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Title: The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics
Author: E. Zeller
Translator: Oswald J. Reichel
Release date: January 25, 2026 [eBook #77777]
Language: English
Original publication: London: Longsmans, Green, and Co, 1892
Credits: Jeroen Hellingman and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net/ for Project Gutenberg (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE STOICS, EPICUREANS AND SCEPTICS ***
THE
STOICS, EPICUREANS
AND
SCEPTICS
TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF
Dr E. ZELLER
Professor of the University of Heidelberg
BY
REV. OSWALD J. REICHEL, B.C.L., M.A.
sometime Vice-Principal of Cuddesden College
NEW AND REVISED EDITION
LONDON
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
AND NEW YORK: 15 EAST 16th STREET
1892
PREFACE.
The present translation aims at supplying an introductory volume to a
later period of the history of mind in Greece, which may be
collectively described as the post-Aristotelian. To the moralist and
theologian no less than to the student of philosophy this period is one
of peculiar interest; for it supplied the scientific mould into which
Christianity in the early years of its growth was cast, and bearing the
shape of which it has come down to us.
The translation has been carefully revised for the present edition,
with the view of rendering more clear any passages which seemed
obscure.
À la Ronde, near Lympstone, Devon:
August 1891.
CONTENTS.
PART I.
STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAPTER I.
THE INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL STATE OF GREECE AT THE CLOSE OF THE
FOURTH CENTURY B.C.
PAGE
A. Merits and defects of the systems of Plato and Aristotle 1
B. Connection between the theories of Aristotle and the
Greek character 6
C. Greece after the battle of Chæronea 12
CHAPTER II.
CHARACTER AND CHIEF FEATURES OF THE POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
A. Causes forming the post-Aristotelian philosophy 15
1. Political causes 15
2. Intellectual causes 17
B. Common characteristics of the post-Aristotelian philosophy 19
1. Theory subordinated to practice 19
2. Peculiar mode of treating the practical problem 21
3. These peculiarities illustrated by subsequent
philosophy 22
C. Development of the post-Aristotelian philosophy 25
1. Dogmatic Schools—Stoics and Epicureans, Dogmatic
Scepticism 25
2. Sceptical Schools—influences producing—Scepticism and
Eclecticism 26
3. Religious School of Neoplatonists 31
PART II.
THE STOICS.
CHAPTER III.
HISTORY OF THE STOICS UNTIL THE END OF THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.
A. Zeno 36
B. Pupils of Zeno 40
1. Cleanthes 40
2. Aristo and Herillus 41
3. Other pupils 43
C. Chrysippus and the later Stoics 45
1. Chrysippus 45
2. Later Stoics 48
CHAPTER IV.
AUTHORITIES FOR THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY; ITS PROBLEM AND DIVISIONS.
A. Authorities 53
1. Review of authorities 53
2. Use to be made of authorities 55
B. Problem proposed to the Stoic philosophy 56
1. Its practical character 56
2. Necessity for intellectual knowledge 58
3. Attitude towards logic and natural science of Aristo—
of Zeno and Cleanthes 59
C. Divisions of philosophy 66
1. Threefold division 67
2. Relative importance of each part 68
CHAPTER V.
LOGIC OF THE STOICS.
A. General remarks 70
1. Field of Logic 70
2. Words and thoughts 73
B. Theory of knowledge 75
1. General character of this theory 75
2. Prominent points in the theory—perceptions—
conceptions—standards of truth 77
C. Formal logic 92
1. Utterance in general 92
2. Incomplete expression—words—the categories 94
3. Complete utterance—judgment—inference—fallacies 110
D. Estimate of Stoic logic 123
1. Its shortcomings 123
2. Its value 123
CHAPTER VI.
THE STUDY OF NATURE: 1. FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS.
A. Materialism 126
1. Meaning of the Stoic Materialism 126
2. Causes which led to Stoic Materialism 132
3. Consequences of Stoic Materialism—individual
perceptions—theory of universal mingling 135
B. Dynamical theory of Nature 139
1. Matter and force 139
2. Nature of force 141
3. Deity—God as force—God as matter 148
C. Pantheism 156
1. God identical with the world 156
2. Relative difference between God and the world 158
3. Views of Boëthus 159
CHAPTER VII.
THE STUDY OF NATURE: 2. COURSE, CHARACTER, AND GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNIVERSE.
A. The General Course of the Universe 161
1. Origin of the world 161
2. End of the world 163
3. Cycles in the world’s course 165
B. Government of the World 170
1. Nature of Destiny—as Providence—as Generative Reason 170
2. Arguments in favour of Providence 173
3. The idea of Providence determined 175
C. Nature of the world 182
1. Its unity and perfection 183
2. Moral theory of the world 187
CHAPTER VIII.
THE STUDY OF NATURE: 3. IRRATIONAL NATURE. THE ELEMENTS.—THE UNIVERSE.
A. The most general ideas on Nature 194
B. The Elements 197
C. The Universe 202
1. The stars 204
2. Meteorology 206
3. Plants and animals 208
CHAPTER IX.
THE STUDY OF NATURE: 4. MAN.
A. The Soul 210
1. Materialistic nature of the soul 210
2. Divisions of the soul 213
B. The Individual Soul and the Soul of the Universe 216
C. Freedom and Immortality 219
CHAPTER X.
ETHICS: 1. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY
OF MORALITY.
A. The Highest Good 225
1. Nature of the Highest Good 225
2. The Good and Evil 230
3. Pleasure and the Good 235
4. Negative character of Happiness 239
5. The Highest Good as Law 240
B. Emotions and Virtue 243
1. The Emotions—their nature—varieties of 243
2. Idea of Virtue—positive and negative aspects of—the
virtues severally—their mutual relations—unity of
virtue 254
C. The Wise Man 268
1. Wisdom and Folly 268
2. Universal Depravity 272
3. Conversion 275
CHAPTER XI.
ETHICS: 2. THE STOIC THEORY OF MORALS AS MODIFIED IN PRACTICE.
A. Things to be preferred and eschewed 278
1. Secondary goods 280
2. Classes of things indifferent 281
3. Collision of modified and abstract theory 284
B. Perfect and intermediate duties 287
C. Emotions 290
1. Permitted affections 290
2. Modification of apathy 292
3. The state of progress 293
CHAPTER XII.
ETHICS: 3. APPLIED MORAL SCIENCE.
A. The Individual 301
1. Importance attaching to the individual 301
2. Cynicism of the Stoics 305
B. Social Relations 311
1. Origin and use of society 311
2. Justice and mercy 315
3. Friendship 317
4. The family and civil life—aversion to political
life—citizenship of the world 320
C. Man and the Course of the World 332
1. Submission to the course of nature 332
2. Suicide 335
CHAPTER XIII.
THE RELATION OF THE STOICS TO RELIGION.
A. General connection of Stoicism and Religion 341
1. Connection of Stoicism with popular faith 343
2. Free criticism of popular belief 344
3. The truth in Polytheism 348
4. Doctrine of Demons 351
B. The Allegorising spirit 354
1. Allegorical interpretation of myths 354
2. Interpretation of myths respecting the Gods 357
3. Allegory applied to heroic myths 367
C. Prophetic powers 369
1. Divination 370
2. Prophecy explained by natural causes 374
3. Causes of divination 377
CHAPTER XIV.
THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE AND ITS HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS.
A. Inner connection of the system 381
1. Ethical side of Stoicism 382
2. Scientific side of the Stoic system 383
3. Connection of the moral and scientific elements 385
B. Relation of Stoicism to previous systems 387
1. Its relation to Socrates and the Cynics 387
2. Relation to Megarians and Heraclitus 392
3. Relation to Aristotle 396
4. Relation to Plato 399
C. The Stoic philosophy as a whole 400
1. Its place in history 400
2. Its onesidedness 402
PART III.
THE EPICUREANS.
CHAPTER XV.
EPICUREANS AND THE EPICUREAN SCHOOL.
A. Epicurus 404
B. Scholars of Epicurus 408
C. Epicureans of the Roman period 411
CHAPTER XVI.
CHARACTER AND DIVISIONS OF THE EPICUREAN TEACHING. THE TEST-SCIENCE OF
TRUTH.
A. Character of Epicurean system 418
1. Its power of self-preservation 418
2. Aim of philosophy according to the Epicureans 420
3. Divisions of philosophy 424
B. Canonic or the Test-Science of Truth 425
1. Sensation and perception 425
2. Notions 428
3. Opinions 429
4. Standard of truth subjective 431
CHAPTER XVII.
THE EPICUREAN VIEWS OF NATURE.
A. General Views on Nature 434
1. Object, value, and method of the study of nature 434
2. Mechanical explanation of nature 437
3. Atoms and empty space 439
B. The World 444
1. The swerving aside of atoms 444
2. Origin of the world 447
3. Arrangement of the universe 449
4. Plants and animals 451
C. Mankind 451
1. Origin of the human race 451
2. The soul 453
3. Sensation 457
4. Will 459
CHAPTER XVIII.
VIEWS OF EPICURUS ON RELIGION.
A. Criticism of the Gods and the popular faith 462
B. The Gods according to Epicurus 464
1. Reasons for his belief 464
2. Nature of the Epicurean Gods 467
CHAPTER XIX.
THE MORAL SCIENCE OF THE EPICUREANS: 1. GENERAL VIEWS.
A. Pleasure 472
1. Pleasure the Highest Good 472
2. Freedom from pain 474
B. Intellectual Happiness 476
1. Intelligence 476
2. Reasons for rising superior to the senses 478
3. Virtue 480
C. The Wise Man 483
CHAPTER XX.
THE EPICUREAN ETHICS CONTINUED: 2. SPECIAL POINTS.
A. The Individual 485
B. Civil Society and the Family 490
1. Civil society 490
2. Family life 492
C. Friendship 493
CHAPTER XXI.
THE EPICUREAN SYSTEM AS A WHOLE. ITS POSITION IN HISTORY.
A. Coherence of the Epicurean teaching 499
B. Historical position of Epicureanism 503
1. Relation to Stoicism 503
2. Relation to Aristippus 508
3. Relation to Democritus 510
4. Relation to Aristotle and Plato 511
PART IV.
THE SCEPTICS: PYRRHO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY.
CHAPTER XXII.
PYRRHO.
A. Historical position of Scepticism 514
1. Relation to cotemporary dogmatic systems 514
2. Causes producing it 515
3. Pyrrho and his followers 517
B. Teaching of Pyrrho 521
1. Impossibility of knowledge 521
2. Withholding of judgment 523
3. Mental imperturbability 525
CHAPTER XXIII.
THE NEW ACADEMY.
A. Arcesilaus 528
1. Denial of knowledge 528
2. Probability 534
B. Carneades 535
1. Negative views of 538
2. Positive views of 553
C. School of Carneades 563
GENERAL INDEX 567
PART I.
STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAPTER I.
THE INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL STATE OF GREECE AT THE CLOSE OF THE
FOURTH CENTURY.
[A. Merits and defects of the systems of Plato and Aristotle.]
In Plato and Aristotle Greek Philosophy reached its greatest
perfection. In their hands the Socratic philosophy of conceptions grew
into elaborate systems, which embraced the whole range of contemporary
knowledge, and grouped it from definite points of view so as to afford
a connected view of the universe. The study of nature was by them
supplemented by careful enquiries into the subject of morals. It was,
moreover, transformed, enlarged, and enriched by Aristotle. In
metaphysics, the foundations for a philosophical structure were deeply
laid, everything being referred to first principles, in a way which no
previous philosopher had before attempted. A multitude of phenomena
which earlier thinkers had carelessly passed over, more particularly
the phenomena of mental life, were pressed into the service of
research; new questions were raised; new answers given. New ideas had
penetrated every branch of knowledge. That idealism in which the Greek
mind so beautifully and lucidly found expression had been set forth by
Plato in brilliant purity, and had been by Aristotle combined with
careful observation. Practice and theory had brought the dialectical
method to the position of an art. A valuable instrument of thought had
been gained in the scientific use of terms of which Aristotle was the
real originator. Within a few generations the intellectual treasures of
Greece had been manifoldly increased, both in extent and value. The
heritage received by Socrates from his predecessors could hardly be
recognised as the same in that which Aristotle left to his successors.
Great as was the progress made by Greek philosophy in the fourth
century before Christ, quite as great were the difficulties with which
it had perpetually to contend; quite as difficult the problems on the
solution of which it had to labour. Aristotle had already pointed out
the weak points in the system of Plato, which rendered it impossible
for him to accept that system as satisfactory. From the platform of
later knowledge still further objections might be raised to it. Even in
Aristotle’s own system inconsistencies on some of the most important
points might be found, concealed under a certain indefiniteness of
expression, but fatal if once brought to light to the soundness of the
whole. For with all his ingenuity, Aristotle never succeeded in
harmoniously blending all the elements out of which his system was
composed. Thus the divergencies of his immediate followers from the
original Aristotelian teaching may be accounted for.
Nor were these defects of a kind that could be easily disposed of. The
deeper the enquiry is carried, the clearer it becomes that they were
defects embedded in the foundations of the systems both of Plato and
Aristotle, and underlying the whole previous range of philosophic
thought. Omitting details and minor points, they may all be ultimately
referred to two: either to an imperfect knowledge and experience of the
world, or to the overhaste of idealistic philosophy to draw
conclusions. To the former defect may be attributed the mistakes in
natural science into which Plato and Aristotle fell, and the limited
character of their view of history; to the latter, the Platonic theory
of ideas with all that it involves—the antithesis of ideas and
appearances, of reason and the senses, of knowledge and ignorance, of
the present world and the world to come—and likewise the corresponding
points in the system of Aristotle; such, for instance (to name some of
the principal ones only), as the relation of the particular and the
general, of form and matter, of God and the world, of the theory of
final causes and natural explanations, of the rational and the
irrational parts of the soul, of speculative theory and practice.
Both defects are closely connected. The Greek philosophers were content
with an uncertain and imperfect knowledge of facts, because they
trusted conceptions too implicitly, and were ignorant of their origin
and worth; and they had this unconditional trust in the truth of
conceptions because the study of nature was yet in its infancy. Their
knowledge of history was too limited for them to see the difference
between the results of careful observation and those of ordinary
unmethodical experience, to realise the uncertainty of most of the
traditional principles and the necessity for a stricter method of
induction. The fault common to both Plato and Aristotle lay in
attaching undue prominence to the dialectical method inherited from
Socrates to the neglect of observation, and in assuming that
conceptions expressing the very essence of things can be deduced in a
purely logical way from current beliefs and the use of language. In
Plato this dialectical exclusiveness appears most strongly, and finds
striking expression in his theory of recollection. If all conceptions
are inherent from the moment of birth and need only the agency of
sensible things to produce a consciousness of their existence, it is
only legitimate to infer that, to know the essence of things, we must
look within and not without, and obtain ideas by abstraction from the
mind rather than by induction from experience. It is equally legitimate
to infer that the ideas derived from the mind are the true standard by
which experience must be judged. Whenever ideas and experience
disagree, instead of regarding ideas as at fault, we ought to look upon
the data of experience as imperfect, and as inadequately expressing the
ideas which constitute the thing as it really exists. Thus the whole
theory of ideas, and all that it implies, is seen to be a natural
corollary from the Socratic theory of conceptions. Even those parts of
this theory which seem most incongruous are best explained by being
referred to the principles of the Socratic process.
From this defective assumption Aristotle is only partially free. He
attempted, it is true, to supply the defects in the Socratic and
Platonic theory of conceptions by observation of a kind with which
Plato’s experimental knowledge cannot be compared either for accuracy
or extent. With that attempt he also combined a complete transformation
of the Platonic metaphysics, whereby he secured the same position for
particulars in relation to the universal that his predecessor had
secured for observation in relation to conceptional knowledge. But
Aristotle did not go far enough. In his theory of knowledge he cannot
wholly discard the assumption that the soul has its knowledge by a
process of development from within, and is not only endowed with the
capacity of thinking, but possesses also from its birth the substance
of ideas. In his scientific method a critical investigation of common
notions and of idiom—that in fact which he himself calls proof by
probabilities—is constantly taking the place of strict induction. His
endeavours to harmonise the two antagonistic currents in Plato’s
teaching may have been undertaken in all sincerity, but the antagonism
was too deeply seated to yield to his efforts. It not only reappears in
the fundamental ideas of his system, but it colours all its general
results. Beginning with the antithesis between form and matter, it ends
in the contrast between the world and a soul independent of the world,
in the conception of reason as something above man, never combining
with the lower parts of his nature to form one complete living unity.
[B. Connection between the theories of Aristotle and Greek character.]
Granting that the Socratic philosophy of conceptions is the source from
which these peculiarities are derived, still that philosophy is itself
only the expression of the character of the nation which produced it.
In an earlier work it has been shown [1] that the most distinctive
feature of Greek life lay in confounding the outer and the inner
worlds, in ingenuously assuming that the two originally corresponded,
and are still in perfect harmony with one another. When the whole
mental life of a people bears this impress, it is sure to be reflected
in its philosophy also. Together with the advantages which accrue from
the confusion of the two, philosophy shares also the disadvantages
which unavoidably attend any theory which ignores the real distinction
between them. The mind only gradually and imperfectly becomes aware of
the distinctive peculiarity of mental life, of the notion of
personality, of the fact that moral rights and duties are independent
of external circumstances, of the share of the individual will in
creating ideas. It has also less hesitation in transferring phases of
consciousness directly to things themselves, in regarding the world
from ideal points of view borrowed from the sphere of mind, in
accepting its own notions of things as realities without testing their
actual truth, and even treating them as more real than the reality of
the senses, and in confounding the critical analysis of a notion with
the experimental investigation of a thing. If the philosophy of Greece
in the time of its greatest perfection was not free from these defects;
if, further, these defects were the cause of all the important faults
in the systems of Plato and Aristotle; the creators of these systems
and their immediate successors are not the only ones to blame; but the
whole mental peculiarity of the people is at fault of which within the
province of science these men were the greatest representatives.
As the faults of the Platonic and Aristotelian systems are seen to be
connected with the general character of Greek life, it becomes obvious
how difficult it must have been for Greeks to emancipate themselves
from them. To overcome the difficulty nothing short of a radical
breaking away from old lines of thought would avail. The origin of
ideas, the primary meaning of conceptions, must be enquired into with
searching thoroughness; a sharper distinction must be drawn between
what is supplied from without and what is supplied from within; the
truth of axioms hitherto received in metaphysics must be more carefully
investigated than had ever been done as yet. The intellect must
accustom itself to an accuracy of observation, and to a strictness of
inductive process, never before reached in Greece. Experimental
sciences must attain a degree of completeness which it was vain to hope
to reach by the methods and means then in vogue. The fashion of
regarding nature as though it were a living being which allowed
questions as to facts to be answered by speculations as to final causes
or by the desire of nature to realise beauty, must be abandoned.
Enquiries into a man’s moral nature and duties must be kept apart from
the simple study of his conduct in relation to natural surroundings,
the disastrous effects which flow from the confusion of the two being
only too apparent in the national type of the Greeks, in the
exclusively political character of their morality, and in their
adherence to slavery.
Before this pass could be reached how much was there not to alter in
the condition and mental habit of Greece! Could it indeed be expected
that a more vigorous and more scientific method would gain foothold so
long as the tendency to look upon the life of nature as analogous to
the life of man was kept alive by a religion such as that of Hellas? Or
that moral science would liberate itself from the trammels of Greek
propriety of conduct, whilst in all practical matters those trammels
were in full force? Or that a clearer distinction would be drawn
between what comes from without and what from within in ideas—a
distinction which we vainly look for in Aristotle—until a depth and an
intensity had been given to the inner life, and until the rights and
value of the individual as such had obtained a recognition which it
required the combined influence of Christianity and the peculiar
Germanic character to bring about? The more vividly the national type
and the national conditions surrounding Greek philosophy are realised,
the firmer becomes the conviction, that to heal its defects—which are
apparent even in its greatest and most brilliant achievements—nothing
short of a revolution in the whole mental tone of Greece would
avail—such as history has seen accomplished, but not till after many
shifts and many centuries.
On the platform of the ancient life of Greece such a change could not
possibly have come about. It may be that under more favourable
circumstances Greek philosophy might have further developed along the
same course of purely intellectual enquiry which it had previously so
successfully followed in the hands of its earlier representatives, more
particularly of Aristotle. What results might in this way have been
attained, we cannot exactly determine. Speculation is, however,
useless. In point of fact, the historical circumstances under which
philosophy had to grow cannot be ignored. Philosophy had become what it
was under the influence of those circumstances. The Socratic theory of
conceptions, and Plato’s theory of ideas, presuppose on the one hand
the high culture of the age of Pericles, and the brilliant career of
Athens and Greece following on the Persian war. They also presuppose
the political degradation and the moral exhaustion of Greece during and
after the Peloponnesian war. Aristotle, with his high intellectual
culture, despairing of everything direct and practical, with his wide
view of things, his knowledge of every kind, his system matured and
elaborate, and embracing all the results of previous enquiry—appears as
the child of an age which was bearing to the grave a great historical
epoch, in which intellectual labour had begun to take the place of
vigorous political action.
The bloom of Greek philosophy was short-lived, but not more short-lived
than the bloom of national life. The one was dependent on the other,
and both were due to the action of the same causes. The Greeks, with a
high appreciation of freedom, a ready aptitude for politics, and a
genius for artistic creations, produced within the sphere of politics
one result of its kind unrivalled and unique. They neglected, however,
to lay the foundations wide and deep. Their political endurance was not
equal to their versatility and restlessness. Communities limited in
extent and simple in arrangement sufficed for them. But how could such
communities include all branches of the Greek family, and satisfy at
once all legitimate aspirations? It is the same within the department
of science. Prematurely concluding and rashly advancing from isolated
experiences without mediating links to the most general conceptions,
they constructed theories upon a foundation of limited and imperfect
experience, which it was wholly inadequate to bear. Whether, and in how
far, the intellect of Greece, if left to itself, might have remedied
these defects in a longer protracted calm of development, is a question
which it is impossible to answer. As a fact, that intellect was far too
intimately bound up with the political, the moral, and the religious
life—in short, with the whole mental tone and culture of the people—not
to be seriously affected by a change in any one of them. It lay, too,
in the character and historical progress of that people to have only a
brief period of splendour, and that soon over. At the time that the
philosophy of Greece reached its highest point in Plato and Aristotle,
Greece was in all other respects in a hopeless state of decline.
Notwithstanding individual attempts to revive it, the old morality and
propriety of conduct had disappeared since the beginning of the
Peloponnesian war. The old belief in the gods was likewise gone. To the
bulk of the people the rising philosophy with its ethics afforded no
substitute. Art, although carefully cultivated, failed to come up to
the excellence of the strictly classic period. Political relations
became daily more unsatisfactory. In the fifth century before Christ
the rivalry of Athens and Sparta had ranged the states of Greece into
two groups. In the succeeding century disunion spread further. The
effort made by Thebes under Epaminondas to found a new leadership only
multiplied parties. Destitute of a political centre of gravity, the
Greeks, of their own choice, drifted into a disgraceful dependence on
the conquered and now declining Persian empire. Persian gold wielded an
influence which Persian arms had been unable to exercise. The petty
jealousies of tiny states and tribes frittered away in endless local
feuds resources which with unity and leadership might have accomplished
wonders. Civil order declined, and with it the well-being and martial
prowess of the nation declined also. The growing pursuit of the art of
war as a profession took the decision of battle more and more out of
the hands of free citizens, and placed it in those of the numerous
bands of mercenaries which are one of the most baneful phenomena of
that age, a sure sign of the decline of freedom, and of the approach of
a military despotism. When by the rise of the Macedonian power the
danger of a military despotism loomed nearer, patriots in Greece
continued to deceive themselves with the hope that their self-devotion
would avert the danger, but any unbiassed reader of history sees in the
failure of their attempts to avert it the natural and inevitable result
of causes so deeply rooted in the Greek character and the course of
Greek history, that neither the most heroic exertions of individuals,
nor the united resistance of the divided states, which came too late,
could for one moment have rendered the final issue doubtful.
[C. Greece after the battle of Chæronea.]
By the battle of Chæronea the doom of Greece was sealed. Never since
then has Greece attained to real political freedom. All attempts to
shake off the Macedonian supremacy ended in humiliating disasters. In
the subsequent struggles Hellas, and Athens in particular, were the
play-ball of changing rulers, the continual arena of their warfare. The
second half of the third century was reached before a purely Grecian
power—the Achæan League—was formed, round which the hopes of the nation
rallied, but the attempt was wholly inadequate to meet the real
requirements of the times. Soon it became apparent that no remedies
were forthcoming to heal the ills from which the country was suffering.
Discord, their old hereditary failing, rendered it impossible for
Greeks to be independent in foreign relations, or to be united and
settled at home. Their best resources were wasted in perpetual
struggles between Achæans, Ætolians, and Spartans. The very individual
who led the Achæans against the Macedonians in the cause of
independence, called the Macedonians back to the Peloponnesus to gain
their support against Sparta. When the supremacy of Macedonia was
broken by the arms of Rome, a more avowed dependence on Italian allies
succeeded. And when, in the year 146 B.C., the province of Achaia was
incorporated into the Roman empire, even the shadow of freedom which up
to that time had been assured departed for ever.
Sad as were the external affairs of Greece at this period, and marked
as was the decline of its intellectual power, its mental horizon,
nevertheless, extended and its culture became more generally diffused.
The Macedonian ascendency, which gave the death-blow to the
independence of Greece, also broke down the barriers which had hitherto
separated Greeks from foreigners. A new world was opened out before
them, and a vast territory offered for their energies to explore.
Greece was brought into manifold contact with the Eastern nations
belonging to the Macedonian monarchy, whereby it secured for its
culture the place of honour among them, but at the same time became
subject to a slow, but, in the long run, important back-current of
Oriental thought, traces of which appear in its philosophy a few
centuries later. By the side of the old famed centres of learning in
the mother country of Hellas, new centres arose, suited by position,
inhabitants, and peculiar circumstances to unite the culture of East
and West, and to fuse into one homogeneous mass the intellectual forces
of different races. Whilst Hellas, by the number of emigrants who left
her shores to settle in Asia and Egypt, was losing her population and
the Greeks in their ancestral homes were being ousted by foreigners,
they were gaining the most extensive intellectual conquests at the time
over the very nations by and through whom they had been oppressed.
CHAPTER II.
CHARACTER AND CHIEF FEATURES OF THE POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
[A. Causes producing the post-Aristotelian philosophy.]
The circumstances which have been briefly sketched in the preceding
chapter are of the greatest importance in their bearing on the
character of the post-Aristotelian philosophy. Greek philosophy, like
Greek art, is the offspring of Greek political independence. In the
whirl of public life every one is thrown on himself and his own
resources. Thereby, and by the emulation begotten of unlimited
competition for all the good things of life, the Greek had learned to
make full use of his intellect. Consciousness of his dignity—which a
Greek associated far more closely than we do with the privilege of
citizenship—and independence of the necessity of struggling for daily
food, had taught him independence of mind, and enabled him to devote
himself to the pursuit of knowledge without any ulterior aim. [2]
[(1) Political causes.]
With the decline of political independence the mental powers of the
nation were broken past remedy. No longer borne up by a powerful esprit
de corps, weaned from the habit of working for the common weal, the
majority gave themselves up to the petty interests of private life and
personal affairs. Even the better disposed were too much occupied in
contending against the low tone and corruption of their times, to be
able to devote themselves in moments of relaxation to independent
speculation. What could be expected in such an age as that which
preceded the rise of the Stoic and Epicurean systems, but that
philosophy would become practical itself, if indeed it were studied at
all?
An age like that did not require theoretical knowledge, but it did
require moral bracing and strengthening. If these were not to be had
from popular religion in its then state, was it matter for wonder that
philosophy should be looked to to supply the deficiency, seeing that in
all cultivated circles philosophy had already taken the place of
religion? If we ask in what form, and in what form only, philosophy
could supply the deficiency under the then circumstances, the answer is
not far to seek. There was little room for creative effort, plenty for
sustained endurance; little for activity without, plenty for activity
within; little room for public life, plenty of room for private life.
So utterly hopeless had the public state of Greece become, that even
the few who made it their business to provide a remedy could only gain
for themselves the honour of martyrdom. As matters stood, the only
course open for the best-intentioned was to withdraw entirely within
themselves, to entrench themselves within the safe barriers of their
inner life against outward misfortunes, and to make happiness dependent
entirely on their own inward state.
Stoic apathy, Epicurean self-contentment, and Sceptic imperturbability,
were the doctrines which suited the political helplessness of the age,
and they were therefore the doctrines which met with the most general
acceptance. There was yet another which suited it—viz., the sinking of
national distinctions in the feeling of a common humanity, the
severance of morals from politics which characterises the philosophy of
the Alexandrian and Roman period. The barriers which kept nations apart
had been swept away, together with their national independence: East
and West, Greeks and barbarians, were united in large empires, brought
into communication and forced into comparison with one another in
matters the most important. Philosophy declared that all men are of one
blood and are equally privileged citizens of one empire, that morality
rests on the relation of man to man, and is independent of nationality
and position in the state; but in so doing it only explicitly stated a
truth which was partly realised and partly implied in actual life.
[(2) Intellectual causes.]
The very course which philosophy itself had taken during the previous
century and a half had prepared the way for the turn which now set in.
Socrates and the Sophists, in different ways no doubt, had each devoted
themselves to the practical side of life; and thus the Cynic School was
the precursor of Stoicism, the Cyrenaic of Epicureanism. These two
Schools are, however, only of minor importance in the general progress
of philosophy in the fourth century, and sophistry by the close of the
same century was already a thing of the past. Socrates, it is true,
would have nothing to do with physical enquiries; yet he felt the
desire for knowledge far too keenly to bear comparison with the
post-Aristotelian philosophers. Proposing to concern himself only with
subjects which were of practical use in life, he yet put forth a theory
of knowledge which involved a reform quite as much of speculative as of
practical philosophy, and that reform was accomplished on a grand scale
by Plato and Aristotle.
However little Greek philosophy as a whole developed during the fourth
century along the lines of its subsequent expansion, still the
speculations of Plato and Aristotle necessarily helped to prepare for
the coming charge. The antagonism between the ideal and phenomenal
worlds which Plato set up, and Aristotle vainly attempted to bridge
over, leads ultimately to a contrast between the outer and the inner
life, between thought and the object of thought. The generic
conceptions or forms, which Plato and Aristotle regard as most truly
real, are, after all, fabrications of the human mind. The conception of
reason, even in its expanded form as the divine Reason, or reason of
the world, is an idea formed by abstraction from the inner life. And
what is really meant by identifying form in itself with what is, and
matter with what is possible, or even (as Plato does) with what is not,
or by placing God outside of and in contrast to the world, but the
admission that man finds in his own mind a higher and more real
existence than any which he finds outside of it, and that what is truly
divine and unlimited must be in the mind as an idea, apart from and
independent of all impressions from without? Plato and Aristotle in
fact declared that reason constitutes the real essence of man—reason
coming from above and uniting itself with the body, but in itself
superior to the world of sense and life in time—and that man’s highest
activity is thought, turned away from all external things, and
meditating only on the inner world of ideas. It was only one step
further in the same direction for the post-Aristotelian philosophy to
contemplate man in complete severance from the outer world, and to
refer him to himself for that satisfaction which he can find nowhere
else in life.
[B. Common characteristics of the post-Aristotelian philosophy.]
This step was taken by the Schools of the Stoics, Epicureans, and
Sceptics which appeared in the first half of the third century before
Christ, superseded the influence of the older Schools, and asserted
their supremacy without great variation in their teaching until the
beginning of the first century. In whatever else these three Schools
may differ, at least they agree in two fundamental points, (1) in
subordinating theory to practice, and (2) in the peculiar character of
their practical philosophy.
[(1) Theory subordinated to practice.]
The subordination of theory to practice is most apparent in the School
of Epicurus. It is nearly as clear in the case of the Sceptics, who,
denying all possibility of knowledge, left as the only ground of action
conviction based on probabilities. Both Schools also agree in
considering philosophy as only a means for securing happiness. By the
Stoics, on the other hand, the need of philosophic speculation was felt
more strongly; but even in their case it may be seen that speculation
was not pursued simply for its own sake, but for practical purposes, by
which it was also determined. Thus the Stoics, like the Epicureans, in
the speculative part of their system confined themselves to current
views—thereby showing that the source of their philosophical
peculiarities lay elsewhere than in speculation, and that other studies
had greater value in their eyes, in which also they considered
themselves more proficient. They even expressly stated that the study
of nature is only necessary as a help to the study of virtue. It is
beyond question, that their chief peculiarities, and those which give
them an importance in history, are ethical. The other parts of their
system, more particularly those in which their distinctive tenets
appear, are likewise regulated by practical considerations. This
statement will hereafter be shown in detail. It may suffice to observe
now, that the most important point in the logic of the Stoics—the
question as to the standard of truth—was decided by a practical
postulate; that the fundamental principles of the Stoic metaphysics are
only intelligible from the ground of their ethics; that for natural
science the Stoics did very little; that in their theory of final
causes on which they lay so much stress nature is explained by moral
considerations; and that their natural as well as their positive
theology bears ample testimony to the practical tone of their system.
Standing in advance of the Epicureans by their higher intellectual
training and their learned energy, and in opposition to the Sceptics by
their dogmatism, the Stoics nevertheless agree with both these Schools
in the essentially practical character of their teaching.
[(2) Peculiar mode of dealing with the practical problem.]
This relationship is more strikingly seen in the way in which they deal
with the practical problem. The Epicurean imperturbability is akin to
that of the Sceptics; both resemble the Stoic apathy. All three Schools
are agreed that the only way to happiness consists in peace of mind,
and in avoiding all those disturbances which sometimes arise from
external influences, at other times from internal emotions; they are
only divided as to the means by which peace of mind may be secured.
They are also agreed in making moral activity independent of external
circumstances, and in separating morals from politics, although only
the Stoics set up the doctrine of the original unity of the whole human
family, and insist on being citizens of the world. Through all the
Schools runs the common trait of referring everything to the subject,
and constantly falling back on man and his own inner life, one
consequence of which is the prominence given to action in preference to
speculation, and another that action is determined by personal
certainty, and a mental equilibrium which must be attained by the
exercise of will and the cultivation of the intellect.
[(3) Their peculiarities illustrated by subsequent philosophy.]
The same character belongs to philosophy in the centuries succeeding
the rise of these three Schools; during which the circumstances which
produced that character were not materially altered. In addition to the
followers of the old Schools, Eclectics are now met with, who gather
from every system what seems true and probable. In this process of
selection their guiding principle is regard for the practical wants of
man. Hence the ultimate standard of truth is placed in personal
consciousness. Everything is referred to the subject as its centre. In
ethics and natural theology the Eclectics were mainly indebted to the
Stoics. A new School of Sceptics also arose, not differing in its
tendencies from the older one. Neopythagoreans and Platonists appeared,
not satisfied with human knowledge, but aspiring to higher revelations.
Professing to appeal to the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle, these
philosophers betray their connection with the later post-Aristotelian
Schools, not only by borrowing largely from the Stoics for the material
for their theology and ethics, but also by their general tone;
knowledge is for them less even than for the Stoics an end in itself,
and they are further from natural science. With them philosophy is
subservient to the interests of religion; its aim is to bring men into
proper relation with God; and the religious needs of mankind are the
highest authority for science.
The same observations apply also to Plotinus and his successors. These
philosophers are not lacking in an elaborate science of metaphysics.
The care which they devoted to this science leaves no doubt as to their
lively interest in scientific completeness and systematic arrangement.
For all that their speculative efforts bear the same relation to the
practical aim of philosophy as those of the Stoics, who in point of
learning and logical elaboration of a system are quite their equals. A
real interest in knowledge was no doubt one of the elements which
brought Neoplatonism into being; but it was not strong enough to
counterbalance another, the practical and religious sentiment. The mind
was not sufficiently independent to be able to get on without appealing
to intellectual and theological authorities; the scientific procedure
was too mixed to lead to a simple study of things as they are. As in
the case of the Neopythagoreans, the ultimate ground of the system is a
religious want. The divine world is only a portion of human thought
projected out of the mind, and incapable of being fully grasped by the
understanding. The highest business of philosophy is to reunite man
with the divine world external to himself. To attain this end, all the
means which science supplies are employed. Philosophy endeavours to
explain the steps by which the finite gradually came to be separated
from the original infinite being; it seeks to bring about a return by a
regular and systematic course; and in this attempt the philosophic
spirit of Greece, by no means extinct, proved its powers by a result of
its kind unrivalled. In the first instance, no doubt, the problem was
so raised as to press philosophy into the service of religion; but, in
the long run, it became apparent that, with the premises assumed, a
scientific solution of the religious question was impossible. The idea
of an original being with which the system started was a reflex of the
religious sentiment, and not the result of scientific research, and the
doctrine of a mystical union with a transcendental being was a
religious postulate, the gratuitous assumption of which betrays an
origin in the mind of the thinker. The platform of Neoplatonism is the
same, therefore, as that of the other post-Aristotelian systems; and it
is hardly necessary in proof of this position to point to the agreement
of Neoplatonism in other respects with Stoicism, and especially in
ethics. Far as the two systems lie asunder, the one standing at the
beginning the other at the end of the post-Aristotelian philosophy,
nevertheless both display one and the same attitude of thought; and we
pass from one to the other by a continuous series of intermediate
links.
In passing from School to School the post-Aristotelian philosophy
assumed, as might be expected, various modifications of character in
course of time; nevertheless, it retained a certain mental habit and
certain common elements. Such was the neglect of intellectual
originality, which drove some thinkers to a sceptical denial of all
knowledge, and induced others to take their knowledge at second hand
from older authorities. Such was the prominence given to practical over
speculative questions. Such was the disregard for natural science, and,
in comparison with former times, the greater importance attached to
theology, apparent not only in the controversy between the Epicureans
and Stoics, but also in the apologetic writings of the Stoics and
Platonists. Such, too, was the negative morality which aimed at
independence of the outer world, at mental composure, and philosophic
contentment; the separation of morals from politics; the moral
universalism and citizenship of the world; the going within self into
the depths of the soul, the will, and the thinking powers; the
deepening of the consciousness accompanied at the same time by a
narrowing and isolation of it, and the loss of a lively interest in the
outer world, and in the simple scientific study thereof.
[C. Development of post-Aristotelian philosophy.]
[(1) Dogmatic Schools.]
[(a) Stoics and Epicureans.]
This mental habit, first of all, found simple dogmatic expression in
philosophical systems. Not only moral science, but also logic and
natural science, were treated in a way consonant with it, although they
were partially built upon older views. In dealing with the moral
problem, two Schools come to view, markedly different and decided in
their peculiarities. The Stoics regard almost exclusively the universal
element in man who seeks contentment within, the Epicureans catch at
the individual side of his being. The Stoics regard man exclusively as
a thinking being, the Epicureans as a creature of feeling. The Stoics
make happiness to consist in subordination to the law of the whole, in
the suppression of personal feelings and inclinations, in virtue; the
Epicureans in individual independence of everything external, in the
unruffled serenity of the inner life, in painlessness. The theoretical
bases of their teaching correspond with these fundamental ethical
positions.
[(b) Dogmatic scepticism.]
Although the rivalry between these two Schools was great, both,
nevertheless, stand on the same platform. Absolute composure of mind,
freedom of the inner life from all disturbance from without, is the
goal at which both aim, although they follow different methods. Hence
it becomes necessary to insist on the common element as the essential
aim and matter of philosophy. If the philosophic axioms of the two
systems contradict one another, it may be thence inferred that the aim
of both may be attained independently of any definite dogmatic view; in
short, knowledge may be despaired of in order to pass from a
recognition of ignorance to a general indifference to everything and to
an unconditional repose of mind. Thus Scepticism is connected with
Stoicism and Epicureanism, as the third chief form of the philosophy of
that age. Apart from Pyrrho’s School, it is most effectually
represented in the New Academy.
[(2) Sceptical Schools.]
[(a) Influences producing Scepticism.]
[(α) Political influence of Rome.]
The rise, the growth, and the conflict of these three Schools, by the
side of which the older Schools have only a subordinate value, occupies
the first portion of the period of post-Aristotelian philosophy, and
extends from the end of the fourth to the beginning of the first
century before Christ. The distinctive features of this epoch consist
partly in the predominance of the above tendencies, and partly in their
separate existence, without modification by intermixture. After the
middle of the second century a gradual change may be observed. Greece
had then become a Roman province, and the intellectual intercourse
between Greece and Rome was continually on the increase. Many learned
Greeks resided at Rome, frequently as the companions of families of
high birth; others living in their own country, were visited by Roman
pupils. Was it possible that in the face of the clearly-defined and
sharply-expressed Roman character, the power and independence of the
Greek intellect, already unquestionably on the decline, would assert
its ancient supremacy? Or that Greeks could become the teachers of
Romans without accommodating themselves to their demands, and
experiencing in turn a reflex influence? Even Greek philosophy could
not withdraw itself from this influence. Its creative power was long
since in abeyance, and in Scepticism it had openly avowed that it could
place no trust in itself. To the practical sense of a Roman no
philosophical system commended itself which did not make for practical
results by the shortest possible route. To him practical needs were the
ultimate standard of truth. Little did he care for strict logic and
argumentative accuracy in scientific procedure. Differences of schools,
so long as they had no practical bearing, were for him of no
importance. No wonder that Greek philosophy, touched by the breath of
Rome, lent itself to Eclecticism!
[(β) Intellectual influence of Alexandria.]
Whilst on the one side of the world the Greeks were falling under the
influence of the nation that had subdued them, on the other they were
assimilating the views of the Oriental nations whom they had subdued by
martial as well as by mental superiority. For two centuries, in
philosophy at least, Greece had held her own against Oriental modes of
thought. Now that her intellectual incapacity continually increased,
those modes of thought gained for themselves a foothold in her
philosophy. Alexandria was the place where the connection of Greece
with the East was first and most completely brought about. In that
centre of commerce for all parts of the globe, East and West entered
into a connection more intimate and more lasting than in any other
centre. Nor was this connection a mere accident of circumstances; it
was also a work of political forecast. From its founder, Ptolemy Soter,
the Ptolemæan dynasty inherited as the principle of government the rule
always to combine what is native with what is foreign, and to clothe
new things in the old and venerable forms of Egyptian custom and
religious ceremony. At Alexandria, accordingly, there arose, towards
the beginning of the first century before Christ, a School calling
itself at first Platonic, afterwards Pythagorean, which later still, in
the shape of Neoplatonism, gained the ascendency over the whole domain
of philosophy. The very fact, however, that such a change in
philosophic views did not appear sooner, is sufficient to show that it
was produced by external circumstances. But notwithstanding external
circumstances it would never have come about had not the intellect of
Greece in the course of its own development been ripe for it.
[(b) Scepticism and Eclecticism.]
The same remark holds good of the rise of that practical Eclecticism
which we have before traced to the influence of Rome. Even in the
period of intellectual exhaustion, Greek philosophy was not simply the
resultant of its outward surroundings, but, under the influence of
outward surroundings, took shape in a way indicated by its previous
progress. If the lingering remains of a few small Schools, which soon
expired, are excepted, there existed, after the beginning of the third
century before Christ, only four great philosophic Schools—the
Peripatetic, the Stoic, the Epicurean, and the School of Platonists.
The last-named of these was converted to Scepticism by Arcesilaus.
These four Schools were all permanently established at Athens, where a
lively interchange of thought took place between them, which renders a
thorough comparison of their several teachings comparatively easy. It
was only natural that they would not long exist side by side without
making overtures towards union and agreement. These overtures were
favoured by Scepticism, which, denying the possibility of knowledge,
only allowed a choice between probabilities, and decided that choice by
the standard of practical needs. Hence, towards the close of the second
century before Christ, these philosophic Schools may be observed to
emerge more or less from their exclusiveness. An eclectic tendency
steals over philosophy, aiming not so much at scientific knowledge as
at attaining certain results for practical use. The distinctive
doctrines of each School drop into the background; and in the belief
that infallibility resides solely in the mind itself, such portions are
selected from each system as seem most in harmony with the selecting
mind. The germ of this eclectic mode of thought lay in Scepticism. On
the other hand, Eclecticism involves doubt. Hence, soon after the
Christian era, a new school of doubt developed, which continued until
the third century. There was thus, on the one hand, a lively interest
in knowledge, which was desired in the practical interest of religion
and morals; and, on the other hand, a disbelief in the truths of
existing knowledge, and, indeed, of knowledge generally, openly avowed
by some as Sceptics, secretly betrayed by others in the unsettledness
of their Eclecticism. These two currents coalescing, led to the thought
that truth, which cannot be found in knowledge, exists somewhere
outside of it, and must be looked for partly in the religious
traditions of the early days of Greece and the East, partly in direct
divine revelation. Then came in such a notion of God, and of His
relations to the world, as accords with this belief in revelation. Man
knowing that truth lies outside himself, and doubting his own
capacities to attain it, removes deity, as the absolute source of
truth, into another world; and because the need of a revelation of
truth still exists, the interval between God and the world is peopled
with intermediate beings, who are sometimes conceived of as
metaphysical entities, and at other times appear as the demons of
popular belief. This mental habit, which is connected with Plato and
Pythagoras, among the older systems, forms the transition to
Neoplatonism. The appearance of Neoplatonism introduces the last stage
in the development of Greek philosophy.
[(3) Religious School of Neoplatonists.]
Yet even this turn in Greek philosophy was not uninfluenced by the
circumstances of the times. Since the end of the second century after
Christ, the decline of the Roman Empire progressed apace. Dread of the
dangers which threatened it on all sides, the pressure of the times and
distress made startling progress. All means of defence hitherto
employed had proved unavailing to stem destruction. With ruin
everywhere impending, the desire and longing for higher assistance
increased. No such assistance was forthcoming from the old gods of Rome
or the religious faith of the day; despite which circumstances were
daily becoming more hopeless. Then it was that the desire for foreign
forms of worship which had been gradually spreading over the Roman
world since the last days of the Republic, and which the circumstances
of the Empire had stimulated, gained ground. That desire was favoured
by the highest power in the state, under the Oriental and half Oriental
emperors who for nearly half a century after Septimius Severus occupied
the imperial throne. The state and the gods of the state were
continually losing their hold on the respect of men. Meanwhile, on the
one hand, Oriental worships, mysteries old and new, and foreign heathen
religions of the most varying kinds, were ever gaining fresh adherents.
On the other, Christianity was rapidly acquiring a power which enabled
it openly to enter the lists for supremacy among the recognised
religions of the state. The powerful monarchs who about the middle of
the third century attempted to refound the Empire, had not for their
object to restore a specifically Roman form of government, but to bring
the various elements which composed the Empire under one sovereign will
by fixed forms of administration. In this attempt Diocletian and
Constantine succeeded. The Roman character asserted itself, as a ruling
and regulating power, but it did so under the influence of another
originally foreign character. The Empire was a congeries of nations
artificially held together, and arranged on a carefully-designed plan;
its centre of gravity lay not within the nation, but in the simple will
of the prince, himself exalted above all rules and laws of state, and
deciding everything without appeal and without responsibility.
In like manner Neoplatonism united all the elements of previous
philosophical Schools into one comprehensive and well-arranged system,
in which each class of existences had its definite place assigned to
it. The initial point in this system, the all-embracing unity, was a
being lying beyond the world, high above every notion that experience
and conception can supply, unmixed with the process of life going on in
the world, and from his unattainable height causing all things, but
himself subject to no conditions of causality. Neoplatonism is the
intellectual reproduction of Byzantine Imperialism. As Byzantine
Imperialism combines Oriental despotism with the Roman idea of the
state, so Neoplatonism supplements the scientific forms of Greek
philosophy with Oriental mysticism.
In Neoplatonism the post-Aristotelian philosophy had manifestly veered
round into its opposite. Self-dependence and the self-sufficingness of
thought made way for implicit resignation to higher powers, for a
craving for revelation, for an ecstatic departure from the sphere of
conscious mental activity. Man has abandoned the idea of truth within
for truth to be found only in God. God stands there as abstract
spirituality removed into another world in contrast to man and the
world of appearances. Speculation has but one aim—to explain the
procession of the finite from the infinite, and the conditions of its
return into the absolute; but neither of these problems can meet with a
satisfactory intellectual solution. Even this form of thought betrays
undeniably the personal character of the post-Aristotelian philosophy,
and is the natural outcome of previous teaching, as will be more fully
seen in the sequel. With it the creative powers of the Greek mind were
exhausted. After being driven step by step during centuries from the
platform of their own national philosophy, the Greeks were eventually
entirely dislodged therefrom by the victory of Christianity.
Neoplatonism made one more futile attempt to rescue the forms of Greek
culture from its mighty rival, but when that attempt failed Greek
religion and Greek philosophy went down together.
PART II.
THE STOICS.
CHAPTER III.
HISTORY OF THE STOICS UNTIL THE END OF THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.
A striking feature in the history of the post-Aristotelian philosophy,
and one which at the same time brings forcibly home the thorough change
in its surroundings, is the fact that so many of its representatives
come from eastern countries in which Greek and Oriental modes of
thought met and mingled. Although for centuries Athens still continued
to have the reputation of being the chief seat of Greek philosophy, and
did not cease to be one of the most important seminaries of philosophy,
even when it had to share that reputation with other cities, such as
Alexandria, Rome, Rhodes, and Tarsus, yet at Athens itself there were
teachers not a few whose foreign extraction indicates the age of
Hellenism. This remark applies primarily to the later Neoplatonic
School: next to it it is of none more true than of the Stoic. With this
fact may be also associated the world-citizenship of this School,
though it would be unfair to attribute a general characteristic of the
then state of the world to purely external circumstances. Nearly all
the most important Stoics before the Christian era belong by birth to
Asia Minor, to Syria, and to the islands of the Eastern Archipelago.
Then follow a series of Roman Stoics, by the side of whom the Phrygian
Epictetus occupies a prominent place; but Greece proper is represented
only by men of third or fourth rate capacity.
[A. Zeno.]
The founder of the Stoic School, Zeno [3] by name, was the son of
Mnaseas, [4] and a native of Citium [5] in Cyprus. Leaving his home, he
repaired to Athens, [6] about the year 320 B.C., [7] where he at first
joined the Cynic Crates. [8] He appears to have soon become disgusted
with the extravagances of the Cynics’ mode of life, [9] and his keen
desire for knowledge could find no satisfaction in a teaching so meagre
as theirs. [10] To supply their defects he had recourse to Stilpo, who
united to the moral teaching of the Cynics the logical acumen of the
Megarians. He also studied under Polemo, and it is said under
Xenocrates and Diodorus the logician, with whose pupil Philo [11] he
was on terms of intimacy. After a long course of intellectual
preparation, he at last appeared as a teacher, soon after the beginning
of the third, or perhaps during the last years of the fourth century
B.C. From the Stoa ποικιλὴ, the place which he selected for delivering
his lectures, his followers derived their name of Stoics, having first
been called after their master Zenonians. [12] Such was the universal
respect inspired by his earnestness, moral strictness, [13] and
simplicity of life, [14] and the dignity, modesty, and affability of
his conduct, [15] that Antigonus Gonatas vied with the city of Athens
in showing appreciation of him. [16] Although lacking smoothness of
style and using a language far from pure, [17] Zeno had nevertheless an
extensive following. Leading a life of singular moderation, he reached
an advanced age untouched by disease, although he naturally enjoyed
neither robust health nor an attractive person. [18] A slight injury
having at length befallen him, which he regarded as a hint of destiny,
he put an end to his own life. [19] His not very numerous writings [20]
have been lost, with the exception of a few fragments, some no doubt
dating from the time when, as a pupil of Crates, he adhered more
strictly to Cynic ideas than was afterwards the case. [21] This point
ought not to be forgotten in sketching his teaching.
[B. Pupils of Zeno.]
[(1) Cleanthes.]
The successor to the chair of Zeno was Cleanthes, [22] a native of
Assos in the Troad, [23] a man of strong and firm character, of unusual
endurance, energy, and contentment, but also slow of apprehension, and
somewhat heavy in intellect. Resembling Xenocrates in mind, Cleanthes
was in every way adapted to uphold his master’s teaching, and to
recommend it by the moral weight of his own character, but he was
incapable of expanding it more completely, or of establishing it on a
wider basis. [24]
[(2) Aristo and Herillus.]
Besides Cleanthes, the best known among the pupils of Zeno are Aristo
of Chios, [25] and Herillus of Carthage, [26] who diverged from his
teaching in the most opposite directions, Aristo confining himself
rigidly to Cynicism, Herillus approximating to the leading positions
held by the Peripatetic School.
[(3) Other pupils.]
Other pupils of Zeno were Persæus, a countryman and companion of Zeno;
[27] Aratus, the well-known poet of Soli; [28] Dionysius of Heraclea in
Pontus, who afterwards joined the Cyrenaic or Epicurean School; [29]
and Sphærus from the Bosporus, who studied first in the School of Zeno,
and afterwards in that of Cleanthes, and was the friend and adviser of
Cleomenes, the unfortunate Spartan reformer. [30] Of a few other pupils
of Zeno the names are also known; [31] but nothing beyond their names.
No appreciable addition was made to the Stoic doctrine by any one of
them.
[C. Chrysippus and the later Stoics.]
[(1) Chrysippus.]
It was therefore fortunate for Stoicism that Cleanthes was followed in
the presidency of the School by a man of learning and argumentative
power like Chrysippus. [32] In the opinion of the ancients, Chrysippus
was the second founder of Stoicism. [33] Born [34] in the year 280
B.C., [35] at Soli in Cilicia, [36] after being a pupil of Cleanthes
[37] and it is said even of Zeno [38] himself, he succeeded, on the
death of Cleanthes, to the conduct of his School. [39] He is also said
to have attended the lectures of Arcesilaus and Lacydes, philosophers
of the Middle Academy; [40] whose critical methods he so thoroughly
appropriated, that later Stoics accused him of furnishing Carneades
with the necessary weapons for attacking them, [41] by the masterly
manner in which he raised philosophical doubts without being able to
answer them satisfactorily. This critical acuteness and skill, more
than anything else, entitle him to be regarded as the second founder of
Stoicism. [42] In learning, too, he was far in advance of his
predecessors, and passed for the most industrious and learned man of
antiquity. [43] Independent in tone, as his general conduct and
intellectual self-reliance [44] often proved, [45] he deviated from the
teaching of Zeno and Cleanthes, as might be expected, in many respects.
[46] Still, the fundamental principles of the system were not altered
by him; only their intellectual treatment was perfected and deepened.
In fact, the Stoic doctrine was expanded by him with such completeness
in details, that hardly a gleaning was left for his successors to
gather up. [47] In multitude of writings [48] he exceeded Epicurus;
[49] their titles, and a comparatively small number of fragments, being
all that have come down to us. [50] With such an extraordinary literary
fertility, it will be easily understood that their artistic value is
not very high. The ancients are unanimous in complaining of their
careless and impure language, of their dry and often obscure style, of
their prolixity, their endless repetitions, their frequent and lengthy
citations, and their too frequent appeals to etymologies, authorities,
and other irrelevant proofs. [51] But by Chrysippus the Stoic teaching
was brought to completeness; and when he died, in the year 206 B.C.,
[52] the form was in every respect fixed in which Stoicism would be
handed down for the next following centuries.
[(2) Later Stoics.]
A cotemporary of Chrysippus, but probably somewhat his senior, was
Teles, from whose writings a few extracts [53] have been preserved by
Stobæus, [54] in the shape of popular moral considerations written from
a Cynic or Stoical point of view. The same age also produced the
Cyrenaic Eratosthenes, [55] a man distinguished in every branch of
knowledge, but particularly celebrated for his mathematical
attainments, who was gained for Stoicism by Aristo. [56] Another
cotemporary of Chrysippus, and perhaps his fellow-student, [57] who in
many respects approximated to the teaching of the Peripatetics, [58]
was the Stoic Boëthus. The proper scholars of Chrysippus were without
doubt numerous; [59] but few of their names are known to us. [60] The
most important among them appear to have been Zeno of Tarsus, [61] and
Diogenes of Seleucia, [62] who succeeded Chrysippus in the presidency
of the School. [63] The pupil and successor of Diogenes, in his turn,
was Antipater of Tarsus, [64] in connection with whom Archedemus his
countryman is frequently mentioned. [65] Under Panætius, Antipater’s
scholar, Stoicism entered the Roman world, and there underwent internal
changes, to which attention will be drawn in the sequel. [66]
CHAPTER IV.
AUTHORITIES FOR THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY: ITS PROBLEM AND DIVISIONS.
[A. Authorities for the Stoic philosophy.]
[(1) Review of authorities.]
To give a faithful exposition of the Stoic philosophy is a work of more
than ordinary difficulty, owing to the circumstance that all the
writings of the earlier Stoics, with the exception of a few fragments,
have been lost. [67] Those Stoics whose complete works are still
extant—Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Heraclitus, Cornutus—lived
under the Roman Empire, and therefore belong to a time in which all
Schools alike exposed to foreign influences had surrendered or lost
sight of many of their original peculiarities, and had substituted new
elements in their place. The same remark applies to writers like
Cicero, Plutarch, Diogenes, Sextus Empiricus, and the commentators on
Aristotle, who may be considered as authorities at second hand for the
teaching of the Stoics; but it is more than doubtful whether everything
which they mention as Stoic teaching really belongs to the older
members of that School. That teaching can, however, be ascertained with
sufficient certainty on most of the more important points, partly by
comparing accounts when they vary, partly by looking to definite
statements on which authorities agree for the teaching and points of
difference between individual philosophers, such as Zeno, Cleanthes,
Chrysippus; partly too by consulting such fragments of their writings
as are still extant. Yet, when the chief points have been settled in
this way, many difficulties still remain. In the first place, it will
be found that only isolated points of their teaching, with at most a
few arguments on which to base them, are recorded; but the real
connection of their tenets, and the motives which gave rise to them,
can only be known by conjecture. Had the writings of Zeno and
Chrysippus come down to us in their entirety, we should have had a much
surer foundation on which to build, and far less would have been left
to conjecture. An opportunity, too, would then have been afforded of
tracing the inward growth of the Stoic teaching, and of deciding how
much of that teaching was due to Zeno, and how much to Chrysippus. That
this work of discrimination can now only be done very imperfectly, is
the second difficulty, and it arises from the nature of the
authorities. It may be ascertained without difficulty what the teaching
of the Stoics was since the time of Chrysippus, but only on a few
points are the differences between Chrysippus and his predecessors
known. For the most part, the authorities do not hesitate to attribute
to the founder of the School all that was known to them as belonging to
its later members, just as everything Pythagorean was directly
attributed to Pythagoras, and everything Platonic to Plato. Still,
there can be no doubt that the Stoic teaching was very considerably
expanded by Chrysippus, and altered in many ways. But how considerable
the alterations were, and in what they consisted, are questions upon
which there is little direct evidence.
[(2) Use to be made of authorities.]
The path is thus marked out, which must be followed in giving an
exposition of the Stoic philosophy. If full information were
forthcoming respecting the rise of the Stoic system and the form it
assumed under each one of its representatives, it would be most natural
to begin by reviewing the motives which led Zeno to his peculiar
teaching, and by describing the system as it grew up. Next it would be
right to trace step by step the changes and expansions which it
received at the hands of each succeeding teacher. In default of the
necessary information for such a treatment of the subject, it will be
better to pursue another course. The Stoic teaching will have to be
treated as a whole, in which the contributions of individuals can no
longer be distinguished. It will have to be set forth in the form which
it assumed after the time of Chrysippus. The share of individuals in
constructing the system, and their deviations from the general type,
cannot be considered, except in cases where they are placed beyond
doubt by the statements of the ancients, or by well-founded historical
surmises. Stoicism will have to be described in the first place as it
is traditionally known, without having its principles explained or
resolved into their component factors; without even considering how
they grew out of previous systems. Not till this has been done will it
be possible to analyse the purport and structure of the system, so as
to fathom its leading motives, to understand the connection of its
various parts, and thus to ascertain its true position in history.
[B. Problem proposed to the Stoic philosophy.]
Proceeding next to ask in what form the problem of philosophy presented
itself to the Stoics, three points deserve to be specially noticed. 1.
In the first place, philosophy was determined practically by an end in
view. 2. The character of this end was decided by the idea of
conformity with reason; and 3, this view was substantiated by
intellectual proof.
[(1) Its practical character.]
The real business of all philosophy, according to the Stoics, is the
moral conduct of man. Philosophy is the exercise of an art, and more
particularly of the highest art—virtue: [68] it is therefore the
learning of virtue. Now virtue can only be learnt by exercise, and
therefore philosophy is at the same time virtue, [69] and the several
parts of philosophy are so many distinct virtues. [70] Morality is the
central point towards which all other enquiries converge. Even natural
science, although lauded as the inmost shrine of philosophy, is,
according to Chrysippus, only necessary for the philosopher to enable
him to distinguish between things good and evil, between what should be
done and what should be left undone. [71] So far from approving pure
speculation, which Plato and Aristotle had commended as the height of
human happiness, Chrysippus plainly asserted that to live for
speculation is equivalent to living only for pleasure. [72] With this
view of Chrysippus most of the statements of the Stoics as to the
relation of various branches of philosophy to each other agree,
although there is a certain amount of vagueness about them, owing to
reasons which will shortly be mentioned; and on no other hypothesis can
the internal structure and foundation of their system be satisfactorily
explained. It is enough to remark here, as has been done before, [73]
that the most important and most distinctive points established by the
Stoic School belong to the sphere of ethics. In logic and natural
science the School displays far less independence, for the most part
following older teachers; and it is expressly noted, as a deviation
from the ordinary teaching of the School, that Herillus, the pupil of
Zeno, declared knowledge to be the highest good, thus making it the
chief end in philosophy. [74]
[(2) Necessity for intellectual knowledge.]
This view of the problem of philosophy is more precisely defined by the
Stoic doctrine of virtue. Philosophy should lead to right action and to
virtue. But right action is, according to the Stoics, only rational
action, and rational action is action which is in harmony with human
and inanimate nature. Virtue consists therefore in bringing man’s
actions into harmony with the laws of the universe, and with the
general order of the world. This is only possible when man knows that
order and those laws; and thus the Stoics are brought back to the
principles of Socrates, that virtue may be learnt; that knowledge is
indispensable for virtue, or rather that virtue is identical with right
knowledge. They define virtue in so many words as knowledge, vice as
ignorance. If sometimes they seem to identify virtue with strength of
will, it is only because they consider strength of will to be
inseparable from knowledge, so that the one cannot be conceived without
the other. Hence the practical study of philosophy conducts with them
to the intellectual; philosophy is not only virtue, but without
philosophy no virtue is possible. [75] Granting that the attainment of
virtue, and the happiness of a moral life, are the chief ends which the
Stoics propose to themselves, still the possession of a comprehensive
scientific knowledge is indispensable, as the only means thereto.
[(3) Position towards logic and natural science.]
[(a) Aristo’s views.]
These remarks prove the need for the Stoics of that kind of scientific
knowledge which has to do with life, the morals and the actions of
mankind, in short, of Ethics. Whether further scientific knowledge is
necessary, was a question on which the earliest adherents of the Stoic
teaching expressed different opinions. Zeno’s pupil, Aristo of Chios,
held that the sole business of man is to pursue virtue, [76] and that
the sole use of language is to purify the soul. [77] This purifying
process, however, is neither to be found in logical subtleties nor in
natural science. Logic, as doing more harm than good, he compared to a
spider’s web, which is as useless as it is curious; [78] or else to the
mud on a road. [79] Those who studied it he likened to people eating
lobsters, who take a great deal of trouble for the sake of a little bit
of meat enveloped in much shell. [80] Convinced, too, that the wise man
is free from every deceptive infatuation, [81] and that doubt, for the
purpose of refuting which logic has been invented, can be more easily
overcome by a healthy tone of mind [82] than by argument, he felt no
particular necessity for logic. Nay, more, he considered that excessive
subtlety transforms the healthy action of philosophy into an unhealthy
one. [83] Just as little was Aristo disposed to favour the so-called
encyclical knowledge: those who devote themselves to this knowledge
instead of to philosophy he compared to the suitors of Penelope, who
won the maids but not the mistress. [84] Natural science would probably
have received a more favourable treatment at the hands of Aristo, had
he not shared the opinion of Socrates, that it is a branch of knowledge
which transcends the capacity of the human mind; [85] and having once
embraced this notion, he was inclined to pronounce all physical
enquiries useless. His attitude towards other sciences has therefore
been generally expressed by saying that he excluded from philosophy
both logic and natural science, on the ground that both are useless;
the former being irrelevant, and the latter transcending our powers.
[86] Even ethics was limited by Aristo to most fundamental notions—to
enquiries into good and evil, virtue and vice, wisdom and folly. The
special application of these notions to the moral problems suggested by
particular relations in life, he declared to be useless and futile;
proper for nursemaids and trainers of young children, but not becoming
for philosophers; [87] wherever there is a proper knowledge and a right
disposition, such particular applications will come of themselves
without teaching; but when these are wanting, all exhortations are
useless. [88]
[(b) Views of Zeno and Cleanthes.]
These views are mentioned as peculiar to Aristo, and as points in which
he differed from the rest of his School; and, to judge from his
controversial tone, the opposite views were those almost universally
entertained by Stoics. That controversial tone, in fact, appears to
have been directed not only against assailants from without—such as the
Peripatetics and Platonists—but far more against those members of the
Stoic School, who attached greater importance than he did to special
ethical investigations, and to logical and physical enquiries. Among
their number must have been Zeno and Cleanthes; for Zeno set the
example to his School of dividing philosophy into logic, ethics, and
natural science; [89] witness the titles of his logical and physical
treatises [90] and also the statements in reference to theoretical
knowledge and natural science which are expressly attributed to him.
Moreover, Zeno himself recommended to others, and himself pursued,
logical enquiries. [91] Indeed, his whole mental habit, [92] with its
keen appreciation of even the subtleties of the Megarians, bears
testimony to an intellectual type of thought which is far removed from
that of Aristo. [93] It was, moreover, Zeno who chose that curt and
unadorned logical style, which is found in its greatest perfection in
Chrysippus. [94] Logical and scientific treatises are also known to
have been written by Cleanthes, [95] who, in his division of
philosophy, allotted separate parts to logic, to rhetoric, and to
natural science, [96] and the name of Cleanthes is one of frequent
occurrence, not only in the natural science, but more particularly in
the theology of the Stoics. Still more exhaustive enquiries into logic
and natural science appear to have been set on foot by Sphærus. [97]
These prove that the energies of the Stoic School must have been
directed to these subjects before the time of Chrysippus, although
these branches of science were no doubt subservient to ethics, whilst
ethics held the most important and highest place in their philosophy.
At a later time, when Chrysippus had expanded the system of the Stoics
in every direction, and especial attention had been devoted to logic,
the necessity for these sciences came to be generally recognised. More
especially was this the case with regard to natural science, including
‘theology.’ All ethical enquiries must start, according to Chrysippus,
with considering the universal order and arrangement of the world. Only
by a study of nature, and a knowledge of what God is, can anything
really satisfactory be stated touching good and evil, and all that is
therewith connected. [98]
Less obvious is the connection between logic and the ultimate aim of
all philosophical enquiries. Logic is compared by the Stoics to the
shell of an egg, or to the wall of a city or garden; [99] and is
considered to be of importance, because it contributes towards the
discovery of truth and the avoiding of error. [100] The value of logic
in their eyes is, therefore, essentially due to its scientific method;
its proper aim is the art of technical reasoning; and thus, following
Aristotle, an unusually full treatment is allowed to the doctrine of
the syllogism. [101] That the value attached to logic must have been
considerable is proved by the extraordinary care which Chrysippus
devoted to the subject; [102] hence, the Stoics would never allow, in
dispute with the Peripatetics, that logic was only an instrument, and
not a part of philosophy. To later writers that stiff logical mode of
description, regardless of all beauty of language, appeared to be a
peculiarity of the Stoic school, [103] and hence that School was
characteristically known as the School of the Reasoners. [104] Frequent
instances will be found hereafter of the Stoic preference for dry
argument and formal logic; [105] in Chrysippus this fondness
degenerated to a dry formalism devoid of taste. [106]
[C. Divisions of philosophy.]
The foregoing remarks have already established the three main divisions
of philosophy [107] which were universally acknowledged by the Stoics
[108]—Logic, Natural Science, and Ethics. As regards the relative worth
and sequence of these divisions, very opposite views may be deduced
from the principles of the [(1) Threefold division.] Stoic teaching.
There can be no doubt, and, indeed, all are agreed in allowing, that
logic was subservient to the other two branches of science, being only
an outpost of the system. If therefore in arranging the parts the
advance is from the less important to the more important, logic will
hold the first place. It will occupy the last place if the opposite
mode of procedure is followed. But the relation existing between ethics
and natural science is an open question. On the one hand, ethics
appears to be the higher science, the crowning point of the system, the
subject towards which the whole philosophical activity of the School
was directed; for philosophy is practical knowledge, and its object is
to lead to virtue and happiness. On the other hand, virtue and the
destiny of man consist in conformity to the laws of nature, which it is
the province of science to investigate. Therefore, natural science has
the higher object. It lays down the universal laws which in ethics are
applied to man. To it, therefore, in the graduated scale of sciences,
belongs the higher rank.
[(2) Relative importance of each part.]
In attempting to harmonise these opposite considerations, the Stoics
did not always succeed. At one time natural science is preferred to
ethics, at another time ethics to natural science, [109] in the
enumeration of the several branches of philosophy. In the comparisons
by means of which their relations to each other were explained, [110]
ethics appears at one time, at another time natural science, to be the
aim and soul of the whole system. Different views were even entertained
in reference to the order to be followed in teaching these sciences.
[111] In describing the Stoic system, preference will be here given to
that arrangement which begins with logic and goes on to natural
science, ending with ethics; not only because that arrangement has
among its supporters the oldest and most distinguished adherents of the
Stoic School, but also because in this way the internal relation of the
three parts to each other can be most clearly brought out. Allowing
that, in many essential respects, natural science is modified by
ethical considerations; still, in the development of the system, the
chief results of science are used as principles on which ethical
doctrines are founded; and logic, although introduced later than the
other two branches of study, is the instrument by means of which they
are put into scientific shape. If the opportunity were afforded of
tracing the rise of the Stoic teaching in the mind of its founder, it
would probably be possible to show how the physical and logical parts
of the system gradually gathered around the original kernel of ethics.
But knowing Stoicism only as we do from the form which it attained
after the time of Chrysippus, it will be enough, in analysing that
form, to proceed from without to within, and to advance from logic
through natural science to ethics. When this has been done it will be
time to go back over the same ground, and to explain how from the
ethical tone of Stoicism its peculiar speculative tenets may be
deduced.
CHAPTER V.
LOGIC OF THE STOICS.
[A. General remarks.]
[(1) Field of logic.]
Under the head of Logic, in the Stoic use of the term after the time of
Chrysippus, a number of intellectual enquiries are included which would
not now be considered to belong to philosophy at all. One common
element, however, characterised them all—they all referred to the
formal conditions of thought and expression. Logic was primarily
divided into two parts, sharply marked off from each other, roughly
described as the art of speaking continuously and the art of
conversing. The former is known as Rhetoric, the latter as Dialectic.
[112] To these two was added, as a third part, the doctrine of a
standard of truth, or the theory of knowledge; and, according to some
authorities, [113] a fourth part, consisting of enquiries into the
formation of conceptions. By others, these enquiries were regarded as
the third main division, the theory of knowledge being included under
dialectic. [114] By rhetoric, however, little else was meant than a
collection of artificial rules, of no philosophical value; [115] and
dialectic was in great measure occupied with enquiries referring to
precision of expression. Dialectic is defined to be the science or art
of speaking well; [116] and since speaking well consists in saying what
is becoming and true, [117] dialectic is used to express the knowledge
of what is true or false, or what is neither one nor the other, [118]
correctness of expression being considered inseparable [(2) Words and
thoughts.] from correctness of thought. Words and thoughts are,
according to this view, the very same things regarded under different
aspects. The same idea (λόγος), which is a thought as long as it
resides within the breast, is a word as soon as it comes forth. [119]
Accordingly, dialectic consists of two main divisions, treating
respectively of utterance and the thing uttered, thoughts and words.
[120] Both divisions, again, have several subdivisions, [121] which are
only imperfectly known to us. [122] Under the science of utterance,
which was generally placed before the science of things uttered, [123]
are included, not only instruction as to sounds and speech, but also
the theories of poetry and music, these arts being ranked under the
head of the voice and of sound on purely external considerations. [124]
What is known of the teaching of the Stoics on these subjects,
consisting, as it does, of a mass of definitions, differences, and
divisions, has so little philosophical value, that it need not detain
attention longer. [125] Two parts only of the Stoic logic possess any
real interest—the theory of knowledge, and that part of dialectic which
treats of ideas, and which in the main agrees with our formal logic.
[B. Theory of knowledge.]
[(1) General character of this theory.]
The Stoic theory of knowledge turns about the enquiry for a criterion
or standard by which what is true in notions may be distinguished from
what is false. Since every kind of knowledge, no matter what be its
object, must be tested by this standard, it follows that the standard
cannot be sought in the subject-matter of notions, but, on the
contrary, in their form. The enquiry after a standard becomes therefore
identical with another—the enquiry as to what kind of notions supply a
knowledge that may be depended upon, or what activity of the power of
forming conceptions carries with it a pledge of its own truth. It is
impossible to answer these questions without investigating the origin,
the various kinds, and the value and importance of notions. Hence the
problem proposed to the Stoics is reduced to seeking by an analysis of
notions to obtain a universally valid standard by which their truth may
be tested.
Whether this enquiry was pursued by the older Stoics in all its
comprehensiveness is a point on which we have no information. Boëthus,
whose views on this subject were attacked by Chrysippus, had assumed
the existence of several standards, such as Reason, Perception, Desire,
Knowledge. Others, in the vaguest manner, had spoken of Right Reason
(ὀρθὸς λόγος) as being the standard of truth. [126] Hence it may be
inferred that before the time of Chrysippus the Stoics had no
distinctly developed theory of knowledge. Nevertheless there are
expressions of Zeno and Cleanthes still extant which prove that the
essential parts of the later theory were already held by these
philosophers, [127] although it is no doubt true that it first received
that scientific form in which alone it is known to us at the hands of
Chrysippus.
[(2) Prominent points in the theory of knowledge.]
The character of this theory of knowledge appears mainly in three
particulars:—(1) In the importance attached by the Stoics to the
impressions of the senses. This feature they inherited from the Cynics
and shared with the Epicureans. (2) In the exaltation of expression
into a conception—a trait distinguishing this from either of the two
other contemporary Schools. (3) In the practical turn given to the
question of a criterion or standard of truth. We proceed to the
expansion of this theory in detail.
[(a) Perceptions the result of impressions from without.]
The origin of all perceptions (φαντασίαι) may be referred to the action
of some object (φανταστὸν) on the soul, [128] the soul at birth
resembling a blank page, and only receiving definite features by
experience from without. [129] By the elder Stoics, this action of
objects on the soul was regarded as grossly material, Zeno defining a
perception to be an impression (τύπωσις) made on the soul, [130] and
Cleanthes took this definition so literally as to compare the
impression on the soul to the impression made by a seal on wax. [131]
Being himself a very exact pupil of Zeno, Cleanthes probably rendered
the views of Zeno correctly in this comparison. The difficulties of
this view were recognised by Chrysippus, who accordingly defined a
perception to be the change (ἑτεροίωσις) produced in the soul by an
object, or, more accurately, the change produced thereby in the ruling
part of the soul; [132] and whereas his predecessors had only
considered sensible things to be objects, he included among objects
conditions and activities of the mind. [133] The mode, however, in
which the change was produced in the soul did not further engage his
attention.
[(b) Conceptions formed from perceptions.]
It follows, as a necessary corollary from this view, that the Stoics
regarded sensation as the only source of all perceptions: the soul is a
blank leaf, sensation is the hand which fills it with writing. But this
is not all. Perceptions give rise to memory, repeated acts of memory to
experience, [134] and conclusions based on experience suggest
conceptions which go beyond the sphere of direct sensation. These
conclusions rest either upon the comparison, or upon the combination of
perceptions, or else upon analogy; [135] some add, upon transposition
and contrast. [136] The formation of conceptions by means of these
agencies sometimes takes place methodically and artificially, at other
times naturally and spontaneously. [137] [(α) Κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι formed
naturally.] In the latter way are formed the primary conceptions,
προλήψεις or κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, which were regarded by the Stoics as the
natural types of truth and virtue, and as the distinctive possession of
rational beings. [138] To judge by many expressions, it might seem that
by primary conceptions, or κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, [139] innate ideas were
meant; but this view would be opposed to the whole character and
connection of the system. In reality, these primary conceptions, or
κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, are only those conceptions which, by reason of the
nature of thought, can be equally deduced by all men from experience;
even the highest ideas, those of good and evil, having no other origin.
[140] The artificial formation of conceptions gives rise to knowledge,
which is defined by the Stoics to be a fixed and immovable conception,
or system of such conceptions. [141] Persistently maintaining, [(β)
Knowledge formed artificially.] on the one hand, that knowledge is a
system of artificial conceptions, impossible without a logical process,
they must, on the other hand, have felt it imperative from this
platform that knowledge should agree in its results with primary
conceptions, [142] agreement with nature being in every department
their watchword. For them it was as natural to derive support for their
system from a supposed agreement with nature, as it was easy for their
opponents to show that this agreement with nature was imaginary, and
that many of their assertions were wholly opposed to general opinions.
[143]
[(c) Relation of perceptions and conceptions.]
Perceptions, and the conclusions based upon them, [144] being thus,
according to the Stoics, the two sources of all notions, the further
question arises, How are these two sources related to each other? It
might have been expected that only perceptions would be stated to be
originally and absolutely true, since all general conceptions are based
on them. Nevertheless, the Stoics are far from saying so. Absolute
certainty of conviction they allow only to knowledge, and therefore
declare that the truth of the perceptions of the senses depends on
their relation to thought. [145] Truth and error do not belong to
disconnected notions, but to notions combined in the form of a
judgment, and a judgment is produced by an effort of thought. Hence
sensations, taken alone, are the source of no knowledge, knowledge
first arising when the activity of the understanding is allied to
sensation. [146] Or, starting from the relation of thought to its
object, since like can only be known by like according to the
well-known adage, the rational element in the universe can only be
known by the rational element in man. [147] But again, the
understanding has no other material to work upon but that supplied by
sensation, and general conceptions are only obtained from sensation by
conclusions. The mind, therefore, has the capacity of formally working
up the material supplied by the senses, but to this material it is
limited. Still, it can progress from perceptions to notions not
immediately given in sensation, such as the conceptions of what is good
and of God. And since, according to the Stoic teaching, material
objects only possess reality, the same vague inconsistency may be
observed in their teaching as has been noticed in Aristotle
[148]—reality attaching to individuals, truth to general notions. This
inconsistency, however, is more marked in their case than in that of
Aristotle, because the Stoics so far adhere to the Cynic nominalism
[149] as to assert that no reality attaches to thought. [150] Such an
assertion makes it all the more difficult to understand how greater
truth can be attributed to thought, unreal as it is said to be, than to
sensations of real and material objects. Do we then ask in what the
peculiar character of thought consists, the Stoics, following
Aristotle, reply that in thought the idea of universality is added to
that which presents itself in sensation as a particular. [151] More
importance was attached by them to another point—the greater certainty
which belongs to thought than to sensation. All the definitions given
above point to the immovable strength of conviction as the distinctive
feature of knowledge; [152] and of like import is the language
attributed to Zeno, [153] comparing simple sensation with an extended
finger, assent, as being the first activity of the power of judgment,
with a closed hand, conception with the fist, and knowledge with one
fist firmly grasped by the other. According to this view, the whole
difference between the four processes is one of degree, and depends on
the greater or less strength of conviction, on the mental exertion and
tension. [154] It is not an absolute difference in kind, but a relative
difference, a gradual shading off of one into the other.
[(d) The standard of truth.]
[(α) Practical need of such a standard.]
From these considerations it follows that in the last resort only a
relative distinction is left whereby the truth of notions may be
tested. Even the general argument for the possibility of knowledge
starts with the Stoics by practically taking something for granted.
Without failing to urge intellectual objections—and often most
pertinent ones [155]—against Scepticism, as was indeed natural,
particularly since the time of Chrysippus, [156] the Stoics
nevertheless specially took up their stand on one point, which was
this, that, unless the knowledge of truth were possible, it would be
impossible to act on fixed principles and convictions. [157] Thus, as a
last bulwark against doubt, practical needs are appealed to.
[(β) Irresistible perceptions the standard of truth.]
The same result is obtained from a special enquiry into the nature of
the standard of truth. If the question is asked, How are true
perceptions distinguished from false ones? the immediate reply given by
the Stoics is, that a true perception is one which represents a real
object as it really is. [158] You are no further with this answer, and
the question has again to be asked, How may it be known that a
perception faithfully represents a reality? The Stoics can only reply
by pointing to a relative, but not to an absolute, test—the degree of
strength with which certain perceptions force themselves on our notice.
By itself a perception does not necessarily carry conviction or assent
(συγκατάθεσις); for there can be no assent until the faculty of
judgment is directed towards the perception, either for the purpose of
allowing or of rejecting it, truth and error residing in judgment.
Assent therefore, generally speaking, rests with us, as does also the
power of decision; and a wise man differs from a fool quite as much by
conviction as by action. [159] Some of our perceptions are, however, of
such a kind that they at once oblige us to bestow on them assent,
compelling us not only to regard them as probable, but also as true
[160] and conformable to the actual nature of things. Such perceptions
produce in us that strength of conviction which the Stoics call a
conception; they are therefore termed conceptional perceptions.
Whenever a perception forces itself upon us in this irresistible form,
we are no longer dealing with a fiction of the imagination, but with
something real; but whenever the strength of conviction is wanting, we
cannot be sure of the truth of our perception. Or, expressing the same
idea in the language of Stoicism, conceptional or irresistible
perceptions, φαντασίαι καταληπτικαὶ, are the standard of truth. [161]
The test of irresistibility [(γ) Primary conceptions a standard as well
as irresistible perceptions.] (κατάληψις) was, in the first place,
understood to apply to sensations from without, such sensations,
according to the Stoic view, alone supplying the material for
knowledge. An equal degree of certainty was, however, attached to terms
deduced from originally true data, either by the universal and natural
exercise of thought, or by scientific processes of proof. Now, since
among these derivative terms some—the primary conceptions (κοιναὶ
ἔννοιαι), for instance—serve as the basis for deriving others, it may
in a certain sense be asserted that sensation and primary conceptions
are both standards of truth. [162] In strict accuracy, neither
sensation nor primary conceptions (πρόληψεις) can be called standards.
The real standard, whereby the truth of a perception is ascertained,
consists in the power, inherent in certain perceptions, of carrying
conviction—τὸ καταληπτικὸν—a power which belongs, in the first place,
to sensations, whether of objects without or within, and, in the next
place, to primary conceptions formed from them in a natural way—κοιναὶ
ἔννοιαι or προλήψεις. On the other hand, conceptions and terms formed
artificially can only have their truth established by being subjected
to a scientific process of proof. How, after these statements, the
Stoics could attribute a greater strength of conviction to artificial
than to primary conceptions; [163] how they could raise doubts as to
the trustworthiness of simple sensations, [164] is one of the paradoxes
of the Stoic system, which prove the existence, as in so many other
systems, of a double current of thought. There is, on the one hand, a
seeking for what is innate and original, a going back to nature, an
aversion to everything artificial and of human device, inherited by
Stoicism from its ancestral Cynicism. On the other hand, there is a
desire to supplement the Cynic appeal to nature by a higher culture,
and to assign scientific reasons for truths which the Cynics laid down
as self-evident.
The latter tendency will alone explain the care and precision which the
Stoics devoted to studying the forms and rules which govern
intellectual processes. Attention to this branch of study may be
noticed in Zeno and his immediate successors at the first separation of
Stoicism from Cynicism. [165] Aristo is the only Stoic who is opposed
to it, his whole habit of mind being purely that of a Cynic. In
Chrysippus it attained its greatest development, and by Chrysippus the
formal logic of the Stoics reached scientific completeness. In later
times, when Stoicism reverted more nearly to its original Cynic type,
and appealed directly to the immediate suggestions of the mind, it lost
its interest in logic, as may be observed in Musonius, Epictetus, and
others. For the present, however, let it suffice to consider the logic
of Chrysippus, as far as that is known to us.
[C. Formal logic.]
[(1) Utterance in general.]
The term formal logic is here used to express those investigations
which the Stoics included under the doctrine of utterance. [166] The
common object of those enquiries is that which is thought, or, as the
Stoics called it, that which is uttered (λεκτόν), understanding thereby
the substance of thought—thought regarded by itself as a distinct
something, differing alike from the external object to which it refers,
from the sound by which it is expressed, and from the power of mind
which produces it. For this reason, they maintain that only utterance
is not material; things are always material; even the process of
thought consists in a material change within the soul, and an uttered
word, in a certain movement of the atmosphere. [167] A question is here
suggested in passing, which should not be lost sight of, viz. How far
was it correct for the Stoics to speak of thoughts as existing, seeing
they are not material, since, according to their teaching, reality only
belongs to material things? [168]
Utterance may be either perfect or imperfect. It is perfect when it
contains a proposition; imperfect when the proposition is incomplete.
[169] The portion of logic, therefore, which treats of utterance falls
into two parts, devoted respectively to the consideration of complete
and incomplete expression.
[(2) Incomplete expression.]
[(a) The grammar of words.]
In the section devoted to incomplete expression, much is found which we
should include under grammar rather than under logic. Thus all
incomplete expressions are divided into two groups—one group includes
proper names and adjectives, the other includes verbs. [170] These two
groups are used respectively to express what is essential and what is
accidental, [171] and are again divided into a number of subdivisions
and varieties. [172] To this part of logic investigations into the
formation and division of conceptions, and the doctrine of the
categories, properly belong; but it cannot be said with certainty what
place they occupy in the logic of the Stoics. [173]
Certain it is that these researches introduced little new matter. All
that is known of the Stoic views in reference to the formation, the
mutual relation and the analysis of conceptions, differs only from the
corresponding parts in the teaching of Aristotle by the change of a few
expressions, and a slightly altered order of treatment. [174]
[(b) The Stoic Categories.]
Of greater importance is the Stoic doctrine of the categories. [175] In
this branch of logic, the Stoics again follow Aristotle, but not
without deviating from him in three points. Aristotle referred his
categories to no higher conception, but looked upon them severally as
the highest class-conceptions; the Stoics referred them all to one
higher conception. Aristotle enumerated ten categories; the Stoics
thought that they could do with four, [176] which four only partially
coincide with those of Aristotle. Aristotle placed the categories side
by side, as co-ordinate, so that no object could come under a second
category in the same respect in which it came under the first one;
[177] the Stoics placed them one under the other, as subordinate, so
that every preceding category is more accurately determined by the next
succeeding one.
[(α) Highest Conception—an indefinite Something.]
The highest conception of all was apparently by the older Stoics
declared to be the conception of Being. Since, however, speaking
strictly, only what is material can be said to have any being, and many
of our notions refer to incorporeal and therefore unreal objects, the
conception of Something [178] was in later times put in the place of
the conception of Being. This indefinite Something comprehends alike
what is material and what is not material—in other words, what has
being and what has not being; and the Stoics appear to have made this
contrast the basis of a real division of things. [179] When it becomes
a question, however, of formal elementary conceptions or categories,
other points are emphasised which have no connection with the division
into things material and things not material. Of this kind are the four
highest conceptions, [180]—all subordinate to the conception of
Something, viz. subject-matter or substance (τὸ ὑποκείμενον) property
or form (τὸ ποιὸν), variety (τὸ πὼς ἔχον), and variety of relation (τὸ
πρός τί πως ἔχον). [181]
[(β) Category of subject-matter or substance.]
The first of these categories [182] denotes the subject-matter of
things in themselves (τὸ ὑποκείμενον), the material of which they are
made, irrespective of any and every quality, [183] the something which
underlies all definite being, and which alone has a substantial value.
[184] Following Aristotle, the Stoics distinguish, [185] in this
category of matter, between matter in general, or universal matter, and
the particular matter or material out of which individual things are
made. The former alone is incapable of being increased or diminished.
Far otherwise is the material of which particular things are made. This
can be increased and diminished, and, indeed, is ever undergoing
change; so much so, that the only feature which continues the same
during the whole term of its existence [186] and constitutes its
identity, is its quality.
[(γ) The category of property.]
The second category, that of property [187] or form, comprises all
those essential attributes, by means of which a definite character is
impressed on matter otherwise indeterminate. [188] If the definite
character be one which belongs to a group or class, it is called a
common quality—κοινῶς ποιόν·—or, if it be something peculiar and
distinctive, it is called a distinctive quality—ἰδίως ποιόν. [189]
Properties therefore combined with matter constitute the special
materials out of which individual things are made; [190] and quality in
this combination (ποιόν), corresponds, as Trendelenburg has well shown,
[191] with the form (εἶδος) of Aristotle. [192] It may, in fact, like
that, be described as the active and efficient part of a thing. [193]
Aristotle’s form, however, expresses only the non-material side of a
thing, whereas quality is regarded by the Stoics as something
material—in fact, as an air-current. [194] Hence the mode in which a
quality is conceived to reside in matter is that of an intermingling of
elements. [195] The same theory of intermingling applies of course to
the union of several properties in one and the same matter, [196] and
likewise to the combination of several attributes to produce a single
conception of quality. [197] In all cases the relation is supposed to
be materialistic, and is explained by the doctrine of the mutual
interpenetration of material things. [198] This explanation, indeed,
could not apply to every kind of attributes. Unable to dispense
entirely with things not material, [199] the Stoics were obliged to
admit the existence of attributes belonging to immaterial things, these
attributes being, of course, themselves not material. [200] What idea
they formed to themselves of these incorporeal attributes, when reality
was considered to belong only to things corporeal, it is, of course,
impossible for us to say. [201]
[(δ) The categories of variety and variety of relation.]
The two remaining categories include everything which may be excluded
from the conception of a thing on the ground of being either
non-essential or accidental. In as far as such things belong to an
object taken by itself alone, they come under the category of variety
(πὼς ἔχον); but when they belong to it, because of its relation to
something else, they come under the category of variety of relation
(πρός τί πως ἔχον). Variety includes all accidental qualities, which
can be assigned to any object independently of its relation to any
other object. [202] Size, colour, place, time, action, passion,
possession, motion, state, in short, all the Aristotelian categories,
with the exception of substance, whenever they apply to an object
independently of its relation to other objects, belong to the category
of variety [203] (πὼς ἔχον). On the other hand, those features and
states which are purely relative—such as right and left, sonship and
fatherhood, &c.—come under the category of variety of relation (πρός τί
πως ἔχον); and from this category the simple notion of relation (πρὸς
τὶ) must be distinguished. Simple relation (πρὸς τὶ) is not treated as
a distinct category, since it includes not only accidental relations,
but also those essential properties (ποιὰ) which presuppose a definite
relation to something else—such as knowledge and perception. [204]
[(c) Relation of the categories to one another.]
The relation of these four categories to one another is such, that each
preceding category is included in the one next following, and receives
from it a more definite character. [205] Substance never occurs in
reality without property, but has always some definite quality to give
it a character. On the other hand, property is never met with alone,
but always in connection with some subject-matter. [206] Variety
presupposes some definite substance, and variety of relation supposes
the existence of variety. [207] It will hereafter be seen how closely
these deductions, and, indeed, the whole doctrine of the categories,
depend on the metaphysical peculiarities of the Stoic system.
[(3) Complete utterance.]
[(a) Judgment.]
Passing from incomplete to complete utterance, we come, in the first
place, to sentences or propositions, [208] all the various kinds of
which, as they may be deduced from the different forms of syntax, are
enumerated by the Stoics with the greatest precision. [209] Detailed
information is, however, only forthcoming in reference to the theory of
judgment (ἀξίωμα), which certainly occupied the chief and most
important place in their speculations. A judgment is a perfect
utterance, which is either true or false. [210] Judgments are divided
into two classes: simple judgments, and composite judgments. [211] By a
simple judgment the Stoics understand a judgment which is purely
categorical. [212] Under the head of composite judgments are comprised
hypothetical, corroborative, copulative, disjunctive, comparative, and
causal [(α) Simple judgment.] judgments. [213] In the case of simple
judgments, a greater or less definiteness of expression is substituted
in place of the ordinary difference in respect of quantity; [214] and
with regard to quality, they not only make a distinction between
affirmative and negative judgments, [215] but, following the various
forms of language, they speak of judgments of general negation,
judgments of particular negation, and judgments of double negation.
[216] Only affirmative and negative judgments have a contradictory
relation to one another; all other judgments stand to each other in the
relation of contraries. [217] Of two propositions which are related as
contradictories, according to the old rule, one must be true and the
other false. [218]
[(β) Composite judgments.]
Among composite judgments the most important are the hypothetical and
the disjunctive. As regards the latter, next to no information has
reached us. [219] A hypothetical judgment (συνημμένον) is a judgment
consisting of two clauses, connected by the conjunction ‘if,’ and
related to one another as cause and effect; the former being called the
leading (ἡγούμενον), and the latter the concluding or inferential
clause (λῆγον). [220] In the correctness of the inference the truth of
a hypothetical judgment consists. As to the conditions upon which the
accuracy of an inference rests, different opinions were entertained
within the Stoic School itself. [221] In as far as the leading clause
states something, from the existence of which an inference may be drawn
for the statement in the concluding clause, it is also called an
indication or suggestive sign. [222]
[(γ) Modality of judgments.]
The modality of judgments, which engaged the attention of Aristotle and
his immediate pupils so much, was likewise treated by the Stoics at
considerable length; but of this branch of enquiry so much only is
known to us as concerns possible and necessary judgments, and it is the
outcome chiefly of the contest between Chrysippus and the Megarian
Diodorus. [223] It is in itself of no great value. By the Stoics,
nevertheless, great value was attached to it, in the hope of escaping
thereby the difficulties which necessarily result from their views on
freedom and necessity. [224]
[(b) Inference.]
In their theory of illation, [225] to which the Stoics attached special
value, and on which they greatly prided themselves, [226] chief
attention was paid to hypothetical and disjunctive inferences. [227] In
regard to these forms of inference, the rules they laid down are well
known: [228] and from these forms they invariably take their examples,
even when treating of inference [(α) Hypothetical inference the
original form.] in general. [229] According to Alexander, [230] the
hypothetical and disjunctive forms are held to be the only regular
forms of inference; [231] the categorical form is considered correct in
point of fact, but defective in syllogistic form. [232] In hypothetical
inferences a distinction was also made between such as are connected
and such as are disconnected. [233] In connected inferences the Stoics
look principally at the greater or less accuracy of expression, [234]
and partly at the difference between correctness of form and truth of
matter. [235] They also remark that true conclusions do not always
extend the field of knowledge; and that those which do frequently
depend on reasons conclusive for the individual, but not on proofs
universally acknowledged. [236] The main point, however, to be
considered in dividing inferences is their [(β) The five simple forms
of hypothetical inference.] logical form. There are, according to
Chrysippus, [237] who herein adopted the division of Theophrastus, five
original forms of hypothetical inference, the accuracy of which is
beyond dispute, and to which all other forms of inference may be
referred and by which they may be tested. [238] Yet even among these
five, importance is attached to some in which the same sentence is
repeated tautologically in the form of a conclusion, [239] which proves
how mechanical and barren must have been the formalism with which the
Stoic logic abounds.
[(γ) Composite forms of inference.]
The combination of these five simple forms of inference gives rise to
the composite forms of inference, [240] all of which may be again
resolved into their simple forms. [241] Among composite forms of
inference, those composed of similar parts are distinguished from those
composed of dissimilar parts; [242] in the treatment of the former,
however, such a useless formality is displayed, that it is hard to say
what meaning the Stoics attached to them. [243] If two or more
inferences, the conclusion of one of which is the first premiss of the
other, are so combined that the judgment which constitutes the
conclusion and premiss at once is omitted in each case, the result is a
Sorites or Chain-inference. The rules prescribed by the Peripatetics
for the Chain-inference are developed by the Stoics with a minuteness
far transcending all the requirements of science. [244] With these [(δ)
Inference from a single premiss.] composite forms of inference
Antipater contrasted other forms having only a single premiss, [245]
but it was an addition to the field of logic of very doubtful worth. On
a few other points connected with the Stoic theory of illation, we have
very imperfect information. [246] The loss, however, is not to be
regretted, seeing that in what we already possess there is conclusive
evidence that the objections brought against the Stoic logic were
really well deserved, because of the microscopic care expended by them
on the most worthless logical forms. [247]
[(c) Refutation of fallacies.]
Next to describing inferences which are valid, another subject engaged
the close attention of the Stoics, and afforded opportunity for
displaying their dialectical subtlety. This is the enumeration and
refutation of false inferences, [248] and in particular the exposing of
the many fallacies which had become current since the age of the
Sophists and Megarians. In this department, as might be expected,
Chrysippus led the way. [249] Not that Chrysippus was always able to
overcome the difficulties that arose; witness his remarkable attitude
towards the Chain-inference, from which he thought to escape by
withholding judgment. [250] The fallacies, however, to which the Stoics
devoted their attention, and the way in which they met them, need not
occupy our attention further. [251]
[D. Estimate of Stoic Logic.]
[(1) Its shortcomings.]
In all these researches the Stoics were striving to find firm ground
for a scientific process of proof. Great as was the value which they
attached to such a process, they nevertheless admitted, as Aristotle
had done before, that everything could not be proved. Here was their
weak point. Instead, however, of strengthening this weak point by means
of induction, and endeavouring to obtain a more complete theory of
induction, they were content with conjectural data, sometimes
self-evident, at other times depending for their truth on the truth of
their inferences. [252] Thus, their theory of method, like their theory
of knowledge, ended by an ultimate appeal to what is directly certain.
[(2) Its value.]
No very high estimate can therefore be formed of the formal logic of
the Stoics. Incomplete as our knowledge of that logic may be, still
what is known is enough to determine the judgment absolutely. We see
indeed that the greatest care was expended by the Stoics since the time
of Chrysippus in tracing the forms of intellectual procedure into their
minutest ramifications, and referring them to fixed types. At the same
time, we see that the real business of logic was lost sight of in the
process, the business of portraying the operations of thought, and
giving its laws, whilst the most useless trifling with forms was
recklessly indulged in. The Stoics can have made no discoveries of
importance even as to logical forms, or they would not have been passed
over by writers ever on the alert to note the slightest deviation from
the Aristotelian logic. Hence the whole contribution of the Stoics to
the field of logic consists in their having clothed the logic of the
Peripatetics with a new terminology, and having developed certain parts
of it with painful minuteness, whilst they wholly neglected other
parts, as was the fate of the part treating of inference. Assuredly it
was no improvement for Chrysippus to regard the hypothetical rather
than the categorical as the original form of inference. Making every
allowance for the extension of the field of logic, in scientific
precision it lost more than it gained by the labours of Chrysippus. The
history of philosophy cannot pass over in silence this branch of the
Stoic system, so carefully cultivated by the Stoics themselves, and so
characteristic of their intellectual attitude. Yet, when all has been
said, the Stoic logic is only an outpost of their system, and the care
which was lavished on it since the time of Chrysippus indicates the
decline of intellectual originality.
CHAPTER VI.
THE STUDY OF NATURE. FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS.
Of far more importance in the Stoic system than the study of logic was
the study of nature. This branch of learning, notwithstanding an appeal
to older views, was treated by them with more independence than any
other. The subjects which it included may be divided under four heads,
viz.: 1. Fundamental positions; 2. The course, character, and
government of the universe; 3. Irrational nature; and 4. Man. [253]
The present chapter will be devoted to considering the first of these
groups—the fundamental positions held by the Stoics in regard to
nature; among which three specially deserve notice—their Materialism;
their Dynamical view of the world; and their Pantheism.
[A. Materialism.]
[(1) Meaning of the Stoic materialism.]
[(a) Material or corporeal objects.]
[(α) Reality belongs to material objects only.]
Nothing appears more striking to a reader fresh from the study of Plato
or Aristotle than the startling contrast to those writers presented by
the Materialism of the Stoics. Whilst so far following Plato as to
define a real thing [254] to be anything possessing the capacity of
acting or being acted upon, the Stoics nevertheless restricted the
possession of this power to material objects. Hence followed their
conclusion that nothing real exists except what is material; or, if
they could not deny existence in some sense or other to what is
incorporeal, they were fain to assert that essential and real Being
only belongs to what is material, whereas of what is incorporeal only a
certain modified kind of Being can be predicated. [255] Following out
this view, it was natural that they should regard many things as
corporeal which are not generally considered such; for instance, the
soul and virtue. Nevertheless, it would not be correct to say [256]
that the Stoics gave to the conception of matter or corporeity a more
extended meaning than it usually bears. For they define a body to be
that which has three dimensions, [257] and they also lay themselves out
to prove how things generally considered to be incorporeal may be
material in the strictest sense of the term. Thus besides upholding the
corporeal character of all substances, including the human soul and
God, [258] they likewise assert that properties or forms are material:
all attributes by means of which one object is distinguished from
another are produced by the existence [(β) Theory of air-currents.] of
certain air-currents, [259] which, emanating from the centre of an
object, diffuse themselves to its extremities, and having reached the
surface, return again to the centre to constitute the inward unity.
[260] Nor was the theory of air-currents confined to bodily attributes.
It was applied quite as much to mental attributes. Virtues and vices
are said to be material, [261] and are deduced from the tension
imparted to the soul by atmospheric substances therein subsisting.
[262] For the same reason the Good is called a body, for according to
the Stoics the Good is only a virtue, and virtue is a definite
condition of that material which constitutes the soul. [263] In the
same sense also truth is said to be material, personal and not
independent, truth being of course meant, [264] that is to say,
knowledge, or a property of the soul that knows. And since according to
the Stoics knowledge consists in the presence of certain material
elements within the soul, truth in the sense of knowledge may be
rightly called something material. Even emotions, impulses, notions and
judgments, in so far as they are due to material causes—the
air-currents pouring into the soul (πνεύματα)—were regarded as material
objects, and for the same reason not only artistic skill but individual
actions were said to be corporeal. [265] Yet [(γ) The causes of
actions material.] certain actions, such as walking and dancing, can
hardly have been called bodies by the Stoics, any more than being wise
was called a body; [266] but the objects which produced these actions,
as indeed everything which makes itself felt, were considered to be
corporeal. To us it appears most natural to refer these actions to the
soul as their originating cause; but the Stoics, holding the theory of
subject-matter and property, preferred to refer each such action to
some special material as its cause, considering that an action is due
to the presence of this material. The idealism of Plato was thus
reproduced in a new form by the materialism of the Stoics. Plato had
said, a man is just and musical when he participates in the idea of
justice and music; the Stoics said, a man is virtuous when the material
producing virtue is in him; musical, when he has the material producing
music.
[(δ) Wide extension of material.]
Moreover, these materials produce the phenomena of life. Hence, not
content with calling them bodies, the Stoics actually went so far as to
call them living beings. It seems, however, strange to hear such things
as day and night, and parts of the day and parts of the night, months
and years, even days of the month and seasons of the year, called
bodies; [267] but by these singularly unhappy expressions Chrysippus
appears to have meant little more than that the realities corresponding
to these names depend on certain material conditions: by summer is
meant a certain state of the air when highly heated by the sun; by
month the moon for a certain definite period during which it gives
light to the earth. [268] From all these examples one thing is clear,
how impossible the Stoics found it to assign reality to what is not
material.
[(b) The incorporeal or non-material.]
In carrying out this theory, they could not, as might be expected,
wholly succeed. Hence a Stoic could not deny that there are certain
things which it is absurd to call material. Among such include empty
space, place, time, and expression (λεκτόν). [269] Admitting these to
be incorporeal, they still would not allow that they do not exist at
all. This view belongs only to isolated members of the Stoic School,
for which they must be held personally responsible. [270] How they
could harmonise belief in incorporeal things with their tenet that
existence alone belongs to what is material is not on record.
[(2) Causes which produced the Stoic materialism.]
The question next before us is: What led the Stoics to this
materialism? It might be supposed that their peculiar theory of
knowledge based on sensation was the cause; but this theory did not
preclude the possibility of advancing from the sensible to the
super-sensible. It might quite as well be said that their theory of
knowledge was a consequence of their materialism, and that they
referred all knowledge to sensation, because they could allow no real
being to anything which is not material. The probability therefore
remains that their theory of knowledge and their materialistic view of
nature both indicate one and the same habit of mind, and that both are
due to the action of the same causes.
[(a) The Stoic materialism not an expansion of Peripatetic views.]
Nor will it do to seek for these causes in the influence exercised by
the Peripatetic or pre-Socratic philosophy on the Stoic School. At
first sight, indeed, it might appear that the Stoics had borrowed from
Heraclitus their materialism, together with their other views on
nature; or else their materialism might seem to be an expansion of the
metaphysical notions of Plato and Aristotle. For if Aristotle denied
Plato’s distinction of form and matter to such an extent that he would
hardly allow form to exist at all except in union with matter, might it
not appear to others more logical to do away with the distinction
between them in thought, thus reducing both to a property of matter?
Were there not difficulties in the doctrine of a God external to the
world, of a passionless Reason? Were there not even difficulties in the
antithesis of form and matter, which Aristotle’s system was powerless
to overcome? And had not Aristoxenus and Dicæarchus before the time of
Zeno, and Strato immediately after his time, been led from the ground
occupied by the Peripatetics to materialistic views? And yet we must
pause before accepting this explanation. The founder of Stoicism
appears, from what is recorded of his intellectual growth, to have been
repelled by the Peripatetic School more than by any other; nor is there
the least indication in the records of the Stoic teaching that that
teaching resulted from a criticism of the Aristotelian and Platonic
views of a double origin of things. Far from it, the proposition that
everything capable of acting or being acted upon must be material,
appears with the Stoics as an independent axiom needing no further
proof.
[(b) The Stoic materialism not due to Heraclitus.]
The supposed connection between the Stoics and Heraclitus, so far from
explaining their materialistic views, already presumes their existence.
Yet long before Zeno’s time the philosophy of Heraclitus as a living
tradition had become extinct. No historical connection therefore, or
relation of original dependence, can possibly exist between the two,
but at most a subsequent perception of relationship can have directed
Zeno to Heraclitus. Zeno’s own view of the world was not a consequence,
but the cause, of his sympathy with Heraclitus. In short, neither the
Peripatetics nor Heraclitus can have given the first impulse to Zeno’s
materialism, although they may have helped in many ways to strengthen
his views on that subject, when already formed.
[(c) Practical turn of the Stoic philosophy the cause.]
The real causes for these views must therefore be sought elsewhere, and
will be found in the central idea of the whole system of the Stoics—the
practical character of their philosophy. Devoting themselves from the
outset with all their energies to practical enquiries, the Stoics in
their theory of nature occupied the ground of common views, which know
of no real object excepting what is grossly sensible and corporeal.
Their aim in speculation was to discover a firm basis for human
actions. [271] In action, however, men are brought into direct and
experimental contact with objects. The objects thus presented to the
senses we are brought face to face with in naked reality, nor is an
opportunity afforded for doubting their real being. Their reality is
proved practically, inasmuch as it affects us and offers itself for the
exercise of our powers. In every such exercise of power, both subject
and object are always material. Even when an impression is conveyed to
the soul of man, the direct instrument is something material—the voice
or the gesture. In the region of experience there are no such things as
non-material impressions. This was the ground occupied by the Stoics: a
real thing is what either acts on us, or is acted upon by us. Such a
thing is naturally material; and the Stoics with their practical ideas
not being able to soar above that which is most obvious, declared that
reality belongs only to the world of bodies.
[(3) Consequences of the Stoic materialism.]
Herefrom it would appear to follow that only individual perceptions are
true, and that all general conceptions without exception must be false.
If each notion (λεκτὸν) is incorporeal, and consequently unreal, [272]
will not absence of reality in a much higher degree belong to the
notion of what is general? [(a) Individual perceptions alone true; yet
a higher truth assigned to general conceptions.] Individual notions
refer directly to perceptions, i.e. to things incorporeal; nevertheless
they indirectly refer to the things perceived, i.e. to what is
material. But general notions do not even indirectly refer to anything
corporeal; they are pure fabrications of the mind, which have nothing
real as their object. This the Stoics explicitly maintained. [273] It
was therefore a gross inconsistency to attribute notwithstanding to
these general conceptions, to which no real objects correspond, a
higher truth and certainty than belongs to the perceptions of
individual objects, but an inconsistency which the Stoic system made
not the slightest attempt to overcome.
[(b) Theory of universal intermingling.]
The materialism of the Stoics likewise led to some remarkable
assertions in the province of natural science. If the attributes of
things, the soul and even the powers of the soul, are all corporeal,
the relation of attributes to their objects, of the soul to the body,
of one body to another body, is that of mutual intermingling. [274]
Moreover, inasmuch as the essential attributes of any definite material
belong to every part of that material, and the soul resides in every
part of the body, without the soul’s being identical with the body, and
without the attributes being identical with the material to which they
belong, or with one another; it follows that one body may intermingle
with another not only by occupying the vacant spaces in that body, but
by interpenetrating all its parts, without, however, being fused into a
homogeneous mass with it. [275] This view involves not only a denial of
the impenetrability of matter, but it further supposes that a smaller
body when mingled with a greater body will extend over the whole of the
latter. It is known as the Stoic theory of universal intermingling
(κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων), and is alike different from the ordinary view of
mechanical mixture and from that of chemical mixture. It differs from
the former in that every part of the one body is interpenetrated by
every part of the other; from the latter, because the bodies after
mixture still retain their own properties. [276] This peculiar theory,
which is one of the much debated but distinctive features of the Stoic
system, [277] cannot have been deduced from physical causes. On the
contrary, the arguments by which Chrysippus supported it prove that it
was ultimately the result of metaphysical considerations. [278] We
have, moreover, no reason to doubt it as a fact, inasmuch as the
materialistic undercurrent of the Stoic system affords the best
explanation of it.
[B. Dynamical theory of nature.]
[(1) Matter and force.]
Although the stamp of materialism was sharply cut, and its application
fearlessly made by the Stoics, they were yet far from holding the
mechanical theory of nature, which appears to us to be a necessary
consequence of strict materialism. The universe was explained on a
dynamical theory; the notion of force was placed above the notion of
matter. To matter, they held, alone belongs real existence; but the
characteristic of real existence they sought in causation, in the
capacity to act and to be acted upon. [279] This capacity belongs to
matter only by virtue of certain inherent forces, which impart to it
definite attributes. Let pure matter devoid of every attribute be
considered, the matter which underlies all definite materials, and out
of which all things are made; [280] it will be found to be purely
passive, a something subject to any change, able to assume any shape
and quality, but taken by itself devoid of quality and unable to
produce any change whatsoever. [281] This inert and powerless matter is
first reduced into shape by means of attributes, [282] all of which
suppose tension in the air-currents which produce them, and
consequently suppose a force producing tension. [283] Even the shape of
bodies, and the place they occupy in space, is, according to the
Stoics, something derivative, the consequence of tension; tension
keeping the different particles apart in one or the other particular
way. [284] Just as some modern physiologists construct nature by
putting together a sum of forces of attraction and repulsion, so the
Stoics refer nature to two forces, or, speaking more accurately, to a
double kind of motion—expansion and condensation. Expansion works
outwardly, condensation inwardly; condensation produces being, or what
is synonymous with it, matter; expansion gives rise to the attributes
of things. [285] Whilst, therefore, they assert that everything really
existing must be material, they still distinguish in what is material
two component parts—the part which is acted upon, and the part which
acts, or in other words matter and force. [286]
[(2) The nature of force.]
[(a) Force limited to the notion of efficient cause.]
The Stoics, however, would not agree with Plato and Aristotle so far as
to allow to formal and final causes a place side by side with this
acting force or efficient cause. If in general anything may be called a
cause which serves to bring about a definite result [287]—and various
kinds of causes may be distinguished, according as they bring about
this result directly or indirectly, by themselves alone or by the help
of others [288]—in the highest sense there can be, according to the
Stoics, only one acting or efficient cause. The form is due to the
workman, and is therefore only a part of the efficient cause. The
type-form is only an instrument, which the workman employs in his work.
The final cause or end-in-chief, in as far as it represents the
workman’s intention, is only an occasional cause; in as far as it
belongs to the work he is about, it is not a cause at all, but a
result. There can be but one pure and unconditional cause, just as
there can be but one matter; and to this efficient cause everything
that exists and everything that takes place must be referred. [289]
[(b) Character of this efficient cause.]
In attempting to form a more accurate notion of this efficient cause,
the first point which deserves attention is, that the Stoics believed
every kind of action ultimately to proceed from one source. For how
could the world be such a self-circumscribed unity, such an harmonious
whole, unless it were governed by one and the same force? [290] Again,
as everything which acts is material, the highest efficient cause must
likewise be considered material; and since all qualities and forces are
produced by vapour-like or fiery elements, can it be otherwise with the
highest acting force? [291] Everywhere warmth is the cause of
nourishment and growth, life and motion; all things have in themselves
their own natural heat, and are preserved and kept in life by the heat
of the sun. What applies to parts of the world must apply to the world
as a whole; hence heat or fire is the power to which the life and the
existence of the world must be referred. [292]
This power must be further defined to be the soul of the world, the
highest reason, a kind, beneficent, and philanthropic being; in short,
deity. The universal belief and the universal worship of God prove
this, as the Stoics think, beyond a doubt; [293] still more accurate
investigation confirms it. Matter can never move or fashion itself;
nothing but a power inherent as the soul is in man can produce these
results. [294] The world would not be the most perfect and complete
thing it is unless Reason were inherent therein; [295] nor could it
contain any beings possessed of consciousness, unless it were conscious
itself. [296] It could not produce creatures endowed with a soul and
reason, unless it were itself endowed with a soul and reason. [297]
Actions so far surpassing man’s power could not exist, unless there
were a cause for them in perfection equally surpassing man. [298] The
subordination of means to ends which governs the world in every part
down to the minutest details would be inexplicable, unless the world
owed its origin to a reasonable creator. [299] The graduated rank of
beings would be incomplete, unless there were a highest Being of all
whose moral and intellectual perfection cannot be surpassed. [300]
Although this perfection belongs, in the first place, to the world as a
whole, [301] nevertheless, as in everything consisting of many parts,
so in the world the ruling part must be distinguished from other parts.
It is the part from which all acting forces emanate and diffuse
themselves over the world, [302] whether the seat of this efficient
force be placed in the heaven, as was done by Zeno, Chrysippus, and the
majority of the Stoics; [303] or in the sun, as by Cleanthes; [304] or
in the centre of the world, as by Archedemus. [305] This primary source
of all life and motion, the highest Cause and the highest Reason, is
God. God, therefore, and formless matter, are the two ultimate grounds
of things. [306]
[(3) Deity.]
[(a) The conception of Deity more accurately defined.]
The language used by the Stoics in reference to the Deity at one time
gives greater prominence to the material, at another to the spiritual
side of their conception of God. As a rule, both are united in
expressions which only cease to be startling when taken in connection
with Stoic views in general. God is spoken of as being Fire, Ether,
Air, most commonly as being πνεῦμα or Atmospheric-Current, pervading
everything without exception, what is most base and ugly, as well as
what is most beautiful. [307] He is further described [308] as the
Soul, the Mind, or the Reason of the world; as a united Whole,
containing in Himself the germs of all things; as the Connecting
element in all things; as Universal Law, Nature, Destiny, Providence;
as a perfect, happy, ever kind and all-knowing Being; nor was it hard
to show that no conception could be formed of God without these
attributes. [309] Both kinds of expression are combined in the
assertion that God is the fiery Reason of the World, the Mind in
Matter, the reasonable Air-Current, penetrating all things, and
assuming various names according to the material in which He resides,
the artistically moulding Fire, containing in Himself the germs of
everything, and producing according to an unalterable law the world and
all that is therein. [310]
As used in the Stoic system, these expressions generally mean one and
the same thing. It is an unimportant difference whether the original
cause is described as an Air-Current or as Ether, or as Heat or as
Fire. It is an Air-Current, for Air-Currents are, as we have already
seen, the causes of the properties of things, giving them shape and
connection. It is also Fire, for by fire is only meant the warm air, or
the fiery fluid, which is sometimes called Ether, at other times Fire,
at other times Heat, [311] and which is expressly distinguished from
ordinary fire. [312] Moreover the terms, Soul of the world, Reason of
the world, Nature, Universal Law, Providence, Destiny—all mean the same
thing, the one primary force penetrating the whole world. Even the more
abstract expressions, Law, Providence, Destiny, have with the Stoics an
essentially gross meaning, implying not only the form according to
which the world is arranged and governed, but also the essential
substance of the world, as a power above everything particular and
individual. [313] If Nature must be distinguished from Destiny, and
both of these notions again from Zeus, [314] the distinction can only
consist herein, that the three conceptions describe one original Being
at different stages of His manifestation and growth. Viewed as the
whole of the world it is called Zeus; viewed as the inner power in the
world, Providence or Destiny; [315] and to prove this identity at the
close of every period, so taught Chrysippus, Zeus goes back into
Providence. [316]
Upon closer examination, even the difference between the materialistic
and idealistic description of God vanishes. God, according to Stoic
principles, can only be invested with reality when He has a material
form. Hence, when He is called the Soul, the Mind, or the Reason of the
world, this language does not exclude, but rather presupposes, that
these conceptions have bodies; and such bodies the Stoics thought to
discern in that heated fluid which they at one time call the
all-penetrating Breath, at another Ether, or primary Fire. [317] Each
of these two determinations appeared to them indispensable, [318] and
both became identical by assuming, as the Stoics did, that the infinite
character of the divine Reason depends on the purity and lightness of
the fiery material which composes it. [319] Seneca is therefore only
following out the principles of his School when he pronounces it
indifferent whether God is regarded as Destiny or as an all-pervading
Breath. [320] Those who charge the Stoics with inconsistency for
calling God at one time Reason, at another Soul of the universe, at
another Destiny, at another Fire, Ether, or even the Universe, [321]
forget that they are attaching to these terms a meaning entirely
different from that in which they were used by them. [322]
[(b) God original matter.]
The more the two sides of the conception of God—the material and the
ideal—are compared, the clearer it becomes that there is no difference
between God and primary Matter. Both are one and the same substance,
which, when regarded as the universal substratum, is known as
undetermined matter; but when conceived of as acting force, is called
all-pervading Ether, all-warming Fire, all-penetrating Air, Nature,
Soul of the world, Reason of the world, Providence, Destiny, God.
Matter and power, material and form, are not, as with Aristotle, things
radically different, though united from all eternity. Far from it, the
forming force resides in matter as such; it is in itself something
material; it is identical with Ether, or Fire-element, or Breath. Hence
the difference between efficient and material cause, between God and
matter, resolves itself into the difference between Breath and other
elements. This difference, too, is no original or ultimate difference.
According to the Stoic teaching, every particular element has in
process of time developed out of primary fire or God, and to God it
will return at the end of every period of the world. [323] It is
therefore only a derivative and passing difference with which we are
here concerned. But taking the conception of Deity in its full meaning,
it may be described as primary matter, as well as primary power. The
sum total of all that is real is the divine Breath, moving forth from
itself and returning to itself again. [324] Deity itself is primary
fire, containing in itself in germ both God and matter; [325] the world
in its original gaseous condition; [326] the Universal Substance
changing into particular elements, and from them returning to itself
again, which regarded in its real form as God includes at one time
everything, at another only a part of real existence. [327]
[C. Pantheism.]
[(1) God identical with the world.]
From what has been said it follows that the Stoics admitted no
essential difference between God and the world. Their system was
therefore strictly pantheistic. The world is the sum of all real
existence, and all real existence is originally contained in deity,
which is at once the matter of everything and the creative force which
moulds this matter into particular individual substances. We can,
therefore, think of nothing which is not either immediately deity or a
manifestation of deity. In point of essence, therefore, God and the
world are the same; indeed, the two conceptions are declared by the
Stoics to be absolutely identical. [328] If they have nevertheless to
be distinguished, the distinction is only derivative and partial. The
same universal Being is called God when it is regarded as a whole,
World when it is regarded as progressive in one of the many forms
assumed in the course of its development. The difference, therefore, is
tantamount to assigning a difference of meaning to the term world,
according as it is used to express the whole of what exists, or only
the derivative part. [329]
[(2) Difference between God and the world only relative.]
Still this distinction does not depend only upon our way of looking at
things, but it is founded in the nature of things. Primary force, as
such, primary fire, primary reason, constitute what is primarily God.
Things into which this primary substance has changed itself are only
divine in a derivative sense. Hence deity, which is ultimately
identical with the whole of the world, may again be described as a part
of the world, as the leading part (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), as the Soul of the
world, as the all-pervading fiery Breath. [330] The distinction,
however, is only a relative one. What is not immediately divine is
nevertheless divine derivatively, as being a manifestation of primary
fire; and if the soul of the world is not identical with the body, at
least it pervades every part of that body. [331] It is a distinction,
too, which applies only to a part of the conditions of the world. At
the end of every period, the sum of all derivative things reverts to
the unity of the divine Being, and the distinction between what is
originally and what is derivatively divine, in other words, the
distinction between God and the world, ceases.
[(3) Boëthus dissents from the pantheism of the Stoics.]
Boëthus alone dissented from the pantheism of the Stoics by making a
real distinction between God and the world. Agreeing with the other
Stoics in considering deity to be an ethereal Substance, [332] he would
not allow that it resided, as the Soul, within the whole world, and,
consequently, he refused to call the world a living being. [333]
Instead of doing so, he placed the seat of deity in the highest of the
heavenly spheres, the sphere of the fixed stars, and made it operate
upon the world from this abode. [334] The opposite view detracted, in
his eyes, from the unchangeable and exalted character of the divine
Being. How anxious he was to vindicate that character will also be seen
in the way in which he differed from his fellow-Stoics in reference to
the destruction of the world.
CHAPTER VII.
THE STUDY OF NATURE. COURSE, CHARACTER, AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNIVERSE.
[A. The general course of the universe.]
[(1) Origin of the world.]
By virtue of a law inherent in nature, Primary Being passes over into
particular objects; for, involving as it does the conception of a
forming and creating force, it must as necessarily develop into a
universe, as a seed or ovum must develop into a plant or animal. [335]
Primary fire—so taught the Stoics, following Heraclitus—first goes over
into vapour, then into moisture; one part of this moisture is
precipitated in the form of earth, another remains as water, whilst a
third part evaporating constitutes atmospheric air, and air, again,
enkindles fire out of itself. By the mutual play of these four elements
the world is formed, [336] built round the earth as a centre; [337]
heat, as it is developed out of water, [338] moulding the chaotic mass.
By the separation of these elements, a distinction between the active
and the passive powers of nature—between the soul of the world and the
body of the world—becomes apparent. The moisture into which the primary
fire was first changed represents the body, just as the heat [339]
latent in it represents the soul; [340] or, taking the later fourfold
division of the elements, the two lower ones correspond to matter, the
two higher ones to acting force. [341]
[(2) End of the world.]
As the distinction between matter and force has its origin in time, so
it will also have an end in time. [342] Matter which primary Being has
separated from itself to form its body is being gradually resolved into
primary Being again; so that, at the end of the present course of
things, a general conflagration of the world will restore all things to
their original form, in which everything derivative will have ceased to
exist, and pure Deity, or primary fire, will alone remain in its
original purity. [343] This resolution of the world into fire or ether,
[344] the Stoics thought, would take place, through the same
intermediate stages as its generation from the primary fire. [345]
Cleanthes, following his peculiar view as to the seat of the governing
[346] force in the world, supposed that its destruction would come from
the sun. [347]
[(3) Cycles in the world’s course.]
No sooner, however, will everything have returned to its original
unity, [348] and the course of the world have come to an end, than the
formation of a new world will begin, [349] so exactly corresponding
with the previous world that every particular thing, every particular
person, and every occurrence will recur in it, [350] precisely as they
occurred in the world preceding. Hence the history of the world and of
Deity—as, indeed, with the eternity of matter and acting force, must
necessarily be the case—revolves in an endless cycle through exactly
the same stages. [351] Still there were not wanting, even in
comparatively early times, members of the Stoic School who entertained
doubts on this teaching; and among the most distinguished of the later
Stoics some gave it up altogether. [352] Besides the periodical
destruction by fire, periodical destructions by floods [353] were also
assumed; there being, however, a difference of opinion as to whether
the whole universe, or only the earth and its inhabitants, were subject
to these floods. [354]
[B. Government of the world.]
[(1) Nature of Destiny.]
[(a) Destiny as Providence.]
One point established by the generation and destruction of the
world—the uncertainty of all particular things, and the unconditional
dependence of everything on a universal law and the course of the
universe—is a leading one in the Stoic enquiries into nature. All
things in nature come about by virtue of a natural and unchangeable
connection of cause and effect, as the nature of the universe and the
general law require. This absolute necessity, regulating all Being and
Becoming, is expressed in the conception of Fate or Destiny (ἡ
εἱμαρμένη). [355] Viewed from the point of view of natural science,
Destiny is only another name for primary Being, for the all-pervading,
all-producing Breath, for the artistic fire which is the soul of the
world. [356] But again the activity of this Being being always rational
and according to law, Destiny may also be described as the Reason of
the World, as universal Law, as the rational form of the world’s
course. [357] When regarded as the groundwork of natural formations,
this primary Being or general Law is called Nature; but when it appears
as the cause of the orderly arrangement and development of the world,
it is known as Providence; [358] or in popular language it is called
Zeus, or the will of Zeus; and in this sense it is said that nothing
happens without the will of Zeus. [359]
[(b) Destiny as generative reason.]
In action as the creative force in nature, this universal Reason also
bears the name of Generative Reason (λόγος σπερματικός). It bears this
name more immediately in relation to the universe, not only as being
the generating power by which all things are produced from primary fire
as from seed according to an inner law, but because in the present
condition of things all form and shape, all life and reason, grow out
of it, in short, because primary fire and reason contain in themselves
the germ of all things. [360] In the same sense, generative powers in
the plural, or λόγοι σπερματικοί, are spoken of as belonging to Deity
and Nature; and in treating of man, λόγοι σπερματικοί denote the
generative powers as a part of the soul, and must be thought of as
bearing the same relation to the individual soul that the generative
powers of Nature do to the soul of nature. [361] By the term Generative
Reason, therefore, must be understood the creative and forming forces
in nature, which have collectively produced the universe, and
particular exercises of which produce individual things. These forces,
agreeably with the ordinary Stoic speculations, are spoken of as the
original material, or material germ of things. On the other hand, they
also constitute the form of things—the law which determines their shape
and qualities, the λόγος—only we must beware of trying to think of form
apart from matter. Just as the igneous or ethereal material of primary
Being is in itself the same as the forming and creating element in
things, the Reason of the world or the Soul of nature; so the
atmospheric substance in the seeds of individual things, in which the
Stoics thought the generative power (σπέρμα) alone resides, [362] is in
itself the germ out of which the corresponding thing is produced by
virtue of an inherent law. [363] The inward form is the only permanent
element in things amid the perpetual change of materials. [364] It
constitutes the identity of the universe; and whereas matter is
constantly changing from one form to another, [365] the universal law
of the process alone continues unchangeably the same.
[(2) Arguments in favour of Providence.]
All parts of the Stoic system lead so unmistakeably to the conclusion,
not only that the world as a whole is governed by Providence, but that
every part of it is subject to the same unchangeable laws, that no
definite arguments would appear necessary to establish this point.
Nevertheless, the Stoics lost no opportunity of meeting objections to
their views [(a) Argument from the general convictions of mankind.] in
the fullest manner. [366] In the true spirit of a Stoic, Chrysippus
appealed to the general conviction of mankind, as expressed in the
names used to denote fate and destiny, [367] and to the language of
poetry. [368] [(b) Argument from the perfection of God.] Nor was it
difficult to show [369] that a divine government of the world followed
of necessity from the Stoic conception of the perfection of God.
Besides, in proving the existence of a God by the argument drawn from
the adaptation of means to ends, a providential government of the world
was at the same [(c) Argument from the theory of necessity.] time
proved. [370] Chrysippus also thought to defend his theory of necessity
in the same strictly logical manner. For must not every judgment be
either true or false? [371] And does not this apply to judgments which
refer to future events, as well as to others? Judgments, however,
referring to the future can only be true when what they affirm must
come to pass of necessity; they can only be false when what they affirm
is impossible; and, accordingly, everything that takes place must
follow of necessity from the causes which produce it. [372]
[(d) Argument from foreknowledge of God.]
The same process of reasoning, transferred from the outer world to the
inner world of mind, underlies the argument from the foreknowledge of
God. [373] If in the one case it is alleged that whatever is true,
before it comes to pass, is necessary, so in the other it is said to be
necessary, if it can be truly known before it comes to pass.
[(e) Argument from the existence of divination.]
To this argument may be added a further one to which the Stoics
attached great importance—the argument from the existence of
divination. [374] If it is impossible to know beforehand with certainty
what is accidental, it is also impossible to predict it.
[(3) The idea of Providence determined.]
[(a) Providence as necessity.]
But the real kernel of the Stoic fatalism is expressed in the maxim,
that nothing can take place without a sufficient cause, nor, under
given circumstances, can happen differently from what has happened.
[375] This were as impossible, according to the Stoics, as for
something to come out of nothing; [376] were it possible, the unity of
the world would be at an end, consisting, as it does, in the chain-like
dependence of cause upon cause, and in the absolute necessity of
everything and of every change. [377] The Stoic doctrine of necessity
was the direct consequence of the Stoic pantheism. The divine power
which rules the world could not be the absolute uniting cause of all
things, if there existed anything in any sense independent of it, and
unless one unchanging causal connection governed every thing.
[(b) Providence directed immediately to the universe, indirectly to
individuals.]
Divine Providence, therefore, does not extend to individual things
taken by themselves, but only to things in their relation to the whole.
Everything being in every respect determined by this relation, and
being consequently subject to the general order of the world, it
follows that we may say that God cares not only for the universe, but
for all individual members of the universe. [378] The converse of this
may also be asserted with equal justice, viz. that God’s care is
directed to the whole, and not to individuals, and that it extends to
things great, but not to things small. [379] Directly it always extends
to the whole, indirectly to individuals throughout the whole, in so far
as they are therein contained, and their condition is determined by its
condition. [380] The Stoic notion of Providence is therefore entirely
based on a view of the universe as a whole; individual things and
persons can only come into consideration as dependent parts of this
whole.
[(c) Difficulties connected with the theory of necessity.]
[(α) Statement of several difficulties.]
The Stoics were thus involved in a difficulty which besets every theory
of necessity—the difficulty of doing justice to the claims of morality,
and of vindicating the existence of moral responsibility. This
difficulty became for them all the more pressing the higher those
claims were advanced, and the more severely they judged the great
majority of their fellow-men. [381] To overcome it, Chrysippus appears
to have made most energetic efforts. [382] The existence of chance he
could not allow, it being his aim to establish that what seems to be
accidental has always some hidden cause. [383] Nor would he allow that
everything is necessary, since that can only be called necessary which
depends on no external conditions, and is therefore always true; [384]
in other words, what is eternal and unchangeable, not that which comes
to pass in time, however inevitable it may be. [385] And, by a similar
process of reasoning, he still tried to rescue the idea of the
Possible, little as that idea accords with the Stoic system. [386]
[(β) Moral responsibility vindicated.]
In reference to human actions, the Stoics did not allow the freedom of
the will, in the proper sense of the term; [387] but were of opinion
that absence of freedom does not prejudice the character of the will as
a deciding power. For is not one and the same all-determining power
everywhere active, working in each particular being according to the
law of its nature, in one way in organic beings, in another in
inorganic beings, differently again in animals and plants, in rational
and irrational creatures? [388] And albeit every action may be brought
about by the co-operation of causes depending on the nature of things
and the character of the agent, is it not still free, the resultant of
our own impulses and decision? [389] Involuntary it would only be were
it produced by external causes alone, without any co-operation, on the
part of our wills, with external causes. [390] Moral responsibility,
according to the Stoics, depends only on freedom of the will. What
emanates from my will is my action, no matter whether it be possible
for me to act differently or not. [391] Praise and blame, rewards and
punishment, express the judgment of society relative to the character
of certain persons or actions. [392] Whether they could have been
different, or not, is irrelevant. Otherwise virtue and vice must be set
down as things not in our power, for which, consequently, we are not
responsible, seeing that when a man is once virtuous or vicious, he
cannot be otherwise; [393] and the highest perfection, that of the
Gods, is absolutely unchangeable. [394] Chrysippus [395] even
endeavoured to show, not only that his whole theory of destiny was in
harmony with the claims of morality and moral responsibility, but that
it presupposed their existence. The arrangement of the universe, he
argued, involves law, and law involves the distinction between what is
conventionally right and what is conventionally wrong, between what
deserves praise and what deserves blame. [396] Moreover, it is
impossible to think of destiny without thinking of the world, or to
think of the world without thinking of the Gods, who are supremely
good. Hence the idea of destiny involves also that of goodness, which
again includes the contrast between virtue and vice, between what is
praiseworthy and what is blameworthy. [397] If his opponents objected
that, if everything is determined by destiny, individual action is
superfluous, since what has been once foreordained must happen, come
what may, Chrysippus replied:—There is a distinction to be made between
simple and complex predestination; the consequences of human actions
being simply results of those actions, are quite as much foreordained
as the actions themselves. [398]
From these observations, it appears that the Stoics never intended to
allow man to hold a different position, in regard to destiny, from that
held by other beings. All the actions of man—in fact, his destiny—are
decided by his relation to things: one individual only differs from
another in that one acts on his own impulse, and agreeably with his own
feelings, whereas another, under compulsion and against his will,
conforms to the eternal law of the world. [399]
[C. Nature of the world.]
Everything in the world being produced by one and the same divine
power, the world, as regards its structure, is an organic whole, in
respect of its [(1) Its unity and perfections.] constitution perfect.
The unity of the world, a doctrine distinguishing the Stoics from the
Epicureans, followed as a corollary from the unity of primary substance
and of primary force. [400] It was further proved by the intimate
connection, or, as the Stoics called it, the sympathy of all its parts,
and, in particular, by the coincidence of the phenomena of earth and
heaven. [401] The perfection of the world follows generally from a
consideration of fundamental principles. [402] But the Stoics made use
of many arguments in support of its perfection, appealing, after the
example of preceding philosophers, sometimes to its beauty, and, at
other times, to the adaptation of means to ends. [403] An appeal to
beauty is the assertion of Chrysippus, that nature made many creatures
for the sake of beauty, the peacock, for instance, for the sake of its
tail [404];—and the dictum of Marcus Aurelius, that what is purely
subsidiary and subservient to no purpose, even what is ugly or
frightful in nature, has peculiar attractions of its own; [405] and the
same kind of consideration may have led to the Stoic assertion, that no
two things in nature are altogether alike. [406] Their chief argument,
however, for the beauty of the world, was based on the shape, the size,
and the colour of the heavenly structure. [407]
The other line of argument is followed not so much in individual
expressions. But owing no doubt to the pre-eminently practical
character of its treatment of things, the Stoic view of nature, like
the Socratic, has ever an eye on the adaptation of means to ends in the
world. As, on the one hand, this adaptation of means to ends is the
most convincing proof of the existence of deity, so, on the other hand,
by it, more than by anything else, the divine government of the world
makes itself manifest. [408] Like Socrates, however, they took a very
superficial view of the adaptation of means to ends, arguing that
everything in the world was created for the benefit of some other
thing—plants for the support of animals, animals for the support and
the service of man, [409] the world for the benefit of Gods and men
[410]—not unfrequently degenerating into the ridiculous and pedantic,
in their endeavours to trace the special end for which each thing
exists. [411] But, in asking the further question, For what purpose do
Gods and men exist? they could not help being at length carried beyond
the idea of a relative end to the idea of an end-in-itself. The end for
which Gods and men exist is that of mutual society. [412] Or,
expressing the same idea in language more philosophical, the end of man
is the contemplation and imitation of the world; man has only
importance as being a part of a whole; only this whole is perfect and
an end-in-itself. [413]
[(2) Moral theory of the world.]
The greater the importance attached by the Stoics to the perfection of
the world, the less were they able to avoid the difficult problem of
reconciling the various forms of evil in the world. By the attention
which, following the example of Plato, they gave to this question, they
may be said to be the real creators of the moral theory of the world.
[414] The character of this moral theory was already determined by
their system. Subordinating individuals, as that system did, to the law
of the whole, it met the charges preferred against the evil found in
the world by the general maxim, that imperfection in details is
necessary for the perfection of the whole. [415] This maxim, however,
might be explained in several ways, according to the meaning assigned
to the term necessary. If necessity is taken to be physical, the
existence of evil is excused as being a natural necessity, from which
not even deity could grant exemption. If, on the other hand, the
necessity is not a physical one, but one arising from the relation of
means to ends, evil is justified as a condition or necessary means for
bringing about good. Both views are combined in the three chief
questions involved in the moral theory of the world: the existence of
physical evil, the existence of moral evil, and the relation of outward
circumstances to morality.
[(a) Existence of physical evil.]
The existence of physical evil gave the Stoics little trouble, since
they refused to regard it as an evil at all, as will be seen in
treating of their ethical system. It was enough for them to refer evils
of this kind—diseases, for instance—to natural causes, and to regard
them as the inevitable consequences of causes framed by nature to serve
a definite purpose. [416] Still, they did not fail to point out that
many things only become evil by a perverted use, [417] and that other
things, ordinarily regarded as evils, are of the greatest value. [418]
[(b) Existence of moral evil]
Greater difficulty was found by the Stoics to beset the attempt to
justify the existence of moral evil, and the difficulty was enhanced in
their case by the prevalence and intensity of moral evil in the world
[419] according to their view. By their theory of necessity they were
prevented from shifting the responsibility for moral evil from natural
law or deity on to man, which is one way out of the difficulty. In not
altogether eschewing this course, and yet refusing to allow to deity
any participation in evil, and referring evil to the free will and
intention of man, [420] they acted as other systems of necessity have
done before, [421] reserving the final word. The real solution which
they gave to the difficulty is to be found partly in the assertion that
even the deity is not able to keep human nature free from faults, [422]
and partly in the consideration that the existence of evil is
necessary, as a counterpart and supplement to good, [423] and that, in
the long run, evil will be turned by the deity into good. [424]
[(c) Connection between virtue and happiness.]
The third point in their moral theory of the world, the connection
between moral worth and happiness, engaged all the subtlety of
Chrysippus and his followers. To deny any connection between them would
have been to contradict the ordinary views of the relation of means to
ends. Besides, they were prepared to regard some part of the evils of
life as divine judgments. [425] Still there were facts which could not
be reconciled with this view—the misfortunes of the virtuous, the good
fortune of the vicious—and these required explanation. The task of
explaining them appears to have involved the Stoics in considerable
embarrassment, nor were their answers altogether satisfactory. [426]
The spirit of their system, however, rendered only one explanation
possible: no real evil could happen to the virtuous, no real good
fortune could fall to the lot of the vicious. [427] Apparent misfortune
will be regarded by the wise man partly as a natural consequence,
partly as a wholesome training for his moral powers; [428] there is
nothing which is not matter for rational action: everything that
happens, when rightly considered, contributes to our good; nothing that
is secured by moral depravity is in itself desirable. [429] With this
view it was possible to connect a belief in divine punishment, by
saying that what to a good man is a training of his powers, is a real
misfortune and consequently a punishment to a bad man; but we are not
in a position to say whether the scattered hints of Chrysippus really
bear this meaning.
The whole investigation is one involving much doubt and inconsistency.
Natural considerations frequently intertwine with considerations based
on the adaptation of means to ends; the divine power is oftentimes
treated as a will working towards a definite purpose, at one time
arranging all things for the best with unlimited power, at another time
according to an unchangeable law of nature; [430] but all these
inconsistencies and defects belong to other moral theories of the
world, quite as much as they belong to that of the Stoics.
CHAPTER VIII.
IRRATIONAL NATURE. THE ELEMENTS. THE UNIVERSE.
Turning from the questions which have hitherto engaged our attention to
natural science in the stricter sense of the term, we must first touch
upon [A. The most general ideas on nature.] a few characteristic
questions affecting the general conditions of all existence. In these
the Stoics hold little that is of a distinctive character. The matter
or substance of which all things are made is corporeal. [431] All that
is corporeal is infinitely divisible, although it is never infinitely
divided. [432] At the same time, all things are exposed to the action
of change, since one material is constantly going over into another.
[433] Herein the Stoics follow Aristotle, in contrast to the mechanical
theory of nature, [434] and distinguish change in quality from mere
motion in space. They enumerate several varieties of each kind. [435]
Nevertheless, they look upon motion in space as the primary form of
motion. [436] Under the conception of motion, they, moreover, include
action and suffering. [437] The condition of all action is contact;
[438] and since the motions of different objects in nature are due to
various causes, and have a variety of characters, the various kinds of
action must be distinguished which correspond with them. [439] In all
these statements there is hardly a perceptible deviation from
Aristotle.
Of a more peculiar character are the views of the Stoics as to the
intermingling of substances, to which reference has already been made.
[440] With regard to Time and Space, they found some innovations on
Aristotle’s theory to be necessary. Space (τόπος), according to their
view, is the room occupied by a body, [441] the distance enclosed
within the limits of a body. [442] From Space they distinguish the
Empty. The Empty is not met with in the universe, but beyond the
universe it extends indefinitely. [443] And hence they assert that
Space is limited, like the world of matter, and that the Empty is
unlimited. [444] Nay, not only Space, but Time also, is by them set
down as immaterial; [445] and yet to the conception of Time a meaning
as concrete as possible is given, in order that Time may have a real
value. Zeno defined Time as the extension of motion; Chrysippus defines
it, more definitely, as the extension of the motion of the world. [446]
The Stoics affirm the infinite divisibility of Time and Space, [447]
but do not appear to have instituted any deep researches into this
point.
[B. Elements.]
In expanding their views on the origin of the world, the Stoics begin
with the doctrine of the four elements, [448] a doctrine which, since
the time of Aristotle and Plato, was the one universally accepted. They
even refer this doctrine to Heraclitus, desiring, above all things, to
follow his teaching in natural science. [449] On a previous occasion,
the order and the stages have been pointed out, according to which
primary fire developed into the several elements in the formation of
the world. [450] In the same order, these elements now go over one into
the other. Yet, in this constant transformation of materials, in the
perpetual change of form to which primary matter is subject, in this
flux of all its parts, the unity of the whole still remains untouched.
[451] The distinctive characteristic of fire is heat; that of air is
cold; that of water, moisture; dryness that of the earth. [452] These
essential qualities, however, are not always found in the elements to
which they belong in a pure state, [453] and hence every element has
several forms and varieties. [454] Among the four essential qualities
of the elements, Aristotle had already singled out two, viz. heat and
cold, as the active ones, calling dryness and moisture the passive
ones. The Stoics do the same, only more avowedly. They consider the two
elements to which these qualities properly belong to be the seat of all
active force, and distinguish them from the other two elements, as the
soul is distinguished from the body. [455] In their materialistic
system, the finer materials, as opposed to the coarser, occupy the
place of incorporeal forces.
The relative density of the elements also determines their place in the
universe. Fire and air are light; water and earth are heavy. Fire and
air move away from the centre of the universe; [456] water and earth
are drawn towards it; [457] and thus, from above to below—or, what is
the same thing, from without to within—the four layers of fire, air,
water, and earth are formed. [458] The fire on the circumference goes
by the name of Ether. [459] Its most remote portion was called by Zeno
Heaven; [460] and it differs from earthly fire not only by its greater
purity, [461] but also because the motion of earthly fire is in a
straight line, whereas the motion of the Ether is circular. [462]
Because of this difference of motion, Aristotle supposed a radical
difference to exist between these two kinds of fire, but the Stoics did
not feel it necessary to admit such a difference. [463] They could
always maintain that, when beyond the limits of its proper locality,
fire tried to return to it as quickly as possible, whereas within those
limits it moved in the form of a circle.
[C. The universe.]
Holding this view of the elements, the Stoics, it will be seen, did not
deviate to any very great extent, in their ideas of the World, from
Aristotle and the views which were generally entertained. In the centre
of the Universe reposes the globe of the earth; [464] around it is
water, above the water is air. These three strata form the kernel of
the world, which is in a state of repose, [465] and around these the
Ether revolves in a circle, together with the stars which are set
therein. At the top, in one stratum, are all the fixed stars; under the
stratum containing the fixed stars are the planets, in seven different
strata—Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Venus, then the Sun, and in the
lowest stratum, bordering on the region of air, is the Moon. [466] Thus
the world consists, as with Aristotle, of a globe containing many
strata, one above another. [467] That it cannot be unlimited, as
Democritus and Epicurus maintain, follows from the very nature of body.
[468] The space within the world is fully occupied by the material of
the world, without a vacant space being anywhere left. [469] Outside
the world, however, is empty space, or else how—the Stoics asked—would
there be a place into which the world could be resolved at the general
conflagration? [470] Moreover, this empty space must be unlimited; for
how can there be a limit, or any kind of boundary, to that which is
immaterial and non-existent? [471] But although the world is in empty
space, it does not move, for the half of its component elements being
heavy, and the other half light, as a whole it is neither heavy nor
light. [472]
[(1) Stars.]
The stars are spherical masses, [473] consisting of fire; but the fire
is not in all cases equally pure, [474] and is sustained, as Heraclitus
taught, by evaporations from the earth and from water. [475] With this
process of sustentation the motion of the stars is brought into
connection, their orbit extending over the space in which they obtain
their nutriment. [476] Not only the sun, but the moon also, was
believed to be larger than the earth. [477] Plato and Aristotle had
already held that the stars are living rational divine beings; and the
same view was entertained by the Stoics, not only because of the
wonderful regularity of their motion and orbits, but also from the very
nature of the material of which they consist. [478] The earth,
likewise, is filled by an animating soul; or else how could it supply
plants with animation, and afford nutriment to the stars? [479] Upon
the oneness of the soul, which permeates all its parts, depends, in the
opinion of the Stoics, the oneness of the universe.
[(2) Meteorology.]
Most thoroughly, however, did the Stoics—and, in particular, Posidonius
[480]—devote themselves to investigating those problems, which may be
summed up under the name of meteorology. This portion, however, of
their enquiries is of little value for illustrating their philosophical
tenets, and it may suffice to mention in a note the objects which it
included, and the sources whence information may be obtained. [481] The
same treatment may be given to the few maxims laid down by the Stoics
on the subject of inorganic nature which have come down to us. [482]
Nor need we mention here the somewhat copious writings of Posidonius,
[483] on the subjects of geography, history, and mathematics.
[(3) Plants and animals.]
Little attention was devoted by the Stoics to the world of plants and
animals. About this fact there can be no doubt, since we neither hear
of any treatises by the Stoics on this subject, nor do they appear to
have advanced any peculiar views. The most prominent point is, that
they divided all things in nature into four classes—those of inorganic
beings, plants, animals, and rational beings. In beings belonging to
the first class a simple quality (ἕξις) constitutes the bond of union;
in those of the second class, a forming power (φύσις); in those of the
third class, a soul; and in those of the fourth class, a rational soul.
[484] By means of this division, the various branches of a science of
nature were mapped out, based on a gradually increasing development of
the powers of life. No serious attempt was made by the Stoics to work
out this thought. With the single exception of man, we know exceedingly
little of their views on organic beings. [485]
CHAPTER IX.
THE STUDY OF NATURE. MAN.
[A. The soul.]
[(1) Materialistic nature of the soul.]
The Stoic teaching becomes peculiarly interesting, when it treats of
Man; and the line it here follows is decided by the tone of the whole
system. On the one hand, the Stoic materialism shows itself most
unmistakeably in the department of anthropology; on the other hand, the
conviction that all actions must be referred to active powers, and all
the several active powers to one original power, can not be held
without leading to a belief in the oneness and in the regulating
capacity of the soul. Not only does it follow, as a corollary from the
materialistic view of the world, that the soul must be in its nature
corporeal, but the Stoics took pains to uphold this view by special
arguments. Whatever, they said, influences the body, and is by it
influenced in turn, whatever is united with the body and again
separated from it, must be corporeal. How, then, can the soul be other
than corporeal? [486] Whatever has extension in three dimensions is
corporeal; this is the case with the soul, since it extends in three
directions over the whole body. [487] Thought, moreover, and motion are
due to animal life. [488] Animal life is nurtured and kept in health by
the breath of life. [489] Experience proves that mental qualities are
propagated by natural generation; they must, therefore, be connected
with a corporeal substratum. [490] As therefore, the mind is nothing
but fiery breath, so the human soul is described by the Stoics
sometimes as fire, sometimes as breath, at other times, more
accurately, as warm breath, diffused throughout the body, and forming a
bond of union for the body, [491] in the very same way that the soul of
the world is diffused throughout the world, and forms a bond of union
for the world. [492] This warm breath was believed to be connected with
the blood; and hence the soul was said to be fed by vapours from the
blood, just as the stars are fed by vapours from the earth. [493]
The same hypothesis was also used to explain the origin of the soul.
One part of the soul was believed to be transmitted to the young in the
seed. [494] From the part so transmitted there arises, by development
within the womb, first the soul of a plant; and this becomes the soul
of a living creature after birth by the action of the outer air. [495]
This view led to the further hypothesis that the seat of the soul must
be in the breast, not in the brain; since not only breath and warm
blood, but also the voice, the immediate expression of thought, comes
from the breast. [496]
[(2) Divisions of the soul.]
Nor is this hypothesis out of harmony with the notions otherwise
entertained by the Stoics as to the nature of man. Plato and Aristotle
had already fixed on the heart as the central organ of the lower
powers; the brain they assigned to reason, with the view of
distinguishing the rational from the mere animal soul. [497] When,
therefore, the Stoics assimilated man’s rational activity to the
activity of the senses, deducing both from one and the same source, it
was natural that they would depart from Aristotle’s view. Accordingly,
the various parts of the soul were supposed to discharge themselves
from their centre in the heart into the several organs, in the form of
atmospheric currents. Seven such parts are enumerated, besides the
dominant part or reason, which was also called ἡγεμονικὸν, διανοητικὸν,
λογιστικὸν, or λογισμός. These seven parts consist of the five senses,
the power of reproduction, and the power of speech; [498] and,
following out their view of the close relation of speech and thought,
[499] great importance is attached to the power of speech. [500] At the
same time, the Stoics upheld the oneness of the substance of the soul
with greater vigour than either Plato or Aristotle had done. Reason, or
τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, is with them the primary power, of which all other
powers are only parts, or derivative powers. [501] Even feeling and
desire they derive from it, in direct contradiction to the teaching of
Plato and Aristotle; [502] and this power is declared to be the seat of
personal identity, a point on which former philosophers had refrained
from expressing any opinion. [503]
[B. The individual soul and the soul of the universe.]
The individual soul bears the same relation to the soul of the universe
that a part does to the whole. The human soul is not only a part, as
are all other living powers, of the universal power of life, but,
because it possesses reason, it has a special relationship to the
Divine Being [504]—a relationship which becomes closer in proportion as
we allow greater play to the divine element in ourselves, i.e. to
reason. [505] On this very account, however, the soul cannot escape the
law of the Divine Being, in the shape of general necessity, or destiny.
It is a mere delusion to suppose that the soul possesses a freedom
independent of the world’s course. The human will, like everything else
in the world, is bound into the indissoluble chain of natural causes,
and that irrespectively of our knowing by what causes the will is
decided or not. Its freedom consists in this, that, instead of being
ruled from without, it obeys the call of its own nature, external
circumstances concurring. [506] To this power of self-determination,
however, the greatest value is attached. Not only are our actions due
to it to such an extent that only because of it can they be considered
ours, [507] but even our judgments are, as the Stoics thought,
dependent on it. The soul itself being open to truth or error,
convictions are quite as much in our power as actions: [508] both are
alike the necessary result of the will. And just as the individual soul
does not possess activity independently of the universal soul, no more
can the individual soul escape the law of destiny. It, too, at the end
of the world’s course, will be resolved into the primary substance, the
Divine Being. The only point about which the Stoics were undecided was,
whether all souls would last until that time as separate souls, which
was the view of Cleanthes, or only the souls of the wise, as Chrysippus
held. [509]
[C. Freedom and immortality.]
The effects of the Stoic principles appear unmistakeably in the above
statements. They, however, pervade the whole body of the Stoical views
on man. [510] From one point of view, the theory of necessity, and the
denial of everlasting life after death, seem quite unintelligible in a
system the moral tone of which is so high; yet the connection of these
theories with the Stoic ethics is very intimate. These theories
commended themselves to the Stoics, as they have done in later times to
Spinoza and Schleiermacher, because they corresponded with their
fundamental view of morality, according to which the individual is the
instrument of reason in general, and a dependent portion of the
collective universe. Moreover, since the Stoics admitted a future
existence, of limited, but yet indefinite, length, the same practical
results followed from their belief as from the current belief in
immortality. The statements of Seneca, [511] that this life is a
prelude to a better; that the body is a lodging-house, from which the
soul will return to its own home; his joy in looking forward to the day
which will rend the bonds of the body asunder, which he, in common with
the early Christians, calls the birthday of eternal life; [512] his
description of the peace of the eternity there awaiting us, of the
freedom and bliss of the heavenly life, of the light of knowledge which
will there be shed on all the secrets of nature; [513] his language on
the future recognition and happy society of souls made perfect; [514]
his seeing in death a great day of judgment, when sentence will be
pronounced on every one; [515] his making the thought of a future life
the great stimulus to moral conduct here; [516] even the way in which
he consoles himself for the destruction of the soul by the thought that
it will live again in another form hereafter [517]—all contain nothing
at variance with the Stoic teaching, however near they may approach to
Platonic or even Christian modes of thought. [518] Seneca merely
expanded the teaching of his School in one particular direction, in
which it approaches most closely to Platonism; and, of all the Stoics,
Seneca was the most distinctly Platonic.
Excepting the two points which have been discussed at an earlier time,
[519] and one other point relating to the origin of ideas and emotions,
which will be considered subsequently, little is on record relating to
the psychological views of the Stoics.
CHAPTER X.
ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF
MORALITY.
Whatever attention the Stoics paid to the study of nature and to logic,
the real kernel of their system lies, as has been already observed, in
their Ethics; even natural science, that ‘most divine part of
philosophy,’ was only pursued as an intellectual preparation for
Ethics. In the field of Ethics the true spirit of the Stoic system may
therefore be expected to appear, and it may be anticipated that this
subject will be treated by them with special care. Nor is this
expectation a vain one; for here the springs of information flowing
freely give ample data respecting the Stoic doctrine of morality.
Nevertheless, respecting the formal grouping of these data only vague
and contradictory statements are forthcoming. Moreover, the Stoics
appear to have followed such different courses and to have been so
little afraid of repetition, that it is hardly possible to obtain a
complete survey of their whole system by following any one of the
traditional divisions. [520]
Proceeding to group the materials in such a way as to give the clearest
insight into the peculiarities and connection of the Stoic principles,
the first distinction to be made will be one between morality in
general and particular points in morality. In considering morality in
general, those statements which give the abstract theory of morals will
be distinguished from those which modify it with a view to meet
practical wants. The former again may be grouped round three
points:—the enquiry into the highest good, that into the nature of
virtue, and that relating to the wise man.
[A. The highest good.]
[(1) Nature of the highest good.]
The enquiry into the destiny and end of man turns, with the Stoics, as
it did with all moral philosophers since the time of Socrates, about
the fundamental conception of the good, and the ingredients necessary
to make up the highest good or happiness. [521] Happiness, they
consider, can only be sought in rational activity or virtue. Speaking
more explicitly, [522] the primary impulse of every being is towards
self-preservation and self-gratification. [523] It follows that every
being pursues those things which are most suited to its nature, [524]
and that such things only have for it a value (ἀξία). Hence the highest
good—the end-in-chief, [525] or happiness—can only be found in what is
conformable to nature. [526]—Nothing can be conformable to nature for
any individual thing, unless it be in harmony with the law of the
universe, [527] or with the universal reason of the world; nor, in the
case of a conscious and reasonable being, unless it proceeds from a
recognition of this general law—in short, from rational intelligence.
[528] In every enquiry into what is conformable to nature, all turns
upon agreement with the essential constitution of the being, and this
essential constitution consists, in the case of a man, simply in
reason. [529] One and the same thing, therefore, is always meant,
whether, with Zeno, life according to nature is spoken of as being in
harmony with oneself, or whether, following Cleanthes, it is simply
said to be the agreement of life with nature, and whether, in the
latter case, φύσις is taken to mean the world at large, or is limited
to human nature in particular. [530] In every case the meaning is, that
the life of the individual approximates to or falls short of the goal
of happiness, exactly in proportion as it approaches to or departs from
the universal law of the world and the particular rational nature of
man. In a word, a rational life, an agreement with the general course
of the world, constitutes virtue. The principle of the Stoic morality
might therefore be briefly expressed in the sentence: Only virtue is
good, and happiness consists exclusively in virtue. [531] If, however,
following Socrates, the good is defined as being what is useful, [532]
then the sentence would run thus: Only Virtue is useful; advantage
cannot be distinguished from duty, whilst to a bad man nothing is
useful, [533] since, in the case of a rational being, good and evil
does not depend on what happens to him, but simply on his own conduct.
[534] A view of life is here presented to us in which happiness
coincides with virtue, the good and the useful with duty and reason.
There is neither any good independently of virtue, nor is there in
virtue and for virtue any evil.
[(2) The good and evil.]
The Stoics accordingly refused to admit the ordinary distinction,
sanctioned by popular opinion and the majority of philosophers, between
various kinds and degrees of good; nor would they allow bodily
advantages and external circumstances to be included among good things,
together with mental and moral qualities. A certain difference between
goods they did not indeed deny, and various kinds are mentioned by them
in their formal division of goods. [535] But these differences amount,
in the end, to no more than this, that whilst some goods are good and
useful in themselves, others are only subsidiary to them. The existence
of several equally primary goods appears to the Stoics to be at
variance with the conception of the good. That only is a good,
according to their view, which has an unconditional value. That which
has a value only in comparison with something else, or as leading to
something else, does not deserve to be called a good. The difference
between what is good and what is not good is not only a difference of
degree, but also one of kind; and what is not a good per se can never
be a good under any circumstances. [536] The same remarks apply to
evil. That which is not in itself an evil can never become so from its
relation to something else. Hence only that which is absolutely good,
or virtue, can be considered a good; and only that which is absolutely
bad, or vice, [537] can be considered an evil. All other things,
however great their influence may be on our state, belong to a class of
things neither good nor evil, but indifferent, or ἀδιάφορα. [538]
Neither health, nor riches, nor honour, not even life itself, is a
good; and just as little are the opposite states—poverty, sickness,
disgrace, and death—evils. [539] Both are in themselves indifferent, a
material which may either be employed for good or else for evil. [540]
The Academicians and Peripatetics were most vigorously attacked by the
Stoics for including among goods external things which are dependent on
chance. For how can that be a good under any circumstances, which bears
no relation to man’s moral nature, and is even frequently obtained at
the cost of morality? [541] If virtue renders a man happy, it must
render him perfectly happy in himself, since no one can be happy who is
not happy altogether. Were anything which is not in man’s power allowed
to influence his happiness, it would detract from the absolute worth of
virtue, and man would never be able to attain to that imperturbable
serenity of mind without which no happiness is conceivable. [542]
[(3) Pleasure and the good.]
Least of all, can pleasure be considered a good, or be regarded, as it
was by Epicurus, as the ultimate and highest object in life. He who
places pleasure on the throne makes a slave of virtue; [543] he who
considers pleasure a good ignores the real conception of the good and
the peculiar value of virtue; [544] he appeals to feelings, rather than
to actions; [545] he requires reasonable creatures to pursue what is
unreasonable, and souls nearly allied to God to go after the enjoyments
of the lower animals. [546] Pleasure must never be the object of
pursuit, not even in the sense that true pleasure is invariably
involved in virtue. That it no doubt is. [547] It is true that there is
always a peculiar satisfaction, and a quiet cheerfulness and peace of
mind, in moral conduct, just as in immoral conduct there is a lack of
inward peace; and in this sense it may be said that the wise man alone
knows what true and lasting pleasure is. [548] But even the pleasure
afforded by moral excellence ought never to be an object, but only a
natural consequence, of virtuous conduct; otherwise the independent
value of virtue is impaired. [549]
Nor may pleasure be placed side by side with virtue, as a part of the
highest good, or be declared to be inseparable from virtue. Pleasure
and virtue are different in essence and kind. Pleasure may be immoral,
and moral conduct may go hand in hand with difficulties and pains.
Pleasure is found among the worst of men, virtue only amongst the good;
virtue is dignified, untiring, imperturbable; pleasure is grovelling,
effeminate, fleeting. Those who look upon pleasure as a good are its
slaves; those in whom virtue reigns supreme control pleasure, and hold
it in check. [550] In no sense can pleasure be allowed to weigh in a
question of morals; seeing it is not an end-in-itself, but only the
result of an action; [551] not a good, but something absolutely
indifferent. The only point on which the Stoics are not unanimous is,
whether every pleasure is contrary to nature, [552] as the stern
Cleanthes, in the spirit of Cynicism, asserted, or whether there is
such a thing as a natural and desirable pleasure. [553] Virtue, on the
other hand, needs no extraneous additions, but contains in itself all
the conditions of happiness. [554] The reward of virtuous conduct, like
the punishment of wickedness, consists only in the character of those
actions, one being according to nature, the other contrary to nature.
[555] And so unconditional is this self-sufficiency of virtue, [556]
that the happiness which it affords is not increased by length of time.
[557] Rational self-control is here recognised as the only good;
thereby man makes himself independent of all external circumstances,
absolutely free, and inwardly satisfied. [558]
[(4) Negative character of happiness.]
The happiness of the virtuous man—and this is a very marked feature in
Stoicism—is thus more negative than positive. It consists in
independence and peace of mind rather than in the enjoyment which moral
conduct brings with it. In mental disquietude—says Cicero, speaking as
a Stoic—consists misery; in composure, happiness. How can he be
deficient in happiness, he enquires, whom courage preserves from care
and fear, and self-control guards from passionate pleasure and desire?
[559] How can he fail to be absolutely happy who is in no way dependent
on fortune, but simply and solely on himself? [560] To be free from
disquietude, says Seneca, is the peculiar privilege of the wise; [561]
the advantage which is gained from philosophy is, that of living
without fear, and rising superior to the troubles of life. [562] Far
more emphatical than any isolated expressions is the support which this
negative view of moral aims derives from the whole character of the
Stoic ethics, the one doctrine of the apathy of the wise man
sufficiently proving that freedom from disturbances, an unconditional
assurance, and self-dependence, are the points on which these
philosophers lay especial value.
[(5) The highest good as law.]
The Good, in as far as it is based on the general arrangement of the
world, to which the individual is subordinate, appears to man in the
character of Law. Law being, however, the law of man’s own nature, the
Good becomes the natural object of man’s desire, and meets his natural
impulse. The conception of the Good as law was a view never unfamiliar
to moral philosophy, but it was cultivated by the Stoics with peculiar
zeal; [563] and forms one of the points on which Stoicism subsequently
came into contact, partly with Roman jurisprudence, partly with the
ethics of the Jews and Christians. Moreover, as the Stoics considered
that the Reason which governs the world is the general Law of all
beings, [564] so they recognised in the moral demands of reason the
positive and negative aspects of the Law of God. [565] Human law comes
into existence when man becomes aware of the divine law, and recognises
its claims on him. [566] Civil and moral law are, therefore, commands
absolutely imperative on every rational being. [567] No man can feel
himself to be a rational being without at the same time feeling himself
pledged to be moral. [568] Obedience to this law is imposed upon man,
not only by external authority, but by virtue of his own nature. The
good is for him that which deserves to be pursued—the natural object of
man’s will; on the other hand, evil is that against which his will
revolts. [569] The former arouses his desire (ὁρμή), the latter his
aversion (ἀφορμή): [570] and thus the demands of morality are called
forth by the natural impulse of a reasonable being, and are, at the
same time, also the object towards which that impulse is naturally
directed. [571]
[B. Emotions and virtue.]
[(1) The emotions.]
[(a) Their nature.]
However simple this state of things may be to a purely rational being,
it must be remembered that man is not purely rational. [572] He has,
therefore, irrational as well as rational impulses. [573] He is not
originally virtuous, but he becomes virtuous by overcoming his
emotions. Emotion or passion [574] is a movement of mind contrary to
reason and nature, an impulse transgressing the right mean. [575] The
Peripatetic notion, that certain emotions are in accordance with
nature, was flatly denied by the Stoics. [576] The seat of the
emotions—and, indeed, of all impulses and every activity of the soul
[577]—is man’s reason, the ἡγεμονικόν. [578] Emotion is that state of
the ἡγεμονικόν in which it is hurried into what is contrary to nature
by excess of impulse. Like virtue, emotion is due to a change taking
place simultaneously, not to the effect of a separate extraneous force.
[579] Imagination, therefore, alone calls it into being, as it does
impulse in general. [580] All emotions arise from faults in judgment,
from false notions of good and evil, and may therefore be called, in so
many words, judgments or opinions; [581]—avarice, for instance, is a
wrong opinion as to the value of money, [582] fear is a wrong opinion
as regards future, trouble as regards present ills. [583] Still, as
appears from the general view of the Stoics respecting impulses, [584]
this language does not imply that emotion is only a theoretical
condition. On the contrary, the effects of a faulty imagination—the
feelings and motions of will, to which it gives rise—are expressly
included in its conception; [585] nor is it credible, as Galenus
states, [586] that this was only done by Zeno, and not by Chrysippus.
[587] The Stoics, therefore, notwithstanding their theory of necessity,
did not originally assent to the Socratic dictum, that no one does
wrong voluntarily. [588] Younger members of the School may have used
the dictum as an excuse for human faults, [589] fearing lest, in
allowing freedom to emotions, they should admit that they were morally
admissible and give up the possibility of overcoming them. [590] Nay
more, as all that proceeds from the will and impulse is voluntary,
[591] so too emotions are also in our power; and it is for us to say,
in the case of convictions out of which emotions arise, as in the case
of every other conviction, [592] whether we will yield or withhold
assent. [593] Just as little would they allow that only instruction is
needed in order to overcome emotions; for all emotions arise, as they
say, from lack of self-control, [594] and differ from errors in that
they assert themselves and oppose our better intelligence. [595] How
irregular and irrational impulses arise in reason was a point which the
Stoics never made any serious attempt to explain.
[(b) Varieties of emotion.]
Emotions being called forth by imagination, their character depends on
the kind of imagination which produces them. Now all impulses are
directed to what is good and evil, and consist either in pursuing what
appears to be a good, or in avoiding what appears to be an evil. [596]
This good and this evil is sometimes a present, and sometimes a future
object. Hence there result four chief classes of faulty imagination,
and, corresponding with them, four classes of emotions. From an
irrational opinion as to what is good there arises pleasure, when it
refers to things present; desire, when it refers to things future. A
faulty opinion of present evils produces care; of future evils, fear.
[597] Zeno had already distinguished these four principal varieties of
emotions. [598] The same division was adopted by his pupil Aristo,
[599] and afterwards became quite general. Yet the vagueness, already
mentioned, appears in the Stoic system in the definition of individual
emotions. By some, particularly by Chrysippus, the essence of emotions
is placed in the imagination which causes them; by others, in the state
of mind which the imagination produces. [600] The four principal
classes of emotions are again subdivided into numerous subordinate
classes, in the enumeration of which the Stoic philosophers appear to
have been more guided by the use of language than by psychology. [601]
In treating the subject of emotions in general, far less importance was
attached by the Stoics to psychological accuracy than to considerations
of moral worth. That the result could not be very satisfactory, follows
from what has been already stated. [602] Emotions are impulses,
overstepping natural limits, upsetting the proper balance of the soul’s
powers, contradicting reason—in a word, they are failures, disturbances
of mental health, and, if indulged in, become chronic diseases of the
soul. [603] Hence a Stoic demands their entire suppression: true virtue
can only exist where this process has succeeded. As being contrary to
nature and symptoms of disease, the wise man must be wholly free from
them. [604] When we have once learnt to value things according to their
real worth, and to discover everywhere nature’s unchanging law, nothing
will induce us to yield to emotion. [605] Hence the teaching of Plato
and Aristotle, requiring emotions to be regulated, but not uprooted,
was attacked in the most vigorous manner by these philosophers. A
moderate evil, they say, always remains an evil. What is faulty and
opposed to reason, ought never to be tolerated, not even in the
smallest degree. [606] On the other hand, when an emotion is regulated
by and subordinated to reason, it ceases to be an emotion, the term
emotion only applying to violent impulses, which are opposed to reason.
[607] The statement of the Peripatetics, that certain emotions are not
only admissible, but are useful and necessary, appears of course to the
Stoics altogether wrong. [608] To them, only what is morally good
appears to be useful: emotions are, under all circumstances, faults;
and were an emotion to be useful, virtue would be advanced by means of
what is wrong. [609] The right relation, therefore, towards
emotions—indeed, the only one morally tenable—is an attitude of
absolute hostility. The wise man must be emotionless. [610] Pain he may
feel, but, not regarding it as an evil, he will suffer no affliction,
and know no fear. [611] He may be slandered and ill-treated, but he
cannot be injured or degraded. [612] Being untouched by honour and
dishonour, he has no vanity. To anger [613] he never yields, nor needs
this irrational impulse, not even for valour and the championship of
right. But he also feels no pity, [614] and exercises no indulgence.
[615] For how can he pity others for what he would not himself consider
an evil? How can he yield to a diseased excitement for the sake of
others, which he would not tolerate for his own sake? If justice calls
for punishment, feelings will not betray him into forgiveness. We shall
subsequently have an opportunity for learning the further application
of these principles.
[(2) Idea of virtue.]
[(a) Positive and negative aspects.]
Virtue is thus negatively defined as the being exempt from emotions, as
apathy. [616] There is also a positive side to supplement this negative
view. Looking at the matter of virtuous action, this may be said to
consist in subordination to the general law of nature; looking at its
manner, in rational self-control. [617] Virtue is exclusively a matter
of reason [618]—in short, it is nothing else but rightly ordered
reason. [619] To speak more explicitly, virtue contains in itself two
elements—one practical, the other speculative. At the root, and as a
condition of all rational conduct, lies, according to the Stoics, right
knowledge. On this point they are at one with the well-known Socratic
doctrine, and with the teaching of the Cynics and Megarians. Natural
virtue, or virtue acquired only by exercise, they reject altogether.
After the manner of Socrates, they define virtue as knowledge, vice as
ignorance, [620] and insist on the necessity of learning virtue. [621]
Even the avowed enemy of all speculative enquiry, Aristo of Chios, was
on this point at one with the rest of the School. All virtues were by
him referred to wisdom, [622] and, consequently, he denied the claims
of most to be virtues at all. [623]
However closely the Stoics cling to the idea that all virtue is based
on knowledge, and is in itself nothing else but knowledge, they are not
content with knowledge, or with placing knowledge above practical
activity, as Plato and Aristotle had done. As we have seen already,
knowledge with them was only a means towards rational conduct, [624]
and it is expressly mentioned, as a deviation from the teaching of the
School, that Herillus of Carthage, Zeno’s pupil, declared knowledge to
be the end of life, and the only unconditional good. [625] Virtue may,
it is true, be called knowledge, but it is, at the same time,
essentially health and strength of mind, a right state of the soul
agreeing with its proper nature; [626] and it is required of man that
he should never cease to labour and contribute towards the common good.
[627] Thus, according to Stoic principles, virtue is a combination of
theory and practice, in which action is invariably based on
intellectual knowledge, but, at the same time, knowledge finds its
object in moral conduct—it is, in short, power of will based on
rational understanding. [628] This definition must not, however, be
taken to imply that moral knowledge precedes will, and is only
subsequently referred to will, nor conversely that the will only uses
knowledge as a subsidiary instrument. In the eyes of a Stoic, knowledge
and will are not only inseparable, but they are one and the same thing.
Virtue cannot be conceived without knowledge, nor knowledge without
virtue. [629] The one, quite as much as the other, is a right quality
of the soul, or, speaking more correctly, is the rightly endowed
soul,—reason, when it is as it ought to be. [630] Hence virtue may be
described, with equal propriety, either as knowledge or as strength of
mind; and it is irrelevant to enquire which of these two elements is
anterior in point of time.
[(b) The virtues severally.]
But how are we to reconcile with this view the Stoic teaching of a
plurality of virtues and their mutual relations? As the common root
from which they spring, Zeno, following Aristotle, regarded
understanding, Cleanthes, strength of mind, Aristo, at one time health,
at another the knowledge of good and evil. [631] Later teachers, after
the time of Chrysippus, thought that it consisted in knowledge or
wisdom, understanding by wisdom absolute knowledge, the knowing all
things, human and divine. [632] From this common root, a multiplicity
of virtues was supposed to proceed, which, after Plato’s example, are
grouped round four principal virtues [633]—intelligence, bravery,
justice, self-control. [634] Intelligence consists in knowing what is
good and bad, and what is neither the one nor the other, the
indifferent; [635] bravery, in knowing what to choose, what to avoid,
and what neither to choose nor to avoid; or, substituting the
corresponding personal attitude for knowledge, bravery is fearless
obedience to the law of reason, both in boldness and endurance. [636]
Self-control consists in knowing what to choose, and what to eschew,
and what neither to choose nor eschew; [637] justice, in knowing how to
give to everyone what is his due. [638] In a corresponding manner, the
principal faults are traced back to the conception of ignorance. [639]
Probably all these definitions belong to Chrysippus. [640] Other
definitions are attributed to his predecessors, [641] some more nearly,
others more remotely, agreeing with him in their conception of virtue.
Within these limits, a great number of individual virtues were
distinguished, their differences and precise shades of meaning being
worked out with all the pedantry which characterised Chrysippus. [642]
The definitions of a portion of them have been preserved by Diogenes
and Stobæus. [643] In a similar way, too, the Stoics carried their
classification of errors into the minutest details. [644]
[(c) Mutual relation of the several virtues.]
The importance attaching to this division of virtues, the ultimate
basis on which it rests, and the relation which virtues bear, both to
one another and to the common essence of virtue, are topics upon which
Zeno never entered. Plutarch, at least, blames him [645] for treating
virtues as many, and yet inseparable, and at the same time for finding
in all virtues only certain manifestations of the understanding. Aristo
attempted to settle this point more precisely. According to his view,
virtue is in itself only one; in speaking of many virtues, we only
refer to the variety of objects with which that one virtue has to do.
[646] The difference of one virtue from another is not one of inward
quality, but depends on the external conditions under which they are
manifested; it only expresses a definite relation to something else,
or, in the language of Herbart, an accidental aspect. [647] The same
view would seem to be implied in the manner in which Cleanthes
determines the relations of the principal virtues to one another. [648]
It was, however, opposed by Chrysippus. The assumption of many virtues,
he believed, rested upon an inward difference; [649] each definite
virtue, as also each definite fault, becoming what it does by a
peculiar change in the character of the soul itself; [650] in short,
for a particular virtue to come into being, it is not enough that the
constituent element of all virtue should be directed towards a
particular object, but to the common element must be superadded a
further characteristic element, or differentia; the several virtues
being related to one another, as the various species of one genus.
All virtues have, however, one and the same end, which they compass in
different ways, and all presuppose the same moral tone and conviction,
[651] which is only to be found where it is to be found perfect, and
ceases to exist the moment it is deprived of one of its component
parts. [652] They are, indeed, distinct from one another, each one
having its own end, towards which it is primarily directed; but, at the
same time, they again coalesce, inasmuch as none can pursue its own end
without pursuing that of the others at the same time. [653]
Accordingly, no part of virtue can be separated from its other parts.
Where one virtue exists, the rest exist also, and where there is one
fault, there all is faulty. Even each single virtuous action contains
all other virtues, for the moral tone of which it is the outcome
includes in itself all the rest. [654] What makes virtue virtue, and
vice vice, is simply and solely the intention. [655] The will, although
it may lack the means of execution, is worth quite as much as the deed;
[656] a wicked desire is quite as criminal as the gratification of that
desire. [657] Hence only that action can be called virtuous which is
not only good in itself, but which proceeds from willing the good; and
although, in the first instance, the difference between the discharge
and the neglect of duty (κατόρθωμα and ἁμάρτημα) depends on the real
agreement or disagreement of our actions with the moral law, [658] yet
that alone can be said to be a true and perfect discharge of duty which
arises from a morally perfect character. [659]
[(d) Unity of virtue.]
Such a character, the Stoics held, must either exist altogether, or not
at all; for virtue is an indivisible whole, which we cannot possess in
part, but must either have or not have. [660] He who has a right
intention and a right appreciation of good and evil, is virtuous; he
who has not these requisites is lacking in virtue; there is no third
alternative. Virtue admits neither of increase nor diminution, [661]
and there is no mean between virtue and vice. [662] This being the
case, and the value of an action depending wholly on the intention, it
follows, necessarily, that virtue admits of no degrees. If the
intention must be either good or bad, the same must be true of actions;
and if a good intention or virtue has in it nothing bad, and a bad
intention has in it nothing good, the same is true of actions. A good
action is unconditionally praiseworthy; a bad one, unconditionally
blameworthy, the former being only found where virtue exists pure and
entire; the latter, only where there is no virtue at all. All good
actions are, on the one hand, according to the well-known paradox,
equally good; all bad actions, on the other, equally bad. The standard
of moral judgment is an absolute one; and when conduct does not
altogether conform to this standard, it falls short of it altogether.
[663]
[C. The wise man.]
[(1) Wisdom and folly.]
From what has been said, it follows that there can be but one
thoroughgoing moral distinction for all mankind, the distinction
between the virtuous and the vicious; and that within each of these
classes there can be no difference in degree. He who possesses virtue
possesses it whole and entire; he who lacks it lacks it altogether; and
whether he is near or far from possessing it is a matter of no moment.
He who is only a hand-breadth below the surface of the water will be
drowned just as surely as one who is five hundred fathoms deep; he who
is blind sees equally little whether he will recover his sight
to-morrow or never. [664] The whole of mankind are thus divided by the
Stoics into two classes—those who are wise and those who are foolish;
[665] and these two classes are treated by them as mutually exclusive,
each one being complete in itself. Among the wise no folly, among the
foolish no wisdom of any kind, is possible. [666] The wise man is
absolutely free from faults and mistakes: all that he does is right; in
him all virtues centre; he has a right opinion on every subject, and
never a wrong one, nor, indeed, ever what is merely an opinion. The bad
man, on the contrary, can do nothing aright; he has every kind of vice;
he has no right knowledge, and is altogether rude, violent, cruel, and
ungrateful. [667]
The Stoics delight in insisting upon the perfection of the wise man,
and contrasting with it the absolute faultiness of the foolish man, in
a series of paradoxical assertions. [668] The wise man only is free,
because he only uses his will to control himself; [669] he only is
beautiful, because only virtue is beautiful and attractive; [670] he
only is rich and happy (εὐτυχὴς), because goods of the soul are the
most valuable, true riches consisting in being independent of wants.
[671] Nay, more, he is absolutely rich, since he who has a right view
of everything has everything in his intellectual treasury, [672] and he
who makes the right use of everything bears to everything the relation
of owner. [673] The wise only know how to obey, and they also only know
how to govern; they only are therefore kings, generals, pilots; [674]
they only are orators, poets, and prophets; [675] and since their view
of the Gods and their worship of the Gods is the true one, only amongst
them can true piety be found—they are the only priests and friends of
heaven; all foolish men, on the contrary, are impious, profane, and
enemies of the Gods. [676] Only the wise man is capable of feeling
gratitude, love, and friendship, [677] he only is capable of receiving
a benefit, nothing being of use or advantage to the foolish man. [678]
To sum up, the wise man is absolutely perfect, absolutely free from
passion and want, absolutely happy; [679] as the Stoics conclusively
assert, he in no way falls short of the happiness of Zeus, [680] since
time, the only point in which he differs from Zeus, does not augment
happiness at all. [681] On the other hand, the foolish man is
altogether foolish, unhappy, and perverse; or, in the expressive
language of the Stoics, every foolish man is a madman, he being a
madman who has no knowledge of himself, nor of what most closely
affects him. [682]
[(2) Universal depravity.]
This assertion is all the more trenchant because the Stoics recognised
neither virtue nor wisdom outside their own system or one closely
related to it, and because they took a most unfavourable view of the
moral condition of their fellow-men. That they should do so was
inevitable from their point of view. A system which sets up its own
moral idea against current notions so sharply as that of the Stoics can
only be the offspring of a thorough disapproval of existing
circumstances, and must, on the other hand, contribute thereto.
According to the Stoic standard, by far the majority, indeed, almost
the whole of mankind, belong to the class of the foolish. If all
foolish people are equally and altogether bad, mankind must have seemed
to them to be a sea of corruption and vice, from which, at best, but a
few swimmers emerge at spots widely apart. [683] Man passes his
life—such had already been the complaint of Cleanthes [684]—in
wickedness. Only here and there does one, in the evening of life, after
many wanderings, attain to virtue. And that this was the common opinion
among the successors of Cleanthes, is witnessed by their constant
complaints of the depravity of the foolish, and of the rare occurrence
of a wise man. [685]
No one probably has expressed this opinion more frequently or more
strongly than Seneca. We are wicked, he says; we have been wicked; we
shall be wicked. Our ancestors complained of the decline of morals; we
complain of their decline; and posterity will utter the very same
complaint. The limits within which morality oscillates are not far
asunder; the modes in which vice shows itself change, but its power
remains the same. [686] All men are wicked; and he who has as yet done
nothing wicked is at least in a condition to do it. All are thankless,
avaricious, cowardly, impious; all are mad. [687] We have all done
wrong—one in a less, the other in a greater degree; and we shall all do
wrong to the end of the chapter. [688] One drives the other into folly,
and the foolish are too numerous to allow the individual to improve.
[689] He who would be angry with the vices of men, instead of pitying
their faults, would never stop. So great is the amount of iniquity!
[690]
No doubt the age in which Seneca lived afforded ample occasion for such
effusions, but his predecessors must have found similar occasions in
their own days. Indeed, all the principles of the Stoic School, when
consistently developed, made it impossible to consider the great
majority of men as anything else than a mass of fools and sinners. From
this sweeping verdict, even the most distinguished names were not
excluded. If asked for examples of wisdom, they would point to
Socrates, Diogenes, Antisthenes, [691] and, in later times, to Cato;
[692] but not only would they deny philosophic virtue, as Plato had
done before them, to the greatest statesmen and heroes of early times,
but they would deny to them all and every kind of virtue. [693] Even
the admission that general faults belong to some in a lower degree than
to others can hardly be reconciled with their principle of the equality
of all who are not wise. [694]
[(3) Conversion.]
The two moral states being thus at opposite poles, a gradual transition
from one to the other is, of course, out of the question. There may be
a progress from folly and wickedness in the direction of wisdom, [695]
but the actual passage from one to the other must be momentary and
instantaneous. [696] Those who are still progressing belong, without
exception, to the class of the foolish; [697] and one who has lately
become wise is in the first moment unconscious of his new state. [698]
The transition takes place so rapidly, and his former state affords so
few points of contact with the one on which he has newly entered, that
the mind does not keep pace with the change, and only becomes conscious
of it by subsequent experience.
In this picture of the wise man, the moral idealism of the Stoic system
attained its zenith. A virtuous will appears here so completely
sundered from all outward conditions of life, so wholly free from all
the trammels of natural existence, and the individual has become so
completely the organ of universal law, that it may be asked, What right
has such a being to call himself a person? How can such a being be
imagined as a man living among fellow-men? Nor was this question
unknown to the Stoics themselves. Unless they are willing to allow that
their theory was practically impossible, and their ideal scientifically
untenable, how could they escape the necessity of showing that it might
be reconciled with the wants of human life and the conditions of
reality? Let the attempt be once made, however, and withal they would
be forced to look for some means of adapting it to those very feelings
and opinions towards which their animosity had formerly been so great.
Nor could the attempt be long delayed. Daily a greater value was
attached to the practical working of their system, and to its agreement
with general opinion. The original direction of Stoic morality aimed at
the absolute and unconditional submission of the individual to the law
of the universe, yet, in developing that theory, the rights of the
individual asserted themselves unmistakably. From this confluence of
opposite currents arose a deviation from the rigid type of the Stoic
system, some varieties of which, in the direction of the ordinary view
of life, deserve now further consideration.
CHAPTER XI.
THE STOIC THEORY OF MORALS AS MODIFIED BY PRACTICAL NEEDS.
[A. Things to be preferred and eschewed.]
The Stoic theory of Ethics is entirely rooted in the proposition, that
only virtue is a good and only vice an evil. This proposition, however,
frequently brought the Stoics into collision with current views; nor
was it without its difficulties for their own system. In the first
place, virtue is made to depend for its existence upon certain
conditions, and to lead to certain results, from which it is
inseparable. These results, we have already seen, [699] were included
by the Stoics in the list of goods. Moreover, virtue is said to be the
only good, because only what is according to nature is a good, and
rational conduct is for man the only thing according to nature. But can
this be so absolutely and unconditionally stated? According to the
Stoic teaching the instinct of self-preservation being the primary
impulse, does not this instinct manifestly include the preservation and
advancement of outward life? The Stoics, therefore, could not help
including physical goods and activities among things according to
nature—for instance, health, a right enjoyment of the senses, and such
like. [700] Practically, too, the same admission was forced upon them
by the consideration [701] that, if there is no difference in value
between things in themselves, rational choice—and, indeed, all acting
on motives—is impossible. At the same time, they reject the notion that
what is first according to nature must therefore be perfect or good,
just as in theory they allow that the source of knowledge, but not
truth itself, is derived from the senses. When man has once recognised
the universal law of action, he will, according to their view, think
little of what is sensuous and individual, and only look upon it as an
instrument in the service of virtue and reason. [702]
[(1) Secondary goods.]
Still, there remains the question, How can this be possible? and this
is no easy one to answer. The contemporary opponents of the Stoics
already took exception to the way in which the first demands of nature
were by them excluded from the aims of a life [703] according to
nature; and we, too, cannot suppress a feeling of perplexity at being
told that all duties aim at attaining what is primarily according to
nature, but that what is according to nature must not be looked upon as
the aim of our actions; [704] since not that which is simply according
to nature, but the rational choice and combination of what is according
to nature constitutes the good. [705] Even if the Stoics pretend to
dispose of this difficulty, they cannot, at least, fail to see that
whatever contributes to bodily well-being must have a certain positive
value, and must be desirable in all cases in which no higher good
suffers in consequence; and, conversely, that whatever is opposed to
bodily well-being, when higher duties are not involved, must have a
negative value (ἀπαξία), and, consequently, deserve to be avoided.
[706] Such objects and actions they would not, however, allow to be
included in the class of goods which are absolutely valuable. [707] It
was therefore a blending of Peripatetic with Stoic teaching when
Herillus, the fellow-student of Cleanthes, enumerated bodily and
outward goods as secondary and subsidiary aims besides virtue. [708]
[(2) Classes of things indifferent.]
Nor were the Stoics minded to follow the contemporary philosopher,
Aristo of Chios (who in this point, too, endeavoured to place their
School on the platform of the Cynic philosophy), in denying any
difference in value between things morally indifferent [709] and in
making the highest aim in life consist in indifference to all external
things. [710] Virtue with them bears, in comparison with the Cynic
virtue, a more positive character, that of an energetic will; they,
therefore, required some definite relation to the outward objects and
conditions of this activity which should regulate the choosing or
rejecting—or, in other words, the practical decision. Accordingly, they
divided things indifferent into three classes. To the first class
belong all those things which, from a moral or absolute point of view,
are neither good nor evil, but yet which have a certain value; no
matter whether this value belongs to them properly, because they are in
harmony with human nature, or whether it belongs to them improperly,
because they are means for advancing moral and natural life, or whether
it belongs to them on both grounds. The second class includes
everything which, either by itself or in its relation to higher aims,
is opposed to nature and harmful. The third, things which, even in this
conditional sense, have neither positive nor negative value. The first
class bears the name of things preferential (προηγμένον), or things
desirable; the second is the class of things to be eschewed
(ἀποπροηγμένον); the third is the class of things intermediate. [711]
The last is called, in the strict sense, indifferent, ἀδιάφορον. [712]
It includes not only what is really indifferent, but whatever has such
a slight negative or positive value that it neither enkindles desire
nor aversion. Hence the terms προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμένον are defined
to mean respectively that which has an appreciable positive or negative
value. [713] Under things preferential, the Stoics include partly
mental qualities and conditions, such as talents and skill, even
progress towards virtue, in as far as it is not yet virtue; partly
bodily advantage—beauty, strength, health, life itself; partly external
goods—riches, honour, noble birth, relations, &c. Under things to be
eschewed, they understand the opposite things and conditions; under
things indifferent, whatever has no appreciable influence on our
choice, such as the question whether the number of hairs on the head is
even or uneven; whether I pick up a piece of waste paper from the
floor, or leave it; whether one piece of money or another is used in
[(3) Collision of modified and abstract theory.] payment of a debt.
[714] Yet they drew a sharp distinction between the purely relative
value of things preferential, and the absolute value of things morally
good. Only the latter are really allowed to be called good, because
they only, under all circumstances, are useful and necessary. Of things
morally indifferent, on the other hand, the best may, under certain
circumstances, be bad, and the worst—sickness, poverty, and the
like—may, under certain circumstances, be useful. [715] Just as little
would they allow that the independence of the wise man suffered by the
recognition outside himself of a class of things preferential. For the
wise man, said Chrysippus, [716] uses such things without requiring
them. Nevertheless, the admission of classes of things to be preferred
and to be declined obviously undermines their doctrine of the good.
Between what is good and what is evil, a third group is introduced, of
doubtful character; and since we have seen the term ἀδιάφορον is only
applied to this group in its more extended meaning, it became
impossible for them to refuse to apply the term good to things
desirable, [717] or to exclude unconditionally from the highest good
many of the things which they were in the habit of pronouncing
indifferent. [718] Nor was this concession merely the yielding of a
term, as will appear when particular instances are considered. Not only
may Seneca [719] be heard, in Aristotelian manner, defending external
possessions as aids to virtue—not only Hecato, and even Diogenes,
uttering ambiguous sentences as to permitted and forbidden gains
[720]—not only Panætius giving expression to much that falls short of
Stoic severity [721]—but even Chrysippus avows that in his opinion it
is silly not to desire health, wealth, and freedom from pain, [722] and
that a statesman may treat honour and wealth as real goods; [723]
adding that the whole Stoic School agrees with him in thinking it no
disparagement for a wise man to follow a profession which lies under a
stigma in the common opinion of Greece. [724] He did not even hesitate
to assert that it is better to live irrationally than not to live at
all. [725] It is impossible to conceal the fact that, in attempting to
adapt their system to general opinion and to the conditions of
practical life, the Stoics were driven to make admissions strongly at
variance with their previous theories. It may hence be gathered with
certainty that, in laying down those theories, they had overstrained a
point.
[B. Perfect and intermediate duties.]
By means of this doctrine of things to be preferred and things to be
eschewed, a further addition was made to the conception of duty. Under
duty, or what is proper, [726] we have already seen, the Stoics
understand rational action in general, which becomes good conduct, or
κατόρθωμα, by being done with a right intention. [727] The conception
of duty, therefore, contains in itself the conception of virtuous
conduct, and is used primarily to express what is good or rational.
Duty thus appears to have a twofold meaning, in consequence of the
twofold characters of things desirable and things good. If the good
were the only permitted object of desire, there would, of course, be
but one duty—that of realising the good; and the various actions which
contribute to this result would only be distinguished by their being
employed on a different material, but not in respect of their moral
value. But if, besides what is absolutely good, there are things
relatively good, things not to be desired absolutely, but only in cases
in which they may be pursued without detriment to the absolute good or
virtue—if, moreover, besides vice, as the absolute evil, there are also
relative evils, which we have reason to avoid in the same cases—the
extent of our duties is increased likewise; a number of conditional
duties are placed by the side of duties unconditional, differing from
the latter in that they aim at pursuing things to be preferred, and
avoiding things to be eschewed. From this platform, all that accords
with nature is regarded as proper, or a duty in the more extended sense
of the term; and the conception of propriety is extended to include
plants and animals. [728] Proper and dutiful actions are then divided
into those which are always such and those which are only such under
peculiar circumstances—the former being called perfect, the latter
intermediate duties; [729] and it is stated, as a peculiarity of the
latter, that, owing to circumstances, a course of conduct may become a
duty which would not have been a duty without those peculiar
circumstances. [730] In the wider sense of the term, every action is
proper or in accordance with duty which consists in the choice of a
thing to be preferred (προηγμένον) and in avoiding a thing to be
eschewed. On the other hand, a perfect duty is only fulfilled by
virtuous action. A virtuous life and a wish to do good constitute the
only perfect duty. [731]
Some confusion is introduced into this teaching by the fact that in
setting up the standard for distinguishing perfect from imperfect
duties, the Stoics sometimes look at the real, sometimes at the
personal value, of actions, without keeping these two aspects distinct.
They therefore use the terms perfect and imperfect sometimes to express
the difference between conditional and unconditional duties; at other
times, to express that between morality and law. [732] Far worse than
the formal defect is the grouping in this division under the conception
of duty things of the most varied moral character. If once things which
have only a conditional value are admitted within the circle of duties,
what is there to prevent their being defended, in the practical
application of the Stoic teaching, on grounds altogether repugnant to
the legitimate consequences of the Stoic principles?
[C. Emotions.]
[(1) Permitted affections.]
In accordance with these admissions, the Stoic system sought in another
respect to meet facts and practical wants by abating somewhat from the
austerity of its demands. Consistently carried out, those demands
require the unconditional extirpation of the whole sensuous nature,
such as was originally expressed by the demand for apathy. But just as
the stricter Stoic theory of the good was modified by the admission of
προηγμένα, so this demand was modified in two ways; the first elements
of the forbidden emotions were allowed under other names; and whilst
emotions were still forbidden, certain mental affections were
permitted, and even declared to be desirable. Taking the first point,
it is allowed by the Stoics that the wise man feels pain, and that at
certain things he does not remain wholly calm. [733] This admission
shows that their system was not identical with that of the Cynics.
[734] It is not required that men should be entirely free from all
mental affections, but only that they should refuse assent to them, and
not suffer them to obtain the mastery. [735] With regard to the other
point, they propound the doctrine of εὐπάθειαι, or rational
dispositions, which, as distinct from emotions, are to be found in the
wise man, and in the wise man only. Of these rational dispositions,
they distinguish three chief besides several subordinate varieties.
[736] Although this admission was intended to vindicate the absence of
emotions in the wise man, since the permitted feelings are not
emotions, still it made the boundary-line between emotions and feelings
so uncertain that in practice the sharply-defined contrast between the
wise and the foolish threatened wellnigh to disappear altogether.
[(2) Modification of apathy.]
This danger appears more imminent when we observe the perplexity in
which the Stoics were placed when asked to point out the wise man in
experience. For not only do opponents assert that, according to their
own confession, no one, or as good as no one, can be found in actual
history who altogether deserves that high title, [737] but even their
own admissions agree therewith. [738] They describe even Socrates,
Diogenes, and Antisthenes as not completely virtuous, but only as
travellers towards virtue. [739] It was of little avail to point to
Hercules or Ulysses, [740] or, with Posidonius, [741] to the mythical
golden age, in which the wise are said to have ruled. The pictures of
those heroes would have to be changed altogether, to bring them into
harmony with the wise man of the Stoics; and Posidonius might be easily
disposed of on Stoic principles, by the rejoinder that virtue and
wisdom are things of free exercise, and, since free exercise was
wanting in the case of the first men, their condition can only have
been a state of unconscious ignorance, and not one of perfection. [742]
If, in reality, there are no wise men, the division of men into wise
and foolish falls at once to the ground: all mankind belong to the
class of fools; the conception of the wise man is an unreal fancy. It
becomes, then, difficult to maintain the assertion that all fools are
equally foolish, and all the wise are equally wise. If, instead of
producing real wisdom, philosophy can only produce progress towards
wisdom, it can hardly be expected to take such a modest estimate of its
own success as to allow that there is no real distinction between a
zealous student and a bigoted despiser of its doctrines.
[(3) The state of progress.]
It was therefore natural that the Stoics, notwithstanding their own
maxims, found themselves compelled to recognise differences among the
bad and differences among the good. In reference to their system these
differences were, indeed, made to depend in the case of the bad upon
the greater or less difficulty of healing the moral defects, or, in the
case of the good, upon qualities morally indifferent. [743] It was also
natural that they should so nearly identify the state of προσκοπὴ—or
progress towards wisdom, the only really existing state—with wisdom
that it could hardly be distinguished therefrom. If there is a stage of
progress at which a man is free from all emotions, discharges all his
duties, knows all that is necessary, and is even secure against the
danger of relapse, [744] such a stage cannot be distinguished from
wisdom, either by its want of experience or by the absence of a clear
knowledge of oneself. For has it not been frequently asserted that
happiness is not increased by length of time, and that the wise man is
at first not conscious of his wisdom? [745] If, however, the highest
stage of approximation to wisdom is supposed still to fall short of
wisdom, because it is not sure of its continuance, and though free from
mental diseases, it is not free from emotions, [746] how, it may be
asked, do these passing emotions differ from the mental affections
which are found in the wise man? Is there any real distinction between
them? If the progressing candidate has attained to freedom from
diseased mental states, is the danger of a relapse very great? Besides,
the Stoics were by no means agreed that the really wise man is free
from all danger. Cleanthes held with the Cynics that virtue can never
be lost; Chrysippus admitted that, in certain cases, it is defectible.
[747] After all this admission is only one among many traits which
prove that the Stoics were obliged to abate from the original severity
of their demands.
CHAPTER XII.
APPLIED MORAL SCIENCE.
All that has hitherto been stated has regard to the general principles
only of the Stoics touching the end and the conditions of moral action.
Whether the mere exposition of principles be enough, or whether the
practical application of these principles to the special relations of
life does not also form part of moral science—is a question as to which
the Stoic School was not originally unanimous. Aristo, a Cynic on this
as on other points, was of opinion that this whole branch of moral
science is useless and unnecessary; the philosopher must confine
himself exclusively to things which have a practical value, the
fundamental ground of morality. [748] Within the Stoic School, however,
this view did not gain much support. Even Cleanthes, who otherwise
agreed with Aristo, did not deny the value of the application of theory
to details, provided the connection of details with general principles
were not lost sight of. [749] Nor can there be any doubt that, after
the time of Chrysippus, details engrossed much of the attention of the
Stoic philosophers. Posidonius enumerates, as belonging to the province
of moral philosophy, precept, exhortation, and advice. [750] His
teacher, Panætius, had discussed the hortatory side of morality [751]
in three books on duties, which are imitated in Cicero’s well-known
treatise. [752] The division of ethics attributed to Diogenes, [753]
and by him referred to Chrysippus, leaves place for such discussions;
[754] and, not to mention Aristo’s opposition, which supposes the
existence of applied moral science, the example of his fellow-student
Persæus, whose precepts for a science of banqueting [755] have been
already referred to, proves how early practical ethics had obtained a
footing within the Stoic School. Moreover, the elaborate theory of
virtue propounded by Chrysippus and his followers [756] can hardly have
failed to include many of the principal occurrences in life. Thus a
number of particular precepts are known to us, which are partly quoted
by other writers as belonging to the Stoics, and are partly to be found
in the pages of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, and in Cicero’s
treatise on duties. Indeed, the Stoics were the first who went at all
deeply into the subject of casuistry. [757] At a later epoch, when more
general questions had been settled by Chrysippus, the preference for
particular enquiries within the domain of applied moral science appears
to have increased among the Stoics. [758] Probably none but the later
members of the School advanced the unscientific assertion [759] that we
ought to confine ourselves to precepts for particular cases, since only
these have any practical value.
In this extension of the moral theory, besides the desire for
scientific completeness, the endeavour may also be observed to
subordinate all sides of human activity to moral considerations. In the
virtuous man, as the Stoics held, everything becomes virtue; [760] and
hence everything is included in moral philosophy. Thereby, without
doubt, the Stoic School contributed in no small degree towards settling
and defining moral ideas, not only for its immediate contemporaries,
but also for all subsequent times. Nevertheless, the more the teaching
of the School entered into the details of every-day life, the more
impossible it became to prevent practical considerations from
overriding the natural severity of Stoic principles, or to keep the
strictness of scientific procedure from yielding to considerations of
experience.
The order and division which the Stoics adopted for discussing details
in the hortatory part of moral science are not known to us; nor,
indeed, is it known whether that order was uniform in all cases. [761]
It will be most convenient for the purpose of our present description
to distinguish, in the first place, those points which refer to the
moral activity of the individual as such, and afterwards to go on to
those which relate to social life. Subsequently, the teaching of the
Stoics on the relation of man to the course of the world and to
necessity will engage our attention.
[A. The individual.]
[(1) Importance attached to the individual.]
It was in keeping with the whole tone of the Stoic system to devote, in
ethics, more attention to the conduct and duties of the individual than
had been done by previous philosophy. Not that previous philosophers
had altogether ignored this side. Indeed, Aristotle, in his
investigations into individual virtue, had been led to enquire
carefully into individual morality. Still, with Aristotle, the
influence of classic antiquity on the border-land of which he stands
was sufficiently strong to throw the individual into the background as
compared with the community, and to subordinate ethics to politics. In
the post-Aristotelian philosophy, this relation was exactly reversed.
With the decline of public life in Greece, intellectual interest in the
state declined also; and, in equal degree, the personality of the
individual and circumstances of private life came into prominence. This
feature may be already noticed in some of the older Schools, for
instance, in the Academy and Peripatetic School. The Peripatetic, in
particular, had, in the time of its first adherents, travelled far on
the road which the founder had struck out. Among the Stoics, the same
feature was required by the whole spirit of their system. If happiness
depends upon man’s internal state and nothing external has power to
affect it, the science which professes to lead man to happiness must
primarily busy itself with man’s moral nature. It can only consider
human society in as far as action for society forms part of the moral
duty of the individual. Hence, in the Stoic philosophy, researches into
the duties of the individual occupy a large space, and there is a
corresponding subordination of politics. These duties form the subject
of by far the greater part of the applied moral science of the Stoics;
and it has been already set forth [762] how minutely they entered in
that study into possible details. At the same time, the scientific
harvest resulting from these researches is by no means in proportion to
their extent.
Confining our attention to the two first books of Cicero’s work, De
Officiis, to form some idea of the treatise of Panætius on duties, we
find, after a few introductory remarks, morality as such (honestum)
described, according to the scheme of the four cardinal virtues (i.
5–42). In discussing the first of these, intelligence, love of research
is recommended, and useless subtlety is deprecated. Justice and
injustice are next discussed, in all their various forms, due regard
being had to the cases of ordinary occurrence in life. Liberality,
kindness, and benevolence are treated as subdivisions of justice; and
this leads to a consideration of human society in all its various forms
(c. 16–18, 60). Turning next to bravery (18, 61), the philosopher draws
attention to the fact that bravery is inseparably connected with
justice. He then describes it partly as it appears in the forms of
magnanimity and endurance, regardless of external circumstances, partly
in the form of energetic courage; and, in so doing, he discusses
various questions which suggest themselves, such as the nature of true
and false courage, military and civil courage, and the exclusion of
anger from valour. Lastly, the object of the fourth chief virtue (c.
27) is described, in general terms, as what is proper (decorum,
πρέπον), and the corresponding state as propriety, both in controlling
the impulses of the senses, in jest and play, and in the whole personal
bearing. The peculiar demands made by individual nature, by time of
life, by civil position, are discussed. Even outward proprieties—of
speech and conversation, of domestic arrangement, tact in behaviour,
[763] honourable and dishonourable modes of life—do not escape
attention. [764]
In the second book of his work, Cicero considers the relation of
interest to duty; and having proved, at length, [765] that most that is
advantageous and disadvantageous is brought on us by other men, he
turns to the means by which we may gain the support of others, and by
which affection, trust, and admiration may be secured. He reviews
various kinds of services for individuals and the state, and embraces
the opportunity to give expression to his abhorrence of despotism and
republican servility to the people. The principles on which this review
is conducted are such that objection can rarely be taken to them from
the platform of modern morality. Yet the Stoic bias is unmistakeably
present in the conception and support of the rules of life, and
particularly in the definitions of various virtues; few of the moral
judgments, however, are other than might have been expressed from the
platform of the Platonic and Aristotelian ethics. [766] The same remark
holds good of some other recorded points by means of which the Stoics
gave a further expansion to their picture of the wise man. [767]
Revolting as their tenets at times appear, there is yet little in their
application that deviated from the moral ideas generally current.
[(2) Cynicism of the Stoics.]
[(a) Connection of Stoics with Cynics.]
More peculiar, and at the same time more startling, is another feature
about the Stoics. Let not too much be made of the fact that they, under
certain circumstances, permitted a lie. [768] Were not Socrates and
Plato, at least, of the same opinion? And, to be frank, we must admit
that, although in this respect moral theories are strict enough, yet
practice is commonly far too lax now. Very repulsive, however, are many
assertions attributed to the Stoics, respecting the attitude of the
wise man to the so-called intermediate things. Was not the very
independence of externals, the indifference to everything but the moral
state, which found expression in the doctrine of things indifferent and
of the wise man’s apathy, at the root of that imperfection of life and
principle which is so prominent in the Cynic School, the parent School
of the Stoics? Granting that in the Stoic School this imperfection was
toned down and supplemented by other elements, still the tendency
thereto was too deeply rooted from its origin, and too closely bound up
with its fundamental view of life, to be ever properly eradicated. It
did not require, indeed, a Cynic life from its members; nay, more, it
avowed that, except in rare cases, such a life ought not to be
followed; [769] still the Cynic’s life was its ideal; and when it
asserted that it was not necessary for a wise man to be a Cynic, it
implied that, if once a Cynic, he would always be a Cynic. [770]
Stoicism took for its patterns [771] Antisthenes and Diogenes quite as
much as Socrates; even those who held, with Seneca, [772] that a
philosopher ought to accommodate himself to prevailing customs, and,
from regard to others, do what he would not himself approve, did not
therefore cease to bestow their highest admiration on Diogenes’s
independence of wants, notwithstanding his eccentricities. [773] More
consistent thinkers even approximated to Cynicism in their moral
precepts, [774] and in later times a School of younger Cynics actually
grew out of the Stoic School.
[(b) Instances of Cynicism.]
Bearing, as the Stoics did, this close relationship to the Cynics, it
cannot astonish us to find amongst them many instances of the most
revolting traits in Cynicism. Their contempt for cultured habits and
violation of right feelings fully justify the righteous indignation of
their opponents. Chrysippus regarded many things as perfectly harmless
in which the religious feeling of Greece saw pollution, [775] and
pleaded in defence of his opinion the example of animals, to show that
they were according to nature. The care for deceased relatives he not
only proposed to limit to the simplest mode of burial, but would have
it altogether put aside; and he made the horrible suggestion, which he
even described in full, of using for purposes of nourishment the flesh
of amputated limbs and the corpses of the nearest relatives. [776]
Great offence, too, was given by the Stoics, and, in particular, by
Chrysippus, in their treatment of the relation of the sexes to each
other; nor can it be denied that some of their language on this subject
sounds exceedingly offensive. The Cynic assertion, that anything which
is in itself allowed may be mentioned plainly and without a
periphrasis, is also attributed to the Stoics. [777] By his proposals
for the dress of women, Zeno offended against propriety and modesty,
[778] and both he and Chrysippus advocated community of wives in their
state of wise men. [779] It is, moreover, asserted that the Stoics
raised no objection to the prevalent profligacy and the trade in
unchastity, [780] nor to the still worse vice of unnatural crime. [781]
Marriage among the nearest relatives was held to be consonant to nature
by the leaders of the School; [782] and the atrocious shamelessness of
Diogenes found supporters in Chrysippus, [783] perhaps, too, in Zeno.
[784]
[(c) Cynicism a theoretical consequence of Stoic principles.]
It would, however, be doing the Stoics a great injustice to take these
statements for more than theoretical conclusions drawn from the
principles to which they were pledged. The moral character of Zeno,
Cleanthes, and Chrysippus is quite above suspicion. It seems,
therefore, strange that they should have felt themselves compelled to
admit in theory what strikes the natural feeling with horror. It
cannot, however, be unconditionally accepted that the statements laid
to their charge as they used them imply all that historians find in
them. Far from it; of some of their statements it may be said not only
that they do not justify conduct recognised to be immoral, but that
they are directed against actions customarily allowed, the argument
being, that between such actions and actions admittedly immoral there
is no real difference. This remark applies, in particular, to Zeno’s
language on unnatural vice. [785] It was not, therefore, in opposition
to the older Stoics, or a denial of their maxim that love is permitted
to a wise man, [786] for the younger Stoics to condemn most explicitly
any and every form of unchastity, and, in particular, the worst form of
all, unnatural vice. [787] In the same way, the language permitting
marriage between those nearest of kin, when examined, is very much
milder than it seems. [788] And Zeno’s proposition for a community of
wives may be fairly laid to the charge of Plato, and excused by all the
charitable excuses of which Plato is allowed the benefit. [789]
Taking the most unprejudiced view of the Stoic propositions, there are
enough of them to arouse extreme dislike, even if they could, without
difficulty, be deduced from the fundamental principles of the system. A
moral theory which draws such a sharp distinction between what is
without and what is within, that it regards the latter as alone
essential, the former as altogether indifferent, which attaches no
value to anything except virtuous intention, and places the highest
value in being independent of everything—such a moral theory must of
necessity prove wanting, whenever the business of morality consists in
using the senses as instruments for expressing the mind, and in raising
natural impulses to the sphere of free will. If its prominent features
allow less to the senses than naturally belongs to them, there is a
danger that, in particular cases in which intentions are not so
obvious, the moral importance of actions will often be ignored, and
such actions treated as indifferent.
[B. Social relations.]
The same observation will have to be made with regard to the positions
which the Stoics laid down in reference to social relations. Not that
it was their intention to detach man from his natural relation [(1)
Origin and use of society.] to other men. On the contrary, they hold
that the further man carries the work of moral improvement [(a) Origin
of social claims.] in himself, the stronger he will feel drawn to
society. But by the introduction of the idea of society, opposite
tendencies arise in their ethics—one towards individual independence,
the other in the direction of a well-ordered social life. The former
tendency is the earlier one, and continues to predominate throughout;
still, the latter was not surreptitiously introduced—nay, more, it was
the logical result of the Stoic principles, and to the eye of an
Epicurean must have seemed a distinctive feature of Stoicism. In
attributing absolute value only to rational thought and will, Stoicism
had declared man to be independent of anything external, and,
consequently, of his fellow-men. But since this value only attaches to
rational thought and intention, the freedom of the individual also
involves the recognition of the community, and brings with it the
requirement that everyone must subordinate his own wishes to the wishes
and needs of others. Rational conduct and thought can only then exist
when the conduct of the individual is in harmony with general law.
General law is the same for all rational beings. All rational beings
must therefore aim at the same end, and recognise themselves subject to
the same law. All must feel themselves portions of one connected whole.
Man must not live for himself, but for society.
This connection between the individual and society is clearly set forth
by the Stoics. The desire for society, they hold, is immediately
involved in reason. By the aid of reason, man feels himself a part of a
whole, and, consequently, is bound to subordinate his private interests
to the interests of the whole. [790] As like always attracts like, this
remark holds true of everything endowed with reason, since the rational
soul is in all cases identical. From the consciousness of this unity,
the desire for society at once arises in individuals endowed with
reason. [791] They are all in the service of reason; there is,
therefore, for all, but one right course and one law, [792] and they
all contribute to the general welfare in obeying this law. The wise
man, as a Stoic expresses it, is never a private man. [793]
At other times, social relations were explained by the theory of final
causes. [794] Whilst everything else exists for the sake of what is
endowed with reason, individual beings endowed with reason exist for
the sake of each other. Their social connection is therefore a direct
natural command. [795] Towards animals we never stand in a position to
exercise justice, nor yet towards ourselves. [796] Justice can only be
exercised towards other men and towards God. [797] On the combination
of individuals and their mutual support rests all their power over
nature. A single man by himself would be the most helpless of
creatures. [798]
The consciousness of this connection between all rational beings finds
ample expression in Marcus Aurelius, the last of the Stoics. The
possession of reason is, with him, love of society (vi. 14; x. 2).
Rational beings can only be treated on a social footing (κοινωνικῶς)
(vi. 23), and can only feel happy themselves when working for the
community (viii. 7); for all rational beings are related to one another
(iii. 4), all form one social unit (πολιτικὸν σύστημα), of which each
individual is an integral part (συμπληρωτικός) (ix. 23); one body, of
which every individual is an organic member (μέλος) (ii. 1; vii. 13).
Hence the social instinct is a primary instinct in man (vii. 55), every
manifestation of which contributes, either directly or indirectly, to
the good of the whole (ix. 23). Our fellow-men ought to be loved from
the heart. They ought to be benefited, not for the sake of outward
decency, but because the benefactor is penetrated with the joy of
benevolence, and thereby benefits himself. [799] Whatever hinders union
with others has a tendency to separate the members from the body, from
which all derive their life (viii. 34); and he who estranges himself
from one of his fellow-men voluntarily severs himself from the stock of
mankind (xi. 8). We shall presently see that the language used by the
philosophic emperor is quite in harmony with the Stoic principles.
[(2) Justice and mercy.]
In relation to our fellow-men, two fundamental points are insisted on
by the Stoics—the duty of justice and the duty of mercy. Cicero,
without doubt following Panætius, [800] describes these two virtues as
the bonds which keep human society together, [801] and, consequently,
gives to each an elaborate treatment. [802] In expanding these duties,
the Stoics were led by the fundamental principles of their system to
most distracting consequences. On the one hand, they required from
their wise men that strict justice which knows no pity and can make no
allowances; [803] hence their ethical system had about it an air of
austerity, and an appearance of severity and cruelty. On the other
hand, their principle of the natural connection of all mankind imposed
on them the practice of the most extended and unreserved charity, of
beneficence, gentleness, meekness, of an unlimited benevolence, and a
readiness to forgive in all cases in which forgiveness is possible.
This last aspect of the Stoic teaching appears principally in the later
Stoics—in Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and Musonius; [804] and
it is quite possible that they may have given more prominence to it
than their predecessors. But the fact is there, that this aspect is
due, not only to the peculiar character of these individuals, but is
based on the spirit and tone of the whole system. [805]
The question then naturally arises, how these two opposites may be
reconciled—how stern justice may be harmonised with forgiveness and
mercy. Seneca, who investigated the question fully, replies: Not
severity, but only cruelty, is opposed to mercy; for no one virtue is
opposed to another: a wise man will always help another in distress,
but without sharing his emotion, without feeling misery or compassion;
he will not indulge, but he will spare, advise, and improve; he will
not remit punishments in cases in which he knows them to be deserved,
but, from a sense of justice, he will take human weakness into
consideration in allotting punishments, and make every possible
allowance for circumstances. [806] Every difficulty is not, indeed,
removed by these statements; still, those which remain apply more to
the Stoic demand for apathy than to the reconciliation of the two
virtues which regulate our relations to our fellow-men. [807]
[(3) Friendship.]
The society for which all rational beings are intended will naturally
be found to exist principally among those who have become alive to
their rational nature and destiny—in other words, among the wise. All
who are wise and virtuous are friends, because they agree in their
views of life, and because they all love one another’s virtue. [808]
Thus every action of a wise man contributes to the well-being of every
other wise man—or, as the Stoics pointedly express it, if a wise man
only makes a rational movement with his finger, he does a service to
all wise men throughout the world. [809] On the other hand, only a wise
man knows how to love properly; true friendship only exists between
wise men. [810] Only the wise man possesses the art of making friends,
[811] since love is only won by love. [812] If, however, true
friendship is a union between the good and the wise, its value is
thereby at once established; and hence it is distinctly enumerated
among goods by the Stoics. [813]
On this point, difficulties reappear. How can this need of society be
reconciled with the wise man’s freedom from wants? If the wise man is
self-sufficient, how can another help him? How can he stand in need of
such help? The answers given by Seneca are not satisfactory. To the
first question, he replies, that none but a wise man can give the right
inducement to a wise man to call his powers into exercise. [814] He
meets the second by saying, that a wise man suffices himself for
happiness, but not for life. [815] Everywhere the wise man finds
inducements to virtuous action; if friendship is not a condition of
happiness, it is not a good at all. Nor are his further observations
more satisfactory. The wise man, he says, [816] does not wish to be
without friends, but still he can be without friends. But the question
is not whether he can be, but whether he can be without loss of
happiness. If the question so put is answered in the negative, it
follows that the wise man is not altogether self-sufficing; if in the
affirmative—and a wise man, as Seneca affirms, will bear the loss of a
friend with calmness, because he comforts himself with the thought that
he can have another at any moment—then friendship is not worth much.
Moreover, if a wise man can help another by communicating to him
information and method, since no wise man is omniscient, [817] is not a
wise man, if not in possession of all knowledge, at least in possession
of all knowledge contributing to virtue and happiness? If it be added,
that what one learns from another he learns by his own powers, and in
consequence of himself helping himself, does not this addition still
overlook the fact that the teacher’s activity is the condition of the
learner’s? True and beautiful as is the language of Seneca: Friendship
has its value in itself alone; every wise man must wish to find those
like himself; the good have a natural love for the good; the wise man
needs a friend, not to have a nurse in sickness and an assistant in
trouble, but to have some one whom he can tend and assist, and for whom
he can live and die [818]—nevertheless, this language does not meet the
critical objection, that one who requires the help of another, be it
only to have an object for his moral activity, cannot be wholly
dependent on himself. If friendship, according to a previously quoted
distinction, [819] belongs to external goods, it makes man, in a
certain sense, dependent on externals. If its essence is placed in an
inward disposition of friendliness, such a disposition depends on the
existence of those for whom it can be felt. Besides, it involves the
necessity of being reciprocated, and of finding expression in outward
conduct, to such an extent that it is quite subversive of the absolute
independence of the individual.
[(4) The family and political life.]
Nor is the friendship of the wise the only form of society which
appeared to the Stoics necessary and essential. If man is intended
[820] to associate with his fellow-men in a society regulated by
justice and law, how can he withdraw from the most common
institution—the state? If virtue does not consist in idle
contemplation, but in action, how dare he lose the opportunity of
promoting good and repressing evil by taking part in political life?
[821] If laws further the well-being and security of the citizens, if
they advance virtue and happiness, how can the wise man fail to regard
them as beautiful and praiseworthy? [822] For the same reason,
matrimony will command his respect. He will neither deny himself a
union so natural and intimate, nor will he deprive the state of relays
of men nor society of the sight of well-ordered family life. [823]
Hence, in their writings and precepts, the Stoics paid great attention
to the state and to domestic life. [824] In marriage they required
chastity and moderation. Love was to be a matter of reason, not of
emotion—not a yielding to personal attractions, nor a seeking sensual
gratification. [825] As to their views on the constitution of a state,
we know [826] that they prefer a mixed constitution, compounded of the
three simple forms, without objecting to other forms of government. The
wise man, according to Chrysippus, will not despise the calling of a
prince, if his interest so require, and, if he cannot govern himself,
will reside at the court and in the camp of princes, particularly of
good princes. [827]
The ideal of the Stoics, however, was not realised in any one of the
existing forms of government, but in that polity of the wise which Zeno
described, undoubtedly when a Cynic, [828] but which was fully set
forth by Chrysippus [829]—a state without marriage, or family, or
temples, or courts, or public schools, or coins [830]—a state excluding
no other states, because all differences of nationality have been
merged in a common brotherhood of all men. [831] Such an ideal may show
that, for the Stoic philosophers, there could be no hearty sympathy
with the state or the family, their ideal state being, in truth, no
longer a state. Indeed, the whole tone of Stoicism, and still more, the
circumstances of the times to which it owed its rise and growth, were
against such a sympathy. If Plato could find no place for a philosopher
in the political institutions of his time, how could a Stoic, who
looked for happiness more exclusively in seclusion from the world, who
contrasted, too, the wise man more sharply with the multitude of fools,
and lived for the most part under political circumstances far less
favourable than Plato? To him the private life of a philosopher must
have seemed beyond compare more attractive than a public career. An
intelligent man, taking advice from Chrysippus, [832] avoids business;
he withdraws to peaceful retirement; and, though he may consider it his
duty not to stand aloof from public life, still he can only actively
take a part in it in states which present an appreciable progress
towards perfection. [833] But where could such states be found? Did not
Chrysippus state it as his conviction that a statesman must either
displease the Gods or displease the people? [834] And did not later
Stoics accordingly advise philosophers not to intermeddle at all in
civil matters? [835] Labour for the commonwealth is only then a duty
when there is no obstacle to such labour; but, as a matter of fact,
there is always some obstacle, and in particular, the condition of all
existing states. [836] A philosopher who teaches and improves his
fellow-men benefits the state quite as much as a warrior, an
administrator, or a civil functionary. [837]
[(b) Practical aversion to political life.]
Following out this idea, [838] Epictetus dissuades from matrimony and
the begetting of children. Allowing that the family relation may be
admitted in a community of wise men, he is of opinion that it is
otherwise under existing circumstances; for how can a true philosopher
engage in connections and actions which withdraw him from the service
of God? The last expression already implies that unfavourable times
were not the only cause deterring the Stoics from caring for family or
the state, but that the occupation in itself seemed to them a
subordinate and limited one. This is stated in plain terms by Seneca
and Epictetus: He who feels himself a citizen of the world finds in an
individual state a sphere far too limited, and prefers devoting himself
to the universe; [839] man is no doubt intended to be active, but the
highest activity is intellectual research. [840] On the subject of
civil society, opinions were likely to vary, according to the
peculiarities and circumstances of individuals. The philosopher on the
throne was more likely than the freedman Epictetus to feel himself a
citizen of Rome as well as a citizen of the world, [841] and to lower
the demands made on a philosophic statesman. [842] At the same time,
the line taken by the Stoic philosophy cannot be ignored. A philosophy
which attaches moral value to the cultivation of intentions only, and
considers all external circumstances as indifferent, can hardly produce
a taste or a skill for overcoming those outward interests and
circumstances with which a politician is chiefly concerned. A system
which regards the mass of men as fools, which denies to them every
healthy endeavour and all true knowledge, can hardly bring itself
unreservedly to work for a state, the course and institutions of which
depend upon the majority of its members, and are planned with a view to
their needs, prejudices, and customs. Undoubtedly, there were able
statesmen among the Stoics of the Roman period; but Rome, and not
Stoicism, was the cause of their statesmanship. Taken alone, Stoicism
could form excellent men, but hardly excellent statesmen. And, looking
to facts, not one of the old masters of the School ever had or desired
to have any public office. Hence, when their opponents urged that
retirement was a violation of their principles, [843] Seneca could with
justice meet the charge by replying, that the true meaning of their
principles ought to be gathered from their actual conduct. [844]
[(c) Citizenship of the world.]
The positive substitute wherewith the Stoics thought to replace the
ordinary relations of civil society was by a citizenship of the world.
No preceding system had been able to overcome the difficulty of
nationalities. Even Plato and Aristotle shared the prejudice of the
Greeks against foreigners. The Cynics alone appear as the precursors of
the Stoa, attaching slight value to the citizenship of any particular
state, in comparison with citizenship of the world. [845] With the
Cynics, this idea had not attained to the historical importance which
afterwards belonged to it; nor was it used so much with a positive
meaning, to express the essential oneness of all mankind, as, in a
negative sense, to imply the philosopher’s independence of country and
home. From the Stoic philosophy it first received a definite meaning,
and was generally pressed into service. The causes of this change may
be sought, not only in the historical surroundings amongst which
Stoicism grew up, but also in the person of its founder. It was far
easier for philosophy to overcome national dislikes, after the genial
Macedonian conqueror had united the vigorous nationalities comprised
within his monarchy, not only under a central government, but also in a
common culture. [846] Hence the Stoic citizenship of the world may be
appealed to, to prove the assertion, that philosophic Schools reflect
the existing facts of history. On the other hand, taking into account
the bias given to a philosopher’s teaching by his personal
circumstances, Zeno, being only half a Greek, would be more ready to
underestimate the distinction of Greek and barbarian than any one of
his predecessors.
However much these two causes—and, in particular, the first—must have
contributed to bring about the Stoic ideal of a citizenship of the
world, nevertheless the connection of this idea with the whole of their
system is most obvious. If human society, as we have seen, has for its
basis the identity of reason in individuals, what ground have we for
limiting this society to a single nation, or feeling ourselves more
nearly related to some men than to others? All men, apart from what
they have made themselves by their own exertions, are equally near,
since all equally participate in reason. All are members of one body;
for one and the same nature has fashioned them all from the same
elements for the same destiny. [847] Or, as Epictetus expresses it in
religious language, [848] all men are brethren, since all have in the
same degree God for their father. Man, therefore, who and whatever else
he may be, is the object of our solicitude, simply as being man. [849]
No hostility and ill-treatment should quench our benevolence. [850] No
one is so low but that he has claims on the love and justice of his
fellow-men. [851] Even the slave is a man deserving our esteem, and
able to claim from us his rights. [852]
In their recognition of the universal rights of mankind the Stoics did
not go so far as to disapprove of slavery. Attaching in general little
value to external circumstances, [853] they cared the less to throw
down the gauntlet to the social institutions and arrangements of their
time. Still, they could not wholly suppress a confession that slavery
is unjust, [854] nor cease to aim at mitigating the evil both in theory
and practice. [855] If all men are, as rational beings, equal, all men
together form one community. Reason is the common law for all, and
those who owe allegiance to one law are members of one state. [856] If
the Stoics, therefore, compared the world, in its more extended sense,
to a society, because of the connection of its parts, [857] they must,
with far more reason, have allowed that the world, in the narrower
sense of the term, including all rational beings, forms one community,
[858] to which individual communities are related, as the houses of a
city are to the city collectively. [859] Wise men, at least, if not
others, will esteem this great community, to which all men belong, far
above any particular community in which the accident of birth has
placed them. [860] They, at least, will direct their efforts towards
making all men feel themselves to be citizens of one community; and,
instead of framing exclusive laws and constitutions, will try to live
as one family, under the common governance of reason. [861] The
platform of social propriety receives hereby a universal width. Man, by
withdrawing from the outer world into the recesses of his own
intellectual and moral state, becomes enabled to recognise everywhere
the same nature as his own, and to feel himself one with the universe,
by sharing with it the same nature and the same destiny.
But, as yet, the moral problem is not exhausted. [C. Man and the course
of the world.] Reason, the same as man’s, rules pure and complete in
the universe; and if it is the business of man to give play to reason
in his own conduct, and to recognise it in that of others, it is also
his duty to subordinate himself to collective reason, and to the course
of the world, over which it presides. In conclusion, therefore, the
relation of man to the course of the world must be considered.
[(1) Submission to the course of nature.]
Firmly as the principles of the Stoic ethics insist upon moral conduct,
those ethics, judged by their whole tone, cannot rest short of
requiring an absolute resignation to the course of the universe. This
requirement is based quite as much upon the historical surroundings of
their system as upon its intellectual principles. How, in an age in
which political freedom was crushed by the oppression of the Macedonian
and subsequently of the Roman dominion, and the Roman dominion was
itself smothered under the despotism of imperialism, in which Might,
like a living fate, crushed every attempt at independent action—how, in
such an age, could those aiming at higher objects than mere personal
gratification have any alternative but to resign themselves placidly to
the course of circumstances which individuals and nations were alike
powerless to control? In making a dogma of fatalism, Stoicism was only
following the current of the age. At the same time, as will be seen
from what has been said, it was only following the necessary
consequences of its own principles. All that is individual in the world
being only the result of a general connection of cause and effect—only
a carrying out of a universal law—what remains possible, in the face of
this absolute necessity, but to yield unconditionally? How can yielding
be called a sacrifice, when the law to which we yield is nothing less
than the expression of reason? Hence resignation to the world’s course
was a point chiefly insisted upon in the Stoic doctrine of morality.
The verses of Cleanthes, [862] in which he submits without reserve to
the leading of destiny, are a theme repeatedly worked out by the
writers of this School. The virtuous man, they say, will honour God by
resigning his will to the divine will; the divine will he will think
better than his own will; he will remember that under all circumstances
we must follow destiny, but that it is the wise man’s prerogative to
follow of his own accord; that there is only one way to happiness and
independence—that of willing nothing except what is in the nature of
things, and what will realise itself independently of our will. [863]
Similar expressions are not wanting amongst other philosophers.
Nevertheless, by the Stoic philosophy, the demand is pressed with
particular force, and is closely connected with its whole view of the
world. In resignation to destiny, the Stoic picture of the wise man is
completed. Therewith is included that peace and happiness of mind, that
gentleness and benevolence, that discharge of all duties, and that
harmony of life, which together make up the Stoic definition of virtue.
[864] Beginning by recognising the existence of a general law, morality
ends by unconditionally submitting itself to the ordinances of that
law.
The one case in which this resignation would give place to active
resistance to destiny is when man is placed in circumstances calling
for unworthy action or endurance. [865] Strictly speaking, the first
case can[(2) Suicide.] never arise, since, from the Stoic platform, no
state of life can be imagined which might not serve as an occasion for
virtuous conduct. It does, however, seem possible that even the wise
man may be placed by fortune in positions which are for him
unendurable; and in this case he is allowed to withdraw from them by
suicide. [866] The importance of this point in the Stoic ethics will
become manifest from the language of Seneca, who asserts that the wise
man’s independence of externals depends, among other things, on his
being able to leave life at pleasure. [867] To Seneca, the deed of the
younger Cato appears not only praiseworthy, but the crowning act of
success over destiny, the highest triumph of the human will. [868] By
the chief teachers of the Stoic School this doctrine was carried into
practice. Zeno, in old age, hung himself, because he had broken his
finger; Cleanthes, for a still less cause, continued his abstinence
till he died of starvation, in order to traverse the whole way to
death; and, in later times, the example of Zeno and Cleanthes was
followed by Antipater. [869]
In these cases suicide appears not only as a way of escape, possible
under circumstances, but absolutely as the highest expression of moral
freedom. Whilst all are far from being advised to adopt this course,
[870] everyone is required to embrace the opportunity of dying with
glory, when no higher duties bind him to life. [871] Everyone is urged,
in case of need, to receive death at his own hand, as a pledge of his
independence. Nor are cases of need decided by what really makes a man
unhappy—moral vice or folly. Vice and folly must be met by other means.
Death is no deliverance from them, since it makes the bad no better.
The one satisfactory reason which the Stoics recognised for taking
leave of life is, when circumstances over which we have no control make
continuance in life no longer desirable. [872]
Such circumstances may be found in the greatest variety of things. Cato
committed suicide because of the downfall of the republic; Zeno,
because of a slight injury received. According to Seneca, it is a
sufficient reason for committing suicide to anticipate merely a
considerable disturbance in our actions and peace of mind. [873] The
infirmity of age, incurable disease, a weakening of the powers of the
mind, a great degree of want, the tyranny of a despot from which there
is no escape, justify us—and even, under circumstances, oblige us—to
have recourse to this remedy. [874] Seneca, indeed, maintains that a
philosopher should never commit suicide in order to escape suffering,
but only to withdraw from restrictions in following out the aim of
life; but he is nevertheless of opinion that anyone may rightly choose
an easier mode of death instead of a more painful one in prospect, thus
avoiding a freak of destiny and the cruelty of man. [875] Besides pain
and sickness, Diogenes also mentions a case in which suicide becomes a
duty, for the sake of others. [876] According to another authority,
[877] five cases are enumerated by the Stoics in which it is allowed to
put oneself to death; if, by so doing, a real service can be rendered
to others, as in the case of sacrificing oneself for one’s country; to
avoid being compelled to do an unlawful action; otherwise, on the
ground of poverty, chronic illness, or incipient weakness of mind.
In nearly all these cases, the things referred to belong to the class
of things which were reckoned as indifferent by the Stoics; and hence
arises the apparent paradox, with which their opponents immediately
twitted them, that not absolute and moral evils, but only outward
circumstances, are admitted as justifying suicide. [878] The paradox,
however, loses its point when it is remembered that, to the Stoics,
life and death are quite as much indifferent as all other external
things. [879] To them, nothing really good appears to be involved in
the question of suicide, but a choice between two things morally
indifferent—one of which, life, is only preferable to the other, death,
whilst the essential conditions for a life according to nature are
satisfied. [880] The philosopher, therefore, says Seneca, [881] chooses
his mode of death just as he chooses a ship for a journey or a house to
live in. He leaves life as he would leave a banquet—when it is time. He
lays aside his body when it no longer suits him, as he would lay aside
worn-out clothes; and withdraws from life as he would withdraw from a
house no longer weather-proof. [882]
A very different question, however, it is, whether life can be treated
in this way as something indifferent, and whether it is consistent with
an unconditional resignation to the course of the world, to evade by
personal interposition what destiny with its unalterable laws has
decreed for us. Stoicism may, indeed, allow this course of action. But
in so doing does it not betray its ill-success in the attempt to
combine, without contradiction, two main tendencies so different as
that of individual independence and that of submission to the universe?
CHAPTER XIII.
THE RELATION OF THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION.
[A. General connection of Stoicism and religion.]
It would be impossible to give a full account of the philosophy of the
Stoics without treating of their theology; for no early system is so
closely connected with religion as that of the Stoics. Founded as is
their whole view of the world upon the idea of one Divine Being,
begetting from Himself and containing in Himself all finite creatures,
upholding them by His might, ruling them according to an unalterable
law, and thus manifesting Himself everywhere, their philosophy bears a
decidedly religious character. Indeed, there is hardly a single
prominent feature in the Stoic system which is not, more or less,
connected with theology. A very considerable portion of that system,
moreover, consists of strictly theological questions; such as arguments
for the existence of deity, and for the rule of Providence;
investigations into the nature of God, His government, and presence in
the world; the relation of human activity to the divine ordinances; and
all the various questions connected with the terms freedom and
necessity. The natural science of the Stoics begins by evolving things
from God; it ends with resolving them again into God. God is thus the
beginning and end of the world’s development. In like manner, their
moral philosophy begins with the notion of divine law, which, in the
form of eternal reason, controls the actions of men; and ends by
requiring submission to the will of God, and resignation to the course
of the universe. A religious sanction is thus given to all moral
duties. All virtuous actions are a fulfilment of the divine will and
the divine law. That citizenship of the world, in particular, which
constitutes the highest point in the Stoic morality, is connected with
the notion of a common relationship of all men to God. Again, that
inward repose of the philosopher, those feelings of freedom and
independence, on which so much stress is laid, rest principally on the
conviction that man is related to God. In a word, Stoicism is not only
a system of philosophy, but also a system of religion. As such it was
regarded by its first adherents, witness the fragments of Cleanthes;
[883] and as such it afforded, in later times, together with Platonism,
to the best and most cultivated men, whenever the influence of Greek
culture extended, a substitute for declining natural religion, a
satisfaction for religious cravings, and a support for moral life.
This philosophic religion is quite independent of the traditional
religion. The Stoic philosophy contains no feature of importance which
we can pronounce with certainty to be taken from the popular faith. The
true worship of God, according to their view, consists only in the
mental effort to know God, and in a moral and pious life. [884] A
really acceptable prayer can have no reference to external goods; it
can only have for its object a virtuous and devout
[(1) Connection of Stoicism, with popular faith.]
mind. [885] Still, there were reasons which led the Stoics to seek a
closer union with the popular faith. A system which attached so great
an importance to popular opinion, particularly in proving the existence
of God, [886] could not, without extreme danger to itself, declare the
current opinions respecting the Gods to be erroneous. And again, the
ethical platform of the Stoic philosophy imposed on its adherents the
duty of upholding rather than overthrowing the popular creed—that creed
forming a barrier against the violence of human passions. [887] The
practical value of the popular faith may, then, be the cause of their
theological orthodoxy. Just as the Romans, long after all faith in the
Gods had been lost under the influence of Greek culture, [888] still
found it useful and necessary to uphold the traditional faith, so the
Stoics may have feared that, were the worship of the people’s Gods to
be suspended, that respect for God and the divine law on which they
depended for the support of their own moral tenets would at the same
time be exterminated.
[(2) Free criticism of popular belief.]
Meantime, they did not deny that much in the popular belief would not
harmonise with their principles; and that both the customary forms of
religious worship, and also the mythical representations of the Gods,
were altogether untenable. So little did they conceal their strictures,
that it is clear that conviction, and not fear (there being no longer
occasion for fear), was the cause of their leaning towards tradition.
Zeno spoke with contempt of the erection of sacred edifices; for how
can a thing be sacred which is erected by builders and labourers? [889]
Seneca denies the good of prayer. [890] He considers it absurd to
entertain fear for the Gods, who are ever-beneficent beings. [891] God
he would have worshipped, not by sacrifices and ceremonies, but by
purity of life; not in temples of stone, but in the shrine of the
heart. [892] Of images of the Gods, and the devotion paid to them, he
speaks with strong disapprobation; [893] of the unworthy fables of
mythology, with bitter ridicule; [894] and he calls the popular Gods,
without reserve, creations of superstition, whom the philosopher only
invokes because it is the custom so to do. [895] Moreover, the Stoic in
Cicero, and the elder authorities quoted by him, allow that the popular
beliefs and the songs of the poets are full of superstition and foolish
legends. [896] Chrysippus is expressly said to have declared the
distinction of sex among the Gods, and other features in which they
resemble men, to be childish fancies; [897] Zeno to have denied any
real existence to the popular deities, and to have transferred their
names to natural objects; [898] and Aristo [899] is charged with having
denied shape and sensation to the Deity. [900]
The Stoics were, nevertheless, not disposed to let the current beliefs
quite fall through. Far from it, they thought to discover real germs of
truth in these beliefs, however inadequate they were in form. They
accordingly made it their business to give a relative vindication to
the existing creed. Holding that the name of God belongs, in its full
and original sense, only to the one primary Being, they did not
hesitate to apply it, in a limited and derivative sense, to all those
objects by means of which the divine power is especially manifested.
Nay, more, in consideration of man’s relationship to God, they found it
not unreasonable to deduce from the primary Being Gods bearing a
resemblance to men. [901] Hence they distinguished, as Plato had done,
between the eternal and immutable God and Gods created and transitory,
[902] between God the Creator and Sovereign of the world, and
subordinate Gods; [903] in other words, between the universal divine
power as a Unity working in the world, and its individual parts and
manifestations. [904] To the former they gave the name Zeus; to the
latter they applied the names of the other subordinate Gods.
[(3) The truth in Polytheism.]
In this derivative sense, divinity was allowed to many beings by the
Stoics, and, in particular, to the stars, which Plato had called
created Gods, which Aristotle had described as eternal divine beings,
and the worship of which lay so near to the ancient cultus of nature.
Not only by their lustre and effect on the senses, but far more by the
regularity of their motions, do these stars prove that the material of
which they consist is the purest, and that, of all created objects,
they have the largest share in the divine reason. [905] And so
seriously was this belief held by the Stoics, that a philosopher of the
unwieldy piety of Cleanthes so far forgot himself as to charge
Aristarchus of Samoa, the discoverer of the earth’s motion round the
sun, the Galilæo of antiquity, with impiety for wishing to remove the
hearth of the universe from its proper place. [906] This deification of
the stars prepares us to find years, months, and seasons called Gods,
[907] as was done by Zeno, or at least by his School. Yet, it must be
remembered, that the Stoics referred these times and seasons to
heavenly bodies, as their material embodiments. [908]
As the stars are the first manifestation, so the elements are the first
particular forms of the Divine Being, and the most common materials for
the exercise of the divine powers. It is, however, becoming that the
all-pervading divine mind should not only be honoured in its primary
state, but likewise in its various derivate forms, as air, water,
earth, and elementary fire. [909]
All other things, too, which, by their utility to man, display in a
high degree the beneficent power of God, appeared to the Stoics to
deserve divine honours, such honours not being paid to the things
themselves, but to the powers active within them. They did not,
therefore, hesitate to give the names of Gods to fruits and wine, and
other gifts of the Gods. [910]
How, then, could they escape the inference that among other beneficent
beings, the heroes of antiquity in particular deserve religious
honours, seeing that in these benefactors of mankind, whom legend
commemorates, the Divine Spirit did not show Himself under the lower
form of a ἕξις, as in the elements, nor yet as simple φύσις, as in
plants, but as a rational soul? Such deified men had, according to the
Stoic view—which, on this point, agrees with the well-known theory of
Euemerus—greatly helped to swell the number of the popular Gods; nor
had the Stoics themselves any objection to their worship. [911] Add to
this the personification of human qualities and states of mind, [912]
and it will be seen what ample opportunity the Stoics had for
recognising everywhere in nature and in the world of man divine
agencies and powers, and, consequently, Gods in the wider sense of the
term. [913] When once it is allowed that the name of God may be
diverted from the Being to whom it properly belongs and applied, in a
derivative sense, to what is impersonal and a mere manifestation of
divine power, the door is opened to everything; and, with such
concessions, the Stoic system could graft into itself even exceptional
forms of polytheism.
[(4) Doctrine of demons.]
With the worship of heroes is also connected the doctrine of demons.
[914] The soul, according to the Stoic view already set forth, is of
divine origin, a part of and emanation from God. Or, distinguishing
more accurately in the soul one part from the rest, divinity belongs to
reason only, as the governing part. Now, since reason alone protects
man from evil and conducts him to happiness—this, too, was the popular
belief—reason may be described as the guardian spirit, or demon, in
man. Not only by the younger members of the Stoic School, by
Posidonius, Seneca, Epictetus, and Antoninus, are the popular notions
of demons, as by Plato aforetime, [915] explained in this sense, [916]
but the same method is pursued by Chrysippus, who made εὐδαιμονία, or
happiness, consist in a harmony of the demon in man (which, in this
case, can only be his own will and understanding) with the will of God.
[917] Little were the Stoics aware that, by such explanations, they
were attributing to popular notions a meaning wholly foreign to them.
But it does not therefore follow that they shared the popular belief in
guardian spirits. [918] Their system, however, left room for believing
that, besides the human soul and the spirits of the stars, other
rational souls might exist, having a definite work to perform in the
world, subject to the law of general necessity, and knit into the chain
of cause and effect. Nay, more, such beings might seem to them
necessary for the completeness of the universe. [919] What reason have
we, then, to express doubt, when we are told that the Stoics believed
in the existence of demons, playing a part in man and caring for him?
[920] Is there anything extraordinary, from the Stoic platform, in
holding that some of these demons are by nature inclined to do harm,
and that these tormentors are used by the deity for the punishment of
the wicked, [921] especially when in such a strict system of necessity
these demons could only work, like the powers of nature, conformably
with the laws of the universe and without disturbing those laws,
occupying the same ground as lightning, earthquakes, and drought? And
yet the language of Chrysippus, when speaking of evil demons who
neglect the duties entrusted to them, [922] sounds as though it were
only figurative and tentative language, not really meant. Besides, the
later Stoics made themselves merry over the Jewish and Christian
notions of demons and demoniacal possession. [923]
[B. The Allegorising Spirit.]
Even without accepting demons, there were not wanting in the Stoic
system points with which the popular beliefs could be connected, if it
was necessary to find in these beliefs some deeper meaning. It mattered
not that these beliefs were often so distorted in the process of
accommodation as to be no
[(1) Allegorical interpretation of myths.]
longer recognised. The process required a regular code of
interpretation by means of which a philosophic mind could see its own
thoughts in the utterances of commonplace thinkers. By the Stoics, as
by their Jewish and Christian followers, this code of interpretation
was found in the method of allegorical interpretation—a method which
received a most extended application, in order to bridge over the gulf
between the older and the more modern types of culture. [924] Zeno, and
still more Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and their successors, sought to
discover natural principles and moral ideas—the λόγοι φυσικοὶ, or
physicæ rationes,—in the Gods of popular belief and the stories of
these Gods, [925] and supposed that such principles and ideas were
represented in these stories in a sensuous form. [926] In this attempt,
they clung to the poems of Homer and Hesiod, the Bible of the Greeks,
[927] without, however, excluding other mythology from the sphere of
their investigation. One chief instrument which they, and modern lovers
of the symbolical following in their footsteps, employed was a
capricious playing with etymologies of which so many instances are on
record. [928] Like most allegorisers, they also laid down certain
principles of interpretation sensible enough theoretically, [929] but
proving, by the use which was made of them, that their scientific
appearance was only a blind to conceal the most capricious vagaries.
Approaching in some of their explanations to the original bases of
mythological formation, they were still unable to shake off the curious
notion that the originators of myths, fully conscious of all their
latent meanings, had framed them as pictures to appeal to the senses;
[930] and, in innumerable cases, they resorted to explanations so
entirely without foundation that they would have been impossible to
anyone possessing a sound view of nature and the origin of legends. To
make theory tally with practice, the founder of the School—following
Antisthenes, and setting an example afterwards repeated by both Jews
and Christians—maintained that Homer only in some places expressed
himself according to truth, in others according to popular opinion.
[931] Thus did Stoicism surround itself with the necessary instruments
for the most extended allegorical and dogmatic interpretation.
[(2) Interpretation of the myths respecting the gods.]
Proceeding further to enquire how this method was applied to particular
stories, the first point which attracts attention is the contrast which
they draw between Zeus and the remaining Gods. From their belief in one
divine principle everywhere at work, it followed as a corollary that
this contrast, which elsewhere in Greek mythology is only a difference
of degree, was raised to a specific and absolute difference. Zeus was
compared to other Gods as an incorruptible God to transitory divine
beings. To the Stoics, as to their predecessor Heraclitus, Zeus is the
one primary Being, who has engendered, and again absorbs into himself,
all things and all Gods. He is the universe as a unity, the primary
fire, the ether, the spirit of the world, the universal reason, the
general law or destiny. [932] All other Gods, as being parts of the
world, are only parts and manifestations of Zeus—only special names of
the one God who has many names. [933] That part of Zeus which goes over
into air is called Here (ἀήρ); and its lower strata, full of vapours,
Hades; that which becomes elementary fire is called Hephæstus; that
which becomes water, Poseidon; that which becomes earth, Demeter,
Hestia, and Rhea; lastly, that portion which remains in the upper
region is called Athene in the more restricted sense. And since,
according to the Stoics, the finer elements are the same as spirit,
Zeus is not only the soul of the universe, but Athene, Reason,
Intelligence, Providence. [934] The same Zeus appears in other respects
as Hermes, Dionysus, Hercules. [935] The Homeric story of the binding
and liberation of Zeus [936] points to the truth, already established
in Providence, that the order of the world rests on the balance of the
elements. The rise and succession of the elements is symbolised in the
hanging of Here; [937] the arrangement of the spheres of the universe,
in the golden chain by which the Olympians thought to pull down Zeus.
[938] The lameness of Hephæstus goes partly to prove the difference of
the earthly from the heavenly fire, and partly implies that earthly
fire can as little do without wood as the lame can do without a wooden
support; and if, in Homer, Hephæstus is hurled down from heaven, the
meaning of the story is, that in ancient times men lighted their fires
by lightning from heaven and the rays of the sun. [939] The connection
of Here with Zeus [940] points to the relation of the ether to the air
surrounding it; and the well-known occurrence on Mount Ida was referred
to the same event. [941] The still more offensive scene in the Samian
picture was expounded by Chrysippus as meaning that the fertilising
powers (λόγοι σπερματικοὶ) of God are brought to bear upon matter.
[942] A similar meaning is found by Heraclitus in the story of Proteus,
[943] and in that of the shield of Achilles. If Hephæstus intended this
shield to be a representation of this world, what else is thereby meant
but that, by the influence of primary fire, matter has been shaped into
a world? [944]
In a similar way, the Homeric theomachy was explained by many to mean a
conjunction of the seven planets, which would involve the world in
great trouble. [945] Heraclitus, however, gives the preference to an
interpretation, half physical and half moral, which may have been
already advanced by Cleanthes. [946] Ares and Aphrodite, rashness and
profligacy, are opposed by Athene, or prudence; Leto, forgetfulness, is
attacked by Hermes, the revealing word; [947] Apollo, the sun, by
Poseidon, the God of the water, with whom, however, he comes to terms,
because the sun is fed by the vapours of the water; Artemis, the moon,
is opposed by Here, the air, through which it passes, and which often
obscures it; Fluvius, or earthly water, by Hephæstus, or earthly fire.
[948] That Apollo is the sun, and Artemis the moon, no one doubts;
[949] nor did it cause any difficulty to these mythologists to find the
moon also in Athene. [950] Many subtle discussions were set on foot by
the Stoics respecting the name, the form, and the attributes of these
Gods, particularly by Cleanthes, for whom the sun had particular
importance, [951] as being the seat of the power which rules the world.
[952] The stories of the birth of the Lotoides and the defeat of the
dragon Pytho are, according to Antipater, symbolical of events which
took place at the formation of the world, and the creation of the sun
and moon. [953] Others find in the descent of two Gods from Leto the
simpler thought, that sun and moon came forth out of darkness. [954] In
the same spirit, Heraclitus, without disparaging the original meaning
of the story, sees in the swift-slaying arrows of Apollo a picture of
devastating pestilence; [955] but then, in an extraordinary manner,
misses the natural sense, in gathering from the Homeric story of
Apollo’s reconciliation (Il. i. 53) the lesson, that Achilles stayed
the plague by the medical science which Chiron had taught him. [956]
Far more plausible is the explanation given of the dialogue of Athene
with Achilles, and of Hermes with Ulysses. These dialogues are stated
to be simply soliloquies of the two heroes respectively. [957] But the
Stoic skill in interpretation appears in its fullest glory in supplying
the etymological meanings of the various names and epithets which are
attributed to Athene. [958] We learn, for instance, that the name
Τριτογένεια refers to the three divisions of philosophy. [959]
Heraclitus discovers the same divisions in the three heads of Cerberus.
[960] Chrysippus, in a diffuse manner, proves that the coming forth of
the Goddess from the head of Zeus is not at variance with his view of
the seat of reason. [961] It has been already observed that Dionysus
means wine, and Demeter fruit; [962] but, just as the latter was taken
to represent the earth and its nutritious powers, [963] so Dionysus was
further supposed to stand for the principle of natural life, the
productive and sustaining breath of life; [964] and since this breath
comes from the sun, according to Cleanthes, it was not difficult to
find the sun represented by the God of wine. [965] Moreover, the
stories of the birth of Dionysus, his being torn to pieces by Titans,
his followers, [966] no less than the rape of Proserpine, [967] and the
institution of agriculture, [968] and the names of the respective Gods,
afforded ample material for the interpreting tastes of the Stoics.
The Fates (μοῖραι), as their name already indicates, stand for the
righteous and invariable rule of destiny; [969] the Graces (χάριτες),
as to whose names, number, and qualities Chrysippus has given the
fullest discussion, [970] represent the virtues of benevolence and
gratitude; [971] the Muses, the divine origin of culture. [972] Ares is
war; [973] Aphrodite, unrestrained passion, or, more generally, absence
of control. [974] Other interpreters, and among them Empedocles,
consider Ares to represent the separating, Aphrodite the uniting, power
of nature. [975] The stories of the two deities being wounded by
Diomedes, [976] of their adulterous intrigues, and their being bound by
Hephæstus, [977] are explained in various ways—morally, physically,
technically, and historically.
In the case of another God, Pan, the idea of the Allnear was suggested
simply by the name. His shaggy goat’s feet were taken to represent the
solid earth, and the human form of his upper limbs implied that the
sovereign power in the world resides above. [978] To the Stoic without
a misgiving as to these and similar explanations, [979] it was a matter
of small difficulty to make the Titan Ἰάπετος stand for language or
Ἰάφετος, and Κοῖος for quality or ποιότης. [980] Add to this the many
more or less ingenious explanations of the well-known stories of Uranos
and Cronos, [981] and we are still far from having exhausted the
resources of the Stoic explanations of mythology. The most important
attempts of this kind have, however, been sufficiently noticed.
[(3) Allegory applied to heroic myths.]
Besides the legends of the Gods, the legends of the heroes attracted
considerable attention in the Stoic Schools. Specially were the persons
of Hercules and Ulysses singled out for the sake of illustrating the
ideal of the wise man. [982] But here, too, various modes of
interpretation meet and cross. According to Cornutus, [983] the God
Hercules must be distinguished from the hero of the same name—the God
being nothing less than Reason, ruling in the world without a superior;
[984] and the grammarian makes every effort to unlock with this key his
history and attributes. Nevertheless, with all his respect for
Cleanthes, [985] he could not accept that Stoic’s explanation of the
twelve labours of Hercules. Heraclitus has probably preserved the chief
points in this explanation. Hercules is a teacher of mankind, initiated
into the heavenly wisdom. He overcomes the wild boar, the lion, and the
bull, i.e. the lusts and passions of men; he drives away the deer, i.e.
cowardice; he purifies the stall of Augeas from filth, i.e. he purifies
the life of men from extravagances; he frightens away the birds, i.e.
empty hopes; and burns to ashes the many-headed hydra of pleasure. He
brings the keeper of the nether world to light, with his three
heads—these heads representing the three chief divisions of philosophy.
In the same way, the wounding of Here and Hades by Hercules is
explained. Here, the Goddess of the air, represents the fog of
ignorance, the three-barbed arrow undeniably (so thought the Stoics)
pointing to philosophy, with its threefold division, in its heavenly
flight. The laying prostrate of Hades by that arrow implies that
philosophy has access even to things most secret. [986] The Odyssey is
explained by Heraclitus in the same strain, nor was he apparently the
first so to do. [987] In Ulysses you behold a pattern of all virtues,
and an enemy of all vices. [988] He flees from the country of the
Lotophagi, i.e. from wicked pleasures; he stays the wild rage of the
Cyclopes; he calms the winds, having first secured a prosperous passage
by his knowledge of the stars; the attractions of pleasure in the house
of Circe he overcomes, penetrates into the secrets of Hades, learns
from the Sirens the history of all times, saves himself from the
Charybdis of profligacy and the Scylla of shamelessness, and, in
abstaining from the oxen of the sun, overcomes sensuous desires. Such
explanations may suffice to show how the whole burden of the myths was
resolved into allegory by the Stoics, how little they were conscious of
foisting in foreign elements, and how they degraded to mere symbols of
philosophical ideas those very heroes on whose real existence they
continually insisted.
[C. Prophetic powers.]
The Stoic theology has engaged a good deal of our attention, not only
because it is instructive to compare their views, in general and in
detail, with similar views advanced nowadays, but also because it forms
a very characteristic and important part of their entire system. To us,
much of it appears to be a mere worthless trifling; but, to the Stoics,
these explanations were solemnly earnest. To them they seemed to be the
only means of rescuing the people’s faith, of meeting the severe
charges brought against tradition and the works of the poets, on which
a Greek had been fed from infancy. [989] Unable to break entirely with
these traditions, they still would not sacrifice to them their
scientific and moral convictions. Can we, then, wonder that they
attempted the impossible, and sought to unite contradictions? or that
such an attempt landed them in forced and artificial methods of
interpretation?
[(1) Divination.]
Illustrative of the attitude of the Stoics towards positive religion
are their views on divination. [990] The importance attached by them to
the prophetic art appears in the diligence which the chiefs of this
School devoted to discussing it. The ground for the later teaching
having been prepared by Zeno and Cleanthes, Chrysippus gave the
finishing touch to the Stoic dogmas on the subject. [991] Particular
treatises respecting divination were drawn up by Sphærus, Diogenes,
Antipater, and, last of all, by Posidonius. [992] The subject was also
fully treated by Boëthus, and by Panætius from a somewhat different
side. [993] The common notions as to prognostics and oracles could not
commend themselves to these philosophers, nor could they approve of
common soothsaying. In a system so purely based on nature as theirs,
[994] the supposition that God works for definite ends after the manner
of men, exceptionally announcing to one or the other a definite
result—in short, the marvellous—was out of place. But to infer
thence—as their opponents, the Epicureans, did—that the whole art of
divination is a delusion, was more than the Stoics could do. The belief
in an extraordinary care of God for individual men was too comforting
an idea for them to renounce; [995] they not only appealed to
divination as the strongest proof of the existence of Gods and the
government of Providence, [996] but they also drew the converse
conclusion, that, if there be Gods, there must also be divination,
since the benevolence of the Gods would not allow them to refuse to
mankind so inestimable a gift. [997] The conception of destiny, too,
and the nature of man, appeared to Posidonius to lead to the belief in
divination; [998] if all that happens is the outcome of an unbroken
chain of cause and effect, there must be signs indicating the existence
of causes, from which certain effects result; [999] and if the soul of
man is in its nature divine, it must also possess the capacity, under
circumstances, of observing what generally escapes its notice. [1000]
Lest, however, the certainty of their belief should suffer from lacking
the support of experience, the Stoics had collected a number of
instances of verified prophecies; [1001] but with so little
discrimination, that we should only wonder at their credulity, did we
not know the low state of historical criticism in their time, and the
readiness with which, in all ages, men believe whatever agrees with
their prejudices. [1002]
In what way, then, can the two facts be combined—the belief in
prophecy, on the one hand, and, on the other, the denial of unearthly
omens arising [(2) Prophecy explained by a reference to natural
causes.] from an immediate divine influence? In answering this
question, the Stoics adopted the only course which their system
allowed. The marvellous, which, as such, they could not admit, was
referred to natural laws, [1003] from which it was speculatively
deduced. The admirable Panætius is the only Stoic who is reported to
have maintained the independence of his judgment by denying omens,
prophecy, and astrology. [1004] Just as in modern times Leibnitz and so
many others both before and after him thought to purge away from the
marvellous all that is accidental and superhuman, and to find in
wonders links in the general chain of natural causes, so, too, the
Stoics, by assuming a natural connection between the token and its
fulfilment, made an effort to rescue omens and divination, and to
explain portents as the natural symptoms of certain occurrences. [1005]
Nor did they confine themselves to cases in which the connection
between the prophecy and the event can be proved. [1006] They insisted
upon divination in cases in which it cannot possibly be verified. The
flight of birds and the entrails of victims are stated to be natural
indications of coming events; and there is said to be even a formal
connection between the positions of the stars and the individuals born
under those positions. [1007] If it is urged, that in this case omens
must be far more numerous than they are supposed to be, the Stoics
answered, that omens are countless, but that only the meaning of a few
is known to men. [1008] If the question is asked, how is it that, in
public sacrifices, the priest should always offer those very animals
whose entrails contain omens, Chrysippus and his followers did not
hesitate to affirm that the same sympathy which exists between objects
and omens also guides the sacrificer in the choice of a victim. [1009]
And yet so bald was this hypothesis, that they had, at the same time, a
second answer in reserve, viz. that the corresponding change in the
entrails did not take place until the victim had been chosen. [1010] In
support of such views, their only appeal was to the almighty power of
God; but, in making this appeal, the deduction of omens from natural
causes was at an end. [1011]
The Stoics could not altogether suppress a suspicion that an
unchangeable predestination of all events has rendered individual
activity superfluous, [1012] nor meet the objection [1013] that, on the
hypothesis of necessity, divination itself is unnecessary. [1014] They
quieted themselves, however, with the thought that divination, and the
actions resulting from divination, are included among the causes
foreordained by destiny. [1015]
[(3) Causes of divination.]
Divination, or soothsaying, consists in the capacity to read and
interpret omens; [1016] and this capacity is, according to the Stoics,
partly a natural gift, and partly acquired by art and study. [1017] The
natural gift of prophecy is based, as other philosophers had already
laid down, [1018] on the relationship of the human soul to God. [1019]
Sometimes it manifests itself in sleep, at other times in ecstasy.
[1020] A taste for higher revelations will be developed, in proportion
as the soul is withdrawn from the world of sense, and from all thought
respecting things external. [1021] The actual cause of the prophetic
gift was referred to influences coming to the soul partly from God or
the universal spirit diffused throughout the world, [1022] and partly
from the souls which haunt the air or demons. [1023] External causes,
however, contribute to put people in a state of enthusiasm. [1024]
Artificial prophesying, or the art of foretelling the future, depends
upon observation and guess-work. [1025] One who could survey all causes
in their effects on one another would need no observation. Such a one
would be able to deduce the whole series of events from the given
causes. But God alone is able to do this. Hence men must gather the
knowledge of future events from the indications by which their coming
is announced. [1026] These indications may be of every variety; and
hence all possible forms of foretelling the future were allowed by the
Stoics; the inspection of entrails, divination by lightning and other
natural phenomena, by the flight of birds, and omens of every kind.
[1027] Some idea of the mass of superstition which the Stoics admitted
and encouraged may be gathered from the first book of Cicero’s treatise
on divination. The explanation of these omens being, however, a matter
of skill, individuals in this, as in every other art, may often go
wrong in their interpretation. [1028] To make sure against mistakes
tradition is partly of use, since it establishes by manifold
experiences the meaning of each omen; [1029] and the moral state of the
prophet is quite as important for scientifically foretelling the future
as for the natural gift of divination. Purity of heart is one of the
most essential conditions of prophetic success.
In all these questions the moral character of Stoic piety is ever to
the fore, and great pains were taken by the Stoics to bring their
belief in prophecy into harmony with their philosophic view of the
world. Nevertheless, it is clear that success could not be theirs
either in making this attempt, or indeed in dealing with any other
parts of the popular belief. Struggling with indefatigable zeal in an
attempt so hopeless, they proved at least the sincerity of their wish
to reconcile religion and philosophy; but they also disclosed by these
endeavours a misgiving that science, which had put on so bold a face,
was not in itself sufficient, but needed support from the traditions of
religion, and from a belief in divine revelations. [1030] Probably we
shall not be far wrong in referring to this practical need the seeming
vagaries of men like Chrysippus, who, with the clearest intellectual
powers, could be blind to the folly of the methods they adopted in
defending untenable and antiquated opinions. These vagaries show in
Stoicism practical interests preponderating over science. They also
establish the connection of Stoicism with Schools which doubted
altogether the truth of the understanding, and thought to supplement it
by divine revelations. Thus the Stoic theory of divination leads
directly to the Neopythagorean and Neoplatonic doctrine of revelation.
CHAPTER XIV.
THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE AND ITS HISTORICAL POSITION.
[A. Inner connection of the Stoic system.]
Having now investigated the Stoic system in detail, we are in a
position to pass a definite judgment on the scope of the Stoic
philosophy, the import and the relation of its various parts, and its
historical position. Its peculiar character manifests itself before all
things in the three points to which attention was drawn at the outset:
[1031]—its pre-eminently practical tone, the determination of this
practical tendency by the notions of the good and of virtue, and the
use of logic and natural science as a scientific basis. Speculative
knowledge is not, as we have seen, to the Stoics an end in itself, but
only a means for producing a right moral attitude; all philosophical
research stands directly or indirectly in the service of virtue. Both
in the earlier and in the later days of its existence the Stoic School
advocated this principle in the most determined and exclusive manner,
nor was it even denied by Chrysippus, the chief representative of its
science and learning.
[(1) Ethical side of Stoicism.]
If it be then asked what is the right moral attitude, the Stoics reply:
action conformable to nature and reason—in other words, virtue. Virtue,
however, implies two things. On the one hand it implies the resignation
of the individual to the universe, obedience to the universal law; on
the other hand it implies the harmony of man with himself, the dominion
of the higher over the lower nature, of reason over emotion, and the
rising superior to everything which does not belong to his true nature.
Both statements may be reconciled, because the law of morality is
addressed only to reasonable beings, and is the law of their nature,
and can only be carried into execution by their own exertions. Still,
in the Stoic ethics, two currents of thought may be clearly
distinguished, which from time to time come into actual collision; the
one requiring the individual to live for the common good and for
society, the other impelling him to live for himself only, to
emancipate himself from all that is not himself, and to console himself
with the feeling of virtue. The first of these tendencies impels man to
seek the society of others; the second enables him to dispense with it.
From the former spring the virtues of justice, sociability, love of
man; from the latter, the inner freedom and happiness of the virtuous
man. The former culminates in citizenship of the world; the latter in
the self-sufficingness of the wise man. In as far as virtue includes
everything that can be required of man, happiness depends on it alone;
nothing is good but virtue, nothing is evil but vice; all that is not
connected with the moral nature is indifferent. On the other hand, in
as far as virtue is based on human nature, it stands on the same
footing with all else that is conformable with nature. If its own
peculiar value cannot be surrendered, no more can it be required that
we should be indifferent to its conformity to nature, that it should
not have for us some positive or negative value, or in some way affect
our feelings. Therewith the doctrine of things indifferent and the wise
man’s freedom from emotions begins to totter. Lastly, if we look at the
way in which virtue exists in man, we arrive at different results,
according as we look at its essence or its manifestation. Virtue
consists in acting conformably with reason, and reason is one and
undivided; hence it appears that virtue forms an undivided unity, and
must be possessed whole and entire or not at all. From this proposition
the contrast of the wise and foolish man, with all its bluntness and
extravagances, is only a legitimate consequence. Or, again, if we look
at the conditions upon which, owing to human nature, the acquisition
and possession of virtue depends, the conviction is inevitable that the
wise man as drawn by the Stoics never occurs in reality. Hence the
conclusion is undeniable that the contrast between wise men and fools
is more uncertain than it at first appeared to be. Thus all the main
features of the Stoic ethics may be simply deduced from their one
fundamental notion, that rational action or virtue is the only good.
[(2) Scientific side of the Stoic system.]
Not only does this view of ethics require a peculiar theory of the
world to serve as its scientific basis, but it has a reflex action
also, influencing alike the tone and the results of theoretic enquiry.
If the duty of man is declared to consist in bringing his actions into
harmony with the laws of the universe, it becomes also necessary that
he should endeavour himself to know the world and its laws. The more
his knowledge of the world increases, the greater will be the value
which he attaches to the forms of scientific procedure. If, moreover,
man is required to be nothing more than an instrument of the universal
law, it is only consistent to suppose an absolute regularity of
procedure in the universe, an unbroken connection of cause and effect,
and ultimately to refer everything to one highest all-moving cause, and
to include everything under one primary substance. If in human life the
individual has no rights as against the laws of the universe, then all
that is of individual occurrence in the world is powerless against
universal necessity. On the other hand, if in the case of man
everything turns upon strength of will, then likewise in the universe
the acting power must be regarded as the highest and most exalted.
There arises thus that view of the world as a series of forces which
constitutes one of the most peculiar and thorough-going characteristics
of the Stoic view of nature. [1032] Lastly, if such excessive
importance is attached to practical conduct as is done by the Stoics,
that sensuous view of the world which finds its crudest expression in
the Stoic Materialism and reliance on the senses, [1033] will most
nearly accord with speculation. At the same time the Materialism of the
Stoics is limited and corrected by the conception of the universe and
of a divine all-penetrating power and reason, just as their appeal to
the senses is by the demand for the formation of conceptions, and the
general application of the process of demonstration; the truth of
knowledge itself is based on a practical postulate, the greater or less
certainty of which is measured by the strength of personal conviction.
If these elements proved too contradictory to be harmonised; if the
Materialism of the Stoics was at variance with their view of the world
as a series of forces; if appeals to the senses were obviously in
conflict with logical method, it was at least thereby clearly
established that a practical and not a purely intellectual interest lay
at the root of their system.
[(3) Connection of the moral and scientific elements.]
This statement must of course not be taken to mean that the Stoics
first developed their ethical principles independently of their theory
of the universe, and afterwards brought the two into connection with
each other. On the contrary, it was by the peculiar connection of
theory and practice that Stoicism itself first came into existence. The
leading thought of Zeno consists in the attempt to vindicate the
supremacy of virtue by a scientific knowledge of the laws of the world;
and he becomes the founder of a new School only by bringing to Cynicism
those scientific ideas and aims which he had learned himself in the
School of Polemo, Stilpo, and Diodorus, or otherwise gathered from a
study of ancient philosophy. These elements are not therefore
accidentally brought together in Stoicism, but they are co-extensive,
and dependent one upon the other. As in the natural science and theory
of knowledge of the Stoics, the experimental basis on which their
system was built may be easily seen, so the peculiar development of
their ethics supposes all those positions respecting the universe and
the powers therein at work, which form the most important part of their
natural science. Only by a scientific treatment of this kind was
Stoicism at all able to improve upon the imperfection of the Cynic
ethics, so far at least as it really did so, and to accommodate itself
to the wants of human nature, so far as to be able to exercise an
influence at large. Upon this union of ethics and metaphysics that
religious attitude of the Stoic system reposes, to which it owes in a
great measure its historical importance. Thereby it occupies so
influential a position in an age in which intellectual power was indeed
declining, but in which the interest for science was keen. But that
Stoic physics and metaphysics should have adopted this line, and no
other; that Zeno and his followers, who draw on former systems for
their own on the most extensive scale, should have borrowed from these
systems these and no other positions, and expanded them in this and no
other direction; these results are, doubtless, ultimately due to their
moral attitude. All that bore on the subject of ethics, and supported
it, they appropriated; all that was opposed thereto they rejected. The
Stoic system as such owes its rise to a union of ethical and
speculative elements, in which both were more definitely determined by
one another; still the ethical platform is the one on which its
formation commences, and which primarily determined its course and
results.
[B. Relation of Stoicism to previous systems.]
[(1) Its relation to Socrates and the Cynics.]
In order to obtain a more accurate notion of the rise of Stoicism, the
premises on which it proceeds, and the grounds on which it is based, we
must take a glance at its relation to preceding systems. The Stoics
themselves deduced their philosophical pedigree directly from
Antisthenes, and indirectly from Socrates. [1034] Clear as is their
connection with both these philosophers, it would nevertheless be a
mistake to regard their teaching as a revival of Cynicism, still more
to regard it as a simple following of Socrates. From both it
undoubtedly borrowed much. The self-sufficiency of virtue, the
distinction of things good, evil, and indifferent, the ideal picture of
the wise man, the whole withdrawal from the outer world within the
precincts of the mind, and the strength of moral will, are ideas taken
from the Cynics. In the spirit of Cynicism, too, it explained general
ideas as simply names. Not to mention many peculiarities of ethics, the
contrasting of one God with the many popular Gods, and the allegorical
explanation of myths, were likewise points borrowed from Cynicism. The
identification of virtue with intelligence, the belief that virtue was
one, and could be imparted by teaching, were at once in the spirit of
Socrates and also in that of the Cynics. The argument for the existence
of God based on the subordination of means to ends, the whole view of
the world as a system of means and ends, and the Stoic theory of
Providence, are views peculiarly Socratic; [1035] and the Stoics
followed Socrates in ethics by identifying the good and the useful.
And yet the greatness of the interval which separates the Stoics even
from the Cynics becomes at once apparent on considering the relation of
Aristo to the rest of the Stoic School. In refusing to meddle with
natural or mental science, or even with ethical considerations at all,
Aristo faithfully reflects the principles of Antisthenes. In asserting
the unity of virtue to such an extent that all virtues are merged in
one, he was only repeating similar expressions of Antisthenes. In
denying any difference in value to things morally indifferent, and in
placing the highest morality in this indifference, he was, according to
the older writers, reasserting a Cynic tenet. [1036] Conversely in
denying these statements, as the great majority of Stoics did, the
points are indicated in which Stoicism differed from Cynicism. [1037]
In the feeling of moral independence, and in invincible strength of
will, the Cynic is opposed to the whole world; he needs for virtue no
scientific knowledge of the world and its laws; he regards nothing
external to himself; he allows nothing to influence his conduct, and
attaches value to nothing; but, in consequence, he remains with his
virtue confined to himself; virtue makes him independent of men and
circumstances, but it has neither the will nor the power to interpose
effectively in the affairs of life, and to infuse therein new moral
notions. Stoicism insists upon the self-sufficiency of virtue quite as
strongly as Cynicism, and will allow quite as little that anything
except virtue can be a good in the strictest sense of the term. But in
Stoicism the individual is not nearly so sharply opposed to the outer
world as in Cynicism. The Stoic is too cultivated; he knows too well
that he is a part of the universe to ignore the value of an
intellectual view of the world, or to neglect the natural conditions of
moral action, as things of no moment. What he aims at is not only a
negation—independence from externals—but a positive position—life
according to nature; and that life only he considers according to
nature which is in harmony with the laws of the universe as well as
with those of human nature. Hence Stoicism is not only far in advance
of Cynicism by its intellectual attitude, but its moral philosophy also
breathes a freer and milder spirit. Let only the principles of the
Stoics on the necessity and value of scientific knowledge be compared
with the sophistical assertions of Antisthenes, destructive of all
knowledge; or the cultivated logical form of the intellectual edifice
of the Stoics, with the chaotic condition of Cynic thought; or the
careful metaphysical and psychological researches and the copious
learning of the School of Chrysippus, with the Cynics’ contempt for all
theory and all learned research, and it becomes apparent at once how
deep-seated is the difference between the two systems, and how little
Stoicism as a philosophic system can be deduced from Cynicism.
In ethics, too, the difference of the two Schools is also fully
apparent. Stoic morality recognises, at least conditionally, a positive
and negative value in external things and circumstances; the Cynic
allows to these absolutely no value. The former forbids affection
contrary to reason, the latter any and every kind of affection. [1038]
The former throws the individual back upon human society, the latter
isolates him. The former teaches citizenship of the world in a positive
sense, requiring all to feel themselves one with their fellow-men; the
latter in a negative sense, that of feeling indifferent to home and
family. The former has a pantheistic tone about it, due to the lively
feeling of the connection between man and the universe, and a definite
theological stamp owing to its taking a stand by positive religion; the
latter has a rationalistic character, owing to the enfranchisement of
the wise man from the prejudices of popular belief, with which it has
exclusively to do. In all these respects Stoicism preserves the
original character of the Socratic philosophy far better than Cynicism,
which only caricatured them. Still it departs from that character in
two respects. In point of theory the Stoic doctrine received a
systematic form and development such as Socrates never contemplated;
and in natural science, it cultivated a field avoided by Socrates on
principle, however much its doctrine of Providence, and its view of
nature as a system of means subordinated to ends, may remind of
Socrates. On the other hand, interest in science, although limited to
the subject of ethics, is with Socrates far deeper and stronger than
with the Stoics, the latter pursuing scientific research only as a
means for solving moral problems. Hence the Socratic theory of a
knowledge of conceptions, simple though it may sound, contained a
fruitful germ of unexpanded speculation, in comparison with which all
that the Stoics did is fragmentary. The Stoic ethics are not only more
expanded and more carefully worked out in detail than those of
Socrates, but they are also more logical in clinging to the principle
that virtue alone is an unconditional good. There are no concessions to
current modes of thought, such as Socrates allowed, who practically
based his doctrine of morals upon utility. On the other hand, the moral
science of the Stoics also falls far short of the frankness and
cheerfulness of the Socratic view of life. If in many respects it toned
down the asperities of Cynicism, still it appropriated its leading
principles far too unreservedly to avoid accepting a great number of
its conclusions.
Asking in the next place in how far the Stoics were induced by other
influences to change and extend the platform of the Socratic
philosophy, we have for determining the practical side of their system,
besides the general tendency of the post-Aristotelian [(2) Relation to
Megarians and Heraclitus.] philosophy, the example of Cynicism. Its
speculative development, on the other hand, is partly connected with
the Megarians, partly with Heraclitus; to the Megarians the personal
connection of Zeno with Stilpo points, to Heraclitus the fact that from
him the Stoics themselves deduced their views on natural science, which
they expanded in commentaries on his writings. [1039]
[(a) The Megarians.]
Probably the Megarian influence must not be rated too high. Zeno may
have thence received an impulse to that reasoning habit which appears
with him in a preference for compressed sharp-pointed syllogisms;
[1040] but in post-Aristotelian times, contact with Megarians was no
longer wanted for this, and the greatest reasoner among the Stoics,
Chrysippus, appears not only to have had no personal relations to them,
but his logic is throughout a simple continuation of that of Aristotle.
[(b) Heraclitus.]
Far greater, and more generally recognised, is the importance of the
influence which the views on nature of the philosopher of Ephesus
exercised on the Stoics. A system which laid such emphasis on the
subordination of everything individual to the law of the universe,
which singled out universal reason from the flux of things as the one
thing everlastingly and permanently the same—a system in many other
ways so nearly related to their own, must have strongly commended
itself to their notice, and offered them many points with which to
connect their own. If to us the view that life is dependent for its
existence on matter is repulsive, it was otherwise to the Stoics; for
them this very theory possessed special attractions. Hence, with the
exception of the threefold division of the elements, there is hardly a
single point in the Heraclitean theory of nature which the Stoics did
not appropriate:—fire or ether as the primary element, the oneness of
this element with universal reason, the law of the universe, destiny,
God, the flux of things, the gradual change of the primary element into
the four elements, and of these back to the primary element, the
regular alternation of creation and conflagration in the world, the
oneness and eternity of the universe, the description of the soul as
fiery breath, the identification of the mind with the demon, the
unconditional sovereignty of the universal law over individuals—these
and many other points in the Stoic system, originally derived from
Heraclitus, [1041] prove how greatly this system is indebted to him.
Nor must it be forgotten that there is nothing in Heraclitus analogous
to the reasoning forms of the Stoics, nor can their ethical views be
referred to his few and undeveloped hints. With all the importance the
Stoics attached to natural science, it is with them only subordinate to
moral science; and the very fact that it is referred to Heraclitus as
its author, proves its inferior position, and the want of any
independent interest in the subject. It is also unmistakeable that even
in natural science the Stoics only partially follow Heraclitus, and
that principles taken from Heraclitus often bear an altered meaning
when wrought into the Stoic system. Omitting minor points, not only is
the Stoic doctrine of nature in a formal point of view far more
developed, and with regard to its extension far more comprehensive,
than the corresponding doctrine of Heraclitus, but the whole Stoic view
of the world is by no means so completely identical with his as might
be supposed. The flux of things, which the Stoics teach equally with
Heraclitus, [1042] has not for them that overwhelming importance that
it had for him. The matter of which the universe consists may be always
going over into new forms, but, at the same time, it is for them the
permanent material and essence of things. [1043] Individual substances,
too, are treated by the Stoics as corporeally permanent. [1044]
Moreover, from the material they distinguish the active principle,
Reason or deity, far more definitely than Heraclitus had done, and the
same distinction is carried into individual things in the contrast
between matter and quality. Thereby it becomes possible for them to
contrast much more sharply than their predecessor had done the reason
of the world, and the blindly working power of nature. Heraclitus, it
would appear, confined his attention to observing nature and describing
its elementary meteorological processes. But the natural science of the
Stoics includes the idea of means working for ends. It sees the object
in referring the whole arrangement of the world to man, and it pursues
this line of thought exclusively, neglecting in consequence science
proper. Hence the idea of sovereign reason or the universal law had not
the same meaning in the minds of both. Heraclitus sees this reason,
primarily and chiefly, in the ordinary sequence of natural phenomena,
in the regularity of the course by which to each individual phenomenon
its place in the world, its extent and duration are prescribed—in
short, in the unchanging coherence of nature. Without excluding this
aspect in their proofs of the existence of God and the rule of
Providence, the Stoics attach the chief importance to the
serviceableness of the order of nature. The reason which rules the
world appears in Heraclitus primarily as a natural power; in the
Stoics, as intelligence working with a purpose. For Heraclitus Nature
is the highest object, the object of independent and absolute interest;
and hence the infinite Being is no more than the power which forms the
world. The Stoics regard nature from the platform of humanity, as a
means for the wellbeing and activity of man. Their deity accordingly
does not work as a simple power of nature, but essentially as the
wisdom which cares for the wellbeing of man. The highest conception in
the system of Heraclitus is that of nature or destiny. Stoicism
accepted this conception also, but at the same time developed it to the
higher idea of Providence.
[(3) Connection with Aristotle.]
Shall we be wrong if we attribute this modification of the Heraclitean
theory of nature by the Stoics partly to the influence of Socrates’ and
Plato’s theory of final causes, but in a still greater degree to the
influence of the Aristotelian philosophy? To Aristotle belongs properly
the idea of matter without qualities, no less than the distinction
between a material and a formal cause. Aristotle applied the idea of
purpose to natural science far more extensively than any other system
had done before; and although the mode in which the Stoics expressed
this idea has more resemblance to the popular theological statements of
Socrates and Plato than to Aristotle, still the Stoic conception of a
natural power working with a purpose, such as is contained in the idea
of artificial fire and λόγοι σπερματικοὶ, is essentially Aristotelian.
Even many positions which appear to be advanced in opposition to
Aristotle were yet connected with him. Thus the existence of ether as a
body distinct from the four elements is denied, and yet in point of
fact it is asserted under a new name—that of artificial fire. The
Peripatetic doctrine of the origin of the rational soul is contradicted
by the Stoic theory of development, and yet the latter is based on a
statement in Aristotle to the effect that the germ of the animal soul
lies in the warm air [1045] which surrounds the seed, warm air which
Aristotle distinguishes from fire quite as carefully as Zeno and
Cleanthes distinguished the two kinds of fire. Even the point of
greatest divergence from Aristotelian teaching—the transformation of
the human soul and the divine spirit into something corporeal—might yet
be connected with Aristotle, and, indeed, the Peripatetic School here
comes to their assistance. For had not Aristotle described the ether as
the most divine body, the stars formed out of it as divine and happy
beings? Had he not brought down the acting and moving forces from a
heavenly sphere to the region of earth? Had he not, as we have just
seen, sought the germ of the soul in an ethereal matter? And might not
others go a little further and arrive at materialistic views? and all
the more so, seeing how hard it is to conceive the extra-mundane
intelligence of Aristotle, at once as incorporeal, and yet touching and
encircling the world of matter, and to make personal unity in the human
soul accord with an origin in a reason coming from above?
The way for Stoicism was more directly paved by the Aristotelian
speculations as to the origin of notions and conceptions. Here the
Stoics did little more than omit (in conformity with their principles)
what their predecessor had said as to an original possession and
immediate knowledge of truth. It has been remarked on an earlier
occasion how closely their formal logic followed that of Aristotle;
they contented themselves with building on Aristotelian foundations,
and even their additions have more reference to grammar than to logic.
The actual influence of Peripatetic views on those of the Stoics
appears to have been least in the province of ethics. Here the crudity
of the Stoic conception of virtue, the entire suppression of emotions,
the absolute exclusion of everything external from the circle of moral
goods, the distinction between the wise and the foolish man, the
attacks on a purely speculative life, present a sharp contrast to the
caution and many-sidedness of Aristotle’s moral theory, to his careful
weighing of current opinions and their practicability, to his
recognition of propriety in every shape and form, and to the praise
which he lavishes on a purely speculative life. What the Stoics chiefly
owe to Aristotle is the formal treatment of the materials and the
psychological analysis of individual moral faculties. On the other
hand, the province of ethics must be looked to for traces of the
teaching which Zeno received from Polemo, perhaps even from Xenocrates.
[(4) Connection with Plato.]
The speculative portions of Plato’s teaching could offer no great
attractions to practical men and materialists like the Stoics, either
in their original form or in the form which they assumed in the older
Academy under Pythagorean influence. On the other hand, such points in
Platonism as the Socratic habit of making knowledge the foundation of
virtue, the comparative depreciation of external goods, the
disparagement of all that is sensual, the elevation and the purity of
moral idealism, and, in the older Academy, the demand for life
according to nature, the doctrine of the self-sufficingness of virtue,
and the growing tendency to confine philosophy to practical issues—all
these were questions for a Stoic full of interest. Unfounded as the
notion of the later Eclectics is, [1046] that the Stoic and Academician
systems of morality were altogether the same, the Stoics, nevertheless,
appear to have received suggestions from the Academy which they carried
out in a more determined spirit. Thus the theory of living according to
nature belongs originally to the Academy, although the Stoics adopted
it with a peculiar and somewhat different meaning. Besides influencing
the moral doctrines of the Stoics, the attitude assumed by the older
Academy towards positive religion may also have had some influence on
their orthodoxy; their most prominent representative, Cleanthes, is in
his whole philosophic character the counterpart of Xenocrates. Although
later in its origin than Stoicism, the new Academy was not without
important influence on that system, through the person of Chrysippus,
but this influence was at first only of an indirect kind, inasmuch as
it obliged the Stoics by its logical contradiction to look about for a
more logical basis for their system, and therewith to attempt a more
systematic expansion of their teaching. [1047] Somewhat similar is the
effect of Epicureanism, which by its strong opposition in the field of
ethics imparted decision and accuracy to the Stoic doctrine, and thus
indirectly helped to form it.
[C. The Stoic philosophy as a whole.]
[(1) Its historical position.]
By the aid of these remarks it now becomes possible to give a
satisfactory account of the history of Stoicism. Belonging to an age of
moral debasement and political oppression, its founder, Zeno, conceived
the idea of liberating himself and all who were able to follow him from
its degeneracy and slavery by means of a philosophy which, by purity
and strength of moral will, would procure independence from all
external things, and unruffled inward peace. That his endeavours should
have taken this practical turn, that he should have proposed to himself
not knowledge as such, but the moral exercise of knowledge as the
object to be realised, was in part due to his own personal character,
and may be in part referred to the general circumstances of the times.
On nobler and more serious minds, these circumstances weighed too
heavily not to call forth opposition and resistance in place of
listless contemplation. The sway of the Macedonian, and afterwards of
the Roman Empire, was far too despotic to allow the least prospect of
open resistance. Nor must it be overlooked that philosophy itself had
reached a pass at which satisfactory answers to speculative problems
were no longer forthcoming; hence attention was naturally directed to
questions of morals.
Haunted by this longing for virtue, Zeno must have felt attracted by a
system of philosophy which had at an earlier period followed a similar
course with marked success, viz. the system of the Cynics, and what he
doubtless identified therewith, the old Socratic teaching. [1048]
Anxious to find a positive meaning and scientific basis for virtue, he
strove to appropriate from every system whatever agreed with the bent
of his own mind. By using all the labours of his predecessors, and
keeping his eye steadily fixed upon the practical end of philosophy, he
succeeded in forming a new and more comprehensive system, which was
afterwards completed by Chrysippus. In point of form this system was
most indebted to the Peripatetic philosophy; in point of matter, next
to its debt to the Cynics, which has been already mentioned, its chief
obligation was to Heraclitus. But the moral theory of the Stoics was as
little identical with that of the Cynics, as the natural science of the
Stoics was with that of Heraclitus. If the divergence was, in the first
instance, due to the influence of the Stoic principles, still the
influence of the Peripatetic teaching is unmistakeable in the natural
and speculative science of the Stoics, and the influence of the Academy
in their moral science. Stoicism does not, therefore, appear simply as
a continuation of Cynicism, nor yet as an isolated innovation, but,
like every other form of thought which marks an epoch, it worked up
into itself all previous materials, and produced from their combination
a new result. In this process of assimilation much that was beautiful
and full of meaning was omitted; everything was absorbed that could be
of use in the new career on which the Greek mind was about to enter.
[(2) Its onesidedness.]
It was the fault of the age that it could no longer come up to the
many-sidedness of an Aristotle or a Plato. Stoicism, it is true,
approximates thereto more nearly than any other of the
post-Aristotelian systems. But in its practical view of philosophy, in
its materialistic appeal to the senses, in its theoretical
self-sufficiency, setting up the wise man as superior to the weaknesses
and wants of human nature; in its citizenship of the world, throwing
political interests into the background; and in so many other traits it
is the fit exponent of an epoch in which the taste for purely
scientific research and the delight in ethical speculation were at an
end, whilst out of the overthrow of states, and the growth of freedom,
the idea of humanity was coming to the fore. Stoicism represented most
powerfully the moral and religious convictions of such an age, yet not
without onesidedness and exaggeration. By exercise of the will and by
rational understanding, man is to become free and happy. This aim is,
however, pursued so persistently that the natural conditions of human
existence and the claims of individuality are ignored. To man, regarded
as the exponent of universal law, as little freedom of will is allowed
by the Stoic natural science in face of the inexorable course of nature
as freedom of action is allowed by the Stoic ethics in face of the
demands of duty. The universal claims of morality are alone
acknowledged; the right of the individual to act according to his
peculiar character, and to develop that character, is almost ignored.
The individual, as such, dwindles into obscurity, whilst a high place
in the world is assigned to mankind collectively. The individual is
subordinated to the law of the whole; but by regarding nature as a
system of means and ends, and introducing the belief in Providence and
Prophecy, the universe is again subordinated to the interests of man—a
view against which a more careful research has many objections to urge.
In both respects Epicureanism is in decided contrast to Stoicism,
though agreeing with it in the general tone of its practical philosophy
and in its aim to make man independent of the outer world and happy in
himself.
PART III.
THE EPICUREANS.
CHAPTER XV.
EPICURUS AND THE EPICUREAN SCHOOL. [1049]
[A. Epicurus.]
Epicurus, the son of the Athenian Neocles, [1050] was born in Samos
[1051] in the year 342 or 341 B.C. [1052] His early education appears
to have been neglected; [1053] and his knowledge of previous
philosophic systems was very superficial, even at the time when he
first came forward as an independent teacher. Still he can hardly have
been so entirely self-taught as he wished to appear at a later period
in life. The names, at least, of the individuals are on record who
instructed him in the systems of Democritus and Plato; [1054] and
although it is by no means an ascertained fact that he subsequently
attended the lectures of Xenocrates, [1055] on the occasion of a visit
to Athens, [1056] no doubt can be felt that he was acquainted with the
writings of previous philosophers, from whom he borrowed important
parts of his system [1057] and more particularly with those of
Democritus.
After having been engaged as a teacher in several Schools [1058] in
Asia Minor, he repaired to Athens about the year 306 B.C., [1059] and
there founded a School of his own. [1060] The meeting-place of this
School was the founder’s garden, [1061] and its centre of attraction
was the founder himself, around whom a circle of friends gathered, knit
together by a common set of principles, by a common affection for a
master whom they almost worshipped, and by a common enjoyment of
cultivated society. [1062] Opponents charged the Epicureans with gross
impropriety, because they admitted not only women, [1063] but women of
loose morality, [1064] to this circle of philosophic culture; but in
the then state of Greek society, such conduct does not appear
extraordinary. Here Epicurus laboured for six and thirty years, during
which he succeeded in impressing a stamp on his School which is now
seen definite and unchanged after the lapse of centuries. In the year
270 B.C. [1065] he succumbed to disease, the pains and troubles of
which he bore with great fortitude. [1066] Out of the multitude of his
writings [1067] only a few have come down to us, and these are for the
most part unimportant ones. [1068] On the whole, these fragments [1069]
bear out the unfavourable opinions which opponents have expressed with
regard to his style. [1070]
[B. Scholars of Epicurus.]
Among the numerous scholars of Epicurus [1071] the best known are
Metrodorus [1072] and Polyænus, [1073] both of whom died before their
master; Hermarchus, [1074] upon whom the presidency of the School
devolved after the death of Epicurus; [1075] and Colotes, [1076]
against whom Plutarch, four hundred years later, wrote a treatise. Many
others are also known, at least by name. [1077] The garden which
Epicurus in his will left to the School [1078] continued after his
death to be the external rallying-point for his followers. Hermarchus
was succeeded by Polystratus, [1079] with whom Hippoclides is also
mentioned [1080] as joint-president. Hermarchus and Hippoclides were
succeeded by Dionysius, and Dionysius again by Basilides. [1081]
Protarchus of Bargylium, [1082] and his pupil, Demetrius the Laconian,
[1083] appear to belong to the second century before Christ; but the
time in which these philosophers flourished cannot be established with
certainty; and the same remark applies to several others whose names
are on record. [1084]
[C. Epicureans of the Roman period.]
Before the middle of the second century B.C. Epicureanism is said to
have obtained a footing in Rome. [1085] It is certain that it existed
there not long afterwards. C. Amafinius is mentioned as the first who
paved the way for the spread of Epicurean doctrines by discussing them
in Latin; [1086] and it is stated that these doctrines soon found many
supporters, attracted partly by their merits, but more often by the
simplicity and the ease with which they could be understood. [1087]
Towards the close of the second century Apollodorus, one of the most
voluminous writers on philosophy, taught at Athens. [1088] His pupil,
Zeno of Sidon, the most important among the Epicureans of that age,
laboured for a long time successfully, both orally and in writing.
[1089] About the same time Phædrus is heard of in Rome and Athens,
[1090] and at a little later period Philodemus, [1091] and Syro or
Sciro in Rome, [1092] and Patro, [1093] the successor of Phædrus, in
Athens. The number of Epicureans at Rome, known to us chiefly from
Cicero’s writings, [1094] is not small. No one of them has obtained a
higher repute than T. Lucretius Carus. [1095] His poem, carefully
reproducing the Epicurean notions on natural science, is one of the
most valuable sources for the knowledge of their system. Contemporary
with Lucretius was the celebrated physician Asclepiades of Bithynia,
[1096] who resided at Rome, but to judge by the views on nature
attributed to him, he was no genuine Epicurean, although connected with
the Epicurean School. [1097]
In the following century several supporters of the practical philosophy
of the Epicureans are known to us, [1098] but no one apparently
approaching Zeno or Phædrus in scientific importance. Rehabilitated
under the Antonines by the establishment of a public chair in Athens,
the Epicurean School outlived most other systems, and continued to
exist as late as the fourth century after Christ. [1099]
CHAPTER XVI.
CHARACTER AND DIVISIONS OF THE EPICUREAN TEACHING: THE TEST-SCIENCE OF
TRUTH.
[A. Character of Epicurean system.]
[(1) Its power of self-preservation.]
The scientific value and capacity for development of Epicureanism are
out of all proportion to its extensive diffusion and the length of time
during which it continued to flourish. No other system troubled itself
so little about the foundation on which it rested; none confined itself
so exclusively to the utterances of its founder. Such was the dogmatism
with which Epicurus propounded his precepts, such the conviction he
entertained of their excellence, that his pupils were required to
commit summaries of them to memory; [1100] and the superstitious
devotion for the founder was with his approval [1101] carried to such a
length, that on no single point was the slightest deviation from his
tenets permitted. Although, even in Cicero’s time, the writings of
Epicurus and Metrodorus found hardly a reader outside the School,
[1102] yet it is asserted that as late as the first and second
centuries after Christ the Epicureans clung tenaciously to their
master’s teaching. [1103] Probably it was easier for an Epicurean than
for any other thinker to act thus. Like his master, [1104] he was
indifferent to the labours of other philosophers, or unable to
appreciate their merits. [1105] For us this conduct of theirs has one
advantage: we can be far more certain that the Epicurean teaching
reflects that of the founder than we can that this is so in the case of
the Stoics. But this philosophical sterility, this mechanical handing
down of unchangeable principles, places the intellectual value of
Epicureanism on the lowest level. The servile dependence of the
Epicurean School on its founder can neither excuse its mental idleness
nor recommend a system so powerless to give an independent training to
its supporters.
[(2) Aim of philosophy according to the Epicureans.]
The want of intellectual taste here displayed appears also in the view
taken by Epicurus of the aim and business of philosophy. If among the
Stoics the subordination of theory to practice was frequently felt,
among the Epicureans this subordination was carried to such an extent
as to lead to a depreciation of all science. The aim of philosophy was,
with them, to promote human happiness. Indeed, philosophy is nothing
else than an activity helping us to happiness by means of speech and
thought. [1106] Nor is happiness, according to Epicurus, directly
promoted by knowledge, but only indirectly in as far as knowledge
ministers to practical needs, or clears away hindrances to their
attainment. All science which does not serve this end is superfluous
and worthless. [1107] Epicurus, therefore, despised learning and
culture, the researches of grammarians, and the lore of historians, and
declared it a piece of good fortune for simplicity of feeling to be
uncontaminated by learned rubbish. [1108] Nor was his opinion different
respecting mathematical science, of which he was wholly ignorant.
[1109] The calculations of mathematicians, he maintained, are based on
false principles; [1110] at any rate, they contribute nothing to human
happiness, and it is therefore useless and foolish to trouble oneself
about them. [1111] The theory of music and poetry he likewise found
exceedingly irksome, although he took pleasure in music itself and the
theatre; [1112] and rhetoric, as an artificial guide to eloquence,
seemed to him as worthless as the show-speeches which are the only
result of the study of it. The power of public speaking is a matter of
practice and of momentary feeling, and hence the skilful speaker is far
from being a good statesman. [1113] The greater part of logical
enquiries fared no better in his judgment. Himself no logician, he set
little store by logic. Definitions are of no use; the theory of
division and proof may be dispensed with; the philosopher does best to
confine himself to words, and to leave all the logical ballast alone.
[1114] Of all the questions which engrossed the attention of Stoic
logicians, one only, the theory of knowledge, was studied by Epicurus,
and that in a very superficial way. [1115]
Far greater, comparatively, was the importance he attached to the study
of nature, [1116] but even natural science was deemed valuable not so
much for its own sake as because of its practical use. The knowledge of
natural causes is the only means of liberating the soul from the
shackles of superstition; this is the only use of natural science. If
it were not for the thought of God and the fear of death, there would
be no need of studying nature. [1117] The investigation of our
instincts is also of use, because it helps us to control them, and to
keep them within their natural bounds. [1118] Thus the onesided
practical view of philosophy which we have already encountered in
Stoicism was carried by the Epicureans to an extreme length.
[(3) Divisions of philosophy.]
Nor is it otherwise than in harmony herewith that logic did not receive
a fuller or more perfect treatment in the further development of their
system. Even the study of nature, going far more fully into particulars
than logic, was guided entirely by practical considerations, all
scientific interest in nature being ignored. Following the usual
method, however, the Epicureans divided philosophy into three parts
[1119]—logic, natural science, and moral science. Limiting the first of
these parts to one branch of logic, the part which deals with the
characteristics of truth, and which they therefore called neither
logic, nor dialectic, but Canonic, they really reduced this part to a
mere introductory appendage to the two other parts, [1120] and studied
Canonic as a part of natural science. [1121] Natural science moreover
was so entirely subordinated to moral science, that we might almost
feel tempted to follow some modern writers [1122] in their view of the
Epicurean system, by giving to moral science precedence of the two
other parts, or at least of natural science. [1123] The School,
however, followed the usual order, and not without reason; [1124] for
although the whole tendency of the Epicurean Canonic and natural
science can only, like the Stoic, be explained by a reference to moral
science, yet moral science with them presupposes the test-science of
truth and natural science. We shall, therefore, do well to treat of
Canonic in the first place, and subsequently to prove how this branch
of study depends on Ethics.
[B. Canonic or the test-science of truth.]
[(1) Sensation and perception.]
Canonic or the test-science of truth, as has been observed, is occupied
with investigating the standard of truth, and with enquiring into the
mode of acquiring knowledge. The whole of formal logic, the doctrine of
the formation of conceptions and conclusions, is omitted by Epicurus.
[1125] Even the theory of the acquisition of knowledge assumes with him
a very simple form. If the Stoics were fain, notwithstanding their
ideal ethics and their pantheistic speculations, ultimately to take
their stand on materialism, could Epicurus avoid doing the same? In
seeking a speculative basis for a view of life which refers everything
to the feeling of pleasure or pain, he appealed far more unreservedly
than they had done to sensation. Now, since the senses can alone inform
us what is pleasant or unpleasant, and what is desirable or the
contrary, our judgment as to truth or falsehood must ultimately depend
on the senses. Viewed speculatively, sensation is the standard of
truth; viewed practically, the feeling of pleasure or pain. [1126] If
the senses may not be trusted, still less may knowledge derived from
reason be trusted, since reason itself is primarily and entirely
derived from the senses. There remains, therefore, no distinctive mark
of truth, and no possibility of certain conviction. We are at the mercy
of unlimited doubt. If, however, this doubt is contradictory of
itself—for how can men declare they know, that they can know
nothing?—it is also contradictory of human nature, since it would do
away not only with all knowledge but with every possibility of
action—in short, with all the conditions on which human life depends.
[1127] To avoid doubt we must allow that sensation as such is always,
and under all circumstances, to be trusted; nor ought the delusions of
the senses to shake our belief; the causes of these deceptions do not
lie in sensation as such, but in our judgment about sensation. What the
senses supply is only that an object produces this or that effect upon
us, and that this or that picture has impressed our soul. The facts
thus supplied are always true, only it does not follow that the object
exactly corresponds with the impression we receive of it, or that it
produces on others the same impression that it produces on us. Many
different pictures may emanate from one and the same object, and these
pictures may be changed on their way to the ear or eye. Pictures, too,
may strike our senses with which no real objects correspond. To
confound the picture with the thing, the impression made with the
object making the impression, is certainly an error, but this error
must not be laid to the charge of the senses, but to that of opinion.
[1128] Indeed, how is it possible, asks Epicurus, [1129] to refute the
testimony of the senses? Can reason refute it? But reason is itself
dependent on the senses, and cannot bear testimony against that on
which its own claims to belief depend. Or can one sense convict another
of error? But different sensations do not refer to the same object, and
similar sensations have equal value. Nothing remains, therefore, but to
attach implicit belief to every impression of the senses. Every such
impression is directly certain, and is accordingly termed by Epicurus
clear evidence (ἐνάργεια). [1130] Nay, more, its truth is so paramount
that the impressions of madmen, and appearances in dreams, are true
because they are caused by something real, [1131] and error only
becomes possible when we go beyond sensation.
[(2) Notions.]
This going beyond sensation becomes, however, a necessity. By a
repetition of the same perception a notion (πρόληψις) arises. A notion,
therefore, is nothing else than the general picture retained in the
mind of what has been perceived. [1132] On these notions retained by
memory depend all speaking and thinking. They are what commonly go
under the name of things; and speech is only a means of recalling
definite perceptions [1133] to the memory. Notions are presupposed in
all scientific knowledge. [1134] Together with sensations they form the
measure of the truth of our convictions; [1135] and it holds true of
them as it did of sensations—that they are true in themselves and need
no proof. [1136] Taken by themselves, notions, like perceptions, are
reflections in the soul of things on which the transforming action of
the mind, changing external impressions into conceptions, has not as
yet been brought to bear.
[(3) Opinion.]
For this very reason notion are not sufficient. From appearances we
must advance to their secret causes; from the known to the unknown.
[1137] Far too little value was attached by Epicurus to the logical
forms of thought, or he would have investigated more accurately the
nature of this process of advancing. [1138] Thoughts, in his view,
result from sensations spontaneously, and although a certain amount of
reflection is necessary for the process, yet it requires no scientific
guidance. [1139] The thoughts arrived at in this way do not stand as a
higher genus above perceptions, but they are only opinions (ὑπόληψις,
δόξα) without a note of truth in themselves, and depending for their
truth upon sensation. That opinion may be considered a true one which
is based on the testimony of the senses, or is at least not contrary to
the senses, and that a false opinion in which the opposite is the case.
[1140] Sometimes we suppose that upon certain present impressions other
impressions will follow: for instance, that a tower which appears round
at a distance will appear round close at hand. In that case, if the
real perception corresponds with the assumption, the opinion is true,
otherwise it is false. [1141] At other times we suppose that certain
appearances are due to secret causes: for instance, that empty space is
the cause of motion. If all appearances tally with their explanations,
we may consider our assumptions correct; if not, our assumptions are
incorrect. [1142] In the first case the test of the truth of an opinion
is that it is supported by experience; in the latter that it is not
refuted by experience. [1143] Have we not here all the leading features
of a theory of knowledge based purely on sensation? The Epicurean’s
interest in these questions was, however, far too slight to construct
with them a developed theory of materialism.
[(4) Standard of truth subjective.]
Little pains seem to have been taken by Epicurus to overcome the
difficulties by which this view was beset. If all sensations as such
are true, the saying of Protagoras necessarily follows that for each
individual that is true which seems to him to be true, that contrary
impressions about one and the same object are true, and that deceptions
of the senses, so many instances of which are supplied by experience,
are really impossible. To avoid these conclusions, Epicurus maintained
that for each different impression there is a different object-picture.
What immediately affects our senses is not the object itself, but a
picture of the object, and these pictures may be innumerable, a
different one being the cause of each separate sensation. Moreover,
although the pictures emanating from the same object are in general
nearly alike, it is possible that they may differ from one another
owing to a variety of causes. If, therefore, the same object appears
different to different individuals, the cause of these different
sensations is not one and the same, but a different one, and different
pictures must have affected their senses. If our own sensations deceive
us, the blame does not belong to our senses, as though they had
depicted to us unreal objects, but to our judgment for drawing
unwarranted inferences from pictures [1144] as to their causes.
This line of argument, however, only removes the difficulty one step
further. Sensation is said always to reproduce faithfully the picture
which affects the organs of sense, but the pictures do not always
reproduce the object with equal faithfulness. How then can a faithful
picture be known from one which is not faithful? To this question the
Epicurean system can furnish no real answer. To say that the wise man
knows how to distinguish a faithful from an unfaithful picture [1145]
is to despair of an absolute standard at all, and to make the decision
of truth or error depend upon the individual’s judgment. Such a
statement reduces all our impressions of the properties of things to a
relative level. If sensation does not show us things themselves, but
only those impressions of them which happen to affect us, it does not
supply us with a knowledge of things as they are, but as they happen to
be related to us. It was, therefore, a legitimate inference from this
theory of knowledge for Epicurus to deny that colour belongs to bodies
in themselves, since some only see colour in the dark, whilst others do
not. [1146] Like his predecessor, Democritus, he must have been brought
to this view by his theory of atoms. Few of the properties belong to
atoms which we perceive in things, and hence all other properties must
be explained as not belonging to the essence, but only to the
appearance of things. [1147] The taste for speculation was, however,
too weak, and the need of a direct truth of the senses too strong in
Epicurus for him to be able to turn his thoughts in this direction for
long. Whilst allowing to certain properties of things only a relative
value, he had no wish to doubt the reality of objects, nor to disparage
the object-pictures which furnish us with sensations. [1148]
CHAPTER XVII.
THE EPICUREAN VIEWS ON NATURE.
[A. General views on nature.]
[(1) Object, value, and method of the study of nature.]
If Epicurus and his followers underrated logic, to natural science they
attached a considerable value. This value was, however, exclusively
derived from a sense of the practical advantages which a knowledge of
nature confers in opposing superstition. Without such an object the
study of nature would have seemed wholly superfluous. [1149] Such being
their attitude of mind, the Epicureans were, as might have been
expected, indifferent about giving a complete and accurate explanation
of phenomena. Their one aim was to put forward such a view of nature as
would do away with the necessity for supernatural intervention, without
at the same time pretending to offer a sufficient solution of the
problems raised by science. [1150] Whilst, therefore, he devoted
considerable attention to natural science, [1151] Epicurus does not
seem to have considered certainty to be of importance, or even to be
possible, in dealing with details of scientific study. Of the general
causes of things we can and ought to entertain a firm conviction, since
the possibility of overcoming religious prejudices and the fears
occasioned by them depends on these convictions. No such result,
however, follows from the investigation of details, which, on the
contrary, only tends to confirm prejudices in those who are not already
emancipated from them. In dealing with details, therefore, it is enough
for Epicurus to show that various natural causes for phenomena may be
imagined, and to offer various suggestions which dispense with the
intervention of the Gods and the myths of a belief in Providence.
[1152] To say that any one of these suggestions is the only possible
one, is in most cases to exceed the bounds of experience and human
knowledge, and to go back to the capricious explanations of mythology.
[1153] Possibly the world may move, and possibly it may be at rest.
Possibly it may be round, or else it may be triangular, or have any
other shape. Possibly the sun and the stars may be extinguished at
setting, and be lighted afresh at rising. It is, however, equally
possible that they may only disappear under the earth and reappear
again, or that their rising and setting may be due to yet other causes.
Possibly the waxing and waning of the moon may be caused by the moon’s
revolving; or it may be due to an atmospheric change, or to an actual
increase and decrease in the moon’s size, or to some other cause.
Possibly the moon may shine with borrowed light, or it may shine with
its own, experience supplying us with instances of bodies which give
their own light, and of those which have their light borrowed. [1154]
From these and such-like statements it appears that questions of
natural science in themselves have no value for Epicurus. Whilst
granting that only one natural explanation of phenomena is generally
possible, yet in any particular case he is perfectly indifferent which
explanation is adopted.
[(2) Mechanical explanation of nature.]
Great stress is, however, laid by him on the general explanation. In
contrast with the religious view which regards the world as a system of
means leading to ends, the leading business of the natural science of
the Epicureans is to refer all phenomena to natural causes. To an
Epicurean nothing appeals more absurd than to suppose that the
arrangements of nature have for their object the well-being of mankind,
or that they have any object at all. The tongue is not given us for the
purpose of speaking, nor the ears for the purpose of hearing. As a
matter of fact, it would, indeed, be more correct to say, that we speak
because we have a tongue, and hear because we have ears. Natural powers
have acted purely according to the law of necessity, and among their
various products there could not fail to be some presenting the
appearance of purpose in their arrangement. In the case of man there
have resulted many such products and powers. But this result is by no
means intentional; it is an accidental consequence of natural causes.
In explaining nature all thought of Gods must be put out of sight. For
their happiness would be inconceivable, on the supposition that they
cared for man and his welfare. [1155]
Confining his interest in nature, as Epicurus did, entirely to this
general view of things, he was all the more inclined, in carrying it
into details, to rely upon some older system. No system, however,
appeared to correspond better with his tone of mind than that of
Democritus, which, moreover, commended itself to him not only by
absolutely banishing the idea of final cause, but by referring
everything to matter, and by its theory of atoms. As Epicurus places in
each individual thing taken by itself the ultimate end of action, so
Democritus had theoretically made all that is real to consist in what
is absolutely individual or in atoms. His natural science, therefore,
seemed to present the most natural basis for the Epicurean Ethics. If
the Stoics, in their views of nature, closely followed Heraclitus,
Epicurus in his followed Democritus still more closely, and hence, with
the exception of one single point, the additions made by Epicurus to
the theory of this philosopher are of no philosophical importance.
[(3) Atoms and empty space.]
With Democritus Epicurus agreed in holding that there is no other form
of reality except that of bodily reality. Every substance, he says in
the words of the Stoics, must affect others, and be affected by them;
and whatever affects others or is itself affected, is corporeal.
Corporeal substance is, therefore, the only kind of substance. [1156]
The various qualities of things, essential as well as accidental
qualities, are accordingly not incorporeal existences, but simply
chance modes of body, the former being called by Epicurus συμβεβηκότα,
the latter συμπτώματα. [1157] But a second something is necessary
besides corporeal substance in order to explain phenomena, viz. empty
space. That empty space exists is proved by the differences of weight
in bodies. For what else could be the cause of this difference? [1158]
It is proved still more conclusively by motion, motion being impossible
without empty space. [1159] Mind as a moving cause, however, seems to
Epicurus altogether superfluous. Everything that exists consists of
bodies and empty space, and there is no third thing. [1160]
Democritus had resolved the two conceptions of body and empty space
into the conceptions of being and not being. True to his position,
Epicurus dispensed with this speculative basis, and clinging to the
ordinary notions of empty space, and of a material filling space,
[1161] he simply proves these notions by the qualities of phenomena.
For this very reason Democritus’s division of body into innumerable
primary particles or atoms appeared to him most necessary. All bodies
known to us by sensation are composed of parts. [1162] If the process
of division were infinitely continued, all things would ultimately be
resolved into the non-existent—in this Epicurus and Democritus
agree;—and conversely all things must have been formed out of the
non-existent, in defiance of the first principle of natural science
that nothing can come from nothing, and that nothing can be resolved
into nothing. [1163] Hence, we must conclude that the primary component
parts of things can neither have come into existence nor cease to
exist, nor yet be changed in their nature. [1164] These primary bodies
contain no empty space in themselves, and hence can neither be divided
nor destroyed, nor be changed in any way. [1165] They are so small that
they do not impress the senses, and as a matter of fact we do not see
them. Nevertheless they must not be regarded as mathematical atoms, the
name atoms being assigned to them only because their bodily structure
will not admit of division. [1166] They have neither colour, warmth,
smell, nor any other property; properties belong only to distinct
materials; [1167] and for this reason they must not be sought in the
four elements, all of which, as experience shows, come into being and
pass away. [1168] They possess only the universal qualities of all
corporeal things, viz. shape, size, and weight. [1169]
Not only must atoms, like all other bodies, have shape, but there must
exist among them indefinitely many varieties of shape, or it would be
impossible to account for the innumerable differences of things. There
cannot, however, be really an infinite number of shapes, as Democritus
maintained, in any limited body—this is intelligible of itself—nor yet
in the whole universe, [1170] since an unlimited number would make the
arrangement of the world impossible, everything in the world being
circumscribed by certain containing limits. [1171] Again, atoms must be
different in point of size; for all materials cannot be divided into
particles of equal size. Yet even to this difference there must be some
limitation. An atom must neither be so large as to become an object of
sense, nor can it, after what has been said, be infinitely small.
[1172] From difference in point of size the difference of atoms in
point of weight follows. [1173] In point of number atoms must be
innumerable, and in the same way empty space must be unbounded also.
For since everything bounded must be bounded by something, it is
impossible to imagine any bounds of the universe beyond which nothing
exists, and hence there can be no bounds at all. The absence of bounds
must, apply to the mass of atoms quite as much as to empty space. If an
infinite number of atoms would not find room in a limited space,
conversely a limited number of atoms would be lost in empty space, and
never able to form a world. [1174] In all these views Epicurus closely
follows Democritus, no doubt agreeing with him also in explaining the
qualities of things by the composition of their atoms. [1175]
[B. The world.]
[(1) The swerving aside of atoms.]
In deducing the origin of things from their primary causes, Epicurus,
however, deviates widely from his predecessor. Atoms—so it was taught
by both—have by virtue of their weight been eternally engaged in a
downward motion. [1176] That all bodies should move downwards in empty
space seemed to Epicurus a matter of course; for whatever is heavy must
fall unless it is supported. [1177] He was therefore opposed to the
Aristotelian view that heaviness shows itself in the form of attraction
towards a centre, and consequently to his further supposition that
downward mode of motion belongs only to certain bodies, circular motion
being for others more natural. [1178] The objection that in endless
space there is no above or below he could meet only by appealing to
experience; [1179] some things always appear above our heads, others
beneath our feet. [1180] But whilst Democritus held that atoms in their
downward motion meet together, thus giving rise to a rotatory motion,
no such view commended itself to Epicurus. Nay rather in his view all
atoms will fall equally fast, since empty space offers no resistance,
and falling perpendicularly it is impossible to see how they can meet.
[1181] To render a meeting possible he supposes the smallest possible
swerving aside from the perpendicular line in falling. This assumption
seemed to him indispensable, since it would be otherwise impossible to
assert the freedom of the human will. For how can the will be free if
everything falls according to the strict law of gravity? For the same
reason this swerving aside was not supposed to proceed from any natural
necessity, but simply from the power of self-motion in the atoms.
[1182] In consequence of their meeting one part of the atoms
rebounds—so Democritus also taught; the lighter ones are forced
upwards, and from the upward and downward motions combined a rotatory
motion arises. [1183] When this motion takes place a clustering of
atoms is the consequence, which by their own motion separate themselves
from the remaining mass, and form a world of themselves. [1184] Atoms
being eternal and unchangeable, the process of forming worlds must go
on without beginning or end; [1185] and inasmuch as they are also
infinite in number, and empty space is infinite also, there must be an
innumerable number of worlds. [1186] In the character of these worlds
the greatest possible variety may be supposed, since it is most
unlikely that the innumerable combinations of atoms all brought about
at random will fall out alike. Equally impossible is it to assert that
all these worlds are absolutely dissimilar. In general, Epicurus
assumed that they are extremely different both in point of size and
arrangement, and that here and there one may be similar to our own.
[1187] Moreover, since eternity affords time for all imaginable
combinations of atoms, nothing can ever be brought about now which has
not already existed. [1188] In one respect all worlds are alike; they
come into existence, are liable to decay, and, like all other
individual elements, are exposed to a gradual increase and decrease.
[1189] So we might have assumed from other positions in his system.
Between the individual worlds both Democritus and Epicurus insert
intermediate world-spaces, in which by the clustering of atoms from
time to time new worlds come into being. [1190]
[(2) Origin of the world.]
The origin of our world is thus described. At a certain period of
time—Lucretius [1191] believes at no very distant period—a cluster of
atoms of varying shape and size was formed in this definite portion of
space. These atoms meeting, there first arose from the pressure and
rebound of the quickly falling particles motions of every variety in
every direction. Soon the greater atoms pressing downwards, by dint of
weight forced upwards the smaller and lighter atoms, the fiery ones
topmost and with the greatest impetus to form the ether, and afterwards
those which form the air. [1192] The upper pressure ceasing, these
masses, under the pressure of particles still joining it from below,
spread forth sidewards, and thus the belts of fire and air were formed.
Next uprose those atoms out of which the sun and stars are formed into
the heights, and at the same time the earth settled down, its inner
part being partially exhausted in those places where the sea now is. By
the influence of the warmth of the ether, and the sun-heat, the
earth-mass was bound together more closely, the sea was pressed out of
it, and the surface assumed an uneven character. [1193] The world is
shut off from other worlds and from empty space by those bodies which
form its external boundary. [1194]
[(3) Arrangement of the universe.]
Asking, in the next place, what idea must be formed of the arrangement
of the world, we are met by the two principles which Epicurus is never
weary of inculcating; one, that we must explain nothing as an
intentional arrangement by deity, but refer everything simply and
solely to mechanical causes; the other, that in explaining phenomena
the widest possible room must be given for hypotheses of every kind,
and that nothing is more absurd than to abridge the wide range of
possible explanations by exclusively deciding in favour of any one.
[1195] Thereby the investigation of nature loses for him its value as
such, nor is it of any great interest to us to follow his speculations
on nature into detail. On one point he dogmatises, protesting that the
framework of heaven must not be considered the work of God, [1196] nor
must life and reason be attributed to the stars. [1197] Otherwise, on
nearly all the questions which engaged the attention of astronomers at
that time, he observes the greatest indifference, treating the views of
his predecessors, good and bad alike, with an easy superficiality which
can only be explained by supposing him altogether indifferent [1198] as
to their truth. The state of his own astronomical knowledge can,
moreover, be easily seen by recalling the notorious assertion [1199]
that the sun, the moon, and the stars are either not at all, or only a
little larger, and may possibly be even less than they appear to be.
The Epicureans also thought to support their theory that the earth,
borne by the air, reposes in the middle of the world—a theory which on
their hypothesis of the weight of bodies is impossible [1200]—by the
gradual diminution in weight of the surrounding bodies. [1201] It would
be impossible here to go through the treatment which they gave to
atmospheric and terrestrial phenomena, particularly as the principle
already indicated was most freely used, and many explanations were
given as being all equally possible. [1202]
[(4) Plants and animals.]
Out of the newly made earth plants at first grew, [1203] and afterwards
animals came forth, since the latter, according to Lucretius, can by no
possibility have fallen from heaven. [1204] In other worlds, likewise,
living beings came into existence, though not necessarily in all.
[1205] Among these beings were originally, as Empedocles had previously
supposed, [1206] all sorts of composite or deformed creatures. Those,
however, alone continued to exist which were fitted by nature to find
support, to propagate, and to protect themselves from danger. Romantic
creatures, such as centaurs of chimæras, can never have existed here,
because the beings of which they are compounded would require
conditions of life [1207] altogether different.
[C. Mankind.]
[(1) Origin of the human race.]
Aiming, as the Epicureans did, at explaining the origin of men and
animals in a purely natural manner, they likewise tried to form an
idea, equally according to nature, of the original state and historical
development of the human race. In this attempt they ignored all
legendary notions, and, notwithstanding their leaning towards
materialism, they on the whole advocated perfectly sound views. The men
of early times, so thought Lucretius, were stronger and more powerful
than the men of to-day. Rude and ignorant as beasts, they lived in the
woods in a perpetual state of warfare with the wild animals, without
justice or society. [1208] The first and most important step in a
social direction was the discovery of fire, the learning to build huts,
and to clothe themselves in skins; then began marriage and domestic
life, [1209] and speech, originally not a matter of convention, but,
like the noises of animals, the natural expression of thoughts and
feelings, was developed. [1210] The older the human race grew, the more
they learned of the arts and skill which minister to the preservation
and enjoyment of life. These arts were first learnt by experience,
under the pressure of nature, or the compulsion of want. What had thus
been discovered was completed by reflection, the more gifted preceding
the rest as teachers. [1211] In exactly the same way civil society was
developed. Individuals built strongholds, and made themselves rulers.
In time the power of kings aroused envy, and they were massacred. To
crush the anarchy which then arose, magistrates were chosen, and order
established by penal laws. [1212] It will subsequently be seen that
Epicurus explained religion in the same way by natural growth.
[(2) The soul.]
The apotheosis of nature, which has been apparent in Epicurus’s whole
view of history, becomes specially prominent in his treatment of
psychology. This treatment could, after all that has been said, be only
purely materialistic. The soul, like every other real being, is a body.
In support of this view the Epicureans appealed to the mutual relations
of the body and the soul, agreeing on this point with the Stoics.
[1213] The body of the soul, however, consists of the finest, lightest,
and most easily moved atoms, as is manifest from the speed of thought,
from the instantaneous dissolution of the soul after death, and,
moreover, from the fact that the soulless body is as heavy as the body
in which there is a soul. [1214] Hence Epicurus, again agreeing with
the Stoics, describes the soul as a material resembling fire and air,
[1215] or, more accurately, as composed of four elements, fire, air,
vapour, and a fourth nameless element. It consists of the finest atoms,
and is the cause of feeling, [1216] and according as one or other of
these elements preponderates, the character of man is of one or the
other kind. [1217] Like the Stoics, Epicurus believed that the
soul-element is received by generation from the parents’ souls, [1218]
and that it is spread over the whole body, [1219] growing as the body
grows. [1220] At the same time he makes a distinction somewhat similar
to that made by the Stoics in their doctrine of the sovereign part of
the soul (ἡγεμονικόν). [1221] Only the irrational part of the soul is
diffused as a principle of life over the whole body; the rational part
has its seat in the breast. [1222] To the rational part belong mental
activity, sensation, and perception, the motion of the will and the
mind, and in this latter sense life itself; both parts together make up
one being, yet they may exist in different conditions. The mind may be
cheerful whilst the body and the irrational soul feel pain, or the
reverse may be the case. It is even possible that portions of the
irrational soul may be lost by the mutilation of the body, without
detriment to the rational soul, or consequently to life. [1223] When,
however, the connection between soul and body is fully severed, then
the soul can no longer exist. Deprived of the surrounding shelter of
the body, its atoms are dispersed in a moment, owing to their
lightness; and the body in consequence, being unable to exist without
the soul, goes over into corruption. [1224] If this view appears to
hold out the most gloomy prospect for the future, Epicurus considers
that it cannot really be so. With life every feeling of evil ceases,
[1225] and the time when we shall no longer exist affects us just as
little as the time before we existed. [1226] Nay, more, he entertains
the opinion that his teaching alone can reconcile us to death by
removing all fear of the nether world and its terrors. [1227]
Allowing that many of these statements are natural consequences of the
principles of Epicurus, the distinction between a rational and an
irrational soul must, nevertheless, at first sight seem strange in a
system so thoroughly materialistic as was that of the Epicureans. And
yet this distinction is not stranger than the corresponding parts of
the Stoic teaching. If the Stoic views may be referred to the
distinction which they drew in morals between the senses and the
reason, not less are the Epicurean ethics marked by the same contrast
between the general and the sensuous side of the mind. Hence Epicurus
shares the Stoic belief in an ethereal origin of the human race; [1228]
and although this belief as at first expressed only implies that man,
like other living beings, is composed of ethereal elements, yet there
is connected with it the distinction already discussed in the case of
the Stoics between the higher and the lower parts of man, which
ultimately comes to be simply another mode of expressing the difference
between mind and matter.
[(3) Sensation.]
Among the phenomena of the soul’s life sensation is made to harmonise
with the general principles of the Epicurean view of nature by the aid
of Democritus’s doctrine of atom-pictures (εἴδωλα). From the surface of
bodies—this is the pith of that doctrine—the finest possible particles
are constantly being thrown off, which by virtue of their fineness
traverse the furthest spaces in an infinitely short time, hurrying
through the void. [1229] Many of these exhalations are arrested by some
obstacle soon after coming forth, or are otherwise thrown into
confusion. In the case of others the atoms for a long time retain the
same position and connection which they had in bodies themselves, thus
presenting a picture of things, and only lacking corporeal solidity. As
these pictures are conveyed to the soul by the various organs of sense,
our impressions of things arise. [1230] Even those impressions, which
have no corresponding real object, must be referred to such pictures
present in the soul. [1231] For often pictures last longer than things
themselves; [1232] and often by a casual combination of atoms pictures
are formed in the air resembling no one single thing. Sometimes, too,
pictures of various kinds are combined on their way to the senses;
thus, for instance, the notion of a Centaur is caused by the union of
the picture of a man with that of a horse, not only in our imagination,
but already previously in the atom-picture. [1233] If, therefore,
sensation distorts or imperfectly represents real objects, it must be
explained as being due to some change or mutilation in the
atom-pictures before they reach our senses. [1234]
In thus explaining mental impressions, the Epicureans do not allow
themselves to be disturbed by the fact that we can recall at pleasure
the ideas of all possible things. The cause of this power was rather
supposed to be the circumstance that we are always surrounded by an
innumerable number of atom-pictures, none of which we perceive unless
our attention is directed to them. Likewise the seeming motion of forms
which we behold in dreams is explained by the hasty succession of
similar atom-pictures, appearing to us as changes of one and the same
picture. [1235] But besides receiving pictures supplied from without,
spontaneous motion with regard to these pictures takes place on our
part, a motion connected in the first instance with the soul’s motion
when it receives the outward impression, but not to be regarded as a
simple continuation thereof. This independent motion gives rise to
opinion, and hence opinion is not so necessary or so universally true
as feeling. It may agree with feeling, or it may not agree with it. It
may be true or it may be false. [1236] The conditions of its being true
or false have been previously investigated. [1237]
[(4) Will.]
Impressions also give rise to will and action, the soul being set in
motion by impressions, and this motion extending from the soul to the
body. [1238] Into the nature of will, however, Epicurus does not appear
to have instituted a more careful psychological investigation. It was
enough for him to assert the freedom of the will. This freedom he
considers absolutely indispensable, if anything we do is to be
considered our own, unless we are prepared to despair of moral
responsibility altogether, and to resign ourselves to a comfortless and
inexorable necessity. [1239] To make freedom possible, Epicurus had
introduced accident into the motion of atoms, and for the same reason
he denies the truth of disjunctive propositions which apply to the
future. [1240] In the latter respect, he, no doubt, only attacked the
material truth of two clauses, without impugning the formal accuracy of
the disjunction, [1241] i.e. he did not deny that of two contradictory
cases either one or the other must happen, nor did he deny the truth of
saying: To-morrow Epicurus will either be alive or not alive. But he
disputed the truth of each clause taken by itself. He denied the truth
of the sentence, Epicurus will be alive; and equally that of its
contradictory, Epicurus will not be alive; on the ground that the one
or the other statement only becomes true by the actual realisation of
an event at present uncertain. [1242] For this he deserves little
blame. Our real charge against him is that he did not more thoroughly
investigate the nature of the will and the conception of freedom, and
that he treats the subject of the soul as scantily and superficially as
he had treated the subject of nature.
CHAPTER XVIII.
VIEWS OF EPICURUS ON RELIGION.
[A. Criticism of the gods and the popular faith.]
Satisfied with the results of his own enquiries into nature, Epicurus
hoped by his view of the causes of things not only to displace the
superstitions of a polytheistic worship, but also to uproot the
prejudice in favour of Providence. Indeed, these two objects were
placed by him on exactly the same footing. So absurd did he consider
the popular notions respecting the Gods, that instead of blaming those
who attacked them, [1243] he believed it impious to acquiesce in them.
Religion being, according to Lucretius, the cause of the greatest
evils, [1244] he who displaces it to make way for rational views of
nature deserves praise as having overcome the most dangerous enemy of
mankind. All the language of Epicurus in disparagement of the art of
poetry applies in a still higher degree to the religious errors
fostered by poetry. [1245] Nor is it better with belief in Providence
than with the popular faith. This belief is also included in the
category of romance; [1246] and the doctrine of fatalism, which was the
Stoic form for the same belief, was denounced as even worse than the
popular faith. [1247] For how, asks the Epicurean, could divine
Providence have created a world in which evil abounds, in which virtue
often fares ill, whilst vice is triumphant? How could a world have been
made for the sake of man, when man can only inhabit a very small
portion of it? How could nature be intended to promote man’s well-being
when it so often imperils his life and labour, and sends him into the
world more helpless than any animal? How can we form a conception of
beings ruling over an infinite universe, and everywhere present to
administer everything in every place? [1248] What could have induced
these beings to create a world, and how and whence could they have
known how to create it, had not nature supplied them with an example?
[1249] In fine, how could God be the happy Being He must be if the
whole burden of caring for all things and all events lay upon Him, or
He were swayed to and fro together with the body of the world? [1250]
Or how could we feel any other feeling than that of fear in the
presence of such a God who troubles himself about everything? [1251]
[B. The gods according to Epicurus.]
[(1) Reasons for his belief.]
With the denial of the popular Gods, the denial of demons, [1252] of
course, goes hand in hand; and, together with Providence, the need of
prayer [1253] and of prophecy is at the same time negatived. [1254] All
these notions, according to Epicurus, are the result of ignorance and
fear. Pictures seen in dreams have been confounded with real
existences; regularity of motion in the heavenly bodies has been
mistaken by the ignorant for the work of God; events which accidentally
happened in combination with others have been regarded as portents;
terrific natural phenomena, storms and earthquakes, have engendered in
men’s minds the fear of higher powers. [1255] Fear is therefore the
basis of religion; [1256] and, on the other hand, freedom from fear is
the primary object aimed at by philosophy.
For all that, Epicurus was unwilling to renounce belief in the Gods,
[1257] nor is it credible that this unwillingness was simply a yielding
to popular opinion. [1258] The language used by the Epicureans
certainly gives the impression of sincerity; and the time was past when
avowed atheism was attended with danger. Atheism would have been as
readily condoned in the time of Epicurus as the deism which denied most
unreservedly the popular faith. It is, however, possible to trace the
causes which led Epicurus to believe that there are Gods. There was
first the general diffusion of a belief in Gods which appeared to him
to establish the truth of this belief, and hence he declared the
existence of Gods to be something directly certain, and grounded on a
primary notion (πρόληψις). [1259] Moreover, with his materialistic
theory of knowledge he no doubt supposed that the primary notion which
convinces us of the existence of Gods arises from the actual
contemplation of divine beings, and from the perception of those
atom-pictures from which Democritus had already deduced the belief in
Gods. [1260] And in addition to these theoretical reasons, Epicurus had
also another, half æsthetical, half religious—the wish to see his ideal
of happiness realised in the person of the Gods, [1261] and it is this
ideal which determines the character of all his notions respecting
them. His Gods are therefore, throughout, human beings. Religious
belief only knows beings such as these, or, as Epicurus expresses it,
only such beings come before us in those pictures of the Gods which
present themselves to our minds, sometimes in sleep, sometimes when we
are awake. Reflection, too, convinces us that the human form is the
most beautiful, that to it alone reason belongs, and that it is the
most appropriate form for perfectly happy beings. [1262] Epicurus even
went so far as to attribute to the Gods difference of sex. [1263] At
the same time everything must be eliminated which is not appropriate to
a divine being.
[(2) Nature of the Epicurean gods.]
The two essential characteristics of the Gods, according to Epicurus,
are immortality and perfect happiness. [1264] Both of these
characteristics would be impaired were we to attribute to the bodies of
the Gods the same dense corporeity which belongs to our own. We must,
therefore, only assign to them a body analogous to our body, ethereal,
and consisting of the finest atoms. [1265] Such bodies would be of
little use in a world like ours. In fact, they could not live in any
world without being exposed to the temporal ruin which will in time
overwhelm it, and, meantime, to a state of fear, which would mar their
bliss. Epicurus, therefore, assigns the space between the worlds for
their habitation, where, as Lucretius remarks, troubled by no storms,
they live under a sky ever serene. [1266]
Nor can these Gods be supposed to care for the world and the affairs of
men, else their happiness would be marred by the most distressing
occupation; but perfectly free from care and trouble, and absolutely
regardless of the world, in eternal contemplation of their unchanging
perfection, they enjoy the most unalloyed happiness. [1267] The view
which the School formed to itself of this happiness we learn from
Philodemus. [1268] The Gods are exempt from sleep, sleep being a
partial death, and not needed by beings who live without any exertion.
And yet he believes that they require nourishment, though this must, of
course, be of a kind suited to their nature. They also need dwellings,
[1269] since every being requires some place wherein to dwell. Were
powers of speech to be refused to them, they would be deprived of the
highest means of enjoyment—the power of conversing with their equals.
Philodemus thinks it probable they use the Greek or some other closely
allied language. [1270] In short, he imagines the Gods to be a society
of Epicurean philosophers, who have everything that they can
desire—everlasting life, no care, and perpetual opportunities of sweet
converse. Only such Gods,—the Epicureans thought, [1271]—need not be
feared. Only such Gods are free and pure, and worshipped because of
this very perfection. [1272] Moreover, these Gods are innumerable. If
the number of mortal beings is infinite, the law of counterpoise
requires that the number of immortal beings must not be less. [1273] If
we have only the idea of a limited number of Gods, it is because, owing
to their being so much alike, [1274] we confound in our minds the
innumerable pictures of the Gods which are conveyed to our souls.
Priding themselves, in contrast to the Stoics, on their agreement by
means of this theology with the anthropomorphic views of the popular
belief, and even outdoing polytheism in the assumption of innumerable
Gods, [1275] the Epicureans were willing to join in the customary
services of religion, [1276] without being nearly so anxious as the
Stoics to prove themselves in harmony with the popular creed. Whilst
the Stoics in their anxiety to do this had plunged head over heels into
allegory, no such tendency is observed on the part of the Epicureans.
Only the poet of the School gives a few allegorical interpretations of
mythical ideas, and he does it with more taste and skill than is usual
with the Stoics. [1277] On other points the Epicureans, not excluding
Lucretius, observe towards the popular faith a negative attitude, that
of opposing it by explanations; and by this attitude, without doubt,
they rendered one of the most important services to humanity.
CHAPTER XIX.
THE MORAL SCIENCE OF THE EPICUREANS. GENERAL PRINCIPLES.
[A. Pleasure.]
[(1) Pleasure the highest good.]
Natural science is intended to overcome the prejudices which stand in
the way of happiness; moral science to give positive instruction as to
the nature and means of attaining to happiness. The speculative parts
of the Epicurean system had already worked out the idea that reality
belongs only to individual things, and that all general order must be
referred to the accidental harmony of individual forces. The same idea
is now met with in the sphere of morals, individual feeling being made
the standard, and individual well-being the object of all human
activity. Natural science, beginning with external phenomena, went back
to the secret principles of these phenomena, accessible only to
thought. It led from an apparently accidental movement of atoms to a
universe of regular motions. Not otherwise was the course followed by
Epicurus in moral science. Not content with human feelings alone, nor
with selfishly referring everything to the individual taken by himself
alone, that science, in more accurately defining the conception of
well-being, ascertained that the same can only be found by rising
superior to feelings and purely individual aims, in short by that very
process of referring consciousness to itself and its universal being,
which the Stoics declared to be the only path to happiness. It is for
us now to portray this development of the Epicurean philosophy in its
most prominent features.
The only unconditional good, according to Epicurus, is pleasure; the
only unconditional evil is pain. [1278] No proof of this proposition
seemed to him to be necessary; it rests on a conviction supplied by
nature herself, and is the ground and basis of all our doing and not
doing. [1279] If proof, however, were required, he appealed to the fact
that all living beings from the first moment of their existence pursue
pleasure and avoid pain, [1280] and that consequently pleasure is a
natural good, and the normal condition of every being. [1281] Hence
follows the proposition to which Epicurus in common with all the
philosophers of pleasure appealed, that pleasure must be the object of
life.
[(2) Freedom from pain.]
At the same time, this proposition was restricted in the Epicurean
system by several considerations. In the first place, neither pleasure
nor pain is a simple thing. There are many varieties and degrees of
pleasure and pain, and the case may occur in which pleasure has to be
secured by the loss of other pleasures, or even by pain, or in which
pain can only be avoided by submitting to another pain, or at the cost
of some pleasure. In this case Epicurus would have the various feelings
of pleasure and pain carefully weighed, and in consideration of the
advantages and disadvantages which they confer, would under
circumstances advise the good to be treated as an evil, and the evil as
a good. He would have pleasure forsworn if it would entail a greater
corresponding pain, and pain submitted to if it holds out the prospect
of greater pleasure. [1282] He also agrees with Plato in holding that
every positive pleasure presupposes a want, i.e. a pain which it
proposes to remove; and hence he concludes that the real aim and object
of all pleasure consists in obtaining freedom from pain, [1283] and
that the good is nothing else but emancipation from evil. [1284] By a
Cyrenaic neither repose of soul nor freedom from pain, but a gentle
motion of the soul or positive pleasure was proposed as the object of
life; and hence happiness was not made to depend on man’s general state
of mind, but on the sum-total of his actual enjoyments. But Epicurus,
advancing beyond this position, recognised both the positive and the
negative side of pleasures, both pleasure as repose, and pleasure as
motion. [1285] Both aspects of pleasure, however, do not stand on the
same footing in his system. On the contrary, the essential and
immediate cause of happiness is repose of mind—ἀταραξία. Positive
pleasure is only an indirect cause of ἀταραξία in that it removes the
pain of unsatisfied craving. [1286] This mental repose, however,
depends essentially on the character of a man’s mind, just as
conversely positive pleasure in systems so materialistic must depend on
sensuous attractions. It was consistent, therefore, on the part of
Aristippus to consider bodily gratification the highest pleasure; and
conversely Epicurus was no less consistent in subordinating it to
gratification of mind.
[B. Intellectual happiness.]
In calling pleasure the highest object in life, says Epicurus, we do
not mean the pleasures of profligacy, nor indeed sensual enjoyments at
all, but the freedom of the body from pain, and the freedom of the soul
from disturbance. Neither feasts nor banquets, neither the lawful nor
unlawful indulgence of the passions, nor the joys of the table, make
life happy, but a sober judgment, investigating the motives for action
and for inaction, and dispelling those greatest enemies of our peace,
prejudices. The root from which it springs,
[(1) Intelligence.]
and, therefore, the highest good, is intelligence. [1287] It is
intelligence that leaves us free to acquire possession thereof, without
being ever too early or too late. [1288] Our indispensable wants are
simple, little being necessary to ensure freedom from pain; other
things only afford change in enjoyment, by which the quantity is not
increased, or else they rest on a mere sentiment. [1289] The little we
need may be easily attained. Nature makes ample provision for our
happiness, would we only receive her gifts thankfully, not forgetting
what she gives in thinking what we desire. [1290] He who lives
according to nature is never poor; the wise man living on bread and
water has no reason to envy Zeus; [1291] chance has little hold on him;
with him judgment is everything, [1292] and if that be right, he need
trouble himself but little about external mishaps. [1293] Not even
bodily pain appeared to Epicurus so irresistible as to be able to cloud
the wise man’s happiness. Although he regards as unnatural the Stoic’s
insensibility to pain, [1294] still he is of opinion that the wise man
may be happy on the rack, and can smile at pains the most violent,
exclaiming in the midst of torture, How sweet! [1295] A touch of forced
sentiment may be discerned in the last expression, and a trace of
self-satisfied exaggeration is manifest even in the beautiful language
of the dying philosopher on the pains of disease. [1296] Nevertheless,
the principle involved is based in the spirit of the Epicurean
philosophy, and borne out by the testimony of the founder. The main
thing, according to Epicurus, is not the state of the body, but the
state of the mind; bodily pleasure being of short duration, and having
much about it to unsettle; mental enjoyments only being pure and
incorruptible. For the same reason mental sufferings are more severe
than those of the body, since the body only suffers from present ills,
whilst the soul feels those past and those to come. [1297] In a life of
limited duration the pleasures of the flesh never attain their
consummation. Mind only, by consoling us for the limited nature of our
bodily existence, can produce a life complete in itself, and not
standing in need of unlimited duration. [1298]
[(2) Reasons for rising superior to the senses.]
At the same time, the Epicureans, if consistent with their principles,
could not deny that bodily pleasure is the earlier form, and likewise
the ultimate source, of all pleasure, and neither Epicurus nor his
favourite pupil Metrodorus shrank from making this admission; Epicurus
declaring that he could form no conception of the good apart from
enjoyments [1299] of the senses; Metrodorus asserting that everything
good has reference to the belly. [1300] For all that the Epicureans did
not feel themselves driven to give up the pre-eminence which they
claimed for goods of the soul over those of the body. Did even the
Stoics, notwithstanding the grossness of their theory of knowledge,
ever abate their demand for a knowledge of conceptions; or cease to
subordinate the senses to reason, although they built their theory of
morals on nature? But all definite character has vanished from these
intellectual joys and pains. The only distinctive feature which they
possess is the addition either of memory, or of hope, or of fear [1301]
to the present feeling of pleasure or pain; and their greater
importance is simply ascribed to the greater force or duration
belonging to ideal feelings as compared with the attractions which
momentarily impress the senses. [1302] Incidentally the remembrance of
philosophic discourses is mentioned [1303] as a counterpoise to bodily
pain; properly speaking, mental pleasures and pains are not different
from other pleasures in kind, but only in degree, by reason of their
being stronger and more enduring. Accordingly Epicurus cannot escape
the admission that we have no cause for rejecting gross and carnal
enjoyments if these can liberate us from the fear of higher powers, of
death, and of sufferings; [1304] and thus the only consolation he can
offer in pain is the uncertain one that the most violent pains either
do not last long, or else put an end to life; and the less violent ones
ought to be endured since they do not exclude a counterbalancing
pleasure. [1305] Hence victory over the impression of the moment must
be won, not so much by mental force stemming the tide of feeling, as by
a proper estimate of the conditions and actions of the senses.
[(3) Virtue.]
In no other way can the necessity of virtue be established in the
Epicurean system. Agreeing with the strictest moralists, so far as to
hold that virtue can be as little separated from happiness as happiness
from virtue, [1306] having even the testimony of opponents as to the
purity and integrity of his moral teaching, which in its results
differed in no wise from that of the Stoics; [1307] Epicurus,
nevertheless, holds a position of strong contrast to the Stoics in
respect of the grounds on which his moral theory is based. To demand
virtue for its own sake seemed to him a mere phantom of the
imagination. Those only who make pleasure their aim have a real object
in life. [1308] Virtue has only a conditional value [1309] as a means
to happiness; or, as it is otherwise expressed, [1310] Virtue taken by
itself does not render a man happy, but the pleasure arising from the
exercise of virtue. This pleasure the Epicurean system does not seek in
the consciousness of duty fulfilled, or of virtuous action, but in the
freedom from disquiet, fear, and dangers, which follows as a
consequence from virtue. Wisdom and intelligence contribute to
happiness by liberating us from the fear of the Gods and of death, by
making us independent of immoderate passions and vain desires, by
teaching us to bear pain as something subordinate and passing, and by
pointing the way to a more cheerful and natural life. [1311]
Self-control aids, in that it points out the attitude to be assumed
towards pleasure and pain, so as to receive the maximum of enjoyment
and the minimum of suffering; [1312] valour, in that it enables us to
overcome fear and pain; [1313] justice, in that it makes life possible
without that fear of Gods and men, which ever haunts the transgressor.
[1314] To the Epicurean virtue is never an end in itself, but only a
means to an end lying beyond—a happy life—but withal a means so certain
and necessary, that virtue can neither be conceived without happiness,
nor happiness without virtue. However unnecessary it may seem, still
Epicurus would ever insist that an action to be right must be done not
according to the letter, but according to the spirit of the law, not
simply from regard to others, or by compulsion, but from delight in
what is good. [1315]
[C. The wise man.]
The same claims were advanced by Epicurus on behalf of his wise man as
the Stoics had urged on behalf of theirs. Not only does he attribute to
him a control over pain, in nothing inferior to the Stoic insensibility
of feeling, but he endeavours himself to describe the wise man’s life
as most perfect and satisfactory in itself. Albeit not free from
emotions, and in particular susceptible to the higher feelings of the
soul such as compassion, the wise man finds his philosophic activity in
no wise thereby impaired. [1316] Without despising enjoyment, he is
altogether master of his desires, and knows how to restrain them by
intelligence, so that they never exercise a harmful influence on life.
He alone has an unwavering certainty of conviction; [1317] he alone
knows how to do the right thing in the right way; he alone, as
Metrodorus observes, [1318] knows how to be thankful. Nay, more, he is
so far exalted above ordinary men, that Epicurus promises his pupils
that, by carefully observing his teaching, they will dwell as Gods
among men; [1319] so little can destiny influence him, that he calls
him happy under all circumstances. [1320] Happiness may, indeed, depend
on certain external conditions; it may even be allowed that the
disposition to happiness is not found in every nature, nor in every
person; [1321] but still, when it is found, its stability is sure, nor
can time affect its duration. For wisdom—so Epicurus and the Stoics
alike believed—is indestructible, [1322] and the wise man’s happiness
can never be increased by time. A life, therefore, bounded by time can
be quite as complete as one not so bounded. [1323]
Different as are the principles and the tone of the systems of the
Stoics and of Epicurus, one and the same tendency may yet be traced in
both—the tendency which characterises all the post-Aristotelian
philosophy—the desire to place man in a position of absolute
independence by emancipating him from connection with the external
world, and by awakening in him the consciousness of the infinite
freedom of thought. [1324]
CHAPTER XX.
THE EPICUREAN ETHICS CONTINUED: SPECIAL POINTS.
[A. The individual.]
The general principles already laid down determine likewise the
character of particular points in the moral science of the Epicureans.
Epicurus, it is true, never developed his moral views to a systematic
theory of moral actions and states, however much his pupils,
particularly in later times, busied themselves with morality and
special points in a system of morals. [1325] Moreover, his fragmentary
statements and precepts are very imperfectly recorded. Still, all that
is known corresponds with the notion which we must form in accordance
with those general views. All the practical rules given by Epicurus aim
at conducting man to happiness by controlling passions and desires. The
wise man is easily satisfied. He sees that little is necessary for
supplying the wants of nature, and for emancipating from pain; that
imaginary wealth knows no limit, whereas the riches required by nature
may be easily acquired; [1326] that the most simple nourishment affords
as much enjoyment as the most luxurious, and is at the same time far
more conducive to health; [1327] that therefore the restriction of
wants rather than the increase of possessions makes really rich; [1328]
and that he who is not satisfied with little will never be satisfied at
all. [1329] He therefore can like Epicurus live upon bread and water,
[1330] and at the same time think himself as happy as Zeus. [1331] He
eschews passions which disturb peace of mind and the repose of life;
considering it foolish to throw away the present in order to obtain an
uncertain future, or to sacrifice life itself for the means of life,
seeing he can only once enjoy it. [1332] He therefore neither gives way
to passionate love, nor to forbidden acts of profligacy. [1333] Fame he
does not covet; and for the opinions of men he cares only so far as to
wish not to be despised, since being despised would expose him to
danger. [1334] Injuries he can bear with calmness. [1335] He cares not
what may happen to him after death; [1336] nor envies any one the
possessions which he does not himself value. [1337]
It has been already seen how Epicurus thought to rise above pains, and
to emancipate himself from the fear of the Gods and death. [1338] And
it has been further noticed that he thinks to secure by means of his
principles the same independence and happiness which the Stoics aspired
to by means of theirs. But whilst the Stoics hoped to attain this
independence by crushing the senses, Epicurus was content to restrain
and regulate them. Desires he would not have uprooted, but he would
have them brought into proper proportion to the collective end and
condition of life, into the equilibrium necessary for perfect repose of
mind. Hence, notwithstanding his own simplicity, Epicurus is far from
disapproving, under all circumstances, of a fuller enjoyment of life.
The wise man will not live as a Cynic or a beggar. [1339] Care for
business he will not neglect; only he will not trouble himself too much
about it, and will prefer the business of education to any and every
other. [1340] Nor will he despise the attractions of art, although he
is satisfied when obliged to do without them. [1341] In short, his
self-sufficiency will not consist in using little, but in needing
little; and it is this freedom from wants which adds flavour to his
more luxurious enjoyments. [1342] His attitude to death is the same.
Not fearing death, rather seeking it when he has no other mode of
escaping unendurable suffering, he will resort to suicide if necessary,
but the cases will be rare, because he has learnt to be happy under all
bodily pains. The Stoic’s recommendation of suicide finds no favour
with him. [1343]
[B. Civil society and the family.]
[(1) Civil society.]
However self-sufficing the wise man may be, still Epicurus will not
separate him from connection with others. Not, indeed, that he believed
with the Stoics in the natural relationship of all rational beings.
[1344] Yet even he could form no idea of human life except in
connection with human society. He does not, however, assign the same
value to all forms of social life. Civil society and the state have for
him the least attraction. Civil society is only an external association
for the purpose of protection. Justice reposes originally on a contract
entered into for purposes of mutual security. [1345] Laws are made for
the sake of the wise, not to prevent their committing, but to prevent
their suffering injustice. [1346] Law and justice are not, therefore,
binding for their own sake, but for the general good; nor is injustice
to be condemned for its own sake, but only because the offender can
never be free from fear of discovery and punishment. [1347] There is
not, therefore, any such thing as universal, unchangeable justice. The
claims of justice only extend to a limited number of beings and
nations—those, in fact, which are able and willing to enter into the
social compact. And the particular applications of justice which
constitute positive right differ in different cases, and change with
circumstances. What is felt to be conducive to mutual security must
pass for justice, and whenever a law is seen to be inexpedient it is no
longer binding. [1348] The wise man will therefore only enter into
political life in case and in as far as this is necessary for his own
safety. Sovereign power is a good, inasmuch as it protects from harm.
He who pursues it, without thereby attaining this object, acts most
foolishly. [1349] Since private individuals live as a rule much more
quietly and safely than statesmen, it was natural that the Epicureans
should be averse to public affairs; public life, after all, is a
hindrance to what is the real end-in-chief—wisdom and happiness. [1350]
Their watchword is Λάθε βιώσας. [1351] To them the golden mean seemed
by far the most desirable lot in life. [1352] They only advise citizens
to take part in public affairs when special circumstances render it
necessary, [1353] or when an individual has such a restless nature that
he cannot be content with the quiet of private life. [1354] Otherwise
they are too deeply convinced of the impossibility of pleasing the
masses to wish even to make the attempt. [1355] For the same reason
they appear to have been partisans of monarchy. The stern and
unflinching moral teaching of the Stoics had found its political
expression in the unbending republican spirit, so often encountered at
Rome. Naturally the soft and timid spirit of the Epicureans took
shelter under a monarchical constitution. Of their political principles
one thing at least is known, that they did not consider it degrading
for a wise man to pay court to princes, and under all circumstances
they recommended unconditional obedience to the powers that be. [1356]
[(2) Family life.]
Family life is said to have been deprecated by Epicurus equally with
civil life. [1357] Stated thus baldly, this is an exaggeration. It
appears, however, to be established, that Epicurus believed it to be
generally better for the wise man to forego marriage and the rearing
of children, since he would thereby save himself many disturbances.
[1358] It is also quite credible that he declared the love of children
towards parents to be no inborn feeling. [1359] This view is, after
all, only a legitimate consequence of his materialism; but it did not
oblige him to give up parental love altogether. Nay, it is asserted of
him that he was anything but a stranger to family affections. [1360]
[C. Friendship.]
The highest form of social life was considered by Epicurus to be
friendship—a view which is peculiar in a system that regarded the
individual as the atom of society. Such a system naturally attributes
more value to a connection with others freely entered upon and based on
individual character and personal inclination, than to one in which a
man finds himself placed without any choice, as a member of a society
founded on nature or history. The basis, however, on which the
Epicurean friendship rests is very superficial; regard is mainly had to
its advantages, and in some degree to the natural effects of common
enjoyments; [1361] but it is also treated in such a way, that its
scientific imperfection has no influence on its moral importance. Only
one section of the School, and that not the most consistent, maintained
that friendship is pursued in the first instance for the sake of its
own use and pleasure, but that it subsequently becomes an unselfish
love. [1362] The assumption that among the wise there exists a tacit
agreement requiring them to love one another as much as they love
themselves, is clearly only a lame shift. [1363] Still, the Epicureans
were of opinion that a grounding of friendship on motives of utility
was not inconsistent with holding it in the highest esteem. Friendly
connection with others affords so pleasant a feeling of security, that
it entails the most enjoyable consequences; and since this connection
can only exist when friends love one another as themselves, it follows
that self-love and the love of a friend must be equally strong. [1364]
Even this inference sounds forced, nor does it fully state the grounds
on which Epicurus’s view of the value of friendship reposes. That view,
in fact, was anterior to all the necessary props of the system. What
Epicurus requires is primarily enjoyment. The first conditions of such
enjoyment, however, are inward repose of mind, and the removal of fear
of disturbances. But Epicurus was far too effeminate and dependent on
externals to trust his own powers to satisfy these conditions. He
needed the support of others, not only to obtain their help in
necessity and trouble, and to console himself for the uncertainty of
the future, but still more, to make sure of himself and his principles
by having the approval of others, and thus obtaining an inward
satisfaction which he could not otherwise have had. Thus, the approval
of friends is to him the pledge of the truth of his convictions. In
sympathy with friends his mind first attains to a strength by which it
is able to rise above the changing circumstances of life. General ideas
are for him too abstract, too unreal. A philosopher who considers
individual beings as alone real, and perceptions as absolutely true,
cannot feel quite happy and sure of his ground, unless he finds others
to go with him. [1365] The enjoyment which he seeks is the enjoyment of
his own cultivated personality; and wherever this standard prevails,
particular value is attached to the personal relations of society, and
to friendship. [1366]
Hence Epicurus uses language on the value and necessity of friendship
which goes far beyond the grounds on which he bases it. Friendship is
unconditionally the highest of earthly goods. [1367] It is far more
important in whose company we eat and drink, than what we eat and
drink. [1368] In case of emergency, the wise man will not shrink from
suffering the greatest pains, even death, for his friend. [1369]
It is well known that the conduct of Epicurus and his followers was in
harmony with these professions. The Epicurean friendship is hardly less
celebrated than the Pythagorean. [1370] There may be an offensive
mawkishness and a tendency to mutual admiration apparent in the
relations of Epicurus to his friends, [1371] but of the sincerity of
his feelings there can be no doubt. One single expression referring to
the property of friends, [1372] is enough to prove what a high view
Epicurus held of friendship; and there is evidence to show that he
aimed at a higher improvement of his associates. [1373]
In other respects Epicurus bore the reputation of being a kind,
benevolent, and genial companion. [1374] His teaching bears the same
impress. It meets the inexorable sternness of the Stoics by insisting
on compassion and forgiveness, [1375] and supersedes its own egotism by
the maxim that it is more blessed to give than to receive. [1376] The
number of such maxims on record is, no doubt, limited; nevertheless,
the whole tone of the Epicurean School is a pledge of the humane and
generous character of its moral teaching. [1377] To this trait that
School owes its chief importance in history. By its theory of utility
it undoubtedly did much harm, partly exposing, partly helping forward,
the moral decline of the classic nations. Still, by drawing man away
from the outer world within himself, by teaching him to seek happiness
in the beautiful type of a cultivated mind content with itself, it
contributed quite as much as Stoicism, though after a gentler fashion,
to the development and the extension of a more independent and more
universal morality.
CHAPTER XXI.
THE EPICUREAN SYSTEM AS A WHOLE; ITS POSITION IN HISTORY.
[A. Inner connection of the Epicurean teaching.]
It has often been urged against the Epicurean philosophy, that it is
deficient both in coherence and consistency. Nor is this objection
without foundation. If we come to the study of it, looking for a
complete scientific groundwork, or a strictly logical development, we
shall certainly be disappointed. It is not difficult to show in what
contradictions Epicurus was involved; in professing to trust the senses
wholly and entirely, and yet going beyond the senses to the hidden
causes of things; in despising logical forms and laws, and at the same
time building up his whole system on deductions; in holding that all
sensations are true, but yet maintaining that a portion of the
realities which they represent as belonging to things is only relative.
Nor were these the only inconsistencies. At one time only natural
causes and laws are acknowledged, and any such thing as free will and
imagination is ignored; at another, by the doctrine of the swerving
aside of atoms and of the human will, unexplained caprice is elevated
to the rank of law. Pleasures and pains are all referred to bodily
sensations, and yet mental states are called higher and more important;
nay, more, even from a basis of selfishness rules and precepts of
humanity, justice, love, faithfulness, and devotion are deduced. It
ought not, however, to be forgotten that the Stoics, to whom the claim
of clear and consistent thought cannot be denied, were involved in
similar difficulties. They, like the Epicureans, built up a rational
system on a basis of the senses. They, too, constructed an ideal theory
of morals on a material groundwork of metaphysics. They, too, declared
that universal law is the only active power, whilst they maintained
that reality belongs only to the world of matter. They, too, deduced a
strict theory of virtue from the principle of self-preservation; not to
mention the inconsistent attitude which they assumed towards the
popular religion. To deny to the Stoics a unity and connectedness of
system, because of these scientific defects and inconsistencies, would
be felt to be doing them an injustice. And can Epicureanism be fairly
condemned, when its faults are essentially of the same kind (though a
little more obvious) as those of the Stoics, without a single
extenuating circumstance which can be urged on its behalf?
The strongest argument in favour of Epicureanism is that the
development of the system does not pretend to rest upon an intellectual
platform. Epicurus sought in philosophy a path to happiness, a school
of practical wisdom. For him knowledge has only a secondary value,
because it contributes to this end; indeed, both the tone and the
results of his intellectual activity were determined by a reference to
this end. In the case of the Stoics, however, it has been already seen
that the comparative subordination of Logic and Natural Science to
Moral Science, the going back to the older view of nature, the
vindication of the truth of the senses and of the reality of matter,
grew out of their peculiarly one-sided view of the scope of philosophy.
In the case of Epicurus the same results appear, and all the more
markedly, since Epicurus did not, like the Stoics, look for happiness
in subordination to a universal law, but in individual gratification or
pleasure. For him the recognition of a universal law had not the same
importance as for the Stoics; and consequently Epicurus did not feel
the same need of a scientific method as they had done. He could
therefore more exclusively content himself with the impressions of the
senses, and regard them as the only unfailing source of knowledge. No
necessity compelled him to advance from pure materialism to a view of
matter in which it is described as possessing a soul, and made to be
the bearer of reason. In fact, the more exclusively everything was
referred by him to mechanical causes, the more easily could he regard
the individual as independent of all superhuman forces in his pursuit
of happiness, and left entirely to himself and his natural powers. No
system in ancient times has so consistently carried out the mechanical
view of nature as that of the Atomists. None, therefore, afforded such
a strong metaphysical support to the Epicurean views of the absolute
worth of the individual. It was as natural for Epicurus to build on the
teaching of Democritus as for the Stoics to build on that of
Heraclitus. But Epicurus, influenced probably more by practical than by
scientific considerations, allowed himself, by his theory of the
swerving aside of atoms, to destroy the consistency of the theory of
Democritus. [1378]
It is hardly necessary to notice here how the distinctive features of
the Epicurean morals were developed out of their theory of happiness,
in contrast to the Stoic teaching. The happiness of Epicurus, however,
does not depend upon sensual gratification as such, but upon repose of
mind and cheerfulness of disposition. His theory of morals, therefore,
notwithstanding its foundation in pleasure, bears a nobler character,
which is seen in its language as to the wise man’s relations to the
pains and passions of the body, to poverty and riches, to life and
death, quite as much as in the mild humanity and the warm and hearty
appreciation of friendship by the Epicurean School. The rationalising
spirit of that School was undoubtedly opposed to any religious belief
which supposed an intervention of God in the course of the world, or
the world’s influence on man for weal or woe; but its appeal to the
senses without criticism placed no objection in the way of admitting
divine beings, from whom no such intervention need be feared. Nay,
more, this belief seemed the most natural ground for explaining the
popular belief in Gods. It satisfied an inborn and apparently keenly
felt want by supplying an appropriate object of devotion, and a
standard by which to test the accuracy of moral ideas. Hence,
notwithstanding scientific defects and contradictions, the whole system
of Epicurus bears a definite stamp. All the essential parts of that
system are subservient to one and the same end. The consistent working
out of a scientific view of nature is looked for in vain; but there is
no lack of consistency arising from an undeniable reference of the
individual to a definite and practical standard.
[B. Historical position of Epicureanism.]
[(1) Relation to Stoicism.]
Looking to the wider historical relations of the Epicurean system, the
first point which calls for remark is the relation of that system to
Stoicism. The contrast between the two Schools is obvious; attention
having been already drawn to it on all the more important points. It is
likewise well known that a constant rivalry existed between the two
Schools during their whole careers, that the Stoics looked down on the
Epicureans, and circulated many calumnies with respect to their morals.
For these statements proofs may be found in the preceding pages.
Nevertheless, the two Schools are related in so many respects, that
they can only be regarded as parallel links connected in one chain,
their differences being varieties where the same main tendency
[(a) Points of agreement.]
exists. Both agree in the general character of their philosophy. In
both practical considerations prevail over speculation. Both treat
natural science and logic as sciences subsidiary to ethics—natural
science especially in view of its bearing on religion. Both attach more
importance to natural science than to logic. If the Epicurean neglect
of scientific rules forms a contrast to the care which the Stoics
devoted thereto, both Schools are at least agreed in one thing—in
displaying greater independence in investigating the question as to a
test of truth. By both this standard was placed in the senses; and to
all appearances both were led to take this view by the same cause;
appeals to the senses being a consequence of their purely practical way
of looking at things. Both, moreover, employed against scepticism the
same practical postulate—the argument that knowledge must be possible,
or no certainty of action would be possible. They even agree in not
being content with the phenomena supplied by the senses as such,
although Epicurus as little approved of the Stoic theory of
irresistible impressions as he did of their logical analysis of the
forms of thought. With such appeals to the senses how could there be
any other result than materialism both in the Stoic and Epicurean
systems? But it is strange that the materialism in both Schools should
be based on the same definition of reality, corresponding with their
practical way of looking at things. [1379]
[(b) Points of difference.]
In the unfolding and detailed exposition of their materialistic views
the systems diverge, more widely, perhaps, than the philosophers
themselves, whose leading they professed to follow. These divergencies
appear particularly on the subject of nature, the Stoics regarding
nature as a system of design, the Epicureans explaining it as a
mechanical product. Whilst the Stoics adhered to fatalism, and saw God
everywhere, the Epicureans held the theory of atoms, and the theory of
necessity. Whilst the Stoics were speculatively orthodox, the
Epicureans were irreligious freethinkers. Both meet again in that
branch of natural science which is most important in respect of
morals—the part dealing with man. Both hold that the soul is a fiery
atmospheric substance. Even the proof for this view, derived from the
mutual influence of body and soul, is common to both. Both distinguish
between the higher and the lower parts of the soul, and thus even the
Epicureans in their psychology allow a belief in the superiority of
reason to the senses, and in the divine origin of the soul.
The arena of the warmest dispute between the two Schools is, however,
ethics. Yet, even on this ground, they are more nearly related than
appears at first sight. No greater contrast appears to be possible than
that between the Epicurean theory of pleasure and the Stoic theory of
virtue; and true it is that the two theories are diametrically
opposite. Nevertheless, not only are both aiming at one and the same
end—the happiness of mankind—but the conditions of happiness are also
laid down by both in the same spirit. According to Zeno virtue,
according to Epicurus pleasure, is the highest and only good; but the
former in making virtue consist essentially in withdrawal from the
senses or insensibility; the latter in seeking pleasure in repose of
mind or imperturbability, are expressing the same belief. Man can only
find unconditional and enduring satisfaction, when by means of
knowledge he attains to a condition of mind at rest with itself, and
also to an independence of external attractions and misfortunes. The
same unlimited appeal to personal truth is the common groundwork of
both systems. Both have expanded this idea under the same form—that of
the ideal wise man—for the most part with the same features. The wise
man of Epicurus is, as we have seen, superior to pain and want; he
enjoys an excellence which cannot be lost; and he lives among men a
very God in intelligence and happiness. Thus, when worked out into
details, the difference in the estimate of pleasure and virtue by the
Stoics and Epicureans seems to vanish. Neither the Stoic can separate
happiness from virtue, nor the Epicurean separate virtue from
happiness.
But, whilst recommending a living for society, both systems take no
real interest in social life. The recognition of a natural society
amongst mankind, of certain positive relations to state and family,
above all, a clear enunciation of a citizenship of the world,
characterise the Stoics. The pursuit of friendship, and the gentle
humanity of their ethics, characterise the Epicureans. Together with
these peculiarities one common feature cannot be ignored. Both have
renounced the political character of the old propriety of conduct, and
diverting their attention from public life, seek to find a basis for
universal morality in the simple relation of man to man.
[(c) The relationship greater than the difference.]
The united weight of all these points of resemblance is sufficient to
warrant the assertion that, notwithstanding their differences, the
Stoics and Epicureans stand on the same footing, and that the sharpness
of the contrast between them is owing to their laying hold of opposite
sides of one and the same principle. Abstract personality, and
self-consciousness developed into a generic idea, is for both the
highest aim. Compared with it not only the state of the senses, but the
scientific knowledge of things, and the realisation of moral ideas in a
commonwealth, are of minor importance. In this self-consciousness
happiness consists. To implant it in man is the object of philosophy,
and knowledge is only of value when and in as far as it ministers to
this end. The point of difference between the two Schools is their view
of the conditions under which that certainty of consciousness is
attained. The Stoics hope to attain it by the entire subordination of
the individual to universal law. The Epicureans, on the other hand, are
of opinion that man can only then be content in himself when he is
restrained by nothing external to himself. The first condition of
happiness consists in liberating individual life from all dependence on
others, and all disturbing causes. The former, therefore, make virtue,
the latter make personal well-being or pleasure, the highest good. By
the Epicureans, however, pleasure is usually conceived as of a purely
negative character, as being freedom from pain, and is referred to the
whole of human life. Hence it is always made to depend on the
moderation of desires, on indifference to outward ills, and the state
of the senses, on intelligence and actions conformable with
intelligence, in short, on virtue and wisdom. Hence, too, the
Epicureans arrive by a roundabout course at the same result as the
Stoics—the conviction that happiness can only be the lot of those who
are altogether independent of external things, and enjoy perfect inward
harmony.
[(2) Relation to Aristippus.]
Towards the older philosophy Epicureanism bears nearly the same
relation as Stoicism. True it is that Epicurus and his School would not
recognise their obligation to either one or other of their
predecessors. [1380] But far from disproving the influence of previous
systems on his own, this conduct only shows the personal vanity of
Epicurus. Epicureanism, like Stoicism, starts with the object of
bringing down science from metaphysical speculation to the simpler form
of a practical science of life. Both systems of philosophy, therefore,
turn away from Plato and Aristotle, whose labours they notably neglect,
to Socrates and those Socratic Schools which, without more extensive
meddling with science, are content with ethics. Circumstances, however,
led Epicurus to follow Aristippus as Zeno had followed Antisthenes. Not
only in morals did Epicurus derive his principle of pleasure from the
Cyrenaics; he likewise derived from them his theory of knowledge, that
the sense-impressions are the only source of ideas, and that every
feeling is true in itself. Nor can he altogether deny that feelings
only furnish direct information respecting our personal states, and
respecting the relative properties of things. With the Cyrenaics, too,
he taught that true pleasure can only be secured by philosophic
intelligence, and that this intelligence aims, before all things, at
liberating the mind from passion, fear, and superstition. At the same
time, he is by no means prepared to follow the Cyrenaics unreservedly.
His theory of morals differs, as has already been seen, from the
Cyrenaic theory in this important particular, that not sensual and
individual pleasure, but mental repose and the whole state of the mind
is regarded as the ultimate end, and the highest good in life. It was
thus impossible for him to be content, as the Cyrenaics were, with
feelings only, with individual and personal impressions. He could not
help requiring conviction which reposed on a real knowledge of things,
since only on such conviction can an equable and certain tone of mind
depend.
[(3) Relation to Democritus.]
Epicurus, therefore, not only differed from Aristippus with regard to
feelings, by referring all feelings to impressions from without, of
which he considered them true representations, but he felt himself
called upon to oppose the Cyrenaic contempt for theories of nature,
just as the Stoics had opposed the Cynic contempt for science. To the
physics of Democritus he looked for a scientific basis for his ethics,
just as they had looked to the system of Heraclitus. But the closer he
clung to Democritus, owing to the weakness of his own interest in
nature, the more it becomes apparent that his whole study of nature was
subservient to a moral purpose, and hence of a purely relative value.
Accordingly, he had not the least hesitation in setting consistency at
defiance, by assuming the swerving aside of atoms and the freedom of
the will. It is not only altogether improbable that Epicurus was but a
second edition of Democritus—for history knows of no such
repetitions—but as a matter of fact it is false. Closer observation
proves that even when the two philosophers agree in individual
statements, the meaning which they attach to these assertions and the
whole spirit of their systems are widely divergent. Democritus aims at
explaining natural phenomena by natural causes. He wishes, in short,
for a science of nature purely for its own sake. Epicurus wishes for a
view of nature which shall be able to avert disturbing influences from
man’s inner life. Natural science stands with him entirely in the
service of ethics. If in point of substance his system is borrowed from
another system, yet its whole position and treatment supposes an
entirely new view of things. The Socratic introspection, and the
Sophistic resolution of natural philosophy into personal rationalising,
are its historical antecedents; and it owes its existence to that
general dislike for pure theory, which constitutes the common
peculiarity of all the post-Aristotelian systems.
[(4) Relation to Aristotle and Plato.]
Excepting the systems named, Epicureanism, so far as is known, is
connected with no other previous system. Even its attack upon those
systems appears to have consisted of general dogmatic and superficial
statements. Still it must not be forgotten that Epicureanism
presupposes the line of thought originated by Socrates, not only as
found in the collateral Cyrenaic branch, but as found in the main line
of regular development by Plato and Aristotle. The view of Plato and
Aristotle, which distinguishes the immaterial essence from the sensible
appearance of things, and attributes reality only to the former, is
undoubtedly attacked by Epicurus as by Zeno, on metaphysical grounds.
Practically, however, he approaches very much nearer to this view in
all those points in which his teaching deviates from the Cyrenaic and
resembles that of the Stoics.
It has been observed on a former occasion that the indifference to the
immediate conditions of the senses, the withdrawal of the mind within
itself, the contentment with itself of the thinking subject, which
Epicurus no less than the Stoics and cotemporary Sceptics required, is
itself a consequence of the idealism of Plato and Aristotle. Even the
materialism of the post-Aristotelian systems, it is said, was by no
means a going back to the old pre-Socratic philosophy of nature, but a
one-sided practical apprehension of that idealism. These systems deny a
soul in nature or a soul in man, because they look exclusively to
consciousness and to personal activity for independence of the senses.
The correctness of this observation may be easily proved from the
Epicurean teaching, notwithstanding the severity and harshness of its
materialism. Why was it that Epicurus relentlessly banished from nature
all immaterial causes and all idea of purpose? And why did he confine
himself exclusively to a mechanical explanation of nature? Was it not
because he felt afraid that the admission of any other than material
causes would imperil the certainty of consciousness; because he feared
to lose the firm groundwork of reality by admitting invisible forces,
and to expose human life to influences beyond calculation if he allowed
anything immaterial? Yet in his view of life, how little does he adhere
to present facts, since his wise man is made to enjoy perfect happiness
by himself alone, independent of everything external. The same ideal is
reproduced in the Epicurean Gods. In their isolated contemplation of
themselves, what else do they resemble but the God of Aristotle, who,
aloof from all intermeddling with the world, meditates on himself
alone? No doubt the independent existence of the thinking mind is held
by Aristotle in a clear and dignified manner. By Epicurus it is
pourtrayed in a sensuous, and, therefore, a contradictory form. But the
connection of the views of both cannot be ignored. There is a similar
general relation between the Epicurean philosophy and that of Plato and
Aristotle. [1381] Little as the former can be compared with the latter
in breadth and depth, it must not, therefore, be regarded as an
intellectual monstrosity. Epicureanism is a tenable though one-sided
expression of a certain stage in the development of the intellect of
Greece.
PART IV.
THE SCEPTICS—PYRRHO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY.
CHAPTER XXII.
PYRRHO.
[A. Historical position of Scepticism.]
Stoicism and Epicureanism are alike in one respect: they commence the
pursuit of happiness with definite dogmatic statements. The Sceptic
Schools, however, attempt to reach the same end by denying every
dogmatic position. Varied as the paths may be, the result is in all
cases the same; happiness is made to consist in the exaltation of the
mind above all external objects, in the withdrawal of man within his
own thinking self. Moving in the same sphere
[(1) Its relation to cotemporary dogmatic systems.]
as the cotemporary dogmatic systems, the post-Aristotelian Scepticism
takes a practical view of the business of philosophy, and estimates the
value of theoretical enquiries by their influence on the state and
happiness of man. It moreover agrees with cotemporary systems in its
ethical view of life; the object at which it aims is the same as that
at which those systems aim, viz. repose of mind, and imperturbability.
It differs from them, none the less; for the Epicureans and Stoics made
mental repose to depend on a knowledge of the world and its laws,
whereas the Sceptics are of opinion that it can only be obtained by
despairing of all knowledge. Hence, with the former morality depends on
a positive conviction as to the highest Good; with the latter, morality
consists in indifference to all that appears as Good to men. Important
as this difference may be, it must not therefore be forgotten that
Scepticism generally revolves in the same sphere as Stoicism and
Epicureanism, and that in renouncing all claim to knowledge, and all
interest in the external world, it is only pushing to extremes that
withdrawal of man into himself which we have seen to be the common
feature of these Schools. Not only, therefore, do these three lines of
thought belong to one and the same epoch, but such is their internal
connection that they may be regarded as three branches of a common
stock.
[(2) Causes producing it.]
More than one point of departure was offered to Scepticism by the
earlier philosophy. The Megarian criticism and the Cynic teaching had
taken up a position subversive of all connection of ideas, and of all
knowledge. Pyrrho, too, had received from the School of Democritus an
impulse to doubt. [1382] In particular, the development of the Platonic
and Aristotelian speculations by those who were not able to follow
them, had made men mistrustful of all speculation, until they at last
doubted the possibility of all knowledge. Not seldom do Sceptical
theories follow times of great philosophical originality. A stronger
impulse was given in the sequel by the Stoic and Epicurean systems.
Related to Scepticism by their practical tone, it was natural that
these systems should afford fuel to Scepticism. At the same time the
unsatisfactory groundwork upon which they were built, and the contrast
between their moral and physical teaching, promoted destructive
criticism. If, according to the Stoics and Epicureans, the particular
and the universal elements in the personal soul, the isolation of the
individual as an independent atom, and his being merged in a
pantheistic universe, are contrasted without being reconciled; among
the Sceptics this contrast has given place to neutrality. Neither the
Stoic nor the Epicurean theory can claim our adherence; neither the
unconditional value of pleasure, nor yet the unconditional value of
virtue; neither the truth of the senses nor the truth of rational
knowledge; neither the Atomist’s view of nature, nor the Pantheistic
view as it found expression in Heraclitus. The only thing which remains
certain amid universal uncertainty is abstract personality content with
itself, personality forming at once the starting-point and the goal of
the two contending systems.
The important back-influence of Stoicism and Epicureanism upon
Scepticism may be best gathered from the fact that Scepticism only
attained a wide extension and a more comprehensive basis in the New
Academy after the appearance of those systems. Before that time its
leading features had been indeed laid down by Pyrrho, but they had
never been developed into a permanent School of Scepticism, nor given
rise to an expanded theory of doubt.
[(3) Pyrrho and his followers.]
Pyrrho was a native of Elis, [1383] and may therefore have early made
the acquaintance of the Elean and Megarian criticism—that criticism, in
fact, which was the precursor of subsequent Scepticism. It can,
however, hardly be true that Bryso was his instructor. [1384] To
Anaxarchus, a follower of Democritus, he attached himself, and
accompanied that philosopher with Alexander’s army as far as India.
[1385] Perhaps, however, he is less indebted to Anaxarchus for the
sceptical than for the ethical parts of his teaching. [1386] At a later
period he resided in his native city, [1387] honoured by his
fellow-citizens, [1388] but in poor circumstances, [1389] which he bore
with his characteristic repose of mind. [1390] He died, it would
appear, at an advanced age, [1391] between 275 and 270 B.C., leaving no
writings behind. [1392] Even the ancients, therefore, only knew his
teaching by that of his pupils, among whom Timon of Phlius was the most
distinguished. [1393] Besides Timon several other of his pupils are
known by name. [1394] His School, however, was short-lived. [1395] Soon
after Timon it seems to have become extinct. [1396] Those who were
disposed to be sceptical now joined the New Academy, towards whose
founder even Timon made no secret of his grudge. [1397]
[B. Teaching of Pyrrho.]
[(1) Impossibility of knowledge.]
The little which is known of Pyrrho’s teaching may be summed up in the
three following statements: We can know nothing as to the nature of
things: Hence the right attitude towards them is to withhold judgment:
The necessary result of suspending judgment is imperturbability. He who
will live happily—for happiness is the starting-point with the
Sceptics—must, according to Timon, take these things into
consideration: What is the nature of things? What ought our attitude to
things to be? What is the gain resulting from these relations? [1398]
To the first of these three questions Pyrrho can only reply by saying
that things are altogether inaccessible to knowledge, and that whatever
property may be attributed to a thing, with equal justice the opposite
may be predicated. [1399] In support of this statement Pyrrho appears
to have argued that neither the senses nor reason furnish certain
knowledge. [1400] The senses do not show things as they are, but only
as they appear to be. [1401] Rational knowledge, even where it seems to
be most certain, in the sphere of morals, does not depend upon real
knowledge, but only upon tradition and habit. [1402] Against every
statement the opposite may be advanced with equal justice. [1403] If,
however, neither the senses nor reason alone can furnish trustworthy
testimony, no more can the two combined, and thus the third way is
barred, by which we might possibly have advanced to knowledge. [1404]
How many more of the arguments quoted by the later Sceptics belong to
Pyrrho it is impossible to say. The short duration and diffusion of
Pyrrho’s School renders it probable that with him Scepticism was not
far advanced. The same result appears to follow from its further
development in the Academy. The ten τρόποι, or aspects under which
sceptical objections were grouped, cannot with certainty be attributed
to any one before Ænesidemus. [1405] Portions of the arguments used at
a later day may be borrowed from Pyrrho and his pupils, [1406] but it
is impossible to discriminate these portions with certainty.
[(2) Withholding of judgment.]
Thus, if knowledge of things proves to be a failure, there only remains
as possible an attitude of pure Scepticism; and therein is contained
the answer to the second question. We know nothing whatever of the real
nature of things, and hence can neither believe nor assert anything as
to their nature. We cannot say of anything that it is or is not; but we
must abstain from every opinion, allowing that of all which appears to
us to be true, the opposite may with equal justice be true. [1407]
Accordingly, all our statements (as the Cyrenaics taught) only express
individual opinions, and not absolute realities. We cannot deny that
things appear to be of this or the other kind; but we can never say
that they are so. [1408] Even the assertion that things are of this or
the other kind is not an assertion, but a confession by the individual
of his state of mind. [1409] Hence, too, the universal rule of
indecision cannot be taken as an established principle, but only as a
confession, and, therefore, as only problematical. [1410] It must,
however, remain a matter of doubt how far the captious turns of
expression by which the Sceptics thought to parry the attacks of their
opponents come from Pyrrho’s School. The greater part, it is clear,
came into use in the struggle with the Dogmatists, and are not older
than the development of the Stoic theory of knowledge by Chrysippus,
and the criticism of Carneades to which it gave rise. In this
despairing of anything like certain conviction consists ἀφασία,
ἀκαταληψία, or ἐποχὴ, the withholding of judgment or state of
indecision which Pyrrho and Timon regard as the only true attitude in
speculation, [1411] and from which the whole School derived its
distinctive name. [1412]
[(3) Mental imperturbability.]
From this state of indecision, Timon, in reply to the third question,
argues that mental imperturbability or ἀταραξία proceeds, which can
alone conduct to true happiness. [1413] Men are disturbed by views and
prejudices which mislead them into the efforts of passion. Only the
Sceptic who has suspended all judgment is in a condition to regard
things with absolute calmness, unruffled by passion or desire. [1414]
He knows that it is a fond delusion to suppose that one external
condition is preferable to another. [1415] In reality only the tone of
mind or virtue possesses value. [1416] Thus, by withdrawing within
himself, man reaches happiness, which is the goal of all philosophy.
[1417] Absolute inactivity being, however, impossible, the Sceptic will
act on probabilities, and hence follow custom; [1418] but at the same
time he will be conscious that such conduct does not rest on a basis of
firm conviction. [1419] The province of uncertain opinion includes all
positive judgments respecting good and evil. Only in this conditional
form will Timon allow of goodness and divine goodness as standards of
conduct. [1420] The real object of Scepticism is, therefore, a purely
negative one—indifference. It cannot even be proved [1421] that
Pyrrho’s School so far accommodated itself to life, as to make
moderation rather than indifference the regulating principle for
unavoidable actions and desires. In this direction the School seems to
have done but little.
CHAPTER XXIII.
THE NEW ACADEMY.
[A. Arcesilaus.]
Plato’s School was the first to put Scepticism on a firm footing, and
to cultivate it as a system. It has been already remarked that after
the time of Xenocrates this School gradually deserted speculative
enquiries, and limited itself to Ethics. To this new tendency it
consistently adhered, when, shortly after the beginning of the third
century before Christ,
[(1) Denial of knowledge.]
it took a fresh lease of life. Instead, however, of simply ignoring
theoretical knowledge, as it had hitherto done, it assumed towards
knowledge an attitude of opposition, hoping to arrive at security and
happiness in life by being persuaded of the impossibility of knowledge.
How far this result was due to the example set by Pyrrho it is
impossible to establish authoritatively. But it is not in itself
probable that the learned originator of this line of thought in the
Academy should have ignored the views of a philosopher whose work had
been carried on at Elis in his own lifetime, and whose most
distinguished pupil, a personal acquaintance of his own, was then
working at Athens as a prolific writer. [1422] The whole tone and
character, moreover, of the Scepticism of the New Academy betrays
everywhere the presence of Stoic influences. By the confidence of its
assertions it provokes contradiction and doubt, without its being
necessary to seek an explanation by improbable conjectures as to the
personal relations of Arcesilaus and Zeno. [1423]
This connection of the New Academy with Stoicism can be proved in the
case of its first founder, [1424] Arcesilaus. [1425] The doubts of this
philosopher are directed not only to knowledge derived from the senses,
but to rational knowledge as well. [1426] The principal object of his
attack was, however, the Stoic theory of irresistible impressions;
[1427] and in overthrowing that theory Arcesilaus, it would seem,
believed he had exploded every possibility of rational knowledge; for
the Stoic appeal to the senses he regarded as the only possible form of
a theory of knowledge, and the theories of Plato and Aristotle he
ignored altogether. Indeed, no peculiar arguments against knowledge are
referred to him. The old sceptical arguments of Plato and Socrates, of
Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Democritus, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, are
repeated, [1428] all of which apply only to the knowledge of the
senses, and not to rational knowledge. Nevertheless, Arcesilaus aimed
at overthrowing the latter along with the former. [1429] The opinion
that he only used doubt to prepare for or to conceal genuine Platonism,
[1430] is opposed to all credible authorities. It appears, however,
established that he deemed it unnecessary to refute the theory of a
knowledge existing independently of the senses.
The Stoic arguments in favour of irresistible impressions Arcesilaus
met by asserting that an intermediate something between knowledge and
opinion, a kind of conviction common to the wise and the unwise, such
as the Stoic κατάληψις, is inconceivable; the wise man’s conviction is
always knowledge, that of the fool is always opinion. [1431] Going then
farther into the idea of φαντασία καταληπτική, he endeavoured to show
that it contained an internal contradiction; for to conceive
(κατάληψις) is to approve (συγκατάθεσις), and approval never applies to
sensation, but only to thoughts and general ideas. [1432] Lastly, if
the Stoics regarded force of conviction as the distinctive mark of a
true or irresistible conception, and as belonging to it in distinction
from every other, the Sceptic rejoined that such conceptions do not
exist, and that no true conception is of such a nature, but that a
false one may be equally irresistible. [1433] If no certainty of
perception is possible, no knowledge is possible. [1434] And since the
wise man—for on this point Arcesilaus agrees with the Stoics—must only
consider knowledge, and not opinion, nothing remains for him but to
abstain from all and every statement, and to despair of any certain
conviction. [1435] It is therefore impossible to know anything, nor can
we even know for certain that we do not know anything. [1436] It was
quite in accordance with this theory for Arcesilaus to lay down no
definite view in his lectures, but only to refute the views of others.
[1437] Even his disparaging remarks on dialectic, [1438] supposing them
to be genuine, [1439] are not at variance with this conduct. He might
consider the arguments of the Stoics and the sophisms of the Megarians
as useless, whilst, at the same time, he was convinced that no real
knowledge could be attained by any other means. He might even have
inferred from their sterility, that thought leads to truth quite as
little as the senses. There is no real difference between the result at
which he arrived and that of Pyrrho. [1440]
If opponents asserted that by denying knowledge all possibility of
action is denied, [1441] Arcesilaus declined to accede to this
statement. No firm conviction is, as he maintained, necessary for a
decision of the will; for an action to come about a perception
influences the will immediately, leaving the question as to its truth
entirely out of sight. [1442] In order to act sensibly
[(2) Probability.]
we need no knowledge; for this purpose probability is quite enough; any
one can follow probability, even though he is conscious of the
uncertainty of all knowledge. Thus probability is the highest standard
for practical life. [1443] We are but scantily informed how Arcesilaus
applied this principle to the sphere of morals, but a few of his
utterances are on record. [1444] All bear witness to the beautiful
spirit of moderation in the moral theory of the Academy, which was
otherwise exemplified in his own life. [1445]
[B. Carneades.]
Comparing with the theory of Arcesilaus that which was propounded by
Carneades a century later, the same leading features are found to be
underlying; but the points have been more carefully worked out, and the
theory placed on a wider footing. Of the immediate followers of
Arcesilaus [1446] it can only be stated that they clung to their
teacher. It may be presumed that they did little in the way of
expansion, since the ancients are silent as to their labours; Carneades
[1447] is only mentioned as the continuer of the Academic Scepticism.
The importance of Carneades is therefore very great, whence he is in
consequence called the founder of the third or New Academy; [1448] and
it is justly great, witness the admiration which his talents called
forth among cotemporaries and posterity, [1449] and the flourishing
condition in which he left his School. [1450] Himself a pupil of
Chrysippus, and resembling him in tone of mind, [1451] Carneades
expanded not only the negative side of the Sceptical theory in all
directions with an acuteness entitling him to the first place among the
ancient Sceptics, but he was also the first to investigate the positive
side of Scepticism, the doctrine of probability, and to determine the
degrees and conditions of probability. By his labours in both ways he
brought the philosophy of Scepticism to its greatest scientific
perfection.
[(1) Negative side of his teaching.]
As regards the negative side of these investigations, or the refutation
of dogmatism, the attacks of Carneades were directed partly against the
formal possibility of knowledge, and partly against the chief actual
results of the knowledge of his day. In both respects he had mainly to
do with the Stoics, [1452] though he did not confine himself to them.
[(a) Denial of possibility of formal knowledge.]
To prove the impossibility of knowledge in general, he appeals
sometimes to experience. There is no kind of conviction which does not
sometimes deceive us; consequently there is none which guarantees its
own truth. [1453] Going then further into the nature of our notions, he
argues, that since notions consist in the change produced on the soul
by impressions from without, they must, to be true, not only furnish
information as to themselves, but also as to the objects producing
them. Now, this is by no means always the case, many notions avowedly
giving a false impression of things. Hence the note of truth cannot
reside in an impression as such, but only in a true impression. [1454]
It is, however, impossible to distinguish with certainty a true
impression from one that is false. For independently of dreams,
visions, and the fancies of madmen, in short, of all the unfounded
chimeras which force themselves on our notice under the guise of truth,
[1455] it is still undeniable that many false notions closely resemble
true ones. The transition, too, from truth to falsehood is so gradual,
the interval between the two is occupied by intermediate links so
innumerable, and gradations so slight, that they imperceptibly pass one
into the other, and it becomes impossible to draw a boundary line
between the two opposite spheres. [1456] Not content with proving this
assertion in regard to impressions of the senses, Carneades went on to
prove it with regard to general notions based on experience and
intellectual conceptions. [1457] He showed that it is impossible for us
to distinguish objects so much alike as one egg is to another; that at
a certain distance the painted surface seems raised, and a square tower
seems round; that an oar in the water seems broken, and the
neck-plumage of a pigeon assumes different colours in the sun; that
objects on the shore seem to be moving as we sail by, and so forth;
[1458] in all these cases the same strength of conviction belongs to
the false as to the true impressions. [1459] He showed further that
this applies equally to purely intellectual ideas; that many logical
difficulties cannot be solved; [1460] that no absolute distinction can
be drawn between much and little, in short between all differences in
quantity; and that it is the most natural course in all such cases to
follow Chrysippus, and to avoid the dangerous inferences which may be
drawn by withholding judgment. [1461] Arguing from these facts,
Carneades concluded at first in regard to impressions of the senses,
that there is no such thing as φαντασία καταληπτικὴ in the Stoic sense
of the term, in other words, that no perception contains in itself
characteristics, by virtue of which its truth may be inferred with
certainty. [1462] This fact being granted, the possibility is in his
opinion precluded of there residing in the understanding a standard for
the distinction of truth from falsehood. The understanding—and this
belief was shared by his opponents—must derive its material from the
senses. [1463] Logic tests the formal accuracy of combinations of
thought, but gives no insight into their import. [1464] Direct proofs
of the uncertainty of intellectual convictions are not therefore
needed. The same result may also be attained in a more personal way, by
raising the question, how individuals obtain their knowledge. He can
only be said to know a thing who has formed an opinion respecting it.
In the mean time, until he has decided in favour of some definite
opinion, he has still no knowledge. And what dependence can be placed
on the judgment of one who has no knowledge? [1465]
[(b) Attack on the scientific knowledge of the time.]
[(α) The physical views of the Stoics attacked.]
In these formal enquiries into the possibility of knowledge, Carneades
had chiefly to deal with the Stoics, with whom he holds a common ground
in his appeal to the senses. The Stoics were also his chief opponents
in his polemic against the material results of the dogmatic philosophy.
Natural science having throughout the period of the post-Aristotelian
philosophy been subordinated to ethics, ethics likewise engaged more
attention at the hands of Carneades than science. [1466] In as far as
he studied Natural science, he appears to have been entirely opposed to
the Stoic treatment of the subject, and to this circumstance we owe it,
that better information is forthcoming regarding his scientific, or
rather his theological, investigations than regarding his moral views.
The Stoic theories of God and of final causes [1467] afforded ample
scope for the exercise of his ingenuity, and from the ground he
occupied it was not difficult for him to expose the weak points of that
theory. The Stoics had appealed in support of the belief in God to the
consensus gentium. How close at hand was the answer, [1468] that the
universality of this belief was neither proved to exist, nor as a
matter of fact did it exist, but that in no case could the opinion of
an ignorant multitude decide anything. The Stoics thought to find a
proof of divine providence in the manner in which portents and
prophecies come true. To expose this delusion, no very expanded
criticism of divination was necessary. [1469] Going beyond this,
Carneades proceeded to call in question the cardinal point of the Stoic
system—the belief in God, the doctrine of the soul and reason of the
universe, and of the presence of design in its arrangements. How, he
asks, is the presence of design manifested? Whence all the things which
cause destruction and danger to men if it be true that God has made the
world for the sake of man? [1470] If reason is praised as the highest
gift of God, is it not manifest that the majority of men only use it to
make themselves worse than brutes? In bestowing such a gift God must
have been taking but little care of this majority. [1471] Even if we
attribute to man direct blame for the misuse of reason, still, why has
God bestowed on him a reason which can be so much abused? [1472] The
Stoics themselves say that a wise man can nowhere be found. They admit,
too, that folly is the greatest misfortune. How, then, can they speak
of the care bestowed by God on men, when, on their own confession, the
whole of mankind is sunk in the deepest misery? [1473] But allowing
that the Gods could not bestow virtue and wisdom upon all, they could,
at least, have taken care that it should go well with the good. Instead
of this, the experience of hundreds of cases shows that the upright man
comes to a miserable end; that crime succeeds; and that the criminal
can enjoy the fruits of his misdeeds undisturbed. Where, then, is the
agency of Providence? [1474] The facts being entirely different from
what the Stoics suppose, what becomes of their inferences? Allowing the
presence of design in the world, and granting that the world is as
beautiful and good as possible, why is it inconceivable that nature
should have formed the world according to natural laws without the
intervention of God? Admitting, too, the connection of parts in the
universe, why should not this connection be the result simply of
natural forces, without a soul of the universe or a deity? [1475] Who
can pretend to be so intimately acquainted with the powers of nature,
as to be able to prove the impossibility of this assumption? Zeno
argued that rational things are better than things irrational, that the
world is the best possible, and must therefore be rational. Man, says
Socrates, can only derive his soul from the world; therefore the world
must have a soul. But what, replies the Academician, [1476] is there to
show that reason is best for the world, if it be the best for us? or
that there must be a soul in nature for nature to produce a soul? What
man is not able to produce, that, argues Chrysippus, must have been
produced by a higher being—by deity. But to this inference the same
objection was raised by the Academicians as to the former one, viz.
that it confounds two different points of view. There may, indeed, be a
Being higher than man. But why must there needs be a rational man-like
Being? Why a God? Why not nature herself? [1477] Nor did the argument
seem to an Academician more conclusive, that as every house is destined
to be inhabited, so, too, the world must be intended for the habitation
of God. To this there was the obvious reply: [1478] If the world were a
house, it might be so; but the very point at issue is whether it is a
house constructed for a definite purpose, or whether it is simply an
undesigned result of natural forces.
[(β) Theological views of the Stoics attacked.]
Not content with attacking the conclusiveness of the arguments upon
which the Stoics built their belief in a God, the scepticism of the
Academy sought to demonstrate that the idea of God itself is an
untenable one. The line of argument which Carneades struck out for this
purpose is essentially the same as that used in modern times to deny
the personality of God. The ordinary view of God regards Him as an
infinite, but, at the same time, as a separate Being, possessing the
qualities and living the life of an individual. To this view Carneades
objected, on the ground that the first assertion contradicts the
second; and argues that it is impossible to apply the characteristics
of personal existence to God without limiting His infinite nature.
Whatever view we may take of God, we must regard Him as a living Being;
and every living being is composite, having parts and passions, and is
therefore destructible. [1479] Moreover, every living being has a
sense-nature. Far, therefore, from refusing such a nature to God,
Carneades attributed to Him, in the interest of omniscience, other
organs of sense than the five we possess. Now, everything capable of
impressions through the senses is also liable to change, sensation,
according to the definition of Chrysippus, being nothing more than a
change of soul. Every such being must therefore be capable of pleasure
and pain, without which sensation is inconceivable. Whatever is capable
of change is liable to destruction; whatever is susceptible to pain is
also liable to deterioration, pain being caused by deterioration, and
is also liable to destruction. [1480] As the capacity for sensation, so
too the desire for what is in harmony with nature, and the dislike of
what is opposed to nature, belong to the conditions of life. Whatever
has the power of destroying any being is opposed to the nature of that
being, everything that lives being exposed to annihilation. [1481]
Advancing from the conception of a living being to that of a rational
being, all virtues would have to be attributed to God as well as bliss.
But how, asks Carneades, can any virtue be ascribed to God? Every
virtue supposes an imperfection, in overcoming which it consists. He
only is continent who might possibly be incontinent, and persevering
who might be indulgent. To be brave, a man must be exposed to danger;
to be magnanimous, he must be exposed to misfortunes. A being not
feeling attraction for pleasure, nor aversion for pain and
difficulties, dangers and misfortunes, would not be capable of virtue.
Just as little could we predicate prudence of a being not susceptible
of pleasure and pain; prudence consisting in knowing what is good, bad,
and morally indifferent. But how can there be any such knowledge where
there is no susceptibility to pleasure or pain? Or how can a being be
conceived of capable of feeling pleasure, but incapable of feeling
pain, since pleasure can only be known by contrast with pain, and the
possibility of increasing life always supposes the possibility of
lessening it? Nor is it otherwise with intelligence (εὐβουλία). He only
is intelligent who always discovers what will subserve his purpose. If,
however, he must discover it, it cannot have been previously known to
him. Hence intelligence can only belong to a being who is ignorant
about much. Such a being can never feel sure that sooner or later
something will not cause his ruin. He will therefore be exposed to
fear. A being susceptible of pleasure and exposed to pain, a being who
has to contend with dangers and difficulties, and who feels pain and
fear, must inevitably, so thought Carneades, be finite and
destructible. If, therefore, we cannot conceive of God except in this
form, we cannot conceive of Him at all, our conception being
self-destructive. [1482]
There is yet another reason, according to Carneades, why God cannot
have any virtue; because virtue is above its possessor, and there can
be nothing above God. [1483] Moreover, what is the position of God in
regard to speech? It was easy to show the absurdity of attributing
speech to Him, [1484] but to call him speechless (ἄφωνος) seemed also
to be opposed to the general belief. [1485] Quite independently,
however, of details, the inconceivableness of God appears, so soon as
the question is raised, whether the deity is limited or unlimited,
material or immaterial. God cannot be unlimited; for what is unlimited
is necessarily immovable because it has no place, and soulless because
by virtue of its boundlessness it cannot form a whole permeated by a
soul; but God we ordinarily think of both as moving and as endowed with
a soul. Nor can God be limited; for all that is limited is incomplete.
Moreover, God cannot be immaterial, for Carneades, like the Stoics,
held that what is immaterial possesses neither soul, feeling, nor
activity. Neither can he be material, all composite bodies being liable
to change and destruction, and simple bodies, fire, water, and the
like, possessing neither life nor reason. [1486] If, then, all the
forms under which we think of God are impossible, His existence cannot
be asserted.
[(γ) Polytheistic views attacked.]
Easier work lay before the Sceptics in criticising polytheistic views
of religion and their defence by the Stoics. Among the arguments
employed by Carneades to overthrow them, certain chain-arguments are
prominent, by means of which he endeavoured to show that the popular
belief has no distinctive marks for the spheres of God and man. If Zeus
is a God, he argues, his brother Poseidon must likewise be one, and if
he is one, the rivers and streams must also be Gods. If Helios is a
God, the appearance of Helios above the earth, or day, must be a God;
and, consequently, month, year, morning, midday, evening, must all be
Gods. [1487] Polytheism is here refuted by establishing an essential
similarity between what is accepted as God and what is avowedly not a
God. It may readily be supposed that this was not the only proof of the
acuteness of Carneades’ reasoning. [1488]
Divination, to which the Stoics attached especial importance, [1489]
was vigorously assailed. Carneades proved that no peculiar range of
subjects belonged thereto, but that in all cases which admit
professional judgment experts pass a better judgment than diviners.
[1490] To know accidental events beforehand is impossible; it is
useless to know those that are necessary and unavoidable, nay, more, it
would even be harmful. [1491] No causal connection can be conceived of
between a prophecy and the ensuing realisation. [1492] If the Stoics
met him by pointing to fulfilled prophecies, he replied that the
coincidence was accidental, [1493] at the same time declaring many such
stories to be without doubt false. [1494]
[(δ) Moral views of the Stoics attacked.]
Connected probably with these attacks on divination was the defence by
Carneades of the freedom of the will. The Stoic fatalism he refuted by
an appeal to the fact that our decision is free; and since the Stoics
appealed in support of their view to the law of causality, he likewise
attacked this law. [1495] In so doing his intention was not to assert
anything positive respecting the nature of the human will, but only to
attack the Stoic assertion, and if for his own part he adhered to the
old Academic doctrine of a free will, he still regarded that doctrine
as only probable.
Less information exists as to the arguments by which Carneades sought
to assail the current principles of morality. Nevertheless, enough is
known to indicate the course taken by his Scepticism in relation
thereto. In the second of the celebrated speeches which he delivered at
Rome in the year 156 B.C., [1496] he denied that there is such a thing
as natural right: all laws are only positive civil institutions devised
by men for the sake of safety and advantage, and for the protection of
the weak; and hence he is regarded as foolish who prefers justice to
interest, which after all is the only unconditional end. In support of
these statements he appealed to the fact that laws change with
circumstances, and are different in different countries. He pointed to
the example of great nations, such as the Romans, all of whom attained
to greatness by unrighteous means. He impressed into his service the
many casuistical questions raised by the Stoics, expressing the opinion
that in all these cases it is better to commit the injury which brings
advantage—for instance, to murder another to save one’s own life—than
to postpone advantage to right, and hence inferred that intelligence is
a state of irreconcileable opposition to justice. [1497]
This free criticism of dogmatic views could not fail to bring Carneades
to the same result as his predecessors. Knowledge is absolutely
impossible. A man of sense will look at everything from all sides and
invariably withhold judgment, thus guarding himself against error.
[1498] And to this conviction he clings so persistently that he
altogether refuses to listen to the objection that the wise man must be
at least convinced of the impossibility of any firm conviction. [1499]
The earlier Sceptics, far from attributing on this ground an equal
value to all notions, had not dispensed with reasons for actions and
[(2) Positive side of the teaching of Carneades.]
[(a) Theory of probabilities.]
thoughts. This point was now taken up by Carneades, who, in attempting
to establish the conditions and degrees of probability, hoped to obtain
a clue to the kind of conviction which might be still permitted in his
system. However much we may despair of knowledge, some stimulus and
groundwork for action is needed. Certain things must therefore be
assumed, from which the pursuit of happiness must start. [1500] To
these so much weight must be attached that they are allowed to decide
our conduct, but we must be on our guard against considering them to be
true, or to be something really known and conceived. Nor must we forget
that even the nature of true ideas is similar to that of false ones,
and that the truth of ideas can never be known with certainty. Hence we
should withhold all assent, not allowing any ideas to be true, but only
to have the appearance of truth (ἀληθῆ φαίνεσθαι) or probability
(ἔμφασις, πιθανότης). [1501] In every notion two things need to be
considered, the relation to the object represented which makes it
either true or false, and the relation to the subject who has the
notion, which makes it seem either true or false. The former relation
is, for the reasons already quoted, quite beyond the compass of our
judgment; the latter, the relation of a notion to ourselves, falls
within the sphere of consciousness. [1502] So long as a notion
seemingly true is cloudy and indistinct, like an object contemplated
from a distance, it makes no great impression on us. When, on the
contrary, the appearance of truth is strong, it produces in us a belief
[1503] strong enough to determine us to action, although it does not
come up to the impregnable certainty of knowledge. [1504]
Belief, however, like probability, is of several degrees. The lowest
degree of probability arises when a notion produces by itself an
impression of truth, without being taken in connection with other
notions. The next higher degree is when that impression is confirmed by
the agreement of all notions which are related to it. The third and
highest degree is when an investigation of all these notions results in
producing the same corroboration for all. In the first case a notion is
called probable (πιθανή); in the second probable and undisputed (πιθανὴ
καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος); in the third probable, undisputed, and tested
(πιθανὴ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος καὶ περιωδευμένη). [1505] Within each one of
these three classes different gradations of probability are again
possible. [1506] The distinguishing marks, which must be considered in
the investigation of probability, appear to have been investigated by
Carneades in the spirit of the Aristotelian logic. [1507] In proportion
to the greater or less practical importance of a question, or to the
accuracy of investigation which the circumstances allow, we must adhere
to one or the other degree of probability. [1508] Although no one of
them is of such a nature as to exclude the possibility of error, this
circumstance need not deprive us of certainty in respect to actions,
provided we have once convinced ourselves that the absolute certainty
of our practical premisses is not possible. [1509] Just as little
should we hesitate to affirm or deny anything in that conditional way
which is alone possible after what has been stated. Assent will be
given to no notion in the sense of its being absolutely true, but to
many notions in the sense that we consider them highly probable. [1510]
[(b) Moral and religious view of life.]
Among questions about which the greatest possible certainty is felt to
be desirable, Carneades, true to his whole position, gave a prominent
place to principles of morals; [1511] life and action being the
principal things with which the theory of probability has to do. [1512]
We hear, therefore, that he thoroughly discussed the fundamental
questions of Ethics, the question as to the highest Good. [1513] On
this subject he distinguished six, or relatively four, different views.
If the primary object of desire can in general only consist of those
things which correspond with our nature, and which consequently call
our emotions into exercise, the object of desire must be either
pleasure, or absence of pain, or conformity with nature. In each of
these three cases two opposite results are possible: either the highest
Good may consist in the attainment of a purpose, or else in the
activity which aims at its attainment. The latter is the view of the
Stoics only, and arises from regarding natural activity or virtue as
the highest Good. Hence the six possible views are practically reduced
to four, which taken by themselves, or else in combination, include all
existing views respecting the highest Good. [1514] But so ambiguously
did Carneades express himself as to his particular preference of any
one view, that even Clitomachus declared he was ignorant as to his real
opinion. [1515] It was only tentatively and for the purpose of refuting
the Stoics, that he propounded the statement that the highest Good
consists in the enjoyment of such things as afford satisfaction to the
primary impulses of nature. [1516] Nevertheless, the matter has often
been placed in such a light as though Carneades had propounded this
statement on his own account; and the statement itself has been quoted
to prove that he considered the satisfaction of natural impulses apart
from virtue as an end in itself. [1517] It is also asserted that he
approximated to the view of Callipho, which does not appear to have
been essentially different from that of the older Academy. [1518] The
same leaning to the older Academy and its doctrine of moderation
appears in other recorded parts of the Ethics of Carneades. The pain
caused by misfortune he wished to lessen by thinking beforehand of its
possibility; [1519] and after the destruction of Carthage he
deliberately asserted before Clitomachus that the wise man would never
allow himself to be disturbed, not even by the downfall of his country.
[1520]
Putting all these statements together, we obtain a view not unworthy of
Carneades, and certainly quite in harmony with his position. That
philosopher could not, consistently with his sceptical principles,
allow scientific certainty to any of the various opinions respecting
the nature and aim of moral action; and in this point he attacked the
Stoics with steady home-thrusts. Their inconsistency in calling the
choice of what is natural the highest business of morality, and yet not
allowing to that which is according to nature a place among goods,
[1521] was so trenchantly exposed by him that Antipater is said to have
been brought to admit that not the objects to which choice is directed,
but the actual choice itself is a good. [1522] He even asserted that
the Stoic theory of Goods only differed in words from that of the
Peripatetics; to this assertion he was probably led by the fact that
the Stoic morality appeals to nature only, or perhaps by the theory
therewith connected of things to be desired and things to be eschewed.
[1523] If there were any difference between the two, Stoicism, he
thought, ignored the real wants of nature. The Stoics, for instance,
called a good name a thing indifferent; Carneades, however, drove them
so much into a corner because of this statement that they ever after
(so Cicero assures us) qualified their assertion, attributing to a good
name at least a secondary value among things to be desired (προηγμένα).
[1524] Chrysippus, again, thought to find some consolation for the ills
of life in the reflection that no man is free from them. Carneades was,
however, of opinion that this thought could only afford consolation to
a lover of ill; it being rather a matter for sorrow that all should be
exposed to so hard a fate. [1525] Believing, too, that man’s happiness
does not depend on any theory of ethics, [1526] he could avow without
hesitation that all other views of morality do not go beyond
probability; and thus the statement of Clitomachus, as far as it refers
to a definite decision as to the highest good, is without doubt
correct. But just as the denial of knowledge does not, according to the
view of Carneades, exclude conviction in general on grounds of
probability, no more does it in the province of ethics. Here, then, is
the intermediate position which was attributed to him—a position not
only suggested by the traditions of the Academic School, but remaining
as a last resource to the sceptical destroyer of systems so opposite as
Stoicism and the theory of pleasure. The inconsistency of at one time
identifying the satisfaction of natural instincts with virtue, and at
another time distinguishing it from virtue, which is attributed to
Carneades, is an inconsistency for which probably Cicero is alone
responsible. The real meaning of Carneades can only be that virtue
consists in an activity directed towards the possession of what is
according to nature, and hence that it cannot as the highest Good be
separated from accordance with nature. [1527] For the same reason,
virtue supplies all that is requisite for happiness. [1528] Hence, when
it is stated that, notwithstanding his scepticism on moral subjects,
Carneades was a thoroughly upright man, [1529] we have not only no
reason to doubt this statement as to his personal character, but we can
even discern that it was a practical and legitimate consequence of his
philosophy. It may appear to us inconsistent to build on a foundation
of absolute doubt the certainty of practical conduct; nevertheless, it
is an inconsistency deeply rooted in all the scepticism of
post-Aristotelian times. That scepticism Carneades brought to
completeness, and in logically developing his theory, even its
scientific defects came to light.
For the same reason we may also give credit to the statement that
Carneades, like the later Sceptics, notwithstanding his severe
criticisms on the popular and philosophic theology of his age, never
intended to deny the existence of divine agencies. [1530] On this point
he acted like a true Sceptic. He expressed doubts as to whether
anything could be known about God, but for practical purposes he
accepted the belief in God as an opinion more or less probable and
useful.
Taking all things into account, the philosophic importance of Carneades
and the School of which he was the head cannot be estimated at so low a
value as would be the case were the New Academy merely credited with
entertaining shallow doubts, and Carneades’ theory of probabilities
deduced from rhetorical rather than from philosophical considerations.
[1531] For the last assertion there is no ground whatever; Carneades
distinctly avowed that a conviction resting on probabilities seemed
indispensable for practical needs and actions. On this point he is
wholly in accord with all the forms of Scepticism, not only with the
New Academy, but also with Pyrrho and the later Sceptics. He differs
from them in the degree of accuracy with which he investigates the
varieties and conditions of probability; but a question of degree can
least of all be urged against a philosopher. Nor should doubts be
called shallow which the ancients even in later times could only very
inadequately dissipate, and which throw light on several of the deepest
problems of life by the critical investigations they occasioned. No
doubt, in the despair of attaining to knowledge at all, and in the
attempt to reduce everything to opinion more or less certain,
indications may be seen of the exhaustion of the intellect, and of the
extinction of philosophic originality. Nevertheless it must never be
forgotten that the scepticism of the New Academy was not only in
harmony with the course naturally taken by Greek philosophy as a whole,
but that it was pursued with an acuteness and a scientific vigour
leaving no doubt that it was a really important link in the chain of
philosophic development.
[C. School of Carneades.]
In Carneades this Scepticism attained its highest growth. The successor
of Carneades, Clitomachus, [1532] is known as the literary exponent of
the views taught by Carneades. [1533] At the same time we hear of his
being accurately acquainted with the teaching of the Peripatetics and
Stoics; and although it was no doubt his first aim to refute the
dogmatism of these Schools, it would appear that Clitomachus entered
into the connection of their doctrines more fully than is usually the
case with opponents. [1534] As to his fellow-pupil, Charmidas (or
Charmadas), [1535] one wholly unimportant utterance is our only guide
for determining his views. [1536] For ascertaining the philosophy of
the other pupils of Carneades, [1537] nothing but the scantiest
fragments have been preserved. The statement of Polybius that the
Academic School degenerated into empty subtleties, and thereby became
an object of contempt, [1538] may deserve no great amount of belief;
but it does seem probable that the School made no important advance on
the path marked out by himself and Arcesilaus. It did not even continue
true to that path for very long. Not a generation after the death of
its most celebrated teacher, and even among his own pupils, [1539] that
eclecticism began to appear, the general and simultaneous spread of
which ushered in a new period in the history of the post-Aristotelian
philosophy.
NOTES
[1] Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen. Part I. 96.
[2] Conf. Arist. Metaph. I. 2, 282 b, 19.
[3] For the life of Zeno, Diogenes is the chief authority, who appears
to be indebted for his information chiefly to Antigonus of Carystus,
who lived about 250 B.C. In proof of this, compare the account of
Diogenes with the extracts given by Athenæus (viii. 345, d; xiii. 563,
e; 565, d; 603, e; 607, e; and, in particular, ii. 55, f) from
Antigonus’ life of Zeno. Of modern authorities, consult Wagenmann, in
Pauly’s Realencyclop.
[4] Diog. vii. 1. Suid. Ζήνων. Plut. Plac. i. 3, 29. Pausan. ii. 8, 4.
He is called by others Demeas.
[5] Citium, which the ancients unanimously call the native city of
Zeno, was, according to Diog. vii. 1, a πόλισμα Ἑλληνικὸν Φοίνικας
ἐποίκους ἐσχηκὸς, i.e. Phœnician immigrants had settled there by the
side of the old Greek population, whence its inhabitants are sometimes
called ‘e Phœnicia profecti’ (Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56), and Zeno is
himself called a Phœnician (Diog. vii. 3; 15; 25; 30; ii. 114. Suid.
Ζήν. Athen. xiii. 563, e. Cic. l.c.). A continuous connection between
Citium and Phœnicia is implied in Diog. vii. 6; οἱ ἐν Σιδῶνι Κιτιεῖς.
[6] The details are differently given by Diog. 2–5; 31; Plut. Inimic.
Util. 2, p. 87; and Sen. Tranq. An. 14, 3. Most accounts say that he
came to Athens for trading purposes, and accidentally became acquainted
with Crates and philosophy after being shipwrecked. According to other
accounts, he remained at Athens, after disposing of his merchandise,
and devoted himself to philosophy. Demetrius of Magnesia (Themist. Or.
xxiii. 295, D) further relates that he had already occupied himself
with philosophy at home, and repaired to Athens to study it more
fully—a view which seems most likely, because the least sensational.
[7] The dates in Zeno’s life are very uncertain. He is said to have
been thirty when he first came to Athens (Diog. 2). Persæus, however
(Ibid. 28), his pupil and countryman, says twenty-two. These statements
are of little use, since the date of his coming to Athens is unknown.
If it is true that after reading with Crates he was for ten years a
pupil of Xenocrates, who died 314 B.C. (Timocrates in Diog. 2), he must
have come to Athens not later than 328 B.C. But this fact may be
doubted. For his whole line of thought resembles that of Crates and
Stilpo. How then can he have been for ten years a pupil in the Academy,
and in addition have enjoyed Polemo’s teaching? Altogether he is said
to have frequented the schools of different philosophers for twenty
years before opening his own (Diog. 4). According to Apollon. in Diog.
28, he presided over his own school for fifty-eight years, which is
hardly reconcileable with the above data, even if he attained the age
of ninety-eight (Diog. 28; Lucian, Macrob. 19). According to Persæus
(Diog. 28), he only attained the age of seventy-two (Clinton, Fast.
Hell. II. 368 capriciously suggests 92), and was altogether only fifty
years in Athens. On the other hand, in his own letter to Antigonus
(Diog. 9), he distinctly calls himself an octogenarian, but the
genuineness of this letter, borrowed by Diogenes from Apollonius the
Tyrian about 50 B.C., may perhaps be doubted. The year of Zeno’s death
is likewise unknown. His relations to Antigonus Gonatas prove at least
that he was not dead before the beginning of his reign in 278 B.C., and
probably not till long afterwards. It would appear from the calculation
of his age, that his death did not take place till 260 B.C. He may,
then, have lived circa 350 to 260 B.C.; but these dates are quite
uncertain.
[8] Diog. vii. 2; vi. 105.
[9] Diog. 3: ἐντεῦθεν ἤκουσε τοῦ Κράτητος, ἄλλως μὲν εὔτονος πρὸς
φιλοσοφίαν, αἰδήμων δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν κυνικὴν ἀναισχυντίαν.
[10] Conf., besides what immediately follows, Diog. 25 and 15: ἦν δὲ
ζητητικὸς καὶ περὶ πάντων ἀκριβολογούμενος.
[11] Diog. vii. 2; 4; 16; 20; 24; ii. 114; 120. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev.
xiv. 5, 9; 6, 6. Polemo is called his teacher by Cic. Fin. iv. 16, 45;
Acad. i. 9, 35. Strabo, xiii. 1. 67, p. 614. On Xenocrates compare p.
37, 1. How ready he was to learn from others is proved by the saying in
Diog. 25; Plut. Fragm. in Hesiod. ix. T. V. 511. W.
[12] Diog. 5, according to whom he gave instruction walking to and fro,
like Aristotle, but never to more than two or three at a time (Diog.
14). It is not probable that he gave any formal lectures.
[13] Which, however, must be judged by the standard of that time and of
Greek customs. Conf. Diog. 13; and the quotations in Athen. xiii. 607,
e; 563, e, from Antigonus of Carystus.
[14] See Musonius in Stob. Serm. 17, 43. His outward circumstances also
appear to have been very simple. According to one account (Diog. 13),
he brought to Athens the fabulous sum of 1000 talents, and put it out
to interest. Themist. Or. xxi., p. 252, says that he forgave a debtor
his debt. He is said to have paid a logician 200 drachmas, instead of
the 100 which he asked for (Diog. 25). Nor is there any mention of a
Cynical life or of poverty. But, according to Diog. 5, Plut. and Sen.,
he had lost his property almost entirely. According to Sen. Consol. ad
Helv. 12, 5 (contradicted by Diog. 23), he owned no slave. Had he been
well to do, he would hardly have accepted the presents of Antigonus.
That Zeno was unmarried appears from Diog. 13.
[15] Conf. Diog. 13; 16; 24; 26; Athen. in the passage quoted p. 36, 2;
Suid.; Clem. Strom. 413, A. It is mentioned as a peculiarity of Zeno,
that he avoided all noise and popular display (Diog. 14); that, though
generally grave, he relaxed over his wine, and that too much; that he
could not tolerate many words, and was very fond of epigrams. See Diog.
16; 20; 24; Athen. l.c. Stob. Serm. 34; 10; 36; 19; 23. He is said to
have carried his parsimoniousness too far. In this respect he was a
thorough Phœnician (Diog. 16). The presents of Antigonus he never
sought, and broke with an acquaintance who asked for his interest with
the king. Still he did not despise them, without abating from his
dignity. The loss of his property he bore with the greatest composure
(Diog. 3; Plut. and Sen.).
[16] Antigonus (conf. Athen. xiii. 603, e; Arrian, Diss. Epict. ii. 13,
14; Simpl. in Epict. Enchir. 283, c; Æl. V. H. ix. 26) was fond of his
society, attended his lectures, and wished to have him at court—but
Zeno declined the offer, sending two of his pupils instead. The
Athenians, to whom, according to Ælian’s untrustworthy account V. H.
vii. 14, he had rendered political services, honoured him with a public
panegyric, a golden crown, a statue, and burial in the Ceramicus. That
the keys of the city were left in his keeping is not probable. The
offer of Athenian citizenship he declined (Plut. Sto. Rep. 4, 1, p.
1034). Nor did his countrymen in Citium fail to show their appreciation
(Diog. 6; Plin. H. N. xxxiv. 19, 32) of him, and Zeno always insisted
on being a Citian (Diog. 12; Plut. l.c.).
[17] He himself (Diog. vii. 18) compares the λόγοι ἀπηρτισμένοι of the
ἀσόλοικοι to the elegant Alexandrian coins, which, instead of being
better, were often lighter than those of Athens. He is charged in
particular with using words in a wrong sense, and with inventing new
words, whence Cic. Tusc. v. 11, 34, calls him ‘ignobilis verborum
opifex,’ and Chrysippus, in a treatise περὶ τοῦ κυρίως κεχρῆσθαι Ζήνωνα
τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, disparages this καινοτομεῖν ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι (Galen.
Diff. Puls. III. 1., vol. viii. 642, K.). He is also charged with
maintaining that nothing ought to be concealed, but that even the most
indelicate things should be called by their proper names. He is further
charged with having propounded no new system, but with having
appropriated the thoughts of his predecessors, and having concealed his
plagiarism by the use of new terms. In Diog. vii. 25, Polemo says:
κλέπτων τὰ δόγματα Φοινικῶς μεταμφιεννύς; and Cicero frequently repeats
the charge (Fin. v. 25, 74; iii. 2, 5; iv. 2, 3; 3, 7; 26; 72; v. 8,
22; 29, 88. Acad. ii. 5, 15. Legg. 1, 13, 38; 20; 53. Tusc. ii. 12,
29).
[18] Diog. 28, 1. The statement that he was ἄνοσος must be taken with
some limitation, according to Diog. vii. 162; Stob. Floril. 17, 43.
[19] Diog. 28; 31. Lucian, Macrob. 19. Lactant. Inst. iii. 18. Stob.
Floril. 7, 45. Suid.
[20] The list of them in Diog. 4, to which additions are made Diog. 34;
39; 134. The Διατριβαὶ (Diog. 34; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 205; 245; Math. xi.
90) may perhaps be identical with the Ἀπομνημονεύματα Κράτητος (Diog.
4), the Τέχνη ἐρωτικὴ (Diog. 34) with Τέχνη (Diog. 4). An exposition of
Hesiod, which had been inferred to exist, from Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36,
Krische, Forsch. 367, rightly identifies with the treatise περὶ τοῦ
ὅλου, and this with the treatise περὶ τῆς φύσεως (Stob. Ecl. i. 178).
Other authorities are given by Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii. 580.
[21] This appears at least probable from Diog. 4: ἕως μὲν οὖν τινὸς
ἤκουσε τοῦ Κράτητος· ὅτε καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν αὐτοῦ γράψαντος, τινὲς
ἔλεγον παίζοντες ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ κυνὸς οὐρᾶς αὐτὴν γεγραφέναι.
[22] Mohnike, Cleanthes d. Sto.: Greifsw. 1814. Cleanthis Hymn. in
Jovem, ed. Sturz, ed. nov. cur. Merzdorf.: Lips. 1835.
[23] Strabo, xiii. 1, 57, p. 610. Diog. vii. 168. Ælian, Hist. Anim.
vi. 50. How Clemens, Protrept. 47, A, comes to call him Πισαδεὺς, it is
hard to say, nor is it of any moment. Mohnike, p. 67, offers
conjectures. Mohnike also rightly maintains, p. 77, that Cleanthes ὁ
Ποντικὸς in Diog. ix. 15 must be the same as this Cleanthes, and Cobet
strikes out the words ὁ Ποντικὸς after Κλεάνθης.
[24] According to Antisthenes (the Rhodian), in Diog. l.c., Cleanthes
was a pugilist, who came to Athens with four drachmæ, and entered the
school of Zeno (according to Hesych. v. Suid., that of Crates, which is
impossible for chronological reasons. Conversely, Valer. Max. viii. 7,
ext. 11, makes him a pupil of Chrysippus, confounding the relations of
pupil and teacher, as we have met with elsewhere), in which he studied
for nineteen years (Diog. 176), gaining a maintenance by working as a
labourer (Diog. 168; 174; Plut. Vit. Ær. Al. 7, 5, p. 830; Sen. Ep. 44,
3; Krische, Forsch.). A public maintenance, which was offered him, Zeno
induced him to refuse, and, in other ways, tried his power of will by
the severest tests. It is, therefore, all the more improbable that
Antigonus gave him 3000 minæ (Diog. 169). On the simplicity of his
life, his constant application, his adherence to Zeno, &c., see Diog.
168; 170; 37; Plut. De Audi. 18, p. 47; Cic. Tusc. ii. 25, 60. He also
refused to become an Athenian citizen (Plut. Sto. Rep. 4, p. 1034). He
died of self-imposed starvation (Diog. 176; Lucian, Macrob. 19; Stob.
Floril. 7, 54). His age is stated by Diog. 176, at eighty; by Lucian
and Valer. Max. viii. 7, ext. 11, at ninety-nine. Diog. 174, gives a
list of his somewhat numerous writings, mostly on moral subjects, which
is supplemented by Fabric. Bibl. iii. 551, Harl. and Mohnike, p. 90.
Cleanthes was held in great esteem in the Stoic School, even in the
time of Chrysippus (Diog. vii. 179; 182; Cic. Acad. ii. 41, 126). At a
later time, the Roman Senate erected a statue to him at Assos (Simpl.
in Epict. Enchir. c. 53, 329, b).
[25] Aristo, son of Miltiades, a Chian, discussed most fully by
Krische, Forsch. 405, known as the Siren, because of his persuasive
powers, and also as the Baldhead, was a pupil of Zeno (Diog. 37; 160;
Cic. N. D. i. 14, 37; Acad. ii. 42, 130; Sen. Ep. 94, 2), but is said,
during Zeno’s illness, to have joined Polemo (Diocl. in Diog. 162).
Although it may be objected that his teaching does not diverge in the
direction of Platonism, but rather in the opposite direction, still
Polemo’s contempt (Diog. iv. 18) for dialectic may at one time have had
its attractions for him. It is a better established fact that his
attitude towards pleasure was less indifferent than it ought to have
been, according to his principles (Eratos and Apollophanes in Athen.
vii. 281, c); but the charge of flattery towards his fellow-pupil
Persæus appears not to be substantiated (Athen. vi. 251, c). His
letters show that he was on intimate terms with Cleanthes (Themist. Or.
xxi. p. 255, b). His loquacity is said to have been displeasing to Zeno
(Diog. vii. 18). He appeared as a teacher in the Cynosarges,
Antisthenes’ old locality (Diog. 161), thus claiming descent from
Cynicism. Of his numerous pupils (Diog. 182; Plut. C. Princ. Philos. i.
4. p. 776), two are mentioned by Diogenes, 161; Miltiades and Diphilus.
Athenæus names two more: Apollophanes, and the celebrated Alexandrian
sage, Eratosthenes, both of whom wrote an ‘Aristo.’ The latter is also
named by Strabo, i. 2, 2, p. 15, Suid. Ἐρατοσθ. Apollophanes, whilst
adopting Aristo’s views of virtue in Diog. vii. 92, did not otherwise
adopt his ethics. His natural science is mentioned by Diog. vii. 140,
his psychology by Tertull. De An. 14. Since Eratosthenes was born 276
B.C., Aristo must have been alive in 250 B.C., which agrees with his
being called a cotemporary and opponent of Arcesilaus (Strabo, l.c.;
Diog. vii. 162; iv. 40, and 33). According to Diog. vii. 164, he died
of sunstroke. Not only had his School disappeared in the time of Strabo
and Cicero (Cic. Legg. i. 13, 38; Fin. ii. 11, 35; v. 8, 23; Tusc. v.
30, 85; Off. i. 2, 6; Strabo, l.c.), but no traces of it are found
beyond the first generation. The writings enumerated by Diog. vii. 163,
with the single exception of the letter to Cleanthes, are said to have
been attributed by Panætius and Sosicrates to the Peripatetic; but
Krische’s remarks, p. 408, particularly after Sauppe’s demurrer
(Philodemi de Vit. Lib. X. Weimar, 1853, p. 7), raise a partial doubt
as to the accuracy of this statement. The fragments, at least, of
Ὁμοιώματα preserved by Stobæus seem to belong to a Stoic. Perhaps from
the Ὅμοια come the statements in Sen. Ep. 36, 3; 115, 8; Plut. De Aud.
8, p. 42; De Sanit. 20, p. 133; De Exil. 5, p. 600; Præc. Ger. Reip. 9,
4, p. 804; Aqua an Ign. Util. 12, 2, p. 958.
[26] Herillus’s native place was Carthage (Diog. vii. 37; 165). If
Χαλχηδόνιος is read by Cobet in the last passage, we have again the
same confusion between Καλχηδὼν and Καρχηδὼν, which made Xenocrates a
Καρχηδόνιος. He came as a boy under Zeno (Diog. 166; Cic. Acad. ii. 42,
129). Diog. l.c. enumerates the writings of Herillus, calling them,
however, ὀλιγόστιχα μὲν δυνάμεως δὲ μεστά. Cic. De Orat. iii. 17. 62,
speaks of a School bearing his name, but no pupil belonging to it is
known.
[27] Citium was his birthplace. His father’s name was Demetrius (Diog.
6; 36), and his own nickname Dorotheus (Suid. Περσ.). According to
Diog. 36; Sotion and Nicias in Athen. iv. 162, d; Gell. ii. 18, 8;
Orig. C. Cels. iii. 483, d; he was first a slave of Zeno’s, which
agrees with his being a pupil and inmate of his house (Diog. 36; 13;
Cic. N. D. i. 15, 38; Athen. xiii. 607, e; Pausan. ii. 8, 4). It is
less probable that he was presented by Antigonus to Zeno as a copyist
(Diog. 36). He subsequently lived at the court of Antigonus (Athen. vi.
251, c; xiii. 607, a; Themist. Or. xxxii., p. 358), whose son
Halcyoneus (Ælian, V. H. iii. 17, says falsely himself) he is said to
have instructed (Diog. 36), and with whom he stood in high favour
(Plut. Arat. 18; Athen. vi. 251, c). He, however, allowed the
Macedonian garrison in Corinth to be surprised by Aratus, in 243 B.C.,
and, according to Pausan. ii. 8, 4; vii. 8, 1, perished on that
occasion. The contrary is asserted by Plut. Arat. 23, and Athen. iv.
162, c. In his teaching and manner of life, he appears to have taken a
very easy view of the Stoic principles (Diog. 13; 36; Athen. iv. 162,
b; xiii. 607, a). It is therefore probable that he did not agree with
Aristo’s Cynicism (Diog. vii. 162), and his pupil Hermagoras wrote
against the Cynics (Suid. Ἑρμαγ.). Political reasons were at the bottom
of Menedemus’ hatred for him (Diog. ii. 143). Otherwise, he appears as
a genuine Stoic (Diog. vii. 120; Cic. N. D. i. 15, 38; Minuc. Felix
Octav. 21, 3; Philodem. De Mus., Vol. Herc. i. col. 14). Compare p. 39,
2. The treatises mentioned by Diog. 36 are chiefly ethical and
political. In addition to these, there was a treatise on Ethics (Diog.
28); the συμποτικὰ ὑπομνήματα, or συμποτικοὶ διάλογοι, from which
Athen. (iv. 162, b; xiii. 607, a) gives some extracts; and the Ἱστορία
(in Suid.). Whether Cicero’s statement is taken from a treatise omitted
by Diogenes, or from that περὶ ἀσεβείας, it is hard to say.
[28] According to the sketch of his life in Buhle (Arat. Opp. i. 3),
Aratus was a pupil of Persæus at Athens, in company with whom he
repaired to Antigonus in Macedonia, which can only mean that he was,
together with Persæus, a pupil of Zeno. Another writer in Buhle (ii.
445) calls him so, mentioning one of his letters addressed to Zeno.
Other accounts (Ibid. ii. 431; 442; 446) describe him as a pupil of
Dionysius of Heraclea, or of Timon and Menedemus. A memorial of his
Stoicism is the introduction to his ‘Phænomena,’ a poem resembling the
hymn of Cleanthes. Asclepiades (Vita in Buhle, ii. 429), in calling him
a native of Tarsus, is only preferring a better-known Cilician town to
one less known.
[29] Hence his name ὁ Μεταθέμενος. On his writings, consult Diog. vii.
166; 37; 23; v. 92; Athen. vii. 281, d; x. 437, e; Cic. Acad. ii. 22,
71; Tusc. ii. 25, 60; Fin. v. 31, 94. Previously to Zeno, he is said to
have studied under Heraclides ὁ Ποντικὸς, Alexinus, and Menedemus.
[30] Diog. 177; Plut. Cleomen. 2; 11; Athen. viii. 354, e. Sphærus’
presence in Egypt seems to belong to the time before he became
connected with Cleomenes. He was a pupil of Cleanthes (Diog. vii. 185;
Athen. l.c.) when he went to Egypt, and resided there at the court of
Ptolemy for several years. He had left Egypt by 221 B.C., but was then
himself no longer a member of the Stoic School at Athens. It is
possible that Sphærus may first have come to Cleomenes on a commission
from the Egyptian king. In that case, the Ptolemy referred to must have
been either Ptolemy Euergetes or Ptolemy Philadelphus—certainly not
Philopator, as Diog. 177 says. If, however, the view is taken that it
was Ptolemy Philopator, it may be supposed that Sphærus repaired to
Egypt with Cleomenes in 221 B.C. Sphærus’ numerous writings (Diog. 178:
Λακωνικὴ πολιτεία also in Athen. iv. 141, 6) refer to all parts of
philosophy, and to some of the older philosophers. According to Cic.
Tusc. iv. 24, 53, his definitions were in great esteem in the Stoic
School.
[31] Athenodorus, a native of Soli (Diog. vii. 38; 100); Callippus of
Corinth (Diog. 38); Philonides of Thebes, who went with Persæus to
Antigonus (Diog. 9; 38); Posidonius of Alexandria (Diog. 38); Zeno of
Sidon, a pupil of Diodorus Cronus, who joined Zeno (Diog. 38; 16;
Suid.).
[32] Baguet, De Chrysippo. Annal. Lovan. vol. iv. Lovan. 1822.
[33] Εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος οὐκ ἂν ἦν στοά (Diog. 183). Cic. Acad. ii.
24, 75: Chrysippum, qui fulcire putatur porticum Stoicorum, Athen.
viii. 335, b.: Χρύσιππον τὸν τῆς στοᾶς ἡγεμόνα. See Baguet, p. 16.
[34] It is recorded (Diog. 179) that he was brought up in early life as
a racer, which is an exceedingly suspicious statement, (confer D, 168);
and that his paternal property was confiscated (Hecato in Diog. 181).
Subsequently, his domestic establishment was scanty, consisting of one
old servant (Diog. 185; 181; 183); but whether this was the result of
Stoicism or of poverty is not known. The Floril. Monac. (in Stob.
Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 289) 262 calls him λιτὸς, ἔχων χρήματα πολλά.
[35] According to Apollodorus in Diog. 184, he died c. 205 B.C., in his
73rd year, which would make 281 to 276 the year of his birth. According
to Lucian, Macrob. 20, he attained the age of 81, and, according to
Valer. Max. viii. 7 ext. 10, completed the 39th book of his logic in
his eightieth year.
[36] This is the view of Diog. 179; Plut. De Exil. 14, p. 605; Strabo,
xiii. 1. 57, p. 610; xiv. 4, 8, p. 671, and most writers. Alexander
Polyhistor, however, in Diog. and Suid. Ζήν. call him a native of
Tarsus; and since his father Apollonius migrated from Tarsus to Soli
(Strabo, p. 671), it is possible that Chrysippus may have been born in
Tarsus.
[37] On this point all authorities are agreed. When and how he came to
Athens is not recorded. He subsequently obtained the rights of
citizenship there (Plut. Sto. Rep. 4, 2, p. 1034).
[38] Diog. 179. This statement cannot be tested by chronology.
Authorities, however, do not look promising.
[39] Diog. Pro. 15. Strabo, xiii. 1, 57, 610.
[40] Diog. vii. 183. It is possible, as Ritter, iii. 524, supposes,
that he was for some time doubtful about Stoicism, whilst he was under
the influence of the Academic Scepticism, and that during this time he
wrote the treatise against συνήθεια. This is possible, but not
probable. But that he should have separated from Cleanthes, and have
set up a school in the Lyceum in opposition to him, is unlikely, and
does not follow from the words of Diog. 179; 185.
[41] Diog. 184; iv. 62. Cic. Acad. ii. 27, 87. Plut. Sto. Rep. p. 10,
3, 1036. These passages refer particularly to Chrysippus’ six books
κατὰ τῆς συνηθείας. On the other hand, his pupil Aristocreon, in Plut.
l.c. 2, 5, commends him as being τῶν Ἀκαδημιακῶν στραγγαλίδων κοπίδα.
(Conf. Plut. Comm. Not. i. 4, p. 1059).
[42] When a learner, he is said to have used these words to Cleanthes:
‘Give me the principles; the proofs I can find myself.’ Subsequently it
was said of him: ‘If the Gods have any logic, it is that of Chrysippus’
(Diog. 179). See Cic. N. D. i. 15, 30, where the Epicurean calls him
Stoicorum somniorum vaferrimus interpres: ii. 6, 16; iii. 10, 25:
Divin. i. 3, 6: Chrysippus acerrimo vir ingenio. Senec. Benefic. i. 3,
8; 4, 1, complains of his captiousness. Dionys. Hal. Comp. Verb. 68,
calls him the most practical logician, but the most careless writer.
Krische, Forsch. i. 445.
[43] Diog. 180. Athen. xiii. 565, a. Damasc. V. Isid. 36. Cic. Tusc. i.
45, 108.
[44] Diog. 179; 183.
[45] Diog. 185, mentions it as deserving of especial notice, that he
refused the invitation of Ptolemy to court, and dedicated none of his
numerous writings to a prince.
[46] Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 143. Diog. 179. Plut. Sto. Rep. 4, 1, p. 1034.
According to the latter passage, Antipater had written a special
treatise περὶ τῆς Κλεάνθους καὶ Χρυσίππου διαφορᾶς.
[47] Quid enim est a Chrysippo prætermissum in Stoicis? Cic. Fin. i. 2,
6.
[48] According to Diog. 180, there were not fewer than 750. Conf.
Valer. Max. viii. 7, ext. 10; Lucian, Hermotim. 48.
[49] This appeared to the Epicureans disparaging to the honour of their
master. Hence the charge that Chrysippus had written against Epicurus
in rivalry (Diog. x. 26, and the criticism of Apollodorus in Diog. vii.
181).
[50] Baguet, pp. 114–357, discusses the subject very fully, but omits
several fragments. As to his logical treatises, of which alone there
were 311 (Diog. 198), see Nicolai, De logicis Chrysippi libris:
Quedlinb. 1859. Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 404. Petersen (Philosoph.
Chrysip. Fundamenta: Hamburg, 1827, 321) attempts a systematic
arrangement of all the known books.
[51] See Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 50; Dionys. Hal. See above 46, 3; Diog.
vii. 180; x. 27. Galen, Differ. Puls. ii. 10; vol. viii. 631 K;
Hippocr. et Plat. Plac. ii. 2; iii. 2; vol. v. 213, 295, 308, 312, 314,
and Baguet, 26. See also Plut. Sto. Rep. 28, 2; and Bergk, Commentat.
de Chrys. lib. περὶ ἀποφατικῶν: Cassel, 1841.
[52] The circumstances of his death are related differently in Diog.
184; but both stories are untrustworthy. The story of the ass is also
told in Lucian, Macrob. 25 of Philemon; the other version in Diog. iv.
44; 61 of Arcesilaus and Lacydes. On the statue of Chrysippus in the
Ceramicus see Diog. vii. 182; Cic. Fin. i. 11, 39; Pausan. i. 17, 2;
Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 5.
[53] In Stob. Floril. 40, 8, mention is made of the honourable position
enjoyed by the Athenian Chremonides, who had been banished from his
country. The banishment of Chremonides being placed in the year 263
B.C., Teles’ treatise περὶ φυγῆς must have been written between 260 and
250 B.C. This is further proved by the fact that there is no reference
in the fragments preserved to persons or circumstances later than this
date. The philosophers to whom reference is made are the Cynics
Diogenes, Crates, Metrocles, Stilpo, Bio the Borysthenite, Zeno, and
Cleanthes (95, 21), the latter being called ὁ Ἄσσιος.
[54] Floril. 5, 67; 40, 8; 91, 33; 93, 31; 98, 72; 108, 82 and 83.
[55] According to Suid., he was born c. 275 B.C., and died in his 80th
year.
[56] See p. 41, 2.
[57] Conf. Diog. 54: ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὐτόν ...
κριτήριά φησιν εἶναι αἴσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν. That he was junior to
Aratus appears by his commentary on Aratus’ poem. See Appendix to
Geminus, Elem. Astron. (Petavii Doctr. Temp. III. 147). The Vita Arati
(Von Buhle’s Aratus, vol. ii. 443), probably confounding him with the
Peripatetic Boëthus, calls him a native of Sidon.
[58] We shall have occasion to prove this in speaking of his views of a
criterion, and of his denial of a conflagration and destruction of the
world. Nevertheless, he is frequently appealed to as an authority among
the Stoics. Philo, Incorruptib. M. 947, C, classes him among ἄνδρες ἐν
τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς δόγμασιν ἰσχυκότες.
[59] This follows from the great importance of Chrysippus, and the
esteem in which he was held from the very first, and is confirmed by
the number of persons to whom he wrote treatises. See the list from
Diog. 189 in Fabric. Bibl. iii. 549. It is, however, ambiguous whether
πρὸς means to or against.
[60] Aristocreon, the nephew of Chrysippus, is the only pupil who can
be definitely mentioned by name. See Diog. vii. 185; Plut. Sto. Rep. 2,
5, p. 1033.
[61] What is known of this philosopher is limited to the statements in
Diog. 35; Suid. Ζήν. Διοσκ.; Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 13, 7; Arius Didymus,
Ibid. xv. 17, 2; that he was a native of Tarsus (in Suid. τινὲς say of
Sidon, evidently confounding him with the Zeno mentioned p. 44, 3);
that he was the son of Dioscorides, the pupil and follower of
Chrysippus; that he left many pupils, but few writings; and that he
doubted a conflagration of the world.
[62] According to Diog. vi. 81; Lucian, Macrob. 20, he was a native of
Seleucia on the Tigris; but he is sometimes called a native of Babylon
(Diog. vii. 39; 55; Cic. N. D. i. 15, 41; Divin. i. 3, 6; Plut. De
Exil. 14, p. 605). Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6, calls him a pupil of
Chrysippus; and Acad. ii. 30, 98, the instructor of Carneades in
dialectic. Plut. Alex. Virt. 5, p. 328, calls him a pupil of Zeno (of
Tarsus). Zeno, he says, Διογένη τὸν Βαβυλώνιον ἔπεισε φιλοσοφεῖν. Diog.
vii. 71, mentions a διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη of his; and, vii. 55 and 57, a
τέχνη περὶ φωνῆς. Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6, speaks of a treatise on
divination. Athen. iv. 168, e, of a treatise περὶ εὐγενείας, xii. 526.
d, of a work περὶ νόμων—the same work probably which, according to Cic.
Legg. iii. 5, 14, was written ‘a Dione Stoico.’ Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51,
calls him ‘magnus et gravis Stoicus;’ Seneca, De Ira, iii. 38, 1,
mentions a trait showing great presence of mind. Diogenes was, without
doubt, aged in 156 B.C. (Cic. De Senec. 7, 23). According to Lucian, he
attained the age of 88, and may therefore have died 150 B.C.
[63] It was often supposed, on the strength of Cic. N. D. i. 15, 41,
Divin. i. 3, 6, that Diogenes was the immediate successor of
Chrysippus. The words, however, consequens or subsequens, by no means
necessarily imply it. On the authority of Arius, Eusebius, and Suidas,
it would seem that Zeno was the successor of Chrysippus, and that
Diogenes followed Zeno.
[64] Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51, only calls him his pupil; but it is clear
that he taught in Athens from Plut. Ti. Gracch. c. 8, as Zumpt, Ueber
die philos. Schulen in Athen. Abh. d. Berl. Acad. 1842, Hist. phil. kl.
p. 103, already remarks; and Plut. Tranq. An. 9, p. 469, seems to imply
that he continued to live at Athens after leaving Cilicia. The same
fact is conveyed by the mention of Diogenists and Panætiasts at Athens
(Athen. v. c. 2, p. 186, a); by the charge brought against Antipater
(Plut. Garrul. c. 23, p. 514; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 6; Cic.
Acad ii. 6, 17, and the fragment from Acad. Post. I. in Non. p. 65),
that he never ventured to dispute with Carneades; and by Diog. iv. 65;
Stob. Floril. 119, 19. According to these two authorities, he
voluntarily put an end to his own life. In Acad. ii. 47, 143, Cicero
calls him and Archedemus ‘duo vel principes dialecticorum,
opiniosissimi homines.’ It appears from Off. iii. 12, 51, where he is
also called ‘homo acutissimus,’ that he pronounced a severer judgment
on several moral questions than Diogenes. Sen. Ep. 92, 5, reckons him
among the magnos Stoicæ sectæ auctores. Epictet. Diss. iii. 21, 7,
speaks of the φορὰ Ἀντιπάτρου καὶ Ἀρχεδήμου. See Van Lynden, De
Panætio, 33; and Fabric. Biblioth. iii. 538 for his numerous lost
treatises.
[65] Cic. l.c.; Strabo xiv. 4, 14, p. 674, Epictet. l.c.; Diog. vii.
55. It does not follow that they were cotemporaries, but only that
their writings and philosophy were the same. We have otherwise no
accurate information as to the date of Archedemus. Passages where he is
mentioned may be found in Fabric. Bibl. III. 540. He also appears to be
meant in Simpl. De Cœlo, Schol. in Arist. 505, a, 45. In Diog. 134, he
appears to be placed between Chrysippus and Posidonius. In Plut. De
Exil. 14, 605, he follows Antipater. According to this authority he
established a school in Babylon, and because he came there from Athens,
Plutarch appears to have considered him an Athenian.
[66] Apollodorus of Athens, the compiler of the Βιβλιοθήκη, a
well-known grammarian, is also mentioned as a pupil of Diogenes
(Scymnus, Chius Perieges. v. 20). His chronicle, dedicated to Attalus
II., Philadelphus of Pergamum (158–138 B.C.), and probably drawn up 144
B.C., would seem to corroborate this assertion. Panætius, whose pupil
he is elsewhere called (Suid. Ἀπολλόδ.), was himself a pupil of
Diogenes’ successor, Antipater (Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6), and can hardly
have been older than Apollodorus.
Another grammarian belonging to the School of Diogenes is Zenodotus
(Diog. vii. 30), supposing him to be identical with the Alexandrian
Zenodotus (Suid. Ζηνόδ.). A third is perhaps the celebrated
Aristarchus, whom Scymnus calls a fellow-disciple of Apollodorus. A
fourth, Crates of Mallos, called by Strabo, xiv. 5, 16, p. 676, the
instructor of Panætius, by Suid. a Stoic philosopher, who in Varro,
Lat. ix. 1, appeals to Chrysippus against Aristarchus.
Antipater’s pupils are Heraclides of Tarsus (Diog. vii. 121); Sosigenes
(Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142); C. Blossius of Cumæ (Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8,
17 and 20; Val. Max. iv. 7, 1; Cic. Læl. 11, 37). Eudromus, mentioned
by Diog. vii. 39, appears to belong to the time between Chrysippus and
Panætius. Between Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes, Diog. vii. 84, names a
certain Apollodorus, the author, probably, of the fragments in Stob.
Ecl. i. 408 and 520. Possibly, however, he may be identical with the
Apollodorus mentioned by Cic. N. D. i. 34, 93, and consequently a
cotemporary of Zeno. In Diog. vii. 39, he is called Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ
Ἔφιλλος, instead of which Cobet reads Ἀπολλόδωρος καὶ Σύλλος.
Apollodorus the Athenian, mentioned by Diog. vii. 181, is without doubt
the Epicurean, known to us also from Diog. x. 2 and 25. Krische,
Forsch. 26, thinks even that the passages in Cicero refer to him.
The age of Diogenes of Ptolemais (Diog. vii. 41), of Œnopides mentioned
by Stob. Ecl. i. 58; Macrob. Sat. i. 17, together with Diogenes and
Cleanthes, and of Nicostratus, mentioned by Philodemus περὶ θεῶν
διαγωγῆς Tab. I. 2 and perhaps by Artemidorus Oneirocrit. I. 2 Sch. is
quite unknown. Nicostratus, however, must have written before the
middle of the first century before Christ. He is probably distinct from
the Nicostratus who wrote on the Aristotelian categories in an adverse
spirit, and is referred to by Simpl. in Categ. Schol. in Arist. 40, a;
24, b, 16; 41, b, 27; 47, b, 23; 49, b, 43; 72, b, 6; 74, b, 4; 81, b,
12; 83, a, 37; 84, a, 28; 86, b, 20; 87, b, 30; 88, b, 3 and 11; 89, a,
1; 91, a, 25; b, 21. For this Nicostratus used the treatise of a
certain Roman Lucius, whereas Roman treatises on the Categories can
hardly have existed before the time of Philodemus, a cotemporary of
Cicero. However, both Lucius and Nicostratus appear to have been
Stoics.
[67] Already Simpl. in Cat. Schol. in Arist. 49, a, 16, says: παρὰ τοῖς
Στωϊκοῖς, ὧν ἐφ’ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν συγγραμμάτων
ἐπιλέλοιπεν.
[68] Plut. Plac. Pro. 2: οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωϊκοὶ ἔφασαν, τὴν μὲν σοφίαν
εἶναι θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην· τὴν δὲ φιλοσοφίαν ἄσκησιν
τέχνης ἐπιτηδείου· ἐπιτήδειον δ’ εἶναι μίαν καὶ ἀνωτάτω τὴν ἀρετήν·
ἀρετὰς δὲ τὰς γενικωτάτας τρεῖς, φυσικὴν, ἠθικὴν, λογικὴν, κ.τ.λ. See
also Diog. vii. 92.
[69] In Seneca, Ep. 89, 4, wisdom is the highest good for the human
mind, and philosophy is a striving after wisdom: wisdom is defined to
be the knowledge of things human and divine; philosophy to be studium
virtutis, or studium corrigendæ mentis. This striving after virtue
cannot be distinguished from virtue itself: Philosophia studium
virtutis est, sed per ipsam virtutem. Seneca further observes (Fr. 17,
in Lactant. Inst. iii. 15): Philosophia nihil aliud est quam recta
vivendi ratio, vel honeste vivendi scientia, vel ars rectæ vitæ agendæ.
Non errabimus, si dixerimus philosophiam esse legem bene honesteque
vivendi, et qui dixerit illam regulam vitæ, suum illi [nomen] reddidit.
Plut. see previous note.
[70] See Diog. vii. 46: αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι καὶ
ἀρετὴν ἐν εἴδει περιέχουσαν ἀρετὰς, κ.τ.λ.
[71] Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 6: δεῖ γὰρ τούτοις [sc. τοῖς
φυσικοῖς] συνάψαι τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, οὐκ οὔσης ἄλλης
ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν ἀμείνονος οὐδ’ ἀναφορᾶς, οὐδ’ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκεν τῆς
φυσικῆς θεωρίας παραληπτῆς οὔσης ἢ πρὸς τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν
διάστασιν.
[72] Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 3, 2: ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσι φιλοσόφοις
ἐπιβάλλειν μάλιστα τὸν σχολαστικὸν βίον ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, οὗτοί μοι δοκοῦσι
διαμαρτάνειν ὑπονοοῦντες διαγωγῆς τινος ἕνεκεν δεῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ
ἄλλου τινὸς τούτῳ παραπλησίου, καὶ τὸν ὅλον βίον οὕτω πως διελκύσαι·
τοῦτο δ’ ἔστιν, ἂν σαφῶς θεωρηθῇ, ἡδέως. Διαγωγὴ had, it is true, been
treated by Aristotle, whose school is here referred to, as an end in
itself; but Aristotle had carefully distinguished διαγωγὴ from ἡδονή.
[73] p. 19.
[74] Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 129: Herillum, qui in cognitione et scientia
summum bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo
dissenserit, et quam non multum a Platone. Fin. ii. 13, 43: Herillus
autem ad scientiam omnia revocans unum quoddam bonum vidit. iv. 14, 36:
In determining the highest good, the Stoics act as one-sidedly, as if
ipsius animi, ut fecit Herillus, cognitionem amplexarentur, actionem
relinquerent. v. 25, 73: Sæpe ab Aristotele, a Theophrasto mirabiliter
est laudata per se ipsa rerum scientia. Hoc uno captus Herillus
scientiam summum bonum esse defendit, nec rem ullam aliam per se
expetendam. Diog. vii. 165: Ἥριλλος ... τέλος εἶπε τὴν ἐπιστήμην. Ibid.
vii. 37. With less accuracy, it is asserted by Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i.
918, that we are raised to the society of the gods, κατὰ Ἥριλλον,
ἐπιστήμῃ.
[75] Sen. Ep. 89, 8: Nam nec philosophia sine virtute est nec sine
philosophia virtus. Ibid. 53, 8: We all lie in the slumber of error:
sola autem nos philosophia excitabit ... illi te totum dedica.
[76] Lact. Inst. vii. 7: Ad virtutem capessendam nasci homines, Ariston
disseruit. See Stob. Ecl. 4, 111.
[77] Plut. De Audiendo, c. 8, p. 42: οὔτε γὰρ βαλανείου, φησὶν ὁ
Ἀρίστων, οὔτε λόγου μὴ καθαίροντος ὄφελός ἐστιν.
[78] Stob. Floril. 82, 15. Diog. vii. 161.
[79] Stob. Floril. 82, 11.
[80] Ibid. 7.
[81] Diog. vii. 162: μάλιστα δὲ προσεῖχε Στωϊκῷ δόγματι τῷ τὸν σόφον
ἀδόξαστον εἶναι.
[82] See Diog. vii. 163.
[83] Aristo (in the Ὁμοιώματα) in Stob. Floril. 82, 16: ὁ ἐλλέβορος
ὁλοσχερέστερος μὲν ληφθεὶς καθαίρει, εἰς δὲ πάνυ σμικρὰ τριφθεὶς
πνίγει· οὕτω καὶ ἡ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λεπτολογία.
[84] Stob. l.c. 4, 110.
[85] See following note and Cic. Acad. ii. 39, 123: Aristo Chius, qui
nihil istorum (sc. physicorum) sciri putat posse.
[86] Diog. vii. 160: τόν σε φυσικὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν λογικὸν ἀνῄρει, λέγων
τὸν μὲν εἶναι ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, τὸν δ’ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, μόνον δὲ τὸν ἠθικὸν
εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Stob. Floril. 80, 7: Ἀρίστων ἔφη τῶν ζητουμένων παρὰ
τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τὰ μὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὰ δὲ μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὰ δ’
ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς. πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ, μὴ πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ τὰ διαλεκτικά· μὴ
γὰρ συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν βίου· ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς δὲ τὰ φυσικά· ἀδύνατα
γὰρ ἐγνῶσθαι καὶ οὐδὲ παρέχειν χρείαν. Minuc. Fel. Octav. 13, and
Lactant. Ins. iii. 20, attribute this utterance to Socrates. According
to Cic. De Nat. De. I. 14, 37, Aristo expressed doubts about the
existence of a God.
[87] Sext. Math. vii. 13: καὶ Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος οὐ μόνον, ὥς φασι,
παρῃτεῖτο τήν τε φυσικὴν καὶ λογικὴν θεωρίαν διὰ τὸ ἀνωφελὲς καὶ πρὸς
κακοῦ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ τόπου τινὰς
συμπεριέγραψε καθάπερ τόν τε παραινετικὸν καὶ τὸν ὑποθετικὸν τόπον·
τούτους γὰρ εἰς τίτθας ἂν καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς πίπτειν·—(almost a literal
translation is given of these words by Seneca, Ep. 89, 13)—ἀρκεῖσθαι δὲ
πρὸς τὸ μακαρίως βιῶναι τὸν οἰκειοῦντα μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν λόγον,
ἀπαλλοτριοῦντα δὲ κακίας, κατατρέχοντα δὲ τῶν μεταξὺ τούτων, περὶ ἃ οἱ
πολλοὶ πτοηθέντες κακοδαιμονοῦσιν. Seneca, Ep. 94, 1: Eam partem
philosophiæ, quæ dat propria cuique personæ præcepta ... quidam solam
receperunt ... sed Ariston Stoicus e contrario hanc partem levem
existimat et quæ non descendat in pectus usque; at illam habentem
præcepta [? ad vitam beatam] plurimum ait proficere ipsa decreta
philosophiæ constitutionemque summi boni, quam qui bene intellexit ac
didicit, quid in quaque re faciendum sit, sibi ipse præcepit. This is
then further expanded following Aristo.
[88] Seneca, § 12, asks for whom should such exhortations be
necessary—for him who has right views of good and evil, or for him who
has them not? Qui non habet, nihil a te adjuvabitur; aures ejus
contraria monitionibus tuis fama possedit; qui habet exactum judicium
de fugiendis petendisque, scit, quid sibi faciendum sit, etiam te
tacente; tota ergo pars ista philosophiæ submoveri potest. In § 17, he
continues: A madman must be cured, and not exhorted; nor is there any
difference between general madness and the madness which is treated
medically.
[89] Diog. vii. 39.
[90] Logical treatises, those περὶ λέξεων, λύσεις καὶ ἔλεγχοι, περὶ
λόγου—and if there were a rhetoric (see p. 40, 3) the τέχνη—physical
treatises, those περὶ ὅλου and περὶ οὐσίας. Diog. 4, 39.
[91] Plut. Sto. Rep. 8, 2: ἔλυε δὲ σοφίσματα καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν, ὡς
τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην, ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν τοὺς μαθητάς. That he
occasionally not only solved but propounded sophisms is proved by the
fallacy quoted Ibid. i. Conf. Diog. vii. 25
[92] See above p. 36.
[93] According to Diog. 32, he declared at the beginning of his Polity
the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία to be useless—a testimony worth very little; for
it is a moot point, in what sense Zeno made this statement. Perhaps he
was only anxious to exclude those studies from the narrower sphere of
philosophy (as Sen. Ep. 88). Perhaps his Polity was nearer Cynicism
than any other of his writings.
[94] Proofs will be given later.
[95] The Catalogue in Diog. 174, περὶ λόγου 3 B. (Mohnike Cleanth. 102,
believes this work was a treatise on life according to reason. The
title is against this view, and it is also improbable, inasmuch as
treatises by Sphærus and Chrysippus bearing the same title, are
exclusively logical), mentions logical treatises περὶ λόγου, περὶ
ἐπιστήμης, περὶ ἰδίων, περὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, περὶ διαλεκτικῆς, περὶ
κατηγορημάτων. To these may be added, from Athen. 467, d; 471, b, the
rhetorical treatises περὶ τρόπων and περὶ μεταλήψεως. Of greater
importance were the physical and theological treatises: περὶ τῆς τοῦ
Ζήνωνος φυσιολογίας (2 B.); τῶν Ἡρακλείτου ἐξηγήσεις (4 B.); πρὸς
Δημόκριτον, περὶ θεῶν, περὶ μαντικῆς (Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6); περὶ
γιγάντων (in Plut. De Flum. 5, 3); and the μυθικὰ (Athen. xiii. 572,
e), which is probably identical with the ἀρχαιολογία of Diogenes.
[96] Diog. 41.
[97] Diog. vii. 178, mentions (1) logical and rhetorical writings: περὶ
τῶν Ἐρετρικῶν φιλοσόφων, περὶ ὁμοίων, περὶ ὅρων, περὶ ἕξεως, περὶ τῶν
ἀντιλεγομένων (3 B.), περὶ λόγου, τέχνη διαλεκτική (2 B.), περὶ
κατηγορημάτων, περὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν; (2) treatises on science: περὶ κόσμου
(2 B.), περὶ στοιχείων, περὶ σπέρματος, περὶ τύχης, περὶ ἐλαχίστων,
πρὸς τὰς ἀτόμους καὶ τὰ εἴδωλα, περὶ αἰσθητηρίων, περὶ Ἡρακλείτου (5
B.), περὶ μαντικῆς. That Sphærus’ definitions were particularly valued,
has been already seen, 44, 2.
[98] Chrys. in the 3rd B., περὶ θεῶν (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 4); οὐ γάρ
ἐστιν εὑρεῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδ’ ἄλλην γένεσιν ἢ τὴν ἐκ
τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ δεῖ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον
τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μέλλομέν τι ἐρεῖν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. The same
writer, in φυσικαὶ θέσεις (Ibid. 5): οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλως οὐδ’
οἰκειότερον ἐπελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τὰς
ἀρετὰς οὐδ’ ἐπὶ εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλ’ ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς
τοῦ κόσμου διοικήσεως. Further details above p. 47, 2.
[99] Sext. Math. vii. 17; Diog. 40.
[100] The chief divisions of the logic of the Stoics (Diog. 42, 46) are
considered important for special purposes. The doctrine περὶ κανόνων
καὶ κριτηρίων is of use, helping us to truth, by making us examine our
notions; ὁρικὸν, because it leads to the knowledge of things by means
of conceptions; διαλεκτικὴ (which includes the whole of formal logic),
because it produces ἀπροπτωσία (= ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πότε δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι
καὶ μὴ), ἀνεικαιότης (= ἰσχυρὸς λόγος πρὸς τὸ εἰκὸς, ὥστε μὴ ἐνδιδόναι
αὐτῷ), ἀνελεγξία (= ἰσχὺς ἐν λόγῳ, ὥστε μὴ ἀπάγεσθαι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ
ἀντικείμενον), ἀματαιότης (= ἕξις ἀναφέρουσα τὰς φαντασίας ἐπὶ τὸν
ὀρθὸν λόγον). Its value is therefore chiefly negative, as a
preservative from error. See Seneca, Ep. 89, 9: Proprietates verborum
exigit et structuram et argumentationes, ne pro vero falsa subrepant.
Sext. Math. vii. 23: ὀχυρωτικὸν δὲ εἶναι τῆς διανοίας τὸν διαλεκτικὸν
τόπον; Pyrrh. ii. 247: ἐπὶ τὴν τέχνην τὴν διαλεκτικήν φασιν ὡρμηκέναι
οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ (the Stoics), οὐχ ἁπλῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ γνῶναί τι ἐκ τίνος
συνάγεται, ἀλλὰ προηγουμένως ὑπὲρ τοῦ δι’ ἀποδεικτικῶν λόγων τὰ ἀληθῆ
καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ κρίνειν ἐπίστασθαι.
[101] This may be seen in Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 134–203, 229; Math. viii.
300; as well as from the catalogue of the writings of Chrysippus in
Diogenes.
[102] The only part which is censured by Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep.
10, 1) is the sceptical logic, which leaves contradictions unsolved:
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐποχὴν ἄγουσι περὶ πάντων ἐπιβάλλει, φησὶ, τοῦτο ποιεῖν,
καὶ συνεργόν ἐστι πρὸς ὃ βούλονται· τοῖς δ’ ἐπιστήμην ἐνεργαζομένοις,
καθ’ ἣν ὁμολογουμένως βιωσόμεθα τὰ ἐναντία στοιχειοῦν.
[103] Cic. Parad. Proœm.: Cato autem perfectus mea sententia Stoicus
... in ea est hæresi, quæ nullum sequitur florem orationis neque
dilatat argumentum: minutis interrogatiunculis, quasi punctis, quod
proposuit efficit. Cic. Fin. iv. 3, 7: Pungunt quasi aculeis
interrogatiunculis angustis, quibus etiam qui assentiuntur nihil
commutantur animo. See also Diog. vii. 18, 20.
[104] In Sextus Empiricus, Διαλεκτικοὶ is their ordinary name. It is
also found in Plut. Qu. Plat. x. 1, 2, p. 1008. Cic. Top. 2, 6; Fin.
iv. 3, 6.
[105] After the example of the Megarians, the Stoics were in the habit
of putting their arguments in the form of questions. Hence the terms
λόγον ἐρωτᾶν (Diog. vii. 186), interrogatio (Sen. Ep. 82, 9; 85, 1; 87,
11), interrogatiuncula (Cic.), which are employed even when the
arguments were not in this form.
[106] See p. 48, 1.
[107] Called μέρη, according to Diog. 39 also τόποι, εἴδη, γένη.
[108] Diog. 39: τριμερῆ φασιν εἶναι τὸν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγον· εἶναι
γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μέν τι φυσικὸν, τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν, τὸ δὲ λογικόν. οὕτω δὲ
πρῶτος διεῖλε Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐν τῷ περὶ λόγου καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ αʹ
περὶ λόγου καὶ ἐν τῇ αʹ τῶν φυσικῶν, καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Ἔφιλλος ἐν τῷ
πρώτῳ τῶν εἰς τὰ δόγματα εἰσαγωγῶν, καὶ Εὔδρομος ἐν τῇ ἠθικῇ
στοιχειώσει, καὶ Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος, καὶ Ποσειδώνιος. Sext. Math.
vii. 16. Sen. Ep. 89, 9; 14. The six divisions enumerated by Cleanthes
(Diog. 41)—Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology
(Diog. 41) may be easily reduced to three.
[109] According to Diog. 40, the first place was assigned to Logic, the
second to Science, the third to Ethics, by Zeno, Chrysippus,
Archedemus, Eudemus, and others. The same order, but inverted, is found
in Diogenes of Ptolemais, and in Seneca, Ep. 89, 9. The latter,
however, observes (Nat. Qu. Prol. 1) that the difference between that
part of philosophy which treats about God, and that which treats about
man, is as great as the difference between philosophy and other
departments, or even as between God and man. On the other hand,
Apollodorus places Ethics in the middle, as also Cleanthes does, and
likewise Panætius and Posidonius, if it is certain that they began with
science. This appears, however, only to have reference to their order
in discussion (see Sext. Math. vii. 22, probably on the authority of
Posidonius). A few (Diog. 40) asserted that the parts could be so
little separated, that they must be always treated together. The
statement of Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 1), that Logic must come
first, and be followed by Ethics and Science, so that the theological
part may form the conclusion, only refers to the order in which they
ought to be taught.
[110] In Diog. 39; Sext. Math. vii. 17; Philo, Mut. Nom. p. 1055, E.
Hösch. (589 M); De Agricul. 189, D (302), philosophy is compared to an
orchard, Logic represents the fence, Science the trees. Ethics the
fruit; so that Ethics are the end and object of the whole. Philosophy
is also compared to a fortified town, in which the walls are
represented by Logic, but in which the position of the other two is not
clear; to an egg, Logic being the shell, and, according to Sextus,
Science being the white and Ethics the yolk, but the reverse according
to Diogenes. Dissatisfied with this comparison, Posidonius preferred to
compare philosophy to a living creature, in which Logic constitutes the
bones and muscles, Science the flesh and blood, and Ethics the soul.
But Diogenes has another version of this simile, according to which
Science represents the soul; and Ritter iii. 432, considers the version
of Diogenes to be the older of the two.
[111] See Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 13.
[112] Diog. 41: τὸ δὲ λογικὸν μέρος φασὶν ἔνιοι εἰς δύο διαιρεῖσθαι
ἐπιστήμας, εἰς ῥητορικὴν καὶ διαλεκτικήν ... τήν τε ῥητορικὴν ἐπιστήμην
οὖσαν τοῦ εὖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐν διεξόδῳ λόγων καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν τοῦ
ὀρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει λόγων. Sen. Ep.
89, 17: Superest ut rationalem partem philosophiæ dividam: omnis oratio
aut continua est aut inter respondentem et interrogantem discissa; hanc
διαλεκτικὴν, illam ῥητορικὴν placuit vocari. Cic. Fin. ii. 6, 17; Orat.
32, 113. Quintil. Inst. ii. 20, 7. According to these passages,
Rhetoric was by Zeno compared to the palm of the hand, and Dialectic to
the fist: quod latius loquerentur rhetores, dialectici autem
compressius. The Stoics agree with Aristotle in calling rhetoric
ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ (Sop. in Hermog. v. 15, Walz.). See Prantl,
Gesch. der Log. i. 413.
[113] Diog. 41: Some divide logic into rhetoric and dialectic: τινὲς δὲ
καὶ εἰς τὸ ὁρικὸν εἶδος, τὸ περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων· ἔνιοι δὲ τὸ
ὁρικὸν περιαιροῦσι. (We have no reason to read as Ménage does
περιδιαιροῦσι, or to conjecture, as Meibom and Nicolai, De Log. Chrys.,
Lib. 23, do, παραδιαιροῦσι.) According to this passage, ὁρικὸν must be
identical with the doctrine of a criterium. In a subsequent passage,
however, the two are distinguished; the doctrine of a criterium is said
to be useful for the discovery of truth: καὶ τὸ ὁρικὸν δὲ ὁμοίως πρὸς
ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας· διὰ γὰρ τῶν εὐνοιῶν τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνεται. We
may therefore suppose that in the passage first quoted the words should
be τὸ ὁρικὸν εἶδος καὶ τὸ περὶ κανόνων, κ.τ.λ. In this case, we may
understand by ὁρικὸν not only the theory of definition—a theory to
which Aristotle devoted a separate section at the end of his Analytics
(Anal. Post. ii.)—but besides a theoretical disquisition on the
formation of definitions, a collection of definitions of various
objects. Such collections are found in the treatises of Chrysippus
(Diog. 199, 189): περὶ τῶν ὅρων ζʹ. ὅρων διαλεκτικῶν στʹ. ὅρων τῶν κατὰ
γένος ζʹ. ὅρων τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας αβʹ. ὅρων τῶν τοῦ ἀστείου βʹ.
ὅρων τῶν τοῦ φαύλου βʹ. ὅρων τῶν ἀναμέσων βʹ; besides the further
treatises περὶ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῖς ὅροις ἀντιλεγομένων ζʹ. Πιθανὰ εἰς
τοὺς ὅρους βʹ. The treatise περὶ εἰδῶν καὶ γενῶν βʹ may also be
included here; perhaps also that περὶ τῶν κατηγορημάτων πρὸς Μητρόδωρον
ιʹ. πρὸς Πάσυλον περὶ κατηγορημάτων δʹ, Diog. 191.
[114] No description of their system can dispense with this fundamental
enquiry, which had been already instituted by Zeno. It appears,
however, to have been treated by several writers as a branch of
dialectic. Diog. 43 says that the branch of dialectic which treats of
σημαινόμενα may be divided εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν τόπον καὶ τῶν
ἐκ τούτων ὑφισταμένων λεκτῶν. (See Nicolai p. 23.) Compare with this
the words of Diocles, in Diog. 49: ἀρέσκει τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς περὶ φαντασίας
καὶ αἰσθήσεως προτάττειν λόγον, καθότι τὸ κριτήριον ᾧ ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν
πραγμάτων γινώσκεται, κατὰ γένος φαντασία ἐστὶ καὶ καθότι ὁ περὶ
συγκαταθέσεως καὶ ὁ περὶ καταλήψεως καὶ νοήσεως λόγος προάγων τῶν ἄλλων
οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας συνίσταται. According to this passage, the branch of
dialectic which treated of φαντασία included the theory of knowledge.
Diog. 53, Petersen’s conjecture is singular (Phil. Chrys. Fund. p. 25)
that the theory of knowledge may have been understood by Chrysippus
under the name rhetoric.
[115] Our information on this head is very small. In the words:
ῥητορικὴ verba curat et sensus et ordinem, a division of rhetoric is
implied by Seneca, which differs in little, except in the position of
the chief parts, from that of Aristotle. A fourth part is added to the
three others by Diog. 43—on Delivery—εἶναι δ’ αὐτῆς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἴς
τε τὴν εὕρεσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν φράσιν, καὶ εἰς τάξιν καὶ εἰς τὴν ὑπόκρισιν.
Diogenes also claims for the Stoics the Aristotelian distinction
between three ways of speaking—συμβουλευτικὸς, δικανικὸς,
ἐγκωμιαστικός—and four parts in a speech: προοίμιον, διήγησις, τὰ πρὸς
τοὺς ἀντιδίκους, ἐπίλογος. Definitions of διήγησις and παράδειγμα are
given from Zeno by the anonymous author in Spengel, Rhet. Gr. i. 434,
23; 447, 11. The same author (Ibid. 454, 4) says that, according to
Chrysippus, the ἐπίλογος must be μονομερής. The Stoic definition of
rhetoric has been already given, p. 70, 1. Another—τέχνη περὶ κόσμου
καὶ εἰρημένου λόγου τάξιν—is attributed to Chrysippus by Plut. Sto.
Rep. 28, 1. Cic. Fin. iv. 3, 7, observes, in reference to the Stoic
rhetoric, and in particular to that of Chrysippus, that such was its
nature that si quis obmutescere concupierit, nihil aliud legere
debeat—that it dealt in nothing but words, being withal scanty in
expressions, and confined to subtleties. This neglect of the truly
rhetorical element appears already in the quotations from Plut. Sto.
Rep. 28, 2. We have not the slightest reason to complain, as Prantl
does, p. 413, of the purely rhetorical value of dialectic with the
Stoics.
[116] See p. 70, 1, Alex. Aphr. Top. 3: οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὁριζόμενοι
τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ εὖ λέγειν ὁρίζονται, τὸ δὲ εὖ λέγειν ἐν
τῷ ἀληθῆ καὶ προσήκοντα λέγειν εἶναι τιθέμενοι, τοῦτο δὲ ἴδιον
ἡγούμενοι τοῦ φιλοσόφου, κατὰ τῆς τελεωτάτης φιλοσοφίας φέρουσιν αὐτὸ
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μόνος ὁ φιλόσοφος κατ’ αὐτοὺς διαλεκτικός. Aristotle had
used the term dialectic in another sense, but with Plato it expressed
the mode of procedure peculiar to a philosopher.
[117] See Anon. Prolegg. ad Hermog. Rhet. Gr. vii. 8, W.: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ
τὸ εὖ λέγειν ἔλεγον τὸ ἀληθῆ λέγειν.
[118] Diog. 42: ὅθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν [τὴν διαλεκτικὴν] ὁρίζονται,
ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. (The same, p. 62, quoted
from Posidonius, and in Sext. Math. xi. 187, and Suid. Διαλεκτική.)
οὐδετέρων being probably used, because dialectic deals not only with
judgments, but with conceptions and interrogations. Conf. Diog. 68.
[119] This is the meaning of the Stoic distinction between λόγος
ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικὸς, a distinction subsequently employed by Philo
and the Fathers, and really identical with that of Aristotle (Anal.
Post i. 10, 76 b, 24): οὐ πρὸς τὸν ἔξω λόγον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.
On this distinction see Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 72, p. 142: διπλοῦς ὁ
λόγος· τούτων δ’ οἱ φιλόσοφοι (the Stoics are meant) τὸν μὲν ἐνδιάθετον
καλοῦσι, τὸν δὲ προφορικόν. ὁ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἔνδον λογισμῶν ἐστιν
ἐξάγγελος, ὁ δ’ ὑπὸ τοῖς στέρνοις καθεῖρκται. φασὶ δὲ τούτῳ χρῆσθαι καὶ
τὸ θεῖον. Sext. Math. viii. 275 (conf. Pyrrh. i. 76): οἱ δὲ Δογματικοὶ
... φασὶν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος οὐχὶ τῷ προφορικῷ λόγῳ διαφέρει τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων
... ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ. The Stoics alone can be meant by the νεώτεροι in
Theo. Smyrn. Mus. c. 18, who are contrasted with the Peripatetics for
using the terms λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός. They are also referred
to by Plut. C. Prin. Phil. 2, 1, p. 777: τὸ δὲ λέγειν, ὅτι δύο λόγοι
εἰσὶν, ὁ μὲν ἐνδιάθετος, ἡγεμόνος Ἑρμοῦ δῶρον, ὁ δ’ ἐν προφορᾷ,
διάκτορος καὶ ὀργανικὸς ἕωλόν ἐστι. The double form of Hermes is
explained by Heraclitus as referring to the twofold λόγος—Ἑρμῆς Χθόνιος
represents λόγον ἐνδιάθετον, and the heavenly Hermes (διάκτορος)
represents the προφορικόν. The distinction passed from the Stoics to
others, like Plut. Solert. An. 19, 1, p. 973; Galen, Protrept. i. 1.
[120] Diog. 43: τὴν διαλεκτικὴν διαιρεῖσθαι εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν
σημαινομένων καὶ τῆς φωνῆς τόπον. Ibid. 62: τυγχάνει δ’ αὕτη, ὡς ὁ
Χρύσιππός φησι, περὶ σημαίνοντα καὶ σημαινόμενα. Seneca l.c.:
διαλεκτικὴ in duas partes dividitur, in verba et significationes, i.e.
in res, quæ dicuntur, et vocabula, quibus dicuntur. The distinction
between τὸ σημαῖνον and τὸ σημαινόμενον, to which τὸ τυγχάνον (the real
object) must be added as a third, will be hereafter discussed in
another place. A much narrower conception of dialectic, and more nearly
approaching to that of the Peripatetics, is to be found in the
definition given by Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 213. The division there given is
also found in the Platonist Alcinous, Isag. c. 3, as Fabricius has
pointed out. It appears, therefore, not to belong to the Stoic School,
but, at most, to a few of its later members.
[121] Seneca continues: Ingens deinde sequitur utriusque divisio,
without, however, giving it.
[122] There is much which is open to doubt in Petersen’s attempt (Phil.
Chrys. Fund. 221) to settle these divisions. At the very beginning, his
reference of the words in Sext. Math. viii. 11 to the parts of logic is
unhappy. Nicolai (De Logic. Chrys. Lib. 21) has acted with greater
caution, but even much of what he says is doubtful.
[123] Diog. 55.
[124] Diog. 44: εἶναι δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἴδιον τόπον καὶ τὸν
προειρημένον περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς, ἐν ᾧ δείκνυται ἡ ἐγγράμματος φωνὴ
καὶ τίνα τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη, καὶ περὶ σολοικισμοῦ καὶ βαρβαρισμοῦ καὶ
ποιημάτων καὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμμελοῦς φωνῆς καὶ περὶ μουσικῆς καὶ
περὶ ὅρων κατά τινας καὶ διαιρέσεων καὶ λέξεων. The theory of the
determination and division of conceptions occupies such an important
place in the section περὶ φωνῆς, that we might feel disposed to suppose
some mistake in the authority. Still, from the later authorities, pp.
60–62, it is seen that by many it is usually so represented.
[125] Further particulars may be obtained in Schmidt’s Stoicorum
Grammatica (Halle, 1839); Lersch, Sprachphilosophie der Alten;
Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft, i. 265–363; Nicolai, De Log.
Chrys. Lib. 31. This part of dialectic began with enquiries into the
voice and speech. Voice is defined to be sound and speech, to be air in
motion, or something hearable—ἀὴρ πεπληγμένος ἢ τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν
ἀκοῆς; the human voice as ἔναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διάνοιας ἐκπεμπομένη, is
distinguished from the sounds of other animals, which are ἀὴρ ὑπὸ ὁρμῆς
πεπληγμένος (Diog. 55; Simpl. Phys. 97; Sext. Math. vi. 39; Gell. N. A.
vi. 15, 6). That the voice is something material is proved in various
ways (Diog. 55; Plut. Plac. iv. 20, 2; Galen, Hist. Phil. 27). The
voice, in as far as it is ἔναρθρος, or composed of letters, is called
λέξις; in as far as it expresses certain notions, it is λόγος (Diog.
56; Sext. Math. i. 155). A peculiar national mode of expression (λέξις
κεχαραγμένη ἐθνικῶς τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῶς ἢ λέξις ποταπὴ) was called
διάλεκτος (Diog. 56). The elements of λέξις are the 24 letters, divided
into 7 φωνήεντα, 6 ἄφωνα, and 11 semivowels (Diog. 57); the λόγος has 5
parts, called στοιχεῖα by Chrysippus—ὄνομα, προσηγορία, ῥῆμα,
σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον—to which Antipater added the μεσότης, or adverb
(Diog. 57; Galen, De Hippocrat. et Plat. viii. 3; Lersch, ii. 28;
Steinthal, 291). Words were not formed by caprice, but certain
peculiarities of things have been imitated in the chief sounds of which
they are composed. These peculiarities can therefore be discovered by
etymological analysis (Orig. c. Cels. i. 24; Augustin. Dialect. c. 6;
Opp. T. I. Ap. 17, c.). (Chrysippus, however, observes (in Varro, L.
Lat. ix. 1) that the same things bear different names, and vice versâ,
and (in Gell. N. A. xi. 12, 1) that every word has several meanings.)
See Simpl. Cat. 8, ζ. Five advantages and two disadvantages of speech
are enumerated Diog. 59; Sext. Math. i. 210; and poetry (Diog. 60),
various kinds of amphibolia (Diog. 62; Galen, De Soph. P. Dict. c. 4),
the formation of conceptions, and division, are treated of.
[126] Diog. vii. 54.
[127] The statements of Zeno and Cleanthes, for instance, in reference
to φαντασία, prove that these Stoics deduced their theory of knowledge
from general principles respecting notions. They therefore started from
the data supplied by the senses. A passage in Zeno, explaining the
relations of various forms of knowledge, shows that even Zeno required
progress to be from perception to conception and knowledge, and that he
distinguished these states only by the varying strength of conviction
which they produced.
[128] Plut. Plac. iv. 12. Diog. vii. 50. Nemes. Nat. Hom. 76. Φαντασία
is πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον ἑαυτό τε καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός,
in the same way, it is added, that light shows other things as well as
itself; φανταστὸν is τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν φαντασίαν, and therefore πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν
δύνηται κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν. Φαντασία is distinguished from φανταστικόν,
because no φανταστὸν corresponds to φανταστικόν· it is διάκενος
ἑλκυσμὸς, πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπ’ οὐδενὸς φανταστοῦ γινόμενον· and the
object of such an empty perception is a φάντασμα. Compare also Sext.
Math. vii. 241: διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς is called φαντασία τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν.
Impressions wholly unfounded, which give the impression of being actual
perceptions, are called by Diog. 51, ἐμφάσεις αἱ ὡσανεὶ ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων
γινόμεναι. In a wider sense, φαντασία means any kind of notion.
[129] Plut. Plac. iv. 11: οἱ Στωϊκοί φασιν· ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος
ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ χάρτης (χάρτην as Galen, H.
Phil. 24, vol. xix. reads), ἐνεργῶν εἰς ἀπογραφήν. εἰς τοῦτο μίαν
ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται· πρῶτος δὲ ὁ τῆς ἀπογραφῆς τρόπος ὁ
διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. See p. 79, 2. Orig. c. Cels. vii. 37, 720, b, says
that they taught αἰσθήσει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὰ καταλαμβανόμενα καὶ πᾶσαν
κατάληψιν ἠρτῆσθαι τῶν αἰσθήσεων.
[130] Plut. Comm. Not. 47: φαντασία τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ. The same in Diog.
vii. 45 and 50. That this was also the view of Diogenes appears from
what follows.
[131] Sext. Math. vii. 228: Κλεάνθης μὲν γὰρ ἤκουσε τὴν τύπωσιν κατὰ
εἰσοχήν τε καὶ ἐξοχὴν ὥσπερ καὶ διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων γινομένην τοῦ κηροῦ
τύπωσιν. Conf. Ibid. vii. 372; viii. 400.
[132] Sext. vii. 229, continues: Χρύσιππος δὲ ἄτοπον ἡγεῖτο τὸ
τοιοῦτον·—according to this view, it would be necessary for the soul to
receive at once many different forms, if it had to retain different
notions at the same time—αὐτὸς οὖν τὴν τύπωσιν εἰρῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος
ὑπενόει ἀντὶ τῆς ἑτεροιώσεως, ὥστε εἶναι τοιοῦτον τὸν λόγον· φαντασία
ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ψυχῆς. Objection had, however, been raised to this
definition, on the ground that not every change of the soul gives rise
to a perception, and therefore the Stoics had defined a perception more
accurately: φαντασία ἐστὶ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ ὡς ἂν ἐν ψυχῇ, which was
equivalent to saying φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ· or else in
Zeno’s definition of φαντασία as τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ they had taken ψυχὴ in
a restricted sense for τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, which really comes to the same
thing. Even this definition had, however, been found too wide, and
hence ἑτεροίωσις was limited to change in feeling (ἑτεροίωσις κατὰ
πεῖσιν). But the definition is still too wide, as Sextus already
remarked; for a perception is not the only feeling of change in the
soul. A more accurate definition has already been quoted, 77, 1. The
statements in Sext. Math. vii. 372; viii. 400; Diog. vii. 45 and 50;
Alex. Aphro. De Anim. 135, b; Boëth. De Interpret, ii. 292 (Schol. in
Arist. 100), are in agreement with the above remarks.
[133] Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 19, 2: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητά ἐστι τἀγαθὰ
καὶ τὰ κακὰ, καὶ τούτοις ἐκποιεῖ λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ πάθη ἐστὶν
αἰσθητὰ σὺν τοῖς εἴδεσιν, οἷον λύπη καὶ φόβος καὶ τὸ παραπλήσια, ἀλλὰ
καὶ κλοπῆς καὶ μοιχείας καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἔστιν αἰσθέσθαι· καὶ καθόλου
ἀφροσύνης καὶ δειλίας καὶ ἄλλων οὐκ ὀλίγων κακιῶν· οὐδὲ μόνον χαρᾶς καὶ
εὐεργεσιῶν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν κατορθώσεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ
ἀνδρείας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν. This passage must not be understood to
mean that the conceptions of good and evil, as such, are objects of
sensation (Ritter, iii. 558). The only objects of that kind are
individual moral states and activities. The general conceptions derived
from them are, according to the Stoic theory of knowledge, only
obtained by a process of abstraction.
[134] Plut. Plac. iv. 11, 2: αἰσθανόμενοι γάρ τινος οἷον λευκοῦ
ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ μνήμην ἔχουσιν, ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδεῖς πολλαὶ μνήμαι
γένωντα τότε φασὶν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν.
[135] Diog. vii. 52: ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἰσθήσει μὲν,
ὡς λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων καὶ τραχέων καὶ λείων· λόγῳ δὲ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως
συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν τούτους· τῶν γὰρ
νοουμένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ περίπτωσιν (immediate contact) ἐνοήθη, τὰ δὲ καθ’
ὁμοιότητα, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετάθεσιν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ
σύνθεσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἐναντίωσιν ... νοεῖται δὲ καὶ κατὰ μετάβασιν
(transition from the sensuous to the super-sensuous) τινὰ, ὡς τὰ λεκτὰ
καὶ ὁ τόπος. Cic. Acad. i. 11, 42: Comprehensio [= κατάληψις] facta
sensibus et vera illi [Zenoni] et fidelis videbatur: non quod omnia,
quæ essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam
posset relinqueret, quodque natura quasi normam scientiæ et principium
sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur. Ibid.
Fin. iii. 10, 33: Cumque rerum notiones in animis fiant, si aut usu
(experience) aliquid cognitum sit, aut conjunctione, aut similitudine,
aut collatione rationis: hoc quarto, quod extremum posui, boni notitia
facta est. Sext. (Math. iii. 40; ix. 393) also agrees with the Stoic
doctrine of the origin of conceptions, in saying that all our ideas
arise either κατ’ ἐμπέλασιν τῶν ἐναργῶν or κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν
μετάβασιν (cf. Diog. vii. 53), and in the latter case either by
comparison, or actual combination, or analogy.
[136] Diog. l.c. Compare the passage quoted from Seneca, 81, 2.
[137] Plut. Plac. iv. 11: τῶν δ’ ἐννοιῶν αἱ μὲν φυσικαὶ γίνονται κατὰ
τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους (according to the context, this must mean by
memory and experience, but perhaps the author of the Placita has been
careless in his extracts here) καὶ ἀνεπιτεχνήτως· αἱ δ’ ἤδη δι’
ἡμετέρας διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμελείας· αὗται μὲν οὖν ἔννοιαι καλοῦνται
μόναι, ἐκεῖναι δὲ καὶ προλήψεις. Diog. vii. 51: [τῶν φαντασιῶν] αἱ μέν
εἰσι τεχνικαὶ, αἱ δὲ ἄτεχνοι.
[138] Plut. Plac. iv. 11: ὁ δὲ λόγος καθ’ ὃν προσαγορευόμεθα λογικοὶ ἐκ
τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑβδομάδα (the first
seven years of life). Comm. Not. 3, 1, says that to the Stoics belonged
τὸ παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας καὶ τὰς προλήψεις τὰς κοινὰς φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀφ’ ὧν
μάλιστα τὴν αἵρεσιν ... καὶ μόνην ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει λέγουσιν. Sen.
Epist. 117, 6: multum dare solemus præsumtioni (πρόληψις) omnium
hominum; apud nos argumentum veritatis est, aliquid omnibus videri.
Frequent instances will occur of appeals to communes notitiæ and
consensus gentium.
[139] Diog. vii. 53: φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δίκαιόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν. 54: ἔστι
δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. In the same strain Chrysippus
(in Plut. Sto. Rep. 17) speaks of ἔμφυτοι προλήψεις of good and evil.
In Plut. Frag. De Anim. vii. 6, T. V. 487 Wytt., the question is asked,
How is it possible to learn what is not already known? The Stoics
reply, By means of φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι.
[140] Compare Cic. Fin. iii. 10: hoc quarto [collatione rationis] boni
notitia facta est; cum enim ab iis rebus, quæ sunt secundum naturam,
adscendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notitiam boni pervenit.
Similarly Sen. Ep. 120, 4, replying to the question, Quomodo ad nos
prima boni honestique notitia pervenerit? observes, Hoc nos natura
docere non potuit: semina nobis scientiæ dedit, scientiam non dedit ...
nobis videtur observatio collegisse [speciem virtutis], et rerum sæpe
factarum inter se collatio: per analogiam nostri intellectum et
honestum et bonum judicant. The notion of mental health and strength
has grown out of corresponding bodily notions; the contemplation of
virtuous actions and persons has given rise to the conception of moral
perfection, the good points being improved upon, and defects being
passed over, the experience of certain faults which resemble virtues
serving to make the distinction plainer. Even belief in a God was
produced, according to Diog. vii. 52, by ἀπόδειξις. See p. 80, 1. Conf.
Stob. Ecl. i. 792: οἱ μὲν Στωϊκοὶ λέγουσι μὲν εὐθὺς ἐμφύεσθαι τὸν
λόγον, ὕστερον δὲ συναθροίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ φαντασιῶν περὶ
δεκατέσσαρα ἔτη.
[141] Stob. Ecl. ii. 128: εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ
ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν
τοιούτων, οἷον ἡ τῶν κατὰ μέρος λογικὴ ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ ὑπάρχουσα· ἄλλην
δὲ σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τεχνικῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔχον τὸ βέβαιον ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ
ἀρεταί· ἄλλην δὲ (knowledge in a relative sense) ἕξιν φαντασιῶν
δεκτικὴν ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου, ἥντινά φασιν ἐν τόνῳ καὶ δυνάμει (sc.
τῆς ψυχῆς) κεῖσθαι. Diog. vii. 47: αὐτήν τε τὴν ἐπιστήμην φασὶν ἢ
κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ ἢ ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου.
(This explanation, which Herillus used according to Diog. vii. 165,
certainly belongs to Zeno.) οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς θεωρίας τὸν
σοφὸν ἄπτωτον ἔσεσθαι ἐν λόγῳ.
[142] See p. 80, 4.
[143] This was the object of Plutarch’s treatise περὶ τῶν κοινῶν
ἐννοιῶν. In the same way, the Peripatetic Diogenianus (in Euseb. Pr.
Ev. vi. 8, 10) throws it in the teeth of Chrysippus that, whilst
appealing to generally received opinions, he is always going contrary
to them, and that he considers all men, with one or two exceptions, to
be fools and madmen.
[144] Diog. 52: ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἰσθήσει μὲν λευκῶν,
κ.τ.λ. λόγῳ δὲ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι,
κ.τ.λ.
[145] Sext. Math. viii. 10: οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς λέγουσι μὲν τῶν τε
αἰσθητῶν τινα καὶ τῶν νοητῶν ἀληθῆ, οὐκ ἐξ εὐθείας δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, ἀλλὰ
κατὰ ἀναφορὰν τὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ παρακείμενα τούτοις νοητά.
[146] Sext. l.c. continues: ἀληθὲς γάρ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς τὸ ὑπάρχον καὶ
ἀντικείμενόν τινι, καὶ ψεῦδος τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον καὶ μὴ (this μὴ is
obviously redundant as appears from Math. viii. 85, 88; xi. 220, where
the same definition is given without the μὴ) ἀντικείμενόν τινι, ὅπερ
ἀσώματον ἀξίωμα καθεστὼς νοητὸν εἶναι· every sentence containing an
assertion or negative, and therefore being opposed to every other.
Ibid. viii. 70: ἠξίουν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ κοινῶς ἐν λεκτῷ τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς εἶναι
καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος· λεκτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχειν φασὶ τὸ κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν
ὑφιστάμενον· λογικὴν δὲ εἶναι φαντασίαν καθ’ ἣν τὸ φαντασθὲν ἔστι λόγῳ
παραστῆσαι. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ἐλλιπῆ καλοῦσι τὰ δὲ αὐτοτελῆ
(conceptions and propositions; conf. Diog. vii. 63) ... προσαγορεύουσι
δέ τινα τῶν αὐτοτελῶν καὶ ἀξιώματα, ἅπερ λέγοντες ἤτοι ἀληθεύομεν ἢ
ψευδόμεθα. Ibid. 74; Diog. vii. 65: ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστιν, ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ
ψεῦδος (see Cic. Tusc. I. 7, 14) ἢ πρᾶγμα (better λεκτὸν as Gell. N. A.
xvi, 8, 4 reads) αὐτοτελὲς ἀποφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφ’ ἑαυτῴ· ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππός
φησιν ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅροις. Aristotle had already observed that
the distinction between false and true first appears in judgment. See
Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 156, 2; 157, 1.
[147] Sext. Math. vii. 93; ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς, φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸν
Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος, ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται,
ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ
συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου. Conf. Plato, Rep. vi. 508,
B.
[148] See Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 231.
[149] Ibid. ii. a, 211.
[150] Diog. 61: ἐννόημα (object of thought) δέ ἐστι φάντασμα διανοίας.
οὔτε τί ὂν οὔτε ποιὸν, ὡσανεὶ δὲ τί ὂν καὶ ὡσανεὶ ποιόν. Stob. Ecl. i.
332: τὰ ἐννοήματά φησι μήτι τινὰ εἶναι μήτι ποιὰ, ὡσανεὶ δὲ τινὰ καὶ
ὡσανεὶ ποιὰ φαντάσματα ψυχῆς· ταῦτα δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἰδέας
προσαγορεύεσθαι ... ταῦτα [ταύτας] δὲ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ φιλόσοφοι φασὶν
ἀνυπάρκτους εἶναι, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐννοημάτων μετέχειν ἡμᾶς, τῶν δὲ
πτώσεων, ἃς δὴ προσηγορίας καλοῦσι, τυγχάνειν. Although defended by
Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. I. 420, 63, the last words as they stand do not
appear capable of any passable meaning and are most probably corrupt.
Plut. Plac. i. 10, 4: οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωϊκοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς
ἰδέας ἔφασαν. Simpl. Categ. 26, e: Χρύσιππος ἀπορεῖ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας, εἰ
τόδε τι ῥηθήσεται. συμπαραληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὴν συνήθειαν τῶν Στωϊκῶν περὶ
τῶν γενικῶν ποιῶν πῶς αἱ πτώσεις κατ’ αὐτοὺς προφέρονται καὶ πῶς οὔτινα
τὰ κοινὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς λέγεται. Syrian. on Met. p. 59. (In Petersen’s
Philos. Chrys. Fund. 80): ὡς ἄρα τὰ εἴδη ... οὔτε πρὸς τὴν ῥῆσιν τῆς
τῶν ὀνομάτων συνηθείας παρήγετο, ὡς Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀρχέδημος καὶ οἱ
πλείους τῶν Στωϊκῶν ὕστερον ᾠήθησαν ... οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ νοήματά εἰσι παρ’
αὐτοῖς αἱ ἰδέαι, ὡς Κλεάνθης ὕστερον εἴρηκε. Prantl, l.c. takes
objection to what Stobæus and Plutarch here say; yet this view is not
that the Stoics regarded their conception of the ἐννόημα as identical
with Plato’s conception of ideas, but that they asserted that these
ideas were only ἐννοήματα—an assertion which had also been made by
Antisthenes. Compare what is said on p. 92 respecting the unreality of
the λεκτόν, likewise what Sext. Math. vii. 246, quotes, as belonging to
the Stoics: οὔτε δὲ ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς εἰσιν αἱ γενικαὶ [φαντασίαι]·
ὧν γὰρ τὰ εἴδη τοῖα ἢ τοῖα τούτων τὰ γένη οὔτε τοῖα οὔτε τοῖα· if
mankind be divided into Greeks and barbarians, the γενικὸς ἄνθρωπος
will be neither one nor the other. The further therefore a conception
is removed from individual limitations, the further it is removed from
truth.
[151] Diog. vii. 54: ἔστι δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. Exc.
e Joan. Damasc. (Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 236), Nr. 34: Χρύσιππος τὸ
μὲν γενικὸν ἡδὺ νοητὸν, τὸ δὲ εἰδικὸν καὶ προσπίπτον ἤδη (Petersen, 83
without cause suggests ἡδὺ) αἰσθητόν.
[152] See p. 82, 1.
[153] Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 145.
[154] Stob. Ecl. ii. 128: Knowledge is defined to be ἕξις φαντασιῶν
δεκτικὴ ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου, ἥντινά φασιν ἐν τόνῳ καὶ δυνάμει
κεῖσθαι.
[155] Here may be noted the objection mentioned by Sext. Math. viii.
463; Pyrrh. ii. 186: The Sceptics cannot deny the possibility of
arguing without proving their assertion and thereby practically
admitting the possibility. Also another one urged by Antipater against
Carneades (Cic. Acad. ii. 9, 28; 34, 109): He who asserts that nothing
can be known with certainty must, at least, believe that he can with
certainty know this. The replies of the Sceptics to these objections,
and the way they turned them in their own favour, will be found in
Sext. Math. l.c. and vii. 433.
[156] Chrysippus opposed Arcesilaus, with such success, according to
the view of the Stoic School, that Carneades was refuted by
anticipation; and it was considered a special favour of Providence that
the labours of Chrysippus had occupied an intermediate place between
two of the most important Sceptics. Plut. Sto. Rep. i. 4, p. 1059.
Diog. 198 mentions a treatise against Arcesilaus.
[157] Plut. Sto. Rep. 10 (see p. 66, 1); Ibid. 47, 12: καὶ μὴν ἔν γε
τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς ἀγῶσιν ὁ πλεῖστος αὐτῷ τε Χρυσίππῳ καὶ
Ἀντιπάτρῳ πόνος γέγονε περὶ τοῦ μήτε πράττειν μήτε ὁρμᾶν ἀσυγκαταθέτως,
ἀλλὰ πλάσματα λέγειν καὶ κενὰς ὑποθέσεις τοῦς ἀξιοῦντας οἰκείας
φαντασίας γενομένης εὐθὺς ὁρμᾶν μὴ εἴξαντας μηδὲ συγκατατιθεμένους.
Ibid. adv. Col. 26, 3, p. 1122: τὴν δὲ περὶ πάντων ἐποχὴν οὐδ’ οἱ πολλὰ
πραγματευσάμενοι καὶ κατατείναντες εἰς τοῦτο συγγράμματα καὶ λόγους
ἐκίνησαν· ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς αὐτῆς τελευτῶντες ὥσπερ Γοργόνα τὴν
ἀπραξίαν ἐπάγοντες ἀπηγόρευσαν. Epict. (Arrian. Diss. i. 27, 15)
quietly suppresses a Sceptic by saying: οὐκ ἄγω σχολὴν πρὸς ταῦτα.
Following also the Stoic line, Cic. Acad. ii. 10–12, makes Antiochus
argue that Scepticism makes all action impossible.
[158] In Sext. Math. vii. 244, ἀληθεῖς φαντασίαι are, first of all,
literally explained to be φαντασίαι, ὧν ἔστιν ἀληθῆ κατηγορίαν
ποιήσασθαι· then, under the head of true φαντασίαι, the καταληπτικαὶ
and οὐ καταληπτικαὶ are distinguished, i.e., notions which are
accompanied by a clear impression of being true, and such as are not;
and, in conclusion, φαντασία καταληπτικὴ is defined: ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ
ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ
ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος. This
definition is afterwards more fully explained. The same explanation is
given Ibid. 402 and 426; viii. 85; Pyrrh. ii. 4; iii. 242; Augustin. c.
Acad. ii. 5, 11; Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 18. Diog. vii. 46: τῆς δὲ φαντασίας
τὴν μὲν καταληπτικὴν τὴν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον· καταληπτικὴν μὲν, ἣν κριτήριον
εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων φασὶ, τὴν γινομένην ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ
ὕπαρχον ἐναπεσφραγισμένην καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην· ἀκατάληπτον δὲ τὴν μὴ
ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν, μὴ κατ’ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον, τὴν
μὴ τρανῆ μηδὲ ἔκτυπον. Ibid. 50.
[159] Sext. Math. viii. 397: ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὡς ἔστι παρ’
αὐτῶν ἀκούειν, καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις, ἥτις διπλοῦν ἔοικεν
εἶναι πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ μέν τι ἔχειν ἀκούσιον, τὸ δὲ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ
ἡμετέρᾳ κρίσει κείμενον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φαντασιωθῆναι ἀβούλητον ἦν καὶ οὐκ
ἐπὶ τῷ πάσχοντι ἔκειτο ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῷ φαντασιοῦντι τὸ οὑτωσὶ διατεθῆναι
... τὸ δὲ συγκαταθέσθαι τούτῳ τῷ κινήματι ἔκειτο ἐπὶ τῷ παραδεχομένῳ
τὴν φαντασίαν. Diog. vii. 51; Cic. Acad. i. 14, 40: [Zeno] ad hæc quæ
visa sunt, et quasi accepta sensibus assensionem adjungit animorum:
quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam. Ibid. ii. 12, 37; De
Fato, 19, 43, Chrysippus affirms: visum objectum imprimet illud quidem
et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem sed assensio nostra erit in
potestate. Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 1: τὴν γὰρ φαντασίαν βουλόμενος [ὁ
Χρύσιππος] οὐκ οὖσαν αὐτοτελῆ τῆς συγκαταθέσεως αἰτίαν ἀποδεικνύειν
εἴρηκεν ὅτι· βλάψουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ ψευδεῖς φαντασίας ἐμποιοῦντες, ἂν αἱ
φαντασίαι ποιῶσιν αὐτοτελῶς τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, κ.τ.λ. Id. 13: αὖθις δέ
φησι Χρύσιππος, καὶ τὸν θεὸν ψευδεῖς ἐμποιεῖν φαντασίας καὶ τὸν σοφὸν
... ἡμᾶς δὲ φαύλους ὄντας συγκατατίθεσθαι ταῖς τοιαύταις φαντασίαις.
Id. Fragm. De An. 2: οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ τρέπει ἑαυτὴν εἰς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων
κατάληψιν καὶ ἀπάτην, κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς. Epictet. in Gell. N. A.
xix. 1, 15: visa animi, quas φαντασίας philosophi appellant ... non
voluntatis sunt neque arbitrariæ, sed vi quadam sua inferunt sese
hominibus noscitandæ; probationes autem, quas συγκαταθέσεις vocant,
quibus eadem visa noscuntur ac dijudicantur voluntariæ sunt fiuntque
hominum arbitratu: the difference between a wise man and a fool
consists in συγκατατίθεσθαι and προσεπιδοξάζειν. The freedom of
approbation must, of course, be so understood in harmony with Stoic
doctrine of the freedom of the will.
[160] On the difference between the conception of εὔλογον and that of
καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, the latter alone being unerring, see Athen. viii.
354, e; Diog. vii. 177.
[161] Compare besides p. 87, 2, Cic. Acad. i. 11, 41: [Zeno] visis (=
φαντασίαις) non omnibus adjungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quæ propriam
quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum, quæ viderentur: id autem
visum, cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehensibile (καταληπτικὴ
φαντασία). Ibid. ii. 12, 38: ut enim necesse est lancem in libra
ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere ... non
potest objectam rem perspicuam non approbare. Conf. Fin. v. 26, 76:
percipiendi vis ita definitur a Stoicis, ut negent quidquam posse
percipi nisi tale rerum, quale falsum esse non possit. Diog. vii. 54;
Sext. Math. vii. 227: κριτήριον τοίνον φασὶν ἀληθείας εἶναι οἱ ἄνδρες
οὗτοι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. It was a departure from the older
Stoic teaching, to refuse, as the later Stoics did, to allow a
conceptional notion to be considered a test of truth, except with the
proviso that no contrary proof could be adduced against its truth.
Sext. 253: ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν Στωϊκῶν κριτήριόν φασιν
εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν καταληπτικὴν ταύτην φαντασίαν· οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι
προσετίθεσαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ἔνστημα, since cases could be
imagined in which a faulty view presented itself with the full force of
truth. This was equivalent to overthrowing the whole doctrine of a
criterion; for how could it be known in any particular case that there
was not a negative instance? But it is quite in harmony with the Stoic
teaching for a later Stoic (Ibid. 257) to say of conceptional
perception: αὕτη γὰρ ἐναργὴς οὖσα καὶ πληκτικὴ μονονουχὶ τῶν τριχῶν,
φασι, λαμβάνεται κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ἄλλου μηδενὸς
δεομένη εἰς τὸ τοιαύτῃ προσπίπτειν, κ.τ.λ. Hence Simpl. Phys. 20, b:
ἀνῄρουν τὰ ἄλλα ... πλὴν τὰ ἐναργῆ.
[162] Diog. vii. 54: κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασὶ τυγχάνειν τὴν
καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τουτέστι τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθά φησι
Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δωδεκάτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος. ὁ
μὲν γὰρ Βοηθὸς κριτήρια πλείονα ἀπολείπει, νοῦν καὶ αἴσθησιν καὶ ὄρεξιν
καὶ ἐπιστήμην (this looks like an approximation to the teaching of the
Peripatetics); ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ
λόγου κριτήριά φησιν εἶναι αἴσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν ... ἄλλοι δέ τινες τῶν
ἀρχαιοτέρων Στωϊκῶν τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κριτήριον ἀπολείπουσιν, ὡς ὁ
Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ περὶ κριτηρίου φησίν. See above p. 76.
[163] See above p. 82, 1.
[164] See above p. 89, 2, and Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 101: neque eos (the
Academicians) contra sensus aliter dicimus, ac Stoici, qui multa falsa
esse dicunt, longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur.
Chrysippus had enquired into the truth of the perceptions of the
senses, and of the notions derived from them, in his treatise περὶ
συνηθείας, without, however, satisfactorily answering the objections
which he quoted against the theory. See p. 46, 2.
[165] See p. 60.
[166] See p. 73, 3.
[167] See Sext. Math. viii. 11: οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τρία φάμενοι συζυγεῖν
ἀλλήλοις, τό τε σημαινόμενον καὶ τὸ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον. ὧν
σημαῖνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν φωνὴν ... σημαινόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ’
αὐτῆς δηλούμενον ... τυγχάνον δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον ... τούτων δὲ δύο
μὲν εἶναι σώματα, καθάπερ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ἓν δὲ ἀσώματον,
ὥσπερ τὸ σημαινόμενον πρᾶγμα καὶ λεκτόν. Sen. Ep. 117, 13, giving it
expressly as the teaching of the Stoics, not as his own: Sunt, inquit,
naturæ corporum ... has deinde sequuntur motus animorum enuntiativi
corporum—for instance, I see Cato walk—corpus est, quod video.... Dico
deinde: Cato ambulat. Non corpus est, inquit, quod nunc loquor, sed
enuntiativum quiddam de corpore, quod alii effatum vocant, alii
enuntiatum, alii edoctum. Compare also on the λεκτόν Sext. Math. viii.
70 (above p. 83, 2); Pyrrh. iii. 52. Various arguments are used by the
Stoics to prove that the voice as opposed to utterance (λεκτὸν) is
material, as has been said. p. 74, 5. Illustrative of the distinction
between utterance and the process of thought is the assertion (in Sext.
Pyrrh. ii. 81) that certainty as being a definite condition of the soul
is material, but that truth itself is not material: λέγεται διαφέρειν
τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ ἀληθὲς τριχῶς, οὐσίᾳ, συστάσει, δυνάμει· οὐσίᾳ μὲν,
ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἀσώματόν ἐστιν, ἀξίωμα γάρ ἐστι καὶ λεκτὸν, ἡ δὲ
ἀλήθεια σῶμα, ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικὴ, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη
πὼς ἔχον ἡγεμονικόν (Id. Math. vii. 38, a similar statement is
expressly attributed to a Stoic); likewise a similar statement which
Sen. Ep. 117, discusses, and at length declares to be a mere quibble,
but not till after a lengthy refutation: sapientiam bonum esse, sapere
bonum non esse. The statement rests on the assertion that nothing can
be a good which does not make itself felt, and nothing can make itself
felt which is not material; wisdom is material, because it is mens
perfecta, but sapere is incorporale et accidens alteri, i.e. sapientiæ.
Accordingly, λεκτὸν (as Ammon. De Inter. 15, b, remarks) is a μέσον τοῦ
τε νοήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος· if, however, νόημα be taken to express
the thought itself, and not the process of thinking, it becomes
identical with λεκτόν. Conf. Simpl. Cat. 3, α, Basil.: τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα
καὶ λεκτὰ τὰ νοήματά ἐστιν, ὡς καὶ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἐδόκει. In Plut. Plac.
iv. 11, 4, a definition of νόημα or ἐννόημα is given similar to that of
λεκτὸν in Sext. Math. viii. 70: φάντασμα διανοίας λογικοῦ ζῴου. See
above p. 84, 4. The statement, however, of Philop. Anal. Pr. lx. a,
Schol. in Ar. 170, a, 2, cannot be true, that the Stoics called things
τυγχάνοντα, thoughts ἐκφορικὰ, and sounds λεκτά, whereas ἐκφορικὸν may
be used of thoughts in the same sense as λεκτόν.
[168] See p. 84, 4. This question was raised in the Stoic School
itself. Sextus at least, not hesitating to attack the Stoic teaching
from this side (Math. viii. 262), speaks of an ἀνήνυτος μάχη in
reference to the ὕπαρξις of λεκτὰ, and he remarks (viii. 258): ὁρῶμεν
δὲ ὡς εἰσί τινες οἱ ἀνῃρηκότες τὴν ὕπαρξιν τῶν λεκτῶν, καὶ οὐχ οἱ
ἑτερόδοξοι μόνον, οἷον οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, ὡς οἱ περὶ
τὸν Βασιλείδην, οἷς ἔδοξε μηδὲν εἶναι ἀσώματον. Probably the question
was first raised by later Stoics, when pressed by their opponents.
Basilides was the teacher of Marcus Aurelius. Otherwise the existence
of λεκτὰ was spoken of as quite natural.
[169] Sext. Math. viii. 70, see above p. 83, 2: τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν
ἐλλιπῆ καλοῦσι τὰ δὲ αὐτοτελῆ. Various kinds of propositions are then
enumerated as being αὐτοτελῆ. Following the same authority, (Diocles?
see Diog. 48) Diog. 63, says: φασὶ δὲ τὸ λεκτὸν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν
λογικὴν ὑφιστάμενον. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν λέγουσιν εἶναι αὐτοτελῆ οἱ
Στωϊκοὶ, τὰ δὲ ἐλλιπῆ. ἐλλιπῆ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὰ ἀναπάρτιστον ἔχοντα τὴν
ἐκφορὰν, οἷον Γράφει· ἐπιζητοῦμεν γὰρ, Τίς; αὐτοτελῆ δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ
ἀπηρτισμένην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφορὰν, οἷον Γράφει Σωκράτης. Prantl in
saying, p. 438, that the Stoics divide judgments (ἀξιώματα) into
complete and incomplete, is inaccurate. Only λεκτὰ are so divided, but
λεκτὸν has a wider meaning than that of a logical judgment. ἀξιώματα
are only one form of λεκτὰ αὐτοτελῆ.
[170] Plut. Qu. Plat. x. 1, 2, p. 1008. A judgment (πρότασις or ἀξίωμα)
ἐξ ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος συνέστηκεν, ὧν τὸ μὲν πτῶσιν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ, τὸ
δὲ κατηγόρημα καλοῦσιν. The terms πτῶσις and κατηγόρημα belonging to
the Stoic terminology, the Stoics must be meant by οἱ διαλεκτικοί. In
the first class of words they distinguish ὄνομα and προσηγορία,
limiting ὄνομα to proper names, and understanding by προσηγορία all
general terms, whether substantives or adjectives (Diog. 58; Bekker’s
Anecd. ii. 842). According to Stob. Ecl. i. 332, πτῶσις was only used
to express προσηγορία. Diog. 192, mentions two books of Chrysippus περὶ
τῶν προσηγορικῶν. For the meaning of κατηγόρημα or ῥῆμα, the verb,
consult Diog. 58 and 64; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14; Cic. Tusc. iv. 9, 21;
Porphyr. in Ammon. De Inter. 37, a. According to Apollon. De Construct.
i. 8, ῥῆμα was used in strict accuracy only for the infinitive, other
forms being called κατηγορήματα.
[171] The distinction between ὄνομα and κατηγόρημα was somewhat bluntly
referred to this logical and metaphysical antithesis by the Stoics, as
may be seen in Stob. Ecl. i. 336: αἴτιον δ’ ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι’ ὃ,
οὗ δὲ αἴτιον συμβεβηκός· καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον
κατηγόρημα.... Ποσειδώνιος ... τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὂν καὶ σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον
οὔτε ὂν οὔτε σῶμα, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ κατηγόρημα. Hence for the latter
the names σύμβαμα and παρασύμβαμα. See following note.
[172] In nouns the cases were distinguished, the nominative, according
to Ammon. l.c. being called ὄνομα, and the other five cases πτώσεις· a
statement, however, which does not agree with the common use of those
terms. In Diog. 65, the cases (γενικὴ, δοτικὴ, αἰτιατικὴ) are called
πλάγιαι πτώσεις. Chrysippus wrote a distinct treatise on the five
cases, Diog. 192. Similar were the divisions of the κατηγόρημα.
According to Diog. 65, the Stoics distinguished between transitive
verbs (ὀρθὰ), such as ὁρᾷ, διαλέγεται· passive verbs (ὕπτια), such as
ὁρῶμαι· neuter verbs (οὐδέτερα), such as φρονεῖν, περιπατεῖν· and verbs
which, with a passive form, do not express a passive relation
(ἀντιπεπονθότα), κείρεσθαι, πείθεσθαι, &c. Consult on this point Philo,
De Cherub. 121, c; Orig. C. Cels. vi. 57. On the ὀρθὰ and ὕπτια, also
Dionys. Thrax, § 15, p. 886, Bekk.; Simpl. Categ. 79, α, ζ; Diog. 191;
and respecting all three divisions, Lersch, ii. 196; Steinthal, Gesch.
der Sprachw. i. 294. They also distinguished between σύμβαμα and
παρασύμβαμα—a verb, when used with a nominative, being called σύμβαμα
or κατηγόρημα, and παρασύμβαμα when used with an oblique case;
περιπατεῖ is a σύμβαμα, μεταμέλει a παρασύμβαμα, περιπατεῖ requiring a
nominative (Σωκράτης), μεταμέλει requiring a dative (Σωκράτει). If an
oblique case is necessary to complete a sentence, besides the subject,
the verb is called ἔλαττον ἢ σύμβαμα or ἔλαττον ἢ κατηγόρημα, as in the
sentence Πλάτων φιλεῖ, φιλεῖ is so called; for these words only make a
complete sentence by the addition of an object thus: Πλάτων φιλεῖ
Δίωνα. If this is necessary with a παρασύμβαμα, it is called ἔλαττον ἢ
παρασύμβαμα· such, for instance, is the word μέλει, for to complete the
sentence it is not enough to say Σωκράτει μέλει, but the object must be
added, as in the sentence: Σωκράτει μεταμέλει Ἀλκιβιάδους. This
difference is explained by Porphyr. in Ammon. l.c., 36, b, whom Lersch,
ii. 31, misunderstands and then blames. See Diog. 64 where the text is
evidently corrupt. Without great temerity we might substitute for the
meaningless οἷον τὸ διὰ πέτρας πλεῖν—τὰ δὲ παρασυμβάματα, which at
least gives a better meaning than the proposals of R. Schmidt, Sto.
Gramm. 66, 91, and Lersch, l.c. 33. Apollon. De Const. iii. 32, p. 299,
Bekk.; Suid. σύμβαμα (very inaccurate); Priscian, xviii. p. 1118, who,
in his equally inaccurate account, has ἀσυμβάματα. The example which
Lucian, Vit. Auct. 21 employs to ridicule the Stoic hair-splitting
anent σύμβαμα and παρασύμβαμα proves, of course, nothing.
[173] There is nothing whatever on record which serves to show the
position held by the categories. By several, definition and division
were treated of most improperly under the head of language.
[174] According to Diog. 60, Bekker, Anecd. ii. 647, ὅρος was defined
by Chrysippus as ἰδίου (which must be read in Diog. in place of καὶ)
ἀπόδοσις· by Antipater as λόγος κατ’ ἀνάλυσιν (Anecd. ἀνάγκην)
ἀπαρτιζόντως ἐκφερόμενος, i.e. a proposition in which the subject and
the collective predicates may be interchanged. Ὁρισμὸς gives in detail
what ὄνομα gives collectively (Simpl. Categ. 16, β). An imperfect ὅρος
is called ὑπογραφή. Instead of the Aristotelian τί ἦν εἶναι, the Stoics
were content with the τί ἦν of Antisthenes (Alex. Top. 24, m). Like
Prodicus, they laid great stress on distinguishing accurately the
conceptions of words of similar meaning, χαρὰ, τέρψις, ἡδονὴ, εὐφροσύνη
(Alex. Top. 96). The relation of γένος to εἶδος is also explained:
γένος is defined to be the summing up of many thoughts (ἀναφαιρέτων
ἐννοημάτων· which might mean thoughts which, as integral parts of a
conception, cannot be separated from it; only this explanation would
not agree with what follows, according to which one would more likely
think of the different species included in the genus. Prantl p. 422
suggests ἀναφορητῶν, which, however, requires explanation); εἶδος as τὸ
ὑπὸ τοῦ γένους περιεχόμενον (Diog. 60). γενικώτατον is ὃ γένος ὂν γένος
οὐκ ἔχει· εἰδικώτατον ὃ εἶδος ὂν εἶδος οὐκ ἔχει (Diog. 61; conf. Sext.
Pyrrh. i. 138). As to διαίρεσις, ὑποδιαίρεσις, and ἀντιδιαίρεσις
(division into contradictories) nothing new is stated; but μερισμὸς has
a special notice (Diog. 61). Lastly, if Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 213 (the
previous definition of dialectic is found, as was stated on p. 73, 3,
in Alcinous Isag. 3, and he also mentions c. 5 three of the four kinds
of division, giving two others instead of the fourth) refers to the
Stoics, four kinds of division are enumerated. The reference of the 8
διαιρέσεις mentioned by Prantl, p. 423, on the authority of Bekker’s
Anecd. ii. 679 to a Stoic source is much more doubtful. There is little
that is new in the Stoic discussion of Opposition, and the same may be
said of what Simpl. (Categ. 100, β and δ; 101, ε; 102, β) quotes from
Chrysippus (περὶ τῶν κατὰ στέρησιν λεγομένων) on the subject of
στέρησις and ἕξις. Conf. Diog. vii. 190.
[175] Petersen, Philos. Chrysipp. Fund. pp. 36–144, is invaluable for
its careful collection of authorities, but in its attempt to construct
the Stoic system on the categories it indulges in many capricious
combinations. Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitr. i. 217; Prantl, Gesch. der
Logik, i. 426. Our authorities for the knowledge of the Stoic doctrine
of the categories are besides a few notices in other writers
principally Simplicius, on the Categories, and Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1,
25–30.
[176] The Stoics attack the Aristotelian categories for being too
numerous, and endeavour to show that they do not include every kind of
expression (as if, rejoined Simplicius, Categ. 5, α, this were the
point at all). Compare Simpl. Categ. 5, α; 15, δ; 16, δ, who quotes
these as objections raised by Athenodorus and Cornutus, the former of
whom lived in the time of Augustus, the latter in the reign of Nero.
Observations of these writers on some of the Aristotelian categories
are given, Ibid. 47, ζ, 91, α.
[177] That this was intended by Aristotle to be the position of the
categories appears by the way in which he introduced them; and also by
his observations (Phys. v. 2) on the various kinds of motion—which are
based entirely on the view that the categories are coordinate.
[178] It will thus be understood how the ancients could at one time
speak of ὂν, at another of τί, as being the highest conception of the
Stoics. The former is found in Diog. 61: γενικώτατον δέ ἐστιν ὃ γένος
ὂν γένος οὐκ ἔχει, οἷον τὸ ὄν. Sen. Ep. 58, 8: Nunc autem genus illud
primum quærimus, ex quo ceteræ species suspensæ sunt, a quo nascitur
omnis divisio, quo universa comprehensa sunt; after noticing the
distinction between what is material and what is immaterial, he
proceeds: quid ergo erit, ex quo hæc deducantur? illud ... quod est [τὸ
ὂν] ... quod est aut corporale est aut incorporale. Hoc ergo genus est
primum et antiquissimum et, ut ita dicam, generale [τὸ γενικώτατον]. It
is, however, more usual to find τί. Thus Plotin. Enn. vi. 1, 25: κοινὸν
τὶ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἓν γένος λαμβάνουσι. Alex. Aphrod. Top. 155; Schol.
278, b, 20: οὕτω δεικνύοις ἂν ὅτι μὴ καλῶς τὸ τὶ οἱ ἀπὸ στοᾶς γένος τοῦ
ὄντος (τὶ as the genus, of which ὂν is a species) τίθενται· εἰ γὰρ τὶ,
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὂν ... ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνοι νομοθετήσαντες αὐτοῖς τὸ ὂν κατὰ
σωμάτων μόνων λέγεσθαι διαφεύγοιεν ἂν τὸ ἠπορημένον· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ
τὶ γενικώτερον αὐτοῦ φασιν εἶναι κατηγορούμενον οὐ κατὰ σωμάτων μόνον
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσωμάτων. Schol. in Arist. 34, b, 11. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 86: τὸ
τὶ, ὅπερ φασὶν εἶναι πάντων γενικώτατον. Math. x. 234: The Stoics
affirm τῶν τινῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα. Sen. l.c. 13:
Stoici volunt superponere huic etiamnunc aliud genus magis principale
... primum genus Stoicis quibusdam videtur quid, for in rerum,
inquiunt, natura quædam sunt, quædam non sunt: examples of the latter
are centaurs, giants, and similar notions of unreal things. Ritter,
iii. 566, remarks, with justice, that the older teaching must have
placed the conception of Being at the head; otherwise the objection
could not have been raised, that what has not being is thus made an
object of thought. Probably the change was made by Chrysippus, although
it is not definitely proved by Stob. Ecl. i. 390. Petersen confuses the
two views, in thinking (p. 146) that the Stoics divided Something into
Being and Not Being, and subdivided Being again into what is material
and what is not material. In other respects, too, he confounds the
Stoic teaching with the consequences, whereby Plotinus l.c. and Plut.
Comm. Not. 30, sought to refute it.
[179] See previous note and p. 92, 2.
[180] The Stoics appear to have regarded them as γενικώτατα or πρῶτα
γένη, rather than as categories. Conf. Simpl. Categ. 16, δ (in other
places as 51, β; 79, β, he is speaking for himself and not of the Stoic
categories); Marc. Aurel. vi. 14; κατηγορία did not suit them so well
because of their use of κατηγόρημα. See p. 95, 1.
[181] Simpl. 16, δ: οἱ δέ γε Στωϊκοὶ εἰς ἐλάττονα συστέλλειν ἐξιοῦσι
τὸν τῶν πρώτων γενῶν ἀριθμόν ... ποιοῦνται γὰρ τὴν τομὴν εἰς τέσσαρα·
εἰς ὑποκείμενα καὶ ποιὰ καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα καὶ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα. Plot.
En. vi. 1, 25; Plut. Comm. Not. 44, 6. p. 1083.
[182] Instead of ὑποκείμενον, the Aristotelian category of being,
οὐσία, was substituted by some, not only without the School, but also
by Posidonius, who in Stob. Ecl. i. 434 distinguishes οὐσία and ποιὸς
the change of the one and the other. Similarly his fellow-disciple
Mnesarchus.
[183] Porphyr. in Simpl. 12, δ: ἥ τε γὰρ ἄποιος ὕλη ... πρῶτόν ἐστι τοῦ
ὑποκειμένου σημαινόμενον. Plot. 588, B: ὑποκείμενα μὲν γὰρ πρῶτα
τάξαντες καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἄλλων προτάξαντες. Galen, Qu. Qual.
S. Incorp. 6, xix. 478: λέγουσι μόνην τὴν πρώτην ὕλην ἀΐδιον τὴν
ἄποιον. Compare following note. It would seem to follow, as a matter of
course, from the Stoic belief in immaterial properties, see p. 106, 4,
that the Stoics also believed in immaterial substances (Petersen, 60);
but as such a view would be at variance with their belief that reality
only belongs to material things, and is nowhere mentioned by any
authority, although obviously inviting the criticism of opponents, it
is safer to suppose that they never went so far as to state the belief
in words.
[184] Simpl. 44, δ: ἔοικε Στωϊκῇ τινι συνηθείᾳ συνεπέσθαι, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ
τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶναι νομίζων, τὰς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ διαφορὰς ἀνυποστάτους
ἡγούμενος. Diog. 150. Stob. Ecl. i. 322 (see below 101, 2) and 324:
ἔφησε δὲ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἄμορφον
εἶναι, καθ’ ὅσον οὐδὲν ἀποτεταγμένον ἴδιον ἔχει σχῆμα οὐδὲ ποιότητα
κατ’ αὐτήν [καθ’ αὑτὴν]· ἀεὶ δ’ ἔν τινι σχήματι καὶ ποιότητι εἶναι,
διαφέρειν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ὕλης, τὴν οὖσαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἐπινοίᾳ
μόνον. Simpl. Phys. 50: τὸ ἄποιον σῶμα τὴν πρωτίστην ὕλην εἶναί φασιν.
Further particulars on matter hereafter.
[185] Porphyr. in Simpl. Cat. 12, δ: διττόν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐ
μόνον κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους. Dexipp. See
following note.
[186] Diog. 150: οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην. So
thought Zeno and Chrysippus: ὕλη δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἧς ὁτιδηποτοῦν γίνεται.
καλεῖται δὲ διχῶς οὐσία τε καὶ ὕλη, ἥ τε τῶν πάντων καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπὶ
μέρος. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὅλων οὔτε πλείων οὔτε ἐλάττων γίνεται, ἡ δὲ τῶν
ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ πλείων καὶ ἐλάττων. Stob. Ecl. i. 322: (Ζήνωνος·) οὐσίαν
δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσαν ἀΐδιον καὶ
οὔτε πλείω γιγνομένην οὔτε ἐλάττω, τὰ δὲ μέρη ταύτης οὐκ ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ
διαμένειν, ἀλλὰ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ συγχεῖσθαι. The same was held by
Chrysippus, according to Stob. Ecl. i. 432, who says: Posidonius held
that there were four varieties of change, those κατὰ διαίρεσιν, κατ’
ἀλλοίωσιν (water to air), κατὰ σύγχυσιν (chemical combination), and
κατ’ ἀνάλυσιν, the latter also called τὴν ἐξ ὅλων μεταβολήν. τούτων δὲ
τὴν κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν γίγνεσθαι (the elements, according
to the Stoics, changing into each other) τὰς δὲ ἄλλας τρεῖς περὶ τοὺς
ποιοὺς λεγομένους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας γιγνομένους. ἀκολούθως δὲ τούτοις
καὶ τὰς γενέσεις συνβαίνειν. τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν οὔτ’ αὔξεσθαι οὔτε
μειοῦσθαι ... ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν (which may be understood, not of
individual properties, but of individually determined things) οἷον
Δίωνος καὶ Θέωνος, καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ μειώσεις γίγνεσθαι. (These words
are explained by Prantl, 432, thus: qualitative determination admits
increase or decrease of intensity; but the use of the terms αὔξησις and
μείωσις, and indeed the whole context no less than the passage quoted
from Diogenes, prove that they refer rather to the increase or
diminution of substance in the individual thing.) διὸ καὶ παραμένειν
τὴν ἑκάστου ποιότητα ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τῆς ἀναιρέσεως.... ἐπὶ δὲ
τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν δύο μὲν εἶναί φασι τὰ δεκτικὰ μόρια (individual things
have two component parts, which are capable of change), τὸ μέν τι κατὰ
τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν τὸ δέ τι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποίου. τὸ γὰρ [ἰδίως
ποιὸν] ὡς πολλάκις λέγομεν τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι.
Porphyr. See previous note. Dexipp. in Cat. 31, 15, Speng.: ὡς ἔστι τὸ
ὑποκείμενον διττὸν, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς
πρεσβυτέρους, ἓν μὲν τὸ λεγόμενον πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον, ὡς ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη
... δεύτερον δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ ποιὸν ὃ κοινῶς ἢ ἰδίως ὑφίσταται,
ὑποκείμενον γὰρ καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης. Plut. Comm. Not. 44, 4, p.
1083 (the Stoics assert) ὡς δύο ἡμῶν ἕκαστός ἐστιν ὑποκείμενα, τὸ μὲν
οὐσία, τὸ δὲ [ποιόν]. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ῥεῖ καὶ φέρεται, μήτ’ αὐξόμενον
μήτε μειούμενον, μήτε ὅλως οἷόν ἐστι διαμένον, τὸ δὲ διαμένει καὶ
αὐξάνεται καὶ μειοῦται καὶ πάντα πάσχει τἀναντία θἀτέρῳ συμπεφυκὸς καὶ
συνηρμοσμένον καὶ συγκεχυμένον, καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῇ αἰσθήσει μηδαμοῦ
παρέχον ἅψασθαι. The latter is the individual thing itself, the former
the material thereof, in reference to which Plutarch had just said: τὰ
λήμματα συγχωροῦσιν οὗτοι, τὰς [μὲν] ἐν μέρει πάσας οὐσίας ῥεῖν καὶ
φέρεσθαι, τὰ μὲν ἐξ αὑτῶν μεθείσας, τὰ δὲ ποθὲν ἐπιόντα προσδεχομένας·
οἷς δὲ πρόσεισι καὶ ἄπεισιν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ πλήθεσιν, ταῦτα μὴ διαμένειν,
ἀλλ’ ἕτερα γίγνεσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις προσόδοις, ἐξαλλαγὴν τῆς οὐσίας
λαμβανούσης. That it should be said of this perpetually changing
material μήτ’ αὐξόμενον μήτε μειούμενον may appear strange; but the
meaning is this: it can only be said of an individual thing that it
increases and diminishes in so far as it remains one and the same
subject, an ἰδίως ποιὸν during the change; but the material itself,
which is ever changing, cannot be regarded as the one identical subject
of increase and diminution. This idea is expanded by Alex. Aphro.
Quæst. Nat. I. 5.
[187] ποιὸν or ποιότης, and also ποιὸς (sc. λόγος). According to Simpl.
55. α, many Stoics assign a threefold meaning to ποιόν. The first,
which is also the most extensive meaning, includes every kind of
quality, whether essential or accidental—the πὼς ἔχον as well as the
ποιόν. In the second meaning ποιὸν is used to express permanent
qualities, including those which are derivative and non-essential—the
σχέσεις. In the third and narrowest sense it expresses τοὺς
ἀπαρτίζοντας (κατὰ τὴν ἐκφορὰν) καὶ ἐμμόνως ὄντας κατὰ διαφορὰν ποιοὺς,
i.e. those qualities which faithfully represent essential attributes in
their distinctive features. The substantive ποιότης is only used in the
last sense.
[188] Simpl. 57, ε (the passage is fully discussed by Petersen, 85, and
Trendelenburg, 223): οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς ποιότητος τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν
σωμάτων λέγουσι διαφορὰν εἶναι οὐσίας οὐκ ἀποδιαληπτὴν (separable,
i.e., from matter) καθ’ ἑαυτὴν, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἓν νόημα καὶ ἰδιότητα [sc.
μίαν] ἀπολήγουσαν οὔτε χρόνῳ οὔτε ἰσχύϊ εἰδοποιουμένην, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐξ
αὐτῆς τοιουτότητι, καθ’ ἢν ποιοῦ ὑφίσταται γένεσις. In place of ἓν
νόημα Petersen, 85, with the approval of Trendelenburg and Prantl (438,
96), reads ἐννόημα. To me, Brandis Schol. 69, a, 32, appears to retain
it with reason, the meaning being that ποιότης constitutes no
independent unity, but only a unity of conception. Non-essential
qualities are by the Stoics excluded from the category of ποιὸν, and
reckoned under that of πὼς ἔχον.
The same distinction between what is essential and what is not
essential is indicated in the terms ἕξις and σχέσις· ποιότητες, or
essential properties, being called essential forms (ἕξεις or ἑκτά);
non-essential qualities being called features or varieties (σχέσεις).
See Simpl. 54, γ; 55, ε. In determining essential attributes, these,
according to Simpl. 61, β (Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 43), are essential,
not when they happen to be permanent, but when they spring from the
nature of the object to which they belong: τὰς μὲν γὰρ σχέσεις ταῖς
ἐπικτήτοις καταστάσεσι χαρακτηρίζεσθαι τὰς δὲ ἕξεις ταῖς ἐξ ἑαυτῶν
ἐνεργείαις. A more limited meaning, that of local position, is given to
σχέσις in Stob. Ecl. i. 410.
The distinction between ἕνωσις and συναφὴ also belongs here. That, the
oneness of which depends on an essential quality, is ἡνωμένον·
everything else is either συνημμένον or ἐκ διεστώτων. Sext. Math. ix.
78 (also in vii. 102): τῶν τε σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἡνωμένα τὰ δὲ ἐκ
συναπτομένων τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων· ἡνωμένα μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἕξεως
κρατούμενα, καθάπερ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα· συνάφεια applies to chains, houses,
ships, &c.; combination ἐκ διεστώτων to flocks and armies. Seneca, Ep.
102, 6, Nat. Qu. ii. 2, says the same. Conf. Alex. De Mixt. 143: ἀνάγκη
δὲ τὸ ἓν σῶμα ὑπὸ μιᾶς ὥς φασιν ἕξεως συνελέσθαι [l. συνέχεσθαι].
Simpl. 55, ε: τὰς γὰρ ποιότητας ἑκτὰ λέγοντες οὗτοι [οἱ Στωϊκοὶ] ἐπὶ
τῶν ἡνωμένων μόνων ἑκτὰ ἀπολείπουσιν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ συναφὴν, οἷον
νεὼς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ διάστασιν, οἷον στρατοῦ, μηδὲν εἶναι ἑκτὸν μηδὲ
εὑρίσκεσθαι πνευματικόν τι ἓν ἐπ’ αὐτῶν μηδὲ ἕνα λόγον ἔχον ὥστε ἐπί
τινα ὑπόστασιν ἐλθεῖν μιᾶς ἕξεως.
Those ἕξεις which admit of no increase or diminution (ἐπίτασις, and
ἄνεσις) are called διαθέσεις or permanent forms. Virtues, for instance,
which, according to the Stoics, always exist in a perfect form where
they exist at all, are διαθέσεις, but arts are only ἕξεις. Simpl.
Categ. 61, β; 72, δ; 73, β; Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 28; 76, a, 12, 24;
Stob. Ecl. ii. 98 and 128. Conf. Petersen 91. A different view was
taken by Aristotle of the relations of these expressions.
[189] Syrian. on Arist. Metaph. 21, p. 90 in Petersen: καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ
δὲ τοὺς κοινοὺς ποιοὺς πρὸ τῶν ἰδίων ποιῶν ἀποτίθενται. Stob. Ecl. i.
434; see above p. 101, 2. Simpl. De An. 61, a, explains ἰδίως ποιὸς by
ἀτομωθὲν εἶδος. Diog. vii. 138; Plut. C. Not. 36. 3.
[190] Besides the passages already quoted in note 2 on p. 101, from
Plutarch and Stobæus, see Sext. Pyrrh. i. 57: τὰ κιρνάμενα (the
intermingling materials,—the question here is the possibility of
mingling) ἐξ οὐσίας καὶ ποιοτήτων συγκεῖσθαί φασιν. Porphyry in Simpl.
Categ. 12, δ disputes this view himself. The Stoics, therefore, clearly
distinguish ἕξις, or essential form, from the subject to which it
belongs; and Philo must have been following the Stoics when he said
(Nom. Mutat. 1063, D): ἕξεις γὰρ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὰς ποιῶν ἀμείνους, ὡς
μουσικὴ μουσικοῦ, κ.τ.λ. They also distinguish between a thing and its
οὐσία. Stob. Ecl. i. 436: μὴ εἶναί τε τοὐτὸν τό τι ποιὸν ἰδίως καὶ τὴν
οὐσίαν ἐξ ἧς ἔστι τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι γε μήδ’ ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ μόνον οὐ
ταὐτὸν, διὰ τὸ καὶ μέρος εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχειν τόπον,
τὰ δ’ ἕτερα τινῶν λεγόμενα δεῖν καὶ τόπῳ κεχωρίσθαι καὶ μήδ’ ἐν μέρει
θεωρεῖσθαι. Conf. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 170; Math. ix. 336: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ
οὔτε ἕτερον τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος οὔτε τὸ αὐτό φασιν ὑπάρχειν· and Seneca,
Ep. 313, 4. Mnesarchus, a fellow disciple of Posidonius, accordingly
compares the relation of an individual thing to its οὐσία with that of
a statue to the material of which it is composed. Since the ἰδίως ποιὸς
distinguishes a thing from every other, there follows as a matter of
course, what is asserted circumstantially and in detail by Chrysippus
(in Philo, Incorrupt. M. 951, B), ὅτι δύο εἰδοποιοὺς [= ἰδίως ποιοὺς]
ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἀμήχανον συστῆναι.
[191] L.c. 222.
[192] This may be seen from the passages quoted in note 2 on the
previous page.
[193] Plut. St. Rep. 43, 4, p. 1054: τὴν ὕλην ἀργὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ
ἀκίνητον ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ἀποφαίνουσι, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας
πνεύματα οὔσας καὶ τόνους ἀερώδεις οἷς ἂν ἐγγένωνται μέρεσι τῆς ὕλης
εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα καὶ σχηματίζειν. It is a carrying out of the Stoic
teaching (as Simpl. 57, ε, remarks) for Plotinus to reduce ποιότης to
the class-conception of δύναμις (Enn. vi. 1, 10, 574, β). But the Stoic
definition of δύναμις (quoted by Simpl. 58, α—ἡ πλειόνων ἐποιστικὴ
συμπτωμάτων, with the additional words καὶ κατακρατοῦσα τῶν
ἐνεργειῶν—does not directly refer to ποιότης. Ποιότης may also be
connected with the λόγος σπερματικός. See Plotin. i. 29, 593, A: εἰ δὲ
τὰ ποιὰ ὕλην ποιὰν λέγοιεν, πρῶτον μὲν οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῖς ἔνυλοι ἀλλ’ οὐκ
ἐν ὕλῃ γενόμενοι σύνθετόν τι ποιήσουσιν ... οὐκ ἄρα αὐτοὶ εἴδη οὐδὲ
λόγοι. Diog. vii. 148: ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις [= ποιότης] ἐξ αὐτῆς
κινουμένη, κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ
αὐτῆς, κ.τ.λ.
[194] Plut. Ibid. § 2: (Χρύσιππος) ἐν τοῖς ἕξεων οὐδὲν ἄλλο τὰς ἕξεις
πλὴν ἀέρας εἶναί φησιν· ὑπὸ τούτων γὰρ συνέχεται τὰ σώματα, καὶ τοῦ
ποιὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι αἴτιος ὁ συνέχων ἀήρ ἐστιν, ὃν σκληρότητα μὲν ἐν
σιδήρῳ, πυκνότητα δ’ ἐν λίθῳ, λευκότητα δ’ ἐν ἀργύρῳ καλοῦσιν. Simpl.
69. γ: ἡ τῶν Στωϊκῶν δόξα λεγόντων, σώματα εἶναι τὰ σχήματα ὥσπερ τὰ
ἄλλα ποιά. Ibid. 67, ε; 56, δ: πῶς δὲ καὶ πνευματικὴ ἡ οὐσία ἔσται τῶν
σωματικῶν ποιοτήτων αὐτοῦ τοῦ πνεύματος συνθέτου ὄντος, κ.τ.λ.
[195] Alex. Aphr. De An. 143, b: πῶς δὲ σωζόντων ἐστὶ τὴν περὶ κράσεως
κοινὴν πρόληψιν τὸ λέγειν καὶ τὴν ἕξιν τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν μεμίχθαι καὶ
τὴν φύσιν τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ τὸ φῶς τῷ ἀέρι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι. Ibid.
144, α, the saying is quoted against the Stoics: μεμίχθαι τῇ ὕλῃ τὸν
θεόν.
[196] Plut. C. Not. 36, 3: λέγουσιν οὗτοι καὶ πλάττουσιν ἐπὶ μιᾶς
οὐσίας δύο ἰδίως γενέσθαι ποίους (this follows from their hypothesis,
but it is distinctly denied by Chrysippus in thesis. See p. 104, 2) καὶ
τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἕνα ποιὸν ἰδίως ἔχουσαν ἐπιόντος ἑτέρου δέχεσθαι καὶ
διαφυλάττειν ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρους.
[197] Simpl. 70, ε: καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ ποιότητας ποιοτήτων ποιοῦσιν
ἑαυτῶν (? ἑκτῶν) ποιοῦντες ἑκτὰς ἕξεις [l. ἑκτὰ καὶ ἕξεις or ἕξεις
only]. The context shows that the meaning of these words is that given
above. The conception of a property is compounded of several
attributes, and, therefore, a property of several subordinate
properties. If λευκὸν is a χρῶμα, the διακριτικὸν ὄψεως is the ἕξις, or
form of λευκὸν.
[198] This follows of necessity, quite independently of the
above-quoted language of Alexander, from the Stoic doctrine of the
material nature of properties and of the mingling of materials. For if
that intermingling of materials in which each one retains its
properties (μῖξις and κρᾶσις in contrast to chemical combination
παράθεσις and σύγχυσις) is defined to be the complete interpenetration
of one material by another, without passing into a third (Stob. Ecl. i.
376; Alex. De Mixt. 142, a; Plut. C. Not. 37, 2); if, moreover,
properties are said to be material; and in all cases when they are
combined, each property retains its own peculiarity, and yet is
inherent in the subject-matter and in every other property belonging to
the same subject-matter; it follows that this relation can only be
explained by supposing a mutual interpenetration of properties with
each other and with their subject-matter.
[199] The proof of this will be given subsequently. Meantime compare
the remarks, p. 92, 2; 94, 1 on the λεκτόν.
[200] Simpl. 56, δ, and 54, β: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ τῶν μὲν σωμάτων σωματικὰς,
τῶν δὲ ἀσωμάτων ἀσωμάτους εἶναι λέγουσι τὰς ποιότητας. Only the
σωματικαὶ ποιότητες are πνεύματα, see p. 105, 2; incorporeal properties
are called ἑκτὰ, to distinguish them from ἕξεις (essential forms).
Dexipp. in Cat. 61. 17, Speng.: θαυμάζω δὲ τῶν Στωϊκῶν χωριζόντων τὰς
ἕξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ἑκτῶν· ἀσώματα γὰρ μὴ παραδεχόμενοι καθ’ ἑαυτὰ, ὅταν
ἐρεσχελεῖν δέον ᾖ ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαλήψεις ἔρχονται. But this use of
terms appears not to have been universal among the Stoics (Simpl.
Categ. 54, γ), with whom different views prevailed touching the extent
of the conception of ἑκτόν. According to this passage it was Antipater
who wished to include under ἑκτὰ, the κοινὰ συμπτώματα σωμάτων καὶ
ἀσωμάτων.
[201] Conf. Simpl. 57, ε, who after giving the definition of quality,
quoted p. 103, 1, continues: ἐν δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μὴ οἷόν τε κατὰ τὸν
ἐκείνων λόγον κοινὸν εἶναι σύμπτωμα σωμάτων τε καὶ ἀσωμάτων, οὐκέτι
ἔσται γένος ἢ ποιότης, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρως μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἑτέρως δὲ ἐπὶ
τῶν ἀσωμάτων αὕτη ὑφέστηκε.
[202] Simpl. 44, δ: ὁ δὲ τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὴν κάθισιν μὴ προσποιούμενος
(including sc. τοῖς οὖσιν) ἔοικε Στωϊκῇ τινι συνηθείᾳ συνέπεσθαι οὐδὲν
ἄλλο ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶναι νομίζων, τὰς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ διαφορὰς
ἀνυποστάτους ἡγούμενος καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα αὐτὰ ἀποκαλῶν ὡς ἐν τοῖς
ὑποκειμένοις ἔχοντα αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πὼς ἔχειν.
[203] Dexipp. in Cat. 41, 20, Speng.: εἰ δέ τις εἰς τὸ πὼς ἔχον
συντάττοι τὰς πλείστας κατηγορίας, ὥσπερ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ποιοῦσιν. Plotin.
vi. 1, 30, 594, A: πῶς δὲ ἓν τὸ πὼς ἔχον, πολλῆς διαφορᾶς ἐν αὐτοῖς
οὔσης; πῶς γὰρ τὸ τρίπηχυ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἰς ἓν [γένος θετέον], τοῦ μὲν
ποσοῦ τοῦ δὲ ποιοῦ ὄντος; πῶς δὲ τὸ ποτὲ καὶ τὸ ποῦ; πῶς δὲ ὅλως πὼς
ἔχοντα τὸ χθὲς καὶ τὸ πέρυσι καὶ τὸ ἐν Λυκείῳ καὶ ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ; καὶ ὅλως
πῶς δὲ ὁ χρόνος πὼς ἔχον; ... τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν πῶς πὼς ἔχον ... καὶ ὁ
πάσχον οὐ πὼς ἔχον ... ἴσως δ’ ἂν μόνον ἁρμόσει ἐπὶ τοῦ κεῖσθαι τὸ πὼς
ἔχον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔχειν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔχειν οὐ πὼς ἔχον ἀλλὰ ἔχον. Simpl.
Categ. 94, ε: The Stoics included ἔχειν under πὼς ἔχον. In saying as
Simpl. 16, δ, does that the Stoics omitted ποσὸν, time, and place, it
must be meant that they did not treat these conceptions as separate
categories. What they did with them Simpl. explains l.c. εἰ γὰρ τὸ πὼς
ἔχον νομίζουσιν αὐτοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα περιλαμβάνειν. Trendelenburg, 229,
with justice, observes that, wherever the species-forming difference
lies in ποσὸν as in mathematical conceptions, there ποσὸν comes under
ποιόν.
[204] Simpl. 42, ε: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ ἀνθ’ ἑνὸς γένους δύο κατὰ τὸν τόπον
τοῦτον ἀριθμοῦνται, τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρός τι τιθέντες, τὰ δ’ ἐν τοῖς πρός
τί πως ἔχουσι, καὶ τὰ μὲν πρός τι ἀντιδιαιροῦντες τοῖς καθ’ αὑτὰ, τὰ δὲ
πρός τί πως ἔχοντα τοῖς κατὰ διαφοράν. (Ibid. 44, β: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ
νομίζουσι πάσης τῆς κατὰ διαφορὰν ἰδιότητος ἀπηλλάχθαι τὰ πρός τί πως
ἔχοντα.) Sweet and bitter belong to τὰ πρός τι· to the other class
belong δεξιὸς, πατὴρ, &c., κατὰ διαφορὰν δέ φασι τὰ κατά τι εἶδος
χαρακτηριζόμενα. Every καθ’ αὑτὸ is also κατὰ διαφορὰν (determined as
to quality), and every πρός τί πως ἔχον is also a πρός τι, but not
conversely. Conf. 43, β. εἰ δὲ δεῖ σαφέστερον μεταλαβεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα,
πρός τι μὲν λέγουσιν ὅσα κατ’ οἰκεῖον χαρακτῆρα διακείμενά πως ἀπονεύει
πρὸς ἕτερον (or, according to the definition in Sext. Math. viii. 454:
πρός τι ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς ἑτέρῳ νοούμενον), πρός τι δέ πως ἔχοντα ὅσα πέφυκε
συμβαίνειν τινὶ καὶ μὴ συμβαίνειν ἄνευ τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ μεταβολῆς καὶ
ἀλλοιώσεως μετὰ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἐκτὸς ἀποβλέπειν, ὥστε ὅταν μὲν κατὰ
διαφοράν τι διακείμενον πρὸς ἕτερον νεύσῃ, πρός τι μόνον τοῦτο ἔσται,
ὡς ἡ ἕξις καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις· ὅταν δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐνοῦσαν
διαφορὰν κατὰ ψιλὴν δὲ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν θεωρῆται, πρὸς τί πως
ἔχοντα ἔσται· ὁ γὰρ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ δεξιὸς ἔξωθεν τινῶν προσδέονται, πρὸς
τὴν ὑπόστασιν· διὸ καὶ μηδεμιᾶς γινομένης περὶ αὐτὰ μεταβολῆς γένοιτ’
ἂν οὐκέτι πατὴρ, τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀποθανόντος, ὁ δὲ δεξιὸς τοῦ παρακειμένου
μεταστάντος· τὸ δὲ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν οὐκ ἂν ἀλλοῖα γένοιτο εἰ μὴ
συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ἡ περὶ αὐτὰ δύναμις. In this sense, therefore, πρός
τι belongs to ποιὸν, being composed (as Simpl. 43, α, says) of ποιὸν
and πρός τι. On the other hand, πρός τί πως ἔχον only expresses, to
quote Herbart, an accidental relation. Prantl’s quotation (I. 437, 108)
from Simpl. 44, β, we have no special reason to refer to the Stoics.
[205] Trendelenburg, 220, considers that these genera are in so far
subordinate to one another, that the previous one continues in the
next, but with the addition of a fresh determination; a better name for
the second category would be ὑποκείμενα ποιά· for the third, ὑποκείμενα
ποιά πως ἔχοντα· for the fourth, ὑποκείμενα ποιὰ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα. In
support of this, he refers to Simpl. 43, α: ἕπεται δὲ αὐτοῖς κἀκεῖνο
ἄτοπον τὸ σύνθετα ποιεῖν τὰ γένη ἐκ προτέρων τινῶν καὶ δευτέρων ὡς τὸ
πρός τι ἐκ ποιοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρός τι. Plut. C. Not. 44, 6: τέτταρά γε
ποιοῦσιν ὑποκείμενα περὶ ἕκαστον, μᾶλλον δὲ τέτταρα ἕκαστον ἡμῶν. Plot.
Enn. vi. 1, 29, 593, A: ἄτοπος ἡ διαίρεσις ... ἐν θατέρῳ τῶν εἰδῶν τὸ
ἕτερον τιθεῖσα, ὥσπερ ἂν [εἴ] τις διαιρῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴν μὲν
γραμματικὴν λέγοι, τὴν δὲ γραμματικὴν καὶ ἄλλο τι· if ποιὰ are to be
ὕλη ποιὰ, they are composed of ὕλη and εἶδος or λόγος. See p. 48, 2.
[206] See p. 103, 1.
[207] See p. 107, 2; Plotin. vi. 1, 30: Why are πὼς ἔχοντα enumerated
as a third category, since πάντα περὶ τὴν ὕλην πὼς ἔχοντα; the Stoics
would probably say that ποιὰ are περὶ τὴν ὕλην πὼς ἔχοντα, whereas the
πὼς ἔχοντα, in the strict sense of the term, are περὶ τὰ ποιά. Yet
since the ποιὰ themselves are nothing more than ὕλη πως ἔχουσα, all
categories must be ultimately reduced to ὕλη.
[208] Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, i. 440–467.
[209] In Diog. 66; Sext. Math. viii. 70; Ammon. De Interp. 4, a (Schol.
in Arist. 93, a; 22, b, 20); Simpl. Cat. 103, α; Boëth. De Interp. 315;
Cramer, Anecd. Oxon. iii. 267, conf. I. 104, a distinction is drawn
between ἀξίωμα (a judgment), ἐρώτημα (a direct question, requiring Yes
or No), πύσμα (an enquiry), προστακτικὸν, ὁρκικὸν, ἀρατικὸν (wishes),
εὐκτικὸν (a prayer), ὑποθετικὸν (a supposition), ἐκθετικὸν (as ἐκκείσθω
εὐθεῖα γραμμὴ), προσαγορευτικὸν (an address), θαυμαστικὸν, ψεκτικὸν,
ἐπαπορητικὸν, ἀφηγηματικὸν (explanatory statements), ὅμοιον ἀξιώματι (a
judgment with something appended, as: ὡς Πριαμίδῃσιν ἐμφερὴς ὁ
βουκόλος! by Sextus called Πλεῖον ἢ ἀξίωμα). Ammon. in Waitz, Arist.
Orig. i. 43, speaks of ten forms of sentences held by the Stoics,
mentioning, however, only two, προστακτικὸς and ἐβκτικός (so reads the
MS. Waitz suggests ἐφεκτικὸς, more probably it is εὐκτικός). Diog. 191,
mentions treatises of Chrysippus on interrogatory and hortatory
sentences. On the relation of an oath to ἀξίωμα light is thrown by
Simpl. l.c., also by Chrysippus’ distinction between ἀληθορκεῖν and
εὐορκεῖν ψευδορκεῖν and ἐπιορκεῖν in Stob. Floril. 28, 15.
[210] Diog. 65: ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστιν ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος. Questions and
other similar sentences are neither true nor false (Ibid. 66 and 68).
This definition of a judgment is constantly referred to, see p. 83, 2,
by Simpl. Cat. 103, α; Cic. Tusc. i. 7, 14; De Fato, 10, 20; Gell. N.
A. xvi. 8, 8; Schol. in Arist. 93, b, 35. The purport of the expression
λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς, λεκτὸν ἀποφαντὸν (in Diog. 65; Gell. xvi. 8, 4;
Ammon. De Interp. 4, a; Schol. in Arist. 93, b, 20) is the same.
[211] Sext. Math. viii. 93: τῶν γὰρ ἀξιωμάτων πρώτην σχεδὸν καὶ
κυριωτάτην ἐκφέρουσι διαφορὰν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ καθ’ ἣν τὰ μέν ἐστιν αὐτῶν
ἁπλᾶ τὰ δ’ οὐχ ἁπλᾶ. Ibid. 95 and 108. Diog. 68 gives the definitions
of both.
[212] Sext. l.c., by whom Diog. must be corrected, see p. 113, 3.
[213] Diog. 69: ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὐχ ἁπλοῖς τὸ συνημμένον καὶ τὸ
παρασυνημμένον καὶ τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον καὶ τὸ αἰτιῶδες καὶ τὸ
διεζευγμένον καὶ τὸ διασαφοῦν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ διασαφοῦν τὸ ἧττον.
Further details presently respecting the συνημμένον and διεζευγμένον.
For the παρασυνημμένον—a conditional sentence, the first part of which
is introduced by ἐπειδὴ—see Diog. 71 and 74; for the συμπεπλεγμένον,
the characteristic of which is the καὶ and καὶ, see Diog. 72; Sext.
Math. viii. 124; Gell. N. A. xvi. 8 and 9; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. 13;
Dexipp. in Cat. 27, 3, Speng.; (Schol. in Arist. 44. a, 9—Prantl, 446,
says this passage is not quite correct; it only implies that the term
συμπλοκὴ was confined to a copulative judgment); for the αἰτιῶδες,
which is characterised by a διότι, and therefore is not identical with
the παρασυνημμένον, Diog. 72 and 74; for the διασαφοῦν τὸ μᾶλλον and
the διασαφοῦν τὸ ἧττον, Diog. 72; conf. Cramer, Anecd. Oxon. i. 188;
Apollon. Synt. (Bekker’s Anecd. ii.), 481. These are only some of the
principal forms of composite judgments, their number being really
indefinite. Chrysippus estimated that a million combinations might be
formed with ten sentences. The celebrated mathematician, Hipparchus
however, proved that only 103,049 affirmative and 310,952 negative
judgments could be formed with that material (Plut. Sto. Rep. 29, 5, p.
1047; Qu. Symp. viii. 9, 3, 11, p. 732).
[214] There is no notice of a division of judgments into general and
particular. Instead of that, Sext. (Math. viii. 96) distinguishes
ὡρισμένα as οὗτος κάθηται, ἀόριστα as τὶς κάθηται, and μέσα as ἄνθρωπος
κάθηται, Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ. When the subject stood in the nominative,
ὡρισμένα were called καταγορευτικὰ (Diog. 70); the others κατηγορικά· a
καταγορευτικὸν is οὗτος περιπατεῖ· a κατηγορικὸν, Δίων περιπατεῖ.
[215] An affirmative judgment was called καταφατικὸν, a negative
ἀποφατικὸν, by Chrysippus in the fragment about to be quoted, and
Simpl. Cat. 102, δ, ζ. Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 266, Oud. renders these
terms by dedicativa and abdicativa. For the manner in which they
expressed negative sentences, see Boëth. De Interp. 373; Schol. in
Arist. 120.
[216] Diog. 69 gives an example of ἀρνητικὸν, οὐδεὶς περιπατεῖ· one of
particular negation, στερητικὸν—ἀφιλάνθρωπός ἐστιν οὗτος· one of double
negation, ὑπεραποφατικὸν—as, οὐχὶ ἡμέρα οὐκ ἐστί.
[217] Sext. Math. viii. 89; Diog. 73: ἀντικείμενα are ὧν τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ
ἑτέρου ἐστὶν ἀποφατικὸν or (according to the outward treatment of these
determinations) ἀποφάσει πλεονάζει—as, It is day, and It is not day.
Aristotle called such a contradictory ἀντίφασις, a contrary ἐναντιότης,
putting both under the class conception of ἀντικείμενα. The Stoics
reserved ἀντικείμενα for contradictories (Simpl. Cat. 102, δ and 102,
ζ, a Stoic discussion intended to show that the conception of ἐνάντιον
is not applicable to negative sentences and conceptions), which is
after all only a difference in terminology. Ἐναντίον they also call
μαχόμενον (Apollon. Synt. 484, Bekk.). Otherwise, following Aristotle,
they distinguished between ἐναντίον and ἐναντίως ἔχον· ἐναντία are
conceptions which are in plain and immediate contrast, such as φρόνησις
and ἀφρόνησις· ἐναντίως ἔχοντα are those which are only contrasted by
means of the ἐναντία, such as φρόνιμος and ἄφρων (Simpl. Categ. 98, γ).
The former, therefore, apply to abstract, the latter to concrete
notions. That every negative judgment has an affirmative judgment
opposed to it is elaborately proved by a series of quotations from
poets, each one of which is four times repeated in the fragment περὶ
ἀποφατικῶν first edited by Letronne (Fragments inédits, Paris, 1838),
and subsequently emended, explained, and with a great degree of
probability referred to Chrysippus by Bergk (De Chrysippi libro περὶ
ἀποφατικῶν, Cassel, 1841, Gymn. progr.). In explaining the fragment
Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. I. 451 appears to have hit the truth in one
point, where Bergk is not satisfied.
[218] Simpl. Categ. 103, β; Cic. De Fato, 16, 37; N. D. i. 25, 70.
Further particulars above p. 83, 2; 110, 3.
[219] Viz. that the members of a disjunction, as well as their
contradictory opposites, must also be contraries (adversa or
pugnantia), and that from the truth of the one the falsehood of the
other follows. A disjunction which does not satisfy one or the other of
these conditions is false (παραδιεζευγμένον). Gell. N. A. xvi. 8, 12;
Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 191; Alex. Anal. Pr. 7, b.
[220] Diog. 71; Sext. Math. 109; Galen, De Simpl. Medicamen. ii. 16,
vol. xi. 499; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. p. 15. The Stoics distinguish
most unnecessarily, but quite in harmony with their ordinary formal
punctiliousness, the case in which the leading clause is identical with
the inferential clause (εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν) and the case in
which it is different (εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶν, φῶς ἔστιν). Conditional
sentences of the first kind are called διφορούμενα συνημμένα. Sext.
viii. 281; 294; and 466; Pyrrh. ii. 112; conf. viii. 95; Diog. 68. That
in all these passages διφορούμενον must be read, and not διαφορούμενον,
appears according to Prantl’s (p. 445, 122) very true observation from
the remarks of Alex. Top. 7, a; Anal. Pr. 7, b, on διφορούμενοι
συλλογισμοί.
[221] Sext. Math. viii. 112; κοινῶς μὲν γάρ φασιν ἅπαντες οἱ
Διαλεκτικοὶ ὑγιὲς εἶναι συνημμένον, ὅταν ἀκολουθῇ τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένῳ
τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ λῆγον. περὶ δὲ τοῦ πότε ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ πῶς, στασιάζουσι πρὸς
ἀλλήλους καὶ μαχόμενα τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἐκτίθενται κριτήρια. Cic. Acad.
ii. 47, 143: In hoc ipso, quod in elementis dialectici docent, quomodo
judicare oporteat, rerum falsumne sit, si quid ita connexum est, ut
hoc: Si dies est, lucet; quanta contentio est! aliter Diodoro aliter
Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. (The further remarks on the points of
difference between Chrysippus and Cleanthes have no reference to
hypothetical judgments.) The Philo here alluded to—the same Philo
against whom Chrysippus wrote his treatises (Diog. vii. 191 and 194)—is
the well-known dialectician and pupil of Diodorus, who declared all
conditional sentences to be right in which a false inferential clause
is not drawn from a true leading clause. According to this view,
conditional sentences would be right, with both clauses true, or both
false, or with a false leading clause and true inferential clause
(Sext. l.c. viii. 245 and 449; Pyrrh. ii. 110). According to Sext.
Pyrrh. ii. 104, the view of Philo appears to have gained acceptance
among the Stoics, perhaps through Zeno, for whose connection with Philo
see Diog. vii. 16. But, in any case, the meaning appears to have been
(Diog. vii. 81), that, in the cases mentioned, conditional sentences
may be right, not that they must be right.
Others more appropriately judged of the correctness of conditional
sentences by the connection of the clauses, and either required, for a
conditional sentence to be right, that the contradictory opposite
(ἀντικείμενον) of the inferential clause should be irreconcileable with
the leading clause, or that the inferential clause should be
potentially (δυνάμει) contained in the leading clause (Sext. Pyrrh. ii.
111). The first of these requirements, which is mentioned by Diog. 73
as the only criterion of the Stoic School, was due to Chrysippus, who
accordingly refused to allow sentences in which this was not the case
to be expressed hypothetically (Cic. De Fato, 6, 12; 8, 15): it was not
right to say, Si quis natus est oriente canicula, is in mari non
morietur; but, Non et natus est quis oriente canicula et is in mari
morietur.
It may be observed, in connection with the enquiry into the accuracy of
conditional sentences, that a true conditional sentence may become
false in time. The sentence, If Dion is alive now, he will continue to
live, is true at the present moment; but in the last moment of Dion’s
life it will cease to be true. Such sentences were called ἀπεριγράφως
μεταπίπτοντα, because the time could not be previously fixed when they
would become false (Simpl. Phys. 305, a). Chrysippus also wrote on the
μεταπίπτοντα, according to Dionys. Comp. Verb. p. 72 Schäfer. Diog.
vii. 105, mentions two treatises of his on the subject, but
characterises them as spurious.
[222] According to Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 100, Math. viii. 143 and 156, the
Stoics distinguished between σημεῖα ὑπομνηστικὰ and σημεῖα ἐνδεικτικά.
The definition of the latter was ἐνδεικτικὸν ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ
καθηγούμενον (or προκαθηγούμενον) ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος· the ὑγιὲς
συνημμένον was a sentence with both the leading and inferential clauses
true. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 101; 106; 115; Math. viii. 249.
[223] Diodorus had said that Only what is, or what will be, is
possible. The Stoics, and in particular Chrysippus, define δυνατὸν as
what is capable of being true (τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθὲς εἶναι), if
circumstances do not prevent; ἀδύνατον as ὃ μή ἐστιν ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ
ἀληθὲς εἶναι. From the δυνατὸν they distinguish the οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον,
which is defined as ὃ καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος οἷόν τε εἶναι τῶν
ἐκτὸς μηδὲν ἐναντιουμένων (Plut. Sto. Rep. 46, p. 1055; Diog. 76;
Boëth. De Interp. 374, Bas. The same thing is also stated in Alex.
Aphr. De Fato, c. 10, p. 30. δυνατὸν εἶναι γενέσθαι τοῦτο δ’ ὑπ’
οὐδενὸς κωλύετα γενέσθαι κἂν μὴ γένηται.) On the other hand, ἀναγκαῖον
is, what is both true and incapable of being false, either in itself or
owing to other circumstances. Diog. and Boëth. There was probably
another definition of οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, as ὃ ψεῦδος οἷόν τε εἶναι τῶν
ἐκτὸς μὴ ἐναντιουμένων· so that it might be said (Boëth. 429) that the
οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον was partly possible and partly impossible, without
contradicting (as Boëth. and Prantl, p. 463, believe) their other
statement, that the δυνατὸν was partly necessary and partly not
necessary. The conceptions of the Possible and the Not-necessary are
thus made to overlap, the former including the Necessary and
Not-necessary, the latter the Possible and the Not-possible.
To defend his definition of the Possible against the κυριεύων of
Diodorus, Chrysippus denied the statement, δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον μὴ
ἀκολουθεῖν, without exposing the confusion contained in it between
sequence in time and causal relation (Alex. Anal. Pr. 57, b; Philop.
Anal. Pr. xlii. b; Schol. in Arist. 163, a; Cic. De Fato, 7, 13; Ep. ad
Div. ix. 4). Cleanthes, Antipater, and Panthoides preferred to attack
another leading clause of Diodorus, the clause that Every past
occurrence must necessarily be true (Epictet. Diss. ii. 19, 2 and 5).
The Aristotelian position in reference to a disjunction, that When the
disjunction refers to something future, the disjunction itself is true,
without either clause being necessarily true, was not accepted by the
Stoics (Simpl. Cat. 103, β).
[224] Plut. Sto. Rep. 46, p. 1055, justly insists on this point.
[225] Prantl, pp. 467–496.
[226] Diog. 45; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 194, see above p. 65.
[227] Both were included by the Peripatetics under the term
hypothetical. In the same way the Stoics include both among the five
ἀναπόδεικτοι. See below p. 119, 2.
[228] Chain-argument seems to have been also treated of in the
categorical form. See p. 120, 3.
[229] As shown by Prantl, 468, 171; on Diog. 76; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 135;
Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 279, Oud. The latter rightly refers to the fact,
that Chrysippus discussed the main forms of hypothetical inference at
the very beginning of his doctrine of inference, Sext. Math. viii. 223.
[230] Anal. Pr. 87, b: δι’ ὑποθέσεως δὲ ἄλλης, ὡς εἶπεν (Arist. Anal.
Pr. i. 23, 41, a, 37) εἶεν ἂν καὶ οὓς οἱ νεώτεροι συλλογισμοὺς μόνους
βούλονται λέγειν· οὗτοι δ’ εἰσὶν οἱ διὰ τροπικοῦ, ὡς φασὶ, καὶ τῆς
προλήψεως γινόμενοι, τοῦ τροπικοῦ ἢ συνημμένου (conditional) ὄντος ἢ
διεζευγμένου (disjunctive) ἢ συμπεπλεγμένου (a copulative judgment
suggesting partly hypothetical judgments like the συμπεπλεγμένον in
Sext. Math. viii. 235, partly negative categorical judgments which have
the force of hypothetical judgments, such as: it is not at the same
time A and B. Conf. Diog. 80. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 158; Matt. viii. 226.
Cic. De Fato, vi. 12). By the νεώτεροι, the Stoics must be meant, for
the terminology is theirs; and the Peripatetics, to whom it might
otherwise apply, always considered the categorical to be the original
form of judgment. See Prantl, 468, 172.
[231] Such an inference was called λόγος· when it was expressed in
definite terms, for instance, If it is day, it is light. The
arrangement of the clauses (which were designated by numbers, and not
by letters, as the Peripatetics had done), was called τρόπος· for
instance, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον. A conclusion composed of both
forms of expression was a λογότροπος· for instance, εἰ ζῇ Πλάτων,
ἀναπνεῖ Πλάτων· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. The premisses were
called λήμματα (in contrast to ἀξίωμα which expresses a judgment
independently of its position in a syllogism); or, more correctly, the
major premiss was λῆμμα, the minor πρόσληψις (hence the particles δὲ γε
were προσληπτικὸς σύνδεσμος, Apollon. Synt. p. 518, Bekk.). The
conclusion was ἐπιφορά, also ἐπιφορικοὶ συνδεσμοί. Ibid. 519. The major
premiss in a hypothetical syllogism was called τροπικόν, its two
clauses being called, respectively, ἡγούμενον (as by the Peripatetics)
and λῆγον (by the Peripatetics ἑπόμενον). Diog. 76; Sext. Pyrrh. ii.
135; Math. viii. 301, 227; Alex. l.c. and p. 88, a; 109, a; 7, b;
Philop. Anal. Pr. lx. a; Schol. in Arist. 170, a, 2; Ammon. on Anal.
Pr. 24, b, 19; Arist. Orig. ed. Waitz, i. 45; Apul. Dog. Plat. iii.
279, Oud.; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. p. 19.
[232] Alex. Anal. Pr. 116, b, after mentioning ἀμεθόδως περαίνοντες
συλλογισμοὶ, or inferences incomplete in point of form, such as: A = B,
B = C, ∴ A = C, which is said to want as its major premiss: Two things
which are equal to a third are equal to one another. On these ἀμεθόδως
περαίνοντες of the Stoics see l.c. 8, a; 22, b; Alex. Top. 10, Ps.
Galen, Εἰς. διαλ. 59. He then continues: οὓς ὅτι μὲν μὴ λέγουσι
συλλογιστικῶς συνάγειν, ὑγιῶς λέγουσι [οἱ νεώτεροι] ... ὅτι δὲ ἡγοῦνται
ὁμοίους αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοῖς κατηγορικοῖς συλλογισμοῖς ... τοῦ παντὸς
διαμαρτάνουσιν.
[233] συνακτικοὶ or περαντικοὶ, and ἀσυνακτικοὶ or ἀπέραντοι, or
ἀσυλλόγιστοι. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 137; Math. viii. 303 and 428; Diog. 77.
[234] Syllogisms which are conclusive in point of fact, but wanting in
precision of form, were called περαντικοί in the narrower sense; those
complete also in form, συλλογιστικοί. Diog. 78; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ.
58.
[235] An inference is true (ἀληθὴς) when not only the illation is
correct (ὑγιὴς), but when the individual propositions, the premisses as
well as the conclusion, are materially true. The λόγοι συνακτικοὶ may
therefore be divided into true and false. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 138; Math.
viii. 310 and 412; Diog. 79.
[236] Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 140 and 135; Math. viii. 305; 313; and 411: True
forms of inference are divided into ἀποδεικτικοὶ and οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοὶ.
ἀποδεικτικοὶ = οἱ διὰ προδήλων ἄδηλόν τι συνάγοντες· οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοὶ
when this is not the case, as in the inference: If it is day, it is
light—It is day, ∴ It is light; for the conclusion, It is light, is
known as well as it is known that It is day. The ἀποδεικτικοὶ may
proceed either ἐφοδευτικῶς from the premisses to the conclusions, or
ἐφοδευτικῶς ἅμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς· ἐφοδευτικῶς when the premisses rest
upon belief (πίστις and μνήμη); ἐκκαλυπτικῶς when they are based on a
scientific necessity.
[237] According to Diog. 79, Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 157, others added other
forms of ἀναπόδεικτοι. Cic., in adding a sixth and seventh (Top. 14,
57), must have been following these authorities.
[238] Consult, on these five ἀναπόδεικτοι of Chrysippus (which need not
be given here more at length, and are absolutely identical with those
of Theophrastus) Diog. 79–81 (on p. 79 we must read συλλογιστικῶν for
συλλογισμὼν. See p. 118, 2); Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 156–159; 201; Math. viii.
223–227; Cic. Top. 13; Simpl. Phys. 123, b; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. 17;
Prantl, 473, 182; on the πέμπτος ἀναπόδεικτος διὰ πλειόνων Sext. Pyrrh.
i. 69; Cleomed. Meteora, pp. 41 and 47; Prantl, p. 475.
[239] Two such cases are distinguished, one in which all three clauses,
the other in which the conclusion and minor premiss are identical. The
first class are called διφορούμενοι· If it is day, it is day; It is
day, ∴ It is day. The second class, ἀδιαφόρως περαίνοντες· It is either
day or night; It is day, ∴ It is day. The latter term is, however,
applied to both kinds. See Alex. Anal. Pr. 7, a; 53, b; Top. 7; Schol.
in Arist. 294, b, 25; Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 96; Prantl, 476, 185.
[240] Cic. Top. 15, 57: ex his modis conclusiones innumerabiles
nascuntur. Sext. Math. viii. 228, in which passage it is striking that
ἀναπόδεικτοι should be divided into ἁπλοῖ and οὐχ ἁπλοῖ. It has been
suggested that ἀποδεικτικῶν should be substituted for ἀναποδείκτων, but
it is also possible that the latter word may be used in a narrow as
well as in a wider sense.
[241] Diog. 78: συλλογιστικοὶ [λόγοι] μὲν οὖν εἰσιν οἱ ἤτοι
ἀναπόδεικτοι ὄντες ἢ ἀναγόμενοι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους κατά τι τῶν
θεμάτων ἢ τινά. According to Galen, Hipp. et Plat. ii. 3, p. 224,
Chrysippus had taken great pains in resolving the composite forms of
inference (Diog. 190 and 194). Antipater suggested still simpler modes.
[242] Sext. 229–243, borrowing the example used by Ænesidemus, but no
doubt following the Stoic treatment. Prantl, 479. Such a composite
inference is that mentioned by Sextus l.c. 281.
[243] Sext.; Prantl, p. 478.
[244] Alex. on Anal. Pr. i. 25, 42, b, 5, after speaking of the
Sorites, continues (p. 94, b): ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ τῶν προτάσεων συνεχείᾳ τό
τε συνθετικόν ἐστι θεώρημα ... καὶ οἱ καλούμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν νεωτέρων
ἐπιβάλλοντές τε καὶ ἐπιβαλλόμενοι. The συνθετικὸν θεώρημα (or
chain-argument), the meaning of which is next investigated, must be a
Peripatetic expression. The same meaning must attach to ἐπιβάλλοντές τε
καὶ ἐπιβαλλόμενοι, which are to be found ἐν ταῖς συνεχῶς λαμβανομέναις
προτάσεσι χωρὶς τῶν συμπερασμάτων· for instance, A is a property of B,
B of C, C of D; ∴ A is a property of D. ἐπιβαλλόμενος means the
inference, the conclusion of which is omitted; ἐπιβάλλων, the one with
the omitted premiss. These inferences may be in either of the three
Aristotelian figures κατὰ τὸ παραδεδομένον συνθετικὸν θεώρημα. ὃ οἱ μὲν
περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην τῇ χρείᾳ παραμετρήσαντες παρέδοσαν, ἐφ’ ὅσον αὐτὴ
ἀπῇτει, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ [στοᾶς] παρ’ ἐκείνων λαβόντες καὶ διελόντες
ἐποίησαν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ καλούμενον παρ’ αὐτοῖς δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον θέμα
καὶ τέταρτον, ἀμελήσαντες μὲν τοῦ χρησίμου, πᾶν δὲ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν δυνάμενον
λέγεσθαι ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ θεωρίᾳ κἂν ἄχρηστος ᾖ, ἐπεξελθόντες τε καὶ
ζηλώσαντες. Reference is made to the same thing in Simpl. De Cœlo;
Schol. in Arist. 483, b, 26: ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη ἀνάλυσις τοῦ λόγου, ἡ τὸ
συμπέρασμα λαμβάνουσα καὶ προσλαμβάνουσα ἄλλην πρότασιν, κατὰ τὸ τρίτον
λεγόμενον παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς θέμα περαίνεται, the rule of which is,
that when a third proposition can be drawn from the conclusion of an
inference and a second proposition, that third proposition can be drawn
also from the premisses of the inference and the second proposition.
Both these passages appear to have escaped the notice of Prantl in his
summing up, otherwise so accurate. Or else the πρῶτον, δεύτερον, τρίτον
and τέταρτον θέμα mentioned by Galen, Hipp. et Plat. ii. 3, vol. v.
224; Alex. Anal. Pr. 53, b, would hardly suggest to him the various
forms of the ἀναπόδεικτοι instead of the formulæ for the resolution of
composite conclusions. The expressions διὰ δύο τροπικῶν, διὰ τριῶν
τροπικῶν, and the title of a treatise of Chrysippus περὶ τοῦ διὰ τριῶν
(sc. τροπικῶν or λημμάτων conf. p. 117, 3) in Diog. vii. 191; (Galen,
l.c.; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 2), appear to refer to such composite
inferences.
[245] Called μονολήμματοι συλλογισμοί. Such were ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἄρα
ἔστιν· and ἀναπνεῖς, ζῇς ἄρα. See Alex. Top. 6, 274; Anal. Pr. 7, a, 8,
a: Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 167; Math. viii. 443; Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 272,
Oud.; Prantl, 477, 186.
[246] Compare the remarks of Prantl, 481, on Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 2; Alex.
Anal. Pr. 53, b; Galen, l.c.; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. 57. If
Posidonius, according to the latter passage, calls analogical
conclusions συνακτικοὺς κατὰ δύναμιν ἀξιώματος, and the Stoics also,
according to Schol. in Hermog. Rhet. Gr. ed. Walz, vii. 6, 764, spoke
of a κατὰ δύναμιν τροπικὸν, we have already met with the same thing, p.
119, 1, where an analogical conclusion was included in the ἀμεθόδως
περαίνοντες, which, by the addition of an ἀξίωμα, can be changed into
regular conclusions. In the doctrine of proof the τόπος παράδοξος was
also treated of, according to Procl. in Euclid, 103, being probably
suggested by the ethical paradoxes of the Stoics.
[247] Conf. Alex. Anal. Pr. 95, a; Galen. See above p. 120, 3.
According to Ps. Galen, l.c. p. 58, Chrysippus wrote these treatises on
Συλλογιστικαὶ ἄχρηστοι.
[248] Diog. 186, mentions fallacies due to Chrysippus, which can only
have been raised for the purpose of being refuted.
[249] The list of his writings contains a number of treatises on
fallacies, among them no less than five on the ψευδόμενος.
[250] Cic. Acad. ii. 29, 93: Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim
interrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint, anne multa, aliquanto
prius, quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere, id est, quod ab iis dicitur
ἡσυχάζειν. The same remark is made by Sext. Math. vii. 416; Pyrrh. ii.
253. The same argument was employed against other fallacies (Simpl.
Cat. 6, γ). With this λόγος ἡσυχάζων (Diog. 198), Prantl, p. 489,
connects ἀργὸς λόγος (Cic. De Fato, 12, 28), regarding the one as the
practical application of the other, but apparently without reason. The
ἀργὸς λόγος, by means of which the Stoic fatalism was reduced ad
absurdum, could not of course commend itself to Chrysippus, nor is it
attributed to him.
[251] Prantl, pp. 485–496.
[252] Sext. Math. viii. 367: ἀλλ’ οὐ δεῖ, φασὶ, πάντων ἀπόδειξιν
αἰτεῖν, τινὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν, ἐπεὶ οὐ δυνήσεται
προβαίνειν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δοθῇ τι πιστὸν ἐξ αὑτοῦ τυγχάνειν.
Ibid. 375: ἀλλ’ εἰώθασιν ὑποτυγχάνοντες λέγειν ὅτι πίστις ἐστὶ τοῦ
ἐρρῶσθαι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ ἀληθὲς εὑρίσκεσθαι ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
ληφθεῖσιν ἐπιφερόμενον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ τούτοις ἀκολουθοῦν ἐστιν ὑγιὲς,
κἀκεῖνα οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀναμφίλεκτα καθέστηκεν.
[253] Natural Science was divided by the Stoics themselves (Diog. 132):
(1) εἰδικῶς into τόποι περὶ σωμάτων καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ στοιχείων καὶ
θεῶν καὶ περάτων καὶ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ· (2) γενικῶς into three divisions,
περὶ κόσμον, περὶ στοιχείων, and the αἰτιολογικός. The first of these
divisions covers ground which is partly peculiar to natural science and
is partly shared by the mathematician (astronomy. Posidonius in Simpl.
Phys. 64, b, discusses at length the difference between astronomy and
natural science); and the third, ground which is shared by both the
physician and the mathematician. The precise allotment of the subject
into these divisions is not known. At best, it would be a very
uncomfortable division.
[254] Soph. 247, D.
[255] Plut. Com. Not. 30, 2, p. 1073: ὄντα γὰρ μόνα τὰ σώματα καλοῦσιν,
ἐπειδὴ ὄντος τὸ ποιεῖν τι καὶ πάσχειν. Plac. i. 11, 4: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ πάντα
τὰ αἴτια σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ. iv. 20: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ σῶμα τὴν φωνήν·
πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δρώμενον ἢ καὶ ποιοῦν σῶμα· ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ποιεῖ καὶ δρᾷ ... ἔτι
πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν καὶ ἐνοχλοῦν σῶμά ἐστιν ... ἔτι πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον σῶμά
ἐστιν. Cic. Acad. i. 11, 39: [Zeno] nullo modo arbitrabatur quidquam
effici posse ab ea [natura] quæ expers esset corporis ... nec vero aut
quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur (more accurately: in quo
efficeretur aliquid. Conf. Ritter, iii. 577) posse esse non corpus.
Seneca, see below p. 128, 1; 129, 1; Stob. Ecl. i. 336 (see p. 95, 2)
and 338: Χρύσιππος αἴτιον εἶναι λέγει δι’ ὅ. καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὂν καὶ
σῶμα, κ.τ.λ. Ποσειδώνιος δὲ οὕτως. αἴτιον δ’ ἐστί τινος δι’ ὃ ἐκεῖνο, ἢ
τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως, καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὂν καὶ σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον οὔτε
ὂν οὔτε σῶμα, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ κατηγόρημα. See p. 95, 1 and 2. Diog.
vii. 56: According to Chrysippus, Diogenes (see Simpl. Phys. 97, a),
and others, the voice is material, πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν σῶμά ἐστι. Ibid.
150: οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην, ὡς καὶ
Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ Ζήνων· ὕλη δέ ἐστιν, ἐξ ἧς
ὁτιδηποτοῦν γίνεται ... σῶμα δέ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία. Hippolyt.
Refut. Hær. i. 21: σώματα δὲ πάντα ὑπέθεντο, κ.τ.λ.
[256] As do Ritter, iii. 577, and Schleiermacher, Gesch. der Philos.
129.
[257] Diog. vii. 135: σῶμα δ’ ἐστὶ (φησὶν Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ φυσικῇ) τὸ
τριχῇ διαστατὸν, κ.τ.λ.
[258] See p. 98. The corporeal nature of deity and the soul will be
subsequently discussed.
[259] See p. 105. Sen. Ep. 102, 7, remarks, in reference to the
difference of ἡνωμένα· (see p. 103, 1): nullum bonum putamus esse, quod
ex distantibus constat: uno enim spiritu unum bonum contineri ac regi
debet, unum esse unius boni principale. Hence the objection raised in
Plut. Com. Not. 50, 1, p. 1085: τὰς ποιότητας οὐσίας καὶ σώματα
ποιοῦσιν, and Ibid. 44, 4, the statement discussed on p. 101, 2.
[260] Philo, Qu. De. S. Immut. p. 298, D (the same in the spurious
treatise De Mundo, p. 1154, E): ἡ δὲ [ἕξις = ποιότης] ἐστὶ πνεῦμα
ἀντιστρέφον ἐφ’ ἑαυτό. ἄρχεται μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα
τείνεσθαι, ψαῦσαν δὲ ἄκρας ἐπιφανείας ἀνακάμπτει πάλιν, ἄχρις ἂν ἐπὶ
τὸν αὐτὸν ἀφίκηται τόπον, ἀφ’ οὗ τὸ πρῶτον ὡρμίσθη. ἕξεως ὁ συνεχὴς
οὗτος δίαυλος ἄφθαρτος, κ.τ.λ. Qu. Mund. S. Incorr. 960, D [De Mundo,
1169, A]: ἡ δ’ [ἕξις] ἐστὶ πνευματικὸς τόνος. There can be no doubt
that Philo is describing the Stoic teaching in these passages.
The same idea is also used to explain the connection between the soul
and the body. The unity of the universe is proved by the fact that the
Divine Spirit pervades it. Further particulars hereafter. Conf. Alex.
Aphr. De Mixt. 142, a: ἡνῶσθαι μὲν ὑποτίθεται [Χρύσιππος] τὴν σύμπασαν
οὐσίαν πνεύματός τινος διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς διήκοντος, ὑφ’ οὗ συνάγεταί τε
καὶ συμμένει καὶ σύμπαθές ἐστιν αὑτῷ τὸ πᾶν. (That must be the reading,
the next sentence containing τῶν δὲ, κ.τ.λ. Conf. 143, b). Alex. 143,
b, carefully denies the statement, that the all-penetrating Breath
keeps things together.
[261] Plut. Com. Not. 45. See p. 129, 3. Sen. Ep. 117, 2: Placet
nostris, quod bonum est, esse corpus, quia quod bonum est, facit:
quidquid facit corpus est ... sapientiam bonum esse dicunt: sequitur,
ut necesse sit illam corporalem quoque dicere. Conf. p. 129, 1.
[262] This is the conception of τόνος, upon which the strength of the
soul depends, as well as the strength of the body. Cleanthes, in Plut.
Sto. Rep. 7, 4, p. 1034: πληγὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστὶ κἂν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
γένηται πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος.
Stob. Ecl. ii. 110: ὥσπερ ἰσχὺς τοῦ σώματος τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν
νεύροις, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχὺς τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ κρίνειν
καὶ πράττειν καὶ μή. All properties may be classed under the same
conception of tension. See p. 127, 5 and Plut. Com. Not. 49, 2, p.
1085: γῆν μὲν γὰρ ἴσασι καὶ ὕδωρ οὔτε αὑτὰ συνέχειν οὔτε ἕτερα,
πνευματικῆς δὲ μετοχῇ, καὶ πυρώδους δυνάμεως τὴν ἑνότητα διαφυλάττειν·
ἀέρα δὲ καὶ πῦρ αὑτῶν τ’ εἶναι δι’ εὐτονίαν ἐκτατικὰ καὶ τοῖς δυσὶν
ἐκείνοις ἐγκεκραμένα τόνον παρέχειν καὶ τὸ μόνιμον καὶ οὐσιῶδες. Ps.
Censorin. Fragm. c. 1, p. 75, Jahn: Initia rerum eadem elementa et
principia dicuntur. Ea Stoici credunt tenorem atque materiam; tenorem,
qui rarescente materia a medio tendat ad summum, eadem concrescente
rursus a summo referatur ad medium. Here tenor or τόνος is made
equivalent to πνεῦμα. Seneca, however, Nat. Qu. ii. 8, conf. vi. 21,
endeavours to show that intentio belongs to spiritus more than to any
other body.
[263] Sen. Ep. 106, 4: Bonum facit, prodest enim: quod facit corpus
est: bonum agitat animum et quodammodo format et continet, quæ propria
sunt corporis. Quæ corporis bona sunt, corpora sunt: ergo et quæ animi
sunt. Nam et hoc corpus. Bonum hominis necesse est corpus sit, cum ipse
sit corporalis.... Si adfectus corpora sunt et morbi animorum et
avaritia, crudelitas, indurata vitia ... ergo et malitia et species
ejus omnes ... ergo et bona. It is then specially remarked that the
Good, i.e. virtue, works upon the body, governing it and representing
itself therein. Conf. p. 128, 1.
[264] Sext. Math. vii. 38: τὴν δὲ ἀλήθειαν οἴονταί τινες, καὶ μάλιστα
οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, διαφέρειν τἀληθοῦς κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους ... οὐσία μὲν
παρ’ ὅσον ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστι τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἀσώματον ὑπῆρχε. καὶ
εἰκότως, φασί. τουτὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀξίωμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀξίωμα λεκτὸν, τὸ δὲ
λεκτὸν ἀσώματον· ἀνάπαλιν δὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστιν παρ’ ὅσον ἐπιστήμη
πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικὴ δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν· πᾶσα δὲ ἐπιστήμη πὼς ἔχον
ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικὸν ... τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν σῶμα κατὰ τούτους ὑπῆρχε.
Similarly Pyrrh. ii. 81. See p. 92, 2.
[265] Plut. Com. Not. 45, 2, p. 1084: ἄτοπον γὰρ εὖ μάλα, τὰς ἀρετὰς
καὶ τὰς κακίας, πρὸς δὲ ταύταις τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς μνήμας πάσας, ἔτι δὲ
φαντασίας καὶ πάθη καὶ ὁρμὰς καὶ συγκαταθέσεις σώματα ποιουμένους ἐν
μηδενὶ φάναι κεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ. ... οἱ δ’ οὐ μόνον τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς
κακίας ζῷα εἶναι λέγουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ πάθη μόνον, ὀργὰς καὶ φθόνους καὶ
λύπας καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, οὐδὲ καταλήψεις καὶ φαντασίας καὶ ἀγνοίας
οὐδὲ τὰς τέχνας ζῷα, τὴν σκυτοτομικὴν, τὴν χαλκοτυπικήν· ἀλλὰ πρὸς
τούτοις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας σώματα καὶ ζῷα ποιοῦσι, τὸν περίπατον ζῷον,
τὴν ὄρχησιν, τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, τὴν προσαγόρευσιν, τὴν λοιδορίαν. Plutarch
is here speaking as an opponent. Seneca, however (Ep. 106, 5).
observes: Non puto te dubitaturum, an adfectus corpora sint ... tanquam
ira, amor, tristitia: si dubitas, vide an vultum nobis mutent:... Quid
ergo? tam manifestas corpori notas credis imprimi, nisi a corpore? See
p. 129, 1; Stob. Ecl. ii. 114: The Stoics consider virtues to be
substantially identical (τὰς αὐτὰς καθ’ ὑπόστασιν) with the leading
part of the soul (ἡγεμονικὸν), and consequently to be, like it, σώματα
and ζῷα. Seneca, Ep. 113, 1, speaks still more plainly: Desideras tibi
scribi a me, quid sentiam de hac quæstione jactata apud nostros: an
justitia, an fortitudo, prudentia ceteræque virtutes animalia sint....
Me in alia sententia profiteor esse.... Quæ sint ergo quæ antiquos
moverint, dicam. Animum constat animal esse.... Virtus autem nihil
aliud est, quam animus quodammodo se habens: ergo animal est. Deinde:
virtus agit aliquid: agi autem nihil sine impetu (ὁρμὴ) potest. If it
is urged: Each individual will thus consist of an innumerable number of
living beings, the reply is that these animalia are only parts of one
animal, the soul; they are accordingly not many (multa), but one and
the same viewed from different sides: idem est animus et justus et
prudens et fortis ad singulas virtutes quodammodo se habens. From the
same letter, 23, we gather that Cleanthes explained ambulatio as
spiritus a principali usque in pedes permissus, Chrysippus as
principale itself.
[266] See p. 92, 2, the extract from Sen. Ep. 117.
[267] Plut. Com. Not. 45, 5, p. 1084: Χρυσίππου μνημονεύοντες ἐν τῷ
πρώτῳ τῶν φυσικῶν ζητημάτων οὕτω προσάγοντος· οὐχ ἡ μὲν νὺξ σῶμά ἐστιν,
ἡ δ’ ἑσπέρα καὶ ὁ ὀρθὸς καὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς νυκτὸς σώματα οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐδὲ
ἡ μὲν ἡμέρα σῶμά ἐστιν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ νουμηνία σῶμα, καὶ ἡ δεκάτη, καὶ
πεντεκαιδεκάτη καὶ ἡ τριακὰς καὶ ὁ μὴν σῶμά ἐστι καὶ τὸ θέρος καὶ τὸ
φθινόπωρον καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτός.
[268] Diog. 151: χειμῶνα μὲν εἶναί φασι τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς ἄερα κατεψυγμένον
διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου πρόσω ἄφοδον, ἔαρ δὲ τὴν εὐκρασίαν τοῦ ἀέρος κατὰ τὴν
πρὸς ἡμᾶς πορείαν, θέρος δὲ τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς ἀέρα καταθαλπόμενον, κ.τ.λ.
Stob. Ecl. i. 260: Chrysippus defines ἔαρ ἔτους ὥραν κεκραμένην ἐκ
χειμῶνας ἀπολήγοντος καὶ θέρους ἀρχομένου ... θέρος δὲ ὥραν τὴν μάλιστ’
ἀφ’ ἡλίου διακεκαυμένην· μετόπωρον δὲ ὥραν ἔτους τὴν μετὰ θέρος μὲν πρὸ
χειμῶνος δὲ κεκραμένην· χειμῶνα δὲ ὥραν ἔτους τὴν μάλιστα κατεψυγμένην,
ἢ τὴν τῷ περὶ γῆν ἀέρι κατεψυγμένην. Ibid.: According to Empedocles and
the Stoics, the cause of winter is the preponderance of air, the cause
of summer the preponderance of fire. Ibid. 556: μεὶς δ’ ἐστὶ, φησὶ
[Χρύσιππος] τὸ φαινόμενον τῆς σελήνης πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἢ σελήνη μέρος ἔχουσα
φαινόμενον πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Cleomedes, Meteora, 112, distinguishes four
meanings of μήν. In the two first it means something material; in the
others, as a definition of time, something immaterial.
[269] Diog. vii. 140; Stob. Ecl. i. 392; Sext. Math. x. 218 and 237;
viii. 11; vii. 38; Pyrrh. ii. 81; iii. 52. See p. 92, 2.
[270] See p. 94, 1.
[271] See p. 66, 1.
[272] See p. 93; 132, 1.
[273] See p. 84, 4.
[274] See p. 105, 3.
[275] Let a piece of red-hot iron be taken, every part of which is
heavy, hard, hot, &c. Not one of these attributes can be confounded
with another, or with the iron itself, but each one runs through the
whole iron. Now, if each attribute is due to the presence of some
material producing it, there is no avoiding the conclusion that there
must exist in the iron, and in each part of it, as many various
materials as there are attributes, without any one of them losing its
own identity.
[276] Diog. vii. 151: καὶ τὰς κράσεις δὲ διόλου γίνεσθαι, καθά φησιν ὁ
Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν, καὶ μὴ κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ
παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰς πέλαγος ὀλίγος οἶνος βληθεὶς ἐπὶ πόσον
ἀντιπαρεκταθήσεται εἶτα συμφθαρήσεται. According to Stob. Ecl. i. 374,
the Stoics more accurately distinguish μῖξις, κρᾶσις, παράθεσις,
σύγχυσις. Παράθεσις is σωμάτων συναφὴ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιφανείας; for
instance, the combination of various kinds of grain. Μῖξις is δύο ἢ καὶ
πλειόνων σωμάτων ἀντιπαρέκτασις δι’ ὅλων, ὑπομενουσῶν τῶν συμφυῶν περὶ
αὐτὰ ποιοτήτων; for instance, the union of fire and iron, of soul and
body. Such a union is called μῖξις in the case of solid bodies, κρᾶσις
in the case of fluids. Σύγχυσις is δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων ποιοτήτων περὶ τὰ
σώματα μεταβολὴ εἰς ἑτέρας διαφερούσης τούτων ποιότητος γένεσιν, as in
the making up salves and medicines. Very much in the same way according
to Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142, a, Chrysippus distinguished three kinds of
μῖξις: παράθεσις, or union of substances, in which each retains its
οἰκεία οὐσία or ποιότης κατὰ τὴν περιγραφήν; σύγχυσις, in which both
substances, as well as attributes, are destroyed (φθείρεσθαι), giving
rise to a third body; κρᾶσις = δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων τινων σωμάτων ὅλων
δι’ ὅλων ἀντιπαρέκτασιν ἀλλήλοις οὕτως, ὥστε σώζειν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ
μίξει τῇ τοιαύτῃ τήν τε οἰκείαν οὐσίαν καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ ποιότητας.
Materials thus united can be again separated, but yet are they so
united: ὡς μηδὲν μόριον ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὴ μετέχον πάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ
μίγματι.
For such a union to be possible, (1) it must be possible for one body
to penetrate every part of another, without being fused into a
homogeneous mass. Hence the expression σῶμα διὰ σώματος ἀντιπαρήκειν,
σῶμα σώματος εἶναι τόπον καὶ σῶμα χωρεῖν διὰ σώματος κένον μηδετέρου
περιέχοντος ἀλλὰ τοῦ πλήρους εἰς τὸ πλῆρες ἐνδυομένου (Plut. C. Not.
37, 2, p. 1077; Alex. 142, b; Themist. Phys. 37; Simpl. Phys. 123, b;
Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21); (2) it must be possible for the smaller
body to extend over the whole size of the greater. This is affirmed by
Chrysippus: οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν φάμενος, οἴνου σταλαγμὸν ἕνα κεράσαι τὴν
θάλατταν, or even εἰς ὅλον τὸν κόσμον διατενεῖν τῇ κράσει τὸν σταλαγμόν
(Plut. 10; Alex. 142, b; Diog.). The greater body is said to help the
smaller, by giving to it an extension of which it would not otherwise
be capable. Nevertheless, the bodies so united need not necessarily
occupy more space than was previously occupied by one of them (Alex.
142, b; Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, C. Fic. 860, 14, Cr.). The
absurdities which this theory involves were already exposed by
Arcesilaus (Plut. 7), and in detail by Alexander, Plutarch, Sextus, and
Plotinus, by the latter in a whole treatise (Enn. ii. 7) περὶ τῆς δι’
ὅλων κράτεως.
[277] Πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ λέγεται περὶ κράσεως καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνήνυτοι περὶ τοῦ
προκειμένου σκέμματός εἰσι παρὰ τοῖς Δογματικοῖς στάσεις. Sext. Pyrrh.
iii. 56. See previous note.
[278] According to Alex. 142, a, the following arguments were used by
Chrysippus:—(1) The argument from κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι—our notion of κρᾶσις
is different from that of σύγχυσις or παράθεσις. (2) Many bodies are
capable of extension, whilst retaining their own properties;
frankincense, for instance, when burnt, and gold. (3) The soul
penetrates every part of the body, without losing its properties. So
φύσις does in plants, and ἕξις does in all which it connects. (4) The
same holds good of fire in red-hot metal, of fire and air in water and
earth, of poisons and perfumes in things with which they are mixed, and
of light, which penetrates air.
The first of these arguments clearly does not embody the real reason in
the mind of Chrysippus; it might, with equal justice, have been used to
prove anything else. Just as little does the second; for the phenomena
to which it refers would be equally well explained on the theory of
simple intermingling (παράθεσις) or complete (σύγχυσις) mixing. Nor
does the fourth argument, taken independently of the theory of the
corporeal nature of properties, necessarily lead to the idea of κρᾶσις
as distinct from παράθεσις and σύγχυσις. For heat, according to the
Peripatetic view, might be regarded as a property of what is hot, light
as a definite property of a transparent body (conf. Alex. 143, a),
παράθεσις and σύγχυσις sufficing for other things. Even the fact,
greatly insisted upon by the Stoics, that things so mixed can be again
separated into their component materials (Alex. 143, a; Stob. i. 378),
was not conclusive. As long as the knowledge of the actual composition
depended on isolated cases and crude experiments, like the one named by
Stobæus (into a mixture of wine and water, put an oiled sponge, it will
absorb the water and not the wine), and as long as the substantial
change of elements, advocated by the Stoics as well as by the
Peripatetics, was clung to, it was no difficult matter for an opponent
to reply. On the other hand, the relation of the soul to the body, of
property to subject-matter, of φύσις to φυτὸν, of God to the world, can
hardly be otherwise explained than it was by Chrysippus, if once
material existence be assigned to the soul, to φύσις, to ἕξις, and to
God. We have, therefore, here the real ground on which this theory of
κρᾶσις was based; and Simplicius rightly deduces it herefrom (Phys.
123, b): τὸ δὲ σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι ὡς ἐναργὲς ἄτοπον
ἐλάμβανον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ὕστερον προσήκαντο ὡς ἀκολουθοῦν ταῖς
σφῶν αὐτῶν ὑποθέσεσιν ... σώματα γὰρ λέγειν πάντα δοκοῦντες, καὶ τὰς
ποιότητας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ διὰ παντὸς ὁρῶντες τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὴν
ψυχὴν χωροῦσαν καὶ τὰς ποιότητας ἐν ταῖς κράσεσι, συνεχώρουν σῶμα διὰ
σώματος χωρεῖν.
[279] See p. 95, 2; 126, 1.
[280] On ἄποιος ὕλη, as the universal ὑποκείμενον or οὐσία κοινὴ, see
p. 100. Sext. Math. x. 312: ἐξ ἀποίου μὲν οὖν καὶ ἑνὸς σώματος τὴν τῶν
ὅλων ὑπεστήσαντο γένεσιν οἱ Στωϊκοί. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων κατ’ αὐτούς
ἐστιν ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη καὶ δι’ ὅλων τρεπτὴ, μεταβαλλούσης τε ταύτης γίνεται
τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, πῦρ, κ.τ.λ. Plut. C. Not. 48, 2, p. 1085: ἡ ὕλη
καθ’ αὑτὴν ἄλογος οὖσα καὶ ἄποιος. M. Aurel. xii. 30: μία οὐσία κοινὴ,
κἂν διείργηται ἰδίως ποιοῖς σώματι μυρίοις. Diog. 137: τὰ δὴ τέτταρα
στοιχεῖα εἶναι ὁμοῦ τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην.
[281] See p. 141, 2.
[282] Plut. Sto. Rep. 43. See p. 105, 1.
[283] See p. 105, 1 and 2; 127, 5; 128, 2.
[284] Simpl. Cat. 67, ε (Schol. 74, a, 10): τὸ τοίνυν σχῆμα οἱ Στωϊκοὶ
τὴν τάσιν παρέχεσθαι λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ τὴν μεταξὺ τῶν σημείων διάστασιν.
διὸ καὶ εὐθεῖαν ὁρίζονται γραμμὴν τὴν εἰς ἄκρον τεταμένην.
[285] Simpl. Cat. 68, ε: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ δύναμιν, ἢ μᾶλλον κίνησιν τὴν
μανωτικὴν καὶ πυκνωτικὴν τίθενται, τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσω, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ
ἔξω· καὶ τὴν μὲν τοῦ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ποιὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν αἰτίαν.
Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 2, p. 29: εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν, καθάπερ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ,
τονικήν τινα εἶναι κίνησιν περὶ τὰ σώματα, εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἅμα καὶ εἰς τὸ
ἔξω κινουμένην, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἰς τὸ ἔξω μεγεθῶν καὶ ποιότητων
ἀποτελεστικὴν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἑνώσεως καὶ οὐσίας. This remark
is confirmed by what is quoted, p. 128, 2 from Censorinus, and by the
language of Plutarch (Def. Orac. c. 28. Schl. p. 425), in reference to
Chrysippus: πολλάκις εἰρηκὼς, ὅτι ταῖς εἰς τὸ αὑτῆς μέσον ἡ οὐσία καὶ
ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ αὑτῆς μέσου διοικεῖται καὶ συνέχεται κινήσεσι.
[286] Diog. vii. 134: δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ
ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν
ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν. τοῦτον γὰρ ὄντα ἀΐδιον
διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα. Such is the teaching of Zeno,
Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Archedemus, and Posidonius. Sext. Math. ix. 11:
οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς δύο λέγοντες ἀρχὰς, θεὸν καὶ ἄποιον ὕλην, τὸν μὲν θεὸν
ποιεῖν ὑπειλήφασι, τὴν δὲ ὕλην πάσχειν τε καὶ τρέπεσθαι. Similarly
Alex. Aph. De Mixt. 144; Achill. Tat. Isag. c. 3, 124, E; Plut. Pl.
Phil. i. 3, 39; Stob. Ecl. i. 306; 322, according to the passage
quoted, p. 101, 2, from Zeno respecting ὕλη: διὰ ταύτης δὲ διαθεῖν τὸν
τοῦ παντὸς λόγον ὃν ἔνιοι εἱμαρμένην καλοῦσιν, οἷόνπερ ἐν τῇ γόνῃ τὸ
σπέρμα. Sen. Ep. 65, 2: Dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri, duo esse in
rerum natura, ex quibus omnia fiant: causam et materiam. Materia jacet
iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat. Causa autem, i.e.
ratio, materiam format et quocunque vult versat, ex illa varia opera
producit. Esse ergo debet, unde fit aliquid, deinde a quo fiat. Hoc
causa est, illud materia. Ibid. 23: Universa ex materia et ex Deo
constant ... potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est
Deus, quam materia patiens Dei.
[287] Sen. Ep. 65, 11: Nam si, quocumque remoto quid effici non potest,
id causam judicant esse faciendi, &c. Sext. Math. ix. 228: εἰ αἴτιόν
ἐστιν οὗ παρόντος γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα. This appears to be the most
general Stoic definition. That given by Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14—τοῦτο, δι’
ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα—and by him said to express the views
of several schools, expresses a narrower conception—the conception of
efficient cause, which, however, for a Stoic, is the only essential
one.
[288] Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 15, distinguishes between συνεκτικὰ, συναίτια,
and σύνεργα αἴτια, all of which are, however, subordinated to the δι’
ὃ, which he is there alone discussing. Seneca l.c. maintains that,
according to the definition given above, time, place, and motion ought
to be reckoned as causes, since nothing can be produced without these.
He allows, however, that a distinction must be made between causa
efficiens and causa superveniens. This agrees with what Cicero (De
Fato, 18, 41) quotes from Chrysippus relative to causæ perfectæ et
principales, and causæ adjuvantes et proximæ, and with the Platonic and
Aristotelian distinction of αἴτιον δι’ ὃ and οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ. See Zeller’s
Philosophie der Griechen. In the same way, Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 4, p.
1056 distinguishes between αἴτια αὐτοτελὴς and προκαταρκτική. Alex.
Aph. De Fato, 72, blames the Stoics: σμῆνος γὰρ αἰτίων καταλέγουσι, τὰ
μὲν προκαταρκτικὰ, τὰ δὲ συναίτια, τὰ δὲ ἑκτικὰ, τὰ δὲ συνεκτικὰ, τὰ δὲ
ἄλλο τι. Conf. Orelli ad locum.
[289] Seneca, l.c., after enumerating the four causes of Aristotle, to
which the Platonic idea is added as a fifth, continues: This turba
causarum embraces either too much or too little. Sed nos nunc primam et
generalem quærimus causam. Hæc simplex esse debet, nam et materia
simplex est. Quærimus quæ sit causa, ratio scilicet faciens, id est
Deus. Ita enim, quæcumque retulistis, non sunt multæ et singulæ causæ,
sed ex una pendent, ex ea, quæ faciet. Conf. Stob. Ecl. i. 336: αἴτιον
δ’ ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι’ ὃ ... Χρύσιππος αἴτιον εἶναι λέγει δ’ ὃ ...
Ποσειδώνιος δὲ οὕτως· αἴτιον δ’ ἐστί τινος δι’ ὃ ἐκεῖνο, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον
ποιοῦν ἢ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως.
[290] Cic. N. D. ii. 7, 19, after speaking of the consentiens,
conspirans, continuata cognatio rerum (συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων), continues:
Hæc ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto
non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur.
See Sext. Math. ix. 78. The same view is further expanded in Sext.
Math. ix. 78. Conf. the quotation on p. 127, 5, from Alexander.
[291] According to the remarks, p. 105 and 126, this requires no proof.
[292] Cic. N. D. ii. 9, 23 (conf. iii. 14, 35), gives it apparently as
the view of Cleanthes, who alone is mentioned, 9, 24. All living
things, plants, and animals, exist by heat: nam omne quod est calidum
et igneum cietur et agitur motu suo. Digestion and circulation are the
result of heat: ex quo intelligi debet, eam caloris naturam vim habere
in se vitalem per omnem mundum pertinentem. Moreover: omnes partes
mundi ... calore fultæ sustinentur. There must be fire in earth and
stones, else it could not be extracted therefrom. Water, especially
fresh spring water, is warm, more particularly in winter, and as motion
warms us, so the roll of the waves does the sea. From water likewise as
it evaporates, air derives its heat.... Jam vero reliqua quarta pars
mundi, ea et ipsa tota natura fervida est, et cæteris naturis omnibus
salutarem impertit et vitalem calorem. Ex quo concluditur, cum omnes
mundi partes sustineantur calore, mundum etiam ipsum simili parique
natura in tanta diuturnitate servari: eoque magis quod intelligi debet,
calidum illum atque igneum ita in omni fusum esse natura, ut in eo
insit procreandi vis, &c.
[293] On the argument, ex consensu gentium, consult Plut. Sto. Rep. 38.
3; Com. Not. 32, 1; Cic. N. D. ii. 2, 5; Seneca, Benef. iv. 4; Sext.
Math. ix. 123 and 131, where different varieties of it are given, even
a particular one from Zeno.
[294] Sext. Math. ix. 75.
[295] Cic. N. D. iii. 9, 22: Zeno enim ita concludit: quod ratione
utitur, melius est, quam id, quod ratione non utitur. Nihil autem mundo
melius. Ratione igitur mundus utitur. The same, ibid. ii. 8, 21, and
12, 34. Sext. Math. ix. 104: εἰ τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ μὴ λογικοῦ κρεῖττόν
ἐστιν, οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρεῖττόν ἐστι, λογικὸν ἄρα ὁ κόσμος ... τὸ
γὰρ νοερὸν τοῦ μὴ νοεροῦ καὶ ἔμψυχον τοῦ μὴ ἐμψύχου κρεῖττόν ἐστιν·
οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρεῖττον· νοερὸς ἄρα καὶ ἔμψυχός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος.
Likewise Diog. 142, says that Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Posidonius
agree that the world is ζῷον καὶ λογικὸν καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ νοερόν· τὸ γὰρ
ζῷον τοῦ μὴ ζῷον κρεῖττον· οὐδὲν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κρεῖττον· ζῷον ἄρα ὁ
κόσμος.
[296] Cic. N. D. ii. 8, 22: Zeno affirms: Nullius sensu carentis pars
aliqua potest esse sentiens. Mundi autem partes sentientes sunt. Non
igitur caret sensu mundus.
[297] Diog. 143: ἔμψυχον δὲ [τὸν κόσμον], ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας
ψυχῆς ἐκεῖθεν οὔσης ἀποσπάσματος. Sext. Math. ix. 101: Ζήνων δὲ ὁ
Κιττιεὺς ἀπὸ Ξενοφῶντος τὴν ἀφορμὴν λαβὼν οὑτωσὶ συνερωτᾷ· τὸ
προϊέμενον σπέρμα λογικοῦ καὶ αὐτὸ λογικόν ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ κόσμος προΐεται
σπέρμα λογικοῦ, λογικὸν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος. The same proof in Sext.
Math. ix. 77 and 84; Cic. l.c. Conf. ibid. ii. 31, 79; 6, 18, where
also the passage in Xenophon, Mem. i. 4, 8, quoted by Sext. ix. 94, is
referred to.
[298] Cic. l.c. iii. 10, 25: Is [Chrysippus] igitur: si aliquid est,
inquit, quod homo efficere non possit, qui id efficit melior est
homine. Homo autem hæc, quæ in mundo sunt, efficere non potest. Qui
potuit igitur, is præstat homini. Homini autem præstare quis possit,
nisi Deus? Est igitur Deus. The same, only a little more fully, ibid.
ii. 6, 16. To this argument, another favourite one of the Stoics, based
on the fulfilment of prophecy, belongs.
[299] Cleanthes made use of arguments from final causes to prove the
existence of God. Of this nature are all the four arguments which he
employs in Cic. N. D. ii. 6, but particularly the fourth, based on the
regular order and beauty of heaven. A building cannot exist without a
builder; no more can the building of the world exist without a ruling
spirit. Therewith Cicero connects the above-named argument of
Chrysippus. The same writer, N. D. ii. 32–66, gives very fully the
physical theological argument for the existence of providence, which is
given in a shorter form by Cleomedes, Meteora, 1; Seneca, De Provid. i.
1, 2–4; Nat. Qu. i.; Sext. Math. ix. 111; conf. Ps. Censorin. Fragm. i.
2, p. 75, Jahn; Plut. Plac. i. 6, 8: belief in gods grows out of
considering the world and its beauty, an argument also quoted by Sext.
Math. ix. 26.
[300] See the expansion of this thought by Cleanthes (in Sext. Math.
ix. 88–91) and the Stoics (in Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 33). Cicero
distinguishes four kinds of beings—Plants, Animals, Men, and that being
which is altogether reasonable and perfect deity.
[301] See p. 143, 2; 144, 1–4; 145, 1 and 2.
[302] Sext. Math. ix. 102, expanding Zeno’s argument given, p. 145, 2:
πάσης γὰρ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς ἡ καταρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἀπὸ
ἡγεμονικοῦ καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου ἐξαποστελλόμεναι δυνάμεις
ὡς ἀπό τινος πηγῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐξαποστέλλονται. Cic. N. D. ii. 29:
according to Cleanthes, omnem enim naturam necesse est, quæ non
solitaria sit, neque simplex, sed cum alio juncta atque connexa, habere
aliquem in se principatum [= ἡγεμονικὸν] ut in homine mentem, &c....
Itaque necesse est illud etiam, in quo sit totius naturæ principatus,
esse omnium optimum. See following note.
[303] Cic. Acad. ii. 41, 126: Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis æther
videtur summus Deus, mente præditus, qua omnia regantur. N. D. i. 14,
36: (Zeno) æthera Deum dicit. 15, 39: ignem præterea et eum, quem antea
dixi, æthera (Chrysippus Deum dicit esse). Diog. vii. 138: οὐρανὸς δέ
ἐστιν ἡ ἐσχάτη περιφέρεια, ἐν ᾗ πᾶν ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον. Ibid. 139: τὸν
ὅλον κόσμον ζῷον ὄντα καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικὸν ἔχειν ἡγεμονικὸν μὲν τὸν
αἰθέρα, καθά φησιν Ἀντίπατρος ... Χρύσιππος δ’ ... καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ...
τὸν οὐρανόν φασι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου. He continues: ὁ μέντοι
Χρύσιππος διαφορώτερον πάλιν τὸ καθαρώτερον τοῦ αἰθέρος ἐν ταὐτῷ [= τῷ
οὐρανῷ] ὃ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν λέγουσιν, αἰσθητικῶς ὥσπερ κεχωρηκέναι διὰ
τῶν ἐν ἀέρι καὶ διὰ τῶν ζῴων ἁπάντων καὶ φυτῶν, διὰ δὲ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς
καθ’ ἕξιν. Arius Didymus, in Eus. Præp. Ev. xv. 15, 4: Χρυσίππῳ δὲ
[ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου εἶναι ἤρεσε] τὸν αἰθέρα τὸν καθαρώτατον καὶ
εἰλικρινέστατον, ἅτε πάντων εὐκινητότατον ὄντα καὶ τὴν ὅλην περιάγοντα
τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν. Ibid. xv. 20, 2: According to the Stoics, the air
surrounding sea and earth is the soul of the world. Cornut. Nat. De. 8:
Zeus dwells in heaven, ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖ ἐστι τὸ κυριώτατον μέρος τῆς τοῦ
κόσμου ψυχῆς. Tertullian (Apol. 47; Ad Nat. ii. 2, 4) inaccurately
attributes to the Stoics the belief in a God external to nature.
[304] Cic. Acad. l.c.: Cleanthes ... solem dominari et rerum potiri =
κρατεῖν τῶν ὄντων putat. He speaks with less accuracy (Krische, Forsch.
428) in N. D. i. 14, 37: either he considers the original deity; for
this does not exclude the other. No doubt he identified αἰθὴρ with
calor (see p. 144, 1), believing that it emanated from the sun. Diog.
139: Κλεάνθης δὲ [τὸ ἡγεμονικόν φασι] τὸν ἥλιον. Ar. Didymus, l.c.
ἡγεμονικὸν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου Κλεάνθει μὲν ἤρεσε τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι διὰ τὸ
μέγιστον τῶν ἄστρων ὑπάρχειν καὶ πλεῖστα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων
διοίκησιν, κ.τ.λ. Stob. Ecl. i. 452; Ps. Censorin. Fragm. i. 4.
According to Epiphan. Exp. Fidei, 1090, C, he called the sun the
δᾳδοῦχος to the universe.
[305] Stob. l.c.: Ἀρχίδαμος (leg. with Cod. A Ἀρχέδημος) τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν
τοῦ κόσμου ἐν γῇ ὑπάρχειν ἀπεφήνατο: the same statement without
mentioning the name in Ar. Didymus, l.c. This reminds one somewhat of
the Pythagorean doctrine of a central fire, and the view of Speusippus.
The resemblance to the Pythagoreans is greater, if Simpl. De Cœlo,
Schol. in Ar. 505, a, 45, is correct in saying Archedemus denied with
the Pythagoreans that the earth was in the centre of the world.
[306] See p. 141, 2; 143, 1. Aristocles, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 14:
στοιχεῖον εἶναί φασι [οἱ Στωϊκοὶ] τῶν ὄντων τὸ πῦρ, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος,
τούτου δ’ ἀρχὰς ὕλην καὶ θεὸν, ὡς Πλάτων.
[307] Fuller particulars p. 144, 1; 146. Hippolytus, Refut. Hær. i. 21:
Chrysippus and Zeno suppose ἀρχὴν μὲν θεὸν τῶν πάντων, σῶμα ὄντα τὸ
καθαρώτατον (æther). Diog. 148: Antipater calls the οὐσία θεοῦ
ἀεροειδής. Stob. Ecl. i. 60: Mnesarchus (a pupil of Panætius) defines
God to be τὸν κόσμον τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ἐπὶ πνεύματος. Sext.
Pyrrh. iii. 218: Στωϊκοὶ δὲ [λέγουσι θεὸν] πνεῦμα διῆκον καὶ διὰ τῶν
εἰδεχθῶν (the adverse). Alex. Aphr. on Metaph. 995, b, 31 (Schol. in
Ar. 607, a, 19): τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔδοξεν ὁ θεὸς καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν
αἴτιον ἐν τῇ ὕγῃ εἶναι. Ibid. De Mixt. 144, gives them credit: πνεύματι
ὡς διὰ πάντων διήκοντι ἀνάπτειν τό τε εἶναι ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ σώζεσθαι καὶ
συμμένειν. Compare the quotations p. 127, 5 and De An. 145: [τὸν νοῦν]
καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις εἶναι θεῖον ὄντα, ὡς τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔδοξεν.
Lucian, Hermot. 81: ἀκούομεν δὲ αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς καὶ ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐν
οὐρανῷ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάντων πεφοίτηκεν, οἷον ξύλων καὶ λίθων καὶ
ζῴων, ἄχρι καὶ τῶν ἀτιμωτάτων. Tertullian, Ad Nation. ii. 4: Zeno makes
God penetrate the materia mundialis, as honey does the honeycombs. See
p. 105, 3.
Clemens, Strom. v. 591, A: φασὶ γὰρ σῶμα εἶναι τὸν θεὸν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ
πνεῦμα κατ’ οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. Ibid. i. 295, C: (οἱ
Στωϊκοὶ) σῶμα ὄντα τὸν θεὸν διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης ὕλης πεφοιτηκέναι
λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς. Protrept. 44, A: τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, διὰ πάσης ὕλης,
καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης, τὸ θεῖον διήκειν λέγοντας. Orig. c. Cels. vi.
71: τῶν Στωϊκῶν φασκόντων ὅτι ὁ θεὸς πνεῦμά ἐστι διὰ πάντων διεληλυθὸς
καὶ πάντ’ ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιεχόν. Opponents like Origen, l.c. and i. 21,
Alexander, De Mixt. l.c., and Plutarch, Com. Not. 48, naturally attack
them for their materialistic views.
[308] Stob. Ecl. i. 58. See following note. Diog. 138 (according to
Chrysippus and Posidonius): τὸν δὴ κόσμον οἰκεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ
πρόνοιαν ... εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ καθάπερ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν
τῆς ψυχῆς. ἀλλ’ ἤδη δι’ ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι’ ὧν δὲ ἧττον. More popularly,
ibid. 147: θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀθάνατον λογικὸν τέλειον ἢ νοερὸν ἐν
εὐδαιμονίᾳ, κακοῦ παντὸς ἀνεπίδεκτον, προνοητικὸν κόσμου τε καὶ τῶν ἐν
κόσμῳ, μὴ εἶναι μέντοι ἀνθρωπόμορφον. εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν δημιοῦργον τῶν
ὅλων καὶ ὥσπερ πατέρα πάντων κοινῶς τε καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ τὸ διῆκον διὰ
πάντων, ὃ πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις προσονομάζεσθαι κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις. Phæd.
Nat. De. (Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβείας) Col. 1 and Cic. Nat. De. i. 15, 39,
quoting from him: According to Chrysippus, Zeus is κοινὴ χύσις,
εἱμαρμένη, ἀνάγκη, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. Col. 3: He considered νόμος to be
deity. Cic. l.c.: legis perpetuæ et æternæ vim ... Jovem dicit esse.
Themist. De An. 72, b: τοῖς ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος ... διὰ πάσης οὐσίας
πεφοιτηκέναι τὸν θεὸν τιθεμένοις, καὶ ποῦ μὲν εἶναι νοῦν, ποῦ δὲ ψυχὴν,
ποῦ δὲ φύσιν, ποῦ δὲ ἕξιν. Cic. Acad. ii. 37, 119: No Stoic can doubt
hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem, quæ se et ipsum fabricata
sit, et omnia moderetur, moveat, regat. Id. N. D. ii. 22, 58: ipsius
vero mundi ... natura non artificiosa solum sed plane artifex ab eodem
Zenone dicitur, consultrix et provida utilitatum opportunitatumque
omnium.... As every nature develops from its stock, sic Natura mundi
omnes motus habet voluntarios conatusque et appetitiones, quas ὁρμὰς
Græci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic adhibet ut nosmet ipsi,
qui animis movemur et sensibus, on which account the mens mundi is
called πρόνοια. M. Aurel. iv. 40: ὡς ἓν ζῷον τὸν κόσμον μίαν οὐσίαν καὶ
ψυχὴν μίαν ἐπέχον συνεχῶς ἐπινοεῖν· πῶς εἰς αἴσθησιν μίαν τὴν τούτου
πάντα ἀναδίδοται καὶ πῶς ὁρμῇ μιᾷ πάντα πράσσει. Heraclit. Alleg. Hom.
72. Tertullian, Apol. 21: Hunc enim (λόγον) Zeno determinat
factitatorem, qui cuncta in dispositione formaverit, eundem et fatum
vocari et Deum et animum Jovis et necessitatem omnium rerum. Hæc
Cleanthes in spiritum congerit, quem permeatorem universitatis
affirmat. Similarly Lactant. Inst. iv. 9, 1, 5. Epiphan. Hær. v. 1, p.
12: According to the Stoics, God is νοῦς, residing in the world as its
soul, and permeating the μερικαὶ οὐσίαι. Zeus is also spoken of as
being the soul of the world by Cornutus, Nat. De. 2; by Plut. Sto. Rep.
39, 2, p. 1052; and by Chrysippus, ibid. 34, 5, p. 1050: ὅτι δ’ ἡ κοινὴ
φύσις καὶ ὁ κοινὸς τῆς φύσεως λόγος εἱμαρμένη καὶ πρόνοια καὶ Ζεύς
ἐστιν οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀντίποδας λέληθε· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ταῦτα θρυλεῖται ὑπ’
αὐτῶν. Stob. Ecl. i. 178: Ζήνων ... [τὴν εἱμαρμένην] δυνάμιν κινητικὴν
τῆς ὕλης κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως, ἥντινα μὴ διαφέρειν πρόνοιαν καὶ φύσιν
καλεῖν. Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 2: God cares for man; He
is kind, beneficent, and loves men. Zeus is called κόσμος as αἴτιος τοῦ
ζῇν, εἱμαρμένη, because εἱρομένῳ λόγῳ διοικεῖ all things, ἀδράστεια,
ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδράσκειν, πρόνοια, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ χρήσιμον
οἰκονομεῖ ἕκαστα. Aristocles (Ibid. xv. 14): Primary fire contains the
causes and λόγοι of all things; the unchangeable law and destiny of the
world supplies their connection. Sen. Benef. iv. 7, 1: Quid enim aliud
est natura, quam Deus et divina ratio toti mundo et partibus ejus
inserta?... Hunc eundem et fatum si dixeris non mentieris. (Similarly
Frag. 122 in Lact. Inst. ii. 8, 23). Id. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 2: God or
Jupiter may be equally well spoken of as Destiny, Providence, Nature,
the World. Stob. Ecl. i. 178: Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Στωϊκὸς θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο τὴν
εἱμαρμένην. Zeus is called κοινὸς νόμος by Diog. vii. 88; by Cleanthes
at the end of his hymn (Stob. Ecl. i. 34); likewise Cic. N. D. i. 14,
36 says of Zeno: Naturalem legem divinam esse censet, eamque vim
obtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria. Plut. C. Not. 32,
1; Sto. Rep. 38, 3 and 7 (here following Antipater): God must be
conceived of as μακάριος, εὐποιητικὸς, φιλάνθρωπος, κηδεμονικὸς,
ὠφέλιμος. Muson. (in Stob. Floril. 117, 8): God is the type of every
virtue, μεγαλόφρων, εὐεργετικὸς, φιλάνθρωπος, κ.τ.λ. Sen. Ep. 95, 48:
Quæ causa est Dis benefaciendi? Natura. Errat, si quis illos putat
nocere nolle: non possunt. Further details respecting the beneficent
nature of the Gods in Sen. Benef. i. 9; iv. 3–9 and 26–28; Clement. i.
5, 7; Nat. Qu. v. 18, 13. On the divine omniscience; Ep. 83, 1; V.
Beat. 20, 5.
[309] According to Cic. N. D. ii. 30, 75, the Stoics divided the
argument as to God’s providential care of the world into three parts.
The first part went to establish that if there existed Gods, there must
also be a care of the world; for Gods could not exist without having
something to do, and to care for the world is the noblest thing that
can be done. If, moreover, deity is the highest being, the world must
be governed by deity. The same conclusion is arrived at from the wisdom
and power of deity, which must always busy itself with what is best and
highest. Lastly, it is stated, that inasmuch as the stars, heaven, the
universe, and all powers in the world are divine, it is clear that
everything must be governed by divine reason. The second part proved
that the force and skill of nature produced and sustains all things.
All the more reason that a universe so skilfully formed and so
harmoniously arranged must be directed by a natura sentiens. And since,
in its parts, it could not be more beautiful or adapted to its purpose,
it must be true of it more than of any human work of art, that it owes
its origin to a forming reason. The third part aims at proving, on
physico-theological grounds, quanta sit admirabilitas cœlestium rerum
atque terrestrium.
[310] Stob. Ecl. i. 58: Διογένης καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Οἰνοπίδης τὴν τοῦ
κόσμου ψυχὴν [θεὸν λέγουσι] ... Ποσειδώνιος πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες,
οὐκ ἔχον μὲν μορφὴν μεταβάλλον δὲ εἰς ὃ βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον
πᾶσιν ... Ζήνων ὁ Στωϊκὸς νοῦν κόσμον πύρινον. Ib. 64; Plut. Plac. i.
8, 17: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ νοερὸν (Plut. κοινότερον) θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται πῦρ
τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου (a similar definition of nature
is given by Zeno in Cic. Nat. De. ii. 22, 57) ἐμπεριειληφός τε πάντας
τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, καθ’ οὓς ἅπαντα (Pl. ἕκαστα) καθ’ εἱμαρμένην
γίνεται, καὶ πνεῦμα ἐνδιῆκον, δι’ ὅλον τοῦ κόσμου, τὰς δὲ προσηγορίας
μεταλαμβάνον διὰ τὰς τῆς ὅλης, δι’ ἧς κεχώρηκε μεταλλάξεις. Following
the same source, Athenag. Leg. pro Christ. c. 5, Schl.: εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν
θεὸς πῦρ τεχνικὸν, κ.τ.λ. (the same down to γίνεται) τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ
διήκει δι’ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου· ὁ θεὸς εἷς κατ’ αὐτοὺς, Ζεὺς μὲν κατὰ τὸ
ζέον τῆς ὕλης ὀνομαζόμενος, Ἥρα δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καθ’
ἕκαστον τῆς ὕλης μέρος, δι’ ἧς κεχώρηκε, καλούμενος. The latter passage
is explained by Diog. 147, who thus continues: Δία μὲν γάρ φασι δι’ ὃν
τὰ πάντα· Ζῆνα δὲ καλοῦσι παρ’ ὅσον τοῦ ζῇν αἴτιός ἐστιν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ζῇν
κεχώρηκεν. (This, too, in Stob. Ecl. i. 48.) Ἀθηνᾶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς
αἰθέρα διάτασιν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ αὐτοῦ. Ἥραν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἀέρα. καὶ
Ἥφαιστον κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ τεχνικὸν πῦρ. καὶ Ποσειδῶνα κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ
ὑγρόν. καὶ Δήμητραν κατὰ τὴν εἰς γῆν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
προσηγορίας ἐχόμενοί τινος ὁμοιότητος ἀπέδοσαν. Plut. C. Not. 48, 2, p.
1085: τὸν θεὸν ... σῶμα νοερὸν καὶ νοῦν ἐν ὕλῃ ποιοῦντες. M. Aurel. 5,
32: τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας διήκοντα λόγον, κ.τ.λ. Porphyr. in Eus. Pr. Ev.
xv. 16, 1: τὸν δὲ θεὸν ... πῦρ νοερὸν εἰπόντες. Orig. c. Cels. vi. 71:
κατὰ μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ... καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ μέχρι
ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἐλαχίστων καταβαίνων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ πνεῦμα
σωματικόν. The same combination of nature and mind in the conceptions
of God is found in the hymn of Cleanthes (in Stob. Ecl. i. 30), Zeus
being described as the ἀρχηγὸς φύσεως, who directs the κοινὸς λόγος ὃς
διὰ πάντων φοιτᾷ, by means of πῦρ ἀείζωον.
[311] Stob. Ecl. i. 374: Chrysippus teaches εἶναι τὸ ὂν πνεῦμα κινοῦν
ἑαυτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, ἢ πνεῦμα ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω·
πνεῦμα δὲ εἴληπται διὰ τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸ ἀέρα εἶναι κινούμενον· ἀνάλογον
δὲ γίγνεσθαι ἔπειτα [? perhaps: αὐτὸ, or: πυρὸς ἢ] αἰθερὸς, ὥστε καὶ
εἰς κοινὸν λόγον πεσεῖν αὐτά. Diog. vii. 137: ἀνωτάτω μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ
πῦρ ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι.
[312] Stob. Ecl. i. 538, on the authority of Zeno; Cic. N. D. ii. 15,
40, on that of Cleanthes. Both state that the difference consists in
this: Ordinary (ἄτεχνον) fire consumes things; but the πῦρ τεχνικὸν,
which constitutes φύσις and ψυχὴ, preserves things. Heraclitus, too, in
making primary fire the basis of things, did not mean flame, but
warmth, which may be equally well described as atmospheric substance or
as ψυχή.
[313] Seneca, De Benefic. iv. 7, 2: God may also be called fatum: nam
cum fatum nihil aliud sit quam series implexa causarum, ille est prima
omnium causa, ex qua ceteræ pendent. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 1: Vis illum
fatum vocare? Non errabis. Hic est, ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa
causarum. The same applies to the name of providence and nature. See p.
162, 2.
[314] Stob. Ecl. i. 178 (Plut. Plac. i. 28, 5): Ποσειδώνιος [τὴν
εἱμαρμένην] τρίτην ἀπὸ Διός. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Δία, δεύτερον δὲ
τὴν φύσιν, τρίτην δὲ τὴν εἱμαρμένην. Conf. Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125,
where prophecy is deduced, according to Posidonius, (1) a Deo, (2) a
fato, (3) a natura. Plut. C. Not. 36, 5, p. 1077: λέγει γοῦν Χρύσιππος,
ἐοικέναι τῷ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν κόσμον (instead of which Heine,
Stoic. De Fat. Doct. p. 25, apparently without reason, conjectures: καὶ
τῷ μὲν σώματι τὸν κόσμον), τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὴν πρόνοιαν· ὅταν οὖν ἐκπύρωσις
γένηται μόνον ἄφθαρτον ὄντα τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν
πρόνοιαν, εἶτα ὁμοῦ γενομένους ἐπὶ μιᾶς τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος οὐσίας
διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους. To this maxim of Chrysippus, reference is made by
Philo, Incorrup. M. 951, B, where, too, πρόνοια is equivalent to ψυχὴ
τοῦ κόσμου.
[315] According to Chrysippus. A different view is taken by Posidonius.
With him Zeus stands for the original force, φύσις for its first, and
εἱμαρμένη for its second production.
[316] Plut. l.c. Sen. Ep. 9, 16: [Jupiter] resoluto mundo et Diis in
unum confusis, paullisper cessante natura, acquiescit sibi,
cogitationibus suis traditus.
[317] Compare, besides what has been already quoted, Cic. Acad. i. 11,
39: (Zeno) statuebat ignem esse ipsam naturam. Diog. vii. 156: δοκεῖ δὲ
αὐτοῖς τὴν μὲν φύσιν εἶναι πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν, ὅπερ
ἐστὶ πνεῦμα πυροειδὲς καὶ τεχνοειδές. Stob. Ecl. i. 180: Χρύσιππος
δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν τοῦ οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξει τοῦ παντὸς
διοικητικήν; or, according to another definition: εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ
κόσμου λόγος, ἢ λόγος, τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων, κ.τ.λ.
Instead of λόγος, he also used ἀλήθεια, φύσις, αἰτία, ἀνάγκη, &c.
[318] See p. 143.
[319] Cic. N. D. ii. 11, 30: Atque etiam mundi ille fervor purior,
perlucidior mobiliorque multo ob easque causas aptior ad sensus
commovendos quam hic noster calor, quo hæc quæ nota nobis sunt,
retinentur et vigent. Absurdum igitur est dicere, cum homines bestiæque
hoc calore teneantur et propterea moveantur ac sentiant, mundum esse
sine sensu, qui integro et puro et libero eodemque acerrimo et
mobilissimo ardore teneatur. Conf. Ar. Didymus, in the passage quoted,
p. 146, 4, p. 105, 127.
[320] Consol. ad Helviam, 8, 3: Id actum est, mihi crede, ab illo,
quisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille Deus est potens omnium, sive
incorporalis ratio, ingentium operum artifex, sive divinus spiritus per
omnia maxima ac minima æquali intentione [= τόνος] diffusus, sive fatum
et immutabilis causarum inter se cohærentium series. Conf. p. 153, 1.
[321] Cic. N. D. i. 14: Zeno calls natural law divine, but he also
calls the Ether and the all-pervading Reason deity. (We shall come back
presently to what he says as to the divinity of the stars.) Cleanthes
gives the name of deity to the world, reason, the soul of the world,
and ether; Chrysippus to reason, to the soul of the world, to ruling
reason, to communis natura, destiny, fire, ether, the universe, and
eternal law.
[322] Krische, Forsch. i. 365.
[323] See pp. 153, 2; 153, 4.
[324] Chrysippus. See p. 152, note 1.
[325] Aristocles. See p. 147, note 3.
[326] Mnesarchus, in Stob. i. 60. See p. 148, 1.
[327] Orig. c. Cels. iii. 75, p. 497, A: Στωϊκῶν θεὸν φθαρτὸν
εἰσαγόντων καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ λεγόντων σῶμα τρεπτὸν διόλου καὶ
ἀλλοιωτὸν καὶ μεταβλητὸν καί ποτε πάντα φθειρόντων καὶ μόνον τὸν θεὸν
καταλιπόντων. Ibid. iv. 14: ὁ τῶν Στωϊκῶν θεὸς ὅτε σῶμα τυγχάνων ὅτε
μὲν ἡγεμονικὸν ἔχει τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν ὅταν ἡ ἐκπύρωσις ᾖ· ὅτε δὲ ἐπὶ
μέρους γίνεται αὐτῆς ὅταν ᾖ διακόσμησις.
[328] Besides the quotations already given from Chrysippus on p. 153,
2, and Cleanthes on p. 155, 1, compare Phædr. Nat. De. (Philodem. περὶ
εὐσεβείας), Col. 5: Διογένης δ’ ὁ Βαβυλώνιος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τὸν
κόσμον γράφει τῷ Διῒ τὸν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν, ἢ περιέχειν τὸν Δία καθάπερ
ἄνθρωπον ψυχήν. Cic. N. De. ii. 17, 45: Nothing corresponds better to
the idea of God, quam ut primum hunc mundum, quo nihil fieri
excellentius potest, animantem esse et Deum judicem. Ibid. 13, 34:
Perfect reason Deo tribuenda, id est mundo. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 3;
Vis illum vocare mundum? Non falleris. Ipse enim est hoc quod vides
totum, suis partibus inditus et se sustinens et sua. Ibid. Prolog. 13:
Quid est Deus? Mens universi. Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum et quod
non vides totum. Sic demum magnitudo sua illi redditur, qua nihil majus
excogitari potest, si solus est omnia, opus suum et extra et intra
tenet. Diog. vii. 148: οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνων μέν φησι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον
καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν. Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 1 and 3: ὅλον δὲ
τὸν κόσμον σὺν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσι προσαγορεύουσι θεόν.... διὸ δὴ καὶ
Ζεὺς λέγεται ὁ κόσμος. Orig. c. Cels. v. 7: σαφῶς δὴ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον
λέγουσιν εἶναι θεὸν Στωϊκοὶ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον. The arguments given, p. 144,
for the existence of God are based on the supposition that God is the
same as the World. The existence of God is proved by showing the
reasonableness of the world. Aratus gives a poet’s description of the
Stoic pantheism at the beginning of the Phænomena: Zeus is the being of
whom streets and markets, sea and land, are full, whose offspring is
man, and who, out of regard for man, has appointed signs in the heavens
to regulate the year. The same idea is contained in the well-known
lines of Virgil, Georg. iv. 220; Æn. vi. 724. The round figure of the
Stoic deity, Sen. Ep. 113, 22; De M. Claud. 8, 1, has also reference to
the world as God. Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 17, 46.
[329] Stob. Ecl. i. 444: κόσμον δ’ εἶναι φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος σύστημα ἐξ
οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων· ἢ τὸ ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων
σύστημα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γεγονότων. λέγεται δ’ ἑτέρως κόσμος ὁ
θεὸς, καθ’ ὃν ἡ διακόσμησις γίνεται καὶ τελειοῦται. Diog. vii. 137:
λέγουσι δὲ κόσμον τριχῶς· αὐτόν τε τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἁπάσης οὐσίας
ἰδίως ποιὸν, ὃς δὴ ἄφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος δημιουργὸς ὢν τῆς
διακοσμήσεως κατὰ χρόνων τινὰς περιόδους ἀναλίσκων εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν
ἅπασαν οὐσίαν καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ γεννῶν. καὶ αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν
τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον εἶναι λέγουσι καὶ τρίτον τὸ συνεστηκὸς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν.
καὶ ἔστι κόσμος ἢ (according to the first meaning of the word) ὁ ἰδίως
ποιὸς τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας, (universal substance in its definite
quality) ἢ (second meaning) ὥς φησι Ποσειδώνιος ... σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ
καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων, ἢ (third meaning) σύστημα ἐκ θεῶν
καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γεγονότων. Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev.
xv. 15, 1: κόσμος is the name for τὸ ἐκ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας ποιὸν, and for
τὸ κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν τὴν τοιαύτην καὶ διάταξιν ἔχον. In the former
sense, the world is eternal, and the same as God; in the latter,
created, and subject to change. Compare also the quotations from the
mathematician Diodorus, in Ach. Tat. Isag. c. 6. p. 129, b.
[330] See p. 148. The two ideas blend. Thus Seneca, Nat. Qu. Prol. 13,
says God must be the Reason of the world and must also be the universe
itself; and he continues: Quid ergo interest, inter naturam Dei et
nostram? Nostri melior pars animus est, in illo nulla pars extra animum
est. Totus est ratio, &c.
[331] The connection of the two, like the connection between soul and
body, and the argument quoted by Tertullian from Zeno on p. 148, 1, is
κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων. See p. 135.
[332] Stob. Ecl. i. 60: Βόηθος τὸν αἰθέρα θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο.
[333] Diog. 143: Βόηθος δέ φησιν οὐκ εἶναι ζῷον τὸν κόσμον. The words
of Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, C—ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ τοὺς
ἀντιδοξοῦντας ὁ θεὸς—imply the same, but these words evidently are not
taken from Boëthus.
[334] Diog. 148: Βόηθος δὲ ἐν τῇ περὶ φύσεως οὐσίαν θεοῦ τὴν τῶν
ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν· which must be understood in the same sense as the
corresponding statements of other Stoics: the ἡγεμονικὸν of the world
resides in the purest part of the ether. Yet, inasmuch as the world is
no living being, nor is deity the soul of the world, it must, according
to the view of Boëthus, act upon it from without. This is expressly
stated in Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, B, God is described as the
charioteer guiding the world, and παριστάμενος the stars and elements.
But this passage, beginning at καὶ μήποτ’ εἰκότως, is evidently Philo’s
own expansion of what he has just quoted from Boëthus.
[335] Diog. vii. 136: κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὑτὸν ὄντα [τὸν θεὸν]
τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ· καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ
σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου
τοιοῦδε ὑπολιπέσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ ἐνεργὸν αὐτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν
τῶν ἑξῆς γένεσιν, κ.τ.λ. Seneca, Nat. Quæst. iii. 13, 1: Fire will
consume the world: hunc evanidum considere, et nihil relinqui aliud in
rerum natura, igne restincto, quam humorem. In hoc futuri mundi spem
latere. Stob. Ecl. i. 372 and 414, 5. See pp. 161, 2; 164, 2.
[336] Stob. i. 370: Ζήνωνα δὲ οὕτως ἀποφαίνεσθαι διαρρήδην· τοιαύτην
δεήσει εἶναι ἐν περιόδῳ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διακόσμησιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας. ὅταν ἐκ
πυρὸς τροπὴ εἰς ὕδωρ δι’ ἀέρος γένηται τὸ μέν τι ὑφίστασθαι καὶ γῆν
συνίστασθαι, ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν διαμένειν ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
ἀτμιζομένου ἀέρα γίνεσθαι, ἐκ τινος δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος πῦρ ἐξάπτειν. Diog.
vii. 142: γίνεσθαι δὲ τὸν κόσμον ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς ἡ οὐσία τραπῇ δι’ ἀέρος
εἰς ὑγρότητα, εἶτα τὸ παχυμερὲς αὐτοῦ συστὰν ἀποτελεσθῇ γῆ τὸ δὲ
λεπτομερὲς ἐξαερωθῇ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐπιπλέον λεπτυνθὲν πῦρ ἀπογεννήσῃ; εἶτα
κατὰ μίξιν ἐκ τούτων φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα καὶ ἄλλα γένη. Chrys. in Plut. St.
Rep. 41, 3, p. 1053: ἡ δὲ πυρὸς μεταβολή ἐστι τοιαύτη· δι’ ἀέρος εἰς
ὕδωρ τρέπεται· κἀκ τούτου γῆς ὑφισταμένης ἀὴρ ἐνθυμιᾶται· λεπτυνομένου
δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος ὁ αἰθὴρ περιχεῖται κύκλῳ. The same writer observes, in the
Scholia on Hesiod’s Theogony, v. 459, ὅτι καθύγρων ὄντων τῶν ὅλων καὶ
ὄμβρων καταφερομένων πολλῶν τὴν ἔκκρισιν τούτων Κρόνον ὠνομάσθαι. Conf.
Clemens, Strom. v. 599, C, and Stob. i. 312.
[337] Stob. Ecl. i. 442, also affirms that the creation of the universe
begins with earth.
[338] Stob. l.c.: Κλεάνθης δὲ οὕτω πώς φησιν· ἐκφλογισθέντος τοῦ παντὸς
συνίζειν τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ πρῶτον, εἶτα τὰ ἐχόμενα ἀποσβέννυσθαι δι’ ὅλου.
τοῦ δὲ παντὸς ἐξυγρανθέντος, τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρὸς, ἀντιτυπήσαντος αὐτῷ
τοῦ μέσου, τρέπεσθαι πάλιν εἰς τοὐναντίον (the probable meaning is,
that the last remains of the original fire begin a motion in the
opposite direction) εἶθ’ οὕτω τρεπόμενον ἄνω φησὶν αὔξεσθαι· καὶ
ἄρχεσθαι διακοσμεῖν τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τοιαύτην περίοδον ἀεὶ καὶ διακόσμησιν
ποιουμένου τοῦ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσίᾳ τόνου (for this favourite
expression of Cleanthes, see p. 127, 5; 128, 2) μὴ παύεσθαι
[διακοσμούμενον τὸ ὅλον]. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἑνός τινος τὰ μέρη πάντα φύεται ἐκ
σπερμάτων ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μέρη, ὧν καὶ
τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις φύεται. καὶ
ὥσπερ τινὲς λόγοι τῶν μερῶν εἰς σπέρμα συνιόντες μίγνυνται καὶ αὖθις
διακρίνονται γενομένων τῶν μερῶν, οὕτως ἐξ ἑνός τε πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ
ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἓν συγκρίνεσθαι, (conf. Heraclit. in vol. i. 467, 1), ὁδῷ
καὶ συμφώνως διεξιούσης τῆς περιόδου. A few further details are
supplied by Macrob. Sat. i. 17. The myth respecting the birth of Apollo
and Artemis is referred to the formation of the sun and moon. Namque
post chaos, ubi primum cœpit confusa deformitas in rerum formas et
elementa nitescere, terræque adhuc humida substantia in molli atque
instabili sede nutaret: convalescente paullatim æthereo calore atque
inde seminibus in eam igneis defluentibus (the connection of Zeus,
i.e., of Ether, with Leto, the Earth) hæc sidera edita esse creduntur;
et solem maxima caloris vi in superna raptum; lunam vero humidiore et
velut femineo sexu naturali quodam pressam tepore inferiora tenuisse,
tanquam ille magis substantia patris constet, hæc matris. The statement
that besides other things plants and animals had their origin in the
intermingling of elements (Stob. and Diog.) must be understood in the
sense of generatio æquivoca. Lactant. Inst. vii. 4, says the Stoics
make men grow like sponges out of the earth, and Sext. Math. ix. 28
says the Stoics speak of the earth-born men of prehistoric ages.
[339] There must always be some remainder of heat or fire, as Cleanthes
and Chrysippus avowed, or else there would be no active life-power from
which a new creation could emanate. Philo, Incorrupt. M. 964, C,
observes that, if the world were entirely consumed by fire at the
ἐκπύρωσις, the fire itself would be extinguished, and no new world
would be possible. διὸ καί τινες τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ... ἔφασαν, ὅτι μετὰ
τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν, ἐπειδὰν ὁ νέος κόσμος μέλλῃ δημιουργεῖσθαι, σύμπαν μὲν
τὸ πῦρ οὐ σβέννυται, ποσὴ δέ τις αὐτοῦ μοῖρα ὑπολείπεται.
[340] Chrys. in Plut. l.c. 41, 6: διόλου μὲν γὰρ ὢν ὁ κόσμος πυρώδης
εὐθὺς καὶ ψυχή ἐστιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἡγεμονικόν. ὅτε δὲ μεταβαλὼν εἰς τὸ
ὑγρὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναπολειφθεῖσαν ψυχὴν τρόπον τινὰ εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν
μετέβαλεν ὥστε συνεστάναι ἐκ τούτων, ἄλλον τινὰ ἔσχε λόγον.
[341] Nemes. Nat. Hom. C. 2, p. 72: λέγουσι δὲ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, τῶν
στοιχείων τὰ μὲν εἶναι δραστικὰ τὰ δὲ παθητικά· δραστικὰ μὲν ἀέρα καὶ
πῦρ, παθητικὰ δὲ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ. Plut. Com. Not. 49, 2. See above p. 127,
5. From this passage a further insight is obtained into two points
connected with the Stoic philosophy, which have been already discussed.
It can no longer appear strange that the active power, or deity (and
likewise the human soul), should at one time be called Fire, at another
Air-Current, for both represent equally the acting force; and the
statement that properties are atmospheric currents—as, indeed, the
whole distinction of subject-matter and property—follows from this view
of things.
[342] The Stoics, according to Diog. 141, where, however, there is
apparently a lacuna in the text, prove that the world (διακόσμησις, not
κόσμος, in the absolute sense, see p. 158, 1) will come to an end,
partly because it has come into being, and partly by two not very
logical inferences: οὗ τὰ [vulgo οὗ τε τὰ, Cobet: οὗ τά τε] μέρη φθαρτά
ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὰ δὲ μέρα τοῦ κόσμου φθαρτὰ, εἰς ἄλληλα γὰρ
μεταβάλλει· φθαρτὸς ἄρα ὁ κόσμος· and εἴ τι ἐπιδεκτικόν ἐστι τῆς ἐπὶ
χεῖρον μεταβολῆς, φθαρτόν ἐστι· καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἄρα· ἐξαυχμοῦται γὰρ καὶ
ἐξυδατοῦται. Conf. Alex. Meteora, 90. In Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 2, p.
1054, Chrysippus asserts that the οὐσία is immortal, but to κόσμος
belongs a ὥσπερ ἀφθαρσία.
[343] Plut. Sto. Rep. 39, 2, p. 1052: [Χρύσιππος] ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ
προνοίας τὸν Δία, φησὶν, αὔξεσθαι μέχρις ἂν εἰς αὑτὸν ἅπαντα
καταναλώσῃ. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ θάνατος μέν ἐστι ψυχῆς χωρισμὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος,
ἡ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴ οὐ χωρίζεται μὲν, αὔξεται δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρις ἂν εἰς
αὑτὴν ἐξαναλώσῃ τὴν ὕλην, οὐ ῥητέον ἀποθνήσκειν τὸν κόσμον. Stob. Ecl.
i. 414 (according to Numenius: see Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 18, 1): Ζήνωνι καὶ
Κλεάνθει καὶ Χρυσίππῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν οἷον εἰς σπέρμα τὸ
πῦρ (Philo, Incorrupt. M. 956, B, expresses himself against this
description) καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου τοιαύτην ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν διακόσμησιν
οἷα πρότερον ἦν. Seneca, Consol. ad Marciam, gives a graphic
description of the end of the world, which recalls the language of the
Revelation. Compare, on the subject of ἐκπύρωσις, Diog. vii. 142, 137
(see above p. 158, 1); Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 1; Plut. Com.
Not. 36 (see p. 153, 2); Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 25, p. 53; Cic. Acad.
ii. 37, 119; N. D. ii. 46, 118; Sen. Consol. ad Polyb. i. 2; Alex.
Aphr. in Meteor. 90, a. In the last-named passage, it is urged by the
Stoics, in support of their view, that even now large tracts of water
are dried up or else take the place of dry land. Simpl. Phys. iii. b;
De Cœlo; Schol. in Arist. 487, b, 35 and 489, a, 13; Justin. Apol. i.
20; ii. 7; Orig. c. Cels. iii. 75, 497, a; vi. 71. Since at the
ἐκπύρωσις everything is resolved into deity, Plut. C. Not. 17, 3, p.
1067, says: ὅταν ἐκπυρώσωσι τὸν κόσμον οὗτοι, κακὸν μὲν οὐδ’ ὁτιοῦν
ἀπολείπεται, τὸ δ’ ὅλον φρόνιμόν ἐστι τηνικαῦτα καὶ σοφόν.
[344] Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 18, 1: ἀρέσκει δὲ τοῖς πρεσβυτάτοις
τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης, ἐξαεροῦσθαι πάντα κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰς
μεγίστας, εἰς πῦρ αἰθερῶδες ἀναλυομένων πάντων. According to Philo,
Incorrupt. M. 954, E, Cleanthes called this fire φλόξ, Chrysippus αὐγή.
Respecting ἄνθραξ, φλόξ, αὐγή, see ibid. 953, E. The observations on p.
151 respecting the identity of πῦρ, πνεῦμα, αἰθὴρ apply here.
[345] This is, at least, the import of the general principle (assigned
to Chrysippus by Stob. Ecl. i. 314) expressed by Heraclitus, that, in
the resolution of earth and water into fire, the same steps intervene,
in a retrograde order, as in their generation.
[346] See p. 147, 1.
[347] Plut. Com. Not. 31, 10: ἐπαγωνιζόμενος ὁ Κλεάνθης τῇ ἐκπυρώσει
λέγει τὴν σελήνην καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα τὸν ἥλιον ἐξομοιῶσαι [leg. -ειν]
πάντα ἑαυτῷ καὶ μεταβαλεῖν εἰς ἑαυτόν.
[348] It is expressly asserted that everything, without exception, is
liable to this destiny; neither the soul nor the Gods are exempt. Conf.
Sen. Cons. ad Marc. 26, 7: Nos quoque felices animæ et æterna sortitæ
(the words are put in the mouth of a dead man) cum Deo visum sit iterum
ista moliri, labentibus cunctis, et ipsæ parva ruinæ ingentis accessio,
in antiqua elementa vertemur. Chrysippus says of the Gods, in Plut.
Sto. Rep. 38, 5: Some of the Gods have come into being and are
perishable, others are eternal: Helios and Selene, and other similar
deities, have come into being; Zeus is eternal. In Philo, Incorrupt. M.
950, A, Orig. c. Cels. iv. 68, Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420, Com. Not.
31, 5, p. 1075, it is objected that, at the general conflagration, the
Gods will melt away, as though they were made of wax or tin. According
to Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, Tab. i. 1, Vol. Hercul. vi. 1, even
Zeno restricted the happy life of the Gods to certain lengthy periods
of time.
[349] Arius, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 19: ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο δὲ προελθὼν ὁ κοινὸς
λόγος καὶ κοινὴ φύσις μείζων καὶ πλείων γενομένη τέλος ἀναξηράνασα
πάντα καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἀναλαβοῦσα ἐν τῇ πάσῃ οὐσίᾳ γίνεται (it occupies
the room of the whole substance) ἐπανελθοῦσα εἰς τὸν πρῶτον ῥηθέντα
λόγον καὶ εἰς ἀνάστασιν [? κατάστασιν] ἐκείνην τὴν ποιοῦσαν ἐνιαυτὸν
τὸν μέγιστον, καθ’ ὃν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς μόνης εἰς αὐτὴν πάλιν γίνεται ἡ
ἀποκατάστασις (the same in Philop. Gen. et Corr. B. ii. Schl. p. 70),
ἐπανελθοῦσα δὲ διὰ τάξιν ἀφ’ οἵας διακοσμεῖν ὡσαύτως ἤρξατο κατὰ λόγον
πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν διεξαγωγὴν ποιεῖται. See p. 161. According to Nemes.
Nat. Hom. c, 38, p. 147, conf. Censorin. Di. Nat. 18, 11, the ἐκπύρωσις
takes place when all the planets have got back to the identical places
which they occupied at the beginning of the world, or, in other words,
when a periodic year is complete. The length of a periodic year was
estimated by Diogenes (Plut. Pl. i. 32, 2; Stob. Ecl. i. 264) at 365
periods, or 365 × 18,000 ordinary years. Plut. De Ei ap. D. 9, g, E, p.
389 mentions the opinion, ὅπερ τρία πρὸς ἓν, τοῦτο τὴν διακόσμησιν
χρόνῳ πρὸς τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν εἶναι. Inasmuch as it had been previously said
that the duration of κόρος (i.e. ἐκπύρωσις) was longer, and that
therefore Apollo, who represents the state of perfect unity, was
honoured nine months with the pæan, whilst Dionysus, torn to pieces by
the Titans, the emblem of the present world of contraries, was only
honoured for three with the dithyramb, some mistake seems to have crept
in. Probably we ought either to read ὅπερ πρὸς τρία ἕν, or to transpose
the passage from διακόσμησιν to ἐκπύρωσιν.
[350] The belief in changing cycles is a common one in the older Greek
philosophy. In particular, the Stoics found it in Heraclitus. The
belief, however, that each new world exactly represents the preceding
one is first met with among the Pythagoreans, and is closely connected
with the theory of the migration of souls and a periodic year. Eudemus,
in a passage which has generally been lost sight of in describing
Pythagorean teaching, had taught (in Simpl. Phys. 173): εἰ δέ τις
πιστεύσειε τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, ὡς πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ ἀριθμῷ κἀγὼ μυθολογήσω
τὸ ῥαβδίον ἔχων ὑμῖν καθημένοις οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὁμοίως ἕξει, καὶ
τὸν χρόνον εὔλογόν ἐστι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι (in that case the time must be
the same as the present time). The Stoics appear to have borrowed this
view from the Pythagoreans (unless with other Orphic-Pythagorean views
it was known to Heraclitus), and it commended itself to them as being
in harmony with their theory of necessity. Hence they taught: μετὰ τὴν
ἐκπύρωσιν πάλιν πάντα ταὐτὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γενέσθαι κατ’ ἀριθμὸν, ὡς καὶ
τὸν ἰδίως ποιὸν πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ πρόσθεν εἶναί τε καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐκείνῳ
τῷ κόσμῳ (Alex. Anal. Pr. 58, b). τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος, δῆλον, ὡς
οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον, καὶ ἡμᾶς μετὰ τὸ τελευτῆσαι πάλιν περιόδων τινῶν
εἰλημμένων χρόνον εἰς ὃν νῦν ἐσμεν καταστήσεσθαι σχῆμα (Chrysippus,
περὶ Προνοίας, in Lactant. Inst. vii. 23. Conf. Seneca, Ep. 36, 10:
Veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponat dies). This applies to every
fact and to every occurrence in the new world, at the παλιγγενεσία or
ἀποκατάστασις (as the return of a former age is called): thus there
will be another Socrates, who will marry another Xanthippe, and be
accused by another Anytus and Meletus. Hence M. Aurel. vii. 19, xi. 1,
deduces his adage, that nothing new happens under the sun. Simpl. Phys.
207, b; Philop. Gen. et Corr. B. ii. Schl. p. 70; Tatian. c. Græc. c,
3, 245, d; Clemens, Strom. v. 549, D; Orig. c. Cels. iv. 68; v. 20 and
23; Nemes. l.c.; Plut. Def. Or. 29, p. 425. Amongst other things, the
Stoics raised the question, Whether the Socrates who would appear in
the future world would be numerically identical (εἷς ἀριθμῷ) with the
present Socrates or not? (Simpl. l.c.)—the answer being, that they
could not be numerically identical, since this would involve
uninterrupted existence, but that they would be alike without a
difference (ἀπαράλλακτοι). Others, however, chiefly among the younger
Stoics, appear to have held that there might be noticeable differences
between the two. (Orig. v. 20, 592, c.) This remark appears to have
given rise to the false notion (Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21; Epiphan.
Hær. v. p. 12, b) that the Stoics believed in the transmigration of
souls. The remark made by Nemes., that the Gods know the whole course
of the present world, from having survived the end of the former one,
can only apply to one highest God, who, however, does not require such
empirical knowledge. The other deities will not have survived the
general conflagration.
[351] Ar. Didym. l.c. continues: τῶν τοιούτων περιόδων ἐξ ἀϊδίου
γινομένων ἀκαταπαύστως. οὔτε γὰρ τῆς ἀρχῆς αἰτίαν καὶ [del.] πᾶσιν οἷόν
τε γινέσθαι, οὔτε τοῦ διοικοῦντος αὐτά. οὐσίαν τε γὰρ τοῖς γινομένοις
ὑφεστάναι δεῖ πεφυκυῖαν ἀναδέχεσθαι τὰς μεταβολὰς πάσας καὶ τὸ
δημιουργῆσον ἐξ αὐτῆς, κ.τ.λ. Conf. Philop.: ἀπορήσειε δ’ ἄν τις, ὥς
φησιν Ἀλέξανδρος, πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ἡ αὐτὴ ἀεὶ διαμένει,
ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ, διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν οὐχὶ κατὰ
περίοδόν τινα πλείονος χρόνου ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ὕλης τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν κατ’
ἀριθμὸν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔσται; ὅπερ τινές φασι κατὰ τὴν παλιγγενέσιαν καὶ
τὸν μέγαν ἐνιαυτὸν συμβαίνειν, ἐν ᾧ πάντων τῶν αὐτῶν ἀποκατάστασις
γίνεται. See M. Aurel. v. 32.
[352] According to Philo (Incorrupt. M. 947, C), besides Posidonius and
Panætius, his instructor (Diog. vii. 142; Stob. Ecl. i. 414), Boëthus
asserted, in opposition to the ordinary Stoic teaching, the eternity of
the world. Philo adds that this was also the view of Diogenes of
Seleucia in his later years. Moreover, Zeno of Tarsus, on the authority
of Numenius (in Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 19, 2), considered that the
destruction of the world by fire could not be proved (φασὶν ἐπισχεῖν
περὶ τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως τῶν ὅλων). But these statements are elsewhere
contradicted. Diogenes mentions Posidonius as one who held the
destruction of the world by fire. The testimony of Diogenes is
confirmed by Plut. Pl. Phil. ii. 9, 3 (Stob. Ecl. i. 380; Eus. Pr. Ev.
xv. 40. See Achill. Tatian, Isag. 131, C), who says that Posidonius
only allowed so much empty space outside the world as was necessary for
the world to be dissolved in at the ἐκπύρωσις. The difference between
his view and the older Stoical view which Bake (Posidon. Rel. 58)
deduces from Stob. i. 432, is purely imaginary. Antipater, according to
Diogenes, also believed in a future conflagration. Little importance
can be attached to the statement in Cic. N. D. ii. 46, 118, respecting
Panætius, addubitare dicebant; whereas the words of Stob. are:
πιθανωτέραν νομίζει τὴν ἀϊδιότητα τοῦ κόσμου; and those of Diog.:
ἄφθαρτον ἀπεφήνατο τὸν κόσμον.
Boëthus emphatically denied the destruction of the world, his chief
reasons (in Philo, l.c. 952, C) being the following:—(1) If the world
were destroyed, it would be a destruction without a cause, for there is
no cause, either within or without, which could produce such an effect.
(2) Of the three modes of destruction, those κατὰ διαίρεσιν, κατὰ
ἀναίρεσιν τῆς ἐπεχούσης ποιότητος (as in the crushing of a statue),
κατὰ σύγχυσιν (as in chemical resolution), not one can apply to the
world. (3) If the world ceased to exist, the action of God on the
world, in fact, His activity would altogether cease. (4) If everything
were consumed by fire, the fire must go out for want of fuel. With
that, the possibility of a new world is at an end.
The resolution of the world into indefinite vacuum, attributed by Plut.
Plac. ii. 9, 2, to the Stoics in general, is no doubt the same as the
condensation and expansion of matter. Ritter, iii. 599 and 703,
supposes it to be a misapprehension of the real Stoic teaching. How
Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 391, and Schleiermacher, Gesch. d. Philos.
p. 129, in view of the passages quoted, can absolutely deny that the
Stoics held a periodic destruction of the world, is hard to comprehend.
[353] The flood and its causes are fully discussed by Sen. Nat. Qu.
iii. 27–30. Rain, inroads of the sea, earthquakes, are all supposed to
contribute. The chief thing, however, is, that such a destruction has
been ordained in the course of the world. It comes cum fatalis dies
venerit, cum adfuerit illa necessitas temporum (27, 1), cum Deo visum
ordiri meliora, vetera finiri (28, 7); it has been fore-ordained from
the beginning (29, 2; 30, 1), and is due, not only to the pressure of
the existing waters, but also to their increase, and to a changing of
earth into water (29, 4). The object of this flood is to purge away the
sins of mankind, ut de integro totæ rudes innoxiæque generentur [res
humanæ] nec supersit in deteriora præceptor (29, 5); peracto judicio
generis humani exstructisque pariter feris ... antiquus ordo
revocabitur. Omne ex integro animal generabitur dabiturque terris, homo
inscius scelerum: but this state of innocence will not last long.
Seneca (29, 1) appeals to Berosus, according to whom the destruction of
the world by fire will take place when all the planets are in the sign
of the Crab, its destruction by water when they are in the sign of the
Capricorn. Since these signs correspond with the summer and winter
turns of the sun, the language of Seneca agrees with that of Censorin.
Di. Nat. 18, 11, evidently quoted from Varro, conf. Jahn, p. viii:
Cujus anni hiems summa est cataclysmus ... æstas autem ecpyrosis. Conf.
Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c, 25, p. 53: When one element gains the
supremacy over the others, the course of the world will come to an end,
by ἐκπύρωσις, if the element is fire; εἰ δ’ ἄθρουν ὕδωρ ἐκραγείη,
κατακλυσμῷ τὸν κόσμον ἀπολεῖσθαι.
[354] For the former view, the language of Heraclitus and Censorinus
tells, for the latter that of Seneca.
[355] Diog. vii. 149: καθ’ εἱμαρμένην δέ φασι τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι
Χρύσιππος, κ.τ.λ. ἔστι δ’ εἱμαρμένη αἰτία τῶν ὄντων εἰρομένη ἢ λόγος
καθ’ ὃν ὁ κόσμος διεξάγεται. A. Gell. vi. 2, 3: (Chrysippus) in libro
περὶ προνοίας quarto εἱμαρμένην esse dicit φυσικήν τινα σύνταξιν τῶν
ὅλων ἐξ ἀϊδίου τῶν ἑτέρων τοῖς ἑτέροις ἐπακολουθούντων καὶ μετὰ πολὺ
μὲν οὖν ἀπαραβάτου οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης συμπλοκῆς. Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125
(according to Posidonius): Fatum, or εἱμαρμένη, was called ordinem
seriemque causarum, cum causa causæ nexa rem ex se gignat. Sen. Nat.
Qu. ii. 36: Quid enim intelligis fatum? existimo necessitatem rerum
omnium actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat. De Prov. 5, 8: Irrevocabilis
humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit. Ille ipse omnium conditor et
rector scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. Semper paret, semper jussit.
[356] Conf. p. 152 and Stob. Ecl. i. 180 (Plut. Plac. i. 28), Χρύσιππος
δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξει τοῦ παντὸς
διοικητικήν.
[357] Hence Chrysippus’ definition (Plut. and Stob.): εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ
τοῦ κόσμου λόγος ἢ λόγος (Plut. νόμος) τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ
διοικουμένων· ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γιγνόμενα
γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται. Instead of λόγος, Chrysippus also
used ἀλήθεια, αἰτία, φύσις, ἀνάγκη. Theodoret. Cur. Gr. Aff. vi. 14, p.
87: Chrysippus assigns the same meaning to εἱμαρμένον and
κατηναγκασμένον, explaining εἱμαρμένη to be κίνησις ἀΐδιος συνεχὴς καὶ
τεταγμένη; Zeno defines it (as Stob. i. 178, also says) as δύναμις
κινητικὴ τῆς ὕλης; also as φύσις or πρόνοια; his successors as λόγος
τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων, or as εἱρμὸς αἰτίων. (The same in
Plut. Plac. i. 28, 4. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 36, p. 143.) Even τύχη, he
continues, is explained as a deity (or as Simpl. Phys. 74, b, has it as
a θεῖον καὶ δαιμόνιον); but this supposes it to be essentially
identical with εἱμαρμένη. Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 34, 8, p. 1050:
τῆς γὰρ κοινῆς φύσεως εἰς πάντα διατεινούσης, δεήσει πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν
γινόμενον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τῶν μορίων ὁτῳοῦν, κατ’ ἐκείνην γενέσθαι καὶ
τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον, κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς ἀκωλύτως· διὰ τὸ μήτ’ ἔξωθεν εἶναι τὸ
ἐνστησόμενον τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ μήτε τῶν μερῶν μηδὲν ἔχειν ὅπως κινηθήσεται ἢ
σχήσει ἄλλως [ἢ] κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν. Cleanthes, Hymn. (in Stob. Ecl.
i. 30) v. 12, 18; M. Aurel. ii. 3. See p. 151, 1.
[358] It has been already demonstrated that all these ideas pass into
one another.
[359] Plut. Com. Not. 34, 5, p. 1076: εἰ δὲ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, οὐδὲ
τοὐλάχιστόν ἐστι τῶν μερῶν ἔχειν ἄλλως ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὴν Διὸς βούλησιν,
κ.τ.λ. Conf. Sto. Rep. 34, 2: οὕτω δὲ τῆς τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομίας
προαγούσης, ἀναγκαῖον κατὰ ταύτην, ὡς ἄν ποτ’ ἔχωμεν, ἔχειν ἡμᾶς, εἴτε
παρὰ φύσιν τὴν ἰδίαν νοσοῦντες, εἴτε πεπηρωμένοι, εἴτε γραμματικοὶ
γεγονότες ἢ μουσικοὶ ... κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον τὰ παραπλήσια ἐροῦμεν
καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡμῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ
τῶν ἀτεχνιῶν, ὡς ἔφην ... οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλως τῶν κατὰ μέρος
γενέσθαι, οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον, ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν
ἐκείνης λόγον. Ibid. 47, 4 and 8. Cleanth. Hymn. v. 15:
οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαῖμον,
οὔτε κατ’ αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον οὔτ’ ἐνὶ πόντῳ,
πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις.
[360] See the quotations on p. 161, 1; 161, 2; 164, 2; 144, 1; 148;
145, 2, from Diog. vii. 136; Stob. Ecl. i. 372 and 414; Cic. N. D. ii.
10, 28; 22, 58; Sext. Math. ix. 101: M. Aurel. iv. 14: ἐναφανισθήσῃ τῷ
γεννήσαντι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναληφθήσῃ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ τὸν σπερματικὸν
κατὰ μεταβολήν. Ibid. 21: αἱ ψυχαὶ ... εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων σπερματικὸν
λόγον ἀναλαμβανόμεναι.
[361] See on p. 151, 1, the definition of deity from Stob.; Plut.
Athenag.; M. Aurel. ix. 1: ὥρμησεν [ἡ φύσις] ἐπὶ τήνδε τὴν διακόσμησιν
συλλαβοῦσά τινας λόγους τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ δυνάμεις γονίμους ἀφωρίσασα,
κ.τ.λ. Ibid. vi. 24: Alexander and his groom ἐλήφθησαν εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς
τοῦ κόσμου σπερματικοὺς λόγους. Diog. vii. 148: ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις ἐξ
αὑτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. 157: μέρη δὲ
ψυχῆς λέγουσιν ὀκτὼ, τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν σπερματικοὺς
λόγους καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ λογιστικόν.
[362] As the primary fire or ether is called the seed of the world (p.
161, 1), so, according to Chrysippus (in Diog. 159), the σπέρμα in the
seed of plants and animals is a πνεῦμα κατ’ οὐσίαν.
[363] σπερματικὸς λόγος is also used to express the seed or the egg
itself. Thus, in Plut. Quæst. Conviv. ii. 3, 3 and 4, it is defined as
λόγος ἐνδεὴς γενέσεως.
[364] See p. 101, 2.
[365] This is particularly manifest, not only in the history of the
world, but also in the doctrine of the constant change of the elements.
[366] Heine, Stoicorum de Fato Doctrina (Naumb. 1859), p. 29.
[367] Compare what the Peripatetic Diogenianus (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8,
7) and Stob. (Ecl. i. 180) observe on the derivations of εἱμαρμένη,
πεπρωμένη, Χρεὼν (Heine, p. 32, 1, suggests on the strength of
Theodoret, Cur. Gr. Affect. vi. 11, p. 87, 4, who transcribes the
quotation from Eusebius, τὸν χρόνον κατὰ τὸ χρεών. We ought rather to
read, according to Theod. Gaisf., τὸ χρεὼν κατὰ τὸ χρέος), Μοῖραι,
Κλωθώ: and the quotations p. 170, 1; 171, 1; also Ps. Arist. De Mundo,
c. 7. The argument for Providence, drawn from the consensus gentium in
Sen. Benef. iv. 4, follows another tack.
[368] Homeric passages, which he was in the habit of quoting in Eus.
l.c. 8, 1.
[369] See Cic. N. D. ii. 30, 76.
[370] The two are generally taken together. Compare the quotations on
p. 145, 4.
[371] See p. 83, 2; 110, 3; Aristotle and the Peripatetics thought
differently. See Simpl. Cat. 103, β.
[372] Cic. De Fato, 10, 20.
[373] Alex. De Fato, p. 92, Orel.: τὸ δὲ λέγειν εὔλογον εἶναι τοὺς
θεοὺς τὰ ἐσόμενα προειδέναι ... καὶ τοῦτο λαμβάνοντας κατασκευάζειν
πειρᾶσθαι δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε γίνεσθαι καὶ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην
οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε εὔλογον.
[374] Cic. N. D. ii. 65, 162; De Fato, 3, 5 (unfortunately the previous
exposition is wanting); Diogenian (in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 1):
Chrysippus proves, by the existence of divination, that all things
happen καθ’ εἱμαρμένην; for divination would be impossible, unless
things were foreordained. Alex. De Fato, c. 21, p. 96: οἱ δὲ ὑμνοῦντες
τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὑτῶν λόγον μόνον σώζεσθαι λέγοντες αὐτὴν καὶ
ταύτῃ πίστει τοῦ πάντα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην γίνεσθαι χρώμενοι, κ.τ.λ.
[375] Plut. De Fato, 11, p. 374: κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἐναντίον [λόγον] μάλιστα
μὲν καὶ πρῶτον εἶναι δόξειε τὸ μηδὲν ἀναιτίως γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
προηγουμένας αἰτίας· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ φύσει διοικεῖσθαι τόνδε τὸν κόσμον,
σύμπνουν καὶ συμπαθῆ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ ὄντα. Then come the considerations
confirmatory of that view—divination, the wise man’s acquiescence in
the course of the world, the maxim that every judgment is either true
or false. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 35, p. 139: εἰ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν αἰτίων
περιεστηκότων, ὥς φασιν αὐτοὶ, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὰ αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι.
[376] Alex. De Fato, c. 22, p. 72: ὅμοιόν τε εἶναί φασι καὶ ὁμοίως
ἀδύνατον τὸ ἀναιτίως τῷ γίνεσθαί τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος.
[377] Alex. l.c. p. 70: φασὶ δὴ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε ἕνα ὄντα ... καὶ ὑπὸ
φύσεως διοικούμενον ζωτικῆς τε καὶ λογικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς ἔχειν τὴν τῶν
ὄντων διοίκησιν ἀΐδιον κατὰ εἱρμόν τινα καὶ τάξιν προϊοῦσαν; so that
everything is connected as cause and effect, ἀλλὰ παντί τε τῷ γινομένῳ
ἕτερόν τι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἠρτημένον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀπ’ ἀνάγκης ὡς αἰτίου, καὶ
πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἔχειν τι πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ᾧ ὡς αἰτίῳ συνήρτηται· μηδὲν γὰρ
ἀναιτίως μήτε εἶναι μήτε γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν
αὐτῷ ἀπολελυμένον τε καὶ κεχωρισμένον τῶν προγεγονότων ἁπάντων·
διασπᾶσθαι γὰρ καὶ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μηκέτι τὸν κόσμον ἕνα μένειν ἀεὶ,
κατὰ μίαν τάξιν τε καὶ οἰκονομίαν διοικούμενον, εἰ ἀναίτιός τις
εἰσάγοιτο κίνησις. See Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125; De Fato, 4, 7; M. Aurel.
x. 5.
[378] In Cic. N. D. ii. 65, 164, the Stoic says: Nec vero universo
generi hominum solum, sed etiam singulis a Diis immortalibus consuli et
provideri solet.
[379] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 46: Singulis non adest [Jupiter], et tamen vim
et causam et manum omnibus dedit. Cic. N. D. 66, 167: Magna Dii curant,
parva negligunt. Ibid. iii. 35, 86: At tamen minora Dii negligunt ...
ne in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant. Sic enim dicitis.
[380] Cicero uses the following argument to show that the providential
care of God extends to individuals:—If the Gods care for all men, they
must care for those in our hemisphere, and, consequently, for the
cities in our hemisphere, and for the men in each city. The argument
may be superfluous, but it serves to show that the care of individuals
was the result of God’s care of the whole world. M. Aurel. vi. 44: εἰ
μὲν οὖν ἐβουλεύσαντο περὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐμοὶ συμβῆναι ὀφειλόντων οἱ
θεοὶ, καλῶς ἐβουλεύσαντο ... εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐβουλεύσαντο κατ’ ἰδίαν περὶ
ἐμοῦ, περί γε τῶν κοινῶν πάντως ἐβουλεύσαντο, οἷς κατ’ ἐπακολούθησιν
καὶ ταῦτα συμβαίνοντα ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ στέργειν ὀφείλω. Similarly, iv.
28. It will be seen that the Stoics consider that the existence of
divination, which served as a proof of special providence, was caused
by the connection of nature.
[381] As Alex. c. 28, p. 88, fitly observes.
[382] The great majority of the Stoic answers to πολλὰ ζητήματα φυσικά
τε καὶ ἠθικὰ καὶ διαλεκτικά, which (according to Plut. De Fato, c. 3)
were called forth by the theory of destiny, in all probability belong
to him.
[383] See p. 171, 3, Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 23, 2, p. 1045. He
assigned as a general reason τὸ γὰρ ἀναίτιον ὅλως ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ
τὸ αὐτόματον. Hence the Stoic definition of τύχη is αἰτία ἀπρονόητος
καὶ ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ in Plut. De Fato. c. 7, p. 572; Plac. i.
29, 3 (Stob. Ecl. i. 218); Alex. De Fato, p. 24; Simpl. Phys. 74, 6.
See p. 171, 1.
[384] Alex. l.c. The Stoics assert that things are possible which do
not take place, if in themselves they can take place, and διὰ τοῦτο
φασὶ μηδὲ τὰ γενόμενα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, καίτοι ἀπαραβάτως γινόμενα, ἐξ
ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι, ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῖς δυνατὸν γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ
ἀντικείμενον. Cic. Top. 15, 59: Ex hoc genere causarum ex æternitate
pendentium fatum a Stoicis nectitur.
[385] Alex. De Fato, c. 10, p. 32; Cic. De Fato, 17, 39); 18, 41, and
above, p. 115, 2. Hence Plut. Plac. (similarly Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 39,
p. 149): ἃ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι κατ’ ἀνάγκην, ἃ δὲ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, ἃ δὲ κατὰ
προαίρεσιν, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τύχην, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον, which is evidently
more explicit than the language used by Stob. Ecl. i. 176, and the
statement of Theodoret on p. 171, 1.
[386] See p. 115, 2. Opponents such as Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 46, and
Alex., pointed out how illusory this attempt was. According to the
latter, he fell back on the simple result, maintaining that, in the
case of things happening καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, there is nothing to prevent
the opposite from coming about, so far as the causes which prevent this
from happening are unknown to us.
[387] See above, p. 171, 3.
[388] Chrysipp. in Gell. N. A. vii. 2, 6; Alex. De Fato, c. 36, p. 112.
[389] Gell. l.c.; Alex. c. 13; Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 35, p. 138, 140.
Alex. c. 33 (on which see Heine, p. 43) gives a long argument,
concluding with the words: πᾶν τὸ καθ’ ὁρμὴν γινόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς οὕτως
ἐνεργοῦσιν εἶναι. Nemes. appeals to Chrysippus, and also to Philopator,
a Stoic of the second century A.D. Of him he remarks, that he has
consistently attributed τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν to lifeless objects.
[390] Cic. De Fato, 18, 41: In order to avoid necessitas, or to uphold
fate, Chrysippus distinguishes causæ principales et perfectæ from causæ
adjuvantes, his meaning being that everything happens according to
fate, not causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adjuvantibus.
Conf. Cic. Top. 15, 59. Although these causes may not be in our power,
still it is our will which assents to the impressions received. Œnomaus
(in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 7, 3, and 10) charges Chrysippus with making a
ἡμίδουλον of the will, because he laid so great a stress on its
freedom.
[391] Gell. vii. 2, 13: Cic. l.c.
[392] Alex. c. 34, p. 106, puts in the mouth of the Stoics: τὰ μὲν τῶν
ζῴων ἐνεργήσει μόνον, τὰ δὲ πράξει τὰ λογικὰ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἁμαρτήσεται,
τὰ δὲ κατορθώσει. ταῦτα γὰρ τούτοις κατὰ φύσιν μὲν, ὄντων δὲ καὶ
ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ κατορθωμάτων, καὶ τῶν τοιαύτων φύσεων καὶ ποιοτήτων μὴ
ἀγνοουμένων, καὶ ἔπαινοι μὲν καὶ ψόγοι καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ κολάσεις.
[393] Alex. c. 26, p. 82.
[394] Alex. c. 32, p. 102.
[395] The arguments usual among the Stoics in after times may, with
great probability, be referred to Chrysippus.
[396] Alex. c. 35: λέγουσι γάρ· οὐκ ἔστι τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ
ἔστι δὲ πεπρωμένη· (It never happens that there is a εἱμαρμένη but not
a πεπρωμένη) οὐδὲ ἔστι πεπρωμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ αἶσα· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν αἶσα,
οὐκ [οὐδὲ] ἔστι δὲ νέμεσις· οὐκ ἔστι μὲν νέμεσις, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ νόμος·
οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν νόμος, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ λόγος ὀρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν ὧν
ποιητέον ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον· ἀλλὰ ἀπαγορεύεται μὲν τὰ
ἁμαρτανόμενα, προστάττεται δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι μὲν τοιαύτη
ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ κατορθώματα· ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔστιν
ἁμαρτήματα καὶ κατορθώματα, ἔστιν ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἔστι
καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἐπαινετὸν, τὸ δὲ αἰσχρὸν ψεκτόν·
οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ ψεκτόν.
What is praiseworthy deserves τιμὴ or γέρως ἀξίωσις, and what is
blameworthy merits κόλασις or ἐπανόρθωσις.
[397] Alex. c. 37, p. 118: A second argument ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς παλαίστρας
is the following:—οὐ πάντα μὲν ἔστι καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
ἀκώλυτος καὶ ἀπαρεμπόδιστος ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν
τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κόσμος· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν κόσμος, οὐκ εἰσὶ δὲ θεοί· (for
κόσμος, according to the definitions of Chrysippus, is the whole,
including gods and men. See p. 158, 1) εἰ δέ εἰσι θεοὶ, εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ οἱ
θεοί· ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, ἔστιν ἀρετή· ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ, ἔστι φρόνησις·
ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο ἔστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ποιητέων τε καὶ οὐ ποιητέων· ἀλλὰ
ποιητέα μὲν ἔστι τὰ κατορθώματα, οὐ ποιητέα δὲ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, κ.τ.λ.
οὐκ ἄρα πάντα μὲν γίνεται καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ γεραίρειν καὶ
ἐπανορθοῦν.
[398] Cic. De Fato, 12, 28; Diogenian. (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 16);
Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 37. Things which were determined by the co-operation
of destiny alone Chrysippus called συγκαθειμαρμένα (confatalia). The
argument by which he was confuted, which Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 489,
erroneously attributes to the Stoics themselves, went by the name of
ἀργὸς λόγος (ignava ratio). Besides the ἀργὸς λόγος, Plut. De Fato, c.
11, p. 574, mentions the θερίζων and the λόγος παρὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην as
fallacies which could only be refuted on the ground of the freedom of
the will. The last-named one, perhaps, turned on the idea (Œnomaus, in
Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 7, 12) that man might frustrate destiny if he
neglected to do what was necessary to produce the foreordained results.
According to Ammon. De Inter. 106, a, Lucian, Vit. Auct. 22, the
θερίζων was as follows:—Either you will reap or you will not reap: it
is therefore incorrect to say, perhaps you will reap.
[399] Sen. (after Cleanthes, whose verses in Epictet. Man. 52) Ep. 107,
11: Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt. Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i.
21, has put it very plainly: τὸ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην εἶναι πάντη
διεβεβαιώσαντο παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι τοιούτῳ, ὅτι ὥσπερ ὀχήματος ἐὰν
ᾖ ἐξηρτημένος κύων, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται ἕπεσθαι, καὶ ἕλκεται καὶ ἕπεται
ἑκὼν ... ἐὰν δὲ μὴ βούληται ἕπεσθαι, πάντως ἀναγκασθήσεται, τὸ αὐτὸ
δήπου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν
ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ πεπρωμένον εἰσελθεῖν. The same idea is
expanded by M. Aurel. vi. 42: All must work for the whole, ἐκ
περιουσίας δὲ καὶ ὁ μεμφόμενος καὶ ὁ ἀντιβαίνειν πειρώμενος καὶ
ἀναιρεῖν τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου ἔχρῃζεν ὁ κόσμος. It is
man’s business to take care that he acts a dignified part in the common
labour.
[400] After all that has been said, this needs no further confirmation.
Conversely, the unity of the forming power is concluded from the unity
of the world. See p. 143, 1, 2. Conf. Plut. Def. Orac. 29, p. 425. M.
Aurel. vi. 38: πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐπιπέπλεκται καὶ πάντα κατὰ τοῦτο φίλα
ἀλλήλοις ἐστί ... τοῦτο δὲ διὰ τὴν τονικὴν κίνησιν καὶ σύμπνοιαν καὶ
τὴν ἕνωσιν τῆς οὐσίας. Ibid. vii. 9.
[401] Sext. Math. ix. 78: τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἡνωμένα, τὰ δὲ ἐκ
συναπτομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων ... ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν,
ἤτοι ἡνωμένον ἐστι σῶμα ἢ ἐκ συναπτομένων, ἢ ἐκ διεστώτων· οὔτε δὲ ἐκ
συναπτομένων οὔτε ἐκ διεστώτων, ὡς δείκνυμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν
συμπαθειῶν· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῆς σελήνης αὐξήσεις καὶ φθίσεις πολλὰ τῶν τε
ἐπιγείων ζῴων καὶ θαλασσίων φθίνει τε καὶ αὔξεται, ἀμπώτεις τε καὶ
πλημμυρίδες (ebb and flood), περί τινα μέρη τῆς θαλάσσης γίνονται. In
the same way, atmospheric changes coincide with the setting and rising
of the stars: ἐξ ὧν συμφανὲς, ὅτι ἡνωμένον τι σῶμα καθέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος,
ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ διεστώτων οὐ συμπάσχει τὰ μέρη
ἀλλήλοις. Diog. vii. 140: ἐν δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ μηδὲν εἶναι κενὸν ἀλλ’ ἡνῶσθαι
αὐτὸν, τοῦτο γὰρ ἀναγκάζειν τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια σύμπνοιαν
καὶ συντονίαν. Ibid. 143: ὅτι θ’ εἷς ἐστι Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ
ὅλου καὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ... καὶ Ποσειδώνιος. Alex. De Mixt.
142, a, see p. 127, 5; Cic. N. D. ii. 7, 19; Epictet. Diss. i. 14, 2:
οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡνῶσθαι τὰ πάντα; Δοκεῖ, ἔφη· τί δέ; συμπαθεῖν τὰ
ἐπίγεια τοῖς οὐρανίοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; Δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Cicero mentions the
changes in animals and plants corresponding with the changes of
seasons, the phases of the moon, and the greater or less nearness of
the sun. M. Aurel. iv. 40. From all these passages we gather what the
question really was. It was not only whether other worlds were
possible, besides the one which we know from observation, but whether
the heavenly bodies visible were in any essential way connected with
the earth, so as to form an organic whole (ζῷον, Diog. vii. 143).
The Stoic conception of συμπάθεια was not used to denote the magic
connection which it expresses in ordinary parlance, but the natural
coincidence between phenomena belonging to the different parts of the
world, the consensus, concentus, cognatio, conjunctio, or continuatio
naturæ (Cic. N. D. iii. 11, 28; Divin. ii. 15, 34; 69, 142). In this
sense, M. Aurel. ix. 9, observes that like is attracted by like; fire
is attracted upwards, earth downwards; beasts and men seek out each
other’s society; even amongst the highest existences, the stars, there
exists a ἕνωσις ἐκ διεστηκότων, a συμπάθεια ἐν διεστῶσι. Even the last
remark does not go beyond the conception of a natural connection;
nevertheless, it paves the way for the later Neoplatonic idea of
sympathy, as no longer a physical connection, but as an influence felt
at a distance by virtue of a connection of soul.
[402] M. Aurel. vi. 1: ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία (the matter of the world)
εὐπειθὴς καὶ εὐτρεπής· ὁ δὲ ταύτην διοικῶν λόγος οὐδεμίαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ
αἰτίαν ἔχει τοῦ κακοποιεῖν· κακίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει, οὐδέ τι κακῶς ποιεῖ,
οὐδὲ βλάπτεταί τι ὑπ’ ἐκείνου. πάντα δὲ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον γίνεται καὶ
περαίνεται.
[403] Diog. 149: ταύτην δὲ [τὴν φύσιν] καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος στοχάζεσθαι
καὶ ἡδονῆς, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δημιουργίας.
[404] Plut. Sto. Rep. 21, 3, p. 1044: εἰπὼν [Χρύσιππος] ὅτι ...
φιλοκαλεῖν ... τὴν φύσιν τῇ ποικιλίᾳ χαίρουσαν εἰκός ἐστι, ταῦτα κακὰ
λέξιν εἴρηκε· γένοιτο δ’ ἂν μάλιστα τούτου ἔμφασις ἐπὶ τῆς κέρκου τοῦ
ταώ. Conf. the Stoic in Cic. Fin. ii. 5, 18: Jam membrorum ... alia
videntur propter eorum usum a natura esse donata ... alia autem nullam
ob utilitatem, quasi ad quendam ornatum, ut cauda pavoni, plumæ
versicolores columbis, viris mammæ atque barba.
[405] M. Aurel. iii. 2: It is there proved by examples, ὅτι καὶ τὰ
ἐπιγινόμενα τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις ἔχει τι εὔχαρι καὶ ἐπαγωγὸν ...
σχεδὸν οὐδὲν οὐχὶ καὶ τῶν κατ’ ἐπακολούθησιν συμβαινόντων ἡδέως πως
διασυνίστασθαι.
[406] Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 85; Sen. Ep. 113, 16. The latter includes this
variety of natural objects among the facts, which must fill us with
admiration for the divine artificer.
[407] Plut. Plac. i. 6, 2: καλὸς δὲ ὁ κόσμος· δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τοῦ σχήματος
καὶ τοῦ χρώματος καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν κόσμον τῶν ἀστέρων
ποικιλίας; the world has the most perfect form, that of a globe, with a
sky the most perfect in colour, &c.
[408] See the passages quoted p. 145, 4, particularly Cic. N. D. ii.
32.
[409] Plut. (in Porphyr. De Abstin. iii. 32): ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο νὴ Δία τοῦ
Χρυσίππου πιθανὸν ἦν, ὡς ἡμᾶς αὐτῶν καὶ ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοὶ χάριν
ἐποιήσαντο, ἡμῶν δὲ τὰ ζῷα, συμπολεμεῖν μὲν ἵππους καὶ συνθηρεύειν
κύνας, ἀνδρείας δὲ γυμνάσια παρδάλεις καὶ ἄρκτους καὶ λέοντας, κ.τ.λ.
Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 37: Scite enim Chrysippus: ut clypei causa
involucrum, vaginam autem gladii, sic præter mundum cetera omnia
aliorum causa esse generata, ut eas fruges et fructus, quas terra
gignit, animantium causa, animantes autem hominum, ut equum vehendi
causa, arandi bovem, venandi et custodiendi canem. Id. Off. i. 7, 22:
Placet Stoicis, quæ in terris gignantur ad usum hominum omnia creari.
[410] Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67: Præclare enim Chrysippus, cetera nata esse
hominum causa et Deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suæ. N.
D. ii. 53, 133, in describing the Stoic teaching: Why has the universe
been made? Not for the sake of plants or animals, but for the sake of
rational beings, Gods and men. It is then shown (c. 54–61), by an
appeal to the structure of man’s body, and his mental qualities, how
God has provided for the wants of man; and the argument concludes with
the words, Omnia, quæ sint in hoc mundo, quibus utantur homines,
hominum causa facta esse et parata. Just as a city, and what is
therein, exists for the use of the inhabitants, so the world is
intended for the use of Gods and men. Even the stars quanquam etiam ad
mundi cohærentiam pertinent, tamen et spectaculum hominibus præbent.
The earth with its plants and animals was created for the service of
man. In Orig. c. Cels. iv. 74, p. 559, the Stoics assert that
Providence created all things for the sake of rational beings; M.
Aurel. v. 16 and 30; Gell. vii. 1, 1. Hence the definition of κόσμος
quoted on p. 158, 1.
[411] Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 32, 1, p. 1049) shows how useful
fowls are; the horse is intended for riding, the ox for ploughing, the
dog for hunting. The pig, Cleanthes thought (Clemens, Strom. vii. 718,
B), was made to sustain man, and endowed with a soul, in place of salt,
to prevent its corrupting (Cic. N. D. ii, 64, 160; Fin. v. 13, 38;
Plut. Qu. Conviv. v. 10, 3 and 6, p. 685; Porphyr. De Abstin. iii. 20);
oysters and birds for the same purpose also (Porphyr. l.c.). In the
same way, he spoke of the value of mice and bugs, see p. 189, 1. The
Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 63, 158, following in the same track, declares
that sheep only exist for the purpose of clothing, dogs for guarding
and helping man, fishes for eating, and birds of prey for divers uses.
Epictet. Diss. ii. 8, 7, in the same spirit, speaks of asses being
intended to carry burdens; for this purpose they must be able to walk,
and, in order to walk, must possess the power of imagination.
[412] See p. 186, 1.
[413] Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 37: Ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum
contemplandum et imitandum, nullo modo perfectus, sed est quædam
particula perfecti. Sed mundus quoniam omnia complexus est, nec est
quidquam, quod non insit in eo, perfectus undique est.
[414] We gather this from the comparatively full accounts of the Stoic
theory of the moral government of the world. Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 1, p.
1051, says that Chrysippus wrote several treatises περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν
ἐγκλητὸν εἶναι μηδὲ μεμπτὸν κόσμῳ.
[415] See p. 187, 2, and Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 6): τέλεον
μὲν ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν, οὐ τέλεα δὲ τὰ κόσμου μέρη τῷ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πως
ἔχειν καὶ μὴ καθ’ αὑτὰ εἶναι. Compare also the statement in Plut.
Solert. An. c. 2, 9, p. 960, that animals must be irrational, because
the irrational must be contrasted with the rational.
[416] Gell. vii. [vi.] 1, 7: Chrysippus in his treatise περὶ προνοίας,
discussed, amongst other things, the question, εἰ αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόσοι
κατὰ φύσιν γίνονται. Existimat autem non fuisse hoc principale naturæ
consilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios ... sed cum multa inquit
atque magna gigneret pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia quoque
simul agnata sunt incommoda iis ipsis, quæ faciebat cohærentia: eaque
non per naturam sed per sequelas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, quod
ipse appellat κατὰ παρακολούθησιν.... Proinde morbi quoque et
ægritudines partæ sunt dum salus paritur. M. Aurel. vi. 36: All evils
are ἐπιγεννήματα τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ καλῶν. Plut. An. Procr. c. 6 and 9, p.
1015: αὐτοὶ δὲ (the Stoics) κακίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν τοσαύτην ... κατ’
ἐπακολούθησιν γεγονέναι λέγουσιν. Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 3, 1.
[417] Sen. Nat. Qu. v. 18, 4 and 13: Non ideo non sunt ista natura
bona, si vitio male utentium nocent.... Si beneficia naturæ utentium
pravitate perpendimus, nihil non nostro malo accepimus.
[418] Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 21, 4) remarks that bugs do us
good service by preventing us from sleeping too long, and mice warn us
not to leave things about. He also observes (Ibid. 32, 2) that wars are
as useful as colonies, by preventing over-population. See the
quotations, p. 185, 4; 186, 2. M. Aurel. viii. 50, makes a similar
remark in regard to weeds. In the house of nature all the waste has its
uses.
[419] A circumstance which Plut. Com. Not. 19, p. 1067, dexterously
uses against the Stoics.
[420] Cleanthes, Hymn. v. 17 (see p. 171, 3); Plut. Sto. Rep. 33, 2:
Chrysippus affirms, ὡς τῶν αἰσχρῶν τὸ θεῖον παραίτιον γίνεσθαι οὐκ
εὔλογόν ἐστιν, law is innocent of crime, God of impiety. Id. (in Gell.
vii. 2, 7): Quanquam ita sit, ut ratione quadam necessaria et
principali coacta atque connexa sint fato omnia, ingenia tamen ipsa
mentium nostrarum perinde sunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietas eorum est
ipsa et qualitas ... sua sævitate et voluntario impetu in assidua
delicta, et in errores se ruunt. Hence Cleanthes continues, in a
passage quoted in Greek by Gellius: ὡς τῶν βλαβῶν ἑκάστοις παρ’ αὐτοῖς
γινομένων καὶ καθ’ ὁρμὴν αὐτῶν ἁμαρτανόντων τε καὶ βλαπτομένων καὶ κατὰ
τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν καὶ πρόθεσιν. In Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 13, p. 1057,
Chrysippus says that, even if the Gods make false representations to
man, it is man’s fault if he follows those representations. Conf.
Epictet. Ench. c. 27: ὥσπερ σκοπὸς πρὸς τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν οὐ τίθεται, οὕτως
οὐδὲ κακοῦ φύσις (evil in itself) ἐν κόσμῳ γίνεται. Id. Diss. i. 6, 40.
Such observations bear out in some degree the statement of Plut. Plac.
ii. 27, 3, that, according to the Stoics, τὰ μὲν εἱμάρθαι, τὰ δὲ
ἀνειμάρθαι. See above, p. 179, 3, 4.
[421] Chrysippus felt this. Hence he says (in Gell.): It has been also
decreed by destiny that the bad should do wrong.
[422] Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 36, 1: κακίαν δὲ καθόλου ἆραι οὔτε
δυνατόν ἐστιν οὔτ’ ἔχει καλῶς ἀρθῆναι. Id. (in Gell. vii. 1, 10): As
diseases spring from human nature, sic hercle inquit dum virtus
hominibus per consilium naturæ gignitur vitia ibidem per affinitatem
contrariam nata sunt.
[423] Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 35, 3 (C. Not. 13, 2): γίνεται γὰρ
αὐτή πως [ἡ κακία] κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καὶ ἵνα οὕτως εἴπω οὐκ
ἀχρήστως γίνεται πρὸς τὰ ὅλα, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν τἀγαθὸν ἦν. C. Not. 14, 1: As
in a comedy, what is absurd contributes to the effect of the whole,
οὕτω ψέξειας ἂν αὐτὴν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς τὴν κακίαν· τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις οὐκ
ἄχρηστός ἐστιν. Similarly M. Aurel. vi. 42. Gell. viii. 1, 2:
(Chrysippus) nihil est prorsus istis, inquit, insubidius, qui
opinantur, bona esse potuisse, si non essent ibidem mala: nam cum bona
malis contraria sint, utraque necessum est opposita inter se et quasi
mutuo adverso quæque fulta nixu (Heraclitus’ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον)
consistere: nullum adeo contrarium est sine contrario altero. Without
injustice, cowardice, &c., we could not know what justice and valour
are. If there were no evil, φρόνησις as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν would
be impossible (Plut. C. Not. 16, 2, p. 1066).
[424] Cleanthes, Hymn. 18:
ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖκαι
καὶ κοσμεῖν τὰ ἄκοσμα, καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν·
ὧδε γὰρ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν
ὥσθ’ ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα.
[425] Plut. Sto. Rep. 35, 1: τὸν θεὸν κολάζειν φησὶ τὴν κακίαν καὶ
πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἐπὶ κολάσει τῶν πονηρῶν ... ποτὲ μὲν τὰ δύσχρηστα
συμβαίνειν φησὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὐχ ὥσπερ τοῖς φαύλοις κολάσεως χάριν ἀλλὰ
κατ’ ἄλλην οἰκονομίαν ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ... [τὰ κακὰ] ἀπονέμεται
κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον ἤτοι ἐπὶ κολάσει ἢ κατ’ ἄλλην ἔχουσάν πως πρὸς
τὰ ὅλα οἰκονομίαν. Id. 15, 2: ταῦτά φησι τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν ὅπως τῶν
πονηρῶν κολαζομένων οἱ λοιποὶ παραδείγμασι τούτοις χρώμενοι ἧττον
ἐπιχειρῶσι τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν. At the beginning of the same chapter,
the ordinary views of divine punishment had been treated with ridicule.
Conf. Quæst. Rom. 51, p. 277.
[426] Thus Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 2) in answer to the
question, How the misfortune of the virtuous is to be explained, says:
πότερον ἀμελουμένων τινῶν καθάπερ ἐν οἰκίαις μείζοσι παραπίπτει τινὰ
πίτυρα καὶ ποσοὶ πυροί τινες τῶν ὅλων εὖ οἰκονομουμένων· ἢ διὰ τὸ
καθίστασθαι ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων δαιμόνια φαῦλα ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι γίνονται
ἐγκλητέαι ἀμέλειαι; Similarly the Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 66: Magna Dii
curant, parva negligunt,—hardly satisfactory explanations for any
theory of necessity. It is still more unsatisfactory to hear Seneca
(Benef. iv. 32) justifying the unmerited good fortune of the wicked as
due to the nobility of their ancestors. The reason assigned by
Chrysippus (in Plut.)—πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης μεμῖχθαι—does not quite
harmonise with Plut. C. Not. 34, 2: οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε ὕλη τὸ κακὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς
παρέσχηκεν, ἄποιος γάρ ἐστι καὶ πάσας ὅσας δέχεται διαφορὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ
κινοῦντος αὐτὴν καὶ σχηματίζοντος ἔσχεν. Just as little does
Seneca’s—Non potest artifex mutare materiam (De Prov. 5, 9)—agree with
his lavish encomia on the arrangement and perfection of the world. For,
according to the Stoics, matter is ultimately identical with reason and
deity. These contradictions do not, however, justify the doubt
expressed by Heine, Stoic. de Fato Doct. 46, that Seneca is here not
speaking as a Stoic. For Chrysippus says very much the same thing. See
p. 190, 1, 2.
[427] M. Aurel. ix. 16: οὐκ ἐν πείσει, ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ
ζῴου κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία αὐτοῦ ἐν πείσει,
ἀλλὰ ἐνεργείᾳ.
[428] M. Aurel. viii. 35: ὃν τρόπον ἐκείνη [ἡ φύσις] πᾶν τὸ ἐνιστάμενον
καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον ἐπιπεριτρέπει καὶ κατατάσσει εἰς τὴν εἱμαρμένην καὶ
μέρος ἑαυτῆς ποιεῖ, οὕτως καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον δύναται πᾶν κώλυμα ὅλην
ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ ἐφ’ οἷον ἂν καὶ ὥρμησεν.
[429] Seneca’s treatise, De Providentia, is occupied with expanding
this thought. In it, the arguments by which the outward misfortunes of
good men are harmonised with the divine government of the world are:
(1) The wise man cannot really meet with misfortune: he cannot receive
at the hands of fortune what he does not, on moral grounds, assign to
himself (c. 2, 6). (2) Misfortune, therefore, is an unlooked-for
exercise of his powers, a divine instrument of training; a hero in
conflict with fortune is a spectaculum Deo dignum (c. 1, 2–4. Conf. Ep.
85, 39). (3) The misfortunes of the righteous show that external
conditions are neither a good nor an evil (c. 5). (4) Everything is a
natural consequence of natural causes (c. 5). Similar explanations in
Epictet. Diss. iii. 17; i. 6, 37; i. 24, 1; Stob. Ed. i. 132; M. Aurel.
iv. 49: vii. 68 and 64; x. 33.
[430] Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, col. 8, Vol. Herc. vi. 53:
ἰδιωτικῶς ἅπαντος αὐτῷ [θεῷ] δύναμιν ἀναθέντες, ὅταν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐλέγχων
πιέζωνται, τότε καταφεύγουσιν ἐπὶ τὸ διὰ τοῦτο φάσκειν τὰ συναπτόμενα
(what is suitable) μὴ ποιεῖν, ὅτι οὐ πάντα δύναται.
[431] See above, p. 126; 101, 2; Diog. 135. Conf. Stob. Ecl. i. 410.
[432] In Diog. 150, there is no difference made between Apollodorus and
Chrysippus. Stob. Ecl. i. 344; Plut. C. Not. 38, 3, p. 1079; Sext.
Math. x. 142. Similarly Aristotle.
[433] Plut. Plac. i. 9, 2: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τρεπτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν καὶ
μεταβλητὴν καὶ ῥευστὴν ὅλην δι’ ὅλου τὴν ὕλην. Diog. 150. Sen. Nat. Qu.
iii. 101, 3: Fiunt omnia ex omnibus, ex aqua aër, ex aëre aqua, ignis
ex aëre, ex igne aër ... ex aqua terra fit, cur non aqua fiat e terra?
... omnium elementorum in alternum recursus sunt. Similarly Epictet. in
Stob. Floril. 108, 60. Conf. p. 101, 2; 198, 3. This is borrowed not
only from Heraclitus, but also from Aristotle.
[434] They only called the first kind κίνησις. Aristotle understood by
κίνησις every form of change.
[435] Stob. Ecl. i. 404, 408, gives definitions of κίνησις, of φορά,
and of μονή, taken from Chrysippus and Apollodorus. Simpl. Categ. 110,
β (Schol. in Arist. 92, 6, 30. Respecting the kinds of μεταβολή see the
extracts from Posidonius on p. 101, 2) distinguishes between μένειν,
ἠρεμεῖν, ἡσυχάζειν, ἀκινητεῖν, but this is rather a matter of language.
Simpl. Cat. 78, β, relates that the Stoics differed from the
Peripatetics in explaining Motion as an incomplete energy, and
discusses their assertion that κινεῖσθαι is a wider, κινεῖν a narrower,
idea.
[436] Simpl. Phys. 310, b: οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς κατὰ πᾶσαν κίνησιν
ἔλεγον ὑπεῖναι τὴν τοπικὴν, ἢ κατὰ μέγαλα διαστήματα ἢ κατὰ λόγῳ
θεωρητὰ ὑφισταμένην.
[437] Simpl. Categ. 78, β (Schol. 78, a, 23): Plotinus and others
introduce into the Aristotelian doctrine the Stoic view: τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ
ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν εἶναι τὰς κινήσεις.
[438] Simpl. l.c. 77, β; Schol. 77, b, 33. Simplicius himself
contradicts this statement. It had, however, been already advanced by
Aristotle.
[439] Simpl. l.c. 78, β (Schol. 78, a, 28): The Stoics who, according
to p. 84, ε, Schol. 79, a, 16, very fully discussed the categories,
made the following διαφοραὶ γενῶν: τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὡς ἡ μάχαιρα
τὸ τέμνειν ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας ἔχει κατασκευῆς—τὸ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργεῖν τὴν
κίνησιν, ὡς αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἰατρικαὶ δυνάμεις τὴν ποίησιν
ὑπεργάζονται; for instance, the seed, in developing into a plant—τὸ ἀφ’
ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν, or ἀπὸ ἰδίας ὁρμῆς ποιεῖν, one species of which is τὸ
ἀπὸ λογικῆς ὁρμῆς—τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖν. It is, in short, the
application to a particular case of the distinction which will be
subsequently met with of ἕξις, φύσις, ψυχὴ, and ψυχὴ λογική. The
celebrated grammatical distinction of ὀρθὰ and ὕπτια mentioned p. 95, 3
is connected with the distinction between ποιεῖν and πάσχειν. Conf.
Simpl. p. 79, α, ζ; Schol. 78, b, 17 and 30.
[440] See page 135.
[441] Stob. Ecl. i. 382: Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐντὸς μὲν τοῦ κόσμου
μηδὲν εἶναι κενὸν ἔξω δ’ αὐτοῦ ἄπειρον (conf. Themist. Phys. 40, b;
Plut. Plac. i. 18, 4; ibid. c. 20, beginning οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος).
διαφέρειν δὲ κενὸν τόπον χώραν· καὶ τὸ μὲν κενὸν εἶναι ἐρημίαν σώματος,
τὸν δὲ τόπον τὸ ἐπεχόμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, τὴν δὲ χώραν τὸ ἐκ μέρους
ἐπεχόμενον (Plut. adds, like a half-empty vessel). Stob. i. 390:
Chrysippus defined τόπος = τὸ κατεχόμενον δι’ ὅλου ὑπὸ ὄντος, ἢ τὸ οἷον
κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ ὄντος καὶ δι’ ὅλου κατεχόμενον εἴτε ὑπὸ τινὸς εἴτε ὑπὸ
τινῶν. If, however, only one portion of the οἷόν τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ
ὄντος is really filled, the whole is neither κενὸν nor τόπος, but
ἕτερόν τι οὐκ ὠνομασμένον, which may possibly be called χώρα. Hence
τόπος corresponds to a full, κενὸν to an empty, χώρα to a half-empty,
vessel. Sext. Math. x. 3, Pyrrh. iii. 124, speaks to the same effect.
Cleomed. Meteor. p. 2, 4; Simpl. Categ. 91, δ. According to the Stoics,
παρυφίσταται τοῖς σώμασιν ὁ τόπος καὶ τὸν ὅρον ἀπ’ αὐτῶν προσλαμβάνει
τὸν μέχρι τοσοῦδε, καθόσον συμπληροῦνται [-οῦται] ὑπὸ τῶν σωμάτων.
[442] The Stoic idea of space is so understood by Themist. Phys. 38, b;
Simpl. Phys. 133, a.
[443] See previous note and in Diog. 140 (where, however, instead of
ἀσώματον δὲ, we should read κενὸν δὲ) definitions of κενόν.
[444] Stob. Ecl. i. 392, quoting Chrysippus.
[445] See p. 131, 2.
[446] Simpl. Categ. 88, ζ. Schol. 80, a, 6: τῶν δὲ Στωϊκῶν Ζήνων μὲν
πάσης ἁπλῶς κινήσεως διάστημα τὸν χρόνον εἶπε (conf. Plut. Plat. Quæst.
viii. 4, 3) Χρύσιππος δὲ διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως. Conf. Ibid.
89, α, β; Simpl. Phys. 165, a. More full is Stob. Ecl. i. 260: ὁ δὲ
Χρύσιππος χρόνον εἶναι κινήσεως διάστημα καθ’ ὅ ποτε λέγεται μέτρον
τάχους τε καὶ βραδύτητος, ἢ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν διάστημα τῇ τοῦ κόσμου
κινήσει. The passages quoted by Stob. Ibid. 250 (Plut. Plac. i. 22, 2),
254, 256, 258, and Diog. 141, from Zeno, Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and
Posidonius, are in agreement with this. In the same places occur
several other observations on Time, which are, however, of no
importance, such as that Time as a whole, and likewise the past and the
future, are unlimited, the present is limited; the present cannot be
accurately determined, it is the boundary between the past and the
future (Archedemus in Plut. C. Not. 38, 6, p. 1081), lying partly in
the one, partly in the other (Chrysippus, ibid. 38, 8).
[447] Sext. Math. x. 142; Plut. Com. Not. 41, p. 1081; Stob. i. 260.
[448] For the conception of στοιχεῖον, which is also that of Aristotle
(Metaph. i. 3, 938, b, 8), and its difference from that of ἀρχὴ, see
Diog. 134; 136. The difference, however, is not always observed.
Chrysippus (in Stob. Ecl. i. 312) distinguishes three meanings of
στοιχεῖον. In one sense, it is fire; in another, the four elements; in
the third, any material out of which something is made.
[449] Lassalle, Heraclitus, ii. 84.
[450] See p. 161. As is there stated, primary fire first goes over into
water δι’ ἀέρος (i.e. after first going over into air, not passing
through air as an already existing medium, as Lassalle, Heracl. ii. 86,
inaccurately says), and water goes over into the three other elements.
In this process there is, however, a difficulty. Fire is said to derive
its origin from water, and yet a portion of primary fire must have
existed from the beginning, as the soul of the world. Nor is it correct
to say, that actual fire is never obtained from water in the formation
of the upper elements (as Lassalle, p. 88, does).
[451] Chrysippus, in Stob. Ecl. i. 312: πρώτης μὲν γιγνομένης τῆς ἐκ
πυρὸς κατὰ σύστασιν εἰς ἀέρα μεταβολῆς, δευτέρας δ’ ἀπὸ τούτου εἰς
ὕδωρ, τρίτης δ’ ἔτι μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνισταμένου τοῦ ὕδατος εἰς
γῆν, πάλιν δὲ ἀπὸ ταύτης διαλυομένης καὶ διαχεομένης πρώτη μὲν γίγνεται
χύσις εἰς ὕδωρ, δεύτερα δὲ ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς ἀέρα, τρίτη δὲ καὶ ἐσχάτη εἰς
πῦρ. On account of this constant change, primary matter is called
(Ibid. 316, where, however, the text is obviously corrupt, and
therefore only partially intelligible) ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἀΐδιος
δύναμις ... εἰς αὐτήν τε πάντα καταναλίσκουσα καὶ τὸ [ἐξ] αὑτῆς πάλιν
ἀποκαθιστᾶσα τεταγμένως καὶ ὁδῷ. Epictet. in Stob. Floril. 108, 60: Not
only mankind and animals are undergoing perpetual changes, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ
θεῖα, καὶ νὴ Δί’ αὐτὰ τὰ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τρέπεται καὶ
μεταβάλλει· καὶ γῆ τε ὕδωρ γίνεται καὶ ὕδωρ ἀὴρ, οὗτος δὲ πάλιν εἰς
αἰθέρα μεταβάλλει· καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς μεταβολῆς ἄνωθεν κάτω. On the
flux of things, see also M. Aurel. ii. 3; vii. 19; ix. 19; 28. Cic. N.
D. ii. 33, 84: Et cum quatuor sint genera corporum, vicissitudine eorum
mundi continuata (= συνεχής; conf. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 2, 2, continuatio
est partium inter se non intermissa conjunctio) natura est. Nam ex
terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aër, ex aëre æther: deinde retrorsum
vicissim ex æthere aër, ex aëre aqua, ex aqua terra infima. Sic naturis
his, ex quibus omnia constant, sursum deorsum, ultro citroque
commeantibus, mundi partium conjunctio continetur. See p. 194, 3.
[452] Diog. 137: εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν πῦρ τὸ θερμὸν, τὸ δ’ ὕδωρ τὸ ὑγρὸν,
τόν τ’ ἀέρα τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν τὸ ξηρόν. Plut. Sto. Rep. 43, 1, p.
1053. The air is, according to Chrysippus, φύσει ζοφερὸς and πρώτως
ψυχρός. Id. De Primo Frig. 9, 1; 17, 1, p. 948, 952; Galen, Simpl.
Medic. ii. 20, vol. xi. 510. Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 10; i. 4: Aër ...
frigidus per se et obscurus ... natura enim aëris gelida est. Conf.
Cic. N. D. ii. 10, 26. Of the four properties by the pairing of which
elements arise, even Aristotle had attributed one to each element as
its distinguishing feature, assigning cold to water, moisture to air.
[453] Thus the upper portion of the air, owing to its proximity to the
region of fire and the stars (Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 10), is the warmest,
the driest, and the rarest; but yet, owing to the evaporation of the
earth and the radiation of heat, warmer than the middle, which in point
of dryness and density is between the two, but exceeds both in cold.
See p. 146, 4.
[454] Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 314: λέγεσθαι δὲ πῦρ τὸ πυρῶδες πᾶν καὶ
ἀέρα τὸ ἀερῶδες καὶ ὁμοίως τὰ λοιπά. Thus Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, E,
who is clearly following the Stoics, distinguishes three kinds of fire:
ἄνθραξ, φλὸξ, αὐγή. He seems, however, only to refer to terrestrial
fire, which, after all, forms only one small portion of fire.
[455] Pp. 128, 2; 148, 2; 151, 1; 163, 2.
[456] This statement must be taken with such modification as the unity
of the world renders necessary. If the upper elements were to move
altogether away from the centre, the world would go to pieces. Hence
the meaning can only be this: that the difference of natural motions
can only take place within the enclosure holding the elements together,
and so far a natural motion towards the centre can be attributed to all
bodies as a distinctive feature, anterior to the contrast between
heaviness and lightness. Conf. Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 6, p.
1054: The striving of all the parts of the world is to keep together,
not to go asunder. οὕτω δὲ τοῦ ὅλου τεινομένου εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ κινουμένου
καὶ τῶν μορίων ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν ἐχόντων ἐκ τῆς τοῦ σώματος φύσεως,
πιθανὸν, πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασιν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην κατὰ φύσιν κίνησιν πρὸς τὸ
τοῦ κόσμου μέσον, τῷ μὲν κόσμῳ οὑτωσὶ κινουμένῳ πρὸς αὑτὸν, τοῖς δὲ
μέρεσιν ὡς ἂν μέρεσιν οὖσιν. Achill. Tat. Isag. 132, A: The Stoics
maintain that the world continues in empty space, ἐπεὶ πάντα αὐτοῦ τὰ
μέρη ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον νένευκε. The same reason is assigned by Cleomedes,
Meteor. p. 5.
[457] Stob. Ecl. i. 346 (Plut. Pl. i. 12, 4). Zeno, Ibid. 406: οὐ
πάντως δὲ σῶμα βάρος ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἀβαρῆ εἶναι ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ ... φύσει γὰρ
ἀνώφοιτα ταῦτ’ εἶναι διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς μετέχειν βάρους. Plut. Sto. Rep.
42, p. 1053: In the treatise περὶ κινήσεως, Chrysippus calls fire
ἀβαρὲς and ἀνωφερὲς καὶ τούτῳ παραπλησίως τὸν ἀέρα, τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος τῇ
γῇ μᾶλλον προσνεμομένου, τοῦ δ’ ἀέρος, τῷ πυρί. (So too in Ach. Tat.
Isag. i. 4 in Pet. Doctr. Temp. iii. 75.) On the other hand, in his
Φυσικαὶ τέχναι, he inclines to the view that air in itself is neither
heavy nor light, which however can only mean that it is neither
absolutely, being heavy compared with fire, and light compared with
water and earth.
[458] Diog. 137: ἀνωτάτω μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ ὃ δὴ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι, ἐν
ᾧ πρώτην τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν γεννᾶσθαι, εἶτα τὴν τῶν πλανωμένων.
μεθ’ ἣν τὸν ἀέρα, εἶτα τὸ ὕδωρ, ὑποστάθμην δὲ πάντων τὴν γῆν, μέσην
ἁπάντων οὖσαν. Ibid. 156; see p. 202, 3. To these main masses, all
other smaller masses of the same element in different parts of the
world are attracted, because all seek to reach their natural place.
Conf. M. Aurel. ix. 9.
[459] Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16, 2 (totum hoc cœlum, quod igneus æther,
mundi summa pars, claudit), and p. 198, 3, where the same thing is
called πῦρ by Stobæus, æther by Cicero. See p. 146, 4. The same thing
is meant by Zeno, where he says (Stob. Ecl. i. 538, 554, and Cleanthes
says the same in Cic. N. D. ii. 15, 40. Ach. Tat. Isag. 133, C) that
the stars are made of fire; not, however, of πῦρ ἄτεχνον, but of πῦρ
τεχνικὸν, which appears in plants as φύσις, in animals as ψυχή. See p.
201, 5.
[460] In Ach. Tat. Isag. 130, A, he defines οὐρανὸς as αἰθέρος τὸ
ἔσχατον, ἐξ οὗ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ πάντα ἐμφανῶς. Similarly Diog. 138;
Cleomed. Met. p. 7. Otherwise the term is used in a wider sense.
[461] See p. 146, 4.
[462] Stob. i. 346: τὸ μὲν περίγειον φῶς κατ’ εὐθεῖαν, τὸ δ’ αἰθέριον
περιφερῶς κινεῖται. See p. 202, 3. It is only of terrestrial fire that
Zeno can (Stob. Ecl. i. 356) say, it moves in a straight line.
Cleanthes even attributed to the stars the spherical shape, which on
the strength of this passage he attributes to it. See Plut. Plac. ii.
14, 2; Stob. i. 516; Ach. Tat. Isag. 133, B.
[463] They denied it, according to Orig. c. Cels. iv. 56. Cic. Acad. i.
11, 39, says: Zeno dispensed with a quinta natura, being satisfied with
four elements: statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quæ quæque
gigneret, et mentem atque sensus.
[464] The spherical shape of the earth is a matter of course, and is
mentioned by Ach. Tat. Isag. 126, C; Plut. Plac. iii. 10, 1; 9, 3.
Cleom. Met. p. 40, gives an elaborate proof of it, for the most part
taken from Posidonius.
[465] Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 36, and Diog. 145, also affirm that the
earth is in the centre, unmoved. The reason for this fact is stated by
Stob. i. 408, to be its weight. Further proofs in Cleomed. Met. p. 47.
[466] Stob. Ecl. i. 446: τοῦ δὲ ... κόσμου τὸ μὲν εἶναι περιφερόμενον
περὶ τὸ μέσον, τὶ δ’ ὑπομένον, περιφερόμενον μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, ὑπομένον
δὲ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς ὑγρὰ καὶ τὸν ἀέρα. The earth is the natural
framework, and, as it were, the skeleton of the world. Around it water
has been poured, out of which the more exalted spots project as
islands. For what is called continent is also an island: ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ
ὕδατος τὸν ἀέρα ἐξῆφθαι καθάπερ ἐξατμισθέντα σφαιρικῶς καὶ
περικεχύσθαι, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὸν αἰθέρα ἀραιότατόν τε καὶ
εἰλικρινέστατον. It moves in circular form round the world. Then
follows what is given in the text as to the stars, next to which comes
the stratum of air, then that of water, and lastly, in the centre, the
earth. Conf. Achil. Tat. Isag. 126, B, see p. 200, 3. The language of
Cleomed. Met. c. 3, p. 6, is somewhat divergent. He places the sun
amongst the planets, between Mars and Venus. That Archedemus also
refused to allow the earth a place in the centre has been already
stated, p. 147, 2. The language of Ach. Tat. Isag. c. 7, 131, B, is
ambiguous: As the circumference originates from the centre, so
according to the Stoics the outer circle originates from the earth;
when compared with the quotations on p. 161, 2; 162, 1.
[467] Stob. i. 356; Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 1; i. 6, 3; Diog. 140; Cleomed.
Met. pp. 39 and 46; Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 46. Ibid. on the
perfection of this form and its adaptation for motion. Comparing Achil.
Tat. Isag. 130, C, Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 1 (Galen. Hist. Phil. c. 11),
with the passages on p. 201, note 4, it appears probable that Cleanthes
believed in a spherical form of the earth. According to Ach. Tat. Isag.
152, A, who probably has the Stoics in view, the axis of the world
consists of a current of air passing through the centre. On the
division of the heaven into five parallel circles, and that of the
earth into five zones, conf. Diog. 155; Strabo, ii. 2, 3, p. 95.
[468] Stob. i. 392; Simpl. Phys. iii. 6; Diog. 143 and 150.
[469] Diog. 140; Stob. i. 382; Plut. Plac. i. 18, 4; Sext. Math. vii.
214; Theodoret, Cur. Gr. Aff. iv. 14, p. 58; Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i.
21. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 7, observes that motion is possible by means of
ἀντιπερίστασις, without supposing the existence of empty space. A
number of arguments against the existence of empty space may be found
in Cleomed. Met. p. 4.
[470] See p. 168, 1; Cleomed. Met. 2 and 5.
[471] Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 392: The Empty and the Non-Material is
unlimited. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μηδὲν οὐδέν ἐστι πέρας, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ μηδενὸς,
οἷόν ἐστι τὸ κενόν. The Empty could only be bounded by being filled. To
the same effect, Cleomed. p. 6. On the unlimited beyond the world, see
Diog. 140 and 143; Stob. i. 260 and 382; Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 1, p.
1054; C. Not. 30, 2, p. 1073; Plac. i. 18, 4; ii. 9, 2; Theodoret, l.c.
and p. 196, 2. That Posidonius denied the infinity of the Empty has
been already stated, p. 168, 1. Chrysippus, in affirming that the world
occupies the centre of space, was therefore contradicting himself, as
Plut. Def. Or. 28, p. 425, Sto. Rep. 44, 2, observes.
[472] Achil. Tat. Isag. 126, A; 132, A, see p. 200, 1; Stob. i. 408.
According to Stob. i. 442, Plut. C. Not. 30, 2 and 10, p. 1073, Plac.
ii. 1, 6; i. 5, 1, Diog. 143, Sext. Math. ix. 332, Ach. Tat. 129, D,
the Stoics had various names for the world, according as the Empty was
included or excluded in the conception. Including the Empty, it is
called τὸ πᾶν; without it, ὅλον (τὸ ὅλον, τὰ ὅλα, frequently occurs
with the Stoics). The πᾶν, it was said, is neither material nor
immaterial, since it consists of both. Plut. C. Not. l.c.
[473] Diog. 145; Plut. Plac. ii. 14, 1; 22, 3; 27, 1; Stob. i. 516;
540; 554; Ach. Tat. 133, D. Compare the reference to Cleanthes on p.
201, 4, with which, however, the statement in Stob. i. 554, that he
considered the moon πιλοειδὴς (ball-like—the MSS. have πηλοειδῆ) does
not agree.
[474] According to Cic. N. D. ii. 15, 40, Diog. 144, Stob. Ecl. i. 314;
519; 538; 554; 565, Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 1; 21, 13, p. 921, 935, Plac.
ii. 25, 3; 30, 3, Galen, Hist. Phil. 15, Philo, De Somn. 587, B, Achil.
Tat. Isag. 124, D; 133, C, and above p. 200, 3; 162, 2, the stars
generally consist of fire, or, more accurately, of πῦρ τεχνικὸν, or
Ether. The purest fire is in the sun. The moon is a compound of dull
fire and air, or, as it is said, is more earth-like, since (as Plin.
Hist. Nat. ii. 9, 46, without doubt after Stoic teaching, observes)
owing to its proximity to the earth, it takes up earthy particles in
vapour. Perhaps it was owing to this fact that it was said to receive
its light from the sun (Diog. 145), which, according to Posidonius in
Plut. Fac. Lun. 16, 12, p. 929, Cleomed. Met. p. 106, not only
illuminates its surface, but penetrates some depth. Cleomed. 100,
believes that, besides the light of the sun, it has also a light of its
own.
[475] Diog. 145; Stob. i. 532; 538; 554; Floril. 17, 43; Plut. De Is.
41, p. 367; Sto. Rep. 39, 1; Qu. Conv. viii. 8, 2, 4; Plac. ii. 17, 2;
20, 3; 23, 5; Galen, Hist. Phil. 14; Porphyr. Antr. Nymph, c. 11; Cic.
N. D. iii. 14, 37; ii. 15, 40; 46, 118; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16. 2;
Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 36, p. 74 and 56, p. 117; most of whom affirm
that the sun is sustained by vapours from the sea, the moon by those of
fresh water, and the other stars by vapours from the earth. The stars
are also said to owe their origin to such vapours. Chrysippus, in Plut.
Sto. Rep. 41, 3, adds to the passage quoted p. 161, 2: οἱ δ’ ἀστέρες ἐκ
θαλάσσης μετὰ τοῦ ἡλίου ἐνάπτονται. Plut. Ibid. 2: ἔμψυχον ἡγεῖται τὸν
ἥλιον, πύρινον ὄντα καὶ γεγενημένον ἐκ τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως εἰς πῦρ
μεταβαλούσης. Id. C. Not. 46, 2, p. 1084: γεγονέναι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον
ἔμψυχον λέγουσι τοῦ ὑγροῦ μεταβάλλοντος εἰς πῦρ νοερόν.
[476] Stob. i. 532; Cic. l.c.; Macrob. Sat. i. 23, quoting Cleanthes
and Macrobius; Plut. Plac. ii. 23, 5. Diogenes of Apollonia had already
expressed similar views. Further particulars as to the courses of the
stars without anything very peculiar in Stob. i. 448; 538; Plut. Pl.
ii. 15, 2; 16, 1; Diog. 144; Cleomed. Meteor. i. 3. Eclipses are also
discussed by Diog. 145; Stob. i. 538; 560; Plut. Fac. Lun. 19, 12, p.
932; Plac. ii. 29, 5; Cleomed. pp. 106 and 115, nor is there anything
remarkable. Quite in the ordinary way are some observations of
Posidonius and Chrysippus given in Stob. i. 518; Achil Tat. Isag. 132,
B; 165, C. The information—quoted from Posidonius by Cleomed. Meteor.
51; Procl. in Tim. 277, E; Strabo, ii. 5, 14, p. 119—respecting
observations of Canobus have no bearing on our present enquiry.
[477] Stob. i. 554 (Plut. Pl. ii. 26, 1). This statement, however,
appears only to be true of the sun, to which, indeed, it is confined by
Diog. 144. That the sun is much larger than the earth, Posidonius
proved; not only because its light extends over the whole heaven, but
also because of the spherical form of the earth’s shadow in eclipses of
the moon. Diog. l.c.; Macrob. Somn. i. 20; Heracl. Alleg. Hom. c. 46;
Cleomed. Met. ii. 2. According to Cleomed. p. 79, he allowed to it an
orbit 10,000 times as large as the circumference of the earth, with a
diameter of four million stadia. The Stoic, in Cic. N. D. ii. 40, 103,
only calls the moon half that size; and Cleomed. p. 97, probably
following Posidonius, calls it considerably smaller than the earth. The
other stars, according to Cleomed. p. 96, are some of them as large as,
and others larger than, the sun. Posidonius, according to Plin. Hist.
N. ii. 23, 85, estimated the moon’s distance from the earth at two
million, and the sun’s distance from the moon at 500 million stadia. He
estimated the earth’s circumference at 240,000, according to Cleomed.;
at 180,000 according to Strabo, ii. 2, 2, p. 95.
[478] Conf. Stob. i. 66; 441; 518; 532; 538; 554; Floril. 17, 43; Plut.
Sto. Rep 39, 1; 41, 2; C. Not. 46, 2; Plac. ii. 20, 3; Diog. 145;
Phædr. Nat. De. (Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβείας) Col. 3; Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36
and 50; ii. 15, 39 and 42; 16, 43; 21, 54; Acad. ii. 37, 110; Porphyr.
l.c.; Achill. Tat. Isag. c. 13, p. 134, A. Hence, in several of these
passages, the sun is called after Cleanthes and Chrysippus a νοερὸν
ἄναμμα (or ἔξαμμα) ἐκ θαλάσσης.
[479] Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16, discusses the point at length. See also the
quotations on p. 144, 1, from Cic. N. D. ii. 9, and on p. 151, 1, from
Diog. 147.
[480] Diog. vii. 152 and 138, mentions a treatise of his, called
μετεωρολογικὴ or μετεωρολογικὴ στοιχείωσις; also, vii. 135, a treatise
περὶ μετεώρων, in several books. Alexander, in Simpl. Phys. 64, 6,
speaks of an ἐξήγησις μετεωρολογικῶν, which, judging by the title, may
be a commentary on Aristotle’s meteorology. Geminus had made an extract
from this book, a long portion of which on the relation of astronomy
and natural science is there given. Whether these various titles really
belong to these different treatises is not clear. Posidonius is
probably the author of most of the later statements about the Stoic
meteorology. He appears also to be the chief authority for Seneca’s
Naturales Quæstiones, in which he is frequently named (i. 5, 10; 13;
ii. 26, 4; 54, 1; iv. 3, 2; vi. 21, 2; 24, 6; vii. 20, 2; 4),
particularly in his meteorological treatises.
[481] On the Milky Way, which Posidonius, agreeing with Aristotle,
looked upon as a collection of fiery vapours, see Stob. i. 576; Plut.
Plac. iii. 1, 10; Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 15. On the comets, which are
explained in a similar way, Stob. i. 580 (Plac. iii. 2, 8.—Whether the
Diogenes mentioned here who looked upon comets as real stars is
Diogenes the Stoic, or Diogenes of Apollonia, is not clear. The former
is more probable, Boëthus having been just before mentioned); Arrian,
in Stob. i. 584; Diog. vii. 152; and, particularly, Sen. Nat. Qu. vii.
We learn from the latter that Zeno held (vii. 19–21; 30, 2), with
Anaxagoras and Democritus, that comets are formed by several stars
uniting; whereas the majority of the Stoics—and, amongst their number,
Panætius and Posidonius (further particulars in Schol. in Arat. v.
1091)—considered them passing phenomena. Even Seneca declared for the
opinion that they are stars. On the phenomena of light and fire, called
πωγωνίαι, δοκοὶ, etc., see Arrian in Stob. i. 584; Sen. Nat. Qu. i. 1,
14; 15, 4. On σέλας, consult Diog. 153; Sen. i. 15; on halo (ἅλως),
Sen. i. 2; Alex. Aphr. Meteorol. 116; on the rainbow, Diog. 152; Sen.
i. 3–8; on virgæ and parhelia, Sen. i. 9–13; Schol. in Arat. v. 880
(Posidonius); on storms, lightning, thunder, summer lightning,
cyclones, and siroccos, Stob. i. 596; 598 (Plac. iii. 3, 4); Arrian,
Ibid. 602; Sen. ii. 12–31; 51–58 (c. 54, the view of Posidonius); ii.
1, 3; Diog. 153; on rain, sleet, hail, snow, Diog. 153; Sen. iv. 3–12;
on earthquakes, Diog. 154; Plac. iii. 15, 2; Sen. vi. 4–31
(particularly c. 16; 21, 2); also Strabo, ii. 3, 6, p. 102; on winds,
Plac. iii. 7, 2; Sen. v. 1–17; Strabo, i. 2, 21, p. 29; iii. 2, 5, p.
144; on waterspouts, Sen. iii. 1–26; the Nile floods, Ibid. iv. 1;
Strabo, xvii. 1, 5, p. 790; Cleomed. Meteor, p. 32; on tides, Strabo,
i. 3, 12, p. 55; iii. 3, 3, p. 153; 5, 8, p. 73; on seasons, p. 111, 2.
[482] Thus colours are explained as πρῶτοι σχηματισμοὶ τῆς ὕλης (Stob.
i. 364; Plac. i. 15, 5); and sounds are spoken of as undulations in the
air by Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 5; Diog. 158.
[483] Conf. Bake, Posidonii Rhod. Reliquiæ, pp. 87–184; Müller, Fragm.
Hist. Græc. iii. 245.
[484] Sext. Math. ix. 81: τῶν ἡνωμένων (on ἕνωσις see p. 103, 1)
σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψιλῆς ἕξεως συνέχεται, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ φύσεως, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ
ψυχῆς· καὶ ἕξεως μὲν ὡς λίθοι καὶ ξύλα, φύσεως δὲ, καθάπερ τὰ φυτὰ,
ψυχῆς δὲ τὰ ζῷα. Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 12, p. 451: καθόλου δὲ τῶν ὄντων
αὐτοὶ τέ φασι καὶ δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἕξει διοικεῖται τὰ δὲ φύσει,
τὰ δὲ ἀλόγῳ ψυχῇ, τὰ δὲ καὶ λόγον ἐχούσῃ καὶ διάνοιαν. Themist. De An.
72, b; M. Aurel. vi. 14; Philo, Qu. De. S. Immut. 298, D; De Mundo,
1154, E; Leg. Alleg. 1091, D; Incorrupt. M. 947, A; Plotin. Enn. iv. 7,
8, p. 463, C, Bas. 861, Cr. (Otherwise Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 33. See p.
146, 1). Respecting the difference of φύσις and ψυχὴ, φύσις is said to
consist of a moister, colder, and denser πνεῦμα than ψυχή; but, on this
point, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 1; Com. Not. 46, 2; Galen, Hipp. et
Plat. v. 3. Vol. v. 521. Qu. Animi Mores, c. 4. Vol. iv. 783. In Diog.
139, ἕξις and νοῦς, as the highest and lowest links in the series, are
contrasted. Ibid. 156, there is a definition of φύσις = πῦρ τεχνικὸν
ὁδῷ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν; and (148) another = ἕξις ἐξ αὑτῆς κινουμένη
κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὑτῆς ἐν
ὡρισμένοις χρόνοις καὶ τοιαῦτα δρῶσα ἀφ’ οἵων ἀπεκρίθη. It hardly need
be repeated that the force is one and the same, which at one time
appears as ἕξις, at another as φύσις. Conf. Diog. 138; Themist. l.c.;
Sext. Math. ix. 84.
[485] The belief that blood circulates in the veins, spiritus in the
arteries (Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 15, 1), which was shared by the
Peripatetics, deserves to be mentioned here, Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 15, 1;
also the explanations of sleep, death, and age in Plut. Plac. v. 23, 4;
30, 5; the assertion that animals are not only deficient in reason (on
this point see Plut. Solert. An. 2, 9; 6, 1; 11, 2, pp. 960, 963, 967),
but also (according to Chrysippus in Galen, Hippoc. et Plat. iii. 3; v.
1, 6. Vol. v., 309, 429, 431, 476) in emotions (or as Galen also says
in θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία), even in man the emotions being connected with
the rational soul. Posidonius, however, denied this statement (Galen,
p. 476), and Chrysippus believed that animals had a ἡγεμονικόν.
(Chalcid. in Tim. p. 148, b.) He even discovered in the scent of dogs
traces of an unconscious inference. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 69. See also p.
225, 2.
[486] Cleanthes, in Nemes. Nat. Hom. p. 33, and Tert. De An. c. 5:
οὐδὲν ἀσώματον συμπάσχει σώματι οὐδὲ ἀσωμάτῳ σῶμα ἀλλὰ σῶμα σώματι·
συμπάσχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι νοσοῦντι καὶ τεμνομένῳ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ
ψυχῇ· αἰσχυνομένης γοῦν ἐρυθρὸν γίνεται καὶ φοβουμένης ὠχρόν. σῶμα ἄρα
ἡ ψυχή. Chrysippus in Nemes. p. 34: ὁ θάνατός ἐστι χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ
σώματος· οὐδὲν δὲ ἀσώματον ἀπὸ σώματος χωρίζεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται
σώματος ἀσώματον· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐφάπτεται καὶ χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος·
σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. The same is said by Tertullian.
[487] Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 2, p. 30.
[488] Diog. 157; Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 36.
[489] Zeno, in Tertull. l.c., and very nearly the same in Chalcid. in
Tim. p. 306 Meurs.: Quo digresso animal emoritur: consito autem spiritu
digresso animal emoritur: ergo consitus spiritus corpus est, consitus
autem spiritus anima est: ergo corpus est anima. Chrysippus in Chalcid.
l.c.
[490] Cleanthes, in Nemes. l.c. 32: οὐ μόνον ὅμοιοι τοῖς γονεῦσι
γινόμεθα, κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, τοῖς πάθεσι, τοῖς
ἤθεσι, ταῖς διαθέσεσι· σώματος δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον, οὐχὶ δὲ
ἀσώματον· σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. The same in Tertullian, l.c.
[491] Chrysippus in Galen, Hipp. et Plat. iii. 1. Vol. v. 287: ἡ ψυχὴ
πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διῆκον. Zeno. Macrob.
Somn. i. 14: Zenon [dixit animam] concretum corpori spiritum ...
Boëthos (probably the Stoic, not the Peripatetic of the first century,
is meant) ex aëre et igne [sc. constare]. Diog. in Galen, ii. 8, p.
282: τὸ κινοῦν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὰς κατὰ προαίρεσιν κινήσεις ψυχική τίς
ἐστιν ἀναθυμίασις. Cic. Nat. D. iii. 14, 36; Tusc. i. 9, 19; 18, 42:
Zeno considers the soul to be fire; Panætius believes that it is
burning air. Diog. L. vii. 156, on the authority of Zeno, Antipater,
Posidonius, says that it is πνεῦμα σύμφυτον, πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον. Stob.
Ecl. i. 796 (Plut. Plac. iv. 3, 3). Cornut. N. D. p. 8: καὶ γὰρ αἱ
ἡμέτεραι ψυχαὶ πῦρ εἰσι. Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 20, 1: Zeno
calls the soul αἴσθησιν ἢ ἀναθυμίασιν (should be αἰσθητικὴν
ἀναθυμίασιν, conf. § 2 and Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. c. 127: τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ
Στωϊκοὶ ὁρίζονται πνεῦμα συμφυὲς καὶ ἀναθυμίασιν αἰσθητικὴν ἀναπτομένην
ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν σώματι ὑγρῶν). Longin. in Eus. Ibid. 21, 1 and 3. Alex. De
An. 127. b: οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς πνεῦμα αὐτὴν λέγοντες εἶναι συγκείμενόν
πως ἔκ τε πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος. Since, however, every πνεῦμα is not a soul,
a soul is stated to be πνεῦμα πὼς ἔχον (Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 4, p. 458,
E); and the distinctive quality of the soul-element is its greater
warmth and rarity. See Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 2, p. 1052: Chrysippus
considers the ψυχὴ to be ἀραιότερον πνεῦμα τῆς φύσεως καὶ
λεπτομερέστερον. Similarly, Galen, Qu. An. Mores, c. 4. Vol. iv. 783:
The Stoics say that both φύσις and ψυχὴ is πνεῦμα, but that the πνεῦμα
is thick and cold in φύσις, dry and warm in ψυχή.
[492] Chrysippus. See previous note. This diffusion is further
explained by Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 870 and 874, Themist. De Anim. f.
68, a. Plotin. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, c, as being κρᾶσις, i.e. an
intermingling of elements. That the soul forms the bond of union for
the body, and not vice versâ, was a point vindicated by the Stoics
against the Epicureans. Posid. in Achil. Tat. Isag. c. 13, p. 133, E;
Sext. Math. ix. 72.
[493] Galen. Hippocr. et Plat. ii. 8, p. 282, on the authority of Zeno,
Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Diogenes; Longin. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 21, 3;
M. Aurel. v. 33; vi. 15; Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. 127.
[494] Zeno described the seed as πνεῦμα μεθ’ ὑγροῦ ψυχῆς μέρος καὶ
ἀπόσπασμα ... μῖγμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν (Arius Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev.
xv. 20, 1), or as σύμμιγμα καὶ κέρασμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων (Plut.
Coh. Ir. 15). Similarly Chrysip., in Diog. 159. Conf. Tertullian, De
An. c. 27. According to Sphærus, in Diog. 159, the seed is formed by
separation from all parts of the body and can consequently produce all,
as Democritus had already said. Panætius (in Cic. Tusc. i. 31, 79)
proves, from the mental similarity, between parents and children, that
the soul comes into existence by generation. For the mother’s share in
producing the soul, see Ar. Did. l.c. See above p. 127, 5.
[495] Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 1 and 8, p. 1052; C. Not. 46, 2, p. 1084. De
Primo Frig. 2, 5, p. 946: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα λέγουσιν ἐν τοῖς
σώμασι τῶν βρεφῶν τῇ περιψύξει στομοῦσθαι καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐκ φύσεως
γενέσθαι ψυχήν. Similarly, Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, c. Conf.
Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. c. 21, p. 40; Tertull. De An. c. 25. Plutarch
(Plac. v. 16, 2; 17, 1; 24, 1) draws attention to the inconsistency of
saying that the animal soul, which is warmer and rarer than the
vegetable soul, has been developed of it there by cooling and
condensation.
[496] On this point, the Stoics were not altogether agreed. Some (not
all, as Plut. Pl. Phil. iv. 21, 5, asserts) made the brain the seat of
the soul, in proof of which they appealed to the story of the birth of
Pallas. Sext. Math. ix. 119; Diog. in Phædr. Fragm. De Nat. De. col. 6.
Conf. Krische, Forschungen, i. 488, and Chrysipp. in Galen, l.c. iii.
8, p. 349. It appears, however, from Galen, l.c. i. 6, ii. 2 and 5,
iii. 1, pp. 185, 214, 241, 287, Tertull. De An. c. 15, that the most
distinguished Stoics—Zeno, Chrysippus, Diogenes, and
Apollodorus—decided in favour of the heart. The chief proof is, that
the voice does not come from the hollow of the skull, but from the
breast. Chrysippus was aware of the weakness of this proof, but still
did not shrink from using it. Galen, l.c. p. 254, 261. At the same
time, he also appealed to the fact (ii. 7, 268; iii. 1, 290, c. 5, 321,
c. 7, 335, 343; iv. 1, 362) that, by universal assent, supported by
numerous passages from the poets, the motions of the will and the
feelings proceed from the heart.
[497] Aristotle had assigned no particular organ of the body to reason.
[498] Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 2. Ibid, c. 21: The Stoics consider the
ἡγεμονικὸν to be the highest part of the soul; it begets the φαντασίαι,
συγκαταθέσεις, αἰσθήσεις, and ὁρμαὶ, and is by them called λογισμός;
from it the seven divisions of the soul reach to the body, like the
arms of a cuttle-fish, and are therefore collectively defined as πνεῦμα
διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοὺ ἡγεμονικοῦ (μέχρις ὀφθαλμῶν, ὤτων, μυκτήρων, γλώττης,
ἐπιφανείας, παραστάτων, φάρυγγος γλώττης καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων).
Galen, l.c. iii. 1, 287. See p. 215, 2; Diog. 110 and 157; Porphyr. and
Iamblich. in Stob. i. 836, 874, and 878; Chalcid. in Tim. 307;
Nicomachus, in Iambl. Theol. Arith. p. 50. But there was no universal
agreement among the Stoics on this subject. According to Tertull. De
An. 14, Zeno only admitted three divisions of the soul, whilst some
among the later Stoics enumerated as many as ten; Panætius only held
six, and Posidonius went still further away from the view current among
the Stoics. The remarks of Stob. i. 828, probably refer to the
Peripatetic Aristo.
[499] See p. 73, 2.
[500] Conf. Cleanth. Hymn 4:
ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν ἰῆς μίμημα λαχόντες
μοῦνοι, ὅσα ζώει τε καὶ ἕρπει θνήτ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν.
[501] See p. 214, 2 and Chrys. in Galen, l.c. iii. 1, p. 287. Conf. p.
211, 5: ταύτης οὖν [τῆς ψυχῆς] τῶν μερῶν ἑκάστῳ διατεταγμένον [ων]
μορίῳ, τὸ διῆκον αὐτῆς εἰς τὴν τραχεῖαν ἀρτηρίαν φωνὴν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἰς
ὀφθαλμοὺς ὄψιν, κ.τ.λ. καὶ τὸ εἰς ὄρχεις, ἕτερόν τιν’ ἔχον τοιοῦτον
λόγον, σπερματικὸν, εἰς ὃ δὲ συμβαίνει πάντα ταῦτα, ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ εἶναι,
μέρος ὂν αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 2: τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἀφ’
οὗ ταῦτα πάντα ἐπιτέτακται [= ταται] διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων προσφερῶς
ταῖς τοῦ πολύποδος πλεκτάναις. Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 102. Alex. Aphr.
(De An. 146) therefore denies the Stoical assertion, that the ψυχικὴ
δύναμις is only one, and that every activity of the soul is only the
action of the πὼς ἔχον ἡγεμονικόν. Conversely Tertullian, De An. 14,
speaking quite after the manner of a Stoic, says: Hujusmodi autem non
tam partes animæ habebuntur, quam vires et efficaciæ et operæ ... non
enim membra sunt substantiæ animalis, sed ingenia (capacities). Iambl.
in Stob. i. 874: The powers of the soul bear, according to the Stoics,
the same relation to the soul that qualities bear to the substance;
their difference is partly owing to the diffusion of the πνεύματα, of
which they consist, in different parts of the body, partly to the union
of several qualities in one subject-matter, the latter being necessary,
for ἡγεμονικὸν to include φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις, ὁρμὴ, and λόγος.
[502] Plut. Virt. Mort. c. 3, p. 441, speaking of Zeno, Aristo, and
Chrysippus: νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾷ τινι
καὶ φύσει ψυχῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
μέρος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικὸν, διόλου τρεπόμενον καὶ
μεταβάλλον ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς κατὰ ἕξιν ἢ διάθεσιν μεταβολαῖς
κακίαν τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Plac.
Phil. iv. 21, 1. Galen, l.c. iv. 1, p. 364: Chrysippus sometimes speaks
as if he admitted a distinct δύναμις ἐπιθυμητικὴ or θυμοειδής; at other
times, as if he denied it. The latter is clearly his meaning. Ibid. v.
6, 476: ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος οὐθ’ ἕτερον εἶναι νομίζει τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς
τοῦ λογιστικοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἀφαιρεῖται τὰ πάθη. See p. 209, 1.
Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 890; Diog. vii. 159. Orig. c. Cels. v. 47: τοὺς
ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀρνουμένους τὸ τριμερὲς τῆς ψυχῆς. Posidonius (in Galen,
l.c. 6, 476) endeavours to prove that Cleanthes held a different view,
by a passage in which he contrasts θυμὸς with λόγος—but this is making
a rhetorical flourish do duty for a philosophic statement.
[503] Chrys. (in Galen, ii. 2, 215): οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν κατὰ
τοῦτο (the primary power in the breast) δεικνύντες αὑτοὺς ἐν τῷ
ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι.
[504] Cleanthes, v. 4, p. 215, 1. Epictet. Diss. i. 14, 6: αἱ ψυχαὶ
συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα. Id. ii. 8, 11.
M. Aurel. ii. 4, v. 27, calls the soul μέρος ἀπόρροια, ἀπόσπασμα θεοῦ;
and, xii. 26, even calls the human νοῦς θεός. Sen. Ep. 41, 2: Sacer
intra nos spiritus sedet ... in unoquoque virorum bonorum, quis Deus
incertum est, habitat Deus. Id. Ep. 66, 12. Ratio autem nihil aliud est
quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa. Consequently,
reason, thought, and virtue are of the same nature in the human soul as
in the soul of the universe, as Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 886, states as
a Stoic view. From this relationship to God, Posidonius deduces in a
well-known simile (see p. 84, 1) the soul’s capacity for studying
nature, and Cicero (De Leg. 1. 8, 24) the universality of a belief in
God. All souls, as being parts of the divine mind, may be collectively
regarded as one soul or reason. Marc. Aurel. ix. 8: εἰς μὲν τὰ ἄλογα
ζῷα μία ψυχὴ διῄρηται· εἰς δὲ τὰ λογικὰ μία λογικὴ ψυχὴ μεμέρισται.
xii. 30: ἓν φῶς ἡλίου, κἂν διείργηται τοίχοις, ὄρεσιν, ἄλλοις μυρίοις·
μία οὐσία κοινὴ, κἂν διείργηται ἰδίως ποιοῖς σώμασι μυρίοις· μία ψυχὴ,
κἂν φύσεσι διείργηται μυρίαις καὶ ἰδίαις περιγραφαῖς. This oneness,
however, must, as the comparison shows, be understood in the sense of
the Stoic realism: the universal soul, in the sense of ethereal
substance, is the element of which individual souls consist. See also
Marc. Aurel. viii. 54.
[505] In this sense, Sen. Ep. 31, 11, calls the animus rectus, bonus,
magnus, a Deus in corpore humano hospitans.
[506] Further particulars, p. 174, 180, 189.
[507] See p. 179.
[508] See p. 88, 1.
[509] Diog. 156; Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 31. 2, p. 1107; Plac. iv. 7, 2;
Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Præp. Ev. xv. 20, 3; Sen. Consol. ad Marc. c. 26,
7; Ep. 102, 22; 117, 6; Cic. Tusc. i. 31, 77. Seneca (ad Polyb. 9, 2;
Ep. 65, 24; 71, 16; 36, 9, and in Tertull. De An. c. 42; Resurr. Carn.
3. 1) and M. Aurelius (iii. 3; vii. 32; viii. 25, 58) are only speaking
κατ’ ἄνθρωπον, in seeming to doubt a future life after death, in order
to dispel the fear of death in every case. It is, however, a mistake of
Tiedemann (Sto. Phil. ii. 155) to suppose that they, in many passages
(Sen. Ep. 71, 102, M. Aur. ii. 17; v. 4, 13), supposed the immediate
dissolution of the soul after death. It is, on the contrary, clear,
from M. Aurel. iv. 14, 21, that the soul lives some time after death,
and is not resolved into the world-soul till the general conflagration.
But even this is a variation from the ordinary view of the Stoics.
According to Seneca (Consol. ad Marciam) the souls of the good, as in
the doctrine of purgatory, undergo a purification, before they are
admitted to the ranks of the blessed; and here this purification is no
doubt required on physical grounds. When the soul is purified, both in
substance and morals, it rises up to the ether, and there, according to
M. Aurelius, united to the σπερματικὸς λόγος τῶν ὅλων, it lives,
according to the common view, until the end of the world. The ether is
also allotted to the blessed, for their residence, by Cic. Tusc. i. 18,
42; Lactant. Inst. vii. 20; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi. 31, 2, p. 1107. The
souls, as Cicero remarks, penetrating the thick lower air, mount to
heaven, until they reach an atmosphere (the juncti ex anima tenui et
ardore solis temperato ignes) congenial with their own nature. Here
they naturally stop, and are fed by the same elements as the stars.
According to Chrysippus (in Eustath. on Il. xxiii. 65), they there
assume the spherical shape of the stars. According to Tertull. De An.
54, conf. Lucan. Phars. ix. 5, their place is under the moon. Zeno, in
speaking of the islands of the blest (Lact. Inst. vii. 7, 20), probably
only desired to enlist popular opinion in his own favour. The souls of
the foolish and bad also last some time after death; only, as being
weaker, they do not last until the end of the world (Ar. Did.;
Theodoret. Cur. Gr. Affec. v. 23, p. 73); and meantime, as it is
distinctly asserted by Sen. Ep. 117, 6, Tertullian, and Lactantius,
they are punished in the nether world. Tertullian in placing a portion
of the souls of the foolish in the region of the earth, and there
allowing them to be instructed by the wise, is probably referring to
the purification mentioned by Seneca. For the supposed transmigration
of souls see p. 166, 2.
[510] The peculiar notion mentioned by Seneca (Ep. 57, 7) as belonging
to the Stoics—animam hominis magno pondere extriti permanere non posse
et statim spargi, quia non fuerit illi exitus liber—was not required by
their principles, as Seneca already observed. It belongs, in fact, only
to individual members of that School.
[511] Conf. Baur, Seneca und Paulus, in Hilgenfeld’s Zeitschrift für
wissensch. Theol. i. 2, 221.
[512] Ep. 102, 22: Cum venerit dies ille, qui mixtum hoc divini
humanique secernat, corpus hic, ubi inveni, relinquam, ipse me Dis
reddam ... per has mortalis vitæ moras illi meliori vitæ longiorique
proluditur. As a child in its mother’s womb, sic per hoc spatium, quod
ab infantia patet in senectutem, in alium maturescimus partum. All we
possess, and the body itself, is only the baggage, which we neither
brought into the world, nor can carry away with us. Dies iste, quem
tanquam extremum reformidas, æterni natalis est. Ep. 120, 14: The body
is breve hospitium, which a noble soul does not fear to lose. Scit
enim, quo exiturus sit, qui, unde venerit, meminit. Conf. Ep. 65, 16.
[513] Consol. ad Marc. 24, 3: Imago dumtaxat filii tui periit ... ipse
quidem æternus meliorisque nunc status est, despoliatus oneribus
alienis et sibi relictus. The body is only a vessel, enveloping the
soul in darkness: nititur illo, unde dimissus est; ibi illum æterna
requies manet. Ibid. 26, 7: Nos quoque felices animæ et æterna sortitæ.
Ibid. 19, 6: Excessit filius tuus terminos intra quos servitur: excepit
illum magna et æterna pax. No fear or care, no desire, envy, or
compassion disturbs him. Ibid. 26, 5. Consol. ad Polyb. 9, 3, 8: Nunc
animus fratris mei velut ex diutino carcere emissus, tandem sui juris
et arbitrii, gestit et rerum naturæ spectaculo fruitur ... fruitur nunc
aperto et libero cœlo ... et nunc illic libere vagatur omniaque rerum
naturæ bona cum summa voluptate perspicit. Ep. 79, 12: Tunc animus
noster habebit, quod gratuletur sibi, cum emissus his tenebris ...
totum diem admiserit, et cœlo redditus suo fuerit. Ep. 102, 28:
Aliquando naturæ tibi arcana retegentur, discutietur ista caligo et lax
undique clara percutiet, which Seneca then further expands.
[514] In Consol. ad Marc. 26, 1, Seneca describes how, the time of
purification ended, the deceased one inter felices currit animas (the
addition: excepit illum cœtus sacer Hanse rightly treats as a gloss)
and how his grandfather shows him the hall of heaven. Ibid. 26, 3.
[515] Ep. 26, 4: Velut adpropinquet experimentum et ille laturus
sententiam de omnibus annis meis dies ... quo, remotis strophis ac
fucis, de me judicaturus sum. Compare the hora decretoria, Ep. 102, 24.
[516] Ep. 102, 29: Hæc cogitatio (that of heaven and a future life)
nihil sordidum animo subsidere sinit, nihil humile, nihil crudele. Deos
rerum omnium esse testes ait: illis nos adprobari, illis in futurum
parari jubet et æternitatem menti proponere.
[517] Ep. 36, 10: Mors ... intermittit vitam, non eripit: veniet iterum
qui nos in lucem reponat dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos
reduceret. Sed postea diligentius docebo omnia, quæ videntur perire,
mutari. Æquo animo debet rediturus exire. The souls cannot return,
according to the Stoic teaching, until after the general conflagration,
presuming that the same persons will be found in the future world as in
the present. See p. 166, 2. As long as the world lasts, the better
souls will continue to exist, and only the particles of the body are
employed for fresh bodies. Accordingly, the passage just quoted, and
also Ep. 71, 13, must refer to the physical side of death, or else to
the return of personality after the conflagration of the world.
[518] Besides the definitions of αἴσθησις in Diog. 52, and the remark
that impressions are made on the organs of sense, but that the seat of
feeling is in the ἡγεμονικόν (Plut. Plac. iv. 23, 1), the following
statements may be mentioned: In the process of seeing, the ὁρατικὸν
πνεῦμα, coming into the eyes from the ἡγεμονικόν, gives a spherical
form to the air before the eye, by virtue of its τονικὴ κίνησις (on
τόνος, see p. 128, 2), and, by means of the sphere of air, comes in
contact with things; and since by this process rays of light emanate
from the eye, darkness must be visible. Diog. 158; Alex. Aph. De Anim.
149; Plut. Plac. iv. 15. The process of hearing is due to the spherical
undulations of the air, which communicate their motion to the ear.
Diog. 158; Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 5. On the voice, called also φωνᾶεν, see
Plut. Plac. iv. 20, 2; 21, 4; Diog. 55, and above p. 214, 2; 74, 6.
Disease is caused by changes in the πνεῦμα, Diog. 158; sleep ἐκλυομένου
τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ τόνου περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, Diog. 158; Tertull. De An. 43;
and in a similar way, death ἐκλυομένου τοῦ τόνου καὶ παριεμένου Iambl.
(in Stob. Ecl. i. 922), who, however, does not mention the Stoics by
name. In the case of man, the extinguishing of the power of life is
only a liberation of rational souls.
[519] Page 77.
[520] The chief passage in Diog. vii. 84, is as follows: τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν
μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε τὸν περὶ ὁρμῆς καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ
ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τόπον καὶ τὸν περὶ παθῶν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ
τέλους περί τε τῆς πρώτης ἀξίας καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων
προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν. καὶ οὕτω δ’ ὑποδιαιροῦσιν οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον
καὶ Ἀρχέδημον καὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Ταρσέα καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρον καὶ Διογένην καὶ
Ἀντίπατρον καὶ Ποσειδώνιον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κιττιεὺς Ζήνων καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης ὡς
ἂν ἀρχαιότεροι ἀφελέστερον περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διέλαβον. There may be
doubts as to the punctuation, and, consequently, as to the sense, of
the first sentence; but the form of expression seems to imply that the
five first portions contain main divisions, and the six following
subdivisions. The ethics of Chrysippus and his followers would
therefore fall into the following main divisions: περὶ ὁρμῆς, περὶ
ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ παθῶν; but it would be hard to assign to these
divisions their respective subdivisions. The statement of Epictetus,
Diss. iii. 2, agrees in part with this division. He distinguishes in
his introduction to virtue three τόποι: ὁ περὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς
ἐκκλίσεις, called also ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη; ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς καὶ
ἁπλῶς ὁ περὶ τὸ καθῆκον; and, lastly, ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀνεξαπατησίαν καὶ
ἀνεικαιότητα καὶ ὅλως ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις. The first of these
divisions would correspond with the third of Diogenes, the second with
his first; but the division περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν does not harmonise
with the third of Epictetus (which, according to what follows, rather
refers to the critical confirmation of moral principles not specially
mentioned by Diogenes), but rather with his first division treating of
ὀρέξεις and ἐκκλίσεις. Stobæus again differs from either. In his survey
of the Stoic ethics (Ecl. ii. c. 5), he first, p. 90, treats of what is
good, evil, and indifferent, of what is desirable and detestable, of
the end-in-chief, and of happiness, in this section discussing at
length the doctrine of virtue. He then goes on, p. 158, to consider the
καθῆκον, the impulses, p. 166, and the emotions (πάθη, as being one
kind of impulse), appending thereto, p. 186, a discussion on
friendship; and concluding, p. 192 to 242, with a long treatise on
ἐνεργήματα (κατορθώματα, ἁμαρτήματα, οὐδέτερα), the greater portion of
which is devoted to describing the wise man and the fool. Turning to
Sen. Ep. 95, 65, it is stated, on the authority of Posidonius, that not
only præceptio, but also suasio, consolatio, and exhortatio, and,
moreover, causarum inquisitio (which, however, can hardly have been
called etymologia by Posidonius, as Hanse reads but ætiologia) and
ethologia, description of moral states, are necessary. In Ep. 89, 14,
the parts of moral science are more accurately given as three; the
first determining the value of things, the second treating de
actionibus, the third de impetu, περὶ ὁρμῆς. Two of these parts
coincide indeed with those of Diogenes, but this is not the case with
the third, which is only one of the subdivisions in Diogenes (περὶ τῶν
πράξεων); and even Seneca’s first part more nearly agrees with one of
these (περὶ τῆς πρώτης ἀξίας). Unfortunately, Seneca does not mention
his authorities; and, accordingly, we are not sure whether his division
is a genuine Stoic division. A similar division will be subsequently
met with in the eclectic Academician Eudorus (living under Augustus).
None of the divisions quoted agree with the three problems proposed by
Cic. Off. ii. 5, 18, or the three sections enumerated by Epict. Enchir.
c. 51 (76), in which Petersen (Phil. Chrys. Fund. p. 260) recognises
Seneca’s three main divisions of Ethics. In the midst of such
contending authorities, it seems impossible to establish the main
division of the Stoic Ethics. One thing alone is clear, that they were
themselves not agreed on the subject. Petersen’s attempt, l.c. p. 258,
appears to me a failure.
[521] Stob. Ecl. ii. 138: τέλος δέ φασιν εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὗ ἕνεκα
πάντα πράττεται, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται μὲν, οὐδενὸς δὲ ἕνεκα.
[522] Diog. vii. 85; Cic. Fin. iii. 5; Gell. N. A. xii. 5, 7. That the
two latter writers follow one and the same authority appears partly
from their literal agreement with each other, and partly from their
adopting a uniform method in refuting the Epicurean statement, that the
desire for pleasure is the primary impulse. That authority is probably
the treatise of Chrysippus περὶ τέλους, since it is distinctly referred
to by Diogenes. Plut. Sto. Rep. 12, 4, quotes from it: ὡς οἰκειούμεθα
πρὸς αὑτοὺς εὐθὺς γενόμενοι καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὰ ἔκγονα ἑαυτῶν. The
difference mentioned by Alex. Aphr. De An. 154—that at one time
self-love, at another the preservation of one’s own nature, is the
impulse—is unimportant.
[523] Diog. vii 85: τὴν δὲ πρώτην ὁρμήν φασι τὸ ζῷον ἴσχειν ἐπὶ τὸ
τηρεῖν ἑαυτὸ, οἰκειούσης αὑτῶ [αὑτῷ] τῆς φύσεως ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, καθά φησιν ὁ
Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τελῶν, πρῶτον οἰκεῖον εἶναι λέγων παντὶ ζῴῳ
τὴν αὑτοῦ σύστασιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἀλλοτριῶσαι
εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοῦ [Cobet incorrectly αὐτὸ] τὸ ζῷον, οὔτε ποιῆσαι ἂν [l.
ποιήσασαν sc. τὴν φύσιν] αὐτὸ μήτ’ ἀλλοτριῶσαι μήτ’ οὐκ [must evidently
be struck out] οἰκειῶσαι. ἀπολείπεται τοίνυν λέγειν συστησαμένην αὐτὸ
οἰκείως πρὸς ἑαυτό· οὕτω γὰρ τά τε βλάπτοντα διωθεῖται καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα
προσίεται. Similarly, Cic. l.c. 5, 16. Antisthenes had already reduced
the conception of the good to that of οἰκεῖον, without the fuller
explanation. Here the Academic theory of life according to nature,
which had been enunciated by Polemo, Zeno’s teacher, is combined
therewith. Some difficulty was nevertheless caused by the question
whether all living creatures possess a consciousness (συνείδησις,
sensus) of their own nature; without such a consciousness, natural
self-love seemed to the Stoics impossible. They thought, however, that
this question (according to Sen. Ep. 121, 5, conf. Cic. l.c.) could be
answered in the affirmative without hesitation, and appealed for
evidence to the instinctive activities by which children and animals
govern their bodily motions, guard themselves from dangers, and pursue
what is to their interest, without denying that the ideas which
children and animals have of themselves are very indistinct, that they
only know their own constitution, but not its true conception
(constitutionis finitio, Sen. p. 11). Constitutio, or σύστασις, was
defined by the Stoics, Sen., p. 10. as principale animi quodam modo se
habens erga corpus.
[524] Cic. Fin. iii. 5, 17; 6, 20.
[525] The terms are here treated as synonymous, without regard to the
hair-splitting with which the Stoics distinguished (Stob. Ecl. ii. 136)
three meanings of τέλος, between τέλος and σκοπός.
[526] Stob. ii. 134 and 138; Diog. vii. 88; 94; Plut. C. Not. 27, 9;
Cic. Fin. iii. 7, 26; 10, 33; Sen. V. Beat. 3, 3; conf. Ep. 118, 8;
Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 171; Math. xi. 30. In Stob. ii. 78 and 96, formal
definitions are given of ἀγαθὸν, τέλος, and εὐδαιμονία. The latter is
generally paraphrased by εὔροια βίου, as Zeno had defined it. Various
formulæ for the conception of a life according to nature are given by
Cleanthes, Antipater, Archedemus, Diogenes, Panætius, Posidonius, and
others in Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. 416; Stob. 134; and Diog., all
apparently taken from the same source.
[527] Diog. vii. 88: διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῇν·
ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατά τε τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων, οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὧν
ἀπαγορεύειν εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινὸς ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ
πάντων ἐρχόμενος ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διΐ ... εἶναι δ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ
εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὔροιαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν
συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ’ ἑκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλων διοικητοῦ
βούλησιν.
[528] Stob. ii. 160 (conf. 158): διττῶς θεωρεῖσθαι τήν τε ἐν τοῖς
λογικοῖς γιγνομένην ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῷοις. Diog. 86:
Plants are moved by nature without impulse, animals by means of
impulse. In the case of animals, therefore, τὸ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν is the
same as τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὁρμήν. In rational creatures, reason controls
impulse; and accordance with nature means accordance with reason. In
Galen. Hippoc. et Plat. v. 2, p. 460, Chrysippus says: ἡμᾶς οἰκειοῦσθαι
πρὸς μόνον τὸ καλόν. M. Aurel. vii. 11: τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις
κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ λόγον. Hence the definition of a virtuous
life, or a life according to nature: ζῇν κατ’ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει
συμβαινόντων (Chrysippus, in Stob. 134; Diog. 87; Clem. l.c.; also
Diogenes, Antipater, Archedemus, Posidonius); and that of the good: τὸ
τέλειον κατὰ φύσιν λογικοῦ ὡς λογικοῦ (Diog. 94).
[529] Sen. Ep. 121, 14: Omne animal primum constitutioni suæ
conciliari: hominis autem constitutionem rationalem esse: et ideo
conciliari hominem sibi non tanquam animali sed tanquam rationali. Ea
enim parte sibi carus est homo, qua homo est. Id. Ep. 92, 1: The body
is subservient to the soul, and the irrational part of the soul to the
rational part. Hence it follows: In hoc uno positam esse beatam vitam.
ut in nobis ratio perfecta sit. Similarly. Ep. 76, 8. M. Aurel. vi. 44:
συμφέρει δὲ ἑκάστῳ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κατασκευὴν καὶ φύσιν· ἡ δὲ ἐμὴ
φύσις λογικὴ καὶ πολιτική. Conf. viii. 7 and 12.
[530] According to Stob. ii. 132, Diog. vii. 89, the ancient Stoics
were not altogether agreed as to the terms in which they would express
their theory. Zeno, for instance, is said by Stobæus to have defined
τέλος = ὁμολογουμένως ζῇν; Cleanthes first added the words τῇ φύσει,
and Chrysippus and his followers augmented the formula by several
additions. Diog. 87 attributes the words τῇ φύσει to Zeno, adding,
however, 89, that Chrysippus understood by φύσις, τήν τε κοινὴν καὶ
ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην, whereas Cleanthes understood τὴν κοίνην μόνην
οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους. These differences are, however, not
important. The simple expression ὁμολογουμένως ζῇν means, without
doubt, ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ, the ζῇν καθ’ ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον (Stob. ii.
132 and 158), the ὁμολογία παντὸς τοῦ βίου (Diog. vii. 89), the vita
sibi concors, the concordia animi (Sen. Ep. 89, 15; V. Be. 8, 6), the
unum hominem agere, which, according to Sen. Ep. 120, 22, is only found
in a wise man—in a word, the even tenour of life and consistency.
Nevertheless, this consistency is only possible when individual actions
accord with the requirements of the character of the agent.
Accordingly, Stob. ii. 158, places ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει by the
side of ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ. Cleanthes, therefore, in adding to the
expression ὁμολογουμένως the words τῇ φύσει, which, however, according
to Diog. 87, Zeno had done before him, was only going back to the next
condition of ὁμολογουμένως ζῇν. We can, however, hardly believe with
Diogenes that Cleanthes understood by φύσις only nature in general, but
not human nature. He may have alluded in express terms to κοινὴ φύσις
or κοινὸς νόμος only, with the praise of which his well-known hymn
ends, but it cannot have been his intention to exclude human nature,
which is only a particular form of nature in general. Chrysippus
therefore only expanded, but did not contradict, the teaching of his
master.
[531] Diog. vii. 30; 94; 101; Stob. ii. 200; 138; Sext. Pyrrh. iii.
169; Math. xi. 184; Cic. Tusc. ii. 25, 61; Fin. iv. 16, 45; Acad. i.
10; Parad. 1; Sen. Benef. vii. 2, 1; Ep. 71, 4; 74, 1; 76, 11; 85, 17;
120, 3; 118, 10, where the relation of the conceptions honestum bonum,
secundum naturam is specially considered. To prove their position, the
Stoics make use of the chain-argument, of which they are generally
fond. Thus Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 11): τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἱρετόν·
τὸ δ’ αἱρετὸν ἀρεστόν· τὸ δ’ ἀρεστὸν ἐπαινετόν· τὸ δ’ ἐπαινετὸν καλόν.
(The same in Cic. Fin. iii. 8, 27, and iv. 18, 50, where I would
suggest the reading validius instead of vitiosius.). Again: τὸ ἀγαθὸν
χαρτόν· τὸ δὲ χαρτὸν σεμνόν· τὸ δὲ σεμνὸν καλόν (The same somewhat
expanded in Cic. Tusc. v. 15, 43.) Stob. ii. 126: πᾶν ἀγαθὸν αἱρετὸν
εἶναι, ἀρεστὸν γὰρ καὶ δοκιμαστὸν καὶ ἐπαινετὸν ὑπάρχειν· πᾶν δὲ κακὸν
φευκτὸν. Another sorites of the same kind in Sen. Ep. 85, 2.
[532] Stob. ii. 78; 94; Diog. vii. 94 and 98; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169;
Math. xi. 22, 25, and 30. According to Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 33, Diogenes
reconciled this definition with the definition of the good and the
perfect quoted on p. 227, 4, by observing that the useful is a motus
aut status natura absoluti.
[533] Sext. l.c. Stob. ii. 188: μηδένα φαῦλον μήτε ὠφελεῖσθαι μήτε
ὠφελεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἴσχειν κατ’ ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι
κινεῖσθαι κατ’ ἀρετήν. Ibid. ii. 202; Plut. Sto. Rep. 12; Com. Not. 20,
1; Cic. Off. ii. 3, 10; iii. 3, 11; 7, 34.
[534] M. Aurel. ix. 16.
[535] See Diog. 94; Stob. ii. 96; 124; 130; 136; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169;
Math. xi. 22; Cic. Fin. iii. 16, 55; Sen. Ep. 66, 5. Good is here
defined to be either ὠφέλεια or οὐκ ἕτερον ὠφελείας (inseparably
connected with ὠφέλεια, the good in itself, just as the virtuous man is
connected with virtue, which is a part of himself. See Sextus l.c. and
above p. 104, 2), or, what is the same thing, ἀρετὴ ἢ τὸ μετέχον
ἀρετῆς. (Sext. Math. xi. 184.) A distinction is drawn between three
kinds of good: τὸ ὑφ’ οὗ ἢ ἀφ’ οὗ ἔστιν ὠφελεῖσθαι, τὸ καθ’ ὃ συμβαίνει
ὠφελεῖσθαι, τὸ οἷόν τε ὠφελεῖν. Under the first head comes virtue,
under the second virtuous actions, under the third, besides the two
others, virtuous subjects—men, Gods, and demons. A second division of
goods (Diog., Sext. iii. 181, Stob.) is into goods of the soul,
external goods, the possession of virtuous friends and a virtuous
country, and such as are neither (τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι σπουδαῖον καὶ
εὐδαίμονα, virtue and happiness considered as the relation of the
individual to himself, as his own possessions). Goods of the soul are
then divided into διαθέσεις (virtues), ἕξεις (or ἐπιτηδεύματα, as
instances of which Stob. ii. 100, 128, quotes μαντικὴ and
φιλογεωμετρία, &c.; these are not so unchangeable as peculiarities of
character, and are therefore only ἕξεις, p. 103, 1), and those which
are neither ἕξεις nor διαθέσεις—actions themselves. A third division of
goods (Diog., Cic. l.c., Stob. 80, 100, 114) distinguishes τελικὰ or
δι’ αὑτὰ αἱρετὰ (moral actions), ποιητικὰ (friends and the services
they render), τελικὰ and ποιητικὰ (virtues themselves); fourthly and
fifthly, μικτὰ (as εὐτεκνία and εὐγηρία), and ἁπλᾶ or ἄμικτα (such as
science), and the ἀεὶ παρόντα (virtues), and οὐκ ἀεὶ παρόντα (οἷον
χαρὰ, περιπάτησις). The corresponding divisions of evil are given by
Diogenes and Stobæus. The latter (ii. 126 and 136) enumerates, in
addition, the ἀγαθὰ ἐν κινήσει (χαρὰ, &c.) and ἐν σχέσει (εὔτακτος
ἡσυχία, &c.), the latter being partially ἐν ἕξει; the ἀγαθὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ
(virtues) and πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα (honour, benevolence, friendship); the
goods which are necessary for happiness (virtues), and those which are
not necessary (χαρὰ, ἐπιτηδεύματα). Seneca’s list is far more limited,
although it professes to be more general. He mentions, prima bona,
tanquam gaudium, pax, salus patriæ; secunda, in materia infelici
expressa, tanquam tormentorum patientia; tertia, tanquam modestus
incessus.
[536] Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 33: Ego assentior Diogeni, qui bonum
definierit id quod esset natura absolutum [αὐτοτελὲς] ... hoc autem
ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris comparando
sed propria vi et sentimus et appellamus bonum. Ut enim mel, etsi
dulcissimum est, suo tamen proprio genere saporis, non comparatione cum
aliis, dulce esse sentitur, sic bonum hoc de quo agimus est illud
quidem plurimi æstimandum, sed ea æstimatio genere valet non
magnitudine, &c.
[537] Sen. Benef. vii. 2, 1: Nec malum esse ullum nisi turpe, nec bonum
nisi honestum. Alex. Aph. De Fat. c. 28, p. 88: ἡ μὲν ἀρετή τε καὶ ἡ
κακία μόναι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἡ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἡ δὲ κακόν. See p. 229; 233, 1.
[538] Sext. Math. xi. 61, after giving two irrelevant definitions of
ἀδιάφορον: κατὰ τρίτον δὲ καὶ τελευταῖον τρόπον φασὶν ἀδιάφορον τὸ μήτε
πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συλλαμβανόμενον. To this
category belong external goods, health, &c. ᾧ γὰρ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς
χρῆσθαι, τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη ἀδιάφορον· διὰ παντὸς δ’ ἀρετῇ μὲν κακῶς, κακίᾳ
δὲ κακῶς, ὑγιείᾳ δὲ καὶ τοῖς περὶ σώματι ποτὲ μὲν εὖ ποτὲ δὲ κακῶς ἔστι
χρῆσθαι. Similarly, Pyrrh. iii. 177, and Diog. 102, who defines
οὐδέτερα as ὅσα μήτ’ ὠφελεῖ μήτε βλάπτει. Stob. ii. 142: ἀδιάφορον = τὸ
μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν, καὶ τὸ μήτε αἱρετὸν μήτε φευκτόν. Plut. Sto.
Rep. 31, 1: ᾧ γὰρ ἔστιν εὖ χρήσασθαι καὶ κακῶς τοῦτό φασι μήτ’ ἀγαθὸν
εἶναι μήτε κακόν.
[539] Zeno (in Sen. Ep. 82, 9) proves this of death by a process of
reasoning, the accuracy of which he appears to have mistrusted: Nullum
malum gloriosum est: mors autem gloriosa est (there is a glorious
death): ergo mors non est malum. In general, two considerations are
prominent in the Stoic treatment of this subject: that what is
according to nature cannot be an evil, and that life taken by itself is
not a good. Other arguments, however, for diminishing the fear of death
are not despised. See Sen. Ep. 30, 4; 77, 11, 82, 8; Cons. ad. Marc.
19, 3; M. Aurel. ix. 3; viii. 58. And other passages quoted in
Baumhauer’s Vet. Philosoph. Doctr. De Morte Voluntaria, p. 211.
[540] Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 15, 4): All virtue is done away
with, ἂν ἢ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν,
ἀγαθὸν ἀπολίπωμεν. Id. (in Plut. C. Not. 5, 2): ἐν τῷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν βιοῦν
μόνον ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμόνως, τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὄντων πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδ’ εἰς
τοῦτο συνεργούντων. Similarly, Sto. Rep. 17, 2. Sen. Vit. Be. 4, 3: The
only good is honestas, the only evil turpitudo, cetera vilis turba
rerum, nec detrahens quicquam beatæ vitæ nec adjiciens. Id. Ep. 66, 14:
There is no difference between the wise man’s joy and the firmness with
which he endures pains, quantum ad ipsas virtutes, plurimum inter illa,
in quibus virtus utraque ostenditur ... virtutem materia non mutat. Ep.
71, 21: Bona ista aut mala non efficit materia, sed virtus. Ep. 85, 39:
Tu illum [sapientem] premi putas malis? Utitur. Id. Ep. 44; 120, 3;
Plut. C. Not. 4, 1; Sto. Rep. 18, 5; 31, 1; Chrysippus, in Ps. Plut. De
Nobil. 12, 2; Diog. 102; Stob. ii. 90; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 181; Alex.
Aphr. Top. 43 and 107.
[541] Sext. Math. xi. 61. See above, p. 232, 3. Diog. 103: The good can
only do good, and never do harm; οὐ μᾶλλον δ’ ὠφελεῖ ἢ βλάπτει ὁ
πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια· οὐκ ἄρ’ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε πλοῦτος οὔθ’ ὑγίεια. Again: ᾧ
ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν· πλούτῳ δὲ καὶ
ὑγιείᾳ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, κ.τ.λ. In Sen. Ep. 87, 11, instead
of the proposition, that nothing is a good except virtue, the following
arguments are given as traditional among the Stoics (interrogationes
nostrorum), apparently taken from Posidonius (see p. 31, 35, 38): (1)
Quod bonum est, bonos facit: fortuita bonum non faciunt: ergo non sunt
bona. (Similarly in M. Aurel. ii. 11, iv. 8: Whatever does no moral
harm, does no harm to human life.) (2) Quod contemptissimo cuique
contingere ac turpissimo potest, bonum non est; opes autem et lenoni et
lanistæ contingunt: ergo, &c. (So, too, Marc. Aurelius, v. 10.) (3)
Bonum ex malo non fit: divitiæ fiunt, fiunt autem ex avaritia: ergo,
&c. (Conf. Alex. Aphr. Top. 107: τὸ διὰ κακοῦ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν
ἀγαθόν· πλοῦτος δὲ καὶ διὰ πορνοβοσκίας κακοῦ ὄντος γίνεται, κ.τ.λ.)
(4) Quod dum consequi volumus in multa mala incidimus, id bonum non
est: dum divitias autem consequi volumus, in multa mala incidimus, &c.
(5) Quæ neque magnitudinem animo dant nec fiduciam nec securitatem,
contra autem insolentiam, tumorem, arrogantiam creant, mala sunt: a
fortuitis autem (previously, not only riches but health had been
included in this class) in hæc impellimur: ergo non sunt bona. That
riches are not a good is proved by Diogenes (in Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 49);
that poverty and pain are no evils is proved by the argument, quoted in
Sen. Ep. 85, 30: Quod malum est nocet: quod nocet deteriorem facit.
Dolor et paupertas deteriorem non faciunt: ergo mala non sunt. The
Stoic proposition is also established from a theological point of view.
Nature, says M. Aurel. ii. 11, ix. 1, could never have allowed that
good and evil should equally fall to the lot of the good and the bad;
consequently, what both enjoy equally—life and death, honour and
dishonour, pleasure and trouble, riches and poverty—can neither be good
nor evil. On the value of fame, see id. iv. 19.
[542] This view is compared with the Academician in Cic. Tusc. v. 13,
39; 18, 51; Sen. Ep. 85, 18; 71, 18; 92, 14. In the last passage, the
notion that happiness can be increased by external goods, and is
consequently capable of degrees, is refuted by arguments such as 4, 24:
Quid potest desiderare is, cui omnia honesta contingunt?... et quid
stultius turpiusve, quam bonum rationalis animi ex irrationalibus
nectere?... non intenditur virtus, ergo ne beata quidem vita, quæ ex
virtute est. Conf. Ep. 72, 7: Cui aliquid accedere potent, id
imperfectum est.
[543] Cleanthes expands this notion, in rhetorical language, in Cic.
Fin. ii. 21, 69. Conf. Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 2: [Virtus] non est virtus si
sequi potest. Primæ partes ejus sunt: ducere debet, imperare, summo
loco stare: tu illam jubes signum petere. Id. Vit. Be. 11, 2; 13, 5;
14, 1.
[544] Compare on this subject the words of Chrysippus on p. 233, 1,
quoted by Plut. Sto. Rep. 15, and, for their explanation, Sen. Benef.
iv. 2, 4: Non indignor, quod post voluptatem ponitur virtus, sed quod
omnino cum voluptate conferatur contemptrix ejus et hostis et
longissime ab illa resiliens. Id. Vit. Be. 15, 1: Pars honesti non
potest esse nisi honestum, nee summum bonum habebit sinceritatem suam,
si aliquid in se viderit dissimile meliori. According to Plut. 15, 3;
13, 3, Com. Not. 25, 2, this statement of Chrysippus is at variance
with another statement of his, in which he says: If pleasure be
declared to be a good, but not the highest good, justice (the
Peripatetic view) might perhaps still be safe, since, in comparison
with pleasure, it may be regarded as the higher good. Still, this was
only a preliminary and tentative concession, which Chrysippus
subsequently proved could not be admitted, inasmuch as it was out of
harmony with the true conception of the good, and changed the
difference in kind (on which see p. 232, 1) between virtue and other
things into a simple difference in degree. Plutarch (Sto. Rep. 15, 6),
with more reason, blames Chrysippus for asserting against Aristotle
that, if pleasure be regarded as the highest good, justice becomes
impossible, but not other virtues; for how could a Stoic, of all
philosophers, make such a distinction between virtues? Evidently the
zeal of controversy has here carried away the philosopher beyond the
point at which his own principles would bear him out.
[545] M. Aurel. vi. 15: ὁ μὲν φιλόδοξος ἀλλοτρίαν ἐνέργειαν ἴδιον
ἀγαθὸν ὑπολαμβάνει· ὁ δὲ φιλήδονος ἰδίαν πεῖσιν· ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἰδίαν
πρᾶξιν. Conf. ix. 16: οὐκ ἐν πείσει, ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ
πολιτικοῦ ζῴου κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.
[546] Sen. Ep. 92, 6–10; Vit. Beat. 5, 4; 9, 4; Posidonius, in Sen. Ep.
92, 10.
[547] Taking the expression in its strict meaning, it is hardly allowed
by the Stoics, when they speak accurately. Understanding by ἡδονὴ an
emotion, i.e. something contrary to nature and blameworthy, they assert
that the wise man feels delight (χαρὰ, gaudium), but not pleasure
(ἡδονὴ, lætitia, voluptas). See Sen. Ep. 59, 2; Diog. 116; Alex. Aphr.
Top. 96; the last-named giving definitions of χαρὰ, ἡδονὴ, τέρψις,
εὐφροσύνη.
[548] Sen. Ep. 23, 2; 27, 3; 59, 2; 14; 72, 8; Vit. Be. 3, 4; 4, 4; De
Ira, ii. 6, 2.
[549] Diog. 94: Virtue is a good; ἐπιγεννήματα δὲ τήν τε χαρὰν καὶ τὴν
εὐφροσύνην καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 3: It is a question
utrum virtus summi boni causa sit, an ipsa summum bonum. Seneca, of
course, says the latter. Conf. De Vit. Be. 4, 5: The wise man takes
pleasure in peace of mind and cheerfulness, non ut bonis, sed ut ex
bono suo ortis. Ibid. 9, 1: Non, si voluptatem præstatura virtus est,
ideo propter hanc petitur ... voluptas non est merces nec causa
virtutis, sed accessio, nec quia delectat placet, sed si placet et
delectat. The highest good consists only in mental perfection and
health, in ipso judicio et habitu optimæ mentis, in the sanitas et
libertas animi, which desires nothing but virtue; ipsa pretium sui.
Ibid. 15, 2: Ne gaudium quidem, quod ex virtute oritur, quamvis bonum
sit, absoluti tamen boni pars est, non magis quam lætitia et
tranquillitas ... sunt enim ista bona, sed consequentia summum bonum,
non consummantia. Here, too, belongs the statement in Stob. ii. 184,
188 (conf. M. Aurel. vii. 74): πάντα τὸν ὁντινοῦν ὠφελοῦντα ἴσην
ὠφέλειαν ἀπολαμβάνειν παρ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, for the reasons stated, p. 230,
1.
[550] Sen. Vit. Be. c. 7 and 10–12; M. Aurel. viii. 10. Among the Stoic
arguments against identifying pleasure and pain with good and evil, may
be placed the inference in Clem. Strom. iv. 483, C, which bears great
similarity to the third argument, quoted on p. 233, 2: If thirst be
painful, and it be pleasant to quench thirst, thirst must be the cause
of this pleasure: ἀγαθοῦ δὲ ποιητικὸν τὸ κακὸν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, κ.τ.λ.
[551] Diog. 85: ὃ δὲ λέγουσί τινες, πρὸς ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν πρώτην
ὁρμὴν τοῖς ζῷοις, ψεῦδος ἀποφαίνουσιν. ἐπιγέννημα γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἄρα
ἐστὶν, ἡδονὴν εἶναι, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν ἡ φύσις ἐπιζητήσασα τὰ
ἐναρμόζοντα τῇ συστάσει ἀπολάβη.
[552] Taking pleasure in its widest sense. In its more restricted
sense, they reject ἡδονή, understanding thereby a particular emotion.
See p. 236. 2.
[553] Sext. Math. xi. 73: τὴν ἡδονὴν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ἀγαθὸν εἶναί
φησιν· ὁ δὲ εἰπὼν ‘μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην’ (Antisthenes) κακόν· οἱ δὲ
ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀδιάφορον καὶ οὐ προηγμένον. ἀλλὰ Κλεάνθης μὲν μήτε κατὰ
φύσιν αὐτὴν εἶναι μήτε ἀξίαν ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καθάπερ δὲ τὸ
κάλλυντρον κατὰ φύσιν μὴ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος κατὰ φύσιν μὲν εἶναι ὡς
τὰς ἐν μασχάλῃ τρίχας, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχειν. Παναίτιος δὲ τινὰ μὲν
κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν τινὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν.
[554] Accordingly, it is also defined to be τέχνη εὐδαιμονίας ποιητική.
Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b.
[555] Diog. 89: τήν τ’ ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην καὶ αὐτὴν
δι’ αὑτὴν εἶναι αἱρετὴν, οὐ διά τινα φόβον ἢ ἐλπίδα ἤ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν· ἐν
αὐτῇ τ’ εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἅτ’ οὔσῃ [-ης] ψύχῃ [-ης] πεποιημένῃ
[-ης] πρὸς ὁμολογίαν παντὸς τοῦ βίου. Sen. De Clem. i. 1, 1: Quamvis
enim recte factorum verus fructus sit fecisse, nec ullum virtutum
pretium dignum illis extra ipsas sit. Id. Ep. 81, 19. Ep. 94, 19:
Æquitatem per se expetendam nec metu nos ad illam cogi nec mercede
conduci. Non esse justum cui quicquam in hac virtute placet præter
ipsam. Id. Ep. 87, 24: Maximum scelerum supplicium in ipsis est. Benef.
iv 12: Quid reddat beneficium? dic tu mihi, quid reddat justitia, &c.;
si quicquam præter ipsas, ipsas non expetis. M. Aurel. ix. 42: τί γὰρ
πλέον θέλεις εὖ πριήσας ἄνθρωπον; οὐκ ἀρκῇ τούτῳ, ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν
σήν τι ἔπραξας, ἀλλὰ τούτου μισθὸν ζητεῖς; When man does good, πεποίηκε
πρὸς ὃ κατεσκεύασται καὶ ἔχει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ. Id. vii. 73; viii. 2. See pp.
230, 1; 236, 4.
[556] Diog. vii. 127: αὐτάρκη εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν. Cic.
Parad. 2; Sen. Ep. 74, 1: Qui omne bonum honesto circumscripsit, intra
se felix est. This αὐτάρκεια is even asserted of individual virtues, by
virtue of the connection between them all. Of φρόνησις, for instance,
in Sen. Ep. 85, 2. it is said: Qui prudens est, et temperans est. Qui
temperans, est et constans. Qui constans est, imperturbatus est. Qui
imperturbatus est, sine tristitia est. Qui sine tristitia est, beatus
est. Ergo prudens est beatus, et prudentia ad vitam beatam satis est.
Similarly in respect of bravery (ibid. 24). This αὐτάρκεια of virtue
was naturally a chief point of attack for an opponent. It is assailed
by Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, on the ground that neither the things which
the Stoics declare to be natural and desirable (προηγμένα), nor, on the
other hand, the natural conditions of virtuous action, can be without
effect on happiness, and that it will not do to speak of the latter as
only negative conditions (ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ). See Plut. C. Not. 4, and 11, 1.
[557] Plut. Sto. Rep. 26; C. Not. 8, 4, where Chrysippus is charged
with at one time denying that happiness is augmented by length of time,
and at another declaring momentary wisdom and happiness to be
worthless. Cic. Fin. iii. 14, 45; Sen. Ep. 74, 27; 93, 6; Benef. v. 17,
6; M. Aurel. xii. 35. The Stoics are, on this point, at variance with
Aristotle.
[558] This view is frequently expressed by the Stoics of the Roman
period, Seneca, Epictetus, and M. Aurelius. Proofs will be found
subsequently.
[559] Tusc. v. 15, 43; 14, 42.
[560] Parad. 2.
[561] De Const. 13, 5; 75, 18: Expectant nos, si ex hac aliquando fæce
in illud evadimus sublime et excelsum, tranquillitas animi et expulsis
erroribus absoluta libertas. Quæris, quæ sit ista? Non homines timere,
non Deos. Nec turpia velle nec nimia. In se ipsum habere maximam
potestatem: inæstimabile bonum est, suum fieri.
[562] Ep. 29, 12: Quid ergo ... philosophia præstabit? Scilicet ut
malis tibi placere, quam populo, ... ut sine metu Deorum hominumque
vivas, ut aut vincas mala aut finias.
[563] See Krische, Forschungen, 368 and 475.
[564] See p. 148, 2.
[565] νόμος, according to the Stoic definition (Stob. Ecl. ii. 190,
204; Floril. 44, 12, and in the fragment of Chrysippus quoted by
Marcian in Digest. i. 3, 2, and the Scholiast of Hermogenes in Spengel
Συναγ. τεχν. 177, Krische, Forsch. 475) = λόγος ὀρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν
τῶν ποιητέων, ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ τῶν οὐ ποιητέων. It is therefore
σπουδαῖόν τι or ἀστεῖον, something of moral value, imposing duties on
man. The ultimate source of this λόγος must be looked for in the λόγος
κοινὸς, the divine or world reason. The general law is, according to
Diog. vii. 88 (who here, according to the passage quoted from Cic. N.
D. i. 15, 40 on p. 148, 2, is apparently following Chrysippus) = ὁ
ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὦν τῷ Διΐ. It is the ratio
summa insita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ facienda sunt, prohibetque
contraria (Cic. Legg. i. 6, 18, conf. the quotation from Cic. N. D. i.
14, 30, respecting Zeus, on p. 150). According to Cic. Legg. ii. 4, 8
and 10, it is no human creation sed æternum quiddam, quod universum
mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique sapientia, the mens omnia
ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei, the ratio recta summi Jovis
(conf. Fin. iv. 5, II, in the fragment in Lact. Inst. v. 8). It is
accordingly, as Chrysippus l.c. says in the words of Pindar (Plato,
Gorg. 484, B), πάντων βασιλεὺς θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων.
[566] Cic. Legg. i. 6, 18; ii. 4, 8; 5, 11.
[567] Or as Stob. ii. 184, expresses it, δίκαιον is φύσει καὶ μὴ θέσει.
[568] This is proved by Cic. Legg. i. 12, 33, in a chain-argument
clearly borrowed from the Stoics: Quibus ratio a natura data est,
iisdem etiam recta ratio data est. Ergo et lex, quæ est recta ratio in
jubendo et vetando. Si lex, jus quoque. At omnibus ratio. Jus igitur
datum est omnibus. Upon this conception of law is based the Stoic
definition of κατόρθωμα as εὐνόμημα, that of ἁμάρτημα as ἀνόμημα.
[569] The good alone, or virtue, is αἱρετόν; evil is φευκτόν. See p.
229, 1; 238, 3, and Stob. Ecl. ii. 202. αἱρετὸν is, however, Ibid. 126,
132, ὃ αἵρεσιν εὔλογον κινεῖ, or, more accurately, τὸ ὁρμῆς αὐτοτελοῦς
κινητικόν; and αἱρετὸν is accordingly distinguished from ληπτόν—αἱρετὸν
being what is morally good, ληπτὸν being everything which has value,
including external goods. The Stoics make a further distinction
(according to Stob. ii. 140 and 194) with unnecessary subtlety between
αἱρετὸν and αἱρετέον, and similarly between ὀρεκτὸν and ὀρεκτέον,
ὑπομενετὸν and ὑπομενετέον, using the first form to express the good in
itself (for instance, φρόνησις), the latter to express the possession
of the good (for instance, φρονεῖν).
[570] ὁρμὴ is defined by Stob. ii. 160, as φορὰ ψυχῆς ἐπί τι· ἀφορμὴ,
which is contrasted therewith in Epict. Enchirid. 2, 2 Diss. iii. 2, 2,
22, 36, as (according to the most probable correction of the text) φορὰ
διανοίας ἀπό τινος. See p. 243, 3. A further distinction (connecting
herewith what may be otherwise gathered from the statements of Stobæus
respecting the Stoic doctrine of impulses) is made between the impulses
of reasonable beings and beings devoid of reason. It is only in the
case of reasonable beings that it can be said that impulse is called
forth by the idea of a thing as something which has to be done
(φαντασία ὁρμητικὴ τοῦ καθηκόντος); that every impulse contains an
affirmative judgment in itself (συγκατάθεσις), to which has been
superadded a κινητικόν· συγκατάθεσις applying to particular
propositions (those in which truth and falsehood consist. See p. 110,
3; 83, 2), whereas ὁρμὴ applies to κατηγορήματα (i.e. activities
expressed by verbs. See p. 95, 1 and 2), since every impulse and every
desire aims at the possession of a good. Ὁρμὴ λογικὴ is defined to be
φορὰ διανοίας ἐπί τι τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν, and is also called ὁρμὴ
πρακτικὴ (only a rational being being capable of πρᾶξις). If the φορὰ
διανοίας refers to something future, the ὁρμὴ becomes an ὄρεξις, for
which the text twice reads ὄρουσις. Among the varieties of ὁρμὴ
πρακτικὴ, Stob. enumerates πρόθεσις, ἐπιβολὴ, παρασκευὴ, ἐγχείρησις,
αἵρεσις, πρόθεσις, βούλησις, θέλησις, the definitions of which he
gives, passing then to the doctrine of emotions, these being also a
kind of ὁρμή. It appears, therefore, that activities of feeling and
will are included in the conception of ὁρμή, as will be subsequently
seen more fully in the doctrine of emotions, the conception of which
likewise includes both.
[571] Stob. ii. 116, similarly 108: πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν
ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ οἱονεὶ τὸ [l. τὸν] τῶν ἡμιαμβειαίων λόγον
ἔχειν κατὰ τὸν Κλεάνθην, ὅθεν ἀτελεῖς μὲν ὄντας εἶναι φαύλους,
τελειωθέντας δὲ σπουδαίους. Diog. 89, see p. 238, 3: The soul rests on
the harmony of life with itself (virtue); extraneous influences corrupt
it, ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις ἀφορμὰς δίδωσιν ἀδιαστρόφους. Sen. Ep. 108, 8: Facile
est auditorem concitare ad cupiditatem recti: omnibus enim natura
fundamenta dedit semenque virtutis.
[572] The one point, according to Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 34, which
distinguishes man from God is, that God is absolutely rational and by
nature good and wise.
[573] Chrysippus (in Galen. De Hippocr. et Plat. iv. 2, vol. v. 368
Kühn): τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀκολουθητικὸν φύσει ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸν
λόγον ὡς ἂν ἡγεμόνα πρακτικόν· πολλάκις μέντοι καὶ ἄλλως φέρεται ἐπί
τινα καὶ ἀπό τινων (for so we must punctuate, the reference being to
ὁρμὴ and ἀφορμὴ, according to the definition, p. 242, 2) ἀπειθῶς τῷ
λόγῳ ὠθούμενον ἐπὶ πλεῖον, κ.τ.λ. From this, it appears that
Chrysippus’ definition of ὁρμὴ (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 6 = τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
λόγος προστακτικὸς αὐτῷ τοῦ ποιεῖν) must not be understood (as in
Baumhauer’s Vet. Philos. Doct. De morte voluntaria, p. 74) to imply
that man has only rational, and no irrational impulses. Chrysippus, in
the passage quoted, must either be referring to that impulse which is
peculiar to man, and is according to his nature; or else λόγος must be
taken in its more extended meaning of notion or idea, for all impulses
are based on judgments, see p. 242, 2; and it is clear, from Cic. Fin.
iii. 7, 23 (‘as our limbs are given to us for a definite purpose, so
ὁρμὴ is given for some definite object, and not for every kind of
use’), that ὁρμὴ is not in itself rational, but first becomes rational
by the direction given to it by man.
[574] The term emotion is used to express πάθος, although the terms of
modern psychology are more or less inadequate to express the ancient
ideas, as Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 35, already observed.
[575] Diog. vii. 110: ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ἡ ἄλογος καὶ
παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις ἢ ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα. The same definitions are
found in Stob. ii. 36, 166, with this difference, that ἀπειθὴς τῷ
αἱροῦντι λόγῳ stands in place of ἄλογος, as in Marc. Aurel. ii. 5. Cic.
Tusc. iii. 11, 24; iv. 6, 11; 21, 47; Chrysippus in Galen. De Hipp. et
Plat. iv. 2, 4; v. 2, 4, vol. v. 368, 385, 432, 458 Kühn, and Id. in
Plut. Virt. Mor. 10, Schl. p. 450; Sen. Ep. 75, 12. A similar
definition is attributed to Aristotle by Stob. ii. 36, but it is no
longer to be found in his extant writings. If it was in one of the lost
books (Heeren suggests in the treatise περὶ παθῶν ὀργῆς Diog. v. 23),
was that book genuine?
[576] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 39: Cumque eas perturbationes [πάθη] antiqui
naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes aliaque in parte animi
cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem assentiebatur
[Zeno]. Nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat, opinionisque
judicio suscipi, et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur esse matrem
immoderatam quandam intemperantiam. Fin. iii. 10, 35: Nec vero
perturbationes animorum ... vi aliqua naturali moventur. Tusc. iv. 28,
60: Ipsas perturbationes per se esse vitiosas nec habere quidquam aut
naturale aut necessarium.
[577] See p. 215, 3; 242, 2.
[578] Chrysippus, in Galen. iii. 7, p. 335; v. 1 and 6, p. 476, and
above, p. 215, 3.
[579] Plut. Virt. Mor. 3, p. 441 (the first part of this passage has
been already quoted, p. 215, 3, the continuation being) λέγεσθαι δὲ [τὸ
ἡγεμονικὸν] ἄλογον, ὅταν τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῆς ὁρμῆς ἰσχυρῷ γενομένῳ καὶ
κρατήσαντι πρός τι τῶν ἀτόπων παρὰ τὸν αἱροῦντα λόγον ἐκφέρηται· καὶ
γὰρ τὸ πάθος, κ.τ.λ. See below, note 3.
[580] See p. 242, 2.
[581] Diog. vii. 111: δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι, καθά φησι
Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ παθῶν. Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 3, p. 441: τὸ πάθος
εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως
σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβόντα. Stob. ii. 168: ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν τῆς
ψυχῆς παθῶν ἐπὶ δόξας αὐτὰ λέγουσιν εἶναι [instead of which read πάντων
... παθῶν δόξας αἰτίας λέγ. εἶν.], παραλαμβάνεσθαι [add δὲ] τὴν δόξαν
ἀντὶ τῆς ἀσθενοῦς ὑπολήψεως. Conf. Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14: Sed omnes
perturbationes judicio censent fieri et opinione ... opinationem autem
volunt esse imbecillam assensionem. Id. iii. 11, 24: Est ergo causa
omnis in opinione, nec vero ægritudinis solum sed etiam reliquarum
omnium perturbationum? Fin. iii. 10, 35: Perturbationes autem nulla
naturæ vi commoventur; omniaque ea sunt opiniones ac judicia levitatis.
Acad. i. 10. See p. 244, 3.
[582] Diog. l.c.
[583] Cic. Tusc. iii. 11, 26; iv. 7, 14. Posidon. (in Galen. iv. 7, p.
416): Chrysippus defined apprehension (ἄση) as δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ
παρουσίας.
[584] See p. 242, 1.
[585] Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 15: Sed quæ judicia quasque opiniones
perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse
dicunt, verum illa etiam, quæ efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut ægritudo
quasi morsum quendam doloris efficiat: metus recessum quendam animi et
fugam: lætitia profusam hilaritatem; libido effrenatam appetentiam.
Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iv. 3, p. 377: (Ζήνωνι καὶ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν
Στωϊκῶν) οἳ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ [should perhaps be
struck out], τὰς ἐπὶ ταύταις ἀλόγους συστολὰς καὶ ταπεινώσεις καὶ
δείξεις [both for δείξεις, and for λήξεις in the passage about to be
quoted from Plutarch, Thurot, Etudes sur Aristote, p. 249, suggests
δέσεις· δήξεις is more probable, confirmed too by Cicero’s morsus
doloris] ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ διαχύσεις ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς
πάθη. Plut. Virt. Mor. 10, p. 449: τὰς ἐπιτάσεις τῶν παθῶν καὶ τὰς
σφοδρότητας οὔ φασι γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἁμαρτητικὸν, ἀλλὰ
τὰς λήξεις [δήξεις] καὶ τὰς συστολὰς καὶ τὸ ἧττον τῷ ἀλόγῳ δεχομένας.
The same results are involved in the definitions of emotion already
given, p. 244, 2. In reference to this pathological action of
representations, one kind of emotions was defined (Stob. ii. 170; Cic.
Tusc. iv. 7, 14) as δόξα πρόσφατος, or opinio recens boni (or mali)
præsentis, πρόσφατον being κινητικὸν συστολῆς ἀλόγου ἢ ὑπάρσεως.
[586] De Hipp. et Plat. v. 1, p. 429): Χρύσιππος μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ
περὶ παθῶν ἀποδεικνύναι πειρᾶται, κρίσεις κινὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ
πάθη, Ζήνων δ’ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγιγνομένας αὐταῖς
συστολὰς καὶ λύσεις, ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ τὰς πτώσεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν
εἶναι τὰ πάθη. Conf. iv. 2, p. 367, and 3, p. 377.
[587] Diog. 111 (see above, p. 245, 3, and the definition quoted on p.
245, 5) confirms the view that, in the passage referred to by Galenus,
Chrysippus explained the emotions to be κρίσεις. Elsewhere Galenus
asserts (iv. 2, p. 367) that he called λύπη a μείωσις ἐπὶ φευκτῷ
δοκοῦντι; ἡδονὴ, an ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν; and charges
him (iv. 6, p. 403), quoting passages in support of the charge, with
deducing emotions from ἀτονία and ἀσθένεια ψυχῆς. That Chrysippus
agreed with Zeno in his definition of emotion, has already been stated
(p. 244, 2). No doubt, too, with an eye to Chrysippus, Stobæus also
(ii. 166) defines emotion as πτοία (violent mental motion), the words
used being πᾶσαν πτοίαν πάθος εἶναι καὶ πάλιν πάθος πτοίαν· and, in
Galenus (iv. 5, p. 392), Chrysippus says: οἰκείως δὲ τῷ τῶν παθῶν γένει
ἀποδίδοται καὶ ἡ πτοία κατὰ τὸ ἐνσεσοβημένον τοῦτο καὶ φερόμενον εἰκῆ.
Chrysippus even repeatedly insists on the difference between emotion
and error—error being due to deficient knowledge, emotion to opposition
to the claims of reason, to a disturbance of the natural relation of
the impulses (τὴν φυσικὴν τῶν ὁρμῶν συμμετρίαν ὑπερβαίνειν). He shows
that both Zeno’s definitions come to this (Galen. iv. 2, p. 368, and
iv. 4, p. 385; Stob. ii. 170), and elsewhere explains (Plut. Vir. Mor.
10, p. 450) how emotion takes away consideration, and impels to
irrational conduct. The quotations on p. 246, 1 from Cicero and Stobæus
are an explanation of positions of Chrysippus, of which Chrysippus is
himself the source. And were he not directly the source, Galenus (iv.
4, p. 390) observes that the view of Chrysippus on the emotions was
generally held in the Stoic School after his time. In designating the
emotions κρίσεις, Chrysippus cannot therefore have intended thereby to
exclude the emotions of impulse and feeling. All that he meant was,
that emotions, as they arise in the individual soul (we should say as
conditions of consciousness), are called forth by imagination. This is
clear from the fact that the modes in which the pathological character
of emotions displays itself are appealed to as evidence. See his words
in Galen. iv. 6, p. 409. τῷ [l. τό] τε γὰρ θυμῷ φέρεσθαι καὶ
ἐξεστηκέναι καὶ οὐ παρ’ ἑαυτοῖς οὐδ’ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι καὶ πάνθ’ ὅσα
τοιαῦτα φανερῶς μαρτυρεῖ τῷ κρίσεις εἶναι τὰ πάθη κἂν τῇ λογικῇ δυνάμει
τῆς ψυχῆς συνίστασθαι καθάπερ καὶ τὰ οὕτως ἔχοντα. On the other hand,
Zeno never denied the influence of imagination on emotion, as is
perfectly clear from the expression of Galenus, quoted pp. 246, 2; 246,
1.
[588] Stob. Ecl. ii. 190 (Floril. 46, 50): The wise man, according to
the Stoic teaching, exercises no indulgence; for indulgence would
suppose τὸν ἡμαρτηκότα μὴ παρ’ αὑτὸν ἡμαρτηκέναι πάντων ἁμαρτανόντων
παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν κακίαν.
[589] Epictet. Diss. i. 18, 1–7; 28, 1–10; ii. 26; M. Aurel. ii. 1; iv.
3; viii. 14; xi. 18; xii. 12.
[590] This motive can be best gathered from the passages in Cicero
already quoted, p. 244, 3, and from Sen. De Ira, ii. 2, 1: Anger can do
nothing by itself, but only animo adprobante ... nam si invitis nobis
nascitur, nunquam rationi succumbet. Omnes enim motus qui non voluntate
nostra fiunt invicti et inevitabiles sunt, &c.
[591] See p. 179, 3, 4.
[592] See p. 88, 1.
[593] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 39: Perturbationes voluntarias esse. Tusc. iv.
7, 14: Emotions proceed from judgment; itaque eas definiunt pressius,
ut intelligatur non modo quam vitiosæ, sed etiam quam in nostra sunt
potestate, upon which follow the definitions quoted, p. 246, 1.
[594] Cic. Tusc. iv. 9, 22: Omnium autem affectionum fontem esse dicunt
intemperantiam (ἀκράτεια), quæ est a tota mente et a recta ratione
defectio sic aversa a præscriptione rationis ut nullo modo adpetitiones
anima nec regi nec contineri queant.
[595] Stob. Ecl. ii. 170, probably from Chrysippus, of whom similar
remarks were quoted, p. 246, 3: πᾶν γὰρ πάθος βιαστικόν ἐστιν, ὡς καὶ
πολλάκις ὁρῶντας τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντας ὅτι συμφέρει τόδε οὐ ποιεῖν
ὑπὸ τῆς σφοδρότητος ἐκφερομένους ... ἀνάγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτὸ ...
πάντες δ’ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες ἀποστρέφονται τὸν λόγον, οὐ
παραπλησίως δὲ τοῖς ἐξηπατημένοις ἐν ὁτωοῦν, ἀλλ’ ἰδιαζόντως. οἱ μὲν
γὰρ ἠπατημένοι ... διδαχθέντες ... ἀφίστανται τῆς κρίσεως· οἱ δ’ ἐν
τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, κἂν μάθωσι κἂν μεταδιδαχθῶσιν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ λυπεῖσθαι
ἢ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅμως οὐκ ἀφίστανται
τούτων ἀλλ’ ἄγονται ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ τούτων κρατεῖσθαι
τυραννίδος. A different view is taken by Epictet. Diss. i. 28, 8, who à
propos of Medea remarks: ἐξηπάτηται· δεῖξον αὐτῇ ἐναργῶς, ὅτι
ἐξηπάτηται, καὶ οὐ ποιήσει.
[596] See p. 242, 2. The same idea is expressed in applying the terms
αἱρετὸν and φευκτὸν to good and evil (Stob. ii. 126 and 142; see p.
229, 1, and 232, 3).
[597] Stob. ii. 166; Cic. Tusc. iii. 11; iv. 7, 14; 15, 43; Fin. iii.
10, 35.
[598] According to Diog. 110, this distinction was found in the
treatise περὶ παθῶν.
[599] In Clem. Strom. ii. 407, A, the words being πρὸς ὅλον τὸ
τετράχορδον, ἡδονὴν, λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, πολλῆς δεῖ τῆς ἀσκήσεως
καὶ μάχης.
[600] The definition of λύπη or ἄση (Cicero ægritudo) as δόξα πρόσφατος
κακοῦ παρουσίας is explicitly referred to Chrysippus (more at length in
Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14: Opinio recens mali præsentis, in quo demitti
contrahique animo rectum esse videatur), as also the definition of
φιλαργυρία = ὑπόληψις τοῦ τὸ ἀργύριον καλὸν εἶναι. See p. 254, 4, 5. In
like manner μέθη, ἀκολασία, and the other passions, were, according to
Diog. 110, defined. To Chrysippus also belong the definitions—quoted
Tusc. iv. 7, 14; iii. 11, 25—of ἡδονὴ (lætitia, voluptas gestiens) =
opinio recens boni præsentis, in quo efferri rectum videatur; of fear =
opinio impendentis mali quod intolerabile esse videatur, agreeing with
the προσδοκία κακοῦ of Diog. 112; of desire (cupiditas, libido,
ἐπιθυμία) = opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu jam præsens esse atque
adesse. It is, however, more common to hear λύπη (Diog. 111; Stob. 172;
Cic. Tusc. iii. 11) described as συστολὴ ψυχῆς ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ, more
briefly συστολὴ ἄλογος, fear as ἔκκλισις ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ, ἡδονὴ even
according to Alex. Aphr. top. 96, as ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρέτῳ δοκοῦντι
ὑπάρχειν, two different translations of which are given by Cic. l.c.
and Fin. ii. 4, 13, ἐπιθυμία as ὄρεξις ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ, or immoderata
appetitio opinati magni boni. The latter definitions appear to belong
to Zeno. They were probably appropriated by Chrysippus, and the
additions made which are found in Stobæus.
[601] Further particulars may be gathered from Diog. vii. 111; Stob. ii
174. Both include under λύπη subdivisions as ἔλεος, φθόνος, ζῆλος,
ζηλοτυπία, ἄχθος, ἀνία, ὀδύνη. Diogenes adds ἐνόχλησις and σύγχυσις;
Stobæus πένθος, ἄχος, ἄση. Both include under φόβος, δεῖμα, ὄκνος,
αἰσχύνη, ἔκπληξις, θόρυβος, ἀγωνία; Stobæus adds δέος and
δεισιδαιμονία. Under ἡδονὴ, Diogenes includes κήλησις, ἐπιχαιρεκακία,
τέρψις, διάχυσις; Stobæus, ἐπιχαιρεκακίαι, ἀσμενισμοὶ, γοητεῖαι καὶ τὰ
ὅμοια. Under ἐπιθυμία, Diogenes places σπάνις, μῖσος, φιλονεικία, ὀργὴ,
ἔρως, μῆνις, θυμός; Stobæus, ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτῆς (θυμὸς, χόλος,
μῆνις, κότος, πικρία, κ.τ.λ.), ἔρωτες σφοδροὶ, πόθοι, ἵμεροι,
φιληδονίαι, φιλοπλουτίαι, φιλοδοξίαι. Definitions for all these
terms—which, without doubt, belong to Chrysippus—may be found in the
writers named. Greek lexicographers may obtain many useful hints from
Stoic definitions.
[602] Plut. Vir. Mor. 10, p. 449: πᾶν μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἁμαρτία κατ’ αὐτούς
ἐστιν καὶ πᾶς ὁ λυπούμενος ἢ φοβούμενος ἢ ἐπιθυμῶν ἁμαρτάνει. The
Stoics are therefore anxious to make a marked distinction in the
expressions for emotions and the permitted mental affections, between
pleasure and joy, see p. 236, 2, fear and precaution (εὐλαβεία), desire
and will (βούλησις, Diog. 116; cupere et velle, Sen. Ep. 116, 1),
αἰσχύνη and αἰδὼς (Plut. Vit. Pud. c. 2, p. 529).
[603] On this favourite proposition of the Stoics, consult Diog. 115;
Stob. ii. 182; Cic. Tusc. iv. 10; whose remarkable agreement with
Stobæus seems to point to a common source of information directly or
indirectly drawn upon by both; iii. 10, 23; Galen. Hipp. et Plat. v. 2;
Sen. Ep. 75, 11. According to these passages, the Stoics distinguish
between simple emotions and diseases of the soul. Emotions, in the
language of Seneca, are motus animi improbabiles soluti et concitati.
If they are frequently repeated and neglected, then inveterata vitia et
dura, or diseases, ensue. Disease of the soul is therefore defined as
δόξα ἐπιθυμίας ἐῤῥυηκυῖα εἰς ἕξιν καὶ ἐνεσκιῤῥωμένη καθ’ ἣν
ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὰ μὴ αἱρετὰ σφόδρα αἱρετὰ εἶναι (Stob. translations of
the definition in Cicero and Seneca). The opposite of such a δόξα, or a
confusion arising from false fear, is an opinio vehemens inhærens atque
insita de re non fugienda tanquam fugienda—such as hatred of womankind,
hatred of mankind, &c. If the fault is caused by some weakness which
prevent our acting up to our better knowledge, the diseased states of
the soul are called ἀῤῥωστήματα, ægrotationes (Diog.; Stob.; Cic. Tusc.
iv. 13, 29); but this distinction is, of course, very uncertain. The
same fault is at one time classed among νόσοι, at another among
ἀῤῥωστήματα; and Cicero (11, 24; 13, 29) repeatedly observes that the
two can only be distinguished in thought. Moreover, just as there are
certain predispositions (ἐνεμπτωσίαι) for bodily diseases, so within
the sphere of mind there are εὐκαταφορίαι εἰς πάθος. Diog., Stob., Cic.
12. The distinction between vitia and morbi (Cic. 13) naturally
coincides with the distinction between emotions and diseases. The
former are caused by conduct at variance with principles, by
inconstantia et repugnantia, likewise vitiositas in a habitus in tota
vita inconstans; the latter consist in corruptio opinionum. It is not
consistent with this view to call κακίαι, διαθέσεις; and νόσοι, as well
as ἀῤῥωστήματα and εὐκαταφορίαι, ἕξεις (Stob. ii. 100, on the
difference between ἕξις and διάθεσις, see 102, 1); and, accordingly,
Heine suggests (De Font. Tuscul. Dis.: Weimar, 1863, p. 18) that, on
this point, Cicero may have given inaccurate information. The unwise
who are near wisdom are free from disease of the soul, but not from
emotions (Sen., Cic.). The points of comparison between diseases of the
body and those of the soul were investigated by Chrysippus with
excessive care. Posidonius contradicted him, however, in part (Galen,
l.c., Cic. 10, 23; 12, 27); but their differences are not of interest
to us.
[604] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Cumque perturbationem animi illi
[superiores] ex homine non tollerent ... sed eam contraherent in
angustumque deducerent: hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere
sapientem. Ibid. ii. 43, 135. We shall find subsequently that the
mental affections, which cause emotions, are allowed to be unavoidable.
[605] Cic. Tusc. iv. 17, 37.
[606] Cic. Tusc. iii. 10, 22: Omne enim malum, etiam mediocre, magnum
est. Nos autem id agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. Ibid.
iv. 17, 39: Modum tu adhibes vitio? An vitium nullum est non parere
rationi? Ibid. 18, 42: Nihil interest, utrum moderatas perturbationes
approbent, an moderatam injustitiam, &c. Qui enim vitiis modum apponit,
is partem suscipit vitiorum. Sen. Ep. 85, 5, says that moderation of
emotions is equivalent to modice insaniendum, modice ægrotandum. Ep.
116, 1: Ego non video, quomodo salubris esse aut utilis possit ulla
mediocritas morbi.
[607] Sen. De Ira, i. 9, 2; particularly with reference to anger, conf.
Ep. 85, 10.
[608] Full details are given by Cic. Tusc. iv. 19–26; Off. i. 25, 88;
Sen. De Ira, i. 5, 21; ii. 12; particularly with regard to the use of
anger.
[609] In the same spirit Sen. De Ira, i. 9, 1; 10, 2, meets the
assertion that valour cannot dispense with anger by saying: Nunquam
virtus vitio adjuvanda est, se contenta ... absit hoc a virtute malum,
ut unquam ratio ad vitia confugiat.
[610] Diog. vii. 117: φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν, διὰ τὸ
ἀνέμπτωτον (faultless) εἶναι. From the apathy of the wise man, absence
of feeling and severity, which are faults, must be distinguished.
[611] Chrysippus (in Stob. Floril. vii. 21): ἀλγεῖν μὲν τὸν σοφὸν μὴ
βασανίζεσθαι δέ· μὴ γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τῇ ψυχῇ. Sen. De Prov. 6, 6; Ep. 85,
29; Cic. Tusc. ii. 12, 29; 25, 61; iii. 11, 25.
[612] Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 12; Musonius (in Stob. Floril. 19, 16); Sen.
De Const. 2; 3; 5; 7; 12. The second title of this treatise is: nec
injuriam nec contumeliam accipere sapientem.
[613] See 253, 2 and 3 and Cic. Tusc. iii. 9, 19.
[614] Cic. Tusc. iii. 9, 20; Sen. De Clem. ii. 5; Diog. vii. 123.
[615] Stob. Ecl. ii. 190; Floril. 46, 60; Sen. l.c. 5, 2; 7; Diog.
l.c.; Gell. N. A. xiv. 4, 4.
[616] Ps. Plut. Hom. 134: οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωϊκοὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τίθενται ἐν τῇ
ἀπαθείᾳ.
[617] See p. 193. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b. Virtue consists in ἐκλογὴ
τῶν κατὰ φύσιν. Diog. vii. 89 (conf. Plut. Aud. Po. c. 6, p. 24): τήν
τ’ ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην.
[618] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Cumque superiores (Aristotle and others)
non omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes
natura aut more perfectas: hic [Zeno] omnes in ratione ponebat.
[619] Cic. Tusc. iv. 15, 34: Ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici
potest. Conf. Sen. Ep. 113, 2: Virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus
quodammodo se habens, and the remarks, p. 128, 1; 129, 3.
[620] The proof of this will be found subsequently in the Stoic
definitions of various virtues and vices. Compare preliminarily 254, 6
and Diog. vii. 93: εἶναι δ’ ἀγνοίας τὰς κακίας, ὧν αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐπιστῆμαι.
Stob. Ecl ii. 108: ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ῥηθείσας ἀρετὰς τελείας εἶναι
λέγουσι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ συνεστηκέναι ἐκ θεωρημάτων. It is not opposed
to these statements for Stob. ii. 92 and 110, to distinguish other
virtues besides those which are τέχναι and ἐπιστῆμαι; nor for Hecato
(in Diog. vii. 90) to divide virtues into ἐπιστημονικαὶ καὶ θεωρητικαὶ
(σύστασιν ἔχουσαι τῶν θεωρημάτων) and ἀθεώρητοι; for by the latter must
be understood not the virtuous actions themselves, but only the states
resulting from them—health of soul, strength of will, and the like. On
the health of the soul, in its relation to virtue, see Cic. Tusc. iv.
13, 30.
[621] Diog. vii. 91 (following Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and others); Ps.
Plut. V. Hom. 144.
[622] See p. 260, 3.
[623] Plut. Sto. Rep. 7; Diog. vii. 161; Galen, vii. 2, p. 595.
[624] See p. 56.
[625] See p. 58, 2. Diog. vii. 165, conf. 37: Ἥριλλος δὲ ὁ Καρχηδόνιος
τέλος εἶπε τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἐστὶ ζῇν ἀεὶ πάντα ἀναφέροντα πρὸς τὸ
μετ’ ἐπιστήμης ζῇν καὶ μὴ τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ διαβεβλημένον. εἶναι δὲ τὴν
ἐπιστήμην ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. On the
definition, see p. 82, 1.
[626] Cleanthes (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 7): When τόνος, on which see p.
128, 2, is found in the soul in a proper decree, ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ
κράτος· ἡ δ’ ἰσχὺς αὕτη καὶ τὸ κράτος ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐπιφανέσιν
ἐμμενετέοις ἐγγένηται ἐγκράτειά ἐστι, κ.τ.λ. In the same way,
Chrysippus (according to Galen, Hipp. et Plat. iv. 6, p. 403) deduced
what is good in our conduct from εὐτονία and ἰσχύς; what is bad, from
ἀτονία καὶ ἀσθένεια τῆς ψυχῆς; and (ibid. vii. 1, p. 590) he referred
the differences of individual virtues to changes in quality within the
soul. By Aristo, p. 220, 1, virtue is defined as health; by Stob. ii.
104, as διάθεσις ψυχῆς σύμφωνος αὐτῇ; by Diog. 89, as διάθεσις
ὁμολογουμένη.
[627] Sen. De Otio, i. (28) 4: Stoici nostri dicunt; usque ad ultimum
vitæ finem in actu erimus, non desinemus communi bono operam dare, &c.
Nos sumus, apud quos usque eo nihil ante mortem otiosum est, ut, si res
patitur, non sit ipsa mors otiosa.
[628] This will appear from the definitions of virtue about to follow.
[629] See pp. 59, 1; 56, 2.
[630] See p. 254, 7. Sen. Ep. 65, 6, after describing a great and noble
soul, adds: Talis animus virtus est.
[631] Plut. Vir. Mor. 2: Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς
ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν ὠνόμαζε, κ.τ.λ. Id. on Zeno, see p. 260, 3,
and Cleanthes, p. 236, 3. According to Galenus, Aristo defined the one
virtue to be the knowledge of good and evil (Hipp. et Plat. v. 5, p.
468): κάλλιον οὖν Ἀρίστων ὁ Χῖος, οὔτε πολλὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς τῆς
ψυχῆς ἀποφηνάμενος, ἀλλὰ μίαν, ἣν ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν εἶναί
φησιν. vii. 2, p. 595. νομίσας γοῦν ὁ Ἀρίστων, μίαν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς
δύναμιν, ᾗ λογιζόμεθα, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔθετο μίαν, ἐπιστήμην
ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. The statement that Aristo made health of soul consist
in a right view of good and evil agrees with the language of Plutarch.
Perhaps Zeno had already defined φρόνησις as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.
[632] Conf. p. 255. 1. Cic. De Off. i. 43, 153: Princepsque omnium
virtutum est illa sapientia, quam σοφίαν Græci vocant: prudentiam enim,
quam Græci φρόνησιν dicunt, aliam quandam intelligimus: quæ est rerum
expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia. Illa autem scientia, quam
principem dixi, rerum est divinarum atque humanarum scientia. A similar
definition of wisdom, amplified by the words, nosse divina et humana et
horum causas, is found Ibid. ii. 2, 5. Sen. Ep. 85, 5; Plut. Plac.
Proœm. 2; Strabo, i. 1, 1. It may probably be referred to Chrysippus;
and it was no doubt Chrysippus who settled the distinction between
σοφία and φρόνησις, in the Stoic school, although Aristo had preceded
him in distinguishing them. Explaining particular virtues as springing
from the essence of virtue, with the addition of a differential
quality, he needed separate terms to express generic and specific
virtue. In Zeno’s definition too, as later writers would have it (Plut.
Vir. Mat. 2), to φρόνησις was given the meaning of ἐπιστήμη.
[633] ἀρεταὶ πρῶται. Diog. 92; Stob. ii. 104. In stating that
Posidonius counted four—Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater more than
four—virtues, Diogenes can only mean that the latter enumerated the
subdivisions, whereas Posidonius confined himself to the four main
heads of the four cardinal virtues. Besides this division of virtues,
another, threefold, division is also met with, see p. 56, 2; 57, 1,
that into logical, physical, and ethical virtues. In other words, the
whole of philosophy and likewise its parts are brought under the notion
of virtue; but it is not stated how this threefold division is to
harmonise with the previous fourfold one. A twofold division, made by
Panætius and referred to by Seneca (Ep. 94, 45)—that into theoretical
and practical virtues—is an approximation to the ethics of the
Peripatetics.
[634] The scheme was in vogue before Zeno’s time. See Plut. Sto. Rep.
7, 1, and the quotations, p. 260, 3.
[635] ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, or ἑκάστων ὧν ποιητέον
καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων. Stob. 102. Stobæus adds, that the
definition needs to be completed by the words, occurring in the
definition of every virtue, φύσει πολιτικοῦ ζῴου. But this is
superfluous, for only in the case of such a being can the terms good
and evil apply. Diog. 92; Sext. Math. xi. 170 and 246; Cic. l.c.
[636] ἐπιστήμη δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων (Stob. 104); ἐπιστήμη
ὧν αἱρετέον καὶ ὧν εὐλαβητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων (Diog.); ἐπιστήμη ὧν χρὴ
θαῤῥεῖν ἢ μὴ θαῤῥεῖν (Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 2, 597). Cic. Tusc.
iv. 24, 53, conf. v. 14, 41: (Chrysippus) fortitudo est, inquit,
scientia perferendarum rerum, vel affectio animi in patiendo ac
perferendo, summæ legi parens sine timore. The last-named
characteristic appears still more strongly in the definition attributed
to the Stoics by Cic. Off. i. 19, 62: Virtus propugnans pro æquitate.
[637] ἐπιστήμη αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. Stob. 102. The
definition of φρόνησις in Cicero is the same, word for word. See p.
258, 1; that of valour in Diogenes is not very different. Since all
duties refer to ποιητέα and οὐ ποιητέα, the definitions of the
remaining virtues must necessarily agree with those of φρόνησις.
[638] ἐπιστήμη ἀπονεμητικὴ τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ, in Stob. Id. p. 104,
further enumerates the points of difference between the four virtues:
intelligence refers to καθήκοντα, self-control to impulses, valour to
ὑπομοναὶ, justice to ἀπονεμήσεις. See also the distinctive
peculiarities of the four virtues in Stob. 112. Below, p. 263.
[639] Diog. 93; Stob. 104. The πρῶται κακίαι are: ἀφροσύνη, δειλία,
ἀκολασία, ἀδικία. The definition of ἀφροσύνη is ἄγνοια ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν
καὶ οὐδετέρων. See p. 255, 1.
[640] This follows from the fact that the conception of ἐπιστήμη is the
basis in all. See p. 258, 1.
[641] Of Zeno, Plut. Vir. Mor. 2, p. 441, says: ὁριζόμενος τὴν φρόνησιν
ἐν μὲν ἀπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην· ἐν δ’ αἱρετέοις σωφροσύνην· ἐν δ’
ὑπομενετέοις ἀνδρίαν. The like in regard to justice in Sto. Rep. 7, 2.
On the other hand valour is here termed φρόνησις ἐν ἐνεργητέοις. He
also says, p. 440, that, according to Aristo, ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιητέα μὲν
ἐπισκοποῦσα καὶ μὴ ποιητέα κέκληται φρόνησις· ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ κοσμοῦσα καὶ
τὸ μέτρων καὶ τὸ εὔκαιρον ἐν ἡδοναῖς ὁρίζουσα, σωφροσύνη· κοινωνήμασι
δὲ καὶ συμβολαίοις ὁμιλοῦσα τοῖς πρὸς ἑτέρους, δικαιοσύνη. Further
particulars as to Aristo may be found in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 2,
p. 595: Since the soul has only one power, the power of thought, it can
only have one virtue, the ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν
αἱρεῖσθαί τε δέῃ τἀγαθὰ καὶ φεύγειν τὰ κακὰ, τὴν ἐπιστήμην τήνδε λαλεῖ
σωφροσύνην· ὅταν δὲ πράττειν μὲν τἀγαθὰ, μὴ πράττειν δὲ τὰ κακὰ,
φρόνησιν· ἀνδρείαν δὲ ὅταν τὰ μὲν θαῤῥῇ, τὰ δὲ φεύγῃ· ὅταν δὲ τὸ κατ’
ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ νέμῃ, δικαιοσύνην· ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, γινώσκουσα μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ
χωρὶς τοῦ πράττειν τἀγαθά τε καὶ κακὰ σοφία τ’ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη, πρὸς
δὲ τὰς πράξεις ἀφικνουμένη τὰς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὀνόματα πλείω λαμβάνει τὰ
προειρημένα. We know, from Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, 4, see p. 256, 3, that,
according to Cleanthes, strength of mind, ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐπιφανέσιν
ἐμμενετέοις ἐγγένηται, ἐγκράτειά ἐστιν· ὅταν δ’ ἐν τοῖς ὑπομενετέοις,
ἀνδρεία· περὶ τὰς ἀξίας δὲ, δικαιοσύνη· περὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ
ἐκκλίσεις, σωφροσύνη. With him, too, if Plutarch’s account is accurate,
ἐγκράτεια, or perseverance, takes the place of φρόνησις. Cic. Tusc. iv.
24, 53, quotes no less than three definitions of bravery given by
Sphærus. See p. 259, 3.
[642] Plut. Vir. Mor. 2, p. 441, charges him with creating a σμῆνος
ἀρετῶν οὐ συνῆθες οὐδὲ γνώριμον, and forming a χαριεντότης, ἐσθλότης,
μεγαλότης, καλότης, ἐπιδεξιότης, εὐαπαντησία, εὐτραπελία, after the
analogy of πρᾳότης, ἀνδρεία, &c. In Stob. ii. 118, among the Stoic
virtues, is found an ἐρωτικὴ as ἐπιστήμη νέων θήρας εὐφυῶν, &c., and a
συμποτικὴ as ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πῶς δεῖ ἐξάγεσθαι τὰ συμπόσια καὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ
συμπίνειν. An ἐρωτικὴ and συμποτικὴ ἀρετὴ are also mentioned by
Philodem. De Mus. col. 15. According to Athen. 162, b (Vol. Herc. i.),
Persæus, in his συμποτικοὶ διάλογοι, had discussed συμποτικὴ at length;
and since, according to the Stoics (Sen. Ep. 123, 15: Stob. l.c.),
none but the wise know how to live aright and how to drink aright,
these arts belong to a complete treatment of wisdom.
[643] Stob. 106, includes under φρόνησις, εὐβουλία, εὐλογιστία,
ἀγχίνοια, νουνέχεια, εὐμηχανία; under σωφροσύνη, εὐταξία, κοσμιότης,
αἰδημοσύνη, ἐγκράτεια; under ἀνδρεία, καρτερία, θαῤῥαλεότης,
μεγαλοψυχία, εὐψυχία, φιλοπονία; under δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια (on which
Diog. 119), χρηστότης, εὐκοινωνησία, εὐσυναλλαξία. Diog. 126, is
slightly different. Stobæus gives the definitions of all these virtues,
and Diogenes of some. By Stobæus, they are generally described as
ἐπιστῆμαι; by Diogenes, as ἕξεις or διαθέσεις. Otherwise, the
definitions are the same. A definition of εὐταξία is given by Cic. Off.
i. 40, 142.
[644] Diog. 93; Stob. 104.
[645] Sto. Rep. 7.
[646] Plut. Vir. Mor. 2: Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς
ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν ὠνόμαζε· τῷ δὲ πρός τι διαφόρους καὶ
πλείονας, ὡς εἴ τις ἐθέλοι τὴν ὅρασιν ἡμῶν λευκῶν μὲν ἀντιλαμβανομένην
λευκοθέαν καλεῖν, μελάνων δὲ μελανθέαν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ
ἀρετὴ, κ.τ.λ. See p. 260, 3. καθάπερ τὸ μαχαίριον ἓν μέν ἐστιν, ἄλλοτε
δὲ ἄλλο διαιρεῖ· καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ περὶ ὕλας διαφόρους μιᾷ φύσει
χρώμενον.
[647] Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 1, p. 590: νομίζει γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖνος,
μίαν οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν ὀνόμασι πλείοσιν ὀνομάζεσθαι κατὰ τὴν πρός τι
σχέσιν. Conf. note 5 and Diog. vii. 161: ἀρετάς τ’ οὔτε πολλὰς εἰσῆγεν,
ὡς ὁ Ζήνων, οὔτε μίαν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλουμένην, ὡς οἱ Μεγαρικοὶ, ἀλλὰ
καὶ [l. κατὰ] τὸ πρός τί πως ἔχειν (scil. πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλουμένην).
[648] See p. 260, 3.
[649] Their distinguishing features fall under the category of ποιὸν,
to use Stoic terms, not under that of πρός τί πως ἔχον, as Aristo
maintained.
[650] Galenus l.c. continues: ὁ τοίνυν Χρύσιππος δείκνυσιν, οὐκ ἐν τῇ
πρός τι σχέσει γενόμενον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀρετῶν τε καὶ κακιῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐν
ταῖς οἰκείαις οὐσίαις ὑπαλλαττομέναις κατὰ τὰς ποιότητος. Plut. Sto.
Rep. 7, 3: Χρύσιππος, Ἀρίστωνι μὲν ἐγκαλῶν, ὅτι μιᾶς ἀρετῆς σχέσεις
ἔλεγε τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι. Id. Vir. Mor. 2: Χρύσιππος δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν
ἀρετὴν ἰδίᾳ ποιότητι συνίστασθαι νομίζων.
[651] Stob. ii. 110: πάσας δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὅσαι ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι καὶ
τέχναι (compare on this additions p. 255, 1) κοινά τε θεωρήματα ἔχειν
καὶ τέλος, ὡς εἴρηται (p. 108—the same is more fully set forth by
Panætius, p. 112), τὸ αὐτὸ, διὸ καὶ ἀχωρίστους εἶναι· τὸν γὰρ μίαν
ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, καὶ τὸν κατὰ μίαν πράττοντα κατὰ πάσας πράττειν.
Diog. 125: τὰς δ’ ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις καὶ τὸν μίαν
ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰ θεωρήματα κοινὰ, as Chrysippus,
Apollodorus, and Hecato assert. τὸν γὰρ ἐνάρετον θεωρητικόν τ’ εἶναι
καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν ποιητέων. τὰ δὲ ποιητέα καὶ αἱρετέα ἐστὶ καὶ
ὑπομενητέα καὶ ἀπονεμητέα, knowledge and action including all the four
principal instincts.
[652] Cic. Parad. 3, 1: Una virtus est, consentiens cum ratione et
perpetua constantia. Nihil huic addi potent, quo magis virtus sit;
nihil demi, ut virtus nomen relinquatur. Conf. Sen. Ep. 66, 9. See p.
267.
[653] Stob. 112 (conf. Diog. 126): διαφέρειν δ’ ἀλλήλων τοῖς
κεφαλαίοις. φρονήσεως γὰρ εἶναι κεφάλαια τὸ μὲν θεωρεῖν καὶ πράττειν ὃ
ποιητέον προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὸ θεωρεῖν καὶ ἃ δεῖ
ἀπονέμειν, χάριν τοῦ ἀδιαπτώτως πράττειν ὃ ποιητέον· τῆς δὲ σωφροσύνης
ἴδιον κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τὸ παρέχεσθαι τὰς ὁρμὰς εὐσταθεῖς καὶ θεωρεῖν
αὐτὰς προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὰ ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς,
ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀδιαπτώτως ἐν ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι. Similarly of
bravery, which has for its basis πᾶν ὃ δεῖ ὑπομένειν; and of justice,
which has τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ. Plut. Alex. Virt. 11: The Stoics teach
that μία μὲν ἀρετὴ πρωταγωνιστεῖ πράξεως ἑκάστης, παρακαλεῖ δὲ τὰς
ἄλλας καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὸ τέλος.
[654] Stob. 116: φασὶ δὲ καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ πάσας τὰς
ἀρετάς· πᾶσαν γὰρ πρᾶξιν τελείαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι. Plut. Sto. Rep. 27, 1,
conf. Alex. Virt. l.c.: τὰς ἀρετάς φησι [Χρύσιππος] ἀντακολουθεῖν
ἀλλήλαις, οὐ μόνον τῷ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τὸν κατὰ
μίαν ὁτιοῦν ἐνεργοῦντα κατὰ πάσας ἐνεργεῖν· οὔτ’ ἄνδρα φησὶ τέλειον
εἶναι τὸν μὴ πάσας ἔχοντα τὰς ἀρετὰς, οὔτε πρᾶξιν τελείαν, ἥτις οὐ κατὰ
πάσας πράττεται τὰς ἀρετάς. If Chrysippus allowed, as Plutarch states,
that the brave man does not always act bravely, nor the bad man always
like a coward, it was a confession to which he was driven by
experience, contrary to Stoic principles.
[655] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Nec virtutis usum modo [Zeno dicebat] ut
superiores (whom the Stoic evidently wrongs), sed ipsum habitum per se
esse præclarum. Id. Parad. 3, 1: Nec enim peccata rerum eventu sed
vitiis hominum metienda sunt. Sen. Benef. vi. 11, 3: Voluntas est, quæ
apud nos ponit officium, which Cleanthes then proceeds to illustrate by
a parable of two slaves, one of whom diligently seeks for the man whom
he is sent to find but without success, whilst the other taking it easy
accidentally comes across him. Ibid. i. 5, 2: A benefaction is only
ipsa tribuentis voluntas. 6, 1: Non quid fiat aut quid detur refert,
sed qua mente.
[656] Compare also the paradoxical statement—Qui libenter beneficium
accepit, reddidit—which Sen. l.c. ii. 31, 1, justifies by saying: Cum
omnia ad animum referamus, fecit quisque quantum voluit.
[657] Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril. 6, 19:
ὅστις ἐπιθυμῶν ἀνέχετ’ αἰσχροῦ πράγματος
οὗτος ποιήσει τοῦτ’ ἐὰν καιρὸν λάβῃ.
[658] On the notions of κατόρθωμα and ἁμάρτημα, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 11,
1: τὸ κατόρθωμά φασι νόμου προστάγμα εἶναι, τὸ δ’ ἁμάρτημα νόμου
ἀπαγόρευμα. To a bad man, law only gives prohibitions, and not
commands: οὐ γὰρ δύνανται κατορθοῦν. Chrysippus, Ibid. 15, 10: πᾶν
κατόρθωμα καὶ εὐνόμημα καὶ δικαιοπράγημά ἐστι. Stob. ii. 192: ἔτι δὲ
τῶν ἐνεργημάτων φασὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι κατορθώματα, τὰ δ’ ἁμαρτήματα, τὰ δ’
οὐδέτερα (examples of the latter are speaking, giving, &c.) ... πάντα
δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα δικαιοπραγήματα εἶναι καὶ εὐνοήματα καὶ εὐτακτήματα,
κ.τ.λ. τὰ δὲ ἁμαρτήματα ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀδικήματα καὶ ἀνομήματα καὶ
ἀτακτήματα.
[659] It is to this view that the distinction between κατόρθωμα and
καθῆκον refers from the one side. A καθῆκον (the conceptions of which
will be subsequently more fully discussed) is, in general, any
discharge of duty, or rational action; κατόρθωμα only refers to a
perfect discharge of duty, or to a virtuous course of conduct. Conf.
Stob. 158: τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ
κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι. κατορθώματα δ’ εἶναι τὰ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργήματα
... τὸ δὲ καθῆκον τελειωθὲν κατόρθωμα γίνεσθαι. Similarly, 184: A
κατόρθωμα is a καθῆκον πάντας ἐπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς. Cic. Fin. iii. 18,
59: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id
autem est perfectum officium; erit autem etiam inchoatum; ut, si juste
depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis (καθήκοντα) ponatur
depositum reddere. Off. i. 3, 8: Et medium quoddam officium dicitur et
perfectum; the former is called κατόρθωμα, the latter καθῆκον. A
virtuous action can only be done by one who has a virtuous intention,
i.e. by a wise man. Cic. Fin. iv. 6, 15: If we understand by a life
according to nature, what is rational, rectum est, quod κατόρθωμα
dicebas, contingitque sapienti soli. Off. iii. 3, 14: Illud autem
officium, quod rectum iidem [Stoici] appellant, perfectum atque
absolutum est, et, ut iidem dicunt, omnes numeros habet, nec præter
sapientem, cadere in quenquam potest. Off. iii. 4, 16: When the Decii
and Scipios are called brave, Fabricius and Aristides just, Cato and
Lælius wise, the wisdom and virtue of the wise man are not attributed
to them in the strict sense of the term: sed ex mediorum officiorum
frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientum.
[660] See p. 263, 2.
[661] In Simpl. Categ. 61, β (Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 28), the Stoics
say: τὰς μὲν ἕξεις ἐπιτείνεσθαι δύνασθαι καὶ ἀνίεσθαι· τὰς δὲ διαθέσεις
ἀνεπιτάτους εἶναι καὶ ἀνέτους. Thus straightness is, for instance, a
διάθεσις, and no mere ἕξις. οὑτωσὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διαθέσεις εἶναι,
οὐ κατὰ τὸ μόνιμον ἰδίωμα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀνεπίτατον καὶ ἀνεπίδεκτον τοῦ
μᾶλλον· τὰς δὲ τέχνας, ἤτοι δυσκινήτους οὔσας ἢ μὴ (add οὐκ) εἶναι
διαθέσεις. Conf. p. 103, 1. Ibid. 72, δ (Schol. 76, a, 12): τῶν
Στωϊκῶν, οἵτινες διελόμενοι χωρὶς τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων τεχνῶν
ταύτας οὔτε ἐπιτείνεσθαι λέγουσιν οὔτε ἀνίεσθαι, τὰς δὲ μέσας τέχνας
καὶ ἐπίτασιν καὶ ἄνεσιν δέχεσθαι φασίν. Simpl. (73, α. Schol. 76, a,
24) replies: This would be true, if virtue consisted only in
theoretical conviction: such a conviction must be either true or false,
and does not admit of more or less truth (for the same line of
argument, see p. 267, 1); but it is otherwise where it is a matter for
exercise. It may be remarked, in passing, that a further distinction
was made between ἀρετὴ and τέχνη—the one being preceded by an ἀξιόλογος
προκοπὴ, the other by a simple ἐπιτηδειότης (Simpl. Categ. 62, β;
Schol. 71, a, 38). There is also a definition of τέχνη attributed by
Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 53 (Jahrb. für Philol. See Supplementb. xiv.
239), to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus; to Zeno in Sext. Pyrrh. iii.
241; Math. vii. 109 and 373; more fully in Lucian, Paras. c. 4, Conf.
Cic. Acad. ii. 7, 22.
[662] Diog. vii. 127: ἀρέσκει δὲ αὐτοῖς μηδὲν μέσον εἶναι ἀρετῆς καὶ
κακίας· τῶν Περιπατητικῶν μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν
προκοπήν· ὡς γὰρ δεῖν, φασιν, ἢ ὀρθὸν εἶναι ξύλον ἢ στρεβλὸν, οὕτως ἢ
δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον· οὔτε δὲ δικαιότερον οὔτε ἀδικώτερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ὁμοίως. Similarly, Sen. Ep. 71, 18: Quod summum bonum est, supra
se gradum non habet ... hoc nec remitti nec intendi posse, non magis,
quam regulam, qua rectum probari solet, flectes. Quicquid ex illa
mutaveris injuria est recti. Stob. ii. 116: ἀρετῆς δὲ καὶ κακίας οὐδὲν
εἶναι μεταξύ.
[663] The much-discussed paradox (Cic. Parad. 3; Fin. iv. 27; Diog. 101
and 120; Stob. 218; Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 1; Sext. Math. vii. 422; Sen.
Ep. 66, 5) is this: ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα. It was,
according to Diog., supported, on the one hand, by the proposition, πᾶν
ἀγαθὸν ἐπ’ ἄκρον εἶναι αἱρετὸν καὶ μήτε ἄνεσιν μήτε ἐπίτασιν δέχεσθαι;
on the other hand, by the remark, to which Sext. and Simpl. in Categ.,
Schol. in Arist. 76, a, 30, refer: If truth and falsehood admit of no
difference of degree, the same must be true of the errors of our
conduct. A man is not at the mark, no matter whether he is one or a
hundred stadia away. Similarly, Stobæus: The Stoics declare all errors
to be ἴσα, although not ὅμοια· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐπίσης ψεῦδος
συμβέβηκεν· (a statement quoted as Stoical by Alex. in Metaph. p. 258,
3 Bon. 667, a, 19 Brand) every ἁμαρτία is the result of a διάψευσις. It
is, however, impossible for κατορθώματα not to be equal to one another,
if vices are equal; πάντα γάρ ἐστι τέλεια, διόπερ οὔτ’ ἐλλείπειν οὔθ’
ὑπερέχειν δύναιτ’ ἂν ἀλλήλων. Cicero and Seneca devoted particular
attention to this enquiry. The investigations of Cicero in the Paradoxa
result in bringing him to the passage quoted p. 263, 2, from which it
follows that nothing can be recto rectius, nor bono melius. The
equality of faults is a corollary from the equality of virtues; it also
follows from the consideration that whatever is forbidden at all is
equally forbidden. De Fin.: It is said, all faults are equal, quia nec
honesto quidquam honestius nec turpi turpius. Seneca (Ep. 66, 5) raises
the question, How, notwithstanding the difference between goods (see p.
230, 3 end), can all be equal in value? and at once replies: Is
virtue—or, what is the same thing, a rightly moulded soul—the only
primary good? Virtue, indeed, admits of various forms, according to the
activities imposed on it, but can neither be increased nor diminished;
Decrescere enim summum bonum non potest, nec virtuti ire retro licet.
It cannot increase, quando incrementum maximo non est: nihil invenies
rectius recto, non magis quam verius vero, quam temperato temperatius.
All virtue consists in modo, in certa mensura. Quid accedere perfecto
potest? Nihil, aut perfectum non erat, cui accessit: ergo ne virtuti
quidem, cui si quid adjici potest, defuit ... ergo virtutes inter se
pares sunt et opera virtutis et omnes homines, quibus illæ contigere
... una inducitur humanis virtutibus regula. Una enim est ratio recta
simplexque. Nihil est divino divinius, cœlesti cœlestius. Mortalia
minuuntur ... crescunt, &c.; divinorum una natura est. Ratio autem
nihil aliud est, quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa ...
nullum porro inter divina discrimen est: ergo nec inter bona. Ibid. 32:
Omnes virtutes rationes sunt: rationes sunt rectæ: si rectæ sunt, et
pares sunt. Qualis ratio est, tales et actiones sunt: ergo omnes pares
sunt: ceterum magna habebunt discrimina variante materia, etc. On the
same ground, Seneca, Ep. 71, defended the equality of all goods and of
all good actions, in particular p. 18, where to the quotation given, p.
266, 3, the words are added: Si rectior ipsa [virtus] non potest fieri,
nec quæ ab illa quidem fiunt, alia aliis rectiora sunt.
[664] Plut. C. Not. 10, 4: ναὶ, φασίν· ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ὁ πῆχυν ἀπέχων ἐν
θαλάττῃ τῆς ἐπιφανείας οὐδὲν ἧττον πνίγεται τοῦ καταδεδυκότος ὀργυίας
πεντακοσίας, οὕτως οὐδὲ οἱ πελάζοντες ἀρετῇ τῶν μακρὰν ὄντων ἧττόν
εἰσιν ἐν κακίᾳ καὶ καθάπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ τυφλοί εἰσι κἂν ὀλίγον ὕστερον
ἀναβλέπειν μέλλωσιν, οὕτως οἱ προκόπτοντες ἄχρις οὗ τὴν ἀρετὴν
ἀναλάβωσιν ἀνόητοι καὶ μοχθηροὶ διαμένουσιν. Diog. 127 (see p. 266, 3).
Stob. ii. 236: πάντων τε τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἴσων ὄντων καὶ τῶν
κατορθωμάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας ἐπίσης πάντας ἄφρονας εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ
ἴσην ἔχοντας διάθεσιν. Cic. Fin. iii. 14, 48: Consentaneum est his quæ
dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem quod appellamus
extremum quod ultimum crescere putent posse, iisdem placere, esse alium
alio etiam sapientiorem, itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte
facere. Quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non
putamus. Then follow the same comparisons as in Plutarch. Sen. Ep. 66,
10: As all virtues are equal, so are omnes homines quibus illæ
contigere. Ep. 79, 8: What is perfect admits of no increase; quicunque
fuerint sapientes pares erunt et æquales.
[665] Stob. ii. 198: ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ
Στωϊκοῖς φιλοσόφοις, δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων
τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου χρῆσθαι
ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων ταῖς κακίαις.
[666] Plut. Aud. Poet. 7, p. 25: μήτε τι φαῦλον ἀρετῇ προσεῖναι μήτε
κακίᾳ χρηστὸν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντως μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ἁμαρτωλὸν εἶναι τὸν
ἀμαθῆ, περὶ πάντα δ’ αὖ κατορθοῦν τὸν ἀστεῖον.
[667] Stob. Ecl. ii. 116; 120; 196; 198; 220; 232; Diog. vii. 117; 125;
Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38; ii. 20, 66; Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 1; Sen. Benef.
iv. 26; Sext. Math. vii. 434.
[668] Compare the collection of expressions respecting the wise and
unwise in Baumhauer, Vet. Phil. Doct. De Mort. Volunt. p. 169.
[669] Diog. 121; 32; Cic. Acad. ii. 44. 136. Parad. 5: ὅτι μόνος ὁ
σοφὸς ἐλεύθερος καὶ πᾶς ἄφρων δοῦλος.
[670] Plut. C. Not. 28, 1; Cic. Acad. l.c.: Sext. Math xi. 170.
[671] Cic. Parad. 6; Acad. l.c.; Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril. 94, 28;
Sext. l.c.; Alex. Aphr. Top. 79.
[672] Sen. Benef. vii. 3, 2; 6, 3; 8, 1.
[673] Cic. Acad. l.c.; Diog. vii. 125.
[674] Cic. l.c.; Diog. vii. 122; Stob. ii. 206; Plut. Arat. 23. On all
the points discussed, Plut. C. Not. 3, 2; De Adul. 16, p. 58; Tran. An.
12, p. 472; Ps. Plut. De Nobil. 17, 2; Cic. Fin. iii. 22, 75; Hor. Ep.
i. 1, 106; Sat. i. 3, 124.
[675] Plut. Tran. An. 12; Cic. Divin. ii. 63, 129: Stob. ii. 122; conf.
Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. 143.
[676] Stob. ii. 122 and 216; Diog. 119; Sen. Provid. i. 5. Philodemus,
περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς (Vol. Hercul. vi. 29), quotes a Stoic saying that
the wise are the friends of heaven, and heaven of the wise.
[677] Sen. Ep. 81, 11; Stob. ii. 118.
[678] Sen. Benef. v. 12, 3; Plut. Sto. Rep. 12, 1: C. Not. 20, 1; and
above, p. 230, 1.
[679] Stob. ii. 196; Plut. Stoic. Abs. Poët. Dic. 1, 4.
[680] Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 2; Com. Not. 33, 2; Stob. ii.
198. Seneca, Prov. i. 5: Bonus ipse tempore tantum a Deo differt. Ibid.
6, 4: Jupiter says to the virtuous: Hoc est, quo Deum antecedatis: ille
extra patientiam malorum est, vos supra patientiam. Ep. 73, 11; De
Const. 8, 2; Cic. N. D. ii. 61, 153; Epictet. Diss. i. 12, 26; Man. 15;
Horat. Ep. i. l. 106.
[681] See p. 239, 1; Sen. Ep. 53, 11: Non multo te Di antecedent ...
diutius erunt. At mehercules magni artificis est clusisse totum in
exiguo. Tantum sapienti sua, quantum Deo omnis ætas patet. 73, 13:
Jupiter quo antecedit virum bonum? Diutius bonus est: sapiens nihilo se
minoris æstimat, quod virtutes ejus spatio breviore cluduntur.
[682] πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται. Cic. Parad. 4; Tusc. iii. 5, 10; Diog. vii.
124; Stob. Ecl. ii. 124; Horat. Sat. ii. 3, 43.
[683] The Peripatetic Diogenianus raises the objection (in Eus. Præp.
Ev. vi. 8, 10): πῶς οὖν οὐδένα φῂς ἄνθρωπον, ὃς οὐχὶ μαίνεσθαί σοι
δοκεῖ κατ’ ἴσον Ὀρέστῃ καὶ Ἀλκμαίωνι, πλὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ; ἕνα δὲ ἢ δύο
μόνους φῂς σοφοὺς γεγονέναι. Similarly Plut. Sto. Rep. 31, 5.
[684] Sext. Math. ix. 90 in the argument quoted, p. 146, 1: Man can be
the most perfect being, οἷον εὐθέως, ὅτι διὰ κακίας πορεύεται τὸν πάντα
χρόνον, εἰ δὲ μή γε, τὸν πλεῖστον· καὶ γὰρ εἴ ποτε περιγένοιτο ἀρετῆς,
ὀψὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῖς τοῦ βίου δυσμαῖς περιγίνεται.
[685] This point will be again considered in the next chapter. Compare
at present Sext. Math. ix. 133, who says: εἰσὶν ἄρα σοφοί· ὅπερ οὐκ
ἤρεσκε τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, μεχρὶ τοῦ νῦν ἀνευρέτου ὄντος κατ’ αὐτοὺς
τοῦ σοφοῦ. Alex. Aphrod. De Fat. 28, p. 90: τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων οἱ πλεῖστοι
κακοὶ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγαθὸς μὲν εἷς ἢ δεύτερος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι
μυθεύεται, ὥσπερ τι παράδοξον ζῷον καὶ παρὰ φύσιν, σπανιώτερον τοῦ
Φοίνικος ... οἱ δὲ πάντες κακοὶ καὶ ἐπίσης ἀλλήλοις τοιοῦτοι, ὡς μηδὲν
διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, μαίνεσθαι δὲ ὁμοίως πάντας. Philodem. De Mus.
(Vol. Herc. i.), col. 11, 18: The Stoic cannot take his stand upon the
opinion of the majority (consensus gentium), since he has declared it
to be profane and impious.
[686] Benef. i. 10, 1–3.
[687] De Ira, iii. 26, 4; Benef. v. 17, 3.
[688] De Clemen. i. 6, 3; De Ira, ii. 28, 1; iii. 27, 3.
[689] Ep. 41, 9; Vit. Be. i. 4.
[690] See the pathetic description, De Ira, ii. 8–10, amongst other
passages the following: Ferarum iste conventus est: ... certatur
ingenti quidem nequitiæ certamine: major quotidie peccandi cupiditas,
minor verecundia est, &c.
[691] Diog. vii. 91: τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν φησιν ὁ
Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ λόγῳ τὸ γενέσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τοὺς
περὶ Σωκράτην, Διογένην καὶ Ἀντισθένην. The limitation likewise
contained herein will be presently discussed. Epictet. Man. 15,
mentions Heraclitus as well as Diogenes as θεῖοι.
[692] See the immoderate language of praise of his admirer Sen. De
Const. 7, 1: The wise man is no unreal ideal, although, like everything
else that is great, he is seldom met with; ceteram hic ipse M. Cato
vereor ne supra nostrum exemplar sit. Ibid. 2, 1: Catonem autem certius
exemplar sapientis viri nobis Deos immortales dedisse quam Ulixen et
Herculem prioribus sæculis.
[693] Plutarch, Prof. in Virt. 2, p. 76; Cic. Off. iii. 4, 16, p. 265,
2.
[694] Sen. Benef. iv. 27, 2: Itaque errant illi, qui interrogant
Stoicos: quid ergo? Achilles timidus est? quid ergo? Aristides, cui
justitia nomen dedit, injustus est? &c. Non hoc dicimus, sic omnia
vitia esse in omnibus, quomodo in quibusdam singula eminent: sed malum
ac stultum nullo vitio vacare ... omnia in omnibus vitia sunt, sed non
omnia in singulis extant (i.e., all points are not equally prominent in
each one). It hardly requires to be pointed out how nearly this view
coincides with that of Augustine on the virtues of the heathen, how
close a resemblance the Stoic doctrine of folly bears to the Christian
doctrine of the unregenerate, and how the contrast between wisdom and
folly corresponds to that between the faithful and unbelievers.
[695] Plut. C. N. 10, 1; Prof. in Virt. 12, p. 82; Sen. Ep. 75, 8.
[696] Plut. C. Not. 9; Stoic. Abs. Poët. Dic. 2. The Stoics are here
ridiculed because, according to their view, a man may go to bed ugly,
poor, vicious, miserable, and rise the next morning wise, virtuous,
rich, happy, and a king. In Prof. in Virt. 1, p. 75, a saying of Zeno’s
is given, that it is possible to tell by a dream whether we are
advancing in virtue.
[697] See p. 266, 3; Plut. Prof. in Virt. 1; Com. Not. 10, 2; see p.
269, 1; Sen. Ep. 75, 8.
[698] Plut. C. Not. 9, 1: τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας παραγινομένης
πολλάκις οὐδ’ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸν κτησάμενον οἴονται διαλεληθέναι δ’ αὐτὸν
ὅτι μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἀθλιώτατος ὢν καὶ ἀχρονέστατος νῦν ὁμοῦ φρόνιμος καὶ
μακάριος γέγονεν. So Sto. Rep. 19, 3. In explanation of these words,
Ritter, iii. 657, aptly refers to Stob. ii. 234 (γίγνεσθαι δὲ καὶ
διαλεληθότα τινὰ σοφὸν νομίζουσι κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους), and Philo,
De Agric. p. 325: Those yet inexperienced in wisdom παρὰ τοῖς
φιλοσόφοις διαλεληθότες εἶναι λέγονται σοφοί· τοὺς γὰρ ἄχρι σοφίας
ἄκρας ἐληλακότας καὶ τῶν ὅρων αὐτῆς ἄρτι πρῶτον ἁψαμένους ἀμήχανον
εἰδέναι, φασι, τὴν ἑαυτῶν τελείωσιν. μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἄμφω
συνίστασθαι τήν τε πρὸς τὸ πέρας ἄφιξιν καὶ τὴν τῆς ἀφίξεως κατάληψιν,
ἀλλ’ εἶναι μεθόριον ἄγνοιαν, κ.τ.λ. Sen. Ep. 75, 9, likewise
investigates the same point, but ranges those who have not yet attained
the consciousness of perfection among advancers, but not among the
wise. Prantl’s conjecture (Gesch. d. Logik, i. 490, 210), that the
σοφὸς διαλεληθὼς is connected with the fallacy known as διαλανθάνων,
appears to be questionable.
[699] See p. 230, 3.
[700] Cic. Fin. iii. 5, 17. Gell. N. A. xii. 5, 7: The primary objects
of natural self-love are the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν; and self-love consists
mainly in this: Ut omnibus corporis sui commodis gauderet
[unusquisque], ab incommodis omnibus abhorreret. Stob. Ecl. ii. 142:
Some things are according to nature, others contrary to nature, others
neither one nor the other. Health, strength, and such like, are among
things according to nature. Ibid. p. 148: τῶν δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιαφόρων
ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστι πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχήν. πρῶτα μέν ἐστι
κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις ἢ σχέσις κατὰ τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους γινομένη,
οἷον ὑγιεία καὶ αἴσθησις, λεγὼ δὲ τὴν κατάληψιν καὶ ἰσχύν. κατὰ μετοχὴν
δὲ ... οἷον χεὶρ ἀρτία καὶ σῶμα ὑγιαῖνον καὶ αἰσθήσεις μὴ πεπηρωμέναι
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν κατ’ ἀνάλογον. Conf. Ibid. p. 60, where
the enumeration of the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν is also in the Stoic sense, and
above, p. 225.
[701] Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 50: Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum:
quam si non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab
Aristone: nec ullum sapientis munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res
eas, quæ ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset neque
ullum delectum adhiberi oporteret. The same argument was used by the
Stoa against the theoretical ἀδιαφορία of the Sceptics (see above, p.
37, 1), with which the practical ἀδιαφορία of Aristo is most closely
connected. It differs only in name from the ἀταραξία of the sceptics,
Aristo having a leaning towards Scepticism. See p. 61, 1.
[702] Cic. Fin. iii. 6, 21: Prima est enim conciliatio [οἰκείωσις]
hominis ad ea quæ sunt secundum naturam, simul autem cepit
intelligentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant ἔννοιαν illi,
viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et ut ita dicam concordiam, multo eam
pluris æstimavit quam omnia ilia quæ primum dilexerat: atque ita
cognitione et ratione collegit ut statueret in eo collocatum summum
illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum ... cum igitur in eo
sit id bonum, quo referenda sint omnia ... quamquam post oritur, tamen
id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est, eorum autem quæ sunt prima
naturæ propter se nihil expetendum, &c. Similarly Gell. l.c.
[703] Plut. Com. Not. 4; Cic. Fin. iv. 17; v. 24, 72; 29, 89.
[704] Cic. Fin. iii. 6, 22: Ut recte dici possit, omnia officia eo
referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturæ: nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum
ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturæ conciliationibus
honesta actio. Consequens enim est et post oritur.
[705] Plut. C. Not. 26, 2: εἰ γὰρ αὐτὰ μὲν [τὰ] πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθὰ
μή ἐστιν, ἡ δ’ εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογὴ καὶ λῆψις αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πάντα τὰ παρ’
ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖν ἕκαστον ἕνεκα τοῦ τυγχάνειν τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν, κ.τ.λ.
εἴπερ γὰρ οἴονται, μὴ στοχαζομένους μήδ’ ἐφιεμένους τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐκεῖνον
τὸ τέλος ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ οὗ δεῖ ἐκεῖνα ἀναφέρεσθαι, τὴν τούτων ἐκλογὴν, καὶ
μὴ ταῦτα. τέλος μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐκεῖνα φρονίμως·
ἐκεῖνα δ’ αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν οὐ τέλος, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ὕλη τις
ὑπόκειται τὸν ἐκλεκτικὴν ἀξίαν ἔχουσα. Cic. See p. 279, 3.
[706] Cic. l.c. 6, 20; Plut. l.c.; Stob. ii. 142: Diog. vii. 105.
[707] See p. 232. Stob. ii. 132: διαφέρειν δὲ λέγουσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ
ληπτὸν ... καὶ καθόλου τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἀξίαν ἔχοντος.
[708] Diog. vii. 165: Herillus taught διαφέρειν τέλος καὶ ὑποτελίδα·
(On this expression compare Stob. ii. 60) τῆς μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ
σοφοὺς στοχάζεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ μόνον τὸν σοφόν. Hence Cic. Fin. iv. 15, 40,
raises the objection, Facit enim ille duo sejuncta ultima bonorum,
because he neither despises external things, nor connects them with the
ultimate aim. Diog. l.c., however, says that he taught τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς
καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα εἶναι; and Cic. Off. i. 2, 6, mentions him,
together with Pyrrho and Aristo, as upholders of ἀδιαφορία. It would
appear from these passages that Herillus was not far removed from true
Stoicism. According to Cic. Fin. ii. 13, 43 (conf. Offic.), he had no
followers after the time of Chrysippus.
[709] Cic. Legg. i. 21, 55: Si, ut Chius Aristo dixit, solum bonum esse
diceret quod honestum esset malumque quod turpe, ceteras res omnes
plane pares ac ne minimum quidem utrum adessent an abessent interesse.
Ibid. 13, 38. Fin. iv. 17, 47: Ut Aristonis esset explosa sententia
dicentis, nihil differre aliud ab alio nec esse res ullas præter
virtutes et vitia intra quas quidquam omnino interesset. Ibid. ii. 13,
43; iii. 3, 11; 15, 50; iv. 16, 43; 25, 68; v. 25, 73; Acad. ii. 42,
130; Offic. Fragm. Hortens. (in Nonn. Præfract.); Diog. vii. 160; Sext.
Math. xi. 64. Cic. usually places Aristo together with Pyrrho.
[710] Diog. l.c.: τέλος ἔφησεν εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαφόρως ἔχοντα ζῇν πρὸς τὰ
μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας μηδὲ ἡντινοῦν ἐν αὐτοῖς παραλλαγὴν ἀπολείποντα
ἀλλ’ ἐπίσης ἐπὶ πάντων ἔχοντα. Cic. Acad. l.c.: Huic summum bonum est
in his rebus (the morally adiaphora) neutram in partem moveri; quæ
ἀδιαφορία ab ipso dicitur. Chrysippus, in Plut. C. Not. 27, 2:
Indifference to that which is neither good nor bad presupposes the idea
of the good, and yet, according to Aristo, the good only consists in
that state of indifference. Stob. i. 920; Clem. Strom. ii. 416, C. See
Cic. Fin. iv. 25, 68, for Chrysippus’ attack on this ἀδιαφορία.
[711] Diog. vii. 105: τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν λέγουσι προηγμένα τὰ δὲ
ἀποπροηγμένα. προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ἔχοντα ἀξίαν· ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ ἀπαξίαν
ἔχοντα. By ἀξία, the three meanings of which are discussed, they
understand here μέσην τινὰ δύναμιν ἢ χρείαν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸν κατὰ
φύσιν βίον. 107: τῶν προηγμένων τὰ μὲν δι’ αὑτὰ προῆκται, τὰ δὲ δι’
ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δι’ αὑτὰ καὶ δι’ ἕτερα.... δι’ αὑτὰ μὲν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν
ἐστί. δι’ ἕτερα δὲ ὅτι περιποιεῖ χρείας οὐκ ὀλίγας. ὁμοίως δὲ ἔχει καὶ
ἀποπροηγμένον κατὰ τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον. Essentially the same account,
only somewhat fuller, in Stob. Ecl. ii. 142. Conf. Cic. Acad. i. 10,
36; Fin. iii. 15, 50; iv. 26, 72; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 191; Math. xi. 60;
Alex. Aphr. De An. 157. Zeno (in Stob. 156; Cic. Fin. iii. 16, 52)
explains the conception προηγμένον, and its distinction from ἀγαθόν:
προηγμένον δ’ εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὃ ἀδιάφορον ὂν ἐκλεγόμεθα κατὰ
προηγούμενον λόγον ... οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι προηγμένον, διὰ τὸ τὴν
μεγίστην ἀξίαν αὐτὰ ἔχειν. τὸ δὲ προηγμένον, τὴν δευτέραν χώραν καὶ
ἀξίαν ἔχον, συνεγγίζειν πως τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν αὐλῇ τὸν
προηγούμενον εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα, ἀλλὰ τὸν μετ’ αὐτὸν τεταγμένον.
[712] Stob. ii. 142: ἀδιάφορα δ’ εἶναι λέγουσι τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ
τῶν κακῶν, διχῶς τὸ ἀδιάφορον νοεῖσθαι φάμενοι, καθ’ ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ
μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν καὶ τὸ μήτε αἱρετὸν μήτε φευκτόν· καθ’ ἕτερον δὲ
τὸ μήτε ὁρμῆς μήτε ἀφορμῆς κινητικόν—τὰ καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα. Similarly
Diog. vii. 104. Sext. M. vi. 60, distinguishes a third meaning. It is,
however, only a subdivision of the second.
[713] Stob. ii. 144, 156; Sext. P. iii. 191; M. xi. 62.
[714] Diog. xii. 106; Stob. ii. 142; Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 51; Sext. l.c.;
Plut. Sto. Rep. 30. The Stoics were not altogether agreed as to whether
fame after death belongs to things to be desired. According to Cic.
Fin. iii. 17, 57, Chrysippus and Diogenes denied it; whereas the
younger Stoics, pressed by the Academician Carneades, allowed it. Sen.
Ep. 102, 3, even quotes it as a Stoic maxim that posthumous fame is a
good. But probably bonum is here inaccurately used for προηγμένον.
[715] Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 34; 16, 52; Sext. M. xi. 62. See p. 232, 3 and
283, 2.
[716] Sen. Ep. 9, 14: Sapientem nulla re egere [δεῖσθαι], et tamen
multis illi rebus opus esse [χρῆναι].
[717] Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 4: ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ἀγαθῶν τρόπον τινὰ
συγχωρεῖ καὶ δίδωσι τοῖς βουλομένοις τὰ προηγμένα καλεῖν ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ
τἀναντία ταύταις ταῖς λέξεσιν· ἔστι, εἴ τις βούλεται κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας
παραλλαγὰς (with reference to the greatness of the difference between
προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμένον) τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῶν λέγειν τὸ δὲ κακὸν
... ἐν μὲν τοῖς σημαινομένοις οὐ διαπίπτοντος αὐτοῦ δ’ ἄλλα
στοχαζομένου τῆς κατὰ τὰς ὀνομασίας συνηθείας. See p. 284, 1; Cic. Fin.
iv. 25, 68, and the previous remarks on the division of goods, p. 230,
3. Diog. 103, says that Posidonius included bodily and external
advantages among the ἀγαθά. In Sen. Ep. 87, 35, he, however, expressly
proves that they are not goods.
[718] Sen. Ep. 95, 5: Antipater quoque inter magnos sectæ hujus
auctores aliquid se tribuere dicit externis (namely for the perfection
of the highest good), sed exiguum admodum. Seneca here declaims, in the
spirit of strict Stoicism, against such a heresy, but he himself says
(De Vit. Be. 22, 5): Apud me divitiæ aliquem locum habent, only not
summum et postremum. But what philosopher would have said they had
this?
[719] De Vit. Bea. 21.
[720] Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51; 13, 55; 23, 91; 15, 63; 23, 89. Diogenes
of Seleucia says that it is permitted to circulate base money,
knowingly to conceal defects in a purchase from the purchaser, and such
like. Hecato of Rhodes, a pupil of Panætius, thinks that not only will
a wise man look after his property by means lawful and right, but he
believes that in a famine he will prefer letting his slaves starve, to
maintaining them at too great a sacrifice.
[721] According to Cic. Off. ii. 14, 51, he would allow an attorney to
ignore truth, provided his assertions were at least probable.
[722] Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 2.
[723] Ibid. 5.
[724] According to Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 3 and 7 and 10; 30, 3, Diog.
vii. 188, Stob. ii. 224, the Stoics, following Chrysippus, admit three
ways of earning an honest livelihood—by teaching, by courting the rich,
by serving states and princes. The first and the last were no longer
condemned in the Alexandrian period, as they had been before, but still
they were in bad repute, and the second was particularly so. Still more
at variance with Greek customs was the course advocated by Chrysippus
(in Plut. Sto. Rep. 30): καὶ κυβιστήσειν τρὶς ἐπὶ τούτῳ λαβόντα
τάλαντον. Chrysippus himself (in Diog.) enumerates the objections to
the modes of life just named, and, in general, to all trading for
money, but his objections cannot have appeared to him conclusive.
[725] Plut. Sto. Rep. 18, 1 and 3. Com. Not. 12, 4: λυσιτελεῖ ζῇν
ἄφρονα μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ βιοῦν κἂν μηδέποτε μέλλῃ φρονήσειν; or, as it is
expressed, 11, 8: Heraclitus and Pherecydes would have done well to
renounce their wisdom, if they could thereby have got rid of their
sickness. A prudent man would rather be a fool in human shape than a
wise man in the shape of a beast.
[726] καθῆκον, an expression introduced by Zeno, according to Diog.
108.
[727] See p. 265.
[728] Diog. 107: καθῆκον φασὶν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογόν τιν’ ἴσχει
ἀπολογισμὸν οἷον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν τῇ ζωῇ (the same in Cicero), ὅπερ καὶ
ἐπὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα διατείνει· ὁρᾶσθαι γὰρ κἀπὶ τούτων καθήκοντα. Stob.
158: ὁρίζεται δὲ τὸ καθῆκον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ, ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογον
ἀπολογίαν ἔχει· παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον δὲ ἐναντίως. τοῦτο διατείνει καὶ εἰς τὰ
ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων, ἐνεργεῖ γὰρ τι κἀκεῖνα ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει· ἐπὶ
δὲ τῶν λογικῶν ζῴων οὕτως ἀποδίδοται, τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ. καθῆκον is,
in general, what is according to nature, with which ἀκόλουθον
coincides. (See p. 228, 2.) See Diog. 108: ἐνέργημα δ’ αὐτὸ [τὸ
καθῆκον] εἶναι ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκεῖον.
[729] Diog. vii. 109: τῶν καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ καθήκει τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἀεί·
καὶ ἀεὶ μὲν καθήκει τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῇν· οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐρωτᾷν τὸ
ἀποκρίνεσθαι καὶ περιπατεῖν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. Cic. Fin. iii. 17, 58: Eat
autem officium quod ita factum est, ut ejus facti probabilis ratio
reddi possit. Ex quo intelligitur, officium medium quoddam esse, quod
neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis ... quoniam enim videmus,
&c. (see p. 265, 2) ... quoniamque non dubium est, quin in iis quæ
media dicimus sit aliud sumendum aliud rejiciendum, quidquid ita fit
aut dicitur communi officio continetur. Also Off. i. 3, 8. Acad. i. 10,
37. Corresponding to προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμένον, Zeno placed officium
and contra officium, as media quædam between recte factum and peccatum.
Stob. ii. 158: τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ
κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι ... οὐκ εἶναι δὲ κατορθώματα τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἃ
δὴ οὐδὲ τέλεια, καθήκοντα προσαγορεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ μέσα, οἷον τὸ γαμεῖν,
τὸ πρεσβεύειν, τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια.
[730] Stob. 160. Diog. l.c.: τὰ μὲν εἶναι καθήκοντα ἄνευ περιστάσεως,
τὰ δὲ περιστατικά. καὶ ἄνευ μὲν περιστάσεως τάδε, ὑγείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι
καὶ αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· κατὰ περίστασιν δὲ τὸ πηροῦν ἑαυτὸν καὶ
τὴν κτῆσιν διαῤῥιπτεῖν. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. This
distinction, of course, only applies to μέσον καθῆκον. The
unconditional duty of virtuous life cannot be abrogated by any
circumstances.
[731] Compare, on this point, besides the quotations on p. 265, 2,
Diog. 108: τῶν γὰρ καθ’ ὁρμὴν ἐνεργουμένων τὰ μὲν καθήκοντα εἶναι, τὰ
δὲ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον, τὰ δ’ οὔτε καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον.
καθήκοντα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ὅσα ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ (demands; see p. 244, 2, the
αἱρῶν λόγος) ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔχει τὸ γονεῖς τιμᾷν, ἀδελφοὺς, πατρίδα,
συμπεριφέρεσθαι φίλοις· παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον δὲ ὅσα μὴ αἱρεῖ λόγος, e.g.
neglect of parents; οὔτε δὲ καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον, ὅσα οὔθ’
αἱρεῖ λόγος πράττειν οὔτ’ ἀπαγορεύει, οἷον κάρφος ἀνελέσθαι, κ.τ.λ.
Combining with this the passage previously quoted, it appears that
καθῆκον includes not only actions which aim at a moral good, but those
which aim at a simple προηγμένον; and, in view of the latter, καθῆκον
is included among things intermediate, or ἀδιάφορα in its more extended
meaning. Cic.; see p. 288, 2. Stob. 158, says that those καθήκοντα
which are at the same time κατορθώματα, are οὐδὲ τέλεια, ἀλλὰ μέσα ...
παραμετρεῖσθαι δὲ τὸ μέσον καθῆκον ἀδιαφόροις τισὶ καλουμένοις δὲ παρὰ
φύσιν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τοιαύτην δ’ εὐφυΐαν προσφερομένοις, ὥστ’ εἰ μὴ
λαμβάνοιμεν αὐτὰ ἢ διωθούμεθα ἀπερισπάστως (if, without particular
occasion, or as Diog. 109 observes, ἄνευ περιστάσεως—see previous
note—we despise or reject them) μὴ εὐδαιμονεῖν.
[732] In the latter sense καθῆκον and κατόρθωμα have been already
discussed, p. 264.
[733] Sen. De Ira, i. 16, 7: When the wise man sees anything revolting,
non ... tangetur animus ejus eritque solito commotior? Fateor, sentiet
levem quendam tenuemque motum. Nam, ut dixit Zeno, in sapientis quoque
animo etiam cum vulnus sanatum est, cicatrix manet. Id. ii. 2; Ep. 57,
3; De Const. 10, 4; Stob. Floril. 7, 21; Plut. C. Not. 25, 5; Epictet.
in Gell. N. A. xix. 1, 17. Conf. p. 253, 5, 6.
[734] Sen. Brevit. Vit. c. 14, 2: Hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere,
cum Cynicis excedere. Similarly Ep. 9, 3: Hoc inter nos et illos
(Stilpo and the Cynics in general) interest: noster sapiens vincit
quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit: illorum ne sentit quidem.
[735] Conf. Sen. De Ira, ii. 2–4, particularly the quotation in Gell.
from Epictetus: Even the wise man is apt, at terrible occurrences,
paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere, non opinione alicujus mali
percepta, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis, officium mentis
atque rationis prævertentibus. But what distinguishes him from the
foolish man is that only the foolish man and not the wise man assents
(συγκατατίθεται, προσεπιδοξάζει) to such impressions (φαντασίαι).
[736] Diog. vii. 115: εἶναι δὲ καὶ εὐπαθείας φασὶ τρεῖς, χαρὰν,
εὐλάβειαν, βούλησιν· καὶ τὴν μὲν χαρὰν ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ
οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔπαρσιν· τὴν δὲ εὐλάβειαν τῷ φόβῳ οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔκκλισιν·
τῇ δὲ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τὴν βούλησιν οὖσαν εὔλογον ὄρεξιν.
Subdivisions of βούλησις are: εὔνοια, εὐμένεια, ἀσπασμὸς, ἀγάπησις; of
εὐλάβεια: αἰδὼς, ἁγνεία; of χαρά: τέρψις, εὐφροσύνη, εὐθυμία. The same
three εὐπάθειαι are mentioned by Cic. Tusc. iv. 6, 12, with the remark
that they only belong to the wise. See Stob. 92, and Sen. Ep. 59, 14;
72, 4 and 8, respecting the wise man’s cheerfulness.
[737] Besides the quotations, p. 271, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 31, 5: καὶ
μὴν οὔθ’ αὑτὸν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀποφαίνει σπουδαῖον, οὔτε τινὰ τῶν αὑτοῦ
γνωρίμων ἢ καθηγεμόνων. Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 145; Quintil. Inst. xii. 1.
18.
[738] Sen. Tranq. An. 7, 4: Ubi enim istum invenies, quem tot seculis
quærimus? (the wise man.) Ep. 42, 1: Scis quem nunc virum bonum dicam?
Hujus secundæ notæ. Nam ille alter fortasse tanquam phœnix semel anno
quingentesimo nascitur, see p. 273, 1, just as everything great is
rare. But compare p. 274, 3.
[739] Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56, and p. 274, 2.
[740] Hos enim (says Sen. De Const. 2, 1, of the two named) Stoici
nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt, invictos laboribus, etc. Further
particulars in Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 33 and 70.
[741] Sen. Ep. 90, 5. To these wise men of the old world Posidonius
traced back all kinds of useful discoveries. Posidonius is probably
meant by the ‘younger Stoics’ (Sext. Math. ix. 28), who say that they
introduced belief in the Gods.
[742] Sen. l.c. 44: Non dat natura virtutem, ars est bonum fieri ...
ignorantia rerum innocentes erant ... virtus non contingit animo nisi
instituto et edocto et ad summum adsidua exercitatione perducto. Ad hoc
quidem, sed sine hoc nascimur, &c.
[743] Stob. Ecl. ii. 236: ἴσων δὲ ὄντων τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων εἶναι τινας ἐν
αὐτοῖς διαφορὰς, καθόσον τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ σκληρᾶς καὶ δυσιάτου
διαθέσεως γίγνεται, τὰ δ’ οὒ. (See p. 251, 2, for the difference
between emotion and disease of the soul.) καὶ τῶν σπουδαίων γε ἄλλους
ἄλλων προτρεπτικωτέρους γίγνεσθαι καὶ πιστικωτέρους ἔτι δὲ καὶ
ἀγχινουστέρους, κατὰ τὰ μέσα τὰ ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενα τῶν ἐπιτάσεων
συμβαινουσῶν, i.e., virtuous men are not all equally secure. These
differences of degree do not, however, apply to wisdom (nor on the
other hand to folly), which admits of no increase, but only to such
properties as are included in the whole moral state, but are not
themselves of moral nature. See Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56, and p. 275, 1.
[744] Stob. Serm. 7, 21: ὁ δ’ ἐπ’ ἄκρον, φησὶ [Χρύσιππος] προκόπτων
ἅπαντα πάντως ἀποδίδωσι τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ οὐδὲν παραλείπει· τὸν δὲ
τούτου βίον οὐκ εἶναί πω φησὶν εὐδαίμονα ἀλλ’ ἐπιγίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ τὴν
εὐδαιμονίαν ὅταν αἱ μέσαι πράξεις αὗται προσλάβωσι τὸ βέβαιον καὶ
ἑκτικὸν καὶ ἰδίαν πῆξίν τινα λάβωσιν. Chrysippus was probably the
author of the division of progressers into three classes, which is
discussed by Sen. Ep. 75, 8. Of those who have reached the highest
stage it is said, omnes jam affectus et vitia posuerunt, quæ erant
complectenda didicerunt, sed illis adhuc inexperta fiducia est. Bonum
suum nondum in usu habent. Jam tamen in illa quæ fugerunt recidere non
possunt, jam ibi sunt unde non est retro lapsus, sed hoc illis de se
nondum liquet et ... scire se nesciunt.
[745] See pp. 239, 1; 271, 7.
[746] Sen. Ep. 75, 10: Quidam hoc proficientium genus de quo locutus
sum ita complectuntur, ut illos dicant jam effugisse morbos animi,
affectus nondum (on this distinction, see p. 251, 2), et adhuc in
lubrico stare, quia nemo sit extra periculum malitiæ nisi qui totam eam
excussit. The same view is upheld by Sen. Ep. 72, 6.
[747] Diog. vii. 127: τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος μὲν ἀποβλητὴν, Κλεάνθης δὲ
ἀναπόβλητον· ὁ μὲν, ἀποβλητὴν, διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν· ὁ δὲ,
ἀναπόβλητον, διὰ βεβαίους καταλήψεις. The latter view was that of the
Cynics. Although departed from by Chrysippus, it belongs to those
points in which the original relation of Stoicism to Cynicism was
weakened by him. Sen. Ep. 72, 6, speaking in the spirit of Cleanthes,
says that he considered a candidate of the first class secure against
relapses. On the other hand, Simpl. Categ. 102, α, β (Schol. in Arist.
86, a, 48; b, 30), says first that the Stoics declared virtue to be
indefectible, but subsequently limits this assertion by saying that, ἐν
καιροῖς (the reading κάροις is better) καὶ μελαγχολίαις, virtue,
together with the whole rational life (λογικὴ ἕξις), is lost, and
succeeded, not indeed by vice, but by a ἕξις μέση. A similar question
is, Whether the wise man can become mad? which is answered in the
negative by Diog. vii. 118, though not without some modifying clauses.
Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b, also combats the view that the wise man will
act virtuously when in a frenzy.
[748] Further particulars have been already given, p. 61. Seneca (Ep.
95, 1) calls the subject of applied ethics, which Aristo rejected,
parænetice, or pars præceptiva. Sextus speaks of two τόποι—a
παραινετικὸς and a ὑποθετικός. Both terms, however, appear to denote
the same thing; for ὑποθετικὸς is defined by Muson. in Stob. Floril.
117, 8, as παραινετικός. He who is himself insufficiently educated will
do well ζητῶν λόγων ἀκούειν ὑποθετικῶν παρὰ τῶν πεποιημένων ἔργον
εἰδέναι τίνα μὲν βλαβερὰ τίνα δὲ ὠφέλιμα ἀνθρώποις. ὑποθετικὸς τόπος is
therefore identical with the suasio of Posidonius (in Sen. Ep. 95, 65).
See p. 223, note 1.
[749] Sen. Ep. 94, 4: Cleanthes utilem quidem judicat et hanc partem,
sed imbecillam nisi ab universo fluit, nisi decreta ipsa philosophiæ et
capita cognovit.
[750] See p. 223, 1.
[751] See Cic. Off. i. 2, 7; 3, 9; iii. 2, 7. Cicero himself said that
he chiefly followed Panætius (περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων), not as a mere
translator, but correctione quadam adhibita. See p. 300, 2.
[752] Cic. Off. i. 3, 7: Omnis de officio duplex est quæstio: unum
genus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum: alterum, quod positum est in
præceptis, quibus in omnes partes usus vitæ conformari possit. He would
devote his attention to officia, quorum præcepta traduntur. Cicero then
goes fully into particulars. He treats of amusement and occupation (i.
29, 103); of the peculiar duties of the young and the old, of
officials, citizens, foreigners (i. 34); of outward appearance, gait,
conversation (i. 36); of the means of winning others (ii. 6, 21).
Panætius must have given a similar treatment to the subject.
[753] See p. 223, 1.
[754] Particularly in the portions treating περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων and
περὶ προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν.
[755] See p. 260, 4.
[756] See p. 260, 4, and 261, 1.
[757] According to Cic. Off. i. 2; 7, Add Att. xvi. 11, Panætius, in
the third chief division of his treatise on duties, intended to discuss
cases of collision between apparent interest and duty, but his
intentions were never carried out. It appears, however, from Off. i.
45, 159; iii. 12, 50; 13, 55; 23, 89, that these cases were frequently
discussed, not only by the pupils of Panætius, Posidonius, and Hecato,
but by Diogenes of Seleucia and Antipater of Tarsus.
[758] The Treatise of Panætius appears to have been used as a chief
authority, not only by Cicero, but by others. Antipater of Tyre, a
cotemporary of Cicero, had added discussions on the care of health and
wealth (Cic. Off. ii. 24, 86); and Hecato, in his treatise on duties,
had added further casuistical investigations (Cic. iii. 28, 89).
Brutus, too, who, like his teacher Antiochus, was devoted to a moderate
Stoicism, and of whom Sen. Ep. 95, 45, reports that he had laid down
rules for the relations of parents, children, and brothers in his
treatise περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος, may have followed Panætius.
[759] Sen. Ep. 94, 1; 95, 1.
[760] Stob. ii. 128: ἐν ἕξει (not only ἐν σχέσει, see p. 230) δὲ οὐ
μόνας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας τὰς τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀνδρὶ,
ἀλλοιωθείσας ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ γενομένας ἀμεταπτώτους, οἱονεὶ γὰρ
ἀρετὰς γίγνεσθαι.
[761] The treatise of Panætius—we learn from Cic. Off. i. 3, 9; iii. 2,
7; 7, 33—discussed its subject first from the platform of duty, and
then from that of interest. The third part, which Panætius proposed to
himself—the collision between duty and interest—was never fully carried
out. Cicero adds discussions on two questions, which of two conflicting
duties and which of two conflicting interests must be preferred (i. 3,
10, c. 43; ii. 25). Otherwise he appears in his two first books to
follow the order of Panætius.
[762] See pp. 260, 298. Amongst other things, as we learn from the
fragment in Athen. xiii. 555, a, Chrysippus discussed the question of
shaving; and Alex. Aphr. Top. 26, quotes, in illustration of the
useless enquiries of the Stoics, ἐν τοῖς περὶ καθηκόντων, an enquiry
whether it is proper to take the largest portion before one’s father at
table, and whether it is proper to cross the legs in the school of a
philosopher.
[763] εὐταξία, εὐκαιρία, talis ordo actionum ut in vita omnia sint apta
inter se et convenientia. i. 40, 142; 144.
[764] i. 43. We omit Cicero’s treatise, this section not being found in
Panætius.
[765] Panætius still more diffusively, 5, 16.
[766] Such, for instance, as the prohibition against being angry with
enemies (i. 25, 88), which recalls at once the difference of the Stoics
and Peripatetics on the admissibility of emotions. See p. 252.
[767] Diog. 117 says: The σόφος or σπουδαῖος is free from vanity
(ἄτυπος), is earnest (αὐστηρὸς), frank (ἀκίβδηλος), and with no
inclination to pretence. He stands aloof from the affairs of life
(ἀπράγμων), lest he should do anything contrary to duty. See p. 323, 1.
Stob. ii. 240, says: The wise man is gentle (πρᾶος), quiet (ἡσύχιος),
and considerate (κόσμιος), never exciting angry feelings against
others, never putting off what he has to do.
[768] Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 1: βλάψουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ ψευδεῖς
φαντασίας ἐμποιοῦντες, ἂν αἱ φαντασίαι ποιῶσιν αὐτοτελῶς τὰς
συγκαταθέσεις· πολλάκις γὰρ οἱ σοφοὶ ψεύδει χρῶνται πρὸς τοὺς φαύλους
καὶ φαντασίαν παριστᾶσι πιθανὴν, οὐ μὴν αἰτίαν τῆς συγκαταθέσεως· ἐπεὶ
καὶ τῆς ὑπολήψεως αἰτία τῆς ψευδοῦς ἔσται καὶ τῆς ἀπάτης. Stob. ii.
230: μὴ ψεύδεσθαι τὸν σόφον ἀλλ’ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀληθεύειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ
λέγειν τι ψεῦδος τὸ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ διαψευστῶς τὸ ψεῦδος
λέγειν καὶ ἐπὶ ἀπάτῃ τῶν πλησίον. τῷ μέντοι ψεύδει ποτὲ συγχρήσασθαι
[l. -σεσθαι] νομίζουσιν αὐτὸν κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ἄνευ συγκαταθέσεως·
καὶ γὰρ κατὰ στρατηγίαν πρὸς τῶν ἀντιπάλων, καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ
συμφέροντος προόρασιν (which, however, may not be translated as Ritter
iii. 662 does ‘for the sake of advantage’; it rather refers to such
cases as those mentioned by Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 17, and Plato, Rep. ii.
382, C, 389, B; iv. 459, C, in which the interests of another or of the
community require deception) καὶ κατ’ ἄλλας οἰκονομίας τοῦ βίου πολλάς.
In accordance with this passage, too, the statement of Procl. in Alcib.
(Op. ed. Cous. iii. 64)—that the Stoics differ from their predecessors
in that they reject all lies—must be explained: οὔτε γὰρ ἐξαπατᾷν ἔστι
δικαίως κατ’ αὐτοὺς οὔτε βιάζεσθαι οὔτε ἀποστερεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἑκάστη τῶν
πράξεων τούτων ἀπὸ μοχθηρᾶς πρόεισιν ἕξεως καὶ ἄδικός ἐστιν. The point
here in dispute is simply verbal; the Stoics were, in reality, at one
with Plato, in not calling permitted falsehood untruth or deceit only
for the reasons quoted by Chrysippus and Stobæus.
[769] Cic. Fin. iii. 20. 68: Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii
cadere in sapientem dicunt, si quis ejusmodi forte casus inciderit, ut
id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo. The latter must, however, have been
in a minority.
[770] Diog. 121: κυνιεῖν τ’ αὐτὸν [τὸν σοφόν]· εἶναι γὰρ τὸν κυνισμὸν
σύντομον ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν ὁδὸν, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρος [on whom, see p. 51, 1] ἐν τῇ
ἠθικῇ. Stob. 238: κυνιεῖν τε τὸν σοφὸν λέγουσιν, ἴσον τῷ ἐπιμένειν τῷ
κυνισμῷ, οὐ μὴν σοφὸν ὄντ’ ἂν ἄρξασθαι τοῦ κυνισμοῦ.
[771] See p. 274, 2. According to the epigrams of Timon, in Diog. vii.
16, Athen. iv. 158, a, Sext. Math. xi. 172, Zeno’s School must have
presented a very Cynical appearance. Probably, the description is
partially true of the earlier history of that School; still I would
attach no great value to it as illustrating the system.
[772] Ep. 5, 1; 103, 5; Fr. 19, in Lactant. Inst. iii. 15.
[773] See, on this point, Tranq. An. 8, 4; Benef. v. 4, 3; 6, 1; Ep.
90, 14. Sen. Ep. 29, 1, does not, however, agree with the Stoic custom
of sowing exhortations broadcast.
[774] As may be seen in Musonius and Epictetus.
[775] Plut. Sto. Rep. 22 (the question being as to the pollution of the
temples by the contact with the dead or lying-in women or unclean
foods); in other cases indeed, as Plutarch objects, he would not allow
these considerations.
[776] Besides Diog. vii. 188, and Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 207, see
Chrysippus’s own words, in Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 247 (Math. xi. 193). The
majority of the Stoics appear to have limited cannibalism to cases of
extreme necessity. See Diog. 121. Chrysippus had probably been
speaking, in the context, of the different modes of treating the dead
among various nations (Cic. Tusc. i. 45, 108), intending to prove that
no uniformity of practice prevailed.
[777] Cic. Off. i. 35, 128, with the limitation: Cynici aut si qui
fuerunt Stoici pæne Cynici.
[778] Diog. vii. 33: καὶ ἐσθῆτι δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κελεύει χρῆσθαι καὶ ἄνδρας
καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ μηδὲν μόριον ἀποκεκρύφθαι. The latter act is only
conditional, and allowed in certain cases, such as for purposes of
gymnastics.
[779] Diog. 33; 131.
[780] Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 201.
[781] Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 200; 245; Math. xi. 190; Clement. Homil. v. 18.
[782] Sext. Pyrrh. i. 160; iii. 205; 246; Math. xi. 191; Plut. Sto.
Rep. 22; Clement. Homil. v. 18.
[783] Plut. l.c. 21, 1.
[784] Sextus, however (Pyrrh. iii. 206), attributes to him, as the
representative of the School, what properly only belongs to Chrysippus:
τό τε αἰσχρουργεῖν ... ὁ Ζήνων οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζει.
[785] His words (Sext. Math. xi. 190; Pyrrh. iii. 245; Plut. Qu. Con.
iii. 6, 1, 6) are as follows: διαμηρίζειν δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἧσσον
παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ παιδικὰ μηδὲ θήλεα ἢ ἄρσενα· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα παιδικοῖς ἢ μὴ
παιδικοῖς οὐδὲ θηλείαις ἢ ἄῤῥεσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πρέπει τε καὶ πρέποντά
ἐστι; and: διαμεμήρικας τὸν ἐρώμενον; οὐκ ἔγωγε· πότερον οὖν ἐπεθύμησας
αὐτὸν διαμηρίσαι; καὶ μάλα. ἀλλὰ ἐπεθύμησας παρασχεῖν σοι αὐτὸν ἢ
ἐφοβήθης κελεῦσαι; μὰ Δί’. ἀλλ’ ἐκέλευσας; καὶ μάλα. εἶτ’ οὐχ ὑπηρέτησέ
σοι; οὐ γάρ. The form of expression is certainly very Cynic-like, but
the meaning is not what Sextus supposes. Zeno’s object is not to
justify unnatural vice, but to show that those who allow any form of
unchastity cannot forbid this form, and that the wish and the attempt
are morally on a par with the deed.
[786] See the following note.
[787] Musonius, in Stob. Serm. 6, 61 (conf. Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 68): Ne
amores quidem sanctos alienos a sapiente esse volunt. According to
Diog. vii. 129, Stob. ii. 238, love is only directed to beauty of soul.
By Diog., Stob., Alex. Aphr. Top. 75, and Cic. Tusc. iv. 34, 72, it is
defined to be ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιΐας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον; and,
according to Plut. C. Not. 28, ἔμφασις κάλλους is an incentive to love;
but these statements are guarded by adding that the bad and irrational
are ugly, and the wise are beautiful. It was probably in imitation of
Plat. Sym. 203, E, that the Stoics nevertheless stated τοὺς ἐρασθέντας
αἰσχρῶν παύεσθαι καλῶν γενομένων. Love is excited by a sensation of
εὐφυία πρὸς ἀρετὴν, its object is to develop this capacity into real
virtue. Until this end has been attained, the loved one is still
foolish, and therefore ugly. When it has been attained, the striving,
in which Eros consists, has reached its object, and the love of the
teacher to his pupil goes over into friendship between equals.
[788] Conf. Orig. c. Cels. iv. 45: The Stoics made good and evil depend
on the intention alone, and declared external actions, independent of
intentions, to be indifferent: εἶπον οὖν ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀδιαφόρων τόπῳ ὅτι
τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ (the action taken by itself) θυγατράσι μίγνυσθαι ἀδιάφορόν
ἐστιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ χρὴ ἐν ταῖς καθεστώσαις πολιτείαις τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν.
καὶ ὑποθέσεως χάριν ... παρειλήφασι τὸν σοφὸν μετὰ τῆς θυγατρὸς μόνης
καταλελειμμένον παντὸς τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους διεφθαρμένου, καὶ
ζητοῦσιν εἰ καθηκόντως ὁ πατὴρ συνελεύσεται τῇ θυγατρὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ
ἀπολέσθαι ... τὸ πᾶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος.
[789] How strictly he respected chastity and modesty in women is proved
by the fragment, preserved by Clem. Pædag. iii. 253, C, respecting the
dress and conduct of maidens.
[790] Cic. Fin. iii. 19, 64: Mundum autem censent regi numine Deorum
eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et Deorum; et
unumquemque nostrum ejus mundi esse partem, ex quo illud consequi, ut
communem utilitatem nostræ anteponamus.
[791] M. Aurel. ix. 9; xii. 30. Sen. Ep. 95, 52: The whole world is a
unit; membra sumus corporis magni. Natura nos cognatos edidit. Hence
mutual love, love of society, justice, and fairness. Ep. 48, 2: Alteri
vivas oportet, si vis tibi vivere. Hæc societas ... nos homines
hominibus miscet et judicat aliquod esse commune jus generis humani.
[792] Cic. Legg. 12, 33: Quibus enim ratio a natura data est, iisdem
etiam recta ratio data est: ergo et lex, quæ est recta ratio in jubendo
et vetando (see p. 241, 2): si lex, jus quoque. At omnibus ratio. Jus
igitur datum est omnibus. Ibid. 7, 23: Est igitur ... prima homini cum
Deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta
ratio communis est. Quæ cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum
Diis putandi sumus. Inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos
communio juris est. Quibus autem hæc sunt inter eos communio, et
civitatis ejusdem habendi sunt. Ps. Plut. V. Hom. 119: The Stoics teach
ἕνα μὲν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, συμπολιτεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ θεοὺς καὶ
ἀνθρώπους, δικαιοσύνης μετέχοντας φύσει.
[793] Cic. Tusc. iv. 23, 51.
[794] Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67; Off. i. 7, 22; Sen. Clement. i. 3, 2;
Benef. vii. 1, 7; M. Aurel. v. 16, 30; vii. 55; viii. 59; ix. 1; xi.
18; Diog. vii. 129; Sext. Math. ix. 131.
[795] Hence, according to Cic. Fin. iii. 21, 69, not only ὠφελήματα and
βλάμματα (moral good and evil), but εὐχρηστήματα and δυσχρηστήματα
(other advantages and disadvantages) are common to all men.
[796] According to Plut. Sto. Rep. 16, Chrysippus denied that a man
could wrong himself. If, in other passages, he seems to assert the
contrary, this apparent inconsistency is probably due to the double
meaning of ἀδικεῖν, which sometimes means ‘to wrong,’ sometimes simply
‘to harm.’ Strictly speaking, a relation involving justice can only
exist towards another. See Cic. on p. 315, 2.
[797] Towards the Gods, man stands, according to the above passages, in
a relation involving justice. There is, therefore (Sext. ix. 131), a
justice towards the Gods, of which piety (see p. 261, 1) is only a
part.
[798] Sen. Benef. iv. 18.
[799] M. Aurel. vii. 13: If you only consider yourself a part, and not
a member, of human society, οὔπω ἀπὸ καρδίας φιλεῖς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους·
οὔπω σε καταληπτικῶς εὐφραίνει τὸ εὐεργετεῖν· ἔτι ὡς πρέπον αὐτὸ ψιλὸν
ποιεῖς· οὔπω ὡς αὑτὸν εὖ ποιῶν.
[800] See p. 298, 3.
[801] Off. i. 7, 20: De tribus autem reliquis [virtutibus, the three
others besides understanding] latissime patet ea ratio, qua societas
hominum inter ipsos et vitæ quasi communitas continetur, cujus partes
duæ sunt: justitia, in qua virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua viri
boni nominantur, et huic conjuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel
benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet.
[802] Off. i. 7–13; ii. 14–17.
[803] See p. 254, 2, 3.
[804] We shall subsequently have occasion to prove this in detail. It
may here suffice to refer to the treatises of Seneca, De Beneficiis, De
Clementia, and De Ira. On the value of mercy, he remarks (De Clem. i.
3, 2): Nullam ex omnibus virtutibus magis homini convenire, cum sit
nulla humanior.
[805] Conf. Panætius, in Cic. Off. i. 25, 88.
[806] De Clem. ii. 5–8.
[807] Among the points characteristic of Stoicism, the censure deserves
notice which Sen. (Ep. 7, 3; 95, 33; Tranq. An. 2, 13) passes on
gladiatorial shows and the Roman thirst for war. (Ep. 95, 30.) The
attitude of the Stoics to slavery and the demand for love of enemies
will be considered hereafter.
[808] Stob. ii. 184: τήν τε ὁμόνοιαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν, διὸ
καὶ τοὺς σπουδαίους πάντας ὁμονοεῖν ἀλλήλοις διὰ τὸ συμφωνεῖν ἐν τοῖς
κατὰ τὸν βίον. Cic. N. D. i. 44, 121: Censent autem [Stoici] sapientes
sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos, nihil est enim virtute
amabilius. Quam qui adeptus erit, ubicumque erit gentium, a nobis
diligetur. See Off. i. 17, 55. Conf. p. 309, 3.
[809] Plut. C. Not. 22, 2. The same thought is expressed in the
statement (ibid. 33, 2) that the wise man is as useful to deity (the
universe) as deity is to him.
[810] Sen. Benef. vii. 12, 2; Ep. 81, 11; 123, 15; 9, 5; Stob. ii. 118;
see p. 271, 3. Diog. 124. According to Diog. 32, Zeno, like Socrates,
was blamed for asserting that only the good (σπουδαῖοι) among
themselves are fellow-citizens, friends, and relations; whilst all the
bad are enemies and strangers.
[811] He is, as Sen. Ep. 9, 5, puts it, faciendarum amicitiarum
artifex.
[812] Si vis amari, ama, says Hecato, in Sen. Ep. 9, 6.
[813] We have already encountered friendship in the Stoic list of
goods. See p. 230, 3. Stob. 186 says, more accurately, that friendship,
for the sake of the commonwealth, is not a good, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐκ
διεστηκότων ἀγαθὸν εἶναι; on the other hand, friendship, in the sense
of friendly relations to others, belongs to external goods; in the
sense of a friendly disposition merely, it belongs to intellectual
goods. On the value of friendship, Sen. 99, 3. Friendship is defined as
κοινωνία βίου (Stob. 130); κοινωνία τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον, χρωμένων ἡμῶν
τοῖς φίλοις ὡς ἑαυτοῖς (Diog. 124). Similar definitions are given by
Stob. of varieties of friendship: γνωριμότης, συνήθεια, κ.τ.λ. On the
absolute community of goods among friends, see Sen. Ep. 47, 2; 3, 2;
Benef. vii. 4, 1; 12, 1.
[814] Ep. 109, 3 and 11.
[815] Ep. 9, 13: Se contentus est sapiens, ad beate vivendum, non ad
vivendum. Ad hoc enim multis illi rebus opus est, ad illud tantum animo
sano et erecto et despiciente fortunam.
[816] Ep. 9, 5.
[817] Sen. Ep. 109, 5.
[818] Ep. 109, 13; 9, 8; 10, 12; 18.
[819] See p. 318, 2.
[820] Stob. ii. 208: τὸν γὰρ νόμον εἶναι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, σπουδαῖον,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν πόλιν. ἱκανῶς δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης περὶ τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι
τὴν πόλιν λόγον ἠρώτησε τοῦτον· πόλις μὲν εἰ (wrongly struck out by
Meineke) ἔστιν οἰκητήριον κατασκεύασμα εἰς ὃ καταφεύγοντας ἔστι δίκην
δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἀστεῖον δὴ πόλις ἐστιν; Floril. 44, 12. See pp.
223; 241, 3.
[821] Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 3: Chrysippus recommends political life,
placing βίος σχολαστικὸς on the same footing with βίος ἡδονικός. Diog.
vii. 121: πολιτεύεσθαί φασιν τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ, ὥς φησι
Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ βίων· καὶ γὰρ κακίαν ἐφέξειν καὶ ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν
ἐφορμήσειν. Sen. De Ot. 3, 2: Epicurus ait: non accedet ad rempublicam
sapiens, nisi si quid intervenerit. Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam,
nisi si quid impedierit. Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 68: Since man exists for
the sake of other men, consentaneum est huic naturæ, ut sapiens velit
gerere et administrare rempublicam: atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem
adjungere et velle ex ea liberos procreare. Stob. ii. 184: τό τε
δίκαιόν φασι φύσει εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει. ἑπόμενον δὲ τούτοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ
τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ... καὶ τὸ νομοθετεῖν τε καὶ παιδεύειν
ἀνθρώπους, κ.τ.λ.
[822] Cic. Legg. ii. 5, 11.
[823] Diog. Ibid.: καὶ γαμήσειν, ὡς ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν πολιτείᾳ, καὶ
παιδοποιήσεσθαι. Ibid. 120: The Stoics consider love of children,
parents, and kindred to be according to nature. Chrysippus (in Hieron.
Ad. Jovin. i. 191): The wise man will marry, lest he offend Zeus
Γαμήλιος and Γενέθλιος. Antipater (whether the well-known pupil of
Diogenes of Seleucia, or the younger Stoic Antipater of Tyre mentioned
by Cic. Off. ii. 24, 86, is not stated) in Stob. Floril. 67, 25: Wife
and child are necessary to give completeness to civil and domestic
life; a citizen owes children to his country, and family love is the
purest. Musonius (Ibid. 67, 20, Conf. 75, 15): A philosopher ought to
be a pattern in married life, as in every other natural relation, and
discharge his duties as a citizen by founding a family; love for wife
and children is the deepest love.
[824] Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 1: ἐπεὶ τοίνυν πολλὰ μὲν, ὡς ἐν λόγοις, αὐτῷ
Ζήνωνι, πολλὰ δὲ Κλεάνθει, πλεῖστα δὲ Χρυσίππῳ γεγραμμένα τυγχάνει περὶ
πολιτείας καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν καὶ ῥητορεύειν.
Conf. the titles in Diog. vii. 4; 166; 175; 178. Diogenes’s list
contains no political writings of Chrysippus. It is, however, known to
be incomplete; for Diog. vii. 34; 131, quotes Chrysippus’s treatise
περὶ πολιτείας, a treatise also quoted by Plut. Sto. Rep. 21 (1, 3, 5).
According to Cic. Legg. iii. 6, 14, Diogenes and Panætius were the only
Stoics before his time who had entered into particulars respecting
legislation, though others might have written much on politics.
[825] Conf. the fragment of Sen. De Matrimonio, in Hieron. Ad. Jovin.
i. 191, Fr. 81 Haase, which, like the Essenes, requires absolute
abstinence from pregnant women. A few unimportant fragments are also
preserved of Chrysippus’s treatise on the education of children. See
Quintil. Inst. i. 11, 17; 1, 4 and 16; 3, 14; 10, 32; Baguet, De Chrys.
(Annal. Lovan. iv. p. 335). He is reproached by Posidonius (Galen.
Hipp. et Plat. v. 1, p. 465) for neglecting the first germs of
education, particularly those previous to birth.
[826] Diog. vii. 131.
[827] Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 3–5; 7; 30, 3; C. Not. 7, 6.
[828] Diog. vii. 4.
[829] Diog. vii. 131.
[830] Diog. 33: κοινάς τε γὰρ γυναῖκας δογματίζειν ὁμοίως ἐν τῇ
Πολιτείᾳ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς διακοσίους στίχους, μήθ’ ἱερὰ μήτε δικαστήρια
μήτε γυμνάσια ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οἰκοδομεῖσθαι ... νόμισμα δ’ οὔτ’ ἀλλαγῆς
ἕνεκεν οἴεσθαι δεῖν κατασκευάζειν οὔτ’ ἀποδημίας. Ibid. 131.
[831] Plut. Alex. Virt. i. 6, p. 329.
[832] Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 1: οἶμαι γὰρ ἔγωγε τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀπράγμονα
εἶναι καὶ ὀλιγοπράγμονα καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, ὁμοίως τῆς τε
αὐτοπραγίας καὶ ὀλιγοπραγμοσύνης ἀστείων ὄντων ... τῷ γὰρ ὄντι φαίνεται
ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἡσυχίαν βίος ἀκίνδυνόν τε καὶ ἀσφαλὲς ἔχειν, κ.τ.λ.
[833] Stob. Ecl. ii. 186: πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς
τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαινούσαις τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας
πολιτείας.
[834] Stob. Floril. 45, 29: In answer to the question, why he withdrew
from public life, he replied: διότι εἰ μὲν πονηρὰ πολιτεύεται [-σεται],
τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπαρέσει, εἰ δὲ χρηστὰ, τοῖς πολίταις.
[835] Sen. Ep. 29, 11: Quis enim placere potest populo, cui placet
virtus? Malis artibus popularis favor quæritur. Similem te illis facias
oportet ... conciliari nisi turpi ratione amor turpium non potest.
[836] Sen. De Ot. 3, 3, p. 320, 3: It needs a special cause for
devoting oneself to private life. Causa autem illa late patet: si
respublica corruptior est quam ut adjuvari possit, si occupata est
malis ... si parum habebit [sc. sapiens] auctoritatis aut virium nec
illum admissura erit respublica, si valetudo illum impediet. Ibid. 8,
1: Negant nostri sapientem ad quamlibet rempublicam accessurum: quid
autem interest, quomodo sapiens ad otium veniat, utrum quia respublica
illi deest, an quia ipse reipublicæ, si omnibus defutura respublica
est? (So we ought to punctuate.) Semper autem deerit fastidiose
quærentibus. Interrogo ad quam rempublicam sapiens sit accessurus. Ad
Atheniensium, etc.? Si percensere singulas voluero, nullam inveniam,
quæ sapientem aut quam sapiens pati possit. Similarly Athenodorus, in
Sen. Tranq. An. 3, 2.
[837] Athenodor. l.c. 3, 3.
[838] Diss. iii. 22, 67.
[839] Sen. De Otio, 4, 1: Duas respublicas animo complectamur, alteram
magnam et vere publicam, qua Di atque homines continentur, in qua non
ad hunc angulum respicimus aut ad illum, sed terminos civitatis nostræ
cum sole metimur: alteram cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi. Does it
not seem like reading Augustin’s De Civitate Dei? Some serve the great,
others the small state; some serve both. Majori reipublicæ et in otio
deservire possumus, immo vero nescio an in otio melius. Ep. 68, 2: Cum
sapienti rempublicam ipso dignam dedimus, id est mundum, non est extra
rempublicam etiamsi recesserit: immo fortasse relicto uno angulo in
majora atque ampliora transit, &c. Epict. Diss. iii. 22, 83: Do you ask
whether a wise man will busy himself with the state? What state could
be greater than the one about which he does busy himself, not
consulting the citizens of one city alone for the purpose of obtaining
information about the revenues of a state, and such like, but the
citizens of the world, that with them he may converse of happiness and
unhappiness, of freedom and slavery? τηλικαύτην πολίτειαν
πολιτευσαμένου ἀνθρώπου, σύ μοι πυνθάνῃ, εἰ πολιτεύσεται; πυθοῦ μου
καὶ, εἰ ἄρξει· πάλιν ἐρῶ σοι· μωρὲ, ποίαν ἀρχὴν μείζονα ἧς ἄρχει;
[840] Sen. De Otio, 5, 1; 7; 6, 4.
[841] Marcus Aurelius, vi. 44: πόλις καὶ πατρὶς ὡς μὲν Ἀντωνίῳ μοι ἡ
Ῥώμη, ὡς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ κόσμος. τὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν οὖν ταύταις ὠφέλιμα μόνα
ἐστί μοι ἀγαθά. ii. 5: πάσης ὥρας φρόντιζε στιβαρῶς ὡς Ῥωμαῖος καὶ
ἄρρην.
[842] Ibid. ix. 29: ὅρμησον ἐὰν διδῶται καὶ μὴ περιβλέπου εἴ τις
εἴσεται μηδὲ τὴν Πλάτωνος πολίτειαν ἔλπιζε, ἀλλὰ ἀρκοῦ εἰ τὸ βραχύτατον
πρόεισι.
[843] Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 1.
[844] De Otio, 6, 5; Tranq. An. 1, 10.
[845] See Socrates and Socratic Schools, p. 324.
[846] This connection is already indicated by Plutarch’s grouping the
Stoics and Alexander together.
[847] Sen. Ep. 95, 52; M. Aurel. See p. 312, 2; 313.
[848] Diss. i. 13, 3. See p. 331, 2.
[849] Sen. Ep. 95, 52, continues after the quotation in p. 312, 2: Ex
illius [naturæ] constitutione miserius est nocere quam lædi. Ex illius
imperio paratæ sint juvantis manus. Ille versus et in pectore et in ore
sit: homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto. V. Be. 24, 3: Hominibus
prodesse natura me jubet, et servi liberine sint hi, ingenui an
libertini, justæ libertatis an inter amicos datæ quid refert? Ubicumque
homo est, ibi beneficii locus est. De Clem. i. 1, 3: Nemo non, cui alia
desint, hominis nomine apud me gratiosus est. De Ira, i. 5.
[850] Sen. De Otio, i. 4: see p. 256, 4: Stoici nostri dicunt ... non
desinemus communi bono operam dare, adjuvare singulos, opem ferre etiam
inimicis. We shall subsequently meet with similar explanations from
Musonius, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. In particular, Seneca’s
treatise, De Ira, deserves to be mentioned here, and especially i. 5,
2: Quid homine aliorum amantius? quid ira infestius? Homo in adjutorium
mutuum genitus est, ira in exitium. Hic congregari vult, illa
discedere. Hic prodesse, illa nocere. Hic etiam ignotis succurrere,
illa etiam carissimos perdere. Ibid. ii. 32, 1: It is not so
praiseworthy to return injury for injury, as benefit for benefit. Illic
vinci turpe est, hic vincere. Inhumanum verbum est ... ultio et talio.
Magni animi est injurias despicere. Conf. Cic. Off. i. 25, 88: Violent
anger towards enemies must be blamed: nihil enim laudabilius, nihil
magno et præclaro viro dignius placabilitate atque clementia. Even when
severity is necessary, punishment ought not to be administered in
anger, since such an emotion cannot be allowed at all. See p. 254, 1.
[851] Sen. Ep. 95, 52. See p. 328, 3. Cic. Off. i. 13, 41.
[852] Cic. l.c.: Even towards slaves, justice must be observed. Here,
too, belongs the question, discussed in full by Sen. Benef. iii. 18–28,
Whether a slave can do a kindness to his master? He who denies that he
can, says Seneca (18, 2), is ignarus juris humani. Refert enim cujus
animi sit, qui præstat, non cujus status: nulli præclusa virtus est,
omnibus patet, omnes admittit, omnes invitat, ingenuos, libertinos,
servos, reges, exules. Non eligit domum nec censum, nudo homine
contenta est. Slavery, he continues, does not affect the whole man.
Only the body belongs to his lord; his heart belongs to himself, c. 20.
The duties of the slave have limits, and over against them stand
certain definite rights (c. 21. Conf. De Clement. i. 18, 2). He
enumerates many instances of self-sacrifice and magnanimity in slaves,
and concludes by saying: Eadem omnibus principia eademque origo, nemo
altero nobilior, nisi cui rectius ingenium ... unus omnium parens
mundus est ... neminem despexeris ... sive libertini ante vos habentur
sive servi sive exterarum gentium homines: erigite audacter animos, et
quicquid in medio sordidi est transilite: expectat vos in summo magna
nobilitas, &c. So Ep. 31, 11; V. Be. 24, 3. See p. 328, 3. Conf. Ep.
44: Rank and birth are of no consequence, and p. 270, 3.
[853] Only the wise man is really free; all who are not wise are fools.
[854] Diog. 122, at least, calls δεσποτεία, the possession and
government of slaves, something bad.
[855] According to Sen. Benef. iii. 22, 1, Cic. l.c., Chrysippus had
defined a slave, perpetuus mercenarius; and hence inferred that he
ought to be treated as such: operam exigendam, justa præbenda. Sen. Ep.
47, expresses a very humane view of treating slaves, contrasting a man
with a slave: servi sunt; immo homines. He regards a slave as a friend
of lower rank, and, since all men stand under the same higher power,
speaks of himself as conservus.
[856] M. Aurel. iv. 4: εἰ τὸ νοερὸν ἡμῖν κοινὸν, καὶ ὁ λόγος καθ’ ὃν
λογικοί ἐσμεν κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ προστακτικὸς τῶν ποιητέων ἢ μὴ
λόγος κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ νόμος κοινός. εἰ τοῦτο, πολῖταί ἐσμεν· εἰ
τοῦτο, πολιτεύματός τινος μετέχομεν· εἰ τοῦτο, ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις
ἐστί.
[857] See pp. 312, 1, 3; 325, 3, and Plut. Com. Not. 34, 6, who makes
the Stoics assert: τὸν κόσμον εἶναι πόλιν καὶ πολίτας τοὺς ἀστέρας. M.
Aurel. x. 15: ζῆσον ... ὡς ἐν πόλει τῷ κόσμῳ. iv. 3: ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ
πόλις.
[858] M. Aurel. iv. 4, and ii. 16. Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67: Chrysippus
asserts that men exist for the sake of each other; quoniamque ea natura
esset hominis ut ei cum genere humano quasi civile jus intercederet,
qui id conservaret, eum justum, qui migraret, injustum fore. Therefore,
in the sequel: in urbe mundove communi. See p. 331, 2 and p. 312, 2.
Sen. De Ira, ii. 31, 7: Nefas est nocere patriæ: ergo civi quoque ...
ergo et homini, nam hic in majore tibi urbe civis est. Musonius (in
Stob. Floril. 40, 9): νομίζει [ὁ ἐπιεικὴς] εἶναι πολίτης τῆς τοῦ Διὸς
πόλεως ἣ συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν. Epict. Diss. iii. 5, 26;
Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 4.
[859] M. Aurel. iii. 11: ἄνθρωπον πολίτην ὄντα πόλεως τῆς ἀνωτάτης ἧς
αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις ὥσπερ οἰκίαι εἰσίν.
[860] Sen. De Ot. 4; Ep. 68, 2. See p. 325, 1. Vit. B. 20, 3 and 5:
Unum me donavit omnibus [natura rerum] et uni mihi omnis ... patriam
meam esse mundum sciam et præsides Deos. Tranq. An. 4, 4: Ideo magno
animo nos non unius urbis mœnibus clusimus, sed in totius orbis
commercium emisimus patriamque nobis mundum professi sumus, ut liceret
latiorem virtuti campum dare. Epict. Diss. iii. 22, 83. Ibid. i. 9: If
the doctrine that man is related to God is true, man is neither an
Athenian nor a Corinthian, but simply κόσμιος and υἱὸς Θεοῦ. Muson.
l.c.: Banishment is no evil, since κοινὴ πατρὶς ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων ὁ
κόσμος ἐστίν. It is, says Cic. Parad. 2, no evil for those qui omnem
orbem terrarum unam urbem esse ducunt.
[861] Plut. Alex. M. Virt. i. 6, p. 329: καὶ μὴν ἡ πολὺ θαυμαζομένη
πολιτεία τοῦ τὴν Στωϊκῶν αἵρεσιν καταβαλλομένου Ζήνωνος εἰς ἓν τοῦτο
συντείνει κεφάλαιον, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ πόλεις μηδὲ κατὰ δήμους οἰκῶμεν,
ἰδίοις ἕκαστοι διωρισμένοι δικαίοις, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώμεθα
δημότας καὶ πολίτας, εἷς δὲ βίος ἦ καὶ κόσμος, ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου
νόμῳ κοίνῳ τρεφομένης.
[862] In Epictet. Man. c. 53: more fully, Ibid. Diss. iv. 1, 131; 4,
34; and translated by Sen. Ep. 107, 11. See p. 182, 1. The verses are:
ἄγου δέ μ’ ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ σύγ’ ἡ Πεπρωμένη
ὅποι ποθ’ ὑμῖν εἰμι διατεταγμένος·
ὡς ἑψομαί γ’ ἄκονος· ἢν δὲ μὴ θέλω
κακὸς γενόμενος οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι.
[863] Sen. Prov. 5, 4 and 8: Boni viri laborant, impendunt,
impenduntur, et volentes quidem, non trahuntur a fortuna, etc.... Quid
est boni viri? Præbere se fato. Vit. Be. 15, 5: Deum sequere.... Quæ
autem dementia est, potius trahi quam sequi?... Quicquid ex universi
constitutione patiendum est, magno excipiatur animo. Ad hoc sacramentum
adacti sumus, ferre mortalia.... In regno nati sumus: Deo parere
libertas est. Ep. 97, 2: Non pareo Deo, sed adsentior. Ex animo illum,
non quia necesse est, sequor, etc. Ep. 74, 20; 76, 23; 107, 9. Epictet.
Diss. ii. 16, 42: τόλμησον ἀναβλέψας πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι χρῶ μοι
λοιπὸν εἰς ὃ ἂν θέλῃς· ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, σός εἰμι. οὐδὲν παραιτοῦμαι τῶν
σοι δοκούντων· ὅπου θέλεις, ἄγε. i. 12, 7: The virtuous man submits his
will to that of God, as a good citizen obeys the law. iv. 7. 20:
κρεῖττον γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι ὃ ὁ θεὸς ἐθέλει, ἢ [ὃ] ἐγώ. iv. 1, 131, in
reference to the verses of Cleanthes: αὕτη ἡ ὁδὸς ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίαν ἄγει,
αὕτη μόνη ἀπαλλαγὴ δουλείας. Man. 8: θέλε γίνεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα ὡς
γίνεται καὶ εὐροήσεις. Similarly Fragm. 134, in Stob. Floril. 108, 60.
M. Aurel. x. 28: μόνῳ τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ δέδοται τὸ ἑκουσίως ἕπεσθαι τοῖς
γινομένοις· τὸ δὲ ἕπεσθαι ψιλὸν πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον. Ibid. viii. 45; x. 14.
[864] Sen. Ep. 120, 11, investigates the question, How does mankind
arrive at the conception of virtue? and replies, By the sight of
virtuous men. Ostendit illam nobis ordo ejus et decor et constantia et
omnium inter se actionum concordia et magnitudo super omnia efferens
sese. Hinc intellecta est illa beata vita, secundo defluens cursu,
arbitrii sui tota. Quomodo ergo hoc ipsum nobis adparuit? Dicam:
Nunquam vir ille perfectus adeptusque virtutem fortunæ maledixit.
Nunquam accidentia tristis excepit. Civem esse se universi et militem
credens labores velut imperatos subiit. Quicquid inciderat, non tanquam
malum aspernatus est, et in se casu delatum, sed quasi delegatum
sibi.... Necessario itaque magnus adparuit, qui nunquam malis ingemuit,
nunquam de fato suo questus est: fecit multis intellectum sui et non
aliter quam in tenebris lumen effulsit, advertitque in se omnium
animos, cum esset placidus et lenis, humanis divinisque rebus pariter
æquus, &c.
[865] Conf. Baumhauer, Vet. Phil. præcipue Stoicorum Doct. de Mor.
Volunt.: Ut. 1842, p. 220.
[866] Diog. vii. 130: εὐλόγως τέ φασιν ἐξάγειν ἑαυτὸν τοῦ βίου τὸν
σοφὸν (ἐξαγωγὴ is the standing expression with the Stoics for suicide.
Full references for this and other expressions are given by Baumhauer,
p. 243). καὶ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος καὶ ὑπὲρ φίλων κἂν ἐν σκληροτέρᾳ γένηται
ἀλγηδόνι ἢ πηρώσεσιν ἢ νόσοις ἀνιάτοις. Stob. Ecl. ii. 226. Conf. the
comœdian Sopater, in Athen. iv. 160, who makes a master threaten to
sell his slave to Zeno ἐπ’ ἐξαγωγῇ.
[867] Ep. 12, 10: Malum est in necessitate vivere. Sed in necessitate
vivere necessitas nulla est. Quidni nulla sit? Patent undique ad
libertatem viæ multæ, breves, faciles. Agamus Deo gratias, quod nemo in
vita teneri potest. Calcare ipsas necessitates licet. Id. Prov. c. 5,
6, makes the deity say: Contemnite mortem quæ vos aut finit aut
transfert.... Ante omnia cavi, ne quis vos teneret invitos. Patet
exitus.... Nihil feci facilius, quam mori. Prono animam loco posui.
Trahitur. Attendite modo et videbitis, quam brevis ad libertatem et
quam expedita ducat via, &c. Conf. Ep. 70, 14: He who denies the right
of committing suicide non videt se libertatis viam eludere. Nil melius
æterna lex fecit, quam quod unum introitum nobis ad vitam dedit, exitus
multos. Ep. 65, 22; 117, 21; 120, 14; M. Aurel. v. 29; viii. 47; x. 8
and 32; iii. 1; Epictet. Diss. i. 24, 20; iii. 24, 95.
[868] De Prov. 2, 9; Ep. 71, 16.
[869] In the passages already quoted, pp. 40, 2; 41, 1; 50, 2.
[870] See Epictetus’s discussion of suicide committed simply in
contempt of life (Diss. i. 9, 10), against which he brings to bear the
rule (in Plato, Phæd. 61, E.) to resign oneself to the will of God. ii.
15, 4. Conf. M. Aurel. v. 10.
[871] Muson. in Stob. Floril. 7, 24, says: ἅρπαζε τὸ καλῶς ἀποθνήσκειν
ὅτε ἔξεστι, μὴ μετὰ μικρὸν τὸ μὲν ἀποθνήσκειν σοι παρῇ, τὸ δὲ καλῶς
μηκέτι ἐξῇ; and, again: He who by living is of use to many, ought not
to choose to die, unless by death he can be of use to more.
[872] M. Aurel. v. 29: Even here you may live as though you were free
from the body: ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπωσι, τότε καὶ τοῦ ζῇν ἔξιθι· οὕτως
μέντοι, ὡς μηδὲν κακὸν πάσχων.
[873] Ep. 70. See p. 338, 3. Clem. Strom. iv. 485, A, likewise calls
the restriction of rational action sufficiently decisive reason: αὐτίκα
εὔλογον ἐξαγωγὴν τῷ σπουδαίῳ συγχωροῦσι καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι (i.e. the
Stoics), εἴ τις τοῦ πράσσειν αὐτὸν οὕτως τηρήσειεν [l. οὕτω
στερήσειεν], ὡς μηκέτι ἀπολελεῖφθαι αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἐλπίδα τῆς πράξεως.
[874] Ep. 58, 33; 98, 16; 17, 9; De Ira, iii. 15, 3.
[875] See Ep. 58, 36, and 70, 11.
[876] See p. 335, 2.
[877] Olympiod. in Phædr. 3 (Schol. in Arist. 7, b, 25). The favourite
comparison of life to a banquet is here so carried out, that the five
occasions for suicide are compared with five occasions for leaving a
banquet.
[878] Plut. C. Not. 11, 1: παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν, ἄνθρωπον ᾧ πάντα
τἀγαθὰ πάρεστι καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδεῖ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ μακάριον, τούτῳ
καθήκειν ἐξάγειν ἑαυτόν· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, ᾧ μηθὲν ἀγαθόν ἐστι μηδ’ ἔσται
τὰ δὲ δεινὰ πάντα καὶ τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ κακὰ πάρεστι καὶ πάρεσται διὰ
τέλους, τούτῳ μὴ καθήκειν ἀπολέγεσθαι τὸν βίον ἂν μή τι νὴ Δία τῶν
ἀδιαφόρων αὐτῷ προσγένηται. Ibid. 22, 7; 33, 3; Sto. Rep. 14, 3; Alex.
Aphr. De An. 156, b; 158, b.
[879] Plut. Sto. Rep. 18, 5: ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὅλως, φασὶν, οἴεται δεῖν
Χρύσιππος οὔτε μονὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, οὔτ’ ἐξαγωγὴν τοῖς κακοῖς
παραμετρεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μέσοις κατὰ φύσιν. διὸ καὶ τοῖς εὐδαιμονοῦσι
γίνεται ποτὲ καθῆκον ἐξάγειν ἑαυτοὺς, καὶ μένειν αὖθις ἐν τῷ ζῇν τοῖς
κακοδαιμονοῦσιν. Ibid. 14, 3. Sen. Ep. 70, 5: Simul atque occurrunt
molesta et tranquillitatem turbantia, emittet se. Nec hoc tantum in
necessitate ultima facit, sed cum primum illi cœpit suspecta esse
fortuna, diligenter circumspicit, numquid illo die desinendum sit.
Nihil existimat sua referre, faciat finem an accipiat, tardius fiat an
citius. Non tanquam de magno detrimento timet: nemo multum ex
stillicidio potest perdere. Conf. 77, 6.
[880] Cic. Fin. iii. 18, 60: Sed cum ab his [the media] omnia
proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur, ad ea referri omnes
nostras cogitationes; in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem.
In quo enim plura sunt, quæ secundum naturam sunt, hujus officium est
in vita manere: in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore
videntur, hujus officium est e vita excedere. E quo apparet, et
sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et
stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser.... Et quoniam excedens e vita et
manens æque miser est [stultus], nec diuturnitas magis ei vitam
fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur, iis qui pluribus naturalibus
frui possint esse in vita manendum. Stob. 226: The good may have
reasons for leaving life, the bad for continuing in life, even though
they never should become wise: οὔτε γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν κατέχειν ἐν τῷ ζῇν,
οὔτε τὴν κακίαν ἐκβάλλειν· τοῖς δὲ καθήκουσι καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον
μετρεῖσθαι τήν τε ζωὴν καὶ τὸν θάνατον.
[881] Ep. 70, 11.
[882] Teles. in Stob. Floril. 5, 67, p. 127 Mein.
[883] The well-known hymn to Zeus, in Stob. Ecl. i. 30, and the verses
quoted p. 333, 1. Nor is the poetic form used by Cleanthes without
importance. He asserted, at least according to Philodem. De Mus. Vol.
Herc. i. col. 28: ἀμείνονά γε εἶναι τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ μουσικὰ
παραδείγματα καὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἱκανῶς μὲν ἐξαγγέλλειν
δυναμένου τὰ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα, μὴ ἔχοντος δὲ ψιλοῦ τῶν θείων μεγεθῶν
λέξεις οἰκείας. τὰ μέτρα καὶ τὰ μέλη καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς ὡς μάλιστα
προσικνεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς τῶν θείων θεωρίας.
[884] Compare the celebrated dictum of the Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 28,
71: Cultus autem Deorum est optimus idemque castissimus plenissimusque
pietatis, ut eos semper pura integra incorrupta et mente et voce
veneremur; and more particularly Epict. Man. 31, 1: τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς
εὐσεβείας ἴσθι ὅτι τὸ κυριώτατον ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ὀρθὰς ὑπολήψεις περὶ
αὐτῶν ἔχειν ... καὶ σαυτὸν εἰς τοῦτο κατατεταχέναι, τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς
καὶ εἴκειν ἐν πᾶσι γινομένοις, κ.τ.λ. Id. Diss. ii. 18, 19. Further
particulars on p. 345, 2.
[885] M. Aurel. ix. 40: We ought not to pray the Gods to give us
something, or to protect us from something, but only to pray: διδόναι
αὐτοὺς τὸ μήτε φοβεῖσθαί τι τούτων μήτε ἐπιθυμεῖν τινος τούτων. Diog.
vii. 124: We ought, in fact, only to pray for what is good.
[886] See p. 144, 2. Sext. Math. ix. 28, says that Rome of the younger
Stoics (perhaps Posidonius, whose views on the primitive condition have
been already mentioned, p. 293, 1) traced the belief in Gods back to
the golden age.
[887] In this spirit, Epict. Diss. ii. 20, 32, blames those who throw
doubts on the popular Gods, not considering that by so doing they
deprive many of the preservatives from evil, the very same argumentum
ab utili which is now frequently urged against free criticism.
[888] Characteristic are the utterances of the sceptic pontifex Cotta,
in Cic. N. D. i. 22, 61; iii. 2.
[889] Plut. Sto. Rep. 6, 1; Diog. vii. 33. See p. 322, 5.
[890] Ep. 41, 1: Non sunt ad cœlum elevandæ manus nec exorandus
ædituus, ut nos ad aures simulacri, quasi magis exaudiri possimus,
admittat: prope est a te Deus, tecum est, intus est. Nat. Qu. ii. 35,
1: What is the meaning of expiations, if fate is unchangeable? They are
only ægræ mentis solatia. See p. 343, 2.
[891] Benef. iv. 19, 1: Deos nemo sanus timet. Furor est enim metuere
salutaria nee quisquam amat quos timet. Not only do the Gods not wish
to do harm, but such is their nature that they cannot do harm. De Ira,
ii. 27, 1; Benef. vii. 1, 7; Ep. 95, 49. It hardly needs remark, how
greatly these statements are at variance with the Roman religion, in
which fear holds such a prominent place.
[892] Ep. 95, 47: Quomodo sint Di colendi, solet præcipi: accendere
aliquem lucernas sabbatis prohibeamus, quoniam nec lumine Di egent et
ne homines quidem delectantur fuligine. Vetemus salutationibus
matutinis fungi et foribus adsidere templorum: humana ambitio istis
officiis capitur: Deum colit, qui novit. Vetemus lintea et strigiles
ferre et speculum tenere Junoni: non quærit ministros Deus. Quidni?
Ipse humano generi ministrat, ubique et omnibus præsto est.... Primus
est Deorum cultus Deos credere. Deinde reddere illis majestatem suam,
reddere bonitatem, &c. Vis Deos propitiare? Bonus esto. Satis illos
coluit, quisquis imitatus est. Fr. 123 (in Lactant. Inst. vi. 25, 3):
Vultisne vos Deum cogitare magnum et placidum ... non immolationibus et
sanguine multo colendum—quæ enim ex trucidatione immerentium voluptas
est?—sed mente pura, bono honestoque proposito. Non templa illi
congestis in altitudinem saxis extruenda sunt: in suo cuique
consecrandus est pectore. Conf. Benef. vii. 7, 3: The only worthy
temple of God is the universe.
[893] In Fr. 120 (in Lact. ii. 2, 14), Seneca shows how absurd it is to
pray and kneel before images, the makers of which are thought little of
in their own profession. On this point he expressed his opinion with
great severity in the treatise, De Superstitione, fragments of which
Augustin. Civ. D. vi. 10, communicates (Fr. 31 Haase). The immortal
Gods, he there says, are transformed into lifeless elements. They are
clothed in the shape of men and beasts, and other most extraordinary
appearances; and are honoured as Gods, though, were they alive, they
would be designated monsters. The manner, too, in which these Gods are
honoured is most foolish and absurd; such as by mortification and
mutilation, stupid and immoral plays, &c. The wise man can only take
part in such acts tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam Diis grata. This
view of worship had been previously set forth by Heraclitus, who
otherwise was so much admired by the Stoics.
[894] Fr. 119 (in Lact. i. 16, 10): Quid ergo est, quare apud poetas
salacissimus Jupiter desierit liberos tollere? Utrum sexagenarius
factus est, et illi lex Papia fibulam imposuit? An impetravit jus trium
liberorum? An ... timet, ne quis sibi faciat, quod ipse Saturno?
Similarly Fr. 39 (in Augustin. l.c.); Brevit. Vit. 16, 5; Vit. Be. 26,
6, the ineptiæ poetarum which, as in the stories of Jupiter’s many
adulteries, give free rein to sins.
[895] Augustin. l.c. Fr. 33: Quid ergo tandem? Veriora tibi videntur T.
Tatii aut Romuli aut Tulli Hostilii somnia? Cloacinam Tatius dedicavit
Deam, Picum Tiberinumque Romulus, Hostilius Pavorem atque Pallorem,
teterrimos hominum adfectus.... Hæc numina potius credes et cœlo
recipies? Fr. 39: Omnem istam ignobilem Deorum turbam, quam longo ævo
longa superstitio congessit, sic adorabimus ut meminerimus cultum ejus
magis ad morem quam ad rem pertinere.
[896] N. D. ii. 24, 63: Alia quoque ex ratione et quidem physica fluxit
multitudo Deorum; qui induti specie humana fabulas poetis
suppeditaverunt hominum autem vitam superstitione omni referserunt.
Atque hic locus a Zenone tractatus post a Cleanthe et Chrysippo
pluribus verbis explicatus est ... physica ratio non inelegans inclusa
est in impias fabulas. Still stronger language is used by the Stoic, c.
28, 70, respecting the commentitii et ficti Dei, the superstitiones
pæne aniles, the futilitas summaque levitas of their anthropomorphic
legends.
[897] Phædrus (Philodemus), col. 2 of his fragment, according to
Petersen’s restoration. Conf. Cic. N. D. ii. 17, 45; Diog. vii. 147;
both of whom assert that the Stoics do not think of the Gods as human
in form; and Lactant. De Ir. D. c. 18: Stoici negant habere ullam
formam Deum.
[898] The Epicurean in Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36.
[899] Cic. l.c. 37. Conf. Krische, Forschung. i. 406 and 415.
[900] Clem., indeed, says (Strom. vii. 720, D): οὐδὲ αἰσθησέων αὐτῷ [τῷ
θεῷ] δεῖ, καθάπερ ἤρεσε τοῖς Στωῑκοῖς, μάλιστα ἀκοῆς καὶ ὄψεως· μὴ γὰρ
δύνασθαί ποτε ἑτέρως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. But, according to all accounts,
this must be a misapprehension. Clement confounds what Stoic writers
have conditionally asserted, for the purpose of disproving it, with
their real opinion. Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 139.
[901] Plut. Plac. i. 6, 16, in a description of the Stoic theology,
evidently borrowed from a good source: The Gods have been represented
as being like men: διότι τῶν μὲν ἁπάντων τὸ θεῖον κυριώτατον, τῶν δὲ
ζῴων ἄνθρωπος κάλλιστον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἀρετῇ διαφόρως κατὰ τὴν τοῦ
νοῦ σύστασιν, (τὸ κράτιστον—probably these words should be struck out),
τοῖς οὖν ἀριστεύουσι τὸ κράτιστον ὁμοίως καὶ καλῶς ἔχειν διενοήθησαν.
[902] Plut. Sto. Rep. 38, 5; C. Not. 31, 5; Def. Orac. 19, p. 420.
[903] The numina, quæ singula adoramus et colimus, which are dependent
on the Deus omnium Deorum, and whom ministros regni sui genuit. Sen.
Fr. 26, 16 (in Lact. Inst. i. 5, 26).
[904] Diog. vii. 147.
[905] See p. 206, 1.
[906] Plut. De Fac. Lun. 6, 3.
[907] Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36.
[908] See p. 131.
[909] Cic. N. D. i. 15, 39; ii. 26; Diog. vii. 147.
[910] Plut. De Is. c. 66; Cic. l.c. ii. 23, 60; i. 15, 38, where this
view is attributed, in particular, to Zeno’s pupil Persæus. Krische
(Forschung. i. 442) reminds, with justice, of the assertion of
Prodicus, that the ancients deified everything which was of use to man.
[911] Phædr. (Philodemus), Nat. De. col. 3, and Cic. N. D. i. 15, 38,
attribute this assertion specially to Persæus and Chrysippus. Id. ii.
24, 64, after speaking of the deification of Hercules, Bacchus,
Romulus, &c., continues: Quorum cum remanerent animi atque æternitate
fruerentur, Dii rite sunt habiti, cum et optimi essent et æterni. Diog.
vii. 151. See p. 351, 1.
[912] This is done in Plut. Plac. i. 6, 9. Belief in the Gods, it is
there said, is held in three forms—the physical, the mythical, and the
form established by law (theologia civilis). All the gods belong to
seven classes, εἴδη: (1) τὸ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων καὶ μετεώρων: the
observation of the stars, and their regularity of movement, the changes
of season, &c., has conducted many to faith; and, accordingly, heaven
and earth, sun and moon, have been honoured. (2 and 3) τὸ βλάπτον καὶ
ὠφελοῦν: beneficent Beings are Zeus, Here, Hermes, Demeter: baleful
Beings are the Erinnyes, Ares, &c. (4 and 5) πράγματα, such as Ἐλπὶς,
Δίκη, Εὐνομία; and πάθη, such as Ἔρως, Ἀφροδίτη, Πόθος. (6) τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν
ποιητῶν πεπλασμένον (τὸ μυθικὸν), such as the Gods invented by Hesiod
for the purpose of his genealogies—Coios, Hyperion, &c. (7) Men who are
honoured for their services to mankind—Hercules, the Dioscuri,
Dionysus. This list includes not only things which deserve divine
honours, but all things to which they have been actually given: hence
it includes, besides the purely mythical Gods, things which the Stoics
can never have regarded as Gods, such as the baleful Gods and emotions,
on which see p. 345, 1; 346, 2. On the other hand, they could raise no
objection to the worship of personified virtues. In the above list the
elementary Gods, such as Here, are grouped, together with the Gods of
fruits, under the category of useful. Another grouping was that
followed by Dionysius (whether the well-known pupil of Zeno—see p. 44,
1—or some later Stoic, is unknown), who, according to Tertullian (Ad
Nat. ii. 2, conf. c. 14), divided Gods into three classes: the
visible—the sun and moon, for instance; the invisible, or powers of
nature, such as Neptune (that is, natural forces as they make
themselves felt in the elements and in planets); and those facti, or
deified men.
[913] Plut. Com. Not. 31, 5: ἀλλὰ Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης, ἐμπεπληκότες,
ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν
θάλατταν, οὐδένα τῶν τοσούτων ἄφθαρτον οὐδ’ ἀΐδιον ἀπολελοίπασι πλὴν
μόνου τοῦ Διὸς, εἰς ὃν πάντας καταναλίσκουσι τοὺς ἄλλους.
[914] Conf. Wachsmuth, Die Ansichten der Stoiker über Mantik und
Dämonen (Berl. 1860), pp. 29–39.
[915] Tim. 90, A.
[916] Posid. in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. v. 6, p. 469: τὸ δὴ τῶν παθῶν
αἴτιον, τουτέστι τῆς τε ἀνομολογίας καὶ τοῦ κακοδαίμονος βίου, τὸ μὴ
κατὰ πᾶν ἕπεσθαι τῷ ἐν αὑτῷ δαίμονι συγγενεῖ τε ὄντι καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν
φύσιν ἔχοντι τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοικοῦντι, τῷ δὲ χείρονι καὶ ζῳώδει
ποτὲ συνεκκλίνοντας φέρεσθαι. Sen. Ep. 41, 2, according to the
quotation, p. 344, 4: Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum
bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos. Hic prout a nobis tractatus
est, ita nos ipse tractat. Ep. 31, 11: Quid aliud voces hunc [animus
rectus, bonus, magnus] quam Deum in corpore humano hospitantem? Just as
Kant calls the moral idea, a primary notion which mankind has embraced,
the moral tone a good spirit governing us. Epict. Diss. i. 14, 12:
ἐπίτροπον [ὁ Ζεὺς] ἑκάστῳ παρέστησε τὸν ἑκάστου δαίμονα, καὶ παρέδωκε
φυλάσσειν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτον ἀκοίμητον καὶ ἀπαραλόγιστον. He who
retires within himself is not alone, ἀλλ’ ὁ θεὸς ἔνδον ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ
ὑμέτερος δαίμων ἐστί. To him each one has taken an oath of allegiance,
as a soldier has to his sovereign, but ἐκεῖ μὲν ὀμνύουσιν, αὐτοῦ μὴ
προτιμήσειν ἕτερον· ἐνταῦθα δ’ αὑτοὺς ἁπάντων; so that the demon is
lost in the αὐτὸς within. M. Aurel. v. 27: ὁ δαίμων, ὃν ἑκάστῳ
προστάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ. οὗτος δέ ἐστιν ὁ
ἑκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος. See ii. 13 and 17; iii. 3; Schl. 5, 6, 7, 12,
16; v. 10; viii. 45.
[917] See the passage quoted from Diog. vii. 88, on p. 227, 3.
(Diogenes had only just before named Chrysippus περὶ τέλους, as
source), which receives its explanation (if it needs one) from the
above words of Posidonius.
[918] In this sense, the words of Sen. Ep. 110, 1, must be understood:
Sepone in præsentia quæ quibusdam placent, unicuique nostrum pædagogum
dari Deum, non quidem ordinarium, sed hunc inferioris notæ ... ita
tamen hoc seponas volo, ut memineris, majores nostros, qui crediderunt,
Stoicos fuisse: singulis enim et Genium et Junonem dederunt, i.e., the
old Romans, not the Stoics.
[919] Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 86. Amongst other things, quoted p. 146, 1,
it is there said: If living beings exist on the earth and in the sea,
there must be νοερὰ ζῷα in the air, which is so much purer; and these
are the demons.
[920] Diog. vii. 151: φασὶ δ’ εἶναι καί τινας δαίμονας ἀνθρώπων
συμπάθειαν ἔχοντας, ἐπόπτας τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων· καὶ ἥρωας τὰς
ὑπολελειμμένας τῶν σπουδαίων ψυχάς. Plut. De Is. 25, p. 360: Plato,
Pythagoras, Xenocrates, and Chrysippus hold, with the old theologians
(amongst whom Wachsmuth, p. 32, 40, rightly thinks of the Orphics),
that the demons are stronger than men, from which the language used of
them by Chrysippus does not follow. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420: The Stoics
believe demons to be mortal. Plac. i. 8, 2: Θαλῆς, Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων,
οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, δαίμονας ὑπάρχειν οὐσίας ψυχικάς. A special treatise περὶ
ἡρώων καὶ δαιμόνων proceeded from the pen of Posidonius, probably, as
was his wont, containing more learned than dogmatic statements, an
extract from which is given by Macrob. Sat. i. 23, containing the
etymology of δαίμων.
[921] Plut. Quæst. Rom. 51, p. 277: καθάπερ οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον οἴονται
φιλόσοφοι φαῦλα δαιμόνια περινοστεῖν, οἷς οἱ θεοὶ δημίοις χρῶνται
καλασταῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀνοσίους καὶ ἀδίκους ἀνθρώπους. Id. Def. Orac. 17,
p. 419: φαύλους ... δαίμονας οὐκ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μόνον ... ἀπέλιπεν, ἀλλὰ
καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Χρύσιππος—a statement which, particularly
as it is extended to Plato, would prove little. The baleful Gods of
mythology (p. 350, 2) were explained as being evil demons by those who
did not deny their existence altogether. Those demons, however, which
purify the soul in another world (Sallust. De Mund. c. 19, p. 266, and
whom Villoisin on Cornutus, p. 553, reminds of), are not borrowed from
Stoicism, but from Plato (Rep. x. 615, E) and the Neoplatonists.
[922] Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 2. See p. 191, 2.
[923] Tertull. Test. An. 3, after speaking of demons, adds: Aliqui
Chrysippi sectator illudit ea.
[924] The Stoics are not the first who resorted to allegorical
explanations of myths. Just as, before philosophy had broken away from
mythology, a Pherecydes, an Empedocles, the Pythagoreans had, whether
consciously or unconsciously, veiled their thoughts in the language of
legend, and even subsequently Plato had used a veil of poetry; so, now
that the breach between the two was open, many attempts were made to
conceal its breadth, and individual beliefs were represented as the
real meaning of popular beliefs, it being always supposed that the
original framers had an eye to this meaning. Thus a twofold method of
treating the myths resulted—that by natural explanation, and that by
allegorical interpretation. The former method referred them to facts of
history, the latter to general truths, whether moral or scientific.
Both methods agreed in looking for a hidden meaning besides the literal
one. This method of treating myths had been already met with among the
older teachers, such as Democritus, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, and other
followers of Anaxagoras (according to Hesych. even Agamemnon was
explained to be the ether). It appears to have been a favourite one in
the time of the Sophists (Plato, Theæt. 153, C; Rep. ii. 378, D; Phædr.
229, C; Crat. 407, A, to 530, C; Gorg. 493, A; Xen. Sym. 3, 6), as
appears from Euripides and Herodotus. It follows naturally from the
view of Prodicus on the origin of belief in the Gods. Plato disapproved
of it. Aristotle occasionally appealed to it to note glimmers of truth
in popular notions without attributing to it any higher value. The
founder of Cynicism and his followers pursued it zealously. From the
Cynics the Stoics appear to have taken it. They carried it much further
than any of their predecessors, and they, too, exercised a greater
influence on posterity than the Cynics.
[925] Cic. N. D. 24, 63; iii. 24, 63, see p. 346, 3.
[926] The definition of allegory: ὁ γὰρ ἄλλα μὲν ἀγορεύων τρόπος, ἕτερα
δὲ ὧν λέγει σημαίνων, ἐπωνύμως ἀλληγορία καλεῖται (Heraclit. Alleg.
Hom. c. 5, p. 6). Accordingly, it includes every kind of symbolical
expression. In earlier times, according to Plut. Aud. Po. c. 4, p. 19,
it was termed ὑπόνοια, which term is found in Plato, Rep. ii. 378, D,
conf. Io. 530, D; Xen. Symp. 3, 6.
[927] In this way Zeno treated all the poems of Homer and Hesiod (Dio
Chrysost. Or. 53, p. 275; Diog. vii. 4; Krische, Forsch. 393), and so
did Cleanthes (Diog. vii. 175; Phædr. [Philodem.] De Nat. De. col. 3;
Plut. Aud. Po. 11, p. 31; De Fluv. 5, 3, p. 1003; Krische, 433) and
Persæus. Chrysippus explained the stories in Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus,
and Musæus (Phæd. col. 3; Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iii. 8, vol. v. 349,
Krische, 391 and 479), and was followed by Diogenes (Phæd. col. 5; Cic.
N. D. i. 15, 41). Compare also Plut. Def. Orac. 12, p. 415, and
respecting the theological literature of the Stoics Villoisin on
Cornutus, p. xxxix. Among the Romans, the same method was followed by
Varro (Preller, Röm. Myth. 29), and from his writings Heraclitus
(living under Augustus) derived the material for his Homeric Allegories
(edited by Mehler), and Cornutus for his work on the nature of the Gods
edited by Osann from Villoisin’s papers.
[928] Cic. N. D. iii. 24, 63.
[929] Corn. c. 17, p. 80: δεῖ δὲ μὴ συγχεῖν τοὺς μύθους, μήδ’ ἐξ ἑτέρου
τὰ ὀνόματα ἐφ’ ἕτερον μεταφέρειν, μηδ’ εἴ τι προσεπλάσθη ταῖς κατ’
αὐτοὺς παραδιδομέναις γενεαλογίαις ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ συνέντων ἃ αἰνίττονται
κεχρημένων δ’ αὐτοῖς ὡς τοῖς πλάσμασιν, ἀλόγως τίθεσθαι.
[930] Proofs may be found in abundance in Heraclitus and Cornutus.
Conf. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 1: The ancients did not believe that
Jupiter hurled his thunderbolts broadcast; sed eundem, quem nos Jovem
intelligunt, rectorem custodemque universi, animum ac spiritum mundi,
&c.
[931] Dio Chrysost. Or. 53, p. 276, R. speaking of Zeno’s commentaries
on Homer, says: ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ Ὁμήρου λέγει, ἀλλὰ διηγούμενος
καὶ διδάσκων, ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφεν.... ὁ
δὲ λόγος οὗτος Ἀντισθένειός ἐστι πρότερον ... ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν οὐκ
ἐξειργάσατο αὐτὸν οὐδὲ κατὰ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἐδήλωσεν.
[932] Special references are hardly necessary after those already
quoted, p. 148, 1; 153, 2; 164, 2: 165, 5. Conf. the hymn of Cleanthes;
Chrysippus, in Stob. Ecl. i. 48; Arat. Phæn. Begin.; Plut. Aud. Poët.
c. 11, p. 31; Varro, in August. Civ. D. vii. 5; 6; 9; 28; Servius, in
Georg. i. 5; Heraclit. c. 15, p. 31; c. 23, 49; c. 24, 50; Corn. pp. 7;
26; 35; 38, where Ζεὺς is derived from ζῇν or ζέειν and Διὸς from διὰ,
ὅτι δι’ αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα; conf. Villoisin and Osann on the passage of
Cornutus, who give further authorities in their notes on the respective
passages. The same on Cornutus, p. 6, discuss the derivation of θεὸς
from θέειν or τιθέναι; of αἰθὴρ from αἴθειν or ἀεὶ θέειν. A portion of
these etymologies is well known to be Platonic.
[933] Πολυώνυμος, as he is called by Cleanthes, v. 1. Conf. Diog. 147;
Corn. c. 9 and 26. The further expansion of this idea may be found in
the Neoplatonic doctrine.
[934] See Diog. l.c.; Cic. N. D. ii. 26, 66; Phæd. (Philodem.), Fragm.
col. 2–5; Heracl. c. 25, p. 53. On Here, consult Heracl. c. 15 and 41,
p. 85; Corn. c. 3; on Hephæstus, Heracl. c. 26, 55; 43, 91; Corn. c.
19, p. 98; Plut. De Is. c. 66, p. 377 (Diog. l.c. perhaps confounds as
Krische, p. 399, supposes, common fire with πῦρ τεχνικὸν, but it is
also possible that the artificial God of mythology may have been
explained now one way now another in the Stoic School, which is not
always uniform in its interpretations); on Poseidon, Heracl. c. 7, 15;
c. 18, 77; c. 46, 117; Corn. c. 12; Plut. De Is. c. 40, Schl. p. 367;
on Hades, whom Cicero l.c. makes the representative of terrena vis;
Heracl. c. 23, p. 50; c. 41, 87; Corn. 5; on Demeter and Hestia, Corn.
c. 28, p. 156; Plut. l.c.; on Athene, Heracl. c. 19, 39; c. 28, 59; c.
61, 123; Corn. c. 20, 103. It is only by a forced interpretation of a
passage in Homer, that (Heraclit. 25, 53) Athene is made to be earth.
That even Zeno treated individual Gods in this way, as parts of one
general divine power or Zeus, is rendered probable by Krische, Forsch.
399, by a comparison of Phædr. col. 5, with the passages quoted from
Cicero and Diogenes.
[935] Sen. Benef. iv. 8, 1: Hunc [Jovem] et Liberum patrem et Herculem
et Mercurium nostri putant. Liberum patrem, quia omnium parens sit....
Herculem, quia vis ejus invicta sit, quandoque lassata fuerit operibus
editis, in ignem recessura. Mercurium, quia ratio penes illum est
numerusque et ordo et scientia. The solution of Helios into Zeus
(Macrob. Sat. i. 23) appears also to be of Stoic origin.
[936] Heracl. c. 25, 52. Conf. Il. i. 395.
[937] Heracl. c. 40, 83; Il. xv. 18.
[938] Ibid. c. 37, 73; Il. viii. 18.
[939] Heracl. c. 26, 54, who applies the same method of interpretation
to the legend of Prometheus (otherwise interpreted by Corn. c. 18, 96),
Corn. c. 19, 98. On the lameness of Hephæstus, Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 3, p.
922.
[940] According to Eustath. in Il. p. 93, 46, probably following a
Stoic interpretation, Here is the spouse of Zeus, because the air is
surrounded by the ether; but does not agree with him, because the two
elements are opposed to each other.
[941] Heracl. c. 39, 78 (conf. Plut. Aud. Po. p. 19), where this
explanation is given very fully. The occurrence on Mount Ida is said to
represent the passage of winter into spring. Here’s tresses are the
foliage of trees, &c.
[942] See Diog. vii. 187; Proœm. 5; Orig. con. Cels. iv. 48; Theophil.
ad Autol. iii. 8, p. 122, C; Clement. Homil. v. 18.
[943] c. 64. Proteus, according to this explanation, denotes unformed
matter; the forms which he assumes denote the four elements
[944] See the description. Alleg. Hom. 43–51, p. 90, of which the above
is a meagre abstract.
[945] According to Heraclit. 53, 112.
[946] We learn from Ps. Plut. De Fluv. 5, 3, p. 1003, that Cleanthes
wrote a θεομαχία, a small fragment of which, containing a portion or
the Prometheus legend in a later and evidently apologetically moulded
form, is there preserved. The theomachy described by Cleanthes (the
Stoic Cleanthes seems to be meant) is, however, not the Homeric
theomachy, but the struggle of the Gods with the Giants and Titans,
described in the book περὶ γιγάντων (Diog. vii. 175). Perhaps on this
occasion he may have discussed the other. At any rate the moral
interpretation given by Heraclitus to Homer’s θεομαχία is quite in the
style of the interpretation of the legend of Hercules, and was probably
borrowed from Cleanthes.
[947] Further particulars on Hermes, Alleg. Hom. c. 72, 141.
[948] Alleg. Hom. c. 54.
[949] Conf. Heracl. c. 6, p. 11; Corn. 32, p. 191; 34, 206; Cic. N. D.
ii. 27, 68; Phædr. (Philodem.) Nat. De. col. 5 and 2. In Phædrus, too,
col. 2 (τοὺς δὲ τὸν Ἀπόλλω), if ἥλιον seems too wild, perhaps φῶς
should be substituted for τούς, for Apollo cannot well symbolise the
earth.
[950] Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 2, p. 922. The Stoics address the moon as
Artemis and Athene.
[951] See p. 147, 1.
[952] The name Apollo is explained by Cleanthes, in Macrob. Sat. i. 17,
ὡς ἀπ’ ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων τόπων τὰς ἀνατολὰς ποιουμένου; by Chrysippus, as
derived from α privative and πολὺς, ὡς οὐχὶ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ φαύλων
αὐσιῶν τοῦ πυρὸς ὄντα. The latter explanation is quoted by Plotin. v.
5, 6, p. 525, as Pythagorean, and Chrysippus may have taken it from
Pythagoras, or the later Pythagoreans from Chrysippus. Cicero, in
imitation, makes his Stoic derive sol from solus. The epithet of
Apollo, Loxias, is referred by Cleanthes to the ἕλικες λοξαὶ of the
sun’s course, or the ἀκτῖνες λοξαὶ of the sun; and by Œnopides, to the
λοξὸς κύκλος (the ecliptic). The epithet Λύκιος is explained by
Cleanthes, quod veluti lupi pecora rapiunt, ita ipse quoque humorem
eripit radiis; Antipater, ἀπὸ τοῦ λευκαίνεσθαι πάντα φωτίζοντος ἡλίου.
In the same author Macrobius found the derivation of πύθιος from πύθειν
(because the sun’s heat produces decay). Other explanations of these as
well as of other epithets of Apollo, of the name of Artemis and her
epithets, of the attributes and symbols of these Gods, are to be found
in abundance in Cornutus, c. 32, 34, and in Macrobius, l.c., who
probably got most of them from Stoic sources.
[953] The first of these stories is explained by Macrob. Sat. i. 17,
down to the most minute details, in the sense of the cosmical views
already given, p. 162, 2, and likewise the story of the slaying of the
Pytho, the dragon being taken to represent the heavy vapours of the
marshy earth, which were overcome by the sun’s heat (the arrows of
Apollo). This interpretation being expressly attributed to Antipater by
Macrobius, it appears probable that the first one came from the same
source. Another likewise quoted by him, according to which the dragon
represents the sun’s course, is perhaps also Stoical.
[954] Cornutus, c. 2, p. 10, points to this in explaining Leto as Ληθὼ,
and referring it to night, because everything is forgotten in sleep at
night.
[955] c. 8, especially p. 16, 22, 28. Ibid. c. 12, p. 24, 28, the clang
of Apollo’s arrows is explained to be the harmony of the spheres.
[956] c. 15, p. 31.
[957] Ibid. c. 19, 72, p. 39, 141.
[958] See Corn. c. 20, 105, and Villoisin’s notes on the passage. The
most varied derivations of Athene are given: from ἀθρεῖν by Heracl. c.
19, 40; Tzetz. in Hesiod. Ἐρ. καὶ Ἡμε. 70; Etymol. Mag. Ἀθηνᾶ—from
θῆλυς or θηλάζειν (Ἀθήνη = ἀθήλη or ἀθηλᾶ = ἡ μὴ θηλάζουσα), by Phædr.
Nat. D. col. 6; Athenag. Leg. pro Christ. c. 17, p. 78—from θείνω,
because virtue never allows itself to be beaten—from αἰθὴρ + ναίω, so
that Ἀθηναία = Αἰθεροναῖα.
[959] This explanation had been already given by Diogenes, according to
Phædr. col. 6. Cornutus also mentions it (20, 108), but he prefers the
derivation from τρεῖν.
[960] c. 33, p. 69.
[961] It is to be found in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iii. 8, pp. 349–353,
but, according to Phædr. (Philodem.) l.c., conf. Cic. N. D. I. 15, 41,
was already put forward by Diogenes. For himself, he prefers the other
explanation, according to which Athene comes forth from the head of
Jupiter, because the air which she represents occupies the highest
place in the universe. Cornut. c. 20, 103, leaves us to choose between
this explanation and the assumption that the ancients regarded the head
as the seat of the ἡγεμονικόν. Heracl. c. 19, 40, states the latter,
Eustath. in Il. 93, 40, the former, as the reason.
[962] p. 349, 4, Corn. 30, p. 172.
[963] See p. 359, 1, Plut. De Is. c. 40, Schl. p. 367: Demeter and Core
are τὸ διὰ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν κάρπων διῆκον πνεῦμα. Phædr. col. 2: τὴν
Δήμητρα γῆν ἢ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ γόνευμα [γόνιμον πνεῦμα]. On Demeter as γῆ
μήτηρ or Δηὼ μήτηρ, see Corn. c. 28, p. 156, and Villoisin on the
passage.
[964] Plut. l.c.: Dionysus is τὸ γόνιμον πνεῦμα καὶ τρόφιμον.
[965] Macrob. Sat. i. 18: Cleanthes derived the name Dionysus from
διανύσαι, because the sun daily completes his course round the world.
It is well known that, before and after his time, the identification of
Apollo with Dionysus was common, and it is elaborately proved by
Macrobius. Servius, too, on Georg. i. 5, says that the Stoics believed
the sun, Apollo, and Bacchus—and likewise the moon, Diana, Ceres, Juno,
and Proserpine—to be identical. Other etymologies of Διόνυσος are given
by Corn. c. 30, 173.
[966] Corn. 30, discusses the point at large, referring both the story
and the attributes of Dionysus to wine. He, and also Heracl. c. 35, p.
71, refer the story of Dionysus and Lycurgus to the vintage.
[967] Corn. c. 28, p. 163, who also refers the legend and worship of
Demeter, in all particulars, to agriculture; and the rape of
Persephone, to the sowing of fruits. Conf. Cic. N. D. ii. 26, 66.
According to Plut. De Is. 66, p. 377, Cleanthes had already called
Περσεφόνη, τὸ διὰ τῶν καρπῶν φερόμενον καὶ φονευόμενον πνεῦμα. A
somewhat different explanation of the rape of Persephone is given in a
passage of Mai’s Mythograph, vii. 4, p. 216, quoted by Osann. on
Cornutus, p. 343.
[968] The legend of Triptolemus is explained by Cornutus, l.c. p. 161,
as referring to the discovery of agriculture by Triptolemus.
[969] Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 180; Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 7 (Theodoret.
Cur. Gr. Aff. vi. 14, p. 87), see p. 171, 1. Conf. Plut. Sto. Rep. 47,
5; Corn. c. 13, p. 38; and Plato, Rep. x. 617, C.
[970] According to Sen. Benef. i. 3, 8; 4, 4, he had filled a whole
book, probably of a treatise not otherwise mentioned on kind deeds,
with these ineptiæ—ita ut de ratione dandi accipiendi reddendique
beneficii pauca admodum dicat, nee his fabulas, sed hæc fabulis
inserit. A portion of these was made use of by Hecato in his work on
this subject.
[971] Chrysippus, in Phædr. (Philodemus), col. 4. Further particulars
in Sen. l.c., and Corn. 15, 55. Somewhat similar is the explanation of
Λιταί (Corn. 12, 37; Heracl. 37, 75), which at best are only casual
personifications.
[972] Corn. 14, 43, who, at the same time, mentions their names and
number; Philodem. De Mus. Vol. Herc. i. col. 15; Erato indicates the
importance of music for ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή. Ibid. 10, 33, on the Erinnyes;
29, 171, on the Horoi.
[973] Heracl. 31, 63; Plut. Am. 13, 15, p. 757.
[974] Heracl. 28, 60; 30, 62, and above, p. 360.
[975] Ibid. 69, 136. In this sense, Aphrodite might be identified with
Zeus, which was really done by Phædr. Nat. De. col. 1: ἀνάλογον εὐν ...
θαι [Petersen suggests εὐνομεῖσθαι, but probably it should be
ὀνομάζεσθαι] τὸν Δία καὶ τὴν κοινὴν πάντων φύσιν καὶ εἱμαρμένην καὶ
ἀνάγκην καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ Εὐνομίαν καὶ Δίκην καὶ Ὁμόνοιαν καὶ
Εἰρήνην καὶ Ἀφροδίτην καὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πᾶν.
[976] The story of Ares, νείατον ἐς κενεῶνα, means, according to
Heracl. 31, 64, that Diomedes, ἐπὶ τὰ κενὰ τῆς τῶν ἀντεπάλων τάξεως
παρεισελθὼν, defeated the enemy; that of Aphrodite (ἀφροσύνη, ibid. 30,
62), that, by his experience in war, he overcame the inexperienced
troops of barbarians.
[977] In Plut. Aud. Po. c. 4, p. 19, the connection of Ares and
Aphrodite is explained as meaning a conjunction of the two planets.
Heracl. 69, 136, gives the alternative of referring this connection to
the union of φιλία and νεῖκος, which produces harmony, or to the fact
that brass (Ares) is moulded in the fire (Hephæstus) into objects of
beauty (Aphrodite). The latter interpretation is given by Corn. 19,
102, who also explains the relation of Ares to Aphrodite to mean the
union of strength and beauty.
[978] Corn. 27, 148; Plut. Krat. 408, C.
[979] His lewdness was said to indicate the fulness of the σπερματικοὶ
λόγοι in nature; his sojourn in the wilderness, the solitariness of the
world.
[980] Corn. 17, 91. Conf. Osann ad locum, who points out similar
interpretations, probably of Stoic origin, in the Scholia to the
theogony, and also in Etymol. M.
[981] Besides the etymologies of οὐρανὸς in Corn. c. 1, and the
observation of Plut. Pl. i. 6, 9, that heaven is the father of all
things, because of its fertilising rains, and earth the mother, because
she brings forth everything, the words in Cic. N. D. ii. 24, 63, on
which Krische, Forsch. 397, comments, deserve notice. It is there said,
probably after Zeno: Uranos is the Ether, and was deprived of his
vitality, because he did not need it for the work of begetting things.
Cronos is Time (the same is said by Heraclit. c. 41, 86, who sees in
Rhea the ever flowing motions), and consumes his children, just as Time
does portions of time. Cronos was bound by Zeus, the unmeasured course
of time having been bound by the courses of the stars. A second
explanation is given by Corn. 7, 21, after making (c. 3, 10) vain
attempts at etymological interpretations of Cronos and Rhea. Cronos
(from κραίνειν) stands for the order of nature, putting an end to the
all too-violent atmospheric currents on earth, by diminishing the
vapour-masses (compare the quotation from Chrysippus on p. 161, 2), and
he is bound by Zeus, to represent that change in nature is limited.
Macrob. Sat. i. 8 (who betrays that he is following a Stoic example by
quoting Chrysippus’s definition of time: certa dimensio quæ ex cœli
conversione colligitur, conf. p. 197, 2), gives another explanation:
Before the separation of elements, time was not; after the seeds of all
things had flowed from heaven down to the earth in sufficient quantity,
and the elements had come into being, the process came to an end, and
the different sexes were left to propagate animal life.
[982] See p. 292, 4, and Sen. Benef. i. 13, 3.
[983] C. 31, 187.
[984] Plut. De Is. 44, Schl. p. 367: He is τὸ πληκτικὸν καὶ διαιρετικὸν
πνεῦμα. Sen. Benef. iv. 8, 1. See above, p. 359, 2, and what Villoisin
quotes on Cornutus, p. 366. from Schol. Apollon. Among the natural
philosophers, i.e. the Stoics, Hercules symbolises strength and
intelligence.
[985] Pers. Sat. v. 63.
[986] Heraclit. c. 33, p. 67, who, in the introduction, expressly
refers to δοκιμώτατοι Στωϊκῶν.
[987] C. 70–75.
[988] C. 70–73, p. 137.
[989] Conf. the way in which Heraclitus, 74, 146, expresses himself as
to Plato’s and Epicurus’s attacks upon Homer.
[990] Conf. Wachsmuth’s treatise mentioned above, p. 351, 2.
[991] Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6. He there mentions two books of Chrysippus on
divination, which are also referred to (as Wachsmuth, p. 12, shows) by
Diog. vii. 149; Varro (in Lactant. Inst. i. 6, 9); Phot. Amphiloch.
Quæst. (Montfaucon, Bibl. Coisl. p. 347); Philodemus, περὶ θεῶν
διαγωγῆς, Vol. Herc. vi. 49, col. 7, 33; and from which Cicero has
borrowed Divin. i. 38, 82; ii. 17, 41; 49, 101; 15, 35; 63, 130; and
perhaps De Fato, 7. Chrysippus also wrote a book, περὶ χρησμῶν (Cic.
Divin. i. 19, 37; ii. 56, 115; 65, 134; Suid. νεοττός); and one περὶ
ὀνείρων (Cic. Divin. i. 20, 39; ii. 70, 144; 61, 126; 63, 130; i. 27,
66: Suid. τιμωροῦντος). In the former, he collected oracular responses;
in the latter, prophetic dreams.
[992] Diog. vii. 178, mentions a treatise of Sphærus περὶ μαντικῆς.
Cic. (Divin. i. 3, 6; i. 38, 83; ii. 17, 41; 43, 90; 49, 101) mentions
a treatise having the same title as that of Diogenes of Seleucia, and
two books of Antipater περὶ μαντικῆς, in which many interpretations of
dreams were given. The same writer (Divin. i. 3, 6; 20, 39; 38, 83; 54,
123; ii. 70, 144; 15, 35; 49, 101) mentions a treatise of Posidonius
περὶ μαντικῆς in five books, Diog. vii. 149; Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6; 30,
64; 55, 125; 57, 130; ii. 15, 35; 21, 47; De Fato, 3; Boëth. De Diis et
Præsens (in Orelli’s Cicero, v. 1) p. 395.
[993] Boëthus, in his commentary on Aratus, attempted to determine and
explain the indications of a storm. Cic. Divin. i. 8, 14; ii. 21, 47.
On Panætius’s objections to μαντικὴ a word will be presently said.
[994] Cic. Divin. i. 52, 118: Non placet Stoicis, singulis jecorum
fissis aut avium cautibus interesse Deum; neque enim decorum est, nec
Diis dignum, nec fieri ullo pacto potest. Ibid. 58, 132: Nunc illa
testabor, non me sortilegos, neque eos, qui quæstus causa hariolentur,
ne psychomantia quidem ... agnoscere. Similarly in Sen. Nat. Qu. ii.
32, 2 (see p. 374, 3), the difference between the Stoic view and the
ordinary one is stated to be this, that, according to the Stoics,
auguries non quia significatura sunt fiant, but quia facta sunt
significent. In c. 42, it is said to be an absurd belief that Jupiter
should hurl bolts which as often hit the innocent as the guilty, an
opinion invented ad coercendos animos imperitorum.
[995] Conf. Diogenian, in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5: τὸ χρειῶδες αὐτῆς
(divination) καὶ βιωφελὲς, δι’ ὃ καὶ μάλιστα Χρύσιππος δοκεῖ ὑμνεῖν τὴν
μαντικήν; and M. Aurel. ix. 27; God shows his care for the wicked by
means of prophecies and by dreams.
[996] Cic. N. D. ii. 5, 13, where among the four reasons from which
Cleanthes deduced belief in Gods, the first is præsensio rerum
futurarum, extraordinary natural phenomena—pestilence, earthquakes,
monsters, meteors, &c., being the third. Ibid. 65, 105: The Stoic says
of divination: Mihi videtur vel maxime confirmare, Deorum providentia
consuli rebus humanis, Sext. Math. ix. 132: If there were no Gods, all
the varieties of divination would be unmeaning; these are nevertheless
universally admitted. Cic. Divin. i. 6, and the quotations on p. 175,
3, 4.
[997] Cic. Divin. i. 5, 9: Ego enim sic existimo: si sint ea genera
divinandi vera, de quibus accepimus quæque colimus, esse Deos,
vicissimque si Dii sint, esse qui divinent. Arcem tu quidem Stoicorum,
inquam, Quinte, defendis. Ibid. 38, 82: Stoic proof of divination: Si
sunt Dii neque ante declarant hominibus quæ futura sunt, aut non
diligunt homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant, aut existimant nihil
interesse hominum, scire quid futurum sit, aut non censent esse suæ
majestatis præsignificare hominibus quæ sunt futura, aut ea ne ipsi
quidem Dii præsignificare possunt. At neque non diligunt nos, &c. Non
igitur sunt Dii nee significant futura (οὐκ ἄρα εἰσὶ μὲν θεοὶ οὐ
προσημαίνουσι δὲ—the well-known expression of Chrysippus for εἰ θεοί
εἰσιν, οὐ προσημαίνουσι, conf. p. 114, 1); sunt autem Dii: significant
ergo: et non, si significant, nullas vias dant nobis ad significationis
scientiam, frustra enim significarent: nec, si dant vias, non est
divinatio. Est igitur divinatio. This proof, says Cicero, was used by
Chrysippus, Diogenes, Antipater. It may be easily recognised as
belonging to Chrysippus. Cic. ii. 17, 41; 49, 101, again reverts to the
same proof. Conf. id. i. 46, 104: Id ipsum est Deos non putare, quæ ab
iis significantur, contemnere. Diog. vii. 149: καὶ μὴν καὶ μαντικὴν
ὑφεστάναι πᾶσάν φασιν, εἰ καὶ πρόνοιαν εἶναι. Some read ᾗ καὶ πρόνοιαν
εἶναι, in which case the argument would be reversed, not from
providence to divination, but from divination to providence.
[998] Cic. Div. i. 55, 125: Primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a
Deo ... deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis divinandi ratioque
repetenda.
[999] Cic. l.c. 55, 126.
[1000] Ibid. 57, 129.
[1001] See p. 370, 3; 371, 1.
[1002] Cic. Divin. i. 27, 56 (Suid. τιμωροῦντος), ii. 65, 135 (Suid.
νεοττός), ii. 70, 144, quoting from Chrysippus; i. 54, 123, quoting
from Antipater; i. 30, 64, De Fat. 3, 5, from Posidonius—gives
instances of stories to which the Stoics attached great value, whilst
their opponents either pronounced the stories to be false, or the
prophecies to be deceptive, or their fulfilment to be accidental (Cic.
Divin. i. 19, 37; ii. 11, 27; 56, 115; De Fato, 3, 5).
[1003] Aristotle, in a somewhat different sense, had explained the
marvellous by a reference to natural causes, even allowing the
existence of presentiments within certain limits.
[1004] Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6, after the passage quoted: Sed a Stoicis vel
princeps ejus disciplinæ Posidonii doctor discipulus Antipatri
degeneravit Panætius, nec tamen ausus est negate vim esse divinandi,
sed dubitare se dixit. Ibid. i. 7, 12; ii. 42, 88; Acad. ii. 33, 107;
Diog. vii. 149; Epiphan. Adv. Hær. Cicero appears to have borrowed from
Panætius, as Wachsmuth rightly observes, this denial of Astrology
(Divin. ii. 42–46), and he allows, c. 42, 88; 47, 97, that Panætius was
the only Stoic who rejected it.
[1005] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 3: Nimis illum [Deum] otiosum et pusillæ
rei ministrum facis, si aliis somnia aliis exta, disponit. Ista
nihilominus divina ope geruntur. Sed non a Deo pennæ avium reguntur nec
pecudum viscera sub securi formantur. Alia ratione fatorum series
explicatur ... quicquid fit alicujus rei futuræ signum est ... cujus
rei ordo est etiam prædictio est, &c. Cic. Divin. i. 52, 118, after the
passage quoted, p. 371, 3: Sed ita a principio inchoatum esse mundum,
ut certis rebus certa signa præcurrerent, alia in extis, alia in
avibus, &c. Posidonius, ibid. 55, 125 (see p. 373, 2). Nor was the
meaning otherwise, when portents (according to Cic. Divin. ii. 15, 33;
69, 142) were based on a συμπάθεια τῆς φύσεως (on which see p. 183, 2),
an opponent not without reason doubting whether it existed, for
instance, between a rent in the liver of a victim and an advantageous
business, or between an egg in a dream and treasure trove.
[1006] As in the passage quoted from Boëthus on p. 371, 2.
[1007] Conf. p. 374, 2; 379, 1, and Cic. Div. ii. 43, 90, according to
whom Diogenes of Seleucia conceded so much to astrology as to allow
that, from the condition of the stars at birth, it might be known quali
quisque natura et ad quam quisque maxime rem aptus futurus sit. More he
would not allow, because twins often differ widely in their course of
life and destiny.
[1008] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 5.
[1009] Cic. l.c. ii. 15, 35: Chrysippus, Antipater, and Posidonius
assert: Ad hostiam deligendam ducem esse vim quandam sentientem atque
divinam, quæ tota confusa mundo sit, as was explained i. 52, 118.
[1010] Cic. ii. 15, 35: Illud vero multum etiam melius, quod ...
dicitur ab illis (conf. i. 52, 118): cum immolare quispiam velit, tum
fieri extorum mutationem, ut aut absit aliquid, aut supersit: Deorum
enim numini parere omnia. See p. 374, 3.
[1011] Cic. i. 53, 120, defends auguries somewhat similarly by arguing:
If an animal can move its limbs at pleasure, must not God have greater
power over His? (his body according to them being the whole world).
[1012] See p. 181.
[1013] Cic. Divin. ii. 8, 20; Diogenian, in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5;
Alex. Aph. De Fat. 31, p. 96.
[1014] Upon the use of divination depends the whole argument for its
reality, based on the divine kindness. Cic. i. 38, 83, and above, p.
372, 1.
[1015] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 37, 2; 38, 2: Effugiet pericula si expiaverit
prædictas divinitus minas. At hoc quoque in fato est, ut expiet, &c.
This answer probably came from Chrysippus, who, as it appears from Cic.
Divin. ii. 63, 130, and Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, Vol. Herc. vi.
col. 7, 33, defended the use of expiation. In the above-quoted and more
general form it is found in Alexander and Eusebius, probably also taken
from Chrysippus, see p. 181.
[1016] According to the definition in Sext. Math. ix. 132, which Cic.
Divin. ii. 63, 130, attributes to Chrysippus, it is an ἐπιστήμη (Cic.
more accurately: a vis = δύναμις, since besides scientific there is
also natural divination), θεωρητικὴ καὶ ἐξηγητικὴ τῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν
ἀνθρώποις διδομένων σημείων. Stob. Ecl. ii. 122 and 238; Eus. Pr. Ev.
iv. 3, 5.
[1017] Plut. Vit. Hom. 212, p. 1238: [τῆς μαντικῆς] τὸ μὲν τεχνικόν
φασιν εἶναι οἱ Στωϊκοί. οἷον ἱεροσκοπίαν καὶ οἰωνοὺς καὶ τὸ περὶ φήμας
καὶ κληδόνας καὶ σύμβολα, ἅπερ συλλήβδην τεχνικὰ προσηγόρευσαν· τὸ δὲ
ἄτεχνον καὶ ἀδίδακτον, τουτέστιν ἐνύπνια καὶ ἐνθουσιασμούς. To the same
effect, Cic. Divin. i. 18, 34; ii. 11, 26.
[1018] Conf. the fragment quoted in ‘Aristotle and the Peripatetics,’
p. 300, which throws light on old and well-known views in the spirit of
the Platonic Aristotelian philosophy, without, however, defending them.
[1019] Cic. Divin. i. 30, 64; ii. 10, 26: The naturale genus divinandi
is, quod animos arriperet aut exciperet extrinsecus a divinitate, unde
omnes animos haustos aut acceptos aut libatos haberemus. Plut. Plac. v.
1; where, however, the words κατὰ θειότητα τῆς ψυχῆς are only a gloss
on the preceding words κατὰ τὸ ἔνθεον, κ.τ.λ. Galen. Hist. Phil. p.
320.
[1020] Cic. Divin. i. 50, 115, and Plut. Compare the many Stoic stories
of dreams and presentiments in Cic. i. 27, 56; 30, 64; ii. 65, 134; 70,
144.
[1021] See besides the passages just quoted, Cic. Divin. i. 49, 110;
50, 113; 51, 115; and in particular i. 57, 129. Hence the prophecies of
the dying (ibid. 30, 63, according to Posidonius; conf. Arist. l.c.),
and the statement (ibid. 53, 121; see p. 380, 1) that true dreams come
of innocent sleep.
[1022] Conf. the quotations on p. 375, 4, from Cic. Divin. ii. 10, 26;
15, 35; and his remarks on the instinct us afflatusque divinus. Cic. i.
18, 34.
[1023] According to Cic. Divin. i. 30, 64, Posidonius thought prophetic
dreams were realised in one of three ways: uno, quod prævideat animus
ipse per sese, quippe qui Deorum cognitione teneatur; altero, quod
plenus aër sit immortalium animorum, in quibus tanquam insignitæ notæ
veritatis appareant; tertio, quod ipsi Dii cum dormientibus
colloquantur. Of these three modes, not the first only, but also the
second, corresponds with the Stoic hypotheses. Indeed, in Stob. Ecl.
ii. 122, 238, μαντικὴ is defined = ἐπιστήμη θεωρητικὴ σημείων τῶν ἀπὸ
θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων πρὸς ἀνθρώπινον βίον συντεινόντων. Posidonius can only
have spoken of Gods in condescension to popular views; as a Stoic, he
would only know of that connection with the soul of the universe which
is referred to in the first mode.
[1024] Amongst such external helps, the Stoic in Cic. Divin. i. 50,
114; 36, 79, enumerates the impression derived from music, natural
scenery, mountains, woods, rivers, seas and vapours arising from the
earth. But it is difficult to understand how, on Stoic principles, he
can have attached value to oracles (ibid. 18, 34) by lot, or justified
them otherwise than in the way mentioned on p. 375, 4.
[1025] Cic. i. 18, 34; 33, 72.
[1026] Ibid. i. 56, 127.
[1027] Cicero, ii. 11, 26, enumerates the above-named varieties, after
having previously (i. 33) treated them separately. Similarly, Ps. Plut.
V. Hom. 212. See above, p. 377, 2, Stob. Ecl. ii. 238, mentions
tentatively, as varieties of μαντικὴ τό τε ὀνειροκριτικὸν, καὶ τὸ
οἰωνοσκοπικὸν, καὶ θυτικόν. Sext. Math. ix. 132, says: If there were no
Gods, there would be neither μαντικὴ nor θεοληπτικὴ, ἀστρομαντικὴ nor
λογικὴ πρόῤῥησις δι’ ὀνείρων. Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 3, gives a theory
of dreams; but in how far it represents the views of the Stoics, it is
impossible to say. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 39, i. 41, clearly distinguishes
the discussion of natural omens from the doctrines of philosophy.
[1028] Cic. i. 55, 124; 56, 128.
[1029] Ibid. i. 56, 127.
[1030] Cic. i. 53, 121: Ut igitur qui se tradet quieti præparato animo
cum bonis cogitationibus tunc rebus (for instance, nourishment; conf.
c. 29, 60; 51, 115) ad tranquillitatem accommodatis, certa et vera
cernit in somnis; sic castus animus purusque vigilantis et ad astrorum
et ad avium reliquorumque signorum et ad extorum veritatem est
paratior.
[1031] See p. 46.
[1032] See p. 139.
[1033] See p. 132.
[1034] Whether Diogenes, in connecting the Stoics with the Cynics, was
following a Stoic authority or not (vii.), is a moot point;
nevertheless, the view comes to us from a time in which the relations
of the two must have been well known, and the quotation from Posidonius
on p. 274, 2, quite accords herewith. Not to mention others, Diog. vi.
14, speaking of Antisthenes, says: δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀνδρωδεστάτης
Στωϊκῆς κατάρξαι ... οὗτος ἡγήσατο καὶ τῆς Διογένους ἀπαθείας καὶ τῆς
Κράτητος ἐγκρατείας καὶ τῆς Ζήνωνος καρτερίας, αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενος τῇ
πόλει τὰ θεμέλια: and Juvenal, xiii. 121, calls the Stoic dogmas a
Cynicis tunica (the common dress in distinction to the tribon)
distantia.
[1035] Krische, Forschungen, i. 363, and above, p. 145, 2.
[1036] On Aristo see p. 59; 260; 281.
[1037] Aristo cannot, therefore, be considered (as he is by Krische,
Forsch. 411) the best representative of the original Stoic theory. On
the contrary, he only represents a reaction of the Cynic element in
Stoicism against the other component parts of this philosophy.
[1038] See p. 290.
[1039] Apart from the testimony of Numenius (in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5,
10), to which no great value can be attached, the acquaintance of Zeno
with Heraclitus is established by the fact that not only the ethics,
but also the natural science of the Stoic School owes its origin to
him. See pp. 40, 3; 62, 2, 3; 126, 2; 141, 2; 144, 4; 145, 1, 2; 146,
4; 148, 2; 151, 1. Diog. mentions treatises of Cleanthes, vii. 174; ix.
15, of Aristo, ix. 5, of Sphærus (vii. 178; ix. 15) treating of
Heraclitus; and Phædrus (Philodem.), Fragm. col. 4, says that
Chrysippus explained the old myths after the manner of Heraclitus.
[1040] Instances have often occurred. See p. 144, 4; 145, 1, 2; 232, 4.
Conf. Sen. Ep. 83, 9.
[1041] Besides meteorological and other points of natural science,
which the Stoics may have borrowed from Heraclitus, Heraclitus’
attitude towards the popular faith also belongs here.
[1042] See p. 101, 2.
[1043] See p. 100, 4, 5; 101, 2; 140, 1.
[1044] As an illustration of the difference, take Heraclitus’ statement
of the daily extinction of the sun, which every one must admit would
not have been possible in the Stoic School.
[1045] πνεῦμα as with the Stoics.
[1046] See particularly Antiochus and also Cicero in many passages. See
above, p. 39, 2.
[1047] See p. 46, 1, 2.
[1048] The story in Diog. vii. 3 bears out this view, that Zeno was
first won for philosophy by Xenophon’s Memorabilia, and that on asking
who was the representative of this line of thought, he was referred to
Crates. According to the quotations on pp. 274, 2; 387, 1, the Cynics
were regarded in the Stoic School as genuine followers of Socrates.
[1049] Consult, on this subject, the valuable treatise of Steinhart, in
Ersch and Gruber’s Encyclopædia, sect. i. vol. 35, pp. 459–477.
[1050] Diog. x. i. He is frequently mentioned as an Athenian, belonging
to the δῆμος Gargettos. Diog. l.c.; Lucret. Nat. Rer. vi. 1; Cic. Ad
Fam. xv. 16; Ælian, V. H. iv. 13.
[1051] Diog. i.; Strabo, xiv. 1, 18, p. 638. According to these
authorities, and Cic. N. D. i. 26, 72, his father had gone thither as a
κληροῦχος. That this happened before his birth has been demonstrated by
Steinhart, p. 461.
[1052] Apollodorus (in Diog. x. 14) mentions 7 Gamelion, Ol. 109, 3, as
the birthday of Epicurus. It was observed (Epicurus’ will, Diog. 18) τῇ
προτέρᾳ δεκάτῃ τοῦ Γαμηλιῶνος. Gamelion being the seventh month of the
Attic year, the time of his birth must have been either early in 341
B.C., or the last days of 342 B.C.
[1053] His father, according to Strabo, was a schoolmaster, and
Epicurus had assisted him in teaching (Hermippus and Timon, in Diog. 2;
Athen. xiii. 588, a). His mother is said to have earned money by
repeating charms (καθαρμοί), and Epicurus to have assisted in this
occupation (Diog. 4). Although the latter statement evidently comes
from some hostile authority, it would seem that his circumstances in
early life were not favourable to a thoroughly scientific education.
His language in disparagement of culture would lead us to the same
conclusion, even were the express testimony of Sext. Math. i. 1
wanting: ἐν πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀμαθὴς Ἐπίκουρος ἐλέγχεται, οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς
κοιναῖς ὁμιλίαις (in common expressions, conf. the censure passed on
him by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Aristophanes in Diog. 4, 13)
καθαρεύων. Cic. Fin. i. 7, 26: Vellem equidem, aut ipse doctrinis
fuisset instructor—est enim ... non satis politus in artibus, quas qui
tenent eruditi appellantur—aut ne deterruisset alios a studiis. Athen.
xiii. 588, a: ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας ἀμύητος ὤν.
[1054] According to his own statement (Diog. 2), he was not more than
fourteen (Suid. Ἐπικ. has twelve) years of age when he began to
philosophise, i.e. to think about philosophical subjects; probably
about chaos, following the suggestion of Hesiod’s verses. He
subsequently boasted that he had made himself what he was without a
teacher, and refused to own his obligations to those shown to be his
teachers. Cic. N. D. i. 26, 72; 33, 93; Sext. Math. i. 2, who mentions
his disparagement of Nausiphanes; Diog. 8, 13; Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 18,
4; conf. Sen. Ep. 52, 3. It is, however, established that in his youth
he enjoyed the instruction of Pamphilus and of that Nausiphanes, who is
sometimes called a follower of Democritus, sometimes of Pyrrho (Cic.;
Sext.; Diog. x. 8; 13; 14; ix. 64; 69; Proœm. 15; Suid. Ἐπικ.; Clem.
Strom. i. 301, D). The names of two other supposed instructors are also
mentioned, Nausicydes and Praxiphanes (Diog. Proœm. 15; x. 13), but
they almost seem to be corruptions for Pamphilus and Nausiphanes.
[1055] According to Cic. l.c., he denied the fact. Others, however,
asserted it, and, among them, Demetrius of Magnesia. Diog. 13.
[1056] Whither he came, in his eighteenth year, according to Heraclides
Lembus, in Diog. 1. Conf. Strabo, l.c.: τραφῆναί φασιν ἐνθάδε (in
Samos) καὶ ἐν Τέῳ καὶ ἐφηβεῦσαι Ἀθήνῃσι.
[1057] According to Hermippus (Diog. 2) Democritus first gave him the
impulse to pursue philosophy; but this is only a conjecture. Besides
Democritus, Aristippus is also mentioned as a philosopher whose
doctrines he followed (Diog. 4). Epicurus is even said to have
expressed a disparaging opinion of Democritus (Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93;
Diog. 8). Nor is this denied by Diog. 9: but it probably refers to
particular points only, or it may have reference to the attitude of
later Epicureans, such as Colotes (Plut. Adv. Col. 3, 3, p. 1108).
Plut. l.c., says, not only that Epicurus for a long time called himself
a follower of Democritus, but he also quotes passages from Leonteus and
Metrodorus, attesting Epicurus’ respect for Democritus. Philodem. περὶ
παῤῥησίας, Vol. Herc. v. 2, col. 20, seems to refer to expressions of
Epicurus which excuse certain mistakes of Democritus. Lucret. iii. 370,
v. 620, also speaks of Democritus with great respect; and Philodem. De
Mus. Vol. Herc. i. col. 36, calls him ἀνὴρ οὐ φυσιολογώτατος μόνον τῶν
ἀρχαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἱστορουμένων οὐδενὸς ἧττον πολυπράγμων.
[1058] Diog. 1, 15 mentions Colophon, Mytilene, and Lampsacus. Strabo,
xiii. 1, 19, p. 589, also affirms that Epicurus resided for some time
at Lampsacus, and there made the acquaintance of Idomeneus and
Leonteus.
[1059] Diog. 2, on the authority of Heraclides and Sotion. According to
him, Epicurus returned to Athens in the archonship of Anaxicrates,
307–6 B.C. In that case the numbers must be slightly reduced in the
statement (Diog. 15) that he came to Mytilene when 32, and taught there
and in Lampsacus for five years.
[1060] Not immediately, however, since Diog. 2 says, on the authority
of Heraclides: μέχρι μέν τινος κατ’ ἐπιμιξίαν τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσοφεῖν,
ἔπειτ’ ἰδίᾳ πως τὴν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ κληθεῖσαν αἵρεσιν συστήσασθαι.
[1061] On this celebrated garden, after which the Epicureans were
called οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν κήπων, see Diog. 10, 17; Plin. H. N. xix. 4, 51; Cic.
Fin. i. 20, 65; v. 1, 3; Ad Fam. xiii. 1; Sen. Ep. 21, 10; Steinhart,
p. 462, 45; 463, 72. Epicurus had purchased it for 80 minæ.
[1062] This subject will be discussed at a later period.
[1063] Such as Themista or Themisto, the wife of Leonteus (Diog. 5; 25;
26; Clem. Strom. iv. 522, D).
[1064] Diog. 4; 6; 7; Cleomed. Meteor. p. 92, Balfor.; Plut. N. P.
Suav. Vivi, 4, 8; 16, 1 and 6; Lat. Viv. 4, 2. The best-known among
these ἑταῖραι is Leontion, who lived with Metrodorus, a pupil of
Epicurus (Diog. 6; 23), and wrote with spirit against Theophrastus
(Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93; Plut. Hist. Nat. Præf. 29). Conf. Diog. 5;
Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας, Vol. Herc. v. 2, Fr. 9. Athen. xiii. 593, b,
tells a fine story of self-sacrifice of her daughter Danaë.
[1065] Ol. 127, 2, in the archonship of Pytharatus, and in his
seventy-second year. Diog. 15; Cic. De Fat. 9, 19.
[1066] Diog. 15; 22; Cic. Ad Fam. vii. 26; Fin. ii. 30, 96; Sen. Ep.
66, 47; 92, 25. That he put an end to his own life (Baumhauer, Vet.
Philo. Doct. De Mort. Volunt. 322), Hermippus (Diog. 15) by no means
implies.
[1067] According to Diog. Pro. 16, x. 26, he was, next to Chrysippus,
the most voluminous writer of the ancient philosophers, his writings
filling 300 rolls. The titles of his most esteemed works are given by
Diog. 27. Conf. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii. 595, Harl.
[1068] Three epistles in Diog. 35; 84; 122; and the κύριαι δόξαι, an
epitome of his ethics, mentioned by Cic. N. D. i. 30, 85, and 139. Of
his 37 books περὶ φύσεως, fragments of books 2 and 11 have been edited
(Vol. Hercul. ii.).
[1069] Fragments in Diog. 5; 7. Besides the testament and the letter to
Idomeneus (Diog. 16–22), many individual expressions of Epicurus have
been preserved by Seneca.
[1070] Aristophanes (in Diog. 13) calls his style ἰδιωτικωτάτη.
Cleomed. Meteor. p. 91, complains of his awkward and barbarous
expressions, instancing: σαρκὸς εὐσταθῆ καταστήματα· τὰ περὶ ταύτης
πιστὰ ἐλπίσματα· λιπάσμα ὀφθαλμῶν· ἱερὰ ἀνακραυγάσματα· γαργαλισμοὺς
σώματος. In this respect, Chrysippus may be compared with him. See
above, p. 48, 1.
[1071] See Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii. 598, Harl. They were, no doubt, very
numerous. Diog. x. 9, probably exaggerates their number in saying the
friends of Epicurus would fill towns. Cic. Fin. i. 20, 65, speaks of
magni greges amicorum. Plut. Lat. Viv. 3, 1, also mentions his friends
in Asia and Egypt. In Greece, however, on his own testimony, and that
of Metrodorus (Sen. Ep. 79, 15), they attracted little notice.
[1072] A native of Lampsacus (Strabo, xiii. 1, 19, p. 589), and, next
to Epicurus, the most celebrated teacher of the School. Cicero, Fin.
ii. 28, 92, calls him pæne alter Epicurus, and states (Fin. ii. 3, 7)
that Epicurus gave him the name of a wise man (Diog. 18; Sen. Ep. 52,
3). Further particulars respecting him and his writings in Diog. x. 6;
18; 21–24; Philodem. De Vitiis, ix. (Vol. Herc. iii.), col. 12; 21; 27;
Athen. vii. 279; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 7, 1; 12, 2; 16, 6 and 9; Adv.
Col. 33, 2 and 6; Sen. Ep. 98, 9; 99, 25. Fragments of the letters are
to be found in Plutarch, Seneca, and Philodemus. Whether the fragments
of a treatise περὶ αἰσθητῶν in vol. vi. of Vol. Hercul. belong to him,
is very uncertain. According to Diog. 23, he died seven years before
Epicurus, in his fifty-third year, and must therefore have been born
330 or 329 B.C. For the education of his children probably by Leontion,
whom Diog. 23 calls παλλακὴ, and Sen. Fr. 45 in Hieron. Adv. Jovin. i.
191 calls his wife, provision is made by Epicurus in his will (Diog.
19, 21).
[1073] Son of Athenodorus, likewise a native of Lampsacus (Diog. 24), a
capital mathematician, according to Cic. Acad. ii. 33, 106; Fin. i. 6,
20. Diog. l.c. calls him ἐπιεικὴς καὶ φιλήκοος; Metrodorus, in
Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας (Vol. Herc. v. a), col. 6, ἀποφθεγματίας. Sen.
Ep. 6, 6, calls him, Metrodorus, and Hermarchus, viros magnos.
Philodemus (vol. v. b), Fr. 49. praises his frankness towards his
teacher. A son of his is also mentioned in Epicurus’ will (Diog. 19),
whose mother would appear to have been a courtesan, according to Plut.
N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 6.
[1074] This individual’s name, formerly written Hermachus, appears as
Hermarchus in the modern editions of Diogenes, Cicero, and Seneca. The
latter form is now established beyond doubt by the Herculanean
fragments from Philodemus (περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, vol. vi. col. 13, 20; De
Vitiis, ix. vol. iii. col. 25, 1), and the inscription on a monument to
him (Antiquitat. Hercul. V. 17). His birthplace was Mytilene,
Agemarchus being his father. (Diog. 17, 15, 24.) Diog. 24 gives a list
of his books. Epicurus (Diog. 20) describes him as one of his oldest
and most faithful friends, in the words: μετὰ τοῦ συγκαταγεγηρακότος
ἡμῖν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ. On his character, see Sen. Ep. 6, 6.
[1075] According to what is stated in the testament of Epicurus. Diog.
16.
[1076] Colotes, a native of Lampsacus. Diog. 25. Further particulars
about him may be obtained from Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 5; 1, 1; N. P. Suav.
Vivi, 1, 1; Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 2. Vol. Hercul. iv. Introd. in
Polystr. p. iii.
[1077] In particular, Neocles, Chairedemus, and Aristobulus, the
brothers of Epicurus (Diog. 3, 28; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 5, 3; where
Ἀγαθόβουλος is evidently a copyist’s error; 16, 3; De Lat. Viv. 3, 2);
Idomeneus, a native of Lampsacus (Diog. 25; 22; 23; 5; Plut. Adv. Col.
18, 3; Strabo, xiii. 1, 19, p. 589; Athen. vii. 279; Philodem. περὶ
παῤῥησίας. Fr. 72, Vol. Herc. v. 2; Sen. Ep. 21, 3 and 7; 22, 5; Phot.
Lex.; and Suid. Πύθια καὶ Δήλια), from whose historical writings many
fragments are quoted by Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. ii. 489; Leonteus,
likewise a native of Lampsacus (Diog. 5; 25; Plut. Adv. Col. 3, 3;
Strabo, l.c.); Herodotus (Diog. 4 and 34); Pythocles (Diog. 5 and 83;
Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 12, 1; Adv. Col. 29, 2; Philodem. περὶ
παῤῥησίας, Fr. 6); Apelles (Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 12, 1); Menœceus
(Diog. 121); Nicanor (Diog. 20); Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus,
who afterwards fell out with Epicurus (Diog. 4 and 6; 23 and 28; Cic.
N. D. i. 33, 93: Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 9; Adv. Col. 32, 7;
Comment. in Hesiod. Fr. 7, 1; Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας, Vol. Herc. v.
a, col. 20). This Timocrates must not be confounded with the Athenian
Timocrates, whom Epicurus appointed his heir, jointly with Amynomachus
(Diog. 16; Cic. Fin. ii. 31, 101). The two last named were probably
pupils of Epicurus. Other pupils were: Mithras, a Syrian, an official
under Lysimachus (Diog. 4 and 28; Plut. Adv. Col. 33, 2; N. P. Suav.
Viv. 15, 5); Mys, a slave of Epicurus, on whom he bestowed liberty
(Diog. 21; 3; 10; Gell. ii. 18, 8; Macrob. Sat. i. 11; the ladies
mentioned on p. 407, 2, 3; likewise Anaxarchus, to whom Epicurus
addressed a letter, and Timarchus, to whom Metrodorus addressed one
(Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 3); Hegesianax, who died early (Plut. N. P. Suav.
Vivi, 20, 5); the poet Menander, whose wondrous epigram on Epicurus is
to be found in the anthology; and probably Dionysius ὁ μεταθέμενος.
(See above, p. 44, 1.)
[1078] Diog. 16. In Cicero’s time, the plot of ground, together with
the tenement standing thereupon, and at that time in ruins (parietinæ),
was in the hands of C. Memmius, a distinguished Roman, to whom Cicero
wrote (Ad Fam. xiii. 1), conf. Ad Att. v. 11, begging him to restore it
to the School. Whether he was successful is not known from Sen. Ep. 21,
10.
[1079] Diog. 25. does not say that Polystratus was a personal disciple
of Epicurus, but it seems probable. Fragments of a treatise of his περὶ
ἀλόγου καταφρονήσεως in the fourth volume of Vol. Hercul.
[1080] According to Valer. Max. i. 8, ext. 17, both these individuals
were born on the same day, and passed their whole lives together with a
common purse. Lysias, according to the older text of Diog. x. 25, was a
cotemporary, at whose house Hermarchus died, as Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii.
606 believes, and who is styled in Athen. v. 215, b, tyrant of Tarsus,
Cobet, however, reads παραλύσει instead of παρὰ Λυσίᾳ.
[1081] Diog. 25. The Dionysius referred to can hardly be Dionysius ὁ
μεταθέμενος (see p. 44, 1), or Diogenes would have said so. Besides the
chronology forbids such an assumption.
[1082] Strabo, xiv. 2, 20, p. 658. He is probably the Protarchus whose
sayings are quoted by Simpl. Phys. 78, a; Themist. Phys. 27, a.
[1083] According to Strabo, l.c., Diog. 26, Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. iii.
137, Math. viii. 348, x. 219, Erotian, Lex. Hippocr. Κλαγγώδη,
Demetrius was one of the most distinguished Epicureans. Whether a
treatise on mathematics, illegible fragments of which are found in
Herculaneum (Vol. Herc. iv. Introd. in Polystr. iii. 2), is his, or
belongs to another Demetrius mentioned by Strabo, xii. 3, 16, page 548,
it is impossible to say.
[1084] Both the Ptolemies of Alexandria (Diog. 25); Diogenes of Tarsus
(Diog. vi. 81; x. 26; 97; 118; 136; 138); Orion (Diog. 26); Timagoras
(Cic. Acad. ii. 25, 80); and also Metrodorus of Stratonice, who went
over from Epicurus to Carneades (Diog. 9)—a very rare thing for an
Epicurean to do—may be named among his pupils.
[1085] According to Athen. xii. 547, a, Ælian, V. H. ix. 12, two
Epicureans, Alcius and Philiscus, were banished from Rome, in the
consulate of L. Postumius (173 or 155 B.C.; see Clinton’s Fasti),
because of their evil influence on youth. Although the story is
obviously taken from a hostile authority and in Suid. (Ἐπίκουρος, vol.
i. b, 419 Bern.), it is told with such exaggerations as to inspire
grave mistrust, it can hardly be altogether without some foundation.
Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 19, 4, says, that in some cities severe laws were
passed against the Epicureans, and just at that time there was a strong
feeling in Rome against innovations, witness the well-known enquiry
into the Bacchanalia instituted 186 B.C.
[1086] According to Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 6, Amafinius seems to have come
forward not long after the philosophic embassy of 156 B.C.; nor is this
at variance with Lucr. v. 336, who claims primus cum primis to have set
forth the Epicurean teaching in Latin. His works made a great
impression at the time, according to Cic. l.c. (cujus libris editis
commota multitudo contulit se ad eam potissimum disciplinam). According
to Acad. i. 2, 5, he pursued natural science, carefully following the
views of Epicurus. Cicero then complains of him and Rabirius, we know
not which one is meant, nor whether he was an Epicurean, qui nulla arte
adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis vulgari sermone disputant: nihil
definiunt, nihil partiuntur, &c. Conf. Tusc. ii. 3, 7. Cassius, too
(Cic. Ad Fam. xv. 12), calls him and Catius (see p. 414, 3) mali
verborum interpretes.
[1087] Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 7: Post Amafinium autem multi ejusdem æmuli
rationis multa cum scripsissent, Italiam totam occupaverunt, quodque
maxumum argumentum est non dici illa subtiliter, quod et tam facile
ediscantur et ab indoctis probentur, id illi firmamentum esse discipliæ
putant. Conf. in Fin. i. 7, 25, the question: Cur tam multi sint
Epicurei?
[1088] Surnamed ὁ κηποτύραννος, the writer of more than 400 books.
Diog. 25; 2; 13; vii. 181.
[1089] Diog. vii. 35, x. 25, and Procl. in Euclid. 55, says that Zeno
was a native of Sidon, and a pupil of Apollodorus; nor can these
statements be referred to an older Zeno, as some previous writers
maintained, believing Apollodorus to be called in error a pupil of
Epicurus by Diog. x. 25, instead of to the one mentioned by Cicero. For
no trace of such a one exists; and Diogenes vii. 35 would then have
passed over the teacher of Cicero without notice, although the latter
cannot possibly have been unknown to him. According to Cic. Acad. i.
12, 46, Zeno attended the lectures of Carneades and admired them; and
since Carneades died not later than 129 B.C., Zeno cannot have been
born much later than 150 B.C. If, therefore, Zeno was really the
successor of Apollodorus, the latter must be placed entirely in the
second century. But this fact is not sufficiently established. Cicero,
in company with Atticus, attended his lectures (Cic. l.c.; Fin. i. 5,
16; Tusc. iii. 17, 38. In Cic. N. D. i. 21, 58, Cotta says the same of
himself), on his first visit to Athens, 78 or 79 B.C.; conf. N. D. i.
34, 93; but this cannot possibly be the same Zeno or Xeno (as Krische,
Forsch. 26, maintains) whom Cic. Ad Att. v. 10, 11; xvi. 3 mentions as
living in 50 and 43 B.C. Cic. N. D. i. 21, calls him princeps
Epicureorum (and Philo of Larissa, coryphæus Epicureorum); Tusc. l.c.,
acriculus senex, istorum (Epicureans) acutissimus. Diog. x. 25, calls
him πολύγραφος ἀνήρ. From Procl. in Euclid. 55; 59; 60, we hear of a
treatise of Zeno, in which he attacked the validity of mathematical
proofs. Philodemus’ treatise περὶ παῤῥησίας (Vol. Herc. v. a) seems,
from the title, to have been an abstract from Zeno. Cotemporary with
Zeno was that Aristio, or Athenio, who played a part in Athens during
the Mithridatic war, and is sometimes called a Peripatetic, and
sometimes an Epicurean (Plut. Sulla, 12; 14; 23). See Zeller’s
Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 759, 2. Perhaps to the time of
his despotism the statement may be referred (Demetrius Magnes in Athen.
xiii. 611, b) that the Stoic Theotimus, who wrote against Epicurus, was
killed at the instance of Zeno.
[1090] Cicero (N. D. i. 33, 93; Fin. i. 5, 16; v. 1, 3; Legg. i. 20,
53) had also studied under him in Athens, and previously in Rome, where
Phædrus must then have been residing (Ad Fam. xiii. 1). He was old when
Cicero for the second time was brought into relations with him.
According to Phlegon, in Phot. Bibl. Cod. 97, p. 84, a, 17, he was
succeeded by Patro (Ol. 177, 3, or 70 B.C.) in the headship of the
School, after holding it only for a very short time; but this is not a
well-ascertained fact. Cicero l.c. praises the character of Phædrus. He
calls him nobilis philosophus (Philip, v. 5, 13). It is supposed that
Cicero’s description (N. D. i. 10, 25; 15, 41), and that the fragments
first published by Drummond (Herculanensia: London, 1810), and then by
Petersen (Phædri ... de Nat. De. Fragm.: Hamb. 1833), and illustrated
by Krische (Forschungen), were from a treatise of Phædrus on the Gods,
to which perhaps Cic. Ad Att. xiii. 39 refers. But Spengel (from the
Herculanean rolls, Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβείας. Abh. d. Münch. Akad.
Philos-philol. Kl. x. 1, 127) and Sauppe (De Philodemi libro ... de
pietate. Gött. Lectionsverz. für Sommer, 1864) have shown that the
Neapolitan (Vol. Herc. Coll. Alt. i. ii. 1862) editors are right in
regarding these fragments as the remains of a treatise of Philodemus
περὶ εὐσεβείας.
[1091] Philodemus (see Vol. Herc. i. 1; Gros, Philod. Rhet. cxii.;
Preller, Allg. Encycl. Sect. III. Bd. xxiii. 345) was a native of
Gadara. in Cœle-Syria (Strabo, xvi. 2, 29, p. 759). He lived at Rome in
Cicero’s time, and is mentioned by Cicero as a learned and amiable man
(Fin. ii. 35, 119; Or. in Pison. 28). Besides philosophic works, he
also wrote poems (Cic. In Pis.; Hor. Sat. i. 2, 121). A number of the
latter, in the shape of epigrams, are preserved. Of his philosophical
works mentioned by Diog. x. 3; 24, no fewer than thirty-six books were
discovered in Herculaneum, which have, for the most part, been
published (Vol. Herc. iv. Introd. in Polystr. iii.) so far as they were
legible. Spengel and Gros have separately edited Rhet. IV.; Sauppe, De
Vitiis X.; and Petersen and Sauppe, the fragments περὶ εὐσεβείας.
[1092] Cic. Acad. ii. 33, 106; Fin. ii. 35, 110; Ad Fam. vi. 11.
According to Virgil, Catal. 7, 9; 10, 1, Donat. Vita Virg. 79, Serv. Ad
Ecl. vi. 13, Æn. vi. 264, he was the teacher of Virgil. The name is
variously written as Syro, Siro, Sciro, Scyro. Somewhat earlier is the
grammarian Pompilius Andronicus, from Syria, who, according to Sueton.
Illust. Gram. c. 8, lived at Rome at the same time as Gnipho, the
teacher of Cæsar (Ibid. c. 7), and gave up his profession for the
Epicurean philosophy, and afterwards lived at Cumæ.
[1093] Cic. Ad Fam. xiii. 1; Ad Att. v. 11; vii. 2; Ad Quint. Fratr. i.
2, 4, where besides him an Epicurean Plato of Sardes is mentioned, and
above, pp. 410, 1; 413, 1.
[1094] Besides Lucretius, the most important among them are T.
Albutius, called by Cic. Brut. 35, 131, perfectus Epicureus (Cic. Brut.
26, 102; Tusc. v. 37, 108; N. D. i. 33, 93; Fin. i. 3, 8 [De Orat. iii.
43, 171]; In Pison. 38, 92; Offic. ii. 14, 50; Orator, 44, 149; In
Cæcil. 19, 63; Provin. Cons. 7, 15; De Orat. ii. 70, 281), and
Velleius, who, as Krische (Forsch. 20) proves, by a gloss on Nat. De.
i. 29, 82 and Cic. De N. D. i. 28, 79 (conf. Divin. i. 36, 79), was a
native of Lanuvium, and was considered the most distinguished Epicurean
of his time (Cic. N. D. i. 6, 15; 21, 58; conf. De Orat. iii. 21, 78).
Other Epicureans were: C. Catius, a native of Gaul, spoken of by Cicero
(Ad Fam. xv. 16) as one long ago dead. By Quintilian, x. 1, 124, he is
called levis quidem sed non injucundus tamen auctor; and the Comment.
Cruqu. in Hor. Sat. ii. 4, 1, says that he wrote four books De Rerum
Natura et De Summo Bono;—C. Cassius, the well-known leader of the
conspiracy against Cæsar (Cic. Ad Fam. xv. 16, 19; Plut. Brut. 37); C.
Vibius Pansa, who died as consul at Mutina in 43 B.C. (Cic. Ad Fam.
vii. 12; xv. 19); Gallus (Ad Fam. vii. 26); L. Piso, the patron of
Philodemus (Cic. in Pis. 28, see above, p. 413, 2; l.c. 9, 20; 16, 37;
18, 42; 25, 59; Post Red. 6, 14); Statilius (Plut. Brut. 12); a second
Statilius appears to be meant (Cat. Min. 65); L. Manlius Torquatus, to
whom Cic. Fin. i. 5, 13 delegates the representation of the Epicurean
teaching. T. Pomponius Atticus, the well-known friend of Cicero,
approached nearest to the Epicurean School, calling its adherents
nostri familiares (Cic. Fin. v. 1, 3) and condiscipuli (Legg. i. 7,
21). He was a pupil of Zeno and Phædrus and a friend of Patro’s; but
his relations to philosophy were too free to entitle him properly to be
ranked in any one school (Cic. Fam. xiii. 1). The same observation
applies also to his friend, L. Saufeius (Nepos, Att. 12; Cic. Ad Att.
iv. 6). Still less can C. Sergius Orata (Cic. Fin. ii. 22, 70; Off.
iii. 16, 67; De Orat. i. 39, 178), L. Thorius Balbus (Fin. l.c.), and
Postumius (Ibid.) be called Epicureans. Nor can anything be stated with
certainty respecting L. Papirius Pætus (Cic. Ad Fam. vii. 17 to 26),
not even from the chief passage Ep. 25, or respecting C. Trebatius from
Cic. Ad Fam. vii. 12. C. Memmius (from the way in which he is spoken of
by Cic. Ad Fam. xiii. 1) cannot be regarded as a member of the
Epicurean School, although Lucret. De Rer. Nat. i. 24; v. 9, expressed
the hope of winning him.
[1095] Born, according to Hieron, (in Eus. Chron.), 95 B.C., he died in
his 44th year, or 51 B.C. In Vita Virgilii, 659 ought therefore to be
substituted for 699 A.U.C. It is clear, from Nepos, Att. 12, that he
was dead before the assassination of Cæsar. Teuffel (in Pauly’s
Realencycl. iv. 1195) justly disputes the statement of Hieronymus, that
he committed suicide in a fit of madness.
[1096] According to Sext. Math. vii. 201, a cotemporary of Antiochus of
Ascalon, whose language towards him is there quoted, and reckoned by
Galen. Isag. c. 4, vol. xiv. 683 among the leaders of the logical
School of Physicians. His medical treatises are often referred to by
Galen. Plutarch in his Placita often names him.
[1097] Known for three things—his theory of atoms, his theory of the
acquisition of knowledge, and his resolution of the soul into matter.
All bodies, he held, consist of atoms, which differ from the atoms of
Democritus in that they owe their origin to the meeting and breaking up
of greater masses, and are not in quality alike and unchangeable
(ἀπαθεῖς). Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 32; Math. ix. 363; x. 318; viii. 220; iii.
5; Galen. l.c. 9, p. 698; Dionys.; Alex. (in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 23, 4);
Cœl. Aurelian. De Pass. Acut. i. 14. See Fabric. on Pyrrh. iii. 32. The
latter is probably in error in describing the primary atoms of
Asclepiades as without quality, differing only in size, form, number,
and arrangement. Although in this respect he resembled Heraclides, with
whom he is generally classed, and applied, like him, the name ὄγκοι to
atoms, still it is probable that his knowledge of Heraclides was
traditionally derived from the Epicureans.
He also asserted, with Epicurus (Antiochus, in Sext. Math. vii. 201):
τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς ἀντιλήψεις εἶναι, λόγῳ δὲ μηδὲν ὅλως
ἡμᾶς καταλαμβάνειν. At the same time he maintained that our senses
cannot distinguish the component parts of things, but even Epicurus and
Democritus admitted as much in respect of atoms.
He differs entirely from Epicurus in denying the existence of a soul
apart from body, and in referring every kind of notion, including the
soul itself, to the action of the senses (Sext. Math. vii. 380; Plut.
Plac. iv. 2, 6; Cœl. Aurelian. l.c. in Fabric. on the passage of Sext.;
Tertullian, De An. 15). What is elsewhere stated of Asclepiades,
leaving alone his medical views, for instance, that with Heraclitus he
believed in a perpetual flux of things, is not at variance with
Epicurean principles.
[1098] Quint Inst. vi. 3, 78, names L. Varus as an Epicurean, a friend
of Augustus, perhaps the individual who according to Donat. V. Virg.
79, Serv. on Ecl. vi. 13. attended the lectures of Syro in company with
Virgil. Horace, notwithstanding Ep. i. 4, 15, was no Epicurean, but
only a man who gathered everywhere what he could make use of (Sat. i.
5, 101). In Caligula’s time, a senator Pompedius was an Epicurean
(Joseph. Antiquit. ix. 1, 5); under Nero, Aufidius Bassus, a friend of
Seneca (Sen. Ep. 30, 1 and 3 and 5; 14), the elder Celsus (Orig. c.
Cels. i. 8), and Diodorus, who committed suicide (Sen. Vi. Be. 19, 1);
under Vespasian or his sons, Pollius (Stat. Silv. ii. 2, 113). In the
first half of the second century, Cleomedes, Met. p. 87, complained of
the honours paid to Epicurus. In the second half of the same century
lived Antonius, mentioned by Galen. De Prop. An. Affect. v. 1, and
Zenobius, who, according to Simpl. Phys. 113, b, was an opponent of
Alexander of Aphrodisias. In the first half of the third century lived
Diogenes Laërtius, who, if not a perfect Epicurean himself, was at
least a friend of the Epicureans. Amongst other Epicureans, the names
of Athenæus (whose epigram on Epicurus is quoted by Diog. x. 12).
Autodorus (Diog. v. 92), and Hermodorus (Lucian, Icaromen. 16) may be
mentioned; but Diog. x. 11 does not justify us calling Diocles of
Magnesia an Epicurean.
[1099] Diog. x. 9, in the first half of the third century, writes: ἥ τε
διδαχὴ πασῶν σχεδὸν ἐκλιπουσῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἐσαεὶ διαμένουσα καὶ νηρίθμους
ἀρχὰς ἀπολύουσα ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης τῶν γνωρίμων. The testimony of
Lactantius, Inst. iii. 17, to the wide extension of Epicureanism is not
so trustworthy, although he treats it as an existing fact. It may be
that he is only following older writers, as Cicero does. See above, p.
412, 1.
[1100] Cic. Fin. ii. 7, 20: Quis enim vestrum non edidicit Epicuri
κυρίας δόξας? Diog. 12 (according to Diocles). Epicurus often exhorted
his scholars (Ibid. 83; 85; 35) to commit to memory what they had
heard. His last exhortation to his friends was (Diog. 16): τῶν δογμάτων
μεμνῆσθαι.
[1101] He speaks of himself and Metrodorus in Cic. Fin. ii. 3, 7, as
wise men. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 18, 5, quotes, as coming from him: ὡς
Κολώτης μὲν αὐτὸν φυσιολογοῦντα προσκυνήσειεν γονάτων ἁψάμενος· Νεοκλῆς
δὲ ὁ ἀδελφὸς εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων ἀποφαίνοιτο μηδένα σοφώτερον Ἐπικούρου
γεγονέναι μηδ’ εἶναι· ἡ δὲ μήτηρ ἀτόμους ἔσχεν ἐν αὑτῇ τοσαύτας, οἷαι
συνελθοῦσαι σοφὸν ἂν ἐγέννησαν. Conf. Id. Frat. Am. 16, p. 487; Adv.
Col. 17, 5; Cleomed. Meteor. p. 89. Not only was Epicurus’ birthday
observed by the Epicurean School during his lifetime, but the 20th of
every month was celebrated as a festival in honour of him and
Metrodorus. In his testament Epicurus especially ordered this twofold
observance for the future. Diog. 18; Cic. Fin. ii. 31, 101; Plut. N. P.
Suav. Viv. 4, 8; Plin. H. N. xxxv. 5. Athen. vii. 298 d: Ἐπικούρειός
τις εἰκαδιστῆς. Epicurus’ picture is constantly referred to (Cic. Fin.
v. 1, 3; Plin. l.c.). The extravagant importance attached to Epicurus
in his School is proved by the high eulogies in Lucret. i 62; iii. 1
and 1040; v. 1; vi. 1. Metrodorus, in Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 4, praises τὰ
Ἐπικούρου ὡς ἀληθῶς θεόφαντα ὄργια.
[1102] Cic. Tusc. ii. 3, 8.
[1103] Sen. Ep. 33, 4, compares the scientific independence of the
Stoics with the Epicurean’s dependence on the founder: Non sumus sub
rege: sibi quisque se vindicat. Apud istos quicquid dicit Hermarchus,
quicquid Metrodorus, ad unum refertur. Omnia quæ quisquam in illo
contubernio locutus est, unius ductu et auspiciis dicta sunt. On the
other hand, Numenius (in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 3), little as he can
agree with their tenets, commends the Epicureans for faithfully
adhering to their master’s teaching, a point in which only the
Pythagoreans are their equals. Of the Epicureans, it may be said: μηδ’
αὐτοῖς εἰπεῖν πω ἐναντίον οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὔτε Ἐπικούρῳ μηδὲν [μηδένα]
εἰς μηδὲν, ὅτου καὶ μνησθῆναι ἄξιον, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς παρανόμημα,
μᾶλλον δὲ ἀσέβημα, καὶ κατέγνωσται τὸ καινοτομηθέν. Thus the Epicurean
School resembles a state animated by one spirit, in which there are no
divisions of party.
[1104] It has been already observed, p. 405, 1; 406, 1, that Epicurus
ignored his obligations to his teachers Pamphilus and Nausicydes, and
only confessed his debt to Democritus. All other philosophers provoked
not only his contempt, but likewise his abuse. Diog. 8, probably on the
authority of Timocrates, communicates his remarks on Plato, Aristotle,
and others. Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93: Cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit
contumeliosissime, Phædoni Socratico turpissime maledixerit. Plut. N.
P. Suav. Vivi, 2, 2: Compared with Epicurus and Metrodorus, Colotes is
polite; τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις αἴσχιστα ῥήματα, βωμολοχίας, ληκυθισμοὺς,
κ.τ.λ. συναγαγόντες Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ
Πρωταγόρου καὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου καὶ Ἱππάρχου, καὶ τίνος γὰρ
οὐχὶ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν, κατεσκέδασαν.
[1105] Cic. N. D. ii. 29, 73: Nam vobis, Vellei, minus notum est, quem
ad modum quidque dicatur; vestra enim solum legitis, vestra amatis,
ceteros causa incognita condemnatis. Ibid. i. 34, 93: Zeno not only
despised cotemporary philosophers, but he even called Socrates a scurra
Atticus, Macrob. Somn. i. 2 (Colotes ridiculing Plato’s Republic).
[1106] Sext. Math. xi. 169: Ἐπίκουρος ἔλεγε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐνέργειαν
εἶναι λόγοις καὶ διαλογισμοῖς τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον περιποιοῦσαν. Conf.
Epic. in Diog. 122: The demand to study philosophy in youth, as well as
in age, is supported on the ground that it is never too early nor too
late to be happy.
[1107] It was mentioned, p. 408, 3, that Epicurus’ own education was
defective. Not content therewith, he upholds this defectiveness on
principle. Nullam eruditionem, says the Epicurean in Cic. Fin. i. 21,
71, esse duxit, nisi quæ beatæ vitæ disciplinam adjuvaret. In poets,
nulla solida utilitas omnisque puerilis est delectatio. Music,
geometry, arithmetic, astronomy et a falsis initiis profecta vera esse
non possunt, et si essent vera nihil afferrent, quo jucundius, i.e. quo
melius viveremus.
[1108] Cic. Fin. ii. 4, 12: Vestri quidem vel optime disputant, nihil
opus esse eum, philosophus qui futurus sit, scire literas. They fetch
their philosophers, like Cincinnatus, from the plough. In this spirit,
Epicurus (Diog. 6; Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 12, 1) wrote to Pythocles:
παιδείαν δὲ πᾶσαν (the παιδεία ἐγκύκλιος, the learned culture),
μακάριε, φεῦγε τὸ ἀκάτιον ἀράμενος; and to Apelles (Plut. l.c.; Athen.
xiii. 588, a): μακαρίζω σε, ὦ οὗτος, ὅτι καθαρὸς πάσης αἰτίας (Plut.
explains it: τῶν μαθημάτων ἀποσχόμενος) ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὥρμησας.
Metrodorus asserted (Plut. l.c.) that it need not be a source of
trouble to anyone, if he had never read a line of Homer, and did not
know whether Hector were a Trojan or a Greek. The art of reading and
writing, γραμματικὴ in the limited sense, was the only art recognised
by Epicurus. Sext. Math. i. 49.
[1109] Sext. Math. i. 1; Cic. Fin. i. 6, 20.
[1110] Cic. Fin. i. 21 (see p. 421, 1), which probably only means, that
mathematical ideas cannot be applied to phenomena. Hence Acad. ii. 33,
106 (conf. Fin. i. 6, 20): Polyænus ... Epicuro adsentiens totam
geometriam falsam esse credidit. Conf. Procl. in Eucl. p. 85.
[1111] See p. 421, 1; Sext. Math. i. 1: Epicurus rejects mathematics ὡς
τῶν μαθημάτων μηδὲν συνεργούντων πρὸς σοφίας τελείωσιν. According to
Diog. 93, Epicurus calls astronomy τὰς ἀνδραποδώδεις τῶν ἀστρολόγων
τεχνιτείας. Conf. Diog. 79.
[1112] Plut. l.c. 13, 1. Philodemus, in his treatise περὶ μουσικῆς, had
discussed at length the value of music, as we gather from the fragments
of the 4th Book, Vol. Herc. i.; in particular rejecting the notion that
it has a moral effect, see col. i. 24, 28. He was even opposed to music
at table (Col. 38, as Epicurus was in Plut., l.c.). The statement of
Diog. 121, that only the wise man can give a right opinion on poetry
and music, is not at variance with these passages.
[1113] Philodemus, De Rhet. Vol. Herc. iv. col. 3; 12. The same polemic
is continued in the further fragments of this treatise. Ibid. V. Col.
6.
[1114] Cic. Fin. i. 7, 22: In logic iste vester plane, ut mihi quidem
videtur, inermis ac nudus est. Tollit definitiones: nihil de dividendo
ac partiendo docet. Non quomodo efficiatur concludaturque ratio,
tradit, non qua via captiosa solvantur, ambigua distinguantur,
ostendit. Ibid. 19, 63: In dialectica autem vestra nullam existimavit
[Epic.] esse nec ad melius vivendum nec ad commodius disserendum viam.
Acad. ii. 30, 97: Ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et
inridet. Diog. 31: τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς παρέλκουσαν ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν·
ἀρκεῖν γὰρ τοὺς φυσικοὺς χωρεῖν κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πραγμάτων φθόγγους.
[1115] See p. 424.
[1116] Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63: In physicis plurimum posuit [Epic.]. Ibid.
6, 17: In physicis, quibus maxime gloriatur, primum totus est alienus.
[1117] Epic. in Diog. x. 82 and 85: μὴ ἄλλο τι τέλος ἐκ τῆς περὶ
μετεώρων γνώσεως ... νομίζειν δεῖ εἶναι ἤπερ ἀταραξίαν καὶ πίστιν
βέβαιον καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. Ibid. 112: εἰ μηθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ περὶ
τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν καὶ αἱ περὶ θανάτου ... οὐκ ἂν
προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας; but this becomes necessary, since, without
knowledge of nature, we cannot he perfectly free from fear. The same in
Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 8, 7; conf. Diog. 79 and 143; Cic. Fin. iv. 5,
11; Lucret. i. 62; iii. 14; vi. 9.
[1118] In Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63, the Epicurean speaks of a fivefold, or,
excluding Canonic, of a fourfold use of natural science: fortitudo
contra mortis timorem; constantia contra metum religionis; sedatio
animi omnium rerum occultarum ignoratione sublata; moderatio natura
cupiditatum generibusque earum explicatis.
[1119] Diog. 29: διαιρεῖται τοίνυν [ἡ φιλοσοφία] εἰς τρία, τό τε
κανονικὸν καὶ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν. Canonic was also called περὶ
κριτηρίου καὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ στοιχειωτικόν; natural science, περὶ γενέσεως
καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ περὶ φύσεως; ethics, περὶ αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ περὶ
βίων καὶ τέλους.
[1120] Diog. 30: τὸ μὲν οὖν κανονικὸν ἐφόδους ἐπὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ἔχει.
[1121] Diog. l.c.: εἰώθασι μέντοι τὸ κανονικὸν ὁμοῦ τῷ φυσικῷ
συντάττειν. Cic. Fin. i. 19. See p. 423, 4. Hence Sext. Math. vii. 14:
Some reckon Epicurus amongst those who only divide philosophy into
natural and moral science; whilst, according to others, he adhered to a
threefold division, at the same time rejecting the Stoic logic. Sen.
Ep. 89, 11: Epicurei duas partes philosophiæ putaverunt esse, naturalem
atque moralem: rationalem removerunt, deinde cum ipsis rebus
cogerentur, ambigua secernere, falsa sub specie veri latentia
coarguere, ipsi quoque locum, quem de judicio et regula appellant, alio
nomine rationalem induxerunt: sed eum accessionem esse naturalis partis
existimant.
[1122] Ritter, iii. 463; Schleiermacher, Gesch. d. Phil. p. 123.
[1123] Steinhart in the treatise often referred to.
[1124] Diog. 29; Sext. Math. vii. 22.
[1125] Cic. Fin. i. 7, 22. See p. 422, 4.
[1126] Cic. Fin. i. 7, 22; Sext. Math. vii. 203. If, according to Diog.
31, and Cic. Acad. ii. 46, 142, Epicurus named three criteria—πρόληψις,
αἴσθησις, and πάθη—instead of the above two, it must be an inaccuracy
of expression; πρόληψις, as we have seen, is derived from sensation.
[1127] Epicurus, in Diog. x. 146; Lucr. iv. 467–519; Cic. Fin. i. 19,
54. Colotes (in Plut. Adv. Col. 24, 3) replies to the Cyrenaic
scepticism by saying: μὴ δύνασθαι ζῇν μηδὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν. In
this case, as in the case of the Stoics, the dogmatism in favour of the
senses is based on a practical postulate, the need of a firm basis of
conviction for human life.
[1128] Epic. in Diog. x. 50, and 147; Sext. Math. vii. 203–210; viii.
9; 63; 185; Plut. Adv. Col. 4, 3; 5, 2; 25, 2; Plac. iv. 9, 2: Lucr.
iv. 377–519; Cic. Acad. ii. 25, 79; 32, 101; Fin. i. 7, 22; N. D. i.
25, 70; Tertull. De An. 17. Further particulars below respecting
sense-perception.
[1129] Diog. x. 31; Lucr. iv. 480.
[1130] Sext. Math. vii. 203 and 216. In Diog. x. 52, instead of
ἐνεργείας, we should read with Cobet ἐναργείας. Besides this peculiar
expression, Epicurus uses sometimes αἴσθησις, sometimes φαντασία (Sext.
l.c.), for sensation. An impression on the senses, he calls φανταστικὴ
ἐπιβολή. Diog. 50.
[1131] Diog. 32.
[1132] Diog. 33: τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἱονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν
ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, τουτέστι μνήμην τοῦ
πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος. By the help of this passage, Cicero’s
description, N. D. i. 16, 43, must be corrected.
[1133] Diog. l.c.: ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥηθῆναι ἄνθρωπος εὐθὺς κατὰ πρόληψιν καὶ
ὁ τύπος αὐτοῦ νοεῖται προηγουμένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων. παντὶ οὖν ὀνόματι τὸ
πρώτως ὑποτεταγμένον ἐναργές ἐστι· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐζητήσαμεν τὸ ζητούμενον,
εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἐγνώκειμεν αὐτὸ ... οὐδ’ ἂν ὠνομάσαμέν τι μὴ πρότερον
αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόληψιν τὸν τύπον μαθόντες. Hence the exhortation in
Epicurus’ letter to Herodotus (in Diog. x. 37): πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ
ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις δεῖ εἰληφέναι ὅπως ἂν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ
ζητούμενα ἢ ἀπορούμενα ἔχωμεν εἰς ὃ ἀνάγοντες ἐπικρίνειν, κ.τ.λ. Every
impression must be referred to definite perceptions; apart from
perceptions, no reality belongs to our impressions; or, as it is
expressed Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 107, Math. viii. 13, 258: The Epicureans
deny the existence of a λεκτὸν, and between a thing and its name there
exists a third intermediate something—a conception. See also Sext. vii.
267.
[1134] Diog. 33. Sext. Math. i. 57 (xi. 21): οὔτε ζητεῖν οὔτε ἀπορεῖν
ἔστι κατὰ τὸν σόφον Ἐπίκουρον ἄνευ προλήψεως. Ibid. viii. 337, p. 521;
Plut. De An. 6: The difficulty, that all learning presupposes
knowledge, the Stoics met by φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι, the Epicureans by
προλήψεις, which accordingly are the natural test of truth.
[1135] See p. 426, 1. Diog. l.c.: ἐναργεῖς οὖν εἰσιν αἱ προλήψεις καὶ
τὸ δοξαστὸν ἀπὸ προτέρου τινὸς ἐναργοῦς ἤρτηται, ἐφ’ ὃ ἀναφέροντες
λέγομεν.
[1136] See previous note and Epic. in Diog. 38: ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον
ἐννόημα καθ’ ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως
προσδεῖσθαι, εἴπερ ἕξομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον
ἐφ’ ὃ ἀνάξομεν.
[1137] Diog. 33 (conf. 38, 104): περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων χρὴ
σημειοῦσθαι.
[1138] See p. 422, 4. Steinhart, p. 466, goes too far in saying that
Epicurus defied all law and rule in thought.
[1139] Diog. 32: καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπίνοιαι πᾶσαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων γεγόνασι,
κατά τε περίπτωσιν (probably: the coincidence of several sensations
which must be distinguished from their σύνθεσις or free combination)
καὶ ἀναλογίαν καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ σύνθεσιν, συμβαλλομένου τι καὶ τοῦ
λογισμοῦ. Conf. p. 422, 4; 429, 1, and the corresponding doctrine of
the Stoics, p. 80, with the teaching of Epicurus, on the genesis of
thoughts from sensations.
[1140] Diog. 33: καὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν ἀπὸ προτέρου τινὸς ἐναργοῦς ἤρτηται
... τὴν δὲ δόξαν καὶ ὑπόληψιν λέγουσιν. ἀληθῆ τέ φασι καὶ ψευδῆ· ἂν μὲν
γὰρ ἐπιμαρτυρῆται ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρῆται ἀληθῆ εἶναι· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ
ἐπιμαρτυρῆται ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρῆται ψευδῆ τυγχάνειν. Sext. Math. vii. 211:
τῶν δοξῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς·
ἀληθεῖς μὲν αἵ τε ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι πρὸς τῆς
ἐναργείας, ψευδεῖς δὲ αἵ τε ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρούμεναι
πρὸς τῆς ἐναργείας. Ritter, iii. 486, observes that these statements
are contradictory. According to Sextus, an opinion is only then true
when it can be proved and not refuted; according to Diogenes, when it
can be proved or not refuted. The latter is, however, clearly meant by
Sextus, and is affirmed by Epicurus in Diog. 50 and 51.
[1141] Epicur. in Diog. 50; Ibid. 33; Sext. vii. 212. The object of a
future sensation is called by Diog. 38, τὸ προσμένον. Diog. x. 34,
himself gives a perverted explanation of this term, which probably
misled Steinhart, p. 466.
[1142] Sext. l.c. 213.
[1143] The two tests of truth, proof and absence of refutation, do not,
therefore, as Sextus expressly says, refer to the same cases. Our
assumptions in respect of external appearances must be proved, before
they can be allowed to be true; our impressions of the secret causes of
these appearances must not be refuted. The former test applies to
opinions regarding τὸ προσμένον; the latter, to opinions regarding τὸ
ἄδηλον. Diog. 38.
[1144] Compare the passages in Sext. vii. 206, quoted p. 427, 1.
[1145] Cic. Acad. ii. 14, 45: Nam qui voluit subvenire erroribus
Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem, dixitque
sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate sejungere, nihil profecit,
ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.
[1146] Plut. Adv. Col. 7, 2 (Stob. Ecl. i. 366; Lucr. ii. 795): ὁ
Ἐπίκουρος οὐκ εἶναι λέγων τὰ χρώματα συμφυῆ τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀλλὰ
γεννᾶσθαι κατὰ ποιάς τινας τάξεις καὶ θέσεις πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν. For says
Epicurus, οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως δεῖ τὰ ἐν σκότει ταῦτα ὄντα φῆσαι χρώματα
ἔχειν. Often some see colour where others do not; οὐ μᾶλλον οὖν ἔχειν ἢ
μὴ ἔχειν χρῶμα ῥηθήσεται τῶν σωμάτων ἕκαστον.
[1147] Simpl. Categ. 109, β (Schol. in Arist. 92, a, 10): Since
Democritus and Epicurus attribute all qualities, to atoms except those
of form and mode of combination, ἐπιγίνεσθαι λέγουσι τὰς ἄλλας
ποιότητας, τάς τε ἁπλᾶς, οἷον θερμότητας καὶ λειότητας, καὶ τὰς κατὰ
χρώματα καὶ τοὺς χυμούς. Lucret. l.c.
[1148] Compare the passages already quoted, on the truth of the
impressions of the senses, and the words of Epicurus, in Diog. 68: ἀλλὰ
μὴν καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ βάρεα καὶ ὅσα
ἄλλα κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ σώματος ὡς ἂν εἰς αὐτὸ βεβηκότα καὶ πᾶσιν
ἐνόντα ἢ τοῖς ὁρατοῖς καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὴν γνωστοῖς, οὐθ’ ὡς
καθ’ ἑαυτάς εἰσι φύσεις δοξαστέον (οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ἐπινοῆσαι τοῦτο),
οὔθ’ ὅλως ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν, οὔθ’ ὡς ἕτερά τινα προσυπάρχοντα τούτῳ ἀσώματα
οὔθ’ ὡς μορία τούτου, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὸ ὅλον σῶμα καθόλου μὲν ἐκ τούτων πάντων
τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον ἀΐδιον, κ.τ.λ.
[1149] Epic. in Diog. 143: οὐκ ἦν τὸν φοβούμενον περὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων
λύειν μὴ κατειδότα τίς ἡ τοῦ σύμπαντος φύσις ἀλλ’ ὑποπτευόμενόν τι τῶν
κατὰ τοὺς μύθους. ὥστε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίας τὰς ἡδονὰς
ἀπολαμβάνειν. For further particulars, p. 422.
[1150] οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἰδιολογίας καὶ κενῆς δόξης ὁ βίος ἡμῶν ἔχει χρείαν,
ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀθορύβως ἡμᾶς ζῇν. Epic. in Diog. 87.
[1151] Diog. 27, mentions 37 books of his περὶ φύσεως, besides smaller
works.
[1152] Epic. in Diog. 78: καὶ μὴν καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων αἰτίαν
ἐξακριβῶσαι φυσιολογίας ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τὸ μακάριον ἐν τῇ
περὶ τῶν μετεώρων γνώσει ἐνταῦθα πεπτωκέναι· καὶ ἐν τῷ, τίνες φύσεις αἱ
θεωρούμεναι κατὰ τὰ μετέωρα ταυτὶ, καὶ ὅσα συγγενῆ πρὸς τὴν εἰς ταῦτα
ἀκρίβειαν· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ πλεοναχῶς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι [evidently
μὴ εἶναι must be read], καὶ τὸ εὐδεχομένως καὶ ἄλλως πως ἔχειν, ἀλλ’
ἁπλῶς μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀφθάρτῳ καὶ μακαρίᾳ φύσει τῶν διάκρισιν ὑποβαλλόντων
ἢ τάραχον μηθέν· καὶ τοῦτο καταλαβεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς οὕτως
εἶναι. τὸ δ’ ἐν τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πεπτωκὸς τῆς δύσεως καὶ ἀνατολῆς καὶ τροπῆς
καὶ ἐκλείψεως καὶ ὅσα συγγενῆ τούτοις μηθὲν ἔτι πρὸς τὸ μακάριον τῆς
γνώσεως συντείνειν (how very different from Aristotle! See Zeller,
Philosophie der Griechen, ii. b, 113, 3; 114, 3; 359, 2), ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως
τοὺς φόβους ἔχειν τοὺς ταῦτα κατιδόντας τίνες δὲ αἱ φύσεις ἀγνοοῦντας
καὶ τίνες αἱ κυριώταται αἰτίαι, καὶ εἰ (as if) μὴ προσῄδεσαν ταῦτα,
τάχα δὲ καὶ πλείους, ὅταν τὸ θάμβος ἐκ τῆς τούτων προκατανοήσεως μὴ
δύνηται τὴν λύσιν λαμβάνειν κατὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων οἰκονομίαν.
(Conf. Lucr. vi. 50; v. 82.) διὸ δὴ καὶ πλείους αἰτίας εὑρίσκομεν
τροπῶν, κ.τ.λ. καὶ οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν τὴν ὑπὲρ τούτων χρείαν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ
ἀπειληφέναι ὅση πρὸς τὸ ἀτάραχον καὶ μακάριον ἡμῶν συντείνει, κ.τ.λ.
Ibid. 104: καὶ κατ’ ἄλλους δὲ τρόπους πλείονας ἐνδέχεται κεραυνοὺς
ἀποτελεῖσθαι. μόνον ὁ μῦθος ἀπέστω.
[1153] Ibid. 87: πάντα μὲν οὖν γίνεται ἀσείστως κατὰ πάντων, κατὰ
πλεοναχὸν τρόπον ἐκκαθαιρομένων συμφώνως τοῖς φαινομένοις, ὅταν τις τὸ
πιθανολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δεόντως καταλίπῃ. ὅταν δέ τις τὸ μὲν
ἀπολίπῃ, τὸ δὲ ἐκβάλῃ ὁμοίως σύμφωνον ὂν τῷ φαινομένῳ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐκ
παντὸς ἐκπίπτει φυσιολογήματος ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον καταῤῥεῖ. Ibid. 98: οἱ
δὲ τὸ ἓν λαμβάνοντες (those who allow only one explanation for every
phenomenon) τοῖς τε φαινομένοις μάχονται καὶ τοῦ τί δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ
θεωρῆσαι διαπεπτώκασιν. In investigating nature, they proceed on
suppositions chosen at random (ἀξιώματα κενὰ καὶ νομοθεσίαι, Epic. l.c.
86). Conf. 94; 104; 113. Lucret. vi. 703.
[1154] Epic. in Diog. 88; 92–95. Many other similar instances might be
quoted. In support of the view that the sun was extinguished at
setting, Epicurus, according to Cleomed. Meteora, p. 89, is said to
have appealed to the story (respecting which Posidonius in Strabo, iii.
1, 5, p. 138) that, as it sets, the hissing of the ocean may be heard
on the sea-shore.
[1155] The principle is thus expanded by Lucret. i. 1021:—
Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum
Ordine se suo quæque sagaci mente locarunt,
Nec quos quæque darent motuspepigere profecto;
Sed quia multa modis multis mutata per omne
Ex infinito vexantur percita plagis,
Omne genus motus et cœtus experiundo,
Tandem deveniunt in tales disposituras,
Qualibus hæc rebus consistit summa creata.
v. 156:
Dicere porro hominum causa voluisse [scil. Deos] parare
Præclaram mundi naturam, &c.
Desipere est. Quid enim immortalibus atque beatis
Gratia nostra queat largirier emolumenti,
Ut nostra quidquam causa gerere adgrediantur?
Quidve novi potuit tanto post ante quietos
Inlicere, ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?...
Exemplum porro gignundis rebus et ipsa
Notities hominum, Dis unde est insita primum; ...
Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi?
Conf. iv. 820; v. 78; 195; 419. In these views, he is only following
Epicurus. Heavenly phenomena, says the latter, in Diog. 76, μήτε
λειτουργοῦντός τινος νομίζειν δεῖ γίνεσθαι καὶ διατάττοντος ἢ
διατάξαντος καὶ ἅμα τὴν πᾶσαν μακαριότητα ἔχοντος μετ’ ἀφθαρσίας· οὐ
γὰρ συμφωνοῦσι πραγματεῖαι καὶ φροντίδες καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ χάριτες τῇ
μακαριότητι, ἀλλ’ ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίον ταῦτα
γίνεται. Ibid. 97: ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμῆ προσαγέσθω, ἀλλ’
ἀλειτούργητος διατηρείσθω καὶ ἐν τῇ πάσῃ μακαριότητι. Ibid. 113. With
these passages Cic. N. D. i. 20, 52, and Plut. Plac. i. 7, 7 (likewise
ii. 3, 2; Stob. i. 442), are quite in agreement.
[1156] Lucr. i. 440:—
Præterea per se quodcumque erit aut faciet quid
Aut aliis fungi [πάσχειν] debebit agentibus ipsum,
Aut erit, ut possint in eo res esse gerique.
At facere et fungi sine corpore nulla potest res,
Nec præbere locum porro nisi inane vacansque.
Ergo præter inane et corpora tertia per se
Nulla potest rerum in numero natura relinqui.
Epic. in Diog. 67: καθ’ ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ ἀσώματον πλὴν ἐπὶ
τοῦ κενοῦ. τὸ δὲ κενὸν οὔτε ποιῆσαι οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται, ἀλλὰ κίνησιν
μόνον δι’ ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς σώμασι παρέχεται. ὥσθ’ οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον εἶναι
τὴν ψυχὴν ματαιάζουσιν. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν εἰ ἦν
τοιαύτη.
[1157] Diog. 68; 40. Lucr. i. 449, who expresses συμβεβηκότα by
conjuncta, and συμπτώματα by eventa. Among the latter Lucretius, 459,
reckons time, because in itself it is nothing, and only comes to our
knowledge through motion and rest. Likewise Epicurus, in Diog. 72
(conf. Stob. i. 252), shows that time is composed of days and nights,
and their portions, of states of feeling or unconsciousness, of motion
or rest, and hence that it is only a product (σύμπτωμα) of these
phenomena; and these being again συμπτώματα, time is defined by the
Epicurean Demetrius (Sext. Math. x. 219; Pyrrh. iii. 137): σύμπτωμα
συμπτωμάτων παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξὶ καὶ ὥραις καὶ πάθεσι καὶ
ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ μοναῖς. The distinction between abstract and
sensuous or undivided time (Steinhart, l.c. 466) does not appear to
exist in Diogenes. His χρόνοι διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὶ (Diog. 47) are
imperceptibly small divisions of time, tempora multa, ratio quæ
comperit esse, which, according to Lucret. iv. 792, are contained in
every given time.
[1158] Lucret. i. 358.
[1159] Lucret. l.c. and i. 329; Diog. 40 and 67; Sext. Math. vii. 213;
viii. 329. Most of the remarks in Lucret. i. 346 and 532 point to the
same fundamental idea: Without vacant interstices, nourishment cannot
be diffused over the whole bodies of plants or animals, nor can noise,
cold, fire and water penetrate through solid bodies, or any body be
broken up into parts. The same in Themist. 40, b; Simpl. De Cœlo,
Schol. in Arist. 484, a, 26.
[1160] Lucr. i. 440; Diog. 39; Plut. Adv. Col 11, 5.
[1161] Body is defined by Epicurus (Sext. Math. i. 21; x. 240; 257; xi.
226) as τὸ τριχῆ διαστατὸν μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας, or as σύνοδος κατὰ
ἀθροισμὸν μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ βάρους. Emptiness is
(according to Sext. x. 2) φύσις ἀναφὴς or ἔρημος παντὸς σώματος. When
occupied by a body, it is called τόπος; when bodies pass through it, it
is χώρα; so that all three expressions, as Stob. Ecl. i. 388 rightly
observes, are only different names for the same thing. To the same
effect is the statement in Plut. Plac. i. 20.
[1162] Hence, in Diog. 69, ἄθροισμα and συμπεφορήμενον are used of
bodies; in Diog. 71, all bodies are called συμπτώματα; and according to
Epicurus (Sext. Math. x. 42), all changes in bodies are due to local
displacement of the atoms. Plut. Amator. 24, 3, p. 769, observes that
Epicurus deals with ἁφὴ and συμπλοκὴ, but never with ἑνότης.
[1163] Epic. in Diog. 40: τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστι συγκρίσεις τὰ δ’ ἐξ
ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηνται· ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἄτομα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα εἴπερ
μὴ μέλλει πάντα εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθαρήσεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἰσχύοντα ὑπομένειν ἐν
ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων ... ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀτόμους ἀναγκαῖον
εἶναι σωμάτων φύσεις. Ibid. 56; Lucr. i. 147; ii. 551; 751; 790.
Further arguments for the belief in atoms in Lucret. i. 498: Since a
body and the space in which it is are entirely different, both must
originally have existed without any intermingling. If things exist
composed of the full and the empty, the full by itself must exist, and
likewise the empty. Bodies in which there is no empty space cannot be
divided. They may be eternal, and must be so, unless things have been
produced out of nothing. Without empty space, soft bodies could not
exist, nor hard bodies without something full. If there were no
indivisible parts, everything must have been long since destroyed. The
regularity of phenomena presupposes unchangeable primary elements. All
that is composite must ultimately consist of simple indivisible parts.
If there were no indivisible parts, every body would consist of
innumerable parts, as many in the smaller as in the greater body (conf.
Epic. in Diog. 56). If nature did not reduce things to their smallest
parts, it could not make new things. These arguments, very unequal in
value, were borrowed by Lucretius from Epicurus. Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev.
1, 8, 9, quotes, as an Epicurean principle, that unchangeable Being
must be at the bottom of everything.
[1164] Epicurus and Lucretius, l.c. Lucr. i. 529; Sext. Math. ix. 219;
x. 318; Stob. Ecl. i. 306; Plut. Pl. Phil. i. 3, 29.
[1165] Epic. in Diog. 41; Lucret. i. 528; Simpl. De Cœlo, Schol. in
Arist. 484, a, 23.
[1166] Diog. 44 and 55; Lucret. i. 266, where it is proved, by many
analogies, that there may be invisible bodies; Stob. l.c.; Plut. l.c.;
Simpl. Phys. 216, a.
[1167] Diog. 44; 54; Lucr. ii. 736 and 841; Plut. l.c. See page 433, 2.
[1168] Lucret. v. 235.
[1169] Diog.; Plut. Plac. i. 3, 29. The statement there made, that
Democritus only allowed to atoms size and shape, and that Epicurus
added weight, is not correct.
[1170] Diog. 42; Lucr. ii. 333 and 478; Plut. Plac. i. 3, 30 (where,
however, it would be against the sense to substitute ἢ for μὴ as
Steinhart l.c. p. 473 note 94 does); Alex. Aphr. in Philop. Gen. et
Corr. 3, b; Cic. N. D. i. 24, 66. It does not, however, appear that
Lucret. ii. 333, made the variety of figures as great as the number of
atoms. (Ritter, iv. 101.)
[1171] Lucret. i. 500.
[1172] Diog. x. 55; Lucr. ii. 381.
[1173] See the passages quoted, p. 442, 6, and 445, 5. The text of
Stobæus, Ecl. i. 346, must be corrected by the aid of these passages.
Plut. Plac. i. 12, 5.
[1174] Epic. in Diog. 41: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἄπειρόν ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ
πεπερασμένον ἄκρον ἔχει· τὸ δ’ ἄκρον παρ’ ἕτερόν τι θεωρεῖται. ὥστε οὐκ
ἔχον ἄκρον πέρας οὐκ ἔχει, πέρας δ’ οὐκ ἔχον ἄπειρον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐ
πεπερασμένον. The same argument is used by Lucret. i. 951; 1008–1020.
He continues 984, 1021: If space were limited, all bodies would collect
towards its lower part by reason of their weight, and their motion
would cease. Unless the quantity of matter were unlimited, the amount
lost by bodies in their mutual contact could not be supplied. Conf.
also Plut. Adv. Col. 13, 3; in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9; Plac. i. 3, 28;
Alex. in Simpl. Phys. 107, b, who mentions the above-quoted argument of
Epicurus as the chief argument of the Epicureans.
[1175] We have but little information; but it has been already shown p.
433, 2, and follows too as a matter of course, that he referred all the
properties of bodies to the shape and arrangement of the atoms.
Whenever he found in the same body different qualities combined, he
assumed that it was composed of different kinds of atoms. For instance,
he asserted of wine: οὐκ εἶναι θερμὸν αὐτοτελῶς τὸν οἶνον, ἀλλ’ ἔχειν
τινὰς ἀτόμους ἐν αὑτῷ θερμασίας ἀποτελεστικὰς, ἑτέρας δ’ αὖ ψυχρότητος.
According to the difference of constitution, it has on some a cooling,
on others a heating effect. Plut. Qu. Conviv. iii. 5, 1, 4; Adv. Col.
6. This agrees with the remarks made on Democritus in vol. i. 597.
[1176] Diog. 43; 47; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 54. What idea Epicurus formed to
himself of motion we are not told. We learn, however, from Themist.
Phys. 52, b, that he replied to Aristotle’s proof of motion, that no
constant quantities can be composed of indivisible particles (Phys. vi.
1), by saying: Whatever moves in a given line moves in the whole line,
but not in the individual indivisible portions of which the line
consists. With reference to the same question, the Epicureans,
according to Simpl. Phys. 219, b, asserted that everything moves
equally quickly through indivisible spaces.
[1177] Cic. Fin. i. 6, 18; Lucret. i. 1074.
[1178] Lucr. ii. 1052 (the text being faulty); Simpl. De Cœlo, Schol.
in Arist. 510, b, 30; 486, a, 7. The latter writer inaccurately groups
Epicurus together with others (Democritus and Strato). The same point,
according to Simpl. Phys. 113, b, was a subject of contention between
Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Epicurean Zenobius, at the close of
the second century after Christ.
[1179] As Aristotle had already done.
[1180] Diog. 60; conf. Plut. Def. Orac. 28, p. 425.
[1181] Epic. in Diog. 43; 61; Lucr. ii. 225; Plut. C. Not. 43, i. p.
1082. This objection was borrowed from Aristotle by Epicurus.
[1182] Lucr. ii. 216; 261; Cic. Fin. i. 6, 18; N. D. i. 25, 69; De
Fato, 10, 22; Plut. An. Procr. 6, 9, p. 1015; Solert. Anim. 7, 2, p.
964; Plac. i. 12, 5; 23, 4; Stobæus, Ecl. i. 346, 394.
[1183] Diog. 44; conf. 62; 90; Plut. Plac. i. 12, 5; Fac. Lun. 4, 5, p.
921; Stob. i. 346; Lucret. v. 432.
[1184] Diog. 73; Lucr. i. 1021. See above, p. 437, 1; Plut. Def. Or.
19, p. 420.
[1185] Cic. Fin. i. 6, 17. See p. 444, 3.
[1186] Diog. 45; 73; Lucret. ii. 1048; Plut. Plac. ii. 1, 3. It need
hardly be remarked that by worlds world-bodies are not meant. In Diog.
88, Epicurus defines the world as a part of the heaven, surrounding the
earth and stars, having a definite shape, and, towards other parts of
the heaven, bounded.
[1187] Diog. 45; 74; 88; Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 2; 7, 3; Stob. i. 490; Cic.
N. D. ii. 18, 48; Acad. ii. 40, 125.
[1188] Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9: Epicurus says, ὅτι οὐδὲν ξένον
ἀποτελεῖται ἐν τῷ παντὶ παρὰ τὸν ἤδη γεγενημένον χρόνον ἄπειρον.
[1189] Diog. 73; 89; Lucret. ii. 1105; v. 91 and 235, where the
transitory character of the world is elaborately proved; Cic. Fin. i.
6, 21. Stob. i. 418; Epicurus makes the world decay in the greatest
variety of ways. Plut. Plac. ii. 4, 2.
[1190] Diog. x. 89.
[1191] v. 324, arguing that historical memory would otherwise go much
further back, and arts and sciences be of much greater antiquity.
[1192] On this point see Lucret. ii. 1112. The principle that similar
elements naturally congregate is there explained in this way.
[1193] Lucr. v. 416–508; Plut. Plac. i. 4. The latter view has been
referred, in vol. i. 604, to the Atomists. It would now appear that it
must be deduced from Epicureanism, and its agreement with the views
attributed to Leucippus in other places explained by the well-known
connection between Epicurus and Democritus. The views of Epicurus on
the formation of the world do not entirely agree with those of
Democritus. It was probably with an eye to Democritus (compare the
extracts in vol. i. 608 from Orig. Philosoph. p. 17) that Epicurus, in
Diog. 90, denied that the world could be increased from without, or
that sun and moon could be possibly absorbed in our world. Lucret. ii.
1105, however, supposes an increase of the world from without to be
possible.
[1194] On these mœnia mundi, which, according to Lucretius, coincide
with the ether or fire-belt, see Epic. in Diog. 88; Id. περὶ φύσεως,
xi. (Vol. Herc. ii.) col. 2; Plut. Plac. ii. 7, 3; Lucr. i. 73; ii.
1144; v. 454.
[1195] On this point see page 434.
[1196] See p. 437, 1.
[1197] In Diog. 77; 81; Lucret. v. 78 and 114, where the contrast is
more fully brought out. By ζῷα οὐράνια, in Plut. Plac. v. 20, 2, we
must by no means think of the stars.
[1198] Examples have already been met with, p. 436. A complete review
of the Epicurean astronomy is not worth our while. It may be studied in
the following passages: For the substance of the stars, consult Plut.
Plac. ii. 13, 9; for their rising and setting, Diog. 92; Lucr. v. 648;
Cleomed. Met. p. 87; for their revolution and deviation, Diog. 92;
112–114; Lucr. v. 509; 612; for the appearance of the moon, Diog. 94,
and Lucr. v. 574, 703; for eclipses of sun and moon, Diog. 96; Lucr. v.
749; for changes in the length of day, Diog. 98; Lucr. v. 678.
[1199] Diog. 91; Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 82; Fin. i. 6, 20; Sen. Qu. Nat. i.
3, 10; Cleomed. Met. ii. 1; Plut. Plac. ii. 21, 4; 22, 4; Lucr. v. 564.
The body of the sun was considered by Epicurus (Plut. Plac. ii. 20, 9;
Stob. i. 530) to consist of earth-like and spongy matter, saturated
with fire. According to Lucret. v. 471, sun and moon stand midway
between ether and earth in point of density.
[1200] It is still more difficult to imagine the world as stationary,
which is tacitly assumed. It would then be bounded by endless space,
and soon come into collision with other masses.
[1201] Lucr. v. 534. Conf. Epic. in Diog. 74, and περὶ φύσεως, xi. col.
1. In the latter passage, Epicurus appeals to the fact that the earth
is equidistant from the bounds of the world.
[1202] Further particulars: on clouds, Diog. 99: Lucr. vi. 451; Plut.
Plac. iii. 4, 3; on rain, Diog. 100; Lucret. vi. 495; on thunder, Diog.
100; 103; Lucret. vi. 96; on lightning, Diog. 101; Lucr. vi. 160; on
sirocco, Diog. 104; Lucr. vi. 423; Plac. iii. 3, 2; on earthquakes,
Diog. 105; Lucr. vi. 535; Plac. iii. 15, 11; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 20, 5;
on winds, Diog. 106; on hail, Diog. 106; Plac. iii. 4, 3; on snow,
thaw, ice, frost, Diog. 107–109; on the rainbow, Diog. 109; on the halo
of the moon, Diog. 110; on comets, Diog. 111; on shooting-stars, Diog.
114. Explanations are given by Lucretius of volcanoes (vi. 639), of the
overflow of the Nile (vi. 712), of Lake Avernus (vi. 738–839), of the
magnet (vi. 906–1087), of the reputed chilling of the springs in summer
(vi. 840).
[1203] Lucret. ii. 1157; v. 780. Otherwise, we learn that the
Epicureans were as far as the Stoics from attributing to plants a soul.
Plut. Plac. v. 26, 3.
[1204] Lucr. ii. 1155; v. 787, giving further particulars as to the
origin and maintenance of living beings, and the subsequent abatement
of the productive powers of earth.
[1205] Epic. in Diog. 74.
[1206] Anaximander, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and
Democritus, all taught the procreation of living beings from earth.
[1207] Lucr. v. 834–921.
[1208] v. 922–1008. Conf. Plato, Polit. 274, B; Arist. Polit. ii. 8,
1269, a, 4; Horace, Serm. i. 3, 99, appears to have had an eye to
Lucretius.
[1209] Lucr. v. 1009–1025.
[1210] Epicurus, in Diog. 75, thus sums up his views on the origin of
language: τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ θέσει γενέσθαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰς τὰς φύσεις
τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθ’ ἕκαστα ἔθνη ἴδια πασχούσας πάθη καὶ ἴδια λαμβανούσας
φαντάσματα ἰδίως τὸν ἀέρα ἐκπέμπειν ... ὕστερον δὲ κοινῶς καθ’ ἕκαστα
τὰ ἔθνη τὰ ἴδια τεθῆναι πρὸς τὸ τὰς δηλώσεις ἧττον ἀμφιβόλους γενέσθαι
ἀλλήλοις καὶ συντομωτέρως δηλουμένας. He who invents any new thing
puts, at the same time, new words into circulation. Lucret. v.
1026–1088, explains more fully that language is of natural origin. On
the voice, Ibid. iv. 522; Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 2.
[1211] Epic. in Diog. 75: ἀλλὰ μὴν ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων
φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτὴν περιεστώτων πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναί
τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι· τὸν δὲ λογισμὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγγυηθέντα καὶ
ὕστερον ἐπακριβοῦν καὶ προσεξευρίσκειν, ἐν μέν τισι θᾶττον ἐν δέ τισι
βραδύτερον.
Lucr. v. 1450:—all arts
Usus et impigræ simul experientia mentis
Paulatim docuit.
Ibid. 1103:—
Inque dies magis hi victum vitamque priorem
Commutare novis monstrabant rebu’ benigni
Ingenio qui præstabant et corde vigebant.
In harmony with these premises, Lucretius then tries to explain various
inventions. The first fire was obtained by lightning, or the friction
of branches in a storm. The sun taught cooking (v. 1089). Forests on
fire, melting brass, first taught men how to work in metal (v.
1239–1294). Horses and elephants were used for help in war, after
attempts had been previously made with oxen and wild beasts (v. 1295).
Men first dressed themselves in skins; afterwards they wore twisted,
and then woven materials (v. 1009; 1348; 1416). The first ideas of
planting and agriculture were from the natural spread of plants (v.
1359). The first music was in imitation of birds; the first musical
instrument was the pipe, through which the wind was heard to whistle;
from this natural music, artificial music only gradually grew (v.
1377). The measure and arrangement of time was taught by the stars (v.
1434); and, comparatively late, came the arts of poetry and writing (v.
1438).
[1212] Lucr. v. 1106.
[1213] Lucr. iii. 161; Diog. 67. See p. 439, 1.
[1214] Lucr. iii. 177; Diog. 63.
[1215] Diog. 63: ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμά ἐστι λεπτομερὲς παρ’ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα (the
body), παρεσπαρμένον· προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν
ἔχοντι. 66: ἐξ ἀτόμων αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλοτάτων
πολλῷ τινι διαφερουσῶν τῶν τοῦ πυρός.
[1216] Lucr. iii. 231; 269; Plut. Plac. iv. 3, 5 (Stob. i. 798), conf.
Alex. Aphr. De An. 127, b.
[1217] Lucr. iii. 288.
[1218] According to Plut. Plac. v. 3, 5, he considered the seed an
ἀπόσπασμα ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος; and, since he believed in a feminine
σπέρμα, he must have regarded the soul of the child as formed by the
intermingling of the soul-atoms of both parents. Ibid. v. 16, 1.
[1219] Diog. 63; Lucret. iii. 216; 276; 323; 370.
[1220] Metrodor. περὶ αἰσθητῶν (Vol. Herc. vi.), col. 7.
[1221] Lucr. iii. 98, contradicts the assertion that the soul is the
harmony of the body; Epicurus having already replied (in Philop. De An.
E. 1) to one of the objections urged against it by Plato.
[1222] Diog. 66; Lucr. iii. 94; 136; 396; 612; Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 3.
Lucretius calls the rational part animus or mens, and the irrational
part anima. The statement, Pl. Phil. iv. 23, 2, that Epicurus made
feeling reside in the organs of sense, because the ἡγεμονικὸν was
feelingless, can hardly be correct.
[1223] Diog. and Lucr. In sleep, a portion of the soul is supposed to
leave the body (Lucr. iv. 913, conf. Tertull. De An. 43), whilst
another part is forcibly confined within the body. Probably this is all
that is meant by Diog. 66.
[1224] Epic. in Diog. 64. Lucr. iii. 417–827, gives an elaborate proof
of the mortality of the soul. Other passages, Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi,
27, 1 and 3; 30, 5; Sext. Math. ix. 72, hardly need to be referred to.
Observe the contrast between Epicureanism and Stoicism. In Stoicism,
the soul keeps the body together; in Epicureanism, the body the soul.
In Stoicism, the soul survives the body; in Epicureanism, this is
impossible. In Stoicism, the mind is a power over the world, and hence
over the body; in Epicureanism, it is on a level with the body, and
dependent on it.
[1225] Epic. in Diog. 124–127, for instance: τὸ φρικωδέστατον οὖν τῶν
κακῶν ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἐπειδήπερ ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς ὦμεν ὁ
θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν· ὅταν δὲ ὁ θάνατος παρῇ τόθ’ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμεν. Id.
in Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 229 (Alex. Aphr. Anal. Pri. 117, Top. 9. Gell. N.
A. ii. 8, 1; Stob. Serm. 118, 30): ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμας· τὸ γὰρ
διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Lucr. iii.
828–975.
[1226] Lucr. iii. 830.
[1227] Diog. 81; 142; Lucr. iii. 37.
[1228] Lucr. ii. 991:—
Denique cœlesti sumus omnes semine oriundi, &c.
999:—
Cedit item retro de terra quod fuit ante
In terras: et quod missum est ex ætheris oris
Id rursum cœli rellatum templa receptant.
[1229] Democritus, from whom Epicurus has borrowed the rest of this
theory, makes them mould the air.
[1230] Epic. in Diog. 46–50; 52; and in the fragments of the second
book περὶ φύσεως; Lucr. iv. 26–266; 722; vi. 921 Cic. Ad Famil. xv. 16;
Plut. Qu. Conviv. viii. 10, 2, 2; Plac. iv. 3, 1; 19, 2; Sext. Math.
vii. 206; Gell. N. A. v. 16; Macrob. Sat. vii. 14; the remarks of Lucr.
iv. 267; 568; Plut. Plac. iv. 14, 2, on reflected images and the echo
belong likewise to the doctrine of idola.
[1231] For instance, the impressions in the minds of dreamers and
madmen. Diog. 32; Lucr. iv. 730.
[1232] Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420: εἰ δὲ χρὴ γελᾷν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὰ
εἴδωλα γελαστέον τὰ κωφὰ καὶ τυφλὰ καὶ ἄψυχα, ἃ ποιμαίνουσιν [sc. οἱ
Ἐπικούρειοι] ἀπλέτους ἐτῶν περιόδους ἐμφαινόμενα καὶ περινοστοῦντα
πάντη τὰ μὲν ἔτι ζώντων τὰ δὲ πάλαι κατακαέντων ἢ κατασαπέντων
ἀποῤῥυέντα.
[1233] Lucr. l.c.
[1234] Sext. l.c.; Lucr. iv. 351.
[1235] Lucr. iv. 766–819; and on the incessant streaming forth of
images, v. 141; Diog. 48.
[1236] Epic. in Diog. x. 52: τὸ δὲ διημαρτημένον οὐκ ἂν ὑπῆρχεν, εἰ μὴ
ἐλαμβάνομεν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ κίνησιν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συνημμένην μὲν,
διάληψιν [al. διάλειψιν] δʹ ἔχουσαν κατὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν συνημμένην τῇ
φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ [impression on the senses], διάληψιν δ’ ἔχουσαν ἐὰν
μὲν μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ τὸ ψεῦδος γίνεται, ἐὰν δὲ
ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ τὸ ἀληθές.
[1237] As to terminology, Epicurus, according to Plut. Plac. iv. 8, 2,
Diog. 32, called the faculty of sensation αἴσθησις, and sensation
itself, ἐπαίσθημα.
[1238] Lucr. iv. 874; conf. Galen, De Hipp. et Plat. v. 2, vol. v. 367,
K.
[1239] Diog. 133: τὸ δὲ παρ’ ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον· ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτὸν καὶ τὸ
ἐναντίον παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκεν. ἐπεὶ κρεῖττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ
κατακολουθεῖν ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἱμαρμένῃ δουλεύειν.
[1240] Cic. N. D. i. 25, 70: [Epicurus] pertimuit, ne si concessum
esset hujusmodi aliquid: aut vivet cras aut non vivet Epicurus,
alterutrum fieret necessarium; totum hoc; aut etiam aut non negavit
esse necessarium. Acad. ii. 30, 97; De Fat. 10, 21.
[1241] Steinhart, p. 466.
[1242] Cic. De Fato, 16, 37, at least says, referring to the above
question: Nisi forte voluimus Epicureorum opinionem sequi, qui tales
propositiones nec veras nec falsas esse dicunt, aut cum id pudet illud
tamen dicunt, quod est impudentius, veras esse ex contrariis
disjunctiones, sed quæ in his enuntiata essent eorum neutrum esse
verum. Cicero indeed adds: O admirabilem licentiam et miserabilem
inscientiam dicendi! but he has no reason for this exclamation; for the
proposition: Either A or B must follow is not identical with the
proposition: It may be stated either of A or of B that it will follow.
Epicurus could, therefore, justly allow the former and deny the latter.
In so doing he is really following Aristotle.
[1243] Diog. x. 123: οἵους δ’ αὐτοὺς [τοὺς θεοὺς] οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν
οὐκ εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ φυλάττουσιν αὐτοὺς οἵους νομίζουσιν. ἀσεβὴς δὲ οὐχ ὁ
τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν θεοὺς ἀναιρῶν ἀλλ’ ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοῖς
προσάπτων. Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 16, 42.
[1244] iii. 14; vi. 49; and, specially, the celebrated passage i. 62:—
Humana ante oculos fœde cum vita jaceret
In terris oppressa gravi sub relligione,
Quæ caput a cœli regionibus ostendebat
Horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans, &c.
as far as to 101:—
Tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum.
Conf. Epic. in Diog. 81, and above p. 423, 3; 437, 1.
[1245] Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 4: [Ἐπίκουρος] ἅπασαν ὁμοῦ ποιητικὴν
ὥσπερ ὀλέθριον μύθων δέλεαρ ἀφοσιούμενος. Ibid. c. 75.
[1246] Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420: Ἐπικουρείων δὲ χλευασμοὺς καὶ
γέλωτας οὔτι φοβητέον οἷς τολμῶσι χρῆσθαι καὶ κατὰ τῆς προνοίας μῦθον
αὐτὴν ἀποκαλοῦντες. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 21, 2: διαβάλλοντες τὴν πρόνοιαν
ὥσπερ παισὶν Ἔμπουσαν ἢ Ποινὴν ἀλιτηριώδη καὶ τραγικὴν ἐπιγεγραμμένην.
In Cic. N. D. i. 8, 18, the Epicurean calls πρόνοια anus fatidica, to
which it was often reduced, no doubt, by the Stoics.
[1247] See p. 460, 1.
[1248] Lucr. v. 196; ii. 1090; Plut. Plac. i. 7, 10. Conf. the
disputation of the Stoic and Epicurean in Lucian, Jup. Trag. c. 35, and
especially c. 46.
[1249] Lucr. v. 165; conf. p. 437, 1; Plut. Plac. i. 7, 8.
[1250] Diog. 76; 97; 113; see p. 437, 1; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 52; Plut.
Plac. i. 7, 7.
[1251] Cic. l.c. 54.
[1252] Plut. Def. Orac. 19; Plac. i. 83.
[1253] Conf. the captious argument of Hermarchus, in Procl. in Tim. 66,
E: If prayer is necessary for everything, it is necessary for prayer,
and so on, ad infin.
[1254] Diog. 135; Lucr. v. 379; Plut. Plac. v. 1, 2; Cic. N. D. i. 20,
55; Divin. ii. 17, 40; Tertull. De An. 46.
[1255] Lucr. v. 1159–1238; conf. iv. 33; vi. 49; Sext. Math. ix. 25;
vi. 19; Diog. 98; 115.
[1256] This view is especially prominent in Lucretius. See p. 462, 2.
Conf. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 21, 10; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 54.
[1257] He drew up separate treatises περὶ θεῶν and περὶ ὁσιότητος.
Diog. 27; Cic. N. D. i. 41, 115; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 21, 11.
[1258] Posidonius, in Cic. N. D. i. 44, 123; Conf. 30, 85; iii. 1, 3;
Plut. l.c.
[1259] Epic. in Diog. 123: θεοὶ μὲν γάρ εἰσι· ἐναργὴς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν
αὐτῶν ἡ γνῶσις. The Epicurean in Cic. N. D. i. 16, 43: Solus enim
[Epicurus] vidit, primum esse Deos, quod in omnium animis eorum
notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quæ est enim gens aut quod genus
hominum quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam Deorum?
quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicurus, &c. These statements must, however, be
received with some caution, since Cicero appears to give up his own
views as to innate ideas. Inasmuch, however, as he expressly refers to
Epicurus’ treatise περὶ κανόνος, we may assume that belief in Gods with
Epicurus rests on a general πρόληψις.
[1260] In support of this view, see Cic. N. D. i. 18, 46. It is there
said of the form of the Gods: A natura habemus omnes omnium gentium
speciem nullam aliam nisi humanam Deorum. Quæ enim alia forma occurrit
umquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormienti? φυσικὴ πρόληψις is here
referred to sensations derived from εἴδωλα. Ibid. 19, 49; and Lucr. vi.
76:
de corpore quæ sancto simulacra feruntur
In mentis hominum divinæ nuntia formæ.
[1261] Diog. 121. Cic. N. D. i. 17, 45: Si nihil aliud quæreremus, nisi
ut Deos pie coleremus et ut superstitione liberaremur, satis erat
dictum: nam et præstans Deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum et
æterna esset et beatissima ... et metus omnis a vi atque ira Deorum
pulsus esset. Ibid. 20, 56: We do not fear the Gods, et pie sancteque
colimus naturam excellentem atque præstantem. Ibid. 41, 115. Sen.
Benef. iv. 19, 3: Epicurus denied all connection of God with the world,
but, at the same time, would have him honoured as a father, propter
majestatem ejus eximiam singularemque naturam.
[1262] Cic. N. D. i. 18, 46; Divin. ii. 17, 40; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 218;
Plut. Pl. Phil. i. 7, 18 (Stob. i. 66); Phædr. (Philodem.) Fragm. col.
7; Metrodorus, περὶ αἰσθητῶν (Vol. Herc. vi.), col. 10; col. 16, 21.
[1263] Cic. N. D. i. 34, 95.
[1264] Epic. in Diog. 123: πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ
μακάριον νομίζων ... μηδὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς
μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ πρόσαπτε, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. 139. Cic. N. D. i.
17, 45; 19, 51; Lucr. ii. 646; v. 165.
[1265] Cic. N. D. ii. 23, 59; i. 18, 49; 25, 71; 26, 74; Divin. ii. 17,
40; Lucr. v. 148; Metrodor. περὶ αἰσθητῶν, col. 7; Plut. l.c. Epicurus
has, as Cicero remarks, monogrammos Deos; his Gods have only quasi
corpus and quasi sanguinem. They are perlucidi and perflabiles, or,
according to Lucretius, tenues, so that they cannot be touched, and are
indestructible.
[1266] Cic. Divin. ii. 17, 40; Lucr. ii. 646; iii. 18; v. 146; Sen.
Benef. iv. 19, 2.
[1267] Epic. in Diog. 77; 97; 139; Cic. N. D. i. 19, 51 (amongst other
things: nos autem beatam vitam in animi securitate et in omnium
vacatione munerum ponimus, both of which features must therefore be
attributed to the Gods); Legg. i. 7, 21; Lucr. ii. 646; iii. 1092; iv.
83; vi. 57; Sen. Benef. iv. 4, 1; 19, 2. Conf. p. 436; 464, 1; 466, 1.
[1268] In the fragments of his treatise περὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν εὐστοχουμένης
διαγωγῆς, κατὰ Ζήνωνα, col. 12.
[1269] The κλίσια discussed by Hermarchus and Pythocles, col. 13, 20,
had reference to these, and not to ordinary feasts.
[1270] Col. 14: The reason being assigned that λέγονται μὴ πολὺ
διαφερούσαις κατὰ τὰς ἀρθρώσεις χρῆσθαι φωναῖς, καὶ μόνον οἴδαμεν
γεγονότας θεοὺς Ἑλληνίδι γλώττῃ χρωμένους. The first statement seems to
refer to the words of the divine language quoted by Homer; the second
statement, to stories of appearances of the Gods. For the whole tone of
the system militates against our thinking of men who have afterwards
become Gods. The sceptical question, Whether the Gods possess speech?
raised by Carneades in Sext. Math. ix. 178, appears to refer to this
μυθολογία Ἐπικούρου.
[1271] Cic. N. D. i. 20, 54; Sen. Benef. iv. 19, 1.
[1272] Philodem. De Mus. iv. (V. Herc. i.) col. 4, says that the Gods
do not need this worship, but it is natural for us to show it: μάλιστα
μὲν ὁσίαις προλήψεσιν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸ πάτριον
παραδεδομένοις ἑκάστῳ τῶν κατὰ μέρος.
[1273] Cic. l.c. i. 19, 50, the sentence, et si quæ interimant,
belonging, however, to Cicero only. For Epicurus cannot have described
his ease-taking Gods as sustainers of the universe.
[1274] Cic. N. D. i. 19, 49: (Epicurus) docet eam esse vim et naturam
Deorum ut primum non sensu sed mente cernatur: nec soliditate quadam
nec ad numerum, ut ea, quæ ille propter firmitatem στερέμνια appellat,
sed imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis: cum infinita
simillimarum imaginum species ex innumerabilibus individuis exsistat et
ad Deos (probably instead of Deos, which gives no sense, we should read
nos. See the commentators in the editions of Moser and Kreuzer)
affluat, cum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem intentam
infixamque nostram intelligentiam capere quæ sit et beata natura et
æterna. The meaning of these words appears to be, that ideas of the
Gods are not formed in the same way as the ideas of other solid bodies,
by a number of similar pictures from the same object striking our
senses (nec soliditate nec ad numerum, Diog. x. 95), but by single
pictures emanating from innumerable divine individuals, all so much
alike that they leave behind them the impressions of perfect happiness
and immortality. The passage of Diog. x. 139, ought probably to be
corrected by that in Cicero. It runs: ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησι, τοὺς θεοὺς
λόγῳ θεωρητοὺς εἶναι· οὓς μὲν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας, οὓς δὲ κατὰ
ὁμοειδίαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιῤῥύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
ἀποτετελεσμένους ἀνθρωποειδῶς. The similarity of most of the
expressions leaves no doubt that Diogenes followed the same authority
as Cicero (probably the same as Plut. Plac. i. 7, 18 followed), but in
the words οὓς μὲν κ.τ.λ., it asserts the very opposite of this and the
Epicurean teaching. There must, therefore, be some error here, either
due to Diogenes or a copyist. This error does not apparently belong to
the words κατ’ ἀριθμὸν, which Cicero renders ad numerum, so that
Steinhart’s suggestion, p. 477, καθ’ ἁρμὸν or καθ’ ἁρμοὺς, is clearly
wrong. It is more probably to be found in the words οὓς μὲν—οὓς δὲ. We
might suggest for οὓς μὲν, οὐ μέντοι.
[1275] In Phædrus (Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβείας), Fragm. col. 7 (10) it is
said in answer to the Stoics: ἐπιδεικνύσθωσαν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἕνα μόνον
[θεὸν] ἅπαντα λέγοντες οὐδὲ πάντας ὅσους ἡ κοινὴ φήμη παρέδωκεν, ἡμῶν
οὐ μόνον ὅσους φασὶν οἱ Πανέλληνες ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείονας εἶναι λεγόντων
ἔπειθ’ ὅτι τοιούτους οὐδὲ μεμήκασιν ἀπολείπειν, οἵους σέβονται πάντες
καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁμολογοῦμεν. ἀνθρωποειδεῖς γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐ νομίζουσιν ἀλλὰ
ἀέρα καὶ πνεύματα καὶ αἰθέρα, ὥστ’ ἔγωγε καὶ τεθαῤῥηκότως εἴπαιμι
τούτους Διαγόρου μᾶλλον πλημμελεῖν. It is then shown how little the
natural substances of the Stoics resemble Gods (col. 9): τὰ θεῖα
τοιαῦτα καταλείπουσιν ἃ καὶ γεννητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ φαίνεται, τοῖς δὲ πᾶσιν
ἡμεῖς ἀκολούθως ἀϊδίους κἀφθάρτους εἶναι δογματίζομεν. Here we have a
phenomenon witnessed in modern times, Deists and Pantheists mutually
accusing one another of atheism, the former missing personality, the
latter missing activity in the deity of their opponents.
[1276] See p. 469, 1.
[1277] Lucr. ii. 598, explains the Mother of the Gods as meaning the
earth. ii. 655, he allows the expressions, Neptune, Ceres, Bacchus, for
the sea, corn, and wine. iii. 976, he interprets the pains of the
nether-world as the qualms now brought on by superstition and folly.
[1278] Epic. in Diog. 128: τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ
μακαρίως ζῇν ... πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον ... πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονὴ
... ἀγαθόν.... καθάπερ καὶ ἀλγηδὼν πᾶσα κακόν. Ibid. 141. Cic. Fin. i.
9, 29; Tusc. v. 26, 73: Cum præsertim omne malum dolore definiat, bonum
voluptate.
[1279] Diog. 129: ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν καὶ
ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φευγῆς καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην
καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει τὸ ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες. Plut. Adv. Col. 27,
1.
[1280] Diog. 137; Cic. Fin. i. 7, 23; 9, 30; ii. 10, 31; Sext. Pyrrh.
iii. 194; Math. xi. 96.
[1281] Stob. Ecl. ii. 58: τοῦτο δ’ [the τέλος] οἱ κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον
φιλοσοφοῦντες οὐ προσδέχονται λέγειν ἐνεργούμενον, διὰ τὸ παθητικὸν
ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸ τέλος, οὐ πρακτικόν· ἡδονὴ γάρ· ὅθεν καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν
ἀποδιδόασι τοῦ τέλους, τὸ οἰκείως διατεθεῖσθαι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν
χωρὶς τῆς ἐπ’ ἄλλο τε ἁπάσης ἐπιβολῆς. Alex. Aphr. De An. 154, a: τοῖς
δὲ περὶ Ἐπίκουρον ἡδονὴ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον ἔδοξεν εἶναι ἁπλῶς· προϊόντων
δὲ διαρθροῦσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἡδονήν φασι.
[1282] Diog. 129; Cic. Fin. i. 14, 48; Tusc. v. 33, 95; Sen. De Otio,
7, 3.
[1283] Epic. in Diog. 139 (Gell. N. A. ii. 9, 2): ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν
ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. Id. in Diog. 128: τούτων γὰρ
[τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν] ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπαναγαγεῖν
οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν. ἐπεὶ
τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῇν ἐστι τέλος. τούτου γὰρ χάριν ἅπαντα πράττομεν
ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν· ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται
λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμὼν οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῴου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς
ἐνδέον τι ... τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρείαν ἔχομεν, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι
τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν· ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα. Ibid.
131; 144; conf. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 3, 10; Stob. Serm. 17, 35;
Lucr. ii. 14; Cic. Fin. i. 11, 37.
[1284] Epicurus and Metrodorus, in Plut. l.c. 7, 1.
[1285] Diog. 136, quotes the words of Epicurus: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ
ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναὶ, ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ
κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται. Ritter, iii. 469, suggests instead of
ἐνεργείᾳ ἐναργείᾳ, but ἐνεργείᾳ gives a very fair meaning: they appear
actually in motion. Sen. Ep. 66, 45: Apud Epicurum duo bona sunt, ex
quibus summum illud beatumque componitur, ut corpus sine dolore sit,
animus sine perturbatione.
[1286] Hence Sen. Brevit. Vit. 14, 2: Cum Epicuro quiescere. Benef. iv.
4, 1: Quæ maxima Epicuro felicitas videtur, nihil agit.
[1287] Diog. 131. Similar views are expressed by Metrodorus, in
Clement, Strom. v. 614, B, in praise of philosophers who escape all
evils by rising to the contemplation of the eternal καθαροὶ καὶ
ἀσήμαντοι τούτου, ὃ νῦν σῶμα περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν. Id. in Plut. Adv.
Col. 17, 4: ποιήσωμέν τι καλὸν ἐπὶ καλοῖς, μόνον οὐ καταδύντες ταῖς
ὁμοιοπαθείαις καὶ ἀπαλλαγέντες ἐκ τοῦ χαμαὶ βίου εἰς τὰ Ἐπικούρου ὡς
ἀληθῶς θεόφαντα ὄργια.
[1288] Epic. in Diog. 122: μήτε νέος τις ὢν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν μήτε
γέρων ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν. οὔτε γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδείς ἐστιν οὔτε
πάρωρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον. He who says it is too early or too
late to study philosophy means πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μήπω παρεῖναι τὴν
ὥραν ἢ μηκέτι εἶναι. Id. in Sen. Ep. 8, 7: Philosophiæ servias oportet,
ut tibi contingat vera libertas.
[1289] Epic. in Diog. 127: τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ αἱ δὲ
κεναί· καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον. τῶν δὲ
ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ
σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῇν. Ibid. 149, further
particulars are given as to the classes. Ibid. 144; Lucr. ii. 20; Cic.
Fin. i. 13, 45; Tusc. v. 33, 94; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 3, 10;
Eustrat. Eth. N. 48, b; Sen. Vit. Be. 13, 1.
[1290] Sen. Benef. iii. 4, 1: Epicuro ... qui adsidue queritur, quod
adversus præterita simus ingrati. Epic. in Sen. Ep. 15, 10: Stulta vita
ingrata est et trepida, tota in futurum fertur; and Lucr. iii. 929.
[1291] Diog. 11; 130; 144; 146; Stob. Floril. 17; 23; 30; 34; Sen. Ep.
2, 5; 16, 7; 25, 4.
[1292] Diog. 144: βραχεῖα σοφῷ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ
κυριώτατα ὁ λογισμὸς διῴκηκε. The like in Stob. Ecl. ii. 354; Cic. Fin.
i. 19, 63; Sen. De Const. 15, 4; Epicurus and Metrodorus in Cic. Tusc.
v. 9, 26, and Plut. Aud. Po. 14, p. 37.
[1293] Diog. 135: κρεῖττον εἶναι νομίζων εὐλογίστως ἀτυχεῖν ἢ ἀλογίστως
εὐτυχεῖν.
[1294] Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 20, 4.
[1295] Diog. 118; Plut. l.c. 3, 9; Sen. Ep. 66, 18; 67, 15; Cic. Tusc.
v. 26, 73.
[1296] Diog. 22; Cic. Fin. ii. 30, 96; Tusc. ii. 7, 17; M. Aurel. ix.
41; Sen. Ep. 66, 47; 92, 25; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 18, 1, the latter
perverting Epicurus’ words to a terrible extent.
[1297] Diog. 137: ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναϊκοὺς διαφέρεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
χείρους τὰς σωματικὰς ἀλγηδόνας λέγουσι τῶν ψυχικῶν ... ὁ δὲ τὰς
ψυχικάς. τὴν γοῦν σάρκα διὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον χειμάζειν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν καὶ
διὰ τὸ παρελθὸν καὶ τὸ παρὸν καὶ τὸ μέλλον. οὕτως οὖν καὶ μείζονας
ἡδονὰς εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς. Further particulars in Plut. l.c. 3, 10: Cic.
Tusc. v. 33, 96. The Epicureans spoke of bodily pleasure by ἥδεσθαι,
mental by χαίρειν. Plut. l.c. 5, 1.
[1298] Diog. 145. Epicurus appears to have first used σὰρξ to express
the body in contrast to the soul: σῶμα, in his system, includes the
soul. See Diog. 137; 140; 144; Metrodor. in Plut. Colot. 31, 2. (Plut.
in N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 9; Plut. has γαστρὶ instead of σαρκί.)
[1299] Diog. x. 6, from Epicurus περὶ τέλους: οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω
τἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονὰς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς δι’
ἀφροδισίων καὶ τὰς δι’ ἀκροαμάτων καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφᾶς (-ῆς). The like,
in a more expanded form, in Cic. Tusc. iii. 18, 41.
[1300] Plut. l.c. 16, 9: ὡς καὶ ἐχάρην καὶ ἐθρασυνάμην ὅτε ἔμαθον παρ’
Ἐπικούρου ὀρθῶς γαστρὶ (see previous note) χαρίζεσθαι; and: περὶ
γαστέρα γὰρ, ὦ φυσιολόγε Τιμόκρατες, τὸ ἀγαθόν. Conf. ibid. 3, 1.
[1301] See p. 478, 1, and Epic. in Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 4, 10: τὸ γὰρ
εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν
ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.
Ibid. 5, 1: τὸ μὲν ἡδόμενον τῆς σαρκὸς τῷ χαίροντι τῆς ψυχῆς
ὑπερείδοντες, αὖθις δ’ ἐκ τοῦ χαίροντος εἰς τὸ ἡδόμενον τῇ ἐλπίδι
τελευτῶντας.
[1302] Conf., besides the extracts on p. 478, 1 and 2, Cic. Fin. i. 17,
55: Animi autem voluptates et dolores nasci fatemur e corporis
voluptatibus et doloribus; it is only a misapprehension on the part of
several Epicureans to deny this fact. Mental pleasures and pains may
therefore be the stronger ones for the reasons assigned above.
[1303] In his last letter (Diog. 22), after describing his painful
illness, Epicurus continues: ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ
ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ.
[1304] Diog. 142; Cic. Fin. ii. 7, 21.
[1305] Diog. 140; 133; Cic. Fin. i. 15, 49; Plut. Aud. Po. 14, p. 36;
M. Aurel. vii. 33, 64.
[1306] Diog. 140: οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῇν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ
δικαίως, οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ δικαίως ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. The same p. 132,
138. Cic. Tusc. v. 9, 26; Fin. i. 16, 50; 19, 62; Sen. Ep. 85, 18.
[1307] Sen. Vit. Be. 13, 1 (conf. 12, 4): In ea quidem ipse sententia
sum (invitis nec nostris popularibus—the Stoics—dicam), sancta Epicurum
et recta præcipere, et si propius accesseris tristia: voluptas enim
illa ad parvum et exile revocatur, et quam nos virtuti legem dicimus
eam ille dicit voluptati ... itaque non dico, quod plerique nostrorum,
sectam Epicuri flagitiorum magistram esse, sed illud dico: male audit,
infamis est, et immerito. Ep. 33, 2: Apud me vero Epicurus est et
fortis, licet manuleatus sit. Seneca not infrequently quotes sayings of
Epicurus, and calls (Ep. 6, 6) Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyænus,
magnos viros. Conf. Cic. Fin. ii. 25, 81.
[1308] Epic. in Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 3: ἐγὼ δ’ ἐφ’ ἡδονὰς συνεχεῖς
παρακαλῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀρετὰς, κενὰς καὶ ματαίας καὶ ταραχώδεις ἐχούσας
τῶν κάρπων τὰς ἐλπίδας.
[1309] Diog. 138: διὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι οὐ
δι’ αὑτάς· ὥσπερ τὴν ἰατρικὴν διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν, καθά φησι καὶ Διογένης.
Cic. Fin. i. 13, 42 (conf. ad Att. vii. 2): Istæ enim vestræ eximiæ
pulchræque virtutes nisi voluptatem efficerent, quis eas aut laudabiles
aut expetendas arbitraretur? ut enim medicorum scientiam non ipsius
artis sed bonæ valetudinis causa probamus, &c. ...; sic sapientia, quæ
ars vivendi putanda est, non expeteretur si nihil efficeret; nunc
expetitur quod est tanquam artifex conquirendæ et comparandæ
voluptatis. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b: [ἡ ἀρετὴ] περὶ τὴν ἐκλογήν ἐστι
τῶν ἡδέων κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον.
[1310] Sen. Ep. 85, 18: Epicurus quoque judicat, cum virtutem habeat
beatum esse, sed ipsam virtutem non satis esse ad beatam vitam, quia
beatum efficiat voluptas quæ ex virtute est, non ipsa virtus.
[1311] Diog. 132; Cic. Fin. i. 13, 43; 19, 62.
[1312] Cic. Fin. i. 13, 47.
[1313] Cic. l.c. 13, 49. Diog. 120: τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν φύσει μὴ γίνεσθαι,
λογισμῷ δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος.
[1314] Cic. Fin. i. 16, 50; Diog. 144; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 6, 1;
Sen. Ep. 97, 13 and 15. Lucr. v. 1152: The criminal can never rest, and
often in delirium or sleep betrays himself. Epicurus, however, refused
to answer the question, Whether the wise man would do what is
forbidden, if he could be certain of not being discovered? Plut. col.
34, 1.
[1315] Philodemus, De Rhet. Vol. Herc. v. a, col. 25: The laws ought to
be kept τῷ μὴ τὰ διωρισμένα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τὴν ὁμοείδειαν αὐτοῖς
ἔχοντα διαφυλάττειν, κἀκεῖνα μὴ μόνον συνειδότων, ἀλλὰ κἂν λανθάνωμεν
ἀπαξάπαντας, καὶ μεθ’ ἡδονῆς, οὐ δι’ ἀνάγκην, καὶ βεβαίως, ἀλλ’ οὐ
σαλευομένως.
[1316] Diog. 117; 118; 119.
[1317] Plut. Adv. Col. 19, 2.
[1318] Diog. 118; Sen. Ep. 81, 11. The Stoic assertion of the equality
of virtues and vices was, however, denied by the Epicureans. Diog. 120.
[1319] Diog. 135; conf. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 7, 3; Lucr. iii. 323.
[1320] Cic. Fin. i. 19, 61; v. 27 80: Semper beatum esse sapientem.
Tusc. v. 9, 26; Stob. Serm. 17, 30. See p. 477.
[1321] Diog. 117.
[1322] Diog. 117: τὸν ἅπαξ γενόμενον σοφὸν μηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν
λαμβάνειν διάθεσιν μήδ’ ἐπαλλάττειν ἑκόντα. The latter words appear to
admit the possibility of an involuntary loss of wisdom, perhaps through
madness.
[1323] Diog. 126; 145; Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63.
[1324] See also page 476, 2.
[1325] We gather this from the fragments of Philodemus’ treatise περὶ
κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν οἷς εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ἅ. The
10th book of this treatise gives a portrait of the ὑπερήφανος, and
kindred faults, after the manner of Theophrastus; the 9th, a mild
criticism of Xenophon’s and Aristotle’s οἰκονομικός. It is objected to
the latter that the master of the house is there made (col. ii. 30) to
rise earlier than his servants, and to go to bed later than they do,
such conduct being ταλαίπωρον καὶ ἀνοίκειον φιλοσόφου.
[1326] Diog. 144; 146; 130; Stob. Floril. 17, 23; Sen. Ep. 16, 7; Lucr.
ii. 20; iii. 59; v. 1115; Philod. De Vit. ix. col. 12: φιλοσόφῳ δ’ ἐστὶ
πλούτου μικρόν· ὃ παρεδώκαμεν ἀκολούθως [for thus and not by εὐκαίρως
must the defective -ως be represented] τοῖς καθηγεμόσιν ἐν τοῖς περὶ
πλούτου λόγοις. Conf. p. 476, 3; 477.
[1327] Diog. 130.
[1328] Stob. Floril. 17, 24 and 37; Sen. Ep. 21, 7; 14, 17; 2, 5:
Honesta, inquit, res est læta paupertas. Ep. 17, 11: Multis parasse
divitias non finis miseriarum fuit, sed mutatio.
[1329] Stob. Flor. 17, 30. Conf. Sen. Ep. 9, 20: Si cui sua non
videntur amplissima, licet totius mundi dominus sit tamen miser est.
[1330] Diog. 11; Stob. Floril. 17, 34; Cic. Tusc. v. 31, 89; Sen. Ep.
25, 4. Epicurus lived very abstemiously. The charge of luxury brought
against him was fully disposed of by Gassendi, De Vit. et Mor. Epic.
153. Timocrates, on the strength of one of his letters, asserts that he
spent a mina every day on his table. If this statement be not a pure
invention, it must refer to the whole circle of his friends. It could
otherwise only have happened at such a time as the siege of Athens by
Demetrius Poliorcetes, when a modius of wheat cost 300 drachmæ, and
when Epicurus counted out to his friends the beans on which they lived.
Plut. Demetr. 33. The further statement of Timocrates—(Diog. 6: αὐτὸν
δὶς τῆς ἡμέρας ἐμεῖν ἀπὸ τρυφῆς)—is certainly an unfounded calumny. The
moderation of Epicurus is admitted by Sen. Vit. B. 12, 4; 13, 1; and
Epicurus flatters himself, in Sen. Ep. 18, 9: Non toto asse pasci,
Metrodorum, qui nondum tantum profecerit, toto; and, in Diog. 11,
because he was satisfied with bread and water. Ibid. he writes: πέμψον
μοι τυροῦ Κυθνίου, ἵν’ ὅταν βούλωμαι πολυτελεύσασθαι, δύνωμαι. Still
less have we any reason to connect the diseases of which Epicurus and
some of his scholars died (as Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 5, 3 does, herein
following Timocrates in Diog. 7) with their presumed luxuriousness.
[1331] Stob. Floril. 17, 30. See p. 477, 2.
[1332] Epicurus and Metrodorus, in Stob. Floril. 16, 28; 20, Conf.
Plut. Tran. An. 16, p. 474: ὁ τῆς αὔριον ἥκιστα δεόμενος, ὥς φησιν
Ἐπίκουρος, ἥδιστα πρόσεισι πρὸς τὴν αὔριον.
[1333] Serious charges on this head, against which Gassendi defends
him, are preferred against Epicurus by Timocrates, in Diog. 6; but
neither the testimony of Timocrates, nor the fact that a woman of loose
morality (see above p. 406) was in his society, can be considered
conclusive. Chrysippus in Stob. Floril. 63, 31, calls Epicurus
ἀναίσθητος. Epicurus is, however, far below our standard of morality.
Thus, in the quotation on p. 479, 1, he reckons ἡδοναὶ δι’ ἀφροδισίων
among the necessary ingredients of the good. By Eustrat. in Eth. N. 48,
such pleasures are included among φυσικαὶ (see p. 476, 3), not among
ἡδοναὶ ἀναγκαῖαι. They are treated in the same light by Lucr. v. 1050;
and Plut. Qu. Conviv. iii. 6, 1, 1, not only discusses the most
suitable time for the enjoyment of love, but quotes as the words of
Epicurus: εἰ γέρων ὁ σοφὸς ὢν καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος πλησιάζειν ἔτι ταῖς τῶν
καλῶν ἁφαῖς χαίρει καὶ ψηλαφήσεσιν (N. P. Suav. V. 12, 3). These
enjoyments, according to Epicurus, are only then allowed when they do
not entail any bad consequences (Diog. 118), or produce passionate
states of feeling. Hence he not only forbids unlawful commerce (Diog.
118), but declares οὐκ ἐρασθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν. Diog. 118; Stob. Floril.
63, 31. Eros is defined (Alex. Aphr. Top. 75) = σύντονος ὄρεξις
ἀφροδισίων. Conf. Plut. Amat. 19, 16, p. 765. It is consequently a
passionate and disturbing state, which the wise man must avoid. The
Stoics, on the contrary, allowed Eros to their wise man. The same view
is taken of Eros by Lucretius, who cannot find words strong enough to
express the restlessness and confusion entailed by love, the state of
dependence in which it places man, and the loss to his fortune and good
name. His advice is to allay passion as quickly as possible by means of
Venus volgivaga, and to gratify it in a calm way.
[1334] Diog. 120; 140; Cic. Tusc. ii. 12, 28; Lucr. iii. 59; 993.
[1335] Sen. De Const. 16, 1.
[1336] Diog. 118: οὐδὲ ταφῆς φροντιεῖν.
[1337] Lucr. iii. 74.
[1338] See pp. 479, 455. A further argument may, however, be here
quoted. In Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 16, 3, he says: ὅτι νόσῳ νοσῶν ἀσκίτῃ
τινὰς ἑστιάσεις φίλων συνῆγε, καὶ οὐκ ἐφθόνει τῆς προσαγωγῆς τοῦ ὑγροῦ
τῷ ὕδρωπι, καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων Νεοκλέους λόγων μεμνημένος ἐτήκετο τῇ μετὰ
δακρύων ἡδονῇ. It is true that a certain mawkishness and self-conceit
may be detected in this language.
[1339] Diog. 119; Philodem. De Vit. ix. 12; 27, 40.
[1340] Diog. 120: κτήσεως προνοήσεσθαι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος. 121:
χρηματίσεσθαί τε ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας ἀπορήσαντα. The limitation implied in
the text would, however, seem to require μόνης. Philodem. in the same
sense l.c. 23, 23, says that Epicurus received presents from his
scholars, Conf. Plut. Adv. Col. 18, 3, also 15, 31.
[1341] Diog. 121: εἰκόνας τε ἀναθήσειν εἰ ἔχοι· ἀδιαφόρως ἕξειν ἂν μὴ
σχοίη (Cobet, not intelligibly: ἀδιαφόρως ἂν σχοίης).
[1342] Epic. in Diog. 130: καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζομεν
οὐχ ἵνα πάντως τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ἐὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν τὰ πολλὰ
τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα πεπεισμένοι γνησίως ὅτι ἥδιστα πολυτελείας
ἀπολαύουσιν οἱ ἥκιστα αὐτῆς δεόμενοι.
[1343] The Epicurean in Cic. Fin. i. 15, 49: Si tolerabiles sint
[dolores] feramus, sin minus, æquo animo e vita, cum ea non placeat,
tanquam e theatro exeamus. Epic. in Sen. Ep. 12, 10: Malum est in
necessitate vivere, sed in necessitate vivere necessitas nulla est. On
the other hand, Ep. 24, 22: Objurgat Epicurus non minus eos qui mortem
concupiscunt, quam eos, qui timent, et ait: ridiculum est currere ad
mortem tædio vitæ, cum genere vitæ ut currendum esset ad mortem
effeceris. Diog. 119, the older editions read: καὶ πηρωθεὶς τὰς ὄψεις
μεθέξειν αὐτὸν τοῦ βίου. Cobet: μετάξειν αὑτὸν τοῦ βίου. Instead of
πηρωθεὶς πηρωθέντα is read, or, as we might prefer, instead of μετάξειν
μετάξει. Suicide was only allowed by Epicurus in extreme cases. In
Seneca’s time, when an Epicurean, Diodorus, committed suicide, his
fellow-scholars were unwilling to allow that suicide was permitted by
the precepts of Epicurus (Sen. Vit. B. 19, 1).
[1344] Epict. Diss. ii. 20, 6: Ἐπίκουρος ὅταν ἀναιρεῖν θέλῃ τὴν φυσικὴν
κοινωνίαν ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κ.τ.λ.
[1345] Diog. 150; 154. From this point of view, Lucr. v. 1106, gives a
long description of the rise of a state.
[1346] Stob. Floril. 43, 139.
[1347] Diog. 150; Lucr. v. 1149; Sen. Ep. 97, 13, and 15; Plut. Adv.
Col. 35. See p. 482, 4.
[1348] Diog. 150–153.
[1349] Diog. 140.
[1350] Plut. Adv. Col. 31; 33, 4; N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 9; Epictet.
Diss. i. 23, 6; Lucr. v. 1125; Cic. pro Sext. 10, 23. Philodem. περὶ
ῥητορικῆς (Vol. Herc. iv.) col. 14: οὐδὲ χρησίμην ἡγούμεθα τὴν
πολιτικὴν δύναμιν, οὔτ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς κεκτημένοις, οὔτε ταῖς πόλεσιν,
αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτήν· ἀλλὰ πολλάκις αἰτίαν καὶ συμφορῶν ἀνηκέστων, when
combined with uprightness, it benefits the community, and is sometimes
useful; at other times, harmful to statesmen themselves.
[1351] Plut. De Latenter Vivendo, c. 4. In this respect, T. Pomponius
Atticus is the true type of an Epicurean, on whose conduct during the
civil war and withdrawal from public life, see Nepos, Att. 6.
[1352] Metrodorus, in Stob. Floril. 45, 26: ἐν πόλει μήτε ὡς λέων
ἀναστρέφου μήτε ὡς κώνωψ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκπατεῖται τὸ δὲ καιροφυλακεῖται.
[1353] Seneca well expresses the difference on this point between
Epicureans and Stoics in the passage quoted, p. 320, 3.
[1354] Plut. Tranq. An. c. 2, p. 465.
[1355] Epic. in Sen. Ep. 29, 10: Nunquam volui populo placere; nam quæ
ego scio non probat populus, quæ probat populos ego nescio. Similar
expressions from Stoics have been previously quoted.
[1356] Diog. 121: καὶ μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν [τὸν σοφόν]. Lucr.
v. 1125:—
Ut satius multo jam sit parere quietum,
Quam regere imperio res velle et regna tenere.
[1357] Epict. Diss. i. 23, 3 (against Epicurus): διατὶ ἀποσυμβουλεύεις
τῷ σοφῷ τεκνοτροφεῖν; τί φοβῇ μὴ διὰ ταῦτα εἰς λύπας ἐμπέσῃ; ii. 20,
20: Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν ἀνδρὸς πάντ’ ἀπεκόψατο καὶ τὰ οἰκοδεσπότου καὶ
φίλου. The last words prove with what caution these statements must be
taken.
[1358] Diog. 119. The passage is, however, involved in much obscurity,
owing to a difference of reading. The earlier text was: καὶ μὴν καὶ
γαμήσειν καὶ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφὸν, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ταῖς διαπορίαις
καὶ ἐν ταῖς περὶ φύσεως. κατὰ περίστασιν δέ ποτε βίου οὐ γαμήσειν.
Cobet reads instead: καὶ μηδὲ γαμήσειν μηδὲ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφόν ...
κατὰ περίστασιν δέ ποτε βίου γαμήσειν. What the MS. authority for this
reading is, we are not told. In sense it agrees with Hieron. Adv.
Jovin. i. 191, quoting from Seneca, De Matrimonio: Epicurus ... raro
dicit sapienti ineunda conjugia, quia multa incommoda admixta sunt
nuptiis. Like riches, honours, health, ita et uxores sitas in bonorum
malorumque confinio, grave autem esse viro sapienti venire in dubium,
utrum bonam an malam ducturus sit.
[1359] Plut. Adv. Col. 27, 6; De Am. Prol. 2, p. 495; Epictet. Diss. i.
23, 3.
[1360] Diog. 10: ἥ τε πρὸς τοὺς γονέας εὐχαριστία καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς
ἀδελφοὺς εὐποιΐα. Diogenes himself appeals to Epicurus’ testament,
ibid. 18.
[1361] Diog. 120: καὶ τὴν φιλίαν διὰ τὰς χρείας [γίνεσθαι] ...
συνίστασθαι δὲ αὐτὴν κατὰ κοινωνίαν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς. Epic. Ibid. 148
(also in Cic. Fin. i. 20, 68): καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὡρισμένοις
ἀσφάλεαν φιλίας μάλιστα κρήσει δεῖ νομίζειν συντελουμένην. (Cobet,
however, reads: φιλίας μάλιστα κατιδεῖν εἶναι συντελυμένην, in which
case φιλίᾳ should be substituted for φιλίας or else κτήσει for
κατιδεῖν.) Sen. Ep. 9, 8: The wise man needs a friend, non ad hoc quod
Epicurus dicebat in hac ipsa epistola (a letter in which Stilpo’s
cynical self-contentment is blamed), ut habeat, qui sibi ægro adsideat,
succurrat in vincula conjecto vel inopi; sed ut habeat aliquem, cui
ipse ægro adsideat, quem ipse circumventum hostili custodia liberet.
Cic. Fin. i. 20, 66: Cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et
metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis
confirmatur animus et a spe pariendarum voluptatum sejungi non potest,
etc. On the same grounds, Philodem. De Vit. ix. (V. Herc. iii.) col.
24, argues that it is much better to cultivate friendship than to
withdraw from it.
[1362] Cic. Fin. i. 20, 69.
[1363] Ibid. 70.
[1364] Ibid. 67.
[1365] The same need finds expression in the advice given by Epicurus
(Sen. Ep. 11, 8; 25, 5): Let every one choose some distinguished man as
his pattern, that so he may live, as it were, perpetually under his
eye. Man requires a stranger to give him moral support.
[1366] As illustrations in modern times, the reunions of the French
freethinkers, or the societies of Rousseau, Mendelssohn, Jacobi, may be
mentioned. It deserves notice that in these societies, as amongst the
Epicureans, an important part was played by women. This is quite
natural, when philosophy is confined to cultivated intercourse and
conversation.
[1367] Diog. 148: ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου
μακαριότητα πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις. Cic. Fin. ii. 25,
80: Epicurus exalts friendship to heaven. In Diog. 120, Cobet reads
instead of the usual φίλον τε οὐδένα κτήσεσθαι [τὸν σοφὸν], which is
altogether untrustworthy, φίλων τε οὐδὲν κτήσεσθαι.
[1368] Sen. Ep. 19, 10, with the addition: Nam sine amico visceratio
leonis ac lupi vita est.
[1369] Plut. Adv. Col. 8, 7; Diog. 121. We have no reason to suppose,
with Ritter, iii. 474, that this was not the expression of a real
sentiment. That it is inconsistent we can well allow.
[1370] The Epicureans in Cic. Fin. i. 20, 65: At vero Epicurus una in
domo, et ea quidem angusta, quam magnos quantaque amoris conspiratione
consentientes tenuit amicorum greges! quod fit etiam nunc ab Epicureis.
Ibid. ii. 25, 80.
[1371] Instances have already been quoted, p. 418, 2, of the
extravagant honours required by Epicurus; nor did he fail to eulogise
his friends, as the fragments of his letters to Leontion, Themista, and
Pythocles (Diog. 5) prove. When Metrodorus had tried to obtain the
release of a captive friend, Epicurus applauded him (Plut. N. P. Sua.
Vivi, 15, 5, Adv. Col. 33, 2): ὡς εὖ τε καὶ νεανικῶς ἐξ ἄστεως ἅλαδε
κατέβη Μίθρῳ τῷ Σύρῳ βοηθήσων. Ibid. 15, 8, he expresses his thanks for
a present: δαΐως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἐπεμελήθητε ἡμῶν τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ
σίτου κομιδὴν, καὶ οὐρανομήκη σημεῖα ἐνδέδειχθε τῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ εὐνοίας.
He wrote of Pythocles before he was 18: οὐκ εἶναι φύσιν ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ
Ἑλλάδι ἀμείνω, καὶ τερατικῶς αὐτὸν εὖ ἀπαγγέλλειν, καὶ πάσχειν αὖ τὸ
τῶν γυναικῶν, εὐχόμενος ἀνεμέσητα εἶναι πάντα καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα τῆς
ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ νεανισκοῦ (Plut. Adv. Col. 29, 2); and he also said
(Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας, Fr. 6, V. Herc. v. 2, 11): ὡς διὰ Πυθοκλέα
τύχην θεώσει παρὰ τὸ τεθεμισμένον. Compare the remarks on p. 488, 3.
[1372] Diog. 11: τόν τε Ἐπίκουρον μὴ ἀξιοῦν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν κατατίθεσθαι
τὰς οὐσίας καθάπερ τὸν Πυθαγόραν κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων λέγοντα,
ἀπιστούντων γὰρ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον· εἰ δ’ ἀπίστων οὐδὲ φίλων.
[1373] Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας (V. Herc. v. 2), Fr. 15; 72; 73,
mentions Epicurus and Metrodorus as patterns of genial frankness
towards friends. Probably the words in Sen. Ep. 28, 9—initium salutis
est notitia peccati—are taken from a moral exhortation addressed to a
friend.
[1374] Not only does Diogenes 9, praise his unequalled benevolence, his
kindness to his slaves, and his general geniality, but Cicero calls him
(Tusc. ii. 19, 44) vir optimus, and (Fin. ii. 25, 30) bonum virum et
comem et humanum.
[1375] Diog. 118: οὔτε κολάσειν οἰκέτας ἐλεήσειν μέντοι, καὶ συγγνώμην
τινὶ ἕξειν τῶν σπουδαίων. 121. ἐπιχαρίσεσθαί τινι ἐπὶ τῷ διορθώματι.
[1376] Plut. N. P. Suav. Vi. 15, 4 (similarly C. Princ. Philos. 3, 2,
p. 778): αὐτοὶ δὲ δήπου λέγουσιν ὡς τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἥδιόν ἐστι τοῦ
πάσχειν. Conf. Alex. Aphr. Top. 123. A similar maxim is attributed by
Ælian, V. H. xiii. 13, to Ptolemy Lagi. Conf. Acts xx. 35.
[1377] Cic. Fin. ii. 25, 81: Et ipse bonus vir fuit et multi Epicurei
fuerunt et hodie sunt, et in amicitiis fideles et in omni vita
constantes et graves nec voluptate sed officio consilia moderantes.
Atticus is a well-known example of genuine human kindness and ready
self-sacrifice, and Horace may be also quoted as an illustration of the
same character. See Steinhart’s remarks, l.c. p. 470.
[1378] See p. 445.
[1379] Conf. p. 126, 2, with 439, 1.
[1380] It has been already stated, p. 405, 1, 4, that Epicurus admitted
his debt to Democritus, but not without some reserve; otherwise he
claimed to be entirely self-taught, and to have learned nothing from
the ancient teachers, and expressed himself with such conceit and scorn
as to spare neither them nor their writings. Diog. 8, besides
mentioning his abuse of Nausiphanes (sup. 342, 1), refers also to his
calling the Platonists Διονυσοκόλακας, Plato himself in irony the
golden Plato, Heraclitus κυκητήν, Democritus Ληρόκριτον, Antidorus
Σαινίδωρον, the Cynics ἐχθροὺς τῆς Ἑλλάδος, the Dialecticians
πολυφθονέρους, Pyrrho ἀμαθῆν and ἀπαίδευτον, and charging Aristotle and
Protagoras with vices in their youth. Diogenes refuses to allow that
any of these statements are true, Epicurus’ friendliness being well
known. But the devotion of Epicurus to his friends and admirers does
not exclude hatred and injustice towards his predecessors (see p. 418,
2), of whom a fair estimate was rendered impossible by the superficial
nature of his knowledge and the onesidedness of his point of view.
Sext. Math. i. 2, attests τὴν πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ
τοὺς ὁμοίους δυσμένειαν; Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 1, mentions a false
objection to Arcesilaus; and Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93, says: Cum Epicurus
Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime, Phædoni Socratico turpissime
maledixerit, etc. The rude jokes mentioned by Diogenes are in harmony
with a man whom Cic. N. D. ii. 17, 46, calls homo non aptissimus ad
jocandum minimeque resipiens patriam. On these jokes he apparently
prided himself as well as on a certain bombastic elegance. See p. 496,
6. In this Epicurus was followed by his pupils. Cic. N. D. i. 34, 93,
says of Zeno: Non eos solum, qui tunc erant, Apollodorum, Silum,
ceteros figebat maledictis, sed Socratem ipsum ... scurram Atticum
fuisse dicebat (according to Cic. Brut. 85, 292, Epicurus had already
expressed a disparaging opinion of the Socratic irony), Chrysippum
nunquam nisi Chrysippam vocabat.
[1381] Compare in this connection the quotations from Metrodorus on p.
476, 1.
[1382] Democritus had denied all truth to sensuous impressions. The
same sceptical tone was more strongly apparent in Metrodorus (Aristocl.
in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 19, 5; Sext. Math. vii. 88; Epiphan. Exp. Fid.
1088, A, although he cannot be considered a full Sceptic,
notwithstanding his usual agreement with the physical views of
Democritus (Plut. in Eus. l.c. i. 8, 11; id. Fac. Lun. 15, 3, p. 928;
Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 19). Scepticism appears to have passed from him to
Pyrrho, Anaxarchus being the middleman (see p. 518, 2, 3), and herewith
may be connected the Sceptical imperturbability. This doctrine of
imperturbability being held by Epicurus, the pupil of Nansiphanes, it
might be supposed that before Pyrrho’s time a doctrine not unlike that
of Pyrrho had been developed in the School of Democritus, from whom it
was borrowed by Epicurus. The connection is, however, uncertain. We
have seen that the doubts of Democritus extended only to
sense-impressions, not to intellectual knowledge. The case of
Metrodorus was similar. His sceptical expressions refer only to the
ordinary conditions of human knowledge, that of ideas derived from the
senses: greater dependence is, however, placed on thought. We must
therefore take the statement ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶν ὃ ἄν τις νοήσαι subject to
this limitation. Anaxarchus is said (Sext. Math. vii. 87) to have
compared the world to a stage-scene, which involves no greater
scepticism than the similar expressions used by Plato as to the
phenomenal world. However much, therefore, these individuals may have
contributed to Pyrrhonism, a simple transference of Scepticism from
Democritus to Pyrrho is not to be thought of. And as regards
imperturbability, Epicurus may have borrowed the expression from
Pyrrho, whom, according to Diog. ix. 64 and 69, he both knew and
esteemed.
[1383] Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 1; Diog. ix. 61. We are
indebted almost exclusively to Diogenes for our information respecting
Pyrrho. Besides Antigonus the Carystian, Apollodorus, Alexander
Polyhistor, Diocles, &c., are the chief authorities drawn upon by
Diogenes.
[1384] Attention has been drawn to the chronological difficulties in
‘Socrates and the Socratic Schools,’ p. 255, note 1 (2nd edition).
Either Pyrrho is falsely called a pupil of Bryso, or Bryso is falsely
called the son of Stilpo. The former seems more probable, Diog. ix. 61,
having derived his statement from Alexander’s διαδοχαί, and it is quite
in the style of the compilers of the διαδοχαὶ to assign a Megarian
teacher to a Sceptic whose connection with that School was sufficiently
obvious.
[1385] Diog. ix. 61; Aristocl. l.c. 18, 20; 17, 8. We gather from them
that Pyrrho was originally a painter. Suidas, Πύῤῥων, only copies the
present text of Diogenes with a few mistakes.
[1386] Besides the passage quoted from Sextus, p. 515, 1, which is
little known, we have no proof of the sceptical tone in Anaxarchus
which Sextus, Math. vii. 48, attributes to him, and since the latter
quotes no proofs, it may be assumed that he had none. Anaxarchus
appears to have been unjustly included among the Sceptics, like so many
others who were called Sceptics by later writers on the strength of a
single word or expression. According to other accounts, he belonged to
the School of Democritus. Plut. Tranq. An. 4, p. 466. In Valer. Max.
viii. 14, ext. 2, he propounds to Alexander the doctrine of an infinite
number of worlds; and Clemens, Strom. i. 287, B, quotes a fragment, in
which, agreeing with Democritus, he observes that πολυμαθία is only
useful when it is properly made use of. Like Epicurus, Anaxarchus
followed Democritus, calling happiness the highest object of our
desire; and this assertion probably gained for him the epithet ὁ
εὐδαιμονικός (Clemens, l.c.; Athen. vi. 250; xii. 548, b; Æl. V. H. ix.
37). In other respects, he differed from Democritus. For first he is
charged by Clearchus in Athen. xii. 548, b, with a luxurious indulgence
far removed from the earnest and pure spirit of Democritus; and
according to Plut. Alex. 52, he had, when in Asia, renounced the
independence of a philosopher for a life of pleasure; Timon also in
Plut. Virt. Mor. 6, p. 446, says he was led away by φύσις ἡδονοπλὴξ
contrary to his better knowledge. Again, he is said to have commended
in Pyrrho (Diog. ix. 63) an indifference which went a good deal beyond
the imperturbability of Democritus; and Timon commends him for his
κυνικὸν μένος. He meets external pain with the haughty pride expressed
in his much-admired dictum under the blows of Nitocreon’s club—Diog.
ix. 59; Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 10, p. 449; Clemens, Strom. iv. 496, D;
Valer. Max. iii. 3, ext. 4; Plin. Hist. Nat. vii. 87; Tertull. Apol.
50; Dio Chrysos. Or. 37, p. 126, B. But he treats men with the same
contempt; and whilst meeting the Macedonian conqueror with an air of
independence, he spoils the whole by adroit flattery. Conf. Plut. Alex.
52; Ad Princ. Iner. 4, p. 781; Qu. Conv. ix. 1, 2, 5; Æl. V. H. ix. 37;
Athen. vi. 250. His indifference was, at any rate, very much lacking in
nobility. Respecting Anaxarchus see Lusac. Lect. Att. 181.
[1387] Diog. ix. 64; 109.
[1388] According to Diog. 64, they made him head-priest, and, on his
account, allowed to philosophers immunity from taxation. According to
Diocles (Diog. 65), the Athenians presented him with citizenship for
his services in putting a Thracian prince Cotys to death.
[1389] Diog. 66; 62.
[1390] Examples in Diog. 67. It sounds, however, highly improbable; and
doubts were expressed by Ænesidemus whether his indifference ever went
to the extent described by Antigonus, Ibid. 62, of not getting out of
the way of carriages and precipices, so that he had to be preserved
from danger by his friends. He must, moreover, have enjoyed a special
good fortune to attain the age of 90, notwithstanding such senseless
conduct.
[1391] All the dates here are very uncertain. Neither the date of his
death nor of his birth is given, and the notice in Suidas that he lived
after the 111 Olympiad (336–332 B.C.) is indefinite. If, however, as
Diog. 62 says, he attained the age of 90, and if he joined Anaxarchus
at Alexander’s first invasion of Asia, being then between 24 and 30,
the statements above given are true.
[1392] Diog. Pro. 16; 102; Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 1 are
better authorities than Sext. Math. i. 282, or Plut. Alex. Fort. i. 10,
p. 331. Neither does Sextus say that the supposed poem on Alexander was
extant. The whole statement is evidently untrustworthy.
[1393] Timon (see Wachsmuth, De Timone Phliasio, Leipzig, 1859) was a
native of Phlius (Diog. ix. 109). A public dancer at first (Diog. 109;
Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 12), when tired of this mode of life
he repaired to Megara, to hear Stilpo (Diog. 109). Stilpo being alive
in the third century, and Timon’s birth having happened approximately
between 325–315 B.C., the connection is not so impossible as Wachsmuth,
p. 5, and Preller, Hist. Phil. Gr. et Rom. 398, suppose, though in the
uncertainty of chronological data it cannot be positively stated.
Subsequently Timon became acquainted with Pyrrho, and leaving his
staunch admirers (Diog. 109, 69; Aristocl. l.c. 11, 14, 21), removed
with his wife to Elis. He then appeared as a teacher in Chalcis, and,
having amassed a fortune, concluded his life in Athens (Diog. 110;
115). It appears from Diog. 112 and 115, that he survived Arcesilaus
(who died 241 B.C.), having nearly attained the age of 90. His death
may therefore be approximately fixed in 230, his birth in 320 B.C. For
his life and character, see Diog. 110; 112–115; Athen. x. 438, a; Æl.
V. H. ii. 41. Of his numerous writings, the best known is a witty and
pungent satire on previous and cotemporary philosophers. Respecting
this satire (Diog. 110) consult Wachsmuth, p. 9 and 3. The latter, p.
51, has collected the fragments.
[1394] Diog. 67–69, mentions, besides Timon, a certain Eurylochus as
his pupil, who, however, was not very successful in the way of keeping
his temper; also Philo, an Athenian, Hecatæus of Abdera, the well-known
historian (on whom see Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. ii. 384); and
Nausiphanes, the teacher of Epicurus. The last assertion is only
tenable on the supposition that Nausiphanes appeared as a teacher only
a few years after Pyrrho, for Pyrrho cannot have returned to Elis
before 322 B.C., and Epicurus must have left the School of Nausiphanes
before 310 B.C. See p. 406, 3. According to Diog. 64, Epicurus must
have become acquainted with Pyrrho whilst a pupil of Nausiphanes.
Nausiphanes is said not to have agreed with Pyrrho, but only to have
admired his character (Diog. l.c.), so that he cannot properly be
called his pupil. The mention of Numenius, by Diog. 102 (conf. 68),
among Pyrrho’s συνήθεις, is suspicious, because Ænesidemus is named at
the same time. It may be questioned whether he as well as Ænesidemus
does not belong to a later period of Scepticism.
[1395] According to Diog. 115, Menodotus (a Sceptic belonging to the
latter half of the second century after Christ) asserted that Timon
left no successor, and that the School was in abeyance from Timon to
Ptolemæus, i.e. until the second half of the first century B.C. Sotion
and Hippobotus, however, asserted that his pupils were Dioscurides,
Nicolochus, Euphranor, and Praÿlus. His son, too, the physician
Xanthus, followed the father. (Diog. 109.) That Timon was himself a
physician, as Wachsmuth, p. 5, supposes, cannot be concluded with
certainty from the words ἰατρικὸν ἐδίδαξε, since these words only imply
that he had received instruction in medicine. On the other hand,
according to Suid. Πύῤῥων, the second Pyrrho, called Timon’s pupil, was
a changeling. If Aratus of Soli was a pupil (Suid. Ἄρατος; conf. Diog.
ix. 113), he was certainly not a follower of his views. See p. 43, 2.
[1396] In Diog. 116, Eubulus is called a pupil of Euphranor, also on
the authority of Sotion and Hippobotus. If Ptolemæus was the next one
who is said to have come after him, no philosopher of Pyrrho’s ἀγωγὴ
can have been known for 150 years.
[1397] Diog. 114.
[1398] Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 2: ὁ δέ γε μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ
Τίμων φησὶ δεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαιμονήσειν εἰς τρία ταῦτα βλέπειν·
πρῶτον μὲν ὁποῖα πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα· δεύτερον δὲ, τίνα χρὴ τρόπον ἡμᾶς
πρὸς αὐτὰ διακεῖσθαι· τελευταῖον δὲ τί περιέσται τοῖς οὕτως ἔχουσιν.
[1399] Aristocl. l.c.: τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματά φησιν αὐτὸν (Pyrrho)
ἀποφαίνειν ἐπίσης ἀδιάφορα καὶ ἀστάθμητα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτα, διὰ τοῦτο [τὸ]
μήτε τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡμῶν μήτε τὰς δόξας ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι. Diog. ix.
61: οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε εἶναι ἕκαστον. Gell. xi. 5, 4: Pyrrho is
said to have stated οὐ μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει τόδε ἢ ἐκείνως ἢ οὐθετέρως.
[1400] See the above-quoted passage of Aristocles and Diog. ix. 114.
[1401] Timon, in Diog. ix. 105: τὸ μέλι ὅτι ἐστὶ γλυκὺ οὐ τίθημι· τὸ δ’
ὅτι φαίνεται ὁμολογῶ.
[1402] Diog. ix. 61: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔφασκεν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε αἰσχρὸν οὔτε
δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων, μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ,
νόμῳ δὲ καὶ ἔθει πάντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράττειν, οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ
τόδε εἶναι ἕκαστον. Sext. Math. xi. 140: οὔτε ἀγαθόν τί ἐστι φύσει οὔτε
κακὸν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα νόῳ κέκριται κατὰ τὸν Τίμωνα.
[1403] In this sense the words of Ænesidemus, in Diog. ix. 106, must be
understood: οὐδέν φησιν ὁρίζειν τὸν Πύῤῥωνα δογματικῶς διὰ τὴν
ἀντιλογίαν. See note 1.
[1404] Diog. ix. 114, on Timon: συνεχές τε ἐπιλέγειν εἰώθει πρὸς τοὺς
τὰς αἰσθήσεις μετ’ ἐπιμαρτυροῦντος τοῦ νοῦ ἐγκρίνοντας· συνῆλθεν
Ἀτταγᾶς τε καὶ Νουμήνιος. The meaning of this proverb has been already
explained.
[1405] Diog. ix. 79 refers these τρόποι to Pyrrho, but inasmuch as he
was there describing Sceptic views, the author of which to his mind was
Pyrrho, nothing follows from his statement. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 36
generally attributes them to the ancient Sceptics, by whom, according
to Math. vii. 345, he understood Ænesidemus and his followers.
Aristocles, l.c. 18, 11, refers them to Ænesidemus, and they may easily
have been referred to Pyrrho by mistake, since Ænesidemus himself
(Diog. ix. 106) and subsequent writers (Favorin. in Gell. xi. 5, 5;
Philostr. Vit. Soph. i. 491) call every kind of sceptical statement
λόγοι or τρόποι Πυῤῥώνειοι. That they cannot belong to Pyrrho in the
form in which they are presented by Sextus and Diogenes is clear, since
they obviously refer to later views.
[1406] Sext. Math. vi. 66; x. 197 quotes an argument of Timon against
the reality of time, and further states (Math. iv. 2) that Timon, in
his conflict with the philosophers of nature, maintained that no
assertion should be made without proof: in other words, he denied
dogmatism; for every proof supposes something established, i.e. another
proof, and so on for ever.
[1407] Aristocl. l.c. 18, 3: διὰ τοῦτο οὖν μηδὲ πιστεύειν αὐτοῖς δεῖν,
ἀλλ’ ἀδοξάστους καὶ ἀκλινεῖς καὶ ἀκραδάντους εἶναι περὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου
λέγοντας ὅτι οὐ μᾶλλον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ καὶ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ
οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτ’ οὐκ ἔστιν. Diog. ix. 61. Ibid. 76: οὐ μᾶλλον means,
according to Timon, τὸ μηδὲν ὁρίζειν ἀλλὰ ἀπροσθετεῖν.
[1408] Ænesidem. in Diog. ix. 106: οὐδὲν ὁρίζειν τὸν Πύῤῥωνα δογματικῶς
διὰ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν, τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν. Timon. Ibid. 105.
See p. 522, 3.
[1409] Diog. ix. 103: περὶ μὲν ὧν ὡς ἄνθρωποι πάσχομεν ὁμολογοῦμεν ...
περὶ δὲ ὧν οἱ δογματικοὶ διαβεβαιοῦνται τῷ λόγῳ φάμενοι κατειλῆφθαι
ἐπέχομεν περὶ τούτων ὡς ἀδήλων· μόνα δὲ τὰ πάθη γινώσκομεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
ὅτι ὁρῶμεν ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ τὸ ὅτι τόδε νοοῖμεν γινώσκομεν, πῶς δ’
ὁρῶμεν ἢ πῶς νοοῦμεν ἀγνοοῦμεν· καὶ ὅτι τόδε λευκὸν φαίνεται
διηγηματικῶς λέγομεν οὐ διαβεβαιούμενοι εἰ καὶ ὄντως ἐστί ... καὶ γὰρ
τὸ φαινόμενον τιθέμεθα οὐχ ὡς καὶ τοιοῦτον ὄν· καὶ ὅτι πῦρ καίει
αἰσθανόμεθα· εἰ δὲ φύσιν ἔχει καυστικήν, ἐπέχομεν.
[1410] Diog. l.c.: περὶ δὲ τῆς Οὐδὲν ὁρίζω φωνῆς καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων
λέγομεν ὡς οὐ δογμάτων· οὐ γάρ εἰσιν ὅμοια τῷ λέγειν ὅτι σφαιροειδής
ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἄδηλον, αἱ δὲ ἐξομολογήσεις εἰσίν. ἐν ᾧ
οὖν λέγομεν μηδὲν ὁρίζειν οὐδ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁριζόμεθα. Diog. gives this
view in its later form, probably following Sext. Pyrrh. i. 197, but
agreeing in substance with the quotations from Timon and Pyrrho.
[1411] Diog. ix. 61 and 107; Aristocl. l.c. The expressions ἀφασία,
ἀκαταληψία, ἐποχὴ, invariably mean the same thing. Later writers use
instead of them, ἀῤῥεψία, ἀγνωσία τῆς ἀληθείας κ.τ.λ. If, according to
Aristocles and Diog. 107, Timon first mentioned ἀφασία in dealing with
the third of his questions, this statement is obviously inaccurate.
[1412] Πυῤῥώνειοι, σκεπτικοὶ, ἀπορητικοὶ, ἐφεκτικοὶ, ζητητικοί. Conf.
Diog. 69.
[1413] Aristocl. l.c. 2: τοῖς μέντοι διακειμένοις οὕτω περιέσεσθαι
Τίμων φησὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀφασίαν ἔπειτα δ’ ἀταραξίαν. Diog. 107: τέλος δὲ
οἱ σκεπτικοί φασι τὴν ἐποχὴν, ᾗ σκιᾶς τρόπον ἐπακολουθεῖ ἡ ἀταραξία, ὥς
φασιν οἵ τε περὶ τὸν Τίμωνα καὶ Αἰνεσίδημον. Apathy is substituted for
ataraxy in Diog. 108; Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 130.
[1414] Timon, in Aristocl. l.c. 18, 14, speaking of Pyrrho:—
ἀλλ’ οἷον τὸν ἄτυφον ἐγὼ ἴδον ἠδ’ ἀδάμαστον
πᾶσιν, ὅσοις δάμνανται ὁμῶς ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε
(conf. Wachsmuth, p. 62)
λαῶν ἔθνεα κοῦφα, βαρυνόμεν’ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα
ἐκ παθέων δόξης τε καὶ εἰκαίης νομοθήκης.
Id. in Sext. Math. xi. 1: The Sceptic lives—
ῥῇστα μεθ’ ἡσυχίης
αἰεὶ ἀφροντίστως καὶ ἀκινήτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ
μὴ προσέχων δειλοῖς ἡδυλόγου σοφίης.
Id. in Diog. 65.
[1415] Cic. Fin. ii. 13, 43: Quæ (externals) quod Aristoni et Pyrrhoni
omnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime
ægrotare nihil prorsus dicerent interesse. iii. 3, 11: Cum Pyrrhone et
Aristone qui omnia exæquent. Acad. ii. 42, 130: Pyrrho autem ea ne
sentire quidem sapientem, quæ ἀπάθεια nominatur. Epictet. Fragm. 93 (in
Stob. Serm. 121, 28): Πύῤῥων ἔλεγεν μηδὲν διαφέρειν ζῇν ἢ τεθνάναι.
[1416] Cic. Fin. iv. 16, 43: Pyrrho ... qui virtute constituta nihil
omnino quod appetendum sit relinquat. The same Ibid. ii. 13, 43; iii.
4, 12.
[1417] See p. 521, 3; 525, 3.
[1418] Diog. 105: ὁ Τίμων ἐν τῷ Πύθωνί φησι μὴ ἐκβεβηκέναι [τὸν
Πύῤῥωνα] τὴν συνήθειαν. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἰνδαλμοῖς οὕτω λέγει· ἀλλὰ τὸ
φαινόμενον παντὶ σθένει οὗπερ ἂν ἔλθῃ. (Conf. Sext. Math. vii. 30.)
Ibid. 106, of Pyrrho: τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν. See p. 519, 4.
[1419] See p. 524, 1, 2.
[1420] Sext. Math. xi. 20: κατὰ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον τούτων ἕκαστον ἔχομεν
ἔθος ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀδιάφορον προσαγορεύειν καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐν
τοῖς ἰνδαλμοῖς ἔοικε δηλοῦν ὅταν φῇ
ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω ὥς μοι καταφαίνεται εἶναι
μῦθον ἀληθείης ὀρθὸν ἔχων κανόνα·
ὡς ἡ τοῦ θείου τε φύσις καὶ τἀγαθοῦ αἰεὶ,
ἐξ ὧν ἰσότατος γίγνεται ἀνδρὶ βίος.
[1421] According to an anecdote preserved by Antigonus of Carystus
(Aristocl. l.c. 18, 19; Diog. ix. 66), Pyrrho apologised for being
agitated by saving: It is difficult to lay aside humanity altogether.
This language only proves what his aim was, and that he had found no
mediating principle between the apathy required by his system and
practical needs. Neither do the remarks of Ritter, iii. 451, prove that
the doctrine of moderation belongs to Pyrrho and his school.
[1422] Conf. Diog. ix. 114. Tennemann’s view (Gesch. d. Phil. iv. 190),
that Arcesilaus arrived at his conclusions independently of Pyrrho,
does not appear to be tenable.
[1423] Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 10; 6, 5, says that Zeno and
Arcesilaus were fellow-pupils under Polemo, and that their rivalry
whilst at school was the origin of the later quarrels between the Stoa
and the Academy. The same may have been stated by Antiochus, since Cic.
Acad. i. 9, 35, ii. 24, 76, appeals to him to prove that they were
together at school. Still the assertion is valueless. There can be no
doubt that both Zeno and Arcesilaus were pupils of Polemo, but it is
hardly possible that they can have been under him at the same time; nor
if they were, could the intellectual differences of the two schools be
referred simply to their personal relation.
[1424] Cic. De Orat. ii. 18, 68; Diog. iv. 28; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16;
Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220. Clemens, Strom. i. 301, C, calls Arcesilaus the
founder of the New (second or middle) Academy.
[1425] Arcesilaus (see Geffers, De Arcesila, Gött. 1842, Gymn. Progr.)
was born at Pitane, in Æolia (Strabo, xiii. 1, 67, p. 614; Diog. iv.
28). His birth-year is not stated; but as Lacydes (Diog. iv. 61) was
his successor in 240 B.C., and he was then 75 years of age (Diog. 44),
it must have been about 315 B.C. Having enjoyed the instruction of the
mathematician Autolycus in his native town, he repaired to Athens,
where he was first a pupil of Theophrastus, but was won for the Academy
by Crantor (Diog. 29; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 2). With Crantor he lived
on the most intimate terms; but as Polemo was the president of the
Academy, he is usually called a pupil of Polemo (Cic. De Orat. iii. 18,
67; Fin. v. 31, 94; Strabo). On the death of Polemo, he was probably a
pupil of Crates; but it is not stated by Diog. 33, or Numen. in Eus.
l.c. xiv. 5, 10, that he was a pupil of either Pyrrho, Menedemus, or
Diodorus. If Eusebius seems to imply it, he may have misunderstood the
statement that he made use of their teaching. Fortified with
extraordinary acuteness, penetrating wit, and ready speech (Diog. 30;
34; 37; Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 18; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 2; Plut. De Sanit.
7, p. 126; Qu. Conv. vii. 5, 3, 7; ii. 1, 10, 4; Stob. Floril. ed.
Mein. iv. 193, 28), learned, especially in mathematics (Diog. 32), and
well acquainted with native poets (Diog. 30, who mentions his own
attempts at poetry, quoting some of his epigrams), he appears to have
early distinguished himself. From Plut. Adv. Col. 26, p. 1121, it
appears that in Epicurus’ lifetime, consequently before 270 B.C., he
had propounded his sceptical views with great success. Apollodorus,
however, appears to have placed his career too early (Diog. 45), in
making his ἀκμὴ between 300 and 296 B.C. On the death of Crates, the
conduct of the School devolved upon Arcesilaus (Diog. 32), through whom
it attained no small note (Strabo, i. 2, 2, p. 15; Diog. 37; Numen. in
Eus. xiv. 6, 14). From public matters he held aloof, and lived in
retirement (Diog. 39), esteemed even by opponents for his pure, gentle,
and genial character (Diog. 37; quoting many individual traits, 44;
vii. 171; ix. 115; Cic. Fin. v. 31, 94; Plut. De Adulat. 22, p. 63;
Coh. Ira, 13, p. 461. Ælian, V. H. xiv. 96). On his relations to
Cleanthes, conf. Diog. vii. 171; Plut. De Adulat. 11, p. 55. He left no
writings (Diog. 32; Plut. Alex. Virt. 4, p. 328).
[1426] Cic. De Orat. iii. 18, 67: Arcesilas primum ... ex variis
Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil
esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit: quem ferunt ...
aspernatum esse omne animi sensusque judicium, primumque instituisse
... non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id, quod quisque se
sentire dixisset, disputare. This is, in fact, the calumniandi licentia
with which Augustin, herein doubtless following Cicero, c. Acad. iii.
17, 39, charges him, contra omnia velle dicere quasi ostentationis
causa.
[1427] Conf. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv, 6, 12, and above, p. 86, 4.
[1428] Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 2; Cic. Acad. i. 12, 44. Ritter’s view of
the latter passage, that Arcesilaus quoted the diversities of
philosophic teaching by way of refuting it (iii. 478), appears to be
entirely without foundation. He rather quoted its uniform resemblance
by way of overcoming doubt.
[1429] Cic. De Orat. iii. 18. See p. 530, 1.
[1430] Sext. Pyrrh. i. 234; Diocles of Cnidus, in Numen. in Eus. Pr.
Ev. xiv. 6, 5; Augustin, c. Acad. iii. 17, 38. Geffers regards
Arcesilaus as a true follower of the older Academy.
[1431] Sext. Math. vii. 153.
[1432] Sext. Math. l.c. 154.
[1433] Cic. Acad. ii. 24, 27. Zeno asserted: An irresistible or
conceptional perception is such an impression of a real object as
cannot possibly come from an unreal one. Arcesilaus endeavoured to
prove nullum tale visum esse a vero, ut non ejusdem modi etiam a falso
posset esse. The same view in Sext. l.c. To these may be added
discussions on deceptions of the senses and contradictions in the
statements of the senses in Sext. vii. 408, and others attributed to
the Academicians. Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 25, 70: Urgebat Arcesilas
Zenonem, cum ipse falsa omnia diceret, quæ sensibus viderentur, Zenon
autem nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia. To these attacks on Zeno
Plut. De An. (Fr. vii.) 1, probably refers: ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν αἴτιον
τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὡς Ἀρκεσίλαος. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη τῆς ἐπιστήμης
αἴτια φανεῖται. All that is here attributed to Arcesilaus is the
assertion that ἐπιστητόν is the cause of ἐπιστήμη, and that it is so
when it produces a φαντασία καταληπτική. The connection in which these
statements were made by Arcesilaus was probably this: If there is such
a thing as knowledge, there must be objects which produce it. These
objects, however, do not exist, there being no object which does not
admit a false opinion equally well with a true one.
[1434] Sext. 155: μὴ οὔσης δὲ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὐδὲ κατάληψις
γενήσεται· ἦν γὰρ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσις· μὴ οὔσης δὲ
καταλήψεως πάντα ἔσται ἀκατάληπτα.
[1435] Sext. l.c.; Cic. Acad. i. 12, 45; ii. 20, 66; Plut. Adv. Col.
24, 2; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16; 6, 4. By Sext. Pyrrh. i. 233, it is
thus expressed: Arcesilaus regards ἐποχὴ as being a good in every case,
συγκατάθεσις as an evil.
[1436] Cic. Acad. i. 12, 45.
[1437] Cic. Fin. ii. 1, 2; v. 4, 11; De Orat. iii. 18, 67; Diog. iv.
28; conf. Plut. C. Not. 37, 7.
[1438] Stob. Floril. 82, 4: Ἀρκεσίλαος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἔφη τοὺς
διαλεκτικοὺς ἐοικέναι τοῖς ψηφοπαίκταις (jugglers), οἵτινες χαριέντως
παραλογίζονται; and, Ibid. 10 (under the heading: Ἀρκεσιλάου ἐκ τῶν
Σερήνου ἀπομνημονευμάτων): διαλεκτικὴν δὲ φεῦγε, συγκυκᾷ τἄνω κάτω.
[1439] The authority is a very uncertain one, particularly as
Arcesilaus left nothing in writing, and the remarks quoted would seem
to be more appropriate to the Chian Aristo (see p. 59) than to
Arcesilaus. Still, if Chrysippus condemned the dialectic of the
Sceptics (according to p. 66, 1), Arcesilaus may very well have
condemned that of the Stoics and Megarians. Does not even Cic. Acad.
ii. 28, 91, probably following Carneades (see p. 541, 4), object to
dialectic, because it furnishes no knowledge?
[1440] This fact is recognised not only by Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv.
6, 4, but by Sext. Pyrrh. i. 232. The difference which the later
Sceptics draw between themselves and the Academicians, viz. that they
assert the principle of doubt tentatively, whereas the Academicians
assert it absolutely, does not apply to Arcesilaus (see p. 533, 1).
Even Sextus says the same, but with some diffidence (πλὴν εἰ μὴ λέγοι
τις ὅτι κ.τ.λ.). On account of this connection with Pyrrho, the Stoic
Aristo called Arcesilaus (following Il. vi. 181): πρόσθε Πλάτων ὄπιθεν
Πύῤῥων, μέσος Διόδωρος. Sext. l.c.; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 11;
Diog. iv. 33.
[1441] It has been already seen that this was the key to the position
which the Stoics and Epicureans took up against the Sceptics.
[1442] Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 3, defending Arcesilaus against the attacks
of Colotes, says: The opponents of Scepticism cannot show that ἐποχὴ
leads to inactivity, for πάντα πειρῶσι καὶ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῖς οὐχ
ὑπήκουσεν ἡ ὁρμὴ γενέσθαι συγκατάθεσις οὐδὲ τῆς ῥοπῆς ἀρχὴν ἐδέξατο τὴν
αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἀγωγὸς ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐφάνη μὴ δεομένη τοῦ
προστίθεσθαι. Perception arises and influences the will without
συγκατάθεσις. Since this statement was controverted by Chrysippus
(Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 12. See above 87, 1), there can be no doubt that
it was propounded by Arcesilaus.
[1443] Sext. Math. vii 158: ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἔδει καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ
Βίου διεξαγωγῆς ζητεῖν ἥ τις οὐ χωρὶς κριτηρίου πέφυκεν ἀποδίδοσθαι,
ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τουτέστι τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος, ἠρτημένην ἔχει τὴν
πίστιν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὅτι ὁ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων κανονιεῖ τᾶς
αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς καὶ κοινῶς τὰς πράξεις τῷ εὐλόγῳ, κατὰ τοῦτό τε
προερχόμενος τὸ κριτήριον κατορθώσει· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν
περιγίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς φρονήσεως, τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν κινεῖσθαι ἐν τοῖς
κατορθώμασι, τὸ δὲ κατόρθωμα εἶναι (according to the Stoic definition)
ὅπερ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογίαν. ὁ προσέχων οὖν τῷ εὐλόγῳ
κατορθώσει καὶ εὐδαιμονήσει. It is a mistake to suppose, with Numen. in
Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, that, Arcesilaus denied probabilities.
[1444] In Plut. Tran. An. 9, sub fin. p. 470, he gives the advice
rather to devote attention to oneself and ones own life than to works
of art and other external things. In Stob. Floril. 95, 17, he says:
Poverty is burdensome, but educates for virtue. Ibid. 43, 91: Where
there are most laws, there are most transgressions of law. Plut. Cons.
ad Apoll. 15, p. 110, has a saying of his as to the folly of the fear
of death. Id. De Sanit. 7, p. 126, Qu. Conv. vii. 5, 3, 7, records a
somewhat severe judgment on adulterers and prodigals. Quite unique is
the statement in Tertull. Ad. Nation. ii. 2: Arcesilaus held that there
were three kinds of Gods (in other words he divided the popular Gods
into three classes): the Olympian, the stars, and the Titans. It
implies that he criticised the belief in the Gods. It also appears by
the language used in Plut. C. Not. 37, 7, respecting the Stoic theory
of a κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλου, that his criticism of dogmatism extended to
natural science.
[1445] Conf. p. 529, 3 sub fin.
[1446] Geffers, De Arcesilæ Successoribus (including Carneades): Gött.
1845. Arcesilaus was succeeded by Lacydes of Cyrene, who died 240 B.C.,
after presiding over the School for 26 years. In his lifetime (probably
shortly before his death) he entrusted it to the care of the Phocæans
Telecles and Euandros (Diog. iv. 59–61). The statements made in Diog.
l.c., Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, Plut. De Adul. 22, p. 63, Ælian,
V. H. ii. 41, Athen. x. 438, a. xiii. 606, C, Plin. H. N. x. 22, 51,
refer to individual peculiarities which he appears to have had. They
must be received with caution, particularly the gossip which Diog. 59
mentions casually and Numenius dwells upon with intolerable garrulity.
Diog. calls him ἀνὴρ σεμνότατος καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγους ἐσχηκὼς ζηλωτάς·
φιλόπονός τε ἐκ νέου καὶ πένης μὲν, εὔχαρις δ’ ἄλλως καὶ εὐόμιλος. To
his admirers belongs Attalus I. of Pergamum. A visit to his court was
however declined in skilful language (Diog. 60, which Geffers, p. 5,
clearly misunderstands). In doctrine, he deviated little from
Arcesilaus, and, having been the first to commit to writing the
teaching of the New Academy (Suid. Λακ.: ἔγραψε φιλόσοφα καὶ περὶ
φύσεως—the latter is somewhat extraordinary for a Sceptic), he was by
some mistake called its founder (Diog. 59). According to Diog. vii.
183, see p. 46, 1, he appears to have taught in the Academy during
Arcesilaus’ lifetime. Panaretus (Athen. xii. 552, d; Æl. V. H. x. 6),
Demophanes, and Ecdemus or Ecdelus (Plutarch. Philopon. 1; Arat. 5, 7)
are also called pupils of Arcesilaus. The most distinguished pupil of
Lacydes, according to Eus. xiv. 7, 12, was Aristippus of Cyrene, also
mentioned by Diog. ii. 83. Another, Paulus, is mentioned by Timotheus,
in Clemens, Strom. 496, D. His successors were Telecles and Euander,
who jointly presided over the School. Euander, however, according to
Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16, Diog. 60, Eus. l.c., survived his colleague, and
was followed by Hegesinus (Diog. 60; Cic. l.c.) or Hegesilaus (as he is
called by Clemens, Strom. p. 301, C). who was the immediate predecessor
of Carneades. Respecting these individuals nothing is known beyond the
names.
[1447] Carneades, the son of Epicomus or Philocomus, was born at Cyrene
(Diog. iv. 62; Strabo, xvii. 3, 22, p. 838; Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 5), and
died, according to Apollodorus (Diog. 65), 129 B.C., in his 85th year.
Lucian, Macrob. 20, assigns to him the same age. With less probability
Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16, Valer. Max. viii. 7, 5, extend his age to 90,
making his birth-year 213 B.C. Later admirers find it remarkable that
his birthday, like Plato’s, occurred on the Carnean festival (Plut. Qu.
Conv. viii. 1, 2, 1). Little is known of his life. He was a disciple
and follower of Hegesinus, but at the same time received instruction in
dialectic (Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 98) from the Stoic Diogenes, and studied
philosophic literature with indefatigable zeal (Diog. 62), more
particularly the writings of Chrysippus (Diog. 62; Plut. Sto. Rep. 10,
44; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 13). In 156 B.C. he took part in the
well-known association of philosophers, and produced the greatest
impression on his Roman hearers by the force of his language and the
boldness with which he attacked the current principles of morals.
Shortly before his death, probably also at an earlier period, he became
blind (Diog. 66). He left no writings, the preservation of his
doctrines being the work of his pupils, in particular of Clitomachus
(Diog. 66, 67; Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 98; 32, 102). Respecting his
character, we may gather from a few expressions that, whilst vigorous
in disputation (Diog. 63; Gell. N. A. vi. 14, 10), he was not wanting
in a repose of mind which was in harmony with his principles (Diog.
66). That he was a just man, notwithstanding his speech against
justice, we can well believe (Quintil. xii. 1, 35).
The quotation in Diog. 64 (ἡ συστήσασα φύσις καὶ διαλύσει) does not
indicate fear of death, but simple resignation to the course of nature.
Still less does his language on Antipater’s suicide, and also what is
quoted in Stob. (Floril. 119, 19) that he made a faint-hearted attempt
to imitate him which he afterwards abandoned. It was only a not very
clever way of ridiculing an action which appeared to Carneades
eminently mad.
[1448] Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12; Lucian, Macrob.
20.
[1449] His School held him in such esteem, that it considered him,
together with Plato, because of his birthday (unless the idea grew out
of his name), to be a special favourite of Apollo. Tradition says that
an eclipse of the moon (Suid. Καρν. adds an eclipse of the sun)
commemorated his death; συμπάθειαν, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, αἰνιττομένου τοῦ
μεθ’ ἥλιον καλλίστου τῶν ἄστρων (Diog. 64). Strabo, xvii. 3, 22, p.
838, says of him: οὗτος δὲ τῶν ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας ἄριστος φιλοσόφων
ὁμολογεῖται. There was only one opinion among the ancients as to the
force of his logic, and the power and attraction of his eloquence.
These gifts were aided by unusually powerful organs (see the anecdotes
in Plut. Garrul. 21, p. 513; Diog. 63). Conf. Diog. 62; Cic. Fin. iii.
12, 41; De Orat. ii. 38, 161; iii. 18, 68; Gell. N. A. vi. 14, 10;
Numen. in Eusebius, Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 2 and 5; Lactant. Inst. v. 14;
Plut. Cato Maj. 22. The latter, speaking of his success at Rome, says:
μάλιστα δ’ ἡ Καρνεάδου χάρις, ἧς δύναμίς τε πλείστη καὶ δόξα τῆς
δυνάμεως οὐκ ἀποδέουσα ... ὡς πνεῦμα τὴν πόλιν ἠχῆς ἐνέπλησε. καὶ λόγος
κατεῖχεν, ὡς ἀνὴρ Ἕλλην εἰς ἔκπληξιν ὑπερφυὴς, πάντα κηλῶν καὶ
χειρούμενος, ἔρωτα δεινὸν ἐμβέβληκε τοῖς νέοις, ὑφ’ οὗ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν
καὶ διατριβῶν ἐκπεσόντες ἐνθουσιῶσι περὶ φιλοσοφίαν.
[1450] Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16.
[1451] See p. 536, note.
[1452] Sext. Math. vii. 159: ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος. ὁ δὲ Καρνεάδης οὐ
μόνον τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀντιδιετάσσετο περὶ
τοῦ κριτηρίου. In Math. ix. 1, Sextus charges the School of Carneades
with unnecessary diffuseness in discussing the fundamental principles
or every system. The Stoics were, however, the chief object of his
attack. Cic. Tusc. v. 29, 82; N. D. ii. 65, 162; Plut. Garrul. 23, p.
514; Augustin. c. Acad. iii. 17, 39.
[1453] Sext. l.c.: καὶ δὴ πρῶτος μὲν αὐτῷ καὶ κοινὸς πρὸς πάντας ἐστὶ
λόγος καθ’ ὃν παρίσταται ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἁπλῶς ἀληθείας κριτήριον, οὐ
λόγος οὐκ αἴσθησις οὐ φαντασία οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα
συλλήβδην διαψεύδεται ἡμᾶς.
[1454] Sext. l.c. 160–163.
[1455] Conf. Sext. vii. 403; Cic. Acad. ii. 15, 47; 28, 89—where
Carneades is undoubtedly meant, although he is not mentioned by name.
For the other sceptical arguments which Cicero mentions tally with
those which Sextus attributes to Carneades, and Cicero makes Antiochus
refute them, who was the immediate adversary of Carneades.
[1456] According to Cic. Acad. ii. 13, 40; 26, 83, the Academic system
of proof rests on the four following propositions: (1) that there are
false notions; (2) that these cannot be known, i.e. be recognised as
true; (3) that of two indistinguishable notions, it is impossible to
know the one and not the other; (4) that there is no true notion by the
side of which a false one cannot be placed indistinguishable from it.
The second and third of these propositions are not denied at all, and
the first is only denied by Epicurus in regard to impressions on the
senses. Hence all importance attaches to the fourth proposition, to
which Sextus, vii. 164 and 402, and Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 4,
look as the most important argument.
[1457] Cic. Acad. ii. 13, 42: Dividunt enim in partes et eas quidem
magnas: primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quæ ducuntur a sensibus et ab
omni consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt (the συνήθεια against which
Chrysippus already directed severe attacks. See p. 46, 2; 91, 2). Tum
perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne ratione quidem et conjectura ulla res
percipi possit. Hæc autem universa etiam concidunt minutius.
[1458] Sext. vii. 409; Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 84; 7, 19; 25, 79; Numen. in
Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 5. Therewith is probably connected the statement
in Galen, De Opt. Doct. c. 2, vol. i. 45, K, that Carneades
persistently denied the axiom that two things that are equal to a third
are equal to one another. His assertion probably comes to this, that it
may be possible to distinguish two things as unequal, which cannot be
distinguished from a third, that therefore two things may appear equal
to a third without being or appearing equal to one another.
[1459] Sext. 402 and 408.
[1460] The fallacy called ψευδόμενος is carefully investigated in Cic.
Acad. ii. 30, 95 (by Carneades as he says, 98), as an instance in
point.
[1461] Sext. 416; Cic. l.c. 29, 92. Since Chrysippus tried to meet the
chain-argument, it may be supposed that this fallacy had been used by
Arcesilaus against the Stoics.
[1462] Sext. vii. 164; Augustin. c. Acad. ii. 5, 11.
[1463] Sext. 165.
[1464] Cic. Acad. ii. 28, 91, who here appears to be following Philo,
and, subsequently, Carneades as well. Carneades also gives utterance to
a similar view of dialectic in Stob. Floril. 93, 13 (conf. Plut. C.
Not. 2, 4), comparing it to a polypus consuming its own tentacles. It
is able, he conceives, to expose fallacies, but not to discover truth.
[1465] Cic. Acad. ii. 36, 117. Carneades is not mentioned by name, but
there can be no doubt that the reference is to some Academician, and it
is probable that it was the work of Carneades.
[1466] Diog. iv. 62.
[1467] Cic. N. D. i. 2, 5, after a brief description of the Stoical
views of Gods: Contra quos Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret
homines non socordes ad veri investigandi cupiditatem.
[1468] Cic. N. D. i. 23, 62; iii. 4, 11. Here, too, Carneades is not
mentioned by name, but the reference to him is made clear by Cicero’s
remark that he is quoting the Academic view.
[1469] Conf. Cic. N. D. iii. 5, 11.
[1470] The Academician in Cic. Acad. ii. 38, 120. That these arguments
were used by Carneades is clear from Plut. in Porphyr. De Abst. iii.
20, where, traversing the arguments of the Stoics, he justifies the
existence of vermin, poisonous plants, and beasts of prey. In answer to
Chrysippus’ assertion, that the final cause of a pig is to be killed,
Carneades argues: A pig, therefore, by being killed, must attain the
object for which it was destined; it is always beneficial for a thing
to attain its object—therefore it must be beneficial to a pig to be
killed and eaten.
[1471] Cic. N. D. iii. 25, 65–70. It is here presumed that the leading
thoughts in Cicero’s description belong to the School of Carneades.
[1472] Ibid. 31, 76.
[1473] Ibid. 32, 79.
[1474] Cic. N. D. iii. 32, 80.
[1475] Cic. Acad. ii. 38, 120; N. D. iii. 11, 28.
[1476] Cic. N. D. iii. 8, 21; 10, 26; 11, 27.
[1477] Ibid. 10, 25.
[1478] L.c.
[1479] Cic. N. D. iii. 12, 29; 14, 34.
[1480] Cic. N. D. iii. 13, 32. More fully Sext. Math. ix. 139–147. Here
too Carneades is expressly mentioned. But were he not mentioned the
agreement of the argument with that given by Cicero would show that the
same person was being referred to.
[1481] Cic.; Ibid. Further proofs of the transient nature of all
earthly beings are there given.
[1482] Sext. Math. ix. 152–175, quotes the same argument for σωφροσύνη,
and so does Cic. N. D. iii. 15, 38. Neither mentions Carneades by name,
but since both writers introduce these proofs in the same position in a
longer argument, in which Carneades is expressly mentioned both before
and after, there can be no doubt that to him they refer.
[1483] Sext. ix. 176. The argument has a look of sophistry about it. It
alludes to the important question which engaged so much attention in
the middle ages, viz. How is the universal related in Deity to the
individual? Are goodness and reason a law for God independent of His
will or not?
[1484] As Epicurus did. See p. 468, 3.
[1485] Sext. 178.
[1486] Sext. l.c. 148–151; 180. That Sextus here refers to Carneades is
clear from his agreement with Cic. N. D. 12, 29–31; 14, 34. Cicero
introduces his remarks with the words: Illa autem, quæ Carneades
afferebat, quemadmodum dissolvitis? Sextus himself seems to refer not
only individual arguments, but the whole series of them, to Carneades,
when he continues, 182: ἠρώτηνται δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Καρνεάδου καὶ
σωριτικῶς τινες κ.τ.λ.
[1487] Sext. 182–190. More fully in Cic. N. D. iii. 17, 43. Sextus also
observes, 190: καὶ ἄλλους δὴ τοιούτους σωρείτας ἐρωτῶσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν
Καρνεάδην εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι θεούς.
[1488] To him, or probably to his School, belongs the learned argument
given by Cic. N. D. iii. 21, 53, to 23, 60, in which he proves the want
of unity in traditional myths by the multiplicity of Gods of the same
name. The whole drift of this argument shows that it was borrowed from
some Greek treatise.
[1489] See Cic. Divin. i. 4, 7; 7, 12.
[1490] Ibid. ii. 3, 9.
[1491] Ibid. v. 13; but Carneades is not here mentioned by name.
[1492] Ibid. i. 13, 23; 49, 109.
[1493] Cic. l.c. and Divin. ii. 21, 48.
[1494] Cic. l.c. ii. 11, 27.
[1495] Cic. De Fato, 11, 23; 14, 31. The freedom of the will, he there
says, may be asserted even granting that every motion is referred to a
cause, for it is not necessary that this law should hold good of the
will. He will therefore confine it to bodily motion, and not allow to
it unconditional validity.
[1496] Lact. Instit. v. 14, following Cic. De Rep. iii. 4; Plut. Cato
Maj. c. 22; Quintil. Instit. xii. 1, 35.
[1497] Lactant. l.c. 16; Cic. De Rep. iii. 8–12; 14; 17; Fin. ii. 18,
59. On the above casuistical cases see De Off. iii. 13; 23, 89, and
above, p. 299, 2. Probably Carneades was the cause of the study of
casuistry among the later Stoics.
[1498] Cic. Acad. ii. 34, 108; conf. 31, 98. In Id. Att. xiii. 21, he
compares this ἐποχὴ to the drawing up of a charioteer, or to the guard
of a pugilist. No doubt it is with reference to ἐποχὴ that Alex. Aphr.
De An. 154 a, says: The Academicians consider ἀπτωσία the πρῶτον
οἰκεῖον, πρὸς ταύτην γάρ φασιν ἡμᾶς οἰκείως ἔχειν πρώτην, ὥστε μηδὲν
προσπταίειν. ἀπροσπτωσία or ἀπροπτωσία is, according to the Stoic
definition (Diog. vii. 46) = ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πότε δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ
μή. It consists, therefore, in not giving a hasty assent to any
proposition. According to the Sceptics, this is only possible, and you
are only then safe from error, when you give assent to none whatever.
ἀπροσπτωσία becomes then identical with ἐποχὴ or ἄγνοια, which Max.
Tyr. Diss. 35, 7, speaks of as the ultimate end of Carneades. Hence
Carneades, as Arcesilaus had done before him, spoke for and against
every subject without expressing a decided opinion. Cic. N. D. i. 5,
11; Acad. ii. 18, 60; Divin. ii. 72, 150; Rep. iii. 5, 8; Tusc. v. 4,
11; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12.
[1499] Cic. Acad. ii. 9, 28.
[1500] Sext. Math. vii. 166: ἀπατούμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτός [ὁ Καρνεάδης] τι
κριτήριον πρός τε τὴν τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγὴν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τὴς εὐδαιμονίας
περίκτησιν δυνάμιν ἀπαναγκάζεται καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸν περὶ τούτου
διατάττεσθαι, κ.τ.λ. Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 99 (of Clitomachus): Etenim
contra naturam esset, si probabile nihil esset, et sequitur omnis vitæ
... eversio. Ibid. 101; 32, 104: Nam cum placeat, eum qui de omnibus
rebus contineat se de assentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid,
reliquit ejusmodi visa, quibus ad actionem excitemur, etc. Hence the
assurance (Ibid. 103; Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 234) that the
Academicians do not wish to go into the question of perception. They
accept it as a phenomenon of consciousness and a basis of action, but
they deny that it strictly furnishes knowledge. The senses are ὑγιεῖς,
but not ἀκριβεῖς.
[1501] Sext. and Cic. l.c.
[1502] Sext. l.c. 167–170.
[1503] Ibid. 171–173; or, as it is expressed by Cicero, Acad. ii. 24,
78: It is possible nihil percipere et tamen opinari. It is of no
importance that Philo and Metrodorus said Carneades had proved this
statement, whereas Clitomachus had stated, hoc magis ab eo disputatum
quam probatum. Acad. ii. 48, 148; 21, 67, attributes the statement to
Carneades, without any qualification, adding only: Adsensurum
(aliquando, as the latter passage adds) non percepto, i.e. opinaturum
sapientem.
[1504] Conf. Augustin. c. Acad. ii. 11, 26 (undoubtedly in point of
matter and probably in terms following Cicero): Id probabile vel
verisimile Academici vocant, quod nos ad addendum sine adsensione
potest invitare. Sine adsensione autem dico, ut id quod agimus non
opinemur verum esse aut non id scire arbitremur, agamus tamen. To the
same effect, Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12: Carneades declared it
impossible to withhold judgment on all points, and asserted πάντα μὲν
εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα, οὐ πάντα δὲ ἄδηλα. Conf. Cic. Acad. ii. 17, 54, where
the objection is raised to the new Academicians: Ne hoc quidem cernunt,
omnia se reddere incerta, quod nolunt; ea dico incerta, quæ ἄδηλα
Græci.
[1505] Sext. l.c. 173; 175–182; Pyrrh. i. 227; conf. Cic. Acad. ii. 11,
33; 31, 99; 32, 104.
[1506] Sext. l.c. 173; 181.
[1507] Ibid. 176; 183.
[1508] Ibid. 184.
[1509] Sext. l.c. 174; Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 99.
[1510] Cic. l.c. 32, 103; 48, 148. This explanation does away with the
charge of inconsistency which is brought against Carneades in Cic.
Acad. ii. 18, 59; 21, 67; 24, 78 (see p. 554, 3), on the ground that he
allowed, in contradistinction to Arcesilaus, that the wise man will
sometimes follow opinion, and will give his assent to certain
statements. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 7, even asserts that he
expressed his own convictions to his friends in private; but this
assertion is no more true of him than of Arcesilaus (see p. 531, 3), as
may be seen from the passage on p. 557, 2.
[1511] Sext. Pyrrh. i. 226: ἀγαθὸν γάρ τί φασιν εἶναι οἱ Ἀκαδημαϊκοὶ
καὶ κακὸν, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ πεπεῖσθαι ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστι
μᾶλλον ὃ λέγουσιν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον; καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
κακοῦ ὁμοίως.
[1512] See p. 553, 2; 554, 4.
[1513] Here the question arises, Whence does the Sceptic derive his
conviction as to probabilities in morals? and as perception is not
available for the purpose, Geffers concludes (De Arc. Successor. 20)
that Carneades assumed a peculiar source of conviction in the mind. For
such an assumption, however, our authorities give no proof. It cannot
be gathered from the hypothetical language respecting the freedom of
the will in Cic. De Fato, ii. 23. See p. 551, 2. Nor is it, indeed,
necessary that Carneades, who never pretended to hold any psychological
theory, should have had any opinion on the subject. Supposing he did
have it, he might have appealed to experience quite as readily or more
so than the Stoics, and have been content with the fact that certain
things are far more agreeable or disagreeable, and either promote or
disturb happiness.
[1514] Cic. Fin. v. 6, 16, to 8, 23; conf. Tusc. v. 29, 84; Ritter,
iii. 686, has hardly expressed with accuracy Carneades’ division, or he
would not have accused it of being inaccurate and superficial.
[1515] Cic. Acad. ii. 45, 139.
[1516] Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 131: Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo
probaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui iis rebus,
quas primas natura conciliavisset (οἰκειοῦν). Similarly Fin. v. 7, 20;
Tusc. v. 30, 84. This view differs from that of the Stoics, because it
makes the highest Good consist not in natural activity as such, but in
the enjoyment of natural goods.
[1517] Cic. Fin. ii. 11, 35: Ita tres sunt fines expertes honestatis,
unus Aristippi vel Epicuri (pleasure), alter Hieronymi (freedom from
pain), Carneadis tertius (the satisfaction of natural instincts). Conf.
Ibid. v. 7, 20; 8, 22.
[1518] Cic. Acad. ii. 45, 139: Ut Calliphontem sequar, cujus quidem
sententiam Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut eam probare etiam
videretur. Callipho is reckoned among those who consider honestas cum
aliqua accessione—or, as it is said, Fin. v. 8, 21; 25, 73; Tusc. v.
30, 85, voluptas cum honestate—the highest Good.
[1519] Plut. Tranq. An. 16, p. 475.
[1520] Cic. Tusc. iii. 22, 54. Let it be observed that this view of
Carneades is specially placed under the head of conviction on
probabilities. It is said, he attacked the proposition, videri fore in
ægritudine sapientem patria capta. The other statements of Carneades on
ethics, such as that in Plut. De Adulat. 16, p. 51, have nothing
characteristic about them.
[1521] See p. 279.
[1522] Plut. C. Not. 27, 14; Stob. Ecl. ii. 134. Plutarch, however,
only quotes it as the opinion of individuals. It appears more probable
that it was an opinion of Chrysippus which Antipater defended against
Carneades. Carneades even practically attributes it to the Stoics.
[1523] Cic. Fin. iii. 12, 41: Carneades tuus ... rem in summum
discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit, in omni hac
quæstione, quæ de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum
Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum.
[1524] Fin. iii. 17, 57.
[1525] Cic. Tusc. iii. 25, 59.
[1526] Ibid. v. 29, 83: Et quoniam videris hoc velle, ut, quæcumque
dissentientium philosophorum sententia sit de finibus, tamen virtus
satis habeat ad vitam beatam præsidii, quod quidem Carneadem disputare
solitum accepimus, etc.
[1527] He explicitly says, Fin. v. 7, 18, that as each one defines the
highest good, so he determines the honestum (the καλὸν, virtue). The
view of the Stoics, he says, places the honestum and bonum in activity
aiming at what is according to nature; adding that, according to the
view which places it in the possession of what is according to nature,
the prima secundum naturam are also prima in animis quasi virtutum
igniculi et semina.
[1528] See p. 560, 3, and Plut. Tranq. An. 19, p. 477, where, however,
the greater part seems to belong to Plutarch.
[1529] Quintil. Instit. xii. 1, 35. See above 536, 1, end.
[1530] Cic. N. D. iii. 17, 44: Hæc Carneades aiebat, non ut Deos
tolleret—quid enim philosopho minus conveniens?—sed ut Stoicos nihil de
Diis explicare convinceret. In this sense the Academician in Cicero (i.
22, 62) frequently asserts, that he would not destroy belief in God,
but that he finds the arguments unsatisfactory. Likewise Sextus, Pyrrh.
iii. 2: τῷ μὲν βίῳ κατακολουθοῦντες ἀδοξάστως φαμὲν εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ
σέβομεν θεοὺς καὶ προνοεῖν αὐτοὺς φαμέν.
[1531] Ritter, iii. 730, 694.
[1532] Clitomachus was a native of Carthage. Hence he is called by Max
Tyr. Diss. 10, 3, ὁ Λίβυς. He originally bore the name of Hasdrubal. At
home he devoted himself to study, and wrote several treatises in his
mother tongue (τῇ ἰδίᾳ φωνῇ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι ἐφιλοσόφει). When 40 years of
age (according to Steph. Byz. De urbe Καρχηδὼν; 28), he came to Athens,
was initiated by Carneades into Greek philosophy, and devoted himself
to it with such zeal and success (Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 17; 31, 98; Athen.
ix. 402, c) that he became esteemed as a philosopher and voluminous
writer (Diog. iv. 67). Treatises of his are mentioned by Cic. Acad. ii.
31, 98; 32, 102; Diog. ii. 92. He died (according to Stob. Floril. vii.
55) by suicide, not before 110 B.C. (as Zumpt remarks, Ueber d.
philosoph. Schulen in Ath., Abh. d. Berl. Akad., Jahrg. 1842. Hist.
Philol. Kl. p. 67), since, according to Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 45, L.
Crassus, during his quæstorship, which falls at the earliest in this
year, met him at Athens. He must then have been very old.
[1533] Diog. iv. 67; Cic. Acad. ii. 32, 102.
[1534] As the peculiar observation in Diog. iv. proves: (ἀνὴρ ἐν ταῖς
τρισὶν αἱρέσεσι διαπρέψας, ἔν τε τῇ Ἀκαδημαϊκῇ Περιπατητικῇ καὶ
Στωϊκῇ).
[1535] According to Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 17; De Orat. i. 11. 45; Orator,
16, 51, Charmadas was a pupil of Carneades, whom he followed not only
in teaching but also in method. He must have survived Clitomachus,
since he taught at the same time with Philo. See p. 566, 1. Philo,
however, according to Clitomachus, undertook the presidency of the
School (Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 9). According to Cic. De Orat. ii. 88,
360. Tusc. i. 24, 59, he was remarkable for a good memory.
[1536] Cic. De Orat. i. 18, 84: Charmadas asserted, eos qui rhetores
nominabantur et qui dicendi præcepta traderent nihil plane tenere,
neque posse quenquam facultatem assequi dicendi, nisi qui philosophorum
inventa didicissent. Sext. Math. ii. 20, also mentions the hostile
attitude of Clitomachus and Charmadas towards rhetoricians, and says
that both he and the School to which he belonged were engaged in
disputes with them. His fellow-disciple Agnon drew up a treatise,
according to Quintil. ii. 17, 15, entitled ‘Charges against the
rhetoricians.’ Ritter’s inferences, that Charmadas recommended
philosophy as the only way to eloquence, and thus betrayed the object
of the philosophical doctrine of probability, iii. 695, make far too
much of a casual expression which means no more than what the Stoics,
and before them Plato, had said.
[1537] In addition to Clitomachus and Charmadas, Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16,
mentions Agnon and Melanthius of Rhodes, the former of whom is also
referred to by Quintilian. (See Athen. xiii. 602, d.) Cicero adds that
Metrodorus of Stratonice passed for a friend of Carneades; he had come
over from among the Epicureans (Diog. x. 9) to join him. This
Metrodorus must neither be confounded with Metrodorus of Skepsis, the
pupil of Charmadas (see p. 566, 1), nor with the Metrodorus
distinguished as a painter, 168 B.C., whom Æmilius Paulus brought to
Rome (Plin. H. N. xxxv. 11, 135). The former must have been younger,
the latter older, than Metrodorus of Stratonice. A pupil of Melanthius
(Diog. ii. 64), and also of Carneades in his later years (Plut. An
Seni. s. ger. Resp. 13, 1, p. 791), was Æschines of Naples, according
to Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 45, who was likewise a distinguished teacher in
the Academic School towards the close of the second century. Another
pupil, Mentor, was by Carneades forbidden the School, because he was
caught with his concubine (Diog. iv. 63; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8,
7).
[1538] Exc. Vatic. xii 26: καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων [τῶν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ] τινὲς
βουλόμενοι περί τε τῶν προφανῶς καταληπτῶν εἶναι δοκούντων καὶ περὶ τῶν
ἀκαταλήπτων εἰς ἀπορίαν ἄγειν τοὺς προσμαχομένους τοιαύταις χρῶνται
παραδοξολογίαις καὶ τοιαύτας εὐποροῦσι πιθανότητας, ὥστε διαπορεῖν,
ἀδύνατόν [l. εἰ δυνατόν] ἐστι, τοὺς ἐν Ἀθήναις ὄντας ὀσφραίνεσθαι τῶν
ἑψομένων ὠῶν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ, καὶ διστάζειν, μή πω καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ
διαλέγονται περὶ τούτων οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἄλλων ἄρ’ ἐν οἴκῳ κατακείμενοι τούτους
διατίθενται τοὺς λόγους· ἐξ ὧν δι’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς παραδοξολογίας εἰς
διαβολὴν ἤχασι τὴν ὅλην αἵρεσιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ καλῶς ἀπορούμενα παρὰ τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις εἰς ἀπιστίαν ἦχθαι, καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ἰδίας ἀστοχίας καὶ τοῖς
νέοις τοιοῦτον ἐντετόκασι ζῆλον, ὥστε τῶν μὲν ἠθικῶν καὶ πραγματικῶν
λόγων μηδὲ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἐπίνοιαν ποιεῖσθαι, δι’ ὧν ὄνησις τοῖς
φιλοσοφοῦσι, περὶ δὲ τὰς ἀνωφελεῖς καὶ παραδόξους εὑρεσιλογίας
κενοδοξοῦντες κατατρίβουσι τοὺς βίους. In the time of Carneades, whose
cotemporary was Polybius, to whom the language as to the enthusiasm of
youth for Sceptical teaching refers, such depreciatory remarks could
not have been made of the Academy. The historical value, therefore, of
the whole passage is suspicious. It bears besides the mark of
exaggeration so strongly that it is of no greater use for giving a view
of the Academy than are the caricatures of opponents for conveying an
idea of modern German philosophy.
[1539] Among these pupils the tendency to lay stress on the doctrine of
probabilities in relation to Scepticism was already strong. Proof may
be found not only in the accounts already given us of Clitomachus and
Æschines, but also in the circumstance that many of the older writers
made the fourth Academy date from Philo and Charmadas, the fifth from
Antiochus (Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16). At a still
earlier date, Metrodorus is said to have departed from the platform of
Carneades. Augustin. c. Acad. iii. 18, 41, after speaking of Antiochus
and his renunciation of Scepticism, says: Quamquam et Metrodorus id
antea facere tentaverat, qui primus dicitur esse confessus, non decreto
placuisse Academicis, nihil posse comprehendi, sed necessario contra
Stoicos hujus modi eos arma sumsisse. Probably Augustin borrowed this
passage from a lost treatise of Cicero; hence it may be relied upon.
The Metrodorus referred to is probably Metrodorus of Stratonice (see p.
564, 5), mentioned by Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16. Metrodorus of Skepsis might
also be suggested (Strabo, xiii. 155, p. 609; xvi. 4, 16, p. 775; Plut.
Lucull. 22; Diog. v. 84; Cic. De Orat. ii. 88, 360; 90, 365; iii. 20,
75; Tusc. i. 24, 59; Plin. Hist. Nat. vii. 24, 89; Quintil. x. 6, 1;
xi. 2, 22; Müller, Hist. Gr. iii. 203), who first learned rhetoric at
Chalcedon, afterwards entered the service of Mithridates, and was put
to death by his orders, B.C. 70, at an advanced age. Cic. De Orat. iii.
20, 75, calls him an Academician; and he is mentioned, Ibid. i. 11, 45,
as a pupil of Charmadas. The language quoted by Augustin may have come
from the treatise περὶ συνηθείας (Strabo, p. 775). He is otherwise only
known as a rhetorician and politician. The same uncertainty prevails as
to the Metrodorus referred to in Cic. Acad. ii. 24, 78 (see p. 554, 3).
We do not know who he is, but it may be inferred that it is the same
Metrodorus who is mentioned by Augustin.
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