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Title: Carranza and Mexico
Author: Carlo de Fornaro
Contributor: Ignacio C. Enríquez
Charles Ferguson
M. C. Rolland
Release date: May 4, 2026 [eBook #78600]
Language: English
Original publication: New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1915
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/78600
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CARRANZA AND MEXICO ***
CARRANZA AND MEXICO
[Illustration: DON VENUSTIANO CARRANZA AND GENERAL I. L. PESQUEIRA
First Chief and Minister of War]
CARRANZA AND
MEXICO
BY
CARLO DE FORNARO
[WITH CHAPTERS BY COLONEL I. C.
ENRIQUEZ, CHARLES FERGUSON AND
M. C. ROLLAND]
[Illustration]
NEW YORK · MITCHELL KENNERLEY · 1915
COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY
MITCHELL KENNERLEY
PRINTED IN AMERICA
_TO_
_PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON_
_who discovered_
_real Mexico to the Americans_
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I The Life of Don Venustiano Carranza 9
II Conditions in Mexico During Diaz’ Régime 34
III The Madero Revolution, Its Aims and Failures 50
IV Plotting Which Overthrew Madero 60
V Huerta in Power. The Landing of American
Marines in Vera Cruz 77
VI Financial Organization of the Revolution 86
VII Civil Organization of the Revolution 96
VIII Diplomatic Work in Washington 99
IX The Constitutionalists in Paris 102
X Investigation Work in the United States. By
M. C. Rolland 106
XI General Outline of Campaign Against Huerta 114
XII Campaign of General Obregon in the West.
By Col. I. C. Enriquez 118
XIII Villa and His Campaign in the North 132
XIV Campaign of Gen. Gonzalez in the East 142
XV Zapata and His Campaign in the South 146
XVI One Hundred Years’ Struggle for Land and
Democracy against Clericalism 157
XVII Attempts at the Solution of the Land Question 166
XVIII Behind the Scenes of the Carranza-Villa Imbroglio 176
XIX The Need of a Democratic Finance in Mexico.
By C. Ferguson 184
XX The Foreign Policy of Carranza 192
XXI President Wilson’s Mexican Policy 205
Reflections 214
Appendix 219
ILLUSTRATIONS
Don Venustiano Carranza and General I. L.
Pesqueira _Frontispiece_
FACING PAGE
Don Rafael Zubáran Capmany 99
Modesto C. Rolland 106
War Map of Mexico 114
General Alvaro Obregon 118
General S. Alvarado 132
General Pablo Gonzalez 142
General Benjamin Hill 176
CHAPTER I
LIFE OF CARRANZA
DON VENUSTIANO CARRANZA!
Who is this man, practically unknown to the American public a year
and a half ago, who with the help of the Mexican Constitutionalists,
overthrew the most cynical, murderous, grafting and powerful military
dictatorship that ever existed in Mexico?
Concentration of power in Mexico City, the support of the foreigners,
of the church, the bankers, the landowners, the militarists, of
foreign bankers and most foreign nations, with the exception of the
United States Government, were at the disposal of General Huerta and
his régime, but Carranza and the Constitutionalists eliminated this
nefarious rule after eighteen months of unbroken victories, sweeping
finally into Mexico City in a peaceful, orderly manner.
The American public is beginning to realize that such a thorough
victory could never have been achieved without a popular movement,
directed by a fearless, statesmanlike chief.
Venustiano Carranza, with the exception of Don Fernando Iglesias
Calderón, is the oldest of all the Constitutionalists, who have fought
for the last year and a half, with every means in their power, against
the rule of General Huerta and his governmental camorra.
Don Venustiano Carranza was born in the State of Coahuila in 1859,
and is therefore, fifty-five years old. In spite of the assertion
of one of the correspondents who interviewed him six months ago for
the _Metropolitan_ magazine, Mr. John Reed, we claim that Carranza
is anything but a “senile old man,” for he rode over 1,500 miles
on horseback, through the States of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, Durango,
Chihuahua and Sonora, visiting the military camps, organizing all the
state and federal governments, and finally settling down in Hermosillo,
State of Sonora, as his capital. Later, after Torreon had been captured
from the Federals, Carranza with his staff and soldiers again crossed
the State of Sonora into Chihuahua on horseback, a distance of nearly
300 miles.
We must admit that unless Carranza had lived a greater part of his life
on his farm, he would not have been able to stand the hardships and
rigors of that famous ride.
His mental training was that of a lawyer, for he studied in the schools
of Coahuila and finished his law course in Mexico City.
A certain weakness of the eyesight prevented him from practising
law, so he retired on his farm, dedicating his time to improving his
“hacienda” and studying history and political economy.
Like the President of the United States, Carranza is one of the
greatest authorities on the history of his own country.
Just as all student-statesmen, Carranza is the type of man which makes
no direct appeal to the imagination of the public by a strenuous,
romantic life--it is the quiet, clear, thinking, organizing brain which
creates, commands and achieves, without the blaze of trumpets, or the
help of well-salaried press-agents.
One incident in his life stands out glaringly like a solitary facet of
a diamond struck by sunlight. Very few Mexicans, and it can be safely
said even a lesser number of Americans, know that Carranza was the only
man who started a local revolution against General Diaz, during the
rule from 1876 to 1910, and succeeded;--that is to say, continued to
live in Mexico, without sacrificing his life to his bold attempt.
This strange and seemingly incomprehensible incident happened in the
year 1893, when Don Venustiano was only thirty-four years old.
At that time there ruled over the State of Coahuila a governor named
Garza Galán. With the exception of Mucio Martinez and General Cravioto,
he was the worst governor in Mexico. Garza Galán used his great power
to rob, expropriate lands by all manner of tricks and stratagems,
imprison, kill those who stood in his way, and went so far as to kidnap
respectable girls.
Everybody expected that Garza Galán would be eliminated after his
two years of governorship, but when it was discovered that Romero
Rubio stood sponsor for another two years of Garza Galán as Governor
of Coahuila, the inhabitants of that State were in utter dismay and
protested to the President.
At that time Romero Rubio, the father-in-law of President Diaz, was one
of his closest advisers. He is the originator of the party which later
was called the “Cientifico” party, and of which Limantour became the
successor.
As Romero Rubio insisted on the candidacy of Garza Galán for a
second term, and as protests were of no avail with General Diaz, Don
Venustiano Carranza arose in arms with the assistance of his brother,
Don Emilio, and started on the warpath against Garza Galán. General
Diaz sent some federal troops to quell the revolt, but Don Venustiano
and his brother took particular care to avoid coming into armed
conflict with the federal troops, while they attacked Garza Galán’s
state troops and defeated them repeatedly. This strange, three-cornered
fight lasted longer than was expected; very soon, other wiser
counsellors of General Diaz pointed out to him that a continuation of
this armed revolt might communicate itself to the other border States
with disastrous effects to the Federal Government. General Diaz then
recalled the candidacy of Garza Galán, and it was transformed into the
one of Señor Musquiz.
Peace followed, but strangest of all, was the immunity of Venustiano
Carranza and his brother to persecutions and attempts on their lives.
Carranza was not a novice in the politics of his country; he served
as a member of the legislature of his native State, as Senator of the
Federal Government in Mexico City and even as a governor of his State.
Maybe the wily old dictator, Don Porfirio Diaz, made a mistake in the
case of Carranza. For sixteen years after the revolt against Garza
Galán, Carranza gave further proof of his strength of character, by
accepting the gubernatorial candidacy offered to him by the people of
Coahuila and refusing to renounce it in the face of the opposition of
the “cientifico” group in Mexico City, because Carranza stood for the
candidacy of General Reyes as Vice-President, as against Ramon Corral
who was the Mephisto of the “cientifico” party.
The answer of Carranza to the emissary of Diaz, who suggested the
advisability of his refusal to run for Governor, was as follows: “Tell
General Diaz, that as long as there is a single person, who will
propose and work in favor of my candidacy, I shall not renounce it, and
I shall accept all the consequences of my conduct.”
After such an unequivocal answer, everybody expected that either the
door of the penitentiary would close upon the bold candidate, or that
he would mysteriously disappear, in accordance with the policy of
General Diaz.
What saved Carranza from either of these fates, was the publicity given
to this incident in the American press, especially a letter of protest
against the meeting which was to take place in El Paso, between General
Diaz and President Taft. The passage referring to this incident says:
“Even as I write these lines, the report is wired from Mexico that
General Diaz has ordered the demission of the Governor of Coahuila,
as the latter showed a marked tendency in favor of General Reyes’
candidacy. Imagine the Republican President of the United States asking
for the resignation of Governor Johnson of Minnesota, because of his
democratic leanings.”[1]
It is quite logical that a man of the stamp of Carranza should view
with great interest the movement which culminated in the overthrow of
General Diaz in 1911.
Francisco I. Madero wrote his famous book “The Presidential Succession
of 1910,” and published it in San Pedro, Coahuila, in December, 1908.
F. I. Madero, because of his innocence or his fearlessness, tried to
create a working candidacy, with himself as presidential candidate and
Dr. Vasquez Gomez as Vice-President, in opposition to General Diaz and
Ramon Corral. There was however no intention of rising to arms against
the government of Diaz, but the policy of the President made the
opposing candidate realize the futility of his efforts.
F. I. Madero was placed in jail twice for his daring, and after the
second time, he was informed that a third imprisonment would mean his
complete elimination. Madero took the tip, and fled to San Antonio,
Texas. The slogan of the Madero revolution was “Effective suffrage and
no re-election” and not, as many Americans believe, “the land question.”
If any one will take the trouble to peruse the long document of San
Luis Potosí, of October 5th, 1910, signed F. I. Madero, which contains
2,500 words, it will be noticed that the land question takes up very
little space, in comparison to the rest of the Plan.[2]
General Carranza never hesitated for one moment, and was soon over the
border to join Madero, and formed part of his revolutionary junta.
He was appointed chief of the Military Division of the States of
Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas, and later Secretary of War in the
provisional cabinet of F. I. Madero.
The premature cessation of hostilities and the installation of
the clerical candidate, L. de la Barra, was strenuously opposed
by Carranza, who said to F. I. Madero, “You are delivering to the
reactionaries a dead revolution, which will have to be fought over
again.” These prophetic words were not heeded, so Don Venustiano went
back to his native State, and calmly awaited the course of events,
while he offered himself as a candidate and was elected as Governor of
Coahuila.
One of the accusations which was published in the American papers
by the Huerta press agents was that F. I. Madero, as President, had
sent several hundred thousand dollars to Governor Carranza, for
the purpose of arming and increasing the state militia against the
Orozco rebellion. About the time of the overthrow of F. I. Madero,
Don Venustiano had been supposedly asked to give an accounting of the
expenditure of the money furnished from Mexico City. As he could not
account for it, it was said, he had decided to start a revolution
against President Madero. When the Huerta treachery took place and
Madero was murdered, Carranza took the opportunity to rebel against the
provisional presidency of General Huerta.
This story may sound plausible to the Huerta type of man, but the facts
in the case dispose of it. A few months before the plot which overthrew
Madero, Don Venustiano Carranza paid a visit to the President. His
watchful eyes and ears detected a very complicated net of plots and
counterplots brewing against Madero. The President did not believe that
there were any plots, and doubted any one’s ability to overthrow him.
Carranza went back to his State and communicated his suspicions to a
few intimate friends. As soon as he heard of the release of Felix Diaz
and General Reyes from their jails, he at once sent several hundred of
the Coahuila volunteers to the assistance of Madero. They took part
in the assault against the citadel, and the reason why General Huerta
lingered so long before turning traitor is now clear.
Besides the Coahuila riflemen, there were several hundred Madero
volunteers who were loyal to the President. General Huerta could not
arrest Madero and Suarez, and make peace with Felix Diaz until the
loyal Madero troops had been eliminated.
So he cautiously kept his own federal regiments back, and sent the
Madero volunteers and the Coahuila riflemen to charge the citadel,
manned by machine guns, in close formation. The Coahuila volunteers who
were mostly mounted, and numbered about 1,150, bravely attacked the
guns, but none of them came back alive; the same happened to the Madero
volunteers.
As soon as Huerta had disposed of the volunteers, he made his peace
with Felix Diaz. What remained of the Madero and Coahuila volunteers
fled to the standard of Zapata after Huerta came into power.
On the 18th of February, 1913, Madero and Suarez were arrested by order
of General Huerta. On the 19th of February all Mexico had heard the
fateful news, and nobody doubted the outcome of the imprisonment.
Don Venustiano Carranza never hesitated one hour, one minute; he
convened at once the legislature of the State of Coahuila, and the
following decree was the result:
_Venustiano Carranza_, Constitutional Governor of the free and
Sovereign State of Coahuila of Zaragoza, informs its inhabitants: That
the Congress of the State has decreed the following:
The Constitutional Congress of the free, independent and sovereign
State of Coahuila of Zaragoza decrees:
No. 1421: Article I.
We disavow General Victoriano Huerta in his character of chief of the
Executive power of the Republic, which he claims was conferred to him
by the Senate, and we likewise disown all the acts and resolutions
which he may dictate under such authority.
Article II. Extraordinary powers are transmitted to the Executive of
this State in all the branches of Public Administration, so that he
may suppress what he may deem convenient and that he shall proceed
by the force of arms to sustain the Constitutionalist order of the
Republic.
To arouse the Governments of the other States and the Chiefs of the
Federal, Rural and Auxiliary Forces, so that they may assist the stand
taken by the Governor of this State.
Decreed in the room of the Congress of the State, in Saltillo, on the
19th of February, 1913. A. Barrera, President of the Legislature. J.
Sanchez Herrera, Secretary. Gabriel Calzada, Secretary.
Let this be printed, communicated and observed.
V. CARRANZA.
E. GARZA PEREZ,
Secretary.
Saltillo, 19 de Febrero de 1913.
After the imprisonment of President Madero and Vice-President Suarez
in February, 1913, a year and a half ago, there were twenty-seven
governors in Mexico, who had the same opportunity to protest against
the usurper Huerta, and refuse to recognize his “coup d’état,” his
dictatorship and his cowardly murders. None of the governors dared
protest. Had all the governors in Mexico arisen together with their
legislatures and refused to recognize the authority of the czar in
Mexico, Huerta with all his money, all his soldiers, all his greed and
ruthlessness, could not have lasted more than three months.
Don Venustiano Carranza was the only governor in Mexico who had the
audacity and patriotism to challenge the great pirate in Mexico City,
who had raised the black flag with the skull and the cross bones over
the national palace.
The chiefs of the States were too terrorized, cowed and frozen by
the brutality, the cynicism, the power of the man in the provisional
presidency, and were aghast at the suddenness of the events which led
to Madero’s downfall. They had not found out what had happened behind
the scenes, the horror of the events and their natural consequence
had not dawned upon their paralyzed minds. Carranza as a real leader
and chief never faltered an instant. Those are the rare and precious
moments which create the national hero.
As soon as Felix Diaz and Victoriano Huerta heard of the stand taken
by Don Venustiano Carranza as Governor of the State of Coahuila, they
realized that a formidable enemy had arisen to spoil their crooked
game. They put their heads together and penned the following epistle to
Carranza, signed it together, and sent a trusted friend as emissary to
find him and convince him:
MEXICO, D. F. 27 de Febrero 1913.
DON VENUSTIANO CARRANZA,
Gov. of the Free and Sovereign State of Coahuila,
_Dear Sir_--
By letters of recent date we have informed you of the plausible
reasons which have inspired the army against the dissolving régime of
Don F. Madero, and we have likewise justified the acts which placed
General Huerta in the office of President of the Republic.
We have been informed that it was your intention to rebel against
the legal authority of the Government. We beg to insist, in the name
of the country and for its exclusive benefit, that you change your
announced attitude not to collaborate with us in the work of peace
which we intend to pursue to the end, at any price. If for some
personal reason you wish to leave the office which you occupy, and
if that can be done without offending or hurting our patriotic end,
the Government will give you all sorts of guarantees and will pay your
salary up to the end of your term.
This letter, as you understand, must be absolutely of a particular
and private character. On this basis we beg to inform you that on our
part there will be no obstacles that could arise between ourselves,
which cannot be solved in the manner most suitable to you. It would be
advisable for you to retire into the United States (for your greater
safety). We shall make all sorts of sacrifices (should you demand
them) so as to satisfy all your wishes and demands. Our envoy (agent)
will bring you instructions on the subject. He is empowered to arrange
matters on the spot.
We beg you to accept our assurance of admiration and respect.
(Signed) VICTORIANO HUERTA.
FELIX DIAZ.
Carranza’s answer follows:
11th March, 1913.
MESSRS. V. HUERTA Y FELIX DIAZ:
My only answer to the despicable proposals offered to me in your
letter dated February 27th, is that I want to inform you that men like
myself do not betray, do not sell themselves; that is your function,
you who have no other objects in life than the shameful satisfaction
of ignoble ambitions.
Raise the black flag of your tyranny, and over the country the voice
shouts: “Treason and Death.”
On my part, with the help of the Mexican people, I shall lift from the
mud into which you have thrown it, the flag of the country. Should I
fall defending it, I shall have obtained for my small action in life,
the greatest prize which we honest men can aspire to.
(Signed) VENUSTIANO CARRANZA.
In the month of March, 1913, not satisfied with having defied the
powers in Mexico, General Carranza published the “Plan of Guadalupe,”
so called from the fact that the revolutionary plan was signed by the
officers at the “hacienda” farm of Guadalupe. The plan is the following:
DECLARATION TO THE NATION
Considering that General Victoriano Huerta, to whom the Constitutional
President, Francisco I. Madero, had confided the defence of the
institutions and the legality of his government, on uniting with the
rebel enemies in arms against that same government, to restore the
latest dictatorship, committed the crime of treason to reach power,
arresting the President and Vice-President, as well as their ministers,
exacting from them by violent means the resignation of their posts,
which is proven by the messages that the same General Huerta addressed
to the Governors of the States, advising them that he had the Supreme
Magistrates of the nation and their cabinet prisoners.
Considering that the legislative and judicial powers have recognized
and protected General Victoriano Huerta and his illegal and
anti-patriotic proceedings, contrary to the constitutional laws and
precepts, and considering, finally, that some governors of the States
of the union have recognized the illegitimate government, imposed by
the part of the army which consummated the treason, headed by the same
General Huerta, in spite of the fact that the sovereignty of those same
States whose governors should have been the first in disowning it, had
been violated, those who subscribe, chiefs and officials, in command of
constitutional forces, we have accorded, and shall sustain by arms the
following:
PLAN
1. General Victoriano Huerta, as President of the republic shall be
disowned.
2. The legislative and judicial powers of the federation shall also be
disowned.
3. The governors of the states who still recognize the federal powers
forming the actual administration, 30 days after the publication of
this plan, shall be disowned.
4. For the organization of the army in charge of seeing that our
purposes are carried out, we name as first chief of the army, which
will be called Constitutionalist, Venustiano Carranza, Governor of the
State of Coahuila.
5. The Constitutionalist army on occupying Mexico City, the executive
power will be provisionally in charge of Venustiano Carranza, first
chief of the army, or in charge of that person who might substitute
him in command.
6. The provisional President of the Republic will convene general
elections as soon as peace may have been consolidated, handing the
power to the citizen who may have been elected.
7. The citizen who may act as first chief of the Constitutionalist
army in the States whose government might have recognized that of
Huerta, will assume the charge of provisional governor and will
convoke local elections, after the citizens elected to discharge the
high powers of the federation may have taken possession of their
office, as provided for in the foregoing basis.
The plan was signed at the Hacienda of Guadalupe, Coahuila, on the 26th
of March, 1913. Sixty-four officers of the state troops affixed their
signatures to the protest. Among the most famous on the list was Lieut.
Col. Lucio Blanco, who fought in Tamaulipas and initiated the sale of
lands belonging to Felix Diaz, among Constitutionalist soldiers, and
Major J. B. Trevino.
As Don Venustiano Carranza was leaving Saltillo to take the field
against the federals, he said to a friend: “We are going to fight the
three years’ war over again.”
A coincidence in atavism is that Don Venustiano’s father, Colonel
Carranza, fought in the north during the three years’ war under the
leadership of Benito Juarez (1857-60) and assisted him financially
as well as politically in the struggle. Later, after the
Constitutionalist government had placed Benito Juarez in the presidency
through the elections, Colonel Carranza was offered the reimbursement
of the sixteen thousand odd dollars which he had contributed to the
liberal cause. He refused the money saying that the victory of the
party was sufficient payment to him.
A further coincidence, amusing to students of history, is found in
the case of Gen. Victoriano Huerta, whose father, Gen. Epitacio
Huerta, fought under the same banner as Colonel Carranza. The history
of the three years’ war mentions the name of three generals: The
Constitutionalist Generals Rocha, Huerta and Arteaga.... After the
clericals had been defeated by the Constitutionalists under Benito
Juarez in 1860 they invited foreign intervention, which ended in the
courtmartial and shooting of Emperor Maximilian and Generals Miramón
and Mejia.
In the present instance, Don Victoriano Huerta, when he perceived an
early defeat, heaped indignities and insults upon American citizens so
as to invite an intervention and a quick march of the American troops
into Mexico City. The clericals which he represented preferred the
presence of Americans to that of the Constitutionalists in Mexico City.
Luckily for Mexico, the Chief Magistrate in Washington foresaw the move
and wisely refused to pull the chestnut out of the fire for a Mexican
monkey.
The first battle of the revolution was fought between Saltillo and
Monclova in a small place called “Anhelo,” which, translated from the
Spanish, means a vehement desire.
The reason for going into certain details of the march of Carranza
across the northern States, is for the purpose of showing the physical
endurance, the mental activity, as well as the profound and implicit
faith that Venustiano Carranza had in the people of Mexico.
The personality of Carranza does not seem to have been sympathetic to
foreign newspapermen who have visited him. His presence and manner
seem utterly cold, intellectual; extremely polite, non-committal. When
talking, his speech is devoid of all the superlatives and amenities
which made New York reporters say of L. de la Barra, “He talked
incessantly for fifteen minutes without saying one word for copy.”
Carranza’s talent as a good listener made him the despair of
journalists, who preferred the generals who fought, talked, gave orders
to shoot a few prisoners, and between snatches of food, dictated
incidents from their lives or told what their plans were for the future
of Mexico. Carranza is more subtle if not sufficiently romantic. The
careful observer must read between the lines, when the personality
grows on one, like the taste for olives or the magnitude of the Chief
Magistrate in Washington. Some leaders are unattractive because of
their very uprightness, their justice, their integrity, their polish;
their flawlessness offers no purchase to a sly attack. Aristides asked
an Athenian citizen, who had voted to ostracize him, if Aristides had
personally offended him, “No, but I am tired of hearing him called the
Just!”
Enemies of Carranza have accused him of being too much of an aristocrat
and a puppet in the hands of his lawyers’ cabinet, or again a jingo for
effect and a rebel for power. His conduct towards his general staff,
his generals, his enemies, his attitude towards the United States
and the foreign powers, his promises or silence on the question of
interior policy,--his words, speeches, letters and decrees are his best
witnesses to judge him by.
After the defeat at Anhelo, Carranza went to the border, passing
through Cuatro Cienegas, which is famous as his birthplace, to Eagle
Pass.
In the month of July, 1913, when the Arrietas and Contreras were
attacking Torreon, Carranza joined them in the hope of success, but
even the second time when Villa attacked Torreon, the victories were
empty, except for the arms, ammunition and money captured.
Disconsolate but not discouraged, Carranza, accompanied by about
two hundred men, slowly wended his way across the State of Durango.
General Huerta was at that period on the highest crest of success and
power,--orders had been telegraphed all over the north, to the federal
and counter-guerrilla chiefs, to capture Carranza, dead or alive,
and be rewarded with a bonus of $150,000. Abraham Gonzalez, Governor
of Chihuahua, had been arrested and assassinated by order of Huerta.
Venustiano Carranza, therefore, travelled at night and rested during
the day; his only pilots were the stars, a small compass and a pocket
edition of “Mexico-Atlas.” The chief himself recounts how often during
their night ride, they espied coming towards them in the distance, the
vaguely outlined forms of peons, men and women carrying their children
in their arms. Scouts were sent ahead to discover if the peasants were
only disguised federals in a desperate attempt to assassinate the brain
of the revolution, and capture a kingly reward.
The phantom shadows were “pacificos,” who had walked for miles to greet
the chief who was going to battle for their rights and their lands.
They only wanted to touch his hands, the hem of his coat, to hear the
voice of the great “Jefe,” and then they turned their weary way sending
back a salutation: “May God protect you!” or “May God be with you!”
which rang in the silent night like the voice of the people, the voice
of God.
As Carranza kept his itinerary secret, the first encounter might have
been accidental, but it happened so frequently that it seemed almost
uncanny and supernatural, this triumphant procession accompanied by the
blessings, the wishes, the yearnings of the Mexican peons. Carranza
himself confessed that no incident in his life made a more profound
impression on him, and gave him a deeper insight of the tremendous
faith of the Mexican people in their champions, pathfinders, and
saviors.
Across the mountains in Durango to Tepehuanes, into Parral in
Chihuahua, where he came in contact with General Chao, and from there
across the Sierra Madre, a mountain range, dividing Chihuahua from
Sonora, into the small city of Fuerte, where Carranza met for the first
time General Obregon and his soldiers.
He reached Guaymas, in Sonora, about the middle of September, 1913. The
little band was tired, and their clothes were in rags, their shoes in
tatters, but the goal was reached and they began the work of organizing
the capital of the Constitutional government.
In Mexico the presence of Carranza was known only to the
revolutionists, and as the federals could not discover the whereabouts
of the Chief at that time, they heralded his disappearance and death.
Everywhere that Carranza had passed with his band of followers in the
small cities, away from the federals who cautiously kept within the
city limits and near the railroads, he invariably organized small
local governments until he was able to communicate with his chiefs in
the middle and east. In the State of Coahuila, his brother Don Jesus,
and Gen. Don Pablo Gonzalez, had come to an understanding as to the
great strategic outline of the campaign in combination with General
Villa in the north and General Obregon on the west. In Guaymas a
provisional cabinet was organized with Don Rafael Zubaran Capmany, one
of the keenest intellects of the revolution, a lawyer from Campeche,
with Francisco Escudero as Minister of Foreign Affairs, as Minister
of Finances F. I. Villareal, Engineer G. Bonilla as Minister of
Communications, and General Angeles as Minister of War.
Gen. J. B. Trevino was the chief of the general staff of Carranza; the
chief secretary was G. Espinosa Mireles; there was also a staff of
officers attached to his person. It was in Hermosillo that the great
strategic campaign was outlined with the help of General Angeles and
the general staff. The orders to the three chiefs, Obregon, Villa and
Gonzalez, came from Hermosillo.
After the northern States were conquered slowly, all the city and rural
governments were organized, and although the work was arduous and
continuous, it was not quite as strenuous as the classic ride across
the sierras and the deserts. The daily routine at headquarters was very
simple but efficient. The chief usually got up between five and six in
the morning, and except when he rode across the mountain took his bath
and attended at once to the most important work of the day. At 7 A. M.
there was a light breakfast with whatever could be had, milk, crackers
with peach preserves, or honey and butter. On the march everybody
had to be satisfied with the national tortilla, made of cornmeal and
beans. Sometimes they could get fresh eggs, sometimes not.
In Hermosillo they fared better; Carranza had two Indian attendants,
one who did the cooking and the other who attended to his horses and
those of the general staff. The Mexican cooks have the most wonderful
capacity for being able to light a fire and cook anywhere under the
most distressing conditions.
Thus they were able to get meals and a few luxuries like boiled
and fried meal, vegetables, and the famous chile with cheese, and
a powdered coffee called “Washington coffee,” with milk. Sometimes
they drank a red wine which is grown in the north of Mexico. Carranza
invited at almost every meal, some friends who had travelled many
miles to see him, or soldiers or civilians belonging to his immediate
surroundings.
Between the hours of 7:30 and 1 P. M. the whole staff was again busy
taking orders from the chief,--writing, telegraphing and conferring.
At one o’clock there was a light luncheon and the work was resumed
until six, when the chief took his daily ride, accompanied by an
aide or a friend. Ten o’clock was usually the time to retire, unless
the “Jefe” had been invited to a fiesta or a dance, which happened
quite frequently as Mexicans are very fond of dancing, theatricals,
speech-making, and are in general very sociable. Unlike most Mexicans,
the chief does not smoke, or favor the national drink “tequila,” or the
Mexicanized cognac, or the excellent Monterrey and Toluca beer which
was advertised in Mexico as “the beer that made Milwaukee jealous.”
By February the chief and his staff packed their belongings, and the
state papers, and crossed the State of Sonora into Sinaloa in Culiacán,
the capital, which had been captured by General Obregon. After the
organization of Sinaloa, the peripatetic government moved back to
Hermosillo and towards the border, to Nogales. By that time, Torreon
had been captured and Carranza, accompanied by 300 cavalry and 400
infantry, crossed the Sierra Madre range into Chihuahua, to Juarez, an
excursion which lasted twenty-five days and covered over 400 miles.
They had come from the tropical heat of the deserts of Sonora to the
snow on the Sierra Madre.
From Juarez on, the procession of the Chief rolled downward to
Chihuahua, Torreon, Saltillo, Monterrey, Tampico, down to Tepotzotlan
near Mexico City. The details of his slow organization of the civil
government of all the conquered States, of his foreign attitude and
of the other details of his revolutionary rule, will be discussed in
separate chapters.
Carranza at first sight makes the impression more of a Saxon
personality than of a Mexican type. The Spanish blood, which flows
in his veins three or four generations back must have been of Basque
origin, which is pure northern European. He is about five feet, eight
inches high, proportionately built, neither too thin nor too stout,
and he carries himself erect and in a dignified manner. His white hair
and beard contrast with the very dark brown complexion which is the
result of an active, out-of-door life. The eye-glasses give to his
appearance a slight professional mien. The professorial air is rather
disconcerting at first, for one expects to behold a type of a man
different from the quiet, unassuming, very polite, gentleman farmer,
and instead of a deep, sonorous voice, a rather high and clear tone of
speech. His eyes are hazel, very open,--his nose straight, his forehead
very high, and he has the high brow of an intellectual, rather than of
a fighter, his ears are quite large, denoting a strong constitution and
a long life. The whole impression is of self-restraint, gentleness;
nevertheless, the keen observing eyes prove an alert intelligence,
always watching, weighing, judging and carefully registering all the
impressions for future use. As all men dealing with people politically,
Carranza has a very retentive memory for faces and names. Being a
comprehending and patient listener he always hears a great deal more
than he says, but when an answer is required, the words come out
slowly, as if chosen with extreme care to express a thought with as few
words as possible. While speaking in public, the use of simple language
denotes a clear mind which can express complicated problems in first
principles, and Carranza makes himself understood by cultured Mexicans
as well as by peons.
CHAPTER II
CONDITIONS IN MEXICO DURING DIAZ’ RÉGIME
It would appear after all that has been written in the United States
and Europe concerning Mexico, that the people ought to possess a
clearer conception of the conditions which brought about the Madero
and the Constitutionalist revolutions, especially when the latter is
nothing more than a continuation of the former. But the words of the
late Joseph Pulitzer, when he said that to instil facts into the minds
of the people there must be constant repetition, seem undeniably true.
It is not sufficient to reiterate certain facts; the correlation of
these facts must be understood and explained.
People heard about the peonage system in Mexico, about the great
power of Porfirio Diaz, about the abuses of this power, but it was
not realized how vital, how deep, how intimate the solution of the
political problems was to the Mexicans themselves. To foreigners the
Mexican problem was only interesting in so far as it affected their
interests,--no more.
After all the cruelties perpetrated by the Diaz-Huerta régimes, I
have heard intelligent Americans exclaim that the Mexicans needed a
strong man like Huerta, and that Diaz after all had brought railroads,
schools, higher wages, money, improvements and progress. It makes one
almost despair of human intelligence to hear such superficial prattle,
but it proves the axiom of Joseph Pulitzer to be very profound and that
Porfirio Diaz had used it to its fullest extent.
Known by few people, Porfirio Diaz used for years a secret fund
amounting to millions solely for the purpose of advertising to the
world that Diaz was the creator of modern Mexico, that “peace” and
“progress” were his two watchwords, with which he had put Mexico on a
permanent basis of greatness. Many small newspapers near the border
as far as San Antonio were paid as much as $5,000 a year to speak in
good terms about Diaz and never to mention any trouble or agitation
which might be started along the border by anarchists who might call
themselves Mexican revolutionists.
Great newspaper proprietors in the United States were given
concessions, others were offered special inducements to publish
special Mexican numbers, which brought from $25,000 to $30,000 worth
of advertising; well-known individuals, such as judges, congressmen
and senators, were invited in an indirect way to visit Mexico, were
received like princes, fêted, dined and were offered mining or other
concessions as one gives cigars to a guest after dinner. When the
concessions were not needed or available, Don Porfirio took particular
care to impress his famous visitor with a set of well chosen phrases
most apt to impress him favorably as to his greatness, his patriotism
and his democracy.
One incident, which was related to me, illustrates the Machiavellian
talent of Diaz. A nationally famous librarian paid his visit to
General Diaz, who received him very graciously. No concessions were
asked or wanted and the President did not mention the great battles he
had fought, which were unknown to the gentle librarian, but he spoke
at great length of the extensive school system in vogue since his
ascension to the presidency, and ended the conversation by declaring:
“It is my greatest ambition to be known as the great schoolmaster of
Mexico.” The phrase impressed the scholar and many people heard the
phrase, and many newspapers repeated it until everybody believed it.
_Pearson’s Magazine_ printed six years ago a fulsome life of Diaz. What
General Diaz thought of it is told in an interview between Ireneo Paz,
a Mexican newspaperman and the President who were friends for more than
sixty years. Don Ireneo Paz asked the President: “I have been wanting
to ask you if that interview which the papers published a few months
ago was authentic; that one which is said to have taken place between
yourself and one Creelman, an American journalist?”
“What surprises me is that sagacious men like you should have been
capable of giving credit to such folly (à semejante paparrucha),”
replied Diaz.
“Because I did not believe it, I asked you if it was authentic.”
“It’s as true as a dead child. You know me too well to believe that
I could stroll for hours upon the terrace of Chapultepec, exhibiting
the white of my eyes and opening my nostrils excessively in order
that the Yankee reporter may be able to give wings to his fancy. What
happened was this: A friend of mine, a member of my cabinet, came to
read me the article which was already manufactured (confeccionado) for
an American publication. It didn’t seem bad to me, or rather it seemed
very good, because without compromising me much it lent a lustre to
my antecedents, and put me on a good footing for the future, so that
it gave me all the facilities which I desired, whether to continue
sacrificing myself for the Fatherland, or to shake off the dust thereof
(zafarme) in time if things should blow into a whirlwind (à ponerse
turbias). I acknowledge to you that I thought the writing was so well
dressed up, so much in conformity with what are not but should be my
profoundest thoughts, so seemly for our luckless proletariat, that I
accepted it unhesitatingly as if it had been inspired by myself, not
making more than a very few modifications on some entirely Yankee
points of view which would have put me in a very ridiculous position,
and I gave my consent to two things:--that it should be published in
English and Spanish, and that it should be amply paid for.”
“About how much was the cost of this work?”
“Some fifty thousand pesos.” (Como unos cincuenta mil pesos.)[3]
Toward the end of the Diaz régime and in an effort to refute the
attacks made in a book by the present writer called, “Diaz, Czar of
Mexico,” the cientificos inspired James Creelman to write “Diaz,
Master of Mexico”; whole chapters were also dedicated in an effort
to discredit the exposé by J. K. Turner in his “Barbarous Mexico.”
Several books published in the United States and England were bought
by Diaz. One was “Porfirio Diaz,” by R. de Zayas Enriquez, and the
other “Yucatan, the American Egypt,” by Tabor and Frost. The Mexican
government inspired their consul in Cuba, J. F. Godoy, to write a
book, “Porfirio Diaz,” which had “seventy pages of endorsements of
Diaz written by prominent Americans.” Here we have the case of a man,
Mr. Godoy, who actually went about--or sent about--among senators,
congressmen, diplomats and cabinet officers, soliciting kind words
for President Diaz.[4] Porfirio Diaz and his cientifico supporters
thought that they could keep the Mexicans, peons, and the middle class
workingmen down if public opinion in Europe and in the United States
was misinformed about the real conditions in Mexico.
The great reputation of General Diaz in America and Europe was
essentially manufactured through laudatory articles in the press,
magazines, weeklies and daily papers, by the publication of books,
interviews of prominent Americans who came back from a visit to the
“Great Old Man” in Chapultepec, who could have said as Macbeth, “And
I have bought golden opinions from all sorts of people.” Judges,
congressmen, senators, governors, members of cabinets, even presidents,
princes and kings spoke in reverence and admiration of Don Porfirio
Diaz.
What chance had any patriotic, democratic, and free loving Mexican
against the avalanche of lies, deliberate and unconscious falsehoods?
Whoever heard in the United States of the Massacre of Papantla where
20,000 Mexican peasants, men, women and children were shot down in
cold blood, and as a result half a dozen villages wiped off the map of
Mexico?
What newspaper in America published the story of the revolution of
Tomochic, when 15,000 mountaineer peasants in Chihuahua were destroyed
and only forty old men and women were left to tell the tale? And
the murder of 15,000 men, the whole male population of Juchitan,
State of Oaxaca, in revenge for the death of Diaz’s brother, and the
assassination of 750 workingmen of the Orizaba cotton mills?
Workingmen in Mexico were killed if they attempted to unionize or to
strike, the peasants were slaughtered to take away from them their
rights under the law; the Yaqui Indians were deported and sold into
slavery in Yucatan to permit the great landowners in Sonora to sell
their land to American syndicates. Anybody who protested orally or in
writing was thrown into jail, where imprisonment was worse than death.
We reproduce the description by a Mexican of a night passed in the
prison of Belem, Mexico City.
May 16.
I dare not credit the testimony of my senses. I cannot yet believe all
that I have suffered in that horrible night which has just passed;
a night of horrible dreams, a succession of repugnant nightmares,
terrific, phantastic, demoniacal, impossible, inconceivable and
nevertheless perfectly and completely real. I thought the night would
be endless. I fancied myself in the infernal regions, in a hell as the
heated phantasy of the poet of maniacal brain never conceived it.
The prison is a sort of a room of 50 yards in length by 6 broad and 5
in height, that is to say 1500 cubic yards. Within its walls sleep 800
individuals according to my calculation. The hygienists claim that 12
by 14 cubic yards of air are necessary in a dwelling for each person:
in that space we did not even have 2 cubic yards each.
All the ventilation consists in an iron grating at the entrance at one
extremity and a window at the other end.
How could 800 persons stay in that small space? It is a mystery to me;
I have seen it and still I cannot explain it, and I am almost willing
to admit the penetrability of the bodies.
The men lie down in two rows, feet to feet and the head against the
wall. Those who arrive first or the strongest lie on the ground,
those who follow do as best they can by lying between two bodies
cradle-wise. Everybody must perforce sleep sideways. For this reason
quarrels and fights are frequent and occasionally they end in wounds
and sometimes in death.
In this prison there are some revolting W. C.’s. They are cleaned
in the morning, but as the night advances they are used constantly
and as there is no running water, the fecal matter and the urine run
over onto the ground soaking those who sleep near them. Some wretches
even sleep seated on those barrels, and bitter fights take place when
somebody wants to use them and for that purpose they are forced to
disturb the sleepers on top of the barrels. Others prefer to commit
nuisance where they happen to be, against the companions who happen to
be near them and that occasions new fights.
The atmosphere is so fetid that it almost chokes and asphyxiates you.
It is so dense that you can almost cut it with a knife.
This dungeon is lighted by some electric lamps whose rays can barely
penetrate the atmosphere. Eight hundred men habitually dirty, clad in
pestilential rags, the respiration of all those lungs, the emanations
of all these bodies, the filth of those barrels.... I am horrified at
the remembrance of it all and I am wondering that I am still alive.
Soon after the prisoners have settled to sleep, from the different
walls there starts a downward immigration of myriads of parasitical
insects. One cannot possibly conceive the innumerable number of
bed-bugs, some of enormous size, lice of all classes, fleas,
mosquitoes and cock-roaches. They assure me that the prisoners become
accustomed to all these parasites and they do not heed them. The truth
is that besides myself I did not notice anybody paying any attention
to them.
Only three persons were privileged to use cots; the head keeper and
two head men. I could not find a place to lie down. The head keeper
saw me standing and understood the reason of my perplexity and
authorized me to sleep under his cot. At first I took this offer as an
insult; later I understood the full value of that concession which was
not gratis but cost me 25 cents.
It had just struck nine at the prison clock when suddenly and
accidentally all the electric lights went out. The darkness was
absolute. Immediately a formidable roar arose from that mob and a
fearful struggle began. There were heard shouts of hatred, fearsome
lamentations, blasphemies, the voices of the head men trying to impose
order and shouting to the prisoners to keep silent, but without avail.
It was undescribable uproar.
Soon afterwards footsteps of soldiers were heard nearing the door.
An employé arrived with the escort bringing a lantern along. He
opened the grated door with a great deal of noise and gave order to
the soldiers to fire in case of further disorder. Then everything
was silent as if by incantation. The turnkey asked for the oil lamps
hanging on the walls, lighted them and distributed them to the head
men to place them in their corresponding places. From time to time the
silence was interrupted by some stifled groans.
The turnkey ordered the formation of rows to make ready for the roll
call. They brought the register and the prisoners going into the
corridor after their names being called. Some did not appear, others
answered in a dying voice. All the prisoners able to do so went back
to rest. There were three dead and seventeen wounded. Who are the
authors of these crimes? They have so far not discovered them, and
those who know the way of the prison claim that they never will be
found. The prisoners no matter how strict the vigilance and how often
they search them succeed in hiding pieces of bones which form part of
the meat rations, and these bones they sharpen against the stones of
the floor until they become as sharp and pointed as daggers. Those
are the weapons used in their fights. They also employ scissors, and
spoons and other instruments which are used in their different trades
and which they manage to steal.
Every time that there is a riot as happens when the lights go out
then some of the most hardened prisoners take advantage of this fact
to revenge themselves or to wound those nearest to them, without any
provocation, and it is very difficult to discover the author of the
crime as many are spattered with blood owing to the crowded conditions
of the dormitory.
Many of the wounds result from the indiscriminate use of the stick in
the confusion and darkness by the head men, who do so in self-defence
or in fear.
After the dead and wounded had been taken to the hospital they locked
us up again calling the names anew and leaving two guards at the gate
to fire at the first sign of disorder. I went back to my place under
the cot of the head keeper thinking to myself that the solitary cell
in spite of the “incommunicacion” was preferable to this dangerous and
filthy galley. I did not sleep a wink all night long. At 6 o’clock in
the morning they opened the gate and all this sickening lee contained
was vomited forth.
I was one of the first ones to go out and I nearly fainted when I
felt the fresh air of the morning. Mr. H.... was waiting for me and
he invited me to breakfast with him in the department of distinction.
Later he asked to see the warden so as to get me a permit to go over
to his department.
Meanwhile I jotted down those notes although I did not know how I
managed to do so as my head seems to be a vacuum. I think I have a
beginning of fever.
Not only were Mexicans persecuted in their own country, but when
Mexican liberals fled across the border into the United States,
thinking that they could tell the truth and publish it in the American
press, they were persecuted and imprisoned through the orders of
the Mexican Ambassador in Washington to the Attorney Generals under
Theodore Roosevelt, and William H. Taft. Some of the liberals were even
kidnapped across the Mexican border and sent to rot in the fortress of
San Juan de Ulloa in Vera Cruz. Manuel Sarabia, F. Flores Magon, L.
Rivera and Antonio I. Villareal were the pioneers of Mexican agitation
against Diaz. “Mother” Jones by suggestion of the writer before his
imprisonment for libel against a Diaz official, induced Congressman
W. B. Wilson of Pennsylvania (Secretary of Labor in the Cabinet of
Wilson), to investigate the persecution of Mexican liberals in the
United States by American officials in 1910. The result was a cessation
of these persecutions and a renewal of agitation in the southwest and
along the border.
The agitation against the blood and iron rule of Porfirio Diaz
was begun over six years before the Madero revolution; it was the
preliminary work of untold numbers of martyrs who died unknown, crushed
by the ruthless hand of the half-breed Czar.
In every State governors, jefes politicos, and cientificos robbed the
Indians of the land in their possession. By the year 1892 all the great
bodies of agricultural land had passed from the possession of more than
a million small farmers into the hands of less than fifty rich families
and corporations of the Diaz clique.
The State of Morelos (2,734 square miles) and a population of 179,614
inhabitants, became practically the property of half a dozen families.
In the State of Chihuahua one family alone, the Terrazas, owned as
much land as the combined territory of Switzerland, Belgium and
Holland. Towards the end of the Diaz régime nearly 3,000,000 Indians
had been despoiled of their native land and General Diaz had sold over
83,000,000 acres for the paltry sum of $3,000,000.
The policy of General Diaz was to eliminate the Mexican Indian peons
from valuable land and from an independent economic life into peonage
in great haciendas, in great mines and factories where they could
be more easily controlled by the rurales and the soldiers. At the
height of Diaz’s rule, in 1908, when all the world was singing the
pæans to the glory of Porfirio Diaz, the writer found out by personal
investigation that the average salary for unskilled labor in the mines
near the city of Pachuca (inh. 40,000) was three cents gold a day, and
in the haciendas six cents gold.
What was the result of this policy of despoliation and oppression?
Simply that wages in the great haciendas, mines, and factories were
kept as low as possible, while prices of food stuffs and necessities
went up by the help of a rigid system of high tariff. The great
haciendados, the foreign owners of mines and industrial concerns, the
same ones who were reaping a golden harvest and singing the praise of
Diaz’s rule were buying labor in Mexico at a very low Mexican silver
rate and were selling the result of this labor at a gold rate.
The press agents of Diaz spoke of the perfect school system inaugurated
at the beginning of his rule. General Diaz never could have crushed
Mexico in the iron grip of his hand if education had been as general
as was claimed. The percentage of illiteracy in the thirty-five years
of the czar’s rule was lowered from ninety to eighty-six per cent.
but only in the cities. The rural school system was almost completely
neglected, or was turned over to the care of priests and nuns.
It was this fourteen per cent. of the people who could read and write,
which organized the agitation in Mexico under tremendous difficulties
and by unheard-of sacrifices.
The political advisers of Diaz never dreamed that every Indian who was
expatriated, every workingman who saw the murders of his companions,
every Mexican who suffered from an unjust imprisonment, became an
incipient rebel, only awaiting the time that a leader would show them
their strength and the way to break the chains of their economic and
political slavery.
It could never be imagined by the rich foreign investors in Mexico
who had observed the patient and ignorant peons, that no matter how
pacific, how miserable and subdued a race, the day would come when they
must rebel and evolve into a daring and independent race.
The same happened in France through the revolution. Read the
description written by Mirabeau’s father of the savage-looking,
long-haired, barefoot peasants who came down from the mountains, and
the older Mirabeau’s prophetic reflections on the subject.
The worst offenders and the greatest enemies to Mexican political
and economic freedom were the foreigners; they always stood by the
oppressors with their financial and moral influence in Mexico, in
the United States and in Europe. Without this powerful help Diaz
would never have lasted thirty-five years. Foreigners in Mexico were
treated with a deference and were allowed privileges unknown to the
average Mexican. Porfirio Diaz always raised the spectre of American
intervention when he wanted to frighten restless Mexicans.
The only friends of liberal Mexico were the Socialists and the
organized workingmen in Europe and especially in the United States
who understood from the beginning the danger of an enslaved, ill-paid
proletariat across the border. The great agitation which exposed the
iron rule of Diaz was helped by Socialists and the proletariat in the
United States, and made it easy for Madero and his friends to plot and
organize a revolution across the border.
The foreign bankers, concessionaires, “friends of the friends” of
General Diaz, wanted a continuation of peace at any price, even at the
price of subjugation of all Mexican liberties, or if that failed, by
American intervention, and as a result of it either American conquest
or of American police rule as in Cuba.
The successor of Diaz had been chosen by the invisible rulers of Diaz,
everything about it was cut and dried, and even the list of members
of the Cabinet of the successor had been drawn up. When a foreigner
was asked about the economic and political rights of the Mexicans, he
shrugged his shoulders and answered that Indians and niggers were not
fit to rule themselves. The self-same Americans who would have started
a revolution in their own country if political conditions had been as
oppressive as in Mexico, spoke contemptuously of the valiant struggle
of the middle class Mexicans. To my utter amazement I heard an American
clergyman inform me after he had listened to a lecture of mine in favor
of the Constitutionalists and the prophecy of a speedy downfall of
Huerta, that he nevertheless believed Mexico needed strong men like
Huerta and Diaz.
Americans who invest money in Mexico cannot be blamed for being
ignorant of Mexican conditions, but how about foreigners who live years
in Mexico and come in daily contact with the people? Is it a wonder
that Mexicans are suspicious of foreigners?
Porfirio Diaz sold out his country to foreigners for a pittance, he
made them rich and prosperous, and he used Mexican labor, freedom,
and their suffering to raise himself on a pinnacle of fame unheard of
to any other man of his times. Mexico was only Mexico, but Diaz was
its prophet, its savior, its creator, its superman, and demi-god. The
Mexicans were an unknown, negligible quantity and quality, and the
fatal pseudo-greatness of Diaz was trumpeted across the world by an
army corps of foreign concessionaries, exploiters and grafters. But the
great Diaz myth like a monstrous Frankenstein destroyed itself in time.
CHAPTER III
THE MADERO REVOLUTION, ITS AIMS AND FAILURES
In the summer of 1908, when the writer was in Mexico he had heard that
a man called F. I. Madero was writing a book, in which he discussed the
advisability of contesting the seventh presidential election of General
Diaz. The book was supposed to have been written in collaboration with
a journalist who later was rewarded with the Governorship of Chiapas.
“The Presidential Question of 1910,” the title of the book, had about
ninety thousand words of written matter, and began with the War of
Independence down to General Diaz’s régime when he tried to analyze the
future political conduct of Diaz.
Of the interview of General Diaz in _Pearson’s Magazine_ of 1908, he
said: “We judge a study of his declarations to Creelman useless, as we
do not believe they are sincere, for they are in manifest contradiction
with his past acts, as General Diaz has always made promises which were
never kept, from the Plan of la Noria down to the last one.”
Although few intelligent Mexicans took General Diaz at his word, they
nevertheless caught him for the first time in a flagrant political
“faux pas” for not having denied the interview. They saw a chance to
take him at his own words and start the work of organizing an agitation
of the political conscience of Mexico.
Madero’s book was a powerful factor in this propaganda, which was
followed by a national organization of political clubs and speechmaking
by a few daring young men of the middle class. This fearless, open
propaganda copied the campaigning methods of the United States and
Madero was the head of the movement.
At first, Diaz, his political supporters and even the foreigners
laughed at their rash, foolish crusade which they thought would soon be
crushed and destroyed.
The Diaz clique, the cientificos and the old supporters of the czar,
men like General Reyes, General Naranjo, General Trevino, General
Izabal, General Torres, General Terrazas, Gen. Mucio Martinez, T.
Dehesa, R. Corral, J. Y. Limantour, E. Creel, Gen. G. Cosio, O. Molina
would all have liked to be president, but they were too much in awe
of the power of the old man in Chapultepec. Their political work was
all done underground, they were all getting ready for the moment when
General Diaz should step down gripped by the hand of death. None of
them imagined that any Mexican, no matter how daring, could shake the
foundation of the Diaz throne without the help of the middle class
of Mexico. When the old guard observed the impunity of the Madero
propaganda they guessed that it was going to be a repetition of the
events in the presidential elections of 1903-04 when Diaz allowed
his foolish enemies to come out in the open and then destroyed them
wholesale and in detail.
The great strength of Madero consisted in his peaceful methods of
propaganda and his constant advice to Mexicans to be patient under the
persecutions of the government agents. He advised them to suffer even
imprisonment and death so as to awaken the interest of the majority who
would soon follow their example.
Madero was assisted in his campaign by his brother Gustavo and a young
lawyer Roque Estrada, and was accompanied everywhere by his wife,
even in jail. Roque Estrada wrote about the evolution of the Madero
revolution and divided it into four parts:
1. The Awakening of the Mexican political soul.
2. The Concentration of the revolutionary propaganda.
3. The Destruction of the Diaz régime.
4. The Reconstruction of the new government.[5]
The campaign continued under difficulties, when the supporters of Diaz
awakened to the fact that Madero was growing popular. Then on the 6th
of June, 1910, came the news of his arrest.
It must be added that one of the reasons for the indifference of the
authorities to the Madero propaganda was the firm conviction that F. I.
Madero was a fool, an idiot, who was being used by powerful enemies to
initiate a counter campaign against Diaz. A second reason was the fact
that Madero belonged to a wealthy and politically influential family
of which the head, Don Evaristo, had been Governor of Coahuila during
General Gonzalez’ term (1880-84). Moreover, the Maderos had financial
connections in New York, Paris and London.
Besides the head of the family, every member of the Madero clan had
disowned Francisco I. Madero’s political activities with the exception
of his wife and Don Gustavo. It was a repetition of the story of Joseph
in the Old Testament: F. I. Madero like Joseph was sold out by this
brother’s family. There was a radical wing in the Madero movement
headed by Gustavo Madero which believed that all the peaceful methods
of agitation were useless and that the only successful method of
overthrowing the dictator was to be effected in the same way by which
he had come into power--by revolution.
F. I. Madero insisted on peaceful methods, so Gustavo without informing
his brother went to Paris ostensibly to organize a Mexican Railway of
the Centre. As soon as he cashed the first instalment of the moneys for
the construction ($375,000)[6] he used it to buy arms and ammunition
for the revolution which was certain to burst out in a few months.
In San Luis Potosí, October 5th, 1910, Don F. I. Madero, who by this
time had become convinced of the futility of peaceful propaganda,
wrote the famous Plan. A few days later he was advised that there was
an order for his arrest which would be followed by the application of
the “Ley Fuga.” Disguised as a common laborer he fled into the United
States on October 7th, and went to San Antonio. Some New York papers
had long accounts of his flight and plans, sent by their correspondents
but the news was not published.
The Plan of San Luis Potosí was a direct challenge to Porfirio Diaz,
and it used almost the same slogan which General Diaz had written on
the Plan de la Noria against Juarez and later his Plan de Tuxtepec and
Palo Blanco which was: “Effective suffrage and no re-election.”
A great deal has been published about the great promises of land reform
and distribution of great estates by F. I. Madero and which he could or
would not fulfil.
The exact wording of that famous Article 3d of the Plan has either been
forgotten or misinterpreted. We reproduce the Article:
_Article 3d_: “As a result of the abuses of the lands, numerous small
proprietors, mostly Indians, have been despoiled of their lands by
common consent of the ministry of Fomento or by the decisions of the
Mexican courts. In justice to the old proprietors, they should be given
back lands which have been taken away from them in such an arbitrary
manner. The decisions of the Ministry of Fomento and of the courts
will be subject to revision and it will be demanded of those who acted
in such immoral fashion, to return the land to their original owners,
besides paying them an indemnity. Only in case that the lands should
have passed to a third party before the publication of this plan, will
the original owners receive an indemnity from those whose spoliation
benefitted them.”[7]
Thus it will be seen that the Plan of San Luis Potosí aimed first of
all to destroy the régime which had made the land robbery possible.
After the capture of Juarez the whole Diaz Government was practically
destroyed as a political force and the Reconstruction would have been
easy with a new government. But the reactionary forces were at work to
arrest the impetus of the revolution. Limantour came back from Paris
and prepared the way to an entrance of the reactionaries by threatening
to arrest Gustavo Madero for the misappropriation of money to the use
of the revolution.
Madero’s father and brother had to accept his conditions and went
post haste to confer with F. I. Madero at the border. Limantour’s
conditions were the cessation of hostilities and a constitutional
transfer of the presidential power on the shoulder of the clerical
L. de la Barra. Limantour’s clever, strategic movement arrested the
radical impulse, put a few Maderistas in the Cabinet, and others in the
Governorship, but the inexperience of the new men and the conscious
inertia of ministers, like Ernesto Madero, Secretary of Finance
and Rafael Hernandez, Secretary of Fomento, checked all effective
attempts at reforms. The two radical brothers, the Vasquez Gomez, were
eliminated. Limantour went back to Paris to watch from a distance and
to direct the tactics of the policy of inertia.
Meanwhile plots were hatched against the life of Madero. One almost
succeeded at this time. While L. de la Barra was provisional President
they sent F. I. Madero to confer with Zapata who agreed to meet him on
condition that no federal troops should accompany Madero in Cuautla.
General Huerta, who was in charge of the federal troops in Morelos
broke the promise, and attacked Cuautla in hopes that Zapata would kill
Madero for his supposed treachery. The common sense of Zapata saved
Madero’s life.
The first conspiracy against Madero happened when he was in Juarez and
the cientificos had plotted his destruction by inciting the suspicious
anger of men like Orozco and Villa against him. But Madero’s bravery
saved him again. The cientifico plotters were said to be T. E.
Obregon, F. Carbajal and Oscar Braniff. T. E. Obregon later became
a member of Huerta’s cabinet and Carbajal the provisional president
following the flight of General Huerta. As soon as Madero was elected
the cientificos captured Orozco with money and started him as the head
of a counter revolution before the President had been seated a month.
Then they pushed General Reyes and later Felix Diaz and Vasquez Gomez
to revolt against Madero.
These movements although they failed, were kept up so as to show the
world the incompetence and lack of popularity of the Madero régime.
Zapata started on the war path incited by the cruelties of the federal
generals and all over the country rich haciendados (ranchers) gave
money to guerrilla leaders to keep up the anarchy and by attacks on
American property and American citizens to invite American intervention.
Twice the Taft régime attempted or threatened an invasion of Mexico
and once they almost succeeded. The failure was due to the exposé of
the little plot which resulted in the resignation of Dickinson, then
Secretary of War.[8]
It must be remembered that the Attorney General under Taft was a lawyer
who had been a personal representative of Diaz in the United States,
and among some of the lawyers who had been his partners was a brother
of the President of the United States. All were interested in Mexico
financially and politically.
The threats of invasion by the Taft régime had a disastrous effect
on the reorganization of the new government. Madero was surrounded
by enemies at home and abroad. The army, the cientificos and the
clericals were plotting at home. The Mexican Ambassador Calero had
formed an alliance with the American Ambassador, hoping to step into
the presidency as L. de la Barra had done. Calero went so far as to
telegraph to some French bankers who were negotiating a loan to Madero,
to stop until further orders; the further orders were supposed to come
from the new government which Calero hoped to head.
But meanwhile there should not come any financial assistance to Madero.
In Congress men like F. Bulnes, Q. Moheno, J. M. Lozano headed the
opposition which interfered with any plans of reform, by cutting off
all financial help. Madero was just beginning to reap the fruit of his
policy of conciliation.
With few exceptions all the old Diaz appointments in the courts, in
the States, in the consular and diplomatic service were kept in their
places, and as a result the old methods were kept in vogue. All the
army officers who had ruthlessly fought the revolutionists were left in
their positions and the rebel chiefs were dismissed with thanks.
With the new interests created by the Madero ascension to power there
sprang up a hungry crowd of office seekers and a neo-cientifico
régime headed by Ernesto Madero and Rafael Hernandez. It would not be
supposed even as a fantastic flight of a poetical imagination that the
neo-cientificos would sincerely attempt a reform of the government. E.
Madero is reported as having said that the financial system left by
Limantour worked like a Swiss watch. The only reform to men of great
interests can be achieved in their favor, not against them.
Zapata could only be induced to stop his rebellious activity by a
solution of the agrarian problem in Morelos. The Cabinet Minister under
Madero only incited the exasperation by sending men of Huerta’s stamp
in their midst.
It can be safely asserted that all the government officials in Mexico
were inimical to reforms beginning with the Madero clan (excepting
F. I. and Gustavo Madero), down to the lowest officials. The men
who had fought for the revolution watched in disgust and dismay the
disintegration of the revolutionary ideals.
CHAPTER IV
PLOTTING WHICH OVERTHREW MADERO
We have seen in the foregoing chapter the mistakes which had been made
by Madero. Being surrounded by enemies, he was too lenient with them,
and it proved disastrous.
Orozco, one of his chiefs of guerrilla, should have been
court-martialled and shot in Juarez according to military rule. The
same drastic penalty could have been applied without injustice against
two other high officers in the Mexican army, who had rebelled against
the authority--Felix Diaz and General Reyes. But Madero, besides being
too humane for such methods, sincerely believed that leniency was a
sign of strength. Assuredly it was, but only in case the cabinet and
the government in general had been loyal to him. Some cabinet members
plotted quite openly against him--A. G. Granados, for instance. The
headquarters of the plotters were in Paris and Geneva, with a branch
office in the New York Consulate. In Mexico Rodolfo Reyes was the soul
of the movement. In Paris, Limantour and L. de la Barra worked together
with General Mondragon to unravel the threads of the conspiracy in
favor of Felix Diaz, who would represent the old Porfirista crowd, with
the assistance of the clericals and the great landowners, and bankers,
Americans as well as Mexican and French.
In New York the plotters supported General Reyes as representing the
army, especially the younger element. To all appearances the conspiracy
was essentially a military mutiny backed by the científicos, the
landed interest and the clericals. The most prominent army plotters
were General Mondragon, General Reyes, General Blanquet, Gen. Felix
Diaz, General Beltran, General Navarrete and General Huerta. Among the
civilians were: M. Calero, A. G. Granados, T. E. Obregon, Vera Estañol,
A. R. Gil, L. de la Barra, J. M. Lozano, Q. Moheno and Dr. Urrutia.
The political and military heads, exemplified in the above mentioned
names, represented the army, the científicos, the clericals, the landed
aristocracy,--in fact, all the reactionary powers and none of the
liberal or revolutionary tendencies of the people.
In utter blindness, innocence and optimism, call it what you please,
Madero scoffed at the idea of a plot which could overthrow him. He
firmly believed that the Mexican people were behind him and would
support him. He forgot that all the powers of reaction were well
organized and that the Mexican people who supported him were not
organized,--that they were at the mercy of a few political bandits
without principles and without country.
These unpatriotic politicians knew from experience that the foreign
bankers, the foreign corporations, the American government and
especially the American ambassador, were inimical to Madero, and
hostile to liberal ideas, and would help them to resist any attempts to
reform the land question or change the financial “status quo” as left
over by J. Y. Limantour.
When Gustavo Madero discovered the plot on February 4th, and learned
of the conspirators, he took it to his brother, who laughed at him.
The mutiny started on Sunday morning, the 9th of February. During five
days Madero continued playing with fate, and when the rebellion, which
was dated for the 16th of March, burst out on the 9th, he was taken by
surprise. The plotters were scared into action six weeks before the
date set, because they suspected treachery in their own ranks. On one
side there existed the ambition of General Reyes, who was under the
political management of his son Rodolfo, on the other side the ambition
of Felix Diaz, whose mentor was General Mondragon. General Huerta’s
ambitions were always latent, but were kindled and managed by his
political tutor, Dr. Urrutia, who represented the clerical interests,
as far back as the Diaz time.
In the year 1908 a young painter, Dr. Atl, had to undergo an operation
and went to the sanatorium of Dr. Urrutia. There he found General
Huerta, who was then unknown to anybody except his own officers and
soldiers. Dr. Atl was a “compadre” of Dr. Urrutia, and although a
radical of the extremest type, Dr. Urrutia and General Huerta only
laughed at him, humored him, but took him into their confidence.
One afternoon as they were discussing political events, Dr. Urrutia
exclaimed that ambitious and able men should prepare the way for the
presidency after the death of General Diaz. Finally Dr. Urrutia said to
General Huerta: “General, you look like presidential timber, you are
capable and fearless and you control half of the army. Why don’t you
begin to get ready?” General Huerta looked at Dr. Urrutia and Dr. Atl
through half closed eyes, expressionless as a graven image, and after a
long pause he said: “It is difficult, but it is not impossible.”
During the Reyes-Diaz mutiny in Mexico City, General Huerta was in
charge of the troops. He was making a great noise and killing off
as many volunteers of Madero and non-combatants as possible. His
ambition was to sap the strength of the Maderists and to terrorize the
population of the city into acquiescence to any future pact.
During these strenuous ten days Dr. Urrutia was seen going back and
forth constantly between the house of the Bishop of Mexico and General
Huerta. He was advising the soldiers and tying the strings which would
lift the less experienced Huerta into the presidential chair, backed
by the money and the prestige of the Church. During the ten days of
constant bombardment, the citadel where Felix Diaz was entrenched was
touched but twice by the Huerta guns, and the National Palace only
twice also. An American officer who happened to be in Mexico City,
backed the claim of General Angeles, that the citadel could have been
taken in a few hours if Huerta had really been sincere in his attack.
General Angeles proposed to carry the citadel if F. I. Madero would
only place him at the head of the government troops. Madero refused for
fear of hurting Huerta’s vanity, and hoped thus to prove that he had
faith in his loyalty.
We publish the account of events which followed the arrest of Madero
and Suarez, by Mr. Marquez Sterling, who tried his best to save
Madero’s life.
DECLARATION made by the Minister of the Republic of Cuba in Mexico,
Mr. Manuel Marquez Sterling, to the _Herald_.
It was exactly twenty-nine days after I presented my credentials to
President Madero, when the revolt in the City of Mexico started. I
shall not refer to the tragic scenes which took place during the
struggle in the city, from the 9th of February to the ruin of the
government, as the same are now well known to all the world; I shall
only refer to the fall of Mr. Madero, after ten days of terrible
disorder, during which, automobiles of diverse legations constantly
crossed the streets of the city.
On the morning of February 18th, in a conference which I had with the
Secretary of Foreign Relations, Pedro Lascurain, he assured me that
in the afternoon the revolt would receive a decisive blow, and that
the city would return to the hands of the government. Precisely at
two o’clock in the afternoon, I received notice that General Blanquet
had made the President and his cabinet prisoners. A short time later
we were called to the American Embassy by Mr. Henry Lane Wilson and
informed of this extraordinary event.
General Blanquet verified the arrest by order of General Huerta, and
as a consequence, the sharpshooting in the streets ceased. In the
evening, the Ministers of Chile, Brazil and I visited the American
Embassy, looking for further news. We there met General Huerta and
Gen. Felix Diaz, who for several days had fought in the streets of
Mexico. They were accompanied by other persons, such as the actual
Minister of Justice, Lic. Rodolfo Reyes. Reyes then read in a loud
voice, in our presence, a document in which both Generals agreed
upon the ceasing of hostilities. Huerta and Diaz later signed this
document, embracing immediately afterwards, while their companions
applauded; the diplomats did not applaud, remaining as mute witnesses
of a scene which was unexplainable to us.
On the 19th, in the morning, I left the Cuban Legation and went
through several streets, in order to get an idea of the popular
sentiment. I heard the death of Gustavo Madero discussed, of whose
capture I had already heard, they saying that he had been assassinated
in the arsenal, and that in the afternoon Huerta would execute
the president himself. They also stated that the Vice-President,
Pino Suarez, had tried to escape. While I listened to all this,
a distinguished Mexican gentleman, whose name I shall not state,
detained me and said: “You and the members of the Diplomatic Corps are
the only ones who can save Madero.”
On returning to the Legation, this idea had taken possession of my
mind, and for that purpose I immediately sent a note to the American
Ambassador, communicating the matter to him and proposing to him that
the Diplomatic Corps should take charge of the same. In the name of
my government, I offered the services of the Cruiser _Cuba_ (which
some days previous I had requested from my government, and which was
anchored in Vera Cruz) to save them from danger, taking them away from
the country, in case they should obtain their liberty. I immediately
went to the Japanese Legation to see the parents of the President,
who had heard of the death of their son, Gustavo, and which they did
not credit. They begged me therefore, to go to Mr. Wilson and beg him
to aid us with General Huerta, to save the lives of their two sons.
The Chargé d’Affaires of the Japanese Legation accompanied me to the
American Embassy and we made our proposition known to the Ambassador.
We there met the Spanish Minister, and he and I agreed that the
situation was more serious than we had thought, and therefore
determined to personally see General Huerta, asking him for the lives
of the prisoners. We went in my automobile, flying the Cuban flag, but
we were not able to see Huerta. Instead, we were received by General
Blanquet, who treated us with great courtesy, assuring us that they
would respect the lives of the prisoners, and while this was passing
the Minister of Chile arrived, telling us that Madero had consented to
resign as President of the Republic, and that the Secretaries of State
and other persons who had been made prisoners with Madero and Pino
Suarez, had been set at liberty.
On the morning of the 19th nevertheless, a representative of Huerta
urged Madero to resign. Madero replied to this messenger that he
was now resolved to resign, provided that he who had usurped his
place should govern according to the Constitution. While they were
explaining this, Mr. Lascurain went to see Madero, as a mediator, to
whom Madero expressed the conditions under which he would resign.
Lascurain, in Huerta’s name, accepted. These conditions were: that the
resignation should be delivered to the Minister of Chile, who would
retain it in his possession until Madero and Pino Suarez should be
safely aboard the _Cuba_ in Vera Cruz. Madero stipulated also that
in the trip to Vera Cruz, they should be accompanied by the Chargé
d’Affaires of Japan and myself, Madero insisting principally in that,
before delivering the resignation to Congress, Huerta should sign a
letter, in which he would promise to comply with the terms of same.
That same afternoon Madero signed his resignation, and further, as
Lascurain was present, he granted, at his indication, that the affair
should be ventilated among Mexicans, handing the resignation to
Lascurain, instead of delivering it to the Minister of Chili. It was
then stipulated that at ten o’clock that night Madero and Pino Suarez
would leave for Vera Cruz in a special train, together with their
families, and accompanied by myself and an official of the Japanese
legation, and escorted by a powerful guard.
Having communicated this arrangement to the office of General
Blanquet, I ascended to General Huerta’s department to see him, but
I was informed that he was sleeping. I immediately returned to the
office of General Blanquet, where the Ministers of Chile and Spain
awaited me. We then asked for permission to see Madero and same was
immediately conceded to us, going to the four first rooms, in which he
was confined.
Madero warmly expressed his gratitude to me, begging me to accompany
him to Vera Cruz, which request I was pleased to accede to.
“When you are ready,” he told us, “come to the palace in order to go
to the station. It would be well if you could come at eight, but at
any rate I shall wait for you until ten o’clock.”
I then left, and immediately went to telegraph to the Commander of the
_Cuba_ that he should expect us, being ready to sail from Vera Cruz,
and that he should do what was necessary in order to receive aboard
the Heads of the Government and their families.
At eight o’clock I was punctually at the Palace, making my proposition
known to General Blanquet. He ordered one of his aides to accompany
me; the four rooms occupied by Madero and Pino Suarez were connecting.
The door of one of the rooms faced the yard, and there were many
soldiers and officials in the entrance; there were also sentinels in
the interior of the sparsely furnished rooms, sentinels who, according
to what I knew were replaced each moment. General Angeles, one of the
official favorites of Madero, was also a prisoner in these rooms.
Ernesto Madero was there visiting his nephew.
Receiving us affectionately, Madero asked me if I knew anything about
his brother Gustavo, and it could be seen that he did not know of his
death. I evaded the question to the best of my ability. Suddenly,
Madero asked about the letter that he had to give to Huerta. None
of us had it, and then Ernesto Madero said that he would go and get
it from Huerta. Almost immediately he returned without it, but with
the news that Lascurain had gone to present Madero’s resignation to
Congress.
On knowing this, Madero became very excited, and from that moment
lost all hope of salvation. “I have fallen into a trap for the second
time,” he said, indicating to his uncle that he should go and tell
Lascurain that he wished him to come immediately. Then Ernesto Madero
confessed the truth to him, telling him that the resignation had
already been presented and accepted by Congress. “This is a felony
of Lascurain,” said Madero. “The agreement was that the resignation
should not be presented until I was aboard the _Cuba_.”
In those moments, we knew by the conduct of an official that Huerta
had just been designated as Provisional President by Congress.
“This has been the second trap into which I have fallen,” Madero
finally said to me. “I am now convinced that I shall not leave Mexico
alive. They will conduct me to prison this same night, and on the
trip, they will shoot me, or else they will assassinate me right here,
as soon as we are alone.”
Ernesto Madero begged me to remain with him, telling me that if they
succeeded in surviving that night, that probably the Diplomatic Corps
would be capable of saving them. I decided to accompany them, for how
could I have the heart to take my hat and leave them, being persuaded
that these men would be dead as soon as I was in the street? Ernesto
finally left us, Madero, Pino Suarez and I remaining in these gloomy
rooms.
At one o’clock in the morning he invited me to rest, indicating to me
that he was very sleepy, and without the least agitation, this man who
had just been deposed from the Presidency, commenced to prepare two
beds with chairs, one for himself and the other for me.
He had finished his labor, when an official sent by General Huerta
arrived, he having ordered him to tell us that the train arranged to
conduct the prisoners out of the country was conveniently ready, but
on account of circumstances which he would explain later, it had been
impossible to despatch it. The same official invited me to retire and
wait. And as, previously, something had been said in regard to the
train being ready to leave at five o’clock in the morning, I asked the
official if this was in the programme, but he replied that he did not
know anything. As soon as I saw Madero sleep, I went to keep company
with Pino Suarez, first giving a glance at Madero, who slept like a
child. At this moment, the guards entered and turned out the lights.
From the upper crevices of the windows some rays of light penetrated,
but they did not molest us. We were so closely guarded, that any
phrase which passed between Pino Suarez and myself had to be spoken
in a very low voice.
At 9:30 in the morning breakfast was served to us. Pino Suarez did not
wish to take the coffee, fearing that it might be poisoned, but Madero
and I took it. Then Madero gave the boy who had served us a dollar,
and told him to bring us the morning papers. We did not permit this,
fearing that he might find out about Gustavo’s death. Madero became
resigned, lying down on his bed of chairs, where he slept for twenty
minutes.
When he awakened, he said he was prepared for everything that might
happen, but he indicated to me that I should approach the diplomats in
order to save him, which I promised to do with pleasure. He also asked
me if his wife had also made any petition personally to Huerta.
About ten o’clock in the morning, the wife of Pino Suarez arrived,
accompanied by a gentleman, and I then took leave of them.
The balance of that day, February 20th, and the two following days,
we worked to save Madero. I asked Huerta why he had not given his
consent in this respect, to which he replied that he did not dare send
Madero to Vera Cruz, until he could have confidence in the military
authorities of that place. I, in turn, indicated to him that he might
be sent to Tampico, where I could have the _Cuba_ sent. He further
showed himself irresolute. Almost all the foreign ministers saw
Huerta personally that day, and interceded for the life of Madero.
On the morning of the 22d, the ministers thought the lives of Madero
and Pino Suarez to be out of danger, although we had heard the rumor
that they schemed to place Madero in an insane asylum. At night
all the ministers approached the American Embassy to celebrate the
anniversary of the birth of Washington. Huerta and all the Ministers
in his Cabinet were present and they all appeared very calm.
On the morning of the following day, Sunday, I was very urgently
called to the telephone. It was Mrs. Madero, who was very excited
on account of the news she had received that her husband had been
wounded. I answered that this could not be true, but a little later I
read in the morning papers the event of the death of Madero and Pino
Suarez at 11:15 the previous night, on being taken to the penitentiary.
Ambassador Wilson finally tried to obtain permission for Mrs. Madero
to see the body of her husband. We then believed that the balance
of the family were in danger, and I hastily proposed to take them
from the country. I personally sent in a secret manner to Vera Cruz,
Francisco Madero, father of the assassinated president, and his
brother Ernesto, and they embarked on the _Cuba_.
I later conducted the mother, widow and sister of the President to
the _Cuba_, leaving Vera Cruz on February 25th.
Mr. Marquez Sterling has belonged to the Diplomatic Corps of the
Republic of Cuba several years, and has occupied the post of Minister
in Argentine, Peru and Brazil. During the administration of President
Palma, he was counsellor of the Department of State. He presented his
resignation as Minister of Mexico after the murder of Madero and Suarez.
In the account of the events leading to the murder of Madero
and Suarez, Mr. Marquez Sterling mentions the excitement of the
prisoner-president when he discovered that Don Pedro Lascurain had
turned over the written resignation of Madero into Huerta’s hands.
What happened was told by Lascurain himself. As soon as General Huerta
heard that Pedro Lascurain had Madero’s resignation in his possession,
he asked to see him and begged him with great insistence to give him
the valuable paper. Don Pedro Lascurain was obdurate, so the cunning
old Indian, knowing that Lascurain was a devout Catholic, fished
out the holy medallion hanging by a chain to his neck. “See this
medallion,” said Huerta. “It is the most precious thing I possess; it
was given to me by my mother when I was a little boy. I promise you
on all that is holy and sacred to me, I swear on the white head of my
sainted mother, the memory of this holy image, that if you give me
the President’s resignation, I shall guarantee his life,” and as he
finished the sentence he kissed the holy medallion.
Don Pedro Lascurain, convinced, handed him the paper with the
resignation of Madero and Suarez. The next day General Huerta was
visited by the Belgian, Spanish and Japanese Ministers who asked him
to guarantee the life of the ex-President and Vice-president. Huerta
answered:
“Gentlemen, will you guarantee to me that if I permit Madero and Suarez
to go out of Mexico, that they will not start another revolution
against my government in the United States?” The three diplomats
declared that they could not give such promises.
“Then,” he exclaimed, “gentlemen, how can I be made responsible for
their lives?” The diplomats left the general without answering.
As the price of blood, the generals and the civilians demanded the
heads of Madero and Suarez; the most insistent of all was Don Rodolfo
Reyes, who called for victims to avenge the death of his father in
front of the National Palace. Adolfo Basso’s life was also sacrificed
with that of Gustavo Madero’s. The Huerta Cabinet went into power like
a Black Hand Cabinet, after the assassination of its enemies. This
infamous list should be remembered by all who are interested in the
reconstruction of Mexico, and who speak of amnesty.
General Huerta, Provisional President.
L. de la Barra, Foreign Affairs.
A. García Granados, Interior.
Rodolfo Reyes, Justice.
T. Esquivel Obregon, Finance.
General Mondragon, War.
J. Vera Estañol, Instruction.
A. Robles Gil, Fomento.
CHAPTER V
HUERTA IN POWER--THE LANDING OF AMERICAN MARINES IN VERA CRUZ
When we speak of revolutions we must consider three facts. First,
that in Mexico’s history there have been only three real revolutions:
the revolution which overthrew Spanish rule, the three years’ war
(1857-60), and the Madero revolution, which began with the overturning
of the Diaz régime and was continued by the Carranza revolution and
the flight of Huerta. Secondly, it must be remembered that all other
political and military upheavals, of long or short duration, cannot be
called revolutions but are in fact either mutinies or revolts or coups
d’état or as the Mexicans call them “cuartelazos.” And lastly, that
no revolution can hope of success unless it is backed by the majority
of the middle class, and no successful revolution can be organized
with foreign and especially American money with concessionary strings
attached to it.
General Huerta with a soldier’s training and temperament, and an
unsympathetic knowledge of his country’s history, thought that for the
sake of getting and staying in power the control of the army was the
only possible road. Not only Huerta, but his most prominent supporters
made the mistake of confusing cruelty, brutality and treachery with
power.
Huerta’s cunning was believed to be statesmanship, but very soon his
Machiavellian “double crossing” of Felix Diaz, Rodolfo Reyes and
General Mondragon, pointed to his methods of procedure. The elimination
of his more powerful enemies and the mysterious disappearance of the
less known enemies, showed that wholesale assassinations were as
frequent as under Diaz’s rule. Nevertheless, if Diaz was ruthless he
was at least more careful of public opinion. The foolish excuse that a
rescuing party had been responsible for the accidental death of Madero
and Suarez, laid bare to the world the inner circumvolution of Huerta’s
political brain.
A simpleton could have advised him that Madero murdered was much more
to be feared than Madero alive. Madero the martyr was remembered
through his virtues and ideals, and all his faults, weaknesses and
blunders were forgotten. What Madero alive could not achieve, Madero
dead, united under one idea, one effort, one banner.
Huerta’s supporters lacked what is essential in politics, psychological
perception of public opinion. Huerta, the double-edged sword of the
clericals, destroyed by his blunders the last vestige of clerical
power which supported the militarists and reactionaries. Terrible
sacrifices were enacted to strike terror into the hearts of political
opponents. Secret agents lured the political victims into automobiles
to a solitary spot near Mexico City, close to Guadalupe; then they were
stabbed to death and hastily buried on the spot.
The Huerta executioners were themselves in danger of being murdered for
knowing too much, but their suspicion enabled them to escape death, and
during Carbajal’s short rule they were caught and lived to tell the
details of their gruesome work.
Dr. Urrutia, once minister of the interior in Huerta’s cabinet was
the chief executioner of the dictator. Senator Dominguez because he
had attacked Huerta in the Senate and accused him of the murder of
Madero and Suarez, and Mr. Rendon were driven gagged to Dr. Urrutia’s
sanatorium in the suburbs. They were put to sleep under the influence
of ether, their bodies were atrociously mutilated and when awakened
to consciousness, they died of the loss of blood and the tremendous
nervous shock.
Such savage methods accelerated the disruption of the reign of terror
and drove all elements into active co-operation under the leadership
of Carranza. Secret agents were also sent to murder Carranza, Villa,
Obregon, Gonzalez, but the game was too risky. The federal General
Rabago succeeded in catching Abraham Gonzalez, governor of Chihuahua
under Madero, and he was murdered by being pushed under the wheels of
a moving train.
A supporter of General Huerta when he foresaw the end of his friend
went into exile. He claimed that he had escaped two dangers by leaving
Mexico, one was a term in jail and the other a portfolio in Huerta’s
cabinet.
There was never a period in the history of Mexico when such a
congregation of incompetents, of grafters, and murderous fools held
sway; even in the world’s history there is difficulty in finding a
parallel. We have to go back to Nero and Caracalla to find such a depth
of infamy, cowardice and Sadism.
Victoriano Huerta appeared as a demoniacal clown let loose on the
political circus of Mexico City, in an infernal saturnalia of gore,
drunkenness and prostitution. Huerta was the Avatar of greed, lust and
alcoholism, a moral hyena laughing diabolically at the amazed world,
a white-livered soldier pickled in cognac, a mental baboon grinning
inanely at his own political antics.
His own cabinet was chosen from among the best saloons, in the houses
of prostitution and from the prisons. A meeting of the Cabinet was like
a confab between maniacs, idiots and drunkards. A prominent Mexican who
asked to be heard by the members of the Cabinet reported that he was
interrupted by a minister before he could finish: “This is no time for
reforms,” said he; “we must drown the whole country in blood.” Another
suggested American intervention as the best method of uniting the
warring revolutionary elements. “Then,” he added, smiling, “the fool
gringos will do the dirty work for us and our lives and property will
be respected.” A third member advised a repetition of the system of
reconcentration as was inaugurated in Cuba by General Weyler.
Cabinet meetings took place in a house several miles from Mexico
City and later in the red light district and the famous Café Colon,
whose proprietor was made a general. All the ministers were also made
generals and had to appear in their uniforms. Everybody in the employ
of the government was created an officer in uniform, even the teachers
and clerks. Bartenders were made sergeants and it was reported that
Doña Lupe of the Salto del Agua was appointed honorary Rear-Admiral of
a squadron of cruisers. The sons of the ministers, especially those of
General Blanquet and the sons and relatives of General Huerta received
concessions for running gambling houses, for the sale of human beings
into the army at so much per head, and contracts for the sale of arms,
ammunition, uniforms and victuals to the War Department.
A naturalized American named Ratner was indirectly responsible for the
landing of the marines in Vera Cruz. Ratner was the president of the
Tampico News Co.; during Madero’s time he was caught selling arms to
Zapata and was deported under Article 33 of the Constitution.
When General Huerta became dictator Ratner came back. Being fertile and
unscrupulous in expedients, he became a favorite of the general. One
day he advised the dictator to buy all the arms and ammunition for sale
then in the United States, and for six months ahead so as to prevent
the Constitutionalists from getting any at any price. It was discovered
that the sum required for the purpose was too great so the order was
limited to machine and field guns and ammunition. Twenty-five million
dollars in gold was the price for this corner in war engines. Ratner
engineered the whole scheme and shipped the material to Odessa in
Russia. From Odessa they were sent to Hamburg and there reshipped for
Vera Cruz.
The United States secret service agents, who had been watching closely
the sales of American manufacturers, did not at first understand the
meaning of the elaborate and expensive shipping and reshipping.
When the _Ypiranga_ headed for Vera Cruz the whole matter became
clear. Huerta’s idea was to get first all the field guns in the
United States so as to prevent the revolutionists from getting them;
thereupon to force the United States to intervene in Mexico, counting
on the patriotism of the Mexicans to fight the invaders. His idea was
to concentrate all the revolutionary chiefs in the battles against
the Americans and to eliminate them one by one when they could be
reached more easily and without arousing suspicion. If that plot did
not succeed, he had decided to permit the Americans to occupy Mexico
City, knowing that they would respect the lives and properties of all
factions.
The Huerta conspiracy fell through because the Constitutionalists
believed in the word and friendship of President Wilson and they
mistrusted the word and patriotism of Huerta. It was soon afterwards
that the dictator made up his mind to resign. By the acceptance of
the A.B.C. mediation, the game was ended and he had decided to retire
before it was too late. Ratner had succeeded in his undertaking and his
commission was a million and a half in gold.
Señor Don Fernando Iglesias Calderón related that while he was a
prisoner in the castle of San Juan de Ulloa he heard that an order had
been telephoned from the Commander of Vera Cruz to the Commander of the
fort, to release, arm and dress about 300 convicts in civilian clothes.
They were landed in Vera Cruz the night before the landing of American
marines. In the morning General Maas, his officers and soldiers hastily
retreated to the hills near Soledad.
The blue jackets found no Federals, but the Mexican snipers who made
such a desperate resistance were mostly ex-convicts who were promised
their liberty if they fought the Americans. The shooting which emanated
from the Naval Academy was directed by ex-prisoners and a few cadets
who fought very bravely.
Two days after the landing of the marines General Navarrete of the
staff of General Maas passed through the American lines into the fort
of Ulloa, where he tried to induce F. Iglesias Calderón to join Huerta
in Mexico City and publish a manifesto uniting all factions against the
hated Americans.
Don Fernando Iglesias answered that he could not believe any
promises made by Huerta and that he was quite certain that the
Constitutionalists would not join the dictator even if they were
forced to resist an American invasion in the north. A few days later
the Commander of the fort under the advice of Don Fernando Iglesias
released all the political prisoners.
The Vera Cruz incident showed up the Federals as a despicable, cowardly
lot,--they had to arm a few hundred ex-convicts and civilians to do the
fighting for them.
The retirement of the Federals to Soledad likewise proved that there
was no serious intention to resist an advance of American soldiers to
Mexico City, as the general line of march could never have been taken
by way of Soledad, but only through the Cerro Gordo on the road to
Jalapa by the Interoceanic Railroad, the same itinerary used by Scott
in 1847. By advancing through the Cerro Gordo, Jalapa, Perote and
Puebla, the American troops could have ignored or driven the Federals
at Soledad into the mountains and by the capture of Esperanza cut off
their communications in the rear. That would automatically have forced
them to evacuate Soledad, Cordoba, and Orizaba. The whole campaign
would have been a repetition of the treachery of Santa Anna in 1847.
Fortunately for the Americans and Mexicans, President Wilson was too
wise to fall into such a trap, and the Constitutionalists were too
patriotic to play into the hands of Huerta.
NOTE.--The details about the arming of prisoners in Ulloa and the
landing of American marines in Vera Cruz were given to the writer by
Don Fernando Iglesias Calderón.
CHAPTER VI
THE FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE REVOLUTION
Interested observers among the Americans and foreigners were wondering
how the Constitutionalists could keep up a revolution against an
organized military dictatorship like Huerta which had millions at
its disposal; and strange to relate instead of getting weaker the
revolutionists grew stronger and better organized; they seemed to have
money to buy arms and ammunition, to run their local governments and
even to send representatives to the United States, and Paris, London,
Madrid and Barcelona, as well as social and political investigators
into America and Europe. The Huerta Government was as surprised as
the foreigners; they were certain that after a year of fighting, the
backbone of the revolution would be broken, but instead, the offensive
became so dangerous that General Huerta invited American intervention
so as to save himself as well as his partisans from complete political
annihilation.
The Huerta agents in America accused the Constitutionalists of having
borrowed money from great trusts or syndicates, and a New York paper
published stolen letters to prove that Carranza had succeeded in
getting loans from corporations. The letters served no other purpose
than to advertise the lawyer who had been in the service of the Madero
revolution, but as far as the source of financial support, it was as
mysterious as ever.
“How can they fight, eat and dress without money?” was asked. “How can
they get the fighting material across the border when it is patrolled
by American soldiers?” Everybody asked the question and nobody could
answer it satisfactorily. But the suspicion was in the air that the
revolutionists with their agents in the United States had received
millions at a high rate and bartered in return for it oil, mining and
railroad concessions. The senatorial investigation which had labored
for months and published its results in a voluminous report did not
prove that Madero had financed the revolution of 1910 with the help
of American money. The money used by Gustavo Madero to finance his
brother’s revolution seemed so small that the senators looked for
greater sums borrowed from the United States to convince them in their
suspicion that all Central American revolutions were started in Wall
Street. But they forgot that Madero’s revolution was not initialed in
New York’s financial centre, and that no great movement can succeed
unless the lower or middle class fight for it.
The fact is clear that no Mexican political leader or military chief
could afford to be linked in any shape or manner with any foreign
corporation, as that would have discredited him forever in the eyes of
his countrymen.
As a convincing example illustrating this assertion, the Madero
revolutionary loan can be referred to. When Francisco I. Madero came
into power his brother, Gustavo, put in a bill for 750,000 pesos
($375,000) for expenses incurred by him during the revolution. As no
vouchers or explanations were offered as to the origin of the money,
accusations were made against Gustavo Madero that he had borrowed
money at a high rate of interest from an American oil company and
given in exchange valuable oil concessions to the detriment of a
British oil company. After Gustavo’s death it was discovered that he
had misappropriated $375,000 from the funds of a railroad company,
organized in Mexico and financed in Paris to build a railroad from
Camacho to Gomez Farias, and instead of using the money for railroad
construction he had sunk it to buy arms and ammunition for his
brother’s revolution. By his desperate and bold action, Gustavo Madero
had risked his reputation and liberty and was saved in the nick of time
from extradition proceedings by the success of the revolution.
Later, instead of telling the truth, Gustavo Madero kept silent and in
Mexico his enemies went so far as to accuse him of having practically
delivered his brother’s government into the hands of a Yankee
corporation. Those accusations cast a shadow on the whole Madero
régime and were a great handicap to its success.
Carranza, who is an older man of political and financial experience,
realized from the beginning that he could not borrow money from
American or foreign companies and decided to rely entirely on the
resources of his own country. Impoverished as Mexico was by two
successive revolutions, the work was slower and entailed great loss of
lives and foreign property. Nevertheless, Carranza reasoned that if
Mexico could not organize a revolution without foreign help it might
as well give up the task and bend under the yoke of the dictator. The
faith of Carranza in the resources of his country proved that he was
right.
It demonstrated first, that Mexico would go to any length rather than
submit to the murderous régime of Huerta; secondly by forcing his
adherents to organize local governments in every conquered state and
city for the purpose of contribution and order, Carranza facilitated
and accelerated the final political reconstruction of the government
when his troops should enter Mexico City, and third and last he would
create for himself and his supporters an impregnable position from the
foreign as well as the Mexican enemies of his cause.
Carranza is fifty-five years old, young enough to take the field
personally and wise enough not to walk into pitfalls and mistakes
excusable but not pardonable in a younger man. The blunders of the
Madero régime were not lost upon him. Two of the most grievous mistakes
committed by the Madero revolutionist leaders were the acceptance of
foreign financial assistance and a compromise with the power which was
being overthrown.
As revolutions cost money and none was forthcoming or could be had
after the murder of President Madero and Vice-president Suarez,
Carranza convened the state legislation of Coahuila demanding from
it the refusal of allegiance asked by General Huerta, and a vote to
turn over to him the money of the state treasury for revolutionary
purposes. Then he rode with a few followers on horseback through the
federal lines across the mountains of the States of Durango and Sinaloa
into Sonora, a State not connected directly by rail with Mexico City.
Being more free there from molestation by federal soldiers than the
other border States he helped to organize the government and made
his headquarters for a while in Hermosillo, Sonora. The seizure of
the border towns of Nogales and Agua Prieta opened the way to the
importation of arms and ammunition and to the receipts of the custom
houses. As the revolutionary troops on the border States captured more
custom houses, as happened in Juarez, Ciudad P. Diaz, Nuevo Laredo,
Matamoros and finally the seaport of Tampico, the revenues increased as
well as the facilities for the importation of foodstuffs, clothing and
ammunition.
Carranza and his sub-chiefs had five different methods of acquiring
financial support in northern Mexico.
1. The interior war tax, which was paid by Mexican and foreign
commercial mining and industrial firms doing business in the northern
States, besides the taxes paid by the “haciendados” or land owners,
farmers.
2. Custom house duties at all the border towns on imports and exports,
that is to say on foodstuffs, cattle, ore, metal, clothing, etc., which
were paid in gold as arms and ammunition bought by the rebels had to be
paid in gold.
3. Forced loans from the enemies of the Constitutionalists.
4. Voluntary loans by the friends of the revolution such as rich
Mexican landowners, capitalists and miners.
5. The creation of an interior debt by the issue of paper money to be
circulated in all the territory under the power of the revolution and
the prohibition to circulate the bills issued by the Banco Nacional of
Mexico City on February 18th, 1913, at the order of General Huerta.
In a pamphlet of recent date there will be found the decrees and other
transactions of the Constitutionalist army. The official publication
born in Chihuahua, 1914, prints the date of each one of the decrees
permitting the printing of paper money. The first issue of paper money
was emitted for 5,000,000 pesos on the 26th of April, 1913, the second
one for fifteen millions on February 28th, 1913, and the third one for
ten millions on February 12th, 1914, for bills of five, ten, fifty and
hundred pesos denominations. As the circulation of those three issues
tended to raise prices in general by paralyzing the transactions with
fractional money, Carranza authorized three more issues of paper money.
One for two hundred thousand, the second for eight hundred thousand and
the third for one million, for five and ten cents denominations, on the
26th of April, 28th of December, 1913, and on February 12th, 1914.
Up to May, 1914, altogether thirty-two million pesos in paper money
were issued to cover the expenses of the revolution.
The governors and military chiefs were empowered to do the same in
the States under their jurisdiction: Generals Villa and Chao in the
State of Chihuahua, Governor Riveros in Sinaloa, General Caballeros in
Tamaulipas and Villareal in Nuevo Leon.
When it is considered that the Constitutionalists had almost 100,000
men under arms, the Madero revolution by comparison will seem an
amateurish and insignificant affair.
General Obregon was supposed to have 20,000, General Villa another
20,000, General Gonzalez 22,000, General Carrera 20,000, General
Natera and the Arrietas 6,000, without counting the Zapatistas with
over 20,000 men.
On an average and in fairly round figures the revolution cost about
$200,000 a week or $800,000 a month. For a revolution which has lasted
over a year and three months the performance is quite wonderful and
shows remarkable organizing qualities in Carranza and the amazing
vitality of Mexico.
When General Huerta waded through Madero’s blood into the dictator’s
chair he was able to get over fifty million dollars in gold from
American and French bankers, besides voluntary and enforced
contributions from the Catholic clergy, foreign corporations and
commercial and industrial concerns with headquarters in Mexico City and
unwilling loans from Mexican haciendados. Huerta had all the power of
the government concentrated in Mexico City in his hands, the support of
all the foreign powers with the exception of the United States, and in
spite of all he failed.
American bankers who had hastily but unwisely loaned several millions
to General Huerta in the forlorn hope that he could prove a second
Diaz to subdue Mexico, lost faith in the dictator’s ability and sent
an agent to offer six million dollars to Carranza if he would promise
to guarantee Huerta’s loans. It goes without saying that the offer was
rejected.
Another committee of American bankers sent an emissary to Mexico City
to offer General Huerta three million dollars if he would only resign
and get out. In the first case the aforementioned banker learned to his
surprise that the revolutionary chief was a man of principles and could
not be bought; the mistake would have been avoided if the American
financier had read the answer of Carranza to Felix Diaz and General
Huerta offering him a huge bribe to retract his challenge against the
dictatorship. In the second instance they offered Huerta three millions
when he had decided to throw up the sponge, and instead of accelerating
his exit from Mexico, only retarded it long enough for Huerta to pocket
their money.
In both cases the American bankers have shown a fundamental lack of
knowledge of the Mexican situation and of Mexican ways.
The Mexican revolution was essentially a Mexican affair and even a
superficial review of Mexican history would have revealed a great
similarity between it and the Three Years’ War. It took the name of
Constitutionalist Revolution from the Constitution of 1857, for which
the Liberals of that period were fighting as against the clerical
dictatorship.
Even if General Huerta had been able to borrow 150 million dollars
in Paris as he expected to do, he would have been defeated in the
end; it would have taken longer to destroy his power, but the result
would have been the same. It would pay American bankers to seek the
advice of unbiased observers, men who are in sympathy with Mexican
aims and ambitions, who have a thorough knowledge of the people and
their history, and not from agents or individuals who are interested
concessionaires and foreigners or Americans who in spite of their long
residence in the country are as ignorant of Mexican conditions as on
the first day of their arrival in Mexico.
CHAPTER VII
CIVIL ORGANIZATION OF THE REVOLUTION
One of the causes which defeated the work of the Madero revolution,
was the lack of organization of civil governments within the States
conquered by the Maderistas. Rebel bands wandered hither and thither,
taking anything they needed and signing vouchers to be repaid at the
end of the revolution.
The Judges, “Jefes Políticos” and minor officials, with the exception
of marked men, stayed in office during the revolution, and after Madero
came into power. The machinery of Diaz remained, the army and all the
officials, with the exception of the President, cabinet members and the
governors.
Carranza learned a lesson and decided to organize the local government
wherever he went and wherever the Constitutionalists were masters of
States. As the chief of the revolution, Carranza directed the movement
of the three army divisions, that is to say, the great strategic
lines, and the generals took care of the tactical movements. Thus was
the first chief able to devote his energy to the creation of civil
government, instead of personally directing or fighting battles. Many
critics have wondered what Carranza had done in the Revolution. It is
quite comprehensible that the patient, unremitting task of organizing
the civil government of conquered States, does not appear in the same
romantic light as the attacking and storming of a city, although it is
as important and useful, and more enduring work.
In many States in the south--Morelos, Guerrero--where the Huerta
officials had all fled and the only rulers were the Zapatista soldiers,
the Indians had instinctively organized a patriarchal and tribal
rule of their own. Very significant of the patience, and law-abiding
sentiment of the average Mexican, is the fact that in those regions,
where for over two years no government existed, crimes were less
frequent than where the government held sway.
Carranza began to organize the postal and telegraph systems in Durango,
Sinaloa and Sonora. Headquarters were in Hermosillo, as the federals
always kept either to border towns or seaports,--the rest of the State
was under the control of the Constitutionalists. Wherever possible
the trains were run on schedule time,--telegrams and mail were sent
and received. Judges and all the municipal governments of the larger
and smaller cities were created. When the border towns were taken, a
simple system of tariff was enacted working both ways, for exports
as well as imports. The Minister who helped Carranza as Secretary of
the Interior, was Rafael Zubáran Capmany, who afterwards was sent to
Washington as a confidential agent for the Constitutionalists.
Those who have had an opportunity to follow the operations of Carranza
through the official paper, _El Constitucionalista_, and the pamphlet
which contains his decrees, can pursue step by step all his official
acts and his reconstructive policy.
Don F. Iglesias Calderón, after escaping from the fortress of San Juan
de Ulloa, told the writer that he crossed the border at Juarez for
Chihuahua, Torreon, Saltillo, Monterey, and back to the border, and
very much to his surprise he travelled on schedule time. At that time
the whole north was in the hands of the Constitutionalists.
The foreign press could not understand why Carranza did not hasten at
once to Mexico City after the flight of Huerta. Carranza could not
leave a single State between Mexico City and the border unorganized,
that is to say, without placing Constitutionalist officials in charge.
Otherwise the Huerta officials would later have created local strife.
The first Chief had to put new wine in new bottles, in order to succeed
in any future reform which might be enacted by Congress.
With Carranza it was not only a question of conquest. His idea was to
rebuild, reconstruct Mexico, not merely conquer it.
[Illustration: DON RAFAEL ZUBÁRAN CAPMANY
Minister of Foreign Affairs with Carranza, also Representative of
Carranza in Washington]
CHAPTER VIII
DIPLOMATIC WORK IN WASHINGTON
From the inception of the Constitutionalist revolution, Carranza
appreciated the necessity of having a representative in Washington.
Alberto Pani and Roberto V. Pesqueira organized a junta which would
counteract the campaign waged against the Constitutionalists by the
Huerta agents in conjunction with the American interests, in the
vain hope of a recognition of the Huerta régime by the Democratic
administration. Pesqueira paid the expenses of the office out of his
own pocket until Carranza was able to devote some of the money at the
disposal of the revolution, to other purposes besides the buying of
arms and ammunition.
The intelligent and effective work done by the two constitutionalist
ambassadors concentrated the attention of the American public upon a
struggle which had appeared one-sided and hopeless.
After a succession of defeats by the federal generals in the
north, Huerta recognized that the great army at his disposal was
swiftly crumbling to pieces, and the three divisions under the
Constitutionalist generals were determinedly closing in upon him,
he became afraid, and with the same unscrupulousness of former
reactionary despots in Mexico, he plucked a leaf from the history of
Mexico, attempting to repeat the feat successfully carried out by the
clericals in 1847, when American intervention was forced, and in 1861
when French intervention was deliberately invited, to save clericalism
from utter annihilation.
Carranza foresaw the move, as the members of Huerta’s cabinet had
openly boasted to bring about American intervention to save their
interests and their lives. With Carranza in Hermosillo was a Mr. Rafael
Zubáran Capmany, a young Mexican lawyer from Campeche, who acted as his
Secretary of the Interior in the Provisional Cabinet. Carranza picked
out Mr. Zubáran as the one man in Mexico to play the diplomatic game in
Washington which would ward off American intervention, even after the
American troops had occupied Vera Cruz.
It is quite true that the landing of American marines meant
intervention, but President Wilson had declared that it was done
against General Huerta, the Dictator, and not against the Mexican
people; that American soldiers would be satisfied to occupy the Mexican
port until the usurper was driven out.
To make the average Mexican understand this complicated situation,
and to convince the Americans that Carranza’s protest was not only
necessary but was the only manly and patriotic act possible for any
Mexican leader, was the task which befell Sr. Zubáran.
The lifting of the embargo on arms and ammunition at the border,
without arousing the hostility of the War Department in Washington, was
another difficult mission.
To prevent the Mexican constitutionalists from crossing the American
border, thereby playing into the hands of Huerta, was as perilous and
risky a game as putting out a lighted fuse near a powder magazine.
A talented writer and lawyer, Don Luis Cabrera, ably assisted Rafael
Zubáran. The sympathetic attitude of President Wilson and Secretary
Bryan helped to crown the efforts with success. Also, the unofficial
and friendly co-operation of ex-Governor Lind was of incalculable value
to the Mexican diplomats.
But any other less experienced and less discreet personality, a mind
less acute, keen and masterly, would have failed ignominiously.
Americans as well as Mexicans are discovering that diplomatic
victories, although silent and modest, are as effective and useful as
military achievements.
CHAPTER IX
THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS IN PARIS
Although the diplomatic and financial battle for great loans of the
Huerta régime was waged and lost in the United States, as a result of
the attitude of the Wilson administration, Huerta was nevertheless
enabled to make a loan in Wall Street, ostensibly to pay the interest
on the Railroad Merger. The real battle for financial assistance,
however, was fought in Paris.
The Parisian bankers were always favorably inclined to the existing
governments of Mexico. Diaz had always been considered financially
solvent, with Limantour at his side.
The French and English bankers, who had made fortunes on Mexican loans,
always spoke with regret and almost pique at the overthrow of “the
grand old man.” Foreign bankers not being by nature sentimental or
radical, had no sympathy or understanding for the tremendous popular
upheaval in Mexico. The whole great libertarian movement was quite
misunderstood or ignored. The Huerta régime seemed like a reversion
to the good old fat times under Limantour. Huerta exhibited all the
ear-marks of the strong man on horseback. To the superficial bankers,
the Mexican Caracalla was bound to stay and ask for more loans, and
offer more profits.
In London, the press did not pay much attention to the
Constitutionalists, as the English oil interests saw to it that stories
were circulated about the bandits, cut-throats and robbers who were
infesting Mexico under the excuse of fighting against the _de facto_
government.
As the English oil interests were closely connected with the English
government, they having signed a contract to supply the British
navy with oil, Huerta gladly gave all the concessions asked for,
and confirmed the previous ones. Although the English oil interests
denied in the press that they were involved in politics, certain facts
came to the notice of the Constitutionalists in Paris, which proved
the contrary. Dr. Atl, who was living in Paris, vouches for the data
furnished.
Dr. Atl had been very friendly to Dr. Urrutia years ago, as the
famous surgeon politician had saved his life. While Dr. Atl was in
the hospital, he became intimate with General Huerta, and being a
“compadre” to Dr. Urrutia, there were no secrets between them. After
the assassination of Madero and Suarez, Dr. Urrutia bethought himself
of the friendship and gratitude of his friend, and without much ado
telegraphed Dr. Atl that one hundred and fifty thousand dollars were
at his disposal at the Mexican legation in Paris: he was to use it to
influence the French press. Although Dr. Atl was broke, as befits a
sincere artist, he sent an answer which is not fit for publication, but
which does credit to his patriotism and his integrity.
Dr. Atl discovered that in spite of the fact that he was considered
almost a confrère among the French journalists, owing to the fact
that he published an art paper in French, and wrote for most literary
magazines and papers in Paris,--when it came to offering material on
the subject of the Constitutionalist cause of Mexico, the pages of the
periodicals were without exception closed to him. Finally reporters
admitted to him that the English oil interests had been paying enormous
sums of money, aggregating the sum of seven million francs. He was even
pointed out an agent of the same oil interests, who had left to the
editor of the paper the sum of one hundred and fifty thousand francs as
a friendly reminder.
After the refusal of Dr. Atl to work for the Huerta régime, a brother
of de la Barra took up the task. Not a word could slip into the French
papers about the defeats of the Federals, and strenuous efforts were
being made to finance a loan of one hundred and fifty million dollars
for Huerta. Dr. Atl had heard that the loan would be effected within a
week. In despair he walked from one office to the other and succeeded
only in getting snubs and rebuffs. To make matters worse, it rained
cats and dogs. Our peripatetic artist, soaking wet, tired and hungry,
not having eaten a morsel of food for two days, was on the point of
giving up the struggle, when he decided to try the only newspaper in
Paris which was above venality, the socialist paper, _L’Humanité_. He
presented himself at the office, and insisted on speaking to Monsieur
Jaurès, who was the editor. The veteran socialist finally consented
to see him. “I am not representing any financial interests,” spoke
up Dr. Atl, “I am only a poor Mexican artist, who expects you to
tell the truth about a matter of interest, not only to Mexico, but
especially to French investors. Huerta is expected to wind up a loan
of 750 million francs; I want to inform you that Carranza, Chief of
the Constitutionalists, has communicated a letter to the press in
the United States, and to us, that if the revolution is successful,
the French loan to Huerta will not be recognized by the successful
Constitutionalists. As I know that you are honest and do not want to
see the French investors risk losing their money, I beg of you to
publish the statement made by Carranza.”
Jaurès published the letter the next day. Mexican bonds went down ten
points, and the loan fell through. Dr. Atl is now Director of the
National Art School in Mexico City.
CHAPTER X
INVESTIGATION WORK INTO THE MUNICIPAL CITY GOVERNMENTS AND THE RURAL
SCHOOL SYSTEM, FACTORIES AND INDUSTRIAL CENTRES IN THE UNITED STATES
BY MODESTO C. ROLLAND
Putting aside my humble personality, not of much importance to the
reader, I am going to relate my life since the Mexican revolution, for
in this manner I can more clearly place in relief something of the
history and social conditions in Mexico, which should be known by all
who desire information on what has taken place and what we wish to do.
Convinced as we were of the tremendous social inequality that has
existed in Mexico under the authority of the capitalists and of the
clerical party, before the apparition of Madero, the idea was launched
of not permitting a re-election with a view to compelling Porfirio Diaz
to verify the necessary evolution, fearing as we did the effects of a
revolution.
[Illustration: MODESTO C. ROLLAND
Engineer, School Teacher, Member of the Cabinet]
We thought, inexperienced sociologists, that it was possible to
conquer a tyrant by persuasion, so as to permit the democratic
practices necessary to choose the President. We made a mistake, and the
anti-re-electionists had to combat a revolution. Madero expounded the
doctrines which were spread over the country, and was at the head of
the revolution that imperiously triumphed.
Many of us Mexicans thinking it was time to take part in public
affairs, united and formed an Engineers’ Club with a view to studying
national problems. In a word, we worked for the nationalization of the
National Railways, and for the establishment of postal savings. Nearly
all of our efforts were shattered by reason of the inertia displayed
by the Secretary of the Treasury, headed by Messrs. Ernesto Madero and
Jaime Gurza.
The Catholic party, seeing the approach of an epoch of social reforms
which they could not admit, conspired with the army and taking
advantage through Huerta, for Felix Diaz turned out to be weak, finally
assassinated Madero and grasped the power.
Then they enjoyed their clerical rule and their laws regarding public
instruction. The army served them to kill the people and to defend
their great estates. The war was kindled with more fury, headed by
Venustiano Carranza. We in the capital suffered day by day from the
insults of the soldiery. All persons who did not favor the government
were known to the authorities, and at any moment were likely to be
detained.
After the ten days’ tragedy, I went to the Military College, where I
was a professor, with the intention of speaking for the last time to
my pupils. I explained to them the course that the army would pursue,
and that they would be the instrument of a traitor to shed the blood of
Mexicans. That same afternoon I was dismissed from my charge. From that
time on I was persecuted.
Being independent and my ideas being known, I could not long remain
free. The idea contrary to the dictatorial system was what they
persecuted most. At length one day they took me out of my office and
conveyed me to the penitentiary where they held me in a dark dungeon
for a month in solitary confinement.
My friends arranged for Minister Garza Aldape to speak with me. I
explained to him frankly why I could not be with the Huertistas
for I could not conform with the politics of the outbreak, and the
consequences of the same. I made him understand that I was not an
active conspirator, for having to keep in favor with two parties is
truly crazy and like throwing oneself into the wolf’s mouth.
He permitted me to go out into the street, but it was impossible for me
to work. My business affairs were shattered; every move was constantly
watched, and at any time I might be sent back to the penitentiary, as
were many others.
I decided to get out of the country. I went to Vera Cruz and with some
difficulty boarded a boat as a contraband, and it was in the position
of table-steward that I finally arrived in this country.
This is the history of thousands of men in Mexico. Thousands of
families remained until they had nothing left to live on, and even the
women were in danger of being put in jail, as many were.
With great eagerness I went toward the north of the republic with
a view to putting myself in contact with the revolution. There I
met many friends who had travelled the path ahead of me, and under
various conditions were serving the cause. There I could speak with
Carranza, first chief of the revolution. It was in Juarez City where
I was presented by the Hon. Mr. Zulara, Minister of Communications.
Mr. Carranza spoke with me of the reconstruction of Mexico. At that
period of the struggle so much confidence was felt in the triumph of
the revolution that the first chief looked ahead to prepare the era of
reconstruction.
He talked with me of the agrarian problem, as a touchstone of all the
social unbalance of our people, and I was convinced that that serene
man, economist by experience and liberal by conviction ought to be the
personification of the national unity.
He spoke to me above all else of the schools. The great desire of
Mr. Carranza is to develop a school system in Mexico. He expressed
himself with the enthusiasm of the man who has long been in contact
with the needs of the people, and I was convinced still further of the
necessity of working without hesitation under the influence of such
a man. The supreme chief being convinced that another soldier was not
needed in the battlefield, and taking advantage of my experience as a
schoolmaster and as an engineer, he arranged for me to go to the United
States with a view to studying municipal and school systems. In this
way I joined a body of students of Administrative service, which Mr.
Carranza had been forming in this country and in Europe. I have put my
heart in my work, and happily I have found in this nation the greatest
facilities for attaining our object. I have visited the principal
cities of the East. New York particularly has served me practically.
SCHOOLS
The Department of Education furnished me with all the methods for
studying the schools, and in this manner I obtained most interesting
information regarding the organization and educative systems of
these schools, where from the first step a child takes, he is taught
something about democracy. The impression which this spirit of the
American schools made upon me will never be forgotten. The continued
effort of the teachers to form the free will of the child is excellent.
The soul of this nation palpitates in its schools. There the body
and the mind are fortified, intensifying the customs of sociability.
These things are facts, not theories, in the American schools. The way
in which all this educative labor is consummated with ingenuity and
honesty, was what impressed me above everything.
Regarding the material organization it is already known how able
Americans are. Organization is nearly always the secret of success, and
that is above all what the Latins need to learn.
The organization of the Department of Education is notable, which
makes possible the co-ordination of an infinity of data, so as to see
schematically the working of the mechanism. I can judge at sight of
the weak point so that the same may be perfected. The weak spot in the
Mexican school system being the rural school system, I was asked by
Carranza to investigate especially that phase in the United States.
The result of my inquiries brought forth the fact that the States of
Wisconsin and Massachusetts have the best organized rural system for
schools in America. These two States are going to be the pattern which
will be used for Mexico’s Minister of Education to work from.
It is well-known that the scholastic family is amiable over the entire
world, but I believe that the American teacher especially is a model of
courtesy. Wherever I went I was treated with such kindness that I shall
always remember my visits with pleasure.
MUNICIPAL SERVICES
The revolution was eager to change the social state of Mexico and that
naturally comprised the sanitary condition of the people. In Mexico it
is necessary to change the hygienic state of the people who have been
always treated with a spirit of exploitation by the privileged castes.
We know that sunshine on the earth does away with the services of the
doctor, for which we shall work so that the sewers called _casas de
vecindad_ may be dispensed with; in these tuberculosis prospers, while
the rich owner assisted through the lenity of the laws is occupied only
in collecting the rents. Pure water, air and light,--the people need
these and Mexico will give them.
New York has given me great experience and has furnished a wide field
of observation, in respect to the Municipal services; and I wish to
set forth my report so as to profit by the many good subjects I have
studied. Naturally, here as in other places there are many matters
which have not yet been satisfactorily settled, as for example that
relative to the “casas de vecindad,” but anyway the efforts of this
people, so materially progressive will help us in a high degree.
The resolution of the problem of the “casas de vecindad” as it is
understood in Glasgow, is our ideal and we shall feel proud on the day
that we can present a city with comfort for the poor.
In the conscience of all the revolutionaries is the profound conviction
that to guarantee the triumph of the revolution it is necessary to
change the social status of Mexico, and for that reason they will
not hesitate to pass laws affecting the land to further works of
irrigation, to establish schools and to contribute to hygienic homes.
The example of this nation is valuable for us and we shall not fail to
utilize the same. We are anxious to push our people forward through
more democratic paths, and are certain that this nation knows how to
appreciate our efforts.
In Mexico, where it may be said that humanity is making a trial of
adaptation, we shall make a trial of what this country has shown us,
and if I myself put into practice what I have learned here I shall
consider myself happy, welcoming all the annoying details, for nothing
is worth more than the esteem of a nation.
CHAPTER XI
GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST HUERTA
To get a clear conception of the strategic work achieved by the three
divisions of the East, North and West, it is advisable to look at the
map of Mexico.
Mexico is broadest at the American border and tapers exactly like a
cornucopia at the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Mexico City lies in a valley
7,400 feet high, within twelve hours’ ride from Vera Cruz, and being
the centre of all the railroads of Mexico, is therefore of the utmost
strategical importance.
Huerta, from Mexico City, could reach all his troops anywhere in
Mexico, either by rail or water. The Constitutionalists in Sonora were
separated from the Northern division by a high range of mountains,
and the Northern division from the Eastern division by another range.
Zapata could not communicate very easily with the three northern
divisions, and was not able to assist them directly.
[Illustration: WAR MAP OF MEXICO.
STRATEGIC R.R. LINES.]
Huerta’s strategy consisted in keeping his soldiers in the large
cities, at the border towns, always hugging the railroad lines. The
federals very seldom attacked in the open, as the lack of horses
detracted from their mobility.
The Western division had for its object the control of the railroad,
starting from Nogales, through Hermosillo to Guaymas in Sonora, then to
Culiacán, Mazatlán in Sinaloa, through San Blas, Tepic into the State
of Jalisco, to the capital Guadalajara. Once Guadalajara was captured,
the aim of the campaign was achieved, and Obregon had only to wait for
the arrival and junction of the Northern and Eastern division near
Celaya, to march to Mexico City. The difficulties encountered by the
Western and Eastern divisions were trebled by a condition which did not
exist in the case of the Northern division under Villa, the fact that
the seaports on the Pacific and Atlantic which were always at the mercy
of the federals, could feed and supply and augment the contingent of
soldiers in the ports.
On the Pacific side, the Federals controlled Guaymas, Topolobampo,
Altata, Mazatlán, San Blas and Manzanillo,--and on the Atlantic side
they controlled Matamoros, Tampico, Tuxpan, Vera Cruz and Puerto Mexico.
The Western division, under Obregon, captured one by one all the border
towns, and later most of the seaports,--and in spite of the fact that
Guaymas stuck to the last, the Western division had so effectively
cooped up the Federals in that port, that they were not interfering
with their downward course towards Guadalajara. General Gonzalez
acted on the same principle. He first captured the border towns, and
then Victoria the capital of Tamaulipas. With the fall of Tampico, the
Federals in San Luis Potosí were outflanked.
General Villa did the same. After he controlled the border cities, he
concentrated all his energies on the capture of Torreon.
The three chiefs of divisions, East, North and West, co-operated with
one another under the direction of Carranza. They were supplied with
money, arms and ammunition by the organization created by Carranza in
the different States, and directed by the efforts of the members of the
provisional cabinet.
Zapata by his activity, aided by that of Genovevo de la O and several
other chiefs in the South, forced Huerta to keep about forty thousand
soldiers in the South.
The railroads created new strategic lines--
1st. From Nogales at the border, the railroad goes almost
uninterruptedly through Sonora, Sinaloa and Tepic, with the exception
of a gap between Tepic and Guadalajara.
2d. From Juarez the railroad runs through Chihuahua, Durango and
Zacatecas into Aguascalientes.
3d. From Ciudad Porfirio Diaz through Coahuila into Nuevo Leon, and to
San Luis Potosí, and from Monterrey to Tampico.
They represent the lines which had to be controlled by the three
divisions. Then there were lines connecting Torreon with Saltillo and
Monterrey,--and Aguascalientes with San Luis Potosí.
The assertion that either one of the three chiefs of the divisions was
solely responsible for the success of the revolution is absurd and
inexact.
Let us admit for instance, that Obregon had reached Guadalajara, and
tried to march through Celaya to Mexico City alone, before Villa had
taken Aguascalientes, or General Gutierrez taken San Luis Potosí. He
would then have been attacked in the rear by the Federals.
In Villa’s case, if he had captured Aguascalientes and tried to march
south to Mexico City, without waiting for Obregon to take Guadalajara,
or General Gutierrez, San Luis Potosí, he would have also been attacked
in the rear.
General Gonzalez in his turn, could not march south as long as San Luis
Potosí was in the possession of Federals.
The three chiefs had to work together, and the utter defeat of either
of the three separately, spelled disaster for the rest. It is fortunate
for Mexico that this campaign should have created four strong soldiers
“on horseback” for the danger to Mexico’s liberties always appeared
with one man as the hero, who subsequently turned to be the “villain.”
When there is more than one savior or liberator, they are apt to be so
busy watching one another, that Mexico’s liberties are more likely to
be respected.
CHAPTER XII
CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL OBREGON IN THE WEST
BY COL. I. C. ENRIQUEZ
Perhaps the most interesting chapter of the Constitutionalist revolt
against the dictator Huerta is the campaign of rebellion led by the
brave citizens of the State of Sonora. When they decided to fight the
bloody dictator and resist his murderous deeds, they were confronted
by a very strong and well organized army. The Federal troops were
well equipped with ammunition and guns. Their positions were well
established, while the Constitutionalists had nothing more than desire
of justice, backed by reckless bravery. They had neither guns nor
ammunition, and certainly no trained army, and in spite of all this,
they were the victors.
[Illustration: GENERAL ALVARO OBREGON
Chief of the Western Division]
After the assassination of Señor Francisco I. Madero and Señor José
Maria Pino Suarez, a dreadful feeling of fear spread through the
country. This was especially evident among the civilians. What but
death had they to expect from such a brutal dictator as Huerta? For
this reason alone, there were at the beginning very few men who were
willing to take up arms against him. Even among the governors,
twenty-seven in number, only _one_ dared to throw down the glove of
challenge to the assassin. He was Don Venustiano Carranza, at that
time governor of the State of Coahuila. Half an hour after the news of
the assassination reached him, he called the state legislature into
session, denounced the dictator Huerta and demanded that they should
not recognize Huerta’s authority. He was the only man with sufficient
moral courage to openly revolt against Huerta.
At that time, Carranza was not the only one who had the historic
opportunity of coming out as a defender of his country’s honor. The
same message was transmitted to Señor José M. Maytorena, then the
governor of the State of Sonora, but unlike Carranza, he did not take
up the cause of his downtrodden countrymen. He saw at a glance the
danger of such a move, and realized that the struggle against Huerta
would be a very unequal one. Thinking of his own safety first, he left
Deputy Ignacio L. Pesqueira as acting governor, and fled to the United
States.
At that time, in Hermosillo, capital of Sonora, there were five hundred
men under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Obregon, who later in
the campaign became a famous general under Carranza. Major Salvador
Alvarado, now general, had command of four hundred troops of the Yaqui
region, while in the southern part of the State, five hundred men were
under the command of Generals Juan Cabral, Benjamin Hill and Sosa.
Many of the officers and soldiers of this army had participated in the
revolution of 1910, consequently they were opposed to the dictatorship
of Huerta. This marked the beginning of the Sonora revolution.
Even before the assassination of Madero, there were a number of chiefs
who waged a relentless war. They were Col. Pedro F. Bracamonte, Col.
Plutarco Elias Calles, and Major Campos. They began to recruit people
on their own authority in the northern part of the State, and the
cutting of railway communication. They also began an open attack on the
Federals in many places. When the Sonora revolution was started, the
chiefs became united, and opened hostilities.
At the beginning of the Sonora revolution, the Federals had a force of
2,650 troops distributed throughout the State, from the frontier to
the coast. Bearing this in mind, the Constitutionalists mapped out a
careful campaign. General Obregon was appointed to direct the military
operations, as he had distinguished himself in the campaign of 1912
against the Orozquistas.
The difficult task that the Constitutionalists were confronted with,
was the prevention of the concentration and the union of the entire
Federal army. They knew that as long as the Federal army was divided
and spread throughout the State, their chances were more than equal.
Thus they had a double task: first, to prevent the union of the
Federal troops, and secondly to fight them in small groups. The main
object of the Constitutionalists was to secure the border positions of
the State.
As the revolution progressed and the fighting continued, the
Constitutionalists found their plans perfectly suited to their needs.
They marched from one city to the next, sometimes under terrible
difficulties, but always victorious. All those in command, and also
the troops, fulfilled their duties admirably. Soon, however, they were
confronted with new and unexpected troubles.
The taking of Naco, as also the greater part of the towns on the
frontier, involved many unnecessary dangers. As it was situated on
the international line, it could only be attacked from the east and
west,--if it was assailed from the south many projectiles would pass
over to the American side. The Constitutionalist chiefs were always
careful to respect the rights of the American people, and avoided as
much as possible the damage and troubles that a war waged at such close
quarters, would be likely to occasion them. The Federal generals,
realizing the position of the Constitutionals, took advantage of
their noble intentions and stuck close to the international line.
The Constitutionalists did not wish to attack them in the town--but
were anxious to meet them in the open country, where there would be
no danger of inflicting suffering to families, especially those of
American citizens.
Knowing that the Federals intended to join their comrades of Chihuahua,
the Constitutionalists decided to lay in wait for them. For more than
a week, they lay concealed behind ridges and in the mountains, but the
blow they had suffered a few days before was a lesson General Ojeda
could not forget, and all the attempts of the Constitutionals to lure
them out in the open country failed.
The chiefs of the Constitutionalists then decided not to wait any
longer. They demanded of General Ojeda, who was in charge of the
Huerta troops, that he come out of the city. They explained to him
the injustice of fighting near a town, where many innocent people and
non-combatants might be injured, but Ojeda’s reply was characteristic
of all the Huerta generals. As long as he was safe, General Ojeda said,
the whole human race might be slaughtered. Furthermore, he would not
come out of his fortified town position--the Constitutionals could
attack him there if they wanted to.
The Constitutionals, realizing that they would have to attack, although
he was entrenched in a position very disadvantageous to such action
on their part, began preparations for the battle. The Federals were
located in a position occupying a semicircle. Their six hundred men,
cannon and rapid-fire guns, could easily defend their positions.
They could sweep the open country with a deadly fire, there being no
protection for the assailants.
After a few days of reconnoitring, during which small skirmishes
took place, the final decisive battle took place, on the night of the
1st of April. It lasted more than twenty-four hours, after which the
Federals were forced to their barracks for protection, while General
Ojeda fled to the American side. The remaining troops surrendered, and
the fighting stopped. This victory gave the Constitutionals complete
control of the frontier towns, assuring them a base of operations.
One of the remarkable features of the Sonora Campaign was the wonderful
manner in which the Federals after each battle, left behind ammunition,
guns and equipment which the Constitutionalists so badly needed. The
reply of the Constitutional chiefs to their complaining soldiers
usually was: “Never mind, boys, Huerta himself will give us arms and
ammunition to fight him with.” This statement has proved true all
through the revolt.
Before the Constitutionals had a chance to recover from the hardships
of the Naco victory, a still greater danger threatened them. A strong
force of Federals, four thousand in number, well-equipped, was coming
from the south by way of the Pacific coast, General Luis Medina
Barron was in charge of them. Before leaving Guaymas, he pledged on
his “military honor” that he would be in Hermosillo in fifteen days.
He said he would have the head of Obregon stuck upon the point of
his sword and that he would banquet at the Hotel Arcadia. But the
Constitutional chiefs were not frustrated by the boastings of General
Barron, and quickly reorganizing their army, they took positions
between Ortiz and Guaymas at Santa Rosa, a flag station on the Southern
Pacific Railroad of Mexico.
Confident of their ultimate victory, the Federals marched towards the
Constitutionalists. Early in the morning of the 9th of May they opened
a vigorous fire. The attack lasted three days.
The Constitutionalists realizing the value of the springs and wells in
that torrid zone, fought desperately for their possession. Once the
water supply was captured, it meant the defeat of the Federals. On
the second day of the battle, this was accomplished and the Federals
were forced back to the Railroad tanks, which could supply them with
water no longer than one day. After the third day’s fighting, the
Federals, worn out with thirst, retired, leaving a large number of dead
and wounded. In their hasty retreat they left behind a great quantity
of armaments and provisions. The boasting General Barron escaped to
Guaymas, wounded by the enemy, while many of his chiefs were taken to
Hermosillo as prisoners of war.
While Obregon was fighting against General Barron, General Hill had not
remained idle. He was appointed to carry on operations in the southern
part of the State. This he accomplished admirably, especially the
wiping out of the “Battalion of Death.” This battalion carried a black
flag, with a skull and cross bones upon it and their method was to
terrorize the townspeople by killing innocent women and children. When
they met General Hill in open battle they were completely wiped out.
Later General Hill drove 450 from the town of Torin, forcing them back
to Guaymas, thus clearing the southern part of the State. After his
successes in this locality, he joined General Obregon, in the hope
of attacking Generals Ojeda and Barron. The following move of the
Constitutionalists is one of the most effective of the whole campaign.
It was a decisive battle for the main water supply, which the troops
were badly in need of and took place at Santa Maria.
The plans of Generals Obregon, Alvarado and Dieguez once more proved
very effective. The Federals, finding the water supply taken, were
forced to assume the offensive. They felt confident of success, and
burdened themselves with all kinds of unnecessary impediments. But
the Constitutionalists were not to be taken by surprise; instead of
waiting for the Federals to advance, they went out to meet them: by
this manœuvre the Federals found themselves face to face with the
Constitutionalists much sooner than they had expected.
For the Federals, it was a fight for existence. They were face to face
with death from thirst, and felt that unless they regained the wells a
miserable death would be their lot. With them, it was not a fight for
the honor of Huerta--they fought from sheer desperation. Under such
conditions, the battle could not last long. Four desperate assaults
were made upon the Constitutionalists’ positions, and were repulsed.
One of these assaults lasted more than twenty-four hours, resulting in
a hand to hand fight. In those hand to hand frays one could not help
admiring the remarkable way in which the Yaquis handled their daggers.
The Federal army was wiped out completely in a very short time.
While much credit is due to the soldiers who fought in the ranks of the
Constitutionalists, many of their victories are due to the remarkable
strategy of the generals. One instance will illustrate this. General
Alvarado, realizing the terrible thirst of the Federal soldiers, drove
them into a watermelon field. He knew fully well the result of such a
move. No sooner had they reached the watermelon field, when all the
fighting on their part ceased. The Federal officers had to force them
to fight at the point of their bayonets, but even that did little good.
Once they had entered the melon field, they were the easy victims of
the Constitutional fire. At the close of the battle, General Ojeda fled
from the scene, abandoning his officers and soldiers. He was followed
by the officers, while a small group of soldiers, braver than their
chiefs, kept on fighting till they reached Guaymas.
The Constitutionals did not realize how great a victory they really had
won, and waited a whole day thinking that the retreat of the Federals
was nothing but a trap set for them. But when they marched forward
they found nothing but dead and wounded, and a great quantity of
ammunition and supplies. They had left behind all the cannons, twelve
rapid-firing guns and sixteen hundred rifles, also a large number of
horses and trappings. But the Constitutionalists had no time to lose,
and they immediately went in pursuit of the enemy.
While I was overjoyed at our tremendous victory, pity and sorrow
embittered the cup of joy. The scenes of horror and misery which I saw
are still engraved in my memory. I saw the disastrous results brought
about by a tyrannical dictator who, in his effort to perpetuate himself
in absolute power, was willing to sacrifice everything and everybody.
It was dreadful to see the battlefield littered with the dead and
wounded, men who meant well but who understood little.
On the other hand there were the patriotic, well-intentioned men, full
of self-sacrifice, willing to die for liberty and the prosperity of
their native country. Alongside these sturdy young fighters were also
the poor women and children, innocent sufferers in the great strife.
They were the greatest sufferers,--they bore the greater burden.
* * * * *
The campaign of General Obregon through the State of Sonora, marks
only the beginning of the great struggle which led him victoriously
to the city of Mexico. This campaign, although never mentioned by
the newspaper correspondents, was nevertheless as important as the
campaign of General Villa. General Obregon not only had to fight an
army much larger than his own, but the geographical location of his
territory constantly endangered his rear wings. Unlike Villa, he was
constantly compelled to guard from rear attacks, as well as from
frontal attacks. This ever existing danger made the campaign much more
difficult, multiplying the dangers which constantly confronted him.
The remark of General Obregon to Don Venustiano Carranza when the First
Chief marked out the three lines of struggle, illustrates the nature
of the fighting General Obregon. When Carranza was about to depart
from Nogales, in February, 1914, Obregon said to him: “First Chief,
tell Generals Villa and Gonzales to hurry up in their march, for I am
going to get busy and get to Mexico.” And true to his word, several
months later, although beset by many more difficulties than the other
generals, he reached Mexico City before any of them. After the Federal
troops were routed and driven back in great disorder to Guaymas, the
State of Sonora was practically cleared from Huerta troops. But that
only meant the beginning of the great fight.
During the months of July and August, General Obregon was preparing for
his advance South. He had little time to waste, for even before he was
through with his preparations, he was forced to advance on San Blas,
Sinaloa. A strong detachment of Federals were sent up from Mexico City
to reinforce the defeated Huerta troops who landed at Topolobampo. But
General Obregon was not taken by surprise. Having assigned Generals
Hill and Iturbe to proceed against the Federals, he himself continued
his march further south. His objective point was the city of Sinaloa.
In the meantime Generals Hill and Iturbe had succeeded in defeating the
Federal troops which landed in Topolobampo, and joined General Obregon
in his attack upon the city of Sinaloa.
The storming of Sinaloa was one of the fiercest battles of the entire
campaign. It lasted nearly five days and again, as in all the previous
battles, the Federals retreated so hastily that they did not have
time to take their guns and ammunition with them. A great quantity
of ammunition and provisions were left behind by them, of which the
Constitutionalists were much in need.
One of the great difficulties which constantly confronted General
Obregon was the guarding of the frontier and the positions all along
the coast. The slightest error in the guarding of those positions might
have caused the annihilation of his entire army by a rear attack. So
that, whenever he took a city from the Federals, he was confronted with
the question of protecting that point. He was forced to always leave
troops behind him, to guard those conquered cities. Had he not done
so, the Federals might have sent up new forces by way of the Pacific
and re-taken the conquered posts.
The most important of all the battles of the entire campaign was the
storming of Culiacan. The Federals, realizing the dangers of Obregon’s
swift march, massed a strong force of troops in that city, numbering
about seven thousand. Needless to say, they were much better equipped
than the Constitutionals, who always had more men than rifles and guns.
When General Obregon, who personally conducted the battle, reached the
city, the Federals were well fortified in their positions. The fight
lasted a whole week, and fighting continued day and night, almost
without cessation. At the end of that time, the Federals were badly
beaten and were forced to retire to Mazatlan. The taking of Culiacan
meant to the Constitutionalists more than just an ordinary victory.
It meant the success of the operations towards their goal, and the
weakening and disintegration of the Huerta troops. The winning of this
battle enabled the Constitutional forces to move further south to the
Territory of Tepic, where General Obregon took the city of Acaponeta
and San Blas by storm.
The rapidity with which he moved and the persistency of his attacks
won him most of his battles. He lost no time,--he did not wait. As
soon as he had taken San Blas, he did not even wait long enough to
give his tired soldiers a good rest. He moved on to his destination
immediately. With his characteristic rapid fire action, he moved
towards Guadalajara in the State of Jalisco. The most interesting thing
about the storming of that city was the capture of fifty-six train
loads of supplies. Never before had they had such luck. The trains
were packed with all kinds of provisions, guns, rifles, cannon and
ammunition. It was one of the richest hauls they ever made.
The conclusion of his march towards the capital was marked by a series
of successful battles, in spite of the difficulties he had in guarding
his base of supplies and the frontier towns. After his victory at
Guadalajara, he marched on towards Irapuato, where he again succeeded
in routing the Federal troops, and thence proceeded to the city of
Mexico.
CHAPTER XIII
VILLA AND HIS CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH
So much has been written about Francisco Villa that only a few
preliminary remarks are necessary to describe the personality of the
famous general. The enemies of Villa made the accusation that the rebel
chief was not respectable because he had been an outlaw under the Diaz
régime.
Those who have studied the Diaz rule with a mind unbiased by profits
and interests, will have discovered that if Villa was a bandit under
the Diaz reign, he certainly must have been an honest one; for almost
without exception all the officials from the President down to the
lowest Jefe Político, were robbers, cut-throats and grafters.
Villa is not better nor worse than the average Mexican, but his
weaknesses are those of his unfortunate countrymen, and his strength is
the latent strength of his people.
Villa, although directly responsible for the mutiny at Juarez in 1911,
when with Orozco he almost succeeded in eliminating F. I. Madero,
discovered that the three cientifico agents in El Paso were the
instigators of the plot. Ever since then Villa remained loyal to
Madero and continued to fight against Huerta, in memory of Madero.
[Illustration: GENERAL S. ALVARADO
Second in Command under General Obregon]
All the biographers of Villa spoke of him as a Napoleon, who had
created an army out of nothing. It must not be forgotten that out
of one hundred and thirty thousand soldiers who fought against the
military dictatorship, there were at least forty generals who created
armies out of nothing. They, too, were without money, ammunition, arms
and with even less experience than Villa.
During his ten or more years as an outlaw, Villa was roaming all over
the States of Chihuahua and Durango, as a leader of lesser outlaws, and
his guerrilla experience was invaluable to him later.
In the case of most other Generals, like Obregon, Gonzales, Gutierrez,
Natera, Herrera, Chao, Calles, Hill, Caballero, their experience was
insignificant. Most of the chiefs who fought the Federals were either
farmers, lawyers, engineers, clerks who had never before handled a gun
in their lives till the last revolution.
When Villa crossed the American border into Mexico in the spring of
1913, he marched up and down the States of Chihuahua, Coahuila and
Durango. He gathered men, attacking small cities and doing very much
the same as other revolutionists did--surprising small detachments of
Federals in outlying districts, and capturing the arms, ammunition,
and horses which were so badly needed. With him were co-operating the
Herrera brothers, Chao, Rosalio Hernandez, and in Durango, the Arrieta
brothers, Contreras, Triana, Carrillo and Urbina. They looted the banks
to buy arms and ammunition from the United States, and stole horses and
saddles to creat a mobile force and killed cattle to feed themselves.
The first important battle won by Villa was fought in San Andrés with
eight hundred men against fourteen hundred Federals, who were defeated
on October 4th, 1913. He attacked, captured and sacked Torreon. Near
Chihuahua he again defeated the Federals, but as Juarez was still in
their power, he had to take the border towns before attempting to fight
towards the south.
How he outwitted the commander of Juarez by stealing a ride north of
Chihuahua on a train loaded with coal, and surprised and drove the
commander across the border, has been told before.
The battle of Tierra Blanca, when he defeated five thousand Federals
who came from Chihuahua to relieve Juarez, was his first important
strategical battle, and as far as the campaign is concerned, is the
most important, even without excepting the battle of Torreon, in April,
1914. Without the battle of Tierra Blanca, no other successes could
have had any decisive value. In Torreon, Villa had all the men, arms
and ammunition he wanted, and with great recklessness, he sacrificed
his men, counting only upon results.
After the capture of Torreon, Saltillo and Monterrey automatically
fell into his power, for Torreon was the strategic key which opened the
way south to his army, i. e., the Northern division.
In another chapter, the causes and details of the Carranza-Villa
quarrel will be discussed. The character of General Villa must be
studied, in order to understand the underlying causes of the quarrel.
Villa, like Zapata, is a man of the peasant class. Physically strong,
with great will power and a good deal of horse sense. In men of this
type, due to their utter lack of education, and inexperience in
politics, they are an easy prey to their secretaries, friends, advisers
and hangers-on. Being fundamentally honest, they take it for granted
that their entourage is likewise, and being unable to read or write,
they are constantly deceived by their secretaries. In the case of the
other generals, like Obregon, Gonzales, etc., their education and
political experience put them on their guard against petty, scheming
politicians, and unscrupulous tools of the reactionaries.
Villa’s ideas outside of stratagems, spoils and the game of war,
are primitive, and not always clear. His appetites and his contempt
for human life is equal to that of the Apaches and Comanches; his
attitude toward life is anarchistic, rebellious. Towards people he is
cunning, suspicious, ostensibly good-natured and at times tyrannical.
An uncontrollable temper is softened by a keen sense of humor, and a
lavish generosity is encouraged by a propensity to acquisitiveness.
Villa is so terribly suspicious of everything and everybody, that
he has been accused of being not quite so brave as he wants to
appear. General Maclovio Herrera is admired for his courage and
is nicknamed “the Lion”: Villa has an unbounded respect for him,
tinged with a little envy. Villa’s enemies claim that he went to
Aguascalientes escorted by eighteen thousand soldiers, because he was
afraid,--although the other generals had none but bodyguards.
When Obregon was sent by Carranza to join Villa in a solution of the
Sonora controversy between Maytorena and Hill, he went alone. Villa
soon lost his temper and had Obregon arrested, and threatened to have
him shot by his soldiers unless he acceded to his demands. Obregon,
calm and cool, answered: “My life belongs to Mexico,--if you believe
that my death is necessary to the solution of the question, I am
ready to sacrifice it. I came here to meet Villa the patriot: I find
a savage Villa who calls himself the savior of Mexico.” The manly and
courageous attitude of Obregon conquered Villa, who instead of ordering
an execution, gave a ball in his honor.
When Carranza was in Chihuahua with Villa after the fall of Torreon, he
heard that Villa had ordered the execution of General Chao, Governor
of Chihuahua. Villa was asked to appear before Carranza, who demanded
an explanation. “I have shot Chao,” grinned Villa. Carranza was very
indignant, and protested vehemently. Then Villa laughed, and admitted
that the order had not been carried out. Carranza ordered him to
free Chao immediately, and said to him: “You have no right to arrest
and shoot an official not under your immediate command, without my
authority, especially a governor who is under my jurisdiction. Am I
the chief of the revolution or am I not?” Villa was impressed and he
ordered the release of Chao. He excused himself by saying that Chao had
grafted. Later it was discovered that Villa’s secretary had sent orders
to Chao, Villa not being able to read what he had signed, and the whole
scheme was engineered by Villa’s secretary to get rid of Chao, who was
his personal enemy. Villa embraced Chao as a result.
One of Villa’s many wives was enterprising enough to induce Villa to
let her sign some treasury notes, which were honored by the officials,
who did not dare refuse.
Once, Villa gave an order for the exportation through Juarez of
$5000 worth of material. The Secretary changed the order from five,
to fifty thousand, which without his knowledge had been telegraphed
to the official in charge of the Custom House in Juarez. The honest
official refused to let the goods pass the border, and the irate Villa
almost shot him for disobedience. Finally the matter was cleared up,
and Villa declared that he had ordered five, and not fifty, thousand
dollars’ worth. “But here is the order signed by you,” said the
official. Villa had been deceived again, as he has been all along by
his secretaries. The two following telegrams, one from Villa, and
the answer of the Arrieta Brothers, will throw a very clear light on
the attitude of Villa toward Carranza. It will also prove that the
majority of the generals do not sympathize with Villa, as he is making
a personal question, or better said, an alleged insult to his division,
a pretext to overthrow Carranza, and become the political dictator of
Mexico.
TELEGRAM.
CHIHUAHUA, General Headquarters,
Sept. 23d, 1914.
_Urgent._
GENERALS MARIANO AND DOMINGO ARRIETA.
Durango, Dgo.
Venustiano Carranza having deeply offended the honor and dignity of
the Northern Division under my command, and not being able to tolerate
any longer his whims and inconsequences, which would have sunk our
country in ruins, disseminating anarchy, while creating distrust with
foreign nations,--since yesterday, all my generals and myself have
decided to repudiate him as Chief of the Nation.
For we are convinced that because of his alliance with the
cientificos and his noted tendencies to favor a certain personal
group which surrounded him, and prevented the solution of the real
revolutionists, and to fulfil the promises made to the people.
As a consequence we have decided to fight only against the personality
of Venustiano Carranza, and to drive him out of the country, without
antagonizing or molesting the other chiefs who have fought to
overthrow the usurping government which has just fallen. Therefore
we repeat that our movement is solely against the personality of
Venustiano Carranza.
As we have always understood that you have been animated by patriotic
sentiments, like ourselves, we address ourselves to you, showing you
the matter clearly, and we hope that in view of the right which is on
our side, you will be with us, and will help by offering your services
to the cause of the people.
Already the Governor of the State of Sonora and his forces, have
repudiated Venustiano Carranza, and we hope that you will act likewise
and will define your position informing us if you are with us or with
Carranza.
We beg you to answer as soon as possible. Greetings.
The General in Chief,
FRANCISCO VILLA.
Answer to the above telegram.
DURANGO TO CHIHUAHUA, Sept. 24th, 1914.
SEÑOR GENERAL DON FRANCISCO VILLA,
Chihuahua.
We are in receipt of your telegram, in which you declare that
the division under your command has repudiated the authority as
Provisional President, of Don Venustiano Carranza, because of insults
to the dignity of said Division and for not having fulfilled the
promises made to the people.
We discover in your telegram a certain ambiguity, as we have no
knowledge of the insults to which you refer.
Concerning the promises made to the people, we consider your
pretentions premature, as a convention has been named to meet on the
first of October, in which clearly and explicitly the programme of the
government will be discussed and studied, so as to solve the various
problems which will benefit the proletariat.
Therefore we would be grateful, if you would communicate to us the
nature of the insults to which you refer, and the cause of the people
which has been frustrated, so that we can intelligently come to a
decision.
And lastly we appeal to your patriotism and the interest of the
country which through this break would be more weakened, and be at
the mercy of the American nation, which has not retired its troops
from Vera Cruz. We beg of you if you are a real patriot, to calm your
temper and meditate on the evils which would befall our country with
this civil war--which would bring about as a consequence a foreign war.
1st. We are of the opinion that you should sacrifice your self-love
for the good of the country, and you should not take notice of said
insults, even if they existed.
Secondly. That we hope that the Convention which is to take place on
the first of October, when all the Constitutionalist forces will be
represented, to solve the great problems of our country, will put
them into effect with the assistance of the arms which we will not
relinquish until our ideals have been fulfilled.
Hoping for an answer to give our definite resolution, we salute you
affectionately.
GENERAL DOMINGO ARRIETA,
GENERAL MARIANO ARRIETA.
As an answer, Villa sent General Urbina against the Arrieta Brothers.
Urbina and his forces were defeated, and the general badly wounded.
Innocent, well-meaning, but utterly deceived Villa! If he only knew
that the Cientifícos whom he accuses of having affiliated with
Carranza, are really pulling their wires from New York, and using him
(Villa) as the tool to eliminate Carranza, and this because the first
chief intends to carry out all the radical reforms of the revolution.
CHAPTER XIV
CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL GONZALEZ IN THE EAST
Like most of the campaigns in the north of Mexico, where the strategic
objectives are the border towns, so the campaign of General Gonzalez
was fought, first for the possession of Piedras Negras (Ciudad Porfirio
Diaz), Nuevo Laredo, Camargo and Matamoros, and later for the control
of Tamaulipas.
The first battle of the revolution against Huerta was fought at Anhelo
and ended in a defeat. Then Venustiano Carranza, with his brother Jesus
Carranza, and Pablo Gonzalez, took Piedras Negras.
Huerta, as well as his generals, were of the opinion that if Carranza
was captured and shot, it would end the constitutionalist revolution
then and there. Therefore, they concentrated all their efforts upon
Piedras Negras, which was defended by four hundred men. More than 9,000
Federals were sent against them, and although the revolutionists were
forced to leave, the enemy did not succeed in capturing the leaders.
[Illustration: GENERAL PABLO GONZALEZ
Chief of the Eastern Division]
Then Pablo Gonzalez, with the help of Jesus Carranza, roamed all over
the States of Coahuila and Nuevo Leon defeating over twenty Federal
garrisons and capturing the much needed arms and ammunition, which were
so scarce and hard to get at the beginning of the struggle.
It is a fact worth noticing that, in the three campaigns in the North,
Centre and South, the revolutionists captured many cities, and then
departed. To the lay mind it seems absurd to fight so hard to capture
a city, and then to let it go almost immediately without even waiting
for the Federals to retake it. Nevertheless, it was good tactics. The
Federal garrisons offered big stores of war material, while the cities
supplied them with food, clothing and money.
Monterrey was attacked twice without success, and there was no chance
of victory until Torreon, Piedras Negras, Nuevo Laredo, Matamoros
and Tampico were in the hands of Pablo Gonzalez. When that was done,
Monterrey was automatically evacuated by the Federals.
Tampico was attacked several times and besieged by Caballero. The
Federals had a great advantage, as they controlled the city with their
gunboats. Another drawback was the presence of foreign warships, of
foreign Consuls and representatives of the great oil corporations. The
Dutch, English and American Oil Companies protested most vigorously
against the attack on Tampico, and the Federals took good care to use
this protection to great advantage.
When Pablo Gonzalez was ordered to take Tampico at all costs, he did so
after only four days’ battle. When the Federals began their retreat,
they threatened to burn and destroy all the oil tanks and property of
the foreigners, if they were followed by the Revolutionists.
Like many of the important moves in the campaign against Huerta, the
great significance of the capture of Tampico was pointed out by a
civilian. In this instance, the Secretary of the Interior in Carranza’s
revolutionary Cabinet, Don Rafael Zubáran, was the wise counsellor.
The first reason given was that Huerta had practically given away many
very valuable oil concessions to an English company, in return for
cash. That the export tax on each barrel of oil was doubled from sixty
cents to $1.20 and calculating that over half a million barrels of oil
were exported daily, it will be seen what a rich source of income would
have been taken away from Huerta.
The second reason was that the seizure of Tampico would eliminate
a great source of friction between the foreign powers and the
revolutionary government, besides relieving the anxiety felt in
Washington as to the constant danger of foreign marines landing in
Tampico to protect the interests of their countrymen.
The third reason was that Tampico, besides being the most important
seaport in Mexico after Vera Cruz, was also a great strategic point.
It cut off Monterrey and Saltillo from the coast, and endangered
and flanked their communications. Huerta considered the possession
of Tampico of such value that when it was threatened by the rebels,
and he knew that it was lost to him, he decided to force American
intervention by arresting some marines who had landed at the Tampico
wharf on routine business. The action was deliberate and was meant to
concentrate the attention of the revolutionists on American aggression,
so that they would discontinue their attacks. The State and Navy
Department very wisely kept the American warship outside of the Panuco
River so as to offer as few pretexts as possible for attacks. It can be
asserted that the fall of Tampico sounded the end of Huerta’s rule in
Mexico.
CHAPTER XV
ZAPATA AND HIS CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH
Undoubtedly there is no Mexican who has been talked about, described,
praised and vilified more than Emiliano Zapata, in the last four years.
Now everybody can pronounce his name in America, for it has become a
byword of the revolution in Mexico.
Innumerable articles have been written in America on Zapata but I have
only met two men who had seen him,--one was a Mexican newspaperman and
the other was a federal major who slept in the same room with him,
unconscious of the fact that a few feet from his bed there was the
man he was supposed to capture dead or alive for Huerta, with three
thousand soldiers. When he did discover this interesting fact, Zapata
was miles away. This incident proved conclusively that the southern
chief could not be caught by force, and that the Indians in Morelos
would as soon think of committing suicide as to betray him.
The nature of the volcanic country in the State of Morelos makes it
very hard for a body of soldiers to march through it without danger of
being surprised and ambushed almost every hundred yards. Every peon in
Morelos and many other southern States is a Zapatista.
No man could have held such power as Zapata over the population of
almost three States, by offering in return only the spoils of war
or brigandage. No bandit ever controlled thirty thousand men on the
mere results or promise of loot or theft. The Zapatistas, with few
exceptions, are all for the abolition of all forms of slavery and for
the distribution of lands. Although Zapata is not the intellectual
leader of the Zapatistas, his name has become a legend. Many people
claim that he never existed, others claim that Genovevo de la O was the
braver and more intelligent of the two, and the real leader.
There were several leaders who fought Diaz before Zapata became
prominent, but the Morelian chief represented the deepest yearnings,
the most profound aspirations and all the unspoken desires of a
miserable, downtrodden, but patient, long-suffering and kindly race.
Any one who has visited that Garden of Eden of Mexico, the State of
Morelos, will bear testimony to the simplicity, morality and patience
of the Morelian Indians, their love of the soil which is almost a
passion, their sterling qualities.
The injustices, robberies and cruelties perpetrated on the Indians are
almost incredible, and almost unbelievable in our century. Until the
European war started, civilized people did not believe that soldiers
could be so cruel, reckless and ruthless against an enemy.
Zapata’s and Villa’s wholesale shooting of prisoners, the looting of
haciendas, banks and stores in captured cities, their retaliation
against federal officers, now seem like kid-glove, pink-tea affairs,
after the stories of German atrocities. In the light of these
atrocities, Villa might be a Mexican Chesterfield, and Zapata a
scrupulous Morelian hidalgo of the most fastidious tastes. Strange
to relate, the most virulent attacks against Mexican civilization,
methods of warfare and revolutionary barbarities, were written by
German editorialists. The Mexicans had no Treitschkes, Nietzsches,
von Bernhardis to sing the pæans of war, of the destruction and
annihilation of enemies, and inoffensive non-combatants in the name of
a higher culture and a greater civilization.
The precedents of cruelties and wanton destruction were created by the
federal officers under Diaz and Huerta. Where the Federals passed, they
left a trail of death and desolation. To prove that they had fought
valiantly the Federals killed peaceful peons and sent the ears of the
Indians as vouchers to the War Department.
Whole villages passed through fire and sword--in others all the men
were impressed into the army, and the women and children concentrated
in the cities. Thousands of fruit trees that had been growing for
years, bearing fruit, and which were the sole source of income of
families of peons, were ruthlessly cut down to be sold for firewood by
greedy Jefes Políticos. A whole population was decimated because it
would not stay under the leash of the slave driver on the sugar and
tobacco plantations owned by half a dozen rich families.
Their day of reckoning has almost arrived, and no matter what Zapata or
any other leader may do politically, the peons of Morelos know that the
lands are theirs for the taking.
Morelos is one of the smallest States in Mexico, and one of the
richest, and has an area of 2,734 square miles and a population of
179,114. As many as thirty thousand soldiers with machine guns and
cannon were sent to conquer Zapata and his army, but Zapata remained
unconquered. All the generals, including Huerta, who had won laurels in
many battlefields, invariably lost them in Morelos. The Federals fought
according to book-strategy, while Zapata and his chiefs fought with
the same fabian tactics which defeated Hannibal in Italy and Napoleon
in Spain. When the patient, ignorant, but physically powerful Indians
discovered that they could shoot and fight as well as the trained
Federals, and that a few thousand Indians banded together could keep at
bay a whole army of Federals, the struggle for land was won.
But there is the reverse of the medal. As all strong people have their
compensation in some flaw, so has Zapata a great weakness which
prevents him from becoming the greatest factor for good in his country.
His illiteracy, coupled with a lack of knowledge of politicians of the
middle and higher class, make him an easy prey to all sorts of schemers
and intriguers.
For years Zapata kept up his guerrilla warfare, accompanied by a staff
of officers and several secretaries. One of the most famous was a
certain Montaño, a school-teacher who wrote the first plan which Zapata
endorsed. The second plan, which was written by a certain Palafox,
another secretary, and was named the Plan of Ayala, which acknowledged
Orozco as the provisional president, when he rebelled against Madero,
assisted by Científico money.
After Madero’s murder, Orozco joined the standard of Huerta, who, true
to his usual methods, tried to use Orozco’s influence with Zapata, to
eliminate him. Orozco went to Morelos for the purpose of conferring
with Zapata, but the wily Morelian had discovered that the meeting was
not meant to bring peace, but to facilitate his capture and murder. As
Orozco was not very brave, and his conscience not very clear, instead
of going personally to the meeting, he sent instead his father and
two other agents. As an answer to the contemplated plot, Zapata took
Orozco’s father and his two agents as prisoners. Later they were found
dead, after an attack by the Federals.
Orozco vowed vengeance, but he left Cuernavaca in great haste under
the pretext of going North to fight the Constitutionalists, where
he was defeated at every encounter. Any one who had read Mexican
newspapers would have known how discredited Orozco’s personality was,
but Zapata’s secretaries wanted a continuation of conditions wherein
they would run the Morelian chief for their own benefit.
When Carranza arrived in Mexico City with the constitutionalist
government, he sent two agents to Zapata, with power to settle the
agrarian question in Morelos, once for all. The following letter by
Gen. A. I. Villareal will show how Zapata’s secretaries spoiled the
settlement.
MEXICO, Sept. 5th, 1914.
GENERAL EMILIANO ZAPATA:
Cuernavaca, Mor.
_Esteemed General_:
I had the pleasure of receiving the last letter, which you were kind
enough to send through Mr. Reyes and in which you express the fact
that you were to blame for the incident at Huitzilac. I must advise
you that this matter was not one of much importance, and it seems
that they gave you exaggerated reports of the same. What we consider
a grave affair, and was really a sad one regarding which we went to
consult you with the object of arriving at an agreement between the
revolutionary elements of the North and the South, was the unjustified
conduct and belligerent attitude of your secretary, Mr. Manuel
Palafox, in respect to whom I intend to speak in this letter with the
most absolute and honest frankness; believing in this way that I may
do you a good turn, not alone yourself personally but also the cause
of the well-being of the public which we must all defend and also the
peace of the nation.
If you critically analyze the happenings which occurred during our
visit in this city, and to which I beg to call your attention, you
will discover in a moment that all the difficulties, all the petty
misunderstandings, all the threats of war, emanated principally from
Mr. Palafox supported by Mr. Serratos, who also in our opinion is
carrying on work right in your office that is very far from being
patriotic and loyal.
It is always the case that when various people come together to
settle great or small differences which may exist between them, it
is understood if they work in good faith and the matters treated
of are thoroughly talked over, that some points are ceded by one
party and some by the other party; there must be reciprocity in
the arrangements, and a definite conclusion reached regarding the
subject under discussion. To continue, conferences held with regard
to any matter must not be reduced to the party on one side imposing
a settlement and the parties on the other side accepting the same
without discussing the propositions for and against and coming to a
mutual agreement.
Unfortunately, in our case this which was the rational and just
method of procedure did not take place, because as you will remember
Mr. Palafox, who was the spokesman during the discussions almost
prevented us from setting forth our side of the subject, and attempted
to impose upon us certain conditions which would have to be accepted
unconditionally as preliminaries before arriving at a resolution.
You will recollect that Mr. Palafox demanded as a first condition
that as revolutionaries of the North we should accept without
discussion the Plan of Ayala as the Supreme Law of the Republic,
declaring that otherwise it would be impossible to treat of other
matters.
This is in direct contradiction to your declarations, that you had no
ambition for power; for in one of the clauses of the Plan of Ayala
it states that General Pascual Orozco is recognized as leader of
the revolution, and in case he is not able to discharge that task,
you will be eligible; and as our complete submission to the Plan of
Ayala is demanded it would intimate that we ought to place you in the
position of the Supreme Chief of the Nation and in a more or less
covert manner, you would be Provisional President of the Republic.
I believe in the sincerity of your words when you say that you have
no ambition to command, that all you want is the settlement of the
agrarian question and the economic betterment of the lower classes for
which you have struggled so bravely. But back of this is Mr. Palafox,
who has the ambition to rule, and who is desirous to see you raised
to supreme power so that he may enjoy a privileged position in your
office in his character of Secretary and Councillor. The same object
animated Mr. Serratos more or less who also enjoys a certain amount of
influence regarding your affairs, and doubtless awaits the auspicious
moment of utilizing the same for his own benefit.
You will remember that Don Luis Cabrera and I set forth very clearly
that we were authorized to accept essentially the Plan of Ayala; that
is, the land question, the satisfaction of the popular needs, the
betterment of the poor. We hereby declare that we agree fully with the
principles set forth in the Plan of Ayala, and only desire that its
form may be modified, and that there may be added to the gubernatorial
programme which we might draw up some clauses relative to the
needs of the Northern States and the States in the centre of the
Republic, which are not in the same condition as those of the south.
Messrs. Palafox and Serratos refused to accept our cordial and just
propositions, and insisted in a blind, unquestionable, despotic manner
that the Plan of Ayala be accepted, without the change of a word or a
comma.
Convinced that the influence of Messrs. Palafox and Serratos over
you would make sterile all our efforts for coming to an agreement
in the form which we proposed, we declined to start a discussion
which only might have served to embitter our souls and to give rise
to more ill-feeling than what we suffered in the course of our
conversation with you. For our part we found ourselves in a visibly
hostile atmosphere, and we lacked the liberty necessary for the free
expression of our opinions.
When Mr. Sarabia spoke with you for the first time, he wrote me
stating that your attitude was cordial and that he saw that your
propositions of peace were sincere. On the occasion of our meeting
with you our surprise was great to find you different from what Mr.
Sarabia had represented. This may be easily explained that the first
time you spoke with Mr. Sarabia you were guided by your own impulses
and by your good intentions, and the second time you were under the
influence of the unhealthy machinations of Mr. Palafox.
The question then is reduced to the following facts: On our part the
greatest and most sincere cordiality, the recognition of the justice
of your cause, the acceptance of the principles of the plan of Ayala
relating to the division of lands and the social betterment; on your
part, good impulses, no ambition for power, and the exclusive desire
for the welfare of the public; and on the part of Mr. Palafox and
Mr. Serratos a spirit of intrigue that distorts the best intentions,
ambitions for power in your hands with a view to thriving in your
shadow, and a decided object of provoking war if their ambitions
should not be satisfied.
Is not this sad, General Zapata? Is it not deeply to be lamented that
all the patriotic efforts of honorable men shall go to pieces before
the caprices of two intriguers? Is it not bitter and even shameful
that a movement as great and unselfish as yours after four years of
struggle should degenerate by reason of an instrument of vile ambition
and in an ignoble weapon for bringing war a second time on a country
already exhausted in its struggle for independence?
I make a supreme appeal to your honor, to your patriotism, to your
love of the people, who would be in the last analysis those who would
suffer most from a war, that you take into consideration what we said
when we were with you, and which I again repeat in this letter, that
we may arrive at a good understanding with the revolutionaries of the
north and the south, who in reality are brothers.
We know that we have done all in our power to arrive at a peaceful
solution, and if at length it might be found impossible to reach it,
it will not be through our fault.
God grant that to-morrow I may not have to tell you that through
attending to the intrigues of an ambitious party more than to the
dictates of patriotism, you may be to blame for the beginning of a war
which would be thoroughly unjustifiable, which no one wants and which
would do no one any good!
I believe that after what I have said it is only necessary to add
the following: That while Palafox continues at your side enjoying the
influence that he does, it will be impossible for us to return to see
you at Cuernavaca, nor for us to send other representatives, for we
consider that we would not have, as we did not, the necessary liberty
to treat with frankness and amplitude the transcendental subject which
is under our discussion.
We would be very thankful to know that you had resolved to act
independently of your harmful counsellor; and in such a case we
consider that it would be easy enough to arrive at a settlement.
In place of Mr. Palafox you should be able to consult your principal
chiefs, who have struggled faithfully for the cause, and you will
surely find among them better standards and better counsel than from
your ancient secretary.
I know that the majority of your chieftains hold Mr. Palafox in scant
esteem and do not care for him; and if they have not so expressed
themselves to you it has been perhaps through lack of opportunity or
excess of discipline. Now it would be convenient that you consult them
regarding this matter.
I trust, Mr. General, in your good judgment and sense of right, to
kindly bear in mind with a spirit of serenity and justice what we
have set before you, and unite your efforts to ours with a view
to realizing the peace which our Republic needs so much, without
lessening the agrarian ideals for which you have struggled for so long
a time.
I am happy to sign myself,
Yours affectionate and loyal friend,
ANTONIO I. VILLARREAL.
CHAPTER XVI
ONE HUNDRED YEARS’ STRUGGLE FOR LAND AND DEMOCRACY, AGAINST CLERICALISM
In August, 1521, Cortez consummated the conquest of New Spain and in
August, 1821, under Iturbide, the independence of Mexico was wrested
from the mother country.
For exactly three hundred years Spain governed Mexico with soldiers
and priests. Ten prelates of the Dominican order, out of a list of
sixty-two viceroys, had ruled New Spain, which was surrounded with a
ring that was mightier than a Chinese wall.
Education, outside of religious teaching, was discouraged.
Communication with the outside world was forbidden. Spain fed New Spain
commercially, politically and intellectually.
The Mexican born was allowed no privileges, no rights. The Spaniards,
soldiers, priests and aristocrats monopolized everything; all the
offices, the commerce, the property, were theirs. Four-fifths of the
lands were in the hands of the Church.
In 1811 an ex-priest, Hidalgo, unfurled the banner of the revolution by
the shouts of: “Long live Religion! Death to bad Government! Death to
the Gachupines!” (Spaniards).
The revolution for freedom from Spanish rule was initiated by an
ex-priest. Morelos, Matamoros, Dr. Cos, and Navarrete, who continued
the struggle, were all ex-priests. Great personalities appeared in the
ten years’ revolution, such as Alvarez, Guerrero, Bravo, Victoria. The
Mexican revolutionists were battling for political liberty and land.
When the Church realized that Mexico was lost to Spain, it put forward
a Spanish officer, Iturbide, as the Liberator. Iturbide betrayed his
own king, and after accepting the first Constitution, betrayed the
revolution and became emperor by means of a military “cuartelazo”
(mutiny).
The Mexican liberals fought continuously the encroachments of the
Church, which used the army to support it politically. The military
strength created by the Church and landowners was maintained, not to
protect the nation from foreign aggression, but to guard the government
from the assaults of the people.
The climax of the struggle took place during the three years’ war,
1857-1860, when the liberal leaders enforced the laws of the reform,
which entitled the nation to possess all the properties of the clergy,
both religious and secular, and the Church was denied the right to own
real estate.
Religious orders as contrary to public welfare were dissolved. Church
and State were absolutely separated, and religious freedom was fully
and firmly established.
Benito Juarez, a pure-blooded Indian, continued the strife of the
Liberals, initiated by Gomez Farias, Melchior Ocampo and other martyrs
of the cause. After the three years’ war, the Church was ostensibly
eliminated as a political power. The land which had been absorbed
by the Church from the Indians, and known as “egidos,” communal
lands, reverted to them, and over three million Indians became small
landowners.
Defeated but not discouraged, the clericals then brought about French
intervention and placed on the throne of Mexico a clerical, Emperor
Maximilian, who met his defeat and death in Queretaro in 1867.
Porfirio Diaz came into power as a liberal through a revolution, and
ended as a clerical. Under his régime of spoliation, all the lands
which belonged to the Indians were taken away from them by trickery
and legal frauds, and distributed among Diaz’ generals and political
supporters. Government land was sold to foreigners.
Through the influence of Carmelita Diaz, the wife of General Diaz, the
religious orders, foreign priests, friars and nuns, came back to Mexico
and acquired property, and the clericals began reorganizing themselves
and taking breath for another struggle which they knew was coming soon.
When Diaz was tottering to his fall, the Church placed the clerical,
De la Barra, in the provisional presidency. The Madero cabinet was
composed of clericals and neo-Científicos who sat tight in a passive
policy of non-intervention in Mexican internal affairs, as if the
government reforms were none of their business.
Meanwhile, the clericals were very active politically and financially;
they contributed millions of dollars to the downfall of the Madero
government. As usual, the clericals corrupted the army chiefs, and
succeeded in having the reform government overthrown.
Dr. Urrutia, a pupil of the Jesuit College, was the instigator and
chief plotter. He picked out Huerta as the most convenient tool for
the Church. Huerta, although a Catholic, was a most unscrupulous and
ambitious man, and used the Church as a stepping-stone. He received
millions of dollars from the clergy, from the landowners, and the
foreigners, such as bankers and mining and oil interests. During
Huerta’s régime, Dr. Urrutia was the Mephisto and Iago of Huerta.
As soon as Huerta was in power and the higher clergy began to notice
the unpopularity of the dictator, they began plotting his assassination
or overthrow. Huerta, who trusted Dr. Urrutia more than any other man
in Mexico except General Blanquet, made him Minister of the Interior,
and upon his shoulders fell the responsibility of the murder of
scores, nay, hundreds, of political enemies of the Huerta régime.
As long as Dr. Urrutia and his friends, Mora the Archbishop of
Mexico, Jenaro Mendez, Archbishop of Michoacan, Eulogio G. Gillow,
Archbishop of Oaxaca, Ramon, Archbishop of Puebla--in fact, almost
all the archbishops of Mexico, were plotting with Dr. Urrutia for the
elimination of the enemies of the dictatorship, Huerta seems to have
made no objection. The following letter, addressed to Dr. Urrutia,
Minister of the Interior, by the Archbishop of Mexico City, silences
the statements made by Catholics in America and Mexico, that the Church
was neutral and did not play politics.
LETTER FROM ARCHBISHOP MORA TO URRUTIA
MEXICO, July 11th, 1913.
_My dear Minister and friend_:
Thanking you for the kind terms of your favor of the 9th inst. which I
received yesterday, I beg to assure you once more THAT ALL THE CURATES
AND PRIESTS UNDER MY JURISDICTION, in compliance with their duty, will
make every effort in order to bring about as soon as possible, the
fulfilment of the aspirations of all the good people in this republic,
who desire the peace and tranquillity of the beloved country.
I say that they do so in compliance with their duty because the Church
desires peace, and to avoid bloodshed, and that all co-operate to
the ultimate object of society, which is the well-being of all its
members.
In this sense, I shall continue to animate them to lose no opportunity
to exhort their parishioners to help to obtain this great boon.
In order to proceed in all justice, I would like, if you have no
objection, to know the name of the person who is working against the
government. _One word from you on the subject will be sufficient._
I enclose a Memo. of something which may be of use to you, and which
has come to my knowledge from trustworthy sources.
With kindest greetings, and assuring you of my thankfulness,
friendship and respect, I beg to remain,
Very respectfully,
JOSÉ, _Archbishop of Mexico_.
Dr. Urruita, emboldened by his success in eliminating so many enemies
by assassination, and in his formidable and terror-inspiring position
as official executioner of Huerta, became ambitious. The high clergy
of Mexico encouraged his pretentions, and began sending out feelers
to discover if he would be willing and ready to oust Huerta and place
himself in Huerta’s stead as dictator. But Huerta was wide-awake, and
as soon as he discovered the plot, he gave orders to have Urrutia
arrested. Urrutia escaped by the skin of his teeth; disguised as an
Indian peon he crossed the American lines to Vera Cruz, where he was
almost lynched by the infuriated Mexicans.
The following letter from the Archbishop of Michoacan proves
irrefutably that the Mexican clergy had plotted to place one of the
most dastardly, cruel and infamous men in Mexico, in the culminating
position of Chief Executive of the Republic, as a protégé and tool of
the Church in Mexico.
LETTER OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF MICHOACAN TO MINISTER URRUTIA
September 11th, 1913.
_My dear compadre_:
The timely measures taken by you saved this city from being ravaged by
the rebel gangs which have been concentrating in these localities to
the number of over a thousand strong, but now, I think I can assure
you that if the detachment which has just arrived, pursues them, this
part of the State will soon be pacified.
The principal object of this letter is to ask you to relieve me of a
great anxiety under which I am laboring, and which has been caused by
the aggressive and almost scandalous attitude taken in public by Mr.
Calero and a small group of porristas, against your good self. I can
well see that their object is to tarnish the glory which you have so
justly won, and to alienate your adherents all over the republic.
But they will not accomplish anything, because all the sensible men
know very well the envy and intrigues that animate these degraded
people. Although I am at ease on that score, my profound sympathy and
affection for you make me fear that these men’s intrigues might put
obstacles on the path that Our Lord and His Blessed Mother HAVE PUT
BEFORE YOU TO CLIMB TO THE CULMINATING POSITION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OF THE REPUBLIC, which position will require of you the greatest
sacrifice, but will at the same time lay before you a vast field in
which to exercise your activity for the glory and honor of God, and
for the benefit of our beloved country.
In the meantime I beg of you to tell me confidentially if this threat
of Calero is to be feared, or whether you think it will be easy for
you to humiliate the efforts of these upstarts.
Your compadre etc.,
JENARO MENDEZ,
_Archbishop of Michoacan_.
The flight of several archbishops from Mexico was not due so much to
their fear of the persecutions of the Constitutionalists but more to
the terror of the retaliations of General Huerta. The Mexican clergy
enlisted the sympathy of the American Catholics and of the Pope
in Rome, in their appeals for protection. The impression has been
given that the Mexican clergy is a victim of the persecutions of the
Constitutionalists, who want to destroy religion.
What the Mexican liberals, as well as the leaders among the Indians,
are after, is the elimination of the clergy from the political
arena. The political activities of the clericals will only result in
disastrous effects--their abstention from it will only enhance their
spiritual supremacy.
At Aguascalientes, one of the delegates of Zapata, Paulino Martinez,
said before the assembled generals: “The Indian, the peon, the
workingman of all the factories, the artisans in the cities, were all
exploited by that odious trinity formed by the cacique, the military
man and the priest.
Carranza never said a more profound truth, than when he stated, at the
beginning of the revolution against Huerta-- “WE ARE FIGHTING THE THREE
YEARS’ WAR ALL OVER AGAIN.”
The religious question in Mexico has to be settled once for all by
the Mexicans themselves, and the pernicious interferences by the
Mexican clergy, which tries to enlist the sympathy, influence and
intervention of the American or foreign Catholics, will only revert to
the disadvantage of all the fair thinking, just Catholics, who, if they
are sincere in their claims that they do not mix in politics, will find
that the safest and most practical thing to do is to keep neutral in a
family quarrel. Otherwise they might burn their fingers.
CHAPTER XVII
ATTEMPTS AT THE SOLUTION OF THE LAND QUESTION
Several attempts have been made during the last four years to solve
the land problem in the States of Morelos, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua.
Other States have followed in the wake in a more or less radical
manner according to the conditions of the peons and the necessity for
cultivating the land to feed the population.
The most interesting of all attempts was initiated by Gen. Lucio Blanco
who was fighting under Gen. Pablo Gonzalez in the division of the East.
Any one taking the trouble to look up the map of Mexico will observe
that the State of Tamaulipas touches the border of the United States
from the mouth of the Rio Grande (Matamoros) to Nuevo Laredo. Along the
line of that strip, on the most fertile parts which can be irrigated
by the waters of the Rio Grande, were lands which belonged to small
tenants and in many cases were communal lands “egidos” belonging to
Indians.
Under the Diaz régime in the last ten years of his rule, Felix Diaz,
the nephew of the dictator, was able to expropriate most of those
lands with the assistance of the governor and the jefes políticos of
Tamaulipas. The company which expropriated the lands and paid the
expenses was under the patronage of Felix Diaz. Roughly speaking there
were about 75,000 acres under the control of that company.
As soon as Gonzalez’s and Blanco’s troops had driven the Federals and
the jefes políticos from the border, Lucio Blanco originated the idea
of selling the lands of Felix Diaz to the peons of Tamaulipas.
He asked the engineers fighting under him to survey the land in
question and divide it into small lots from ten to sixty acres. Then
he offered them at public auction, giving the preference to the
soldiers under his command. The effect was surprising; peons came from
everywhere to watch the proceedings. Most of the land was sold to the
highest bidder at a very low price, on the installment plan, with a
small sum to be paid in cash. The most astonishing and significant
result of the experiment was that over 400 peons bought the land
besides a great many soldiers who, having acquired small lots, refused
to continue fighting. Their logic was irrefutable: they had taken up
arms to get back the land and now that they were in possession of it,
why fight any longer?
The problem was perplexing in the extreme. If all the generals in the
revolution acted on the same principle as Lucio Blanco then all the
Constitutionalist soldiers would stop fighting.
This incident proves quite conclusively that the revolution in Mexico
is an economic more than a political upheaval.
Carranza was informed of this land distribution and its disastrous
results in as far as it touched the military question and the result
was that Gen. Lucio Blanco had to shift his command to the western
division under General Obregon.
In the State of Chihuahua General Villa began a distribution of lands.
Unlike General Blanco, he went at the problem in a haphazard, personal
way.
As the Terrazas were personal enemies of his and owners of almost
one-third of the State of Chihuahua, he proclaimed the Terrazas estates
confiscated. The distribution was made among some of his officers,
civilians on his staff and personal friends.
In Mexico wherever there is cultivation of any kind there will be found
a farmhouse (hacienda) built like a fortress. The hacienda proper is a
small village, sometimes a small city in itself, containing the house
of the proprietor, the manager, the servants and the peons, a church,
buildings for gathering the crops, often a factory, enclosures or
stables for horses, cattle, sheep. The whole is surrounded by a high
and very thick wall which can stand a prolonged siege and can defy
capture by armed forces. Everything for its protection is found within
its walls: gatling guns, rifles, ammunition, food, clothing, and even
wells of water.
Formerly some of the haciendados were able to arm and organize as many
as 30,000 men under their command from their haciendas.
Most of the haciendas are now in the hands of the Revolutionists,
generals, officers and peons who work the farms for their own benefit.
Land without a farmhouse has not the same value, as the farmer coming
into a piece of land would have to build a house, unless the land
allotted to him happened to be near his abode. Besides, the haciendas
contain everything needed for the cultivation, such as plows,
agricultural implements, seeds, horses, cattle.
When Villa gave land away he incorporated with it a farmhouse. In that
sense he was creating another landed aristocracy to take the place of
the old one. Another factor which is important in the land question is
the climatic condition of the State. In Chihuahua with the exception
of the western part the rest is dry and needs artificial irrigation to
bring satisfactory results. Artificial irrigation has to be done by the
State or the federal government and cannot be carried on by private
individuals unless they are very rich or backed by capitalists or
corporations.
Most of the Terrazas estates thereupon fell into the hands of a few
scores of individuals instead of one single family.
When it is taken into account that the population of Chihuahua is about
405,500, it will be found that the distribution of the land by Villa
only touched an infinitesimal percentage of the population. Even if it
is calculated that it is necessary that one-third of the population
of Chihuahua may be needed to sustain the State by agriculture,
then 135,000 people or a third of the State would have to come into
possession of land. Admitting that Villa should succeed in giving away
land to all the soldiers and officers who have fought under him or
about 25,000 men, still there would be left over 110,000 landless peons
who very likely would have to go to work for the fortunate soldiers of
the northern division. The peons could justly claim that the revolution
was fought for all the Mexicans and especially for the peons and not
solely for the soldiers of the northern division.
The solution of the land question by Villa is therefore unequitable and
is likely to bring further trouble.
Zapata on the other side solved the problem in the most drastic and so
far in the most practical manner.
The State of Morelos is a very small State and has a population of
about 180,000 inhabitants. The land is very fertile, needing no
irrigation, as the periodical rainy season and the rivers irrigating
the whole State makes the growth of every kind of fruit trees,
vegetables, coffee, sugar cane, tobacco, corn, etc., luxuriant in the
highest degree. In fact several crops can be gathered every year.
Zapata did not only include the officers of his staff and army in the
land distribution but every soldier who had fought for him and every
peon and every family of peons in the State of Morelos.
In the case of the big sugar plantations Zapata levied a ransom which
was calculated on a certain percentage of the profits; to feed, clothe
and arm his soldiers. The salaries of the workers were increased and
the proprietor of the plantation was protected against depredations and
destruction. If the sugar planter refused to pay, then his machinery,
the buildings and the crops were burned. The constant threat of and
fear of Zapata’s army eliminated the worst form of slavery: peonage.
The rest of the population was empowered to appropriate and cultivate
the land surrounding the villages or near their dwellings.
In this fashion Zapata’s soldiers were fed, clothed and armed--every
ablebodied man, every peon had his rifle and his ammunition and was
always ready to fight the aggressions of the federal army. Practically
the whole male population between the ages of twenty and thirty was
under arms; when the Federals were away it attended to the crops; when
soldiers invaded its territory they were driven out of it or forced to
keep within the limits of the cities.
Without having any knowledge of French history the Zapatistas followed
in the footsteps of the French revolutionists.
While the leaders Marat, Danton, Robespierre were fighting their
and their parties’ supremacy and eliminating one another with the
assistance of the guillotine; while the French armies were fighting
the foreign invaders, the French peasants after burning a few chateaux
and driving away the aristocratic landowners settled down to work the
land for their own profits. As long as the aristocrat could not come
back to claim the land, the peasant cared not who ran the government.
Napoleon was able to become Emperor because he wisely left the peasants
in possession of lands which they had confiscated from the aristocrats.
In Mexico the identical thing has happened and continues and will
continue until some sort of government will be created to satisfy the
needs of the country. The basis of future democracy in Mexico will be
founded on municipal self rule in all the cities and rural settlements.
When that is a fact there will be little trouble with the other
branches of the government. The landowners in most of the States have
been driven out and meanwhile the peons are working on the land in
Morelos as well as in most of the other States. The rich haciendados
have left and the poor peons have stayed behind.
We hear only about battles, the capture of cities, the ambitions of
leaders, the quarrels among the generals, but we hear nothing at all
of the peons working to feed the 15,000,000 inhabitants in Mexico, of
the thousands of artisans and workingmen who help to complete the work
of the farmer.
There may be 140,000 or 150,000 men under arms in Mexico, but what
is that in comparison to the 15,000,000 people who continue to live
without fighting, who have to be fed, clothed and even amused? The
longer the revolution lasts the happier will be the lot of the average
peons, for every added day will decrease the chances of the reactionary
landowner to come back and through legal means deprive the Indian of
this land.
The French revolution lasted almost ten years. When the Bastille was
stormed about 25,000 aristocrats and prelates owned all the land in
France. When Napoleon came into power as Emperor over half a million
people owned land in France.
In Mexico over 65,000 haciendados are in possession of the country,
but a great majority of them are not on their haciendas, many are in
exile. The revolution has lasted about four years. The longer it lasts
the more chances there are that the original proprietors will stay away
and the latifundiæ will be divided automatically. The peons are more
interested in the ownership of the land than the question of peace,
the ballot, or who is going to be president or governor; they are
indifferent as to who will loan or will not loan money to the Mexican
government; if the Mexican consols are rising or dropping in value, as
long as the haciendados keep away long enough to give him a chance to
claim the land as his own. A little cultivation will give him all the
food he needs, what he does not need he will sell and buy with it a few
necessities.
For the success of the revolution it is vital that it should continue
until every reactionary element, the clergy, the landowner, the
army chiefs have been so thoroughly beaten that they will have no
opportunity to come back and play a political game of which they know
all the tricks. The reactionary elements must be so fearful of the
wrath of the revolutionists, must be made so poor, that they will never
come back again.
Carranza is right and so is Cabrera when they say that the land must
be taken wherever it can be found; that the revolutionists must carry
out the reforms with the power of their bayonets or they will never be
consummated. That those who speak of a constitutional government and of
elections are the reactionaries who want to play the game and arrest
the triumphant march of the revolution.
Madero was elected constitutionally, so was a congress, so were the
senators and the governors. The ministers sat in council. What happened
to the reforms of the plan of San Luis Potosí? Reactionaries like
Ernesto Madero and Rafael Hernandez who sat in the cabinet for two
years, very effectively canned all the reforms. The revolution had to
be fought all over again.
If Villa backed by the reactionary elements should control the
destinies of Mexico, then it would be only a question of a few months
until a new revolution would overthrow his régime.
Revolutions are the maladies of nations, they cannot be arrested in
their course with impunity, for then the disease will crop out in a
more virulent form.
Mexico at the end of the Diaz régime was as feudal as France under
Louis XVI. Mexico had the aristocratic landowner, the political
clergy and the military chiefs as well as in France. They will have
to be eradicated as thoroughly as noxious weeds from a field before
cultivation. After a while order will come out of chaos. Meanwhile the
peon is slowly coming into his own.
CHAPTER XVIII
BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE CARRANZA-VILLA IMBROGLIO
To make the story very short we could say that Mexican and American
reactionary interests were behind Villa, in an endeavor to exclude
Carranza as a factor in Mexican politics. But the story will be more
interesting and revealing if we point out some of the methods used to
engineer the conspiracy.
During the first six months of the revolution against Huerta (1913),
few authentic stories were published about the revolution. Most of the
news came from Mexico City. There was no other political personage
who could get more space in the first page of the newspapers than
Victoriano Huerta.
In Europe, the oil interests very effectively silenced the press as to
the progress of the revolution; in Paris the press was bought outright.
[Illustration: GENERAL BENJAMIN HILL
(Defender of Naco), under General Obregon]
Although the American press cannot be bought, there are ways of
circumventing it and cheating it of the truth. The Huertista press
agents knowing the curiosity of the American people, fed them with
stories about Huerta, and with details of his official and
unofficial actions, and more than once his very thoughts were reported
and published. The refrain was always: No matter how bad Huerta may
be, he is nevertheless President de facto,--he is the strongest
man in Mexico and he should be recognized. A Mexican and a foreign
newspaperman spent four thousand dollars a week on publicity work,
while another supporter of Huerta is known to have spent ten thousand
dollars for the same purpose.
The Huerta agents came in contact with the felicista and científico
agents, and they put their heads together to devise a means of breaking
up the successful revolution. The reactionary junta watched the events
with keen interest. As soon as Villa had proved his ability as a
general, he was chosen at once as the easiest and most convenient tool
to break up the harmony between the revolutionists.
All the efforts were concentrated on Villa. He was furnished
with money, ammunition, friends and advisers. Villa’s sincerity,
impulsiveness, his violent temper and cruelty, his utter lack of
scruples and his ignorance, were splendid instruments in the hands
of the past masters of intrigue. On May 13th, 1911, during a mutiny,
Pascual Orozco and Villa almost succeeded in murdering Francisco I.
Madero. This incident pointed out to the científico element, the man
who might be induced to repeat, more successfully, the elimination of
another leader of the new revolution.
The Villa press agents began to fill the magazines and Sunday papers
with romantic stories about the bandit general, the Napoleon bandit,
the Washington, the Lincoln of Mexico. The life record of Villa, his
personality and ignorance, forbade his ever becoming a presidential
possibility. That just suited the junta, as Villa’s presidency would
have been fraught with too many dangers for the científico element.
Huerta worked very hard to bring about a break between Villa and
Carranza, while he was in power, but he did not succeed. Nevertheless,
the work of corrosion and strife was continued by the exiled
huertistas, felicistas and científicos.
During the summer of 1913, the Villa publicity reached its zenith.
As much as two hundred dollars was paid to a writer to get a story
on Villa into a New York Sunday paper. At about that time everybody
began to suspect that Huerta would resign. Carranza was approached
by the interests which had loaned money to Huerta, to discover if he
would recognize the loan, and as Carranza would not countenance such a
proposition, the foreign interests united with the Huerta, felicista
and científico exiles, with the addition of some of the Madero clan, to
work together, against the Constitutionalists.
Villa, with all his ability as a guerrilla general, became a
marionette in the hands of politicians who pulled the strings. Even
the Aguascalientes Convention became a Punch & Judy show managed from
New York, and it was used as a convenient lever to oust Carranza and
place a puppet in his stead. The original suggestion to acclaim Don F.
Iglesias Calderon as provisional president missed fire, because of the
refusal of that very fine and integral personality to take orders from
a single military division. Suggestions were telegraphed from New York
to the junta’s representatives in Aguascalientes, who, under the guise
of radical counsellors, were really dictating what Villa should do.
In fact, all the interviews passed through the hands of an American
press agent of Villa, and his manifestos, proclamations and letters
were written by the agents, and signed by Villa, who was absolutely
ignorant of the contents of the documents.
The Aguascalientes convention was to be represented by all the generals
who had fought in the revolution. Only one civilian was present: Luis
Cabrera. No soldiers outside of the personal staffs of the generals
were supposed to come near Aguascalientes.
Nevertheless, Villa sent ten thousand soldiers to the city and had
it surrounded by troops, while he sat in a caboose on a railroad
track at the outskirts. For all practical and illegitimate purposes,
the Convention was imprisoned--the deliberations were not free and
independent, and were not meant to be so. Many generals who tried to
escape outside of the ring formed by Villa’s soldiers were sent back
to the city; while others managed to slip through and joined their
commands.
A perusal of the cabinet members supposed to be named by E. Gutierrez,
shows that the list was drawn up in New York. F. Iglesias Calderon,
although perfectly honest and independent, stands very high among the
members of the Científico Junta. He refused the honor of a portfolio.
José Vasconcelos is known to the American public through the stolen
Hopkins letters, where his name was mentioned as a recipient of
American oil money. E. C. Llorente, who is to represent Gutierrez in
Washington, was a porfirista who plotted against the Madero régime at
the border.
One of the most important reasons for Villa’s caution in not rushing
into a fight against Carranza’s generals, is that he did not feel
strong enough to cope against the constitutionalist forces. Fighting
veteran Constitutionalists is a different proposition from fighting
Huerta’s raw recruits and ex-convicts, or boys. The defection of
Villa’s best generals, Generals Luis and Maclovio Herrera, and the
Arrieta brothers, could not be supplanted by the support of J. M.
Maytorena.
In his anxiety to fight Carranza, General Villa went so far as to
enlist many federal Huerta generals, whom he had fought so bitterly
and denounced so roundly, and who had escaped from Mexico in fear of
Villa’s wrath. Poor Villa seemed unconscious of the fact that he was
slowly being surrounded by all the reactionary elements in Mexico--the
same element of which he was a conspicuous victim during the Diaz
régime. When these interests that now surround him have achieved their
purpose, they will try to corrupt him, and if they cannot buy him they
will assassinate him.
Villa’s blindness could not go any farther. No reasoning, no arguments,
no sense of patriotism or decency can rouse such an innocent fool,
and therefore, force will have to decide once more the question of
supremacy.
As Luis Cabrera said in a speech before the Convention, “In all
probability, the only solution at which the Aguascalientes Convention
will arrive, will be another war, another military action,” the name
of Aguascalientes (hot waters), is very significant as to the trouble
which the Convention has brought Mexico face to face with.
The Científico-Huerta-Madero junta in New York decided a few months ago
that if Carranza could not be eliminated through the Convention, he
could be forced out by another revolution within the revolution proper.
When it was discovered that the appeal Villa had sent out to the
revolutionary generals on September 23d before the Convention, had
not succeeded in bringing about the desired result, it was decided to
induce the doubtful element in the Convention to join in a supposedly
legal procedure. After Carranza’s resignation had been refused at
the Convention in Mexico, the delegates suggested the Aguascalientes
meeting as a means of settling all the questions of reform. Villa’s
supporters, instead of keeping to the business on hand, jammed through
the Gutierrez election, published the list of the Cabinet members, and
sent Carranza an ultimatum.
In this way they expected to give a legal appearance to their
action, and thus accelerate the secession, throwing the loyal
Constitutionalists on the side of the Villa contingent.
Neither Villa nor Zapata ever harbored the intention of handing over
their forces to the generals designated by the convention--their
hope was that Carranza might resign, and then they would control the
situation by the mere threat of force, backed by their success.
It can be safely asserted that if Villa should succeed, he would be the
president maker, the virtual dictator of Mexico. Then Villa and the
científico faction would fight for supremacy ... and destroy each other.
However, no matter what the result of the struggle may be, the Mexican
people are tired of “strong men on horseback” and the succession of a
Villa tyranny would not be much more advantageous than a Huerta or Diaz
dictatorship.
The Mexican people, the 15,000,000 who have suffered so much from
military liberators, will very effectively overthrow the pretorian
rule of one or more guerrilla czars, when they discover that the
strings are managed by Mexican and foreign reactionary interests.
Villa will only repeat Orozco’s treachery and defection, and he will
pay the price of his foolishness and ignorance with the contempt and
ostracism of the real revolutionary element.
CHAPTER XIX
THE NEED OF A DEMOCRATIC FINANCE IN MEXICO
BY CHARLES FERGUSON
During the summer of 1914, while Mr. M. C. Rolland was studying the
financial system of the United States for Carranza, he came in contact
with Mr. Charles Ferguson, who had devoted a year to investigating
financial conditions in Europe. Mr. Rolland suggested the need of a
democratic finance in Mexico, so as to liberate it from the financial
system left over by J. Y. Limantour. The Mexican and the American
investigators exchanged their views, and as both were on mutual and
sympathetic ground with a perfect understanding of the subject, Mr.
M. C. Rolland begged Mr. Ferguson to crystallize his ideas into an
article. The following chapter is a simple outline of the idea which
is behind the revolutionary reforms of all vital questions in Mexico.
Mr. Charles Ferguson was for a time one of the leading editorial
writers of a well known Metropolitan paper. He was sent abroad by
President Wilson to investigate the banking system of Europe. Mr.
Ferguson is considered one of the greatest authorities on the subject
of finance and banking in the United States.
Under the conditions of capitalistic and corporate organization and of
universal banking and exchange that have spread throughout the world
during the last two or three generations, the problem of democratic
politics has become an entirely new problem. The old solutions, the
ideas of Rousseau, Jefferson, Juarez, have become, in large part,
inapplicable.
The change is mainly due to the strength of the modern business
organization. The business organization tends to become stronger than
the democratic state, because it deals more directly with the forces of
nature and with the every day interests of ordinary men.
Everywhere in Europe, in the modern States of Asia and Africa, and
in North and South America, there is a struggle going on between the
business organization and the economic rights of the people.
This world-wide struggle has shown its acutest phases in Mexico.
The Mexican problem cannot be solved merely by the establishment of
land reform, a wide suffrage and a representative parliament. These
things are good and necessary, but they are not enough. If the banking
and credit system of Mexico is left to settle back into the general
lines approved by Diaz and Limantour, or by the orthodox financial
opinion of Europe, the banks of Mexico will contravene the work of the
political revolution.
And since the revolution cannot be wholly crushed, Mexico will continue
to be a house divided against itself, and will utterly exhaust itself
in a continuing series of revolutions and counter-revolutions.
The modern business system centres in the bank. If the democratic
revolution is to prevail and stand fast, the business system of Mexico
must be democratized. It is impossible to make business democratic
otherwise than by making the bank democratic.
The leaders of the Mexican revolution shall seize upon the control
of the capitalistic forces of the country. This can be done by
improvising--perhaps by executive decree, perhaps otherwise--a central
bank and a banking system that shall monopolize the banking function.
The existing banking systems of the world are in general based upon
public debts and are motived in their operation by the interest of a
creditor class. Mexico should have a banking system based first, upon
the property rights of the nation--the sum of the material values
that belong not to individuals but to the Commonwealth; second, upon
a capitalization of the productive powers of the people to the extent
that these can be developed by the civilizing projects of the bank.
Under existing banking systems the National estate is either not
represented at all or else stands as debtor or claimant on a footing
no higher than that of private estates. But the bank of the revolution
should be the responsible legal trustee of the public estate,
exclusively devoted to the improvement of that estate--_i.e._, to the
betterment of the material status of common citizenship.
Under most banking systems the bankers have no direct interest or
concern with the development of the natural and creative resources of
a country. Their interest in the processes of production is at best
indirect and incidental. What the bankers aim at is the accumulation
of certificates of indebtedness against society at large. They are
indeed concerned that the assets of Society at large shall equal
its liabilities. But they make no effort and take no risk for the
enrichment of society beyond bare solvency.
The general tendency of their finance is to load the working
organization of the world with as heavy a weight of bond and mortgage
as it will stand, and to vest the ownership of the securities in a
comparatively small class of creditors.
The unsocial and unscientific character of the world’s banking systems
is the main cause of that universal conflict between the business
organization and the democratic state, which has reached its most
poignant crisis in Mexico. If Mexico can work out a congruity between
modern business organization and the economic rights of the people,
it will solve the essential social problem of our times. It will
win economic leadership in the family of nations. It will achieve
unparalleled wealth and power.
The bank of the revolution should be governed by a board of directors,
got together with a minimum of racial bias in the spirit--let us
say--of the university--that is, of the arts and sciences.
There should be a dozen men, more or less, having the highest
reputation and credit as engineers, agriculturists, sanitarians,
administrators, and so on. They should be paid perhaps on the scale
of Cabinet Ministers, but should derive no other income from Mexican
sources. Their control of the bank should be disinterested and
impersonal--like that of men in high public office.
Every detail of the banking business will undergo a marked change
because of this change of motive. Yet there need be no serious division
of opinion as to the financial technique that will best promote the new
purpose.
The changes of practice concerning discount rates, note issues,
metallic reserves, etc., will follow logically and obviously from the
conception that the business of the bank is not the accumulation of
enforceable claim against the public, but rather the husbanding of the
public estate.
Banking, under any and all systems, is chiefly a matter of exchanging
specific personal claims for general social claims. The bank receives
personal debt-certificates and gives back certificates of social-debt
or documentary claims against society at large. Personal credits at the
bank are, in effect, charges against the public. Sound banking consists
in not overcharging the public.
The mystery that shrouds all banking problems is due to the
obscuring of the fundamental fact that banking has become, under
modern conditions, the most vital social function; it determines the
obligations owed by society to the individual and so fixes every man’s
status and power.
It is absurd that such a social function should be performed without
social responsibility and solely for the sake of a speculative private
profit. The proposal is, therefore, that the revolution shall establish
in Mexico the first banking system in the world deserving to be called
modern. For no excellence of banking machinery can atone for the fact
that throughout the whole circle of commerce, private credits and the
corresponding public obligations are being measured and registered by
men whose interest is quite separate from that of the public.
The proposed identification of the banking interest with the public
interest does not necessarily imply that banks should be administered
by political officials. It is indeed necessary, as an exigency of the
revolution, that the new bank of Mexico should be backed by the highest
political authority. But the real point is that modern banking will
reach a normal development only when banking has become a responsible
profession--in the analogy of law and medicine at their highest level.
In the long run it will be found that a sound, democratic, financial
system is to be regarded as the creator rather than the creature of
democratic government.
The new Mexican government should take its bank managers from any
quarter--as one might choose world-famous engineers or physicians to
conquer a devastating plague, or to accomplish a constructive public
work of extraordinary difficulty. These men should be chartered as
directors of a corporation to set up a central banking institution
in the City of Mexico and a system of branch banks in provincial
towns. The basic capital of the bank should be a trust deed executed
by the Mexican Government and conveying to the banking corporation
such portions of the national estate as are not needed for the
administrative uses of the government. The State would, of course,
retain its right to annul if necessary the bank charter and trust
deed--after reasonable notice and with due adjustment of the equities
involved.
The Bank should be the general fiscal and economic agent of the
Government for the enhancement of its revenues, the funding and
amortizing of outstanding public debts and the development of the
wealth of the country.
Through the bank, the government should take good care of the soldiers
of the revolution--giving them possession of lands on easy terms and
assistance in capitalizing farms and small business undertakings.
Legal means should be taken to cancel or compound uneconomic
commercial concessions made to foreigners and other private persons by
reactionary governments in the past. The inordinate foreign profits
derivable from such concessions might be scaled down by a system of
export duties.
It should be understood that the new bank in all its branches is
not to be regarded as a passive or merely regulative factor in the
economics of Mexico. It should, on the contrary, embody the highest
possible organization of intelligence and will for the expansion of the
productive life of the people. Much may be learned for this purpose
from a study of the working methods of the Deutsche Bank of Berlin.
CHAPTER XX
CARRANZA’S FOREIGN POLICY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NATIONAL SPIRIT
From the beginning of the Constitutionalist revolution the attitude
of Carranza as the first Chief toward the Foreign Powers, was very
bitterly criticised. His uncompromising stand as regards the European
nations was corroborated by interviews given out to the press.
Several reasons can be given for Carranza’s conduct as well as for
the criticisms. The first one is that Foreign Cabinets, Ministers and
Consuls have been so used to the servile, cowardly and undignified
behavior of Diaz and his Ministers toward Foreign Representatives that
the proud, independent behavior of Carranza and his Ministers was a
shock to European courts.
The foreign policy of the Great Powers towards small and weak nations,
with the exception of the United States, has been as a rule, that of
polite bullies and buccaneers. Great nations committed political acts,
which private individuals would not dare perpetrate. If the average
standard of the individual has been raised, that of the nations in
their international policy, has advanced very little from the times of
the cave dwellers.
Mexico being weak and torn by civil war since the inception of
her independence, has always suffered as much, if not more, from
foreigners, than from her own enemies. The French in the thirties and
sixties, the Americans in the forties, the Spaniards intermittently,
have brought trouble to Mexico. The Mexicans are always suspicious of
the international policy of the European powers.
When Huerta committed murder in the persons of the President and
Vice-President of Mexico, France, England, Germany and Spain rushed
to recognize him, so anxious were they to get in at the trough of
concessions. It was this conscienceless, greedy, sordid behavior which
disgusted Carranza in particular, and Mexicans in general. No action
in the history of the United States has created more sympathy for the
feared Yankees in Mexico and South America, than the refusal of the
recognition of Huerta on moral grounds. Carranza’s refusal to give an
account or to allow Villa to permit an investigation into the murders
of Benton and Bauche, was correct from an international standpoint.
England, who had so hastily recognized the murderer of a Mexican
President and Vice-President, became very indignant at the murder of a
naturalized Britisher who got into trouble through his own fault, and
expected the United States to demand satisfaction for it. Carranza, as
the first Chief, insisted that England should protest to him, as the
representative of the revolution, not to Villa or the United States.
The attitude of England, France, Germany and Spain towards Mexico, was
very arrogant and insulting; their protests to the United States were
quite expressive of their anxiety to have the United States intervene
and police Mexico in the same manner as had been done in Cuba.
The European powers were quite too busy watching their own frontiers to
embark on a foolish expedition like the threatened march and occupation
of Mexico City by the allied powers. The American papers came out time
after time announcing the landing of European marines in Mexico, in
case that the United States should not deem it expedient to protect
their interests. Any one familiar with European politics could have
guessed that the alarmist’s warning came either from the innermost
circles of the American military clique which had been itching for
intervention for the last four years, or from foreign chancellorships
who wanted to frighten the United States into a war with Mexico.
The European powers foreboded a general conflagration at the end of
1914. Some of them felt that the northern republic should do their
police work in Mexico while they would be busy fighting for their own
existence in Europe; others more charitably inclined, hoped that the
United States might easily get into a wasps’ nest, by intervening in
Mexico,--especially as Japan stood on the other side of the Pacific,
as a warning of the brown peril, and as a sympathetic, though selfish
supporter of Mexican integrity. In spite of contrary assertions,
Mexican statesmen and level-headed thinkers dread an American invasion
into their country; be it for the purpose of conquest or an unselfish
police-work.
A military offensive or defensive alliance with Japan is much more
dreaded by the Mexicans than an American intervention. The American
Colossus, as the United States is called, does not represent the
brutal, military, imperialistic methods of the Japanese, but a danger
of elimination by military conquest or absorption by political,
commercial, and financial attrition and suction.
All the Mexican politicians, writers and statesmen fear American
meddling in their internal affairs, and although their admiration for
the United States and its greatness is unbounded, nevertheless, their
patriotism is still greater than their neighborly love. The whole
spirit of South America, south of the Rio Grande, is not Spanish nor
Indian--the spirit is essentially latin and gallic. The mental attitude
of the Zapotec Indian Juarez was neither Iberian nor Aztec, but
essentially of the roman type of the republic.
The intellectual radicalism of the liberals, Gomez Farias, Melchior
Ocampo, Leandro del Valle, was of the same pattern as that of the
French revolutionary Jacobins--the clearest, most advanced and
progressive ideas in politics have been absorbed from Gallic and Latin
sources. The French revolution, the Napoleonic epos, are the text
books of the liberals and the ambitious politicians. Roman and French
history was admired and unconsciously imitated. The one for the civic
virtues, courage and greatness of its citizens,--the other for the
daring, patriotism and intellectual clearness of its most prominent men.
Spanish history and philosophy is a closed book to Mexican
thinkers--for Spanish thought was always in the rear guard of
intellectual Europe. The Spanish spirit is found in reactionary types,
like Lucas Alaman,--the Don Quixotic characteristic in a Lopez de
Santa Ana,--the Castilian cruelty in a Miguel Marquez. As a Mexican
writer once said: “Spain has brought us only priests, money-lenders,
bull-fighters and dancers.”
Americans were astonished at the outburst of hatred made manifest in
the persecution of Spanish priests in Mexico, and Spaniards in general,
especially in the State of Morelos, by Zapata, and the deportation of
Spaniards in Chihuahua by Villa. They do not know that the Spaniards
have always been on the side of the dictators, the oppressors, never
with the liberators, and that the active co-operation of Spaniards
in politics has outlawed them. After the assassination of Madero and
Suarez, the Spaniards in Vera Cruz gave a banquet in honor of the
tragedy. The Mexicans are not likely to forget this incident. The
Mexicans of the middle class and the Indians despise the Spaniards. On
the other hand, they do not dislike the Americans, but they dread the
proximity of the Colossus, and the constant threats of American armed
invasion.
The American public was shocked by the reported cruelties of the
revolutionists in Durango, and other captured cities. Many reports
were exaggerated, but the Durango stories were utterly false. Several
Americans who came to New York after the capture of Durango declared
that they had witnessed the entry of the Constitutionalist soldiers,
and their behavior in Durango, and could vouch for the inaccuracy of
the news--not only in the general outline, but in all its details.
The American public, as well as the editors in the American press, did
not suspect then that Huerta had press agents in New York, who made
it a point of disseminating false reports about the revolutionists,
so as to discredit the movement and pave the way for recognition
of Huerta. Governor Hunt, of Arizona, wrote a letter to the first
Chief, protesting against the alleged cruelties. Venustiano Carranza
answered, and the following letter is quoted as a fair example of the
attitude of the Chief and the Mexican revolutionists on the question of
retaliations and shooting of prisoners.
HERMOSILLO, November 27th, 1913.
GOVERNOR GEORGE W. P. HUNT,
Phoenix, Arizona.
_Esteemed Sir and Friend_:
I am pleased to acknowledge receipt of your interesting letter of
the 17th inst., written on account of the occupation of Ciudad Juarez
by the Constitutional forces under the immediate command of General
Francisco Villa,--and to manifest to you my gratitude for the kind
phrases which you express in same, regarding myself.
Recognizing with pleasure in the spirit of frank friendship which
animated your letter, the personal sympathy of yourself and of the
people of the United States for the struggle of civilization and
justice, which we are sustaining, I can only lament that a not
entirely perfect knowledge of the peculiar conditions of the Mexican
problems may be propitious in certain cases (and in spite of that
excellent disposition) to a bad intelligence of some of our acts.
This is probably due to the fact that the criminal acts with which
the struggle was initiated, and the cruel proceedings employed to
sustain it, have been forgotten. When Mexico had realized the highest
democratic prerogative to elect its mandataries, and we had the right
to expect in the midst of peace and tranquillity, the periodical
renovation of the public powers, for the expression of the national
will only, the most corrupt balance of the conquered classes have
tried to destroy our political institutions for all time and by
violence or force only have they disposed of the life, the rights and
interests of our countrymen. They have perpetrated bloody executions
without subjection to any law; they assassinate the Constitutionalists
who fall wounded, battling with arms for the liberty of the
people,--and deputies and senators who defend our democratic
institutions by word, they drag peaceful men and even children from
their homes, obliging them to take up arms against us, and instil
terror throughout, burning entire towns. It has been crimes of this
nature which have made the cause that I represent, constitute not only
a corrective political revolution but also that it should have the
character of an act of peace, and severe justice which will chastise
the guilty, and provide for the salvation of the Mexican family.
To fill these purposes, within the spirit of our Constitution, without
any sentiment of passion, but meditating with reflection up to what
point clemency and magnanimity can arrive, before an imperious duty
of justice and the high necessity of assuring peace and the future of
the nation, I have determined that the law of Juarez of January 25th,
1862, which defines and chastises crimes against the public peace,
shall be put into force.
With strict subjection to that pre-existent law, the Huerta officials
were tried and executed, among whom were some who had been apprehended
in Torreon by the same General Villa who, in addition to pardoning
them, then acceded to the fact that they should become incorporated
in our forces, in which they tried later, but in vain, to make the
men whose command was entrusted to them, desert--they finally running
away, in order to relapse into their crimes.
It is true that the principles established in international wars agree
to give pardon and immunity to the prisoners, but in civil struggles
the most civilized nations in all epochs have employed proceedings
still more rigorous and bloody than those which we have been obliged
to adopt. In the case of executions of officials in Ciudad Juarez, the
chastisement according to the law, of delinquents against peace and
public security must be viewed, as a just punishment, rather than a
cruelty to prisoners of war.
The Mexican people, exhausted in the first phase of this civil war,
headed by Francisco I. Madero, all their clemency and all their
pardon, experiencing as only fruits of this magnanimity, tyranny in
the interior and the loss of prestige in the exterior. To-day it
wishes to assure the operation of its institutions and re-establish
peace for all time, by means of a definite and official guarantee of a
national organism.
The events of Ciudad Juarez have been very far from revesting
the individual importance which the intemperance of our enemies
have wished to give it, in the same manner as was calumnious the
statement published by them, that in Durango more than forty women
and young girls committed suicide, for fear of the excesses of the
Constitutionalists, as I could personally verify that in Durango, as
in all parts, our forces have been disciplined and respectable, giving
guarantees to the towns which have fallen into their power.
Before concluding, it gives me great satisfaction to advise you that
I am animated by the same sentiments of humanity that you possess,
and that if I have placed the law of Juarez in force, in respect to
an exigency of national sentiment, of justice, of public convenience,
and the necessity of bringing peace to my country,--I have at the same
time tried to have this law applied to unscrupulous enemies within the
limits of the most absolute necessity, always authorizing pardon and
immunity to the unconscious ones.
I hope the preceding declarations will be sufficient to establish
the attitude of the well understood justice and humanity of the
Constitutionalists, in order not to detract the personal sympathy and
favorable opinion of the North American people from our cause, and you
may be sure that I shall take into consideration your noble ideas, in
order to recommend greater clemency toward our enemies, always within
the respect of the law.
Assuring you of my highest estimation and respect, and asking that you
will consider me an affectionate and sincere friend, I remain,
(Signed)
V. CARRANZA.
It would be too much to have asked of the revolutionists to pardon
and release the federal officers captured by them. The experiment was
tried, and every time they repeated their treacheries, cruelties and
infamies. They were trained in the school of Diaz and Huerta--with
few exceptions they were men without conscience, honor or patriotism.
They represented militarism in its lowest, most despicable and sordid
form. A federal officer who had been fighting in Morelos against Zapata
was interviewed on his arrival in New York. He asserted candidly that
the only manner to eradicate the land problem in Morelos consisted
in killing the whole male population of the State and that any other
solution was Utopian.
When the American marines landed in Vera Cruz, the news caused a
sensation in Mexico. A gentleman who was present at the headquarters of
Carranza describes the excitement of all the Mexican civilians as well
as the soldiers in the camp. Without a doubt it was the most critical
moment of the revolution; everybody was discussing the news and the
agitation was intense. The only calm and cool person was Carranza; he
was sitting immobile and silent, looking straight ahead, without seeing
anybody or paying attention to the noise, bustle, gesticulations and
the shouts of the people.
He was thinking very hard and the only gesture which gave a clue to
his agitation was a slow movement of the hand, stroking his beard in a
mechanical fashion. When the Carranza protest was published there was
like an universal sigh of relief after a tense situation.
The Mexicans felt that Carranza had embodied in his protest their
outraged sense of national dignity and pride.
The protest was a safety valve which prevented a dangerous national
explosion. Huerta, who had cunningly contrived to bring about American
intervention, worked feverishly to use this patriotic wave, and to
attract it under his guidance in a foreign war, which would save him
and his army from annihilation.
In the United States many persons were disgusted at what they called
the ingratitude of Carranza. They forgot to enquire if Carranza had
asked for intervention, and that an unbidden gift is an unwelcome
gift. They should have demanded the thanks of Huerta instead.
Subsequent events have proven the assertion of Mexican observers that
the occupation of Vera Cruz by the Americans, instead of helping the
revolution, assisted in keeping Huerta several months longer in power.
Vera Cruz could easily have been captured by the revolutionists, and
Huerta would have hastened to flee by the way of Puerto Mexico. The
occupation of Vera Cruz by the Americans prevented the revolutionists
from attacking the railroad connecting Mexico City with Puerto
Mexico,--as Vera Cruz had to be used as a base. If the occupation of
Vera Cruz was achieved to prevent the cargo of war material of the
Ypiranga from reaching Huerta, then it failed in the purpose. It did
not accelerate the resignation of the dictator, nor did it calm the
Mexican troubled waters.
If, as it is claimed, the occupation of Vera Cruz was the climax or
punishment for a series of insults to Americans, and the upholding of
national honor, would it not have been more in keeping with military
traditions to capture or sink Mexican gunboats in the Atlantic and
Pacific without attempting to land marines in any port, and to blockade
both coasts of Mexico?
The A B C Peace Commission would have arrived at Niagara Falls by the
same road and achieved the same results. The meddling in Mexico would
not have cost the American tax payers five million dollars. The most
charitable description of the incident is that it was a hasty and
costly blunder of the Navy Department.
Let us put ourselves in the place of the Mexicans themselves. The
touchiness of their national pride and their dignity is well known, as
well as that their patriotism and love of country is as great as that
of the greatest nation. Why criticise a characteristic of a weak nation
which is considered a virtue in a strong one?
Consider for instance the question as applied to the United States.
If during the Civil War British marines had landed and occupied New
Orleans for some reason or other, what would have happened? Would the
northerners have protested against British intervention, or acclaimed
it? Would not the northerners as well as the southerners have fought
British occupation?
If it is a question of the Monroe Doctrine, we beg to differ--the
Monroe Doctrine, to reach its highest value as a political tenet,
should work both ways,--in the interests of the United States as well
as Central and South America. If the Monroe Doctrine is expedient,
in the case of the United States, it should be acceptable to Latin
America. Latin America rebels against a one-sided view of the Monroe
Doctrine.
When Villa gave out his interview on the occupation of Vera Cruz,
he was evidently inspired by his American adviser and Mephisto. He
was giving out the American side of the question,--not the Mexican.
Unconsciously Villa acted as Porfirio Diaz or any other Cientificos
would have done, if they had been in his place. Carranza represents the
Mexican people, although Carranza has never been anything but a friend
and admirer of the United States. It must be considered that no true
friendship can exist without self-respect on Mexico’s side and mutual
respect on both sides.
The occupation of Vera Cruz has been a source of irritation for the
Mexican and American, and a constant element of danger. It was a
mistake which turned into a costly blunder.
CHAPTER XXI
PRESIDENT WILSON’S MEXICAN POLICY
The attitude of President Wilson towards the Huerta régime was attacked
not only in the European press but likewise in the American newspapers.
The French, German, English and Spanish daily and weekly papers sneered
at what they dubbed the moral policy of a puritan school teacher.
The American papers were divided in their opinion; the Republican
organs laughed at the reversal of their beloved “dollar diplomacy,” and
many so-called Democratic papers attempted to uphold the blustering
“big stick” policy. With the exception of the labor and socialistic
press there was a great deal of doubt and misgivings expressed as to
the outcome of the new diplomacy.
Even the average American, who is always on the side of justice
and fair play, was rather taken back by this radical departure in
American and foreign relations. For American diplomacy, although
usually equitable, always took into consideration the interests of the
Americans in a foreign country first and last, even if they clashed
with the fundamental rights of the natives.
In the case of American interests in Mexico, it was long suspected
they had been playing politics and throwing their all powerful
influence in favor of the government which could give them the best
advantages in a business way, which were in opposite relation to the
liberal principles and the welfare of the majority of the Mexicans.
The great corporations have always received extraordinary favors from
dishonest governments. The mining and oil syndicates, the railroad and
land concessionaires, acquired great privileges and gave very little in
return for them. For example, an American oil company in Mexico made
as high as 450 per cent. profit on its original investment and doubled
the selling price of oil and gasoline. As soon as an English company
invaded the field they fought each other for a while, then realizing
that it was an expensive affair which redounded to the benefit of the
Mexican consumer, they came to an agreement by dividing the territory
among themselves and right away the price of oil and gasoline went up
again.
Scores of cases can be cited to prove that all the advantages are in
favor of foreign investors. The salaries of the Mexican workingman or
peons are not raised, but the prices of commodities are never lowered.
The great Orizaba cotton mills, all the factories, the great mining
corporations have always paid the lowest salaries. Whenever there was a
strike for higher wages or for better conditions, the Diaz and Huerta
régimes always protected the foreigners and at the slightest pretext
massacred the strikers. In the rare cases when the government was
fair to the strikers, as happened under Madero and Carranza, then the
foreign investors protested to their governments that their interests
were in danger of destruction.
With the Mexican laborer and peons it has become a conviction that
foreign interests are always on the side of dictators as against the
Mexican people. In Central and South America the new democratic policy
was watched with keen interest; the Latin Americans shrewdly guessed
that the attitude of the Democratic administration would be a test
stone of their relations with the State Department.
So much had been written about the famous Monroe Doctrine by successive
American statesmen that the original meaning of this doctrine had been
entirely lost to view.
The original Monroe doctrine was uttered as a warning to the Holy
Alliance in its well known designs to attempt the reconquest of the
provinces lost by Spain.
The Monroe doctrine was never meant to be an excuse to collect debts
for American or foreigners or a pretext to police unruly republics.
With the exception of some Central American States there has never been
a case in a hundred years when South America and Mexico could not cope
successfully against foreign invaders.
As far back as 1806-07 England attempted to conquer Argentina and
Uruguay when they were still under Spanish rule. The Spaniards and the
natives fought very bravely and repelled the invaders, who had already
occupied Buenos-Ayres. The native South Americans did not intend to
exchange masters and soon afterwards they overthrew the Spaniards.
In the early forties France fought the Argentinian dictator Rozas,
but after a two years’ war she was defeated. Later, in 1845, France
and England pretended that Rozas should open the interior rivers to
international navigation. Buenos-Ayres was blockaded and the war lasted
for five years; but England and France were defeated.
Brazil and Argentina tried to conquer the little republic of Paraguay.
The war lasted five years (1865-70). The result was that forty-five per
cent. of the male population was killed in battle, but Paraguay was not
conquered.
The Latin American republics feel that they can take care of
themselves, and their nationality against their neighbors as well as
against Europe. No matter what the ambitions, intentions or plans
of conquests of certain European powers may be they know fully well
that there is not the slightest chance for a permanent occupation by
European armies, and that any conquest by any Asiatic or European
nation is an absurd dream.
It is understood that the Monroe doctrine was once a very useful moral
protection, but it did not prevent attacks and occupation of South
American territory by Spain, France and England. The only reason
which interfered with the territorial designs of European powers was
not the help of the United States, when it was most needed, but the
heroic resistance of the Latin American nations themselves. The fear
is rampant that the Monroe doctrine might be used as a pretext for
aggression by the United States.
Latin Americans follow this line of argument; the great American
corporations can invest a great deal of money in South America. They
can very easily send agents to foment revolutions which necessarily
would destroy American property and then a pretext would be found for
American intervention, as happened in Nicaragua.
There is a very short step from temporary to permanent occupation,
tending to create a very dangerous precedent in favor of American
occupation in any country where there is a great deal of invested
American capital.
The thought was expressed by a great many South American statesmen that
President Wilson’s Mexican policy would be a good illustration of the
future policy towards South America. At the beginning the expressions
of neutrality and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Mexico
were considered rather suspiciously.
Had the President of the United States declared war on Mexico and sent
troops to Mexico City on any pretext whatsoever, the Latin American
nations would have closed their doors to American capital, commerce,
and would have boycotted American goods. The thought would have always
been present that the Americans would always use their interests as a
wedge for interference in their national affairs.
The entrance of Argentina, Brazil and Chile in a solution of the
Mexican-American incident at Tampico was a characteristic move
exemplifying the new trend of thought on statesmanship in Washington.
Under a republican administration, England, France and Germany would
have been asked to settle the question with the United States instead
of the A B C powers. Without fear of contradiction it can be stated
that Argentina, Brazil and Chile’s entrance into Pan American affairs
with the co-operation of the United States proves that the State
Department has finally learned the A B C of Pan American statesmanship.
Likewise, that the Monroe doctrine can only reach its highest
efficiency in co-operation with the whole of America from Patagonia to
Canada.
When the Americans create a Pan American doctrine, then there is no
doubt that Europe will not dare to challenge it.
At present a challenge to the Monroe doctrine is in reality a challenge
to the American navy. With a new Pan American doctrine the challenge
would include all Latin American countries, with the United States
and Canada in an offensive and defensive alliance against one or
more European powers. At present it appears as if the defence of the
territorial integrity of all America was shouldered upon the United
States alone. The Latin Americans feel that they should have a share of
this responsibility, for they believe themselves capable and ready to
do so.
There was a great deal of excitement and indignation in South America
when the American marines landed in Vera Cruz. Huerta was not made more
popular by this incident, but the national instinct of preservation of
the Latin races made them unconsciously understand that the landing of
American blue jackets was only a wedge to achieve American occupation
and that as long as Vera Cruz was occupied, it was only a question of
time until American soldiers would march to Mexico City.
When Roosevelt was in South America he was fêted and banqueted by the
most prominent men in the A B C republics. They were too polite to
inform him what they thought of his speeches on the Monroe doctrine.
The articles and editorials commenting Roosevelt’s theories were
very plain if courteous: that either Mr. Roosevelt had forgotten the
original meaning of the Monroe doctrine or that he was deceiving
himself into an imperialistic meaning of the doctrine.
The Latin Americans and Mexico hope fervently that the unselfish,
humanitarian and democratic diplomacy of President Wilson will bear the
brunt of the tremendous influences that are brought to bear upon it.
It is a well known platitude that certain American mining, railroad
and oil interests are subterraneously working against this idealistic
policy; that the War Department has been itching for a war of conquest
or police work in Mexico. An officer of the United States army in an
expansive moment volunteered the information that intervention in
Mexico would mean an increase from 80 to 350,000 men in the American
army and make it possible to organize it more in proportion with its
population. That there being always a danger of a war with Japan, and
the United States not being ready for it, a war with Mexico would
prepare the army for that eventuality.
President Wilson has more admirers in Mexico and South America than
any other President or statesman in the whole history of the United
States has ever had, not even excepting the martyr President Lincoln,
or Washington.
The popular thought has been deeply imbedded with the conviction that
if the dictator Huerta could not exasperate and inveigle President
Wilson into a war with Mexico, that no power for evil can achieve the
purpose in the future.
Far seeing Mexicans did not expect a prompt solution of the vital
problems after the elimination of Huerta. The dictator was only the
greatest impedimenta to a realization of liberal ideals; once Huerta
eliminated the work was a little less arduous, but still of tremendous
purport.
The participation of England, France and Germany in a struggle for life
in Europe has luckily relieved Mexico of three great mischief makers.
The great and sombre powers which have kept Mexico in a turmoil for a
hundred years are still at work: the clericals, the landowners and the
militarists; in the last twenty years the American interests have been
added to the list.
A Mexican thinker concreted the thought thus: “The great powers for
evil in Mexico are: The Church, the Latifundiæ and the Trusts; their
great victims will be President Wilson, Carranza and the Mexican
people.”
REFLECTIONS
In the beginning of the revolution against Diaz, as public opinion
seemed to be favorable to what was called “The Great Constructive Work
of Diaz,” there was a vague and superficial impression that the United
States should repeat the policy which had been inaugurated toward Cuba;
a sort of political tutelage which left the independence of the island
in the hands of the natives.
Subsequent events have revealed to the Americans that although the
Mexicans were still groping for a Constitution more in keeping with
their racial characteristics, that they had had, in opposition to
Cuba, which gained its independence from Spain in 1908, a national
history for one hundred years, with great national heroes, martyrs and
political ideals which could not be infringed and trespassed upon by an
uncalled for intervention in their internal affairs.
Thoughtful and well-informed statesmen and politicians have come to the
conclusion that a political tutelage as in Cuba will never be tolerated
in Mexico, any more than military aggression for the sake of conquest,
or under the hypocritical name of peace.
The average American knows that a Mexican war would be a war without
heroes or glory for American arms.
The Mexicans are intensely grateful to President Wilson for insisting
on keeping hands off in Mexico. The internal struggle of the liberals
fighting against the reactionary powers in Mexico must be settled by
the Mexicans themselves, or it will have to be settled all over again.
* * * * *
The impression of a great many Americans is that Mexico is going
towards political disruption, that is to say, a secession into three
entities: the North, the Centre and the South.
Northern secession is encouraged by the great mining, oil, railroad,
and land interests in the United States and by the reactionaries in
Mexico. Southern secession is not only encouraged, but fomented, by the
ambitious and able dictator of Guatemala.
The northern republic would comprise the border states, as well as
Lower California, which, even if independent, would be more friendly to
the United States than a united Mexico. That is the conviction of those
interested in a Northern secession.
A Southern republic would mean the absorption of the States of Yucatan,
Campeche, Tabasco, Chiapas, and the Territory of Quintana Roo, under
the leadership and hegemony of Guatemala.
Working towards that end, and in co-operation with the Guatemalan
dictator, is a gentleman in the State Department, who was once U. S.
representative in Guatemala.
American interests are allied with the Mexican interests, whereas, the
American radicals, socialists and the labor party are in sympathy with
the Mexican liberals. The American and Mexican capitalists are opposed
to the American and Mexican middle class and proletariat.
* * * * *
The same class trouble is going on in the Church in Mexico. The native
Mexican clergy is opposed to the high or foreign clergy. All the
oppressions, cruelties, and treacheries in the fight of the clericals
against the liberals have emanated from the foreign or high clergy,
which used the military element for that purpose. The unselfish,
libertarian struggle on the other hand, was always actively assisted by
the native priests; by men like Morelos and Hidalgo. The poor Mexican
priest, or better said, the low Mexican clergy, is first a Mexican,
and if that agrees with his belief, he will be a good Catholic; but if
his faith is pitted against the welfare of his country, then he will
invariably prefer to be a good Mexican and a poor Catholic, to being a
poor Mexican and an obedient Catholic.
The higher clergy in the United States, by attacking the liberal
policies in Mexico, and waging an active campaign against the Mexican
revolutionists, is placing itself in direct opposition to the lower
Mexican clergy.
* * * * *
From the Mexican point of view, three principles have been laid down to
face and combat American aggression, or absorption. The elimination
of predatory American capital, the curtailment of American immigration
schemes, and the advancement of European immigration. American methods,
on the other hand, will be encouraged in all the active expressions of
life, such as business organizations, farming and school methods.
* * * * *
There is no doubt that ten years of a complete and practical rural
school system in Mexico will change the whole social and political
character of the republic. The advancement of woman in life will also
gain a decided advantage for the Mexican, for no nation can be greater
or better than its women.
* * * * *
Oriental immigration cannot be encouraged, as being dangerous to
the best interests of Mexico, not because of the inferiority of the
Orientals, but because of their superiority, which would tend to
segregate them into colonies.
* * * * *
A Mexican engineer suggested a plan to cut a canal in Lower California,
from Enseñada to the Rio Colorado, a distance of ninety miles. By this
method Lower California would be made into an island, and the passage
of ships from the Pacific Ocean at Enseñada, through the Canal into
the Gulf of California would double the importance, commercially and
politically, of the States of Sonora, Sinaloa and the Eastern side
of Lower California. Irrigation, and later immigration, in Lower
California, would change the barren island into a garden.
* * * * *
The Mexican revolutionists are socialists without knowing it; their
actions in the economical and political field have proven it; the
Marxian theorists in Europe showed by their attitude in the war, that
they were not socialists, but political trimmers.
* * * * *
The French revolution is being repeated in Mexico. Bare feet are
pattering up on one side of the stairway, while patent leathers are
descending on the opposite side.
* * * * *
The Mexican problem is like a sand-bar in the path of the American Ship
of State.
APPENDIX
THE PLAN OF SAN LUIS POTOSÍ
By F. I. MADERO.
DECLARATION TO THE NATION
The people, in their constant effort to bring about the triumph of
their ideals of liberty and justice, have deemed it necessary at
certain historical moments to make the greatest sacrifices.
Our dear country has arrived at one of these times; a tyranny which
the Mexicans had not been accustomed to endure, since we gained
our independence, oppresses us in such a manner that it has become
intolerable. In exchange for that tyranny, peace has been offered us,
but a shameful peace for the Mexican people, as it is not based on
right but on might; for it does not have as an object the advancement
and prosperity of the country, but only the enrichment of a small group
who, abusing their influence, have converted the public positions into
fountains of benefit exclusively personal, exploiting without scruples
all the concessions and lucrative contracts.
The legislative power as well as the judicial are completely under the
executive; the division of power, the State sovereignty, the liberty
of the municipal government and the rights of the citizen only exist
as they are written in our Magna Charta; but as a fact, in Mexico it
can almost be said that martial law reigns constantly; justice instead
of imparting protection to the weak, only serves to legalize the
plundering committed by the strong; the judges instead of being the
representatives of justice are agents of the executive, whose interests
they serve faithfully; the House of Congress of the Union has no other
will than that of the dictator; the State Governors are appointed
by him, and they in their turn appoint and tax in the same way the
municipal authorities.
From this it results that the administrative gear, judicial and
legislative, obeys with one will the caprice of Gen. Porfirio Diaz,
who during his long administration has demonstrated that the principal
motive that guides him is to maintain himself in power at all costs.
For many years deep uneasiness has been felt throughout the republic,
due to the above form of management of the Government, but General
Diaz, with great astuteness and perseverance, had well-nigh crushed
out all independent elements, so that it was impossible to organize
any kind of a movement to deprive him of the power, which he had so
misused. The mischief was constantly aggravated, and the decided
eagerness of General Diaz to impose on the nation a successor in the
person of Mr. Ramón Corral, brought matters to a crisis and determined
many Mexicans, although lacking political affiliations because it
had been impossible to form them during the thirty-six years of
dictatorship, to throw themselves into a struggle, intending to regain
the sovereignty of the people and their purely democratic right to the
land.
Among other parties which had the same object, the National
Anti-Re-electionist Party was organized, proclaiming the principles
of EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE AND NO RE-ELECTION as the only ones capable
of saving the republic from the imminent danger which menaced from
the prolongation of a dictatorship each day becoming more and more
onerous, more despotic and more immoral.
The Mexican people actively seconded that party and responded to the
call which was made, sending its representatives to a convention, in
which also was represented the National Democratic Party, which also
interpreted the popular desires. The said convention appointed its
candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency of the republic,
those nominations devolving upon Dr. Francisco Vásquez Gomez and on
me, for the respective charges of Vice-President and President of the
republic.
Although our situation was extremely disadvantageous owing to the fact
that our adversaries received the sanction of all the official element,
on which they did not hesitate to rely, we believe it our duty to
accept an honorable appointment like this in order to best serve the
cause of the people. In imitation of the wise customs of republican
countries, I travelled over a portion of the republic, calling upon
my compatriots. My passing from one town to another was like a real
triumphal march, for everywhere the people, electrified by the magic
words Effective Suffrage and No Re-election, gave evident proofs of
their irrevocable resolution to obtain the conquest of such secure
principles. At length, the moment arrived when General Diaz began to
notice the true situation of the republic, and understood that he could
not advantageously struggle with me in the field of democracy, and
sent me to prison before the elections, which were consummated while
excluding the public from the primaries through violence, filling the
prisons with independent citizens and committing the most shameful
frauds.
In Mexico, as a democratic republic, the public power cannot have
any other origin or base than the national will, and this cannot be
subordinated to formulas consummated in a fraudulent manner.
For this reason the Mexican people have protested against the
illegality of the last elections, and wishing to employ successively
all the recourses which the laws of the republic offer, in due form
they requested the annulment of the elections before the Chamber of
Deputies, notwithstanding the fact that in that body a legitimate
origin was not recognized, and it being known beforehand that the
members of the same were not representatives of the people and only
respected the will of General Diaz, to whom exclusively they owed their
investiture.
In such a state of affairs the people, who are the only sovereign, also
protested in an energetic manner against the elections, in imposing
manifestations consummated in different parts of the republic, and if
these did not spread through all the national territory, it was due
to the terrible pressure exercised by the government, which always
smothers in blood any democratic demonstration, such as passed in
Puebla, Vera Cruz, Tlaxcala, Mexico and other parts.
But this situation so violent and illegal could not last long.
I have understood very well that if the people have appointed me as
their candidate for President it is not because there may have been
an opportunity of discovering in me the faculties of a statesman or
a governor, but only the virility of a patriot resolved to sacrifice
himself if necessary in the cause of liberty, and to help the public
free itself from the odious tyranny which oppresses the nation.
From the time when I threw myself into the democratic struggle I knew
very well that General Diaz had no respect for the freewill of the
nation and the noble Mexican people, and upon attending the primaries I
knew also very well the attacks that awaited them; but notwithstanding
these facts, the public gave to the cause of liberty a numerous
contingent of martyrs when these were necessary, and with admirable
stoicism met at the polls to receive all sorts of annoyances.
But such conduct was indispensable to demonstrate to the world at
large that the Mexican people are ready for democracy, that they are
thirsty for liberty, and that their present governors do not meet their
aspirations.
Besides, the attitude of the people before and during the elections, as
well as after them, demonstrates clearly that they opposed with energy
the government of General Diaz, and that if their electoral rights had
been respected I might have been elected as President of the republic.
Taking this into consideration and echoing the public sentiment, I
declare illegal the past elections, and as the republic for that reason
is without legitimate governors, I assume provisionally the Presidency
of the republic, while the people appoint according to law their
governors. To attain this object it is necessary to hurl from power
the audacious usurpers, who for all the titles of legality boast a
scandalous and immoral fraud.
With all honor I declare that I would consider it a sign of weakness on
my part and treason to the public who have confided in me, not to place
myself in front of my fellow-citizens who anxiously call upon me from
all parts of the country, to compel General Diaz by force of arms to
respect the national will.
The present Government, although it originated in violence and fraud
from the moment that it was tolerated by the people, yet can hold for
foreign nations certain titles of legality up to the 30th of the coming
month, in which their tenure expires; but as it is possible that the
new government emanating from the last fraud, may not by that time be
in power, at least because the greater part of the nation is making
an armed protest against that usurpation, I have appointed SUNDAY, the
20th of next November, from 6 o’clock in the afternoon on, for all
the towns and villages in the republic to take up arms against the
government under the following
PLAN.
1st. The elections for President and Vice-President of the republic,
Magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation and Deputies
and Senators, held in June and July of the present year, are hereby
declared null and void.
2nd. The present government of General Diaz is not recognized, nor the
power of any authority emanating from the popular vote, for not having
been elected by the people, they have lost what little title they did
have of legality, aiding and favoring for their own interests the most
scandalous electoral fraud ever known in the history of Mexico, with
the money placed at their disposal by the public.
3d. To avoid as much as possible the upheavals incident to all
revolutionary movements, all the laws promulgated by the present
administration and the rules pertaining to the same, with the exception
of those which are found to be decidedly opposed to the principles
set forth by this plan, are declared to be in force, until such as
require adjustment may be reformed according to constitutional methods.
Also, exception is made of laws, sentences of courts, and decrees
which may have been sanctioned regarding the accounts and handling
of funds of all the functionaries of the Porfirista administration,
in all their branches. For as soon as the revolution triumphs the
formation of commissions of investigation will be initiated to decide
on the responsibilities which the functionaries of the State and city
federations may be able to incur.
In all cases the obligations contracted by the Porfirista
administration with foreign governments and corporations before the
20th of the coming month, will be respected.
Abusing the law of waste land, numerous small proprietors, mostly all
quite poor, have been despoiled of their possessions, through the
connivance of the Secretary of Public Welfare, or by decrees of the
courts of the republic. It being only just to restore to their former
owners the lands of which they have been despoiled in such an arbitrary
manner, such dispositions and decrees have been declared subject to
revision, and there will be demanded of those who acquire them in such
a lawless manner, or of their heirs, to make restitution to their
former proprietors, who will also pay an indemnity for the injuries
suffered. Only in cases where such lands have passed to a third person
before the promulgation of this plan, the former owners will receive
indemnity from those in whose benefit the spoliation was accomplished.
4th. Besides the constitution and laws in force, the supreme law of
the republic is declared to be the principle of NO RE-ELECTION of the
President and Vice-President of the republic, Governors of the States
and Municipal Presidents, while the respective constitutional reforms
may be made.
5th. I assume the character of Provisional President of the United
States of Mexico, with the necessary faculties to make war on the
usurping government of General Diaz.
As soon as the capital of the republic and half of the States of
the Federation may be in the power of the army of the nation, the
Provisional President will call for extra general elections for a month
thereafter, and will deliver the power to the President who may be
elected, as soon as the result of such election may be known.
6th. The Provisional President, before handing over the authority, will
give account to the Congress of the Union of the use which has been
made of the faculties which the present plan confers upon him.
7th. The 20th day of the month of November, from the 6th of the
afternoon on, all the citizens of the republic will take up arms to
hurl from power the authorities which at present govern them. (The
towns which are situated away from the railway lines will take up arms
from the evening on.)
8th. When the authorities present armed resistance, they will be
compelled by force of arms to respect the popular will; but in this
case the laws of war will be rigorously observed, attention being
specially called to the prohibitions relative to not using expansive
balls, nor shooting prisoners. Also attention is called respecting the
duty of all Mexicans to have consideration for all foreigners and their
interests.
9th. The authorities who oppose resistance to this plan will be sent to
prison so that they may be judged by the courts of the republic, when
the revolution may be over. As soon as each city or town recovers its
liberty, there will be recognized as legitimate temporary authority the
principal chief at arms, with the faculty of delegating his functions
to any other citizen, who may be confirmed in his charge or removed by
the Provisional Governor.
One of the first measures of the provisional government will be to put
at liberty all the political prisoners.
10th. The nomination of Provisional Governor of each State that may
have been occupied by revolutionary troops, will be made by the
Provisional President. This Governor will be under strict obligation
to convoke the elections for the Provisional Governor of the State,
as soon as it may be possible to do so, according to the judgment of
the Provisional President. There is excepted from these rulings the
States that for two years have sustained democratic campaigns for a
change of government, for in these the man who was the candidate of the
people will be considered as Provisional Governor, of course it being
understood that he is expected to adhere strictly to this plan.
In case that the Provisional President has not made a nomination
of Governor, or the nominee has not arrived to take charge of his
position, or if the person so honored does not accept for any reason,
then the Governor will appoint by vote among all the chiefs of the army
who may operate in the territory of the respective State, with the
understanding that his nomination may be ratified by the Provisional
President as soon as it may be convenient.
11th. The new authorities will dispose of all the funds that are found
in the public offices for the ordinary expenses of the administration
and for the expenses of the war, keeping account scrupulously. In case
that these funds may not be sufficient to meet the expenses of the war,
loans are to be contracted, either voluntary or forced. These last to
be consummated only with citizens or national institutions. Account
will also be carefully kept of these loans, and receipts will be
tendered in due form to the interested parties, with a view to making
restitution to those who have loaned, the revolution having triumphed.
TRANSITORY. A. The chiefs of the volunteer army will hold the rank
which may correspond to the numbers of forces on hand. In case of
operating military forces and volunteers together, the chief of the
highest rank will take command of them, because in the event of both
chiefs holding the same rank, the command will be for the military
chieftain.
The civil heads will profit by said rank while the war lasts, and once
terminated, these appointments on petition of the parties interested,
will be revised by the Secretary of War, who will confirm the various
ones in their charges, or remove such as he may see fit.
B. All the chiefs, civil as well as military, will keep their troops
under the strictest discipline, as they will be held responsible by the
Provisional Government for any misbehavior of which the soldiers under
their command may be guilty; excepting in such cases where they may
justify themselves by proving that it was impossible to restrain the
troops, and to have imposed on the offenders the merited punishment.
The severest punishments will be inflicted on any soldiers who sack any
town or kill defenceless prisoners.
C. If the army and the authorities sustained by General Diaz shoot
prisoners of war, the same procedure will not be observed with those
who fall into our hands, as reprisals; but on the contrary, the civil
or military authorities in the service of General Diaz, who may,
after the initiation of the revolution, have ordered, decreed in any
form, sent an order, or shot any of our soldiers, will be shot within
twenty-four hours after a court-martial.
From this sentence the highest functionaries will not be exempted; the
only exception will be that of General Diaz and his ministers, who in
case of their ordering shootings or permitting them, will receive the
same punishment, though after having judged them in the courts of the
republic, when the revolution may have terminated.
In such cases where General Diaz may decree that the laws of war may
be respected, and the prisoners who fall into his hands are treated
with humanity, his life will be safe, but he must explain in the courts
as to how he has handled the funds of the nation, and as to how he has
complied with the law.
D. As it is an indispensable requisite of the laws of war that the
belligerent troops may wear some uniform of distinction, and as it
would be difficult to uniform the numerous forces of the people who are
going to take part in the contest, there will be adopted as distinctive
of all the liberating army, whether they be volunteers or regular
soldiers, a tricolored ribbon, in the cap or on the arm.
FELLOW CITIZENS. If we are called to take up arms and overturn the
government of General Diaz, it is not only for the offence committed
during the last elections, but only to save the country from the dark
future which awaits her, if she continues under his dictatorship, and
under the government of the abominable scientific oligarchy, that
unscrupulously and with great rapidity are absorbing and wasting the
national resources; and if we permit them to continue in power, within
a very brief space of time they will have completed their work; they
will have carried the nation to ignominy and degradation; they will
have absorbed all of her riches and left her in total misery; they
will have caused the bankruptcy of our finances and the dishonor of
our country, which, weak, impoverished and manacled, will find herself
unable to defend her frontiers, her honor and her institutions.
With respect to me, I have a tranquil conscience, and no one can accuse
me of promoting the revolution for personal interests, for the whole
nation understands that I did all that was possible to arrive at a
peaceful arrangement, and was disposed even to renounce my candidacy
if General Diaz would only have permitted the people to appoint the
Vice-President of the republic; but dominated by incomprehensible
pride and by unheard of haughtiness he was deaf to the voice of the
country, and preferred to precipitate the nation in a revolution before
conceding one jot toward returning to the people an atom of their
rights, before executing, although it might be in the last stages of
his life, a part of the promises he made in Noria and Tuxtepec.
The present revolution was justified when he said: “That no citizen may
be charged with and perpetuated in the exercise of power, and this will
be the last revolution.”
If in the mind of General Diaz there had been more attention paid to
the interest of the country than the sordid interests of himself and
his counsellors, this revolution might have been avoided by making some
concessions to the people; but it has not been so--so much the better!
The change will be rapid and more radical, for the Mexican public in
place of lamenting like a coward, will accept the challenge like a
hero, and even if General Diaz pretends to depend upon brute force to
imposing his ignominious yoke, the public will rely on the same force
for throwing aside this yoke, for hurling this dismal man from power
and for reconquering liberty.
FELLOW CITIZENS. Do not hesitate a moment: Seize the arms, throw the
usurpers from power, recover your rights as free men, and remember that
our predecessors bequeathed us an inheritance of glory which we must
not stain. Remember how they acted: invincible in war, magnanimous in
victory.
EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE. NO RE-ELECTION.
SAN LUIS POTOSÍ, October 5, 1910.
(Signed) FCO. I. MADERO.
NOTE. The present plan will circulate only among the co-religionists
of the greatest confidence up to November 15th, from which date it
will be re-printed; the plan will be prudently divulged from the 18th
and profusely from the 20th on.
PROTEST AGAINST MEETING OF DIAZ AND TAFT
(Reprinted from _The Evening World_, September 3, 1909.)
_To the President of the United States._
SIR: The national press has lately startled thoughtful men with the
most unusual of announcements. We are told we may shortly expect to
witness the meeting of the popularly elected President of this great
Republic with the uncrowned Czar of Mexico. Calculated to inspire
enthusiasm in the minds of the ignorant or the falsely informed, this
piece of news brings dismay to those who know the truth and honor
American traditions. For the last thirty years the world has only
heard unchallenged reports of the genius, the equity and the kindness
of Porfirio Diaz. All this being true, it would only be fitting and
proper that the two neighboring chiefs should exchange international
courtesies.
But as a matter of history Porfirio Diaz represents in Mexico what
Abdul Hamid was to Turkey. On his white head rests the responsibility
for the massacres of over 50,000 Mexican Christians; the slavery
of thousands of Yaqui and Maya Indians who escaped fire and sword;
the destruction of all liberties, personal as well as public; the
corruption of the judiciary; the creation of a financial system
which has mortgaged Mexico to European and American bankers; for the
persecution of all the Mexican liberals in the United States, which
reached a climax of brazenness and impudence when a Mexican liberal
was kidnapped across the Rio Grande from an American jail by the help
of American detectives in the payroll of the Czar.
Therefore, I protest in the name of humanity, common decency and
national dignity as distinguished from political expediency and
international courtesy against such an exchange between the deeply
trusted and patriotic President of the United States and the
treacherous, unpopular and bloody-handed Nero of Mexico.
You might retort that it is no business of mine to couple your name
with an attack seemingly so unwarranted.
My answer is that I speak no more than truth and not otherwise than
I have spoken in a recent book on the real political conditions in
Mexico. I am moved to repeat these truthful characterizations of
Mexico’s president and the rule he stands for, because this pamphlet
has been suppressed by an indictment against me in an American court
brought about by the Mexican Government, which used your own brother,
Henry W. Taft, as their lawyer against me, transparently to gain for
their case the weight of an implied connection between it and the
Administration.
You might reply that the American Government cares nothing about the
internal policy of the Mexican government as long as it behaves and
protects American interests.
I answer that if a neighbor be a good neighbor it might be sufficient
unto you; but if your neighbor should torture or attempt to kill his
children would it not be your duty to protest?
If the excuse for meddling in another nation’s affairs is only found
in the destruction of American lives and their property, under what
pretext did the American Government protest against the Armenian
massacres? What brought about armed intervention in Cuba? Why did the
State Department undertake to refund the unjust Chinese indemnity?
And how are you to explain the wherefore of the tremendous struggle to
stamp out slavery?
The reason for this system of intervention lies deeper than in
financial and political interests. It proves to the civilized world
that the American nation is something mightier than a rich, powerful
and progressive republic; that it is likewise a moral entity backed by
the conscience of a people.
The propaganda about Mexico has its source in the knowledge of the
real history of Porfirio Diaz. At the beginning of his career he
concealed his real political face, but the higher he rises in power
and statecraft, the more he uncovers his fundamental lack of principle.
Even as I write these lines the report is wired from Mexico that
General Diaz has ordered the demission of the Governor of Coahuila
as the latter showed a marked tendency in favor of General Reyes’s
candidacy. Imagine the Republican President of the United States
asking for the resignation of Governor Johnson of Minnesota because of
his Democratic leanings!
Political evolution in Mexico will move faster in the next twelve
months, inasmuch as the new generation is impelled by cleaner, more
honest and patriotic motives than those of the malevolent Czar and his
infamous camarilla. Porfirio Diaz is fashioning the tools of his own
destruction and as a last resort is using the handshake across the
Rio Grande to countenance in advance the arbitrary repressions and
assassinations which are sure to take place in the false elections of
next year.
When that period is passed the mask of this master Machiavelli will
have been torn aside. The American people will then realize with
humiliation that their honored President has exchanged an intimate
greeting with the basest slave-driver of modern times.
CARLO DE FORNARO,
National Arts Club.
_Translation._
LETTER FROM ARCHBISHOP GILLOW TO URRUTIA.
HACIENDA DE CHAUTLA, July 11th, 1913.
SR. DR. AURELIANO URRUTIA,
Minister of the Interior, Mexico.
_Esteemed Sir and Friend_:
I returned to this hacienda yesterday and was informed that up around
Huejotzingo, capital of this District, things are rather unsettled,
due to a few disturbers who molest the authorities, and consequently
disturb public peace. Having in mind the kind offers which you made
to me during my recent visit in that city, I now take the liberty of
addressing you.
The disturbers of Huejotzingo are a certain Luis Pinto and his
brother. They own real estate and small houses to the amount of may
be Three Thousand Dollars each, in that locality. They put on airs of
caciques, and have for some time even gone so far as to pretend to
subordinate the local authorities. They have become more overbearing
since the time of Madero.
While Mr. Alberto García Granados was Minister of the Interior, the
referred-to Pinto brothers attempted to overthrow Mr. Enrique Acevedo
from his position as Governor of the Province. Mr. Acevedo has
maintained the peace and well-being in this district ever since he
came into office. As Mr. Granados, owner of the Hacienda de Chagua,
near Huejotzingo, knows Mr. Acevedo, he maintained Mr. Acevedo as
Governor, and the Pinto brothers did not molest him any more until Mr.
Granados resigned the secretaryship.
As Mr. Acevedo is well acquainted with the intrigues of the Pinto
brothers, he has kept them well watched, and they, resenting this,
have hostilized him, to the degree of having trumped up false
accusations against him before the municipality of Puebla. They did
not however, obtain their end, for they were unable to obtain his
removal, though he was for a time suspended from office, much to the
regret of the honest contingent of Huejotzingo. The Mayor replaced him
during this time.
On the other hand, Mr. Ramon Vargas, Judge of the Primary Court of
Claims of Huejotzingo, has been for three months working unceasingly
to put to date all pending cases, which had been accumulating, due to
the fact that his predecessors, partly due to indifference and partly
to fear of the Revolution, often absented themselves, abandoning their
offices. Among those who most distinguished themselves of these last
mentioned, was a certain Felipe Ramirez, whose wife is a Huejotzingo
woman, on which account he was of course interested in holding that
position in Huejotzingo. The mother of the lady in question also found
a way to take advantage of the situation, and arranged things so that
those who wished their cases attended to, had to have a recommendation
from her, if they wanted a favorable judgment. For this she was of
course paid a certain sum, and she managed to derive quite a fine
income.
This by-play came to the knowledge of Mr. García Granados, and he
managed to obtain the Puebla Municipality to offer the Judge Felipe
Ramirez to transfer him to Matamoros, which offer he declined, staying
in Huejotzingo and exercising his profession of lawyer. This Mr.
Ramirez works in harmony with the Pinto brothers, and the three of
them, openly antagonize Acevedo the Governor, Ramon Vargas, the Judge
and Sidronio Primo, Commissioner of the Ministry, who is an old
employé in this locality and who works together with the other two
last mentioned.
With the foregoing details, and prompted by the desire to maintain
order and peace in this district, I beg you to exert your good
influence with the government of Puebla, to have Mr. Acevedo return
to his post, and to have Mr. Ramon Vargas the present Judge, and also
Mr. Sidronio Primo, stay in their positions. The presence of Mr.
Felipe Ramirez, who still pretends to occupy the position of Judge in
this District, is very harmful to public interests, as is also the
presence of the Pinto brothers, so that although I harbor no feelings
of personal enmity towards them for I do not know them except from
hearsay, I beg to suggest the advantage of their being removed from
this locality, in whatever way you may deem most appropriate.
Kindly forgive the length of this letter, but I feel justified in
giving you all these details, for the sake of the preservation of
peace in this region, which has some importance due to its relations
to Puebla and Mexico.
Thanking you in advance for whatever you may deem fit to do in
the interests of the honest citizens who have given me the above
information, and which I transmit to you confidentially, I beg to
remain,
Very respy., etc., etc.,
EULOGIO G. GILLOW,
Archbishop of Oaxaca.
LETTER FROM MINISTER URRUTIA TO ARCHBISHOP MORA.
MEXICO, July 9th, 1913.
_Very illustrious Sir_--
Kindly allow me to acquit myself of the pleasant duty of expressing,
to you, very sincere thanks for the good assistance you have been
lending to the Government in the re-establishment of peace,--a task
the more useful because accomplishing it, as you are doing, with
intelligence and common sense, it might be able to effect a durable
benefit to the country.
In the name of the government to which I belong and with which you are
happily connected, I earnestly beg of you to continue your good work,
if possible, with more energy than before.
In this connection and prompted by the confidence which your kindness
invites, I take the liberty of telling you that some memorial services
held in honor of the Madero brothers, made a bad impression in social
circles, and especially on the Government, and therefore I would ask
of you to take such measures as you may deem necessary, to prevent a
repetition of demonstrations of this nature, which might contribute to
retard the success of the work undertaken by the Government in order
to put an end to our internal wars.
I also must call your attention to the necessity of stopping at all
costs, a certain person in the clergy, from continuing his propaganda
against the Government, and this for the same reasons as above
expressed. With your intelligence and tact, I am sure you will find
an efficacious means to put a stop to the workings of the person in
question.
I remain, etc., etc.,
URRUTIA.
GLOSSARY OF SPANISH WORDS.
CARRANZISTA Political follower of Venustiano Carranza.
CASAS DE VECINDAD Tenement houses.
CIENTIFICO A group of politicians headed by J. I.
Limantour, who took as a basis of
their political party some of the Comte
theories. They believed in a scientific
government. The term cientifico
is now applied to political
exponents of graft in politics.
CIUDADELA Citadel.
COLORADOS Reds, red-flaggers. Name given to the
guerrilla troops under Orozco, because
besides carrying a red flag they
carried destruction everywhere by fire
and sword.
COMPADRE Godfather, an expression which means
protector, benefactor,--and implies
great obligations and great sacrifices.
CUARTELAZO A military mutiny. From cuartel, a
military barrack.
DON Title of courtesy given to people of the
better class. Formerly in Spain,
when addressing a person of aristocratic
lineage, it was customary to
write before the name,--De origen
noble--(of noble origin). It was
afterwards abbreviated to D. O. N.
One should be careful to use the Don
only before the first name, or together
with first and second names,
for instance--Don Porfirio Diaz, never
Don Diaz, as it implies an insulting
meaning.
EGIDOS Communal lands surrounding villages
and cities in Mexico.
FELICISTA Political follower of Felix Diaz.
FIESTA Holiday, merry-making.
FOMENTO Excite, encourage. Ministerio de Fomento:
the department for the development
of the country, industrially
and commercially.
GACHUPINES Nickname given to Spaniards.
GRINGO Nickname used in Mexico and South
America to designate Americans.
HACIENDA Plantation, ranch, farm.
HUERTISTA Political follower of Victoriano Huerta.
INCOMUNICACION Incommunication. The position of a
man in prison who is not permitted to
communicate with his friends, lawyers
or any one from the outside.
JEFE Chief.
JEFE POLITICO Political chief. Head of a district
under the jurisdiction of the Governor.
Under Diaz they had almost unlimited
power for mischief.
LEY FUGA The Runaway Law--which was resorted
to for the purpose of doing
away with obnoxious political enemies
or agitators; while they were
taken from one prison to the other,
they were shot from the back, and
the pretext was that they had tried
to run away.
MADERISTA Political follower of F. I. Madero.
MOCHO Contemptible term to designate members
of the clerical party in Mexico.
NEO-CIENTIFICO New scientist. A political party which
was a continuation of the old cientifico
party. They came into power
under Madero, and were headed by
Ernesto Madero, uncle of Don F. I.
Madero, and by Rafael Hernandez, a
cousin of the president.
PACIFICO A peaceful Indian, one that cultivates
the land and does not carry arms.
PELADO “Skinned.” Term applied to a very
poor Indian.
PEON Indian worker on plantation or mines.
PLAN DE AYALA Written by a school-teacher, Montaño,
for Zapata. It was aimed against
the neo-cientificos in the Madero cabinet,
--the provisional president was
supposed to be P. Orozco, and in case
of his absence Emiliano Zapata. The
Plan was essentially an agrarian plan,
local in its ideas of reforms.
PLAN DE GUADALUPE A Manifest written by V. Carranza to
rally the Mexicans in the overthrow
of the Huerta dictatorship. It did
not attempt to bring about any reforms,
--only the elimination of
Huerta and his supporters.
PLAN DE SAN LUIS POTOSÍ Was the political plan written by F. I.
Madero against the Diaz régime on
October 5th, 1910.
PORFIRISTA Political follower of Porfirio Diaz.
PORRISTA A member of the Porra, a political club
created by the friends of F. I. Madero,
supposed to be headed by Gustavo
Madero, to fight and intimidate the
enemies of the Maderistas.
RELIGION Y FUEROS Battle-cry of the clericals since the
revolution. “Religion & Privileges.”
The Church and the army under
Spanish rule had special courts composed
of either religious clerics or of
soldiers, which judged members of
the church or soldiers in criminal
cases. The Clericals now demand a
return of their old privileges.
VILLISTA Political follower of F. Villa.
ZAPATISTA Political follower of Zapata.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Full text of letter will be found in Index.
[2] Full text of the Plan of San Luis Potosí will be found in Index.
[3] From “Mexico the Land of Unrest,” by Henry Baerlein.
[4] “Barbarous Mexico,” J. K. Turner.
[5] “The Revolution and F. I. Madero,” Roque Estrada, 1912.
[6] “The Political Shame of Mexico,” E. I. Bell, 1914.
[7] See Plan in Index.
[8] The New York _Call_ published the first article of the exposé, May
5, 1911.
Transcriber's Notes:
Italics are shown thus: _sloping_.
Variations in spelling and hyphenation are retained.
Perceived typographical errors have been changed.
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