan, No. 546, Lance-Corporal W. N. Infantry.
Flannagan, No. 17182, Lance-Corporal W. M. Infantry.
Foden, No. 8451, Corporal G. W. Infantry.
Forbes, No. 2175, Private J. Infantry.
Forman, No. 2177, Lance-Sergeant J. L. Infantry.
Fourie, No. 624, Sapper J. J. Engineers.
Fritz, No. 6407, Private E. H. Infantry.
Gardiner, No. 7628, Sergeant T. H. Infantry.
Gardner, No. X727, Private E. H. Infantry.
Garland, No. 3241, Lance-Corporal F. L. Infantry.
Gaskon, No. 8130, Corporal A. H. Infantry.
Gaston, No. 11342, Lance-Corporal J. A. Infantry.
Gerber, No. 6155, Sergeant H. J. Infantry.
Gibson, No. 8523, Private P. A. Infantry.
Giles, No. 1064, Gunner E. H. Heavy Artillery.
Glennie, No. 15130, Private S. A. Infantry.
Goldsworthy, No. 8455, Private F. Infantry.
Goodwill, No. 3865, Corporal H. P. S.A.M.C.
Gourlay, No. 6210, Lance-Corporal J. H. Signal Company.
Graham, No. 14829, Private C. F. Infantry.
Granger, No. 4418, Private J. L. Infantry.
Gray, No. 425, Private A. Infantry.
Gray, No. 591, Corporal W. A. Infantry.
Green, No. 9672, Lance-Corporal G. P. Signal Company.
Greenhough, No. 6346, Corporal P. R. Infantry.
Greenish, No. 8752, Lance-Corporal M. T. Infantry.
Grenfell, No. 8970, Private G. A. Infantry.
Guerini, No. 6874, Corporal V. Infantry.
Hall, No. 3351, Private J. Infantry.
Hamilton, No. R1783, Private B. B. Infantry.
Hammond, No. 6310, Corporal L. H. Signal Company.
Hands, No. 9626, Sergeant C. Infantry.
Hansen, No. 6213, Sergeant W. Signal Company.
Hansen, No. X149, Gunner W. C. Heavy Artillery.
Hardwick, No. 7065, Sergeant R. E. S. Infantry.
Hare, No. 888, Private H. L. Infantry.
Harris, No. 5027, Private W. F. Infantry.
Harris, No. 5687, Lance-Corporal W. S. Infantry.
Harrison, No. 3458, Private R. W. Infantry.
Hart, No. 4278, Lance-Corporal G. A. Infantry.
Hawke, No. 2955, Sergeant W. C. Infantry.
Hawkins, No. 1004, Private C. W. Infantry.
Hawthorne, No. 7368, Lance-Corporal J. Infantry.
Healy, No. 7785, Private P. W. Infantry.
Heathcote, No. 880, Lance-Corporal L. S. Infantry.
Hein, No. 466, Gunner B. Heavy Artillery.
Hemmings, No. 749, Gunner W. Heavy Artillery.
Hendry, No. 54, Sergeant A. Heavy Artillery.
Henning, No. 9468, Corporal J. A. Infantry.
Heunis, No. R1769, Sergeant C. M. Infantry.
Hincks, No. X154, Sergeant H. T. Heavy Artillery.
Hinwood, No. 128, Sergeant S. J. Infantry.
Hoaston, No. 6286, Corporal A. Infantry.
Hodgson, No. 793, Private J. Infantry.
Holborn, No. X15, Sergeant J. S. Infantry.
Holdsworth, No. 4476, Private W. Infantry.
Holiday, No. 906, Private T. H. Infantry.
Hollenbury, No. 5726, Private W. Infantry.
Holliday, No. 12768, Private M. A. Infantry.
Hollington, No. 5381, Private E. E. Infantry.
Holmes, No. 4399, Private R. J. Infantry.
Hook, No. 746, Private T. C. Infantry.
Hopkins, No. 1785, Gunner D. A. J. Heavy Artillery.
Hosking, No. 14070, Private J. F. Infantry.
Howard, No. 16253, Private C. L. Infantry.
Howard, No. X121, Bombardier H. W. Heavy Artillery.
Hugo-Brunt, No. 196, Gunner H. Heavy Artillery.
Hume, No. 4855, Private D. M. Infantry.
Humphries, No. 8573, Private W. Infantry.
Hunter, No. 259, Sergeant W. F. Engineers.
Huntley, No. 12798, Private W. B. Infantry.
Hurd, No. 15058, Private H. K. Infantry.
Huskisson, No. 100, Sergeant D. S. S.A.M.C.
Ind, No. 8484, Private H. G. Infantry.
Inglis, No. 15436, Lance-Corporal W. B. Infantry.
Jackson, No. 4825, Sapper V. D. Signal Company.
Jacobs, No. 123, Private C. J. S.A.M.C.
James, No. 5956, Sergeant W. N. Infantry.
Johnson, No. 1358, Private J. Infantry.
Jones, No. 10162, Corporal A. Infantry.
Jones, No. 583, Lance-Corporal A. Engineers.
Jones, No. 8861, Private P. D. Infantry.
Jordan, No. 5088, Private M. Infantry.
Jorgensen, No. 527, Sergeant W. H. Signal Company.
Juul, No. 10624, Sergeant A. W. Infantry.
Keates, No. 150, Lance-Corporal F. J. Engineers.
Kerwin, No. 15150, Private A. T. K. Infantry.
Kikillas, No. 1592, Private T. N. Heavy Artillery.
Kirkland, No. 125, Private F. G. S.A.M.C.
Kirkland, No. X286, Corporal J. Signal Company.
Kretschmer, No. 12216, Lance-Corporal H. F. Infantry.
Kriel, No. 2965, Sergeant J. Infantry.
Kruger, No. 8449, Private P. S. Infantry.
Lagerstroom, No. 5211, Lance-Sergeant J. Infantry.
Laidler, No. 7606, Lance-Sergeant J. Infantry.
Lang, No. 13287, Private B. G. Infantry.
Langlands, No. 5032, Private W. G. Infantry.
Laverack, No. 4706, Sergeant A. Infantry.
Lawrence, No. 11941, Private R. J. Infantry.
Lazarus, No. 7843, Private C. M. Infantry.
Lee, No. 16767, Lance-Corporal F. E. Infantry.
Lee, No. 10130, Corporal J. Infantry.
Lees, No. X233, Gunner J. S. Heavy Artillery.
Leith, No. 295, Gunner G. B. A. Heavy Artillery.
Lerche, No. 16796, Private H. F. Infantry.
Levey, No. 16114, Private H. G. Infantry.
Levinson, No. 2656, Private L. Infantry.
Liebenberg, No. 1707, Private B. J. Infantry.
Lotz, No. 14169, Private J. C. Infantry.
Loubser, No. 1138, Lance-Corporal J. J. Infantry.
Lowe, No. 12481, Private C. V. Infantry.
Lowings, No. 22, Private B. A. Infantry.
Lubbe, No. 4920, Private G. J. J. Infantry.
Lubbie, No. 1266, Corporal T. A. Infantry.
Lumb, No. 651, Sapper F. Engineers.
MacDonald, No. 8591, Sergeant D. Infantry.
MacGuire, No. 3304, Private J. N. Infantry.
MacIntosh, No. 4691, Private A. G. M. Infantry.
Mackay, No. 10415, Private W. Infantry.
Mackay, No. 12432, Private D. Infantry.
MacLachlan, No. 2302, Private G. H. Infantry.
Magnussen, No. 453, Private M. A. S.A.M.C.
Makepeace, No. 4106, Private R. B. N. Infantry.
Maloney, No. 3760, Private W. Infantry.
Manzie, No. 13533, Private A. J. Infantry.
Marshall, No. X305, Lance-Corporal C. E. Signal Company.
Martin, No. 8473, Private A. Infantry.
May, No. 3614, Private G. H. Signal Company.
M’Clelland, No. 6852, Lance-Corporal J. Infantry.
M’Donald, No. 6845, Sergeant W. S. Infantry.
M’Donald, No. 13351, Private C. A. Infantry.
M’Dougall, No. X111, Gunner J. S. Heavy Artillery.
M’Gregor, No. 498, Lance-Sergeant D. Infantry.
M’Innes, No. 6462, Sergeant N. Infantry.
M’Kendrick, No. 159, Lance-Corporal M. Infantry.
M’Kenna, No. 157, Lance-Corporal J. P. Engineers.
M’Kenzie, No. 14203, Private A. C. Infantry.
M’Lean, No. 7069, Lance-Sergeant D. Infantry.
M’Lellan, No. 6987, Sergeant A. W. Infantry.
M’Millan, No. 4074, Private J. Infantry.
Meggy, No. 761, Lance-Corporal R. S. Infantry.
Messum, No. 1600, Gunner G. G. Heavy Artillery.
Meyers, No. 6571, Private L. C. C. Infantry.
Milella, No. 8346, Sergeant O. A. Infantry.
Miller, No. 3479, Sergeant D. H. C. Infantry.
Mills, No. 1281, Corporal S. G. Infantry.
Mitchell, No. 6291, Lance-Corporal G. F. Infantry.
Mitchell, No. 8453, Private T. Infantry.
Monoran, No. 1356, Private F. G. Infantry.
Moore, No. 7814, Sergeant C. V. Infantry.
Moreton, No. 2898, Corporal H. B. Signal Company.
Munro, No. 300, Gunner G. W. Heavy Artillery.
Munro, No. 8928, Private H. W. Infantry.
Murray, No. 6067, Corporal J. W. Infantry.
Nelson, No. 161, Private R. W. S.A.M.C.
Nicholl, No. X124, Gunner G. Heavy Artillery.
Nicholls, No. 5444, Sergeant H. Infantry.
Nicholls, No. 1941, Sergeant T. H. Infantry.
Nicholson, No. 2418, Private L. Infantry.
Nicolle, No. 4817, Corporal J. Signal Company.
Noble, No. 3198, Corporal C. A. Infantry.
Noble, No. 1458, Lance-Corporal J. E. T. Infantry.
Norvall, No. 6415, Sergeant W. A. Infantry.
O’Boyle, No. 16, Gunner L. N. Heavy Artillery.
O’Connor, No. 3886, Lance-Corporal C. J. Signal Company.
Oliver, No. 5291, Corporal S. Infantry.
Oosthuizen, No. 10386, Private W. J. J. Infantry.
Orsmond, No. 16703, Lance-Corporal S. Infantry.
Owen, No. 7102, Corporal A. E. Infantry.
Paddock, No. 9082, Private J. R. Infantry.
Page, No. 7032, Corporal R. Infantry.
Page, No. 1591, Corporal S. A. Signal Company.
Pains, No. 590, Gunner J. F. Heavy Artillery.
Parfitt, No. 165, Private F. W. S.A.M.C.
Parfitt, No. 145, Lance-Corporal W. H. Engineers.
Parker, No. 118, Sergeant E. H. Heavy Artillery.
Parkinson, No. 1512, Lance-Corporal J. G. Infantry.
Patience, No. 12998, Private J. Infantry.
Paton, No. 211, Gunner R. Heavy Artillery.
Patterson, No. 3140, Sergeant W. Infantry.
Pownall, No. 3863, Driver C. S.A.M.C.
Peacock, No. 827, Bombardier E. M. Heavy Artillery.
Pearce, No. 172, Private H. S. S.A.M.C.
Pearce, No. 8182, Private W. C. Infantry.
Pentz, No. 10516, Lance-Corporal H. F. Infantry.
Perrett, No. 614, Sergeant W. J. Heavy Artillery.
Perrie, No. 705, Lance-Corporal J. Infantry.
Prentice, No. 5097, Private W. Infantry.
Preston, No. 17806, Lance-Corporal S. Infantry.
Price, No. 84, Corporal S. Heavy Artillery.
Pringle, No. 6617, Private G. G. Infantry.
Pritchard, No. 17620, Private E. E. Infantry.
Pullen, No. 823, Gunner C. E. Heavy Artillery.
Raats, No. 11230, Private P. J. Infantry.
Reece, No. 704, Corporal A. O. Engineers.
Reingold, No. 8446, Lance-Corporal J. Infantry.
Rennie, No. 5827, Private A. Infantry.
Reynolds, No. 12281, Sergeant G. J. Infantry.
Rhodin, No. 12739, Private W. H. Infantry.
Richardson, No. 7961, Lance-Corporal J. Infantry.
Richardson, No. 7955, Private T. L. Infantry.
Ritchie, No. 5762, Private F. Infantry.
Robertson, No. 5250, Sergeant F. Infantry.
Robinson, No. 409, Corporal H. E. B. Heavy Artillery.
Rodgers, No. X295, Sapper H. C. Signal Company.
Ross, No. 1534, Lance-Corporal F. W. Infantry.
Ross, No. 841, Gunner W. T. W. Heavy Artillery.
Rowley, No. 9013, Sergeant E. Infantry.
Rundle, No. 15860, Private S. P. Infantry.
Ryder, No. 3114, Corporal A. Infantry.
St. George, No. 5599, Private J. C. Infantry.
St. George, No. 10599, Private R. T. Infantry.
Salsbury, No. 869, Corporal E. Heavy Artillery.
Scholes, No. 213, Bombardier C. E. Heavy Artillery.
Schultz, No. 11904, Private H. Infantry.
Schuur, No. 544, Gunner H. M. Heavy Artillery.
Scott, No. 10114, Lance-Corporal R. C. Infantry.
Seddon, No. 4725, Lance-Corporal L. J. Infantry.
Shapcott, No. 1971, Lance-Corporal F. R. Infantry.
Sharman, No. 522, Coy. Sergt.-Major W. Engineers.
Shearer, No. 10437, Sergeant J. Infantry.
Shepherd, No. 6479, Sapper J. Signal Company.
Sheppherd, No. 7491, Private G. S. Infantry.
Sherman, No. 423, Private H. J. Infantry.
Simpson, No. 7703, Sergeant J. N. Infantry.
Sinclair, No. 509, Sergeant W. N. Heavy Artillery.
Sjoberg, No. 373, Private A. B. Infantry.
Slade, No. X302, Bombardier A. J. Heavy Artillery.
Smith, No. 979, Sergeant A. Infantry.
Smith, No. 4087, Sergeant A. Infantry.
Smith, No. 7217, Private A. W. C. Infantry.
Smith, No. 6796, Sergeant H. C. Infantry.
Smuts, No. 582, Private M. R. Infantry.
Snibbe, No. 9742, Sergeant M. J. Infantry.
Sobey, No. 8116, Private W. N. Infantry.
Somerville, No. 2291, Corporal W. Infantry.
Spangenberg, No. 10074, Private J. M. Infantry.
Speed, No. 4683, Lance-Corporal T. H. Infantry.
Spencer, No. 8032, Private J. G. A. Infantry.
Sprague, No. 15663, Private H. G. R. Infantry.
Stafford, No. 9089, Sergeant T. Infantry.
Steele, No. 877, Bombardier G. Heavy Artillery.
Steele, No. 1905, Private H. Infantry.
Stephen, No. 1052, Lance-Sergeant R. G. Infantry.
Stephen, No. 616, Bombardier W. Heavy Artillery.
Stewart, No. 713, Lance-Sergeant T. T. Infantry.
Stewart, No. 2037, Private W. A. Infantry.
Still, No. 13, Sergeant J. F. Infantry.
Stober, No. 20, Lance-Corporal F. Infantry.
Strickland, No. 4959, Lance-Corporal G. C. Infantry.
Sumner, No. 3677, Corporal H. L. Infantry.
Super, No. 451, Private E. S. S.A.M.C.
Surman, No. 9537, Corporal M. W. Infantry.
Sutherland, No. 2542, Corporal N. Infantry.
Suttie, No. 3811, Private L. H. Infantry.
Swan, No. 9351, Private V. E. Infantry.
Swanepoel, No. 16823, Private J. J F. Infantry.
Swaraston, No. 50, Sergeant H. D. Engineers.
Swart, No. 14796, Private J. J. L. Infantry.
Symonds, No. 10661, Sergeant J. Infantry.
Tanner, No. 101, Lance-Corporal A. D. Engineers.
Tasker, No. 631, Gunner G. T. B. Heavy Artillery.
Taylor, No. 6285, Private H. M. Infantry.
Taylor, No. X24, Corporal J. H. Infantry.
Taylor, No. 886, Sergeant O. Heavy Artillery.
Taylor, No. 2581, Corporal W. Infantry.
Tennant, No. 8064, Sergeant J. R. Infantry.
Thomas, No. 9335, Private C. D. Infantry.
Thompson, No. 160, Private B. Infantry.
Thompson, No. 7747, Sergeant D. Infantry.
Thompson, No. 11114, Private J. Infantry.
Thompson, No. 290, Sergeant W. G. Infantry.
Thomson, No. 6586, Private A. Infantry.
Thomson, No. 5871, Lance-Corporal A. R. Infantry.
Thorpe, No. 5835, Corporal H. S. Infantry.
Thow, No. 212, Private J. M. S.A.M.C.
Thurgood, No. 9092, Sergeant A. H. Infantry.
Thurman, No. 416, Bombardier E. G. Heavy Artillery.
Tomsett, No. 213, Private R. S.A.M.C.
Topp, No. 885, Gunner R. M. Heavy Artillery.
Tregonning, No. 890, Gunner W. J. Heavy Artillery.
Trehoeven, No. 8711, Private W. H. Infantry.
Tucker, No. 205, Private S. S.A.M.C.
Tuer, No. 4969, Sergeant J. Infantry.
Turnbull, No. 3875, Driver D. S.A.M.C.
Turnbull, No. 11, Bombardier J. M. M. Heavy Artillery.
Twynham, No. 11928, Lance-Corporal W. C. Infantry.
Usborne, No. 7981, Batt. Sergt.-Major H. H. Heavy Artillery.
Van Buuren, No. 10383, Sapper N. A. A. Signal Company.
Van Heerden, No. R1678, Lance-Cpl. J. L. Infantry.
Van Rensburg, No. 16820, Private P. Infantry.
Van Rensburg, No. 258, Sapper J. A. J. Engineers.
Van der Walt, No. 11990, Private N. Infantry.
Vice, No. 51, Sergeant J. H. B. Heavy Artillery.
Vimpany, No. X193, Private A. Infantry.
Walker, No. 7455, Private J. Infantry.
Wall, No. 7701, Sergeant A. W. Infantry.
Wanliss, No. 4197, Private J. Infantry.
Ward, No. 9511, Sergeant E. Infantry.
Waterhouse, No. 11935, Private J. Infantry.
Wattrus, No. 585, Bombardier C. E. Heavy Artillery.
Waugh, No. 11078, Private P. Infantry.
Wells, No. 11860, Sapper A. Signal Company.
Wentzel, No. 9704, Sapper E. J. Signal Company.
Whillier, No. 16599, Private C. E. Infantry.
White, No. 10216, Private J. R. Infantry.
White, No. 4122, Sergeant W. M. Infantry.
Wilkins, No. R1473, Sergeant W. T. Infantry.
Willard, No. 7944, Private W. F. Infantry.
Willcocks, No. 4979, Corporal W. Infantry.
Williams, No. 15300, Private A. R. Infantry.
Williams, No. 315, Bombardier C. Heavy Artillery.
Williams, No. 5752, Corporal G. W. Infantry.
Williams, No. 913, Staff-Sergeant W. Heavy Artillery.
Wood, No. 13123, Corporal T. C. P. Infantry.
Woolgar, No. 217, Private C. S. S.A.M.C.
Wright, No. 4116, Corporal A. J. Infantry.
Wright, No. 13860, Corporal C. H. Infantry.
Wright, No. 17091, Private G. F. Infantry.
Young, No. 5095, Sergeant J. J. Infantry.
Yuill, No. 652, Corporal A. Engineers.
Zahn, No. 7440, Sergeant F. S. T. Infantry.
MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL.
Barends, No. 959, Lance-Corporal H. A. Labour Corps.
Bayne, No. 3346, Coy. Q.M.-Sergeant W. Infantry.
Berry, No. 4554, Staff-Sergeant A. Infantry.
Blackwell, No. 266, Bombardier M. C. Heavy Artillery.
Bonacina, No. 6148, Sergeant L. Infantry.
Bothwell, No. 5051, Sergeant-Major H. Pay Corps.
Boyce, No. 3189, Sergeant D. R. Infantry.
Brown, No. 3504, Sergeant J. Infantry.
Burton, No. 5639, Lance-Corporal J. Signal Company.
Burton, No. 6211, Sapper R. J. Signal Company.
Butlin, No. 83, Reg. Q.M.-Sergeant H. Labour Corps.
Clatworthy, No. HT4185, Coy. Sgt.-Maj. W. M. Cape Aux. Horse Transport.
Clews, No. 4, Company Sergeant-Major J. C. Labour Corps.
Coombes, No. 3121, Sergeant A. S. Infantry.
Craig, No. 1347, Reg. Sergt.-Major W. Infantry.
Cruickshank, No. 4812, Coy. Q.M.-Sergeant P. Signal Company.
Dalton, No. 6334, Sergeant W. J. Signal Company.
Evans, No. 4180, Sergeant W. D. Infantry.
Ferguson, No. 2004, Coy. Q.M.-Sergeant A. Infantry.
Field, No. 129, Sergeant W. C. Labour Corps.
Forsyth, No. X12, Sergeant J. R. Infantry.
Gadd, No. 167, Sergeant W. P. Labour Corps.
Glencross, No. 3120, Sergeant C. M. G. Infantry.
Gonsalves, No. 5026, Coy. Q.M.-Sergt. M. A. Infantry.
Gordge, No. 80, Quartermaster-Sergeant J. H. S.A.M.C.
Greenwood, No. 21654, Private J. H. Infantry.
Guy, No. 1361, Sergeant E. A. Heavy Artillery.
Hall, No. 5332, Sergeant P. C. W. Signal Company.
Hickman, No. 6294, Reg. Q.M.-Sergt. C. S. Infantry.
Holborn, No. X15, Corporal J. S. Infantry.
Horridge, No. 19322, Sergeant-Major J. D. Staff.
Hudson, No. 2817, Sergeant-Major T. Infantry.
Jamieson, No. X503, Staff-Sergeant T. C. Labour Corps.
Kenny, No. 2330, Staff-Sergeant P. Infantry.
Knox, No. 306, Quartermaster-Sergeant A. J. S.A.M.C.
Lightfoot, No. 344, Staff-Sergeant R. S.A.M.C.
Lowe, No. 4700, Sergeant T. E. Infantry.
M’Callum, No. 3650, Sergeant J. A. Signal Company.
M’Dowell, No. 41, Reg. Sergt.-Major A. H. Labour Corps.
M’Farlane, No. 4317, Sergeant J. Infantry.
M’Feggans, No. 125, Colour-Sergeant A. Labour Corps.
M’Pherson, No. 4011, Sergeant C. Infantry.
Melrose, No. 20, Superintendent-Clerk G. M. Labour Corps.
Orchard, No. 165, Coy. Q.M.-Sergeant A. O. Labour Corps.
Phillips, No. 11764, Corporal L. D. Infantry.
Powell, No. X523, Staff-Sergeant H. E. Pay Corps.
Reeves, No. 10585, Sergeant J. H. Infantry.
Rhind, No. 53, Company Sergeant-Major F. Staff.
Ritchie, No. 6658, Sergeant H. Signal Company.
Roxburgh, No. 1, Reg. Sergt.-Major A. Labour Corps.
Russell, No. 9110, Coy. Q.M.-Sergt. E. E. R. Infantry.
Sayer, No. 3112, Colour-Sergeant A. Infantry.
Sheard, No. 3616, Sergeant O. F. Signal Company.
Shepherd, No. 4340, Coy. Sgt.-Major D. D. Infantry.
Sowden, No. 4716, Sergeant C. H. V. Signal Company.
Stanley, No. 75, Colour-Sergeant A. E. Labour Corps.
Stearns, No. 2164, Private E. Infantry.
Stirton, No. V50, Sergeant-Major S. A. Engineers.
Stokell, No. 1929, Coy. Sergt.-Major E. R. Infantry.
Summers, No. 1046, Gunner H. Heavy Artillery.
Thompson, No. 160, Private B. Infantry.
Trimmer, No. 1375, Reg. Q.M.-Sergt. H. W. Infantry.
Truss, No. 955, Sergeant W. G. Heavy Artillery.
Walker, No. X235, Sergeant-Major J. H. Staff.
Watson, No. 7546, Lance-Corporal W. Infantry.
Weddell, No. 425, Staff-Sergeant A. C. S.A.M.C.
White, No. 408, Quartermaster-Sergeant J. H. S.A.M.C.
White, No. 896, Bombardier T. W. Heavy Artillery.
Wilkinson, No. 910, Sergeant F. Labour Corps.
Williams, No. 5906, Sergeant A. E. Infantry.
Willson, No. 6393, Sergeant H. B. Signal Company.
Wilson, No. HT2499, Coy. Sergt.-Major. H. J. Cape Aux. Horse Transport.
Witney, No. 3536, Coy. Sergt.-Major. A. W. Infantry.
Woodhead, No. 3208, Sergeant H. C. Infantry.
Zeederberg, No. 85, Superintendent-Clerk H. Labour Corps.
MENTIONED IN DESPATCHES.
OFFICERS.
Allin, Captain H. G. W. Labour Corps.
Alston, Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Heavy Artillery.
Anderson, Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Cape Aux. Horse Transport.
Bailey, Lieutenant H. Heavy Artillery.
*Baker, Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Staff.
Barnard, Major A. J. C. Labour Corps.
Bendlestein, Lieutenant A. Heavy Artillery.
*Bennett, Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Heavy Artillery.
Blaine, Captain C. H. Heavy Artillery.
Blew, Lieutenant-Colonel T. H. Heavy Artillery.
Bond, Lieutenant C. H. Heavy Artillery.
Brydon, Major W. Heavy Artillery.
Cameron, Q.M. and Hon. Captain C. S. Labour Corps.
Campion, Lieutenant R. R. Heavy Artillery.
Chester, Second-Lieutenant R. S. Heavy Artillery.
Christian, Lieutenant-Colonel E. Infantry.
*Cochran, Major F. E. Infantry.
Collins, Lieutenant F. Signal Company.
*Collins, Lieutenant-Colonel F. R. Engineers.
Cooke, Lieutenant F. A. Signal Company.
Crooks, Q.M. and Hon. Lieutenant A. S. Infantry.
Currie, Second-Lieutenant J. Heavy Artillery.
Davis, Captain F. M. Infantry.
****Dawson, Brigadier-General F. S. Staff.
Dickerson, Captain F. J. Labour Corps.
Drummond, Captain J. S.A.M.C.
Duff, Colonel C. de V. Labour Corps.
*Edwards, Major S. B. Heavy Artillery.
Ellis, Captain P. H. Infantry.
Emmett, Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. C. Labour Corps.
Farmer, Lieutenant P. D. Infantry.
Farrell, Captain T. Infantry.
*Fawcus, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Labour Corps.
*Forbes, Lieutenant E. C. Infantry.
Geddes, Captain W. L. Labour Corps.
Goodwin, Second-Lieutenant B. W. Infantry.
Gordon, Captain W. L. S.A.M.C.
Grady, Captain E. E. D. Infantry.
Green, Second-Lieutenant A. P. Heavy Artillery.
Greene, Captain L. Infantry.
*Hands, Major P. A. M. Heavy Artillery.
Harris, Major J. J. F. Infantry.
Harrison, Lieutenant-Colonel N. Signal Company.
Heal, Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Infantry.
Heenan, Major C. R. Infantry.
Hemming, Major H. S. J. L. Infantry.
Hill, Lieutenant W. J. Infantry.
*Hunt, Major D. R. Infantry.
Hunt, Second-Lieutenant V. A. Infantry.
Ison, Lieutenant C. H. Signal Company.
Jackson, Captain J. W. Infantry.
Jacobs, Captain L. M. Infantry.
Jacobsby, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Labour Corps.
*Jenkins, Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Infantry.
Johnson, Captain W. J. Signal Company.
Jones, Lieutenant-Colonel F. A. Infantry.
Joseph, Second-Lieutenant H. A. Infantry.
Kernick, Second-Lieutenant R. G. Infantry.
King, Second-Lieutenant F. Infantry.
Lawrence, Second-Lieutenant G. G. J. Infantry.
Lawrence, Captain H. R. S.A.M.C.
Lawrie, Captain M. B. S.A.M.C.
*Lennox, Captain J. Chaplains Dept.
**Lukin, Major-General Sir H. T. Staff.
Maasdorp, Major L. H. Heavy Artillery.
MacLeod, Lieutenant-Colonel D. M. Infantry.
Mallett, Lieutenant S. Infantry.
Marshall, Captain H. E. Labour Corps.
M’Lean, Lieutenant W. Infantry.
Medlicott, Second-Lieutenant G. H. Infantry.
Mellish, Second-Lieutenant F. W. Heavy Artillery.
Miller, Captain R. S. Heavy Artillery.
Mills, Second-Lieutenant F. E. Infantry.
*Mullins, Captain A. G. Heavy Artillery.
Mullins, Major H. R. S.A.M.C.
*Murray, Major C. M. S.A.M.C.
Murray-M’Gregor, Lieutenant A. Heavy Artillery.
Ormiston, Major T. Infantry.
Owen, Captain J. W. W. Chaplains Dept.
*Page, Lieutenant P. T. A. Heavy Artillery.
Palmer, Major J. E. Labour Corps.
Pickburn, Major W. H. Heavy Artillery.
*Power, Major M. S. S.A.M.C.
Preston, Lieutenant W. G. Labour Corps.
*Pringle, Major R. N. S.A.M.C.
*Pritchard, Colonel S. A. M. Labour Corps.
Purcocks, Captain G. F. Heavy Artillery.
Pybus, Captain W. H. L. Engineers.
Rann, Major A. E. Heavy Artillery.
Richardson, Q.M. and Hon. Lieut. W. S.A.M.C.
Ridley, Captain E. G. Heavy Artillery.
Roberts, Second-Lieutenant C. W. Infantry.
Roper, Captain A. W. F. Heavy Artillery.
Roseby, Lieutenant P. R. Infantry.
*Ross, Captain F. M. Signal Company.
Ross-Garner, Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. J. Labour Corps.
Scheepers, Captain J. C. Infantry.
Solomon, Lieutenant A. C. Heavy Artillery.
Sprenger, Major L. F. Infantry.
Sproule, Major H. Labour Corps.
Symmes, Major H. C. Infantry.
****Tanner, Brigadier-General W. E. C. Staff.
Tarboton, Second-Lieutenant C. C. Infantry.
Tatham, Second-Lieutenant E. V. Infantry.
**Thackeray, Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Infantry.
Theron, Captain F. H. Infantry.
Thomas, Second-Lieutenant W. F. G. Infantry.
*Thomson, Lieutenant-Colonel G. R. S.A.M.C.
Tomlinson, Captain L. W. Infantry.
Tripp, Major W. H. L. Heavy Artillery.
Unwin, Second-Lieutenant H. W. Heavy Artillery.
Usmar, Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. S.A.M.C.
Van der Byl, Lieut.-Colonel V. A. W. Labour Corps.
*Van Ryneveld, Captain T. V. Infantry.
Wakefield, Major H. S. Infantry.
Walsh, Captain F. G. Infantry.
Ward, Lieutenant-Colonel A. B. S.A.M.C.
*Ward, Major C. P. Heavy Artillery.
*Williamson, Captain E. Labour Corps.
*Wolff, Lieutenant-Colonel H. P. Labour Corps.
NURSING STAFF.
Bester, Nursing-Sister H. L. S.A.M.N.S.
Brookshaw, Staff-Nurse F. S.A.M.N.S.
Burgess, Nursing-Sister E. S.A.M.N.S.
Child, Assistant-Matron J. C. S.A.M.N.S.
Conyngham, Nursing-Sister A. B. S.A.M.N.S.
Creagh, Matron E. R. S.A.M.N.S.
Dawson, Nursing-Sister L. Q.A.I.M.N.S.R.
Freshney, Nursing-Sister F. H. S.A.M.N.S.
Gilson, Nursing-Sister M. A. S.A.M.N.S.
Johnson, Nursing-Sister M. E. Q.A.I.M.N.S.R.
Kingon, Nursing-Sister H. A. S.A.M.N.S.
*Northard, Staff-Nurse C. A. S.A.M.N.S.
Northard, Nursing-Sister M. S.A.M.N.S.
Thomson, Probationer Nurse D. M. S.A.M.N.S.
Van Niekerk, Nursing-Sister D. N. K. S.A.M.N.S.
Waters, Nursing-Sister I. G. S.A.M.N.S.
WARRANT OFFICERS, N.C.O’S, AND MEN.
Anderson, No. 271, Staff-Sergeant R. D. S.A.M.C.
Atwood, No. 12731, Sergeant E. E. Infantry.
Bantjes, No. 4371, Private M. J. Infantry.
Barker, No. 3877, Private J. G. Infantry.
Beasley, No. 3855, Coy. Q.M.-Sergt. N. Infantry.
Bentley, No. 5846, Sergeant P. Infantry.
Blackie, No. 2878, Lance-Corporal F. T. Signal Company.
Borland, No. 6016, Coy. Sgt.-Major J. C. Signal Company.
Brown, No. 49, Coy. Sergeant-Major J. Labour Corps.
Butler, No. 16, Colour Sergeant F. Labour Corps.
Cullen, No. 2913, Lance-Cpl. R. V. V. Signal Company.
Cursley, No. 5811, Private F. Infantry.
Dalton, No. 6334, Sergeant W. J. Engineers.
Davis, No. 1895, Sergeant J. Infantry.
Elliott, No. 382, Sergeant R. P. Heavy Artillery.
Emery, No. 17, Lance-Corporal E. H. Infantry.
Ewin, No. 2142, Sergeant E. F. Infantry.
Ferguson, No. 1580, Corporal J. Heavy Artillery.
Gattons, No. V35, Sergeant J. Engineers.
Gillholm, No. 59, Coy. Sergt.-Major H. P. Labour Corps.
Gordge, No. 80, Q.M.-Sergeant J. H. S.A.M.C.
Grant, No. 78, Sergeant J. A. F. S.A.M.C.
Hall, No. 3613, Coy. Sergeant-Major A. Infantry.
Hall, No. 5332, Sergeant P. C. W. Signal Company.
Harrison, No. 289, Sergeant J. G. Heavy Artillery.
Helfrick, No. 3977, Private W. Infantry.
Henderson, No. 5351, Sergeant W. Infantry.
Hewitt, No. 141, Reg. Sgt.-Major W. H. Labour Corps.
Hopkins, No. 540, Staff-Sergeant C. Heavy Artillery.
Hughes, No. 572, Gunner F. Heavy Artillery.
Hukins, No. 242, Colour Sergeant L. C. Labour Corps.
Hulett, No. 179, Coy. Sergt.-Major A. C. Labour Corps.
Jessop, No. 107, Colour Sergeant W. H. Labour Corps.
Jones, No. 10951, Private W. E. Infantry.
Jorgensen, No. 527, Corporal W. H. Signal Company.
Kenyon, No. 4807, Corporal A. J. Signal Company.
Krige, No. 1067, Gunner P. H. Heavy Artillery.
Lee, No. 1491, Gunner F. L. F. Heavy Artillery.
Lenz, No. 388, Sergeant F. Labour Corps.
Lodge, No. 1838, Sergeant H. Infantry.
Long, No. 1665, Lance-Corporal C. E. Infantry.
Lowe, No. 4700, Sergeant T. E. Infantry.
Loxton, No. 5620, Lance-Corporal C. Infantry.
Mackay, No. 622, Batt. Q.M.-Sergeant A. Heavy Artillery.
Magor, No. 282, Sergeant H. C. Labour Corps.
M’Conachie, No. 1933, Sergeant J. Infantry.
Meredith, No. 5755, Reg. Sgt.-Major G. Infantry.
Morgan, No. 245, Private R. H. Infantry.
Munro, No. 3890, Corporal W. Signal Company.
Nicholls, No. 45, Reg. Q.M.-Sergt. G. R. F. Infantry.
Nicolle, No. 4817, Corporal J. Signal Company.
Northend, No. 5330, Corporal G. F. Signal Company.
Parsley, No. 7728, Staff-Sergeant A. J. Infantry.
Perrett, No. 614, Sergeant W. J. Heavy Artillery.
Petters, No. 497, Sergeant A. T. Heavy Artillery.
Prebble, No. 348, Coy. Sergt.-Major E. E. Infantry.
Price, No. 745, Sergeant F. W. Labour Corps.
Prior, No. 1998, Private E. C. Infantry.
Purcell, No. 6031, Lance-Corporal I. Signal Company.
Ritchie, No. 6658, Sergeant H. J. Signal Company.
Robey, No. 5275, Coy. Sergt.-Major J. E. Infantry.
Rowe, No. 3655, Corporal H. J. Engineers.
Salsbury, No. 869, Gunner E. Heavy Artillery.
Schoeman, No. 18, Private A. J. Infantry.
Schuring, No. 3550, Sergeant D. Infantry.
Sewell, No. 545, Sergeant-Major W. E. Heavy Artillery.
Shaw, No. 2, Colour Sergeant R. G. Labour Corps.
Skinner, No. 4146, Sergeant W. T. Infantry.
Stidworthy, No. 8781, Sergeant G. A. Infantry.
Truss, No. 955, Sergeant W. G. Heavy Artillery.
*Van Hoof, No. 2893, Sergeant A. C. Signal Company.
Vlok, No. 429, Private N. J. Infantry.
Walter, No. 9004, Corporal B. C. Infantry.
Wedderburn, No. 3188, Sergeant A. Infantry.
Westley, No. 14561, Private L. F. C. Infantry.
Whitnall, No. 4280, Q.M.-Sergt. E. C. Infantry.
Wilson, No. 5266, Reg. Sergeant-Major J. Infantry.
Beckman, No. 4768, Sergeant G. H. W. Infantry.
Dewar, No. 3110, Lance-Sergeant W. R. Infantry.
Hilson, No. 2179, Sergeant J. C. Infantry.
Husband, No. 2146, Lance-Sgt. W. J. M. Infantry.
King, No. 3782, Coy. Sergt.-Major W. L. Infantry.
MENTIONED IN WAR OFFICE COMMUNIQUÉS.
OFFICERS.
Ashmead, Lieutenant J. E. W. Infantry.
Balfour, Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. S.A.M.C.
Bamford, Lieutenant-Colonel H. W. M. Infantry.
Byrne, Captain M. J. Engineers.
Chave, Lieutenant A. F. Infantry.
Covernton, Captain R. H. Signal Company.
Davison, Major G. L. Labour Corps.
Deane, Major R. Infantry.
Ellis, Lieutenant N. N. Pay Corps.
Jamieson, Captain E. C. K. Pay Corps.
Knibbs, Lieutenant A. R. Infantry.
Legge, Captain E. A. Infantry.
Macdougal, Major I. Infantry.
Marillier, Second-Lieutenant F. L. Infantry.
M’Cubbin, Captain J. S. Infantry.
Metelerkamp, Second-Lieutenant L. Infantry.
Millar, Captain E. S. Infantry.
Mills, Major H. P. Infantry.
Money, Captain A. G. Infantry.
Montgomery, Captain H. Infantry.
Paxton, Captain A. L. Infantry.
Rae, Lieutenant N. E. Infantry.
Rigby, Major J. C. A. S.A.M.C.
Riley, Captain J. W. Infantry.
Thomson, Captain A. M. Infantry.
Tucker, Captain W. E. Infantry.
Young, Lieutenant-Colonel B. Infantry.
Walker, Major E. B. Infantry.
Whiting, Captain E. Infantry.
Whyte, Captain J. C. Labour Corps.
NURSING STAFF.
Adendorff, Staff-Nurse M. A. S.A.M.N.S.
Allen, Staff-Nurse P. W. S.A.M.N.S.
Aves, Staff-Nurse D. S.A.M.N.S.
Cloete, Probationer-Nurse R. F. S.A.M.N.S.
Donaldson, Nursing-Sister A. E. S.A.M.N.S.
Fraser-Wood, Nursing-Sister K. Q.A.I.M.N.S.R.
Pearson, Staff-Nurse E. M. S.A.M.N.S.
Thom, Probationer-Nurse H. S.A.M.N.S.
WARRANT OFFICERS, N.C.O.’S, AND MEN.
Ardouin, No. 10758, Corporal W. Infantry.
Augustus, No. 200, Q.M.-Sergeant I. S. Pay Corps.
Bailey, No. X558, Staff-Sergeant J. S. Pay Corps.
Bell, No. 4699, Coy. Sergeant-Major F. Infantry.
Blackmore, No. 8667, Corporal W. Infantry.
Boam, No. 1918, Staff-Sergeant H. N. Pay Corps.
Bothwell, No. 5051, Staff-Sergeant H. Pay Corps.
Brampton, No. 8505, Sergeant T. C. Infantry.
*Bromehead, No. 2098, Sergeant E. C. Infantry.
Bruno, No. 2779, Corporal H. A. Infantry.
Buchanan, No. 5562, Sergeant D. K. Infantry.
Burns, No. X661, Staff-Sergeant J. F. Pay Corps.
Burns, No. 8673, Sergeant W. R. Infantry.
Burrage, No. 3144, Staff Q.M.-Sergt. F. L. Pay Corps.
Church, No. 6298, Q.M.-Sergeant R. L. Infantry.
Cooper, No. 6811, Sergeant W. P. Infantry.
Coyne, No. X44, Sergeant W. B. M. Infantry.
Craig, No. 1347, Reg. Sergt.-Major W. Infantry.
Crocker, No. 4558, Sergeant W. T. H. Infantry.
Crowson, No. 6299, Q.M.-Sergeant E. Infantry.
Dagnin, No. 1623, Lance-Sergt. A. A. F. Infantry.
Davenport, No. 6074, Reg. Sgt.-Major B. Infantry.
*Davidson, No. X19, Sergeant C. Infantry.
Driver, No. 8522, Sergeant E. M. Infantry.
Easterbrook, No. 6262, Lance-Cpl. E. H. Infantry.
Fearnhead, No. 400, Staff-Sergeant E. A. Pay Corps.
Fletcher, No. 13834, Lance-Corporal C. A. Infantry.
Foster, No. 11594, Sergeant W. M. Infantry.
Fromant, No. 4893, C. Q.M.-Sgt. J. W. G. Infantry.
*Furley, No. 1518, Sergeant E. H. Infantry.
Glencross, No. 3120, Sergeant C. M. G. Infantry.
Hall, No. 1474, Sergeant O. H. Infantry.
Harris, No. 1065, Sergeant E. W. Heavy Artillery.
*Hickman, No. 6294, Reg. Q.M.-Sgt. C. S. Infantry.
Hudson, No. 2817, Coy. Q.M.-Sergeant T. Infantry.
Impellezzenie, No. 13957, Private G. A. Infantry.
Janion, No. 1058, Lance-Corporal J. R. Infantry.
Johnstone, No. 4456, C. Sgt.-Major C. E. Infantry.
Kelly, No. X256, Staff-Sergeant G. Pay Corps.
Levell, No. 787, Q.M.-Sergeant W. J. Heavy Artillery
*Lightfoot, No. 344, Staff-Sergeant R. S.A.M.C.
Murgatroyd, No. 3207, Lance-Cpl. T. C. Infantry.
Newall, No. 478, Sergeant W. S.A.M.C.
Pauley, No. X255, Staff-Sergeant H. E. R. Pay Corps.
Phillips, No. 2946, Staff-Sergeant D. T. Infantry.
Pool, No. 10093, Lance-Corporal W. Infantry.
Popkiss, No. 3146, Staff Sergt.-Major R. J. Pay Corps.
Pretorius, No. 6238, Corporal J. L. Infantry.
*Priest, No. 388, Sergeant-Major F. D. S.A.M.C.
Reid, No. 3315, Sergeant H. Infantry.
Rhind, No. 53, Sergeant F. Staff.
*Rose, No. 414, Private R. S.A.M.C.
Rowley, No. 5883, Reg. Q.M.-Sergt. A. B. Infantry.
Russell, No. 9110, Coy. Q.M.-Sergt. E. E. Infantry.
Sayer, No. 3112, Sergeant A. Infantry.
Scherger, No. 5711, Corporal B. Infantry.
Shearer, No. 10077, Sergeant J. Infantry.
Sherman, No. 423, Corporal H. J. Infantry.
Shires, No. 2212, Corporal A. Infantry.
Sim, No. 11041, Lance-Corporal A. E. Infantry.
**Smith, No. 315, Staff-Sergeant C. G. W. S.A.M.C.
Stead, No. 15343, Corporal F. H. Infantry.
Swanby, No. X23, Staff-Sergeant C. F. S.A.M.C.
Thomas, No. 639, Bombardier B. J. A. Heavy Artillery.
Tuck, No. 9122, Lance-Corporal F. G. Infantry.
*Walker, No. X235, Staff Sgt.-Major J. H. Staff.
Walton, No. X522, Staff-Sergeant A. E. Pay Corps.
Wasser, No. 2673, Private J. Infantry.
White, No. 403, Corporal H. W. S. S.A.M.C.
FOREIGN DECORATIONS.
FRENCH HONOURS.
CROIX DE GUERRE.
Clunnie, No. 4080, Sergeant R. J. Infantry.
Edwards, Major S. B. Heavy Artillery.
Fraser, No. 6212, Corporal C. M. Signal Company.
Glascock, No. 6317, Sergeant E. W. Infantry.
Goodwin, Second-Lieutenant B. W. Infantry.
Harrison, Major N. Signal Company.
Hunter, No. 1197, Private H. P. Infantry.
Maasdorp, Major L. H. Heavy Artillery.
Meredith, No. 5755, Reg. Sergeant-Major G. Infantry.
Nelson, No. 943, Sergeant T. D. Heavy Artillery.
Ross, Lieutenant F. M. Signal Company.
Smith, No. 4087, Sergeant A. Infantry.
Sowdon, No. 4716, Sergeant C. H. V. Signal Company.
Steele, No. 1905, Private H. Infantry.
Thackeray, Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Infantry.
Wilkie, No. 3657, Coy. Sergeant-Major F. Infantry.
Wilson, Lieutenant C. K. Signal Company.
LÉGION D’HONNEUR, CROIX D’OFFICIER.
Collins, Lieutenant-Colonel F. R. Engineers.
MÉDAILLE MILITAIRE.
Davenport, No. 6074, Reg. Sergeant-Major B. Infantry.
Hodges, No. 468, Bombardier T. E. Heavy Artillery.
Mann, No. 13298, Sergeant A. Heavy Artillery.
Stevens, No. 7071, Private J. B. Infantry.
BELGIAN HONOURS.
ORDRE DE LA COURONNE.
Little, Second-Lieutenant H. G. Heavy Artillery.
CROIX DE GUERRE.
Clegg, No. X93, Corporal W. D. Heavy Artillery.
L’Estrange, No. X123, Bombardier G. E. F. Heavy Artillery.
Little, Second-Lieutenant H. G. Heavy Artillery.
Stiger, No. 968, Corporal W. T. M. Heavy Artillery.
Tanner, Brigadier-General W. E. C. Staff.
Truss, No. 955, Sergeant W. G. Heavy Artillery.
ORDRE DE LÉOPOLD.
Tanner, Lieutenant-Colonel W. E. C. Infantry.
Truss, No. 955, Sergeant W. G. Heavy Artillery.
DÉCORATION MILITAIRE.
Gourlay, No. 6210, Sergeant J. H. Signal Company.
Page, No. 1591, Private S. A. Signal Company.
ITALIAN HONOURS.
SILVER MEDAL FOR MILITARY VALOUR.
Charlton, Captain W. D. Infantry.
Shenton, Captain J. L. Infantry.
Unwin, Lieutenant H. W. Heavy Artillery.
BRONZE MEDAL FOR MILITARY VALOUR.
Allison, No. 3554, Lance-Corporal C. J. Infantry.
Knowles, No. 777, Gunner J. D. Heavy Artillery.
SERBIAN HONOURS.
ORDER OF THE WHITE EAGLE.
FOURTH CLASS WITH SWORDS.
Christian, Lieutenant-Colonel E. Infantry.
FIFTH CLASS WITH SWORDS.
Pepper, Captain A. L. Staff.
CROSS OF KARAGEORGE.
FIRST CLASS WITH SWORDS.
Wells, No. 563, Coy. Sergeant-Major F. W. Infantry.
SECOND CLASS WITH SWORDS.
Jenner, No. 3447, Lance-Corporal D. Infantry.
GOLD MEDAL.
Hoy, No. 1469, Lance-Corporal J. D. Infantry.
Pringle, No. 4137, Private N. Infantry.
Tuer, No. 4969, Sergeant J. Infantry.
SILVER MEDAL.
Bower, No. 4225, Private T. Infantry.
Hunter, No. 142, Private H. J. Infantry.
MONTENEGRIN HONOURS.
ORDER OF DANILO.
FIFTH CLASS.
Medlicott. Captain R. F. C. Infantry.
SILVER MEDAL FOR MERIT.
Morgan, No. 245, Private R. H. Infantry.
Naisby, No. 1813, Sergeant J. Infantry.
EGYPTIAN HONOURS.
ORDER OF THE NILE.
THIRD CLASS.
Lukin, Brigadier-General H. T. Staff.
ROUMANIAN HONOURS.
MÉDAILLE BARBATIE SI CREDINTA.
SECOND CLASS.
Digby, Second-Lieutenant C. R. Cape Aux. Horse Transport.
CHEVALIER OF THE ORDER OF THE CROWN OF ROUMANIA.
Havery, Lieutenant J. N. Infantry.
SUMMARY.
1. V.C. 2
2. K.C.B. 1
3. C.B. 2
4. C.M.G. 6
5. Bar to D.S.O. 1
6. D.S.O. 35
7. C.B.E. (Military Division) 6
8. O.B.E. (Military Division) 29
9. M.B.E. (Military Division) 15
10. Bar to M.C. 10
11. M.C. 134
12. D.C.M. 64
13. Bar to M.M. 16
14. M.M. 431
15. M.S.M. 75
16. Royal Red Cross 16
17. French Decorations 22
18. Belgian Decorations 11
19. Italian Decorations 5
20. Serbian Decorations 9
21. Montenegrin Decorations 3
22. Roumanian Decorations 2
23. Egyptian Decorations 1
24. Brevet Rank 5
25. Mentioned in Despatches 218
26. Mentioned in War Office Communiqués 107
FOOTNOTES
[1] On January 1, 1917, the pay of privates was raised to 3s. a day, but
other ranks continued to draw pay at Imperial rates.
[2] About 15 per cent. of the original Brigade was Dutch. The proportion
rose to something like 30 per cent. before the end of the campaign.
[3] The regiment wore the tartan of the Atholl Murrays. The story of the
Atholl Highlanders may be read in _The Military History of Perthshire_,
by the present Duchess of Atholl.
[4] See Appendix I.
[5] A medical unit with South African _personnel_ for service with the
French Army was formed in South Africa in the autumn of 1914 by the
Société Française du Cap. Early in 1915 this unit was established by the
French military authorities at the Hôtel Beau-Rivage at Cannes, which was
equipped as a hospital for the reception of French sick and wounded. It
did admirable work under the auspices of the French Red Cross, with which
it was affiliated.
[6] Troops could not be moved to Dabaa by rail from lack of rolling stock.
[7] The phrase is Sir John Maxwell’s in his dispatch of March 1, 1916.
[8] The Duke of Westminster received the Distinguished Service Order; he
was recommended for the Victoria Cross.
[9] The 9th Division was now composed of the 26th Infantry Brigade,
comprising the 8th Black Watch, the 7th Seaforths, the 5th Camerons, and
the 10th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; the 27th Infantry Brigade,
comprising the 11th Royal Scots, the 12th Royal Scots, the 6th K.O.S.B.
and the 9th Scottish Rifles; and the South African Infantry Brigade. The
Pioneer Battalion was the 9th Seaforths.
[10] Both of these brigades belonged to Major-General Shea’s 30th
Division.
[11] The XX. Corps held the Grand Couronné of Nancy in September 1914,
and delivered the counter-attack at Douaumont on February 26, 1916, which
turned the tide at Verdun.
[12] If we take the casualties from the 1st of July, the total is
2,815—made up of 502 killed, 1,735 wounded, and 578 missing. Tanner,
MacLeod, and Thackeray were all wounded. General Lukin was slightly
gassed.
[13] Lieutenant-Colonel Tanner was wounded on 17th July and his
second-in-command, Major Gee, took over the 2nd Regiment. Major Gee
was killed almost at once, and as there were no senior officers of the
2nd left Major Heal of the 1st took over command. This he held till
the arrival from England at the end of August of Lieutenant-Colonel
Christian, who took command of the 2nd Regiment. After the death of
Lieutenant-Colonel Jones the 4th Regiment was under Major D. M. MacLeod.
He was wounded on 17th July, after which Major D. R. Hunt took over, and
continued in command till December 31, 1916.
[14] In its origin it was probably a big-gun emplacement.
[15] “One saw a large party of South Africans at full stretch with
bayonets at the charge—all dead; but even in death they seemed to have
the battle ardour stamped on their faces.” Lieut.-Col. Croft’s _Three
Years with the 9th Division_, p. 84.
[16] When the Nose was finally occupied by the 6th K.O.S.B. they found
over 250 German dead lying around it.
[17] The atrocious condition of the ground was partly due to our use of
the delay-action fuse, which caused shells to explode well below the soil
and so led to big subsidences which speedily became mudholes.
[18] The Butte de Warlencourt was never taken during the Battle of the
Somme, though early in November the 50th Division made a gallant attempt.
It was occupied by us in the last week of February 1917, when the enemy
retreated.
[19] Their right flank was in a marsh, where duck-shooting could be
enjoyed within 800 yards of the German trenches.
[20] The casualties of the 27th Brigade in this ill-fated action were
nearly as high as those of the South Africans.
[21] MacLeod took over the 4th from Christian on 25th April when he
returned from sick leave, Christian going to the XVII. Corps School of
Instruction as Commandant.
[22] On some maps this is given as the Hansbeek, or Hannebeek, but it is
more convenient to keep this name for the larger stream which runs by St.
Julien.
[23] Private C. E. Fennessy was awarded the Military Medal for this
exploit.
[24] He was mortally wounded on the 20th, and died the day after.
[25] Of Lukin Sir Douglas Haig wrote: “Coming to France in April 1916,
his skilful command of the South African Brigade soon induced me to
select him for command of the 9th Division. This division he has
commanded with skill and ability in many hard-fought battles, and I
have looked on him as one of the most reliable divisional commanders in
France.” Lieut-Col. Croft in his _Three Years with the 9th Division_ has
this pleasant tale of Lukin at Third Ypres: “In the early stage of the
night march we met the divisional commander, who, like all the divisional
commanders of the 9th Division, spent most of his time near the front
lines. He was on his way back, and this good old regimental officer
insisted on getting off the track and up to his knees in mud while the
men went by, saying, ‘I have a comfortable dug-out to go back to,’ when
we offered to make way for him.”
[26] Up till this, Chapel Hill had been in the area of the 21st Division,
but Dawson that afternoon was ordered to assume responsibility for it.
[27] Major C. M. Murray, another distinguished officer, had been recalled
in September to take up work in England. He was with the ambulance during
the heavy fighting of the first half of 1918.
INDEX.
Aa, River, 196.
Abbeville. See _Hospital, S. African General_.
Abeele, 194.
Addison, Sec.-Lieut. E. C., 214.
Agagia, Battle of, 32-5.
Ailette, River, 231.
Ailly-sur-Somme, 47.
Aisne, River, 106, 126, 128, 129, 216.
Aitken, Sec.-Lieut. A., 144.
Albert, 189.
Alexandria, 22, 26, 27, 41.
Alim Tejdid, 38.
Allenby, Field-Marshal Sir Edmund (Viscount Allenby), 103, 113, 126.
Alston, Major C. W., 20, 275.
Alwyn Farm (Méteren), 222.
American Armies in France, The, 158, 217, 228, 230.
Amiens, 194, 195, 214.
Ancre, River, 50, 51, 87, 104.
Anderson, Lieut.-Col. J. D., 337, 339, 351.
Anderson, Sec.-Lieut., 223.
Arbre de Guise, 246.
Armentières, 45, 195.
Armin, General Sixt von. See _Sixt von Armin_.
Armistice, The, 255-6.
Armoured cars, 30;
at Agagia, 33;
in advance on Sollum, 36, 39, 40.
Army, British—
First, 83, 105, 113, 225, 231, 255.
Second, 44, 134, 217, 231.
Third, 85, 102, 104, 113, 159, 161, 170, 177, 191, 230, 231, 232,
233, 249.
Fourth, 85, 90, 230, 231, 232, 233, 249, 253, 255.
Fifth, 88, 104, 132, 133, 134, 135, 146, 159, 161, 170, 171, 176,
177.
Army, German—
Fourth, 130, 196.
Sixth, 151, 196.
Arnold, Sec.-Lieut. L., 153.
Arras, 49, 83, 88, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110-12, 178, 195,
218;
Battle of, 115-126, 258.
Artillery, Heavy (South African), 16, 19, 20, 21, 267-278.
See also under _Battery, Heavy Artillery_; and _Brigade, Heavy
Artillery_.
Artillery, Royal Garrison. See _Artillery, Heavy_.
Artillery, Royal Marine, 19.
Athies, 116.
Atholl, Duchess of, 17 _n._;
Duke of, 21.
Aulad Ali tribes, 36.
Australian Camel Corps, 36, 38.
Australian Forces in France.
See under _Corps, British_; _Division, British_.
Avelu, 235.
Avesnes, 252.
Bagbag, 37, 38.
Bailleul, 44, 195, 203, 204, 205, 206, 218.
Baillon Farm, 246.
Bain, Capt. J. T., 144.
Baker, Lieut.-Col. J. Mitchell, 18, 351.
Baker, Private, 66.
Bamford, Lieut.-Col. H. W. M., commands Composite Battalion, 209, 210;
commands 2nd Regiment, 225, 233.
Bancroft, Lieut., 167, 175.
Bannockburn, 114.
Bapaume, 48, 50, 51, 60, 86, 87, 109, 230.
Barisis, 159.
Barrani, 25, 32, 35, 36, 37.
Basutoland, 19.
Bate, Lieut., 59.
Battery, Heavy Artillery (S. African)—
_71st_, 20, 267, 269-70, 273.
_72nd_, 20, 267, 268, 275-6.
_73rd_, 20, 267, 268-9.
_74th_, 20, 267, 268, 274-5.
_75th_, 20, 267, 268, 276-7.
_125th_, 267, 268, 271-2.
_496th_, 267, 277.
_542nd_, 267.
Baudimont Gate (Arras), 111.
Bavai, 252.
Bazentin-le-Grand, 56.
Bazentin-le-Petit, 56, 86.
Bazuel, 241, 242, 247.
Beaumont, 253.
Beaurevoir, 231, 232, 234.
Beauvois, 176.
Beck House, 138.
Begbie, Major R. P. G., 271, 272.
Beit Hussein, 25.
Below, General Otto von, 151.
Bennett, Lieut.-Col. G. M., 274, 275.
Bernafay Wood, 48, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 76, 77.
Berthonval, 84.
Bertry, 236, 237.
Bethell, Maj.-Gen. H. K., 226, 232, 238, 245, 248, 253, 254.
Bethlehem Farm, 198, 200.
Béthune, 195, 196, 217.
Beugnies, 253.
Beverley, Capt. R., 172, 184, 188.
Beviss, Lieut., 167, 175.
Beyers, General, 13.
Billon Valley, 52.
Bir Abdih, 32.
Bir Asisa, 39.
Bir-el-Augerin, 37, 38.
Bir Shola, 27, 28, 29, 30.
Bir Tunis, 26.
Bir Warr, 39, 40.
Birrell, Sec.-Lieut., 234.
Blacklock, Maj.-Gen., 211.
Blanchard, Sec.-Lieut. W. J., 144.
Blangy, 111.
Blew, Lieut.-Col. T. H., 272, 273, 350.
Bliss, Lieut., 35.
Boehn, General von, 228.
Boesinghe, 132.
Bois de Madame, 254.
Bois de Martinsart, 256.
Bond Street (Delville Wood), 61.
Bony, 233.
Borry Farm, 138.
Bostin Farm, 141.
Botha, General Louis, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 193.
Bouchavesnes, 177, 179, 180, 183, 191.
Bourlon, 151.
Brahmin Bridge (Méteren), 222.
Brandhoek, 134.
Bray-sur-Somme, 51, 184, 189.
Bremen Redoubt, 136, 141.
Brigade, Heavy Artillery (S. African)—
_44th_, 268, 269, 270, 272-4.
_50th_, 268, 275, 276, 277-8.
Brigade, Cavalry (British)—
_5th Cavalry_, 253, 254.
_Canadian Cavalry_, 237.
Brigade, Infantry (British)—
_2nd Guards_, 152.
_4th Guards_, 205.
_8th_, 147.
_10th_, 123.
_21st_, 52, 53.
_26th_, 44, 57, 59, 60, 64, 71, 84, 91, 92, 98, 100, 101, 107, 108,
116, 119, 123, 125, 135, 161, 163, 189, 207, 208, 211, 218, 221.
_27th_, 44, 52, 54, 57, 58, 59, 65, 67, 91, 103, 107, 116, 123, 125
_n._, 126, 134, 135, 138, 139, 144, 172, 177, 178, 180, 209, 218,
221, 224.
_44th_, 92.
_48th_, 190.
_55th_, 55.
_57th_, 198, 199, 203.
_58th_, 198, 199.
_62nd_, 208.
_64th_, 208.
_76th_, 69, 70, 72.
_89th_, 52.
_108th_, 201, 202, 203.
_116th_, 158.
_125th_, 137.
_141st_, 85, 91.
_142nd_, 85.
_149th_, 244.
_150th_, 246.
_151st_, 244.
_174th_, 127.
_198th_, 226, 234, 235, 238, 241, 246.
_199th_, 226, 234, 235, 238, 241, 254.
_1st Australian_, 220.
Brigade, Infantry (S. African), 11;
inception of, 15;
formation, 16-19;
arrival in England, 21;
ordered to Egypt, 22;
Egyptian campaign of, 23-42;
training in Flanders, 43-47;
at Battle of Somme, 47-58;
at Delville Wood, 48-82;
in Vimy area, 83-85;
at Butte de Warlencourt, 85-103;
in Arras area, 103-115;
at Battle of Arras, 115-122;
in action at Rœux, 123-6;
at Third Ypres, 128-147;
return to the Somme, 151-5;
memorial service at Delville Wood, 157-8;
before German attack, 158-164;
in the Somme Retreat, 165-180;
the stand at Marrières Wood, 180-192;
brigade re-formed, 194;
at Battle of the Lys, 196-209;
re-formed, 225;
in advance on Le Cateau, 232-9;
capture of Le Cateau, 239-248;
becomes advanced guard, 253-5;
at hour of armistice, 255-6;
achievement of, 257-8;
quality and characteristics of, 258-263;
tributes to, 35, 78, 126, 153, 157, 189-191, 193-194, 204, 205,
226, 248.
See also under _Regiments, South African_; _Lukin_; _Dawson_;
_Tanner_; _Raids_; _Casualties_.
Briqueterie Trench, 52, 53, 54.
Brits, General, 13.
Brook, Lieut. E. J., 234, 244.
Brown, Lieut. W. N., 53.
Browne, Major, 138, 175.
Brussilov, General, 48, 87.
Bryant, Capt. E. C., 153.
Brydon, Major Walter, 20, 268-9, 272-3, 350.
Buchanan Street (Delville Wood), 61, 63, 69.
Bullecourt, 170.
Bunce, Capt. H., 169, 174.
Burges, Major E. T., 70, 79.
Burgess, Capt., E. J., 59, 79, 175, 189, 200, 353.
Burrows, Lieut., 119, 121.
Butte de Warlencourt, 89, 91;
action at, 91-103.
Byng, General the Hon. Sir Julian (Lord Byng), 113, 149, 151, 159,
160, 170, 176, 189, 191, 230, 231, 233, 235, 247, 249, 252.
Cadorna, General, 151.
Caestre, 219.
Cambrai, 109;
Battle of, 149, 151, 152, 230, 231, 233, 235, 236.
Campbell, Maj.-Gen. David, 161.
Campbell Street (Delville Wood), 61.
Campion, Lieut., 268, 269.
Canal du Nord, 127, 230, 231.
Candas, 194.
Cape Auxiliary Horse Transport Companies, 337-340.
Cape Province, The, 13, 16, 19, 20.
Cape Town, 19.
Caporetto, 151.
Carency, 84.
Carstens, Lieut., 200.
Cassel, 218.
Casualties (of Infantry Brigade), 54;
at Delville Wood, 74, 79-82;
at Butte de Warlencourt, 102;
in early months of 1917, 108;
at Battle of Arras, 121;
at Rœux, 125;
at Third Ypres, 144;
in winter 1917-18, 155;
during first days of Somme Retreat, 175;
at Messines, 205;
at Méteren, 223;
of Composite Battalion, 225;
in Le Cateau operations, 248;
total, 258.
Cawood, Sec.-Lieut. R. C., 255, 353.
Champagne, 160.
Chantecler, 116.
Chapel Crossing, 162.
Chapel Hill, 162, 168, 169, 171, 172.
Charles, Maj.-Gen., 238.
Chemical Works, The (Rœux), 123.
Chimney Trench, 53.
Christensen, Lieut., 200.
Christian, Lieut.-Col. E., 27, 84 _n._;
at Butte de Warlencourt, 91;
at Arras, 117, 136 _n._;
commands 2nd Regiment, 147, 153;
in Somme Retreat, 174, 179, 186, 188, 350.
Clapham Junction (Ypres), 133.
Clarke, Lieut., 200.
Clerk, Major, 175, 245.
Cléry, 179, 184.
Clifford, Capt. H. E., 54.
Cochran, Major F. E., at Third Ypres, 136, 141, 143;
in Somme Retreat, 173, 180, 184;
his death, 185, 188, 350.
Cojeul, River, 110.
Cole, Lieut.-Col., 336.
Collins, Lieut.-Col. F. R., 333-5, 350.
Collins, Capt. F., 298, 308, 313, 314, 351, 353.
Cologne, River, 176.
Combles, 87, 184, 191.
Composite Battalion, The, after Marrières Wood, 189;
after Messines, 209-214;
in summer of 1918, 216-225.
Condé, 252.
Confusion Corner, 212.
Congreve, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Walter, 51, 58, 68, 152, 176, 177, 179.
Contalmaison, 51, 52, 90.
Cooper, Lieut., 185.
Cooper, Sec.-Lieut. A. B., 144.
Corbie, 47.
Corps, Infantry (British)—
IV., 83, 127.
V., 134, 178, 232, 234, 342.
VI., 103, 107, 112, 114, 121.
VII., 114, 152, 176, 177, 225.
IX., 196, 197, 204.
XIII., 51, 232, 235, 238, 241, 242, 245, 246, 247, 248, 253.
XVII., 107, 113, 121, 126.
XVIII., 146, 176.
_Australian_, 189, 219, 231.
_Canadian_, 87, 107, 110, 113, 118, 147, 230, 252, 255.
Corps, Infantry (American)—
II., 232, 238, 246.
Corps, Infantry (French)—
XX., 53.
Corps, Infantry (German)—
Guard Reserve, 87, 254.
Bavarian Alpine, 206.
_3rd_, 73.
_4th_, 72, 73, 130.
_5th_, 87.
_54th_, 240.
_Corsican_, The, 27.
Courcelette, 86, 87, 89.
Cousolre, 256.
Coxen, Lieut., 138, 144.
Craig, Lieut. A. W., 66, 79.
Crewe, Sir Charles, 16, 18.
Croft, Lieut.-Col., his “Three Years with the 9th Division” quoted,
98 _n._, 156 _n._
Croisilles, 113, 116, 164.
Crown Prince, The German, 45.
Crozat Canal, The, 176.
Cruddas, Lieut., 94, 144.
Currie, Lieut. J., 268-9, 350.
Dabaa, 25, 27 _n._
Dalrymple, Colonel W., 18.
Davis, Capt. F. M., 144.
Dawson, Brig.-Gen. F. S., appointed to command 1st Regiment, 18;
at Agagia, 33;
at Delville Wood, 66, 70-71;
at Butte de Warlencourt, 96-101;
commands S. African Brigade, 103;
at Arras, 121;
at Third Ypres, 134, 139, 143, 145, 155;
in Somme Retreat, 167, 168, 169 _n._, 171, 172, 177, 178, 179,
180, 181, 182, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 349, 350.
Débeney, General, 231, 233, 235, 247, 249.
Delhi, Ridge of, 192.
Delville Wood, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60;
description of, 61;
Battle of, 61-82, 142;
memorial service at, 157-8, 181, 258.
Desinet Farm, 206, 208.
Destremont Farm, 90.
De Wet, General Christian, 13.
Dickebusch, 209, 212.
Dickerson, Sec.-Lieut. V. S., 153.
Dingaan, 192.
Dingwall, Capt. J. A., 297, 298, 310, 314, 353.
Division, Cavalry (British)—
_1st Cavalry_, 188.
Division, Infantry (British)—
_Guards_, 87, 152, 153, 252.
_1st_, 142.
_2nd_, 142, 178.
_3rd_, 69, 72, 118, 147.
_4th_, 114, 120, 122, 123, 125.
_9th_, 44, 45, 51, 53, 56, 57, 64, 67, 69, 83-5, 91-102, 103, 107,
114, 116-26, 127, 134-47, 152, 158-64, 170-89, 196-211, 217,
220, 225, 226.
_12th_, 114, 118.
_14th_, 73, 114, 118.
_15th_, 85, 91, 92, 114, 118, 123.
_16th_, 22, 190.
_18th_, 55, 56, 64, 232, 248.
_19th_, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204, 206, 208, 209.
_21st_, 114, 161, 166, 168, 169, 171, 172, 173, 178, 179, 180, 183,
184, 208, 211, 212, 213.
_23rd_, 91.
_25th_, 196, 201, 202, 211, 212, 213, 232, 238, 248.
_29th_, 205.
_30th_, 47, 52 _n._, 53, 54, 114, 211, 213.
_31st_, 205.
_33rd_, 204, 205.
_34th_, 107, 113, 122, 201, 202, 206, 208.
_35th_, 107, 184, 186, 188.
_38th_, 233.
_39th_, 158, 211, 213.
_40th_, 201.
_41st_, 147.
_47th_, 85, 90, 91, 161, 178.
_48th_, 146.
_49th_, 205, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213.
_50th_, 90, 232, 233, 242, 244, 246, 248.
_51st_, 18, 107, 113.
_55th_, 135, 141, 143, 196, 201.
_56th_, 114, 118.
_66th_, 225, 231, 232-39, 241-8, 252-6.
_1st Australian_, 205.
_2nd Australian_, 135.
_New Zealand_, 87.
_Portuguese_, 196.
Division, Infantry (French)—
_39th_, 53.
Division, Infantry (German)—
_2nd Guard Reserve_, 141.
_6th Bavarian_, 90.
_10th Bavarian_, 62, 73.
_5th_, 73.
_8th_, 72, 73.
_17th Reserve_, 238.
Doignies, 170.
Doingt, 177.
Dompierre, 253.
Donaldson, Lieut., 94.
Dorward, Lieut., 121.
Douai, 110.
Douglas, Sec.-Lieut., 223.
Douve, River, 196.
Dranoutre, 212.
Drocourt-Quéant Switch, The, 109, 116, 121, 122, 230.
Dublin Redoubt, 53;
trench, 53.
Duisans, 103.
Dunkirk, 196.
Dutch in South Africa, The, 15, 261.
Earl Farm, 199.
East Africa, German. See _German East Africa_.
Eaucourt l’Abbaye, 86, 90, 91.
Edgar, Sergeant C. W., 145, 362.
Egan, Lieut., 234.
Egypt, Campaign of S. African Brigade in, 23-42.
Elincourt, 235.
Elliott, Lieut., 100, 101, 118, 119.
Ellis, Capt. P. H., 118, 137.
Emperor, The German, 191, 253.
Engineers, The Royal, 117, 255.
_63rd Field Co._, 220.
_64th Field Co._, 51.
_430th Field Co._, 253.
Equancourt, 172, 176.
Escaufourt, 237.
Estaires, 201.
Estill, Lieut., 95.
Estment, Lance-Corporal A., 66, 362.
Estrées, 86.
Fampoux, 116, 121, 123, 124, 176.
Fanshawe, Lieut.-Gen. Sir E. A., 134, 178.
Farrell, Capt. T., 138, 207.
Fatimite invasion of Egypt, The, 40.
Faulds, Sec.-Lieut. W. F., 66, 343, 349.
Fennessy, Private C. E., 140, 362.
Fergusson, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Charles, 107, 113.
Fernie, Sec.-Lieut., 234.
Feuchy, 109.
Field Ambulance, 1st S. African, 16, 20, 21;
at Delville Wood, 76, 77;
at Arras, 122;
at Fampoux, 125-6;
at Third Ypres, 144-5, 225;
at Le Cateau, 251-2.
Fins, 154, 174.
Fitzpatrick, Major P. N. G., 270.
Flag Ravine, 152.
Flers, 57, 65, 66, 70, 86, 87, 89, 90, 93, 96.
Flesquières, 170.
Flêtre, 218, 219.
Foch, Marshal, 194, 217, 224, 228, 230, 231, 239, 252, 253, 254.
Fonsommes, 231.
Forder, Major C. J., 278.
Forder, Sec.-Lieut. W. G. S., 144.
Forest, 238, 239.
Fosse 8 (Loos), 44.
Four Huns Farm, 199.
Francis, Sec.-Lieut., 234.
Franks, Maj.-Gen., 184.
Frelinghien, 196.
Frévillers, 83, 84.
Frezenberg, 136.
Fricourt, 48.
Frohbus, Sergeant, 139.
Fruges, 152.
Furse, Maj.-Gen. Sir W. T., 44, 52, 58, 59, 67, 68, 69, 92, 103.
Gaafer, 24, 25, 32, 33, 35.
Gallipoli, 22.
Gattignies Wood, 235, 236.
Gauche Wood, 152, 162, 166, 168, 170, 171, 181.
Gavrelle, 123.
Gee, Major H. H., 80, 83 _n._
Gemmell, Capt. D., 138, 144.
General Hospital, No. 1 S. African. See _Hospital, General_.
Genin Well Copse, 168, 169, 171.
German East Africa, 13, 14, 258, 260.
German Emperor, The. See _Emperor, The German_.
German South-West Africa, 13, 14, 15, 19, 260.
Gheluvelt, 133, 136, 140.
Giddy, Sec.-Lieut., 234.
Ginchy, 57, 86, 87.
Givenchy, 196, 201, 202;
en-Gohelle, 113.
Glatz Redoubt, 52, 53, 55.
Godfrey, Lieut., 121.
Gommecourt, 50.
Goodwin, Lieut. B. W., 108, 213, 353.
Gordon, Lieut.-Col. J. L. R., 28, 29.
Gorringe, Maj.-Gen. Sir G. F., 161.
Gough, General Sir Hubert, 88, 132, 134, 159, 160, 176, 177, 179,
189, 191.
Gouraud, General, 249, 250, 252, 253.
Gouzeaucourt, 152, 162, 163, 170, 174.
Government Farm, 179.
Grady, Capt. E. C. D., 82, 118, 125.
Grandrieu, 254, 256.
Gray, Lieut. S. E. G., 119, 243, 353.
Green, Capt. Garnet, 72, 80, 167-8, 173, 174, 353.
Greene, Capt. L., 54, 80, 202, 350, 354.
Greenland Hill, 123, 126.
Grenville, Sir Richard, 188.
Grieve, Pipe-Major, 157.
Griffiths, Lieut., 200.
Grove Town, 51.
Gueudecourt, 86, 88.
Guillaumat, General, 231, 249, 252.
Guillemont, 57, 65, 86.
Gunn, Sec.-Lieut., 234.
Hadlow, Lieut., 167.
Haig, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas (Earl Haig), 22;
in spring of 1916, 45-6, 47;
at Battle of the Somme, 50, 52, 56, 57, 78, 86, 87;
his plans for 1917, 104-107;
reviews S. African Brigade, 108;
at Battle of Arras, 109-111;
strategy of Third Ypres, 128-30, 133-4, 147;
tribute at Delville Wood memorial service, 157;
position at beginning of 1918, 158-61;
message to Botha, 193-4;
at Battle of Lys, 195;
verdict on fight of 13th April, 205;
his order of 11th April, 214-15;
advance on Siegfried Line, 230-31;
in the final stage, 235, 241, 247, 249, 250, 251, 252.
Halazin, Battle of, 28-30.
Haldane, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Aylmer, 69, 103, 114.
Halfaia Pass, The, 38.
Hamage Farm, 234.
Hamilton-Gordon, Lieut.-Gen. Sir A., 196, 204.
Hands, Major P. A. M., 269, 273, 350, 354.
Hannebeek (Ypres), 136 _n._
Happy Valley, The, 72, 74, 78.
Hardwich, Lieut., 121.
Hargicourt, 170.
Harp, The (Arras), 118.
Harris, Lieut. W. E., 95, 354.
Harrison, Major H. C., 20, 269, 350.
Harrison, Lieut.-Col. N., 279, 282, 283, 290, 297, 298, 310, 313, 350.
Harvey, Lieut., 221.
Haute-Allaines, 178.
Havrincourt, 127.
Hazebrouck, 195, 204, 206, 217, 218.
Heal, Lieut.-Col. F. H., takes command of 2nd Regiment, 84 _n._;
of 1st Regiment, 103;
at Arras, 117;
at Third Ypres, 136, 139, 140, 141, 143;
in Somme Retreat, 174, 179;
his death, 186, 188.
Heavy Artillery. See _Artillery, Heavy_.
Hell Farm (Messines), 200, 202.
Hem, 188.
Hendry, Sec.-Lieut. N. T., 144.
Hengest, 83.
Hénin-sur-Cojeul, 176.
Henry V., King, 48.
Henry, Lieut., 59.
Hermann Line, The, 240.
Hestrud, 254, 255.
Heudicourt, 154, 155, 158, 163, 172, 173, 174, 189.
Heuringhem, 218.
Hewat, Sec.-Lieut. R. D., 242, 354.
Hewitt, Sec.-Lieut. W. H., 143, 345, 349.
Highlanders, 77th (Atholl), 17;
Cape Town, 16.
High Wood, 56, 85, 94, 101, 102.
Hill, Capt. the Rev. E. St. C., 77, 80, 354.
Hill, Lieut. R., 237.
Hill 37 (Ypres), 141;
60 (Ypres), 196, 211;
63 (Messines), 202.
Hindenburg Line. See _Siegfried Line_.
Hinwood, Sergeant S. J., 234, 363.
Hirson, 240, 249, 252.
Hogg, Lieut., 208.
Hohenzollern Redoubt, The, 44.
Hollebeke, 197, 200, 202.
Hondeghem, 218, 219, 221.
Hong-Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery, The, 35, 36, 38.
Honnechy, 235, 236, 237.
Honours won by S. African Forces in France, 349-84.
Hopgood, Lieut., 200.
Hopoutre, 209, 211.
Horne, General Sir Henry (Lord Horne), 113, 160, 231, 249, 252, 255.
Hospital, No. 1 S. African General, 16, 21, 317, 318, 319, 320-7.
Hospital, S. African Military, 21, 317, 319, 327-32.
Houlle, 145.
Humbert, General, 230.
Hunt, Major D. R., 64, 84 _n._, 93.
Hunt, Lieut. V. A., 121.
Hunter, General Sir Archibald, 21.
Hutier, General von, 151, 216.
Hyde, Lieut., 119.
Hyde Park Corner, 212.
Hyderabad Redoubt, 121, 123, 125.
Infiltration, Method of, 150, 245.
Jack, Lieut. J., 303, 354.
Jackson, Maj.-Gen., 242.
Jacobs, Capt. L. M., 194, 199, 202, 245, 350.
Jeffreys, Maj.-Gen., 197, 204.
Jenkins, Lieut.-Col. H. H., 97, 175, 209, 225, 237, 254, 350.
Jenner, Lieut., 189, 200.
Joffre, Marshal, 45.
Johannesburg, 18.
Jones, Lieut.-Col. F. A., appointed to command 4th Regiment, 15;
death at Battle of the Somme, 55, 84 _n._
Keeley, Sec.-Lieut., 223.
Keith, Serg.-Major P., 184, 354, 358.
Kemmel, 203, 205, 206, 208, 210, 211, 213, 217, 218.
Kennedy, Brig.-Gen., 189.
Kennedy, Lieut., 167.
Khedival Highway, The, 24, 31, 36.
Kimberley, 18.
King, His Majesty the, visits the S. African Brigade, 84.
King, Capt., 247.
King Street (Delville Wood), 61.
Kruisstraat Cabaret, 203, 204.
La Bassée, 195, 196, 203.
La Clytte, 196, 197, 204, 211, 212.
La Crèche, 206.
La Polka, 206, 208.
La Sablonnière, 234.
Lagnicourt, 170.
Lambton, Maj.-Gen. the Hon. W., 116, 120, 121, 123.
Langdale, Capt., 98, 99, 100.
Langeberg, 19.
Langemarck, 133, 136, 140.
Larisch, General von, 240.
Larmuth, Capt. W. A., 200.
Lassigny, 216.
Lattre St. Quentin, 103.
Laurent-Blangy, 116.
Lausanne, Treaty of, 23.
Lawe, River, 201, 202.
Lawrence, Lieut., 139, 200.
Lawrie, Capt. M. B., 77, 122, 145, 352, 354.
Lawson, Private J. A., _quoted_, 74-6.
Le Cateau, 191, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 241, 242, 246, 248, 251;
capture of, 258.
L’Enfer, 203.
Le Sars, 86, 90, 91, 92.
Le Transloy, 86, 92.
Le Verguier, 170.
Le Waton, 224.
Lee, Lieut., 119, 121.
Lens, 109, 116, 119.
Lesbœufs, 86, 87.
Lestrem, 201.
Libyan Desert, The, 24, 25, 39.
Liebson, Capt. S., 82, 172, 354.
Liége, 250.
Ligny-Thilloy, 92.
Lilburn, Lieut., 85.
Lille, 195, 240.
Locon, 202.
Locre, 211, 212, 213, 218.
Long, Mr. Walter, 109.
Longueval, 52, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 65, 67, 71, 72, 76, 77,
86, 188.
Longuyon, 252.
Loos, Battle of, 22, 44.
Losses. See _Casualties_.
Lucas, Lieut. E. D., 144.
Ludendorff, General, 148, 149, 151, 158, 160, 164, 171, 182, 194,
195, 197, 203, 210, 214, 216, 228, 230, 240, 245, 250.
Lukin, Maj.-Gen. Sir H. T. appointed to command Infantry Brigade, 19;
at Agagia, 31-35;
in advance on Sollum, 36-40, 52, 53;
at Delville Wood, 58-74;
reviews remnant of Brigade, 78;
at Butte de Warlencourt, 93-100;
commands 9th Division, 103;
at Third Ypres, 134, 135, 156 _n._;
relinquishes command of 9th Division, 155-6;
Sir D. Haig’s tribute, 156 _n._, 349.
Lumbres, 224.
Lumm’s Farm, 198, 199, 201.
Lys, River, 132, 195, 196, 201, 202, 217;
Battle of, 195-214.
M’Carter, Lieut. R. G. A., 234.
M’Cubbin, Capt., 138.
M’Donald, Capt. A. W. H., 72, 81, 144, 354.
Macfarlane, Lieut. B. N., 54.
MacFie, Sec.-Lieut. T. G., 209, 354.
MacGregor, Sec.-Lieut. R., 247.
Mackay, Lieut., 223.
Mackie, Sec.-Lieut. D. C., 223, 354.
MacLeod, Lieut.-Col. D. M., commands 4th Regiment, 55;
at Delville Wood, 74 _n._, 82, 84 _n._;
at Third Ypres, 136;
in Somme Retreat, 169, 174, 175, 188;
in advance on Le Cateau, 225, 236, 350.
M’Millan, Lieut., 243.
Machine-Gun Battery, 9th, 181;
company, 28th Brigade, 51, 74.
Mackensen, General von, 22.
Maedelstaede Farm, 203.
Maitland, 20.
Malcolm, Maj.-Gen. Neill, 226.
Male, Sec.-Lieut., 223.
Mallett, Lieut., 95, 96.
Malta, 26.
Maltzhorn Ridge, 52, 53, 64.
Mametz, 48, 85.
Mandy, Sec.-Lieut. G. J. S., 153.
Mangin, General, 224, 230, 231, 249, 252.
Maretz, 235.
Maricourt, 47, 50, 83, 189.
Maritz, Colonel, 13.
Marne, River, 216, 224.
Marrières Wood, 180;
the stand of the S. Africans at, 181-8, 193, 214, 229, 258.
Martinpuich, 86, 87, 91.
Marwitz, General von der, 177, 191.
Masnières, 151.
Mason, Capt. C. E., 335, 336.
Matruh. See _Mersa Matruh_.
Maubeuge, 241, 252.
Maurois, 235, 236, 237, 238.
Maxse, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Ivor, 56, 146, 176.
Maxwell, Brig.-Gen. F., 134, 144.
Maxwell, Maj.-Gen. Sir John, 27, 30 _n._, 40.
Méaulte, 48.
Medean Pass, 37.
Medlicott, Capt. R. F. C., 62, 81.
Medlicott, Lieut., 95, 96.
_Megantic_, The, 43.
Menin, 133, 134, 135, 142.
Merris, 203.
Mersa Matruh, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 35.
Merville, 202.
Messines, 105, 130, 196, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 209, 214,
258.
Méteren, 211, 218, 219, 220, 221;
capture of, 222-4.
Méteren Becque, 218, 220, 222, 224.
Methuen, Field-Marshal Lord, 26.
Metz, 252.
Meuse, River, 230, 231, 249.
Mex Camp, 27.
Mézières, 240, 249, 252.
Middle Farm (Messines), 199, 201, 202.
Miscellaneous Trades Company, 335-6.
Mitchell, Capt. F. M., 175, 355.
Mitchell’s Farm (Ypres), 138, 141.
Moislains, 152, 154, 174, 175, 178, 179.
Moltke, 23.
Monchy-Breton, 126.
Monchy-Lagache, 176.
Money, Lieut. A. G., 118, 119.
Monro, General Sir Charles, 83, 84, 85.
Mons, 255.
Mont des Cats, 206, 218, 221.
Mont Rouge, 212, 213.
Mont St. Quentin, 178.
Montagne de Paris, 224.
Montauban, 51, 52, 59, 60, 71.
Montay, 238, 239, 242.
Montbliart, 256.
Montgomery, Capt., 94.
Montmédy, 252.
Moore, Sir John, 46.
_Moorina_, The, 25, 39.
Morbecque, 47.
Morland, Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. L., 231.
Mormal, Forest of, 241, 247, 249, 252.
Morrison, Lieut. R. E., 118.
Morval, 86, 87.
Mosilikatse, 192.
Moulin de l’Hospice (Messines), 201.
Mount Pleasant, 123.
Mouquet Farm, 86.
Mudie, Lieut.-Col., 207.
Mulcahy, Lieut. C. L. H., 54.
Mullins, Major A. G., 275, 350.
Murray, Lieut.-General Sir Archibald, 41.
Murray, Major C. M., 251 _n._, 350.
Murray-MacGregor, Major A. M., 275, 354.
Namur, 251, 252.
Nelson, Private R. W., 126, 336.
Neuf Berquin, 202.
Neuve Chapelle, Battle of, 149.
Neuve Eglise, 197, 202, 203, 206, 208.
Neuville Vitasse, 118.
Neville, Lieut., 200.
Newbery, Lieut. J., 138, 144.
Newell, Lieut. W. F., 335.
Nieppe, 201, 202, 221.
Nieuport, 147.
Nivelle, General, 106.
North Midland Farm (Messines), 203.
North Street (Longueval), 65, 66, 70.
Nose of the Switch, The (Butte de Warlencourt), 97, 98, 99, 100
_n._, 101.
Notts Battery, R.H.A., The, 31.
Nourrisson, General, 53.
Nuri Bey, 24, 32.
Nurlu, 172, 174, 175, 177, 178.
Observation Hill (Arras), 118.
Oise, River, 159, 164, 235.
Oise-Sambre Canal, The, 247, 249.
Omignon, River, 170, 176.
_Oriana_, The, 43.
Ormiston, Major T., at Butte de Warlencourt, 100, 101;
in Somme Retreat, 185, 350.
Ostreville, 108.
Otavifontein, 14.
Oughterson, Lieut., 53.
Oultersteene, 203.
Ovillers, 51.
Passchendaele, 133, 146, 147.
Pay of Infantry Brigade, 15.
Pearse, Capt., 94, 175.
Pearse’s Trench, 94, 99.
Peirson, Capt., 190, 191.
Pepper, Major A. L., 18, 351.
Péronne, 86, 87, 161, 175, 176, 177, 178, 184.
Perrem, Sec.-Lieut. C. H., 247, 355.
Perry, Sec.-Lieut. H., 237.
Pershing, General, 249, 251, 252, 253.
Pétain, General, 45, 158, 160.
Petite Folie Farm, 234.
Petits Puits (Messines), 200, 201.
Peyton, Maj.-Gen. Sir W. E., 30, 31, 35, 36, 38, 41.
Phillips, Lieut. E. J., 71, 72, 355.
Phillips, Lieut. S. G., 352, 355.
Piave, River, 151.
Pick House (Messines), 198, 199, 201.
Pickburn, Major, 20, 274.
Pietermaritzburg, 18.
“Pill-Boxes,” Tactics of, 131, 132, 135.
Pimple, The (Butte de Warlencourt), 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101.
Ploegsteert, 196, 201, 202.
Plumer, General Sir Herbert (Lord Plumer), 44, 47, 134, 160, 202,
205, 206, 211, 217, 231.
Point du Jour, 116.
Polygon Wood, 146.
Pont d’Echelles, 202.
Pope-Hennessy, Lieut. B., 153, 200, 354.
Poperinghe, 211.
Porteous, Lieut., 125.
Potchefstroom, 18, 20.
Potgieter, Andries, 192.
Potsdam Redoubt (Ypres), 138-9.
Powell, Sec.-Lieut. C. H., 247.
Power, Major M. B., 251, 350.
Pozières, 56, 86.
Prémont, 235.
Princboom, 219.
Princes Street (Delville Wood), 61, 63, 67, 69, 70, 71.
Pringle, Lieut.-Col. R. N., 251, 350.
Pulteney, Lieut.-Gen. Sir W., 85.
Quast, General von, 196.
Queen, Her Majesty the, reviews Infantry Brigade, 21.
Queen’s Cross, 163.
Quentin Redoubt, 162, 166, 168, 171.
Quentin Ridge, 152.
Raids, by S. African Brigade, at Vimy, 84-5;
at Arras, 105, 115.
Railton, 171.
Railway Companies, 333-5.
Railway Triangle, The (Arras), 118;
(Le Cateau), 244, 245, 246.
Ramillies, 209.
Rancourt, 180.
Ravelsberg, 206.
Rawlinson, General Sir Henry (Lord Rawlinson), 78, 92, 230, 231, 233,
235, 247, 249, 252.
Regent Street (Delville Wood), 61.
Regiment, Cape of Good Hope. See _Regiments, South African, 1st_.
Regiment, Natal and Orange Free State. See _Regiments, South African,
2nd_.
Regiment, Transvaal and Rhodesia. See _Regiments, South African, 3rd_.
Regiment, Transvaal Scottish, 16.
Regiments, Cavalry (British)—
12th Lancers, 253, 254.
20th Hussars, 254, 255.
Australian Light Horse, 25, 28.
Scottish Horse, 17.
4th S. African Mounted Rifles, 68.
See also under _Yeomanry_.
Regiments, Infantry (British)—
Coldstream Guards, 74, 153.
11th Royal Scots, 44, 66, 171, 173.
12th Royal Scots, 44, 54, 139.
1/6 (T.) Royal Scots, 29, 31, 32.
2nd Royal West Surrey, 55.
18th King’s Liverpool, 226, 238.
6th Lancashire Fusiliers, 226.
2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, 74, 209, 211, 212, 213, 219, 221.
5th South Wales Borderers, 199, 202.
6th King’s Own Scottish Borderers, 44, 54, 101, 180.
9th Scottish Rifles, 44, 209, 211 212, 218, 220, 224.
5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 226.
9th Gloucester, 226.
8th Black Watch, 44, 57, 211, 224.
Middlesex, 26;
7th, 55.
9th Manchesters, 226.
18th Manchesters, 53.
7th Seaforth Highlanders, 44, 207, 208, 219.
9th Seaforth Highlanders, 44, 57.
1st Gordon Highlanders, 70.
5th Cameron Highlanders, 44, 57, 60, 64, 211, 215, 221, 223.
1st Royal Irish Fusiliers, 203.
5th Connaught Rangers, 226, 238.
10th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 44, 57.
6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 226.
15th Sikhs, 25, 28, 29, 30.
New Zealand Rifle Brigade, 25, 28, 29.
Regiments, Infantry (German)—6th Bavarian, 62.
Regiments, South African—
_1st_, 16, 18;
at Agagia, 32-5;
in Somme area, 52, 53, 56;
at Longueval, 58-9;
at Delville Wood, 59, 64, 66, 67, 70, 71, 74;
at Frévillers, 84;
at Butte de Warlencourt, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99;
in Arras area, 103;
raid by, 115;
at Battle of Acre, 117-23;
at Rœux, 123-5;
at Third Ypres, 136, 139, 140, 146;
in Gouzeaucourt area, 152, 153, 155;
at Quentin Redoubt, 166, 170;
in Somme Retreat, 173, 174, 175, 179, 183, 188;
at Battle of Lys, 194, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 206, 207, 208,
209;
re-formed, 225;
in advance on Le Cateau, 233, 234, 237, 238, 241, 242, 243, 245,
247;
as advanced guard, 254, 255.
_2nd_, 16, 18;
at Halazin, 27-30;
in Somme area, 52, 53, 54, 56;
at Delville Wood, 59, 62, 63, 67, 68, 74;
raid at Vimy, 85;
at Butte de Warlencourt, 91, 92, 93, 94;
in Arras area, 103;
at Battle of Arras, 117-123;
at Rœux, 123-5;
at Third Ypres, 136, 140, 141, 146;
in Gouzeaucourt area, 152, 153, 154;
at Gauche Wood, 162;
in Somme Retreat, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 181, 185;
at Battle of the Lys, 194, 198, 199, 201, 206, 207, 208, 209;
re-formed, 225;
in advance to Le Cateau, 233, 234, 235, 237, 241, 242, 243, 245,
247.
_3rd_, 16, 18;
at Agagia, 32-5;
in Somme area, 52, 56, 58;
at Delville Wood, 59, 62, 63, 69, 71, 74;
at Butte de Warlencourt, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 100;
in Arras area, 103;
raid by, 108;
at Battle of Arras, 117-23;
at Third Ypres, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 146;
in Gouzeaucourt area, 152, 153, 154;
disbanded, 155, 157.
_4th_, 16, 17, 18, 21;
in Somme area, 52, 53;
at Trônes Wood, 54-6;
at Delville Wood, 59, 60, 62, 64, 71, 74;
at Butte de Warlencourt, 93, 94, 99, 100;
in Arras area, 103;
at Battle of Arras, 117-123;
at Rœux, 123-5;
at Third Ypres, 136, 137, 140, 146;
in Gouzeaucourt area, 152, 153, 155;
in Somme Retreat, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 179, 184;
at Battle of the Lys, 194, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 206, 207,
208, 209;
re-formed, 225;
in advance to Le Cateau, 233, 234, 236, 237, 241, 243, 244, 245.
Reid, Capt., 118, 194.
Reninghelst, 206.
Rethel, 253.
Reumont, 237, 241.
Revelon Farm, 163, 169, 171, 172.
Ridge Wood, 211, 212, 213.
Ridley, Major E. G., 278, 352, 355.
Riga, 151.
Roberts, Sec.-Lieut. C. W., 234, 355.
Rœux, 123, 124.
Roffe, Capt. T., 115, 352, 355.
Rogers, Capt., 175.
Rommen’s Farm (Messines), 201.
Ronssoy, 170, 231.
Rorke’s Drift, 192.
Roseby, Lieut. F. R., 58, 68, 79.
Ross, Capt., F. H., 93, 100, 355.
Ross, Capt. F. M., 298, 314, 355.
Ross, Lieut. J. M., 125.
Rotten Row (Delville Wood), 61.
Roulers, 135, 136, 139.
Royal Engineers. See _Engineers, Royal_.
Roye, 105.
Rumania, 87.
Russell, Capt., 55.
Russia, 22, 43, 50, 105, 128, 129, 148.
Sailly-le-Sec, 47.
Sailly-Saillisel, 86.
St. Benin, 238, 242.
St. Jans-Cappel, 211.
St. Mihiel, 230.
St. Pancras Trench (Arras), 107.
St. Pierre Vaast Wood, 179.
St. Pol, 83.
St. Quentin, 159, 160, 230, 231.
St. Sauveur (Arras), 111.
St. Souplet, 241, 242.
Salient. See _Ypres Salient_.
Salonika, 232.
Sambre, River, 252.
Sanna’s Post, 144.
Sarrail, General, 87.
Sautain, 256.
Savernake Wood, 182.
_Saxonia_, The, 27.
Scarpe, River, 104, 107, 109, 110, 116, 121, 125, 230.
Scheepers, Capt. J. C., 115, 223, 355.
Scheldt, River, 110, 231, 232, 241, 249.
Scherpenberg, 196, 197, 211, 213.
_Scotian_, The, 43.
Scottish Regiment, South African. See _Regiments, S. African, 4th_.
Scottish troops. See under _Divisions_, _9th_, _15th_, and _51st_.
Sedan, 249, 250, 253.
Selle, River, 235, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248,
251.
Sensée, River, 110, 170.
Senussi, The, 24, 25, 29, 31, 35, 36, 39, 41.
Senussi, The Grand (Sidi Ahmed), 24, 26, 36, 41.
Sequehart, 233.
Serain, 234, 235, 249, 252.
Shea, Maj.-Gen., 52 _n._
Sidi Barrani. See _Barrani_.
Siegfried Line, 105, 106, 109, 131, 230, 231, 233, 235.
Signalling Company, The South African, 16, 21, 225, 279-316.
Sivry, 254.
Siwa oasis, The, 41.
Siwiat, 38.
Sixt von Armin, General, 130, 131, 196, 201, 206, 208, 210, 212.
Smith, Lieut. G., 118, 189.
Smuts, Lieut.-Gen. J. C., 14, 18, 114, 155.
Snag Trench (Butte de Warlencourt), 92, 93, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101.
Snow, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Thomas, 114.
Société Française du Cap, 21 _n._
Solesmes, 239, 241.
Sollum, 24, 25, 31, 35-8, 40, 41.
Solre-le-Château, 253, 254.
Somme, River, 176;
Battle of the, 47, 48-50, 51-2, 56-8, 86-91, 105, 117, 131, 147,
149.
See also under _Delville Wood_; _Butte de Warlencourt_.
Sorel-le-Grand, 154, 169, 173, 174.
Souter, Lieut.-Col., 34.
South-West Africa, German. See _German S.W. Africa_.
Spanbroekmolen, 203, 206.
Sprenger, Major L. F., 95, 96, 137, 138, 233, 235, 236, 237, 242,
245, 350, 355.
Sprenger, Lieut. A. W., 175.
Spyker, Lieut., 144, 200.
Stapleton, Lieut. P. R., 98, 355.
Steenbecque, 47.
Steenbeek (Ypres), 136.
Steenebeek (Messines), 198, 201.
Steenstraate, 132.
Steenwerck, 201, 202.
Stein, Capt., 175.
Stewart, Brig.-Gen. Ian, 248.
Stewart, Major J. G., 272, 355.
Stock, Colonel P. G., 18, 317, 319, 351.
Stokes, Lieut., 214.
Store Farm (Messines), 207, 208.
Strand, The (Delville Wood), 61, 68, 69, 70.
Strannock, Lieut. W. G., 30.
Suez Canal, 23.
Suvla Bay, 30.
Swayne’s Farm (Messines), 199.
Sweeney, Sec.-Lieut. W. P., 144.
Symmes, Major H. C., 121.
Symons, Capt. T. H., 234, 356.
Tabruk, 39.
Tail Trench (Butte de Warlencourt), 92, 93, 95, 97, 98, 100.
Talus Boise, 52, 54, 55, 72.
Tamplin, Major E. H., 273, 275.
Tanner, Brig.-Gen. W. E. C., commands 2nd Regiment, 18;
at Halazin, 27-30;
at Delville Wood, 60-69, 78, 80, 83 _n._;
at Arras, 117;
commands 8th Brigade, 147;
commands S. African Brigade, 194, 196;
at Battle of the Lys, 197, 204, 207, 208, 210, 211, 212;
in advance to Le Cateau, 237;
at capture of Le Cateau, 245;
with advanced guard, 253-6, 349, 350.
_Tara_, The, 25, 39.
Telegraph Hill (Arras), 118.
Templeux, 170.
Terry, Lieut., 175.
Thackeray, Lieut.-Col. E. F., commands 3rd Regiment, 18;
at Agagia, 33;
at Delville Wood, 69-72, 74, 81;
at Butte de Warlencourt, 94;
at Arras, 117;
at Third Ypres, 136, 143, 349, 350.
Thélus, 109.
Thesiger, Maj.-Gen. George, 44.
Thiepval, 86, 87, 88, 89.
Thieushoek, 219.
Thomas, Lieut. W. F. G., 108, 119, 356.
Thompson, Lieut. W. H., 202.
Thompson, Sergeant D., 224, 369.
Thomson, Capt. A. M., 243.
Tilloy-lès-Mofflaines, 109.
_Tintoretto_, The, 43.
Tobias, Capt., 200.
Tomlinson, Capt. L. W., 41, 62, 137, 236, 350.
Tortille, River, 177, 178.
Tournai, 252.
Training School for Disabled Men, The, 330-1.
Trench Mortar Battery, S. African Brigade, 51, 71, 225.
Trescault, 127.
Trethewy, Sec.-Lieut. B. D., 144.
Tripoli, 23, 41.
Tripp, Lieut.-Col. W. H. L., 20, 276, 277, 350.
Trônes Wood, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 64, 188.
Tudor, Maj.-Gen., 156, 178, 179, 180, 184, 189, 196, 206, 207, 220,
226.
Tulip Cottages (Ypres), 141.
Tyndale-Biscoe, Brig.-Gen., 28.
Ulundi, 19.
Unjeila, 26, 31, 32, 35.
Usigny, 233.
Usmar, Lieut.-Col. G. H., 20, 317, 352.
Uys, Lieut., 221.
Valenciennes, 237, 240, 247, 249, 252.
Vampir Farm (Ypres), 138.
Van Damme Farm (Messines), 207, 208.
Van Deventer, General Sir J. L., 13.
Van Ryneveld, Lieut. (R.F.C.), 30.
Van Ryneveld, Lieut. T. V., 119.
Vaucellette Farm, 168, 169.
Vaux, 176.
Vechtkop, 192.
Vendhuile, 151.
Verdun, 22, 45, 48, 49, 73, 130, 142, 158.
Vesle, River, 231.
Victoria Crosses won by S. Africans, 341-8.
Vierstraat, 206, 209, 211, 212.
Villers, 233.
Villers-Guislain, 162.
Villers-Outréaux, 233, 234.
Vimy, 84, 105, 110, 111, 113, 116, 118.
Vivian, Capt. E. V., 118, 120, 137, 138, 144, 356.
Voormezeele, 211, 212, 213.
Voyennes, 176.
Vraignes, 176.
Wadi Senaab, 25.
Walfisch Bay, 19.
Wallace, Maj.-Gen., 25, 26, 27, 30.
Walsh, Capt. J. D., 30.
Walsh, Lieut. F. G., 85, 356.
Wanquetin, 103.
War, S. African (1899-1902), 19, 26;
Zulu, 19.
Ward, Capt. A. E., 175, 200, 352, 356.
Ward, Major C. P., 276, 350.
Warnave, River, 196.
Waterend Farm, 141.
Waterloo, Battle of, 114, 252.
Waterlot Farm, 64.
Watson, Maj.-Gen., 41.
Watts, Lieut.-Gen. Sir H. E., 176, 177.
Webb, Lieut. M., 174.
Webber, Major, 126.
Wellington, Duke of, 252.
Welsh, Capt. T., 76-7, 126, 356.
Wepener, 19.
Western Frontier Force, The (Egypt), 25, 30.
Westminster, Major the Duke of, 33, 38, 40.
Whelan, Lieut. M. E., 243, 356.
Williams, Sec.-Lieut. D. A., 144.
Wilson, Field-Marshal Sir Henry, 83.
Windhoek, 14.
Wulverghem, 202, 203, 204, 208.
Wynberg, 20.
Wytschaete, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, 202, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208,
209, 210.
Yeomanry, Bucks (Royal Bucks Hussars), 28, 31, 34;
Dorset, 28, 31, 34, 35, 36;
Herts, 28;
Duke of Lancaster’s, 28.
Young, Lieut. A., 82, 100.
Young, Lieut.-Col., 174, 189, 194.
Ypres, 146, 218, 221, 231;
First Battle of, 74, 142, 158, 209;
Third Battle of, 138-47, 248, 258;
Salient, 44, 73, 105, 130, 131, 133, 142, 200.
Ypres-Comines Canal, 212.
Zandvoorde, 132.
Zevenkote, 136, 141.
Zillebeke, 132.
Zonnebeke, 136, 146.
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