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Title: The first Moroccan crisis, 1904-1906
Author: Eugene N. Anderson
Release date: May 5, 2026 [eBook #78609]
Language: English
Original publication: Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/78609
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE FIRST MOROCCAN CRISIS, 1904-1906 ***
THE FIRST MOROCCAN CRISIS
1904-1906
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
* * * * *
THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY
NEW YORK
THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON
THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA
TOKYO, OSAKA, KYOTO, FUKUOKA, SENDAI
THE COMMERCIAL PRESS, LIMITED
SHANGHAI
THE FIRST
MOROCCAN CRISIS
1904-1906
BY
EUGENE N. ANDERSON
_The University of Chicago_
[Decoration]
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
COPYRIGHT 1930 BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. PUBLISHED JUNE 1930
* * * * *
COMPOSED AND PRINTED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U.S.A.
DEDICATED
TO
MY MOTHER
PREFACE
The fall of Morocco under European control marks the nadir in the annals
of Islam. The land was the last important Mohammedan territory to be
taken by the Christians. Thereafter began the Islamic revival which is
still in course. This volume, however, deals not with that subject but
with the history of a conflict in European diplomacy, referring to
Morocco proper only when necessary to explain the moves of the Powers.
The Moroccan crisis of 1904-6 contained all those elements that were
present at the other crises on the road to the great war—desire for
colonial acquisition, trade and investment rivalries, national honor,
diplomacy which contained the threat of war, the principle of the
balance of power, fears, and counterfears. The special interest of this
episode lies in the fact that, as the first of the series, it shows the
Powers choosing sides and fixing their opinions and policies. It
determined the mental attitude of the players in the subsequent
struggles and gave direction and mind, so to speak, to the later events.
In the history of the Moroccan affair from approximately 1898 to 1906,
when the first crisis ended, are mirrored almost all the important
movements of the Powers with reference to one another. The grouping of
the Powers around France, the development of Anglo-German rivalry, the
failure of Germany’s policy of playing between Great Britain and the
Dual Alliance, Germany’s _riposte_ and attempts to restore her
position—all are either intimately connected with the Moroccan question
or can be explained in the light of it. The Moroccan problem was the
political barometer of Europe.
In making this study I have relied chiefly upon the official documents
contained in _Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914_,
in _British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914_, and in the
two _Livres jaunes_ concerning the Moroccan affair from 1901-1906. The
presence of so much new material has rendered antiquated most of the
older accounts of the subject. I have therefore not cited all of this
secondary literature, preferring to give source references.
In spite of this rich material, there are still obstacles to a complete,
impartial, and balanced account of this episode. The outstanding one is
the absence of adequate French documents. The French policy has
practically to be studied through British or German eyes and on the
basis of the accomplished fact. The British and the German policies are
thus treated with more understanding and detail. But even here
difficulties arise. History cannot be written alone on the basis of the
official diplomatic documents of today. The variety and amount of
information which Ranke found condensed in the reports of the Venetian
ambassadors of the sixteenth century is now scattered in a hundred
places. The improved facilities for communication and transportation
have limited and specialized the correspondence of governments and their
foreign representatives. Information is now obtained as well from
personal interviews, newspapers, and all those means which create
governmental as well as public opinion. Much of great importance is
never written down at all. Foreign secretaries often give orders to
their ambassadors without explaining their reasons. This is particularly
true of the British, less true of the Germans. Moreover, statesmen are
at times inclined for reasons of policy to write down how they wish a
certain event to be viewed, not how they actually view it. To check and
supplement the official documents, therefore, the intimate and more
personal information in biographies, autobiographies, and memoirs has
been especially valuable, although neither the number of those works,
particularly on the French side, nor the material in them is complete.
While international relations were more complex in the pre-war days than
ever before in history, the study of them is facilitated by the fact
that diplomacy was still secret, that a relatively few individuals
guided it. By focusing attention upon these individuals, one can
interpret the motives which consciously or unconsciously determined
foreign policy. These men sublimated and represented the diplomatic mind
of the nations. A new actor had also made its appearance in their midst,
that combination of Proteus and Fata Morgana, public opinion; but even
it was given tangible shape in the minds of the responsible statesmen
who had to interpret it and respond to its demands. I have tried to test
these interpretations by checking them against the opinions of
contemporaries and by reading in the contemporary newspapers, magazines,
speeches, and letters.
Diplomatic policies and situations cannot be explained in a formula.
Statesmen are all more or less opportunists; they usually keep several
alternatives in mind. To assert that one country is bent on war and
another on peace, one on revenge and aggression and another on defense,
is to give an incomplete view. In handling the fluid and shifting
materials of diplomacy, one must avoid both oversimplicity and
historical fatalism. Further information will probably add or change
many details in this study, but I believe that the main lines of the
history of this crisis are herein explained.
I wish especially to express my appreciation to Professor Bernadotte E.
Schmitt, Professor Ferdinand Schevill, Associate Professor Arthur P.
Scott, and Associate Professor Louis R. Gottschalk—all of the University
of Chicago—for much beneficial advice and criticism in reading this work
in manuscript, and to thank my sister, Dr. Jesse May McFadyen, of the
University of Minnesota, for many hours of help in searching for the
right phrase.
EUGENE N. ANDERSON
CHICAGO, 1929
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. FRANCE AND MOROCCO, 1898-1904 1
II. THE FRANCO-ITALIAN ENTENTE, 1900-1902 19
III. THE FRANCO-SPANISH ENTENTE, 1898-1903 35
IV. DELCASSÉ’S POLICY TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY, 41
1898-1902
V. THE ANGLO-GERMAN ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS, 1898-1901 52
VI. THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 81
VII. ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AFTER THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE 110
CORDIALE
VIII. FRENCH POLICY AFTER THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 117
IX. GERMANY AND THE ENTENTE CORDIALE, 1903-4 135
X. THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A RUSSO-GERMAN ALLIANCE, 1904 159
XI. THE VISIT TO TANGIER 181
XII. THE MOROCCAN CRISIS FROM THE VISIT TO TANGIER TO THE FALL 196
OF DELCASSÉ
XIII. THE MOROCCAN CRISIS, JUNE 6-JULY 8, 1905 234
XIV. THE MOROCCAN CRISIS, JULY-OCTOBER, 1905 259
XV. THE TREATY OF BJÖRKÖ AND ITS ANNULMENT 279
XVI. THE PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 311
XVII. THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 348
XVIII. CONCLUSION 397
INDEX 409
CHAPTER I
FRANCE AND MOROCCO, 1898-1904
I. THE DECADENT MOROCCO
Morocco was one of the last of the “backward” countries to be taken
under control by a European state. It was a historic land with a long
record of wars against the Christians; but, like many another, it had
never adapted itself to the course of European civilization, and by the
end of the nineteenth century had consequently become consigned by
statesmen interested in colonial conquest to the category of “dying
states.” Hence it was qualified for acquisition, division, or control.
The execution of this work was beset with unusually grave difficulties.
Several centuries of more or less regular diplomatic and commercial
relations with European Powers had assured Morocco international
recognition as a sovereign and independent land. Moreover, the rival
interests of the Powers there were so firmly established and so
conflicting that they seemed irreconcilable. Down to 1900 these Powers
had jealously blocked each other from a special position, and, in case
of necessity, as in 1880, had settled common problems concerning Morocco
by means of an international conference.[1] And while this disunion
obtained, that country of eight million fanatical and warlike souls able
to play one potential enemy against the other was secure.
At the opening of the twentieth century Morocco was one of the least-
known lands of the world. Insecurity of life, absence of roads and means
of transportation and communication of any but the most primitive sort,
undeveloped harbors poor by nature, and a governmental policy designed
to prevent any Power from gaining a foothold in the land by the
acquisition of property, mining or other concessions had excluded the
“Christian dogs” and maintained Mohammedan purity.[2]
Nevertheless, the country was reputed by Europeans to be rich in natural
resources, the “pearl of North Africa.”[3] The plains and valleys, if
irrigated and cultivated by modern methods, would, it was held, produce
vast supplies of foodstuffs and would become one of the granaries of
Europe. Other regions were declared to be admirably suited for grazing;
while the mountains, those bulwarks against the encroachments of the
desert, were envisaged as teeming with minerals. Popular imagination
glorified Morocco into another Promised Land.[4]
However that might be, Europeans were doing very little business there.
Official French statistics reckoned the total amount of foreign trade
with Morocco in 1903 as 109,495,888 francs. Of this small sum France and
Algeria enjoyed 31 per cent; Great Britain, 41.6 per cent; Germany, 9
per cent; Spain, 8.4 per cent; and the other Powers insignificant
amounts.[5] The contrast between economic fact and economic possibility
acted as a spur to the groups desirous of political acquisition; but the
smallness of these economic interests and their substantial equality for
a number of the Powers made it difficult to determine which had the
dominant claim to develop Morocco.
A conflict of strategic interests added to this complication. Morocco’s
geographic situation on the Straits of Gibraltar and on the route to
South Africa, her proximity to the French and Spanish possessions in
North Africa and to Spain, made the Sherifian Empire a land coveted by
all Powers with Western Mediterranean interests, in particular Great
Britain, Germany, France, Spain, and Italy. Since each state suspected
that any rival would abuse its advantages if it gained ascendancy,
disagreement over the future of Morocco persisted. However, in an era
which was coming to be more and more dominated by the urge for colonial
control, this problem would not long remain unsolved. At the close of
the century a favorable turn in international affairs and an
accentuation of the chronic state of anarchy in the land itself brought
the question to the fore.
The period of strong rule in Morocco under Sultan Mulai-el-Hassan
(1873-94) and the grand vizier, Ba-Ahmed, came to an end with the death
of the latter in May, 1900, when the young, inexperienced, and
incompetent sultan, Abd-el-Aziz, assumed authority in person. By his
preference for foreign goods and society he soon not only exhausted his
treasury but also estranged his subjects. He acquired a fantastic
collection in which figured cameras, coaches, bicycles, dolls, pianos by
the dozen, and animals for a menagerie. He amused himself lavishly with
his European friends. He listened to the advice of his two intimates,
Kaid Sir Harry Maclean, a former English soldier from Gibraltar who had
been in Moroccan service for almost two decades, and Mr. W. B. Harris,
correspondent in Morocco of the _London Times_; and by promulgating a
program of fiscal reform sought to replenish his resources and
reorganize his country in time to prevent the intervention of the
Powers, particularly of France, and the consequent loss of his
independence. But, while his intentions were good, his actions proved
disastrous for himself and his land.[6] Scandalized by the tales of his
antics with the Christians and outraged by the new taxes that violated
the Koran, the natives revolted in 1900.[7] The rebellions in the north
and northeast constituted a double menace since they might lead to
attacks on the French and Spanish possessions and bring on an
intervention of those two Powers.[8] The Sultan had no money, therefore
no army; and without an army he could collect no taxes. The rumor spread
that he had actually turned Christian and sold the land to the English.
The political and religious ties with his people were everywhere
breaking.[9] By 1903 his precarious authority was confined to a few
towns; and his capital, Fez, was itself threatened by the rebels.[10]
As this situation was nothing unusual in Moroccan annals, the natives
were not greatly disturbed. If events had been permitted to take their
normal course, a revolution would probably have replaced Abd-el-Aziz by
some stronger man, and the country would have returned to its usual
condition of semianarchy. The tragedy for Morocco lay in the fact that
this disorder gave the opportunity for the interested Powers to
intervene. The increasing insecurity of foreigners and the Sultan’s need
for loans foreshadowed the end of Moroccan independence. In 1899 Lord
Salisbury, British prime minister, had declared that Morocco was
decaying and might collapse at any moment.[11] Politicians elsewhere
began to turn their attention toward this corner of Africa. Among them
the French assumed the lead and solved the problem.
II. FRANCE AND THE MOROCCAN PROBLEM, 1898-1904
By the end of the nineteenth century France’s North African empire was
assuming definitive form. In the 1890’s agreements with Great Britain,
Germany, and Spain (1900) consolidated France’s possession and left only
Morocco, a country almost inclosed on the land side by French territory,
as an object whose acquisition was coming to be regarded by Frenchmen as
essential to the completion of their ambitions in that region.[12]
To aid in the achievement of this goal a Comité de l’Afrique française
had been organized in 1889 to popularize African questions with the
French people, to exert pressure upon the government, and to carry on a
unified and consistent activity for colonial expansion which the French
cabinets could not do. Its membership was relatively small—about seventy
in all—but very select. With the Prince d’Arenberg as its president, it
numbered in its ranks deputies, senators, military and naval officers,
officials in the government (although no cabinet members, of course),
members of the Academy, newspaper editors and owners, members of the
Institute, members of various geographical societies, colonial
societies, chambers of commerce—men such as M. Gabriel Hanotaux, former
minister of foreign affairs; M. Jules Siegfried, who resigned
temporarily when he became minister of commerce in 1893; M. Paul Révoil,
governor-general of Algeria; General Joseph Galliéni, governor-general
of Madagascar; M. Eugène Etienne, former undersecretary of state for the
colonies and future cabinet member; M. Antoine Guillain, vice-president
of the Chamber for a time and former minister of the colonies; M. Paul
Deschanel, president of the committee for foreign and colonial affairs
in the Chamber. Through common membership and close co-operation the
Comité was assured of the active support of the other colonial,
geographical, and commercial organizations. The character and position
of its members in state affairs gave it an undeniably great influence
upon the government as well as upon the nation. This influence was
enhanced by the organization of groups favoring colonial acquisition in
both the Chamber (1892) and Senate (1898), the former of which under the
presidency of M. Etienne boasted in 1902 almost two hundred members.[13]
During the 1890’s the French advocated a policy of _status quo_ with
reference to Morocco. They opposed permitting any Power to gain undue
influence there or allowing Morocco to reform herself. They were
suspicious of any individual or collective intervention by the Powers,
and wanted to hold the future completely free. But the defeats of Italy
by Abyssinia in 1896 and of Spain by the United States in 1898 dampened
the ardor of those two rivals. Then, when British attention was claimed
by the Boer War and when the internal disintegration of Morocco
increased the possibilities of intervention, the proponents of
aggression demanded that France should act.
Late in 1899 the official publication of the Comité declared that the
Moroccan question was of paramount importance in French foreign
policy.[14] It promoted the campaign for the acquisition of Morocco so
successfully that by the end of 1903 almost all parties in France,
including even the Socialists under M. Jaurès, had come to consider the
French claims to predominance in Morocco as superior to those of any
other Power.[15] The popular arguments, based largely upon the proximity
of Algeria to Morocco, ranged from the theory of the “natural frontier”
to economic and strategic contentions. In Morocco rebellions and
religious wars could easily start, it was claimed, spreading thence over
the whole of North Africa and endangering France’s possessions. If any
other European Power established itself in that land, it could utilize
the native resources in troubling France. On the other hand, by virtue
of her experience in handling and employing Mohammedans, France was
better fitted to perform this work of civilization than anyone else.
These were, of course, the stock arguments of all parties advocating the
establishment of European control over “backward” areas.
The Comité formulated a policy for handling both the internal and the
international aspects of the question—a policy which M. Delcassé,
minister of foreign affairs from 1898 to 1905, was actually to follow.
It was the popular solution, and, for France, the only possible one.[16]
As the Fashoda affair had taught the French that the approval of the
Powers was necessary for the acquisition of colonial territory, the
first requisite was to make agreements with the interested states, among
whom the _Bulletin_ included Germany. Moreover, the nature of the
problem demanded this approach. For Morocco’s international status, the
interests of the Powers there, the military strength of the fanatical
population, and the consequent need of having French hands completely
free from the danger of complications before attempting to reform
Morocco made this preliminary international understanding imperative.
The program contained four essential points. The sovereignty of the
sultan and the independence and integrity of his land should be assured.
Adequate guaranties for the freedom of the straits should be provided.
The legitimate interests of the Powers, considered to be chiefly
economic, should be satisfied through the acceptance of the principle of
full commercial liberty. Lastly, Spain’s territorial claims should be
satisfied. By this course the Comité and its followers thought to
dispose of the international aspect.
At the same time Morocco itself had to be won. The _Bulletin_ believed
that a policy of “pacific penetration” carried on through the agency of
the sultan would solve this task. The sultan was the sole source of
authority, religious as well as political, that France could properly
utilize. By working through him she might further her own interests and
might introduce reforms without provoking the natives to war. The
sovereignty of the Sultan would not be touched nor the independence and
integrity of his land be violated. The “pacific” aspect would prevent
the other Powers from taking offence and would satisfy the French
people. The “penetrating” aspect would give satisfactory reality. It was
a masterful combination, with an air of superficial plausibility so long
as one did not attempt to reconcile the phrases “pacific penetration”
and “preponderant influence” with those of “sovereignty of the sultan”
and “independence and integrity of the land.”[17]
The French minister of foreign affairs from 1898 to 1905 was, as already
said, M. Théophile Delcassé. Born in 1852, he was at a very
impressionable age when the Franco-Prussian War occurred. He became so
ardent a disciple of Gambetta that he could never speak afterward of
their friendship without emotion. Journalist, deputy, colonial
undersecretary, colonial minister—such was the course of his rise.
Uncommunicative by nature, he avoided Parliament as much as possible. He
was on intimate terms with M. Waldeck-Rousseau, premier from 1899 to
1901; but with the latter’s successors, MM. Combes and Rouvier, his
relations were cool, and he asserted his entire independence in the
conduct of his office. In a short and caustic sketch, November, 1900,
Sir Edmund Monson, British ambassador at Paris, wrote of him:
Delcassé is an unsatisfactory Minister to us diplomatists in Paris. He
is extremely uncommunicative, not to say secretive. Consequently it is
very rare that any one of us succeeds in extracting information from
him. He has plenty of commonplace conversation, which flows glibly
enough, and he will talk eloquently in an academical fashion. But he
hardly ever tells one anything in the way of political news, and he has
an adroit way of feigning ignorance which took me in at first, until I
convinced myself that it was all shamming. He always urges that he is
not a diplomatist by profession, but he carries the practice of
subterfuge to an extent which I have hardly ever met before in a
Minister of Foreign Affairs. On the other hand, he does not tell lies
systematically, as X did.[18]
His long tenure in office and the free scope given him by the cabinet
and Parliament, both engrossed in internal affairs,[19] enabled him to
put his own impress upon French foreign policy and to give it a
positive, constructive content. Although a member of radical cabinets
that reduced the military and naval budgets and neglected the defenses
of the land, he openly disapproved of that policy and advocated rearing
a virile, patriotic generation of fighters. He courted and received the
support of all parties. He took as the sole objective in his foreign
policy the maintenance and development of French interests, and avowed
himself an opportunist in his method of diplomacy. He was a
_Realpolitiker_ at a moment when the French people seemed to be turning
toward internationalism and pacifism. His policy unfolded itself
gradually, and, in the absence of adequate documentary material, it has
to be explained largely upon the basis of its accomplishments.[20]
The new elements introduced into French policy by this minister were
associated almost altogether with the Moroccan question. He seems from
the start to have coveted that country.[21] He thought that since the
Dual Alliance was firmly established, France as well as Russia ought to
reap some benefits therefrom. But, as Russia was turning her energies
more and more to the Far East and was thereby weakening the
effectiveness of the Alliance, he desired some means of re-establishing
the equilibrium of forces in Europe. Particularly was this necessary
since Germany had inaugurated her _Weltpolitik_; for, with German power
increasing at so fast a pace, France had to seek new friends for the
protection of herself, her colonies, her interests, and for the
realization of her ambitions toward Morocco before it was too late.[22]
This triple aim of better defense, of increased prestige, and of
colonial acquisition in Northwest Africa he saw could be realized by the
settlement of the international aspect of the Moroccan question. Italy
and Spain as Mediterranean neighbors and Great Britain as a formidable
colonial rival should be won to the French plan by agreements which at
the same time should create friendships between them and fortify and
aggrandize the French position in Europe. Moreover, M. Delcassé hoped to
reconcile Russia with Great Britain, above all to prevent them from
actual conflict. And, depending upon circumstances, he was apparently
willing to treat with Germany. A colonial acquisition and a
rearrangement in international relations were to be achieved together,
and the Moroccan problem came to signify both.[23]
The basis of the Franco-Moroccan relations was laid by the treaty of
1845 regulating the boundary between Algeria and her western
neighbor.[24] However, the frontier remained in part indefinite; border
raids recurred; the possession of the oases, Touat, Gourara, and
Tidikelt, discovered after the treaty was made, remained unsettled.[25]
The consequence was chronic trouble, which France tried to eliminate by
occupying these oases late in 1899 and in 1900 and by beginning to
construct railroads toward them.
Alarmed by this activity, the Sultan asked Queen Victoria in the autumn
of 1900 to obtain assurances from France which would tranquilize his
fears. Realizing that this would be impossible, the British government
refused, and Sir Edmund Monson, the British ambassador at Paris, merely
mentioned the Sultan’s anxieties to the French Foreign Minister (October
17).[26] The Italian, Spanish, and German governments also showed some
concern over this action at Touat.[27] M. Delcassé replied to them all
with the statement which he had made in the French Senate on April 3,
that in Africa France would honor all treaties signed by her, that she
would respect the frontiers of neighboring states, and that she had no
intention of changing the _status quo_ in the Mediterranean. She was
merely occupying territory manifestly belonging to her.[28]
The number of attacks of the Moroccans upon Algeria increased. After
several particularly bold raids had occurred early in 1901, the French
government sent a sharply worded note to the Sultan which he interpreted
as threatening action against his ancestral home, Tafilelt.[29] He
appealed to the British government for protection,[30] and in June and
July sent an embassy headed by the minister of war, el-Menebhi, to
London and Berlin to obtain aid against France and to negotiate a
loan.[31] As the question of an alliance was then engrossing the
attentions of both the British and the German governments, neither felt
inclined to give the Moroccans anything but innocuous advice, and this
mission was a failure.[32]
The dispatch of that embassy just at the time when Anglo-German
relations were so cordial alarmed the French Foreign Minister.[33]
Through M. Révoil, governor-general of Algeria, he warned the Moroccan
government against signing any political or commercial agreement without
French approval, and exacted a promise from a Moroccan embassy then in
Paris concerning the execution of any accord which might be signed.[34]
Among the Powers, M. Delcassé had little to fear from Spain, with whom
he was on intimate terms, or from Italy, with whom in the previous
December he had made an agreement about Morocco.[35] He assured the
British government that France had no intention of raising “serious
questions in Morocco.” The Marquess of Lansdowne, British foreign
secretary, responded with a frank account of his conversations with the
Moroccan embassy.[36] It was Germany of whose reactions M. Delcassé was
most uncertain. In June, through his friend M. Leon y Castillo, the
Spanish ambassador, he suggested to Prince Radolin, the German
ambassador in Paris, that if the German government, as the victor in
1870, would take the initiative, he would like to discuss various
matters with a view to arriving at an entente.[37] The German response
to the Spanish Ambassador was that before Germany could enter into an
arrangement with France whereby the hostility of a third Power might be
incurred the two countries must make a mutual guaranty of each other’s
territorial integrity. Since France would thereby have to guarantee the
German possession of Alsace-Lorraine, the proposed negotiation was
crushed.[38] None the less, in a conversation with Prince Radolin on
June 23, 1901, M. Delcassé made and received an important statement
about Morocco. When the Ambassador mentioned the discussion in the
French newspapers of a French protectorate over that land, the Foreign
Minister replied:
“If by that word protectorate one means that France, mistress of Algeria
and Tunis, has and must conserve toward Morocco an unique situation
[_une situation absolument à part_], it seems to me that it is self-
evident [_il me semble que c’est l’évidence même_].” “Nothing is more
just, every one takes account of that situation [_tout le mond se rend
compte de cette situation_],” answered Prince Radolin.[39]
Much or little could be read into either remark; but together with the
general diplomatic situation they enabled M. Delcassé in the Senate on
July 5 to declare that
if France, mistress of Algeria and through Algeria neighbor of Morocco
along an immense frontier, is forced to follow what occurs there with a
singular interest,—our vigilance does not aim at other than the
tranquillity, prosperity, and integrity of the Sherifian empire. . . .
.[40]
The presence of an embassy in Paris simultaneously with the one in
London and Berlin[41] gave the French Minister an opportunity for taking
the first steps toward “pacific penetration.” The mission came to Paris
to seek an agreement with the French government upon a definite boundary
line between Algeria and Morocco which would assure Moroccan isolation.
M. Delcassé, however, aimed, by leaving the frontier line indefinite, to
utilize this geographic proximity as a means of creating a community of
interests with the Sultan and his people and of familiarizing them with
things European.
The French Minister succeeded partially in incorporating this plan in an
agreement with the Moroccan embassy in July, 1901, supplementing that of
1845. Drawn “to consolidate the bonds of amity existing between them
[France and Morocco] and to develop their reciprocal good relations,”
the treaty provided that the boundary should remain uncertain, but that
France and Morocco should each have the right to set up a line of posts
for purposes of defense and customs collection in the desert region on
soil which unquestionably belonged to them. The tribes living in the
territory between those two lines should be permitted to choose which
authority they preferred to reside under. Moroccans and Algerians could
enter that territory freely for commercial or other purposes. Moroccan
tribes who owned pastures in Algeria could continue to use them, and
vice versa. For the preservation of amicable relations between the two
countries each government agreed to appoint two commissioners annually
to settle future border disputes.[42]
To Ben Sliman, the leader of the embassy to Paris, M. Delcassé offered
French friendship and aid, but added a veiled threat of the trouble
which France would make for Morocco if his offers were not accepted.
While the French Minister showed a nice regard for Moroccan
sensitiveness toward innovations, he voiced the expectation that when
the land should decide to “enter into new ways” it would give France the
preference for furnishing it with the needed resources. In an important
dispatch of July 27, 1901, M. Delcassé instructed M. Saint-René
Taillandier, the French representative at Tangier, concerning his future
conduct. The French Minister was to assure the Sultan of French respect
for the integrity of his land and for his own sovereignty, to affirm
France’s desire to give him friendly aid, and to point out the benefit
which the Sultan, as ruler, might derive therefrom. He was to warn the
latter against foreign innovations which might imperil the security of
Algeria.[43] Lastly he was to support all enterprises, commercial,
industrial, and philanthropic, calculated to increase French influence
in the land.[44]
Thus the French government could note with satisfaction that whereas the
Moroccan mission to London and Berlin had accomplished nothing, the one
to Paris had enabled France to feel out the Powers on this question, to
proclaim publicly her special interests, and to begin the actual
execution of her program. M. Delcassé was now started upon a conscious
policy of establishing French predominance in the Sherifian Empire.
When the French and Moroccan commissioners appointed to execute the
agreement of 1901 set to work, they found that its terms were
impracticable. The assassination of two French captains by Moroccans in
January, 1902, also showed that if order were ever to obtain along the
frontier, French power would have to strengthen the Sultan’s
efforts.[45] The commissioners therefore negotiated in April and May,
1902, two further treaties, the content of which was much more in
harmony with the French objective of loosening the boundary instead of
tightening it, of providing a complete program of military, economic,
and political co-operation between the two governments as follows: In
case of need the two states should concert in pacifying and policing the
frontier from Teniet-Sassi to Figuig, but no guard or customs posts
should be established between those two points. In lieu of these customs
duties, France agreed to pay Morocco a lump sum annually. In the other
frontier area the two governments should establish markets and customs
posts at specified points in order to develop commerce between Algeria
and Morocco.[46]
It became impossible to carry out the commercial clauses of the treaty
because of anarchy on the Moroccan side of the border. But the Sultan
made immediate use of the military articles by requesting permission of
the French government to send Moroccan troops and munitions to the
frontier by way of Algeria, and by asking it in July to furnish military
instructors for these troops. M. Delcassé readily agreed.[47]
Notwithstanding these requests, the Sultan was dissatisfied with the
course of affairs, and in September, 1902, sent Kaid Maclean to Europe
to seek aid in stemming the tide of the French advance. Carrying
personal letters from the Sultan to King Edward and to the German
Emperor, the Kaid went first to London. He proposed to the King and to
Lord Lansdowne that the integrity of Morocco be guaranteed by Great
Britain, or, failing that, by Great Britain and Germany, for a period of
seven years, and that, if at the end of this period Morocco had not
thoroughly reformed her government and developed her natural resources,
the guaranty should lapse. He proposed also that a Moorish loan be made
in England, France, and Germany, and that all railway concessions be
divided between those three countries. The British government approved
the method of handling the project for a loan and for railroad
construction; but, as it was already in conversation with the French
government over the future of Morocco and was disinclined to tie its
hands, it refused to consider the other measure. Thus the mission was a
failure.[48]
In 1903 the Sultan was in dire straits. While the whole country was more
or less in rebellion, the main center of danger lay in the northeast
near Taza where the pretender to the throne, Bu-Hamara, “Father of the
She-Ass,” had acquired a large following late in 1902. He was in a
position to attack the French along the border or the Sultan in Fez, and
did so. His defeat of the Sherifian army endangered Fez itself. Even in
his capital the Sultan angered his subjects by summarily executing the
murderers of a British missionary. In this plight, he turned to the
obliging French for further aid. He received permission for his troops
and the loyal border tribes to seek refuge in Algeria. After M. Delcassé
had officially intervened in his behalf, he was able to obtain a loan of
7,500,000 francs from the French banking-house of Gautsch. By the time
the Anglo-French agreement of April 8, 1904, was made, the Sultan seemed
to be falling in line with the French policy of “pacific
penetration.”[49]
[Footnote 1: This was the Conference of Madrid.]
[Footnote 2: See among the numerous works on Morocco: Albert Salmon, _Le
Maroc. Son état économique et commercial_ (Paris, 1906); René Pinon,
_L’empire de la Méditerranée_ (Paris, 1904), p. 96; Eugène Aubin,
_Morocco of To-Day_ (London, 1906), p. 119.]
[Footnote 3: Victor Piquet, _La colonisation française dans l’Afrique du
Nord: Algérie, Tunisie, Maroc_ (Paris, 1912), p. 15.]
[Footnote 4: For typical reactions see Pinon, _L’empire de la Médit._;
M. Aflalo, _The Truth about Morocco. An Indictment of the Policy of the
British Foreign Office with Regard to the Anglo-French Agreement_
(London, 1904); _Zwanzig Jahre alldeutscher Arbeit und Kämpfe_ (Leipzig,
1910), pp. 219 ff. For a more scientific discussion see Piquet, pp. 514
ff.]
[Footnote 5: The statistics about Morocco are all unreliable. They vary
according to the persons taking them. The Moroccan government took none
itself. Those given above are quoted in André Tardieu, _La conference
d’Algésiras. Histoire diplomatique de la crise marocaine (15 Janvier-7
Avril, 1906)_ (Paris, 1909), pp. 499 ff.]
[Footnote 6: On the new sultan see Pinon, _L’empire de la Médit._, pp.
150 ff.; Aubin, pp. 137 ff., 178; Walter B. Harris, _Morocco That Was_
(Edinburgh and London, 1921), esp. pp. 65 ff.]
[Footnote 7: See Aubin, pp. 203 ff.; Auguste Lombard, _La banque d’état
du Maroc_ (Montpellier, 1911), pp. 14 ff.]
[Footnote 8: On this disorder see Victor Bérard, _L’affaire marocaine_
(Paris, 1906), p. 82; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents
diplomatiques. Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905_ (Paris, 1905), Nos. 33 ff.,
42 ff., 61 ff., 90, 98 ff. (This _Livre jaune_ is hereafter cited as
_L.j., 1901-5_.) See also _Bulletin du comité de l’Afrique française,
Supplément_, 1901, pp. 193 ff. (This magazine is hereafter cited as
_Bulletin_.)]
[Footnote 9: Aubin, p. 109.]
[Footnote 10: _Ibid._, pp. 320-21.]
[Footnote 11: Hatzfeldt to Bülow, Feb. 8, 1899, _Die Grosse Politik der
Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914. Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des
Auswärtigen Amtes_ (im Auftrage des Auswärtigen Amtes herausgegeben von
Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Friedrich Thimme;
Berlin, 1922-27), XVII, 295 f., No. 5152 (hereafter cited as _G.P._).]
[Footnote 12: See Pinon, _Empire de la Médit._; speech by M. Etienne on
June 16, 1903, reprinted in _Bulletin, Supplément_, 1903, p. 179.]
[Footnote 13: _Bulletin_, July, 1902, p. 267.]
[Footnote 14: _Ibid._, Dec., 1899, pp. 412, 429.]
[Footnote 15: See the debates in the Chamber on this subject, Nov.,
1903, _Journal officiel de la République française. Débats
parlementaires_ (Chambre des Députés, Nov., 1903); Tardieu, pp. 17 ff.]
[Footnote 16: See _Bulletin_, Dec., 1899, pp. 412, 429; Jan., 1900, p.
2; April, 1900, p. 140; June, 1901, p. 182; March, 1902, p. 107; Oct.,
1902, pp. 347, 350; Oct., 1903, pp. 301, 305; Jan., 1904, p. 3, etc.
Also speech by M. Etienne, June 16, 1903, in _ibid., Supplément_, 1903,
p. 179.]
[Footnote 17: See _ibid._, July, 1900, p. 257; Aug., 1901, pp. 259 f.;
April, 1903, p. 120; Pinon, _Empire de la Médit._, p. 182.]
[Footnote 18: Lord Newton, _Lord Lansdowne, A Biography_ (London, 1929),
p. 209.]
[Footnote 19: Such as the Dreyfus case, the law of the Congregations,
the separation of church and state.]
[Footnote 20: On Delcassé see Christian Schefer, _D’une guerre à
l’autre. Essai sur la politique extérieure de la Troisième République
(1871-1914)_ (Paris, 1920), pp. 221 f.; Georges Reynald, _La diplomatie
française. L’œuvre de Delcassé_ (Paris, 1915); René Millet, _Notre
politique extérieure de 1898 à 1905_ (Paris, 1905), p. 2; Robert Dell,
_My Second Country_ (New York, 1920), p. 176; René Pinon, _France et
Allemagne, 1870-1913_ (Paris, 1913), pp. 116 ff.; Delcassé’s speeches;
Monson to Lansdowne, Nov. 15, 1904, _British Documents on the Origins of
the War, 1898-1914_ (ed. by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley; London,
1927——), III, 14 f., No. 11 (hereafter cited as _B.D._).]
[Footnote 21: See his speeches, _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._,
Sénat, April 3, 1900, pp. 299 f.; Chambre, Jan. 21, 1902, quoted in
_Bulletin, Supplément_, 1902, pp. 46 f.; Chambre, March 11, 1903,
_Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, p. 1356; especially his speech on
Nov. 10, 1904, in the Chambre, _ibid._, pp. 2381, 2386; Sénat, Dec. 7,
1904, pp. 1048 ff.; Reynald, p. 11.]
[Footnote 22: André Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort à la Conférence
d’Algésiras_ (Paris, 1909), pp. 117 f. Mévil’s book contains the
official apology for Delcassé’s work.]
[Footnote 23: See Mévil, pp. 120 f., and Delcassé’s speeches. On Dec. 7,
1904, in the Senate and on Nov. 10, in the Chamber, he spoke as follows:
“The problem, in effect, was this: to establish the preponderance of
France in Morocco, thereby to augment her power in the Mediterranean,
not by alienating but rather by conciliating the Powers whose position
in the Mediterranean brings them to our attention. . . . . In
considering the positions occupied not only by England, but by Italy and
by Spain in the Mediterranean, it is evident that if diplomacy succeeds
in resolving this problem [of Morocco] it will have at one blow
fortified and aggrandized the situation of France in Europe by the
friendships which it will have procured and by the _rapprochements_ of
interests of which it will have been the creator.”
He further declared that this had been his conscious policy during his
six years of residency at the Quai d’Orsay (see _Journal officiel,
Debats parlem._, Sénat, Dec. 7, 1904, pp. 1048 ff.; Chambre, Nov. 10,
1904, p. 386).]
[Footnote 24: See Augustin Bernard, _Les confins algéro-marocaine_
(Paris, 1911). Treaty given in De Clercq, _Recueil des traités de la
France_, pp. 271 ff.]
[Footnote 25: See various articles in the _Bulletin_; also Pinon,
_Empire de la Médit._; Bérard, _L’affaire marocaine_; speech of Waldeck-
Rousseau in the Chamber, July 2, 1900, _Journal officiel, Debats
parlem._, pp. 1739 f.]
[Footnote 26: Exactly what the Sultan requested is not known. Count
Bülow, the German foreign minister, heard in June, 1900, from an Italian
source that the Grand Vizier of Morocco just before his death had
proposed to Salisbury, the British premier, that the Powers guarantee a
new boundary to be made between Algeria and Morocco, but that the
British Minister had refused to consider the matter. See Bülow to
Tschirschky, June 5, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 318, No. 5167. On the Sultan’s
proposal of October see Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 12, 17, 1900, _B.D._,
II, 259, Nos. 312 f.]
[Footnote 27: We have positive evidence that the Spanish and German
governments did so; and as Italy was then in negotiation with France
over the question of Morocco (see below), it is safe to say that her
government did also. See Bülow to Münster, April 27, 1900, _G.P._, XVII,
299 ff., No. 5156; Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, _ibid._, 301 f.,
No. 5157.]
[Footnote 28: See _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, Sénat, April 3,
1900, p. 299. He also said in private that France had no intention of
attacking Morocco. Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 301
f., No. 5157; Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 17, 1900, _B.D._, II, 259, No.
313.]
[Footnote 29: See Bérard, p. 68; Aubin, p. 178; _Bulletin_, Aug., 1901,
p. 279; _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 1, 3, 4, 6. For the note see Révoil to
Delcassé, March 23, 1901, Révoil to Si Mohamméd Torres and Ben Sliman,
March 18, _ibid._, No. 2 and annexe.]
[Footnote 30: So the British Minister at Tangier stated to his German
colleague (Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, April 13, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 326
f., No. 5173).]
[Footnote 31: Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, April 13, 20, 1900, _ibid._, 326
f., No. 5173; 328, No. 5174.]
[Footnote 32: See Cambon to Delcassé, July 4, 1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 13
ff., No. 19 and annexe; Hatzfeldt to foreign office, June 19, 1901,
_G.P._, XVII, 332 f., No. 5177 and note; Holstein to Eckardstein, July
8, 1901, _ibid._, 333, No. 5178; memorandum by Mentzingen concerning the
conversations between Richthofen and the Moroccan Ambassador, _ibid._,
334 ff., No. 5179, undated though handed in to the foreign office on
July 19, 1901; Mühlberg to Mentzingen, July 19, 1901, _ibid._, 336 f.,
No. 5180; Eckardstein to F. O., July 29, 1901, _ibid._, 338 f., No.
5182.]
[Footnote 33: On the cordiality of their relations see below. Late in
1899 Joseph Chamberlain, the British colonial secretary, had made a
speech at Leicester advocating an Anglo-German-American alliance; an
accord over China had been made between them in 1900, and the Emperor
had in January, 1901, hurried to the bedside of the dying Queen
Victoria.]
[Footnote 34: Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, July 27, 1901, _L.j.,
1901-5_, 20, No. 21. What the promise was is not related. Also editor’s
note, _G.P._, XVII, 332 f., No. 5177; Eckardstein to F. O., July 29,
1901, _ibid._, 338 f., No. 5182; Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, July 5, 1901,
_ibid._, XVIII, 781 f., No. 5872.]
[Footnote 35: See below.]
[Footnote 36: Lansdowne to Monson, July 3, 1901, _B.D._, II, 261, No.
318; Cambon to Delcassé, July 4, 1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 13 ff., No. 19.]
[Footnote 37: On these conversations see Radolin to Bülow, June 5, 1901,
_G.P._, XVIII, 772 ff., No. 5868; June 15, _ibid._, 775 ff., No. 5869;
_ibid._, 777 f., No. 5870. Leon y Castillo declared that Delcassé had
said to him that “he wished for nothing better than to converse with the
German Ambassador on different points, that he would be very desirous of
arriving at an entente with him” (_ibid._, 775 ff., No. 5869). At the
same time leading articles appeared in _Temps_ and _Figaro_, papers in
close touch with the foreign office, to the effect that Germany had the
opportunity in the Moroccan affair to prove her good will toward France
(Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, July 5, 1901, _ibid._, 781, No. 5872).]
[Footnote 38: Bülow to Radolin, June 19, 1901, _ibid._, 778 ff., No.
5871; Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, July 5, 1901, _ibid._, 781 f., No. 5872;
Mühlberg to Mentzingen, July 19, 1901, _ibid._, XVII, 336 f., No. 5180.]
[Footnote 39: Delcassé to Noailles, June 23, 1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 13,
No. 18. No account of the conversation is given in _G.P._]
[Footnote 40: _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, Sénat, July 5, 1901,
p. 1207.]
[Footnote 41: The British government might have prevented the sending of
that mission. See Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, April 20, 1901, _G.P._, XVII,
328, No. 5174. The German Minister at Tangier reported that the Sultan
had asked Mr. Nicolson, British minister there, whether he should also
send a mission to Paris and St. Petersburg.]
[Footnote 42: On these negotiations see Révoil to Delcassé, April 27,
1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 5, No. 5; Delcassé to Martiniére, July 20, 1901,
_ibid._, 15 ff., No. 20 and annexe; Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier,
July 27, 1901, _ibid._, 18 ff., No. 21; Saint-René Taillandier to
Delcassé, Sept. 19, 1901, _ibid._, 22, No. 22.]
[Footnote 43: Such, for instance, as the recent tax reforms.]
[Footnote 44: Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, July 27, 1901, _L.j.,
1901-5_, 18 ff., No. 21.]
[Footnote 45: Révoil to Delcassé, Feb. 22, 1902, _ibid._, 31, No. 25.]
[Footnote 46: Révoil to Delcassé, Jan. 18, April 26, May 17, 1902,
_ibid._, 26 ff., No. 24; 33 ff., Nos. 27 f.; Graham H. Stuart, _French
Foreign Policy from Fashoda to Serajevo (1898-1914)_ (New York, 1921),
p. 144.]
[Footnote 47: See especially Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, July
22, Aug. 6, 1902, _L.j., 1901-5_, 44 ff., Nos. 29 f.]
[Footnote 48: See memo. for Maclean, Oct. 24, 1902, by Lansdowne,
_B.D._, II, 272 f., No. 328; Sir Sidney Lee, _King Edward VII. A
Biography_ (London, 1925, 1927), II, 220 f. Apparently Maclean did not
go to Berlin at all, although he threatened to do so if the British
government refused his proposal. See Lee, II, 220 f.]
[Footnote 49: For instances of this co-operation see _L.j., 1901-5_,
Nos. 33, 39, 44-46, 57, 60, 68, 70-72, 77-79, 81-84, 86, 89, 91-107,
110-11, 119-26, 132; for Delcassé’s part in assuring the loan see
Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, Jan. 5, 1903, _ibid._, 53 ff., No.
39. The Sultan obtained similar loans in Spain and in England.]
CHAPTER II
THE FRANCO-ITALIAN ENTENTE, 1900-1902
When M. Delcassé assumed office in 1898, the Bismarckian system of
agreements which had isolated France in Europe had already crumbled
away. The formation of the Franco-Russian alliance had been followed by
the lapse in 1896 of the ententes between Austria-Hungary, Great
Britain, Italy, and Spain for the maintenance of the _status quo_ in the
Mediterranean.[50] The way was clear for the enterprising French Foreign
Minister gradually to win the friendship of the last three Powers,
previously joined in enmity against France. The first of these
_rapprochements_ to bear fruit was the one with Italy.
During the nineties, Italian dissatisfaction with the foreign policy had
been steadily growing. Italian leaders complained that Italy had
suffered from a tariff war with France, that she had been unable to
restrain France from denouncing Italian treaty rights in Tunis or from
fortifying Bizerta, that she had failed to secure colonial territory in
North Africa, especially in Tripoli, and in Abyssinia. They regarded the
Triple Alliance and the good will of Great Britain as inadequate to
Italian needs. They asserted that their country was the victim of the
Triple Alliance, made to suffer by France because of membership in it,
and not even protected against that Power, much less given compensatory
benefits for these undeserved injuries. The anger directed at Great
Britain was hardly less than that at Germany and Austria-Hungary.[51]
To meet these difficulties, the Marquis de Rudini, premier from 1896 to
1898, inaugurated a policy of friendship toward France which his
successors in office continued. While remaining loyal to her alliances,
the Marquis said, Italy would henceforth endeavor to prevent trouble
with other Powers and to restore normal relations with France.[52]
In 1896 Italy and France settled their difficulties over Tunis. In 1898
a commercial treaty put an end to ten years of tariff warfare between
them and opened the way to the flow of French capital into Italy.[53] In
the same year the two countries made a settlement of the boundary line
between their possessions on the Red Sea. So when M. Delcassé visited
Rome in 1898, he found that both he and the Italian foreign minister,
Marquis Visconti Venosta (1896-98), thought necessary a durable entente
between their two countries which would respect the French possession of
Tunis and the Italian membership in the Triple Alliance; and they agreed
that the Mediterranean, which had previously divided their states,
should become the means of their _rapprochement_.[54] The Italian
Minister was overthrown before any further steps could be taken; but
under his successor, Admiral Canevaro (1898-99), an opportunity was
offered to initiate the negotiations which finally led to the
consummation of the entente.
In March, 1899, France and Great Britain settled the differences growing
out of the Fashoda affair by an agreement which assigned to the former
the hinterland of Tripoli. Since Italian leaders regarded the eventual
possession of Tripoli as vital to the welfare of their state, they felt
that Italy had been betrayed by her supposed friend, Great Britain, and
the Italian government appealed to its German ally for advice.[55] The
latter remained noncommittal, Lord Salisbury equally so.[56] It was
France, the supposed enemy, who applied balm to the wound. The French
ambassador, M. Barrère, assured Admiral Canevaro that Italy “need in no
way fear that she will find France in her path if she should ever have
ambitions toward Tripoli.” When the Italian Minister asked for a written
statement to that effect, M. Barrère replied that, although Tripoli was
Turkish territory, M. Delcassé would “under conditions” attempt to find
some way in which to satisfy this desire. Those conditions, of course,
had to do with Italy’s relations to Morocco. The materials were thus at
hand for an agreement.[57]
The negotiations were long drawn out; for, as France had Italy at her
mercy, she drove a hard bargain. On December 14, 1900, Marquis Visconti
Venosta, Italian foreign minister (1899-1901), and M. Barrère reached a
secret agreement.[58] By its terms Italy received in writing a purely
negative assurance that France harbored no designs upon Tripoli. The
_quid pro quo_ for France was more valuable.
In that which concerns Morocco particularly, it is agreed . . . . that
the action of France has for its object to exercise and safeguard the
rights which result for her from the proximity of her territory to that
empire. Thus defined, I [Marquis Visconti Venosta] have recognized that
such action is not in our view of a nature to prejudice the interests of
Italy as a Mediterranean Power. It has been likewise agreed that if
there must result therefrom a modification of the political or
territorial status of Morocco, Italy will reserve for herself, as a
reciprocal measure, the right of eventually developing her influence in
the Cyrenaic Tripolitaine.[59]
So vague a statement could be variously interpreted. M. Barrère thought
that Italy had given France a free hand in dealing with Morocco so long
as her action did not modify the political or territorial integrity of
the land. Marquis Visconti Venosta declared later to the German
Ambassador that the accord had only permitted France to take measures
necessary for the defense of her frontier.[60] As either meaning could
be read into the documents, the future course of Franco-Italian
relations would determine which one would obtain.
The _rapprochement_, attested by M. Delcassé in the French Senate on
February 11, 1901, and affirmed by a visit to Italian waters of the
French fleet in April, had been facilitated by a number of
circumstances. On the one hand, the Italian government was angry with
Austria-Hungary for having excluded it, in violation of Article VII of
their treaty of alliance, from the negotiation in 1897 of an agreement
with Russia over Balkan affairs. Tariff difficulties with both allies
were looming up, and an occasional irredentist voice was being heard. On
the other hand, an anticlerical government in France made certain that
in the near future at least the republic would not attempt to restore
Rome to the pope. Moreover, King Victor Emmanuel, possibly influenced by
his Montenegrin wife, leaned decidedly away from his father’s policy of
strict adherence to the Triple Alliance toward one of closer friendship
with France, and, if possible, with Russia.[61] Italian public opinion
was likewise showing itself markedly pro-French, a tendency which M.
Barrère’s courting of press and public helped to develop;[62] and when
in 1901 the King chose the pro-French M. Zanardelli to form a cabinet,
the Italians applauded.[63]
The affinity for France of the new cabinet and the greater defiance
toward Italy’s allies were foreseen from the political past of some of
its members. M. Zanardelli was a native of the Trentino, and would have
been foreign minister in 1893 if the Austrian government had not
objected.[64] M. Prinetti, the new foreign minister (1901-3), had spoken
energetically in 1891 against the renewal of the Triple Alliance. M. de
Martino, his undersecretary, had asked in the Italian Chamber, December,
1899, “how this Triple Alliance is able to serve Italy.”[65] The
attitude of these men was soon manifested. Toward the end of the year
the Premier was making veiled threats of a tariff war with his
allies;[66] while M. Prinetti, ambitious, inflammatory, and unreliable,
was engaged in negotiations with France which radically transformed the
nature of Italy’s international obligations.
One of M. Prinetti’s first undertakings was to gain better terms for
Italy with reference to Tripoli. He proposed to France that “each of the
two Powers be able freely to develop its sphere of influence in the
regions Tripoli and Morocco at the moment that it judges opportune and
without the action of the one of them being subordinated to that of the
other.”[67] The French government was willing to accept his overture for
the sake of obtaining a freer hand in Morocco; it also saw an
opportunity to win an even greater advantage. As the Triple Alliance was
to be renewed in 1902, it determined to repeat its former endeavor to
nullify the clauses in that treaty referring to France.[68]
M. Barrère argued the French case to the Italian government as follows:
Italy had joined the Triple Alliance because of quarrels with France
about the Mediterranean. As the two countries were now friends, with
their difficulties already harmonized or capable of becoming so, should
not their friendship be assured for the future by the removal of any
aggressive point against France which the Triple Alliance might contain?
Were the clauses of that treaty compatible with Franco-Italian
friendship? “The alliance remains defensive,” so he summarized his
arguments later to his government. “But it permits a very broad
interpretation of the duties of the allies; if France, openly provoked,
should declare war, could Italy regard this declaration as a defensive
step on our part? It is doubtful.” So he concluded that “under defensive
appearances, the Triple Alliance implied an eventually offensive
character which ought to be eliminated in the interest of our security
and of the relations of friendship between the two countries.” Above
all, the French government desired to bring about the suppression of the
anti-French military conventions or protocols between Italy and her
allies.[69]
M. Prinetti acknowledged the force of these remarks. In June, 1901—that
is, before Great Britain had turned away from Germany to France, and
while Austria-Hungary and Italy were still on passable terms—he made a
verbal agreement with M. Barrère by which the rights of Italy toward
Tripoli were put on a par with those of France toward Morocco. In return
he promised that the renewed treaty of the Triple Alliance should
contain “nothing hostile” to France.[70]
The problem of adjusting Italy’s alliance obligations to her new
international situation growing out of the Franco-Italian entente was
taken up at the end of the year when negotiations for the renewal of the
Triple Alliance were begun.[71] To strengthen Italy’s hand, MM.
Prinetti, Delcassé, and Barrère all attested publicly in December, 1901,
and January, 1902, to the complete harmony of Franco-Italian interests
in the Mediterranean; M. Delcassé referred pointedly to Tripoli and
Morocco.[72] And the _Tribuna_ gave bold notice, January 2, that “Italy
counts for something and can with her weight turn the scale one way or
the other.”[73] In spite of his promises to France, however, M. Prinetti
made very feeble efforts to change the Triple Alliance in accordance
therewith. He said nothing to the German government about revising or
omitting Articles II, IX, X, and the protocol[74] which Italy herself
had had incorporated in the treaty. His sole proposal to Count Bülow, to
whom he repeated his promise to M. Barrère, was that an introductory
statement, intended for publication or for communication to France,
should be included affirming the purely defensive character of the
alliance. Other matters concerning Italy and her two allies were of far
more importance to the Italian Foreign Minister in these negotiations.
He wanted the allies officially to affirm Italy’s preponderant rights in
Tripoli; he wished for them to have a more binding understanding about
the Balkans; above all, he sought to make the renewal of the alliance
contingent upon the negotiation of tariff treaties with Germany and
Austria-Hungary favorable to Italy. In discussing these questions with
the German government he grew excited, wept, threatened to resign or not
to renew the alliance. About those which concerned France he was more or
less apologetic.[75]
German public opinion regarded the Franco-Italian _rapprochement_ with
misgivings. But the Chancellor assumed a nonchalant attitude, stating in
the Reichstag, January 8, 1902:
The Triple Alliance still enjoys the best of health. . . . . The Triple
Alliance is not a society for acquisition but an insurance company. It
is not offensive but defensive; it is not aggressive but peaceful to a
high degree. The Triple Alliance does not bar good relations between its
members and other Powers, and I would not consider it proper if even a
small part of the German press should show any uneasiness over Franco-
Italian agreements. In a happy marriage the husband must not become
jealous if his wife dances an innocent extra round with some one else.
The main thing is that she does not run away from him, and she will not
do so if she is best situated with him. . . . . The Franco-Italian
agreements over certain Mediterranean questions do not violate the
Triple Alliance. . . . . The goals of the present day _Weltpolitik_
extend to areas and objects which lie far from Germany’s boundaries. I
name in this connection, for example, the north coast of Africa, Persia,
the Far East.[76]
That speech, however, did not reflect the Chancellor’s actual feeling.
He still assumed that, should any important change be made in the
Mediterranean area, for instance in Morocco, Germany would be
consulted;[77] but he relied upon Russia’s retarding influence, Great
Britain’s hostility, and fear of Germany to prevent France from taking
action in that land.[78] He was dissatisfied with the turn of affairs,
and blamed Great Britain for having forced Italy into French arms by
ignoring her interests.[79] He suspected that the Franco-Italian
understanding contained more than M. Prinetti admitted.[80] He
recognized the improvement in Italy’s international relations, and
realized that her antagonism to Austria would thenceforth become
sharper, and that her Tripolitan ambitions would be so zealous as
possibly to cause trouble with Germany’s friend, the Turkish Sultan.[81]
As to renewing the alliance, which he strongly desired, the Chancellor
believed that self-interest and the known antagonism of Great Britain to
the Dual Alliance would prevent Italy from changing camps.[82] Under
other circumstances he might have been willing to make some further
concessions to Italy in return for the renewal.[83] In the previous
March he had relieved her from any obligations under the German-Italian
military convention, although permitting the military conversations to
continue as before.[84] But the Franco-Italian entente, the lever with
which M. Prinetti expected to pry loose those concessions, was the very
cause for Count Bülow’s refusing to permit any change whatever in the
treaty. As the alliance was already defensive, he said, there was no
need for an introductory statement to that effect. Pointing to the
expectation voiced by the French press that anti-French clauses would be
dropped, he declared that any modification would permit the French to
draw the desired conclusion and thereby to belie the true nature of the
alliance. Before he would renew the Triple Alliance he demanded of M.
Prinetti an assurance that Italy had made no agreements with other
states which could diminish its defensive forces. He even expressed his
willingness to drop the alliance rather than make any changes in it,
remarking that Italy’s adherence to it was of no fundamental importance.
The Chancellor’s adamantine attitude was effective. By May, 1902, M.
Prinetti agreed to the renewal.[85]
In March, 1902, M. Prinetti had reported to M. Barrère the probability
of his failure. He had refused to communicate the text of the treaty to
the Ambassador, but had declared that the protocols thereto must be
abolished,[86] and that he was ready, so M. Barrère reported, to give
France “assurances of a nature to leave no doubt in our mind as to the
character and scope of this document” (the treaty of the Triple
Alliance).[87] On May 7, M. Prinetti informed the French Ambassador that
“it will be necessary for us to discuss the future of our relations in
regard to that treaty.” Under French pressure, he agreed that
“thenceforth it was in a direct understanding with us [France] that he
should find the means of fixing the interpretation with regard to us
which Italy intended to give to her obligations as an ally.” He was
willing to put this understanding into writing.[88]
Before the proper negotiations were well under way, the actual renewal
of the alliance forced M. Prinetti to declare in the Italian Chamber,
May 22, 1902, as follows:
The Triple Alliance as it is and as it will be, completely and uniquely
pacific and defensive, will remain in the future what it has been for
years: the most solid rampart in the cause of peace. . . . . The Triple
Alliance, containing nothing aggressive, either directly or indirectly
against France, nothing which menaces her surety or tranquillity may not
in any manner constitute an obstacle to the conservation and development
of cordial relations with our Latin sister with whom we are and wish to
remain friends. . . . . And since it has been said that there exists
between certain Central Powers conventions and protocols adjoined to the
Triple Alliance which modify its pacific character and would even be
aggressive toward France, I hereby solemnly declare that there is no
convention and no protocol of that nature.[89]
Presumably even prior to this statement, which was repeated in a formal
note to the French government on June 4, M. Prinetti began negotiations
with M. Barrère over the written agreement. It was the Ambassador’s
intention that that agreement
would contain the engagement not to attack, not to join in any
aggression on the part of one or several Powers against one of the
contracting parties; not to consider as aggressive on the part of the
contracting Powers the obligation to declare war in consequence of a
manifest provocation [this was “the capital point” of the project, wrote
M. Delcassé]; finally to abandon the military protocols and other
dispositions of the same sort concerning us and envisaging war with us.
If we are able to arrive at that result [wrote M. Barrère to his chief],
we shall have obtained all that we could hope and desire.[90]
The negotiations were far enough along to permit M. Delcassé to declare
in the French Chamber, July 3, as follows:
The declarations which have thus been made to us [by the Italian
government] have permitted us to feel assured that the policy of Italy
by virtue of her alliances is not aimed either directly or indirectly
against France; that she will not in any case be a menace to us, either
in a diplomatic form or through protocols or in international military
stipulations; and that in no case and in no form will Italy become
either the instrument or the auxiliary of an aggression against our
country.[91]
That statement was stronger and more inclusive than the one by M.
Prinetti on May 22. It indicated the existence of a fuller understanding
than the public knew of. It caused M. Prinetti some embarrassment when
the German Ambassador brought up the subject. The Foreign Minister
declared himself “somewhat astonished” at the speech; but after a feeble
explanation in which he betrayed nothing, he remarked that “so far as he
was concerned, he regarded the question as settled.”[92]
Meanwhile the Franco-Italian negotiations continued. On November 1, in
an exchange of notes an understanding was reached by which Italy was
given a free hand to develop her “sphere of influence” in Tripoli, and
France the same right with reference to Morocco. Nor should the action
of the one be necessarily subordinated to that of the other. Then
followed a clause which M. Delcassé was particularly eager to have
incorporated:[93]
In case France [Italy] shall be the object of a direct or indirect
aggression on the part of one or several Powers, Italy [France] will
preserve a strict neutrality. The same will hold in case France [Italy]
as a result of direct provocation is forced to take, for the defence of
her honor or security, the initiative of a declaration of war.
A conditioning clause was added:
In that eventuality the government of the Republic [the Royal
government] must communicate beforehand its intention to the Royal
government [the government of the Republic], so that the latter may
verify that it is a case of direct provocation . . . . I am authorized
to confirm to you that there does not exist on the part of Italy
[France] and that there will not be concluded by her any protocol or
military disposition of an international contractual order which will be
in disagreement with the present declarations.
The Italian government asserted that these declarations were in
“complete harmony” with its existing international engagements. The
agreement was to be secret and to obtain until the Italian government
abrogated it. A supplementary statement by M. Prinetti defined the term
“direct provocation” to mean one which concerned the “direct relations
between the Power provoking and the Power provoked.”[94]
Was this accord compatible with the renewed and unchanged treaty of the
Triple Alliance? With Article II it could be made to agree. Articles IX
and X and the protocol it merely nullified but left standing.[95] It
broke completely not the letter, but the spirit of the alliance. The
dishonesty of the Italian Foreign Minister lay in three directions;
toward the German government by permitting it to continue in the belief
that the old relations as established in their treaty still obtained;
toward the French government by informing it that this treaty contained
nothing either directly or indirectly hostile to France, although
Articles II, IX, X, and XI and the protocol of that treaty had been
retained without any attempt to abolish them; toward Italy by not
clarifying the situation.[96] The matter was so arranged that in the
future the Italian foreign ministers would be able to determine whether
or not the agreement with France would be abrogated and the clauses of
the Triple Alliance, temporarily in abeyance, would again be called into
action. The Italian government was safeguarding its country on both
sides and giving up none of its securities, although its policy looked
toward two different international orientations. This was the equivocal
position between France and the Triple Alliance, later between the
Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance, which Italy was to occupy until
she entered the World War.[97] The advantages of it lay in the fact that
it gave greater mobility to Italian policy, that it caused Great Britain
to iron out her differences with Italy early in 1902,[98] that it opened
up a future of closer relations with Russia, and that it assured Italy
of the future possession of Tripoli.
The French government profited most from these negotiations. M. Delcassé
had won his initial victory in the execution of his policy.[99] He had,
at least for the time being, nullified the anti-French clauses of the
Triple Alliance and drawn Italy out of that group into a middle
position.[100] He had also settled the important question of Morocco
with the most jealous of the Mediterranean Powers, and had begun the
process of pulling the Powers away from Germany and drawing them around
France.
[Footnote 50: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Feb. 8, 1896, _G.P._, XI, 99 ff.,
No. 2664; Alfred Franzis Pribram (ed.), _The Secret Treaties of Austria-
Hungary, 1879-1914_ (Eng. ed. by Archibald Carey Coolidge; Cambridge,
1920-21), I, 124 ff., 142 ff.]
[Footnote 51: For manifestations of this feeling see Pribram, II, 104,
106; _Memoirs of Francesco Crispi_ (ed. by Thomas Palamenghi-Crispi;
trans. by Mary Prichard-Agnetti; London, 1914), III, 330 ff.; Hohenlohe
to Bülow, Feb. 15, 1896, _G.P._, XI, 230 ff., No. 2766; Bülow to
Hohenlohe, Feb. 5, 1896, _ibid._, 89, No. 2657; Bülow to Hohenlohe, Feb.
18, 1896, _ibid._, 89 ff., No. 2658; and in general the documents in
_ibid._, chaps. lxviii, lxix. Currie to Lansdowne, Jan. 15, 1902,
_B.D._, I, 285, No. 355; 286, No. 356; Currie to Lansdowne, Nov. 27,
1900, Lansdowne to Currie, Dec. 12, 1900, Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp.
211 ff.]
[Footnote 52: Bülow to Hohenlohe, Nov. 26, 1896, _G.P._, XI, 285 f., No.
2813; Pückler to Hohenlohe, July 19, 1897, _ibid._, 286, No. 2814; Bülow
to Hohenlohe, March 17, 1896, _ibid._, 293, No. 2819; Bülow to
Hohenlohe, July 22, 1896, _ibid._, 296 ff., No. 2821; Bülow to
Hohenlohe, Oct. 23, 1896, _ibid._, 299 f., No. 2823.]
[Footnote 53: _Política èstera italiana_ (1916), p. 499; André Tardieu,
_La France et les alliances_ (Paris, 1910), pp. 97 ff.; Radolin to
Bülow, April 19, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 716, No. 5833; Pinon, _Empire de
la Médit._, pp. 39, 44 f., 48.]
[Footnote 54: Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort à la Conférence
d’Algésiras_ (Paris, 1909), p. 121; André Tardieu, _Questions
diplomatiques de l’année, 1904_ (Paris, 1905), p. 14.]
[Footnote 55: Canevaro called it an act of “perfidy,” of “dishonesty,” a
“sharp slap in the face.” See Saurma to F. O., March 29, 1899, _G.P._,
XIV, 429, No. 3946; Saurma to F. O., April 1, 1899, _ibid._, 429 f., No.
3947; Saurma to Hohenlohe, March 29, 1899, _ibid._, 430 f., No. 3948;
Marschall to Hohenlohe, April 14, 1899, _ibid._, 434 f., No. 3952;
Bernhard Schwertfeger (ed.), _Zur europäischen Politik_ (Berlin, 1919),
I, No. 12; Rumbold to Salisbury, March 31, 1899, _B.D._, I, 203, No.
246; Currie to Salisbury, April 4, 1899, _ibid._, 203, No. 247.]
[Footnote 56: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 4, 1899, _G.P._, XIV, 432
f., No. 3950; Saurma to F. O., April 28, 1899, _ibid._, 435, No. 3953;
Bülow to Romberg, April 29, 1899, _ibid._, 436, No. 3954; Romberg to F.
O., April 30, 1899, _ibid._, 436 f., No. 3955; Bülow to Saurma, April
30, 1899, _ibid._, 437, No. 3956; Currie to Salisbury, Nov. 4, 1898,
_B.D._, I, 194, No. 236; Currie to Salisbury, April 4, 1899, _ibid._,
204, No. 247; Currie to Salisbury, April 10, 1899, _ibid._, 204 f., Nos.
248 f.; Salisbury to Currie, April 25, 1899, _ibid._, 206, No. 251;
Salisbury to Currie, May 13, 1899, _ibid._, 207, No. 252; Salisbury to
Currie, Oct. 12, 1900, _ibid._, 282, No. 350. In Sept., 1900, Currie,
apparently on his own initiative, appealed to his government to give the
Lateran “some proof of our determination to stand by Italy in the event
of her being attacked.” Lansdowne refused (Newton, pp. 211 ff.).]
[Footnote 57: Saurma to F. O., April 28, 1899, _G.P._, XIV, 435, No.
3953; Currie to Salisbury, April 4, 1899, _B.D._, I, 204, No. 247. See
also Canevaro’s declaration in the Italian Senate, April 24, 1899,
Senato, _Discussioni, XX Legislatura_ (2d sess.), p. 946, quoted by G.
Salvemini, “La Triple Alliance,” _Revue des nationes latines_, Oct.,
1916, p. 250. Also see the interview between Delcassé and Ojetta in
_Giornale d’Italia_, Jan. 3, 1902, reprinted in the _London Times_, Jan.
4, 1902.
Italy had formerly thought that she had vital interests in Morocco, and
her hope to acquire the land had received expression in a clause
concerning its future in the treaty of the Triple Alliance of 1891
(Pribram, I, 150 ff.; Vol. II, chap. iii). But the Moroccan vogue had
passed; her wishes had become more modest. To be sure, the French
occupation of Touat caused the Italian government in April, 1900, to
declare excitedly to its German ally that the Moroccan question could
become a reef upon which the House of Savoy might suffer shipwreck; but,
as M. Prinetti later explained, what his predecessor in office had
feared was that a French occupation of Morocco might force Italy to
seize Tripoli in order to maintain the equilibrium of interests in the
Mediterranean (Bülow to Münster, April 27, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 300, No.
5156; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 14, 1900, _ibid._, 302 f., No. 5158; Wedel
to Bülow, Dec. 12, 1901, _ibid._, 718, No. 5834).]
[Footnote 58: On these negotiations, about which very little is known,
see Barrère to Delcassé, Jan. 10, 1901, Ministère des Affaires
Etrangères, _Documents diplomatiques. Les accords franco-italiens,
1900-1902_ (Paris, 1919), 1 f., No. 1. (This _Livre jaune_ is hereafter
cited as _L.j., 1900-2_.) Salvemini, Oct., 1916, p. 249; Wedel to Bülow,
March 31, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 712 ff., No. 5831; Metternich to F. O.,
Dec. 21, 1901, _ibid._, 726 f., No. 5840; Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 5, 1902,
_ibid._, 738 f., No. 5845; Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 19, 1902, _ibid._, 747
f., No. 5851; Diplomaticus, “The Shifting Foundations of European
Peace,” _Fortnightly Review_, LXXVIII (Sept. 1, 1902), 370 f.;
Anonymous, “The Marquis of Salisbury,” _Quarterly Review_, CXCVI (Oct.,
1902), 664 ff.]
[Footnote 59: Terms of the accord given in _L.j., 1900-2_, 3 f., No. 1,
Annexes I and II. See also Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 19, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII,
747 ff., No. 5851.]
[Footnote 60: Barrère to Delcassé, Jan. 10, 1901, _L.j., 1900-2_, 1 f.,
No. 1; Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 19, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 747 f., No. 5851.]
[Footnote 61: See Bülow to Wedel, Nov. 30, 1900, _G.P._, XVIII, 502 f.,
No. 5704. The King made his first state visit to St. Petersburg in 1902
(A. Savinsky, _Recollections of a Russian Diplomat_ [London, ——], pp. 25
f.).]
[Footnote 62: On Barrère’s activity see Currie to Salisbury, Jan. 18,
1899, _B.D._, I, 281, No. 347; Currie to Salisbury, April 24, 1899,
_ibid._, 205, No. 250; memo. by Richthofen, Dec. 17, 1901, _G.P._,
XVIII, 507 f., No. 5708.]
[Footnote 63: Salvemini, Jan., 1917, p. 12; _London Times_, Dec. 16,
1901, p. 5; _G.P._, Vol. XVIII, chap. xxii.]
[Footnote 64: Salvemini, Jan., 1917, p. 12 f., quoting Un Bresciano,
“L’intervènto e le pressióni dell Austria nella crisi ministeriale de
1893” (_Nuova antologia_, Oct. 16, 1915).]
[Footnote 65: Salvemini, Jan., 1917, pp. 13 f.; Prinetti’s explanation
of this speech in the Chamber, June 14, 1901, is quoted in _Política,
èstera italiana_, pp. 536 f. See also Zanardelli’s interview in the _New
York World_, quoted in _London Times_, March 27, 1901, p. 5.]
[Footnote 66: Dispatch of Jan. 24, 1902, _Zur europ. Politik_, I, 91.]
[Footnote 67: Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _L.j., 1900-2_, 11
ff., No. 11.]
[Footnote 68: It had attempted to do this or to break the alliance in
1891 and 1896. See _G.P._, Vol. XI, chap. lxix; _ibid._, Vol. VIII,
chap. lxv.]
[Footnote 69: These arguments are contained in Barrère to Poincaré,
March 10, 1912, _L.j., 1900-2_, 11 ff., No. 11. One other argument,
which, however, M. Barrère probably did not use with Prinetti, he
formulated as follows: “What is more, nothing prevented her [Italy] from
going beyond the actual text of the treaty, if she should judge that her
political interests demanded it of her.” See also Salvemini, Feb., 1917,
p. 197. The military agreement of 1887 between the allies had become
known to the French government soon after its signing. See Salvemini,
Feb., 1917, p. 198; also Jules Hansen, _L’alliance franco-russe_ (Paris,
1897), p. 42. In March, 1901, _Matin_ published a version of it and
demanded its annulment (quoted in the _London Times_, March 27, 1901).]
[Footnote 70: According to other reports from the German Ambassador in
Rome, Prinetti promised “nothing aggressive” (Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 5,
June 27, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 512, No. 5711; 757, No. 5858).]
[Footnote 71: See Salvemini, Feb., 1917, p. 197.]
[Footnote 72: The occasion for these statements was the French
occupation of Mytilene, which alarmed Italian public opinion. See
Prinetti’s speech in the Italian Chamber, Dec. 14, 1901, Cámera dei
Depitatio, _Discussioni_, p. 6747; Delcassé’s interview in _Giornale
d’Italia_, Jan. 3, 1902, quoted in the _London Times_, Jan. 4, 14, 1902;
Barrère’s speech on Jan. 1, 1902, before the French colony in Rome,
quoted in _ibid._, Jan. 2, 1902; Delcassé’s speech before the French
Senate, March 20, 1902, _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, p. 605.]
[Footnote 73: _London Times_, Jan. 4, 1902.]
[Footnote 74: Article II of the Triple Alliance read as follows: “In
case Italy, without direct provocation on her part, is attacked by
France for any reason whatsoever, the two other contracting parties will
furnish to the party attacked aid and assistance with all their forces.
The same obligation is incumbent upon Italy in case of an aggression not
directly provoked by France against Germany.” Articles IX, X, XI, and
the protocol provided for the maintenance of the _status quo_ in the
Cyrenaic, Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco, and, in certain eventualities,
for an aggressive attack by Italy aided by her allies, upon France. See
the document given in _G.P._, VII, 99 ff., No. 1426.]
[Footnote 75: On these negotiations see _ibid._, Vol. XVIII, chaps.
cxxii, cxxv.]
[Footnote 76: Bernhard von Bülow, _Reden_ (hrsg. von Johannes Penzler;
Leipzig, 1903), I, 243 ff.]
[Footnote 77: Bülow to Metternich, Dec. 18, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 721,
No. 5835.]
[Footnote 78: Alvensleben to F. O., Dec. 26, 1901, _ibid._, 727 f., No.
5841; Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 508 ff., No. 5709.]
[Footnote 79: Bülow to Metternich, Dec. 18, 1901, _ibid._, 720 f., No.
5835.]
[Footnote 80: Memo. by Bülow, Jan. 12, 1902, _ibid._, 524, No. 5715;
Mühlberg to Bülow, April 25, 1902, _ibid._, 589, No. 5754; Bülow to F.
O., April 26, 1902, _ibid._, 590 f., No. 5755; Wedel to Bülow, Dec. 26,
1901, _ibid._, 728 ff., No. 5852; memo. by Holstein, Dec. 31, 1901,
_ibid._, 735, No. 5844.]
[Footnote 81: Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 508 ff., No.
5709.]
[Footnote 82: Memo. by Bülow, Jan. 12, 1902, _ibid._, 523 ff., No. 5715;
Wedel to Bülow, April 10, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 715 f., No. 5832; 723,
No. 5836; Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 509 f., No. 5709.]
[Footnote 83: Bülow to Wedel, Feb. 24, 1902, _ibid._, 545, No. 5727.]
[Footnote 84: _Ibid._, chap. cxxiv.]
[Footnote 85: See the documents in _ibid._, chaps. cxxii, cxxiv, esp.
Nos. 5712, 5727, 5749, 5755.]
[Footnote 86: This was easily said since the German government had in
the previous year released Italy from her obligations under the military
convention (see above). Prinetti made it appear as a special favor yet
to be performed.]
[Footnote 87: Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _L.j., 1900-2_, 12,
No. 11.]
[Footnote 88: Barrère to Delcassé, May 8, 1902, _ibid._, 4 f., No. 3;
Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _ibid._, 12 f., No. 11.]
[Footnote 89: Quoted in Salvemini, July, 1917, p. 321.]
[Footnote 90: Barrère to Delcassé, May 8, 1902, _L.j., 1900-2_, 5, No.
3; Delcassé to Barrère, June 18, 1902, _ibid._, 6, No. 5.]
[Footnote 91: _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, Chambre, July 3, 1902,
pp. 444 f.]
[Footnote 92: Wedel to Bülow, July 6, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 758 f., No.
5859.]
[Footnote 93: Barrère to Delcassé, May 8, 1902, _L.j., 1900-2_, 4 f.,
No. 3; Delcassé to Barrère, June 18, 1902, _ibid._, 6, No. 5.]
[Footnote 94: Terms given in _ibid._, 7 ff., Nos. 7 and 8. On July 20
Barrère reported that Prinetti regarded the following cases as examples
of direct provocation:
“1. The publication of sharpened dispatches [_dépêches maquillées_] by
Prince Bismarck in 1870; King William’s refusal to receive M. Benedetti.
“2. The Schnaebele incident.”
As examples of indirect provocation, Prinetti cited “Prince
Hohenzollern’s candidacy to the throne of Spain, and such indirect
initiative in Far Eastern affairs which do not aim at one of the
contracting Powers, although that initiative may displease it and appear
contrary to its direct interest” (Barrère to Delcassé, July 20, 1902,
_ibid._, 7, No. 6). The choice of examples is significant.]
[Footnote 95: See above.]
[Footnote 96: For a severer criticism of his actions see G. Lowes
Dickinson, _The International Anarchy, 1904-1914_ (New York, 1926), pp.
94 ff. Dickinson asserts that the Italian Minister broke both the letter
and the spirit of the Triple Alliance. The analogy of this agreement to
that of Bismarck’s reinsurance treaty with Russia of 1887 was remarked
upon by Italian statesmen at the time (see Lansdowne to Currie, Dec. 17,
1901, _B.D._, I, 284, No. 353). Bismarck’s pacific attitude toward
Russia was well known, however, and he was not responsible for the
inclusion of the anti-Russian clauses in the Austro-German treaty of the
Alliance. See Trützschler v. Falkenstein, _Bismarck und die Kriegsgefahr
von 1887_ (Berlin, 1924), chap. v., and _G.P._, Vol. V. The Italian
government, on the other hand, had not only pursued an anti-French
policy, but had been responsible for including the clauses antagonistic
to France in the treaty of the Triple Alliance.]
[Footnote 97: For analyses of the Italian policy see Rodd to Lansdowne,
July 9, 1902, _B.D._, I, 292 ff., No. 364; Bertie to Lansdowne, Oct. 20,
1903, _ibid._, 295, No. 366. For the German discussion see below. Mr.
Bertie in October, 1903, formulated his conception of the Italian King’s
foreign policy as follows: “His aim, I believe, is that Italy should be
a link between the several Powers of Europe and at the same time remain
a partner in the Triple Alliance: that France should have hopes of
drawing Italy away from Austria and Germany, and that those two Powers
should be made to feel that an understanding between Italy and France
and perhaps even with Russia also is possible. As to England the King
probably feels pretty sure that her interests will not seriously clash
with those of Italy, and he relies on England standing in the way of
French supremacy in the Mediterranean” (Bertie to Lansdowne, Oct. 20,
1903, _ibid._, 295, No. 366).]
[Footnote 98: On the renewal of the Anglo-Italian entente see Lansdowne
to Currie, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 284, No. 353; Currie to Lansdowne,
Jan. 1, 1902, _ibid._, 285, No. 355; Currie to Lansdowne, Jan. 5, 1902,
_ibid._, 286, No. 356; Lansdowne to Currie, Feb. 3, 1902, _ibid._, 287,
No. 359; Lansdowne to Currie, March 7, 1902, _ibid._, 291, No. 361;
Plunkett to Lansdowne, April 10, 1902, _ibid._, 291, No. 362.]
[Footnote 99: This he realized. See _L.j., 1900-2_, 4 f., Nos. 2 f.]
[Footnote 100: Cf. Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _ibid._, 13, No.
11.]
CHAPTER III
THE FRANCO-SPANISH ENTENTE, 1898-1903
The close of the nineteenth century found Spain at one of the lowest
points in her history. She was disorganized, isolated, defeated in 1898
by the United States; her navy was destroyed; her colonial empire was
shattered. Spain was particularly embittered toward Great Britain, whose
Premier had openly spoken of “moribund nations” with direct reference to
her, and whose attitude during the recent war had been strongly pro-
American.[101] Fearful that the British might seize a Spanish port,[102]
M. Silvela, head of the Conservative government, with the approval of
the Liberal leaders, early in 1899 determined upon a change of policy by
which Spain would seek to bring about a secret defensive alliance with
France, Germany, and Russia.[103]
The sympathy of those Powers had been on the side of Spain during the
recent war. But when the Premier laid the plan before them,[104] the
German government was encouraging but skeptical; the French government,
dilatory; the Russian government seemed not to favor it and advised
Spain instead to hold closely to France.[105] Nevertheless, during the
next few years the Spanish government continued its effort to realize
this program, particularly a Franco-German _rapprochement_.
One of the main objects of this grouping was the defense of Spanish
interests in Morocco. In spite of Spain’s colonial losses in the war of
1898, her concern over the future of that Islamic land remained active.
Spain claimed a special position with reference to it, just as France
did. Economic interests, the number of her subjects resident in Morocco
(larger than that of any other foreign nation), geographic proximity,
historical attempts at conquest, and Spanish pride were all advanced in
support of this claim. Strategic reasons, reinforced by her actual
possession of small bits of territory in Northern Morocco, also prompted
Spain to seek control of at least the northern part of the land and
above all to prevent that area from falling into the hands of France or
Great Britain.[106] The Spanish leaders recognized the French interests
in Morocco and the British right to participate in any settlement of the
problem of the straits. But, conscious of their weakness in dealing with
other Powers, they preferred to maintain the _status quo_ as long as
possible unless the larger Continental grouping was consummated.
In 1899 and 1900, when M. Delcassé showed a willingness to negotiate an
accord over Morocco, the Spanish government evaded the overture,[107]
and settled with him only the long standing dispute over the boundary of
Rio de Oro.[108] During 1901 events moved faster. In March a Liberal
ministry under M. Sagasta with the Duke of Almodovar as foreign minister
came into office. It saw France, unchecked by Great Britain, pushing her
frontier steadily forward in the desert region back of Morocco. So it
suspected the existence of a secret accord between those two Powers. The
British government denied it,[109] but Spain feared that an accord might
be made to her exclusion and injury. The Franco-Italian entente also
aroused her alarm. In this uncertainty the Spanish government endeavored
to use the presence of the Moroccan missions in Europe in June and July
to bring about a _rapprochement_ between France and Germany.[110] The
move failed. In August, M. Silvela published an article in _La Lectura_
advocating a solution of the Moroccan problem by agreement with France.
Encouraged by this expression and urged on by M. Leon y Castillo,
Spanish ambassador in Paris, the Spanish government determined to open
direct negotiations with M. Delcassé on the subject.[111] And that
minister was ready to listen. The negotiations progressed slowly, not
only because M. Delcassé was disinclined to concede to Spain the
territory which she desired,[112] but also because he was treating with
Italy and, to the disgust of the Spanish Ambassador, with Great Britain
at the same time.[113] By September, 1902, the main lines of the accord
were agreed upon. Then came further discussion over details; and, after
a last effort (October, 1902) by M. Leon y Castillo to bring France and
Germany together had failed, the accord was ready for signing early in
December.
By the terms of the agreement Spain was to receive the region of the Sus
in the south and almost all of the old kingdom of Fez, including the
capital and Tangier in the north, as her sphere of influence, while the
rest was to constitute that of France. The two governments agreed upon a
policy of pacific penetration of the land, and the French government
promised its diplomatic support to Spain in the execution of the
treaty.[114]
The failure of this agreement was an accident. On December 1 the Duke of
Almodovar was called away from Madrid. Before he could return and issue
instructions to sign the treaty, his government unexpectedly fell
(December 3).[115] The incoming Conservative ministry under M. Silvela
with M. Abarzuza at the foreign office refused to complete the accord.
Although they recognized its advantages to Spain, they feared the
possible attitude of Great Britain and decided to sound her out before
completing the treaty. Upon doing so they were informed by Lord
Lansdowne, early in January, 1903, that in case of a break-up of
Morocco, Spain “would be entitled to a voice in any new international
arrangements” over that land, but that the British government was
strongly opposed to any discussion of such an eventuality at that
moment.[116] In February, 1903, M. Abarzuza revealed the nature of the
Franco-Spanish negotiations to the British Ambassador, and asked for an
official British objection to it so that he (M. Abarzuza) would be in a
firmer position to refuse his signature.[117] Lord Lansdowne replied as
follows:
We regard it as of the utmost importance that Spain and Great Britain
should act together in regard to Morocco. . . . . I have more than once
informed French Ambassador here that we deprecated attempts to bring
about a virtual partition of Morocco. . . . . We should certainly not
tolerate an attempt to deal with Morocco without regard to British
interests.[118]
Thus while M. Delcassé was assuring the Spanish government that their
agreement could be concluded without fear since Great Britain was
interested only in Tangier,[119] the Spanish Foreign Minister was being
informed to the contrary by Lord Lansdowne himself. As M. Abarzuza did
not believe in the possibility of an Anglo-French agreement over
Morocco, he let the negotiations with France fall through.[120]
Immediately thereafter, however, arose a report of Anglo-French
conversations for that very purpose. In alarm the Spanish government
questioned the British Foreign Secretary and received the following
assurance: “We are quite willing to enter into an agreement with the
Spanish Government that neither will commit itself to any settlement of
Moorish question without previously consulting the other.”[121]
As it developed later, Spain lost by relying upon Great Britain and not
concluding this accord. For the British promise was too general to be of
much value, and after the Anglo-French agreement was made, Spain had to
accept the territory which the two Powers had reserved for her. Her
portion was naturally not as large as before, nor were the terms as
favorable. For France and M. Delcassé, on the other hand, it was
fortunate that the project failed. The resulting agreement would have
been strongly opposed by the French as too advantageous to Spain.[122]
France obtained better terms by first arriving at a settlement with
Great Britain. But the _rapprochement_ between the two Latin Powers was
an actuality, and that had been one of M. Delcassé’s main objects.
[Footnote 101: In 1898 Chamberlain publicly advocated an alliance with
the United States. See Jerónimo Becker, _Historia de Marruecos_ (Madrid,
1915), pp. 414 f.; Wolff to Salisbury, May 15, 1898, _B.D._, II, 253,
No. 300.]
[Footnote 102: Early in 1899 Silvela asserted to the ambassadors of
Germany, France, and Russia that if Great Britain and France had gone to
war in the previous year, the former had intended to occupy Vigo
(_G.P._, XV, Vol. Nos. 4205-8). When this fear was brought to the
attention of the British government, by an exchange of notes with the
Spanish government it denied any such intention. See Wolff to Salisbury,
March 10, 1899, _B.D._, II, 255 f., No. 305; Salisbury to Wolff, March
16, 1899, _ibid._, 256, No. 306; Conde de Romanones, _Las
responsabilidades politicas del antique régimen de 1875 á 1923_ (Madrid,
——), p. 36; Becker, pp. 415 f. The British and Spanish governments also
found by an exchange of views in January, 1899, that they both wished to
maintain the _status quo_ in Morocco. The Spanish diplomat and
historian, Becker, has written that they were about to make an agreement
to that effect when the Liberal government in Spain fell from power
(March, 1899) (_op. cit._, p. 415; Salisbury to Wolff, Jan. 11, 1899,
_B.D._, II, 255, No. 304).]
[Footnote 103: The plan was approved by Sagasta, leader of the Liberals,
by Leon y Castillo, the Liberal ambassador at Paris, and by the Queen
Regent. See Alberto Mousset, _La politica exterior de España, 1873-1918_
(Madrid, 1918), chap. v; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, April 15, 1899, _G.P._,
XV, 115 ff., No. 4205; Bülow to Radowitz, April 27, 1899, _ibid._, 119
ff., No. 4206; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 28, 1899, _ibid._, 125 ff.,
No. 4210; and others in _ibid._, chap. ic. Cf. F. de Leon y Castillo,
_Mis tiempos_ (Madrid, 1921), II, 255, written after the World War.]
[Footnote 104: Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 28, 1899, _G.P._, XV, 125 ff.,
No. 4210; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Aug. 12, 1899, _ibid._, 127 ff., No.
4211.]
[Footnote 105: Bülow to Radowitz, April 27, 1899, _ibid._, 119 ff., No.
4206; Bülow to Radowitz, May 16, 1899, _ibid._, 124 f., No. 4209;
Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Oct. 5, 1899, _ibid._, 130 ff., No. 4214;
Tschirschky to Hohenlohe, Oct. 24, 1899, _ibid._, 133 f., No. 4213;
Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Feb. 4, 1900, _ibid._, 134 f., No. 4214.]
[Footnote 106: Romanones, pp. 34 f.; Gabriel Maura, _La question du
Maroc au point de vue espagnol_ (Paris, 1911), pp. 1 ff.; Becker, pp.
446 ff., esp. chap. lxi; Pinon, _L’empire de la Médit._, pp. 123 ff.;
Emile Vidal, _La politique de l’Espagne au Maroc_ (Montpellier, 1913),
pp. 1 ff.; M. Ribera, “L’Espagne et la question du Maroc,” _Questions
diplomatiques et coloniales_, Jan. 1, 1902, pp. 46 ff.]
[Footnote 107: This is asserted by Becker although he does not cite his
authority. See Becker, pp. 414, 419; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 10,
1899, _G.P._, XV, 123 f., No. 4208; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Oct. 5, 1899,
_ibid._, 130 ff., No. 4212; Tschirschky to Hohenlohe, Oct. 23, 1899,
_ibid._, 133 f., No. 4213; Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, _ibid._,
XVIII, 301 f., No. 5157; Wolff to Salisbury, Oct. 11, 1900, _B.D._, II,
258, No. 311; Becker, p. 426; Romanones, p. 39.]
[Footnote 108: Schefer, _D’une guerre à l’autre, etc._, p. 237; Mousset,
pp. 121 ff.; Romanones, p. 38; Delcassé’s statement in the French
Senate, Feb. 11, 1901, _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, p. 295; Leon
y Castillo, II, 143 ff.]
[Footnote 109: Durand to Lansdowne, April 13, 1901, _B.D._, II, 259 f.,
No. 314; Lansdowne to Durand, April 16, 1901, _ibid._, 260, No. 315.]
[Footnote 110: See below.]
[Footnote 111: Romanones, pp. 40 ff.; Mousset, pp. 132 ff.; Becker, pp.
425 ff.; Vidal, p. 138; Leon y Castillo, II, 173 ff., 122 ff. See also a
speech of the Duke of Almodovar in the Spanish Chamber, June 8, 1904,
_Diario de las sesiones de Cortes, Legislatura de 1903_ (Congreso de los
Diputados), pp. 4919 ff.; speech by Romanones in the same, June 7, 1904,
_ibid._, p. 4883; Radolin to Bülow, June 15, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 777
f., No. 5870.]
[Footnote 112: Romanones, p. 41.]
[Footnote 113: _G.P._, XVII, 343, editor’s note; Becker, p. 427.]
[Footnote 114: Leon y Castillo was allowed a free hand in those
negotiations. See Romanones, pp. 41 f.; Becker, pp. 427 f.; Mousset, p.
135; speeches by Almodovar and Romanones in the Spanish Chamber, June 7,
8, 1904, _Sesiones del Congreso, Legislatura_, pp. 4883, 4944 f., 4917
ff.; exchange of letters between Silvela and Almodovar published in
_L’Imparcial_, June, 1904, and reprinted in Leon y Castillo, II, 185 ff.
The result was shown to Silvela early in September, 1902, and received
his entire approval, “provided one treats of a work of peace and concord
guaranteed against all suspicion and opposition of friendly Powers.” The
exact terms of the proposed accord are not known, only the main points.
See R. Gay de Montella, _España ante el problema del Mediterráneo_
(Barcelona, 1917), pp. 40 ff., quoting an article by Leon y Castillo in
_Mercurio_, May 27, 1917; André Tardieu, “France et Espagne, 1902-1912,”
_Revue des deux mondes_, Dec. 1, 1912, pp. 635 f.; Durand to Lansdowne,
Feb. 14, 1903, _B.D._, II, 279, No. 336; Lansdowne to Monson, Aug. 5,
1903, April 29, May 13, 1904, _ibid._, 306 ff., No. 364; III, 33, No.
34; 35, No. 37; Monson to Lansdowne, May 20, 1904, _ibid._, 37, No. 41;
Lansdowne to Egerton, April 27, 1904, _ibid._, 31 f., No. 32; Leon y
Castillo, II, 177 ff.]
[Footnote 115: Mousset, p. 135; Leon y Castillo, II, 128.]
[Footnote 116: On this question see a speech by Maura, minister of
foreign affairs, in the Spanish Chamber, June 9, 1904, _Sesiones del
Congreso, Legislatura_, p. 4959; Becker, pp. 429 f.; Tardieu, p. 635;
Durand to Lansdowne, Jan. 3, 1903, _B.D._, II, 276 f., No. 332;
Lansdowne to Durand, Jan. 5, 1903, _ibid._, 277, No. 333; Durand to
Lansdowne, Jan. 17, 1903, _ibid._, 278, No. 335; Metternich to F. O.,
Dec. 31, 1902, _G.P._, XVII, 247 f., No. 5192; Groeben to F. O., Sept.
17, 1903, _ibid._, 353 f., No. 5198 and note; Monson to Lansdowne, April
22, 1904, _B.D._, III, 30, No. 30; Leon y Castillo, II, 179 f. There is
a story that Silvela tried to change the basis of the accord in such a
way as also to obtain Russian support for Spain against Great Britain
and that he was willing to enter the anti-British camp. His proposal to
spend eight hundred million _pesetas_ in the building of a navy pointed
in this direction; but that there is anything to the tale seems
doubtful. See Mousset, pp. 137 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 635 f.; Anonymous, “Una
nouva alleanza,” _Nouva antologia_, Aug. 1, 1903, pp. 511.]
[Footnote 117: Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 14, 1903, _B.D._, II, 279, No.
336.]
[Footnote 118: Lansdowne to Durand, Feb. 16, 21, 1903, _ibid._, 279 f.,
No. 337; 280, No. 339.]
[Footnote 119: Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 21, 1903, _ibid._, 280, No.
338.]
[Footnote 120: See Tardieu, p. 635; Leon y Castillo, II, 179 f.]
[Footnote 121: Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 21, 1903, _B.D._, II, 280, No.
338; Lansdowne to Durand, Feb. 21, 1903, _ibid._, 280, No. 339;
Lansdowne to Durand, March 29, 1903, _ibid._, 282, No. 334; Leon y
Castillo, II, 180.]
[Footnote 122: Maura, p. 88; speeches by Ribot and Deschanel in the
French Chamber, March 11, Nov. 19, 1903, _Journal officiel, Debats
parlem._, pp. 793, 1111 f.; Millet, _Notre politique extérieure_, pp.
193 ff.; Pinon, _France et Allemagne_, pp. 143 f.]
CHAPTER IV
DELCASSÉ’S POLICY TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY, 1898-1902
M. Delcassé assumed office at a most unpropitious time for the success
of his policy with reference to Great Britain. On September 1, 1898, he
remarked to Sir Edmund Monson, the British ambassador, that “he had
always . . . . regarded as eminently desirable a cordial understanding
between England, France, and Russia,” and offered his service “in
soothing the way both at St. Petersburgh and Paris for the attainment of
this object.”[123] From then until March of the next year he repeatedly
urged Lord Salisbury, British premier and foreign minister, to agree to
a general understanding on all matters at issue, so that Great Britain
and France could exchange the old relation of hostility for one of
friendship.[124] But in spite of the French Minister’s cordiality the
Fashoda crisis in the autumn and early winter of 1898 brought the two
countries perilously close to war.[125] Anglo-Russian difficulties in
China and elsewhere also remained acute.[126] Furthermore, Lord
Salisbury replied to M. Delcassé that French ministries were too
unstable to deal with.[127] Hence, instead of improving, relations
between the two countries became more strained. In the late winter and
early spring of 1899, the bellicose stand on the Fashoda affair taken by
the British government and press aroused a general fear in France of a
British attack.[128] By August, the French Foreign Minister complained
bitterly to the British Ambassador that “the conduct of her Majesty’s
Government seemed to show a deliberate intention of being unfriendly to
France in every possible way,” and added that “he began to believe that
the politicians who argue that there is nothing to be done with England
are right.”[129]
During the period of the Boer War, the presence of Lord Salisbury at the
foreign office, the bitter feeling of the French against the British,
the continued Anglo-Russian trouble in China, and the British attempt to
align with Germany prevented M. Delcassé from obtaining any
results.[130] In fact, conditions were more favorable for the pursuance
of a directly anti-British policy. The Russian government wished it, and
worked for closer concert against Great Britain among the Continental
Powers.[131] The Spanish government had the more far-reaching ambition
of bringing about a definite Continental union against Great
Britain.[132] Italy was at odds with the latter. The German Emperor and
his government had been wooing France and making veiled proposals for
co-operation since 1890.[133] And French feeling toward Germany had
become more amicable than at any time since 1870.
The French Foreign Minister did not deviate from his original
purpose,[134] but tried rather to be friendly to both Great Britain and
Germany, to play between them for the advantage of France; and, warned
by Mr. Chamberlain’s[135] open advocacy in November, 1899, of an
alliance with Germany and the United States and by the signs of an
Anglo-German _rapprochement_, he sought to eliminate the occasion for
this alliance.[136] This policy had been foreshadowed during the Fashoda
crisis.
In December, 1898, immediately after France had retreated before the
British demands, M. Delcassé in a conversation with Herr Arthur von
Huhn, correspondent of the _Kölnische Zeitung_, had bitterly denounced
the brutal threats of Great Britain against France, had expressed his
fear that that Power was seeking war in order to have an excuse for
destroying the French fleet, and had proposed a _rapprochement_ with
Germany for pursuing a common policy against British encroachments and
for making colonial accords.[137] Simultaneously with this indirect
overture, which had never been followed up by either government, the
French Minister had threatened the British government with the
acceptance of indirect proposals from Germany for co-operation against
it if Great Britain did not change her attitude toward France and assent
to his offer of a general accord.[138]
During 1899 M. Delcassé had turned farther away from Great Britain and
had sought means of holding her in check.[139] But when the Boer War
broke out, he held aloof from any movements for intervention, even
risked unpopularity by publicly denouncing the expressions of rabid
anti-British sentiment on the part of the French people.[140] Upon the
retirement of Lord Salisbury from the foreign office in November, 1900,
he again suggested a general understanding to the British
government.[141] He was accused of being Anglophile to the detriment of
French interests, particularly in Morocco;[142] for many of the French
writers advocated a policy of co-operation with Germany for the
settlement of colonial questions (among which, of course, would be
included the Moroccan), while Great Britain could not effectively
object.[143] But M. Delcassé was willing merely to occupy the Saharan
oases back of Algeria during the war and to initiate the French policy
for the eventual acquisition of the Sherifian Empire.
Not that the French Foreign Minister was averse to any accord with
Germany. As already seen, he made an indirect overture to the German
government for an agreement while the Moroccan missions were in Europe
in 1901. Although rebuffed on that occasion, he made another attempt in
October of the same year at the urging of the Spanish and the Russian
governments.[144] At this time M. Jules Hansen, a French agent, stated
to the German Ambassador in Paris that M. Delcassé had recently
expressed to him the earnest wish to meet Count Bülow personally. The
problem was where and how to meet. The French Minister had said that if
the Count would come secretly and unofficially to Paris, he would greet
him most heartily and would make a public visit to Berlin in
return.[145]
Although very much interested, Count Bülow refused to run the risk. The
time was inopportune, he said; the French government and people must
first be more solicitous of closer relations with Germany.[146] That
reply postponed the matter to the Greek calends.
In 1902 M. Delcassé made a concentrated effort to establish the French
claim to ascendancy in Morocco. His negotiations with Italy, which led
to the agreement of November of that year, and those with Spain, which
in December proved abortive, have already been considered.
Simultaneously therewith, M. Delcassé again endeavored to negotiate with
Great Britain and, perhaps, with Germany on the same question.
On several occasions in January and February, M. Cambon, the French
ambassador at London, discussed Anglo-French differences, including the
Moroccan one, with Mr. Chamberlain, British colonial minister, and with
Lord Lansdowne, British foreign secretary since November, 1900. While
the British officials showed some interest, no progress was made.[147]
For after the publication of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance in
February, France was forced to declare with her ally that the Dual
Alliance extended to the Far East.[148] Under pressure from Russia[149]
and with the hope of obtaining support while negotiating a treaty with
Siam,[150] the French government drew closer to Germany.
Late in June the French Ambassador, in asking the German views on the
Siamese question, remarked to Count Bülow that “the present good
relations between Germany and France justified the hope that France
would receive the support [_coup d’épaule_] of Germany in the Siamese
affair.”[151] As the German government ignored the suggestion, however,
and as the French government was alarmed at the growing influence of
certain Englishmen, particularly Kaid Maclean, over the Sultan of
Morocco, M. Delcassé determined, in spite of probable Russian
objection,[152] to open the Moroccan question with the British
government.
On July 23, when M. Cambon asked Lord Lansdowne about discussing fully
the Moroccan problem, the British Minister replied that he would be
ready to consider it “in the frankest possible manner.”[153] On August
6, therefore, the Ambassador officially proposed an accord over the
future of Siam and Morocco. After a consideration of the former
question, the two men took up the latter one. While asserting that the
French government preferred that the Moroccan problem should not become
acute, the Ambassador desired that the two governments “frankly discuss
the action which they might be constrained to adopt in the event of
Morocco passing ‘into liquidation.’” Spain, he explained, could be
satisfied by a sufficient allowance of hinterland behind her coastal
possessions; Tangier could be converted into an international and open
port—for France could not allow it to pass into the hands of any
European Power; and beyond the Spanish line, France would expect
“exclusive influence.”
Lord Lansdowne replied that although he listened to the French proposal
with great interest, yet since Italy, Spain, and Germany had also at
various times manifested a concern in the Moroccan question, he regarded
with the “greatest apprehension” any attempt to deal prematurely with a
liquidation of that land, which “would be sure to lead to serious
complications.” The Ambassador answered that at any rate there could be
no harm “in discussing these eventualities in good time.” He pointed out
that Spain and Germany had both failed egregiously in their attempts to
establish themselves in Morocco, and that at present Germany was “not to
the front there or elsewhere in the Mediterranean.” But the British
Foreign Secretary, denying that his government had made any difficulties
in Morocco for France, postponed further consideration of the proposal
until after the government holiday.[154] When in October M. Cambon
returned to the subject, Lord Lansdowne not only replied that the French
terms were unsatisfactory, but he also refused to discuss the
possibility of a liquidation of Morocco.[155]
In the meantime, M. Delcassé had been again seeking the co-operation of
Germany. In September the German government assured France of its
disinterestedness in Siam, provided German economic interests remained
uninjured. Although this reply contained no mention of the larger
request for support made by the French Ambassador in June, yet the
latter, in expressing the satisfaction of his government with the German
answer, added that this opportunity had been used to emphasize the
community of French and German interests, and not only in Siam. To this
broad hint the German government made no response.[156]
In the next month the Spanish Ambassador in Paris reported to Prince
Radolin that the French Foreign Minister had recently said to him:
I do not believe that Germany wishes to come to an understanding with
France. . . . . Four years ago it was said to M. de Noailles at Berlin
that there were points upon which the two countries might place
themselves in accord. I found the matter so important that I immediately
took it to the president of the Republic and to the premier. I was
authorized by them to telegraph to M. de Noailles that I was disposed to
treat with Germany on all points on which the two countries would be
able to agree. M. de Noailles reported that they had informed him in the
_Wilhelmstrasse_ that in view of its importance the question deserved to
be studied. That was four years ago. Since then not a word more has been
said on that subject. Our ambassador still awaits a response.[157]
The German government replied to this overture with recriminations
against the French Minister. It complained that his proposals had lacked
in concreteness, that France had rejected several German offers of co-
operation, and it accused M. Delcassé of consistent bias in favor of
Great Britain.[158]
When this reply was passed on to M. Delcassé by the Spanish Ambassador
late in November, he remarked, “Then M. de Noailles is a fool”;
thereafter he had no business to transact with the German
representative.[159]
The refusal by both the British and the German governments of the French
overtures was followed in December by that of the Spanish government to
sign the agreement over Morocco. So M. Delcassé’s campaign of 1902
terminated in failure. At the end of the year he reverted to the policy
of the _status quo_, and, anxious about the situation in Morocco,
proposed to Lord Lansdowne that if disorders there should necessitate
action “the Powers interested should take counsel together as to its
nature and scope, and should agree that there should be no single-handed
intervention . . . . on the part of any one Power.” In approving this
policy the British Minister asked M. Cambon for a further explanation of
the phrase “interested Powers.” The latter replied that Great Britain,
France, and Spain were the ones referred to, that Italy had no interest
in Morocco, and that the French government was solicitous of excluding
the United States, and, above all, Germany from that group. He thought
that “it would be most desirable that if Germany were at any moment to
come forward and attempt to assume a conspicuous rôle, it should be
intimated to her that she had no _locus standi_.” Upon that point Lord
Lansdowne refused to commit himself.[160]
M. Delcassé had shown a pro-British inclination from the start, and it
may be that his approaches to Germany had been intended primarily to
press Great Britain to an agreement. Certainly they had been
sufficiently vague to be in harmony with the traditional French attitude
of irreconcilability with the victor of 1870-71. But they had also been
concrete enough to show the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of
negotiating with Germany on acceptable terms. Whether M. Delcassé was
sincere in those overtures cannot be said, although he seems to have
been. At any rate, despairing of Germany, he devoted his full energies
in 1903 toward achieving an accord with Great Britain, from whom no
irredentist problem separated France.
[Footnote 123: Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 1, 1899, _B.D._, I, 216, No.
262.]
[Footnote 124: Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 8, 1898, _ibid._, 163, No.
188, and other documents in chaps. iv, v. Delcassé went so far as to
state to Monson on Sept. 28, 1898, that “he would much prefer an Anglo-
French to a Franco-Russian alliance.” See Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 28,
1898, _ibid._, 171, No. 198.]
[Footnote 125: Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 22, 1898, _ibid._, 169, No.
196, and other documents in the same chapter.]
[Footnote 126: Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 8, 1898, _ibid._, 37, No. 58;
and others in _ibid._, chap. i.]
[Footnote 127: So stated by Paul Cambon in an interview in the _London
Times_, Dec. 22, 1920.]
[Footnote 128: Monson to Salisbury, Jan. 13, 1899, _B.D._, I, 199, No.
241.]
[Footnote 129: Monson to Salisbury, Aug. 14, 1899, _ibid._, 212, No.
259. Cambon had in March made similar complaints to Salisbury (Salisbury
to Monson, March 15, 1899, _ibid._, 211, No. 257).]
[Footnote 130: For expression of French public opinion against Great
Britain see two articles by Ernst Lavisse in the _Revue de Paris_, Feb.
1, 1899, and Jan. 1, 1900. See also Monson to Salisbury, Feb. 3, 1899,
_B.D._, I, 200 f., No. 242; Mévil, _De la paix de Francfort, etc._, pp.
128 f.; Sir Thomas Barclay, _Thirty Years; Anglo-French Reminiscences,
1876-1906_ (London, 1914), pp. 193 f., 209 f.; J. A. Spender, _Life,
Journalism, and Politics_ (London, 1927), I, 183 ff.; Newton, _Lord
Lansdowne_, p. 209.]
[Footnote 131: Romanones, _Las responsabilidades politicas, etc._, pp.
27, 36; Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 27, 1899, _B.D._, I, 234 f., No. 287;
Rumbold to Salisbury, Nov. 3, 1899, _ibid._, 237, No. 291; _G.P._, Vol.
XV, chaps. ic, ci, ciii.]
[Footnote 132: See above, chap. iii; also Emil Bourgeois et Georges
Pagès, _Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande guerre_ (Paris,
1922), p. 276.]
[Footnote 133: The German Emperor made a special endeavor to win France;
hence his numerous telegrams of congratulations or condolence to French
leaders, his toasts and decorations for French officers, etc. The French
called him the “new Lohengrin.” Both he and Bülow made repeated hints to
the French representatives for a _rapprochement_; and one of the
Emperor’s favorite schemes to form a Continental grouping against Great
Britain and the United States was well known from his frequent
references to it. See Theodor Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_ (Munich, 1924), pp.
110, 114, 117, 123 f.; _G.P._, Vol. XVIII, Nos. 5860-71; Bourgeois et
Pagès, pp. 277 ff., 256 f.; William II to Bülow, Oct. 29, 1899, _G.P._,
XV, 406 ff., No. 4394; and the editor’s long note thereto, pp. 406 ff.
On June 4, 1899, the French Ambassador reported a conversation between
the French naval attaché, Buchard, and the Emperor in which the latter
said: “The hour is certainly come when the Continent must defend itself
against England and America, and I think that it is necessary for
Germany and France to rely upon each other [_s’appuient l’une sur
l’autre_].” And Buchard added, “The Emperor is very desirous of
establishing good relations with you” (Bourgeois et Pagès, p. 279). See
also Spring Rice to Villiers, April 24, 1900, Stephen Gwynn (ed.), _The
Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice. A Record_ (Boston and
New York, 1929), I, 220.]
[Footnote 134: How entirely alien to Delcassé’s mind was the idea of a
Continental alliance with Germany was shown by the fact that in August,
1899, at his instigation the phrase “the maintenance of the equilibrium
between the forces of Europe” was introduced into the Dual Alliance. See
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents diplomatiques. L’alliance
franco-russe_ (Paris, 1918), pp. 94 f.; Dickinson, _The International
Anarchy, 1904-1914_ (New York, 1926), p. 108; Georges Michon,
_L’alliance franco-russe, 1891-1917_ (Paris, 1927), pp. 87 ff.]
[Footnote 135: Chamberlain was Colonial minister in the Unionist
cabinet.]
[Footnote 136: In September, 1898, Delcassé had spoken to Monson of the
rumors of an “alliance” between Great Britain and Germany (Monson to
Salisbury, Sept. 8, 1898, _B.D._, I, 162, No. 187).]
[Footnote 137: Memo. by Huhn, Dec. 5, 1898, _G.P._, XIII, 247 ff., No.
3558.]
[Footnote 138: Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 28, 1898, _B.D._, I, 185, No.
221; Monson to Salisbury, Dec. 9, 1898, _ibid._, 196, No. 238.]
[Footnote 139: Count Witte writes in his _Memoirs_ (New York, 1921), p.
178, that when Delcassé came to St. Petersburg in August, 1899, he
sought means of accomplishing this end, and urged the Russian government
to push the construction of the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway so that in
emergency Russia could threaten India. Leon y Castillo, Spanish
ambassador at Paris and an intimate friend of the Minister, likewise
stated in round terms to Radowitz, German ambassador at Madrid, in May,
1899, that Delcassé belonged to the party desirous of a closer
understanding with Germany (Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 28, 1899, _G.P._,
XV, 125 ff., No. 4210. On the other hand, Sir Thomas Barclay records
that upon Delcassé’s departure for St. Petersburg in August, 1899, the
latter said to him that “there was nothing he [Delcassé] personally
would welcome more warmly than a state of feeling which would permit the
two Governments [French and British] to negotiate a solution of their
outstanding difficulties in a friendly give-and-take spirit” (Barclay,
p. 170).]
[Footnote 140: Barclay, pp. 169 f.; Monson to Salisbury, Dec. 1, 1899,
_B.D._, I, 242, No. 300; Monson to Salisbury, Nov. 7, 1899, _ibid._,
239, No. 294; Wolff to Salisbury, June 9, 1900, _ibid._, II, 258, No.
210.]
[Footnote 141: Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 214.]
[Footnote 142: According to an anonymous article, “Quatre ans de
politique extérieure,” _Revue politique et parlementaire_, Oct., 1902,
pp. 24 f., 31, on one occasion during the Boer War when a deputy asked
Delcassé if he did not think this an opportune time to settle the
Moroccan affair with Great Britain, the Minister replied, “How do you
wish me to speak with the English Government? It is so occupied that it
has no time to reply.”]
[Footnote 143: Robert de Caix, writing in the _Bulletin_, was one of
these. Moreover, in March, 1901, not long after the German Emperor’s
visit to England, Delcassé took advantage of the opportunity offered by
the presence of the British mission in Paris for announcing the
accession of King Edward VII to the throne, to let the British know that
the French government wanted a “good understanding” with them (Lee, II,
14 f.).]
[Footnote 144: It must be remembered that Delcassé was then discussing
the Moroccan problem with the Spanish Ambassador, who sought to use that
question as the means for paving the way to the new Continental
combination. Moreover, the Czar and the German Emperor, together with
their foreign ministers, had an interview at Danzig in September at
which the Russian Minister openly advocated a Russo-German alliance.
From Danzig the Czar journeyed to France, and a short time thereafter
occurred Delcassé’s indirect overture to Radolin. On the meeting at
Danzig see Bülow’s account of the conversations on Sept. 12, 14, 1901,
in _G.P._, XVIII, 28 ff., Nos. 5393-95; Savinsky, _Recollections of a
Russian Diplomat_, pp. 17 ff.]
[Footnote 145: The identical project was also proposed to Radolin by
Pallain, governor of the Banque de France. Hansen also remarked that an
important Russian personage had told him positively that Lamsdorff had
spoken to Delcassé of the trip to Berlin. The idea seems to have been
suggested to the Russian Minister by the German Emperor (Radolin to
Bülow, Oct. 27, 1901, _ibid._, 782 ff., No. 5873).]
[Footnote 146: Bülow to Radolin, Nov. 6, 1901, _ibid._, 785, No. 5874.]
[Footnote 147: Metternich to F. O., Jan. 30, 1902, _ibid._, XVII, 342
f., No. 5186; Hermann Freiherr von Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und
politische Denkwürdigkeiten_ (Leipzig, 1919, 1921), II, 379; Lansdowne
to Monson, Jan. 22, 1902, _B.D._, II, 262 f., No. 320; interview with
Cambon published in the _London Times_, Dec. 22, 1920; Monson to
Lansdowne, Feb. 6, 1902, _B.D._, I, 274, No. 339. Lansdowne was so much
interested in the French Ambassador’s ideas that the latter wrote him a
letter enumerating the differences which might be treated. King Edward
read the letter and declared to Cambon, “It is excellent. You must go
on” (interview with Cambon published in the _London Times_, Dec. 22,
1920).]
[Footnote 148: A few days later, however, Delcassé spoke in the Chamber
so vaguely of this declaration and emphasized so strongly France’s
pacific intentions that he cast great doubt upon its value. See Mévil,
pp. 81 f. n.; Tardieu, _La France et les alliances_, pp. 21 f.; see also
Newton, pp. 226 f.]
[Footnote 149: Memo. by Bülow of a conversation with the French
Ambassador, March 20, 1902, _G.P._, XVII, 179 f., No. 5064. In February
the Russian government urged the German government to enter into an
agreement against the new alliance, but the offer was refused (_ibid._,
chap. cx, Part B).]
[Footnote 150: On Siamese affairs, an old cause of trouble between Great
Britain and France, see _ibid._, XVIII, 795 ff., Nos. 5881-83; Schefer,
_D’une guerre à l’autre, etc._, p. 242; _Quest. dipl. et col._, Nov. 15,
1902, pp. 577 ff.; and others.]
[Footnote 151: Richthofen to Metternich, June 30, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII,
795 f., No. 5881.]
[Footnote 152: Memo. by Bülow of a conversation with the Russian
Ambassador, Feb. 25, 1902, _ibid._, XVII, 160 ff., No. 5051; Alvensleben
to F. O., Feb. 25, 1903, _ibid._, 349, No. 5195.]
[Footnote 153: Lansdowne to Monson, July 23, 1902, _B.D._, II, 263 f.,
No. 321.]
[Footnote 154: Lansdowne to Monson, Aug. 6, 1902, _ibid._, 264 ff., No.
322.]
[Footnote 155: Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 15, 1902, _ibid._, 268 ff., No.
325; Newton, pp. 268 f.]
[Footnote 156: Mühlberg to Radolin, Aug. 18, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 795
f., No. 5882; Schlözer to F. O., Sept. 22, 1902, _ibid._, 797, No.
5883.]
[Footnote 157: Radolin to Bülow, Oct. 15, 1902, _ibid._, 797 ff., No.
5884.]
[Footnote 158: Richthofen to Radolin, Oct. 23, 1902, _ibid._, 799 f.,
No. 5885. These accusations were unfair. In the previous June in a
dispatch to Metternich, ambassador at London, two instances had been
mentioned in which the French government had tried to secure the co-
operation of Germany. The editors of _G.P._ admit that one of these
proposals was definite; and in August, 1901, Holstein of the German
foreign office had written that the French government was “not in itself
irreconcilable.” That admission speaks volumes. Moreover, the German
reply admitted that the French Ambassador had usually taken the
initiative in these attempts at co-operation. See Richthofen to
Metternich, June 30, 1902, _ibid._, 795 f., No. 5881; Holstein to Bülow,
Aug. 8, 1901, _ibid._, XVII, 341, No. 5184.]
[Footnote 159: Radolin to Bülow, Dec. 4, 1902, _ibid._, XVIII, 801, No.
5886. As an explanation for this very marked attitude, Delcassé said to
a third party that he had tried to co-operate with Germany but had been
refused (Memo. by Klehmet, April 19, 1903, _ibid._, 801 f., No. 5887).
None the less, up to Oct., 1903, the French government continued to
approve the investment of French capital in the Bagdad Railway (memo. by
Rosen, Oct. 29, 1903, _ibid._, 456 ff., No. 5274).]
[Footnote 160: This conversation occurred on Dec. 31, 1902. Lansdowne to
Monson, Dec. 31, 1902, _B.D._, II, 274 ff., No. 330; Lansdowne to
Monson, Dec. 28, 1902, Monson to Lansdowne, Dec. 31, 1902, Newton, pp.
269 f.]
CHAPTER V
THE ANGLO-GERMAN ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS, 1898-1901
The international position of Great Britain at the end of the nineteenth
century was uncomfortable. The major Powers were all busy in the
colonial world more or less in opposition to her interests;
_Weltpolitik_ was the order of the day; the navies of all states were
growing rapidly and by combining might be able to threaten her maritime
supremacy. On the Continent, the German Emperor’s courtship of an
apparently complaisant France, cordial relations between Russia and
Germany, an agreement in 1897 between Russia and Austria-Hungary over
Balkan affairs, and a growing amity between France and Italy and between
France and Spain gave evidence of a developing _rapprochement_ between
the two systems of alliance. Trouble in West Africa with France in 1897
and early in 1898 made Anglo-French relations acute. Fashoda was on the
way; so was the Boer War. British markets in China were being menaced by
Russia, and the British feared that the Russian, French, and German
governments might co-operate on Chinese affairs to their injury. Public
opinion demanded that the government defend British interests more
actively.[161] These were the more important of the difficulties
confronting the island empire.
To dispel these dangers, two policies were advocated by members of the
Unionist cabinet. Lord Salisbury, prime minister and foreign secretary,
did not believe that a Continental alliance against Great Britain would
be made.[162] He clung to the traditional position of “splendid
isolation,” of making special agreements with the various Powers over
specific issues. As he realized the inadequacy of this policy if Great
Britain attempted to expand her influence too largely in China, South
Africa, and elsewhere, he only half-heartedly supported a vigorous
program of aggression.[163] In January, 1898, he proposed to the Russian
government a general agreement over China and Turkey.[164] On March 8 he
asked the United States government to co-operate in maintaining the open
door in China.[165] However, he was old, in poor health, and inclined to
permit Mr. Chamberlain, the colonial secretary, to force his hand. In
fact, the last five years of his administration have been called the
“Chamberlain period,” so great was the latter’s influence.[166]
This “stormy petrel” from Birmingham favored an entirely new
policy.[167] Determined to maintain and extend British interests in the
whole world, he sought to form a corporation for directing world-affairs
by close co-operation with the United States and Germany. He was
supported more or less fully by the Prince of Wales (who in 1901 became
King Edward VII), in the cabinet by Mr. Balfour (who in 1902 succeeded
Lord Salisbury as prime minister), and by the Duke of Devonshire;[168]
while his influence with the masses and with the business elements
seemed to assure him of popular approval.
Various difficulties had in recent years arisen between Great Britain
and Germany. But Mr. Chamberlain thought that in view of the German
Emperor’s offers of alliance to the British government at various times
during the 1890’s, one as late as January, 1898,[169] the German
government would eagerly accept a proposal to that effect. When Lord
Salisbury’s policy toward Russia failed and trouble with Russia[170] and
with France[171] threatened, in March and April, 1898, the British
Colonial Minister declared to Count Hatzfeldt, the German ambassador,
that Great Britain would have to relinquish her isolation. Under threat
of coming to terms with Russia or France if his overture were refused,
he made an unofficial offer of defensive alliance to Germany.[172]
Mr. Chamberlain’s proposal was coolly received. Count Bülow, the German
secretary of state for foreign affairs, and his inspirer and guide, Herr
von Holstein, privy councilor (_vortragender Rat_) in the foreign
office, who with occasional interference from the Emperor were the
directors of the German foreign policy, not only were mistrustful of
British intentions, but also saw no reason for dissatisfaction with the
current international position and prospects of their state.[173]
Besides, this overture so increased the power of their situation that
they were able to lay down a policy of the “free hand” to be followed
during the next few years. A telegram from Emperor William II to Count
Bülow on April 10, 1898, together with the latter’s marginal notes, best
expressed this policy. After stating that Germany had less need of a
British alliance since Great Britain had turned her attention from the
Continent to the colonial world, the Emperor wrote:
If the English need of support direct itself in the future toward
European affairs also, we could consider it more closely than now.
Nevertheless, it is also of great significance for the present to keep
the official attitude in England favorable and hopeful toward us
[Bülow’s comment, “Yes”]. . . . . Through an England friendly to us we
hold another card in our hand toward Russia. [Bülow’s comment, “Very
true, we must remain independent between them, be the tongue to the
wagon, not the pendulum restlessly swinging about.”] And we thereby have
prospects of gaining colonial and commercial advantages from England.
[Bülow’s comment, “Also the reverse. The calmer relations we have with
Russia, the more will England treat us with respect, not to say take
great care with respect to us.”]
The Emperor proposed that Count Hatzfeldt be instructed not to refuse
the overture abruptly, but rather to express pleasure at the prospect of
a profitable co-operation leading toward an alliance. To the Emperor’s
remark that the pro-German sentiment of the British cabinet would not
long remain concealed from Russia, Count Bülow wrote, “It does not
matter, if only the English cannot prove to the Russians and _vice
versa_ with the evidence in hand that we have played falsely.”[174] In
accordance with the Emperor’s suggestion, Mr. Chamberlain’s offer was
for the time refused.[175]
The German leaders had found the policy by which they hoped to carry out
their program of _Weltpolitik_, already so resoundingly proclaimed in
their speeches and acts.[176] “I am the balance of power,” declared the
Emperor in 1901;[177] and by utilizing the advantages of that position,
he and his advisers hoped to gain colonial concessions from the Powers,
to construct the Bagdad Railway, and to build the German battle fleet.
It was a policy of finesse and at times of intrigue, one nicely suited
to Count Bülow’s ingratiating nature, but one full of pitfalls. Success
depended upon whether Anglo-Russian and Anglo-French hostility was
temporary or relatively permanent, upon whether Mr. Chamberlain was in
earnest in declaring that Great Britain must abandon her policy of
isolation,[178] upon whether German diplomacy would be competent to
force concessions from those Powers without driving them together.
Guided by Emperor William II, Count Bülow, and Herr von Holstein, the
policy of the “free hand” seemed almost foredoomed to failure.
In 1898 the Emperor was thirty-nine years of age, but experience had
taught him very little caution, moderation, or political understanding.
He remained the spoiled sovereign of a spoiled country; each had risen
to power so rapidly as to be unable to take this position for granted
and not to demand explicit recognition of it, and as to be inclined
consequently to abuse its power. The Emperor’s belief in and practice of
his divine right to rule were not tempered by any consistent application
to his task. While not devoid of political intuition, he lacked most of
the qualities of a statesman. He was brilliant, but erratic and
impulsive. In spite of his seeming wide knowledge, he was mentally lazy
and devoid of profundity. Of a highly nervous temperament, he was guided
chiefly by his emotions. He appeared rigid, severe, and forbidding on
state occasions, but he loved to relax, to be jocose and sociable. He
could be cordial and wonderfully amiable and charming, like his mother,
and again, when his temper was aroused, he could be ruthless and
crushing. He spoke often and dramatically, and traveled as much and as
widely as he could. He frequently antagonized and angered people
unintentionally by his imperious obtuseness. Then he would feel
aggrieved and abused, for he expected all the understanding to come from
the other side. One could not take him at his word; one had to interpret
his meaning from his acts and intentions as well. At times his words
would leave exactly the opposite meaning from that which he intended. He
once remarked to Sir Frank Lascelles, the British ambassador, that “the
noodles seem to have had a lucid interval,” when upon further
conversation it developed he had intended thereby to express his great
satisfaction with the communication from the British government.[179] He
loved to set countries at odds by his intrigues and gossip. His jealousy
of Great Britain, her empire, and her fleet was a cardinal reason both
for his being constantly attracted to England and for his desiring to
become her colonial and naval rival. Nevertheless, after twelve years of
personal contact with the Emperor, Sir Frank Lascelles came to the
following sane conclusion about him:
In spite of his habit of twirling his moustache and rattling his sabre
(I trust that this sentence may be taken in its metaphorical and not in
its literal sense, for, as a matter of fact, I have never either seen
him twirl his moustache or heard him rattle his sword), which he may
think a befitting attitude for the ruler of a mighty Empire, he is
really animated by the most pacific sentiments, and . . . . his great
ambition now is that his name should be handed down to posterity as that
of the German Emperor who kept the peace. It would seem that this is the
estimate which the Emperor has formed of his own character, as in a
recent conversation with Prince Radolin[180] he said he was at a loss to
understand how, with his well-known peaceful intentions, he had come to
be looked upon as a disturbing element—an instance, perhaps, of that
“inconscience” which M. Herbette[181] considered a characteristic of the
German nation, and concluded with the almost pathetic sentence, “Ich bin
doch kein böser Mensch” [I am really not a bad person].[182]
The Emperor’s deficiences were in part made up by Count Bülow, who had
been chosen secretary of state for foreign affairs in 1897 to execute
the program of _Weltpolitik_. Born in 1849 of an old North German
family, he had had diplomatic service at St. Petersburg, Vienna, Athens,
Paris, Bucharest, and Rome where he had been ambassador since 1894. He
came to his task at a crucial time in the history of Germany’s foreign
relations, but he lacked the farsightedness, decision, and firmness of
character necessary to deal with the problems adequately. Although he
learned with time, recognized his mistakes, and tried to readjust the
German foreign policy, he was then unable to do so. While his
cosmopolitan culture and knowledge enabled him to understand other
nations better than most Germans did, he seemed incapable of using this
understanding practically. Under him the German policy appeared to
demand something for nothing, anywhere or everywhere, merely because
Germany was so strong a Power. In 1907 Lord Sanderson, British permanent
undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, 1894-1906, a sane,
sympathetic witness, stigmatized the German method of handling foreign
affairs as follows:
The Germans are very tight bargainers, they have earned the nickname of
“_les Juifs de la diplomatie_.” The German Foreign Office hold to a
traditional view of negotiation that one of the most effective methods
of gaining your point is to show how intensely disagreeable you can make
yourself if you do not. They are surprised that the recollection of
these methods should rankle, and speaking generally the North Germans
combine intense susceptibility as regards themselves with a singular
inability to appreciate the susceptibilities of others.[183]
Under Count Bülow, German foreign policy lacked direction and stability.
It aroused the mistrust of the other Powers, who could not comprehend
what Germany wanted. The Count was abler at extricating himself from
difficulties than at avoiding them. A confirmed optimist at all times,
he was suave and reassuring; the French Ambassador complained that he
“was a fluent speaker but when one came to recall and note down what he
had said very little came out of it.” Sir Frank Lascelles called him a
perfect master at expressing vague generalities.[184] Count Bülow no
doubt had a difficult time keeping the Emperor within bounds and undoing
the latter’s mischief, but he was by no means an able statesman himself,
and he relied for advice upon a person whom many considered a
psychopath.
Since Prince Bismarck’s dismissal in 1890, Herr von Holstein had been a
dominant influence in the German foreign office as the preserver of the
Bismarckian tradition. Strangely secretive, he avoided all publicity and
all responsible offices, yet he lusted after power behind the scenes. He
was irascible, morbidly suspicious, both timorous and bold, by nature
unfit to handle foreign affairs. He could not make up his mind to act.
He could not understand the other government’s viewpoint. He knew few of
the foreign representatives in Berlin personally, and rarely consulted
with any of them. He relied for information chiefly upon the dispatches
and upon newspapers, thus lacking the intimate contact with reality
which might have balanced his recluse judgment. His mobile mind could
make two plus two equal three, five, or seven and a half, but seldom
four. His training under Prince Bismarck had taught him that master’s
use of threats and force but not his caution and comprehensive sagacity.
His adroit and intricate analysis of diplomatic situations and policies
made him a power in the foreign office. The Emperor urged his dismissal,
but Count Bülow clung to him, consulted him on all matters, and
generally followed his advice.[185]
During the next year the German plan worked. On the one hand, with
troubles coming to a head in China, the Sudan, and South Africa, the
British government was grudgingly compelled to play the German game by
agreeing to a division of the Samoan Islands and a prospective partition
of the Portuguese colonies and by acknowledging the utility of similar
accords.[186] On the other hand, an indirect bid for a _rapprochement_
by M. Delcassé in December, 1898,[187] and a proposal from the Russian
government in 1899 for an agreement over Asia Minor[188] signified equal
success, although the German government refused both offers. Then when
the Boer War began late in 1899, Great Britain, surprised by the
universal outburst of hatred against her on the Continent and
apprehensive of German, French, and Russian intervention in favor of the
Boers, had urgent need of Germany’s friendship. Hence the pressing
invitation to the Emperor William II and his foreign secretary in the
autumn of 1899 to visit England.[189]
As Count Bülow cared nothing about the fate of the Boers, the visit took
place (November 21-24). He and the Emperor were received
enthusiastically by government, court, and people. The British ministers
showed anger at France and Russia and a desire for co-operation with
Germany.[190] Mr. Chamberlain, who boldly asserted that the two
countries “must sooner or later come to a general understanding because
we need each other,” repeated his wish for a grouping of Germany, the
United States, and Great Britain.
The German leaders responded as in the previous year that more intimate
relations between the two countries should be prepared for by special
agreements. The British Colonial Minister, readily accepting this
program, suggested two subjects for negotiation, the Bagdad Railway and
Morocco; whereupon it was agreed that he should take up the latter
question with the German Ambassador in the very near future.[191]
The visit to Windsor was apparently a complete success. Both governments
were highly pleased with the results. The only discord in the harmony
was the expression of mutual antagonism on the part of the English and
German press. To counteract this opposition, Mr. Chamberlain, at Count
Bülow’s suggestion,[192] openly advocated his project in a speech at
Leicester on November 30 as follows:
The same sentiments which bring us into closer sympathy with the United
States of America may also be evoked to bring us into closer sympathy
and alliance with the Empire of Germany. . . . . If the union between
England and America is a powerful factor in the cause of peace, a new
triple alliance between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of
the Anglo-Saxon race will be a still more potent influence in the future
of the world.[193]
The Colonial Secretary’s act had the very reverse effect of that
intended, for the German people rejected with vituperation the idea of
allying with the oppressors of the Boers. The German Foreign Minister,
ambitious for the chancellorship when the aged Prince Hohenlohe should
retire, and inclined to follow the dictates of public opinion, felt
compelled to take cognizance of this feeling. Speaking before the
Reichstag on December 11, he made a cool rejoinder to Mr. Chamberlain’s
proposal. In a chauvinistic declaration of Germany’s need for colonies
and a navy, he proclaimed: “As for England we are gladly willing to live
with her in peace and harmony on a basis of complete reciprocity. But
since our international position is at present a favorable one, we must
utilize it in order to safeguard ourselves for the future.”[194]
Mr. Chamberlain was indignant at this reply, even though the German
government made special efforts to explain it away.[195] Hence, as the
two presses were at each other’s throats and the governments were
wrangling over minor troubles arising out of the Boer War, he dropped
the idea of an alliance, presumably also that of a Moroccan accord, at
least until the close of the war.[196]
In 1900, with the French advance on Touat, the Moroccan question became
acute. In April the German government for the first time weighed
carefully its ambitions with reference to Morocco and the means for
realizing them.[197] Count Bülow held that Germany had maritime
interests of her own in that land, and was no longer concerned merely
for the sake of Italy, as she had been ten years before. He coveted
particularly the southern area on the Atlantic Coast. A British seizure
of Moroccan territory without consideration for German interests, he
stated, “would within Germany greatly weaken and discredit the
Government and in its foreign relations make any future co-operation
with England impossible and force us to seek connection with Russia and
France at almost any price”; while an Anglo-French settlement of the
question to the exclusion or detriment of Germany “would have
incalculable results for the further course of German internal and
external policy.” In either case German foreign policy would be forced
to take another direction whether the government wished it or not; and
relations with Great Britain would become more strained than ever
before. In fact, the German government “could not possibly accept either
eventuality.”[198]
In these words lies the key to the understanding of Germany’s
precipitation of the Moroccan crisis in 1905.
To obviate those dangers, the German government preferred an agreement
with Great Britain. In May, 1900, it proposed to Mr. Chamberlain that
they negotiate a Moroccan accord. But the Colonial Minister, while
acknowledging that the only peaceful way to solve the Moroccan problem
was by an agreement between Great Britain and Germany, had become more
wary and requested the German government to make an official proposal
which he could submit to the cabinet. He felt sure, he said, that it
would be favorably received, and promised to support it, provided his
well-known desires were given due consideration.[199]
Fearing a rejection, the German government deemed it inadvisable to
follow Mr. Chamberlain’s suggestion. Nor did Count Bülow warn the
British government that Germany must participate in any Moroccan
settlement, since he believed it possible to prevent the Moroccan affair
from becoming serious until the opportunity for an Anglo-German
agreement arose.[200] He held that an Anglo-French understanding about
Morocco was impossible because of the conflict of French and British
interests over the possession of the south shore of the straits. To
avert a crisis, he issued a discreet warning to M. Delcassé in May,
1900, not to go beyond treaty limits in the action against Touat;[201]
he incited the Russian Foreign Minister, who, he thought, would be
opposed to any Anglo-French agreement or to a European disturbance over
Morocco, to restrain the French Minister;[202] and he instructed the
German representative at Tangier to retard the collapse of the Sherifian
Empire.[203] Thereafter the Moroccan question remained in abeyance for a
time.[204]
In November, 1900, Lord Salisbury resigned the secretaryship of foreign
affairs to Lord Lansdowne. Lord Lansdowne had had a varied life. Of high
aristocratic and wealthy family, he had entered politics as a matter of
course and had served as governor-general of Canada, viceroy of India,
and secretary of state for war. He fitted admirably into his new
position as foreign secretary, for he possessed patience, tact, and the
ability to inspire confidence, and he assumed responsibility with
decision and courage. While he entered office with very few
preconceptions, he wrote to Sir Frank Lascelles, he did believe that “we
should use every effort to maintain and, if we can, to strengthen the
good relations which at present exist between the Queen’s Government and
that of the Emperor” of Germany.[205] In his foreign policy he sided
with the new school, already represented by Mr. Balfour and Mr.
Chamberlain. When King Edward VII gave royal support to this group after
his accession to the throne in January, 1901, the Victorian policy of
“splendid isolation” definitely terminated. However, the old Marquess of
Salisbury remained premier until 1902; and the foreign policy eventually
adopted was a compromise between the old and the new.
The international position of Great Britain remained bad. If anything,
it had grown worse since 1899; for the Boer War lingered on, and France
and Russia were endangering important British interests, the one by her
active policy with reference to Morocco, the other by her use of the
Boxer Rebellion to extend her power in China and by her activity in
Persia and Afghanistan.
In the autumn of 1900, the British government had negotiated an accord
with Germany over China to hold Russia in check.[206] In January of the
next year Mr. Chamberlain, after repeating his assertion that Great
Britain must ally either with Germany and the Triple Alliance or with
France and Russia, proposed to Baron Eckardstein, first secretary of the
German embassy in London, that as an introduction to the project for an
alliance the two governments agree over Morocco. The subject could be
taken up with Lord Lansdowne, he said, as soon as Lord Salisbury, still
in feeble health, left for the south.[207] Before any negotiations were
begun, however, far eastern affairs, as more pressing and vital, brought
to the fore the question of alliance.[208]
Early in 1901, reports were spread of a Russo-Chinese agreement which
would give Russia practically a protectorate in Southern Manchuria. The
problem which thereupon confronted the British government was
illuminatingly summed up by Mr. Bertie, undersecretary of state for
foreign affairs, as follows (March 11, 1901):
Germany has assured Japan that there is no secret understanding between
Germany and Russia respecting the Far East, and that, in the event of a
crisis, Germany will observe a benevolent neutrality, the effect of
which would be to keep the French fleet in check.
The Japanese Government ask whether His Majesty’s Government have been
consulted by Germany, and whether they believe the assurances given to
Japan; and they further ask: “How far may Japan rely upon the support of
Great Britain in case Japan finds it necessary to approach Russia?”
It is assumed by the Japanese Minister that “approach” in the context
means “resist,” which is war.
Unless Japan can make sure of neither Germany nor France taking an
active part on the side of Russia, she will not fight Russia over the
Manchurian Agreement. If the possession of Corea by Russia were at
issue, Japan would fight, with or without support, and independently of
whether France or Germany would remain neutral.
If Germany and England, in answer to the Japanese Government’s
inquiries, deprecated war, and said that if unfortunately war broke out
between Japan and Russia, it would be the object of England and Germany
to restrict as much as possible the theatre of it, and they would
consequently remain neutral, so long as no third Power attempted to take
a part in it, then I think that such an assurance might be sufficient to
satisfy Japan that France would not be allowed to join with Russia, and
that Japan might fight Russia single-handed. . . . .
If France were allowed to side with Russia, and they crushed Japan, the
result might be a renewal of the triple understanding—viz., Russia,
France, and Germany. Those three Powers would become supreme in China,
and we should go to the wall.
If Russia alone, or in combination with France, defeated Japan, and we
came to the rescue to prevent the obliteration of Japan, we should incur
the lasting enmity of Russia and France, and a defeated, and probably
ungrateful, Japan would not be of much use to us as against Russian
encroachments.
It has been suggested that if Japan defeated Russia there would be grave
danger to European interests in the Far East.
A great military and naval Power, with unbounded natural resources and
an immense population such as Russia, is not likely to accept defeat
permanently. She would reorganize for a further trial of strength, but
such a trial might be a long way off, and it would be greatly retarded
by Japan being allowed to take as the spoils of war the Liaotung
Peninsula. Its possession by Japan would be a guarantee that there would
be no reconciliation between Russia and Japan. This would be an
advantage to England and Europe. The yellow danger would be kept in
check by Russia and the Russian danger by Japan.
If we do nothing to encourage Japan to look upon us as a friend and
possible ally against Russia and France, we may drive her to a policy of
despair, in which she may come to some sort of terms with Russia. I do
not say that it is probable, but it is possible, and our interests would
greatly suffer if she did.[209]
Therein lies the deciding reason why the British government tried to
secure the support of Germany; why it made the alliance with Japan when
this attempt came to naught; and why it subsequently established the
entente with France. An agreement with Germany, supplemented by one with
Japan, would have solved Great Britain’s difficulty of defending her
colonial interests by assuring the maintenance of the balance of power
in Europe. Failing this, an alliance with Japan and a policy of
reconciliation and entente with the other Powers furnished the best
solution. But in any case either alliance or close friendship with a
European Power was essential.
At the time the prospect of obtaining German aid looked favorable. The
German Emperor had rushed impetuously to the bedside of the dying Queen
Victoria late in January, 1901, and had remained for her funeral. In his
talk with the British officials he had denounced Russia for her
aggressions in China, had informed them that Great Britain needed an
alliance, and, in a dinner speech at Marlborough House on February 5,
had declared: “We ought to form an Anglo-German alliance, you to keep
the seas while we would be responsible for the land.”[210]
Late in January the British government tried to obtain German aid
against the Russian aggressions in Manchuria by calling into action the
Anglo-German agreement of the previous year; but the German government
refused to permit an interpretation of that accord which would embroil
it with its eastern neighbor.[211] Instead, it tried to persuade the
British government to connive at embroiling Russia and Japan in war
without binding themselves.[212] It assured Japan of the localization of
that conflict by remarking that Germany would remain neutral and would
thereby hold France neutral. In March, Lord Lansdowne, following up this
assertion, asked Baron Eckardstein if Germany would undertake to hold
France neutral in case of war (March 16). In violation of strict orders
from Herr von Holstein “not to breathe a word of alliance” to the
British government,[213] Baron Eckardstein replied that “if there were a
defensive alliance between Germany and Great Britain covering all
eventualities,” Germany would be able to do so.[214] Two days later Lord
Lansdowne declared to the Baron that “England now stands at a turning
point and must decide upon her future policy”; and in accordance with
the Baron’s strong hint, a defensive alliance was tentatively set forth
for consideration. By its terms each Power should preserve neutrality in
case of an attack upon the other by either France or Russia but should
come to its aid in case of an attack by those two Powers combined.[215]
Baron Eckardstein reported the proposal as coming from the British
Minister, and his government looked upon it as a British offer. Lord
Lansdowne made the Baron responsible for the initiative. With the
existing evidence, the contradiction cannot be cleared up; yet as each
government was under the impression that the other had taken the first
step and was therefore more eager for the alliance than was really the
case, the negotiations endured longer than they might otherwise have
done.[216]
In the next two and a half months the course of the negotiations was
checkered. On March 22, Baron Eckardstein unofficially brought up the
subject with Lord Lansdowne. During their discussion they agreed that it
would be best for the _casus foederis_ to arise when one of the Powers
was attacked by two or more Powers, and that the accord should be
ratified by the two parliaments. The British Secretary declared that the
Premier approved “in principle of a strictly defined defensive
alliance.”[217] On March 29 they again touched on the matter; but owing
to Lord Lansdowne’s inability to consult his chief, who was ill, and
owing to a flare-up between the two governments over a minor matter
connected with the Chinese customs, Baron Eckardstein postponed the
negotiations.[218] On April 9 he was ready to resume the discussion; and
for the first time he mentioned to the British Minister the
indispensable stipulation of his government, that Austria-Hungary and
Italy must also be included in the alliance.[219]
From the start the attitude of the German government toward these
proposals was mistrustful. Since the British government had been
disinclined to execute the Anglo-German accord of 1898 for a future
division of the Portuguese Colonies, the German government was reluctant
to consider even Mr. Chamberlain’s suggestion for an accord over
Morocco, at least until events permitted its immediate execution.[220]
Count Bülow and Herr von Holstein refused to believe that the British
government would make an alliance so long as Lord Salisbury remained in
authority. Moreover, they feared that if the negotiations failed and
became known to France and Russia, owing to British perfidy or to
Parliament’s rejecting the treaty—and either outcome seemed likely to
them—Germany would be the one to suffer from the wrath of those two
Powers while Great Britain, protected by the sea, would enjoy greater
international security than before.
I am especially mistrustful of this present storm of friendship by
Chamberlain and comrades [wrote Herr von Holstein to Count Metternich]
because the threatened understanding with Russia and France is such
complete fraud. A retreat by England would postpone her struggle for
existence for a few years, but would then make it all the more certain,
because the opponents [France and Russia] will have been strengthened,
while the English will have been weakened in power and prestige. A
reasonable agreement with England, that is, one in which a proper
consideration is given to the almost certain danger of war to which we
should thereby expose ourselves, can in my opinion first be achieved
when the appreciation of her constrained position has become more
general in England than it is at present.[221]
Count Bülow, chancellor since the previous October, held the same view.
In fact, he was even more inclined to preserve the policy of the “free
hand.” “Facts, sir, facts,” he wrote in connection with this question of
alliance, and above all he wanted facts in the form of colonial
acquisitions in Africa.[222] So while sensible of the power of such an
alliance, these two would have it only on German terms, an alliance
between the British Empire, on the one hand, and the Triple Alliance, on
the other; or, as an alternative formulation, an alliance by which Great
Britain joined the Triple Alliance.[223] To obviate all possibility of
betrayal, they instructed Baron Eckardstein to demand of Lord Lansdowne
the acceptance of this basic condition before continuing the
negotiations. Not until then, they declared, should the terms of the
Triple Alliance be imparted to the British government.[224]
Conversations were resumed in the second half of May. When, on May 23,
Count Hatzfeldt made clear to Lord Lansdowne the provision of his
government, an _impasse_ was soon reached. The British Foreign Secretary
approved the project of alliance in principle, but he had never expected
much to come of it. Upon ascertaining the German condition he foresaw a
breakdown when the time came to formulate the terms.[225]
Moreover, Lord Salisbury persistently refused to admit that Great
Britain needed an alliance. He asserted that it would be a bad bargain
to join the Triple Alliance, for the “liability of having to defend the
German and the Austrian frontiers against Russia is heavier than that of
having to defend the British Isles against France.” He opposed any
secret agreement on the grounds that Parliament had the right to decide
questions of war and peace; and he continued to favor isolation and
dependence on public opinion to determine governmental policy in a
crisis. Nor did he believe that German public opinion, so hostile to
Great Britain, would accept an Anglo-German defensive alliance.[226]
Thus while some of the members of the cabinet discussed the possible
terms of an alliance, and Sir Thomas Sanderson, permanent undersecretary
of state for foreign affairs, even drew up two trial drafts of a treaty,
the opposition of Lord Salisbury together with the German refusal to
communicate the terms of the Triple Alliance forced the negotiations to
a halt in June.[227]
The German Chancellor readily accepted this turn of affairs. After
expressing a desire for a future alliance, he assured the British
government that Germany would continue the policy of the “free
hand.”[228]
The visit of the Moroccan embassy to London and Berlin in June and July
afforded an opportunity to revive the Moroccan question. Lord
Lansdowne’s uneasiness about the French actions with reference to
Morocco was not allayed by the French Ambassador’s assertion to him on
July 3 that France had no intention of raising that problem.[229] But
nothing was done.[230]
When el-Menebhi, the leader of that embassy, was dismissed in disgrace
on his return home, the British Foreign Secretary expressed the wish to
remain in constant touch with the German government on the Moroccan
question.[231] Each Power, however, acted separately in defending the
Moroccan Minister; and the German government looked on this as another
occasion in which Great Britain was trying to employ Germany to defend
British interests. The German leaders likewise thought that by refusing
to make any separate agreements with Great Britain they would eventually
force the latter to accept their terms for an alliance.[232]
As soon as the negotiations with Germany showed no prospect of success,
the British government followed up Japan’s offer of an alliance and in
August began official conversations on that subject.[233] None the less
it continued its efforts to make some kind of agreement with Germany.
But on August 23, at Wilhelmshöhe, a meeting between Emperor William II
and King Edward VII, which the British leaders hoped would pave the way
for an understanding, had no result.[234] In November, Lord Lansdowne
regarded the difficulties in the way of an alliance as “at the present
moment virtually insuperable,” enumerating some of them as follows:
1. The impossibility of arriving at a definition of the _casus foederis_
which would not be either so rigid as to greatly hamper our freedom of
action or so vague as to deprive the alliance of all practical value.
2. The certainty of alienating France and Russia.
3. Complications with the Colonies, which might not at all approve of
the idea of hanging on to the skirts of the Triple Alliance.
4. The risk of entangling ourselves in a policy which might be hostile
to America. Without knowledge of the German Emperor’s views in regard to
the United States, this is to my mind a formidable obstacle.
5. The difficulty of carrying Parliament with us at a moment when the
Parliamentary situation is as little satisfactory as it is at
present.[235]
But, he wrote, “the argument that, because we have in the past survived
in spite of our isolation, we need have no misgivings as to the effect
of that isolation in the future,” could be pushed too far. Besides,
since negotiations then in progress for an alliance with Japan virtually
signified that Great Britain did not wish to remain alone, he proposed
that the government seek “a much more limited understanding with Germany
as to our policy in regard to certain matters of interest to both
Powers”—for instance, they might agree to co-operate for the
preservation of the territorial _status quo_ on the shores of the
Mediterranean, the Adriatic, the Aegean, and the Black Seas, for the
maintenance of the “freedom for the commerce and navigation . . . . in
the Persian Gulf, and the prevention of any territorial acquisitions on
its shores by other Powers which might interfere with that object.” But
only “whenever the occasion for it might arise” should the nature of
their co-operation be determined.[236]
The Premier remained vigorously opposed to the project; but Lord
Lansdowne urged that the German government probably expected him to
reopen the negotiations, and that if he made this offer, that government
would be deprived of any grounds for complaining that Great Britain “had
treated it inconsiderately or brusquely rejected its overture.” As he
also suspected that “the German Gov’t. (or the German Emperor) desire
something much more precise and far-reaching . . . . and that they would
refuse an overture on the above lines,” he maintained that the proposal
could cause no damage.[237]
On December 19 the British Foreign Minister recalled to Count
Metternich, the new German ambassador at London, the negotiations for an
alliance and stated that “while . . . . we certainly did not regard the
German proposal with an unfriendly or indifferent eye, I did not think
that for the moment we could afford to take it up.” Instead he suggested
that the two governments arrive at “an understanding with regard to the
policy which they might pursue in reference to particular questions or
in particular parts of the world in which they are alike interested.”
Count Metternich expressed surprise that the British government had not
“jumped at” this “magnificent opportunity” to end its isolation, and
replied that he did not expect his government to favor this restricted
proposal. “It was a case of the whole or none.”[238]
There the matter rested. Lord Lansdowne and King Edward were both
dissatisfied with Count Metternich’s critical tone;[239] but they
continued to voice their solicitude, which the German Emperor and Count
Bülow reciprocated, that the two governments keep in close touch.[240]
However, public opinion in both countries remained bitterly hostile, and
when in October, 1901, Mr. Chamberlain spoke disparagingly of the
actions of the German army in the war of 1870-71, the protest of the
German press was so vehement that the Chancellor, on January 8, 1902,
declared in the Reichstag, “let the man go and do not become excited. He
bites on granite.”[241] The pleasant visit of the Prince of Wales to
Germany a short time later did not offset the discord resulting from
this war of words.[242] By March, Count Metternich wrote that he
“wouldn’t give two pence for Anglo-German relations”; while the
Chancellor admitted that so far as Great Britain was concerned the
Emperor was Germany’s “best card.”[243] It was a dismal fiasco for so
momentous a negotiation.
The British government thought that by considering an alliance the
German leaders had manifested friendly feeling. Lord Lansdowne did not
believe that the animosity of Germany toward Great Britain would last
forever or that Germany would “let us ‘go under’ before a great European
coalition.” “Is it not more likely,” he wrote, April 22, 1902, to Sir
Frank Lascelles, “that she will stick to her rôle of the honest broker,
taking advantage, if you like, of our difficulties in order to pursue a
_politique de pourboire_ at our expense, but without pooling her
ironclads with those of France and Russia?” The Ambassador agreed with
him; but after talking to the British naval attaché in Berlin he pointed
out for the first time that the German navy was definitely aimed at
Great Britain.[244] The future for Anglo-German relations was therefore
none too bright for the British government, and British public opinion
cordially approved when on January 30, 1902, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
was concluded.
The German government was not at all alarmed by this failure. Its
relations with France and Russia were of the best. As a result of the
Anglo-German intimacy in 1901, M. Delcassé had twice endeavored to
approach Germany, while in September, during a meeting at Danzig of the
Russian and German rulers together with their foreign ministers, the
Russian Minister had asserted that “an alliance between Germany and
Russia would be the greatest blessing and is a goal to be striven for.”
The overtures were disregarded.[245] When the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
was concluded in February, 1902, the Russian government urged Germany to
enter a Continental combination against those Powers; but Count Bülow,
pleased to see obviated the possibility of an Anglo-Russian
understanding, bluntly rejected the proposal.[246] Nor did he believe
that, since Russia and Great Britain were so decisively at odds, France
would dare make an accord with the latter.[247] And Herr von Holstein
wrote on December 31, 1901, that “at the present day Germany with her
enormous strength on land and sea is a factor which no Power that wishes
to perform an important act dare leave in its rear without having
previously come to an understanding with her.”[248]
Thus, the German apostles of _Weltpolitik_ guiding the destinies of an
acquisitive and chauvinistic nation, refused to co-operate with Great
Britain, France, or Russia. Apparently they did not know what they
wanted or how they might utilize their favorable situation; for they
derived no benefits whatever from any of the opportunities offered. An
Anglo-German agreement would have prevented the formation of the Entente
Cordiale and would very likely have brought about a settlement of the
Moroccan question to Germany’s advantage. By cultivating France and
encouraging her to draw closer, Germany might have come to some
agreement with that Power through which she could have prevented the
later Entente Cordiale from becoming so cordial, and through which she
might have shared in the general improvement of relations between the
Powers and in the settlement of the Moroccan question. The whole
Moroccan crisis and many others to follow might thereby have been
avoided. In a world of shifting friendships, of swiftly changing
policies, a world demanding resolute and judicious statesmanship, the
German Chancellor and Herr von Holstein refused to take risks. Toward
the British government they had showed themselves too sensitive,
suspicious, and peremptory in their demands.[249] The French and Russian
governments they had rebuffed even more brusquely. Deluded by wrong
preconceptions of international politics and overprudent in their
negotiations, they believed themselves entirely safe in playing their
favorite rôle of sphinx and of aligning with no one.[250] Their naval
program alarmed Great Britain; their construction of the Bagdad Railway
antagonized Russia; their Moroccan policy exasperated France. They
played against all three Powers, and still did not expect them to draw
together against a common opponent. Instead of alliances or ententes,
they reaped animosities. By their refusals and their clumsy diplomacy,
they paved the road for the Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian ententes.
And when, a few years later, those Powers came to agreement, the German
leaders feared that their country was being encircled and isolated.
[Footnote 161: Memo. by Bertie, March 14, 1898, _B.D._, I, 17 f., No.
24; memo. by Tilley, on relations between Russia and Great Britain,
1892-1904, Jan. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 1 ff., No. 1; O’Conor to Salisbury,
March 15, 1898, _ibid._, 20, No. 29; Salisbury to O’Conor, March 24,
1898, _ibid._, 24 f., No. 38; Monson to Salisbury, Feb. 26, 1898,
_ibid._, 146, No. 172; Monson to Salisbury, March 6, 1898, _ibid._, 147,
No. 173; Monson to Salisbury, May 19, 1898, _ibid._, 154, No. 179; memo.
by Bertie, June 30, 1898, _ibid._, 54, No. 72; Erich Brandenburg, _Von
Bismarck zum Weltkriege_ (Berlin, 1924), chaps. iv, v; Sir A. W. Ward
and G. P. Gooch (eds.), _The Cambridge History of British Foreign
Policy, 1783-1919_ (Cambridge, 1923), Vol. III, chaps. iii, iv,
_passim_; _G.P._, Vol. XIV, chap. xci. The British were especially
concerned over maintaining the open door in China. See Alfred L. P.
Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906_ (New York, 1928),
pp. 179, 182 f.]
[Footnote 162: For expressions of this fear see Gwynn, _The Letters and
Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 182 f., 225 f., 331 f.]
[Footnote 163: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, _G.P._, XIV, 221
ff., No. 3793; dispatches from Hatzfeldt recounting conversations with
Salisbury, May 12, 15, 1898, _ibid._, 230 ff., and notes; Hatzfeldt to
F. O., May 15, 1898, _ibid._, 233 ff., No. 3797. The best exposition of
Salisbury’s views is given in a memorandum by him, May 29, 1901, _B.D._,
II, 68 f., No. 86. See also J. A. Spender, _The Public Life_ (New York,
1925), I, 79; Salisbury to Lansdowne, April 21, 1897, Newton, _Lord
Lansdowne, A Biography_, pp. 145 f. On Aug. 30, 1899, Salisbury wrote to
Lansdowne that the British army would not be needed for a Continental
war “in a blue moon” (_ibid._, p. 157).]
[Footnote 164: Salisbury to O’Conor, Jan. 17, 25, 1898, _B.D._, I, 5,
No. 5; 8, No. 9; and others in _ibid._, chap. i.]
[Footnote 165: Dennis, pp. 170 f.]
[Footnote 166: Salisbury was prime minister from 1895 to 1902.]
[Footnote 167: On Chamberlain see Spender, I, 79.]
[Footnote 168: Hatzfeldt, German ambassador to London, also thought that
the Liberal leaders, Lord Rosebery and Sir William Harcourt, approved of
Chamberlain’s plan. Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 7, 1898, _G.P._, XIV,
209 ff., No. 3788. See also Gwynn, I, 188, 191.]
[Footnote 169: Lieut. Col. Grierson, British military attaché at Berlin,
reported to the British Ambassador a conversation with the Emperor on
Jan. 15, 1898, as follows: “He [the Emperor] said that for eight years
he had striven to be friendly with Great Britain to gain her alliance,
and to work hand in hand with her, but had failed” (Grierson to
Lascelles, Jan. 19, 1898, _B.D._, I, 42, No. 62). The Emperor said the
same to Lascelles on Feb. 1. See Lascelles to Salisbury, Feb. 1, 1898,
_ibid._, 43 f., No. 63; memo. by Tilley on the relations between Germany
and Great Britain (1892-1904), Jan. 5, 1905, _ibid._, Appendix, 322 ff.;
Brandenburg, chaps. i-iv.]
[Footnote 170: Russia had just occupied Port Arthur. In speaking to the
Russian Ambassador about that act on March 24, Balfour declared that the
British government regarded it with “grave objection,” as a “menace” to
the friendship of the two countries. See Salisbury to O’Conor, March 24,
1898, _B.D._, I, 24 f., No. 38.]
[Footnote 171: Monson to Salisbury, March 6, 1898, _ibid._, 147, No.
173. Salisbury tried to obtain the support of the United States on
Chinese affairs (Dennis, p. 170).]
[Footnote 172: It was on March 24 that Hatzfeldt reported that Alfred
Rothschild had arranged a meeting between him and Chamberlain and
Balfour. See Hatzfeldt to F. O., March 24, 1898, _G.P._, XIV, 193 f.,
No. 3779. For reports of the conversations between Hatzfeldt and Balfour
and Chamberlain see the following dispatches: Hatzfeldt to F. O., March
25, 29, April 1, 1898, _ibid._, 195 ff., Nos. 3781, 3782, 3784;
Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, _ibid._, 221 ff., No. 3793. The
editors of the _British Documents_ could find “practically no evidence”
concerning this proposal in the archives of the British foreign office,
and have stated that Chamberlain apparently treated the affair as
private (_B.D._, Vol. I, Foreword). See also the dispatch from Lascelles
to Balfour, Aug. 23, 1898, _ibid._, 101, No. 122. That Chamberlain was
uncertain about the sort of agreement he wished was evident from the
different formulations of the proposal which he made. As to the American
aspect of his plan, Chamberlain was influenced by Ambassador John Hay,
who supported the idea of an Anglo-American alliance. On May 13, 1898,
at Birmingham the British Minister spoke publicly in favor of that
alliance (Dennis, pp. 117 f., 122). Nothing of course came of the
matter. The great affinity for the United States on the part of the
British government was shown in July, 1898, by its indirect warning to
Germany not to interfere in the Spanish-American War (Gwynn, I, 251,
253). On the Anglo-German negotiations for an alliance see Friedrich
Meinecke, _Geschichte des deutsch-englischen Bündnisproblems, 1890-1901_
(München and Berlin, 1927); Eugen Fischer, _Holsteins Grosses Nein_
(Berlin, 1925).]
[Footnote 173: Holstein thought that the possibility for this alliance
would first enter “when (1) Russia threatens us; (2) England acts less
haughty than today.” See Holstein’s minute to a dispatch from Hatzfeldt
to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, _G.P._, XIV, 223, No. 3793. On the German
reaction see also the dispatch from Bülow to Hatzfeldt, April 3, 1898,
_ibid._, 204 ff., No. 3785, and the following documents.]
[Footnote 174: William II to F. O., April 10, 1898, _ibid._, 217 f., No.
3790.]
[Footnote 175: Bülow to Hatzfeldt, April 3, 24, 1898, _ibid._, 207, No.
3785; 218 ff., No. 3792.]
[Footnote 176: In January, 1896, the Emperor had sent the famous
telegram to President Krueger of the Transvaal which was regarded by the
British as showing a desire to take the Boers under Germany’s wing. On
Dec. 6, 1897, Bülow in his first speech before the Reichstag as
secretary of state for foreign affairs declared: “The days are past when
the German left to one neighbor the earth, to another the sea, and
reserved for himself the air. . . . . We do not wish to place anyone in
the shadow, but we demand also our place in the sun” (Bülow, _Reden_, I,
7 f.). In 1898 the first important navy bill was passed by the
Reichstag. On September 23, 1898, the Emperor declared, “Our future lies
on the sea” (G. P. Gooch, _History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919_ [New
York, 1923], pp. 225 ff.). These were merely a few examples of Germany’s
changed interests.]
[Footnote 177: William II to Bülow, Jan. 29, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 28, No.
4987.]
[Footnote 178: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, _ibid._, 224, No.
3793.]
[Footnote 179: The occasion for this remark was the conclusion of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance early in 1902 (Lascelles to Lansdowne, Feb. 8,
1902, Newton, p. 247).]
[Footnote 180: German ambassador at Paris at the time.]
[Footnote 181: Formerly French ambassador at Berlin.]
[Footnote 182: Extract from “General Report on Germany for 1906, May 24,
1907,” _B.D._, III, 437 f.]
[Footnote 183: Memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, _ibid._, p. 429.]
[Footnote 184: Whitehead to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 108 f.,
No. 135; extract from “General Report on Germany for 1906,” _ibid._, p.
435.]
[Footnote 185: Emil Ludwig, _Wilhelm der Zweite_ (Berlin, 1926); G. P.
Gooch, “Baron von Holstein,” _Cambridge Historical Journal_, Vol. I;
Johannes Haller, _Die Ära Bülow; eine historisch-politische Studie_
(Stuttgart and Berlin, 1922); Otto Hammann, _Bilder aus der letzten
Kaiserzeit_ (Berlin, 1922); extract from “General Report on Germany for
1906,” _op. cit._, III, 434 ff.; Wilhelm Spickernagel, _Fürst Bülow_
(Hamburg, 1921); André Tardieu, _Le Prince de Bülow_ (Paris, 1909).]
[Footnote 186: _G.P._, Vol. XIV, chaps. xcii, xcvi; _B.D._, Vol. I,
chaps. ii, iii.]
[Footnote 187: Memo. by Huhn, Dec. 5, 1898, _G.P._, XIII, 247 ff., No.
3558. See above.]
[Footnote 188: Memo. by Bülow, April 18, 1899, _ibid._, XIV, 540 f., No.
4017, and the following documents. According to a memorandum by Bülow on
May 5, 1899, Count Osten-Sacken, the Russian ambassador, attempted “in
every way” to convince him that Germany “should hold in all questions to
Russia and France and take position against England.” “England is strong
only because Germany and France do not co-operate,” said the Ambassador
(_ibid._, 546 ff., No. 4020).]
[Footnote 189: Hatzfeldt to F. O., Sept. 30, 1899, _ibid._, XV, 397, No.
4386; Bülow to F. O., Sept. 25, 1899, _ibid._, 396 f., No. 4385; Monson
to Salisbury, Aug. 14, 1899, _B.D._, I, 213, No. 259; Monson to
Salisbury, Oct. 1, 1899, _ibid._, 233, No. 285; and other documents in
_ibid._, chap. vii.; Dennis, pp. 125 ff.]
[Footnote 190: Salisbury was absent on account of the death of his wife,
but the officials in the British foreign office assured Hatzfeldt that
the premier was not at all prejudiced against Germany, as the latter
supposed. See Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Dec. 2, 1899, _G.P._, XV, 423, No.
4401; cf. Gwynn, I, 351.]
[Footnote 191: On this visit see Lee, _King Edward VII_, I, 747;
Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, Vol.
II, chaps. iv, v; memo. by Bülow, Nov. 24, 1899, _G.P._, XV, 413 f., No.
4398; Eckardstein to Hatzfeldt, Nov. 30, 1899, _ibid._, 421 f., No.
4400; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Dec. 2, 1899, _ibid._, 422 ff., No. 4401.]
[Footnote 192: Eckardstein, II, 107.]
[Footnote 193: _Annual Register_ (1899), p. 227. Salisbury agreed to
this act, but warned Chamberlain that Germany would very probably
disappoint him (Spring Rice to Miss Lascelles, April 17, 1902, Gwynn, I,
351).]
[Footnote 194: Bülow, I, 88 ff.]
[Footnote 195: Eckardstein, II, 126 ff., 133 ff.]
[Footnote 196: _Ibid._, p. 125.]
[Footnote 197: On several previous occasions Morocco had been the topic
of conversation between British and German officials. In January, 1897,
not to go back any farther, Lord Salisbury had sounded the German
government on that question, but the latter had not been interested
(_G.P._, XVII, No. 4979 n.). But when the subject was brought up in a
conversation between the Premier and Hatzfeldt in February and again in
June, 1899, the German policy, now launched on its career of
_Weltpolitik_, was different. Salisbury stated that in case of the
break-up of the Sherifian Empire, “Great Britain could not with
indifference see the Atlantic seaboard pass under any other dominion.”
Hatzfeldt replied that in his personal opinion his government would
approve a British acquisition of territory in that land only in case
Germany received her share; and he added that it would be very desirable
to exchange views and ideas on the subject whenever action should become
pressing. Salisbury, however, expressed the wish for the _status quo_ to
be indefinitely maintained, and refused to enter into details. See
Hatzfeldt to Bülow, Feb. 8, 1899, _ibid._, 295 f., No. 5152; Salisbury
to Lascelles, June 7, 1899, _B.D._, II, 256 f., No. 307.
A short time before the visit to Windsor in Nov., 1899, Chamberlain
suggested to Eckardstein that the two governments make a secret
agreement over Morocco by which the Mediterranean coast should be left
free for Great Britain while Germany should receive far-reaching
concessions on the Atlantic seaboard. See Hatzfeldt to F. O., _G.P._,
XVII, 297, No. 5153. Eckardstein also states that in Jan., 1901,
Chamberlain and Devonshire both told him that in 1899 Salisbury had
approved the idea of a solution of the Moroccan problem with Germany
(Eckardstein, II, 359).]
[Footnote 198: These remarks by Bülow were chiefly contained in his
minutes to the dispatches from Hatzfeldt. See Bülow to Münster, April
27, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 299 ff., No. 5156; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May
1, 1900, _ibid._, 303 ff., No. 5159; Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, 1900,
_ibid._, 309 ff., No. 5162; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 29, 1900, _ibid._,
313 f., No. 5165; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, June 1, 1900, _ibid._, 314
ff., No. 5166.]
[Footnote 199: Bülow’s plan was also to associate Italy later in the
Moroccan settlement. See Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 14, 1900, _ibid._, 302
f., No. 5158; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May 21, 1900, _ibid._, 303 ff.,
No. 5159; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 23, 1900, _ibid._, 308 f., Nos. 5160
f.; Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, 1900, _ibid._, 309 ff., No. 5162.]
[Footnote 200: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May 21, 1900, _ibid._, 303 ff.,
No. 5159; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 23, 1900, _ibid._, 308, No. 5160;
Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, 1900, _ibid._, 309 ff., No. 5162; Bülow to
Hatzfeldt, May 28, 1900, _ibid._, 311 f., No. 5163; Hatzfeldt to F. O.,
May 29, 1900, _ibid._, 312 f., No. 5164; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, June 1,
1900, _ibid._, 314 ff., No. 5166.]
[Footnote 201: Bülow to Münster, April 27, 1900, _ibid._, 299 f., No.
5156; Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, _ibid._, 301 f., No. 5157.]
[Footnote 202: Bülow to Tschirschky, June 5, 1900, _ibid._, 318 ff., No.
5167; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, June 13, 1900, _ibid._, 321 ff., No. 5168.]
[Footnote 203: Derenthall to Mentzingen, Aug. 2, 1900, _ibid._, 324, No.
5170.]
[Footnote 204: Bülow to Hatzfeldt, June 30, 1900, _ibid._, 323 ff., No.
5169 and note.]
[Footnote 205: Newton, pp. 196 f.]
[Footnote 206: _G.P._, Vol. XVI, chap. cv; _B.D._, Vol. II, chap. ix,
Part I.]
[Footnote 207: Eckardstein, II, 235 ff.; Hatzfeldt to F. O., Jan. 18,
1901, _G.P._, XVII, 14 ff., No. 4979. In the same month Lansdowne
expressed to the German government the desire to remain in “complete
harmony” with it on Chinese affairs. See Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 4,
1901, _B.D._, II, 20 f., No. 25; Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 18, 1901,
_ibid._, 21 f., No. 26.]
[Footnote 208: On those far eastern troubles see _G.P._, Vol. XVI;
_B.D._, Vol. II, chap. ix.]
[Footnote 209: _B.D._, II, 43, No. 54. On Anglo-Russian relations see
also Newton, pp. 215 f.]
[Footnote 210: Quoted in Lee, II, 11. This was against Bülow’s advice
(Bülow to William II, Jan. 21, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 20 f., No. 4983). On
the Emperor’s visit see Eckardstein to F. O., Jan. 29, 1901, _ibid._, 23
f., No. 4986; William II to Bülow, Jan. 29, 1901, _ibid._, 24 ff., No.
4987; Lansdowne’s memo., Jan., 1901, Newton, p. 199. The Emperor had
been given an enthusiastic welcome in England. The Harmsworth press had
called him “A Friend in Need” (Newton, p. 198).]
[Footnote 211: Memo. by Mühlberg, Jan. 28, 1901, _G.P._, XVI, 286, No.
4785, and following documents.]
[Footnote 212: Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 18, 1901, Newton, pp. 199
f.]
[Footnote 213: Eckardstein, II, 279.]
[Footnote 214: He naturally did not report this statement to Berlin
(_ibid._, pp. 280 f.).]
[Footnote 215: _Ibid._, pp. 277 ff.; Eckardstein to F. O., March 19,
1901, _G.P._, XVII, 41 f., No. 4994; Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 18,
1901, _B.D._, II, 61, No. 77; Newton, pp. 199 f. As the Ambassador was
ill during most of this time, Eckardstein carried on the negotiations.]
[Footnote 216: Eckardstein has written in his memoirs that in his
private correspondence with Holstein he took the latter’s peculiarities
into account and used expressions that were adapted to his “complex
mentality.” “For instance, I very often avoided using the word
_alliance_ and spoke of a _defensive arrangement_; then I emphasized
that the whole affair was yet in embryo, although in fact the
negotiations progressed very smoothly and were on the point of
conclusion, etc. As soon as the negotiations began to run smoothly and
lightly, Holstein became suspicious, and if the other party were willing
to accede to our wishes, smelled a rat.” The truth seems to be that for
this very reason Eckardstein sent home not less but more favorable
reports of the British desire for an alliance than was really the case,
and by stretching his instructions to the utmost in his ardent desire to
ally the two Powers, may have been responsible for the contradiction
mentioned above (Eckardstein, II, 273).]
[Footnote 217: Hatzfeldt to F. O., March 23, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 46 ff.,
No. 4997; Eckardstein, II, 321 ff.]
[Footnote 218: Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 29, 1901, _B.D._, II, 62,
No. 79; Eckardstein, II, 326 ff.]
[Footnote 219: Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 9, 1901, _B.D._, 62 f., No.
80; Eckardstein, II, 335.]
[Footnote 220: Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Jan. 20, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 17 f.,
No. 4981.]
[Footnote 221: Holstein to Metternich, Jan. 21, 1901, _ibid._, 22, No.
4984. Metternich accompanied the Emperor to England at that time.]
[Footnote 222: See his minutes to the dispatch from Holstein to
Hatzfeldt, Feb. 11, 1901, _ibid._, 37, No. 4989; Bülow to Hatzfeldt,
Jan. 20, 1901, _ibid._, 17 f., No. 4981; Bülow to William II, Jan. 21,
1901, 20 f., No. 4983.]
[Footnote 223: The two formulations were in no way identical, but the
negotiations never proceeded far enough to permit their being
discussed.]
[Footnote 224: Bülow to Hatzfeldt, March 24, 1901, _ibid._, 49, No.
4998; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 11, 1901, _ibid._, 54 ff., No. 5003;
Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, May 18, 1901, _ibid._, 60 ff., No. 5007;
Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, May 20, 1901, _ibid._, 64 f., No. 5009; and the
following documents.]
[Footnote 225: Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 13, 1901, _B.D._, II, 63,
No. 81; Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 18, 1901, Newton, pp. 199 f.]
[Footnote 226: Memo. by Salisbury, May 29, 1901, _B.D._, II, 68 f., No.
86.]
[Footnote 227: Memo. by Sanderson, May 27, 1901, _ibid._, 66 ff., No.
85; Lansdowne to Eckardstein, May 24, 1901, _ibid._, 66, No. 84;
Lansdowne to Lascelles, May 30, 1901, _ibid._, 69 ff., No. 87 and
inclosures; Hatzfeldt to Lansdowne, May 30, 1901, _ibid._, 71, No. 88;
Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 68 f., No. 5012; and the
following documents.]
[Footnote 228: Lascelles to Lansdowne, Aug. 25, 1901, _B.D._, II, 73,
No. 90; memo. by Holstein, June 14, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 83 ff., No.
5019. Late in October, 1901, Holstein and Bülow had long talks with
Valentine Chirol of the _London Times_ to a like effect. See memo. by
Holstein, Oct. 31, Nov. 1, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 101 ff., Nos. 5026 f.;
Sir Valentine Chirol, _Fifty Years in a Changing World_ (London, 1927),
pp. 288 ff.]
[Footnote 229: On April 13, 1901, Lansdowne had written to Lascelles:
“Things in Morocco look ugly. Do you hear anything?” See _B.D._, II, 64,
No. 81; Lansdowne to Monson, July 3, 1901, _ibid._, 261, No. 318.]
[Footnote 230: Eckardstein gives the following story:
Early in July, soon after the arrival of the Moroccan embassy in London,
Sir Arthur Nicolson, British minister in Morocco, told him that France
was intriguing in that land for the establishment of a protectorate. At
Lansdowne’s request he suggested the co-operation of Great Britain and
Germany for the maintenance of the _status quo_ in Morocco. Then he
touched upon the subject of a common Anglo-German peaceful penetration
of that country, which should be inaugurated by a commercial treaty with
the Sultan. Between the two European states an agreement should be made
to determine which concessions each should receive. He proposed that
Germany be given, among others, the right of supplying all railway and
electrical materials and of installing them, and that all further
political, financial, or economic measures should be carried through by
the two Powers together. Eckardstein states that he sent a long telegram
to Berlin in regard to this conversation, but received no reply
(Eckardstein, II, 357 f.). The editors of _G.P._, however, found no such
telegram (_G.P._, XVII, 333 n.), nor is there any mention of the
proposal in any of the documents published by them or by the British.
Still the offer may have been made, as will be evident later. Hammann,
director of the press department in the German foreign office at that
time, has also written that on the dismissal of el-Menebhi, the British
government proposed common action to the German government, but that it
was refused (Otto Hammann, _Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges.
Erinnerungen aus den Jahren 1897-1906_ [Berlin, 1918], pp. 139 f.).]
[Footnote 231: Eckardstein to F. O., July 29, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 338
f., No. 5182.]
[Footnote 232: Memo. by Mühlberg, Aug. 8, 1901, _ibid._, 339 f., No.
5183; Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 8, 1901, _ibid._, 341, No. 5184; Bülow to
F. O., Aug. 9, 1901, _ibid._, 341 f., No. 5185.]
[Footnote 233: _B.D._, Vol. II, chap. x; Newton, pp. 221 ff.]
[Footnote 234: On that meeting see Lee, II, 130 f.; Lascelles to
Lansdowne, Aug. 25, 1901, _B.D._, I, 259, No. 323; Lascelles to
Lansdowne, Aug. 23, 1901, _ibid._, II, 73, No. 90; memo. by William II,
Aug. 23, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 94 ff., No. 5023. For the meeting Lansdowne
gave to King Edward a memorandum on the questions which might be brought
up. “With regard to Morocco,” he wrote, “the policy of the German and
British Governments would appear to be identical. Both desire the
maintenance of the _status quo_, and both would probably resent any
indignity offered to the Moorish Envoy who lately visited, and was
received with honours at the German and British Courts” (_ibid._, 124,
No. 5033). By mistake King Edward gave a copy of this memorandum to the
Emperor, whose government responded with a similar communication to the
British government. The statement about Morocco was as follows: “In
Morocco we follow a policy of reserve. The Morocco question by itself is
not sufficiently important for us to justify a policy by which Germany
might incur the risk of serious international complications” (_ibid._,
129, No. 5025, Anlage).]
[Footnote 235: Memo. by Lansdowne (very secret), Nov. 11, 1901, _B.D._,
II, 78, No. 92. Late in July, Lascelles had expressed to Eckardstein his
personal opinion that an alliance between Great Britain and the Triple
Alliance was hardly possible, that at most one between Great Britain and
Germany was all that could be expected (Eckardstein to F. O., July 29,
1901, _G.P._, XVII, 91, No. 5021).]
[Footnote 236: Memo. by Lansdowne, Nov. 11 and Dec. 4, 1901, _B.D._, II,
76 ff., Nos. 92 f.]
[Footnote 237: Memo. by Lansdowne, Dec. 4, 1901, _ibid._, 79 f., No. 93,
and Salisbury’s minutes.]
[Footnote 238: Lansdowne to Lascelles, Dec. 19, 1901, _ibid._, 80 ff.,
No. 94; memo. by Metternich, Dec. 28, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 111 ff., No.
5030.]
[Footnote 239: Lee, II, 133 ff.]
[Footnote 240: Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 16, 1902, _B.D._, I, 268,
No. 331; Plunkett to Lansdowne, April 11, 1902, _ibid._, 274 f., No.
340; Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 3, 1902, _ibid._, II, 84, No. 95;
memo. by Mühlberg, Dec. 27, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 109 f., No. 5028;
William II to Edward VII, Dec. 30, 1901, _ibid._, 110 f., No. 5029.]
[Footnote 241: He was quoting Frederick the Great (Bülow, I, 242). See
Metternich to Bülow, Nov. 19, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 194 f., No. 5073;
Bülow to Metternich, Nov. 26, 1901, _ibid._, 195 ff., No. 5074;
Metternich to F. O., Nov. 26, 1901, _ibid._, 197 ff., No. 5075; Buchanan
to Lansdowne, Nov. 20, 1901, _B.D._, I, 263, No. 325; Lansdowne to
Buchanan, Nov. 26 and Dec. 3, 1901, _ibid._, 263, No. 326; 265, No. 328;
Lansdowne to Lascelles, Jan. 14, 1902, _ibid._, 266 f., Nos. 329 f.;
Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 16, 1902, _ibid._, 268 f., No. 332. Cf.
Chirol, p. 297; Gwynn, I, 350.]
[Footnote 242: Lee, II, 138 ff.; _B.D._, I, Nos. 334 ff.]
[Footnote 243: Bülow to Metternich, March 13, 1902, _G.P._, XVII, 149
ff., No. 5046.]
[Footnote 244: Newton, pp. 247 f.]
[Footnote 245: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 12 and 14, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 28
f., Nos. 5393 f.; memo. by Bülow, Sept. 14, 1901, _ibid._, 29 ff., No.
5395.]
[Footnote 246: Alvensleben to F. O., Feb. 19, 1902, _ibid._, XVII, 156
f., No. 5049; Bülow to Alvensleben, Feb. 22, 1902, _ibid._, 157 ff., No.
5050; memo. by Bülow, Feb. 25, 1902, _ibid._, 160 ff., No. 5051; and the
following documents.]
[Footnote 247: See below.]
[Footnote 248: Memo. by Holstein, Dec. 31, 1901, _ibid._, XVIII, 737,
No. 5844.]
[Footnote 249: Eckardstein, III, 93.]
[Footnote 250: Hammann, _Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, pp. 144 f.]
CHAPTER VI
THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE
I
The Boer War had revealed to Great Britain the depth of antagonism
toward her among the European nations and the haphazard inadequacy of
her defensive preparations. The British government had therefore sought
the support of Germany and of Japan. But the alliance with the second
had not compensated for the rebuff from the first; and in 1902 the
future direction of the British foreign policy, particularly with
reference to Europe, remained undecided.
In February, 1903, Mr. Balfour, who succeeded Lord Salisbury as premier
in 1902, appointed as a permanent body a Committee of Imperial Defence,
whose duty, he said, was
to survey as a whole the strategical military needs of the Empire, to
deal with the complicated questions which are all essential elements in
that general problem, and to revise from time to time their own previous
decisions, so that the Cabinet shall always have at its disposal
information upon these important points.[251]
Great Britain also wanted to maintain peace, to settle her outstanding
international difficulties, and to form ententes. In the first part of
1903 the government tried to co-operate with the various Powers. In
January and February it asked the aid of Austria-Hungary and Italy in
preventing Russia from sending ships of war through the Dardanelles and
the Bosphorus. The two states refused although both were cordial friends
of Great Britain.[252] Moreover, the British government associated
itself with Germany in the Venezuela affair and expressed its
willingness to participate in the Bagdad Railway. British public opinion
protested strenuously, however, for it mistrusted Germany, regarding her
as so chauvinistic, so hungry for colonies, so bold in her naval
ambitions as to be not a friend but a rival. Hence the government had to
settle the one affair as quickly as possible and, in March, to recede
entirely from its stand on the other.[253]
Anglo-Russian relations were most troublesome. Early in 1903 the
antagonism of these two Powers became acute all along the line from the
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to Persia to Afghanistan to Tibet to
China. The British government offered in March to negotiate over
Afghanistan, but Russia refused.[254] Still more pressing for Great
Britain was the problem which resulted from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
In April, 1903, the renewal of Russian activity in Manchuria and its
extension into the Yalu Valley caused a grave increase of tension
between Russia and Japan.[255] The revived danger of war between those
two states brought home to the British government the urgent need of
assurance that it would not become involved if hostilities did ensue. By
the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the _casus foederis_ would
arise only in case of an attack upon one of the allies by two or more
Powers. Manifestly it would depend upon France and upon the nature of
her obligations as ally to Russia whether Great Britain could preserve
neutrality in case of a conflict.[256] Hence the British government,
which in the previous year had refused to touch the dangerous Moroccan
question, now concluded to accept the French proposal for a Moroccan
accord and to liquidate the various differences with France. It would
thereby win a friend who could act as mediator between Great Britain and
Russia and would make certain that a Russo-Japanese war would not
involve the allies of those Powers.
The way toward France instead of Germany was indicated clearly by the
drift of British public opinion; for while the animosity between the
British and German peoples had increased in 1902 and 1903, the flow of
vituperation between the British and French press over the Boer War and
the Dreyfus case[257] had practically ceased, and concerted movements
were on foot to create a popular basis for an “entente cordiale.”
Political and business groups took the lead in this work. By 1903 King
Edward, who two years previously had desired an alliance with Germany,
advocated strongly a _rapprochement_ with France. His personal dislike
and mistrust of his nephew, William II, and of Germany, his wide
knowledge of men and of international affairs, his sensitiveness to
currents of public opinion, caused him to incline toward France.[258]
His willingness to take the initiative in clarifying public opinion and
in defending British interests enabled him to play an important rôle in
transforming British foreign relations.[259] One of his advisers was
Lord Esher, a man who held no official position but who exerted quiet
influence upon court, government, and press. Particularly interested in
naval and military problems, he was instrumental in creating the
Committee of Imperial Defence, of which he became a permanent member.
Through him the press leaders were kept informed about the needs of
defense and were guided toward friendship with France.[260] The
influence of the business world in the same direction was represented by
Mr. Thomas Barclay, former president of the British Chamber of Commerce
in Paris and an active worker for the improvement of international
relations. In 1901 he began a campaign in both France and England for a
_rapprochement_, to which during the next two years he devoted his
entire time and fortune.[261] In England these efforts had complete
success.[262] In France they encountered more difficulty, for France had
usually been the loser in Anglo-French diplomatic battles. However, the
_revanche_ anti-German group, the socialists and internationalists, and
the commercial and business elements approved. Then, after the French
people at large became convinced that Great Britain was not so
thoroughly egoistic and chauvinistic as they had supposed, and that she
really felt amicable toward France, they heartily welcomed a
_rapprochement_ as flattering and beneficial to their country.[263]
Nevertheless, they remained skeptical about the durability of any
entente with their old rival. The French press laid down as conditions
for one that the Dual Alliance should not be weakened thereby and that
Great Britain should convince France of her serious intentions by
treating her equitably in the settlement of their colonial differences,
particularly the Moroccan question.[264] This mistrust was not entirely
dispelled for several years.
Informal conversations for an agreement were resumed in April, 1903,
between representatives of the two governments.[265] Then King Edward
visited Paris (May 1-5); and, although at first he was met with cold
silence, his felicity of speech and act soon won the French people. As a
French Anglophobe said to a friend: “I can’t think what has come over
the population of Paris. The first day they behaved well; the second
day, they merely displayed interest; but the third day, _c’était
attristant—ils ont acclamé le Roi!_”[266] This visit, so unexpectedly
successful, created a favorable atmosphere for further
negotiations.[267] Later in the month, at M. Cambon’s initiative, the
project of a treaty of arbitration was taken up.[268] In July, when
President Loubet, accompanied by M. Delcassé, returned the King’s visit,
the newspapers reported a statement by King Edward to the effect that M.
Loubet would be more heartily welcomed in England than any chief of
state had ever been. The President was able to speak of the Entente
Cordiale as established.[269]
During the visit the foreign ministers agreed that the time was “in
every way propitious for a frank exchange of opinions.” They began that
long negotiation from which the Entente Cordiale was to result. They
discussed the question of the fishing rights off the coast of
Newfoundland, the question of Siam, of the New Hebrides, of Sokoto, of
the treatment of British firms in French Congo, and of Morocco. The
French Minister frankly stated that if they could come to terms over
Morocco, “all other difficulties would disappear, or become
comparatively easy to deal with.” While denying any desire “to get rid
of the Sultan or to annex his country” or to “force the pace,” he
declared that in view of the rapidly waning authority of the Sultan,
France could not regard with indifference the prevalence of chronic
disorder in Morocco or permit any other Power to undertake the task of
regenerating the land. What France wished, said M. Delcassé, was a
“reasonable assurance that their policy would not be obstructed by Great
Britain.”
In reply, Lord Lansdowne made three conditions for an accord over
Morocco. First, British interests in the Mediterranean seaboard of
Morocco, particularly in Tangier and the neighboring coast, must be
protected. Second, Spanish ambitions must be fairly dealt with. Third,
complete equality of economic opportunity in Morocco must be assured. M.
Delcassé unhesitatingly accepted all three stipulations. Then the
British Minister proposed that they make the settlement a comprehensive
one by including the Egyptian question. Again the French Minister
agreed, provided they reached accord “as to the position of France and
Morocco.”[270]
A few days later M. Cambon made to the British Minister a more detailed
statement of the French proposal. Concerning Morocco, he said, the two
governments could agree that the existing constitution _au point de vue
politique_ as well as _au point de vue territorial_ should be
maintained. But the British should acknowledge that France “has a
peculiar interest in maintaining peace within that country, and in
assisting the Moorish Government to bring about the administrative,
economical, and financial improvements of which Morocco stands so much
in need.” The French, in turn, should expressly attest that these
improvements would not infringe in any way upon the principle of
commercial liberty. The two governments, continued M. Cambon, might co-
operate in securing a free passage through the Straits of Gibraltar by
preventing the erection of any fortifications on the southern shore.
When Lord Lansdowne raised the objection that Great Britain was
interested in other parts of the Moorish littoral besides that abutting
on the straits, the Ambassador readily acknowledged this point, and
remarked that France wished to prevent any Power from establishing
itself at any strategic position on the Moroccan coast.
As M. Cambon did not mention the Egyptian problem, the British Minister
immediately stated that its inclusion was an absolute condition to any
consideration of the Moorish question. The Ambassador proposed that they
leave Egypt alone for the present; but, when this suggestion was
refused, he declared that if the French government, by acknowledging the
permanency of the British hold upon that land, extracted this “big thorn
from the foot of Great Britain,” it would expect _une grosse
compensation_. This, he said, “might take the shape of greater liberty
of action in Morocco—something less remote and conjectural . . . . than
she [France] had yet asked for.”[271]
After this agreement upon the questions to be included in the
negotiation there remained the other preliminary matter of how to deal
with Spain. Lord Lansdowne thought that “it would not be difficult for
us to come to terms with France if Spain were out of the way.”[272] But,
bound by the promise of the previous March to that Power and more
desirous of having weak and decadent Spain than powerful France control
the south shore of the straits, he upheld Spain’s interest in Morocco.
M. Cambon declared that his government acknowledged this position,
mentioning the Franco-Spanish negotiations of 1902 as proof. At his
suggestion they decided on August 5 that a subsequent settlement between
France and Spain in harmony with the proposed Anglo-French accord be
made and be communicated to the British government.[273]
The negotiations over these complex problems lasted almost ten months.
Two months passed before the British answer was ready; for the members
of the cabinet were on their vacation, a ministerial crisis occurred in
September as a result of which several resigned,[274] and Lord Cromer,
British consul-general and agent in Egypt, had to be consulted. This
influential official had previously received permission to send Sir
Eldon Gorst, financial adviser to the Egyptian government, to Paris in
the autumn in order to sound the French government about converting the
Egyptian debt and abolishing the _caisse de la dette_. Foreseeing the
failure of that effort unless the British government made concessions in
Morocco, Lord Cromer urged it to do so. He realized that thereby Morocco
would “to all intents and purposes become before long a French
province”; none the less he supported the proposed accord fully to
strengthen British control in Egypt, and played a major rôle during the
negotiations in determining the British policy.[275]
On October 1 Lord Lansdowne stated to M. Cambon the British conditions
for an arrangement.[276] He accepted the French proposal about Morocco
with slight modifications. He suggested that France should agree not to
erect any military or naval works along the Moroccan coast from Algeria
to Mazaghan, and that the two Powers should engage not to permit any
others to do so; that a certain amount of territory in Northern Morocco
“should be recognized as destined to fall under Spanish influence” and
that “in the event of a complete collapse of the Sultan’s authority,”
Spain should be intrusted with the administration of the Moroccan
seaboard as far south as Mazaghan. However, Spain was to “be precluded
from fortifying this portion of the coast, and also from alienating it
or her existing possessions in Morocco to another Power.” As the _quid
pro quo_ for these concessions to France, the British Minister required
in Egypt the lifting of the time limit to the British occupation and the
French sanction of the abolishment of the _caisse de la dette_, the
reorganization of the railway administration, and the conversion of the
Egyptian debt. He also requested the consent of the French government to
examine at some future time proposals abolishing the capitulations in
Egypt and “tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative and judicial
systems to those in force in other civilized countries.” “His Majesty’s
Government would, on their side,” he continued, “be ready to examine, in
consultation with the Government of the French Republic, similar
proposals with regard to Morocco, if at any future period France should
acquire so predominant a position in Morocco as to become outwardly
responsible for the good government of the country.” The other questions
considered in the Minister’s reply, those of Newfoundland, Siam, New
Hebrides, Nigeria, Zanzibar, and Madagascar, were less significant.[277]
With the offers of each party known, the bargaining began. On October 27
M. Cambon replied. He was still averse to dealing with the Egyptian
affair so fully, and declared that the terms offered were unequal; for,
whereas France received “hopes” alone in Morocco, Great Britain would
enjoy immediate and concrete benefits in Egypt. Moreover, France would
have to settle with Spain, and might even have to reckon with the
pretensions of Germany. So he suggested that the proposed changes in
Egypt be introduced _pari passu_ with correlative ones in Morocco. He
also objected to giving Spain control over any seacoast farther south
than the Sebou River. He further suggested that Great Britain and France
undertake “to maintain, save for the consequences of the present accord,
the territorial _status quo_ within a radius of 500 miles around the
straits.”[278]
When these terms were submitted to Lord Cromer, he was pleased with the
progress that had been made. “Who would have imagined, only a short time
ago,” he wrote Lord Lansdowne, November 1, “that we should ever have got
so far? . . . . We _must_ manage to come to terms. . . . . I regard this
as by far the most important diplomatic affair that we have had in hand
for a long time past. . . . . _We must not fail_.” He added that Great
Britain was asking for much more in Egypt than she offered France in
return in Morocco. Lord Lansdowne agreed with him; but, he said, the
French “are extremely anxious to have their position in Morocco
recognized, and we must turn this feeling to account.” His suggestion to
Lord Cromer that consideration of the conversion of the Egyptian debt be
postponed so as to diminish the difficulties was not carried into
execution.[279]
On November 19 Lord Lansdowne replied to M. Cambon that he was willing
to limit the Spanish and the neutralized portions of the Moroccan coast
to those between Melilla and Rabat; but he refused the French proposal
concerning the simultaneous introduction of changes in Egypt and
Morocco, particularly the change by which the “abandonment of financial
control by France in Egypt would proceed _pari passu_ with the
acquisition of financial control by France in Morocco.” He likewise
wished the French government to join Great Britain “in addressing the
other Powers for the purpose of securing their assent” to the suggested
British changes in Egypt. And he held out for absolute guaranties of
full economic liberty in Morocco.[280]
In the French response of December 9 M. Cambon reported that his
government agreed to assist the British government in obtaining the
assent of the other Powers to the Egyptian changes; but he objected
strongly to the exclusion of Rabat from the French sphere. Moreover, he
desired that the period of commercial liberty in Morocco be limited to
fifteen or twenty years, and that the construction and administration of
railways and ports there be kept under governmental control. In
explaining the five-hundred-mile proposal, M. Cambon pointed out
Germany’s designs upon Morocco which had recently been renewed, in all
probability under the encouragement of Spain. He recalled the Spanish
proposal in 1887 for the assembly of a European conference to discuss
the Moroccan question, and added:
It was quite likely that some such proposal might now be revived. It was
in view of these circumstances that the French Government had proposed
the maintenance of the _status quo_ within a radius of 500 miles from
the Straits—a radius which would include the Balearic Islands, in which
Germany might perhaps desire to obtain a footing.[281]
Both Lord Lansdowne and Lord Cromer knew that Germany was interested in
the fate of Morocco, and they fully anticipated a request from her for
some territory there, for example, Rabat or some other port. They also
realized that the French expected Great Britain to help in keeping
Germany out of Morocco, and Lord Cromer gathered from conversations with
French officials in Egypt that the French would like to embroil Great
Britain and Germany, bring about an Anglo-Russian agreement, and isolate
Germany. As both statesmen felt that a demand on the part of Germany for
a coaling station would be very awkward to meet, Lord Lansdowne did
nothing to clarify the situation beyond refusing M. Cambon’s anti-German
project.[282] He thereby left to the French the possibility of forcing
Great Britain to aid them in case Germany did try to intervene in the
Moroccan question.
In reply to M. Cambon on December 11 Lord Lansdowne signified his
apprehension that if Rabat were not neutralized France might later
transform it into a torpedo-boat station. The other points concerning
Morocco he agreed to, except that he extended the limit for commercial
equality to fifty years.[283]
Thus far the negotiations had proceeded smoothly. The Anglo-French
arbitration treaty had been signed on October 14. Agreement over the two
main questions, those of Egypt and of Morocco, had practically been
reached.[284] And on November 23 M. Delcassé had been able to declare in
the French Chamber, with evident reference to Great Britain, that “when
one speaks today of a Moroccan problem, the idea that in the solution
the decisive word pertains to France has become almost familiar and
appears almost natural, even to those who in the past would have
believed themselves obliged to oppose it with the greatest vigor.”[285]
II
These discussions had been closely connected with another diplomatic
movement. The Anglo-French _rapprochement_ was logically followed by
attempts at an Anglo-Russian settlement which in turn would have an
alleviating effect upon Russo-Japanese relations. The British and French
governments immediately recognized this fact, as did also Count
Lamsdorff, Russian foreign minister. In July, just after M. Delcassé’s
visit to England, conversations began, at the instigation of the French
Foreign Minister,[286] between Lord Lansdowne and the Russian
Ambassador. The British Foreign Secretary remarked to Count
Benckendorff, July 29, as follows: “If Russia would put us in full
possession of her ideas, and if she would bear in mind that for any
concessions which she obtained from us we should expect corresponding
concessions from her, I believe that we might put an end to the
unfortunate rivalry which had so long prevailed between us in China and
in the other parts of Asia.” But he declared a few days later that until
he was “thoroughly satisfied” by Russia, especially as to Manchuria, he
“must remain observant and critical.” The Ambassador, who seemed
favorable toward a general agreement, left in August for a visit to St.
Petersburg, and did not see Lord Lansdowne again until November 7.[287]
An understanding along the lines mentioned by Lord Lansdowne would have
settled both the Anglo-Russian and the Russo-Japanese problems. As an
inducement to a _rapprochement_ the British Foreign Secretary was
showing compliance with Russia’s policy in the Balkans,
even to the extent [wrote on October 26 Sir Louis Mallet, précis writer
to Lord Lansdowne] of suggesting reforms which will give them [Russia] a
foothold in the Balkans. H. M. G. are therefore committed to a certain
extent to a policy of not opposing Russia’s advance to Constantinople.
At least, I read it in that light. . . . . It’s a chance Russia will
never get again of buying off our opposition to their advance to
Constantinople.[288]
Russia, however, continued her Asiatic activity, so objectionable to
Great Britain and Japan. She dallied with the Japanese offer of
agreement over their Chinese differences while she made new demands on
China, extended her interests in the Yalu Valley and in Seoul itself,
and seemed on the way to take Korea.[289] She asserted her right to send
agents into Afghanistan at will, contrary to the old understanding with
Great Britain; and on October 5 made a communication to the British
government on that subject which Sir Charles Hardinge, assistant
undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, regarded as “peremptory in
tone, and almost discourteous in its terms.”[290]
In this grave situation Lord Lansdowne besought the help of the French
government in restraining Russia. On October 26 he expressed regret to
M. Cambon over the absence of frankness in Anglo-Russian intercourse.
“Their conduct [the Russian government’s],” he complained, “placed us in
a very embarrassing position.” The pledges which they gave—for example,
with respect to the evacuation of Manchuria—remained unfulfilled. “We
were . . . . told that the obstructiveness of the Chinese was to blame.
There might be some truth in this, but it was impossible to test the
truth of the assertion unless the Russian Government would really tell
us what they wanted.” Lord Lansdowne expressed the hope that during
Count Lamsdorff’s forthcoming visit to Paris (October 29-31) his
conversations with M. Delcassé “might indirectly have an effect upon the
attitude of the Russian Government towards that of this country.”[291]
M. Delcassé took the hint. Count Lamsdorff agreed with him on the value
of an arrangement with both Great Britain and with Japan.[292] He also
expressed publicly Russia’s satisfaction with the Anglo-French and the
Franco-Italian _rapprochements_.[293]
This intercession had an immediate result. When Count Benckendorff
returned to London, Lord Lansdowne summed up his assertions, November 7,
as follows:
Count Lamsdorff felt strongly that it was of importance that an
endeavour should be made to remove all sources of misunderstanding
between the two Governments, and that there should be “a change for the
better” in our relations. Count Benckendorff was therefore instructed to
discuss frankly with me the various questions outstanding between Great
Britain and Russia, with the object of arriving at an agreement as to
the manner in which they should be dealt with. In the meantime, the
Russian Government would be careful to avoid any action bearing the
appearance of hostility to this country.
Lord Lansdowne was pleased at this response, for, as he said, he “had
been seriously concerned at the position into which the two Powers were
apparently drifting.” The two men then discussed in general terms the
questions dividing their countries.[294] On November 17 and 25 they
returned to the subject, and on November 22 King Edward and Sir Charles
Hardinge each had an interview with Count Benckendorff. The Count stated
that “the moment was riper now for a friendly understanding than at any
time during the past twenty years.” He said that the matters for
consideration “seemed naturally to group themselves into (1) questions
concerning China in which Russia had a special interest (2) questions
concerning India, in which Great Britain had a special interest and (3)
questions concerning Persia in which both Powers were interested.” But
it became clear from these conversations that the Ambassador was
instructed merely to discuss the problems, that he had no definite
proposals to make. Nor were the discussions satisfactory. The Ambassador
could make no statement about Russian aims in China. He objected to the
division of Persia into spheres of influence. He protested strongly
against the British expedition to Tibet announced in that month. He
refused to put anything on paper about Afghanistan.
In order to make some headway, Lord Lansdowne made a frank exposition of
the British desires. On December 11 Count Lamsdorff voiced “much
satisfaction” with this “ready response.” The British Ambassador urged
him to make “an early and equally frank expression of the views of the
Russian Government,” which might “lead to a satisfactory understanding.”
Count Lamsdorff promised to try to reply before February 2, when
Parliament was to reassemble. And Count Benckendorff planned to go to
St. Petersburg early in 1904 for consultation.[295]
Just as Lord Lansdowne had expected, the negotiations did not proceed
beyond that point; Russia would not limit her Asiatic ambitions. She
would not accept the British terms, which of course included
stipulations concerning China satisfactory to Japan, nor would she
settle with Japan alone. Count Lamsdorff was willing to do so; but, as
was well known by the other governments, he had no control over Russia’s
far eastern policy. Since August this policy had been directed by the
viceroy in the Far East, back of whom stood the Czar and the coterie
around him interested in Russian expansion into Manchuria and Korea.
Count Lamsdorff’s hands were tied; Russian activity made war with Japan
a certainty. Toward the end of 1903 this menace grew so ominous that on
December 11 Lord Lansdowne warned M. Cambon as follows:
H. E. [His Excellency] was no doubt aware that, under the Agreement with
Japan, our intervention could only be demanded in case that Power were
assailed by two others. On the other hand, public opinion here might
render it extremely difficult for us to remain inactive if Russia were
to find some pretext for attacking Japan and were to endeavour to crush
her out of existence.
It seemed to me in these circumstances that it was the duty of our two
Governments, which were, I rejoiced to think, at this moment in such
friendly relations, to do all in their power to keep the peace.[296]
The French government reciprocated this wish, and let the British
government perceive that it would not enter a Russo-Japanese war. Early
in January the other Powers also asserted their intention of remaining
neutral.[297]
Having been fully informed about Russo-Japanese relations, the British
government had recognized the danger of war since July and had in
consequence not let the negotiations with France lag or fail.[298] But
since it now felt reasonably certain of not being drawn into the
impending struggle, it allowed the transactions with France, on January
13, 1904, to come to a deadlock over a question hitherto cursorily
considered. M. Delcassé requested territorial indemnity for the
relinquishment of certain fishing rights off the coast of Newfoundland;
and the British government refused to give the amount desired. The
difficulty imperiled the entire settlement since both sides were so
fearful of public opinion that they refused to make concessions.[299]
But on February 10 the Russo-Japanese War began. Admiral Fisher was
certain that Japan would be defeated.[300] Rumors were abroad concerning
Russo-German negotiations for closing the Baltic Straits,[301] and some
British officials had misgivings that a coalition of Russia, France, and
Germany might be formed against their country.[302] Moreover, the
British government feared that a Balkan war might break out in the
spring.[303] Under these circumstances the British government could not
afford to risk alienating France.[304]
M. Delcassé was surprised by the outbreak of the war.[305] His ambition
had been for the Anglo-French _rapprochement_ to be supplemented by an
Anglo-Russian one. Then as Italy was also trying to approach Russia, a
more or less loose grouping of France, Russia, Great Britain, Italy,
Spain, and Japan would be created.[306] Busy with the Anglo-French
negotiations, he had been misled by the optimism of the Russian
government into thinking that war would not occur.[307] He had not
appreciated fully the weakness of Count Lamsdorff’s position. Not until
January, 1904, did he perceive the danger and make belated efforts to
maintain peace. But Great Britain refused to aid him.[308] Immediately
after the war began he tried again to secure British co-operation in
stopping it. When the British government again refused, M. Delcassé
became incensed, for he saw the defeat of his larger program.[309] His
better judgment soon calmed him, however, for with France’s ally
eliminated from European affairs, he needed British co-operation more
than ever in order to keep the war from spreading[310] and to offset the
increased power of Germany. Late in February both parties were therefore
ready to compromise.[311] And, after a threat by Lord Lansdowne on March
31 to break off negotiations when the French Foreign Minister, alarmed
by French public opinion, attempted to reopen the Newfoundland
question,[312] the accord was finally completed on April 8, 1904.
This agreement consisted of three documents: first, a convention which
settled the Newfoundland question, modified certain boundaries between
French and British colonies in Africa, and gave the Iles de Los to
France; second, a declaration concerning Siam, Madagascar, and the New
Hebrides; and third, a declaration concerning Egypt and Morocco. Only
the convention had to be submitted to the two parliaments, since it
alone provided for territorial changes in the existing possessions of
the two states. While the solution of all these difficulties established
the Entente Cordiale, the last-named declaration gave to the entente its
great significance in international affairs; for through it two of the
old sore spots in Anglo-French diplomacy were healed, and the basis for
the future co-operation of the two Powers was laid.
By the terms of this declaration France relinquished her rights and
interests in Egypt in favor of Great Britain; Great Britain, in favor of
France in Morocco. Only the clauses concerning Morocco are of interest
here. Article II read as follows:
The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no
intention of altering the political status of Morocco.
His Britannic Majesty’s Government . . . . recognize that it appertains
to France . . . . to preserve order in that country, and to provide
assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial,
and military reforms which it may require.
They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for
this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights
which Great Britain, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and usage,
enjoys in Morocco. . . . .
Article IV provided for full commercial liberty, which, however, should
obtain for only thirty years. Each government reserved the right “to see
that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc. [in Morocco and
Egypt], are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the
authority of the State over these great undertakings of public
interest.” By Article VII the free passage and non-fortification of the
south shore of the Straits of Gibraltar were assured. According to
Article VIII the interests of Spain in Morocco were to be respected, and
the compact over them to be worked out between the Spanish and French
governments was to be communicated to the British government. Article IX
was included at the insistence of the British government, which planned
thereby to enjoy French support in obtaining the acquiescence of the
other Powers to the proposed changes in Egypt. Although the French
reluctantly agreed to it, it eventually proved to be of the greatest
value to them. It read as follows: “The two Governments agree to afford
to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the
execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and
Morocco.”
Five secret articles supplemented the public agreement. Article I was as
follows:
In the event of either Government finding themselves constrained, by the
force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt and
Morocco, the engagements which they have undertaken towards each other
by Articles IV, VI and VII of the Declaration of to-day’s date would
remain intact.
Article II was included at the wish of the British:
His Britannic Majesty’s Government have no present intention of
proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the Capitulations,
or in the judicial organization of Egypt.
In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce into Egypt
reforms tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in
force in other civilized countries, the Government of the French
Republic will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the
understanding that His Britannic Majesty’s Government will agree to
entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic may
have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms in
Morocco.
Articles III and IV marked out the portion of Morocco which should come
within the “sphere of influence” of Spain “whenever the Sultan ceases to
exercise authority over it,” and provided for the validity of the Anglo-
French declaration in case Spain refused to make an agreement.[313]
Article V concerned the Egyptian debt.
The contradictions in the accord are apparent. The “political status” in
Morocco was to be preserved, but it would take a statesman trained in
diplomatic casuistry to explain how this was possible with France alone
making all the proposed internal reforms. Of course, what was meant was
that the “international status” of the land should be respected.
However, the terms of the secret articles foresaw a future change even
in that; and it can hardly be called showing a nice regard for Morocco’s
international and sovereign independence for two alien Powers to set a
time limit to the right of commercial liberty in that land. The doctors
were agreeing upon a division of the patient’s property before they
began to operate. That Morocco, an independent state, would eventually
be partitioned into French and Spanish protectorates was evident to
anyone with an understanding of contemporary political practices. To
preserve peace and amity between themselves, Great Britain and France
had simply made a division of spoils at Morocco’s expense.[314]
The new accord was most cordially welcomed by all parties in Great
Britain. In the House of Commons on June 1, Earl Percy, speaking for the
government, and Sir Edward Grey, speaking for the opposition, both
emphasized the need for Great Britain henceforth to follow a policy of
“administrative concentration and consolidation” of her empire, and
declared that similar agreements should be made with other Powers. Not
all troubles with France had been disposed of, said Earl Percy, but the
chief ones had been, and the others could now be more easily settled. As
to the terms dealing with Morocco, while he admitted that the Sultan had
not been consulted beforehand, he declared that Morocco needed setting
to rights and that France had a better claim to execute that work than
anyone else. He also emphasized the unique quality of the Entente
Cordiale.
The parties pledge themselves not merely to abstain from poaching on
each other’s preserves but to do all in their power to further one
another’s interests. We promise to give to one another, as friends,
advantages which are ordinarily given only to allies, and it is as a
pledge of friendship rather than as the terms of a compromise between
jealous and exacting litigants that we ask the House to consent to these
concessions.
Sir Edward Grey approved of the relinquishment of Morocco to France.
Together with other speakers, he praised the spirit of the agreement,
and he expressed the hope that Article IX would enable the two nations
to draw closer together by increasing the “opportunities for the
interchange of international courtesies between them.”
During the debates Mr. Gibson Bowles declared that the agreement
amounted to a “partition of three new Polands” (Egypt, Morocco, and
Siam), “a compact of plunder.” But from a European point of view he
considered it of “the highest import,” for it signified a “return to the
. . . . system of the balance of power.” “There are stalking through
Europe,” he stated, “ambitions which must be curtailed and which may be
developed to a greater extent than seems at present. Against such it is
well to raise a visible barrier in England and France.” Mr. Balfour, the
premier, however, denied that there had been “any reversal of the
traditional policy of our party,” or that anything had been done
“prejudicial to the interests of Germany or any other Power.”
The _Times_ did not agree with him. Its Paris correspondent wrote on
April 14 as follows:
The Triple Alliance has long since ceased to be the European bogey which
it once was. . . . . There is the Dual Alliance, the Anglo-French
Agreement, and the Franco-Italian _rapprochement_, with benevolent
diplomatic neutrality on the part of Russia. Now, in the midst of this
happy family, the Triple Alliance only appears as the ghost of its
former self.
The editorial comment of that paper was in a similar tone.
The days have gone by when the Germans could assume with some shadow of
plausibility that in the larger questions of international politics
Great Britain must follow in the wake of the Triple Alliance, and that
the attitude of France might be ignored. There is no alliance between
them, but there is a cordial understanding which will induce both to
discuss all subjects affecting them fairly and without jealousy or
suspicion, and which, combined with the relations in which they stand to
Italy, must exercise a great influence upon all States, and, it may be,
a great attraction upon some of them.
Events soon proved that the _Times’s_ estimate of that entente was more
accurate than that of Mr. Balfour.[315]
Although happily surprised by the conclusion of the Anglo-French
agreement, French public opinion did not accept the accord as whole-
heartedly as did the British. Opposition to various parts of the
settlement was expressed by extremists who regretted the final
renunciation of French ambitions in Egypt and who thought that French
interests in Siam and elsewhere had not been adequately upheld; by those
in the maritime districts of Northern and Northwestern France who
criticized the terms concerning Newfoundland as disastrous to French
fishing interests in that region; and more or less openly by the enemies
of M. Combes, the premier, whose stringent anticlerical policy had
aroused bitter antagonism among the French. These critical forces,
however, were more than offset by the elements who praised the
agreement. “It is equitable, the equilibrium of the accord is
irreproachable,” wrote M. de Caix. The recognition of France’s special
interests in Morocco was especially commended by almost all parties. The
strengthening of France’s international position was also acknowledged
with satisfaction. In reporting the agreement to the Chamber of Deputies
on November 3 M. Deloncle declared: “We do not wish a . . . . passing
entente between our two countries. We think . . . . of the formation of
accords always more intimate and durable, which, loyally executed by
both parties, . . . . on the basis of reciprocal confidence, will cement
the community and solidarity of the two countries.” Alliance with
Russia, friendship with Great Britain, was the popular formula.
Nevertheless, the convention over Newfoundland was accepted by the
Chamber only on condition that M. Delcassé attempt to reopen the
question with the British government. Many warned M. Delcassé not to
trust Great Britain too far, not to permit the entente to assume in any
way the character of an alliance, and not to involve France in the
Anglo-German rivalry. In the Chamber on November 8 M. Delafosse declared
that the accord signified a “detente,” not an “entente.” M. René Millet,
former governor of Tunis, wrote that the arrangement was “a retreat in
good order” which “does not justify the enthusiasm with which it has
been received.” M. Millet found insufficient the diplomatic preparation
for the French action in Morocco.
It is not possible [he wrote] for France to undertake anything without
knowing the thoughts of Germany. . . . . Our bad will toward the Germans
will only render them more imperious, and, without declaring war, they
will have more than one means of being disagreeable to us, especially at
the time when Russia . . . . is unable to help us. . . . . Of all
pretensions, the most foolish would be to wish to isolate the German
Empire, as certain musketeers of the press advise.[316]
Alarmed by the criticism of the Newfoundland convention, M. Delcassé
tried in June and July to obtain some further concessions from the
British government.[317] Although he had no success, he felt compelled
during the debates in the French Chamber, November 3-10, to promise to
reopen negotiations on the Newfoundland question. Otherwise, he feared a
rejection. This meaningless concession, together with the fact that the
entente had already proved its value by enabling M. Delcassé to mediate
between Great Britain and Russia in October for a peaceful settlement of
the Dogger Bank episode,[318] smoothed the path for parliamentary
approbation. Hence M. Delcassé, in his speech of defense, was able to
confine himself to generalities. He reviewed his achievement of the
ententes with Italy, Spain, and Great Britain, by which the Moroccan
question had been settled in favor of France and by which the French
position in the world had been elevated. He advocated a policy of peace
and conciliation, but he also declared that France must maintain her
defenses.
And this is what procures for France [he concluded], augmented in her
credit and prestige, the trust and sympathy of the world. The world is
convinced to-day that French policy does not seek the advantage for
France other than in the harmony of French interests with the interests
of others. And she is happy to affirm that that harmony, which no one
believes or pretends to believe unrealisable, is being realised each day
to the benefit of all.
It will be the honor of our democracy to have practiced that policy.
He was roundly applauded, and his achievements were approved by both
Parliament and people. The accord was ratified in the Chamber by a vote
of 443 to 105, and in the Senate by one of 215 to 37.[319]
[Footnote 251: 4 Hansard, Vol. CXVIII, col. 1579.]
[Footnote 252: See Rodd to Lansdowne, Jan. 9, 1903, _B.D._, IV, 41 f.,
No. 32, and following documents. However, an extract from _Defence
Committee Paper 1b_ (Feb. 11, 1903), read as follows: “What difference
would it make to the balance of power in the Mediterranean if Russia
were to obtain, through possession of Constantinople, free egress from
the Black Sea through the Dardanelles, these remaining closed, as at
present, against other Powers?
“The answer to this question unanimously accepted by the Committee was
that, while Russia would no doubt obtain certain naval advantages from
the change, it would not fundamentally alter the present strategic
position in the Mediterranean.”
An extract from _Defence Committee Paper 2b_ of the same month read as
follows: “It may be stated generally that a Russian occupation of the
Dardanelles, or an arrangement for enabling Russia to freely use the
waterway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, such as her
dominating influence can extract from Turkey at her pleasure, would not
make any marked difference in our strategic dispositions as compared
with present conditions” (_B.D._, IV, 59 f.). This opinion was approved
on April 22, 1904, by King Edward and by Sir Charles Hardinge, who had
just been appointed ambassador at St. Petersburg (Lee, _King Edward
VII_, II, 289 f.). It apparently led to a change of policy in the autumn
of 1903 (see below).]
[Footnote 253: Chirol, _Fifty Years in a Changing World_, pp. 276 ff.;
_G.P._, Vol. XVII, chaps. cxii, cxiv, Part A; _B.D._, Vol. II, chap.
xii. See also Lansdowne to Curzon, April 24, 1903, Newton, _Lord
Lansdowne_, p. 254.]
[Footnote 254: See _B.D._, IV, 41 ff., Nos. 32 ff.; memo. on British
policy in Persia, Oct. 31, 1905, _ibid._, 365 ff., No. 321; memo.
respecting Russia and Afghanistan, Oct. 14, 1903, _ibid._, 512 ff., No.
465; Newton, pp. 271 ff.]
[Footnote 255: The Japanese Foreign Minister, in communicating to the
British Minister on April 27 the Russian demands to China, spoke “with
unwonted seriousness” and asserted “that he considered the situation
exceedingly grave” (MacDonald to Lansdowne, April 27, 1903, _B.D._, II,
198 ff., No. 226. The dispatch was received first on June 2, but there
is no reason to doubt that the view expressed therein was immediately
known to the British government since the two governments were in
constant communication. See Lansdowne to MacDonald, April 29, 1903,
_ibid._, 200 f., No. 228; memo. communicated by Hayashi, Japanese
minister to London, to Lansdowne, April 27, 1903, _ibid._, 201 f., No.
228, inclosure; William L. Langer, “Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg,”
_Europäische Gespräche_, June, 1926, pp. 310 ff.; Tyler Dennett,
_Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_ (New York, 1925), pp. 139 f., 355
ff.]
[Footnote 256: When Russo-Japanese relations became strained early in
1901, Lansdowne asked Monson whether he thought “that France is under
any engagement to take part on the side of Russia in the event of war,
or that without such obligation she would attempt to do so” (Lansdowne
to Monson, March 8, 1901, _B.D._, II, 40, No. 49). Monson replied that
he did not know whether the Dual Alliance laid down the obligation of
military aid outside of Europe, and that while the French people showed
little zeal for far eastern affairs, yet nationalistic hatred against
Great Britain might be aroused at any time and might make the French
stand uncertain (Monson to Lansdowne, March 13, 1901, _ibid._, 44 f.,
No. 56). The Franco-Russian declaration of 1902 in reply to the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance stated that the Dual Alliance was extended to the Far
East, although a few days later Delcassé cast doubt upon the
significance of this engagement. While French public opinion was opposed
to becoming involved in the Far East for the sake of Russia, yet this
ambiguity left the French position in case of a war in doubt (see
above).]
[Footnote 257: See Pinon, _France et Allemagne_, pp. 79 f.; Jean Darcy,
_France et Angleterre. Cent années de rivalité coloniale: L’Afrique_
(Paris, 1904); Barclay, _Thirty Years: Anglo-French Reminiscences,
1876-1906_, chaps. xiii-xvi.]
[Footnote 258: Philippe Crozier, who in 1903 was French minister at
Copenhagen, states that to his intimate friends King Edward “even
foresaw the hypothesis of a positive alliance” with France (“L’Autriche
et l’avant guerre,” _Revue de France_, April 15, 1921, p. 271).]
[Footnote 259: Lee, II; Newton, pp. 292 f. Early in 1915 Balfour wrote
to Lansdowne denying that King Edward was the author of the Entente
Cordiale. “Now, so far as I remember, during the years which you and I
were his Ministers, he [King Edward] never made an important suggestion
of any sort on large questions of policy” (Newton, p. 293). This
estimate may be true, but it does not give the King credit for what he
actually did.]
[Footnote 260: Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 185 ff.
Esher had been furnishing information to Spender, who was editor of the
_Westminster Gazette_, a Liberal paper, since 1900. Spender denies that
the British foreign office inspired the newspapers (_op. cit._, I,
185).]
[Footnote 261: J. L. de Lanessan, _Histoire de l’entente cordiale
franco-anglaise_ (Paris, 1916), pp. 218 ff., 229, 234; Barclay, chaps.
xvii-xx.]
[Footnote 262: The _Times_, the Northcliffe Press, the Chamberlain
Press, the _National Review_, _Fortnightly Review_, _Contemporary
Review_, the Liberals as well as the Conservatives, supported the
movement. See _G.P._, XVII, Nos. 5081-83, 5087-88, 5094, 5026-27;
Hammann, _Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, pp. 175 f.; Wolff, _Das
Vorspiel_, p. 135; Barclay, pp. 177 f.]
[Footnote 263: See Barclay, chaps. xvii, xx.]
[Footnote 264: Reports from the Belgian ministers in Paris and London,
May 4, 1902, _Zur europ. Politik_, I, 105 f. Impressed with the
unanimity of friendliness toward France among the British, M. Delcassé
expressed to Monson his regret that the French did not fully reciprocate
this feeling. See Monson to Lansdowne, July 24, 1903, _B.D._, II, 302
f., No. 361; _Bulletin_, July, 1903, pp. 211 ff.; _Quest. dipl. et
col._, XV, 656 f., XVI, 147; articles from _Figaro_ and the _Temps_
quoted in the _London Times_, May 5, 1903; article by Etienne in the
_National Review_, July 1, 1903, esp. p. 748_a_.]
[Footnote 265: So Eckardstein asserts, _Lebenserinnerungen, etc._, II,
337; cf. Schefer, _D’une guerre à l’autre, etc._, p. 249.]
[Footnote 266: King Edward’s trip was a bold move, for Paris was the
center of anti-British feeling, and some members of the British
government were doubtful about its success. But the King initiated the
visit and took the entire responsibility for it, feeling certain that he
would be well received. In his first public speech, more optimistically
than truthfully, he declared: “There may have been misunderstandings and
causes of dissension in the past [between the two countries], but all
such differences are, I believe, happily removed and forgotten, and I
trust that the friendship and admiration which we all feel for the
French nation and their glorious traditions may in the near future
develop into a sentiment of the warmest affection and attachment between
the peoples of the two countries. The achievement of this aim is my
constant desire.” Quoted in the _London Times_, May 2, 1903, M. Paul
Cambon’s estimate of the significance of the King’s visit is as follows:
“Of course, King Edward helped immensely. His visit to Paris in the
spring of 1903 really made it [the Anglo-French entente] possible. . . .
.” See interview with Cambon in _ibid._, Dec. 22, 1920. On the visit see
Captain the Hon. Sir Seymour Fortescue, _Looking Back_ (London, 1920),
pp. 279 ff.; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XV, 656 f.; Lee, II, 221 ff., 236
ff.; Barclay, p. 218; Viscount Esher, _The Influence of King Edward and
Essays on Other Subjects_ (London, 1915), pp. 57 ff.; Pinon, p. 114;
Herbert H. Asquith, _The Genesis of the War_ (New York, 1923), p. 30;
Metternich to Bülow, June 2, 1903, _G.P._, XVII, 590 ff., No. 5376;
Crozier, pp. 272 ff.; Newton, pp. 275 f., 278 f.]
[Footnote 267: Shortly before this visit Chamberlain remarked to
Eckardstein: “Here in England the King’s visit to Paris is very popular,
and if France gives him a good reception then everything will go well
between us in the future.” See Eckardstein to Bülow, May 10, 1903,
_G.P._, XVII, 568, No. 5369; Metternich to Bülow, June 2, 1903, _ibid._,
590 ff., No. 5376.]
[Footnote 268: Monson to Lansdowne, Jan. 20, 1902, _B.D._, II, 261 f.,
No. 319; Lansdowne to Monson, May 19, 1903, _ibid._, 289, No. 352;
Monson to Lansdowne, May 22, 1903, _ibid._, 290, No. 353; Monson to
Lansdowne, May 29, 1903, _ibid._, 290 f., No. 354; Lansdowne to Monson,
July 21, 1903, _ibid._, 301 f., No. 360, and inclosures; _Annual
Register_ (1903), pp. 216 f.; Barclay, pp. 235, 242; expressions of
public opinion on this project contained in _Quest. dipl. et col._, July
1 and 15, Aug. 1, Sept. 1 and 15, 1903.]
[Footnote 269: King Edward’s assertion had direct reference to the
German Emperor, with whom he had never agreed (_Zur europ. Politik_, I,
110; Lee, II, 244 ff.; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XVI, 147 ff.).]
[Footnote 270: On this interview see the dispatch from Lansdowne to
Monson, July 7, 1903, _B.D._, II, 294 ff., No. 357; also Delcassé’s
interview in _Petit Parisien_, April 10, 1904, reprinted in _Quest.
dipl. et col._, April 16, 1904, pp. 616 f. Delcassé’s conversation with
Lansdowne had been prefaced by the talks between Cambon and Lansdowne
during the previous year and also by a long talk on July 2, 1903,
between Lansdowne and Etienne. Etienne had stated one of the reasons for
an Anglo-French entente as follows (the account is from the hand of the
British minister): “M. Etienne expressed his belief that the most
serious menace to the peace of Europe lay in Germany, that a good
understanding between France and England was the only means of holding
German designs in check, and that if such an understanding could be
arrived at, England would find that France would be able to exercise a
salutary influence over Russia and thereby relieve us from many of our
troubles with that country” (Lansdowne to Monson, July 2, 1903, _B.D._,
II, 293, No. 356).]
[Footnote 271: Lansdowne to de Bunsen, July 15, 1903, _ibid._, 298, No.
358; Lansdowne to Monson, July 29, Aug. 5, 1903, _ibid._, 304 ff., Nos.
363 f.]
[Footnote 272: Lansdowne to Durand, July 14, 1903, Newton, p. 280.]
[Footnote 273: Then Lansdowne notified the Spanish government of the
steps which he had taken and asked for a statement of its views on the
Moroccan question. Whether Spain replied is not evident. See Lansdowne
to Monson, Aug. 5, 1903, _B.D._, II, 306 f., No. 364; Lansdowne to
Durand, Aug. 11, 1903, _ibid._, 309 f., No. 366; Newton, p. 280.]
[Footnote 274: J. A. Spender, _The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry
Campbell-Bannerman_ (London), Vol. II, chaps. xxiii-xxiv.]
[Footnote 275: Cromer to Lansdowne, July 17, 1903, _B.D._, II, 298 ff.,
No. 359; memo. by Cromer, Aug. 7, 1903, _ibid._, 307 ff., No. 365;
Newton, pp. 280 ff.]
[Footnote 276: Lee, II, 245 f.; Lansdowne to Cambon, Oct. 1, 1903,
_B.D._, II, 311 ff., No. 369; 400 n.]
[Footnote 277: Lansdowne to Cambon, Oct. 1, 1903, _ibid._, 311 ff., No.
369.]
[Footnote 278: Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 7, 1903, _ibid._, 317 f., No.
370; Cambon to Lansdowne, Oct. 26, 1903, _ibid._, 320 ff., No. 373.]
[Footnote 279: Cromer to Lansdowne, Nov. 1, 1903, Lansdowne to Cromer,
Nov. 17, 1903, Newton, pp. 283 ff.]
[Footnote 280: Cromer to Lansdowne, Oct. 30, 1903, _B.D._, II, 323, No.
374; Lansdowne to Cambon, Nov. 19, 1903, _ibid._, 324 ff., No. 376.]
[Footnote 281: The French government, Cambon said, knew that “the Queen
of Spain during her recent visit to the Continent had been in
communication with the German Emperor upon the subject of Morocco”
(Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 9, 1903, _ibid._, 329 ff., No. 378).]
[Footnote 282: Lansdowne to Cromer, Nov. 17, 1903, Cromer to Lansdowne,
Nov. 27, 1903, Newton, pp. 285 f.]
[Footnote 283: Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 11, 1903, _B.D._, II, 333 f.,
No. 380. It was evident that in view of the monopolistic tendencies of
the French, British trade in Morocco would practically cease at the end
of the time limit (Cromer to Lansdowne, Dec. 11, 1903, _ibid._, 332 f.,
No. 379).]
[Footnote 284: Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 13, 1904, _ibid._, 338, No.
384; Cromer to Lansdowne, Dec. 11, 1903, _ibid._, 332, No. 379.]
[Footnote 285: Quoted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, Dec. 1, 1903, p. 821.]
[Footnote 286: Delcassé had received the hint from Chamberlain (see next
reference).]
[Footnote 287: Lansdowne to Scott, July 29, Aug. 12, 1903, _B.D._, II,
212 f., Nos. 242 f. In September, Lansdowne wrote in a memorandum for
the cabinet as follows: “A good understanding with France would not
improbably be the precursor of a better understanding with Russia” (Lee,
II, 246). In July, Lansdowne also sought the co-operation of the United
States in checking Russia in the Far East (Dennis, _Adventures in
American Diplomacy_, p. 359).]
[Footnote 288: Mallet to Spring Rice, Oct. 26, 1903, Gwynn, _Letters and
Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 366 f.]
[Footnote 289: Lansdowne to MacDonald, July 3, 13, 1903, _B.D._, II, 206
ff., Nos. 237 f., and the following documents. See MacDonald to
Lansdowne, Sept. 4, Oct. 1, 1903, _ibid._, 214 ff., Nos. 246, 248;
Alfred von Hedenström, _Geschichte Russlands von 1878 bis 1918_
(Stuttgart and Berlin, 1922), p. 170; _Cambridge History of British
Foreign Policy_, III, 324 f.; Langer, pp. 312 ff.]
[Footnote 290: _B.D._, IV, 621; memo. respecting Russia and Afghanistan,
Oct. 14, 1903, _ibid._, 518 f., No. 465; memo. on Russo-Afghan
relations, Oct. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 519 f., No. 466; Hardinge to
Lansdowne, Nov. 22, 1903, _ibid._, 194, No. 181 (_b_). There was also
trouble over Tibet and the Persian Gulf (see Newton, p. 287).]
[Footnote 291: Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 26, 1903, _B.D._, II, 217 f.,
No. 250.]
[Footnote 292: Lansdowne to Monson, Nov. 4, 1903, _ibid._, 221 f., No.
257.]
[Footnote 293: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 12, 1906, _ibid._, IV, 224, No.
209; Bülow to F. O., Oct. 31, 1903, _G.P._, XVIII, 853, No. 5918.]
[Footnote 294: Lansdowne to Spring Rice, Nov. 7, 1903, _B.D._, II, 222
ff., No. 258.]
[Footnote 295: Lansdowne to Spring Rice, Nov. 7, 17, 25, 1903, _ibid._,
222 ff., No. 258; IV, 183 ff., Nos. 181 f.; 306 f., No. 289; Scott to
Lansdowne, Dec. 22, 1903, _ibid._, II, 226, No. 262; Lee, II, 280 f.;
Lansdowne to Cromer, Dec. 7, 1903, Newton, p. 287.]
[Footnote 296: Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 11, 1903, _B.D._, II, 224, No.
259.]
[Footnote 297: In Dec., 1903, Delcassé informed the Japanese Minister in
Paris that he did not approve of all of Russia’s designs in the Far East
(Dennis, p. 385). Hayashi, Japanese minister in London, believed as
early as Dec. 23 that France would remain neutral. See Eckardstein, III,
62, 188; see also Metternich to F. O., Jan. 8, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 20 f.,
No. 5931; memo. by Eckardstein, Jan. 17, 1904, _ibid._, 38 ff., No.
5945; Langer, p. 317; Bülow to William II, Jan. 12, 1904, _G.P._, XIX,
26, No. 5936.]
[Footnote 298: Lee, II, 282; Langer, pp. 316 f.; Dennis, chap. xiii.
However, as late as Nov. 4, 1903, Lansdowne did not expect war, nor did
Sir Charles Hardinge as late as Dec. 25. By Jan. 5, the latter did
(Gwynn, I, 391 f.).]
[Footnote 299: Cambon to Lansdowne, Dec. 27, 1903, _B.D._, II, 336, No.
382; and the following documents, particularly the dispatch from
Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 18, 1904, _ibid._, 339, No. 386. The British
were also surprised to learn early in January that Delcassé had kept his
colleagues in the dark concerning the details of the arrangement, and
feared some trouble on that account. It seems that as late as March 2
Delcassé had not consulted the French Colonial Minister (Lansdowne to
Cromer, Jan. 5, 1904, Monson to Lansdowne, Jan. 8, 1904, Newton, pp. 287
ff.).]
[Footnote 300: _Ibid._, p. 307.]
[Footnote 301: _G.P._, XIX, 89 f., editor’s note, and the documents in
_G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxix; Gwynn, I, 391.]
[Footnote 302: Spring Rice to Ferguson, Feb. 4, 1904, Spring Rice to
Roosevelt (no date given, though written in Feb. or March, 1904), Gwynn,
I, 392 ff.; Sternburg to F. O., March 21, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 112, No.
5992. See also the dispatch from Alvensleben to Bülow, Dec. 20, 1903,
_ibid._, 18, No. 5929. Sir Charles Dilke summed up the danger of the
situation as follows: “If Germany were to declare war on Japan, Great
Britain would be forced by her treaty engagement to declare war on
Russia and Germany; and France, it is understood, to declare war upon
Great Britain and Japan” (Dilke, “The War in the Far East,” _North
American Review_, April, 1904, quoted in Dennett, p. 94).]
[Footnote 303: Lansdowne to Monson, Feb. 17, 1904, _B.D._, V, 67 f., and
following documents.]
[Footnote 304: Lansdowne to Monson, Feb. 25, 1904, _ibid._, II, 346, No.
391, and following documents; on March 1, King Edward wrote to Balfour
strongly advising in favor of the territorial sacrifice asked by the
French on the Newfoundland question, for, he wrote, “_more than ever
now_ [in italics in the original] we must leave no bone of contention
between ourselves and the French Government” (Lee, II, 248). See also
Holstein’s keen analysis of the situation on Jan. 23, 1904, _G.P._, XIX,
48 ff., No. 5951. Cromer also urged his government to make concessions
(Newton, p. 289).]
[Footnote 305: Tardieu, _La France et les alliances_, p. 23; E. J.
Dillon, _The Eclipse of Russia_ (New York, 1918), pp. 330 ff.;
Eckardstein, III, 57 ff., 187 ff.; Crozier, pp. 282 f.; Mévil, _De la
paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. 83 ff.; Radolin to F. O., Feb. 11, 1904,
_G.P._, XIX, 60 f., No. 5960.]
[Footnote 306: Mévil, p. 82.]
[Footnote 307: For an illustration of that optimism see Nicholas II to
William II, Jan. 24, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 53, No. 5952.]
[Footnote 308: Lansdowne to Scott, Jan. 19, 1904, _B.D._, II, 237, No.
280; Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 27, 1904, _ibid._, 240, No. 283.]
[Footnote 309: In July, 1905, Spring Rice reported to his friend
Roosevelt a conversation which he had recently had with Lansdowne, as
follows: “In speaking in general terms of our relations with Japan, he
[Lansdowne] pointed out that from the very first our political interest
had been to prevent the war [between Russia and Japan] which would not
only expose us to great dangers of loss in Asia itself, but would
seriously imperil our good understanding with France. . . . .” Then
after explaining why Great Britain refused to press Japan to maintain
peace, he continued: “As a result we all but lost our agreement with
France” . . . . (Dennett, pp. 213 f.). Cf. Eckardstein to Schwabach,
Feb. 10, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 60, No. 5959. Spring Rice’s assertion was no
doubt exaggerated in order to prove to Roosevelt that Great Britain
really desired peace between Russia and Japan.]
[Footnote 310: See Radolin to Bülow, March 15, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 3 f.,
No. 6366.]
[Footnote 311: See Lansdowne to Monson, March 1, 1904, _B.D._, II, 347,
No. 393, and following documents.]
[Footnote 312: See Monson to Lansdowne, March 30, 1904, _ibid._, 357,
No. 405; Lansdowne to Monson, March 30, 31, 1904, _ibid._, 358, No. 406;
359 f., No. 408; Newton, pp. 289 f.]
[Footnote 313: The first two articles were kept secret at Delcassé’s
desire; the next two for obvious reasons.]
[Footnote 314: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents
diplomatiques. Accords conclus, le 8 avril, 1904, entre la France et
l’Angleterre au sujet du Maroc, de l’Egypte, de Terre-Neuve, etc._
(Paris, 1904); _Parliamentary Papers. Declaration between the United
Kingdom and France Respecting Egypt and Morocco, together with the
Secret Articles Signed at the Same Time. Signed at London, April 8,
1904_ (Cd. 5969), Vol. CIII (1911); _B.D._, II, 373 ff., No. 417. The
secret articles were first revealed in 1911.]
[Footnote 315: On the reaction of the British people to the accord see
Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 188 ff.; _London Times_,
April 12 and 14, 1904; _Spectator_, quoted in Schulthess, _Europäischer
Geschichtskalendar 1904_, p. 223. For the debates in the British
Parliament see 4 Hansard, Vol. CXXXV, cols. 502 ff. Adverse opinion was
expressed by Lord Rosebery, the _Daily Chronicle_, the _Morning Post_,
and Mr. Aflalo who had lived in Morocco and was particularly interested
in the fate of the land; but their voices were lost in the general
applause (Metternich to Bülow, April 9, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 13 f., No.
6375).]
[Footnote 316: _Bulletin_, April, 1904, p. 107: Millet, _Notre politique
extérieure 1898-1905_, pp. 168, 173. Millet was a follower of Hanotaux,
Delcassé’s predecessor at the foreign office, and a consistent critic of
the latter.]
[Footnote 317: Count de Montferrand, who in company with M. Cambon
talked with Sanderson about the Newfoundland question, remarked that “if
M. Delcassé was not able to inform the French Chambers that they had
secured this right, the Convention would be rejected” (memo. by
Sanderson, June 30, 1904, _B.D._, III, 6, No. 5; see _ibid._, chap. xvi,
Part I).]
[Footnote 318: See below.]
[Footnote 319: For a summary see the article by Louis-Jaray, “L’Accord
entre la France et l’Angleterre. L’Opinion publique et le rapprochement
franco-anglais,” _Quest. dipl. et col._, XVIII (Nov. 16, 1904), 593 ff.
The debates in the Chamber, Nov. 3-10, 1904, and in the Senate, Dec.
5-7, 1904, are to be found in the _Journal officiel, Debats. parlem._
(Chambre), pp. 2255 ff.; _ibid._ (Sénat), pp. 1013 ff. See also Monson’s
reports to Lansdowne, Nov. 9, Dec. 8, 1904, _B.D._, III, 11 ff., Nos. 8
ff.]
CHAPTER VII
ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AFTER THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE
After the Russo-Japanese War began, the British and Russian governments
decided that for the present nothing further could be done toward an
understanding.[320] Russian anger was directed as much against Great
Britain as against Japan for having caused the conflict;[321] while
Great Britain could hardly jeopardize her alliance with Japan by coming
to a settlement with the latter’s enemy. A few days after the signing of
the Anglo-French agreement, King Edward tried to revive the negotiations
in a talk at Copenhagen with M. Iswolski, Russian minister at the
capital. When Count Benckendorff mentioned the King’s conversation to
Lord Lansdowne, the latter reiterated his former opinion, adding that in
the meantime the two governments should so handle any differences which
might arise as to permit the renewal of the discussions for an agreement
after the conclusion of the war.[322]
This suggestion was acted upon, for, even apart from other reasons,
Count Lamsdorff wished to hold Great Britain to the strictest neutrality
during the war with the lure of an understanding. The British government
assured him of its neutral intentions.[323] King Edward cultivated
assiduously the friendship of the Czar during the next months.[324]
Early in June the British government gave reassurances about its policy
toward Tibet, in return for which the Russian government approved the
Khedivial decree putting into execution the reforms in Egypt foreseen in
the Anglo-French declaration.[325] Fraught with more danger was the
possibility that Russia might send her Black Sea fleet through the
straits. Lord Lansdowne warned her that that act “could not be tolerated
by this country,” that it “might render conflict inevitable.”[326] So
the fleet was never sent. In spite of British protests, however, Russia
dispatched several vessels belonging to the volunteer fleet through the
Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. When, in July and August, two of these
ships seized some British merchant vessels suspected of carrying
contraband, British public opinion demanded that the government defend
British commerce. When Lord Lansdowne expressed indignation at the
depredations, the Russian government immediately agreed to a
conciliatory settlement.[327] In September the Russian government
objected strongly to the terms of the recent Anglo-Tibetan Treaty, but
without avail. Being in no position to follow up that protest, it had to
acquiesce in the British action.[328]
In October the two countries came dangerously close to war over the
Dogger Bank affair. The Russian Baltic fleet, a makeshift, heterogeneous
collection of vessels, was on its way to the war zone. While passing
through the North Sea, it shot into a British fishing fleet off the
Dogger Bank in the night of October 21, sinking one vessel and damaging
others, killing two men and wounding members of the crews. The Russian
fleet thought that it had fired at two Japanese torpedo boats, and
continued its voyage without stopping to see what damage it had
inflicted. The previous mishandling of British merchant ships by the
Russians had already so irritated the British nation that it became
incensed at this latest act. Public opinion was bellicose. Sir Charles
Hardinge, British ambassador at St. Petersburg, described the fleet’s
conduct to Count Lamsdorff as “an unqualified and brutal outrage.” The
British government demanded a full investigation, punishment of those
culpable, “ample apology and complete and prompt reparation as well as
security against the recurrence of such intolerable incidents.” “The
matter is one which admits of no delay,” asserted Lord Lansdowne to the
Russian Ambassador; “if an attempt were made to fence with the question,
public feeling here would become uncontrollable.” Unless prompt action
were taken by the Russian government, he continued, “we should certainly
be obliged to take our own measures for guarding against a repetition of
these acts.”[329] The British admiralty mobilized the fleets at Portland
and at Malta, rushed reinforcements to the fleet at Gibraltar, and
advised the commander there that “it may become necessary for you to
stop the Baltic Fleet, by persuasion if possible, but by force if
necessary.”[330]
This energetic procedure brought immediate results. The Russian
government agreed quickly to the British demands. With the help of
French mediation, the crisis passed within a week, and the final
settlement was left to international arbitration. But on October 29 Lord
Lansdowne warned the Russian Ambassador as follows:
I owned . . . . that I lived in dread of new troubles arising. . . . .
It had not been without the greatest difficulty that we had avoided a
conflict. . . . . I would not, in these circumstances, dwell upon the
results of a repetition of the North Sea incident.
There was however another peril against which it was our duty to guard.
. . . . If, during its [the Russian fleet’s] long voyage, the Russian
captains considered themselves justified in the wholesale seizure of
vessels suspected of carrying contraband, public feeling in this country
would become uncontrollable.[331]
A few days later the British Foreign Secretary again warned the
Ambassador, somewhat more mildly to be sure, against permitting two
particularly predatory ships of the volunteer fleet which had just been
added to the Russian fleet itself to prey on neutral commerce.[332] No
more trouble arose.
After events of this kind, an Anglo-Russian _rapprochement_ seemed far
off. The British and Russian presses were at each other’s throats. On
December 2 Sir Charles Hardinge reported his French colleague’s views as
follows:
He [M. Bompard] impressed upon me that the attitude of His Majesty’s
Government during the next year when the conditions of peace would be
under discussion would be decisive of the relations between England and
Russia for the next twenty five years. Thanks to the Japanese war the
German Government were only now recovering the position which they had
lost at the congress of Berlin. If His Majesty’s Government continued to
maintain the same strained relations during the forthcoming year as in
the past twelve months there would be no prospect of a rapprochement
between the two countries for another generation. He begged me to
remember that the many incidents which had occurred had redounded solely
to the advantage of the German Emperor who now had a position at the
Russian Court which a year ago would have been regarded as
impossible.[333]
In the next month M. Delcassé urged upon the British Ambassador the
desirability of an Anglo-Russian _rapprochement_ and asked about the
possibility of bringing Italy also into new quadruple grouping.
Lord Lansdowne saw no reason why a permanent understanding with Russia
should be impossible, but he pointed out the difficulty. “The Russian
diplomatic currency has become debased and discredited,” he wrote to the
Ambassador at Paris, “and it will not be easy to restore it to its face
value.”[334] None the less he hardly needed the French warning and
advice, for he had already been acting in accordance with them. The
British government had shown as much consideration for Russian feeling
in the Dogger Bank affair as circumstances permitted. In February of the
next year it tried to reach accord on the Afghan question, but Count
Lamsdorff was too much occupied with other matters.[335] Great Britain
could well afford to be friendly since the Japanese victories were so
eminently satisfactory to her. Moreover, she wanted no war, for, apart
from her aversion to war as such, she feared what Germany might do in
case of one.[336] Rumors of a Russo-German treaty were already abroad
and spread rapidly toward the end of 1904.[337] British public opinion
was becoming more mistrustful of Germany than of Russia. Having regarded
the growing German navy, so near at hand in the North Sea, as a distinct
menace for over a year, it now feared that Germany might try a sudden
descent upon the English coast.[338] The British government viewed the
situation more sanely, but it appreciated the danger of the German navy.
As Mr. Spring Rice, first secretary of the British embassy in St.
Petersburg, had written to his friend, President Roosevelt, in the
summer of 1904:
We are trying our best to come to some sort of understanding with Russia
(when the war is over), so as to put an end to the continual régime of
panic in India, Persia, etc. The reason we are doing so is that with the
establishment of a strong German navy on our flanks we cannot afford to
have a life-and-death struggle in Asia and the Far East. Germany is
rapidly acquiring a very strong position in Russia. . . . . In any case,
if we were at war with Russia, Germany would either take Russia’s side,
or exact very hard terms from us for her neutrality. The German fleet
has really revolutionized politics.[339]
In August, 1904, Sir John Fisher, first sea lord of the British
admiralty, had warned the government that “‘instant readiness for war’
was imperative, . . . . unless naval reforms were ‘ruthless and
remorseless, . . . . we may as well pack up and hand over to
Germany.’”[340] In accordance with his recommendation, the British
government reorganized and redistributed its fleet late in 1904 in such
a way as to concentrate the main strength in home waters. And at the
close of the year, when the German statesmen expressed fears of a
British attack on their country, Lord Lansdowne wrote to Sir Frank
Lascelles:
They cannot seriously believe that we are meditating a coup against
them. Are they perchance meditating one against us and are they seeking
to justify it in advance? All this talk about one driving them to lean
towards Russia looks a little like it.
The knowledge gained early in 1905, that Germany was making approaches
not only to Russia and the United States but to Japan as well, augmented
British mistrust of her policy.[341]
The pressure of events and the insistence of such men as King Edward,
Admiral Fisher, and others were completing the change of policy which
Great Britain had been making since 1901. Great Britain had abandoned
her policy of splendid isolation; she was more and more taking an active
share in European international relations and assuming a definite
position in the Continental system of alliances.
[Footnote 320: Lansdowne to Spring Rice, April 22, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 188
f., No. 183. The breakdown of the negotiations as a result of the war
had been anticipated early in January by Sir Charles Hardinge (Gwynn,
_The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 392).]
[Footnote 321: Hardinge to Lansdowne, June 8, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 194 f.,
No. 188; Radolin to Bülow, Feb. 28, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 165 ff., No.
6028, and following documents; Lansdowne to Scott, March 4, 1904,
_B.D._, V, 73; Spring Rice to Ferguson, March 2, 1904, Gwynn, I, 403
ff.]
[Footnote 322: Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 283 ff.; Lansdowne to Spring
Rice, May 4, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 189 f., No. 184, and following documents;
Savinsky, _Recollections of a Russian Diplomat_, pp. 90 f.; Crozier,
_Revue de France_, April 1, 1921, pp. 275 ff.; Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_,
pp. 307 ff.; cf. _ibid._, pp. 243 f.]
[Footnote 323: Hardinge to Lansdowne, June 8, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 194 f.,
No. 188; Newton, pp. 310 ff.]
[Footnote 324: Lee, II, 287 ff.]
[Footnote 325: Lansdowne to Spring Rice, May 4, 10, 1904, _B.D._, IV,
189 f., No. 184; 307 ff., No. 291; Hardinge to Lansdowne, May 18, 1904,
_ibid._, 190, No. 185; Monson to Lansdowne May 27, 1904, _ibid._, 193,
No. 186.]
[Footnote 326: Lansdowne to Monson, April 29, 1904, _ibid._, II, 401;
Lansdowne to O’Conor, June 7, 1904, _ibid._, IV, 51, No. 46; Metternich
to F. O., Aug. 18, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 240, No. 6070.]
[Footnote 327: _B.D._, Vol. IV, chap. xxiii, Part III; _G.P._, Vol. XIX,
chap. cxxxii; Newton, pp. 313 ff.; Gwynn, I, 424 f. King Edward was in
favor of showing to Germany, whose commerce was also being molested by
those ships, a mark of friendship by co-operating with her in handling
the matter with Russia. Lansdowne disapproved the idea (Lee, II, 297
f.).]
[Footnote 328: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 23, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 317,
No. 299; Lansdowne to Hardinge, Sept. 27, 1904, _ibid._, 319 f., No.
301.]
[Footnote 329: Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 24 and 25, 1904, _ibid._, 6,
No. 6; 7 f., No. 8; 10 f., No. 12; Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 24, 1904,
_ibid._, 7, No. 7.]
[Footnote 330: Admiralty to F. O., Oct. 28, 1904, _ibid._, 18 f., No. 19
and inclosures.]
[Footnote 331: Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 29, 1904, _ibid._, 23 f., No.
23.]
[Footnote 332: Lansdowne to Hardinge, Nov. 3, 1904, _ibid._, 55, No. 52.
On the Dogger Bank affair see _ibid._, chap. xxiii, Part 11; _G.P._,
Vol. XIX, chap. cxxxiv; Lee, II, 301 ff.; Newton, pp. 315 ff.; Gwynn, I,
432 f.]
[Footnote 333: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Dec. 2, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 66 f.,
No. 58.]
[Footnote 334: Newton, pp. 339 f.]
[Footnote 335: Lansdowne to Benckendorff, Feb. 17, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 520
f., No. 466_a_; Lansdowne to Hardinge, March 8, 1905, _ibid._, 521, No.
466_b_.]
[Footnote 336: On Nov. 5, 1904, Spring Rice wrote to Roosevelt as
follows: “Emperor William has got the ear of the Emperor here. . . . .
It is plain that Germany naturally enough wants to see Russia have a
free hand in Asia and hopes in exchange to have one in Europe; that if
England could be engaged in a war with Russia which would require her
fleet to be absent in the East, the German fleet, especially if France
would come in, would have a good chance for a sudden descent on England”
(quoted in Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, pp. 73 f.;
see also Gwynn, I, 414 ff., 436, 438 ff.).]
[Footnote 337: Lascelles to Lansdowne, Sept. 23, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 4 f.,
No. 4; Gwynn, I, 427 f.; see also below.]
[Footnote 338: Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, _England and Germany,
1740-1914_ (Princeton, 1916), p. 180; _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxxvi.
Balfour denied in the House of Commons that an attack was likely or
would succeed if it were made. But the British fear continued. See 4
Hansard, Vol. CXLII (March 7, 1907), col. 595; Vol. CXLVI (May 11,
1905), cols. 72 f.]
[Footnote 339: Dennett, pp. 152 f.; Gwynn, I, 422 f. The letter was a
reply to one from Roosevelt dated June 13, 1904. The approximate date
given by Dennett is incorrect.]
[Footnote 340: Fisher to Knollys, Aug. 19, 1904, Lee, II, 328.]
[Footnote 341: Newton, p. 332.]
CHAPTER VIII
FRENCH POLICY AFTER THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE
As friend of Great Britain and ally of Russia, France was in an uneasy
situation after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Hostility
between those two Powers was increasing. Thereby the influence of
Germany in St. Petersburg was greatly augmented, and Germany was
assiduously courting Russia. M. Delcassé had to show enough sympathy and
give enough help to Russia to prevent Germany from usurping France’s
position at St. Petersburg and at the same time hold to the Anglo-French
entente.
The task did not prove to be unduly arduous, for Russia did not require
much of her ally. M. Delcassé sought to maintain harmony between Great
Britain and Russia by helping them settle their disputes.[342] He also
did what favors he could for Russia, such as permitting the Russian
Baltic fleet to use French ports on the way to the Far East. But
otherwise he left Russia to her own resources and devoted himself to
other tasks.
The Anglo-French accord did not complete M. Delcassé’s work of
establishing France’s right to preponderance in Morocco and of elevating
her position in Europe, but it made the completion possible. The Foreign
Minister still had to negotiate an agreement with Spain, to exclude
Germany from the Moroccan settlement, and to execute the policy of
pacific penetration in the Sherifian Empire. During the succeeding
months he was occupied with these problems.
I. THE FRANCO-SPANISH AGREEMENT, 1904
When M. Delcassé, in accordance with Article VIII of the Anglo-French
declaration, proposed to the Spanish government in April, 1904, that
they negotiate over the Moroccan question, he immediately met with
difficulty. Relying upon promises by Lord Lansdowne and M. Delcassé, the
Spanish government had expected to be consulted before the conclusion of
the bargain. It therefore complained because the negotiations had not
been conducted _à trois_.[343] The Spanish Queen Mother branded the act
as an “unfriendliness” to Spain, and the Marquis del Muni (M. Leon y
Castillo), Spanish ambassador at Paris, “clinched his fist in his
pocket” at the two Powers.[344] When the Cortes met, the Liberals took
occasion on June 6, 7, and 9, to expose the main terms of the Franco-
Spanish accord of 1902 which the Conservatives had refused to sign, and
to accuse that party of having inadequately upheld Spain’s interests. As
the nation remained apathetic, M. Maura, the prime minister, had no
difficulty in defending his government.[345] Urged by the British
government,[346] he accepted M. Delcassé’s overture.
The course of the negotiations, which began in April, was a rocky one.
The Spanish accused the French of being too-hard bargainers; the French
thought that the other party was too prone to alarm.[347] The Spanish
government, ignorant of the secret articles in the Anglo-French
agreement by which the Spanish sphere was already limited,[348] demanded
the territorial terms which had been informally agreed upon in 1902. But
M. Delcassé refused to give them, for, he asserted, Spain ought to bear
her part of the sacrifice which France had had to make to Great Britain.
Aroused by this reply, the Spanish government appealed late in April to
the German government for an “active expression” of “sympathy . . . . at
the opportune moment.” Although the German Chancellor was eager to give
it,[349] Spain aimed to use this intimacy merely as a threat. While
continuing the conversations more or less dilatorily with Germany, she
asked for and relied chiefly upon the support of Great Britain to obtain
satisfactory terms with France.
Through Lord Lansdowne’s mediation, M. Delcassé agreed in May to extend
the Spanish sphere of influence in the north from Melilla to the mouth
of the Moulouya—a particularly sore spot with the Spanish since they
owned islands just off this coast—and to expand the limits of the
Spanish sphere in Southern Morocco. The French Minister made these
concessions dependent upon Spain’s accepting his other conditions, and
asserted to the Spanish Ambassador that “he was not prepared to prolong
the discussion of these details, and his offer was _à prendre ou à
laisser_.”[350]
This bold speech did not impress the Spanish government, which, knowing
France’s need for an agreement with it, followed Count Bülow’s advice of
drawing out the negotiations.[351] Its views differed from those of M.
Delcassé in that it desired Spanish control in Tangier, full commercial
liberty throughout Morocco without any time limit, and the publication
of the agreement—all of which the French Minister refused.[352] However,
by the last of June accord was virtually reached, when M. Delcassé
brought forth a new condition to the effect that Spain should be
precluded from taking any action in her prospective sphere until the
_status quo_ in Morocco came to an end.[353]
M. Delcassé was confronted with the problem of how to maintain a unified
Franco-Spanish policy in the peaceful penetration of Morocco, how to
retain the initiative in that work in French hands, how to minimize
Spain’s rights in Morocco in favor of France. Mistrusting Spain’s
competence to handle subject peoples, he wished to prevent her from
taking any action in her sphere that would arouse the Moroccans to a war
not only against Spain but also against France and thus ruin the work of
pacific penetration. He feared that Spain might precipitate the
liquidation of Morocco so as to obtain full control of her area. The
French policy was to postpone that event until a suitable occasion, in
the meantime undermining Morocco’s integrity and independence while
pretending to maintain them. He was legally within his rights in taking
this line toward Spain, and was fortified against British intervention
in the latter’s favor, because secret Article III of the Anglo-French
agreement provided that the specified area should come within the sphere
of influence of Spain and be administered by her “whenever the Sultan
ceases to exercise authority over it.”[354]
The Spanish government, protesting that this proposal would reduce its
position to that of a subprotectorate, demanded the same rights in its
sphere of influence as France would enjoy in hers. It desired
particularly that Tangier be policed by Spanish altogether. The Spanish
Foreign Minister asserted that Spain was averse to disturbing the
_status quo_ in Morocco, but he and his colleagues suspected that France
would never acknowledge a change in the political status in Morocco and
would thus exclude Spain from any share in the land. The Spanish
Minister declared that he “would not sign an agreement which abandoned
Spanish rights,” and in complaining to the British government he
threatened to “appeal to the Powers.”
Lord Lansdowne knew that by “Powers” was meant Germany, who was just
then showing marked interest in helping Spain in the Moroccan affair.
Wishing to obviate German intervention, he advised the Spanish to make
concrete proposals to France concerning ways of exercising an influence
in the proposed Spanish sphere—for instance, as to “the construction of
railways and other useful works.” He also cautioned Spain against
undertaking to police Tangier. At the same time he urged M. Delcassé to
be more conciliatory toward Spain so as to avoid the possibility of
“international difficulties.”[355]
M. Delcassé was willing to permit Spanish participation in the economic
development of Morocco and also to associate Spanish officials with
French ones in two of the three ports whose customs revenues were to be
collected as security for the recent French loan. He refused to recede
on the other points.[356] This reply so excited the Spanish that when M.
Delcassé proposed a clause whereby Spain would be prohibited from
alienating the Moroccan territory over which she should have control,
the Spanish government rejected it as beneath its dignity. It offered
instead to give France a right of preference in case Spain wished to
alienate any or all of that area. Lord Lansdowne, who did not want
France to gain this preferential right, persuaded the Spanish to accept
the French proposal.[357]
The main issue, however, that of Spain’s independence of action in her
sphere, remained unsolved. In the middle of July, while leaving the
impression that the cause of difference was the question of full
commercial freedom, the Spanish government informally asked the German
government to give Spain a _coup d’épaule_ in Paris. As the German
government desired a more definite proposal, it did not carry out the
request.[358] Nor was much support to be obtained from Great Britain.
But as both French and British governments knew of Germany’s interest in
the negotiations, M. Delcassé, in August, agreed to restrict Spain’s
action for fifteen years only.[359] The Spanish government rejected that
concession, but offered to take no action for that period without
previous accord with France, provided France recognized that she “ought
to proceed in accord with the Spanish Government in that which touches
the zone of influence reserved to Spain.” Lord Lansdowne supported this
proposal. So while M. Delcassé held to his previous stand, he agreed
that “France would take no steps within the Spanish Sphere without
giving previous notice to Spain.” Thus, although the Marquis del Muni
thought that the two parties had reached a deadlock, there was in
reality no great difference between the two demands. On October 3 the
agreement was signed.[360]
The accord consisted of a published declaration and of sixteen secret
articles. The former merely expressed the fact that Spain adhered to the
Anglo-French declaration of April 8 concerning Morocco and Egypt and
that Spain and France were in agreement “to fix the extension of their
rights and guaranty of their interests” in Morocco.[361] The secret
articles were of a far different caliber. Spain received as her sphere
of influence not only the area from the Moulouya to Larache in Northern
Morocco but also the coastal territory and hinterland extending from her
possession Rio de Oro northward to the Wad Sus, just south of Agadir.
The rest of Morocco constituted the French sphere (Arts. II, IV, V).
Provision for a future change was included.
In case the political state of Morocco and of the Sherifian Government
are unable to subsist, or if by the feebleness of the Government and by
its continued impotence to introduce security and public order, or for
any other cause to be stated in a common accord, the maintenance of the
_status quo_ becomes impossible, Spain will be permitted freely to
exercise her action in . . . . her sphere of influence [Art. III].
Although the same rights of action were permitted to Spain in her sphere
as to France in hers, yet for a period of not over fifteen years from
the date of signing the convention Spain was prohibited from taking
action in her sphere without previous understanding with France. The
latter, however, could take action unrestricted by Spain in the French
zone, and could also act in the Spanish zone after having notified Spain
of her intention. After that first period expired and as long as the
_status quo_ obtained, France could not act in the Spanish zone without
previous agreement with Spain (Art. II). By Articles VII and VIII Spain
agreed not to cede or to alienate in any form any of the territory
assigned to her or to seek the aid of a foreign Power other than France
in taking any military action in her sphere of influence. Article IX
preserved “the special character” of Tangier “which the presence of the
diplomatic corps and the municipal and sanitary institutions give it.”
Article X ran as follows:
So long as the actual political status continues, the enterprises for
public works, railroads, roads, canals . . . . shall be executed by such
companies as may be formed by French and Spanish. In the same manner it
will be permissible for French and Spanish in Morocco to co-operate for
the exploitation of mines, quarries, and, in general, of enterprises of
an economic order.[362]
The two Powers immediately communicated the agreement to the British
government, which accepted it.[363] The Spanish government thanked both
British and German governments for their aid during the negotiations,
and briefly informed the latter that by the treaty Tangier had been
neutralized and complete equality and freedom of commerce and trade had
been guaranteed.[364]
In Spain the agreement, grudgingly approved by the government as the
best that it could obtain, was shown by the Premier to the various party
leaders, and received their indorsement.[365] M. Delcassé informed none
of the French politicians of the content of the treaty. During the
debates in the French Parliament on the Anglo-French accord in November
and December, however, the Franco-Spanish agreement was also accepted on
faith.[366] The convention was a logical extension of the accord of
April 8. Both agreements anticipated a change in the political status of
Morocco and made provisions for a future division of the land. The one
permitted commercial restriction at the end of thirty years; the other
arranged for a Franco-Spanish monopoly of all economic enterprises. Both
accords violated the principle of the open door. In fact, had the secret
articles of the two agreements been known, they would have proved that
the clauses concerning the independence and integrity of Morocco and the
sovereignty of the sultan were complete shams. In declaring to the other
Powers that commercial freedom would be absolutely respected, M.
Delcassé was equivocating and attempting to disarm suspicions concerning
his real intention of destroying economic freedom in Morocco.[367]
II. DELCASSÉ AND GERMANY, 1904
It was manifest during the Anglo-French negotiations that the French
government planned to prevent Germany from gaining any foothold in
Morocco or the Western Mediterranean.[368] Fearing that that Power might
try to share in the Moroccan settlement when the Anglo-French accord
became known, M. Delcassé endeavored to avoid a discussion of the
agreement with it.[369]
When, therefore, on March 23, Prince Radolin asked the French Minister
an “indiscreet question” about the reported Anglo-French negotiations,
the latter replied that they had been going on for some time and would
probably be successfully concluded. He said that they treated of
Newfoundland, Egypt, and Morocco (the other questions he did not
mention); and he explained the terms of the proposed agreement
concerning the last-named land. “You know already our point of view on
this subject. . . . . We wish to maintain in Morocco the existing
political and territorial status; but that status, to endure, must
manifestly be sustained and improved.” After citing the many occasions
for intervention of which France had taken no advantage, he stated that
the Sultan had already requested French aid. “It is now a matter of
continuing it to him,” he said, and he assured the Prince that
commercial liberty would be “rigorously and entirely respected. . . . .
France wishes no special rights in Morocco, but it should be her task in
the interest of all nations trading there to put an end, according to
her power, to the anarchy in that land.” Moreover, the free passage
through the straits should be secured by neutralizing their southern
shore. As for Spain, her “positive interests and legitimate ambitions”
in Morocco would be amicably treated. He did not mention either the
clause limiting commercial freedom to thirty years or Article IX
assuring mutual diplomatic support in the fulfilment of the accord. And
of course he gave no hint of the existence of the secret articles.[370]
This informal and incomplete notification misrepresented the true aims
of the agreement with respect to Morocco. M. Delcassé expected that by
avoiding an official notification of the accord to the German government
and by omitting to request an expression of opinion from it he would
cause the German government either to permit him a diplomatic victory or
to take the initiative for a Franco-German understanding.[371] He felt
safe in his policy,[372] because France, in addition to her alliance
with Russia, whose victory over Japan M. Delcassé and the French people
confidently expected,[373] now enjoyed with her ally’s public
approval[374] the friendship of Great Britain, Italy, and Spain, whereas
the Triple Alliance was weakened by internal strife. Moreover, the
French Minister learned on March 30[375] that at Vigo a few days before
the Emperor William had denied having any territorial interests in
Morocco. Hence by shunning the word “protectorate” he hoped to avoid the
responsibility for endeavoring to establish one.[376] In October his
notification of the Franco-Spanish agreement to the German government
was even more perfunctory.[377]
III. “PACIFIC PENETRATION,” 1904
After the signing of the Anglo-French agreement, the French Parliament
voted 600,000 francs with which to carry on the work of pacific
penetration in Morocco.[378] The French government immediately
dispatched a preliminary mission to Fez under Count de Saint-Aulaire,
first secretary of the legation in Tangier. The Count gave the Sultan an
exact Arabic translation of the published declaration of April 8; and,
after setting forth the need for progressive reforms in Morocco and the
special interest of France in executing them, he offered the friendly
co-operation of his government to that end.[379] Thus, in spite of the
persistent Moroccan raids across the Algerian border, the Sultan was
asked to believe that France was once more manifesting her patience and
good will.[380]
The Sultan scarcely knew what line of policy to take toward the Anglo-
French agreement.[381] His subjects, from the religious groups to the
merchants of Fez, were all hostile to any form of foreign control.
Alarmed at the news of the agreement, they feared an immediate invasion
by the Christians. Suspecting their ruler of conniving with the French,
they became even more rebellious; many denied that he possessed the
_baraka_, the divine benediction. At court the Conservative party, led
by Si Feddoul Gharnet, grew stronger in its opposition to all French
actions and policies. The Sultan realized the precariousness of his
position, and was very anxious about the effects of his acts upon his
people. He was uneasy and angry at having been ignored in the
negotiations over his land. Nevertheless, as he did not comprehend the
full significance of the accord, particularly since the French had
explained it to him in soothing terms, he soon became calmer. Some of
his officials were not opposed to the French, as they realized that the
present conditions could not last and that the French had the power to
change them. Furthermore, certain practical considerations prevented him
from closing his ear to the French altogether. His ambition was, with
the help of Europeans selected by himself, so to strengthen his land as
to enable it to maintain its independence.[382] The Sultan had no funds;
the small French, English, and Spanish loans of the previous year were
exhausted, and he could not collect taxes or maintain an army. Forced to
seek foreign aid, he had begun negotiations with the Banque de Paris et
des Pays-Bas for a large loan late in January, and had besought the help
of the French government in obtaining it. M. Delcassé had readily
promised his support.[383]
In this situation the Sultan neither accepted nor rejected the Anglo-
French agreement and Count de Saint-Aulaire’s explanation of it although
he showed favor toward them.[384] On June 12 with the aid of the French
government he concluded the transaction for the loan.
The loan, made by a consortium of eleven French banks headed by the
Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, fulfilled political as well as economic
purposes, for it was backed by the French government and was admirably
adapted to the work of pacific penetration. The amount was 62,500,000
francs (Art. I), of which 80 per cent was actually to be credited to the
Sultan (Art. XXIV). The interest was set at 5 per cent (Art. III). The
loan was to be redeemed within thirty-six years, but the schedule of
amortization was fixed and could not be hastened during the first
fifteen years (Arts. IV, VII). The loan, guaranteed by the customs
duties in all the ports of Morocco, was to have preference and priority
over all other loans which might be similarly guaranteed (Art. XI).
Sixty per cent of the customs revenues were reserved for the repayment
of the obligation. If the necessary amount was not obtained thereby, the
Moroccan government was to make up the deficit (Art. XVII). Two million
francs were left in the bank at Paris to cover short payments; if
withdrawn, this amount was to be re-established immediately by the
Sultan’s government (Art. XXI). The remainder, after the Sultan’s
outstanding loans were liquidated, was placed at the ruler’s disposal to
be drawn upon at will (Arts. XXV, XXXV). By Article XIV the existing
customs treaties and arrangements of Morocco with the Powers were
guaranteed. Article XXXII prohibited the Sultan from using the customs
receipts at his disposal to guarantee any other loan without a previous
agreement with the French banks. By Article XXXIII those banks were
given the right of preference in contracting new loans, coining money,
or buying and selling gold and silver for Morocco, provided the
conditions they offered were equal to those offered by others. The
collection of the customs was to be supervised by a special group of
French officials under the protection of the French legation. Their
director should communicate with the Moroccan government through the
French Minister at Tangier. Furthermore, if the stipulated funds were
not turned over to the supervisors, the agents could appeal to the
French Minister; and, with his consent and with due notification to the
Sultan, they could collect the sums themselves. Thus, when by the last
of July those officials were installed, the control of the customs was
practically lost to the Sultan.[385]
In May an act of banditry occurred in Morocco which convinced public
opinion everywhere that reform in that land was immediately necessary
and which enabled France to take another step in her work of
penetration. On May 18, Raisouli, a sherif, ex-cattle thief, robber and
rebel, avenger of wrongs, opponent to Europeans—in short, a Moroccan
Robin Hood—took prisoner an American citizen, Ion Perdicaris, and his
English son-in-law, Varley, in their home near Tangier. As the price of
their release he demanded a large ransom, the dismissal and punishment
of certain of the Sultan’s loyal officials who were his enemies, and his
own appointment as pasha for the district around Tangier. The Sultan had
to accept his terms. On June 24, through the good offices of the French
government, working through some of its Algerian religious leaders with
followers in Morocco, the release was effected.[386] But the panic-
stricken foreigners in Tangier, fearing that Raisouli would continue
such lucrative business and that he would have imitators, demanded
protection.[387] Thereupon the French government stationed two warships
in Moroccan waters and secured the appointment of French and Algerian
officers over the Tangier police.[388] The work of “pacific penetration”
was most auspiciously under way.
Private French enterprise did not lag behind that of the government.
Moroccan towns swarmed with hungry fortune-seekers eager to enjoy the
opportunities for quick wealth which the opening of Morocco was expected
to bring. The Comité du Maroc, formed in the preceding December from the
ranks of the larger Comité de l’Afrique française, engaged energetically
in directing and expanding the work of scientific exploration in the
Sherifian Empire and of disseminating propaganda in France.[389] It
received the financial support of the chief banks, maritime companies,
steel works, railway companies, and some of the leading newspapers of
France.[390] The list of guests present at a banquet held by it on June
15 to enlist public support reads like a French _Who’s Who_.[391]
In the autumn and early winter the French government made preparations
to send a larger mission to Fez under the resident minister, M. Saint-
René Taillandier, to obtain the Sultan’s approval of the French program
of reforms. According to M. Delcassé’s instructions on December 15,[392]
the Minister’s foremost task should be to institute police reforms
similar to those inaugurated in Tangier, first in the towns already in
contact with Europeans and then gradually in the other areas. In the
border region order should be preserved by extending the co-operation of
the two governments. The establishment of a state bank, the construction
of means of transportation and of communication, the improvement of
harbors, the support of philanthropic works, the spread of the French
language, and the settlement of claims for damages inflicted on Algeria
by Moroccan raiders were the other matters to be taken up. It was a
comprehensive program, the achievement of which would end Moroccan
isolation and independence.
The departure of the mission was delayed by the long negotiations for an
accord with Spain and by the fact that the French Chamber did not
approve the Moroccan accords until November. When the mission was
prepared to start in December, the situation in Morocco, apparently
favorable for France in the spring, had become adverse. The natives had
grown bolder in their attacks upon foreigners, venting their hatred upon
them even in Fez. The Sultan had begun to show signs of resisting. In
September he had disgraced the pro-foreign minister el Menebhi and
confiscated his property. Later in the year he had supplanted his pro-
French ministers by anti-foreign ones, such as Si Feddoul Gharnet. In
December he had dismissed all foreign employees at Fez and Rabat.[393]
These signs augured trouble for the French. While assuming an optimistic
manner publicly, M. Saint-René Taillandier acknowledged to his chief on
December 12 that he might “be powerless to make the Sultan accept the
minimum of reforms that the present state of Morocco demands.”[394] But
as firmness was the best means to “recall the Moroccan government to a
sense of reality,”[395] he immediately countered the dismissal of the
French officers by a sharply worded letter to the Moroccan Foreign
Minister. After reminding the latter of the _acte international_ by
which France had “assumed the task of aiding” the Makhzen[396] to reform
the land, he stated that the Sultan’s co-operation was expected and
desired, but that
if that co-operation were not forthcoming, France would know how to
accomplish the work alone. Dangerous counselors [he wrote] have led the
Sultan astray as to the true state of affairs. And in consequence the
French Government has decided to postpone the departure of the mission,
and to recall to Tangier from Fez within ten days the French military
mission, vice-consul, and all French subjects resident there.[397]
The Sultan’s opposition wilted immediately. The French vice-consul at
Fez reported that the Makhzen was “ready to welcome all French counsels
and to accept all the reforms,” that it “withdrew all the actions which
have offended us.”[398] But the Sultan’s submission was not so complete
as it seemed. Although France was the victor in this encounter, the
conflict had only begun.
[Footnote 342: On Oct. 28, 1904, at the height of the Dogger Bank
crisis, Lansdowne reported the following assertion by Cambon: “His
Excellency [M. Cambon] said that he did not himself know precisely what
obligations France had undertaken in virtue of that understanding [the
Dual Alliance]. He did not however believe that if there was a
collision, France would join Russia against us, but if a collision
occurred, and particularly if it were brought on by unreasonable demands
on our part, there would be a _revirement_ of public feeling, and the
Anglo-French _entente_ could not fail to suffer” (Lansdowne to Monson,
Oct. 28, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 22, No. 21).]
[Footnote 343: According to a speech in the Spanish Senate on March 21,
1904, by M. Abarzuza, who had been a member of Silvela’s cabinet from
Dec. 6, 1902, to July 20, 1903, both the British and the French
governments promised Spain in the first half of 1903 not to touch the
Moroccan question or to make any alterations in North Africa without
Spain’s previous knowledge and acquiescence. The speech is quoted by
Becker, _Historia de Marruecos_ (Madrid, 1915), pp. 440 f. See above for
Lansdowne’s promise. The Spanish government did try to participate in
the Anglo-French negotiations by way of both London and Paris; but it
was put off with general assurances of friendship by both Lansdowne and
Delcassé. See Lansdowne to Durand, Aug. 11, 1903, _B.D._, II, 309 f.,
No. 366; Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 23, 1904, _ibid._, 341, No. 388;
Lansdowne to Egerton, April 11, 1904, III, 25 f., No. 24; Bülow to F.
O., Sept. 18, 1904, _G.P._, XVII, 354, No. 5199, and the following
documents. For expression of Spanish public opinion over the Anglo-
French accord see the _London Times_, April 11-16, 1904; Gay, _España
ante el problema del mediterráneo_, pp. 31 ff.; Maura, _La Question du
Maroc, etc._ (Paris, 1911), pp. 32 f.; Mousset, _La politica exterior de
España, 1873-1918_ (Madrid, 1918), pp. 149 ff.]
[Footnote 344: _G.P._, XX, 169 f.]
[Footnote 345: The debates in the Cortes are to be found in the _Diario
de las sesiones de Cortes_. Congreso de los Diputados (_Legislatura de
1903_), pp. 4883 ff., 4917 ff., 4944 ff., 4959 ff. Also see Maura, pp.
85 ff.]
[Footnote 346: Lansdowne to Egerton, April 11, 1904, _B.D._, III, 25 f.,
No. 24; Egerton to Lansdowne, April 11, 1904, _ibid._, 26 f., No. 25.]
[Footnote 347: Egerton to Lansdowne, May 6, 1904, _ibid._, 34, No. 35.]
[Footnote 348: The British government kept these articles secret
(Lansdowne to Egerton, April 11, 1904, _ibid._, 25 f., No. 24).]
[Footnote 349: Bülow to Radowitz, April 27, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 169 f.,
No. 6481, and following documents.]
[Footnote 350: Lansdowne to Monson, April 20, 1904, _B.D._, III, 29, No.
28, and following documents.]
[Footnote 351: Bülow to Radowitz, May 22, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 173 f., No.
6484. Bülow repeated his offer of aid on May 31. Bülow to Radowitz, May
31, 1904, _ibid._, 175 f., No. 6487. The Spanish Ambassador at Paris
remarked to Monson that if Great Britain did not help Spain the latter
“would be done out of half her rights in that country [Morocco]” (Monson
to Lansdowne, May 20, 1904, _B.D._, III, 37, No. 41).]
[Footnote 352: Romanones, _Las responsabilidades politicas, etc._, pp.
49 ff.; reports from Madrid, June 15 and 21, 1904, _Zur europ. Politik_,
I, 121; see also _G.P._, Vol. XX, chap. cxliv.]
[Footnote 353: Egerton to Lansdowne, July 1, 1904, _B.D._, III, 38, No.
43; Lansdowne to Egerton, July 2, 1904, _ibid._, 38 f., No. 44.]
[Footnote 354: _Ibid._, II, 393 f.]
[Footnote 355: Egerton to Lansdowne, July 1, 1904, _ibid._, III, 38, No.
43; Lansdowne to Egerton, July 2, 6, 1904, _ibid._, 38, No. 44; 40, No.
46; Lansdowne to Monson, July 4, 1904, _ibid._, 40, No. 45; Leon y
Castillo, _Mis tiempos_, II, 182 ff.]
[Footnote 356: Lansdowne to Monson July 8, 1904, _B.D._, III, 41, No.
47.]
[Footnote 357: Lansdowne to Monson, July 29, 1904, _ibid._, 42, No. 49;
Lansdowne to Egerton, July 29, 1904, _ibid._, 43, No. 50; Egerton to
Lansdowne, July 31, 1904, _ibid._, 44, No. 52.]
[Footnote 358: Memo. by Richthofen, July 16, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 186 f.,
No. 6503; and other documents in _ibid._, Vol. XX, chap. cxliv.]
[Footnote 359: At first Delcassé said thirty years.]
[Footnote 360: Egerton to Lansdowne, July 31, 1904, _B.D._, III, 44, No.
52, and following documents; also Leon y Castillo, II, 183 f.]
[Footnote 361: _L.j., 1901-5_, 164, No. 187.]
[Footnote 362: The text of the agreement, which became public in 1909,
is to be found in _British and Foreign State Papers_, CII (London,
1913), 432 ff.; and in _B.D._, III, 49 ff., No. 59.]
[Footnote 363: Lansdowne to Adam, Oct. 5, 1904, _B.D._, III, 52, No.
60.]
[Footnote 364: Radowitz to F. O., Oct. 7, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 191 f., No.
6509.]
[Footnote 365: Maura, p. 54; Radowitz to F. O., Oct. 7, 1904, _G.P._,
XX, 191 f., No. 6509.]
[Footnote 366: Maura, p. 78; Tardieu, _Questions diplomatiques_, 1904,
pp. 75 ff.; Millet, _Notre politique extérieure 1898-1905_, pp. 179 ff.;
and the French debates cited above.]
[Footnote 367: For an estimate of this accord see Tardieu, _Revue des
deux mondes_, Dec. 1, 1912, pp. 637 ff.; Stuart, _French Foreign Policy
from Fashoda to Serajevo (1898-1914)_ (New York, 1921), pp. 154 ff.]
[Footnote 368: See, among others, the dispatch from Lansdowne to Monson,
Dec. 9, 1903, _B.D._, III, 332, No. 378.]
[Footnote 369: Lansdowne to Monson, March 11, 1904, _ibid._, II, 353,
No. 398. One day long after signing the accord Radolin remarked to
Delcassé that he “had heard of an apparent treaty with England but had
never read the text of it in any authentic form.” The Minister replied
that he could find it in the _Livre jaune_ (letter from Radolin,
apparently to Holstein, March 25, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 266 n.).]
[Footnote 370: In repeating these assertions to the German government on
April 26 the French Ambassador added that “the Anglo-French entente was
directed against no other Power and in no way menaced the German
commercial interests.” See Delcassé to Bihourd, March 27, 1904, _L.j.,
1901-5_, 122, No. 142; Radolin to Bülow, March 23, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 5
ff., No. 6368; Bihourd to Delcassé, April 27, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 131,
No. 155.]
[Footnote 371: See Bertie to Lansdowne, March 22, 1905, _B.D._, III, 60,
No. 67.]
[Footnote 372: Bihourd, the French ambassador at Berlin, warned Delcassé
in April that Germany had not said her last word on the Moroccan
question and that more complete guaranties of commercial liberty should
be given to her; but Delcassé disregarded the warning. See Bihourd to
Delcassé, April 18, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 128, No. 151; Delcassé to
Bihourd, April 18, 1904, _ibid._, 129, No. 152; Bihourd to Delcassé,
April 21, 1904, _ibid._, 129 f., No. 153; cf. Lee, _King Edward VII_,
II, 338.]
[Footnote 373: Michon, _L’alliance franco-russe, 1891-1917_, pp. 101 f.]
[Footnote 374: Statement made by Nelidow, Russian ambassador to Paris,
to a reporter of the _Temps_, reprinted in _Quest. dipl. et. col._,
XVII, 607 f.]
[Footnote 375: Radolin to Bülow, March 30, 1904, _G.P._, XVII, 365, No.
5210.]
[Footnote 376: There is some evidence, however, that Delcassé did make
some vague attempts to approach the German government on the Moroccan
affair in 1904. Bülow, in a dispatch of March 22, 1905, stated that if
Delcassé should declare that he had discussed Moroccan affairs
“thoroughly with German diplomats passing through” Paris, Radolin was to
reply that those conversations were only private ones and showed plainly
the inclination to avoid the official and proper authorities. See Bülow
to Radolin, March 22, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 267, No. 6568. Theodor Wolff,
at that time Paris correspondent of the _Berliner Tageblatt_, also has
written that in the spring of 1904 Delcassé said to Lichnowsky, an
official in the German foreign office, that they should come to an
understanding over Morocco. According to Wolff, Holstein became furious
at the dispatch from Lichnowsky (Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_, pp. 154 f.; cf.
Ludwig, _Wilhelm der Zweite_, p. 342). Lichnowsky may have been the
person to whom Bülow referred, although, if any such conversation
occurred, it was not mentioned later by either the French or the
Germans.]
[Footnote 377: The French Ambassador merely left a copy of the published
declaration and added verbally that the accord in no way infringed upon
commercial liberty in Morocco. See Richthofen to Radowitz, Oct. 7, 1904,
_G.P._, XX, 191, No. 6508; memo. by Richthofen for Bülow, Oct. 7, 1904,
_ibid._, 230, No. 6534; Delcassé to Bihourd, Oct. 6, 1904, _L.j.,
1901-5_, 164, No. 187; Bihourd to Delcassé, Oct. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 166,
No. 190; Delcassé to Bihourd, Oct. 8, 1904, _ibid._, 167 f., No. 193.]
[Footnote 378: This was done on a motion by Jaurès, made on Nov., 1903,
and passed on April 25, 1904 (Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés._, p. 35).]
[Footnote 379: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, April 14 and 24,
1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 124, No. 146; 130, No. 154; Delcassé to Saint-René
Taillandier, April 27, 1904, _ibid._, 131, No. 156; Saint-René
Taillandier to Delcassé, May 19, 1904, _ibid._, 133, No. 159 and annexe;
Lansdowne to Nicolson, April 19, 1904, _B.D._, III, 28, No. 27.]
[Footnote 380: _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 148, 157, 158, 183, 186, 189,
194-98, 202-7.]
[Footnote 381: On the Moroccan reaction see report by A. Bernard, who
was in Morocco at the time, in _Bulletin_, June, 1904, pp. 203 f.;
Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Jan. 1 and 24, Feb. 22, April 24,
May 19, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 119 ff., Nos. 135, 137, 140, 154, 159.]
[Footnote 382: Kühlmann to Bülow, Jan. 31, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 250, No.
6553.]
[Footnote 383: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Jan. 29, 1904, _L.j.
1901-5_, 119, No. 138.]
[Footnote 384: Ben Sliman, Moroccan minister of foreign affairs, wrote
to Saint-René Taillandier on June 17 as follows: “The Sultan . . . . has
instructed me to reply to you that he does not doubt your favorable
sentiments nor those of your Government, either the humanity of your
actions or the sincerity of your counsels. . . . . Your letter is an
argument the more in favor of the reaffirmation of that conviction and a
testimony of your good intentions, conforming to the desire of the two
countries. This is confirmed also by the conversations which we have had
with your secretary to clarify the difficult points of the accord. . . .
. I express to you in his [the Sultan’s] name the fullest thanks for
your happy efforts past and present which, we hope, will characterize
the conduct of our future relations” (_ibid._, 156 ff., No. 177, annex;
Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort, etc._ [Paris, 1909], pp. 172 f. n.).]
[Footnote 385: The prominent part played by the French government in
making this loan is attested as follows: As already stated, in January,
at the Sultan’s request, Delcassé promised his help in making the loan.
Furthermore, Saint-Aulaire and his interpreter, in Fez at the time, took
an active part in bringing the negotiation to a satisfactory conclusion,
being consulted on various points and helping in the formulation of the
terms (Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, July 30, 1904, _L.j.,
1901-5_, 162 f., No. 184.). The contract was signed and sealed by the
French Consul at Fez (_ibid._, 142 f., No. 170, Annex I). And the terms
of the loan were such as could never have been obtained without the
approval of the French government. The contract is printed in _ibid._,
143 ff., No. 170, Annex II. On the instalment of customs officials see
the dispatches from Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, July 24, and 30,
1904, _ibid._, 159 ff., Nos. 181, 184; also Tardieu, _Questions
diplomatiques, 1904_, pp. 60 ff.]
[Footnote 386: On this episode see the various dispatches in _L.j.,
1901-5_, 135 ff., Nos. 160 ff. On Raisouli see Rosita Forbes, _El
Raisuni, the Sultan of the Mountains_ (London, 1924). On June 22, 1904,
Secretary of State Hay cabled to the American Consul at Tangier, “We
want Perdicaris alive or Raizuli dead.” See William Roscoe Thayer, _The
Life and Letters of John Hay_ (Boston and New York, 1915), II, 383;
Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, pp. 443 ff. Both the British
and the American governments requested the good offices of the French
government in effecting the release. Mr. Hay, the American secretary of
state, gave assurance that if more serious action were subsequently
necessary in Morocco, it would not take place “without a previous
exchange of views” with France. Thus he acknowledged France’s special
position with reference to that country. See Saint-René Taillandier to
Delcassé, May 30, 1904, _ibid._, 137, No. 163; Delcassé to Saint-René
Taillandier, May 31, 1904, _ibid._, 137, No. 164; Jusserand to Delcassé,
June 20, 1904, _ibid._, 152, No. 171; Porter to Delcassé, June 27, 1904,
_ibid._, 155, No. 176; Mévil, pp. 172 f.]
[Footnote 387: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, June 2 and 27, July
2, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 137 ff., Nos. 165, 175, 178.]
[Footnote 388: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, June 11 and 27, July
2, 1904, _ibid._, 140 ff., Nos. 168, 175, 178; Delcassé to Saint-René
Taillandier, July 26, 1904, _ibid._, 160, No. 182; Saint-René
Taillandier to Delcassé, July 29, 1904, _ibid._, 160 f., No. 183, and
annex.]
[Footnote 389: _Bulletin_, Dec., 1903, p. 377; Jan., 1904, pp. 3 ff.;
March, 1904, pp. 76 f.; and others.]
[Footnote 390: See the list of the large subscribers in _ibid._, July,
1904, p. 224.]
[Footnote 391: The names of those present, 355 in all, are given in
_Quest. dipl. et col._, XVIII, 62 ff. See also _Bulletin_, June, 1904,
p. 185.]
[Footnote 392: Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, Dec. 15, 1904, _L.j.,
1901-5_, 179 ff., No. 209. In October a conference had been held in
Paris with Jonnart, governor-general of Algeria; Gen. Lyauty, commander
of the French troops at Ain-Sefra in Southern Oran; and Saint-René
Taillandier, on the Moroccan question (Monson to Lansdowne, Oct. 7,
1904, _B.D._, III, 54 f., No. 63.)]
[Footnote 393: _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 199, 210-12, 215, 218-20, 222-24;
_B.D._, III, 55, No. 64; _Bulletin_, Sept. and Oct., 1904, pp. 279,
320.]
[Footnote 394: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Dec. 12, 1904,
_ibid._, 179, No. 208; Tardieu, _Questions diplomatiques, 1904_, pp. 78
ff.]
[Footnote 395: The words are Delcassé’s (Delcassé to Saint-René
Taillandier, Dec. 20, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 186, No. 213.)]
[Footnote 396: The term is used to designate the Moroccan court and
government.]
[Footnote 397: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Dec. 19 and 24, 1904,
_L.j., 1901-5_, 185 f., No. 212; 186 f., No. 214.]
[Footnote 398: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Dec. 30, 1904, Jan.
2, 1905, _ibid._, 188 ff., No. 216 f.]
CHAPTER IX
GERMANY AND THE ENTENTE CORDIALE, 1903-4
I
In the early part of 1903, although one of Germany’s allies was rent by
nationalistic conflicts[399] and the other was no longer reliable, and
although British and German public opinion remained so hostile that the
former prevented Anglo-German co-operation,[400] Count Bülow and Herr
von Holstein were untroubled about the international situation. Upon the
announcement of King Edward’s forthcoming visit to Paris, the latter
wrote to his chief, on April 2, that an Anglo-French alliance was “music
of the future,” and that the Franco-Russian alliance was slowly breaking
under the strain of conflicting interests in the Balkans. “We have
blocked M. Delcassé’s policy in Turkey as well as in Morocco,” he
stated. The Chancellor agreed with him.
Delcassé’s coquetting with England [he wrote] would become serious for
us only in case he should also succeed in bringing about a
_rapprochement_ between England and Russia. . . . . Otherwise his wooing
of England will . . . . strengthen Count Lamsdorff in the thought that
the former League of the Three Emperors is, all things considered, the
best combination for Russian autocracy. But the present groupings will
not change soon, and in my opinion, we cannot take things too
coolly.[401]
Soon after King Edward’s visit to Paris the equanimity of the German
government was somewhat disturbed by a dispatch of May 10 from Baron
Eckardstein, formerly first secretary of the German embassy in London.
The Baron expressed his belief that a general Anglo-French settlement of
colonial differences including that of Morocco was under way; and that
since the two nations were reconciled, it would very likely be
concluded. He denied that this agreement would cause a breach in the
Dual Alliance, as was supposed in Germany; rather, he wrote, “a new
Triple Alliance is being formed, which, although it may assume no
written form and perhaps may endure only for a number of years, will for
a time cause us everywhere at least economic and political
difficulties.”[402]
This dispatch was referred by Count Bülow to the German ambassadors at
St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, and to the first secretary of the
embassy in London for consideration. Not one of these men believed
possible an Anglo-Russian settlement or the formation of a new Triple
Alliance. The Chancellor and Prince Radolin, the ambassador at Paris,
were both very skeptical about the prospects for an Anglo-French
agreement; but the German representatives in London thought that one
might be achieved. Count Metternich’s opinion was that Great Britain and
France were merely negotiating another colonial accord, which he
admitted might lead to closer co-operation between them, but which need
not cause alarm so long as Great Britain, already pacifically inclined,
enjoyed only the fickle friendship of France and was confronted by the
antagonism of Russia.[403]
In September the German government believed that the Anglo-French
settlement was already far advanced;[404] and, learning from the Spanish
Queen Mother, who was visiting in Austria, that France and Spain were
also negotiating over Morocco,[405] it resolved to intervene. To that
end on September 24 it instructed Herr von Radowitz, German ambassador
at Madrid, as follows:
By virtue of our political international position and especially by
virtue of the great significance of our economic interests in Morocco,
we must seek to be considered also in a division of the land by
obtaining territorial compensation, for example in the region of the
Sus, or elsewhere in the colonial world, perhaps by the cession of
Fernando Po. Your Excellency should weigh thoroughly the means by which
we should best reach that goal, whether through direct negotiations with
Spain, through breaking the way for participation in the negotiations of
the most interested states, or through proposing a conference.[406]
Thus the German government, realizing the improvement in the diplomatic
position of France and the decline in its own, was apparently willing to
make a division of Morocco with Great Britain, France, and Spain.
When Herr von Radowitz immediately unfolded the German desire to the
Spanish Foreign Minister, the latter, admitting the German right to a
share, agreed to study the proposal.[407] After this the conversations
appear to have ceased.
Simultaneously with these efforts, in the autumn of 1903 the German
government planned by maintaining strict reserve to allow the Franco-
Russian antagonism about the Balkans and the Russo-Japanese hostility in
the Far East to grow. It thought that any German leanings toward Russia
would pull France back into line and cause Japan to recede before the
danger of a new Continental triple entente.[408] On the Chancellor’s
advice, William II, during his meeting with the Czar at Wiesbaden and
Wolfsgarten on November 4-5, 1903, kept Germany’s hands entirely free.
Nevertheless, after the Czar’s approval of the Anglo-French and the
Franco-Italian _rapprochements_ was made public late in October, the
Emperor began to suffer from the “nightmare of the coalitions.” During
the visit he sought to incite Nicholas II against France and Great
Britain and to urge him further into far eastern enterprises. In his
correspondence with the Czar in December and January he continued these
tactics.[409] Count Bülow remonstrated, but the Emperor, haughtily
replying that these were private letters, advised the Chancellor to mind
his own business.[410]
To the satisfaction of the German government,[411] the Russo-Japanese
War broke out in February, 1904. In anger at Great Britain, Russia
immediately drew nearer to her neighbor;[412] and, with a war in
progress, the German statesmen planned by a wise manipulation of their
power to improve their international position and to gain concrete
advantages.[413] For the time, however, they endeavored by assuring the
British government that Germany would preserve strict neutrality to
obviate the need for Great Britain to come to terms with France, arguing
that a neutral Germany would entail a neutral France.[414] Moreover,
carrying out a suggestion of the Prince of Monaco, the _Wilhelmstrasse_
sought to effect, through the mediation of the Italian government, a
meeting between the Emperor William and President Loubet of France
during their visits to Italy in March and April.[415] But on March 23
Prince Radolin surprised his government[416] by reporting a conversation
with M. Delcassé which showed that the Anglo-French agreement was near
completion. By March 26 it became evident that the French had refused to
permit the proposed meeting.[417] So Count Bülow recommended to the
Emperor on March 30 the dispatch of three small warships to Tangier as a
direct intervention in the Moroccan affair. By thus arousing French
animosity, Germany would show Great Britain that the formation of a
Continental _bloc_ was impossible, that there was no cause for her to
sacrifice her interests in Morocco.[418] The Emperor regarded the move
as “entirely inopportune”; for, he argued, since France, Great Britain,
and Spain were about to settle the Moroccan question, “a one-sided
bellicose action by Germany . . . . would undoubtedly arouse the
suspicion of those Powers, would undermine belief in our repeatedly
expressed assurance, reiterated to the King of Spain at Vigo, that we
claim no exclusive rights in Morocco, and would put the stamp of
duplicity upon our policy.” He suggested that if the government wished
to take action in Morocco, it should first consult those three Powers
and secure their co-operation.[419]
Without relinquishing the idea, Count Bülow had to content himself for
the time with a renewed declaration to the British Ambassador on April 6
of neutrality during the Russo-Japanese War.[420] On April 8 the Anglo-
French accord was signed.
II
German public opinion was disquieted by the Anglo-French agreement and
by the Franco-Italian intimacy. Apart from the “lunatic fringe” as
represented by the Pan-German League, which demanded an immediate
seizure of a portion of Morocco,[421] no one expressed particular
concern over the loss of that country.[422] The scandals in the colonial
administration and the costly war with the natives of German Southwest
and German East Africa had momentarily turned the nation against further
colonial ventures.[423] The new international alignments, however, were
viewed by the nation with some alarm. In the Reichstag on April 12 Herr
Sattler, a National Liberal and a supporter of the government, expressed
satisfaction that the Triple Alliance remained firm; but, he continued,
“one has the feeling that otherwise a transformation has occurred in the
relations of the great Powers which can be of the gravest influence also
on German relations.” On the next day the Nationalist Count Reventlow
sarcastically remarked that he could not understand why Germany should
rejoice since France and Great Britain had settled their differences.
“If the world is divided, we must assume a somewhat different attitude
thereto,” he declared; “even in prudent circles of our people the course
of our foreign policy is being followed with national sorrow,” for the
government was trying to be overcordial to all without gaining anything.
Herr Bebel, the Social Democratic leader, greeted the Anglo-French
settlement on April 14; but he also regarded it as weakening the Triple
Alliance and strengthening the Dual Alliance. Like Count Reventlow, he
said that Germany’s international position in the last few years had in
no way improved, acknowledging with regret the increasing antipathy to
Germany in foreign lands.[424]
Count Bülow endeavored to calm the public opinion by declaring in the
Reichstag, April 12 and 14, that “we have no reason to suppose that the
Anglo-French colonial accord is directed at any other Power.” To this
apparently “amicable understanding . . . . from the standpoint of German
interests we have nothing to object.” As to Morocco, “in the main”
Germany had economic interests which “we must and shall protect. . . . .
We have no cause to fear that these . . . . could be disregarded or
injured by any Power.” While scoffing at the allegation that Germany was
isolated, he added: “If we keep our sword sharp, we need not fear
isolation very much. Germany is too strong not to be able to make
alliances. Many combinations are possible for us.” Denying any thought
of waging a war over Morocco, he upheld a policy of “prudent quiet and
even of reserve”; but he concluded with the significant statement that
“if one wishes to arouse friction in the world, one does not shout it
from the house-tops. Frederick the Great may now and then have made a
Machiavellian move in politics, but he previously wrote the Anti-
Machiavelli.”[425]
The Chancellor’s speech expressed only a temporary acquiescence in the
Anglo-French agreement, an intimation to France and Great Britain to
consult Germany over Morocco.[426] The German government liked that
accord less than the German people did, even though it knew nothing of
the content of the secret articles. The Emperor feared that now Great
Britain “would put every consideration for us more and more into the
background.”[427] And Count Bülow, who knew that the new alignment
placed Germany in no actual danger,[428] admitted that “doubtlessly both
Powers [France and Great Britain] win in international influence and in
freedom of movement by this accord and by their _rapprochement_, and
that the drawing force of the Anglo-French Entente on Italy will also be
strengthened.”[429] The prospective loss of Morocco to Germany and the
general dissatisfaction within Germany over the conduct of her foreign
affairs accentuated Count Bülow’s ill will toward the new agreement.
III
The Chancellor’s prophecy about Italy came true almost immediately.
Italy’s policy was, of course, to play between the Triple Alliance and
France for her own advantage. Italian opinion interpreted the Anglo-
French _rapprochement_, following upon the Franco-Italian entente, as a
setback to Germany, and became more independent toward its allies. After
Italy’s special interest in the future of Tripoli was recognized, the
Italian people raised the irredentist question in the summer and autumn
of 1903. In the winter relations with Austria became so tense that war
clouds loomed up.[430] Count Goluchowski, the Austrian foreign minister,
desired to replace the Triple Alliance by the old League of the Three
Emperors, and declared that if the present relations with Italy
continued, Austria could not renew the alliance.[431]
Count Bülow succeeded in patching up the raveling fabric of the Triple
Alliance.[432] He suspected that Italy had made a reinsurance treaty
with France after the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1902, by which
the alliance was nullified in case of a Franco-German war.[433] Neither
he nor General Schlieffen, German chief of staff, expected Italy to
support Germany in that instance or even to hold inactive the French
troops on the Italian frontier. None the less, at the request of the
Italian chief of staff, the Chancellor permitted the German-Italian
military conversations to continue as before.[434] He endeavored to
preserve at least the outward appearance of harmony.[435]
But in the spring of 1904 the Triple Alliance almost went on the rocks
over an intrinsically insignificant affair—whether or not the
entertainment of the French and of the German chiefs of state, who were
both to visit Italy at about the same time in March and April, should be
on a similar scale.
After the Emperor’s visit on March 26-27 had passed off quietly
enough[436] the French government sought to expand the program of
reception for President Loubet in order to demonstrate the great
popularity of France in Italy,[437] while the German government
endeavored to restrict it. Under threat of breaking the alliance, the
latter forced M. Tittoni, the Italian foreign minister, to promise that
Italy’s loyalty to the Triple Alliance would be warmly mentioned in the
toasts.[438] But when the visit occurred, April 24-28, the Italian King,
playing his own hand, helped the French to enjoy an unbroken
triumph.[439] On April 25 and 26 affection for them was extravagantly
displayed by the Italians while no mention of the Triple Alliance was
made.[440] In an endeavor to stop further exchange of toasts, the German
ambassador, Count Monts, complained bitterly to M. Luzzati, Italian
secretary of the treasury, of the pro-French attitude of the King,
government, and press; of the non-fulfilment of promises; of the King’s
ignoring him at the festivals; of the failure to mention the alliance in
the speeches. “My training and instructions prohibit me from using that
tone toward the _Consulta_ which would correspond with its behavior,” he
declared. He demanded that no more toasts be made.[441]
Doubtless this peremptoriness would have produced the desired result if
at the crucial moment the German Emperor had not sent a telegram of warm
thanks for his reception to the Italian government and nullified the
entire effect of the Ambassador’s indignation.[442] At Naples the King
again exchanged toasts with M. Loubet without mentioning the alliance.
Although the demands of the German government had been flouted, it could
not execute its threat; for a dissolution of the Triple Alliance,
occurring so soon after the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale, would
have been too great a victory for France. “One would say,” wrote Count
Bülow, “that our policy since the retirement of Bismarck has lost us
first the alliance with Russia, then good relations with England, and
finally the Triple Alliance itself.”[443] So, feigning cool indifference
toward the renegade ally, he remarked to the Italian Ambassador that as
the conditions out of which the Triple Alliance had developed no longer
obtained, Germany had no need of Italy’s aid, nor, he supposed, had
Italy of Germany’s.[444] Then came apologies. On May 18 M. Tittoni
declared in the Italian Chamber that “the policy of Italy is not one of
balancing, which would be unworthy of a great state, but one of loyal
honesty. The alliance with Germany is not incompatible with friendly
relations with France.”[445] Although the German government did not
believe him, it accepted his excuses. The Triple Alliance resumed its
precarious course.[446]
As a result of this episode, the anger of the German government at
France, already aroused over the diminution of German influence through
the Entente Cordiale, was increased. The Emperor, who had tarried near
the Italian coast in the persistent hope of a chance meeting with M.
Loubet,[447] returned home feeling like the poor kinsman uninvited to
the feast. On May 1, at the opening of the new Rhine bridge at Mainz, he
gave vent to his chagrin in the following warning: “I desire sincerely
that peace . . . . be kept. But I am convinced that if this bridge
should have to be used for more serious transports, it would stand the
test completely.”[448]
IV
“We need a success in our foreign policy,” wrote Prince Lichnowsky,
councilor in the German foreign office, on April 14, “because the Anglo-
French understanding as well as the Franco-Italian _rapprochement_ is
generally considered a defeat for us.”[449] The German government
immediately took steps toward obtaining that success.
To manifest its dissatisfaction at being excluded from the Moroccan
settlement and to force M. Delcassé to agree with Germany on that
question, the German government first considered in April the project of
dispatching a warship to Tangier, ostensibly to settle certain
grievances against Morocco.[450] As a precaution, General Schlieffen,
chief of staff, was consulted, April 19, about the possibility of
success in case of a Franco-German war. Herr von Holstein summed up the
General’s reply as follows: “In case of the outbreak of a Franco-German
war at the present, Russia’s participation would be improbable, but
England’s attitude would be uncertain.”[451]
The proposal was not executed at the time,[452] for Count Bülow had
other plans. The first one was to test the strength of the Entente
Cordiale, to weaken its force, and to include Germany among the Powers
making ententes by endeavoring to negotiate an arbitration treaty and a
general settlement with Great Britain similar to the Anglo-French ones.
If accord, even in principle, were reached on Anglo-German difficulties,
the Chancellor was willing to propose a naval agreement. He felt certain
that by careful handling he could win the Emperor’s approval of the
whole transaction.[453]
The opportunity to make the proposal was afforded when about the first
of May the British government asked the other Powers interested in Egypt
to approve the changes which France had accepted in the declaration of
April 8. The German foreign office replied that Germany must receive the
same guaranty of her rights in Egypt that France had received, and
proposed to include in the negotiations the Anglo-German troubles
concerning Samoa, Transvaal indemnities, and the Canadian preferential
tariff.
The British government refused to broaden the basis of negotiations,
declaring that the Egyptian affair must be settled on its own merits.
How Lord Lansdowne regarded the German proposal was shown in his letter
of May 6 to Sir Frank Lascelles.
The proposal of the German Government to make their concurrence in
regard to the Khedivial Decree dependent upon an all-round settlement
[he wrote] . . . . looks to an ordinary observer like a great piece of
effrontery. . . . . The suggestion that the consent of the German
Government to a perfectly innocuous arrangement in Egypt can only be
bought at the price of concessions elsewhere does not become more
palatable when we find it connected with an intimation that Germany is
hesitating whether “she shall turn to the East or to the West.” This is
a veiled threat of which I remember Hatzfeldt used to be fond.[454]
Pointing out the fact that Germany held only a very small per cent of
the Egyptian bonds (he said only ¼ per cent), that the other Powers had
agreed to the Egyptian changes unconditionally, and that France had made
reciprocal concessions to Great Britain in return for the guaranty of
her rights in Egypt, Lord Lansdowne refused to give Germany the special
guaranty which she requested.[455]
Count Bülow agreed (May 28) to confine the negotiations to Egypt alone;
but he would not recede from the other demands. For, he argued, France
had been given large compensation in return for her renunciations in
Egypt while Germany merely asked an equal assurance of her rights and
interests in that land, particularly of her commercial interests. Thus
the two governments reached a deadlock. Each felt that it had a just
grievance.[456] Herr von Holstein, considering the occasion a “test of
strength,” thought that if Germany receded, the world would perceive
that sharp handling was sufficient to vanquish her.[457] Count
Metternich reported, however, that the British refusal was caused not by
any malign designs against Germany, but rather by the fact that the
government was opposed to weakening or endangering the Entente Cordiale
by treating Germany in the same way as France, and by the fact that it
saw no reason for making an exception of Germany after the other Powers
had unconditionally accepted the modifications. Above all, he wrote, the
British government feared another outburst of vituperation against
Germany from British public opinion and of indignation against the
British government itself for permitting Germany again to browbeat
it.[458] So about the middle of June at the Count’s suggestion, a
compromise was effected. The British government gave Germany a guaranty
of its Egyptian interests in return for an acceptance of the French
obligations in that land. The other Powers were to be asked to approve
this new agreement.[459]
Late in June King Edward enjoyed a pleasant visit as the Emperor’s guest
at a naval review at Kiel; on July 10, at the King’s suggestion, some
German warships touched at Plymouth; and on July 12 an arbitration
treaty was signed between the two Powers. Their relations seemed to be
improving. At Kiel, Count Bülow once more assured the King that Germany
intended to guard strict neutrality during the Russo-Japanese War; and
Edward VII declared that “no special agreements were needed between
England and Germany since no conflict of political interests divided
them.” He also stated that he wished a settlement with Russia, in fact,
that he desired to diminish animosities among all Powers; but he added
that he had no thought thereby of isolating Germany.[460]
In spite of the King’s cordial words, the fact remained that Germany was
still regarded with marked mistrust and antipathy by the British people,
while the British government had shown a preference, not yet appreciated
by Germany, for the friendship of France. Germany’s bid to participate
in the formation of ententes had failed.
V
Count Bülow’s second plan was to share in the settlement of the Moroccan
problem. He had made preparations to that end in the previous autumn,
but his policy had been repudiated by the German Emperor (who personally
had no interest in Morocco)[461] during an interview with the King of
Spain at Vigo on March 16, 1904. In one of his expansive and oracular
moods William II advised the youthful King to keep on good terms with
France and to make his first foreign visit to Paris, to be on his guard
against Great Britain and her satellite, Portugal, but to maintain
friendly personal relations with King Edward, and to come to an
agreement over the future of Morocco with the other nations, especially
France, interested in North Africa. Germany, he said, aimed at no
territorial acquisitions in North Africa, but only the maintenance of
the open door for, among others, “railway concessions, open ports, and
importation of manufactured articles.”[462]
In spite of the Emperor’s renunciation, Count Bülow did not relinquish
his ambitions although the difficulty of realizing them was enormously
increased. The indefiniteness and apparent duplicity of the German
policy on the Moroccan question were caused by Count Bülow’s dilemma of
gaining a share in Morocco without violating the Emperor’s assertions.
Late in April, 1904, the Chancellor was afforded an opportunity to
intervene through Spain, whose government asked for Germany’s sympathy
and “practical proof of it at the opportune moment” during the Franco-
Spanish negotiations then under way. Count Bülow was eager to fish in
troubled waters by lending aid, and in his optimism went so far as to
instruct Herr von Radowitz on April 29 as follows:
Port Mahon we leave entirely out of consideration. Primarily Fernando Po
interests us, for which under circumstances we would also pay well. If,
moreover, a harbor in West Morocco is obtainable, that would be very
useful. Perhaps Your Excellency can use the prevailing opinion in Spain
against the Anglo-French accord in this direction.[463]
The Chancellor advised the Spanish government to draw out the
negotiations; for, he argued, if Great Britain were given time in which
to recover from her fear that the far eastern entente of 1895 might be
renewed, she would begin to rue her bargain, and would at least
passively support Spain or acquiesce in the latter’s receiving better
terms from the more powerful France.[464] When the Chancellor heard of
difficulty between the two negotiating Powers over the control of
Tangier, he decided to give diplomatic support to Spain in obtaining
that port and its hinterland provided Great Britain was not obliged to
aid France diplomatically in acquiring them. In other words, he was
making it very easy for Great Britain to sin against her obligations to
France. When the German Ambassador sounded Lord Lansdowne early in June,
the latter, while not objecting, made it evident that he preferred and
expected a satisfactory settlement directly between the two Powers
themselves.[465] By June 10 the German government learned that this
matter had been arranged, but that trouble had arisen over the question
of publishing the agreement. Count Bülow immediately urged Spain in
favor of it.[466] On June 17 Herr von Radowitz reported that Spain was
insisting upon complete commercial freedom in Morocco without the thirty
years’ limitation. As this was also a sensitive point for Germany Count
Bülow on the next day instructed the Ambassador to advise Spain strongly
to insist upon the assurance of the fullest economic freedom even for
obtaining government contracts and concessions. He left it to Herr von
Radowitz to determine “whether it would be advantageous for the
achievement of the German goal to let the Spanish perceive that Germany
would assume and maintain the same standpoint at the proper moment.”
“Naturally,” he added for the Ambassador’s personal information, “it
would be . . . . a great help to us for Spain to take the lead.”[467]
By July, however, there seemed little prospect of Germany’s profiting
from the Franco-Spanish negotiations.[468] German grievances against
Morocco remained unsettled. German firms trading there demanded
protection against the French monopolistic actions. In June, France
practically gained control over the Sultan’s finances, and she was
preparing an important mission to Fez in the autumn. Nor did M. Delcassé
show any inclination to open negotiations with Germany. Already
disgruntled at the French Foreign Minister, the German government came
to feel itself slighted and humiliated by his disregard. Its resentment
toward him became concentrated upon the one grievance which could be
best supported in public, that he was infringing upon Germany’s economic
interests in Morocco. It therefore decided to assume a more active
policy, and late in July held a discussion of ways and means. The
government did not follow up a hint from the Sultan for co-operation
because of its unsettled claims against Morocco. Nor could it tender him
financial support or begin an economic penetration of the land similar
to that of France because, as Baron Richthofen wrote late in July, “the
German banks all strike immediately when one mentions Morocco. The
German Foreign Secretary advised against keeping pace with every act of
the French in Morocco as too venturesome; while to take the initiative
directly with the French government by requesting guaranties for
economic freedom he regarded as both doubtful of success and beneath
German dignity. So at the Baron’s suggestion a “gradual, purely matter-
of-fact advance, ignoring as long as possible a special position of
France,” was decided upon. German warships should appear from time to
time in Moroccan waters, and during one of these visits the grievances
against Morocco should be settled.[469]
The uncertain international situation also caused the German government
to proceed warily. On June 3 the Belgian Minister at Berlin had stated
to the German foreign office that he suspected the presence of a secret
article in the Anglo-French accord concerning the Rheinish frontier.
Although believing that the agreement did contain secret clauses
regarding Egypt, Count Metternich refused to credit this suspicion. Upon
mentioning the rumor to Lord Lansdowne on June 19, he received a full
denial that the accord contained any articles which concerned European
complications.[470] Nevertheless, the Chancellor realized that “any
attempt on the part of Germany to interfere in the Moroccan question in
its present phase can lead to an action with far-reaching consequences
and therefore deserves special precaution.”[471] For that reason he
first sought to learn how the British government regarded its
obligations to France with respect to Morocco.[472]
On August 15 Count Metternich declared to Lord Lansdowne that “the
French effort aimed at a monopolization in Morocco. We could not permit
this.” Asserting that Germany was in no way bound by the Anglo-French
agreement, he said that Germany’s economic interests in regard to
governmental concessions and industrial enterprises in Morocco were
endangered by France. “We could very soon be put in a situation in which
we should have to protect our commercial interests [in the widest sense]
against France.” He asked Lord Lansdowne how the British government
interpreted the last part of Article IV of the Anglo-French declaration
stating that concessions for roads, etc., in Morocco were to be granted
“only on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the
State over these great undertakings of public interest,” and Article IX
obliging Great Britain to lend diplomatic aid to France.
Lord Lansdowne denied that Great Britain had renounced her right to
share in the concessions in Morocco, but he refused to interpret Article
IX until a concrete instance arose. He declared that in the French
agreement
we [Great Britain] made no attempt to dispose of the rights of other
Powers, although we made certain concessions in respect of the rights
and opportunities to which we were ourselves entitled. I could at any
rate say that it was not at all probable that, if any third Power were
to have occasion to uphold its Treaty rights, we should use our
influence in derogation of them.
Count Metternich inferred from that interview that Lord Lansdowne would
limit the scope of Article IX, and that in case Germany’s actions did
not infringe upon the Sultan’s authority Germany would be safe in
opposing France in Morocco. However, he wrote, if Germany sought, for
instance, to acquire control of a harbor there, Great Britain would
support France. He warned his government that Great Britain would not
connive at blocking the French advance in Morocco or endanger her
friendship for the sake of that land. If a third Power disputed
politically the French position there, both government and people would
support France. Within those limits Germany could execute her Moroccan
policy. But, he continued, “in the present international situation, it
will be difficult for us to arrest the process of France’s establishing
herself in Morocco.”[473]
Even before receiving Count Metternich’s reply, the Chancellor proposed
to dispatch an ultimatum to the Sultan demanding under threat of a naval
demonstration that he satisfy the German claims within three
months.[474] But the Emperor, who remained strongly opposed to active
interference in the Moroccan affair, refused his consent for the third
time, and upset the Chancellor’s policy.[475] In September the foreign
office discussed the plan to seize the Moroccan transport ship and even
Agadir, but nothing was done.[476] Early in October Baron Richthofen
suggested that since the Emperor was so averse to intervention the
government should take up the Moroccan question directly with the French
government. This project also came to naught.[477]
While no action was taken German feeling continued to smolder. The
noncommittal communication from the French government about the
agreement with Spain early in October[478] and the repeated petitions of
German firms for the defense of their interests in Morocco[479]
augmented the bitterness against France. So while the German government
itself played the sphinx, it showed its resentment through the
semiofficial press and through conversations between German and French
officials in Morocco and elsewhere. By the end of the year the Moroccan
question was still very much alive. As an influential Moor remarked,
“Germany has not yet spoken, and so long as that has not occurred, we
cannot believe that anything definite has been decided.”[480] Before
Germany did speak, she endeavored to solve her difficulties by an effort
to ally with Russia.
[Footnote 399: See among others Richard Charmatz, _Österreichs äussere
und innere Politik von 1895 bis 1914_ (Leipzig and Berlin, 1918).]
[Footnote 400: On the state of British public opinion see Eckardstein,
_Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, II, 397 f.; and
the various dispatches from Metternich and Eckardstein, _G.P._, XVII,
Nos. 5046, 5071, 5094, 5104, 5371, 5375, and others.]
[Footnote 401: Holstein to Bülow, March 30, 1903, _G.P._, XVII, 573 n.;
memo. by Holstein, April, 1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 802 ff., No. 5888;
Holstein to Bülow, April 2, 1903, _ibid._, 838 f., No. 5910; Bülow to F.
O., April 3, 1903, _ibid._, 839 f., No. 5911.]
[Footnote 402: An ardent advocate of the proposed Anglo-German alliance
and a sufferer from the “nightmare of coalitions,” Eckardstein had
resigned his position in October, 1902, because he disapproved of the
diplomatic method and the policy of his foreign office and “saw black
ahead” for his country; also perhaps because of personal pique at not
having been appointed ambassador in London upon the death of the aged
Count Hatzfeldt (Eckardstein, II, 412 f.). For his dispatch to Bülow see
_G.P._, XVII, 567 f., No. 5369; also published with minor changes in
Eckardstein, II, 425 f. The few changes from the original which occur in
some of the documents in Eckardstein’s memoirs are not of any great
importance. On the whole his judgments were sound.]
[Footnote 403: The dispatches are to be found in _G.P._, Vol. XVII,
chap. cxv. In July, however, the German Emperor could not conceal from
the French Ambassador his irritation at Delcassé’s success in the Anglo-
French _rapprochement_. After expressing the wish that French vessels
might repeat the visit of 1895 to Kiel, he remarked to M. Bihourd, July
16: “‘I know well that nothing is to be accomplished with M. Delcassé.
The advances to England are the work of M. Delcassé and M. Cambon. . . .
. But the Russians are not content with that and some day they will make
you. . . . .’ Here a gesture of disappointment, concluded M. Bihourd,
made clear the prediction” (quoted from a dispatch from Bihourd in
Bourgeois et Pagès, _Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande
guerre_, p. 293).]
[Footnote 404: Groeben to F. O., Sept. 17, 1903, _G.P._, XVII, 353 f.,
No. 5198; Richthofen to Radowitz, Sept. 28, 1903, _ibid._, 357 ff., No.
5202.]
[Footnote 405: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 18, 1903, _ibid._, 354, No. 5199;
Richthofen to Radowitz, Sept. 24, 1903, _ibid._, 354 ff., No. 5200.]
[Footnote 406: Richthofen to Radowitz, Sept. 24, 1903, _ibid._, 355, No.
5200.]
[Footnote 407: Radowitz to F. O., Sept. 29, Oct. 4, 1903, _ibid._, 359
ff., Nos. 5203, 5205.]
[Footnote 408: Radolin to F. O., Oct. 17, 1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 845 ff.,
No. 5915; Bülow to William II, Oct. 19, 1903, _ibid._, 847 ff., No.
5916.]
[Footnote 409: William II wrote to Nicholas II, Dec. 1, 1903, as
follows: “The visit of the hundred British Parliamentary—gentlemen and
ladies—to Paris shows how ‘the Crimean combination’ is warming to its
work. Your ally is making rather free with his flirt [with Great
Britain]. You should pull him up a little.” Again on Jan. 3, 1904, he
wrote to the same: “Therefore it is evident to every unbiassed mind that
Korea must and will be Russian. When and how that is nobody’s affair and
concerns only you and your country.” See Bülow to F. O., Oct. 31, 1903,
_ibid._, 853 f., No. 5918; memo. by Bülow, Nov. 7, 1903, _ibid._, 70
ff., No. 5422; Walter Goetz (ed.), _Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren,
1894-1914_ (Berlin, 1920), pp. 330 ff.; Savinsky, _Recollections of a
Russian Diplomat_, pp. 63 ff. William II addressed Nicholas in various
letters as “Admiral of the Pacific” and signed himself “Admiral of the
Atlantic.” In spite of these words, to hold the Emperor responsible for
the Russo-Japanese War is to underestimate the force of Russian foreign
policy.]
[Footnote 410: See _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chaps. cxxviii, cxxix, especially
Bülow to William II, Jan. 4, 1904, _ibid._, 87 ff., No. 5972, and the
Emperor’s minutes; memo. by Bülow, Feb. 14, 1904, _ibid._, 62 f., No.
5961.]
[Footnote 411: Bülow to Holstein, Jan. 15, 1904, _ibid._, 33 f., No.
5942; memo. by Eckardstein, Jan. 17, 1904, _ibid._, 38 ff., No. 5945,
and the Emperor’s minutes thereto.]
[Footnote 412: Count Benckendorff, Russian ambassador at London, spoke
of the Dual Alliance as going to pieces, and there was talk among other
Russian diplomats of renewing the former League of the Three Emperors.
See Radolin to Bülow, Feb. 28, 1904, _ibid._, 165 ff., No. 6028;
Metternich to Bülow, March 14, 1904, _ibid._, 167 ff., No. 6029;
Alvensleben to Bülow, March 18, 1904, _ibid._, 172 ff., No. 6030; memo.
by Holstein, Jan. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 35 ff., No. 5944.]
[Footnote 413: “Because of the importance of German neutrality we shall
perhaps find opportunity to utilize our central position in case of
further sharpening of the hostility in the same way that M. Delcassé
intends doing with reference to Morocco,” wrote Holstein in a memo. on
Jan. 23, 1904 (_ibid._, 48 ff., No. 5951). Also see memo. by Holstein,
Jan. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 48 ff., No. 5951.]
[Footnote 414: Bülow to Metternich, Jan. 9, 1904, _ibid._, 22, No. 5932;
Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 8, 1904, _B.D._, II, 232, No. 273. Bülow
later complained that the British had offered very weak resistance to
the French demands (Bülow to Metternich, June 4, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 28,
No. 6383).]
[Footnote 415: Radolin to Bülow, Feb. 4, 1904, _ibid._, 105 f., No.
6431; Bülow to Radolin, Feb. 18, 1904, _ibid._, 106 f., No. 6432, and
following documents.]
[Footnote 416: For proof that the German government had not expected the
signing of the accord then see Eckardstein, II, 426 f.; Otto Hammann,
_Der misverstandene Bismarck. Zwanzig Jahre deutscher Weltpolitik_
(Berlin, 1921), p. 110.]
[Footnote 417: Monts to F. O., March 26, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 116, No.
6439.]
[Footnote 418: Although Bülow did not say so, it is manifest that this
was one of his intentions (Bülow to William II, March 30, 1904, _ibid._,
197 ff., No. 6512).]
[Footnote 419: Tschirschky to Bülow, April 3, 1904, _ibid._, 199 ff.,
No. 6513. On the interview at Vigo see below.]
[Footnote 420: Bülow to Tschirschky, April 3, 1904, _ibid._, 8 f. No.
6370; memo. by Bülow, April 6, 1904, _ibid._, 10 f., No. 6372; Bülow to
Tschirschky, April 6, 1904, _ibid._, 201 and note, No. 6514. The last
dispatch was not sent, for on April 8 the accord was signed.]
[Footnote 421: _Zwanzig Jahre alldeutscher Arbeit und Kämpfe_, pp. 219,
233, 235, 238 f.]
[Footnote 422: See, for instance, _Berliner Tageblatt_, April 17, 1904;
Dr. Th. Schiemann, _Deutschland und die grosse Politik, 1904_ (Berlin,
1905), p. 118, and others; _Grenzboten_, June 23, 1904, p. 668.]
[Footnote 423: Alfred Zimmerman, _Deutsche Kolonialpolitik_ (Berlin,
1914), pp. 241 ff.]
[Footnote 424: _Stenographische Berichte von den Behandlungen des
Reichstages_, CXCIX, 2019, 2053 f., 2058 f.; Hammann, _Bilder aus der
letzten Kaiserzeit_, p. 42; reports from the Berlin correspondent to the
_London Times_, April 11 and 16, 1904.]
[Footnote 425: Bülow, _Reden_, II, 74, 84, 90 f.; see also Hammann,
_Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit_, pp. 42 f.]
[Footnote 426: This was Sanderson’s opinion. He was at the time British
permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs. See memo. by
Sanderson, Feb. 25, 1907, _B.D._, III, 421.]
[Footnote 427: William II to Bülow, April 19, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 22 ff.,
No. 6378.]
[Footnote 428: From London, Bernstorff, first secretary of the embassy,
reported that the British were entirely pacific in their intentions and
inclinations (Bernstorff to Bülow, April 16, 1904, _ibid._, 14 ff., No.
6376). The Emperor considered this report “excellent.” Alvensleben also
wrote from St. Petersburg that Russia was not so well satisfied with the
Anglo-French accord as French newspapers would have one believe
(Alvensleben to Bülow, April 15, 1904, _ibid._, 21 f., No. 6377).]
[Footnote 429: Bülow to William II, April 20, 1904, _ibid._, 24, No.
6379.]
[Footnote 430: On Austro-Italian relations see Wedel to Bülow, Sept. 14,
1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 621 ff., No. 5779; memo. by Bülow, Sept. 20, 1903,
_ibid._, 624 ff., No. 5780; Monts to F. O., _ibid._, XX, 47 f., No.
6399; Monts to Bülow, April 25, 1904, _ibid._, 54 ff., No. 6404; Monts
to Bülow, April 30, 1904, _ibid._, 64 ff., No. 6412.]
[Footnote 431: Memo. by Bülow of conversation with Goluchowski at
Vienna, Sept. 20, 1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 625 f., No. 5780; Wedel to
Bülow, Oct. 20, 1903, _ibid._, 627 f., No. 5783.]
[Footnote 432: An interview between the Italian and the Austrian foreign
ministers at Abazzia on April 9, 1904, attested to this fact. See Wedel
to Bülow, April 14, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 50 ff., No. 6401; memo. by Bülow,
May 9, 1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 613 ff., No. 5775; Bülow to Monts, June 9,
1903, _ibid._, 616 ff., No. 5776; and following documents in _ibid._,
chap. cxxii, Anhang.]
[Footnote 433: Monts to Bülow, April 30, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 64, No.
6412; memo. by Holstein, March 3, 1904, _ibid._, 37 ff., No. 6388.]
[Footnote 434: Chelius to Schlieffen, Dec. 1, 1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 705
ff., No. 5827; Richthofen to Schlieffen, Dec. 11, 1903, _ibid._, 707 f.,
No. 5826; Schlieffen to Richthofen, Dec. 14, 1903, _ibid._, 708, No.
5829.]
[Footnote 435: Memo. by Holstein, March 3, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 37 ff.,
No. 6388; Monts to F. O., March 7, 1904, _ibid._, 41, No. 6390.]
[Footnote 436: Bülow to William II, March 11, 1904, _ibid._, 46, No.
6397; Monts to F. O., March 26, 1904, _ibid._, 47 f., No. 6399; _Quest.
dipl. et col._, April 1, 1904, XVII, 524 f.]
[Footnote 437: Monts to Bülow, April 16, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 53 f., No.
6403. Giovanni Giolitti, who was then Italian premier, has written as
follows about this visit: “In Delcassé I noticed particularly his
finesse and ability, as well as the insistence with which he attempted
to loosen or weaken our bonds with Germany, without however putting
forward anything at all in the nature of a definite proposal” (_Memoirs
of My Life_ [London, 1923], p. 183). On March 5, 1904, Sir Francis
Bertie, British ambassador in Rome, wrote to Lansdowne as follows: “M.
Ba[rrère] does all he can to create friction between Italy and Austria
to alienate Italy from her partner in the Triplice” (_B.D._, V, 74). In
contrast the British Ambassador in Vienna was in April, 1904, reassuring
his Italian colleague about Austrian intentions in the Balkans now that
Russia was in a far eastern war (Plunkett to Lansdowne, April 7, 1904,
_ibid._, V, 80, No. 41).]
[Footnote 438: Memo. by Holstein, March 3, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 37 ff., No.
6388; Bülow to Monts, March 6, 1904, _ibid._, 39 ff., No. 6389, and
following documents.]
[Footnote 439: Monts to F. O., March 17, 1904, _ibid._, 45, No. 6396;
Bülow to Monts, March 26, 1904, _ibid._, 46 f., No. 6398; Monts to
Bülow, April 2, 1904, _ibid._, 48 f., No. 6400; Monts to Bülow, April
16, 1904, _ibid._, 52 f., No. 6402; Monts to Bülow, April 16, 1904,
_ibid._, 53 f., No. 6403.]
[Footnote 440: Monts to Bülow, April 25, 1904, _ibid._, 54 ff., No.
6404; Monts to F. O., April 26, 1904, _ibid._, 57 f., No. 6405; _Quest.
dipl. et col._, XVII, 688 ff.]
[Footnote 441: Monts to Bülow, April 28, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 60 ff., No.
6410.]
[Footnote 442: Monts to Bülow, April 29, 1904, _ibid._, 63 f., No.
6411.]
[Footnote 443: Bülow’s minutes to a dispatch from Monts, May 21, 1904,
_ibid._, 78, No. 6419.]
[Footnote 444: Holstein advised informing the Italian government that
the Triple Alliance “practically speaking has had its day,” while Monts
confined his relations with Tittoni to written communications. See
Richthofen to Monts, April 28, 1904, _ibid._, 59 f., No. 6409; Bülow to
Monts, May 7, 1904, _ibid._, 67 ff., No. 6414; memo. by Holstein, May
12, 1904, _ibid._, 71 f., No. 6416; memo. by Bülow, May 12, 1904,
_ibid._, 73 f., No. 6417.]
[Footnote 445: Quoted in _ibid._, p. 75 nn.; Tommaso Tittoni, _Italy’s
Foreign and Colonial Policy. A Selection from the Speeches Delivered in
the Italian Parliament by Tommaso Tittoni_ (New York, 1915), pp. 12 f.,
quoting a speech by Tittoni on May 14, 1904.]
[Footnote 446: Memo. by Bülow, May 12, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 73 f., No. 6417
and Anlage; Monts to Bülow, May 12, 1904, _ibid._, 74 ff., No. 6418; and
the following documents. At a personal meeting on Sept. 27, 1904,
Premier Giolitti affirmed to Bülow Italy’s loyalty to her alliance and
promised to show more reserve toward France (memo. by Bülow, Sept. 28,
1904, _ibid._, 81 ff., No. 6422).]
[Footnote 447: The Emperor tarried so long that Bülow finally advised
him to come home; otherwise he would make himself ridiculous. See Monts
to F. O., April 17, 1904, _ibid._, 117, No. 6440; Bülow to William II,
April 17, 1904, _ibid._, 117 f., No. 6441.]
[Footnote 448: The Emperor made similar speeches at Karlsruhe, April 28,
and at St. Johann-Saar-brücken, May 14 (Schulthess, _Europäischer
Geschichtskalender 1904_, pp. 76, 92). At Karlsruhe he declared: “I hope
that peace will not be disturbed and that the events which we see
occurring will have the effect of . . . . making our eyes clear, of
steeling our courage, and of uniting us if it should become necessary to
interfere in the _Weltpolitik_.”]
[Footnote 449: Memo. by Lichnowsky, April 13, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 203, No.
6516.]
[Footnote 450: Dr. Genthe of the _Kölnische Zeitung_ had recently been
murdered by some of the Moroccans; a native employee of a German firm
had been illegally imprisoned; and certain indemnities from the Moroccan
government had to be collected. See Mentzingen to Bülow, April 5
(received April 11), 1904, _ibid._, 202, No. 6515; memo. by Lichnowsky,
April 13, 1904, _ibid._, 202 f., No. 6516; memo. by Bruning, April 23,
1904, _ibid._, 203 ff., No. 6517, and Richthofen’s minutes thereto.]
[Footnote 451: Memo. by Lichnowsky, April 19, 1904, _ibid._, XIX, 174
f., No. 6031; Schlieffen to Bülow, April 20, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 175 ff.,
No. 6032.]
[Footnote 452: On May 21, Mühlberg, of the German foreign office,
telegraphed to Mentzingen, German minister at Tangier, that since “a
forceful action could be easily misunderstood and lead to erroneous
conclusions about the German policy,” the ship would not be sent
(_ibid._, 206, No. 6502).]
[Footnote 453: Memo. by Holstein, April 19, 1904, _ibid._, 123 f., No.
6443; Bülow to Richthofen, April 19, 1904, _ibid._, 124, No. 6444. All
three men approved of the idea.]
[Footnote 454: Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. 329 f.]
[Footnote 455: Richthofen to Lascelles, May 4, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 127 f.,
No. 6446. Whether or not the communication was sent in this form is not
known. See Rücker-Jenisch to F. O., May 18, 1904, _ibid._, 128 f., No.
6447; Villiers to Lascelles, May 24, 1904, _ibid._, 129 ff., No. 6448;
Lascelles to Lansdowne, May 18, 1904, _B.D._, III, 1, No. 1; Lansdowne
to Lascelles, May 4, 1904, _ibid._, 18, No. 16, and following
documents.]
[Footnote 456: Memoir handed to Richthofen to Lascelles, May 28, 1904,
_G.P._, XX, 132 f., No. 6449; Metternich to F. O., June 1, 1904,
_ibid._, 147 f., No. 6454.]
[Footnote 457: Memo. by Holstein, June 5, 1904, _ibid._, 144 f., No.
6461; William II to Bülow, June 6, 1904, _ibid._, 147 f., No. 6463.]
[Footnote 458: Dispatches from Metternich to F. O., June 2, 3, 4, 8, 9,
1904 (_ibid._, 138 ff., Nos. 6455, 6458, 6460, 6464, 6466). Cf. Mallet
to Spring Rice, early summer, 1904 (Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships
of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 414). Mallet stated that the British
government did not want to weaken the advance toward France by a
settlement with Germany, especially since the Anglo-French accord had
not been definitely ratified.]
[Footnote 459: _G.P._, XX, 148 ff., Nos. 6464-80; _B.D._, III, 21 ff.,
Nos. 19-23.]
[Footnote 460: Memo. by Bülow, June 26, 29, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 186 ff.,
Nos. 6038, 6040; memo. by Richthofen (undated though probably written
about July 4, 1904), _ibid._, 194 ff., No. 6042; Richthofen to
Metternich, June 20, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 163, No. 6478; Lee, _King Edward
VII_, II, 292 ff. See also MacDonald to Lansdowne, June 23, 1904,
_B.D._, IV, 1, No. 1; Lansdowne to MacDonald, June 24, 1904, _ibid._, 2,
No. 2.]
[Footnote 461: In 1896 the Emperor had shown a decided interest in
Morocco (_G.P._, XI, No. 2820). In the next years, however, his attitude
had changed. The motive force behind the German policy toward Morocco
was Bülow.]
[Footnote 462: The Emperor thought of buying Fernando Po, but said
nothing of this to the King. On this incident and the Emperor’s attitude
toward Morocco see his minutes to Radolin to Bülow, Oct. 20, 1903,
_ibid._, XVII, 362, No. 5206; William II to Bülow, March 16, 1904;
_ibid._, 363, No. 5208; Radowitz to Richthofen, March 23, 1904, _ibid._,
364, No. 5209; Radolin to Bülow, March 30, 1904, _ibid._, 365, No. 5210.
On Oct. 20, 1903, Radolin had reported from Paris a conversation with
the Spanish Ambassador in which the latter, after admitting that France
and Spain were well on the way toward an accord over Morocco, remarked
to him, “I suppose that you have nothing to object to our entente.”
Radolin replied, “We have only commercial interests in those parts,
which, however, are of very great importance and which we must
safeguard” (Radolin to Bülow, Oct. 20, 1903, _ibid._, 361 f., No.
5206).]
[Footnote 463: Bülow to Radowitz, April 29, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 169 f.,
No. 6481.]
[Footnote 464: Bülow to Radowitz, May 22, 1904, _ibid._, 173 f., No.
6484; Bülow to Radowitz, May 25, 1904, _ibid._, 174 f., No. 6486.]
[Footnote 465: Bülow to Metternich, May 31, 1904, _ibid._, 176 f., No.
6488; Metternich to F. O., June 1, 1904, _ibid._, 177 f., No. 6489, and
following documents; also Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 1, 1904, _B.D._,
III, 53, No. 61.]
[Footnote 466: Radowitz to F. O., June 10, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 180 f., No.
6494; Bülow to Radowitz, June 16, 1904, _ibid._, 181, No. 6496.]
[Footnote 467: Radowitz to F. O., June 17, 1904, _ibid._, 182, No. 6497;
Bülow to Radowitz, June 18, 1904, _ibid._, 182 f., No. 6498 and
following documents.]
[Footnote 468: Radolin to Bülow, July 27, 1904, _ibid._, 216, No. 6524;
memo. by Richthofen, July 16, 1904, _ibid._, 186, No. 6503; Radowitz to
F. O., July 21, 1904, _ibid._, 188, No. 6504.]
[Footnote 469: Bülow to Radolin, July 21, 1904, _ibid._, 210 ff., No.
6523; Radolin to Bülow, July 27, 1904, _ibid._, 215 ff., No. 6524; memo.
by Richthofen, July 29, 1904, _ibid._, 217, No. 6525, and Bülow’s
minutes. In the negotiations with Germany over the acceptance of the
Khedivial decree, Lansdowne informed Metternich that France had agreed
to support Great Britain fully if at some future time the latter should
propose “a revision of the international agreements affecting the
position of the Powers in Egypt” (Lansdowne to Whitehead, June 19, 1904,
_B.D._, III, 22 f., No. 21). This was, of course, the content of one of
the secret articles in the Anglo-French agreement of April 8, although
naturally Lansdowne did not say so. Whether the German government
inferred therefrom that a reciprocal concession had been made by Great
Britain to France with respect to Morocco is not evident, but it
probably did. Lansdowne also stated to Metternich on June 1 what the
area was which should be supervised by Spain, although he spoke only of
having emphasized this point verbally to the French government and said
nothing of a secret article to that effect. So far as the documents
show, the German government does not seem to have recognized the import
of this statement, although this negative proof is not conclusive
(Metternich to F. O., June 1, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 177 f., No. 6489).]
[Footnote 470: Bülow to Metternich, June 4, 1904, _ibid._, 27 f., No.
6383; Metternich to F. O., June 4, 1904, _ibid._, 29 f., Nos. 6384 f.]
[Footnote 471: Bülow to Radolin, July 21, 1904, _ibid._, 210 f., No.
6523. Radolin also warned that if “English diplomatic support of France
does not signify much, we have a free hand, while an Anglo-French
resistance could easily force us to retreat” (Radolin to Bülow, July 27,
1904, _ibid._, 216 f., No. 6524).]
[Footnote 472: Mühlberg to Metternich, Aug. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 217 ff.,
No. 6526.]
[Footnote 473: Metternich to Bülow, Aug. 15, 1904, _ibid._, 219 ff., No.
6527; Lansdowne to Lascelles, Aug. 15, 1904, _B.D._, III, 53 f., No.
62.]
[Footnote 474: Metternich’s dispatch was sent on Aug. 18, although dated
Aug. 15. Bülow approved of the new measures on Aug. 17. See Mentzingen
to Bülow, Aug. 6, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 222 f., No. 6528; Mühlberg to Bülow,
Aug. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 223 f., No. 6529; Bülow to Tschirschky, Aug. 17,
1904, _ibid._, 224 f., No. 6530.]
[Footnote 475: Mentzingen to F. O., Sept. 13, 18, 1904, _ibid._, 226
ff., Nos. 6532 f.]
[Footnote 476: See editor’s note, _ibid._, p. 225; also memo. by
Richthofen, Oct. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 228, No. 6534.]
[Footnote 477: Memo. by Richthofen, _ibid._, 228 ff., No. 6534.]
[Footnote 478: Richthofen to Radowitz, Oct. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 191, No.
6508; memo. by Richthofen for Bülow, Oct. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 228 ff., No.
6534.]
[Footnote 479: Memo. by Kries, Oct. 22, 1904, _ibid._, 231 f., No.
6535.]
[Footnote 480: Kühlmann to Bülow, Nov. 9, 1904, _ibid._, 232 ff., No.
6536.]
CHAPTER X
THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A RUSSO-GERMAN ALLIANCE, 1904
Early in July, 1904, Herr von Holstein offered his resignation because
of personal differences with Baron Richthofen. In doing so, he stated
that the prestige of Germany had diminished during the past years “while
our opponents and rivals are on the point of encircling us”; and as
“difficult situations” were to be anticipated, he was happy to be
relieved of responsibility. Count Bülow patched up the quarrel, but his
comment to Herr von Holstein’s remarks is illuminating:
Now he [Herr von Holstein] speaks of our shrunken prestige just as the
Bismarckian press does. But I cannot believe that Holstein, like that
press, attributes the decline of our authority to the dismissal of the
great Chancellor. Since that dismissal, from the non-renewal of the
Russian Reinsurance Treaty and the East Asiatic Triple Alliance to the
handling of the Moroccan and Egyptian questions, from the so-called
Urias letter to Vienna to the publication of the Swinemünde dispatch,
from the turn in 1896 against England to the Shanghai and Pauncefote
difference with that Power, nothing of significance has happened in our
foreign policy without Holstein’s advice.[481]
The results of those errors, so frankly confessed, were apparent: the
conclusion of the Entente Cordiale, the exclusion of Germany from the
entente movement and from the Moroccan settlement, the British efforts
to approach Russia,[482] animosity between Great Britain and Germany.
They all caused that attempt at a new orientation of policy which in
1900 Count Bülow had threatened in this eventuality.
One of the most favorable aspects of the German foreign relations was
the _rapprochement_ with the United States in 1903 and 1904. There was
cordial friendship between President Roosevelt and Baron Sternburg, the
German ambassador,[483] and the two governments both desired to maintain
the integrity of China during the current war.[484] The President
mistrusted Russia, about whom he could say nothing good, and France in
their policy toward China, and he met difficulty in trying to co-operate
with Great Britain.[485] As he was ambitious to mediate peace between
Russia and Japan when the time came, he turned to Germany for aid, in
August expressing the wish “to go hand in hand with Germany in East
Asia.”[486] The German government perceived in this co-operation a means
of protecting its interests in China, of issuing from its relative
international isolation, and of preventing France and Great Britain from
mediating peace—an event which might enable them to form a triple
grouping with Russia or even a quadruple combination with Russia and
Japan.[487] Count Bülow therefore cordially responded to the President’s
invitation,[488] seeking at the same time to increase the latter’s
suspicion of France and Great Britain.[489]
As the German government realized the limitations to this intimacy with
the United States, it sought a more effective association in an alliance
with Russia. In January, 1904, the Chancellor had been unconcerned about
such an alliance;[490] but by July he was waiting for the “psychological
moment” in which to propose a renewal of the former “League of the Three
Emperors.”[491]
The advent of that moment seemed highly probable. Since the beginning of
the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian people, government, and sovereign
had drawn closer to Germany.[492] On June 1, “dearest Nicky” wrote to
his cousin “Willy” (so they addressed each other), “I know that you feel
for us in this serious time and it is a comfort to realize that one’s
_real friends_ think and sympathize with one.”[493] And “Willy,” in his
replies, overflowed with affection and advice—advice that varied from
directing “Nicky” upon how to conduct war to lecturing him on the
“piratical” practices of his ships, from urging him to send his Black
Sea fleet through the Dardanelles in spite of British opposition to
reporting gossip which would antagonize him against Great Britain and
France.[494]
In October the opportunity arose for the German move toward an alliance.
A Russian company had given a contract to the Hamburg-American Line to
furnish coal for the Russian Baltic fleet which was to sail for the war
zone about the middle of that month.[495] As the German firm intended to
use mainly English coal, it had chartered a number of British ships and
had given a subcontract to a British firm to aid it in the
transportation. None the less, on learning of the transaction, the
British press bitterly attacked Germany for thus violating neutrality.
In view of this attack Count Bülow on October 4 instructed Baron
Romberg, first secretary of the German embassy in St. Petersburg, to
make a communication to the Russian government as follows: Baron Romberg
should state to Count Lamsdorff that this press campaign might provoke a
war but that the German government would not prevent the execution of
the coaling contract, that it “would run the risk of having the English
kindle fire-rockets in Japan.” If war did occur with Japan and Great
Britain, Germany would hold France also responsible; for not only would
a large element among the French advocate grasping the opportunity for
revenge against Germany, but also the arousing of the British zeal for
war would be a direct result of the Entente Cordiale. “So if we lose our
colonies, trade, merchant marine, and perhaps also a part of our war
fleet in an unequal battle on the sea . . . . a reckoning with France on
land would become unavoidable for us.”[496]
Count Lamsdorff showed no inclination to respond to this feeler. On
October 19, while thanking the German government for its friendship, he
refused to credit either Great Britain or Japan with bellicose
intentions against Germany. He interrupted Baron Romberg to assure him
that nothing was to be feared from France; not a word did he utter about
an alliance.[497]
Meantime, the Russian Baltic squadron sailed, and in the night of
October 21 occurred the Dogger Bank disaster which brought war between
Great Britain and Russia dangerously close.[498] The “psychological
moment” had come, reasoned Count Bülow and Herr von Holstein. Defeated
in the Far East, menaced by revolution, and excited by this new danger,
Russia should welcome the project of an alliance with the strongest
military power in Europe. So on October 24 Herr von Holstein, who
usually held aloof from all ambassadors, explained the German
proposition to Count Osten-Sacken,[499] the Russian representative.
Three days later the Emperor’s influence with the Czar, who was thought
to be more pliable and more favorably inclined than his Foreign
Minister, was brought into play. In a letter to Nicholas II the Emperor
wrote:
For some time English press has been threatening Germany, on no account
to allow coals to be sent to your Baltic Fleet now on its way out. It is
not impossible, that the Japanese and British Governments may lodge a
joint protest against our coaling your ships coupled with a _sommation_
to stop further work. The result aimed at by such a threat of war would
be absolute immobility of your fleet and inability to proceed to its
destination from want of fuel. This new danger would have to be faced in
community by Russia and Germany together, who would both have to remind
your ally France of the obligations she has taken over in the treaty of
Dual Alliance with you, the _casus foederis_. It is out of the question,
that France on such an invitation, would try to shirk her implicit duty
towards her ally. Though Delcassé is an Anglophile _énragé_, he will be
wise enough to understand that the British fleet is utterly unable to
save Paris! In this way a powerful combination of 3 of the strongest
continental Powers would be formed to attack, whom the Anglo-Japanese
group would think twice before acting. . . . . My news from London say,
that the Press and mob make a noise, the Admiralty some fuss, but that
Government, Court and Society look with greatest calm at the event as an
unhappy accident, arising from to great nervousness.[500]
This broad hint, amounting almost to a proposal of alliance itself, was
immediately effective. The Czar replied two days later:
As you say . . . . Germany, Russia, and France should at once unite upon
an arrangement to abolish Anglo-Japanese arrogance and insolence. Would
you like to lay down and frame the outlines of such a treaty and let me
know it? As soon as accepted by us France is bound to join her ally.
This combination has often come to my mind. It will mean peace and rest
for the world.[501]
On the next day a draft of a treaty and a long explanatory letter, both
composed by the Chancellor and Herr von Holstein,[502] were sent by the
Emperor to the Czar. This draft, which was intended to test how far the
Russian government would go, provided for a “defensive alliance . . . .
to localize as far as possible the Russo-Japanese War.” The first
article was the most important:
In case one of the two Empires shall be attacked by a European Power,
its ally will aid it with all its force on land and sea. The two allies,
in that case, would make common cause for the purpose of recalling to
France the obligations which she has assumed by the terms of the Franco-
Russian treaty of Alliance.
By the second article neither Power was to conclude a separate peace
with a common adversary. The third article was designed to safeguard
Germany in the coaling affair and to continue the alliance after the
current war was over. It read:
The engagement of mutual aid is equally valid in case acts performed by
one of the high contracting parties during the war such as the delivery
of coal to a belligerent should give place after the war to reclamations
of a third Power, as pretended violations of the right of neutrality.
In the letter the Emperor emphasized the defensive and the purely
European character of the alliance. “It is very essential that America
should not feel threatened by our agreement,” he wrote. He denounced
France, “this republic of miserable civilians,” “the French radicals,
Clemenceau and all the rest of the tag-rag and bobtail” for not
fulfilling France’s obligations to her ally.
I positively know that as far back as last December the French Finance
Minister Rouvier told the Finance Minister of another power, France
would on no account join in a Russo-Japanese war, even though England
sided with Japan. To make doubly sure, the English have handed Morocco
over to France. The certainty, that France intends to remain neutral and
even to lend her diplomatic support to England, is the motive, which
gives English policy its present unwonted brutal assurance. This unheard
of state of things will change as soon as France finds herself face to
face with the necessity of eventually choosing sides. . . . . The
radical party . . . . abhors war and militarism, while the nationalist
party while not objecting to war in itself, hates fighting for England
and against Russia. Thus it will be in the interests of both parties to
bring pressure to bear on and warn England to keep the peace. The main
result will be, if you and I stand shoulder to shoulder, that France
must formally and openly join us, thereby fulfilling her treaty-
obligations toward Russia. . . . . This consummation once reached, I
expect to maintain peace and you will be left an undisturbed and free
hand to deal with Japan. . . . . Of course, before we can take any steps
in this question and approach France that tiresome North Sea incident
must first have been brought to a close.
For, he continued, the French foreign office had already accepted the
British view of the incident, and in case of difficulty over this
matter, France would choose the British side. At the close of his letter
the Emperor wrote that only he and Count Bülow knew of the project, and
that when they had finished the draft the Chancellor had said: “May
God’s blessings rest upon the work of the two monarchs and may the
mighty three-Power group, Russia, Germany, France, preserve forever the
peace of Europe. God grant it!”[503]
The real object of this extravagant show of devotion to Russia was of
course to inveigle her into an alliance. It did not signify a desire for
a general conflict; the German government appreciated the British naval
power too keenly for that.[504] Moreover, since it knew how averse the
Russian government and especially the Czar were to an extension of the
war, it emphasized the pacifying influence which the proposed alliance
would exercise. The German leaders doubtlessly realized, however, that
they were running a big risk, since Count Bernstorff, first secretary of
the embassy in London, had warned them that Great Britain would regard
an alliance between Germany and Russia, no matter how defensive in
character, as an aggression directed against the security of the British
Empire.[505]
The Chancellor and Herr von Holstein considered the risk worth while,
because, if the alliance could be concluded, they expected France, under
the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, to enter the new grouping.
If she did so, they no doubt reasoned, the Entente Cordiale would be
destroyed, the work of M. Delcassé would be blocked, and, instead of
Great Britain, Germany would be the center of the new combination.
France, as the weakest member of the firm, would have to take orders
from both her partners. In fact, the German government openly expressed
to the Czar the expectation that in case of a war the control over the
French army and navy would be put into German hands. If France, refusing
to enter the alliance, elected to range herself with Great Britain and
if the Russo-German alliance alone were made, the German statesmen
apparently thought that the Dual Alliance would be broken, France would
again be at the mercy of the German military power, and the possibility
of an Anglo-Russian accord would be destroyed. The gains, both positive
and negative, to be derived by Germany from such an alliance would be
enormous. Its completion would constitute a far-reaching diplomatic
revolution.[506]
In Russian governmental circles opinion was divided. The Czar, who had
proposed the alliance without consulting his Foreign Minister,[507] was
its staunchest supporter. Weak and dependent, he usually agreed with his
most recent adviser. His imagination, which could be vivid at times, was
given freer rein because of his indolence. In 1903 he had succumbed to
the arguments and ambitions of the adventurer, M. Bezobrazov, about
Manchuria and Korea and had brought on the war with Japan. As the
necessary European part of that program, M. Bezobrazov had advocated an
understanding between the Dual and the Triple alliances. This aspect had
not been achieved, probably owing to Count Lamsdorff’s opposition.[508]
But the war was taking a disastrous course for Russia, revolution was
threatening, and the German Emperor’s telegram arrived while the crisis
with Great Britain was still acute and when Russia, according to the
British Ambassador, would have welcomed a war with that Power.[509] The
forlorn and troubled Czar returned readily to the idea of an alliance
when William II suggested it.
Count Lamsdorff was wary of this move from the start. Not a very strong
personality, he was unable at times to maintain control of the foreign
policy, yet he was a capable and loyal official who, when necessary,
spoke frankly to his master. The Czar was actuated chiefly by sentiment
and emotion; his Minister by shrewd diplomatic calculations. Although
the one did not grasp the German motives, the other did; and the
prospect of feeling “the heavy weight . . . . of the iron bands” of a
German alliance was not to his liking. Count Lamsdorff did not believe
that Russia needed this alliance as he felt certain that Great Britain
would not attack her.[510] Furthermore, the conclusion of an agreement
of neutrality about Balkan affairs with Austria-Hungary late in October
relieved his country from danger in that quarter.[511]
On the other hand [he wrote to Count Osten-Sacken], we manifestly need
the friendship of our powerful neighbor for the security of our
extensive frontier, for our provisioning with coal and other
contrabands, etc. All this must be seriously considered and we must
endeavor not to permit our relations with Berlin to deteriorate,
although Paris must also not be disregarded. Only through the
preservation of this balance will Russia succeed in obtaining all
possible advantages from both sides.[512]
When the German draft of the treaty arrived, the Dogger Bank crisis was
over, but the Russian government remained embittered because Great
Britain had made special naval preparations and a detachment of British
cruisers, cleared for action, had followed the Russian fleet from Vigo
to Tangier.[513] Still, that was no reason to assume the “iron bands” of
a German alliance. The Czar and his Foreign Minister immediately set to
work to make the terms more favorable for Russia.[514] They modified the
first and third articles.[515] In the latter, to be kept secret, they
incorporated a _quid pro quo_ by which Russia should receive German
support in the Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace. The revised first
article was the more important. The first sentence remained as before;
but, instead of stipulating that Russia and Germany both advise France
to enter the alliance, the second sentence was changed to read: “His
Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias will take the steps necessary to
initiate France into this accord and to invite her to associate herself
in it as ally.” The Czar told the Emperor that the revised Article I
must stand without change.[516]
When the Russian government had been brought to this point, the German
leaders revealed their real aim. They were, of course, obliged to accept
the new first article; but the Emperor, in his reply to Nicholas II,
November 17, made it plain that France would have to choose sides, even
though, as he frankly wrote, “doubtless the French would much prefer any
other grouping of Powers to that of the Alliance _a trois_ as in 1895.”
The chief revisions asked by the German government were in the
introduction and in Article III. The former was changed to read: The
Emperor and the Czar “for the purpose of assuring the maintenance of
peace in Europe have agreed on the following articles of a treaty of
defensive alliance.” According to an entirely new Article III the treaty
should remain in force until denounced one year in advance; however, it
was left to the Czar to set any time limit he wished.
These revisions transformed the basis of the negotiation. They made the
alliance a general one to continue after the war. The changes were
explained on the ground that, in the previous version, the treaty had
been aimed too openly at Great Britain, and that, while this was the
case, it was not politic to make the fact too evident.
The Russian _quid pro quo_ in Article III was also rejected. Germany
preferred not to help Russia in the negotiations for peace for fear of
antagonizing the United States and of driving her into British arms,
although the Emperor excused this refusal by explaining that if this
secret clause became known, public opinion might consider the treaty an
aggressive one binding Germany to defend the Russian conquests. Instead,
he proposed that the previous Article III be made into an extra secret
article in which the second sentence should read: “It follows from the
the terms of the first sentence of Article I that Germany will associate
herself with no action whatever that might imply hostile tendencies to
Russia.” That clause, wrote the Emperor, would safeguard Russia against
the repetition of any such congress as that of 1878, whereby she had
been deprived of her Turkish conquests.
In his accompanying letter to the Czar, for which Count Bülow and Herr
von Holstein furnished the rough draft, the Emperor urged a quick
signing of the agreement, adding the extraordinary proposal that Russia
make some military demonstration on the Persian-Afghan frontier. “Even
should the forces at your disposal not suffice for a real attack on
India itself,” he wrote, “they would do for Persia—which has no army—and
a pressure on the Indian frontier from Persia will do wonders in England
and have remarkably quieting influence on the hot headed Jingoes in
London.” He also warned the Czar against Anglo-French ambitions to
mediate at the desire of Japan.[517]
In St. Petersburg, Count Lamsdorff persuaded the Czar to proceed slowly
with the negotiations, and, more important still, to consult France
before concluding any agreement. So on November 23 Nicholas II
telegraphed the German Emperor to that effect, adding:
As long as it is not signed one can make small modifications on the
text; whereas if allready approved by us both, it will seem as if we
tried to enforce the treaty on France. In this case a failure might
easily happen, which I think is neither your wish.[518]
The Germans realized that this answer spelled defeat for them; because
if the treaty became known to the French government that government
would of course strenuously resist its completion. In fact, the Emperor
was sure that M. Delcassé would at once publish the news of the proposed
alliance, that a war cry in England would then burst forth, and that the
timid Czar would back out. As he aptly expressed it, Count Lamsdorff and
M. Witte had “spat in the German soup.”[519] On November 26 he replied
with a refusal to let France know a word of the affair; it would be
better to drop the whole matter until a more suitable moment, he
declared. Although disgusted at this display of “cold feet,” as he put
it, William II showed no especial anger or uneasiness in his answer and
asked Nicholas II to continue their intimacy as before.[520]
On the receipt of that reply Count Lamsdorff had to persuade his master
all over again, because the latter was more anxious to make the alliance
than he was to be considerate of his ally.[521] Certainly his letter of
October 29 to William II was such as to warrant confidence that he would
be willing to force the alliance upon France whether she wished it or
not. Count Lamsdorff argued that the relations of Russia and Germany
were sufficiently close to hold them together without an alliance. He
declared that France’s intimacy with Great Britain had not caused her to
be disloyal to her ally. While he doubted whether she could be won to
the proposed combination, he urged her right to be consulted beforehand
and denied that she would disclose the secret. She must be won
gradually, he said, and not confronted with a _fait accompli_ which
might force her back upon Great Britain.[522]
It is obvious that Count Lamsdorff sought by this method to quash the
project or render it harmless. He succeeded only partly in winning over
his master. In the reply to the Emperor on December 7 Nicholas II once
more asked permission to obtain the French reaction to the main lines of
the alliance, even though the original document itself be kept secret
from her. “In case of a negative answer,” he wrote in conclusion, “the
second phase of Art. I of the draft of the treaty ought to be left out I
think.”[523] Thus, even in case Germany refused his request, the Czar
was still apparently willing to make an alliance with her to the entire
exclusion of France.
While the Russian government was preparing this answer, the Germans lost
patience. Prospects for success seemed doubtful if not entirely
hopeless. The declarations of the French press that the Dual Alliance
remained as firm as ever and that Germany’s attempts to win Russia had
failed caused the Chancellor to suspect that news of the negotiations
had leaked out. Threats to seize the German vessels coaling the Russian
fleet appeared in the Japanese press; the British government laid
restrictions upon the shipping of coal to that fleet. In November and
December Germany began to fear a British attack.[524]
Since October the British press had returned to its campaign of
calumniation against Germany, seeing a German plot behind every British
difficulty. In the autumn a redistribution of the British naval forces
had weakened the Mediterranean fleet and concentrated the main strength
in home waters. Germany perceived in this rearrangement a tangible proof
of the new alignment of Great Britain with France and of the growing
British animosity toward her.[525]
Hence when in November several articles appeared in _Vanity Fair_ and in
the _Army and Navy Gazette_ proposing that the German fleet be
“Copenhagened”[526] as useless for any other purpose than to attack
Great Britain,[527] German public opinion took these threats seriously.
The Emperor wrote to Count Bülow on November 23 that “the situation
assumes more and more the aspect of that immediately preceding the Seven
Years’ War.”[528] The German navy department began hurried measures to
recall the vessels in foreign waters.[529] Taking a saner view, the
Chancellor, by means of an interview published in the _Nineteenth
Century_ for December and a speech in the Reichstag on December 5,
sought to calm both his own and the British people by an absolute
disclaimer of the thought of war between the two countries and by a
denial that in the construction of her fleet Germany intended any
hostility toward Great Britain.[530] But by December 5 Herr von Holstein
himself came to credit the possibility of a British attack.[531]
While this situation seemed serious, the Chancellor was more concerned
by the fact that the completion of the coaling of the Russian fleet
would soon deprive Germany of her hold over Russia.[532] On December 6
he instructed the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to inquire
peremptorily of the Russian government whether Germany could rely upon
its full support in case the coaling led to war. The Ambassador was to
state that if no satisfactory answer were received by the time the
Russian fleet reached Madagascar the Hamburg-American Line would be
forbidden to continue its task. This telegram, which was followed on the
next day by a similar one from the Emperor to Nicholas II,[533] forced
the negotiations back to the very point from which they had started.
Upon receipt of this message the Czar, highly agitated, immediately
telegraphed that his letter of the same date (December 7) had evidently
crossed the other on the way and would explain everything.[534] But when
that letter arrived, William II demanded that they settle the coaling
affair by signing a convention concerning it at once.[535] Thus, Germany
herself destroyed the possibility of continuing the previous
negotiations and of concluding, perhaps, a defensive alliance with
Russia alone. The Czar could only acquiesce.[536] On December 12 Count
Lamsdorff gave written assurance to the German government that Russia
would make common cause with it in case the coaling led to war.[537]
The promptness with which the Russian government agreed to the German
demand showed how essential to Russia was the continued coaling of her
fleet, which within about a week would reach Madagascar. Count Lamsdorff
felt entirely safe in making the assurance of support, for, as he
frankly said to the German Ambassador, he did not believe that either
Great Britain or Japan would let things come to war.[538] Also he
particularly wished to avoid antagonizing Germany while she was
permitting a Russian loan of 231,000,000 rubles to be made in
Berlin.[539] The Minister was elated over the turn which the Russo-
German negotiations had taken. By changing the basis of discussion from
that of a defensive alliance to that of a specific agreement limited to
a definite eventuality, the German government had adopted his own policy
of close friendship and co-operation without an alliance. His battle
with both Germany and the Czar was won by the German government itself.
On riper thought the German foreign office perceived that this Russian
promise did not cover all cases in which war might arise as a result of
German friendliness. It had no doubt had time since the arrival of the
Czar’s letter of December 7 in which to appreciate its mistake in
hastily changing the basis of negotiation. Hence on December 12 it
instructed Count Alvensleben to propose to the Russian government a
general defensive agreement. By its terms Russia would be bound to aid
Germany in case of a conflict arising: first, because of any German act
of “benevolent neutrality” in favor of Russia during the current war;
or, second, because of the coaling affair during and after the war. The
Ambassador was to declare that if Russia did not accept this agreement
the coaling would be discontinued.[540] What was here proposed amounted
practically to Articles I and III of the first German treaty draft with
the parts pertaining to France omitted, and was in keeping with the
Czar’s letter of December 7.
Since the instructions arrived after Count Lamsdorff had accepted the
earlier German demand, the exasperated Ambassador consulted his
government before executing them.[541] Count Bülow then realized that
the Russian Minister would not receive the proposal favorably and that
the German government would seem not to know its own desires if it
persisted in this new demand. Furthermore, on December 18, he was
assured by Count Metternich that, although a Dogger Bank affair between
Great Britain and Germany or the passage by Germany of a stronger naval
law might precipitate a crisis, the British did not seek a war and had
no intention of starting one.[542] Hence the Chancellor canceled the
instructions. Instead, he notified the Russian Minister, December 26,
that “within the limits which care for our own safety prescribes, we
shall be glad to aid Russia as previously.”[543] The coaling was
continued without mishap.[544]
On December 21 William II repeated to the Czar his refusal to permit the
consultation of France about the project of alliance, hoping thereby to
reopen the discussion.[545] But Nicholas II, in his reply of December
25, did not mention the matter.[546]
Just at this moment of profound disappointment to the German government
another outlet seemed to open up. On December 26 it learned that the
Japanese government was thinking of sending Viscount Aoki to Berlin in
the next year in order to establish closer contact with it on the
questions to be considered in the Russo-Japanese negotiations for
peace.[547] The German government reacted cordially to this project. The
Emperor William, still unable to comprehend the failure of the Russian
negotiations, had visions of Germany’s so mediating peace between Russia
and Japan as to form an agreement _à trois_ with them.[548] Apparently
without consulting the foreign office he appealed to the Czar on January
2 “as your faithful friend” for a statement of his plans for the future,
“so that if possible, I make myself useful to you and be enabled to
shape the course of my policy.”[549] As Nicholas II ignored this
request—the third rebuff from Russia within two months—the Emperor
wanted to cultivate Japan so zealously that Count Bülow had to hold him
back for fear of antagonizing Russia.[550]
The German government, particularly Herr von Holstein, continued to
apprehend that France and Great Britain would endeavor to mediate peace
and form a new quadruple grouping with Russia and Japan by partitioning
China.[551] To obviate that possibility it had attempted during the past
months to draw closer to President Roosevelt[552] and to keep check upon
the Russian views about peace. But since Russia had rebuffed this
endeavor[553] as well as an alliance, Count Bülow turned late in
December, 1904, to Japan and the United States in order to escape from
“the sulking-corner in which not only England but also Russia is seeking
to hold us.”[554] In January, 1905, the German government intensified
its campaign to arouse President Roosevelt’s mistrust of Great Britain
and France. Articles in the semiofficial press in Paris, assertions by
M. Doumer, president of the French Chamber and intimate friend of M.
Delcassé, and discreet soundings by French, British, and Russian
diplomats gave body to the German fears. Count Bülow emphasized to the
President the menace of this new quadruple alliance to both the United
States and Germany. At the Count’s suggestion in January Mr. Roosevelt
obtained from the Powers an assurance of the territorial integrity of
China during the negotiations for peace.[555] This move brought the
German government and Mr. Roosevelt into greater intimacy. The latter
suspected France and Russia, but not Great Britain.[556] He refused to
believe rumors of a Russo-German agreement, and credited the German
denials of those reports.[557] With Japan, however, the German
government was not so successful; hearing those same rumors, the
Japanese government decided in February not to send Viscount Aoki to
Berlin.[558]
In the same month the German government tried once more to make an
agreement with Russia, this time over Austria-Hungary. Torn by national
conflicts, that empire was not expected to survive the death of the aged
Emperor Francis Joseph. Count Bülow therefore proposed to the Russian
Foreign Minister that they sign a public treaty of territorial
disinterestedness in case of the disruption of the Hapsburg Empire.
While Count Lamsdorff agreed to make the accord, he stipulated that it
be kept secret, and left its formulation to the proposer. Thereupon the
German foreign office, fearing that the existence of a secret Russo-
German treaty might become known and might make Japan and the United
States mistrustful of Germany and doubting whether the Russian Minister
would really conclude the accord, decided to drop the project.[559]
Thus the negotiations between Germany and Russia worked only to the
detriment of Germany’s international relations. They were in large part
responsible for the acuteness of British anger at Germany and for the
collapse of the proposed Aoki mission. And had it not been for President
Roosevelt’s ignorance of Continental affairs, they would no doubt have
turned him against Germany. Although protestations of friendship were
exchanged between the German and Russian rulers and governments, the
German Emperor and his government were greatly chagrined at their
failure.[560] They had found the bonds of the Dual Alliance tighter than
they had expected, and had suffered a rebuff by a Power in the very
worst straits. Believing that another opportunity to solve Germany’s
international problems in this way would likely not be offered, the
German foreign office next attempted the employment of force.
[Footnote 481: Both letters, the one by Holstein, the other by Bülow,
dated July 11 and July 13, respectively, are given in Hammann, _Bilder
aus der letzten Kaiserzeit_, pp. 33 ff.]
[Footnote 482: It is of course apparent that the German government
anticipated no immediate success from these British efforts. Signs of
Anglo-Russian antagonism were too numerous (see _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap.
cxxxi).]
[Footnote 483: Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, p. 36.]
[Footnote 484: _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxx, A; Gwynn, _The Letters and
Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 397 f.]
[Footnote 485: Dennett, pp. 36 ff., 42; Sternburg to F. O., Sept. 27,
1904, _G.P._, XIX, 542, No. 6266.]
[Footnote 486: Bülow to William II, Aug. 31, 1904, _ibid._, 536, No.
6264.]
[Footnote 487: Bülow to William II, Aug. 31, 1904, _ibid._, 535 ff., No.
6264; Bülow to Bernstorff, Sept. 1, 1904, _ibid._, 217 f., No. 6051;
Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 218 ff., No. 6052.
Eckardstein informed Bülow in August, 1904, of attempts being made by
Witte to introduce negotiations for peace with Hayashi. Bülow was not in
favor of an early peace. See Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und
politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, III, 76 ff.; Goetz, _Briefe Wilhelms II an
den Zaren 1894-1914_, p. 341; Dillon, _The Eclipse of Russia_, p. 297;
memo. by Bülow, Nov. 2, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 387 f., No. 6167.]
[Footnote 488: Bülow to Sternburg, Sept. 5, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 541, No.
6265.]
[Footnote 489: See _ibid._, Nos. 5977, 6259 ff.]
[Footnote 490: Memo. by Bülow, Jan. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 34, No. 5943;
memo. by Holstein, Dec. 23, 1903, _ibid._, 73 ff., No. 5967.]
[Footnote 491: Bülow to William II, July 15, 1904, _ibid._, 202, No.
6043. Richthofen opposed the project (memo. by Richthofen, undated
although probably written early in July, 1904, _ibid._, 194 ff., No.
6042. This intention did not prevent Bülow from negotiating a commercial
treaty with Russia in July, 1904, which Witte, Russian minister,
declared exacted a tribute from Russia “much greater than any war
indemnity on record” (Bülow to William II, July 15, 1904, _ibid._, 196
ff., No. 6043; Dillon, pp. 323 ff.; Witte, _Memoirs_, pp. 413 f.).]
[Footnote 492: Radolin to Bülow, Feb. 28, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 165 ff.,
No. 6028; Metternich to Bülow, March 14, 1904, _ibid._, 167 ff., No.
6029; Alvensleben to Bülow, May 11, 1904, _ibid._, 177 ff., No. 6033,
and following documents.]
[Footnote 493: Nicholas II to William II, June 1, 1904, _ibid._, 181,
No. 6034.]
[Footnote 494: See their correspondence in Goetz, pp. 337 ff.; also in
_G.P._, XIX, Nos. 6028 n., 6034, 6035, 6037, 6039, 6056, 6057, 6062 and
n., 6064 and n., 6073 and n. The Emperor’s letters were dated Feb. 11,
March 29, June 6, June 12, June 28, July 17, July 23, Aug. 19, Oct. 8,
Oct. 10; the Czar’s replies were dated June 1, July 20, July 31, Sept.
28, 1904.]
[Footnote 495: Bernhard Huldermann, _Albert Ballin_ (Berlin, 1922), pp.
146 ff.; _G.P._, XIX, Nos. 6077 ff.]
[Footnote 496: Bülow to Romberg, Oct. 4, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 257 ff., No.
6084.]
[Footnote 497: Romberg to F. O., Oct. 19, 1904, _ibid._, 259, No. 6085.]
[Footnote 498: See above.]
[Footnote 499: Osten-Sacken to Lamsdorff, Oct. 27, 1904,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 456 ff.; Savinsky, _Recollections
of a Russian Diplomat_, p. 97.]
[Footnote 500: William II to Nicholas II, Oct. 27, 1904, _G.P._, XIX,
303 f., No. 6118. Their correspondence was entirely in English, in the
use of which they made frequent mistakes. Osten-Sacken reported on Nov.
4 a conversation with Bülow in which the latter, repeating the remarks
of Holstein, declared that in case the British government objected to
the coaling of the Russian ships by the German firm, “we should
apparently be forced to ask the St. Petersburg cabinet whether we should
refuse this objection and thus assume the risk of a war with England and
become your [Russia’s] ally; or would Russia prefer to dispense with . .
. . the coaling . . . . which in this case we should have to prohibit as
incompatible with Germany’s neutrality” (_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov.,
1924, p. 463).]
[Footnote 501: Nicholas II to William II, Oct. 29, 1904, _G.P._, XIX,
305, No. 6119.]
[Footnote 502: Bülow and Holstein were the proponents of the alliance.
Richthofen and Tirpitz, secretary of the Navy Department, opposed it
(Alfred von Tirpitz, _Erinnerungen_ [Leipzig, 1920], pp. 143 ff.).]
[Footnote 503: William II to Nicholas II, Oct. 30, 1904, Goetz, pp. 346
ff.; Bülow to William II, Oct. 30, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 305, No. 6120, and
Anlage I and II.]
[Footnote 504: Mühlberg to Tschirschky, Aug. 10, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 238
f., No. 6069; Bülow to William II, July 15, 1904, _ibid._, 204, No.
6043.]
[Footnote 505: Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 220, No.
6052.]
[Footnote 506: “It is a matter here of a really great and, for the
onlooking world, wholly unexpected transformation [_Weichenstellung_],”
wrote Bülow to the Emperor, Nov. 16, 1904 (_ibid._, 312, No. 6125).]
[Footnote 507: See the report from Lamsdorff to the Czar of Holstein’s
conversation with Osten-Sacken on Oct. 24, and the Czar’s minute to it
(_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 455 f. and n.; cf. Savinsky, p.
97).]
[Footnote 508: Langer, _Europ. Gespr._, June, 1926, pp. 397 f.; Dennis,
_Adventures in American Diplomacy_, pp. 354 f.]
[Footnote 509: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Nov. 7, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 35, No.
26.]
[Footnote 510: A. Savinsky, “Guillaume II et la Russie. Ses Dépêches à
Nicholas II, 1903-1905,” _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 790 f.;
_G.P._, XIX, Nos. 6044 ff.; Savinsky, p. 97. Savinsky was an official in
the Russian foreign office in the confidence of Lamsdorff, _G.P._, XIX,
505, editor’s note).]
[Footnote 511: _Ibid._, Vol. XXII, chap. clviii.]
[Footnote 512: Lamsdorff to Osten-Sacken, Nov. 10, 1904,
_Kreigsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 464 f.; cf. Savinsky, p. 99.]
[Footnote 513: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 31, Nov. 7, 1904, _B.D._, IV,
25, No. 24; 34 f., No. 26.]
[Footnote 514: On receipt of that draft the Czar wrote to Lamsdorff:
“To-day I received the Emperor’s letter with the treaty draft. As I read
it, I laughed aloud. The content of the three articles touches France
mostly. The last point concerns the particular object of dissatisfaction
of the German Government with the British action in the coaling
operation. This, however, is a private affair of both states. . . . .
The matter must be considered from all sides, and a more desirable
counterproposal for us must be composed” (_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov.,
1924, p. 461).]
[Footnote 515: Lamsdorff to Nicholas II, Nov. 4, 1904, _ibid._, pp. 462
f.]
[Footnote 516: Nicholas II to William II, Nov. 7, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 310
ff., No. 6124 and Anlage.]
[Footnote 517: William II to Nicholas II, Nov. 17, 1904, Goetz, pp. 349
ff.; Savinsky, p. 102; Bülow to William II, Nov. 16, 1904, _G.P._, XIX,
312 ff., No. 6125 and Anlage. The treaty draft is given in Goetz, pp.
146 f. See also Alexander Iswolsky, _Recollections of a Foreign
Minister_ (New York, 1921), pp. 34 f.]
[Footnote 518: Nicholas II to William II, Nov. 23, 1904, _G.P._, XIX,
317, No. 6126, Anlage; Savinsky, pp. 102 f.]
[Footnote 519: William II to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 316 f.,
No. 6126.]
[Footnote 520: Bülow to William II, Nov. 24, 1904, _ibid._, 318 f., No.
6127 and Anlage; William II to Nicholas II, Nov. 26, 1904,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 471 f.; Savinsky, pp. 103 f.]
[Footnote 521: Iswolsky makes an attempt to exonerate the Czar of the
charge of disloyalty to France, but his argument is not convincing
(Iswolsky, pp. 27, 36 f.).]
[Footnote 522: Report of Lamsdorff for Nicholas II, Nov. 23, 1904,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 473 ff.; Savinsky, _Revue des deux
mondes_, XII (1922), 789 ff.; Savinsky, pp. 104 ff.]
[Footnote 523: He inclosed a draft of the proposed communication to
France. See Nicholas II to William II, Dec. 7, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 322
ff., No. 6131.]
[Footnote 524: Bülow to William II, Dec. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 263 ff., No.
6088; _ibid._, chap. cxxxvi.]
[Footnote 525: Metternich to F. O., Oct. 20, 1904, _ibid._, 652, No.
6349, and following documents; Flotow to Bülow, Oct. 26, 1904, _ibid._,
286 f., No. 6105 and following documents.]
[Footnote 526: This was the expression used.]
[Footnote 527: Memo. by Metternich for Bülow, Dec. 25, 1904, _ibid._,
367 ff., No. 6156; report of Marine Attaché Coerper, Jan. 15, 1905,
_ibid._, 379 f., No. 6161; Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 329; Admiral Sir
Edward E. Bradford, _Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Knyvet
Wilson_ (London, 1923), p. 197.]
[Footnote 528: William II to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 316 f.,
No. 6126; Graf Robert Zedlitz-Trützschler, _Zwölf Jahre am deutschen
Kaiserhof_ (Stuttgart, 1925), pp. 86 f.]
[Footnote 529: On this war scare see _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxxvi.]
[Footnote 530: J. L. Bashford, “Great Britain and Germany: A
Conversation with Count von Bülow, German Chancellor,” _Nineteenth
Century_, Dec., 1904, pp. 873 ff.; Bülow, _Reden_, II, 123 ff.]
[Footnote 531: Memo. by Holstein, Dec. 5, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 358 f., No.
6153.]
[Footnote 532: Bülow to William II, Dec. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 263 ff., No.
6088.]
[Footnote 533: Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 320 f., No.
6129; William II to Nicholas II, Dec. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 322, No. 6130.]
[Footnote 534: Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII ( 1922), 794 f.;
Savinsky, p. 107.]
[Footnote 535: William II to Nicholas II, undated, _G.P._, XIX, 325, No.
6132.]
[Footnote 536: Nicholas II to William II, Dec. 11, 1904, _ibid._, 325
f., No. 6134.]
[Footnote 537: On December 11 Lamsdorff stated to Alvensleben that as
soon as the Czar had made a decision he would be ready to agree with
Germany on the “modality of co-operation” in case of a conflict. On the
next day in his note to that government he did not mention this matter,
and as Germany seemed satisfied, he never returned to it. See
Alvensleben to F. O., Dec. 11 and 12, 1904, _ibid._, 325 ff., Nos. 6134
ff.; Lamsdorff to Alvensleben, Dec. 13, 1904, _ibid._, 329, No. 6137;
Savinsky, p. 108.]
[Footnote 538: Alvensleben, to F. O., Dec. 11, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 325
f., No. 6134.]
[Footnote 539: M. A. de Wolfe Howe, _George von Lengerke Meyer: His Life
and Public Services_ (New York, 1920), pp. 121 f.; Schulthess
(_Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_), p. 255.]
[Footnote 540: Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 12, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 326 f.,
No. 6135; Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 21, 1904, _ibid._, 342 f. Nos. 6142
f.]
[Footnote 541: Editor’s note giving a summary of a dispatch from
Alvensleben on Dec. 13, 1904, _ibid._, p. 342.]
[Footnote 542: On Dec. 13 Metternich was called to Berlin for
consultation as to the effect which a Russo-German agreement of any sort
would have on Anglo-German relations. Schulenburg and Eulenburg, of the
German embassy in London, also were asked about the attitude of the
British toward Germany. They all believed that the British would not
tolerate as much from Germany as they would from Russia. See memo. by
Bülow, Dec. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 331 f., No. 6139, and editor’s note;
memo. by Metternich, Dec. 18, 1904, _ibid._, 332 ff., No. 6140;
Schulenburg to Bülow, Dec. 14, 1904, _ibid._, 359 ff., No. 6154; memo.
by Eulenburg, Dec. 15, 1904, _ibid._, 366 f., No. 6155; Alfred von
Tirpitz, _Politische Dokumente_, Band I; _Der Aufbau der deutschen
Weltmacht_ (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1924), pp. 13 f. A few days later
Lascelles tried to argue with both Bülow and Holstein that the British
fear of the German navy was more reasonable than the German fear of the
British navy. And on Dec. 26 Holstein declared to Lascelles as follows:
“In the present instance a situation had been created by the action of
the Press which was fraught with the gravest of all dangers, viz.: that
of two great nations being involved in war, for if any untoward incident
had arisen which gave rise to an acrimonious discussion between the two
Governments it would have been almost impossible to have settled it
owing to the atmosphere which the Press campaign had created.”
Nevertheless both parties agreed that Anglo-German relations had become
easier. See Lascelles to Lansdowne, Dec. 28, 1904, _B.D._, III, 56 ff.,
No. 65. At about the same time King Edward, Lansdowne, and Balfour all
branded the German fears of a British attack as foolish; and the British
condemned them as hypocritical. But the press war continued into January
as bitterly as before. See Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, _G.P._,
XIX, 372 f., No. 6157; and following documents. See also Schulthess
(1905), p. 3; Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. 331 f.; Friedrich Thimme,
“Auswärtige Politik und Hochfinanz: Aus den Papieren Paul H. von
Schwabach’s,” _Europäische Gespräche_, June, 1929, p. 307.]
[Footnote 543: Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 21, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 342 f.,
Nos. 6142 f.; Alvensleben to Bülow, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 343 ff., No.
6144.]
[Footnote 544: Mühlberg to Tirpitz, Jan. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 265 ff., No.
6089, and following documents.]
[Footnote 545: William II to Nicholas II, Dec. 21, 1904, _ibid._, 340
f., No. 6141; also Goetz, p. 354. The letter was written by the foreign
office.]
[Footnote 546: Nicholas II to William II, Dec. 25, 1904, _G.P._, XIX,
346, No. 6145.]
[Footnote 547: Memo. by Eckert, Nov. 18, 1904, Received Dec. 26, 1904,
_ibid._, 395 ff., No. 6176.]
[Footnote 548: Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 400 ff., No.
6178.]
[Footnote 549: William II to Nicholas II, Jan. 2, 1905, _ibid._, 404 f.,
No. 6180.]
[Footnote 550: William II to Bülow, March 11, 1905, _ibid._, 411, No.
6187; Bülow to William II, March 11, 1905, _ibid._, 412, No. 6188. On
Jan. 16, 1905, the Emperor wrote: “The action of Delcassé and Lamsdorff
is unspeakably treacherous and common. This trio [France, Great Britain,
and Russia, who he thought desired to divide China] must be opposed by a
German-American-Japanese league. That must be done quickly and
energetically. Above all America’s mistrust of France and Russia be
nourished” (Emperor’s minute to the dispatch from Bülow to William II,
Jan. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 562, No. 6280).]
[Footnote 551: Memo. by Holstein, Dec. 29, 1904, _ibid._, 551 ff., No.
6275. The Emperor also suffered from the “nightmare of the coalitions,”
but his suffering assumed more varied forms. At one moment he feared a
Franco-Anglo-American-Japanese grouping; at another, an Anglo-Franco-
Russian grouping; at another, an Anglo-Franco-Russo-Japanese grouping
(see _ibid._, Nos. 5925, 5945, 6187, 6280).]
[Footnote 552: See _ibid._, chap. cxxxix.]
[Footnote 553: Romberg to Bülow, Dec. 1, 1904, _ibid._, 394 f., No.
6175.]
[Footnote 554: Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 402 f., No.
6178.]
[Footnote 555: See Dennett, pp. 77 ff., 162, 171 f.; Dennis, pp. 392 f.,
397; Bülow to William II, Dec. 24, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 547 ff., No. 6274,
and following documents.]
[Footnote 556: See, among others, Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 3 and 9,
1905, _G.P._, XIX, 567 f., No. 6285; 570, No. 6287.]
[Footnote 557: Dennett, pp. 73 ff., 50; Dennis, pp. 367 f., 385 ff. The
anonymous document which Dennis quotes must have been written some time
early in 1905, for it refers to events which occurred in January, 1905.]
[Footnote 558: Arco to F. O., Feb. 10, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 407, No. 6183;
Arco to Bülow, March 16, 1905, _ibid._, 413 ff. No. 6190.]
[Footnote 559: _Ibid._, Vol. XXII, chap. clix.]
[Footnote 560: Alvensleben to Bülow, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, XIX, 343
f., No. 6144; William II to Bülow, Dec. 28, 1904, _ibid._, 346 f. No.
6146; Bülow to Alvensleben, Jan. 1, 1905, _ibid._, 347 f., No. 6147;
Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 400 ff., No. 6178.]
CHAPTER XI
THE VISIT TO TANGIER
Upon the refusal of an alliance by Russia, the German government, in the
early part of 1905, regarded its international situation and loss of
prestige with concern. The continued defeats of Russia by Japan in the
Far East, culminating in that at Mukden, February 23 to March 10, and
the outbreak of revolution in Russia had for the time neutralized the
effectiveness of the Dual Alliance. But the Anglo-German animosity
persisted. On February 2 at Eastleigh, Mr. Arthur Lee, first civil lord
of the British admiralty, frankly explained the redistribution of the
fleet as follows:[561]
The balance and center of naval power in Europe had been shifted during
the last few years. They [Great Britain] had not so much to keep their
eyes upon France and the Mediterranean as they had to look with more
anxiety, though not fear, towards the North Sea. It was for that reason
that the Fleets had been distributed to enable them to deal with any
danger in that direction. . . . . If war should unhappily be declared,
under existing conditions the British Navy would get its blow in first,
before the other side had time even to read in the papers that war had
been declared.
The German Emperor regarded those assertions as an “open threat of war”
by that “vengeance-breathing corsair.”[562] An Anglo-German press war
ensued. Count Bülow declared to Admiral Tirpitz that he would agree to
any sum for the German naval law for 1906.[563]
The state of the Triple Alliance also worried the German foreign office;
Austria-Hungary was in internal turmoil, Italy more unreliable than
ever. Irredentist troubles, which had flamed up again in the previous
November,[564] and Balkan rivalries had so antagonized those two allies
that during 1904 the main military force of Italy had been transferred
from the French to the Austrian frontier. During the winter, reports of
a Franco-Italian agreement nullifying the Triple Alliance and of the
activity of Ambassador Barrère in attempting to foment difficulty
between Austria and Italy came to the German government.[565] But when,
toward the end of February, 1905, Count Bülow mentioned these rumors to
the Italian Ambassador, King Victor Emmanuel and his government both
formally denied that Italy had made any agreement “that is in
contradiction with the Triple Alliance or that may diminish the value of
our obligations toward our allies,” and asserted that M. Prinetti’s
declarations to France did not “vary, modify, or attenuate the bearing
or obligations that result from it [the Triple Alliance] for us.”[566]
Although the Chancellor did not believe these asseverations, he
continued to hold to Italy. As he wrote to the Emperor on March 5 and 9:
For times of peace and for all international combinations it is to our
interest to maintain the façade of the Triple Alliance as intact as
possible, if only because the Italians, so long as they remain in it,
will meet with mistrust from hostile sides. In case of complications,
however, we need have no illusions concerning active Italian co-
operation. Still, it is an advantage if Italy remains neutral instead of
siding with France. . . . . The general international situation is so
tense that we must endeavor to sacrifice as few tricks as possible.
Therein was expressed the German policy toward Italy until the latter’s
final entry into the World War. Upon reading this confession, the
Emperor, who already feared that King Edward VII was trying to establish
a Franco-Russo-British alliance, summed up the international position of
his country as follows: “The Triple Alliance loosened by the antagonism
of Austria and Italy, Russia unchanged or indifferent toward us, England
hostile, France revengeful.” As to Italy, he wrote severely to the
Chancellor: “Your Excellency is easily satisfied. My grandfather and I
looked upon the co-operation of the Italian army as a matter of course.
In case of a French attack on us that must be adhered to.”[567]
The diminution in Germany’s prestige was felt most acutely in her
relationship to France, whose Foreign Minister showed by the dispatch of
the French mission to Fez in January that he intended to establish
French control over Morocco without consulting Germany. Hence, after the
failure of the move toward Russia, the German government began, in
December, to turn its attention to the Moroccan question. Conveniently
disregarding its unsettled grievances against the Sultan, it responded
to certain overtures for a _rapprochement_ from that monarch by quietly
and unofficially encouraging him to resist the French demands.[568]
This action could the more easily be taken since the Sultan had already
begun to oppose the French by convoking an assembly of Moroccan notables
to consider the French proposals for reform. The Sultan selected two men
from each town, who were moderate conservatives, more or less amenable
to his influence, hostile to French control but not in principle opposed
to foreigners or to reforms.[569] Count Bülow, much pleased, advised the
Sultan about the middle of February to unite with the rebel, Bou-Amama
[_sic_], and to threaten a holy war in case France tried to prevent the
meeting of the assembly.[570] Early in February a German warship
appeared casually in Moroccan waters. A few days later Herr von Holstein
instructed Herr von Kühlmann, first secretary of the German legation in
Tangier, to avoid official utterances toward France “until we are more
certain about the attitude of the Sultan”; for “according as the Sultan
shows himself firm or yielding, German policy will endeavor as much as
possible to strengthen his back or will confine itself to defending
German economic interests.”[571]
The Moroccan government lived up to the German hopes by convening the
assembly of notables on February 22 and by requiring M. Saint-René
Taillandier to explain the French program to it. To stiffen the Moroccan
resistance against France, Herr von Kühlmann suggested that the German
government send a note to the Sultan manifesting its disapproval of the
French policy.[572] Before following that suggestion, however, the
German government endeavored to interest President Roosevelt in the
Moroccan question.
As Mr. Roosevelt and the German government were co-operating so
cordially for the preservation of the open door in China, Count Bülow
sought to extend this effort to Morocco and to involve the United States
against France and Great Britain, or at least to prepare the President
for isolated German action on the Moroccan question. On February 25,
after calling Mr. Roosevelt’s attention to the Franco-Spanish
monopolistic plans, the Chancellor invited him to unite with Germany in
advising the Sultan that the calling of the assembly was a correct move
toward fortifying his government and inaugurating reforms. This action,
argued the Chancellor, would stop the French advance and make possible a
peaceful solution of the Moroccan question. Even if the United States
did not participate, he continued, France would scarcely risk a Moroccan
war with a silent Germany on her frontier.[573]
Although not interested in Morocco, the President agreed to instruct the
American representative in Tangier to keep in close touch with his
German colleague.[574] The answer satisfied the German government, which
now felt assured of Mr. Roosevelt’s moral support in case Germany took
action alone. On March 10 the note was sent.
Through this note and the supplementary statements of the German
representatives in Morocco the German government informed the Sultan
that, although he must reorganize his country, Germany
hopes that the rumors of a prospective change in the existing conditions
in Morocco—equal rights and freedom for all nations—are unfounded.
Germany would disapprove of such a change. Germany and the United States
are favorably inclined toward the maintenance of the present conditions;
. . . . the attitude of the other Powers is not definitely known. In
England the Government has bound itself to a certain extent in favor of
France, even though in the English commercial world a current in favor
of the maintenance of the independence of Morocco and in favor of equal
rights of the Powers is present.[575]
Germany here showed her strong disapproval of the whole French action
and sought to augment Moroccan resistance without committing herself to
any definite policy.
Immediately after the dispatch of the note the German government heard
that at the opening session of the assembly of notables on February 22
M. Saint-René Taillandier had claimed to have “the assent of other
foreign representatives at Tangier” to the French program of
reform.[576] Considering this a deliberate misrepresentation for the
purpose of overawing the Moroccans, the German government sought further
means for blocking French efforts. The Chancellor intimated in the
Reichstag on March 15 that Germany intended taking steps to defend her
economic interests in Morocco.[577] Five days later the newspapers
announced the forthcoming visit of the German Emperor to Tangier.[578]
When Count Bülow saw the strong opposition which this proposed visit
aroused in the French and English press, he immediately determined to
put it to a political use.[579] He wrote to the Emperor: “Your Majesty’s
visit to Tangier will embarrass M. Delcassé, thwart his plans, and be of
benefit to our economic interests in Morocco.” For, he wrote a few days
later,
apart from the fact that the systematic exclusion of all non-French
merchants and promoters from Morocco according to the example in Tunis
would signify an important economic loss for Germany, it is also a want
of appreciation of our power when M. Delcassé has not considered it
worth the effort to negotiate with Germany over his Moroccan plans. M.
Delcassé has completely ignored us in this affair.[580]
William II was lukewarm about the project. He had persistently opposed
interfering in the Moroccan question both for reasons of general policy
and for lack of interest in Morocco itself. At the insistence of the
Chancellor he agreed to execute the _coup_; but Count Bülow had to
employ every means to hold him steady. When the Emperor learned from the
papers that the natives and the German and British colonies in Morocco
intended to exploit his visit against the French, he wrote to the
Chancellor on March 20 as follows: “Telegraph immediately to Tangier
that it is _highly_ doubtful whether I shall land and that I shall only
travel incog[nito] as a tourist, that is, no audiences, no
receptions.”[581] Count Bülow overcame his objections by arguing that
otherwise M. Delcassé would spread the rumor that the program of
reception for the Emperor had been curtailed after remonstrances had
been made in Berlin.[582]
Aside from the communication with President Roosevelt, the German
government made no diplomatic preparation for this action.[583] Direct
contact with the French government was cut off as early as March
22.[584] Two days later the Chancellor issued general orders to play the
sphinx on the subject of Morocco.[585] A Franco-German press war alone
revealed the tension of the situation.[586]
With the performance ready to start, the chief actor began to suffer
from stage fright. Learning of an attempt at Tangier a day or so before
to assassinate Mr. Harris of the _London Times_, the Emperor telegraphed
Count Bülow from Lisbon on March 28 as follows: “In Tangier the devil is
already loose. Yesterday an Englishman almost murdered. I consider the
affair there as very doubtful.”[587] Furthermore, he learned that at
Tangier he would have to disembark in an open boat, and that after he
was in the town he would have to walk through the narrow streets or be
carried in a sedan or ride some unknown Berber horse. The first two ways
were decidedly beneath imperial dignity, while the last one, on account
of the Emperor’s crippled left arm, might be too dangerous. Not only the
anxious sovereign, but members of his company as well, were inclined to
advise against the attempt. But Count Tattenbach, former minister at
Tangier and at the time minister at Lisbon, whom the Emperor had brought
along from Portugal, and Prince Eulenburg clung to the plan and kept up
their master’s courage,[588] while from Berlin the Chancellor sent one
telegram after the other to effect the visit. To the Emperor he
telegraphed that it would be a “historic act,” that the attention of the
world was focused on him, that “if the visit . . . . turns out as
desired, Delcassé with his anti-German policy will stand there as a
disgraced European,” and that the French Foreign Minister would probably
then be overthrown by his enemies in France. He agreed with Count
Tattenbach that since press and people were discussing the matter so
fully the Emperor could not recede without exposing himself to the
accusation of cowardice. He likewise sent a telegram of four pages to
the Emperor on March 26 with instructions about his speeches at Tangier.
It read in part as follows:
Naturally it is not to German interest for the Sultan to be discouraged
now at the beginning of the French negotiations and to place himself
under a French protectorate. To oppose this . . . . Your Majesty should
receive the Sultan’s representative expressly as a representative of a
sovereign, and should . . . . express the hope that he [the Sultan]
would soon suppress the rebellion of Bou-Amama. . . . . Your Majesty
might ask where the rebel Bou-Amama obtains the means for his long
resistance. If the representative should reply, “Probably from France,”
Your Majesty might answer, “It is difficult to believe the French
capable of such baseness.”
. . . . Without saying an unfriendly word about France, Your Majesty
should ignore her in Morocco, should not mention at all the French
advance against Morocco, and should honor the French chargé d’affaires
with . . . . only a silent greeting.
It is improbable that any diplomat will mention France’s Moroccan policy
to Your Majesty. If that subject should be brought up, Your Majesty
might reply that the French policy is entirely unknown to you. The case
is different, however, if the Sultan’s representative at his master’s
command . . . . asks Your Majesty’s advice. On the reply will depend
whether the Sultan will continue to defend the independence of Morocco
or will submit to France. The question whether Your Majesty can risk a
war with France for the sake of Morocco cannot be considered at all. But
on the other hand it is more than doubtful whether the present civil
Government of France . . . . would risk a war with Morocco so long as
the least possibility exists that Germany might sooner or later
interfere. Therefore we must for the present leave our goal uncertain.
We cannot conveniently make an alliance with the Sultan. But if we
withdraw our moral support entirely from him and destroy all hope, we
shall relinquish important German interests. Therefore I conceive Your
Majesty’s reply to the Sultan’s minister somewhat as follows: “It is
known that I desire no Morocco territory, but that I value equality of
treatment with other nations in trade and commerce with Morocco. Other
commercial nations have the same interest. As my view is known, the
English colony greeted me joyfully today. It is to the interest of the
Sultan as well as of almost all seafaring and commercial peoples that he
preserve his independence and therewith freedom to permit them all equal
rights in his empire. The main strength of every ruler lies in having
his people back of him at decisive moments. In that case no foreign
Power will attack him lightly. Therefore the Sultan should make certain
that the notables whom he has summoned to Fez for advice are of one mind
with him and should direct his policy in accordance therewith.”
Since it is well known that the Moorish delegates at present assembled
at Fez are entirely hostile to the Sultan’s conciliation toward France,
definite advice would herewith be imparted to the Sultan. If the
representative should ask whether Your Majesty would support the Sultan
in a war against France, Your Majesty might reply: “In case I promised
today to support you, you would attack the French at once. But I desire,
if possible, to maintain peace, although I have a very strong army.
Therefore I must reserve decision until it really comes to war between
France and Morocco. I do not expect this event. France will try to see
how far she can advance with threats. But France knows that her
situation would be dangerous if she attacked Morocco without having
assured herself of Germany’s neutrality.”
Next in importance to the conversation with the Sultan’s representative
is Your Majesty’s reply to a probable short English greeting. . . . .
There Your Majesty might well stress the common interest in equality for
all nations. By emphasizing this principle at that place Your Majesty
will make it half impossible for the English Government in later Franco-
German discussions about Morocco to place itself on the French side.
Finally, in case Your Majesty has to reply to a question from a non-
Moroccan source about what attitude Germany would take in case of a
Franco-Moroccan war, Your Majesty might reply somewhat as follows:
“Germany has no obligations which would prevent her from being guided in
that case by her own interests.” This reply sounds disquieting for our
opponents but binds us to nothing.
Thus, Count Bülow instructed the Emperor to encourage the Moroccans in
their resistance to France, to make France uneasy by his actions and
words, but not to bind Germany to anything definite.
At the same time, to assure his master’s safety, the Chancellor
telegraphed to Herr von Kühlmann that German and Spanish secret police
should be present in abundance, that the visit should perhaps be
shortened, and that “a horse, guaranteed gentle, which should be
exercised early in the morning for several hours by some trustworthy
rider in order to quiet it, would be best and could obviate all
difficulties as well as any curtailment of the program.”[589] Then, to
cut off any possibility of retreat, the Chancellor declared on March 29
to the Reichstag that Germany had no aggressive intentions toward
Morocco, but that she did aim to defend her economic interests and the
open door.
The speech and attitude of a diplomat . . . . must vary according to
circumstances [he stated]. The moment suitable . . . . for the
preservation of our interests I shall choose as I think best. But in
this case the tendency of the German policy has not changed. Whoever
seeks a _fait nouveau_ will not find it in the German policy. In the
same degree as it is attempted to change the international position of
Morocco or to control the open door in the economic development of the
land, we must also to a greater degree than before be heedful that our
economic interests in Morocco remain safe. For this reason we are
entering into relations with the Sultan of Morocco.[590]
When the Emperor’s boat arrived at Tangier early in the morning of March
31, a stiff east wind made landing impossible.[591] Herr von Kühlmann
and the captain of one of the French warships stationed in the harbor
succeeded only with the greatest difficulty in coming aboard. The
Emperor immediately drew the latter into conversation about the weather
prospects. It looked as if the “historic act” would not occur. A few
hours later, however, the wind died down, and General Scholl, a member
of the Emperor’s party, went ashore to make a tour of inspection. He
returned with an enthusiastic report of the reception in view from the
natives, declared the horse to be trustworthy, and said that if one did
not mind getting wet, one could make the landing. So the Emperor
intrusted himself to the wind and the waves, the Moroccans, and a Berber
horse. The landing was made; the horse, which at first shied at the
splendor of the imperial costume, was quieted; and
followed by about twenty attendants all on horseback [according to Herr
von Schoen’s account], the Emperor entered the town, the narrow streets
of which, filled with the joyous, noisy masses, permitted only a slow
advance. The flat roofs of the houses were thickly packed with Moorish,
Christian, and Jewish women who hailed the Emperor in the most varied
tones and scattered flowers. Finally the procession arrived at the Soko,
the open place before the garden of the legation, filled with a
turbulent sea of human beings who expressed their enthusiasm in
deafening cries and wild shooting. The confused din was increased still
more by a military band sent by the Sultan which endeavored in vain to
drown out the uproar of the people. The restlessness of the horses
caused me to ask the French officer, apparently leading a command,
whether he could not stop the wild shooting. He replied dejectedly that
he had some influence only over the handful of regular troops entrusted
to his instruction but not the least over the sportively shooting, half-
wild Kabyle.
However, the company reached the legation in safety where the German
colony, the diplomatic corps, and the representative of the Sultan were
received.
In the speeches which the excited Emperor delivered, he permitted his
tongue to become looser than usual. Whereas he had previously been
opposed to intervention in the Moroccan affair, he now fixed the German
policy with respect to Morocco more tightly than the Chancellor had
wished and exposed himself to the criticism of having taken another
backward monarch under his wing. In reply to the greeting of the
Sultan’s representative, Abd-el-Melik, the Emperor declared that
he . . . . had great interest in the welfare and prosperity of the
Moroccan Empire, that he visited the Sultan as an independent ruler, and
that he hoped that under the authority of the Sultan a free Morocco
would be opened to the peaceful competition of all nations without
monopoly or exclusion.
The Sultan’s representative read to the Emperor a message from his
master in which the latter stated that
he remembered the friendship which had always existed between his
predecessors and Germany and that he was filled with the wish to
strengthen and extend those friendly relations in every way. In reply
the Emperor William expressed his thanks for this cordial message. He
shared the feelings of the Sultan [he said] and agreed with Abd-el-
Melik’s assertations concerning the divine power and wisdom which
directs the fate of peoples. He wished sincerely for the development and
welfare of the Moroccan Empire for the sake of his subjects and for that
of the other European nations who traded there, as he hoped, on the
basis of full equality.
The Emperor then decorated Abd-el-Melik and his three companions. Later,
he said to Abd-el-Melik that
his visit to Tangier aimed to assert that German interests in Morocco
would be protected and preserved. Concerning the best means to achieve
this, he would enter into direct relations with the Sultan, whom he
regarded as an independent ruler. The Emperor closed with the remark
that prudence was necessary in the reforms which the Sultan planned and
that regard should be paid to the religious feelings of the Moroccan
people in order to avoid disturbing public order.[592]
After the speeches were over, the imperial party hurried back on
shipboard before some accident should occur or a contrary wind arise.
Count Bülow was so relieved upon learning that his master was safe on
board that, as he later confided to the Emperor, he had a “nervous fit
of tears.”[593] The Emperor himself did not at first realize the great
political significance of his act. When he met Prince Louis of
Battenberg at Gibraltar on April 1, he expressed the time-honored
shibboleth, that “Germany, Great Britain and the United States must make
common cause and march shoulder to shoulder.”[594] When he received the
reports from the press several days later, he awoke from his
illusions.[595] For, although the whole event smacked of a comic opera,
it none the less threw down the gauntlet to M. Delcassé and French
policy in Morocco[596] and ushered in a long period of crisis in
international relations. The echoes which the Emperor’s speeches aroused
in Europe reverberated like the distant rumblings of cannon.
[Footnote 561: Reported in the _London Times_, Feb. 4, 1905. When Lee
saw how the German press took offense at his words, he published a
“correct version” of these passages in a somewhat milder form (_ibid._,
Feb. 7, 1905; _Annual Register, 1905_, pp. 21 f.).]
[Footnote 562: Von Tirpitz, _Politische Dokumente_, I, 14.]
[Footnote 563: _Ibid._, pp. 17 ff.]
[Footnote 564: Monts to Bülow, Nov. 19, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 85 ff., No.
6423.]
[Footnote 565: Monts to Bülow, Dec. 18, 1904, _ibid._, 88 f. No. 6424;
report of Military Attaché Chelius to Schlieffen, Dec. 18, 1904,
_ibid._, 89 ff., No. 6424 Anlage; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 12, 1905,
_ibid._, 93, No. 6425. The relation of Italy to France and Germany was
well shown in the following incident. Shortly after Loubet’s visit to
Rome, an Italian officer was caught delivering to the French important
documents dealing with the Italian plan of mobilization. At about the
same time the Italian chief of staff gave to the German government
photographs of the French border fortifications (_ibid._, Nos. 6423-24,
6426).]
[Footnote 566: Bülow to Monts, Feb. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 93 f., No. 6426;
Monts to F. O., Feb. 25, 1905, _ibid._, 94 f., No. 6427; Bülow to
William II, March 5, 1905, _ibid._, 95, No. 6428 and Anlage.]
[Footnote 567: Bülow to William II, March 5 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 95
ff., Nos. 6428 f., and the Emperor’s minutes.]
[Footnote 568: The German representatives in Morocco unofficially
assured the Sultan early in February that Germany had a political
interest in the Moroccan question, that Germany as well as several other
Powers had not yet taken the question in its existing form into
consideration, that Germany would not actively support Morocco, but
that, with a silent Germany on her frontier, France would not attack the
latter (see _ibid._, Nos. 6538-40, 6544-47, 6550, 6553).]
[Footnote 569: Kühlmann to Bülow, Jan. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 248, No.
6552.]
[Footnote 570: Bülow to Kühlmann, Feb. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 251 ff., No.
6554.]
[Footnote 571: Bülow to Kühlmann, Feb. 16, 1905, _ibid._, 255, No. 6556.
The dispatch was written by Holstein.]
[Footnote 572: Kühlmann to Bülow, Feb. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 255 f., No.
6557.]
[Footnote 573: Bülow to Kühlmann, Jan. 16, 1905, _ibid._, 245, No. 6547;
Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 25, 1905, _ibid._, 256 ff., No. 6558.]
[Footnote 574: Sternburg to F. O., March 9, 1905, _ibid._, 258 f., No.
6559; Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, pp. 83 f.]
[Footnote 575: Only a summary of the note is given in _G.P._, XX, 260 n.
The quotations are taken from this summary and from a telegram from
Bülow to Kühlmann, March 10, 1905, _ibid._, 260 f., No. 6561.]
[Footnote 576: Report from Vassel, German vice-consul at Fez, Feb. 23,
1905. According to a second report from him, March 7, the French
Minister had claimed to have “the approval of his proposals by the
foreigners” (_ibid._, pp. 255 f. n.; Auswärtiger Amt, _Aktenstücke über
Marokko, 1905_ [Berlin, 1905], No. 3). The latest communication received
by the German government from Vassel, before the dispatch of the note of
March 10, was of Feb. 17. See Kühlmann to Bülow, Feb. 21, 1905, _G.P._,
XX, 255, No. 6557; Bülow to Kühlmann, March 10, 1905, _ibid._, 260, No.
6561.]
[Footnote 577: The Chancellor declared as follows: “I understand
entirely the attention which is given here to the events in and about
Morocco. I regard it as a duty of the German Government to see that . .
. . our economic interests in Morocco are not injured. But the present
moment is unsuitable for further explanations” (Bülow, _Reden_, II, 186
f.). As a matter of fact, German economic interests ran a very poor
third behind those of France and Great Britain (_Zeitschrift für
Kolonialpolitik_, Dec., 1904, pp. 885 ff.).]
[Footnote 578: The information was given out to the _London Standard_,
_London Times_, and the _Kölnische Zeitung_, at Tangier on March 19. The
origin of the visit is obscure. Theodor Wolff relates that Kühlmann and
Hornung, correspondent in Tangier of the _Kölnische Zeitung_, were
responsible for proposing in February that the Emperor include Tangier
in his itinerary (Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_, p. 156). The plan for the
Emperor’s voyage in the Mediterranean submitted to the Chancellor on
March 13 included a stay of four hours in Tangier (editor’s note,
_G.P._, XX, 263). Probably Bülow aimed to use this visit politically
from the start, just as he had intended using the dispatch of a warship
to Tangier in the previous year. But only after he saw the effect of the
announcement upon public opinion did he realize the full political
significance of the visit (cf. _ibid._, pp. 262 ff.). Crozier’s story of
the origin of this voyage is unsubstantiated by any evidence (_Revue de
France_, April 1, 1921, pp. 279 f.).]
[Footnote 579: Editor’s note, _G.P._, XX, 263 f.; Bülow to William II,
March 20, 1905, _ibid._, 262, No. 6563; 264 f., No. 6565.]
[Footnote 580: Bülow to William II, March 20, 1905, _ibid._, 263, No.
6563; Bülow to William II, March 26, 1905, _ibid._, 274 f., No. 6576. It
was reported in the German foreign office soon after the Anglo-French
accord was made that Delcassé had said to some intimate friends: “Je
viens de rouler Radolin; il ne me reste plus qu’à rouler l’empereur
d’Allemagne” (Guibert et Ferrette, _Le conflit franco-allemand en 1905_
[Paris, 1905], p. 83, quoted in Stuart, _French Foreign Policy from
Fashoda to Serajevo_, p. 136 n.). On Feb. 21, 1907, Lord Sanderson,
permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, 1894-1906, wrote
as follows: “M. Delcassé . . . . ignored Germany entirely when he
commenced operations in Morocco. The action of France and her demands on
the Sultan were undoubtedly much exaggerated and misrepresented. But in
addition there is no doubt that M. Delcassé was steadily pursuing a
series of manœuvres for the purpose of isolating Germany and weakening
her alliances. The German Gov[ernmen]t and the German nation are
extremely sensitive about being ignored or neglected in the discussion
of important questions, and it is not surprising that on this occasion
they should have been much exasperated, and determined on inflicting on
France a severe humiliation. That they also wished to separate us from
France, to prevent the Agreement from developing into an alliance, and
to obtain any share they could in the eventual development of Morocco is
no doubt also true. The methods adopted were characteristic of German
policy, and as on some other occasions they failed” (memo. by Lord
Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, _B.D._, IV, 421). Whether the German
government knew the exact terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement is a
question. Tardieu says that it did know them (_La conf. d’Algés_, p.
156). Hammann has written, “One may assume that it learned the main
content” (_Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, p. 200). It also
suspected that the Moroccan accords contained stipulations for the
exclusion of Germany from any participation in the territorial division
of Morocco (_ibid._, p. 201). See also the dispatch from Stumm to Bülow,
Feb. 20, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 191, No. 7024, and the Emperor’s minute
thereto: “And the rascals [the Spanish government] will not even admit
what sort of a pact they have made with the devil [France].” See also
Veit Valentin, _Deutschlands Aussenpolitik von Bismarcks Abgang bis zum
Ende des Weltkrieges_ (Berlin, 1921), p. 54; report from Madrid, Dec.
10, 1904, _Zur europ. Politik_, I, 126 f. However, the German government
did know the terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement of Sept. 1, 1905, so
Ojeda of the Spanish foreign office admitted to Cartwright of the
British embassy (Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233,
No. 252). The probability is therefore that it also learned in good time
the terms of the other secret accords. Failure to mention that knowledge
or even denials of being informed in the documents is not conclusive
proof that the secret articles were not known to the German foreign
office.]
[Footnote 581: William II to Bülow, undated, _G.P._, XX, 263, No. 6564.
The editors of _G.P._ presume the date of this communication to have
been March 21; but Bülow’s reply to it was dated March 20. See Bülow to
William II, March 20, 1905, _ibid._, 264, No. 6565. The Emperor had
dined at the French embassy on March 17 and had said nothing about his
proposed visit. Furthermore, just before leaving on his trip he made at
Bremen one of his half-militaristic, half-pacific speeches which did not
indicate what was to follow (Schulthess, _Europäischer
Geschichtskalender 1905_, pp. 67 f.; Ludwig, _Wilhelm der Zweite_, p.
275; Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. 193 ff.).]
[Footnote 582: Bülow to William II, March 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 264 f.,
No. 6565.]
[Footnote 583: The unexpectedness of this action was shown by the
remarks made on March 21 by Bernstorff, first secretary of the embassy
in London, to a reporter of the _Daily Chronicle_. He asserted that
Germany had only economic interests in Morocco over which it ought not
to be difficult for France and Germany to agree (Bülow to Metternich,
March 22, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 268 f., and note, No. 6569).]
[Footnote 584: Bülow to Radolin, March 22, 1905, _ibid._, 267 f., No.
6568; Flotow to F. O., March 23, 1905, _ibid._, 269, No. 6570; Flotow to
F. O., March 28, 1905, _ibid._, 278, No. 6578; Bülow to Flotow, March
28, 1905, _ibid._, 278, No. 6579; Mévil, pp. 197 f.]
[Footnote 585: Memo. by Bülow, March 24, 1905, _G.P._, 271, No. 6573.]
[Footnote 586: Mévil, p. 205; _G.P._, XX, 262 f., n. 266 n., Nos. 6570,
6584, 6590; _Quest. dipl. et. col._, XIX, 442 ff.; Schulthess, _1905_,
pp. 78 f.]
[Footnote 587: William II to Bülow, March 28, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 279, No.
6580.]
[Footnote 588: Tattenbach to F. O., March 29, 1905, _ibid._, 283, No.
6585; Freiherr von Schoen, _Erlebtes. Beiträge zur politischen
Geschichte der neuesten Zeit_ (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1921), pp. 19 ff.]
[Footnote 589: See his telegrams from March 26 to March 30, 1905,
_G.P._, XX, 272 ff., Nos. 6574 ff.]
[Footnote 590: Bülow, II, 209 f.]
[Footnote 591: For a description of the visit see Schoen, pp. 19 ff.;
Schoen to F. O., March 31, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 285 ff., Nos. 6588 ff.;
Tardieu, pp. 69 f.]
[Footnote 592: The foregoing is the official version of the speeches
published in the German press (see _Allgemeine Zeitung_ [Munich], April
4, 1905). There were various versions of the speeches since the Emperor
spoke extemporaneously. Schoen on March 31 sent to the foreign office a
report of William II’s assertions as follows: When Count de Chérisey
attempted to greet the Emperor in the name of Delcassé in such a way as
to imply a French predominance in Morocco, William II replied sharply
that his visit “signified that Germany demanded free trade there and
full equality with other nations.” When the Count admitted this, the
Emperor remarked that “he would treat directly with the Sultan as a
peer, as a free ruler of an independent land, that he would know how to
assert his just claims and expected that these also be respected by
France.” Those words crushed the Count. To the Sultan’s representative
the Emperor spoke as follows: “He regarded the Sultan as the ruler of a
free and independent Empire, subject to no foreign suzerainty. He
expected for German trade and commerce the same advantages as for all
other commercial nations. He would always negotiate with the Sultan
directly. Reforms which the Sultan planned to introduce ought always to
be executed within the limits of the customs and views of his people and
without violation of the precepts of the Koran, in honest administration
and strengthening of peace and order that would make the best impression
outside. European customs and usages would not be taken over without
further consideration. Let the Sultan therein listen carefully to the
counsel of the great ones of his land” (Schoen to F. O., March 31, 1905,
_G.P._, XX, 286 f., No. 6589. It was also stated in the press, although
not in the official version of the speeches, that the Emperor replied to
the greetings from the German colony at Tangier that that colony “could
rely on the support of the German Government to prevent any obstacle in
that free country [Morocco] from hindering the success of its efforts in
favor of the national commerce” (Quoted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX,
504). Schoen made no mention of this assertion. Cf. Schoen, pp. 20 f.;
Mévil, pp. 210 ff.; _B.D._, III, 62 f., Nos. 71 f.; 64, No. 74; Prince
Louis of Battenberg’s report of a conversation with the Emperor, April
1, 1905, Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. 333 f.]
[Footnote 593: William II to Bülow, Aug. 11, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 497, No.
6237.]
[Footnote 594: Memo. by Prince Louis of Battenberg, April 1, 1905,
Newton, p. 333.]
[Footnote 595: Schoen, p. 22.]
[Footnote 596: Mévil, p. 210.]
CHAPTER XII
THE MOROCCAN CRISIS FROM THE VISIT TO TANGIER TO THE FALL OF DELCASSÉ
I
The visit to Tangier, because of its very unexpectedness, did not at
first alarm the French, who refused to credit the German Emperor with
hostile intentions.[597] Better-informed personages in Paris, however,
interpreted the event more accurately. They were asking seriously
whether war would ensue and were declaring that “no such critical moment
has occurred since the Schnäbele affair.” The Austrian Ambassador was
reminded by the Franco-German press war of the days immediately
preceding the conflict of 1870.[598]
The French government had been warned by both German and British
representatives of Germany’s interest in Morocco. As early as November,
1904, Herr von Kühlmann had declared to the French chargé d’affaires at
Tangier that Germany had expected France to acquaint her with the new
situation in Morocco created by the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish
accords, but that she had since realized that she was being
“systematically excluded.” “The Imperial Government is ignorant of all
the accords made over Morocco and does not consider itself bound in any
way on that question,” he said. The French chargé d’affaires had not
regarded these remarks as sufficiently significant to report until the
following February. Upon direct inquiry in Berlin the French government
had had them corroborated by the German foreign office.[599] On February
12, 1905, Sir Arthur Nicolson, British ambassador at Madrid, had
remarked to his French colleague that “the attitude assumed by the
German Government in response to the petition of their subjects in
Morocco was an invitation to the French Government to initiate some
discussion with a view to obtain their concurrence with the provisions
of the Convention.”[600] M. Delcassé had not heeded this advice. By
March 22 he had become uneasy over the German policy, about which he was
so uncertain.[601] He was determined, however, to maintain intact
France’s accords with the other Powers and her position in Morocco.[602]
Ascertaining on the eve of the voyage to Tangier that Great Britain,
Spain, and Italy would hold loyally to their agreements,[603] he
declared in the Senate on March 31, the same day on which William II
spoke at Tangier, that
nothing in our Moroccan policy, nothing in our execution of the accords
of April 8 and October 3, 1904, can explain the movements of the German
press. . . . . You may legitimately hope that in the western basin of
the Mediterranean . . . . France will succeed, without ignoring any
right, without injuring any interest, in assuring her future.[604]
The semiofficial French press threatened the formation of a new Dual
Alliance between France and Great Britain supported by Italy and Spain
in case Germany attempted to gain any special advantages in
Morocco.[605] At the same time, M. Delcassé instructed M. Saint-René
Taillandier, who since March 24 had been making substantial progress in
the negotiations with the Sultan,[606] to warn that monarch against
following the proposal of the German press for an international
conference over the Moroccan question.[607] He also informed the Italian
government, April 12, that France could not entertain such a
proposal.[608]
The Emperor’s move nevertheless forced M. Delcassé to open negotiations
with Germany for an understanding regarding Morocco. From March 28 he
endeavored indirectly to approach the German government.[609] On April 7
a threatened interpellation in the Chamber forced him to state publicly
that France was “ready to dissipate any misunderstanding which . . . .
may still exist.”[610] Under pressure from the French cabinet[611] as
well as from public opinion M. Delcassé, while dining at the German
embassy on April 13, repeated that statement directly to Prince Radolin.
He denied that M. Saint-René Taillandier had ever claimed before the
Sultan to have a mandate of Europe. He excused his failure to transmit
the Anglo-French agreement to the German government; and, while
admitting that the conversation of March 23, 1904, had been unofficial,
he declared that his intention had been to show special favor to Germany
by communicating the contents of the accord to her beforehand. He had
also believed, he said, that freedom of commerce for all nations had
been completely safeguarded in that agreement and in the one with
Spain.[612] Immediately thereafter the French government informally
asked the British government to “help to convince the Emperor that
German interests were in no way threatened” in Morocco.[613]
To carry out his policy, M. Delcassé needed the loyal support of all
France. That he did not have. Political jealousy because of his long
tenure in office, dislike of his secretiveness, enmity between him and
M. Rouvier (the premier), hostility because of his defending the Russian
government in the massacre of January 22, 1905[614]—all these forces of
opposition were now strengthened by the fact that the Foreign Minister
had blundered and that, aroused by the fear of complications, France
sought a victim whose sacrifice might dispel the danger. Quickly
deserting M. Delcassé, the nation pressed him on too rapidly to take the
initiative with Germany. As time passed with nothing settled, nothing
known, the French grew more and more alarmed, until on April 19 the
Chamber denounced the Foreign Minister for having neglected to consult
Germany, and demanded information. M. Deschanel declared that the
Foreign Minister should have heeded Germany’s well-known imperialistic
ambitions by negotiating with that Power about Morocco. “There are not
lacking in England people who desire to utilize the French power against
Germany,” he said. “And there are not lacking in Germany people who will
try to utilize the French power against England. We should not offer
ourselves to that play.” M. Tournade accused M. Delcassé of having hoped
that if he “juggled the question with Germany” and confronted her with a
_fait accompli_, she would venture no opposition. M. de Pressensé,
charging him with deliberately having avoided an official notification
to Germany of the Moroccan accords, asserted: “You have not followed an
exact conception of the interests of France. Your policy is unworthy of
a great country.” M. Delafosse, sensing the reason for the German action
in the Anglo-French entente rather than in Morocco, expressed the
general demand that “it is necessary to ask Germany what she wishes of
us.” No one, however, believed that Germany would question France’s
special position in Morocco.
Although not a voice was raised in his behalf, M. Delcassé refused to
impart any new intelligence in answer to these accusations and demands.
If M. Rouvier had not come to his rescue, he would have been repudiated
by all parties. In defending the Foreign Minister M. Rouvier declared
that not France but Germany had altered her Moroccan policy since the
previous year, attributing this change to the defeat of France’s
ally.[615] The initiative toward conversations with Germany, he said,
had already been made. “We have closed our ear to no proposal,” he
avowed; “anything which is in harmony with the formula . . . .: to
safeguard the honor of our country and to maintain peace, . . . . we are
ready to consider.” He made the retention of M. Delcassé a cabinet
question, but he assured the Chamber that in the future he would
supervise the foreign policy.[616]
Upon receiving this check, M. Delcassé would have resigned had it not
been for the appeals of President Loubet and of MM. Paul Cambon and
Barrère, both of whom were in Paris at the time.[617] His policy of
treating with Germany on an equal footing was checkmated. French public
opinion had forced an almost complete surrender in the face of the
German menace. It remained to be seen how far M. Rouvier could yield
before French desire for peace would conflict with French national
honor.
II
The Emperor’s injudicious assertions at Tangier compelled the German
foreign office to take some positive action in Morocco instead of
leaving the initiative to the Sultan. Herr von Holstein contended that
“a retreat would stand on the same level with Olmütz and cause Fashoda
to be forgotten.”[618] By April 2 the Chancellor decided upon the
following policy:[619] first, to continue denying any territorial
ambitions in Morocco; second, to demand economic equality for all
nations, the open door “in the widest sense”; third, and this he
considered Germany’s “trump card,” to advocate calling an international
conference like that at Madrid in 1880 for deliberating upon the entire
question of Moroccan reform.[620] Of course no separate negotiations
with France would be considered.
The Chancellor and Herr von Holstein believed that the proposal for a
conference would give Germany an unassailable position. Protected by the
appearance of absolute legality and disinterestedness, they hoped to
break the ententes and accords between France and the other Powers,
especially Great Britain, or at least to show that Germany could force
them to submit the results of their agreements to the consideration of a
general conference.[621] They did not doubt that the proposal would be
accepted and that the conference would refuse to turn Morocco over to
France. For, they argued,
in case a conference meets, we are already certain of the diplomatic
support of America in favor of the open door. . . . . Austria will not
quarrel with us over Morocco . . . . Russia is busy with herself.[622] .
. . . The English Government—between Roosevelt and those English groups
which think as the _Morning Post_, _Manchester Guardian_, and Lord
Rosebery[623]—will not stir. Spain is of no importance, and also has a
strong party in favor of the _status quo_. We shall certainly be able to
hold Italy in order, if necessary by a gentle hint that while we settle
with France, Austria will perhaps settle the irredentist question. . . .
. If France refuses the conference, she will put herself in the wrong
toward all the signatory Powers[624] and thereby will give England,
Spain, and Italy a probably welcome excuse to withdraw.[625]
Immediately after the Emperor’s speeches at Tangier, Herr von Holstein
proposed advocating a conference in the semiofficial press. The
Chancellor approved; but Herr Hammann, director of the press bureau in
the foreign office, objected. Inasmuch as the Emperor and the Chancellor
had both declared that Germany would next communicate directly with the
Sultan, he argued, this abrupt change would expose German policy to the
accusation of unsteadiness. He advised preparing public opinion for a
conference, for, he maintained, the government had “to combat a much
stronger aversion to a serious conflict with France and England over
Morocco in the public than in the press.”[626] On April 7 he predicted a
“press storm” if the menace of war arose.[627] So, for the time a milder
note was sounded in the press. The grievances against M. Delcassé, who
was made personally responsible for Germany’s action,[628] the necessity
for defending the German economic interests in Morocco, and the intimacy
of German-American relations were emphasized. Little by little the
proposal for a conference was brought to the fore.[629]
The main basis for the optimism of the German government was its
friendship with President Roosevelt. Since the early part of the year
both the British and the German governments had been endeavoring to win
the President’s support and to arouse his suspicions by accusing each
other of aggressive intentions.[630] Needing the support of both to
effect peace between Russia and Japan, Mr. Roosevelt had refused to
believe the tales of either. He had diagnosed their trouble as a case of
“jumpy nerves,” and had tried in February and March, 1905, to bring them
together in a new triple entente.[631] The German government had
responded favorably to his suggestion; but the British government,
taxing the President with being hoodwinked by the Emperor, had replied
that better relations with that hostile Power were scarcely
possible.[632] This lack of success with Great Britain, combined with
mistrust of France, caused the President to draw closer to Germany.[633]
On April 3 the German government confidently asked Mr. Roosevelt to lend
“moral support” for the maintenance of the _status quo_ in Morocco and
for the peaceful settlement of the Moroccan difficulty by speaking
“calmly and academically,” particularly to Great Britain, for the equal
treatment of all Powers in the Sherifian Empire.[634] Ten days later it
asked the President to speak to Great Britain in favor of an
international conference on the Moroccan question.[635] Not delaying for
a definite reply or heeding the signs of the drawing together of Great
Britain and France,[636] the German government, on April 9, determined
to send Count Tattenbach to Fez to combat the efforts of the French
mission and to win the Sultan’s approval of a conference. The Count had
telegraphed that this move was essential, since the Sultan was a
weakling, his advisers incompetent and venal, and since the French were
otherwise likely to gain the acceptance of their plans of reform.[637]
On the same date (April 9) upon which the German government made this
decision, it began to sound the other Powers concerning a conference.
Austria-Hungary and Russia could be excluded from consideration although
both showed disapproval of Germany’s action.[638] When the Spanish
government was asked on April 12 to support the proposal for a
conference, the foreign minister, M. Villa-Urrutia, replied that he
could accept it only if France and Great Britain did so. He suggested
that the German desires be fulfilled not by a conference but by an
exchange of notes and declarations between the Powers.[639]
With Italy the German government was more brusque. While reassuring that
Power that Germany had no intention of becoming a rival in the
Mediterranean, Count Bülow demanded under threat of breaking the
alliance that Italy support the German policy in the Moroccan affair.
But on April 12 the Italian government, evading a definite position,
urged a direct settlement of the Franco-German discord. Count Monts,
German ambassador at Rome, reported that only in case Great Britain
showed coolness toward France might Germany expect any support from her
ally, who would otherwise endeavor to remain neutral.[640]
Since the German government thought that Great Britain had relinquished
her Moroccan interests, it intended to ignore her and deal solely with
France. On April 19 Count Metternich merely explained to Lord Lansdowne
the German views in the Moroccan affair without asking for any
expression of opinion. In this conversation he received the impression
that the British Foreign Minister disapproved of the German action and
that, against his desire, he could easily be forced to give France
diplomatic support.[641]
Without waiting for either the British or the American reply, the German
government, on April 18, responded to M. Delcassé’s offer “to dissipate
any misunderstanding” with the suggestion that “the simplest and most
natural means” of settling the question of Moroccan reform would be to
bring about “an exchange of ideas between all the signatory Powers” of
the Convention of Madrid.[642] At the same time, through messages to the
Sultan the Chancellor sought to prevent him from making any decisions
before the German mission arrived, and he pressed Count Tattenbach to
hasten his departure for Fez. Count Bülow realized that if the French
succeeded in gaining the Sultan’s acceptance of their program of
reforms, the entire German action would be rendered absurd. In fact,
until Count Tattenbach could persuade the Sultan to issue an invitation
for a conference, the latter held the fate of Germany’s policy in his
hands.[643]
III
The German Emperor’s visit to Tangier aroused bitter antagonism in Great
Britain, where government and people believed that Germany had struck as
much at Great Britain as at France in an effort to break the Entente
Cordiale. Alarm over a possible German attack upon the British Isles was
revived.[644] Public feeling was well expressed by King Edward who, on
April 15, wrote indignantly to Lord Lansdowne:
The Tangier incident was the most mischievous and uncalled for event
which the German Emperor has ever been engaged in since he came to the
throne. It was also a political theatrical fiasco, and if he thinks he
has done himself good in the eyes of the world he is very much mistaken.
He is no more or less than a political “enfant terrible” and one can
have no faith in any of his assurances. His own pleasure seems to wish
to set every country by the ears.[645]
The Foreign Secretary’s criticism was also severe.
I am afraid that we can hardly regard this Tangier ebullition [he wrote,
on April 9, to Sir Frank Lascelles] as an isolated incident. There can
be no doubt that the Kaiser was much annoyed by the Anglo-French
Agreement, and probably even more so by our refusal to vamp up some
agreement of the same kind with Germany over the Egyptian question.
We shall, I have little doubt, find that the Kaiser avails himself of
every opportunity to put spokes in our wheels. . . . .[646]
This staunch pro-French sentiment was not concealed. Early in April an
exchange of visits by the British and French fleets was announced for
the summer. King Edward had an interview with MM. Loubet and Delcassé on
April 6 while passing through Paris on his way south.[647] In Berlin at
the same time Sir Frank Lascelles spoke in private “very disapprovingly”
of the German action, and strongly opposed the idea of a
conference.[648] And British public opinion, the true guide of the
foreign policy, gave entire support to France.[649] So although the
British government admitted that M. Delcassé had blundered in his
handling of Germany[650] and although it knew that the secret articles
of the two Moroccan accords were not in keeping with the public ones, it
felt obliged both by honor and by interest to help France out of her
difficulty. Its official attitude was expressed by Lord Lansdowne to the
Ambassador at Berlin as follows:
My impression is that the German Government have really no cause for
complaint either of us or the French in regard to the Morocco part of
the Agreement. We made no secret of its existence. It dealt exclusively
with French and British interests in Morocco, and so far as the other
Powers were concerned, it provided adequate security for their
interests, and for the integrity of Morocco itself. What else does the
Kaiser want?[651]
Particularly since British policy aimed at preventing Germany from
obtaining ports anywhere in the colonial world[652] did the British
government desire to keep that Power out of Morocco. And, while Sir
Francis Bertie, British ambassador at Paris, reported the French
government as “solid on Morocco,” he added the ill-omened statement of
M. Delcassé, that the German government was “turning him out.”[653] Lord
Lansdowne did not follow up the French suggestion of intervening in
Berlin in favor of France for fear of doing more harm than good by
arousing the Emperor’s resentment.[654] But he did send the British
Minister at Tangier to Fez to offset the effects of the German
mission.[655] And on April 22 he instructed Sir Francis Bertie as
follows:
It seems not unlikely that German Government may ask for a port on the
Moorish coast.
You are authorized to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that we should
be prepared to join French Government in offering strong opposition to
such a proposal and to beg that if question is raised French Government
will afford us a full opportunity to conferring with them as to steps
which might be taken in order to meet it.
German attitude in this dispute seems to me most unreasonable having
regard to M. Delcassé’s attitude and we desire to give him all the
support we can.
On April 25 the Ambassador handed M. Delcassé the following _aide-
memoire_ (dated April 24):
The British Government finds that the conduct of Germany in the Moroccan
question is most unreasonable in view of M. Delcassé’s attitude, and it
desires to give to His Excellency all the support in its power. It seems
not improbable that the German Government may ask for a port on the
Moroccan coast. In that event the British Government would be willing to
join the French Government in offering strong opposition to such a
proposal, and it asks M. Delcassé, in case the question is raised, to
give to the British Government full opportunity to concert with the
French Government upon the measures which might be taken to meet that
demand.[656]
By inverting the order of the sentences, the Ambassador gave to Lord
Lansdowne’s communication a force and a meaning which were originally
lacking. He changed the emphasis from that of helping France to oppose
the German acquisition of a port to that of helping her to oppose
Germany in the whole Moroccan question. The one document limited the
scope of the support and stressed the point of conferring beforehand as
well as that of offering strong opposition. The other document began
with a blanket offer of aid, and then used the present instance as one
example of that offer. Moreover, the statement “to concert with the
French Government upon the measures which might be taken to meet that
demand” was stronger than the one used by Lord Lansdowne, “of conferring
with them as to steps which might be taken in order to meet it.” Sir
Francis Bertie’s _aide-memoire_ was so colored by his own very pro-
French feeling that it did not accurately reproduce his chief’s
proposal.
IV
M. Delcassé was “most grateful” for this support. He denied that Germany
had made any such request, although he remarked that some years ago
Count Hatzfeldt had approached the British government on the subject. He
promised to communicate with the latter if he heard of any German
aspirations for a port and to warn the Sultan against giving any
concession to Germany.[657] Thus, by virtue of the British offer, the
French Foreign Minister was able to hold to his policy in spite of
Germany’s refusal to consider his overture and in spite of his
unpopularity with the French Parliament. On May 2, he again attempted to
approach the German government, offering through M. Luzzati, Italian
minister of finance, to give “any satisfaction desired by Germany in
order to settle the Moroccan question in a way which would not wound
French honor too deeply.”[658] At the same time he continued the French
action at Fez. When on April 26 the Sultan, emboldened by the German
intervention, requested an international guaranty of the proposed
Franco-Moroccan agreement over military reforms, M. Delcassé immediately
refused. “You may declare peremptorily to Ben Sliman,” he instructed the
French Minister on May 3, “that there can no more be intermediate Powers
between France and Morocco than there are intermediate countries between
Morocco and Algeria.”[659]
The Foreign Minister’s policy was disapproved by the French Premier, who
since April 19 had assumed general control over foreign affairs. Whereas
M. Delcassé, a skilled diplomat, was secretive, pro-British, and anti-
German, the inexperienced M. Rouvier, a business man who sought to
employ business methods in the conduct of foreign relations, suspected
Great Britain of attempting to use France as a cat’s-paw against
Germany. Realizing that the British navy “did not have wheels,” M.
Rouvier favored treating Great Britain and Germany alike.[660] When the
German government, instead of replying to M. Delcassé’s proposal of
April 13, prepared to send a mission to Fez and the German newspapers
advocated an international conference on the Moroccan affair, M. Rouvier
intervened personally in an effort to reach a settlement.
On April 26, while Prince Radolin’s guest at dinner, the Premier brought
up the Moroccan question. Protesting that the French really preferred
the Germans to the English, he intimated that he appreciated Germany’s
defense of her Moroccan interests, and said: “We will do everything
possible and will give every desired explanation and satisfaction.”
Denying that France was seeking to change the _status quo_, he upheld
her right to suppress the anarchy in Morocco along the Algerian
frontier. He offered to drop the thirty-year limitation to freedom of
commerce, which, he added, was in fact already invalidated by the
existing treaties between Morocco and other states. At the close of the
conversation he exclaimed passionately: “It is impossible, it would be
criminal for two states that are intended to agree and to approach each
other to become embroiled, and especially over Morocco!” The Ambassador
coldly responded that a collective settlement of the question seemed to
him the simplest solution.[661]
On the following day M. Rouvier proposed indirectly to Prince Radolin a
settlement of the Moroccan problem by an exchange of notes between
France and the other Powers. If the majority of the Powers opposed the
French program of reform, it would not be carried out. M. Rouvier had no
objection to Count Tattenbach’s making new commercial treaties with
Morocco. But he did ask that, in case Germany were satisfied by his
offer, the Emperor, on his return from the Mediterranean, should
announce publicly the forthcoming settlement of the Franco-German
dispute.[662]
When these offers were made, the anxiety of the German government was
relieved. To be sure, on April 25, Prince Radolin heard from a “usually
well-informed person just returned from England” that King Edward would,
on his way home from the South, declare officially to the French
government that “Great Britain was ready to support the French policy in
Morocco and the execution of the Anglo-French accord with her whole
power.”[663] But at the same time the German government learned
definitely that the Sultan had made no final promises to the French and
that he had agreed to postpone all decisions until the arrival of Count
Tattenbach.[664] Equally satisfactory, the answer from Washington
arrived.
As the President had been absent on a hunting trip in Colorado, he had
not replied until April 20, when he had explained his policy to Mr.
Taft, acting secretary of state, as follows:
I do not feel that as a Government we should interfere in the Morocco
matter. We have other fish to fry and we have no real interest in
Morocco. . . . .
At the same time if I can find out what Germany wants I shall be glad to
oblige her if possible, and I am sincerely anxious to bring about a
better state of feeling between England and Germany. Each nation is
working itself up to a condition of desperate hatred of the other; each
from sheer fear of the other. The Kaiser is dead sure that England
intends to attack him. The English Government and a large share of the
English people are equally sure that Germany intends to attack England.
Now, in my view this action of Germany in embroiling herself with France
over Morocco is positive proof that she has not the slightest intention
of attacking England. . . . . I do not wish to suggest anything whatever
as to England’s attitude in Morocco, but if we can find out that
attitude with propriety and inform the Kaiser of it, I shall be glad to
do so. . . . . If we find that it will make the English suspicious—that
is, will make them think we are acting as decoy ducks for Germany—why,
we shall have to drop the business. . . . . I should advise your being
absolutely frank with both Speck [von Sternburg] and the British people.
. . . . Remember . . . . that both parties are very suspicious. You
remember the King’s message to me through Harry White and his earnest
warning to me that I should remember that England was our real friend
and that Germany was only a make-believe friend. In just the same way
the Germans are always insisting that England is really on the point of
entering into a general coalition which would practically be inimical to
us—an act which apart from moral considerations I regard the British
Government as altogether too flabby to venture upon.
In a letter to the German Ambassador on the same date, Mr. Roosevelt had
reiterated that the United States had no direct interest in Morocco, had
offered to serve as mediator between Germany and Great Britain and to
advise the British “to arrive at an understanding over Morocco and to
work in harmony” with Germany.[665]
The German Chancellor regarded this statement as “satisfactory to a high
degree.”[666] On April 27 he instructed Prince Radolin to uphold the
project for a collective settlement and to postpone further negotiations
with the French government until Count Tattenbach could send exact
information from Fez concerning the actions of the French Minister.[667]
In other words, he put the French off until the Count could block their
efforts in Fez and secure the Sultan’s acceptance of a conference.
Otherwise, he feared, M. Delcassé might try to break the Moroccan
resistance by intimating to the Sultan that his supposed friend,
Germany, was now deserting him for a direct understanding with
France.[668]
This hazardous policy was not approved by either Prince Radolin or Count
Tattenbach. The former advised his chief to accept M. Delcassé’s offer
of April 13.[669] The Count also expressed his preference for a direct
agreement with France. “In my opinion,” he wrote to the Chancellor on
April 29,
the condition for a separate understanding with France would first be
given if the other Powers reject the idea of a conference and the Sultan
also acts unreliably and declines to heed our advice and wishes,—as is
to be expected. In this case we must receive Southern Morocco as our
sphere of influence. . . . . We must therefore decide whether we wish .
. . . to fight a long diplomatic battle of doubtful issue against
France, either through supporting the Sultan with money and weapons or
through relying upon the conservative, fanatically anti-French party in
Morocco, or whether we wish to gain through an understanding with France
a substantial pledge for a large-scale African colonial policy which
aims at the acquisition of all the French African possessions.[670]
The Chancellor’s reply to Count Tattenbach contained the explanation for
Germany’s proposal of a conference. He wrote:
Your last idea guided Germany’s Moroccan policy in the past and under
proper circumstances can guide it again in the future if you keep the
future free. For the present, the German policy must be governed by the
fact that His Majesty the Emperor . . . . declared to the King of Spain
that he has enough African possessions and wishes no territory in
Morocco but only the maintenance of commercial freedom. This declaration
naturally does not bind us forever; but in the year which has passed
since those remarks, the effect of the Southwest African events has been
of a nature to increase the antagonism to colonial acquisitions by
military force as well with His Majesty as with a great part of the
German people. Even if, therefore, France were inclined to permit us to
conquer a part of Morocco, we would for the present perhaps not be in a
position to take advantage of this overture. In reality, we are
confronted with the alternative either of relinquishing Morocco now to
France without adequate compensation to Germany or of working for the
extension of life of the Sherifian Empire in the expectation of a turn
of events favorable to us. Thus, I perceive your important task to be in
holding the future free for the profit of German interests. I sum it up
in stating that you should bring the Sultan to declare that he could
consider the French demands only if they were advised by a conference of
all the signatory Powers. The reference to the conference I consider for
the Sultan the easiest and for us the most favorable form of refusal.
That the Sultan refuse the French demands is naturally the main
thing.[671]
This frank document furnished the key to the German refusal of the
French offers and to the persistent demands for a conference. Count
Bülow’s embarrassment was caused by the Emperor’s renunciations at Vigo
and even more by the temporary apathy if not antagonism of the German
people toward further colonial acquisition. Pursuing an objective
undesired by German public opinion, the Chancellor was still bent on
acquiring a share in Morocco or compensation elsewhere. To delay and
postpone, to “hold the future free” until public opinion veered into a
more chauvinistic channel, to relieve Germany of the restrictions
imposed by the Emperor’s assertions, Count Bülow thought that a
conference was the best means. The continuation of the crisis was a
logical result of this ambition.
On the same day upon which Count Bülow penned this dispatch M. Rouvier
made another offer. He was led to this move by the increasing excitement
in France. The lack of response from Germany and the uncertainty about
her objective, the publication of an article in the _Kreuzzeitung_ on
April 26 and of one in _Matin_ on the next day hinting at war,[672]
caused a panic on the Paris stock exchange on April 27.[673] M. Bihourd
telegraphed on April 28 of the presence of “bellicose counselors” in the
_entourage_ of the Emperor who would have an excellent opportunity “to
advocate the present time as propitious for war against France.”[674] So
in a conversation with Prince Radolin on April 30 M. Rouvier indorsed
the Emperor’s assertions at Tangier and the principles of the Convention
of Madrid, except with respect to the Algero-Moroccan frontier. He
offered to “make an agreement similar to the Anglo-French one, where all
doubtful points, including Morocco, would be settled.” The Ambassador
made no reply.[675]
The next day an intermediary explained to Prince Radolin that the
Premier regarded a conference as hardly acceptable since France had
engaged herself so fully in the Moroccan affair. M. Rouvier would be
willing, however, to include in a general settlement such questions as
those of boundaries in Africa and the Bagdad Railway. In return, the two
governments should agree upon a mode of adjusting the Moroccan affair
directly with the Powers. The German government refused the offer.[676]
On May 1 King Edward VII arrived in Paris where he remained for four
days. Strongly supporting M. Delcassé’s views, he assured the French
government that Germany would not dare a war; in case of conflict, he
said, France could rely on British support.[677] To the German
Ambassador he praised the French for seeking a direct settlement of the
Moroccan difficulty, abruptly demanding, “Why does not Berlin reply to
the last French overture?”[678] His interference, however, was of no
avail. In fact, French public opinion, suspecting the King and British
press of attempting to estrange France and Germany, was more than ever
anxious for an agreement with Germany.[679]
Distressed by refusals and silence from the German government and
fearful of war, M. Rouvier sought to restore connections with Germany by
sending his friend, M. Betzold, to Berlin to interview Herr von
Holstein, and by persuading Baron Eckardstein, then living privately in
England, to lay the French proposals directly before Count Bülow and the
Emperor at Karlsruhe. These men were to inform the German officials that
the French cabinet, disapproving of M. Delcassé’s secretiveness, hoped
to bring about the Minister’s downfall over some domestic difficulty in
the next three or four weeks. They were to state that while in case of
war the French Government knew for a certainty that Great Britain would
interfere in France’s favor, the cabinet, except M. Delcassé, preferred
not to seek this support. As an inducement for a direct settlement, the
two emissaries were to offer Germany “a coaling station and eventually
also a strip of land on the Atlantic coast of Morocco.” They were
especially to urge the Emperor against making any inflammatory speeches
on his return from the Mediterranean.[680]
Neither M. Betzold nor Baron Eckardstein had the least success. While
Herr von Holstein assured M. Betzold on May 2 of Germany’s desire for
good relations with France, he observed that for the time he saw no
possibility of making a direct agreement with her. For, even apart from
Germany’s official declaration in favor of a collective settlement of
the Moroccan question, the German government did not trust M. Delcassé
sufficiently to negotiate with France. That Minister’s policy toward
Germany, he asserted, had been “dishonest,” “hostile,” “insidious,” and
in this affair “disrespectful.” “Slow tempo, temporary truce, and
removal of Delcassé would be the next,” he concluded. In Karlsruhe, on
May 5, Count Bülow rebuffed Baron Eckardstein with the bold assertion:
“The English inciting does not impress us. In case of a conflict the
game would be played between Germany and France. . . . . We are in a
position to await further developments with composure.” The Baron was
not allowed to see William II at all.[681]
Thus every offer for a direct settlement was refused.[682] Indeed, the
German government even suggested to M. Rouvier on May 7 that France take
the initiative in calling a conference, arguing that “the advantage of a
conference lies in that it can have no positive results. It will neither
divide Morocco nor check her continuing decay. It will fulfil its object
in removing the danger of an acute conflict, at the same time holding
the future open.”[683]
M. Rouvier of course would not consider the suggestion. Nor was he any
longer so willing to eliminate M. Delcassé. On May 8 he informed the
German government through M. Betzold that while he had been unable to
convince the Foreign Minister of the faults of his policy, the latter
was needed in the work of mediating between Russia and Japan. It might,
therefore, take weeks or even months to achieve his dismissal. M.
Rouvier hoped, said M. Betzold, to settle the Moroccan and other
difficulties with Germany after Count Tattenbach convinced himself of
the French Minister’s proper conduct at Fez and after M. Delcassé had
been eliminated.[684]
More unfortunate words could hardly have been chosen. The German
government was opposed to an early peace between the warring
Powers,[685] and its mistrust of M. Delcassé was increased by his
continued justification of his policy. Since French public opinion had
repudiated the Minister, since M. Rouvier, known to be weak and easily
influenced, had practically offered the Minister’s head, the German
government determined to press the frightened and pacifically inclined
French Premier until the objectionable Foreign Minister was overthrown.
To that end, on May 16, Prince Radolin announced to M. Rouvier “that the
prerequisite for the _rapprochement_ desired by him [M. Rouvier] is for
us [Germany] to have full trust in the foreign policy of France. . . . .
After what has happened, this trust is lacking.” The Premier replied, “I
understand you fully. Leave it to me.” But through M. Betzold he urged
the German government to wait until he could accomplish the act by some
internal crisis.[686]
Meanwhile, the German government was pressing Spain, Italy, and the
United States for support. Early in May Herr von Radowitz warned the
Spanish government against sending a mission to Fez at that time, and
remarked that “it would be wise for Spain not to intervene in the
present Moorish difficulties, and that it was to her interest to be on
friendly terms with Germany, who could be of greater assistance to her
than any other Power.”[687] At the same time Count Monts in Rome was
using “menacing language,” hinting at “the possibility of war.”[688] In
both places this talk made a deep impression.
To President Roosevelt the German government asserted that, although
certain voices had been raised in France in favor of a conference, Great
Britain still resisted the project. It asked the President to inform the
British government that its attitude justified the suspicion that “in
the accord with France they [the British] had wished to dispose not only
of English rights but also of the rights of the other signatory Powers.”
The German government further informed Mr. Roosevelt that if the
proposal for a conference became hopeless, it would then think of its
interests alone and would be forced to choose “between the possibility
of a conflict with France and the consideration of conditions which
France might perhaps propose to avoid a conflict.”[689]
Criticizing sharply the British hostility to the conference, Mr.
Roosevelt promised to repeat his advice to the British government to
settle its differences with Germany. Upon doing so he was again accused
by the British leaders of being under German influence. He stoutly
denied this accusation, writing to Senator Lodge, then in England, on
May 15, as follows:
It always amuses me to find that the English think that I am under the
influence of the Kaiser. The heavy witted creatures do not understand
that nothing would persuade me to follow the lead of or enter into close
alliance with a man who is so jumpy, so little capable of continuity of
action, and therefore, so little capable of being loyal to his friends
or steadfastly hostile to an enemy. Undoubtedly with Russia weakened
Germany feels it can be fairly insolent within the borders of Europe. I
intend to do my best to keep on good terms with Germany, as with all
other nations, and so far as I can to keep them on good terms with one
another; and I shall be friendly to the Kaiser as I am friendly to every
one. But as for his having any special influence with me, the thought is
absurd.[690]
Nevertheless, the British government rejected his advice. On May 19 Mr.
Roosevelt had to report to Baron Sternburg that “the British Government
had given him to understand that it did not wish better relations with
Germany,” and that “it had even hinted broadly to the secretary of state
that Great Britain could take care of her affairs alone.” He could not
do more, he said, without exposing himself to an incivility.[691] The
German government was well pleased with the result, however, for it
placed Mr. Roosevelt on the German side.
On May 13 Count Tattenbach arrived in Fez. He found that the French
party was still strong, with some of the Moroccan ministers bought over
to that side. He accomplished his object with some difficulty. He
reported immediately that the Sultan himself affirmed the accusation
against the French Minister of having claimed to enjoy a mandate of
Europe.[692] A few days later the Count telegraphed that upon his
arrival the French Minister, under instructions from M. Delcassé, had
issued a veiled threat of violence against Morocco if the Sultan agreed
to a conference.[693] Upon receiving these dispatches Count Bülow
immediately warned M. Rouvier against M. Delcassé’s “stormy and violent
. . . . Moroccan policy.”[694] As that Minister still remained in
office, the Chancellor instructed Herr von Miquel, councilor at the
German embassy in Paris, to inform M. Rouvier amicably but firmly that
the Foreign Minister would have to go, that Franco-German relations
would not improve as long as he remained in office. Indeed, if M.
Delcassé’s anti-German and bellicose policy became known to the German
people, he was to state, it would have an effect for which Count Bülow
refused to be responsible. “A change in the present situation is above
all to be made possible by a change in the direction of the French
foreign policy.”
When Herr von Miquel carried out these instructions on May 30, the
Premier realized the necessity for eliminating the Foreign Minister. In
his despair he cried: “I cannot cause M. Delcassé to fall because
Germany frowns. I would be reproached always . . . . always.”[695] The
German pressure, however, did not cease. In a telegram on May 25 Count
Tattenbach reported French assertions to the Moroccans that in the face
of the united action of the Mediterranean Powers, “who would never
suffer an interference by Germany in Mediterranean questions,” Germany
would desert the Sultan. In sending this report to Rome, on May 31, the
German Chancellor requested the Italian government to favor publicly the
collective settlement of the Moroccan question. “No matter what turn
Moroccan affairs take, Germany will follow up the consequences of the
advice which His Majesty sent to the Sultan,” he wrote. “Thus the
possibility that the Sultan will remain isolated in this difficulty need
not be considered.” The Italian Foreign Minister immediately denied
France’s right to speak of a common policy of the Mediterranean Powers,
and, as Count Bülow probably intended, he passed on the German warning
to the French government.[696]
On May 28 Count Tattenbach telegraphed the Sultan’s official rejection
of the French proposals and his approval of an international
conference.[697] Thereupon, through M. Betzold, the Chancellor warned
the French Premier, June 1, that in as much as the Sultan had accepted
the German point of view, Germany “would follow up the consequences if
France continued the policy of intimidation and violence hitherto
pursued by M. Delcassé.”[698] On June 3 Prince Radolin described the
situation to M. Dupuy, an intimate friend of M. Rouvier’s, as “very
serious.”[699] Thus the German government struck blow after blow to
force an immediate dismissal of the French Foreign Minister.[700]
On the French side, M. Delcassé remained as adamantine as the Germans.
Fearing an intention on the part of Germany to force his dismissal,
hearing of Germany’s pressure on Spain and Italy and of bellicose talk
by the German Ambassador at Rome,[701] he made a bid on May 17 for
British support. On that date M. Cambon apprised Lord Lansdowne of
Germany’s endeavor to arouse discord between Great Britain and France
“all over the world.” Although he did not regard the relations with
Germany as “profoundly dangerous,” he pictured them as serious enough to
cause him “much preoccupation.”
Lord Lansdowne wished to lend the pro-British Foreign Minister all
possible support. Late in April, for the sake of France and the Entente
Cordiale, he had run the risk of antagonizing President Roosevelt by
instructing the British Ambassador in Washington not to give him an
opportunity to mediate between Great Britain and Germany. He realized
that the President’s interference encouraged Germany and worked to the
detriment of France and Great Britain. He had therefore denied to the
President that there was any “subject of dispute” between Great Britain
and Germany, and had expressed his inability to see “why any
international complication should be created [over Morocco], unless
German Gov[ernmen]t is determined to take advantage of what was at most
a diplomatic oversight in order to make mischief or to disturb the
_status quo_, e.g. . . . ., by demanding cession of a Moorish
port.”[702] But Lord Lansdowne also sought to correct any erroneous
impression which Sir Francis Bertie’s _aide-memoire_ of April 25 may
have made. Lord Lansdowne said to M. Cambon:
The moral . . . . seemed to me to be that our two Governments should
continue to treat one another with the most absolute confidence, should
keep one another fully informed of everything which came to their
knowledge, and should, so far as possible, discuss in advance any
contingencies by which they might in the course of events find
themselves confronted. As an instance of our readiness to enter into
such timely discussions, I reminded H[is] E[xcellency] of the
communication which had recently been made to the French Gov[ernmen]t by
you [Sir Francis Bertie] at a moment when an idea prevailed that Germany
might be on the point of demanding the cession of a Moorish Port.[703]
To avoid all misunderstanding this communication was put in writing in
an exchange of notes between the British Foreign Secretary and M. Cambon
on May 24-25. When the former perceived that M. Cambon still interpreted
the British policy in the light of Sir Francis Bertie’s _aide-
memoire_,[704] he reiterated his correcting statement as follows:
I do not know that this account [of their conversation of May 17]
differs from that which you have given to M. Delcassé, but I am not sure
that I succeeded in making quite clear to you our desire that there
should be full and confidential discussion between the two
Gov[ernmen]ts, not so much in consequence of some acts of unprovoked
aggression on the part of another Power, as in anticipation of any
complications to be apprehended during the somewhat anxious period
through which we are at present passing.[705]
At some time in this crisis, the British fleet was commanded to be “in
readiness to make a descent on the German coast at short notice,”[706]
and conversations were begun between the French and British military and
naval officers looking toward active co-operation in case of war.[707]
When news arrived of the Sultan’s proposal for a conference, M. Delcassé
opposed it vigorously. At his instigation the British government on June
5 ordered Mr. Lowther, who had just arrived in Fez, to advise the Sultan
against the idea and to refuse the invitation.[708] The French Minister
also reported Mr. Taft’s remark that the American government would
probably not be favorably disposed toward a conference. Thereupon Lord
Lansdowne on June 5 added his support in trying to convince the American
government that “the proposal was unsound and should not be
entertained.”[709] To bring Spain into closer intimacy with the Entente
Cordiale, the British Foreign Secretary offered early in June to effect
an understanding with her over the Spanish interests in the
Mediterranean and elsewhere.[710]
In spite of Lord Lansdowne’s correcting statements about the British
policy, M. Delcassé apparently continued to interpret the British
communication of May 17 in the sense of Sir Francis Bertie’s _aide-
memoire_ of April 25. He was impressed by the practical identity of that
communication with the political clauses of the Franco-Russian
alliance.[711] Reassured by the British support and by the adverse
attitude of the British, Spanish, and American governments toward the
project of a conference, and believing with the British that Germany was
bluffing, he was in no mood to recede. M. Rouvier, who was receiving all
the German threats, took a different view of the situation. With some of
the other members of the cabinet, he prepared for the retirement of the
offending Minister.[712] During the visit of the King of Spain to Paris,
May 30-June 4, little could be done. But by June 3 M. Delcassé’s
resignation was anticipated in parliamentary circles.[713] On June 5 the
Chamber was thrown into excitement bordering on panic by the rumor of a
report from M. Barrère at Rome that if an Anglo-French alliance were
concluded Germany would attack France.[714] On the same day M. Rouvier
explained the gravity of the situation to President Loubet;[715] on June
6 he laid his controversy with M. Delcassé before the cabinet.
At that meeting, although well aware of his isolation, M. Delcassé
valiantly defended his policy of the past seven years, a policy which he
declared had been opposed by Germany alone.[716] He claimed that in a
very recent exchange of notes, one of which he read, France had received
from Great Britain assurance of support in case of a German attack.
Asserting the possibility of a formal alliance with Great Britain, he
urged acceptance of the British offer.[717] He proposed that the French,
British, and Spanish governments should address identical notes to the
Sultan declining the conference. He assured the cabinet that Germany
confronted by this Anglo-French-Spanish opposition with Italy neutral
would not fight. But M. Rouvier declared that the German government had
threatened war if France accepted the British offers. Turning to the
ministers of war and of navy, he asked if France were prepared for that
contingency. They both replied emphatically “No.” As M. Delcassé was not
supported by a single minister, he resigned, and M. Rouvier took over
his position. Before leaving M. Delcassé prophetically warned the
cabinet that after this abdication before the demands of Germany, that
Power would become “more insolent and more exacting than ever”; it had
not opposed his person, he said, but rather the French policy of
accords. He declared that the cabinet’s pusillanimity would give rise to
new dangers.[718]
French public opinion was almost unanimous in its approval of M.
Delcassé’s downfall. This approbation was noted by Herr von Flotow,
first secretary of the German embassy in Paris, who on June 7 reported
to his government as follows:
The history of the downfall of M. Delcassé shows that without a doubt
there is a latent under-current in France which wishes . . . . a
satisfactory understanding with Germany. It is after all significant
that in the entire press of all parties there is hardly a paper which
does not censure the anti-German policy of M. Delcassé. The second
interesting point in the history of the past few days is the fact that
in spite of the continued and almost importunate offers of English aid,
. . . . French public opinion has never shown a real inclination to
accept this support. Wherever one has opportunity here . . . . to
observe public feeling, one meets the view that England is only
endeavoring to engage the French power for her differences with Germany,
and that in case of a crisis France would have to pull the English
chestnuts out of the German fire.[719]
Great Britain was disgusted. The British government had made strenuous
endeavor to save M. Delcassé, for it was certain of his loyalty to the
entente, whereas it was dubious of the more pro-German M. Rouvier. It
had intimated its willingness to oppose by force the German
aggression;[720] but so far had met with no encouragement.
Delcassé’s dismissal or resignation under pressure from the German
Government [stated Mr. Balfour to King Edward on June 8] displayed a
weakness on the part of France which indicated that she could not at
present be counted on as an effective force in international politics.
She could no longer be trusted not to yield to threats at the crucial
moment of a negotiation. If, therefore, Germany is really desirous of
obtaining a port on the coast of Morocco, and if such a proceeding be a
menace to our interests, it must be to other means than French
assistance that we must look for our protection.[721]
In spite of M. Rouvier’s public assertion, June 6, that his policy
toward the Anglo-French understanding would remain the same as
before,[722] the Entente Cordiale had received a hard blow.
While expressing satisfaction that France had repudiated the anti-German
Minister, the German press, under official guidance,[723] kept its
discussion of the affair within the bounds of propriety. But German
obtuseness to the feelings of other nations was manifested when on the
day of M. Delcassé’s fall the German Emperor made Count Bülow a prince.
Thus, the first period of the crisis was closed. Germany had gained her
objective in winning the Sultan’s acceptance of the project of a
conference and in overthrowing M. Delcassé. While playing with war, the
German government had had no desire to start one, and, gauging correctly
French sentiment toward M. Delcassé and war, it had achieved success in
Paris merely by a liberal use of threats. In the Moroccan affair the
German foreign office had reached the peak of its power. But it had
aroused so many complications that the crisis continued as acutely as
before.
[Footnote 597: _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 516.]
[Footnote 598: Radolin to F. O., April 9, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 317, No.
6612; Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 330 ff., No. 6622.
After having talked with President Loubet early in April, Edward VII
wrote to Lansdowne as follows: “President Loubet was most amiable . . .
. but I could see from his manner that he considers the German conduct
at Tangier, if not a direct menace to France, at any rate a covert
insult” (Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 341). The Schnäbele affair brought
France and Germany almost to war in 1887.]
[Footnote 599: Kühlmann to Bülow, Nov. 9, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 232 ff., No.
6536; Chérisey to Delcassé, Feb. 11, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 196, No. 225;
Delcassé to Bihourd, Feb. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 196 f., No. 226; Bihourd to
Delcassé, Feb. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 197 f., No. 227; Lowther to Lansdowne,
April 26, 1905, _B.D._, III, 67, No. 81.]
[Footnote 600: Nicolson to Lansdowne, D. Feb. 12, 1905, R. March 4,
1905, _B.D._, III, 59, No. 66.]
[Footnote 601: Bertie to Lansdowne, March 22, 1905, _ibid._, 60, No. 67.
For the uncertainty about the Emperor’s proposed action see Lascelles to
Lansdowne, March 23, 1905, _ibid._, 61, No. 69; Nicolson to Lansdowne,
March 23, 1905, _ibid._, 62, No. 70.]
[Footnote 602: Delcassé stated to Bertie, June 10, that “his policy had
been to be ready to make commercial concessions to Germany if she were
willing to discuss with the French Government the question of Morocco,
but not to yield anything politically or territorially” (Bertie to
Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 78, No. 96).]
[Footnote 603: Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. 206 f., 231;
Imperial Foreign Office, _Reports of the Belgian Representatives in
Berlin, London, and Paris to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in
Brussels, 1905-1914. European Politics during the Decade before the War
as Described by the Belgian Diplomatists_ (. . . ., 1915), No. 3
(hereafter cited as _Belg. Docs., 1905-1914_); _Quest. dipl. et col._,
XIX, 517; Henry Wickham Steed, _Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922: A
Personal Narrative_ (London, 1924), I, 229. Delcassé also made strenuous
efforts during the succeeding weeks to mediate peace between Japan and
Russia so that the latter Power could resume its obligations as France’s
ally. See Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 345, No. 6635;
Lansdowne to MacDonald, April 19, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 76 f., No. 68;
Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, pp. 176 f.]
[Footnote 604: _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._ (Sénat, March 31,
1905), pp. 540 f.]
[Footnote 605: Articles in _Temps_ of April 3, and in the _Dépêche de
Toulouse_ of April 10. Mévil, the official apologist for Delcassé,
asserts that the latter article was based on the “best” information (pp.
218 ff.).]
[Footnote 606: By April 13 the Sultan had expressed his general approval
of the French proposals, and the details for military reorganization in
six of the Moroccan towns were ready for final formulation and signature
(Mévil, p. 200 n.; Vassel to Tattenbach, April 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 339
ff., No. 6631; and the various dispatches from Saint-René Taillandier to
Delcassé during Feb., March, April, 1905, in _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos.
228-31, 233, 240, 243, 248, 266).]
[Footnote 607: Delcassé instructed the Minister to make the following
statement to the Sultan: “We cannot conceive that, changing from the way
of accords which he [the Sultan] has followed for several years, he will
decide to assume an attitude which will oblige us to consider strict
right alone as the basis of our relation with him” (Delcassé to Saint-
René Taillandier, April 9, 1905, _ibid._, 208, No. 239).]
[Footnote 608: Egerton to Lansdowne, April 12, 1905, _B.D._, III, 66,
No. 78. The French government was afraid that Spain would not loyally
uphold their agreement if some other Power intervened in Morocco
(Nicolson to Lansdowne, Feb. 12, 1905, _ibid._, 59, No. 66). But with M.
Villa-Urrutia at the foreign office, Spain remained entirely on the
French side (Nicolson to Lansdowne, April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 66, No.
79).]
[Footnote 609: On March 22 Bihourd advised Delcassé to “establish by an
exchange of notes the bearing of the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish
accords on the commercial and industrial interests of Germany,” adding
that “until then we shall remain under the menace, very clearly
formulated by the German press, of some inopportune surprise” (Bihourd
to Delcassé, March 22, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 202 f., No. 232). On March
28 an article by André Tardieu, a journalist with close governmental
connections, stated that the French Foreign Minister would give
satisfaction to Germany if she wished it on the subject of Morocco,
“provided it is a question solely of commercial interests” (Flotow to F.
O., March 28, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 282 f., No. 6584). On April 4 Billy, a
press writer in the French foreign office, sounded Theodor Wolff, Paris
correspondent for the _Berliner Tageblatt_, upon how the German
government would receive a French overture (_ibid._, p. 305 n.). On
April 7 Hedeman, London correspondent of _Matin_, talked with Hammann to
the same effect (memo. by Hammann, April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 310 ff., Nos.
6608 f.).]
[Footnote 610: Quoted in _Quest. dipl et col._, XIX, 511 f.]
[Footnote 611: Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 331, No.
6622.]
[Footnote 612: Radolin to F. O., April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 328 ff., No.
6621; Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 330 ff., No. 6622;
Mévil, pp. 238 ff.; Delcassé to Bihourd, April 14, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_,
pp. 211 f., No. 244; Bihourd to Delcassé, April 18 and 25, 1905,
_ibid._, 214, Nos. 246 f.; memo. by Mühlberg, April 19, 1905, _G.P._,
XX, 332 f., No. 6623. Saint-René Taillandier’s denial that he had ever
claimed to have a mandate of Europe must be balanced against the
Sultan’s personal assertion that he had claimed it. The truth would seem
to be that the French Minister had sought to make more out of France’s
international accords over Morocco than the facts justified by speaking
vaguely and by not clearing up misunderstandings in the Sultan’s mind
(_L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 214, 231, 238, 263; _G.P._, XX, Nos. 6621, 6631,
6658, 6662, 6551 n.; _Aktenstücke über Marokko, 1905_, Nos. 1, 3). Cf.
the report from the Belgian Minister at Paris, Dec. 19, 1905, _Zur
europ. Politik_, II, 96.]
[Footnote 613: Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 67,
No. 80.]
[Footnote 614: Michon, _L’alliance franco-russe 1891-1917_, pp. 117 ff.]
[Footnote 615: As already shown, the Russian defeat at Mukden had
nothing to do with the change of Germany’s policy.]
[Footnote 616: _Journal officiel. Debats parlem._ (Chambre, April 19,
1905), pp. 1543 ff. Cf. Bertie’s estimate on April 25: “The general
feeling in Paris is that the chief object which the German Emperor has
had in view in his recent proceedings is to show to the French people
that an understanding with England is of little value to them and that
they had much better come to an agreement with Germany. To this end ‘il
fait la guerre à l’Angleterre sur le dos de la France’ and the French
Public realizing that the Emperor’s wrath is against England for
enabling France to carry out her Morocco policy and not against France
for taking advantage of her agreement with England feel that if they
keep their heads nothing really serious will come of His Majesty’s ill
temper which they believe is not entirely shared by the German
Government and still less so by the German people” (Bertie to Lansdowne,
April 25, 1905, _B.D._, III, 75, No. 93).]
[Footnote 617: Mévil, pp. 257 ff.]
[Footnote 618: Memo. by Holstein, April 4, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 304, No.
6601. Olmütz signified the humiliation of Prussia by Austria in 1850;
Fashoda, that of France by Great Britain in 1898.]
[Footnote 619: Memo. by Holstein, April 3, 1905, _ibid._, 297 ff., No.
6597.]
[Footnote 620: The suggestion of a conference was first made by Kühlmann
in a dispatch of March 2 (_ibid._, p. 293 n.). On March 27 Bülow still
thought it possible of execution only in case Great Britain accepted it
(Bülow to Kühlmann, March 27, 1905, _ibid._, 293 f., No. 6591). After
the Emperor’s visit, however, he accepted the proposal. In Feb., 1904,
Lascelles had reported a conversation with Bülow in which the latter had
opposed calling a conference on the Macedonian question, arguing as
follows: “A Congress was excellent at the end of a war when both
belligerents were more or less exhausted and desired peace, but it was a
most dangerous thing at any other time, and would only accentuate more
strongly any difference of opinion which might exist and thus cause
greater complications, unless indeed the Great Powers should have
decided beforehand exactly what was to be done, and should have appealed
to the Congress, to give the sanction of Europe to the decisions they
had already taken” (Lascelles to Lansdowne, Feb. 26, 1904, _B.D._, V,
72). A year later Bülow had apparently forgotten this very accurate
judgment. Or possibly he saw no other way out, and faced the facts with
his usual optimism.]
[Footnote 621: In a memorandum by Hammann on April 7, this statement
appeared: “Naturally the result would be greater if there followed from
a conference a breach in the Anglo-French accord over Morocco.” Bülow’s
minute to that assertion was: “We do not desire that at all, or at least
we should in no instance show such an aim. We only wish to preserve our
rights in Morocco” (_ibid._, XX, 312 f., No. 6609; cf. Chirol, _Fifty
Years in a Changing World_, p. 300).]
[Footnote 622: When the _Nowoje Wremja_ denounced the German action
Bülow, on March 27, protested strongly to Lamsdorff against this anti-
German attitude. Russia was expected to remain neutral in this affair,
he declared (Bülow to Alvensleben, March 27, _G.P._, XX, 277 f., No.
6577).]
[Footnote 623: Those three had criticized the Anglo-French accord.]
[Footnote 624: The signatory Powers were those which had participated in
the conference of Madrid in 1880 over Moroccan affairs.]
[Footnote 625: Quoted from a dispatch from Bülow to William II, April 4,
1905, _ibid._, 303, No. 6599; and from a memo. by Holstein, April 4,
1905, _ibid._, 304 f., No. 6601.]
[Footnote 626: Memo. by Hammann, April 3, 1905, _ibid._, 300 f., No.
6598.]
[Footnote 627: Memo. by Hammann, April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 311 f., No.
6609.]
[Footnote 628: On April 8 Bülow sent Hammann the following instructions
for directing the press: “All criticism and attacks should, under the
greatest possible consideration for the French national feeling, be
directed against the systematically anti-German, insolent, and inept
policy of Delcassé” (minute by Bülow to a memo. by Hammann, April 7,
1905, _ibid._, 313, No. 6609). On April 4 he had issued instructions to
restrain the German press from war with the British press (Mühlberg to
Metternich, April 4, 1905, _ibid._, 603 and note, No. 6839).]
[Footnote 629: That Holstein wished to turn loose a _Kriegsfanfare_, as
Hammann later asserted, seems unlikely, for German policy at that time
was not bellicose. But Holstein did propose to exert great pressure by
vigorous words and threats, and his program might very likely have had
the result which Hammann foresaw. On this controversy between the two
men see Hammann, _Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit_, pp. 35 f.; Otto
Hammann, _Der neue Kurs. Erinnerungen_ (Berlin, 1918), pp. 104 ff.;
Hammann, _Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, pp. 210 f.; memo. by
Holstein, April 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 297 ff., No. 6597; memo. by
Hammann, April 3, 1905, _ibid._, 300 f., No. 6598; memo. by Holstein,
April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 308 f., No. 6606; memo. by Hammann, April 7,
1905, _ibid._, 309 f., No. 6607.]
[Footnote 630: Durand to Lansdowne, March, 1905, quoted in Brigadier
General Sir Percy Sykes, _The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand: A
Biography_ (London, 1926), p. 280; Spring Rice to Roosevelt, undated
though written in the first half of Jan., 1905, quoted in Dennett, pp.
152 f.; Sternburg to Bülow, Feb. 10, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 573 ff., No.
6288; Sternburg to F. O., March 7, 1905, _ibid._, 580 f., No. 6293;
Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 576 ff., No. 6290; and
others in _ibid._, chap. cxxxix; Dennett, pp. 45, 73 ff.; Dennis,
_Adventures in American Diplomacy_, p. 393; Joseph B. Bishop, _Theodore
Roosevelt and His Times_ (New York, 1920), I, 378 f., 468 f., 473;
Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 406
ff., and chap. xiii.]
[Footnote 631: Sternburg to Bülow, Feb. 10, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 573 f.,
No. 6288; Sternburg to F. O., March 7, 1905, _ibid._, 580 f., No. 6293.]
[Footnote 632: So Roosevelt asserted to Sternburg. See Sternburg to F.
O., April 1, 1905, _ibid._, 590, No. 6300; Sykes, p. 280; Dennis, pp.
397 f.; Gwynn, Vol. I, chap. xiii; Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, p. 322.]
[Footnote 633: On March 21 Roosevelt declared to Sternburg: “My earnest
wish is that we use as much as possible the four years which stand
before me in office to improve the relations between our countries. I
believe in the German people” (Sternburg to F. O., March 21, 1905,
_G.P._, XIX, 583, No. 6295).]
[Footnote 634: Bülow to Sternburg, April 3, 1905, _ibid._, 592 ff., No.
6302; Bishop, I, 468 f.]
[Footnote 635: Bishop, I, 469.]
[Footnote 636: See below.]
[Footnote 637: In the absence of a regular minister at Tangier,
Tattenbach had remained there after the Emperor’s visit. See Tattenbach
to F. O., April 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 313 f., No. 6610; Bülow to
Tattenbach, April 9, 1905, _ibid._, 315 f., No. 6611. O’Conor, British
ambassador at Constantinople, reported to Lansdowne, May 1, 1905, that
Germany was trying to induce the Sultan to send a mission to Morocco
with a view to establishing closer relations. The Sultan eventually
refused. On Feb. 12, 1906, O’Conor was able to state why. The Sultan had
sent secret emissaries to Morocco, but the Sultan of Morocco became
suspicious and refused either to send a formal mission to Constantinople
or to receive one thence. O’Conor also heard that the Sultan had written
to Abd-el-Aziz recommending the German Emperor as the friend and
protector of Islam whose advice was well worth following. See O’Conor to
Grey, Feb. 12, 1906, _B.D._, III, 248, No. 277. Tardieu states that the
Sultan’s letters to his Moorish colleague were written in Feb.-March,
1906 (_La Conf. d’Algés_, p. 259 n.). Nothing further is known of this
affair.]
[Footnote 638: No. 6612; Bülow to Alvensleben, March 27, 1905, _ibid._,
277 f., No. 6577.]
[Footnote 639: Radowitz to F. O., April 12, 1905, _ibid._, 326 f. and
note, No. 6619; Mousset, _La politica exterior de España, 1873-1918_, p.
165.]
[Footnote 640: Bülow to Monts, April 3, 11, 12, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 295
f., No. 6594; 318 ff., No. 6613; 322 f., No. 6616; Monts to F. O., April
12, 1905, _ibid._, 324 ff. and notes, Nos. 6617 f. Tittoni, the Italian
foreign minister, had to feel his way carefully. On April 14 he sounded
the Spanish government on its attitude, and was informed that Spain
would remain loyal to her agreement with France and would accept the
conference only if France and Great Britain did (Nicolson to Lansdowne,
April 14, 1905, _B.D._, III, 66, No. 79).]
[Footnote 641: Bülow to Metternich, April 11, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 605 ff.,
No. 6843; Metternich to F. O., April 19, 1905, _ibid._, 608 f., No.
6845. On April 10, however, Radolin reported a statement by Eckardstein,
which he himself seemed to think correct, to the effect that “in case of
a serious Franco-German conflict England would undoubtedly stand
actively on the French side and would even advance with enthusiasm
against Germany” (_ibid._, 607 f., No. 6844).]
[Footnote 642: By that answer Bülow aimed to show the French government
that “we do not consider separate Franco-German negotiations as adequate
to the situation.” See Radolin to F. O., April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 328
ff., No. 6621; memo. by Mühlberg, April 19, 1905, _ibid._, 332 f., No.
6623; Bülow to Tattenbach, April 18, 1905, _ibid._, 333 f. and note, No.
6624.]
[Footnote 643: Bülow to Tattenbach, April 18, 1905, _ibid._, 333 f., No.
6624; Tattenbach to F. O., April 21, 1905, _ibid._, 335, No. 6625; Bülow
to Tattenbach, April 22, 1905, _ibid._, 336 f., No. 6626; Tattenbach to
F. O., April 23, 1905, _ibid._, 337 f., No. 6627; Bülow to Tattenbach,
April 24, 1905, _ibid._, 338, No. 6628.]
[Footnote 644: On April 3 Balfour repeated his denial in the House of
Commons of the likelihood of a German attack.]
[Footnote 645: Lee, II, 340.]
[Footnote 646: Newton, p. 334.]
[Footnote 647: Radolin to F. O., April 6, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 311, No.
6608.]
[Footnote 648: Mühlberg to Metternich, April 4, 1905, _ibid._, 604, No.
6840; Metternich to Bülow, April 6, 1905, _ibid._, 604, No. 6841; memo.
by Hammann, April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 311, No. 6608.]
[Footnote 649: Metternich to Bülow, March 28, April 6, 1905, _ibid._,
601 ff., Nos. 6837, 6841.]
[Footnote 650: Metternich to Bülow, March 28, 1905, _ibid._, 602, No.
6837; Kühlmann to Bülow, March 19, 1905, _ibid._, 261 f., No. 6562;
Lascelles to Lansdowne, March 23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 61, No. 69.]
[Footnote 651: April 9, 1904 (Newton, p. 334).]
[Footnote 652: Viscount Grey of Falloden, _Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916_
(New York, 1925), I, 115.]
[Footnote 653: Lee, II, 342.]
[Footnote 654: Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 67,
No. 80; Lansdowne to Bertie, April 24, 1905, _ibid._, p. 73.]
[Footnote 655: Tattenbach to F. O., April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 348, No.
6639.]
[Footnote 656: Lansdowne to Bertie, April 22, 1905, _B.D._, III, 72 f.,
No. 90; and following documents; Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_,
II, 248; Grey, I, 106 f.]
[Footnote 657: Bertie to Lansdowne, April 25, 1905, _B.D._, III, 74 f.,
Nos. 92 f.]
[Footnote 658: The offer was so stated by Monts (Monts to F. O., May 2,
1905, _G.P._, XX, 362, No. 6648).]
[Footnote 659: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, April 26, 1905,
_L.j., 1901-5_, 215, No. 248; Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, May 3,
1905, _ibid._, 217, No. 251; Bourgeois et Pagès, _Les origines et les
responsabilités de la grande guerre_, p. 309. Ben Sliman was Moroccan
minister of foreign affairs.]
[Footnote 660: On Rouvier see Mévil, pp. 253 ff.; Victor Bérard, _La
France et Guillaume II_ (Paris, 1907), p. 296; Radolin to F. O., April
27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 345, No. 6635; Radolin to Bülow, May 8, 1905,
_ibid._, 373 f., No. 6657. Rouvier’s policy was certainly more in
keeping with French opinion.]
[Footnote 661: Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, _ibid._, 344 f., No.
6635. To Rouvier’s assertion that “France would do everything necessary
to live on the best terms with Germany” Bülow commented as follows:
“Then the French Government should cease its efforts to isolate us, to
break up the Triple Alliance, to incite England against us” (Bülow’s
minute to the foregoing dispatch).]
[Footnote 662: Radolin to F. O., April 27 and 28, 1905, _ibid._, 346,
No. 6636; 348 f., No. 6640.]
[Footnote 663: Radolin to Bülow, April 25, 1905, _ibid._, 615, No.
6847.]
[Footnote 664: Tattenbach to F. O., April 23, 24, 25, 1905, _ibid._, 337
f., No. 6627; 339, No. 6629; 341, No. 6632; Vassel to Tattenbach, April
21, 1905, _ibid._, 339 ff., No. 6631.]
[Footnote 665: Bishop, I, 469 ff.; Sternburg to F. O., April 25, 1905,
_G.P._, XX, 342, No. 6633.]
[Footnote 666: Bülow to Sternburg, April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 342, No.
6634.]
[Footnote 667: Bülow to Radolin, April 28, 29, 1905, _ibid._, 346 f.,
No. 6637; 349 f., No. 6641.]
[Footnote 668: Holstein to Mühlberg, April 24, 1905, _ibid._, 339, No.
6630; Bülow to Sternburg, April 27, 1905, _ibid._, 342 ff., No. 6634.]
[Footnote 669: Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 330 ff., No.
6622. Monts also regarded Delcassé’s offer through Luzzati as signifying
victory for Germany in her Moroccan campaign and as giving the
opportunity “for a definitive friendly agreement with France” (Monts to
F. O., May 2, 1905, _ibid._, 362, No. 6648).]
[Footnote 670: Tattenbach had on the previous day talked to Lowther,
British minister at Tangier, and had found him strongly opposed to a
conference and in favor of a direct Franco-German settlement (Tattenbach
to F. O., April 29, 1905, _ibid._, 251 f., No. 6642).]
[Footnote 671: Bülow to Tattenbach, April 30, 1905, _ibid._, 352, No.
6643.]
[Footnote 672: The article was by Professor Schiemann, who was known to
be in close touch with the German government (reprinted in Schiemann,
_Deutschland und die grosse Politik 1905_, pp. 110 f.).]
[Footnote 673: Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 347, No.
6638; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 576 ff.]
[Footnote 674: Bihourd to Delcassé, April 28, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 215,
No. 249.]
[Footnote 675: Rouvier also assured Radolin that “he disapproved of much
that had happened” and that he himself had taken over the general
control of foreign affairs. It had cost him some effort to save Delcassé
in the Chamber, he said, but he had thought it wiser to do so (Radolin
to Bülow, April 30, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 360 ff., No. 6647).]
[Footnote 676: Radolin to Bülow, May 1, 1905, _ibid._, 355 ff., No.
6645; Bülow to Radolin, May 1, 1905, _ibid._, 353 f., No. 6644.]
[Footnote 677: Eckardstein was informed to this effect on May 4, 1905,
by Rouvier’s intimate friend, Armand Levy, a Parisian financier
(Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, III,
106; Lee, II, 342).]
[Footnote 678: Radolin to Bülow, May 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 616 f., No.
6848. The King may have put this question to Radolin at the desire of
Delcassé, who was complaining of Germany’s lack of response (Bertie to
Lansdowne, April 27, 1905, _B.D._, III, 68, No. 84). On May 11, 1905,
Lansdowne wrote to Knollys, King Edward’s private secretary, as follows:
“The King’s Mediterranean tour left matters in excellent shape so far as
we are concerned” (Lee, II, 342).]
[Footnote 679: _Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, No. 4.]
[Footnote 680: Wilhelm Betzold was an international financier with wide
political connections (Eckardstein, I, 243 ff.). The instructions were
given to Eckardstein, May 4, by Armand Levy, like Betzold, an intimate
friend of Rouvier, just after an interview between the two and the
Premier, Levy had made a note of the various points which he now laid
before Eckardstein, explaining that naturally Rouvier could not speak
directly to him of these delicate affairs but adding that his statements
were “rigorously exact” (Eckardstein, III, 100 ff.). Only Eckardstein’s
account of the interview with Bülow contains anything about the Moroccan
proposal, but there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of his statement
(see also Prince Lichnowsky, _My Mission to London, 1912-1914_ [London,
1918], p. 3).]
[Footnote 681: Memo. by Holstein, May 2, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 357 ff., No.
6646. Paul von Schwabach’s account of arranging the interview for
Betzold is given in _Berliner Tageblatt_, March 21, 1922. See also Bülow
to F. O., May 5 and 6, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 368 ff., Nos. 6652 f.]
[Footnote 682: On May 2 the Chancellor also refused to consider
Delcassé’s offer through Luzzati; and when a few days later he heard
that Barrère wished to be sent to Berlin to arrange affairs, he
immediately advised Rouvier that he would not be received. See Bülow to
Monts, May 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 363 f., No. 6649; Radolin to Holstein,
May 8, 1905, _ibid._, p. 372 n.; Bülow to Radolin, May 9, 1905, _ibid._,
372, No. 6656.]
[Footnote 683: Bülow to Radolin, May 4, 1905, _ibid._, 366 f., No. 6650;
Radolin to F. O., May 8, 1905, _ibid._, 371 f., No. 6655.]
[Footnote 684: The British and the Russian governments were also
supporting Delcassé. See Radolin to Bülow, May 8, 1905, _ibid._, 373
ff., No. 6657 f.; Betzold to Eckardstein, May 9, 1905, quoted in
Eckardstein, III, 204.]
[Footnote 685: Sternburg to F. O., June 2, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 607, No.
6311, Bülow’s minute.]
[Footnote 686: Radolin to Bülow, May 13 and 16, 1905, _ibid._, 376 f.,
No. 6659; 378 f., No. 6661.]
[Footnote 687: So related by the Spanish Foreign Minister to Nicolson
(Nicolson to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, _B.D._, III, 70 f., No. 87).
Although there is no account of the conversation in _G.P._, the language
is entirely in keeping with German policy. The episode referred to the
possible departure of Spain’s new minister in Morocco to Fez.]
[Footnote 688: So reported by Egerton to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905,
_ibid._, 71, No. 88. Cf. Bülow to Monts, May 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 363
f., No. 6649; Bülow to F. O., May 6, 1905, _ibid._, 368, No. 6651.]
[Footnote 689: Bülow to Sternburg, April 27, May 10 and 16, 1905,
_ibid._, 342 ff., No. 6634; 620 ff., No. 6851; XIX, 600 ff., No. 6306;
Bishop, I, 469 f.]
[Footnote 690: _Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt
and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918_ (New York, 1925), II, 123. See also
Dennett, pp. 88 ff.]
[Footnote 691: The President’s statements were so formulated by
Sternburg. See Sternburg to F. O., May 13 and 19, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 622
f., No. 6852; _ibid._, XIX, 603 f., No. 6308; Dennett, pp. 184 f., 88
ff., 75 f.]
[Footnote 692: Tattenbach to F. O., May 15, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 379 f.,
No. 6662.]
[Footnote 693: Tattenbach’s version of the threat was as follows: “The
French Government would consider it an injury to France’s interests if
the French proposals for reform were submitted for consideration to the
signatory Powers. No Power possessed the right to intervene in the
Moroccan affair, especially in the frontier question. . . . . The French
Government would continue to watch sharply the affairs in Morocco, and
reserved the right to act according to circumstances.” See Tattenbach to
F. O., May 17, 1905, _ibid._, 380, No. 6663. Cf. with the original
threat quoted above. See also Tattenbach to F. O., May 31, 1905,
_ibid._, 399 f., No. 6676.]
[Footnote 694: Bülow to Radolin, May 22, 1905, _ibid._, 382 f., No.
6665.]
[Footnote 695: Miquel was chosen for this work because he was just being
transferred to St. Petersburg. See Bülow to Radolin, May 30, 1905,
_ibid._, 388 ff., No. 6669; memo. by Miquel, May 30 and 31, 1905,
_ibid._, 393 ff., Nos. 6674 f.]
[Footnote 696: Bülow to Monts, May 31, 1905, _ibid._, 390 f., No. 6670,
and note citing a dispatch from Monts of June 2, 1905; Mévil, p. 272.
Egerton was informed by Barrère that Monts had said to Tittoni that “if
the French Minister maintained his threat of military measures against
the Sultan of Morocco, a German army would cross the French frontier”
(Egerton to Lansdowne, June 13, 1905, _B.D._, III, 95, No. 122).]
[Footnote 697: Tattenbach to F. O., May 28, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 392, No.
6672.]
[Footnote 698: Bülow to Radolin, June 1, 1905, _ibid._, 392 f., No.
6673; Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905, _ibid._, 407, No. 6685.]
[Footnote 699: Radolin to F. O., June 3, 1905, _ibid._, 401, No. 6678.]
[Footnote 700: The _Gaulois_ published articles on June 9 and 17, 1905,
asserting that Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck had also been sent by the
German government to Paris about June 1 to warn Rouvier that Delcassé
must be dismissed (Mévil, pp. 273 ff.; Bourgeois et Pagès, p. 310). The
editors of _G.P._ state that this story is “exaggerated”; Donnersmarck
was mentioned only once in the documents, they assert—in a dispatch from
Radolin on June 17, 1905, describing the assertions of Donnersmarck
given in _Gaulois_ as apocryphal (_G.P._, XX, 390 n.). According to
Eckardstein, Rouvier declared to him on May 4 that some time previously
Donnersmarck had asserted to him, apparently at Bülow’s request, that
there were only two possibilities, a Franco-German alliance or war. On
the other hand, Eckardstein saw Donnersmarck in Berlin on June 6 and
found him eager for news from London and Paris (Eckardstein, III, 103
f., 127 f.). It seems clear that Donnersmarck’s assertions, whatever
they were, were made on his own responsibility; that, as the editors of
_G.P._ state, Bülow issued his warnings directly to Rouvier (_G.P._, XX,
390 n.).]
[Footnote 701: Nicolson to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, _B.D._, III, 70 f.,
No. 87; Egerton to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, _ibid._, 71, No. 88;
Lansdowne to Bertie, May 3, 1905, _ibid._, 69 f., No. 86.]
[Footnote 702: Durand to Lansdowne, April 26, 1905, _ibid._, 67 f., No.
82; Lansdowne to Durand, April 27, 1905, _ibid._, 68, No. 83. Durand did
not follow that line exactly. He left the impression with Roosevelt that
the Anglo-German opposition was bitter, but that nevertheless Great
Britain did not want Roosevelt interfering—thus letting the latter think
that Great Britain was more bellicose than she was (see above). One
reason for the British government’s slowness about helping Roosevelt
mediate between Russia and Japan was, no doubt, that it wished to
exclude all opportunity for the President to mediate between Great
Britain and Germany. On April 26 Spring Rice asked Roosevelt not to
support the idea of a conference (Gwynn, I, 469).]
[Footnote 703: Lansdowne added: “I had heard fears expressed that, in
order to put an end to a state of things which could not fail to be
highly inconvenient to them, the French Government might be induced to
purchase the acquiescence of Germany by concessions of a kind which we
were not likely to regard with favour, in other parts of the world. I
had myself no such misgivings, and felt convinced that each side might
continue to rely upon being treated with absolute frankness by the
other. His Excellency [M. Cambon] expressed his entire concurrence in
what I had said.” See Lansdowne to Bertie, May 17, 1905, _B.D._, III,
76, No. 94; Spender, II, 248; _Cambridge History of British Foreign
Policy_, III, 342 f.]
[Footnote 704: “During our last conversation about Morocco you . . . .
added that . . . . if circumstances demanded it, if for example we had
serious reasons to believe in an unjustified aggression on the part of a
certain Power, the British Government would be entirely ready to concert
with the French Government on the measures to take” (Cambon to
Lansdowne, May 24, 1905, _B.D._, III, 77, No. 95, inclosure).]
[Footnote 705: Lansdowne to Cambon, May 25, 1905, _ibid._, 77 f., No.
95, and inclosure.]
[Footnote 706: Bradford, _Life of Wilson_, p. 199. Nothing more was
heard of this order, which probably came from Sir John Fisher. Fisher
was in favor of “Copenhagening” the German fleet and also of landing
soldiers in North Germany in case of a war (_Memories_; Newton, pp. 334
f.). In 1922, Lord Sanderson wrote as follows concerning the events of
this time: “There were no doubt preparations by our military authorities
for defending Belgium in case of an attack by Germany on France through
Belgian territory, and these preparations must have been known to the
French military attaché in London. There was also a good deal of loose
talk in naval circles and some high quarters of a possible expedition to
Schleswig in the possible event of war. I do not believe such a measure
was ever seriously entertained, and I looked upon the report as put
about for the purpose of a warning” (Sanderson to Temperley, Aug. 17,
1922, _B.D._, III, 87, No. 105).]
[Footnote 707: Grey, I, 74. The British press supported the French
loyally for the sake of maintaining the balance of power. See O.
Eltzbacher, “The Balance of Power in Europe,” _Nineteenth Century and
After_ (May, 1905); Steed, I, 230 ff. It is difficult to state exactly
what were the British motives for supporting France so whole-heartedly
in this crisis. One has to deduce them from acts, for, unlike the
Germans, the directors of the British policy did not write down their
reasons. As to King Edward’s view of the international situation,
especially of the German danger, see Spring Rice to Lansdowne, D. May 7,
1905, R. May 13, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 77 f., No. 69, and King Edward’s
minute thereto. On July 10 Spring Rice, in a memo. written after talking
with Lansdowne, stated that British policy aimed at maintaining the
balance of power (Gwynn, I, 476).]
[Footnote 708: Tattenbach to F. O., May 31, June 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX,
399, No. 6676; 400, No. 6677; Metternich to F. O., June 8, 1905,
_ibid._, 422, No. 6697; Lowther to Lansdowne, D. May 31, 1905, R. June
3, 1905, _B.D._, III, 88, No. 106; Lansdowne to Bertie, June 1 and 5,
1905, _ibid._, 88, No. 107; 89, No. 109; Lansdowne to Lowther, June 5,
1905, _ibid._, 89, No. 108.]
[Footnote 709: Lansdowne to Bertie, June 5, 1905, _ibid._, 89, No. 109;
Lansdowne to Durand, June 5, 1905, _ibid._, 90, No. 110.]
[Footnote 710: Nicolson to Lansdowne, June 29, 1905, _ibid._, 109, No.
136. The editors of _B.D._ promise to publish more information about
this offer in a later volume.]
[Footnote 711: That treaty read in part as follows: “The two Governments
declare that they will take counsel together upon every question of a
nature to jeopardize the general peace; in case that peace should be
threatened with an aggression, the two parties undertake to reach an
understanding on the measures whose immediate and simultaneous adoption
would be imposed upon the two Governments by the realization of this
eventuality.” See _Livre jaune: L’alliance franco-russe_, p. 16, No. 17,
annexe; Pribram, _The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary_, II, 213;
Bernadotte E. Schmitt, “Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1902-1914,”
_American Historical Review_, XXIX, 459 f.]
[Footnote 712: Thayer, _The Life and Letters of John Hay_, II, 404 f.;
Eckardstein, III, 115 ff.; Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905, _G.P._, XX,
497 ff., No. 6685; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _B.D._, III, 78,
No. 96, recounting a conversation with Delcassé on that date.]
[Footnote 713: Radolin to F. O., June 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 400 f., No.
6678.]
[Footnote 714: Delcassé’s formal denial of the rumor had no effect. See
Mévil, pp. 284 f.; Flotow to Bülow, June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 406, No.
6684.]
[Footnote 715: Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905, _ibid._, 407 ff., No.
6685; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 770.]
[Footnote 716: Delcassé informed Bertie, June 10, that the Spanish
Foreign Minister “had told him that he thought that Spain, France and
England, should reply to the Government of Morocco in identic terms
declining the proposal” (Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _B.D._,
III, 78, No. 96).]
[Footnote 717: The report spread in 1905 that at the French cabinet
meeting on June 6 Delcassé had stated that the British government had
offered an alliance to France. Lansdowne and Sanderson denied to the
German government that Great Britain had ever done so. See Metternich to
F. O., June 16, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 630 ff., No. 6858; Metternich to F.
O., June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 635 ff., No. 6860; see also _B.D._, III, 87,
No. 105; Metternich to F. O., Oct. 9, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 663 f., No.
6873. According to Mévil, the official apologist for Delcassé, just
before the arrival of the King of Spain in Paris on May 30, the British
government assured Delcassé that “the British military forces were ready
to march with us [France] against Germany if that Power attacked us.
Moreover, the principle of defensive co-operation once admitted, the
English Government declared itself ready to sign in the shortest time an
accord which would definitely fix that co-operation” (Mévil, p. 268). In
a letter of March 20, 1922, Delcassé wrote as follows: “From the Entente
it was possible for us in 1905 to proceed to a formal alliance with
England. . . . . On June 6th the British offer of assistance had been
only forty-eight hours in my possession” (quoted in the _London Times_,
March 27, 1922). In connection with the Grey-Cambon correspondence of
1912, Poincaré has written: “Thus to make a joint study of the situation
was the sole engagement which was made [in that correspondence]. In
communicating to me the result obtained, M. Paul Cambon wrote me that at
the time of Lord Lansdowne an entente of that kind would have been only
a beginning. Now, however, it was the last word for the Liberal cabinet.
The forced resignation of M. Delcassé had perhaps made us lose in 1905,
stated M. Cambon, the opportunity for a real alliance with England. All
that we were able to obtain today was this engagement to confer in the
presence of danger and this hypothetical approval of the programs drawn
up by the general staff.” See also J. A. Farrer, _England under Edward
VII_ (London, 1922), pp. 127 f.; Mévil, pp. 269 f.; _G.P._, XX, 632 n.,
664 n.; Raymond Poincaré, _Au service de la France. Neuf années de
souvenirs: I. Le lendemain d’Agadir, 1912_ (Paris, 1926), p. 221. Later
Lansdowne wrote on his dispatch to Bertie of May 17, 1905, as follows:
“I suppose this was the origin of the offensive and defensive alliance”
(_B.D._, III, 76, No. 94). His inference is probably correct only in
part. The exchange of notes between Cambon and Lansdowne was sent to
Bertie on May 31, 1905, and received by him on June 3. It is not
apparent whether he communicated that exchange to the French government,
although the “offer of assistance” which Delcassé has written of as
having received only forty-eight hours before the cabinet meeting on
June 6 may have been the notice of this exchange from Bertie. Word to
Delcassé through the Governor-General of Algeria from King Edward, who
was then cruising in the Mediterranean, urging the Foreign Minister not
to resign also strengthened the latter’s hand. The King took that step
on his own initiative (Newton, p. 342).]
[Footnote 718: On that cabinet meeting see the following: Mévil, pp. 293
ff.; Pinon, _France et Allemagne_, pp. 164 f.; Radolin to Bülow, June
11, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 407 ff., No. 6685; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 8,
1905, _B.D._, III, 91, No. 114; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905,
_ibid._, 78, No. 96, recounting a conversation with Delcassé on that
date; Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_, pp. 167 ff. Cf. Bertie’s explanation of
Delcassé’s fall (Bertie to Lansdowne, June 15, 1905, Newton, pp. 341
f.).]
[Footnote 719: Flotow to Bülow, June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 406, No. 6684;
625, No. 6854. Cf. the report from the Belgian Minister at Paris to his
government, June 8, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 62 f. See also
_Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 770 ff.]
[Footnote 720: Cf. _Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy_, III,
341.]
[Footnote 721: Quoted in Lee, II, 344. See also a letter from John Hay,
who was then in London, to Henry Adams, June 7, 1905, quoted in Thayer,
II, 405; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _B.D._, III, 78, No. 96.
Lansdowne’s reaction is expressed in Newton, p. 341.]
[Footnote 722: Bertie to Lansdowne, June 6, 1905, _B.D._, III, 90, No.
111.]
[Footnote 723: Bülow’s minute to a dispatch from Flotow, June 5, 1905,
_G.P._, XX, 403, No. 6681.]
CHAPTER XIII
THE MOROCCAN CRISIS, JUNE 6-JULY 8, 1905
The downfall of M. Delcassé was merely an incident in Germany’s drive
toward a conference. Prince Bülow, believing that the Minister’s
resignation ended the acute phase of the crisis,[724] immediately
dispatched a circular note to the signatory Powers[725] informing them
of Germany’s acceptance of the Sultan’s invitation to a conference and
asking them also to accept. In this note he argued as follows: Since
Article XVII of the Convention of Madrid[726] guaranteed to every Power
the same treatment as the most favored nation, the Moroccan reforms had
to receive the approval of all the signatory Powers. If the proposal for
a conference were refused, the legal status of Morocco would remain
unchanged, for the opposition of one Power alone would suffice to block
the execution of any reforms proposed. But aside from these legal
arguments, the conference was the best means of introducing reforms
without endangering the existing political and commercial interests of
the signatory Powers by concession of special rights to individual
states. Moreover, since the Convention of Madrid was a compact between
the Powers, France would have to obtain their sanction for a special
position in Morocco. While the details of the French program of Moroccan
reforms were unknown, it was evident that France sought, in violation of
Article XVII, to control the land as she did Tunis. Thus, to oppose the
French action was merely to defend the existing legal status of
Morocco.[727]
The attitude of the Powers toward this exposé was not at all
satisfactory to the German government. The Russian, Austrian, Italian,
Portuguese, and Danish governments evaded a reply, leaving the
initiative to the French and the British.[728] German relations with
Spain over the matter were complicated by reports that while M. Villa-
Urrutia, the Spanish foreign minister, had been in Paris during King
Alfonso’s visit, he had openly aligned himself with M. Delcassé’s
policy. After the French Minister’s downfall, the German government
notified the Spanish government on June 11 that, if M. Villa-Urrutia
remained in office, Germany would recall her Ambassador for an
indefinite leave of absence.[729] While waiting for the Minister to be
overthrown, the German government did not press Spain on the question of
the conference.
The British attitude was even more adverse. When Count Metternich handed
the German note to Lord Lansdowne, the latter interpreted it as meaning
that “the Conference, if it were to meet, would be expected to deal not
only with the introduction of reforms, but with the maintenance of the
independence and integrity of Morocco, and the preservation of the open
door.”[730] The Ambassador’s affirmative reply enhanced Lord Lansdowne’s
suspicion that Germany was endeavoring to break the Anglo-French
understanding. While questioning strongly the propriety of a conference,
the Foreign Secretary gave no definite answer. This note, however, and
the passing of M. Delcassé caused the British government to recede on
June 8 from its original refusal of the Sultan’s invitation and to
postpone its decision until it could consult with France.[731] But on
June 7, Herr von Flotow reported from Paris a rumor that Great Britain
had offered to France “an offensive and defensive alliance aimed at
Germany” which the latter was still considering.[732] Hence, it was
manifest to the German government that Great Britain was in complete
opposition to its policy.
President Roosevelt also gave a disappointing reply. On May 25 and 30
Prince Bülow had told the President that “the decision in the question
of a conference depended to a great extent upon him.” He maintained that
if the conference were refused as a result of Great Britain’s pressure
upon France, Germany would be forced to choose between a war with France
and perhaps Great Britain and an agreement with the former which would
serve as a prelude to a strong Continental _bloc_. Declaring that he was
averse to making the choice, the Chancellor asked Mr. Roosevelt to favor
the conference to the signatory Powers.[733] But the President replied
on June 8 that he could hardly participate in a conference without
exposing himself to the sharpest attacks, since American opinion was
opposed to interfering in the Moroccan affair and inclined to approve
reform by one Power.[734]
The attitude of M. Rouvier was equally unsatisfactory to the German
government. The Premier expressed to the German representative through
M. Betzold the hope that the fall of M. Delcassé would enable the two
countries to reach a direct understanding, and promised to show the
“greatest conciliation” toward Germany.[735] When the German note of
June 6 arrived, he immediately denied to the Powers the accusations made
therein.[736] He also instructed M. Saint-René Taillandier to suspend
action at Fez so as to avoid complications.[737] He endeavored to find
some way by which Germany could be satisfied, France’s position in
Morocco be preserved and her agreements with the other Powers be upheld,
and the humiliating conference be avoided. On June 7 he protested to
Herr von Flotow that France could hardly accept the conference, which
French public opinion rejected so completely, and remarked that Great
Britain, Spain, and Italy would probably refuse it.[738] Herr von Flotow
replied that Germany would not desert the Sultan. Two days later the
Premier offered through an intermediary to make a general agreement with
Germany not only over the Moroccan question but also over others, such
as those of the Bagdad Railway and far eastern affairs.[739] In a
conversation with the German Ambassador on June 10, M. Rouvier
persisted, in spite of threats, in his repugnance to the conference. Why
go there, he asked Prince Radolin, if Germany refused the reforms in
Morocco which France considered necessary? In the course of his defense
of France’s previous Moroccan policy, he said: “If an understanding
concerning the extension of permissible reforms could previously occur
with Germany, participation in the conference might be possible.” He was
so discouraged that he thought seriously of resigning, for, he declared
to the Prince, he could not defend before the French Chamber the German
demands as then formulated.[740]
At home Prince Bülow’s policy was encountering disapproval from the
Emperor William II, then in a pacific mood. Toward the end of May the
Emperor had rebuked the German Navy League for criticizing the naval
program as inadequate.[741] On June 3 he had started the movement which
culminated in the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War and was co-
operating with President Roosevelt in that work—an act which Prince
Bülow would have prevented had he been aware of his master’s
intentions.[742] Even though the Emperor knew nothing of the French
offers,[743] he was entirely willing after the fall of M. Delcassé to
gratify M. Rouvier’s wish for an understanding.[744] At the wedding of
the German Crown Prince on June 6 he assured the French representative
that there would be no war over Morocco.[745]
The beginning of Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace had no effect
upon the German policy, for Russia’s force was broken both by defeat and
by the rapidly developing revolution.[746] But the attitude of France
was so uncompromising and that of the other Powers so unfavorable that
Prince Bülow doubted whether he would succeed in launching the
conference.[747] He endeavored to do so by a show of boldness coupled
with real concessions to France.
To bring President Roosevelt back into active participation in the
affair, Prince Bülow reported to him the rumor of the British offer of
alliance to France and pictured the possibility of a war with France and
Great Britain “not because we want too much but because we desire
nothing.” The Prince added that if this war did occur, a new Triple
Alliance between France, Great Britain, and Japan, with which Russia
might also be associated, might be formed. To preclude this event he
urged the President to advise the Powers in favor of a conference or to
prevent British participation in a possible Franco-German war brought on
by French aggression in Morocco. By confronting the President with the
choice of facing the outbreak of a new war just at the moment when he
was endeavoring to stop the Russo-Japanese conflict or of supporting the
proposal for a conference, Prince Bülow obtained the desired result. On
June 12 Mr. Roosevelt agreed to advise the French government in favor of
accepting the Sultan’s invitation and against concluding an Anglo-French
alliance.[748]
At the same time the German government endeavored to restrain Great
Britain. Herr von Holstein asserted to the British Ambassador that “if
any one had told him two years ago that a war between England and
Germany was within the bounds of possibility he would have simply
laughed, but now things had reached such a point that it could no longer
be considered impossible.” Both he and the Chancellor cited the
bitterness of the British press toward Germany and the reported British
offer of a defensive and offensive alliance to France as proofs. Neither
of the two German officials believed that Great Britain would attack
Germany, but they argued that the popular fear of such an aggression in
their country was more plausible than that of a German invasion in Great
Britain. In like manner Sir Frank Lascelles credited Germany with
pacific intentions, but maintained that the British fears were more
justified than the German. Herr von Holstein assured the Ambassador that
“the Moroccan question would not lead to any serious complications,” and
Lord Lansdowne denied that Great Britain wanted war or had offered an
alliance to France. As neither side believed entirely the pacific
asseverations of the other, the tension in Anglo-German relations was
only slightly relaxed.[749]
While making these efforts with the United States and Great Britain,
Prince Bülow yielded before the French resistance. Although he explained
away the Emperor’s conciliatory remarks to the French government with a
threat and although he warned M. Rouvier not to assume M. Delcassé’s
policy toward Morocco, he repeated his assurances that “the conference
can have no positive results which would injure the French future.” It
was “merely a question of etiquette and of delay,” he said, so that
Germany could hold faith with the Sultan and disengage herself from the
position into which M. Delcassé had forced her. Instead of demanding
that all consideration of the Moroccan question be left to the
conference, the Chancellor offered on June 12 to negotiate over the
program for that assembly if France would first accept the Sultan’s
invitation. In addition, he instructed Prince Radolin to state not
officially, but as his (Radolin’s) personal view, that from the very
nature of the affair the conference would have to adopt as fundamental
“for the present no prejudice to the independence of Morocco . . . . and
. . . . no injury to the prospects of France.” The Ambassador should
state that the items to be considered by that body, as logical
deductions from those two points were: police and military reforms, to
be limited in time and international in character; financial reforms,
likewise to be internationally executed; and the economic opening of the
land in accordance with the principle of the open door. He should warn
M. Rouvier against permitting Algerians to furnish the Moroccan
pretender with contraband supplies; for if the Sultan should request
German mediation in this affair, Germany would give it even at the risk
of grave difficulties.[750]
When the Ambassador carried out these instructions two days later, he
found M. Rouvier “angry, discouraged, sick” but still defending France’s
Moroccan policy. Nor did the Ambassador’s remarks change his mood.[751]
On June 16, in response to the Premier’s request for further
information, the Ambassador explained unofficially as further logical
deductions from the two fundamental points: first, that the military
reforms should be internationally ordered by a division of the mandate
among the Powers in such a way that France would receive it for the area
along the Algerian frontier; second, that to give an international
character to the financial reforms, a state bank should be organized in
which the capital and management should be divided as equally as
possible among the banks representing the various Powers.[752] The
Premier’s apparent relief at these remarks encouraged the German
government to believe that a solution was near.[753]
In the meantime, in accordance with Germany’s desires, President
Roosevelt intervened in Paris and London. Notwithstanding his conviction
that France was in the right, he advised her to avoid a war and help the
Emperor “save his face” by accepting the conference. He argued that
British support in case of a conflict would be of little value to
France, and predicted a French victory at the conference. He promised
the French government that if the United States participated, he “would
treat both sides with absolute justice, and would, if necessary, take
very strong grounds against any attitude of Germany which seemed . . . .
unjust and unfair.”[754]
In handling Great Britain the President took another line. He suspected
her of wishing to make trouble. For he was receiving no support from her
in his mediation between Russia and Japan; he knew that Lord Lansdowne
was opposed to the conference; and, so far as he could tell from the
British Ambassador at Washington, Great Britain was anxious for France
to humiliate Germany by refusing the conference and was willing to face
the possibility of war. He thought this sagacious on her part, but not
valorous; she would be assured a victory on sea, while France would have
to bear the brunt of the battle on land. So he warned Great Britain not
to put difficulty in the way of a peaceful settlement between France and
Germany, and otherwise ignored her.[755]
Neither Prince Radolin’s conciliatory remarks nor President Roosevelt’s
advice won the French Premier to accept the conference. While deeply
impressed by reports of German threats against France in other
capitals,[756] he inferred from his conversations with Prince Radolin
and from an assertion of the German Ambassador in Madrid that if France
agreed to the conference the German government would then be ready to
commence discussions with a view to an understanding which would make
the conference unnecessary.[757] M. Rouvier was also assured of the
entire support of the British government. On June 16 Lord Lansdowne, in
approving M. Paul Cambon’s returning to Paris to advise the
inexperienced Premier,[758] remarked to the Ambassador that he saw
nothing to be gained
by admitting the theoretical necessity of a Conference, except perhaps
to enable Germany, which had brought about M. Delcassé’s downfall, to
secure a further success. Our attitude must of course depend upon that
of the French Government, but if they maintained their refusal, so, most
certainly, should we.[759]
The French note to Germany of June 21 was therefore so composed by M.
Paul Cambon as to accept the conference in principle while at the same
time inviting Germany to negotiate further in order to obviate that
assembly—the position which M. Rouvier had taken for two weeks. Since
Prince Radolin’s explanations on June 14 and 18 had been made in such an
unofficial and confidential manner, the Premier did not know whether
they represented the German view or not, and did not mention them in the
note.[760] Hence that document of June 21 ran as follows:
The Imperial Government will not fail to recognize the inconvenience
which would result for it as for us from the acceptance of the
Conference without a previous accord, an accord which would not infringe
upon those already concluded and which would not harm in any way the
interests of which the Imperial Government is solicitous. . . . . The
Government of the Republic is deeply impressed by the double
consideration that the Conference may be dangerous if it is not preceded
by an entente, and useless if it follows one. [Nevertheless, the French
government did not refuse the conference.] It desires solely to know
what are, in the mind of the Imperial Government, the precise points
which will be treated at the Conference and the solutions which it will
offer there.
Thus they could arrive at the entente which both governments
wished.[761]
The Premier acquainted the British and American governments with the
contents of the note and of the German threats, and asked them to
recommend this solution to Germany. He emphasized to Mr. Roosevelt
especially the menace of a German attack. Declaring that the President
could avert that danger, he urged him to exert influence with the
Emperor in favor of peace. Mr. Roosevelt immediately agreed to do so in
energetic terms.[762]
The German reaction was hostile. As the Chancellor realized that the
crisis had arisen in Franco-German relations, he endeavored by a mixture
of enticements and threats to bring the impressionable and pacific M.
Rouvier to accept the German terms.[763] Refusing the French request,
Prince Bülow warned the Premier on June 21, 22, and 23 against resuming
M. Delcassé’s policy and against permitting the Algerians to aid the
Moroccan pretender. While promising the French government “seriously and
loyally” to work for a result satisfactory to all parties and especially
for an understanding with France at the conference, the Chancellor
declared to the French Ambassador: “The situation is serious. With a
little good will and decision we may emerge from it.” But “one should
not play with fire”; “it is a dangerous game which might lead further
than you and I wish.” Threatening to make a defensive alliance with the
Sultan if French policy forced him to, he refused the overture for
negotiation and advised a quick acceptance of the conference.[764]
The German policy was not as successful as the Chancellor had expected.
By June 21 Italy had, in spite of German pressure, accepted the
conference only conditionally.[765] The British government, loyally
following the lead of France, fully approved the French note (June
23).[766] In Spain, although a ministerial crisis on June 20 had
eliminated M. Villa-Urrutia as Germany had demanded, the new Liberal
government refused Germany’s request for support; it declared on June 25
that it would remain loyal to the Franco-Spanish accord.[767]
Furthermore, it was apparent that M. Rouvier would not accept the German
demands in their existing form.[768] The Premier was staunchly supported
by the French press, which was quickly coming to credit Germany with the
intention not of making friends with France but of teaching her a lesson
and of setting limits to her foreign policy.[769] More discouraging
still, on June 24 Baron Sternburg telegraphed the following statement
from President Roosevelt:
The French Government informs me unofficially . . . . that it has ceased
its opposition to a conference. . . . . It seems as a matter of course
that a program of the conference would be needed in advance in
accordance with the usual custom in such cases. I suggest that that be
arranged between France and Germany. . . . . Let me congratulate the
Emperor warmly on his diplomatic triumph of the first magnitude.[770]
The German government retreated. Replying to the French government on
June 24,[771] it asserted the right of the other Powers to participate
in the work of Moroccan reform. It refused to negotiate a program for
the conference beforehand, but admitted “that France has a very
legitimate interest in maintaining order in the territory bordering on
the frontier.” In the verbal explanations made upon the delivery of the
note, the Chancellor, denying that the conference was intended to
procure for Germany a “miserable satisfaction for her _amour-propre_” or
to humiliate France, declared that international reform should be
attempted in Morocco first. Then if this work broke down, he said, “the
future is free,” and “in that future, which is perhaps not so distant,
we shall again be able to become opportunists.” He was profoundly
surprised, he said, that the French note took no cognizance of the
overtures made by the German Ambassador. He urged the acceptance of the
conference so that the two countries might escape from this “perilous
and dangerous situation” into “a path which leads to appeasement,
conciliation, and peace.”
The Chancellor also instructed Prince Radolin to inform M. Rouvier that
if France accepted the conference, Germany would then be willing to work
out an agreement with her on the bases mentioned previously (June 14 and
18) for a prospective program to be submitted to the Sultan.[772] If the
Ambassador thought that M. Rouvier would refuse to accept the conference
before the program was agreed upon, the Chancellor would permit him to
propose that the French and German representatives work out a program
with the Sultan in Fez. If M. Rouvier refused the conference altogether,
Prince Radolin should warn him that Germany would aid the Sultan against
any French aggressions. The Ambassador was to tell M. Rouvier that the
Moroccan government had made offers to Germany which would insure her a
leading position in that land, but that Germany would refuse them as
long as the possibility of an accord with France remained.[773]
By June 27 the advantage again shifted to the German side. In Paris the
more anti-British and pro-German element, led by M. Dupuy, owner of
_Petit Parisien_ and an intimate friend of M. Rouvier, was gaining
greater influence. M. Dupuy informed the German Ambassador on June 26
that M. Rouvier, whom he represented as a rather well-meaning simpleton,
now regretted having dispatched the French note and that he now sought
some phrase by which the German and French views could be harmonized and
the conference accepted. In fact, M. Dupuy stated that he expected the
French government to make the acceptance in a day or so. Both he and M.
Betzold said that the Premier still mistrusted Great Britain.[774]
Even more valuable for the German government was Mr. Roosevelt’s change
in attitude. When the German government explained to Mr. Roosevelt that
France had not agreed to the conference except under conditions which
Germany had persistently refused,[775] the President immediately advised
France on June 26 to accept unconditionally. He stated that the question
of a program was a minor one, that the important thing was for the
conference to meet. In answer, the French Ambassador protested that in
view of the German Emperor’s erratic temperament France could not go to
the conference
without previously having drawn up a program, or at least without an
understanding, indicating that which we might have reason to expect and
guaranteeing in particular that solemn international undertakings, which
have for a long time been public property, should not be brought into
question.[776]
Thereupon Mr. Roosevelt proposed the following compromise: “Let France
and Germany go into the conference without any programme or agreement;
but to discuss all questions in regard to Morocco; save of course where
either is in honor bound by a previous agreement with another
power.”[777]
In reporting to Baron Sternburg what he had done, the President said
that if France and Germany agreed upon this or any other compromise, he
himself would accept the invitation to the conference and would advise
Great Britain to do likewise. On June 27 he offered to telegraph his
greetings to the Emperor William II. He also expressed to the British
Ambassador his strong hope that Great Britain would drop her objections
to the conference.[778]
The President’s intervention was beneficial to both the French and the
German governments; it brought them into a frame of mind which permitted
a compromise. The German government was elated over his action; for even
though it diminished any hope of breaking the French accords over
Morocco, it did seem to assure a peaceful issue of the crisis by the
acceptance of the conference. Hence Prince Bülow telegraphed to
Washington on June 27 that “if after the acceptance of the conference by
France we negotiate with the French and differences arise, I shall be
ready at all times to support before His Majesty the Emperor that
decision which President Roosevelt recommends as practical and
fair.”[779]
This success, however, was offset by a report from Baron Eckardstein on
June 27 that M. Delcassé had received an offer of an offensive and
defensive alliance from Great Britain, but that M. Rouvier had refused
to consider it. Within the past ten days, the Baron continued, the
British government had informed the French Premier “that he could rely
upon its diplomatic support under all circumstances, but that if he
wished to make an alliance with England, the English fleet would also
uphold the French policy in case of necessity.”[780] After frankly
repeating those statements to Lord Lansdowne on the following day, Count
Metternich added that “at no moment had the German Government desired to
fasten a quarrel upon France,” as the British seemed to think. Lord
Lansdowne replied that “the language attributed to some of the German
representatives had certainly suggested the idea that it was desired to
do so.” He then made this important statement:
. . . . British diplomatic support was assured to the French by the
Anglo-French accord. . . . . As a natural result questions which
concerned that agreement would have been discussed between the two
Governments and proper ways and means conferred upon to maintain intact
the individual points of the accord. The question of an alliance with
France has never been discussed by the British cabinet nor has an
English alliance ever been offered to France. . . . . However, he would
not conceal his belief that in the event that Germany “lightheartedly”
made war upon France, which he considered entirely improbable, it was
not to be foreseen how far British public opinion would force the
Government to support France.[781]
To this alarming information was added the report from Paris that the
British were exerting all possible pressure to prevent France from
accepting the conference.[782] Furthermore, when Prince Radolin carried
out his instructions, June 27, M. Rouvier continued to refuse the
conference without a previous understanding. To that end he offered two
proposals. One, a suggestion which he took from a German newspaper, was
that the French and German representatives at Fez work out a program in
co-operation with the Sultan prior to French acceptance of the
conference. The other was that in providing for the international
regulation of the police and financial reforms France should be assured
the right to execute the police reforms along the Algerian frontier
while nothing definite should be stated about the organization of the
police in the rest of Morocco. This agreement, M. Rouvier added, could
become valid as soon as France officially accepted the conference. He
also desired the recall of the three ministers from Fez so as to prevent
complications.[783]
As already seen, the Chancellor was willing to accept the first
proposal, although, fearing that upon further delay the Sultan might
throw over the project of a conference and undermine the entire German
policy, he preferred some other solution. Since he mistrusted the
Sultan, he refused to recall Count Tattenbach from Fez until the
conference actually met. He also held to his formula of “first
acceptance, then negotiations”; but to counteract the British pressure
he retreated further by agreeing on June 28 for the Premier to declare
publicly that
the French Government has dropped its objections to the conference after
becoming convinced from the declarations of Your Highness [Prince
Radolin] that Germany would pursue no goals at the conference which
would stand in opposition to the just interests of France.
He refused, however, to permit M. Rouvier to make public anything
further about the German concessions of June 14 and 18.[784] On the same
day he declared to M. Bihourd that once the conference met, Germany
would be freed from her obligations to the Sultan and could follow her
own interests. Let international reforms first be tried in Morocco, he
said; if they failed, Germany would have to consult only her own
interests, among which Morocco occupied “an infinitely small place.” If
France, in conformity with the views of the British government, refused
the conference, there would obtain a condition of _la paix armée_. If
she accepted, there would be “neither victor nor vanquished.”[785]
Learning that the German government regarded Prince Radolin’s assertions
of June 14 and 18 as official and despairing of any other solution, M.
Rouvier was more inclined to accept the conference. He justified this
course to the British chargé d’affaires on June 28 as follows:
He [M. Rouvier] considered that under the conditions a conference was
perhaps the best way of arriving at a satisfactory solution. The Emperor
had made it a point of personal honour: France would go into it with the
support of England, Spain, and possibly Italy, whereas Germany would be
alone; Germany was prepared to admit the preponderance of French
interests on the Algerian frontier. It was absolutely necessary to
arrive at some solution as the present situation was excessively
dangerous. So long as the Conference was not accepted, Germany
considered that she was entitled to a free hand in Morocco, and she was
very very [_sic_] active. She would ask for all sorts of concessions,
ports, cables, etc., and were the Sultan to accede to such demands the
situation both for France and England would become far more critical.
Monsieur Rouvier hinted that once the present difficulties had been more
or less tided over at the Conference, it would be possible to see that
Germany did not get too much in Morocco.[786]
Before approving the proposal for a conference, however, M. Rouvier
intended to include in the agreement with Germany some mention of
France’s accords with Great Britain and Spain over Morocco.[787]
While M. Rouvier delayed, the German government grew apprehensive.
Prince Radolin heard on June 29 that M. Paul Cambon, Sir Francis Bertie,
and the British government were making every effort to prevent the
French acceptance, arguing that Germany was endeavoring to nullify the
Anglo-French agreement. On the next day M. Dupuy informed the Ambassador
that the British “were sitting powerfully on M. Rouvier’s back” to
obstruct it and that Sir Francis Bertie was pressing the French Premier
to make a defensive and offensive alliance with Great Britain. When M.
Cambon reached Paris on June 30, M. Dupuy thought that there was grave
danger of M. Rouvier’s being overthrown.[788]
In this situation the German government denied on June 30 to the French
government that it meant to question the Anglo-French accord. On the
next day it was prepared to give way still further, but M. Rouvier
accepted the conference.[789] The Premier proposed that he and the
German Ambassador make an exchange of notes and sign a declaration
incorporating the concessions which the German government had made to
France.[790] M. Rouvier then submitted the bases of the agreement to
Lord Lansdowne, who approved them.[791] After much bickering over the
formulation of the agreement, during which a liberal repetition of
German threats mixed with enticements was made, accord was finally
reached on July 8.[792]
By that agreement Germany promised to pursue no goal at the conference
which would compromise the “legitimate interests” of France in Morocco
or
that would be contrary to the rights of France resulting from treaties
or arrangements and harmonizing with the following principles:
sovereignty and independence of the Sultan; integrity of his empire;
economic liberty without any inequality; utility of police and financial
reforms the introduction of which will be regulated for a short period
by way of an international accord; recognition of the situation created
for France with reference to Morocco by the contiguity, over a long
stretch, of Algeria and the Sherifian empire, by the particular
relations which result therefrom between the two neighboring countries,
as well as by the special interest which results therefrom for France
for order to obtain in the Sherifian empire.
The two governments agreed to work out a program for the conference
which they would submit to the Sultan for acceptance. The French and
German missions were to be recalled from Fez as soon as the conference
met. Prince Radolin also stated specifically that the Anglo-French and
Franco-Spanish agreements remained untouched by this understanding.[793]
The French, British, and German presses greeted this accord with relief
and with the sincere hope that the crisis was past.[794] The Powers also
signified their acceptances.[795]
The agreement marked Germany’s first reverse in her Moroccan campaign.
She had been compelled to recognize France’s special interest in Morocco
and had failed to nullify the French ententes. Germany could have placed
herself on the same basis with reference to France that Great Britain
occupied, both in regard to European and to colonial affairs. Instead,
however, of weakening the Entente Cordiale, instead of making a valuable
colonial accord by accepting the French offers, the German government
had preferred both to keep its promises to the Sultan and to free itself
from those promises by forcing a conference upon an unwilling world.
Caught in the toils of its own tangled policy and determined to have a
share in Morocco even though the German people were uninterested, it had
refused present offers of colonial gain with the hope of bringing about
their renewal in the future. Its virtue, not appreciated by any other
Power, was greater than its common sense.
Although the German government had receded, it had done so only after
embittering the French nation and arousing it to the united defense of
its national honor. As Ambassador Jusserand wrote to Mr. Roosevelt on
July 11:
I leave greatly comforted by the news concerning Morocco. The agreement
arrived at is in substance the one which we had considered and the
acceptation of which you did so very much to secure. Letters just
received by me from Paris . . . . confirm what I guessed was the case,
that is, that there was a point where more yielding would have been
impossible; everybody in France felt it, and people braced up silently
in view of possible great events.[796]
Germany’s actions had antagonized M. Rouvier and converted him to the
Entente Cordiale. M. Rouvier remarked to the British chargé d’affaires
as follows:
His Majesty [the German Emperor] had expected a complete climb-down to
follow upon the change of direction of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
but as His Excellency [M. Rouvier] said, there was no reason because he
parted with Monsieur Delcassé that he should throw himself “dans les
bras de l’Empereur et sur son cou.”[797]
M. Cambon informed Lord Lansdowne that
after all that had happened M. Rouvier was more convinced than ever of
the necessity of maintaining a close understanding with this country
[Great Britain]. It was, in his view, essential that the two Governments
should treat one another with the fullest confidence, and that no
further steps should be taken without previous discussion between us.
While holding this opinion, M. Rouvier thought it desirable to proceed
with caution in dealing with the German Government and thought we should
avoid parading a desire to run counter to them.
These assertions met with Lord Lansdowne’s entire approval, for they
signified the success of the British struggle to maintain the Entente
Cordiale and to keep Germany out of Morocco. The Foreign Secretary
assured M. Cambon that Great Britain had no intention of withdrawing her
support. But he added: “. . . . The apparent sacrifice of M. Delcassé in
the face of German pressure had created an unfavourable impression in
this country, and I therefore thought there was a good deal to be said
for M. Rouvier’s view that it would be as well to avoid any action
calculated to bring about fresh complications.”[798] In other words,
Lord Lansdowne intimated that British public opinion would not be so
willing to support France as it had been before that display of French
weakness.
In spite of this remark, signs were not lacking of close intimacy
between the two countries. On July 12 _Gaulois_ published the
information that at the cabinet meeting on June 6 M. Delcassé had
favored an alliance with Great Britain in order to hold Germany in
check. Without definitely stating so, the article left the impression
that the Foreign Minister had been certain of an alliance.[799] When the
French and British fleets exchanged visits in July and August, the press
compared the visits to that of the Russian fleet to Toulon in 1893 which
had sealed the Franco-Russian alliance.[800]
The German government was thus furthering that process which it called
Germany’s encirclement and isolation.
[Footnote 724: Bülow to Tattenbach, June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 418 f.,
No. 6692.]
[Footnote 725: The signatory Powers were as follows: Austria-Hungary,
Italy, Spain, Great Britain, France, Russia, United States, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Belgium, and Germany.]
[Footnote 726: Art. XVII read as follows: “Le droit au traitement de la
nation la plus favorisée est reconnu par le Maroc à toutes les
Puissances representées à la Conférence de Madrid” (Leon Deloncle [ed.],
_Statut international du Maroc_ [Paris, 1912], p. 51). The French
refused to accept this interpretation of the Convention of Madrid and of
Art. XVII. Tardieu replied to the German arguments as follows: “That
convention aimed to limit at the demand of Morocco the right of
protection of the legations to certain Moroccan subjects which some
Powers tended to abuse. It had regulated the exercise of that right,
determined the conditions of naturalization for the Moroccans, those for
the acquisition of landed property by foreigners, and had established
the basis of the agricultural tax. Concerning general policy or
stipulations about the tariff, not a word. Article XVII, which Germany
invoked as the charter of international equality in Morocco, applied in
reality only to the right of protection. . . . . Article XVII is not a
promise of the Powers among themselves never to touch the diplomatic or
economic terrain. It is a promise by Morocco never to differentiate
between them within the limits of 1880 and within those limits alone,
that is (following the preamble of the convention) in the exercise of
protection” (Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés_, p. 39). Lansdowne also
challenged the German interpretation. “Any rights which other countries
may have to most-favoured-nation treatment in Morocco would not . . . .
preclude the possibility of a privileged position being in certain
respects accorded to France in her dealings with the Moorish Government.
Most-favoured-nation treatment is variously interpreted in different
countries. But no Power has, I believe, ever contended that the
obligation to give such treatment debars one country from invoking the
assistance of another in improving its domestic administration, and it
is obvious that such assistance can be most conveniently and effectually
given when the Power which affords it is the immediate neighbour of that
which receives it, nor was there any desire or intention on the part of
France to deprive other Powers of the rights and privileges to which
they were justly entitled under Treaty” (Lansdowne to Bertie, July 11,
1905, _B.D._, III, 117 f., No. 150; cf. Metternich to F. O., June 6,
1905, _G.P._, XX, 416 f., No. 6690).
The German interpretation was based upon a loose construction of that
convention while the French interpretation was based upon a strict
construction. Although from a legal standpoint the French view was
correct, yet the precedent of an international conference over Moroccan
affairs, no matter what they were, favored the German argument.
Moreover, the fact remained that France had tried to change the existing
status in Morocco without consulting Powers who had as much right to be
considered as the three with whom she had come to terms.]
[Footnote 727: Bülow to Flotow, June 5, dispatched June 6, 1905, _G.P._,
413 ff., No. 6687; _L.j., 1901-5_, 230 f., No. 268, annexe.]
[Footnote 728: Alvensleben to F. O., June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 419, No.
6693; Wedel to F. O., June 6, 1905, _ibid._, 417 f., No. 6691; Monts to
F. O., June 6, 9, 12, 1905, _ibid._, 415 f., No. 6688; 424 f., No. 6699;
435 ff., No. 6709; de Bunsen to Lansdowne, June 8, 1905, _B.D._, III, 91
f., No. 115; Smith to Lansdowne, June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 101, No. 129;
Lansdowne to Goschen, June 21, 1905, _ibid._, 100, No. 127; Egerton to
Lansdowne, June 9, 10, 13, 1905, _ibid._, 94 f., Nos. 119 ff.; Hardinge
to Lansdowne, June 14, 1905, _ibid._, 96, No. 123.]
[Footnote 729: Bülow to Radowitz, June 10, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 425 f., No.
6701.]
[Footnote 730: Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 8, 1905, _B.D._, III, 92 f.,
No. 117.]
[Footnote 731: Metternich to F. O., June 6 and 8, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 416
f., No. 6690; 422 ff., No. 6697 f. King Edward also refused to permit
the Prince of Wales to attend the wedding of the German Crown Prince on
June 6 (Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 335 f.). Lowther had communicated
the British refusal to the Sultan when on June 8 new instructions
arrived for him to await further developments. See Lowther to Lansdowne,
June 9, 1905, _B.D._, III, 94, No. 118; Lansdowne to Lowther, June 8,
1905, _ibid._, 92, No. 116.]
[Footnote 732: The information came from M. Bunau-Varilla, owner of
_Matin_ (_G.P._, XX, 623 f., No. 6853).]
[Footnote 733: Bülow to Sternburg, May 25 and 30, 1905, _ibid._, 385 f.,
Nos. 6667 f.; Bishop, _The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt_, I, 470
f.]
[Footnote 734: Sternburg to Bülow, June 8, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 421, No.
6696. Durand reported that Roosevelt had said to Sternburg that “so long
as the French Government object, the United States Government could not
adhere to the proposal for a Conference of the Powers” (Lansdowne to
Cambon, June 6, 1905, _B.D._, III, 90 f., No. 112).]
[Footnote 735: Radolin to F. O., June 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 402 f., No.
6680; Flotow to F. O., June 6 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 404, No. 6682; 425,
No. 6700. In these negotiations Rouvier leaned on the advice of Révoil,
who in June without holding any office was given a desk in the foreign
office (Tardieu, p. 84).]
[Footnote 736: _L.j., 1901-5_, 230, No. 268; 231, No. 269; 233, No.
271.]
[Footnote 737: Rouvier to Saint-René Taillandier, June 10, 1905,
_ibid._, 230 f., No. 269.]
[Footnote 738: Flotow to F. O., June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 420, No.
6694.]
[Footnote 739: Flotow to F. O., June 9, 1905, _ibid._, 425, No. 6700.]
[Footnote 740: Bülow to Radolin, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 427 f., No.
6702; Radolin to F. O., June 11, 1905, _ibid._, 430 f., No. 6705;
Rouvier to Bihourd, June 11, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 232, No. 270.
Immediately after that interview Rouvier declared to some of his
friends: “They are putting a knife to my throat. I do not know where
they wish to drive us” (Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_, pp. 174 f.).]
[Footnote 741: Schulthess, _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, p.
92.]
[Footnote 742: Goetz, _Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren 1894-1914_, pp.
370 ff.; _G.P._, XIX, Nos. 6193, 6196 f., 6311 ff., 6318; _B.D._, Vol.
IV, chap. xxiii, Part. V.]
[Footnote 743: The absence of minutes by him to the dispatches during
this crisis points to this fact (also see Eckardstein,
_Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, III, 167). The
Emperor first learned of Rouvier’s offer of a general colonial agreement
at this time in 1907. His comment was as follows: “If I had known of
that, I would have accepted it and the whole stupid conference of
Algeciras would have been avoided” (Brandenburg, _Von Bismarck zum
Weltkriege_, p. 215).]
[Footnote 744: See the Emperor’s minutes, one of the very few instances
in which they are to be found, to the dispatch from Radolin to Bülow,
June 11, 1905 (_G.P._, XX, 409, No. 6685).]
[Footnote 745: On this episode see Eckardstein, II, 139 f.; Zedlitz-
Trützschler, _Zwölf Jahre am deutschen Kaiserhof_, p. 174; Bülow to
Radolin, June 10, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 429 f., No. 6704.]
[Footnote 746: This was General Schlieffen’s opinion. Schlieffen
believed that the condition of the Russian army would grow worse instead
of better. See Bülow to Schlieffen, June 4, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 422, No.
6194; Schlieffen to Bülow, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 423 f., No. 6195.]
[Footnote 747: Bülow to Tattenbach, June 7, 1905, _ibid._, 418 f., No.
6692.]
[Footnote 748: Bülow to Sternburg, June 9 and 10, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 421
f. n.; 626 ff., No. 6856; Bishop, I, 476 f.; Sternburg to F. O., June
12, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 433 f., No. 6707.]
[Footnote 749: Metternich to Bülow, June 9, 1905, _ibid._, 625 f., No.
6855; Bülow to Metternich, June 11, 1905, _ibid._, 628 ff., No. 6857;
Metternich to F. O., June 15 and 16, 1905, _ibid._, 441 f., No. 6712;
630 ff., No. 6858; Lascelles to Lansdowne, June 12, 1905, _B.D._, III,
79 ff., Nos. 97 f.; Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 16, 1905, _ibid._, 82
f., No. 99. See also Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. 335 f.]
[Footnote 750: Bülow to Radolin, June 12, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 431 ff., No.
6706. The accusation that Algerians were helping the pretender was made
by a German army officer who in June returned from the Algerian border.
Governor Jonnart of Algeria denied it and asserted that the contraband
came, not from Algeria but from the Riff. Although Jonnart’s statement
was undoubtedly correct, yet the report came in so handily that the
German government used it as a weapon of intimidation against France
(_ibid._, Nos. 6724, 6746; _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 275 f., 281, 283 f.).]
[Footnote 751: Radolin to F. O., June 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 438 f., No.
6710.]
[Footnote 752: Bülow to Radolin, June 16, 1905, _ibid._, 439 ff., No.
6711; Radolin to Rouvier, June 16, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 234 ff., No.
272.]
[Footnote 753: Bülow to Tattenbach, June 19, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 448 ff.,
No. 6718.]
[Footnote 754: Sternburg to F. O., June 17, 1905, _ibid._, 442 f., No.
6713; Bishop, I, 477 f.]
[Footnote 755: On Roosevelt and Great Britain see Bishop, I, 474 f., 481
ff., 408; Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, 37 f., 210
ff.; Sykes, _The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand_, p. 285;
Sternburg to F. O., June 12, 17, 25, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 433 f., No. 6707;
442 f., No. 6713; 473 ff., No. 6738; Lansdowne to Durand, June 16, July
12, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 89, No. 85; 91, No. 87; Spring Rice’s
correspondence with Roosevelt, June-July, 1905, Gwynn, _The Letters and
Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 472 ff.]
[Footnote 756: Threats by the German ambassadors in Paris, Rome, and
Madrid (_B.D._, III, 97, No. 126).]
[Footnote 757: Lansdowne to Bertie, June 16, 1905, _ibid._, 96, No. 124;
Nicolson to Lansdowne, June 17, 1905, _ibid._, 97, No. 125.]
[Footnote 758: Barrère, the two Cambons, and Jusserand, all firmly in
sympathy with Delcassé’s policy, were holding Rouvier in line. See
Egerton to Lansdowne, June 13, 1905, _ibid._, 95, No. 122.]
[Footnote 759: Lansdowne to Bertie, June 16, 1905, _ibid._, 96 f., No.
124. In Rome Egerton was working to hold Italy in line with this policy.
See Egerton to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 94, No. 120.]
[Footnote 760: Radolin to F. O., June 26, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 484, No.
6745.]
[Footnote 761: Rouvier to Radolin, June 21, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 235
ff., No. 273; Radolin to F. O., June 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 452 f., No.
6720. The note was composed mainly by Paul Cambon. See Radolin to F. O.,
June 30, 1905, _ibid._, 494, No. 6752.]
[Footnote 762: Lansdowne to Bertie, June 21, 1905, _B.D._, III, 97 f.,
No. 126; Metternich to F. O., June 23, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 463 f., No.
6727; Rouvier to Jusserand, June 23 and 25, 1905, quoted in Bishop, I,
478 ff. Dennis relates that while in France in May, 1926, he heard a
story to the effect that Roosevelt had written to the German Emperor at
this crisis warning him that “it would be a crime against civilization
for Germany to declare war against France.” Dennis was unable to find
any such letter, and presumes that the one thought to have contained
this warning was one from Roosevelt to Sternburg on June 26 [_sic_],
1905 (Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, p. 495). The truth
seems to be that Roosevelt, who had not been so schooled in diplomacy as
to choose his words carefully, spoke to Jusserand as if he would use
such language to the Emperor, and then softened down his words greatly
when he did write to Sternburg. Cf. Jusserand’s letter to Rouvier on
June 25, 1905, with Roosevelt’s letter to Sternburg on the same date,
quoted in Bishop, I, 480 f., 483 ff. Rouvier gave Roosevelt credit for
his acceptance in principle of the conference. The French Premier also
asked Eckardstein to intervene again, but the latter refused since he
was in such bad odor with his government (Eckardstein, III, 147 ff.).]
[Footnote 763: “Rouvier . . . . we know does not wish a conflict with
us,” . . . . “the Chamber of Deputies wishes above all to avoid war”
(quoted from a dispatch from Bülow to William II, June 22, 1905, _G.P._,
XX, 456, No. 6723). “The sooner we make it clear to him [Rouvier] what
results the French refusal of the conference and the further support of
the pretender must have, the more we diminish the dangers of the
situation” (Bülow to Radolin, June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 466, No. 6730).
That the German government was playing with war but did not intend to
start one is also evident from a confidential letter from Holstein to
the editor of the _Kölnische Zeitung_, June 28, 1905, which expresses
completely the nature of the German policy. “. . . . In brief, I
consider the danger of war for Germany at the present moment vanishingly
small. It will be still more diminished if a conviction of our firmness
prevails. We know now for certain that in the last ministerial council
Delcassé declared: ‘Germany will not dare to fight, it is all bluff.’
This doubt about our determination could have led to a conflict if the
other ministers had shared Delcassé’s views” (reprinted in _Kölnische
Zeitung_, April 2, 1922).]
[Footnote 764: Radolin to F. O., June 22, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 457 ff., No.
6724; memo. by Bülow, June 23, 1905, _ibid._, 459 ff., No. 6725; Bülow
to William II, June 22 and 24, 1905, _ibid._, 455 ff., No. 6723; 464 f.,
No. 6729; Bülow to Radolin, June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 465 f., No. 6730;
Bihourd to Rouvier, June 23, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 240 f., No. 277;
Lansdowne to Lister, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 105 ff., No. 133;
Whitehead to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 108 f., No. 135.]
[Footnote 765: Monts to Bülow, June 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 454 f., No.
6722.]
[Footnote 766: Metternich to F. O., June 23, 1905, _ibid._, 463 f., No.
6727; Lee, II, 344; Lansdowne to Bertie, June 21, 1905, _B.D._, III, 97
f., No. 126.]
[Footnote 767: Bülow held out prospects of aiding Spain to acquire
Tangier and the surrounding territory in case of a future break-up of
Morocco if Spain would uphold the German policy. The insincerity of the
statement is proved by a letter from Holstein to Radolin on July 2,
1905. In regard to the Moroccan affair he wrote: “We need have no
consideration for the wishes of others, at any rate not for those of
Spain who has never caused other than anger or embarrassment for us.”
See Bülow to Radowitz, June 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 453 f., No. 6721;
Radowitz to F. O., June 25, 1905, _ibid._, 473, No. 6737; Holstein to
Radolin, July 2, 1905, _ibid._, 503, No. 6757.]
[Footnote 768: See Rouvier’s reply to the Prince of Monaco, which the
latter immediately handed to the German government (William II to Bülow,
June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 464, No. 6728).]
[Footnote 769: Eckardstein, III, 147 ff.; report from Paris, June 18,
1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 60; _Bulletin_, June, 1905, pp. 235 ff.
“There appear to me to be indications that the feeling is growing in
France that it is necessary to treat the Morocco question in as
conciliatory a spirit as possible, but that when further demands are
made by Germany they should be met by a firm refusal. . . . . The
feeling of resentment against Germany on account of her present action
is very strong and the spirit of the ‘revanche’ is reawakening; the
French have pulled themselves together wonderfully after their first
panic and they now seem prepared to face calmly the contingency of war
in the future should the pretensions of Germany continue.
“There is I think no doubt that Monsieur Rouvier could at present
command a very large majority in the Chamber on any question of Foreign
policy, and his efforts to preserve peace by conciliation so far as
conciliation can go without loss of dignity, will only enhance his
position in the eyes of his countrymen, and assure him their unanimous
support in the event of such a policy being rendered impossible” (Lister
to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 107 f., No. 134).]
[Footnote 770: Sternburg to F. O., June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 466 f., No.
6731; Bishop, I, 482.]
[Footnote 771: The note was dated June 24, but was handed by Bülow to
Bihourd on June 25 and by Radolin to Rouvier on June 27, 1905. See
Radolin to Rouvier, June 24, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 242 ff., No. 278;
Bihourd to Rouvier, June 25, 1905, _ibid._, 244 f., No. 279; Bülow to
Radolin, June 25 and 26, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 470 f., No. 6734; 472, No.
6736; Bülow to William II, June 26, 1905, _ibid._, 476 ff., No. 6740.]
[Footnote 772: However, the Sultan and the other Powers should not be
precluded thereby from proposing other matters for the consideration of
that body.]
[Footnote 773: Bülow to Radolin, June 25, dispatched June 26, 1905,
_ibid._, 470 f., No. 6734.]
[Footnote 774: Radolin to F. O., June 25 and 26, 1905, _ibid._, 472, No.
6735; 479, No. 6741; Radolin to Bülow, June 26, 1905, _ibid._, 483 f.,
No. 6743.]
[Footnote 775: Bülow to William II, June 25, 1905, _ibid._, 467 ff., No.
6732; Sternburg to F. O., June 25, 1905, _ibid._, 473 ff., No. 6738;
Bülow to Sternburg, June 26, 1905, _ibid._, 475 f., No. 6739; Bishop, I,
483 f.]
[Footnote 776: Bishop, I, 485 f.]
[Footnote 777: Sternburg to F. O., June 26, 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 479
ff., No. 6742 f.; Bishop, I, 485.]
[Footnote 778: Sternburg to F. O., June 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 480 f.,
No. 6743.]
[Footnote 779: Bülow to Sternburg, June 27, 1905, _ibid._, 481, No.
6744. Sternburg inadvertently changed the wording of that promise to
read as follows: “The Emperor has requested me [Sternburg] to tell you
that if during the coming conference differences of opinion should arise
between France and Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up
the decision which you should consider to be most fair and most
practical” (Sternburg to Roosevelt, June 28, 1905, quoted in Bishop, I,
487). The latter promise bound the German government more tightly than
did the former, and was to cause it embarrassment later.]
[Footnote 780: Metternich to F. O., June 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 634 f.,
No. 6859.]
[Footnote 781: Metternich to F. O., June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 636, No.
6860; Lansdowne to Whitehead, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 103, No.
132_a_.]
[Footnote 782: Radolin to F. O., June 26, dispatched June 27, 1905,
_G.P._, XX, 479, No. 6741.]
[Footnote 783: Radolin to F. O., June 27, dispatched June 28, 1905,
_ibid._, 485 f., No. 6746.]
[Footnote 784: Bülow to Radolin, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 487 f., No.
6748; Bülow to William II, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 488 ff., No. 6749.]
[Footnote 785: Bülow to Radolin, July 1, 1905, _ibid._, 495 ff., No.
6753 and Appendix; Holstein to Radolin, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 490 ff.,
No. 6750.]
[Footnote 786: Lister to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 107 f.,
No. 134.]
[Footnote 787: Lansdowne entirely approved of this suggestion, remarking
that “it [the Anglo-French declaration] might be usefully cited for the
purpose of showing that the policy of both France and Great Britain had
been in favour of maintaining the independence and integrity of Morocco
and preserving commercial equality” (Lansdowne to Bertie, July 1, 1905,
_ibid._, 110 f., No. 137). The rancor back of Lansdowne’s statement is
apparent.]
[Footnote 788: Radolin to F. O., June 29 and 30, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 492
ff., Nos. 6751 f.; Lee, II, 344.]
[Footnote 789: Bülow to Radolin, July 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 495 ff., No.
6753 and Anlage; Rouvier to Bihourd, July 9, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 249,
No. 285.]
[Footnote 790: Radolin to Bülow, July 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 499, No.
6754; 501 f., No. 6756; Radolin to F. O., July 1, 1905, _ibid._, 499 f.,
No. 6755.]
[Footnote 791: Lansdowne to Bertie, July 1, 1905, _B.D._, III, 110 f.,
No. 137.]
[Footnote 792: On those negotiations see _G.P._, XX, Nos. 6754 ff.;
Rouvier to Bihourd, July 9, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 249, No. 285.]
[Footnote 793: _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 287 f.; _G.P._, XX, Nos. 6767 f.;
_B.D._, III, 115 f., No. 147.]
[Footnote 794: See Rouvier’s speech in the Chamber on July 10, 1905
(_Journal officiel. Debats parlem._ [Chambre, July 10, 1905], pp. 2825
f.). Lansdowne’s speech of acceptance in the House of Lords, July 11,
1905, 4 Hansard, Vol. CIXL, col. 241. Richthofen to Radolin, July 9,
1905, _G.P._, XX, 516 f., No. 6769. The German government prohibited
Jaurès from coming to Berlin to speak before a socialist congress on
July 9, but as the prohibition was based on internal reasons, it had
little effect upon Franco-German relations (Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 104
f.; _L’année politique, 1905_, p. 388).]
[Footnote 795: The French and British governments were particularly
anxious for Russia and the United States to attend. See Lansdowne to
Lister, July 6, 1905, _B.D._, III, 114, No. 143; see also _ibid._, Nos.
149 ff., 154, 159 f., 164.]
[Footnote 796: Quoted in Bishop, I, 488.]
[Footnote 797: Lister to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 108, No.
134.]
[Footnote 798: Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, 1905, _ibid._, 118 f., No.
152. On June 28 Lowther reported a conversation with Tattenbach in which
the latter gave him to understand that “what he [Tattenbach] desired the
Conference should do, would be to bring about an amendment of the Anglo-
French Convention of April 8th, 1904.” King Edward’s minute to this
dispatch was, “In plain English—Germany ousts France fr[om] Morocco and
puts herself in her place!” See Lowther to Lansdowne, D. June 28, 1905,
R. July 10, 1905, _ibid._, 101 f., No. 191.]
[Footnote 799: Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 217 f.]
[Footnote 800: Lee, II, 344 f.]
CHAPTER XIV
THE MOROCCAN CRISIS, JULY-OCTOBER, 1905
After Germany had forced France to lay the Moroccan problem before an
international conference, M. Rouvier was no longer willing to give
Germany a share in Morocco. Confident of British support and heartened
by the friendly assertions of the German officials, he hoped to obtain a
general mandate from the conference for executing the military, police,
and financial reforms.[801] Thus resuming the original French policy
toward Morocco, he took steps to fulfil it by way of that assembly.
Before negotiating with Germany over a program for the conference, M.
Rouvier obtained the approval of his proposals from Great Britain and
Spain.[802] He also felt it necessary to affirm and supplement the
Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904 in accordance with the new situation
and to make certain of Spain’s loyalty at the conference.
The new government formed in Madrid late in June showed immediately a
more independent spirit toward France than its predecessor had done.
Both M. Montero Rios, the premier, and M. Roman, the foreign minister,
reiterated to the British Ambassador that “the chief aim of their
foreign policy was to be on specially intimate terms with Great Britain,
and to strengthen as far as possible the good understanding at present
existing.” But they established closer contacts with Germany, and
informed the British and French governments that while Spain would abide
by the Franco-Spanish Agreement she had not “abnegated her personality,”
and was free to take any course, in matters outside that agreement, “as
might be dictated by her interests.” Spanish public opinion reflected
the same sentiment. Some elements even wished to use the acceptance of
the conference as an excuse for withdrawing from the Franco-Spanish
agreement entirely. With the help of the British government and the
blunders of Germany, that antagonized Spain, M. Rouvier ironed out the
differences.[803] On September 1 the French and Spanish governments
signed a secret agreement.[804] Its terms were as follows:
All officers and underofficers charged with the instruction and command
of the native troops in Larache and Tetouan were to be Spanish, while
those in Rabat and Casablanca were to be French. The policing of Tangier
should be intrusted for fifteen years to a Franco-Spanish corps
commanded by a Frenchman. Contraband traffic in arms should be
suppressed by France and Spain, individually in certain areas, co-
operatively in others. The two governments were to work together to the
end that “the participation in the capital and the works of all public
enterprises will be offered to subjects of the two nations.” In the
state bank or in any other institution to be created the presidency
should be reserved to France, while the degree of participation of Spain
should be superior to that of any other Power except France.
The two Powers engage to observe this accord even in case where the
stipulations of Article XVII of the Convention of Madrid of 1880 come to
be extended to all economic and financial questions; they will aid each
other before the Sultan . . . . to assure the loyal accomplishment of
all that the present accord stipulates. Moreover, Spain being firmly
resolved to act in complete accord with France . . . . and France
proposing to act in the same way with Spain, it is agreed . . . . that
the two Governments will assist each other and will proceed in common
accord in the deliberations [at the conference] in that which concerns
the stipulations of the convention of October 3, 1904, in its broadest
and most amicable interpretation as well as in that which concerns the
different objects of the present accord. They engage to extend to each
other the most complete pacific aid on all questions of a general order
concerning Morocco in harmony with the cordial and friendly entente
between them with reference to the affairs of the Sherifian Empire.[805]
Both governments were well pleased with the terms. The British
government also readily approved them. The transaction marked another
step in drawing the three Powers closer together and in handing Morocco
over to the charge of France and Spain.[806]
At the same time M. Rouvier began negotiations with the German
government over the program for the conference. The two were at
loggerheads from the start, for the German views of what constituted a
just consideration of France’s interests in Morocco were different from
those of the French. When, late in June, the Moroccan government offered
to give various economic contracts to Germany and to appoint a few
German officers for creating a small Moroccan army, Count Tattenbach was
enthusiastically in favor of accepting the proposals.[807] Prince Bülow
refused, and on July 11 instructed the Minister as follows:
As for your further deportment in Fez, . . . . keep in mind that you
will soon have to co-operate with the French representative. We regard
the concessions offered by the Sultan as desirable, but can accept them
only if they are not in contradiction to the future decisions of the
conference. Therefore . . . . delay making a decision about these
offers. . . . .[808]
Nevertheless, the Chancellor planned for the conference to divide the
police and military mandate in Morocco among the Powers in such a way
that France would receive the mandate for the frontier region only,
while Germany would receive it for “the western coastal towns from Rabat
south . . . . as suitable for a future German sphere of interest.”[809]
Furthermore, he expected Germany to receive her share of the economic
advantages in the development of the entire land.[810]
To achieve these ends the German foreign office appointed Count
Tattenbach as its representative at the conference,[811] even though he
was highly objectionable to the French. It also instructed Prince
Radolin on July 10 to inform M. Rouvier either directly or indirectly
that “the desired understanding would be placed seriously in doubt” if
he did not exclude M. Delcassé’s followers, such as M. Paul Cambon and
M. Georges Louis,[812] from influence upon French foreign policy, or if
he should appoint M. Révoil, former governor of Algeria and a reputed
Germanophobe, as a delegate to the conference.[813] Prince Radolin was
also to uphold Tangier as a meeting place for the assembly; for the
German government believed that the anti-French and pro-German influence
of the Moroccans would be more strongly exerted there than in some
European town.[814] When the Ambassador stated his government’s requests
to MM. Dupuy and Léon, both men begged him “not to put the pistol to M.
Rouvier’s breast too sharply.” M. Rouvier was having enough difficulty
with public opinion, they said.[815] The German government asked
President Roosevelt to support its views about M. Révoil and about
Tangier, but this time, after consulting the French government, the
President refused.[816] M. Rouvier chose M. Révoil in spite of German
opposition. Furthermore, asserting that Tangier was a dangerous hotbed
of intrigue, he urged the choice of some European town.[817] By the end
of July the German government was willing to acquiesce, although for
bargaining purposes it reserved its public consent until later.[818]
It was not M. Rouvier’s determined stand which induced this
acquiescence, but rather the unexpected signing by the German and
Russian rulers of the Björkö treaty of alliance on July 24.[819] This
treaty, which provided for the later association of France in the
alliance, was signed by both sovereigns under the impression that the
Franco-German agreement of July 8 had settled the Moroccan affair and
had cleared the way for a _rapprochement_. In view of this changed
situation Prince Bülow, on July 31, instructed the foreign office as
follows:
1. We must reserve the possibility of permitting France a free hand in
Morocco at the moment in which she has to decide about joining the
Russo-German understanding. A better use of Morocco we could hardly find
and that would be by far the most favorable close of our Moroccan
campaign. 2. To attain this we need not relinquish too early our general
position on the Moroccan question. But the French need not believe that
our aim was ultimately to set foot in Morocco. It appears to me more
advisable to permit the Moroccan question to rest for a time rather than
to hasten it. Pushing or threatening at this moment on account of
Morocco would only press France still closer to England and at the same
time cause the Emperor Nicholas to suspect that directly after Björkö he
is to be forced to choose between us and France.[820]
In keeping with this policy, Prince Bülow, Baron Richthofen, and Herr
von Mühlberg all absented themselves from Berlin during the succeeding
days, and left Count Pourtales, Prussian minister in Munich, in charge
of the foreign office. As he was not in touch with the negotiations,
Herr von Holstein and Dr. Kriege, the legal adviser, directed affairs.
While the “Grey Eminence” approved the new direction to be given to the
Moroccan policy,[821] he seemed entirely unable to relinquish a stand
once taken or to sacrifice details for the achievement of a larger end.
When his blunders brought him to the point of having to retreat or
fight, he preferred _Machtpolitik_. Neither he nor his chief realized
that some form of settlement of the Moroccan affair was necessary to
allay French and British mistrust, and that their new policy of delay
would prolong the period of crisis. This was particularly the case since
the policy continued to lack unity. Herr von Holstein, Dr. Kriege, the
Emperor, Count Tattenbach—each had his particular addition to make,
whether it harmonized with the whole or not; and the gracious Prince
Bülow, successor to Bismarck, accepted all contributions.
The most striking example of this lack of harmony was manifested by
Count Tattenbach at Fez. Early in August the news spread that the Count
had been instrumental in persuading the Moroccan government to grant to
the German firm of Bourgeaud-Hansemann on July 30 a contract for
building a mole in the harbor of Tangier at the price of 1,300,000
marks. It was also rumored that he was aiding negotiations between the
Sultan and a group of German banks for a loan of 10,000,000 marks.[822]
The French press indignantly accused the German government of double-
dealing. _Le Temps_ noted that Count Tattenbach had been recalled from
Morocco several years before for a similar indiscretion. Germany had
accused France, it said, of wishing to make a second Tunis of Morocco;
but France did not intend to let Germany make a second Turkey of it. It
asked that Germany again deal severely with Count Tattenbach. M.
Clémenceau in _L’Aurore_ spoke bluntly in an article entitled “No
Dupery,” and a few days later, even more strongly in one headed “C’est
trop.” The press also attacked M. Rouvier for permitting the Germans to
hoodwink him. If Parliament had been sitting, his position might have
been precarious.[823]
These criticisms were undeserved. M. Rouvier had made every effort to
prevent the concessions from being given. Both he and the British
government had tried to block the negotiations as soon as reports of
them came through. When the definite fact of the mole concession became
known, M. Rouvier, supported by Lord Lansdowne, immediately strengthened
his protests to the German government against Count Tattenbach’s
actions. He declared that they infringed upon French rights,[824] that
they were a breach of faith and a violation of the spirit of the accord
of July 8, that they endangered the success of the conference, the
harmony of Franco-German relations, and his own position as minister. It
was not his fault, he said angrily, that Franco-German relations
continued to be strained. He urged that the project for a loan be
blocked, or if this were impossible, that the German government agree to
repayment of the loan with funds from the Moroccan state bank to be
established. The question whether the German or a French firm had a
prior right to the contract for the mole, he asserted, should be left in
abeyance until the conference should regulate the method of granting
contracts for public works.[825] The Spanish government was equally
angry at Germany because of Count Tattenbach’s acts. On August 23 M.
Montero Rios poured out his wrath to the French Ambassador over
Germany’s trampling on Spanish interests in Morocco. It was generally
understood, he said, that Northern Morocco was reserved to Spain. Yet,
he continued indignantly, Germany had acquired concessions in that area
and had obtained a mortgage on the lands around Tangier.
Under all these provocations . . . . Spain had to remain mute [so the
British ambassador reported his remarks]. France was the mouthpiece of
the three Powers who were working together to save the situation in
Morocco and His Excellency [M. Montero Rios] expressed an earnest hope
that she would not yield all along the line to German pressure and would
bear in mind what were the modest but real interests of Spain in
Morocco. Señor Montero Rios concluded . . . . by bringing down his fist
upon the table and saying, “we shall not forget what Germany has done to
us on this occasion.”
When M. Jules Cambon warned the German Ambassador in Madrid on August 23
that “it might become necessary for the Powers mainly interested in
Morocco to insist that all concessions recently obtained should be
examined by the Conference before they were finally ratified,” M.
Montero Rios heartily approved and volunteered to speak in like manner
to Herr von Radowitz.[826]
The German government itself supported the loan in order to strengthen
its hold over the Sultan and to calm his fears about Germany’s separate
negotiations with France. The contract for the mole surprised and
embarrassed Prince Bülow. He reprimanded Count Tattenbach for having
transgressed his instructions and warned him to abide by them in the
future.[827] Nevertheless, he upheld both transactions against the
French complaints. He asserted to M. Rouvier that the negotiations for
the contract had been under way for several months.[828] He claimed that
the loan was not a “loan” but a harmless temporary “advance” which could
be repaid at any time. Repeating the assurances of Germany’s
disinterestedness in Morocco and of friendship for France, the German
government refused M. Rouvier’s suggestions for an understanding about
these two affairs and was unable to comprehend the French
excitement.[829] As M. Rouvier felt that the facts spoke otherwise, the
two governments reached an _impasse_ by the first of September.
At the same time the two governments came to a deadlock over the choice
of a meeting place and the terms of the program for the conference.
Although M. Rouvier submitted proposals about military and financial
reforms on July 20 and August 1, respectively,[830] Germany did not
reply until August 26. The delay was caused by the necessity of
consulting Count Tattenbach, but the French government and press
suspected that Germany was uneasy about possible defeat at the
conference and was therefore putting France off so as to gain
concessions from the Sultan.[831] In its answer the German government
accepted the main lines of the French proposal, but refused to permit
France to settle directly with Morocco the regulation of the police in
the region of the frontier, and also declined to give way on the choice
of Tangier as a meeting place. The German government planned for the
conference to restrict France’s interest in Morocco to this frontier
region.[832] But, on August 30, M. Rouvier met rejection with rejection.
To permit the conference to decide upon the reorganization of the
frontier region would, he wrote in a note to Prince Radolin, mean
sacrificing an advantage and a right which France had enjoyed for sixty
years.[833]
On the question of a meeting place M. Rouvier urged the Spanish
government early in August to propose formally to the Powers that the
conference be held in Spain. Thereby he would exert pressure on Germany
to relinquish Tangier. M. Montero Rios was eager to obtain the honor for
his country, but fearing a rejection of the proposal, he hesitated to
make it. Under French and British persuasion, however, he dispatched a
verbal note to France and Germany offering some town in Southwest Spain
for the conference. As the German government made no reply, M. Montero
Rios was “deeply hurt” at the “high-handed and discourteous manner” in
which Germany was treating Spain.[834]
With affairs so confused, the Chancellor interfered. He sent Dr. Rosen,
the future minister at Tangier, to Paris for direct negotiations. In
reporting this intention to M. Bihourd on September 4, Prince Bülow
expressed in general terms his desire for an entente and spoke of the
mole and the loan as insignificant. But he declared that there was a
line beyond which “German dignity” would not permit him to go and that
if this attempt failed “we would be placed again in the situation which
obtained before the accord of July 8.”[835]
Dr. Rosen, who was entirely unfamiliar with the history of the
negotiations when he started to Paris, soon concluded that a change of
policy was necessary. In France he found that both government and people
were mistrustful, fast becoming embittered, and yet strongly desirous of
a speedy settlement of the controversy. On September 8 he telegraphed to
the Chancellor his opinion that the German government had already given
assurances to France which entitled her to expect that the regulation of
the frontier region would be excluded from the deliberations of the
conference, and that to move her from this view would require “the
speech of cannons” and not “juristic deductions.” He therefore proposed
to regard this point as lost and to prevent France from spreading her
influence further into Morocco by obtaining an exact definition of the
limits of the frontier region. On the choice of a meeting place, he
advised making concessions after all else was settled; the contract for
the mole he would handle as a “bagatelle.” He foresaw greater difficulty
in regard to the loan, which the French considered an act of duplicity;
but he stated to Prince Bülow that he would endeavor to uphold it even
though he regarded as untenable the German distinction between a “loan”
and an “advance.”[836]
Dr. Rosen’s opinion, which Prince Radolin had held for some time, turned
the scales. “As it appears to me,” wrote the Chancellor to Baron
Richthofen on September 8, “we need above all to extricate ourselves
from this Moroccan affair, which has apparently become confused, in such
a way as to maintain our prestige in the world and to preserve the
German economic and financial interests intact as much as possible.” He
accepted Dr. Rosen’s proposals. Germany should yield on the questions of
the frontier and the meeting place, and France on those of the mole and
the loan.[837]
The ensuing negotiations, carried on by Dr. Rosen mainly with M. Révoil,
were replete with dramatic moments.[838] By September 16, the two men
reached agreement on most of the points. But when Dr. Rosen learned from
M. Révoil that France expected to obtain at the conference a general
mandate for the financial and police reforms in the whole of Morocco, he
made the concession on the frontier question contingent upon an official
French disclaimer of that intention.[839]
M. Rouvier rejected this demand. He offered several times to compensate
Germany for her renunciation in Morocco by including other questions in
the negotiations, such as those of the Bagdad and the Camerun
railways.[840] Dr. Rosen declined to broaden the basis of the
negotiations, however, and threatened to break them off (although in
reality he had no intention of doing so) if the French persisted in
their denial of his request.[841] When the French press began to attack
Germany, the Chancellor warned M. Rouvier repeatedly that “if the French
imagine that they can intimidate us or even publicly humiliate us, they
are playing a dangerous game which can lead to war.” Conditions were
much as they had been three months before.[842] Then the sudden
intervention of M. Witte changed the situation.
Returning from Portsmouth, where he had represented Russia in the
negotiations for peace with Japan, M. Witte stopped in Paris to arrange
a loan for Russia. In discussing the project with M. Rouvier, he was
told that France could not consider the loan until the conflict with
Germany was settled.[843] Since he was interested in a quick solution of
the Moroccan difficulty and since he favored a _rapprochement_ between
Russia, Germany, and France against Great Britain,[844] M. Witte
discussed matters with his friend Prince Radolin on the morning of
September 23. Immediately after this conversation M. Witte saw the
French Premier, and at the latter’s request returned that afternoon to
urge the French views upon the German Ambassador. M. Rouvier was
willing, M. Witte said to Prince Radolin, to give verbally the most
formal declaration that he would not seek a mandate for Western Morocco
at the conference, but since M. Rouvier believed that French public
opinion would never accept a written one, he would rather resign than
give it. Germany was sufficiently protected against that possibility in
any case, the Premier had argued to M. Witte, by the requirement of
unanimity in the conference. M. Rouvier had also promised, said M.
Witte, to co-operate harmoniously with Germany at the assembly. M. Witte
found a sympathetic listener in Prince Radolin, who was disgusted with
Dr. Rosen’s policy. When later in the same afternoon the Prince, Dr.
Rosen, and M. Rouvier met for further discussion, the Ambassador openly
supported the French side. Hence Dr. Rosen had to yield.[845]
From Paris M. Witte went to Germany. At Berlin on September 25 he
persuaded the Chancellor to accept M. Rouvier’s views;[846] and at
Rominten on September 27-28 he was even more successful with the Emperor
William II, who immediately telegraphed to Prince Bülow as follows:
Bring Rosen to reason so that that disgusting quarreling in Paris will
cease. I am completely fed up on it . . . . [_Ich habe es gründlich
satt_]. France must now . . . . be shown friendship and be permitted to
save her face so that she will remain without rancour and will complete
the turn necessary to bring her into our alliance.[847]
As a result of M. Witte’s intervention, the two Powers reached an
understanding on September 28.[848] They agreed that the program for the
conference should provide for police reform and the suppression of
contraband traffic in arms by way of an international accord, except in
the frontier region where the execution of that action should remain
“the exclusive affair” of France and Morocco. A Moroccan state bank
should be created, the Moroccan monetary system be stabilized, and funds
be advanced for paying the police and for carrying out certain urgent
public works. Improved methods of collecting the customs and of raising
revenues should be provided. The Sultan should engage not to alienate
any public service to the profit of particular interests. The principle
of adjudication without regard to nationality should be followed in
giving contracts for the construction of public works. The conference
should meet at Algeciras in Spain. In a supplementary understanding the
French government acknowledged the German “loan” to be an “advance”;
but, while the control of that transaction should remain in German
hands, the French banks were permitted to furnish one-half the sum
necessary.[849] The German government also agreed that an investigation
of the relative rights of the French and German firms to the contract
for the mole should be made, although it was tacitly understood that the
German firm would win.[850]
To make doubly sure that, apart from this agreement, France would have
her hands free at the conference, M. Rouvier made the following
declaration to the German government:
Aside from the agreement to be signed between the two governments, I am
not bound on any point. I renew my affirmation that I have to the same
degree as the Imperial Government the desire to avoid all open discord
between us at the conference and to co-operate in effecting the
solutions that respect best the interests and _amours propres_, in such
a way that there will be neither victor nor vanquished. . . . . The
guarantee for Germany lies in the fact that, since the decisions of the
conference must be unanimous, her opposition will suffice to prevent the
general mandate from being given to us.[851]
M. Rouvier thereby changed the statement transmitted by M. Witte to
Prince Radolin that France would not strive for a mandate for Western
Morocco to a less binding one which would leave France free to seek a
mandate if she thought that Germany could be coerced into agreeing. This
ambiguity was to cause trouble later.
The Sultan’s approval of this program was obtained with some difficulty.
The monarch and his advisers were very diffident about reforms and
feared what the outcome of the conference might be. They besieged Count
Tattenbach with questions about the program, wanting to know why Morocco
had been excluded from the negotiations, what the various clauses in it
would result in, whether France would after all succeed in her object by
way of the conference. Count Tattenbach, who was practically unsupported
by the French Minister, replied that Morocco could not survive without
reforms, that Germany would defend Morocco’s independence and integrity.
As none of the Sultan’s advisers would shoulder the risk of approving
the program to their master, Count Tattenbach had to do so. By October
22 he succeeded in his work. On December 1 the Sultan issued a circular
letter inviting the signatory Powers to the conference.[852] The
invitations were accepted.
On September 29, in reporting the conclusion of the Franco-German
agreement, Dr. Rosen mentioned to his government for the first time the
offers which M. Rouvier had made to include in the settlement the
difficulties over the Bagdad and Camerun railways. Prince Bülow was
immediately eager to open negotiations.
At the present time we must use every opportunity to create solidarity
of interest between France and us [he instructed the foreign office on
the next day]. Under the present circumstances every African agreement
with France is useful to us. Naturally far more useful would be an
understanding over the Bagdad Railway. We must always take into
consideration the inclination of the English to come to terms with
Russia over Asia Minor, whereby we would eventually be placed in the
dilemma of suffering a defeat on the question of the Bagdad Railway or
of arousing acute antagonism between Russia and us.
But, the Chancellor added, Germany must not show undue eagerness in the
matter.[853]
When Prince Radolin broached the subject to the French Premier on
October 18, the latter replied that he had offered “an even more far-
reaching agreement” at a time when he had hoped to settle the Moroccan
affair without a conference, but that under the circumstances he would
consider the project only after the conference.[854] That the Chancellor
could have expected any other reply showed how little understanding he
had of the French state of mind.
Prince Bülow manifested the same obtuseness in an interview with M.
Tardieu of _Le Temps_ on October 3 as a bid for friendlier relations
with France. Repeating all the German criticisms of the French policy,
the Chancellor declared:
I think that the conference, far from dividing us, ought to contribute
to a _rapprochement_ between us. For that _rapprochement_, however, one
condition is necessary: that French public opinion thoroughly recognize
that the policy of isolating Germany is an object of the past. . . . .
Today as yesterday, provided your colonial policy respects our
commercial interests . . . . we will not obstruct you, but in case of
need will aid you in Morocco and elsewhere.
He denied that Germany sought to force upon France an anti-British
policy and that Germany had any ulterior motives in her friendship with
Russia. He summed up the international situation as follows:
A double system of alliances, both pacific, assures equilibrium in
Europe. On those alliances we can and must superimpose friendships. You
are friends with Italy: nothing is better. We are friends of Russia: it
is perfect. But we must not give to the Franco-Italian _rapprochement_
an anti-German character or to the Russo-German _rapprochement_ an anti-
French character.[855]
In spite of the Chancellor’s attempt at conciliation, French public
opinion did not like the “schoolmaster” tone of his remarks and saw
therein “the proof that the Moroccan incident had been only a pretext to
intervene in the direction given to France’s foreign policy and to force
France to modify it.”[856] In fact, not a single French newspaper spoke
well of the German policy.[857] Rather, _Le Matin_ took occasion on
October 5 to publish revelations to the effect that at the crucial
French cabinet meeting of June 6 M. Delcassé had declared that
England was ready, whatever might happen, to aid France if the latter
were the object of an unforeseen and improbable aggression. [It was
further asserted in the article that] England, in effect, informed the
Government of the Republic verbally that if France were attacked, she
was ready to mobilize her fleet, to seize the Kiel Canal, and to land
100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. The French Government was even told
later that if it so desired, that offer would be made in writing.[858]
The reports were denied by M. Delcassé and by the French and British
governments.[859] But the _London Times_ and the French press believed
the first part of the revelations, although the _Times_ regarded the
latter part as gossip.[860]
In Germany these revelations provoked an outburst of indignation. Still
at odds with King Edward VII, the Emperor wanted to recall Count
Metternich for an indefinite leave of absence unless the British
government gave a satisfactory explanation of the disclosures.[861] But
Prince Bülow knew that the Emperor’s suggestion could not be carried out
merely on the basis of newspaper talk. In fact, he did not believe that
the revelations were accurate.[862] Still he seized the opportunity to
relieve his own position with German public opinion by giving
instructions for the German press to accept the revelations as true. By
these means M. Delcassé should be represented as having used the
Moroccan affair to bring on a war with Germany, while Great Britain
should be accused of inciting the French to unleash a world-war. The
press should state that Germany had never thought of attacking France,
of drawing France to her by force, or of playing France against Great
Britain. “It is important that the German public understand how grave
the international situation is, how necessary it is to be armed, and how
wretched, in view of the seriousness of the world situation, party
conflicts and the usual Philistine pettifogging appear.” By so using the
press, the Chancellor wrote, “we embarrass our enemies in England and
bring advantage to our naval proposals.”[863] Moreover, on October 26,
when the Emperor dedicated a statue to Field-Marshal Count Moltke, he
declared: “How we stand in the world you have seen. Therefore, the
powder dry, the sword sharp, the goal known, the forces braced, and the
pessimist banished, I drink to our nation in arms.”[864]
Here were the fruits of two months and a half of tedious and irritating
negotiations. Starting with the assurance that the conference would meet
and that the reforms would be internationally executed, Germany ended
with the same assurance, a half-share in a loan of 10,000,000 marks and
a petty contract for a mole. She began with the intention of winning
France for the sake of completing a continental alliance with Russia;
but by her blundering mismanagement of the Moroccan affair she ruined
any chance for doing so. In June the victorious Germany had confronted a
France fearful of war and subject to pressure. Since then Germany
herself had been constantly receding before the determination of a
united French nation. In June M. Rouvier had endeavored to “save
France’s face”; by September, Prince Bülow was trying to “save Germany’s
face.” The tables were turned.
[Footnote 801: Rouvier to Bihourd, July 9, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 249,
No. 285.]
[Footnote 802: It was Lansdowne’s suggestion that Spain be included. See
Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12 and 13, 1905, _B.D._, III, 118 ff., Nos.
152 f.; Cambon to Lansdowne, July 20, 1905, _ibid._, 121 f., No. 157;
Lansdowne to Manneville, July 21, 1905, _ibid._, 122, No. 158.]
[Footnote 803: Nicolson to Lansdowne, D. June 29, 1905, R. July 10,
1905, D. July 1, 1905, R. July 10, 1905, July 7 and 11, 1905, _ibid._,
109 f., No. 136; 111 f., No. 138; 114, No. 144; 116, No. 148; Lansdowne
to Nicolson, July 8, 1905, _ibid._, 114 f., No. 145; Lansdowne to
Bertie, July 12, 1905, _ibid._, 119, No. 152.]
[Footnote 804: Nothing is known of these negotiations. See Vidal, _La
politique de l’Espagne au Maroc_, pp. 172 ff.; Mousset, _La politica
exterior de España 1873-1918_, pp. 162 f.; Tardieu, _Revue des deux
mondes_, Dec., 1912, p. 640; _La Conf. d’Algés._, pp. 58 ff., 156.]
[Footnote 805: The accord is reprinted in _Archives diplomatiques_, CXX
(1911), 15 ff.]
[Footnote 806: Lansdowne to Lister, Aug. 30, 1905, _B.D._, III, 131, No.
173; Cartwright to Lansdowne, Sept. 4 and 7, 1905, _ibid._, 136, No.
175; 137 f., No. 177; Cambon to Lansdowne, Sept. 6, 1905, _ibid._, 136
f., No. 176; Lansdowne to Cambon, Sept. 9, 1907, _ibid._, 138, No. 179.]
[Footnote 807: Tattenbach to F. O., June 16, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 444 f.,
Nos. 6714 f; Tattenbach to F. O., June 23 and 25, 1905, _ibid._, pp. 524
f. n.]
[Footnote 808: Bülow to Tattenbach, June 19 and 20, 1905, _ibid._, 448
ff., No. 6718 f.; Bülow to Tattenbach, July 11, 1905, _ibid._, 524 ff.,
No. 6774.]
[Footnote 809: Tattenbach to F. O., June 25, 1905, _ibid._, p. 525 n.;
Bülow to Tattenbach, June 19, July 11, 1905, _ibid._, 450, No. 6718; 525
f., No. 6774.]
[Footnote 810: Tattenbach had visions of persuading the Sultan to
transfer his residence from Fez to Marrakech where he would be under
German influence after Morocco was divided, and where Germany could then
secure the appointment of Germans as the Sultan’s military instructors
(Tattenbach to F. O., June 25, 1905, _ibid._, p. 525 n.).]
[Footnote 811: Bülow to Tattenbach, July 11, 1905, _ibid._, 524, No.
6774.]
[Footnote 812: Georges Louis was the political director of the French
foreign office.]
[Footnote 813: Richthofen to Radolin, July 10, 1905, _ibid._, 521 f.,
No. 6771; Holstein to Radolin, July 10, 1905, _ibid._, 523, No. 6772.]
[Footnote 814: Mühlberg to Wedel, July 13, 1905, _ibid._, 526 f., No.
6775; Bülow to William II, Aug. 3, 1905, _ibid._, 537, No. 6786. This
choice was also desired by the Moroccan government for its own
convenience (Lowther to Lansdowne, July 24, 1905, _B.D._, III, 123, No.
161).]
[Footnote 815: Radolin to F. O., July 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 527, No.
6776.]
[Footnote 816: Bussche-Haddenhausen to F. O., July 25 and 30, 1905,
_ibid._, 528 f., No. 6778; 529, No. 6779; Bishop, _The Life and Times of
Theodore Roosevelt_, I, 488.]
[Footnote 817: His view was actively supported by the British
government. Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, 1905, _B.D._, III, 119, No.
152; Lansdowne to Lowther, July 28, 1905, _ibid._, 123, No. 163.]
[Footnote 818: Bülow to William II, Aug. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 537, No.
6786.]
[Footnote 819: See next chapter.]
[Footnote 820: Bülow to F. O., July 31, 1905, _ibid._, 531 f., No. 6782.
Holstein expressed the same opinion.]
[Footnote 821: Holstein to Bülow, July 26, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 468 ff.,
No. 6223.]
[Footnote 822: The loan was proposed to the German banking house,
Mendelssohn & Co., by an English firm in Tangier, Moses Pariente, in
April, 1905. A syndicate of German banks, among them the Bleichröder
group, the Mendelssohn group, the Disconto Gesellschaft, the Berliner
Handels-Gesellschaft, was formed to make it. The loan, under negotiation
during the summer and early autumn of 1905, was concluded on Oct. 4,
1905 (Schulthess, _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, p. 306). It
was a purely temporary one to be guaranteed by some of the Sultan’s
personal property in land, a fact which alarmed the French even more
because it denoted a possible German design to acquire possession of
territory in Morocco. On the matters of the mole and loan see the
following: Chérisey to Rouvier, Aug. 1, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 260, No.
295; Saint-Aulaire to Rouvier, Aug. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 267 f., No. 304;
note signed by the French and German representatives, Sept. 28, 1905,
_ibid._, 307 f., No. 352; Holstein to Radolin, Aug. 14, 1905, _G.P._,
XX, 540 ff., No. 6789; Pourtales to Radolin, Aug. 19, 1905, _ibid._, 542
f., No. 6790; _Bulletin_, Aug., 1905, p. 299.]
[Footnote 823: Radolin to Bülow, Aug. 29, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 549 ff.,
Nos. 6794 f.; Lister to Lansdowne, Aug. 2 and 15, 1905, _B.D._, III,
126, No. 167; 128 f., No. 170.]
[Footnote 824: A French firm had been surveying and making estimates for
some months with a view to obtaining that same contract as well as other
contracts for the improvement of the Moroccan harbors. The French
claimed that by Art. XXXIII of the contract between the Sultan and the
French consortium of banks in the previous year the latter had been
given a priority right to make all future loans to Morocco.]
[Footnote 825: Rouvier to Radolin, July 29, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 254
f., No. 292, and following documents; Bülow to Radolin, Aug. 3, 1905,
_G.P._, XX, 533 ff., No. 6784, and following documents; Lansdowne to
Whitehead, Aug. 1, 1905, _B.D._, III, 125 f., No. 166; Lansdowne to
Lowther, June 23 and 26, July 19 and 31, 1905, _ibid._, 100, No. 128;
101, No. 130; 120 f., No. 155; 124 f., No. 165.]
[Footnote 826: So Cambon informed Cartwright (Cartwright to Lansdowne,
Aug. 24, 1905, _ibid._, 130, No. 172).]
[Footnote 827: Mühlberg to Tattenbach, Aug. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 535 f.,
No. 6786.]
[Footnote 828: Tattenbach and Kühlmann both supported the contract for
the mole, which, it was found, the Emperor had also approved. See
Holstein to Radolin, Aug. 18, 1905, _ibid._, 540, No. 6789; telegram
from Tattenbach, June 25, 1905, _ibid._, p. 525 n.; Lowther to
Lansdowne, June 23 and 25, July 19 and 31, 1905, _B.D._, III, 100, No.
128; 101, No. 130; 120 f., No. 155; 124 f., No. 165.]
[Footnote 829: Bülow to Radolin, Aug. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 533 ff., No.
6784, and the following documents. Also Bihourd to Rouvier, Aug. 1,
1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 260 f., No. 296; note handed by Radolin to the
French government, Aug. 4, 1905, _ibid._, 262 f., No. 298 and following
documents.]
[Footnote 830: Rouvier to Radolin, July 20, Aug. 1, 1905, _L.j.,
1901-5_, 253 f., No. 290; 253 f., No. 294; 256 ff., No. 294; Radolin to
F. O., July 20, Aug. 2, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 528, No. 6777; 532 f., No.
6783.]
[Footnote 831: Lister to Lansdowne, Aug. 15, 1905, _B.D._, III, 128, No.
170.]
[Footnote 832: Bülow to F. O., Aug. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 537 f., No.
6787; Mühlberg to Tattenbach, Aug. 6, 1905, _ibid._, 538 ff., No. 6788;
Bülow to Radolin, Aug. 22, dispatched Aug. 24, 1905, _ibid._, 544 ff.,
No. 6792; Radolin to Rouvier, Aug. 26, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 283 ff.,
No. 323; memo. by Kriege, Sept. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 554 ff., No. 6798.]
[Footnote 833: Rouvier to Radolin, Aug. 30, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 290
ff., No. 331; Radolin to Bülow, Aug. 29, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 549 ff., No.
6794; Radolin to F. O., Aug. 31, 1905, _ibid._, 552 ff., Nos. 6796 f.;
papers communicated by M. Geoffray, Sept. 1, 1905, _B.D._, III, 131 ff.,
No. 174. In one matter during August the German government had, to its
embarrassment, to support France. The Moroccan government seized
illegally an Algerian subject. With the approval of the Powers, the
French government demanded and soon obtained his release. See _L.j.,
1901-5_, Nos. 301 ff.; _G.P._, XX, 552 n.; 559, No. 6801; _B.D._, III,
138, No. 178.]
[Footnote 834: Cartwright to Lansdowne, Aug. 8 and 24, 1905, _B.D._,
III, 127 f., No. 169; 130, No. 172; Leon y Castillo, _Mis Tiempos_, II,
253.]
[Footnote 835: Bülow to Radolin, Sept. 4, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 557, No.
6799; 558 f., No. 6801; Bihourd to Rouvier, Sept. 4, 1905, _L.j.,
1901-5_, 297 f., No. 339.]
[Footnote 836: Memo. by Kriege, Sept. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 554 ff., No.
6798; Bülow to F. O., Sept. 8, 1905, inclosing a telegram from Rosen,
_ibid._, 559 ff., No. 6802; Radolin to F. O., Sept. 9, 1905, _ibid._,
563 f., No. 6804. Radowitz acknowledged on Sept. 7 to Jules Cambon that
Germany would defend the selection of Tangier “only for form’s sake”
(Cartwright to Lansdowne, Sept. 7, 1905, _B.D._, III, 138, No. 178).]
[Footnote 837: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 8, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 562 f., No.
6803; Richthofen to Radolin, Sept. 10, 1905, _ibid._, 564 ff., No. 6805;
Richthofen to Bülow, Sept. 10, 1905, _ibid._, 566 f., No. 6806.]
[Footnote 838: On these negotiations, apart from the references cited
below, see Bertie to Lansdowne, Sept. 24, 1905, _B.D._, III, 140, No.
182; Lansdowne to Bertie, Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 140 ff., No. 183.]
[Footnote 839: He demanded an exchange of notes to the following effect:
“Neither France nor Germany will propose exclusive candidatures to
execute the military reforms at the conference. It is understood that
for the execution of the reforms (except in the frontier region) Germany
and France will remain on a basis of equality.” See Radolin to Bülow,
Sept. 16, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 568 ff., No. 6808 and following documents;
Radolin to F. O., Sept. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 577, No. 6817.]
[Footnote 840: Radolin to F. O., Sept. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 593 f., No.
6833.]
[Footnote 841: Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 16, 1905, _ibid._, 568 ff., No.
6808.]
[Footnote 842: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 18 and 19, 1905, _ibid._, 571 ff.,
Nos. 6810 ff.]
[Footnote 843: Witte, _Memoirs_, p. 416.]
[Footnote 844: See below.]
[Footnote 845: Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 23, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 503 f.,
No. 6241; Rosen to Bülow, Sept. 22, 1905, _ibid._, 579 ff., No. 6819 and
following documents; also Witte, pp. 416 ff. Cf. Tardieu, _La Conf.
d’Algés._, p. 77.]
[Footnote 846: Bülow to William II, Sept. 25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 505
ff., No. 6243.]
[Footnote 847: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 508, No. 6245;
William II to Bülow, Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 508 ff., No. 6246; Witte,
pp. 417 ff.]
[Footnote 848: Witte’s claim in his memoirs to have prevented a Franco-
German war was hardly justified. Germany did not intend war, but only
intimidation (Witte, pp. 424 f.).]
[Footnote 849: The German government in turn admitted that this
“advance” did not place in question the right of preference of the
French banking consortium to make loans to Morocco.]
[Footnote 850: The accord is given in _L.j., 1901-5_, 307 ff., Nos. 351
f.; _G.P._, XX, 592, No. 6832; _B.D._, III, 142 ff., No. 184; 146 f.,
No. 188.]
[Footnote 851: Rouvier to Bihourd, Sept. 25, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 305
f., Nos. 349 f.; Radolin to F. O., Sept. 26, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 589, No.
6828; Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés._, pp. 44 f. In December, M. Louis told
Bertie that the German government had replied to Rouvier’s declaration
by asserting that “though bound by their Agreement, they [Germany]
reserved to themselves the faculty of supporting in the Conference any
proposals made by another Government which they might consider good”
(Bertie to Grey, Dec. 15, 1905, _B.D._, III, 158, No. 195). There is no
reference to this statement in _G.P._]
[Footnote 852: _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 357 f., 362 ff., 367, 313 ff.;
_G.P._, XXI, Nos. 6889 ff., 6898; _B.D._, III, Nos. 165, 186 ff.]
[Footnote 853: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 30, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 595, No.
6834; Richthofen to Bülow, Oct. 6, 1905, _ibid._, XXV, 196 f., No. 8622;
Bülow to F. O., Oct. 7, 1905, _ibid._, 197, No. 8623. It was at this
time that the question of including France in the alliance made at
Björkö was coming to the fore (Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés._, p. 136).]
[Footnote 854: Radolin to F. O., Oct. 18, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 596 f., No.
6836.]
[Footnote 855: Quoted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 497 ff., Radolin to
F. O., Sept. 29, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 593 f., No. 6833; Bülow to F. O.,
Sept. 30, 1905, _ibid._, 594 f., No. 6834.]
[Footnote 856: Quoted from the report of the Belgian Minister at Paris
to his government, Oct. 14, 1905 (_Zur europ. Politik_, II, 72). See
also the article by De Caix in _Journal des debats_, quoted in _Quest.
dipl. et col._, XX, 500.]
[Footnote 857: _G.P._, XXI, 16, No. 6901.]
[Footnote 858: Quoted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 500 f. The
revelations were made by Stéphane Lauzanne, a journalist. Lauzanne
denied that he had received his information from Delcassé. He stated
that he had written the articles three months ago. See Lister to
Lansdowne, Oct. 11, 1905, _B.D._, III, 83 f., No. 100; Bertie to
Lansdowne, Oct. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 84, No. 101. His assertions were in
the main corroborated by two other French journalists, Eugène Lautier
and Alexandre Ular, in _Figaro_, Oct. 13, 1905, and by Jaurès (_G.P._,
XX, 666 n.).]
[Footnote 859: _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 504; Lascelles to Lansdowne,
Oct. 15, 16, 20, 1905, _B.D._, III, 84 ff., Nos. 102 ff.; Metternich to
F. O., Oct. 9, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 663 f., No. 6873.]
[Footnote 860: _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 500, 503 f.; Mévil, _De la
Paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. 269 ff. n.]
[Footnote 861: Bülow to F. O., Oct. 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 666, No.
6876.]
[Footnote 862: Bülow to F. O., Oct. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 667 f., No.
6877.]
[Footnote 863: Bülow to F. O., Oct. 10 and 12, 1905, _ibid._, 664 f.,
Nos. 6874 f.]
[Footnote 864: Schulthess, _1905_, p. 127.]
CHAPTER XV
THE TREATY OF BJÖRKÖ AND ITS ANNULMENT
I
By forcing France in July to submit the Moroccan question to an
international conference, the German government asserted its power and
restored its country’s prestige; but it had had to employ means which
could not often be repeated with impunity. The future of Germany’s
international position remained uncertain. While the Entente Cordiale
had become firmer, the Triple Alliance was still unsteady and
unreliable. King Edward and his nephew, the Emperor William, were having
one of their numerous quarrels.[865] The German government believed
positively that in case of a Franco-German war Great Britain would
actively support France.[866] Although relations with President
Roosevelt and with Russia remained intimate, these close friendships did
not give Germany the security and power which she had enjoyed before the
conclusion of the Entente Cordiale. Then suddenly, out of a clear sky,
came the possibility of Germany’s becoming master of the situation
again. The Emperor William and Czar Nicholas arranged a meeting at
Björkö, and the Emperor requested that a copy of the projected Russo-
German treaty of the previous autumn be sent to him.
In the latter half of July the Emperor and the Czar were both cruising:
the one in the Baltic Sea, the other in the Finnish Gulf. As it was the
hope of both the Chancellor[867] and the Emperor that a meeting with the
Czar might occur during these cruises, William II suddenly telegraphed
to his cousin on July 18 that he would shortly pass the entrance to the
gulf. “Should it give you any pleasure to see me . . . ., I of course am
always at your disposal.” Nicholas immediately replied: “Delighted with
your proposal. Would it suit you meet at Bjoerkoe-sund . . . .? . . . .
Look forward with intense pleasure to seeing you.” Upon receiving this
answer the Emperor requested Prince Bülow to send him the draft.
The Chancellor, who was at Norderney at the time, forwarded the request
to Herr von Holstein. While he was dubious about the affair, he wrote to
Herr von Holstein that the meeting would at least be a useful means of
keeping in close touch with Russia and finding out something about her
future foreign and internal policy. Germany could not intervene in favor
of Russia during the peace negotiations, he stated, but it would be
advantageous to engage the Czar so far that M. Witte and Count Lamsdorff
would be unable to prepare for a Franco-Russo-British entente
immediately after peace was established.[868]
Herr von Holstein’s long replies to the Chancellor were not very
hopeful. The final draft of the treaty of the previous autumn was
acceptable, he thought, if the clause added by Russia—“Their entente
cordiale will also hold in the case of difficulties which may arise at
the time of the negotiations of peace between Russia and Japan”—were
omitted. In fact, he was willing to accept a change in Article I making
the alliance valid in case of an attack by two Powers instead of by one.
He no longer believed it necessary for Russia and Germany to be in
complete accord before negotiations with France were begun, because M.
Rouvier’s cabinet would not “so absolutely oppose Germany’s joining [the
Dual Alliance] as Delcassé had,” and because, as Russia was more
dependent upon France for loans than she had been six months previously,
she would take no step without the latter’s approval. Herr von Holstein
expected M. Witte, Count Lamsdorff, the mother and wife of the Czar, and
the French government to oppose the project and to favor an Anglo-Russo-
French grouping. In his opinion almost the only reason for Russia to
prefer a German alliance to the other grouping was that it could be
concluded in time to be of value to Russia in the forthcoming
negotiations for peace with Japan. Herr von Holstein therefore advised
that if the treaty were concluded it be published immediately. Fearing
rejection of the German proposal by Count Lamsdorff and an exploitation
of the Russian refusal, he wished the Emperor not to take the initiative
in proposing an alliance, at least until Nicholas II manifested a desire
to pursue a common policy with Germany. Herr von Holstein’s telegrams
formed the basis for the instructions sent to the Emperor on July
22.[869]
The story of Björkö is one of drama and mystery. The two sovereigns
agreed that their meeting should be kept secret until it occurred; and,
although the news immediately leaked out in the Russian press, the
company on the Emperor’s yacht did not know where it was going or for
what purpose. The rulers met, July 23-24, in Björkö Bay, far away from
civilization, with only the sea and the forest-clad shore around them.
The Emperor prepared himself for the interview by lifting up his hands
and asking God to guide and aid him, or at least not to aid the Czar.
When his yacht steamed into the bay, the Czar had already arrived. The
Emperor immediately went on board the “Polar Star.” After a touching
exchange of embraces the two monarchs withdrew for a long conversation.
“Willy” found “Nicky” feeling discouraged, forlorn, and friendless
except for him; and Count Lamsdorff was not there to give him backbone.
The gathering force of the Russian revolution, the defeat by Japan,
anger at Great Britain and France, and deep appreciation for the
friendly attitude of Germany and William II toward him and his country
during their troubles had prepared this weak monarch to throw himself
into the arms of the far stronger, confident, and brilliantly seductive
Emperor. As William II asserted later, the Czar was in a mood to
subscribe to almost anything.
In the first conversation between the two rulers[870] they both relieved
themselves of their anger at Great Britain and King Edward VII. Nicholas
II was particularly enraged at the British, whose unfriendliness toward
Russia during the current war was fresh in his mind. When he described
King Edward as “the greatest mischief-maker and most insincere as well
as the most dangerous intriguer in the world,” the Emperor agreed with
him heartily. King Edward “has a passion to begin something with every
Power, to make ‘a little agreement,’” said William. The Czar replied as
he struck the table with his fist, “Well I can only say, he shall not
get one from me, and never in my life against Germany or you, my word of
honor on it.” When they brought up the Moroccan affair, the Czar,
pleased with the Franco-German agreement, strongly seconded the
Emperor’s hope that out of that agreement a permanent understanding with
France might develop. When the Emperor remarked that “in spite of
English incitements France has absolutely refused to go to war with us
[Germany], and so has shown that she will no longer fight for the sake
of the lost provinces,” Nicholas II replied incisively: “Yes that I saw,
it is quite clear the Alsace-Lorraine question is closed once for all,
thank God.” As they were going on deck again the Czar once more embraced
the Emperor and thanked him for coming.[871]
That night the two groups celebrated together until daybreak. During the
festivities some of the Russian officials in close touch with their
master spoke openly in favor of a Continental alliance. The Emperor
therefore concluded that the ground was prepared for his project. Before
going to breakfast with the Czar and Grand Duke Michael the next
morning, William II opened his _Losungen der Brüdergemeinde für
1905_[872] upon the following text: “Each will receive his reward
according to his work.” So, full of hope, he put a copy of the treaty in
his pocket and set out. He found the Czar in the same mood as before.
They spoke of the Anglo-French fraternization, behind which the Emperor
suspected lay a “little agreement.” The Czar’s head drooped in
dejection. “That is too bad,” he grieved. “What shall I do in this
disagreeable situation.” “I felt that the moment had come,” wrote the
Emperor later to Prince Bülow, in reporting this interview.
Since the ally has preserved the policy of the free hand and of
reinsurance without consulting or informing the Czar [he said to
Nicholas II], it is quite permissible for him . . . . to do the same.
How would it be if we also made a little agreement? We discussed one in
the previous winter, but it failed because of Delcassé and tension with
France. Now that is all past, we shall be good friends with the French.
So does not every obstacle fall? “Oh yes to be sure, I remember well,
but I forgot the contents of it, what a pity I havent got it here.” I
possess a copy which by chance I have in my pocket. The Czar seized me
by the arm, drew me into his father’s cabin, and closed all the doors.
“Show it me please.” The dreamy eyes sparkled. I drew the envelope from
my pocket, unfolded the sheet on the writing desk of Alexander III
before the pictures of the Czar’s mother, between photographs from
Fredensborg and Copenhagen, and laid it before the Czar. He read the
text once, twice, thrice. . . . . I prayed the dear God to be with us
and guide the young ruler. It was deathly still; only the sea murmured
and the sun shone joyfully and clear in the cozy cabin, and directly
before me lay the Hohenzollern and high in the morning air waved the
imperial standard. I was just reading the letters on the black cross,
God with us, when the Czar said, “That is quite excellent. I quite
agree!” My heart beat so loudly that I could hear it. I pulled myself
together and said casually, “Should you like to sign it? It would be a
very nice souvenir of our entrevue.” He read it once more and replied,
“Yes I will.” I opened the ink-well, extending to him the pen, and he
wrote with a firm hand “Nicolas.” Then he passed it to me, I signed it,
and as I arose he, deeply moved, folded me in his arms and said, “I
thank God and I thank you, it will be of most beneficial consequences
for my country and Yours; You are Russia’s only real friend in the whole
world, I have felt that through the whole war and I know it.” Tears of
joy stood in my eyes—to be sure the sweat poured from my brow and
back—and I thought of Frederick William III, Queen Louise, Grandfather
and Nicholas I. Were they near at that moment? At any rate they saw it
all and were overjoyed.
The terms of the treaty were as follows: The Czar and the Emperor, “to
assure the maintenance of peace in Europe, have agreed upon the
following articles of a treaty of defensive alliance.” Article I read:
“In case one of the two Empires is attacked by an European Power, its
ally will aid it in Europe with all its forces on land and sea.”
According to Article II, “The high contracting parties engage not to
conclude a separate peace with a common enemy.” Article III was as
follows: “The present treaty becomes valid as soon as peace is concluded
between Russia and Japan and will remain valid until it is denounced a
year in advance.” By Article IV the Czar agreed “after the coming into
force of the treaty” to take “the steps necessary to initiate France
into the accord and to associate herself in it as ally.”[873]
Thus the act was accomplished. How was it possible? The Emperor’s
explanation was simple and satisfying—God did it.[874] For he was
present, as were various spirits and shades of dead and departed
kinsmen. A humble and depressed Czar and an inspired Emperor with his
_Losungen der Brüdergemeinde_, tears and sighs and embraces, many a
dainty dish and flask of old wine, many a satisfying outburst of anger
at absent enemies—no wonder the Björkö treaty was signed!
The Emperor had visions of illimitable possibilities for the alliance.
On July 27 he wrote to Nicholas II as follows:
In times to come it may not be impossible that even Japan may feel
inclined to join it [the alliance]. This would cool down English self-
assertion and impertinence, as she is her ally too. The 24th of July
1905 is a cornerstone in European Politics and turns over a new leaf in
the history of the world; which will be a chapter of peace and goodwill
among the great Powers of the European Continent, respecting each other
in friendship, confidence and in pursuing the general Policy on the
lines of a community of interests. The moment the news of the new
“groupement” will have become known in the world, the smaller nations,
Holland, Belgium, Danmark, Sweden, Norway will all be attracted to this
new great centre of gravity, by quite natural laws of the attraction of
smaller bodies by the larger and compacter ones. They will revolve in
the orbit of the great block of powers (Russia, Germany, France,
Austria, Italy) and feel confidence in leaning on and revolving around
this mass. The dual Alliance combining with the Triple Alliance gives a
Quintupel Alliance, well able to hold all unruly neighbours in order, to
impose peace even by force, if there should be a power hairbrained
enough to wish to disturb it.[875]
Notwithstanding this optimism, the treaty caused difficulty from the
start. The absence of a countersignature by the Chancellor was not
considered serious.[876] But against the advice of Herr von Tschirschky,
the representative of the foreign office on the cruise, the Emperor had
without consulting the Chancellor introduced very important changes in
the draft of the treaty. In the first article he had added the words “en
Europe,” while he had re-worded the third article so that the alliance
should not become effective before the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese
War.[877] Prince Bülow was very dubious about the value of the treaty
after those changes were made, particularly the change in Article I,
“because in Europe,” he wrote to Herr von Holstein, “Russia can be of no
use at all to us against England.” He requested the latter’s advice
before acting.[878]
Herr von Holstein approved decidedly of the treaty even in its changed
form, although he regretted that the Emperor had not obtained more while
the Czar was so pliant. He said that the treaty should be kept
absolutely secret.[879] Otherwise he feared that Great Britain and
perhaps also France would seek to prolong the Russo-Japanese War with
the result that the Czar would be deposed, and that Great Britain, if
she had aggressive plans, might hurriedly attack Germany before the
alliance came into operation. He thought that the suspensive clause was
especially disadvantageous to Germany in that the treaty, if effective
at once, would have a calming effect upon any bellicose spirit on the
part of both France and Great Britain. Moreover, he believed that France
could be brought to join the alliance at the time; whereas if the action
to bring her in were postponed, she would align herself more closely
with Great Britain. The inclusion of the phrase “en Europe” he also
regretted as being advantageous only to Russia.
In case of an Anglo-German war, Russia need not advance against India. .
. . . But even with the best will Russia will not be able to help us in
Europe. . . . . The only positive value from the changed treaty is the
assurance that Russia can no longer enter the Quadruple Alliance.[880]
The circle around Germany can no longer close. That is something. But we
could have obtained more and we must expect that the publication of this
treaty will cause little disquietude in England and will not be
considered as a great success of German diplomacy.[881]
The Chancellor regarded the inclusion of the suspensive clause as an
advantage under the circumstances; but he had grave objections to the
inclusion of the phrase “en Europe.”[882] When he telegraphed these to
the Emperor, the latter replied that he had made the change “after ripe
deliberation” in order to prevent Germany from being obliged to aid
Russia in Asia. He did not believe possible an attack by Russia on
India, nor did anyone else, he stated. The advantage from the treaty
lay, not in the expectation of any active help from Russia in case of a
war with Great Britain but rather in the assurance that Germany would
enjoy full freedom and security on her eastern frontier, that she would
be able to throw all her forces against one front, that is, France,
instead of against two—“naturally provided France mobilizes to help
England, which is not impossible.” He and General Moltke looked upon the
situation in this way:
If England declares or otherwise begins war with us, you [the
Chancellor] must immediately send dispatches to Brussels and Paris with
a demand to state within six hours whether for or against us. We must
immediately march into Belgium no matter what the reply. As to France it
depends upon whether she remains neutral,—which I do not consider
entirely impossible even if the probability is small;—in that case the
Russian _casus foederis_ does not enter into effect. If she [France]
mobilizes, that is a war-threat against us in favor of England, and then
the Russian regiments must march with ours. . . . . It should eventually
be considered whether France could not be offered as an enticement for
good behavior toward us perhaps a part of Belgium as compensation for
the lost provinces.[883]
The Chancellor fully approved the Emperor’s remarks concerning Belgium;
but neither he nor Herr von Holstein thought that it would be possible
to permit French neutrality in case of a British attack on Germany.[884]
Nor was he convinced by the Emperor’s other arguments. He continued to
regard the inclusion of the phrase “en Europe” as “pernicious.” He
declared that he could not uphold the treaty before the German people
unless Russia were bound to give aid in both Asia and Europe, and sought
ways of bringing about a change to that effect.[885] While he had
accepted the treaty at first and had congratulated the Emperor upon
achieving it, and while he had thought that there was plenty of time in
which to eliminate the objectionable phrase,[886] he suddenly reversed
his attitude. On August 3 he stated that he could not accept the
responsibility for the treaty in the present form or for bringing about
the necessary changes. He therefore offered his resignation.[887]
Knowing that he had his master in a quandary, since German public
opinion was already complaining about too much imperial initiative in
foreign affairs, the Chancellor apparently did not expect his
resignation to be accepted. He continued as before to seek means of
altering the treaty without ruining it entirely.[888] And, as a matter
of fact, the Emperor collapsed, agreed to anything, and on August 11
wrote a hysterical letter to his Chancellor.
I thought that I had worked and had accomplished something special for
you. Then you send me a couple of cold lines and your resignation!!!
Please excuse me, dear Bülow, from depicting the condition of my soul to
you. To be so treated by my best, most intimate friend, without giving a
single plausible reason, has been such a fearful blow to me that I have
completely collapsed and fear a grave nervous sickness. You say that the
situation has become so serious because of the treaty with “en Europe”
that you cannot assume responsibility; before whom? And in the same
breath you believe that before God you can assume responsibility of
deserting your Emperor and master to whom you have sworn fidelity, who
has loaded you with love and honors, your fatherland and, as I believed,
your truest friend, in the situation regarded by you as critical and
serious!? No, dear Bülow, that you will not do! We have both been called
by God and created for each other to work for our dear German
fatherland. If in your opinion a graver situation has really been made
by my error—which I do not believe—, it has been done with the best
intentions. You know me well enough to recognize that. Your person is
100,000 times more valuable to me and our country than all the treaties
in the world. I have immediately taken steps with the Czar which shall
weaken or eliminate those words. Do not forget that you sent me to
Tangier against my will in order to achieve a success in your Moroccan
policy. Read my telegrams before the visit to Tangier. You have admitted
to me yourself that you were so anxious that when you received the
announcement of my safe departure you had a nervous fit of weeping. For
your sake because the fatherland needed it I landed, mounted a strange
horse in spite of my crippled left arm, and the horse nearly caused my
death—all of which was your affair! I rode through Spanish anarchists
because you wished it and your policy would profit thereby! and now you
want abruptly to desert me, when I have done everything—and, as I
honestly believe, far more—for you, because my situation appears to you
too serious. Bülow, I have not deserved that of you. No, my friend, you
remain in office and with me and shall continue to work with me _ad
majorem Germaniae gloriam_. You plainly owe me that because of my
service this year. You can and dare not forsake me. Therewith your whole
policy of this year would be disavowed by you yourself and I blamed
forever. That I cannot survive. Grant me a few days to rest and collect
myself before you come, for the nervous excitement caused by your letter
is too great, I am now unable to argue in quiet. . . . . I appeal to
your friendship for me, and let us hear no more of your intention to
resign. Telegraph me “all right” after this letter; then I shall know
that you will remain! For the morning after the arrival of your
resignation will find the emperor no longer alive! Think of my poor wife
and children![889]
How were the mighty fallen! The Chancellor had won, and of course
telegraphed “All right.”
In the meantime various proposals to eliminate the phrase “en
Europe”[890] were being combated by Herr von Holstein, who feared that
the opponents of the treaty in Russia, particularly Count Lamsdorff,
might use such opportunity to propose changes on their side, to annul
the treaty entirely, or at least to undermine its prestige. He wrote:
The treaty even in its present crippled form is still too valuable to
risk in hazardous play. Its value lies in the crushing effect which it
will have upon France and in the indirect reaction through France upon
England. . . . . Through the inclusion of “en Europe” and through the
introduction of the suspensive article, the value of the treaty is
lowered 50 per cent. But this 50 per cent remains to us and should not
be risked.
He urged against proposal for a change until time for the treaty to come
into effect or until the Emperor and the Czar had another meeting.
Prince Bülow acceded to these views.[891]
II
Occurring at a crisis in world-affairs, when the Moroccan difficulty was
still unsettled, when the Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace were
about to begin, when the choice of a king by Norway was not yet made,
the news of the unexpected and secret interview at Björkö caused a furor
in the diplomatic world and in the press.[892] Especial alarm was shown
by the British, jealous and mistrustful as they were of Russo-German
intimacy. The English press suspected the German Emperor of seeking the
Norwegian crown for a Hohenzollern and of endeavoring to close the
Baltic Sea to all except the Baltic nations.[893] Sir Francis Bertie,
British ambassador at Paris, was reported to have remarked that Germany
seemed to harbor Napoleonic tendencies, which Great Britain would oppose
as she had the original ones.[894] Mr. Spring Rice, after consulting
Lord Lansdowne, wrote to President Roosevelt as follows:
The most serious aspect of the question is the general balance of power
in Europe. . . . . Two of the great powers have practically disappeared
so far as active intervention in European affairs is concerned, Russia
and Austria. Germany is by far the most powerful of the remaining
powers, and she has an old feud to settle with France. If France is
attacked, there is no Russia to help her and the English Army is at
present practically negligible for a continental campaign. If France is
forced to accept German hegemony, England remains the only independent
great power, and we are in much the same position as during the
Napoleonic wars. We consider it therefore our duty to prepare for
contingencies.
. . . . Of course, nobody here, except the small body of hot-heads who
exist everywhere, desires to attack Germany. Our interest in peace is
supreme and in fact perhaps too dominant. But we all have an
uncomfortable feeling that always and everywhere we encounter the fixed
and determined hostility of Germany, and that, when opportunity offers,
this hostility will take an active form.[895]
Late in July, forthcoming British maneuvers in the Baltic Sea were
suddenly announced in the press without any previous notification to the
various governments. Following so closely after the meeting at Björkö,
that announcement had a sinister significance which the Russian and the
German presses interpreted as a warning to their countries that Great
Britain was still mistress of the seas and that no change should occur
against her will. Germany feared a British attack and, without an
adequate fleet, felt herself defenseless.[896]
The British press denounced these fears as preposterous. In the House of
Commons, Earl Percy, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs,
declared on August 3 that “the situation in Europe presented no special
cause for anxiety” and would present even less cause if certain
“irresponsible persons were not perpetually attributing to this country
Machiavellian motives of which we were quite innocent and who were
always imagining that we could not enter into arrangements with one
country for mutual convenience without having a hostile intent against
some other country.”[897] Lord Lansdowne immediately explained to the
German and Russian governments that the lack of notification had been an
oversight; he denied that the maneuvers were intended as a demonstration
in any way.[898]
As neither side wanted trouble, this explanation cleared up the
difficulty. The press became calmer and the visit of the British fleet
to Swinemünde and Neufahrwasser, August 27-September 1, was used by both
the British and the Germans for demonstrations of good will.[899] Yet
the fact that for the first time in years the British fleet was
practicing in the Baltic was not without significance. Furthermore, King
Edward VII was still at odds with the German Emperor. In August and
September, with the approval of his government, he refused to meet his
nephew until Franco-German relations improved.[900] And at some time in
August the British government learned from a member of the German
Emperor’s party at Björkö that at that meeting William II had seemed
nervous and preoccupied, that he had been seized by sudden fits of
talkativeness and of silence, and that he had advocated his ideas of a
coalition of Germany, Russia, and France to the exclusion of Great
Britain. Lord Lansdowne’s comment to that information was as follows:
“The description of the Kaiser’s language and demeanour fills me with
disquiet. What may not a man in such a frame of mind do next?”[901]
III
When the report reached Paris on July 23 that the interview at Björkö
was to occur, M. Rouvier immediately asked M. Witte, who was in Paris on
his way to Portsmouth, whether it was true. M. Witte, equally in the
dark, replied that he did not believe the rumor.[902] When the authentic
news of the meeting came a few hours later, the French government and
people were alarmed, for the Czar’s meeting with the German Emperor
signified a lack of regard for French feeling and seemed to belie M.
Witte’s assurances of Russia’s devotion to the Dual Alliance.[903]
Moreover, M. Witte’s private advocacy of closer co-operation between the
three great Continental Powers against the great naval Powers, that is,
against France’s friend, Great Britain, no doubt increased the concern
of the French government.[904]
On July 22 M. Bompard, French ambassador in St. Petersburg, demanded an
explanation from Count Lamsdorff of the report of the forthcoming
meeting. The Foreign Minister assured the French government that it was
a strictly private interview, devoid of any political character.[905]
Nevertheless, after the meeting occurred the French government continued
to feel uneasy.[906] Although M. Bompard believed that Count Lamsdorff,
faithful to the Dual Alliance, hoped that the meeting had had no
significance, the Ambassador strongly suspected that the Minister had
again not been consulted beforehand by his master.[907] Believing that
the Emperor William II was trying through his personal relations with
the Czar to destroy the Dual Alliance, he feared the results of an
interview between the two sovereigns. When he learned that some sort of
document had been signed by the two rulers, he surmised that it was a
personal agreement of friendship by which they promised not to
participate in any enterprise directed against the other and to exchange
any information which came to their knowledge.[908]
Faced by the immense possibilities of the meeting at Björkö, M. Rouvier
determined to forestall any Russian initiative looking toward a change
in the Dual Alliance by frankly explaining his foreign policy to the
Russian ambassador, M. Nelidow. On August 9, the Ambassador reported the
Minister’s words as follows:
The Minister assured me that the basis of his policy must remain the
alliance with Russia; France needs no other. “Wherein does my policy
differ from that of my predecessor?” he said to me. “Therein that I wish
to establish good relations with England and Germany; but we do not
intend thereby to make a closer agreement with the latter, just as on
the other hand we do not desire to weaken the understanding already
existing with England.” Upon my remarking that several newspapers have
gone so far as to speak of a German alliance, M. Rouvier replied
emphatically that that would be “absolutely impossible.”[909]
IV
The Czar, who probably felt guilty about not having consulted his
Foreign Minister before signing the Björkö treaty, did not tell Count
Lamsdorff of it until September 12.[910] He probably did so then because
peace with Japan, signed on September 6 and soon to be officially
ratified, would bring the Björkö accord into force.[911] Count Lamsdorff
was horrified at the news. On October 9 he wrote to his friend M.
Nelidow that the German Emperor had endeavored in the previous year to
persuade “our poor monarch” to sign a treaty of defensive alliance with
the obligation for France to join it. He continued:
I succeeded in preventing this crude attempt. But during the fateful
meeting at Björkö, the Emperor William was able with the aid of base
flattery to convince our dear Emperor that he alone was his true friend
and his support, and that the only salvation for Russia and for Europe
lay in a new Triple Alliance which in his opinion France would gladly
join.
After informing M. Nelidow of the treaty signed at Björkö, he went on:
“There you have the new mess into which we have been plunged after so
many unusual adventures during the past two years. You can imagine how
comforting this is.”[912]
From the first Count Lamsdorff was determined to destroy the treaty.
After comparing it with the terms of the Dual Alliance, he concluded
that the one was a flagrant violation of the other.[913] In fact, he
thought that in case of a Franco-German war arising out of the Moroccan
affair, Russia was bound by this treaty to support Germany against her
own ally. He wrote to M. Nelidow:
From long years of experience I have become convinced that the alliance
with France is necessary in order to have really good relations with
Germany. Otherwise we lose our independence; for I know nothing heavier
than the German yoke. Without sacrificing the most intimate relations
with Berlin, we have very tactfully repulsed all attempts to compromise
us.
Not only did he expect France to refuse flatly to enter the new
grouping, but he also considered it bad policy to give up the Dual
Alliance in favor of a doubtful combination _à trois_. He considered the
treaty to be altogether in favor of Germany, for she was bound to aid
Russia only in Europe although Russia had most cause to fear Asiatic
conflicts. Count Lamsdorff held that this alliance might involve Russia
in the Anglo-German rivalry and might draw her into a war in which she
had no interest. Preferring a policy of peace and good will with all
Powers, he believed that Russia should next settle her difficulties with
Great Britain, in spite of the fact that the renewal of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance in August had angered him. He was determined to
extricate Russia from this situation with the least possible damage to
Russo-German relations but above all without a breach in the Dual
Alliance.[914]
When the Russian Foreign Minister marshaled these arguments before the
Czar, the latter refused to yield. Without showing much consideration
for French interest in the matter, Nicholas II replied that the alliance
would be of benefit to both Russia and France and maintained that the
latter would join it.[915] Although he was strongly skeptical about this
possibility, the Foreign Minister was forced to inquire of M. Nelidow on
September 14 whether or not France would do so.[916]
Without consulting anyone, M. Nelidow replied decidedly no. The Dual
Alliance, together with the Entente Cordiale, every day becoming more
intimate, he wrote, formed the foundation of the French foreign policy,
whereas Franco-German relations were far from satisfactory. This new
triple alliance, manifestly aimed at Great Britain, might, he continued,
involve France in a war, which she wished above all to avoid, especially
a war against Great Britain for the defense of German interests.
Furthermore, such an alliance would mean the renunciation of all hopes
of revenge for France. In fact, he thought that the slightest hint in
favor of a Continental grouping would only shake France’s trust in her
ally. Nevertheless, he promised to investigate further.[917]
Not convinced by these arguments, the Czar clung to his plan. Just at
this juncture M. Witte arrived in St. Petersburg with a letter from
William II which forced a decision about the alliance.
M. Witte’s ideas on foreign policy were confused. Early in May, 1905, he
spoke of Germany to Mr. Spring Rice in hostile terms. In July,
immediately before he left St. Petersburg for Portsmouth to negotiate
peace with Japan, he was upholding among his friends and to the Czar the
plan that at Portsmouth he should not only make peace but should also
negotiate an “all-round arrangement” with Japan which Great Britain and
France should adhere to or at least recognize.[918] A few days later at
Paris he advocated the formation of a Continental grouping against the
overseas Powers.[919] The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
increased his antagonism to Great Britain.[920] On his return to Paris
in September, he refused an invitation from King Edward to visit England
as well as an offer of British participation in the proposed Russian
loan, and aided in settling the Moroccan difficulty in order to make
possible a Franco-German _rapprochement_.[921]
As M. Witte had to pass through Germany on his trip home, the Emperor
William obtained permission from the Czar for him to stop over and to be
initiated into the secret of Björkö.[922] After a cordial interview with
Prince Bülow at Berlin,[923] M. Witte journeyed to Rominten where he
received an almost royal welcome from the Emperor (September 26). When
William II informed him of the signing of the alliance at Björkö, the
Russian statesman, according to the Emperor, wept tears of joy. M. Witte
proposed that the German and the Russian ambassadors be given
instructions to co-operate on all possible questions as a means of
persuading France to enter the new grouping voluntarily and of preparing
the world for this momentous event. In the meantime, he advised that the
accord be kept closely secret. He promised to do his part in “using this
foundation for the construction of a good house.” Overjoyed at his
success, William II accepted these suggestions. In a letter to the Czar
carried by M. Witte he made this proposal for the co-operation of their
foreign representatives:[924] “This common exposal of a common cause,”
he wrote, “will not fail to impress the world that our relations have
become closer and thus slowly prepare your Allies the French for the new
orientation which their policy must take for the entry into our
treaty.”[925]
In the conversations with M. Witte, who was not shown a copy of the
treaty itself, the Emperor represented the accord as much less binding
upon Franco-Russian relations than was really the case.[926] On his
side, M. Witte, anxious to have the support of William II in regaining
the good graces of the Czar and harboring some vague ideas about the
desirability of a Continental grouping, was easily charmed by the
Emperor into approval of the project. When he reached St. Petersburg,
September 28, he urged upon the French Ambassador the need of a Dual
Alliance-German coalition as a reply to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. M.
Bompard naturally rejected the idea.[927] When Count Witte (he had just
been ennobled) protested to him the Emperor William’s love for France
and his attachment to the Dual Alliance, the Ambassador significantly
asked, “Does not the Emperor’s love for the Dual Alliance extend so far
that he wished to join it?”[928] Count Lamsdorff, even less sympathetic,
showed to Count Witte the actual treaty and wrathfully denounced it. The
latter began to recover from the social intoxication of his visit to
Germany and to perceive that the treaty would have to be annulled.[929]
Count Lamsdorff, Count Witte, M. Nelidow, and the Grand Duke Nicholas,
who was initiated into the secret, all joined forces in persuading the
Czar. By appealing to their master’s sense of honor and loyalty to the
alliance made by his revered father, they succeeded in winning the
unhappy ruler’s consent to a compromise. He acknowledged that the treaty
of Björkö and the terms of the Dual Alliance were in contradiction, and
agreed that before the former became operative either Germany should be
brought to change it in such a way that it would not affect France or
that the French government should be moved to a scrutiny of the terms of
the Dual Alliance “in the sense of a more or less close association with
this defensive Triple Alliance.” Thus, simultaneous attempts were to be
made to persuade either France or Germany to change the terms of her
alliance.[930]
It very soon became apparent that the French government would never
accept the Björkö treaty. When M. Nelidow broached to M. Rouvier on
October 4 the idea of alliance with Germany which his government claimed
President Roosevelt also favored, the Premier repeated his former
assertions on this question. He, in turn, stated his complete approval
of an Anglo-Russian accord.[931] Again on October 18 the Russian
Ambassador reported that during a most intimate conversation with M.
Rouvier he had pressed the arguments in favor of a Continental alliance
against Great Britain only to receive from the Premier the following
emphatic reply:
We have aggressive intentions toward no one. We have given clear proof
of our love of peace. Thirty-five years ago after a war unfortunate for
us two provinces were taken away and we had to pay several billion
francs for peace. Our nation submitted, and since then we have
endeavored to avoid any cause for conflict or misunderstanding. To avoid
difficulties which threatened to come to a head, I recently ventured to
wound the pride of my country a little. But one cannot demand more of
us. The nation would not tolerate a closer _rapprochement_ with Germany.
It cannot forget what it has suffered from her, of which suffering it
has just been reminded in a careless and purposeless way. An alliance
with Germany is impossible. The government is obliged to regard the
feelings of the country.
As M. Nelidow commented in his dispatch, this was M. Rouvier’s final
reaction. It destroyed the possibility of France’s entering a
Continental alliance so completely that even the Czar had to acknowledge
the fact.[932]
In the meantime, the Czar’s letter of October 7 to William II arrived in
Berlin. It read as follows:
The great question is to draw France into our new defensive Alliance. .
. . . But if France were to refuse to join us, then, not only would Art.
IV drop away, but also the meaning of Art. I would change radically,
because its obligations in the _present wording_ point at any European
Power and France too—Russia’s ally. During your stay at Bjorkoe I did
not have with me the documents signed by my Father. . . . . The first
steps taken with the object of trying to find out, whether the French
Government could be induced to join our new treaty, showed us that it is
a difficult task and that it will take a long time to prepare to bring
it over of its free will. . . . . Therefore I think that the coming into
force of the Bjorkoe treaty ought to be _put off until_ we know how
France will look upon it. In case she absolutely refuses to join our two
countries, it will be necessary to change the wordings of articles I and
IV so as to bring them into full accordance with Russia’s obligations
towards France, since the formation of the Triple Alliance in 1890. I
shall do my best to get France to join us.[933]
Without consulting the Chancellor, William II replied on October 12 with
a refusal:
I fully agree with you, that it will cost time, labour and patience to
induce France to join us both, but the reasonable people will in future
make themselves heard and felt! Our Moroccan business is regulated to
entire satisfaction so that the air is free for better understanding
between us. Our treaty is a very good base to build upon. We joined
hands and signed _before God_ who heard our vows! I therefore think that
the treaty can well come into existence. But if you wish any changes in
the wording or clauses or provisions for the future or different
emergencies—as for instance the absolute refusal of France, which is
improbable—I gladly await any proposal you will think fit to lay before
me. Till these have been laid before me and are agreed upon, the Treaty
must be adhered to by us as it is.[934]
The Czar, who had expected an acquiescence,[935] was in an unhappy
plight; no matter which way he turned he would be accused of breaking
his word. Since France had the prior claim and since the pressure upon
him in St. Petersburg was pro-French, he wrote to William II on November
23 that to fulfil with equal loyalty the clauses of the Dual Alliance
and those of the treaty of Björkö he would have to add the following
declaration to the latter:
In view of the difficulties in the way of an immediate adhesion by the
French Government to the treaty of defensive alliance signed at Björkoe
. . . . it is understood that Article I of that act shall not have any
application in the eventuality of a war with France and that the mutual
engagements which unite the latter to Russia will be maintained in full
until the establishment of an accord _à trois_.
To soften his refusal the Czar reported that Great Britain was “trying
hard to get us round for an understanding about Asiatic frontier
questions”; but he assured William II that he had not “the slightest
intention of opening negotiations with her.”[936]
This reply destroyed the entire force of the treaty; it spelled the
failure of Germany’s second effort to ally with Russia. The German
Emperor and his government were bitterly disappointed. In the answer to
the Czar on November 28, based upon a memorandum by Herr von Holstein,
William II did not absolutely say yes or no, but left it to be
understood that Germany still considered the treaty as binding in spite
of the Czar’s declaration.[937] On December 2 the Czar refused to accept
the accord without the proposed declaration.[938] There the matter
rested.
On January 21, 1906, the Czar wrote to William II that in keeping with
“the real sense of our Bjorkoe treaty,” he had accepted a proposal of
President Loubet’s to attach a French general to his person.
I think that this courtesy to France will bring her still closer to
Russia. As long as I can hold her tight she will remain peaceful and
quiet. It seems to me therefore that the continent’s interests and still
more so the interests of Germany can only gain from it. And with God’s
help some day Your right idea of forming a new “triple alliance” will
become a solid reality.
In sending this letter to Prince Bülow on January 23 the Emperor
wrote:[939]
I am sending you herewith another precious, bungling effort from the
youthful idealist on the Russian throne! The latest phase of the Russo-
Gallic Alliance borders on the ridiculous, but show’s how in Paris—at
London’s suggestion?—a counter blow is immediately struck against every
_rapprochement_ between the two Emperors; every time, the little Czar by
reason of the “ancient alliance” immediately falls or is won over by
Lamsdorff. That he speaks on “my” idea of a triple alliance, as if I
were receiving a special favor thereby, is really more than childish or
naïve! . . . . And all that is served to me from behind a tear-drenched
mask of eternal, most intimate friendship! How long will it be until he
will have an “English general” at his side, naturally only in order to
realize “my” ideal of world peace, and then a Japanese general to calm
the oriental peoples, and finally an American general! His Majesty ought
to be ashamed before his and my ancestors and before me to do such
things, to write such letters to me, which Lamsdorff has dictated to
him!
Thus the results of Björkö upon Russo-German relations were entirely
different from those anticipated by the two rulers. By overreaching
himself, by seeking a too-brilliant success without adequate
preparation, the German Emperor alienated the Czar, who felt that he had
played an ignominious rôle.[940] The consequence was that Russia again
drew nearer to France[941] and began to look with more favor upon
British overtures. Germany’s effort to restore her dominant position in
Europe and to prevent the dreaded encirclement by means of a Russian
alliance resulted, therefore, in preparing the ground for the very act
which Germany most feared, the formation of an Anglo-Russo-French
entente.
V
The German bid at Björkö for Russia’s friendship and the rumors of what
had happened there—approaching more and more nearly the truth by
October[942]—inevitably aroused rival efforts by Great Britain. The
British policy of obtaining an understanding with Russia was complex.
Defeat by Japan and revolution within made Russia discouraged and
powerless, and broke the prestige of the chauvinistic, militaristic
groups for the time being.[943] To complete the prophylactic work of
fixing adequate restraints to the Russian expansive energy, Great
Britain renewed prematurely her alliance with Japan in August, 1905,
modifying the terms so that the alliance became effective in case of an
attack by one Power and not only China specifically but also the
“regions of Eastern Asia and of India” were included within its
scope.[944] Then the British government hoped that Russia, with no other
alternative, would make a satisfactory settlement of their Asiatic
differences.[945]
In the previous May, Sir Charles Hardinge, British ambassador at St.
Petersburg, had carried King Edward’s most cordial greetings to the
Russian Foreign Minister. With marked pleasure, Count Lamsdorff had
replied that the maintenance of peace and good relations with Great
Britain was _mon culte et ma religion_. Remarking to the Ambassador that
“interested parties” were trying to stir up discord between their
countries, the Count said that these endeavors must be frustrated. Count
Lamsdorff, wrote the Ambassador to his government,
thoroughly realized the actual difficulties of the situation, but he was
full of confidence that at the end of this miserable war both
Governments would find a means of arriving at a satisfactory arrangement
of all outstanding differences in the same manner as the Anglo-French
arrangement had been made.[946]
Russia and Japan agreed upon terms of peace on September 5. Three days
later, Sir Charles Hardinge notified Count Lamsdorff of the new Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, and assured him most earnestly that it was one of
national insurance, that Great Britain was absolutely sincere in her
desire for peace and friendly relations, and that she had no wish “to
interfere with the legitimate activity of Russia” or “to seek a policy
of aggrandizement at her expense.” Count Lamsdorff replied that he
remained convinced of the value of an agreement and repeated that a
third party was trying to arouse hostility between Great Britain and
Russia. However, when Sir Charles Hardinge alluded to the possibility of
resuming the previous negotiations at a future date, the Foreign
Minister responded “that he was most anxious that they should be brought
to a successful issue but that they should not be unduly hastened.”[947]
This cool reply to the British sounding was caused partly by the
pressing need at that time to annul the Björkö treaty, but primarily by
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, whose renewal at that moment Russia had not
expected. Interpreting it as another blow to a state already humiliated
by defeat, Russian public opinion denounced the treaty.[948] Thinking
that the Russian animosity would pass, Lord Lansdowne proposed on
October 3 a way of bringing the two countries closer together.
My own feeling was [he said to the Russian ambassador] that it would be
a mistake to attempt too much, or to allow it to be understood that the
two countries were on the eve of a comprehensive transaction analogous
to that which had taken place between France and Great Britain. My idea
of the procedure to be followed was rather that we should take up in
detail any outstanding points as to which differences of opinion had
manifested themselves and endeavour to dispose of these, and that we
should then pass on to others, if we found that our work proceeded
successfully.
Although the Russian Foreign Minister was gratified at the expression of
British good will, he replied that
he could give no answer of a definite character, but, speaking
privately, he could say that the Treaty had had a very bad effect and
had left an unpleasant impression upon the mind of the Emperor, and he
would recommend our Ambassador, as a friend, not to press for an answer
as it might be a disagreeable one, nor to open negotiations as to a
definite treaty between England and Russia as to their interests in
Asia.
Count Benckendorff even remarked that “any arrangement . . . . should
not be conceived in a spirit of hostility towards Germany”—an
implication which the British Foreign Secretary repudiated with
force.[949]
Greatly alarmed at Russian soundings about a Continental coalition
against Great Britain, the French government in October tried several
times to bring Russia and Great Britain together, even on any minor
question.[950] In view of the Russian reserve, no definite proposals
were made.[951] By October 21, however, the French and British
governments were certain that the danger of a Russo-German combination
was past.[952] Shortly thereafter President Roosevelt, to the content of
those governments, entirely denied that he favored a Continental
grouping against the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.[953] When King Edward
learned the truth about the Björkö affair in the autumn, he could with
some relief describe his nephew, the Emperor William, as “the most
brilliant failure in history.”[954]
While these conversations were unsuccessful, Sir Charles Hardinge
thought that “the improvement which has already shown itself in the
relations between England and Russia only requires careful fostering to
bear fruit in due season.”[955] To that end it was necessary for the two
governments to find some opportunity for disinterested co-operation—an
opportunity which the Conference of Algeciras was to afford—and for
Russian public opinion to reciprocate the amicable feelings of the
British so that an Anglo-Russian understanding would be built upon a
durable basis, like that of the Entente Cordiale. The British press was
doing its share in bringing about this change of attitude. In fact,
British public opinion felt more relieved than it had in months. The
conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance, the signing of the Franco-German agreement of September 28—all
cleared the diplomatic atmosphere. The _Matin_ revelations on October 5
concerning the supposed British offer of alliance to France in the
previous summer placed Great Britain in a somewhat embarrassing position
before the world as a disturber of peace. Moreover, it was recognized
that Anglo-German animosity had almost caused a Russo-German alliance,
and that, to make a settlement with Russia, Great Britain should restore
better relations with Germany.[956] So British public opinion was ready
to be friendly with Russia, and, in part, with Germany. During the
autumn, sections of the British people, although not the government,
tried to smooth over the animosities with Germany. A meeting was held in
London early in December for that purpose at which eminent politicians,
business men, representatives of the press, clergymen, and others were
present to further the work.[957] As German public opinion responded to
these efforts, a general _détente_ set in.[958]
[Footnote 865: On these differences see Mühlberg to Metternich, July 18,
1905, _G.P._, XX, 638, No. 6863 and following documents; Lee, _King
Edward VII_, II, 334 ff., 346 ff.]
[Footnote 866: Even Lascelles, British ambassador at Berlin, admitted to
Metternich that “in a Franco-German war in view of the prevailing
opinion here [in England] England would be actively on the French side.”
See Metternich to Bülow, July 19 and 22, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 639 f., No.
6864; 646 ff., No. 6867; Bülow to Metternich, July 22, 1905, _ibid._,
641 ff., No. 6866.]
[Footnote 867: William II to Bülow, Aug. 11, 1905, _ibid._, XXX, 497,
No. 6237.]
[Footnote 868: Bülow to F. O., July 20, 1905, _ibid._, 435 f., No. 6206.
The telegrams between the two rulers were in English.]
[Footnote 869: See the correspondence between Holstein and Bülow, July
21-24, 1905, _ibid._, 436 ff., Nos. 6203-14. It was Holstein who
determined the whole policy of the German foreign office on this
question. Bülow served only as his mouthpiece. Richthofen and
Metternich, and also General Moltke (who in 1906 became chief of staff),
were all opposed to the project of alliance, but their opinions were
either not asked or were disregarded. See Bülow to F. O., Aug. 9, 1905,
_ibid._, 488, No. 6235; Metternich to Bülow, Oct. 2, 1905, _ibid._, XX,
659 ff., No. 6871; Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und politische
Denkwürdigkeiten_, III, 167.]
[Footnote 870: They conversed in English. In the Emperor’s account of
the interview he gives the Czar’s statements in that language.]
[Footnote 871: The Czar was also unpleasantly surprised to learn that
King Edward VII was supporting the candidacy of his son-in-law, Prince
Carl of Denmark, for the Norwegian throne. Nicholas II favored Prince
Waldemar, Carl’s younger brother, while the Emperor favored choosing a
member of the House of Bernadotte. It looked to him, said Nicholas, as
if Great Britain were endeavoring thereby to get her fingers on Norway
with the possible purpose of acquiring the port of Christiansund from
which to block the Skaggerrack. See the references given in the
succeeding footnote.]
[Footnote 872: “Watchwords of the Common Brethren for 1905.” It was a
book of proverbs.]
[Footnote 873: There is another account of the meeting written by Bülow
on Aug. 18 immediately after a talk with the Emperor which does not
agree in all details with this one written by the Emperor on the day
after the meeting occurred. The two versions supplement each other. But
the one of July 25 reproduces better the atmosphere in which the affair
took place. The other version is as follows: The Czar declared that he
wished to go hand in hand with the Emperor, his only friend. The latter
asked why the treaty had not been signed in the previous autumn. The
reply was that France had opposed it, that he (the Czar) had had to
maintain the Dual Alliance, and that France and Germany had been
hostile. The Emperor then said that those relations were better, that he
wished France and Germany to become friends, that the Moroccan question
was to be used for that purpose, and that an understanding over it would
certainly be reached. The Czar replied that if that were the case then
nothing stood in the way of a Russo-German treaty. The Emperor then
produced a copy of the treaty and it was signed immediately. See memo.
by Bülow, Aug. 18, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 502 f., No. 6240. The other
accounts of the Björkö interview are as follows: Tschirschky to Bülow,
July 24, 1905, _ibid._, 454 ff., No. 6218; William II to Bülow, July 25,
1905, _ibid._, 458 ff., No. 6220; Bülow to F. O., July 24, 1905,
_ibid._, 452, No. 6215; Witte, _Memoirs_, p. 428; Savinsky, _Revue des
deux mondes_, XII (1922), 798 f.; Savinsky, _Recollections of a Russian
Diplomat_, p. 115; Helmuth von Moltke, _Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente,
1877-1916_ (Stuttgart, 1922), pp. 325 ff. The treaty was countersigned
by Grand Duke Michael, Tschirschky, and Admiral Birileff, the last two
apparently without reading it. The Grand Duke was asked to sign it
because William II feared that Nicholas II might be deposed and Michael
made czar. Naturally he did not mention his reason.
The Czar wished to consider an agreement guaranteeing to the King of
Denmark the possession of his territory, so that in case of war Russia
and Germany would be sure of being able to defend the Baltic Sea north
of the Belt. A declaration of Danish neutrality would not suffice,
Nicholas argued to the Emperor, because in case the opponent did not
respect it and seized the territory as a base of operation, Germany and
Russia would be in a difficult situation. But the Emperor, who together
with his government was opposed to touching this important question, put
Nicholas off with a promise to consider the matter with Bülow.
The Emperor also urged the Czar at this interview to grant to the
Russian people a habeas corpus act which would guarantee their civil
liberties, and to call a general council of state to consider the
question of a constitution.]
[Footnote 874: _G.P._, XIX, 459.]
[Footnote 875: Goetz, _Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren 1894-1914_, p.
374.]
[Footnote 876: Bülow to F. O., July 25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 453 f., No.
6217; Holstein to Bülow, July 25, 1905, _ibid._, 457 f., No. 6219.]
[Footnote 877: Bülow to F. O., July 27, Aug. 9, 1905, _ibid._, 470 f.,
Nos. 6224 f.; 488 ff., No. 6235.]
[Footnote 878: Bülow to F. O., July 26, 1905, _ibid._, 467 f., No. 6222;
476 f., No. 6228.]
[Footnote 879: The German government was particularly concerned lest
Roosevelt become mistrustful on account of this interview and the
conclusion of an alliance with Russia. It even considered imparting the
terms of the treaty to him, but in view of the need for secrecy decided
not to. Instead, on July 28, the Emperor wrote personally to Roosevelt
making it appear that the interview dealt only with matters pertaining
to the Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace (Mühlberg to Bussche-
Haddenhausen, July 28, 1905, _ibid._, 614, No. 6319). On this discussion
about whether to notify Roosevelt of the accord see _ibid._, Nos. 6203,
6206-8, 6221, 6223.]
[Footnote 880: He meant the one Germany feared of Russia, France, Great
Britain, and Japan.]
[Footnote 881: Holstein to Bülow, July 26, 1905, _ibid._, 468 ff., No.
6223; memo. by Holstein, July 28, 1905, _ibid._, 474 ff., No. 6227.]
[Footnote 882: Bülow to F. O., July 28, Aug. 5, 1905, _ibid._, 476 f.,
No. 6228; 482 f., No. 6231.]
[Footnote 883: Bülow to F. O., July 30, Aug. 5 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 477
ff., No. 6229; 485 ff., No. 6233; 488 ff., No. 6235.]
[Footnote 884: Bülow to William II, July 30, 1905, _ibid._, 477 ff., No.
6229; Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 5, 1905, _ibid._, 483 f., No. 6232.]
[Footnote 885: Bülow to F. O., Aug. 2, 5, 9, 1905, _ibid._, 481 ff.,
Nos. 6230 f.; 488 ff., No. 6235.]
[Footnote 886: Bülow to William II, July 24, 27, 1905, _ibid._, 452, No.
6216; 471 ff., No. 6226; Bülow to F. O., July 27-29, 1905, _ibid._, 471,
No. 6225; 476 ff., Nos. 6228 f.]
[Footnote 887: It is highly probable that Bülow took this step not so
much because of defects in the treaty, but rather because the Emperor
had disregarded his authority by making those important changes without
consulting him. Under the persuasion of Richthofen he took this course
in order to uphold his authority and to teach the Emperor a lesson
(Eckardstein, III, 166; editor’s note in _G.P._, XIX, 481 f., note).]
[Footnote 888: Bülow to F. O., Aug. 5 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 482 f., No.
6231; 488 ff., No. 6235.]
[Footnote 889: William II to Bülow, Aug. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 496 ff., No.
6237.]
[Footnote 890: Bülow to F. O., Aug. 5 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 482 f., No.
6231; 485 ff., No. 6233; 488 ff., No. 6235.]
[Footnote 891: Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 5, 6, 14, 1905, _ibid._, 483 f.,
No. 6232; 487 f., No. 6234; 501, No. 6239; Mühlberg to Bülow, Aug. 10,
1905, _ibid._, 493 ff., No. 6236; Bülow to F. O., Aug. 12, 1905,
_ibid._, 498 ff., No. 6238; memo. by Bülow, Aug. 18, 1905, _ibid._, 502
f., No. 6240.]
[Footnote 892: Meyer to Roosevelt, Aug. 1, 1905, quoted in Howe, _George
von Lengerke Meyer_, p. 188.]
[Footnote 893: Schulthess, _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, p.
195.]
[Footnote 894: Mühlberg to Bülow, Aug. 10, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 495, No.
6236.]
[Footnote 895: Memo. by Spring Rice for a letter to Roosevelt, July 10,
1905, Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Aug. 10, 1905, quoted in Gwynn,
_The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 476, 484.]
[Footnote 896: Memo. by Mühlberg, Aug. 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 648 f., No.
6868; Mühlberg to William II, Aug. 4, 1905, _ibid._, 649 ff., No. 6869;
Metternich to Bülow, Aug. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 651 ff., No. 6870. The
Emperor did not fear an attack at the time, but certainly at some later
date. He thought that the maneuvers were meant to remind Denmark that
she was an outpost for Great Britain just as Portugal was and that she
must not be too familiar with Germany. And with an English princess
married into the Swedish royal family and King Edward’s son-in-law
seeking the Norwegian throne, he feared that Norway would also become a
British satellite (William II to Bülow, July 30, 1905, quoted in a
dispatch from Bülow to F. O., July 30, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 477 ff., No.
6229). Even so sane a person as General Moltke, who in the next year
became chief of staff, confided to his diary on July 30, 1905: “The
visit of the Channel Fleet in the Baltic announced by England is to be
regarded as a demonstration. . . . . The English are inciting in the
most unbelievable fashion, they are telling the most despicable lies
about us, and are representing Germany as the evil spirit in the whole
world. . . . . The future lies dark before us. May Germany have the
strength to bear difficult times” (Moltke, p. 331).]
[Footnote 897: 4 Hansard, Vol. CLI, cols. 113, 122, 136 ff., 143.]
[Footnote 898: Memo. by Mühlberg, Aug. 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 648 f., No.
6868; Mühlberg to William II, Aug. 4, 1905, _ibid._, 649 ff., No. 6869.
As a matter of fact, the maneuvers had been planned for some time, and
to begin with had no political significance. No direct connection
existed between their inception and the meeting at Björkö, but it is
very probable that the British government was not at all averse to their
occurring at the time (cf. Bradford, _Life of Wilson_, p. 200). Wilson
was in command of the British fleet (see also _G.P._, XIX, 478, editor’s
note).]
[Footnote 899: Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 109, 113; Bradford, p. 205.]
[Footnote 900: The German government learned of this fact in August but
not of its approval by the British government. See Metternich to Bülow,
Aug. 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 658, No. 6870; Lee, II, 348, 353. On the
quarrels of King Edward and his German nephew see Lee, II, 346 ff.;
_G.P._, 648 ff., Nos. 6868, 6870; Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, p. 330.]
[Footnote 901: William II to Nicholas II, Aug. 22, 1905, Goetz, p. 377;
Hardinge to Lansdowne, Aug. 1, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 95 f., No. 91 and
editor’s note; Newton, pp. 337 f.]
[Footnote 902: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_,
Nov., 1924, p. 477.]
[Footnote 903: _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 65 f.]
[Footnote 904: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, Oct. 15, 1905,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 477, 491; Radolin to Bülow, July
25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 426 ff., No. 6198; M. Bompard states that Witte
used the word “alli” (Bompard, “Le traité de Bjoerkoe,” _Revue de
Paris_, XXV [May 15, 1918], 438).]
[Footnote 905: Bompard, XXV, 432; Witte, p. 415; _Quest. dipl. et col._,
XX, 174 f.]
[Footnote 906: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_,
Nov., 1924, p. 477.]
[Footnote 907: Bompard, XXV, 432 f.; Bourgeois et Pagès, _Les origines
et les responsabilités de la grande guerre_, p. 313.]
[Footnote 908: Bompard, XXV, 424 f. Just when Bompard learned this fact
is not evident, but apparently he did so soon after the interview. Cf.
Hardinge to Lansdowne, Aug. 3, 1905, _B.D._, III, 127, No. 168.]
[Footnote 909: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_,
Nov., 1924, pp. 477 f.]
[Footnote 910: There are various statements about the date upon which
Lamsdorff learned of the treaty. See Iswolsky, _Recollections of a
Foreign Minister_, pp. 49 f.; Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII
(1922), 798; A. Nekludow, “Autour de l’entrevue de Bjoerkoe,” _Revue des
deux mondes_, March 1, 1918, p. 139; Nekludow was a secretary in the
Russian embassy in Paris in 1905 (Witte, p. 426; Savinsky, p. 114). The
correct date is given in a dispatch from Lamsdorff to Nelidow on Oct. 9,
where the Foreign Minister stated that he was first told of the treaty
by the Czar just before the latter’s departure for Finland on Aug. 30
(or Sept. 12, according to the new calendar). See _Kriegsschuldfrage_,
Nov., 1924, p. 487. The Czar excused his delay to Lamsdorff on the
grounds that he had promised William II to preserve secrecy. See
_ibid._, p. 487; Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 798 f.;
cf. Iswolsky, pp. 49 f.]
[Footnote 911: There is no substantiation in _G.P._ for the assertion by
Savinsky that the Czar told Lamsdorff that William II had asked him then
to make known the accord to the French government (Savinsky, _Revue des
deux mondes_, XII [1922], 799; Savinsky, p. 115).]
[Footnote 912: Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 799;
Savinsky, pp. 115 ff.; Iswolsky, pp. 49 f.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct.
9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 486 ff.]
[Footnote 913: This was certainly the case. Even apart from the fact
that the military clauses of the Dual Alliance provided for a war
against Germany, the political clauses as revised in 1899 stated the aim
of the alliance to be “the maintenance of the general peace and of the
European balance of power” (Pribram, _The Secret Treaties of Austria-
Hungary_, II, 206 ff.).]
[Footnote 914: Nekludow, _Revue des deux mondes_, March 1, 1918, pp. 137
f.; Savinsky, _ibid._, XII (1922), 799 ff.; Witte, p. 425; Savinsky, pp.
115 ff.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 9, Sept. 28, 1905,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 480 f., 486 ff.; Nelidow to
Lamsdorff, Oct. 5, 1905, _ibid._, p. 483.]
[Footnote 915: Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 800 ff.;
Savinsky, pp. 118 ff., 126 f.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 6 and 9, 1905,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 485 ff.; Witte, pp. 415 ff.;
Iswolsky, pp. 44, 49.]
[Footnote 916: Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Sept. 14, 1905,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, p. 478.]
[Footnote 917: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Sept. 21, 1905, _ibid._, pp. 479
f.]
[Footnote 918: Hardinge to Lansdowne, July 25, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 93 f.,
No. 89; Spring Rice to G. Balfour, July 29, 1905, and Spring Rice to
Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5, 1905, Gwynn, I, 481 f., 496.]
[Footnote 919: Radolin to Bülow, July 22, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 426 ff.,
No. 6198. On July 26 the German government was about to inaugurate a
press campaign against Witte, thinking that he was pro-British (Bülow to
F. O., July 26, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 468, No. 6222).]
[Footnote 920: See Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 4, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 205,
No. 195.]
[Footnote 921: Witte, pp. 293 f., 416 f.; Dillon, _The Eclipse of
Russia_, pp. 350 f.; Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 23, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 503
f., No. 6241; Witte’s interview in _Le Temps_, reprinted in _Quest.
dipl. et col._, XX, 439; Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Oct. 15, 1905,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, p. 491; Lee, II, 307 f.]
[Footnote 922: William II to Bülow, Sept. 25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 505,
No. 6242.]
[Footnote 923: At the Emperor’s request Bülow said nothing to him about
the Björkö treaty. See Bülow to William II, Sept. 25, 1905, _ibid._, 505
ff., No. 6243.]
[Footnote 924: On the meeting at Rominten see the following: Witte, pp.
416 ff.; Iswolsky, pp. 50 ff.; Dillon, pp. 396 f.; Goetz, pp. 379 ff.;
Bülow to F. O., Sept. 27, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 507 f., Nos. 6244 f.;
William II to Bülow, Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 508 ff., No. 6246.]
[Footnote 925: William II to Nicholas II, Sept. 26, 1905, Goetz, pp. 379
ff.]
[Footnote 926: Bülow instructed the Emperor to that effect. See Bülow to
William II, Sept. 25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 506, No. 6243. See the dispatch
from the Emperor to Bülow on Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 508 ff., No.
6246.]
[Footnote 927: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 1 and 4, 1905, _B.D._, IV,
202 f., No. 193; 205 f., No. 195.]
[Footnote 928: Bompard, XXV, 441 f.; Bourgeois et Pagès, pp. 318 f.]
[Footnote 929: In his memoirs Witte represented himself the dupe of the
two rulers; when he read the document itself, he wrote, he was
horrified. He claimed that he was largely responsible for the annulment
of the treaty (Witte, pp. 425 ff.; Dillon, pp. 358 ff., 354, 413 f.; cf.
Savinsky, p. 125). These accounts by him were both of a much later date,
when he had been out of favor for several years and held a deep grudge
against his master. Consequently he wanted to paint the latter’s perfidy
toward France as black as possible. That Witte thought the treaty so
harmful at the time is difficult to believe. See his letter to
Eulenburg, Oct. 8, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 519 f., No. 6250, Anlage; Witte,
p. 424; Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 1 and 4, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 202 f.,
No. 193; 205 ff., No. 195; Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5, 1905,
Gwynn, I, 496 f.]
[Footnote 930: See the following: Witte, pp. 427 ff.; Iswolsky, pp. 54
ff.; Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 801; Dillon, pp. 361
ff.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 9 and 27, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_,
Nov., 1924, pp. 487, 495; Bompard, XXV, 422 ff.; Savinsky, pp. 120 ff.]
[Footnote 931: Lamsdorff met with a similar response from Bompard.
According to the latter, Lamsdorff suggested a combination of Russia,
France, Germany, and the United States as a counterpoise to the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, “in the same manner that the political equilibrium of
Europe was maintained by the Dual and Triple Alliances.” See Hardinge to
Lansdowne, Oct. 14, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 211 f., No. 198; Spring Rice to
Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5 and 15, 1905, Gwynn, I, 497, 501 f.]
[Footnote 932: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Oct. 5, 15, 18, 1905,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 481 f., 489 f.]
[Footnote 933: Nicholas II to William II, Oct. 7, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 512
f., No. 6247.]
[Footnote 934: William II to Nicholas II, Oct. 12, 1905, _ibid._, 514,
No. 6248; William II to Bülow, Oct. 12 and 17, 1905, _ibid._, 515 ff.,
Nos. 6249 f. The reply to Witte was made by Eulenburg at the same time.
See Bülow to Eulenburg, Oct. 18, 1905, _ibid._, 520 f., No. 6251;
Eulenburg to Witte, Oct., 1905, _ibid._, 521, No. 6252. Cf. Bompard,
XXV, 443 ff. Bülow approved of the line taken by his master, for he
earnestly desired to continue the negotiations (Bülow to Eulenburg, Oct.
18, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 520, No. 6251).]
[Footnote 935: Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 12, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_,
Nov., 1924, p. 488.]
[Footnote 936: The letter was delivered by Osten-Sacken, Russian
ambassador at Berlin, to give it full official character. See _G.P._,
XIX, 522 ff., No. 6254 and Anlage. The Czar approved this reply as early
as Nov. 10. Lamsdorff to Osten-Sacken, undated though bearing the date
of approval by Nicholas II of Nov. 10. See _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov.,
1924, pp. 495 f.; Iswolsky, pp. 55 f.; Bompard, XXV, 443 ff.; Witte, p.
429; Savinsky, pp. 123 f.]
[Footnote 937: William II to Bülow, Nov. 26, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 524 f.,
No. 6255. The Emperor thought that Russia had shown little appreciation
of German friendship during the recent war, and he declared to Bülow
that the coalition of Russia, France, and Great Britain was _de facto_
already existent. In the same letter he stated that Germany alone, since
Russia refused her aid, must win France to the new project. For the
reply to the Czar see William II to Nicholas II, Nov. 26 and 28, 1905,
_ibid._, 526 f., Nos. 6256 f. That the German government continued to
hold the alliance as valid is seen from a memorandum composed by the
foreign office for the Emperor just before the latter’s meeting with the
Czar at Swinemünde, July, 1907 (_ibid._, p. 528 n.).]
[Footnote 938: _Ibid._, 527 f., No. 6528. See also Bompard, XXV, 447;
Witte, p. 429; Bourgeois et Pagès, p. 313.]
[Footnote 939: Both letters are quoted in _G.P._, XIX, 528 n.]
[Footnote 940: Nekludow, _Revue des deux mondes_, March 1, 1918, pp.
142, 144. See also the correspondence between the two rulers, Jan. 21
and 29, 1906, _G.P._, XIX, 528 n.; Goetz, p. 386.]
[Footnote 941: Iswolsky, p. 56.]
[Footnote 942: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 1, 4, 14, 1905, _B.D._, IV,
202 f., No. 193; 205 ff., No. 195; 211 f., No. 198; Lansdowne to Bertie,
Oct. 25, 1905, _ibid._, 217 f., No. 203.]
[Footnote 943: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 6, 1905, _ibid._, 198 f.,
No. 191.]
[Footnote 944: _Ibid._, chap. xxiv.]
[Footnote 945: Cf. Bertie to Lansdowne, Sept. 9, 1905, _ibid._, 177, No.
172_a_; Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5, 1905, Gwynn, I, 498.]
[Footnote 946: Hardinge to Knollys, May, 1905, Lee, II, 306; Hardinge to
Lansdowne, May 30, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 195 f., No. 189.]
[Footnote 947: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 9, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 178 f.,
No. 172 (_b_); Lansdowne to Hardinge, Sept. 4, 1905, Newton, pp. 327 f.]
[Footnote 948: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 2, 9, 26, 1905, _B.D._, IV,
170 f., No. 159; 178 f., No. 172 (_b_); 199 ff., No. 192 and following
documents.]
[Footnote 949: Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 3 and 5, 1905, _ibid._, 204
f., No. 194; 207 f., No. 196; Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 15,
1905, Gwynn, I, 501.]
[Footnote 950: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 4, 8, 14, 1905, _B.D._, IV,
205 ff., No. 195; 208 ff., Nos. 197 f.; Lansdowne to Bertie, Oct. 17 and
25, 1905, _ibid._, 212 f., No. 199; 217 f., No. 203.]
[Footnote 951: See Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 211
f., No. 198, Lansdowne’s minute; _ibid._, pp. 521 f.; report from
London, Oct. 30, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, No. 22; report from St.
Petersburg, Nov. 8, 1905, _ibid._, No. 23; Metternich to Bülow, Oct. 22,
1905, _G.P._, XIX, 663 ff., No. 6360; Metternich to F. O., Nov. 15,
1905, _ibid._, XXV, No. 8501; Richthofen to Bülow, Oct. 24, 1905,
_ibid._, XIX, 665, No. 6361; Schoen to Bülow, Jan. 28, 1906, _ibid._,
XXV, 5 f., No. 8502; Miquel to Bülow, Oct. 24, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 666
ff., No. 6362; Nicholas II to William II, Nov. 23, 1905, _ibid._, 523,
No. 6254. On Oct. 21, 1905, King Edward instructed Hardinge to express
to the Czar “my earnest desire that the best and most durable relations
should be established between the two countries, and that all important
points should be discussed in the most amicable spirit and arranged as
soon as possible” (Edward VII to Hardinge, quoted in Lee, II, 310). On
Oct. 12 Lord Sydenham received a letter from Balfour stating that “the
time is propitious for an understanding with Russia.” Lord Sydenham, a
member of the Defence Committee, wrote a draft of an agreement with
Russia and sent it to the Premier, Oct. 20. On Nov. 1 he discussed
Persian railways with Balfour and Sir Charles Hardinge, and, after
Balfour had left, he (Sydenham) and Hardinge talked over the draft
agreement. Hardinge believed that the Russians would accept it (Colonel
Lord Sydenham, _My Working Life_ [London, 1927], p. 182).]
[Footnote 952: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 21, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 214,
No. 201; Metternich to F. O., Nov. 15, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 521 f., No.
6253.]
[Footnote 953: Roosevelt to Spring Rice, Nov. 1, 1905, Gwynn, II, 8; G.
Balfour to Spring Rice, Oct. 25, 1905, _ibid._, I, 503.]
[Footnote 954: Eckardstein, I, 218 f.]
[Footnote 955: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 24, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 216,
No. 202.]
[Footnote 956: Metternich to F. O., Nov. 15, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 521 f.,
No. 6253; Howe, p. 209.]
[Footnote 957: Report from London, Oct. 23, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_,
II, 80 f.; Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. 8, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 636 ff., No.
6340. Party leaders, magazines, newspapers, and various societies in
England took up the work. The _Times_, however, continued its anti-
German campaign. In December, Colonel Repington published an article
therein, warning the public against friendliness with Germany
(Lieutenant Colonel Charles à Court Repington, _Vestigia_ [London,
1919], pp. 262 f.). See also E. T. Raymond, _The Life of Lord Rosebery_
(New York, 1923), p. 211; Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II,
208; Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 198 ff.; Metternich to Bülow, Oct. 18 and
22, Nov. 2, Dec. 3 and 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 669 ff., Nos. 6879 ff.;
Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 191 f.]
[Footnote 958: See Metternich to Bülow, Dec. 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 690,
No. 6886.]
CHAPTER XVI
THE PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS
I. GERMAN PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS
After the Björkö treaty had been annulled by the Russian government, the
Moroccan affair once more held the chief attention of the German foreign
office. Already important, it became more so; for there was no longer
any reason for the German government to use the Moroccan affair as a
means of conciliating France and there was added need for it to justify
to the German people and to the world the long diplomatic campaign over
Morocco by checkmating France at the Conference.
Our chief object [wrote Prince Bülow on November 23] must be to avoid
isolation at the conference. If we have the majority or all the other
Powers against us on a question upon which we have engaged ourselves,
boldness and threats will be of no use since after all that has
occurred, our situation would be almost ludicrous.[959]
At almost the same moment the French Premier sounded the German
government as to whether it would agree for France and Spain together to
receive a police mandate from the Conference.[960] The inclusion of
Spain, he said, would prevent the concession from appearing one-sided in
favor of France and would enable the latter to keep her promise not to
seek a general mandate. He added that Germany might be forced to agree
to that solution. Replying doubtfully to these overtures, Herr von
Flotow advised the French government to make the proposal directly in
Berlin in accordance with diplomatic form. A few days later (November
30) Herr von Kühlmann reported that M. Vaffier-Pollet, representative of
the Comité du Maroc in Tangier, and Count de Chérisey, former secretary
of the French legation in Tangier, had proposed to him in Paris that the
German and French governments make a secret agreement before the
Conference to the following effect: The _status quo_ in Morocco should
be maintained for three or four years, after which, if conditions had
not improved, Germany should not oppose the bestowal upon France of the
police mandate for all of Morocco; in return, Germany should be assured
of the open door and of the right for German capital to participate to
the extent of 45 per cent in all governmental enterprises in Morocco, of
territorial compensation in the French Congo region, and of the cession
of the French right of preference to acquire the Belgian Congo.[961]
Although M. Rouvier stood behind this offer, the German government did
not know it and did not reply. It was much disposed to consider the
overture made through Herr von Flotow; but this fact the French Premier
could not know, and, misled by the German silence, he never returned to
the subject.[962]
The German Chancellor’s willingness to negotiate directly with France
showed that he was beginning to appreciate Germany’s increasingly
unfavorable position in international relations. He knew that the German
government faced a hard campaign and that its public opinion, which had
no particular interest in Morocco and was averse to war, must be
convinced of the justice of the German cause and aroused to the
seriousness of the international situation. In the Reichstag on December
6 the Chancellor therefore warned the nation that while animosities had
been overcome, new ones were possible, and that the British were
particularly anti-German. Repeating all the German accusations against
the French Moroccan policy, he justified at length Germany’s defense of
her interests. He avowed his strong desire for the maintenance of
friendly relations with all nations. He assured his hearers that Italy
remained loyal to the Triple Alliance. But he urged his country to be
prepared for any emergency.[963] The speech was widely approved.[964]
The Chancellor’s utterances were soon answered by M. Rouvier through the
publication of a French _Livre jaune_ of over three hundred pages, which
was supplemented by a speech in the Chamber on December 16.[965]
Therein, to the satisfaction of the French, the German accusations were
denied and the national policy of France toward Morocco was
exonerated.[966] According to the reports of the German representatives
in Paris in December and January, France was firmly resolved not to
recede further, and the French government was making military
preparations.[967]
These manifestations did not augur well for the German government. Nor
did the terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement of September 1, 1905,
which it learned of at some time before the Conference opened.[968] The
knowledge of the terms gave a concrete basis to the mistrust of France’s
intentions toward Morocco, and stiffened German resistance. On December
25 the German government envisaged three ways in which the Conference
might end: first, a provisorium of about three years might be agreed
upon, at the end of which each Power would recover its freedom of
action; second, a separate agreement with France might be made, but only
in case the latter offered suitable terms; third, a general police
mandate for Western Morocco might be given to France. This last result,
equivalent to a French victory, the German government was determined not
to permit, holding a conflict as preferable.[969] In fact, none of these
solutions was very palatable to the government. But it was determined to
hold firm,[970] and the instructions to Herr von Radowitz and Count
Tattenbach, the German delegates at the Conference, were optimistic.
The delegates were to uphold the open door and economic equality for
all. They should combat the monopoly for making loans to Morocco claimed
by the French banks. As Germany had already recognized the legitimate
interests of France by permitting her to regulate the frontier, the
mandate for police reforms in the west should be given to a number of
Powers and should be internationally organized for a limited number of
years. If a division of mandated areas were made, Germany should receive
her share—one with a port advantageously located for later expansion
into the interior; however, Germany was ready to agree with the others
not to draw any advantage for herself from this mandate. All the
signatory Powers should participate equally in establishing and
directing the proposed state bank, for which adequate international
organization and control should be provided. Above all, the delegates
should not permit themselves to be isolated or to stand alone with
Morocco. Thus, in general, they were to work for the
internationalization of Morocco.[971]
Prince Bülow became more and more optimistic as the Conference
approached.[972] At his urging, the Sultan promised to select carefully
his delegates to the assembly and to co-operate with the Powers
there.[973] The Chancellor expected the neutral Powers to support
Germany against the monopolistic desires of France. He particularly
courted President Roosevelt; for, although he knew that Mr. White, the
American delegate, would not be permitted to take the initiative at the
Conference, the Chancellor thought that the President and his delegate
would be able, behind the scenes, to exert a powerful influence.[974]
From Russia, Prince Bülow anticipated no interference. The Austrian
Foreign Minister stated his government’s readiness to go hand in hand
with Germany at the Conference.[975] Spanish mistrust and jealousy of
France with reference to Morocco might be aroused and used.[976] To that
end the German government prevented the selection of the anti-German M.
Villa-Urrutia as delegate.[977]
Toward Italy, embarrassed by her situation as Germany’s ally and
France’s friend through an agreement over Morocco, the Chancellor
modified his former tactics. He offered to support her as a candidate
for the general police mandate at the Conference.[978] But the Italian
government refused. Sending the aged and experienced Marquis Visconti
Venosta as delegate, it gave him permission to act as he saw fit in
order to keep his head out of the noose.[979] The German Chancellor
approved this choice and welcomed the Marquis’ statement that he would
endeavor to mediate between France and Germany and to bring the
Conference to a successful conclusion.[980] Prince Bülow planned to
exploit Italy’s position by laying down a flat _non possumus_ on the
question of permitting France to receive the mandate for the police,
with the expectation that the Italian government would then press France
to accept the German terms in order to prevent a conflict wherein it
would be forced to choose sides.[981]
The Chancellor instructed Prince Radolin to impress French official
circles with the fact that Germany would never permit France to obtain a
general police mandate or a special position in the state bank, that if
France persisted in refusing to agree to the open door in Morocco, a
“very critical situation would arise” which “would lead inevitably to a
grave conflict” between the two states.[982] Prince Bülow was pleased to
learn that the French people were growing nervous and that M. Rouvier,
M. Jules Cambon, French ambassador in Madrid, and others were asserting
France’s wish for a peaceful and satisfactory solution.[983]
The main reason for the Chancellor’s growing optimism was the fact that
in December a Liberal government had come to power in England and that
British public opinion was more friendly to Germany. Prince Bülow and
the Emperor both expected an improvement in Anglo-German relations, and
exerted their influence in achieving it.[984] The Chancellor did not
believe that the new Liberal government would stiffen the French
resistance by holding out the prospect of active aid in case of war as
the Unionist cabinet had done. He interpreted the overwhelming Liberal
victory at the elections in January as a clear rejection of chauvinism
and an equally clear expression by the nation of an earnest desire for
peace and for further improvement in Anglo-German relations. He learned
that Edward VII had spoken in favor of a peaceful settlement.[985] Then,
just after the Conference opened, the King and the Emperor entered into
personal correspondence once more.[986] The Chancellor therefore
expected the British government to play the rôle of mediator instead of
active French partisan, and he endeavored to impress this duty upon
it.[987] In view of this situation he believed that France would accept
the German solution of the Moroccan problem.[988]
Although the Chancellor knew that France was improving her defenses, he
did not anticipate a war.[989] He notified General Moltke, the new chief
of staff, that he need take no precautionary measures.[990] The Emperor
also regarded the French fears of war as “ludicrous, bordering on
insanity.” Late in December he roundly declared to Mr. Werner Beit, a
friend of Edward VII, and to the Marquis de Laguiche, French military
attaché in Berlin, that “there is absolutely no cause for any war or for
any concern about an attack from us,” adding, however, these more
ominous words:
Even if we had the best intentions and were loyal and wished to remain
peaceful, there would be danger that in case of continued inciting of
France by London, she [France] might, relying on certain aid from
England, conduct herself toward us so ill-manneredly and provocatively
that finally our national honor would come into question, for the sake
of which we should have to resort to arms; then we would have to strike
and therewith, through our “illegal attack” on France, give the occasion
for England’s aid. And it is monstrous perfidy [for England] to work
toward such.[991]
Thus, hopeful for peace but not entirely averse to war, the German
leaders saw the Conference begin.
II. FRENCH PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS
In spite of the failure of his overtures to the German government in
November, the French Premier assured the _Wilhelmstrasse_ on the eve of
the Conference that he wished to reach an understanding at that assembly
on the basis of “no victor, no vanquished.” Nevertheless, both he and
the French nation were determined to uphold France’s ambitions and
claims toward Morocco. On January 8, 1906, Prince Radolin wrote that
there prevailed in France “grave anxiety over the possibility of warlike
complications. . . . . In press and public it is said that Germany
wishes war, that France has receded . . . . on all points, but without
satisfying Germany.” At the Conference, thus Prince Radolin interpreted
French opinion, “proposals would be made which would be contrary to her
honor and her traditional policy in Morocco. France must defend herself
and be prepared for any eventuality. . . . . Germany makes no secret of
her armaments, and therefore it is imperative for France also to keep
her powder dry.”[992]
In this state of mind the French Parliament during the latter half of
1905 investigated French defences and put 200,000,000 francs at the
disposal of the war Minister for repairing them, particularly on the
eastern frontier. That work was actively begun; food and munitions were
brought in; the frontier forces were increased by reserves; drilling and
trial mobilizations were held.[993] As M. Delcassé had prophesied, M.
Rouvier returned completely to the international policy of the fallen
Minister in order to achieve victory at the Conference. The French
government realized that the opposition of the French and German
policies was so complete as to make retreat difficult for either party.
Preparing for the worst, M. Rouvier yet hoped to exert sufficient moral
pressure on Germany at the Conference to gain a French victory without
precipitating a war.[994] To that end he supplemented the military
measures by diplomatic work. He was certain of Russia’s support because,
aside from the alliance, Russia had urgent need of a French loan, which
M. Rouvier would not permit until after a satisfactory conclusion of the
Moroccan affair.[995] Russia’s influence was restricted by the
revolution and by a lack of interest in Morocco. But a promise from the
Czar to exercise his personal power with Emperor William II in favor of
conciliation would be of eminent value, and M. Rouvier sought to obtain
it.[996] He also wished to have President Roosevelt act similarly at the
proper moment. This plan was to bear fruit later; but at the time the
American government replied that it had small concern in the Moroccan
conference and that, while standing for the open door and exerting its
influence for peace, it would interfere as little as possible in the
deliberations. Mr. Root, the secretary of state, told the British
Ambassador that the American delegate would “avoid any action which
could tend to weaken Anglo-French entente.”[997] M. Rouvier also
received “satisfactory assurances” from the Austro-Hungarian government;
he did not expect opposition from it or from Belgium.[998] Far more
important was the continuation of British aid, both for its own sake and
for holding Italy and Spain in line.[999] From the new Liberal
government that came in early in December, the French Premier was
immediately assured of diplomatic aid by word and act.
III. BRITISH PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS
When internal disputes over the question of tariff reform finally forced
the resignation of the Unionist government on December 4, the Liberals,
with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as prime minister, entered office. In
response to the popular demand they were pledged to continue the foreign
policy of their predecessor, and the presence at the foreign office of
Sir Edward Grey assured the fulfilment of that pledge. The Foreign
Secretary was a Liberal Imperialist, a follower of Lord Rosebery. He had
been one of the rebels against the leadership of Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman, a Gladstonian Liberal, because of the latter’s denunciation
of the Boer War. Regretting that Lord Rosebery would not enter the
cabinet, Sir Edward Grey at first refused office unless the Premier
would accept a peerage and leave the leadership in the House of Commons
to Mr. Asquith, another Liberal Imperialist. After much persuasion from
his friends and after the influence of the Liberal Imperialists had been
increased by the appointment of Mr. Haldane as secretary of war, Sir
Edward receded from his demand.[1000]
The new Foreign Secretary found the “mud of foreign politics” deeper
than any he had ever been in; but he was soon steering himself through
it as nimbly as his predecessors. Although an idealist who hated war, he
was not afraid of it, for, he wrote to Sir Francis Bertie, January 15,
1906, “We can protect ourselves . . . . for we are more supreme at sea
than we have ever been.”[1001] He followed the ways of _Realpolitik_,
playing the “grand game” of prestige politics in the ordinary way with
national interest as his ultimate guide. He impressed other men with
whom he had personal contact as trying to be entirely frank and honest
and sympathetic. Yet his insularity, his lack of knowledge of the
Continent, really prevented him from appreciating any other state’s
point of view. Combining the limitations of a “downright Britisher” with
high moral and political rectitude, he usually believed that Great
Britain was in the right and acted accordingly. Then he was unable to
comprehend why other Powers misinterpreted her policy.[1002]
With regard to Russia, Sir Edward Grey immediately stated to the
Ambassador his hope for a settlement of the outstanding questions. Count
Benckendorff thought that negotiations were impossible “while things in
Russia were in their present condition.” Appreciating this fact, Sir
Edward Grey answered that “during this inevitable delay, it would be the
policy of our Government not to do anything which would make the
resumption of negotiations or a settlement more difficult later
on.”[1003] In January of the next year, Count Witte, Russian premier,
proposed to the British government that Czar Nicholas and King
Edward—diplomats he distrusted as being too slow—should at a personal
meeting conclude a general agreement in return for which Great Britain
should make a loan to Russia. The British Ambassador soon showed him the
impracticability of the idea.[1004] In the same month Count Benckendorff
talked vaguely and informally with Mr. Spring Rice of the Bosphorus and
the Dardanelles and of Persia—all to no object, for, as the British
government perceived, Russia was indifferent to an agreement.[1005] But
some progress was made toward a _rapprochement_. The two governments co-
operated on the Cretan and Macedonian questions.[1006] Treating each
other more frankly,[1007] each refused to take advantage of the other
early in 1906 by making a loan to Persia.[1008] The British government
renewed its assurances about Tibet in January.[1009] British bankers
agreed to participate in a forthcoming loan to Russia.[1010] The Czar
and King Edward were on cordial terms, the former late in January even
intimated to his uncle that he would be pleased with a visit from
him.[1011] And the two governments were in harmony in their policy of
helping France at Algeciras. So while the work of achieving the entente
was slow, the British government did not let it cease.
The British Foreign Secretary also continued the previous policy toward
Germany. He knew very little of that Power, did not understand it,[1012]
and nursed a deep suspicion of it from his experiences as undersecretary
of state for foreign affairs from 1892 to 1895. He was determined not to
let Great Britain fall again into that state of trouble with other
Powers, which he thought had enabled Germany to treat her so high-
handedly at that time and to make demands upon her inimical to her
interests.[1013] His advisers in the foreign office, Sir Charles
Hardinge and Mr. Eyre Crowe, were of a similar mind, lacking the
balanced and comprehensive judgment characteristic of Lord Sanderson,
who after years of service retired from his position as permanent
undersecretary of state for foreign affairs in January, 1906.[1014]
Sir Edward Grey was now confronted with the same kind of action on the
part of Germany which had previously angered him. He saw a conference
approaching at which the new friendship with France would be tested, at
which it would be either broken or confirmed. He was resolved that if
possible it should not be broken, though he did not necessarily intend
that it should become stronger. “It was a matter of interest,” he said
on August 3, 1914, with reference to this crisis, “to preserve it [the
Entente] as well as a point of honour to act up to the diplomatic
obligations contained in it.”[1015] At the time (December 21, 1905) he
expressed himself more concretely to Sir Arthur Nicolson as follows:
The Morocco Conference is going to be difficult if not critical. As far
as I can discover the Germans will refuse altogether to concede to
France the special position in Morocco, which we have promised France
not only to concede to her but to help her by diplomatic methods to
obtain.
If she can succeed in getting this with our help it will be a great
success for the Anglo-French _Entente_; if she fails the prestige of the
_Entente_ will suffer and its vitality will be diminished.
Our main object therefore must be to help France to carry her point at
the Conference.[1016]
Thus for the sake of interest and honor, that invincible pair, Sir
Edward Grey based British policy upon the matter of prestige. Whereas
Lord Lansdowne had admitted that the Anglo-French declaration over
Morocco did not bind Germany, the new British Foreign Secretary was
determined that Germany should formally recognize France’s preponderant
position in Morocco. It is to be inferred from his statement that
Germany had the alternative of accepting France’s monopolization of the
Sherifian Empire passively or of challenging it and then being forced to
accept it.
That this ominous feeling was not peculiar to Sir Edward Grey was shown
early in January by a letter which Lord Ripon, one of the older members
of the cabinet, wrote to Lord Fitzmaurice, parliamentary undersecretary
of state for foreign affairs. It read in part as follows:
One cannot help being anxious about this Morocco business. I am sorry
though not surprised to hear that you think the Germans intend to make
the Conference a failure. That a European war should arise out of the
matter seems almost impossible, but when one has to deal with a
potentate like the German Emperor one can feel no real security.[1017]
On December 19 Count Metternich gave to Sir Edward Grey a general
explanation of Germany’s policy on the Moroccan question, expressing the
hope that the British government would play the part of conciliator at
the Conference.[1018] The British Minister replied on January 3. The
Conference filled him with concern, he said. After having studied the
documents more thoroughly, he had found that Lord Lansdowne had stated
to Count Metternich “that, in the event of war between Germany and
France, public feeling in England would be such that, in his opinion, it
would be impossible for England to remain neutral.” This statement, he
went on, he made his own; for, while the British government “wanted to
avoid trouble between Germany and France,” and would not “egg” France on
at the Conference, yet since the entente was very popular in England he
“really thought that if there was trouble, we [Great Britain] should be
involved in it. . . . . It was not a question of the policy of the
Government,” he told the Ambassador; “what made a nation most likely to
take part in war was not policy or interest, but sentiment, and if the
circumstances arose, public feeling in England would be so strong that
it would be impossible to be neutral.” British opinion, he declared,
would be moved not by hostility to Germany but by the wish to preserve
friendship with France. He made an Anglo-German _rapprochement_
contingent upon a happy outcome of the Conference, an improvement in
Franco-German relations and the assurance thereby that the Entente
Cordiale would not be endangered. He spoke frankly, he said, because the
situation might later become such as to make openness more difficult.
When Count Metternich reminded him that Lord Lansdowne had qualified his
statement concerning the possibility of active British aid by the
further assertion, “in case of an unprovoked attack by Germany upon
France,” Sir Edward Grey made no reply. But the meaning of his statement
was clear to the Ambassador, who accepted it as an honest rendition of
the British position.[1019]
The bluntness of these remarks seemed justified immediately by the
varying reports about Germany’s intentions which came to the British
foreign office. The German Emperor was in a friendlier mood although
angry at the tone of the British press. Baron Richthofen and Herr von
Radowitz both spoke of a desire for conciliation.[1020] The British
Consul in Hamburg, however, learned from Herr von Tschirschky of the
German foreign office on New Year’s Day that “Germany’s policy always
had been and would be to try to frustrate any coalition between two
States which might result in damaging Germany’s interests and prestige,
and Germany would, if she thought that such a coalition was being
formed, even if its actual results had not been carried into practical
effect, not hesitate to take such steps as she thought proper to break
the combination.”[1021] And Prince Bülow’s brother, minister at Berne,
remarked to his British colleague on December 31:
No doubt the sudden intervention of Germany [in Morocco] had not been
dictated by the desire to safeguard German interests in that region. The
object had been a higher one. Germany was bound in self-defense to
emancipate herself from the isolation with which she was threatened.
First Russia, then Italy, and lastly England had been won over by
France. The cordon must be broken, and the penultimate defeat of Russia
had furnished the propitious moment. . . . . He thought that a _détente_
would make itself felt when once the Conference was over.[1022]
It was becoming more and more apparent that Anglo-German antagonism
would accentuate the difficulties of the Conference. Prince Bülow
informed the British government on January 11 that he advocated reforms
on an international basis. Stating that M. Rouvier had promised not to
seek a general police mandate for France,[1023] the Chancellor made it
understood that Germany could not accept that solution. In talking to
the British Ambassador on the next day Herr von Holstein foresaw danger
since France, relying upon British aid, might, if dissatisfied with the
results of the Conference, “seek to create a _fait accompli_ by invading
Morocco. The Sultan would appeal to the Emperor, and war would be the
result.” Asseverating that France was preparing for war, Herr von
Holstein said that the danger could be averted if the British government
would hint to the French that in the event of their invading Morocco it
was doubtful whether British opinion would approve of supporting France
by force of arms.
Upon being consulted, Sir Francis Bertie denied that France had any such
intention, and asserted that
any communication to the French Gov[ernmen]t such as the Baron
[Holstein] suggests would shake the confidence of the French
Gov[ernmen]t in H[is] M[ajesty’s] present Gov[ernmen]t resulting from
their assurances as to policy of England (and) might lead France either
to make concessions to Germany in Morocco injurious to us or bring her
out of Morocco by concessions elsewhere detrimental to our interests but
not greatly to those of France.
After this Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Frank Lascelles, January
15, the following curt response to Herr von Holstein’s suggestion:
I hope the result of Morocco conference will prevent the contingency,
which Herr von Holstein contemplates, from arising. Should it however be
otherwise we cannot deprecate any action on the part of France which
comes within the terms of the Anglo-French declarations of April 1904.
Herr von Holstein should know this.[1024]
In these negotiations the British Foreign Secretary tried to impress the
German government with the fact that Great Britain placed herself
squarely on the French side. This was one facet of his policy. The other
had to do with France.
The British government was as eager for France to win at the conference
as was the French government. To that end Sir Francis Bertie informed M.
Rouvier on December 22 that his government
would loyally act up to the engagements taken by their predecessors and
. . . . would give to France their unreserved support in the Conference
on Morocco within the four corners of the Anglo-French Agreement and the
programme arranged between the French and German Governments; but in
order to enable them to do so effectively, and to put them in a position
to act in concert with France, it would be desirable that His Majesty’s
Government should be made acquainted with the views of the French
Government on the matters to be discussed, and as to the concessions, if
any, which might be made for the satisfaction of Germany.
The British government, he said, wished to avoid the accusation of being
more French than the French. Going farther still, the Ambassador assured
M. Rouvier that his government was in no way associated with the
friendly manifestations toward Germany then being made in England. While
the British government wanted friendly relations with Germany, he
stated, an improvement in those relations “would depend on the attitude
of the German Government in regard to Morocco and other questions in
which England was interested.” The cordiality with which M. Rouvier
agreed to respect this wish showed how conscious both governments were
of the mutual advantages in loyal co-operation.[1025]
The need therefor was manifested at once in the case of Spain. While
King Alfonso was regarded as entirely loyal,[1026] M. Moret, the Spanish
premier who supplanted M. Montero Rios in December, was mistrusted by
the British and French governments as being too friendly toward Germany
and uncertain in his attitude toward the Moroccan agreements. Both
governments knew of German efforts to win Spain, both learned of the
German Emperor’s offer in November of a military convention to the King
of Spain, and both learned that at Germany’s request the Spanish
government had not appointed M. Villa-Urrutia as delegate to the
Conference.[1027] At the French initiative the two governments late in
December pressed M. Moret to remain loyal to them. These efforts won
over the Spanish Premier. He frankly admitted that the Emperor had made
the offer, but denied that he had ever considered it. He stated that
Spain would support the French policy during the Conference, and hoped
that the three Powers would work harmoniously together. And he told the
French that “it will facilitate his support of them at the Conference if
they will provide money to quiet the Spanish Opposition.”[1028]
Nevertheless, the British government suspected that the Duke of
Almodovar, the Spanish delegate and proposed president of the
Conference, would be “in the hands of the German Ambassador [Herr von
Radowitz].” Sir Edward Grey also feared that Spain might, to the
detriment of British interests, be induced to cede a part of her
possessions along the north coast of Morocco or elsewhere to
Germany.[1029] So Spain remained under constant observation and pressure
by the Entente Cordiale.[1030] The British government put similar
pressure upon Italy. In informing the Italian Ambassador on December 27
of the British policy, Sir Edward Grey remarked that the four Powers
most interested in the Mediterranean were all good friends now and that
he “hoped we should all come out of the Conference as good friends as we
went in.” The Italian government protested that it had “not only
friendship but also an alliance to be considered.” This item Sir Edward
Grey ignored, and in Rome Sir Edwin Egerton repeatedly asserted that “a
European political combination did not appear to regard special
agreements respecting a local question, such as that of Morocco.” This
veiled threat and curious interpretation of the Triple Alliance were
valuable aids to M. Barrère in urging Italy to the Anglo-French side.
The selection as delegates of the Marquis Visconti Venosta, who had made
the agreement with France in 1900, was regarded as insuring a pro-French
policy. But the Italian government could make no promises of support,
and Sir Edward Grey feared that the Marquis might, by trying to play the
“fine” but “dangerous” rôle of mediator at the Conference, suggest some
solution which would be altogether unacceptable.[1031]
The Anglo-French co-operation extended to planning the procedure at the
Conference and to drawing up instructions for the French delegates.
Every precaution was taken for victory. The British were as sensitive to
alarms as were the French. About the middle of December both governments
heard that the proposed Austrian delegate thought it possible to bring
matters before the Conference not mentioned in the program. M. Rouvier
took immediate steps in Vienna to prevent that danger.[1032]
Furthermore, the two governments planned that the less difficult
problems should be considered first and the police question last. M.
Rouvier proposed that the published Anglo-French, Anglo-Spanish, and
Franco-German agreements over Morocco should be laid before the
Conference, but Sir Edward Grey objected that they might then be
discussed and questioned by the Powers. The British Foreign Secretary
thought that “it should appear that the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish
Agreements of 1904 were rather intended to give a formal sanction to a
_de facto_ state of affairs than to create a new situation.” M. Rouvier
accepted this suggestion. It was also in accordance with a British
proposal that the French delegate was instructed to refuse to argue the
matter of France’s right in the Algero-Moroccan frontier region, since
it might lead to an “embarrassing discussion.”[1033]
The main problem which the British and French governments had to solve
was that of the police. For, as they learned from Prince Bülow,[1034]
Germany would propose either that Morocco be divided into sectors, each
one under the police power of a different state, or that the policing be
done by a lesser Power disinterested in Morocco. While the first
solution could be easily rejected, the second one would be more
difficult for France to combat without exposing herself to the
accusation of selfishness. If the Conference broke up because of a
refusal, France would be blamed. At this point the two governments
received a suggestion from M. Bacheracht, Russian minister at Tangier
and a delegate at the Conference, to the following effect: “All
considerations of a political character and all references to ‘special
interests,’ etc., should not be touched upon in discussion” of the
police question. The problem should be considered solely from a
practical point of view, of how to assure protection and safety to the
foreigners. Clearly that work could be done best by France and Spain,
who had had experience in handling Mohammedans, who were already
policing portions of Moroccan soil, and who could employ Mohammedans
from their North African territories to aid them. The policing might be
regarded as experimental and temporary so as to mollify German
opposition. If Germany rejected the plan, she would receive the
discredit for breaking up the Conference. The British and French
authorities accepted this proposal at once, for, as MM. Paul and Jules
Cambon said, it would be “difficult to combat.”[1035]
After this thorough preparatory discussion, M. Rouvier sent the
following instructions to M. Révoil, a copy of which he also gave to the
British government: The repression of contraband trade should be
committed to France and Spain alone. A state bank should be established
in which French participation in capital and in personnel should be in
harmony with France’s superior rights in Morocco resulting from the loan
contract of June, 1904, and from the high percentage of trade
(approximately 80 per cent) which France together with Great Britain and
Spain had with that country as compared with that (approximately 10 per
cent) of Germany. The bank should be under the French legal system and
its president a Frenchman. Moroccan revenues should be augmented, but
not merely by an increase in customs duties. The thirty-year limitation
to commercial freedom might be extended. “In a general manner it is in
the economic program that we are disposed to accord the most complete
satisfaction. But you will avoid a definitive acquiescence in those
solutions until you are certain that the delegates do not aim to adopt
unacceptable solutions relative to the organization of the police.” This
question should refer solely to the policing of the coastal towns and
should not concern the Moroccan army. Any internationalization of the
police should be refused. The plan of dividing Morocco into sectors
among the Powers, that of selecting a minor Power to accomplish the
task, and that of selecting officers from neutral Powers should be
absolutely refused. The policing should be conferred upon France and
Spain alone.
In case the proposals conforming to our desires on that matter meet with
insurmountable opposition . . . ., we would consider that, the economic
questions being regulated according to our views, an accord for the
maintenance of the _status quo_ in that which concerns the police would
be an acceptable solution, if that accord respects our rights and
implies the renunciation by the other contracting parties to all action
tending to reopen the question with the Sultan without previous
agreement with us. . . . . In résumé . . . . no one will expect of us an
adhesion to any solution of a nature to compromise the future of our
national interests. Under that condition, you will show on all occasions
our sincere desire to respect the rights of other countries, to open
Morocco to the free competition of commercial interests, and you will
affirm at the same time our desire to maintain our rights and interests
only with the most formal guarantees of the sovereign rights of the
Sultan, the independence and the established traditions of his
Empire.[1036]
A few days later, with the approval of Spain, M. Rouvier advised the
French delegate to reject as “absolutely inacceptable” any plan to
neutralize Morocco.[1037]
These instructions denoted a determination to defeat
internationalization, by all means to exclude Germany from Morocco, and
to divide Morocco between France and Spain.
While these negotiations were in progress, the French government was
sounding Great Britain as to a defensive agreement against Germany.
Toward the middle of December Major Huguet, French military attaché in
London, spoke to General Grierson, director of military operations in
the British war office, about the French fears of a German attack, and
questioned him about the British organization for war. When he asked
whether the British general staff had ever considered operations in
Belgium, General Grierson replied that “as a strategical exercise” he
had worked out a plan for them last spring.[1038]
On December 28 Major Huguet dined with Colonel Repington, a retired
officer serving as military correspondent on the _London Times_. The
conversation turned immediately to the Colonel’s article of the previous
day, in which he had denounced the attempts being made toward an Anglo-
German _rapprochement_, expressed anxiety over the international
situation, and advised full loyalty to France. The two men found
themselves in entire agreement over the possibility of complications and
over the need for France and Great Britain to be prepared for co-
operation in case of a German aggression. Major Huguet said that the
French embassy was worried because Sir Edward Grey, the new British
foreign minister, had not renewed the assurances given by his
predecessor.[1039] Time was pressing, he said, for the Conference of
Algeciras would open on January 16. He wished that Sir Edward Grey would
broach the subject at the next diplomatic reception. The French “knew
that our sympathies were with them,” so Colonel Repington has recorded
the military attaché’s words, “but they wanted to know what we should do
in case Germany confronted them with a crisis.”
Colonel Repington immediately communicated the conversation to the
British Foreign Secretary, who was then electioneering in
Northumberland. The latter replied on December 30 as follows: “I can
only say that I have not receded from anything which Lord Lansdowne said
to the French, and have no hesitation in affirming it.” The Colonel also
reported Major Huguet’s words to Sir George Clarke, secretary of the
Defence Committee, and to Lord Esher, a member of that Committee. They
agreed that in view of the German menace, active steps toward co-
operation should be taken. As Colonel Repington was a free-lance, they
suggested that he open unofficial conversations with Major Huguet and
communicate the results to the British officials. The Colonel prepared a
set of questions which Major Huguet took to Paris on January 7. These
questions were considered by M. Rouvier, M. Etienne, minister of war, M.
Thomson, minister of marine, his naval staff, General Brun, and General
Brugère. On January 12 a cordial reply was returned to Colonel Repington
who then imparted it to the Defence Committee.[1040]
When Major Huguet related these incidents to his ambassador, M. Cambon
was so struck by the fact that British as well as French authorities
were studying the problem of how quickly the British forces could be
mobilized for action on the Continent that he went immediately to Paris
to consult M. Rouvier.[1041] The latter approved of the plan to broach
Sir Edward Grey for a closer and more definite understanding.
Before returning to London, M. Cambon visited his brother in Madrid.
There the two prepared the ground for later discussion by a conversation
with Sir Arthur Nicolson which the latter reported (January 2) as
follows:
They [MM. Cambon] asked me, supposing, as they considered probable, that
the Conference failed, what did I think would be the consequences? I
replied that in my opinion it was quite possible that the Sultan would
then apply to Germany to take in hand the military, financial and police
administration. They remarked that that would mean war. I said that I
did not consider that this would necessarily follow; but I did think
that they would have to take up a very firm attitude at Fez, and prevent
the Sultan from handing himself over to the Germans.[1042]
This alarming forecast, together with the staunch diplomatic support
which the British government was rendering France, strengthened the
French authorities in their resolve. When M. Cambon reached London, he
had a long conversation with Sir Edward Grey on January 10 which the
latter recorded as follows:
M. Cambon said that he did not believe that the German Emperor desired
war, but that His Majesty was pursuing a very dangerous policy. He had
succeeded in inciting public opinion and military opinion in Germany,
and there was a risk that matters might be brought to a point in which a
pacific issue would be difficult. During the previous discussions on the
subject of Morocco, Lord Lansdowne had expressed his opinion that the
British and French Governments should frankly discuss any eventualities
that might seem possible, and by his instructions your Excellency [Sir
Francis Bertie, ambassador in Paris] had communicated a Memorandum to M.
Delcassé to the same effect. It had not been considered necessary at the
time to discuss the eventuality of war, but it now seemed desirable that
this eventuality should also be considered.
M. Cambon said that he had spoken to this effect to M. Rouvier, who
agreed in his view. It was not necessary, nor, indeed, expedient, that
there should be any formal alliance, but it was of great importance that
the French Government should know beforehand whether, in the event of
aggression against France by Germany, Great Britain would be prepared to
render to France armed assistance.[1043]
The British statesman, embarrassed by the question, replied that he
personally could give the French government no promise of active aid. He
put the Ambassador off by pointing out that the Prime Minister was away,
that the members of the cabinet were all electioneering, and that the
verdict of the elections was doubtful. He said that he could only state
as his personal opinion that “if France were to be attacked by Germany
in consequence of a question arising out of the Agreement [of April 8,
1904] . . . . public opinion in England would be strongly moved in
favour of France.” When he added that Great Britain earnestly desired
“that the conference should have a pacific issue favourable to France,”
M. Cambon replied that “nothing would have a more pacific influence on
the Emperor of Germany than the conviction that, if Germany attacked
France, she would find England allied against her.” Sir Edward Grey
answered that he thought that “the German Emperor did believe this, but
that it was one thing that this opinion should be held in Germany and
another that we should give a positive assurance to France on the
subject.” He could give no assurance, he said, of which he was
uncertain. He “did not believe that any Minister could, in present
circumstances, say more than I had done, and, however strong the
sympathy of Great Britain might be with France in the case of a rupture
with Germany, the expression which might be given to it and the action
which might follow must depend largely upon the circumstances in which
the rupture took place.”[1044]
As Sir Edward Grey thus postponed a definitive answer until after the
elections, M. Cambon replied that he would repeat his request at that
time. But he asked that in the meantime the “unofficial communications”
between the British admiralty and war office and the French naval and
military attachés “as to what action might advantageously be taken in
case the two countries found themselves in alliance in such a war” might
be permitted to continue. “They did not pledge either Government,” he
said.[1045]
Sir Edward Grey immediately sent a report of this conversation to the
Prime Minister and to Lord Ripon, and he met his friend, Mr. Haldane, at
Berwick on January 12 to discuss the matter, particularly the French
request concerning the military conversations.[1046] He had learned that
under the Unionist cabinet in the previous year such military and naval
conversations had taken place, and that at the present time official
conversations were going on between Admiral Sir John Fisher and the
French naval attaché while the military conversations were being held
unofficially between the French military attaché and Colonel Repington.
When consulted on January 11, General Grierson replied that “if there is
even a chance of our having to give armed assistance on land to France
or to take the field on her side in Belgium in consequence of a
violation of Belgian territory by the Germans, we should have as soon as
possible informal communication between the military authorities of
France and/or Belgium and the General Staff.”[1047] Neither Sir Edward
Grey nor Mr. Haldane saw any reason why these conversations should not
be carried on officially also. As the former argued:
It was quite clear that no Cabinet could undertake any obligation to go
to war, but the Anglo-French Agreement was popular in Britain. It was
certain that if Germany forced a quarrel on France upon the very matter
of that Agreement, the pro-French feeling in Britain would be very
strong, so strong probably as to justify a British Government in
intervening on the side of France or even to insist on its doing so. We
must, therefore, be free to go to the help of France as well as free to
stand aside. But modern war may be an affair of days. If there were no
military plans made beforehand we should be unable to come to the
assistance of France in time, however strongly public opinion in Britain
might desire it. We should in effect not have preserved our freedom to
help France, but have cut ourselves off from the possibility of doing
so, unless we had allowed the British and French staffs to concert plans
for common action.[1048]
The Prime Minister feared the interpretation that would be put upon
these conversations. “I do not like the stress laid upon joint
preparations,” he wrote to Lord Ripon on February 2. “It comes very
close to an honourable undertaking; and it will be known on both sides
of the Rhine.” However, he considered them to be merely “provisional and
precautionary measures” not binding the government, “raising no new
question of policy and therefore within the competence of the War
Office.” So he agreed to them.[1049] It was definitely understood that
these military conversations did not bind the governments.[1050] On
January 17 they were begun between the French military attaché and
General Grierson and continued uninterrupted between the French and
British general staffs until the outbreak of the World War.[1051]
The same reasoning applied to Belgium, for both the French and the
British authorities expected Germany to violate Belgian neutrality in
order to strike France suddenly from the northeast.[1052] On January 15
Sir Edward Grey therefore instructed General Grierson to open
conversations with the Belgian military authorities “as to the manner in
which, in case of need, British assistance could be most effectually
afforded to Belgium for the defence of her neutrality. Such
communications,” he continued, “must be solely provisional and
noncommittal.”[1053] Colonel Barnardiston, the British military attaché
in Brussels, broached the subject on January 18 to General Ducarne,
Belgian chief of staff, remarking that the British Minister would bring
up the matter with the Belgian Foreign Minister.[1054] After consulting
the Minister of War, General Ducarne agreed to the conversations.[1055]
This decision was anticipated by Colonel Barnardiston, who had learned
that the Belgian military authorities were quietly making preparations
for instant mobilization.[1056] The Anglo-Belgian negotiations continued
at least until the end of April.[1057]
These conversations, both military and naval, were kept secret. The
Anglo-Belgian negotiations were known to only half-a-dozen persons; the
ones with France were not known to all the members of the British
cabinet although reports of them leaked out in the press about the
middle of 1906.[1058] Sir Edward Grey wanted to prevent either these
conversations or any military or naval action from being regarded as
provocations. In informing Lord Tweedmouth, first lord of the admiralty,
of the Anglo-French conversations, he wrote, January 16:
Meanwhile the mood of the German Emperor is said to be pacific; the tone
of German diplomacy is quiet and not aggressive. Any movement of our
ships which could be interpreted as a threat to Germany would be very
undesirable at this moment and most unfortunate so long as there is a
prospect or even a chance that things may go smoothly at the Morocco
Conference which meets today. I hope therefore that the Admiralty won’t
plan any special cruises or visits to Foreign ports or unusual movements
of squadrons without consulting the F[oreign] O[ffice] as to the
possible political effect.
I assume that the present disposition of the Fleet is satisfactory as
regards possibilities between Germany and France; if so the quieter we
keep for the present the better.[1059]
With the opening of these conversations a new military problem
confronted the British which Mr. Haldane, then minister of war, has
described as follows:
It was, how to mobilize and concentrate at a place of assembly to be
opposite the Belgian frontier, a force calculated as adequate (with the
assistance of Russian pressure in the East) to make up for the
inadequacy of the French armies for their great task of defending the
entire French frontier from Dunkirk down to Belfort, or even further
south, if Italy should join the Triple Alliance in an attack.[1060]
At the time, in January, the Committee of Imperial Defence, although not
all of its members knew of the military conversations then beginning,
studied the question. It decided that “four Divisions and a Cavalry
Division” could be landed at the nearest French port in case of a sudden
outbreak of hostilities.[1061] The admiralty was prepared “to bar the
Channel against the German squadrons.”[1062] The Minister of War began a
thorough reorganization of the army in order to make British aid
effective at the desired moment in the future.[1063]
Having settled this matter, Sir Edward Grey had the difficult problem of
how to answer M. Cambon’s question about a formal agreement.[1064] As it
was inconvenient then to hold a cabinet meeting, Sir Edward Grey talked
over the reply to be given with the Premier and Mr. Haldane, who were
both in London after January 26, and asked Sir Francis Bertie to write
his opinion.[1065]
The Ambassador wrote that France did not desire war at all, but that if
a conflict did arise over Morocco either then or later she expected
active British support. He warned his chief that if his answer did not
assure to France
more than a continuance of diplomatic support, or of neutrality in the
event of a war provoked by Germany, there is serious danger of a
complete revulsion of feeling on the part of the French Government and
of public opinion in France. The Government would consider that they had
been deserted and might, in order to avoid the risks of a war without
ally, deem it advisable to make great concessions to Germany outside
Morocco in order to obtain liberty of action in that country.
Such concessions might not be very great sacrifices for France but they
might well be very detrimental to the interests of the British Empire,
for, in the temper in which France would then be, it could not be
expected that she would give them much consideration.[1066]
Sir Edward Grey’s personal opinion was that “if France is let in for a
war with Germany arising out of our agreement with her about Morocco, we
cannot stand aside, but must take part with France.” While pondering the
question of an alliance, he saw the great difficulties in making
one.[1067] He decided to adapt the policy of his predecessor in office
to the new situation created by M. Cambon’s request. This policy is best
explained in the long dispatch which Sir Edward Grey wrote to Sir
Francis Bertie about his interview with the French Ambassador on January
31:
The French Ambassador asked me again to-day whether France would be able
to count upon the assistance of England in the event of an attack upon
her by Germany.
I said that I had spoken on the subject to the Prime Minister and
discussed it with him, and that I had three observations to submit.
In the first place, since the Ambassador had spoken to me a good deal of
progress has been made. Our military and naval authorities had been in
communication with the French, and I assumed that all preparations were
ready, so that, if a crisis arose, no time would have been lost for want
of a formal engagement.
In the second place, a week or more before Monsieur Cambon had spoken to
me, I had taken an opportunity of expressing to Count Metternich my
personal opinion, which I understood Lord Lansdowne had also expressed
to him as a personal opinion, that, in the event of an attack upon
France by Germany arising out of our Moroccan Agreement, public feeling
in England would be so strong that no British Government could remain
neutral. I urged upon Monsieur Cambon that this, which I had reason to
know had been correctly reported at Berlin, had produced there the moral
effect which Monsieur Cambon had urged upon me as being one of the great
securities of peace and the main reason for a formal engagement between
England and France with regard to armed co-operation.
In the third place, I pointed out to Monsieur Cambon that at present
French policy in Morocco, within the four corners of the Declaration
exchanged between us, was absolutely free, that we did not question it,
that we suggested no concessions and no alterations in it, that we left
France a free hand and gave unreservedly our diplomatic support on which
she could count; but that, should our promise extend beyond diplomatic
support, and should we take an engagement which might involve us in a
war, I was sure my colleagues would say that we must from that time be
consulted with regard to French policy in Morocco, and, if need be, be
free to press upon the French Government concessions or alterations of
their policy which might seem to us desirable to avoid a war.
I asked Monsieur Cambon to weigh these considerations in his mind, and
to consider whether the present situation as regards ourselves and
France was not so satisfactory that it was unnecessary to alter it by a
formal declaration as he desired.
M. Cambon replied that a war might break out over some Moroccan incident
so quickly that if it were necessary for the British government “to
consult, and to wait for manifestations of English public opinion, it
might be too late to be of use.” He repeated his request for some form
of verbal assurance. Sir Edward Grey pointed out the difficulties of
giving this assurance—that it would be a “solemn undertaking,” that it
would have to be put in writing and submitted to the cabinet and also to
Parliament. He said that it would constitute the transformation of the
entente into a defensive alliance, that it could not be given
unconditionally, and that the conditions “would be difficult to
describe.” He again asked M. Cambon “whether the force of circumstances
bringing England and France together was not stronger than any assurance
in words which could be given at this moment.” He added that German
pressure “might eventually transform the ‘Entente’ into a defensive
alliance,” yet at the time he did not think that the change was needed.
When M. Cambon emphasized the fact that Sir Edward Grey had expressed
his personal opinion that in case of a German attack upon France, no
British government could remain neutral, the latter replied that he had
said this first to Count Metternich and not to him,
because, supposing it appeared that I had overestimated the strength of
feeling of my countrymen, there could be no disappointment in Germany;
but I could not express so decidedly my personal opinion to France,
because a personal opinion was not a thing upon which, in so serious a
matter, a policy could be founded. In speaking to him, therefore, I must
keep well within the mark. Much depended as to the manner in which the
war broke out between Germany and France.
Sir Edward Grey believed that the British people would be unwilling to
fight in order to put France into possession of Morocco. But if “it
appeared that the war was forced upon France by Germany to break up the
Anglo-French ‘Entente,’ public opinion would undoubtedly be very strong
on the side of France.” He said, however, that British sentiment was
much averse to war, and that it was not certain whether this aversion
would be overcome by the desire to aid France. While he was ready to
reopen the conversation at any time in the future, he did not think that
the situation justified such a radical change at that time.[1068] M.
Cambon appeared to be satisfied with that answer.[1069]
Thus, Sir Edward Grey laid down the policy which he followed until the
outbreak of the World War. He was open and frank with both France and
Germany. To the German government he emphasized the probability of
British intervention in favor of France in case of war. To the French
government he gave the promise of full diplomatic support; while
permitting preparations for any emergency, he refused to give to the
French assurance of active aid in case of war or even to speak as firmly
on that score as he did to the German government. Instead of binding
Great Britain and France in an alliance—an act which would have forced
him to keep a hand on France’s policy toward Morocco and Germany—Sir
Edward Grey kept British hands free. In giving France sufficient
assurance to maintain Anglo-French intimacy and co-operation, he
depended upon the uncertainty of British support in a crisis to hold
France back. He relied upon the same uncertainty—this time, however,
that Great Britain might enter a Franco-German conflict—to restrain
Germany. By this apparently simple but really intricate policy he sought
to satisfy the needs of British foreign relations.
[Footnote 959: Memo. by Bülow, Nov. 23, 1905, _G.P._, XXI, 14 f., No.
6900.]
[Footnote 960: Rouvier was apparently led astray by William II’s
instructions to the Prince of Monaco in October to tell Rouvier that “he
would lay no hindrances whatever in the way of the French policy”
(Radolin to F. O., Oct. 18, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 596 f. and note, No.
6836). Rouvier sounded the German embassy first through a third person
and then unofficially through M. Louis of the foreign office.]
[Footnote 961: Memo. by Mühlberg, Nov. 30, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 20 ff.,
No. 6906.]
[Footnote 962: On this episode see _ibid._, Nos. 6901, 6903 ff. The
editors of _G.P._ assure us that there is no indication in the documents
that Rouvier followed up the subject (_ibid._, p. 23). Joseph Caillaux
states that Rouvier was back of the overture made through Vaffier-
Pollet. He also asserts that in Nov., 1905, Rouvier offered the port of
Mogador and its hinterland to Germany, but that the latter refused
(_Agadir, ma politique extérieure_ [Paris, 1919], p. 25). There is no
reference to this proposal in _G.P._ Caillaux is probably referring to
the offer made through Eckardstein in May, 1905.]
[Footnote 963: Bülow, _Reden_, II, 250 ff., 272 ff.; see also Hammann,
_Bilder_, pp. 43 f. At the opening of the Reichstag on Nov. 28 the
Emperor declared that Germany stood with all Powers in “correct
relations” and with the most of them in “good and friendly relations”
(Schulthess _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, pp. 132 f.).]
[Footnote 964: Report from the Belgian Minister at Berlin, Dec. 2 and
11, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 92 ff.]
[Footnote 965: _Journal officiel. Debats parlem._ (Chambre), pp. 4034
ff. Rouvier received a vote of confidence of 501 to 51 (_ibid._, p.
4050).]
[Footnote 966: _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 662 ff.]
[Footnote 967: William II to Bülow, Dec. 29, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 693, No.
6887; Flotow to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 15 ff., No. 6901;
Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 4, 1906, _ibid._, 52, No. 6924.]
[Footnote 968: So Ojeda, Spanish undersecretary of state for foreign
affairs, declared to Cartwright on Jan. 22, 1906 (Cartwright to Grey,
Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, No. 252). There is no indication in
_G.P._ that those terms were known.]
[Footnote 969: Memo. by Mühlberg, Dec. 25, 1905, _G.P._, XXI, 28 f., No.
6914. It contained the conclusions of a conference by Bülow with
Richthofen, Mühlberg, and Klehmet.]
[Footnote 970: On Jan. 8 the government published a _Weissbuch_ on
Morocco of thirty-nine pages substantiating the German accusations
against the French policy. According to Bülow it was intended to
supplement the French _Livre jaune_ (_G.P._, XXI, 24 n.). Its appearance
made a painful impression in France. Rouvier found it “scarcely
courteous” and hardly indicative of the conciliatory spirit which
Germany professed to have (report from Paris, Jan. 11, 1906, _Zur europ.
Politik_, II, 99 f.). It was well received by the German press
(Lascelles to Grey, Jan. 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 215 f., No. 235.).]
[Footnote 971: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 38 ff., No.
6922 and Anlage.]
[Footnote 972: Metternich was very pessimistic about the outcome. See
Metternich to Bülow, Nov. 2, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 672 ff., No. 6881; Bülow
to Metternich, Nov. 6, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 673, No. 6364.]
[Footnote 973: Tattenbach to Bülow, Nov. 4, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 12, No.
6898.]
[Footnote 974: Bülow to Sternburg, Oct. 29, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 641 f.,
No. 6341 and note; Sternburg to F. O., Nov. 3, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 9 f.,
No. 6896; Bülow to Sternburg, Nov. 7, 1905, _ibid._, 11 f., No. 6897;
memo. by Mühlberg, Dec. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 23 f., No. 6909; Dennis,
_Adventures in American Diplomacy_, pp. 398 f., 499. Mr. Choate,
ambassador in London, had been selected as American delegate in August
(_Roosevelt-Lodge Correspondence_, II, 172 ff.); but the final choice
rested on Mr. White, ambassador at Rome.]
[Footnote 975: Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 22, 1905, _G.P._, XXI, 27 n.; cf.
Steed, _Through Thirty Years_, I, 234.]
[Footnote 976: According to a minute by the Emperor William to a
dispatch from Stumm on Feb. 20, 1906 (the only reference to this
incident which _G.P._ contains), during the visit of the King of Spain
to Germany in the previous November the Emperor had “proposed to the
Spanish King to renew the agreement with his father and a convention
regarding the common action of our armies! Whereupon the King said that
he knew nothing of that matter, but would look into it upon his return.”
Nothing came of the matter. See _G.P._, XXI, 191, No. 7024. See also
Grey to Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, _B.D._, III, 160, No. 197; Nicolson to
Grey, Dec. 26 and 27, 1905, _ibid._, 165, No. 205; 167, No. 208.]
[Footnote 977: Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 14, 1906, _B.D._, III, 150 f., No.
192.]
[Footnote 978: Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 54, No. 6925.]
[Footnote 979: So expressed by San Giuliano, Italian foreign minister.
(Monts to Bülow, Jan. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 34 ff., No. 6921).]
[Footnote 980: Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, _ibid._, 53 f., No. 6925;
Monts to Bülow, Jan 6, 1906, _ibid._, 56 ff., No. 6928.]
[Footnote 981: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 59, No. 6929.]
[Footnote 982: Bülow to Radolin, Dec. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 30 f., No.
6916; memo. by Radolin, Dec. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 31, No. 6917; memo. by
Bülow, Dec. 30, 1905, _ibid._, 32, No. 6918.]
[Footnote 983: Flotow to F. O., Dec. 20, 1905; _ibid._, 25 f., No. 6911;
Radolin to F. O., Jan. 8 and 10, 1906, _ibid._, 60 f., No. 6931; 64 f.,
No. 6934; Radolin to Bülow, Jan. 16, 1906, _ibid._, XX, 697 f., 6888;
Radowitz to Bülow, Dec. 27, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 32 f., No. 6919 f.;
Bülow also remained willing to negotiate directly with the French
government over the Moroccan affair (Bülow to Radolin, Jan. 16, 1906,
_ibid._, 67, No. 6936).]
[Footnote 984: Report from Berlin, Dec. 24, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_,
II, 97 f.; report from Berlin, Dec. 31, 1905, _Belg. Docs., 1905-14_,
No. 14; Metternich to Bülow, Nov. 2, Dec. 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 672 ff.,
No. 6881; 685 ff., No. 6886; Bülow, II, 434; Schulthess, _1905_, p. 154.
The Emperor refused twice to help before Bülow won him over. See Bülow
to William II, Dec. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 679 ff., No. 6882, and the
Emperor’s minutes.]
[Footnote 985: So D. M. Wallace, special representative of the _London
Times_ at the conference, asserted to Radowitz (Radowitz to F. O., Jan.
21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 95 n.).]
[Footnote 986: Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 524 ff.; Edward VII to
William II, Jan. 23, Feb. 5, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 108 f., No. 6961; 111
f., No. 6963; William II to Edward VII, Feb. 1, 1906, _ibid._, 110 f.,
No. 6962.]
[Footnote 987: “If England restricts herself to the diplomatic support
of the French claims, peace and the permanent open door are assured. But
as soon as France has reason to count on the armed help of England for
the conquest of Morocco and for any results therefrom, then both peace
and the open door will be endangered” (Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 17, 1906,
_ibid._, 94, No. 6950). A similar thought was expressed by Bülow to
Lascelles, Jan. 24, to Sir Edgar Speyer, London banker and friend of
Grey’s, on Jan. 18, by Metternich to Grey, Dec. 20, Jan. 23, and was
given out to the press. See _ibid._, 96 ff., Nos. 6953 f.; 106 ff., No.
6960; 103 ff., No. 6959; _ibid._, XX, 685 ff., No. 6886.]
[Footnote 988: For Bülow’s reasoning see his dispatch to Moltke, Jan.
24, 1906, _ibid._, XXI, 77 ff., No. 6943.]
[Footnote 989: A report of a partial French mobilization on the eastern
frontier did alarm Bülow, but it was immediately proved to be untrue
(_ibid._, 71 ff., Nos. 6937 ff.).]
[Footnote 990: The German government had announced a new navy bill,
which would have been proposed anyway, and was only hastened because the
visit of the British fleet to the Baltic and the revelations in _Le
Matin_ insured it a favorable reception by the German public. Aside from
that Germany took special pains to avoid leaving the impression that she
was preparing for a conflict. Moltke, at his own suggestion, postponed
his visit to Vienna to announce himself as the new chief of staff until
after the conference closed so as to avoid suspicion. See Moltke to
Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 79 and note, No. 6944. See also Philip
Fürst zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld, _Aus 50 Jahren. Erinnerungen, Tagebücher,
und Briefe_ (ed. Johannes Haller; Berlin, 1923), p. 311. Moltke,
however, did not expect the French to recede, writing to Bülow on
January 23 as follows: “In my opinion the French now consider further
concession on the Moroccan question as incompatible with the honor of
their land, after they have already receded once and have let Delcassé
fall.
“They fear therefore that as a result of their firm stand the conference
may not only end without result but may also lead to war. They
themselves wish no war and do not think of attacking. But they wish to
be armed against an attack from Germany” (_G.P._, XXI, 75, No. 6942).]
[Footnote 991: William II to Bülow, Dec. 29, 1906, _ibid._, XX, 690 ff.,
No. 6887. The account of the Emperor’s conversation with Laguiche was
published in _Le Temps_ on Dec. 28. Richthofen spoke to a similar effect
to the Belgian minister (_Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, No. 14).]
[Footnote 992: Radolin to Bülow, Jan. 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 60 f., No.
6931; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 4, 1906, _ibid._, 51 f., No. 6924; _Zur
europ. Politik_, II, 95 f., 99; Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés._, pp. 92 ff.
See also Bompard’s analysis of the German policy toward France (Spring
Rice to Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir
Cecil Spring Rice_, II, 58 f.).]
[Footnote 993: According to Moltke, France was making military and
financial preparations for defensive purposes. “The fortifications on
the eastern frontier are being strengthened and put in a more defensive
condition. Their provisions in munitions and food are being replenished.
The forces of the frontier defence troops are apparently being brought
approximately to the legal number for peace time by the addition of
troops from the interior. Moreover, reserves are here and there being
called up to undergo their legal drilling.
“The training of the troops on the frontier is being furthered in every
way. Numerous trial mobilizations by the various garrisons and drilling
of the border troops by day and night are occurring.
“But all these preparations are not to be regarded as preparations for
an intended mobilization but only as precautionary measures, which are
easily explained” (Moltke to Bülow, Jan. 23, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 75, No.
6942).
According to the Belgian Minister at Paris, Jan. 16, 1906, the sum of
270,000,000 francs was being devoted to the defenses (_Zur europ.
Politik_, II, 103).]
[Footnote 994: Meyer to Root, Jan. 9, 1906, Dennis, _Adventures in
American Diplomacy_, p. 498; _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 99 f.]
[Footnote 995: The Russian delegate, Count Cassini, declared that in
forty years he had never received such positive instructions (Tardieu,
p. 88; Witte, _Memoirs_, p. 298; Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906,
_B.D._, III, 204, No. 223). Rouvier repeated the refusal of that loan
just before the conference (Witte, pp. 295 ff., 429 f.; Nicholas II to
William II, Jan. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 125 f., and note). Concerning
that loan Sir Edward Grey wrote to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, as follows: “.
. . . Russia has demanded a loan on improper terms as the price of her
support [at the conference]” (_B.D._, III, 178, No. 216).]
[Footnote 996: Meyer to Root, Jan. 9, 1906, Dennis, p. 498. Witte
apparently offered to obtain this promise in return for an immediate
French loan, but the Czar refused to give it—at least, that was Spring
Rice’s inference (Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, Gwynn, II, 57
f.).]
[Footnote 997: Dennis, pp. 498 f.; Durand to Grey, Jan. 11, 1905,
_B.D._, III, 217, No. 236.]
[Footnote 998: Bertie to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905; _B.D._, III, 165, No.
204.]
[Footnote 999: See Rouvier’s assertion to Hardinge on Jan. 15, 1906,
_ibid._, 227 and inclosure, No. 245.]
[Footnote 1000: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 193 ff.;
Grey, _Twenty-five Years_, I, 60 ff., Richard Burdon Haldane, _An
Autobiography_ (London, 1929), pp. 157 ff., 168 ff.]
[Footnote 1001: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 178, No.
216.]
[Footnote 1002: Cf. Spender, _The Public Life_ (1925), I, 112 ff.;
Haldane, _An Autobiography_, pp. 215 f.; cf. Hermann Lutz, _Lord Grey
und der Weltkrieg_ (Berlin, 1927).]
[Footnote 1003: Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 13, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 218, No.
204; Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 22, 1905, Gwynn, II, 53 f.]
[Footnote 1004: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3 and 16, 1906, _B.D._, IV,
219 f., No. 205; 221, No. 207; and Gwynn, II, 54 f., 57; Spring Rice to
Knollys, Jan. 3 and 16, 1906, _ibid._, pp. 22, 26.]
[Footnote 1005: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, Gwynn, II, 55 f.]
[Footnote 1006: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 26, 1906, _B.D._, IV, 222 ff.,
No. 208; Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 22, 1905, Gwynn, II, 53 f.]
[Footnote 1007: See Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 20, 1905, _B.D._, IV,
213 f., No. 200; Hardinge to Grey, Jan. 6, 1906, _ibid._, pp. 622 f.]
[Footnote 1008: _Ibid._, chap. xxvii, Part III. Nicolson suspected that
Russia acted so loyally because she had no money with which to make the
loan (Nicolson to Grey, Sept. 12, 1906, _ibid._, 242, No. 228).]
[Footnote 1009: Grey to Spring Rice, Jan. 3, 1906, _ibid._, 323, No.
304.]
[Footnote 1010: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, _ibid._, 220, No.
205.]
[Footnote 1011: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 223, No.
208; Lee, II, 564; Spring Rice to Mallet, Jan. 31, 1906, Gwynn, II, 61
f.]
[Footnote 1012: Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 215.]
[Footnote 1013: Grey, I, 100 f.]
[Footnote 1014: Cf. memo. by Crowe, Jan. 1, 1907, _B.D._, III, 397 ff.;
memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, _ibid._, pp. 420 ff.; Haldane, _An
Autobiography_, p. 215.]
[Footnote 1015: Grey, I, 100 f.]
[Footnote 1016: _B.D._, III, 162, No. 200.]
[Footnote 1017: Lucien Wolf, _Life of the First Marquess of Ripon_
(London, 1921), II, 292 f.; see also Spring Rice to Mallet, Jan. 31,
1906, Gwynn, II, 61.]
[Footnote 1018: Metternich gives the date of the conversation as Dec.
18. See Grey to Whitehead, Dec. 20, 1905, _B.D._, III, 160 f., No. 198;
Metternich to Bülow, Dec. 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 685 ff., No. 6886.]
[Footnote 1019: On this conversation between Grey and Metternich see the
following: Grey to Lascelles Jan. 9, 1906, Grey to Campbell-Bannerman,
Jan. 9, 1906, quoted in Grey, I, 80 ff., 114, and in _B.D._, III, 209
ff., No. 229; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 3 and 4, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 45
ff., Nos. 6923 f. Grey repeated his statement to Metternich on Jan. 10,
1906. See Metternich to F. O., Jan. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 64, No. 6933. See
also Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 24, 1906, quoting a dispatch from
Metternich, _ibid._, 103 ff., No. 6959. However, Van Grooten, secretary
of the Belgian ministry in London, reported to his government on Jan. 14
as follows: “Of late the Minister of Foreign Affairs has repeated at
various occasions to the different Ambassadors accredited in London that
Great Britain has engaged herself towards France in the Moroccan
question and that she will meet her obligations fully even in case of a
Franco-German war and at all costs. The press and public opinion give
proof of the same sentiments” (_Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, p. 19). The
report is exaggerated, but it is significant that it was current.]
[Footnote 1020: Lascelles to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, _B.D._, III, 206 ff.,
Nos. 225 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905, _ibid._, 163, No. 203.]
[Footnote 1021: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 257 f.]
[Footnote 1022: Acton to Grey, Dec. 31, 1905, _B.D._, III, 167 f., No.
209.]
[Footnote 1023: Rouvier denied that he had done so. Notes by Hardinge,
Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 226 and inclosure, No. 245 (see above).]
[Footnote 1024: On this episode see Lascelles to Grey, D. Jan. 3, R.
Jan. 6, 1905, D. Jan. 11, R. Jan. 15; dated Jan. 12, D. Jan. 13, R. Jan.
15, 1906, _ibid._, 207 f., No. 226; 217 ff., Nos. 237 f.; 222 f., Nos.
240 f.; Grey to Lascelles, Jan. 9 and 15, 1906, _ibid._, 211 f., No.
230; 225, No. 243; Bertie to Grey, Jan. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 224, No. 242;
memo. by Holstein, Jan. 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 96 f., No. 6953.]
[Footnote 1025: Bertie to Grey, D. Dec. 22, R. Dec. 27, 1905, _B.D._,
III, 163 ff., No. 204; Grey to Nicolson, Dec. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 162,
No. 200. “Nous serons biens sûrement avec vous,” Grey stated to Cambon
(Grey to Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, _ibid._, 160, No. 197).]
[Footnote 1026: Tardieu, pp. 81 f.]
[Footnote 1027: Nicolson thought that he would have been “an admirable
selection.” King Edward’s comment to the report of Germany’s veto was,
“a case of bullying as usual!” See Nicolson to Grey, D. Dec. 14, R. Dec.
23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 150 f., No. 192.]
[Footnote 1028: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 178, No. 216.]
[Footnote 1029: Minutes to dispatch from Nicolson to Grey, D. Jan. 5, R.
Jan. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 209, No. 227.]
[Footnote 1030: Grey stated to the Spanish Ambassador, Jan. 3, 1906, as
follows: “All the four Powers most directly interested in the
Mediterranean had made arrangements with each other which were
satisfactory to themselves and it was most undesirable that they should
allow these arrangements to be disturbed” (Grey to Nicolson, Jan. 10,
1906, _ibid._, 215, No. 234). On this Spanish affair see also Grey to
Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, _ibid._, 160, No. 197; Grey to Nicolson, Dec. 14,
20, 21, 1905, _ibid._, 151, No. 193; 161 f., Nos. 199 ff.; Nicolson to
Grey, Dec. 22, 25, 27, 1905, Jan. 5 and 9, 1906, _ibid._, 163, No. 202;
165, No. 205; 167, No. 208; 208 f., No. 227; 212, No. 231; Bertie to
Grey, Dec. 22, 1905, _ibid._, 163 ff., No. 204.]
[Footnote 1031: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 225, No. 244;
Grey to Egerton, Dec. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 166, No. 206; Egerton to Grey,
Dec. 27, 1905, Jan. 9, 1906, _ibid._, 166 f., No. 207; 212 f., No. 232.]
[Footnote 1032: Gorst to Bertie, Dec. 13, 1905, _ibid._, 149 f. and
inclosure, No. 191; Bertie to Grey, Dec. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 158 f., No.
195.]
[Footnote 1033: Memo. by Cambon, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 226, No. 244
and inclosure; Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 17, 1906, _ibid._, 228 f., No.
247.]
[Footnote 1034: Lascelles to Grey, D. Jan. 11, R. Jan. 15, 1906,
_ibid._, 217 ff., No. 237.]
[Footnote 1035: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 205 f., No.
224; Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 213 ff., No. 233. See also
Bompard’s conversation with Spring Rice as reported by the latter to
Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, Gwynn, II, 59 f.]
[Footnote 1036: Rouvier to Révoil, Jan. 12, 1906, _B.D._, III, 220 ff.,
No. 239; Tardieu, pp. 101 ff., 244; Bertie to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905,
_B.D._, III, 164, No. 204. In talking to Sir Charles Hardinge on Jan. 15
Rouvier added a third alternative—“a mandate to France, Spain and a
third Power to study and elaborate a scheme for submission to the
Powers” (notes by Hardinge, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 226 f., No. 245 and
inclosure).]
[Footnote 1037: Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 233 f., No.
253.]
[Footnote 1038: Grierson to Sanderson, Jan. 11, 1906; _ibid._, 172, No.
211.]
[Footnote 1039: This display of doubt about Great Britain’s loyalty was
one of France’s best means of gaining that Power’s support. See
Bompard’s assertions as reported by Spring Rice to Knollys, Jan. 31,
1906, Gwynn, II, 62; also see below.]
[Footnote 1040: The story is given in Lieutenant-Colonel Charles à Court
Repington, _The First World War, 1914-1918: Personal Experiences_
(London, 1920), I, 2 ff.]
[Footnote 1041: Général Huguet, _L’intervention militaire britannique en
1914_ (Paris, 1928), p. 15.]
[Footnote 1042: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906, _B.D._, III, 206, No.
224.]
[Footnote 1043: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, quoted in Spender, _Life
of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 249 ff.; Grey, I, 70 f.; _B.D._, III, 170
f., No. 210_a_.]
[Footnote 1044: This document is sufficient proof against the accusation
of the editors of _G.P._ that Grey went further in his assertions to the
French Ambassador in his first conversation with the latter, and that
afterward, apparently restrained by the more pacific Premier, he
qualified his position in the interview of Jan. 31. It is apparent that
Grey’s statements of Jan. 10 and 31 do not differ in kind or degree,
except that in the latter the Foreign Secretary expanded the conditions
which he had already formulated in the earlier interview (see _G.P._,
XXI, 48 f. note; see also below).]
[Footnote 1045: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, quoted in Grey, I, 70
ff., in Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 249 ff., and in
_B.D._, III, 170 f., No. 210. Cambon’s account to Rouvier of the
conversation is given in _ibid._, 173 f., No. 212. Sanderson was present
at that interview.]
[Footnote 1046: Grey, I, 72, 114; Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_,
II, 251 f.; Repington, I, 12 f.]
[Footnote 1047: Grierson to Sanderson, Jan. 11, 1906, _B.D._, III, 172,
No. 211.]
[Footnote 1048: Grey, I, 72 f.]
[Footnote 1049: “C-B was a fine old Tory in Army matter” (Repington, I,
13). On this affair see Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 253,
256 f.; Repington, I, 12 f.; Viscount Haldane, _Before the War_ (London,
1920), p. 184; Grey, I, 70 ff., 83; Haldane, _An Autobiography_, pp. 189
f.]
[Footnote 1050: Grey, I, 70 ff.]
[Footnote 1051: _Ibid._, pp. 73 f.; Repington, I, 13; _B.D._, III, 169,
editor’s note, 438 ff. In 1911 Grey wrote to Asquith that he never knew
anything more of the course of those conversations (Grey, I, 92).]
[Footnote 1052: Sydenham, _My Working Life_, pp. 186 f., 190; Haldane,
_Before the War_, p. 45; Repington, I, 3. The British based their belief
on the German construction of obviously unnecessary railroads to the
Belgian frontier (_Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the
Outbreak of the European War_ [1915], pp. 365 f.).]
[Footnote 1053: Sanderson to Grierson, Jan. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 176
f., No. 214; Grierson to Barnardiston, Jan. 16, 1906, _ibid._, 179, No.
217_b_.]
[Footnote 1054: In a dispatch to Grierson on Jan. 19 Barnardiston wrote
that he had told Ducarne at their first meeting that Sir C. Phipps, the
British minister in Brussels, had already mentioned the matter to the
Belgian Foreign Minister (_ibid._, III, 188). In some notes by
Barnardiston deposited in the war office, he stated that Phipps would
speak to the Belgian Foreign Minister. The Belgian government asserts
that there is no record of such a communication; rather, that the
Foreign Minister learned of the military conversations from the Belgian
Minister of War. There is no report of any conversation on this subject
between Phipps and the Belgian Minister in the papers in the British
foreign office, nor is there any record of instructions on it being sent
to Phipps. On March 17 Barnardiston wrote to Grierson that both the
Belgian Minister of War and the Minister of Foreign Affairs knew of the
conversation (editor’s note, _ibid._, p. 203; _Collected Diplomatic
Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War_, p. 355;
Haldane, _Before the War_, pp. 201 f.). There is no doubt but that the
conversations were approved by both foreign ministers.]
[Footnote 1055: Barnardiston to Grierson, Jan. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III,
187 f.]
[Footnote 1056: Barnardiston to Phipps, Jan. 17, 1906, _ibid._, pp. 179
f.]
[Footnote 1057: On these negotiations see the correspondence between
Grierson and Barnardiston in _ibid._, pp. 187 ff.; _Collected Diplomatic
Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War_, pp. 350 ff.;
Haldane, _Before the War_, pp. 201 ff.]
[Footnote 1058: Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 193;
Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 191.]
[Footnote 1059: _B.D._, III, 203.]
[Footnote 1060: Haldane, _Before the War_, pp. 45 f.]
[Footnote 1061: Statement written by Lord Sydenham, July 19, 1927,
_B.D._, III, 185, No. 221_a_; memo. by Brigadier General Nicholson, Nov.
6, 1911, _ibid._, pp. 186 f.; Admiral Ottley to First Sea Lord, Jan. 13,
1906, _ibid._, p. 186; Sydenham, p. 186.]
[Footnote 1062: Memo. by Cambon, Jan. 31, 1906; _B.D._, III, 193, No.
220_a_.]
[Footnote 1063: Haldane, _Before the War_, chap. iv.]
[Footnote 1064: Grey informed Cambon of the approval of the naval and
military conversations on Jan. 15, but postponed answering the larger
question (Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 177, No. 215; 225,
No. 244.)]
[Footnote 1065: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 253, 256 ff.;
Grey, I, 84. Grey’s omission to consult the entire cabinet has been
severely criticized. He has admitted in his memoirs that he did wrong.
See especially Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 191; Earl Loreburn, _How
the War Came_ (London, 1919), pp. 80 f.; cf. Spender, _Life, Journalism
and Politics_, I, 193.]
[Footnote 1066: Bertie to Grey, D. Jan. 13, R. Jan. 18, 1906, _B.D._,
III, 174 ff., No. 213.]
[Footnote 1067: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 177 f., No. 216;
Grey, I, 75.]
[Footnote 1068: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 253 ff.;
Grey, II, 76 ff.; _B.D._, III, 180 ff., No. 219. Cambon and Grey
exchanged memoranda of that conversation. According to Mr. Eyre Crowe,
senior clerk in the British foreign office, Cambon’s account differed
from Grey’s on the following points: “(A) The French note alludes to the
intention of the British Admiralty in case of a conflict with Germany,
to bar the Channel against the German squadrons. This passage does not
occur in Sir E. Grey’s draft. . . . . (B) The French note contains no
allusion to the argument given in the following passage of Sir E. Grey’s
draft: ‘I did not think people in England would be prepared to fight in
order to put France in possession of Morocco. They would say that France
should wait for opportunities and be content to take time, and that it
was unreasonable to hurry matters to the point of war’” (Crowe’s minute
to the memo. by Cambon, Jan. 31, 1906, _ibid._, 183 f., No. 220_a_). On
Feb. 1 Sanderson talked over the two drafts with Cambon, who made some
changes in his. Sanderson again emphasized the reasons why the British
government could not give the desired assurance, speaking in part as
follows: “I told him [Cambon] that I thought that if the Cabinet were to
give a pledge which would morally bind the country to go to war in
certain circumstances, and were not to mention this pledge to
Parliament, and if at the expiration of some months the country suddenly
found itself pledged to war in consequence of this assurance, the case
would be one which would justify impeachment, and which might even
result in that course unless at the time the feeling of the country were
very strongly in favour of the course to which the Government was
pledged” (memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 184 f., No.
220_b_).]
[Footnote 1069: So thought Sanderson, and Grey’s secretary (Grey, I, 85;
Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 257; memo. by Sanderson, Feb.
2, 1906, _B.D._, III, 185, No. 220_b_). Grey was absent from the foreign
office for some time owing to the sudden death of his wife, Feb. 1.]
CHAPTER XVII
THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS
The Conference of Algeciras opened formally on January 16, 1906.[1070]
The place was badly adapted to such a purpose. It was small,
inadequately prepared to house and entertain the one hundred and fifty
delegates, secretaries, and newspaper correspondents who had to remain
there for over two months and a half. The delegates were quartered at
one of the two hotels and the journalists at the other. They were thrown
into constant contact with each other. The place swarmed with newspaper
correspondents, most of them from France. There were about fifty
principal ones, not to speak of the minor ones. They saw or heard or
surmised about everything. They brought public opinion to the door of
the Conference, and the French particularly were able at times of crisis
or of important decisions to exercise a marked influence on the course
of the deliberations.[1071]
Among the delegates there were three important groups, the German, the
American-Italian-Austrian, and the British-French-Spanish-Russian. The
representatives of Morocco and the smaller states took practically no
part in the proceedings. In the first group Herr von Radowitz was a
nonentity—old, feeble, so elusive and cautious as to be difficult to
negotiate with. Count Tattenbach was the positive force, described by
his British colleague as “a rasping, disagreeable man, not
straightforward or truthful and evidently has to exercise much effort to
control his temper.”[1072] He made a bad impression on the delegates by
his blunt aggressiveness. Although he knew the Moroccan problem
thoroughly, he was unsuited for the delicate negotiations required at
the Conference. By his personality and methods he injured his country’s
interests. He was more influential with his government than was Herr von
Radowitz, but as a rule both men merely carried out orders from Berlin.
Mr. White (the American delegate), Marquis Visconti Venosta, and Count
Welsersheimb (the Austrian delegate) acted as mediators. M. Révoil and
Sir Arthur Nicolson were the leaders of the third group. Both had served
their respective countries as minister at Tangier. M. Révoil was a
supple, subtle reasoner, inclined like Herr von Holstein to lose sight
of his objective in the mazes of his argument. He was oversensitive,
overcautious, and very mistrustful of Germany. His obstinacy proved in
the end of advantage to France, but he would have made a number of
mistakes serious for his country and for the success of the Conference
if he had not had the advice of Sir Arthur Nicolson. The latter was the
most astute member taking an active part in the assembly, although he
played his rôle so quietly that the other delegates, particularly the
Germans, did not perceive his significance. A true diplomat, he carried
out the difficult British policy admirably. It was primarily his work
that the Conference thrashed the fundamental problems through to a
definite conclusion.
When the Conference was organized, it was decided that the formal
session should be reserved for ratification of matters already agreed
upon unanimously in the committee of the whole, composed of all the
delegates sitting unofficially and engaging in free debate. There was
also to be a special committee of formulation to draft the propositions
agreed upon.[1073] Naturally the work was done in these two bodies. More
important were the direct negotiations between the delegates of France
and Germany, which after January 25, at the urging of the other
delegates, were almost constantly in progress.
The basic principles governing the work of the Conference in preparing a
program of reform for Morocco were laid down by the president, the Duke
of Almodovar, in his opening speech. After previous agreement with the
French and German delegates,[1074] he stated that everyone wished
“reforms based on the triple principle of the sovereignty of the Sultan,
integrity of his empire, and equality of treatment in matters
commercial, that is, the open door.” It was not the mission of the
conference, he said, to work out a complete plan for the administrative
transformation of Morocco, but rather to “study together the means of
applying measures which at present appear to be the most urgent and the
easiest to introduce.”
The Conference, pessimistic at the beginning, took up first the
questions which could be easily settled. Since these were considered
primarily from the standpoint of practicality, agreement was soon
reached on the following: “Regulation concerning the surveillance and
repression of contraband of arms”; “declaration concerning the better
collection of taxes and the creation of new revenues”; “regulation
concerning the customs duties of the empire and the repression of fraud
and of contraband”; “declaration relating to public services and to
public works.” The discussion of these matters was unimportant.[1075]
The troublesome problems were those of the organization of the police
and the establishment of a state bank. The solution of these would
determine whether France or Germany should emerge victorious. After the
initial success on the minor matters, the delegates confronted these two
questions with more hope.[1076]
Marquis Visconti Venosta and Mr. White first tried to mediate upon the
basis that Germany should make concessions on the bank, France on the
police. M. Révoil was willing, being ready, so he privately informed the
British delegate, to associate Italy with France and Spain on the
police, but he asked for definite proposals.[1077] At the instigation of
the other delegates, Herr von Radowitz and M. Révoil began direct
conversations on these matters on January 25.[1078] Puzzled by so many
reports of different German projects on the police,[1079] M. Révoil
assumed the defensive. But on Sir Arthur Nicolson’s advice he laid his
proposals frankly before the German representatives a few days
later.[1080] On January 29 M. Regnault, French adviser at the
Conference, outlined for Count Tattenbach the French plan on the bank as
follows: The bank should be subject to French law and to the French
judicial system; the capital should be so divided that France should
receive 27 per cent, Spain 23 per cent, Great Britain 20 per cent,
Germany 20 per cent, Italy 10 per cent; an administrative council of ten
members should be chosen according to nationality by the shareholders; a
directory should be named by this council; a committee of discount in
Tangier selected from the resident shareholders should be established
and a committee of examination should be chosen by the future
subscribers; the preferential right to make loans held by the French
banks should continue, but perhaps be relinquished in return for an
increase in the per cent of capital given to France. M. Regnault
justified the project on the grounds that “the preponderance of French
economic interests in Morocco must be given expression therein,” that it
was a question of maintaining the open door without destroying acquired
interests, and that “the open door does not signify that those who are
in the house must leave it.”[1081]
On February 3 M. Révoil proposed to Herr von Radowitz that the mandate
for the police be given to France and Spain together. “Over its form,
extension and control all desirable international agreements could be
made,” he said, so as to prevent any other right from being deduced
therefrom and to guarantee complete commercial equality. He declared
that France pursued no special political aims in Morocco, but that she
must demand protection in proportion to her preponderant material
interests. He also informed the German delegate indirectly that France
might agree to the addition of a third Power to control the execution of
the mandate.[1082]
In the end the German government was to accept practically these terms,
but at the moment it was averse to making any concessions, believing
that the Conference, “so far as grouping and general course are
concerned, is turning out favorably for us.”[1083] Since it regarded the
bank as more influential in the long run than the police, it rejected
the French claim to preference for making loans on the grounds that that
claim violated Article XVII of the Convention of Madrid, and proposed
the use of the Egyptian mixed codes and the equal division of the
capital among the Powers. Thus internationalism instead of a French
preponderant control would be established in the bank.[1084]
On the question of the police, which was the more important, the German
government offered various plans to prevent France from obtaining
military control. It endeavored particularly to interest President
Roosevelt in this problem. In a long dispatch to Washington on January
20, it laid three different proposals before the President: First, the
individual Powers might participate on a basis of equality in the
reorganization of the police by having each one, or at least the more
important ones, assume a mandate for a certain port. A time limit should
be set, and the Powers should renounce any idea of giving to their
occupation a permanent character. For unity of policy the Powers could
come to a general agreement on various questions like those of arming
and training. Second, one or several smaller Powers, such as
Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, or Holland might assume the duty.
(Belgium was excluded as being too liable to French influence.) Third,
no mandate should be given, but the obligation should be imposed upon
the Sultan to maintain at certain points police trained and commanded by
foreign officers. The choice of these officers could either be left to
the Sultan completely or be confined to certain nationalities, perhaps
the smaller Powers. The Chancellor offered to accept any other solution
in harmony with the principle of equality and the open door.[1085] On
January 24 M. de Lanessan, a French writer, published in the _Siècle_ a
solution practically identical with No. 3. The article read in part as
follows:
There remains only one admissible solution; to charge the Sultan with
the policing of his empire while determining the means over which he
should have control and while instituting an international control over
the organisation and employment of those means.[1086]
The Chancellor immediately seized upon it with greatest favor and
advocated it to President Roosevelt.
The proposal at once called forth vehement opposition in the French
press. When Herr von Radowitz mentioned the article to M. Révoil on
February 3, the latter replied emphatically that in view of the
incompetence of the Sultan the plan was not acceptable.[1087] Thus the
issue was joined on the questions of both the bank and the police. In
this situation, which had been anticipated by both parties, the French
and German governments sought to win the Powers to their respective
views.
The German government wished the Austrian, the Italian, and above all
the American delegates to mediate in favor of its proposals.[1088] When
on January 23 Baron Sternburg explained to Mr. Root, the American
secretary of state, the German proposals on the police and asked for the
American views, Mr. Root replied that the United States could not
participate in any work of Moroccan police but that he personally
approved most of proposal No. 3. He said that he would consult the
President about the question.[1089]
This reply was eminently satisfactory to Prince Bülow, who immediately
urged the American government to mediate upon the basis of M. de
Lanessan’s proposals. On January 30 he telegraphed to Washington that
the Austrian cabinet had instructed its representative at Algeciras to
that effect, that the Italian Foreign Minister had spoken favorably of
it, that the Czar had expressed his entire approval of the German
position on the open door, that therefore the American government would
run no risk in making such a proposal. The time was ripe for it, he
stated.[1090] He also sought to influence the President against the
French proposal on the bank.[1091]
At Algeciras, however, Herr von Radowitz found that the Italian,
American, and Russian delegates all approved the French proposal of
February 3 as moderate and practical.[1092] When Count Tattenbach tried
on February 3 to persuade Sir Arthur Nicolson to desert France and
support Germany, he met with total failure.[1093] As a result Herr von
Radowitz again advised his government to compromise.[1094] But in view
of the apparently favorable attitudes of the Austrian, Italian,
Spanish,[1095] and American governments toward M. de Lanessan’s
proposal, Prince Bülow refused.[1096]
Before talking with M. Révoil again, Herr von Radowitz consulted the
American, Italian, and Austrian delegates concerning the chances of
success of the German proposal on the police. All three declared that
France would never accept it, that mediation on the basis of it would be
futile. They urged Germany to agree to the French plan, with
modifications, in order to prevent a break-up of the Conference.[1097]
Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, correspondent for the _London Times_, said
the same.[1098] Furthermore, Baron Sternburg reported on February 8 that
Mr. Root had promised again that he would consult the President about
mediating on the German proposal but that he would not undertake any
move unless assured of a definite result. When the Ambassador had listed
the Powers in favor of the plan, Mr. Root had asked significantly what
was the attitude of Great Britain.[1099]
Continuing to rely upon the mediation of the American delegate and to
hope for the support of the American and Italian delegates, the German
government instructed Herr von Radowitz on February 9 and 12 to hold to
plan No. 3 with the two alternatives of choosing the instructors from
some minor Power or of permitting the Sultan free play in the choice of
them. In case the three delegates refused to mediate, Herr von Radowitz
was to talk directly with M. Révoil. If the French delegate refused both
the German proposals, Herr von Radowitz should request him to offer a
proposal in keeping with the fundamental principle of the equality of
all nations in Morocco. If M. Révoil held to his project of February 3,
Herr von Radowitz should return to proposal No. 1, dividing Morocco into
sectors each under the charge of a single Power.[1100]
As the three delegates advised Herr von Radowitz to speak directly with
the French delegate, he did so on February 13. M. Révoil grudgingly
agreed to transmit the following offer to his government:
It is proposed that the conference request the Sultan to undertake the
organization of the police. He will have the duty of maintaining in the
places determined upon, a troop of police which will be formed and
commanded by foreign officers chosen freely by the Sultan. The funds
necessary to maintain the troops will be placed at the disposal of the
Sultan by the new state bank. The diplomatic corps at Tangier will
exercise control over the actions of that organization; a foreign
officer of one of the secondary Powers will be charged with the
inspection and will report to the diplomatic corps at Tangier. This
entire organization will be a tentative one to endure from three to five
years.[1101]
The German stand on the police was meeting with the more or less openly
expressed disapproval of all the important Powers. Sir Arthur Nicolson
had taken the French side from the start.[1102] The pro-French attitude
of Count Cassini, the Russian delegate, was confirmed by Count
Lamsdorff, who on February 12 expressed to Herr von Schoen, the new
German ambassador in St. Petersburg, his and the Czar’s entire approval
of the French proposal on the police and advised the German government
to accept it.[1103] Even the Austrian government urged the German
government to compromise. Count Welsersheimb reported that mediation on
the German project No. 3 was futile; and on February 12 Count
Goluchowski, Austrian foreign minister, declared to the German
Ambassador that the German proposal No. 1 was impracticable and
hopeless. Regarding the situation as “rather serious,” the Austrian
Foreign Minister stated that “Morocco was not worth a war,” and advised
that in case of necessity the Conference be permitted to break up
without result. Count Wedel, German ambassador at Vienna, warned the
_Wilhelmstrasse_ that because of domestic troubles Austria had no desire
to become involved in a conflict.[1104]
Although in danger of becoming a minority of one, the German government
hoped to win its point by a show of determination.[1105] It complained
vigorously to the new Italian government of the pro-French position
taken by its delegate, and endeavored to persuade it to support the
German views.[1106] It sought to exert direct pressure upon M. Rouvier
by instructing Prince Radolin to inform him that Germany had made
concessions on the frontier under the expectation that France would
agree to the German terms with regard to the rest of Morocco. If the
Conference failed, the Ambassador was to assert, the legal status of
1880 in Morocco would again obtain. The Ambassador should also state to
the Premier that if he did not stop the anti-German campaign of the
French press “we [Germany] must conclude that M. Rouvier has reconciled
himself to the idea of assuming the responsibility for the results of
this activity.”[1107] On February 13 the German government, in telegrams
to Rome, Washington, Vienna, London, and St. Petersburg, declared as
follows:
No reason for a further retreat is evident. The principle of sacrificing
one’s own interests merely because they block the way for another Power
could lead to such serious consequences that we consider a disruption of
the conference as the lesser evil.[1108]
That is, if the Powers wished to prevent a break-up of the assembly,
they should persuade France to show more conciliation, for Germany would
not recede. A newspaper campaign against the French views on the police
accompanied these efforts.[1109]
This defiance did not have the effect desired, for it was based upon an
erroneous conception of the determination of France and the views of the
Powers. So vehement was the opposition of the French press to the German
plan, which was of course known in spite of attempts at secrecy, that
the French government could not have accepted it at all. Nor did M.
Rouvier have any intention of doing so. The British government, although
suspecting that Germany meant to make the Conference fail, was ready to
support the French proposals actively by exerting pressure upon the
other Powers. On February 14 Sir Edward Grey replied to the defiant
German manifesto by arguing to Count Metternich in behalf of the French
views.[1110]
In Russia, Count Lamsdorff, who had at the opening of the Conference
anticipated a conciliatory policy from Germany, soon became
disillusioned, and early in February again promised Russia’s entire
support to France. Several of the delegates suspected that while the
German representatives realized the necessity of concessions, they were
not informing their government of the gravity of the situation.[1111] So
Count Lamsdorff advised the French government that the only way in which
to make Germany recede was by inducing the other Powers, especially
Great Britain, the United States, and Italy to aid Russia in exerting
moral pressure upon her and to show her that she was isolated.[1112] He
approached the British government with a view to co-operation in favor
of France. His friendly expressions were most cordially reciprocated by
Sir Edward Grey.[1113] Furthermore, Mr. White and the French and British
ambassadors in Washington persuaded President Roosevelt to yield to the
French arguments concerning the special interest of France in Morocco,
her unique fitness to execute the reforms, her honest desire to maintain
the open door. Considering the downfall of M. Delcassé and the
acceptance of the Conference as great concessions to Germany, Mr.
Roosevelt thought that the latter should now recede in favor of the more
practical French proposal about the police. His opinion was confirmed by
expressions to the same effect from the Italian, Russian, and even the
Austrian governments. The last two urged him to exert his influence with
the Emperor for a moderation of the German demands.[1114] The President
was coming to suspect Germany of wishing to divide Morocco into sectors
and to regard France as the protector of Morocco’s integrity.[1115] He
and Mr. Root both thought that Germany, believing herself able to defeat
both Great Britain and France since Russia was out of the way, was
playing the “big bully”; and the President had visions of the weak
German navy’s defeating the British fleet, landing fifty thousand men in
England, and taking the island from that guileless Power.[1116] Hence
when M. Jusserand asked the President early in February to intervene
with the Emperor in favor of the French plan, Mr. Roosevelt agreed to do
so.[1117]
With the support of Great Britain, Russia, and the United States, the
French government was almost certain of success. When on February 13 and
15 Prince Radolin complained about the tone of the French press and
about the French proposal for the police, the French Premier, denying
any responsibility for the press, handed the Ambassador the following
memorandum:
. . . . If M. Rouvier agreed last July that the solution of the question
of the Moroccan police should be international in principle, namely by
conference, he was not of the opinion that it would be so in execution.
As to the mandate for the police, at no moment has the French Government
engaged not to ask for it. . . . . Moreover, it is not a question of
organizing the police outside of the coastal towns, and it has always
been understood that the principal object would be to guard the security
of foreigners. . . . . The proposals ought to be examined at Algeciras,
France having agreed at the demand of Germany to submit them to the
conference.[1118]
At the same time the French reply to the German proposal of February 13
was ready. Urged by Marquis Visconti Venosta and others, who feared a
break-up of the Conference, the French government attempted to harmonize
the German plan about the police with the French demands. Then Mr. White
transmitted the project to President Roosevelt, who in turn would
recommend it to the German government as his own, while M. Révoil would
reply directly with a more general statement. Although the latter
despaired of any success, this plan was carried out.[1119] On February
16 M. Révoil handed the following memorandum to Herr von Radowitz:
There is no opposition to the organization of the police in the ports by
the Sultan, or to the payment of the troops and officers by the Bank of
State, or to the short duration of that institution, but under the
condition that the foreign officers chosen by His Sherifian Majesty be
French and Spanish. The point of the German proposition relative to a
surveillance of the execution of that organization may be examined if
the question of the nationality of the officers has been agreed upon as
indicated above.[1120]
On February 19 Mr. Root, declaring to the German Ambassador that
Germany’s persistence in her plan about the police would break up the
Conference, proposed the following solution:[1121]
1. That the organization and maintenance of police forces in all the
ports be entrusted to the Sultan, the men and officers to be Moors.
2. That the money to maintain the force be furnished by the proposed
international bank, the stock of which shall be allotted to all the
powers in equal shares (except for some small preference claimed by
France, which he [the President] considers immaterial).
3. That duties of instruction, discipline, pay and assisting in
management and control be entrusted to French and Spanish officers and
non-commissioned officers, to be appointed by the Sultan on presentation
of names by their Legations.
That the senior French and Spanish instructing officers report annually
to the government of Morocco, and to the government of Italy,[1122] the
Mediterranean Power, which shall have the right of inspection and
verification, and to demand further reports in behalf of and for the
information of the Powers. The expense of such inspection, etc., etc.,
to be deemed a part of the cost of police maintenance.
4. That full assurances be given by France and Spain, and made
obligatory upon all their officers who shall be appointed by the Sultan,
for the open door, both as to trade, equal treatment and opportunity in
competition for public works and concessions.
These terms, which the French government clung to notwithstanding the
opposition of the French press, were unsatisfactory to the German
government. At first Prince Bülow refused completely the proposal of
February 16, and requested the French delegate to make an offer in
keeping with the fundamental principle of the equality for all nations
in Morocco.[1123] When the authority of President Roosevelt was added to
it, however, the Chancellor receded on some points.[1124] He still held
that the Sultan should be permitted to choose the military instructors
freely from others besides the French and Spanish nations. But he was
willing to limit the nations to those participating in the bank, or, in
case France feared that the Sultan might favor German officers, to at
least four nationalities. In order to recognize the special rights of
France in Morocco, he even agreed that the Sultan might place Tangier
and perhaps some other port under the control of France alone; that in
the other ports the officers of various nationalities should co-operate.
Both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Root realized that this reply would be
totally unacceptable to France, and they refused the German request to
mediate on that basis.[1125]
On the question of the bank, the situation was just as bad. Since early
in February negotiations on it had been neglected in favor of the more
important problem of the police. But to keep the Conference going, the
German delegates took it up again on February 19. The next day both
theirs and the French plans were submitted to the committee of the
whole. The German plan provided that: an equal division of capital among
the Powers should be made; the Egyptian mixed codes should be used for
the bank; a mixed consular court with the addition of a Moroccan
delegate to try cases involving the bank should be established at
Tangier; the bank should be supervised by a Conseil de Surveillance
composed of the diplomatic representatives at Tangier, and managed by a
Conseil d’Administration composed of two delegates from each national
group and by a director appointed by the Conseil d’Administration;
statutes should be drawn up by this latter body and ratified by the
Conseil de Surveillance; customs duties, perhaps with the deduction of
the sums necessary for the service of the French loan, should be
received by the bank; funds for the police organization and for certain
needed public works should be furnished by the bank, which should also
be charged with the service of the public debt, especially the French
loan and the German advance, and should be the financial agent of the
state and have priority right to make loans; the Conseil de Surveillance
should have the right to reserve funds necessary for the police
organization and for the execution of necessary public works independent
of the Sultan’s power, to fix the budget, and to advise the Sultan in
deciding on public works.[1126]
The French plan contained the following provisions: the capital should
be divided into fifteen parts, of which eleven should be subscribed by
financial groups in Germany, Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, Spain, the
United States, France, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Russia, and Sweden,
with no Power having more than one part; the other four were to be given
to the French group of banks that made the Moroccan loan in 1904 in
return for relinquishment of the right of preference for making loans to
Morocco; the bank was to be directed by a Conseil d’Administration of
fifteen members selected by the shareholders, each chosen from the
nationality of the subscribing group; a high commissioner selected by
the Moroccan government should watch over the bank for the Sultan; the
Conseil d’Administration should select the bank officers and determine
their powers; an international committee of discount chosen among the
chief merchants and bankers of Tangier possessing at least twenty-five
shares should be formed for consultative purposes on credit and
discount; the bank should be subject to the French law and to the French
judicial system; the statutes should be drawn up by a committee chosen
from the various subscribing groups and submitted to the stockholders.
France wanted the central office of the bank located at Paris, whereas
Germany preferred Tangier.[1127]
The main points of difference between the two projects related to the
choice of the central office of the bank, the choice of legislation and
jurisdiction, the surveillance of the bank, the division of the capital,
and the right of preference. The one side complained that the other
project would make the bank into a French institution; the other side
complained that the opposing project would create, not an economic
institution, but a political one aimed at France—that it disregarded
recognized French rights and interests and that it was
impracticable.[1128] M. Regnault became indignant at the presumption of
the German proposal; Count Tattenbach answered him in kind.[1129] The
plans were so divergent that their discussion in committee was postponed
until March 3 so that time could be given for further direct
negotiations.[1130]
Thus, discussion on both questions reached a crisis. Fear of imminent
failure pervaded the Conference. The issue was one of victory or defeat
in the whole Moroccan episode. To break the deadlock the pro-French
Powers again exerted moral pressure on the German government to force
its retreat.[1131]
When the French reply on the police was made to Germany, the Russian
government approved it to the German authorities. Count Lamsdorff
declared frankly to Herr von Schoen on February 19 his belief that
Germany would be isolated in her refusal of the French proposals and
that if the Conference broke up she would be blamed, particularly in
Russia, for the continuation of the political and economic tension in
Europe. If the Björkö ideal were to be realized, he said, France and
Germany must become friends.[1132]
On February 20, at French request, Count Witte urged the German
government and Emperor William personally to permit a speedy settlement
of the Moroccan affair. Until then, he argued, the Continental grouping
could not be formed nor could Russia obtain the loan which she so
greatly needed for suppressing the revolution.[1133] The German
government replied that if Russia wanted the loan quickly, she should
advise the French government to be more conciliatory.[1134] On February
23 occurred another conversation between Herr von Schoen and Count
Lamsdorff, whose assertions the Ambassador reported as follows:
It is difficult to understand why we [Germany] defend so obstinately an
international right on the police question at the Conference which all
other Powers, in view of the practical solution offered by the French,
are ready to give up. The pessimistic impression has spread throughout
the Conference that we aim to frustrate an understanding.
The results of a failure would be incalculable. In France, where
feelings are already very much excited and M. Rouvier would be accused
of too great conciliation, a crisis with the downfall of M. Rouvier and
his replacement by an intransigent person could scarcely be avoided. The
continued anarchy in Morocco might bring forth bellicose complications
at any moment, in which case England would certainly enter on France’s
side while Russia would remain an inactive witness, but at the worst
would be affected sympathetically. A European war would enkindle new
revolutionary outbreaks which would also lead to difficult times for
Germany. But the worst would be that the foundation for the peace
program agreed upon by the two monarchs would be destroyed. . . . .
Denying that the outlook was so pessimistic, Herr von Schoen replied
that even though the addition of the third Power to the Björkö accord
might have to be postponed, that treaty would remain valid; whereupon
Count Lamsdorff answered that the Dual Alliance still held good, that if
France became involved in a war with Germany, the Björkö accord would
collapse.[1135]
When this warning had no apparent effect, Count Lamsdorff hesitated to
use the Czar’s influence with the German Emperor.[1136] But as a final
effort he had an article published on March 2 in the semiofficial
journal, _L’Etat russe_, denouncing the German policy at the Conference
and upholding the French.[1137]
Great Britain also gave her fullest support to the French, not only in
Algeciras and London, but in the various capitals of the other Powers.
In upholding the French proposal to Count Metternich on February 19 the
British Minister repeated his belief that British public opinion would
point the way to active support of France in case of a war with Germany
and would thus force the postponement of an Anglo-German
_rapprochement_. The Ambassador answered that if Germany had to give in
to every French pretension which arose from the Entente Cordiale in
order to gain British friendship, he feared that the price was too high.
The German people would come inevitably to look upon the British as
their chief enemy. Sir Edward Grey assured him, however, that if the
Moroccan affair were settled permanently, he would carry out his promise
to work for a _rapprochement_.[1138] He also kept in close touch with
the Russian government on Moroccan affairs. While refusing on February
22 Count Lamsdorff’s suggestion to intervene in Berlin in favor of
France, he urged Russia to do so.[1139]
The British Foreign Secretary was pessimistic over the outlook for the
Conference. He was especially desirous for the onus of the disruption
not to rest upon France. To prevent that he was even willing for the
Moroccan police to be temporarily organized under the Sultan by officers
taken from a neutral minor Power with a French officer selected by the
French government in general control. But he hesitated to suggest this
solution to France for fear of hurting the Entente Cordiale.[1140] On
February 20 he recorded his reactions to the situation as follows:
If the Conference breaks up without result the situation will be very
dangerous. Germany will endeavour to establish her influence in Morocco
at the expense of France. France to counteract this or even simply to
protect herself and a neighbour from the state of disturbance, which is
now chronic in Morocco, will be driven to take action in Morocco, which
Germany may make a _casus belli_.
If there is war between France and Germany it will be very difficult for
us to keep out of it. The _Entente_ and still more the constant and
emphatic demonstrations of affection . . . . have created in France a
belief that we should support her in war. . . . . If this expectation is
disappointed the French will never forgive us.
There would also I think be a general feeling in every country that we
had behaved meanly and left France in the lurch. The United States would
despise us, Russia would not think it worth while to make a friendly
arrangement with us about Asia, Japan would prepare to re-insure herself
elsewhere, we should be left without a friend and without the power of
making a friend and Germany would take some pleasure, after what has
passed, in exploiting the whole situation to our disadvantage, very
likely by stirring up trouble through the Sultan of Turkey in Egypt. As
a minor matter the position of any Foreign Secretary here, who had made
it an object to maintain the _entente_ with France, would become
intolerable.
On the other hand the prospect of a European War and of our being
involved in it is horrible.
I propose therefore, if unpleasant symptoms develop after the Conference
is over, to tell the French Ambassador that a great effort and if need
be some sacrifice should in our opinion be made to avoid war. To do this
we should have to find out what compensation Germany would ask or accept
as the price of her recognition of the French claims in Morocco. There
is also a point about Egypt, which might be worked in on our behalf. I
should myself be in favour of allowing Germany a port or coaling
station, if that would ensure peace; but it would be necessary to
consult the Admiralty about this, and to find out whether the French
would entertain the idea, and if so what port?
The real objection to the course proposed is that the French may think
it pusillanimous and a poor result of the _Entente_. I should have to
risk this. I hope the French would recognize that in a war with Germany
our liabilities would be much less than theirs. We should risk little or
nothing on land, and at sea we might shut the German fleet up in Kiel
and keep it there without losing a ship or a man or even firing a shot.
The French would have a life and death struggle and that expenditure of
blood and treasure with a doubtful issue. They ought therefore not to
think it pusillanimous on our part to wish to avoid a war in which our
danger was so much less than theirs.
I have also a further point of view. The door is being kept open by us
for a _rapprochement_ with Russia; there is at least a prospect that
when Russia is re-established we shall find ourselves on good terms with
her. An _entente_ between Russia, France and ourselves would be
absolutely secure. If it is necessary to check Germany it could then be
done. The present is the most unfavourable moment for attempting to
check her. Is it not a grave mistake, if there must be a quarrel with
Germany for France or ourselves to let Germany choose the moment, which
best suits her.
There is a possibility that war may come before these suggestions of
mine can be developed in diplomacy. If so it will only be because
Germany has made up her mind that she wants war and intends to have it
anyhow, which I do not believe is the case. But I think we ought in our
minds to face the question now, whether we can keep out of war, if war
breaks out between France and Germany. The more I review the situation
the more it appears to me that we cannot, without losing our good name
and our friends and wrecking our policy and position in the world.[1141]
Thus Sir Edward Grey intended to do his utmost to preserve peace even at
the risk of antagonizing France. He desired to postpone the Moroccan
settlement if necessary until the Anglo-Russian entente could be
consummated, believing that then France would be in a far stronger
position with reference to Germany. But if war did arise, he was
determined to throw his entire influence in favor of active
participation.[1142]
In Rome, M. Barrère, loyally seconded by Sir Edwin Egerton, endeavored
to interpret the Franco-Italian accords in such a way as to induce the
Italian government to take the French side openly in case of a vote at
the Conference. The Italian government refused. It also refused to
support Germany, and left matters in the hands of its delegate.[1143]
Similarly, the French and British representatives co-operated to prevent
Spain, somewhat disgruntled over the Moroccan accords, from refusing to
live up to its obligations. The Spanish government promised complete
loyalty. But when it appeared that the conference would fail, the
Spanish government felt that as host it should endeavor to prevent that
issue. On February 19 the Duke of Almodovar read to Mr. Révoil a note in
which he said that for the sake of a settlement Spain was willing to
accept the following plan as a sort of truce: The police should be
organized by the Sultan under the control of the diplomatic corps for
three years; the instructors should be exclusively Moroccan except at
Tetouan, where they should be Spanish, and at Oudjda, where they should
be French; France and Spain might renew their claims after the three
years if they saw fit.[1144]
Horrified at the idea, the Anglo-French combination immediately busied
itself to bring Spain back into line. At Madrid the British and French
representatives informed the foreign office that if Spain deserted her
friends the Anglo-French opposition to the German projects would
continue anyway. They argued that a break-up of the Conference with the
maintenance of the Franco-Spanish accords was preferable to the success
of the Conference through the ruin of those accords, in which lay their
sole guaranty for the morrow. M. Ojeda, acting minister of foreign
affairs, acknowledged to the British representative that “he hated
France and French influence in Morocco, and that he had no confidence in
and personal dislike for French Ambassador,” but he added that “he would
act faithfully in accordance with Spain’s engagements, although he
disliked them.” M. Moret, the Spanish premier, also protested his
loyalty to the accords. The Duke of Almodovar was instructed to abstain
in the future from all initiative not previously concerted with his
French colleague.[1145] To prevent any bad feelings from this episode,
the British and French governments thanked Spain for her loyalty. Thus
the danger from Spain was averted.[1146]
M. Rouvier consulted the smaller governments represented at the
Conference with a view to obtaining their open support in case matters
were forced to a vote. But they remained neutral.[1147]
The French government, again sustained by Great Britain,[1148] even
sought to influence Austria in its favor, and with some success. Finding
Count Goluchowski of the opinion that after France’s concessions on
February 3 and 16 Germany should show moderation, the French Ambassador
hinted discreetly that the Foreign Minister speak to the German
government to that effect.[1149] Count Goluchowski, who on February 14
had suggested a compromise to the German government very similar to the
French offer of February 16, urged it to accept the offer and to seek
compensation in the settlement of the bank question. Both the American
and the Italian delegates approved it, he argued, and he predicted that
if the Conference broke up Germany would be blamed.[1150] On February 23
Emperor Francis Joseph himself intervened. Calling the German Ambassador
to him, he said that Austria would act with Germany at the Conference,
but that according to all reports from Algeciras they would be isolated
in case of a vote. Such an isolation would be unpleasant for both
Powers, but far graver, he said, was the possibility that out of a
failure of the Conference might develop a new grouping of the Powers
separating Russia from the two monarchies and associating her with Great
Britain and France. He declared that it was necessary to avoid that
turn.[1151]
The French party at the Conference knew that Germany was isolated, that
even her ally, Austria, opposed her policy.[1152] On February 26 M.
Révoil, refusing to make any further proposal, asserted to the German
delegates: “If the Conference recognizes the utility of new guarantees,
we will not refuse to examine them. It belongs to the Conference . . . .
to determine the solution.” In other words, he told Germany that, having
demanded the Conference, she might permit it to settle the matter.[1153]
He and Sir Arthur Nicolson were devising some means by which a rupture
of the Conference should not occur over the bank question and by which
the responsibility for a rupture should not fall on France and Great
Britain. The issue on the bank was not as clear cut as on the police,
and public opinion would not understand why financial differences could
not be harmonized. So the two men planned to bring the police question
up first for decision. They did not favor taking a formal vote on that
matter, as Count Lamsdorff suggested,[1154] for they perceived that the
American, Italian, Dutch, Belgian, and Swedish delegates would very
probably not vote. But they intended in some way to make plain to
Germany the preference of the Conference for the French police proposal.
Then if Germany remained adamantine, she would receive the blame for the
break-up of the assembly.[1155]
The opportunity came on March 3. During the discussion of the bank in
the official session of the Conference, Germany’s views were supported
solely by Austria and Morocco and were opposed, for the first time, by a
firm British-French-Spanish-Russian group.[1156] That same day, on the
motion of Sir Arthur Nicolson and with the aid of the Duke of Almodovar,
the Conference voted to take up the question of the police on February 5
instead of that of the bank. The German and Austrian delegates alone
opposed the motion, even the Italian representative siding openly
against them.[1157] At the session on March 5 Germany was again
isolated. Her policy in regard to the police was not even defended by
Austria, while the French plan was openly approved by Great Britain,
Russia, Spain, and Portugal.[1158]
All the delegates were pessimistic. As direct negotiations had proved
futile, M. Révoil and Sir Arthur Nicolson both expected that the
antagonism would come to a head at the next session and the Conference
would break up.[1159] Herr von Radowitz reported to his government that
agreement was impossible if Germany held to her present terms, for
France would not recede, and that the other representatives, anxious to
conclude the Conference, were in favor of the French police proposal.
Even Count Tattenbach thought that his government was too
obstinate.[1160] In Berlin, however, Herr von Holstein, misjudging the
French feeling, planned to meet the crisis by disregarding the
Conference and making a direct temporary agreement with the French
government. The visit to Berlin of Baron de Courcel, former ambassador
at Berlin, on February 20-22, afforded him the opportunity to propose
the following terms: In regard to the police the two governments should
make a temporary settlement for four or five years; France, in
consideration of her special interests in Morocco, should be given one
port to police alone, while officers in equal numbers of the various
nationalities, including French and German, should co-operate in each of
the other seven ports; in the bank France should also be given a slight
advantage. Let France accept this internationalization for the time
being, he said, and in a few years she and Germany could come to a
direct permanent settlement of the Moroccan question by which Germany,
in return for concessions elsewhere, would leave the land entirely to
France. These concessions he declared to be the utmost that Germany
would make; she preferred to let the Conference disband rather than
recede further. Baron de Courcel seemed favorable to the plan; but, on
March 6, M. Rouvier refused to consider it or any other direct
negotiations with Germany.[1161] So that channel was definitely closed.
While this effort was being made, Prince Bülow took personal charge of
all the details concerning the Moroccan affair.[1162] The Chancellor had
no idea of permitting a disruption of the Conference,[1163] and began to
consider a proposal suggested by the Austrian delegate on February 26
for a way out. In its final form this project provided that the
organization of police in Tangier, Saffi, Rabat, and Tetouan should be
intrusted to the French; in Mogador, Larache, and Mazagan to the
Spanish; in Casablanca to the command of a Swiss or Dutch officer with
powers of inspection over all the police. It further proposed that this
inspector should report to the diplomatic corps at Tangier, which should
exercise general control over the reorganization of the police. Herr von
Radowitz, Count Welsersheimb, and Marquis Visconti Venosta all declared
this to be the least that the French would accept.[1164] The German
government endeavored first to have Austria and Italy mediate on the
basis of the plan outlined to Baron de Courcel;[1165] but on March 4
Count Goluchowski, the Austrian foreign minister, regarding the step as
futile, refused to do so. Instead he urged that either Count
Welsersheimb’s project be accepted _in toto_ or that the selection of
officers be left to the Sultan with the understanding that he choose
only French and Spanish ones.[1166] From Italy also came a negative
response.[1167] When Count Tattenbach himself favored the Austrian plan,
the Chancellor accepted it on March 6 with the proviso that the
commander at Casablanca choose his officers from other nationalities
than French and Spanish, and also that France accede to the German
demands on the bank. Then the Chancellor sought to obtain a combined
Austro-Italian mediation for the plan.[1168]
On March 8 Count Welsersheimb’s project and the French plan of February
16 were formally introduced in the Conference.[1169] On March 10 both
were referred to the committee for formulation on a motion by Herr von
Radowitz, who said:
It seems to me that accord ought to be reached on the basis of the two
projects. . . . . That of the French delegation certainly contains
proposals which deserve the most serious examination. They ought to be
completed by those of the Austro-Hungarian project.[1170]
The Austro-German proposal was a welcome surprise to the Conference,
which recognized it as a great concession. Sir Arthur Nicolson found
that “members of the Conference, with the exception of French and
Spanish, are unanimous in favour of” it. He as well as the other
delegates did not hesitate to inform M. Révoil frankly of this view. In
Algeciras, London, and Paris the British government on March 9-10 stated
to the French authorities that Germany’s concessions “had brought an
agreement so near that it would not do to let the Conference break up
now without a settlement.” “I would,” said Sir Arthur Nicolson to M.
Révoil, “support him [M. Révoil] to the best of my ability in whatever
course he might take, but I must tell him that in the event of the
Conference ending in a failure we should be placed in an exceedingly
false position with all the public feeling of Europe against us.”[1171]
Sir Edward Grey thought that “Germany has conceded the substance and it
would be a great pity, if France sacrificed the substance to the
shadow.”[1172]
M. Révoil, whose views were also valid for the Spanish delegates, was
totally unwilling to accept the Austrian proposal. He was handicapped by
the unexpected fall of the French government on March 7 over a minor
question concerning relations with the church. A week before the French
Premier would have accepted the Spanish proposal of February 19 as a
means of last resort.[1173] Now out of power, though remaining at the
foreign office until the new government was formed, M. Rouvier of course
could not make concessions even had he so desired. Staunchly supported
by the French press, which on March 13 published the instructions to M.
Révoil,[1174] he and the French delegate demanded the following
modifications in the Austrian plan:
The police instructors at Casa Blanca to be, like at the other seven
ports, French or Spanish.
Distribution of ports to French or Spanish instructors to be a matter
for agreement between French and Spanish Gov[ernmen]ts. The Inspector
General to be a subject of neutral state and to have powers of
inspection at all eight ports without right to command or give orders to
French and Spanish instructors, and to make his reports to the Sultan of
Morocco and not to the diplomatic body at Tangier.
He also preferred as inspector a Swiss or, even better, a Dane to a
Dutchman for fear the latter might be too much under German
influence.[1175]
Both MM. Rouvier and Révoil believed that Germany would recede on these
points, for on about March 8 the Prince of Monaco arrived in Paris from
Berlin with a message for M. Rouvier from Prince Bülow to the effect
that Germany would accept a French and Spanish police “under the most
discreet control of an officer from a lesser Power.”[1176] The message
was undoubtedly misleading and the French hope unjustified.[1177] When
Marquis Visconti Venosta, Mr. White, and Sir Arthur Nicolson, at M.
Révoil’s request, asked the German delegates March 9, 10, whether they
would give way, the latter assured them that Germany had spoken her last
word, that “the establishment of the inspector at a port as instructor
was a _sine qua non_ condition.”[1178]
M. Révoil was “greatly disappointed” and “a little unstrung.” He told
Sir Arthur Nicolson that his government would not accept such a
solution. “He said with much bitterness that the Germans had
internationalized the finances, and they now intended to introduce the
principle throughout Morocco. France would leave the Conference having
yielded everything and gained nothing.” His chief concern was that if
France were forced to accept the Austrian plan, “the outcry which would
be raised against it in France might be utilized to weaken the Anglo-
French understanding.” Sir Arthur Nicolson replied that he “would always
support him [M. Révoil], but I had given warnings as a friend should.”
And Sir Arthur added “that he must face the situation as it stood, and
that there could be no question of breaking down the Conference on that
point, and at a moment when a favourable end was so nearly
reached.”[1179]
In Paris, M. Rouvier
rather demurred [to the British Ambassador] to the supposition that the
conference was so favourably impressed by the Austrian scheme. He said
that France still counted on her side Spain, England, Russia, Portugal,
and others had only been gained over by the German Delegates having
persuaded them that Germany would make no further concessions.[1180]
Mr. Eyre Crowe was alarmed for the Entente Cordiale; he urged the
greatest caution in advising France to recede. But Sir Edward Grey on
March 12 repeated to M. Cambon that in his opinion France “should accept
the Swiss at Casa Blanca rather than let the Conference break up.”[1181]
As the pressure of the delegates was so strong, M. Révoil and the Duke
of Almodovar began on March 11 to consider tentatively the plan of
associating actively a Swiss inspector with the French and Spanish in
the policing of Tangier.[1182] Nothing could be decided until the new
French government was formed. Meanwhile, the opposition of views became
public in the Conference session of March 11 when two matters remaining
unsolved on the question of the bank were taken up. In a previous
sitting Sir Arthur Nicolson, in agreement with M. Révoil, had proposed
that three censors be chosen to oversee the bank. In accepting this
proposal Herr von Radowitz stipulated that in order to preserve the
principle of internationality the censors should be chosen by the
respective governments from the personnel of the banks interested in the
Moroccan state bank and that a copy of the censors’ reports should be
sent to the governments of the signatory Powers. The French delegates,
however, desired that the first censors be selected by the committee
drawing up the statutes of the bank and should thereafter be chosen by
co-optation and that their reports should be sent to the council of
administrators of the bank. The French continued to demand four shares,
while Germany was willing to concede them only three.[1183] At the
session on the next day M. Révoil refused the Austrian proposal to give
the command in Casablanca to an officer of a third Power, but agreed to
the inspection by one, preferably a Swiss.[1184]
In reporting M. Révoil’s pertinacity to Berlin on March 11, Herr von
Radowitz stated: “I have been told by all my colleagues, even the
English, that after our action they would no longer consider justified
the French adherence to the points declared inacceptable by us and they
have so expressed themselves to M. Révoil.”[1185] On the next day
Marquis Visconti Venosta said in confidence to Herr von Radowitz that
the latter would “not be able to come to an arrangement with M. Révoil
without a positive intervention of the government at Paris. . . .
.”[1186] The same day the _Lokalanzeiger_ published an exaggerated
report from its correspondent at Algeciras in which the “complete
isolation” of France in the committee was spoken of; Italy, Russia, the
United States, and even Great Britain, the article read, had put
themselves on the German side.[1187]
Instead of maintaining a dignified silence while public opinion and the
persuasion of the Powers compelled France to give way or break up the
Conference, Prince Bülow tried to increase the pressure by beginning a
diplomatic and press campaign against France. With German thoroughness
he overdid the thing. On March 12 he sent telegrams to the German
ambassadors at Vienna, London, St. Petersburg, Rome, Washington, and
Paris in which he stated that the generous concessions granted by
Germany on March 10 had made agreement seem possible. Then all had been
placed in doubt again by sudden and unexpected opposition from the
French delegates. The other delegates, including the British, he
continued, had expressed to Herr von Radowitz and to M. Révoil their
opinion that France should now recede; and, after repeating Marquis
Visconti Venosta’s statement, he asked the various governments to
intervene at Paris “so that the voice of reason will again rule there
and further opposition be given up.”[1188]
The Russian, Italian, and Austrian governments agreed to advise France
to accept the Austrian compromise. Sir Edward Grey, whom Count
Metternich did not ask to intercede in behalf of the plan as he believed
that the British Minister would refuse, welcomed the German concessions
but loyally upheld the French proposals.[1189] Mr. Roosevelt
unexpectedly replied most adversely.
In a letter on March 7 the President advised the Emperor to accept his
proposal of February 19. He justified his interference by quoting a
passage from Baron Sternburg’s letter to him on June 28, 1905, to the
effect that “the Emperor has requested me to tell you that in case,
during the coming conference, differences of opinion should arise
between France and Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up
the decision which you should consider to be most fair and most
practical.” He warned the German government that it would lose “credit”
and “moral power” in the world if the Conference failed.[1190] In his
reply on March 12 the Emperor announced his acceptance of the Austrian
plan, and urged the President to support it.[1191]
Upon receiving that reply Mr. Roosevelt on March 14 denounced the
Austrian project to Baron Sternburg as “absurd because it favors the
very ideas the conference has been trying to eliminate namely partition
and spheres of influence,” and also because it was impracticable. On the
other hand, “placing French and Spanish officers in the same ports gives
according to my view a safer guarantee than placing them separately in
single ports,” he said. In spite of that reply, however, Prince Bülow
regarded the German position as “at present not at all
unfavorable.”[1192]
Meanwhile, the French were restoring their front. In Paris a new
government was formed by M. Sarrien on March 14 with M. Bourgeois at the
foreign office. M. Bourgeois, with whom Prince Radolin was on cordial
terms, was known to be a conciliatory statesman interested in
harmonizing international differences. But he could hardly begin his
career in office with an unpopular concession on the Moroccan question.
He renewed M. Révoil’s instructions, refusing to compromise on the
police in any manner whatever.
It was a bold act. The French government knew that the Russian, Italian,
British, and Austrian governments disapproved. Several influential
members of the French Parliament tried to persuade M. Bourgeois that the
British government, influenced by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, would
withdraw its support from France. The new cabinet was alarmed by the
British advice to accept a neutral police in Casablanca rather than
break up the Conference, and some of the ministers suspected that Great
Britain and Germany were about to come to an arrangement leaving France
in the lurch. In a French cabinet meeting M. Clémenceau was at first the
only minister to combat these doubts.[1193]
But the move succeeded. M. Bourgeois quickly repulsed the intervention,
half-hearted as it was, of the Russian, Italian, and Austrian
ambassadors in Paris in favor of the Austrian plan; he even gathered
from his conversation with the Austrian representative that the latter’s
government would try to persuade Germany to relinquish her stand on the
policing of Casablanca.[1194] In addition, as soon as the French
instructions were published, Sir Edward Grey immediately informed the
French government that Great Britain would “of course” support it.[1195]
When he learned of the French doubts about the continuation of British
aid, he rather indignantly replied that the French leaders, MM.
Bourgeois, Etienne, and Clémenceau,
should be told that there has never been any question here of
discontinuing our support to France. We have given it throughout at
Algeciras and in every capital in Europe where required and shall
continue this so long as the French wish it and trust us. Cordial co-
operation with France in all parts of the world remains a cardinal point
of British policy and in some respects we have carried it further than
the late Government here were required to do.
Any advice Nicolson has given to Révoil has been on the understanding
that this support would be continued, and if he has given advice freely
it has been because of his complete confidence that this was understood
by his French colleague. The same is true of my conversations with
Cambon. . . . . The Prime Minister has been cognizant of all I have said
and has cordially approved of it.
Sir Arthur Nicolson denied that either directly or indirectly had he
ever said to the German delegates that France ought to give way on any
point.[1196] Sir Edward Grey informed the other governments that the
British fidelity to France would continue as before. And on March 18 _Le
Temps_ published the instructions to Sir Arthur Nicolson so that public
opinion could see how complete that support was.[1197]
If the French leaders intended to bring Great Britain back unreservedly
into line by expressing these doubts about British support, they
succeeded. M. Bourgeois could with more assurance inform the German
Ambassador that France had receded as far as she would. On March 17
Prince Radolin reported his words as follows:
The Minister added that he stood on the defensive, that he supported
entirely the previous policy of Rouvier and Révoil, . . . . that he had
agreed in principle with the appointment of a general inspector from
some lesser state “subject to agreement on details” but that under no
circumstances would he permit the inspector to exercise a command or a
collaboration. That is a question of principle, a vital question for
France and her prestige in Algeria. Moreover in case the conference ends
without result, the _status quo_ is no disadvantage for France. Germany,
not France, had demanded the conference. “It is your turn now to speak,
but not of the police. It is lost effort.”
He accused the German government of being responsible for the pressure
of the other Powers on France. According to instructions, Prince Radolin
replied in a serious tone but without threat that the steps taken by
those governments were caused by Germany’s great concessions of March
10.[1198] But the vote of confidence given without debate to the new
cabinet by the Chamber on March 19 showed that M. Bourgeois interpreted
French feeling correctly.[1199]
There were signs at Paris and Algeciras as early as March 17 that
Austria was seeking some new way out of the deadlock, and that Germany
might accept the French view about Casablanca.[1200] Before the Austrian
mediation had time to materialize, however, the renewed intervention of
the American government turned the scales in favor of France. On March
16 Prince Bülow had replied to Mr. Roosevelt with arguments showing that
the Austrian plan would preserve the unity and integrity of Morocco
whereas the French plan would divide the country into spheres of
influence.[1201] The President remained unconvinced. Thinking that the
whole German action was intended to humiliate France, he and American
public opinion took the French side. While he no longer believed that
Germany aimed at war with her western neighbor, he and his advisers did
suspect her of intending by the Austrian proposal to gain a port and a
sphere of influence in the Mediterranean. Germany’s extreme demands were
arousing dissatisfaction among the other delegates at Algeciras, he told
Baron Sternburg, and Austria and Russia had already asked him to advise
Germany to moderate them. So, while he declared that he would not hold
out if the other Powers accepted the Austrian plan, he remained hostile
to it. He threatened to publish the entire correspondence on the subject
if the Conference failed. Baron Sternburg learned that Mr. Root had said
privately that Germany’s attitude at the Conference was “petty and
unworthy of a great nation,” that she was fast losing the confidence of
the world. In reiterating the American stand, Mr. Root wrote to the
Ambassador: “If we had sufficient interest in Morocco to make it worth
our while, we should seriously object, on our own account, to the
adoption of any such arrangement [as the Austrian plan].”[1202]
With the net drawing tighter around Germany, Prince Bülow notified
President Roosevelt on March 19 that Germany would accept the American
plan of having French and Spanish officers in about equal numbers co-
operate in each of the ports, supervised by a general inspector from
another nation.[1203] President Roosevelt was jubilant over Germany’s
acceptance of his plan. He immediately proposed it to the French
government and asked the British to support him.[1204]
From this side the President met with strenuous opposition. France and
Spain would have nothing to do with the idea of mixed police, except if
necessary in Tangier and Casablanca. Complaining of too many
peacemakers,[1205] Sir Edward Grey supported the Franco-Spanish view.
Mr. Roosevelt suddenly grew timid and refused to defend his project
before the Conference.[1206] The German government was therefore forced
to fall back on Austrian mediation.[1207]
In a private conversation on March 23 Count Welsersheimb informed M.
Révoil that Germany might sacrifice her demand for a neutral police at
Casablanca if France would make reciprocal concessions. M. Révoil was
willing to limit the number of French shares in the bank to three. But
for the other unsettled problems of determining how much international
control should be established over the police and bank and how the
police should be divided among the various ports, the two men failed to
find a solution. On the first question the German government demanded as
a _conditio sine qua non_ that the inspector should be made responsible
to the diplomatic corps at Tangier, which should exercise a general
supervision over the police. M. Révoil, on the other hand, supported by
the British and Spanish delegates, desired that the diplomatic corps be
excluded from intervening in this matter at all. On the question of the
bank the Germans wanted the various governments and the diplomatic corps
at Tangier to have some authority over the censors while the French did
not. As to the division of ports the French formally requested that the
settlement of this problem and of other details should be left for
France and Spain to determine later with the Sultan; the Germans
preferred to have the Conference itself divide the ports between these
two Powers.[1208]
At that point the Conference again reached a deadlock. With victory in
view the French, on March 26, refused to give way;[1209] while the
Germans, who had already made the great concession, sought to save as
much as they could. They felt compelled to be firmer because the
publication in _Le Temps_ on March 21 of the very pro-French
instructions to the Russian delegate at Algeciras, succeeding the
publication of the French and British instructions, made it appear as if
the German government were being coerced into retreat.[1210] With one or
two exceptions, the delegates, anxious to conclude the Conference and
attributing little importance to these matters, were inclined to think
that France ought to recede on the question of the responsibility of the
inspector.[1211] President Roosevelt was once more urging that both
France and Spain be given a joint mandate and that they accept from the
Conference a joint responsibility for every port no matter how the ports
were divided.[1212] After the session on March 26, the mediators again
set to work. Germany agreed for France and Spain to divide the ports as
they wished and to submit their decision to the Conference for approval.
Both Powers made concessions on the question of the control of the bank.
On the most difficult problem of the responsibility of the police
inspector, the French, British, Spanish, Russian, and Italian first
delegates met privately at M. Révoil’s suggestion and worked out a
formula. Then Mr. White submitted it to the German delegates, and the
latter accepted it (March 27).[1213] The difficulties were thereby
settled.
In the meantime trouble, which did not come to the surface, had arisen
between France and Spain. The Franco-Spanish accord of 1905 had provided
for the policing of only five ports, whereas the Conference had dealt
with all eight. France wanted the other three left to her; but Spain
refused. On March 18 she requested that Tangier be given to her, but the
French government rejected the suggestion, offering instead to agree
that Casablanca as well as Tangier should be policed by French and
Spanish together. This offer was refused by Spain, who on about March 25
made the additional request that she should be given an extra share in
the bank by the Conference instead of receiving it later from France
according to agreement. The French would not accede to this, but by
March 31 the two Powers decided that the officers should be Spanish in
Tetouan and Larache, French and Spanish in Casablanca and Tangier, and
French in the other four ports.[1214]
The Conference accepted this division, together with the following terms
on the police: They should function for five years; they should be
inspected at least once a year by a Swiss officer stationed at
Tangier[1215] who should report to the Sultan; this officer was also
empowered to make as many special reports as he saw fit; he should
likewise send a copy of these reports to the dean of the diplomatic
corps in order that that body might
confirm that the Moroccan police is functioning in conformity with the
decisions taken by the Conference and that it may see whether it
guarantees in an efficacious manner and in conformity with the treaties
the security of persons and of the property of foreigners as well as
that of commercial transactions; . . . . in case of demand before it by
an interested legation the diplomatic corps may, after advising the
representatives of the Sultan of its action, request the inspector to
make an inquiry and draw up a report on the complaint made.
On the question of the bank it was stipulated that the censors should be
chosen with the approval of their governments by the various state banks
of the countries involved. Instead of using the expression that the
censors should exercise “the supervision of the administration of the
Bank in the name of the signatory Powers,” a phrase to which the French
objected as smacking of internationalization again, the delegates
substituted the less colorful one that the censors should exercise “the
supervision of which they are invested by the present Act in that which
concerns the administration of the bank.”[1216]
Thus, formulas were found. Details were cleared up; minor points
settled. On April 7 the delegates signed the general act. The Conference
of Algeciras was ended.[1217]
The conclusions of the Conference were determined by the exigencies of
international relations and the interests of European Powers, not by the
needs of Morocco. The less interested Powers had aimed chiefly at
preserving peace in Europe. France and her satellite, Spain, had been
concerned with maintaining their interests in Morocco and with
preventing any other Power from gaining a foothold there. Germany alone
had endeavored to defend Moroccan rights, and she had done so only
because that policy had been in accord with her interests. The Moroccan
delegates had in general been disregarded by the Conference, which
assumed that the Sultan would under pressure accept its decisions.
Although the assembly had formally acknowledged the independence and
integrity of Morocco and the sovereignty of the Sultan, it had shown
little more regard for them than had the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish
agreements of 1904-5. While the open door had been allowed, the French
and Spanish military control in Morocco assured to those two Powers the
main economic advantages. In view of the terms of the Franco-Spanish
accord of 1905, it was certain that those Powers would not preserve
equality of economic treatment. France and Spain had both fought
internationalization so effectively that the international supervision
established was entirely inadequate to command respect. The idea that a
Power might be charged by the other Powers with the exercise of a
mandate for the sake of the “backward people” had not as yet been
seriously considered by any government. In February and March President
Roosevelt and the German government had discussed the proposal of
granting to France and Spain a mandate in Morocco “from all the Powers,
under responsibility to all of them for the maintenance of equal rights
and opportunities”[1218]—that is, for the advantage of the Western
Powers not for that of Morocco—but the trouble lay in the absence of any
existing machinery which would have enabled it to be put into effect.
The reforms provided for were hardly more than a beginning. They were
unsatisfactory both to the Moroccans and to the French and the Spanish.
The Moroccan government was surprised at the outcome of the Conference,
having expected that France would be arraigned before that body as
before a tribunal. The mass of the Moroccan people remained hostile to
reform; they were turning their homage more to the pretender and to
Raisouli. Even those ministers who recognized the necessity for change
denounced the Conference proposals as benefiting the Europeans and
European trade in Morocco but not the Moroccan government. “The
conference has turned Morocco over to the French,” said El Tores, a
delegate to that assembly, to Dr. Rosen. He thought that either
acceptance or rejection of the Conference act by the Sultan would be a
misfortune.[1219] Ben Sliman, the Moroccan foreign minister, was equally
despondent.
He regarded the outlook after the decision of the Conference as simply
hopeless [so Mr. Lowther reported his assertions]. If the Makhzen
assented to the Conference’s decision there was an end to the Moorish
Government, as a Government. The ports were thereby practically handed
over for ever to the Powers. These were of importance to Europeans and
of a certain financial value to the Sultan although they were but a
small part of the country and their populations a mere handful of those
of the Sultan’s subjects, who, in normal times, had acknowledged His
Majesty’s rule, and paid taxes. But the decisions of the Conference Ben
Sliman considered, in practice if not in theory, left the Sultan no
means or hopes of doing anything to re-establish order and restore
prosperity to the vast mass of his people, to whose needs at large the
proposed reforms were totally inadequate and he was deeply disappointed
with them.
His Excellency would therefore infinitely have preferred the reforms to
have been so framed that the Powers would have exercised some kind of
direction, assistance and advice at the Court itself, the influence of
which would have been, in course of time, felt throughout the country to
the great advantage of all concerned. As it was, the Makhzen seemed to
be left in as impotent and ridiculous a position as ever in the eyes of
its subjects.[1220]
Opinion at court was divided upon whether to accept the decisions of the
Conference or not. When the dean of the diplomatic corps in Tangier
officially communicated the Conference act to the Sultan, the latter
tried to delay a decision and to discuss certain points. But on June 18
he reluctantly signed the act with reservations. All indications pointed
to the opposition of the Moroccan government to any serious efforts at
reforms.[1221]
The Conference had made inadequate provisions for coping with Moroccan
opposition. There could be no half-measures in handling Morocco. Europe
had to leave her alone entirely or give the mandatory Powers complete
freedom to “shoot” reforms into the land. The right to police eight
towns would just suffice to involve France and Spain in a series of
petty, indecisive clashes with the natives. If they wished to employ
more military authority, they would have either to obtain the permission
of the Powers or to risk another international crisis by taking an
unauthorized initiative. As soon as the execution of the reforms should
begin, the inadequacy of all this diplomatic activity would become
evident. The Moroccan problem had not been solved.
[Footnote 1070: The Conference opened later than was originally planned,
the immediate cause being the marriage of the Infanta Maria Theresa,
sister of King Alfonso, to Prince Ferdinand of Bavaria, on Jan. 12. The
King of Spain had wanted in December to move the meeting place to
Madrid, and both the French and German governments had agreed; but as
the Sultan opposed, the proposal had been dropped. Bülow’s opinion was
that it made no difference to Germany whether the Conference met at
Madrid or Algeciras or elsewhere. “It was a mistake that we originally
settled ourselves on Tangier,” he wrote, Dec. 25, 1905. See _G.P._, XXI,
25 ff., Nos. 6911, 6913 ff.; _B.D._, III, 160, No. 196; _L.j., 1901-5_,
No. 368; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents diplomatiques.
Affaires du Maroc, 1906, Protocols et comptes rendus de la Conférence
d’Algéciras_ (1906), 5, No. 2 (hereafter referred to as _L.j., 1906_).]
[Footnote 1071: Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés_, pp. 90 ff., 503 f.;
Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 17, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 96, No. 6952. Tardieu’s
book contains almost an official account of the Conference from the
French side. He was present as representative of _Le Temps_ and had
access to the fullest information, as his articles showed. His book is
an excellent example of patriotic historiography carried almost to a
hysterical extreme, and his interpretations have to be read with the
greatest caution. Dr. Hammann criticized the work when it appeared in
1907 in two articles, one in _Grenzboten_, 1907, p. 12, the other in the
_Kölnische Zeitung_, March 30, 1907 (editor’s note, _G.P._, XXI, 92 f.).
See also the masterly criticism of French policy by Dickinson, _The
International Anarchy 1904-1914_, pp. 134 ff.]
[Footnote 1072: Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 5, 1906, _B.D._, III, 243, No.
268; Tardieu, pp. 85 f.]
[Footnote 1073: Tardieu, pp. 100 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 16, 1906,
_G.P._, XXI, 92 f., No. 6949; Révoil to Rouvier, Jan. 18, 1906, _L.j.,
1906_, 11, No. 4.]
[Footnote 1074: Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 16, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 92 f.,
No. 6949; Tardieu, pp. 100 ff.; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 9 f.; Nicolson to
Grey, Jan. 18, 1906, _B.D._, III, 229, No. 248.]
[Footnote 1075: _L.j., 1906_, 264 ff., No. 37.]
[Footnote 1076: _Ibid._, 5 ff., No. 3, and following documents; Radowitz
to F. O., Jan. 12, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 91, No. 6947; Bülow to Radowitz,
Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 92, No. 6948; Radowitz to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906,
_ibid._, 119 ff., No. 6967; Tardieu, pp. 100 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Jan.
19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 230 f., No. 249.]
[Footnote 1077: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 21, 1906, _B.D._, III, 231 ff.,
Nos. 250 f.; Monts to F. O., Jan. 28, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 126, No. 6970;
Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 31, 1906, _ibid._, 130 f., No. 6975.]
[Footnote 1078: Révoil wished to push matters into the open sessions of
the Conference as much as possible, where he would have more support
(Tardieu, pp. 136 ff.; Radowitz to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI,
119 f., No. 6967).]
[Footnote 1079: As seen below, the German government was proposing
several alternative solutions of that question, and the German delegates
seem also to have been discussing others on their own initiative. See
Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 25 and 27, 1906, _B.D._, III, 235, No. 256; 239
f., Nos. 262 f.; Tardieu, pp. 144 ff.]
[Footnote 1080: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 24, 25, 26, 1906, _B.D._, III,
234, No. 254; 235 f., Nos. 256 f.; 236 ff., Nos. 259 f.; 239 f., Nos.
262 f.; Tardieu, pp. 136 ff.]
[Footnote 1081: Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 29, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 128 ff.,
No. 6974.; Tardieu, pp. 141 ff.]
[Footnote 1082: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 136 f.,
No. 6980; Tardieu, pp. 148 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 4 and 5, 1906,
_B.D._, III, 242, No. 266; 243 f., No. 268.]
[Footnote 1083: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 114, No.
6965.]
[Footnote 1084: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 30, 1906, _ibid._, 128, No.
6973; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 29 and 31, 1906, _ibid._, 128 ff., Nos.
6974 f.; Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 132 ff., No. 6977;
Tardieu, p. 142.]
[Footnote 1085: Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 20, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 99 ff.,
No. 6956; Tardieu, pp. 160 ff. A proposal similar to No. 1 had been made
to Roosevelt by Bülow earlier in January (Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 6,
1906, _G.P._, XXI, 54 f., No. 6926). Bülow also offered to support Italy
in seeking a general mandate on the police, manifestly in order to
create antagonism between Italy and France. The offer was rejected and
was soon dropped by Bülow who feared that Italy might later help France
penetrate Morocco in return for French aid to Italy in Tripoli. See
Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 53 f., No. 6925; Bülow to
Radowitz, Jan. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 114 f., No. 6965; Tardieu, pp. 146 f.
There is no proof in the published British and German documents of
Tardieu’s assertion that in January the German government also offered
to support Spain in seeking this general mandate. See _ibid._, pp. 145,
155 f. Cf. Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, No. 252;
Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 6, 1906, _ibid._, 244, No. 270.]
[Footnote 1086: Tardieu, p. 146 n.; Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 27, 1906,
_G.P._, XXI, 123 ff., No. 6968.]
[Footnote 1087: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 136 f.,
No. 6980; Tardieu, pp. 148 ff.]
[Footnote 1088: The German government did not desire British mediation,
as it feared that Great Britain might try to pose as the protector of
France and strengthen the Entente Cordiale (Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 26,
1906, _G.P._, XXI, 114 f., No. 6965).]
[Footnote 1089: Sternburg to F. O., Jan. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 102 f., No.
6958.]
[Footnote 1090: Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 27, 1906, _ibid._, 123 ff., No.
6968; 127, No. 6972. On Feb. 3 Goluchowski declared to the German
Ambassador that Austria would go with her ally on the questions of the
police and the bank “through thick and thin” (Holstein to Wedel, Feb. 4,
1906, _ibid._, 137, No. 6981). Dr. Kriege, of the German foreign office,
was sent on a special mission to Vienna on Feb. 2 to gain the Austrian
support (memo. by Kriege, Feb. 4, 1906, _ibid._, 137 ff., No. 6982;
Wedel to F. O., Feb. 5, 1906, _ibid._, 140, No. 6983). A cabinet crisis
in Italy on Feb. 1 prevented the German government from taking any
immediate steps to gain Italy’s active support. But Bülow expected
Visconti Venosta to be willing to mediate. On Feb. 8 a new government
was formed in Rome under Sonnino (Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906,
_ibid._, 143 ff., No. 6987).]
[Footnote 1091: Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 1, 1906, _ibid._, 131, No.
6976. Bülow also instructed Sternburg to interest the American
financiers in the Moroccan state bank so that they would press their
government to oppose the French plan and to favor the German one. At the
Chancellor’s request, the German banker, Mendelssohn, who was to take
charge of German interests in the Moroccan bank, endeavored to arouse
the Dutch, American, and Austrian bankers in the same way. See Bülow to
Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, _ibid._, 145 f., No. 6987; Sternburg to F. O.,
Feb. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 148, No. 6989.]
[Footnote 1092: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 5, 1906, _ibid._, 140 f., No.
6984; Tardieu, pp. 152 f.; Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_,
p. 500; Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 27, 1906, _B.D._, III, 239, No. 262.]
[Footnote 1093: Nicolson reported that Tattenbach argued as follows: “He
observed that situation had completely changed since Conference had been
agreed upon, and that now _vis-a-vis_ to France I was exactly in the
same position as the other delegates. He continued that if I urged my
French colleague to make all required concessions on police question, my
words would be decisive; while if I declined to say those words, I
should be practically encouraging my French colleague to resist; and he
hinted that if the Conference fell through a great deal of the
responsibility would fall on me.” See Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 4, 1906,
_B.D._, III, 241, No. 265; 242 f., No. 267; Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 13,
1906, _ibid._, 251 f., No. 281; Tardieu, pp. 147 f.]
[Footnote 1094: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 6, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 141 f.,
No. 6985; Tardieu, pp. 153 f.]
[Footnote 1095: The Spanish undersecretary of state for foreign affairs,
M. Ojeda, had approved it. See Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, _G.P._,
XXI, 145 and note, No. 6987. On the German attempts to win over Spain
see Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, No. 252;
Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 6, 1906, _ibid._, 244, No. 270.]
[Footnote 1096: Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 143 ff.,
No. 6987.]
[Footnote 1097: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 9, 10, 1906, _ibid._, 148 f.,
No. 6990; 155, No. 6996; Dennis, pp. 501 f.]
[Footnote 1098: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 9, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 151, No.
6992.]
[Footnote 1099: Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 147 f., No.
6989.]
[Footnote 1100: Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 9, 12, 1906, _ibid._, 149 ff.,
No. 6991; 155 f., No. 6997; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 10, 1906, _ibid._,
155, No. 6996; Tardieu, p. 172.]
[Footnote 1101: Quoted from a memorandum given by Radowitz to Révoil on
that date. See Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 13, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 162 f.,
No. 7004; Tardieu, pp. 175 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 14, 1906, _B.D._,
III, 253, No. 284.]
[Footnote 1102: Radowitz to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 122, No.
6967; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 9, 1906, _ibid._, 151, No. 6992. See the
documents in _B.D._, III, 227 ff., Nos. 246 ff.]
[Footnote 1103: Schoen to F. O., Feb. 12, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 156 f., No.
6998; Tardieu, pp. 158 f., 194 ff.; Witte, _Memoirs_, pp. 298 ff.;
Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 13, 1906, _B.D._, III, 249 f., No. 279.]
[Footnote 1104: Wedel to F. O., Feb. 12 and 14, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 157
ff., No. 6999; 166 f., No. 7007.]
[Footnote 1105: Holstein to Radolin, Feb. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 152 ff.,
No. 6994.]
[Footnote 1106: Tardieu, pp. 198 ff.; Bülow to Monts, Feb. 10, 1906,
_G.P._, XXI, 154, No. 6995.]
[Footnote 1107: Bülow to Radolin, Feb. 7 and 10, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 146
f., No. 6988; 152, No. 6993. Holstein was the inspirer of these
dispatches. See Holstein to Radolin, Feb. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 152 ff.,
No. 6994. On the press war see also Tardieu, pp. 167 ff.]
[Footnote 1108: Bülow to Monts, Feb. 13, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 159 f. and
note, No. 7000; Tardieu, p. 195. The telegram to Washington, dispatched
the next day, was not of identical wording with the others but to the
same effect (Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 14, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 163 f., No.
7005).]
[Footnote 1109: Tardieu, pp. 74, 163, 167, 176 f., 196; _G.P._, XXI, 152
n.]
[Footnote 1110: Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 12, 1906, _B.D_, III, 248 f., No.
278; Grey to Lascelles, Feb. 14, 1906, _ibid._, 254 f., No. 285;
Metternich to F. O., Feb. 14, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 164 ff., No. 7006.]
[Footnote 1111: Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 6 and 7, 1906, _B.D._, III, 244,
No. 269; 245, No. 271; Tardieu, p. 154. The accusation was not
deserved.]
[Footnote 1112: Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 13, 1906, _B.D._, III, 249 f.,
No. 279; Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 253, No. 283;
Tardieu, pp. 79 f., 158 ff., 204 f., 246 ff.; Witte, pp. 298 ff.;
_G.P._, XXI, 125 f. n.; Goetz, _Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren
1894-1914_, pp. 386 f.]
[Footnote 1113: According to Bompard, the Russian government was not
certain that the Liberal government in London would support France as
whole-heartedly as its predecessor had done. Grey’s assertions early in
February reassured it entirely (Spring Rice to Knollys, Jan. 31, 1906,
and Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 16, 1906, Gwynn, _The Letters and
Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, II, 62 ff.; Spring Rice to Grey,
Feb. 7 and 8, 1906, _B.D._, III, 245 f., Nos. 272 f.; Grey to Spring
Rice, Feb. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 246, No. 274).]
[Footnote 1114: Sternburg to F. O., March 17 and 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI,
300 ff., Nos. 7112 f.; Bishop, _The Life and Times of Theodore
Roosevelt_, I, 489.]
[Footnote 1115: Tardieu, pp. 160 ff.; Bishop, I, 489.]
[Footnote 1116: Roosevelt to Reid, March 1, 1906, quoted in Royal
Cortissoz, _The Life of Whitelaw Reid_ (New York, 1921), II, 329 f.,
347; Sternburg to F. O., March 17 and 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 300 ff.,
Nos. 7112 f.]
[Footnote 1117: Tardieu, pp. 161 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 11, 1906,
_B.D._, III, 246 ff., Nos. 275 f.]
[Footnote 1118: Radolin to F. O., Feb. 13 and 15, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 160
f., No. 7001; 171 f., No. 7010; Tardieu, pp. 200 f.; Grey to Bertie,
Feb. 13, 1906, _B.D._, III, 250 f., No. 280; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 16,
1906, _ibid._, 259 f., No. 290.]
[Footnote 1119: Tardieu, pp. 179 f., 249 ff. White was very critical of
the German tactics in his dispatches to Washington, especially of the
German attempt to negotiate directly with the Quai d’Orsay while the
Conference was going on (White to Root, Feb. 11, 1905, Dennis, p. 502
and note; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 257 f., No.
287).]
[Footnote 1120: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 16, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 172, No.
7011; Tardieu, p. 181; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 17, 1906, _B.D._, III, 260
f., No. 292. Révoil was contemplating an involved, vague reply when he
talked to Nicolson. At the latter’s advice it was made concise and
straightforward (Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 256 ff., No.
287).]
[Footnote 1121: Root to Sternburg, Feb. 19, 1906, quoted in Bishop, I,
489 ff., _G.P._, XXI, 181 ff., No. 7019; Tardieu, pp. 249 f., 180.]
[Footnote 1122: Italy had been chosen for obvious reasons, for she was
bound to France by the accords of 1900 and 1902 and to Germany by the
Triple Alliance. As such, her choice might be acceptable to both Powers
(Tardieu, p. 181).]
[Footnote 1123: Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 19, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 173 f.,
No. 7013; Tardieu, pp. 187, 249 ff.]
[Footnote 1124: Bülow’s minute to _G.P._, XXI, 183, No. 7019; Sternburg
to Roosevelt, Feb. 22, 1906, in Bishop, I, 491 ff.; Bülow to Sternburg,
Feb. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 183 f., No. 7020; Tardieu, p. 250.]
[Footnote 1125: Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 183 f.,
No. 7020; Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 213, No. 7038.]
[Footnote 1126: The plan was drawn up with the aid of Glasenapp of the
Deutsche Bank and of Mendelssohn, who was to take over the German shares
in the bank. See Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 27, 1906; _ibid._, 115 ff., No.
6966; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 114 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 186, 221 ff.]
[Footnote 1127: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 117 f.; Tardieu, pp. 184 f., 221 ff.]
[Footnote 1128: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 113 f., 120 ff., 136 ff.; Radowitz to
F. O., Feb. 20, 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 204, No. 7031; 205, No. 7033;
Tardieu, pp. 186, 221 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 20, 1906, _B.D._, III,
265 f., No. 298.]
[Footnote 1129: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 19, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 176 f.,
No. 7015.]
[Footnote 1130: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 113 ff.]
[Footnote 1131: Rouvier suggested to Révoil that the representative of
France, Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Spain, Russia, Italy,
and Austria-Hungary meet informally and try to find a solution on the
police. Nicolson and White opposed the idea as impracticable, and it was
soon dropped (Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 16, 1906, _B.D._, III, 260, No.
291).]
[Footnote 1132: Schoen to F. O., Feb. 19, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 178 f., No.
7017; Tardieu, pp. 194 f., 204 f.]
[Footnote 1133: Tardieu, pp. 246 ff.; Schoen to F. O., Feb. 20, 1906,
_G.P._, XXI, 192, No. 7025; Eulenburg to William II, Feb. 22, 1906,
_ibid._, 194, No. 7027 and Anlage, Witte to Eulenburg, Feb. 20, 1906;
Witte, p. 301.]
[Footnote 1134: Bülow to Schoen, Feb. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 193, No.
7026; memo. by Bülow, Feb. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 197 f., No. 7028;
Eulenburg to Witte, Feb. 27, 1906, _ibid._, 202 ff., No. 7030; Tardieu,
pp. 195, 295.]
[Footnote 1135: Schoen to F. O., Feb. 23, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 211 ff.,
No. 7037; Witte, p. 301; Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, _B.D._,
III, 271 f., No. 308; 273 f., No. 311.]
[Footnote 1136: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 28, 1906, _B.D._, III, 279,
No. 320; Spring Rice to Knollys, March 1, 1906, Gwynn, II, 65 f.]
[Footnote 1137: Tardieu, pp. 247, 249; Schoen to F. O., March 3, 1906,
_G.P._, XXI, 234 f., No. 7052; Schoen to Bülow, March 4, 1906, _ibid._,
251 ff., No. 7068. The article so embittered the German government that
Bülow would not show it directly to the Emperor but informed him of it
personally so as to take away the sting (see the minutes to the dispatch
from Schoen to F. O., March 3, 1906, _ibid._, 235, No. 7052).]
[Footnote 1138: A visit of the London City Council to Paris, Feb. 8,
gave occasion for confirming the Entente Cordiale (_G.P._, XXI, 185 ff.
and note, No. 7021). Grey also intimated to Metternich that France would
be willing to eliminate the thirty-year limitation to commercial freedom
in Morocco as provided for in the Anglo-French accord. See Metternich to
F. O., Feb. 19 and 20, 1906, _ibid._, 179 ff., No. 7018; 185 ff., Nos.
7021 f.; Grey to Lascelles, Feb. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 263 f., No.
296.]
[Footnote 1139: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 22, 24, 28, 1906, _B.D._, III,
269, No. 303; 271 f., No. 308; 273 f., No. 311; 278 f., No. 320; Grey to
Spring Rice, Feb. 20, 22, 1906, _ibid._, 264 f., No. 297; 270, No. 304;
Grey to Spring Rice, Feb. 19, 1906, Gwynn, II, 65.]
[Footnote 1140: Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 258, No.
288. Apparently it was not mentioned to the French at all.]
[Footnote 1141: Memo. by Grey, Feb. 20, 1906, _ibid._, 266 f., No. 299.]
[Footnote 1142: Sir Charles Hardinge, permanent undersecretary of state
for foreign affairs, believed that the way to prevent Germany from
attacking France because of some French action in Morocco was for Great
Britain to inform Germany that she is “absolutely ‘solidaire’ with
France as far as the Moroccan question is concerned.” He feared that if
Great Britain did leave France in the lurch, “an agreement or alliance
between France, Germany and Russia in the near future is certain” (memo.
by Grey, Feb. 20, 1906, and Hardinge’s minute, _ibid._, 266 ff., No.
299). Mr. Eyre Crowe, senior clerk in the British foreign office, a
prejudiced, bitter opponent of Germany, suspected that Germany might
demand and seize a port in Morocco or obtain a lease as she had done at
Kiaouchau in China. He advised warning the Sultan against Germany. Sir
Edward Grey regarded the proposal as premature so long as the Conference
was sitting, but said that the eventualities referred to should be kept
in mind (minutes to dispatch from Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906,
_ibid._, 272, No. 308).]
[Footnote 1143: Monts to Bülow, Feb. 13, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 168 f., No.
7008; Monts to F. O., Feb. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 161 f., No. 7002; Bülow to
Monts, Feb. 14, 1906, _ibid._, 162 and note, No. 7003; Monts to Bülow,
Feb. 27, 1906, _ibid._, 230 ff., No. 7050; Monts to Bülow, March 11,
1906, _ibid._, 286 ff., No. 7103; Monts to Bülow, Feb. 24, 1906,
_ibid._, 216 f., No. 7043; Tardieu, pp. 198 f., 205 f.; Grey to Egerton,
Feb. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 262, No. 295; Egerton to Grey, March 3,
1906, _ibid._, 283, No. 325.]
[Footnote 1144: “C’est la pire des solutions,” wrote Tardieu, p. 155 and
elsewhere. See the conversation between Ojeda and Stumm reported by the
latter on Feb. 20, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 189 ff., No. 7024; Tardieu, pp.
155 ff., 199 f.; Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22 and 26, 1906, _B.D._, III,
233, No. 252; 236, No. 258.]
[Footnote 1145: Tardieu writes that the instructions were “all that
France wished” (Tardieu, pp. 207 f., 255).]
[Footnote 1146: Tardieu has a long story about German threats and
intimidations toward Spain between Feb. 11 and 20. The King of Spain, he
writes, was angry, but Ojeda listened to the siren voice of Stumm, first
secretary of the German embassy in Madrid. According to the German
documents, Stumm had at least two conversations with Ojeda during
February, one on Feb. 20, trying without success to influence Spain to
support the German proposals (_G.P._, XXI, 145, 189 ff.). On the Spanish
proposal see Tardieu, pp. 199 f., 188 ff., 207 ff.; Grey to Cartwright,
Feb. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 262 n., No. 295; 271, No. 307; Cartwright to
Grey, Feb. 21, 22, 24, 1906, _ibid._, 268 f., No. 301; 270 f., No. 305;
273, No. 310; Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 22, 1906, _ibid._, 269, No. 302;
Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 271, No. 306.]
[Footnote 1147: The Belgian government informed him that its delegate
had orders to abstain from voting in case of a conflict, and to
participate actively in the Conference only when the commercial
interests of Belgium were involved. The Dutch government said that its
delegate would vote with the majority. Sweden replied that she would
abstain from voting in case of disagreement (Tardieu, p. 257).]
[Footnote 1148: As Sir Edward Grey knew how interested Austria was in
keeping Great Britain and Germany friendly, he impressed upon the
Austrian government, Feb. 26, “how unfortunate” was the German stand on
the police, and “how impossible it was to improve the relations between
England and Germany as long as there was this dispute between Germany
and France about a matter on which we had an Agreement with France which
was publicly known to the whole world, and which had been the very
beginning of our friendship with France” (Grey to Goschen, Feb. 26,
1906, _B.D._, III, 276 f., No. 316).]
[Footnote 1149: Tardieu, pp. 202 f.]
[Footnote 1150: Wedel to F. O., Feb. 14 and 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 166
f., No. 7007; 175 f., No. 7014. To the Italian and American governments
Goluchowski openly censured the German attitude (Tardieu, p. 203, and
above; Goschen to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, _B.D._, III, 273, No. 309).]
[Footnote 1151: Memo. by Bülow, Feb. 24, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 213 f., No.
7039; Tardieu, pp. 257 ff.; Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 28, 1906, _B.D._,
III, 279, No. 320.]
[Footnote 1152: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 28, 1906, _ibid._, 278, No.
318; 279, No. 320.]
[Footnote 1153: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 177 f.,
No. 7016; Tardieu, pp. 187, 266 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 26, 1906,
_B.D._, III, 276, No. 315.]
[Footnote 1154: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, _B.D._, III, 274,
No. 311.]
[Footnote 1155: Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 25 and 26, 1906, _ibid._, 274
ff., Nos. 312 f.; Tardieu, Part III, chap. ii, _passim_, pp. 268 ff.]
[Footnote 1156: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 21, March 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI,
204 f., No. 7032; 233 f., No. 7051; Tardieu, pp. 143 ff., 227, 223 ff.]
[Footnote 1157: Tardieu, pp. 275 ff.; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 159 ff.;
Radowitz to F. O., March 3 and 9, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 233 f. and note,
No. 7051; Nicolson to Grey, March 3, 1906, _B.D._, III, 282, No. 323;
283 f., No. 326. The French press played up that vote as a great
victory; the German press and government took the opposite view.
Nevertheless, the German delegates complained to the Italian, Belgian,
Spanish, and even the Austrian delegates about their actions; and the
vote undoubtedly helped to accomplish the object of Nicolson and
Révoil.]
[Footnote 1158: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 168 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, March 7,
1906, _B.D._, III, 285 ff., No. 330; Tardieu, pp. 283 ff.]
[Footnote 1159: Nicolson to Grey, March 3 and 7, 1906, _B.D._, III, 282
f., No. 324; 285, No. 328. On March 7 Grey again advised the Spanish
government to stand firmly with France and Great Britain (Grey to de
Bunsen, March 7, 1906, _ibid._, 285, No. 329).]
[Footnote 1160: Tardieu states that on March 5 Tattenbach openly said so
to several of the delegates (p. 291). Bülow also found it necessary to
bolster up the courage of the German delegates. See memo. by Bülow,
March 7, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 256, No. 7069. See also Metternich to F. O.,
Feb. 20, 1906, _ibid._, 188, No. 7023; Radowitz to Bülow, Feb. 26, 1906,
_ibid._, 217 ff., No. 7044; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 27, March 5, 1906,
_ibid._, 226, No. 7048; 243 ff., Nos. 7061 f. King Edward’s visit to
Paris, March 4-5, at which time he showed special favor to Delcassé, was
also a significant sign to the Germans (Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 510;
Bertie to Grey, March 5, 1906, _B.D._, III, 284, No. 327).]
[Footnote 1161: On this episode see Tardieu, pp. 241 ff., 296; Grey to
Bertie, Feb. 28, 1906, _B.D._, III, 278, No. 319; Bertie to Grey, March
5, 1906, _ibid._, 284, No. 327; Nicolson to Grey, March 8, 1906,
_ibid._, 288, No. 331; memos. by Holstein, Feb. 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI,
206 ff., and note, Nos. 7034 f.; Holstein to Radolin, March 4, 1906,
_ibid._, 237, No. 7055; Radolin to F. O., Feb. 27, March 5 and 6, 1906,
_ibid._, 225, No. 7047; 240 f., No. 7059; 250 f., No. 7067; Bülow to
Radolin, March 5, 1906, _ibid._, 240, No. 7058. Courcel spoke to Louis,
of the French foreign office, about the project on March 5. On the next
day Rouvier mentioned it to Radolin, only to refuse it. On Holstein’s
views see also Lascelles to Grey, March 1, 1906, _B.D._, III, 280 f. and
inclosure, No. 321.]
[Footnote 1162: Hammann, _Bilder_, pp. 37 f.; memo. by Holstein, Feb.
22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 208 f., No. 7035; Holstein to Radolin, March 4,
1906, _ibid._, 237, No. 7055; _ibid._ p. 338, editor’s note.]
[Footnote 1163: See the conversation with Tschirschky on March 16
recorded by Zedlitz-Trützschler, _Zwölf Jahre am deutschen Kaiserhof_,
pp. 146 f.]
[Footnote 1164: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 26, March 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI,
233 f., No. 7045; 262 f., No. 7077; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 187 f.]
[Footnote 1165: Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 28, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 224 f.,
No. 7046.]
[Footnote 1166: Goluchowski reluctantly agreed to mediate on that basis
at first, but after learning of the vote of March 3 and after consulting
Welsersheimb he changed his mind (Wedel to F. O. March 1 and 4, 1906,
_ibid._, 228 ff., No. 7049; 238 f., No. 7056).]
[Footnote 1167: Monts to Bülow, Feb. 27, 1906, _ibid._, 230 ff., No.
7050; Radowitz to F. O., March 3, 1906, _ibid._, 235 f., No. 7053.]
[Footnote 1168: Bülow to Radowitz, March 6 and 7, 1906, _ibid._, 245 f.
and note, No. 7063; Bülow to Wedel, Bülow to Monts, March 6, 1906,
_ibid._, XXI, 248 f. and note, No. 7065.]
[Footnote 1169: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 183 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 8,
1906, _G.P._, XXI, 261 ff., Nos. 7076 ff., Nicolson to Grey, March 8 and
9, 1906, _B.D._, III, 288, No. 331; 289 ff., No. 334. Visconti Venosta,
informed at the last minute of the proposed Austrian mediation, refused
angrily to co-operate in it. Why he did so is difficult to see. He
claimed that the Austrian project was not in keeping with the German
view which he represented. This, however, seems a poor excuse, for he
had approved the project when it was first suggested. It seems more
likely that Visconti Venosta was seeking to avoid taking the Austro-
German side publicly against France. The Austrian government was more
alarmed at his refusal than was the German government, which consoled
itself with the fact that the Italian delegate was performing useful
work under cover. See Wedel to F. O., March 9 and 11, 1906, _G.P._, XXI,
269, No. 7083; 271 f., No. 7087; Monts to F. O., March 7, 1906, _ibid._,
257, No. 7070; Radowitz to F. O., March 11, 1906, _ibid._, 272 and note,
No. 7088.]
[Footnote 1170: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 189 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 10,
1906, _G.P._, XXI, 270, No. 7085; Tardieu, p. 293; Nicolson to Grey,
March 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 292 f., No. 337. By these words Radowitz
did not mean that Germany would accept the French terms, as Tardieu
imagines (Tardieu, pp. 308 ff., 313).]
[Footnote 1171: Nicolson to Grey, March 9 and 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 288
f., No. 332; 294, No. 338; Grey to Bertie, March 9, 1906, _ibid._, 289,
No. 333; Bertie to Grey, March 10, 1906, _ibid._, 292, No. 336; Radowitz
to F. O., March 8 and 10, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 261, No. 7075; 264 f., No.
7079; 269 f., No. 7084; Dennis, p. 503. Cf. Tardieu, pp. 297 f., 308 f.]
[Footnote 1172: Grey to Nicolson, March 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 292, No.
335.]
[Footnote 1173: Bertie to Grey, March 2, 1906, _ibid._, 281 f., No.
322.]
[Footnote 1174: Tardieu, pp. 299 f., 309 f., 321, 328; Grey, _Twenty-
five Years_, I, 103.]
[Footnote 1175: Nicolson to Grey, March 9, 1906, _B.D._, III, 288 f.,
No. 322; Bertie to Grey, March 10, 1906, _ibid._, 292, No. 336.]
[Footnote 1176: Radolin to F. O., March 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 265 f.,
No. 7080.]
[Footnote 1177: On March 5, 6, and 7, Bülow showed no inclination to
accept the French plan, but held firmly to the Austrian one. See Bülow
to Wedel, March 5 and 6, 1906, _ibid._, 239, No. 7057; 248 f., No. 7065;
memo. by Bülow, March 7, 1906, _ibid._, 256, No. 7069. He may, however,
have made this statement to the Prince of Monaco without explaining that
by “the most discreet control of an officer from a lesser Power” he
really meant the Austrian plan and did not intend an acceptance of the
French plan. Tardieu’s assumption that Bülow made the surrender and then
receded from his concession after the fall of the French government on
March 7, hoping to exploit this embarrassing situation, is, so far as we
can tell, devoid of foundation (Tardieu, pp. 293 ff., 314 f.).]
[Footnote 1178: Germany also refused to recede on the police in return
for French concessions on the bank (Nicolson to Grey, March 10 and 11,
1906, _B.D._, III, 294 f., Nos. 338 f.).]
[Footnote 1179: Nicolson to Grey, March 11 and 12, 1906, _ibid._, 295
f., No. 339; 297 ff., Nos. 341 f.]
[Footnote 1180: Bertie to Grey, March 11, 1906, _ibid._, 296 f., No.
340.]
[Footnote 1181: Crowe’s minutes to the dispatch from Nicolson to Grey,
March 12, 1906, _ibid._, 299, No. 342; Grey to Nicolson, March 12, 1906,
_ibid._, 300, No. 344.]
[Footnote 1182: Nicolson to Grey, March 11, 12, 14, 1906, _ibid._, 295,
No. 339; 298, No. 341; 303, No. 349. Rouvier also approved this plan.
See Hardinge to Nicolson, March 15, 1906, _ibid._, 305, No. 354.]
[Footnote 1183: The number of censors was later increased to four, one
each from Great Britain, Spain, France, and Germany. See Radowitz to F.
O., March 8 and 11, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 263 f., No. 7078; 272 f., No.
7089; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 152 f., 182, 189 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 291 f.]
[Footnote 1184: Radowitz to F. O., March 12, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 279, No.
7094.]
[Footnote 1185: Radowitz to F. O., March 11, 1906, _ibid._, 273, No.
7089.]
[Footnote 1186: Radowitz to F. O., March 12, 1906, _ibid._, 274, No.
7090.]
[Footnote 1187: Quoted in _ibid._, p. 274 n.; and in Tardieu, p. 316.]
[Footnote 1188: _G.P._, XXI, 274 ff., Nos. 7091 ff.; Tardieu, p. 318;
Bishop, I, 495 ff. Bülow also sent a condensed telegram to the German
banker, Mendelssohn, then in St. Petersburg negotiating a loan with
Witte.]
[Footnote 1189: Schoen to F. O., March 13, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 279 f.,
No. 7095; Monts to F. O., March 13, 1906, _ibid._, 280 f., No. 7097;
Wedel to F. O., March 13, 1906, _ibid._, 281 f., No. 7099; Metternich to
F. O., March 13, 1906, _ibid._, 282 ff., No. 7100; Grey to Lascelles,
March 13, 1906, _B.D._, III, 301 f., Nos. 347 f.]
[Footnote 1190: Sternburg to F. O., March 7, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 259 ff.,
No. 7074; Bishop, I, 493 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 251 f., 297.]
[Footnote 1191: Bülow to Sternburg, March 12, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, No.
7093; Bishop, I, 495 ff.; Tardieu, p. 335. The President’s intervention
was extremely embarrassing to Bülow, who, after calling Sternburg’s
attention to the difference between the original wording of the promise
to Roosevelt sent from Berlin in the previous June and that sent to the
President by Sternburg, threatened to disavow the Ambassador (_G.P._,
XXI, 277 f., No. 7093). However, he did not do so.]
[Footnote 1192: Sternburg to F. O., March 14, 1906, _ibid._, 285 f., No.
7102.]
[Footnote 1193: Bertie to Grey, March 15, 16, 17, 1906, _B.D._, III,
306, Nos. 355 f.; 307 f., No. 358; 309 f., No. 361; Grey, I, 102 ff.]
[Footnote 1194: Tardieu, pp. 327 f., 343; Radolin to F. O., March 14 and
15, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 291 f., No. 7104; 295 ff., No. 7107; Bertie to
Grey, March 16, 1906, _B.D._, III, 307 f., No. 358.]
[Footnote 1195: Grey to Bertie, March 14, 1906, _B.D._, III, 303, No.
350; 304, No. 352. In private both Sir Edward Grey and Sir Charles
Hardinge greatly deplored the French refusal. On March 15 the former
wrote to Sir Francis Bertie as follows: “I think the French made a great
mistake in not closing at once with the German concession at Algeciras;
they could have made it appear to be a diplomatic victory for
themselves. . . . . Even the _Times_ correspondent of Algeciras thinks
France ought not to break off on such a wretched point as Casa Blanca,
which I believe is a useless hole. However, if she does, we shall back
her up” (_ibid._, 304 f., No. 353). And on the same day Sir Charles
Hardinge wrote to Sir Arthur Nicolson as follows: “. . . . If the
Conference breaks up over such an absurd point as the Casablanca
proposal _we_ shall be in a disagreeable position, as I remember well
your opinion that the French position will not be difficult for Germany
to undermine in Morocco and we shall then be exposed to any violent
action which the French may take to retrieve their losses and shall find
ourselves compelled to support France in a war against Germany. If the
Conference is broken off I shall not like the outlook. I felt very
strong about telling Cambon that in our opinion the Austrian proposal
should be accepted rather than allow the Conference to fall through”
(_ibid._, 305, No. 354).]
[Footnote 1196: Grey to Bertie, March 15, 1905, _ibid._, 307, No. 357;
Grey to Nicolson, March 14, 1906, _ibid._, 304, No. 351; Nicolson to
Grey, March 15, 1906, _ibid._, 304 n., No. 351; Spring Rice to
Lamsdorff, March 17, 1906, quoted in Grey, I, 107 f.; Tardieu, pp. 311
f.]
[Footnote 1197: Grey, I, 107 f.; Tardieu, pp. 329 f., 347.]
[Footnote 1198: Radolin to F. O., March 17, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 303 f.,
No. 7114; Tardieu, pp. 343 f.; Nicolson to Grey, March 18, 1906, _B.D._,
III, 311, No. 363.]
[Footnote 1199: _Journal officiel. Debats parlem._ (Chambre, March 14
and 19, 1906), pp. 1290, 1438 f.]
[Footnote 1200: The conversation on March 15 between Bourgeois and the
Austrian Ambassador also pointed in this direction. See Bertie to Grey,
March 16, 1906, _B.D._, III, 307 f., No. 358. See also Nicolson to Grey,
March 17, 18, 21, 1906, _ibid._, 308, No. 359; 310 f., No. 362; 311 f.,
No. 364; 314 f., No. 368; Grey to Bertie, March 17, 1906, _ibid._, 308
f., No. 360.]
[Footnote 1201: Bülow to Sternburg, March 16, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 293
ff., No. 7106.]
[Footnote 1202: Sternburg to F. O., March 17 and 18, 1906, _ibid._, 300
ff., Nos. 7112 f.; 305 ff., No. 7115; Bishop, I, 497 ff.]
[Footnote 1203: Bülow to Radowitz, March 16, 19, 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI,
298 f., No. 7110; 307 ff., No. 7117; 311, No. 7120; Radowitz to F. O.,
March 17, 18, 21, 1906, _ibid._, 299 f., No. 7111; 306 f., No. 7116; 310
f., No. 7119; Tardieu, pp. 344 ff.; Bülow to Sternburg, March 19, 1906,
_G.P._, XXI, 309 f., No. 7118.]
[Footnote 1204: Dennis, pp. 505 f.; Grey to Durand, March 22, 1906,
_B.D._, III, 317, No. 374.]
[Footnote 1205: Grey to Goschen, March 21, 1906, _B.D._, III, 315 f.,
No. 371.]
[Footnote 1206: On this episode see Nicolson to Grey, March 19, 21, 23,
1906, _ibid._, 312 ff., Nos. 365 ff.; 315, No. 370; 318, No. 376; 319
f., No. 379; Grey to de Bunsen, March 21, 1906, _ibid._, 316, No. 372;
Bertie to Grey, March 22, 1906, _ibid._, 317 f., No. 375; Grey to
Durand, March 22 and 23, 1906, _ibid._, 317, No. 374; 318, No. 377;
Durand to Grey, March 24, 1906, _ibid._, 320 f., Nos. 380 f.; de Bunsen
to Grey, March 27, 1906, _ibid._, 325 f., No. 385; Tardieu, pp. 385 ff.;
Sternburg to F. O., March 21 and 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 311 f., No.
7121; 321, No. 7126; Radowitz to F. O., March 21, 1906, _ibid._, 310 f.,
No. 7119.]
[Footnote 1207: The Austrian government was opposed to trying to mediate
upon the basis of Roosevelt’s proposal (unsigned and undated memoir
handed by Szogyeny to the German government, March 23, 1906, _G.P._,
XXI, 321, No. 7127).]
[Footnote 1208: France could afford to make the concession on the bank
because she had assured herself of the votes of Italy, Great Britain,
Spain, Belgium, and the United States, which with her own three votes
would constitute a majority. On this discussion see Tardieu, pp. 297,
342, 347 ff.; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 196 ff.; Bülow to Radowitz, March 24,
1906, _G.P._, XXI, 322 f., No. 7129; Radowitz to F. O., March 16, 23,
25, 26, 1906, _ibid._, 297, No. 7109; 322, No. 7128; 324 ff., No. 7131;
326 f., Nos. 7132 f.; Nicolson to Grey, March 23, 1906, _B.D._, III, 319
f., No. 379.]
[Footnote 1209: Tardieu, pp. 362, 365 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 26,
1906, _G.P._, XXI, Nos. 7132 f.; Nicolson to Grey, March 26, 27, 1906,
_B.D._, III, 321, No. 382; 322 ff., No. 383.]
[Footnote 1210: This publication, which was another answer to the
exaggerated article in the _Lokalanzeiger_ on March 12, angered the
German government. A short time previously Bülow had asked the Russian
government to use its influence in moderating the anti-German campaign
of the French press, especially of Tardieu in _Le Temps_. Instead of
doing so, the Russian government issued this denial that it had ever
advised France to accept the Austrian police proposal and asserted that
Russia had never ceased and would not cease from acting toward France as
a faithful ally. The German government complained to the Russian
government against its so manifestly taking the French side, and
threatened to refuse German participation in the forthcoming Russian
loan. Both Lamsdorff and Witte were impressed by the vigor of the
complaints, and tried to explain the affair away. Nelidow had endeavored
to influence Tardieu, they said, and had spoken to him in general terms
of the instructions which he had just received. To the Ambassador’s
amazement, he had discovered an entirely false account of these
instructions published in _Le Temps_. On demanding an explanation from
Tardieu, the latter said that he had obtained his information in the
French foreign office. Both ministers as well as the Ambassador
expressed their regrets over the affair, and Lamsdorff published a
correct version of the instructions. But as Schoen said, the latter
version did not change the previous one much. Osten-Sacken weakened the
Russian explanation by admitting to Tschirschky that Nelidow himself had
given an “excerpt” of the instructions to the offending journalist. So
the German government was not appeased by the excuses (see Bülow to
Schoen, March 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 312 f., No. 7122, and following
documents). As a matter of fact, those instructions were published on
purpose to impress upon Germany that Russia held to the Dual Alliance
and did not regard the Björkö accord as binding. See Witte, pp. 298 ff.;
Iswolsky, _Recollections of a Foreign Minister_, pp. 23 f.; Tardieu, pp.
330 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, March 21, 1906, _B.D._, III, 315, No. 369;
Spring Rice to Grey, March 21, 1906, _ibid._, 316 f., No. 373.]
[Footnote 1211: Even the Russian and Spanish delegates considered this
matter of no importance. See Tardieu, pp. 361 ff.; Radowitz to Bülow,
March 28, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 330 f., No. 7137.]
[Footnote 1212: Sternburg to F. O., March 24, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 324,
No. 7130.]
[Footnote 1213: Radowitz to F. O., March 26 and 27, 1906, _ibid._, 326
ff., Nos. 7132 ff.; Radowitz to Bülow, March 28, 1906, _ibid._, 330 f.,
No. 7137; Nicolson to Grey, March 27, 1906, _B.D._, 324 f., No. 384;
Tardieu, pp. 371 ff.]
[Footnote 1214: On these negotiations see Tardieu, pp. 378 ff. Almodovar
tried to reopen the question of Tangier with the French on April 1 but
had no success (_ibid._, pp. 394 ff.; see also _L.j., 1906_, p. 239).]
[Footnote 1215: A Swiss was selected at France’s wish because
Switzerland was so little interested in Morocco. See Nicolson to Grey,
March 28, 1906, _B.D._, III, 326 f., No. 386.]
[Footnote 1216: Tardieu, pp. 396 ff.; _L.j., 1906_, p. 210; Lee, II,
362.]
[Footnote 1217: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 196 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 27
and 31, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 328 ff., Nos. 7134 ff.; 331 f., No. 7138;
Radowitz to Bülow, March 28, 1906, _ibid._, 330 f., No. 7137; Tardieu,
pp. 396 ff. The final act is found in _L.j., 1906_, pp. 262 ff.]
[Footnote 1218: Bishop, I, 492, 494, 496 ff.]
[Footnote 1219: Rosen to Bülow, May 17, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 601 f., No.
7276.]
[Footnote 1220: Lowther to Grey, April 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 338, No.
402.]
[Footnote 1221: Grey to Nicolson, March 12, 1906, _ibid._, 299 f., No.
343; Nicolson to Grey, March 13, April 3, 1906, _ibid._, 301, No. 346;
330, No. 392; Lowther to Grey, April 17 and 22, 1906, _ibid._, 337 ff.,
Nos. 401 f.; 346 f. and inclosure, No. 412; memo. by Geoffray, Aug. 31,
1906, _ibid._, 341 ff., No. 405; Tardieu, pp. 425 ff.]
CHAPTER XVIII
CONCLUSION
The conclusion of the Conference relaxed the tension in Europe and
cleared the way for a gradual improvement in the relations of the
Powers. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the results, which,
according to official interpretation, left behind neither victor nor
vanquished.[1222] None the less it was evident that Germany had been
defeated. She had tried to obtain a material interest in Morocco; she
had endeavored to break the Entente Cordiale and therewith the other
French ententes; she had sought to disrupt or to modify the Dual
Alliance. And she had failed in every effort. In attempting to restore
her dominating position of the time before the formation of the Entente
Cordiale, Germany had only driven France, Great Britain, and Russia into
closer intimacy and had furthered the very alignment of the Powers which
she had feared. By defending an international right which no one else
valued she had permitted her isolation, except for the support of
Austria, to be exposed to all the world. At the Conference she had
forced Russia, Italy, and even the United States reluctantly to take the
French side. Germany had entirely miscalculated the situation.[1223]
The German statesmen realized that their international position had
grown more serious. Italy’s meager support at the Conference was further
proof that Germany could not rely upon that ally.[1224] The increased
importance of Austria to Germany was tacitly admitted when, on April 13,
the Emperor William thanked Count Goluchowski for playing the “brilliant
second” at the Conference and promised him: “You can also be certain of
similar service from me in a similar case.”[1225] Prince Bülow, whom his
master had not consulted beforehand, warned him, however, “(1) that our
relations with Austria have now become more important than ever, since
that state is our only reliable ally; (2) that we must let our relative
political isolation be noticed by the Austrians as little as
possible.”[1226] And in September the Emperor commented sarcastically:
“Fine prospects! In the future we can count on the Franco-Russian
Alliance, Anglo-French Entente Cordiale and Anglo-Russian Entente, with
Spain, Italy, and Portugal as appendages thereto in the second
line!”[1227]
To counteract this isolation the German government could do little for
the time being except remain quiet.[1228] It permitted relations with
Italy to continue as before.[1229] It assumed a “correct but reserved
attitude toward France.”[1230] It refused to sanction German
participation in the Russian loan, but otherwise remained on friendly
terms with that Power.[1231] Its main desire was to reach some kind of
an understanding with Great Britain so as to share in the entente
movement.[1232] Anglo-German relations did improve, but the British
government replied to German soundings that more time should elapse
before the two governments should attempt any concerted efforts to bring
their countries closer together.[1233]
German public opinion was dissatisfied with the way in which its foreign
affairs were being conducted; its alarm over the international situation
increased as the year progressed. When the debate in the Reichstag on
that subject, delayed because of the Chancellor’s illness, was held on
November 14, Herr Bassermann of the National Liberal party remarked as
follows:
Today the Triple Alliance has no further practical utility. The Italian
press and population lean more and more towards France. Austria has been
too much praised for this rôle of “brilliant second” which she herself
declined. The Franco-Russian Alliance remains intact, and the
disposition of France towards us is less friendly than formerly. The
explanations at Cronberg between the English and German sovereigns does
not prevent England from pursuing her old policy of isolating us. We
live in an era of alliances between other nations. . . . . Our policy
lacks tranquillity and consistency, and we see brutal hands derange well
prepared plans.[1234]
As these criticisms were widespread, Prince Bülow replied in a long and
carefully prepared speech. Admitting the deep hostility of France to
Germany, he expressed the hope that the two nations would live
peacefully together. As to Anglo-German relations he declared: “A long
period of misunderstanding lies behind us. The needle of the political
barometer has happily gone from rain and wind to changing.” He denied
that any deep antagonisms divided the two countries and that the German
fleet was a menace to Great Britain. He suggested that time should be
allowed for the two nations to approach each other. “We have no
thought,” he said, “of wishing to push ourselves in between France and
Russia or France and England.” He announced that “for some time
negotiations between Russia and England have been under way which
promise that an understanding will be reached over certain Central
Asiatic regions. . . . .” He added: “We have no reason at all to disturb
these negotiations or to regard their probable result with mistrustful
eyes.” But he issued the following warning: “The Entente Cordiale
without good relations between the Powers and Germany would be a danger
to European peace. . . . . Such an encirclement is not possible without
the exercise of a certain pressure. Pressure produces counter-pressure,
from pressure and counter-pressure explosions may finally arise.” He
denied that Germany was isolated and testified to the loyalty of her two
allies; but he declared that Germany was strong enough to defend herself
alone. Urging the nation not to be uneasy, he said: “More than once we
have been in situations where the danger of a general grouping against
us lay nearer than today. . . . . The political world is still agitated
by a certain excitement which calls for carefulness and prudence, but
gives no cause for pusillanimity.” He concluded with a vigorous defense
of his own and the Emperor’s methods of conducting foreign affairs. His
words were widely applauded, even though they did not assuage German
fears or stop criticism.[1235]
The satisfaction of the French and British governments with the results
of the Conference was real. Although France had had to recognize the
international character of Moroccan reforms, she had practically
asserted her position in that land. She had also preserved her ententes
and alliance against Germany’s attacks, and had herself shown a
determined spirit hitherto lacking in the Third Republic. The British
government had had no direct interest in the Moroccan crisis except from
the point of view of general policy, but it was well pleased that the
Entente Cordiale had stood the test, that it had grown firmer than
before.[1236]
Out of this crisis the Entente Cordiale emerged as a lasting dynamic
combination for checking Germany. As Sir Edward Grey remarked to the
French Ambassador, July 9, 1906, “If we [Great Britain] were called on
to take sides [between France and Germany], we must take sides with
France as at Algeciras. As long, however, as Germany kept quiet, there
was no reason for trouble, and things would go on quietly.”[1237] The
British Foreign Secretary did not thereby give France a blank check
against Germany, nor had he done so during the crisis. He had cautioned
the French that British support would in last analysis depend upon
public opinion. But as the crisis at the Conference in March had shown,
he could be forced to take the French side even though he disapproved of
it.
The Entente Cordiale was so necessary to both Powers and yet so loose in
form that it acquired a peculiar character. Dependent not upon the
written word but upon feeling, it had constantly to be kept warm. It
partook more of the nature of a jealous engagement than of a trustworthy
and tolerant marriage. Each party was particularly mistrustful of any
playing by the other with Germany. Still other causes divided them from
Germany. They regarded the latter’s interference in the Moroccan affair
as gratuitous and unjustified. “All that is necessary,” wrote Sir Edward
Grey in May, 1906, “is for the Germans to realize that they have got
nothing to complain of.”[1238] France and Great Britain feared that
Germany might attempt another aggression. As the British Foreign
Secretary stated in June, 1906, implying an accusation in doing so, “The
Germans do not realize that England has always drifted or deliberately
gone into opposition to any Power which establishes a hegemony in
Europe.”[1239] The French and English believed so firmly that German
diplomacy called for the arousing of discord between Powers at every
opportunity that they were almost reluctant to have any dealings with
the _Wilhelmstrasse_. They saw German intrigues everywhere—in Persia, in
Abyssinia,[1240] in Paris, in London. When the German Ambassador in
Paris spoke in July of a detente in Anglo-German relations, the French
and British governments suspected therein an attempt to weaken the
Entente Cordiale.[1241] Each government, therefore, was cool toward the
renegade Power. “When one recovers from a year’s sickness,” stated the
semiofficial _Le Temps_ with reference to Franco-German relations, “the
convalescence cannot be immediate.”[1242] Sir Edward Grey appeared
friendlier; in July he described Anglo-German relations as again normal.
But he refused Germany’s bid for an understanding because public opinion
was not prepared and especially because France would object. Count
Metternich remarked to him on July 31 that M. Delcassé’s policy had been
to encircle Germany and that at present the British and French press
also asserted that this aim should be accomplished with the help of
Russia. The Count warned Sir Edward Grey that that dangerous game might
call forth a situation which would make it necessary for Germany to
break the circle.
A peaceful policy on the other hand is [he said] to extend the hand to
Germany and to draw her into the circle of the others. . . . . But so
long as in England the German attempts at _rapprochement_ are repulsed
through fear of arousing displeasure among the French, it appears to me
that the policy of creating a balance of power is preferred here to that
of drawing Germany into the circle of friendship.
The Foreign Secretary denied that the policy of agreement with Russia
was directed in any way against Germany. But when the Ambassador asked
“Are, openly avowed, friendly relations with Germany compatible with
England’s friendship with France?” he replied, “That depends on German
politics.” The Ambassador immediately countered, “No, it rather seems to
depend on French interpretation of German politics.”[1243] The British
Foreign Secretary, however, was not to be moved by German criticisms.
The British as well as the French put Germany on her good behavior.
Notwithstanding Sir Edward Grey’s denial, this mistrust of the Central
Power was an important inducement for Great Britain and France to
complete the Entente Cordiale by an entente between Great Britain and
Russia.[1244] Conditions were more favorable for success than they had
ever been. The Moroccan affair no longer occupied international
attention. The domestic situation in Russia was more stable with the
calling of the Duma. And M. Iswolsky, who succeeded Count Lamsdorff in
the Russian foreign office in 1906, brought new vigor into the Russian
policy. As a partisan of an agreement with Great Britain, he took up the
negotiations, and after an intermittent pursuit of them, brought them to
completion in the next year.[1245] Thus the work of insuring against
Germany was continued.
What the entente Powers regarded as insurance, Germany called
encirclement. Both sides had been playing the game of the balance of
power. France had tried to abandon this game in the previous year, but
Germany’s refusal of her offers had driven her back into the play.
Neither side appreciated the other’s point of view; neither heeded the
other’s warnings. Each side accused the other of aiming at its defeat,
of being a menace. Each scoffed at the other’s fears, but each continued
to arm and to broaden and tighten the policy which each warned the other
was leading to trouble. Neither side had learned anything from this
episode except to be more cautious. Neither changed its method.
The motives that caused this crisis still obtained as guiding forces.
Prestige and national interests were at stake on both sides. Having
become deeply engaged in the Moroccan affair, Germany, France, and Great
Britain could not easily back out of it, especially since the Conference
of Algeciras had given a better sanction than ever to both sides. That
France and Spain would give Germany opportunities for intervening was,
in view of the difficulty which they would encounter in reforming
Morocco, just as certain as that Germany would take advantage of those
opportunities. The Moroccan problem both in its local and in its
international aspects left behind plenty of raw material from which
future conflicts could arise. The crisis was only the first of these
episodes born of the clashings of mutual fears and ambitions, nurtured
on hazardous playing with war and on diplomatic blunderings. The road to
Armageddon lay open.
[Footnote 1222: On April 5 Bülow declared in the Reichstag as follows:
“A time of alarm lies behind us. There were weeks when the thought of
armed complications occupied our minds. . . . . We wished to show that
Germany does not let herself be handled as a _quantité negligeable_. . .
. . We may now look into the future with more calmness. The Conference
of Algeciras has, I believe, had a result equally satisfactory to
Germany and France and useful to all nations” (_Reden_, II, 303 ff.). On
April 12 Bourgeois spoke in the French Chamber in a similar vein: “. . .
. All the work of the conference has aimed to harmonize the three
essential conditions of Moroccan reform [the sovereignty of the Sultan,
the integrity of his empire, and commercial liberty] with the rights and
the special interests that France has the duty of defending. . . . .
That result has been obtained, thanks to the reciprocal concessions
seriously weighed and loyally consented to in terms absolutely honorable
for all and without the abandonment of the fruits of our country’s past
efforts, of the dignity of its present situation, or of the safeguards
of its future. . . . . France has been able to put to the test the
solidarity of her alliance and friendships to which precious sympathies
have been joined” (quoted in _L.j., 1906_, pp. 290 ff.). The act was
accepted by the French Parliament and by the German Reichstag in Dec.,
1906 (Schulthess, _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1906_, pp. 219, 328
ff.; Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés_, pp. 415 ff.).]
[Footnote 1223: Cf. Stuart, _French Foreign Policy from Fashoda to
Serajevo_, pp. 221 ff.; Tardieu, _La France et les alliances_, pp. 239
ff. Schoen reported that his French colleague, Bompard, had expressed
his opinion as follows: “What has resulted . . . . from the Conference
of Algeciras? First, a welding together of France and England which the
former did not at all wish in this measure. Then an almost complete
isolation of Germany and probably no small amount of ill-humor among all
the Powers, who saw themselves compelled to take an open stand on
questions in which they really had little interest. Finally, apparent
discord between Russia and Germany. True, the Conference has left behind
neither victor nor vanquished; Germany has achieved
internationalization; France, a certain recognition of her special
position. But the existing sources of friction do not appear to have
been destroyed, but rather new ones to have been created. . . . . The
Conference, together with its previous history, has left in the French
nation a certain mistrust which may not disappear quickly and which will
for years stand in the way of a genuine friendly _rapprochement_, which
is desired on both sides and which was so near” (Schoen to Bülow, April
7, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 341, No. 7144).]
[Footnote 1224: Monts was so disgusted with Italy that he wished the
terms of the Triple Alliance to be radically modified at the next
renewal (Monts to Tschirschky, June 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 364 ff., No.
7156). The Austrian Ambassador reported that the German Emperor said
that “it would give him great satisfaction for us at a suitable moment,
which in view of the unreliable policy of the kingdom is not impossible,
to teach the latter [Italy] a wholesome lesson, even by arms” (Pribram,
_The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary_, II, 138).]
[Footnote 1225: Schulthess, _1906_, p. 92.]
[Footnote 1226: Bülow to William II, May 31, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 360, No.
7154.]
[Footnote 1227: Minute by William II to a dispatch from Miquel to Bülow,
Sept. 19, 1906, _ibid._, XXV, 23, No. 8518.]
[Footnote 1228: Tschirschky to William II, May 12, 1906, _ibid._, XXI,
433 f., No. 7184; Bülow to F. O., Aug. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 449, No. 7193.
The resignation of Holstein from the foreign office in April was also
considered as significant of a change of policy. On that episode see
_ibid._, pp. 338 f., editor’s note.]
[Footnote 1229: Bülow to Monts, Nov. 16, 1906, _ibid._, 387 f., No.
7165, and others in chap. cliv.]
[Footnote 1230: Tschirschky to Metternich, July 7, 1906, _ibid._, 439,
No. 7188.]
[Footnote 1231: Tschirschky to Metternich, July 7, 1906, _ibid._, 439,
No. 7188.
10 Schoen to Bülow, May 14, 1906, _ibid._, XXII, 21 ff., No. 7355, and
other documents in chap. clx. On the question of the loan see the report
from the Belgian Minister at Berlin, April 11, 1906, _Zur europ.
Politik_, II, pp. 110 ff.; Witte, _Memoirs_, pp. 304 ff.]
[Footnote 1232: “Our relations with England have for a long time been of
a very delicate nature. It is the object of my serious care to bring
about an improvement herein.” See Tschirschky to General von Einem, July
9, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 440, No. 7190. See also the Emperor’s remark to a
similar effect in a memorandum by him, Aug. 15, 1906, _ibid._, XXIII,
84, No. 7815.]
[Footnote 1233: The improvement in Anglo-German relations was manifested
by visits of German burgomasters in May, of German journalists to
England in June, by a visit of Edward VII to his nephew at Cronberg in
August, and by the presence of Mr. Haldane at the German maneuvers later
in the same month. See Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 528 ff.; Haldane,
_Before the War_, pp. 37 ff., 57 ff.; Metternich to Bülow, May 8, 1906,
_G.P._, XXI, 427 ff., No. 7181; Mühlberg to Radolin, June 27, 1906,
_ibid._, 437 f., No. 7187; Bülow to F. O., Aug. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 449,
No. 7193 and following documents; memo. by William II, Aug. 15, 1906,
_ibid._, XXIII, 84 ff., No. 7815; Tschirschky to Metternich, Sept. 4,
1906, _ibid._, 86 f., No. 7816. See also the documents in _B.D._, Vol.
III, chap. xxii; Grey, _Twenty-five Years_, I, 110 ff. During Grey’s
absence the foreign office at first opposed Haldane’s visit for fear of
alienating the French (Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 202; Spender,
_Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 260).]
[Footnote 1234: _Stenogr. Berichte_, Reichtag (1906), p. 4238; Tardieu,
_La France et les alliances_, pp. 243 f.]
[Footnote 1235: Bülow’s speech is given in Bülow, II, 306 ff.; see also
Hammann, _Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit_, pp. 45 ff.]
[Footnote 1236: Bertie to Grey, April 4, 1906, _B.D._, III, 330 f., No.
395; Grey to Bertie, April 4, 1906, _ibid._, 331, No. 396; Grey to
Spring Rice, Feb. 19, 1906, Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir
Cecil Spring Rice_, II, 65.]
[Footnote 1237: Grey to Bertie, July 9, 1906, _B.D._, III, 361, No.
420.]
[Footnote 1238: Grey’s minute to a dispatch from Lascelles to Grey, May
24, 1906, _ibid._, 358, No. 416.]
[Footnote 1239: Minute by Grey, June 9, 1906, _ibid._, 359, No. 418.]
[Footnote 1240: _Ibid._, p. 356; IV, 381 f., No. 328.]
[Footnote 1241: The German instructions to Radolin used _detente_.
Bourgeois used _rapprochement_ in his memorandum of the conversation
with the German Ambassador. In talking to Grey, Cambon spoke of
_entente_. There may have been point to this change, for Grey, who was
sensitive about Anglo-French relations, immediately assured the French
that Anglo-German relations were not and would not become too intimate,
and that an entente did not exist. See Grey to Bertie, July 9, 1906,
_ibid._, III, 361 f., No. 420; Bertie to Grey, July 12, 1906, _ibid._,
362 f., No. 421; Mühlberg to Radolin, June 27, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 438,
No. 7187; Tschirschky to Metternich, July 7, 1906, _ibid._, 438 f., No.
7188.]
[Footnote 1242: Bertie to Grey, March 31, 1906, _B.D._, III, 328, No.
387.]
[Footnote 1243: Metternich to Bülow, July 31, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 441
ff., No. 7191; Grey to Lascelles, July 31, 1906, _B.D._, III, 363 f.,
No. 422.]
[Footnote 1244: On Feb. 20, 1906, Grey wrote: “The door is being kept
open by us for a _rapprochement_ with Russia; there is at least a
prospect that when Russia is re-established we shall find ourselves on
good terms with her. An _entente_ between Russia, France and ourselves
would be absolutely secure. If it is necessary to check Germany it could
then be done” (_B.D._, III, 267, No. 299).]
[Footnote 1245: _Ibid._, Vol. IV, chap. xxv, Part IV; Gwynn, Vol. II,
chaps. xiv ff.; William L. Langer, “Russia, the Straits Question, and
the European Powers, 1904-8,” _English History Review_, Jan., 1929; and
others.]
INDEX
INDEX
Abarzuza, 118 n.; refuses to sign Franco-Spanish accord, 39-40; and
Great Britain, 39
Abazzia, 144 n.
Abd-el-Aziz, 3-4, 7, 8, 11, 18, 128-29, 133-34, 184-85, 190-94, 198
and n., 199 and n., 206 and n., 208, 214, 216, 223, 249, 252-53, 274,
315, 348 n., 364, 394-96; sends Maclean to London, 17; requests of
French government, 17-18; asks German co-operation in 1904, 154;
convokes assembly of notables, 183; opposition to France in 1905, 212;
accepts Conference conclusions, 396
Abd-el-Melik, 193-94
Afghanistan, 66, 82, 96, 98, 114, 170
Aflalo, 106 n.
Agadir, 157
Alfonso XIII, King, 140, 151, 229, 316 n., 330, 348 n.
Algeciras, 348
Algeria, 2, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 16-18, 133; report of military aid to
Moroccan pretender, 241-42 and n.
Almodovar, Duke of, 37, 38 n., 39, 331, 350, 372, 375, 382, 393
Alsace-Lorraine, 14, 282
Alvensleben, Count, 143 n., 174 and n., 175-76
Anglo-Belgian military conversations in 1906, 341 n., 342
Anglo-French agreement in 1899, 20-21
Anglo-French agreement on April 8, 1904, 135, 140-42, 155 n., 156,
196, 199, 340; terms, 102-4; criticism of, 104; British opinion on,
104-6; French opinion on, 106-9
Anglo-French alliance, 230-31 n.
Anglo-French arbitration treaty, 87, 94
Anglo-French military and naval conversations in 1906, 335-37, 339-40
Anglo-French _rapprochement_, 84-86
Anglo-German agreements, 66, 69, 71, 150
Anglo-German alliance negotiations in 1901, 69-77
Anglo-German arbitration treaty, 150
Anglo-German conversations on Morocco, 63 n.
Anglo-German press war, 63, 77, 176 n.
Anglo-Japanese alliance, 47, 75, 78-79, 82, 83, 99, 299-300, 306-7
Anglo-Russian relations, 41, 54 and n.; Chinese difficulties, 52;
difficulties in 1903, 82-83; attempts at _rapprochement_, 94-98;
negotiations for agreement, 110; difficulty over Russian seizure of
vessels in 1904, 111; proposed Afghan agreement, 114; _rapprochement_
of 1906, 404-5; _see_ Dogger Bank Affair
Aoki, Viscount, 177, 179-80
d’Arenberg, Prince, 5
_Army and Navy Gazette_, 173
_L’Aurore_, 265
Austria-Hungary: 143, 358, 361, 373 and n.; compromise proposal in
March, 1906, 377-78; seeks to mediate again in March, 1906, 388
Austro-Italian relations in 1904-5, 181-82
Austro-Russian agreements, 23, 52, 168
Ba-Ahmed, grand vizier, 3, 11 n.
Bacheracht, 333
Bagdad Railway, 50 n., 56-57, 62, 80, 82, 218, 238, 271, 274-75
Balance of power, 56, 81 n., 181, 228 n.
Balearic Islands, 93
Balfour, Arthur J., 54 and n., 66, 84 n., 105-6, 115 n., 176 n., 208
n., 232, 309 n.
Baltic Sea, 291, 292 and n., 293 and n.
Baltic Straits, 100
Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, 129-31
Barclay, Sir Thomas, 44 n., 85
Barnardiston, Colonel, 341 and n.
Barrère, 21-23, 25-26, 29-32, 181, 202, 230, 244 n., 332, 371;
arguments to Italy for accord in 1901-2, 25; and renewal of Triple
Alliance, 25-26; anti-German activity, 145 n.
Bassermann, 400
Bebel, 141
Becker, Jeronimo, 35
Beit, Werner, 319
Belgium, 373 n.
Benckendorff, Count, 95, 97-98, 110, 139 n., 308, 323-24
Ben Sliman, 15, 129 n., 212, 395
Bernstorff, Count, 142 n.; interview in _Daily Chronicle_, 166
Bertie, Sir Francis, 145 n., 197 n., 201 n., 210, 291, 329-30, 343-4;
on Italian policy, 33 n.; memo on Chinese situation on March 11, 1901,
67-68; _aide-mémoire_ to France, 210-11
Betzold, 219 and n., 220 and n., 221, 225, 237, 249, 254
Bezobrazov, 167
Bihourd, 137 n., 199 n., 217; warning to Delcassé in 1904, 127 n.
Billy, 199 n.
Birileff, Admiral, 285 n.
Bismarck, 33 n.; system of alliances, 19
Bizerta, 19
Björkö meeting, 281-85, 284-85 n.; alarms Europe, 291
Björkö Treaty, 263, 367-68, 391 n.; terms, 284; annulment, 303-4;
results, 305-6
Boer War, 6, 42, 44, 61, 81
Bompard, 113, 294-95, 295 n., 300, 302 and n., 360 n., 398 n.
Bou-Amama, 184, 190
Bourgeaud-Hansemann, 264 and n.
Bourgeois, 386, 388 n., 403 n.; renews instructions to Révoil in
March, 1906, 385; declaration to Radolin on March 17, 1906, 387;
speech in Chamber on April 12, 1906, 397 n.
Bowles, Gibson, 105
Boxer Rebellion, 66
Buchard, 43
Bülow, Herr von, 328
Bülow, Count (Prince after June, 1905), 11 and n., 43 n., 47, 57,
61-65, 69 n., 71-73, 78-79, 127 n., 135-44, 147 n., 160 n., 163 n.,
164 and n., 165-67, 170, 172-74, 176 n., 181-82, 188-90, 195, 203 and
n., 204 and n., 208 n., 220 n., 234, 251-52, 261-64, 269-72, 274-78,
288, 314 n., 317 n., 333, 348, 354 n., 355 and n., 368 n., 376 n.,
377; and Franco-Italian relations, 27-28; renewal of Triple Alliance
in 1902, 27-29; relieves Italy of military obligations, 29; and French
overture, 46; policy of free hand, 55-56; rejects Chamberlain’s
overture in 1898, 56; character of, 57-60; on Morocco, 63-65; on
Anglo-French agreement, 61; on Anglo-German alliance in 1901, 71-72;
on German position in 1902, 79; and Spain, 119-20, 152-55; and Morocco
in 1904, 140, 148-58; and Italy, 143-44, 146; desires Anglo-German
accord in 1904, 148; and Moroccan settlement in 1904, 151-57; on
German mistakes, 159; and Roosevelt in 1904, 160; and Russia in 1904,
161-63, 175-77; interview in _Nineteenth Century_ (1904), 173;
approaches Japan and United States, 178; proposal to Russia about
Austria in 1905, 179; and Morocco in 1905, 181-95; on Italy in 1905,
182; and Sultan in 1905, 184-85; and Roosevelt in 1905, 184-85, 237,
240; Tangier visit, 187, 202-8; instructions to William II on March
26, 1905, 190-91; policy after Tangier visit, 202 and n., 203 and n.,
216-17; on Delcassé in 1905, 213 n., 215; rejects French overtures in
1905, 215, 219-20; and Russo-Japanese peace negotiations, 221; warns
Rouvier, 223-25, 246 and n., 271; on Delcassé’s fall, 234; note to
Powers in June, 1905, 234-35; on conference, 240; and Great Britain in
1905, 240-41; concessions to France in June, 1905, 241-42; and Spain
in 1905, 247 n.; and France in June, 1905, 248-49; instructions to
Tattenbach on July 11, 1905, 261; ambitions toward Morocco in July,
1905, 262; Moroccan policy on July 31, 1905, 263-64; and Moroccan
concessions in 1905, 267; on Franco-German relations in Sept., 1905,
269-70; desires Franco-German colonial accord in Oct., 1905, 274-75;
interview in _Le Temps_ on Oct. 3, 1905, 275-76; and German press in
Oct., 1905, 277; Björkö affair, 279-81, 286-91, 299, 303, 305; offers
resignation, 289 and n.; on the Conference, 311; optimistic about
Conference, 315-16; diplomatic preparations for Conference, 315-19;
offer to Italy in Jan., 1906, 316; and Great Britain in Jan., 1906,
318, 328; on American proposal in Feb., 1906, 363-64; accepts Austrian
proposal in March, 1906, 377-78; diplomatic campaign against France in
March, 1906, 383-84; and Roosevelt in March, 1906, 384 n., 388-89; and
Russia in March, 1906, 391 n.; on the international situation in 1906,
398-99; speeches in Reichstag: Dec. 6, 1897, 56 n.; Dec. 11, 1899,
62-63; Jan. 8, 1902, 27-28, 77; April 12 and 14, 1904, 141-42; Dec. 5,
1904, 173; March 15, 1905, 186 and n.; March 29, 1905, 192; Dec. 6,
1905, 313; April 5, 1906, 397 n.; Nov. 14, 1906, 400-401
Bu-Hamara, 18
_Bulletin_, 7
Caillaux, Joseph, 312 n.
Caix, M. de, 45, 107
Cambon, Jules, 244 n.; 267, 270 n.; 317, 333
Cambon, Paul, 46-48, 50, 86 n., 87-94, 96, 98, 117 n., 202, 226-27,
231 n., 244 and n., 254, 257, 262, 333; conversations of, with Grey on
Jan. 10 and 31, 1906, 337-39, 338 n., 344-46, 346 n.
Camerun railways, 271, 274
Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, 322, 338-39 n., 339-40 and n., 343,
385, 387
Canevaro, Admiral, 20-21
Cartwright, 188 n.
Cassini, Count, 321 n., 358
Chamberlain, Joseph, 43, 46, 63-66, 63 n., 71, 77, 87 n., 95 n.;
speech of, at Leicester, 12, 62; foreign policy of, 53-54; proposals
of, to Germany, 54, 55 n., 61-62
“Chamberlain period,” 53
Chérisey, Count de, 194 n., 312
China, 52-53, 66-68, 82, 95-98, 160, 179
Chirol, Valentine, 73 n.
Choate, Joseph, 315 n.
Clarke, Sir George, 336
Clemenceau, 165, 265, 385-86
Combes, 8, 107
Comité de l’Afrique française, 5-7, 132
Comité du Maroc, 132
Committee of Imperial Defence, 81, 84, 336, 343
Conference of Algeciras, chap. xvii; organization of, 350; importance
of police and bank questions at, 351; crisis of, 366; sessions of, on
March 3 and 5, 1906, 375; the Act of, 393; criticism of work of,
394-96; results of, 397-98
Conference of Madrid, 1
Continental war, 53 n.
Convention of Madrid, 208, 218, 235, 353; Art. XVII of, 234-35;
interpretations of, 234-35 n.
Courcel, Baron de, 376-77 and n.
Cromer, Lord, 90, 92, 100 n.
Crowe, Eyre, 325, 346 n., 371 n., 382
Crozier, Philippe, 84 n., 186 n.
Currie, 21
Danzig interview, 45 n., 78
Dardanelles, 81, 82 n., 111, 161, 324
Delafosse, 107, 201
Delcassé, Théophile, 7, 10 n., 11, 12 n., 13 n., 17, 19, 22 n., 23,
34, 37, 45 n., 47 n., 50 and n., 51, 61, 86 n., 87-88, 97, 100 and n.,
104 n., 129, 133, 139, 144 n., 166, 171, 178 and n., 188, 190, 195,
197 n., 198 n., 200-201, 209, 220-21 n., 230-31 n., 257, 276 and n.;
career and character of, 8-9; interest of, in Morocco, 9-10; French
action in Sahara in 1900, 11; sounds Germany in 1901, 13; and Radolin
in 1901, 14; and Moroccan embassy in 1901, 14-15; instructions of, to
Saint-René Taillandier in 1901, 15-16; visit of, to Rome, 20; and
Italy, 21, 26, 30-31; and Spain, 37-38, 40; overture of, to Great
Britain, 41-42, 44-45, 47, 50-51; policy of, toward Great Britain and
Germany, 43; conversation of, with Huhn, 43-44; overture of, to
Germany, 43-46, 47, 49-50; at St. Petersburg in 1899, 44; and Morocco
in 1902, 46, 50; and Anglo-Russian conversations in 1903, 95 and n.;
on Russia’s far eastern policy in 1903, 99 n.; surprised by outbreak
of Russo-Japanese War, 100-101; anger of, at Great Britain in 1904,
101; Newfoundland question in 1904, 108 and n.; urges Anglo-Russian
_rapprochement_ in 1904, 114; policy of, in 1904, 117; and Spain in
1904, 117-25 and n.; conversation of, with Radolin on March 23, 1904,
125-26; and Germany in 1904, 126-27, 154, 187 and n.; policy of, in
March, 1905, 197-98; overtures of, to Germany in 1905, 199 and n.,
212; says Germany is “turning him out,” 210; and Moroccan question in
1905, 211-22; warns Sultan in 1905, 223 and n.; adheres to policy,
225; asks British support in May, 1905, 226; opposes conference,
228-30; defends his policy on June 6, 1905, 230-31; resignation of,
231; speeches: Senate in July, 1901, 14; Chamber on July 3, 1902, 31;
Chamber on Nov. 23, 1903, 94; Chamber and Senate in Nov.-Dec., 1904,
10 n., 108; Senate on March 31, 1905, 197
Deloncle, 107
Dennis, Alfred L. P., 245 n.
Deschanel, Paul, 5, 200
Devonshire, Duke of, 54, 63 n.
Dilke, Sir Charles, 100 n.
Dogger Bank affair, 108, 112-13, 162, 168
Donnersmarck, Prince Henckel von, 225 n.
Doumer, 178
Dual Alliance, 9-10, 19, 28, 43 n., 47, 83 n., 85, 106, 135-36, 141,
163, 166, 172, 180, 229 and n., 284 n., 286, 297 and n., 298, 300-301,
303, 391 n., 397, 399-400
Ducarne, General, 341 and n.
Dupuy, 225, 249, 254, 262
Durand, Sir Mortimer, 226 n., 243
Eckardstein, Baron, 63 n., 66, 69, 70 and n., 71-72, 136, 160 n., 207
n., 218-19 and nn., 220, 225 n., 245 n.; on British offer of alliance
to France, 251
Edward VII, King, 17, 45, 47 n., 54, 66, 75 and n., 77, 82 n., 84 and
n., 86 and n., 87 and n., 97, 100 n., 111 and n., 135, 150-51, 176 n.,
183, 196 n., 208-9, 214, 218, 231 n., 236 n., 257 n., 279, 282, 293,
299, 308-9 n., 309, 318, 324, 330 n., 376 n., 400 n.; conversation of,
with Iswolsky in April, 1904, 110
Egerton, Sir Edwin, 244 n., 331, 371
Egypt, 88-94, 102-4, 106, 148-49
Entente Cordiale, 84 n., 102, 117 n., 143, 146, 150, 162, 166, 226,
229, 233, 256-57, 279, 298, 325, 346, 355 n., 368-69, 382, 397, 399,
401-4; negotiation of, 86-94, 99-102
Esher, Lord, 84-85, 336
_L’Etat russe_, 368 and n.
Etienne, 5, 6, 88 n., 336, 386
Eulenburg, Prince, 176 n., 189
Fashoda crisis, 7, 41-42, 52
Fernando Po, 137, 152 and n.
Fez, 18; threatened by rebels, 4
_Figaro_, 13 n., 276 n.
Figuig, 16
Fisher, Admiral, 100, 115-16, 228 n., 339
Flotow, 232, 238, 311; reports British offer of alliance to France on
June 7, 1905, 236-37
France, 36-38, 40-51, 67-68, 73-74, 95-97, 99, 104, 276, 384, 390 n.;
trade of, with Morocco, 2; and Morocco, 2-18; North African empire, 5;
Parliament, 5, 6, 107-8, 128, 199-200, 229-30; Moroccan policy of,
5-6; claims of, to Morocco, 6-7; occupies oases, 11; note of, to
Sultan, 12; and Italy, 20-34; fleet of, visits Italy, 23; effort of,
to break Triple Alliance, 25; press of, 29, 85-86, 172, 198 and n.,
247, 265, 271, 354, 359-60, 375 n., 380; and Great Britain, 84-94; and
Germany, 93-94; international situation in Feb., 1904, 117; and Spain,
118-25; and Morocco in 1904, 128-34; Mission of, to Fez, 183; Tangier
visit, 196-202; and Germany in 1905, 196, 211-33, 237-38, 240-57,
261-78; and Spain in 1905, 198 n., 259-61; cabinet of, 199; public
opinion of, 199-200, 202, 276, 232; deserts Delcassé, 200, 247-48 n.;
fleet visits England in 1905, 209, 258; fear of war in 1905, 217;
cabinet meeting on June 6, 1905, 230-31 and n.; note on June 21, 1905,
244-45; and Great Britain in 1905, 256-58; and Björkö, 294-95; efforts
to bring Russia and Great Britain together in 1905, 308-9; _Livre
jaune_ (1905), 313; preliminaries to Conference, 319-22, 329-40,
343-47; military defense in 1905, 320 and n.; and Spain, 330-31, 372,
392-93; pressure on Italy in Dec., 1905, 331-32; sounds Great Britain
about agreement in Jan., 1906, 335; plan for Moroccan police and bank,
351-52, 365-66; seeks Austrian support in Feb., 1906, 373-74; and
Great Britain in March, 1906, 385; cabinet and Parliament in March,
1906, 388; opposes Roosevelt’s proposal in March, 1906, 389; satisfied
with results of Conference, 401-2; mistrusts Germany in 1906, 402-3
Francis Joseph I, Emperor, 179, 374
Franco-German agreement on July 8, 1905, 255
Franco-German agreement on Sept. 28, 1905, 272-73
Franco-German détente, 42-43
Franco-German press war in 1905, 189, 196
Franco-Italian agreements, 20, 22, 27, 31-32, 182
Franco-Italian entente, 29, 37, 143
Franco-Moroccan agreements, 11, 15-17
Franco-Spanish agreements, 37, 118-25, 188 n., 196, 259-61, 372, 392
Franco-Spanish negotiations in 1902-3, 37-40, 89
Franco-Spanish proposed accord in 1902, 38; its failure, 38-40
Franco-Spanish _rapprochement_, 40
Galliéni, Joseph, 5
Gambetta, 8
_Gaulois_, 225 n., 257
Gautsch, 18
Genthe, Dr., 147 n.
German-American _rapprochement_, 160
German-Italian military convention, 29, 144
German Navy League, 239
Germany, 3, 5, 7, 10-11 and n., 17, 25-28, 36, 47 and n., 51, 81-82,
88 n., 93, 116-17, 119, 122, 125, 171, 254-56, 258, 261, 355 n., 359,
367, 375 n., 381 n., 390-91, 400 n.; trade with Morocco, 2; reply to
France in 1901, 13-14; and Delcassé in 1902, 49-50 n.; and Great
Britain, 53-80; proposal to Chamberlain in 1900, 64-65; warning to
Delcassé in 1900, 65; efforts to maintain _status quo_ in Morocco in
1900, 65; and Japan in 1901, 69; criticism of foreign policy, 79-80;
public opinion of, 135, 400; policy of, in 1903-4, 138-39; and Morocco
in 1904, 140-42, 154, 157-58, 183 and n.; and Italy in 1904, 143-47;
anger at France, 147; contemplates intervening in Morocco in 1904,
147, 148 n.; and Great Britain in 1904, 148-51, 155-57, 173, 176 and
n.; secret articles in Anglo-French agreement, 155 and n.; and United
States in 1904, 160; and Russia in 1904, 160-80; and Russian alliance
in 1904, 166-67; fears British attack, 172-73; fears Quadruple
Alliance, 178; international situation in 1905, 181; and Morocco in
1905, 183-95; secret articles of Franco-Spanish agreements, 187 n.,
188 n., 313-14; Tangier visit, 202-8; and Roosevelt in 1905, 205-6;
Tattenbach to Fez, 206; and Turkish Sultan, 206 n.; sounds Powers
about conference, 206-7; reply of, to Delcassé’s overtures, 207-8;
rejects French offers in 1905, 218; and France in 1905, 211-25,
237-56, 261-78; suggests to Rouvier to call conference, 220;
determines to overthrow Delcassé, 221; presses the Powers for support,
221; seeks Roosevelt’s support in May, 1905, 222; and Italy in May,
1905, 224; press of, on Delcassé’s downfall, 233; forces Villa-Urrutia
from office, 236; reply to France on June 24, 1905, 248-49; criticism
of her policy in 1905, 256; presses Rouvier in July, 1905, 262; asks
Roosevelt’s aid in July, 1905, 263; Moroccan loan in 1905, 267; and
Tattenbach in Aug., 1905, 267; reply to Rouvier in Sept., 1905, 273-74
n.; anger at Great Britain in 1905, 277; international situation in
July, 1905, 279; and Russia in 1905, 279-91; and Roosevelt about
Björkö, 287 n.; press of, angry at Great Britain in 1905, 292; and
annulment of Björkö Treaty, 304 and n.; and Moroccan affair in 1905,
311; preliminaries to Conference of Algeciras, 311-19; French
overtures in Nov., 1905, 312; international situation in winter of
1905-6, 312-13; Weissbuch in 1906, 314 n.; on conference in Dec.,
1905, 314; instructions to delegates, 314-15; warnings to France in
Jan., 1906, 317; improvement in Anglo-German relations in 1906,
317-18; navy bill in 1906, 318 n.; refuses French proposals on police
and bank, 352-53; proposals on police, 353-54, 354 n., 357-58; policy
of, at Conference in Feb., 1906, 359-60; presses Rouvier in Feb.,
1906, 359; declaration of, to Powers in Feb., 1906, 359; proposal of,
on banks, 364-65; defeat of, 397; policy of, after Conference, 399-400
Gharnet, S. Feddoul, 129, 133
Giolitti, Giovanni, 144 n., 146 n.
Glasenapp, 365 n.
Goluchowski, Count, 143, 355 n., 358, 373-74, 374 n., 378 and n., 398
Gorst, Sir Eldon, 90
Gourara, 11
Great Britain, 2, 3, 5, 10, 13, 14 n., 17, 28, 39 n., 40, 50-56, 104,
209, 276; trade of, with Morocco, 2; and Italy, 19, 33; and Spain over
Morocco, 35 n.; antagonism to, 42; international situation of, at
close of nineteenth century, 52, 66; and Germany, 60-80; change of
policy of, in 1901, 68; seeks aid of Austria and Italy in 1903, 81;
policy of, in 1902, 81; and Russia, 81 n., 82 and n., 110-16, 81-102;
and France, 81-102, 225-29, 232-33; public opinion of, hostile to
Germany, 82, 151, 162, 172-73, 291-92, 309-10, 310 n.; press, 85, 228
n.; public opinion of, 135; cabinet crisis of, in 1903, 90; and
Russia’s policy in Balkans in 1903, 95-96; fear of Continental
coalition in 1904, 100; Parliament, 105-6; fear of German navy in
1904, 114-15; redistribution of naval forces of, 115, 172-73; and
Franco-Spanish agreement in 1904, 124; asks Powers to approve
Khedivial decree, 148; refuses German proposal for agreement in 1904,
148-49; and Germany, 148-51; fears German attack in 1905, 208 and n.;
Tangier visit, 208-11; fleet of, visits France in 1905, 209, 258;
prevents Germany from obtaining ports, 210; offers aid to France in
April, 1905, 210-11; rejects Roosevelt’s advice in May, 1905, 223;
naval preparations in 1905, 228; Anglo-French military and naval
conversations in 1905, 228 and n.; and Delcassé’s downfall, 232; and
Germany in 1905, 236-37, 240-41, 291-94, 309-10; not supporting
Roosevelt in 1905, 243; and Russia, 291-92, 309-10; naval maneuvers
of, in the Baltic in 1905, 292-93 and nn.; visit of fleet to German
ports in Aug.-Sept., 1905, 293; efforts of, to approach Russia in
1905, 306-10; renewal of Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1905, 306;
preliminaries to Conference, 322-47; promises support to France at the
Conference, 329-30; pressure of, on Spain in Dec., 1905, 330-31;
pressure of, on Italy in Dec., 1905, 331-32; and Belgium in 1906,
340-41 and n.; supports France in Feb., 1906, 368; pressure of, on
Spain in Feb., 1906, 372; favors Austrian proposal in March, 1906,
379; and Germany in 1906, 399-400; satisfied with results of
Conference, 401-2
Grey, Sir Edward, 105, 321 n., 322-23, 327 n., 329, 331 and n., 332,
336-37, 342-43, 343 n., 360 and n., 371 n., 379, 384, 386 and n., 387,
389, 400 n., 403 n.; and Russia, 323-24; and Germany, 324-27;
conversations of, with Cambon on Jan. 10 and 31, 1906, 337-39, 338 n.,
344-46, 346 n.; approves military and naval conversations in 1906, 340
and n.; instructions of, to Grierson in Jan., 1906, 341; summary of
policy of, 347; conversation with Metternich on Feb. 19, 1906, 368-69;
and Austria in Feb., 1906, 373 n.; and Spain in March, 1906, 376 n.;
advises France to accept Austrian proposal, 382; and Germany in 1906,
402-4; and Russia in 1906, 404 n.
Grierson, General, 54 n., 335, 339-41
Guillain, Antoine, 5
Haldane, Richard, 339-40, 342-43, 400 n.
Hamburg-American Line, 161, 174
Hammann, Otto, 74 n., 187 n., 199 n., 203 n., 348 n.; dispute with
Holstein, 204 and n.
Hanotaux, Gabriel, 5
Hansen, Jules, 45, 46 n.
Harcourt, Sir William, 54 n.
Hardinge, Sir Charles, 82 n., 96, 97, 110 n., 112-13, 306-7, 309 and
n., 325, 371 n., 386 n.
Harmsworth, 69 n.
Harris, W. B., 3
Hatzfeldt, Count, 54 and n., 63 n., 72
Hay, John, 131-32 n.
Hayashi, Count, 160 n.
Hedeman, 100 n.
Holland, 373 n.
Holstein, Herr von, 50 and n., 55 and n., 57, 60, 69, 70 n., 71, 135,
139 n., 146 n., 148, 150, 159, 163 and n., 164 and n., 166, 170, 176
n., 178, 184, 202-3, 219-20, 240-41, 264, 304, 328-29, 376; on German
position in Dec., 1901, 79; fears British attack in 1904, 173; dispute
with Hammann, 204 and n.; letter on June 28, 1905, 246 n.; on alliance
with Russia in July, 1905, 280-81 and n.; on Björkö Treaty, 286-87,
290-91; resignation in 1906, 399 n.
Hornung, 186 n.
Huguet, Major, 335-36
Huhn, Arthur von, 43-44
_L’Imparcial_, 38 n.
India, 170
Irredentism, 23, 143, 181
Iswolsky, Count, 110, 171 n., 404
Italy, 3, 10-11 and n., 19-34, 42, 50, 101; defeat of, by Abyssinia,
6; international situation of, 19; relations of, with France, 19-20;
and Anglo-French agreement in 1899, 21; Moroccan interest of, 22; and
Austria, 23; and Triple Alliance, 143-47, 182-83; and Conference, 207
and n., 247, 316, 332
Japan, 67-68; relations of, with Russia in 1903, 82-83; proposal of,
to send Aoki to Berlin, 177, 179
Jaurès, 276 n.; approves French claims to Morocco, 6
Jonnart, Governor, 133 n., 242 n.
Jusserand, 244 n., 250, 256, 361
Khedivial decree, 111, 148-49
Kiel, naval review in 1904, 150
_Kölnische Zeitung_, 43
_Kreuzzeitung_, 217
Kriege, Dr., 264, 355 n.
Krueger telegram, 56 n.
Kühlmann, 184, 186 n., 192, 196, 202 n., 267 n., 312
Laguiche, Marquis de, 319
Lamsdorff, Count, 46 n., 95-98, 101, 110, 112, 114, 135, 162, 167-72,
168 n., 174 n., 178 n., 294-95, 302 n., 369; and Germany in 1904,
162-63, 174-79; character and policy of, toward Germany, 167-68; and
Germany in 1905, 282, 300-302; reaction of, to Björkö Treaty, 296-97;
cordiality of, to Great Britain in May, 1905, 306-7; refuses British
overtures in Sept.-Oct., 1905, 307-8; and Germany in 1906, 358, 360,
367-69; co-operation of, with Great Britain, 360; urges Germany to
accept French propositions at conference, 360, 367-69, 375, 391 n.
Lanessan, M. de, 354-56
Lansdowne, Lord, 13, 21 and n., 46, 48, 50-51, 66 n., 69-78, 75 n.,
96-98, 110-14, 153, 155 and n., 209-10, 218 n., 232 n., 254 and n.,
291, 293, 337, 344; refuses Sultan’s request in 1902, 17; and Spain
over Morocco, 39-40; conversation of, with Cambon in 1902, 48-51;
character of, 65-66; policy of, toward Germany, 66; and Germany over
China, 66 n.; on possibility of Anglo-German Alliance, 75-76; on
failure of negotiations for Anglo-German alliance, 78; and France,
87-102; favors agreement with Russia in 1903, 95 and n.; appeals to
France to restrain Russia in 1903, 96-97; warns Cambon of possibility
of Russo-Japanese war, 98-99; and Russia, 110-16; Anglo-Russian
_rapprochement_, in 1904, 114; on German fear of British attack, 115;
mediates between France and Spain in 1904, 121-23; on German proposal
in 1904, 149; interprets Anglo-French accord, 156; on Anglo-German
hostility in 1904, 176 n.; opposed to Conference, 207, 236, 244; on
the visit to Tangier, 209; offers aid to France, 210; rejects
Roosevelt’s offer to mediate in May, 1905, 226; policy of, toward
France in May, 1905, 226-27 and nn.; advises United States against
conference, 228-29; offers Mediterranean accord to Spain in June,
1905, 229; denies offer of alliance to France, 230-31 n., 241, 251-52;
interpretation of Art. XVII of Convention of Madrid, 234-35 n.;
assurance to France in July, 1905, 257; on William II and Björkö, 294
Lascelles, Sir Frank, 176 n., 202 n., 241, 279; on the German Emperor,
58; on Bülow, 59; on possibility of Anglo-German alliance, 75-76 n.;
against idea of a conference, 209
Lautier, Eugène, 276 n.
Lauzanne, Stéphane, 276 n.
League of the Three Emperors, 135, 139 n., 143, 161
Lee, Arthur, 181 and n.
Léon, 263
Leon y Castillo, 13, 35 n., 37-38, 44, 49, 120 n., 123, 152 n.
Levy, Armand, 218-19 nn.
Lichnowsky, Prince, 127 n., 147
Lister, 248 n., 253
Lodge, Senator, 222
_Lokalanzeiger_, 383
London City Council, visit of, to Paris on Feb. 8, 1906, 369 n.
_London Times_, 3, 106, 186 n., 189, 276-77, 310 n., 386 n.
Loubet, President, 87, 139, 146, 182 n., 196 n., 201, 209, 230, 305;
visit of, to Italy in 1904, 144-45
Louis, Georges, 262 and n., 273-74 n., 311 n., 377 n.
Louis of Battenberg, Prince, 195
Lowther, 216 n., 228, 257 n.
Luzzati, 145, 212, 220 n.
Lyauty, General, 133 n.
Maclean, Kaid Sir Harry, 3, 17, 47
Mallet, Louis, 95, 150 n.
_Manchester Guardian_, 203
Manchuria, 69, 82, 95-96, 98
Martino, M. de, 24
_Matin_, 217, 276, 310
Maura, Gabriel, 118-19
Mediterranean ententes, 19
Mendelssohn & Co., 264 n., 265 n., 355-56 n., 365 n., 384 n.
el-Menebhi, 12, 74, 133
Metternich, Count, 71, 76-77, 136, 150, 155 and n., 207, 251, 281 n.,
315 n., 344-45; on Anglo-German relations in 1902, 78; warns
government in 1904, 156-57; on British danger, 176 and n.; explains
German policy to Grey, 326-27; warns Grey in 1906, 403-4
Mévil, 198 n., 230 n.
Michael, Grand Duke, 285 n.
Millet, René, 107-8
Miquel, Herr von, 244 and n.
Moltke, General, 281 n., 288, 292 n., 318 and n., 319 and n., 320 n.
Monson, Sir Edmund, 11, 41, 83 n.; character sketch of Delcassé, 8
Montero Rios, 259, 266, 268-69
Montferrand, Count de, 108 n.
Monts, Count, 145, 207, 222, 398 n.
Moret, 330-31, 372
_Morning Post_, 203
Morocco, 1-18, 2 n., 22-23, 28, 31, 36, 45 and n., 46, 48, 50, 62-65,
63 n., 71, 74 and n., 83, 87-94, 102-5, 107-8, 119-26, 140-42, 147,
154, 157-58, 255, 260, 272-73; loans, 12, 17-18, 264-65 and n.;
embassy in Paris, 13-16; embassy in London and Berlin, 16, 73; and
France, 128-34, 183-84, 191; offers concessions to Germany in 1905,
261; seizure of Algerian in 1905, 268 n.; criticism of results of
Conference, 395-96; results of crisis, 405
Mühlberg, Herr von, 148 n., 264
Mukden, 181, 201 n.
Mulai-el-Hassan, 3
Mytilene, 26 n.
Nelidow, 295-96, 298, 302
Newfoundland, 99, 100 n., 102, 107-8 and n.
Nicholas, Grand Duke, 301
Nicholas II, Czar, 45, 98, 138 and n., 161-72, 168 n., 296-306, 321
and n., 324, 368; proposes alliance to Germany in 1904, 164; and
Germany in 1904, 174-75, 177-78; Björkö meeting, 279-86, 284-85 n.;
and Danish question, 285 n.; repudiates Björkö Treaty, 303-4 and n.
Nicholson, Sir Arthur, 14, 74 n., 197, 324 n., 330 n., 337, 349-51,
356 and n., 358, 374-76, 375 n., 379; favors Austrian proposition,
381-82, 386-87
_Nineteenth Century_, 173
Noailles, M. de, 49, 50
Norway, throne question in 1905, 282-83 n., 291, 292 n.
_Nowoje Wremja_, 203 n.
O’Conor, Sir Nicholas, 206 n.
Ojeda, 188 n., 314 n., 356 n., 372, 373 n.
Osten-Sacken, Count, 61 n., 163 and n., 391 n.
Pacific penetration, 7, 8, 14, 18, 74 n., 117, 120, 128-34
Pallain, 46 n.
Pan-German League, 140
Pariente, Moses, 264
Percy, Earl, 105, 292-93
Perdicaris, Ion, 131 and n.
Persia, 66, 82, 98, 170, 324 and n.
Phipps, Sir Charles, 341 n.
Plymouth, visit at, of German warships in 1904, 150
Poincaré, 230-31 n.
Port Arthur, 54 n.
Portuguese colonies, 60
Pourtales, Count, 264
Pressensé, M. de, 200
Prince of Monaco, 139, 247 n., 311 n., 380 and n.
Prinetti, 22, 24-32, 182; speech in Italian Chamber on May 22, 1902,
30; negotiations with France in 1902, 30-31
Rabat, 92-94, 134
Radolin, Prince, 46 n., 125 n., 136, 139, 152 n., 155 n., 199, 213-14,
225, 238, 248-49, 254, 362, 387, 403 and n.; disapproves German policy
in 1905, 215; warning to Rouvier on May 16, 1905, 221; on public
opinion in France in Jan., 1906, 319-20
Radowitz, Herr von, 137, 153, 221, 267, 270 n., 327, 331, 349, 351,
353, 356-57, 376-78, 382-83
Raisouli, 131 and n., 132
Regnault, 351-52, 366
Repington, Colonel, 335-36, 339
Reventlow, Count, 141
Révoil, Paul, 5, 12-13, 238 n., 262-63, 270, 334, 349, 351 and n.,
353, 356-57, 372, 374, 375 n., 376, 380-83, 386, 390, 392; memo. to
Radowitz on Feb. 16, 1906, 362-63; opposes Austrian proposal, 379
Richthofen, Baron, 154, 157, 159, 161 n., 164 n., 264, 281 n., 289 n.,
319 n., 327
Ripon, Lord, 326, 339-40
Roman, 259
Romberg, Baron, 162
Rominten, 272, 299-300
Roosevelt, President, 101 n., 115, 178-80, 184-85, 188, 203, 226 and
n., 239-40, 245 and n., 248, 287 n., 301, 309, 321, 353-54, 357,
361-62, 392; draws closer to Germany in 1904-5, 160, 205 and n., 206;
tries to calm Anglo-German hostility in 1905, 205 and n., 215, 222-23;
policy of, on Moroccan conflict on April 20, 1905, 214-15; hesitates
about accepting invitation to conference in June, 1905, 237;
intervenes in Paris and London in June, 1905, 243; advises France to
accept conference in June, 1905, 249-50; beneficial result of his
intervention in June, 1905, 250-51; refuses German request in July,
1905, 263; mistrusts Germany in 1906, 361; compromise proposal in
1906, 363-64; opposes Austrian proposal in March, 1906, 384-85,
388-89; proposal in March, 1906, 389
Root, 321, 355, 357, 361, 363-64, 389
Rosebery, Lord, 54 n., 106 n., 203, 322
Rosen, Dr., 274; his proposal for Franco-German accord in Sept., 1905,
269-70 and n.; negotiations in Paris in Sept., 1905, 269-72
Rothschild, Alfred, 54 n.
Rouvier, 8, 165, 200, 202, 224, 225 n., 229-31, 243-44 and n., 246 and
n., 247 and n., 248 n., 249, 251-54, 256-57, 259-63, 267-69, 271-75,
278, 295, 314 n., 317, 328 n., 330, 332-34, 337, 367, 373, 377 and n.,
381, 382 n.; speech in Chamber on April 17, 1905, 201; foreign policy
of, 212 and n.; overtures to Germany, 212-13, 217-19 and nn., 220-21;
opposed to conference in June, 1905, 237-38; offers direct agreement
to Germany in June, 1905, 238; despair over Germany’s policy in June,
1905, 238-39 and n.; discouraged at German replies in June, 1905, 242;
asks Roosevelt’s support in June, 1905, 245; accepts conference, 254;
policy of, toward Germany on Morocco in July, 1905, 259; negotiates
with Spain in 1905, 259-60; protests to Germany about Moroccan
concessions in 1905, 265-66; offers colonial agreement to Germany in
Sept., 1905, 271; declaration to Germany in Sept., 1905, 273;
statement to Germany in Sept., 1905, 274; refuses to negotiate
colonial agreement with Germany in Oct., 1905, 275; alarm over Björkö
meeting, 294; on Continental alliance in 1905, 301-2; overtures to
Germany in Nov., 1905, 311-12, 311 n.; speech in Chamber on Dec. 16,
1905, 313; determined to uphold French interests in Morocco at the
Conference, 319; assumes Delcassé’s policy, 320; diplomatic
preparations for Conference, 320-22; instructions to Révoil, 334-35,
335 n.; clings to policy in Feb., 1906, 360; declaration to Germany on
Feb. 15, 1906, 362; downfall of, 379-80
Rudini, Marquis de, 20
Russia, 23, 36, 39 n., 41, 47 n., 54 n., 67-69, 94-102, 110-16, 117,
323-24, 361; interest of, in the Far East, 10; favors Continental
_bloc_ against Great Britain, 42; proposal to Germany in 1899, 61;
proposal to Germany in 1902, 79; far eastern aggressions in 1903, 96;
anger of, at Great Britain in 1904, 110, 168; Black Sea fleet of, 111;
draws closer to Germany in 1904, 139, 161; and Germany in 1904,
160-72; Baltic fleet of, 161-63; divided opinion about alliance with
Germany in 1904, 167-68; need of German aid in 1904, 175; negotiates
loan in Berlin in 1904-5, 175; revolution, 181; press angry at Great
Britain in 1905, 292; anger over renewal of Anglo-Japanese alliance in
1905, 307; loan in 1906, 321 and n., 323-24, 367, 391 n., 399;
publication of instructions to Cassini in March, 1906, 391 and n.
Russo-Chinese agreement, 67
Russo-German commercial treaty of 1904, 161 n.
Russo-German negotiations for alliance in 1904, 114; proposed terms,
164-65, 169-70; results of, 179-80
Russo-Japanese relations, 67-68, 82-83 and n., 96; as affecting
British interests, 67-68; and Germany, 67-68; and France, 67-68
Russo-Japanese War, 100, 110, 117, 139-40, 150, 161, 164-65, 239
Sagasta, 35 n., 37
Saint-Aulaire, Count de, 128, 129, 131 n.
Saint-René Taillandier, 15, 134, 184, 186 and n., 198 and n., 199 and
n., 238; prepares mission to Fez in 1904, 133; his instructions, 133
Salisbury, Lord, 4, 11, 21, 35, 44, 61 n., 62 n., 63 n., refuses
Delcassé’s overture, 41-42; policy of, 53; asks co-operation of United
States in 1898, 53; proposes agreement to Russia in 1898, 53-54;
opposes Anglo-German alliance, 73, 76
Samoan Islands, 60
Sanderson, Lord, 73, 108 n., 142 n., 228 n., 230 n.; on German policy,
59; on Delcassé’s anti-German policy, 187 n.
Sarrien, 385
Sattler, 141
Savinsky, 168 n., 296 n.
Schiemann, 217 n.
Schlieffen, General, 144, 148, 239 n.
Schoen, Herr von, 193, 367-68, 391 n.
Scholl, General, 192
Schulenburg, Count, 176 n.
Siam, 47-49, 87, 91, 106
Siegfried, Jules, 5
Signatory Powers, 203 and n., 234 and n.
Silvela, 35-36, 38 n., 39 and n.; article in _La Lectura_, 37
Sonnino, Baron, 355 n.
Spain, 3, 5, 10-11 and n., 45, 50, 90 n., 89-93, 118 n., 152-54, 247
and n., 266-69; trade with Morocco, 2; defeat of, by United States, 6,
35; anger at Great Britain, 35; internal and international situation,
35; and France, 35-40, 118-25, 259-61; interest in Morocco, 36-37;
endeavors to bring about Franco-German _rapprochement_, 37; Cortes,
debates in 1904, 118; support from Great Britain in 1904, 119; appeals
to Germany for aid in 1904, 119, 122; Franco-Spanish agreement in
1904, 127 and n.; public opinion, 260; anger at Germany in Aug., 1905,
266; compromise proposal in Feb., 1906, 372-73; opposes Austrian
proposal in March, 1906, 379; opposes Roosevelt’s proposal in March,
1906, 389; trouble with France in March, 1906, 392-93
Spain, Queen Mother of, 35 n., 93 n., 118, 137
“Splendid isolation,” 53
Spring Rice, Cecil, 101 n., 114 n., 115, 228 n., 291-92, 324
Sternburg, Baron, 160, 250, 251 n., 355, 384 n., 385
Straits of Gibraltar, 3
Stumm, Herr von, 373 n.
Sultan of Turkey, 28, 206 n.
Sweden, 373 n.
Switzerland, 393 n.
Sydenham, Lord, 309 n.
Tafilelt, 12
Taft, 214, 228
Tangier, 47-48, 65, 88, 120-21, 124, 130-34, 140, 153, 181-89, 186 n.,
190, 196-97, 202, 247 n., 262-63, 270 n.; visit to, 192-95
Tardieu, André, 187 n., 199 n., 206 n., 234 n., 275, 348 n., 354 n.,
372 n., 373 nn., 376 n., 381 n., 391 n.
Tattenbach, Count, 189-90, 206 n., 208, 213-15, 216 n., 223-25, 252,
257 n., 261-62 and n., 264-68, 274, 349, 352, 356 and n., 366, 376 and
n.; proposal to Bülow on April 29, 1905, 215-16; favors Austrian
proposal in 1906, 378
_Temps, Le_, 13 n., 265, 275, 387, 391 and n., 403
Teniet-Sassi, 16
Tibet, 82, 111
Tidikelt, 11
Tirpitz, Admiral, 164 n., 181
Tittoni, 145-46, 207 n., 224-25, and n.
Tores, El, 395
Touat, 11, 22, 63, 65
Tournade, 200
_Tribuna_, 26
Triple Alliance, 19-20, 22 n., 23-30, 32-34, 72-73, 75, 76 n., 106,
136, 141, 143-46, 181-83, 213 n., 279, 286, 398 n., 400
Triple entente, 138
Tripoli, 21-22, 24, 26, 143
Tschirschky, Herr von, 285 n., 286, 328, 399 n.
Tunis, 14, 19
Tweedmouth, Lord, 342
Ular, Alexandre, 276 n.
United States, 43, 50, 53, 62, 95 n., 160, 170, 178, 215
Vaffier-Pollet, 312 and n.
Van Grooten, 327 n.
_Vanity Fair_, 173
Varley, 131
Vassel, 186 n.
Venezuela affair, 82
Victor Emmanuel II, King, 23, 33 n., 145-46, 182
Victoria, Queen, 11
Vigo, 35 n., 127, 140, 151, 217
Villa-Urrutia, 198 n., 206, 236, 247, 316, 330 and n.
Visconti-Venosta, Marquis, 22, 23, 316, 332, 349, 351, 362, 377, 378
n., 381; policy of, toward France, 20
Waldeck-Rousseau, 8
Wallace, D. M., 357
Wedel, Count, 358
Welsersheimb, Count, 349, 358, 377-78, 378 n., 390
_Weltpolitik_, 10, 27-28, 52, 56-58
White, Henry, 214, 349, 351, 362 and n., 381, 392
Wiesbaden, 138
Wilhelmshöhe, 75
William II, Emperor, 17, 45, 46 n., 55-58, 56 n., 68-69, 75 and n., 93
n., 161, 165, 167, 169-74, 181-82, 186 and n., 187-88 and n., 193,
195-96, 198, 201 n., 202, 214, 222, 250, 267 n., 272, 300, 309, 317
and n., 318-19, 326; cordiality toward France, 42, 43 and n.; offers
alliance to Great Britain, 54; aversion of, to Holstein, 60; visit of,
to England in 1899, 61-62; visit of, to England in 1901, 68-69; at
Vigo, 127, 151; on Moroccan question, 140; visit to Italy in 1904,
144-45; speeches in May, 1904, 147 and n.; lack of interest in
Morocco, 151-52 and n.; opposes intervention in Morocco in 1904, 157;
letter to Czar on Oct. 27, 1904, 163; failure of alliance negotiations
in 1904, 177-78 and n., 180; and Japan in 1905, 178; speech at Bremen
in 1905, 188 n.; opposes Tangier visit, 188-89; speeches at Tangier,
193-94 and n., 195 n.; initiates Russo-Japanese negotiations for
peace, 239; opposes Bülow’s policy in June, 1905, 239 and n.; anger
of, at Delcassé and Great Britain in Oct., 1905, 277; speech on Oct.
26, 1905, 277; Björkö meeting, 279-85 and n.; advice to Czar in July,
1905, 285 n.; letter to Czar on July 27, 1905, 285-86; changes
phrasing of Björkö Treaty, 286, 288; on French and Belgian neutrality
in case of Anglo-German war, 288; letter to Bülow on Aug. 11, 1905,
289-90; on British naval maneuvers in the Baltic in 1905, 292 n.; and
Witte in 1905, 299 and n.; and Czar in Sept., 1905, 299-300; and Czar
on Björkö Treaty, 303-4, 304 n.; disappointment over annulment of
Björkö Treaty, 305; speech in Reichstag on Nov. 28, 1905, 313 n.;
offer to Spanish King in Nov., 1905, 316 n., 330; protests pacific
intentions in Dec., 1905, 318-19; “Brilliant second,” 398; on Italy in
1906, 398 n.; on international situation in 1906, 399
Windsor, 62
Witte, Count, 44, 160 n., 161 n., 271-72, 294 and n., 301 n., 321 n.,
324, 367, 384 n., 391 n.; ideas on foreign policy in 1905, 298-99;
visit to Rominten in Sept., 1905, 299-300; and annulment of Björkö
Treaty, 300-301
Wolff, Theodor, 127 n., 186 n., 199 n.
Zanardelli, 24
[ PRINTED ]
[IN U·S·A·]
Transcriber's note
pg 25, footnote 69, Changed: "military agreement of 1887 beween" to:
"between"
pg 37-38, footnote 111, Changed: "_Diario de la sesiónes de Cortes_"
to: "_las sesiones_"
pg 131-132, footnote 386, Changed: "Saint-René Taillander, May 31,
1904" to: "Taillandier"
pg 153, Changed: "to let the Spanish percieve that" to: "perceive"
pg 168, footnote 512, Changed: "_Kreigsschuldfrage_" to:
"_Kriegsschuldfrage_"
pg 187, footnote 580, Changed: "_zum Ende des Welkkrieges_" to:
"_Weltkrieges_"
pg 264, footnote 820, Changed: "Bülow to F. O., July 31, 1903" to:
"1905"
pg 410, Changed: "Bibourd" to: "Bihourd"
pg 417, [Révoil] Changed: "meno. to Radowitz" to: "memo."
Minor changes in punctuation have been done silently.
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