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Title: What I believe
Author: Bertrand Russell
Release date: June 6, 2024 [eBook #73782]
Language: English
Original publication: New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1925
Credits: Produced by Donald Cummings and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WHAT I BELIEVE ***
WHAT I BELIEVE
THE TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW SERIES
_DÆDALUS, or Science and the Future_
By J. B. S. Haldane
_ICARUS, or The Future of Science_
By the Hon. Bertrand Russell, F.R.S.
_THE MONGOL IN OUR MIDST_
By F. G. Crookshank, M.D. _Fully Illustrated_
_WIRELESS POSSIBILITIES_
By Prof. A. M. Low. _With four Diagrams_
_TANTALUS, or The Future of Man_
By F. C. S. Schiller
_NARCISSUS, An Anatomy of Clothes_
By Gerald Heard. _Illustrated_
_CALLINICUS, A Defence of Chemical Warfare_
By J. B. S. Haldane
_THE PASSING OF THE PHANTOMS_
By C. J. Patten, M.A., M.D., Sc.D., F.R.A.I.
_QUO VADIMUS? Some Glimpses of the Future_
By E. E. Fournier d’Albe, D.Sc., F.Inst.P.
_THE CONQUEST OF CANCER_
By H. W. S. Wright, M.S., F.R.C.S.
_LYSISTRATA, or Woman and the Future_
By Anthony M. Ludovici
_WHAT I BELIEVE_
By the Hon. Bertrand Russell, F.R.S.
_HYPATIA_
By Dora Russell (The Hon. Mrs. Bertrand Russell)
_In Preparation_
_PERSEUS, of Dragons_
By H. F. Scott Stokes, M.A.
_THE EVOCATION OF GENIUS_
By Alan Porter
_THE FUTURE OF SEX_
By Rebecca West
_AESCULAPIUS, or Disease and The Man_
By F. G. Crookshank, M.D.
E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY
WHAT I BELIEVE
BY
BERTRAND RUSSELL
[Illustration]
NEW YORK
E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY
681 FIFTH AVENUE
Copyright, 1925
By E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY
_All Rights Reserved_
First Printing, April, 1925
Second Printing, June, 1925
Third Printing, June, 1925
Fourth Printing, March, 1926
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PREFACE
In this little book, I have tried to say what I think of man’s place
in the universe, and of his possibilities in the way of achieving the
good life. In _Icarus_ I expressed my fears; in the following pages I
have expressed my hopes. The inconsistency is only apparent. Except
in astronomy, mankind have not achieved the art of predicting the
future; in human affairs, we can see that there are forces making for
happiness, and forces making for misery. We do not know which will
prevail, but to act wisely we must be aware of both.
_January 1st, 1925_ B. R.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAP. PAGE
I NATURE AND MAN 1
II THE GOOD LIFE 19
III MORAL RULES 35
IV SALVATION: INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL 55
V SCIENCE AND HAPPINESS 65
WHAT I BELIEVE
CHAPTER I
NATURE AND MAN
Man is a part of Nature, not something contrasted with Nature. His
thoughts and his bodily movements follow the same laws that describe
the motions of stars and atoms. The physical world is large compared
with Man――larger than it was thought to be in Dante’s time, but not so
large as it seemed a hundred years ago. Both upward and downward, both
in the large and in the small, science seems to be reaching limits. It
is thought that the universe is of finite extent in space, and that
light could travel round it in a few hundred millions of years. It is
thought that matter consists of electrons and protons, which are of
finite size, and of which there are only a finite number in the world.
Probably their changes are not continuous, as used to be thought, but
proceed by jerks, which are never smaller than a certain minimum jerk.
The laws of these changes can apparently be summed up in a small number
of very general principles, which determine the past and the future of
the world when any small section of its history is known.
Physical science is thus approaching the stage when it will be
complete, and therefore uninteresting. Given the laws governing the
motions of electrons and protons, the rest is merely geography――a
collection of particular facts telling their distribution throughout
some portion of the world’s history. The total number of facts of
geography required to determine the world’s history is probably finite;
theoretically, they could all be written down in a big book to be
kept at Somerset House, with a calculating machine attached, which, by
turning a handle, would enable the inquirer to find out the facts at
other times than those recorded. It is difficult to imagine anything
less interesting, or more different from the passionate delights of
incomplete discovery. It is like climbing a high mountain and finding
nothing at the top except a restaurant where they sell ginger-beer,
surrounded by fog but equipped with wireless. Perhaps in the time of
Ahmes the multiplication-table was exciting.
Of this physical world, uninteresting in itself, Man is a part. His
body, like other matter, is composed of electrons and protons, which,
so far as we know, obey the same laws as those not forming part of
animals or plants. There are some who maintain that physiology
can never be reduced to physics, but their arguments are not very
convincing and it seems prudent to suppose that they are mistaken.
What we call our “thoughts” seem to depend upon the organization of
tracks in the brain in the same sort of way in which journeys depend
upon roads and railways. The energy used in thinking seems to have
a chemical origin; for instance, a deficiency of iodine will turn a
clever man into an idiot. Mental phenomena seem to be bound up with
material structure. If this be so, we cannot suppose that a solitary
electron or proton can “think”; we might as well expect a solitary
individual to play a football match. We also cannot suppose that an
individual’s thinking survives bodily death, since that destroys the
organization of the brain, and dissipates the energy which utilized the
brain-tracks.
God and immortality, the central dogmas of the Christian religion,
find no support in science. It cannot be said that either doctrine
is essential to religion, since neither is found in Buddhism. (With
regard to immortality, this statement in an unqualified form might be
misleading, but it is correct in the last analysis). But we in the West
have come to think of them as the irreducible minimum of theology. No
doubt people will continue to entertain these beliefs, because they are
pleasant, just as it is pleasant to think ourselves virtuous and our
enemies wicked. But for my part I cannot see any ground for either.
I do not pretend to be able to prove that there is no God. I equally
cannot prove that Satan is a fiction. The Christian God may exist; so
may the Gods of Olympus, or of ancient Egypt, or of Babylon. But no one
of these hypotheses is more probable than any other: they lie outside
the region of even probable knowledge, and therefore there is no reason
to consider any of them. I shall not enlarge upon this question, as I
have dealt with it elsewhere.[A]
[A] See my _Philosophy of Leibniz_, Chapter XV.
The question of personal immortality stands on a somewhat different
footing. Here evidence either way is possible. Persons are part of the
everyday world with which science is concerned, and the conditions
which determine their existence are discoverable. A drop of water
is not immortal; it can be resolved into oxygen and hydrogen. If,
therefore, a drop of water were to maintain that it had a quality of
aqueousness which would survive its dissolution, we should be inclined
to be sceptical. In like manner we know that the brain is not immortal,
and that the organized energy of a living body becomes, as it were,
demobilized at death, and therefore not available for collective
action. All the evidence goes to show that what we regard as our mental
life is bound up with brain-structure and organized bodily energy.
Therefore it is rational to suppose that mental life ceases when bodily
life ceases. The argument is only one of probability, but it is as
strong as those upon which most scientific conclusions are based.
There are various grounds upon which this conclusion might be
attacked. Psychical research professes to have actual scientific
evidence of survival, and undoubtedly its procedure is, in principle,
scientifically correct. Evidence of this sort might be so overwhelming
that no one with a scientific temper could reject it. The weight to be
attached to the evidence, however, must depend upon the antecedent
probability of the hypothesis of survival. There are always different
ways of accounting for any set of phenomena, and of these we should
prefer the one which is antecedently least improbable. Those who
already think it likely that we survive death will be ready to view
this theory as the best explanation of psychical phenomena. Those,
who, on other grounds, regard this theory as unplausible will seek
for other explanations. For my part, I consider the evidence so far
adduced by psychical research in favour of survival much weaker than
the physiological evidence on the other side. But I fully admit that
it might at any moment become stronger, and in that case it would be
unscientific to disbelieve in survival.
Survival of bodily death is, however, a different matter from
immortality: it may only mean a postponement of psychical death. It
is immortality that men desire to believe in. Believers in immortality
will object to physiological arguments, such as I have been using, on
the ground that soul and body are totally disparate, and that the soul
is something quite other than its empirical manifestations through our
bodily organs. I believe this to be a metaphysical superstition. Mind
and matter alike are for certain purposes convenient terms, but are not
ultimate realities. Electrons and protons, like the soul, are logical
fictions: each is really a history, a series of events, not a single
persistent entity. In the case of the soul, this is obvious from the
facts of growth. Whoever considers conception, gestation, and infancy
cannot seriously believe that the soul is an indivisible something,
perfect and complete throughout this process. It is evident that it
grows like the body, and that it derives both from the spermatozoon
and from the ovum, so that it cannot be indivisible. This is not
materialism: it is merely the recognition that everything interesting
is a matter of organization, not of primal substance.
Metaphysicians have advanced innumerable arguments to prove that the
soul _must_ be immortal. There is one simple test by which all these
arguments can be demolished. They all prove equally that the soul must
pervade all space. But as we are not so anxious to be fat as to live
long, none of the metaphysicians in question have ever noticed this
application of their reasonings. This is an instance of the amazing
power of desire in blinding even very able men to fallacies which would
otherwise be obvious at once. If we were not afraid of death, I do not
believe that the idea of immortality would ever have arisen.
Fear is the basis of religious dogma, as of so much else in human
life. Fear of human beings, individually or collectively, dominates
much of our social life, but it is fear of nature that gives rise
to religion. The antithesis of mind and matter is, as we have seen,
more or less illusory; but there is another antithesis which is more
important――that, namely, between things that can be affected by our
desires and things that cannot be so affected. The line between the
two is neither sharp nor immutable――as science advances, more and more
things are brought under human control. Nevertheless there remain
things definitely on the other side. Among these are all the _large_
facts of our world, the sort of facts that are dealt with by astronomy.
It is only facts on or near the surface of the earth that we can, to
some extent, mould to suit our desires. And even on the surface of the
earth, our powers are very limited. Above all, we cannot prevent death,
although we can often delay it.
Religion is an attempt to overcome this antithesis. If the world
is controlled by God, and God can be moved by prayer, we acquire a
share in omnipotence. In former days, miracles happened in answer to
prayer; they still do in the Catholic Church, but Protestants have lost
this power. However, it is possible to dispense with miracles, since
Providence has decreed that the operation of natural laws shall produce
the best possible results. Thus belief in God still serves to humanize
the world of nature, and to make men feel that physical forces are
really their allies. In like manner immortality removes the terror from
death. People who believe that when they die they will inherit eternal
bliss may be expected to view death without horror, though, fortunately
for medical men, this does not invariably happen. It does, however,
soothe men’s fears somewhat, even when it cannot allay them wholly.
Religion, since it has its source in terror, has dignified certain
kinds of fear, and made people think them not disgraceful. In this it
has done mankind a great disservice: _all_ fear is bad, and ought to be
overcome not by fairy tales, but by courage and rational reflection.
I believe that when I die I shall rot, and nothing of my ego will
survive. I am not young, and I love life. But I should scorn to shiver
with terror at the thought of annihilation. Happiness is none the less
true happiness because it must come to an end, nor do thought and love
lose their value because they are not everlasting. Many a man has
borne himself proudly on the scaffold: surely the same pride should
teach us to think truly about man’s place in the world. Even if the
open windows of science at first make us shiver after the cosy indoor
warmth of traditional humanizing myths, in the end the fresh air brings
vigour, and the great spaces have a splendour of their own.
The philosophy of nature is one thing, the philosophy of value is
quite another. Nothing but harm can come of confusing them. What we
think good, what we should like, has no bearing whatever upon what is,
which is the question for the philosophy of nature. On the other hand,
we cannot be forbidden to value this or that on the ground that the
non-human world does not value it, nor can we be compelled to admire
anything because it is a “law of nature.” Undoubtedly we are part
of nature, which has produced our desires, our hopes and fears, in
accordance with laws which the physicist is beginning to discover. In
this sense we are part of nature; in the philosophy of nature, we are
subordinated to nature, the outcome of natural laws, and their victims
in the long run.
The philosophy of nature must not be unduly terrestrial; for it, the
earth is merely one of the smaller planets of one of the smaller stars
of the Milky Way. It would be ridiculous to warp the philosophy of
nature in order to bring out results that are pleasing to the tiny
parasites of this insignificant planet. Vitalism as a philosophy, and
evolutionism, show, in this respect, a lack of sense of proportion and
logical relevance. They regard the facts of life, which are personally
interesting to us, as having a cosmic significance, not a significance
confined to the earth’s surface. Optimism and pessimism, as cosmic
philosophies, show the same naïve humanism: the great world, so far
as we know it from the philosophy of nature, is neither good nor bad,
and is not concerned to make us either happy or unhappy. All such
philosophies spring from self-importance, and are best corrected by a
little astronomy.
But in the philosophy of value the situation is reversed. Nature is
only a part of what we can imagine; everything, real or imagined, can
be appraised by us, and there is no outside standard to show that our
valuation is wrong. We are ourselves the ultimate and irrefutable
arbiters of value, and in the world of value Nature is only a part.
Thus in this world we are greater than Nature. In the world of values,
Nature in itself is neutral, neither good nor bad, deserving of
neither admiration nor censure. It is we who create value, and our
desires which confer value. In this realm we are kings, and we debase
our kingship if we bow down to Nature. It is for us to determine the
good life, not for Nature――not even for Nature personified as God.
CHAPTER II
THE GOOD LIFE
There have been at different times and among different people many
varying conceptions of the good life. To some extent the differences
were amenable to argument; this was when men differed as to the
means to achieve a given end. Some think that prison is a good way
of preventing crime; others hold that education would be better. A
difference of this sort can be decided by sufficient evidence. But some
differences cannot be tested in this way. Tolstoy condemned all war;
others have held the life of a soldier doing battle for the right to
be very noble. Here there was probably involved a real difference as
to ends. Those who praise the soldier usually consider the punishment
of sinners a good thing in itself; Tolstoy did not think so. On such
a matter, no argument is possible. I cannot, therefore, prove that my
view of the good life is right; I can only state my view, and hope that
as many as possible will agree. My view is this:
_The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge._
Knowledge and love are both indefinitely extensible; therefore, however
good a life may be, a better life can be imagined. Neither love without
knowledge, nor knowledge without love can produce a good life. In the
Middle Ages, when pestilence appeared in a country, holy men advised
the population to assemble in churches and pray for deliverance; the
result was that the infection spread with extraordinary rapidity among
the crowded masses of supplicants. This was an example of love without
knowledge. The late War afforded an example of knowledge without love.
In each case, the result was death on a large scale.
Although both love and knowledge are necessary, love is in a sense more
fundamental, since it will lead intelligent people to seek knowledge,
in order to find out how to benefit those whom they love. But if people
are not intelligent, they will be content to believe what they have
been told, and may do harm in spite of the most genuine benevolence.
Medicine affords, perhaps, the best example of what I mean. An able
physician is more useful to a patient than the most devoted friend,
and progress in medical knowledge does more for the health of the
community than ill-informed philanthropy. Nevertheless, an element of
benevolence is essential even here, if any but the rich are to profit
by scientific discoveries.
Love is a word which covers a variety of feelings; I have used it
purposely, as I wish to include them all. Love as an emotion――which
is what I am speaking about, for love “on principle” does not seem to
me genuine――moves between two poles: on the one side, pure delight in
contemplation; on the other, pure benevolence. Where inanimate objects
are concerned, delight alone enters in: we cannot feel benevolence
towards a landscape or a sonata. This type of enjoyment is presumably
the source of art. It is stronger, as a rule, in very young children
than in adults, who are apt to view objects in a utilitarian spirit. It
plays a large part in our feelings towards human beings, some of whom
have charm and some the reverse, when considered simply as objects of
aesthetic contemplation.
The opposite pole of love is pure benevolence. Men have sacrificed
their lives to helping lepers in such a case, the love they felt cannot
have had any element of aesthetic delight. Parental affection, as a
rule, is accompanied by pleasure in the child’s appearance, but remains
strong when this element is wholly absent. It would seem odd to call a
mother’s interest in a sick child “benevolence,” because we are in the
habit of using this word to describe a pale emotion nine parts humbug.
But it is difficult to find any other word to describe the desire for
another person’s welfare. It is a fact that a desire of this sort
may reach any degree of strength in the case of parental feeling. In
other cases it is far less intense; indeed it would seem likely that
all altruistic emotion is a sort of overflow of parental feeling,
or sometimes a sublimation of it. For want of a better word, I shall
call this emotion “benevolence.” But I want to make it clear that I am
speaking of an emotion, not a principle, and that I do not include in
it any feeling of superiority such as is sometimes associated with the
word. The word “sympathy” expresses part of what I mean, but leaves out
the element of activity that I wish to include.
Love at its fullest is an indissoluble combination of the two elements,
delight and well-wishing. The pleasure of a parent in a beautiful and
successful child combines both elements; so does sex-love at its best.
But in sex-love benevolence will only exist where there is secure
possession, since otherwise jealousy will destroy it, while perhaps
actually increasing the delight in contemplation. Delight without
well-wishing may be cruel; well-wishing without delight easily tends
to become cold and a little superior. A person who wishes to be loved
wishes to be the object of a love containing both elements, except in
cases of extreme weakness, such as infancy and severe illness. In these
cases benevolence may be all that is desired. Conversely, in cases of
extreme strength admiration is more desired than benevolence: this is
the state of mind of potentates and famous beauties. We only desire
other people’s good wishes in proportion as we feel ourselves in need
of help or in danger of harm from them. At least, that would seem to
be the biological logic of the situation, but it is not quite true
to life. We desire affection in order to escape from the feeling of
loneliness, in order to be, as we say, “understood.” This is a matter
of sympathy, not merely of benevolence; the person whose affection is
satisfactory to us must not merely wish us well, but must know in what
our happiness consists. But this belongs to the other element of the
good life, namely knowledge.
In a perfect world, every sentient being would be to every other the
object of the fullest love, compounded of delight, benevolence, and
understanding inextricably blended. It does not follow that, in this
actual world, we ought to attempt to have such feelings towards all the
sentient beings whom we encounter. There are many in whom we cannot
feel delight, because they are disgusting; if we were to do violence
to our nature by trying to see beauties in them, we should merely
blunt our susceptibilities to what we naturally find beautiful. Not
to mention human beings, there are fleas and bugs and lice. We should
have to be as hard pressed as the Ancient Mariner before we could feel
delight in contemplating these creatures. Some saints, it is true, have
called them “pearls of God,” but what these men delighted in was the
opportunity of displaying their own sanctity.
Benevolence is easier to extend widely, but even benevolence has its
limits. If a man wished to marry a lady, we should not think the better
of him for withdrawing if he found that some one else also wished to
marry her: we should regard this as a fair field for competition. Yet
his feelings towards a rival cannot be _wholly_ benevolent. I think
that in all descriptions of the good life here on earth we must assume
a certain basis of animal vitality and animal instinct; without this,
life becomes tame and uninteresting. Civilization should be something
added to this, not substituted for it; the ascetic saint and the
detached sage fail in this respect to be complete human beings. A small
number of them may enrich a community; but a world composed of them
would die of boredom.
These considerations lead to a certain emphasis on the element of
delight as an ingredient in the best love. Delight, in this actual
world, is unavoidably selective, and prevents us from having the same
feelings towards all mankind. When conflicts arise between delight and
benevolence, they must, as a rule, be decided by a compromise, not by
a complete surrender of either. Instinct has its rights, and if we
do violence to it beyond a point it takes vengeance in subtle ways.
Therefore in aiming at a good life the limits of human possibility
must be borne in mind. Here again, however, we are brought back to the
necessity of knowledge.
When I speak of knowledge as an ingredient of the good life, I am
not thinking of ethical knowledge, but of scientific knowledge and
knowledge of particular facts. I do not think there is, strictly
speaking, such a thing as ethical knowledge. If we desire to achieve
some end, knowledge may show us the means, and this knowledge may
loosely pass as ethical. But I do not believe that we can decide
what sort of conduct is right or wrong except by reference to its
probable consequences. Given an end to be achieved, it is a question
for science to discover how to achieve it. All moral rules must be
tested by examining whether they tend to realize ends that we desire.
I say ends that we desire, not ends that we _ought_ to desire. What
we “ought” to desire is merely what someone else wishes us to desire.
Usually it is what the authorities wish us to desire――parents,
schoolmasters, policemen, and judges. If you say to me “you ought to do
so-and-so,” the motive power of your remark lies in my desire for your
approval――together, possibly, with rewards or punishments attached to
your approval or disapproval. Since all behaviour springs from desire,
it is clear that ethical notions can have no importance except as they
influenced desire. They do this through the desire for approval and the
fear of disapproval. These are powerful social forces, and we shall
naturally endeavour to win them to our side if we wish to realize any
social purpose. When I say that the morality of conduct is to be judged
by its probable consequences, I mean that I desire to see approval
given to behaviour likely to realize social purposes which we desire,
and disapproval to opposite behaviour. At present this is not done;
there are certain traditional rules according to which approval and
disapproval are meted out quite regardless of consequences. But this is
a topic with which we shall deal in the next chapter.
The superfluity of theoretical ethics is obvious in simple cases.
Suppose, for instance, that your child is ill. Love makes you wish
to cure it, and science tells you how to do so. There is not an
intermediate stage of ethical theory, where it is demonstrated that
your child had better be cured. Your act springs directly from desire
for an end, together with knowledge of means. This is equally true of
all acts, whether good or bad. The ends differ, and the knowledge is
more adequate in some cases than in others. But there is no conceivable
way of making people do things they do not wish to do. What is possible
is to alter their desires by a system of rewards and penalties, among
which social approval and disapproval are not the least potent. The
question for the legislative moralist is, therefore: How shall this
system of rewards and punishments be arranged so as to secure the
maximum of what is desired by the legislative authority? If I say that
the legislative authority has bad desires, I mean merely that its
desires conflict with those of some section of the community to which I
belong. Outside human desires there is no moral standard.
Thus, what distinguishes ethics from science is not any special kind
of knowledge, but merely desire. The knowledge required in ethics is
exactly like the knowledge elsewhere; what is peculiar is that certain
ends are desired, and that right conduct is what conduces to them. Of
course, if the definition of right conduct is to make a wide appeal,
the ends must be such as large sections of mankind desire. If I defined
right conduct as that which increases my own income, readers would
disagree. The whole effectiveness of any ethical argument lies in its
scientific part, i. e. in the proof that one kind of conduct, rather
than some other, is a means to an end which is widely desired. I
distinguish, however, between ethical argument and ethical education.
The latter consists in strengthening certain desires and weakening
others. This is quite a different process, which will be separately
discussed at a later stage.
We can now explain more exactly the purport of the definition of the
good life with which this chapter began. When I said that the good
life consists of love guided by knowledge, the desire which prompted
me was the desire to live such a life as far as possible, and to see
others living it; and the logical content of the statement is that, in
a community where men live in this way, more desires will be satisfied
than in one where there is less love or less knowledge. I do not mean
that such a life is “virtuous” or that its opposite is “sinful,”
for these are conceptions which seem to me to have no scientific
justification.
CHAPTER III
MORAL RULES
The practical need of morals arises from the conflict of desires,
whether of different people or of the same person at different times
or even at one time. A man desires to drink, and also to be fit for
his work next morning. We think him immoral if he adopts the course
which gives him the smaller total satisfaction of desire. We think ill
of people who are extravagant or reckless, even if they injure no one
but themselves. Bentham supposed that the whole of morality could be
derived from “enlightened self-interest,” and that a person who always
acted with a view to his own maximum satisfaction in the long run would
always act rightly. I cannot accept this view. Tyrants have existed
who derived exquisite pleasure from watching the infliction of torture;
I cannot praise such men when prudence led them to spare their victims’
lives with a view to further sufferings another day. Nevertheless,
other things being equal, prudence is a part of the good life. Even
Robinson Crusoe had occasion to practise industry, self-control, and
foresight, which must be reckoned as moral qualities, since they
increased his total satisfaction without counterbalancing injury to
others. This part of morals plays a great part in the training of young
children, who have little inclination to think of the future. If it
were more practised in later life, the world would quickly become a
paradise, since it would be quite sufficient to prevent wars, which
are acts of passion, not of reason. Nevertheless, in spite of the
importance of prudence, it is not the most interesting part of morals.
Nor is it the part that raises intellectual problems, since it does not
require an appeal to anything beyond self-interest.
The part of morality that is not included in prudence is, in essence,
analogous to law, or the rules of a club. It is a method of enabling
men to live together in a community in spite of the possibility that
their desires may conflict. But here two very different methods are
possible. There is the method of the criminal law, which aims at a
merely external harmony by attaching disagreeable consequences to acts
which thwart other men’s desires in certain ways. This is also the
method of social censure: to be thought ill of by one’s own society is
a form of punishment, to avoid which most people avoid being known
to transgress the code of their set. But there is another method,
more fundamental, and far more satisfactory when it succeeds. This is
to alter men’s characters and desires in such a way as to minimize
occasions of conflict by making the success of one man’s desires as
far as possible consistent with that of another’s. That is why love is
better than hate, because it brings harmony instead of conflict into
the desires of the persons concerned. Two people between whom there is
love succeed or fail together, but when two people hate each other the
success of either is the failure of the other.
If we were right in saying that the good life is inspired by love and
guided by knowledge, it is clear that the moral code of any community
is not ultimate and self-sufficient, but must be examined with a
view to seeing whether it is such as wisdom and benevolence would
have decreed. Moral codes have not always been faultless. The Aztecs
considered it their painful duty to eat human flesh for fear the light
of the sun should grow dim. They erred in their science; and perhaps
they would have perceived the scientific error if they had had any love
for the sacrificial victims. Some tribes immerse girls in the dark from
the age of ten to the age of seventeen, for fear the sun’s rays should
render them pregnant. But surely our modern codes of morals contain
nothing analogous to these savage practices? Surely we only forbid
things which really are harmful, or at any rate so abominable that no
decent person could defend them? I am not so sure.
Current morality is a curious blend of utilitarianism and superstition,
but the superstitious part has the stronger hold, as is natural,
since superstition is the origin of moral rules. Originally, certain
acts were thought displeasing to the gods, and were forbidden by law
because the divine wrath was apt to descend upon the community, not
merely upon the guilty individuals. Hence arose the conception of sin,
as that which is displeasing to God. No reason can be assigned as to
why certain acts should be thus displeasing; it would be very difficult
to say, for instance, why it was displeasing that the kid should be
seethed in its mother’s milk. But it was known by Revelation that
this was the case. Sometimes the Divine commands have been curiously
interpreted. For example, we are told not to work on Saturdays, and
Protestants take this to mean that we are not to play on Sundays. But
the same sublime authority is attributed to the new prohibition as to
the old.
It is evident that a man with a scientific outlook on life cannot let
himself be intimidated by texts of Scripture or by the teaching of
the Church. He will not be content to say “such-and-such an act is
sinful, and that ends the matter.” He will inquire whether it does
any harm, or whether, on the contrary, the belief that it is sinful
does harm. And he will find that, especially in what concerns sex, our
current morality contains a very great deal of which the origin is
purely superstitious. He will find also that this superstition, like
that of the Aztecs, involves needless cruelty, and would be swept away
if people were actuated by kindly feelings towards their neighbours.
But the defenders of traditional morality are seldom people with
warm hearts, as may be seen from the love of militarism displayed by
Church dignitaries. One is tempted to think that they value morals as
affording a legitimate outlet for their desire to inflict pain: the
sinner is fair game, and therefore away with tolerance!
Let us follow an ordinary human life from conception to the grave,
and note the points where superstitious morals inflict preventable
suffering. I begin with conception, because here the influence of
superstition is particularly noteworthy. If the parents are not
married, the child has a stigma, as clearly undeserved as anything
could be. If either of the parents has venereal disease, the child
is likely to inherit it. If they already have too many children for
the family income, there will be poverty, underfeeding, overcrowding,
very likely incest. Yet the great majority of moralists agree that the
parents had better not know how to prevent this misery by preventing
conception. To please these moralists, a life of torture is inflicted
upon millions of human beings who ought never to have existed, merely
because it is supposed that sexual intercourse is wicked unless
accompanied by desire for offspring, but not wicked when this desire is
present, even though the offspring is humanly certain to be wretched.
To be killed suddenly and then eaten, which was the fate of the Aztecs’
victims, is a far less degree of suffering than is inflicted upon a
child born in miserable surroundings and tainted with venereal disease.
Yet it is the greater suffering which is deliberately inflicted by
Bishops and politicians in the name of morality. If they had even the
smallest spark of love or pity for children they could not adhere to a
moral code involving this fiendish cruelty.
At birth, and in early infancy, the average child suffers more from
economic causes than from superstition. When well-to-do women have
children, they have the best doctors, the best nurses, the best diet,
the best rest, and the best exercise. Working-class women do not enjoy
these advantages, and frequently their children die for lack of them. A
little is done by the public authorities in the way of care of mothers,
but very grudgingly. At a moment when the supply of milk to nursing
mothers is being cut down to save expense, public authorities will
spend vast sums on paving rich residential districts where there is
little traffic. They must know that in taking this decision they are
condemning a certain number of working-class children to death for the
crime of poverty. Yet the ruling party are supported by the immense
majority of ministers of religion, who, with the Pope at their head,
have pledged the vast forces of superstition throughout the world to
the support of social injustice.
In all stages of education the influence of superstition is disastrous.
A certain percentage of children have the habit of thinking; one of the
aims of education is to cure them of this habit. Inconvenient questions
are met with “hush, hush” or with punishment. Collective emotion is
used to instil certain kinds of belief, more particularly nationalistic
kinds. Capitalists, militarists, and ecclesiastics co-operate in
education, because all depend for their power upon the prevalence of
emotionalism and the rarity of critical judgment. With the aid of
human nature, education succeeds in increasing and intensifying these
propensities of the average man.
Another way in which superstition damages education is through
its influence on the choice of teachers. For economic reasons, a
woman-teacher must not be married; for moral reasons, she must not have
extra-marital sexual relations. And yet everybody who has taken the
trouble to study morbid psychology knows that prolonged virginity is,
as a rule, extraordinarily harmful to women, so harmful that, in a sane
society, it would be severely discouraged in teachers. The restrictions
imposed lead more and more to a refusal, on the part of energetic and
enterprising women, to enter the teaching profession. This is all due
to the lingering influence of superstitious asceticism.
At middle- and upper-class schools the matter is even worse. There are
chapel services, and the care of morals is in the hands of clergymen.
Clergymen, almost necessarily, fail in two ways as teachers of morals.
They condemn acts which do no harm, and they condone acts which do
great harm. They all condemn sexual relations between unmarried people
who are fond of each other but not yet sure that they wish to live
together all their lives. Most of them condemn birth-control. None of
them condemn the brutality of a husband who causes his wife to die of
too frequent pregnancies. I knew a fashionable clergyman whose wife
had nine children in nine years. The doctors told him that if she had
another she would die. Next year she had another and died. No one
condemned him; he retained his benefice, and married again. So long as
clergymen continue to condone cruelty and condemn innocent pleasure,
they can only do harm as guardians of the morals of the young.
Another bad effect of superstition on education is the absence of
instruction about the facts of sex. The main physiological facts
ought to be taught, quite simply and naturally, before puberty, at
a time when they are not exciting. At puberty, the elements of an
unsuperstitious sexual morality ought to be taught. Boys and girls
should be taught that nothing can justify sexual intercourse unless
there is mutual inclination. This is contrary to the teaching of the
Church, which holds that, provided the parties are married and the man
desires another child, sexual intercourse is justified however great
may be the reluctance of the wife. Boys and girls should be taught
respect for each other’s liberty; they should be made to feel that
nothing gives one human being rights over another, and that jealousy
and possessiveness kill love. They should be taught that to bring
another human being into the world is a very serious matter, only to
be undertaken when the child will have a reasonable prospect of health,
good surroundings, and parental care. But they should also be taught
methods of birth-control, so as to insure that children shall only come
when they are wanted. Finally, they should be taught the dangers of
venereal disease, and the methods of prevention and cure. The increase
of human happiness to be expected from sex-education on these lines is
immeasurable.
It should be recognized that, in the absence of children, sexual
relations are a purely private matter, which does not concern either
the State or the neighbours. Certain forms of sex which do not lead to
children are at present punished by the criminal law: this is purely
superstitious, since the matter is one which affects no one except the
parties directly concerned. Where there are children, it is a mistake
to suppose that it is necessarily to their interest to make divorce
very difficult. Habitual drunkenness, cruelty, insanity are grounds
upon which divorce is necessary for the children’s sake quite as
much as for the sake of the wife or husband. The peculiar importance
attached, at present, to adultery is quite irrational. It is obvious
that many forms of misconduct are more fatal to married happiness than
an occasional infidelity. Masculine insistence on a child a year, which
is not conventionally misconduct or cruelty, is the most fatal of all.
Moral rules ought not to be such as to make instinctive happiness
impossible. Yet that is an effect of strict monogamy, in a community
where the numbers of the two sexes are very unequal. Of course, under
such circumstances, the moral rules are infringed. But when the rules
are such that they can only be obeyed by greatly diminishing the
happiness of the community, and when it is better they should be
infringed than observed, surely it is time that the rules were changed.
If this is not done, many people who are acting in a way not contrary
to the public interest are faced with the undeserved alternative of
hypocrisy or obloquy. The Church does not mind hypocrisy, which is
a flattering tribute to its power; but elsewhere it has come to be
recognized as an evil which we ought not lightly to inflict.
Even more harmful than theological superstition is the superstition of
nationalism, of duty to one’s own State and to no other. But I do not
propose on this occasion to discuss this matter, beyond pointing out
that limitation to one’s compatriots is contrary to the principle of
love which we recognized as constituting the good life. It is also,
of course, contrary to enlightened self-interest, since an exclusive
nationalism does not pay even the victorious nations.
One other respect in which our society suffers from the theological
conception of “sin” is the treatment of criminals. The view that
criminals are “wicked” and “deserve” punishment is not one which a
rational morality can support. Undoubtedly certain people do things
which society wishes to prevent, and does right in preventing as far
as possible. We may take murder as the plainest case. Obviously, if
a community is to hold together and we are to enjoy its pleasures
and advantages, we cannot allow people to kill each other whenever
they feel an impulse to do so. But this problem should be treated in
a purely scientific spirit. We should ask simply: What is the best
method of preventing murder? Of two methods which are equally effective
in preventing murder, the one involving least harm to the murderer is
to be preferred. The harm to the murderer is wholly regrettable, like
the pain of a surgical operation. It may be equally necessary, but it
is not a subject of rejoicing. The vindictive feeling called “moral
indignation” is merely a form of cruelty. Suffering to the criminal can
never be justified by the notion of vindictive punishment. If education
combined with kindness is equally effective, it is to be preferred;
still more is it to be preferred if it is more effective. Of course
the prevention of crime and the punishment of crime are two different
questions; the object of causing pain to the criminal is presumably
deterrent. If prisons were so humanized that a prisoner got a good
education for nothing, people might commit crimes in order to qualify
for entrance. No doubt prison must be less pleasant than freedom; but
the best way to secure this result is to make freedom more pleasant
than it sometimes is at present. I do not wish, however, to embark
upon the subject of Penal Reform. I merely wish to suggest that we
should treat the criminal as we treat a man suffering from plague.
Each is a public danger, each must have his liberty curtailed until
he has ceased to be a danger. But the man suffering from plague is an
object of sympathy and commiseration, whereas the criminal is an object
of execration. This is quite irrational. And it is because of this
difference of attitude that our prisons are so much less successful in
curing criminal tendencies than our hospitals are in curing disease.
CHAPTER IV
SALVATION: INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL
One of the defects of traditional religion is its individualism,
and this defect belongs also to the morality associated with it.
Traditionally, the religious life was, as it were, a duologue between
the soul and God. To obey the will of God was virtue; and this was
possible for the individual quite regardless of the state of the
community. Protestant sects developed the idea of “finding salvation”,
but it was always present in Christian teaching. This individualism of
the separate soul had its value at certain stages of history, but in
the modern world we need rather a social than an individual conception
of welfare. I want to consider, in this chapter, how this affects our
conception of the good life.
Christianity arose in the Roman Empire among populations wholly
destitute of political power, whose national States had been destroyed
and merged in a vast impersonal aggregate. During the first three
centuries of the Christian Era, the individuals who adopted Christianity
could not alter the social or political institutions under which they
lived, although they were profoundly convinced of their badness. In
these circumstances, it was natural that they should adopt the belief
that an individual may be perfect in an imperfect world, and that the
good life has nothing to do with this world. What I mean may become
plain by comparison with Plato’s Republic. When Plato wanted to describe
the good life, he described a whole community, not an individual; he did
so in order to define justice, which is an essentially social
conception. He was accustomed to citizenship of a Republic, and
political responsibility was something which he took for granted. With
the loss of Greek freedom comes the rise of Stoicism, which is like
Christianity, and unlike Plato, in having an individualistic conception
of the good life.
We, who belong to great democracies, should find a more appropriate
morality in free Athens than in despotic Imperial Rome. In India, where
the political circumstances are very similar to those of Judea in the
time of Christ, we find Gandhi preaching a very similar morality to
Christ’s, and being punished for it by the christianized successors
of Pontius Pilate. But the more extreme Indian nationalists are not
content with individual salvation: they want national salvation. In
this they have taken on the outlook of the free democracies of the
West. I want to suggest some respects in which this outlook, owing to
Christian influences, is not yet sufficiently bold and self-conscious,
but is still hampered by the belief in individual salvation.
The good life, as we conceive it, demands a multitude of social
conditions, and cannot be realized without them. The good life, we
said, is a life inspired by love and guided by knowledge. The knowledge
required can only exist where governments or millionaires devote
themselves to its discovery and diffusion. For example: the spread of
cancer is alarming――what are we to do about it? At the moment, no one
can answer the question for lack of knowledge; and the knowledge is not
likely to emerge except through endowed research. Again: knowledge of
science, history, literature, and art ought to be attainable by all
who desire it; this requires elaborate arrangements on the part of
public authorities, and is not to be achieved by means of religious
conversion. Then there is foreign trade, without which half the
inhabitants of Great Britain would starve; and if we were starving
very few of us would live the good life. It is needless to multiply
examples. The important point is that, in all that differentiates
between a good life and a bad one, the world is a unity, and the man
who pretends to live independently is a conscious or unconscious
parasite.
The idea of individual salvation, with which the early Christians
consoled themselves for their political subjection, becomes impossible
as soon as we escape from a very narrow conception of the good life.
In the orthodox Christian conception, the good life is the virtuous
life, and virtue consists in obedience to the will of God, and the will
of God is revealed to each individual through the voice of conscience.
This whole conception is that of men subject to an alien despotism. The
good life involves much besides virtue――intelligence, for instance.
And conscience is a most fallacious guide, since it consists of vague
reminiscences of precepts heard in early youth, so that it is never
wiser than its possessor’s nurse or mother. To live a good life in the
fullest sense a man must have a good education, friends, love, children
(if he desires them), a sufficient income to keep him from want and
grave anxiety, good health, and work which is not uninteresting. All
these things, in varying degrees, depend upon the community, and are
helped or hindered by political events. The good life must be lived in
a good society, and is not fully possible otherwise.
This is the fundamental defect of the aristocratic ideal. Certain good
things, such as art and science and friendship, can flourish very
well in an aristocratic society. They existed in Greece on a basis of
slavery; they exist among ourselves on a basis of exploitation. But
love, in the form of sympathy or benevolence, cannot exist freely in
an aristocratic society. The aristocrat has to persuade himself that
the slave or proletarian or coloured man is of inferior clay, and
that his sufferings do not matter. At the present moment, polished
English gentlemen flog Africans so severely that they die after hours
of unspeakable anguish. Even if these gentlemen are well-educated,
artistic, and admirable conversationalists, I cannot admit that they
are living the good life. Human nature imposes some limitation of
sympathy, but not such a degree as that. In a democratically-minded
society, only a maniac would behave in this way. The limitation of
sympathy involved in the aristocratic ideal is its condemnation.
Salvation is an aristocratic ideal, because it is individualistic. For
this reason, also, the idea of personal salvation, however interpreted
and expanded, cannot serve for the definition of the good life.
Another characteristic of salvation is that it results from a
catastrophic change, like the conversion of Saint Paul. Shelley’s
poems afford an illustration of this conception applied to societies;
the moment comes when everybody is converted, the “anarchs” fly, and
“the world’s great age begins anew”. It may be said that a poet is
an unimportant person, whose ideas are of no consequence. But I am
persuaded that a large proportion of revolutionary leaders have had
ideas extremely like Shelley’s. They have thought that misery and
cruelty and degradation were due to tyrants or priests or capitalists
or Germans, and that if these sources of evil were overthrown there
would be a general change of heart and we should all live happy ever
after. Holding these beliefs, they have been willing to wage a “war to
end war”. Comparatively fortunate were those who suffered defeat or
death; those who had the misfortune to emerge victorious were reduced
to cynicism and despair by the failure of all their glowing hopes.
The ultimate source of these hopes was the Christian doctrine of
catastrophic conversion as the road to salvation.
I do not wish to suggest that revolutions are never necessary, but I
do wish to suggest that they are not short cuts to the millennium.
There is no short cut to the good life, whether individual or social.
To build up the good life, we must build up intelligence, self-control,
and sympathy. This is a quantitative matter, a matter of gradual
improvement, of early training, of educational experiment. Only
impatience prompts the belief in the possibility of sudden improvement.
The gradual improvement that is possible, and the methods by which it
may be achieved, are a matter for future science. But something can be
said now. Some part of what can be said I shall try to indicate in a
final chapter.
CHAPTER V
SCIENCE AND HAPPINESS
The purpose of the moralist is to improve men’s behaviour. This is
a laudable ambition, since their behaviour is for the most part
deplorable. But I cannot praise the moralist either for the particular
improvements he desires, or for the methods he adopts for achieving
them. His ostensible method is moral exhortation; his real method
(if he is orthodox) is a system of economic rewards and punishments.
The former effects nothing permanent or important; the influence
of revivalists, from Savonarola downwards, has always been very
transitory. The latter――the rewards and punishments――have a very
considerable effect. They cause a man, for example, to prefer casual
prostitutes to a quasi-permanent mistress, because it is necessary to
adopt the method which is most easily concealed. They thus keep up the
numbers of a very dangerous profession, and secure the prevalence of
venereal disease. These are not the objects desired by the moralist,
and he is too unscientific to notice that they are the objects which he
actually achieves.
Is there anything better to be substituted for this unscientific
mixture of preaching and bribery? I think there is.
Men’s actions are harmful either from ignorance or from bad desires.
“Bad” desires, when we are speaking from a social point of view, may
be defined as those which tend to thwart the desires of others, or,
more exactly, those which thwart more desires than they assist. It
is not necessary to dwell upon the harmfulness that springs from
ignorance; here, more knowledge is all that is wanted, so that the
road to improvement lies in more research and more education. But the
harmfulness that springs from bad desires is a more difficult matter.
In the ordinary man and woman there is a certain amount of active
malevolence, both special ill-will directed to particular enemies
and general impersonal pleasure in the misfortunes of others. It
is customary to cover this over with fine phrases; about half of
conventional morality is a cloak for it. But it must be faced if the
moralists’ aim of improving our actions is to be achieved. It is shown
in a thousand ways, great and small: in the glee with which people
repeat and believe scandal, in the unkind treatment of criminals in
spite of clear proof that better treatment would have more effect in
reforming them, in the unbelievable barbarity with which all white
races treat negroes, and in the gusto with which old ladies and
clergymen pointed out the duty of military service to young men during
the War. Even children may be the objects of wanton cruelty: David
Copperfield and Oliver Twist are by no means imaginary. This active
malevolence is the worst feature of human nature, and the one which it
is most necessary to change if the world is to grow happier. Probably
this one cause has more to do with war than all the economic and
political causes put together.
Given this problem of preventing malevolence, how shall we deal with
it? First let us try to understand its causes. These are, I think,
partly social, partly physiological. The world, now as much as at any
former time, is based upon life-and-death competition; the question
at issue in the War was whether German or Allied children should die
of want and starvation. (Apart from malevolence on both sides, there
was not the slightest reason why both should not survive). Most people
have in the background of their minds a haunting fear of ruin; this
is especially true of people who have children. The rich fear that
Bolsheviks will confiscate their investments; the poor fear that they
will lose their job or their health. Every one is engaged in the
frantic pursuit of “security”, and imagines that this is to be achieved
by keeping potential enemies in subjection. It is in moments of panic
that cruelty becomes most wide-spread and most atrocious. Reactionaries
everywhere appeal to fear: in England, to fear of Bolshevism; in
France, to fear of Germany; in Germany, to fear of France. And the
sole effect of their appeals is to increase the danger against which
they wish to be protected.
It must, therefore, be one of the chief concerns of the scientific
moralist to combat fear. This can be done in two ways: by increasing
security, and by cultivating courage. I am speaking of fear as
an irrational passion, not of the rational prevision of possible
misfortune. When a theatre catches fire, the rational man foresees
disaster just as clearly as the man stricken with panic, but he adopts
methods likely to diminish the disaster, whereas the man stricken with
panic increases it. Europe since 1914 has been like a panic-stricken
audience in a theatre on fire; what is needed is calm, authoritative
directions as to how to escape without trampling each other to pieces
in the process. The Victorian age, for all its humbug, was a period of
rapid progress, because men were dominated by hope rather than fear. If
we are again to have progress, we must again be dominated by hope.
Everything that increases the general security is likely to diminish
cruelty. This applies to prevention of war, whether through the
instrumentality of the League of Nations, or otherwise; to prevention
of destitution; to better health by improvement in medicine, hygiene,
and sanitation; and to all other methods of lessening the terrors that
lurk in the abysses of men’s minds and emerge as nightmares when they
sleep. But nothing is accomplished by an attempt to make a portion of
mankind secure at the expense of another portion――Frenchmen at the
expense of Germans, capitalists at the expense of wage-earners, white
men at the expense of yellow men, and so on. Such methods only increase
terror in the dominant group, lest just resentment should lead the
oppressed to rebel. Only justice can give security; and by “justice” I
mean the recognition of the equal claims of all human beings.
In addition to social changes designed to bring security, there is,
however, another and more direct means of diminishing fear, namely
by a regimen designed to increase courage. Owing to the importance
of courage in battle, men early discovered means of increasing it by
education and diet――eating human flesh, for example, was supposed
to be useful. But military courage was to be the prerogative of the
ruling caste: Spartans were to have more than helots, British officers
than Indian privates, men than women, and so on. For centuries it
was supposed to be the privilege of the aristocracy. Every increase
of courage in the ruling caste was used to increase the burdens on
the oppressed, and therefore to increase the grounds for fear in the
oppressors, and therefore to leave the causes of cruelty undiminished.
Courage must be democratized before it can make men humane.
To a great extent, courage has already been democratized by recent
events. The suffragettes showed that they possessed as much courage
as the bravest men; this demonstration was essential in winning them
the vote. The common soldier in the War needed as much courage as a
Captain or Lieutenant, and much more than a General: this had much to
do with his lack of servility after demobilization. The Bolsheviks, who
proclaim themselves the champions of the proletariat, are not lacking
in courage, whatever else may be said of them; this is proved by their
pre-revolutionary record. In Japan, where formerly the samurai had a
monopoly of martial ardour, conscription brought the need of courage
throughout the male population. Thus among all the Great Powers much
has been done during the past half-century to make courage no longer
an aristocratic monopoly: if this were not the case, the danger to
democracy would be far greater than it is.
But courage in fighting is by no means the only form, nor perhaps even
the most important. There is courage in facing poverty, courage in
facing derision, courage in facing the hostility of one’s own herd. In
these, the bravest soldiers are often lamentably deficient. And above
all there is the courage to think calmly and rationally in the face
of danger, and to control the impulse of panic fear or panic rage.
These are certainly things which education can help to give. And the
teaching of every form of courage is rendered easier by good health,
good physique, adequate nourishment, and free play for fundamental
vital impulses. Perhaps the physiological sources of courage could
be discovered by comparing the blood of a cat with that of a rabbit.
In all likelihood there is no limit to what science could do in the
way of increasing courage, by example, experience of danger, an
athletic life, and a suitable diet. All these things our upper-class
boys to a great extent enjoy, but as yet they are in the main the
prerogative of wealth. The courage so far encouraged in the poorer
sections of the community is courage under orders, not the kind that
involves initiative and leadership. When the qualities that now confer
leadership have become universal, there will no longer be leaders and
followers, and democracy will have been realized at last.
But fear is not the only source of malevolence; envy and disappointment
also have their share. The envy of cripples and hunchbacks is
proverbial as a source of malignity, but other misfortunes than
theirs produce similar results. A man or woman who has been thwarted
sexually is apt to be full of envy; this generally takes the form of
moral condemnation of the more fortunate. Much of the driving force
of revolutionary movement is due to envy of the rich. Jealousy is, of
course, a special form of envy: envy of love. The old often envy the
young; when they do, they are apt to treat them cruelly.
There is, so far as I know, no way of dealing with envy except to make
the lives of the envious happier and fuller, and to encourage in youth
the idea of collective enterprises rather than competition. The worst
forms of envy are in those who have not had a full life in the way of
marriage, or children, or career. Such misfortunes could in most cases
be avoided by better social institutions. Still, it must be admitted
that a residuum of envy is likely to remain. There are many instances
in history of Generals so jealous of each other that they preferred
defeat to enhancement of the other’s reputation. Two politicians of
the same party, or two artists of the same school are almost sure
to be jealous of one another. In such cases, there seems nothing to
be done except to arrange, as far as possible, that each competitor
shall be unable to injure the other, and shall only be able to win by
superior merit. An artist’s jealousy of a rival usually does little
harm, because the only effective way of indulging it is to paint better
pictures than his rival’s, since it is not open to him to destroy his
rival’s pictures. Where envy is unavoidable, it must be used as a
stimulus to one’s own efforts, not to the thwarting of the efforts of
rivals.
The possibilities of science in the way of increasing human happiness
are not confined to diminishing those aspects of human nature which
make for mutual defeat, and which we therefore call “bad”. There is
probably no limit to what science can do in the way of increasing
positive excellence. Health has already been greatly improved; in spite
of the lamentations of those who idealize the past, we live longer
and have fewer illnesses than any class or nation in the eighteenth
century. With a little more application of the knowledge we already
possess, we might be much healthier than we are. And future discoveries
are likely to accelerate this process enormously.
So far, it has been physical science that has had most effect upon
our lives, but in the future physiology and psychology are likely to
be far more potent. When we have discovered how character depends upon
physiological conditions, we shall be able, if we choose, to produce
far more of the type of human beings that we admire. Intelligence,
artistic capacity, benevolence――all these things no doubt could be
increased by science. There seems scarcely any limit to what _could_
be done in the way of producing a good world, if only men would use
science wisely. I have expressed elsewhere my fears that men may not
make a wise use of the power they derive from science.[B] At present I
am concerned with the good that men could do if they chose, not with
the question whether they will choose rather to do harm.
[B] See _Icarus_.
There is a certain attitude about the application of science to
human life with which I have some sympathy, though I do not, in the
last analysis, agree with it. It is the attitude of those who dread
what is “unnatural.” Rousseau is, of course, the great protagonist
of this view in Europe. In Asia, Lao-Tze has set it forth even more
persuasively, and 2400 years sooner. I think there is a mixture
of truth and falsehood in the admiration of “nature,” which it is
important to disentangle. To begin with, what is “natural”? Roughly
speaking, anything to which the speaker was accustomed in childhood.
Lao-Tze objects to roads and carriages and boats, all of which were
probably unknown in the village where he was born. Rousseau has got
used to these things, and does not regard them as against nature. But
he would no doubt have thundered against railways if he had lived
to see them. Clothes and cooking are too ancient to be denounced by
most of the apostles of nature, though they all object to new fashions
in either. Birth-control is thought wicked by people who tolerate
celibacy, because the former is a new violation of nature and the
latter an ancient one. In all these ways those who preach “nature” are
inconsistent, and one is tempted to regard them as mere conservatives.
Nevertheless, there is something to be said in their favour. Take for
instance vitamines, the discovery of which has produced a revulsion
in favour of “natural” foods. It seems, however, that vitamines can
be supplied by cod-liver oil and electric light, which are certainly
not part of the “natural” diet of a human being. This case illustrates
that, in the absence of knowledge, unexpected harm may be done by a new
departure from nature; but when the harm has come to be understood
it can usually be remedied by some new artificiality. As regards our
physical environment and our physical means of gratifying our desires,
I do not think the doctrine of “nature” justifies anything beyond
a certain experimental caution in the adoption of new expedients.
Clothes, for instance, are contrary to nature, and need to be
supplemented by another unnatural practice, namely washing, if they
are not to bring disease. But the two practices together make a man
healthier than the savage who eschews both.
There is much more to be said for “nature” in the realm of human
desires. To force upon man, woman, or child a life which thwarts their
strongest impulses is both cruel and dangerous in this sense, a life
according to “nature” is to be commended with certain provisos. Nothing
could be more artificial than an underground electric railway, but no
violence is done to a child’s nature when it is taken to travel in one;
on the contrary, almost all children find the experience delightful.
Artificialities which gratify the desires of ordinary human beings
are good, other things being equal. But there is nothing to be said
for ways of life which are artificial in the sense of being imposed
by authority or economic necessity. Such ways of life are, no doubt,
to some extent necessary at present; ocean travel would become very
difficult if there were no stokers on steamers. But necessities of this
kind are regrettable, and we ought to look for ways of avoiding them. A
certain amount of work is not a thing to complain of; indeed, in nine
cases out of ten, it makes a man happier than complete idleness. But
the amount and kind of work that most people have to do at present is
a grave evil: especially bad is the life-long bondage to routine. Life
should not be too closely regulated or too methodical; our impulses,
when not positively destructive or injurious to others, ought if
possible to have free play; there should be room for adventure. Human
nature we should respect, because our impulses and desires are the
stuff out of which our happiness is to be made. It is no use to give
men something abstractly considered “good”; we must give them something
desired or needed if we are to add to their happiness. Science may
learn in time to mould our desires so that they shall not conflict with
those of other people to the same extent as they do now; then we shall
be able to satisfy a larger proportion of our desires than at present.
In that sense, but in that sense only, our desires will then have
become “better.” A single desire is no better and no worse, considered
in isolation, than any other; but a group of desires is better than
another group if all of the first group can be satisfied simultaneously
while in the second group some are inconsistent with others. That is
why love is better than hatred.
To respect physical nature is foolish; physical nature should be
studied with a view to making it serve human ends as far as possible,
but it remains ethically neither good nor bad. And where physical
nature and human nature interact, as in the population question, there
is no need to fold our hands in passive adoration and accept war,
pestilence, and famine as the only possible means of dealing with
excessive fertility. The divines say: it is wicked, in this matter, to
apply science to the physical side of the problem; we must (they say)
apply morals to the human side, and practise abstinence. Apart from
the fact that every one, including the divines, knows that their advice
will not be taken, why should it be wicked to solve the population
question by adopting physical means for preventing conception? No
answer is forthcoming except one based upon antiquated dogmas. And
clearly the violence to nature advocated by the divines is at least
as great as that involved in birth-control. The divines prefer a
violence to human nature which, when successfully practised, involves
unhappiness, envy, a tendency to persecution, often madness. I prefer
a “violence” to physical nature which is of the same sort as that
involved in the steam engine or even in the use of fire. This instance
shows how ambiguous and uncertain is the application of the principle
that we should follow “nature.”
Nature, even human nature, will cease more and more to be an absolute
datum; more and more it will become what scientific manipulation has
made it. Science can, if it chooses, enable our grandchildren to live
the good life, by giving them knowledge, self-control, and characters
productive of harmony rather than strife. At present it is teaching our
children to kill each other, because many men of science are willing to
sacrifice the future of mankind to their own momentary prosperity. But
this phase will pass when men have acquired the same domination over
their own passions that they already have over the physical forces of
the external world. Then at last we shall have won our freedom.
* * * * *
Transcriber’s Notes:
――Text in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_).
――Obvious spelling inaccuracies were silently corrected.
――Archaic and variable spelling and punctuation have been preserved.
――Variations in hyphenation and compound words have been preserved.
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