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Title: The Greek orators
Author: John Frederic Dobson
Release date: December 17, 2024 [eBook #74925]
Language: English
Original publication: London: Methuen & co. ltd
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THE GREEK ORATORS
THE
GREEK ORATORS
BY
J. F. DOBSON, M. A.
TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY
OF BRISTOL
METHUEN & CO. LTD.
36 ESSEX STREET W.C.
LONDON
_First Published in 1919_
PREFACE
The object of this book is to provide a reasonably short account of
the works of the Orators and to give a general idea of the style of
each. It seemed to me at the outset that this object could be best
attained, not by applying methods of scientific analysis, but by giving
numerous quotations from the speeches to emphasise the points which I
wished to bring out. I have therefore avoided as far as possible the
technicalities of criticism, and illustrated my remarks by translations
of characteristic passages, hoping thus to make my work easily accessible
not only to classical students, but also to others who, while generally
interested in the Classics, have not the time or the capacity to study
them in the original.
I have no idea of superseding the standard works on the subject, such
as Jebb’s _Attic Orators_ and Blass’ _Attische Beredsamkeit_, which
deal with the subject more fully and from a somewhat different point of
view. No student of the Orators can afford to neglect the works of these
scholars, but though I have frequently consulted them, I have by no
means considered myself bound by their opinions; in fact, my chief claim
to consideration is that my own judgments are entirely independent of
authority, and are based directly upon a first-hand study of the extant
writings of the Orators.
The chief work, in addition to the two above mentioned, to which I am
indebted is Croiset’s _Histoire de la Littérature Grecque_.
* * * * *
I have to thank Balliol College and the Clarendon Press for permission to
print extracts from Jowett’s _Plato_.
J. F. DOBSON
BRISTOL, _July 1919_
CONTENTS
CHAP. PAGE
I. THE BEGINNINGS OF ORATORY 1
II. ANTIPHON 19
III. THRASYMACHUS—ANDOCIDES 50
IV. LYSIAS 74
V. ISAEUS 103
VI. ISOCRATES 126
VII. MINOR RHETORICIANS 160
VIII. AESCHINES 163
IX. DEMOSTHENES 199
X. PHOCION, DEMADES, PYTHEAS 268
XI. LYCURGUS, HYPERIDES, DINARCHUS 271
XII. THE DECLINE OF ORATORY 308
INDEX 315
THE GREEK ORATORS
CHAPTER I
THE BEGINNINGS OF ORATORY
§ 1
Oratory is one of the earliest necessities of society; as soon as men
were organised on terms of equality for corporate action, there must have
been occasions when opinions might differ as to the best course to be
pursued, and, if there were no inspired king whose unquestioned authority
could impose his will, the majority must decide whether to flee or to
fight, to kill or to keep alive. Thus different plans must be discussed,
and, in cases where opinion was evenly balanced, that side would prevail
which could state its views most convincingly; and so the need for
deliberative oratory arose.
With the Greeks oratory was instinctive; in the earliest semi-historical
records that we possess, eloquence is found to be a gift prized not
less highly than valour in battle; the kings and princes are not only
‘renowned for their power,’ but are ‘leaders of the people by their
counsels, ... wise and eloquent in their instructions’; strength and
courage are the property of all, but the real leaders must be the
counsellors, βουλήφοροι ἄνδρες. Nestor, who is almost past the age for
fighting, is honoured among the first for his eloquence, and whereas
Achilles shares with many other warriors the glories of the _Iliad_,
Odysseus, fertile in counsel, is the chief subject of an entire poem. The
speech of Phœnix in the ninth book of the _Iliad_ shows us the ideals
which were aimed at in the education of a prince. He tells how he trained
the young Achilles to be a ‘speaker of words and a doer of deeds’;[1]
and Achilles, as we know him, well justified this training. The leading
characters in the Homeric poems are already fluent orators, able and
ready to debate intelligently on any concrete subject, and, moreover, to
seek guidance from general principles. Nestor makes frequent appeals to
historical precedent; Phœnix introduces allegorical illustration;[2] many
speakers refer to the sanctity of law and custom; though the particular
case is foremost in the mind, generalisations of various kinds are by
no means infrequent. The Homeric counsellor can urge his own arguments
and rebut those of his opponent with a natural facility of speech and
readiness of invective which even a polished wielder of personalities
like Demosthenes might envy.
From the spontaneous outpourings of Achilles and his peers to the studied
artifice of Lysias and Demosthenes is a long journey through unknown
country, and it is obvious that no definite course of development can be
traced; but a reference to Homer is of twofold importance. In the first
place, it may indicate that Greek oratory was obviously of native growth,
since the germs of it are to be found in the earliest annals; secondly,
Homer was studied with such devout reverence not only by the Athenian
orators themselves but by their immediate literary predecessors, the
cosmopolitan Sophists and the rhetoricians of Sicily, that his influence
may have been greater than would at first sight seem probable.
§ 2
The records of eloquence may be studied from various points of view,
which may be roughly classified under the headings ‘literary’ and
‘practical,’ though it is not always easy to keep the elements distinct.
A stylistic study of the writings of the Athenian orators must find a
place in any systematic work on the development of Attic prose, but in
a work like the present, which professes to deal with orators only,
such a study cannot be carried out with any attempt at completeness;
thus, while it may be possible to discuss the influence of Thucydides
or Plato on Demosthenes, there will be no room to consider how far the
historian himself may have been influenced directly by Antiphon, or the
philosopher by Gorgias, though a cursory indication may be given that
such influences were at work. When, however, we regard rhetoric not
for its literary value but as a practical art, our task becomes more
feasible; in literature there are many eddies and cross-currents, but in
oratory, especially of the forensic type, there is more uniformity of
flow. Antiphon and Demosthenes had, to a great extent, similar ground
to traverse, similar obstacles to overcome or circumvent; and a study
of their different methods of approaching like problems may give some
reasonable and interesting results which will be a contribution to the
history of the ‘Art of Persuasion.’ Even here we shall find difficulties,
for one who is reckoned among the greatest orators, Isocrates, is known
not to have been practical at all in the sense in which Demosthenes was;
his so-called speeches were never meant to be delivered, and depended for
their efficacy far more on their literary style than on their practical
characteristics. There is, perhaps, only one great factor which is common
to all orators alike; they all give us, both directly and indirectly,
invaluable materials for the study of Athenian history, information with
regard both to public and private life and national character. While the
speeches before the assembly and in public causes increase our historical
knowledge in the wider sense, the private speeches, often dealing with
matters of the utmost triviality, provide a miscellaneous store of
information on domestic matters only comparable to that more recently
recovered from the _papyri_ of Egypt.
§ 3
It would seem that constitutional liberty and a strong civic feeling are
indispensable as a basis for the growth of oratory. Such a statement
must be made with caution, as it leaves out of account a thousand
influences which may have been operative; but we have no records of
oratory at Athens before the establishment of the democracy, and after
the limitation of Athenian influence due to the spread of Hellenism under
Alexander, oratory very rapidly declined.
The imagination of Herodotus gives us, in the debates of the Persian
court, some idea of what he conceived the oratory of an earlier age
to be; but as he transferred the ideas of his own country to another,
without any serious attempt at realism, such speeches are of little
value to us. Thucydides again inserted speeches freely into his history,
but these, he candidly admits, are not authentic records but imaginary
reconstructions. Nevertheless, it is chiefly on Thucydides that we must
draw for information about the eloquence of the early statesmen of the
democracy.
* * * * *
Themistocles has left behind him some reputation as a speaker. Herodotus
indicates how he harangued the Greeks before the battle of Salamis;[3]
Thucydides commends him for ability in explaining his policy,[4] and the
author of the pseudo-Lysian _Epitaphios_ names him as ‘equally capable
in speech, decision, and action.’[5] Beyond these meagre notices, and a
reference to his eloquence in Cicero,[6] we have nothing earlier than
Plutarch,[7] who tells us that from early youth he took an interest in
the practice of speech-making, and that he studied under a Sophist,
Mnesiphilus, who apparently taught him something of the science of
statesmanship. Plutarch records his answer to Eurybiadas, who had taunted
him in the council of allies with being a man without a city—since Athens
was evacuated—and therefore not entitled to the right of speech:
‘We, villain, have left our houses and our walls, disdaining to
be slaves for the sake of these lifeless things; but still we
have a city—the greatest of Greek cities—in our fleet of 200
triremes, which now are ready to help you if you care to be
saved by their aid; but if you go away and betray us a second
time, the Greek world shall forthwith learn that the Athenians
possess a free city and a country no worse than the one they
have lost.’[8]
Another fragment is preserved by Plutarch, an address to Xerxes in quite
a different vein, containing an elaborate metaphor which may have been
thought suited to the Oriental mind:
‘The speech of man is like to a piece of cunning embroidery,
for both when unrolled display their patterns, but when folded
up conceal them.’[9]
Many others of his sayings are chronicled; they are more or less
apocryphal, as his retort to the man of Seriphos, who hinted that
Themistocles owed his greatness to the fact that his city was great.
‘You, Themistocles, would never have been famous if you had been a
Seriphian’—‘Nor would you, if you had been an Athenian.’[10] His
interpretation of the oracle, explaining ‘wooden walls’ as ships, shows
the man ready at need like Odysseus; and the impression that we form
of him from the very slight indications which we possess, is of a man
always clear and plausible in his statements, never at a loss for an
explanation, and perhaps rather a good debater than an orator.
Of Pericles, who represents the following generation, we have a clearer
picture. We know more about his private life and the associates who
influenced his opinions. His earliest instructors were the musicians
Damon and Pythoclides, of whom the former remained his intimate friend
through life,[11] and, if we believe Plutarch, was capable of giving
him advice even on questions of statesmanship.[12] The friendship of
Anaxagoras was doubtless a powerful influence, as Plato affirms in a
well-known passage of the _Phaedrus_:[13]
‘All the arts require discussion and high speculation about
the truths of nature; hence come loftiness of thought and
completeness of execution. And this, as I conceive, was the
quality which, in addition to his natural gifts, Pericles
acquired from his intercourse with Anaxagoras.... He was thus
imbued with the higher philosophy ... and applied what suited
his purpose to the art of speaking.’
He is said also to have been acquainted with Zeno of Elea, an
accomplished dialectician, and with the great Sophist Protagoras.
Plutarch represents him as amusing himself by discussing with Protagoras
a question which is the theme of one of Antiphon’s tetralogies—a man
in a gymnasium accidentally kills another with a javelin: who is to
blame?[14] In Xenophon’s _Memorabilia_[15] we find him engaged in
sophistical discussion with his young nephew Alcibiades, who, fresh from
the rhetorical schools, was apparently his superior in hair-splitting
argument.
Thucydides puts three speeches into the mouth of Pericles; though the
language is that of the historian, some of the thoughts may be those of
the statesman. We seem to recognise his high intelligence, developed by
philosophical training, and the loftiness and effectiveness of which
Plato speaks.[16]
The comic poet Eupolis gives us a picture from a different point of view:
A. ‘Whenever at Council he rose in his place
That powerful speaker—so hot was the pace—
Could give other runners three yards in the race.’
B. ‘His speed I admit; in addition to that
A mysterious spell on his lips ever sate:
He charmed; and alone of the orators he
Left something behind, like the sting of a bee.’[17]
We know from Thucydides the extent of his influence over the people.
He was no demagogue in the vulgar sense; they knew him to be sincere
and incorruptible. He was never deterred by the unpopularity of his
policy; he would lead the people rather than submit to be led by them;
he could abase their spirits when they were unduly elated, or raise
them to confidence when unseasonably disheartened.[18] At the height
of his career his eloquence was the more effective because it was
rarely displayed; minor matters in the assembly were transacted by his
subordinates; when Pericles himself arose to speak it was a signal that
a matter of national importance was to be debated, and his appearance
roused a confident expectation that the treatment would be worthy of
the subject.[19] The epithet ‘Olympian,’ applied to him originally in
sarcasm, was felt to be more truly applicable than its originator,
perhaps, intended. His eloquence was a noble exposition of the fine
intelligence and high character which first claimed a hearing.
Though we have no verbal record of his speeches, a few of his phrases
stuck in the memory of chroniclers. Aegina was to him ‘the eye-sore of
the Piraeus’—it spoiled the view from the Athenian harbour.[20] The
Samians, who submitted very reluctantly to the blessings of Athenian
civilization, are like ‘babies that cry when you give them their pap,
but take it all the same’;[21] and Boeotia, disintegrated by civil
war, is like an oak split by oaken wedges.[22] His finest simile—not,
perhaps, original, since Herodotus attributes a similar phrase to Gelon,
when Greece refused his invaluable assistance—occurred, according to
Aristotle, in a funeral speech:
‘The city has lost its Youth; it is as though the year had lost
its Spring.’[23]
§ 4
The eloquence of these earlier statesmen, though significant of the
tendency of the Attic genius, is an isolated phenomenon. It has no
bearing on the development of Athenian oratory. We have now to consider
two direct influences, that of the Sophists and that of the early
rhetoricians of Sicily.
In the middle of the fifth century B.C.,—when in turn the unrestricted
imagination of the Ionian philosophers had failed to explain the riddle
of existence on physical grounds, the metaphysical Parmenides had denied
the possibility of accurate knowledge, and Zeno, the dialectician
of Elea, had reduced himself to dumbness by the conclusion that not
only knowledge is impossible but even grammatical predication is
unjustifiable, for you cannot say that one thing is another, or like
things unlike,—Philosophy fell somewhat into disrepute. A spirit of
scepticism spread over the Greek world, and the greatest thinkers,
foiled In their attempts to discover the higher truths, turned their
attention to the practical side of education. In various cities of
Greater Greece there arose men of high intellectual attainment,
conveniently classed together under the title of _Sophists_ (educators),
who, neglecting abstract questions, undertook to prepare men for the
higher walks of civic life by instruction of various kinds. The greatest,
of these, Protagoras of Abdera, expressed his contempt for philosophy in
the well-known dictum, ‘Man is the measure of all things—of what is, that
it is; and of what is not, that it is not.’ He therefore devoted himself
to the study of literature, and, in particular, of Homer. He attained
great popularity; in the course of long travels throughout the Greek
world, he made several visits to Athens, where he knew Pericles. Plato,
in the dialogue named after him, gives us some idea of the fascination
which his personality exercised over the young men of Athens, and,
indeed, ‘Sophistry’ as a whole had a tremendous popularity. All young
men of good family and position, who aspired to political life, flocked
to hear the lectures of the Sophists. Alcibiades, Critias, and others
undoubtedly owed to this movement much of their political ability.
The morality of sophistry has been much discussed. The comic poets
represent it as the chief instrument for the destruction of the ancient
ideals of conduct. Plato, though he recognized its humanistic value and
spoke with appreciation of several individual teachers, blamed their
teaching as a whole. Certainly the claim of Protagoras, that he could
make the worse cause appear the better, laid him particularly open to
attack. Protagoras made some elementary studies in grammar, presumably
as a basis for logic. His method of teaching was apparently by example.
In the dialogue of Plato he gives a demonstration of how a given subject
should be discussed: his discourse consists first of a ‘myth,’ then a
continuous speech, finally a criticism on a poetical quotation. We may
suppose that this is a reasonable imitation of his methods. His pupils
committed to memory such speeches, or summaries of them, on various
subjects, and were thus moderately well equipped for purposes of general
debate.
Prodicus of Ceos, who seems to have been many years younger than
Protagoras,[24] was more concerned with moral philosophy than with
dialectical exercises. He paid the greatest attention in all his teaching
to ὀρθοέπεια, the correct use of words, _i.e._ the distinction of meaning
between words which in the popular language have come to be treated as
synonymous.[25] This precision may have been carried to the point of
pedantry, but as the correct use of terms is an important element in
prose style, his studies deserve consideration.
Hippias of Elis is of less importance. He was ready to discourse on any
subject under the sun, and could teach his pupils a similar glibness;
abundance of words was made to conceal a lack of ideas.
§ 5
Cicero has preserved, from Aristotle, a statement that forensic rhetoric
came to its birth at Syracuse, when, after the expulsion of the tyrants
in 465 B.C., many families, whose property had been confiscated by them,
tried to re-establish their claims.[26] Certainly Corax, the founder of
rhetoric, was teaching about the year 466 B.C., and composed a τέχνη,
or handbook of rhetorical principles.[27] He was followed by his pupil
Tisias, who also wrote a treatise which Aristotle pronounced to be better
than his master’s, and was in turn soon superseded by a better one.[28]
Both Corax and Tisias attached great importance to εἰκός (probability) as
a means of convincing a jury. A sample of the use of this argument from
the work of Corax is the case of the man charged with assault, who denies
the charge and says, ‘It is obvious to you that I am weak in body, while
he is strong; it is therefore inherently improbable that I should have
dared to attack him.’ The argument can of course be turned the other way
by the prosecutor—‘the defendant is weak in body, and thought that on
that account no one would suspect him of violence.’ We shall find that
this argument from εἰκότα is very characteristic of the orator Antiphon;
it occurs in his court speeches as well as in his tetralogies, which are
model exercises. It seems, indeed, that he almost preferred this kind of
argument to actual proof, even when evidence was available.[29] Tisias
improved on the theme of Corax; supposing that a feeble but brave man has
attacked a strong one who is a coward, he suggests that both should tell
lies in court. The coward will not like to admit his cowardice, and will
say that he was attacked by more than one man. The culprit will prove
this to be a lie, and will then fall back on the argument of Corax, ‘I
am weak and he is strong; I could not have assaulted or robbed him,’—and
so on.[30]
An anecdote of these two rhetoricians further indicates the slipperiness
of the ground on which they walked.[31] Tisias took lessons from Corax
on condition that he should pay the fee only if he won his first case in
court. After some lapse of time Corax grew impatient for his money, and
finally brought an action—the first case, as it happened, on which Tisias
was ever engaged. Corax asserted, ‘If I win the case, I get my money by
the verdict; if I lose it, I claim payment by our contract.’ ‘No,’ said
Tisias, ‘if I win, I don’t pay, and if I lose I don’t pay.’ The court
dismissed the case with the remark, ‘A bad _crow_ lays bad eggs’;[32]
and this was obviously to the advantage of the younger man, who had nine
points of the law on his side.
Though no writings of either are preserved, we can form an idea of
their methods. They were wholly immoral or non-moral, and perversely
sophistical. The plausible was preferred to the true, and the one
object was to win the case. Their method of teaching was, according to
Aristotle, ‘quick but unscientific,’[33] and consisted of making the
pupil learn by heart a large number of ‘commonplace’ topics and standard
arguments suitable to all kinds of legal processes. They do not appear to
have paid any attention to style on the literary side.
§ 6
Gorgias of Leontini, a contemporary of Protagoras, started out, like the
Sophist, from the position that nothing can be known, and the pursuit
of philosophy is a ploughing of the sand. He is said to have been a
pupil of Tisias, and occupies a place between the early rhetoricians
and the Sophists usually so-called. Like the former, he studied and
taught oratory, but whereas they were only concerned with the struggle
for mastery in debate, he entertained, like Protagoras, a broad view
of education, and, while continuing to regard rhetoric as the art of
persuasion,[34] attached more attention to the artistic side than any
other educator had done. He became the first conscious artist in prose
style.
Like the other Sophists he travelled from town to town giving displays
of his art, and gained riches which he spent freely.[35] In 427 B.C. he
came to Athens as an ambassador from his native city,[36] and produced
a remarkable impression on his hearers, not only the multitude before
whom he spoke, but the highly educated class who could appreciate his
technique. Thucydides owed something to him, and the poet Antiphon showed
traces of his influence.[37] We hear of his sojourn at Larissa, where
the Thessalians, in admiration, coined from his name the word which
Philostratus uses to express his exuberant style.[38]
His first work is said to have been a sceptical treatise on Nature, or
the Non-existent.[39] This was followed by a certain number of speeches,
the most famous of which was the _Olympiac_, in which, like Isocrates at
a later date, he urged on the Greeks the necessity of union. The _Funeral
Oration_, to which we shall recur, is supposed to have been delivered
at Athens, but this can hardly have been the case, as such speeches
were regularly delivered by prominent Athenian statesmen, and there
would be no occasion for calling in a foreigner. A _Pythian_ speech and
various _Encomia_ are recorded; some on mythical characters, which may be
regarded as mere exercises, some on real people, as the Eleans.[40] He
seems not to have written speeches for the law-courts; his tendency, as
in his personal habits, so in his speech, was towards display, and so he
originated the style of oratory known as epideictic, which Isocrates in a
subsequent age was destined to bring to perfection. Though an Ionian by
birth, he instinctively recognized the great possibilities of the Attic
dialect, and chose it as his medium of expression; it was not, however,
the Attic of everyday life, but a language enriched by the exuberance of
a poetical imagination. We possess of his actual work only one noteworthy
extract from the _Funeral Speech_; but from this, joined to a few
isolated criticisms and phrases preserved by commentators, as well as
from the language ascribed by Plato to his imitator Agathon,[41] we can
form some idea of his pompous exaggerations.
He was much addicted to the substitution of rare expressions—γλῶτται,
as the Greek critics called them—for the ordinary forms of speech. His
language abounded in archaic and poetical words, striking metaphors
and unusual compounds. He frequently employed neuter adjectives and
participles in preference to the corresponding abstract nouns; he liked
to use a verbal noun accompanied by an auxiliary in places where a simple
verb would be naturally employed. Finally, though he could not aspire
to composition in elaborate periods like Isocrates or Demosthenes, he
developed the use of antithesis, word answering to word and clause to
clause, pointing his antithetical style not only by the frequent use
of μὲν and δέ, but by the use of assonance at the ends of clauses,
corresponding forms of verbs in similar positions, and by some attention
to rhythm and equality of syllabic value in contrasted clauses.
His chief fault was excess; he was a pioneer in expression, and did very
valuable work; but he lacked a sense of proportion. The result is that
the page of his genuine work which we possess reads like a parody of
style, as every characteristic is carried to extreme. But the teacher
must indulge in exaggeration, or the pupil will not grasp his points, and
the work of Gorgias has a considerable value. It was the first attempt
to form a style, and his followers learned partly by imitation, partly
by avoiding the faults which were too prominent. The very fact that the
fragment preserved is possibly not in his best style makes it the easier
to observe his influence on his successors—Antiphon, Thucydides, and many
subsequent writers of artistic prose.
In addition to the speeches already mentioned we possess two _encomia_ on
Helen and Palamedes, which are attributed to him. Their authenticity is
very doubtful, but Blass, who discussed the question very thoroughly in
his _Attic Orators_ without coming to a conviction, has since decided in
favour of their genuineness.[42] This is entirely a matter of personal
opinion; but, even if not genuine, they are probably able imitations of
the Gorgian style and method.
The fragment from the _Epitaphios_ can hardly be translated in a way that
will give a proper idea of its affectations, but as some notion of its
most striking faults may be formed from an English version, some extracts
are added. In the Greek in some places there seems to be very little
sense, and what there is has been entirely subordinated to the sound:
‘What quality was there absent in these men which ought in
men to be present? And what was there present that should not
be present? May I have the power to speak as I would, and
the will to speak as I should, avoiding the jealousy of gods
and escaping the envy of men. For these were divine in their
valour, though human in their mortality; often preferring mild
equity to stern justice, and often the uprightness of reasoning
to the strictness of the laws, considering that the most divine
and universal law is this—to speak, to omit, and to do the
proper thing at the proper time. Two duties above all they
practised, strength of mind and strength of body; the one in
deliberation, the other in execution; tenders of those who by
injustice were unfortunate, punishers of those who by injustice
were fortunate.... And accordingly, though they have died, our
yearning died not with them, but immortal over these bodies not
immortal it lives when they live no more.’
Contrast and parallelism are rampant throughout this incredible piece
of bombast, which in addition to the curious jingles produced by such
words as γνώμην καὶ ῥώμην; δυστυχούντων, εὐτυχούντων, shows a poetical
vocabulary in such phrases as ἔμφυτος Ἄρης, ‘the Mars that is born in
them,’ ἐνόπλιος ἔρις, ‘embattled strife,’ and φιλόκαλος εἰρήνη, ‘peace
that loves the arts.’ Antiphon and Thucydides suffered severely from the
contagion of this style, and a conscious imitator, the author of the
pseudo-Lysian _Epitaphios_, has reproduced its florid monotony.
CHAPTER II
ANTIPHON
§ 1
Antiphon is said to have been almost contemporary with Gorgias, but a
little younger.[43] He was born about 480 B.C. He took no part in public
life, perhaps disdaining to serve the democracy owing to his strong
aristocratic prejudices. He wrote many speeches for others, but himself
never spoke in the assembly and very rarely in the public courts. Most of
his speeches were written for private individuals, but we have a record
on one ‘_about the tribute of Samothrace_,’ apparently composed on behalf
of that community when appealing against their assessment. Having lived
in comparative obscurity all his life, he stepped suddenly into brilliant
light in 411 B.C., the year of the revolution of the Four Hundred.
According to Thucydides his was the brain which had planned all the
details of this anti-democratic conspiracy. The historian pays a striking
tribute to his ability as an organiser:
‘It was Pisander who proposed this motion and in general took
the most active steps for the subversion of the democracy; but
the one who contrived the whole plot and the details of its
working and who had given his attention to it longest was
Antiphon, a man who must be placed in the first rank for his
character, his ingenuity, and his powers of expression. He never
put himself forward in the assembly, nor appeared, from choice,
at any trial in the courts, but lay under the people’s suspicion
owing to a reputation for cleverness. He was, however, more
capable than any other man of giving assistance to anybody who
consulted him with regard to a case either in the courts or the
assembly. Eventually, when the Four Hundred suffered reverse and
were being harshly treated by the democracy, he was himself
brought to trial, for participation in the revolution, and is
known to have made the finest defence ever on record as having
been delivered by a man on trial for his life.’[44]
During the short rule of the Four Hundred he seems to have been one
of the leaders of the extreme party, as opposed to the followers of
Theramenes, who advocated measures of conciliation. He went, with
Phrynichus and eight other envoys, to negotiate peace with Sparta in
the hope of thus securing the oligarchical government. Shortly after
the failure of this embassy came the murder of Phrynichus and the fall
of the Four Hundred, and the democracy was ready for revenge. Most of
the ringleaders fled to Deceleia; Antiphon and Archeptolemus remained,
were prosecuted for treason to the people, condemned and executed.
Their property was confiscated, their houses razed to the ground, their
descendants disfranchised for all time, and their bodies refused burial
in the soil of Athens or any of her allies.
On the occasion of his trial the orator, who had spent the best years
of his life in pleading by the lips of others in causes which did not
interest him, justified his renown and far surpassed all expectation,
delivering what was, in Thucydides’ opinion, the finest speech of its
kind ever heard up to that time. Aristotle preserves an anecdote telling
how the poet Agathon congratulated the condemned man on his brilliant
effort, and Antiphon replied that ‘he would rather have satisfied one
man of taste than any number of common people’—οἱ τυγχάνοντες, a fine
aristocratic term for great Athenian people.[45]
§ 2
At the time when Antiphon composed his speeches, Attic prose had not
settled down into any fixed forms. The first of the orators was therefore
an explorer in language; he was not hampered by traditions, and this
freedom was an advantage; but on the other hand, the insufficiency of
models threw him back entirely on his own resources.
Of his predecessors in prose-writing, the early historians were of
no account as stylists. Herodotus wrote in a foreign dialect and a
discursive colloquial manner which was unsuited to the needs of oratory;
Gorgias, indeed, used the Attic dialect, but had hindered the growth
of prose by a too copious use of florid poetical expression. Antiphon,
therefore, had little to guide him, and we should expect to find in his
work the imperfections which are natural in the experimental stage of any
art.
So few of his works remain that we cannot trace any development in his
style; it is only possible to guess at certain influences which may have
helped to form it.
He must have been familiar with the methods of the best speakers in
the assembly and the law-courts of the Periclean age; without great
experience of procedure in both he could not have hoped for any success
as a speech-writer. He must have been versed in the theories of the
great Sophists, such as Protagoras and, more particularly, Gorgias; and
the model discourses which they and others composed for their pupils’
instruction were, no doubt, accessible to him. The general influence of
Sophistry is, however, to be traced more in the nature of his arguments
than in his style.[46]
§ 3
As regards vocabulary, we are struck at once by the fact that Antiphon
uses many words which, apart from their occurrence in these speeches,
would be classed as rare or poetical; words, that is, which a maturer
prose-style was inclined to reject. This was partly the result of
circumstances; as has been noted, there was no canon of style and
vocabulary, and the influence of Gorgias had been rather to confuse
than to distinguish the dictions of prose and poetry, while the great
importance attached to poetry in the sophistical education of the time
increased the difficulties for any experimental writer who was unwilling
to resort to the colloquial language. In many cases, however, we may
give Antiphon credit for intention in the deliberate use of poetical
words: the ‘austere’ style ‘is wont to expand itself,’ says Dionysius,
‘by means of big spacious words’;[47] and a store of such words is to be
found in the poets, notably Aeschylus.[48]
Antiphon is not singular among prose writers in introducing poetical
words; Plato, the greatest master of Attic prose, is in some cases more
poetical than the poets themselves, though his genius is sufficient to
obviate any sense of harshness or incongruity. But to an orator such
harshness might on occasion be a positive advantage for producing a
particular effect; an unusual word must, at the worst, attract attention;
at the best it lends dignity to an otherwise pedestrian sentence.
Dionysius classed Antiphon and Aeschylus together as masters of the
‘austere’ style, and some of the orator’s words and phrases, quite apart
from his treatment of his subjects, have a certain touch of Aeschylean
majesty.
Besides poetical words—words which may, as we see, have been used
intentionally, in preference to their ordinary equivalents in everyday
speech—he employs, for the same reasons, a certain number of unusual
words and forms not necessarily poetical. Every conscious stylist makes
experiments: some of his innovations may become current coin; others may
never pass into general circulation, but remain unused until, perhaps,
after many generations an archæologist discovers and uses the hoard.[49]
A few familiar words occur in unusual forms which are generally regarded
as un-Attic; unless they are to be removed by emendation, we must suppose
that they were used intentionally to give an archaic tone.[50]
Another noticeable characteristic of Antiphon’s language is the frequent
employment of circumlocutions both for verbs and nouns; a neuter
participle or adjective in combination with the definite article does
duty as a substantive, while a verbal noun joined to an auxiliary takes
the place of a verb. Thus, by an artifice which becomes very common in
later writers, ‘the beautiful’ is used as a synonym for the abstract
noun ‘beauty,’ and to ‘be judges of the truth’ is substituted for ‘judge
the truth.’ These artificialities are often to be noticed in Thucydides,
especially in the speeches, and are probably derived from Gorgias, who
seems to have instituted the fashion.[51]
§ 4
Aristotle and subsequent critics distinguish, in prose, the running style
(εἰρομένη λέξις) and the periodic (περιοδική). The characteristic of the
former is that a sentence consists of a succession of clauses loosely
strung together (εἴρω), like a row of beads; generally by τε, δέ and
other copulae; the sentence begins and ends with no definite plan, and
may be of any length. In the word _period_ (circuit) the metaphor is
rather that of a hoop; the sentence does not stretch out indefinitely in
a straight line, but after a certain time bends back on itself so that
the end is joined to the beginning. It must, according to Aristotle,[52]
be of limited length, not longer than can be taken in at a glance or
uttered in one breath, and have a definitely marked beginning and end.[53]
Aristotle finds the loose, running style tedious, because it has no
artistic limit of length, and never gets to an end until it has finished
what it has to say. To us it seems to have this slight advantage, that
it can always stop when it has said what it means, and has no temptation
to plunge itself into antithesis or lose its way at the cross-roads
of chiasmus before it arrives at its destination; for though, in the
periodic style, the end of the sense should ideally coincide with the
end of the period, there are in practice many instances where the sense
is fully expressed and the sentence might end before the ‘circuit’ is
artistically complete.
The baldest examples of the ‘strung together’ style must be sought in the
fragments of the early historians; but Herodotus is sufficiently near to
them to provide us with an object-lesson.
Take, for instance, the following:
‘When Ardys had reigned forty-nine years, Sadyattes his son
succeeded him, and he reigned twelve years, and Alyattes
succeeded Sadyattes. And he made war on Cyaxares, the
descendant of Deioces, and the Medes, and drove the Cimmerians
out of Asia and took Smyrna, a colony of Colophon, and attacked
Clazomenae. Here he had not the success he desired, but met
with grave disaster. And during his reign he did other
noteworthy deeds, as follows. He fought with the Milesians ...’
etc., etc.[54]
Yet even Herodotus, the most obvious exponent of the loose style, shows
a tendency towards the greater compression of periodic writing; this
tendency is at times strongly marked, _e.g._ in the speeches of the
Persian nobles in debate.[55] Here there is a continual movement towards
the balance of clauses; it is very far from the harmonious structure of
Isocrates, and is perhaps unconscious, but the elements of the periodic
style are there.
The particular faculty of this latter style is that it can be
more emphatic and precise than the other. It must be concentrated
(κατεστραμμένη)[56] if the sentence is to be of moderate length; it
tries, as Dionysius says, ‘to pack the thoughts close together, and bring
them out compactly.’[57]
These qualities, concentration of thought and preciseness of expression,
are essential for a pleader in the courts, and so it was not unnatural
that the development of the periodic style should coincide at Athens with
the rise of forensic oratory. Antiphon, the first practical pleader on
scientific lines, is also the earliest of extant writers known to have
been a careful student of periodic expression.
It must not be supposed that all his work consisted of periods carefully
balanced: on the one hand, perfection could not be attained at the
first onset; many of the sentences are crude; in some cases there is a
weakness of emphasis due to imperfect mastery of the form; on the other
hand, there are cases where the style is freer and more analogous to
the simple fluency of the εἰρομένη λέξις. The plain fact is that the
method of Herodotus is the most appropriate for telling a straightforward
narrative from one point of view only; while the periodic style comes
spontaneously into being for purposes of criticism, or where we contrast
what is with what might have been; or of debate, where we put up
alternatives side by side with the object of choosing between them.
The first object of history, to the mind of Herodotus, is to tell a
story; and Herodotus mostly keeps this end in view. Thucydides in some
parts of his narrative does the same, but whereas he has a greater
tendency to consider each event not by itself but in relation to other
circumstances, such as the motives for the action, its effects and
influences, he is often periodic even in narrative. He is still more so
in speeches. The object of a deliberative speech is not usually to tell
a plain story but to produce a highly-coloured one; it mentions facts
chiefly with the object of criticizing them and drawing an inference or a
moral.
If this is true of the speeches in Thucydides, it must be still more
applicable to those of a forensic orator. In Antiphon we find short
passages in the simple narrative style—for instance, in the statement
of facts in the _Herodes_ case; but a short section of this nature is
followed by criticism and argument expressed in the more artificial
period. This is inevitable; there is no time to spend on long narratives.
Closely connected with the desire for a periodic style is the tendency
to frequent use of verbal antithesis, an artistic figure which provides
a happy means of completing the period and the sense. It is useful
because the second part of the antithesis supplies the reader or hearer
with something which he is already expecting. It is the application in
practice of a familiar psychological law of association by contrary
ideas. Such contrast is emphasized in Greek by the common use of the
particles μέν and δέ, and is of unnecessarily frequent occurrence in
Athenian writers. All readers of Thucydides will remember that author’s
craving for the contrast between ‘word and deed.’ In judicial rhetoric
this kind of opposition must inevitably occur very often. From the nature
of things each speaker will want to insist on his own honesty and the
dishonesty of his opponents; the truth which he is telling as opposed to
their lies, and to contrast the appearances, which seem so black against
him, with the transparent whiteness of his character as revealed by a
true account of the case. But Antiphon, like the speakers in Thucydides,
carries this use of antithesis too far, for a sentence which contains too
many contrasted ideas is difficult to follow, and so loses force.
A fair example may be taken from the third speech of the second tetralogy:
‘I, who have done nothing wrong, but have suffered grievously
and cruelly already, and now suffer still more cruelly not
from the words but the acts of my adversary, throw myself
upon your mercy, Gentlemen—you who are avengers of impiety
but discriminators of piety—and implore you, in view of plain
facts, not to be over-persuaded by a malicious precision of
speech, and so consider the true explanation of the deed to be
false; for his statement has been made with more plausibility
than truth; mine will be made without guile, though at the same
time without force.’
This outburst is part of a sentence in which the prosecutor expresses his
indignation that the opponent whom he has accused of murder has had the
audacity to defend himself at some length.
One more example—from the speech on the charge of poisoning—is almost
ridiculous.
‘Those whose duty it was to play the part of avengers of the
dead and my helpers, have played the part of murderers of the
dead, and established themselves as my adversaries.’
§ 5
All speakers must consider the sound of their sentences as well as
their grammatical structure, and among all careful writers we find that
attention is paid to the balance of clauses. Some orators go further than
this; they emphasize contrasts or parallels by the repetition of similar
sounds and even show a preference for certain rhythms, it being a maxim
of late rhetoricians that prose, though not strictly metrical in the same
way as verse, should possess a characteristic rhythm of its own.
Some authors go so far as to change the natural order of words for
the purpose of escaping hiatus of open vowels, which are necessarily
awkward to pronounce in rapid speech. This is familiar from the pages of
Demosthenes, and what the later writers did systematically, Antiphon, and
even Thucydides, seem to have done at times instinctively.
As regards the balance of clauses, a good example may be found in the
opening of the _Herodes_ speech:
τοῦ μὲν πεπείραμαι πέρα τοῦ προσήκοντος,
του δ’ ἐνδεής εἰμι μᾶλλον τοῦ συμφέροντος,
where the correspondence of the two clauses in equal numbers of syllables
is noticeable. The next sentence shows the same sort of correspondence,
though not quite so precise; but here the structure is more elaborate,
since we have two clauses, each of two parts, contrasted both in whole
and part:
A. οὗ μὲν γάρ μ’ ἔδει κακοπαθεῖν τῷ σώματι μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας τῆς οὐ
προσηκούσης,
α. ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδέν μ’ ὠφέλησεν ἡ ἐμπειρία,
B. οὗ δέ με δεῖ σωθῆναι μετὰ τῆς ἀληθείας εἰπόντα τὰ γενόμενα,
β. ἐν τούτῳ με βλάπτει ἡ τοῦ λέγειν ἀδυναμία.
Though there is no rhythmical correspondence here, and the syllabic
lengths only correspond roughly, the ‘antistrophic’ structure is obvious.
Gorgias, if we may condemn him on the evidence of a single short
fragment, seems to have affected rhyme—at any rate his collocation of
γνώμην and ῥώμην cannot have been accidental—and the similar sound of the
endings of the two clauses in the first passage quoted above proves that
Antiphon at any rate took no pains to avoid such natural assonance. In
an inflexional language, where there is always a strong probability that
a rhyme will occur wherever we have to use an adjective agreeing with a
noun, or two verbs in the same tense and person, some ingenuity has to
be employed at times to avoid a rhyme, and Antiphon here, at any rate,
did not choose to avoid it. The use of rhyme in verse seems to have been
offensive to the Greek ear;[58] perhaps for that very reason it may have
been at times desirable in prose, its harshness producing the same kind
of effect which Antiphon elsewhere attains by the use of uncommon words.
Hiatus is of fairly common occurrence in Antiphon, and I cannot point
to any certain instance of an attempt to avoid it by a change from the
natural order of words.
Antiphon draws little from common speech; perhaps his dignity prevented
him from enforcing a point by the use of those γνῶμαι—proverbial
maxims—which Aristotle recommends; and he seldom has recourse to
colloquialisms. We are inclined, however, to put in this class such a
phrase as περιέπεσεν οἷς οὐκ ἤθελεν—‘he got what he didn’t want’—used
of an unfortunate who has been accidentally killed through his own
negligence.
Metaphors are rare, but telling when they do occur, as δίκη
κυβερνήσειε—‘May justice steer my course’; ζῶντες κατορωρύγμεθα—‘I am
buried in a living tomb,’ used by a man who lost his only son; or,
again, the appeal of the prisoner to the jury not to condemn him to
death—ἀνίατος γὰρ ἡ μετάνοια τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν—‘Repentance for such a
deed can never cure it.’
* * * * *
Some exaggeration of language is permitted to an orator. The defendant in
the first tetralogy thus appeals for pity—‘An old man, an exile and an
outcast, I shall beg my bread in a foreign land.’
The so-called ‘figures of thought’ (σχήματα διανοίας) such as irony and
rhetorical questions, so frequent in Demosthenes, are scarcely used
by Antiphon. There is no instance either of the hypocritical reticence
(παράλειψις), also common in later orators, which by a pretence of
passing over certain matters in silence hints at more than it could prove.
Greek oratory was much bound by conventions from which even the greatest
speakers could not altogether escape. To some extent this may be
attributed to the evil influence of the teachers of rhetoric, but by far
the greater part of the blame must rest upon the Athenian audiences.
The dicasts, with a curious inconsistency, seem to have demanded a
finished style of speaking, and yet to have been suspicious of any
speaker who displayed too much cleverness. It was, in fact, the
possession of this quality which made Antiphon himself unpopular.[59]
A pleader, therefore, who felt himself in danger of incurring such
suspicion, must apologize to his audience in advance, stating that any
strength which his case might seem to possess was due to its own inherent
justice, not to his own powers of presenting it. He must compliment the
jury on their well-known impartiality, and express a deep respect for
the sanctity of the laws. The early rhetoricians made collections of
such ‘topics’ or ‘commonplaces,’ and instructed their pupils how to use
them. The process became merely mechanical; any speaker could obtain from
the rhetorical handbooks specimens of sentences dealing with all such
requirements, but only a man of rare genius could, by originality of
treatment, make them sound at all convincing. Aristotle at a later date
made a practically exhaustive collection of such topics.[60]
Antiphon, in his Tetralogies, showed by example how some of these
commonplaces might be employed. In his real speeches he uses them freely,
and with so little care that he repeats his own actual words even within
the limits of the few extant speeches.[61]
In the introduction of these devices, however, he shows some skill. The
speech on the murder of Herodes is quite subtle in places. Compliments
are paid to the jury, but the flattery is not too open. It is sometimes
achieved rather by suggestion than by statement. ‘Not that I wished to
avoid a trial by your democracy,’ says the defendant; and again, ‘Of
course I could trust you quite without considering the oath you have
taken’; or once more, in parenthesis, ‘On the supposition that I had no
objection to quitting this land for ever, I might have left the country.’
Here, and in other cases, there is little more than a hint which an
intelligent juror may grasp.
The most prominent of all the topics used by Antiphon is the appeal to
the divine law by which guile meets with punishment; the murdered man,
if unavenged by human justice, will find divine champions who will not
only bring the homicide to book, but will punish the guilty city which
has become polluted by harbouring him. So much stress is laid upon
this conception of divine justice that some writers have believed that
Antiphon held firm religious views which he thus expressed. This opinion
may reasonably be held, but it must not be pressed. We know from external
sources that Antiphon was not in sympathy with the existing government,
yet the speakers of his orations express or imply admiration for the
democracy; the speech-writer, in fact, wrote what he thought would be
acceptable to the judges rather than what he himself believed. Arguing,
in Antiphon’s own way, from probabilities, we may say it is more likely
that a highly educated contemporary of Anaxagoras and Pericles should in
private life profess a moderate scepticism than an unquestioning belief
in the sort of curse that destroyed the house of Atreus, even though
Antiphon may be Aeschylean in style.
The argument of the defendant in the _Herodes_, ‘Those who have sailed
with me have made excellent voyages, and sacrifices at which I have
assisted have been most favourably performed, and this is a strong
argument for my innocence,’ does not appeal to us, who do not believe
in the accidental blood-guiltiness of the community which unknowingly
harbours a guilty individual. It may or may not have had some weight
with Antiphon himself, but it certainly would have some influence on the
common people of Athens, who believed that the whole city was polluted
by the sacrilege of the mutilation of the Hermae. The fact that it must
impress the jury was a good reason for inserting it, whether Antiphon had
any religious feeling or not.[62]
§ 6
It remains to consider Antiphon’s manner in the treatment of his
subjects.
His personal dignity is as remarkable in his manner as in the formalities
of style. As we turn back to him from Demosthenes or Aeschines, who
lowered the tone of forensic pleading to suit contemporary taste, we are
surprised to find that he hardly ever condescends to ridicule, never
to scurrilous invective. His judicial adversaries are not necessarily
persons of discreditable parentage, immoral character, and infamous
occupation. They may perhaps be liars, for one’s own statement of the
case must be assumed to contain the whole truth, and consequently the
other side must depend on falsehood; but even here the orator is prepared
to admit, with almost un-Attic generosity, that his adversaries have been
misled and are not acting up to their true character. Take the opening of
Tetralogy II. 3:
‘The behaviour of my adversary shows, better than any theory
could, that necessity constrains men to speak and act contrary
to their better nature.
Up to the present he has never spoken shamelessly or acted
desperately; but now his misfortunes have constrained him to
use language which, knowing him, I should never have expected
him to utter.’
Antiphon’s method of constructing his speeches is simple: a conventional
preface, of the kind which every rhetorician kept in stock,[63] is
followed by an introduction describing and criticizing the circumstances
under which the action has been brought.[64] The facts, or a selection of
facts of the case, are then narrated,[65] and are followed by arguments
and proofs.[66] The evidence of witnesses may be interspersed through
the narrative, taken point by point; or, if the narrative is short and
simple, all the testimony may be reserved for the end. A peroration,[67]
reviewing the situation and containing a final appeal to the court,
normally ends the speech.
The speeches in the Tetralogies, which are only blank forms composed
for practice or as specimens for study, contain only preface, argument,
and peroration; there being no actual facts to deal with, there is no
introduction or narrative.
It is a peculiar weakness of the extant speeches that they rely so much
more on arguments from general probability (εἰκότα) than on real pleading
on the basis of evidence.[68]
Thus the defendant in the _Herodes_ mentions quite casually that he never
left the ship on the night when the murder was committed on shore, but he
produces no evidence for the _alibi_ and treats it as of quite secondary
importance.[69] He insists more on the point that the slave who gave
evidence against him was probably induced to bear false witness by the
prosecutors. Another piece of evidence against him is the assertion that
he wrote a letter to Lycinus, stating that he had committed the murder.
‘Why,’ he asks, ‘should I have written a letter, when my messenger would
know all the facts?’
It may be, in this instance, that the defendant’s case was a very weak
one, and that he was obliged to rely on generalities: but the First
Tetralogy affords an interesting parallel. There the defendant, in his
_second_ speech, the last speech of the trial, affirms, what he has
apparently forgotten to mention before, that he never left his house on
the night of the murder.
The most serious artistic defect in the extant speeches is the lack of
that realism which the Greeks called ἦθος, characterization. The language
of the defendants in the _Herodes_ and the _Choreutes_ is very similar,
though the former is a young Lesbian and the latter a middle-aged
Athenian. Moreover, the young Lesbian apologizes for his inexperience and
lack of capacity for speaking, and does so in polished periods elaborated
with all the devices of rhetorical art—antithesis of words and ideas,
careful balance of the length of clauses, and judicious employment of
assonance.
A perusal of Antiphon’s introduction to the speech _de Caede Herodis_
will help, better than any detailed criticism, to an understanding of his
methods of composition. We must note the disproportionate length of this
introduction, to which the pleader evidently attaches more importance
than to the disproof of the charge itself.[70] A study of it leads us
to believe that the guilt or innocence of the party would have little
to do with the verdict if he had once succeeded in impressing the jury
favourably. He apologizes in artistic periods for his incapacity in
public speaking, and enlarges on the commonplace that truth has often
been stifled through lacking the power of expression.
He makes no appeal for impartiality, since he can trust the jury—another
brazen commonplace (§§ 1-7).
The procedure of his adversaries is as shameless as it is unjust (§§
8-9); it is even sacrilegious (§§ 10-12), so that they merit indignation,
while the defendant, who respects the laws of God and man as he loves
his country, deserves every indulgence (§§ 13-15). The prosecutors’
brutality can be explained by their distrust in the justice of their case
and the uprightness of the jury (§§ 16-17). Finally, they have had ample
time to work up their case, while the victim of their intrigues is called
upon at a moment’s notice to answer the most serious charges (§§ 18-19).
‘1. I could wish, Gentlemen, that I possessed a capacity
for speaking and an experience of the world on a scale
corresponding to the misfortune and sufferings that have
befallen me; as it is, my experience in the latter is as much
beyond my deserts as my deficiency in the former falls short of
my requirements.
‘2. When I had to suffer in my own person under an undeserved
charge, I had no experience to help me on; now, when my
salvation lies in a plain statement of the facts as they
occurred, I am thwarted by my incapacity in speaking.
‘3. In many instances men with no capacity in speaking have
been disbelieved because they only told the truth, and have
owed their ruin to the fact that they could not demonstrate the
truth; many, on the other hand, who possess the capacity for
speaking, have been believed on account of their lies, and owed
their salvation to the fact that they lied well. So one who has
not the necessary experience of procedure in the courts must
inevitably be at the mercy of the speeches of the prosecution;
he cannot rest secure upon a true statement of the facts of the
case.
‘4. Now, most parties in such causes as this make a request
for a fair hearing—implying a mistrust of themselves and a
conviction that you are not impartial. I shall make no such
request, for it is only reasonable that honest men should grant
a hearing to the defendant, even though he has not asked for
it, just as the prosecutor has been granted a hearing without
asking.
‘5. But my prayer is, firstly, that if my tongue leads me into
error, you will be merciful, and consider that my error is
due to inexperience rather than guilt; and secondly, that if
I should in any point express myself well, you will attribute
such expression not to any cleverness of mine but to the
inherent power of truth; for justice demands that a man guilty
in his actions should not win salvation by his speech, and,
equally, that one righteous in his actions should not for
his speech be brought to ruin; for an error in speech is the
tongue’s fault—an error in action is a fault of the heart.
‘6. A man who realizes that his personal safety is endangered
is bound to err sometimes; he has to think not only of the
defence he is making, but of its possible results; for the
issue of all matters yet undecided depends on chance rather
than on forethought.
‘7. Such considerations cannot fail to cause anxiety to one
whose life is in danger; indeed, I observe that people who have
a thorough experience of the courts fail to do justice to their
powers when in danger themselves, but are far more successful
in cases which involve no personal danger. Thus, Gentlemen, my
request is both lawful and righteous; it is as just for you to
grant as for me to prefer it; and I now proceed to answer in
detail the charges which have been brought against me.
‘8. First, I would draw attention to the illegality of the
methods by which I have been forced into this trial, not that I
wish to avoid judgment by this democratic court—for even if you
had taken no oath, and were bound by no law, I should be ready
to leave in your hands the decision about my life, confident
as I am that I have done no wrong in this matter, and that
your verdict will be a just one—but in order that my enemies’
violent and illegal action against me in this case may help you
to realize their conduct towards me on other occasions.
‘9. My first point is this: Contrary to all precedent at
Athens, though I am on trial for murder, I was indicted for
“criminal violence.” Now my enemies themselves have testified
that I neither belong to the class of “violent criminals,” nor
am subject to the law which covers such cases. It applies to
such offences as stealing and highway robbery, and they have
shown that no such charge can attach to me.
‘Thus their conduct in the matter of my summary arrest has made
it in the highest degree legal and just for you to acquit me.
‘10. They say, indeed, that the taking of life is in itself an
aggravated form of “criminal violence.” I admit that it is a
most serious kind, and so is sacrilege or treason; but you have
laws which deal with each of these charges specifically.
‘And, to begin with, they have brought me to trial in the
Agora, the very place which a defendant in a charge of murder
is ordinarily warned to avoid; secondly, they have proposed a
penalty of their own choosing, whereas the law ordains that the
man who has taken another’s life shall lose his own in return.
‘This they have done, not for my benefit, but for their own
convenience, and herein they have failed in that respect for
the dead which the law prescribes.
‘11. Again, as I imagine you all know, all the courts concerned
with murder trials sit in the open air, with this particular
object, that the jurors may not have to enter the same building
with those who have blood on their hands, and that the
prosecutor in a trial for murder may not find himself under the
same roof with him who committed the act.
‘But you, Sir, have acted contrary to all precedent in
transgressing this law; and not only this: It was incumbent
on you to take the most solemn and binding oath, to invoke
destruction upon yourself and your family and your house if you
failed in its conditions, namely, that you would not bring any
charges against me except such as referred to the murder and my
complicity in it.
‘Had this obligation been observed, however great crimes I had
committed I could not be found guilty except in view of the one
fact of blood-guiltiness, and on the other hand, however many
good deeds I had to my credit, these good deeds could not save
me.
‘12. All this regular procedure you have violated; you have
invented laws for your own use; you who prosecute me have
taken no oath; your witnesses who bear witness against me have
taken none, though they ought first to take the same oath as
yourself; they should lay their hands upon the sacrifice while
they are bearing witness against me.
‘Further, you ask the court to dispense with the oath; to give
credence to your witnesses and bring in a verdict of Guilty,
though you yourself have made them disinclined to credit you
by transgressing the established laws, and by imagining that
your own illegal conduct should in their consideration have
precedence over law itself.
‘13. You say, however, that if I had been set at liberty I
should not have remained here, but should have gone away and
disappeared—as if you had compelled me against my will to
enter the country. I answer that, on your supposition that I
should not have minded saying farewell to Athens, it was open
to me either not to appear in obedience to the summons, and
so incur judgment by default, or to go away after replying to
the opening speech of the prosecution; for this privilege is
open to all. But you, by legislating in your own interest,
are trying to withhold in my case alone this privilege which
belongs to all of Greek race.
‘14. Yet I think we must all agree that the laws which govern
such procedure are the best laws in the world, and most in
accordance with divine sanction. They have a double claim to
respect; they are the most ancient laws in this land, and they
are unchangeable as the offences with which they deal; and this
is the strongest indication that a law is well framed; for time
and experience teach mankind to recognize what is not well
done.
‘So you do not require to learn from the speeches of the
prosecution whether the laws were well framed or not, as he
implies; but you do require to learn by the aid of the laws
whether the speeches of the prosecution are urging a righteous
and lawful action, or the reverse—as I assert.
‘15. The laws, then, which relate to the charge of murder,
are excellently framed, inasmuch as no one has ever ventured
to disturb them; you alone have ventured to legislate anew,
and for the worse. You would set aside justice as you have
transgressed law in your attempt to bring me to ruin. But your
illegal procedure is in itself the strongest evidence in my
favour; for you knew well enough that nobody who had taken that
solemn oath would have borne witness against me.
‘16. Again, you did not rely on the facts sufficiently to
allow the question of facts to be settled indisputably by a
single trial; you reserved for yourself the right to dispute
the judgment, and reopen the case, implying a distrust in the
verdict of the present court. The result is that even if I am
acquitted I am no better off, since it is open to you to say
that I was acquitted on the charge of criminal violence but not
on the charge of murder; whereas, if you secure my condemnation
you will demand my death on the ground that I have been found
guilty of murder.
‘What can surpass the cruelty of such a device by which you,
if you can once convince the jury, have attained your object;
while I, if I escape your clutches once, find the same danger
awaiting me again?
‘17. Again, my imprisonment was a monstrous illegality. I
consented to produce three sureties as required by law, but
they contrived that I should not be allowed to do so. There
is no other instance on record of the imprisonment of a
non-Athenian who consented to produce sureties.
‘Yet the officers who have custody of criminals are subject to
this same law, so that this is another privilege common to all
men which was withheld from me alone.
‘18. Of course, it suited my accusers, firstly, that I should
be as unprepared as possible, through being unable to attend
to my own business in person, secondly, that I should suffer
personal ill-usage, and in consequence of this personal
ill-usage find my own friends more ready to bear false witness
in support of my accusers than true witness in my support. And
so they inflicted a life-long disgrace on me and my family.
‘19. Thus I have been brought to trial handicapped in many ways
in relation to your laws and to justice; but even with these
disadvantages I shall try to demonstrate my innocence.
‘But it is a hard task to refute at a moment’s notice a number
of deliberate falsehoods long-prepared; for it is impossible to
be forearmed against unexpected attacks.’
After this long preamble, the speaker at last discusses the accusation
(§§ 19 _sqq._), and to some extent deals satisfactorily with the
evidence—entirely circumstantial—which has been brought against him.
It has already been noticed that, though he casually leaves it to be
inferred that he could prove an _alibi_, he lays no stress on the
assertion, and is far more concerned with showing that it is ‘improbable’
that he should be a murderer. The final and, apparently, the most
important argument is drawn from the absence of divine signs which might
have pointed to the speaker’s guilt. He makes no attempt, like the
defendant in the First Tetralogy, to suggest other explanations of the
crime; many crimes, he says, have before now baffled investigation, and
he is only concerned with denying the charge against himself.
§ 7
In the _Life of Antiphon_, falsely ascribed to Plutarch,[71] we read
that sixty speeches were extant under the orator’s name, but of these
twenty-five were considered spurious by the critic Caecilius of
Calacte. We have now fifteen, viz. the three Tetralogies, or sets of
four speeches; the speeches on the Murder of Herodes, the Death of the
Choreutes, and the Charge of Poisoning. All of these deal with homicide,
the department in which Antiphon, presumably, showed especial skill.
Blass has collected besides the titles of twenty-three other speeches on
miscellaneous subjects.[72]
The Tetralogies, each consisting of four short speeches on the same
imaginary case—two for the prosecution, and two for the defence—have this
peculiar interest, that they stand on the border-line between theory
and practice. They differ from the exercises composed by other early
rhetoricians and from the declamations of the Roman Empire in that they
are not concerned with historical or mythological personages in possible
or imaginary positions, but treat cases which, although fictitious, are
of the kind which might arise in everyday life at Athens. Thus these
skeleton-speeches give a clear idea of the lines on which either side
might plead its case in an actual trial. The professional advocate must
be ready to plead on either side in any cause, and here we find Antiphon
composing speeches in turn suitable for both sides. As has been noted,
there is very little detail given. No narrative of facts occurs; the
actual circumstances presupposed can only be gathered from the arguments
employed; and the result is that the outlines of the speeches both in
accusation and defence are very clearly marked.
The argument of the First Tetralogy is as follows:—A certain citizen has
been murdered on his way home from a dinner party. His slave, who was
mortally wounded at the same time, deposed that one of the murderers was
a certain enemy of his master, against whom the latter was on the point
of bringing a serious law-suit. The case comes before the Areopagus.
α. The accuser argues that the deceased cannot have been murdered by
robbers, since he was not plundered; nor in a drunken brawl, which was
impossible considering the time and place. Therefore the crime was
premeditated, and the motive was revenge or fear. The accused had both
these motives, and moreover the slave identified him.
β. The defendant argues that the murder may have been done by robbers who
were scared away before they had robbed the corpse, or by some criminal
who feared the dead man’s testimony, or by some other enemy, who felt
secure because he knew suspicion would fall on the accused. The slave may
have been mistaken or perhaps suborned. If probability is to decide the
case, it is more probable that the defendant would have employed some
one else to do the murder than that the slave would be certain of having
recognized the criminal. The danger of losing a law-suit could not have
seemed so serious as the present danger of losing his life.
γ. The accuser in his second speech ingeniously meets the arguments of β
point by point; and
δ. The defendant criticizes and disposes of the arguments of γ, and
incidentally mentions that he could prove an _alibi_—though he does not
seem to lay any stress on this.
With the exception of the evidence of the slave, now dead, the whole case
rests on a discussion of probabilities.
The Second Tetralogy deals with the death of a boy accidentally killed by
a javelin with which another youth was practising in the gymnasium. The
question to decide was, who was to blame—the accuser maintained that it
was a case of homicide, the defendant suggested unintentional suicide![73]
The Third Tetralogy supposes that an old man has been brutally beaten by
a young man, and died of his injuries a few days later. The defendant
attempts to put the blame first on the dead man, since he struck the
first blow, secondly on the surgeon; and, finding this not plausible
enough, goes into exile: the second speech for the defence is spoken by a
friend of the accused.
The extant speeches composed for real cases may be taken in the order of
their importance.
* * * * *
_On the Murder of Herodes._—Herodes, an Athenian citizen who had settled
at Mitylene, made a voyage to Aenus in Thrace to receive the ransom
of some Thracian captives. He sailed with the accused, a Mitylenean
whose father lived at Aenus. They were driven by a storm to shelter at
Methymna, and there exchanged from their open boat into a decked vessel.
They fell to drinking to pass the time, and Herodes, going ashore one
night, was never heard of again. His companion continued the voyage, and
on returning to Mitylene was charged with murder. It was asserted that a
slave had confessed to having assisted in the murder, and that a letter
had been discovered from the defendant to one Lycinus, supposed to be the
instigator of the crime.
By the laws of the Athenian League such a trial must take place at
Athens; ordinarily a case of murder would come before the Areopagus,
but actually the accused was indicted as a ‘_malefactor_,’[74] was
arrested and brought before an ordinary court. He contends that this is
a grievance, for if the prosecution fails he may still be brought before
the Areopagus. Further, he was kept in prison, all bail being refused.
This was, apparently, illegal.
The trial took place probably about 417 or 416 B.C. The introduction to
the speech has been quoted.[75] The narrative gives first the facts up to
the defendant’s arrival at Athens (§§ 19-24), and shows that probability
is against the prosecution (§§ 25-28); next, the return of one of the
ships to Mitylene, and the confession of the slave under torture (§§
29-30). The slave’s evidence is proved to be worthless (§§ 31-41). The
alleged letter to Lycinus is discussed, and the defendant proves that he
himself had no motive for the murder, and cannot be expected to know who
is the real culprit (§§ 42-73). Odium has been unjustly stirred against
him by the assertion of his father’s disloyalty (§§ 74-80). The absence
of signs of divine anger is a further proof of his innocence (§§ 81-84).
Finally, he appeals for another chance at least, since, if acquitted
now, he may be tried again by the Areopagus (§§ 85-95).
* * * * *
The speech _On the Choreutes_ refers to the death of a boy Diodotus,
who was being trained to sing in a choir at the Thargelia, and was
accidentally poisoned by a drug given him to improve his voice. The
_choregus_ or choir-master was accused of poisoning before the Areopagus.
The extant speech is the second for the defence; the date is probably
about 412 B.C. The speaker comments on the disingenuous action of his
adversaries, who refused to have slaves examined, and introduced much
irrelevant matter. He contrasts the openness of his own conduct. The
epilogue is lost.
* * * * *
The speech _Against a Stepmother on a Charge of Poisoning_ is
sometimes regarded as a mere exercise, but, in striking contrast to
the Tetralogies, this speech contains full and detailed narrative. Its
authenticity has been further questioned, but we have so little material
for judging of the style of Antiphon that it is impossible to pronounce
definitely against the supposition that this speech was composed by him.
It may be that it was an early work; it is certainly less powerful than
the other two genuine speeches.
_The Argument._—A young man accuses his stepmother of having poisoned
his father by the help of another woman, a slave. The father was dining
with Philoneos, a former lover of this woman, and she was persuaded to
administer a love-philtre to the two. Both men died, the woman was put to
death, and the prosecutor now urges that his stepmother, who instigated
the crime, should be punished for her guilt.
Of the speeches known to us only by name or by short fragments, it is
probable that some at any rate were the work of Antiphon the Sophist,
with whom the orator is often confused. A work on rhetoric and a
collection of proëmia and epilogues were also current under the orator’s
name.
CHAPTER III
THRASYMACHUS—ANDOCIDES
§ 1
A new period begins with Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, who adopted Athens as
his home. He is placed by Aristotle between Tisias, one of the founders
of rhetoric, and Theodorus of Byzantium,[76] who was a contemporary
of Lysias. According to the chronology of Plato’s _Phaedrus_, he was
already at the height of his powers when Isocrates was only a youth of
promise.[77] The dramatic date of the dialogue being 410 B.C., we may
suppose him to have been born between 460 and 450 B.C., though there is
no clear indication.
He seems to have followed the lines of his predecessors. He composed a
τέχνη or handbook of rhetoric, and composed or compiled a collection of
passages to serve as models for his pupils, called by Suidas ἀφορμαὶ
ῥητορικαί (_oratorical resources_). This probably included the _exordia_
and _epilogues_ mentioned by Athenaeus.[78] Aristotle mentions a work
called Ἔλεοι (_appeals to pity_),[79] and a book with the mysterious
title ὑπερβάλλοντες completed his educational output.[80] He composed
also some epideictic speeches, which, as Suidas calls them παίγνια,
were probably of the mythological type, of which we possess examples
in the _Helen_ and _Palamedes_ of Gorgias. Dionysius says that he left
no deliberative or forensic speeches, and this statement agrees with
the known fact that he was an alien, and therefore could not appear
in the courts or the assembly.[81] On the other hand, Suidas mentions
public speeches, and Dionysius has himself preserved a fragment of what
appears to be a deliberative speech.[82] The probability is that this
was composed only as a model for his pupils, and it is, in fact, of a
vagueness which would be appropriate to almost any circumstances.
He excelled in the ‘pathetic’ style: ‘For the “sorrows of a poor old
man,”’ says Socrates, ‘or any other pathetic case, no one is better
than the Chalcedonian giant; he can put a whole company of people into
a passion and out of one again by his mighty magic, and is first-rate
at inventing or disposing of any sort of calumny on any grounds or
none.’[83] These gifts seem to have been the natural expression of his
impetuous and passionate character represented in the _Republic_.[84]
The loss of his works is much to be regretted, since he was the inventor
of a style—the _tempered_ style, as it was called by Dionysius—which,
standing between the austerity of Antiphon and Thucydides, and the
elaborate simplicity perfected by Lysias, combined the best qualities
of both. He was thus a forerunner of Isocrates. In the fragment which
is preserved, we find no trace of rare or poetical words or audacious
compounds such as Gorgias used; none of the complicated sentences of
Thucydides, and no forced antithesis; the diction is flowing, and the
expression clear. He seems to have been the first writer to make a
careful study of metrical effect, and is mentioned for his frequent
use of the _paeon_ by Aristotle, who apparently classed him with those
writers to whom diction is more important than ideas.[85]
The fragment already mentioned purports to be the _exordium_ of a
political speech:
‘I could have wished, men of Athens, that my lot had been
cast amid those ancient times and conditions when the younger
men were content to be silent, since circumstances did not
force them to speak in public, and their elders were able
administrators of the state....’
This is a conventional opening; a similar phrase of regret (ἐβουλόμην)
begins the speech of Antiphon on the murder of Herodes,[86] and Aeschines
has elaborated the same theme of the superiority of political life in
the time of Solon in a way which leads us to suspect that he had the
_prooemium_ of Thrasymachus in mind.[87]
Of the works of Theodorus of Byzantium not a sentence remains. A
contemporary of Lysias, he taught rhetoric and composed certain works
on the subject.[88] He concerned himself with the proper divisions of
a speech, adding a section of ‘further narrative’ (ἐπιδιήγηις) to the
usual narrative, and ‘further proof’ (ἐπιπίστωσις) to proof.[89] It is
for this over-subtlety that Plato ridicules the ‘cunning artificer of
speeches’ from Byzantium.[90]
§ 2
Andocides was born about 440 B.C., a member of a family which had been
distinguished for three generations.
His great-grandfather, as he tells us, fought against the Pisistratidae;
his grandfather Andocides was one of the envoys for the peace with Sparta
in 445, and was twice subsequently a _strategus_; his father, Leogoras,
is mentioned by Aristophanes as rearing pheasants.[91] The orator himself
was a member of a ἑταιρεία or club—probably a social rather than a
political club, as the only meeting mentioned was purely for convivial
purposes.
In 415, on the eve of the sailing of the Sicilian expedition, Athens was
startled and horrified by a remarkable act of sacrilege. The images of
Hermes which stood everywhere in the town were, all but one, mutilated
and defaced in a single night. The superstitious citizens, with a deep
feeling that the whole community must suffer for the guilty action of
some of its members, considered this an evil omen for the fortunes of
the Syracusan expedition, and, less reasonably, took it as an indication
of impending revolution and an attempt to subvert the democracy. Their
anxiety was increased by rumours that a profane parody of the Eleusinian
mysteries was being celebrated in certain private houses. Such acts of
impiety were likely to bring upon Athens the wrath of the gods who had
hitherto protected her.
It will be remembered how Alcibiades, one of the leaders of the
expedition, was accused of complicity in the plot, and how this
accusation brought about his recall from Sicily and his estrangement from
his native city, which led to the utter failure of the great enterprise
of conquest, and ultimately, through the total loss of her best armies
and fleets, to the downfall of Athens herself.
Andocides was accused of complicity both in the profanation of the
mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae. Of the former charge he
apparently succeeded in clearing himself, but he confesses to a knowledge
of the affair of the Hermae.
A certain Teucrus denounced eighteen persons as guilty of the mutilation
of the busts. Of these some were put to death, the rest went into
exile. The list included some members of the club to which Andocides
belonged. Another informer, Dioclides, came forward with a tale that
about three hundred persons were implicated, and he named forty-two of
them, including Andocides and twelve of his near relations. Athens was
in a panic, and eager for instant vengeance. The informers’ victims were
at once imprisoned, and their situation was grave indeed. Andocides
describes how, to save his father and other innocent persons, he at
last resolved to tell what he knew. He gave his information under a
promise of immunity from punishment, but in accordance with the terms of
a subsequent decree he suffered ‘_atimia_,’ comprising exclusion from
the market-place and the temples; and being thus debarred from a public
career he decided to go abroad.
In the _de Reditu_, delivered in 410 B.C., five years after the outrage,
Andocides implies that he was himself concerned in the deed, and asks
pardon for his ‘youthful folly’ (§ 7). The language of Thucydides[92]
and others also implies that he accused himself along with others. The
language of the _de Reditu_ is not, however, explicit, and does not
necessarily disagree with the statement made twelve years later in the
_de Mysteriis_.
Andocides there affirms that he knew of the plot and opposed its
execution, but it was carried out without his knowledge. In proof of this
he points out that the Hermes opposite his own house was the only one not
mutilated.
‘So I told the Council that I knew the culprits, and I declared
the facts—namely that Euphiletus suggested the plot while we
were drinking, and I spoke against it, and for the moment
prevented it. Some time later I was riding a colt I had in
Cynosarges, and had a fall, and broke my collar-bone and cut
my head, and was carried home on a stretcher. Euphiletus,
hearing of my condition, told the others that I had been
persuaded to join them, and had agreed to take a hand in the
work and mutilate the Hermes beside the shrine of Phorbas. In
this statement he deceived them, and this is the reason why
the Hermes which you all see in front of our house, the one
erected by the Aegeid tribe, was the only Hermes in Athens not
to be mutilated, because it was supposed that I would do it, as
Euphiletus said. The conspirators, when they heard of it, were
highly indignant, considering that I knew of the affair, but
had taken no part in it. On the next day Meletus and Euphiletus
came to me and said:
‘“We have done it, Andocides, and it’s all over. If you care
to keep quiet and hold your tongue, you will find that we are
as good friends to you as ever; if not, our enmity will count
much more than any friendship you could form by betraying us.”
‘I answered that, from what had occurred, I considered
Euphiletus a scoundrel; but that they had much more to fear
from the fact of their guilt than from my knowledge of it.’[93]
This story is at least a plausible one. The only suspicious detail is the
orator’s own candid admission that all of those whom he accused—with the
exception of four—had already been named by Teucrus and punished, some
by death, the rest by exile, so that his ‘confession’ could do them no
further harm. The four others whom he included were not yet in prison,
though they were known to be associates of those who had already paid
the penalty. They had time to escape into exile (§ 68). We may suspect
that they received from the informer due notice of his intentions. Thus,
at the expense of driving four men, who were probably guilty, into
exile, Andocides undoubtedly saved the lives of himself, his father, his
brother-in-law, and the rest of the forty-two prisoners. The informer
Dioclides now recanted, and said that he had been compelled by Alcibiades
and Amiantus to lay false information. He was brought to trial and put to
death (§ 66). Andocides, suffering from partial disfranchisement, was for
many years away from Athens. He engaged in commerce in many countries,
and made money, sometimes by discreditable means. He had dealings with
Sicily, Italy, the Peloponnese, Thessaly, Ionia, the Hellespont, and
finally, Cyprus, where Evagoras, King of Salamis, bestowed a valuable
property on him.[94]
In 411 B.C. he made an attempt to recover his rights. He procured
oars for the Athenian fleet at Samos, and returned to Athens to plead
his cause. Unfortunately the Four Hundred had then just usurped the
government, and they rejected his plea on the ground that he had helped
their enemies. Later, in 410 or 408 B.C., he made another attempt,
and delivered the speech _de Reditu_, but was again unsuccessful. It
was only after the amnesty of Thrasybulus (403 B.C.) that he resumed
his full citizenship, and henceforward took an active part in public
life, figuring now as an ardent democrat, speaking in the assembly and
performing liturgies. In 399 B.C. old enmities burst into flame, and
he was accused of impiety on two counts—as having taken part in the
Eleusinian mysteries at a time when he was legally disqualified from
doing so, and as having deposited a suppliant’s branch on the altar at
Eleusis during the time of the mysteries—which was a profanation. The
penalty for either offence was death, and the _de Mysteriis_ is his
successful answer to these charges.
In 391 B.C., as one of the envoys delegated to bring about a peace
with Sparta, he delivered the _de Pace_. The peace was not concluded.
This is the last mention of this interesting adventurer, though the
pseudo-Plutarch affirms that he went into exile again. If that is true,
we know that he had comfortable places to retire to, in Cyprus and
elsewhere.
§ 3
Ancient critics dealt severely with Andocides. Though Alexandrine
criticism included him in the list of the ten standard orators, Dionysius
barely mentions him;[95] Quintilian disparages his work,[96] and
Herodes Atticus modestly hopes that he himself is at least superior to
Andocides;[97] Hermogenes sums up his defects as an orator as follows:
‘He aims at being a statesman, but does not quite succeed. He
lacks proper articulation and distinctness in his “figures,”
he lacks order in connecting his sentences and rounding them
off, losing distinctness by the use of parentheses, so that he
strikes some as ineffectual and needlessly obscure. He has very
little finish or arrangement and little vigour. He has a small,
but very small, portion of cleverness in systematic argument,
but practically none of any other kind.’[98]
It is with some hesitation that I give this tentative translation of
a difficult passage. It seems to mean that Andocides, though he uses
‘figures,’ such as antithesis, rhetorical question and irony, does not
attain ‘precision’ or make them distinct enough. His sentences are
sometimes deformed because a parenthesis overpowers the main clause. His
diction is unpolished and unconvincing. The only credit which he deserves
is for his μέθοδος—his system of stating his case; wherein Hermogenes was
perhaps thinking of the way in which the orator arranges his material,
giving only part of the narrative at a time, and criticizing it as he
goes along, rather than keeping narrative and arguments quite separate.
Later and more practised orators have been commended for this method. By
general cleverness, Hermogenes probably means skill in the use of the
usual sophistries of the rhetorician.
The Pseudo-Plutarch is less severe on the orator:
‘He is simple and inartificial in his narratives,
straightforward and free from “figure.”’[99]
It must at once be granted that many of the criticisms aimed at Andocides
hit their mark; but it is open to doubt whether they can penetrate deep
enough to deal a vital blow at his reputation. The ancient critics were
academic and tended to lose sight of practical details. They were, as a
rule, more concerned with the impressions that a speech produced on the
reader than with its effect on the hearers; they laid great emphasis on
the artistic side, and in examining a speech looked carefully to see how
closely the orator had followed the artificial rules of the rhetorician.
But this kind of estimate may lead to injustice, for not only must
the critic refer to an artificial standard established by convention,
a standard which might not have been recognized by the orator’s
contemporaries, but, even granting that certain rules of rhetoric should
generally be followed, we may maintain that particular circumstances
justify a speaker in departing from them. Rhetoric is a practical art,
whose object, as Plato tells us, is persuasion; and though most people
who practise it will do best to move on the accustomed lines, there may
be some who can succeed without following the beaten track.
* * * * *
Andocides is not to be compared to his predecessor Antiphon in the
points which are the latter’s chief characteristics—dignity of manner,
balance of clauses and verbal antithesis; but, on the other hand, he has
command of a fairly lucid style, and a gift for telling a straightforward
narrative of events, two matters in which the older orator was not
conspicuously successful. Again, Andocides starts with one signal
advantage. If we read the tetralogies of Antiphon, excellent as they may
be in showing the writer’s grasp of the technique of his trade, and turn
from them to one of the real speeches, the _Herodes_, for instance, we
feel at once how great a gain it is to have the human interest before
us. A speech in which real persons are concerned must always have this
advantage over a declamatory exercise. But we still feel that the
personal element is not so prominent as it might be, simply because the
orator is not giving voice to his own thoughts on an occasion where his
own interests are deeply concerned, but stringing together sentences
which an obscure young man from Mitylene may clumsily stumble through
without, perhaps, in the least comprehending their cleverness. But
Andocides is a real live man speaking in his own person and in his own
defence on a most serious charge. He is in grave danger, and must exert
himself to the utmost; he must rise to the great occasion, or expect to
pay the penalty—perhaps with his life. This is an occasion, if there
ever can be one, when style may be completely put in the background,
where matter is of more importance than method, where the means are of
no account unless the end can be attained; for epigram cannot temper
the hemlock-cup, and the laws of Athens are stronger than the rules of
oratory.
It was natural to Antiphon to pay attention to details of style, and his
style is of a rather archaic tone. Andocides, on the other hand, was not
a trained orator, except in so far as every Athenian was trained in youth
in the elements of speaking. He was not either a professional pleader or
a frequent speaker in public—indeed, from the fact that he lived long in
exile he cannot have had many opportunities of appearing either in the
law-courts or the assembly. Possessing a convenient fluency of speech
and a thorough command of the language of daily life, he finds in it
a satisfactory means of expression. In most cases he seems to have by
nature what Lysias obtained by art—a clear and direct way of expressing
his thoughts, a simplicity of language in which nothing strained or
unfamiliar strikes the ear. On the other hand, there are inconsistencies
in his style; there are times when, apparently without premeditation, he
does use words or phrases slightly foreign to the speech of common life.
We have a feeling that this was done without affectation; that in the
course of his fluent and rapid utterance he used just those words which
naturally occurred to him as appropriate.[100] In this he differs from
Lysias, who took the common speech and perfected it into a literary form,
attaining by study a refined simplicity and purity which only careful
practice could produce.
On the whole, Andocides is most effective when he is most simple; when he
uses common words and makes no attempt at the rhetorical artifices which
do not come natural to him. The following narrative will emphasize my
point:
‘When we had all been taken to prison, and it was night and
the prison gates were shut, and one man’s mother had come,
and another’s sister, and another’s wife and children, and
sounds of lamentation were heard as they wept and bewailed our
miserable state, Charmides spoke to me—he was a cousin of mine,
of the same age as myself, and he had been brought up in our
home from childhood.
‘“Andocides,” he said, “you see what serious trouble we are
in; and though I did not want to say anything, or to annoy
you at all before, I am now forced to do so on account of the
misfortune we are come to.
‘“Your other friends and associates, apart from us who are your
relations, have some of them already been executed for the
charges on which we are being done to death, while others have
admitted their guilt by fleeing from the country.
‘“If you have heard anything about this affair, tell the truth,
and by doing so save both yourself, and your father, who must
be very dear to you, and your brother-in-law, who is married
to your only sister, and finally, all the rest of your family
and friends, not to mention me—for in all my life I have never
caused you annoyance, but am devoted to you and ready to do
anything I can to help you.”’[101]
His exposure of Dioclides is simple and effective; he repeats the
informer’s statement, and with a very few words of comment makes it
appear ridiculous:
‘Encouraged by his country’s misfortunes Dioclides laid
information before the Council. He asserted that he knew the
persons who had mutilated the Hermae, and that there were about
three hundred of them. He proceeded to relate how he had come
across the matter.
‘He said that he had a slave working at Laureion, and had to
go there to get the man’s wages. He rose very early, having
mistaken the time, and started on his way. The full moon was
shining, and as he passed the gateway of Dionysus, he saw a
number of men coming down from the Odeum into the Orchestra. He
was afraid of them, and so went into the shadow and sat down
between the pillar and the pedestal on which the bronze statue
of the General stands.
‘He estimated the number of the men he saw at about three
hundred, and they were standing round in groups of five or ten,
or, in some cases, twenty. He could recognize most of them, as
he saw the moonlight shining on their faces.
‘Now he made this monstrous statement in the first place in
order that it might be in his power to say that any citizen he
liked was or was not a member of that company.
‘After seeing all this, he said, he went on to Laureion, and on
the next day heard of the mutilation of the Hermae. So he knew
at once that it was the work of the men whom he had seen.’[102]
The opening of the speech shows a reasonable use of the sort of
commonplaces which custom demanded as a preface to argument—the malignity
and ingenuity of the speaker’s enemies and the perplexity caused by the
number of their accusations which makes it difficult to know where to
begin.
‘Nearly all of you know, Gentlemen, with what persistency my
enemies have contrived to harm me in every possible way, by
fair means or foul, from the time when I first came to Athens,
and there is no need for me to dwell upon the subject; but I
shall ask you only for just treatment, a favour which is as
easy for you to grant as it is important for me to gain.
‘First, I would have you bear in mind that I have now appeared
before you without having been in any way forced to await my
trial; I have neither surrendered to bail, nor have I suffered
the constraint of imprisonment. I appear because I have put
my trust above all in the justice of my cause, and secondly,
in your character; feeling as I do that you will give a just
decision, and not allow me through a perversion of justice to
be ruined by my enemies, but that you will much rather save
me by allowing justice to take its course in accordance with
the laws of the city, and the oaths which you have sworn as a
preliminary to the verdict which you are about to record.
‘It is reasonable, Gentlemen, that, in the case of men who
voluntarily face the danger of a trial, you should take the
same view of them as they do of themselves. Those who refuse to
await their trial practically stand self-condemned, so that you
may reasonably pass on them the sentence which they have passed
on themselves; but as for those who wait to stand their trial
in the confidence that they have done no wrong, you have a
right to hold the same opinion about them which they have held
about themselves, and not decide, without a hearing, that they
are in the wrong....
‘I am considering, therefore, from which point I ought to begin
my defence. Shall I begin with the last-mentioned plea, that
my indictment was illegal? or with the fact that the decree of
Isotimides is not valid? or shall I appeal to the laws and
the oaths which you have taken? or, lastly, shall I start by
relating the facts from the beginning?
‘My greatest difficulty is that the various counts of the
indictment do not stir you all equally to resentment, but each
of you has some point which he would like me to answer first.
It is impossible to deal with them all at once, and so it
seems to me the best course to relate the whole story from the
beginning, omitting nothing; for if you thoroughly realize what
actually occurred, you will easily recognize the lies which my
accusers have told to my discredit.’[103]
The peroration is simple and vigorous in its directness:
‘Do not deprive yourselves of your hopes of my help, nor
deprive me of my hopes of helping you. I now request those who
have already given proof of the highest nobility of feeling
towards the democracy to mount the platform and advise you in
accordance with what they know of my character. Come forward,
Anytus and Cephalus, and you members of my tribe who have been
chosen to plead for me—Thrasyllus and the rest.’[104]
Reference has already been made to the vitality of his speech. Compared
with his life-like vigour, the ‘austerity’ of Antiphon becomes dull and
pompous. The most striking feature of his work is the ease with which,
in reporting conversations or explaining motives, he breaks into direct
quotation, recalling his own words or putting words into the mouths
of others to express what they said or thought. We recognize in this
something of a Homeric quality; it is comparable to the Epic use of ὧδε
δέ τις εἴπεσκε and καὶ ποτέ τις εἴπῃσι.
The following extract shows how the main thread of the sentence may be
lost in a tangle of such parenthetical quotations:
‘From the first, though many people informed me that my enemies
were saying that I should never await my trial—“For what could
induce Andocides to await his trial, when he may leave the
city and still be well off? If he sails to Cyprus, where he
comes from, there is waiting for him a large and flourishing
farm of which he has the freehold; will he prefer to put his
neck into a halter? With what end in view? Cannot he see which
way the wind blows here?” I, Gentlemen, disagree entirely with
this view. I would not live and enjoy the utmost prosperity
somewhere else at the price of losing my fatherland; and
even if the wind did blow here as my enemies say it does, I
would rather be a citizen of Athens than of any other city;
prosperous, for the present, as such other cities may seem to
me to be. Holding such views as these I have committed to you
the decision about my life.’[105]
It has been noted that Andocides is not addicted to the use of verbal
antithesis such as Thucydides and Antiphon have made too familiar. We do
not find him playing upon the contrasts between ‘word and deed,’ ‘being
and seeming’ with such recurrent monotony.
There is, however, one kind of antithesis to which he is somewhat
partial—an antithesis of thought rather than language. He is fond of
explaining a difficulty of choice by putting it in the form of a dilemma.
As far as his own personal conduct was concerned, he must often have had
to face dilemmas. From the part which he had played in the sacrilege,
and the awkward positions in which consequently he found himself placed,
it must often have been equally difficult and dangerous for him to lie
and to speak the truth. So it is not unnatural that we should often find
sentences like the following:
‘How would each of you have acted, Gentlemen, if you had
had to choose either to die nobly, or to owe your life to a
disgraceful action?
‘Some may say that what I did was base, but many would have
chosen as I did.’[106]
This appeal to the individual feelings, especially the request by which
it is prefaced, that they will judge ‘by human standards’ (ἀνθρωπίνως),
is effective in its boldness. The speaker must have felt sure of his
audience before he ventured to appeal to the lower nature which every one
would like to repudiate.
In marked contrast to the dignity of Antiphon, Andocides from time to
time lapses into scurrility, dragging into his speech discreditable
anecdotes relating to his opponents which are quite irrelevant to his
proper subject and merely serve to raise a laugh at the moment. Thus
the long recital about the domestic affairs of Callias (§§ 123-130) has
no bearing at all on the trial. A man whose father has been three times
unhappily married may still be a trustworthy witness. The introduction
of the irrelevant story is then quite unjustifiable, but, since such
examples of bad taste were freely tolerated at Athens, it was worth while
to make a score by such foul hitting, especially if one could deliver the
blows as neatly as in the following passage:
‘At the mother’s request, the relations took the child to the
altar at the time of the Apaturia. They brought a victim, and
requested Callias to perform the sacrifice. He asked who was
the father of the child. “Callias, the son of Hipponicus.”—“But
I’m Callias.”—“Yes, and it’s your child.”’[107]
There is more to be said in justification of the attack on Epichares.
To prove, or to assert violently, that his accuser was an enemy of the
democracy and a person of vile character formed a presumption in favour
of the defendant. Demosthenes himself made a custom of such practices,
and was not less unscrupulous or less irrelevant than Andocides:
‘But Epichares, who is the worst of them all, and wants to keep
up his reputation, and so acts vindictively against himself—for
he was a member of the Council in the time of the Thirty; and
what is the provision in the law which is inscribed on the
pillar in front of the Council room? “Whosoever shall hold
office in the city when the democracy has been overthrown, may
be slain without penalty, and his slayer shall be free from
blood-guiltiness, and shall possess the property of the slain.”
Surely then, Epichares, any one who slays you now will have
clean hands, according to Solon’s law? Let me have the law on
the pillar read aloud?’[108]
But Andocides in such cases certainly violates the laws of good taste,
and in the matter of this personal abuse, though less fertile in
vocabulary, is a worthy forerunner of the great orators. His scurrility
is hardly excused by the ingenuity of its epigrammatic form:
‘You jackal, you common informer! ... are you allowed to live
and prowl about the city? Little do you deserve it; under
the democracy you lived by the informer’s trade; under the
oligarchy, for fear of being forced to give up the money you
had made by informing, you were a menial of the Thirty....’[109]
and again:
‘One result of your decision to observe the present laws is
that he has been restored from exile to citizenship, and
from legal disability to the free exercise of the informer’s
trade.’[110]
The use of parenthesis is sometimes carried by Andocides to extremes. An
instance has been quoted in which the grammatical construction breaks
down because the writer introduces an imaginary conversation into the
middle of it.[111] The style is sometimes so loose and discursive that
not only is the construction difficult to follow, but the argument is
obscure. The writer suffers from an inability to keep to the point, or
rather, he tries to explain several things at once, and so makes nothing
clear. An extreme instance is to be found in §§ 57 _sqq._ of the _de
Mysteriis_. His thoughts run too fast for his tongue, and he has not the
technical skill to guide them on their proper courses. Such sentences
afford a practical comment on the introduction to the same speech, in
which he states that he does not know where to begin.[112]
On the other hand, passages may be found in which a series of short
sentences, loosely combined, and disturbed by _anacoluthon_, are really
effective, since they simulate the broken utterance of passion. Of such
is the following:
‘Then the herald inquired who had deposited the suppliant’s
branch, and no one answered. Now we were standing close by,
and Callias could see me. When nobody answered, he retired into
the temple. Eucles, stepping forward—oblige me by calling him
up—Now then, Eucles, first of all give evidence whether I am
speaking the truth.’[113]
§ 4
I have dealt hitherto chiefly with the speech _de Mysteriis_, the best
of Andocides’ work. The other speeches now demand a short mention. The
_de Reditu_ differs remarkably from the later speech, _de Mysteriis_,
but it is chiefly a difference of tone. The verbal style is much the
same, though there is rather more tendency to antithetical structure. The
language is simple, the sentences are less hampered with parentheses.
But here Andocides is humble; he appears as a young man without friends
speaking before a critical and hostile assembly; he is moderate in
his language, apologetic in tone, careful not to give offence by any
sarcastic or ill-considered utterance. In the _de Mysteriis_ he is
speaking with the consciousness not of a better cause but of increased
powers and an assured position in the State. He is confident, almost
arrogant at times; he is bitter and violent in his attacks on his enemies.
The _de Pace_ bears a general resemblance in style to the other speeches,
except for certain grammatical peculiarities. Dionysius declared it to be
spurious, but modern critics mostly regard it as genuine.
The chief grounds for suspicion are the inaccuracies of the historical
narrative (§§ 3-9) and the curious fact that a very similar passage
occurs in Aeschines (_de F. L._, §§ 172-176), where even certain
peculiarities of phraseology[114] are reproduced. As to history,
the orators were often inaccurate about the past history of their
own country. Careless statements occur even in the _de Mysteriis_.
Demosthenes is an untrustworthy authority even for events almost
contemporary. As to the other matter, there is good reason for the belief
that Aeschines plagiarized Andocides in the fact that a reference to
Andocides, the grandfather of the orator, which occurs in both speeches,
is in place in a speech of Andocides, while there is no particular reason
why Aeschines, if he were composing the passage, should have mentioned
him. In some minor points, as Jebb has shown, Andocides is more accurate
than Aeschines. The suggestion that the _de Pace_ is a spurious speech,
composed by a later rhetor who plagiarized from Aeschines, is therefore
hardly tenable. There remains a third possibility, that both Aeschines
and Andocides borrowed from the same semi-historical compilation, perhaps
a lost rhetorical exercise.
The _de Pace_ and the _de Reditu_ are not enlivened by excursions into
anecdote or the consequent direct quotations of speech which characterize
the _de Mysteriis_. The historical argument already mentioned is dull in
itself, but the tedium of the _de Pace_ is somewhat relieved by a not
infrequent use of rhetorical question.
‘What is there left for us to discuss? The subject of Corinth
and the invitation of Argos. First, I should like to be
informed about Corinth: if the Boeotians do not join us in the
war but make peace with Sparta, what will Corinth be worth to
us? Remember the day, men of Athens, when we made our alliance
with the Boeotians; what was our feeling in that transaction?
Was it not that we and Boeotia in combination were strong
enough to stand against all the world? But now our question
is, if the Boeotians make peace, how shall we be able, without
Boeotian help, to fight against Sparta? We can do it, say some
people, if we protect Corinth, and have an alliance with Argos.
‘But when the Spartans attack Argos, are we going to help Argos
or not? We must definitely choose one course or the other.’[115]
An appeal for peace does not give such opportunities for oratory as a
call to arms; nevertheless, a greater orator might have made more of the
subject.
The speech _Against Alcibiades_ is undoubtedly spurious and belongs to a
much later date.
It is based upon a complete misconception of the nature of the law
about ostracism. The speaker is represented as discussing the question
whether he himself or Nicias or Alcibiades should be ostracized—a quite
impossible position. The speech is little more than a collection of some
of the stock anecdotes about Alcibiades, such as occur in Plutarch.
* * * * *
The names of four lost speeches are preserved:—πρὸς ἑταίρους,
συμβουλευτικός, περὶ τῆς ἐνδείξεως and ἀπολογία πρὸς Φαίακα. Fragments—a
few lines in each case—remain of two unnamed speeches. One of these
refers to Hyperbolus as still in Athens, and so must be placed not later
than 417 B.C., the year when Hyperbolus was ostracized. It deserves
quotation as being typical of the snobbishness of the young aristocrat,
not yet disciplined by misfortune.
‘I am ashamed to mention the name of Hyperbolus; his father
is a branded slave, who up to the present day works in the
public mint; he himself is a foreigner, a barbarian, and a
lampmaker.’[116]
CHAPTER IV
LYSIAS
§ 1
Though we attempt a chronological arrangement of the orators, such a
treatment is apt to be misleading, for their lives and the periods of
their activity overlap considerably. About the year 390 B.C. Andocides
was still composing speeches, Lysias was yet in his prime; Isocrates
had already made himself a reputation, and Isaeus had at least begun to
be known. It would be rash therefore to attempt to trace in the work
of any one the influence of any of the others. Speaking and writing
as contemporaries all may have had something to teach and something
to learn, but we can hardly say that one is in the fullest sense the
literary predecessor or the disciple of another.
Lysias was by descent a Syracusan; his father Cephalus, of whom Plato
gives us a charming picture in the opening chapters of the _Republic_,
was induced by Pericles to settle in Athens, and there Lysias was born.
The Pseudo-Plutarch gives the date as 459 B.C., and Dionysius gives
the same year; but this is founded on an assumption. He was known to
have gone to Thurii at the age of fifteen, and Thurii was founded in
443 B.C. But there is no proof that Lysias went to Thurii in the year
of its foundation; we only know that he cannot have been born earlier
than 459 B.C. Tradition, however, made him live to the age of eighty or
eighty-three, and his latest known speech is dated, probably, in 380
B.C., so that if we assume his death to have occurred shortly after 380
B.C., we shall be consistent.[117] The modern view, supported by Blass,
that Lysias was born not earlier than 444 B.C., has little evidence to
support it. It is based chiefly on the statement of the Pseudo-Plutarch
that Lysias did not go to Thurii till after his father’s death, and the
belief that Cephalus was alive in 430 B.C., the date in which the scene
of the _Republic_ is supposed to be laid. But Blass has himself collected
instances of Plato’s untrustworthiness about dates, and the biographer by
himself is a poor authority.
Lysias, then, went to Thurii with his brothers Polemarchus and
Euthydemus. He is said to have studied under the Syracusan rhetorician
Tisias. After the loss of the Athenian armies in Sicily, 413 B.C.,
Lysias and his brothers were among three hundred persons accused of
‘Atticizing,’ and were expelled from Thurii. They returned to Athens in
412 B.C. From this year till 404 B.C., the brothers lived in prosperity
and happiness, making a considerable fortune as proprietors of a
shield-factory, where they employed 120 slaves.
They had many friends; they belonged to the highest class of aliens—the
_isoteleis_—and the evidence of Plato and Dionysius makes it clear that
they mixed with the most cultivated society. They took pride in the
performance of all public services which fell to their share.
Fortune changed for the sons of Cephalus when in 404 B.C. a successful
revolution brought the Thirty into power; the orator himself gives a
graphic description of the way in which their ruin was brought about.
The Thirty, he tells us, ‘avowed that they must purge the city of
wrongdoers, and turn the rest of the citizens towards virtue and
justice.’ Two of the leaders pointed out that some of the _metoeci_ were
discontented with the new constitution; these _metoeci_ were rich, so
that their execution was not only a moral duty but a sound financial
move. They easily prevailed on their colleagues, who, as Lysias neatly
puts it, ‘thought nothing of taking life but thought a lot of making
money.’ The orator’s name was on the list, and he was arrested at a
dinner-party in his own house. He describes what followed:
‘I asked Piso whether he would save my life for money; he said
he would, if it was a large sum. So I said I was ready to pay
a talent, and he agreed to the terms. I knew well enough that
he regarded neither god nor man, but I thought my only chance
lay in trusting him. So when he had sworn by his own and his
children’s hope of salvation that he would save me if he got a
talent for it, I went into my strong-room and opened the chest.’
The sight of its contents, amounting to about six talents’ worth of
gold and silver as well as a quantity of plate, was too much for Piso’s
honesty. ‘I begged him to allow me enough for my journey, but he said I
ought to be well satisfied if I saved my skin.’
The prisoner was handed over by Piso to the keeping of Damnippus and
Theognis in the former’s house, and Damnippus, who seems to have been
softer-hearted than the rest, agreed to speak with Theognis on Lysias’
behalf. He knew his man, and ‘thought he would do anything for money.’
While they were bargaining, Lysias managed to slip away unnoticed
through the back-door, and on the following day escaped on ship-board to
Megara; his brother Polemarchus was arrested by Eratosthenes and put to
death.[118]
During his exile, which lasted something less than a year, Lysias showed
himself a true friend of the democracy. He gave two hundred shields to
the army and obtained recruits and gifts of money. When the oligarchy
fell in 403 B.C. the ecclesia, on the motion of Thrasybulus, passed a
vote conferring the citizenship on Lysias; but owing to some informality
the decree was declared illegal, and he lost his privilege immediately.
From this time till about 380 B.C. he was actively employed in writing
speeches, very few of which he delivered himself. His industry must have
been considerable, since Dionysius attributed to him not less than two
hundred forensic speeches.
The prosecution of Eratosthenes in 403 B.C. marks, so far as we know,
his only personal contact with Athenian politics. The occasion of the
_Olympiacus_ shows us Lysias appealing to a far wider audience at the
Olympic festival of 388 B.C. He died, according to the computation of the
ancients, soon after 380 B.C., at the age of about eighty years.
§ 2
In literature as in politics we grow tired of hearing Aristides called
the Just, and so perfect writers are less admired than they should be.
In Latin Terence, praised by all for the purity of his style, is less
read than the ruder Plautus, and in Greek Lysias, accounted by ancient
critics the standard writer of Attic prose,[119] is less appreciated than
Demosthenes.
Using the everyday language as a literary medium, Lysias, by his
exceptional skill and mastery over its idiom, exalted it to a simplicity
and accuracy of expression never surpassed by other writers. This
simplicity is deceptive:
‘ut sibi quivis
Speret idem, sudet multum frustraque laboret
Ausus idem.’
It is not till we analyse a passage or try to imitate the style that we
realize how great a part has been played by art in this structure which
seems so natural.
The smoothness strikes us, after a time, as monotonous, and many
readers will turn with relief from Lysias’ polish to the more telling
ruggedness of Antiphon, or the varied magnificence of Plato. Lysias, in
fact, provides us with an excellent example of the purest prose, but
the comparative coarseness of the average taste prefers something less
refined, less carefully purged of the natural impurities which prevent
insipidity, less free from the colouring matter which gives character.
So far I have considered only the broad impression produced by the
language, apart from more personal elements in style.
As an orator, Lysias is, on first acquaintance, disappointing. He seems
to lack fire, and to subordinate vigour to precision.
For this apparent weakness we must make certain allowances. We must
remember that he has to be judged chiefly by speeches written for others,
and speeches dealing with cases which in their very nature are often
unimportant, and in their details have little interest.
It would be unreasonable to ask for any other qualities than clear
statement of fact in a speech for the prosecution relating to
embezzlement by a trustee for a will (_Against Diogiton_), or in the
indictment of Nicomachus, a magistrate who has not rendered his accounts
in due course. Such speeches are of considerable importance indirectly:
to the jurist, as bearing upon the peculiarities of Attic Law; to the
general reader, because they help to fill in details of the picture of
public and private life at Athens. We should not pass a hasty judgment
on the writer because, considered as examples of oratory, they are less
attractive and impressive than some of the more famous models.
I will reserve for future consideration the only speech in which the
personal feelings of Lysias are deeply involved—the accusation of
Eratosthenes. Of the other speeches there is none which, taken as
a whole, is comparable to the finest of the public speeches or the
harangues of Demosthenes. Though Lysias had often to deal with trials of
public men, these trials were never really of public importance. It was
not his business to lay down a definite line of policy for his city to
follow; it was not for him to awake an apathetic nation to the need of
instant and decisive action. We cannot believe that any of his speeches
would appeal, or were meant to appeal, to Athens as a whole.
Even when he is dealing with events that took place during the tyranny
of the Thirty, though no doubt feeling still ran high, we have the
impression that only that part of the community which had been directly
concerned in promoting or thwarting the Revolution would be keenly
interested in the process of punishing or rewarding those who had
played minor parts: the majority had acquiesced, with greater or less
unwillingness, at the time of the changes, and now that the trouble was
past, were eager to make the best of the present; political memory at
Athens was short.
The position of Demosthenes was very different; his chief activity was
not after a crisis, but during a time of national danger. He found great
opportunities and he rose to them.
A great enthusiasm is required to produce really great men, whether
orators or statesmen. A gifted man under the influence of a great
constructive idea may, with exceptional opportunities, become a Pericles;
an extraordinarily favourable combination of such circumstances may give
birth to an Alexander.
In modern times the greatest eloquence is usually on the side of the
opposition, and in all ages a losing cause has tended to produce more
conspicuous men.
Demosthenes owes his great reputation partly to his exceptional ability,
but in very large part also to his opportunities, to the fact that he
was fighting against national apathy and foreign aggression for a noble
ideal—his conception of Athenian Liberty. A lesser intellect might have
shone under such circumstances; and on the other hand Demosthenes, if he
had had no opportunity for the speeches against Philip, might have been
ranked almost in the same class with such orators as Lysias.
§ 3
Lysias is no less simple in the arrangement of his subject-matter than
in his language. Practically every speech which has come down to us in
entirety may be analysed into four elements—preface, narrative, proof,
and epilogue. The preface or epilogue may be very slight; the narrative
may be so self-evident that proof is practically unnecessary, or on the
other hand, there may be hardly any facts to narrate, so that beyond
the words of the indictment only an accumulation of proofs is required;
but the order of the parts seems to be invariable. We have seen that
Andocides instinctively divided up his narrative, where there was a long
story to tell, and interspersed the parts with proofs of the details.
Isocrates, who states the necessity of the divisions which Lysias tacitly
adopted, himself departs from his own rules at times, while Isaeus, by a
judicious subdivision and shifting of the parts, contrives, as Dionysius
says, to ‘outmanœuvre’ the judges.[120]
Within these limits Lysias aimed at elasticity; though the form of the
speech was to be settled precisely, his artistic sense demanded a variety
in the details. It is remarked by Dionysius that, though he composed two
hundred speeches, he never used the same preface twice. Some orators
were in the habit of using over again the opening sentences which had
already served as introduction to an old speech, and even borrowing such
_proems_ whole from the speeches of their predecessors or from rhetorical
handbooks.
Lysias, with a truer instinct for what was appropriate, composed for
every speech a _proem_ adapted to its requirements. His versatility in
this small matter is much to be admired. It is to be noticed also that
there is considerable variety in his ways of ending his speeches; though
many of his epilogues practically say the same thing in different words,
they nearly all succeed in saying it in a way more appropriate to the
particular speech than to any other.
As there is diversity in these forms, so there is great variety in the
details of expression. There are very few formal mannerisms on which we
could seize if we wished to produce a parody of the style. There are
indeed one or two common necessary phrases which he employed frequently,
but even these are presented in different shape from time to time.[121]
§ 4
Lysias varies greatly in the structure of his sentences, at one time
producing periods neatly turned, with clauses carefully balanced, at
another time writing in a style by no means periodic; again varying
his form by mingling the two methods, inserting in the middle of the
period a parenthesis or relative clause which keeps us in suspense, or
attaching to the end of the period an extra limb which, from a technical
point of view, spoils its symmetry. It is impossible without quoting
a large number of examples to prove these statements in detail, but
we may state broadly that in speeches dealing with serious matters of
public interest the style is more periodic; in some of the private
speeches on comparatively trivial subjects the style is simpler and more
straightforward.
But there is often much variety within the limits of the same speech;
as Blass and others have pointed out, the narrative is usually told
in a simple style,[122] while for arguments and proofs the greater
elaboration of the period is employed. As I have pointed out in a
previous chapter,[123] narrative and argument seem naturally to evoke
different styles, and it may be supposed further that the juries
trying the more serious cases looked for a more finished style of
speech than the colloquial simplicity which would be admissible in
minor police-court cases. But even in the unimportant private speeches
Lysias has not one method only, and we feel that he varied his style of
sentence-construction to suit the character of the speaker for whom he
wrote. Thus the youth Mantitheus is nearly as simple in speech as he is
ingenuous in thought, while the cripple, whom we feel to be a plausible
rascal, glibly produces strings of neat antitheses, such as the following:
‘The rich with their money can buy exemption from danger, the
poor are compelled by their indigence to practise moderation.
The young claim indulgence from their elders, but both young
and old are equally severe on the faults of the others.
‘The strong have the opportunity, without risk to themselves,
of ill-treating whom they will; the weak can neither defend
themselves against an aggressor when they are ill-treated, nor
overpower their intended victims when they wish to ill-treat
others.’[124]
§ 5
The variation of sentence-construction is a minor help towards the
delineation of character—a necessary part of the business of a
professional speech-writer who tries to be realistic. But, in order that
the speech may seem appropriate to the speaker, it is necessary that
not only his words and phrases but his sentiments should be consonant
with his character. This effect Lysias attempted to produce, and he is
credited with having attained great success.
We may to some extent discover from the speeches what was the nature of
the speakers, but not altogether, for we have no indication as to tone or
manner of delivery.
However, from data of various kinds, we can form conceptions of many of
the speakers. Thus the defendant on a charge of receiving bribes (Or.
xxi.) gives a long and prosy catalogue of his services to the State, with
an account of the moneys that he has spent on liturgies (§§ 1-10); all
this leads up to his conclusion that he, who desired little for himself
and expended all his fortune for his country’s good, had no inducement to
take bribes to injure her.
* * * * *
From the _Mantitheus_ we get quite a vivid and pleasing picture of
a young Athenian of good birth and breeding, who ingenuously admits
to having some fashionable affectations and owns to an overpowering
ambition to distinguish himself as a speaker in the ecclesia, as he has
already done good service in the field.
The speech throughout is frank and self-confident, but not by any means
boastful:
‘From such records as these you ought to judge a man who in his
public life is guided by ambition combined with moderation;
you ought not to detest a man because he does his hair in the
fashionable way: such habits hurt nobody personally, and do no
harm to the community; while all of you alike are benefited by
those who willingly face your enemies. So it is not fair either
to love or to hate any one on account of his looks; you should
judge by his actions. Many people who talk little and dress
quietly have been the authors of great harm, while others who
do not affect such deportment have done you great services....
‘I have observed, too, that some people are offended with me
because I have ventured to speak in public when I am in their
opinion too young: but in the first place I have been forced to
speak publicly about matters which concern me, and besides, I
think I am by nature somewhat excessively ambitious.
‘I reflect that my ancestors have never ceased to serve the
State, and—to be candid—I observe that you think that such
people alone deserve your notice.
‘Seeing that such is your opinion, who would not be encouraged
to act and speak on the State’s behalf? And why should you be
displeased with those who do so? No one else has a right to
judge them; it is for you alone.’[125]
A very different picture is that of the cripple (Oration xxiv.) who
defends himself on a charge of receiving a State pension under false
pretences. He seems to protest too much about his infirmity, his
poverty, and his general helplessness, while he keeps a sneering tone
throughout, and hardly troubles to conceal a malicious temper:
‘I am almost grateful to the prosecutor for instituting this
trial. Hitherto I have had no pretext for giving you an account
of my life: now I have obtained one—through him. In my speech
I shall attempt to show that he is a liar, and that up to the
present day my life has been one that should win praise rather
than be exposed to jealousy, for I cannot think that he has
brought me to trial from any other motive than jealousy. But
if a man feels jealousy towards one whom all others pity, what
baseness will he not sink to, do you suppose?
‘It is not to gain money that he has laid this information, and
he is not trying to punish an enemy; he is a bad character,
with whom I have had no dealings either friendly or hostile.
So it is clear, Gentlemen, that he is jealous of me because,
though thus afflicted, I am a better citizen than he is. For I
think that one should compensate for bodily misfortunes by good
habits of mind; and if I show a disposition of mind to match my
unfortunate body, and fashion my life accordingly, I shall be
as bad as he is....’[126]
‘As to my riding, which he has had the audacity to mention,
having no fear of fortune or respect for you, there is not much
to say. I know that all who labour under any incapacity seek
some such relief, and speculate how best they may alleviate
their suffering. I am one of this class, and, being afflicted
as you see, have found riding a great comfort for a journey of
any length....
‘If I had the means, I would ride in comfort on a mule, instead
of a borrowed horse; but as I cannot afford a beast of my own,
I am compelled often to use a borrowed horse.... I am surprised
that he does not make it a ground for accusation that I walk
with two sticks, while others use one—on the plea that only the
affluent can afford two.’[127]
‘Again, he says that I associate with numerous bad characters
who have spent all their own money, and are plotting against
those who want to keep what belongs to them. But reflect that
this accusation does not hit me more than anybody else who
practises a trade; nor does it apply to my visitors more than
those of the rest of the working-class. Every one of you pays
visits to the perfumer, the barber, the shoemaker, or any
tradesman, and most people go to the establishments nearest
the market-place, and fewest to those farthest away. So if you
condemn my visitors as scoundrels, it is clear that you must
equally condemn those who spend their time in other people’s
shops; and if they are guilty, all the inhabitants of Athens
must be; for you are all in the habit of paying visits and
spending your time somewhere or other.’[128]
Another good example of this realism in depicting character is the speech
_de Caede Eratosthenis_. Lysias seems to have given us just the kind of
speech that is appropriate to a rather stupid man of the lower middle
classes who, by his own showing, is no better than his neighbours, though
no worse. Incidentally, the whole speech is an important contribution to
our knowledge of domestic arrangements in an Athenian home:
‘So things went on, till one day I returned unexpectedly from
the country. After dinner the baby was crying and fidgeting—the
servant had been teasing it on purpose, to make it cry,
for Eratosthenes was in the house: I heard all about that
afterwards.—I told my wife to go and feed the baby, to stop it
crying. She refused at first, pretending to be glad to have me
back after so long; but when I grew annoyed and told her again
to go, “Yes,” said she, “and leave you and the servant alone
up here; I know how you behaved one night when you were drunk.”
I laughed, but she got up and went away and shut the door,
treating it as a joke, and drew the bolt outside. I thought
nothing of it, and had no suspicion, and was glad to go to
sleep after my day’s work in the country. Early in the morning
she came back and opened the door, and when I asked why the
doors had banged in the night, she told me that the lamp beside
the child’s bed had gone out, and she had fetched a light from
a neighbour. I made no remark, supposing that this was the
truth. I had an idea that her face was powdered, although her
brother had died less than a month ago; but for all that I
said nothing more about it, and left the house and went on my
business without comment.’[129]
§ 6
Though Lysias shows dramatic instinct in the representation of character,
he seldom employs theatrical effects for the purpose of overpowering
the feelings of the court. He trusts more to logic than to the elements
of pity and terror, and shows a moderation of language comparable to
the self-restraint which characterizes his style in general. He avoids
exaggeration of every kind; even the story of his own arrest is told in
a dispassionate, almost impersonal style.[130] There can be no doubt
that Lysias thus gains greatly in dignity. The prison scene described
by Andocides[131] may appeal more to our feelings, but certainly more
impressive is the solemnity of a similar scene in Lysias:
‘When they were condemned to death, and their end was near,
they sent for various kinswomen—sister, mother, wife, as the
case might be—to visit them in prison, in order that they
might, before they died, bid them a last farewell. Dionysodorus
sent for my sister, who was his wife. Receiving the message,
she came dressed in mourning as a fit tribute to her husband’s
condition.’[132]
The prisoner then disposed of his property, and ‘solemnly warned his
wife, if she should bear a son, to tell the child that Agoratus had
killed his father, and bid him take vengeance on the murderer.’
There is no hint here of such weeping and wailing as Andocides describes;
nothing but the quiet pathos of the story itself to work upon the
feelings. To a certain class of audience this style would appeal more
truly than any extravagance of grief, and passages of this kind should be
enough to refute the common charge against Lysias that he lacks pathos.
§ 7
Lysias was not without a sense of humour, and sometimes employed sarcasm
which could be delicate and playful or bitter to the point of brutality
according to circumstances; thus in the _Epitaphios_ he remarks how the
Persians thought that their best chance of success would be to invade
Greece ‘while Greece was still quarrelling as to the best means of
defence against invasion.’[133]
Other sentences may be found in the speech _For the Cripple_.[134]
Sometimes a sarcastic reference is introduced by a play on words—as
βουλεύειν—δουλεύειν in _Philo_, § 26—‘He desires the position of a public
servant; that of a public slave is what he deserves.’ Out of several
instances in the _Nicomachus_ one may be quoted, in comparison with a
rather similar passage in Andocides: ‘He has now become a citizen instead
of a slave, a rich man instead of a poor man, a legislator instead of an
under-clerk.’
This is far less effective than the unexpected turn which Andocides gives
to a similar passage.[135]
Finally, the fragment of the speech against Aeschines the Socratic
contains a long humorous passage. Aeschines has a mania for borrowing
money which he never repays. ‘His neighbours are so badly treated by him
that they all move as soon as they can and take houses at a distance....
The crowd of creditors round his doors at daybreak makes people think
they are assembling for a funeral,’ and so on, in a comic vein, till the
speaker ends with a spiteful remark about Aeschines’ mistress, that ‘you
could count her teeth more easily than the fingers of her hand.’
§ 8
Lysias composed an extraordinary number of speeches; of the 425
attributed to him, Dionysius pronounced 233 to be genuine.[136] There
are now extant thirty-four, either complete or, in some cases, with
portions missing. A hundred and twenty-seven speeches are known by the
preservation of their titles or of small fragments.
As we cannot trace with any certainty a chronological development in
style, the most convenient classification of the speeches is according to
their subject-matter.
_Epideictic Speeches_
The fragment of the ‘Olympiac’ speech, which is undoubtedly genuine, is
an interesting specimen of compositions of this class.
The Sophists had early realized the opportunities which the great
assembly of all Greek States gave for an expression of national feeling,
and though perhaps the speech-making was instituted chiefly for the
display of oratory, the custom had grown up of making it an occasion
for discussing broad political questions. Thus Gorgias had preached the
necessity of union among Greeks, and in later time Isocrates in his
_Panegyric_ was to urge again the need of putting aside petty disputes
among cities for the good of the Greek nation.
In 388 B.C. Dionysius of Syracuse had sent a magnificent embassy to the
Olympic festival. Lysias, realizing that this despot of the West, who
had reduced important cities of Sicily, had defeated Carthage, and was
now threatening the towns of Magna Graecia, might become, especially if
allied with Persia, a serious menace to the independence of the cities of
Greece proper, urged them to sink their private animosities for the good
of all, and as a foretaste of their enmity he called upon them to tear
down the royal pavilion at Olympia and scatter its treasures.
In the extant fragment the speaker warns his hearers that much of the
Greek world is in the hands of tyrants, and much under barbarian sway.
This is owing to the weakness caused by internal discord. Empire depends
on command of the seas, and Dionysius and Artaxerxes are both strong in
ships.
‘You ought therefore to lay aside your war with each other, and
by harmonious action make a bid for safety; you should view the
past with shame and the future with apprehension.’
He invites Sparta to take the lead. The substance of the end of the
speech is known to us only from the ‘argument,’ but the fragment is long
enough to be judged as a simple yet dignified composition.
The _Epitaphios_ or Funeral Speech purports to relate to the Athenians
who fell in the Corinthian war, _c._ 394 B.C., though it is impossible to
determine the year precisely.
Such speeches were habitually delivered at Athens, a speaker of
established reputation being generally chosen to perform the service. Now
Lysias, not being a citizen, could not be so chosen, and, if the speech
was really delivered, he can hardly have composed it; for a practised
public speaker would probably not require the services of a professional
logographos.[137]
An extract from the peroration will give a general idea of the style:
‘And so we may deem these men most happy, in that they faced
and met their end on behalf of all that is great and noble, not
committing themselves to chance, nor awaiting the death that
comes in nature’s course, but choosing the noblest way of dying.
‘For their memory is ageless, and their honour is envied of
all men; we mourn for them as mortal in their nature, but we
celebrate them as immortal for their valour. They are receiving
a public funeral, and in their honour we institute displays
of strength and wisdom and wealth, holding them who have died
in battle worthy to be honoured with the same honour as the
immortals. So I call them happy in their death, and envy them
therefor, and think it should be said that life was worth the
possessing only for those men who, endowed with mortal bodies,
have left behind them through their valour a memorial that is
immortal. Still, we must follow ancient custom, and, obeying
the law of our fathers, make lamentation for those whom we are
burying to-day.’[138]
There is nothing striking or original in this peroration, which recalls
the fragment of the funeral speech of Gorgias, especially in the forced
and repeated contrasts between ‘mortal’ and ‘immortal.’ In manner and in
substance it is infinitely inferior to the famous speech of Pericles,
which, with all its extravagances of style, has a note of true feeling.
The _Epitaphios_ of Lysias rings hollow; it is feeble in imagery, it
contains very little reference to the dead, and holds out no hope of
comfort to the living. The allusions to the Persian war are part of the
rhetorical paraphernalia such as stirred the bile of Aristophanes, while
the historical references to the supposed circumstances of the speech are
so vague as not to be appropriate to any particular occasion.
On internal evidence, therefore, we may well believe that it is not a
real speech, but a declamatory exercise.
There is the further question, whether it was composed by Lysias or not.
The composer of a ‘_declamatio_’ may allow himself liberties which he
would not take in a real speech; yet it is hard to believe that Lysias
would have committed such faults of taste as to drag the wars of the
Amazons into discussion or to indulge in the exaggerations of the opening
sections: ‘All time would not be enough for all men to prepare a speech
adequate to such deeds!’ and again, ‘Everywhere and among all men do
those who mourn for their own sorrows proclaim the valour of these dead!’
This is not appropriate to the Corinthian war nor to any war in
the lifetime of Lysias, and Lysias did not elsewhere say things so
inappropriate.[139]
The speech is probably an exercise composed by a writer who had before
him the speech of Pericles and other such compositions. It is actually
quoted by Aristotle, who, however, does not assign it to Lysias.[140] The
general lack of restraint in tone is suspicious, and is, on the whole,
the strongest argument against authenticity.
Only one fragment (Or. xxxiv.) remains of a speech composed for the
ecclesia. According to its title, it was delivered in opposition to
some proposals to abolish or limit the ancient constitution after the
fall of the Thirty (403 B.C.). Dionysius doubts whether it was actually
delivered, but considers it to be written in a style suitable for
debate.[141] It is significant historically that the speaker dares to
compare the position of Athens in relation to Sparta with that of Argos
and Mantineia. The Athenians must have been broken in spirit to tolerate
such a reference.
_Public Causes_
These γραφαί fall under various heads; they deal with all offences
against the State, directly comprising treason, sacrilege, embezzlement,
unconstitutional procedure, evasion of military service, wrongful
claims for admission to office; or against the State in the person of an
individual, _e.g._ charges of murder or attempted murder.
They range in importance from high treason (_e.g._ _Ergocles_) and
deliberate murder (_e.g._ _Eratosthenes_) to the attempt of the Cripple
(Or. xxiv.) to obtain an insignificant pension by alleged false pretences.
* * * * *
_For Polystratus_ (Or. xx.), 411-405 B.C. This speech is entitled ‘_For
Polystratus; defence on a charge of attempting to subvert the democracy_.’
Polystratus had held office under the Four Hundred, and had even been
a member of that body. The nature of the charge brought against him
is uncertain, but as the penalty proposed was only a fine, it cannot
have been so serious as the title implies. Modern critics decide that
the speech is spurious, entirely on grounds of style and method. The
arrangement is at times confused, the argument obscure, and the style
weak.
This kind of argument against genuineness must always be a subjective
one; it is hard to prove the case. The speech _Against Theomnestus_ (_see
below_, p. 100) has faults unworthy of Lysias, and yet, according to the
same critics, it is undoubtedly genuine.
It should be remembered that the present speech is earlier by some years
(_c._ 407 B.C.) than any of the orations accepted as genuine, and perhaps
in the case of an orator’s earlier efforts we should look for less
precision and finish.
Or. xxi., on a charge of taking bribes, is only the second half of the
speech. The first part, dealing with specific charges, is lost. The
defendant points to his distinguished public services as a proof that he
is not the sort of man to be bribed to betray his country. The date is
probably 402 B.C.
* * * * *
_Against Ergocles_ (Or. xxviii.), _Against Epicrates_ (Or. xxvii.), and
_Against Philocrates_ (Or. xxix.) may be taken together as speeches
delivered by a public prosecutor, all in the year 389 B.C.; they assume
that the previous speakers have gone fully into the charges, so that
they themselves need only recapitulate them. The speakers are vigorous
and concise, but impersonal. There was no need in such formal orations
for the kind of adaptation to the speaker’s character which we find
elsewhere. Ergocles was prosecuted and put to death for betraying Greek
cities in Asia and enriching himself by embezzlement. Philocrates had
been his subordinate and confederate. Epicrates was also accused of
embezzling public money when in a position of trust.
* * * * *
_Against Nicomachus_ (Or. xxx.), date probably 399 B.C.—The only
charges against Nicomachus are that, having been appointed to revise
certain laws, he was dilatory in his work and did not finish it within
the appointed time, and has caused an excessive expenditure of public
money—not, be it noted, for his own advantage. Though Nicomachus at the
worst was unbusinesslike and indiscreet, the accuser thinks fit to shower
abuse on him, chiefly in connection with his humble origin, for his
father was a freedman.[142]
* * * * *
_Against the Corn-dealers_ (Or. xxii.) is a plain, unpretentious speech
arising out of the laws relating to the corn supply; the dealers were
not allowed to make a profit of more than one obol a bushel, and monopoly
was strictly guarded against. The date is uncertain; possibly about 390
B.C.
* * * * *
_On the Confiscation of the Property of the Brother of Nicias_ (Or.
xviii.), about 396-385 B.C.—Nicias’ brother Eucrates was put to death by
the Thirty in 404 B.C., and at some time later a decree was passed for
the confiscation of his estate. The sons and nephew of Eucrates plead
against the enforcement of this sentence. Of the fragment which remains
the greater part consists of an appeal to pity, which is very unusual in
the speeches of Lysias.
* * * * *
_For the Soldier_ (Or. ix.), 394-387 B.C.; a defence of Polyaenus, who is
prosecuted for non-payment of a fine, is of doubtful authenticity, though
the arguments concerning it are not conclusive.
* * * * *
_On the Property of Aristophanes_ (Or. xix.), 387 B.C., is another case
dealing with confiscation. The speech is very carefully constructed to
meet what was evidently a difficult case.
* * * * *
_Against Evandrus_ (Or. xxvi.), 382 B.C.—This is a considerable fragment
of a speech relating to a scrutiny (δοκιμασία). Leodamas, the first man
to be elected as archon for the year 381 B.C., having been rejected
as unfit, the second choice, Evandrus, becomes archon if he can pass
the scrutiny; but his enemies refer to his actions in the time of
the oligarchy, and, while admitting that he has been blameless since
the Restoration, refuse him all credit for this. The bitterness and
injustice of this speech are unusual in Lysias, but its genuineness is
not suspected.
* * * * *
_For Mantitheus_ (Or. xvi.),[143] about 392 B.C.; _Against Philo_ (Or.
xxxi.), 405-395 B.C.; and the wrongly entitled _Defence on a charge of
subversion of the democracy_ (Or. xxv.), 402-400 B.C., are all concerned
with δοκιμασία. There is more bitterness in the κατὰ Φίλωνος than in
the speech against Evandrus, but with more justification, for Philo, if
the stories told of him are true, must have been a very objectionable
scoundrel.
* * * * *
The speech _For the Cripple_ (Or. xxiv.), about 400 B.C., is also
concerned with a δοκιμασία, though of a different kind. A pension was
given by the State to certain persons who could not, on account of bodily
infirmity, support themselves, and had no other means of living. The
defendant in this case is accused of claiming the pension, whereas he is
comparatively well off.[144]
* * * * *
_Against Eratosthenes_ (Or. xii.), 403 B.C.—This, the most famous of
Lysias’ speeches, has been to some extent dealt with already.[145] It is
generally classed as a speech in a prosecution for murder, but it seems
more probable that it was delivered on the occasion of the εὔθυνα of
Eratosthenes; for the amnesty passed after the expulsion of the Thirty
specially provided that any of them who chose to give an account of their
actions should receive a fair trial.[146] Eratosthenes and Pheidon were
the only two who embraced this opportunity.
The latter view finds some support in the fact that only the first part
of the speech (§§ 1-37) deals with the murder of Polemarchus; the
longer portion (§§ 37-100) deals more generally with the character of
Eratosthenes and the crimes of the Thirty in general.
* * * * *
_Against Agoratus_ (Or. xiii.), 400-398 B.C.—Agoratus, an informer,
is prosecuted for having caused the death of the speaker’s cousin,
Dionysodorus. There is much historical matter in the speech, but the
accuser keeps definitely to the charge of murder, touching on political
matters only incidentally.
* * * * *
_On the Murder of Eratosthenes_ (Or. i.), date uncertain, is of interest
chiefly as illustrating domestic life among the middle class at
Athens.[147]
* * * * *
_Defence against Simon_ (Or. iii.), after 394 B.C.; and _On wounding
with intent_ (Or. iv.), date uncertain, are both speeches in defence on
the charge of wounding with intent to kill (τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας). The
defendant in the latter, wishing to prove that he was formerly on good
terms with the prosecutor, tells an extraordinary story of corruption.
The prosecutor was nominated by the defendant as judge at the Dionysia,
on the understanding that, if elected, he should award the prize to
the latter’s tribe. He left a written note of this agreement; but
unfortunately he was not elected, so that the prize went to a chorus
which either sang better or organized its corrupt practices with more
skill.[148]
* * * * *
_For Callias_ (Or. v.), date uncertain, is a defence, apparently, on a
charge of sacrilege. The precise charge is unknown.
* * * * *
_On the Sacred Olive_ (Or. vii.), about 395 B.C., is in defence of a
man charged with uprooting the stump of a sacred olive—a sacrilege
punishable by banishment and confiscation of property.
* * * * *
_Against Alcibiades, I. and II._ (Or. xiv. and Or. xv.), about 395 B.C.
The first is on a charge of desertion, the second of avoiding military
service—two different aspects of the same offence. The defendant, a son
of the great Alcibiades, had presumed to serve in the cavalry when he
was only entitled to be a hoplite. The young Alcibiades evidently paid
for the sins of his father, to whom half of the present indictment is
devoted. On this point we may compare the subject-matter of the speech of
Isocrates in defence of Alcibiades,[149] and the speech against him which
is attributed to Andocides, but is probably a later work.[150]
_Private Speeches_
_Against Theomnestus_ (Or. x.), 384-383 B.C., is a speech for the
prosecution in an action for defamation. The speaker deals at quite
disproportionate length with a verbal quibble by which the defendant has
tried to escape justice. The argument is ingenious, but owing to the
slightness of the subject-matter the speech has no interest except to
students of method.[151]
* * * * *
_Against Diogiton_ (Or. xxxii.), 400 B.C., is a truly excellent
statement of the case against a dishonest guardian. In addition to the
skilful handling of financial details, there is much dramatic skill in
description and suggestion of character.
* * * * *
_On the Property of Eraton_ (Or. xvii.), 397 B.C.—This speech occurred in
a διαδικασία between an individual and the State. The speaker asserts
a claim to the property of Eraton (which has been confiscated), for the
repayment of a debt.
* * * * *
_Against Pancleon_ (Or. xxiii.), date uncertain.—Pancleon, accused on
some unknown charge, and supposed by the prosecutor to be a _metoecus_,
has put in a plea that he is a Plataean citizen and therefore not
amenable to the law under which he was indicted. He turns out after all
to be a runaway slave.
These last two speeches consist almost entirely of narrative.
_Spurious or Doubtful Speeches_
_Against Andocides_ (Or. vi.), 399 B.C.—It is generally believed that
this speech is not by Lysias, the most serious argument being that the
writer of it is a blunderer. As Jebb points out, he makes at least three
damaging admissions calculated seriously to injure his own case. It may,
however, really be a speech delivered against Andocides. It contains some
statements which do not agree with Andocides’ own admissions, but, as
we have seen, it cannot be proved that Andocides was always veracious.
On the ground of general agreement with Andocides’ statements we may
believe that it was composed by some contemporary orator, and not, as has
been sometimes asserted, by a late Sophist. It may have been actually
delivered at the trial of Andocides in 399 B.C.
* * * * *
_Eroticus._—Phaedrus, in the dialogue of Plato which bears his name,
reads aloud a speech of Lysias which Socrates criticizes.
If Plato could be taken literally, we should believe that what is read
was the authentic work of Lysias; but Plato is if anything too emphatic
in his attempts to produce this illusion, and most readers will probably
be left with the impression that Plato is following his usual custom; he
tries to give his myths the solemnity of fact, and what he produces here
is an imitation too close to be called a parody. We may compare Plato’s
reproduction of Aspasia’s oration in the _Menexenus_.
* * * * *
The speech _To his Companions_ (Or. viii.) cannot reasonably be
attributed to Lysias, and indeed is so trivial that it can hardly be the
work of any self-respecting forger. It is probably to be regarded as a
declamatory exercise.
The speaker complains that his friends have slandered him by asserting
that he forced his company on them; they have sold him an unsound horse,
and accused him of inducing others to slander them. He therefore abjures
their friendship.
* * * * *
Extracts from six lost speeches are preserved by quotation in various
writers:
_Against Cinesias_ (Athenaeus, xiii. 551 D); _Against Tisis_ (Dion.,
_de Demos._, ch. xi.); _For Pherenicus_ (Dion., _de Isaeo_, ch. vi.);
_Against the Sons of Hippocrates_ (_ibid._); _Against Archebiades_
(_ibid._, ch. x.); _Against Aeschines_ (Athenaeus, xiii., 611 E-612
C).[152]
The fragments of other speeches, in Suidas, Harpocration, and others, are
negligible.
CHAPTER V
ISAEUS
§ 1
Dionysius could find, in the authorities whom he consulted, no definite
information about the life of Isaeus. The dates of his birth and death
are unknown; we cannot, as Dionysius observes, say what were his
political opinions, or even whether he had any at all.[153] We are even
in doubt as to his birthplace; some authorities called him an Athenian,
others a Chalcidian. The suggestion that he may have been the descendant
of an Athenian who settled in Chalcis as a _cleruch_ is plausible, but
without any authority.[154] The inference, from the fact that he took no
part in public life, that he was probably an alien, is not justifiable.
The fact that, whether an Athenian or not, he never spoke at any of the
great national assemblies, where rhetoricians from all Greek countries
gave displays, seems to argue that he had no ambition for personal
distinction as an orator, but was content to be a professional writer of
speeches.
There is a legend that the young Demosthenes, impressed by the
effectiveness of Isaeus’ oratory, induced the latter to live in his house
and train him thoroughly in all the arts of the forensic speech-writer;
it is even said that the earliest speech of Demosthenes, against
Aphobus, was in reality composed by his master. The authority for these
tales is quite insignificant, but the influence of Isaeus on Demosthenes
was nevertheless considerable, whether or not they came much into
personal contact.
Dionysius records, on the authority of Hermippus, that Isaeus ‘was a
pupil of Isocrates and a teacher of Demosthenes, and came into close
contact with the best of the philosophers.’[155]
There is no evidence that he was ever a companion of Socrates, since his
name is not anywhere mentioned by Plato.
His earliest speech (_On the Estate of Dicaeogenes_) is assigned with
some probability to the year 390 B.C., and his latest (_On the Estate of
Apollodorus_) to 353 B.C.
If the date 390 B.C. is correct, the period of his study under Isocrates
may reasonably be placed during the period 393-390 B.C., when that orator
was starting his school, and on this assumption we might place the birth
of Isaeus approximately at 420 B.C. But the chronology rests entirely
on internal evidence which in this case is ambiguous; a later date for
the speech is equally possible, and in that case the earliest speech is
that _On the Estate of Aristarchus_, 377-371 B.C. Isaeus, then, need not
have been born before 400 B.C. There is more certainty in the dating of
the last extant speech about 353 B.C., but we have no means of knowing
whether or not the orator lived long after its composition. He may have
spent many years in retirement. Isocrates was writing up to the moment
of his death, but he had great thoughts to express; Isaeus, with no
interest in politics, may, when he retired from the monotonous task of
writing speeches for others, have been glad to find no further necessity
for composition. However, the approximate dates 420-350 B.C. will give a
reasonable duration for such a life.
Isaeus is perhaps the only one of the orators for whom we cannot feel any
enthusiasm. If we had, from external sources, the slightest clue to his
real feelings, we might be able to collect from his speeches some hints
that would help us to form an image of his personality. He is known to
us only from speeches which he wrote for others, all of them, with the
exception of one fragment, dealing with testamentary cases, which are not
the most interesting province of law. He was not personally interested
in any of these trials, unless we can believe the more than doubtful
assertion of the Greek argument to the fourth oration, that he himself
spoke in support of Hagnon and Hagnotheus, being their kinsman.
We may contrast his case with that of Antiphon, who similarly is
known to us chiefly from speeches in one department of law—trials for
homicide; but in Antiphon’s case we are fortunate in having a short but
illuminating notice of his life by Thucydides, which forms the outline of
the picture; and in addition we have the tetralogies which to some extent
help to fill in the details. Of Isaeus as a man we know less, almost,
than we do of Homer. We gather only an impression of his wonderful
efficiency in dealing with subjects of a particular class—his exhaustive
knowledge of the intricacies of testamentary law, and his dexterity in
applying that knowledge to the best purpose; a kind of efficiency which
is admirable, but dull.
Isaeus is our chief authority for the Attic Laws of inheritance.[156]
These laws were often arbitrary, and though they were to some extent
simplified by the fact that a man who had sons could not legally will his
property away from them, the intricacies of tables of consanguinity were
so complex that only a specialist could be expected to have a complete
mastery of them. There was no class of professional lawyers at Athens;
the Attic Laws were very largely framed by amateurs, of which we have
evidence in the number of recorded cases in which the proposers of laws
were prosecuted for illegality, _i.e._ for enacting laws contrary to
laws already established; and as the framing of them was a matter of
haphazard improvisation, so their interpretation was often a question of
the temper of the jury for the moment. No doubt some record of verdicts
was kept, but the Athenians had no great respect for precedent, or at any
rate could not make full use of it in the lack of professional judges who
should be experts in such matters. Thus there were great opportunities
for a man like Isaeus, who combined a minute knowledge of law and
procedure with skill in applying his knowledge; who could quote at will
either the law or precedent for departing from its letter, and, where
the wording of the law left any room for ambiguous interpretation, could
twist the meaning to one side or the other to suit his case.
The particular branch of law which Isaeus chose as his special
province was important owing to the large number of cases dealing with
inheritances which seem to have come before the Athenian Courts, and
these cases were often in themselves important owing to the religious
significance of the fact of inheritance. An Athenian desired to leave
behind him a male heir not only that his property might remain in the
family, but that the family might have a representative who should carry
on the private worship of the household gods, and in particular should
duly perform the funeral rites of the testator and offer all the proper
sacrifices at his grave. Heirship, therefore, carried with it certain
definite religious duties, and a man who had no child living usually
ensured the continuity of the family worship by adopting a son either in
his lifetime or by will.
The skill of Isaeus in dealing with complicated cases is well shown
by a consideration of the arguments of any of the remaining speeches;
for instance, Oration v. (_On the Estate of Dicaeogenes_) is concerned
with the claims of a certain man’s nephew as against his cousin, who
inherited a third portion under a will subsequently proved to be false,
and eventually succeeded to the whole under a second will which the
claimants proved false. Two wills and the results of two previous trials
have to be kept in mind, as well as the rather complicated relationship
of the parties; but Isaeus makes the case substantially clear. Again,
in Oration xi. (_On the Estate of Hagnias_) twenty-three members of the
family are referred to by name, and it is necessary to trace the family’s
ramifications through a large number of second cousins whose nearness of
consanguinity is in some cases affected by the intermarriage of first
cousins. The facts of the case are not easy to follow even on paper, and
it appears that the judges on this occasion were puzzled into giving a
wrong verdict.
The orator’s methods may, however, be studied more conveniently in a
simpler speech, _On the Estate of Ciron_ (Or. viii.). The essential facts
of the case are as follows:—Ciron by his first marriage had one daughter,
the mother of the two claimants. Ciron married a second wife, the sister
of Diodes. The son of Ciron’s brother, instigated by Diodes, made a
counter-claim on the grounds that (1) Ciron’s daughter was illegitimate
and consequently her sons were illegitimate; (2) a brother’s son in any
case has a better claim than a daughter’s son. The speaker, the elder of
the claimants, first establishes his mother’s legitimacy, proving that
Ciron always treated her as his daughter and twice gave her a dowry, and
regarded her sons as his natural heirs.
‘Our grandfather Ciron died, not without issue, but leaving
as issue my brother and myself, the sons of his legitimate
daughter; but the plaintiffs claim the inheritance on the
assumption that they are the next of kin, and insult us by the
insinuation that we are not sons of Ciron’s daughter, and that
he never had a daughter at all. This is due to the claimants’
covetousness and the great amount of Ciron’s estate, which they
have seized, and now control. They have the impudence to say
that he left nothing, and in the same breath to lay a claim to
the inheritance.
‘Now your judgment ought not, in my opinion, to have reference
to the man who has urged the claim, but to Diocles of Phlya,
known as Orestes, who has incited him to annoy us, endeavouring
to withhold the property which Ciron left at his death, and to
endanger our interests, so that he may not have to part with
any of it, if you are misled by the assertions of the claimant.
Since they are working for these ends it is right that you
should be informed of all the facts, in order that no detail
may escape you, and that you may have a full knowledge of all
that has occurred, before you give your verdict. So I ask you
to consult the interests of justice by giving to this case
as serious consideration as you have given to any other case
before. This is only just. Recall the numerous cases that have
come before you, and you will find that no plaintiffs have ever
made a more shameless or barefaced claim to property that does
not belong to them than these two.
‘Now it is a hard task, Gentlemen, for one entirely
inexperienced in the procedure of the courts to hold his own in
a trial for such an important issue against concerted speeches
and witnesses who give false evidence; but I have a confident
hope that I shall obtain justice from you, and that my own
speech will be satisfactory to the point, at least, of stating
a just cause, unless I am thwarted by some obstacle of the kind
which I apprehend. I therefore urge you, Gentlemen, to give
me a courteous hearing, and if you consider that I have been
wronged, to support the justice of my claim.
‘First, I shall convince you that my mother was the legitimate
daughter of Ciron. For events long past I shall rely on
reported statements and evidence, for those within our memory
I shall adduce witnesses who know the facts, as well as proofs
which are stronger than depositions; and when I have laid this
all before you I shall prove that I have a better right than
the claimant to inherit the estate of Ciron.
‘I shall start from the point at which my opponents began, and
from thence onwards instruct you in the facts.
‘My grandfather Ciron, Gentlemen, married my grandmother, who
was his own first cousin, being the daughter of a sister of his
own mother. After the marriage she in due course gave birth to
my mother, and four years later she died.
‘My grandfather, having only this one daughter, married his
second wife, the sister of Diodes, who bore him two sons. He
brought up my mother in the house with his wife and children,
and during the lifetime of the latter, when his daughter was of
marriageable age, he bestowed her on Nausimenes of Cholarge,
giving her a dowry of clothing and gold ornaments, as well as
twenty-five minae. Three or four years after this, Nausimenes
fell ill and died, before my mother had borne him any children.
My grandfather took her back to his house, but owing to the
disorder of her husband’s affairs he did not recover all the
dowry he had given with her; he then married her a second time
to my father, with a dowry of 1000 drachmae.
‘In face of the charges now brought by the plaintiffs, how can
my statements be proved? I sought and found the way.
‘Ciron’s domestic slaves, male and female, must know whether my
mother was or was not his daughter; whether she lived in his
house; whether he did or did not on two occasions give feasts
in honour of her marriage; what dowry each of her husbands
received. Wishing to examine them under torture by way of
supporting the evidence already in my hands, in order that
you might put more confidence in their evidence when they had
submitted to the examination than you would if they were only
apprehending it, I requested the plaintiffs to surrender their
slaves of both sexes to be examined on the above points and all
others of which they have knowledge. But this man, who will
shortly request you to believe his own witnesses, shrank from
submitting to such an examination. But if I can prove that he
refused, how can we avoid the presumption that his witnesses
are now giving false evidence since he has shrunk from a test
so searching?
‘To prove the truth of my assertion, take first this deposition
and read it.[157]
[_The deposition._]
‘Now you hold the opinion, both personally and officially, that
torture is the surest test; and whenever slaves and freemen
come forward as witnesses and you have to arrive at facts, you
do not rely on the evidence of the freemen, but torture the
slaves and seek thus to discover the truth. You are right in
your preference; for you know that whereas some witnesses have
been suspected of giving false evidence, no slaves have ever
been proved to have made untrue statements in consequence of
the torture to which they were submitted.[158]
‘Who may be expected to know the early facts? Obviously those
who were acquainted with my grandfather, and they have told us
what they heard. Who must know about my mother’s marriage? The
parties to the marriage contracts, and their witnesses. On this
point the relations of Nausimenes and of my father have given
evidence. And who knew that my mother was brought up in Ciron’s
house, and was his legitimate daughter? The present claimants
give clear evidence that this is true, by their action in
refusing the torture. Surely, then, it would not be reasonable
for you to discredit my witnesses, while you can hardly fail to
disbelieve those of the other side.
‘Besides these, we can bring other proofs by which you shall
know that we are sons of Ciron’s daughter. He treated us as he
naturally would treat his daughter’s sons; he never conducted a
sacrifice without our presence, but whether the sacrifice were
small or great, we were always there and joined in it. Not only
were we summoned for such occasions, but he always used to take
us to the rural Dionysia, and we used to see the show with him,
sitting by his side; and we came to his house to keep every
feast-day. And when he sacrificed to Zeus Ktesios, a sacrifice
to which he attached the utmost importance, never allowing
slaves or even freemen, outside the family, to participate, but
doing everything by himself, we used to share in the sacrifice;
we helped him to handle the offerings, we helped him to
place them on the altar, we helped him in everything, and, as
our grandfather, he would pray the God to give us health and
wealth. But if he had not considered us as his daughter’s sons,
and seen in us the only descendants left to him, he would never
have done anything of the kind, but would have kept by his
side this man who now claims to be his nephew. The truth of
this is known best of all by my grandfather’s servants, whom
the plaintiff refused to surrender to torture; but it is known
accurately enough by some of my grandfather’s friends, whose
evidence I shall produce’ (§§ 14-17).
The speaker continues that he and his brother were enrolled by Ciron in
the _phratria_, and were allowed to conduct the funeral by Diocles, who
thus tacitly admitted their claim.
He next proves by legal argument that direct descendants have a better
claim than collateral relations. By way of epilogue he gives an account
of the property and the machinations of Diocles, whose personal character
he attacks, and at the end produces evidence that Diocles has been proved
guilty of adultery.
§ 2. _Literary Characteristics_
Isaeus studied under Isocrates, and it is therefore reasonable to
follow the chronological order and take the master first; but as the
master survived the pupil by several years, and was actively engaged
in literature down to the day of his death, ordinary considerations of
seniority do not apply in this case. It is more satisfactory to study
Isaeus in relation, not to Isocrates, but to the earlier speech-writers,
Antiphon and Lysias. He is more closely connected with them in his
subject-matter, since he is, like them, essentially a practical writer,
and his businesslike style has more affinity to the terse condensation
of Lysias than to the florid ‘epideictic’ diction of the author of the
_Panegyric_.
In language there is not very much difference between Lysias and Isaeus;
both use the current vocabulary, making a literary medium out of the
popular speech of their day. A search through the latter’s speeches
re-discovers a certain number of words which, so far as our knowledge
goes, have a poetical tinge; but practically all these may be found in
other orators and prose-writers.[159]
Again, there are a few noteworthy metaphors, such as ἐκκόπτειν, to
‘knock out’ or ‘knock on the head’—this is used again by Dinarchus—and
καθιπποτροφεῖν, ‘to race away one’s money,’ _i.e._ squander it on a
stable. We know little of the idioms of the language spoken in the
streets of Athens in the fourth century, but we do know that popular
speech has always a tendency to the employment of rough metaphors,
and where we come into contact with the spoken word we expect to find
expressions of this kind.[160] A study of the private letters contained
among the Oxyrhynchus Papyri will give many examples to the point.[161]
Lastly, a few words recall the language of comedy.[162]
We may readily believe that, in admitting these few blemishes to the
purity of his Atticism, the orator was indulging in a realism of which
we find very few traces, as a rule, in literary prose.[163]
His grammar, according to strict Attic rule, is occasionally at
fault,[164] and the MSS. exhibit a certain number of word-forms which are
supposed to be un-Attic.[165]
Whether we should emend these passages to suit the supposed standard,
or make the standard more liberal to admit such passages, is a matter
for controversy. The MSS. of Thucydides exhibit a wealth of ingenious
perversity in the way of grammar, and in that case, though many critics
have spent their ingenuity on reducing the text to order and decency, an
opposite school of criticism maintains that the historian may have chosen
to write as he liked. The greatest artists are above the laws of their
art, and Isaeus may have condescended to a level which he knew not to be
the highest.
With regard, then, to the purity of language, Isaeus, though surpassed
by Lysias and Isocrates, is not far behind them. He is on a level with
Lysias also in clearness and accuracy of thought, and in what Dionysius
calls ἐνάργεια, vividness of presentation. But in the structure of
sentences some differences between these two must be noted. Lysias, as
has already been stated, varied his structure considerably according to
the subjects of his speeches, the succession of periods being broken by
the introduction of a freer style; but at the same time he had a love of
antithesis to which sacrifices had sometimes to be made.
Isaeus is free from this straining after antithesis, and is hardly
bound at all by scholastic rules. We cannot truly say that his style
is non-periodic, for formal periods are to be met with; but a marked
characteristic of his style is his skill in the use of short sentences,
often abrupt, nearly always vigorous. In argumentative passages
especially, he uses the form of imaginary question and answer; in
narrative he sometimes gives us a series of short sentences, connected
in thought, but not formally bound together. He has the appearance of
composing negligently, but from his effectiveness we conclude that the
negligence was studied. The following passages illustrate these styles:
‘Eupolis, Thrasyllus, and Mneson were brothers from the same
two parents. Their father left them a considerable property, so
that they were eligible for the performance of public services.
This the three divided amongst them. Of these brothers, two
died about the same time,’ etc.[166]
The speech about Ciron’s inheritance contains the best example of
argument by question and answer:
‘On what ground should a statement be believed? Should we not
say, on the ground of the evidence? I fancy so. And on what
ground should we believe witnesses? From the fact that they
have been tortured? Naturally. And on what grounds should we
disbelieve the statements of the plaintiffs? Because they
shrink from this test? Most certainly.’[167]
A third quotation gives a good example of the purely ornamental use of
the rhetorical question; it is precious as showing us that Isaeus was on
occasion capable of applying a lighter touch. He is so coldly logical as
a rule that we turn with relief to any exhibition of ordinary feeling:
‘Who was there who omitted to cut his hair short when the two
talents arrived? Who was there who failed to wear black, hoping
that his mourning would give him a claim to the inheritance?
Or how many relatives and sons laid claim, by deed of gift, to
the estate of Nicostratus? Demosthenes said he was his nephew,
but when the present claimants disproved his statement, he
retired. Telephus said that Nicostratus had given him all his
property. He too soon ceased to be a claimant. Ameiniades came
before the archon and produced a son for Nicostratus—a child
less than three years old, though Nicostratus had not been in
Athens for eleven years past. Pyrrhus of Lamptra said that the
money had been dedicated by Nicostratus to Athena, but given
by Nicostratus to himself. Ctesias of Besaea and Cranaus first
said that judgment had been given in their favour against
Nicostratus for a talent, and when they could not prove it,
asserted that he was their freedman. They, like the rest,
failed to establish their statement.
‘These were the parties who in the first instance pounced at
once upon the property of Nicostratus. Chariades made no claim
at the time.’[168]
Dionysius, a very keen critic on the literary side, misses in Isaeus the
grace and charm of Lysias, but allows him more cleverness.[169]
This ‘charm,’ by which Dionysius could distinguish a genuine speech of
Lysias, is incapable of definition and too elusive for our blunter wits
to apprehend; but we can form a general impression that the diction of
Lysias has something in it more pleasing than that of Isaeus. Perhaps
there is something in the illustration which the ancient critic applies,
when he compares the speeches of the former to a clearly drawn picture
of simple colour and design; those of the latter to a more elaborate and
ingenious composition, where there is more play of light and shade and
the depth and brilliance of the colouring in some cases obscures the
lines—with a suggestion that the drawing may be faulty.[170] This simile,
however, applies more truly to the structure of the speeches than to the
diction. Dionysius recurs to the style,[171] and quotes parallel extracts
from the introductions to speeches by the two writers to demonstrate the
simplicity of Lysias and the artificiality of Isaeus. The demonstration
is not overpowering. The first specimen from Lysias is indeed simple and
clear, but the extract from Isaeus, though the language is a little more
elaborate, seems equally suitable for its purpose.
Lysias wrote as follows:
‘I feel, Gentlemen, that I must tell you about my friendship
with Pherenicus, so that none of you may be surprised that I,
who have never before pleaded for any one else, am now pleading
for him. I had a friend in his father Cephisodotus, and when
our party was exiled to Thebes I stayed with him, as did any
other Athenian who wished to.
‘He did us many kind services, both officially and privately,
before we were restored to our homes. So when his family met
with the same misfortune, and came in exile to Athens, I
felt that I owed them the greatest possible gratitude, and
received them in such intimate fashion that nobody who came
to the house, and did not know, could tell which of us was
the owner of it. Now Pherenicus knows that there are many who
are cleverer speakers than I, and have more experience of
such business; but he thinks that he can rely absolutely on
my friendship. So I should think it disgraceful, when he asks
me and urges me to support his claims, to allow him to lose
Androclides’ gift, if I can do anything to prevent it.’[172]
The following is the parallel extract from Isaeus:
‘Before now I have been of service to Eumathes, as indeed he
has deserved; and now, so far as in me lies, I shall try to
help you to save him. Now listen to me for a short time, lest
any of you suppose that I through recklessness or any other
unjust motive have approached the case of Eumathes.
‘When I was a trierarch in the archonship of Cephisodorus,
and a report was carried to my relatives that I had been
killed in the sea-fight, whereas I had some moneys deposited
with Eumathes, Eumathes sent for my relative and friends, and
declared the amount of the money which was in his hands, and
justly and honestly made payment in full.
‘In consequence of this I, when I got home in safety, treated
him as a still closer friend, and when he was starting business
as a banker I provided him with money. After this, when
Dionysius claimed him as a slave, I vindicated his liberty,
knowing that he had been manumitted by Epigenes before the
court. But I shall say no more on this subject.’[173]
Dionysius thus criticizes them:
‘What is the difference between these proëmia? In Lysias the
introduction of the subject is pleasing for this one reason,
that it is stated naturally and simply.
‘“I feel, Gentlemen, that I must begin by telling you about my
friendship with Pherenicus”’—
What follows has no appearance of premeditation, but is put just as an
amateur might express it:
‘“so that none of you may be surprised that I, who have never
before pleaded for any one else, am now pleading for him.” But
in Isaeus what seems so simple is really premeditated, and we
see at once that it is rhetorical: “Before now I have been of
service to Eumathes, as indeed he has deserved; and now, so far
as in me lies, I shall try to help you in saving him.” This is
more exalted and less simple than the other; still more is this
true of the next sentence: “Now listen to me for a short time,
lest any of you suppose that I through recklessness or any
other unjust motive have approached the case of Eumathes.”’
Dionysius finds that the expressions here used, προπέτεια, ἀδικία, πρὸς
τὰ Εὐμαθοῦς πράγματα προσῆλθον, sound to him artificial rather than
spontaneous. In this he may be right; but we feel him to be hypercritical
when he blames the next sentence for lack of simplicity, and tries, by
a few verbal alterations, to show how it might have been improved. He
would re-write the sentence thus:—‘When I was trierarch, and it was
reported at home that I had been killed, Eumathes, having some money of
mine on deposit,’ etc. Here he has certainly succeeded in omitting once
the name Eumathes, which occurs twice in Isaeus; but the other changes
consist purely in the substitution of two temporal clauses introduced
by ὅτε (when) for two participial clauses in the genitive absolute—a
construction which is, surely, common enough in all Greek writers to
escape the censure of being ‘rhetorical.’
§ 3. _Structure of Speeches_
The exceptional power of Isaeus does not, then, depend upon any charm
of language or any oratorical gift; it lies in his exhaustive legal
knowledge and his remarkable skill in argument. He has an almost unique
gift for circumstantial statement and proof of the facts bearing on his
case. This is the cleverness (δεινότης) to which Dionysius so often
refers with grudging admiration.
His speeches are not arranged according to a single plan, but, on the
contrary, exhibit great variety of structure. Lysias keeps practically
to one form—exordium, narrative, proof, epilogue. Isaeus, when the
narrative is too long or complicated to be grasped all at once, does not
set it out as a whole, but breaks it up into sections, each of which is
accompanied by its evidence and argument.[174] ‘The orator is afraid.’
thinks Dionysius, ‘that the argument may be hard to follow, on account of
the number of its sections, and that the proofs of the various points,
if all collected together, being so numerous as they must be, dealing
with matters so numerous, may be detrimental to clearness.’ The critic is
referring particularly to the speech _For Euphiletus_ (Or. xii.), a large
fragment of which his quotations have preserved for us; but an analysis
of any of the extant speeches will show that they are constructed
skilfully on varying plans, unhampered by technical rule, with an art
that adapts its material according to the requirements of the case. This
skill, which aims at success rather than literary finish, shows that
Isaeus was above all a competent tactician—such a master of argument
that, ‘whereas we should be ready to believe Lysias even when he tells a
lie, we can hardly regard Isaeus without suspicion even when he tells the
truth.’[175]
Dionysius is no doubt led rather far away by his desire for a contrast;
he has given Isaeus a bad name and is seeking means to justify his
condemnation of the man who ‘takes a mean advantage of his adversary and
outmanœuvres the judges.’[176]
This Greek of a late Hellenistic age thoroughly grasped the Athenian
spirit, which demanded artistic composition and was yet suspicious of
any man who was too obviously clever, a spirit against which we find
Antiphon, the earliest of the orators, contending, when he makes his
characters protest their own inexperience and insinuate that their
opponents seem strong only because they have that same discreditable
skill to make the worse cause appear the better.[177]
Isaeus sometimes reiterates his arguments; he will even quote the same
document twice. This is inartistic, but it pays. A notable advance on his
predecessors is found in the form of some of his epilogues. The earlier
orators were generally content, after stating the case, to finish with
a general appeal to justice or pity. Isaeus on occasion makes a more
practical use of his closing periods; he recapitulates the case, pointing
out that he has proved what he set out to prove;[178] or gives a short
summary of the narrative which he regards as now established, or of the
claims urged by himself and his opponent. In one speech[179] he has
actually reached the end and summarized his results, when the very last
words surprise us by an unexpected attack on his adversary’s character:
‘I do not know that there is any need for me to say more, for I
think there is no point on which you have not full knowledge;
but I will ask the clerk to take the last remaining deposition,
showing how the claimant was convicted of adultery, and read it
to the court.’
Some of the earlier speech-writers made an attempt at character-drawing,
and tried to suit their speeches to the character (ἦθος) of their
clients. In Isaeus this illusion is not maintained; his style varies
somewhat according to the subject, but every speech bears, as Dionysius
observes, the stamp of the professional writer, which must have betrayed
it to the acute perceptions of an Athenian jury.[180] Probably the
accumulated experience of the orators had proved that such attempts at
deception were on the whole useless; for a certain class of client it
would be necessary either to write a bad speech or let it be evident that
the speaker was only a mouthpiece for an advocate cleverer than himself,
and as success in the case was of more importance than artistic illusion,
the proper choice was obvious. The _ethos_ in Isaeus consists not in
making the characters speak as they naturally would have spoken, but in
putting their arguments for them in the way most likely to appeal to
the reason and the feelings of the judges. Experience had further shown
that though, from the lips of a real orator, appeals to sentiment and
passion may have a great effect, such appeals by themselves, unsupported
by argument, or made at an inauspicious moment, may do more harm than
good. An appeal to the reason is always stronger, provided only that the
speaker must avoid giving offence by a too presumptuous bearing.
When the court is already convinced by an argued demonstration of
the justice of the case, an appeal to pity or indignation may be
overpowering; without such preparation it is nothing but a last resort of
weakness.
Isaeus, though he uses such appeals, as indeed he wields every weapon of
the orator’s armoury, uses them with moderation and discernment, showing
in this, as in all his tactics, a sound knowledge of practical utility.
§ 4. _Speeches_
The ‘Life’ by the Pseudo-Plutarch tells us that sixty-four speeches were
attributed to Isaeus, of which fifty were considered genuine. He also
composed an _Art of Rhetoric_. We now possess eleven and a considerable
fragment of a twelfth, and know the titles of forty-two others. The
eleven speeches which are extant all deal directly or indirectly with
inheritances. Six of these are connected with διαδικάσιαι—trials to
decide who is the righteous claimant—and their titles are as follows:—_On
the Estate of Cleonymus_ (Or. i.), date 360-353 B.C.; _On the Estate
of Nicostratus_ (Or. iv.), the date is uncertain—the author of the
‘argument’ asserts, with no plausibility, that Isaeus delivered the
speech in his own person; _On the Estate of Apollodorus_ (Or. vii.),
about 353 B.C.; _On the Estate of Ciron_ (Or. viii.) (_see above_, pp.
108-10), date uncertain, perhaps circa 375 B.C.; _On the Estate of
Astyphilus_ (Or. ix.), date perhaps about 369 B.C.; _On the Estate of
Aristarchus_, date probably between 377 and 371 B.C.
Three speeches deal with prosecutions for false witness in connection
with testamentary cases, viz. _On the Estate of Menecles_ (Or. ii.), date
about 354 B.C.; _On the Estate of Pyrrhus_ (Or. iii.), of uncertain date;
_On the Estate of Philoctemon_ (Or. vi.),—the date of this speech can be
fixed with certainty at 364-363 B.C., as we learn from § 14 that it is
now fifty-two years since the Athenian expedition sailed to Sicily.
Oration v., _On the Estate of Dicaeogenes_, is in an ἐγγύης δίκη,
an action to compel Leochares, who was surety for Dicaeogenes in an
agreement connected with the will of the latter’s cousin, also named
Dicaeogenes, to carry out the contract, since Dicaeogenes, the principal,
is a defaulter. The date can only be fixed by the references to the
death of the testator, who was killed in battle at Cnidos. There are
two engagements which might be referred to, the first in 412 B.C., the
second in 394 B.C. Twenty-two years have elapsed between that event and
the present trial, so the date is either 390 B.C.—many years earlier than
that of any other speech of Isaeus—or 372 B.C.
_On the Estate of Hagnias_ (Or. xi.) is in a prosecution of a guardian
for ill-treatment of his ward under a will.
_For Euphiletus_ (Or. xii.), a considerable fragment preserved by
Dionysius, is the only specimen that we possess of a speech not connected
with a will-case. It refers to an appeal by Euphiletus to a law-court
against the decision of his fellow demes-men, who have struck him off the
roll.
The remaining fragments are hardly important except in so far as
they provide us with the names of several lost speeches. One of them
(frag. 23) contains several sentences repeated verbally from Or. viii.
(_Ciron_), § 28.
The fragment of the speech _For Eumathes_, preserved by Dionysius, has
been referred to above (p. 118).
CHAPTER VI
ISOCRATES
§ 1. _Life_
Isocrates was born in 436 B.C., and lived to the remarkable age of
ninety-seven in full possession of his faculties. His childhood and youth
were passed amid the horrors of the Peloponnesian War; he was already
of age when the failure of the Sicilian expedition turned the scale
against Athens. In mature manhood he saw the ruin of his city by the
capitulation to Lysander. He lived through the Spartan supremacy, saw the
foundation of the new Athenian League in 378 B.C., and the rise and fall
of the power of Thebes. At the time when Philip obtained the throne of
Macedon he was already, by ordinary reckoning, an old man, but the laws
of mortality were suspended in the case of this Athenian Nestor. Some
of his most important works were composed after his eightieth year; the
_Philippus_, which he wrote at the age of ninety, shows no diminution of
his powers; he produced one of his longest works, the _Panathenaicus_, in
his ninety-seventh year, and lived to congratulate Philip on his victory
at Chaeronea in 338 B.C.
In a life of such extent and such remarkable variety of experience we
should expect to find many changes of outlook and modifications, from
time to time, of earlier views. But Isocrates was a man of singularly
fixed ideas. With regard to education, he formulated in the discourse
against the Sophists (391 B.C.) views which are practically identical
with what he expressed nearly forty years later in the _Antidosis_, views
which he maintains in his last work of all, the _Panathenaicus_ (339
B.C.). With regard to Greek politics, he held till the close of his life
the opinions propounded in the _Panegyricus_ of 380 B.C. His aims were
unchanged, though of necessity he modified the means by which he hoped to
carry them out.
We have little information about the orator’s early life. He tells us
himself that his patrimony was dissipated by the Peloponnesian War,[181]
so that he was forced to adopt a profession to make a living.
The story contained in the ‘Life,’ that he endeavoured to save
Theramenes when condemned by the Thirty, has no other authority but the
Pseudo-Plutarch. It appears from Plato’s _Phaedrus_[182] that he was
intimate with Socrates, that Socrates had a high opinion of him, and
considered that the young man might distinguish himself either in oratory
or in philosophy. Tradition names the Sophists Prodicus, Protagoras, and
Gorgias among his early teachers. He is believed to have visited Gorgias
in Thessaly.
Plutarch asserts that Isocrates at one time opened a school of rhetoric,
with nine pupils, in Chios; and that while there he interfered in
politics and helped to institute a democracy.[183] The story may be
accepted with reservations. Isocrates himself never refers to it, and in
_Ep._ vi. § 2 (to the children of Jason) excuses himself from visiting
Thessaly on the ground that people would comment unfavourably on a man
who had ‘kept quiet’ all his life if he began travelling in his old
age.[184] Jebb assumes a short stay in Chios in 404-403 B.C.
Between 403 and 393 B.C. Isocrates composed a certain number of speeches
for the law-courts, in which, however, he never appeared as a pleader,
for natural disabilities—lack of voice and nervousness, to which he
refers with regret—made him unfitted for such work.
About 392 B.C. he opened a school at Athens, and in 391 B.C. published,
in the discourse _Against the Sophists_, his views on education. His
pupils were mostly Athenians, many of them afterwards being men of
distinction.[185]
It was probably between 378 and 376 B.C. that Isocrates went on several
voyages with Conon’s son, Timotheus, who was engaged in organizing
the new maritime league. From this time down to 351 B.C. he had many
distinguished pupils from far countries—Sicily and Pontus as well as all
parts of Greece—and amassed, as he tells us, a reasonable competence,
though not a large fortune.
In the year 351 B.C., when a great contest of eloquence was held by
Artemisia, widow of Mausolus of Caria, in honour of her husband, it is
reported that all the competitors were pupils of Isocrates.
In the last period of his life, 351-338 B.C., Isocrates still continued
to teach, and was also busily occupied in writing. He published the
_Philippus_, which is one of his most important works, and one of the
greatest in historical interest, in 346 B.C.; in 342 B.C. he began
the lengthy _Panathenaicus_, which he had half finished when he was
attacked by an illness, which made the work drag on for three years. It
was finished in 339 B.C. In the following year, a few days after the
battle of Chaeronea, he died. A report was current in antiquity that
he committed suicide, by starving himself, in consequence of the news
of this downfall of Greek liberty; the story is quite incredible when
we consider that the result of the battle gave a possibility of the
fulfilment of the hopes which Isocrates had been cherishing for half his
life, the end to which he had been labouring for over forty years—the
concentration of all power into the hands of one man, who might redeem
Greece by giving her union and leading her to conquest in the East.
His last letter, in fact, written after the battle of Chaeronea,
congratulates Philip on his victory; and even if this letter is spurious,
the probability, to judge from the tone of his earlier works, is that he
would have hailed the Macedonian success as a victory for his imperial
ideas.
§ 2. _Style_
Though Isocrates composed, in his youth, a few forensic speeches, it
is not by such compositions that he must be judged; indeed he himself,
far from claiming credit for his activity in that direction, in later
life adopted an apologetic tone when speaking of his earlier work. As
a teacher of rhetoric he won great renown, numbering, as he boasts,
even kings among his pupils; and he had a complete mastery of all the
technique of the rhetorical art.
He was also a master of style, having theories of composition which he
exemplified in practice with such skill that he must occupy a prominent
place in any treatise on the development of Greek prose.
But his highest claim to consideration is as a political thinker. His
bold and startling theories of Greek politics were expressed indeed in
finished prose, and in rhetorical shape; but the artistic form is only
an added ornament; if Isocrates had written in the baldest style he
must have made a name by his treatises on political science, and by the
fact that he took a broader and more liberal view of Hellenism than any
Athenian before or after. Thus he, who perhaps never delivered a public
speech, is of more importance than any of the other orators; and though
no politician in the narrow sense, he exerted a wider influence than any,
not excepting Demosthenes, who devoted their lives to political activity,
for he originated and promulgated ideas which completely changed the
course of Greek civilization. It was probably he who was the first to
instigate Philip to attempt the conquest of Asia, as he had before urged
Dionysius and others to make the attempt—all for the sake of the union
of Greek States and the spread of Hellenism; certainly he encouraged the
Macedonian in his project, and perhaps it may be said to be due to him
that on Philip’s death Alexander found the way prepared.
Isocrates could not fully foresee the results of Alexander’s conquests;
Alexander himself modified and expanded his ambitions as he advanced;
but undoubtedly Isocrates urged the general desirability of the
undertaking and saw clearly, up to a certain point, the lines on which it
ought to be carried out. The petty law-suits which occupied Lysias and
Andocides seem trivial and unimportant, even the patriotic utterances
of Demosthenes seem of secondary weight, compared with these literary
harangues of Isocrates, in cases where civilization and barbarism, unity
and discord, are the litigants, and the court is the world.
Isocrates is named by Dionysius as an example of the smooth (or florid)
style of composition, which resembles closely woven stuffs, or pictures
in which the lights melt insensibly into the shadows.[186]
It is clear that to aim consciously at producing such effects as these
is to exalt mere expression to supreme heights, and to risk the loss
of clearness and emphasis. We may gather the opinions of Isocrates on
the structure of prose partly from his own statements, partly from the
criticisms of Dionysius, and partly from a study of his compositions. The
subject has been very fully and carefully dealt with by Blass, and in the
present work only a summary of the chief results can be attempted.
The most noticeable feature of the style is the care taken to avoid
hiatus. This is particularly remarked by Dionysius, who, after quoting
from the _Areopagiticus_ a long passage which he particularly admires,
notes, ‘You cannot find any dissonance of vowels, at any rate in the
passage which I have quoted, nor any, I think, in the whole speech,
unless some instance has escaped my observation.’[187]
We should expect to find that, to produce this effect, it was necessary
to depart frequently from natural forms of expression, either by changing
the usual order, or by inserting unnecessary words. It is probable that
Isocrates resorted to both these devices; but such is the skill with
which he handles his materials that careful reading is necessary to
detect the distortions.[188]
Dionysius further notes that dissonance or clashing of consonants is
rare, and herein Isocrates seems to have been at pains to follow the
rules of euphony laid down in his own Τέχνη. In a fragment preserved
by Hermogenes he tells his readers to avoid the repetition of the same
syllable in consecutive words—as ἡλικὰ καλά, ἔνθα Θαλῆς.[189] The
ingenuity of Blass has discovered passages in which the natural form
of a phrase has been altered to avoid such juxtaposition of similar
syllables.[190] Certain combinations of consonants, too, are hard to
pronounce, and must therefore be avoided. There is, in truth, much
justice in the remark of Dionysius that in reading Isocrates it is not
the separate words but the sentence as a whole that we must take into
account.
The third characteristic of Isocrates’ style is his attention to rhythm.
The extravagance of Gorgias had hindered the development of the
language by introducing into prose the rhythms and language of poetry;
Thrasymachus, as we know from Aristotle’s _Rhetoric_, had studied the
effect of the foot ‘_paeonius_’ (–⏑⏑⏑ or ⏑⏑⏑–) at the beginning and end
of periods.[191] Isocrates, while deprecating the use of poetical metres
in any strict sense, asserted that oratorical prose should have rhythms
of its own, and favoured combinations of the trochee and the iambus. In
this he differed from Aristotle, who disapproved of the iambic rhythm as
being too similar to the natural course of ordinary speech, and of the
trochaic, as being too light and tripping—in contrast to the hexameter,
which he classed as too solemn for spoken language.[192]
The periods of Isocrates are remarkable for their elaboration. The
analyses of Blass show us a complication of structure in some of the
longer sentences which may almost be compared to that of a Pindaric ode.
Never, perhaps, has there been a writer who attained such luxuriant
complexity in his composition of sentences. But Isocrates is too much
the slave of his own virtues; his periods are so long, so complete, so
uniformly artistic, that their everlasting procession is monotonous.
Lysias, less perfect in form, has in consequence more variety;
Demosthenes, who could compose long periods, did not confine himself to
them, but enlivened his style by contrast.
The structure of the period lends itself naturally to antithetical
forms of expression. We observed in Antiphon the frequency of verbal
antitheses of various kinds—the λόγῳ and ἔργῳ, the μὲν and δέ, and
others. Isocrates, having before him the examples of his predecessors
and the precepts of rhetoricians, and having theories of his own on
sentence-construction, developed very fully a scheme of parallelism in
word, sense, and sound.
Thus a period will consist, as we have seen, of a succession of κῶλα
or limbs, each one corresponding to another in size, and pairs of
corresponding κῶλα will contain pairs of words parallel in sense, form or
sound. So the whole period is bound closely together.
_Vocabulary. Schemata_
His vocabulary avoids excess; he is, in the judgment of Dionysius, the
purest of Atticists, with the exception of Lysias. But if we compare
the two we find much more tendency to fine writing in Isocrates.
Using ordinary words he can produce notable effects, and he is always
consciously striving after a certain pomposity of diction. This is most
noticeable in the exhibition-writings, such as the _Helen_ and _Busiris_,
where grandiloquent compound words are not infrequent, and metaphors are
commoner and more striking than in the speeches on real subjects.
One of his affectations, copied by nearly all subsequent orators, is
the unnecessary piling up of words almost synonymous to express one
idea.[193] On the other hand we sometimes find synonyms apparently
contrasted in different parts of the sentence; such contrast is only
verbal, and is made for the purpose of rounding the period; in either
case we must note that the writer departs from simplicity in order to
improve the sound of his words, but does not add much to the sense.[194]
Another characteristic is the use of the plural of abstract nouns,
in much the same sense as the singular.[195] All these details—the
partiality for compounds, for the accumulation of synonyms and for the
use of the plural instead of the singular, may be classed together under
the head of exaggerations of expression, and recorded as characteristics
of the _epideictic_ style.
In general, the tone is heightened, and Isocrates tends to appear florid
when compared with Lysias; if, on the other hand, we take Gorgias as a
standard, we see how far Isocrates, who undoubtedly imitated the Sicilian
style, has surpassed his model in the direction of refinement.
§ 3. _On Education_
Prevented by natural disabilities from exercising his talents in
public, but urged on by the necessity of earning a living, since the
Peloponnesian War had dissipated his fortune, Isocrates turned to a
profession for which he was well fitted, that of an educator. During
many years he was, like Gorgias, a teacher of rhetoric, and like Gorgias
he may be classed as a Sophist. This title is misleading. In itself it
means nothing more than an educator, or teacher of wisdom, and early,
writers use it in a laudatory sense; Herodotus applies it to the Seven
Sages. In the fourth century it was debased, partly by the comic poets,
as representing the popular habit of sneering at anything which the mob
cannot understand, but more honestly and systematically by Plato, who,
though he admitted that some of the Sophists, such as Protagoras, were
men worthy of the highest respect, took many opportunities of disparaging
Sophists as a class, and Sophistry as a profession.
There can be no doubt that he was quite sincere, for he takes great pains
to bring out the distinction between the educators and his own master
Socrates, whom Aristophanes had already marked as one of the crowd.[196]
To us it seems that the marked distinction cannot be maintained; apart
from Socrates’ peculiarity of refusing to take fees from his pupils, he
is distinguished only by possessing a higher moral tone than the rest
of the Sophists. Like them he was a sceptic as far as philosophy was
concerned, and like them he was an educator.
We have, however, accepted the word at the value which Plato chose to put
upon it; but we must not suppose that this was the value at which it was
usually current. This is clear from the fact that Isocrates can use the
word without any idea of disparagement.
Though he wrote a speech _Against the Sophists_, it is directed not
against the profession as a whole, but against certain classes, whom he
calls the ἀγέλαιοι σοφισταί—‘Sophists of the baser sort.’
Isocrates’ earliest work on education, the speech or tract _Against the
Sophists_ (Or. xiii.), dates from the beginning of his professional
career, perhaps about the year 390 B.C. We possess only part, perhaps
less than half, of the speech. What remains is purely destructive
criticism which, as is clear from the concluding words, was meant to lead
up to an exposition of the writer’s own principles and theory. The loss
is to be regretted, but is not irreparable, since the speech _On the
Antidosis_, composed thirty-five years later, supplements it by a full
constructive statement.
The introduction on the Sophists is sweeping in its severity:[197]
‘If all our professional educators would be content to tell the
truth and not promise more than they ever intend to perform,
they would not have a bad reputation among laymen. As it is,
their reckless effrontery has encouraged the opinion that
a life of incurious idleness is better than one devoted to
philosophy.’
He proceeds to criticize various classes:
‘We cannot help hating and despising the professors of
contentious argument (eristic), who, while claiming to seek
for Truth, introduce falsehood at the very beginning of their
pretensions. They profess in a way to read the future, a power
which Homer denied even to the gods; for they prophesy for
their pupils a full knowledge of right conduct, and promise
them happiness in consequence. This invaluable commodity
they offer for sale at the ridiculous price of three or four
minae. They affect, indeed, to despise money—mere dross of
silver or gold as they call it—yet, for the sake of this small
profit they will raise their pupils almost to a level with the
immortals. They profess to teach all virtue; but it is notable
that pupils, before they are admitted to the course, have to
give security for the payment of their fees.’
The general tone of this censure recalls the attacks of the Platonic
Socrates on the ‘eristic’ Sophists; but it is certain that the
‘eristics,’ whom Isocrates here attacks, are some of the lesser
Socratics. This is made obvious by the reference in § 3 to the knowledge
(ἐπιστήμη) which, according to these teachers, will lead to right conduct
or virtue, and so to happiness. The Socratic view that knowledge is
the basis of virtue, and virtue of happiness, is well known. Socrates
himself did not profess to teach virtue for a fee; but the Megarians,
the followers of his pupil Euclides, did, and at them the sarcasm of
Isocrates seems to be directed. Elsewhere, indeed, Isocrates refers
definitely to the Platonic school as belonging to the eristic class.[198]
The teachers of ‘Political Discourse’ fall next under ban, that is, the
teachers of practical rhetoric, whether forensic or deliberative.[199]
‘They care nothing for truth’—whereas the eristics, at any rate,
professed to seek it—‘they consider that their profession is to attract
as many pupils as possible by the smallness of their fees and the
greatness of their promises. They are so dull, and think others so
dull, that though the speeches which they write are worse than many
non-professionals can improvise, they undertake to make of their pupils
orators equal to any emergency. They say that they can teach oratory
as easily as the alphabet, which is a subject fixed by unchangeable
rules, whereas the conditions for a speaker are never quite the same
on two occasions. A speech, to be successful, must be appropriate to
the subject, to the occasion, and to the speaker; and in some degree
original. Instruction can give us technical skill; but cannot call into
existence the oratorical faculty, which a good speaker must have innate
in him.’
No doubt Isocrates himself professed to give a practical training for
public life; but he states here what he repeats with more emphasis in
a later writing:[200] ‘For distinction either in speech or in action,
or in any other work, there are three requisites: natural aptitude,
theoretical training, and practical experience.... Of these the first
is indispensable, and by far the most important.’ The Sophists claimed
to dispense with the first, and this is the ground of the philosopher’s
quarrel with them.
The third section of the speech, following naturally on the second, deals
with writers of technical guides to rhetoric (τέχναι).
‘They profess to teach litigation, choosing for themselves this
offensive title which would be more appropriate in the mouths
of their detractors. They are worse than those who wallow
in the mire of “eristic,” for they at least pretend to be
concerned with virtue and moderation, while those whom we are
considering now undertake only to teach men to be busy-bodies
from motives of base covetousness.’[201]
Here again Isocrates, who himself composed an ‘Art’ of rhetoric, does not
condemn all who may try to teach the subject; his complaint is that the
majority of such teachers have confined themselves to the ignoble branch
of the profession. This criticism is obviously a valid one, and is echoed
by Aristotle, who declares that speaking before a public assembly is less
knavish (κακοῦργον) than speaking in a law-court.[202]
The speech entitled _On the Antidosis_ is really Isocrates’ defence
of his life and profession. In 355 B.C. he was challenged by one
Megacleides to undertake the trierarchy, or else to accept an
_antidosis_, or exchange of properties. The matter was the subject of
a trial, in consequence of which Isocrates performed the trierarchy.
Some time—perhaps two years—later, he wrote this speech, which is of no
historical importance, since even the name of the plaintiff, Lysimachus,
is fictitious. The introduction (§§ 1-13) makes it clear that the
law-suit is only introduced for the sake of local colour. The speech
itself begins with a semblance of forensic form in § 14, but the pretence
is very soon dropped. The cloak is resumed in the Epilogue (§§ 320-323);
but the greatest part of the speech has nothing to do with any trial,
real or imaginary.
The treatise, as we may call it, falls into two parts: in §§ 14-166 the
writer defends his own character; in §§ 167-319 he defends his system of
education.
The indictment against which he pleads is that he is in the habit of
corrupting the younger generation by teaching them habits of litigation.
He has little difficulty in showing that his chief work has lain in a
far nobler field than that of forensic rhetoric. While others have been
engaged in the paltry contentions of the law-courts he has composed
speeches bearing upon the politics of all Greece. This he proves by
reciting long extracts from his most famous works: the _Panegyric_ (§
59); _On the Peace_ (§ 66); _Nicocles_ (§ 72).
The second half of the speech contains, as has been noted, a statement
and defence of Isocrates’ theory.
‘Philosophy,’ he says, ‘is for the soul what Gymnastic is for
the body.’
This analogy he elaborates.
‘The gymnastic trainer teaches his pupils first to perform
the separate movements, then to combine them. The educator
follows the same order, and both insist on long and diligent
practice; but the trainer of the body cannot always make
a man an athlete, nor can the trainer of the mind make
everybody an orator. There are three essentials requisite for
success—natural aptitude, proper teaching, and long practice;
and moreover there must be a will on the part of both teacher
and pupil to persevere. The natural ability is by far the most
important element. Training, however complete, may break down
utterly if the speaker lacks nerve.[203]
‘Some people expect a marked improvement after a few days of
study with a Sophist, and demand a complete training in a
year. This is ridiculous; no class of education could produce
such results; and there is no need to disparage us as a class
because we cannot do more than we profess. We cannot make all
men orators, but we can give them culture.
‘Others assert that our philosophy has an immoral tendency. I
shall not defend all who claim to be educators, but only those
who have a right to the name. We have nothing to gain by making
men immoral; on the contrary the greatest satisfaction for a
Sophist is that his pupils should become wise and honourable
men, respected by their fellows. Our pupils come from Sicily,
from Pontus, and from other distant regions; do they come so
far to be instructed in wickedness? Surely not; they could find
plenty of teaching at home. They incur the trouble and expense
because they think that Athens can give them the best education
in the world.
‘Again, power in debate is not in itself a demoralizing thing.
The greatest statesmen of this and earlier generations studied
and practised oratory—Solon, who was called one of the Seven
Sophists, Themistocles, Pericles. You blame the Thebans for
lacking culture; why blame us who try to impart it? Athens
honours with a yearly sacrifice the Goddess Persuasion; our
enemies attack us for seeking the faculty which this goddess
personifies.
‘We are even attacked by the “Eristics”:[204] far from
retorting, I am ready to admit that there is good to be got
even from eristic disputation, from astronomy,[205] and from
geometry: they are useful as a preliminary to higher studies.
‘My own view of philosophy is a simple one. It is impossible
to attain absolute knowledge of what we ought or ought not to
do; but the wise man is he who can make a successful guess as
a general rule, and philosophers are those who study to attain
this practical wisdom. There is not, and never has been, a
science which could impart justice and virtue to those who are
not by nature inclined towards these qualities; but a man who
is desirous of speaking or writing well, and of persuading
others, will incidentally become more just and virtuous, for it
is character that tells more than anything.
‘Thoughtful speaking leads to careful action. Your superior
culture raises you above the rest of Greece, just as mankind is
superior to the lower animals and Greeks to barbarians: do not,
then, punish those who would give you this culture.’[206]
These two treatises taken together, and supplemented by a few passages
from other speeches, give us a fair idea of Isocrates’ system. His
‘Philosophy’ is to be distinguished from all merely theoretical
speculation, such as the physical theories of the Ionians, or the logic
of Parmenides; from ‘eristic’—the art of arguing for argument’s sake—from
geometry and astronomy; from literary work which has no practical use;
from the rhetoric of the law-courts. Boys at school may profitably study
grammar and poetry; at a later age the applied mathematics, and even
‘eristic,’ are good mental training; but it must be recognized that they
are only a preparation for the Isocratean ‘philosophy,’ which is for the
soul what gymnastic is for the body.
As the gymnastic-master teaches first the various thrusts and parries, so
to speak, the teacher of philosophy makes his pupils learn first all the
styles of prose composition.[207] He then makes them combine (συνείρειν)
the things which they have learnt. The subjects for such exercises
must be properly chosen—they must be practical and must deal with wide
interests.
Practice on these lines will prepare a man, as far as his nature allows,
for speaking and acting in a public capacity; so that what Isocrates
calls his ‘philosophy’ is really a science of practical politics.
Isocrates seems to have been thorough in all things; himself a hard
worker who took extraordinary care over his compositions, he expected
his pupils to work hard. He was not content, like some Sophists, with
making them learn his own ‘fair copies’ by heart; they must do the
work for themselves. He scoffs at those teachers who claim to ‘finish’
their pupils in a year; his pretensions are more modest, but even so
he requires a course of three or four years. He believed in individual
attention rather than class-teaching, if we may regard an anecdote of
the Pseudo-Plutarch, who recounts that three pupils once came to him
together, but he admitted only two, telling the third to come next day.
He endeavoured to impart to his students something of that broadness of
view, so prominent in his own speeches, which enabled him to look beyond
the trials of the law-courts, beyond the interests of party or even of
individual state, and lift his eyes to a conception of national unity;
and something of that loftiness of spirit which, in an age of selfish and
scurrilous orators, enabled him to pursue his course towards the truth,
unbiased by personal considerations, and never descending to invective or
abuse.
§ 4. _Patriotism_
Isocrates was no less a patriot than Demosthenes, though he differed
very widely in his political views from the later orator. What these
views were may be gathered from a series of speeches on national subjects
extending over a period of more than forty years.
The _Panegyricus_, the first of these, was probably composed for
publication at one of the great national assemblies, perhaps the
Olympic festival, about 380 B.C. This was certainly a time when the
long-continued dissensions of the city-states had brought the affairs
of Greece to a crisis. There seemed to Isocrates to be no solution of
the difficulties, no chance of established peace or contentment, unless
some enterprise could be found which should unite the sympathies of the
rival cities, induce them to put their own quarrels aside, and throw them
whole-heartedly into a cause which concerned Hellas as a nation.
The only motive which had ever been able to unite the Greeks, even
temporarily, was hatred of the barbarians, and Isocrates works upon this
feeling. He draws a vivid picture of the miserable state to which the
Greek world has been reduced by civil war, and shows how the influence of
Persia, besides keeping this war alive, has in other ways worked towards
the ruin of Greece. Having discussed with outspoken candour the claims
of Sparta and Athens to leadership, he suggests that they should agree by
a compromise, and urges that they and all other States should unite in a
racial war against the Persians.
This speech had no practical effect. The rise of Thebes shortly after
this date changed the balance of power, and on the whole did not improve
conditions. Despairing of originating any joint action within Greece
itself, Isocrates looked farther for a leader, and in or about 368 B.C.
we find him writing to Dionysius of Syracuse, who at the time held an
empire far more powerful than that of any State of Greece proper, and
suggesting that he should come forward as the champion of the Greek
national spirit.[208]
In 356 B.C. Isocrates turned again towards Sparta, this time writing
to Archidamus, who had recently succeeded his father Agesilaus in the
kingship, and urging him to take steps which will ‘put an end to civil
war in Greece, curb the insolence of the barbarians, and deprive them of
part of their ill-gotten gains.’ Archidamus, if he could be as vigorous
as his father and more unselfish, might well seem to be a suitable leader
for the crusade on which Isocrates had set his heart.
At this time Philip of Macedon, though he was beginning to attain
notoriety, was probably regarded by the majority of Greeks as a pauper
prince, sitting insecurely on a throne which he had usurped, and from
which he might at any time be removed by rebellion or assassination. But
in this year he obtained possession of the gold mines of Pangaeum, and
it was soon realized that Macedon was to play a leading part in Greek
politics.
In 346 B.C. Isocrates addressed Philip as one capable of taking the
lead, first in combining the Greek States into a union, and secondly, in
leading them to conquer the barbarian.[209] The ten years of desultory
hostilities between Philip and Athens had now been ended by the peace of
Philocrates, and Isocrates, thinking that Amphipolis, for which they had
been fighting, was an undesirable possession for either party, imagined
and hoped that the peace might be made permanent.
Though the _Panegyric_ and the addresses to Dionysius and Archidamus had
failed, Isocrates hoped that an appeal to Philip might be more successful.
‘I decided,’ he writes, ‘to broach the subject to you, not as a
special compliment, though I should be glad if my words could
find favour with you, but from the following motive. I saw that
all other men of distinction have to obey their cities and
their laws, and may do nothing beyond what they are told; and
moreover none of them are capable of dealing with the matter I
now intend to discuss.
‘You alone have had given you by fortune a full authority to
send embassies to whom you will, and receive them from where
you choose, and to say whatever you think expedient. Besides,
you possess wealth and power beyond any other Greek—the two
things which are the most potent either to persuade or to
compel: and you will find persuasion useful for the Greeks and
compulsion for the barbarians.’[210]
A summary of a few extracts will indicate the tenor of the speech.
‘It is your duty to try to reconcile the four great
cities—Argos, Sparta, Thebes, and Athens; bring these four
to their right mind, and you will have no difficulty with the
rest, which all depend on them (§§ 30-31). Your ancestors are
Argive by descent, and these cities should never have been at
enmity with you or each other. All must make allowances, as
all have been at fault (§§ 33-38). If Athens or Sparta were
now, as once, predominant, nothing could be done; but all
the great cities are now practically on a level. No enmities
are so deep-seated that they cannot be overcome: Athens has
at different times been allied with both Thebes and Sparta.
Sparta, Argos, and Thebes all desire peace; Athens has come to
her senses before the others, and already made peace. She will
be ready to give you her active sympathy’ (§§ 39-56).
‘History provides many instances of men who, with few
advantages, even with disabilities, have achieved great tasks:
you, with all your resources, should find the present task
easy’ (§§ 57-67).
‘Success in such a cause would be magnificent; even failure
would be noble: your slanderers impute to you the design of
subjugating Greece; you will convince them of their error’ (§§
68-80).
‘So much for your duty to Greece; now turn to the conquest
of Asia. Agesilaus failed because he stirred up political
animosities.
‘The Greeks under Cyrus defeated the Persian army, and though
left leaderless they made good their retreat. All conditions
are favourable for you. The Greeks of Asia were hostile to
Cyrus, but will welcome you. The present King of Persia is
less of a man than his predecessor, against whom Cyrus fought;
and Persia is divided against itself. Cyprus, Cilicia, and
Phoenicia, which provided the king with ships, will do so no
longer’ (§§ 83-104).
‘You may aim at conquering the whole Persian Empire; failing
of that you might win all that is west of a line drawn from
Cilicia to Sinope. Even this would be an enormous advantage.
You could found cities for the hordes of mercenaries who are
driven by destitution to wander and prey upon the settled
inhabitants—a growing menace to Greeks and Persians alike. You
would thus render these nomads a great service, and at the same
time establish them as a permanent guard of your own frontiers.
If this proved too much for you, at the very least you could
free the Greek cities of Asia. However great or little is your
success, you will at least win great renown for having led a
united expedition from all Greece’ (§§ 119-126).
‘No other state or individual will undertake the task; you are
free from restrictions, as all Hellas is your native land. You
will fight, I know, not for power or wealth, but for glory.
Your mission, then, is this:—To be the benefactor of Greece,
the king of Macedon, the governor of Asia’ (§§ 127-155).
It may be said that Isocrates overrated the purity of Philip’s motives.
On the other hand, it may be conceived that Philip would have greatly
preferred to march to Asia as the general of a Greek force willingly
united. He, whom Isocrates reckons as a Greek of royal or semi-divine
descent, whom Demosthenes stigmatized as a barbarian of the lowest
type, had much more of the Greek than the barbarian in his nature. To
Athens at least he always showed extraordinary clemency, treating her
with a respect far beyond her merits, and honouring her for her ancient
greatness. He did all that was possible to conciliate her, and this
policy he handed on to his son. But he could not start for the East,
leaving so many irreconcilable enemies behind him; and the refusal of the
States to accept his hegemony made Chaeronea inevitable.
Those who read, not this short summary, but the essay as a whole, must be
struck by the firm grasp which the writer has on contemporary history,
and by his insight into the forces at work. He under-estimated the
conservatism of the city-states, wrongly imagining that the majority
could be as broad-minded as himself.
The chapters on Asia show considerable knowledge both of the conditions
and the requirements. His advice about the founding of cities was
followed literally by Alexander, who, immediately after his first
victory, initiated this policy for securing his conquests.
In 342 B.C. Isocrates wrote again to Philip, reproaching him for his
recklessness in exposing his own life in battle. He repeated some of
the arguments of the first essay, and summarized his advice as follows:
‘It is far nobler to capture a city’s good-will than its walls.’ After
Chaeronea, in the year 338 B.C., he wrote once more, recalling his
former advice, and reflecting with satisfaction that the dreams of his
youth were some of them already fulfilled, and others on the point of
fulfilment.
§ 5. _Remaining Works_
The general contents of the _Panegyricus_ have already been discussed,
but only a careful study of the speech will reveal the skill with which
one topic is made to lead up to another, the nice proportion of the
parts, and the adroitness displayed in gathering and binding together the
various threads of the argument. Numerous paragraphs which seem at first
to be almost digressions are found, when we take the speech as a whole,
to be essential to its unity, and though in its course a large number of
topics is handled, the main subject is never left out of view. The level
of style is high throughout, and no extracts can properly represent it.
A short analysis may, however, serve to indicate the coherence of the
arguments:[211]
‘I am here to offer advice about the necessity of war with
Persia and unity among the Greeks. Others have handled the same
theme, but the fact of their failure renders any excuse for
a fresh attempt superfluous, and the subject admits of being
treated better than it has been’ (§§ 1-14).
‘My predecessors have missed an important point; that nothing
can be done until the leaders—Athens and Sparta—are reconciled,
and persuaded to share the leadership.
‘Sparta has accepted a false tradition, that leadership is hers
by ancestral right. I shall try to prove that the leadership
really belongs to Athens; Sparta then should consent to a joint
command’ (§§ 15-20).
‘Athens first possessed maritime empire, and her civilization
is the oldest in Greece (§§ 21-25). Her claims to hegemony are
as follows:—
‘A. (_a_) Tradition, which has never been refuted, records that
Athens first provided the necessities of life. Demeter taught
in Attica the cultivation of corn and instituted the Mysteries.
‘(_b_) Athens undoubtedly led the way in colonization, thus
enlarging the boundaries of Greek land, and driving back the
barbarians (§§ 28-37).
‘(_c_) Athens had the earliest laws, and the earliest
constitution. She established the Piraeus, the centre of Greek
trade. She provides in herself a perpetual festival, at which
the arts are encouraged. Practical philosophy and oratory are
so highly honoured at Athens that the name “Greek” is applied
properly not by claim of blood but by virtue of the possession
of Athenian culture (§§ 38-50).
‘B. (_a_) From heroic times downwards Athens has shown herself
the helper of the oppressed. Even Sparta grew great through her
support (§§ 57-65).
‘(_b_) Athens in the earliest times and in the Persian Wars
distinguished herself against the barbarians (§§ 66-74).
‘In old days the rivalries between opposite political parties
and between Athens and Sparta were noble ones, and the
honourable competition of the two cities shamed the other
Greeks into taking arms against Xerxes. Athens, however,
furnished more ships than all the rest put together. Her claim
to leadership, up to the end of the Persian War, is therefore
established’ (§§ 75-79).
‘It is true that Athens treated her revolted allies—Melos and
Scione—severely: rebels must expect punishment. On the other
hand, our loyal subjects enjoyed for seventy years freedom from
tyranny, immunity from barbarian attacks, settled government,
and peace with all the world’ (§§ 100-106).
‘Sparta and her partisans inflicted more harm in a few months
than Athens in the whole duration of her empire’ (§§ 110-114).
‘Our rule was preferable to the so-called “peace and
independence” which Sparta has given the cities. The seas
are overrun by pirates, and more cities are raided now than
before the peace was made. Tyrants and harmosts make life in
the cities intolerable. The Great King, whom Athens confined
within stated limits, has raided the Peloponnese (§§ 115-119);
Sparta has abandoned the Ionians to slavery, and herself
caused devastation in Greece, and burdened the islanders with
taxation. It is monstrous that we Greeks, owing to our petty
quarrels, should devastate our own country, when we might reap
a golden harvest from Asia’ §§ (120-132).
‘We have allowed the Great King to attain unheard of
power—simply through our quarrels, for he is not really strong.
‘Numerous instances from history betray the inferiority of the
Persian leaders and organization. They have often been defeated
on the coast of Asia; when they invaded Greece we made an
example of them; finally, they cut a ridiculous figure before
the walls of their own palaces’[212] (§§ 133-149).
‘This is what we might expect from their manner of life; the
mass of the people are more fit to be slaves than soldiers; the
nobles are by turns insolent and servile, and being permanently
corrupted by luxury they are weak and treacherous. They deserve
our hatred, and, in fact, our enmity can never be reconciled.
One of the reasons even of Homer’s popularity is that he tells
of a great war against Asia’ (§§ 150-159).
‘The time is favourable for attack; Phoenicia and Syria are
devastated; Tyre is captured; Cilicia is mostly in our favour;
Egypt and Cyprus are in revolt. The Greeks are ready to rise;
we must make haste, and not let the history of the Ionic
revolt repeat itself. The present suffering in Greece passes
all records, and for this the present generation deserves
some recompense—another reason for haste. The leading men in
the cities are callously indifferent, so we who stand outside
politics must take the lead, as I am doing’ (§§ 160-174).
‘The treaty of Antalcidas need not stand in our way; it has
been broken already in spirit. We only observe the provisions
which are to our own shame, _i.e._ those by which our allies
are given over to the Persians. It was never a fair covenant—we
submitted to terms dictated by the king.
‘Honour and expediency alike demand that we should combine to
undertake this war, whose fame will be greater than that of the
Trojan war’ (§§ 175-189).
We may now consider the group of speeches which deals with the internal
affairs of Greece.
_Plataicus_ (Or. xiv.). Plataea, destroyed in 427 B.C., was restored
by Sparta in 386 B.C. as a menace to Thebes, but was forced into the
Boeotian Confederacy in 376 B.C. In 373 B.C. it was surprised by a Theban
army and again destroyed. The inhabitants escaped to Athens, and their
case was discussed in the ecclesia, and also at the congress of allies.
The present speech is professedly delivered by a Plataean before the
Athenian ecclesia. It consists chiefly of an appeal to sentiment through
history; the speaker recalls the ancient relations of Plataea and Athens,
and thence infers the present duty of Athens. The speech is in a form
suitable for delivery before the assembly, and may have been so delivered.
_On the Peace_ (Or. viii.), on the other hand, is a political treatise.
It dates from 355 B.C., when the Social War was near its end. The main
theme of the speech is the necessity of peace between Athens and all the
world, but the urging of this policy naturally brings in a criticism of
the war-party, and a severe indictment not only of present politics but
of the conditions of the old empire of Athens. The speech is remarkable
from the fact that for once Isocrates abandons his even and temperate
language, and allows indignation and even bitterness to give colour to
his criticisms.
‘The acquisition of empire,’ he says, ‘over unwilling subjects,
is both unjust and impolitic. Ambition is like the bait which
entices a wild beast into a trap. Our administration is rotten;
our citizens have lost faith in personal effort, and we employ
mercenaries to fight our battles. Our politicians are our worst
citizens, and we appoint as generals incompetent men who are
not fitted for any position of trust. We hold our own, but only
because our rivals are as weak as we are. The follies of our
assembly win allies for Thebes; their follies in turn are our
salvation. It would pay either State to bribe the assembly of
the other to meet more often.
‘Our hope lies in abandoning our empire; it is unjust, and
moreover, we could not maintain it when we were rich, and now
we are poor. The statesmen of imperial Athens did all that they
could to make their city’s policy unpopular. They displayed
the tribute extorted from the allies, thus reminding all the
world of their tyranny; and paraded the children of those who
had fallen in wars in various parts of the world—the victims of
national covetousness. Far different was the position of Athens
under Themistocles and Aristides. National life is demoralized
by Empire. The history of Sparta’s supremacy is another case
to the point. Pericles was a demagogue, and led the city on a
disastrous career, but he at least enriched the treasury, not
himself. Our modern demagogues are merely self-seeking, and
their covetousness reduces not only the state but the citizens
to penury.
‘Peace, at the price I have indicated, is the only remedy. We
must deliver Greece, not despoil her. Athens should hold among
Greek States the position that the kings occupy in Sparta;
they are not tyrants; they have a higher standard of conduct
than any private person, and are held in such respect that any
man who would not throw away his life for them in the field is
reckoned meaner than a deserter.’
There is much truth in the invectives aimed at the old empire; Isocrates
could see behind the glowing colours in which the glories of the
Periclean age are sometimes painted, and equally with Demosthenes he
realized, and did not shrink from noticing, the weakness of Athens in
his own days. But his advice, though noble, is unpractical. He failed,
in spite of his knowledge of history, to fathom the depth of Greek
selfishness. No State that relied solely or chiefly on moral worth could
have a voice in the council of Greece, far less dominate its policy.
The _Areopagiticus_ (Or. vii.), perhaps composed in the same year,
in many points supplements the _de Pace_. It is chiefly devoted to
a contrast between the old days of dignified government under the
constitutions of Solon and Cleisthenes, and the unsatisfactory conditions
of life in the orator’s time. The description of the old constitution is,
perhaps, a fancy picture, but the contrast serves to bring out the evils
at which Isocrates is aiming in the modern State. The speech deals with
the inner life of Athens rather than with her foreign policy, and the
chief credit for good government and good life in the old days is given
to the Council of the Areopagus, that majestic body which even now ‘has
so strong an influence that the worst men of modern times, if promoted to
membership of it, are pervaded by its spirit, and, losing the meanness
of their own hearts, think and act in accordance with the Council’s high
traditions.’
The _Archidamus_ (Or. vi.) is put into the mouth of the Spartan king
of that name, for whom, as we know from a letter, Isocrates had a deep
respect. It professes to be part of a debate in 366 B.C., on the proposal
of the Thebans to grant peace on condition that Sparta recognized the
independence of Messenia. It probably contains a fair representation of
the feelings of the Spartans at the time when it was proposed to make an
independent and permanently hostile state of the Messenians, whom for
generations they had regarded as their slaves.
There still remain works of three classes—the ‘hortatory letters,’ the
‘displays,’ and forensic speeches.
_Hortatory Letters_
_To Demonicus_ (Or. i.), 372 B.C. (?). This letter, addressed to a young
monarch, of whom nothing else is known, is destined to be a ‘storehouse’
(ταμιεῖον) of moral maxims, comprising duty to the gods, duty to men,
and duty to oneself. It contains a vast number of maxims, mostly of a
practical or semi-practical nature—‘We test gold by fire, friends by
misfortune.’ ‘Never swear by the gods where money is concerned; some will
think you a perjurer, others a covetous man.’ Occasionally the moral tone
is higher—‘If you do wrong, never hope to be undiscovered; if others
discover you not, your own conscience will discover you to yourself.’
_To Nicocles_ (Or. ii.), 374 B.C., addressed to Nicocles, who became
king of Salamis in Cyprus in 374 B.C., deals with the duties and
responsibilities of a king. ‘Remember your high position, and be careful
that you never do anything unworthy of it.’
_Nicocles, or the Cyprians_ (Or. iii.), 372 B.C., is a complement to Or.
ii. In it the king himself is represented as discoursing on the duties of
subjects towards their king. ‘Do to your king as you would wish your own
subjects to do to you.’
_Epideictic Speeches_
Many of the Sophists wrote imaginary speeches on legendary themes, and
Isocrates, though this art was outside his province, strayed into it
as a critic. The _Busiris_ (Or. xi.), 391 B.C., addressed to a Sophist
Polycrates, contains first a criticism of a speech composed by Polycrates
on that subject, and secondly an exposition of how Isocrates himself
would treat such a theme. Incidentally, Isocrates accepts the early
legends as true on the whole, while rejecting certain parts of them as
unbecoming.
The _Encomium of Helen_ (Or. x.), 370 B.C., begins with criticism of
a certain encomium which is generally believed to be the extant one
attributed to Gorgias. The previous writer has written not an encomium
but an apology; Isocrates himself will write a real encomium, omitting
all the topics which have been used by others.
The _Evagoras_ (Or. ix.), 365 B.C. (?), was composed for a festival
celebrated by Nicocles in memory of his father, Evagoras of Salamis, who
died 374 B.C. It contains a laudatory account of the king’s career, and
an encouragement to the son to emulate his father’s virtues.
The _Panathenaicus_ was begun when Isocrates was 94 years old, _i.e._
in 342 B.C. Owing to an illness, he was not able to finish it for three
years. It contains much of the material which had already been used
in the _Areopagiticus_. Its main topic is the greatness of Athens,
considered historically, and not with reference to contemporary politics.
But it contains long digressions—a defence of his own system against the
attacks of certain baser Sophists (§§ 5-34); a discourse on Agamemnon
(§§ 62-73); a personal explanation (§§ 99 _sqq._), in which the author
explains that the speech would naturally end at this point, and details
the conversations and discussions which led him to continue it. He was
blamed for being too harsh against Sparta, and though he silenced his
critics, he had some misgivings. The result is to increase the length of
the speech by one third, and completely to spoil the balance and destroy
whatever unity it possessed.
_Forensic Speeches_
Six forensic speeches have come down to us; they belong to the early
days of Isocrates, who in later years regretted that he had ever been
concerned with such an art; they may be dismissed in a few words:
_Against Lochites_ (Or. xx.), 394 B.C., is an action for assault;
_Aegineticus_ (Or. xix.), 394 B.C., a claim to an inheritance; _Against
Euthynus_ (Or. xxi.), 403 B.C., an action to recover a deposit;
_Trapeziticus_ (Or. xvii.), 394 B.C., a similar action, against the
famous banker Pasion; περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους (Or. xvi.), 397 B.C., spoken
by the younger Alcibiades against a man Tisias, who asserts that the
elder Alcibiades, father of the speaker, robbed him of a team of four
horses. This is an action for damages amounting to five talents. _Against
Callimachus_, 399 B.C., a παραγραφή or special plea entered by the
defendant, who contends that an action for damages brought against him
cannot be maintained.
_Letters_
Reference has already been made to certain letters, to Dionysius, 368
B.C., Archidamus, 365 B.C., Philip and Alexander, 342 B.C. Others extant
are addressed to the children of Jason (_Ep._ vi.), 359 B.C.—_i.e._
Thebe, and her half-brothers, children of the tyrant of Pherae, who
was murdered in 370 B.C.; to Timotheus (_Ep._ vii.), 345 B.C.—a king
of Heraclea on the Euxine; to the Rulers of Mitylene (_Ep._ viii.),
350 B.C.—the oligarchs who had recently overthrown the democracy;
to Antipater (_Ep._ iv.), 340 B.C., at the time, apparently, regent
of Macedonia during Philip’s absence in Thrace. This list of the
correspondents of Isocrates, with some of whom at least he is on terms of
familiarity, may serve to indicate his importance in the Greek world.
Isocrates is also credited with the composition of a τέχνη or treatise
on the art of rhetoric, now lost, except for a single quotation; and the
editions of the text contain a number of apophthegms attributed to him.
None are important.
CHAPTER VII
MINOR RHETORICIANS
The contemporaries of Isocrates are overshadowed by his genius;
nevertheless there were in his time other speakers and teachers of
ability. The only one of them who deserves serious consideration is
Alcidamas, a pupil of Gorgias or of his school, who, though a rival of
Isocrates, had come under the influence of the latter’s style. We possess
under his name a sophistical exercise, the _Accusation of Palamedes
by Odysseus_, which is of no importance, and may be spurious, and a
declamation _On the Sophists_, which is probably genuine; at least we
may say that it is the work of an able critic and a graceful writer. His
other works included two rhetorical exercises, the _Praise of Death_ and
the _Praise of Nais_, and a _Messenian Oration_, which was apparently a
counterblast to the _Archidamus_ of Isocrates.
_The Sophists_ is really an attack on the methods of Isocrates, and is
directed against the practice of laboriously composing written speeches,
which are no real help to a man who wishes to be an orator, whether in
the assembly or the law-courts. Certain so-called Sophists, he contends,
who, while quite incapable of speaking, have practised writing, pride
themselves on this accomplishment, and though they can call only one
small department of rhetoric their own, claim to be masters of the
complete science. He would not disparage the art of writing, but he
considers it of secondary importance, while other accomplishments deserve
far more attention. Any man of ability, given the time, can learn to
write moderately well; but in order to speak well you must apply a
careful training to the development of certain special gifts. To be able
to speak extemporaneously is a very important gift; a man who possesses
it can adapt himself to the mood of his audience, while one who relies
on prepared orations must often miss a great opportunity, for it is
beyond human powers to learn by heart enough speeches to be ready at a
moment’s notice to speak on any subject and to any kind of audience. A
man accustomed to the use of written speeches, when forced to speak _ex
tempore_, will not maintain his proper level of performance.[213] Many
arguments, of more or less value, are adduced; in all of them there is a
certain cleverness.
Dionysius thought the style of Alcidamas coarse and trivial;[214]
Aristotle says that he used his epithets ‘not as seasoning but as
meat.’[215] These strictures do not apply to the one surviving work.
He seems to have been raised above the dead level of rhetoricians by
possessing ideas; in the speech advocating the freedom of the Messenians
occurred the sentence, ‘God has made all men free; nature has made no
man a slave’; and his description of the _Odyssey_ as ‘a noble mirror of
human life,’ is a fine expression in itself, though Aristotle objects
that such ornaments detract from the value of a speech, as giving the
impression of over-preparation.[216]
* * * * *
Polycrates, a rhetorician of the same period, is known to have composed
a fictitious _Accusation of Socrates_, to which Isocrates refers.[217]
His _Encomium of Busiris_, the cannibal king of Egypt, stirred Isocrates
to write his own _Busiris_, in order to show how such a theme ought to
be treated. Dionysius found his style inane, frigid, and vulgar.[218]
Lycophron, an imitator of Gorgias, is quoted several times by Aristotle;
and Cephisodorus, the best known rhetorician of the school of Isocrates,
wrote an admirable defence of his master against the attacks of
Aristotle.[219]
* * * * *
These minor teachers, who are mentioned only as offshoots from the
prominent schools, had no permanent influence on the growth either of
rhetoric or of oratory.
CHAPTER VIII
AESCHINES
§ 1. _Life_
Aeschines was for twenty years a bitter enemy of Demosthenes. This
enmity was perhaps the chief interest in his life; at any rate it is the
dominant motive of his extant speeches. Demosthenes on his side could not
afford to despise an enemy whose biting wit and real gift of eloquence
assured him an attentive hearing, whether in the courts or before the
ecclesia, and thus gave him an influence which the vagueness of his
political views and the instability of his personal character could
never entirely dissipate. Aeschines had no constructive policy, but he
had just the talents which are requisite for the leader of a captious
and malicious opposition. To the fact of the long-maintained hostility
between these two men we owe a good deal of first-hand information about
each of them, both as regards public and private life. It is true that we
cannot accept without reservation the statements and criticisms made by
either speaker about his rival; but in many cases they agree about facts,
though they put different interpretations on them, and so, with care, we
may arrive at a substratum of truth.
Aeschines was born about 390 B.C.[220] His father Atrometus, an Athenian
citizen of pure descent,[221] was exiled by the Thirty, and fled to
Corinth, with his wife. He served for some time as a mercenary soldier in
Asia, and finally returned to Athens, where he kept a school. His wife,
Glaucothea, filled some minor religious office, initiating the neophytes
in certain mysteries, apparently connected with Orphism. Aeschines seems
to have helped both his parents in their work, if we may suppose that
there is a grain of truth mixed with the malice of Demosthenes:
‘You used to fill the ink-pots, sponge the benches, and sweep
the schoolroom, like a slave, not like a gentleman’s son. When
you grew up you helped your mother in her initiations, reciting
the formulas, and making yourself generally useful. All night
long you were wrapping the celebrants in fawn-skins, preparing
their drink-offerings, smearing them with clay and bran,’
etc.[222]
The whole of the description from which the foregoing passage is taken is
an obvious caricature, and its chief value is to show that Demosthenes,
if circumstances had not made him a statesman, might have been a
successful writer of mediocre comedy; but it seems to point to the fact
that Aeschines’ parents were in humble circumstances, that he himself
had a hard life as a boy, and did not enjoy the usual opportunities of
obtaining the kind of education desirable for a statesman.[223] After
this, at an age when other aspirants to public life would have been
studying under teachers of rhetoric, he was forced to earn his living.
He was first clerk to some minor officials, then an actor—according to
Demosthenes he played small parts in an inferior company, and lived
chiefly on the figs and olives with which the spectators pelted him.[224]
He also served as a hoplite, and, by his own account, distinguished
himself at Mantinea and Tamynae. In 357 B.C. he obtained political
employment, first under Aristophon of Azenia, then under Eubulus, and
later we find him acting as clerk of the ecclesia.
He married into a respectable family about 350 B.C., and in 348 B.C. he
first appears in a position of public trust, being appointed a member
of the embassy to Megalopolis in Arcadia. On this occasion he went out
admittedly as an opponent of Philip, but came back a partisan of peace.
The reasons for this change of view will be discussed later. His own
explanation, that he realized war to be impracticable, is reasonable
in itself.[225] Two years later he was associated with Demosthenes in
the famous embassies to Philip, which, after serious delays, resulted
in the unsatisfactory peace of Philocrates. The peace was pronounced by
Demosthenes to be unworthy of Athens,[226] though he urged that, good
or bad, it must be upheld; and besides uttering insinuations against
the conduct of Aeschines as an ambassador, he prepared to prosecute him
for betraying his trust by taking bribes from Philip. He associated
with himself as a prosecutor one Timarchus. Aeschines prepared a
counter-stroke. He prosecuted Timarchus on the ground that he was a
person of notorious immorality, and, as such, debarred from speaking
in public. Timarchus appears to have been found guilty. In 343 B.C.
Demosthenes brought the action in which his speech _de Falsa Legatione_
and that of Aeschines bearing the same title were delivered, and
Aeschines was acquitted by the rather small majority of thirty votes. In
the next year Aeschines prepared for reprisals, but when on the point of
impeaching Demosthenes he in his turn was thwarted by a counter-move on
his rival’s part.[227]
In 339 B.C. Aeschines was a _pylagorus_ at the Amphictyonic Council, and
an inflammatory speech which he made there led to the outbreak of the
Sacred War.
In 337 B.C., the year after the battle of Chaeronea, the proposal of
Ctesiphon to confer a crown on Demosthenes for his services to Athens
gave Aeschines a new weapon with which to strike at his enemy. He
impeached Ctesiphon for illegality. The case was not actually tried
till 330 B.C., when Aeschines, failing to obtain a fifth of the votes,
was fined a thousand drachmae, and, being unable or unwilling to pay,
went into exile. He retired to Asia Minor, and lived either in Ephesus
or Rhodes. He is said by Plutarch to have spent the rest of his life
as a professional Sophist, that is to say, no doubt, as a teacher of
rhetoric;[228] but we have no further information about his life or the
manner or date of his death.
§ 2. _Public Character_
Aeschines cannot be considered as a statesman, since he had no definite
policy. He was, as he admitted himself, an opportunist. ‘Both individual
and state,’ he says, ‘must shift their ground according to change of
circumstances, and aim at what is best for the time’;[229] and though he
claims to be ‘the adviser of the greatest of all cities,’[230] he never
had in public matters any higher principle than this following of the
line of least resistance.
It is necessary, however, to consider whether he was actually the corrupt
politician that Demosthenes makes him out to be.
Athenian opinion with regard to corrupt practices was less strict than
ours; Hyperides admits that there are various degrees of guiltiness in
the matter of receiving bribes; the worst offence is to receive bribes
from improper quarters, _i.e._ from an enemy of the State, and to the
detriment of the State.[231]
This principle implies a corollary that to receive bribes for doing
one’s duty and acting in the best interests of one’s country is a venial
offence, if indeed it is an offence at all; in which case a man’s guilt
or innocence may be a matter for his individual conscience to determine.
Demosthenes definitely accused Aeschines of changing his policy in
consequence of bribes received from Philip. It is known that at the
beginning of his public life he was an opponent of Macedon, and we have
his own account of his conversion on the occasion of the embassy to
Megalopolis:
‘You reproach me for the speech which I made, as an envoy,
before ten thousand people in Arcadia; you say that I have
changed sides, you abject creature, who were nearly branded as
a deserter. The truth is that during the war I tried to the
best of my ability to unite the Arcadians and the rest of the
Greeks against Philip; but when I found that nobody would give
help to Athens, but some were waiting to see what happened and
others were marching against us, and the orators in the city
were using the war as a means of meeting their daily expenses,
I admit that I advised the people to come to terms with Philip,
and make the peace which you, who have never drawn a sword, now
say is disgraceful, though I say that it is far more honourable
than the war.’[232]
After the conclusion of the peace of Philocrates the accusations were
more definite. Demosthenes asserts that Aeschines had private interviews
with Philip when on the second embassy, and that for his services he
received certain lands in Boeotia;[233] he recurs to this charge in the
_de Corona_, many years later. Aeschines does not deny or even mention
this charge either in the speech _On the Embassy_ or in the accusation
of Ctesiphon. Demosthenes, having, apparently, little direct evidence,
tries to establish his case by emphasizing the relations of Aeschines
with the traitor Philocrates; but this is a weak argument, for though
Aeschines at one time boasted of these relations, on a later occasion
he repudiated them, and even ventured to rank Demosthenes himself with
Philocrates.[234] Perhaps we should attach more importance to the
other fact urged by Demosthenes, that Aeschines from time to time urged
the city to accept Philip’s vague promises of good-will; but before we
condemn him on this ground we must recollect that Isocrates, a man of
far greater intelligence than Aeschines, and of undoubted honesty, had
come so completely under the spell of Philip’s personality as to place a
thorough belief in the sincerity of his professions.[235] Aeschines may
have been duped in the same manner.
But the most severe condemnation of Aeschines’ policy is contained in his
own speeches.
During a visit to the Macedonian army in Phocis he was guilty of a
gross piece of bad taste by joining with Philip in dancing the paean to
celebrate the defeat of Phocis. He admits the charge, and maintains that
it was even a proper thing to do.[236] His conduct at the Amphictyonic
Council was far more serious.[237] He was invited to make a speech, and
as he began, was rudely interrupted by a Locrian of Amphissa. In revenge
it ‘occurred to him’[238] to recall the impiety of the Amphissians in
occupying the Cirrhaean plain. He caused to be read aloud the curse
pronounced after the first Sacred War, and by recalling the forgotten
events of past generations worked up his audience to such a pitch of
excitement that on the following morning—for it was too late to take
action that night—the whole population of Delphi marched down to Cirrha,
destroyed the harbour buildings, and set fire to the town. Though this
action undoubtedly plunged Greece into an Amphictyonic War, Aeschines,
quite regardless of the awful consequences, can only dwell upon the
remarkable effects of his own oratory.
§ 3. _Personality_
Something of the personal characteristics of Aeschines may be gathered
from his own writings and those of Demosthenes. He must have been a
man of dignified presence, for even if he only played minor parts,
as Demosthenes so frequently asserts, he acted, on occasion, in good
company, as his enemy, in an unguarded moment, admitted. The conditions
under which Greek tragedy was performed required a majestic bearing even
in a tritagonist, and the taunt of Demosthenes, who calls him ‘a noble
statue,’ makes it certain that Aeschines did not fall short of these
requirements.[239] The words of Demosthenes probably imply that the
dignity was overdone, that the statuesque pose of the ex-actor appeared
pompous and exaggerated in a law-court. Aeschines himself condemned the
use of excited gestures by orators. He urged the necessity of restraint,
and often insisted that an orator should, while speaking, hold his
hand within his robe.[240] This declared prejudice on his part gave
Demosthenes his opportunity for a neat retort—‘You should keep your hand
there, not when you are speaking, but when you go on an embassy.’[241] On
this occasion Demosthenes scored a point, but where wit and repartee were
in question, the honours generally rested with Aeschines.
Another striking characteristic of Aeschines was his magnificent voice,
which he used with practised skill; Demosthenes, who had serious natural
disabilities as a speaker, envied him bitterly, and in consequence was
always trying to ridicule his delivery.[242] Conscious, no doubt, of his
natural advantages, to which Demosthenes had once paid a more or less
sincere tribute,[243] Aeschines was apparently unmoved by these taunts;
but he seems to have been deeply injured when Demosthenes compared him to
the Sirens, whose voices charm men to their destruction. His indignation
can find no repartee; he can only expostulate that the charge is
indecent, and even if it were true, Demosthenes is not a fit man to bring
it; only a man of deeds would be a worthy accuser; his rival is nothing
but a bundle of words. Here, recovering himself a little, he delivers
himself of the idea that Demosthenes is as empty as a flute—no good for
anything if you take away the mouthpiece.[244]
In the case of other orators I have laid but little stress on personal
characteristics, because as a rule the orator must be judged apart from
his qualities as a man. In considering Isaeus, for instance—an extreme
case, certainly—personal qualities and peculiarities are of no importance
at all. But so many personal traits appear in the writings of Aeschines
that we cannot afford to neglect them; they form important data for our
estimate of him, both as a speaker and a public character. There is some
excuse, then, for dealing at greater length with his personality than
with that of any other of the Attic orators. The question of his public
morality has already to some extent been discussed;[245] an examination
of his more private qualities may possibly throw further light on the
question of his culpability.
He was, as we saw, to some extent a self-made man; he had at least risen
far above the station in which he was born. All through his speeches we
find traces of his pride in the position and the culture which he has
attained—his _vanité de parvenu_, as M. Croiset styles it. He is proud
of his education, and boasts of it to excess, not realizing that he thus
lays himself open to the charge of having missed the best that education
can give. Demosthenes is just, though on the side of severity:
‘What right have you,’ he asks, ‘to speak of education? No
man who really had received a liberal education would ever
talk about himself in such a tone as you do; he would have the
modesty to blush if any one else said such things about him;
but people who have missed a proper education, as you have, and
are stupid enough to pretend that they possess it, only succeed
in offending their hearers when they talk about it, and fail
completely to produce the desired impression.’[246]
Aeschines considered ἀπαιδευσία, want of education, almost as a cardinal
sin, and could never conceive that he himself was guilty of it.[247]
He displays his learning by quotations from the poets, which are
sometimes, it must be admitted, very appropriate to his argument, and
by references to mythology and legend, which are sometimes frigid. His
use of history betrays a rather superficial knowledge of the subject; it
is hardly probable that he had studied Thucydides, for instance. Still,
he possessed a fair portion of learning; what leads him astray is really
his lack of taste. He is at his best in the use of quotation when he
adduces the lines of Hesiod on the man whose guilt involves a whole city
in his own ruin—the passage will be quoted later.[248] The verses give
a real sting to his denunciations, and the opinion which he expresses
on the educational influence of poetry is both solemn and sincere.
But he cannot keep to this level. His much boasted education! results
generally in an affectation of a sort of artificial propriety in action
and language, and a profession of prudery which is really foreign to
his nature. He professes an admiration for the self-restraint of public
speakers in Solon’s time, and during the greatness of the republic, and
speaks with disgust of Timarchus, who ‘threw off his cloak and performed
a _pancration_ naked in the assembly.’[249] In the opening of the same
speech he makes a strong claim to the merit of ‘moderation’; in the
prosecution of Timarchus his moderation consists in hinting at certain
abominable practices, which he does not describe by name.
‘I pray you, Gentlemen, to forgive me if, when forced to speak
of certain practices which are not honourable by nature,
but are the established habits of the defendant, I am led
away into using any expression which resembles the actions of
Timarchus.... The blame should rest on him rather than on me.
It will be impossible to avoid all use of such expressions, ...
but I shall try to avoid it as far as possible.’[250]
Notice again the hypocritical reticence or ‘omission’ (_paraleipsis_)—a
rhetorical device familiar to readers of Cicero—which insinuates what it
cannot prove:
‘Mark, men of Athens, how moderate I intend to be in my attack
on Timarchus. I omit all the abuses of which he was guilty
as a boy. So far as I am concerned they may be no more valid
than, say, the actions of the Thirty, the events before the
archonship of Euclides, or any other limitation which may ever
have been established.’[251]
‘I hear that this creature’ (an associate of Timarchus) ‘has
committed certain abominable offences, which, I swear by Zeus
of Olympus, I should never dare to mention in your presence; he
was not ashamed of doing these things, but I could not bear to
live if I had even named them to you explicitly.’[252]
In spite of the prosecutor’s modesty, particular references to the
offences of Timarchus are frequent enough throughout the speech; the
reticence is assumed for the purpose of insinuating that only a tithe of
the offences are really named. The whole tone of the speech, therefore,
is disingenuous and dishonest.
On the other hand, the orator’s tribute to the judges’ respectability is
at times overdrawn. They are informed that ‘Timarchus used to spend his
days in a gambling-house, where there is a pit in which cock-fights are
held, and games of chance are played—I imagine there are some of you who
have seen the things I refer to, or if not, have heard of them.’[253] No
large assembly could ever take quite seriously such a compliment to its
innocence, and it must have been meant as a lighter touch to relieve the
dark hues around it. Such playful sallies are not infrequent, and, like
this one, are often quite inoffensive.[254]
A far more serious arraignment of the character of Aeschines is brought
by Blass, who, having made a very careful study of the speech against
Timarchus, finds a strong presumption, on chronological grounds, that
the majority of the charges are false. It is certainly remarkable that
the charges of immorality rest almost entirely on the statements of the
prosecutor. He expresses an apprehension that Misgolas, a most important
witness, will either refuse to give evidence altogether, or will not
tell the truth. To meet trouble half-way like this is a very serious
confession of weakness, which is confirmed by the orator’s further
comment on the state of the case. He has, he says, other witnesses,
but ‘if the defendant and his supporters persuade them also to refuse
to give evidence—I think they will not persuade them; at any rate not
all of them—there is one thing which they never can do, and that is to
abolish the truth and the reputation which Timarchus bears in the city,
a reputation which I have not secured for him; he has earned it for
himself. For the life of a respectable man should be so spotless as not
to admit even the suspicion of offence.’[255]
Blass considers that the minor charges, directed against the reckless
extravagance with which Timarchus had dissipated his inherited property,
are better substantiated; but these alone would have been hardly enough
to secure his condemnation.
Against Blass’ theories we must set the little that we know about the
facts. Timarchus was certainly condemned and disfranchised.[256] Now
an Athenian jury was not infallible, and whether in an ordinary court
of justice or, as for this case, in the high court of the ecclesia,
political convictions might triumph over partiality; nevertheless, a
man who was innocent of the charge specifically brought against him,
especially if he had not only committed no real political offence, but
had played no part in political affairs—a man, moreover, who had the
powerful influence of Demosthenes behind him—might reasonably expect to
have a fair chance of being acquitted. Aeschines himself was acquitted
a few years later on a political charge, though his political conduct
required a good deal of explanation, and he had all the weight of
Demosthenes not for him, but against him.
Aeschines might well feel a legitimate pride at the high position to
which he had climbed from a comparatively humble starting-point; but to
reiterate the reasons for this pride is a display of vanity. He likes to
talk of himself as ‘the counsellor of this the greatest of cities,’ as
the friend of Alexander and Philip. ‘Demosthenes,’ he says, ‘brings up
against me the fact of my friendship with Alexander.’[257] Demosthenes
retorts that he has done nothing of the sort. ‘I reproach you, you say,
with Alexander’s friendship? How in the world could you have gained it
or deserved it? I should never be so mad as to call you the friend of
either Philip or Alexander, unless we are to say that our harvesters and
hirelings of other sorts are “friends” and “guests” of those who have
hired their services.’[258]
And again—‘On what just or reasonable grounds could Aeschines, the son of
Glaucothea, the tambourine-player, have as his host, or his friend, or
his acquaintance, Philip?’[259] Demosthenes’ estimate of the position is
probably the truer one; Aeschines, with all his cleverness, was not the
man, as Isocrates was, to meet princes on terms of equality.
His vanity about his speeches and the effect which they produced is
attested by the various occasions on which he quotes them, or refers
to them. He gives a summary of a speech which he made as an envoy to
Philip;[260] a speech delivered before the ecclesia is epitomized;[261]
a speech made before ‘thousands and thousands of Arcadians’ is
mentioned.[262] The notorious speech delivered to the Amphictyons is
quoted at some length,[263] and its disastrous effect described, the
speaker’s delight in his own powers blinding him completely to the
serious and far-reaching consequences of his criminal indiscretion.
His private life, in spite of some damaging admissions in the
_Timarchus_, seems to have been satisfactory according to Athenian
standards. Demosthenes accused him of offering a gross insult to an
Olynthian lady. Whether or not the statement was an entire fiction, we
are not in a position to judge. Aeschines indignantly denies the charge,
and asserts that the Athenian people, when it was made, refused to listen
to it, in view of their confirmed respect for his own character:
‘Only consider the folly, the vulgarity of the man, who has
invented so monstrous a lie against me as the one about the
Olynthian woman. You hissed him down in the middle of the
story, for the slander was quite out of keeping with my
character, and you knew me well.’[264]
Whatever his origin may have been, he was not ashamed of it. He more than
once refers with affectionate respect to his father.[265] His love for
his wife and children is on one occasion ingeniously introduced in an
eloquent passage to influence the feelings of his hearers. This use of
‘pathos’ was familiar enough to Greek audiences, but Aeschines shows his
originality by the form in which he puts the appeal—aiming directly at
the feelings of individual hearers for their own families, rather than
asking the assembly collectively to pity the victims of misfortune:
‘I have by my wife, the daughter of Philodemus and sister of
Philon and Echecrates, three children, a daughter and two sons.
I have brought them here with the rest of my family in order
that I may put one question and prove one point to my judges;
and this I shall now proceed to do. I ask you, men of Athens,
whether you think it likely that, in addition to sacrificing
my country and the companionship of my friends and my right to
a share in the worship and the burial-place of my fathers, I
could betray to Philip these whom I love more than anything in
the world, and value his friendship higher than their safety?
Have I ever become so far the slave of base pleasures? Have I
ever yet done anything so base for the sake of money? No; it is
not Macedon that makes a man good or bad, but nature; and when
we return from an embassy we are the same men that we were when
you sent us out.’[266]
Lastly, he could speak of himself with dignity, as in the passage, quoted
above,[267] where he rebuts a charge against his private character, and
in the following:
‘My silence, Demosthenes, is due to the moderation of my
life; I am content with a little; I have no base desire
for greatness; and so my silence or my speech is due to
careful deliberation, not to necessity imposed by habits of
extravagance. You, I imagine, are habitually silent when you
have got what you want; when you have spent it, you raise your
voice.’[268]
§ 4. _Style_
The vocabulary of Aeschines consists mostly of words in ordinary use
which require no comment. Though he was a great admirer of poetry, his
ordinary writing does not display more poetical or unusual words than
that of any other orator.
The difference between his style and that of a writer such as Lysias
is, essentially, a difference not of vocabulary but of tone; the tones
of Aeschines are raised. He tends to use words which are stronger
than they need be, to be ‘angry’ when only surprise is called for;
to be ‘excessively indignant’ when a moderate resentment would meet
the case, to ‘detest’ when to dislike would be enough.[269] He makes
unnecessary appeals to the gods more frequently than any other orator
except Demosthenes. Exaggeration is part of the secret of his _splendor
verborum_, as the Roman critic described it; but by far the greatest part
is his instinct for using quite ordinary words in the most effective
combinations. His best passages, if analysed, contain hardly any words
which are at all out of the common, and yet their vigour and dignity are
unquestionable.[270] The ancients, however, denied purity of diction to
Aeschines, perhaps on account of the characteristics just described.
He is, as Blass observes, occasionally obscure; that is, it is possible
to find sentences which are not quite easy to understand; but on the
whole these are very rare. No writer, even a Lysias, can be at all
times perfectly lucid.[271] As a rule Aeschines is as simple in the
construction of his sentences as he is in the arrangement of his
speeches, and he is much easier to understand than, for instance,
Demosthenes.
He has not the consummate grace and terseness which critics admire as
the chief beauties of Lysias; sometimes unnecessary repetitions of a
word are to be found, sometimes two synonyms are used where one word
would suffice; but such repetitions often give us lucidity, though at the
expense of strict form, and the accumulation of synonyms increases the
emphasis.[272] Only the great artist, who is perfectly confident that
he has found the right word to express adequately his whole meaning in
exactly the right way, can afford to do without all superfluous strokes.
Aeschines is not a perfect artist in language; he aims not at artistic
beauty but effect, to which style is nothing but a subordinate aid. The
composition of artistic prose is, for him, far from being an end in
itself.
His speeches were designed not to be read by literary experts, but
to be delivered from the platform, and he aimed, not at pleasing the
critics’ taste but at working on the passions of the ordinary citizen.
Some of his most important orations were not written at all, though he
probably preserved notes of them,[273] and the three which he did write
out in full were preserved not for their literary beauty but for their
subject-matter. The time for the rhetoric of culture was past; the course
of events required the kind of oratory that would stir men to action. As
to the effectiveness of his speeches, there can be no doubt. We know—on
his own authority, certainly; but it has never been disputed—how his
harangue moved the Amphictyons; and we know that, without any conspicuous
moral qualities, with no advantages from family influence and no definite
political principles, he became a power in Athens solely by virtue of his
eloquence.
Aeschines varies the length of his sentences very considerably; some
of them are long, and consist of strings of participial and relative
clauses. These, however, occur mostly in narrative passages, where
such discursive style is excusable: for instance, the long sentences
in the _de Legatione_, §§ 26-27, §§ 75-77, and § 115, contain reports
of Aeschines’ own earlier speeches. The first of these (§§ 26-27) is
monotonous owing to the series of genitives absolute which compose an
inordinately long protasis, the main verb not occurring till near the end
of the sentence, and then being followed by another genitive clause.
A long sentence early in the _Ctesiphon_ gives a _résumé_ of the
circumstances by which the orator is impelled to speak; the clauses
are mostly connected by καί, though all depend on a relative at the
beginning. No skill is displayed in the structure of such sentences,
and their possible length is limited only by the amount of water in the
_clepsydra_. Up to a certain length, they are forcible, but if the limit
is exceeded, the effect is lost, for the point which the orator wishes
to make is too long deferred, since the main clause, containing the
statement which the preceding relative clauses illustrate or explain, is
not reached until the heavy accumulation of relative clauses has wearied
the perception.
In general, however, Aeschines is moderate in length; his sentences, on
the average, are shorter than those of Isocrates, and he tacitly adheres
to the rule that a period should not be so long that it cannot be uttered
in one breath.
Though not pedantic, he was far from being without a taste for
composition. In all the speeches we find examples of the deliberate
avoidance of hiatus, and in the _de Legatione_ he bestowed some care on
the matter.
The avoidance may generally, though not always, be traced in an unusual
order of words.[274] Examples of harsh hiatus are rare, though there
are many unimportant instances. Quite apart from theoretical rules, a
good orator will instinctively avoid awkward combinations of letters,
for euphony is necessary for fluent speaking. Aeschines, secure in the
possession of a perfect delivery, might admit sounds which Isocrates and
other theorists considered harsh; it was with practical declamation that
he was concerned.
The use of the rhetorical ‘figures’ is a prominent characteristic of
Aeschines. The verbal contrasts which Gorgias and the Sophists affected,
many of which seem to us so frigid and tedious, have too much honour from
Aeschines; for instance, the purely formal antithesis—‘He mentions the
names of those whose bodies he has never seen.’[275] where the sound of
the jingle—ὀνόματα, σώματα—is more important than the sense. The effect
of such ‘like endings’ (_homoeoteleute_) cannot as a rule be reproduced,
though sometimes a play upon words will indicate it: _e.g._ οὐ τὸν
τρόπον ἀλλὰ τὸν τόπον μόνον μετήλλαξεν—‘he has changed, not his habits,
but only his habitation.’[276] In such assonance there is an undoubted
aiming at comic effect. A forcible repetition of words is found in such
sentences as the following: ‘What I saw, I reported to you as I saw
it; what I heard, as I heard it; now what was it that I saw and heard
about Cersobleptes? I saw ...’ etc.[277] Repetitions of this and similar
kinds seem to break at times from the speaker’s control, and pass all
measure.[278]
Aeschines does not seem to have paid any attention to rhythmical writing;
his style is too free to be bound by unnecessary restrictions; verses
and metrical passages occur sporadically, but they are rare. He seems to
have fallen into them by accident, since they occur in positions where no
special point is marked by an unusual rhythm.[279]
Direct quotations of poetry, for which he had a great liking, are,
on the other hand, very frequent. No other orator, except Lycurgus,
is comparable to him in this respect, and Lycurgus uses his power of
quotation with much less force than Aeschines, who often employs it
aptly. He gives us the impression that serious religious conviction is at
the back of his quotation from Hesiod:
‘Often the whole of a city must suffer for one man’s sin.’[280]
In other cases the quotations are excessively long and, like those of
Lycurgus, have hardly any bearing on the point.
His metaphors are sometimes vivid and well chosen—ἀμπελουργεῖν τὴν
πόλιν—‘to strip the city like a vineyard’; ἔναυλον ἦν πᾶσιν—‘it was
dinned into everybody’s ears.’ Some of the most forcible occur in
passages which purport to be quotations or paraphrases of Demosthenes:
_e.g._ ἐπιστομίσαι, ‘to bridle’ the war-party; ἀπορράψειν τὸ Φιλίππου
στόμα, ‘to sew up Philip’s mouth.’[281] These are probably caricatures
of Demosthenes’ daring phrases.
Turning now from the consideration of the materials to the finished
product, we find that Aeschines can attain a high level of style. His
denunciation of the sharp practices prevailing in the course of his day
is impressive; we know that he is speaking the truth, and he does not
make the mistake of exaggerating. The seriousness is relieved, but not
impaired, by the light thread of sarcasm which runs through the whole
fabric:
‘The hearing of such cases, as my father used to tell me, was
conducted in a way very different from ours. The judges were
much more severe with those who proposed illegal measures than
the prosecutor was, and they would often interrupt the clerk
and ask him to read over again the laws and the decree; and
the proposers of illegal measures were found guilty not if
they had ridden over all the laws, but if they had subverted
one single clause. The present procedure is ridiculous beyond
words; the clerk reads the illegal decree, and the judges, as
if they were listening to an incantation or something that did
not concern them, keep their minds fixed on something else. And
already, through the devices of Demosthenes, you are admitting
a disgraceful practice; you have allowed the course of justice
to be changed, for the prosecutor is on his defence, and the
defendant conducts his prosecution; and the judges sometimes
forget the matter of which they are called on to be arbiters,
and are compelled to vote on questions which they ought not
to be judging. The defendant, if he ever refers to the facts
at all, tells you, not that his proposal was legal, but that
somebody else has proposed similar measures before his time,
and has been acquitted.’[282]
The following passage has been many times pointed out, and justly,
as a fine example of the higher style of Aeschines’ rhetoric. Taken
apart from its context, and without any consideration of the truth of
the insinuations which it makes, it is a notable piece of ‘pathetic’
pleading. The Romans, with a fondness for epigrammatic contrast,
attributed to Aeschines more of sound and less of strength than to
Demosthenes. This is true if we regard their works as a whole; but in
isolated passages like this, Aeschines finds his level with the best of
Attic orators:
‘Thebes, our neighbour Thebes, in the course of a single day
has been torn from the midst of Greece; justly, perhaps, for in
general she followed a mistaken policy; yet it was not human
judgment but divine ordinance that led her into error. And
the poor Lacedaemonians, who only interfered in this matter
originally in connection with the seizure of the sanctuary,
they who once could claim to be the leaders of the Greeks, must
now be sent up to Alexander to offer themselves as hostages
and advertise their disaster; they and their country must
submit to any treatment on which he decides, and be judged by
the clemency of the conqueror who was the injured party. And
our city, the common asylum of all Greeks, to whom formerly
embassies used to come from Greece to obtain their safety from
us, city by city, is struggling now not for the leadership
of the Greeks but for the very soil of her fatherland. And
this has befallen us since Demosthenes took the direction of
our policy. A passage in Hesiod contains a solemn warning
appropriate to such a case. He speaks, I believe, with the
intention of educating the people, and advising the cities not
to take to themselves evil leaders.
‘I shall quote the lines, for I conceive that we learn by heart
the maxims of the poets in childhood, so that in manhood we may
apply them:—
‘“Often the whole of a city must suffer for one man’s sin,
Who plotteth infatuate counsel, and walketh in evil ways,
On such God sendeth destruction, by famine and wasting plague,
And razeth their walls and armies, and shatters their ships at
sea.”’[283]
We know that Aeschines took education very seriously—more seriously,
in fact, than anything else—and his reference here to the educative
influence of the poets gives proof of his earnestness, which may have
been a transient emotion, but was, for the moment, a strong one.
Setting apart a few such serious passages, Aeschines is at his best
when he is directly accusing Demosthenes. His attacks are nearly always
characterized by a humorous manner which does not make them any the less
forcible, and they generally contain just enough truth to make their
malice effective. The fact that Aeschines himself had too deep a respect
for the truth to be prodigal in the use of it does not diminish the
virulence of his attack on his rival’s veracity, while any question as
to the exactitude of his statements would be drowned in the laugh that
followed the concluding paragraph:
‘The fellow has one characteristic peculiarly his own when
other impostors tell a lie, they try to speak vaguely and
indefinitely, for fear of being convicted of falsehood; but
when Demosthenes seeks to impose upon you, he first of all
enforces his lie with an oath, invoking eternal ruin on
himself; secondly, though he knows that a thing never can
happen at all, he dares to speak with a nice calculation of the
day when it is going to happen; he utters the names of people
whose faces he has never seen, thus cheating you into hearing
him, and assuming an air of truthfulness; and so he thoroughly
merits your detestation, since, being such a scoundrel as he
is, he discredits the usual proofs of honesty.
‘After talking in this way he gives the clerk a decree to
read—something longer than the _Iliad_, and more empty than
the speeches he makes or the life he has led; full of hopes
that can never be realized, and armies that will never be
mustered.’[284]
The pleasing custom followed by the orators of antiquity, whether Greek
or Roman, of defiling the graves of the ancestors of their political
opponents, and defaming their private lives, can be as well exemplified
from Aeschines as from his rival. Aeschines shows no great originality in
particular terms of abuse—Dinarchus has a greater variety of offensive
words—but the following extract from his circumstantial fictions about
Demosthenes is more effective, because more moderate in tone, than
the incredible insults with which the latter described the family
circumstances and the career of Aeschines:[285]
‘So, on his grandfather’s account, he must be an enemy of the
people, for you condemned his ancestors to death; but through
his mother’s family he is a Scythian, a barbarian, though he
speaks Greek; so that even his wickedness is not of native
growth. And what of his daily life? Once a trierarch, he
appeared again as a speech-writer, having in some ridiculous
fashion thrown away his patrimony; but as in this profession he
came under suspicion of disclosing the speeches to the other
side, he bounded up on to the tribunal; and though he took
great sums of money from his administration, he saved very
little for himself. Now, however, the king’s treasure has
drowned his extravagance—but even that will not be enough; for
no conceivable wealth can survive evil habits.
‘Worst of all, he makes a living not out of his private sources
of income, but out of your danger.’[286]
But he is really at his best where some slight slip on the part of his
opponent gives him the opportunity of magnifying a trivial incident into
importance. In the following caricature the indecision of Demosthenes is
better expressed by the vacillating language thrust into his mouth than
it could have been by the most eloquent description in the third person:
‘While I was in the middle of this speech, Demosthenes
shouted out at the top of his voice—all our fellow-envoys can
support my statement—for in addition to his other vices he
is a partisan of Boeotia. What he said was something to this
purpose:—“This fellow is full of a spirit of turbulence and
recklessness; I admit that I am made of softer stuff, and
fear dangers afar off. However, I would forbid him to raise
disturbances between the States, for I think that the right
course is for us ambassadors not to meddle with anything.
Philip is marching to Thermopylae; I cover my face. No man will
judge me because Philip takes up arms; I shall be judged for
any unnecessary word that I utter, or for any action in which I
exceed my instructions.”’[287]
The failure of Demosthenes to rise to the occasion when he had the
opportunity of delivering an impressive speech before Philip, during
the first embassy, forms the groundwork for excellent comedy on the
part of Aeschines. Demosthenes, by his rival’s account, was usually so
intolerable as a companion that his colleagues refused to stay in the
same lodging with him whenever another was obtainable; but he had found
opportunity to impress them with his own sense of his importance as an
orator. These professions are well indicated in a few words. The account
of his failure, of Philip’s patronizing encouragement, of the fiasco in
which the whole proceedings terminated, are sketched with a delicate
malice that must have made any defence or explanation impossible; indeed
Demosthenes seems to have attempted no reply:
‘When these and other speeches had been made, it was
Demosthenes’ turn to play his part in the embassy, and
everybody was most attentive, expecting to hear a speech of
exceptional power; for, as we gathered later, even Philip and
his companions had heard the report of his ambitious promises.
When everybody was thus prepared to listen to him, the brute
gave utterance to some sort of obscure exordium, half-dead
with nervousness, and having made a little progress over the
surface of the subject he suddenly halted and hesitated, and at
last completely lost his way. Philip, seeing the state he was
in, urged him to take courage, and not to think he had failed
because, like an actor, he had forgotten his part; but to try
quietly and little by little to recollect himself and make the
speech as he intended it. But he, having once been flurried,
and lost the thread of his written speech, could not recover
himself again; he tried once more, and failed in the same
way. A silence followed, after which the herald dismissed the
embassy.’[288]
Aeschines not only excelled in this class of circumstantial caricature,
but he could win a laugh by a single phrase. It is well known that
Midias, after various discreditable quarrels, put the final touch to his
insolence by a public assault on Demosthenes, whose face he slapped
in the theatre. Demosthenes on many occasions made capital out of this
assault; which fact inspires the remark of Aeschines, ‘His face is his
fortune.’[289] Of his dexterity in repartee a single instance may be
quoted: Demosthenes, in an outburst of indignation, had suggested that
the court should refuse to be impressed by the oratory of a man who
was notoriously corrupt, but should rather be prejudiced by it against
him.[290] Aeschines, catching at the words, rather than the spirit,
retorted, ‘Though you, gentlemen, have taken a solemn oath to give an
impartial hearing to both parties, he has dared to urge you not to listen
to the voice of the defendant.’[291]
§ 5. _Treatment of subjects: general estimate_
During his tenure of the office of γραμματεύς—clerk to the
ecclesia—Aeschines must have gained a thorough knowledge of the procedure
of that assembly, and of law. This comes out in his general treatment of
his subjects, and particularly in his legal arguments, which are clear
and convincing. In the speech against Ctesiphon, where the irregularities
of the proceedings about Demosthenes’ crown gave him a good subject for
argument, he makes out a very strong case.
In the structure of his speeches he follows a chronological order. He
realized well that the style of his eloquence lent itself naturally
to bright and attractive narrative. His versatility saves him from
becoming tedious; at one time he can speak with a noble solemnity which
reminds M. Croiset of the eloquence of the pulpit,[292] at another, the
lightness of his touch almost conceals the bitterness of his sentiments
and the seriousness of his purpose.[293] He can speak of himself with
dignity, of his family with true feeling; careful argument succeeds to
lucid narrative; crisp interrogation, reinforced by powerful sarcasm, to
masterly exposition. He can awaken his hearers’ interest by an indication
of the course which he intends to follow, and this interest is sustained
by all the resources of an eloquence which, though at times sophistical,
and though disfigured by occasional blemishes, has more of naturalness
and shows less traces of scholastic elaboration, than that of any other
great orator. He is abler than Andocides, more varied than Lysias, more
alive than Isaeus.
His natural gifts place him above Lycurgus, though our insight into the
latter’s high character gives him a powerful claim to our consideration.
Blass ranks him below Hyperides, but a study of the lighter passages
in Aeschines leads us to believe that, had he turned his attention to
private cases, he might have equalled or surpassed that polished orator
on his own chosen ground. The unanimous judgment of ancient and modern
times places him far below Demosthenes, who stands apart without a rival;
but in one quality, at least, he surpasses the paragon. Demosthenes,
according to the opinion of Longinus, is apt to make his hearers
laugh not with him but at him;[294] Aeschines never turns the laugh
against himself. Aeschines is perhaps less read than he deserves; he
has suffered from historical bias, and the prevalent contempt for his
qualities as a statesman has led to an undue disregard of his virtues as
an orator. There is nothing unfamiliar in this judgment; other orators
have suffered in the same way at the hands of prejudiced historians.[295]
It is interesting to read the account of Aeschines in Blass’ _Attische
Beredsamkeit_; the gifted scholar apparently starts with a strong
prejudice against his author, and is almost too ready to insist on his
faults; but time after time he is obliged to admit the existence of
positive merits, and in the end he seems, almost against his will, to
have been forced to modify his judgment; while the care and impartiality
with which he has detailed all points, good and bad alike, provides
material for a more favourable estimate such as that of Croiset.
§ 6. _Contents of Speeches_
A short account of the subject-matter of the three speeches may conclude
this chapter.
1. _Against Timarchus._
The speech begins (§§ 1-2) with a statement of the prosecutor’s motives;
§ 3 states the position which he intends to assume—that Timarchus, by
breaking the laws, has made the bringing of this action inevitable. Laws
relating to the matter are read and fully discussed (§§ 4-36).
This preliminary legal statement, apart from the particular case, puts
the prosecution on a sounder footing than if the speech had begun at once
with the narrative.
§§ 37-76. _The first charge_ (immorality). Narrative of the private life
of Timarchus, interspersed with evidence and argument as to his political
disabilities.
§§ 77-93. Examples of disability imposed on other grounds. Precedents for
a verdict in accordance with general knowledge even when the evidence is
defective.
§§ 94-105. _The second charge._ Timarchus is a spendthrift. Narrative and
evidence about his prodigality.
§§ 106-115. _The third charge._ His corruptness in public life.
§ 116, recapitulation. §§ 117-176, anticipation of the defence.
§§ 177-195. Epilogue, announced beforehand (§ 117) as an ‘exhortation to
a virtuous life.’ § 196, a short conclusion—‘I have instructed you in the
laws, I have examined the life of the defendant; I now retire, leaving
the matter in your hands.’
2. _On the Embassy._
Demosthenes had accused Aeschines of treason; his speech, it is to be
noted, dealt really with the second embassy only, and the events in
Athens subsequent to it, though he makes some reference to the third
embassy, and implies that Aeschines was corrupt even before the second.
He follows no chronological order, so that his story is hard to follow.
Aeschines, on the other hand, has a great appearance of lucidity,
treating all events in chronological order; but this is misleading, for,
in order to divert attention from the period in which his conduct was
questionable, he spends a disproportionate time in describing the first
embassy, in connection with which no accusation is made by Demosthenes.
The exordium (§§ 1-11) contains a strong appeal for an impartial hearing.
The events of the first embassy to Philip are the subject of an amusing
narrative at the expense of Demosthenes (§§ 12-39); the return of the
envoys and their reports, etc., occupy §§ 40-55. The same clearness does
not appear in the rest of the speech. Aeschines has to make a defence
on various charges brought against himself, so a plain narrative is not
enough. The chief charges were that Aeschines was in the pay of Philip,
and that he deceived the people as to Philip’s intentions, thus leading
them into actions which proved disastrous. The former charge could not
be proved by Demosthenes, however strong his suspicions were; the facts
relating to the peace of Philocrates and the delay in the ratification of
the agreement with Philip were matters of common knowledge; it was only
a question of intention. The defence of Aeschines is that he deceived
the people because he was himself deceived—a confession of credulity and
incompetence. The narrative is not continuous; details about the embassy
to Philip, the embassy to the Arcadians, and the fate of Cersobleptes,
are to some extent mixed together. Reference is also made to some
specific charges, _e.g._ the case of the Olynthian woman, the speech
before the Amphictyons, the singing of the paean, etc. In the two latter
cases there is no defence, but an attempt at justification (§§ 55-170).
The epilogue begins with an historical survey of Athenian affairs, which
is stolen either from Andocides or from some popular commonplace book,
and contains the usual appeal to the judges to save the speaker from his
adversaries’ malice.
He ends by calling on Eubulus and Phocion to speak for him. (§§ 171-178.)
Stress has been laid in these pages on the somewhat disjointed character
of the sections dealing with the principal charges, and it cannot be
denied that the defence is sometimes vague; that Aeschines seems to aim
not at refuting but eluding the accusations. These imperfections come out
on an analysis; but the speech taken as a whole is a very fine piece of
advocacy, and makes the acquittal of the speaker quite intelligible.
3. _Against Ctesiphon._
The speech opens with an elaboration of a trite commonplace, modelled on
the style of Andocides, about the vicious cleverness of the speaker’s
opponents and his own simple trust in the laws. Aeschines proposes to
prove that the procedure of Ctesiphon was illegal, his statements false,
and his action harmful. (§§ 1-8.)
_First charge_—‘The proposal to grant a crown to Demosthenes was illegal,
because Demosthenes was at the time liable to εὔθυνα (§§ 9-12). All
statements to the contrary notwithstanding, a consideration of the laws
proves conclusively that Demosthenes was so liable.’ (§§ 13-31.)
_Second charge_—‘It was illegal for the proclamation of the crown to be
made in the theatre.’ (§§ 32-48.)
_Third charge_—‘The statements on which the proposal was made, viz. that
the public counsel and public actions of Demosthenes are for the best
interests of the people, are false.’ (§ 49.)
The first two charges are dealt with by means of legal argument, in which
Aeschines, as usual, displays considerable ability. The third and longest
section of the speech (§§ 49-176) is less satisfactory. The orator
proposes to set aside the private life of his enemy, though he hints
that many incidents might be adduced to prove its general worthlessness
(§§ 51-53), and to deal only with his public policy. This he does, in
chronological order and at great length. Numerous occasions are described
on which the policy of Demosthenes was detrimental to Athens. The
arguments with which the narrative is interspersed are often of a trivial
nature, consisting sometimes of appeals to superstition, as when he tells
us that troops were sent to Chaeronea, although the proper sacrifices
had not been performed; and attempts to show that Demosthenes is an
ἀλιτήριος, for whose sin the whole city must suffer. Taken in detail,
some of these passages are impressive; but the weakness of the whole is
that Aeschines himself does not declare any serious or systematic policy.
This section contains incidentally digressions, in the taste of the day,
about the family and character of Demosthenes.[296]
§§ 177-190 contain some references to heroes of antiquity, by way of
invidious comparison; §§ 191-202, the deterioration of procedure in the
courts.[297]
§§ 203-205, recapitulation; §§ 206-212, further incrimination of
Demosthenes, and §§ 213-214, of Ctesiphon. §§ 215-229, chiefly
refutation of charges against Aeschines. §§ 230-259, further general
discussion of the illegality of the measure and the unworthiness
of Demosthenes. The final appeal to the past—‘Think you not that
Themistocles and the heroes who fell at Marathon and Plataea, and the
very graves of our ancestors, will groan aloud if a crown is to be
granted to one who concerts with the barbarians for the ruin of Greece?’
ends abruptly and grotesquely with an invocation to ‘Earth and Sun and
Virtue and Intelligence and Education, through which we distinguish
between the noble and the base.’
It reminds us strangely of the invocations put into the mouth of
Euripides by Aristophanes.[298]
CHAPTER IX
DEMOSTHENES
§ 1. _Introduction_
The art of rhetoric could go no further after Isocrates, who, in addition
to possessing a style which was as perfect as technical dexterity could
make it, had imparted to his numerous disciples the art of composing
sonorous phrases and linking them together in elaborate periods. Any
young aspirant to literary fame might now learn from him to write fluent
easy prose, which would have been impossible to Thucydides or Antiphon.
If the style seems on some occasions to have been so over-elaborated that
the subject-matter takes a secondary place, that was the fault not so
much of the artist as of the man. Isocrates never wrote at fever-heat;
his greatest works come from the study; he is too reflective and
dispassionate to be a really vital force.
With Demosthenes and his contemporaries it is otherwise; they are men
actively engaged in politics, actuated by strong party-feeling, and
swayed by personal passion. This was the outcome of the political
situation: just as feeling was strong in the generation immediately
succeeding the reign of the oligarchical Thirty at Athens, so now, when
Athens and the whole of Greece were fighting not against oligarchy but
the empire of a sovereign ruler, the depths were stirred.
A new feature in this period is the publication of political speeches.
From the time of the earliest orator—Antiphon—the professional
_logographoi_ had preserved their speeches in writing. The majority of
these were delivered in minor cases of only personal importance, though
some orations by Lysias and others have reference indirectly to political
questions.
Another class of speeches which were usually preserved is the
_epideictic_—orations prepared for delivery at some great gathering, such
as a religious festival or a public funeral. Isocrates was an innovator
to the extent of writing in the form of speeches what were really
political treatises; but these were only composed for the reader, and
were never intended to be delivered.
Among the contemporaries of Demosthenes we find some diversity of
practice. Some orators, such as Demades and Phocion, never published any
speeches, and seem, indeed, hardly to have prepared them before delivery.
They relied upon their skill at improvisation.
Others, for instance Aeschines, Lycurgus, and Dinarchus, revised and
published their judicial speeches, especially those which had a political
bearing. Hyperides and Demosthenes, in addition to this, in some
cases gave to the world an amended version of their public harangues.
Demosthenes did not always publish such speeches; there are considerable
periods of his political life which are not represented by any written
work; but he seems to have wished to make a permanent record of certain
utterances containing an explanation of his policy, in order that those
who had not heard him speak, or not fully grasped his import, might
have an opportunity for further study of his views after the ephemeral
effect of his eloquence had passed away. It is probable that most
of the speeches so published belong to times when his party was not
predominant in the State, and the opposition had to reinforce its speech
by writing. The result is of importance in two ways, for the speeches are
a serious contribution to literature, of great value for the study of
the development of Greek prose; and they are of still greater historical
value; for, though untrustworthy in some details, they provide excellent
material for the understanding of the political situation, and the aims
and principles of the anti-Macedonian party.
§ 2. _Life, etc._
Demosthenes the orator was born at Athens in 384 B.C. His father,
Demosthenes, of the deme of Paeania, was a rich manufacturer of
swords; his mother was a daughter of an Athenian named Gylon, who
had left Athens, owing to a charge of treason, at the end of the
Peloponnesian War, settled in the neighbourhood of the Cimmerian
Bosporus (Crimea),[299] and married a rich woman who was a native
of that district. We know nothing more of her except that Aeschines
describes her as a Scythian. She may have been of Hellenic descent; even
Plutarch doubts the assertion of Aeschines that she was a barbarian; the
suspicion, however, was enough for Aeschines, who is able to call his
enemy a Greek-speaking Scythian.
Demosthenes the elder died, leaving his son seven years old and a
daughter aged five. By his will two nephews, Aphobos and Demophon, and a
friend Therippides, were appointed trustees. The two former, as nearest
of kin, were, according to Attic custom, to marry the widow and her
daughter, but these provisions were not carried out. During the years of
Demosthenes’ minority his guardians ruined the sword business by their
mismanagement, and squandered the accumulated profits.
At the age of eighteen Demosthenes, who had been brought up by his
mother, laid claim to his father’s estate. The guardians by various
devices attempted to frustrate him, and three years were spent in
attempts at compromise and examinations before the arbitrators. During
this time Demosthenes was studying rhetoric and judicial procedure under
Isaeus, to whose methods his early speeches are so deeply indebted that a
contemporary remarked ‘he had swallowed Isaeus whole.’[300] At last, when
he was twenty-one years old, he succeeded in bringing his wrongs before
a court; thanks to the training of Isaeus he was able to plead his own
case, and he won it. The ingenuity of his adversaries enabled them to
involve him in further legal proceedings which lasted perhaps two years
more. In the end he was victorious, but by the time he recovered his
patrimony there was very little of it left.
Being forced to find a means of living he adopted the profession of
a speech-writer, which he followed through the greater part of his
life.[301] He made speeches for others to use, as his father had made
swords, and he was as good a craftsman as his father. He succeeded by
this new trade in repairing his damaged fortunes.
In addition to forging such weapons for the use of others, he instructed
pupils in the art of rhetoric. This practice he seems to have abandoned
soon after the year 345 B.C., when public affairs began to have the
chief claim on his energies.[302] From that time forward he wielded with
distinction a sword of his own manufacture.
It is said that as a youth barely of age he made an attempt to speak in
the ecclesia, and failed. His voice was too weak, his delivery imperfect,
and his style unsuitable. The failure only inspired him to practise that
he might overcome his natural defects. We are familiar with the legends
of his declaiming with pebbles in his mouth and reciting speeches when
running up hill, of his studies in a cave by the sea-shore, where he
tried to make his voice heard above the thunder of the waves.
The training to which he subjected himself enabled him to overcome to
a great extent whatever disabilities he may have suffered from, but
he never had the advantage of a voice and delivery such as those of
Aeschines. Legends current in the time of Plutarch represent him as
engrossed in the study of the best prose-writers. He copied out the
history of Thucydides eight times, according to one tradition. This we
need not accept, but it may be taken as certain that he studied the
author’s style carefully. He may not have been a pupil of Isocrates
or Plato, but from the former he must have learnt much in the way
of prose-construction and rhythm, and the latter’s works, though he
dissented from the great principle of Plato that the wise man avoids the
_agora_ and the law-courts, may well have inspired him with many of the
generous ideas which are the foundation of his policy. From the study of
such passages as the Melian controversy and others in which the historian
bases Justice upon the right of the stronger, he may have turned with
relief to the nobler discussion of Justice in the Republic, and indeed,
in his view of what is right and good, Demosthenes approaches much nearer
to the philosopher than to the historian.
A professional speech-writer at Athens might make a speciality of some
particular kind of cases, and by thus restricting his field become a real
expert in one department, as Isaeus, for instance, did in the probate
court; or, on the other hand, he might engage in quite general practice.
A farmer might have a dispute with his neighbours about his boundaries,
or damage caused by the overflow of surface water;[303] a quiet citizen
might seek redress from the law in a case of assault against which he was
unable or unwilling to make retaliation in kind;[304] an underwriter who
had been defrauded in some shady marine transaction might wish to bring
another knave to account.[305] But besides these private cases, whether
they are purely civil,[306] or practically, if not technically, criminal
actions, there is other work of more importance for a _logographos_.
The State may wish to prosecute an official who has abused its trust. In
times when honesty is rarer than cleverness it may find the necessity
of appointing a prosecutor rather for his known integrity than for his
ability in the law-courts. Such a prosecutor will need professional
assistance; and this need evoked some of the early political speeches
of Demosthenes, _Against Androtion_, _Timocrates_, and _Aristocrates_
(355-352 B.C.). It is noticeable that we have no trace of his work
between the speeches delivered against his guardians and the first of
this latter group. Probably he spent these ten years partly in study and
partly in the conduct of such cases as fell to the portion of a beginner.
In this time he must gradually have built up a reputation, but he may not
have wished to keep any record of his first essays which, when he had
arrived at his maturity as a pleader, could not, perhaps, have seemed to
him worthy of his reputation.
It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of these varied activities
to the career of Demosthenes. In the course of these early years he must
have made himself familiar with many branches of the law; he was brought
into intimate relations with individuals of all classes, and all shades
of political opinion. In order to be of use vicariously in political
cases he must have made a careful study of politics. Such studies were
of great value in the education of a statesman, and by means of the
semi-public cases in which he was engaged, though not on his own account,
and perhaps not always in accordance with his convictions, his own
political opinions must gradually have been formed.
In 354 B.C., the year after the trial of Androtion, Demosthenes appeared
in person before the dicastery on behalf of Ctesippus in an action
against Leptines. This was a case of some political importance. A few
months later he came forward in the assembly to deliver his speech _On
the Symmories_, which was shortly followed by another public harangue _On
behalf of the people of Megapolis_ (353 B.C.). Two years later he came to
the front not as a mere pleader, but a real counsellor of the people, and
began the great series of _Philippics_.
His career from this point onward is divided naturally into three periods.
In the first, 351-340 B.C., he was in opposition to the party in power
at Athens. The beginning of it is marked by some famous speeches, the
_First Philippic_ and the first three _Olynthiac_ orations (351-349
B.C.). Till this time the Athenians had not realized the significance of
the growth of the Macedonian power. It was only eight years since Philip,
on his accession to the throne, had undertaken the great task of uniting
the constituent parts of his kingdom which had long been torn by civil
war, of fostering a national feeling, and creating an army. He had won
incredible successes in a few years. By a combination of force and deceit
he had made himself master of Amphipolis and Pydna in 357 B.C. In the
following year he obtained possession of the gold mines of Mt. Pangaeus,
which gave him a source of inexhaustible wealth, and enabled him to
prepare more ambitious enterprises. This was an important crisis in his
career: the bribery for which he was famous and in which he greatly
trusted could now be practised on a large scale.
In the early speeches of Demosthenes there is little reference to
Philip; he is certainly not regarded as a dangerous rival of Athens.
There is a passing mention of him in the _Leptines_ (384 B.C.);[307]
in the _Aristocrates_ he plays a larger part, but is treated almost
contemptuously: ‘You know, of course, whom I mean by this Philip of
Macedon’ (ἴστε δήπου Φίλιππον τουτονὶ τὸν Μακέδονα) is the form in which
his name is introduced (§ 111). He is considered as an enemy, but only
classed with other barbarian princes, such as Cersobleptes of Thrace.
But Philip was not content with annexing towns and districts in his own
neighbourhood in whose integrity Athens was interested—Amphipolis, Pydna,
Potidaea, Methone, and part of Thrace. He interfered in the affairs of
Thessaly, which brought the trouble nearer home to Athens (353 B.C.). In
352 B.C. he proposed to pass through Thermopylae, and take part in the
Sacred War against Phocis, but here Athens intervened for the first time
and checked his progress.
After this one vigorous stroke the Athenians, in spite of Philip’s
renewed activities in Thrace and on the Propontis, relapsed into an
apathetic indifference, from which Demosthenes in vain tried to rouse
them.
The language of the _First Philippic_ shows that Demosthenes fully
recognized the seriousness of the situation, and the imminent danger to
which the complacency of his countrymen was exposing them; he wishes to
make them feel that the case, though not yet desperate, is likely to
become so if they persist in doing nothing, while a whole-hearted effort
will bring them into safety again:
§ 2. ‘Now, first of all, Gentlemen, we must not despair about
the present state of affairs, serious as it is; for our
greatest weakness in the past will be our greatest strength in
the future. What do I mean? I mean that you are in difficulties
simply because you have never exerted yourselves to do your
duty. If things were as they are in spite of serious effort on
your part to act always as you should, there would be no hope
of improvement. Secondly, I would have you reflect on what some
of you can remember and others have been told, of the great
power possessed not long ago by Sparta; yet, in face of that
power you acted honourably and nobly, you in no wise detracted
from your country’s dignity; you faced the war unflinchingly in
a just cause....’
§ 4. ‘If any of you thinks that Philip is invincible,
considering how great is the force at his disposal, and how
our city has lost all these places, he has grounds for his
belief; but let him consider that _we_ once possessed Pydna,
Potidaea, and Methone, and the whole of that district; and many
of the tribes, now subject to him, were free and independent
and better disposed to us than to Macedon. If Philip had felt
as you do now, that it was a serious matter to fight against
Athens because she possessed so many strongholds commanding his
own country, while he was destitute of allies, he would never
have won any of his present successes, or acquired the mighty
power which now alarms you. But he saw clearly that these
places were the prizes of war offered in open competition; that
the property of an absentee goes naturally to those who are on
the spot to claim it, and those who are willing to work hard
and take risks may supplant those who neglect their chances.’
§ 8. ‘Do not imagine that he is as a God, secure in eternal
possession. There are men who hate and fear and envy him, even
among those who seem his closest associates. These feelings are
for the present kept under, because through your slowness and
your negligence they can find no opening. These habits, I say,
you must break with.’
§ 10. ‘When, I ask, when will you be roused to do your
duty?—When the time of need comes, you say. What do you think
of the present crisis? I hold that a free nation can never be
in greater need than when their conduct is of a kind to shame
them. Tell me, do you want to parade the streets asking each
other, “Is there any news to-day?” What graver news can there
be than that a Macedonian is crushing Athens and dictating the
policy of Greece? “Philip is dead,” says one. “Oh no, but he
is ill,” says another. What difference does it make to you?
Even if anything happens to him you will very soon call into
existence a second Philip if you attend to your interests as
carefully as you are doing now. For it is not so much his own
strength as your negligence that has raised him to power.’
The orator proceeds to give detailed advice for the conduct of the
war; he asks for no ‘paper forces,’[308] such as the assembly is in
the habit of voting, irrespective of whether they can be obtained or
not—ten or twenty thousand of mercenaries or the like. He requires a
small but efficient expeditionary force, of which the backbone is to be
a contingent of citizen-hoplites, one quarter of the whole; a small but
efficient fleet, and money to pay both army and navy—this was a matter
often overlooked by the assembly—and an Athenian general in whom the host
will have confidence. The advice was moderate and sound in the extreme.
Demosthenes probably knew what he was talking about when he said that
two thousand hoplites, two hundred cavalry, and fifty triremes were
enough for the present. A resolute attack on Philip by such a force would
probably have put fresh heart into the many enemies whom he had not yet
completely subdued.
There is a further point which marks the difference between the present
advice and that of previous counsellors. The army is not to be enlisted
for a particular expedition only; it is to be maintained at its original
strength as long as may be necessary.[309] Soldiers will serve for a
certain limited time, and at the end of their term will be replaced by
fresh troops.[310] The army which he suggests will not be enough to
defeat Philip unaided, but enough to produce a strong impression. They
might send a large force, but it would be unwieldy, and they could not
maintain it.[311]
The _First Philippic_ failed to produce the effect desired. The
_Olynthiac_ speeches which closely followed it were also ineffectual.
In 349 B.C. Philip seized a pretext for making war on Olynthus, which
appealed for help to Athens. The alliance, which had been sought in
vain in 357 and 352 B.C., was now, apparently, granted with little
opposition, and Chares with two thousand mercenaries sent to the help of
the Olynthian league. Demosthenes tries to emphasize the importance of
the situation, the aid which has been voted is not enough; they ought
to act at once, sending two forces of citizens, not mercenaries; the
one to protect Olynthus, the other to harass Philip elsewhere. Large
supplies of money are necessary, and he hints that the Athenians have
such supplies ready at hand. He refers to the Festival Fund (θεωρικόν),
but concerning this he is in a delicate position. The ministry of
Eubulus was in power, and a law of Eubulus had pronounced any attempt to
tamper with the Θεωρικόν a criminal offence. Demosthenes, being one of a
weak minority, could only move cautiously, suggesting that a change of
administration was desirable, but not proposing a definite motion.
There is a marked difference in tone between the first two speeches and
the third. In the former Demosthenes insists that everything is still to
be done, but he points out that there are many weak points in Philip’s
armour, and a vigorous and united policy may still defeat him. In the
third he makes it clear that the opportunity is past, and the lost ground
can only be recovered by desperate measures. He openly advocates the
conversion of the Festival Fund into a military chest, and this is the
main theme of the oration, to which every argument in turn leads up.[312]
The efforts of Athens were dilatory and insufficient; Olynthus and
the other cities of the Chalcidian League fell in the following year
(349 B.C.); they were destroyed, and all the inhabitants made slaves.
Attempts to unite the Peloponnesian States against the common enemy were
futile, and negotiations were begun between Philip and Athens. They were
conducted at first informally by private persons, but in 347 B.C., on
the proposal of Philocrates, an embassy was sent to Philip. Philip’s
answer, received in 346 B.C., demanded that Phocis and Halus should be
excluded from the proposed treaty. Demosthenes contested this point, but
Aeschines carried it. A second embassy was sent, and the discreditable
Peace of Philocrates was signed. The result was the ruin of Phocis.
Although Demosthenes disapproved of the peace, later in the year, in his
speech _On the Peace_, he urged Athens to keep its conditions, arguing
that to break it would bring upon them even greater disaster.
In consequence of the peace, Philip had been able to convoke the
Amphictyonic Council, and pass a vote for the condemnation of Phocis.
Twenty-two towns were destroyed, and the Phocian votes in the Council
transferred to Philip, who was also made president of the Pythian Games.
Thus the barbarian of a few years ago had received the highest religious
sanction for his claim to be the leader of Greece. Athens alone, whose
precedence he had usurped, refused to recognize him, and Demosthenes saw
that to persist in a hostile attitude might involve all the States in
a new Amphictyonic war. It was better to surrender their scruples, and
to regard the convention not, indeed, as a permanent peace, but a truce
during which fresh preparations might be made. Six years of nominal
peace ensued, during which Philip extended his influence diplomatically.
Whether from principle or policy he treated Athens with marked courtesy,
and, through his agents, made vague offers of the great services which he
was prepared to render. Many of the citizens believed in his sincerity,
notably Isocrates, who in 346 B.C. spoke of the baseless suspicions
caused by the assertions of malicious persons, that Philip wished
to destroy Greek freedom.[313] Demosthenes was never duped by these
professions. He was now a recognized leader, and was gathering to his
side a powerful body of patriotic orators such as Lycurgus and Hyperides.
Philip, after organizing the government of Thessaly and allying himself
with Thebes, interfered in the Peloponnese by supporting Messene,
Arcadia, and Argos against Sparta.
An Athenian embassy, led by Demosthenes, was sent to these states to
advise them of the danger which they incurred by their new alliance.
Some impression was produced, and apparently an embassy was sent by some
of the states to Athens. In reply to their representations, of which no
trace is preserved, Demosthenes delivered the _Second Philippic_. In it
he exposes the king’s duplicity. ‘The means used by Athens to counteract
his manœuvres are quite inadequate; we talk, but he acts. We speak to the
point, but do nothing to the point. Each side is superior in the line
which it follows, but his is the more effective line (§§ 1-5). Philip’s
assurances of good-will are accepted too readily. He realized that
Thebes, in consideration of favours received, would further his designs.
He is now showing favour to Messene and Argos from the same motive. He
has paid Athens the high compliment of not offering her a disgraceful
bargain (§§ 6-12). His past actions betray him; as he made the Boeotian
cities subject to Thebes, he is not likely to free the Peloponnesian
States from Sparta. He knows that he is really aiming at you, and that
you are aware of it; that is why he is ever on the alert, and supports
against you Thebans and Peloponnesians, who, he thinks, are greedy
enough to swallow his present offers, and too stupid to foresee the
consequences’ (§§ 12-19). The epilogue contains an indictment of those
whose policy is to blame for the present troubles. In accordance with
Demosthenes’ general practice Aeschines and Philocrates, at whom he aims
the charge, are not mentioned by name.
The anti-Macedonian party grew in strength in 343 B.C. Hyperides
impeached Philocrates, who retired into exile and was condemned to death.
About the same time Demosthenes himself brought into court an action
against Aeschines, which had been pending for three years, for traitorous
conduct in connexion with the embassy to Philip. The position was a
difficult one for two reasons: his own policy in that matter could not
be sharply distinguished from that of Aeschines; the accusation depended
largely on discrimination of motives, and he had practically no proof
of the guilt of Aeschines. Considering the technical weakness of the
prosecutor’s case it is not surprising that Aeschines escaped; it is more
remarkable that he was acquitted only by a small majority.
In 342 B.C. Philip, whose influence in the Peloponnese had slightly
waned, began a fresh campaign in Thrace, and in 341 B.C. had reached
the Chersonese. The possession of this district meant the control of
the Dardanelles, and, as Athens still depended largely on the Black Sea
trade for her corn supply, his progress was a menace to her existence.
Diopeithes, an Athenian mercenary captain, had in 343 B.C. taken
settlers to Cardia, a town in the Chersonese in nominal alliance with
Macedon. Cardia was unwilling to receive them, and Philip sent help to
the town. Diopeithes, who, in accordance with the habit of the times,
in order to support his fleet, exacted ‘benevolences’ from friends and
foes impartially, happened to plunder some districts in Thrace which
were subject to Macedon. Philip addressed a letter of remonstrance to
Athens, and his adherents in the city demanded the recall of Diopeithes.
Demosthenes in his speech _On the Chersonese_ urged that the Chersonese
should not be abandoned at such a crisis: a permanent force must be
maintained there. He defends the actions of Diopeithes by an appeal
to necessity. The Athenians were in the habit of voting armaments for
foreign service without voting them supplies; consequently the generals
had to supply themselves.
‘All the generals who have ever sailed from Athens take money
from Chios, Erythrae, or from any other Asiatic city they
can. Those who have one or two ships take less; those with a
larger force take more. Those who give, whether in large or
small amounts, are not so mad as to give them for nothing; they
are purchasing protection for merchants sailing from their
ports, immunity from ravages, safe convoy for their own ships
and other such advantages. They will tell you that they give
“Benevolences,” which is the term applied to these extortions.
‘Now in the present case, since Diopeithes has an army, it is
obvious that all these people will give him money. Since he got
nothing from you, and has no private means to pay his soldiers
with, where else do you imagine he can get money to keep them?
Will it fall from the skies? Unfortunately, no. He has to live
from day to day on what he can collect and beg and borrow.’[314]
In addition to including a plan of campaign, the speech contains, as many
of the orations do, a frank statement of the position of affairs, and
the usual invectives against Athenian apathy. The concluding section,
however, contains a more solemn warning than is usual, showing that
Demosthenes almost despairs of success.
‘If you grasp the situation as I have indicated, and cease to
make light of everything, it may be, it may be that even now
our affairs may take a favourable turn; but if you continue
to sit still and confine your enthusiasm to expressions of
applause and votes of approval, but shirk the issue when any
action is required of you, I cannot conceive of any eloquence
which, without performance of your duty, can guide our State to
safety.’[315]
The _Third Philippic_ was delivered in the same year (341 B.C.). The
situation is in all essentials the same. Demosthenes again demands
that help should be sent to the Chersonese and the safety of Byzantium
assured; but he does not enlarge on these points, which have been treated
by previous speakers.[316] ‘We must help them, it is true, and take care
that no harm befalls them; but our deliberations must be about the great
danger which now threatens the whole of Greece.’[317] It is this breadth
of view which distinguishes the _Third Philippic_, and makes it the
greatest of all the public harangues.
In the _Chersonese_ Demosthenes had suggested the dispatch of numerous
embassies; he now enlarges on this topic; the interests of Athens must
be identified with those of all Greece, and all States must be made to
realize this. Philip’s designs are against Greek liberty as a whole;
Athens must arm and put herself at the head of a great league in the
struggle for freedom.
‘I pass over Olynthus, Methone, and Apollonia, and thirty-two
cities in the Thracian district, all of which he has so
brutally destroyed that it is hard for a visitor to say whether
they were ever inhabited. I am silent about the destruction of
a great nation, the Phocians. But how fares Thessaly? Has he
not deprived the cities of their governments, and established
tetrarchies, in order that they may be enslaved, not only city
by city, but tribe by tribe? Are not the cities of Euboea now
ruled by tyrants, though that island is close on the borders of
Thebes and Athens? Does he not expressly state in his letters
“I am at peace with those who will obey me”? And his actions
corroborate his words. He has started for the Hellespont;
before that he visited Ambracia; he holds in the Peloponnese
the important city of Elis; only the other day he made plots
against Megara. Neither Greece nor the countries beyond it can
contain his ambition.’[318]
This short extract is a fair example of Demosthenes’ vigorous use of
historical argument, but it can give little idea of the speech as a
whole. It abounds, indeed, in enumerations of recent events bearing on
the case, and in contrasts between the present and the past.
This running appeal to example to a great extent takes the place of
reasoned argument, but the effect of the whole, with its combined appeals
to feeling and reason, is convincingly strong.
The orator himself must have attached great importance to this speech
as an exposition of his policy, for he appears to have published two
recensions of it. Both are preserved in different families of MSS. The
shorter text contained in S (_Parisinus_) and L (_Laurentianus_) omits
many phrases and even whole passages which occur in the other group. It
is believed that the shorter is the final form in which Demosthenes
wished to preserve the speech.[319]
The _Fourth Philippic_ contains the suggestion that Athens should make
overtures to the Persian king for help against Philip. The speech is
probably a forgery, but one of a peculiar kind. About a third of the text
consists of passages taken directly from the speech _On the Chersonese_,
and one division (§§ 35-45) is in favour of a distribution of the Theoric
Fund, which is quite opposed to the policy of the _Olynthiacs_ and the
Chersonese speech. On the other hand, some passages are in a style and
tone quite worthy of Demosthenes, and consistent with his views. There
can be little doubt that we have here a compilation from actual speeches
of Demosthenes, expanded by a certain amount of rhetorical invention.
The ‘answer to Philip’s letter’ and the speech περὶ συντάξως are, on the
other hand, simple forgeries. This concludes the list of the _Philippic_
speeches.
Our record of Demosthenes’ public speeches ceases with the _Third
Philippic_, at the moment when his eloquence had reached its greatest
height. The great speeches belong to the years of opposition; now, after
eleven years of combat, he had established himself as chief leader of the
assembly. He spoke, no doubt, frequently and impressively, but, engaged
in important administrative work, he had no leisure or need for writing.
The years 340-338 B.C. were a time of vigorous revival for Athens. For
a short but brilliant period it seemed that the city-state might emerge
triumphant from the struggle against monarchy. Enthusiasm inspired the
patriotic party to noble efforts. Euboea was removed from Philip’s
influence, and Athens inaugurated a new league, including Acarnania,
Achaea, Corcyra, Corinth, Euboea, and Megara. Philip himself suffered a
check before Byzantium, which had appealed to Athens for help, and had
not called in vain.
In internal affairs, a new trierarchic law not only increased the
efficiency of the fleet, but abolished a great social grievance by making
the burden of trierarchy fall on all classes in just proportion to their
means, whereas hitherto the poorer citizens had suffered unduly. A still
greater reform was the execution of the project, so long cherished, for
applying the Theoric Fund to the expenses of war (339 B.C.). In 338 B.C.
Lycurgus was appointed to the Ministry of Finance, an office which he was
to fill with exceptional efficiency for twelve years to come.
But Philip held many strings, and was most dangerous when he seemed to
turn his back on his enemies. Unsuccessful on the Hellespont, he withdrew
his fleet and undertook an expedition by land against a Scythian prince
who had offended him. This journey had no direct relation to his greater
designs, and Athens was pleased to think that he might be defeated or
even killed. He was, indeed, wounded, but he returned to Macedonia in
339 B.C., having accomplished what was probably his chief object, to
restore the confidence of his soldiers after their reverses in recent
encounters with the Greeks.
Meanwhile events in Greece, which perhaps were partly directed by his
influence, pursued a course favourable to his plans.
In 340 B.C. two enemies of Demosthenes, Midias and Aeschines, represented
Athens as _pylagorae_ at the Amphictyonic Council. Aeschines describes
how, apparently from no political motive but for the satisfaction of a
personal grudge, he himself inflamed the passions of the Amphictyons to
the point of declaring a sacred war against the Locrians of Amphissa.
Any war between Greeks was to Philip’s advantage. The Amphictyonic War
was carried on in a dilatory way, and in the autumn of 339 B.C. the
Council, still under the influence of Aeschines, nominated Philip to
carry the affair to a conclusion. The king had recovered quickly from his
wound, and eagerly embraced the sacred mission which allowed him to pass
through Thessaly and Thermopylae unmolested. On reaching Elatea, once the
principal town of Phocis, but now desolate, he halted and began to put
the place in a state of defence. The news was received at Athens with
great consternation, as Demosthenes vividly describes.[320] An assembly
was hastily summoned, and Demosthenes explained the full import of this
action. It was a threat to Athens and Thebes alike. All the masterly
eloquence of the great statesman was exerted to the utmost of his powers
to induce Athens to forget long-standing enmities and offer to Thebes
the help of her entire fighting force freely and unconditionally. It was
probably the greatest triumph of eloquence ever known that Demosthenes
was successful in his plea. War was inevitable sooner or later, and it is
greatly to his credit that he brought about the Theban alliance, though
it ended disastrously for all the Greeks concerned in the battle of
Chaeronea (338 B.C.).
Henceforward the influence of Athens on external affairs was strictly
limited, though she retained her independence, for Philip was a generous
foe.[321] Demosthenes busied himself with internal matters; to him was
committed the repair of the fortifications, to the expense of which he
gave a contribution of 100 minae. For this act Ctesiphon proposed in 337
B.C. that he should be rewarded with a gold crown. Aeschines indicted
Ctesiphon for an illegal motion, and the famous case of _The Crown_,
which produced great speeches from both the rivals, was the result. The
case, however, was not heard till six years later.
In 336 B.C. Philip was murdered. Demosthenes set the example of rejoicing
by appearing in public crowned with flowers, though he was in mourning
for his daughter at the time. The great hopes which the city-states had
entertained were dashed to the ground by the energy of Alexander, who,
though only twenty years old, proved himself an even greater general and
statesman than his father.
Thebes was induced to revolt by Demosthenes, who was supported by Persian
gold, but Alexander crushed and destroyed Thebes before help could
reach it, and sent an ultimatum to Athens. He demanded the surrender of
Demosthenes, Lycurgus, and eight other orators of their party. They were
saved, it appears, by the intervention of Demades.[322]
Alexander departed for Asia, and Athenian statesmen were left to quarrel
about the politics of their city. It was now that the great case in which
Demosthenes and Aeschines were concerned came up for trial. The matter
nominally in dispute was only a pretext; it was really a question of
reviewing and passing judgment on the political life of the two great
antagonists for the last twenty years.
The charges of illegality brought against Ctesiphon were three: (1) That
the decree, falsely asserting that Demosthenes had done good service to
the State, involved the insertion of a lie into the public records. (2)
That it was illegal to crown an official who, like Demosthenes, was still
subject to audit. (3) That proclamation of the crowning in the theatre
was illegal.
On (2) and (3), the technical points, the prosecutor had a strong case,
but the first section was the only one of real importance, since the
process was really aimed at Demosthenes. The main part of the speech of
Aeschines against Ctesiphon is accordingly devoted to an indictment of
the public life of Demosthenes. Four periods are taken: (1) From the war
about Amphipolis to the peace of Philocrates (357-346 B.C.). (2) The
years of peace (346-340 B.C.). (3) The ministry of Demosthenes (340-338
B.C.). (4) The years after Chaeronea (338-330 B.C.).
The reply of Demosthenes (_de Corona_) is mainly concerned with a
defence of his own policy, the technical points on which the issue
nominally depended being kept very much in the background. It is
remarkable that in dealing with the early years he makes no attempt to
take credit for the great speeches by which in that time he attempted to
influence his country—the _First Philippic_ and the three _Olynthiacs_.
He discusses chiefly the peace negotiations. He speaks more fully of the
second period, and lays the greatest stress on the third—the years during
which he was the acknowledged leader of the people, so that an eulogy of
the national policy must involve a tribute to his own patriotism. Only
short allusions are made to the last period, the years since the battle
of Chaeronea.
The order is not chronological, and the structure is not apparently
systematic; nevertheless the _de Corona_ is the greatest of all Athenian
speeches.
The speech cannot be represented by extracts; it must be read as a whole
to be appreciated. All that a summary can do is to draw attention to the
peculiarities of structure, which are possibly due in some measure to the
length of the speech and the variety of the subjects which have to be
treated:[323]
1. §§ 1-8. The conventional exordium, in this case both
introduced and finished by a solemn prayer.
2. §§ 9-52. Refutation of the calumnies uttered by Aeschines.
This section consists chiefly of Demosthenes’ own version
of the negotiations for the peace of 346 B.C., showing that
Aeschines and his associates were really guilty of treason in
their dealings with Philip.
3. §§ 53-125. Defence of Ctesiphon—Demosthenes undertakes
to prove (_a_) that he deserved to receive a crown, (_b_)
that on the legal point Ctesiphon is not to blame. (_a_) He
summarizes the condition of Greece during the years of peace,
and immediately after it records his own public services
and justifies his policy. (_b_) He examines the question of
legality, and proves that Ctesiphon is on the right side of the
law.
4. §§ 126-159. Invective against Aeschines. This might be
called a pseudo-epilogue, but is really only an interlude. It
deals with (_a_) the birth and life of his rival, and (_b_) in
particular, his action which kindled an Amphictyonic war.
5. §§ 160-251. Demosthenes continues the discussion of his past
policy, in regard to the Theban alliance and the last war with
Philip.
6. §§ 252-324. An epilogue of exceptional length, mainly
devoted to a comparison between Demosthenes and Aeschines. The
speaker closely identifies himself with the city, whose policy
he has shaped; so that in attacking him, Aeschines attacks
Athens. The speech ends, as it began, with a prayer.
§ 3
For the next few years Demosthenes probably spent some of his time in
composing private speeches for others, though the extant speeches of
this period are mostly of doubtful authenticity. He also remained as a
prominent figure in Athenian politics. He had not changed his views, but
he seems to have been deposed from the leadership of the patriotic party
by others whose patriotism was of a more violent type than his, so that
he must be now counted as a moderate in opinion. It may have been this
position which brought him into danger in 324 B.C.
Harpalus, who had been left as Alexander’s governor at Babylon, on
receipt of a rumour of his master’s death in India, made off with the
royal treasure, and, accompanied by a force of six thousand men, took
ship and sailed for Greece. He appeared off Piraeus, and the fervid
patriots proposed that Athens should welcome him and use his treasure and
his men to help them in a revolt.
Demosthenes opposed an open breach with Alexander, and on his motion
admission was refused to the flotilla. Harpalus came a second time
without his army, and was admitted. Close on his heels came messengers
from Alexander to demand his surrender, but this was resisted by
Demosthenes and Phocion. On the motion of Demosthenes it was decided to
temporize; Harpalus was to be treated as a prisoner, and the treasure
deposited in the Parthenon. The amount of the treasure was declared by
Harpalus as 720 talents, but it soon became known that only 350 talents
had been lodged in the Acropolis. Harpalus in the meantime had escaped
from prison and disappeared, and suspicion was roused against all who
had had any kind of dealings with him. To allay the public excitement
Demosthenes proposed that the Council of the Areopagus should investigate
the mystery of the lost talents. Six months later the Council gave its
report, issuing a list of nine public men whom it declared guilty of
receiving part of the lost money. The name of Demosthenes himself headed
the list; he was charged with having received twenty talents for helping
Harpalus to escape. This declaration did not constitute a judicial
sentence, but in consequence of it prosecutions were instituted, ten
public prosecutors were appointed, and Demosthenes was found guilty. He
was condemned to pay a fine of fifty talents, and being unable to raise
the money he was cast into prison. He soon escaped, and fled first to
Aegina and then to Troezen, where, according to Plutarch, he sat daily by
the sea, watching with sad eyes the distant shores of Attica.
The whole affair is obscure; we do not know how Demosthenes defended
himself, but we possess two of the speeches for the prosecution, by
Hyperides and Dinarchus. Neither is explicit. The report of the Areopagus
was held to have established the facts, so that no further evidence was
required; it was the business of the court only to interpret motives and
decide the degree of each defendant’s guilt.
Hyperides[324] affirms that Demosthenes began by admitting the receipt of
the money; but he afterwards denied it, declaring that he was ready to
suffer death if it could be proved that he had received it.[325] It was
certainly Demosthenes who proposed that the Areopagus should investigate
the affair.
Two details in the case give rise to perplexity: the fine inflicted—two
and a half times the amount involved—was light, considering that the law
demanded ten-fold restitution; secondly, it is difficult to see when
Demosthenes can have received the money. Harpalus could not pay him at
the time of his escape, or indeed at any time subsequent to his arrest,
for he did not take the money to prison with him. It seems improbable
that the money should have been paid earlier, for Demosthenes was acting
against Harpalus all the time. Professor Butcher supposed that payment
might have been made when Demosthenes resisted the surrender of Harpalus
to Alexander.[326]
Two theories have been proposed with a view to the complete or partial
exculpation of the orator—one, that he was absolutely innocent, but
became the victim of a combination of his political enemies, the extreme
patriots, who were dissatisfied with his moderate policy, and his ancient
foes the Macedonian party. The other view is that he received the money
and spent it, or intended to spend it, on secret service of the kind on
which every State spends money, though it is generally impossible to
give a detailed account of such expenses. Even if he could not prove
such a use, the offence of receiving bribes was a venial one, as even
his prosecutor Hyperides admits, if they were not received against the
interests of the State. In Demosthenes’ favour we have the late evidence
of Pausanias, who affirms that an agent of Harpalus, when examined by
Alexander with regard to this affair, divulged a list of names which did
not contain that of Demosthenes.
A minor charge of bribery is brought by Dinarchus, who asserts that
Demosthenes received 300 talents from the Great King to save Thebes in
335 B.C., but sacrificed Thebes to his own avarice because he wished
to keep ten talents which had been promised to the Arcadians for their
assistance. The story is ridiculous.
In 323 B.C. Alexander died; the hope of freedom revived, and Demosthenes
started at once on a tour of the Peloponnese to urge on the cities the
need of joint action. He was reconciled with the party of Hyperides and
recalled from exile. He was fetched home in a trireme, and a procession
escorted him from the harbour to the city. By a straining of the law,
the public paid his fine. The Lamian war opened successfully under
Leosthenes, but at the battle of Crannon Antipater crushed the Greek
forces. Athens was forced to receive a Macedonian garrison, to lose her
democratic constitution, and to give up her leaders to the conqueror’s
vengeance. Demades carried a decree for the death of Demosthenes and
Hyperides. Demosthenes had already escaped and taken sanctuary in the
temple of Posidon on the island of Calauria. Here he was pursued by an
agent of Antipater, one Archias, known as the exile-hunter, who had been
an actor. This man tried to entice him forth by generous promises, but
Demosthenes answered, ‘Your acting never carried conviction, and your
promises are equally unconvincing.’ Archias then resorted to threats, but
was met by the calm retort, ‘Now you speak like a Macedonian oracle; you
were only acting before; only wait a little, so that I may write a few
lines home.’ While pretending to write he sucked poison from the end of
his pen, and then let his head sink on his hands, as if in thought. When
Archias approached again he looked him in the face and said, ‘It is time
for you to play the part of Creon, and cast out this body unburied. Now,
adored Posidon, I leave thy precinct while yet alive; but Antipater and
his Macedonians have left not even thy shrine undefiled.’ He essayed to
walk out, but fell and died upon the steps of the altar.[327]
Lucian, in his _Encomium of Demosthenes_, has given a fanciful account of
Antipater receiving the news from Archias; these are the concluding words:
‘So he is gone, either to live with the heroes in the Isles
of the Blest or along the path of those souls that climb
to Heaven, to be an attendant spirit on Zeus the giver of
Freedom; but his body we will send to Athens, as a nobler
memorial for that land than are the bodies of those who fell at
Marathon.’[328]
§ 4. _Literary Reputation_
The verdict of antiquity, which has generally been accepted in modern
times, ranked Demosthenes as the greatest of orators. In his own age
he had rivals: Aeschines, as we have seen already, is in many respects
worthy of comparison with him; of his other contemporaries Phocion was
impressive by his dignity, sincerity, and brevity—‘he could say more in
fewer words’; the vigorous extemporizations of Demades were sometimes
more effective than the polished subtleties of Demosthenes; Aeschines
claims to prefer the speaking of Leodamas of Achamae, but the tone in
which he says so is almost apologetic, and the laboured criticism to
which Aeschines constantly subjects his rival practically takes it for
granted that the latter was reckoned the foremost speaker of the time.
Later Greek authorities, who are far enough removed to see in proper
perspective the orators of the pre-Macedonian times, have an ungrudging
admiration for Demosthenes. The author of _The Sublime_ saw in him many
faults, and admitted that in many details Hyperides excelled him.[329]
Nevertheless he finds in Demosthenes certain divine gifts which put him
apart from the others in a class by himself; he surpasses the orators of
all generations; his thunders and lightnings shake down and scorch up
all opposition; it is impossible to face his dazzling brilliancy without
flinching. But Hyperides never made anybody tremble.
In later times we find Demosthenes styled ‘The Orator,’ just as Homer is
‘The Poet.’ Lucian, whose literary appreciations are always worthy of
attention, wrote an _Encomium of Demosthenes_, containing an imaginary
dialogue, in which Antipater is the chief speaker. He pays a generous
tribute to his dead enemy, who ‘woke his compatriots from their drugged
sleep’;[330] the _Philippics_ are compared to battering-rams and
catapults, and Philip is reported to have rejoiced that Demosthenes
was never elected general, for the orator’s speeches shook the king’s
throne, and his actions, if he had been given the opportunity, would have
overturned it.
Of Roman critics, Cicero in many passages in the _Brutus_ and _Orator_
expresses extreme admiration for the excellence of Demosthenes in every
style of oratory; he regards him as far outstripping all others, though
failing in some details to attain perfection. Quintilian’s praise is
discriminating but sincere; in fact we may say that the Greek and Roman
worlds were practically unanimous about the orator’s merits.
It is difficult to take a general view of the style of Demosthenes,
from the mere fact that it is extremely varied; the three classes of
speeches—the forensic speeches in private and public suits, and the
public harangues addressed to the assembly, all have their particular
features: nevertheless there are certain characteristics which may be
distinguished in all classes.
First of these is his great care in composition. Isocrates is known to
have spent years in polishing the essays which he intended as permanent
contributions to the science of politics; Plato wrote and erased and
wrote again before he was satisfied with the form in which his philosophy
was to be given to the world; Demosthenes, without years of toil, could
produce for definite occasions speeches whose finished brilliancy made
them worthy to be ranked as great literature quite apart from their
merits as contributions to practical policy.
It is a well-known jest against him that his speeches smelt of midnight
oil, but he must have had a remarkable natural fluency to be able to
compose so many speeches so well. It is quite possible, on the other
hand, that the speeches which survive are not altogether in the form in
which they were delivered. It seems to have been a habit among orators of
this time to edit for publication their speeches delivered in important
cases, in order that a larger audience might have an opportunity of
reading a permanent record of the speakers’ views on political or legal
questions which had more than a transitory interest.
We have indirect evidence that Demosthenes was in the habit of
introducing corrections into his text. Aeschines quotes and derides
certain expressions, mostly exaggerated metaphors, which do not occur
in the speeches as extant to us, though some of them evidently should,
if the text had not been submitted to a recension.[331] We may note the
remark of Eratosthenes[332] that while speaking he sometimes lost control
of himself, and talked like a man possessed, and that of Demetrius of
Phaleron, that on one occasion he offended against good taste by quoting
a metrical oath which bears the stamp of comedy:
‘By earth and fountains, rivulets and streams.’[333]
This quotation is not to be found in any extant speech, but it is
noticeable that formulae of the kind, typically represented by the
familiar ὦ γῆ καὶ θεοί—‘Ye Earth and Gods’—are commonly affected by
Demosthenes, as indeed they are to be found in his contemporary Aeschines.
Evidently the Attic taste was undergoing a modification; such
expressions are foreign to the dignified harmonies of Isocrates and of
rare occurrence in the restrained style of Lysias; but they begin to
appear more frequently in Isaeus, whose style was the model for the
early speeches of Demosthenes. Certain other expressions belonging to
the popular speech, and probably avoided by Isocrates as being too
colloquial, are found in Demosthenes’ public speeches—_e.g._ ὁ δεῖνα and
ὦ τᾶν.
Under the same heading must come the use of coarse expressions and terms
of personal abuse. In many of the speeches relating to public law-suits
Demosthenes allows himself all the latitude which was sanctioned by
the taste of his times. In the actual use of abusive epithets—θηρίον,
κατάρατος and the like—he does not go beyond the common practice of
Aeschines, and is even outstripped by Dinarchus; but in the accumulation
of offensive references to the supposed private character of his
political opponents he condescends to such excesses that we wonder how a
decent audience can ever have tolerated him.[334] Evidently an Athenian
audience loved vulgarity for its own sake, apart from humour.
In the private speeches there is at times a certain
coarseness—inevitably, since police-court cases are often concerned with
sordid details. Offensive actions sometimes have to be described;[335]
but this is a very different matter from the irrelevant introduction of
offensive matter.
In the speeches delivered before the ecclesia Demosthenes set himself
a higher ideal. Into questions of public policy, private animosities
should not be allowed to intrude, and throughout the _Philippics_
and _Olynthiacs_ Demosthenes observes this rule. Under no stress of
excitement does he sink to personalities; his political opponents for the
time being are not abused, not even mentioned by name. The courtesies of
debate are fully and justly maintained.
§ 5. _Style and Composition_
Though Demosthenes wrote in pure Attic Greek, it is to Lysias and
Isocrates rather than to him that Dionysius assigns praise for the most
perfect purity of language. It is probable that Demosthenes was nearer
to the living speech. Even in his deliberative speeches he can use such
familiar expressions as ὦ τᾶν, ὁ δεῖνα and such expletives as νὴ Δία,
the frequent use of which would have seemed to Isocrates to belong to
the vocabulary of Comedy. The epideictic style would also have shunned
such vigorous touches as λαγὼ βίον ἔζης—‘you lived a hare’s life,’ or,
to give the proper equivalent,’ a dog’s life.’[336] or the famous κακῶν
Ἰλιάς—‘Twenty-four books of misery.’[337] Colloquial vigour is apparent
in some metaphorical uses of single words, _e.g._ ἕωλα καὶ ψυχρά—‘stale
and cold’ (applied to crimes),[338] προσηλῶσθαι—‘to be pinned down,’[339]
or the succession of crude metaphors in the account of how Aristogiton,
in prison, picked a quarrel with a newcomer; ‘he being newly caught
and fresh, was getting the better of Aristogiton, who had got into
the net some time ago and been long in pickle; so finding himself
getting the worst of it, he ate off the man’s nose.’[340] There is bold
personification of abstractions in ‘Peace, which has destroyed the walls
of your allies and is now building houses for your ambassadors,’[341]
and such phrases as τεθνᾶσι τῷ δέει τοὺς τοιούτους ἀποστόλους—‘they are
frightened to death of so and so,’ are more vigorous than literary.[342]
Demosthenes seems to discard metaphor in his most solemn moments. In a
spirit of sarcasm he can use such expressions as those quoted above about
the disorderly scene in prison, and in an outburst of indignation he can
speak of rival politicians as ‘Fiends, who have mutilated the corpses
of their fatherlands, and made a birthday present of their liberty
first to Philip, and now again to Alexander; who measure happiness by
their belly and their basest pleasures’;[343] but on grave occasions,
whether in narrative or in counsel, he reverts to a simplicity equal
to that of Lysias. The plainness of the language in which he describes
the excitement caused by the news of Philip’s occupation of Elatea is
proverbial;[344] and the closing sentences of the _Third Philippic_
afford another good example:
‘If everybody is going to sit still, hoping to get what he
wants, and seeking to do nothing for it himself, in the
first place he will never find anybody to do it for him, and
secondly, I am afraid that we shall be forced to do everything
that we do not want. This is what I tell you, this is what I
propose; and I believe that if this is done our affairs may
even yet be set straight again. If anybody can offer anything
better, let him name it and urge it; and whatever you decide, I
pray to heaven it may be for the best.’
The simplicity of the language is only equalled by the sobriety of tone.
The simplest words, if properly used, can produce a great effect, which
is sometimes heightened by repetition, a device which Demosthenes finds
useful on occasion—ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετε—‘But surely,
_surely_ you were not wrong.’[345] We realize a slight raising of the
voice as the word comes in for the second time. Dinarchus, an imitator
of Demosthenes, copies him in the use of this ‘figure,’ but uses it too
much and inappropriately. In this, as in other details, his style is an
unsuccessful parody of the great orator.
Dionysius compares Demosthenes to several other writers in turn. He finds
passages, for instance, which recall the style of Thucydides.[346] He
quotes the first section from the _Third Philippic_, and by an ingenious
analysis shows the points of resemblance. The chief characteristic
noticed by the critic is that the writer does not introduce his thoughts
in any natural or conventional sequence, but employs an affected order of
words which arrests the attention by its avoidance of simplicity.
Thus, a parenthetical relative clause intrudes between the subject and
the verb of the chief relative clause, while we are kept in long suspense
as to what the verbs are to be, both in relative clauses and in the main
clause itself. The peculiar effects which he notices cannot be reproduced
in a non-inflexional language such as English.
At other times, especially in narrative, Demosthenes emulates the
lucidity of Lysias at his best. Dionysius quotes with well-deserved
approval the vivid presentment of the story on which the accusation
against Conon is based. As the speech gives us an excellent picture of
the camp life of an undisciplined militia, it will be worth while here to
quote some extracts:
‘Two years ago, having been detailed for garrison-duty, we
went out to Panactum. Conon’s sons occupied a tent near us;
I wish it had been otherwise, for this was the primary cause
of our enmity and the collisions between us. You shall hear
how it arose. They used to drink every day and all day long,
beginning immediately after breakfast, and this custom they
maintained all the time that we were in garrison. My brothers
and I, on the contrary, lived out there just as we were in
the habit of living at home. So by the time which the rest of
us had fixed for dinner, they were invariably playing drunken
tricks, first on our servants, and finally on ourselves. For
because they said that the servants sent the smoke in their
faces while cooking, or were uncivil to them, or what not,
they used to beat them and empty the slops over their heads
... and in every way behaved brutally and disgustingly. We
saw this and took offence, and first of all remonstrated with
them; but as they jeered at us and would not stop, we all went
and reported the occurrence to the general—not I alone, but
the whole of the mess. He reprimanded them severely, not only
for their offensive behaviour to us, but for their general
conduct in camp; however, they were so far from stopping or
feeling any shame that, as soon as it was dark that evening,
they made a rush on us, and first abused us and then beat me,
and made such a disturbance and uproar round the tent that the
general and his staff and some of the other soldiers came out,
and prevented them from doing us any serious harm, and us from
retaliating on their drunken violence.’[347]
Another passage quoted from the same speech gives a companion picture of
the defendant’s behaviour in civil life:
‘When we met them, one of the party, whom I cannot identify,
fell upon Phanostratus and held him tight, while the defendant
Conon and his son and the son of Andromenes fell upon me, and
first stripped me, and then tripped me up, and dashed me down
in the mud. There they jumped upon me and beat me, and so
mishandled me that they cut my lip right through, and closed up
both my eyes. They left me in such a weak state that I could
neither get up nor speak, and as I lay on the ground I heard
them uttering floods of abominable language. What they said
was vilely slanderous, and some of it I should shrink from
repeating, but I will mention one thing which is an example
of Conon’s brutality, and proves that he was responsible for
the whole incident—he began to crow like a game-cock after a
victory, and the others told him to flap his arms against his
sides in triumph. After this I was carried home naked by some
passers-by, while the defendants made off with my coat.’[348]
Dionysius observes that the ecclesia and the courts were composed of
mixed elements;[349] not all were clever and subtle in intellect; the
majority were farmers, merchants, and artisans, who were more likely to
be pleased by simple speech; anything of an unusual flavour would turn
their stomachs: a smaller number, a mere fraction of the whole, were
men of high education, to whom you could not speak as you would to the
multitude; and the orator could not afford to neglect either section. He
must therefore aim at satisfying both, and consequently he should steer a
middle course, avoiding extremes in either direction.
In the opinion of Dionysius both Isocrates and Plato give good examples
of this middle style, attaining a seeming simplicity intelligible to
all, combined with a subtlety which could be appreciated only by the
expert; but Demosthenes surpassed them both in the perfection of this
art. To prove his case he quotes first the passage from _The Peace_ which
Isocrates himself selected for quotation, as a favourable example of his
own style, in the speech on the _Antidosis_. With this extract a passage
from the third _Olynthiac_ is contrasted, greatly to the advantage of
Demosthenes, who is found to be nobler, more majestic, more forcible,
and to have avoided the frigidity of excessive refinement with which
Isocrates is charged.
The criticism professes to be based on an accumulation of small details,
but there is no doubt that Dionysius depended, in the main, not upon
analysis, but upon subjective impressions. After enumerating the points
in which either of the writers excels or falls short, he describes his
own feelings:
‘When I read a speech of Isocrates, I become sober and serious,
as if I were listening to solemn music; but when I take up a
speech of Demosthenes, I am beside myself, I am led this way
and that, I am moved by one passion after another: suspicion,
distress, fear, contempt, hate, pity, kindliness, anger,
envy—passing successively through all the passions which can
obtain a mastery over the human mind; ... and I have sometimes
thought to myself, what must have been the impression which he
made on those who were fortunate enough to hear him? For where
we, who are so far removed in time, and in no way interested
in the actual events, are led away and overpowered, and made
to follow wherever the speech leads us, how must the Athenians
and other Greeks have been led by the speaker himself when the
cases in which he spoke had a living interest and concerned
them nearly?...’[350]
Dionysius, as we know from many of his criticisms, had a remarkably acute
sense of style; he had also a strong imagination. In this same treatise
he recounts how the forms of the sentences themselves suggest to him the
tone in which the words were uttered, the very gestures with which they
were accompanied.[351]
Though we modern students cannot expect to rival him in these peculiar
gifts, it is still possible for us to sympathize with his feelings.
We cannot fail, in reading a speech like the _Third Philippic_, for
instance, to appreciate how fully Demosthenes realizes the Platonic
ideal, expressed in the _Gorgias_, that rhetoric is the art of
persuasion. We need not pause to analyse the means by which he attains
his end; he may resemble Lysias at one moment in a simple piece of
narrative, at another he may be as involved and antithetical as
Thucydides, or even florid like Gorgias; he can be a very Proteus, as
Dionysius says, in his changes of form; but in whatever shape he appears,
naïve, subtle, pathetic, indignant, sarcastic, he is convincing. The
reason is simple: he has a single purpose always present to his mind,
namely, to make his audience feel as he feels. Readers of Isocrates were
expected, while they followed the exposition of the subject-matter,
to regard the beauties of the form in which it was expressed; in
Demosthenes there is no idea of such display. A good speech was to him a
successful speech, not one which might be admired by critics as a piece
of literature. It is only incidental that his speeches have a literary
quality which ranks him among the foremost writers of Attic prose; as an
orator he was independent of this quality.
The strong practical sense of Demosthenes refused to be confined by any
theoretical rules of scholastic rhetoricians. He does not aspire to the
complexity of periods which makes the style of Isocrates monotonous in
spite of the writer’s wonderful ingenuity. Long and short, complex and
simple sentences, are used in turn, and with no systematic order, so that
we cannot call any one kind characteristic; the form of the sentence,
like the language, is subordinate to its purpose.[352]
He was moderately careful in the avoidance of hiatus between words, but
in this matter he modified the rule of Isocrates to suit the requirements
of speech; he was guided by ear, not by eye; thus we find that hiatus is
frequently omitted between the _cola_ or sections of a period; in fact
any pause in the utterance is enough to justify the non-elision of an
open vowel before the pause. Isocrates, on the contrary, usually avoids
even the appearance of hiatus in such cases.
There is one other formal rule of composition which Demosthenes follows
with some strictness; this is the avoidance of a succession of short
syllables. It is notable that he very seldom admits a tribrach (three
short syllables) where a little care can avoid it, while instances of
more than three short vowels in succession are very exceptional.[353]
An unusual order of words may often be explained by reference to this
practice.[354]
We know from Aristotle and other critics that earlier writers of artistic
prose, from Thrasymachus onwards, had paid some attention to the metrical
form of words and certain combinations of long and short syllables.
Thrasymachus in particular studied the use of the _paeonius_ (–⏑⏑⏑ or
⏑⏑⏑–) at the beginning and end of a sentence.[355]
The effect of increasing the number of short syllables, whether in verse
or prose, is to make the movement of the line or period more rapid.
The frequent use of tribrachs by Euripides constantly produces this
impression, and an extreme case is the structure of the Galliambic metre,
as seen, for instance, in the _Attis_ of Catullus.[356] Conversely the
multiplication of long syllables makes the movement slow, and produces an
effect of solemnity.[357]
Demosthenes seems to have been the first prose-writer to pay attention to
the avoidance of the tribrach; Plato seems to have consciously preferred
a succession of short syllables where it was possible. The difference
between the two points of view is probably this—that Plato aimed at
reproducing the natural rapidity of conversation, Demosthenes aimed at
a more solemn and dignified style appropriate to impressive utterance
before a large assembly.
This is the only metrical rule which Demosthenes ever observed, and one
of the soundest of modern critics believes that even this observance was
instinctive rather than conscious.[358] He never affected any metrical
formula for the end of sentences comparable to Cicero’s famous _esse
videatur_, or the double trochee –⏑–⏑ at the beginning of a sentence,
approved by later writers. An examination shows that he has an almost
infinite variety both in the opening and the close of his sentences. He
seems never to follow any mechanical system.
Much labour has been expended, especially in Germany, on the analysis
of the rhythmical element in Demosthenes’ style. There is no doubt that
many orators, from Gorgias onwards, laboured to produce approximate
correspondence between parallel or contrasted sections of their periods.
In some cases we find an equal number of syllables in two clauses, and
even a more or less complete rhythmical correspondence. Such devices
serve to emphasize the peculiar figures of speech in which Gorgias
delighted, and may have been appropriate to the class of oratory intended
primarily for display, but it is hard to believe that such elaboration
was ever consciously carried through a long forensic speech.
The appendix to the third volume of Blass’ Attic oratory is a monumental
piece of work. It consists of an analysis of the first seventeen sections
of the _de Corona_, and the whole of the _First Olynthiac_ and _Third
Philippic_ speeches, and conveys the impression that this Demosthenic
prose may be scanned with almost as much certainty as a comparatively
simple form of composition like a Pindaric ode. It is hard to pronounce
on such a matter without a very long and careful study of this difficult
subject; but the theory of rhythmical correspondence seems to have been
worked out far too minutely. In many cases emendation is required; we
have to divide words in the middle, and clauses are split up in an
arbitrary and unnatural way. I am far from believing that analysis
can justifiably be carried to this extent; it is more reasonable to
suppose that Demosthenes had a naturally acute ear, and that practice
so developed his faculty that a certain rhythm was natural to all his
speech. I am not convinced that all his effects were designed.[359]
§ 6. _Rhetorical Devices_
Isaeus, the teacher of Demosthenes, was a master of reasoning and
demonstration; Demosthenes in his earliest speeches shows strong traces
of the influence of Isaeus, but in his later work he has developed
varied gifts which enable him to surpass his master. Realizing the
insufficiency, for a popular audience, of mere reasoning, he reinforced
his logic by adventitious aids, appealing in numerous indirect ways to
feeling and prejudice. One valuable method of awakening interest was his
striking use of paradox:
‘On the question of resources of money at present at our
disposal, what I have to say will, I know, appear paradoxical,
but I must say it; for I am confident that, considered in the
proper light, my proposal will appear to be the only true and
right one. I tell you that we need not raise the question of
money at all: we have great resources which we may fairly and
honourably use if we need them. If we look for them now, we
shall imagine that they never will be at our disposal, so far
shall we be from willingness to dispose of them at present; but
if we let matters wait, we shall have them. What, then, are
these resources which do not exist at present, but will be to
hand later on? It looks like a riddle. I will explain. Consider
this city of ours as a whole. It contains almost as much money
as all other cities taken together; but those individuals who
possess it are so apathetic that if all the orators tried to
terrify them by saying that the king is coming, that he is
near, that invasion is inevitable, and even if the orators were
reinforced by an equal number of soothsayers, they would not
only refuse to contribute; they would refuse even to declare
or admit the possession of their wealth. But suppose that the
horrors which we now talk about were actually realized, they
are none of them so foolish that they would not readily offer
and make contributions.... So I tell you that we have money
ready for the time of urgent need, but not before.’[360]
Similarly in the _Third Olynthiac_ he rouses the curiosity of the
audience by propounding a riddle, of which, after some suspense, he
himself gives the answer. The matter under discussion is the necessity of
sending help to Olynthus. There is, as usual, a difficulty about money.
‘“Very well,” you may say; “we have all decided that we must
send help; and send help we will; but how are we to do it;
tell me that?” Now, Gentlemen, do not be astonished if what I
say comes as a surprise to most of you. _Appoint a legislative
board._ Instruct this board not to pass any law (you have
enough already), but to repeal the laws which are injurious
under present conditions. I refer to the laws about the Theoric
Fund.’[361]
This mention of the Festival Fund suggests some reflections on the
orator’s tenacity and perseverance. He is not content to say once what
he has to propose, and leave his words to sink in by their own weight.
Like a careful lecturer he repeats his statement, emphasizing it in
various ways, until he perceives that his audience has really grasped its
importance. The walls which he is attacking will not fall flat at the
sound of the trumpet; his persistent battering-rams must make a breach,
his catapults must drive the defenders from their positions. Such is the
meaning of Lucian’s comment in the words attributed to Philip.[362]
The speech _On the Chersonese_, for instance, may be divided into three
parts, dealing successively with the treatment of Diopeithes, the
supineness of Athens, and the guilt of the partisans of Philip; but in
all parts we find emphatically stated the need for energetic action. This
is really the theme of the speech; the rest is important only in so far
as it substantiates the main thesis.
The extract last given[363] shows with what adroitness he introduces
dialogues, in which he questions or answers an imaginary critic. This
is a device frequently employed with considerable effect. The following
shows a rather different type:
‘If Philip captures Olynthus, who will prevent him from
marching on us? The Thebans? It is an unpleasant thing to
say, but they will eagerly join him in the invasion. Or the
Phocians?—when they cannot even protect their own land, unless
you help them. Can you think of any one else?—“My dear fellow,
he won’t want to attack us.” It would indeed be the greatest
surprise in the world if he did not do it when he got the
chance; since even now he is fool enough to declare his
intentions.’[364]
Narrative, too, can take the place of argument; a recital of Philip’s
misdeeds during the last few years may do far more to convince the
Athenians of the necessity for action than any argument about the case of
a particular ally who chances to be threatened at the moment.[365]
Demosthenes’ knowledge of history was deep and broad. The superiority of
his attainments to those of Aeschines is shown in the more philosophic
use which he makes of his appeals to precedent; his examples are apposite
and not far-fetched; he can illuminate the present not only by references
to ancient facts, but by a keen insight into the spirit which animated
the men of old times.[366]
The examples already quoted of rhetorical dialogue with imaginary
opponents will have given some idea of his use of a sarcastic tone.
Sarcasm thinly concealed may at times run through a passage of
considerable length, as in the anecdote which follows. We may note in
passing that he is usually sparing in the use of anecdote, which is never
employed without good reason. Here it may be excused by the fact that it
figures as an historical precedent of a procedure which he ironically
recommends to his contemporaries.
Inveighing against the reckless procedure of the Athenian politicians,
who propose laws for their own benefit almost every month,[367] he
recounts the customs of the Locrians, and, with an assumption of
seriousness, implies a wish that similar restrictions could be imposed at
Athens:
‘I should like to tell you, Gentlemen, how legislation is
conducted among the Locrians. It will do you no harm to have an
example before you, especially the example of a well-governed
State. There men are so convinced that they ought to keep to
the established laws and cherish their traditions, and not
legislate to suit their fancy, or to help a criminal to escape,
that any man who wishes to pass a new law must have a rope
round his neck while he proposes it. If they think that the law
is a good and useful one, the proposer lives and goes on his
way; if not, they pull the rope and there is an end of him. For
they cannot bear to pass new laws, but they rigorously observe
the old ones. We are told that only one new law has been
enacted in very many years. Whereas there was a law that if a
man knocked out another man’s eye, he should submit to having
his own knocked out in return, and no monetary compensation was
provided, a certain man threatened his enemy, who had already
lost an eye, to knock out the one eye he had left. The one-eyed
man, alarmed by the threat, and thinking that life would not be
worth living if it were put into execution, ventured to propose
a law that if a man knocks out the eye of a man who has only
one, he shall submit to having both his own knocked out in
return, so that both may suffer alike. We are told that this is
the only law which the Locrians have passed in upwards of two
hundred years.’[368]
This, however, occurs in a speech before the law-courts; it is excellent
in its place, but would have been unsuitable to the more dignified and
solemn style in which he addresses the assembly. Equally unsuitable to
his public harangues would be anything like the virulent satire which
he admits into the _de Corona_, the vulgar personalities of abuse and
gross caricatures of Aeschines and his antecedents.[369] For these the
only excuse is that, though meant maliciously, they are so exaggerated
as to be quite incredible. They may be compared to Aristophanes’ satire
of Cleon in the _Knights_, which was coarse enough, but cannot have done
Cleon any serious harm. Demosthenes indeed becomes truly Aristophanic
when he talks about Aeschines’ acting:
‘When in the course of time you were relieved of these duties,
having yourself committed all the offences of which you accuse
others, I vow that your subsequent life did not fall short
of your earlier promise. You engaged yourself to the players
Simylus and Socrates, the “Bellowers,” as they were called, to
play minor parts, and gathered a harvest of figs, grapes, and
olives, like a fruiterer getting his stock from other people’s
orchards; and you made more from this source than from your
plays, which you played in dead earnest at the risk of your
lives; for there was a truceless and merciless war between you
and the spectators, from whom you received so many wounds that
you naturally mock at the cowardice of those who have never had
that great experience.’[370]
He is generally described as deficient in wit, and he seems in this point
to have been inferior to Aeschines, though on one or two occasions he
could make a neat repartee.[371] As Dionysius says:
‘Not on all men is every gift bestowed.’[372]
If, as his critic affirms,[373] he was in danger of turning the laugh
against himself, he had serious gifts which more than compensated this
deficiency.
It must not be supposed that he was entirely free from sophistry. Like
many good orators in good or bad causes he laboured from time to time to
make a weak case appear strong, and in this effort was often absolutely
disingenuous. The whole of the _de Corona_ is an attempt to throw the
judges off the scent by leading them on to false trails. It may be urged
in his defence that on this occasion he had justice really on his side,
but finding that Aeschines on legal ground was occupying an impregnable
position, he practically threw over the discussion of legality and
turned the course of the trial towards different issues altogether. In
this case, admittedly, the technical points were merely an excuse for
the bringing of the case, and were probably of little importance to the
court. The trial was really concerned with the political principles and
actions of the two great opponents, while Ctesiphon was only a catspaw.
But a study of other speeches results in the discovery of many minor
points in which, accurately gauging the intelligence of his audience,
he has intentionally misled them. Thus, his own knowledge of history
was profound; but experience has proved that the knowledge possessed
by any audience of the history of its own generation is likely to be
sketchy and inaccurate. Events have not settled down into their proper
perspective; we must rely either on our own memories, which may be
distorted by prejudice, or on the statements of historians who stand too
near in time to be able to get a fair view. This gives the politician his
opportunity of so grouping or misrepresenting facts as to give a wrong
impression.
Instances of such bad faith on the part of Demosthenes are probably
numerous, even if unimportant.
In the speech on the _Embassy_[374] he asserts that Aeschines, far from
opposing Philip’s pretension to be recognized as an Amphictyon, was
the only man who spoke in favour of it; yet Demosthenes himself had
counselled submission. In the speech _Against Timocrates_ there are
obvious exaggerations to the detriment of the defendant. Timocrates had
proposed that certain debtors should be given time to pay their debts;
Demosthenes asserts that he restored them to their full civic rights
without payment.[375] Towards the end of the speech a statement is made
which conflicts with one on the same subject in the exordium.[376]
But such rhetorical devices are only trivial faults to which most
politicians are liable.[377] The orator himself would probably feel that
even more doubtful actions were justifiable for the sake of the cause
which he championed. We must remember that all the really important cases
in which he took part had their origin on political grounds, and during
his public career he never relaxed his efforts for the maintenance of
those principles which he expounded in his public harangues. Until the
end he had hopes for Greek freedom, freedom for Athens, not based on any
unworthy compromise, but dependent on a new birth of the old Athenian
spirit. The regeneration which he pictured would be due to a revival of
the spirit of personal self-sacrifice. Every man must be made to realize
first that the city had a glorious mission, being destined to fulfil an
ideal of liberty based on principles of justice; secondly that, to attain
this end, each must live not for himself or his party but wholly for the
city. It is the consciousness that Demosthenes has these enlightened
ideas always present in his mind which makes us set him apart from other
orators. Lycurgus, a second-rate orator, becomes impressive through
his sincerity and incorruptibility; Demosthenes, great among orators,
stands out from the crowd still more eminently by the nobleness of his
aspirations.
§ 7. _Structure of Speeches_
The structure of the speeches will give us a last example of the
versatility of the composer and his freedom from conventional form.
We find, indeed, that he regularly has some kind of exordium and
epilogue, but in the arrangement of other divisions of the speech
he allows himself perfect freedom; we cannot reckon on finding a
statement of the case in one place, followed regularly by evidence, by
refutation of the opponent’s arguments, and so forth. All elements may be
interspersed, since he marshals his arguments not in chronological nor
even, necessarily, in logical order, but in such an arrangement as seems
to him most decisive. He is bound by no conventional rules of warfare,
and may leave his flanks unprotected while he delivers a crushing attack
on the centre. In some cases it is almost impossible to make regular
divisions by technical rule; thus, in the _de Corona_ there is matter for
dispute as to where the epilogue really begins.[378]
The majority of the speeches actually end, according to the Attic
convention which governed both Tragedy and Oratory, in a few sentences of
moderate tone contrasting with the previous excitement; a calm succeeds
to the storm of passions. In the forensic speeches there is usually
at the very end some appeal for a just verdict, or a statement of the
speaker’s conviction that the case may now be safely left to the court’s
decision; thus the _Leptines_ ends with a simplicity worthy of Lysias:
‘I cannot see that I need say any more; for I conceive there
is no point on which you are not sufficiently instructed’; the
_Midias_ more solemnly, ‘On account of all that I have laid
before you, and particularly to show respect to the god whose
festival Midias is proved to have profaned, punish him by
rendering a verdict in accordance with piety and justice.’
In the _de Falsa Legatione_ there is more personal feeling: ‘You must
not let him go, but make his punishment an example to all Athens and
all Greece.’ The _Timocrates_ is rather similar: ‘Mercy under these
circumstances is out of place; to pass a light sentence means to
habituate and educate in wrong-doing as many of you as possible.’ The
_Androtion_ ends with a personal opinion on the aspect of the offence,
and the _Aristocrates_ is in a similar tone. The (first) speech against
Aristogiton appeals directly to the personal interests of all the jurors:
‘His offence touches every one, every one of you: and all of you desire
to be quit of his wickedness and see him punished.’
The _de Corona_ is remarkable in every way; this great speech, which,
arising from causes almost trivial, abandons the slighter issues, and is
transformed into a magnificent defence of the patriotic policy, begins
with a solemn invocation: ‘I begin, men of Athens, with a prayer to
all the gods and goddesses that you may show me in this case as much
good-will as I have shown and still show to Athens and to all of you.’ It
ends in an unique way with an appeal, not to the court but to a higher
tribunal, an appeal which is all the more impressive as its language
recalls the sacred formulas of religious utterance. ‘Never, ye gods of
heaven, never may you give their conduct your sanction; but, if it be
possible, may you impart even to my enemies a sounder mind and heart. But
if they are beyond remedy, hurl them to utter and absolute destruction by
land and sea; and to the rest of us grant, as quickly as may be, release
from the terrors which hang over us, and salvation unshakable.’
The speeches before the assembly are naturally different in their endings
from the judicial speeches; there is no criminal to attack, and no crime
to stigmatize; the hearers themselves are, as it were, on their defence,
and Demosthenes freely points out their faults, but, as has been noticed,
individual opponents escape; if there have been evil counsellors, the
responsibility for following bad advice rests with the public, and they
can only be exhorted to follow a better course. The speeches on the
_Symmories_ and on _Megalopolis_ end with a summary of the speaker’s
advice. So, too, does that _On the Freedom of Rhodes_, the last words
containing a fine appeal to the lesson of antiquity. ‘Consider that your
forefathers dedicated these trophies not in order that you might gaze in
admiration upon them, but in the hope that you might imitate the virtues
of those who dedicated them.’
Several of the speeches dealing with the Macedonian question end with a
short prayer for guidance: thus, the _First Philippic_, ‘May that counsel
prevail which is likely to be to the advantage of all’; the _First
Olynthiac_, ‘May your decision be a sound one, for all your sakes’; the
_Third Philippic_, ‘Whatever you decide, I pray to heaven it may be to
your advantage’; the _Third Olynthiac_, ‘I have told you what I think is
to your advantage, and I pray that you may choose what is likely to be of
advantage to the State and all yourselves.’
Sometimes there is a greater show of confidence, as in the _Second
Olynthiac_: ‘If you act thus, you will not only commend your present
counsellor, but you will have cause to commend your own conduct later
on, when you find a general improvement in your prospects.’
The _Second Philippic_ ends with a prayer rather similar to that in the
_de Corona_, though less emphatic; the speech _On the Chersonese_ with a
reproof and a warning.[379] _The Peace_ contains no epilogue at all, but
breaks off with a sarcasm.
* * * * *
An indication of the nature of the subjects of the genuine speeches may
be useful for reference. They may be taken in their three groups: A.
Private, B. Public, C. Deliberative speeches.
A.—SPEECHES IN PRIVATE CAUSES
_Against Aphobus_, i. and ii., 363 B.C., delivered in the action which
Demosthenes brought against his guardian for the recovery of his property.
_For Phanos against Aphobus_, 363 B.C. Aphobus, convicted in the former
case, accused a witness, Phanos, of perjury: Demosthenes defends the
latter.
_Against Onetor_, i. and ii., 362 B.C. Another case arising out of the
guardianship. When Aphobus was convicted it was found that he had made
over some of the property to his father-in-law Onetor, against whom
Demosthenes was forced to bring a δίκη ἐξούλης.
_On the Trierarchic Crown_, between 361-357 B.C. Apollodorus, having been
awarded the crown given each year to the trierarch who first had his ship
in commission, claims a second crown for having given the best equipped
ship.
_Against Spudias_ (date unknown). One Polyeuctus died, leaving his
property equally to his two daughters. The husband of the elder claims
that the dowry promised with her was never paid in full, and that
Spudias, the husband of the younger daughter, has consequently no right
to half of the _gross_ estate. The debt to the complainant should be
discharged first.
_Against Callicles_ (date unknown). Callicles, a farmer, alleges that the
defendant’s father built a wall stopping a water-course; consequently the
plaintiff’s land was flooded in rainy weather. The defendant denies the
charge, and ridicules it on the ground that the high-road was the natural
water-course.[380]
_Against Conon_ (possibly 341 B.C., see Paley and Sandys’ edition).
Ariston prosecutes Conon for assault. The quarrel dated from a time
when the two parties were on garrison duty, and Conon and his sons
deliberately annoyed Ariston and his friends. Subsequently the defendant,
aided by his sons and others, members of a disreputable ‘Mohock’ club
called the ‘Triballi,’ violently assaulted the speaker.[381]
_For Phormio_, 350 B.C. Phormio, chief clerk to Pasion, the famous
Athenian banker, succeeded him in the business. Some years later
Apollodorus, Pasion’s elder son, claimed a sum of money, said to be
due to him under his father’s will; Phormio, however, proved that a
compromise had been made which rendered the present action invalid.
_Against Stephanus_, i., 349 or 348 B.C. Apollodorus accuses Stephanus,
a witness for Phormio in the previous case, of perjury. It is noticeable
that Demosthenes, the professional speech-writer, has now changed sides,
an action of rather dubious morality if judged by strict standards.
_Against Boeotus_, i., 348 B.C. Mantias, an Athenian politician,
had three sons, Mantitheus (legitimate), and Boeotus and another
illegitimate. Boeotus laid claim to the name Mantitheus, and the true
Mantitheus brought an action to restrain him from using the name.
_Against Pantaenetus_, 346 B.C. A plea (παραγραφή) by one Nicobulus
against Pantaenetus, who had charged the former with damaging his mining
property. The case is hard to follow, since the mine in question was held
in succession by no less than six different parties, whether as owners,
mortgagees, or lessees.
_Against Nausimachus_ (about 346 B.C.). Nausimachus and Xenopeithes,
orphans, brought an action against their guardian Aristaechmus with
regard to their estate, but agreed to compromise for three talents, which
was duly paid. After his death they brought an action against his four
sons, renewing their original claim. The sons put in a παραγραφή to stop
the action on the ground of the compromise.
_Against Eubulides_, 345 B.C. Euxitheus, who has been ‘objected to’ at
the revision of the list of citizens, claims that he is a citizen by
rights, but has been removed from the roll maliciously by Eubulides. The
present case is his appeal (ἔφεσις) to the court against the decision.
The remaining private speeches were quite possibly not composed by
Demosthenes, though proof is generally impossible. They seem, however, to
be genuine speeches, composed for delivery by some author or authors of
the Demosthenic period, and are of extreme interest and importance to all
students of private life at Athens.
_Against Callippus_, 369 B.C. An ἔφεσις or appeal to a court from an
arbitration which, according to the plaintiff Apollodorus, Pasion’s
son, was informal, as the arbitrator had not taken the oath. The case
arises from a claim made by Callippus for money deposited with the banker
Pasion, and by him paid out to one Cephisiades.
_Against Nicostratus_, 368-365 B.C. Apollodorus had declared that
Arethusius, a debtor to the State, possessed two slaves, who were liable
to be confiscated in payment of the debt. Nicostratus, brother of
Arethusius, declared that the slaves were his. Apollodorus in this speech
has to prove that the claim is false.
_Against Timotheus_, 362 B.C. Apollodorus claims from Timotheus money
which, he affirms, the latter borrowed from Pasion.
_Against Polycles_, 358 B.C. Apollodorus was forced to act at trierarch
beyond the appointed time, as Polycles, his successor, was not ready to
take over the duty. The former claims damages.
_Against Stephanus_, ii. See _Against Stephanus_, i., to which this is a
supplement.
_Against Euergus and Mnesibulus_, 356-353 B.C. A prosecution for perjury
of witnesses in a case of ex-trierarchs who are state-debtors.
_Against Zenothemis_, date unknown. An intricate story of fraud and
collusion in connexion with money borrowed on the security of a ship and
an attempt to scuttle the ship.
_Against Boeotus_, ii., 348-346 B.C. (see the first speech _Against
Boeotus_). Mantitheus claims from his brothers the payment of his
mother’s dowry in addition to his share of his father’s inheritance.
_Against Macartatus_, _c._ 341 B.C. A case dealing with a forged will and
conflicting claims to an inheritance.
_Against Olympiodorus_, _c._ 341 B.C. Olympiodorus and Callistratus,
brothers-in-law, obtained the inheritance of Conon. Their title being
questioned, judgment went against them by default. They brought a fresh
action, Olympiodorus claiming the whole and Callistratus half, but they
had secretly agreed to divide the booty equally. Olympiodorus was awarded
the whole, and kept it, so Callistratus brought an action on the ground
of their agreement.
_Against Lacritus_, date unknown. Lacritus disclaims responsibility for
the debts of his brother Artemon, whose property he has inherited.
_Against Phaenippus_, 330 B.C. (?). The petitioner, chosen for the
trierarchy, claimed that Phaenippus was better able to afford it, and
should submit to _antidosis_, or exchange of property. He accuses
Phaenippus of making a false declaration.
_Against Leochares_, date unknown; another case of disputed inheritance.
_Against Apaturius_, 341 B.C. (?). Apaturius claims that the speaker has
certain liabilities towards him in accordance with an agreement which
he has lost. The speaker affirms in a παραγραφή that the contract was
fulfilled some time ago and the document torn up.
_Against Phormio_, _c._ 326 B.C. Phormio having borrowed money on the
security of a ship’s cargo in a voyage to the Bosporus and back, shipped
no cargo on the return journey, but as the ship was lost, evaded his
liabilities. When Chrysippus, the debtor, claimed repayment, Phormio put
in a παραγραφή stating that he had fulfilled his contract.
_Against Dionysodorus_, 323-322 B.C. Another action for breach of
contract in a similar case.
B.—SPEECHES IN PUBLIC CAUSES
_Against Androtion_, 355 B.C., written for Diodorus. Androtion had
proposed the bestowal of a golden crown on the Boulé for their services
during the year. Euctemon and Diodorus attacked the proposal as illegal
because the navy had not been increased during the year. Demosthenes
in this speech attacks the retrograde naval policy, pointing out by
historical argument the importance of the navy, and inveighs generally
against the corruptness of the party which Androtion represents, as well
as his personal character.
_Against Leptines_, 354 B.C. This is the first appearance of Demosthenes
in a public court. Leptines had proposed the abolition of hereditary
immunities from taxation (ἀτέλειαι) granted to public benefactors. It was
a salutary measure in view of the existing financial embarrassment, but
Demosthenes opposed it as being a breach of faith. ‘You must take care
not to be found guilty of doing, as a State, the sort of thing that you
would shrink from as individuals.’[382] This debasement of the State is
compared to a debasement of the coinage, which is a capital offence.[383]
_Against Timocrates_, 353 B.C. Another speech written for Diodorus,
contains several passages repeated from the _Androtion_. This man and
others, having failed to repay certain moneys which they had embezzled,
were liable to imprisonment. Timocrates proposed an extension of the
time within which they might pay. Demosthenes maintains that the law was
informally passed and was unconstitutional. Many of the arguments are
sophistical or trivial, but some are weighty, and on general grounds,
that retrospective legislation in the interests of individuals is bad,
this speech is very sound. The peroration contains an eulogy on the laws
of Athens.[384]
_Against Aristocrates_, 352 B.C., is an important authority for the
Athenian law of homicide. Aristocrates had carried a resolution making
the person of Charidemus inviolable. This man, an Euboean by birth,
was a mercenary leader, who having helped to lose Amphipolis, was now
proposing to recover it. He was at present commanding the forces of the
Thracian chief Cersobleptes. Demosthenes wrote this speech for Euthycles,
who impeached the proposal. It contains an unusually careful arrangement
in three divisions: (1) The proposal is illegal, (2) it is against our
interest, (3) Charidemus is an unworthy person. Demosthenes is seen at
his best in his appeal to legislative principle, his use of historical
argument, and his description of the conditions of mercenary service and
the politics of the barbarian fringe. The case against Charidemus is
strong; he has been in the service of Athens, Olynthus, Asia, and Thrace,
and has played fast and loose with all.
_Against Midias_, 347 B.C. A fine speech on a trivial subject, which all
the eloquence of Demosthenes cannot dignify. Strong emotion is evident
all through, the tone is exalted, there are pathetic and humorous
passages, and all about a box on the ear!
Midias, who had a long-standing personal grudge against Demosthenes,
was also his political opponent. When Demosthenes undertook to furnish
the chorus for his tribe at the greater Dionysia in 348 B.C., Midias
did all that he could to ruin the performance. On the day itself he
slapped Demosthenes in the face in the presence of the whole people in
the theatre.[385] Demosthenes laid a complaint, and Midias was declared
guilty of ‘contempt’ in a religious sense (ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὴν ἑορτήν). This
preliminary vote involved no penalty, and Demosthenes was determined
to push the case to extremes. Midias, having assaulted an official in
discharge of his duty, and, further, committed sacrilege in so doing,
might be condemned to death or confiscation of property. In the end,
however, as we learn from Aeschines,[386] a compromise was made, and
Demosthenes accepted half a talent as compensation for his injuries.
This sum was quite inadequate, but there is good reason to believe that
Demosthenes gave way for political reasons, since at the end of this year
we find there is an understanding between him and the party of Eubulus,
to which Midias belonged.
_On the Embassy (de Falsa Legatione)_, 344 B.C.
We come now to the two great speeches arising out of the political
hostility of Demosthenes and Aeschines, the speeches _On the Embassy_,
344 B.C., and _On the Crown_, 330 B.C. The history of the quarrel has
been given in earlier chapters, and the speeches themselves to some
extent described, since an account of the lives of the two orators
must have been very incomplete without a full reference to their
antagonism.[387] A few supplementary remarks may, however, be in place
here.
In the _Embassy_ Demosthenes has to fight an uphill fight; he accuses
Aeschines of having, from corrupt motives, concluded a dishonourable
and fatal peace. He can bring no direct evidence of the guilt of his
rival, but his presumptive evidence is strong. He has one undisputed fact
to work upon: Aeschines, on his return from the second embassy, made
certain statements and promises which misled the people, and resulted in
the occupation of Thermopylae and the ruin of Phocis. Aeschines himself
must either have been duped or bribed by Philip, and as he has never
admitted that he was a fool, it becomes certain that he was a knave. A
long section of the speech (§§ 29-97) is devoted to a description of the
effects of Aeschines’ policy, and another (§§ 98-149) infers his guilt on
the lines indicated and from other incidents in his career. A presumption
of guilt had already been reached in the opening sections (§§ 9-28) where
the sudden change of front of Aeschines is described. The impression
is strengthened by a review of the events of the second embassy (§§
150-178). The charge has now been established as far as circumstances
permit; the remainder of the speech, almost as long as this first part,
is really a supplement. It is more discursive, and in some places, by
its enunciation of general principles, recalls the tone of deliberative
oratory.
The speech _On the Crown_,[388] 330 B.C., surpasses even the preceding
speech in the appearance of disorder, which is probably due to deep
design. The unity and consistency of the whole is preserved by the
thought, which pervades every section, that the speaker must identify
himself with the city; his policy has been hers; personal interests
are merged in those of the community, and the case is to be won not on
technical points of law but by a justification of the broader principles
which have underlain all actions of the State.
The speeches _Against Aristogiton_, 325-4 B.C.,[389] are generally
considered spurious; Weil, however, defends the authenticity of the
first, while abandoning the second. The process is an attempt to crush a
malicious and dangerous sycophant.
Two more public speeches by contemporary writers are included wrongly
in editions of Demosthenes: _Against Neaera_, written for Apollodorus
between 343 and 339 B.C., on a question of the legal status of a
_hetaira_, and _Against Theocrines_, about 340 B.C. Theocrines was
another sycophant, whom Demosthenes branded for ever by using his name as
a term of abuse, referring to Aeschines as ‘a Theocrines with the bearing
of a tragic actor.’[390]
C.—DELIBERATIVE SPEECHES
_On the Symmories_, 354 B.C., deals with a rumour that Persia intended
to invade Greece. Demosthenes points out that this apprehension is
unfounded, and discourages any rash steps; but admits that trouble is to
be anticipated in the future, and so finds an opportunity for introducing
a scheme of naval reform. The money could be obtained when the danger was
imminent;[391] it was necessary now to perfect the machinery. The style
is Thucydidean.
_For the people of Megalopolis_, 353 B.C. Megalopolis, the city of
the Arcadian league, instituted by Epaminondas, was threatened with
disruption by Sparta, and appealed to Athens. Sparta sent an embassy
at the same time. Demosthenes, professing neutrality, really supported
the Arcadians, wishing to preserve their integrity for the sake of the
balance of power. He failed in his object.
_First Philippic_, 351 B.C., _vide supra_, pp. 206-210.
_For the Liberty of the Rhodians_, 351 B.C., supports the claim of the
islanders against oppression by Artemisia, widow of Mausolus of Caria.
Demosthenes failed again, chiefly through the prejudice against Rhodes,
which had revolted against Athens in 357 B.C.
_First_, _Second_, and _Third Olynthiacs_, all in 349 B.C., _vide supra_,
p. 210.
_On the Peace_, 346 B.C., _vide supra_, p. 212.
_Second Philippic_, 344 B.C., _vide supra_, pp. 213-214.
_On the Chersonese_, 341 B.C., _vide supra_, pp. 215-216.
_Third Philippic_, 341 B.C., _vide supra_, pp. 216-218.
The spurious _Fourth Philippic_ (341-340 B.C.) has been discussed
(_supra_, p. 218). The speech on _Halonnesus_ (342 B.C.) is attributed to
Hegesippus. It is a reply to an offer on the part of Philip to present to
Athens the island of Halonnesus which he had seized, after clearing out
the pirates who occupied it.[392]
_On the Treaty with Alexander_, date uncertain, probably 335 B.C., is
also by a contemporary of Demosthenes. The theme is,—Treaties should
be observed by all, but Macedon has broken promises, so this is an
opportunity for Athens to recover her freedom.
The _Answer to Philip’s Letter_ and the speech περὶ συντάξεως (on
financial organization) are generally regarded as rhetorical forgeries.
Two epideictic speeches, the _Epitaphius_ and _Eroticus_, are almost
certainly not by Demosthenes, and the six _Letters_ are doubtful. The
fifty-six _prooemia_, or introductions to speeches, are probably genuine
exercises of the orator’s early days.
CHAPTER X
PHOCION, DEMADES, PYTHEAS
Though as a rule an orator could not hope to be successful in
fourth-century Athens without a professional training, yet there were at
times men who, either through strength of character or natural gifts,
could dispense with a rhetorical education.
Foremost among the men of the peace party was Phocion, an aristocrat by
instinct if not by birth; a man admired alike for ability and integrity,
so that, though he was no great orator, his speeches always commanded
respect. He aspired, like Pericles, to be both a statesman and a general,
and in the former capacity had at times to speak in the assembly. Various
anecdotes in Plutarch point to his efforts to attain a conciseness
which was almost laconic. His utterance was as trenchant as it was
brief—Demosthenes called him ‘the knife that cuts my speeches down’; and
he had a lively wit, which must have pleased his hearers even though
his policy was unpopular. On one occasion, when the people applauded
him—which was rare, for he neither courted nor expected popularity—he
paused in his speech and asked, ‘Have I said something absurd?’
An unsparing critic of the democracy, as he was nevertheless their
faithful servant, he continued, from the purest motives, to urge peace,
though the best years of his life were spent in war. He was respected
for his high character by Philip and Alexander, and acquiesced in the
government instituted by Antipater in 322 B.C., but fell a victim to the
hatred of the extreme democrats, and was forced to drink hemlock, at the
age of eighty years, in 317 B.C.
Demades, his contemporary, and a member of the same political party,
is a perfect type of the vulgar demagogue. He depended for his success
on a lively wit and a never-failing flow of words. After the battle of
Chaeronea, where he was taken prisoner, he became an avowed agent of
Philip and Alexander.[393] In consequence of his supposed services to
Athens after the destruction of Thebes, he attained great popularity, his
statue was erected in the market-place, and the more material benefit
of perpetual meals in the Prytaneum was decreed to him. He was put to
death by Cassander, the son of Antipater; his fellow-citizens melted
down his statues and applied the metal to even baser purposes.[394] His
recorded sayings show imagination—‘Alexander is not dead; if he were,
the whole world would stink of his corpse’; or again, ‘Macedon without
Alexander would be like the Cyclops without his eye’;[395] finally,
Athens is to him ‘not the sea-fighter whom our ancestors knew, but an
old woman, wearing slippers and supping barley-water.’[396] For the high
opinion entertained of his eloquence we may refer to the verdict of
Theophrastus—‘Demosthenes is an orator worthy of Athens; Demades is on a
higher plane than Athens.’[397] We have no further means of forming any
conception of his style.
Pytheas, another orator who raised himself by his talents from a humble
position, was much younger than the previous two, who were about
contemporary with Demosthenes.[398] He was one of the prosecutors of
Demosthenes in the affair of Harpalus in 324 B.C. Soon after the death
of Alexander he was banished, took service with Antipater, and worked as
his agent in the Peloponnese, using his influence to thwart the efforts
of Demosthenes towards united resistance. After this we lose sight of
him. He is said to have had talent, but to have been handicapped by lack
of education. He was the coiner of the famous phrase about the speeches
of Demosthenes, that they ‘smelt of the lamp,’ and another equally apt,
though less familiar, that Demosthenes ‘had swallowed Isaeus whole.’[399]
CHAPTER XI
LYCURGUS, HYPERIDES, DINARCHUS
§ 1. _Life_
Lycurgus according to Libanius, was older than Demosthenes,[400] though
they were practically contemporaries. He belonged to the illustrious
house of the Eteobutadae, who traced their descent from one Butes,
brother of Erechtheus. The priesthood of Posidon-Erechtheus, and other
religious offices, were hereditary in this family.
The grandfather of the orator, also called Lycurgus, was put to death by
the Thirty; his father, Lycophron, is known only by name.
In the orator’s extant speech, and in his recorded actions, we find
abundant proof of a sincere piety and deep religious feeling, which were
natural in the true representative of such a family. The traditions of
his house may well have turned his thoughts to the stern virtues of
ancient days, the days of Athenian greatness, when self-sacrifice was
expected of a citizen. He expresses a friendly feeling towards Sparta.
Of his earlier political life we know only that he was an ally of
Demosthenes.[401] He came into greater prominence after Chaeronea, and
was one of the ten orators whose surrender was demanded by Alexander
after the destruction of Thebes.
In 338 B.C., when the war party came into power, he succeeded Eubulus,
the nominee of the peace party, in an important financial office. In the
decree quoted by the Pseudo-Plutarch he is called ‘Steward of the public
revenue’ (τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου ταμίας), which is probably not his correct
title, though it fairly represents his appointment.[402] He kept this
office for twelve years. His long administration, which was characterized
by absolute probity, brought the finances of Athens to a thoroughly sound
condition. During his office he built a theatre and an odeon, completed
an arsenal, increased the fleet, and improved the harbour of Piraeus.
He also embellished the city with works of art—statues of the great
poets erected in the public places, golden figures of Victory and golden
vessels dedicated in the temples. His respect for the poets was further
shown by his decree that an official copy should be made of the works
of the three great tragedians—a copy which afterwards passed into the
possession of the Alexandrine library.[403]
He conceived it as his mission to raise the standard of public and
private life. Himself almost an ascetic,[404] he enacted sumptuary
laws; as a religious man by instinct and tradition, he built temples
and encouraged religious festivals; an ardent patriot by conviction,
he thought it his duty to undertake the ungrateful part of a public
prosecutor, pursuing all who failed in their sacred duty towards their
country. In this way he conducted many prosecutions, which were nearly
all successful. He was never a paid advocate or a writer of speeches
for others; indeed he would have thought it criminal to write or speak
against his convictions.[405] His indictments were characterized by such
inflexible severity that his contemporaries compared him to Draco, saying
that he wrote his accusations with a pen dipped in death instead of
blood.[406]
He died a natural death in 324 B.C.,[407] and was honoured by a
public funeral. His enemy Menesaechmus, who succeeded to his office,
accused him of having left a deficit, though, according to one story,
Lycurgus, on the point of death, had been carried into the ecclesia and
successfully defended himself on that score. His sons were condemned to
make restitution, and, being unable to pay, were thrown into prison, in
spite of an able defence by Hyperides. They were released on an appeal by
Demosthenes, then in exile.[408]
§ 2. _Works_
Fifteen speeches of Lycurgus were preserved in antiquity, nearly all
accusations on serious charges. He prosecuted Euxenippus, whom Hyperides
defended; he spoke against the orator Demades, and, in alliance with
Demosthenes, against the sycophant Aristogiton. Other speeches known to
us by name are _Against Autolycus_, _Against Leocrates_, two speeches
_Against Lycophron_, _Against Lysicles_, _Against Menesaechmus_, a
_Defence of himself against Demades_, _Against Ischyrias_, πρὸς τὰς
μαντείας (obscure title), _Concerning his administration_, _Concerning
the priestess_, and _Concerning the priesthood_.[409]
Only one speech is now extant, the impeachment of Leocrates.
Leocrates, an Athenian, during the panic which succeeded the battle of
Chaeronea, fled from Athens to Rhodes, and thence migrated to Megara,
where he engaged in trade for five years. About 332 B.C. he returned
to Athens, thinking that his desertion would have been forgotten; but
Lycurgus prosecuted him as a traitor.
Only a small part of the speech is really devoted to proving the charge.
By § 36 Lycurgus regards it as generally admitted. The remaining
114 sections consist mostly of comment and digressions which aim at
emphasizing the seriousness of the crime and produce precedent for the
infliction of severe punishment in such cases.
_Analysis_
1. _Introduction._ Justice and piety demand that I should
bring Leocrates to trial (§§ 1-2); the part of a prosecutor
is unpopular, but it is my duty to undertake it (§§ 3-6).
This is a case of exceptional importance, and you must give
your decision without prejudice or partiality, emulating the
Areopagus (§§ 7-16).
2. _Narrative._ The flight of Leocrates to Rhodes. _Evidence_
(§§ 17-20). His move to Megara and occupation there. _Evidence_
(§§ 21-23).
3. _Argument._ Comments on the narrative. Possible line of
defence (§§ 24-35). The case is now proved. It remains to
describe the circumstances of Athens at the time when Leocrates
deserted her (§ 36).
4. The panic after the battle of Chaeronea (§§ 37-45). Praise
of those who fell in the battle there (§§ 46-51). Acquittal
is impossible (§§ 52-54). Another ground of defence cut away
(§§ 55-58). Further excuses disallowed (§§ 59-62). Attempt of
his advocates to belittle his crime refuted by appeal to the
principles of Draco (§§ 63-67). They appeal to precedent—the
evacuation of the city before the battle of Salamis: this
precedent can be turned against them (§§ 68-74). The sanctity
of oaths and punishment for perjury. Appeals to ancient
history. Codrus (§§ 75-89). Leocrates says he is confident in
his innocence—_quem deus vult perdere, prius dementat_ (§§
90-93). Providence (§§ 94-97). Examples of self-sacrifice;
quotations from Euripides and Homer (§§ 97-105). Praise of
Sparta. Influence of Tyrtaeus on patriots. Thermopylae (§§
106-110). Severity of our ancestors towards traitors (§§
111-127). Sparta was equally severe (§§ 128-129). Due severity
will discourage treachery, and the treachery of Leocrates is of
the basest sort (§§ 130-134). His advocates are as bad as he is
(§§ 135-140). Appeal to the righteous indignation of the judges
(§§ 141-148).
_Epilogue_ (§§ 149-150):
‘I have come to the succour of my country and her religion and
her laws, and have pleaded my case straightforwardly and justly,
neither slandering Leocrates for his general manner of living,
nor bringing any charge foreign to the present matter; but you
must consider that in acquitting him you condemn your country
to death and slavery. Two urns stand before you, the one for
betrayal, the other for salvation; votes placed in the former
mean the ruin of your fatherland, those in the latter are
given for civil security and prosperity. If you let Leocrates
go, you will be voting for the betrayal of Athens, her religion,
and her ships; but if you put him to death, you will encourage
others to guard and secure your country, her revenues, and her
prosperity. So imagine, Athenians, that the land and its trees
are supplicating you, that the harbours, the dockyards, and the
walls of the city are imploring you; that the temples and holy
places are urging you to come to their help; and make an example
of Leocrates, remembering what charges are brought against him,
and how mercy and tears of compassion do not weigh more with
you than the safety of the laws and the commonwealth.’[410]
§ 3. _Style, etc._
Lycurgus is called a pupil of Isocrates; whether he was actually a
student under the great master we cannot be sure, but undoubtedly he
had studied the master’s works. The influence of the _Panegyric_ may be
traced here and there in the forms of sentences and in certain terms
of speech which are characteristic of the epideictic style. Blass
and others have drawn attention to isolated sentences in the speech
against Leocrates which might have been deliberately modelled, with
only the necessary changes of words for the different circumstances, on
sentences in Isocrates.[411] The employment of a pair of synonyms, or
words of similar sense, where one would suffice, also belongs to this
style[412]—_e.g._ safeguard and protect, § 3; infamous and inglorious, §
91; greatheartedness and nobility, § 100.
With these we must class such phrases as τὰ κοινὰ τῶν ἀδικημάτων for τὰ
κοινὰ ἀδικήματα[413] (§ 6), and the employment of abstract words in the
plural, as εὔνοιαι, φόβοι, § 48, 43.
Lycurgus is very variable with regard to hiatus. In some instances he
has deliberately avoided it by slight distortions of the natural order
of words;[414] in some passages he has been able to avoid it without any
dislocation of order—a work of greater skill;[415] but again there are
sentences where the sequences of open vowels are frequent and harsh.[416]
Other instances of careless writing may be found in the inartistic
joining of sentences and clauses, for instance in §§ 49-50, where
several successive clauses are connected by γάρ,[417] or in the clumsy
accumulation of participles, as in § 93.[418] We must conclude that
Lycurgus, though so familiar with the characteristics of Isocratean prose
as to reproduce them by unconscious imitation, was too much interested
in his subject to care about being a stylist; and that though, like
Demosthenes, he wrote his speeches out, he really belongs rather to the
class of improvisatory speakers like Phocion.
His tendency towards the epideictic style is also seen in his treatment
of his subject-matter; thus §§ 46-51 are nothing but a condensed funeral
speech on those who died at Chaeronea. It is introduced with an apology
(§ 46); it may seem irrelevant, he says, but it is frankly introduced to
point the contrast between the patriot and the traitor. The concluding
sections of the eulogy are as follows:
‘And if I may use a paradox which is bold but nevertheless
true, they were victorious in death. For to brave men the
prizes of war are freedom and valour; for both of these the
dead may possess. And further, we may not say that our defeat
was due to them, whose spirits never quailed before the terror
of the enemy’s approach; for to those who fall nobly in battle,
and to them alone, can no man justly ascribe defeat; for
fleeing from slavery they make choice of a noble death. The
valour of these men is a proof, for they alone of all in Greece
had freedom in their bodies; for as they passed from life
all Greece passed into slavery; for the freedom of the rest
of the Greeks was buried in the same tomb with their bodies.
Hence they proved to all that they were not warring for their
personal ends, but facing danger for the general safety. So,
Gentlemen, I need not be ashamed of saying that their souls are
the garland on the brows of their country.’[419]
This, with the exception of a slight imperfection of style already
noticed, is good in its way, in the style which tradition had established
as appropriate to such subjects. It is less conventional and, in spite of
its bold metaphors, less insincere than Gorgias, avoiding as it does the
extravagance of his antithetical style.
But in spite of the speaker’s apology we feel that it is out of
place, and its effect is spoiled by the use to which it is put in the
argumentative passage which immediately follows:
‘And because they showed reason in the exercise of their
courage, you, men of Athens, alone of all the Greeks, know how
to honour noble men. In other States you will find memorials
of athletes in the market-places; in Athens such records are
of good generals and of those who slew the tyrant. Search the
whole of Greece and you will barely find a few men such as
these, while in every quarter you will easily find men who
have won garlands for success in athletic contests. So, as
you bestow the highest honours on your benefactors, you have
a right to inflict the severest punishments on those by whom
their country is dishonoured and betrayed.’[420]
His use of examples from ancient history is similar to that of Isocrates,
_e.g._ in the _Philip_ and the _Panegyric_; but many of these episodes
are forcibly dragged into a trial of the kind with which Lycurgus was
concerned, whereas those of Isocrates always help to convey the lesson
which he is trying to enforce. Thus the following passage, which succeeds
a quotation from Homer, leads up to a digression on Tyrtaeus, accompanied
by a lengthy quotation from his works. There is only a bare pretence that
all this has anything to do with the case:
‘Hearing these lines and emulating such actions, our ancestors
were so disposed towards manly courage that they were content
to die not only for their own fatherland but for all Greece,
as their common fatherland. Those, at any rate, who faced the
barbarians at Marathon, conquered the armament of all Asia,
by their individual sacrifice gaining security for all the
Greeks in common, priding themselves not upon their fame but
on doing deeds worthy of their country, setting themselves up
as champions of the Greeks and masters of the barbarians; for
they made no nominal profession of courage, but gave an actual
display of it to all the world.’[421]
Here Lycurgus has reverted to the antithetical style of Antiphon, the
opposition of ‘word’ and ‘deed,’ ‘private’ and ‘public,’ and the like. We
are also from time to time reminded of Antiphon by the prominence given
in the _Leocrates_ to religious considerations. The digressions may be
partly explained by the speaker’s avowed motive in introducing some of
them—his wish to be an educator. He introduces a very moral tale of a
young Sicilian who, tarrying behind to save his father, on the occasion
of an eruption of Etna, was providentially saved while all the others
perished. This is his excuse—‘The story may be legendary, but it will be
appropriate for all the younger men to hear it now’;[422] and the manner
of the lecturer is evident elsewhere—‘There are three influences above
all which guard and protect the democracy and the welfare of the city,’
etc. ‘There are two things which educate our youth:—the punishment of
evil-doers and the rewards bestowed on good men.’[423]
Quite apart iron these decorative digressions, Lycurgus admits into his
ordinary discourse poetical phrases and metaphors which the stricter
taste of Isocrates would have excluded. The bold personifications in his
epilogue and elsewhere are cases in point:
‘So imagine, Athenians, that the land and its trees are
supplicating you; that the harbours, the dockyards, and the
walls of the city are imploring you; that the temples and holy
places are urging you to come to their help.’[424]
Lycurgus must have tried the patience of his hearers by his lengthy
quotations from the poets. No other orator, perhaps, would have dared
to recite fifty-five lines of Euripides and to follow them, after a
short extract from Homer, with thirty-two lines of Tyrtaeus. Aeschines,
no doubt, was fond of quoting, but his extracts are comparatively
short and generally to the point; he can make good use of a single
couplet. Demosthenes too, in capping his great adversary’s quotations,
observed moderation and season. But the long quotations in Lycurgus
are superfluous; that from Euripides is a mere excrescence, for he
has already summarized in half a dozen lines the story from which he
draws his moral; and the only purpose in telling the story at all is to
introduce the refrain ‘Leocrates is quite a different kind of person.’
In this matter Lycurgus lacks taste—that is to say, he lacks a sense of
proportion; but for all that he is felt to be speaking naturally quite
according to his own character; he is attaining the highest _ethos_ by
being himself. We know his interest in the tragedians from the fact that
he caused an official copy of the plays to be preserved; and though
religious motives would suffice to account for this decree, probably
personal feeling, the statesman’s private affection for the works which
he thus perpetuated, to some degree influenced his judgment.
Though he may be unskilful, if judged by technical standards, Lycurgus
impresses us by his dignified manner. He will not condescend to any
rhetorical device which might detract from this dignity. He has no
personal abuse for his opponent; he promises to keep to the specific
charge with which the trial is concerned,[425] and at the end of the
speech can justly claim that he has done so.[426] Though it may lay him
open to the suspicion of sycophancy, he disclaims any personal enmity
against Leocrates; he professes to be impelled entirely by patriotic
motives, and we believe him.[427] He may seem to us excessively severe;
we may regard the crime of Leocrates as nothing worse than cowardice;
but we are convinced that to Lycurgus it appeared as the greatest of all
crimes; and the Athenian assembly too was apparently so convinced.[428]
Failure in patriotism was to Lycurgus an offence against religion,
and religion has the utmost prominence in his speech. There can be no
doubt of his sincerity. The court of the Areopagus, which was more
directly under religious protection and more closely concerned with
religious questions than any other court, is mentioned by him with
almost exaggerated praise.[429] The Areopagus was very highly respected
by all Athenians, but it was not a democratic court; it was a survival
from pre-democratic days. An orator who only wished to propitiate the
good-will of his popular audience would praise not the old aristocratic
court but the modern popular assembly before which he was speaking.
Lycurgus gives praise and blame where he thinks them due. He is by no
means satisfied with the democratic courts.
‘I too, shall follow justice in my prosecution, neither
falsifying anything, nor speaking of matters extraneous to the
case. For most of those who come before you behave in the most
inappropriate fashion; for they either give you advice about
public interests, or bring charges, true or false, of every
possible kind rather than the one on which you are to be called
on to give your verdict.
There is no difficulty in either of these courses; it is as
easy to utter an opinion about a matter on which you are not
deliberating as it is to make accusations which nobody is going
to answer. But it is not just to ask you to give a verdict in
accordance with justice when they observe no justice in making
their accusations. And you are responsible for this abuse,
for it is you who have given this licence to those who appear
before you....’[430]
The whole speech is pervaded by references to religion; Rehdantz has
noted that the word θέος occurs no less than thirty-three times; and
other words of religious import are very frequent, though the orator
never uses ejaculations such as the ὦ γῆ καὶ θεοί of Demosthenes. This
reiteration is of less significance than the serious tone of the passages
in which such references occur; his opening sentences indicate the
attitude which he is to maintain:
‘Justice and Piety will be satisfied, men of Athens, by the
prosecution which I shall institute, on your behalf and on
behalf of the gods, against the defendant Leocrates. For I pray
to Athena and the other gods, and to the heroes whose statues
stand in the city and in the country, that if I have justly
impeached Leocrates; if I am bringing to trial the betrayer
of their temples, their shrines and their sanctuaries, and the
sacrifices ordained by the laws, handed down to you by your
forefathers, they may make me to-day a prosecutor worthy of his
offences, as the interests of the people and the city demand;
and that you, remembering that your deliberations are concerned
with your fathers, your children, your wives, your country,
and your religion, and that you have at the mercy of your vote
the man who betrayed them all, may prove relentless judges,
both now and for all time to come, in dealing with offenders
of this kind and degree. But if the man whom I bring to trial
before this assembly is not one who has betrayed his fatherland
and deserted the city and her holy observances, I pray that he
may be saved from this danger both by the gods and by you, his
judges.’[431]
Passages later in the speech deepen this impression, and contain definite
statements of belief which we cannot disregard:
‘For the first act of the gods is to lead astray the mind of
the wicked man; and I think that some of the ancient poets were
prophets when they left behind them for future generations such
lines as these:
For when God’s wrath afflicteth any man,
By his own act his wits are led astray,
And his straight judgment warped to crooked ways,
That, sinning, he may know not of his sin.
‘The older men among you remember, the younger have heard, the
story of Callistratus, whom the city condemned to death. He
fled the country, and hearing the god at Delphi declare that if
he went to Athens he would obtain his due, he came here, and
took sanctuary at the altar of the twelve gods; but none the
less he was put to death by the city.
‘This was just; for a criminal’s due is punishment. And the god
rightly gave up the wrong-doer to be punished by those whom he
had wronged; for it would be strange if he revealed the same
signs to the pious and the wicked.’
‘But I am of opinion, Gentlemen, that the god’s care watches
over every human action, particularly those concerned with our
parents and the dead, and our pious duty towards them; and
naturally so, for they are the authors of our being, and have
conferred innumerable blessings on us, so that it is an act of
monstrous impiety, I will not say to sin against them, but even
to refuse to squander our own lives in benefiting them.’[432]
The following fragment deserves quotation as an example of his dignified
severity:
‘You were a general, Lysicles; a thousand of your
fellow-citizens met their death, two thousand were made
prisoners, and our enemies have set up a trophy of victory over
Athens, and all Greece is enslaved; all this happened under
your leadership and generalship; and yet do you dare to live
and face the sun’s light, and invade the market-place—you,
who have become a memorial of disgrace and reproach to your
country?’[433]
HYPERIDES
Hyperides, a member of a middle-class family, was born in 389 B.C., and
so was almost exactly contemporary with Lycurgus, whose political views
he shared. He too, according to his biographer, was a pupil of Isocrates
and of Plato, but the influence of the latter can nowhere be traced in
his work.
A man of easy morals and self-indulgent habits, he presents a striking
contrast to the austerity of Lycurgus. The comic poets satirized his
gluttony and his partiality for fish, and the Pseudo-Plutarch records
that he took a walk through the fish-market every day of his life; but
the pursuit of pleasure did not impair his activity.
He was at first a writer of speeches for others, as Demosthenes was at
the beginning of his career;[434] but before he reached the age of thirty
he began to be concerned personally in trials of political import. He
prosecuted the general Autocles on a charge of treachery, in 360 B.C.;
he appeared against the orator Aristophon of Azenia, and Diopeithes. He
impeached in 343 B.C., Philocrates, who had brought about the peace with
Philip.[435] He was sent as a delegate to the Amphictyonic Council,[436]
and showed himself a vigorous supporter of the policy of Demosthenes;
in 340 B.C., when an attack on Euboea by Philip was anticipated, he
collected a fleet of forty triremes, two of which he provided at his
own cost. Shortly before Chaeronea he proposed a decree to honour
Demosthenes; after the battle he took extreme measures for the public
safety, including the enfranchisement of _metoeci_ and the manumission
of slaves. He was prosecuted by Demades for moving an illegal decree,
and retorted, ‘The arms of Macedon made it too dark to see the laws; it
was not I who proposed the decree—but the battle of Chaeronea.’[437] He
was able to retaliate soon afterwards by prosecuting Demades for the
same offence of illegality. Demades had proposed to confer the title
of _proxenos_ on Euthycrates, who had betrayed Olynthus to Philip. A
fragment which remains of Hyperides’ speech on this subject shows him to
be a master of sarcasm.[438]
We know nothing for certain about the origin of the breach between
him and Demosthenes; it may have been due to his disapproval of the
latter’s policy of inactivity when Sparta in 330 B.C. wished to fight
with Antipater; at any rate his language in 334 B.C. shows him to be an
irreconcilable adversary of Macedon. Nicanor had sent a proclamation
to the Greeks requesting them to recognize Alexander as a god, and
to receive back their exiles. At the same time Harpalus, Alexander’s
treasurer, had deserted from the king’s side and arrived at Athens with
a considerable treasure. Demosthenes was in favour of negotiating with
Alexander; Hyperides wished to reject the proposals of Nicanor, and use
the treasure of Harpalus for continuing the war against Macedon. Harpalus
was arrested, but succeeded in escaping, and many prominent statesmen
came under suspicion of having received bribes from him. Hyperides was
chosen as one of the prosecutors, and Demosthenes was exiled.
Hyperides, after Alexander’s death, took the chief responsibility for
the Lamian war, and was chosen to pronounce the funeral oration on
his friend, the general Leosthenes, and the other Athenians who fell
in the war. Demosthenes had now returned from exile; the two patriots
were reconciled, and persisted in the policy of resistance from which
the prudence of Phocion had long striven to dissuade Athens. After the
battle of Crannon, Antipater demanded the surrender of the leaders of the
war party; Hyperides fled, was captured and put to death in 322 B.C.
He is said to have bitten out his tongue for fear that he might, under
torture, betray his friends. His body was left unburied till the piety
of a kinsman recovered it and gave him interment in the family tomb by
the Rider’s Gate. He had proved himself consistent throughout his public
life, and however mistaken his policy, especially in the latter years,
may have been, honour is due to him for the unflinching patriotism which
led him to martyrdom in a vain struggle to uphold his country’s honour.
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Hyperides was known to the
modern world only from the criticisms of Dionysius and other ancient
scholars, and from a few minute fragments preserved here and there by
quotations in scholiasts and lexicographers. A manuscript is believed to
have existed in the library at Buda, but when that city was captured by
the Turks in 1526 the library was destroyed or dispersed, and Hyperides
was lost.
In 1847 portions of his speeches began to reappear among the papyri
discovered in Egypt. In that year a roll, containing fragments of the
speech _Against Demosthenes_ and of the first half of the _Defence of
Lycophron_, was brought to England; a second roll discovered in the
same year was found to contain the second half of the _Lycophron_ and
the whole of the _Euxenippus_. In 1856 were discovered considerable
fragments of the Funeral Speech. In 1890, some fragments of the speech
_Against Philippides_ were acquired by the British Museum, while the most
important discovery of all was that of the speech _Against Athenogenes_.
The MS. was purchased for the Louvre in 1888, but the complete text was
only published in 1892. Its importance may be estimated by the fact that
Dionysius couples this speech and the defence of Phryne as being the
best examples of a style in which Hyperides surpassed even Demosthenes.
The papyrus itself is of interest as giving us one of the very earliest
classical MSS. that we possess; it dates from the 2nd century B.C.[439]
In many points Hyperides challenges comparison with Lysias. The criticism
of Dionysius is well worth our consideration: ‘Hyperides is sure of aim,
but seldom exalts his subject; in the technique of diction he surpasses
Lysias, in subtlety (of structure) he surpasses all. He keeps a firm hold
throughout on the matter at issue, and clings close to the essential
details. He is well equipped with intelligence, and is full of charm; he
seems simple, but is no stranger to cleverness.’[440]
The first sentence contrasts Hyperides once for all with his contemporary
Lycurgus, who, while less sure of his aim, has a personal dignity which
gives exaltation to every theme.
We have hardly enough of the work of Hyperides to enable us to form a
first-hand judgment as to the merits of his diction compared with that of
Lysias. He has, indeed, the same simplicity and naturalness, but hardly,
so far as we can judge, the same felicity of expression.
Hermogenes blames him for carelessness and lack of restraint in the use
of words, instancing such expressions as μονώτατος, γαλέαγρα, ἐπήβολος,
etc., which seem to him unsuited for literary prose. As we have had
occasion to notice already, rare and unusual words may be found
occasionally in every orator, almost in every writer. Hyperides was no
purist; he enlivened his style with words taken from the vocabulary of
Comedy and of the streets. He did not wait for authority to use any
expression which would give a point to his utterance.
Critics who expected dignified restraint in oratorical prose may have
been shocked by the adjective θριπήδεστος, ‘worm-eaten,’ which he applied
to Greece; to us it seems an apt metaphor. Of his other colloquialisms
some recall the language of Comedy—as κρόνος (‘an old Fossil’), the
diminutive θεραποντίον, and ὀβολοστάτης[441] (‘a weigher of small
change’ = ‘usurer’), προσπερικόπτειν (‘to get additional pickings’—the
metaphor is apparently from pruning a tree), παιδαγωγεῖν in the sense of
‘lead by the nose.’ Others seem to be merely colloquial, part of that
large and unconventional vocabulary which was soon to form the basis of
Hellenistic Greek; for we must remember that we are already on the verge
of Hellenism, and that the Attic dialect must soon give way before the
spread of a freer language. In this class we may put ἐποφθαλμιᾶν (‘to eye
covetously’), ὑποπίπτειν (‘to put oneself under control of somebody’),
ἐνσείω (‘to entrap’), κατατέμνειν (‘to abuse’), ἐπεμβαίνω (poetical or
colloquial, ‘to trample on’).
In some of his speeches relating to _hetairai_ he seems to have used
coarse language which offended his critics; nothing offensive is found in
his extant speeches.[442]
Other metaphors and similes abound; he is fond of comparing the life
of the State to the life of a man, as Lycurgus does also—ἓν μὲν σῶμα
ἀθάνατον ὑπείληφας ἔσεσθαι, πόλεως δὲ τηλικαύτης θάνατον κατέγνως, ‘You
imagine that one person (_i.e._ Philip) can live for ever, and you
passed sentence of death on a city as old as ours.’ The Homeric phrase
ἐπὶ γήρως ὀδῷ (= ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ, ‘on the threshold of old age’) is
curiously introduced into a serious passage in the _Demosthenes_ without
any preparation or apology. We can only suppose that it was so familiar
to his hearers that it would not strike them as being out of place in
ordinary speech. It is similarly used by Lycurgus.[443] In the same
speech (_Against Demosthenes_) Hyperides speaks of the nation being
robbed of its crown, but the metaphor is suggested by the fact that
actual crowns had been bestowed on Demosthenes. Such metaphors as ‘others
are building their conduct on the foundations laid by Leosthenes,’ though
less common in Greek than in English, are perfectly intelligible. A happy
instance of his ‘sureness of aim’ which Dionysius commended is preserved
in a fragment about his contemporaries:
‘Orators are like snakes; all snakes are equally loathed, but
some of them, the vipers, injure men, while the big snakes eat
the vipers.’[444]
He uses simile, however, with varying success; the following, though the
conception is good, is not properly worked out, as the parallelism breaks
down:
‘As the sun traverses the whole world, marking out the seasons,
and ordering everything in due proportion, and for the prudent
and temperate of mankind takes charge of the growth of their
food, the fruits of the earth and all else that is beneficial
for life; so our city ever continues to punish the wicked and
help the righteous, preserving equal opportunities for all,
and restraining covetousness, and by her own risk and loss
providing common security for all Greece.’[445]
The _Epitaphios_ from which the last quotation is taken is a speech of
a formal kind composed in the _epideictic_ style, and naturally recalls
similar speeches of Isocrates and others. Its composition shows much
greater care than was taken with the other speeches; thus there are few
examples of harsh hiatus, a matter to which the author as a rule paid
no attention. All the other extant speeches have far more instances of
clashing vowels.[446] The antithetical sentences are appropriate to the
style, and the periodic structure is like that of Isocrates, except that
the sentences are, on the whole, shorter and simpler.
In other speeches he mingles the periodic and the free styles with
discretion. The objection to a long period is that it takes time to
understand it; we cannot fully appreciate the importance of any one
part until we have reached the end and are in a position to look back
at the whole. For practical oratory it is far better to make a short
statement which may be in periodic form, and amplify it by subsequent
additions loosely connected by καί, δέ, γάρ, and such particles. This
is what Hyperides does with success, for instance in the opening of the
_Euxenippus_, an argumentative passage.[447] In narrative passages a free
style is expected.[448]
In contrast to this flowing style we must notice the quick abrupt
succession of short sentences which he sometimes affects, either in the
form of question and answer, as in the following fragment, or otherwise:
‘“Did you propose that the slaves should be made free?” “I did,
to save the free men from becoming slaves.” “Did you move that
the disfranchised citizens should be enfranchised?”—“I did, in
order that all in harmony might fight side by side for their
country.”’[449]
Still more effective is the following:
‘It is on this account that you have enacted laws to deal
separately with every possible offence that a citizen may
commit. A man commits sacrilege—prosecution for sacrilege
before the king-archon. He neglects his parents—the archon
sits on his case. A man proposes an illegal measure—there is
the council of the Thesmothetae. He makes himself liable to
arrest—the “eleven” are permanent officials.’[450]
Hyperides possessed an active wit which enabled him on many occasions
to evade an argument by making his opponent appear ridiculous.
Euthias, in prosecuting Phryne for impiety, made his audience shudder
by describing the torments of the wicked in Hades. ‘How is Phryne to
blame,’ asked Hyperides, ‘for the fact that a stone hangs over the head
of Tantalus?’[451] In the _Euxenippus_, he complains that the process of
impeachment before the assembly has been applied to the present case:
‘Impeachment has hitherto been employed against people like
Timomachus, Leosthenes, Callistratus, Philon, and Theotimus
who lost Sestos—some of them for betraying ships which they
commanded, some for betraying cities, and one for giving, as
an orator, bad advice to the people.... The present state of
affairs is ridiculous—Diognides and Antidorus are impeached for
hiring flute-players at a higher price than the law allows;
Agasicles of Piraeus is impeached for being registered as of
Halimus; and Euxenippus is impeached on account of the dream
which he says he dreamed.’[452]
His sarcasm is playful at times, even in serious passages; for instance
the following:
‘These Euboeans Demosthenes enrolled as Athenian citizens,
and he treats them as his intimate friends; this need not
surprise you; naturally enough, since his policy is always
ebbing and flowing, he has secured as his friends people from
Euripus.’[453]
Another good example of his sarcastic humour appears in the defence of
Euxenippus against the charge of Macedonian sympathy:
‘If your assertion (the prosecutor’s) were true, you would
not be the only person to know it. In the case of all others
who in word or deed favour Philip, their secret is not their
own; it is shared by the whole city. The very children in the
schools know the names of the orators who are in his pay, of
the private persons who entertain and welcome his emissaries,
and go out into the streets to meet them on their arrival.’[454]
This same sarcasm is in many places a powerful weapon of offence, as in
the next extract from the indictment of Demosthenes:
‘You, by whose decree he was put in custody, who when the watch
was relaxed did nothing to assure it, and when it was abandoned
altogether did not bring the guilty to trial—no doubt it was
for nothing that you turned the opportunity to such advantage.
Are we to believe that Harpalus gradually paid out his money
to the minor politicians, who could only make a noise and raise
an uproar, and overlooked you, who were master of the whole
situation?’[455]
The following fragment contains the most striking example of irony to be
found anywhere in his works; the situation explains itself:
‘The reasons which Demades has introduced are not the true
justification for Euthycrates’ appointment, but if he must
be your _proxenos_, I have composed, and now put forward, a
decree setting forth the true reasons why he should be so
appointed:—Resolved—that Euthycrates be appointed _proxenos_,
for that he acts and speaks in the interests of Philip; for
that, having been appointed a cavalry-leader, he betrayed the
Olynthian cavalry to Philip; for that by so doing he caused the
ruin of the people of Chalcidice; for that after the capture
of Olynthus he acted as assessor at the sale of the prisoners;
for that he worked against Athens in the matter of the temple
at Delos; for that, when Athens was defeated at Chaeronea,
he neither buried any of the dead nor ransomed any of the
captured.’[456]
We have seen already how he could turn his wit against the whole class of
orators, to which he belonged himself; it is pleasant to find him, in a
speech which he wrote for a fee, thus describing Athenogenes: ‘A common
fellow, a professional writer of speeches.’[457] It was the business of
the _logographos_ to sink his own personality in that of his client, and
Hyperides, who was an artist by instinct, did so more successfully than
any other speech-writer, except, perhaps, Demosthenes. In the present
instance he must have felt a peculiar satisfaction in his work.
In private speeches he introduces many matters extraneous to the case;
thus in the _Athenogenes_, though the question is only about a shady
business transaction, he rouses odium by references to his adversary’s
political offences. No doubt many weak cases succeeded by such devices,
which call forth the just indignation of Lycurgus.[458] In public cases
he has a higher ideal. When Lycurgus was an advocate on the other side,
Hyperides referred to him with all the respect due to his character. Even
the speech against Demosthenes is entirely free from personal abuse,
if we except a little mild banter about Demosthenes’ austere habits of
sobriety.[459] The indictment of Demosthenes’ public actions is vigorous
enough, but it is restrained within the limits of good taste, and this is
not for the sake of ancient friendship, which Hyperides repudiates:
‘After that will you dare to remind me of our friendship? ...
(as if it were) not you yourself who dissolved that friendship,
when you received money to do your country harm, and changed
sides? When you made yourself ridiculous and brought disgrace
on us who hitherto had been of your party? Whereas we might
have been held in the highest respect by the people, and been
attended for the rest of life’s journey by an honourable
repute, you shattered all such hopes, and are not ashamed at
your age to be tried by the younger generation for receiving
bribes. On the contrary, the younger politicians ought to
receive education from men like you; if they committed any
hasty action they ought to be rebuked and punished. Things
are quite different now, when it falls upon the young men
to correct those who have passed the age of sixty. And so,
Gentlemen, you may well be angry with Demosthenes, for through
you he has had his fair portion of wealth and renown; and now,
with his foot on the threshold of old age, he shows that he
cares nothing for his country.’[460]
Dionysius approves the diversity of Hyperides’ manner in dealing with
his narratives:—‘He tells his story on a variety of ways, sometimes
in the natural order, sometimes working back from the end to the
beginning.’[461] We have no means of judging; the _Euxenippus_, the only
complete forensic speech, contains practically no narrative; the story of
the _Athenogenes_ is, apparently, told straight through without a break,
and then followed by evidence and criticism and legal arguments. Then
follows the attempt to blacken the character of Athenogenes by extraneous
arguments.
We may conclude this section by a few sentences from the treatise _On the
Sublime_, expressing an estimate of the general character of his oratory:
‘If successes were to be judged by number, not by magnitude,
Hyperides would be absolutely superior to Demosthenes. He has
more tones in his voice, and more good qualities. He is very
nearly first-class in everything, like a pentathlete, so that,
while other competitors in every event beat him for the first
prize, he is the best of all who are not specialists.’ ...
‘Where Demosthenes tries to be amusing and witty, he raises
a laugh, but it is against himself. When he attempts to be
graceful, he fails still more signally. At any rate, if he had
attempted to compose the little speech about Phryne or the
one against Athenogenes, he would have established still more
firmly the reputation of Hyperides.’ ‘But ... the beauties
of the latter, though numerous, are not great; his sobriety
renders them ineffective, and leaves the hearer undisturbed—no
one, at any rate, is moved to terror by reading Hyperides.’[462]
And the passage concludes with a sincere tribute to the titanic force of
Demosthenes.
Hyperides had seventy-seven speeches ascribed to him, of which fifty-two
were thought by the Greek biographer to be genuine.[463] Blass has
collected the titles of no less than sixty-five, in addition to the five
which are extant in the papyri; so that only seven are unknown by name.
Some quotations have been given from the indictment of Demosthenes;[464]
the subject-matter has been explained,[465] and the treatment, so far as
we can judge from the fragments, criticized.[466] The date is 324 B.C.
The _Defence of Lycophron_ is a speech in an εἰσαγγελία in which Lycurgus
was one of the prosecutors. Lycophron, an Athenian noble, was a commander
of cavalry in Lemnos, and was accused of seducing a Lemnian woman of good
family, the wife of an Athenian who died before the case came on. The
date is uncertain; perhaps _circa_ 338 B.C. The case of Euxenippus arises
out of the fact that Philip, after Chaeronea, restored the territory of
Oropus to Athens. It was divided into five lots, and one lot assigned
to every two tribes. A question arose whether the portion given to the
Hippothoöntid and Acamantid tribes was not sacred to Amphiaraüs, and
Euxenippus and two others were deputed to sleep in the shrine of the hero
and obtain from their dreams a divination on the subject. They reported
a dream which could be interpreted in favour of their tribes. In the
present instance they are prosecuted for having given a false report of
their dreams. The defendant and another advocate had already preceded
Hyperides, so that the present speech is mainly devoted to bickering with
the prosecutors, of whom Lycurgus was one. Date about 330 B.C.
The speech _Against Philippides_[467] is very much mutilated. It is a
γραφὴ παρανόμων against Philippides, otherwise unknown, who had proposed
a vote of thanks to a board of πρόεδροι or presidents of the ecclesia
for their action in passing a certain decree, which seems to have been a
vote of honour to Philip. It was passed under compulsion, and Philippides
attempted subsequently to exonerate them from all possible blame by a
decree which is here declared illegal.
The _Epitaphios_ or Funeral Speech is a composition in a well-known
conventional form. The topics for such a speech were already laid down
by long custom. The skill of the orator is seen in his original way of
handling the traditional commonplaces. First of all there is the strong
personal note. He had been associated in politics with Leosthenes,
and with him was jointly responsible for the Lamian war in which the
latter met his death.[468] His personal feeling for the general is very
prominent in the speech; Leosthenes is in fact the principal theme; he is
put, as M. Croiset remarks, almost on a level with Athens:—‘Leosthenes
seeing all Greece humbled and cowering, brought to ruin by the traitors
whom Philip and Alexander had bought; seeing that our city wanted a
man, and all Greece wanted a city, to take the leadership, freely gave
himself for his country and gave our city for the Greeks to win their
freedom.’[469] It is not, he says, that he wishes to slight the other
patriots, but in praising Leosthenes he is praising all. He draws a fancy
picture of the heroes of antiquity welcoming Leosthenes in Hades. It is
a sign of the times that the individual should so be exalted; we have
travelled far indeed from the cold impersonality of Pericles, to whom
the nameless heroes who sacrifice their lives are but part of a pageant
passing before the eyes of the deathless city. The consolation to the
living is remarkable for containing references to a future life, which
is quite without precedent:—‘It is hard to comfort those who are in
such grief; for neither speeches nor laws can send sorrow to sleep’ ...
(there follow remarks about eternal praise, which are not particularly
characteristic; but he concludes in a higher strain):—‘Furthermore, if
the dead are as though they had never been, our friends are released from
sickness and pain and the other misadventures which afflict mankind; but
if the dead have consciousness, and are under the care of God, as we
believe, we may be sure that they, who upheld the honour of the gods when
it was threatened, are now the objects of God’s loving kindness.’[470]
Truly Socrates had not lived in vain.
The speech _Against Athenogenes_[471] is an admirable example of the
orator’s lighter style. Its chief merit is the way in which the narrative
of the events is delivered by the speaker.
Hyperides’ client, a young Athenian, wished to obtain possession of a
young slave, who was employed in a perfumery-shop. Athenogenes, the owner
of the shop—‘a vulgar speech-maker, and worst of all an Egyptian’—saw
his opportunity for a good stroke of business, and at first refused to
sell the slave. A quarrel ensued. At this point Antigona, once the most
accomplished courtesan of her day, but now retired, came and offered
her services to the young man. She contrived to pick up for herself a
gratuity of 300 drachmas, just as a proof of his good opinion. Later,
she told the young man that she had persuaded Athenogenes to release
the boy, not separately, but together with his father and brother,
for forty minas. The young man borrowed the money; a touching scene
of reconciliation followed, Antigona exhorting the two adversaries to
behave as friends in future. ‘I said that I would do so, and Athenogenes
answered that I ought to be grateful to Antigona for her services; “and
now,” he said, “you shall see what a kindness I will do you for her
sake.”’ He offered, instead of setting the slaves free, to sell them
formally to the plaintiff, who could then set them free when he liked,
and so win their gratitude. As to any debts they have contracted, you can
take them over; they are trifling, and the stock remaining in the shop
will easily cover them.’ Assent having been given, Athenogenes produced
a contract in these terms, which he had brought with him, and it was
signed and sealed on the spot. Within three months the unhappy purchaser
found himself liable for business debts and deposits amounting to five
talents. Athenogenes made the preposterous excuse that he had not known
anything about this enormous debt. His dupe was in an awkward position,
as he had formally taken over the business and its liabilities. He tries
to prove that the contract should be held not valid. His legal claim
is very slight; the appeal is really to equity. The second part of the
speech deals with Athenogenes in his political relations. The epilogue
exhorts the judges to take this opportunity of punishing such a scoundrel
on general grounds, even if he cannot actually be brought under any
particular law.
DINARCHUS
Dinarchus, the last of the ten orators of the Alexandrian Canon, was
a Corinthian by birth. He lived as a _metoecus_ at Athens, but never
obtained the citizenship, and was therefore unable to appear in the
courts or the assembly. He was born about 360 B.C.; on coming to Athens
he is said to have studied under Theophrastus, and he began to write
speeches, as a professional _logographos_, about 336 B.C. He did not
come into prominence till about the time of the affair of Harpalus, and
his most flourishing period was after the death of Alexander, under the
oligarchic constitution set up by Cassander. During these fifteen years,
322-307 B.C., he composed a large number of speeches. In 307 B.C. the
democratic restoration threatened danger to all who had flourished under
the oligarchy, and he retired to Chalcis in Euboea, where he lived for
fifteen years.[472] He returned to Athens in 292 B.C. and stayed for a
time with one Proxenos, who, taking advantage of his age and infirmity,
robbed him of a large sum of money. He brought his host to justice, and,
according to Dionysius and other biographers, himself spoke in court for
the first time. We know nothing of the result of the case, and have no
information of the rest of the life of Dinarchus or his death.[473]
Dinarchus wrote, according to Demetrius Magnes,[474] over a hundred and
sixty speeches. Many of these were rejected by Dionysius, who, however,
admits the authenticity of a sufficiently large number—sixty out of
eighty-seven which he knew.[475] Three only have come down to us, and the
authenticity of the longest of these—_Against Demosthenes_—was questioned
by Demetrius. We shall, however, treat it as genuine, since in style and
subject-matter it is very similar to the others. The three speeches,
_Against Demosthenes_, _Aristogiton_, and _Philocles_, all relate to
the affair of Harpalus. The corruption connected with this affair was
so deep-rooted that it was necessary above all to find men of upright
character to conduct the prosecutions, and these would not be well-known
orators, since most of the prominent politicians were implicated as
defendants in the case. It is hardly remarkable, therefore, that
professional speech-writers should be employed or that one writer should
compose speeches to be delivered in three of the many prosecutions.
Dinarchus, the last of the truly Attic orators, is of very little
importance in himself, but must find a place in any history of this
kind as representing the beginning of the decline of oratory. ‘He
flourished most of all,’ says Dionysius, ‘after the death of Alexander,
when Demosthenes and the other orators had been condemned to perpetual
banishment or put to death, and there was nobody left who was worth
mentioning after them.’ This contains a fairly just estimate of the
merits of the man, who, according to the same critic, ‘neither invented
a style of his own, like Lysias and Isocrates and Isaeus, nor perfected
the inventions of others, as, in our judgment, Demosthenes, Aeschines,
and Hyperides did.’[476] His merits and defects are very obvious. He
knows all the technique of prose composition; he can avoid hiatus
cleverly, and writes a style which is easily intelligible, even when
his sentences are inordinately long. He has some skill in the use of
new words and metaphors—μετοιωνίσασθαι τὴν τύχην, ‘auspicate your
fortunes anew’—ἐκκαθάρατε, ‘purge him away from the State’—δευσοποιὸς
πονηρία, ‘ingrained wickedness.’ He has some vigour and liveliness:
abrupt statements like the following are terse and graphic enough—‘You
chose prosecutors in due course; he came before the court; you acquitted
him’;[477] he makes good use of rhetorical questions addressed to the
defendant:—‘Did you propose any motion about it? Did you give any
counsel? Did you contribute any money? Did you ever in any small matter
prove serviceable to those who were working for the common safety? Not
in the slightest degree’ ... etc.[478] His sarcasm, which is rare,
because he is generally too directly violent to be sarcastic, is at
times pointed:—‘Read again the decree which Demosthenes proposed against
Demosthenes.’[479] He knows the oratorical tricks: he can flatter the
jury by references to their intelligence, by praise of the Areopagus,
by encomia on the virtues of their ancestors. He can appeal to ancient
and modern precedent for the impartiality of judges and their severity
against evil-doers.
He is at his best in the long refutation of the defence which he
anticipates from Demosthenes[480]—this is, on the whole, orderly and
effective—and in short passages like the following from the speech
_Against Philocles_:
‘Reflecting on these facts, Athenians, and remembering the
present crisis, which calls for honour, not corruption, it is
your duty to hate evil-doers, to exterminate from your city
such beasts, and show the world that the nation has not shared
in the degradation of certain of its politicians and generals,
and is not a slave to conventional opinion; knowing that, by
God’s favour, with the help of justice and concord, we shall
easily defend ourselves, if any enemies wrongfully attack us,
but that in union with corruption and treachery and other such
vices which infect mankind, no city can ever be saved.’[481]
He was, then, thoroughly competent; but he was careless. He passes
from section to section with no logical and little formal connection;
invective takes the place of argument, and even his abuse is incoherent.
Everything is overdone; other writers have produced striking effects by
slight changes in the order of words; Dinarchus disarranges his order
without improving the emphasis.[482] Again, the repetition of a single
word may give emphasis, as thus:—‘A hireling, men of Athens, a hireling
he is and has been’; but this device is used _ad nauseam_.[483] His
sentences, great concatenations of participles and relatives, trail along
like wounded snakes.[484]
Invective had its place in Athenian oratory, but when on every page
we find such expressions as beast, foul creature, foul beast, scum,
cheat, accursed, thief, traitor, perjurer, receiver of bribes, hireling,
unclean, we feel that the orator is spitting rather than talking.[485]
There is a similar lack of decency in his imputation of corrupt motives
to all the public actions of Demosthenes, good or bad, and to his
exaggeration of the latter’s offences. He becomes positively ridiculous
when he describes Aristogiton’s first imprisonment—the first of many.
Aristogiton, the worst man in Athens, or rather, in all the world ... has
spent more time in prison than out ... the first time he went there he
behaved so disgustingly that the other prisoners, the dregs of all the
world, refused to have their meals with him, or associate with him on
terms of equality.[486] This abuse of a man who is on trial for a merely
political offence, is grossly over-coloured, and is probably as false
as his description of Demosthenes’ callousness:—‘He went about exulting
in the city’s misfortunes; he was carried in a litter down the road to
Piraeus, mocking at the miseries of the poor.’ Finally, his plagiarisms
from Demosthenes, Aeschines, and other orators are too numerous to
record; he borrows whole passages without skill or appropriateness.[487]
He borrows even from himself.[488] The ancient nicknames for him,
ἀγροῖκος Δημοσθενής, κριθινός Δημοσθενής—‘the boorish Demosthenes,’ ‘the
small-beer Demosthenes,’ are as apt as such characterisation can be.[489]
To sum up: the very marked decline of which Dinarchus is typical, is
due not to lack of technical ability, but to lack of originality on the
intellectual side, and still more to moral causes:—lack of literary
conscience, shown in the plagiarisms; lack of proper care, shown in the
incoherence of the whole speeches; and lack of all sense of proportion
and restraint, shown by the numerous exaggerations of various kinds which
have been described above.
CHAPTER XII
THE DECLINE OF ORATORY
Owing to the extraordinary success of the Macedonian arms, Hellenic
culture spread rapidly over a great part of the world; but it was beaten
out thin in the process.[490]
The conditions of life in Greece underwent a great change in the
generations which succeeded the death of Alexander. Athens, which had for
so long been the intellectual headquarters of the world, was now only a
station of secondary importance. Alexandria, founded by the king himself,
became under the divine auspices of the Ptolemies not only the great mart
of the world but the greatest centre of learning; Pergamus in the course
of time rivalled Alexandria, at any rate in literary resources; while
Antioch and Tarsus also became prominent in the history of learning.
From early times men of genius born elsewhere in Greece, in the Ionian
cities and in Magna Graecia, had turned to Athens for appreciation of
their powers. It is easy to see at a glance how much Athens owed to these
aliens for her intellectual advancement—Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras
of Abdera, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon. Her
dramatic poets were her own, and so were her great orators, with
the exception of Lysias; but this is partly due to the fact that the
constitution of her laws gave little opportunity for aliens to win
distinction on the platform or the stage. Of her great historians,
one was not of Athenian birth and even wrote in a foreign dialect; in
philosophy no true-born Athenian before Plato won real distinction. In
the Macedonian era a distinguished stranger had more prospect not only
of appreciation but of material advancement in one of the royal cities
than in a city-state which had become little better than a minor satrapy
in one of the great empires, and traded only on the fading memories of
its former magnificence. Life in the great cities was very different,
too, from life in democratic Athens. From the time of Pericles to that
of Demosthenes, all citizens had at least a strong corporate feeling;
all citizens knew each other. The sculptor fought side by side with the
tanner, the Alcmaeonid met the lamp-seller in debate; there were many
common grounds in which all could meet under conditions of equality. In
the law-courts the orator must satisfy not only the learned few but the
unlettered many; in the theatre the poet and his actors appealed to all
classes, from the high-priest who must not be allowed to slumber on his
central throne to the people who ate sweetmeats in the back rows, and, if
dissatisfied, with true Athenian spirit, threw these harmless missiles
at the performers.[491] Moreover, all spoke the same language. The
diction of tragedy gradually put off its artificiality, and the orators
approached nearer and nearer to the idiom of common speech.
In Alexandria, on the other hand, to take one typical example, there was
no such unity. Among the Greek inhabitants there were many classes—the
court-circle, the scholars of the Museum, the merchants, the mercenary
troops, all with different aims and occupations; and these formed but
a minority. In addition there would be thousands of Jews, Egyptians,
Phoenicians, Mesopotamians, and others, to whom Greek was at first
a foreign language, and who when they had acquired it spoke, in the
κοινή, a dialect corrupted by innumerable foreign elements. Thus, though
scholarship persisted and flourished, there must always have been a sharp
distinction between the lettered classes and the common people.
Oratory, like all other arts, faded away in Athens after Alexander’s
death, partly from the general causes indicated, partly on account of the
special conditions of Athenian life.
Forced to submit to Antipater in 322 B.C., Athens was allowed to exist
on humiliating terms. She received a Macedonian garrison into Munychia,
the democracy was overthrown; 12,000 of the poorer citizens were not only
disfranchised but expatriated, and an oligarchy was instituted. Five
years later a temporary revival occurred, when Polysperchon (317 B.C.)
overthrew the oligarchy; but a few months after this Cassander obtained
possession of the city and again established a government on narrower
lines, installing as governor a man of great erudition and culture,
Demetrius of Phalerum. This Demetrius, though practically a satrap of
Cassander, governed the city wisely for ten years; but in 307 B.C. he
fled before the approach of Demetrius Poliorcetes, son of Antigonus. The
Besieger made a proclamation of freedom, which the Athenians by this
time were unworthy to enjoy; they ascribed to him divine honours, and in
301 B.C. he took up his quarters in the Parthenon. No wonder that Pallas
Athene fled in disgust when her shrine was polluted by the licentious
orgies of this new war-god.
Phocion, Demades, and Dinarchus, from among the contemporaries of
Demosthenes, lived to see their city under Macedonian rule, but they
left no successors. There were few opportunities left for an orator.
The ecclesia, when it met on sufferance, could debate only on matters
of domestic import; and proposals to improve the water-supply, or erect
statues to a tyrant, give less scope for eloquence than the great
issues of peace and war which had formerly been the subject of their
deliberation. Men of political ability had no scope when politics were
dead. In the courts, too, there could be no public cases of great
interest comparable with the case of the _Crown_ or the impeachment of
Demosthenes. Private cases, in which aspiring politicians had hitherto
found it convenient to try their strength, were more suited to the
attainments of professional lawyers, and these cases must have greatly
decreased in numbers and importance when all the dependencies of Athens
were taken from her.[492] The oratory of display, brought to perfection
by Isocrates, had likewise but few openings. No orator could rise at the
Olympic Festival to summon all Greeks to brotherhood in arms; no funeral
speech could move a people to tears or exalt them to enthusiasm when
battles were waged by mercenaries and war declared not by a nation but
by a foreign prince. The art of rhetoric was still practised, but already
Aristotle, by going back to first principles, had composed the first
and last scientific treatise on this subject, and shown that it must
be put into its true place as a branch of philosophy, to be studied in
combination with its counterpart, Dialectic.[493] Political theory, which
figures prominently in Isocrates and Demosthenes, had likewise become the
property of the philosophical schools.
Demetrius of Phalerum, the regent of Cassander, is reckoned by Quintilian
as the last of the orators. Such time as he could spare from the
management of the city and the contemplation of the 360 statues erected
to him by an admiring or subservient populace,[494] was devoted to the
study of philosophy, history and oratory. He wrote more than any other
Epicurean on record[495]—philosophical dialogues, historical works,
erudite researches, literary and rhetorical studies, speeches, all
testified alike to his industry and the wide extent of his interests. His
_Rhetoric_, which contained personal reminiscences of Demosthenes, is
quoted by Plutarch on that account; his treatise on _Demagogy_ contained
his ideas of political science; his history of his regency (περὶ τῆς
δεκαετείας) might, if we could recover it, add much to our scanty
knowledge of that period. So short are the fragments remaining of his
work that we must turn chiefly to Cicero and Quintilian for an estimate
of his value. We gather that he was an excellent example of the ‘tempered
style,’ excelling in grace and brilliance, but deficient in vigour and in
real passion. A philosophical treatment of his subject-matter was one of
his marked characteristics.[496]
A few facts about his life are known chiefly from Diogenes. He was the
son of Phanostratus, an enfranchised slave. He studied under Theophrastus
and entered political life about 324 B.C. Belonging to the Macedonian
party, he took part in the negotiations after the Lamian war. In 317
B.C., when Phocion was put to death, he fled, but was chosen by the
citizens, with the approval of Cassander, to be their governor, and
ruled from 317 to 307, when he was superseded by Demetrius Poliorcetes.
He retired to Thebes, and twenty years later went to Egypt. Exiled from
Alexandria by Philadelphus, he died of a snake-bite in one of the remote
demes of Egypt about 280 B.C.
Demochares and Charisius belong also to this period; the former, one
of the few Athenians who retained any independence of spirit, was a
nephew of Demosthenes, whose style he imitated; Charisius imitated and
exaggerated the simplicity of Lysias.[497]
From this time onward, oratory is practically dead; declamations on
fictitious subjects took the place of real speeches in the assembly or
the courts; oratory became an element in education and nothing more.
We need mention only Hegesias of Magnesia (_c._ 250 B.C.), the founder
of what was subsequently known as the ‘Asian’ school of rhetoric, the
characteristics of which were affected expression, grotesque metaphor,
plays upon words, incongruous rhythms, and general lack of ideas.[498]
Dionysius quotes an extract, with the remark that it looks as if it had
been written for a joke. Hegesias is important only on account of the
debasing influence which he exercised over his Greek and Roman followers.
For a genuine revival of oratory we must wait till the last years of the
Roman Republic.
FOOTNOTES
[1] _Iliad_, ix. 443.
[2] _Ibid._, ix. 502 _sqq._
[3] Herod., viii. 83.
[4] Thuc., i. 138.
[5] § 42.
[6] _Brutus_, § 28.
[7] _Themistocles_, ch. ii.
[8] _Ibid._, ch. xi.
[9] Ch. xxix.
[10] Plato, _Republic_, i. 330 A.
[11] Plato, _Alcibiades_, 1., 118 C.
[12] Plut., _Pericles_, ch. iv., who quotes Plato (comicus): σὺ γάρ, ὤς
φασι, Χείρων ἐξέθρεψας Περικλέα.
[13] p. 270 A, Jowett’s translation.
[14] Antiphon, _Tetral._ ii.
[15] 1. 2. 40.
[16] Plato, _l.c._
[17] Bothe, _Comic Frag._, i. 162. See also Aristophanes, _Acharn._ 530.
‘Then Pericles the Olympian in his wrath
Lightened and thundered and confounded Greece.’
[18] Thuc., ii. 65.
[19] Plut., _Pericles_, ch. vii.
[20] Arist., _Rhet._, iii. 10. 7 D.
[21] Thuc., i. 115-117; Arist., _Rhet._, iii. 4. 3.
[22] Arist., _ibid._
[23] Herod., vii. 162; Arist., _Rhet._, i. 7. 34. In a later age the
orator Demades borrowed it. (Athenaeus, iii. 99 D.)
[24] Plato, _Protag._, 317 C.
[25] Plato, _Protag._, 337 A-C, where Plato parodies his style.
[26] Cicero, _Brutus_, § 46.
[27] Arist., _Rhet._, ii. 24. 11.
[28] _Soph. Elench._, 183 p. 28 _sqq._
[29] _Vide infra_, p. 36.
[30] Quoted by Plato, _Phaedrus_, 273 B.C.
[31] Schol. on Hermogenes; also Sext. Empir. _adv. Mathem._, ii. 96.
[32] κακοῦ Κόρακος κακὰ ὠά.
[33] _Soph. Elench._, 184 a. 1.
[34] Cf. Plato, _Gorgias_, 453 A; _Phaedr._, 259 E.
[35] Isocr., _Antid._, § 155.
[36] If it is true, as Philostratus, _Ep._ ix. says, that Aspasia
‘sharpened the tongue of Pericles’ in Gorgian style, he must have visited
Athens in a private capacity at an earlier date, unless his _Olympiac_
and other speeches were widely circulated and read.
[37] Πολλαχοῦ τῶν ἰάμβων γοργιάζει, Philost., _Lives of the Sophists_,
ix. 493.
[38] Plato, _Meno_, 70 B; Philost., _Epist._ ix. 364.
[39] περὶ φύσεως ἢ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, Sext. Emp., vii. 65. Cicero (_Brut._, §
46) mentions also a collection of _communes loci_ made for instructional
purposes.
[40] Arist., _Rhet._, iii. 14. 12.
[41] _Symposium_, 194 E, _sqq._, 197 D; the latter contains some
excellent examples: πραύτητα μὲν πορίζων, ἀγριότητα δ’ ἐξορίζων·
φιλόδωρος εὐμενείας, ἄδωρος δυσμενείας, etc.
[42] Introduction to the Teubner edition of Antiphon (1908), p. xxviii.
[43] Ps.-Plut., _Lives of the Orators_, Antiphon, § 9.
[44] Thuc., viii. 68.
[45] _Eth. Eudem._, iii. 1232 b. 7.
[46] The Sophistical element is very prominent, especially in the
tetralogies. Like Tisias he makes great use of arguments from probability.
[47] _De comp. verborum_, ch. 22.
[48] Such words are, for instance, ἀνατροπεύς; μήνιμα and ἀλιτήριος,
separately, as μήνιμα ἀκέσασθαι, δεινοὺς ἀλιτηρίους ἕξομεν, or together,
μήνιμα τῶν ἀλιτηρίων προστρίψομαι; θεία κηλίς, γεγωνεῖν, ὀπτήρ,
ἀείμνηστος.
[49] Rare but not poetical words are, _e.g._ ὑπῆρκτο, χωροφιλεῖν,
καταδοχθείς, ἐπίδοξος, and, from lost Speeches, μοιρολογχεῖν,
τριβωνεύεσθαι, ἀστοργία, and many others quoted by lexicographers for
their peculiarity.
[50] _E.g._ οἴδαμεν, ᾔδεις, and the remarkable εἰκότερον.
[51] _Vide supra_, p. 16. A striking example of the verbal periphrasis is
in Antiphon, _Herodes_, § 94: νῦν μὲν οὖν γνωρισταὶ γίνεσθε τῆς δίκης,
τότε δὲ δικασταὶ τῶν μαρτύρων· νῦν μέν δοξασταί, τότε δὲ κριταὶ τῶν
ἀληθῶν.
[52] _Rhet._, iii. 9. 1-2.
[53] _Rhet._, iii. 9. 3: λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ’
αὐτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον. _Ibid._, 5: εὐανάπνευστος.
[54] Herod., i. 16-17.
[55] _Id._, iii. 80-81.
[56] Arist., _Rhet._, iii. 9. 3.
[57] Dion., _de Lysia_, 6; ἡ συστρέφουσα τὰ νοήματα καὶ στρογγύλως
ἐκφέρουσα λέξις.
[58] See Verrall, _Rhyme and Reason_, in _The Bacchants of Euripides_.
[59] _Supra_, p. 20.
[60] Arist., _Rhet._, i.
[61] _E.g._, on the laws, _Herodes_, § 14, and _Choreutes_, § 2, where
the same passage of about eight lines occurs with only the alteration of
two or three unimportant words.
[62] Jebb (_Attic Orators_, vol. i. pp. 40-41) insists that the
prominence given to this kind of argument points to a deep religious
feeling in the orator’s heart. However, we meet with the same type of
argument in Aeschines, to whom no such depth of feeling is usually
imputed.
[63] Cf. the Demosthenic collection of προοίμια.
[64] προκατασκευή.
[65] διήγησις.
[66] πίστεις.
[67] ἐπίλογος.
[68] This is another characteristic of the earlier rhetoricians; _vide
supra_, p. 12.
[69] _Herodes_, § 26.
[70] The Introduction amounts to one-fifth of the whole speech.
[71] Ps.-Plut., _Lives of the Ten Orators_.
[72] _Attische Beredsamkeit_, vol. i. pp. 104-105.
[73] In the similar case discussed by Pericles and Protagoras, the third
possibility was considered—the guilt of the javelin. (Plut., _Pericles_,
ch. 36.)
[74] ἕνδειξις κακουργίας.
[75] _Supra_, p. 38 _sqq._
[76] _Soph. Elench._, 183 b. 32.
[77] 267 C.
[78] x. 416 A.
[79] _Rhet._, iii. 1. 7.
[80] The word seems to mean _powerful_ or _convincing_; whether τόποι
(_commonplaces_ or _passages_) or λόγοι (_arguments_) is the word to be
supplied, we cannot even conjecture.
[81] _de Isaeo_, ch. xx.
[82] _de Demosthene_, ch. iii.
[83] _Phaedrus_, 267 C (Jowett).
[84] Book I., 336B.
[85] _Rhet._, iii. 8. 4; iii. 1. 7. The _paeon_ = –⏑⏑⏑ or ⏑⏑⏑–.
[86] Cf. Aristoph., _Frogs_, 866: ἐβουλόμην μὲν οὐκ ἐρίζειν ἐνθάδε.
[87] Aesch. _in Ctes._, § 2.
[88] The reference by Arist., _Rhet._, ii. 23. 28 to ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου
τέχνη—the _earlier_ treatise of T.—implies others.
[89] Cf. Arist., _Rhet._, iii. 13. 4: διήγησις, ἐπιδιήγησις, προδιήγησις;
ἔλεγχος, ἐπεξέλεγχος.
[90] _Phaedrus_, 266 C, λογοδαίδαλος.
[91] Aristoph., _Clouds_, 109.
[92] Thuc., vi. 60.
[93] _de Myst._, §§ 61 _sqq._
[94] _Ibid._, § 4.
[95] Dion., _de Lysia_, ch. 2.
[96] Quint., xii. 10, 21.
[97] Philostratus, _vita Her. Att._, ii. 1, § 14.
[98] Hermogenes, περὶ ἰδεῶν, ch. xi. p. 416. Spengel (_Rhetores Graeci_).
[99] Ps.-Plut., _Lives of the Ten Orators_.
[100] The following is a list of some of the poetical or unusual words
and phrases occurring in the speeches—_de Myst._: § 29 ταῦτα τὰ δεινὰ καὶ
φρικώδη ἀνωρθίαζον. § 67 πίστιν ... ἀπιστοτάτην. § 68 ὁρῶσι τοῦ ἡλίου τὸ
φῶς. § 99 ἐπίτριπτον κίναδος. § 130 κληδών. § 146 (γένος) οἴχεται πᾶν
πρόρριζον.
_de Pace_: § 7 τὸν δῆμον ... ὑψηλόν ἦρε. § 8 and in three other passages
κατηργάσατο (_secure, bring about_, cf. Eur. _Her._, 646 πόλει σωτηρίαν
κατεργάσασθαι). § 18 κρατιστεύειν. § 31 ἐκτεῖναι τὸν θυμὸν, ἀρχὴν πολλῶν
κακῶν.
The _de Pace_ is noticeable for the recurrence of two grammatical
forms which do not occur in the other speeches, the use of τοῦτο μὲν,
τοῦτο δέ after the manner of Herodotus for the simple μέν and δέ; and
the repetition of δέ with a resumptive force, as, _e.g._, § 27 ἃ δὲ
πρὸς τούτους μόνους ἐκεῖνοι συνέθεντο, ταῦτα δ’ οὐδεπώποτ’ αὐτούς φασί
παραβῆναι.
The illogical use of the plural of οὐδείς in the same sense as the
singular (_de Myst._, § 23 οὐδένας, § 147 οὐδένα) is perhaps colloquial.
There are many instances of the use of this plural in the later orators,
a point which Liddell and Scott did not observe, or, at any rate, failed
to make clear. Another phrase which may be colloquial is τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ
ταῖν χεροῖν ταῖν ἐμαυτοῦ (_de Myst._, § 144).
[101] _de Myst._, §§ 48-50.
[102] _de Myst._, §§ 37-39.
[103] _de Myst._, §§ 1-3 and 8.
[104] _Ibid._, § 150.
[105] _de Myst._, §§ 4, 5.
[106] _de Myst._, § 57.
[107] _de Myst._, § 126.
[108] _Ibid._, § 95.
[109] ὧ συκόφαντα καὶ ἐπίτριπτον κίναδος, κ.τ.λ., _de Myst._, § 99.
[110] _Ibid._, § 93.
[111] _Supra_, p. 66.
[112] § 8.
[113] _de Myst._, § 112.
[114] _E.g._, the poetical ὑψηλὸν ἧρε. Andoc., § 7; Aesch., § 174. Cf.
Euripides, _Supp._, 555, and _Her._ 323.
[115] _de Pace_, §§ 24-26.
[116] Frag. 5 (Blass).
[117] Two lost speeches for Iphicrates, 371 B.C. and 354 B.C., were
pronounced spurious by Dionysius; but, as he accepted the date of Lysias’
birth as 459 B.C., he was bound to conclude that these speeches were not
by him.
[118] _Against Eratosthenes_, §§ 5-17.
[119] Dion., _de Lysia_, ch. 2: τῆς Ἀττικῆς γλώττης ἄριστος κανών.
[120] καταστρατηγεῖ.
[121] _E.g._ δεινὸν δέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι εἰ νῦν μὲν ... τότε δέ, etc., and
ἄξιον δ’ ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὅτι ...
[122] Examples are numerous: _e.g._ the speech of Polyaenus (_For the
Soldier_, §§ 4-5) shows a simplicity in narrative which Herodotus could
not have surpassed.
[123] Ch. ii. pp. 26-7.
[124] _For the Cripple_, § 7.
[125] _For Mantitheus_, §§ 18-21.
[126] _For the Cripple_, §§ 1-3.
[127] _For the Cripple_, parts of §§ 10-12.
[128] _Ibid._, §§ 19-20.
[129] _de Caede Eratosthenis_, §§ 11-14.
[130] _Supra_, p. 76.
[131] _Supra_, p. 62.
[132] _Agoratus_, §§ 39-40.
[133] _Vide infra_, p. 92, on the question of authenticity.
[134] _Supra_, pp. 83 _sqq._
[135] Lysias, _Nicomachus_, § 27; Andocides, _de Myst._, § 93, quoted
_infra_, p. 96.
[136] Ps.-Plut., _Lives of the Ten Orators_; Dion., _de Lys._, ch. 17,
διακοσίων οὐκ ἐλάσσους δικανικοὺς γράψας λόγους.
[137] However, Socrates, in Plato’s _Menexenus_, 236 B, suggests that
Pericles’ famous Funeral Speech was composed for him by Aspasia.
[138] _Epit._, §§ 79-81.
[139] The reference to the Amazons and the general vagueness of the
historical setting are closely paralleled by the Funeral Speech in
Plato’s _Menexenus_, which is generally regarded as a parody.
[140] _Rhet._, III. 10. 7.
[141] _de Lys._, ch. 32.
[142] Cf. _supra_, p. 90.
[143] _Vide supra_, p. 85.
[144] _Vide supra_, pp. 85-6.
[145] _Supra_, pp. 76-7.
[146] Andoc., _de Myst._, § 90.
[147] _Vide supra_, p. 87.
[148] § 3.
[149] _Vide infra_, p. 150.
[150] _Vide supra_, p. 72.
[151] The second speech with the same title is only an epitome of the
first.
[152] Cf. _supra_, p. 90.
[153] Dion., _de Isaeo_, ch. 1.
[154] Jebb, vol. ii. p. 265.
[155] _de Isaeo_, ch. 1.
[156] He is by far the most important; in some cases we can supplement
him from Demosthenes, but other authorities are negligible.
[157] §§ 1-11.
[158] § 12. I have translated this section, though not relevant to the
matter under discussion, because it gives a good indication of Athenian
feeling on the subject of the torture of slaves.
[159] Jebb, _Attic Orators_, vol. ii. p. 277³.
[160] Cleisthenes (_Herod._, vi. 129), in a moment of extreme excitement,
remarked to Hippoclides ἀπωρχήσαο τὸν γάμον—‘You have danced away your
chances of marriage.’
[161] Cf., too, the use of ὑπωπτιάζω in the New Testament.
[162] _E.g._ γρῦξαι.
[163] It has been already remarked that the speech-writers are, as a
rule, ridiculously unsuccessful in their attempt to make their clients
speak in the way that is natural to them (_vide supra_, p. 37).
[164] _E.g._ Or. v. 23, ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν βεβαιώσειν, κ.τ.λ. Or. v.
31. ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐμμενεῖν οἷς ἂν γνοῖεν. Or. v. 43, δαπανηθείς (in middle
sense).
[165] _E.g._ καθιστάνειν, ψηφίσεσθε, ἄξαντες.
[166] _The Estate of Apollodorus_ (Or. vii.), § 5.
[167] _Ciron_ (Or. viii.), § 28.
[168] _Nicostratus_ (Or. iv.), §§ 7-10.
[169] _de Isaeo_, ch. 3.
[170] _de Isaeo_, ch. 4.
[171] _Ibid._, ch. 5.
[172] Lysias, fr. 46.
[173] Isaeus, fr. 15.
[174] Cf. _de Isaeo_, ch. 14.
[175] _de Isaeo_, ch. 16.
[176] _Ibid._, ch. 3.
[177] Cf. _supra_, p. 38.
[178] _E.g._ Orr. 2, 3, 7, 8, 9.
[179] Or. 8 (_Ciron_), § 46.
[180] _de Isaeo_, ch. 16.
[181] _Antid._, § 161.
[182] _Phaedr._, pp. 278-9.
[183] καὶ ἀρχὰς δὲ [και] (τὰς?) περὶ τὴν Χίον κατέστησε καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ
πατρίδι πολίτειαν. Ps.-Plut., 837 B.
[184] However, if we pressed this passage, we must regard the journey
with Timotheus as unhistorical. All the evidence is to be found in Blass,
_Att. Ber._, vol. ii. pp. 16-17.
[185] _Antid._, §§ 159 _sqq._
[186] _de Comp. Verb._, ch. xxiii.
[187] _de Comp. Verb._, ch. xxiii. He quotes _Areop._, §§ 1-5.
[188] Isocrates allows elisions of certain short vowels, but he is more
sparing than most poets in the use of it. In the epideictic speeches the
commonest elision is of enclitics or semi-enclitics (τε, δέ, etc.) and
of personal pronouns. Crasis, except of καὶ ἄν is rare. In the forensic
speeches (his early work) elision is much less restricted.
[189] Maxim. Planud. _ad Hermog._, v. 469.
[190] Vol. ii. p. 144.
[191] _Rhet._, Book III. 8. 4.
[192] _Ibid._
[193] θαυμάζειν καὶ ζηλοῦν, ἐπαινεῖν καὶ τιμᾶν, etc.
[194] _E.g._ _Paneg._ § 5, ὅταν ἢ τὰ πράγματα λάβῃ τέλος ... ἢ τὸν
λόγον ἴδῃ τις ἔχοντα πέρας, where τέλος and πέρας, two words for end
or completion, are not really distinguishable, or, at any rate, the
distinction is very slight. So in _Evagoras_, § 11, εὐλογεῖν and
ἐγκωμιάζειν are used antithetically (to praise—to eulogise).
[195] _E.g._ _Evagoras_, § 10, αὐταῖς ταῖς εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς
συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. Elsewhere we find μετριότητες,
λαμπρότητες, αὐθάδειαι, ἀργίαι, etc.
[196] Aristoph., _Clouds_, _passim_.
[197] Cf. Isocrates’ reference to this passage in _Antid._, § 193.
[198] _Hel._ (Or. x.), § 1, οἱ δὲ διεξιόντες ὡς ἀνδρία καὶ σοφία καὶ
δικαιοσύνη ταὐτόν ἐστι.
[199] §§ 9 _sqq._
[200] _Antid._, §§ 187-189.
[201] §§ 19 _sqq._
[202] _Rhet._, i. 1. 10.
[203] τὸ τολμᾶν, § 192.
[204] _Vide supra_, p. 137.
[205] _Or_ astrology?
[206] _Antid._, Summary of §§ 181-303.
[207] _Antid._, § 11, ἰδέαι.
[208] _Ep._ 1, § 87. This letter is referred to in _Philippus_, § 81; the
text of the letter remaining to us is incomplete.
[209] _Philippus_, 346 B.C.
[210] _Ibid._ (Or. v.), §§ 14-17.
[211] Isocrates is said to have spent ten years over the composition of
the _Panegyricus_; it was probably published in 380 B.C.
[212] _I.e._ the victory of the 10,000 at Cunaxa.
[213] The truth of this maxim is illustrated by our records of the
_impromptu_ performances of Demosthenes, _vide infra_, p. 190.
[214] _de Isaeo_, ch. xix., παχύτερον ὄντα τὴν λέξιν καὶ κοινότερον.
[215] _Rhet._, iii. 3. 3.
[216] Arist., _Rhet._, iii. 3. 4.
[217] _Busiris_, §§ 5-6. He endeavoured to make Socrates responsible for
the misdeeds of Alcibiades.
[218] _de Isaeo_, ch. xx.
[219] Dion., _de Isocrate_, ch. xviii.: τὴν ἀπολογίαν τὴν πάνυ θαυμαστὴν
ἐν ταῖς πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη ἀντιγραφαῖς ἐποιήσατο.
[220] See _Timarchus_, § 49, where Aeschines states, in 346 B.C., that he
is rather over forty-five years old.
[221] Aesch., _de Leg._, § 147. Dem. (_de Cor._, 129 _sqq._) asserts that
he was originally a slave named Tromes (_Coward_), but changed his name
to Atrometus (_Dauntless_).
[222] Dem., _de Cor._, §§ 258-259. See further _infra_, p. 249.
[223] However, his elder brother, Philocrates, was elected general three
times in succession, and his younger brother, Aphobetus, was sent as an
ambassador to the Great King.—Aesch., _de Leg._, § 149.
[224] _de Cor._, § 262, _vide infra_, p. 249.
[225] _de Leg._, § 79; _vide infra_, p. 168.
[226] See _de Pace_ (_passim_) delivered in the same year.
[227] Aesch., _Ctes._, §§ 222-225.
[228] _Dem._, ch. 24, περὶ Ῥόδον καὶ Ἰωνίαν σοφιστεύων κατεβίωσεν.
[229] _de Leg._, § 16, τοῖς γὰρ καιροῖς ἀνάγκη συμπεριφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ
κράτιστον καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὴν πόλιν.
[230] _Ibid._, § 157, ὁ τῆς μεγίστης σύμβουλος πόλεως.
[231] Hyper., _adv. Dem._, xxiv.
[232] _de Leg._, § 79.
[233] Dem., _de Falsa Leg._, §§ 145, 166-177; _de Cor._, § 41.
[234] _Timarchus_, § 174; _Ctes._, § 58.
[235] _Supra_, p. 148.
[236] _de Leg._, § 163.
[237] _Vide supra_, p. 166.
[238] ἐπῆλθέ μοι, Aesch., _Ctes._, § 118, where A. complacently relates
the whole incident.
[239] _de Cor._, §§ 129, 262, etc. Further, _de Falsa Leg._, § 246. A
tritagonist would ordinarily have to play the parts of kings and tyrants,
who must as a rule be majestic characters (cf. ὁ Κρέων Αὶσχίνης, _de
Falsa Leg._, § 247).
[240] _Timarch._, § 25.
[241] Dem., _de Falsa Leg._, § 252.
[242] Dem., _de Falsa Leg._, § 255, σεμνολογεἳ ... φωνασκήσας, etc.; _de
Cor._, § 133, σεμνολόγου; and numerous references to τριταγωνίστης.
[243] Aesch., _de Leg._, § 41, τὴν φύσιν μου μακαρίζων, etc. (of the
behaviour of Demosthenes during the first embassy).
[244] _Ctes._, §§ 228-229, ἐξ ὀνομάτων συγκείμενος, etc.
[245] _Supra_, pp. 167-170.
[246] Dem., _de Cor._, § 128.
[247] References to himself as πεπαιδευμένος, to his adversaries as
ἀπαίδευτοι, to their ἀπαιδευσία, τό ἀμαθές, etc., are very common in the
speeches against Timarchus and on the embassy.
[248] _Infra_, pp. 184, 187.
[249] _Timarch._, § 26. Aeschines adds a characteristically Greek
touch—‘his body was so horribly out of condition through his drunkenness
and other excesses that decent people covered their eyes.’ It was the
neglect of the body, rather than the exposure of the arms and legs, which
is exaggerated into ‘nakedness,’ that really shocked the spectators, in
addition to the ‘rough-and-tumble’ gestures of the orator.
[250] _Timarch._, §§ 37-38.
[251] _Timarch._, § 39. Ἄκυρος is used in a double sense; the early
actions of Timarchus are unratified in the sense of not proved; the
actions of the Thirty are not ratified by the succeeding governments. It
is a looseness of expression which does not spoil the general sense, and
there is, perhaps, an implied reference to the _Amnesty_, declared after
the expulsion of the Thirty. Similarly Aeschines declares an _amnesty_
for all the offences of Timarchus before a certain date.
[252] _Ibid._, § 55. In § 70 there is a further apology. Cf. also § 76.
[253] _Timarch._, § 53.
[254] Cf. _infra_, p. 191.
[255] _Timarch._, § 48.
[256] Dem., _de Falsa Leg._, §§ 2, 257.
[257] ξενία, expressing the mutual relations of host and guest, cannot be
adequately translated into English.
[258] _de Cor._, § 51.
[259] _Ibid._, § 284.
[260] Aesch., _de Leg._, §§ 25-33.
[261] _Ibid._, §§ 75-78.
[262] _Ibid._, § 79.
[263] _Ctes._, §§ 119-121.
[264] Aesch., _de Leg._, § 153.
[265] _E.g._, _de Leg._, § 147. His esteem for his mother is expressed,
_ibid._, § 148.
[266] _de Leg._, § 152.
[267] p. 178.
[268] _Ctes._, § 218.
[269] Cf. the frequent use of δεινός and δεινῶς—δεινὴ ἀπαιδευσία,
ἀναισχυντία; δεινῶς σχετλιάζειν, ἀσχημονεῖν, ἀγνοεῖν, etc., and compounds
such as ὑπεραγανακτῶ, ὑπεραισχύνομαι.
[270] _E.g._ the fine passage about Thebes, _infra_, p. 186.
[271] The speech of Lysias against Eratosthenes, for instance, contains
many complicated sentences which are unnecessarily obscure.
[272] ὁρώντων φρονούντων βλεπόντων ὑμῶν. _Ctes._, § 94.
[273] Cf. his frequent references to his speeches, _supra_, p. 177.
[274] _E.g._ _de Leg._, § 183, τοὺς εἰς τὸν μέλλοντ’ αὐτῷ χρόνον
ἀντεροῦντας. Blass, vol. iii. pt. 2, p. 232, notes that there is more
consistent care on this point in the _de Legatione_ than in the other two
speeches.
[275] _Ctes._, § 99.
[276] _Ibid._, § 78.
[277] _de Leg._, § 81.
[278] Cf. _Ctes._, § 198, ὅστις μὲν οὖν ἐν τῇ τιμήσει τὴν ψῆφον αἰτεῖ,
τὴν ὀργὴν τὴν ὑμετέραν παραιτεῖται, ὅστις δ’ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ λόγῳ τὴν ψῆφον
αἰτεῖ ὅρκον αἰτεῖ, νόμον αἰτεῖ, δημοκρατίαν αἰτεῖ, ὧν οὔτε αἰτῆσαι οὐδὲν
ὅσιον οὔτ’ αἰτηθέντα ἑτέρῳ δοῦναι.
[279] _E.g._ iambics, _Ctes._, § 239, ἃ σωφρονῶν ὁ δῆμος οὐκ ἐδέξατο;
and _de Leg._, § 66, μίαν δὲ νύκτα διαλιπὼν συνηγόρουν, etc.; anapaestic
effect, _ibid._, 223, ἀεὶ τὸ παρὸν λυμαινόμενος, τὸ δὲ μέλλον
κατεπαγγελλόμενος; and a curious combination, _ibid._, 91, ἁπάντων
μετασχὼν τῶν πόνων τῇ πόλει, ⏑––|⏑––|–⏑–|–⏑–.
[280] _Ctes._, § 135.
[281] _de Leg._, §§ 110, 21.
[282] _Ctes._, §§ 192-193.
[283] _Ctes._, §§ 133-136.
[284] _Ctes._, §§ 99-100.
[285] Dem., _de Cor._, §§ 129, 259.
[286] _Ctes._, §§ 172-173.
[287] _de Leg._, §§ 106-107.
[288] _de Leg._, §§ 34-35.
[289] _Ctes._, § 212, οὐ κεφαλὴν ἀλλὰ πρόσοδον κέκτηται. The play upon
words is not easy to reproduce: κεφαλή, of course, suggests κεφάλαιον,
‘principal,’ or ‘capital,’ while πρόσοδος is ‘income’ or ‘revenue.’
[290] _de Falsa Leg._, § 339.
[291] Aesch., _de Leg._, § 1.
[292] _La Litt. Grecque_, iv. 643, with reference particularly to
_Ctes._, § 133 (quoted above, p. 186) and §§ 152 _sqq._
[293] _E.g._ on Demosthenes, quoted _supra_, pp. 187-188.
[294] _de Sublim._, ch. xxiv., οὐ γέλωτα κινεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ καταγελᾶται.
[295] Mommsen (Book v., ch. xii. pp. 609-610, Eng. ed. of 1887) could
write of Cicero: ‘Cicero had no conviction and no passion; he was nothing
but an advocate, and not a good one.’ ... ‘If there is anything wonderful
in the case, it is in truth not the orations but the admiration which
they excited.’
[296] _E.g._, in particular, §§ 171-176, partly quoted _supra_, p. 188.
[297] Quoted _supra_, p. 185.
[298] _Frogs_, 892, αἰθήρ, ἐμὸν βόσκημα, καὶ γλώττης στροφίγξ, καὶ
ξύνεσι, etc.
[299] Aesch. (_Ctes._, § 171) says only ἀφικνεῖται εἰς Βόσπορον, which
is ambiguous, as there were several Βόσποροι. The fact that he calls the
woman Σκυθίς seems to prove that he meant the Crimea.
[300] Pytheas, quoted by Dionysius.
[301] The last private speeches of which the genuineness is undoubted
are dated about 346 and 345 B.C., but others, _e.g._ _Against Phormio_,
of which the authenticity was not questioned in ancient times, go down
to 326 B.C. or even later. The genuineness of the _Phormio_ is at least
probable.
[302] Aesch. (in 345 B.C.) in the _Timarchus_, §§ 117, 170-175, refers to
him as a teacher. In the _Embassy_ (343 B.C.) there is no reference to
this profession.
[303] _Against Callicles._
[304] _Against Conon._
[305] The speeches _Against Zenothemis_, _Lacritus_, _Dionysodorus_, and
_Phormio_.
[306] _E.g._ _Against Boeotus_.
[307] § 61. ‘Pydna and Potidaea, which are subject to Philip and hostile
to you.’ Also § 63.
[308] ἐπιστολιμαίους δυνάμεις, § 19.
[309] § 19, δύναμιν ... ἢ συνεχῶς πολεμήσει....
[310] § 21, χρόνον τακτὸν στρατευομένους, μὴ μακρὸν τοῦτον, ἀλλ’ ὅσον ἂν
δοκῇ καλῶς ἔχειν, ἐκ διαδοχῆς ἀλλήλοις.
[311] § 23, οὐ τοίνυν ὑπέρογκον αυτήν (οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μισθὸς οὐδὲ τροφή),
οὐδὲ παντελῶς ταπεινὴν εἶναι δεῖ.
[312] I have assumed the traditional order of the Olynthiac speeches
to be the correct one. The question is much disputed, and is lucidly
discussed by M. Weil in his introductions to the speeches (_Les Harangues
de Démosthène_).
[313] Isocr., _Philippus_, § 73-74.
[314] _Chers._, §§ 24-26.
[315] § 77.
[316] § 19.
[317] § 20.
[318] §§ 26-27.
[319] The subject is admirably discussed by M. Weil (_Les Harangues de
Démosthène_ (2me éd.), pp. 312-316). His arguments should be carefully
read by those interested in the subject. I quote only his conclusions:
‘Nous avons déjà vu que plusieurs passages, qui manquent dans S et L,
ne pouvaient guère émaner que de Démosthène lui-même’ (p. 314). ‘Le
résultat de cet examen, c’est que nous nous trouvons en présence de deux
textes également autorisés, et que les additions et les modifications
qui distinguent l’un de l’autre doivent être attribuées a l’orateur
lui-même....’ (p. 315). These conclusions are adopted by Blass (_Att.
Bered._, 1893) and Sandys (1900), who, however, considers that the
shorter version was the orator’s first draft. Butcher (_Demosthenes_,
3rd ed., 1911) considers that the shorter text represents ‘the maturer
correction of the orator.’
[320] _de Cor._, §§ 169-170.
[321] Philip seems to have had a genuine admiration for Athens, and
always treated her with extraordinary consideration. For a full
appreciation of this attitude see Hogarth, _Philip and Alexander_.
[322] Plut., _Dem._, ch. xxiii.
[323] See also _infra_, p. 253, _note_ 1, and p. 254.
[324] Hyp., _Against Dem._, fr. 3, col. xiii.
[325] Dinarchus, _Against Dem._, § 1.
[326] Butcher, _Dem._, pp. 124-127.
[327] This account is taken from Plutarch (_Dem._, ch. xxix.).
[328] Lucian, _Dem. Enc._, § 50.
[329] _de Sublimi_, ch. xxxiv.
[330] § 36, οἷον ἐκ μανδραγόρου καθεύδοντας.
[331] Aesch., _Ctes._, §§ 72, 166; _de Leg._, § 21; _Ctes._, §§ 84, 209.
[332] Plut., _Dem._, ch. ix., παράβακχον.
[333] ἐνθουιῶντα. Cf. Aristophanes, _Clouds_, 194:
μὰ γῆν, μὰ παγίδας, μὰ νεφέλας, μὰ δίκτυα.
[334] Notably the caricatures of Aeschines’ private life and family
history in the _de Corona_, §§ 129-130, 260. Mr. Pickard-Cambridge makes
it clear that the habitual members of the law-courts would be of a lower
average socially than the ecclesia. The pay in either case was not enough
to attract any but the unemployed, but whereas members of the leisured
classes would have sufficient motives for attending the ecclesia, and
well-to-do business-men might sacrifice valuable time unselfishly for the
good of the State, there would be little inducement to such people to
endure the wearisome routine of the law-courts (see _Demosthenes_, ch.
iii.).
[335] _E.g._ _Conon_, § 4.
[336] _de Cor._, § 263.
[337] _de Falsa Leg._, § 148.
[338] _Midias_, § 91.
[339] _Ibid._, § 105.
[340] On the other hand he often apologizes for metaphors by ὣσπερ or
οἷον—ἦν τοῦθ’ ὣσπερ ἐμπόδισμά τι τῷ Φιλίππῳ—though ἐμπόδισμα is probably
as natural a form of expression as our ‘obstacle.’
[341] _de Falsa Leg._, § 275.
[342] I _Phil._, § 45; cf. τεθνάναι τῷ φόβῳ Θηβαίους, _de Falsa Leg._, §
81.
[343] _de Cor._, § 296.
[344] _de Cor._, § 169.
[345] _de Cor._, § 208.
[346] _de Thucyd._, ch. 53.
[347] _Against Conon_, §§ 3-5.
[348] _Against Conon_, §§ 8-9.
[349] _de Demos._, ch. xv.
[350] _Demos._, ch. xxii.
[351] _Demos._, chs. liii., liv. So Aeschines, after reading aloud some
extracts from Demosthenes, and observing their effect on his hearers,
exclaimed, ‘But what if you had heard the brute himself?’
[352] _de Chersoneso_, §§ 69-71, gives an example of a sentence of about
twenty-seven lines in the Teubner edition.
[353] _Timocrates_, § 217, οὐδ’ ὁτιοῦν ἂν ὄφελοσ εἴη is a case in
point—(⏑⏑⏑⏑––); in this instance no other arrangement of the words was
possible; οὐδ’ ὁτιοῦν ἂν εἴη ὄφελος would give a harsh hiatus. Cf. also
_First Olynthiac_, § 27, ἡλίκα γ’ ἐστὶ τὰ διάφορ’ ἐνθάδ’ ἢ ’κεῖ πολεμεῖν,
where five shorts appear in sequence.
[354] _E.g._ _de Falsa Leg._, § 11, διεξιὼν ἡλίκα τὴν Ἕλλαδα πᾶσαν, οὐχὶ
τὰς ἰδίας ἀδικοῦσι μόνον πατρίδας οἱ δωροδοκοῦντες. The position of
ἀδικοῦσι is peculiar, but the sentence already contains a preponderance
of short syllables, and any other arrangement would give more of them
together: _e.g._ the more natural orders τὰς ἰδίας μόνον πατρίδας
ἀδικοῦσι (⏒⏑⏑⏑⏑–⏑) or ἰδίας μόνον ἀδικοῦσι πατρίδας (⏑⏑–⏑⏑⏑⏑–⏑⏒⏑⏑).
[355] Arist., _Rhet._, iii. 8. 4.
[356] Super alta vectus Attis celeri rate maria, etc. The ending with
five short syllables gives an impression of headlong speed.
[357] Cf. the ‘spondaic’ hymn, Ζεῦ πάντων ἀρχά, πάντων ἅγητορ, Ζεῦ σοὶ
σπένδω ταύταν ὕμνων ἀρχάν.
[358] Croiset, _Hist. de la Litt. Gr._, tome iv., pp. 552-553.
[359] See _ad hoc_, Croiset, iv. 553. 1.
[360] _de Symmor._, §§ 24-26.
[361] _Third Olynthiac_, §§ 10-11.
[362] Quoted above, p. 230.
[363] _Supra_, p. 245.
[364] _First Olynthiac_, §§ 25-26.
[365] _Chersonese_, §§ 61-67. The recital of the present condition of
Phocis is a simple but impressive piece of argument by description: ‘It
was a terrible sight, Gentlemen, and a sad one; when we were lately on
our way to Delphi we were compelled to see it all, houses in ruins, walls
demolished, the country empty of men of military age; only a few poor
women and little children and old men in pitiable state—words cannot
describe the depth of the misery in which they are now sunk’ (_de Falsa
Leg._, § 65).
[366] Cf. _Third Olynthiac_, §§ 24-26.
[367] Viz., on every meeting of the ecclesia at which legislation was
possible.
[368] _Timocrates_, §§ 139 _sqq._
[369] In particular _de Corona_, §§ 129-130, 258-262. Cf. _supra_, p. 164.
[370] _de Corona_, §§ 261-262.
[371] _Vide supra_, pp. 170, 177.
[372] οὐ γάρ πως ἅμα πάντα θεοὶ δόσαν ἀνθρώποισι.
[373] _de Sublimi_, ch. xxxiv.
[374] _de Falsa Leg._, §§ 112-113, with Weil’s note.
[375] § 90.
[376] §§ 9, 196. Weil remarks truly, ‘Les orateurs ne se piquent pas
d’être exacts: ils usent largement de l’hyperbole mensongère.’
[377] Mr. Pickard-Cambridge (_Demos._, p. 80) observes: ‘Men who are
assembled in a crowd do not think.... The orator has often to use
arguments which no logic can defend, and to employ methods of persuasion
upon a crowd which he would be ashamed to use if he were dealing with
a personal friend.’ This is partly true, but should be accepted with
reservations. The arguments in the harangues of Demosthenes will
generally bear the light, and the public speeches by distinguished
statesmen of this country on the causes of the Great War have frequently
appealed to the _higher_ nature of their audiences.
[378] There is a pseudo-epilogue, §§ 126-159, devoted chiefly to the
birth and life of Aeschines. Here the speech might have ended, but
the orator reverts in § 160 to an examination and defence of his own
political life. The real epilogue is contained in §§ 252-324. The
disorder is undoubtedly due in part to the peculiar facts of the case,
namely, that the issues of the trial were much wider than might have
appeared. Demosthenes is not so much concerned to prove the legality of
Ctesiphon’s decree as to offer an _apologia_ of his own political conduct
during many years.
[379] Quoted _supra_, p. 216.
[380] A plausible answer. In Greece at the present day water-courses are
used as roads, and the same is true of the south of Spain. At Malaga, a
few years ago, the tram-line actually crossed the river-bed.
[381] _Vide supra_, p. 237.
[382] § 136.
[383] § 167.
[384] §§ 210 _sqq._ ‘A State’s character is reflected in its laws’
(νόμους ... ὑπείληφασι ... τρόπους τῆς πόλεως.).
[385] _Vide supra_, p. 190.
[386] _Ctes._, § 52.
[387] _Vide supra_, pp. 168, 194, 223.
[388] Cf. _supra_, p. 223.
[389] We know from Dinarchus, _Aristogiton_, § 13, that this trial
shortly preceded the affair of Harpalus.
[390] _de Cor._, § 313, τραγικὸς Θεοκρίνης.
[391] _Vide supra_, pp. 244-245.
[392] This Hegesippus, an orator of secondary importance, was an
ardent supporter of the patriotic party. In 357 B.C. he had brought an
accusation against one Callippus in connexion with the affairs of Cardia
(_de Halon._, § 43, and the hypothesis to the speech). In 343 B.C. he
was one of an embassy sent to Philip (Demos., _de Falsa Leg._, § 331).
He was still alive in 325 B.C. (Croiset, vol. iv. p. 621). The extant
speech consists of a clear and straightforward discussion of the various
points in Philip’s proposal; the style is easy, but without distinction,
and Dionysius, who did not doubt that it was the work of Demosthenes,
remarks that the orator has reverted to the style of Lysias (_de Demos._,
ch. ix.). Hiatus is frequent and there are some monotonous repetitions.
Critics were somewhat shocked by the concluding phrase of § 45—‘If you
carry your brains in your heads, and not in your heels so as to walk on
them.’ Aeschines calls the orator κρώβυλος, from his affected way of
wearing his hair in a ‘bun’ on the top of his head.
[393] Dinarchus, _Demos._, § 104, ὁμολογῶν λαμβάνειν καὶ λήψεσθαι.
[394] Plut., _Moralia_, 820 F, κατεχώνευσαν εἰς ἀμίδας.
[395] Demetrius, _de Elocutione_, §§ 282, 284.
[396] _Ibid._, § 286.
[397] For this and other judgments, see Plut., _Demos._, chs. viii.-x.
[398] _Ibid._, ch. viii.
[399] Dionysius, _Isaeus_, ch. iv.
[400] Hypothesis to Demos., _Against Aristogiton_.
[401] In some MSS. of Demosthenes (_Phil._, iii., § 72) his name occurs
as a member of an embassy which made a tour of the Peloponnese in 343
B.C. to rouse opposition against Philip.
[402] See (Aristotle) Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία, ch. 43, with Sandys’ notes. He
must have been either ταμίας τῶν στρατιωτικῶν or president of οἱ ἐπὶ τὸ
θεωρικόν, or perhaps he held both these appointments, as the scope of his
work seems to imply. Ps.-Plutarch says πίστευσάμενος τὴν διοίκησιν τῶν
χρημάτων.
[403] Ptolemy Philadelphus borrowed it in order to have it copied. He
deposited a large sum as security, but in the end he sacrificed the
deposit, kept the original, and presented Athens with his new copy.
[404] He wore the same clothes in summer and winter, and shoes only in
very severe weather (_Ps.-Plut._).
[405] See his condemnation of the advocates of Leocrates, § 135.
[406] οὐ μέλανί ἀλλὰ θανάτῳ χρίοντα τὸν κάλαμον κατὰ τῶν πονηρῶν
(_Ps.-Plut._).
[407] Suidas.
[408] Assuming (with Blass) the authenticity of the third letter of
Demosthenes, which is doubtful.
[409] This list is taken from Suidas. The list compiled by Blass, from
various sources, is different in some details.
[410] §§ 149-150.
[411] _E.g._ cf. § 3, ἐβουλόμην δ’ ἄν, ὥσπερ ὀυφέλιμόν ἐστι, etc., with
Isocr. viii. (_de Pace_), § 36, ἠβουλόμην δ’ ἄν, ὥσπερ προσῆκόν ἐστιν,
etc. also § 7 with Isocr. vii. (_Areopagiticus_), § 43, etc.
[412] Cf. _supra_, p. 134.
[413] This circumlocution may have been employed originally for the
avoidance of hiatus, as in the example quoted, and in § 111, τὰ καλὰ τῶν
ἔργων; it is, however, also used in cases where no such consideration
enters, _e.g._ § 48, τοὺς ποιητοὺς τῶν πατέρων.
[414] _E.g._ § 7, οὐ μικρόν τι μέρος συνέχει τῶν τῆς πόλεως, οὐδ’ ἐπ’
ὀλιγὸν χρόνον, where συνέχει | οὐδ’ is deliberately avoided.
[415] _E.g._ §§ 71-73.
[416] _E.g._ § 143, καὶ αὐτίκα μάλ’ ὑμᾶς ἀξιώσει ἀκούειν αὐτοῦ
ἀπολογουμένου. § 20, πολλοὶ ἐπείσθησαν τῶν μαρτύρων ἢ ἀμνημονεῖν ἢ μὴ
ἐλθεῖν ἢ ἑτέραν πρόφασιν εὑρεῖν.
[417] See the translation on p. 278.
[418] φυγόντα, καὶ ... ἀκούσαντα ..., ἀφικόμενον καὶ ... καταφυγόντα, καὶ
οὐδὲν ἣττον ... ἀποθανόντα.
[419] §§ 49-50.
[420] § 51.
[421] § 104.
[422] § 95.
[423] §§ 3, 10; cf. also § 79.
[424] § 150, cf. also § 43. ‘He contributed nothing to the nation’s
safety, at a time when the country was contributing her trees, the dead
their sepulchres, and the temples their arms.’ And § 17, οὔτε τοὺς
λιμένας τῆς πόλεως ἐλεῶν; § 61, πόλεώς ἐστι θάνατος ἀνάστατον γενέσθαι.
Hyperides has a similarly bold expression, ‘Condemning the city to death.’
[425] § 11.
[426] § 149.
[427] § 5.
[428] Leocrates was acquitted by one vote only.
[429] § 12. ‘It is so far superior to other courts that even those who
are convicted before it do not question its justice. You should take it
as your model.’
[430] §§ 11-12.
[431] §§ 1-2.
[432] §§ 92-94.
[433] _Against Lysicles_, fr. 75.
[434] He could not afford to be particular as to the kind of cases which
he took up; the affair of Athenogenes is far from respectable on either
side, and several of his speeches were in connexion with _hetairai_
of the less reputable sort. His defence of the famous Phryne was his
masterpiece.
[435] He mentions these three among the most famous cases in which he has
been concerned (_For Euxenippus_, § 28).
[436] Demos., _de Cor._, §§ 134-135.
[437] Fr. 28.
[438] _Vide infra_, p. 295.
[439] The agreement of Blass and Kenyon on this point may be taken as
conclusive. Small fragments of another speech _For Lycophron_ have been
recently published (_Pap. Oxyrh._, vol. xiii.).
[440] ἀρχαίων κρίσις, v. 6.
[441] ὀβολοστατεῖν was used by Lysias also (fr. 41).
[442] Demetrius, περὶ ἑρμηνείας, § 302.
[443] _Leoc._, § 40.
[444] Fr. 80.
[445] _Epitaphios_, § 5.
[446] Cf. _de Demos._, col. xi, ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ἑπτακόσια φήσας εἶναι τάλαντα,
νῦν τὰ ἡμίση ἀναφέρεις, καὶ οὐδ’ ἐλογίσω ὅτι τοῦ πάντα ἀνενεχθῆναι
ὀρθῶς, κ.τ.λ. _Ibid._, col. xiii., καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι φίλοι αὐτοῦ ἔλεγον ὅτι
ἀναγκάσουσι, κ.τ.λ. _Euxenippus_, § 19, etc.
[447] §§ 1-3, although a full stop occurs in the second line of § 3, are
all really one sentence, but in spite of its length it is perfectly lucid.
[448] A good example of a story told by a succession of short sentences
joined by καὶ is to be found in _Athenogenes_, § 5.
[449] Frr. 27-28.
[450] _Euxenippus_, §§ 5, 6.
[451] Fr. 173.
[452] _Euxenippus_, §§ 1-3.
[453] _Against Demos._, fr. v., col. xv. 15. The tide in the Euripus,
which ebbed and flowed nine times a day, was, of course, proverbial.
[454] _Euxenippus_, col. xxxiv., § 22.
[455] _Against Demos._, col. xii.
[456] Fr. 76.
[457] _Athenogenes_, col. 2, ἄνθρωπον λογόγραφόν τε καὶ ἀγοραῖον.
[458] Lycurgus, _Leocr._, § 11; cf. § 149.
[459] Col. xxxix., the last two fragments of the speech in Blass’ edition.
[460] _Demos._, v., §§ 20-21.
[461] _de Dinarcho_, ch. 6.
[462] περὶ ὕψους, ch. 34.
[463] _Ps.-Plut._, § 15.
[464] _Supra_, pp. 18, 294-296.
[465] _Supra_, p. 225-227.
[466] _Supra_, p. 296.
[467] Date 336-5 B.C.
[468] 322 B.C.
[469] _Epitaphios_, § 10.
[470] _Epitaphios_, §§ 41-43.
[471] Date between 328 and 323 B.C.
[472] Dion. (_de Dinarcho_, ch. iv., _ad fin._) believed that he wrote
no speeches during this time, for nobody would take the trouble to go to
Chalcis for a speech either in a private or public action—οὐ γὰρ τέλεον
ἠπόρουν οὕτω λόγων. Dionysius consequently rejected as spurious all
speeches attributed to Dinarchus which were dated between 307 and 292 B.C.
[473] Suidas says that he was appointed Commissioner of the Peloponnese
(ἐπιμελητὴς Πελοποννήσου) by Antipater, but this was another Dinarchus.
Demetrius Magnes, quoted by Dionysius (_Din._, ch. 1), mentions four men
of this name.
[474] In Dionysius, _de Din._, ch. 1.
[475] The curious may collect the titles from Dionysius (_de Din._ chs.
x.-xiii.).
[476] Dion., _Din._, ch. 2.
[477] _Demos._, § 58.
[478] _Ibid._, § 35.
[479] _Ibid._, § 83.
[480] _Demos._, §§ 48-63.
[481] _Phil._, § 19.
[482] In such extravagances as ἡ τῶν ἐκ προνοίας φόνων ἀξιόπιστος οὖσα
βουλὴ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τἀληθὲς εὑρεῖν (_Demos._, § 6). Cf. also §§ 12, 23,
59, 110, and elsewhere.
[483] _Demos._, § 28; cf. §§ 10, 27, 46, 76, etc.
[484] _Demos._, §§ 18-21 (thirty-six lines without a real stop);
_Philocles_, §§ 1-3 (twenty-three lines).
[485] θηρίον, μιαρός, μιαρὸν θήριον, κάθαρμα, γόης, κατάρατος, κλέπτης,
προδότης, ἐπιωρκηκώς, δωρόδοκος, μισθωτός, καταπτυστός are culled without
any special diligence from his elegant repertory.
[486] _Aristog._, §§ 1, 2, 9-10.
[487] _Demos._, § 24, description of Thebes, from Aeschines. See Weil,
_les Harangues de Démosthène_, p. 338, note on _Philippic_, iii., § 41,
and Din., _Aristog._, § 24, which is borrowed from it: ‘Il est à son
modèle ce que la bière est au vin.’ (This barley-beer was a barbarian
drink.)
[488] _E.g._ the passage about Conon’s son, _Demos._, § 14, used again in
_Phil._, § 17.
[489] Dion., _de Din_., ch. viii.; Hermogenes, περὶ ἰδεῶν, B, p. 384, iv.
[490] The general decline of taste reacted on literary style, cf. _infra_
pp. 309-10.
[491] Arist., _Eth. Nic._, x. 5. 4, οἱ τραγηματίζοντες. Demos., _de
Cor._, cf. _supra_, p. 249.
[492] _E.g._ many of the private speeches of Demosthenes refer to
maritime speculations; many of these cases, under Macedon, would be
settled in local courts instead of being brought to Athens, and the
diminution of Athenian commerce would still further reduce their number.
[493] Arist., _Rhet._, 1. i., _ad init._
[494] Diog. Laert., v. 75.
[495] _Ibid._, v. 80-81.
[496] Cicero, _Brutus_, § 37; _Orator_, § 92; _de Oratore_, ii. § 95;
Quint., x. 1, 80; Diog. L., v. 82.
[497] Cicero, _Brutus_, § 286.
[498] He was over-fond of the _ditrochaeus_ (–⏑–⏑) at the end of the
sentence, _vide_ Cicero, _Brutus_, § 286; _Orator_, §§ 226, 230; Dion.,
_de Comp. Verb._, ch. xviii.
INDEX
Achilles, 2.
Administration, speech of Lycurgus on his, 274.
Aegina, 8.
_Aegineticus, the_, of Isocrates, 158.
Aeschines, =163-198=; 35, 70, 71, 200, 201, 203, 220, 224, 229, 231,
247, 249, 255, 263, 265, 267, 307.
Aeschines the Socratic, 90, 112.
Aeschylus, 23.
Agamemnon, 157.
Agathon, 15, 21.
Agesilaus, 145, 147.
Agoratus, speech of Lysias against, 99.
Alcibiades, 7, 10, 54, 158;
speech of Lysias against, 100.
Alcidamas, =160-162=.
Alexander the Great, 4, 130, 158, 176-7, 221-2, 225, 228, 268, 271.
Alexandria, 308, 309.
_Allegory_, 2.
Amphictyonic Council, the, 169, 220, 251, 286.
Amphissa, 169, 220.
Anaxagoras, 6, 34, 308.
Andocides, =53-73=; 81, 88, 192.
Andocides, speech of Lysias against, 101.
Androtion, speech of Demosthenes against, 205, 254, 261.
Antalcidas, 152.
Antidosis, speech of Isocrates on the, 14, 127, 137 _sqq._
Antioch, 308.
Antipater, 158, 228, 229, 269, 270, 287, 310.
Antiphon, =19-49=; 3, 7, 12, 16, 17, 51, 59, 66, 105, 112, 199, 200,
280.
Antiphon the poet, 14.
Antiphon the Sophist, 49.
_Antithesis_, 16, 17, 27, 52, 58, 60, 66, 70, 93, 115, 133, 183, 240,
278, 280.
Apaturius, speech of Demosthenes against, 260.
Aphobus, speech of Demosthenes against, 103, 256.
Apollodorus, speech of Isaeus on the estate of, 104, 115, 123.
_Archaism_, 16.
Archebiades, speech of Lysias against, 102.
Archeptolemus, 20, 93.
Archidamus, 145, 158.
_Archidamus, the_, of Isocrates, 155, 160.
_Areopagiticus, the_, of Isocrates, 131, 154-5, 157.
Areopagus, the, 47, 155, 225, 282, 304.
Argos, 147, 213.
Aristarchus, speech of Isaeus on the estate of, 104, 124.
Aristides, 154.
Aristocrates, speech of Demosthenes against, 205, 254, 262.
Aristogiton, speech of Demosthenes against, 234, 265;
of Lycurgus, 273;
of Dinarchus, 303, 306.
Aristophanes, 53, 136, 198, 232, 249.
Aristophanes, speech of Lysias on the property of, 97.
Aristophon of Azenia, 286.
Aristotle, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 21, 25, 32, 50, 133, 161, 162, 272.
Artaxerxes, 92.
Artemisia, 128, 266.
Asia, 130.
Aspasia, 102.
Astyphilus, speech of Isaeus on the estate of, 124.
Athenaeus, 50.
Athenogenes, speech of Hyperides against, 288, 295, 300-1.
Athens, 4, 5, 10, 126, 141, 145, 147, 150-2, 154, 219, 267, 308-11.
_‘Austere’ style, the_, 27.
Autolycus, speech of Lycurgus against, 273.
Balance of Clauses (see also _Period_), 30.
Blass, F., 17, 44, 83, 132, 174, 176, 192, 193, 218, 243-4, 273, 276.
Boeotia, 9.
Boeotus, speech of Demosthenes against, 258-9.
Bosporus, 201.
Bribery, 167.
_Busiris, the_, of Isocrates, 134, 156.
Butcher, Prof. S. H., 218, 227.
Byzantium, 216, 219.
Caecilius of Calacte, 44.
Callias, speech of Lysias for, 99.
Callicles, speech of Demosthenes against, 204, 257.
Callimachus, speech of Isocrates against, 158.
Callippus, speech of Demosthenes against, 258.
Cassander, 302, 310.
Cephisodorus, 162.
Cersobleptes, 183.
Chaeronea, 126, 129, 148, 149, 221, 274-5, 278.
Charidemus, 262.
Charisius, 313.
Chersonese, the, 214, 240, 247, 266;
speech of Demosthenes on the, 215-16, 256.
Choreutes, speech of Antiphon on the, 33, 37, 44, 48.
Cicero, 5, 11, 14, 174, 193, 230, 312.
Cinesias, speech of Lysias against, 102.
_Circumlocution_, 24.
Ciron, speech of Isaeus on the estate of, 108-112, 115, 123, 125.
Cirrha, 169.
Cleonymus, speech of Isaeus on the estate of, 123.
Colloquialisms, 23, 31, 78, 113, 232, 234, 289-90.
Companions, speech of Lysias to his, 102.
Conon, speech of Demosthenes against, 204, 237-8, 257.
Corax, 12, 13.
Corinthian War, the, 94.
Corn-dealers, speech of Lysias against the, 96-7.
Cripple, speech of Lysias for the, 83, 86-7, 89, 95, 98.
Critias, 10.
Croiset, M., 192, 243, 244, 266, 299.
Crown, speech of Demosthenes on the, 165, 170, 220, 222-4, 248, 254,
263-5, 311.
Ctesiphon, 166, 179, 183, 185, 187-9, 191, 196-8, 221, 222-4, 253.
Cunaxa, 147.
Cyrus, 147.
Damon, 6.
_Death, the praise of_, by Alcidamas, 160.
Deceleia, 20.
_Declamations_, 44.
Demades, =269-270=; 200, 222, 228-9;
speech of Lycurgus against, 273, 274, 286, 294.
Demetrius Magnes, 303.
Demetrius of Phalerum, 232, 290, 310, 312-13.
Demetrius Poliorcetes, 310, 313.
Demochares, 313.
Democracy, speech of Lysias on a charge of subversion of the, 98.
Demonicus, letter of Isocrates to, 155-6.
Demosthenes, =199-267=; 2, 3, 16, 29, 32, 35, 68, 78, 80, 81, 103,
104, 130, 133, 144, 154, 163-198 _passim_, 270, 271, 278, 286,
287, 289, 294, 296, 303, 304, 306.
Dicaeogenes, speech of Isaeus on the estate of, 104, 107, 124.
Dinarchus, =302-307=; 200, 226, 236, 311.
Dioclides, 56, 63.
Diogenes Laertius, 312.
Diogiton, speech of Lysias against, 100.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 23, 50, 57, 70, 74, 81, 90, 94, 103, 104,
114, 116, 118, 120, 122, 131, 161, 162, 236, 238-40, 250, 270,
288, 289, 302, 303, 313.
Dionysius I. of Syracuse, 91, 92, 130, 145, 158.
Dionysodorus, speech of Demosthenes against, 204, 261.
Diopeithes, 214-15, 246, 286.
Education, Isocrates’ views on, 127, 128, 135-44, 172, 187.
Eleusis, mysteries of, 53-5.
Embassy, speech of Aeschines on the, 166, 167, 179, 182, 191, 194-6;
speech of Demosthenes on the, 166, 168, 170, 251, 253, 263-4.
_Encomia_, 15, 16, 156-7.
Epicrates, speech of Lysias against, 96.
_Epideictic style_, 15-16, 93, 135, 200, 234, 243, 276-7, 292.
_Epitaphios, the_, of Demosthenes, 267;
of Gorgias, 15, 17;
of Hyperides, 292, 299;
of Lycurgus, 288;
of Lysias, 5, 17, 89, 92-3.
Eraton, speech of Lysias on the property of, 100-1.
Eratosthenes, speech of Lysias against, 77, 79, 98.
Eratosthenes, speech of Lysias on the murder of, 87, 95, 99.
Eratosthenes (criticism of Demosthenes), 232.
Ergocles, speech of Lysias against, 95, 96.
_Eroticus, the_, of Demosthenes, 267;
of Lysias, 101-2.
_Ethos_, 37, 67, 84-8, 114, 122, 295.
Eubulides, speech of Demosthenes against, 258.
Eubulus, 196, 211, 263.
Euclides of Megara, 138.
Eucrates, 95.
Euergus and Mnesibulus, speech of Demosthenes against, 259.
Eumathes, speech of Isaeus for, 118-19, 125.
Euphiletus, speech of Isaeus for, 120, 124.
Euphony, 132.
Eupolis, 7.
Euripides, 198.
Eurybiadas, 5.
Euthynus, speech of Isocrates against, 158.
Euxenippus, speech against, of Hyperides, 288, 293-5;
of Lycurgus, 273.
_Evagoras, the_, of Isocrates, 135, 157.
Evandrus, speech of Lysias against, 97, 98.
_Falsa Legatione, de_, see _Embassy_.
_Figures of thought_ (see also _Rhetorical devices_), 31, 58, 89, 183,
294.
_‘Florid’ style, the_, 131.
Four Hundred, the, 19-20, 57.
Gelon, 9.
_Glottai_ (rare words), 15, 51.
Gorgias, =12-18=; 19, 21, 22, 30, 51, 52, 91, 93, 127, 135, 160, 240,
243, 278, 308.
Hagnias, speech of Isaeus on the estate of, 107, 124.
Halonnesus, speech of Demosthenes on, 266.
Harpalus, 225-7, 287, 302.
Harpocration, 102.
Hegesias, 313.
Hegesippus, 266.
_Helenae encomium_ of Gorgias, 51, 157;
of Isocrates, 134, 138, 156-7.
Hellenism, 4, 130, 290.
Hermae, the, 34, 53-4.
Hermogenes, 13, 58, 289.
Herodes, speech of Antiphon on the murder of, 27, 33-4, 36, 37-43,
44, 46, 60.
Herodes Atticus, 58.
Herodotus, 4, 5, 9, 21, 26, 27, 135.
Hesiod, 173, 184, 186.
_Hiatus_, 29, 30, 131-2, 183, 241, 267, 277, 304.
Hippias, 11.
Hippocrates, speech of Lysias against the sons of, 102.
Hogarth, D. G., 221.
Homer, 1, 2, 10, 65, 105, 137, 152, 230, 279.
Hyperbolus, 72-3.
Hyperides, =285-301=; 167, 192, 200, 213, 214, 226-8, 230, 273, 304.
Inheritance, 105-7.
Ionian philosophers, 9, 142.
Isaeus, =102-125=; 81, 171, 192, 202, 244, 270, 303.
Ischyrias, speech of Lysias against, 274.
Isocrates, =125-159=; 4, 14, 16, 51, 81, 91, 100, 104, 112, 113, 114,
160, 162, 177, 199, 200, 204, 212, 231, 234, 238-9, 241, 276,
279, 285, 303.
Jason, letter of Isocrates to the children of, 127, 158.
Jebb, Sir R. C., 34, 101, 102, 128.
Lacedaemon, 92, 145, 147, 150-2, 154, 215.
Lacritus, speech of Demosthenes against, 204, 260.
Lamian War, the, 228, 287, 299.
Leochares, speech of Demosthenes against, 260.
Leocrates, speech of Lycurgus against, 273, 274-6, 280, 283-5.
Leodamas, 229.
Leosthenes, 287, 299-300.
Leptines, speech of Demosthenes against, 206-7, 253-4, 261.
Libanius, 271.
Lochites, speech of Isocrates against, 158.
Locrians, the, 248.
Logographi, 34, 84, 92, 200, 202, 286, 295, 302.
Longinus, 192.
Lucian, 229, 230, 246.
Lycophron, 162;
speech of Hyperides for, 298;
of Lycurgus against, 273, 288, 298.
Lycurgus, 271-285.
Lysander, 126.
Lysias, =73-102=; 2, 51, 61, 112, 113, 114, 117, 120, 133, 135, 192,
236, 253, 289, 303, 308, 313.
Lysicles, speech of Lycurgus against, 274, 285.
Macartatus, speech of Demosthenes against, 260.
Macedonia, 128, 129, 311.
πρὸς τὰς Μαντείας, speech of Lycurgus, 274.
Mantitheus, speech of Lysias for, 83-5, 98.
Mausolus, 128.
Megalopolis, 165, 168;
speech of Demosthenes for the people of, 206, 255, 266.
Menecles, speech of Isaeus on the estate of, 124.
Menesaechmus, speech of Lycurgus against, 274.
_Menexenus, the_, of Plato, 94, 102.
_Messenian Oration, the_, of Alcidamas, 160-1.
_Metaphor_, 31, 184, 234-5, 290-1, 304.
Midias, 190, 220;
speech of Demosthenes against, 253, 262-3.
Mitylene, letter of Isocrates to the rulers of, 158.
Mnesiphilus, 5.
Mommsen, 193.
Mysteries, speech of Andocides on the, 55, 57, 62-5, 69, 71.
_Nais, the Praise of_, by Alcidamas, 160.
Nausimachus, speech of Demosthenes against, 258.
Neaera, speech of Demosthenes against, 265.
Nestor, 1.
Nicias, speech of Lysias on the property of the brother of, 97.
_Nicocles, or The Cyprians_, by Isocrates, 140, 156.
Nicomachus, speech of Lysias against, 90, 96.
Nicostratus, speech of Isaeus on the estate of, 116, 123.
Nicostratus, speech of Demosthenes against, 259.
Odysseus, 2, 6.
_Odyssey, the_, 161.
Olympia, 91, 144, 311.
_Olympiacus, the_, of Gorgias, 15;
of Lysias, 77, 91.
Olympiodorus, speech of Demosthenes against, 260.
_Olynthiacs, the_, of Demosthenes, 206, 210, 223, 233, 245, 246, 255.
Olynthus, 210-211, 217, 245, 286, 295.
Onetor, speech of Demosthenes against, 256.
Orphism, 164.
Palamedes, the defence of, by Gorgias, 16, 51.
_Panathenaicus, the_, of Isocrates, 126, 127, 129, 157.
Pancleon, speech of Lysias against, 101.
_Panegyricus, the_, of Isocrates, 91, 134, 140, 144, 146, 149-52,
276, 279.
Pantaenetus, speech of Demosthenes against, 258.
Papyri, 4, 113, 288.
_Paradox_, 244-5.
_Paraleipsis_, 32, 174.
_Parallelism_, 17, 29.
_Parenthesis_, 69.
Parmenides, 9, 142.
Pasion, 158.
_Pathos_, 88, 123, 178.
Pausanias, 227.
_Peace, on the_, speech of Andocides, 57, 70;
of Demosthenes, 212, 256;
of Isocrates, 140, 153-4.
Peloponnesian War, the, 126-7, 135, 201.
Pergamus, 308.
Pericles, 6, 7, 10, 34, 74, 93, 141, 154, 268, 309.
_Period_, 16, 24-6, 82-4, 114, 133.
Persia, 4, 92-3, 144, 147, 150-2, 221.
_Personalities_, 35, 67-9, 122, 164, 170-1, 187-91, 233, 248, 305.
_Personification_, 198, 234, 280-1.
Persuasion, the goddess, 142.
_Phaedrus, the_, of Plato, 7, 50, 127.
Phaenippus, speech of Demosthenes against, 260.
Phanos, speech of Demosthenes for, 256.
Pherenicus, speech of Lysias for, 102.
Philip of Macedon, 81, 126, 129, 130, 145-9, 158, 165, 167-9, 176-7,
189, 206-221, 251, 269, 286, 294-5.
Philip’s letter, Demosthenes’ answer to, 267.
_Philippics, the_, of Demosthenes, 207-10, 213, 216-18, 255-6, 266.
Philippides, speech of Hyperides against, 288, 299.
_Philippus, the_, of Isocrates, 126, 129, 146-9, 215, 279.
Philocles, speech of Dinarchus against, 303-5.
Philocrates, speech of Hyperides against, 214, 286;
speech of Lysias against, 96.
Philocrates, the peace of, 146, 168, 212.
Philoctemon, speech of Isaeus on the estate of, 124.
Philon, speech of Lysias against, 98.
Philostratus, 14.
Phocion, =268-269=; 196, 200, 225, 229, 278, 287, 311.
Phocis, 169, 212, 217, 220.
Phœnix, 2.
Phormio, speech of Demosthenes for, 257;
do. against, 204, 260.
Phryne, Hyperides’ defence of, 286, 289, 293.
Phrynichus, 20.
Pickard-Cambridge, A. W., 233, 251.
Piraeus, 8, 150, 225, 272.
Pisander, 19.
Piso, 76-7.
_Plataicus, the_, of Isocrates, 152-3.
Plato, 3, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 20, 50, 51, 74-5, 101-2, 104, 127, 136,
204, 231, 238-9, 285, 309.
Plato _comicus_, 4.
Plutarch, 5, 6, 166, 201, 203, 226, 229, 232, 268.
— Pseudo-, 44, 57, 59, 74-5, 90, 123, 127, 143, 272-3, 285, 298.
_Poetical quotations_, 184, 187, 232, 275, 279, 281.
_Poetical words_, 16, 17, 23, 51-2, 179.
Poisoning, speech of Antiphon on a charge of, 29, 44, 48.
Polemarchus, 99.
Polycles, speech of Demosthenes against, 259.
Polycrates, 162.
Polysperchon, 310.
Polystratus, speech of Lysias for, 95.
Priestess and Priesthood, speeches of Lycurgus on the, 274.
_Probability, argument from_, 36.
Prodicus, 10, 20.
_Prooemia_, of Demosthenes, 267;
of Lysias, 82.
_Prose-style_ (see also _Period_, _Style_, etc.), 3, 14, 16, 21, 130,
201, 238-240.
Protagoras, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 22, 127, 136, 308.
Ptolemy Philadelphus, 272.
Pyrrhus, speech of Isaeus on the estate of, 124.
Pytheas, 202, 270.
_Pythian speech, the_, of Gorgias, 15.
Pythian Games, the, 212.
Pythoclides, 6.
Questions, rhetorical, 58, 71, 115-16, 293, 304.
Quintilian, 58, 230, 312.
_de Reditu_, speech of Andocides, 54-55, 70.
_Rhetoric and rhetoricians_, 3, 9, 12, 32, 50, 59, 129-30, 133, 138,
161, 162, 181, 199, 312.
_Rhetorical devices_, 33, 64, 69, 93, 183, 244-52, 304.
Rhodians, speech of Demosthenes on the freedom of the, 255, 266.
_Rhyme_, 18, 30-31.
_Rhythm_, 16, 27-30, 52, 132-3, 184, 241-4.
Rome, 314.
Sacred Olive, speech of Lysias on the, 99-100.
Sacred War, the, 166, 169.
_Sacrilege_, 53.
Salamis, 5.
Samos, 8.
Samothrace, 19.
Sandys, Sir J. E., 218.
Sextus Empiricus, 13, 14.
Sicilian expedition, the, 53, 126.
Sicily, 3, 9.
_Simile_, 9, 290-1.
Simon, speech of Lysias against, 99.
_Smooth style, the_, 131.
Social War, the, 153.
Socrates, 127, 136-8, 300.
_Socrates, the Accusation of_, by Polycrates, 162.
Socratics, 138.
Soldier, speech of Lysias for the, 97.
Solon, 141, 173.
Sophists, the, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 22, 135-44, 157, 160.
Sophists, speech of Alcidamas on the, 160.
Sophists, speech of Isocrates against the, 127, 128, 136-144.
Spudias, speech of Demosthenes against, 256.
Stephanus, speech of Demosthenes against, 257, 259.
_Structure_ of sentences, 30, 82, 133-4, 181-2, 292-3;
of speeches, 35, 52, 81, 114, 117, 120-2, 191, 252-5.
_Style_, types and characteristics of, 15-16, 21-7, 51, 58, 61, 78,
82, 113, 117, 119, 179-81, 185, 234, 238, 276, 292-3, 303-4.
_Sublime, treatise on the_, 229, 297.
περὶ συντάξεως, speech of Demosthenes, 267.
Symmories, speech of Demosthenes on the, 206, 244-5, 255, 265.
Syracuse, 11.
Tarsus, 308.
_Tetralogies, the_, of Antiphon, 19-43, 44-9, 60.
Thebes, 126, 141, 145, 147, 152, 186, 215, 221, 227, 271.
Themistocles, 5, 6, 141, 154, 198.
Theocrines, speech of Demosthenes against, 265.
Theodorus of Byzantium, 50, 52-3.
Theomnestus, speech of Lysias against, 100.
Theophrastus, 269, 302, 313.
_Theoric Fund, the_, 211, 218, 219, 245-6.
Theramenes, 20, 127.
Thermopylae, 220.
Thessaly, 14, 217, 220.
Thirty, The, 76, 98, 127, 164, 174, 199, 271.
Thrasymachus, =50-52=; 132, 308.
Thucydides, 3, 5, 7, 8, 16, 18-20, 27-9, 51, 52, 55, 105, 114, 199,
203.
Thurii, 74-5.
Timarchus, speech of Aeschines against, 164-6, 168, 170, 173, 176,
193-4.
Timocrates, speech of Demosthenes against, 205, 248, 251, 254, 261.
Timotheus, son of Conon, 128.
Timotheus, letter of Isocrates to, 158.
Tisias, 12-14, 50, 75.
Tisis, speech of Lysias against, 102.
_Torture of slaves_, 47, 110-11, 112.
_Trapeziticus, the_, of Isocrates, 158.
Treaty with Alexander, speech of Demosthenes on the, 267.
Trierarchic Crown, speech of Demosthenes on the, 256.
Trierarchic law, 219.
Verrall, A. W., 31.
_Vocabulary_, 18, 22, 23, 61, 68, 81, 113, 134-5, 179, 289.
Weil, H., 218, 251, 265, 306.
Wounding with intent, speech of Lysias on, 99.
Xenophon, 7.
Xerxes, 6.
Zeno, 7, 9.
Zenothemis, speech of Demosthenes against, 204, 259.
περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους, speech of Isocrates, 158.
Ζεὺς Κτήσιος, 111.
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