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Title: The war in Nicaragua
Author: William Walker
Release date: September 18, 2025 [eBook #76898]
Language: English
Original publication: Mobile: S.H. Goetzel & Co, 1860
Credits: Peter Becker and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WAR IN NICARAGUA ***
[Illustration: Engᵈ. by J. C. Buttre, New York.
_Wᵐ. Walker_]
THE
WAR IN NICARAGUA.
WRITTEN BY
GEN’L WILLIAM WALKER.
WITH A COLORED MAP OF NICARAGUA.
MOBILE:
S. H. GOETZEL & CO.
NEW-YORK: 82 WARREN-ST.
1860.
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1860,
BY S. H. GOETZEL & CO.,
In the Clerk’s office of the District Court of the United States
for the Southern District of New-York.
To My Comrades in Nicaragua
I dedicate this effort to do justice to their acts and motives: To the
living, with the hope that we may soon meet again on the soil for which
we have suffered more than the pangs of death—the reproaches of a people
for whose welfare we stood ready to die: To the memory of those who
perished in the struggle, with the vow that as long as life lasts no
peace shall remain with the foes who libel their names and strive to tear
away the laurel which hangs over their graves.
W. W.
PREFACE.
No history is so hard to write as that of our own times. Few, if any, can
free themselves from the fashions of thought and opinion which control
the daily life of their neighbors, and every one inhales to some extent
the vapors and miasms floating in the air he hourly breathes. The task
is even more difficult if a man attempts to narrate events in which he
has taken part. As the soldier, warmed by the heat of battle, dimly sees
through the dust and smoke of a well-fought field, the large movements
which decide the issue of the conflict, so he who has mingled in the
struggles of parties or the contests of nations, may not be as well
fitted as others to speak of facts moulded partially by his own will and
hand. But if the memoir writer be fair and discreet, he may contribute
materials for future use, and his very errors may instruct after ages.
The author of the following narrative does not expect to attain perfect
truth in all things; he merely asks the reader to give him credit for
the desire to state facts accurately, and to reason justly about the
circumstances attending the presence of the Americans in Nicaragua.
_March 1st, 1860._
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
THE VESTA AND HER PASSENGERS.
The Revolution of 1854—Organization of Provisional Government—Grounds
of the Contest—The two Constitutions—Democrats and Legitimists—Siege
of Granada—Retreat of Jerez—Death of Chamorro—Policy of Honduras
and of Guatemala—Lower California Expedition—Its Objects and
Purposes—Its Termination—Contracts of Cole with Castellon—Crabb
Contract with Jerez—Legality of the Cole Grant of Colonization—Charter
of the Vesta—Her Difficulties and final Departure—Her Voyage—State
of Parties in June, 1855—Arrival of the Vesta at Realejo—Landing of
Passengers—Walker’s Visit to Leon—Castellon and Muñoz—The American
Phalanx—Its Organization—Expedition to Rivas PAGE 13
CHAPTER II.
RIVAS, JUNE TWENTY-NINTH, 1855.
Preparations for the Rivas Expedition—Native Troops—Ramirez and
Mariano Mendez—Maximo Espinosa-Departure from Realejo—Landing
at El Gigante—Difficulties of the March—Appearance of the
Camp—Skirmish at Tola—March from Tola to Rivas—Effect
of Scenery on the Americans—Plan of Attack—Action at
Rivas—Desertion of Ramirez—Loss of the Americans—Retreat to
San Juan del Sur—Embarkation on the Schooner San José—Burning
of the Cuartel—Departure for Realejo—Execution of Dewey—Its
Effects on the People—Transfer to the Vesta and Return to
Realejo—Despatch to Castellon—His Reply-Visit of Mariano
Salazar—Castellon’s Anxiety—Americans at Chinandega—Cole
and Von Natzmer—March to Leon—Arrival there—State of the
Capital—Policy of Muñoz—Danger to the Falange—Necessity for
Caution—Counter-march to Chinandega—New Contract with Castellon PAGE 42
CHAPTER III.
VIRGIN BAY, SEPTEMBER THIRD, 1855.
Discontent of the Americans—Sale of the Vesta—March of
Muñoz toward Segovia—Movements of Guardiola—Walker’s Plans
for Returning to Rivas—José Maria Valle—His Friendship
to the Americans—Reports of the Enemy—Departure from
Chinandega—Despondency of the People—The Cholera—Valle on
the Vesta—Distress of Castellon—Action at Sauce—Death of
Muñoz—Sailing for San Juan del Sur—Arrival at San Juan—Parker
H. French—Relative Strength of the Democrats and Legitimists
in the Meridional Department—Action at Virgin Bay—Good Conduct
of the Natives—Results of the Action—Death of Castellon—His
Character and Policy—New Director—Contribution Levied—Sources
of Revenue—Don Guadalupe Saënz—Rumors of Corral’s
Advance—Ambush on Transit Road—Intercepted Despatches—Corral
Ready to Treat for Peace—Arrival of Gilman—Re-organization of
the Falange PAGE 76
CHAPTER IV.
GRANADA, OCTOBER THIRTEENTH, 1855.
Hornsby gets Possession of the Steamer La Virgen—Democrats
embark for Granada—Landing above the Town—Surprise
of Granada—Flight of the Legitimists—Fury of Native
Democrats—Conduct of the Americans—Release of Prisoners—Fermin
Ferrer and Carlos Thomas—Niña Yrena—Father Vigil—Negotiations
with Corral—Mediation of Mr. Wheeler—Arrival of Fry—The Lake
Steamer fired on—Shooting of Mayorga—Corral at Masaya—Comes
to Granada as Commissioner—Treaty of 23d October—Macdonald’s
Loan of Twenty Thousand Dollars—Entry of Legitimists to
Granada—Rivas Inaugurated—Walker Commander-in-Chief—Formation
of the Cabinet—Nature of the Treaty—Intercepted Letters
of Corral—His Trial and Execution—Narciso Espinosa—Rivas’
Government recognized by Mr. Wheeler PAGE 109
CHAPTER V.
THE ADMINISTRATION OF RIVAS.
Policy of Rivas—His Appointments—Course of the
Clergy—Colonization Decree—El Nicaraguense—Military
Enlistments—The Accessory Transit Company—Its
Mercenaries—Kinney and His Schemes—Negotiations with the
Company—Garrison and Morgan—Course of the Company—Edmund
Randolph and Parker Crittenden—Revocation of the Company’s
Charter—Justice and Policy of the Act—The Randolph
Grant—How Americans were carried to Nicaragua—Sickness at
Granada—Circular of Rivas—General Trinidad Cabañas—His
Influence over Jerez—Resignation of Jerez and Selva—Course
of the Four States of Central America—Commission to
Costa Rica—Policy of the United States—Policy of Great
Britain—British Consul at Realejo—British Aid to Costa
Rica—Declaration of War by Costa Rica—Its Effects on the
Country PAGE 142
CHAPTER VI.
THE COSTA RICAN INVASION.
State of the American Force on March 1st, 1856—Arrival
of Goicouria—Col. Padilla—Proclamation of
General-in-Chief—Expedition to Guanacaste—Rout at Santa
Rosa—Its Effects—Headquarters at Rivas—Government removed
to Leon—Address to the Troops—C. J. Macdonald—Goicouria
as Intendente-General—The Americans at Granada—Mora at
Rivas—Walker marches to Rivas—Action of 11th April—The
Americans retire—Effects of the Action—Action on the
Serapaqui—Appointment of Father Vigil as Minister to
Washington—Sickness at Granada—Arrival of Hornsby with
Recruits—Cholera at Rivas—Depression of the Costa Ricans—Mora
leaves Nicaragua—Letter of Cañas—Cholera in Costa
Rica—Expedition through Chontales—Execution of Ugarte—Effects
of Fever—Difficulties of the Americans—Affairs at Leon PAGE 177
CHAPTER VII
THE DEFECTION OF RIVAS.
Communication from San Salvador—Reports from Northern States of
Central America—Walker at Leon—Proposal of San Salvador—Effect
of Vigil’s Reception at Washington—Arrest of Salazar—Goicouria
and Guerrero—Election Decree—Movement at Leon—Flight of Rivas
to Chinandega—The Course of the Americans—Ferrer as Provisional
President—Election and Inauguration of Walker—Forfeiture
of the Schooner San José—The Granada in Commission—Lt.
Fayssoux—Cabinet of Walker—The New Administration recognized
by Mr. Wheeler—Cruise of the Granada—Capture of Salazar—His
Execution—Letter of Manning—Arrest of Dr. Livingston—Course
of the American Minister—Hon. Pierre Soulé—Desertion and
Fate of Turley—State of the Allies at Leon—Disease and
Dissensions—Murder of Estrada—Arrangements with Morgan and
Garrison—The Cubans in Nicaragua PAGE 216
CHAPTER VIII.
THE WALKER ADMINISTRATION.
Necessity for Social Re-organization—Difference of
Language—Decree of Forfeited Estates—The Registry
Decree—The Slavery Decree—Colonial Systems of Spain and
England—Anti-Slavery Feeling in Europe and America—How
Produced—Effects on Spanish American States—The Negro in
Tropical America—Policy of the Decree—Its Relations to
Parties in the United States—The Anti-Annexation Character
of the Decree—M. Ange de St. Priest—Interest of Continental
Powers—Interest of England—Feeling against the Slave Trade—True
Character of the Commerce—Africa and America—Experiments
of Hayti and Jamaica—Position of the Slave States—Their
Apathy—The Course of the South—Her Proper Policy—Efforts of the
Anti-Slavery Parties and Powers—Southern Interest in Nicaragua PAGE 251
CHAPTER IX.
THE ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES.
The Army in September, 1856—Death of Ubaldo Herrera—March to
San Jacinto by McDonald—Attack on San Jacinto by Cole—Death
of Cole and Callahan—Reinforcements for Belloso—The Allies
march to Managua—State of the American Force at Masaya—Its
Withdrawal to Granada—Belloso occupies Masaya—Attack by the
Americans—Zavala attacks Granada—Action of the 13th October,
1856—Conduct of the Allies at Granada—Murder of Lawless—Other
Murders—Treatment of the American Minister—Shooting of
Lainé—Execution of Valderraman and Allende—Arrival of
Henningsen—His Appointment as Brigadier General—State of the
Meridional Department—Lieut. Fayssoux and the Granada—Action
of the 10th November—Action of the 12th—Effects of these
Actions—March to Masaya—Fighting there—Return to Granada PAGE 281
CHAPTER X.
THE RETREAT FROM GRANADA.
Preparation for Retreat—Causes of Delay—Force at Virgin Bay—The
Granada and the Once de Abril—Promotion of Fayssoux—The
Attack of the Allies on Henningsen—His Defence—Charge
of O’Neal—Henningsen’s Difficulties—Destruction of the
Town—Loss of the Fort—The Americans abandon the Plaza—They
take Possession of the Guadalupe—Henry and Swingle—Disease
in Henningsen’s Camp—Strategems of the Allies—Henry’s
Entrenched Position—Cholera and Typhus—Commissary and Ordnance
Stores—The Hospital at Omotepe—The Attack of Indians on the
Island—Exaggerated Report—Reinforcements from San Francisco
and New-Orleans—Organization of them—Landing of Waters at
Granada—His Relief of Henningsen—Embarkation of the whole
Force—Justice and Policy of Destroying Granada PAGE 313
CHAPTER XI.
OPERATIONS ON THE SAN JUAN.
Spencer’s Attack on the Serapaqui—He takes the Boats at
Punta Arenas—Course of Capt. Erskine of the Orion—Mora’s
Force on the San Carlos—Occupation of Castillo—Capture
of Fort San Carlos—Full Possession of the Lake by
Mora—Spencer’s Services—His Employers—Connivance of Mr.
Marcy—Violation of Neutral Rights by Costa Rica—Causes of
Mr. Marcy’s Action—British Fleet at San Juan del Norte—The
Costa Rican Decree—Lockridge at Punta Arenas—Interference
of British Officers—Arrival of Titus—Action at
Serapaqui—Desertions—Difficulties of the Costa Ricans—Titus
at Castillo—Effects of his Misconduct—Instructions sent to
Lockridge—Reinforcement under Capers and French—Failure to
attack Castillo—Disorganization of the Force—Explosion of the
J. R. Scott—Subsequent Attempts to open the Transit PAGE 342
CHAPTER XII.
THE DEFENCE OF RIVAS.
Force at Rivas in December, 1856—State of the Allies—Charges
against Belloso—Rangers at Nandaime—Rivas prepared for
Defence—Advance of the Allies to Obraje—Skirmish at
Obraje—Allies occupy San Jorge—Henningsen’s Attack on San
Jorge—March to San Juan del Sur—The Americans at Virgin
Bay—Attempt to carry San Jorge by Surprise—Proclamation of
Mora—Cannonade of San Jorge—Desertion—Its Causes—H. B. M.’s
Steamer Esk at San Juan del Sur—Sir Robert McClure and Capt.
Fayssoux—Commander Davis and the U. S. Sloop St. Mary’s—Davis’
Visit to Rivas—Encounters near the Transit and at Jocote—Red
Star Guard—Address to the Troops—Action of 16th March—News by
the Orizaba—Attack of the Allies on Rivas, the 23d March—Their
Repulse and its Results—Rations at Rivas—Second Attack of
11th April—Women Leave Rivas—Conduct of Davis—Treaty with
Walker—Capture of the Granada—Conclusion PAGE 367
THE WAR IN NICARAGUA.
Chapter First.
THE VESTA AND HER PASSENGERS.
On the 5th of May, 1854, a number of native Nicaraguans who had been
exiled by the existing Government of their Republic, landed at Realejo,
and thence proceeded to Chinandega with a view of organizing a revolution
against the acting authorities of the country. Among them were D. Maximo
Jerez, D. Mateo Pineda, and D. José Maria Valle, leading citizens of the
Occidental Department. They had sailed from Tiger Island on a vessel
commanded by an American, Gilbert Morton, and were about fifty-four in
all when they surprised the garrison at Realejo. After the revolutionists
reached Chinandega, they were joined by large numbers of the people,
and they proceeded with little delay to march towards Leon. On the road
thither they met the forces of the Government at several points, each
time routing them; and the President, D. Fruto Chamorro, seeing the
temper of the people, and unable to resist the revolution about Leon,
fled alone, and without an escort, to Granada. He did not reach the last
named city for some days after leaving Leon, having gone astray in the
woods and hills about Managua, and his partisans had almost despaired of
ever again seeing him, when he rode into the town where his principal
adherents resided.
After the revolutionists, headed by Jerez, reached Leon, they organized
a Provisional Government, naming as Director, D. Francisco Castellon.
This gentleman had been a candidate for the office of Director at the
preceding election in 1853; and his friends asserted that he had a
majority of votes, but that Chamorro had obtained the office by the free
use of bribes among the members of the electoral college. Chamorro was
installed in the office, and soon found pretexts for banishing Castellon
and his chief supporters to Honduras. In that State, General Trinidad
Cabañas held executive power; and favored by him, Jerez and his comrades
had been able to sail from Tiger Island with the arms and ammunition
requisite for their landing at Realejo.
While his political enemies were in Honduras, Chamorro had called a
constituent Assembly, and the constitution of the country had been
thoroughly revised and changed. The constitution of 1838 placed the Chief
Executive power in the hands of a Supreme Director, who was elected every
two years; the new constitution created the office of President, who
was to be chosen every four years. In all respects the new constitution
placed more power in the Government than had been trusted to it by the
previous law; hence it was odious to the party styling itself Liberal,
and acceptable to those who called themselves the party of order.
The new constitution was printed on the 30th of April, 1854; and its
partisans say it was also promulgated on that day. The opponents of
the new constitution say it never was promulgated. At any rate, the
revolution, made professedly against this constitution, was started on
the 5th of May, before the new law could have been promulgated in the
towns and villages distant from the capital.
The Leonese revolutionists styled their Executive Provisional Director,
and asserted their resolution to maintain the organic act of 1838.
They took the name of Democrats, and wore as their badge a red ribbon
on their hats. Chamorro was called by his friends President—they thus
declaring their adhesion to the new constitution; and calling themselves
Legitimists, they mounted the white ribbon, in opposition to the red of
the Democrats.
During the month of May the Provisional Government was accepted by all
the municipalities of the Occidental Department, and by some of the other
towns; and the democratic army, as it was called, marching southward,
reached Granada in the early part of June. The delay of the Democrats at
Leon and at Managua had given Chamorro time to organize his force, and
though his numbers were small, he repulsed Jerez and his followers (for
these latter could not be called a force) when they attempted to carry
Granada by assault. After the first repulse, Jerez sat down before the
town, and affected to lay siege to the place. The rabble at his heels
were, however, busier in plundering the shops of the suburbs than in
defeating the plans of their enemies. The arrival of some officers and
soldiers from Honduras assisted Jerez in his efforts to organize the
“democratic army,” and was a proof of the readiness with which Cabañas
had recognized the Provisional Government.
For some months Jerez remained at Granada, vainly attempting to get
possession of the chief square of the city, known as the Plaza. All the
towns of the State had in the meanwhile declared for Castellon, and
his friends held the lakes as well as the San Juan river, by means of
small schooners and bungos. The schooners were under the command of a
physician—an American or Englishman who had resided in the United States,
and bore the name of Segur, although his real name was Desmond. In the
month of January, 1855, Corral succeeded in taking Castillo, as well as
the lake schooners, from the Democrats; and soon thereafter Jerez broke
up his camp before Granada, and retreated in a rapid and disorderly
manner towards Managua and Leon. The flight of the Democrats from Rivas
followed almost immediately the retreat from Granada; and in a few weeks
the turn of affairs was visible by the adhesion of many persons of
property to the Legitimist party.
It was well for the Democrats that Chamorro, worn out by long disease and
anxious thought, died a short time after they left the Jalteva. He was
buried in the parish church, on the main Plaza of Granada, and his death
was kept carefully concealed from the enemy. His name was strength to
the Legitimists and a terror to their foes; and had he lived, a far more
vigorous hand than that of Corral would have driven the flying Democrats
back to the square of Leon. After the death of Chamorro, Corral remained
in command of the Legitimist army, and the Presidency fell, under the
constitution of 1854, to one of the Senators, D. José Maria Estrada.
In the meantime, causes at work outside of Nicaragua were destined
to influence very materially the fate of the Provisional Government.
President Carrera, of Guatemala, being friendly to the principles of the
party led by his countryman Chamorro, had determined to act against the
Government of Cabañas, in Honduras. In view of this fact, Alvarez and the
Honduras contingent received orders to return from Nicaragua, and this
dampened the spirit of the Democratic leaders. Honduras, threatened by
the much greater power of Guatemala on the north, not only had need of
all the resources she could control, but she could hardly hope, without
foreign assistance, to resist the strength of Carrera and his Indians.
Not even the Nicaraguans themselves could blame Cabañas for the course he
took, and the friendship between Castellon and the President of Honduras
remained unaffected by the policy the latter was forced to pursue. The
alliance between the Governments at Leon and at Comayagua continued, and
they seemed to be linked together for a common fate. But closely as the
cause of Castellon was bound to that of Cabañas, it was not in Honduras,
nor yet in Guatemala, that its destiny was being determined. The very
day which witnessed the most signal triumph of the Nicaraguan Democrats
was destined to behold the overthrow of the Cabaña administration; and
to ascertain the cause of such a strange result we must leave Central
America and consider events in California.
Three days after Jerez and his comrades landed at Realejo—that is on
the 8th of May, 1854—a novel scene was enacted on the boundary between
Upper and Lower California. On that day a small band of Americans marched
from the Tia Juana country-house to the monument marking the boundary
between the United States and Mexico, and there yielded their arms to
a military officer of the former power. These men were poorly clad,
but even at the moment of their surrender they—I speak not of their
leader—bore themselves with a certain courage and dignity not unworthy
of men who had aspired to found a new State. They were the last of what
has been called the expedition to Lower California; and some among them
had seen the flag of Mexico lowered at La Paz to give place to another
made for the occasion. They had passed through much toil and danger; and
most of them being altogether new to war had taken their first lesson
in that difficult art by long fasts, and vigils, and marches across one
of the most inhospitable regions of the American continent. The natural
obstacles of Lower California, the scarce subsistence, the long intervals
between watering-places, the rugged sides of the mountains, and the
wide wastes of sandy desert, would make war in that territory not a
pastime even to a well-appointed force. And when you add to these natural
difficulties an enemy who knows the country well, and who is always able
to muster larger numbers than your own, some idea may be formed of
the trials of those engaged in the Lower California expedition. When,
however, these men crossed the line, they gave no sign of failing spirit,
but looked the foe which hung about their rear and flanks as resolutely
in the face as if they had just left a field of triumph and victory.
Such a fact is itself sufficient to prove that the vulgar ideas of this
expedition are false; and as several of the persons with Colonel Walker
in Lower California afterward acted in Nicaraguan affairs, it is not
irrelevant to ascertain the motives which guided them in their first
enterprise, so little understood by the American people.
The object of these men in leaving California was to reach Sonora; and
it was the smallness of their numbers which made them decide to land at
La Paz. Thus forced to make Lower California a field of operations until
they might gather strength for entering Sonora, they found a political
organization in the peninsula requisite. It was the intention of their
leader to establish at as early a time as possible a military colony—not
necessarily hostile to Mexico—on the frontier of Sonora, with a view
of protecting that State from the Apaches. The design of such a colony
first took form at Auburn, in Placer county, California, early in 1852. A
number of persons there contributed to send two agents to Guaymas for the
purpose of getting a grant of land near the old town of Arispe, with the
condition of protecting the frontier from the Indians. These agents—one
of whom was Mr. Frederic Emory—arrived in Sonora just after Count
Raousset de Boulbon had agreed to settle several hundred French near the
mine of Arizona; and the State Government of Sonora expected the French
to do the work the Americans desired to attempt. Mr. Emory and his
companion, therefore, failed in their object; and the Count de Boulbon
soon afterward going to Sonora, the Auburn plan was abandoned. The
Government of Arista, or rather persons attached to that administration,
became hostile to Raousset de Boulbon on account of their interest in a
conflicting claim to the mine he contracted to work; and by the intrigues
of Colonel Blanco the French were driven into revolution, and afterward,
during the illness of their leader, into an agreement to leave the
country.
At the time the news of their departure from Sonora reached California,
Mr. Emory proposed to Mr. Walker, to revive the Auburn enterprise; and
Walker, together with his former partner, Mr. Henry P. Watkins, sailed
for Guaymas, in the month of June, 1853, intending to visit the Governor
of Sonora, and try to get such a grant as might benefit the frontier
towns and villages. Walker was careful to provide himself with a passport
from the Mexican consul at San Francisco; but this availed him little
when he reached Guaymas. The day after his arrival there the Prefect
ordered him to the office of police, and after a long examination forbade
him to leave for the interior, refusing to countersign his passport
for Ures. Seeing the obstacles placed in his way at the outset, Walker
determined to return to California; and after he went aboard the vessel
for that purpose the Prefect sent him word the Governor, Gandara, had
ordered his passport to be countersigned in order that he might go to the
capital. The same courier who bore the order from Gandara to the Prefect,
Navarro, also brought news that the Apaches had visited a country-house,
a few leagues from Guaymas, murdering all the men and children, and
carrying the women into a captivity worse than death. The Indians sent
word that they would soon visit the town “where water is carried on
asses’ backs”—meaning Guaymas; and the people of that port, frightened
by the message, seemed ready to receive any one who would give them
safety from their savage foe. In fact several of the women of the place
urged Walker to repair immediately to California, and bring down enough
Americans to keep off the Apaches.
What Walker saw and heard at Guaymas satisfied him that a comparatively
small body of Americans might gain a position on the Sonora frontier,
and protect the families on the border from the Indians; and such an act
would be one of humanity, no less than of justice, whether sanctioned
or not by the Mexican Government. The condition of the upper part of
Sonora was at that time, and still is, a disgrace to the civilization
of the continent; and until a clause in the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
was rescinded by one in the Gadsden treaty, the people of the United
States were more immediately responsible before the world for the Apache
outrages. On none more immediately than on the American people, did the
duty devolve of relieving the frontier from the cruelties of savage war.
Northern Sonora was, in fact, more under the dominion of the Apaches
than under the laws of Mexico; and the contributions of the Indians
were collected with greater regularity and certainty than the dues to
the tax-gatherer. The state of this region furnished the best defence
for any American aiming to settle there without the formal consent of
Mexico; and although political changes would certainly have followed the
establishment of a colony near Arispe, they might be justified by the
plea that any social organization, no matter how secured, is preferable
to that in which individuals and families are altogether at the mercy of
savages.
But the men who sailed for Sonora were obliged to sojourn, for a time, on
the peninsula; and their conduct in Lower California may be taken as the
measure of their motives in the enterprise they undertook. Wheresoever
they went they sought to establish justice and maintain order, and those
among them who violated law were summarily punished. An instance occurred
at the old mission of San Vincente, illustrative of the character of the
expedition, and of the persons who directed it. Several of the soldiers
had formed a conspiracy to desert and to pillage the cattle-farms on
their way to Upper California. The plan and purposes of the conspirators
were revealed by one of the confederates, and the parties to the plot
were tried by court-martial, found guilty of the charge, and sentenced
to be shot. A military execution is a good test of military discipline;
for no duty is so repulsive to the soldier as that of taking life from
the comrade who has shared the perils and privations of his arduous
service. On this occasion, too, the duty was more difficult, because the
number of Americans was small, and was daily diminishing. But painful
as was the duty, the men charged with the execution did not shrink from
the performance of it; and the very field where the unfortunate victims
of the law expiated their offence with their lives, was suggestive of
comparison between the manner in which the expeditionists and the Mexican
Government severally performed the duties of protection to society. The
expeditionary force, drawn up to vindicate law, by the most serious
punishment it metes out to the offender, stood almost in the shadow of
the ruins of the church of the mission fathers. The roofless buildings
of the old monastery, the crumbling arches of the spacious chapel, the
waste fields which showed signs of former culture, and the skulking form
of the half-clothed Indian, relapsing into savageism from which the holy
fathers had rescued him, all declared the sort of protection Mexico had
given to the persons as well as the property of the Peninsula. In the
vital functions of government, the expeditionists may safely challenge a
comparison of their acts with those of Mexico in Lower California; and
the ruin and desolation which followed the unwise no less than unjust
measure of secularizing the missions, were sufficient to forfeit the
claim of the Mexican Republic to the allegiance of the peninsula.
The main fact for us to know is that those engaged in the Lower
California expedition gave proof of their desire not to destroy, but to
re-organize society wherever they went. They were all young men, and
youth is apt to err in pulling down before it is ready to build up. But
they were men, also, full of military fire and thirsting for military
reputation; and the soldier’s instinct leads him to construct rather than
to destroy. The spirit of the soldier is conservative; the first law of
military organization is order. Therefore, these men, though young,
were not ill-fitted to lay the foundations of a new and more stable
society than any they might find either in Sonora or Lower California.
They failed, however; whether through the actions of others more than
of themselves, it imports not our present purpose to determine. Suffice
it to say that the last remains of the expedition reached San Francisco
about the middle of May, 1854.
The leader of the expedition—William Walker, or, as he was then called,
Col. Walker—after returning to Upper California, resumed the occupation
of editor of a daily paper. One of the proprietors of the paper he edited
was Byron Cole, whose attention had been for several years directed to
Central America, and more particularly to Nicaragua. Cole, in frequent
conversations with Walker, urged him to give up the idea of settling in
Sonora, and to devote his labors to Nicaragua; and soon after he heard
of the revolution undertaken by Jerez and Castellon, Cole sold his
interest in the paper at San Francisco, and sailed for San Juan del Sur.
He left for Nicaragua on the steamer of the 15th of August, 1854, being
accompanied by Mr. Wm. V. Wells, whose attention was fixed on Honduras.
From San Juan del Sur, Mr. Cole, after numerous delays and vexations,
succeeded in getting to Leon, and there obtained from Castellon a
contract, by which the Provisional Director authorized him to engage
the services of three hundred men for military duty in Nicaragua, the
officers and soldiers to receive a stated monthly pay, and a certain
number of acres of land at the close of the campaign. With this contract
Cole returned to California early in the month of November, and forthwith
sought Walker for the purpose of getting him to take an interest in
the enterprise. As soon as Walker read the contract he refused to act
under it, seeing that it was contrary to the act of Congress of 1818,
commonly known as the neutrality law. He, however, told Cole that if
he would return to Nicaragua, and get from Castellon a contract of
colonization, something might be done with it. Cole accordingly sailed a
second time for San Juan; and on the 29th of December, 1854, Castellon
gave him a colonization grant, under which three hundred Americans were
to be introduced into Nicaragua, and were to be guaranteed forever the
privilege of bearing arms. This grant Cole sent to Walker, and it reached
the latter at Sacramento early in the month of February, 1855.
A few days after receiving this contract, Walker went to San Francisco
with the view of providing means, if possible, for carrying two or three
hundred men to Nicaragua. He there met an old schoolmate, Mr. Henry A.
Crabb, who had just returned from the Atlantic States; and Crabb having
passed through Nicaragua on his way from California to Cincinnati, gave a
glowing report of the natural wealth and advantages of the country. While
crossing the Transit Road, Crabb heard of the events then transpiring in
the Republic—of the revolution at Leon and the siege of Granada; and he
also ascertained that Jerez was anxious to obtain the aid of Americans
for the campaign against the Legitimists. This suggested the idea of
getting an element into the society of Nicaragua for the regeneration of
that part of Central America; and while in the Atlantic States Crabb had
secured the co-operation of Mr. Thomas F. Fisher, formerly and now of
New-Orleans, and of Captain C. C. Hornsby, who had served in one of the
regiments known as the Ten Regiments, during the Mexican war. The three,
Crabb, Fisher, and Hornsby, left New-Orleans together in the month of
January, 1855: and on the way to San Juan del Norte they found aboard
the steamer Mr. Julius De Brissot, bound, as he said, for the Gallipagos
Islands. De Brissot joined the party; and he, together with Hornsby and
Fisher, remained in Nicaragua, while Crabb proceeded to San Francisco.
When Walker met Crabb at the latter place, he was awaiting advices from
Fisher, who stopped on the Isthmus for the purpose of visiting Jerez and
obtaining from him authority to engage Americans for the service of the
Democratic army.
Not many days elapsed before Fisher himself came to California, bringing
with him authority to enlist five hundred men for Jerez, and with a
promise of the most extravagant pay, in both money and lands, to the
officers and men who might engage in the service. It seems Fisher,
Hornsby, and De Brissot, found the newly-arrived United States Minister,
John H. Wheeler, on the Isthmus; and as His Excellency was anxious
to visit the Democratic camp in the Jalteva, as well as Chamorro, in
Granada, before deciding what authority he would recognise, Fisher and
his party went as an escort to the Minister, and under the protection of
the American flag, into both camps. From Jerez, however, Fisher obtained
at this time the contract he bore to San Francisco; while Hornsby and
De Brissot, after leaving Granada, went to Rivas, and entered into a
Quixotic agreement with D. Maximo Espinosa to take Fort Castillo Viejo
and the San Juan river from the Legitimists, who had lately driven
the Democrats from the stronghold at the Rapids. These two gentlemen,
however, were soon glad to manage their escape from San Juan del Sur
aboard of the steamer for San Francisco; and not long after Fisher’s
arrival, Hornsby and De Brissot both appeared in California.
Crabb and Walker had known each other from childhood, and their views
were similar in regard to the state of Central America, and the means
necessary for its regeneration. Therefore, Crabb generously proposed
to give Walker the whole benefit of the contract Fisher had made with
Jerez; and Crabb, in view of certain political movements then occurring
in California, decided to remain in that State. Walker, however, while
thanking Crabb for his offer, refused to have anything to do with the
Jerez contract, preferring to act under the Castellon grant to Cole,
not only because of its entire freedom from legal objections, but also
because it was more reasonable, and had been given by an authority
competent to make the bargain. Hornsby and De Brissot embarked in the
enterprise with Walker; and it will be seen hereafter that they, as well
as Fisher, held commissions under the Republic of Nicaragua.
In the meanwhile, Walker had taken care that no show of secrecy should
bring suspicion on his undertaking, either as to its illegality or its
injustice. He took the Cole grant to the District Attorney of the United
States for the Northern District of California, Hon. S. W. Inge, and
that gentleman after examining it declared no law would be violated by
acting under it. At that time, too, General Wool, commanding the Pacific
Division, was supposed to have special power from the President for
suppressing expeditions contrary to the Act of 1818. His headquarters
were at Benicia, and the General was in the habit of reading to many
persons the letters addressed by him to the then Secretary of War,
Colonel Jefferson Davis, defending the course he took in reference to the
Lower California expedition. Among others, he read these letters (which
the old gentleman seemed to think models of logic and style) to Walker,
the very person about whose acts the discussion had arisen between
himself and the Secretary. From these letters Walker was led to infer
that the common impression about the powers vested in the General, under
the Act of 1818, was correct; and, therefore, when he heard of General
Wool being in San Francisco, he sought him out, and found him on the
wharf only a few minutes before four o’clock, the hour for the departure
of the Sacramento steamer. The General was about to leave in the boat for
Benicia; and after hearing Walker’s statement as to the nature of the
grant made to Cole, and of his intention to act under it, the old man,
shaking him heartily by the hand, said he not only would not interfere
with the enterprise, but wished it entire success. Thus having secured
the sanction of the proper Federal authorities, Walker proceeded in his
efforts to provide means for carrying colonists to Nicaragua under the
Cole contract. He soon found that it would be impossible to get more than
a pitiful sum of money, and that his arrangements would have to be made
on the most economical scale.
While engaged in these preliminary preparations, Walker received an
injury in the foot, which kept him in his chamber until the middle of
April; and, in fact, the sore was not wholly healed when he sailed from
San Francisco. Thus confined to the house, he was able to do little more
in the way of means than to obtain a thousand dollars from Mr. Joseph
Palmer, of the firm of Palmer, Cook & Co. At this gentleman’s house he
had met with Colonel Fremont and talked with him about the enterprise
in Nicaragua; and the Colonel, who had passed across the Isthmus the
previous year, thought well of the undertaking. It is due probably, to
both Colonel Fremont and Mr. Palmer, to state that they were not fully
aware of all the views Walker held on the subject of slavery; nor,
indeed, was it necessary at that time for those views to be expressed.
Besides the assistance given by Mr. Palmer, Walker was much aided by two
friends—Mr. Edmund Randolph and Mr. A. P. Crittenden.
After much difficulty, a contract was made with one Lamson for the
passage of a certain number of men, aboard the brig Vesta, from San
Francisco to Realejo. The agreement had been made through a ship-master,
McNair, and it was considered that he would sail in command of the Vesta.
But, after the cash payment on the charter party had been made to Lamson,
he and McNair fell out, and the former was obliged to employ another
captain for his vessel. The provisions and the passengers were all aboard
the brig about the 20th of April; and when it was thought she was on
the point of leaving, the Sheriff seized the vessel by attachment at the
suit of an old creditor of the owner, Lamson. The evening, too, after the
attachment, there were some signs of the brig getting under way for sea;
and therefore the Sheriff sent down a posse of eight or ten, armed with
revolvers, for the purpose of preventing an escape. A sort of scuffle,
more in jest than in earnest, occurred between some of the posse and
their acquaintances among the passengers; and the new captain, frightened
out of his wits, jumped over the rail to the wharf, taking with him the
papers of the ship. A few days afterward the United States Marshal served
a writ on the brig for the price of the provisions; and the revenue
cutter W. L. Marcy was hauled astern of the Vesta, with orders to keep
her from going to sea with the Deputy Marshal aboard. To make assurance
doubly sure, the Sheriff had the sails of the brig unbent and put in
store. The owner seemed to be entirely without means to satisfy the
claims against the vessel, and everybody thought the chance very small
for the departure of the vessel on her proposed voyage.
Walker, however, advised the passengers to remain aboard, and all except
a few followed the advice. Soon he found a captain for the Vesta, in the
person of Mr. M. D. Eyre, who professed some knowledge of navigation. The
holder of the claim against Lamson, under which the attachment issued,
happened to be a friend of Crabb, from Stockton; and he was induced by
good will for the voyage the Vesta was bound on, to grant easy terms for
the release of the brig. Lamson really controlled the action of the
merchants who sold him the provisions; and when he was told it might
not be safe for him to keep the passengers in San Francisco, he rather
hesitatingly agreed to have the libel dismissed. But the sheriff’s costs
had run up, by the employment of the posse, and other extraordinary
expenses, to more than three hundred dollars; and Walker having expended
nearly the last dollar, it seemed as if this trivial amount might stop
the whole enterprise. The costs of the sheriff were very large, if
not illegal; but, as he had the sails in store, he seemed to have the
Vesta in his power. Walker managed, however, to get an order from the
sheriff on the store-keeper for the sails; and as the sheriff was kept
in ignorance of the dismissal of the libel, he supposed the cutter would
detain the brig in port if she tried to go out. Besides this, he had
a keeper aboard; and the keeper having been a member of a California
Legislature, was supposed to keep a sharp lookout for any suspicious
movement. The captain of the cutter was informed a little before dark
that the Vesta was out of the marshal’s hands, and arrangements were made
through one of the Marcy’s officers, for her sailors to come aboard about
ten o’clock, in order to bend the sails of the brig. The United States
sailors came at the appointed time, and the passengers managed to get the
sheriff’s keeper into the cabin, where he was detained for several hours.
Swiftly and silently the work of bending the sails went on; and shortly
after midnight, on the morning of the 4th of May, 1855, the steam-tug
Resolute came alongside the Vesta, and hitching her on, towed her from
the wharf, through the shipping, into the stream, and out by the Heads
to sea. The sheriff’s keeper was sent to the Resolute, the towlines were
cast off, and the Vesta put to sea, to the great joy of the passengers,
who had been for two weeks alternating between hope of her departure and
fear of her detention.
When the brig got to sea, it was found that there were fifty-eight
passengers bound for a new home in the tropics. Among them were Achilles
Kewen, who had commanded a company under Lopez, at Cardenas, in 1850;
Timothy Crocker, who had served under Walker throughout the Lower
California expedition; C. C. Hornsby, whose previous adventures in
Nicaragua have been alluded to; Dr. Alex. Jones, who had lately been to
the Cocos Islands in search of a buried treasure; Francis P. Anderson,
who had served in the New-York regiment in California during the Mexican
war; and others, whose names will hereafter appear in the course of this
narrative. They were most of them men of strong character, tired of the
humdrum of common life, and ready for a career which might bring them the
sweets of adventure or the rewards of fame. Their acts will afford the
best measure both of their capacity and of their character.
The voyage of the Vesta was rather long and tedious. In crossing
the Gulf of Tehuantepec she encountered a gale which tested her
timbers—twenty-nine years in her sides—to the utmost. The bow of the old
brig would open to the waves as they roared around her, and at times her
decks were swept clear by the huge billows passing over her. She was
worked by men detailed from the passengers; and after living through the
storm off Tehuantepec, the crew had little to do until she reached the
Gulf of Fonseca. More than five weeks had been consumed since leaving
San Francisco before the volcano of Coseguina—the first Nicaraguan
land—was seen looming in the distance. The want of wind detained the
brig for some hours at the mouth of the gulf, while a boat was sent in
to the port of Amapala, on the Island of Tigre. Captain Morton, the same
American who had carried Jerez to Realejo, in May, 1854, was at Amapala
with instructions from Castellon, awaiting the arrival of the Vesta.
The captain was gladly welcomed aboard the brig, as the skipper who
had brought the vessel from San Francisco knew nothing of the Central
American coast. After taking Morton aboard, the Vesta proceeded on her
way, and on the morning of the 16th of June, she came to anchor within
the port of Realejo.
I have been somewhat minute, and it may be tedious, in narrating the
earlier incidents of the enterprise whereby Americans were introduced
as an element into Nicaraguan society, because we may often judge best
of events by seeing clearly the origin of them. The father ceases to
have any direct influence over either the mind or the organization of
the child after the moment of conception; and yet how often we trace not
merely the features of the father, but even the delicate traits of his
character, in his offspring. The fine cells which determine the nature of
organic structure, have been minutely studied by the physiologist, and
the manner of their development has opened to him some of the hitherto
hidden laws of life. If, then, you desire to understand the character
of the late war in Nicaragua, do not despise the small events which
attended the departure of the fifty-eight from San Francisco. From the
day the Americans landed at Realejo dates a new epoch, not only for
Nicaragua, but for all Central America. Thenceforth it was impossible for
the worn-out society of those countries to evade or escape the changes
the new elements were to work in their domestic as well as in their
political organization.
The state of native parties in Nicaragua on the 16th day of June,
1855, was quite different from that existing on the 29th of December,
1854—the day on which Castellon made the grant to Cole. When the Vesta
dropped anchor in the port of Realejo, the Provisional Government was
confined almost entirely to the Occidental Department. The Legitimists
held all the Oriental and Meridional Departments, and most of the towns
and villages in Matagalpa and Segovia were subject to their sway. The
ally, too, of the Provisional Government, Cabañas, sat less firmly in
the executive chair of Honduras than he had on the previous Christmas.
A force organized by the aid of Guatemala, and commanded by a General
Lopez, had invaded the Department of Gracias; and while Lopez was sent
into the north of Honduras, General Santos Guardiola—whose name was
itself a terror to the towns of both States—sailed from Istapa for
San Juan del Sur, aboard the Costa Rican schooner San José, with the
intention of engaging in the service of the Legitimists for a campaign in
Segovia, close to the confines of Tegucigalpa and Choluteca. Guardiola
arrived at Granada only a few days before Walker reached Realejo; and
the latter found the people about Chinandega trembling at the name of
one who, whether properly or improperly it is hard to say, had acquired
the epithet of the “Butcher” of Central America. After the retreat from
Granada Jerez had fallen into disgrace with his party—at least they
denied him all claim to military capacity, no doubt glad to place on
the shoulders of their leader the blame of all the misfortunes which
had followed their entire want of military virtue. In place of Jerez,
Castellon put at the head of the “Democratic Army” General Muñoz, who
had at that time more reputation as a soldier than any man in Central
America. He had been invited to Leon from Honduras, whither he had
retired several years previously in consequence of having failed in a
revolution against the Government of D. Laureano Pineda; and it was only
by much entreaty and grave concession that Castellon had prevailed on
him to take the command of the army of the Provisional Government. Since
assuming the command Muñoz had acted wholly on the defensive, devoting
his time to drilling the men pressed into the service of Castellon; and
it was widely whispered among the people, especially among the blood reds
of the Democrats, that Muñoz was anxious for a compromise between the two
contending parties, thinking more of maintaining himself in power than of
the success of the principles for which the revolution was begun.
Walker was not ill pleased to hear from Morton on the way from Tiger
Island to Realejo, the condition of affairs in Nicaragua. He felt that
the more desperate the fortunes of the Castellon party were, the more
deeply would they be indebted to the men who might rescue them from
their danger, and the more thoroughly would they be committed to any
course or policy the Americans might propose. Far from being depressed by
the news, which to some might have appeared gloomy, he saw in the very
straits to which the Democratic party was reduced, the cause no less than
the presage of the success of his companions. The anxiety, too, with
which Castellon evidently awaited the arrival of the Vesta, was cheering.
He had sent Morton to Tiger Island for the express purpose of boarding
the brig and of bringing her as speedily as possible to Realejo; and when
the vessel appeared off the Island of Cardon, the collector of the port
and a special officer, sent by the Provisional Director, Col. Ramirez,
came out to the Vesta in order to welcome her to the waters of Nicaragua.
On the evening of the 15th of June—the day before the Vesta was able to
enter the harbor—these two officers came aboard the brig, and Colonel
Ramirez informed Walker that he was ordered from Leon to see all proper
arrangements made for the reception of the Americans. Quarters had been
prepared for them at Realejo, and the Director was anxious to see Walker
as early as possible.
As soon as the brig came to anchor, the passengers got ready to go up the
river to the town which lies four or five miles from the harbor. Several
bungos were secured for the purpose; and a little past noon the native
boatmen pulled away from the brig, the Americans taking with them their
clothes and blankets as well as their arms and ammunition. Each of them
carried a rifle, and many of them had revolvers. The bungos entered the
river, and silence was rarely broken save by the plashing of the oars
in the water, or the harsh cry of a macaw screaming its discordant note
from the boughs overhanging the stream. The deep gloom of the tropical
forests was more impressive from the ocean of sunshine which surrounded
it; and the stillness of all nature affected the beholder with an awe
which commanded silence and reflection. After pulling a short distance,
however, the native boatmen, whose senses long use had blunted to the
peculiar impressions of the scenery, began to talk about the different
objects they passed; nor did they fail to point out the stones used by
Morgan as ballast, and which he threw from his vessel in order to receive
the precious freight he pillaged from Realejo. The distance of the
present town from the harbor is due in fact to the dread the Spaniards
had of the buccaneers of the seventeenth century.
It was near 4 o’clock in the afternoon when the Americans drew up at
the wharf of Realejo and leaped ashore for the first time in Nicaragua.
The guard-house was near the landing-place, and as Walker passed, the
officer, a light, active young fellow, with a bright red short-cloak
thrown gracefully over his left shoulder, turned out the guard, and
saluted. The soldiers all wore the red ribbon with the words “Ejercito
Democratico” printed on it; and although without uniform or any music
except that made by a very indifferent drum, they had a good military
carriage, and their step, unimpeded by shoe or sandal, was excellent. As
the Americans passed up the street to the quarters assigned them, the
women, with their best dresses and most pleasing smiles, stood at the
doors and windows saluting with much natural grace the strangers who
had come to find a home in their midst, and to share the fortunes of the
party with which their husbands and lovers, and fathers and brothers,
were identified.
Early the next morning, Walker and Crocker, accompanied by Col. Ramirez
and Capt. Doubleday, an American who had served in the Democratic army
during the siege of Granada, started for Leon. As they entered the town
of Chinandega the church bells rang a welcome peal, and at all the
villages on the road they received marks of good will and hospitality.
The road from Chinandega to Leon, by Chichigalpa and Posultega, passes
through a country for which nature has done much and man little; and
the effect of even what little man had done was marred by the constant
signs of revolutionary violence. Under the shade of the magnificent
ceiba might be seen halted a company of soldiers with their trowsers
rolled above their knees; but on close observation you could perceive
that the sergeants and corporals were keenly watching lest some of
their new recruits might take advantage of the halt to slip away for a
moment, and so escape the hated service. It was a relief to turn from
man and his works to the nature brilliant with beauties in her tropical
aspects. As the travellers approached Leon they beheld spread out before
them a vast plain which seems almost boundless in extent as you look
toward the south; while gazing northward, you perceive the lofty line of
volcanoes—Viejo on one flank and Momotombo on the other—stretching from
the Gulf of Fonseca to the Lake of Managua. It is only when you ascend
the tower of the cathedral within the city, and are able to distinguish
to the westward the ocean through the break in the coast range of hills,
that you see the southern wall of the plain made by the mountains around
the town of Managua.
But it was not to muse over nature or to admire her vast and grand
proportions in these southern latitudes, that the companions of the
swarthy Ramirez had come to Central America. The sight of the picket on
the outskirt of the town, though at least three quarters of a league
from the Plaza, was more suggestive of the objects they had in view; and
riding rapidly through the lanes and streets they soon reached the house
of the Provisional Director. Castellon received the new-comers with frank
cordiality, and expressed the lively pleasure he felt at their arrival.
It did not require many minutes to see that he was not the man to control
a revolutionary movement, or to conduct it to a successful issue. There
was a certain indecision, not merely in his words and features, but
even in his walk and the general motions of his body; and this trait
of character seemed to be aggravated by the circumstances about him. A
short conversation revealed his anxiety that Walker should meet Muñoz;
and Castellon said at once that he needed the military assistance of the
Americans to secure the success of the Provisional Government. He said
he wished them to enter the service as a separate corps, and proposed to
call them _La Falange Americana_—the American Phalanx.
During the evening Muñoz called at the house of the Director, and Walker
was presented to him. The contrast between the manner of the Executive
and that of the General was striking. Castellon was modest, gentle,
almost shrinking in his address; Muñoz had an air of conceit which
affirmed a feeling of superiority on his part, to all around him. It was
not difficult to see that they disliked each other; though Castellon
concealed his feelings and opinions better than Muñoz. The General, soon
after saluting Walker, began to talk in the most ridiculous style about
the comparative military merits of General Scott and General Taylor,
exposing his ignorance in every sentence, and showing the weakness of
his character. Muñoz let the American perceive that the new element
Castellon proposed to introduce into the war did not have the approval
of the commander-in-chief; and after the General took leave, Walker
told Castellon that if he and his comrades entered the service of the
Provisional Government, it was with the distinct understanding they were
not to be put under the orders of Muñoz. Walker found that the Director
was not at all averse to have some one with him to lighten the burden he
had been obliged to bear in the person of the commanding general.
The next day Walker determined to return to Chinandega, to let the
Americans know that Castellon wished their services as soldiers; and
before leaving, he proposed to the Director, in case they enlisted, to
immediately march on the town of Rivas, with a view of occupying the
Meridional Department. This movement, if successful, would furnish money
to the Government, which was now obliged to overtax and thereby to create
disaffection among the people of the Occidental; and the occupation of
the Transit Road would place the Americans in a position to increase
their numbers from the passengers across the Isthmus. The Director
said he would place the proposition before his Minister of War, D.
Buenaventura Selva, and advise Walker of the decision in the matter.
The Americans were delighted, on Walker’s return to Chinandega, where
he found them, to hear that Castellon wished them to engage in the
service, and that in a few days they might be called on to march against
the enemy. On the 20th of June, Walker received a commission as Colonel
in the Democratic army, and the Secretary of War informed him that
commissions would be issued to other officers among the Americans as he
might suggest. Achilles Kewen was appointed to the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel; Crocker was made Major; and the _Falange_ being organized into
two companies, two captains were named, the senior being C. C. Hornsby.
By the constitution of 1838, a simple declaration of intention made any
native-born citizen of an American Republic a naturalized citizen of
Nicaragua, and under this clause most of the _Falange_ became Nicaraguans.
At the same time the Secretary of War sent Walker his commission, he
informed him that the Director desired him to organize a force to act
against the enemy in the Meridional Department; that Col. Ramirez had
been ordered to raise two hundred natives, and to report with his command
to Col. Walker as soon as he was ready to march; and that the civil and
military officers at Chinandega and Realejo had been ordered to give him
any assistance he required in the way of supplies and transportation for
the force intrusted to his charge.
Chapter Second.
RIVAS, JUNE TWENTY-NINTH, 1855.
Immediately after receiving the dispatches of the Government placing
him in command of an expeditionary force to act against the Legitimists
at Rivas, Walker began to prepare the _Falange_, as the Americans were
henceforth called, to march to Realejo whence they were to sail on board
the Vesta for a point in the Meridional Department. The stores, both
commissary and ordnance, were sent by ox-carts to Realejo and thence
by bungos to the brig anchored off Point Ycaco. On the 23d, three days
after the order reached Chinandega, the force was aboard ready for
sailing. Ramirez had been backward in his movements and showed little
disposition for the enterprise, deeming it hazardous and ill-advised.
He was evidently influenced by the words of Muñoz, whose disapproval
of the expedition to Rivas was well known. So much did the opinion of
his superior, Muñoz, control his conduct, that he made small effort
to enlist the number of men—two hundred—the Director assigned as the
strength of the native force. When the Vesta was ready for sea, not
many more than one hundred natives mustered on her decks. Among the
officers with Ramirez was Mariano Mendez, a pure Indian who had been
engaged in revolutions and counter-revolutions from his youth upward.
With violent passions and uncontrolled desires he had a courage and
experience which made him at times useful to the men who were in the
habit of attempting political changes for personal objects; and when
active service was required, they would put the old chief on a good horse
with a stout lance in his hand, and reasonably expect from him the most
hazardous enterprises. Utterly unfit for civil life and incapable of
being subjected to the rigid rules of military law, he was a dangerous
tool and an unreliable friend. He would not serve under Ramirez, and
obeyed no orders except those from Walker himself. Aboard of the Vesta
his principal amusement was to spread his blanket on the deck and gather
a crowd of soldiers about him for his favorite game of Monte. Once the
money of the bettors was on Mariano’s blanket, it mattered little, so
far as the fate of the cash was concerned, whether the cards ran for or
against him; it was honor enough, so Mendez thought, and so some of the
men seemed to think, for a soldier to bet with a Colonel of Lancers, as
he claimed to be; and to lose his money was, with the soldier, a pleasant
mode of paying for so signal a distinction. Muñoz was no doubt glad to
get Mendez out of Leon; and the Colonel of Lancers was glad for awhile
to exchange the aguardiente of Subtiaba for the chocolate of Rivas,
especially with the prospect of being able to slip a few ceroons to Leon
for sale among the Indians of his neighborhood.
Nor had Castellon failed to provide for a civil organization in case
the expedition got a foothold within the Meridional Department. D.
Maximo Espinosa, the owner of a valuable cacao plantation near Rivas,
was authorized by the Minister of Relations, D. Francisco Baca, to act
as Prefect of the Department, and also as Commissioner to collect the
revenue so necessary for the sustenance of the Provisional Government.
Espinosa was an old man, upward of seventy, with a Don Quixote cast
of features, and the dark lustreless eye, full of melancholy, so
characteristic of his race. A ruling passion with him seemed to be
hatred to D. Juan Ruiz (one of Estrada’s Ministers), whose lands touched
those of Don Maximo. Indeed it is probable that an old feud about limits
between Don Juan and Don Maximo determined the latter to espouse the
cause of the Democratic army. Having lived all his life near Rivas,
Espinosa was thought to be well informed as to the roads and places
near the town. His nephew, who accompanied him, was also familiar with
the Meridional Department; and his services as guide were useful to the
expedition.
Morton was placed in charge of the Vesta; and although he knew the coast
well and took all advantage of the winds, it was not until four days
after leaving Point Ycaco that Walker was enabled to land. On the evening
of the 27th of June, about sunset, boats were let down for landing the
force at a point known as El Gigante, a short distance above Brito and
some six leagues to the north of San Juan del Sur. The boats were few and
small, and De Brissot who, by his desire to produce an effect was often
taking false steps, ran a whaleboat he had charge of against the rocks
the first trip she made to the shore. It was nearly midnight before the
whole force, consisting of about fifty-five Americans and one hundred and
ten natives, was landed on the coast. When the disembarkation commenced
the moon was shining brightly; but by eleven o’clock the sky was
overcast. The clouds continued to grow thicker and darker, and before the
force was formed in marching order, drops of rain, precursors of a heavy
shower, began to fall. Espinosa and his nephew found the trail which led
over the coast range of hills to Rivas; and about midnight the Americans
in front, Ramirez and his command in the rear, and a few native soldiers
detailed to carry the ammunition covered with ox-hides in the centre, the
column took up its march for the interior. The men carried nothing but
their arms and blankets with two day’s provisions in their haversacks, so
that they marched with as much rapidity as the damp, muddy nature of the
ground would permit; but before they had gone more than half a mile the
rain came down in torrents. Then Espinosa and his nephew lost the trail;
the old man complained of colic, and the young one seemed to be afraid to
venture further. A halt was ordered; several were sent out to search for
the trail; and in the meanwhile the main body got what shelter it could
under the heavy foliage of the large dark-looking forest trees. In a few
minutes, however, the rain ceased, the trail was found, and the command
resumed its march. At dawn the little force had somewhat recovered its
spirits, and had got over the drenching of the night previous; and
marching briskly through the thick forests, they avoided all habitations,
designing if possible to surprise the enemy at Rivas the night of the
28th. About nine o’clock they came to an old deserted adobe house, and
halted several hours for breakfast and rest.
The encampment that morning was quite gipsy-like. The felt hats of the
_Falange_ showed, in their drooping brims, the effects of the night’s
rain; and thick, heavy beards gave to most of the body a wild and
dangerous air. As soon as the sentries were posted, the Americans began
to dispose of their crackers and cold meat, washed down in some instances
by a draught from a liquor canteen; while the native soldiers opened
their supplies of cheese and tortillas, winding up with a little tiste—a
mixture of chocolate, sugar, and corn meal, diluted in water—from the
fantastically carved jicaras they carried tied with a string run through
the button-holes of their jackets or trowsers. After breakfast and
several hours’ sleep, the force was well prepared to renew its march, and
the disagreeable impressions of the night were completely forgotten in
the balmy effects of the soft, mild air, which seemed a fluid altogether
different from the atmosphere of northern climates. You felt as if a
thin, and vapory exhalation of opium, soothing and exhilarating by turns,
was being mixed at intervals with the common elements of the atmosphere.
By night, however, the clouds began again to gather; and soon after dark
a steady rain set in. The weather interfered so much with the march
that Walker saw he could not reach Rivas, as he had expected, before
morning; and as the natives carrying the ammunition began to complain of
their burden, it became an object to secure pack-horses for the command.
Besides this, many of the Americans, tired and foot-sore, lost some of
the alacrity requisite for action.
At the little village of Tola there was a small body of horsemen, sent
out by the commandant at Rivas, to watch the approach of Walker, whose
departure from Realejo had been already communicated to Corral at
Granada. Report said the news of this fact was carried to the Legitimists
by a German who received a passport to leave Leon from Muñoz. The story
is not improbable, and was confirmed by so many circumstances, that it
is not singular the Americans adopted it as a well-authenticated fact.
The Legitimists themselves said, the first news they got was from this
German; and it is certain he passed through Pueblo Nuevo with a passport
from the commanding general of the Democratic army. On receipt of the
news of Walker’s sailing from Realejo, Corral sent Colonel Bosque with a
force to Rivas; and after his arrival at the latter place, Bosque began
to build barricades, and to press the men of the town into the ranks as
soldiers. He had sent out horsemen to scour the country between Rivas and
the sea-coast; and twenty of these were, according to the information
Walker received from some Democrats near Tola, quartered in the village
the night of the 28th. As the expeditionary force approached Tola, the
rain fell fast; the roads became filled with water, and the men found it
almost impossible to keep their ammunition dry. About half a mile from
the village, some twenty men were sent on in advance to attack, and,
if possible, capture the enemy there. The detachment marched briskly
forward, the main body following at a short distance. As Walker reached
the outskirts of the village, he heard, between two claps of loud
thunder, the sharp crack of the American rifles, then all was still.
The detachment had found the hostile party in the corridor of one of the
principal houses of the town; and so little did the Legitimists expect
an enemy in the midst of the storm, that they were, without a sentry
posted, playing at cards. Several of them—among others the officer in
command—were wounded; the rest escaped, and carried the news of the
approach of the Americans to Rivas. After securing the horses of the
Legitimist troopers, sentries were posted by the Democrats, and they
halted for the night. Orders were given to the surgeon, Dr. Jones, to
look after the wounded prisoners—much to the dissatisfaction of some
native officers, who thought they ought to be shot.
A little after eight o’clock next morning, Walker marched for Rivas,
which lies about nine miles to the eastward of Tola. The day soon
became clear and bright; and the _Falange_, eager for a fight, pressed
forward briskly. Mendez having found a horse and taken a lance from one
of the enemy, was in a fine flow of spirits, and kept near the head of
the column, sometimes pressing the advance-guard to let him pass. But
Ramirez hung back, and even checked his men as they stepped close after
the Americans. Every now and then market-women, with fruit-baskets on
their heads, and just from Rivas, would gayly greet the soldiers, nodding
familiarly to some acquaintance among the natives, and much wondering at
the strange figures of the men from California. Nor were the Americans
less amused at the new faces and forms they met on the road; and such of
them as spoke any Spanish, would waste all the terms of endearment they
could muster on the girls, who seemed pleased with the compliments of the
men from the land of gold. When, however, the command reached the summit
of a hill, about four miles from Rivas, a scene of beauty and of splendor
burst upon their vision, and for a while drew them from everything else,
even from thought of the eager strife in which they expected soon to
mingle.
As the advance guard reached a turn in the road it seemed to halt for a
moment, involuntarily, and though the order was to march in silence an
exclamation of surprise and pleasure escaped the lips of all. Mendez,
the red streamer flying from the lance which rested on his stirrup, was
up with the advance and uttered the single word “Omotepe.” To his eye
the scene was familiar, but to the Americans it appeared a vision of
enchantment. The lake of Nicaragua lay in full view, and rising from
it, as Venus from the sea, was the tall and graceful cone of Omotepe.
The dark forests of the tropics clothed the side of the volcano, which
seemed to repose under the influence of the soft sunshine around it. The
form of the mountain told its history as if written in a book; and the
appearance of the volcano was so much that of a person enjoying a siesta,
the beholder would not have been surprised to see it waken at any moment
and throw the lava from its burning sides. The first glimpse of the scene
almost made the pulse stand still; and the Falange had scarcely recovered
from its effects when the command was halted opposite a country-house a
few hundred yards from Rivas, in order to prepare for the attack on the
town.
About a mile from Rivas Walker had fallen into the road leading to
Granada, so that he might enter the former place from the north. He took
this course with a view of securing the houses either of the Maleaño or
of the Santa Ursula estates—two cacao plantations on the edge of the town
furnishing good positions to a force either attacking or defending the
place. Halting his troops, then, less than half a mile from the first
houses of the town, Walker called the principal officers, American and
native, around him, explaining his plan of attack, and assigning to each
his separate duty. Kewen and Crocker were ordered to drive the enemy, if
possible, from the streets, keeping the Americans advancing at a quick
step until they reached the Plaza; while Ramirez and his command were
to follow close after the Americans, protecting, as much as they could,
their flanks and rear. A few moments sufficed for these orders, and all
declared their full understanding of the several places assigned them.
Then Kewen and Crocker ordered their men to advance. As they got within
sight of the first houses, a body of the enemy opened fire; the reply of
the rifles was sharp and deadly, and the shout of the Americans as they
rushed forward proclaimed their eagerness for the strife. The Legitimists
fell back rapidly toward the Plaza; the hill of Santa Ursula was gained
by the Falange, and driving in the panels of the gates and doors with the
butts of their rifles, the soldiers soon had possession of the houses on
the summit. Walker rode past just as the houses were entered; and seeing
Crocker a short distance in advance, he called out to know how far the
men had got toward the Plaza. Crocker was panting with excitement; his
chin was bleeding from the graze of a bullet, one arm hung useless, being
shot through near the shoulder, while in the hand of the other side he
carried his army revolver, with half its barrels discharged. But the rage
of battle was on him; and heedless of wounds he was trying to drive the
men toward the enemy. As soon, however, as he saw his commander, he sank
his voice, and said in a low tone, “Colonel, the men falter; I cannot get
them on.” Then Walker, looking to the rear, saw that the natives were not
yet in sight. The pack-mules and horses with the ammunition were slowly
coming on; and Mendez, with a few natives near him, was to be seen a
little to the right. Passing to the front, Walker saw it was too true,
as Crocker said, that the men could not be brought to advance. At the
same time a brisk fire was opened on the left flank of the Americans by
Colonel Manuel Arguëllo, who had just arrived with a force from San Juan
del Sur. Then the Americans were concentrated in a large adobe house near
the hill of Santa Ursula, and in some small houses on the opposite side
of the street; the ammunition was unpacked, and the whole force was, as
far as possible, placed under cover, in order to get a breathing time
before future action.
The enemy seeing Ramirez did not press forward to aid the Americans,
got in between the two bodies; and Madregil, as the Leonese colonel was
called, marched off with nearly his whole command toward the Costa Rican
frontier, thinking, doubtless, that the Falange would be destroyed.
The Legitimists, too, noticing the disappearance of Ramirez, began to
press the Americans on all sides, making several efforts to charge the
houses, where the rifles did good execution. The white ribbons were
strewed thickly about the streets, and the Americans had several killed
and wounded early in the conflict. But the spirits of the latter did not
droop until first Crocker and then Kewen was reported killed. Even after
these losses, however, the men were brought to a charge in order to drive
the enemy from an old gun, a four-pounder, they were trying to get to
bear on the houses the Americans occupied. The charge was successful,
and the enemy were unable to use the piece during the action. Then the
Legitimists tried to fire the houses held by the Democrats, and they
so far succeeded as to get one of the roofs in a blaze. By this time
upward of fifteen of the Americans were killed or wounded, not more than
thirty-five of them remaining for action. The fight had begun at twelve
o’clock, and it was near four when orders were issued to prepare for
retreat. Several of the wounded had to be left; but those who could march
at all were notified of the intention to abandon the houses, so that they
might be ready to move when the order was given. The enemy, protected
by the thick undergrowth, had crowded in some force close to the houses
when the order was given to sally. At the moment of leaving the house, a
shout was raised by the sallying party; the nearest of the enemy turned
and fled in confusion; and the main body of the Legitimists, paralyzed,
as it were, by the offensive appearance of the American movement, waited,
expecting everywhere an attack. Thus the Falange escaped from its
difficult position with the loss of only one man killed.
When the Democrats attacked Rivas, the Legitimists had probably five
hundred men in the town; and they were re-enforced soon after the action
commenced by Arguëllo, with some seventy-five or eighty men. There were,
according to the best accounts, at least seventy of the Legitimists
killed, and as many wounded. The Americans lost six killed and twelve
wounded; and five of their wounded left behind were barbarously murdered
by the enemy, and their bodies burnt. After such a day, the Legitimists
were not much in the humor of pursuing those who had taught them a first
lesson in the use of the rifle.
But it was not by numbers that the loss of the Americans was to be
computed. The chivalrous spirit of Kewen would have weighed against a
host of common men; and the death of Crocker was a loss hardly to be
repaired. A boy in appearance, with a slight figure, and a face almost
feminine in its delicacy and beauty, he had the heart of a lion; and
his eye, usually mild and gentle, though steady in its expression, was
quick to perceive a false movement on the part of an adversary, and
then its flash was like the gleam of a scimetar as it falls on the head
of the foe. With little military experience and less military reading,
he was a man to lead others where danger was to be met; and none who
knew him feared he would get a command into any position from which his
courage and address would be unable to extricate them. To Walker he was
invaluable; for they had been together in many a trying hour, and the
fellowship of difficulty and danger had established a sort of freemasonry
between them.
There had been with the Americans during most of the day, at Rivas, two
natives, one of them a boy, the other a man, familiar with the country
about Rivas. Under the guidance of the latter the little band retreated
through cacao plantations, seeking some road which might lead them toward
the Transit. Their march was of course slow, and they were obliged to
wait often for the wounded to come up. Among those most seriously hurt
were De Brissot and Anderson (afterward Colonel Anderson), the former
having a wound through the fleshy part of the thigh, and the latter, in
addition to a wound in the thigh, having a scratch in the scalp and a cut
in the foot. Capt. Doubleday, a volunteer in the expedition, was useful
by his knowledge of native character and the modes of native warfare; and
although having a painful wound in the head, he did not for a moment lose
his spirits or presence of mind. Two or three times in their wanderings
through plantations, the retreating party came upon native laborers, who
are accustomed to fly at the sight of armed men, through fear of being
pressed into military service; and once overtaking a slow, cautious old
man who, after some hesitation, half opened his jacket, to show a red
rose under it, they were amused by seeing a white rose at the same time
fall to the ground. After a doubtful day in revolutionary times, the
poor fellow thought it best to have the white emblem for the Legitimists
as well as the red for the Democrats. Nor were the Americans themselves
altogether lacking in such prudence; for many of them had torn the red
ribbon from their hats, in order to escape the notice of hostile parties.
This, however, was a vain precaution, since their tongue, as well as
their dress and manners, plainly told the race, and therefore the party,
to which they belonged.
It was nearly dark when the guide succeeded in striking the road from
Rivas to St. George, about half way between the two places. As the
Falange approached the high road the bells of Buenos Ayres were ringing
in the distance, and Doubleday thought it was for the victory of the
Legitimists, though it was probably for the usual vesper prayers.
Marching briskly on, the remains of the expeditionary force passed, about
dark, the outskirts of San Jorge, all the doors being closed, as usual
when a battle has been fought in the neighborhood, and all the dogs of
the village seeming to bark at the tread of the retreating Americans.
Walker ordered Mayorga, the guide, to take the command by as quiet a path
as possible to the Transit; and he soon led the party by a trail to the
right of the road between Rivas and Virgin Bay. The ground was muddy and
difficult, the men at times sinking into it over their shoes and half way
up to the knee. And if the march was trying to well men, how much more so
was it to Anderson and De Brissot, with the muscles of their thighs bored
through by musket-balls. The rear guard, however, did its duty well, and
kept the column closed up, while maintaining the coolness and firmness
requisite for meeting the enemy in case of a pursuit. But there was no
sign of pursuit; and about midnight the worn-out soldiers of the Falange
halted, and camped until morning at a deserted hut on the top of a hill,
some two miles from the Transit road.
A little sleep and a hearty breakfast revived the exhausted spirits of
the command; and before nine o’clock on the morning of the 30th, they
were again toiling along the muddy trail. Soon they got a glimpse of
the white Transit road, between two and three miles from Virgin Bay.
It looked American, and the very sight of it refreshed the Falange and
put new life even into the wounded. Not many minutes after they got
on the Transit, Walker heard, at a distance ahead, the tinkle of a
mule-bell, and the guide said it was the treasure train, the passengers
having crossed from San Juan del Sur to Virgin Bay the day before. As
the train was usually accompanied by an escort, Walker was apprehensive
of a collision between the treasure guard and his force, and of the
misrepresentations which would necessarily arise from such an event.
Hence he hastily ordered the men to be hid on the side of a hill they
were then passing; and he was relieved at seeing the whole train pass by
with none but the muleteers in charge of it. The march was then resumed,
and near the Half-way House a man named Dewey, formerly a gambler in
California, rode up, and informing Walker he was just from San Juan del
Sur, told him some of the native Democrats, Mendez among them, had passed
through town the night before, on their way to Costa Rica, but that no
Legitimists had been there since the departure of Arguëllo, early on the
morning of the 29th, for Rivas.
A few minutes after sunset, the people of San Juan del Sur beheld about
forty-five men, several of them wounded—some without hats, others without
shoes—all of them travel-stained and clinging to their rifles, defile
through the streets of the town and take up their quarters in the
barracks near the beach. The appearance of the Falange at that moment was
not imposing; but he who knew how to read men might see from the looks
of these, that they bore with firmness the blows of adverse fate. There
was no hesitation in their march or in their movements. A few men—you
could not style them a detachment, scarcely a detail—were ordered to
take possession of all the small boats in the harbor and keep them under
guard. The Costa Rican schooner, San José, cast anchor in the harbor just
as the Falange entered the barracks; and, before any of her officers or
crew had got ashore, a file of Americans were aboard and held her for
further orders. Walker expected to hear something of the Vesta, as Morton
had been ordered to cruise off and on near San Juan del Sur, until he
saw a certain signal from the shore. But no one at San Juan, although
many there were friendly to the democrats, could give any news of the
Vesta. Several of the residents of the town did all they could for the
wounded and destitute soldiers; and even in that moment of adversity,
an Irishman, Peter Burns, and a Texan, Henry McLeod, had the hardihood
to link their fate with that of the Falange. It was encouraging for the
soldiers to find that some, besides themselves, did not regard their
fortunes as altogether desperate; and small as was this addition to their
numbers, it gave increased moral as well as material strength to the
command.
Hearing nothing from the Vesta, Walker determined to press the San José
for the service, and go in search of the brig, or in default of finding
her, sail for Realejo. Accordingly the wounded were first sent to the
schooner, and soon afterward the whole command followed. They found
the owner of the vessel, one Alvarado, of Punta Arenas, aboard the
San José, which had formerly been a pilot-boat out of San Francisco.
Alvarado received the command courteously, and Walker assured him the
schooner should not be used for the democratic service longer than was
absolutely necessary; and as this same vessel had brought Guardiola, a
military person of importance, from Guatemala to Nicaragua, with the
avowed object of making war against the Provisional Government at Leon,
the owner thought it well to act civilly, lest a libel might be filed
against the schooner on her arrival at Realejo. In what may be termed
minor diplomacy, the Central Americans are not surpassed by any race on
the continent.
The tide was coming in, and there was little or no wind when the
Americans went aboard of the San José; hence the vessel remained at
anchor waiting for the turn of the tide and for the morning breeze to
spring up. Most of the soldiers, fatigued by their toils and excitement
during the last three or four days, at once threw themselves on the decks
and were asleep almost the moment after they touched the planks. Walker,
however, with Captain Hornsby and a few others, kept awake, watching
anxiously the shore for any signs of movement there, and as keenly
regarding the waters and the heavens, in order to catch the faintest
signal of the ebbing tide or of the expected breeze. With all their
senses on the stretch, they suddenly saw the flames burst forth from the
barracks near the beach, and in an instant the blaze seemed to their
startled view to spread over half the town. Immediately a boat was sent
off to gather the meaning of the fire. The flames, on close observation,
seemed to be confined, and owing to the calmness of the night the fire
did not spread. In a few minutes the boat returned with the news that
the barracks had been set on fire by Dewey and a sailor named Sam: the
former being an American, who had lived for a while on the Isthmus, and
the latter being the owner of a small launch running between Realejo
and San Juan del Sur, and which had followed the Vesta on her voyage
to El Gigante. These two men had some private hatreds against certain
legitimists about the Transit: and taking advantage of the times, they
determined to wreak their revenge by this act of destruction. It may be,
too, that the thirst for plunder and the hope of satisfying their avarice
during the confusion of the fire partly prompted the act: for Dewey was
a desperate man who had fled from California to escape the punishment of
his crimes. Their act had jeoparded the whole town; for all the houses
being built of wood, a light wind would have borne the flames to most of
the property of the place.
It became important for Walker to get possession of these men and punish
their offence; otherwise the whole responsibility of the act might fall
on the Americans in the democratic service, and the enemies of these
last would say that, in revenge for their repulse at Rivas, they had
attempted, like savages, to burn up an inoffensive town. He therefore
sent an officer with a few men—their arms concealed in the bottom of
the boat—to attempt to get Dewey and Sam aboard the San José. Half
by stratagem and half by force, Sam was brought to the schooner; but
Dewey, doubtful of the result, refused to venture aboard, and took,
as he thought, the safer course of getting to Sam’s launch, which was
luckily hitched astern of the pilot-boat. Sam had no sooner crossed the
taffrail of the San José than he came reeling (for he was drunk) to
where Walker stood, and openly boasted that he and Dewey had set fire
to the barracks, and that they considered it an act of right against
the legitimists. After these declarations of Sam, there could remain no
doubt of his guilt, and as little of Dewey’s, since Sam had made similar
statements in the presence of and uncontradicted by his accomplice. The
refusal, too, of Dewey to come before Walker, implied guilt. Sam was,
therefore, ordered to be tried: and after a short consultation with Capt.
Hornsby and John Markham (afterward Colonel Markham), who had shown much
discretion at Rivas and during the march thence, Walker determined to
send the criminal ashore in order to have him executed there. Riflemen
were also placed at the stern of the schooner to watch the launch and
prevent Dewey from cutting the lines which held it to the San José.
The prisoner was sent ashore in charge of Capt. Hornsby and a few
select men, with orders to shoot him and place on his body a memorandum
stating the offence, and by whose command he had been executed; for
haste was necessary, it being far past midnight and Alvarado’s skipper
was expecting every moment to be able to weigh anchor and set sail.
The duty was disagreeable; and therefore, the Colonel commanding had
himself chosen the men for the performance of it. Hornsby was an upright
honorable soldier; but, then, his ability to fulfil the order might
depend on the disposition of those who were to carry it into execution.
He was almost the only commissioned officer left to Walker; yet, he was
without the large views requisite for perceiving the great importance
of clearing the Americans from any participation in the arson which had
been committed. Therefore, the commander took aside those who were to
go with Hornsby and strove to impress on them the urgent necessity for
faithful and conscientious conduct on their part. Hornsby and his detail
took the prisoner off in a small boat; in a short time Walker heard the
crack of the rifles, and soon afterward the rubbing of the oars against
the rowlocks as the boat approached the schooner. Hornsby came back to
report that the prisoner had escaped; that while the men were in the act
of untying Sam he had broken away, and the rifles being fired at random
in the dark, it was not known whether he had been hit or not. It was
afterward ascertained that he escaped unhurt to Costa Rica.
The escape of Sam gave an air of connivance at his crime to the action of
the Americans. This was the impression certain to be made on the natives
of the country, unless some means were found to counteract it. Indeed,
when the Costa Rican merchant, Alvarado, who was watching the events as
they happened, heard Sam had not been shot, he seemed, by his air, more
than by his words, to intimate that the Americans were not over-anxious
to punish the offender. Hence, it became necessary to guard against
Dewey’s escape; for such an event would tend to strengthen the inference
enemies might draw from the failure to execute the sentence of his
accomplice. Throughout the night, therefore, which seemed to Walker as if
it would never end, strict guard was kept over Sam’s launch. The wearying
wretchedness of that night’s watch may be imagined when it is considered
that the future character of the Americans in Nicaragua depended, to a
great extent, on their ability to punish Dewey’s crime.
At last day broke, and about sunrise the breeze sprung up off shore. The
skipper of the schooner weighed anchor and the vessel put to sea, towing
the launch astern. Walker ordered the San José to be kept two or three
leagues from the land, steering for Realejo, and watching in-shore for
the Vesta. A native woman of Chinandega, Sam’s mistress, and who sailed
with him on his voyages, managed the rudder of the launch. Three or four
hours passed thus; the riflemen in the stern with their eyes constantly
on the launch, and with orders to shoot Dewey if he attempted to cut the
lines by which she was towed. The small hold of the boat enabled Dewey
to keep out of sight, and as he had a couple of army revolvers with him,
and was a remarkable shot, it was necessary for the men watching him to
keep themselves covered. It was a contest between crime and law after
the fashion of the Indian. After a while Dewey rose stealthily from the
hold, and managing to place the woman between himself and the riflemen,
was evidently preparing to make a desperate effort to cut loose from
the schooner. The woman was warned in Spanish to keep clear from Dewey,
and was told that death would be the result if she attempted to aid
him in his plans. But the poor creature was unable to get away from the
man. The order was given to the riflemen to watch their opportunity and
shoot Dewey when they could do so without endangering the woman. The
discharge of a couple of rifles, almost at the same instant, told that
the opportunity had been found. Dewey dropped into the hold, shot through
the body; but the ball, passing entirely through him, had, unfortunately,
inflicted a painful and dangerous wound on the woman. The woman was
brought aboard the San José; her wound was dressed by the surgeon, and
she recovered in a short time her usual health. Dewey’s body was sewed up
in canvas and buried at sea.
I have minutely narrated the circumstances attending Dewey’s death,
because they made a deep impression on the native mind, and gave a
certain and decided character to the Americans in the democratic
service. The Nicaraguans conceived from these events a respectful idea
of American justice. They saw that the men they had been taught to call
“filibusters,” intended to maintain law and secure order wherever they
went; that they had the will to administer justice, and would, when they
had the power, protect the weak and the innocent from the crimes of the
lawless and abandoned. And it is this sentiment stamped deeply on the
people of Nicaragua which makes the evil-doers of that land dread the
re-appearance of the Americans in the country. The anarchy and license of
thirty-five years of revolution have unfitted the political leaders for
subjecting their lawless passions and unbridled impulses to the fixed
rule of unchanging and unswerving duty.
Late in the afternoon of the same day the schooner left San Juan, her
passengers recognized the Vesta at a distance bound northward, and
apparently for Realejo. After the brig saw the schooner, her movements
became mysterious and uncertain; in fact she did not know what to make of
a vessel showing Costa Rica colors, and clearly looking out for, and in
chase of the Vesta. The San José, however, soon overhauled the brig, and
in a few moments the Falange was again aboard of their old acquaintance.
The wind was favorable; the Vesta kept on her course for Realejo, and
the schooner followed close in her wake. Alvarado, no doubt, thought it
was fair, and by his civility he had made it safe for him to carry on
a little smuggling, and pay himself out of the pockets of the Leonese
for the services he had rendered their friends. Early the next morning,
it being the first of July, the Vesta again found the volcano of Viejo
bearing due north, and letting her cable slip, she stood at her former
anchorage opposite Point Ycaco.
A few stragglers from the force of Ramirez, taking the coast trail
from Rivas to Chinandega, had already reached the latter place, and
reported some of the incidents of the march and action on the 29th.
Therefore the Vesta had been but a few hours in port, when three or four
of the principal Democrats of Chinandega came down to get the news of
the expedition to the Meridional Department. On their return with the
flood-tide—for whenever a boat was sent up the river to Realejo, it was
generally on the incoming tide—one of these gentlemen bore to Castellon
the written report of occurrences at the south. In his report, Walker
stated his impression that Muñoz had acted in bad faith, and that the
conduct of Ramirez was due to the inspiration, if not orders, of the
commander-in-chief; and the report concluded by informing the Director
that, unless the course of Muñoz was inquired into, and cleared of the
suspicions hanging about it, the Americans would be compelled to leave
the service of the Provisional Government, and seek elsewhere than in
Nicaragua a field for their faculties and enterprise. The next day Dr.
Livingston, an American, long resident in Leon, brought Castellon’s
reply to Walker aboard of the Vesta. The Director complimented the
Americans on their conduct at Rivas, thanked them for the services
they had rendered the democratic cause, but evaded saying anything in
reference to the acts of Muñoz. He urged Walker, however, not to think
of leaving Nicaragua, as such an event might be fatal to the Provisional
Government; and Dr. Livingston was sent to urge verbally the same views,
intimating, too, that the critical position of the democratic party
made it inexpedient for the Director to scan too closely the conduct
of the commander-in-chief. Walker, however, appeared obstinate, having
decided in his own mind to remain some days on the brig for the purpose
of allowing the Americans to recover from their fatigues and wounds, and
with a view of making the Castellon party manifest as clearly as possible
the necessity of the Falange to their cause. So Dr. Livingston went back
to Leon, with a report not very encouraging to the Provisional Government.
For some days Walker continued to receive letters from Castellon,
entreating him not to give up the democratic cause, and urging him to
march the Falange to Leon. In order to bring about the latter result
the Director stated that the Legitimists were meditating a movement
against his capital, Corral being at Managua with a force of nearly a
thousand men, and with arms and ammunition for the supply of a large
additional number of recruits. It was also certain that the recruiting
of _voluntarios forçados_—forced volunteers—was going on actively in the
Oriental Department. Don Mariano Salazar, too, the most energetic man in
the democratic party, visited Walker aboard the Vesta, to impress on him
the danger of an attack on Leon by Corral, and the necessity of having
the American rifles about the residence of the Director. Salazar was the
brother-in-law of Castellon; and being a merchant of much shrewdness and
sufficient capital, he managed to have a sort of monopoly of the trade
in foreign fabrics, imported by the ports of Realejo and Tempisque. Thus
he was able and willing to furnish means to the democratic army, and
offered to supply the Americans with any ammunition they might need. He,
accordingly, sent to La Union, and procured a quantity of rifle powder
for the Falange; the powder which the natives used in their muskets
not being fit for the arms of the Americans. Walker appeared, however,
inflexible, and the friends of the Provisional Government again began to
despair.
Some ten days passed in this manner, and the Falange, recovered from
the effects of the expedition to Rivas, was beginning to wish for more
active exercise than could be found aboard the Vesta. It was, therefore,
decided to march them to Chinandega, as they were promised good quarters
there, and the wounded would be able to get more delicate diet than was
to be had at Point Ycaco. Accordingly boats and bungos were procured, and
the whole body of Americans was transported to Realejo without previous
notice given to the authorities. Not many minutes after Walker reached
the town he was standing in front of the Collector’s office, and saw
the Director, Castellon, and Don Mariano Salazar, step from the boat.
It seems Don Francisco had left Leon that morning, and passing by the
Polvon, a sugar plantation belonging to two Americans, John Deshon and
Henry Myers, had reached the Vesta only a few minutes after the Americans
entered the river. He had forthwith followed, in order to persuade Walker
to continue his march to Leon. His anxiety was apparent; in fact it was
necessary for him to get back to his capital before the people discovered
his absence, otherwise a panic might ensue, and the effects be disastrous.
In reply to the entreaties of Castellon, Walker affected to be undecided
as to his course after reaching Chinandega, evading a positive reply,
by saying he did not know whether he could safely leave his wounded at
the last-named town, since the Legitimists, if they intended to enter
the Occidental Department, would certainly occupy that place, in order
to cut off supplies and communications. The Director told Walker that
if he intended to go to Leon, the sub-prefect at Chinandega had orders
to furnish him with all the supplies and transportation he required.
Castellon and Salazar left for Leon in better spirits, because there
appeared a prospect of retaining the Falange in the country; and the
Americans proceeded to Chinandega, where they arrived the same afternoon,
and found as comfortable quarters as the town afforded. All the officers,
civil and military, vied with each other in the efforts they made to
satisfy the wants of the Falange; and the women of the place were
constantly paying to the wounded those little attentions which take away
from the tedium of the soldier obliged to lie idle and inactive, while
the bustle of preparation for marching and adventure is going on around
him.
The day after reaching Chinandega, Walker made his requisition on the
sub-prefect for the horses and ox-carts necessary on the march to
Leon; and the Americans were in high spirits at the idea of visiting
the old capital of the country, and the second city in size of Central
America. The evening before they set out for the seat of the Provisional
Government, Byron Cole rode into Chinandega accompanied by Don Bruno Von
Natzmer. The former had waited several months after sending his contract
to California, expecting each week to hear of the arrival of Americans at
Realejo; but as time wore away and the cause of Castellon waned rapidly,
he had gone to Honduras hoping to find profit, if not fame, in the gold
hills of Olancho. There he met Bruno Von Natzmer, a Prussian, who had
resigned his commission in the cavalry of his native country to join
Baron Bulow in the colony he proposed to establish in Costa Rica some
years ago. Von Natzmer spoke Spanish very well, French tolerably, and
English quite indifferently. Having resided for some time in Central
America, and being a man of fine intelligence, Von Natzmer was well
calculated to render much service to the Americans. He and Cole had left
Olancho for Nicaragua as soon as they heard of the arrival of the Vesta
at Realejo; and it will be seen in the course of events that they were
valuable auxiliaries to the Falange.
Leaving the wounded at Chinandega, in charge of the sub-prefect there,
Walker marched to Leon, carrying the ammunition and baggage in the
ox-carts of the country. It was late at night when he arrived at the
first pickets; and the strength of the pickets, as well as the number
of sentries, indicated that Muñoz thought it not altogether improbable
the enemy might be in the neighborhood. A native officer was sent on
to inform the sentries it was necessary to pass of the approach of the
Falange; though the creaking of the cart-wheels, easily heard at the
distance of a mile, was sufficient evidence that the party entering
the city did not expect to take it by surprise. The white trowsers and
jackets of the sentries, as they paced their posts, enabled a person to
distinguish their position, even in the darkness of the night, while
the clothing of the Falange was favorable to secrecy and concealment.
Nor were other differences in military habits less striking; and it
was difficult for the Americans to see the advantages of many pickets
where large camp-fires were kept burning, as the light enabled an
enemy not only to discover the position, but also, in some cases, the
exact strength of the picket. It might appear a delicate matter for a
force speaking an entirely different tongue, and with military habits
altogether dissimilar, to enter a friendly camp near the hour of
midnight; but the very difference of language and habits in this case
facilitated the task, and no unpleasant incident occurred to mar the
arrival of the Americans at the quarters which were assigned them.
The day after the arrival of the Falange at Leon, Castellon expressed
a desire for a meeting between Muñoz and Walker, entreating the latter
to forget his resentment for the grievances he thought he had suffered
at the hands of the commanding-general. Accordingly they met at the
house of the Director, and both avoided any allusion to the past,
conversing mostly about the prospects of the advance on the part of
Corral. The cholera had broken out at Managua; and with an adventurous
captain this might have determined him to attack an enemy, hoping by a
movement forward to escape the dreadful scourge, or if pursued by the
plague to scatter it also among the hostile force, and at least to bring
on an action before his own strength was destroyed by the ravages of
disease. But Corral was not of the temper such a movement requires; and
his character was sufficient guaranty that the cholera alone, without
other foe, would drive him back to Granada. Nevertheless, there were
constant rumors of the approach of the Legitimists; and the market-women
were frequently seen picking up their trays and baskets and flying in
all directions from the Plaza. These alarms would sometimes happen at
night as well as during the day; and one of them, soon after the Falange
reached Leon, was near having serious consequences.
Muñoz had invited Walker to visit the pickets with him, and to observe
the condition of the camp after tattoo. Previous to mounting they
had met at the house of the Director, and they with Castellon were
conversing together when a clashing was heard at the main entrance of the
building, and the officer on duty ordered the body-guard to fall in. The
general-in-chief, the Director, and Walker, all advanced rapidly toward
the gate in order to ascertain the cause of the movement; and on getting
into the street, they found the Americans with cartridge-boxes on, and
their rifles in their hands, mingled with the officers of the general’s
staff, some mounted, others dismounted, some with their swords drawn,
and others with their pistols out of their holsters. As soon as the
Americans saw Walker they at once retired toward their quarters; and then
the cause of the disturbance became manifest. Two of the officers of the
general’s staff had got to quarrelling at the door of the Director, and
had drawn their swords intending to fight out the quarrel on the spot. In
the effort on the part of others of the staff to prevent this, a certain
noise and confusion ensued; and as the quarters of the Falange were near
the Director’s house, and the Americans knew that Walker was there with
Muñoz, the idea occurred to some of them that treason was being practised
on their leader. They rushed to the house demanding admission, and were
about to force the door when Walker appeared. The difference of language
added, of course, to the misunderstanding; and in the confusion of the
moment the report spread among the people that the enemy had secretly
entered the town, and were already at the house of Castellon. The alarm
continued for some moments; but at length quiet was restored, and the
officers proceeded to make the tour of the camp.
The ride that night would have furnished amusement and interest to the
general observer, no less than to the soldier. The sentry duty is well
done by the natives, and if they fought as well as they do guard duty,
or as patiently as they submit to all manner of hardship except when
mixed with danger, they would make extremely formidable troops. In riding
through the streets at night, it was difficult at times to keep your
horse from treading on the soldiers. There they lay on the hard pavements
ranged by companies in two files, the feet of the front and rear ranks
toward each other, and their heads against the walls of the houses on
opposite sides of the street; their arms are at their sides, and their
cartridge-boxes with one compartment, and made sometimes of leather,
sometimes of hide, turned in front, in order to enable them to lie easily
on their back or sides. And if dismounting you enter their quarters and
see them, some on the brick or dirt floors, others swinging in hammocks,
and bent up almost double in order to keep from falling out, you would
not wonder at the horror the whole people have of military service. There
is scarcely any labor a Nicaraguan will not do in order to keep out of
the clutches of the press-gang; and their immunity from this dreaded evil
by the presence of the Americans in the country, gave the latter much of
the moral power they possessed over the native population. The laborers
and small proprietors run more risks to escape military duty than they
are generally required to meet, if they are so unlucky as to be caught by
the recruiting sergeant.
After the Falange had been in Leon a few days reports of the advance
of Corral became less frequent, then ceased altogether; and afterward
there came vague rumors of terrible ravages by cholera at Managua, and
of the intention of the Legitimists to fall back on Granada. Then Walker
broached to Castellon his real object in going to Leon. He desired to
get an efficient native force of two hundred men, commanded by a man in
whom he had confidence, to make another effort against the enemy in the
Meridional Department. Castellon appeared uneasy as soon as the subject
was broached, and at length proposed a meeting of Muñoz, Walker, Jerez,
and several others, in order to discuss a plan of a general campaign.
Jerez was at that time under a cloud; but Walker sought to bring him
forward inasmuch as he manifested a deep resentment at being superseded
in the command of the army by Muñoz. Accordingly the meeting was held,
and of course without result. The general-in-chief proposed to divide
the Americans by tens, distributing them among the several bodies
of the native troops, and this done he proposed to march by several
directions on Granada. But the object of his policy was too plain to
deceive anybody, and by proposing such a plan he merely disclosed his
feelings without being able to move a step toward the accomplishment
of his desires. The manner of Castellon showed Walker that but little
was to be done toward obtaining aid for another expedition to Rivas,
although the Director went so far as to say that Muñoz would march toward
the Department of Segovia in a few days, and something might be done
after his departure in furnishing force for the Meridional Department.
Walker then, to the chagrin of Castellon, determined to counter-march to
Chinandega.
Orders were issued to the Falange to prepare for marching, and
requisitions were made on the prefect for horses and ox carts, but
hours passed and the carts did not make their appearance. All at once a
section, consisting (in the Nicaraguan use of the term) of three hundred
or three hundred and fifty men, marched into a strong house just opposite
the quarters of the Americans. Walker immediately ordered the Falange
to be on the alert, standing by their arms and ready for action. At the
same time he sent word to Castellon that the movement of these troops was
menacing and, unless they were ordered from their new position within an
hour, the Falange would consider the force hostile and act accordingly.
The native troops were immediately ordered from the building, and they
marched out of the house less than an hour after they marched into it.
Had Muñoz been able to take the Americans unawares, he would, in all
probability, have disarmed them and sent them out of the country. Nor
was it long after these troops evacuated the house opposite the Falange,
before the carts, required for the march of the latter from Leon, were
driven to their quarters. In a little while the Americans were on the
road to Chinandega, keeping a sharp lookout to the rear and all the time
prepared for any movement which might appear offensive. They arrived,
however, at Chinandega without any incident worthy of notice.
Cole had remained in Leon with the view of securing certain
modifications in the contract by which the Americans had entered the
service of the Provisional Government. He easily obtained what he
sought. The colonization grant was given up, and Walker was authorized
to enlist three hundred men for the military service of the Republic,
the State promising them one hundred dollars a month, and five hundred
acres of land at the close of the campaign. Castellon also gave Walker
authority to settle all differences and outstanding accounts between the
Government and the Accessory Transit Company. These powers were necessary
preliminaries to the effort for securing a position in the Meridional
Department; and it was a fixed policy with Walker to get as near the
Transit as possible, in order to recruit from the passengers to and from
California, and to have the means of easy and rapid communication with
the United States. So far as the Falange was concerned it was idle for
them to waste their energies and strength on a campaign which did not
bring them toward the Transit road.
As soon as Walker received the documents Cole brought from Leon he
determined to return to the Meridional Department, whether he was or
was not able to obtain aid for the expedition from the Provisional
Government. It was necessary, however, to wait on events and choose the
most opportune moment for carrying out the designs he had in view.
Chapter Third.
VIRGIN BAY, SEPTEMBER THIRD, 1855.
Nothing tries so much the firmness of men like those constituting the
Falange as inaction. The roving and adventurous life of California had
increased in them the thirst for action and movement characteristic
of the American race; and as they were engaged in the service of the
Provisional Government on mere promises, the value of which depended on
success, it is not singular that the garrison life at Chinandega soon
became irksome to them. Two of the men, especially restless and unsettled
in their characters, abandoned the service; and their conduct as well
as their conversation had a demoralizing effect on many others of the
Falange. Walker perceiving the spirit which began to prevail called the
men together and addressed them for a few minutes, exhorting them not
to look back when once the hand was to the plough; and his address had
the effect of bringing the disaffected to a sense of the duties and
responsibilities devolved upon them. In his conversations as well as in
his addresses he strove constantly to fill them with the idea that small
as was their number they were the precursors of a movement destined to
affect materially the civilization of the whole continent. Thus filled
with the importance of the events in which they were participating, the
Falange became capable of performing worthily the part assigned them.
Nor were other causes for difficulty lacking. The skipper of the Vesta,
Eyre, did not know what to do with his vessel. He had brought her out
of San Francisco without sailors and it was impossible to engage any in
the port of Realejo. Besides, her condition as to sea-worthiness made
it unsafe to undertake a long voyage with her. Therefore it was thought
advisable for the men who had worked the vessel down from California to
bring suit against her for wages; and the collector intervened also for
his port charges. After due notice judgment was rendered against the
captain and vessel in favor of the claimants, and the brig was ordered
to be sold under execution. She was bought for a little upward of six
hundred dollars by the two persons, McNab and Turnbull, who had separated
from the Falange.
In the meanwhile, letters were daily passing between Castellon and Walker
in reference to the expedition to the Meridional Department. The Director
seeing that the commander of the Falange was bent on this enterprise, no
longer opposed it directly but strove to delay it promising assistance
after the departure of Muñoz from Leon. At length Muñoz marched with six
hundred men, the best organized and best equipped in the Provisional
service; but he left few materials either of men or of arms to be
disposed of by the Director. The movement of Muñoz was made with the view
of acting against Guardiola, who having left Granada with a small force
but with a good supply of arms and ammunition was proceeding toward
Condega, thereby joining hands with his friends in Tegucigalpa and being
thus enabled to act against either Comayagua or Leon as circumstances
might require. Guardiola was recruiting industriously in the villages
of Matagalpa and Segovia; and his activity together with the terror of
his name inspired the people of the Occidental Department with a dread
they seemed unable to shake off. The Director himself thought Guardiola
intended to strike at Leon; and he therefore desired to have the Falange
within easy distance of his capital. The people of Chinandega, too, were
anxious to keep the Americans in their town, in order that their property
might not fall a prey to the reputed rapacity of Guardiola and his
soldiers.
Under these circumstances it was easy for Walker to see that there was
small hope of his securing assistance from the Provisional Government for
any enterprise outside of the Occidental Department. He went on, however,
purchasing all the rifles he could find about Leon and Chinandega, in
order to have arms for any recruits on the Isthmus, and continued to
replenish his stores of fixed ammunition, almost entirely exhausted by
the Rivas expedition. Powder and caps were obtained from La Union; but
it was impossible to get lead thence, and the quantity of that metal
in northern Nicaragua was extremely small. The cartridges used by the
natives in their muskets contained an iron missile, made by cutting
into slugs, about an inch long, the gratings of the windows. Leon and
Chinandega were searched in order to procure one or two hundred pounds of
lead for the American rifles; and the only supply to be had was from a
few pounds of bird-shot and a few pieces of lead sheeting belonging to an
Englishman at Chinandega. An officer was sent to buy the metal from him,
but he refused to sell. A small guard was then sent with orders to take
the lead, paying therefor a reasonable price. Thereupon the Englishman
declared to the officer that if the guard entered his house he would run
up the British flag and put his house under the protection of the British
Government. The officer, uncertain how to act, returned to Walker for
orders; and being told that no foreign resident, except a representative
of the sovereignty of his country, had a right to fly a foreign flag, he
was ordered to enter the house, and in case the British colors were shown
over it, to tear them down and trample them under foot, thus returning
the insult offered to the Republic of Nicaragua by their display. The
native authorities, accustomed to yield to the wishes of not only British
consuls but even of British merchants, were utterly astounded at these
orders. On the Englishman, however, the orders produced a wholesome
effect; for he immediately gave up the lead, about one hundred and fifty
pounds, for the use of the Americans.
At the same time Walker was collecting the scanty supplies of arms and
ammunition the country afforded for the use of the Falange, he was also
searching for some native officer who would have the resolution to join
in the expedition to the Meridional Department with or without the
consent of the Provisional Government. Such a person was found in the
sub-prefect of Chinandega, D. José Maria Valle. He was one of those
who accompanied Jerez on his landing at Realejo, in May, 1854, and had
risen to the rank of Colonel in the democratic army; but a severe wound
in the lower third of the thigh had endangered his life during the siege
of Granada, and the bone being broken in splinters, he was left with a
stiff knee, and had retired for the time from active service. Valle had
great influence over the soldiers about Leon and Chinandega, and with a
certain rude eloquence he was accustomed to stir the hearts of the people
with a recitation of the wrongs they had suffered from the Legitimist
Government. Almost a pure Indian, without any education, being unable to
either read or write, he would ride through the streets of Chinandega and
into the hamlets of the neighborhood, speaking of the generous Americans,
who had come to help them in their struggles against the Granadians. Nor
was his influence confined to the men. When he took the guitar in hand
he would carry the women away with his songs of love or of patriotism;
and the control he exercised over the women was not to be despised in a
country where they serve to some extent the use of newspapers, at the
same time scattering news and forming opinion.
Since the arrival of the Americans in the country, Chélon—as Valle was
familiarly called—had been their firm friend; and it was not difficult to
secure his co-operation in the movement toward the Meridional Department.
He was, however, a warm adherent of Castellon, and the latter could
scarcely refuse his permission for Chélon to march with the Falange. But
the Director endeavored to dissuade Valle from the enterprise, trying
to convince him of the danger to Chinandega from Guardiola, in case the
town was left inadequately guarded. As the devotion of the sub-prefect
to his family and friends was strong, it required an effort for him to
resist the arguments of Castellon; but his hatred to the Legitimists,
and his desire to avenge the death of a brother he had lost in the siege
of Granada, overcame the logic of the Director. Valle was, however, one
of those wavering men easily influenced by persons around them, and it
became necessary to fix his determination by leading him to take some
active steps in the enterprise.
Accordingly Walker decided, near the middle of August, to march the
Falange to Realejo, and place it aboard the Vesta. The morning the
Americans were to leave Chinandega, and while they were packing the
carts for the march, an alarm arose and the rumor flew through the town
that Guardiola was a few leagues off on his way to attack the place. The
commandant sent a couple of drummer-boys through the streets beating the
call to arms; and although it was Sunday, the churches were closed, and
the whole town wore the appearance of expecting an immediate assault.
Walker, however, thought the alarm was a mere trick, got up by the
government, in order to keep the Americans from marching. The general
impression about the Falange was that you only had to show them a chance
for fighting, to secure their presence at the dangerous point.
When the Americans left Chinandega the people who really imagined
Guardiola was near the town, gave up to despair, expecting soon to find
themselves at the mercy of one their fancies painted as a relentless
foe. In a few hours, however, the alarm subsided; and, although Don
Pedro Aguirre, the sub-delegado of hacienda at Chinandega, who had shown
much attachment to the Americans during their stay there, followed the
Falange as far as Realejo, the news of Guardiola still being in Segovia
encouraged the old man to remain ashore rather than proceed to the Vesta.
As a consequence of this change in his resolution (for he had brought his
trunk along, with the idea of going to the brig) Don Pedro was taken with
cholera at Realejo, and died there after a few hours’ illness.
The cholera—or colerin, as the natives called it, for the disease was a
mild type of cholera—had appeared at Chinandega in the month of July.
It had aided the democrats previously by its ravages at Granada and at
Managua; and moving slowly northward had finally reached the Occidental
Department. At Chinandega it preyed entirely on the natives, and the
Americans escaped it altogether. Nor was this peculiarity of the disease
confined to Chinandega. It will be seen hereafter that although natives
and Americans were together on the same vessel, with the disease killing
off the former in considerable numbers, the latter were entirely free
from the malady. Whether the fact arose from the more vigorous life or
from the more generous meat diet, or from the greater care in sleeping,
which the Americans had, it is difficult for the unlearned—probably also
for the learned—to decide.
In going aboard the Vesta Walker had put out the report that he intended
to leave for Honduras since the Provisional Government would render him
no assistance in the expedition to the Meridional Department, and General
Cabañas had written letters inviting the Falange to Honduras. In fact,
the President of the latter State was beginning to be hard pressed by the
invaders from Guatemala; and in some of his letters to Castellon he had
inquired whether some of the Americans could not be sent to Comayagua
in return for the aid rendered to the Provisional Government of Leon
the previous year. Walker, however, had little idea of getting farther
off rather than nearer to the Transit: still less did he intend, if he
could prevent it, to have the Americans divided up into squads, and thus
trifled away for the use of chiefs of contending factions. In his letters
to Castellon he spoke of going to Honduras; and the former, despairing
almost of keeping the Falange in the Occidental Department, rather
favored the plan, sending copies of extracts from letters Cabañas had
written on the subject.
The Falange, with all its baggage and ammunition having been put aboard
the Vesta, Valle, who had recently performed the duties of commandant
as well as sub-prefect for the district of Chinandega, began to recruit
his force. He placed on his staff D. Bruno Von Natzmer (afterward Col.
Natzmer) who, in his new capacity, was of great service to Valle as
well as to the Americans. The people immediately began to talk about
Chélon’s recruiting; and rumors were soon rife of a revolution against
the government at Leon. In fact, Valle wished to pronounce and establish
a new provisional government; for he had been used to such proceedings
for the last twenty-five years, and felt at home in them. But Walker
dissuaded him from the idea; and at length got him to march his force
to Realejo, and thence to send it aboard of the Vesta. Von Natzmer, who
wished Walker to go to Honduras and was doubtful of the enterprise in the
Meridional Department, rode up to Leon and let the Director know what was
going on. Castellon, in great alarm, wrote to Valle, now entreating him
as his old friend, then commanding him as a superior his subordinate,
to desist from joining Walker. But Chélon was now aboard the Vesta; his
course was decided, and the Director could not turn him from his purpose.
Von Natzmer, on his return to Chinandega, was put in arrest by Walker;
but he had acted with good motives, though from mistaken views, and being
soon after released he showed himself first, a worthy soldier, and after,
one of the best officers in Nicaragua.
Valle brought down from Chinandega between one hundred and sixty and
one hundred and seventy men; but while the commissary stores were being
taking aboard the brig numbers died of cholera and several deserted when
sent ashore at Point Ycaco to keep the vessel from being overcrowded
while in port. Just before the Vesta sailed a courier came down with
letters from Castellon, informing Walker that there had been an action
between Muñoz and Guardiola, at Sauce; that the Democrats had won the
day, after several hours’ fighting, but that Muñoz had died of a wound
received in the battle. The loss of the Democrats had, however, been
heavy, and the Director, uneasy lest the Legitimists, though defeated,
might move toward Leon, when they heard of the death of Muñoz, was
anxious to keep all the force he could in the Occidental Department.
Again he urged Walker to return to Leon, and now, Muñoz being out of the
way, all would be well. But the Vesta was ready for sea, and the order
was given to weigh anchor, Morton being again in charge of the vessel.
And, as the brig was overcrowded, a ketch of Punta Arenas, having a
German supercargo aboard, was employed to convey a part of the force
bound for the Meridional Department.
The expedition sailed on the 23d of August, and the ketch was ordered
to sail for San Juan del Sur. Scarcely had the Vesta passed the mouth
of the harbor before she saw the schooner San José making for the port,
her decks being apparently filled with men. The schooner passed close
to the brig, and some aboard of the latter recognized Mendez among the
passengers of the San José. Walker ordered the Vesta to be put about, and
leaving her near the mouth of the harbor, he, with Valle, took a small
boat and endeavored to overhaul the schooner as she sailed slowly up
toward the river; but they were unable to reach her until some minutes
after she had come to anchor. On boarding the schooner it was ascertained
she was from Punta Arenas, and that Ramirez, who had come passenger,
had already taken a boat and started for the town, fearing to meet the
Americans after his conduct at Rivas. Chélon easily persuaded Mendez
to go aboard the Vesta, but, as they had to wait for the ebb tide, it
was nearly dark when they started for the brig. As they passed down
the harbor, Valle insisted on saying good-bye once more to his two
daughters, whom he had brought as far as Point Ycaco. The girls, with a
younger brother, got into the boat with their father, and went with him
some distance down the harbor, the old man promising them presents from
Granada when he returned, and the girls as gay as if their parent was
going out with a hunting party. The old revolutionist took his eldest
son (not more than fifteen) with him, and telling the younger to take
care of his sisters, he embraced them as composedly as if he expected to
meet them at breakfast the next morning, and saying adieu again and again
as he put off for the Vesta, left them, to pass through many a scene of
peril and danger before again meeting them.
After getting to sea the cholera was less severe among the troops, and
few died between the time of leaving Realejo and the arrival of the brig
at San Juan del Sur. The passage was long, and it was the 29th of August
before the Vesta made the port. Two Americans seeing her outside brought
Walker the intelligence that all the Legitimist troops had left San Juan
as soon as the well-known brig hove in sight. The ketch had not arrived,
nor had she been seen by the Vesta for several days. Some uneasiness
was felt on her account, but the calms and contrary winds which had
prevailed and the slow sailing of the craft were sufficient to explain
her non-appearance. Soon after dark the Vesta dropped anchor in the port,
but it was determined not to land the forces until the next morning.
A short time after the brig came to anchor Walker ascertained that
Parker H. French had just arrived in the town from Granada, and was
there waiting the next steamer for San Francisco. French had started for
California in 1849, but, being engaged in some doubtful transactions in
Texas, on his way to the Pacific, his name had ever since been suggestive
of unfairness and dishonesty. In California he had been a member of
the Legislature, and afterward established a short-lived journal at
Sacramento. During the time Walker was trying to get men at San Francisco
to go to Nicaragua French had met him and professed to have great
influence with C. K. Garrison, the agent of the Accessory Transit Company
in California. French’s character presented no obstacle to an intimacy of
the sort he alleged between himself and Garrison, and French told Walker
he had spoken to Garrison in reference to the proposed expedition and
its bearing on the Transit Company. Certainly Garrison did nothing to
aid the departure of the Vesta from San Francisco, but French intimated
that after the sailing of a first party for Nicaragua he would himself
follow, and would manage to interest Garrison in the enterprise. Nothing
was heard from French until it was reported through the country that the
Legitimist government was about to secure the services of a “coto”—one
armed man—whose skill as an artillerist was amazing; for French had
brought with him from San Francisco a mulatto servant to be used as the
vehicle for communicating the most astonishing stories as to his master’s
skill, bravery and general attainments. At his own desire French was
brought aboard the Vesta under arrest. He strove to impress Walker with
the idea that he had gone to Granada to observe the strength and defences
of the place, and he then proceeded to state what he had observed. Of
course Walker attached no importance to his statements, nor did he ever
care to examine minutely the real motives of French in going there. The
motives of such men are generally so tangled that he who attempts to
unravel them is poorly paid for his trouble.
The next morning the force, together with all the stores, were landed,
and the Democrats had scarcely taken possession of the town before the
steamer from California appeared off the harbor. It was a glad sight
for the Falange, inasmuch as it suggested the fact that they were now
in communication with the friends of youth and manhood, and that there
would now be an opportunity to swell their numbers from the passengers
crossing the Isthmus. Some difficulty occurred at first in regard to
the conveyance of the passengers across the Isthmus, as the contractor
seemed afraid to venture to town with his mules and carriages; but soon
they were all sent to Virgin Bay, and the town settled to its usual quiet
condition. About midnight the ketch appeared, and the troops aboard of
her were immediately landed. The full force of the command then amounted
to near fifty Americans, and one hundred and twenty natives. A number
of the latter were on the sick list, and the prevailing disease was the
colerin, which generally carried the patient off in two or three days.
The enemy was reported to have five or six hundred men—some said eight
hundred, but this was an exaggeration—at Rivas, and in a day or two it
was known Guardiola had arrived to take the command. Flying from Sauce
after his defeat there, the Legitimist General had hurried to Granada,
entering that city with a single attendant. Brooding over his ill-luck in
the north, and anxious for a chance to regain his lost fame, he leaped
at the opportunity of going to Rivas in order, as he said, to sweep the
“filibusters” into the sea. He marched from Granada with some two hundred
select soldiers, expecting to make them the nucleus of a force to be
organized after his arrival at Rivas. With him marched several officers,
reputed to be of skill and courage, and desirous of more active service
than was to be had under Corral. French’s mulatto man, Tom, who was sent
over to Virgin Bay on some errand for his master, reported on his return
that Guardiola had come down with a thousand men, and would march at once
on San Juan del Sur; but this story was like that of his master being
able to hit a man every shot with a twenty-four pounder at the distance
of a mile.
By the morning of the 2d of September, the passengers from the Atlantic
side had arrived, and were aboard the steamer ready to sail. French
returned to San Francisco with authority to raise and bring down
seventy-five men for the service of the Provisional Government. Anderson,
who had been wounded at Rivas, also went up on the steamer, hoping,
by change of air, to recover his health and the use of his leg. The
Vesta sailed for Punta Arenas the same day the steamer left; and on the
afternoon of the 2d, the port had a solitary look. On shore, however,
the town wore an aspect of activity. Pack-mules and carts were being
collected for a march, and the soldiers in all the quarters were busy
preparing for a movement which, it was supposed, might bring them nearer
to the enemy.
Owing to the delays of some native officers, it was past midnight before
the force was ready to march. The column was formed with the Falange in
front, and the command of Valle in the rear, the baggage and ammunition
of the Americans being in their charge; while the ammunition of the
natives, they having no baggage, was under a guard from their own body.
The night was fine and pleasant, the road good, and the spirits of the
command high. At the Half-way house a halt was ordered, and the owner
of the establishment brought water to the door, the soldiers not being
allowed to enter as there was liquor within. The keeper of this house
was, perforce, a model trimmer. He was an American; but having witnessed
various political changes since his residence on the Isthmus, and his
place being often visited the same day by scouting parties belonging to
adverse parties, he had acquired the habits of a man born in the midst
of revolutions. He had in perfection all the little arts by which a
man manages to maintain his neutrality though constantly surrounded by
circumstances tending to endanger it.
About daybreak the report of a gun was heard in the direction of Rivas;
but not much attention was given to it at the time. The march was
uninterrupted, and the force reached Virgin Bay about nine o’clock in
the morning. A few moments after Walker halted and took quarters in the
village, a well-authenticated report was brought to him that Guardiola
had marched from Rivas with a strong force the previous afternoon; but
the same report stated that he had returned to the town. The pickets
were posted; quarters were assigned the several companies, and all
prepared for a hearty breakfast after their bracing night march.
Breakfast was just over, and some of the men had already spread their
blankets for sleep, when a fire of musketry was heard in the direction
of the picket on the transit road. Then the picket of natives was seen
retiring slowly and in excellent order, firing, as it fell back with
coolness and entire regularity. The conduct of this picket, checking
as it did momentarily, the advance of the whole body of the enemy, was
admirable; and it gave the Falange time to get ready for the reception
of the attack. The picket reached the main body without loss, and they
had scarcely got to the first houses of the village before the enemy was
seen in large numbers, pressing forward rapidly along the sides of the
Transit, and to the right and left of the road, through the thick wood
which skirts its edges.
On the right of Virgin Bay, as you stand with your back to the Lake and
your face toward the Pacific, is a rising ground, offering advantages
to an enemy attacking the place; on the left, the ground is level,
though somewhat interrupted by ditches, and covered with fences made of
upright stakes, affording defence for a force within the village. Near
the lake the ground falls at once to the beach by a steep declivity,
thus forming a sort of bank for the protection of riflemen. The building
of the Accessory Transit Company, a large wooden storehouse surrounded
with palisades, stands on the edge of the village next the lake, and to
the left of the road. A small, trifling wharf then ran a few yards from
the end of the Transit into the lake; but it afforded little advantage
either for embarking or disembarking. Thus the democratic force stood
with its back to the lake, and in a few moments its front and flank were
simultaneously threatened by the enemy. It thus became necessary to fight
well or be cut to pieces; none, not even the natives under Valle, hoping
or expecting any quarter at the hands of Guardiola.
Walker’s first object was to prevent the enemy from gaining the high
ground on his right flank, and for this purpose he placed some twenty
of the Falange along the slope under cover of the weeds and bushes and
of a few small huts scattered irregularly on that side of the village.
This detachment advanced toward the enemy, creeping cautiously along, and
firing only when it could do so to advantage. At first the Legitimists
came on quite boldly; but when they got within thirty or forty yards of
the Americans their hearts seemed to fail them. The defiant air of the
Americans, shouting at the same time they fired with deadly accuracy,
appeared to appal their assailants; and the officers of the Legitimists,
marked by their black coats, and many being mounted, were seen freely
using their riding whips and the backs of their swords in order to drive
the soldiers to the use of the bayonet. But these efforts had little
effect, and Walker seeing the enemy checked on the right, turned his
attention to the other flank, which was being vigorously assailed.
Valle and Luzarraga, with the native force, had steadily resisted the
advance of the Legitimists by the centre on the transit road. At one
time the Granadinos had nearly got to a charge against the Leoneses,
and one or two of the latter actually received bayonet thrusts from the
former; but the Democrats showing a firm front, the enemy retired, thrown
into some confusion and disorder by a fire from the houses on the edge of
the village. But it was on the left flank that the Legitimists pressed
their opponents the hardest. They appeared to aim at securing a position
on the beach, and also at gaining possession of the Accessory Transit
Company’s house, whence they might assail the rear of the Democrats.
Markham, with some fifteen of the Falange, was pouring a well-directed
fire from behind the fences and palisades on the left of the village,
and a few others were deployed at irregular intervals along the beach to
prevent a lodgment there by the enemy. At one time the Legitimists had
got within thirty or thirty-five yards of the Company’s buildings, but
Gray and several others charging with revolvers had driven them back;
then Markham pressed forward toward the wood, skirting the left of the
village, and the enemy showed signs of giving way, not only in that
direction but on all sides. Soon the firing grew feebler and feebler;
Chélon was seen coming in from the transit road with the ox-carts
carrying the enemy’s ammunition; and then a loud shout from the whole
democratic force announced that the day had been won by them.
Walker’s loss was trifling, and, considering the duration of the action,
its heat, and the close distances at which the firing was done, almost
inexplicable, unless on the supposition that the Central Americans fight
better far off than near. None of the Falange were killed, though
several were wounded. Small was shot through the chest, besides being hit
in more than one place elsewhere; Benj. Williamson had a painful hurt
in the groin; Capt. Doubleday was struck in the side; and Walker was
struck in the throat by a spent ball, which knocked him to the ground
for a moment, while the letters of Castellon, in his coat pocket, were
cut to pieces. The only wound apparently fatal was that of Small, and he
recovered in a few weeks; while Williamson’s wound, seemingly trifling,
kept him in bed for months. The native Democrats had two killed and
three wounded. The loss of the enemy was large. Upward of sixty dead
were found on the field; and subsequent reports stated that over a
hundred wounded—many of whom died of their wounds—reached Rivas, whither
Guardiola retired, almost unattended, after the action.
When the wounded prisoners were examined, it was ascertained that
Guardiola had marched from Rivas the afternoon of the 2d, with about six
hundred chosen troops of the Legitimist army. He had camped over night
at Jocote, a farm-house, distant about half a league from the Half-way
house. His plan was to attack the Americans soon after daylight, at
San Juan del Sur, expecting to find them there. But on arriving at the
Half-way house he found, probably from the servants of the establishment,
as well as by the signs on the road, that Walker had just passed toward
Virgin Bay. Immediately facing about, he followed the Democratic
force—probably not more than four or five miles in their rear. He had
with him a six-pounder, with which he expected to drive the Democrats
from the houses; but on arriving at Virgin Bay, he was unable to use
the piece, through some defect in the carriage. Finding he could not
use his gun, he decided to attack at once with the bayonet. Rations of
aguardiente were distributed to the troops, and the order was given to
charge. But either the quantity of liquor was insufficient, or it may
have been too great, or it began to die out before the soldiers got close
to their adversaries. The empty demijohns which were picked up on the
road after the action looked like huge cannon-balls that had missed their
mark.
The people of the village were quite relieved when they saw Guardiola
driven back to Rivas. When the firing commenced the women and children
had sought refuge in the Company’s house; and the agent, Mr. Cortlandt
Cushing, had so arranged the trunks and boxes stored in the building
as to protect the inmates from the fire of the enemy. Although very
much frightened, the women and even the children maintained a silence
which might be the result of revolutionary training. After the danger
had passed, however, their tongues were unloosed, and the squalling of
babies, mixed up with the shrill tones of the mothers, soon brought even
the smooth-tempered agent into the open air. Fortunately, none of the
poor people were hurt; and after it became very certain the enemy did not
intend to return, they withdrew to their several houses, engaging with as
much calmness as if no war existed, in the daily round of their domestic
joys and domestic cares.
The troops, both American and native, being fatigued by the night-march
as well as by the excitement of the action, Mr. Cushing undertook
to have the dead of the enemy buried. In the meantime the wounded
Legitimists were brought in and carefully tended, the surgeon of the
Falange dressing their wounds as carefully as if they had been Democrats.
This surprised the people of the village much; and the poor fellows, who
expected to be shot, were exceedingly grateful for the attentions they
received. Details of the Leoneses were sent into the neighboring wood to
gather up the muskets thrown away by the retreating foe; and more than
a hundred and fifty of these were collected. Later in the day Valle and
Mendez, with such Americans as were able to get horses, scouted the roads
for several miles round, to see if any of the Legitimists yet lurked in
the neighborhood; but no signs of the enemy were found, and they seemed
to have disappeared as suddenly as they had appeared.
Walker’s object in marching to Virgin Bay had not been to occupy the
place, but to prevent the enemy, as well as the people of the Department,
from supposing he intended to remain entirely on the defensive, by
keeping his force shut up at San Juan del Sur. His own force would
acquire confidence by seeing its ability to pass through the country
without the fear of an attack from the enemy; and he had scarcely hoped
for so fortunate a circumstance as the march of Guardiola to Virgin Bay.
The action of the 3d of September secured the Democrats for a time from
being troubled by the Legitimists, and gave them time to gather up the
friends they had in the Meridional Department. On the afternoon of the
4th, therefore, Walker marched back to San Juan, carrying with him his
wounded, and the arms and ammunition taken from the enemy. Early the
next morning the column was seen pouring over the hill back of San Juan,
and in a short time the whole force was again quartered within the town.
Despatches were immediately sent to the Provisional Director informing
him of the incidents at Virgin Bay, and requesting, if possible, new
supplies of men and provisions, with a view to offensive operations. The
bearer of despatches arrived in Leon just in time to see the Director
die. Within an hour after the official news of the victory reached the
capital, Castellon breathed his last, yielding to the fatal cholera which
was then slaying so many scores of his countrymen and adherents. He had
fulfilled his task—an important one it was—of introducing a new element
into Central American society; and his amiable spirit—the body worn out,
probably, by the toils and troubles ill-suited to his gentle nature,
and offering an easy prey to the fearful pestilence—had gone forth to
give an account of the deeds done in the flesh. Much as his friends and
neighbors loved and respected him, their estimate of his character will
rise yet higher if they live long enough to see in maturity the fruits of
the policy he inaugurated. Leon deeply mourned his death, and time will
yet develop the fact that, soft as his nature seemed, he was destined to
have a far wider, and a far deeper, and a far more enduring effect on
the fate of Nicaragua, than was left by his stern, unyielding rival, Don
Fruto Chamorro, who preceded him only a few months—but how fruitful—to
the grave.
The despatches to Castellon were answered by the new Provisional
Director, D. Nasario Escoto, who succeeded to the office in virtue
of being the Senator of the Republic designated for the place by
the constitution of 1838. The Senator-Director warmly thanked the
expeditionary force, native and American, for the services it had
rendered, and he further wrote that the Provisional Government would use
all diligence to forward supplies from Realejo to San Juan del Sur. The
cholera, according to Don Nasario, was making much havoc about Leon,
and hence it was difficult to command labor, much less men for military
service. Besides this Walker wanted only volunteers from the natives,
and refused the forced levies by which the ranks of all factions, and
parties, and governments, are generally filled in Central America. The
Director promised to send only these, and stated the circumstances to
account for the fewness of the number.
In the meanwhile the little force at San Juan del Sur was swelling its
numbers from another source. Soon after the news of the action at Virgin
Bay spread through the country, the men of San Jorge—always democratic in
their feelings and now irritated by the arbitrary acts of the Legitimists
at Rivas—began to come with the red ribbon on their hats, asking to
receive arms and be admitted into the democratic ranks. Those, too, who
had fled to Guanacaste when the Granada Government got possession of
the Meridional Department, now returned and joined Walker with the hope
of once more getting back to their families and friends. Among these
last were Dr. Cole, an American, who had married some years previously
into a family residing near Rivas, and the three Cantons, Tranquillino,
Clemente, and Daniel. Soon, also, Don Maximo Espinosa—who had been hid
in the neighborhood of his plantation since the 29th of June—made
his appearance, and then came his son-in-law, Don Ramon Umaña. After
Espinosa’s arrival at San Juan del Sur he was charged with organizing the
civil administration of the Department in virtue of the authority given
him by the Provisional Government in the month of June previous.
Nor were deserters from the enemy’s ranks wanting. Almost every day the
men from Rivas, forced into the service by the Legitimists would manage
to escape from the barricades, and come down to San Juan del Sur to
report the numbers and situation of the enemy, and even to take up arms
to avenge the injuries they had sustained. As Walker would not permit
the native democratic officers to follow their old habit of impressment,
the people from the neighboring farms, men as well as women, came in
daily with their supplies of fruits and provisions for the soldiers. It
was difficult at first to check this inveterate habit of catching a man
and tying him up with a musket in his hand to make a soldier of him, but
seeing the good effects of the policy the officers afterward desisted
from a practice which seemed to have become almost a second nature to
them.
Soon after returning from Virgin Bay Walker had, in order to raise means
for the support of his troops, resorted to a military contribution on the
principal traders doing business at San Juan del Sur. Among others, John
Priest, the United States consul, who kept an inn and drinking-house,
was assessed at the same rate as others of his calling. Priest refused
to pay, on the ground that he was a foreign consul, showing thereby
an intelligence more akin to his inn-keeping than to his consular
character. He talked largely about having an American man-of-war brought
into port for the purpose of enabling him to sell grog quietly to
soldiers and sailors without being obliged to pay taxes for the support
of a government which could not claim him as a citizen. But as he had on
a former occasion complained loudly at the outrages said to have been
practised on his person and property by the Legitimists, but had, when
the United States sent a sloop-of-war to inquire into his grievances,
made the commander of the ship appear very ridiculous by demanding
compensation for Priest, when the latter had really signed a paper fully
exonerating the Chamorro government, the consular inn-keeper’s threats
carried little weight with them. For his contumacy, he found a native
guard placed in his house, with orders not to permit any one to pass in
or out until the assessment was paid. Not many hours elapsed before the
inn-keeper forgot his consular dignity, and came forward with the money
to pay the contribution.
There were, in fact, few sources of revenue at San Juan. Most of the
lots in the town are held by the occupants at a monthly rent, to be
paid to the State; and in addition to this there were the customs and
the monopoly of the sale of beef. These revenues, small as they were,
could not be honestly collected through means of native functionaries.
One of the Leoneses, acting as collector, was caught taking bribes from
a merchant for smuggling; and the complaints against Mendez for killing
cattle and selling beef in fraud of the revenue were almost daily. The
habit of cheating the State, prevailing in all parts of Central America,
leads to the maladministration which produces revolution; and the habit
of revolution in turn reacts and increases the disposition of officers
to make as much as possible for themselves at the public expense, since
the tenure of their offices must, necessarily, be short. It is difficult
to say which is cause and which effect; and it may be that they are both
common effects of a radically bad social organization. Nor can reforms
in revenue, either as to the method of raising or of collecting it, be
well attempted in the midst of war. The taxes to which the people are
accustomed, being those most readily collected, must be resorted to in
times when the demand for money is urgent.
Walker soon had evidences that the Legitimists found the question of
revenue as difficult as did the Democrats. Near the 20th of September the
steamer Sierra Nevada arrived at San Juan, having on board D. Guadalupe
Saënz, who had been sent to California for the purpose of raising means
to aid the government at Granada. Don Guadalupe seeing the red ribbons
on shore did not venture to land, but a detail was sent to the steamer
and searched the vessel thoroughly without, however, being able to find
the Commissioner of Estrada. His papers, less fortunate than his person,
fell into the hands of the Democrats, and showed that he had sold to
one Body of California some brazil-wood belonging to Mariano Salazar,
but then in the possession of the Legitimists, and that he had made a
contract with the same Body for the establishment of a mint in Nicaragua.
The private papers of Don Guadalupe also disclosed that while acting
for the Government he had not failed to take care of himself; and they
proved that Body had probably made good bargains, as his partner in the
contracts was no less a person than Commissioner Saënz himself. The
diary, too, kept by Don Guadalupe, revealed the singular sensation he
had when he first tasted a sherry cobbler, and recorded his deliberate
opinion as to the superiority of such a beverage over the taste of
Nicaragua.
The Sierra Nevada was not able to get coal at San Juan, and had to go to
Realejo for that purpose. It was consequently some days after her arrival
before she got off for San Francisco. A few recruits for the Falange were
obtained from the passengers for California; and they, together with some
residents of the Isthmus, who enrolled themselves in the body, swelled
its numbers to nearly sixty effective men. The strength of Valle’s
force, in spite of losses from cholera, reached over two hundred. In the
meantime the Legitimists had been recovering from the effects of Virgin
Bay. Guardiola, made more moody than ever by his late defeats, was not
sorry to yield the command to Corral, who came from Granada with a view
of directing the operations against the Democrats in person. With more
amenity of manner than the Hondureño, the legitimist commander-in-chief,
was able to conciliate many the other had repelled; but he lacked
decision and was more fertile in perceiving difficulties than in defying
or overcoming them. Not having been defeated like Guardiola—for his
skill consisted rather in avoiding action than in bringing the enemy to
blows—he was better suited to restore order to the disorganized troops
he found at Rivas, and to infuse spirit into the adherents of his party
residing in the department.
There were constant reports coming to San Juan of Corral’s intention
to advance against the democratic force. But the rainy season made the
roads difficult to pass, and swelled the water-courses so bodies of men
could not cross them with ease, unless having more facilities than are
to be found in Central American armies. A report, however, that Corral
had actually marched, coming with some probabilities of truth, induced
Walker to march out to meet him, and, if possible, bring him to action
unexpectedly. A day or two, therefore, after the steamer sailed, the
Falange, accompanied by Valle’s command, was marched late at night to the
hill, a little over a league distant from San Juan, on the transit road;
and on the side of the hill next to Virgin Bay the whole force was placed
in ambush to await the approach of Corral. The night was dark and dismal,
the rain falling now slowly and like a heavy mist, then rapidly and in
drops nearly as big as a revolver bullet; but the men stood to their
places, sheltering themselves under the large trees which cover the sides
of the hill, and being careful to keep their cartridge-boxes dry, drawing
them, for this purpose, to the front part of the belt, and bending over
so as to protect the precious powder with their bodies. Such situations
have their excitements and pleasures as well as their discomforts; and
although, when the morning came, and no enemy appeared, the force looked
wet and weather-beaten, it marched at a brisk and cheerful pace to the
Half-way house, where a ration of liquor made the men as fresh and lively
as if they had passed the night in a palace.
Hearing no tidings of the enemy from mine host at the Half-way house, who
always ran off to another subject when the news was asked or talked of,
Walker determined to continue his march to Virgin Bay. There he heard
that Corral had actually left Rivas with nearly his whole force; but on
reaching the river Lajas, the Legitimist general hearing the Democrats
had marched from San Juan, and fearing they might attack the chief
town of the Department while it was comparatively undefended, hastily
counter-marched and withdrew within his barricades. Thus Walker, by the
march to Virgin Bay, ascertained that he had only to leave San Juan del
Sur, apparently for Rivas, in order to paralyze any advance movement his
opponent might make. Besides this, however, he obtained other useful
information which hereafter materially affected the operations against
the enemy. The day he reached Virgin Bay he intercepted despatches and
letters from the _Mayor General_—literally Major General, but really
performing the duties of Adjutant General—of the Legitimist army, D.
Fernando Chamorro, to Corral; and they disclosed to the democratic
officer the destitute condition of the government at Granada and its
inability to assist its commander-in-chief at Rivas with more men.
The letters also indicated that Granada itself was almost entirely
undefended; that the spirit of its people was drooping: and that the
chiefs of the party began to despair of maintaining the war much longer
if vigorously pressed by the democratic forces.
After reading these letters and despatches, Walker sent them to Corral
with a note stating that he had taken the liberty to read them, thus
making the Legitimist general feel that his condition and prospects were
not unknown to his adversary. Walker also intimated in the note that
the country needed repose, both parties, so far as the native forces
were concerned, having nearly exhausted themselves in the long struggle.
To this note Walker soon received a reply acknowledging the receipt of
the letters and despatches from Granada, and within Corral’s answer was
a small slip of paper containing some cabalistic signs the democratic
colonel did not understand. Supposing these signs to be masonic—for it
was known Corral was a mason—Walker showed them to Captain Hornsby,
who, although a mason, seemed ignorant of their meaning. Then they were
shown to De Brissot, who, according to Hornsby’s statements, was of high
standing in the mystic order. De Brissot said the signs were masonic,
and that Corral desired by them to know whether he could communicate
confidentially with Walker. Here the correspondence ended; and it had
served the purpose of showing that Corral was not indisposed for peace
even in the then condition of affairs.
Remaining only a few hours at Virgin Bay, Walker returned with his whole
force to San Juan del Sur. Even had the condition of the roads allowed
a march to Rivas, he did not have sufficient strength for an attack on
that place. Besides this, his views were now directed elsewhere; and the
reports he received almost daily from Granada confirmed the statements
of the despatches he had intercepted. A musician by the name of Acevedo,
imprisoned at Granada for being a democrat, escaped to San Juan and gave
a full account of the state of affairs there, saying, among other things,
that there were more than a hundred democrats working in the streets with
balls and chains about their legs.
On the morning of the 3d of October the steamer Cortes from San Francisco
came into port, and soon the news spread that Colonel Charles Gilman,
one of the companions of Walker in Lower California, was aboard with
some thirty-five men. In a short time they were all ashore, each of
them carrying a rifle, and being well supplied with ammunition. Gilman
was a man of strong mind, with all the sentiments of a soldier, and
having a good store of military knowledge. He had lost a leg in Lower
California, and the wound from which he suffered long and cruelly before
the amputation of the limb, having kept him abed for many months, his
intellect seemed to have ripened rapidly during his confinement. With
him were also several others of excellent capacity. Captain George R.
Davidson, who had served in the Kentucky Regiment during the Mexican war,
was one of the company; as were also Captain A. S. Brewster, afterward
Major; John P. Waters, afterward Colonel Waters, and John M. Baldwin,
afterward Major Baldwin. They had scarcely landed ere they were sent on
service, being ordered to guard the specie train across the transit road
to Virgin Bay.
The Falange, now numbering nearly a hundred men, was at once organized
into three companies, and called a battalion. Captain Hornsby was placed
in command of it with the rank of colonel, and Colonel Gilman was
appointed lieutenant-colonel. The three captains were Markham, Brewster,
and Davidson. Lieutenant George R. Caston was made adjutant, and Captain
William Williamson, quartermaster. While, however, the Americans were
thus gaining strength in Nicaragua, they also suffered some losses.
Captain Doubleday, who had served for some time under Jerez, and had
diligently performed the duties of commissary of war under Walker, asked
and obtained leave to return to the United States. Industrious and exact
in the performance of his duties, and having from his long residence in
the country a knowledge of the language and manners of the people, he was
much missed after his departure. He left at this time because having,
without invitation, stated to Walker his opinion about certain movements
being made, the commander remarked, that “when his commissary’s opinion
was required it would be asked for.” At the time the remark was made,
it was of the first necessity for the force to feel that it had but one
head. Captain Doubleday afterward returned to the country and engaged in
its service with credit to himself and benefit to the cause.
The same day Colonel Gilman with his comrades arrived at San Juan, a
small vessel came in from Realejo, having on board a democratic officer,
Ubaldo Herrera, with some thirty-five Leoneses. These, with the recruits
who had been daily dropping in to fill the places of those cut off by
disease, raised the force under Valle to upward of two hundred and fifty
men. It became necessary, at the same time, to get rid of Mendez. His
offences were daily; and his cruelty to his men, together with his petty
peculations, destructive of discipline and order, made it expedient to
send him to Leon. He went away telling Walker he would learn that the
Nicaraguans were to be governed only with silver in one hand and the whip
in the other.
Besides the increase of numbers about this time, the democratic force was
somewhat strengthened by a small brass two-pounder brought from Leon,
and a new iron six-pounder obtained from Captain Reed of the clipper
ship Queen of the Pacific, then in port with a cargo of coal. Some days
were passed in mounting the six-pounder, and preparing ammunition for
it; and during this period, the organization and discipline of the whole
force were being improved. Finally all was ready for a march, and on the
morning of the 11th Walker moved with his whole force to Virgin Bay, and
arrived there a little after dark of the same day.
Chapter Fourth.
GRANADA, OCTOBER THIRTEENTH, 1855.
It was expected that the steamer La Virgen, belonging to the Accessory
Transit Company, would arrive at Virgin Bay the evening of the 11th,
and the democratic force had scarcely got into quarters before it was
announced that she was in sight. A sentry had been previously posted
near the wharf with orders to prevent any boat from leaving the village
without permission; and as soon as the steamer appeared, Colonel Hornsby
was ordered to go aboard when she cast anchor and take possession of
her. He executed the order without Capt. Joseph N. Scott, who was on
the Virgen, knowing his object until he had accomplished it. Both Mr.
Cushing, the agent of the company, and Capt. Scott, protested against the
use of the vessel for military purposes, as well as against the forcible
possession. Mr. Cushing said he had the assurance of the United States
Government, that it considered these vessels of the Accessory Transit
Company American property, under the American flag; but he had been
in the diplomatic service of the United States, and was too familiar
with the first principles of public law, to imagine that persons acting
under the authority of Nicaragua would regard any such interpretation
of her rights of sovereignty. The Accessory Transit Company was a
creature of the government of Nicaragua; and its vessels were by the
very terms of its charter under the Nicaraguan flag. Even, however, had
the property been that of a neutral, and not of a subject, it would have
been permissible to use it temporarily for the purpose of transporting
troops. It is not at all true, as has been sometimes asserted, that
the steamer was there by concert between Walker and the agent of the
company; on the contrary, the latter had always resisted the idea of
permitting the vessels of the corporation to be used in any manner by the
belligerents, and the former, to disarm Mr. Cushing of any suspicions he
might entertain, had always protested that he knew of no way in which the
steamers could aid the objects he had in view.
From the time the steamers appeared the camp was doubly guarded, and
no one was allowed to leave the village. Thus the enemy was kept in
ignorance of the fact, that the Virgen was in the possession of the
democratic force. The next day preparations were made for embarking the
whole command aboard the steamer; and by four or half-past four in the
afternoon, the last boat-full of men was alongside. Soon the order was
given to weigh anchor, and the prow of the steamer was turned toward
Granada. When the natives saw whither the force was moving, their joy
was extravagant. It became necessary, however, to keep them quiet, and
as much concealed as possible, in order not to attract attention from
the shore, as the scouts of the enemy could be plainly perceived at
intervals along the beach. On approaching Granada the lights on the
steamer were extinguished, the canvas curtains were let down from the
roof of the upper deck, and the boat was kept off from the fort, so as
not to be seen by the sentries stationed there.
Near ten o’clock at night the steamer was anchored near the shore, about
three miles to the north of Granada. A line was made fast to a large
tree on the beach, and the disembarkation was effected by pulling an
iron launch from the steamer by means of the cable fastened ashore. It
was about three o’clock in the morning when the last body of men landed;
and the horses which had been brought up for the use of Valle and Gilman
made a great noise at the last trip of the launch. No doubt the noise
appeared greater than it was to those who were anxious to keep their
movements quiet and secret. After all had landed, the column was formed
with some difficulty owing to the darkness of the night, the thickness of
the forest trees, and the entire ignorance of the officers and soldiers
in regard to the nature of the ground. At last the order to march was
given, the Falange in front, the native force in the rear. Ubaldo
Herrera, a native of Granada, undertook to act as the guide. While it
was dark the march was perplexed and difficult; but as soon as day broke
Herrera seemed to know precisely where he was, and in a few minutes the
column reached the road running from the city to Los Cocos. One or two
market-people whom he met informed Walker that all was quiet in the city,
nobody expecting an attack, or apprehending the approach of an enemy.
The Democrats had got to within half a mile of the town, and the first
rays of the rising sun had begun to warm the eastern heavens, when
suddenly all the bells of the city were heard ringing a quick and joyful
peal. Some of the Americans thought the bells were a signal of alarm,
and that their tone showed confidence on the part of the enemy, as if
welcoming an attack. But the ringing was really to celebrate a triumph
Martinez had over the Democrats at Pueblo Nuevo, two days previously.
The bells were yet pealing, when the advanced guard of the Falange
reached the first huts on the outskirts of the town. Then the Americans
seeing, from the startled air of the people in the suburbs, that the
Legitimists were completely taken by surprise, threw off their coats
and dropped their blankets, rushing forward with a shout to gain the
first barricades. The gaunt form of Hornsby in the van served as a sort
of guide for those behind. On they pressed, and the first shots of the
enemy were from the old convent of San Francisco; but these were few and
straggling, and scarcely checked for a moment the impetuous march of the
Falange. A shout from the advance announces that the Plaza is won, and
the last few shots were fired from the gallery of the government house
as Walker entered the square. Then the streets leading from the Plaza
were searched in vain for the flying enemy. In fact, the Legitimist force
in the town had been trifling, and the encounter between it and the
Democrats could scarcely be dignified with the name of an action. Two or
three of the Legitimists were killed, and a drummer-boy under Valle was
the whole loss of the Democrats. As Norris, the drummer of the Falange
afterward said, when asking to be excused from serving as drum-major,
“In every battle scene you see a drummer-boy lying dead by the side of
his drum.”
When the Democrats entered the town all the doors and windows were
closed and the several national flags were flying from the houses of
the foreign residents—a flag being a very useful piece of furniture to
foreigners of equivocal character and doubtful nationality in Central
American countries. As soon, however, as the confusion of the collision
was over, the houses and doors began to be cautiously opened. The house
of the American Minister was about the first to unclose its portals; and
its saloon and chamber and court yard presented a curious spectacle.
Eighty or a hundred women and children were huddled together seeking
safety under the folds of the American flag. There was the gentle dame
who thought the Democrats were all robbers and murderers because they
made war on the old aristocracy of the land and the humble servant-girl
who imagined the Leoneses would kill her because her father or brother
had followed the fortunes of his legitimist master rather than take up
arms in defence of the rights of his class. In their fancies a filibuster
was a sort of centaur with far more of the beast than of the man in his
nature; and their surprise was great to hear the Americans speak mildly
and conduct themselves quietly after the noise of the fray was over.
Walker had gone for a moment to the house of the Minister in order to
answer some of the demands made on his attention there and was returning
thence across the Plaza toward the Government House, when he saw several
of the native soldiers heavily laden with merchandise trotting hastily
along the opposite side of the square. On approaching them they did not
halt until ordered, nor did they seem to imagine they were doing aught
to anger their chief. It was clear from their manner that they thought
the town was to be given up for sack. But Walker, placing his sword at
the breast of one of them, called the guard and ordered the offenders
to be arrested and the goods restored to their owners. The order was
immediately given to the Falange to remain under arms in order to protect
the property of the citizens. There were some murmurs among the native
soldiers, especially among those who had themselves suffered either in
their property or their persons or in those of their families; but the
co-operation of Valle was soon obtained and the disorders were to a great
extent arrested.
But on another point Valle was less yielding. In the course of the
morning D. Dionisio Chamorro and D. _Toribio_ Jerez had presented
themselves to Walker under the assurance of their persons being
respected, and they had been consigned to the charge of M. Bernard, a
French subject, in whose house they resided and with whom they were
connected by marriage. As the two well-known legitimists were passing
the streets on their way home they caught the eye of Valle, and the old
democrat immediately ordered them to follow him to Walker’s quarters.
By the time Chélon arrived at the quarters he was in a sort of frenzy
rhapsodizing about his losses, the death of his brother, the death of his
friends, and the cruelties of the Legitimists, and declaiming against all
who showed mercy to the hateful Granadinos. A little brandy for which
he had a keen relish, no doubt added fuel to the flame of his feelings
and inspired some of the eloquence which rolled rapidly from his lips.
In vain Walker tried to soothe his irritation; soft words seemed oil
to the fire of his passion. Then changing his tone Walker assumed the
language of authority, reminded Chélon that he was his superior and that
any disobedience of orders would be summarily punished. Dismissing the
legitimists to their house under the escort of Americans, he informed
Valle that any one interfering with their persons would do so at his
peril. The fierce old democrat retired muttering something about the
Granadian bullet in his leg; but he got over his wrath, and in the
evening was as ready as ever for a serenade or a charge, according as the
circumstances called for one or the other.
A prisoner of consideration was made in the person of D. Mateo Mayorga,
the secretary of relations under Estrada. He was placed on his parole in
the house of the American Minister. Other leading legitimists presented
themselves in the course of the day, and were put under the protection of
the American rifles.
Nearly a hundred prisoners were released from their chains by the capture
of Granada. They had been arrested for political offences, and some of
them were under sentence of death. Among them were D. Cleto Mayorga,
son-in-law of D. Patricio Rivas and cousin of D. Mateo Mayorga, the
Minister of Relations; an American by the name of Bailey, confined, as he
said, on suspicion of favoring the democratic cause; and a youth by the
name of Tejada, brother to D. Rafael Tejada, commissioner under Estrada
to settle the differences between the Republic and the Accessory Transit
Company. All these prisoners asked for arms and were incorporated into
the democratic forces, so that before the night of the 13th the aggregate
of the troops occupying Granada amounted to near four hundred and fifty
men.
A short time after entering the city, on the morning of the 13th, Walker
met, on the Plaza, D. Carlos Thomas, a foreign merchant, long resident
in the place, and D. Fermin Ferrer, a landholder of Chontales, but who
resided at Granada, and was familiar with the routine of public business.
Ferrer was appointed prefect, and entered immediately on the discharge
of his duties. Thomas rendered much service to Walker, by his knowledge
of men and things in Granada; and among other functions he performed was
that of writer of proclamations. He spoke and wrote English, French,
and Spanish, with equal facility, and probably equal elegance, his
English being, however, more Johnsonese than idiomatic, and his French
and Spanish being probably tinged with the same fault. The swell of
his sentences was perfectly Ciceronian, when, with a glass or two of
brandy in his head, he began to dilate on the grandeur of the present
crisis in Nicaragua; and the exuberance of his feelings overflowed in a
proclamation he wrote out for Walker, and had published, somewhat to the
annoyance of the latter, when he saw his signature appended in print to
an address teeming with the rhetoric which characterizes Spanish-American
productions. The proclamation, however, though offensive to taste, did
some good; for the purport of it was, that protection would be given to
all interests, and that none need refuse to return to their homes through
fear of political persecution.
For a short time after entering the city, Walker took up his quarters at
the house of a woman of middle age, called generally, by the people, Niña
Yrena. Her family name was Irish, and she was probably the descendant
of an Irish officer in the Spanish service, sent to the colonies before
the independence. A quick and minute observer, with all the gravity and
apparent indifference of the native race, she had rendered much service
to the legitimist party in days past; and even the stern nature of Fruto
Chamorro owned her sway, and yielded to her influence, when all others
failed to move him. The private relations which it is said, and probably
with truth, existed between her and D. Narciso Espinosa, a leading man
among the Legitimists, enabled her to breathe her spirit into the party
after the death of Chamorro had taken away the unity it before possessed.
The Niña was fertile in resources for sending intelligence to her
friends; and hence the headquarters of the force occupying Granada were
soon fixed at the government house on the Plaza.
The 14th was Sunday, and at the eight o’clock mass Walker, with a number
of other officers, attended, the curate of the city, Father Vigil,
preaching a sermon, in which he exhorted to peace, moderation, and the
putting away of revolutionary passions. Sketching rapidly the history
of Nicaragua, since her independence, he dwelt on the miseries which
had flowed from the civil license of the period, and pointed out the
necessity to the country of a force strong enough to curb the political
passions which had hitherto rent asunder families, and friends, and
neighborhoods. None could object to the good Father’s sentiments,
and the effect of his sermon on the people was excellent and decided.
Nor were Father Vigil’s labors in the cause of peace confined to the
pulpit; he warmly co-operated with Walker in his efforts to make such an
arrangement between parties as would put an end to the civil war; and
the thorough knowledge of men and things he had, from long practice of
the duties of parish priest at Granada, made his counsel valuable in the
negotiations which followed the 13th of October.
The chief object Walker had in view, when he marched on Granada was, by
securing the main depots of the enemy, to place himself in a position
to make the best terms possible with Corral for the advantage of the
democratic party, and especially for the policy Castellon adopted, of
introducing an American element into Nicaraguan society. Corral had
already shown Walker that he was not unwilling to treat for terms;
but, of course, it was more advantageous for the latter to treat at
Granada than on the Transit, though the possession of the Transit was
intrinsically more important to the Americans than the occupation of a
town forty or fifty miles from the line of travel across the Isthmus.
Hence he did not contemplate, at first, the permanent occupation,
regarding his possession of the place merely as a means of getting good
terms from Corral, in case a treaty could be negotiated.
Accordingly, as soon as order was established, steps were taken for
communicating with Corral. The municipal authorities met and requested
Walker to take the Presidency of the Republic. This he declined,
suggesting, however, that if Corral were placed in the Executive, after
proper terms were agreed on between the contending parties, he would
undertake, as commander-in-chief, to maintain order within the State. On
the part, then, of the town, commissioners were appointed, the principal
being D. Hilario Selva and D. Rosario Vivas, to go to Rivas and urge on
Corral the expediency of an arrangement between the two parties which
divided the Republic. At the same time these commissioners proceeded by
land, D. Juan Ruiz, Minister of War, under Estrada, and Hon. Mr. Wheeler,
the American Minister, would go by the steamer to San Jorge with a view
of placing the same subject before Corral. Mr. Wheeler was urged to this
course by the Legitimists themselves. The families of the town insisted
that he should go with Ruiz, supposing the weight of his position might
influence Corral to treat with Walker, and thus get rid of the hated
Leoneses.
Mr. Wheeler accordingly took the steamer, and in company with D. Juan
Ruiz proceeded to Rivas. When he arrived there he found that Corral had
marched north on the afternoon of the 14th; and D. Florencio Xatruch,
the friend and comrade of Guardiola, was in command of the Legitimist
troops in the Meridional Department. The Minister and his secretary
were kept under guard by Xatruch for two days, and they only made good
their escape—for so it may be called—by the spirit and resolution of Mr.
Wheeler. After his arrival at Virgin Bay, on his return from Rivas, the
minister received a note from Corral, dated at his headquarters, the
17th of October, informing Mr. Wheeler that he would not be responsible
for his personal safety, and that he had communicated an account of his
conduct to Mr. Marcy, the Secretary of State, and to the New-York papers.
The Minister returned to Granada without seeing Corral, and D. Juan Ruiz
failing to keep his parole, tied to Costa Rica.
Selva, Vivas, and the other commissioners who went by land toward Rivas,
met Corral, on his march northward, near Nandaime. From that place they
sent a communication to Walker, saying that it was impossible to get
Corral to treat on any terms; but the next morning Walker got a note from
the Legitimist commander, complaining of some Democrats firing on a party
of his troops while commissioners were in his camp asking for peace.
As no cessation of hostilities had been agreed on, or even proposed as
preliminary to the negotiations, the note of Corral showed his anxiety to
keep up a correspondence and suggested the inference that he was desirous
of an arrangement with Walker. The reply of the democratic commander
was to the effect that no armistice having been agreed to, he should
continue to carry on the war as vigorously as possible. Though the reply
called for no answer, the Legitimist general wrote to say that Walker
could scarcely expect any peace to be made on the principles held and
enunciated by the native Democrats in his camp. To this, of course, no
reply was made, and the negotiations ceased until other events brought
them to a speedy and a favorable termination.
On the 17th of October the steamer Uncle Sam arrived at San Juan del
Sur, having on board Col. Birkett D. Fry, Parker H. French, and about
sixty other Americans for the service of the Provisional Government.
They were all armed with rifles and well supplied with ammunition. On
landing they were organized in two companies commanded respectively by
Capt. S. C. Asten and Capt. Chas. Turnbull. Edward J. Sanders acted as
major, and French had, without authority, promised the rank of colonel to
Fry. A brass six-pounder, with some ammunition for it, was obtained from
the steamer; and then a most irregular march, considering the presence
of the enemy at Rivas, was made across the Transit to Virgin Bay. There
they found the steamer waiting to convey the California passengers to the
Toro Rapids. French urged Fry to take the steamer, the passengers being
also aboard, and proceed to San Carlos with a view of taking that place
from the enemy. It was a most foolish if not criminal act, to take the
passengers on the boat destined for such an expedition, and no benefit
could be expected to result from an undertaking commenced under such
circumstances. On arriving opposite San Carlos the works appeared too
strong for their force; it was suddenly discovered that the supply of
caps was insufficient, and the Virgin was wisely put about and steamed
over to Granada. Fry’s recruits were landed, and the passengers for the
Atlantic States returned to Virgin Bay.
The existing circumstances made it necessary to overlook the acts of Fry
and French. At the conduct of the latter Walker was not much surprised;
but he had been led by the opinions of others to expect from Fry a more
discreet and regular course. The reputation of the latter, as a soldier,
had been gained by service in the Voltigeur Regiment during the Mexican
war; and the friends of the Nicaraguan cause in California had considered
him a valuable accession to the enterprise. Amiable in manner and
honorable in sentiment, he had many qualities to conciliate esteem; but
a lack of firmness and decision made him too often yield to the evil and
inconsiderate suggestions of others. As he had left California under the
impression that he was to receive the rank of colonel, it was given to
him; and at the same time Sanders, who had much more energy of character,
was made major. French was made commissary of war, with the hope that his
industry might be useful in the office, while, being under the control of
another, his imprudence, to say nothing of more serious defects, might be
prevented from doing harm.
After the passengers from California returned to Virgin Bay from Granada,
and while they were waiting at the former place for an opportunity to
pass down the river to San Juan del Norte, a body of soldiers from Rivas
entered the village, and firing indiscriminately, killed three of the
passengers (American citizens), and wounded several others, rifling at
the same time the pockets of those who were killed. The house of the
Accessory Transit Company was broken into and plundered; and the agent,
Mr. Cushing, was taken a prisoner to Rivas, whence he was released only
after the payment of a fine of two thousand dollars.
Nor were the passengers from New-York less unfortunate than those from
California. The Legitimist commandant at San Carlos fired a twenty-four
pound shot into the steamer as she passed from the river to the lake,
killing a woman and her infant, and taking away the foot of another
child. In such a state of affairs it was foolish, of course, to attempt
to pass into the river with the California passengers. They, therefore,
returned to Granada until some means might be found for passing safely to
San Juan del Norte; and at the same time news was brought to Walker of
the events of Virgin Bay and on the lake.
Such conduct on the part of officers, acting under color of the
Legitimist government, called for retaliation and punishment in order to
prevent its recurrence. Accordingly, early on the morning of the 22d, and
soon after the news of the murders at Virgin Bay and on the lake reached
Granada, Walker ordered D. Mateo Mayorga to be shot on the main Plaza.
Mayorga was a member of the cabinet of Estrada, and was, therefore,
morally responsible for the outrages and barbarities practised by those
holding a military commission from the Legitimist authorities. He was
executed soon after the order was given to the officer of the day, Ubaldo
Herrera, and a file of Leoneses were detailed for the duty. All the
native democratic officers approved the act, and they then remarked the
Americans would hereafter learn that their mercy to the Legitimists was
injustice to themselves.
In the meantime, Corral had reached Masaya and was there behind
barricades with a large proportion of the Legitimist strength; while
Martinez, who had driven the Democrats from Pueblo Nuevo, on the 11th of
the month, falling back on Managua after the surprise of Granada, was
again assailed by an irregular body of Leoneses under General Mateo
Pineda and Mariano Mendez. This was the position of affairs when, on the
morning of the 22d, D. Pedro Rouhaud, a French subject long resident at
Granada, went to Masaya, in order to inform Corral of Mayorga’s execution
and the causes for it, and also to say that all the Legitimist families
of the city would be held as hostages for the future good conduct of
Estrada’s officers toward American women and children, and toward
non-combatants generally. This message naturally produced a deep effect,
not only on Corral but on all the officers at Masaya, since most of them
had families or relatives then in Granada. Accordingly it was resolved
that Corral should go to Walker’s camp with full powers to treat for
peace, and D. Pedro Rouhaud returned late on the evening of the 22d with
the gratifying intelligence.
Col. Fry, with a mounted escort of Americans, was immediately ordered to
the neighborhood of Masaya, to meet the Legitimist general, and accompany
him to Granada. A little after nine o’clock on the morning of the 23d, it
was announced that Corral, with the escort, had reached the powder-house,
just outside of the city, on the Masaya road; and Walker, with a number
of the democratic officers, rode out to meet him. The commanders of the
two forces, after saluting each other, rode side by side through the main
street leading to the Plaza. As they passed, the doors and windows of the
houses were filled with women and children, dressed in the bright colors
affected by the people of the country, and smiling through tears at the
prospect of peace. On the Plaza the whole democratic force was drawn up
to receive the commanding-general of the Legitimists; and arms were put
into the hands of many of the California passengers, and they were drawn
up in as good array as possible, to impress Corral with an idea of the
American strength of the democratic army. Then the two commanders retired
to the government house, in order to open negotiations.
Corral produced his authority from Estrada, empowering him
_omnimodamente_—in all respects—to treat for the Legitimist government
without the necessity for ratification, thus beforehand making his acts
the acts of the government. Walker had no powers from the government
whose commission he held; and Corral treated with him simply as colonel
commanding the forces occupying Granada—it being understood that, in case
a treaty was agreed on, it should be sent to Leon for ratification. The
Legitimist general seemed disposed to take the lead in the negotiation,
and Walker permitted him to develop freely the terms he desired, saying
little by way either of objection or amendment. After some consultation,
the outlines of a treaty were agreed on, and Corral undertook to draw it
up for signature.
The treaty, therefore, as signed, was nearly altogether the work of
Corral. By it peace was established between the contending parties,
and a Provisional Government was established, with D. Patricio Rivas
as executive, for the space of fourteen months, unless an election was
previously called. Walker was to be placed in command of the army, and
all officers of both sides were to retain their respective ranks and
rates of pay. All debts contracted during the war, by either party, were
to become debts of the Republic; and to provide for the liquidation of
these claims, a Minister of Public Credit was to be added to the usual
Cabinet officers. At Corral’s suggestion, the Americans were to be
retained in the military service of the State; and the only clause in
the treaty inserted at Walker’s instance, without a previous suggestion
from Corral, was that by which the articles of the Constitution of
1838, concerning naturalization, were to remain the law of the land.
All badges of previous parties were to be thrown aside, and the troops
of the Republic were to wear a blue ribbon with the device, “Nicaragua
Independiente.” The foreigners, principally French, who had been in the
Legitimist service, were to remain in the army or not, at their choice;
and the contracts made with them as to pay and lands, as well as those
made with the Americans by Castellon, became obligations of the State.
Martinez was to remain in command at Managua, and Xatruch at Rivas.
On the afternoon of the 23d, Corral and Walker were together, at the
house of a merchant of the city, when news came that a steamer was in
sight, apparently from San Carlos. The Americans, as well as the native
Democrats, were suspicious of bad faith, and apprehended an attack might
be made on them while the enemy was appearing to treat. These suspicions
turned out to be groundless, as the vessel was the Central America, which
had come from Toro Rapids with the news that the Legitimist garrisons at
San Carlos and at Castillo had disappeared, thus leaving the river open
for the safe passage of those going to the Atlantic side. Thus the props
of the Legitimists seemed to crumble and give way under the influence of
the loss of Granada.
The treaty having been signed Corral at once returned to Mayasa, with
the understanding that he would enter Granada at a time to be hereafter
agreed upon between himself and Walker. The Transit passengers then in
Granada left the same day, and Capt. Joseph N. Scott carried to Don
Patricio Rivas the news of events at Granada, and the offer to bring him
immediately to the capital by the Company’s steamer. Valle and Ferrer
were despatched to Leon with the treaty, and with the request from Walker
that the democratic force be withdrawn from the attack on Managua.
In the meantime, means had been provided for setting the Provisional
Government in motion as soon as Rivas arrived. Among the passengers by
the Cortes, arriving on the 3d of October, was Mr. C. J. Macdonald, a
Scotchman, who had been for some time resident in California. He was
introduced to Walker by Col. Gilman, with the assurance from the latter
that he possessed the confidence of Garrison, the agent of the Accessory
Transit Company at San Francisco. Macdonald was at Granada when the
treaty was signed, and proposed to advance twenty thousand dollars of the
treasure in transit from California to New York on the faith of the new
government. French, being Commissary of War, brought the proposition to
Walker, and the latter refused to take advantage of it without knowing
Macdonald’s authority to act. Accordingly a power from C. K. Garrison to
Macdonald, vaguely drawn, but still constituting him a general agent in
Nicaragua, was shown, and, after asking Gilman particularly about the
relations between Macdonald and Garrison in California, so as to be able
to interpret the power fully, Walker acceded to the proposition. The bars
were landed from the steamer under protest from Scott, and Macdonald
drew on Charles Morgan in New-York for the value of them. Obligations
were given by the Commissary of War pledging the State to repayment with
interest, and securing the debt by pledging dues from the Accessory
Transit Company. It may be worth while to state that the drafts of
Macdonald on Morgan were duly honored.
This amount was of signal service at the time, for the governments of
both Leon and Granada were then entirely without means. Soon after the
Democrats occupied Granada, a contribution had been levied by the prefect
on the Department, but little had been collected under it. The treasurer
of the Fund of Public Instruction should, according to all accounts, have
had some thousands of the public moneys in his possession; when, however,
he was called on to produce the fund with a view of placing it, for a
time, in the general fund, he paid over to the Treasurer of State only
a few hundred dollars. To show the utter destitution of the Legitimists
it is only necessary to state that the day after the treaty was signed,
Corral drew on Walker for five hundred dollars to pay the daily expenses
of the force at Masaya and Managua.
A day or two after the treaty was signed a general order was read
forbidding the use of the red ribbon, and commanding the democratic
force in Granada to mount the blue ribbon, with the device “Nicaragua
Independiente.” There were loud murmurs on the part of the Leoneses when
the order was published, and some of them absolutely refused to take
the red ribbon from their hats. Several were punished before the order
could be enforced, and afterward some of the ardent Democrats would tie
a narrow piece of red about their musket barrels. It is possible that
Corral had some of the same difficulties in substituting the blue for
the white; but the Legitimists were far more orderly and submissive to
authority than were the Democrats.
On the 28th it was agreed between the two commanders that Corral and
his troops should, on the next day, enter Granada. At an early hour the
hum of preparation was heard in the city, and about eleven o’clock it
was announced that the Legitimists were on the edge of the town. The
democratic force, American as well as native, was drawn up in line of
battle on the western side of the Plaza, and Corral marched in by the
street from the Masaya road. Thus, in case of any hostile movement—and
there were many suspicions of such—on the part of the Legitimists, the
Democrats would have been able to act with advantage from the public
square down the streets leading to it. The accidental discharge of a
single musket or rifle would have led to serious consequences, for each
party was suspicious of the good faith of the other. Fortunately no
disagreeable or untoward incident occurred. The two commanders approached
each other near the centre of the square, and, after embracing,
dismounted, walking arm in arm to the church on the east side of the
Plaza. Attended by numerous officers, both Legitimist and Democratic,
they were met at the door of the church by Father Vigil and conducted
toward the high altar. A Te Deum was sung, and then Corral and Walker
passed from the church to the government house, on the opposite side of
the square. The troops marched from the Plaza toward the several quarters
assigned them, with orders to the officers to keep the soldiers out of
the streets and away from the liquor-shops during the day, so that no
affray might arise to disturb the general peace of the city.
D. Patricio Rivas having arrived on the 30th, it was decided that his
inauguration should take place immediately. The Cabildo was the scene of
the ceremony, and a table was prepared within the railing which separates
the raised portion of the public chamber from the part occupied by the
people. A crucifix with an open copy of the Gospels was placed on one end
of the table, and Father Vigil took his seat to put in form the procés
verbal recording the installation. The formal record being completed,
D. Patricio Rivas knelt on a cushion before the crucifix swearing to
observe the treaty of the 23d of October, and to perform the duties of
Provisional President in accordance with its stipulations. Then Corral,
by a slight gesture, intimated to Walker that they both were to take
an oath on the occasion. No agreement of the sort had been made on the
subject, and it is possible that Corral had no sinister purpose in thus
attempting to take Walker by surprise. But the American did not appear to
hesitate. Kneeling in the same manner with the President, he swore on the
Holy Gospels to observe, and cause to be observed, the treaty of the 23d,
and Corral took the same oath, the form of it being prepared in his own
handwriting. After the oath had been taken and recorded, all retired to
their several quarters, Corral and the President abiding together at that
time.
In fact, for two or three days Corral seemed to have the new executive in
his keeping. The afternoon of the 29th he clearly thought the Legitimists
had gained the advantage over the Leoneses; for passing by the house of
Niña Yrena, who stood at the door to ask the general what he thought of
the turn affairs had taken, he replied in the language of the cock-pit,
“We have beaten them (the Democrats) with their own cock.” The Niña shook
her head incredulously, but Corral was in high spirits, and would not
listen to her doubts.
Rivas had been collector of customs for the port of San Juan del Norte,
resident at Castillo, or San Carlos, under the Legitimist government; and
although moderate in his political opinions, was naturally disposed to
take part with the Granadinos against the Leoneses. Corral was forthwith
made minister of war and also minister general; and nothing was said to
Walker about the formation of a Cabinet. On the 30th, a decree from the
ministry appointed Walker commander-in-chief; and the minister intimated
to him that it would be necessary to take an oath of office. When Corral,
on the morning of the 31st, invited Walker to the executive chamber in
order to administer the oath, he remarked that it was a mere form, but in
accordance with usage. Although Walker had been educated a Protestant, he
had no objections to kneeling before the crucifix—the symbol of salvation
to all Christians—and if the Legitimist expected to gain a point by the
refusal of the American to take the oath, he was, as in the case the day
before, disappointed.
On the 31st, Jerez, with a number of the leading citizens of Leon arrived
at Granada, bearing the news of the ratification of the treaty by the
Provisional Director, D. Nasario Escoto and his cabinet. At the same
time Walker received decrees of the government at Leon, issued some
days previously, promoting him first, to the rank of brigadier-general,
then to the rank of general of division. The appearance of the Leoneses
evidently annoyed Corral; and he had not expected so ready a ratification
of the treaty. Their presence was, on the contrary, very acceptable to
the new commander-in-chief; for there were previously no native Democrats
at Granada, sufficiently familiar with public business to take part in
the administration.
Carlos Thomas had been much worried by the course of the new President
before the arrival of Jerez and the Democrats. He had signified to Don
Patricio that matters would go badly if he continued to remain entirely
in the hands of Corral. The brother of Don Carlos also, D. Emilio Thomas,
a man of excellent sense, and of most honorable character, perceived the
error of Rivas in trusting implicitly to the counsels of the minister
of war, and did what he could to change the course affairs seemed to be
taking. The President saw that it would be necessary for him to rely on
some others than Corral, if he expected to bring the Democrats to the
support of his administration; and, therefore, he came to consult with
Walker in reference to the formation of a cabinet.
As the Legitimists were represented in the cabinet by their former
commander-in-chief, it was only fair that the Democrats should insist on
the appointment of Jerez to the Ministry of Relations. Walker suggested
this; but when it was mentioned to Corral, he evinced the most bitter
opposition to the proposal. He thought it would be impossible for himself
and Doctor Jerez—as he insisted on calling the general, D. Maximo—to act
together in the same cabinet. The principles of Jerez were, according to
his opinion, disorganizing and destructive of all civil society. The name
of D. Buenaventura Selva was also mentioned; but he was, if possible,
more unpalatable, than Jerez. To D. Fermin Ferrer, as Minister of Public
Credit, no serious objection was made; and as French was ambitious of
a seat in the cabinet, it was agreed in the struggle between the two
parties, that he should be appointed Minister of Hacienda. The main
difficulty was concerning the Minister of Relations; and Rivas, seeing
Walker insist on the appointment of Jerez, finally overcame or silenced
the objections of Corral, and the cabinet was completed with the name of
the chief of the Leoneses.
The government, then, of President Rivas being fully organized, under the
treaty of the 23d, by the appointment of Jerez, Minister of Relations,
Corral, Minister of War, Ferrer, Minister of Public Credit, and French,
Minister of Hacienda, the first step was to establish the army on a peace
footing. With this view all the natives in Granada who desired discharges
obtained them. The desire of the soldiers to go to their homes was
universal, the military service being distasteful to most of them. On the
4th of November the Legitimist troops who had marched in from Masaya were
entirely disbanded, and not many of the native Democrats remained in the
service. Thus one of the first results of the treaty was to release more
than fifteen hundred men from the ranks of the army, sending them forth
to supply the demand for labor then existing generally throughout the
State.
The Americans thus remained the chief military defence of the government,
and all parties looked to them for the maintenance of peace and order.
It was through their instrumentality that the treaty was made; not
a treaty, as has been often said, made by two military chiefs, but
sanctioned and ratified by two contending governments representing the
parties into which the whole people of the country was divided. The act
of the twenty-third of October was, therefore, in the fullest sense of
the word, the act of the sovereignty of Nicaragua; and therefore no party
had the right to say that the Americans were domiciliated in the State
and engaged in its military service without its consent. The contract of
Castellon was acknowledged by the Legitimist authorities as the contract
of the Republic. Both Democrats and Legitimists expressed gratitude for
the services the Americans had already rendered; and the new Provisional
Government, whose orders were now recognized and obeyed throughout the
whole State, looked to them as its tower of strength and bulwark of
defence.
But in the midst of the general joy for peace there suddenly arose a
voice to disturb the public repose. On the morning of the 5th of November
Valle brought to Walker a package of letters which had been given him by
a courier Martinez despatched from Managua to the Honduras frontier. The
courier, it seems, was a democrat who had been imprisoned at Managua,
as he alleged, for political offences; and Martinez had given him his
liberty in order that he might carry the letters intrusted to him as
far as Yuscaran. After getting away from Managua, however, the democrat
suspecting there was something wrong in the package of papers given
him, turned his steps toward Granada, and on arriving there delivered
the letters to Valle. Walker found one of the letters addressed, in
the handwriting of Corral, to D. Pedro Xatruch at Tegucigalpa, and
another in the same handwriting to the Señora D. Ana Arbizu also at
Tegucigalpa. Another of the letters was addressed to the same Doña Ana in
the handwriting of Martinez; and as the Señora Arbizu was known to be a
friend of Guardiola, the letters were opened and the two from Corral were
sufficient to amaze any one who had heard him a few days before solemnly
swear to observe the treaty of the twenty-third.
The letter addressed to D. Pedro Xatruch read as follows:—“Friend Don
Pedro: We are badly, badly, badly off. Remember your friends. They have
left me what I have on, and I hope for your aid. Your friend, P. Corral.”
That addressed to the Señora Arbizu was marked “private,” and read:
“Granada, November 1st, 1855. General D. Santos Guardiola: My Esteemed
Friend: It is necessary that you write to friends to advise them of the
danger we are in, and that they work actively. If they delay two months
there will not then be time. Think of us and of your offers. I salute
your lady; and commend your friend who truly esteems you and kisses your
hand, P. Corral. Nicaragua is lost; lost Honduras, San Salvador and
Guatemala, if they let this get body. Let them come quickly if they would
meet auxiliaries.”
In order to fully understand these letters it is necessary to remember
that just after the treaty was signed Guardiola and D. Pedro Xatruch had
left Masaya for Honduras, by way of Segovia, they having there heard
of the entrance of Lopez into Comayagua on the morning of the 14th of
October, and of the flight of Cabañas to San Salvador. The letter of
Corral to Guardiola shows that the latter had made offers of assistance
and letters from D. Florencio Xatruch, contained in the same package
placed in Valle’s hands and forwarded by Martinez, showed his desire to
return with his brother and friend to Honduras, but that he had been
detained at the urgent entreaties of Legitimist comrades. Hence the
insertion by Corral in the treaty of the clause leaving Managua in the
hands of Martinez and Rivas in the hands of Xatruch. And the plot was
clearly against the Americans; for the “if they let this get body” could
refer to none else.
As soon as Walker read these letters the guard was strengthened, and
orders were given to let none pass out of the town. Officers were sent
to the houses of the principal Legitimists, requesting their presence
at Walker’s quarters, and the President and members of the Cabinet were
invited to attend at the same place. When all had assembled the letters
of Corral were produced, and the commander-in-chief charged him with
treason, by inviting the enemies of the State to invade Nicaragua,
and conspiring with them for the purpose of overturning the existing
government. The minister of war admitted that he wrote the letters;
most of those present knew his handwriting, and every one saw their
genuineness. All appeared surprised at the contents of them, none more
so than D. Patricio Rivas; and a general stupefaction appeared to
pervade the Legitimists. Among the Democrats there was an expression of
suppressed pleasure, and the energy of Jerez was especially observed. He
suggested at once that Martinez should be ordered to Granada, and a new
commandant be appointed for Managua. Accordingly the orders were made out
by himself, Pascual Fonseca, the sub-prefect, being put in command of the
troops in place of Martinez. The latter, however, had in the meanwhile
heard of events at Granada, and taking a boat, with a few followers, he
crossed the lake to Segovia, thence flying to Honduras.
The leading Legitimists at Granada were placed under guard; and charges
were made out against Corral for treason and conspiracy to overturn the
government of the Republic. A court martial was ordered to try him, on
the charges and specifications: for there was no existing civil tribunal
before which to arraign him, and besides, being a military officer, he
could, according to the laws of the country, be called on to answer only
in the military forum. The court consisted of Americans, for there were
few other officers of the army in Granada; and Corral, far from objecting
to the court, preferred the naturalized to the native Nicaraguans as his
judges. Colonel Hornsby was president of the court; Colonel Fry, judge
advocate; and French acted as the counsel for the prisoner. D. Carlos
Thomas was sworn as interpreter of the court.
The court martial met on the 6th, and the testimony was short but
conclusive. The accused scarcely denied the charges; he asked only for
mercy. The condition of his family was brought before the court, in
order, if possible, to enlist its sympathy. The prisoner was found guilty
on all the charges and specifications, and the sentence was “Death by
shooting”; but the court unanimously recommended him to the mercy of the
commander-in-chief.
The general-in-chief, however, considered that in this case mercy to
one would be injustice to many. Walker had solemnly sworn, with bended
knee and on the Holy Evangelists, to observe and have observed the
treaty of the twenty-third of October; and he was responsible before the
world, and especially to the Americans in Nicaragua—as well as before
the throne of Heaven—for the faithful observance of his oath. How could
the treaty continue to have the force of law if the first violation of
it—and that too by the very man who had signed it—was permitted to pass
unpunished? As an act of right and justice, none could reasonably impugn
the sentence of the court, and Walker considered the question of policy
as clear and unequivocal as the question of justice. Not only did duty
to the Americans in Nicaragua demand the execution of the sentence, but
it was politic and humane to make their enemies feel that there was a
power in the State capable and resolved to punish any offences against
their interests. Mercy to Corral would have been an invitation to all
the Legitimists to engage in like conspiracies, and would have involved
them in future difficulties, which many of them managed to escape. It was
after such reflections as these that Walker determined to approve the
sentence of the court, and Corral was, accordingly, ordered to be shot at
midday on the eighth of November.
As soon as the sentence was published, the sympathy of the people for
the prisoner was everywhere shown. His mild and gentle demeanor had
conciliated the friendship of those among whom he had long lived; and
without the stern manner of Chamorro, he had won more the affection of
his party. Father Vigil, after ministering to the spiritual wants of the
unhappy man, asked that the rigor of the sentence might be relaxed in
his behalf; but he soon saw that the mind of the general-in-chief was
fixed, and desisted from efforts clearly useless. Then the night before
the fatal day the daughters of Corral, accompanied by many of the women
of the city, came with sobs and anguish and tears to attempt what the
priest had failed to accomplish. But he who looks only at present grief,
nor sees in the distance the thousand-fold sorrow a misplaced mercy may
create, is little suited for the duties of public office; and hard as it
was to resist such entreaties as the daughters of the prisoner pressed,
Walker promised them to consider the pleas they had urged, and closed the
painful interview as soon as kind feeling permitted.
The next day the hour of execution was postponed from 12 M. to 2 P.M.,
and at the appointed hour the sentence was executed under the direction
of Colonel Gilman, the officer of the day.
The remaining Legitimists who had been placed under guard for a short
time were released, with the exception of D. Narciso Espinosa. There
was some vague and uncertain evidence as to his complicity in the plot
to introduce foreign troops into the State for the subversion of the
government; but it was not sufficient to justify serious proceedings
against him. In the then condition of affairs, however, it was judged
well for him to leave the Republic, and he was accordingly sent to
New-York by one of the steamers of the Accessory Transit Company. His
conduct in the United States was such as might be expected of a man
without principle and without shame.
The Ministry of War made vacant by the arrest of Corral was filled by D.
Buenaventura Selva, who had held the same office under the government of
Castellon. Although a native of Granada, and having numerous connections
there, he was among the most decided of the democrats. The family of
which he was a member was large, and much divided in its political
affinities. Don Hilario was a moderate Legitimist; and one of the sisters
married to Narciso Espinosa, was among the bitterest and most violent
of the same party. Several of the other sons, Pedro Ygenio, Domingo,
Raymundo, and Gregorio, were Democrats; and the mother of them all, while
not very decided between the native parties, was firm in her friendship
for the Americans, and devoted in her attentions to the sick or such as
needed her assistance. The divisions of this family are but one instance
out of the many produced by the unhappy wars of Nicaragua; and too often
political parties were used for the purpose of gratifying family feuds
and domestic hatreds.
On the 10th of November the government of Rivas was recognized by the
American Minister. The Minister was escorted from the Legation to the
Executive Chamber, and as he passed the President’s guard, arms were
presented, and the march beat. The chamber was filled with officers
both native and American, and Mr. Wheeler, after being presented to the
President, delivered an address congratulating the country on the peace
just secured for it. D. Patricio Rivas made a suitable reply, saying that
the relations between the United States and Nicaragua were now of more
importance than ever, “since the Republic counts on new and powerful
elements of liberty and order which cause us to conceive well-founded
hopes that the country will march with a firm step in the path of
progress toward the greatness offered it by its free institutions and
natural advantages.”
With the reception of Mr. Wheeler the administration of Rivas may be
said to have fairly commenced; and the course of events might have been
very different if the federal administration at Washington had frankly
approved the conduct of its representative. But let us not murmur at the
Providence which works out its own ends by its own means.
Chapter Fifth.
THE ADMINISTRATION OF RIVAS.
In tracing the introduction of the American element into Nicaraguan
society, it has hitherto been convenient to follow events in the order
of time. As the facts become more complex it will be requisite to group
them so that their relative relations may be distinctly seen, and thus
the policy of the Rivas administration may appear with the unity it
really possessed. The domestic policy of the government first claims
our attention: for its foreign relations were the consequences of the
internal changes it aimed to effect. Thus, too, we may clearly perceive
the cause of the war which afterward raged in Nicaragua.
From the outset the Provisional President aimed to heal the civil
discords, which had heretofore divided not only districts but even
families. With this view appointments to the principal offices were made
indifferently from both of the old parties, and the Legitimists were, in
spite of the Corral conspiracy, invited to share with the Democrats in
the duties of government. Rivas was himself moderate in his political
opinions and was much disposed to place in office men of the same stamp.
He was also honest and, therefore, desired the co-operation of all
“hombres de bien,” good men, in the Republic. Hence his gratification
when he was able to secure for the service of the State such men as D.
José, Maria Hurtado, who occupied the place of prefect of the Meridional
Department. His aversion to the dishonest Democrats, such as Trinidad
Salazar, forced on him by the Leonese element in his cabinet, was strong,
and it was with reluctance that he consented to appoint such men to
responsible offices.
The authorities of the Church zealously co-operated with the civil
power to allay the passions which had so long divided the State, and
the servants of Christ did not fail in their public as in their private
ministrations, to inculcate the doctrines of peace and good-will
characteristic of their faith. Soon after the inauguration of the new
government, the vicar-general, Father José Hilario Herdocia, wrote from
Leon, the seat of the See of Nicaragua, congratulating Walker on the
success of his efforts to secure peace; and the general-in-chief, in
his reply, was careful to deny the charge of irreligion the enemies of
the Americans had brought against them. “It is very acceptable,” so the
general wrote, “for me to hear that the authority of the Church will be
used in favor of the existing government. Without the aid of religious
sentiments and religious teachers there can be no good government;
for the fear of God is the foundation of all social and political
organization.... In God I put my trust for the success of the cause in
which I am embarked and for the maintenance of the principles I advocate.
Without his aid all human efforts are unavailing, but with his divine
assistance a few may triumph over a legion.” The bishopric of the
diocese being vacant, the vicar-general was the highest ecclesiastical
authority of the State, and during all the trials through which the
Republic passed, Father Herdocia worthily and faithfully performed the
duties of his holy office. Had the good father been able to influence by
his conduct all the priests within his diocese, the dissensions of the
country would have been speedily cured. But, unfortunately in Nicaragua
as elsewhere the tonsure does not always destroy the earthly passions
of the mortal; and the emblematic crown of thorns may be worn by those
possessed of little of the spirit of humility which adorned the Holy
Redeemer.
To secure internal order, however, Rivas did not rely so much on the
efforts of the civil and ecclesiastical authorities to extinguish the
party passions of the past, as on the speedy increase of the American
element in the government of the Republic. Therefore one of his earliest
decrees was that of colonization. By this decree each adult immigrating
to the State was entitled to two hundred and fifty acres from the public
lands, and after six months’ residence on it might secure a title for
the same. A family was entitled to a hundred additional acres, and all
personal effects, furniture, agricultural implements, seeds, plants, and
domestic animals, were permitted to pass in free of duty. A director
of colonization, Mr. Joseph W. Fabens, was appointed to carry out the
objects of the decree, and to collect seeds and plants for the use of
immigrants. The decree was published the 23d of November, 1855.
As a means of diffusing information concerning the natural resources
and advantages of Nicaragua, no less than as a chronicle of current
events, the newspaper called “El Nicaraguense” had been established at
Granada soon after the signature of the treaty of peace. It was printed
with types found in the town at the time of its capture, and one half
of the paper was published in English, the other half in Spanish. To
collect such knowledge of the country as might be useful to immigrants,
commissioners were sent into different parts of the Republic, and their
reports were duly published. First, George H. Campbell, formerly of
Calaveras county, California, explored a portion of Chontales. Then a
Saxon, Max Sonnenstern, visited not only Chontales, but other districts,
and his reports were full of useful facts. These surveys were made under
the direction of the general-in-chief, and the expenses of them were paid
almost entirely from the chest of the commissary of war. In fact, for
some time, there was no other fund from which to defray the civil no less
than the military expenses of the State.
But in addition to these acts, by which it was expected to introduce
American colonists into Nicaragua, a decree was also published
authorizing the general-in-chief to increase the American element of the
army. Under the contract of Castellon, dated in the July previous, Walker
was empowered to raise three hundred men for the military service of the
State; and early in December Jerez drew up the decree fixing the pay and
emoluments of those enlisted by the general. Before this the question has
probably suggested itself as to the means by which Americans had been
already brought to Granada; and the answer to this involves the policy
which was pursued in reference to the Accessory Transit Company. As the
course the Rivas government pursued toward this corporation has been much
misrepresented and censured, it is necessary to narrate fully the facts
as they occurred, and to explain clearly the causes for the revocation
of the company’s charter. It will then be seen that this important act
of the Rivas administration was vital to its safety and welfare, no less
than just toward a corporation which had abused the privileges granted to
it.
Before leaving San Francisco Walker had tried to ascertain the wishes
of the Transit Company concerning the introduction of Americans into
Nicaragua. It was generally said that the company was indebted to the
Republic in a large amount, and Walker hoped to secure its co-operation
by proposing an advantageous mode of settling this debt. But the agent
of the company in California stated that his principals had instructed
him to have nothing to do with such enterprises as he supposed Walker
to contemplate. The company, however, did not practise that neutrality
between the contending parties in Nicaragua, its instructions to the
California agent seemed to inculcate. In July, 1855, they sent from
New-York to Castillo a company of armed men, organized militarily for the
purpose, as was alleged, of protecting their property on the Isthmus.
These men were mostly Europeans—Poles, French, Germans, and Italians.
A brother of Walker happened to be aboard of the steamer which carried
these men from New-York to San Juan del Norte, and saw them, a few days
after leaving the former display, the uniform provided for their use in
Nicaragua. After remaining several weeks at Castillo, most of these men
were engaged by D. Patricio Rivas at San Carlos for the service of the
Legitimist government, and were a part of the force under Corral during
the months of September and October.
These men, gathered from all nations and professing to be nothing but
pure mercenaries, using their arms for no higher purpose than the
pay they got, were intended for the special object of protecting the
property of the company from one H. L. Kinney, who, it was said, aimed
at punishing the corporation for the wrongs he fancied he had received
at its hands. Kinney had been engaged in trade on the frontier between
Texas and Mexico, and had been suspected by many Texans, during the
days of independence, of giving information to their enemies for the
privilege of trading beyond the Rio Grande. He had acquired that sort of
knowledge and experience of human nature derived from the exercise of
the mule-trade, and having succeeded in making money, by bargaining for
horses and cattle, he fancied himself capable of establishing an American
colony on the Musquito shore. Alleging that he had an interest in the
Shepard and Haley grant from the Musquito chief, he went to Washington
for the purpose of interesting influential persons in his colonization
schemes. Through the instrumentality of one Phillips, a Washington
correspondent for newspapers, he made the acquaintance of Sidney Webster,
the private secretary of the President; and Webster becoming interested
in Kinney’s projects, it was surmised that Mr. Pierce and the government
would be favorable to them. It was also reported—but with how much
truth it is almost impossible from the character of the witnesses to
determine—that the Accessory Transit Company engaged to co-operate with
Kinney. But the United States Government, willingly or unwillingly, was
led by the remonstrances of Marcoleta, the representative of Nicaragua
at Washington, to take steps against the Kinney movement. Then, too, the
Accessory Transit Company pronounced against the colonial projector, and
Kinney, breathing fire against the traitors, as he called them, escaped
to San Juan del Norte with an inconsiderable body of followers. Hence
the pretext for the mercenaries who finally fell into the ranks of the
Legitimists.
In the month of June, Estrada had appointed D. Gabriel Lacayo and D.
Rafael Tejada commissioners, to proceed to New-York, and to treat with
the company concerning its liabilities to the State, and Castellon soon
afterward notified the corporation that he would consider null and
void any settlement made with these commissioners. In July, Castellon
appointed Colonel Walker commissioner to negotiate and arrange with
the company, and that officer showed his credentials to the agent,
Mr. Cushing, a few hours after the action at Virgin Bay on the 3d of
September. Mr. Cushing, as he said, notified the company of Walker’s
powers, but nothing was ever attempted to be arranged under this
authority. During September and October, while the democratic forces
occupied the Transit, their relations with the agents and servants of the
company were of the most friendly character.
When Colonel Gilman arrived at San Juan del Sur he gave Walker to
understand that there was a struggle in the company itself, between
rivals parties aiming to get the control of it. The impression made on
Walker was that the agents in New-York and San Francisco were acting
together to depress the market price of the stock, so as to buy in and
get the majority of the shares. The advance by Macdonald, however,
indicated another plan on the part of Garrison and Morgan. With the
conviction that Garrison might be brought to co-operate largely in the
policy of introducing the American element into Nicaragua, Walker wrote
to an intimate friend, A. P. Crittenden, of San Francisco, saying that
any arrangements he might make to get five hundred men into the country
would be fully approved. This letter was written immediately after the
signature of the treaty of peace; the necessity for more Americans in
Nicaragua was urgent, and Walker had entire faith in Crittenden’s honor
and discretion.
Meanwhile the president of the company in New-York was, early in the
month of November, peremptorily notified, under a clause of the charter,
to appoint commissioners to settle the matters in controversy with the
government. To the notification given by the Minister of Hacienda the
company replied, enclosing an opinion of the counsel of the corporation,
Joseph L. White. The opinion maintained that the matter had passed from
the hands of the company, by the appointment of two commissioners to
treat with Tejada and Lacayo, although the powers of these latter had
been formally revoked, and the four, even if properly appointed, had not,
as the charter required, appointed a fifth to complete the commission.
The answer of the president of the company was a mere evasion; and
while this official correspondence went on, White, who was the leading
mind of the corporation, was writing letters to the agent, Mr. Cushing,
threatening the authorities unless they settled with the company on its
own terms.
On the 17th of December, 1855, Edmund Randolph, accompanied by W. R.
Garrison, a son of C. K. Garrison, and by Macdonald, arrived at San Juan
del Sur, and soon afterward reached the headquarters of the army at
Granada. The friendship between Randolph, Crittenden, and Walker, was of
a character not to be expressed by words; but the existence of such a
sentiment between these three is essential for an understanding of the
perfect confidence which marked their acts in reference to the Transit.
And to the noblest qualities of the heart, Randolph and Crittenden added
the loftiest attributes of the intellect. To those who have heard the
former at the bar, it will not be deemed the voice of friendship alone
speaking, when it is said that his legal talents are such as would adorn
courts when learning, and logic, and eloquence, were more appropriate to
the profession than they appear to be in these latter days. And they who
have studied the legislation of California—not the evanescent laws born
of party passion or impure interest, but those which mould society, and
form its habits—can best appreciate the capacity, and the patient labor
of Parker Crittenden.
After reaching Granada, Randolph informed Walker that he and Crittenden
had carefully examined the charter of the Accessory Transit Company, and
were both clear and decided in the opinion that it had been forfeited.
Then he stated what the lawyers would call the points of the case; and
they were almost too clear for argument. As they are fully stated in the
decree whereby the charter of the Transit Company, and of the Atlantic
and Pacific Ship Canal Company were revoked, they will properly appear
when the publication of that decree is narrated. Suffice it to say, at
present, that after due reflection Walker was entirely satisfied as
to the views of Randolph and Crittenden. At the same time Walker was
informed that under his letter Crittenden had agreed with Garrison to
obtain a new transit charter from the government of Nicaragua, and with
this view Randolph had come to Granada. In virtue of this agreement of
Crittenden with Garrison, more than a hundred Americans for the service
of the Republic came down with Randolph on the steamer Sierra Nevada; and
it was promised that as many as possible should be hereafter brought from
California; Garrison advancing to the State the price of their passages.
Up to that time nearly all the Americans in Nicaragua had come from
California, and a very large proportion of them had been brought thither
at the expense of Garrison. The immigration into the country by persons
paying their own passage was small; for at that time little was known
in the United States of the natural advantages of Nicaragua. It was
necessary to get at once a number of persons capable of bearing arms into
the State; and none were more urgent in this policy, or more anxious
when the steamer arrived to hear how many passengers were for Nicaragua,
than the Provisional President and the members of his cabinet. Internal
order as well as freedom from foreign invasion depended, in their eyes,
entirely on the rapid arrival of some hundreds of Americans.
It will thus appear that the agreement of Crittenden with Garrison was
the means, and at that time, the only means, for carrying out the policy
vital to the Rivas administration. True, neither the President nor the
cabinet knew of the means whereby their objects were accomplished; and
it was in fact highly necessary to the success of the measures that
they should be known by as few persons as possible. After Randolph and
Walker had agreed on the terms of a new transit grant, a copy was sent
up to Garrison at San Francisco, Macdonald being the bearer of it. W. R.
Garrison went to New-York for the purpose of informing Charles Morgan
of the arrangements which had been, and were about to be made; while
Randolph remained in Granada to await the return of these parties.
Nothing was said to Rivas of the new transit contract, Walker and
Randolph had drawn up and agreed to.
At length Macdonald arrived again from San Francisco, and W. R. Garrison
from New-York, and it was decided that the blow should be struck.
Randolph had been living at the house of Niña Yrena, and was in bad
health; therefore Walker went to his room in order that they might
draw up the decree of revocation. It was necessary, in an act of such
importance, to state clearly and fully the causes for it, so that it
might appear properly before the world. Hence the considerations of the
decree were drawn with no common care. As the Accessory Transit Company
held its charter for the sole purpose of facilitating the building of a
ship canal, the destruction of the Canal Company implied the destruction
of the Accessory Transit. Hence the decree recites the failure of the
Ship Canal Company to perform its agreements. The company had agreed to
contract a ship canal across Nicaragua, and it had not only failed to
commence the work but had declared it impracticable; it had agreed to
construct a railroad, or a rail and carriage road, in case the completion
of the canal was not possible, and it had done neither one nor the other;
it had agreed to pay the Republic annually ten thousand dollars, together
with ten per cent. of the net profits on any route it might establish
between the two oceans, and it had failed to pay these amounts, falsely
and fraudulently alleging that no profits were made and no commissions
due; and finally, it had been notified to appoint commissioners to
settle the matter in dispute between the State and the company, and
had expressly refused to comply with the demand. If failure to perform
its obligations, coupled with falsehood and fraud in its dealings with
the government, and accompanied by marked contempt of the sovereignty
from which it derived its existence, were insufficient to warrant the
revocation of the charter, there is small merit in law or its remedies.
At the same time the charters of the companies were revoked, three
commissioners, D. Cleto Mayorga, E. J. C. Kewen, and George F. Alden,
were appointed to ascertain the amount due from the Canal Company to the
State; and for this purpose they were ordered by the decree to notify
the agents of the companies to appear before them forthwith. They were
also commanded to cause all the property of the companies to be seized
and held by responsible persons, subject to the order of the Board.
Ignorant and prejudiced people have said the property of the companies
was confiscated; but this is untrue. The seizure was in the language
of the civil law prevailing in Nicaragua, a provisional one for the
purpose of securing the payment of the debt due from the company to
the government. And, in order to preserve the property, it was in the
meantime placed in the hands of persons giving the necessary bonds. Nor
was the condition that the property be forthcoming when called for by the
Board of Commissioners the sole agreement of the undertakers on the bond.
In order that the transit of passengers might not be interrupted, they
were required to transport the passengers who might arrive on the sides
of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the expenses of such transportation
to be charged against the companies.
After the decree of revocation was drawn up in English, Walker broached
the subject to the Provisional President, and to D. Fermin Ferrer, then
acting as Minister General; and neither of them made any objections
to the measure. In fact, there was a general prejudice on the part of
the Nicaraguans against the Accessory Transit Company, because of the
arrogant tone it had used on all occasions toward the authorities of the
Republic. As collector of customs at San Carlos, D. Patricio Rivas had
frequent opportunities to observe the haughty and overbearing character
of the company, and he was gratified at the proposal to take away its
privileges. Accordingly, the decree was translated from English into
Spanish by Walker, the minister correcting the language of the rough
translation. The President signed the decree, not only without hesitation
but with undisguised pleasure.
After the decree of revocation was signed, the decree for a new charter
to Randolph and his associates was submitted to the President; but there
was much difficulty in obtaining his approval of this act. Even at this
time the mind of Rivas had been poisoned by evil-disposed persons; and
in discussing with D. Fermin Ferrer the new contract, he said it was
“a sale of the country,” meaning thereby that it placed the government
entirely in the hands of the American element. In consequence of Don
Patricio’s feelings, the translation of the decree for the new charter
was so made as to deprive the grantees of many privileges they required;
and it became necessary to have the first draught of the Spanish decree
materially modified. With much difficulty the signature of Rivas was
finally obtained to the decree for the new charter, and it bore date
the 19th of February, 1856, the day after the date of the decree of
revocation.
Although copies of the decrees had been signed and delivered to Randolph
and his associates on the 18th, the publication was delayed until the
day after the passengers from California crossed the Lake for San Juan
del Norte. Thus Morgan and Garrison had news of the acts before they
were known to the companies; and it was an object to give the former as
much time as possible, to get ready for running their steamer before the
old grantees stopped their line. The advantage of this course was shown
some days afterward; for, on the steamer of the Accessory Transit Company
which left New-Orleans on the 27th of February, more than two hundred
and fifty passengers for the service of Nicaragua were carried to San
Juan del Norte, their passages being paid with drafts of D. Domingo de
Goicouria on Cornelius Vanderbilt, the president of the company. Had the
decree of the 18th gone to New-Orleans before these passengers left—as
it might have done if published a day earlier—they would certainly not
have been carried to Nicaragua at the expense of Mr. Vanderbilt or of the
company. As it was, the price of these passages was so much secured by
the State on the indebtedness due from the corporation.
The necessity for the American element to predominate in the government
of Nicaragua sprang from the clauses in the treaty of peace. In order
to carry out the spirit of that treaty—to secure to the Americans in
the service of the Republic the rights guaranteed to them by the full
sovereign power of the State—it was requisite to get into the country a
force capable of protecting it, not only from domestic but from foreign
enemies. Hence the “sale of the country,” in Rivas’ use of the term, was
a foregone conclusion after the 23d of October. Walker had sworn to have
the treaty observed in all respects. He was responsible before Nicaragua
and before the world for the faithful execution of it, and above all he
was bound to the Americans on the Isthmus to gain for them the strength
requisite for the maintenance of their privileges. And for this object it
was of the first importance to place the Transit in the hands of those
pledged by every consideration of interest to secure the permanence of
the new order of things. The old Transit Company aimed at being master of
the government; the new charter made the owners of the grant the servants
of the State and the agents of its policy. The control of the Transit
is, to Americans, the control of Nicaragua: for the lake, not the river
as many think, furnishes the key to the occupation of the whole State.
Therefore, whoever desires to hold Nicaragua securely, must be careful
that the navigation of the lake is controlled by those who are his
stanchest and most reliable friends.
The commissioners proceeded, under the decree, to seize the property of
the companies, and place it in the keeping of Joseph N. Scott, after he
had given a full and satisfactory bond. The subsequent proceedings of the
commissioners, and the conduct of the grantees under the new charter,
will be hereafter related. In this connection the main object is to show
how the policy of Rivas toward the Accessory Transit Company was, as it
were, the keystone of the arch supporting his administration. With a
different policy the Provisional President would have found himself with
a very small force to oppose the combination which threatened him almost
from the day he was inaugurated.
Under the influence of these measures of the government, the number of
Americans had been rapidly increasing since the first of November, 1855.
Mr. Fabens, who was in Granada at the time Walker entered the city, went,
soon after the treaty was signed, to San Juan del Norte, and induced
many of the Americans with Kinney to join the army of Nicaragua. On the
7th of November Capt. R. W. Armstrong, with a company from San Francisco,
arrived at Granada, and thus the American force was swelled to upward
of two hundred men. After this, until the arrival of Capt. Anderson on
the 17th of December, the increase was by small numbers at a time, and
in the meanwhile the cholera had appeared at Granada. The disease seemed
to select those officers who were most capable and useful, and there
were suspicions that the people of the town, mostly Legitimists, were
not entirely ignorant of the cause which produced the deaths of leading
Americans. Among the first victims of the disease were Capt. Davidson
and Col. Gilman; and the death of the latter was a severe loss. Then
Capt. Armstrong and Major Jesse Hambleton passed away. The deaths finally
became daily, and the frequent sound of the dead march, as the funeral
escorts passed through the streets, began to exercise a depressing effect
on the troops. The surgical staff was inexperienced, and the services of
some volunteers were valuable. Dr. James Nott was the most efficient of
these, and many a Nicaraguan, who owed his life to this surgeon’s kind
and skilful attention, regretted his departure and mourned his death,
which occurred on the passage from San Juan del Norte to New-Orleans. It
was only after the arrival of Dr. Israel Moses, early in February, 1856,
that the surgical staff was well organized and its duties well performed.
He gave such order and system to this department of the army that the
good effects of his administration were felt long after he ceased to act
as surgeon-general. Indeed, it is safe to say that after the appointment
of Dr. Moses few military hospitals were better administered than the
hospitals at Granada and Rivas.
In spite, however, of the fearful ravages of disease, the number of
Americans continued to increase, most of the immigrants coming from
California until the month of March, 1856. A few, during January and
February, had come from New-York and New-Orleans, but it was not until
Goicouria arrived, early in March, that any numbers were received from
the Atlantic side. So successful had been the policy of the Rivas
administration for the introduction of the new element, that on the 1st
of March, 1856, there were upward of twelve hundred Americans, soldiers
and citizens, in the Republic, capable of bearing arms. It remains,
now, for us to see what effect this domestic policy of the Provisional
Government had produced in its foreign relations.
Immediately on the organization of the Rivas Government, the Minister
of Relations, Jerez, sent circulars to the several States of Central
America, announcing the terms of the treaty of the 23d of October, and
expressing friendly feeling for the respective governments to which
the circulars were addressed. The State of San Salvador gave an early
reply, declaring the gratification of that cabinet in the peace secured
to Nicaragua. No replies were received from the other States, and the
silence was expressive. It was clear that the clauses in the treaty
which secured and encouraged the presence of the Americans in Nicaragua
were not acceptable to the neighboring Republics, and the journals of
Costa Rica were particularly virulent in their remarks on the course
of events in Granada. Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica, were at that
time governed by the adherents of the old servile or aristocratic party,
while San Salvador was under liberal influences. Gen. Cabañas, driven
from Comayagua by the assistance of Guatemala, had found refuge at the
mines of Los Encuentros, near the borders of Honduras and San Salvador,
and Guardiola was canvassing for the Presidency of the former State, in
place of his exiled rival, whose legal term was to expire on the 31st of
January, 1856.
General Trinidad Cabañas was the oldest and most respected among
the Liberals of Central America. He had been the faithful companion
of Morazan in his efforts to preserve the Confederacy, and although
generally unfortunate as a soldier, none doubted his courage or his
devotion to the principles he professed. Americans who had met him
pronounced him the most honest public man within the limits of the five
Republics, and his conduct toward the Nicaraguan Democrats had certainly
been that of a self-sacrificing man. The aid he gave to Castellon was
undoubtedly the cause of his losing power in Honduras, and Walker was
easily induced, after the news of the retirement of Cabañas to San
Salvador arrived at Granada, to invite the ex-President to visit the
capital of Nicaragua.
Cabañas arrived at Leon in the latter part of November, and when it
was known that he was on his way to Granada, Col. Hornsby was ordered
to Managua to conduct the ex-President to the capital. On the 3d of
December he was received by Walker with every mark of respect, and he
was entertained as the guest of the State. A guard of honor was placed
at his orders, and the attention due a good man in fallen fortunes
was scrupulously bestowed. But the Honduranian desired assistance to
regain his power in his own State; he asked that a body of Americans
might be given him to re-enter the capital from which he had not long
been expelled. Jerez urged that the request of Cabañas be granted; he
recalled the signal services the ex-President had rendered Castellon and
the democratic army. Rivas, however, was not disposed to hearken to the
prayers of Cabañas. He saw clearly that if assistance were given to the
exiled General-President and an American force entered Honduras, it would
be the signal for a coalition of the other four States against Nicaragua.
Walker regarded the plans of Cabañas with the same eye as Rivas. It was
easy to perceive that sooner or later there was to be a struggle of force
between the American policy of the Nicaraguan cabinet and the other
governments by which it was surrounded. But it was expedient and proper
to make the enemies of the Americans strike the first blow. To have sent
troops to Honduras, even with the design of reëstablishing Cabañas,
would have afforded a pretext for the declaration that the Americans of
Nicaragua were aggressive in their nature. It was only necessary for the
Americans to wait in order to have their enemies move, and it would have
been unwise to hasten the struggle by seeking to restore a man, however
worthy, who had just been driven from his own State.
Jerez admitted the reasonableness of the views of Rivas, yet he
continued to insist on the aid Cabañas sought. The ex-President was a man
of narrow mind, strong prejudices, and bitter animosities, and seemed
to have his heart set on getting back to Honduras before the 31st of
January. The very obstinacy with which he asked to be restored before the
expiration of his time, was a proof of the tendency of his mind to dwell
on unimportant points. Incapable of looking at the affairs of Central
America with general views, he seemed a Morazan federalist dwindled by
age to a Honduras official. But as his opinions had been contracted with
time they had hardened also, and with the dull perceptions of age he
had its obstinacy and its hatred of new things. Not understanding the
American movement, he was disposed to regard it as an evil unless it
could be converted to an agency for driving Guardiola and Lopez out of
Honduras. The past reputation of Cabañas, however, his long service in
the ranks of the Liberal party, together with the feeling of gratitude
for the treatment the Nicaraguan Democrats received in Honduras, wrought
on the mind of Jerez. The Minister of Relations was readily moved by
generous sentiments, and it was not difficult to lead him on a false
course through his emotions. His head, too, as one of his friends often
said, was filled with the legends Plutarch has palmed off on the world
as the lives of his Greek and Roman heroes; and Jerez was constantly
imagining somebody was plotting against the Republic, and that it was his
function to save the State. Vega, one of the leading Legitimists, soon
after the organization of the Rivas cabinet, sent to Walker a printed
paper, on the margin of which there was a sketch of all the ministers,
and the shrewd old Granadino described Jerez as a conspirator by nature.
It may be readily imagined how Cabañas would act on Jerez after he saw
that Walker was determined not to send any of the Americans to Honduras.
After a sojourn of some twenty days at Granada, the ex-President went
to Leon accompanied by the minister, Jerez. He would wait at Leon, he
said, the final decision of the government in regard to his requests.
When Jerez returned, the mind of Rivas was fixed in opposition to the
propositions of Cabañas, and then Jerez resigned his place in the
ministry. About the same time, D. Buenaventura Selva resigned the
ministry of war, because a Legitimist, Arguëllo, was put in office. Jerez
retired to Leon; Selva went first to Rivas and San Juan del Sur, whence
he sailed for San Salvador to remain, as he said, until “hombres de bien”
were restored to power in Nicaragua. As many Legitimists had been put in
office by Rivas before the appointment of Arguëllo, it was probably the
private enmity of Selva toward the latter which led to his resignation;
and thus, by the friendship of one Minister for Cabañas, and the hatred
of another toward Arguëllo, Ferrer was, for a time, sole minister.
It was not enough, however, that Nicaragua showed, by her course toward
Honduras, the policy she sought to follow in relation to Central America.
On the 12th of January, 1856, a circular was addressed to the several
Republics, declaring the peaceful intentions of Nicaragua, and requesting
the appointment of commissioners to discuss and arrange the terms of a
union of the separate States. The latter proposition was made because
the old serviles, who had always been against Federalism, were now
zealously discussing a union, for the purpose of affording pretexts to
interfere against the Americans of Nicaragua. It was thus made manifest
that the Rivas government, satisfied of the honor and straightforwardness
of its intentions, was not afraid of placing itself in closer relations
with the other States of the old confederation.
The only response given to this circular was that of the Honduras
commissioner, D. Manuel Colindres, who did not get beyond Leon. He had
been sent by the government of Honduras to assure Nicaragua of its
peaceful purposes; though it is possible his secret design may have been
to watch the movements of Cabañas. On the 24th of January, however,
Señor Colindres, in acknowledging the receipt of a printed copy of the
circular, said he had no doubt his government would reply favorably to
that of Nicaragua. But no such answer as the commissioner anticipated
was ever received. After Guardiola, however, was elected President of
Honduras, he showed little disposition to interfere with the domestic
policy of Nicaragua; and the thirst for war his enemies attributed to him
was not manifested in his course toward the Central American coalition.
The most violent invectives against the domestic policy of Nicaragua
had been published in the official journal of Costa Rica. Besides this,
a large number of the Legitimists had fled to Guanacaste, and were
thence threatening the tranquillity of the Meridional Department. To
remonstrate against the presence of the Legitimists on the frontier,
and at the same time to endeavor to correct some of the errors which
had spread in Costa Rica, it was decided to send a commissioner to that
Republic. Accordingly, on the 4th of February, Louis Schlessinger and
Manual Arguëllo, accompanied by Captain W. A. Sutter, left Granada for
Virgin Bay, with instructions to proceed to San José. Schlessinger had
been selected because he was one of the few among those attached to
the American force possessed of any knowledge of Spanish; nor were his
previous career and character as well known then as afterward. In fact,
he had come to Nicaragua with excellent recommendations from people of
repute; and as he had some tact and address, it was thought he might
accomplish some of the objects of the commission. D. Manuel Arguëllo was
joined with Schlessinger because, being a Legitimist, he might remove
prejudices, and probably induce many of his old party to leave Guanacaste
and return to their homes and estates near Rivas.
D. Rafael Mora, however, had made up his mind to act at once against
Nicaragua. Schlessinger and Sutter were, therefore, ordered out of the
Republic; and Arguëllo remained in Costa Rica only to join its army. On
the 1st of March, 1856, President Mora formally declared war against the
“filibusters,” as he styled the Americans of Nicaragua. And in order
to trace some of the causes which led to this step, it is necessary to
examine events outside of Central America. This brings us to the course
the United States and Great Britain pursued in reference to Nicaragua.
Not long after the recognition of the Rivas government by the American
Minister at Granada, French was sent as minister from Nicaragua to the
United States. He was appointed to that office with a view of getting him
out of the Hacienda Department and out of the country. He was utterly
unfitted for the administration of the hacienda, having little knowledge
of either the principles or details of public business, and not having
either the modesty to be sensible of his defects or the patience to
overcome them. Moreover, his rapacity made him dreaded by the people
of the country, and, as a measure of policy, it was necessary for the
Americans to get rid of him. He was, however, of not less character
than Marcoleta, a Spaniard, who at the time represented Nicaragua at
Washington; for French had not been ordered out of the State Department
for pilfering papers from its archives. On his arrival in the United
States it was generally reported that the federal government would
not receive the new minister because of his previous history. After
waiting for some time French presented his credentials and was refused
recognition because it was impossible for the American Secretary
of State, Mr. Marcy, to determine whether or not the government he
represented was the government of the people of Nicaragua. When it is
remembered that Mr. Marcy, in a conversation with Mr. J. W. Fabens,
placed Nicaragua among the South American Republics, his inability to
decide whether the government of Rivas was in existence or not, need
create little surprise. His entire ignorance or wilful misrepresentation
of Nicaraguan affairs appears to much advantage in his correspondence
with Mr. Wheeler.
From the beginning of the movement Mr. Marcy had set his face against the
introduction of Americans into Nicaragua. In one of his first despatches
on the subject he spoke of the entrance of Americans into the country as
an invasion, and with him the establishment of peace and the provisional
government of Rivas was “a successful foray of arms.” He censured Mr.
Wheeler for his visit to Rivas at the instance of the people of Granada,
and intimated that the danger he incurred was the due reward of the
minister’s efforts to act as mediator between the parties. Hence, it is
an error to suppose that the refusal to receive French was owing in any
manner to the character of that person. Nor is it more correct to assign
the interest certain parties near the President had in the Shepard and
Haley grant and in Kinney’s schemes, as the reason for the action of
the Secretary of State. At that time it was scarcely known what policy
the Rivas administration would pursue in reference to the claims on the
Mosquito shore. The causes for Mr. Marcy’s conduct were far deeper than
such as were suggested at the time, and they will probably be seen more
clearly in the sequel.
The refusal of the United States government to recognize the Rivas
administration created great surprise in Nicaragua, and encouraged the
enemies of the Americans in Costa Rica. The public men of Nicaragua,
ignorant of the internal machinery of the federal government at
Washington, and of the secret springs controlling the actions of parties
in the United States, were unable to divine the motives of the cabinet of
Mr. Pierce. It was an enigma they could not solve; and while some of the
native Nicaraguans attributed the course of the Republic of the north to
fear of England, others resorted to the common ground on which political
action is always put when it cannot be otherwise reasonably explained,
and traced the conduct of the federal cabinet, and more particularly
of the Secretary of State, to personal prejudices and passions. All
the Nicaraguans saw, however, the effect of the Marcy policy on the
neighboring States; for while it furnished them with an excuse for
withholding diplomatic intercourse it also encouraged them to take active
and decided measures against the Rivas government.
But while the policy of the United States appeared inexplicable
to the people of Central America, that of the British government
excited no surprise. From long familiarity with British diplomacy the
Spanish-American States are generally able to divine what its course
will be, though they scarcely take the trouble to analyze its motives or
to arrive at the objects of its policy. Before examining, however, the
course of the British cabinet toward the Rivas administration, it may aid
us to ascertain, if we can, the motives of English policy in reference to
all the Spanish American States. There is a unity in this policy which
must spring from a simple motive.
The English policy is as old as the time of Elizabeth, and sprang
immediately from the contests of that sovereign with Philip the Second.
The privateers, in the habit of plundering the towns of the Spanish main,
were the first fruits of the policy. England, shut out from a large
portion of America by the jealous colonial regulations of Spain, sought
to make profit out of these countries by the double means of buccaneering
and of contraband trade. This system continued during the whole time of
the Spanish dominion on the continent; and traces of it yet remain in the
settlements at Balize—named after the freebooter and smuggler Wallis—and
in the relations of England to the Indians on the Mosquito shore. The
object of the policy was not to acquire colonies, but to acquire trade;
hence the wood-cutters at Balize were not colonists, but mere floating
settlers, with a right to cut mahogany and dye-woods, yet without the
right to organize for themselves a society or a government. And in the
same manner it was sought to raise the roving tribes of the Mosquito
shore into a community claiming, as did the wood-choppers at Balize, the
protection of the British crown. The settlers at Balize, and the Indians
and Zambos of the Mosquito shore, might be called, in one of the elegant
cant phrases of the day, “squatter sovereigns.”
When the Spanish colonies declared their independence, the relations
between Spain and England were vastly different from what they had been
in the time of Elizabeth; and the Peninsula, just emerging from the
struggle with Napoleon, supposed her alliance with Great Britain would
secure the neutrality of her old rival in the contest between herself and
her rebellious subjects. But England, true to her traditional policy,
favored by all possible means the independence of the colonies. British
arms, British soldiers, and British counsels, were freely furnished to
several Spanish-American States, and their independence was speedily
acknowledged by the British crown. Then British merchants flocked to the
new fields opened to their enterprise, and organized everywhere the old
system of the buccaneers and smugglers. They found the new governments
fit tools of their system. Open and general bribery of custom-house
officers supplanted, it is true, the plain and less corrupt smuggling of
former times, and British men-of-war, sent to collect British claims for
advances made to revolutionary governments at most usurious rates, took
the place of the old buccaneers; but in reality the substance of things
was the same as before.
By this system England derives from the Spanish-American States all the
advantages of trade she receives from her colonies; and yet she has not
the expense or the trouble of governing them. And it is her interest
to keep them in this condition. Now they furnish her with an excellent
market for her fabrics; and, through her merchants, scattered over the
central and southern portions of the continent, she manages to control
the distribution of the products of these countries. Thus her shipping
is swelled, her sailors educated, and an opportunity is offered for
scattering her men-of-war like sentries along the coasts of both oceans,
from Mexico to Patagonia. Her aim is to maintain the _status quô_, for
she could scarcely hope to better herself by any change that might be
attempted.
The British consul at Realejo, Thomas Manning, was a type of the class of
English merchants in the Spanish-American States. Arriving in Nicaragua
without means—a sailor, it is said, on a merchant vessel—he had married
a woman of the country, and soon built the foundations of a fortune.
Without any education, or any habit of regarding political events in the
light of principle or of fixed policy, he yet had that keen instinct for
property and his own interests which enabled him to use British power
to aid his trading adventures. He sometimes lent money to the Republic,
only, however, when it was in great straits and promised extravagant
interest; and when the principal and interest had accumulated to a
suitable sum, he would call on the British fleet to blockade the ports
of the States until the debt was paid. As early as 1849, Manning had
foreseen the danger of Americans passing in numbers through Nicaragua;
and while the Californians were crossing the Isthmus, on their way to
and from the land of gold, he had written to Lord Palmerston that unless
England averted the calamity, in ten years the country would be “overrun
by North American adventurers.” It is wise for England to make her
merchants consuls, and to intrust them somewhat with diplomatic business;
the sting of self-interest keeps the sentry from sleeping on his post.
Manning had houses both at Leon and at Chinandega, and his commercial
and social relations were mainly with the residents of the Occidental
Department. Hence, in the revolution of 1854, he naturally favored
Castellon and his adherents, though his notions about government, if he
could be said to have any, inclined him more toward the Legitimists.
Besides, however, his personal relations with some of the leading
Democrats, the all-subduing sense of interest led him with the Leoneses.
The rivalry between the towns of Leon and Granada was a rivalry of trade
and of interests as well as of social and political power. True, the
political principles prevalent at Granada naturally led to high tariffs,
while those of Leon tended to free trade; but the geographical position
of the two towns did most to beget the commercial contest between them.
Granada received its goods from the Atlantic, by the way of the lake and
San Juan river, while Leon was supplied from vessels obliged to pass Cape
Horn. It was difficult, however, to carry on smuggling by the river,
while the facilities for contraband on the Pacific side were great. Thus
Leon was able to compete with Granada by making up in smuggling what she
lost by the voyage round the Horn. It may thus be readily conceived how
the British consul’s interests induced him to wish for the success of the
Leoneses, not only in the Occidental Department but throughout the State.
Their success would necessarily aggrandize Leon and depress the trade of
Granada.
Of course Manning’s relations with the Castellon government were
intimate, and especially with the Minister of Hacienda, D. Pablo
Caravajal. It was through the officers of the hacienda that all
arrangements had to be made for landing goods at Realejo; and the
interests of the minister might sometimes be opposed to the interests of
the government he served. So, too, it was with the hacienda Don Tomas—as
the people called Manning—treated, when he was so kind as to advance a
little money at the rate of one and a half or two per cent. a month. And
as Caravajal was the minister who countersigned the first contract of
Castellon with Cole, and none besides himself and the director knew its
character, he was probably obliging enough to drop a copy of it where
Don Tomas might find it. At any rate Manning heard of the Cole contract
soon after it was made, and he immediately remonstrated with Castellon as
to the policy he was pursuing. The director, however, had been in England
to negotiate on the part of Nicaragua concerning the Mosquito coast, and
was sagacious enough to perceive the drift of British policy and the
subjection in which it sought to retain his country. The remonstrances of
Manning were, therefore, of little avail.
It is then probable that the British cabinet was, from the beginning,
well informed as to the American movement in Nicaragua. While the
government of the United States had merely newspaper reports of events
in Nicaragua, previous to the surprise of Granada, Lord Clarendon was
undoubtedly receiving minute and detailed statements from official
sources. Hence, when we can get at the facts, it is not strange to
see that Lord Clarendon is deeply interested in the events of Central
America, and that, by act as well as words, he is urging Costa Rica to
make war on the Americans in Nicaragua.
The sources of information on this subject are exclusively Costa Rican,
and the only published facts are those contained in certain letters
taken from the English mail for San José, in the month of March, 1856.
Among this intercepted correspondence was the copy of a note from
the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. E. Hammond, to
E. Wallerstein, consul-general for Costa Rica at London. The note is
dated from the Foreign Office, February 9th, 1856, and acquaints
the consul-general that Lord Clarendon has been informed by the War
Department “two thousand smooth bore muskets (Witton’s), which are not
so highly finished as the Line pattern muskets of 1842, can be supplied”
to the government of Costa Rica, “at £1, 3s. each; or, if it should
be preferred, two thousand of the Line pattern muskets of 1842 can
be furnished at 56s. 8d. each.” Then a letter from Wallerstein to D.
Bernardo Calvo, Minister of Relations for Costa Rica, advising him of the
offer of Lord Clarendon, says: “I have written a private letter to the
secretary, entreating him to send me an order to examine the two kinds.
After seeing them I will still consider if it is proper to take the
muskets without positive instructions from his Excellency, the President;
but, in the meantime, I am persuaded his Excellency will see, in the
promptness with which H. B. M.’s government has complied with my request,
a strong proof of its sympathy and good will toward the Republic. Nothing
is said, it is true, about the time the money should be paid; this shows
it is for your government to decide that point.” And while writing
officially to his chief in the cabinet, Mr. Wallerstein does not forget
to send a private letter for his esteemed friend, D. Juan Rafael Mora.
After telling the President, “The pleasure I felt was such, on receipt
of Mr. Hammond’s letters, I could not sleep at all that night;” the
complacent consul-general goes on: “I have letters from Guatemala and San
Salvador, requiring me to request from this government help and succor;
but what can be done for republics or people who cannot help themselves?
When I was telling Lord Clarendon Costa Rica had already an army of eight
hundred men on the frontiers, he was much pleased, and said that was a
right step; and I am persuaded my having made that intimation is the
reason for their giving us the muskets.”
Through these letters we can perceive the prudence and yet the decision
with which the British cabinet acted in reference to the Rivas
administration. There is no doubt or hesitation in its conduct, because
it acts in accordance with a traditional policy. England does not desire
firm and steady government in Central America, because her merchants
would thus be restricted to the common profits of legitimate trade; and
she is, above all, opposed to the establishment of such governments there
by American influences, for fear other goods than her own would be thrown
into the markets of those countries.
Urged on, therefore, by Great Britain, tacitly encouraged by the United
States, Costa Rica declared war against the Americans in the service of
Nicaragua. Mora is careful to make the issue clearly and distinctly.
He does not declare war against the Republic of Nicaragua, but against
certain persons in her service. And as the manner in which the war is
declared defies the restraints of public law, so the way in which it is
to be waged points not to the rules adopted by Christian nations. The
same day war was declared, a decree was published ordering all prisoners
taken with arms in their hands to be shot. Yet there have been found
Christian people unblushing enough to praise the conduct and the policy
of Juan Rafael Mora. And in the blindness of party passion Americans have
not been ashamed to support the man who distinctly enounced the principle
that they were to be excluded from Central America, and if venturing
there against his will, they should be shot.
On whom, then, rests the responsibility of the war which for more than a
year drained the resources of Nicaragua and made her fields the scenes
of deadly conflict rather than of abundant harvests? Not surely on those
who exhausted every effort in order to maintain peace and bring about a
diplomatic discussion rather than armed arbitrament of the questions at
issue. Costa Rica scorned to discuss the right of Nicaragua to employ
Americans in her military service. Mora refused to listen to the voice of
reason, and defiantly seizing the clarion, blew the note of war. If it
is permitted, however, to anticipate events not yet narrated—if we may
“see the future in the instant,” in order to gather therefrom a lesson
of justice and of right—it may not be inappropriate to say that Costa
Rica has derived nothing from the war except a scarcity of labor for her
fields, a heavy debt to embarrass her treasury, and the prospect of civil
commotions to disturb her industry. Mora, too, reaps in exile the fruits
of his policy; but let us pass Mora in exile, as Ugolino in hell, afar
off and with silence.
Chapter Sixth.
THE COSTA RICAN INVASION.
On the first of March, 1856, the regular American force in the service of
Nicaragua was about six hundred men. It was organized in two battalions,
one denominated the Rifle and the other the Light Infantry Battalion. The
first was commanded by Colonel M. B. Skerrett, with E. J. Saunders as
lieutenant-colonel and A. S. Brewster as major. The light infantry was
commanded by Colonel B. D. Fry, with J. B. Markham as major. Nearly all
the rifle companies were then stationed at Leon, a single company under
Captain Rudler being at Rivas, where Major Brewster acted as commandant.
The light infantry was at Granada. Since the appointment of Colonel P.
R. Thompson as adjutant-general early in February, more system and order
had been given to the army organization. The medical staff was well
directed by the surgeon-general, Dr. Moses; and Colonel Thomas F. Fisher
had charge of the quarter master’s department. W. K. Rogers had been
recently appointed assistant commissary-general with the rank of major,
and was then at the head of the commissariat. Colonel Bruno Von Natzmer
was inspector-general; but was, at that time, stationed at Leon, having
general and indefinite powers to regulate the civil administration there
and to see that the wants of the American force were properly provided
for. His knowledge of the people in the Occidental Department made his
services valuable, inasmuch as there were constant rumors of trouble and
difficulties on the part of the natives at Leon.
During the four months which had elapsed since the establishment of
the provisional government, the Americans had been, for the most part,
stationed in Granada. But the sickness prevailing there, as well as the
partial necessity for a force elsewhere, had caused small bodies to be
sent in several directions through the Republic, thus familiarizing the
people of the remote districts with the appearance of the Americans, and
furnishing the latter with a knowledge of the roads and local prejudices
of the inhabitants. Thus Colonel Fry, with a party of voltigeurs,
had spent several weeks in the neighborhood of Matagalpa, proceeding
even as far as Juigalpa in order to quell certain disturbances the
Legitimists were creating among the Indians. It would have been better
for the discipline and spirit of the troops if they had remained less
and in smaller bodies at Granada; but this being the depot of arms and
the seat of government by the terms of the treaty, the disposition of
the Legitimists of the town made it necessary to keep a strong force
in the place. The quantity of liquor there, and the fondness of many
officers for drink, not only injured the health of the troops, but tended
materially to prevent its growth in military virtue.
In addition to the regular force of the Americans there were more than
five hundred men capable of bearing arms engaged in civil business either
at Granada or along the line of the Transit. At the capital there were
numbers of Americans employed in the civil offices, besides the laborers
engaged in building a wharf at the old fort; and at Virgin Bay and San
Juan del Sur, the Transit Company had scores of persons engaged in the
construction of their works at these two places. Some of these were
organized as volunteer companies, and at Virgin Bay a company of this
description, with a good uniform, and commanded by George McMurray, had
nearly fifty members. Many persons supposed these men could be relied
on, in case of disturbance, with as much certainty as the regular force,
and hence it was estimated that in the event of invasion nearly twelve
hundred Americans could be brought into action for the defence of
Nicaragua.
A few days afterward, on the 9th of March, the regular force was largely
increased by the arrival at Granada of more than two hundred and fifty
men, under the direction of D. Domingo de Goicouria. The night before
these recruits arrived a bearer of despatches from San Salvador, Col.
Padilla, had reached Granada; and on the morning of the 9th, dressed in
a ludicrous uniform, and wearing a cocked hat he had brought all the
way over the mountains from Cojutepeque, he sallied forth on a visit to
the general-in-chief. The new men had just reached the Plaza, and were
drawn up so as to show their numbers to the best advantage, when Padilla
entered the general’s quarters. The surprise of the San Salvadorian, at
the sight of so many strange-looking men, was equal to the amazement the
Americans found in his long, lank person, run into trowsers too short for
his legs, and with the chest and arms tightly encased in a small military
coat, buttoned up to the throat, and obstinate in the habit of slipping
its lower edges above the pit of the stomach. As Padilla had brought
despatches from the Minister of Relations at Cojutepeque, Señor Hoyos,
asking why Americans were being introduced into Nicaragua, the arrival of
Goicouria and his recruits was not inopportune.
Schlessinger had, in the meanwhile, returned from Costa Rica with an
account of his treatment there. Manuel Arguëllo, for whose sake Selva
left the cabinet, remained with his Legitimist friends near Mora, and
his conduct was a sample of the actions of the old Granada faction. On
the 11th, therefore, the new recruits were organized in a battalion
of five companies, under the command of Schlessinger, and Capt. J. C.
O’Neal was raised to the rank of Major, and attached to the corps. The
same day a proclamation was issued by the general-in-chief, closing
with the order to the troops to assume and wear the red ribbon. The
object of the proclamation was to secure the zealous co-operation of the
Nicaragua Democrats as well as of the liberals of the other States in
the war immediately impending, and the cause assigned for resuming the
red ribbon was the course of the Nicaragua Legitimists. “The self-styled
Legitimist party of Nicaragua,” so the proclamation ran, “has repelled
our efforts at conciliation. They have maintained communication with
their fellow serviles in the other States. They have, by all means in
their power, attempted to weaken the present provisional government, and
have given aid and encouragement to the enemies of Nicaragua outside of
the Republic.... They owe us for the protection they have had for their
lives and property—they have paid us with ingratitude and treachery.”
A few hours after Walker wrote this proclamation he received the Mora
decree of the 1st of March, declaring war against the Americans in
Nicaragua. As soon as this decree was read, the Provisional President
published a proclamation of war against Costa Rica, and on the 13th the
general order was issued: “The Supreme Provisional Government of the
Republic of Nicaragua having formally declared war, by decree of March
11th, 1856, against the State of Costa Rica, the army will be held in
readiness to commence active operations.”
Col. Schlessinger, after organizing his battalion and receiving muskets
for the several companies, was ordered to prepare for marching. He
proceeded with his command to Virgin Bay, and, according to instructions,
sent the weakest of his companies, under Lieut. Colman, to Rivas,
while Capt. Rudler, with Co. F of the Rifles, was ordered to report to
Schlessinger. The four full companies of the new battalion were commanded
respectively by Capt. Thorpe, Capt. Creighton, Capt. Prange, and Capt.
Legeay. The companies of these two latter officers consisted entirely the
one of German and the other of French, and Schlessinger’s familiarity
with the languages of these companies, no less than his acquaintance
with Spanish and with the Department of Guanacaste, was the cause of
his selection for the service on which he was about to be sent. After
Rudler’s company reported, Schlessinger’s command numbered about two
hundred and forty men.
Walker ordered Schlessinger to march with this force into the Department
of Guanacaste. His object was to strike the first blow of the war on
the territory held by the enemy, and also to have a strong outpost at
some distance south of the Transit, to guard against any surprise on the
line of American travel across the Isthmus. With the same view companies
were occupying Castillo and Hipp’s Point, at the mouth of the Serapaqui.
It was necessary to hold the Transit with more tenacity than any other
part of the State, not only because the property there had more need of
protection than any other in the Republic from the foreign enemy, but
also because of the new arrangements made it was from the Transit the
Nicaragua force was to be fed and supplied with new troops. As there are
very few people between the Transit road and the line of Guanacaste,
the necessity for a corps of observation toward the south was the more
urgent. The greatest difficulty in war, that of knowing accurately
your enemy’s movements, is increased in Central America by the want of
facilities for communication, and by the habit frequent revolutions have
begot of spreading the most exaggerated reports about most trifling
facts. You can always get some facts, however, from any report; so that,
all things considered, it requires more labor to get facts from thinly
settled than from populous districts.
On the 16th, Schlessinger marched from San Juan del Sur toward the La
Flor, a small stream which separates Guanacaste from the Meridional
Department. Before leaving he had much irritated Major Brewster, who was
commanding at Rivas, by the numerous irregularities he practised, but
with natural reluctance that officer was slow in reporting such facts
at headquarters. The march to the La Flor and beyond it to Salinas was
characterized by the same irregularity which marked the command while
on the Transit; and so great was the disorder that the surgeon of the
command, a new-comer, and ignorant of the grave fault he was committing,
left the force and returned to Granada with letters from Schlessinger.
This fact, all too late, revealed the weakness of the commander who
had permitted his only surgeon to leave at a time when he might any
day engage the enemy. With such ignorance of duty, on the part of both
commander and surgeon, it was necessary to carry on the war in the best
manner possible. This instance of Schlessinger and his surgeon, one out
of many, illustrates a difficulty which beset the Americans during the
whole war.
It was not until late at night on the 20th that Schlessinger arrived
at the country-house of Santa Rosa, the men hungry and exhausted by
the long and weary march. The guard seems to have been properly posted
during the night, and the next morning mounted men were sent to get news
and, if possible, guides. An inspection of arms had been ordered first
for two and afterward for three o’clock in the afternoon; and the men
were lounging in all directions in and around the camp, when, shortly
before the inspection was to take place, the alarm was given and the
cry of “Here they come,” was uttered by a mounted rifleman as he rode up
to the main building where the colonel was quartered. Schlessinger was
taken entirely by surprise, and, in the confusion, could not be found
by the adjutant. Capt. Rudler with his rifles seized a corral near the
main house with a view of protecting the American flank; but the fire
of the advancing enemy soon forced him to leave it. In the meanwhile
Capt. Creighton, aided by Major O’Neal, had formed his company, its
right resting on the house, and fired a few volleys at the Costa Ricans;
but the German company had broke and left the field, while the French
under Legeay retired from the hilly, broken ground, they had attempted
to occupy. In five minutes, the whole command, led by its colonel, was
in full and most disorderly retreat. Major O’Neal, with several other
officers, strove in vain to turn the men and carry them back toward the
enemy; but the panic was such that they found few willing to listen or to
follow.
The Costa Rican force attacking at Santa Rosa was the advance guard
of the whole army, then on its march toward the northern frontier. It
consisted of about five hundred men, and among its officers was Manuel
Arguëllo, the Legitimist. They wore the red ribbon, with the view both
of deceiving the Americans and of conciliating the Nicaraguan Democrats.
After the main body of the army, with the President, Rafael Mora, at its
head, reached Santa Rosa, the Nicaraguan prisoners, many of them wounded,
were tried by court martial and ordered to be shot. The cruel sentence
was too faithfully executed.
After wandering for some time between Santa Rosa and the lake of
Nicaragua, the disorganized remains of Schlessinger’s force arrived at
a point near Tortugas, whence they found their way to Virgin Bay. They
came to the latter place by squads rather than by companies, some without
hats and shoes, and some even without arms. In their flight many had been
torn by the thorns through which they had been forced, and it was days
and even weeks before straggling men of the expedition ceased to arrive.
The depression of spirits was great, and some of the soldiers, in order
to diminish the shame of their retreat, were but too ready to exaggerate
among their comrades the disciplined air, fine military conduct, and
excellent arms and equipment of the enemy they so hastily saw at Santa
Rosa.
Meanwhile Walker was concentrating the American force at Granada, and
preparing for the war in which, it was probable, the other three Central
American States would join Costa Rica. The Rifles were ordered from Leon;
and about the time they entered Granada, a company of recruits arrived
from San Juan del Norte under the command of Capt. Mason. With this
company came Turnbull and French; but both those persons, finding their
services were not required, soon left the Republic. While the Rifles were
marching into the capital, the general-in-chief was in bed with a violent
attack of fever; but thanks to good medical attendance and a strong
constitution, he was able, on the next day, Sunday the 23d, to go to the
dinner-table. Scarcely able to sit up, he had a note from Major Brewster
put in his hands, bearing the first hasty news of the reverse at Santa
Rosa. The same evening he managed to get aboard the steamer, and was, on
the morning of the 24th, at Virgin Bay. The news of the stragglers from
Santa Rosa was a better tonic than a cold bath. The necessity for mental
and moral action has a wonderful effect in driving the reluctant body to
perform the tasks the will imposes.
The disaster in Guanacaste made Walker determine to move the main
strength of the Americans to Rivas. He did not know what effect the
rout at Santa Rosa might have on the native Nicaraguans, or how far it
might shake their confidence in the ability of the Americans to protect
the State from its enemies. Orders were given accordingly; and in the
meanwhile arrangements had been made for removing the government to Leon.
Rivas was anxious to fill the vacancies in his cabinet; and Jerez had
intimated that if the President would go to Leon he might resume his
place in the government. Before leaving Granada, however, the President
issued a decree whereby the Oriental and Meridional Departments were put
under martial law, and the general-in-chief was invested with absolute
power over these portions of the Republic. The Minister of Public Credit,
Ferrer, remained at Granada as commissioner, to co-operate with the
general, as far as the latter might require, in supplying means for
carrying on the war, and for ministering to the wants of the army.
The day Walker established his headquarters at Rivas, Schlessinger
arrived to report in person the incidents of his march and retreat. He
urged the inexperience of the men, and their want of disciplined courage
as the cause of his misfortune; and he forthwith proposed to organize
a new force for the occupation of Guanacaste. But the officers of the
expedition who began to arrive all agreed as to the incapacity and
cowardice shown by their late commander. Some, indeed, hinted that he had
sold his command; but such conduct was not suited to his timid nature.
Had he sold his men, he would never have returned to Nicaragua. The
charges, however, made against him required a court of inquiry; and the
report of the court of inquiry led to his arrest and trial before a court
martial on the charges of neglect of duty, of ignorance of his duties of
commanding officer, and of cowardice in the presence of the enemy. To
these was afterward added the charge of desertion.
The movement of the army from Granada to Rivas by Virgin Bay had
developed the necessity for more vigor in its means of transportation.
Therefore C. J. Macdonald was appointed quartermaster-general with the
rank of colonel; but this office he held only a few days for causes which
will soon appear. Up to the 30th, the re-organization of the men who had
returned from Costa Rica was going on, and efforts were being made to
increase in several respects the efficiency of the army. But a general
depression seemed to pervade officers as well as men. Applications were
constantly made for furloughs to return to the United States; and the
spirit of the troops was yet more depressed by the Americans outside
of the army thronging to headquarters in order to get passports to
leave the country. Two or three ladies—Mrs. Thompson, the wife of the
adjutant-general, and Mrs. Kewen, the wife of Mr. E. J. C. Kewen, a civil
officer of the State—aided to keep up the courage of the men by the
cheerfulness with which they met all forms of fatigue and danger. But the
sphere of such influences was necessarily narrow, and it was requisite to
infuse some enthusiasm into the army or let it dissolve from the effects
of one shameful panic.
Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 30th, the force in Rivas was paraded
on the main Plaza, and the general-in-chief addressed them a few minutes
in such words as he could find for the occasion. He endeavored to place
before them the moral grandeur of the position they occupied. Alone in
the world, without a friendly government to give even its sympathy, much
less its aid, they had nothing to support them in the struggle with the
neighboring States save the consciousness of the justice of their cause.
Maligned by those who should have befriended them, and betrayed by those
they had benefited, they had to choose between basely yielding their
rights and nobly dying for them. Nor did their general seek to hide from
them the peril in which they stood; but from the urgency of the danger
arose the greater necessity for becoming conduct. The words were few and
simple, and drew little force from the manner of him who uttered them;
but they had the desired effect and created a new spirit among the men.
It is only by constant appeals to the loftier qualities of man that you
can make him a good soldier; and all military discipline is a mere effort
to make virtue constant and reliable by making it habitual.
On the 1st of April the arrival of the steamer Cortes from San Francisco
at San Juan del Sur was announced. W. R. Garrison had come as passenger
with a view of making arrangements for the new transit; but no men had
come for the service of Nicaragua. Soon after news reached Rivas of the
arrival of the steamer, Walker received intelligence that she had again
put to sea, towing out the coal-ship then in the harbor. The up-going
steamer of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company had spoken the Cortes
before she entered the port of San Juan, and had borne to her commander
the orders of his principals in New-York. Captain Collens, of the Cortes,
had, however, left Mr. Garrison ashore; and the latter, when he got to
Rivas, informed Walker that this sudden movement of the old company had
not been provided for, and that it might be several weeks, at least
six, before another steamer would come from California. Thus one motive
for holding fast to the Transit was, for the moment, taken away. Thus,
at the very outset, the new contractors, Morgan and Garrison, by their
timidity—to use no harsher word—jeoparded the welfare of those who had
acted on the faith of their capacity and willingness to fulfil their
agreements.
At the same time that Garrison and Morgan were embarrassing Walker’s
communications with the United States by the hesitation and weakness of
their conduct, Rivas was writing that news every day reached Leon of
an intention on the part of Guatemala and San Salvador to join in the
war against Nicaragua. It was clear that the people in the Occidental
Department began to shake at the idea of an invasion from the northern
States. As the Transit was, for the time being, made useless by the
action of persons having an interest in the property on the line of
travel, the general-in-chief decided to move northward so as to restore
confidence to the Leoneses. He was not then aware of the large force
Mora had on the frontier. Scouting parties of the enemy had come as
far as Peña Blanca, a point on the southern boundary of the Meridional
Department; but these were not of such force as to indicate the presence
of the numbers Mora was leading through Guanacaste.
Just as orders were being issued to prepare the army for its movement to
Virgin Bay, Col. Macdonald resigned the office of quartermaster-general.
At the time, Walker attributed this act to the projected departure of the
troops from the Transit, Macdonald then being on the Isthmus to watch
the interests of Garrison and Morgan. But after events showed that his
conduct was more the result of mortification at the apparent bad faith
of his principal at San Francisco, than of any disaffection toward the
cause of the Americans in Nicaragua. His resignation was, however, a loss
at the time; for his clear head and energetic action were much needed in
the coming crisis. At that time the general-in-chief knew something of
the value of Macdonald’s head; but it was only at a later period that
he had the opportunity of discovering other admirable qualities the
sturdy Scotchman possessed. With the Highland blood, he had the Highland
loyalty; but his dogged tenacity of purpose was that of the Lowland
borderer.
After Macdonald’s resignation, D. Domingo de Goicouria was appointed
intendente-general with the rank of brigadier-general. He was a Cuban,
and had been engaged with the patriots of that island in some efforts
to gain its independence. Before going to Nicaragua, Goicouria had
sent a pure-hearted and devoted son of the island, Lainé, to negotiate
with Walker for future assistance against the Spanish dominion. And the
latter, while pledging his personal efforts to the Cuban cause, had been
careful not to involve the relations of Nicaragua by such promises. On
his part, Goicouria had promised much help in the way of money, arms,
and clothing; and his manner and conversation, more mercantile than
military, were calculated to make you imagine him capable of inspiring
capitalists with confidence in his commercial ability. As many persons
concurred in representing Goicouria’s credit to be good, his desire for
rank was gratified by the appointment, and it was hoped thus to secure
some recompense in the shape of shoes, jackets and equipments for the
soldiers. The duties of the quartermaster’s department were devolved
on the intendencia; and the chief, Goicouria, recommended for first
and second assistants Fisher and Byron Cole—who had lately returned to
Nicaragua—with the ranks respectively of colonel and lieutenant-colonel.
These appointments were accordingly made.
The intendencia, thus hastily organized, received immediate orders to
prepare transportation for the whole force then in Rivas, with all the
property of the army there, to Virgin Bay. Walker himself repaired to
the latter point to see that everything was ready to embark the troops
on one of the lake steamers. After reaching Virgin Bay he was called up
about midnight by the new intendente-general, who had rode all the way
from Rivas to propose that he should be left with a few Americans and
some native troops in charge of the Meridional Department. The conceit
of Goicouria, excited by his new rank and title, had turned his head;
and although he had scarcely been a month in the country, he foolishly
presumed to thrust his opinion unasked on his general-in-chief. Of course
he got a short answer; and Walker began to think the shoes and shirts
might be too dearly purchased by the appointment of Don Domingo.
By the evening of the 5th of April, all were at Virgin Bay, and the
embarkation was commenced. Most of the American residents about the
Transit road, thinking from the preparations that the Meridional
Department was to be abandoned, flocked with the troops aboard the San
Carlos. When all were on the steamer she was ordered to the San Juan
river, and the morning of the 6th found her off San Carlos Fort. Captain
Linton’s company stationed at that point was embarked, and the steamer
proceeded down the river to Toro Rapids. A company intended to garrison
Castillo Viejo was sent down to relieve the force previously there; and
when the returning company had reached the San Carlos, she was ordered
to Granada. On the morning of the 8th, the steamer anchored off Granada,
and the troops were rapidly disembarked. Thus the movement northward was,
for a time, concealed from the people of the Meridional Department, among
whom the enemy had numerous spies, and the impression was temporarily
created, that the Americans intended to move either out of the country or
toward San José. The enemy seems to have adopted the former opinion.
It seems that Mora, after his success at Santa Rosa, was pressing on
toward the frontier; but hearing Walker had occupied Rivas in force,
he stopped to watch his adversary. Then seeing the preparations for
abandoning the department, he allowed the embarkation of the Americans
almost in his very presence. Of course, with the Legitimists in and
about Rivas, it was far easier for Mora to get reliable news than for
the Nicaraguan general. As no villages or even country-houses were to be
passed, it was not difficult to bring a force of three thousand men to
the neighborhood of the Transit road, without its being at all known in
the department. Walker had no sooner left Virgin Bay, than Mora moved
forward with a view of occupying Rivas and the Transit road.
Early on the morning of the 7th, according to the testimony of sworn
witnesses, examined by the American minister, Mr. Wheeler, the Costa
Rican troops entered Virgin Bay and surrounded the office of the Transit
Company. The officer in command gave the order to fire, and nine American
citizens, mostly laborers in the service of the company, and all of them
entirely unarmed, were killed or wounded by the first volley. The wounded
were immediately run through with the bayonets of the soldiers and
swords of the officers. Then the doors of the building were broken open,
the trunks stored in it were rifled, and the persons of the murdered
Americans were robbed of the money, watches, and jewelry, found on
them. Nor were the brutal passions of the invaders satisfied with these
acts. They afterward set fire to the wharf the Transit Company was just
completing, and declared their intention to exterminate every American
on the Isthmus. They commenced the work of destruction by burning to the
water’s edge the wharf which American capital had constructed for the
use and advantage of Nicaraguan labor and Nicaraguan products.
To San Juan del Sur and to Rivas, the entrance of the Costa Ricans
was more orderly. At Rivas, particularly, Mora made every effort to
conciliate the people of the country. A prefect was appointed, and D.
Evaristo Carazo, who for several years had been accumulating a fortune
from the transit of Americans across the Isthmus, accepted the office.
Orders were also issued prohibiting the impressment of men for military
service; but urgent invitations were made to the people to join those
who professed to have come for their liberation from the yoke of the
Americans. Few, however, if any, accepted the invitation; and the
President of Costa Rica did not fail to express his disappointment at
the backwardness of the people to join his ranks. He had trusted too
much to the partial representations of the Legitimists, and he afterward
complained bitterly of the deception practised on him.
An hour or two after Walker landed at Granada, on the morning of the 8th,
an American from the Transit came to inform him of the events occurring
there. At the same time the letters from Leon indicated that the alarm
there had subsided. Hence orders were at once issued to have the whole
marching force then in Granada, with the exception of two companies to
garrison that place, ready to move the next morning by daylight.
The American force had been sensibly diminished by the expedition to
Santa Rosa, and after the return from that disastrous field the French
and German companies were disbanded and all who could not speak English
were discharged from the army. Thus, on the morning of the 9th, not more
than five hundred and fifty men marched out of Granada toward Rivas.
The men were, however, in good spirits and went at a brisk pace, so
that early in the afternoon they were halted for dinner a league to the
southward of Nandaime. Here they met Col. Machado, a Cuban, who had been
left at Rivas with a few native troops when Walker marched the American
force thence. The officer commanding at Rivas was José Bermudez, who
remained and took service under Mora, but the rank and file of the native
Nicaraguans forsaking Bermudez had followed Machado, and left Rivas
some hours before the Costa Ricans entered. Thus was it generally in
Nicaragua; the people adhered to the Americans; the _calzados_, those
wearing shoes, deserted to the enemies of the Republic.
After rest and dinner, the command strengthened by Machado’s men,
marched to the Ochomogo, where it encamped for the night. Then it was
ascertained that Mora had entered Rivas the day before with a large
army, the woman, who brought the story, saying at least three thousand.
But as the ideas of the people of the country about numbers are rather
vague, not much confidence was put in the report. On the 10th, the march
was slow and toilsome, owing to the heat of the day and to the long
stretches of dry and dusty road without any shade to protect the men
from the fierce tropical sun. During the morning a native from Rivas was
taken, carrying proclamations from Mora to his Legitimist friends about
Masaya, and, after some threats, much information was educed from the
messenger concerning the position and strength of the enemy. As the force
approached the Gil Gonzales, a body of rangers, under command of Capt.
Waters, was sent on to the point where the main road to Rivas crosses the
river, and there exchanged shots with an outpost of the enemy placed near
Obraje. The main body of the Americans, however, left the high road half
a league from the river, and taking a trail to the left struck the Gil
Gonzales some distance below the point where Waters had encountered the
enemy. About sunset Walker camped for the night on the south bank of the
Gil Gonzales, and due silence was kept in order to prevent the enemy from
perceiving his presence there.
Just before reaching camp a herdsman, hunting cattle for the Costa
Ricans, had been made prisoner, and the soldiers had scarcely reached
the several points in the camp assigned to them, before a man, found
skulking near the river, was brought to the general-in-chief. At first
he denied all knowledge of the enemy at Rivas, but a rope thrown around
his neck and cast over a limb of the nearest tree brought him the use of
his memory, and he gave an accurate and detailed account of the several
points at which the Costa Ricans were posted. He stated the houses
in which Mora and the principal officers quartered, the place where
the ammunition was stored together the quantity of it, not forgetting
two pretty little pieces of artillery commanding some of the streets.
Unfortunately for himself, he let out the fact that he had been sent to
gather news of the Americans, and hence was punished as a spy. But his
information was so full, and, after severe cross-examination there was
so little contradiction in his story, that Walker formed his plan of
attack on the facts thus obtained. The result showed that the statements
of the spy were entirely accurate. The fear of death had so discomposed
his mind that he could not invent a lie.
Before retiring for the night, Walker sent for the principal officers,
and explaining the plan of attack for the next day, assigned to each his
separate duty. Lieut.-Col. Sanders, with four companies of Rifles, was to
enter by the streets running along the north side of the Plaza, and was
to keep his men in full charge, if possible, until they reached the house
where Mora was quartered, about eighty yards from the main square. Major
Brewster, with three companies of Rifles, was to enter by the street
on the south side of the Plaza and was, also, to attempt to reach the
headquarters of the enemy. As Walker expected to surprise Mora, he hoped
to get possession of his person before he could escape; and at any rate
as his headquarters were opposite the magazine, the occupation of the
former would command the latter. Hence the object in ordering the Rifles
to strike for the house Mora was known to occupy. Col. Natzmer, with
Major O’Neal and the Second Rifles—as his command was called—although
then armed with muskets, was to pass to the extreme left of the town thus
threatening the right of the enemy and yet being within easy distance of
Brewster. Machado with the natives was to pass by a road which enters the
Plaza from the north, and would thus find himself on Sanders’ right. Col.
Fry was to hold his companies of light infantry as a reserve.
Between two and three o’clock in the morning, the several companies were
formed and the march toward Rivas began, Dr. J. L. Cole acting as guide.
Owing to the darkness of the night and the obscurity of the trail, the
march was for a time slow and interrupted by frequent halts; but when day
broke, and the command fell into the road through Potosi, the pace of
the men became brisk and lively. The quick yet firm step of the soldiers
showed that their spirit was good, and the dust of the road, though thick
and heavy, affected them little. The deep silence of the expectant ranks
was only broken by the low voice of one asking his comrade for a drop
of water from his gourd; and the bark of the watch-dogs, common in the
huts along the roadside, was passed unheeded, save with the half-uttered
hope that the noise of the brute might not give the enemy notice of their
approach. Soon after they passed Potosi the sun rose in all the splendor
of his southern skies, and when the Americans, making a detour toward the
lake, fell into the road from San Jorge to Rivas, about a mile from the
latter place, it was near eight o’clock.
Not more than half a mile from the edge of the town Walker met some
market-women, who told him the enemy were not aware of his approach;
they had left the Plaza only a few minutes previously, and the Costa
Ricans—_hermaniticos_, as the San Jorge women called them—were as
careless and indifferent as if they were in their own country. A short
halt was made at the Cuatro Esquinas to give the rear time to close up;
and when the rear-guard appeared the order was given for the several
divisions of the force to advance in the manner indicated the night
before.
Sanders, being in the advance, drove in a small picket near the edge
of the town, and proceeding at a double quick step, entered the Plaza
and rushed up the street toward Mora’s quarters. The enemy, taken by
surprise, had scarcely commenced to return the fire of the Rifles when
the latter reached a small brass gun standing in the street, about half
way between the Plaza and the magazine of the Costa Ricans. Sanders’
men, shouting over the gun they had taken, carried it to the Plaza;
but in the meantime they had given the enemy time to recover from the
first shock and the Costa Ricans’ fire now became galling. Brewster had
succeeded also in clearing his side of the Plaza of the enemy, and, with
Captain Anderson’s company in front, was urging his command on toward the
houses occupied by the Costa Ricans. A few sharp-shooters, however, of
the enemy, French and Germans, got possession of a tower in front of the
Rifles, and so annoyed them that they were finally forced to seek cover.
Natzmer and O’Neal got possession of the houses on Brewster’s left and
were doing good execution, keeping their men well protected and pouring a
sharp fire into the enemy’s ranks. While Machado, leading on his natives
in the most gallant manner, had himself fallen; and his soldiers, after
his death, took small part in the engagement.
Thus, in a few moments, the Americans had possession of the Plaza and
all the houses around it, while the enemy shutting themselves up in the
buildings in the western part of the town, kept up an irregular fire from
the doors and windows, as well as from the loop-holes they soon began
to cut through the adobe walls. As for the Americans, after the first
enthusiasm of the attack had died away, it was impossible to get them to
storm the houses where the Costa Ricans were hiding from the deadly aim
of the riflemen. Many of the men, exhausted by the first charge, actually
set their muskets against the walls, and throwing themselves on the
ground, could scarcely be driven to any active exertion. When Col. Fry
came up with his reserve an effort was made to get them to charge down
the street to Mora’s house; but Fry and then Kewen—who as volunteer aid
acted gallantly during the day—urged the men in vain to the attack. The
depression of the companies, blown by the first onset, had its effect on
the fresh men; and it was impossible to get any portion of the force to
renew the attack with the vigor which marked its commencement.
The few Rangers, under Captain Waters, had dismounted early in the action
and had taken part in the conflict. Young Gillis, an impetuous lieutenant
under Waters, had already fallen; while the captain taking possession
of the tower of the church, on the east side of the Plaza, was able to
observe to advantage the movements of the enemy and to annoy them with
his rifles. Some of Sanders’ men were also placed on the roofs of the
houses to the west of the square, and were able to do execution from this
position. It soon became evident, however, that it might require days to
drive the Costa Ricans from the houses they occupied after their first
surprise was over, especially as the Nicaraguan force had no artillery,
and would have to depend on the pick and crow-bar for working through
the thick adobe walls of the town. Mora, it was clear, was closely
pressed, for at different times during the day the Costa Rican troops
from San Juan and Virgin Bay were observed entering Rivas. The president
had concentrated all the strength he had in the department to repel the
attack of the Americans.
But when the enemy saw the Nicaraguans made no advance, they assumed the
offensive and undertook to get into a house to the north of the Plaza,
whence they might pour a destructive fire into the American flank. This
movement was defeated by Lieutenant Gay with a number of others, officers
principally, who volunteered for the service. The gallantry of those
who went with Gray was, in its spirit, more like that of the knights of
feudal times than of the officers and soldiers of regular armies. Among
those with the young lieutenant were Rogers of the commissary department,
bearing the rank of major, Captain N. C. Breckenridge and Captain Huston.
There was no thought of rank, but each one went forth with his revolver,
ready to do the part of a true man in the fray. Not more than a dozen
went out to drive away upward of a hundred, and their charge swept the
enemy completely away. Gray and Huston fell, and Breckenridge received a
slight wound in the head; but the remainder of the party came off unhurt.
During the afternoon the enemy set fire to some of the houses held by
the Americans, and the fire of their rifles from a tower, in front of
Brewster’s command, interfered somewhat with free communication between
the east and west sides of the Plaza. As night, too, approached, the fire
from both sides slackened, each apparently exhausted by the excitement
and strife of the day. In the meanwhile, Walker was preparing to
withdraw, and after dark the wounded and disabled were moved over to
the church on the east side of the square. Then the several companies
were gradually gathered toward the same point, a few men being still
left in the burning houses to keep the enemy from embarrassing the
American movement. The surgeons examined the wounded, and those declared
mortally hurt were left in the church near the altar, while the others
were provided with horses for the march. It was past midnight when all
arrangements were completed, and the command slowly and silently defiled
from the town, the wounded in the centre, and Major Brewster commanding
the rear-guard.
Soon after daylight, the little force, weary and foot-sore, ragged, but
resolute, crossed the Gil Gonzales near Obraje, and halted for a short
rest. Their guide, Dr. Cole, and Macdonald, who had gone to Rivas as
a volunteer, were missing, although they had left the town with the
command. Nor was Captain Norvell Walker anywhere to be found. The rear
guard had been well commanded by Brewster, and his coolness and firmness
conduced much to the orderly character of the march. It was not until the
Americans were some miles beyond the Gil Gonzales that Captain Walker,
marching by himself, overtook the rear-guard, and showed by his story
that his absence was not due to any laxity of the guard in keeping up
stragglers. He had fallen asleep in the tower of the church on the Plaza
at Rivas, and not waking until daylight, was surprised to find himself
alone in a town occupied by the enemy. But the Costa Ricans had not, up
to the time he left, discovered that the Americans had retired: hence he
was able to escape with safety. Cole and Macdonald, overcome by fatigue,
wandered into a bye-path near Rivas to take rest. Finding themselves
separated from the Nicaraguan force they sought and obtained refuge from
a poor native, who kept them hid near San Jorge for a week. They did not
re-appear in Granada until ten days after the action.
On the night of the 12th the camp was again on the banks of the Ochomogo.
Col. Natzmer was sent forward to Granada with orders to have all the
disposable horses and mules, together with some provisions, brought to
Nandaime; and about noon of the 13th the force had reached the latter
village. Here the first report of the losses at Rivas was made by the
adjutant-general. The official report showed 58 killed, 62 wounded, and
13 missing. Most of the latter afterward came in; so that the whole loss
may be put at 120. A very large proportion of both the killed and wounded
were officers. Among the former were Captains Huston, Clinton, Horrell
and Linton, Lieutenants Morgan, Stoll, Gray, Doyle, Gillis and Winters;
of the latter were Captains Cook, Caycee and Anderson, Lieutenants Grist,
Jones, Jamieson, Leonard, Potter, Ayers, Latimer, Dolan and Anderson. The
loss of the enemy is difficult to determine: for the Central Americans
never, even to their own officers, state their losses accurately. But
there were probably near six hundred of the Costa Ricans put hors de
combat; two hundred killed and four hundred wounded. Their force at the
beginning of the action was upward of three thousand; and their losses
may be estimated by the wounded they afterward took away from Nicaragua.
From Nandaime to Granada the march was long and wearisome, in spite of
the additional facilities of transportation. Hence, it was near midnight
when the shattered forces of the Republic entered the capital. The
friends of the government in Granada were, however, awake, in order to
receive the force with every demonstration of respect and confidence. The
bells rang forth a joyful peal, rockets were sent up into the air, and
all appeared thankful for the services the army had rendered the State.
Although the Americans had not succeeded in driving the Costa Ricans
from Rivas, they had struck a blow which paralyzed the enemy. Mora was
surprised by the suddenness and the force of the attack made on him;
and the sight of the crowded hospitals at Rivas depressed the spirits
of his soldiers, new to the trials and sufferings of war. The people,
too, of the Meridional Department, as well as those of the Oriental and
Occidental, seeing the Americans were not intimidated by the numbers
brought against them, regained their confidence, somewhat lost by the
disgrace of Santa Rosa.
While Mora had marched into the Meridional Department, a body of 250
Costa Ricans had been sent to the Serapaqui in order to cut off Walker’s
communications by the San Juan river. Capt. Baldwin, a vigilant and
intelligent officer, was at Hipp’s Point when he ascertained the enemy
were cutting a road toward the river. He did not wait for the enemy to
reach him; but, ascending the Serapaqui, he vigorously assailed the
Costa Ricans while they were cutting the road, and drove them back with
large loss and in extreme confusion. He himself lost one killed, Lieut.
Rakestraw, and two wounded; while the enemy left more than twenty dead on
the field. This affair of the Serapaqui took place on the 10th of April;
and the routed Costa Ricans did not stop in their flight until they had
fallen back to San José.
Immediately on reaching Granada the general-in-chief wrote to the
President at Leon a detailed statement of the action at Rivas; and a
day or two afterward he sent Mr. Fabens with letters to Don Patricio,
suggesting the appointment of Father Vigil as Minister to the United
States. The President replied to the letter concerning the engagement
with the Costa Ricans, thanking the army, in the name of the Republic,
for the courage and the conduct it had shown in the attack on the
invaders of Nicaragua; and Mr. Fabens brought back with him the
credentials and instructions of Vigil as Minister. The latter forthwith
got ready to leave for San Juan del Norte in company with Mr. John P.
Heiss. The priest agreed to leave his easy home in the tropics for the
purpose of explaining properly to the cabinet at Washington the nature of
the events occurring in Central America.
During the absence of the main body of the army on the expedition
to Rivas, Schlessinger had been left at Granada on parole. He had
an opportunity to regain, to some extent, his lost character, by
volunteering to march with the Americans against the enemy. But he
did not take advantage of the occasion; on the contrary, he remained
to acquire, if possible, new infamy by adding desertion to his former
crimes. The court martial which was ordered to try him, found him guilty
of all the charges brought against him; and he was sentenced to be shot,
and to be published throughout the civilized world. He afterward joined
a body of the Legitimists acting against the Americans, and in such
society he sank, by the way he permitted himself to be treated, beneath
the contempt of the lowest soldier in even a Central American army. He is
now fallen so far that it would be an unworthy act to execute on him the
sentence of an honorable court.
After the return of the Americans to Granada an enemy fiercer and more
malignant than the Costa Ricans began to ravage their thinned ranks.
The fever which had before carried off many, re-appeared in an even
aggravated form. Major Brewster was one of its first victims; and few
could have been more missed than he. He had the calmness of spirit no
danger disturbed; and it was only in the hour of trial and misfortune
his full value could be known. It was the loss of officers—dying just as
they began to be formed, and as their character and value began to be
known—which prevented the American force from acquiring the discipline
and steady virtue it might otherwise have attained. During the earlier
as well as the later stages of the war in Nicaragua, it was the officer,
ambitious of gaining a knowledge of his profession, and zealous in the
pursuit of duty, who was most apt to seek the post of danger, and was
therefore most likely to fall by the bullets of the enemy; and at times,
too, it seemed as if disease also seized on such with more avidity than
it did on others who might have been better spared.
New-comers, however, began to arrive to take the place of those cut off
by battle and disease. On the morning of the 21st of April the steamer
arrived at Granada with about two hundred men in charge of General
Hornsby, who had been absent on business in the United States. As the
Americans had been re-organized after the 13th in two battalions, one
rifle, the other light infantry, the new recruits were formed into a
second infantry battalion, with Leonidas McIntosh as major, and James
Walker and James Mullen as captains. Upward of twenty men had come at
their own expense to Granada, and they were enlisted for four months,
and put into the rangers under Captain Davenport. This addition to the
numbers of the army of course re-animated the old troops—for some of
them, considering the services they had seen, might with propriety be
called old troops; and after the arrival of the new men all were as eager
as ever to march against the enemy at Rivas.
And while the Nicaraguan force was increasing, that of Costa Rica was
rapidly sinking from the double cancers of cholera and desertion.
When the Americans retired from Rivas, the Costa Ricans were encumbered
with so many dead that instead of regularly burying the bodies they threw
them into the wells of the town. Their surgical staff, too, was weak;
and the hospitals being crowded and ill-regulated, the festering sores
of the wounded soldiers tended to produce disease even if the cholera
had not appeared. The epidemic which began to prey on their camp soon
after the 11th of April, was probably the same _colerin_ that attacked
the Democrats at San Juan del Sur the year before, and afterward troubled
the Americans at Virgin Bay. The spasms of this form of disease are not
so violent as those of the Asiatic cholera, nor does the patient sink so
rapidly. Its fatal effects were increased in the Costa Rican camp by the
general depression of spirits which pervaded the officers as well as the
men after they saw the results of the first conflict with the enemy they
had come to drive, as they imagined, by easy marches, and by the mere
force of their numbers, out of Central America.
Walker soon heard, through the people of San Jorge, the condition of the
Costa Rican camp. Far from receiving recruits from the Nicaraguans, all
fled the infected town. Mora began to build barricades as soon as the
Americans retired; and this of itself showed fear of another attack.
But when cholera and desertion supervened, the invader lost the hope of
holding his ground even behind the adobes of Rivas. Nor was it possible
for the Costa Rican officers to conceal from the soldiers the fact
that the Americans were receiving reinforcements. Increased depression
followed the growing apprehension of attack; and the pestilence found
its victims each day yielding more readily to his deadly grasp. Then,
too, there were vague rumors of movements in Costa Rica against the rule
of the Moras. The people, beginning to feel the burden of the war, were
asking why it was made; and the party which had for years been banished
from the business of the State, was heard to raise its voice against the
unjust war an ambitious executive was waging for the increase of his own
personal power. D. Rafael Mora saw he must leave Rivas and return to San
José; so, placing his brother-in-law, General José Maria Cañas, in charge
of the army, with orders to lead it back to Costa Rica, the troubled
President mounted his horse, and almost alone took the road to Guanacaste.
It was no part of the Nicaraguan general’s plan to waste his strength on
an army which was being effectually destroyed by other causes; so he did
not move from Granada until he heard the Costa Ricans were preparing to
abandon Rivas. Then putting the rifle and light infantry battalions on
the lake steamer, he proceeded with them to Virgin Bay. The battalions
were landed as quickly as the charred and ruined state of the wharf
admitted; and the order was given to advance along the familiar Transit
road toward San Juan del Sur. But the force had gone not quite a league
when a breathless messenger rode up to inform the general that Cañas was
already marching with rapid and disorderly steps toward the La Flor.
At the same time the messenger bore a letter addressed to “Wm. Walker,
General-in-chief of the Nicaraguan Army,” signed “José Maria Cañas,
General-in-chief of the Costa Rican Army,” and couched in the following
terms: “Obliged to abandon the Plaza of Rivas, on account of the
appearance of the cholera in a most alarming form, I am forced to leave
here a certain number of sick it is impossible to carry away without
danger to their lives; but I expect your generosity will treat them with
all the attention and care their situation requires. I invoke the laws of
humanity in favor of these unfortunate victims of an awful calamity, and
I have the honor of proposing to you to exchange them when they get well,
for more than twenty prisoners who are now in our power, and whose names
I will send you in a detailed list for making the exchange. Believing
that this, my proposal, will be admitted, according to the laws of war,
I have the honor of subscribing myself, with feelings of the highest
consideration, your obedient servant.” It is needless to add, that the
surgeons immediately received orders to take charge of the sick of the
enemy wherever found.
Such, then, was the conclusion of the first act in the war of
extermination. Had the Nicaraguan chief been a proud man, or one capable
of rejoicing in the humiliation of a foe, he might have been excused for
some elation of spirit at receiving the letter of Cañas. The enemy which,
not two months before, had declared war against the “filibusters,” and
ordered all taken with arms in their hands to be shot, now supplicated
the commander-in-chief of the Nicaraguan army to spare the lives of the
suffering soldiers left behind at Rivas. The victims of the murderous
court-martial at Santa Rosa, the bayonet stabs inflicted on the wounded
prisoners found near the altar of the church at Rivas, the insults to the
bodies of the brave dead who gave up their lives on the 11th of April,
for a country theirs only by adoption, were to be avenged by mercy, and
care, and attention, bestowed on the sick and wounded of those who had
done the wrongs. It was a revenge such as the Americans might well be
proud of—not unworthy either of the cause they advocated, or of the race
from which they sprang.
It is scarcely necessary to follow the Costa Ricans in their sad and
dreary march from San Juan to San José. The path to the La Flor was
blocked with the bodies of stragglers who had fallen behind when the
fatal spasms seized them, and prevented them from returning with their
comrades. Nor did the scourge cease to pursue them when they entered the
territory of Guanacaste. It tracked them to San José, and so well was its
work of destruction done, that not more than five hundred of the brave
array which had gone forth to exterminate the “filibusters,” returned to
the capital of the Republic. Then the pestilence turning from the army it
had almost wholly devoured, sought its prey among the peaceful families
of the land. Young and old, women and children, succumbed to the disease,
and some estimate that as many as fourteen thousand died from its
effects. Probably, however, the more moderate estimate of ten thousand
might cover all the loss to the population of the State.
While the Costa Ricans were occupying Rivas, it was reported that the
Legitimists were attempting to raise men in the District of Chontales,
and in the departments of Matagalpa and Segovia. Goicouria was sent with
Captain Raymond’s company to scour the hills of Chontales; and meeting
a small collection of the old Granadinos at Acoyapa, he scattered them
in the course of a few moments. Then traversing the greater part of the
district, he returned to Granada, and reported all quiet on the other
side of the lake. Valle, who was military governor of Segovia, readily
dispersed the Legitimists who made some show of a movement near Somoto
Grande; while Mariano Salazar, sent by the government as commissioner
to Matagalpa, pacified the Indians of that region, and returned with his
command to Leon. Thus, in a few weeks, order and quiet were restored to
the whole Republic, and the commands of the provisional government were
respected in all parts of the State.
In the Meridional Department it was necessary to make examples of some
Legitimists who had marched with the Costa Ricans from Guanacaste to
invade the Republic. A principal one of these was Francisco Ugarte, who
had been married to a sister of Dr. Cole’s wife. The general-in-chief
heard that Ugarte remained in the department after the departure of the
enemy; and a detachment sent in search of the traitor, found him and
brought him to headquarters. He was tried by a military commission, and
ordered to be hung. This mode of punishment for such offenders being
unusual in the country—shooting being resorted to rather than hanging—the
execution of Ugarte made a strong impression on the people, and infused
a salutary dread of American justice among the plotting Legitimists. As
there had been some questions concerning the guardianship of Ugarte’s
children, and the administration of their mother’s estate between him
and his connections, the natives generally attributed the arrest of the
criminal to information derived from his wife’s brother-in-law, Dr. Cole;
and the prevalence of the suspicion indicates that the people were not
unaccustomed to see adherence to a party, or proposed devotion to the
public interests, made the stalking-horse for the gratification of family
feuds and personal passions.
For two or three weeks after the departure of Cañas from Rivas, the
main body of the Americans were kept at Virgin Bay, detachments being
constantly sent to different points of the department, with a view of
restoring confidence in the strength of the Rivas administration. The
fever was fierce at Granada, carrying off many of those who had lately
reached the country. After some days, too, the cholera or colerin
appeared at Virgin Bay, and numbers died from it there. Nor were the
resident Americans or the soldiers the only victims of fever and
cholera at this time. The owners of the Transit not having made proper
arrangements for their line, the passengers for California who had come
to San Juan del Norte, in April, were obliged to remain in Nicaragua
a whole month. Many of these passengers being destitute of means, and
irregular in their course of life, readily yielded to the fever then
prevailing at Granada; and the reports they gave of the country, thrown
into it as they were without any of the common comforts of civilization,
prevented many from going thither. It was not until the 19th of May,
that the steamer arrived at San Juan del Sur, and gave these suffering
passengers a chance to go to San Francisco.
In spite, however, of the sickness which prevailed among the Americans,
their spirits were good and their hopes high. To the casual observer the
political elements appeared at rest, and all seemed more tranquil than at
any time since the treaty of the 23d of October. The common people, with
their strong religious instinct, thought that Providence had sent the
cholera in order to drive the Costa Ricans from the soil. The Americans
with that faith in themselves which has carried them in a wonderfully
short period from one ocean to another, regarded their establishment in
Nicaragua as fixed beyond the control of casualties. But to him who knows
that great changes in states and societies are not wrought without long
and severe labor, the difficulties of the Americans in Nicaragua might
appear to be only beginning. To destroy an old political organization is
a comparatively easy task, and little besides force is requisite for its
accomplishment; but to build up and re-constitute society—to gather the
materials from the four quarters, and construct them into an harmonious
whole, fitted for the uses of a new civilization—requires more than
force, more even than genius for the work, and agents with which to
complete it. Time and patience, as well as skill and labor, are needed
for success; and they who undertake it, must be willing to devote a
lifetime to the work.
At that time there was one man at least in Nicaragua who saw that the
path of the Americans was even then beset with thorns. Edmund Randolph,
who since the beginning of April, had been in the Occidental Department,
came down to Virgin Bay to take passage for New-York. During his stay
at Leon and Realejo he had been very ill, almost dead at one time,
from an affection of the liver; but in the intervals of his painful
sickness, his quick eye had seen an under-current in the affairs of the
provisional government. On the 20th of May, just before leaving for San
Juan del Norte, he told Walker there was something wrong at Leon; but
that confined as he was to his bed he had not the means of ascertaining
precisely what was the nature of the evil.
Nor was the information given by Randolph unsupported by other facts. A
day or two before the Costa Ricans evacuated Rivas, a courier from Leon
had been brought to Granada, and on him were found letters directed to
His Excellency, D. Juan Rafael Mora. Walker, on opening these letters,
was surprised to find them signed by Patricio Rivas; and one was an
official communication from the government stating that it desired to
send a commissioner to treat for peace. Of course the general-in-chief
detained the courier and the letters, he well knowing that Mora was about
to abandon the town of Rivas. The Provisional President in his letters to
Walker from Leon, said nothing about these communications with the enemy
for some days; and the fact that he had sent such letters to Mora without
advising with the general-in-chief was suspicious.
It became, therefore, highly important for the Americans to ascertain
the state of affairs at Leon. Hence as soon as the mails for California
and the Atlantic States had been despatched, Walker determined to repair
to the Occidental Department. The events which transpired at Leon in
consequence of that visit present another and a new phase of the war in
Nicaragua.
Chapter Seventh.
THE DEFECTION OF RIVAS.
One of the avowed objects of Jerez in desiring the Provisional President
to remove to Leon was to establish friendly relations with the states
to the north and particularly with San Salvador. Accordingly, even
before the departure of Rivas from Granada, commissioners were sent to
Cojutepeque for the purpose of explaining to the cabinet of San Salvador
the actual condition of affairs in Nicaragua. But the commissioners
met with a cold reception; and on the 7th of May the government of San
Salvador sent a communication to the Provisional President declaring that
the presence of the Americans in Nicaragua threatened the independence
of Central America. The tone of the communication was so insulting that
D. Patricio Rivas refused to make any reply. After, however, the retreat
of the Costa Ricans from Rivas was known at Cojutepeque the news from
San Salvador became more pacific; but soon came news that Guatemala
was preparing troops to march against Nicaragua. So frequent and so
circumstantial did these reports become, that on the 3d of June Rivas
published a proclamation to the people declaring that the troops of
Carrera were marching against the State, and calling on all to take up
arms for the Republic.
On the 31st of May, Walker, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson in
command of two hundred Rifles, and by Captain Waters with two companies
of Rangers, left Granada for Leon; and Gen. Goicouria, who fancied
he understood native character because he spoke Spanish, joined the
general-in-chief in the excursion to the north. Not far from Masaya the
party was met by D. Mariano Salazar, who came to inform Walker of the
authenticity of the reports from Guatemala and of the necessity for a
portion of the American force to protect the northern frontier. Salazar
represented that the people of the Occidental Department were bitter in
their hostility to the troops of Carrera and might be depended on for
resisting their entrance into the State; but as the Guatemalan force was
said to be large and well organized, it was necessary to have some of the
Rifles at Leon ready to meet it.
Walker arrived at Leon on the 4th of June, and was received in the most
enthusiastic manner. At the entrance to the town, he was met by all
the dignitaries of the government and of the department. The streets
through which he passed were filled with crowds of the people, shouting
a welcome to their deliverers, as they styled the Americans; and the
doors and windows of the houses were thronged with women dressed in all
the colors of the rainbow. A feast had been prepared for the occasion;
but before taking his seat at table the general-in-chief was called
to the court-yard of the house where he was quartered, and there had
gathered the women of every age and every condition to thank him for
the protection the Americans had given to their homes. In the evening
the musicians came to sing songs in praise of American valor, and the
local rhymsters of the place—of whom there were not a few—poured forth
the sonorous sounds of Castilian verse in glory of the strangers who
had delivered Nicaragua from the oppressions of her enemies. All seemed
to vie with each other in their demonstrations of respect and good-will
toward the Rifles and Rangers.
But in the midst of the general joy, it was easy to see that some
of those connected with the government were not well pleased at the
enthusiasm shown by the people. The face of Jerez had a cloud over it,
and he appeared anxious and nervous; nor did Rivas seem as much at ease
in the presence of Walker as he had formerly been. The threatening
attitude of San Salvador and the rumored march of the troops of Carrera
alarmed the Provisional President, and it was evident that Jerez did
not strive to diminish the apprehensions of Rivas. Soon after Walker
reached Leon the President told him the cabinet of Cojutepeque had
proposed the reduction of the American force in the service of Nicaragua
to two hundred men, and had intimated that if the proposal were accepted
relations would be established with the provisional government. The
manner in which Rivas spoke of the proposal indicated that he was not
averse to the plan, but the reply of Walker that such a proposition
could be entertained only when the State was ready to pay the men it
discharged, showed the President he need not expect the general-in-chief
to co-operate in the policy suggested by San Salvador.
During the month of April an election had been called for president as
well as for senators and representatives. An election had taken place
at different times during the month of May, in several of the districts
of the State, but the irregularity in the voting had been such and the
condition of the Republic was so disturbed that all parties considered
the election as invalid. Little or no attention was paid to it, and as
quiet now prevailed throughout the State, the propriety of a decree for
a new election was being discussed at the time Walker left Granada for
Leon. The votes polled in May were mostly in the Occidental Department,
and were divided between Jerez, Rivas, and Salazar. The Granadinos,
alarmed at this and fearful that the seat of government might be
permanently fixed at Leon, were speaking of Walker as the fit person for
the presidency, while the Republic was threatened with invasion by the
adjacent States. When the general-in-chief reached Leon the question of
calling an election was also discussed there, and he was surprised to
find the President and Jerez, who had a few weeks before insisted on an
election, now hostile to the measure. The only minister who seemed at all
friendly to the proposition for a new election was D. Sebastian Salinas,
then holding the portfolio of Relations. Walker urged the President
to call the election, for he saw that Don Patricio was frightened
by appearances in the north, and could not be relied on to face the
coalition preparing against Nicaragua, and he thought it prudent to have
the election called while the State was comparatively quiet and before it
was more seriously menaced.
While this decree was being discussed news reached Leon of the
reception of Father Vigil by the United States government as Minister
from Nicaragua. At the same time the arrival of Col. Jaquess at Granada
with about one hundred and eighty men, was announced. Hereafter it may
be necessary to examine the manner of Vigil’s reception and the causes
which led to it; at present the fact is merely stated in order to show
the effect it had on the deliberations at Leon. Of course it strengthened
the American influence in Nicaragua, and while it tended to make the
prospect of hostilities from San Salvador more remote, it gave an
additional reason for fixing the government on affirm basis by an appeal
to the popular will; attended, too, by an addition to the numbers of the
Americans, it made the friends of the election stronger than before.
Several circumstances, in the meanwhile, occurred to show the
disaffection of many of the principal men toward the Americans. D.
Mariano Salazar, as Walker ascertained after reaching Leon, had made
a sale of some brazil-wood he owned to the government, on terms
advantageous to himself, and tending to diminish the receipts of the
customs at Realejo. In the actual condition of affairs it was necessary
for the State to get every cent of revenue possible; and hence it was
reprehensible for a friend of the government, and especially for a
military officer, to speculate on the necessities of the Republic. Under
the army regulations derived from the old Spanish service, it was not
permitted for an officer to contract with the State, unless with the
permission of the general-in-chief. Hence Walker, to rebuke the act
of Salazar, put him under arrest, and kept him in his house for some
hours. Several of the leading persons of the city came to intercede for
Salazar during his short arrest, and endeavored to excuse his act as
not unusual in the country; and it was easy to see that they were not
at all favorable to an authority which aimed to protect the State from
contractors and speculators.
The Sunday after reaching Leon, Goicouria proposed to call together
the chief persons of the city and converse freely with them about the
state of affairs. He constantly labored under the delusion that he
knew the natives, whereas he always under-estimated the capacity of
the leaders and the virtues of the people. But he got a number of the
prominent politicians together, and gave them a rambling discourse on his
ideas—most crude they were—of re-organizing the country. He touched on
the ecclesiastical authority, and suggested an application to the Pope
for the appointment of a Bishop who might be free from the metropolitan
of Guatemala. The suggestion was innocent enough in itself, but D.
José Guerrero, a wily intriguer who once, while Director, had got up a
revolution against his own government as an excuse for prolonging his
authority, distorted Goicouria’s suggestion into such a shape that it
was soon reported through the city the Americans aimed to draw Nicaragua
from the jurisdiction of the Roman See. Goicouria expected to influence
the ambition of the higher clergy, by placing before them visions of
the mitre and the crosier, but a more dexterous politician than himself
managed to turn his suggestion to his own disadvantage. The fact is,
the natives disliked Goicouria because they took him for a Spaniard,
and the Nicaraguans hate the Spaniards more than they do any other
foreigners. Of course the general-in-chief knew nothing of Goicouria’s
suggestion until after it was made; his policy had always been to leave
the church entirely to the management of its own affairs. But it was easy
for the disaffected to make Goicouria’s speech appear the inspiration
of his commanding officer; and the reports circulated about this silly
meeting showed Walker that there were many in Leon desirous of exciting
popular passions and prejudices against the Americans. Those, too,
whose loyalty to the Americans was beyond doubt, were every day telling
the general-in-chief that certain agencies were at work to destroy the
confidence of the people in the naturalized Nicaraguans. Valle, who was
rather superciliously treated by the educated leaders, because he could
not read or write, insisted that no faith was to be put in the friendly
professions of many who owed power to the will of the general-in-chief.
D. Nasario Escoto, also, who had succeeded Castellon in the provisional
government, previous to the treaty of peace, said no reliance should be
placed on the firmness of the persons then directing the government. In
fact, all things tended to show that, in case Nicaragua were invaded by
San Salvador and Guatemala, the Americans might find the machinery of
the government they had created and sustained turned against themselves.
Hence, unless disposed to carry off Rivas as a prisoner—and thereby the
whole moral force of his government would have been lost—it was necessary
for the welfare of the Americans that a new election should be called.
Finally, after much deliberation, the decree calling an immediate
election was drawn up in full cabinet session, and was signed on Tuesday
the 10th of June. Walker proposed to leave for Granada early on the
morning of the 11th. The evening before his departure he was visited
several times by Jerez, who had an anxious and nervous manner not unusual
with him. Three or four times he called in the course of as many hours;
and there was much conversation between him and the general-in-chief
relative to another minister to the United States, as it was thought
Father Vigil would prefer returning to Nicaragua. Jerez himself had been
spoken of for the place, and Walker mentioned to him that if he desired
it the appointment might be urged on Don Patricio. Afterward the minister
remarked, “My visit to the United States is then decided on;” but in
such a tone as intimated it might be an excuse to get rid of him. The
immediate reply was, his appointment should be pressed only in case he
desired it. This incident serves to show the temper of Jerez, and points
out the influences which wrought on the pliable mind of Rivas.
Early on the morning of the 11th Walker left Leon escorted by the
Rangers and leaving Anderson’s Rifles with Col. Natzmer in the city.
The President and many others of the chief citizens of the department
accompanied him several miles on his journey; and at parting Don Patricio
affectionately embraced the general-in-chief, remarking with moist eyes
that he might be depended on in every emergency. Salazar, in spite of
the arrest, was also of the party; but Jerez was absent. All cordially
saluted the general; and the latter proceeded to Managua where he
remained over night, and the next day arrived at Masaya early in the
afternoon.
Walker had not been many hours at Masaya before he received letters from
Col. Natzmer relating strange events at Leon. On the morning of the 12th
the military governor of the department, Escobar, had asked a detail of
Americans to guard the _Principal_—a strong building on the Plaza where
the arms and ammunition were stored—and no sooner was the sentry from the
Rifles posted than a singular movement was perceptible in the town. The
President and the Ministers hastily left the government house near the
Principal, and Mariano Salazar on horseback rode through the streets,
proclaiming that the Americans were about to make Rivas prisoner and to
assassinate the Ministers and chief men of the city. The excitement soon
became intense; the barriers of San Felipe, one of the most turbulent
quarters of the town, began to send forth its unquiet residents, some
of them armed and all endeavoring to increase the popular ferment.
Then it was reported Rivas had left the city; and the women, regarding
the movement as a revolution and the signal of war, commenced packing
their trunks and closing their doors and windows. Natzmer, seeing the
threatening aspect of the men at the barriers, called the Americans to
the Plaza and placing them under arms, prepared for defence.
At once a courier was despatched to Chinandega with orders for Lieut.
Dolan—who was there with a company of Rifles—to march immediately for
Leon. Dolan was but a short distance on his march, when he met Rivas
and Jerez riding toward Chinandega. The singularity of the fact made
him suspect something was wrong, and he thought of arresting them on
their way; but the surgeon with him, Dr. Dawson, who had lived for many
years in Nicaragua, suggested that it would not be proper for a simple
lieutenant to arrest the President and one of his Ministers. Dolan,
therefore, marched on without molesting them, and soon joined Anderson in
the Plaza.
As soon as these tidings reached Walker, he ordered Col. Jaquess, then
in Masaya with his command, to prepare for a march; and Jaquess with the
Rangers was in a short time on the road to Managua. Couriers met Walker
every few hours on his way toward Leon; and when near Nagarote he was met
by Ferdinand Schlessinger—a man to whom Rivas had given a commission to
fortify the harbor of Realejo. Schlessinger told the general-in-chief,
that Rivas and Jerez were at Chinandega, barricading the town, and
pressing natives into military service; also, that they had given him
orders to stop the works at Point Ycaco, and in consequence of his
suspicions he had made good his escape. At the same time, letters from
Natzmer informed Walker that Jerez, as Minister of War, had issued orders
to him to disoccupy the towers of the cathedral, where riflemen had been
placed, in order that troops of the country might be stationed there.
Natzmer forwarded the order to Walker, awaiting his instructions on the
subject.
As soon as Natzmer’s letter reached Walker, he sent the order to obey the
command of Jerez, and to withdraw the whole American force from Leon to
Nagarote. The designs of Rivas and Jerez were now apparent to everybody;
and they had, on their arrival at Chinandega, gone so far as to send a
commissioner to invite the troops of Carrera into the State, and to urge
their immediate approach to Leon. Jerez had given the order to Natzmer,
supposing it would not be obeyed, thereby hoping to make the movement
against the Americans turn on their disobedience to a lawful authority.
But Walker was not disposed to have the coming struggle occur on any such
issue. He determined to have the contest made on more formal grounds.
Not knowing, either, how far the defection of the native leaders had
spread, he was anxious to concentrate his force scattered on a long line
from Leon to Castillo; therefore military no less than political reasons
led him to await with Jaquess at Nagarote the arrival of Natzmer and
Anderson, and then to march with the united force toward Granada.
A number of the native residents about Leon and some families accompanied
the Rifles to Nagarote, and among them were D. José Maria Valle and
D. Mateo Pineda. The latter was a man of rare truth and fidelity for
a Central American—in fact, his virtues would make him remarkable in
any country. With a name so pure that it has escaped the malice of
his enemies during all the civil disturbances of Nicaragua, he stands
almost a solitary example, in that distracted land, of spotless faith
and unshaken loyalty. He has required no defence save his high honor and
stainless character to protect him from the persecutions of political
enemies; and if other proofs were lacking of the devotion the Americans
in Nicaragua yielded to right and justice, they might find ample evidence
in the single fact that Mateo Pineda adhered to their fortunes in each
extremity of good and evil.
When the Rifles reached Nagarote they, with the Rangers and the new
infantry battalion, took up the line of march for Masaya. At Managua they
found the commandant of the post, José Herrera, firm in his faith to the
Americans, and he remained true until death, in spite of a brother’s
efforts to seduce him from the path of military duty, being executed by
the allies, under the sentence of a court-martial some time afterward,
for his adhesion to the Americans.
On arriving at Granada, the general-in-chief published the decree
re-constructing the provisional government by virtue of the treaty of
the twenty-third of October. That treaty guaranteed the naturalized
Nicaraguans equality of privileges with the native born; but the
President and his ministers had violated it by attempting to create
distinctions to the prejudice of the naturalized citizens. Walker had
sworn, not only to observe the treaty himself, but to cause it to be
observed. He remained the sole sponsor for Rivas before Nicaragua and
before the world; and he would have deserved to be branded as a perjured
man had he permitted Rivas with impunity not merely to excite the
passions of the people against the Americans, but to invite the foreign
foe into the State with a view of expelling the naturalized soldiers. In
addition to the duties devolved on Walker by his oath to cause the treaty
to be observed, he had been invested with unlimited authority to protect
the Oriental and Meridional Departments from the foreign enemies of the
Republic; but how could such protection be afforded if the orders of the
political power, giving the enemy free entry into the State, were to be
respected? Therefore, the commissioner for the Oriental and Meridional
Departments, D. Fermin Ferrer, was named Provisional President until the
people might select their own ruler, under the decree issued by Rivas on
the 10th of June. The same day the decree was published Walker issued an
address to the people of Nicaragua, and after reciting the acts of the
Rivas government, he concluded: “With such accumulated crimes—conspiring
against the very people it was bound to protect—the late provisional
government was no longer worthy of existence. In the name of the people
I have, therefore, declared its dissolution, and have organized a
provisional government, until the nation exercises its natural right of
electing its own rulers.”
Under the decree of the 10th of June the election for President took
place on the fourth Sunday of the month and the two succeeding days. The
voting was general in the Oriental and Meridional Departments; but as D.
Patricio Rivas rescinded his own decree after reaching Chinandega, and
as the Guatemalans had already passed the northern frontier of the State
there were no ballots cast in the Occidental Department. A large majority
of the votes polled were for the general-in-chief; and the Provisional
President, Ferrer, declaring the result of the election by decree,
fixed on the 12th of July for the inauguration of the President elect.
Accordingly, on the appointed day, with due observances, both civil and
religious, Walker took the oath of office on the Plaza of Granada, and
was installed as Chief Executive of the Republic of Nicaragua.
A few days after the decree of the 20th of June was published, the
Costa Rican schooner, San José, commanded by Gilbert Morton, entered
the port of San Juan del Sur. She had been purchased from her former
owner, Alvarado, by Mariano Salazar, and he had made Morton nominal
half-owner of the schooner, supposing she might thereby get the right
to carry American colors. The American vice-consul at Realejo, one
Giauffreau, gave the schooner what Morton called a sailing letter; and
the vice-consul, according to all accounts, was either so ignorant or
so neglectful of his duties as to permit the vessel to fly the American
flag and to be cleared from the port of Realejo under this pretended
sailing letter. The commandant at Chinandega, a Cuban, by the name of
Golibard, had been ordered away by Rivas because he refused to forsake
the Americans; and Golibard was aboard the San José when she arrived
at San Juan del Sur. Morton, thinking he could impose on the port
authorities with his sailing letter from Giauffreau, had not hesitated to
enter the harbor; and he, as well as Salazar, supposed they might, under
the American flag, drive a profitable trade with the schooner during
hostilities between Nicaragua and the other States.
But the San José had not been many hours in the port of San Juan before
she was seized, the charge against her being that she was without a flag
and without lawful papers. The schooner was American-built and had passed
from the flag of the United States to that of Costa Rica. Even if she had
then been re-sold to an American citizen she could not have recovered her
original character without an act of Congress. Morton, after the seizure,
appealed for relief to the U. S. States Minister at Granada: but on a
careful examination of the subject Mr. Wheeler was satisfied that the
schooner, far from being entitled to protection by American authority,
was really amenable for an abuse of the American flag. The San José was,
therefore, condemned by a court of admiralty jurisdiction at the port
of San Juan; and being forfeited to the government of Nicaragua, she
was converted into a schooner-of-war, bearing the flag of the Isthmian
Republic.
The Granada was armed with two six-pound carronades and was placed in
charge of Lieutenant Callender Irvine Fayssoux. This officer was a native
of Missouri, and had served for a time in the Texan navy under the orders
of Commodore Moore. He had also accompanied Gen. Lopez in his expedition
to the Island of Cuba in May, 1850; and at Cardenas he had contributed
essentially to the successful landing of the force from the steamer
Creole, by swimming ashore with a rope in his mouth when there was much
embarrassment as to the means of getting the boat up to the wharf.
His high qualities will hereafter appear when we come to relate the
history of the schooner; and it is only necessary here to say, that his
system and order were such, the Granada was ready for service in a very
short time. The men detailed from different companies of the army for
service on the schooner were soon brought under good discipline by their
efficient commander; and all of them felt they were subject to the orders
of one capable of command, and determined to have each man do his duty on
all occasions.
On the 29th of June, Col. John Allen of Kentucky arrived at Granada
with one hundred and four men for the service of the State; and on the
6th of July about the same number were landed coming from New-York,
from New-Orleans and from California. A day or two after the latter
arrival, Major Waters, with about a hundred Rangers, marched to Leon and
reconnoitred the town. He found it barricaded in every quarter, and the
Guatemalans under General Paredes were occupying the main Plaza. On the
approach of Waters all the pickets of the enemy were drawn in, and their
whole force was put under arms for action. But no portion of the enemy
ventured to leave the barricades. After passing through the suburbs of
the city and examining the preparations of the enemy for defence, Waters
returned to Granada with a report showing the inability of the Allies—as
they called themselves—to move until they had received large additions of
force.
After the inauguration of Walker on the 12th of July, his cabinet was
formed by the appointment of D. Fermin Ferrer as Minister of Relations,
D. Mateo Pineda as Minister of War, and D. Manuel Carrascosa as Minister
of Hacienda and Public Credit. The organization of the new government
was duly communicated to the American Minister; and on the 19th of July
Mr. Wheeler was received by the President at the government house in
Granada. The Minister opened his address to the Executive of Nicaragua,
saying: “I am directed by the President of the United States to notify
you that I am instructed to establish relations with this State.” Mr.
Wheeler thus showed himself far bolder and more decided than Mr. Pierce
had been at Washington. It is true the government at Washington had
instructed its minister “to establish relations” with the government of
Nicaragua; but at the time the order was given it was thought Rivas would
be in power at Granada. Mr. Marcy had also instructed Mr. Wheeler to ask
explanations concerning the revocation of the charter of the Accessory
Transit Company, and to request the discharge from the Nicaraguan army of
two or three boys—among them a son and nephew, I think, of Senator Bayard
of Delaware—who had run off from school and gone to Central America in
search of novelty and adventure. Of course the explanations of the decree
of revocation and the discharges of the boys could be obtained only from
Walker; and hence the minister had either to disregard the orders of Mr.
Marcy or to recognize the government of the lately-elected President.
The message Mr. Pierce sent to Congress, touching the reception of Father
Vigil, was strongly marked with the weakness and hesitation of American
diplomacy. The whole tone of the message was apologetic; and the American
President was throughout overcome by the false idea many people in the
United States had formed as to the Nicaraguan movement being one of
annexation to the Republic of the North. The representatives of France,
Spain, Brazil, and the Spanish American States, at Washington, seeing the
weakness of the United States, combined for the purpose of driving Father
Vigil from the country. So well did they succeed, that the Minister of
Nicaragua withdrew from the Federal Capital not many days after his
reception, and thus Mr. Marcy, aided by the intrigues of the foreign
representatives, might be able to take advantage of any opportunity
circumstances afforded to relieve the American cabinet from the awkward
position in which he fancied it had been placed. Hence the vexation of
the Secretary of State may be imagined when he heard Mr. Wheeler had, in
literally carrying out his instructions, recognized the government which
displaced that of Rivas.
Mr. Wheeler, being on the ground, and seeing the actual condition of
affairs, was never in doubt as to the policy his country ought to pursue
toward the parties contending in Nicaragua; but the Secretary of State
at Washington, remote from the scene of trouble, constantly wrought
on by the ministers of foreign countries, and dreading the effect the
new Nicaraguan movement would have on old political organizations in
the United States, was always averse to any action which might favor
the Americans in Nicaragua. Not many days, however, after Mr. Wheeler
recognized the Walker government, facts occurred showing in a strong
light the good policy of the American minister.
Lieut. Fayssoux, as soon as he was ready for sea, received orders to
sail northward from San Juan and cruise about the Gulf of Fonseca. It
was well known that the enemy were communicating with San Salvador and
Guatemala by bungos from Tempisque to La Union, and it was hoped the
Granada might intercept letters showing the state of affairs at Leon and
the relations of Rivas with the other States. The presence, too, of the
schooner in those waters could not fail to alarm the enemy and embarrass
the reinforcements going toward Leon. It was also reported that the enemy
were preparing vessels to send after the Granada in order to capture
her, and that these vessels were being fitted out at La Union, in the
State of San Salvador.
On the evening of the 21st of July, the schooner hove anchor and put to
sea, and on the afternoon of the 23d she was cruising off the entrance of
the Gulf of Fonseca. “At 3h. 30m.,” so the log runs, “saw a sail standing
out of the gulf: made chase. At 5h. 30m. brought her to with a shot from
the port gun. Capt. De Brissot (a passenger on the schooner) boarded her.
She proved to be the Italian brig Rostan, from La Union, bound to San
Juan del Sur. She reported two Chilian brigs and one Sardinian schooner
lying at La Union, and the French frigate Embuscade at Tiger Island.
At 7, took in flying-jib and foresail, and stood off and on, on the
lookout for a schooner that the Rostan reported due from the northward
and westward.” Then, on the 24th: “At 9h. 15m. A.M., saw a sail standing
out from La Union. At 2 P.M. light breezes from S. and W. At 4, standing
to the E., passed, on opposite tracks, the French frigate Embuscade. At
4h. 30m., saw a number of small craft to the E.: called all hands to
quarters. At 5, boarded the launch Maria, Capt. Braganda. She proving to
be French, and her papers all right, she was allowed to proceed on her
course to Tempisque. Capt. Braganda reported the same as the brig Rostan,
therefore, as there were none of the enemy’s vessels in the gulf, we
concluded to go out to look for the schooner from the N. and W.”
Nothing, however, was seen of the vessel expected from the northward and
westward, and on the 26th, the Granada again stood up the gulf. On the
27th, a bungo, with several passengers, was captured, and on the 28th, a
large boat from Tempisque was taken, and one of the passengers proved to
be Mariano Salazar. When Salazar was brought aboard the Granada he gave
his name as Francisco Salazar, but De Brissot had seen him at Realejo,
and, although not certain of the fact, told Fayssoux he thought the
prisoner was Don Mariano. In the same bungo with Salazar were several
letters for persons in San Salvador. The day after Salazar was taken, the
Granada sailed for San Juan del Sur, whence the prisoner and the letters
were immediately, on the schooner’s arrival, despatched for Granada.
Salazar was executed as a traitor on the Plaza of Granada late in the
afternoon of the 3d of August. It was Sunday, and the people of the town
gathered in numbers to witness the execution. They regarded Salazar as
the author of most of the misfortunes they had undergone during the civil
war. It was his money had fitted out the democratic bands which had
burnt the Jalteva, and robbed the shop-keepers of the suburbs; and they
regarded it as a special providence that he should be taken by a schooner
he had himself owned, and be executed by the Americans he had first used
and then attempted to betray. There was the same joyful feeling shown
by the old Legitimists at the death of Salazar as had been shown by the
Democrats at the execution of Corral.
Among the letters taken in the gulf was one from Manning, the British
vice-consul at Realejo, to his correspondent at San Miguel, D.
Florencio Souza. It was dated at Leon, on the 24th of July, and is so
characteristic that the most of it deserves insertion as an instance of
British conduct and British policy. He pathetically begins: “Dear Friend;
I am here without knowing where to go, since Walker will not give us a
passport to pass through Granada. I understand the man is furious against
me, attributing to me the change. It is certain that all his acts are
rapid: and we have not passed here without great apprehensions that he
will make an attack on Leon. He came as far as Managua, and all we know
is that he returned to Granada. If this man receives forces and money,
I assure you it will not be so easy to drive him out of the State; for
as the forces come from the other States in handfuls of men nothing is
accomplished, and the expenses and sacrifices are made in vain. I am
much afflicted to think that under these circumstances no more activity
is used in so serious an affair. At the present there are 500 men from
San Salvador, 500 from Guatemala, and 800 belonging to this place, and
according to my judgment double that number is required.” Then from
public affairs the wily trader comes to business. “Altogether affairs are
wretched in Nicaragua and very distressing, and if I remain here much
longer I shall not have a shirt I can put on. Already you can suppose how
much I have suffered by these convulsions.” He prepares to make Souza
useful to himself by seeming to have a care for the interests of the
Salvadorian: “It is known,” he writes, “that a certain Fabens has sailed
to Boston with the gold quartz, and that with one Heiss he has bought the
mine from Padre Sosa. You need not be afraid but I will do all I can
for your interest in this affair with all earnestness; and you should
write to Davis in Boston via Omoa, inquiring whether the ore Fabens and
Heiss took was from the mines of Bestaniere.” At last, and like a lady’s
postscript, comes the gist of the letter: “The troops here are altogether
naked. If you have any drilling you can sell at 12½ cents per yard, I
will take ten bales. Don’t forget my request in favor of my adopted son,
Mr. George Brower, to have him appointed to represent San Salvador in
Liverpool.” Much as the vice-consul sympathized with the cause of the
allies, he could not let the chance slip of making some money from the
drilling the soldiers required.
When the friends of Salazar at Leon heard of his capture in the gulf,
they immediately arrested Dr. Joseph W. Livingston, an American long
resident in Nicaragua, and sent a courier to Granada saying they would
hold him as a hostage for Salazar’s safety. The British vice-consul did
not disdain to write a letter to the American Minister entreating him
to save the life of Salazar in order that Livingston might go unharmed.
But the courier arrived several days after the execution of the Leonese
traitor; and Mr. Wheeler was not a man to be startled from his propriety
by the cunning devices of Mr. Manning. In his reply to the British
vice-consul the American Minister draws the distinction between Salazar
and Livingston in such words as probably little suited his correspondent.
“Salazar,” he writes, “was one—and a most prominent one—of a faction
revolting against the lawful government of the Republic, and a general in
their forces. He knew that he was liable to the penalty of treason. Dr.
Livingston is an American citizen, much loved and respected, and owes no
allegiance to the authorities of Nicaragua, much less to a disappointed
faction; nor has he ever been mixed up with the parties by any overt or
belligerent act.” At the same time he answered Mr. Manning’s letter, Mr.
Wheeler wrote to General Ramon Belloso, commanding-in-chief the Allied
forces, informing the latter that if any harm befell Dr. Livingston, the
government of the United States would promptly hold the governments of
San Salvador and Guatemala to a strict accountability. He concluded by
saying, that “if one hair of Dr. Livingston’s head is injured, or his
life taken, or that of another American citizen, your government and that
of Guatemala will feel the force of a power which, while it respects the
rights of other nations, will be ready and is able to vindicate its own
honor and the lives and property of its citizens.” Brave words these; and
they might have resulted in worthy deeds if Mr. Wheeler had controlled
the necessary force; but when read with the gloss of after events, they
are turned into a biting sarcasm on the government he represented. The
life of Livingston was, however, probably saved by the energetic words of
the Minister; though he was ordered from the State in which he had been
living for ten years.
Some days after these events occurred, Hon. Pierre Soulé arrived at
Granada. He went thither with the object of securing some modifications
in a decree which had been published by Rivas a few days before his
flight from Leon to Chinandega. The decree authorized commissioners to
negotiate a loan of five hundred thousand dollars, to be secured by a
million of acres of the public lands. The modifications suggested by Mr.
Soulé were soon made, and S. F. Slatter and Mason Pilcher became the
commissioners to act under the decree. The bonds issued under this decree
are the only legal bonds of the Republic ever sold in the United States,
and the common impression that large quantities of Nicaraguan obligations
are afloat is altogether erroneous.
But, although the decree for the loan was the immediate object of Mr.
Soulé’s visit, his presence in Nicaragua had other beneficial results.
His fine head and noble air made a deep impression on the people of the
country, peculiarly sensitive as they are to the charms of feature and
of manner; and then he spoke the Castilian with such lofty elegance,
and addressed the common people with so much kindness and insight into
their wants and feelings that all listened to him with mingled delight
and reverence. The docility of the native Nicaraguans, especially of the
Indians, is great, and when approached with gentleness and persuasion
they may be led in almost any direction. The influence of such words as
Mr. Soulé spoke to them remained for a long time, and often after he left
they used to ask when His Excellency, a title they give to persons they
consider of rank, would return to Nicaragua.
During the month of August not many persons arrived in the country,
either for military service or for civil pursuits. A new and more
dangerous disease, also, began to make its appearance in the army;
desertion, more fatal than cholera, commenced its ravages in the ranks.
The first notable desertion was that of one Turley with a whole company
of Rangers. They were sent from Managua by the commandant, Capt. Dolan,
with orders to examine the road along the southwestern shore of the
lake, as far as Tipitapa. For several days Dolan anxiously awaited their
return; but news reached Granada of their being seen on the Malacatoya
river. It was not until many days, however, that their purposes and fate
were known. They appear to have deserted with the intention of proceeding
through Chontales, robbing and plundering as they went, and of finally
reaching the sea by the Blewfields river. Some circumstances indicate
that the plan was formed before Turley and his men reached Nicaragua; for
on their arrival they were very urgent in the request to remain a company
by themselves, and they had been in the service only a few weeks when
they deserted. Their plan, however, whether long meditated or the result
of sudden resolution, met with the punishment it deserved.
Many days after Turley’s disappearance a French trader, from the mining
town of Libertad, came to Granada to inform Walker of the fate of the
deserters. When they first appeared in Chontales the people supposed they
were on duty, but their violent and rapacious acts soon betrayed their
true character. They passed into the mining district, and near Libertad
they tied up and flogged a Frenchman, in order to make him disclose the
place where he kept his gold. Then the French of the district, composed
mostly of those discharged from the army at Rivas in the March previous,
acting together, raised a number of the people of the country and
attacked the robbers. Turley’s party was, it seems, short of ammunition,
and they finally agreed to give up their arms if they were furnished with
a guide to conduct them to the Blewfields. Their arms were given up,
and soon thereafter, while they were being marched, by their captors,
toward the town, fire was opened on them, and they were all, except two,
slaughtered on the spot.
With the exception, however, of Turley’s company, desertion among the
Americans was, at that time, rare. The desertions, though not many,
were principally confined to the Europeans in the ranks. Many of these
Europeans had gone to Nicaragua with the idea of enlisting for the mere
pay they were to get; and without the foresight or patience which might
enable them to wait for time to enhance the value of the lands they
were to receive, they became dissatisfied with the scarcity of money,
and sought means of leaving the army and the country. New-comers, also,
were frightened by the reports constantly circulated as to the number
and strength of the enemy; and it was among those who knew least of the
land that the disposition to despond was greatest. In addition to these
causes, tending to diminish the strength of the army, a large proportion
of the men going to Nicaragua at the expense of the State, were found
unfit for military service. As they could not be examined surgically in
the United States, their defects were not known until they came under
the eye of the surgical staff at Granada. Those familiar with medical
statistics, may readily imagine how many of the men were rejected for the
single disease of hernia.
The enemy, however, were not without causes of weakness and dissension.
Some of the faults of their force arose from its allied nature. The
soldiers in Leon were drawn from Guatemala and San Salvador; and besides
these, Rivas had pressed numbers of laborers about Leon and Chinandega
into the ranks. The Guatemalan contingent was made up entirely of
Indians, and fierce was the feud between them and the Leoneses. Not
unfrequently collisions would occur between the Guatemalans and the
people of the town, at the numerous liquor shops scattered through the
suburbs of Subtiaba; and in the quarrels knives would be drawn, and blood
spilled. So pressing was the evil that the Guatemalan soldiers were
finally ordered to remain in their quarters, and it was necessary to keep
them out of the streets, in order that the insults of the people might be
avoided. The Salvadorians were tolerated by the Leoneses; but the local
authorities could not prevail on the latter to regard the former as their
deliverers from tyranny and oppression.
The allied troops had not been many days at Leon, before fever and
cholera attacked them. The Guatemalans especially suffered from this
disease; and so great was their loss, that many among the soldiers, and
some even of the officers, attributed the malady to poisonous substances
mixed in their food. But it was easy for a medical eye to perceive
sufficient causes for the mortality of the troops in their sudden removal
from the highlands of Guatemala to the plains of Nicaragua, and in the
total want of comfort and cleanliness about the quarters and persons of
the soldiers. As Manning wrote, the troops were almost without clothing;
and this was a severe deprivation to the Guatemala Indian, accustomed to
the use of the thick woollen jacket, which protects him from the cold of
his native hills. And woollen covering at night is indispensable to the
health of the soldier in Nicaragua. The warm days, followed by the clear
cold nights, render blankets necessary at all seasons of the year; and
it was the want of care in sleeping which produced much of the disease,
not only among the Guatemalans at Leon, but also among the Americans
at Granada. When you add to these causes, the little attention Central
American officers pay to the health of their soldiers, and the small
skill of their surgeons and physicians, it is not difficult to understand
the mortality among the Allies.
While disease was destroying the soldiers and dissensions were spreading
between the people and the troops, the leaders were not more friendly
in their feelings toward each other than were their followers: the
consequences were divided counsels and conflicting conduct. The chief
command of the allied force had been given by the provisional government
of Rivas to General Ramon Belloso, the commander of the San Salvador
contingent. But Paredes, who commanded the Guatemalans, was little
disposed to obey the orders of a man he regarded as altogether his
inferior in knowledge and capacity, and he also thought it unworthy of
his Republic to yield the control of her forces to the general of a
much feebler State. The Guatemalans consider theirs the best organized
and the leading State of Central America; and the pure Spanish race,
which maintains its supremacy at the seat of the old captain-generalcy
by the aid of Carrera and his Indians, regards, with some disdain,
the irregular governments the mixed races attempt to establish. On the
contrary, the self-styled liberals throughout Central America have a
bitter hatred toward Carrera and his minions, as they call the Aycinenas
and the Pavones, who really direct the affairs of the Republic, under
the nominal presidency of the illiterate Indian. And it was jealousy of
Guatemala which induced Rivas and Jerez to place the command in the hands
of the Salvadorian general. Paredes, however, seems to have retained the
privilege of refusing to obey Belloso whenever he thought proper, and the
latter was not in the position to enforce obedience or to dispense with
the services of the Guatemalans.
Besides the dissensions in the allied camp, there were two authorities
in the upper part of Nicaragua claiming the supreme executive power.
At Leon, D. Patricio Rivas and his cabinet asserted their right to be
esteemed by the Allies the sovereign authority of the Republic; while
at Somoto Grande, in Segovia, D. José Maria Estrada had set up his
government, and issued orders in the name of the people of Nicaragua.
Each of these cabals ridiculed the claims of the other, and their
contentions were like to involve the allied States in new difficulties.
Estrada had sought refuge in Honduras after the treaty of the
twenty-third of October, and had published a pamphlet, claiming a right
to be chief executive of Nicaragua, because he had written a private
decree, declaring null and void the treaty made by Corral under the
absolute power he had conferred. Everybody laughed at the idea of giving
force to a decree which was unheard of until published in Honduras; but
when the defection of Rivas took place, Estrada entered Segovia under
the protection of a few Legitimists, commanded by Martinez. The latter
proceeded toward Matagalpa, in order to press the Indians of that region
into his service, while the Senator-president, as Estrada called himself,
remained at Somoto Grande.
The Legitimist pretender was now in the way of his own party. He had not
the discretion to perceive that by thus placing himself as an obstacle to
the union of the two factions against the Americans, he made his removal
from Nicaragua an object with his friends as well as his enemies. The
idea of his being purposely left at Somoto Grande without any adequate
guard, seems not to have entered his mind. But the fact of Estrada’s
defenceless condition was soon known at Leon—known in so short a time as
almost to preclude any explanation, save that the information was sent by
some of his own adherents. Immediately, a violent Democrat, who had been
imprisoned at Granada during the civil war and was released by Walker on
the thirteenth of October, 1855, collected a band of some forty-five or
fifty armed men and hurried on toward Somoto Grande. This man, by name
Antonio Chavis, could scarcely have acted as he did without the knowledge
and assistance of the Rivas administration. Chavis reached Somoto Grande
without Estrada hearing of his approach, and while the Granadino was
indulging his dream of regaining power in the Republic, the Democrats
from Leon surprised and murdered him in the streets of the mountain
village.
The murder of Estrada reminds us of the dark craft which marks the
history of the Italian Republics during the thirteenth, fourteenth,
and fifteenth centuries. The same causes which in Italy produced the
Carraras of Padua, the Viscontis of Milan, and finally the master-piece
of the school, Cæsar Borgia, Duke of Urbino, have brought forth the
same type of character in the politicians and soldiers of the Spanish
American Republics. It is true, there is wanting in the latter the
exalted intellect and refined taste of the former, and the mixed race
of Central and South America could never produce a Machiavelli capable
of depicting with terrible truth the principles, if such they may be
called, controlling the political action of his countrymen. But the
Spanish American is as dark, though not as deep and wise, in his craft
as the Italian. And long civil war seems to have the power of creating
this type of politicians, even among races least affected toward it; for
the English wars of the Roses produced the subtle genius of the third
Richard, who vied with the best Italian of them all in his adherence to
the maxims of the illustrious author of The Prince.
Thus, by the death of Estrada, the old Legitimists who had emigrated
after the treaty of the twenty-third of October, were led to acknowledge
the authority of D. Patricio Rivas. Thenceforth Martinez who had, with
a few men and some arms, penetrated as far as Matagalpa acted under the
orders of the provisional government at Leon. It was easier, however,
for the leaders to settle their differences and to agree on a common
plan of action than for them to extinguish the hatreds and animosities
they had kindled and fed among their respective followers. They did not
venture for some time to place Legitimists in the same camp with the
Democrats they had either inveigled or forced into their service, and it
was necessary, during the war, for them to keep the soldiers of the two
factions as widely apart as possible.
Toward the close of the month of August the arrangements of the Walker
administration with Garrison and Morgan, for bringing Americans to
Nicaragua, were completed. The commissioners appointed to investigate the
indebtedness of the old Canal Company to the government had reported in
July; and the dues from the company, according to the report, amounted
to more than four hundred thousand dollars. Some payments, had, however,
been made, but the report did not estimate them, because the company
had failed to appear, and the judgment against them was by default.
After deducting all payments, still the indebtedness was upward of three
hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and this was much more than the value
of all the property on the Isthmus. The property was, therefore, sold to
Garrison and Morgan, they paying therefor in the bonds they had received
for advances made to the Rivas government. In the meantime the American
minister, obeying the instructions of his chief, examined the facts which
led to the revocation of the charters of the Canal and Accessory Transit
Companies. Besides the explanations given by the Nicaraguan government,
and the facts brought out in the report of the commissioners, Mr. Wheeler
examined a number of witnesses, whose depositions he forwarded to the
State Department at Washington. The facts reported by the minister were
so conclusive as to the legality and justice of the proceedings against
the companies, that Mr. Marcy never wrote another word on the subject.
In fact the Accessory Transit Company had itself furnished the American
government with the most satisfactory evidence of its own unscrupulous
and criminal character. On the 8th of April, while Mora was yet in
Nicaragua, Thomas Lord, the vice-president of the company, wrote to Hosea
Birdsall, authorizing him “to ask for the assistance of the commander
of any man-of-war of Her Britannic Majesty’s navy in the port of San
Juan.” “The object of the Transit Company,” so its vice-president wrote,
“is to prevent accessions of filibusters to Walker’s force, pending his
hostilities with Costa Rica, and to effect this purpose, no pains must
be spared or effort left untried.” In conclusion he adds: “Unless our
boats are seized by the filibusters on the Orizaba and Charles Morgan
they cannot get into the interior, and without large accessions Walker
must fail and Costa Rica be saved. To this result Her Majesty’s officers
in San Juan can materially contribute, by protecting American property in
the manner indicated.” It was made clear, by such acts, that the company
was afraid to trust the justice of its own government.
It was the necessity for completing the arrangements about the Transit,
no less than the rainy season, which kept Walker from moving against the
Allies. It would have been folly to advance against Leon without having
the Transit secure and communication with the United States certain.
Leon was well barricaded, and the Americans had not numbers to spare
for an assault; neither had they artillery to aid their attack, even if
the roads had admitted of its easy transportation. Besides, disease and
dissension were weakening the Allies; and it was only after the death of
Estrada that they got even an appearance of unity. It was early in the
month of September that events occurred to encourage the Allies in an
advance toward Granada. But before narrating these events, it may be well
to mention the celebration of the 1st of September, at the capital, as it
displays an element which entered into the war in Nicaragua.
At different times a number of Cubans had found their way to
Nicaragua; and after Lt. Col. F. A. Lainé was appointed aide-de-camp
to the general-in-chief, they were formed into a body-guard for the
President. The Cuban company consisted of about fifty members, and
their familiarity with the two languages—Spanish and English—made their
services valuable. Early in the year the Cuban element in Nicaragua had
attracted the attention of the Spanish authorities in the island; and
in June, 1856, General Morales de Rada, who naturally disliked those
called “filibusters,” because his running away from them had made him
the laughing-stock of all the Havana wits, was sent to San José for the
purpose of advising with President Mora in reference to the war against
the Americans of Nicaragua. The Cubans with Walker were well known for
their devotion to the cause of independence. Two of the aides of the
general-in-chief, Lainé and Pineda, had been engaged in revolutionary
schemes on the island, and the prefect of the Oriental Department, D.
Francisco Aguëro, was a native of the disaffected district of Puerto
Principe. Hence the interest with which Spain watched affairs in
Nicaragua.
On the 1st of September, a mass for the repose of the soul of Lopez was
celebrated in the parish church at Granada, and the day was in other
respects observed by the Cubans in the service. The ardent minds of these
southern youths dreamed, however, more of the future than they meditated
the past; they thought more of the time when they should sail for the
island to avenge the death of Lopez and his followers, than of the
dark and painful scenes which attended their execution. And it is this
reluctance of the southern imagination to dwell on the gloomy side of
affairs which fits its possessors less for the real work of revolution,
than the robust children of the North, whose fancies do not fly from the
grave and its surroundings.
Chapter Eighth.
THE WALKER ADMINISTRATION.
The policy of the Walker government was, of course, the same as
that of Rivas, so far as the introduction of the white race into
Nicaragua was concerned. But the administration of Rivas was, from
its nature, transitional. It sought to increase the American element
without inquiring what place the new people were to occupy in the old
society. Rivas and his cabinet felt that Nicaraguan society required
re-organization, but they knew not how it was to be accomplished,
nor would they have adopted the means necessary for the end even if
the proper measures had been pointed out to them. Hence, when the
re-organization, not merely of the State, but of the family and of labor,
became necessary, another executive than Rivas was not a matter of
choice. Not merely the secondary form of the crystal was to be modified,
but the primary form was to be radically changed, and for this a new
force was to be brought into play. It may be that the re-organization in
Nicaragua was attempted too soon; but those who have read the foregoing
pages may judge whether or not the Americans were driven forward by the
force of events. Sooner or later the struggle between the old and the new
forms of society must inevitably have occurred.
The difference of language between the members of the old society
and that portion of the white race, necessarily dominant in the new,
while it was a cause keeping the elements apart, afforded also a means
of regulating the relations between the several races meeting on the
same soil. In order that the laws of the Republic might be thoroughly
published, it was decreed that they should be published in English as
well as in Spanish. The reason of this was apparent to every one; but
the object of another clause in the same decree, “That all documents
connected with public affairs shall be of equal value whether written
in English or Spanish,” was not noticed except by the careful observer.
By this clause the proceedings of all the courts, and the record of all
the deeds in the State, might be made in English. It was not necessary
to decree that all such records should be in English—the mere permission
was sufficient to accomplish the object. Lawyers will readily see what an
advantage such a clause gave to those speaking both English and Spanish,
over those acquainted only with the latter language.
The decree concerning the use of the two languages tended to make the
ownership of the lands of the State fall into the hands of those speaking
English. But in addition to this, a decree was published declaring the
property of all enemies of the State forfeited to the Republic, and
a Board of Commissioners was named “to take possession of, direct,
determine upon, and sell all such confiscated or forfeited properties.”
The Board was given the ordinary power of courts for citation, for
examining witnesses, and for enforcing obedience to its orders. All
property declared confiscated was to be sold soon after the rendition of
the judgment, and military scrip was to be received in payment at the
sale of such property, thus giving those who had been in the military
service of the State an opportunity to secure their pay out of the
estates of the persons engaged in the war against them.
The land titles in Nicaragua were in a very unsettled condition, and
the same system prevailed there as in other Spanish American States.
The limits of grants were indeterminate, and there was, of course, no
registry law. Accordingly, in order to fix the number of outstanding
grants from the Republic, a decree was published requiring all claims to
land to be recorded within six months, and it was further decreed that
after a certain date no conveyance or mortgage should be valid against
third parties, unless duly recorded in the district where the land lay.
This was a substitution of the English and American system for the rules
of the Roman and Continental law. The recording of titles is undoubtedly
for the public advantage, and those possessed of good titles to land in
Nicaragua would in virtue of this decree have held their possessions by
a tenure more certain than ever. But the system was fatal to the bad or
uncertain titles. It also gave an advantage to those familiar with the
habit of registry.
The general tendency of these several decrees was the same; they were
intended to place a large proportion of the land of the country in the
hands of the white race. The military force of the State might, for a
time, secure the Americans in the government of the Republic, but in
order that their possession of government might be permanent, it was
requisite for them to hold the land. But the natives who had held the
lands for more than a generation admitted that the cultivated fields had
diminished in number and extent every year since the independence, for
the want of a proper system of labor; hence, according to the admission
of all parties, the re-organization of labor was necessary for the
development of the resources of the country.
In order to command the labor already in the country a decree was issued
for enforcing contracts for terms of service. A stringent decree against
vagrants was also published, and this was a measure of military caution
as well as of political economy. When Martinez set about recruiting in
Matagalpa the men scattered on the farms of Chontales and Los Llaños
repaired to Granada in order to escape the press-gang. But these men had
nearly all been in the employ of Legitimist masters, and when gathered
in the city there was danger of their being used for bad purposes. Few
of them had any visible means of livelihood, and hence most would have
come under the provision of the decree concerning vagrants. As they had
little disposition for work they soon disappeared after the publication
of the decree, and thus a population which at the time might have proved
dangerous around Granada was got rid of.
The decree of the 22d of September was, however, the measure from which
most was to be expected for organizing the labor of the country. This
was the act around which the whole policy of the administration revolved;
and as it has been much criticised it may be well to give the decree
entire. It reads:
“Inasmuch as the Constituent Assembly of the Republic, on the
30th day of April, 1838, declared the State, free, sovereign,
and independent, dissolving the compact which the Federal
Constitution established between Nicaragua and the other States
of Central America:
“Inasmuch as since that date, Nicaragua has been in fact free
from the obligations the Federal Constitution imposed:
“Inasmuch as the Act of the Constituent Assembly, decreed on
the 30th of April, 1838, provides, that the federal decrees
given previous to that date shall remain in force unless
contrary to the provisions of that act:
“Inasmuch as many of the decrees theretofore given are unsuited
to the present condition of the Republic, and are repugnant
to its welfare and prosperity as well as to its territorial
integrity: Therefore it is
“DECREED:
“ARTICLE 1. All acts and decrees of the Federal Constituent
Assembly, as well as of the Federal Congress, are declared null
and void.
“ARTICLE 2. Nothing herein contained shall affect rights
heretofore vested under the acts and decrees hereby repealed.”
One of the earliest acts of the Federal Constituent Assembly was the
abolition of slavery in Central America; and as this, among other acts,
was repealed by the decree of the 22d of September, it was generally
supposed the latter re-established slavery in Nicaragua. Whether this
be a strictly legal deduction may be doubted; but the repeal of the
prohibition clearly prepared the way for the introduction of slavery.
The spirit and intention of the decree were apparent; nor did its author
affect to conceal his object in its publication. By this act must the
Walker administration be judged; for it is the key to its whole policy.
In fact the wisdom or folly of this decree involves the wisdom or folly
of the American movement in Nicaragua; for on the re-establishment of
African slavery there depended the permanent presence of the white race
in that region. If the slavery decree, as it has been called, was unwise,
Cabañas and Jerez were right when they sought to use the Americans for
the mere purpose of raising one native faction and depressing another.
Without such labor as the new decree gave the Americans could have played
no other part in Central America than that of the pretorian guard at Rome
or of the Janizaries of the East; and for such degrading service as this
they were ill suited by the habits and traditions of their race.
The difference between the colonial system of the English and Spanish
Crowns explains the different results of the English and Spanish
settlements in America. The colonies of Great Britain founded their own
forms of society; they made for themselves all the rules and regulations
their new situation required, and hence they built firmly the foundation
of a peculiar and original civilization. Their institutions sprang from
their necessities, and were hence adapted to the climate and the soil
they found on the new continent. But it was far otherwise with the
Spanish possessions. The laws of the Indies were decreed by the Crown;
and the regulations, sometimes for good but oftener for evil, were
the result of monarchical will. In the case of Cuba the resolution of
Isabella was swayed by the counsels of the benevolent Las Casas; and
Spain owes her possession of the island at the present moment to the wise
philanthropy of the simple-hearted priest. Negro-slavery is, without
doubt, the cause of the present prosperity of the island as well as of
its continued colonial government; and Cuba offers a fine contrast to
Jamaica and St. Domingo, and displays to advantage the superior wisdom of
Spain when compared with the false humanity of France and England. On the
continent, however, Spain was not so fortunate as on the ever-faithful
isle. Her conquest of force was there followed by no radical and
permanent change in political organization. She carried thither the Roman
law; but it did not inform the new society or breathe a fresh spirit into
its institutions. The only real changes in Mexico and Peru, for example,
were wrought by the church. The pagans of the continent were converted
to Christianity and the mission fathers reclaimed the wild tribes from
their savageism, teaching them agriculture and the ruder arts of life.
Beyond the protection the Crown afforded the church in its labors for
the re-construction of society, the Spanish government did little for
its vast continental possessions. Slavery on the continent was not more
than what the physiologists call a “trace;” and it soon yielded to the
passions which followed the independence of the colonies.
The men who framed the Constitution of the United States were not
beyond the control of the influences which in France led to the horrors
of Hayti and in England to the miseries of Jamaica. The wits and
philosophers of the constitutional convention—the strong reason of
Franklin and the brilliant genius of Hamilton, as well as the lofty
soul of Washington—were not unaffected by the errors of the French
reformers of the period. The mad rhapsodies of Rousseau, the sharp keen
sarcasm of Voltaire, had infected the readers of that time with a sort
of hydrophobia—a mortal aversion to the word _slavery_. Hamilton and
Washington, though struggling against French notions, were still under
the influence to some extent of the Genevese ravings about equality
and fraternity. Mr. Jefferson not only yielded to the French fashions
of thought and feeling, but actually cherished them as if they were
the fruits of reason and philosophy. While such causes operated on the
American leaders of the time, the people of the period were tainted
with the notions of the English Buxton and Clarkson. The dissenters
of Great Britain infused their opinions about the slave-trade into
their religious brethren in America; and thus, by the union of French
philosophy with English humanitarianism, the constitution of 1787 was
burdened with clauses of which the evil effect is now constantly felt by
the slaveholding communities of the United States.
If the strong, broad minds of the constitutional convention of 1787 were
not able to resist entirely the opinions prevalent in France and England
concerning slavery, how much less were the poor, imitative creatures
Spanish policy left to her American colonies after their independence
able to withstand the prejudices of the European world. Spain had, in
fact, left them with too little slavery to preserve their social order.
Instead of maintaining the purity of the races as did the English in
their settlements, the Spaniards had cursed their continental possessions
with a mixed race. Hence it would have been little less than a miracle if
the Spanish American States had at the moment of independence decided to
retain slavery in their midst. It is only of late years that the really
beneficial and conservative character of negro-slavery has begun to be
appreciated in the United States.
For a long time it was the fashion, and with many it still is, to
regard the Northern States of the Federal Union as the conservative
element of American society. It is true that the Northern States
are the conservative element of the federal government; because the
Union is nearly altogether the creature of their will and of their
interests. Therefore, on all occasions they have sought to strengthen
the federal power through tariffs and banks and large schemes of
internal improvement. But such conservatism as this does not touch the
organic structure of society; it merely determines its external form and
appearance. The conservatism of slavery is deeper than this; it goes to
the vital relations of capital toward labor, and by the firm footing
it gives the former it enables the intellect of society to push boldly
forward in the pursuit of new forms of civilization. At present it is the
struggle of free labor with slave labor which prevents the energies of
the former from being directed against the capital of the North through
the ingenious machinery of the ballot box and universal suffrage; and it
is difficult to conceive how capital can be secured from the attacks of
the majority in a pure democracy unless with the aid of a force which
gets its strength from slave labor.
The Spanish American States, after their independence, aimed to
establish Republics without slavery; and the history of forty years of
disorder and public crime is fertile in lessons for him who hath eyes
to see and ears to hear. Carried away by his imagination, or rather
by his sensibilities, Mr. Clay pleaded the cause of Spanish American
independence, and anticipated good government as the result of the
movement. The policy he urged was undoubtedly wise both for the United
States and for England, inasmuch as it opened the old Spanish colonies to
other commercial nations. But the effects of independence have not been
beneficial on the people of the colonies themselves. Spain gave order, at
least, to the possessions she held in the New World; and order, attended
as it was by exaction, sometimes even by extortion, was better than the
anarchy of so-called Republican rule. In Nicaragua whole tracts which
were cultivated under the Spanish dominion have gone to waste since the
independence; and the indigo of the Isthmus, which even ten years ago was
a valuable article of export, has disappeared almost entirely from trade.
If Spain, then, failed to leave her colonies with the internal force or
the system capable of re-organizing their independent society, the plan
immediately suggests itself of applying to them the rules which have
constructed a firm and harmonious civilization where the Anglo-American
has found himself on the same soil with one of the colored races. The
introduction of negro-slavery into Nicaragua would furnish a supply of
constant and reliable labor requisite for the cultivation of tropical
products. With the negro-slave as his companion, the white man would
become fixed to the soil; and they together would destroy the power of
the mixed race which is the bane of the country. The pure Indian would
readily fall into the new social organization; for he does not aim at
political power, and only asks to be protected in the fruits of his
industry. The Indian of Nicaragua, in his fidelity and docility, as well
as in his capacity for labor, approaches nearly the negroes of the United
States; and he would readily assume the manners and habits of the latter.
In fact the manners of the Indian toward the ruling race are now more
submissive than those of the American negro toward his master.
Some, however, may urge that the climate of tropical America is
unfavorable to the African negro. This idea has been set afloat by
some statistics a British officer has published in reference to the
comparative vitality of the European and negro regiments in Jamaica. The
figures, as given, go to show, that the average mortality is greater
among the negro than among the European regiments; and even Dr. Josiah
C. Nott has been led to quote the statistics with approval, and to infer
that tropical America is not suited to the African. But the figures of
the British officer may be read in another sense, and probably with
a nearer approach to natural laws. It is not the climate, but the
profession of soldier, which destroys so rapidly the negro regiments
of Jamaica. No avocation of life requires so much intelligence, so much
knowledge of the laws of life, and so much resolution and self-denial in
adhering to them, as that of the soldier. The great difference between a
veteran and a raw recruit is, that one knows how to take care of himself,
and the other does not. But you never can make a veteran of the negro;
he remains always in the condition of recruit, and hence negro regiments
will have the health and vitality of regiments of recruits. No one, who
has seen the negro in tropical America, will, for a moment, allow the
accuracy of the deduction, hastily drawn from the regimental returns of
Jamaica.
In Nicaragua the negro seems to be in his natural climate. The blacks who
have gone thither from Jamaica are healthy, strong and capable of severe
labor. They were much employed by the Accessory Transit Company on the
San Juan river and at Virgin Bay; and even on the bungos of the lake and
river, they bore the toil and exposure to the sun as well as the natives
of the country. In fact, the negro blood seems to assert its superiority
over the indigenous Indian of Nicaragua. Some of the negro and mulatto
officers in the Legitimist army were remarkable among their fellows for
courage and energy, though with these qualities were generally joined
cruelty and ferocity.
The advantage of negro slavery in Nicaragua would, therefore, be
two-fold; while it would furnish certain labor for the use of
agriculture, it would tend to separate the races and destroy the
half-castes who cause the disorder, which has prevailed in the country
since the independence. But there are many who, while admitting the
advantage of slavery to Nicaragua, think it was impolitic to have
attempted its re-establishment at the time the decree of the 22d of
September was published. This brings us to consider the decree in its
relation with the question of slavery in the United States.
At the time the decree was published it was clear that the Americans in
Nicaragua would be called on to defend themselves against the forces of
four Allied States. Their cause was right and just, but it then appeared
to touch themselves only. Up to that time there was no American interest
in the country, save that of the army and of the Transit Company; hence
it was expedient by some positive act to bind to the cause for which
the naturalized Nicaraguans were contending some strong and powerful
interest in the United States. The decree, re-establishing slavery while
it declared the manner in which the Americans proposed to regenerate
Nicaraguan society made them the champions of the Southern States of the
Union in the conflict truly styled “irrepressible” between free and slave
labor. The policy of the act consisted in pointing out to the Southern
States the only means, short of revolution, whereby they can preserve
their present social organization.
In 1856, the South began to perceive that all territory hereafter
acquired by the federal government, would necessarily enure to the use
and benefit of free labor. The immigrant from the free labor States
moves easily and readily into the new territories; and the surplus of
population being greater at the North than at the South, the majority
in any new territory would certainly be from the anti-slavery region.
Besides this, the South has no surplus labor to send westward or
southward. On the contrary the Gulf States are crying out for more
negroes; and the uneasiness of Southern society results from the
superabundance of its intellect and capital in proportion to its rude
labor. It is impossible, in the present condition of affairs, for the
South to get the labor it lacks; and the only means of restoring the
balance to its industry is to send its unemployed intellect to a field
where no political obstacles prevent it from getting the labor it
requires.
There are, however, some people in the Southern States who condemn every
effort to extend slavery, because they say, it irritates the anti-slavery
sentiment, and thus feeds and strengthens hostility to Southern society.
With them, the great cure for abolitionism, is rest and inaction on the
part of slaveholders. But such are the shallowest of thinkers. It is
impossible to keep down the discussion of the slavery question in the
United States. The question is one which touches the whole labor of the
country, and involves the vital relations of capital with labor.[1] And
this is the question which in all ages, and in all countries, has divided
states and societies. Hence it is idle to speak of the question being
settled; from the nature of things the contest between free and slave
labor is “never ending, still beginning.”
In September, 1856, the canvass for the presidency was developing the
passions and the prejudices of the several sections of the Union; and
one of the great parties of the country, in convention assembled, had
declared its sympathy and pledged its support to the efforts then being
made to regenerate Central America. These promises and pledges were made
by the party which relied on the slave States for its success, and it
should have looked with favor on a measure which tended to strengthen
slavery in the Southern States. But the manner in which the free labor
democracy of the North received the decree re-establishing slavery in
Nicaragua, is a proof of the hollowness of its professions of friendship
for Southern interests. There was scarcely a voice raised in defence
of the measure north of the Potomac; though the free-labor States may
find, when it is too late, that the only way to avoid revolution, and a
conflict of force between the Northern and Southern States of the Union,
is by the very policy Nicaragua proposed to establish.
It is true the author of the slavery decree was not aware, at the time it
was published, of the strong and universal feeling which exists in the
Northern States against Southern society. He did not know how thoroughly
anti-slavery sentiments prevail in the free-labor States; that they are
taught in the schools, preached from the pulpit, and instilled by mothers
into the minds of their children from infancy upward. But the knowledge
of such a state of feeling would have made the publication of the decree
a matter of sacred duty no less than of policy. To avert the invasion
which threatens the South, it is necessary for her to break through the
barriers which now surround her on every side, and carry the war between
the two forms of labor beyond her own limits. A beleagured force, with no
ally outside, must yield to famine at last, unless it can make a sally
and burst through the enemy which confines it.
While the slavery decree was calculated to bind the Southern States to
Nicaragua, as if she were one of themselves, it was also a disavowal of
any desire for annexation to the Federal Union. And it was important, in
every respect, to make it appear that the American movement in Nicaragua
did not contemplate annexation. This idea constantly haunted the minds
of the public men of the Union, little accustomed to regard political
questions except from party points of view. It disturbed the mind of Mr.
Pierce, when he wrote his message at the reception of Father Vigil; it
worried Mr. Marcy, when he contemplated the future fate of the democratic
party. And it was, without doubt, the uncertainty the Secretary of State
felt in regard to the effect the Nicaraguan movement might have on party
action in the United States which prompted him to frown on the enterprise
from the beginning. Mr. Marcy was an old man, ambitious of yet higher
station than he had held under the federal government; and his long
experience enabled him to calculate with nice accuracy the weight of old
party issues in conventions and popular elections. But here was a new
element about to be thrown into the politics of the Union; and to the
distrust of new things common to age, was added the inability of the
Secretary to estimate precisely the force and direction of the Nicaraguan
movement. To show the spirit of Mr. Marcy, it is only necessary to state
when the decree repealing the acts of the Federal Constituent Assembly
and Federal Congress was published in Nicaragua, Mr. Wheeler advised his
government of the fact, and merely remarked that he thought it a measure
of advantage for the Isthmus. The despatch of Mr. Wheeler was, according
to excellent authority, discussed in a full meeting of Mr. Pierce’s
cabinet. Mr. Marcy and Mr. Cushing insisted on the immediate recall of
the minister; while Mr. Davis and Mr. Dobbin defended Mr. Wheeler, saying
he had done nothing but his duty in advising his government of the decree
published in Nicaragua, and of the effect it was likely to produce on the
country. The Secretary of State insisted on the dismissal of Mr. Wheeler
to the last; and only the day before he left office, he required of the
President, as a personal favor, that he should procure the resignation of
the minister.
The decree of the 22d of September was intended to destroy the delusion
of the public men of the United States as to the desire of Nicaragua for
annexation. To a thinking mind it was apparent that to enter the Federal
Union would be to defeat the object of the decree; for the federal law
prohibits the introduction within the limits of its authority of any
persons held to labor for a term of years. Nicaragua could not expect to
draw her negro labor from States already complaining of the deficiency of
their own supply; and the Southern States would themselves have opposed
the annexation of a territory which might drain from them the labor they
so much need. In the heat of party passion, however, such views were
not appreciated by the politicians, of whom Mr. Marcy was a type. They
were too much absorbed in watching the currents of popular opinion and
in distributing the spoils of party warfare, to devote any time to the
consideration of the public weal or of a true and just public policy.
So far were the politicians of the Union from perceiving it was Walker’s
policy by the slavery decree to declare his hostility to annexation, that
some of them supposed they had achieved a discovery by the publication of
certain letters instructing Goicouria as to the course he should pursue
in England. The intendente-general was authorized by Walker to proceed to
London in order to impress on the English cabinet the fact that Nicaragua
had no desire for admission into the American Union; and it was supposed
that he, being a Cuban, might more readily get the ear of the British
Ministry on the subject than a native of the United States. The letter
of Walker to Goicouria instructed him to explain that the necessities
of Nicaragua required “a republic based on military principles,” such
a republic being clearly unfit for admission into the northern Union.
The English would readily perceive that the growth of such a republic
toward the southern limits of the United States would tend to restrain
the territorial extension of the latter power. Walker conceived that by
such a policy he would promote the welfare of his native no less than
of his adopted country; for the acquisition by the United States of any
territory covered by a Spanish-American population would be fertile
of troubles and dangers to the confederacy, as well as of suffering
and oppression to the inhabitants of the new territory. Above all, the
acquisition of territory on the south would be fatal to the slaveholding
States; for it would complete the circle of free-labor communities now
girdling them on almost every side.
In France it would have been easier than in England to make the
anti-annexation character of the slavery decree apparent. M. Ange de
St. Priest, a savant who has published a large and valuable work on
the antiquities of Mexico and Central America, accepted the office of
consul-general for Nicaragua at Paris; and it was hoped through him to
establish relations with the Imperial government. The steady policy
of Napoleon the Third has been to increase the tonnage of France, and
thereby to enlarge her facilities for educating sailors. It was hoped
that such a treaty might have been made as would lead to the employment
of French bottoms for bringing African apprentices to the ports of
Nicaragua, thus furnishing labor to the latter republic, and increasing
the trade of French ships. The Emperor has himself written a work on the
subject of the inter-oceanic canal through Nicaragua; and his familiarity
with the country would enable him to perceive the advantages of carrying
negro labor thither. Next, too, to the possession of the isthmus by
France, he would desire to have the canal route in the hands of a power
bound to the empire by strong ties of interest and trade.
In fact it is the decided interest of all the continental powers of
Europe, to favor the policy the Americans proposed to pursue in
Nicaragua. By this policy they would secure tropical products at a much
cheaper price than at present; and Russia, particularly, needs a supply
of such articles from a country not under the control or influence of
England. Even Great Britain, if she would look beyond the immediate gains
of her grasping merchants, might perceive permanent advantages from the
security and order negro labor would give to Nicaragua. Now that the
Crown has taken the government of India from a trading corporation,
it might disdain to be moved by the narrow commercial jealousy which
sacrificed Jamaica to the East India Company.
But, it may be said, England will never permit anything which looks like
the revival of the African slave-trade. They, however, who watch closely
the phases of British politics, know that the influence of Exeter Hall
is on the wane. The frenzy of the British public against the slave-trade
has exhausted itself, and men have begun to perceive that they were led
into error by the benevolent enthusiasm of parsons, who knew more about
Greek and Hebrew than they did about physiology or political economy, and
of middle-aged spinsters, smit with the love of general humanity, though
disdaining to fix their affections firmly on any objects less remote than
Africa. All the arguments used by the adversaries of the slave-trade
were drawn from its abuses; and the true remedy was, not to abolish but
regulate the trade. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it
was styled “a commerce for the redemption of African captives;” and if
the old name, descriptive as it is of the true character of the trade,
were revived, many of the prejudices against the business would be
removed.
It was the alliance of a skeptical philosophy with a purblind religious
zeal which generated the opinion of Europe in regard to the African
slave-trade. Confining their attention to the abuses of the system, the
opponents of the trade failed to raise their eyes toward any large views
of the subject. If we look at Africa in the light of universal history,
we see her for more than five thousand years a mere waif on the waters
of the world, fulfilling no part in its destinies, and aiding in no
manner the progress of general civilization. Sunk in the depravities of
fetichism, and reeking with the blood of human sacrifices, she seemed a
satire on man, fit only to provoke the sneer of devils at the wisdom,
and justice, and benevolence of the Creator. But America was discovered,
and the European found the African a useful auxiliary in subduing the
new continent to the uses and purposes of civilization. The white man
took the negro from his native wastes, and teaching him the arts of life,
bestowed on him the ineffable blessings of a true religion. Then only do
the wisdom and excellence of the divine economy in the creation of the
black race begin to appear with their full lustre. Africa is permitted
to lie idle until America is discovered, in order that she may conduce
to the formation of a new society in the New World. A strong, haughty
race, bred to liberty in its northern island home, is sent forth with
the mission to place America under the rule of free laws; but whence
are these men, imbued with love of liberty and equality, to derive the
counterpoise which shall prevent their liberty from degenerating into
license, and their equality into anarchy or despotism? How are they,
when transplanted from the rugged climate where freedom thrives to
retain their precious birthright in the soft, tropical air which woos to
luxury and repose? Is it not for this that the African was reserved? And
is it not thus that one race secures for itself liberty with order, while
it bestows on the other comfort and Christianity?
But man, ever the dupe of his vain desires, always oscillating between
the extremes of opinion, and never fixed in the possession of truth,
was not content with the place assigned the African in the plan of
creation and of Providence. The preachers of the new gospel of equality
and fraternity were not satisfied with descanting on the horrors of the
middle passage, or of weeping over the miseries of men redeemed from the
captivity of savage masters. If the slave-trade be criminal, slavery,
which is the cause of it, should be extirpated. Therefore the trial is
made on St. Domingo, and the slave, suddenly loosed from the restraints
the law had put around him, goes forth to murder and destroy. Then they
determine on another experiment more cautiously conducted and more
narrowly watched. Slavery is abolished in Jamaica, and forthwith the
island goes to waste. The time seems to be approaching when man, guided
by a less vain philosophy, will seek truth in some other direction than
Haytian massacres or Jamaican impoverishment.
If the views above expressed of the uses of the African in the economy
of nature and Providence be correct, slavery is not abnormal to American
society. It must be the rule, not the exception. But to keep it so
requires effort and labor. The enemies of the only original form of
American civilization are many and powerful. They are resolute in their
determination not merely to limit but to extirpate slavery. The man who
leads the free-labor myriads of the United States—he, whose firm will
and far-reaching mind do not quail either at the doctrines or the acts
to which his political philosophy logically conducts him, has already
declared that he hopes to see the time when the foot of not a slave shall
press the continent. Yet the sluggards of slavery say, “a little more
rest, a little more folding of the arms to slumber.” Strafford sleeps
though the axe of the headsman is whetted for his execution.
The contest between free and slave labor in the United States not only
touches the interests and destiny of those immediately engaged in the
struggle but it affects the fate of the whole continent. The question
involved is whether the civilization of the western world shall be
European or American. If free labor prevails in its effort to banish
slave labor from the continent, the history of American society becomes a
faint reflex of European systems and prejudices, without contributing any
new ideas, any new sentiments, or any new institutions, to the mental and
moral wealth of the world. The necessary consequence of the triumph of
free labor will be the destruction, by a slow and cruel process, of the
colored races which now inhabit the central and southern portions of the
continent. The labor of the inferior races cannot compete with that of
the white race unless you give it a white master to direct its energies;
and without such protection as slavery affords, the colored races must
inevitably succumb in the struggle with white labor. Hence a Nicaraguan
can not be an indifferent spectator of the contest between the two forms
of labor in the United States; and deeper yet must be his interest in the
matter if born and educated in a slave State of the Union, he revolves in
his mind the results which will ensue to the home of his childhood, and
the firesides of the friends of his youth, in case victory smiles upon
the soldiers of free labor. Do not, therefore, men of the South, deem
it the voice of a stranger, or of one without a stake in your country’s
welfare, which urges you to strike a blow in defence of your honor, no
less than of your hearths and your families, ere the blast of the enemy’s
bugle calls upon you to surrender your arms to an overwhelming force.
The tongue of truth and friendship is not that of undue praise or fawning
flattery, and the soft songs of the suitor too often woo to danger and
destruction. Therefore, be not displeased, sons of the South—for it is
to you I now speak—if the criticism on your acts and policy appear harsh
or severe; but examine your conduct and that of your public servants for
the last three years and see whither it has led you. It is now but little
more than three years since you elected the President of your choice, and
in your simplicity you thought this success a great victory. What fruits
have you reaped from it? Where are the rewards of your campaign? In what
triumphs of policy have all your toils and all your efforts ended?
Your President—for he is the work of your hands—went into office pledged
to your policy in Kansas and in Central America. He attempted to deceive
you in Kansas, and your leaders drove him to the course he was forced to
pursue. Like sheep to the slaughter he and his Northern friends were led
to the support of Southern policy in Kansas; but what has resulted from
their sacrifice, or from all the efforts the Southern leaders made to
drag them to the altar? Was Kansas admitted into the Union? Did you have
even the empty pleasure of boasting over a barren victory? The Kansas
contest was made, as all admitted, for an abstract right. Your leaders
were true to you, because you were true to yourselves, when contending
for an “abstract right”; let us see whether you and they were equally
faithful to your honor and your interests when contending for a right not
abstract.
The President was pledged to your policy in Central America even
more explicitly than to your Kansas measures. The resolutions of the
Cincinnati Convention on the Central American policy were drawn by no
trembling or unsteady hand.[2] They were not couched in the Delphic
sentences behind which timid politicians shrink when they seek the
support of their constituents. Clear, distinct, and unmistakeable, they
could not be read in a dozen senses by the jugglers, who fancy all
political wisdom consists in deceiving the people with words which seem
other than they are. Have the pledges given at Cincinnati been redeemed?
Have those words, so full of meaning and of resolution, taken shape in
acts; or have they died into the sobs and sighs and moans of a party
which aspired to greatness yet dared not its accomplishment?
It needs no new word to tell you how basely the pledges made at
Cincinnati have been violated. It was not enough to trample under foot
the promises made, in the name of a party, to the country; it was
necessary also to disregard all the principles of public law, and to
proclaim before the world that the end justified the means. Violated
faith excused violated law: and when the message of the President,
excusing the acts of Commodore Paulding at Punta Arenas, in December,
1857, was sent to the senate, Mr. Seward might well say, in a double
sense, that his Excellency had become a convert to the “higher law”
doctrine.
And how did the leaders of the South act in the emergency? It was just at
the time the news of Paulding’s act at Punta Arenas reached Washington
that the adoption of the Lecompton Constitution was ascertained. Then the
President besought the men who were driving him on the Kansas question
not to press him on the Central American policy, and the Southern
leaders, giving up the substance, fled in pursuit of the shadow.[3] The
Lecompton Constitution would not give another foot of soil to slavery,
and the movement in Nicaragua might give it an empire; yet the latter was
sacrificed to the former, and the insults of Paulding and the President
have gone unrebuked by the South up to the present time.
Is it not time for the South to cease the contest for abstractions
and to fight for realities? Of what avail is it to discuss the right
to carry slaves into the territories of the Union, if there are none
to go thither? These are questions for schoolmen—fit to sharpen the
logical faculty and to make the mind quick and keen in the perception
of analogies and distinctions; but surely they are not such questions
as touch practical life and come home to men’s interests and actions.
The feelings and conscience of a people are not to be called forth by
the subtleties of lawyers or the differences of metaphysicians; nor can
their energies be roused into action for the defence of rights none of
them care to exercise. The minds of full-grown men cannot be fed on mere
discussions of territorial rights: they require some substantial policy
which all can understand and appreciate.
Nor is it wise for the weaker party to waste its strength in fighting for
shadows. It is only the stronger party which can afford to throw away
its force on indecisive skirmishes. At present the South must husband
her political power else she will soon lose all she possesses. The same
influence she brought to bear in favor of the position she took in Kansas
would have secured the establishment of the Americans in Nicaragua. And
unless she assumes now an entirely defensive attitude, what else is
left for the South except to carry out the policy proposed to her three
years ago in Central America? How else can she strengthen slavery than
by seeking its extension beyond the limits of the Union? The Republican
party aims at destroying slavery by sap and not by assault. It declares
now that the task of confining slavery is complete and the work of the
miner has already commenced. Whither can the slaveholder fly when the
enemy has completed his chambers and filled in the powder and prepared
the train, and stands with lighted match ready to apply the fire?
Time presses. If the South wishes to get her institutions into tropical
America she must do so before treaties are made to embarrass her action
and hamper her energies. Already there is a treaty between Mexico and
Great Britain by which the former agrees to do all in her power for
the suppression of the slave-trade, and in 1856 a clause was inserted
in the Dallas-Clarendon Convention, stipulating for the perpetual
exclusion of slavery from the Bay Islands of Honduras. This clause
was suggested (as the writer was informed by the person himself who
proposed it) by an American, for the purpose of securing the support of
England to a projected railway across Honduras; and thus the rights of
American civilization were to be bartered away for the paltry profits
of a railroad company. And while Nicaragua was to be hemmed in by an
anti-slavery treaty between England and Honduras on the north, Costa
Rica made an agreement with New Granada that slavery should never be
introduced within her limits. The enemies of American civilization—for
such are the enemies of slavery—seem to be more on the alert than its
friends.
The faith which Walker had in the intelligence of the Southern States
to perceive their true policy and in their resolution to carry it out,
was one of the causes which led to the publication of the decree of the
22d of September at the time it was given forth. Nor is his faith in
the South shaken; though who can fail to be amazed at the facility with
which the South is carried off after chimeras? Sooner or later, however,
the slaveholding States are bound to come as one man to the support of
the Nicaraguan policy. The decree of the 22d September, not the result
of hasty passion or immature thought, fixed the fate of Nicaragua and
bound the Republic to the car of American civilization. For more than two
years the enemies of slavery have been contriving and plotting to exclude
the naturalized Nicaraguans from their adopted country. But as yet not a
single additional barrier has been interposed; and the South has but to
resolve upon the task of carrying slavery into Nicaragua in order that
the work may be accomplished.
If other appeals than those of interest are required for stimulating the
Southern States in the effort to re-establish slavery in Central America
they are not lacking. The hearts of Southern youth answer to the call of
honor, and strong arms and steady eyes are waiting to carry forward the
policy which is now the dictate of duty as well as of interest. The issue
between slavery and anti-slavery has been made in Nicaragua, and it is
impossible for slavery to retire from the contest without losing some
of its courage and character. Nor is the issue one of mere words. It is
not a tilt of sport, a joust of reeds; but the knights have touched the
shields of their adversaries with the points of their lances, and the
tourney is one of mortal strife. And may fortune most favor them who best
do their duty in the fray.
Something is due from the South to the memory of the brave dead who
repose in the soil of Nicaragua. In defence of slavery these men left
their homes, met with calmness and constancy the perils of a tropical
climate, and finally yielded up their lives for the interests of the
South. I have seen these men die in many ways. I have seen them gasping
life away under the effects of typhus; I have seen them convulsed in the
death agony from the fearful blows of cholera; I have seen them sink to
glorious rest from mortal wounds received on honorable fields; but I
never saw the first man who repented engaging in the cause for which he
yielded his life. These martyrs and confessors in the cause of Southern
civilization surely deserve recognition at its hands. And what can be
done for their memories while the cause for which they suffered and died
remains in peril and jeopardy?
If there, then, be yet vigor in the South—and who can doubt that there
is—for further contest with the soldiers of anti-slavery, let her cast
off the lethargy which enthrals her, and prepare anew for the conflict.
But at the same time she throws aside her languor and indifference,
let her, taught by the past, discard the delusions and abstractions
with which politicians have agitated her passions without advancing her
interests. It is time for slavery to spend its efforts on realities
and not beat the air with wanton and ill-advised blows. The true field
for the exertion of slavery is in tropical America; there it finds the
natural seat of its empire and thither it can spread if it will but make
the effort, regardless of conflicts with adverse interests. The way is
open and it only requires courage and will to enter the path and reach
the goal. Will the South be true to herself in this emergency?
Chapter Ninth.
THE ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES.
In the beginning of September, 1856, the army of Nicaragua was organized
in two battalions of Rifles, two of Light Infantry, one of Rangers, and
a small company of Artillery. The First Rifles was the fullest as well
as the best corps of the army, and it scarcely mustered two hundred
effective men. The Second Rifles was a mere shadow of a battalion,
and its discipline was almost entirely neglected. The Light Infantry
battalions were larger than the Second Rifles, and some companies of
these, as, for example, the company of Capt. Henry, of the Second
Infantry, were in good order and condition. The Rangers consisted of
three small companies, under the command of Major Waters, and were
capable of effective service. Capt. Schwartz, with a few artillerymen,
had shown capacity for organizing his corps, and possessed knowledge in
his profession, he having served for some time as an artillery officer
in Baden during the revolutionary troubles of 1848. The whole effective
force scarcely amounted to eight hundred men.
Gen. Hornsby was in command of the Meridional Department, having his
headquarters sometimes at San Jorge, sometimes at Rivas, and sometimes at
San Juan del Sur. He had with him some companies of the First Infantry
and the artillery squad—it could scarcely be called a company—of Capt.
Schwartz. The First Rifles were at Granada, while the Second Rifles,
under Lieut.-Col. McDonald, were at Tipitapa. The Second Infantry were
at Masaya, and, in the absence of Col. Jaquess, it was commanded by
Lieut.-Col. McIntosh. Capt. Dolan had been in command of a company of
Rifles at Managua, but about the middle of September, Major Waters
was sent thither with his Rangers. The principal depot of commissary,
quartermaster, and ordnance stores, and all the work-shops of the army,
were at Granada. The San Juan river was guarded by two companies of
infantry, and Lieut.-Col. Rudler was placed in charge of that frontier.
The main strength of the enemy was at Leon, under the orders of Gen.
Belloso, and in the month of August Martinez began to collect men in
Matagalpa, and even as far down as Chocoyas and Trinidad. The troops
under Belloso were kept closely about Leon, and Rangers from Managua were
in the habit of scouting beyond Pueblo Nuevo without meeting any signs of
the enemy. Martinez, however, was collecting the herdsmen and servants
attached to the Legitimist owners of cattle-estates in the upper part
of Chontales and Los Llaños, and these being familiar with the country
were easily able to provide their chief with any news in that region
of country. A large proportion of the cattle used by the Americans was
drawn from these districts, and they were generally driven to Granada
by native officers, accompanied by small detachments of riflemen mounted
for the occasion. One of the most efficient of these native officers was
Ubaldo Herrera, whose services during the civil war have been heretofore
related.
In the latter part of August, Herrera, with a few Americans, was sent to
one of the cattle-estates of Los Llaños, and while carelessly driving
cattle toward Tipitapa he was attacked and slain by a small band of
Legitimists. This incident occurred not many miles from Tipitapa, and
in consequence of it Lieut.-Col. McDonald received orders to cross the
Tipitapa river, and marching toward Los Llaños, to ascertain whether any
traces of the enemy were to be seen in that direction. The roads were,
at the time, difficult, and all movements were necessarily slow and
uncertain, owing to the heavy rains of the season. McDonald, however,
with Capt. Jarvis, and about forty men, proceeded in the direction of San
Jacinto, a large cattle-estate a few miles east and north of Tipitapa. It
was reported that some of the enemy were quartered at the country-house
belonging to the estate, and McDonald, arriving near the house before
daybreak, postponed a nearer approach until he might be able to see the
strength of the enemy. Soon after daylight he drew up his force for an
attack, but while proceeding at a quick pace he was received by such a
sharp, steady fire that he deemed it prudent to withdraw. Capt. Jarvis
was brought off mortally wounded, and McDonald had ascertained that the
enemy were in larger numbers than he expected, and strongly barricaded
behind adobes.
The presence of the enemy at San Jacinto was a serious inconvenience to
the commissariat, and when it was known at Granada there were numerous
volunteers who proposed to drive the Legitimists from the house they
occupied. The state of the roads made it almost impossible to send
artillery against San Jacinto, even had there been the round shot or
shell requisite for rendering a gun useful in an attack on adobes. There
was a general impression at Granada that McDonald’s Rifles had retired
too soon, and the impression was due to the utter want of discipline
in the corps. Seeing the enthusiasm of some officers and citizens, and
desirous of ascertaining more exactly the strength of the enemy beyond
Tipitapa, Walker consented that volunteers should be engaged for an
attack on San Jacinto.
The volunteers were principally Americans who had been in the army, and
who had been discharged or had resigned; and these had their numbers
swelled to about sixty-five or seventy by the officers at Granada and
Masaya. Among the officers who joined the expedition were Major J. C.
O’Neal, Captains Watkins, Lewis, and Morris, and Lieutenants Brady,
Connor, Crowell, Hutchins, Kiel, Reader and Sherman. They left Granada
on the afternoon of the 12th of September, and passing through Masaya
reached Tipitapa on the morning of the 13th. At Tipitapa they offered
the command of the party to Lieutenant-Colonel Byron Cole, who had been
visiting several points in Chontales with a view of procuring cattle for
the army, and Cole agreed to accept the offer. Wiley Marshall, a citizen
of Granada, was named as second in command. The spirit of adventure
which controlled not only these men but many others in Nicaragua can
be judged of by the fact that under this improvised organization Major
O’Neal consented to receive orders from a simple citizen, Marshall.
Cole and his command arrived before San Jacinto about 5 o’clock, on
the morning of Sunday the 14th of September. They found the house well
situated for defence on a gentle elevation commanding all the ground
about it. Near the house was a corral, the sides of which afforded
protection against rifle or musket balls. Cole halted a few minutes to
arrange his plan of attack; and dividing his small force into three
bodies, placed the first in charge of Robert Milligan, an ex-lieutenant
of the army, the second under Major O’Neal, and the third under Captain
Watkins. The attack on the enemy was to be made at three several points,
and the weapons to be used principally were revolvers. These arrangements
being made, the order to charge simultaneously the points assigned to
each division was given. The order was gallantly obeyed, and Cole with
Marshall and Milligan had already gained the corral when they were struck
down by the well-directed fire of the enemy. O’Neal was more fortunate,
receiving only a wound in the arm, while Watkins was disabled by a shot
in the hip. Thus, almost at the same instant, and when the men were
within a few rods of the house, all of the leaders and nearly one third
of the whole force were either killed or wounded. Then the others, seeing
nothing was to be accomplished with their numbers, withdrew, carrying
off their wounded; and in a few minutes they were in full retreat toward
Tipitapa.
Thus in the bold but fruitless charge he made on San Jacinto perished
Byron Cole, whose energy and perseverance had done so much toward
securing the presence of the Americans in Nicaragua. It was the first
opportunity he had for being under fire; and he had scarcely seen the
flash of an enemy’s musket before he met his fate. For months preceding
the arrival of the Americans at Realejo, he had travelled and toiled in
their behalf; and the only reward of all his labor and anxiety was death
on the first field where he met the foe of the principles he had aided to
advance. Nor was Cole the only loss of note on that fatal day. Marshall
died of his wounds after reaching Tipitapa; and among the missing was
Charles Callahan, who had been appointed collector of customs at Granada.
The latter was correspondent of the New-Orleans Picayune newspaper, and
his genial nature secured for him a large circle of friends who regretted
his untimely loss. The thirst for action led him to exchange his business
in Granada for the excitement of the attack on San Jacinto; and he never
returned to fill the duties he had so well begun a few weeks previously.
The retreat of the volunteers from San Jacinto was irregular and
disorderly; and on such a command as that of McDonald at Tipitapa the
arrival of the defeated party had an alarming effect. So great was
the panic that the bridge across the river was torn up to prevent the
expected enemy from using it. But no enemy appeared and the alarm
gradually subsided. The news, however, of the defence at San Jacinto
encouraged the Allies greatly; and soon after the news of the affair
reached Leon, Belloso, urged on by some of the more resolute of his
officers, determined to advance toward Granada.
A few days after the affair at San Jacinto, about two hundred men
arrived at Granada from New-York for the Nicaraguan service. They were
soon organized into companies; but they showed from the beginning how
worthless they were for military duty. A very large proportion of them
were Europeans of the poorest class, mostly Germans who cared more for
the contents of their haversacks than of their cartridge-boxes. With the
exception of Captain Russell and Lieutenants Nagle and Northedge, the
officers were as trifling as the men; and these New-York volunteers, as
they called themselves, had not been in the country ten days before they
began to desert in numbers. The promise of free quarters and rations
seemed to have carried the most of them to Nicaragua; and the idea of
performing duty could scarcely have entered their minds when they left
the United States. Of course such trash as these men proved to be were
far worse than no men at all; for their vices and corruptions tainted the
good materials near them.
While these recruits were arriving at Granada, Belloso, having received
reinforcements from San Salvador and Guatemala, was marching from Leon
toward Managua with a force of about eighteen hundred men. He was
accompanied by General Zavala, the second in command of the Guatemalan
officers, Paredes remaining sick at Leon. Jerez also followed the allied
camp; nor was he unattended by such Leoneses as Mendez and Olivas, eager
for any disorder which held out the prospect of plunder. Valle, having
ventured back to the Occidental Department after the June changes, with
the view of raising the people against the Rivas authority, was arrested
and afterward kept under the eye of the police. He waited at Chinandega
hoping for the turn in affairs which might render his presence there
useful to the Americans. By remaining in the Occidental Department he
aided to keep the people of that region from joining in the crusade the
Allies preached against the “filibusters.”
Major Waters watched closely the advance of the Allies, and by the firm
front he showed at Managua delayed them for several days on the road
between that place and Leon. When, however, Belloso approached within a
few miles of Managua Waters received orders to fall back to Masaya. At
the latter place, Lieutenant-Colonel McIntosh was commanding, and the
garrison consisted of about two hundred and fifty men; these had been
increased in numbers, though not much in strength, by the Second Rifles
from Tipitapa. Subsistence for many days was collected at Masaya, and the
commandant began to build barricades and other defences near the main
square of the city. While these works were going on, Captain Henry, who
had been confined to his bed for many weeks from a painful wound received
in a duel, came out, and by the skill he evinced inspired the soldiers
with confidence in his judgment and sagacity. The commanding officer,
Lieutenant-Colonel McIntosh, was sadly deficient both in knowledge and
force of character; and the effect of his irresolution was such that it
was clear the force at Masaya could not be depended on for holding the
town against the advancing enemy. Had Henry been in command the condition
of the garrison would have been far different; and it was unfortunate
that his long confinement had prevented his capacity from being known
until the last moment. As will be seen hereafter, his disposition to get
into danger, kept him on the list of wounded nearly the whole time he
was in Nicaragua. During the war in Central America, there was no better
soldier engaged in it than Henry; and by reading and study, as well as
by practice and habit, he was familiar, not only with the details of
military administration, but also with the deeper and more difficult
principles of the art of war.
After halting a short time at Managua, Belloso continued to advance;
and at Nindiri, a league from Masaya, he was joined by Martinez and his
followers from Chontales and Matagalpa, thus swelling the allied force
to twenty-two or twenty-three hundred men. The moral condition of the
command at Masaya was such that McIntosh received orders to retire on
Granada; and the state of his men may be judged from the manner in which
they left Masaya. Such was the haste and confusion that Capt. Henry
was left behind, and his safety was the result of accident, being due
to the good-will of the women who attended him during his illness. A
brass six-pounder was left on the road, about three miles out of Masaya,
and the enemy afterward got possession of it. McIntosh might have been
deliberate, even slow in his movement with entire safety; for Belloso did
not enter Masaya for some hours after it was abandoned by the Americans.
Walker, had he desired it, might probably have prevented for a time, or
at least much embarrassed the junction of Martinez with Belloso. But a
war against scattered guerillas was more exhausting to the Americans
than a contest with the enemy gathered in masses. The Allies were less
formidable when united than when acting in detached bodies at several
distant points. Hence, no obstacle was put in the way of Martinez
in his march toward Belloso. In fact, the best manner of treating a
revolutionary movement in Central America, is to treat it as a boil, let
it come to a head, and then lance it, letting all the bad matter out at
once. It was an object for the Americans to let all the dissatisfied
elements in Nicaragua gather about the Allied force, so that the question
at issue might be decisively determined. The accession of Martinez really
added little, if any, to Belloso’s military strength.
Meanwhile the force in Granada was increased by the arrival, on the
4th of October, of Col. Sanders, with Capt. Ewbanks, and about seventy
recruits from California. Three days after, Col. John Allan landed with
nearly one hundred fresh men; and at the same time two twelve-pound
mountain howitzers, with a small supply of shells, and four hundred
Minié rifles were received from New-York. By some blunder, however, the
carriages of the howitzers did not accompany them; and several days
elapsed before Capt. Schwartz was able to have temporary carriages
prepared. The arrival of the howitzers and shells had been anxiously
expected, since it was hoped with their aid to drive the enemy more
readily from the towns they were in the habit of barricading with
adobes, thus making it difficult to carry them by assault, unless with
the loss of large numbers of men.
General Hornsby, with his command, was ordered from the Meridional
Department to Granada; and thus nearly the whole force of the Republic
was concentrated at this point. The effective strength was about a
thousand men, including those employed in the several departments of the
army, as well as those in the line. A very large proportion of these,
however, were newly arrived in the country; many of them had no military
training whatever and still more had never seen an enemy during the whole
course of their lives. Nevertheless it was necessary to strike a blow at
the Allies, if for no other purpose than to show them that the Americans
were not thrown entirely on the defensive. Accordingly, as soon as the
howitzers were mounted on their rather clumsy carriages, and the new
men, suitably armed and equipped, were distributed in the several corps,
orders were issued for a march.
On the morning of the 11th October, Walker marched to Masaya with about
800 men. It was near midday when the First Rifles formed in the Jalteva
and thence proceeded along the middle road to Masaya. In advance of the
Rifles was Major Waters, with two companies of Rangers, and in their rear
was the Cuban body-guard of the general-in-chief. Next after the guard
came Capt. Schwartz with the howitzers; then the ammunition mules. The
Second Rifles followed; and after them were the two Infantry battalions,
under command of Gen. Hornsby. A small body of Rangers brought up the
rear. The march was quiet and uninterrupted; and a little after nine
o’clock in the evening the force encamped on the edge of the town of
Masaya, occupying the high ground flanking each side of the Granada road
as it enters by the plazuela of San Sebastian. Some irregular firing took
place during the night, between mounted scouts of the enemy and some of
the American pickets, but the skirmishing was slight and unimportant.
Soon after daybreak on the 12th, Capt. Schwartz threw a few shells into
the plazuela of San Sebastian, and then Capt. Dolan, with his company
of rifles, proceeded at a brisk pace, to occupy the square, finding it
entirely abandoned by the enemy. Belloso had withdrawn his whole force
into the houses near and around the main Plaza; and the mouths of all the
streets leading into the large square were strongly barricaded. After the
main body of Nicaraguans had reached the plazuela of San Sebastian, a few
sappers and miners who had been hastily organized by a civil engineer,
Capt. Hesse, were ordered to cut through the walls of the houses on both
sides of the main street leading from the plazuela to the Plaza. Hesse
worked quite vigorously, supported by the Rifles on the right side of
the street and by the Infantry on the left. From time to time Capt.
Schwartz tried to throw shells into the midst of the main Plaza, but the
fuses were too short-timed, and the shells, for the most part, burst in
the air. Besides the unfitness of the fuses, one of the howitzers was
dismounted after a few discharges, and the carriage of the other was
ill-adapted for its purposes.
The Rifles and Infantry, however, preceded by the working party,
steadily advanced toward the Plaza, sometimes encountering the enemy
in their progress through the houses, and always driving them back.
Capt. Leonard, with Capts. McChesney and Stith, were the foremost and
most active among the Rifles; while on the left of the street, Dreux,
of the Infantry, took and kept the lead. By dark the houses fronting
on the Plaza were all that divided the Americans from the enemy; and
then the men, tired out by their labors of the day were obliged to
suspend work until morning. In the meanwhile, also, the Rangers on the
Granada road reported heavy firing in the direction of the lake, and
it became necessary to ascertain the meaning of it. Col. Fisher, the
quartermaster-general, accompanied by Lieut.-Col. Lainé and Major Rogers,
with an escort of Rangers, was sent to Granada in order to procure some
stores, and also to ascertain whether or not the road was clear of the
enemy. Not long after midnight Rogers returned, with the report that the
enemy had attacked Granada, and were occupying much of the town, with the
hope of getting entire possession of the place.
It seems that when Zavala, who, with his Guatemalans and some
Legitimists, was occupying Diriomo, a small village between Masaya and
Nandaime, heard of Walker’s march from Granada, he determined to attack
that place, supposing it to be left entirely defenceless. Gen. Fry had,
however, command at Granada; and although the regular force under his
orders was small, the citizens of the town, and the civil employees of
the government, brought the number of the Americans to about two hundred.
The force of Zavala was not less than seven hundred when he entered the
town, and it was probably swelled to nine hundred before the morning
of the 13th. Among his followers was a renegade named Harper, who, in
the previous April, had fled from Granada to join the Costa Ricans,
because his known character of pardoned convict from the California
penitentiary had prevented him from securing the position he expected in
the Nicaraguan army.
When Walker heard of the attack on Granada he immediately ordered his
whole force to prepare for marching, and early on the morning of the 13th
he was proceeding with rapid steps to the relief of Fry and his little
garrison. Not long after nine o’clock, A.M., the returning Americans
heard frequent volleys of small arms in the town; and, on approaching
the Jalteva, they found a strong body of the enemy, with a small brass
gun, occupying both sides of the barricaded road. Colonel Markham, with
the First Infantry, was in advance; and the fire of the Allies was so
sharp and well-directed that, for a time, it arrested the progress of
the Infantry. In a few minutes, however, the Americans were brought to a
charge, and then the enemy disappeared, scattering in all directions and
leaving their gun behind them. Then the main body of the Nicaraguan force
proceeded rapidly toward the main Plaza, where they saw their flag yet
flying, and the town was soon cleared of the Allies. Zavala left another
piece, besides the one taken at the Jalteva, behind him: and the streets
were strewn with the bodies of his dead. Several prisoners of rank and
some wounded remained in the hands of the Nicaraguans.
After Walker reached the Plaza, he ascertained that Zavala had attacked
the town early the day before, and that the little garrison had been
fighting the Allies for nearly twenty-four hours. The citizens of the
place acted with commendable courage, and some of them received wounds
they will carry to their graves in defence of their new homes. Major
Angus Gillis, acting recorder of the Oriental Department, had gone to
Nicaragua to revenge the death of a noble son who fell fighting at Rivas
on the eleventh of April; and while with all the vigor of youth he was
acting against the hated foe which had robbed him of his son, he received
a severe and painful wound in the face, injuring permanently the sight of
one eye, if not of both. John Tabor, the editor of the _Nicaraguense_,
had his thigh broken while defending his right to print and publish
his opinions in Central America. Douglass J. Wilkins had defended the
hospital, threatened almost every instant with assault, and he had
infused something of his own unquailing spirit into the weak and wasted
forms of those stretched on the beds and gathered up in the hammocks of
the several wards. The officers, too, attached to the several departments
of the army had been very serviceable in repulsing the attacks of the
Allies. Colonel Jones, paymaster-general, had directed the defence of
the government house on the corner of the Plaza; while Major Potter, of
the ordnance, was serviceable at many points, and particularly at the
guard-house near the church. It was on this occasion, too, that Captain
Swingle first displayed the skill and courage which made him so useful in
future operations.
Nor did those, whose usual avocation was to preach peace, deem it
unworthy of their profession to strike a blow in defence of a cause
reviled and persecuted of men, but just and sacred in the eyes of those
familiar with the facts of the contest. It may not appear singular that
the judge of the Court of First Instance, Thomas Basye, used his rifle in
defence of the authority by which he held his commission; but the conduct
of Father Rossiter, a Catholic priest who had lately been appointed
chaplain of the army, is more likely to attract attention and inquiry.
But when we ascertain the acts of the Allies on their entrance to the
town, it will not surprise us to see even a priest of the church arm in
defence, from the attacks of those who acted like savages. This brings us
to some incidents which occurred during the attack on Granada, indicating
the character of the war the Allies were waging.
Among the old American residents at Granada was John B. Lawless, a
native of Ireland but a naturalized citizen of the United States. He had
been for a number of years engaged in trade on the Isthmus, principally
in the purchase of hides and skins for export to New-York. Of a mild
temper and inoffensive manner he had conciliated even Granadian jealousy
by the honesty of his dealings and the integrity of his character.
During the first weeks of the occupation by the Americans he had been
of much service to the Legitimists by bringing their little grievances
and complaints to the attention of the general-in-chief; and his
intercessions were uniformly in favor of the native race, and in order to
protect them from the thoughtless conduct of the new-comers. So entire
was his faith in the good will of the Legitimists toward him, so perfect
was his confidence in the protection of his American citizenship, that
he refused, when opportunity offered, to repair to the Plaza to seek
the safety afforded by Nicaraguan arms. He remained in his house when
the soldiers of Zavala entered the town; and he was in the very act of
unfolding the American flag before his door, when the Guatemalans tore
him from his house, took him to the Jalteva, and there riddling his body
with bullets, vented their savage passions in stabbing the lifeless body
with their bayonets.
Nor was Lawless the only victim of their violence. An agent of the
American Bible Society, Rev. D. H. Wheeler, was taken from his house and
murdered after the same fashion as Lawless. Rev. Wm. J. Ferguson, also,
a preacher of the Methodist denomination, was torn from the arms of his
wife and daughter, and met the same fate as Lawless and Wheeler. Not
satisfied with murdering these harmless persons, the brutal soldiers of
Carrera had robbed them of their clothes and thrown their naked bodies,
like dogs, into the public places. And in the house where Father Rossiter
was quartered, a crime even darker still was committed by the followers
of Zavala. When the Guatemalan troops entered the town the children of an
Englishman, who had lately arrived at Granada from New-York, were seated
at dinner. The group at the table consisted of a boy six years old, two
girls one four and the other two years old, and their nurse. A soldier
passing by the window pointed his musket at the innocent party, and
firing deliberately, killed the boy instantly. The nurse saved the girls
by flight to the next house, while the soldiers were forcing the doors
and windows of the room, where the dead boy lay.
These injuries were done to persons claiming the protection of the
American flag; but that flag itself was the scoff and scorn of the
soldiers an unlettered savage had let loose on the plains of Nicaragua.
The American Minister, when the Allies attacked the town, lay nigh unto
death from the effects of a sudden illness, which had seized him a few
days previously. The ladies and other non-combatants had been sent to
the Minister’s house at the first moment of alarm; but it was well that
a small body of riflemen was also sent to protect them. The Minister was
not in a condition to take charge of the helpless persons at his house;
but his flag was waving its ample folds in front of the door, and this
was deemed sufficient protection from the Guatemalans. When the enemy,
however, got possession of the houses near the American legation, they
began firing at the “star-spangled banner,” and called on Mr. Wheeler to
come forth into the street. All the choice phrases of Spanish ribaldry
were poured over the name of the _Ministro filibustero_—the filibuster
Minister; and no epithet of hatred or contempt for the race of the North
was left unuttered by the old Legitimists of Granada. It was well for Mr.
Wheeler that the American Secretary of State about this time gave him
leave to return to Washington in order to report the condition of affairs
in Nicaragua—a civil way of telling the Minister his government had no
further need of his services.
The loss of the Americans during the action of the 12th and 13th at
Masaya and Granada, was something upward of a hundred—twenty-five killed
and eighty-five wounded. The loss at Masaya was very slight: most of
the casualties occurred at Granada. A few were missing, principally
those belonging to the party Col. Fisher had taken from Masaya on the
evening of the 12th. Fisher returning toward Masaya by a different road
from that Walker took on the morning of the 13th, was surprised when he
reached the outskirts of the town to find himself in the presence of a
large detachment of the enemy. Hastily taking a side path toward Diria
and Diriomo he succeeded for a time in evading the enemy; but it was
not long before he again fell in with them, though not in such force as
previously. Then the Rangers and officers with Fisher found that the
heavy night-dew had made the Sharp’s carbines they carried unreliable,
the moisture getting in between the chamber and the barrel. Finally
the party separated, some soon finding their way to Granada, while it
was several days before others returned. Lieutenant-Colonel Lainé,
aide-de-camp to the general-in-chief, was taken prisoner by the Allies
and shot. As soon as his execution was certainly known at Granada two
Guatemalan officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Valderraman and Captain Allende,
were there shot in retaliation.
The loss of the enemy at Granada was heavy. On the night of the 12th they
probably buried their dead of that day, as many new graves were found in
the neighborhood of the houses the Allies occupied. In addition to these,
nearly a hundred bodies were buried by the Americans after Zavala retired
to Masaya. The reports also stated that there were large numbers of
wounded not only carried from Granada but also of those hurt at Masaya on
the morning and afternoon of the 12th.
The lake steamer, La Virgen, was lying near the wharf at Granada during
the action of the 12th and 13th; and late in the evening of the 13th
she left for Virgin Bay, carrying several officers who were returning
to the United States, and also Father Vigil for San Juan del Norte. The
curate of Granada was wiser in the ways of Central American warfare than
the Bible Society’s agent, Mr. Wheeler, or the Methodist preacher, Mr.
Ferguson: for as soon as he heard the Guatemalans were in the Jalteva he
fled into a swamp near the town and remained hid away until the retreat
of the enemy was entirely certain. Late in the afternoon of the 13th he
came to congratulate the general-in-chief on the victory obtained over
the Allies; and his congratulations ended in a request for a passport
to go aboard the steamer about to leave for Virgin Bay. Nor did the
good father feel easy until he was safely on the steamer beyond, as he
thought, the reach of the dreaded _Chapines_.
A few days after the action of the 13th, the army received a valuable
accession in the person of Col. C. F. Henningsen, who arrived at Granada
in charge of arms and ordnance stores from New-York. When not more than
nineteen, Col. Henningsen had commenced his military career under the
Carlist leader, Zumalacarregui; and his service in Spain was well fitted
to qualify him for war in Nicaragua. Although an Englishman by birth, he
had spent most of his life on the continent of Europe; and after the
death of Zumalacarregui he had resided for some years in Russia. Finally
in 1849 he espoused the cause of Hungarian independence and came about
the same time as Kossuth to the United States. A day or two after he
reached Granada he was appointed brigadier-general, and charged specially
with the organization of the artillery and with directing the practice
with the Minié musket. Much dissatisfaction was evinced by many officers
at the rank given to Henningsen; nor were efforts wanting to create
prejudices against him because he was not an American. But his own worth
and merits soon overcame most of these prejudices, though in the breasts
of some officers jealousy lurked to the last. Walker, however, never
had reason to regret the confidence he early placed in the capacity of
Henningsen.
The efficiency of the new brigadier-general was soon felt in the
organization of two companies of artillery and of a company of sappers
and miners. Full and detailed instructions for the use of the Minié
musket were written by Henningsen, and practice with this arm was carried
on for some days under his supervision. He had much to combat in the
idleness and indifference of the officers, too many of whom valued their
rank more as an excuse for indulging their ease than as an incentive
to difficult and arduous duty. He was more successful in the artillery
practice than with the new rifle-muskets; for among the officers of
artillery were several who had much pride of profession. The skill and
experience of Major Schwartz have been mentioned, and besides him, Capt.
Dulaney and Lieut. Stahle deserve mention. Capt. Ferrand had courage and
little else; his laziness was intolerable. Stahle was particularly useful
in the practice with howitzers and cochorn-mortars. The proper carriages
for the howitzers having arrived they were more fit for service than
before, and the mortars, being light and easy of transportation, carried
the same shell as the howitzers. The practice with the mortars was much
simplified by always using the same charge, and determining the distance
the projectile was to be sent entirely by the angle of elevation of the
piece.
Meantime the Meridional Department was unprotected save by the schooner
Granada, lying in the port of San Juan del Sur. During August and
September Lieut. Fayssoux had been cruising first about the gulf of
Fonseca and then in the gulf of Nicoya, and finally off Realejo; but
he had not been able to see anything with a hostile flag. The presence
of the schooner at several points on the coast had kept the enemy in
constant fear, and the Granada had, in many ways, embarrassed the action
of the Allies. As the time, however, for the arrival of the steamer
from San Francisco approached it became necessary to send a guard for
the specie across the Transit and also to afford protection for the
passengers on the Isthmus. Hence Gen. Hornsby was, on November 2d, sent
from Granada to Virgin Bay with one hundred and seventy-five men. He
reached the Transit just in time to guard the specie brought down by the
Sierra Nevada.
It was known that a detachment had been sent from Masaya for the purpose
of occupying Rivas; while the reports of a fresh force from Costa Rica,
with a view of co-operating with the Allies in the Meridional Department,
were frequent and continued. Therefore Hornsby was ordered to remain at
Virgin Bay with a view of holding the wharf, so that a force from Granada
might at any moment be landed; while Fayssoux remained in the port of
San Juan del Sur to keep the enemy uneasy in case they attempted the
occupation of that place. The log of the Granada shows how she performed
her part. On the 7th of November, “At 4.30 P.M.,” so the log reads,
“received a notice, dated 4 P.M. at one mile from San Juan, and signed
José M. Cañas, commanding vanguard of Costa Rican army, to surrender the
post without firing a shot; if I did so the citizens should be protected,
if not, no protection would be given; to which I paid no attention. At 5
P.M. Mr. G. Rozet—United States inspector at San Juan—came on board with
a message that Gens. Bosque and Cañas were in the Plaza with six hundred
Costa Ricans; that they demanded the surrender of the schooner without
my firing a shot; if I did not the citizens would not be protected. I
replied I would not surrender, but not having the power to drive them
from the town I thought it would be prudent to run out of the harbor.
At 5.45 P.M. cast loose from the buoy, ran out and lay off the harbor.”
Then on the 8th the log proceeds: “Lying-to off the harbor. At 3.30
P.M. received letters from the officer in command of San Juan, Guardio,
offering protection to all citizens that would deliver up their arms to
him, and from Mr. Rozet praying me not to come in, that if I did all
Americans would perish. My answer to Rozet was that I did not intend
to come in and for him to say to Guardio that I would not communicate
with the enemy. The persons who came off to me reported that the Costa
Ricans were looking hourly for a bark and two brigs, the latter armed and
carrying troops, the former with provisions and troops.” On the 10th: “At
12 M. close in the mouth of the harbor. Saw a number of mounted men, and
apparently about one hundred and fifty foot soldiers leave the town.” The
cause of their departure will appear by returning to the movements of
Gen. Hornsby at Virgin Bay.
Although the nominal numbers of the infantry at Virgin Bay was 175,
their real strength was much less; and when, on the 10th, Hornsby
was reinforced by Sanders with 150 rifles and a howitzer under Capt.
Dulaney, he was not able to march against the enemy with more than 250
men. Cañas had taken up a position on the hill over which the Transit
road passes about a mile beyond the Half-way House toward San Juan del
Sur. Just beyond the Half-way House there is a deep cut in the road, and
some hundred and fifty yards farther on there is a slight bridge thrown
across a deep ravine. The enemy had barricaded near the bridge, and thus
commanded a long stretch of the road, flanked on one side by rising
ground and on the other by the ravine. Captain Ewbanks, with a detachment
of Rifles, turned the right flank of the Costa Ricans defending the
bridge; and thus Hornsby was enabled to reach the foot of the hill where
the main body of Cañas was posted. When, however, the American general
reconnoitred the hill the Costa Ricans occupied, and saw the effect
produced on his men by the fire they had just passed through, he deemed
it prudent to retire without hazarding an attack. He therefore withdrew
to Virgin Bay, and repairing to Granada reported in person to Walker the
result of his march against Cañas.
It was all-important to keep the Transit clear of any formidable force of
the Allies. The enemy were well aware of its importance to the Americans
when they styled the Transit the “highway of filibusterism.” Accordingly,
on the 11th, Walker repaired with 250 Rifles to Virgin Bay, taking also a
howitzer, a mortar, and a squad of sappers and miners. General Henningsen
accompanied the force with a view of directing the new corps which had
been formed under his supervision. The Artillery had not acted well on
the 10th, and the general was anxious for it to redeem its character.
Walker landed on the afternoon of the 11th; and marched the same night to
the Half-way House, which he reached just before daybreak. After a short
rest, the advance resumed its march and had proceeded as far as the cut
in the road when the enemy opened fire from the same barricades near the
bridge they had occupied on the morning of the 10th. Captain Ewbanks,
being familiar with the ground, was ordered to make a large detour to the
left, and he thus succeeded as before in dislodging the Allies from their
barricades. The whole column then pushed forward without interruption
to the foot of the hill where Cañas held his whole force, probably 800
strong.
The enemy, chiefly Costa Ricans, occupied the very ground on which the
Democrats, a little over a year previously, had awaited in ambush the
approach of Corral from Rivas toward San Juan del Sur. Colonel Natzmer,
acting as aide to Valle in September, 1855, was therefore acquainted
with the sides of the hill on which the Democrats had then been placed.
Accordingly he was ordered to take the sappers and miners along the
hill-side to the right of the road and cut a path toward the top of
the hill and in the rear of the first barricades of the enemy. Captain
Johnson, with a company of Rifles, followed and protected the working
party. Captain Green was also sent in the rear of Johnson’s company; but
getting separated from those in advance, Green lost his way in the thick
undergrowth and was not seen for several hours afterward.
The movement of Natzmer was covered by advancing the howitzer toward the
curve in the road fronting the first barricades of Cañas, and by sending
several shells into the works of the enemy. The fire of the allies was,
however, so fierce and well-directed as to make it prudent to withdraw
the howitzer, under cover, after a few rounds. On this occasion, the
artillerymen behaved with commendable coolness, and recovered, by their
steadiness under fire, some of the reputation they had lost on the 10th.
In the meanwhile, the Costa Ricans kept up an irregular fire of musketry
and rifles—for they had a number of riflemen with them—and Capt. Stith
lost his life by exposing his tall person for a moment in the middle of
the road.
In the course of an hour and a half Col. Natzmer had succeeded in
reaching the point at which he aimed; but in the meantime the enemy,
becoming aware of his movement and fearful of its effects, prepared for
retreat. When Johnson and the Rifles reached the barricades, they were
already deserted, and Cañas was on his way toward San Juan del Sur. The
Americans then pushed on in pursuit, and as some of the Rangers were
well mounted, they, acting under the orders of Henningsen, pressed on
the rear of the enemy. Cañas conducted his retreat with deliberation
as far as San Juan, taking advantage of several points in the road to
delay the progress of the Americans; but, finally, near where the little
stream that runs into the sea on the edge of the town crosses the Transit
road, Henningsen, followed by Capt. Leslie, Lieut. Gaskill, and a few of
the Rangers, charged on the retreating foot soldiers and breaking them
completely, drove them at a rapid pace through San Juan and across the
river up the coast trail to Rivas. The enemy were so scattered after
passing San Juan that further pursuit would have been fruitless.
Numbers of the Costa Ricans had, in the confusion of the retreat, escaped
from their ranks and taken the road to Guanacaste. Thus Cañas reached
Rivas with a force not only thinned by deaths and desertions, but also
discouraged and demoralized by defeat. It was evident, therefore, that he
could not soon take any measures to trouble the Transit; he could scarce
venture to show himself out of the barricades of Rivas. Hence Walker was
anxious to return immediately to Granada and again attack Belloso, while
Cañas was calling on him for aid in the Meridional Department. On the
13th, then, Walker marched from San Juan to Virgin Bay, and embarking
his force on the lake steamer, arrived the same night at Granada. Col.
Markham, with the First Infantry, was left at Virgin Bay.
On the morning of the 15th, the Americans were again on the road from
Granada to Masaya. The force consisted of Sanders’ Rifles, and a company
of 2d Rifles, together with Jaquess’ Infantry, a body of Rangers, under
Waters, a few sappers and portions of the two companies of Artillery.
The whole strength was about 560 men. The Artillery consisted of a
twelve-pound howitzer, two small brass pieces, taken from the Allies,
and two of the small mortars. As the train of pack-mules, carrying the
ammunition, was long, and the day hot, the march was slow and fatiguing;
nor had the force passed over more than half the distance to Masaya, when
Walker ascertained that Jerez had marched toward Rivas with seven or
eight hundred men. In consequence of this information Jaquess, with his
Infantry, was ordered to return to Granada, and take a lake steamer for
Virgin Bay. Thus Walker reduced his own strength to less than 300 men.
Major Henry, although scarcely able to walk, had mounted his mule and
followed the column marching on Masaya. Two or three miles from the edge
of the town he and Col. Thompson succeeded in passing the advanced guard,
and coming on a picket of the enemy charged it at full gallop. The picket
fled like deer, one of them leaving his hat, with a hole made by a bullet
from Henry’s revolver, and the blood sprinkled over the coarse straw of
the crown. This incident, while it shows the excess of courage animating
some of the officers in Nicaragua, also proves how difficult it was to
restrain their valor within the limits of order and regularity; though it
is probable Henry and Thompson were not aware of the fact that they had
passed the guard, owing to the neglect of the officer in charge of the
advance to perform his duty.
As the Rangers in front approached the small huts on the edge of Masaya,
the enemy opened a heavy fire of musketry, and Waters drawing his men to
the right of the road, in order to cover them with the heavy tropical
vegetation, gave room for the Rifles to pass. In entering by the plazuela
of San Sebastian, the road passes through a cut, on each side of which
are scattered small reed huts, in the midst of plantain patches. The
Allies, posted in the plantain patches, poured a most destructive fire
into the Rifles as they advanced. Sanders, however, contrived to move
toward the plazuela, deploying his men on each side of the road; while
Henningsen, pushing the howitzer close to the enemy, poured into them a
rapid rain of canister. For several minutes the fighting was furious;
but finally the firing became less and less, and the enemy falling back
into the main part of the town, left the Americans in possession of the
suburbs.
But the ground had not been gained without severe loss. The Nicaraguans
had lost more than fifty-six killed, and more than forty wounded. Lieut.
Stahle, a valuable officer of artillery, had fallen beside his gun,
and Major Schwartz had been wounded. Besides this, several of the best
officers of the Rifles had been severely hurt. Capt. Ewbanks and Lieut.
C. H. West had received painful and dangerous wounds; and Col. Natzmer
was struck down by a spent ball hitting him back of the ear. The approach
of night, too, no less than the nervous state of the command, exhausted
by the excitement and heavy loss, made it expedient to encamp on the high
ground abandoned by the enemy. Hence orders were given to unpack the
mules, and post the pickets for the night.
In the condition, however, of the force, it was far easier to issue
orders than to have them executed. Owing to the darkness, it was some
time before the wounded could be got together near the centre of the
camp, and the surgeons had some difficulty in dressing their wounds in
the dark. As the general-in-chief passed from one point to another, in
order to see his commands executed, he found so many of the officers
in such a state of languor and exhaustion, that they were incapable of
controlling their men. Some of them during the long march had taken a
great deal of liquor, and this, as well as the excitement of the conflict
dying out, left them utterly deprived of moral strength. It was only by
his personal exertions that Walker obtained any security for the camp;
and never, during the whole time he was in Nicaragua, did he find it so
difficult, as on that night to have his orders executed. The will of the
force seemed to be momentarily paralyzed by the fierce fire through which
it had passed.
The night was long and tedious; but finally day broke, and the men
somewhat refreshed by the short and interrupted sleep they had procured,
were again ready for action. Major Schwartz, with admirable accuracy,
threw a few shells from the howitzer into the houses near the plazuela
of San Sebastian; and then Major Caycee advancing with a few of the
Second Rifles, got possession of the little square apparently just
abandoned by the Allies. Soon the wounded were comfortably quartered in
the small church of San Sebastian; and after the troops had taken a
hearty breakfast, their spirits were as good as ever. The sappers began
their work cutting through the houses on each side of the street running
into the right-hand corner of the main Plaza as you approach from San
Sebastian. The cuts made through the adobe houses, during the attack of
the 12th of October, were also found serviceable.
The work of the sappers was, however, slow; and while they were advancing
in front under the protection of a company of Rifles, it was several
times necessary to defend the plazuela from the attacks of the Allies.
But the enemy, after several repulses with loss, seemed to conclude that
they were exhausting their strength fruitlessly by these demonstrations
against the rear of the Americans. Then, too, the front having got so far
toward the Plaza that it was inconvenient to keep up communications with
San Sebastian, Walker pushed his whole available force close up to the
enemy, burning the houses behind him so as to protect his rear. Moving
thus during the 16th and 17th, the Americans had on the evening of the
latter day, got within twenty-five or thirty yards of the houses on the
Plaza held by the enemy.
General Henningsen had established a mortar battery in a hut near the
enemy, and a few shells thrown from it were quite effective. But the
fuses were, as before noticed, too short-timed, and the shells at the
disposal of the Nicaraguans were too few to justify any lavish use of
them. This, in fact, was a main reason for the small effects produced by
the mortars and howitzers (when shells were used in the latter) during
the whole campaign. In addition to the defective fuses, and the small
supply of shells, the effects of three days’ labor and fighting were
seen in the lassitude of the men and the almost utter impossibility of
having guard duty properly performed. Although the Allies were clearly
disheartened by the approach of the Americans, it would have required
some time longer to drive them from the town; and Walker, anxious about
the Transit, resolved to retire to Granada, preparatory to an abandonment
of the Oriental Department.
Accordingly, near midnight of the 17th, after a few hours’ rest in the
early part of the evening, the Americans silently abandoned the houses
they held and took up the line of march for Granada. In the darkness
of the night the force was divided for a little while, but it was soon
re-united and pursued its way toward the lake. The loss during the
three days was nearly a hundred—one third of the whole number which
attacked Masaya; and the long line of the wounded mounted on horses,
necessarily impeded the march to Granada. But in spite of the exhaustion
of the command, the march was regular and the force was kept compactly
together. General Henningsen, with a howitzer, kept the rear well closed
up, and secured it from any annoyances the enemy might have attempted.
The Allies, however, did not trouble the retiring Americans; they were
probably glad enough to be rid of such troublesome neighbors. On the
morning of the 18th, Walker again entered Granada; and he soon after
announced to Henningsen his determination to abandon the place.
Chapter Tenth.
THE RETREAT FROM GRANADA.
The obstinate resistance of the Allies at Masaya was due mainly to the
fact that they had received a reinforcement of about eight hundred
Guatemalans the very day they were attacked. It was these Guatemalans who
had been placed in the plantain patches a few hours after they reached
Masaya; and ignorant of the effects of American rifles they had kept
their ground longer than any other portion of the allied force would have
maintained it. During the three days’ fighting, however, the fire had
been taken from the new men of Belloso; and his losses had been such that
it was supposed he would scarcely be able to move without fresh troops.
Hence Walker imagined the evacuation of Granada might be effected without
any interruption from the enemy. He had, however, determined to destroy
as well as abandon Granada; and as this duty required skill and firmness,
he decided to intrust the task to Henningsen.
Preparations for the retreat from Granada were begun on the 19th.
The sick and wounded in the hospital were placed on a steamer for
transportation to Omotepe Island. In order to make the movement as rapid
as possible, both the lake steamers, the San Carlos and La Virgen, were
engaged for the service. On the 20th Walker repaired to Virgin Bay with
the view of having all ready for a march to San Jorge or to Rivas, after
the destruction of Granada. He supposed that the government property and
stores would be at Virgin Bay on the 21st or the 22d, at latest: but
several causes delayed the movement. There was a great deal of property
scattered through Granada, belonging to officers and soldiers, and each
one tried to save everything he owned. Besides, as soon as the idea got
abroad that the town was to be destroyed the work of plunder began, and
liquor being abundant, nearly every man able to do duty was more or
less under its influence. Henningsen found it impossible to restrain
the passions of the officers, and these, in turn, lost all control over
their men. On the 22d, however, Fry had removed the women and children,
as well as the sick and wounded, to the island, and had with him a guard
of about sixty men. Henningsen had removed most of the ordnance stores
to the steamer, and was proceeding with the destruction of the city. As
the burning went on the excitement of the scene increased the thirst
for liquor, and soldiers thought it a pity to waste so much good wine
and brandy. In spite of guards and sentries, orders and officers, the
drunkenness went on, and the town presented more the appearance of a wild
Bacchanalian revel than of a military camp. Of course, Belloso soon knew
the state of affairs at Granada, and on the afternoon of the 24th the
town was attacked by the Allies.
At Virgin Bay the Infantry of Markham and of Jaquess were in a very
disorganized condition. It being the close of the rainy season there
was much fever in the camp; and the contrast between the quarters at
Granada and at Virgin Bay, as well as the scarcity of vegetables in the
rations at the latter point, depressed the spirits of the officers no
less than of the soldiers. There were some choice men who seemed more
cheerful at the prospect of difficulty and danger and privation; but such
organizations are rare in every time and among every people. They are,
unfortunately, the exceptions and not the rule.
To add to the general gloom, on the morning of the 23d, news came from
San Juan del Sur that the schooner Granada had gone out of the harbor to
engage a Costa Rican brig, and the people of the town had watched the
fight by the flashes of the guns, until a broad bright light, accompanied
by a loud noise as of thunder, led them to suppose one of the vessels had
been blown up. Couriers arrived at Virgin Bay from time to time during
the night of the 23d, announcing it as the general impression at San
Juan that Fayssoux had blown up his schooner rather than let her fall
into the hands of the enemy. This report, while it shows the opinions
held by the people as to the inevitable result of a conflict between a
vessel of the size of the Costa Rican brig and the little schooner, also
indicates the idea they had formed of the character of the commander of
the Granada. The failure of the schooner to enter the harbor during the
night confirmed the impression of the townspeople; and at Virgin Bay few,
besides the general-in-chief, doubted the correctness of the conclusions
drawn from the light and the explosion.
On the morning of the 24th, however, the schooner was seen coming into
port, and although her deck seemed covered with more than her complement
of men, she cast anchor as usual in the harbor. In a little while the
news spread that it was the enemy’s vessel which had been blown up the
night before. The log of the schooner for the 23d tells the story thus:
“Commences with light breezes from the N. and E., and pleasant. At 4 P.M.
saw a sail off the harbor; hove up anchor, and stood out to her. At 5h.
45m. she hoisted Costa Rica colors. At 6, within four hundred yards of
her; she fired round shot and musketry at us. At 8 we blew her up. At 10
we had taken from the sea her captain and forty of her men. Her name was
Once de Abril, Capt. Antonie Villarostra; crew, 114 men and officers;
guns 4, 9 lbs. calibre. The captain states that he was about surrendering
when she blew up. All were lost and killed but those that I picked up. I
had one man, Jas. Elliot, killed; Mathew Pilkington dangerously wounded,
Dennis Kane seriously, and six others slightly. Light breezes; stood in
for the harbor.”
The simplicity of the narrative reveals a feature in its author’s
character; but it needs the commentary of the schooner’s size, and
crew, and armament, to make its fall force felt. The Granada was about
seventy-five tons burden, and had on board during the action with the
Once de Abril twenty-eight persons all told, and among them were a boy
and four citizens of San Juan. She carried two six-pound carronades,
and had not more than 180 rounds of ball and canister. No wonder the
people on shore imagined that a fight of two hours at close distance (for
they knew, they said, Fayssoux would bring the brig to close work), had
disabled the Granada to such an extent as to induce her commander to blow
her up.
The destruction of the brig was caused by a ball fired into her from the
schooner, the shot probably striking some iron or caps in the magazine.
The Costa Ricans, however, and the people of Nicaragua, imagined it was
effected by some new missile the Americans had invented. Many of the
prisoners were badly burned; and they appeared grateful and somewhat
surprised at the care the surgeons bestowed on their wounds. The captain
was badly hurt, but after some time his burns were healed, and passage
was given him on the steamer to Panama. The prisoners who could walk
were soon released, and passports were given them for Costa Rica. When
they reached home their reports did much to correct the prejudices the
Moras had created against the Americans; and the released prisoners were
finally silenced by the orders of the government. None of them, however,
could ever be forced to march to Nicaragua.
The day after the action with the Once de Abril, Fayssoux was promoted to
the rank of captain, and the estate of Rosario, near Rivas, was bestowed
on him for the signal services he had rendered the republic. The result
of this first sea-fight with the enemy, the disparity of numbers and
guns, as well as the decisive character of the contest, gave new life to
the men at Virgin Bay. Even the mean quarters and scanty rations of the
village were, for a while, forgotten in the new glory the Granada had
won for the red star flag of Nicaragua. And when, late in the evening of
the 24th, news came that Henningsen was attacked at Granada, it did not
interrupt the cheerfulness inspired by the success of the schooner off
San Juan.
About three o’clock in the afternoon of the 24th the Allies attacked
Henningsen at three points almost at the same moment.[4] One body of the
enemy appeared in the Jalteva, another on the side of the San Francisco
church, while a third body attacked the Guadalupe church on the street
leading from the main Plaza to the Playa of the Lake. Major Swingle with
a few cannon-shot soon caused the force in the Jalteva to disappear;
while O’Neal resisted the advance of the enemy on the side of San
Francisco. At the Guadalupe, however, the Allies were more successful.
They not only gained possession of the church of Guadalupe, but also
commanded the church of Esquipulas, about half way between the former and
the Plaza. Thus a small body of men at the fort and on the wharf engaged
in sending freight aboard of the steamers were entirely cut off from
Henningsen and the main body of Americans.
Soon after the enemy appeared around Granada Lieut. O’Neal had fallen;
and his brother Calvin, half frantic from the loss, called on Henningsen
to permit him to charge the enemy forming near the church of San
Francisco. The Allies were between four and five hundred strong; but
O’Neal, in his fury, thought not of numbers, and every other feeling
was drowned in grief for a brother’s death. At a convenient moment the
general gave him thirty-two picked Rifles and let him loose on the enemy.
O’Neal, barefooted and in his shirt sleeves, leaped on his horse, and
calling on his Rifles to follow, dashed into the midst of the Allies as
they formed near the old church. The men, fired by the spirit of their
leader, followed in the same fierce career, dealing death and destruction
on the terrified foe. The Allies were entirely unprepared for O’Neal’s
sudden, dashing charge, and they fell as heedless travellers before the
blast of the simoom. The slaughter made by the thirty-two Rifles was
fearful, and so far were O’Neal and his men carried by the “rapture of
the strife” that it was difficult for Henningsen to recall them to the
Plaza. When they did return it was through streets almost blocked with
the bodies of the Guatemalans they had slain. This charge well closed the
fighting on the first day of the attack.
At daybreak on the 25th, Henningsen had concentrated his force and was
able to ascertain his real strength. He had only 227 men capable of
bearing arms, and was encumbered with 73 wounded and 70 women, children,
and sick persons. Twenty-seven had been cut off on the wharf, while Capt.
Hesse with 22 men had been lost, either killed or taken prisoners, at
the Guadalupe church. Henningsen had also seven guns and four mortars;
but his supply of ammunition for these was so short as to make them of
much less service than they might have been. This force was, during the
night of the 24th, concentrated near the Plaza, and it held the adobe
houses on each side of the principal street leading from the main square
by the churches of Esquipulas and Guadalupe to the lake. A breastwork was
built from the parish church on one side of the mouth of this street to
the guard-house on the other side; and the Americans were also partially
protected from the enemy by the burning buildings around and near the
main Plaza.
During the 25th, Henningsen, while repelling the advances the enemy were
constantly attempting to make, pushed on toward the Esquipulas, driving
the Allies from the huts and small houses of the neighborhood; and in
the afternoon he succeeded in getting possession of the church. The hot
embers had prevented the enemy from occupying Esquipulas; but they had
loopholed several huts near, and thus, for some time, kept the Americans
from getting possession. After a second charge, however, the Allies were
driven from their barricades in the brush as well as from the huts they
held; and thus the way was open for the advance of the Americans toward
Guadalupe. The losses during the day were small; and the wounds slight.
On the 26th, all the houses on the Plaza were destroyed, except the
church, the guard-house, and one or two others. Still the operations were
delayed by the too free use of liquor; and it was difficult to get work
done at the time and in the way it was ordered. The general commanding
found himself unable to keep together a sufficient force to aid in the
attempts he made against the Guadalupe church. In the efforts to gain
this point much of the slender supply of shot and shell were exhausted
without making any impression on the defences of the enemy; and the
Americans, on the contrary, were somewhat discouraged by the success of
the Allies in knocking away the works they hastily built. About sunset
Henningsen gave up the attempt on Guadalupe, with a loss of sixteen
killed and wounded. In addition to this loss several officers had been
hurt during the day at different points; and Col. Jones had received a
wound which kept him on his back for many weeks afterward. Fortunately,
after this, the supply of brandy in the American camp was scanty; and the
allied soldiers having got some of the liquor left in the town, it is
probable, that Belloso found difficulty in managing its distribution.
Soon after giving up the attempt on Guadalupe, Henningsen heard heavy
firing, as he supposed toward the north; and then prolonged shouts coming
apparently from the same direction. He fancied, at the time, it might
be a relieving force, which had been landed to the north of the town;
but it was really the firing and shouts of the Allies at the attack they
made on the men at the old fort, which had been partially destroyed for
the purpose of building a wharf. This point was held for two days by
the captain of police, Grier, assisted by some twenty-five of his men
and of other civil employees of the government. On the evening of the
25th, Walker hearing no news from Granada after the attack, took the
steamer San Carlos, which anchored off the wharf early on the morning
of the 26th. The general-in-chief seeing the red-star flag flying on
the parochial church, and the smoke of the burning houses constantly
rising in new directions, inferred that Henningsen, not having completed
the destruction of the town at the time of the attack, was delayed on
the Plaza more through choice in the complete execution of orders, than
by any necessity the Allies had imposed. But perceiving the importance
of holding the fort for Henningson’s ready communication with the lake,
Walker sent to the wharf in order to ascertain the state and the wants
of its defenders. Grier sent word that his men were in good spirits,
confident of holding the position, and that all they wished was, after
a while, some provision and ammunition. At dark, a boat was sent from
the San Carlos to the wharf with the articles required; but then the
aide, who went in the boat, reported, on his return, that the spirits
of the men were failing. The change was due to the desertion of a young
Venezuelan, Tejada, who had been released from chains by the Americans,
on the 13th of October, 1855. The consciousness that their exact number
and condition were reported to the enemy by Tejada, made the men nervous
of an attack on the fort. By their courage and skill in the use of their
weapons they had given the Allies the idea, that they were much stronger
than they really were; but now, the deserter, by destroying the delusion
of the enemy, also destroyed the confidence of drier and his men.
Scarcely had the aide-de-camp returned to the San Carlos before the heavy
firing Henningsen heard on the evening of the 26th was also heard aboard
of the steamer. The frequent flashes of discharging small arms formed
a circle of fire around the wharf, and the deep, prolonged volleys of
musketry, so distinct from the short, sharp crack of the rifle, told
that the enemy were doing most of the work; nor were the shouts from
the shore such as come from the lusty lungs of defiant or triumphant
Americans. In a short time, too, a man swam to the steamer, and saying he
had escaped from the wharf, told the story of its capture by the allies.
The deserter, Tejada, had not only given the number of Grier’s men to
the enemy, but had also pointed out how the wharf in the rear of the
Americans might be reached with a large iron launch on the beach. At the
same time Grier was assailed in the rear, a large force attacked him in
front, and, paralyzed by the combined assault as well as by the number
of the enemy, the Americans were nearly all killed or wounded, and taken
prisoners without a serious struggle. Well does the conduct of these men,
before and after the desertion of Tejada, illustrate the oft-repeated
remark of the great captain, “that in war the moral is to the physical as
three to one.”
On the 27th, Henningsen moved his wounded from the parochial church, and
the difficulty with which the labor was begun shows the indisposition of
his force to do any work except fighting. Some of the Jamaica negroes,
who had been at work on the lake steamer, and were caught in the town
accidentally, were of service for fatigue duty; nor were prisoners from
the guard-house entirely useless. After the wounded had been removed, a
few hundred pounds of damaged powder were put under one of the towers of
the church, and all the houses remaining on the Plaza were fired. The
enemy tried to press on the Americans as they left the main square,
but they were kept back by a few riflemen in the church towers until
Henningsen was ready to withdraw. When all was prepared, the Americans
abandoned the Plaza, and as they retired put a match to a train reaching
the damaged powder under the church. The fire reached the powder, blowing
the tower high into the air just as the too eager enemy were crowding
into the Plaza, of which they had so long strove to get the mastery.
The town was now almost entirely destroyed, and Henningsen having got
his force completely together, determined to make another attempt on
the Guadalupe church. He was now able to control sixty good men for the
assault, and the spirits of his command were raised by the success of
previous operations. Besides the sixty riflemen for the attack, there
were twenty-four artillerymen at the three six-pounders, and after seven
rounds from each of the guns, rapidly fired into the Guadalupe, the
Rifles rushed to the assault. But the enemy had abandoned the church
before the Americans reached it, and thus the most important point
between the Plaza and the Lake was carried without the loss of a single
man. Immediately the wounded, ammunition, stores, and guns, were moved
to the Guadalupe, and Major Henry was ordered, with twenty-seven men, to
take possession of two huts in the low ground between the church and the
lake.
Henry forthwith executed the order, and soon reported that, from
appearances, he expected an early attack by the enemy. He also advised
the abandonment of one of the huts, adding that he could hold the other
during the night. Henningsen urged him to hold the single hut as long as
possible, and promised reinforcements; but the confusion of the move to
the Guadalupe not being yet over, only ten riflemen, with Col. Schwartz
and his howitzer, could be sent to Henry’s assistance. Nor was it long
after dark when the enemy, under the shade of the thick plantain walks
and mango trees, crept up toward the huts, with the hope of surprising
the Americans. But a vigilant eye was watching their movements, and
Henry, sending a few rifle shots among them, discovered their position
and strength by the answering volleys of musketry. Then the howitzer
threw its canister into the allied ranks, spreading death and confusion
among the numerous body attacking Henry’s position. The enemy were driven
back with severe loss.
After this repulse of the Allies Henningsen re-organized his force and
found it stronger than he had supposed. He formed forty of the best men
into a main guard, holding them in reserve for immediate and urgent use.
A company of fifteen were detailed to guard the doors and windows of
the Guadalupe church; while twenty were selected for the defence of the
enclosure in the rear. Ten men were assigned to each of the six guns
at the church, and besides these it was found there were yet thirty to
spare. The latter were formed into a lower main guard and sent to report
to Henry at the hut in the low ground. It will thus be seen that the
fighting men, then for duty, numbered two hundred and ten.
Nor was the increase of strength by the new and more efficient
organization the only added force Henningsen now had. The men recovering
from the effects of debauchery in the town and seeing the necessity for
laborious effort were more willing to work than they had hitherto been.
During the night of the 27th, they worked with a vigor which surprised
their commander, and by daybreak of the 28th, they had finished an
adobe breastwork the general had scarcely hoped to see completed. Major
Swingle, by his industry and intelligence, did much to forward the labors
of the men, and it would have been difficult for Henningsen to find a
man more capable than Swingle of directing the execution of any orders
he might issue. But the concentration of the force at the Guadalupe,
while it enabled Henningsen to complete an organization whereby his
men were more readily handled, had its inconveniences and dangers. The
crowding together of more than three hundred persons, many of them sick
and wounded was calculated to affect the health of the camp; and the
exposed nature of the ground where Henry was posted, commanded as it was
by several points in the hands of the enemy, made it impossible to move
non-combatants thither until it was properly entrenched.
On the 28th the enemy, under cover of a flag of truce, sent into the
American camp a renegade by the name of Price, together with an aide
of Zavala, bearing a letter to “the commander-in-chief of the remains
of Walker’s forces.” This letter invited the commanding officer, for
humanity’s sake, to surrender himself and soldiers prisoners-of-war,
promising them safety and passports to leave the country. Price, too,
at his entrance into the camp urged the men to give up their arms
as they were surrounded by three thousand of the Allies, but Price
was immediately arrested and silenced, and a defiant reply to their
insulting invitation was forthwith despatched to the leaders of the
hostile forces. The aide was evidently sent as a spy, for he entered
without being blindfolded or duly introduced, and Henningsen showed his
contempt for the Allied leaders by telling the officer he might pass
through his camp and observe all his defences.
The enemy, finding it was necessary to use more vigorous means than
words in order to get the Americans out of the positions they held, made
several efforts to regain the church of Guadalupe. At three o’clock in
the afternoon of the 28th, they tried to storm the church, but were
repulsed with severe loss. Then at eight the same evening they attempted
to surprise the position. The night was dark, and a large force got
within eighty yards of the breastwork in the rear of the church before
they were discovered. Major Swingle with two six-pounders poured canister
rapidly into the approaching columns, and the blaze of the enemy’s
musketry showing their position, the guns were used with deadly effect.
In a short time the Allies were again repulsed, and without the waste of
rifle caps, now becoming scarce in Henningsen’s camp. Several other faint
attacks were afterward made on the church, but it was clear that the
officers of the Allies could not drive their soldiers to an assault.
The entrenchments near Henry’s position were not sufficiently advanced to
admit of the removal of the sick and wounded until the 1st of December.
In the meanwhile cholera and typhus broke out in the Guadalupe. The
crowded state of the church, the numbers of sick and wounded, and the
bad air from the decaying bodies of the enemy’s dead, tended to produce
sickness; and the tendency was increased by the exposure to night air
and rains. The camp was now subsisting on mule and horse meat with small
rations of flour and coffee; but this diet, sufficiently wholesome, had
little to do with the disease which appeared. The Allies also perished
in large numbers by cholera and fever; yet they had an excellent quality
and great variety of subsistence. Among the allied officers who died of
cholera was the commander of the Guatemalan forces, Gen. M. Paredes. His
death left Zavala in command of the Guatemalan contingent.
The cholera was a more fearful enemy to the Americans than any by which
they were surrounded. Hence it was important to hasten the removal of
the sick and wounded to the entrenchments in the low ground; and after
they left the Guadalupe disease diminished and the cholera almost
entirely disappeared. About seventy men remained in the church; but its
garrison was gradually reduced to thirty rifles under the command of
Lieut. Sumpter Williamson. His steady courage and cheerful spirits made
him competent, even with the small force at his disposal, to hold the
position against any attempts of the enemy; and it was always easy for
Henningsen, in an emergency, to strengthen him with fresh men.
But the cholera did not leave until it had taken off some of the most
useful persons in the American camp. Among these was Mrs. Bingham, the
wife of Edward Bingham, the actor. While the disease was worst in the
Guadalupe, she had been constantly employed in the care of the sick;
and her unwearied kindness and attention had probably enabled many to
overcome the fatal epidemic. But she was herself finally seized and
carried off by the disease in a few hours.
After moving the main part of his force to Henry’s position, Henningsen
endeavored to work his way to the lake while keeping open his
communications with Williamson in the church. For several days the enemy
strove constantly to interrupt these communications. But all their
attempts failed; and while the Americans held their ground against the
enemy, the ordnance officers were increasing the supplies of ammunition.
Major Rawle, one of the original fifty-eight, was possessed of untiring
industry; and Major Swingle was fertile in resources and most ingenious
in all mechanical contrivances. They made round shot by piling up small
pieces of iron in sand hollowed on a six-pound ball, and then pouring
lead over the iron pieces so as to hold them together. Thus the effective
strength of the artillery was much increased; and the general was enabled
to count on it as a means for breaking through the enemy’s lines in case
such a step became necessary or advisable.
On the 8th Zavala sent another letter to Henningsen, imploring him to
surrender, and saying that he need expect no assistance from Walker,
as the steamers had arrived at San Juan del Sur and San Juan del Norte
without bringing any passengers for Nicaragua. But the Nicaraguan general
did not condescend to give a written reply to the Guatemalan officer.
He merely sent the message that he could parley only “at the cannon’s
mouth.” The men now began to be discouraged at the frequent appearance
of the steamers on the lakes without the landing of a relieving force;
and the enemy not moving it was necessary to send the Americans to
attack some indigo vats on their right to keep them from dwelling on the
condition in which they were placed by the Allies. The provisions were
nearly exhausted; and the men had commenced discussing among themselves
the necessity of breaking through the enemy’s lines, when, on the morning
of the 12th, the steamer, La Virgen, again appeared off the port.
While the retreat from Granada was thus embarrassed by the large and
constantly recruited force the Allies had brought against Henningsen, the
troops in the Meridional Department were not prepared to relieve their
beleagured comrades. Walker was almost constantly on the lake, watching
the progress and attempting to ascertain the position of Henningsen; and
when, at intervals, he returned to Virgin Bay, he usually found the force
there nervous and apprehensive of an attack from Cañas and Jerez who
then held Rivas. Jaquess, commanding at Virgin Bay, had more knowledge
of tactics than of other branches of the military art more important
in the operations of irregular war; and he permitted the most alarming
reports as to the strength and resources of the enemy to be circulated in
his camp. His men were worn out by heavy guard duty, and all the spirit
was taken out of them by being kept in a state of constant anxiety and
watchfulness.
Nor was the camp at Omotepe, whither the main hospital of the army had
been temporarily removed, in a less uneasy mood than the Infantry at
Virgin Bay. Fry had some sixty men capable of duty, and there were with
him several efficient officers. It was impossible for the enemy, in any
numbers, to reach the island, even if they had been able to spare the
force from the position they held. But there were constant rumors of
barges passing from San Jorge to Omotepe with arms for the use of the
Indians on the east side of the island. Knowing well that but few of
the Indians on Omotepe could be used against the Americans, even if the
Allies had been able to furnish them all with arms, Walker felt confident
that no serious attack could be made on the little village where the
hospital had, for the time, been fixed.
On the morning of the 2d of December the general-in-chief went aboard
of the lake steamer, with a view of visiting Granada. Just before the
anchor was hove, a courier from San Juan del Sur announced the arrival
of the Orizaba with eighty men for Nicaragua. The steamer was getting
under weigh when a small canoe, with three men in it, approached the
vessel from the direction of Omotepe. The men from the canoe were taken
aboard the steamer, and they reported that the Americans on the island
had been attacked the night previously by a large body of Indians. The
tale of these three persons was indistinct, but as they had been out
during the night and were shivering from exposure to the damp, chilly
air, it was more charitable to impute the confusion of their story to
cold than to fear. The steamer was forthwith ordered to the island, and
the general-in-chief took the most intelligent of the three fugitives to
the cabin and dosing him with a half-tumblerful of whiskey, tried to get
out of him the true state of affairs at Omotepe. All he could get out of
the man was that every soul on the island, sick and wounded, women and
children, had probably been murdered. The cowardly fellow was not ashamed
to live and tell the tale.
As the steamer approached the island one of the large iron launches
used by the Transit Company for loading freight and passengers was seen
drifting in the lake, without sail or rudder, and filled with a crowd
of men, women, and children, in all varieties of dress and humor. It
was some comfort to see that everybody on the island was not killed;
though the forlorn condition of the launch’s passengers was well fitted
to excite pity and compassion. Among them, two or three ladies who had
been delicately brought up, bore their trials and sufferings with more
patience than the stoutest men; while some of the women, viragos in
appearance, as soon as they were safely aboard the steamer, loosened
their tongues and gave free play to their long-restrained feelings. Soon
the steamer anchored off the village where Fry was quartered; and he
immediately reported that the Indians had attacked the Americans merely
to get a chance of rifling their trunks, and that they had disappeared
not long after daylight. Some of the men capable of bearing arms, and
even some officers, had disgraced themselves by deserting women and
children, as well as the sick and wounded, at the first alarm. Two or
three of these men, as they might by courtesy be called, escaped to the
main land before the passengers by the Orizaba left Virgin Bay; and thus
the report was sent to the United States that all the people of Omotepe
had been massacred by the Indians.
Leaving the island and going to Granada, Walker remained there only long
enough to see that Henningsen had reached the huts half way between the
Guadalupe and the lake; then, returning to Virgin Bay, he proceeded to
organize the new men who had arrived from California on the Orizaba. The
spirits of Jaquess’ men had been revived by the arrival of these fresh
recruits; and in a short time the main portion of the troops at Virgin
Bay were ready for a march to San Jorge. On the afternoon of the 3d
December, the Americans occupied San Jorge, without any opposition from
Cañas, then at Rivas with some seven or eight hundred men. The sick at
Virgin Bay, as well as the army stores and government property collected
there, were carried to San Jorge on the lake steamers; and the fine
air of that village, together with the improved quarters and rations,
diminished the sick list and increased materially the effective force of
the several companies.
When nearly the whole American strength in the Meridional Department had
been concentrated at San Jorge, the hospital at Omotepe, together with
the women and children there, were removed to the main land. Many of
the native women and families had followed the army in its retreat from
Granada, and many of these were supplied with quarters and rations by
the proper officers of the Nicaraguan forces. The trunks and chests of
most had suffered from the foray the Indians made on the island; but the
delightful air of the isthmian December rendered the loss less severe
than might be imagined.
In the meanwhile the steamer from New-Orleans arrived at San Juan del
Norte with nearly two hundred and fifty passengers for Nicaragua. On
the afternoon of the 6th these persons reached Virgin Bay; and on the
morning of the 7th they arrived at San Jorge. They were mostly under
the direction of Lockridge, who had gone to the United States during
the previous summer to encourage emigration to Central America. A small
company of these men, commanded by Captain G. W. Crawford, was assigned
to the Rangers; while the remainder were organized into a new corps,
called the Second Rifles, (the old Second Rifles being dissolved,) and
placed under the command of Major W. P. Lewis. Crawford’s company were,
for the most part, supplied with saddles and revolvers they had brought
from the United States; and the rifle, commonly called Mississippi, was
issued to them. Major Lewis’ men were armed with Minié muskets.
Lockridge had brought to San Jorge about 235 men; and these, together
with the men from California, raised the number of recruits to more than
300. The men from California were, for the most part, distributed into
two companies, commanded respectively by Capt. Farrell and Capt. Wilson.
Farrell was ordered to report to Waters for duty with the Rangers; while
Wilson was attached to the new command of Lewis. These fresh men were in
good spirits, and all anxious to see some fighting. Nor had they long to
wait for active service. Sanders was ordered to take Higley’s company,
the strongest of Lewis’s command, and proceed to Granada with a view of
ascertaining Henningsen’s position. It was supposed that Henningsen had
probably been able to reach the lake; and if such were the case, Higley’s
company would suffice to aid his embarkation. But Sanders returned and
reported that Henningsen appeared not to have advanced further than the
position he held between Guadalupe and the beach on the 2d; and it was
certain that he was altogether unable to communicate with the lake shore.
Rumors also came by the way of Nandaime, through native channels, to the
effect that the Americans were suffering from disease and famine in the
church of Guadalupe.
Accordingly on the 11th, Higley’s and Wilson’s companies were ordered
to report to Waters; and these, together with Leslie’s, Farrell’s, and
Crawford’s companies of Rangers, formed a body of 160 men. Waters soon
had his men embarked on the steamer La Virgen; and the general-in-chief
accompanied the command. Besides the Rangers and the two companies of
Rifles, several volunteers requested leave to act under Waters. Lockridge
appeared anxious for action; and although no definite rank was assigned
him, he was, for the occasion, placed next in command to the chief of
the Rangers. Early on the morning of the 12th, the steamer was anchored
off Granada, out of range of the enemy’s shot; and the officers were
instructed to keep the men carefully concealed in the lower part of
the vessel. During the day, the positions of the enemy were as far as
possible observed; and the anxiety of the Allies to prevent a landing,
was proved by their parading soldiers in numbers along the beach. These
soldiers would march and counter-march; and the effort was manifest to
arrange them in such a manner as to make them appear more numerous than
they really were.
Between eight and nine o’clock in the evening, the steamer quietly and
with all her lights covered, moved up the lake to the same point where
the Democrats landed on the night of the 12th of October, 1855. This
point was more than a league from the fort and wharf of Granada; and the
depth of water was such as to allow the steamer to approach near the
shore. The disembarkation was immediately begun; and when the first boat
reached the beach, a picket of the enemy fired a single volley and fled.
In about two hours the whole force was ashore; and Waters received orders
to proceed to the relief of Henningsen, keeping as close as possible
to the beach, in order not to lose his power of communicating with the
general-in-chief who remained aboard the steamer. Then the La Virgen
withdrew, and resumed as nearly as possible the anchorage she held during
the day.
Not long after the steamer anchored off the wharf, and near midnight of
the 12th, the long lines of fire from small arms followed by the reports
of heavy volleys of musketry and answered by quick and angry retorts
from the rifles announced that the conflict of Waters with the enemy had
begun. Then the flashes and the reports ceased; but in a short time the
fires again appeared and the sounds yet louder and more distinct told
that the bold chief of the Rangers was driving the enemy before him. For
several minutes the flashes and the reports were even fiercer and heavier
than before; but they soon ceased, and their sudden cessation again told
the tale of the yet advancing Americans. Soon after the last firing
was heard, a noise from the water, crying as if for help, announced a
messenger with news. A small boat was let down, and in a few moments a
dusky form was seen scrambling over the rail of the steamer. At first
Walker was apprehensive the news might be from Waters, and, it being dark
and the messenger not a white man, the general-in-chief commenced his
questions in Spanish. But the answer was English, and spoken in the thick
broken accents of a Kanaka boy who had come to Central America on the
Vesta in 1855. Kanaka John had been for several hours in the water, and
bore, in a sealed bottle, a note from Henningsen, giving information of
the state of his force and indicating certain signals to be made in case
a landing was attempted. The signals were made as soon as the note was
read; but they were not seen by those for whom they were intended.
After landing Waters proceeded along a narrow strip of land with the lake
on his left and a lagoon on his right. As he approached a point where the
lagoon reaches within thirty or forty yards of the lake, he was fired on
by the enemy, who were stationed behind a barricade they had built from
one body of water to the other. The heaviness of the volleys showed that
the Allies were in force; and the Americans for a moment wavered. Waters
had ordered Leslie to assault the barricades with his company; but his
men hesitated, and some confusion arising, Leslie took the first who
offered and leading them up to the barricades drove the enemy from their
position. The march toward Granada was resumed; but when Waters reached
a place called the “coal pits” he was again arrested by a large body
of the Allies. The numbers of the enemy were greater than at the first
barricade; the position, however, was not so good and they were soon
driven from it by the vigorous charge of Higley and his company.
Waters, as he approached the town, turned to the right in order to gain
the Tipitapa road which passes over higher ground than that nearer the
lake. About daybreak he had gained the suburbs and was approaching some
small cane huts when he again received the fire of the Allies. The enemy
were behind strong barricades; but Capt. Crawford, passing with his
company to some rising ground on the right, was enabled to turn the left
flank of the Allied lines. A prisoner taken at this point gave Waters
such information as decided him to proceed at once to the Guadalupe.
He was encumbered with thirty wounded and it became an object to join
Henningsen without further loss. Leslie was, therefore, sent in advance
to advise Henningsen of Waters’ approach; and thus early in the morning
of the 13th the Americans in the Guadalupe were strengthened by the
entrance of the force landed the night previously.
It was well for Henningsen that Waters arrived; for the commissary stores
of the former were nearly exhausted, and, as fearful a plague as cholera,
desertion, had begun to thin his enfeebled ranks. Even after Waters’
arrival, the difficulties of Henningsen’s position were not slight. But
the vigorous fighting of the Americans during the night had impressed
the Allies with an exaggerated idea of their strength; and Belloso
was discouraged by the fierceness with which his barricades had been
assailed. He began to think that wood and earth were no safe protection
from the soldiers who had carried three well-defended positions in the
course of almost as many hours; and the movements of his force soon
showed his weakness and irresolution. The fort was abandoned, and the
sheds built on it were set afire. Of course, as soon as Henningsen
discovered the fort was given up by the enemy he took possession of it;
and thus, without further difficulty, communication with the steamer was
established.
Preparations were immediately made for embarking the whole command on the
La Virgen. The number of sick and wounded made the movement slow; and the
men for duty were exhausted, some by their long fatigues and exposures,
and others by the march and actions of the previous night. Of the 419
under Henningsen when Granada was surprised, 120 died of cholera and
typhus, 110 were killed or wounded, nearly 40 deserted, and 2 were made
prisoners. Of Waters’ force, 14 were killed and 30 wounded. Leslie was
unfortunately shot in the head after he reached the Guadalupe, and his
death was a loss not easily repaired, for his services as a scout were
inestimable. Lieut. Tayloe, who was absent, by leave, from his post at
San Carlos, had obtained permission to march with Waters, and he fell at
one of the barricades outside the town.
It was near two o’clock on the morning of the 14th before everything
was aboard the steamer. At leaving, Gen. Henningsen stuck up on a lance
the words “_Aqui fué Granada_”—“Here was Granada”; and these were well
calculated to re-kindle the passions of party, not yet extinct among the
old Legitimists and Democrats. While the voice of one party was that
of wailing and woe, at the loss of its cherished city, the other party
could not suppress its feelings of triumph and exultation. Nor has the
destruction of Granada failed to call forth censure elsewhere than in
Central America. It has been denounced as an act of vandalism, useless in
its consequences to the authority which ordered it. As to the justice of
the act, few can question it; for its inhabitants owed life and property
to the Americans in the service of Nicaragua, and yet they joined the
enemies who strove to drive their protectors from Central America. They
served the enemies of Nicaragua in the most criminal manner; for they
acted as spies on the Americans, who had defended their interests, and
sent notice of all their movements to the Allies. By the laws of war, the
town had forfeited its existence; and the policy of destroying it was as
manifest as the justice of the measure. It encouraged the Leonese friends
of the Americans, while it gave a blow to the Legitimists from which they
have never recovered. The attachment of the old Chamorristas to Granada
was strong and peculiar. They had for their chief city a love like that
of woman; and even after years have passed tears come to their eyes when
they speak of the loss of their beloved Granada. And well did it become
them to have such affection for the town; because it furnished them with
the resources which enabled them to maintain power, and to keep under
the excitable passions, as they called them, of the Leonese Democrats.
The destruction of Granada was, therefore, a long step toward the
destruction of the Legitimist party; and thus the Americans of Nicaragua
were able to cripple their most bitter and consistent foe.
As the steamer left her anchorage a strong north-easter rose, and the
vessel was obliged to seek the shelter of Omotepe, and to lie for several
hours under the lee of the beautiful volcano which springs, as it were,
from the waters of the lake. When the wind fell the La Virgen ran across
to San Jorge, and everything was soon got ashore. The enemy at Rivas,
hearing of the relief of Henningsen, and fearful of the artillery now
at the disposal of the Americans, stealthily abandoned the place, and
marched hastily to join Belloso at Masaya. On the morning of the 16th the
Americans were again in possession of Rivas.
Chapter Eleventh.
OPERATIONS ON THE SAN JUAN.
In the retreat from Granada much of the type and printing materials, as
well as the paper belonging to the office of the _Nicaraguense_, had
been destroyed or lost. Hence, a few days after the headquarters of the
army were moved to Rivas, the sub-secretary of Hacienda, Rogers, went to
San Juan del Norte for the purpose of purchasing the materials necessary
for the publication of the suspended newspaper. A number of officers, on
leave of absence, went down the river on the same steamer with Rogers.
Lockridge also, who had shown himself active in procuring emigration to
Nicaragua, was aboard the steamer on his way to New-Orleans. He seemed
anxious to serve the cause of the Americans in Nicaragua, and as there
was no place in the army he could suitably fill, he was sent to the
United States with the hope that he might be useful there. Emile Thomas,
too, and his brother Carlos, repaired to San Juan del Norte at the same
time.
As these passengers for the mouth of the San Juan steamed down the river
they saw some suspicious looking rafts floating out of the San Carlos,
and Emile Thomas, a watchful and discreet man, familiar with the country
and its people, advised a scrutiny into the meaning of the singular
appearance. Some have sought to place on Rogers the whole blame of the
neglect to follow the advice of Thomas, and there were not wanting
persons who attributed the negligence to design. But whatever may have
been the previous faults of Rogers, it must be admitted that he served
the cause of Nicaragua with a singleness of purpose and honesty of action
which might have shamed the conduct of those who spoke evil of him. And
on this occasion there were aboard the steamer officers whose duty it was
to ascertain the meaning of the rafts, whereas such was no part of the
duty specially pertaining to Rogers’ office or orders. The responsibility
of neglecting the rafts must rest on other shoulders than those of the
sub-secretary of Hacienda.
It was not long after the steamer passed the mouth of the San Carlos
before the meaning of the rafts became apparent. On the 23d of December,
while the company stationed at the mouth of the Serapaqui were at
dinner, they were surprised by a body of Costa Ricans about 120 strong,
led on by a man named Spencer. When Thompson, who commanded at the
Serapaqui, was attacked by Spencer, he had no sentries posted, and the
arms of the men were at some little distance from the place where they
were dining. Spencer had got to the rear of the American camp, and by
placing a soldier in the top of a tree he was able to know accurately
the state of Thompson’s camp. The surprise was complete, and most of the
Americans were either killed or wounded. Thompson was made prisoner; his
conduct and courage were praised by the Costa Ricans, and he himself was
liberated soon after being taken to San Juan del Norte. Well might the
Costa Ricans afford to laud Thompson, for it was his criminal neglect
of duty which enabled them to get possession of the point at the mouth
of the Serapaqui, and thereby secured the success of their subsequent
operations.
Spencer had marched with his Costa Ricans from San José to a point on
the San Carlos river, some miles above its mouth, and had thence floated
his men on rafts down to the mouth of the Serapaqui. In addition to the
force which attacked Thompson on the 23d, a large body of soldiers had
been marched to the San Carlos, under the orders of General José Joaquin
Mora, brother of the President, Juan Rafael Mora, and commander-in-chief
of the Costa Rican army. The march was very difficult from the nature
of the country through which it was made, the region between San José
and the San Carlos being entirely uninhabited, and wholly destitute of
subsistence. The road over which Mora marched was a mere trail, and his
soldiers had at times to cut their way with machetes through the thick
undergrowth. The results of the march depended wholly on the success of
Spencer’s efforts to get possession of the river San Juan and of the
boats plying on it, and Spencer, as we have seen, owed his first and most
important success to the gross and criminal negligence of Thompson at the
Serapaqui.
After the surprise of Thompson, Spencer again took to his rafts and
floated to the harbor of San Juan del Norte. He reached there during the
night of the 23d, and on the morning of the 24th he had possession of all
the river steamers at Punta Arenas. The United States commercial agent
at San Juan del Norte called on the commander of the English forces off
that port to protect American interests from the soldiers of Costa Rica.
To this request Capt. Erskine of the Orion replied that “he had taken
steps, by landing a party of marines from one of Her Majesty’s ship,
to protect the persons and private property of Capt. Joseph Scott, his
family and all citizens of the United States of America;” but as regards
the capture of the steamers he adds: “To prevent all misapprehension, I
think it, however, right to state that the steamers and other property
belonging to the Accessory Transit Company being at this moment the
subject of a dispute between two different companies, the representatives
of which are on the spot, and one of them authorizing the seizure, I do
not feel justified in taking any steps which may affect the interests
of either party. With respect to the participation of a force of Costa
Ricans in the seizure and transfer of the steamers alluded to, I must
observe that these steamers having been for some months past employed
in embarking in this port and conveying to the parties with whom Costa
Rica is now carrying on active hostilities, men and munitions of war, it
appears that as a non-belligerent I am prohibited by the law of nations
from preventing the execution of such operations by a belligerent party.”
Of course it was a mere act of comity for a British officer to protect
American property at Punta Arenas; but the subtlety of distinguishing
between American property in dispute and that not in dispute, was a
convenient invention for the occasion. If Capt. Erskine desired to
protect American property his plain course was to maintain those in
possession. As to the question of the right of Costa Rica to seize the
steamers it will more properly come up when we inquire why the United
States had, at this time, no naval force at San Juan del Norte.
When Spencer had secured the river boats in the harbor of San Juan he
proceeded to the mouth of the San Carlos and communicated to General
Mora—then at the embarcadero, some miles up the latter river—the success
of the operations below. As the small steamer Spencer sent up the
San Carlos approached a picket of Costa Ricans posted on a raft, the
soldiers, frightened by the noise and appearance of such a boat as they
had never before seen, plunged into the river and were drowned in their
efforts to reach the shore. At the embarcadero Mora had, according to
Costa Rican accounts, eight hundred men, with a rear guard of three
hundred more expected each moment to arrive. To supply this force with
subsistence six hundred men were employed in carrying provisions from the
capital to the river. Much of the transportation between those points was
done on the backs of men, as the trail is difficult for even mules.
Castillo was forthwith occupied by the Costa Ricans; and Spencer,
taking the steamer which runs over the Toro Rapids, easily succeeded,
by concealing his men, in getting possession of the lake steamer, La
Virgen, then lying at the mouth of the Zavalos, awaiting the return
of Rogers from San Juan del Norte. Then proceeding to Fort San Carlos
he lured aboard the steamer Capt. Kruger, commanding that post. The
first-lieutenant of Kruger had been sent to headquarters on business
connected with the garrison at San Carlos; and his second lieutenant,
Tayloe, had been killed at Granada, while marching as a volunteer under
Waters to the relief of Henningsen. Hence, after Kruger’s capture by
Spencer, the post was in charge of a sergeant, and Kruger so far forgot
his duty as to permit Spencer, under a threat of death, to extort from
him an order directing the sergeant to surrender the post to the enemy.
The sergeant, taken by surprise, was less to blame for obeying the order
than was the captain for signing it.
Thus the Costa Ricans were in possession of the San Juan river from
Fort San Carlos to the sea, and they also held the smallest of the lake
steamers, the La Virgen. On the latter steamer they had also taken some
arms and ammunition intended for the service of Nicaragua. But the
occupation of the river and the seizure of the La Virgen would have been
comparatively useless to them and harmless to Walker without the capture
of the steamer San Carlos. The loss of the river might have been easily
repaired by the force then at Rivas, but the loss of the control over
the lake was a much more serious event. Spencer well knew that he could
not venture on the lake with the La Virgen as long as the larger and
faster steamer remained in the hands of the Americans, and, therefore, he
prevailed on Mora to keep his Costa Ricans quiet until the San Carlos got
into the river with passengers from California for the Atlantic States.
Early in the afternoon of the 2d of January, 1857, the Sierra Nevada
arrived at San Juan del Sur from San Francisco. Her passengers were
in a few hours aboard of the San Carlos ready to cross the lake. Some
anxiety had been felt at Rivas on account of the long delay of the La
Virgen in the river, but it was easy to imagine causes why she had not
yet returned to Virgin Bay. Therefore the steamer San Carlos, with the
passengers aboard, unsuspectingly approached Fort San Carlos and passed
into the river without seeing any cause for alarm on shore. But when the
steamer had passed the fort, Spencer, who was aboard a river boat with a
force of Costa Ricans, hailed the San Carlos, demanding her surrender.
There were a number of Nicaraguan officers on the San Carlos, going to
the United States, but in the midst of the confusion, created by the
surprise, Spencer got aboard of the lake steamer and soon had possession
of her. The captain of the San Carlos, a cool, bold Dane, proposed to
run the steamer back into the lake under the guns of the fort, and the
movement might have been made without any great danger or loss of life.
But Harris, jointly interested with his father-in-law, Morgan, in the
transit contract across Nicaragua, happened to be aboard the steamer, and
he refused to permit Capt. Ericsson to make the attempt. By the surrender
of the San Carlos the Costa Ricans got control of the lake, and thus
they were enabled to communicate rapidly and readily with the Allies at
Masaya, while Walker was cut off from any direct communication with the
Caribbean sea.
It is clear that the success of Mora’s movement to the San Juan river was
due to the skill and daring of Spencer. The march to the San Carlos with
all its expense and all its fatigues would have been useless without
the aid of the bold hand which got possession of the river steamers.
And the success of Spencer was the reward of a rashness which, in war,
sometimes supplies the place of prudent design and wise combinations. The
fortune which proverbially favors the brave certainly aided Spencer much
in his operations. Mora afterward Attempted to depreciate the value of
the services Spencer rendered him; and the brutality of the man toward
the soldiers soon made it an object for the Costa Rican General to get
rid of him. But it would be difficult to overestimate the advantages
the Allies derived from the services of the base and murderous man who
did not scruple for the sake of lucre to imbrue his hands in the blood
of countrymen straggling to maintain the rights of their race against a
cruel and vindictive foe.
Unfortunately for the honor of human nature, Spencer was not the only
American who co-operated with the Costa Ricans for the purpose of robbing
the naturalized Nicaraguans of the rights they had in Central America. As
to Spencer’s immediate employers their conduct need not excite surprise;
for gain is the god of their idolatry, and at Ephesus they would have
persecuted the Apostle to the Gentiles for teaching a religion which
destroyed their trade in shrines. From such as these he is but a fool
who expects aught high in principle or unselfish in action. But we are
entitled to expect loftier sentiment and nobler actions from the men who
aspire to govern states and control policies. As Spencer’s operations
closed the American transit across Nicaragua, it is not unimportant to
ascertain if any public persons besides the Moras of Costa Rica and
their Allies in Central America are directly or remotely responsible for
the act. Especially is this becoming in view of the fact that no less a
person than the President of the United States[5] has, in a grave annual
message to the Houses of Congress, declared with most indecent inaccuracy
that the Transit was closed in February, 1856, by the revocation of the
charters of the Ship Canal and of the Accessory Transit Companies.
As early as the month of April, 1856, the American Secretary of State,
Mr. Marcy, had been advised by the Costa Rican government that it
meditated the seizure of the river and lake steamers and the consequent
destruction of the Transit. At that time Mr. Marcy replied such an
act would not be regarded with indifference by the United States. The
language of the Secretary implied that the American government would deem
it a duty to prevent such acts. And such a position was worthy of an
American Minister. Undoubtedly Costa Rica, at war with Nicaragua, had a
right not only to prevent the latter from using the property of neutrals
for the purpose of transporting military persons and stores; and she
might also take possession of such property and use it, as lawfully as
Nicaragua, for the conveyance of her own troops and military equipments.
But this did not involve the right of Costa Rica to confiscate the
property of neutrals used by her enemy for purposes of transportation.
Neutral ships at sea are liable to capture by a belligerent if they are
found having aboard military stores or persons belonging to the enemy;
for at sea, such an act on the part of a neutral is one of choice and
not of compulsion. But on land, or within the territory of a country at
war, where the property of neutrals is entirely under the control of
the belligerent sovereign, the involuntary act of the neutral certainly
cannot subject him to the loss of his property. Hence Mr. Marcy was right
when he told Costa Rica, to all intents and purposes, that the use of
American property by Nicaragua did not make it forfeit if taken by the
enemy; and still less could it justify the destruction of a franchise,
such as the Transit across the Isthmus, held by the owners of the lake
and river steamers. When Walker saw the declaration Mr. Marcy made to
the Costa Rican Minister, he felt assured the Allies would not attempt
to interrupt the Transit and thus risk a rupture with the United States.
Nor, in the face of this declaration, is it probable that Costa Rica
would have attempted to break up the Transit without assurances of the
act not provoking active hostilities from the American Republic.
Heretofore we have seen the decided opposition of the Secretary of
State to the American movement in Nicaragua. But he was reluctantly
compelled to give way to the President in reference to the reception of
Father Vigil. Mr. Pierce was, in May, 1856, seeking the nomination of
the democratic party for a re-election; hence he was able to resolve
on a policy displeasing to his chief minister. After the Cincinnati
Convention, it was easier for the Secretary to manage the President; and
the departure of Father Vigil from Washington having been procured,
Mr. Marcy was relieved from the presence of a Minister of Nicaragua. He
immediately ordered Mr. Wheeler to demand the causes of the revocation
of the Accessory Transit charter; but in August he was disappointed at
a reply which entirely justified the act of the Rivas administration.
If, however, Mr. Wheeler proved not pliant to the purposes of the
Secretary, it was easy to secure British aid for getting the Americans
out of Nicaragua. And if Mr. Marcy would silently permit British power to
accomplish this object, he might hope for a strong interest in the city
of New-York to aid his ambitious schemes.
It is difficult to imagine that an American Secretary of State would
thus connive at a plan for driving his countrymen from the Isthmus; but
pride of opinion and desire for office were Mr. Marcy’s leading passions,
and one of these had been hurt by the reception of Father Vigil and the
other was pleased at the hope of conciliating a strong influence in his
own State. The evidences, too, of this connivance, are too palpable to
escape the notice of the least observing. By the middle of September,
1856, the British had stationed off San Juan del Norte a strong fleet,
of eight vessels, carrying several hundred guns, and evidently with a
view of influencing the result of the war in Central America. No United
States vessels were sent thither to watch the movements or ascertain
the intentions of the British fleet. The objects of the fleet had been
foreshadowed in the previous April by the attempt of the British vessel
Eurydice to prevent the passengers of the Orizaba from going up the
river. At that time the commodore of the American squadron in the
Caribbean had been instructed to show the United States flag at San Juan
del Norte; and if it was expedient for the American flag to be displayed
when only a single British man-of-war was in the harbor, how much more
pressing the necessity when several hundred British guns were pointed at
the Isthmian transit.
Not only did the American Secretary of State quietly permit a strong
British fleet to take its station off San Juan del Norte and there await
a favorable opportunity to act against the naturalized Nicaraguans; but
he was also advised by Costa Rica of her intention to close the transit
if she had the requisite military force. On the first of November the
President of Costa Rica published a decree, declaring in its second
article: “The navigation of the river San Juan del Norte is prohibited
to all kinds of vessels while hostilities against the invaders of
the Central American soil continues.” And the fourth article of the
same decree orders: “The officers and military forces of the Republic
will carry out this decree, using for that purpose every means within
their reach.” Here was a public and explicit declaration to Mr. Marcy
notifying him that if he desired to keep the Transit from being closed
during the hostilities between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, he must have
United States vessels at San Juan del Norte to resist force with force.
The United States had a consul in Costa Rica to advise it of the acts
of the government there; and so well aware was her Britannic Majesty’s
consul, Allan Wallis, of the movement against the Transit that with
evident reference thereto he published, at San José, on the 26th Nov.,
the following notice: “All persons residing in this Republic, claiming
to be British subjects, are requested to send into this office with as
little delay as possible, and not later than the 20th prox., their names,
professions or occupations and places of residence, with the names of
the members of their family, if any.” Singular, too, as it may seem, the
Secretary of State did not, after the order of Mora’s decree of the first
of November was executed, take any steps to re-establish the Transit or
protect those who were aiming to re-open it from the interference of the
British naval forces. These facts, together with others to be hereafter
related concerning the acts of American naval officers on the Pacific
coast of Nicaragua, lead irresistibly to the conclusion that Mr. Marcy
co-operated with the British government in its Central American policy.
An insight into the policy of the American Secretary of State is
necessary to a due understanding of the events which followed Spencer’s
operations on the San Juan river. The Costa Rican soldiers who
accompanied the passengers from California to Punta Arenas were scarcely
able to leave on their return up the river before the steamer Texas
arrived in the port of San Juan del Norte with nearly two hundred men for
the service of Nicaragua. But these men not having been received by the
State could not act in the name of the government. Hence Mr. Harris, the
agent of the owners of the lake and river steamers, selected Lockridge,
who was at San Juan del Norte, as a proper person to regain possession of
their property for the Transit contractors. As before stated, Lockridge
had been ordered to New-Orleans on special duty; and had the task of
re-opening the Transit been a strictly military enterprise, the duties
of command would naturally have devolved on Lieut.-Colonel Rudler, the
senior officer present at San Juan del Norte, and lately charged with the
defence of the River frontier. Rudler had a leave of absence to visit
the United States; but he had only to tear up his leave and resume his
right to command on the river in order to have full authority over any
expedition attempted in the name of Nicaragua. But merit is modest and
unobtrusive, while pretension is forward and presumptuous; therefore,
Lockridge was put in command of the men who were expected to clear the
river of the Costa Ricans, and Rudler left for New-Orleans. In addition
to the men by the Texas, General C. R. Wheat, and Colonel Anderson, with
some forty others from New-York, arrived at Punta Arenas on the ninth of
January by the James Adger. Arms and ammunition were not wanting for the
whole of Lockridge’s command; and the supply of provisions was abundant.
Lockridge remained for some days at Punta Arenas, engaged with Joseph N.
Scott in fitting up one of the old disused river steamers for purposes
of transportation. But he was not allowed to work without interruption
by the British naval officers. On the morning of the 16th of January,
Capt. Cockburn, of H. B. M.’s ship Cossack, went ashore at Punta Arenas,
and inquired for the commander of the armed men occupying the point. On
meeting Lockridge, Capt. Cockburn informed him he had received orders
from Capt. Erskine, of Her Majesty’s ship Orion, and “senior officer
of Her Majesty’s ships and vessels employed on the coasts of Central
America,” to offer protection to any British subjects who might be
detained and compelled to bear arms against their will. In accordance
with his instructions, Capt. Cockburn demanded a list of all the men at
Punta Arenas, and required them to be paraded in his presence, that he
might read to them the orders of Capt. Erskine. The men were accordingly
drawn up on the beach, and Cockburn read to them the order of Erskine.
The concluding sentences of the order were: “Should any of the party in
question claim protection as British subjects, and their claims appear to
you to be well founded, you will acquaint the officer commanding, that
these men must be permitted to withdraw from their present position;
and you will (in the event of his acquiescence) either give these men
a passage to Greytown, or take them on board Her Majesty’s ship under
your command, to await my decision as to their disposal, as they may
desire. In the event of the aforesaid officer resisting such a course
as I have pointed out, you will inform him that, in the first place,
no person whatever under his command will be permitted to leave their
present position, to proceed up the river or elsewhere, until my demands
shall be complied with; and, secondly, that I will adopt such measures
to enforce the rights of British subjects as I may think best adapted
to the purpose.” Ten men claimed and received protection under the
order of Erskine, and were taken from the point in Cockburn’s boat. The
instructions of Her Majesty’s government must have been indeed stringent,
when they induced honorable officers to degrade themselves to the work
of inciting men to desert a cause they had voluntarily embraced; for
Cockburn, not satisfied with reading Erskine’s orders, had also advised
the whole of Lockridge’s command of the dangers they ran in attacking the
large force the Costa Ricans had concentrated on the river.
Thus the demoralization of Lockridge’s men was commenced before they
left Punta Arenas. The Americans—at least the good men among them—were,
of course, indignant at the course the British pursued; but all the
Europeans were more or less affected by this English interference. Nor
is it in the nature of men long to respect those claiming authority
over them, when they see such persons humbled by the actions of others.
Hence it was all-important for Lockridge to get beyond the reach of
British interference. Not only was he daily losing men by the policy the
British practised; but the effectiveness of those remaining with him was
constantly diminished. Finally the small steamer was got ready for going
up the river, and Lockridge moved his whole force to a point several
miles below the mouth of the Serapaqui.
On the morning of the 4th of February the Texas again arrived from
New-Orleans at San Juan del Norte, having aboard H. T. Titus, known in
Kansas as Col. Titus, in charge of about one hundred and eighty men.
Many of the persons with Titus had been his companions in Kansas, and
probably most of them were made of better stuff than their leader. But
his swaggering air had imposed on many people; and the contest in which
he was said to have been engaged, gave him a sort of newspaper notoriety,
thus making his name familiar as the leader of the “border ruffians.”
Lockridge organized Titus and his men in a separate body, and soon a
jealousy rather than rivalry sprang up between the new-comers and those
acting under Anderson. Attached to the command of the latter was Capt.
Doubleday, formerly of the Nicaraguan service; and several others who
were yet in the service, acted under Anderson’s orders. All of Titus’ men
were entirely new to the country.
Soon after Titus arrived, Lockridge, by a sharp skirmish, got possession
of Cody’s Point, a piece of high ground just opposite the mouth of the
Serapaqui; and Wheat thence opened a cannonade on the defences the Costa
Ricans had built on the opposite side of the San Juan river. But the
fire of Wheat’s guns was not of such a character as to make a serious
impression on the enemy; and it was only after Col. Anderson had crossed
the river and succeeded in harassing the Costa Rican flank and rear with
riflemen, that the Americans drove the enemy from the Serapaqui, and
got possession of both sides of the river. The Costa Ricans left behind
a number of killed and wounded, besides two guns, some small-arms and
ammunition, and a supply of military clothing. A yet more important
portion of the articles captured were certain letters from General Mora
detailing the condition of his force on the San Juan, and urging the
necessity for fresh troops, in order to hold his position on the river.
The Costa Ricans were driven from the mouth of the Serapaqui on the
morning of the 13th of February; and the next day Titus, with some
hundred and forty men, ascended the river on the little steamer Rescue
with the view of attacking Castillo. Anderson was placed in charge
of Hipp’s Point; and the contest between him and Titus, as to rank,
had increased the disorganization and disorder already existing in
Lockridge’s command. Desertions were frequent, and were, of course,
encouraged by the protection and assistance the English gave to the
deserters. The heavy rains made camp life disagreeable, and its duties
arduous; and much labor was necessary in order to protect the men from
the weather. Thus the movements were impeded; and much care was necessary
to keep the ammunition in a state fit for use. Numbers were sick with
fever; but considering the exposure and fatigues to which the men were
subjected, their health was not bad.
On the other hand the difficulties of the Costa Ricans were not slight.
After getting possession of the San Juan and of the lake, Mora had
communicated with the Allies at Masaya; and movements were undertaken
which will be more particularly described hereafter. Suffice it to say
here, that these movements entailed heavy draughts on the force Mora held
on the river; and in addition to this the Costa Ricans coming from the
high lands about San José, suffered much with fever when they reached the
low country on the San Juan. Thus by the necessities of the Allies for
troops in the western part of Nicaragua, and by the effects of disease
in the force occupying the river, the garrison at Castillo was reduced
to a trifling figure; and when Titus appeared before the fort Cauty, an
Englishman commanding at Castillo, had, according to some, twenty-five,
and according to others, fifty men.
When Titus landed near the fort of Castillo Viejo, he found the houses
of the village in flames, and the small steamer Machuca also rapidly
burning. He succeeded, however, in cutting loose the steamer J. N.
Scott, and although her machinery was somewhat damaged, it was easily
repaired in the course of two or three days’ work. Soon after he appeared
at Castillo, Titus sent to Cauty a demand to surrender the fort; and
the reply was a proposal for an armistice of twenty-four hours, with
a promise of surrender in case the garrison were not relieved by the
expiration of that time. Strange to say the proposal of Cauty was
accepted; and it was not difficult for him to send a courier to Fort
San Carlos with news of his position. Of course, before the armistice
expired, reinforcements for Cauty were landed a short distance above the
fort; and on the appearance of the fresh Costa Ricans, Titus retreated
in great disorder and confusion. The retreat was made before the number
of the relieving party was even approximately ascertained; and the fact,
that the Americans were able to escape without any protection to their
rear, shows the enemy did not arrive with much force.
After the Americans withdrew, or rather fled, from Castillo, they
halted at San Carlos Island, a few miles below the fort. On this island
Lockridge threw up some works for defence from the enemy, and also built,
with much labor, sheds for protection from the weather. The repulse at
Castillo, shameful in its character, added to the demoralization of the
whole command on the river, and desertions accordingly increased. Such,
too, was the feeling against Titus that he gave up his command and left
for San Juan del Norte, with the intention of going by Panama to Rivas.
When he arrived at San Juan del Norte his insulting language to one of
the British officers led to his arrest and detention for a few hours. At
the same time Titus was arrested the steamer Rescue was detained; but she
was soon released when the U. S. sloop of war Saratoga was seen coming
into port. This single fact shows how different might have been the
conduct of the British naval forces had there been a few United States
vessels stationed off San Juan del Norte.
In the latter part of February Walker sent an aide, Major Baldwin,
from Rivas by Panama, to Lockridge, confirming the latter in his
command on the river, and also informing him of the importance of early
communication either around or across the lake. The orders sent to
Lockridge were, if he found it impossible to take Castillo and San Carlos
without great sacrifice, to cut a road from the river either to Chontales
or the southern shore of the lake, and march by land to Rivas. The cause
of these orders will hereafter appear; and it is sufficient here to say,
that one chief reason for Walker’s holding Rivas was, the apprehension
that Lockridge, reaching the Meridional department, might be placed
in an awkward position by finding the town in the possession of the
Allies. Baldwin arrived at San Juan del Norte about the middle of March,
and nearly at the same time with some hundred and thirty fresh men,
principally from Mobile and Texas, and directed respectively by Major W.
C. Capers and Captain Marcellus French.
With this reinforcement under Capers and French, Lockridge’s numbers
had been so reduced by desertion and sickness, that his effective force
scarcely reached four hundred. The men, however, were for the most
part of excellent quality, and in other hands might have accomplished
much. French’s command particularly was, by general consent, composed
of fine materials. But these men arrived too late; and they met on the
river bands which had been disorganized by bad conduct and ill fortune.
Lockridge, however, determined to make another effort to get possession
of Castillo Viejo; and with this purpose he prepared nearly his whole
command for an attack on the fort.
Landing his force a short distance below Castillo and out of sight of
the enemy, he led his men by a trail through the woods to a position
near an elevation, known as Nelson’s Hill. This elevation commands the
fort, and the Costa Ricans having entrenched it were occupying the
summit. Along the sides of the hill they had cut some trees and formed
a sort of chevaux-de-frise; and by clearing away the undergrowth for
some distance around the summit, they had made the approach difficult
and dangerous. After reconnoitring the position of the enemy, Lockridge
deemed it imprudent to hazard an attack; and calling the principal
officers together and asking their opinions, he received the concurrence
of all as to the expediency of retiring without engaging the enemy. The
resolution was wise, for defeat would almost inevitably have been the
result of an attempt on the Costa Rican defences. The opportune moment
for taking Castillo had been lost through the incapacity of Titus, and
with a month to prepare for a second attack, the enemy had not been
idle. Even if the Costa Ricans had been less strongly posted, the moral
condition of Lockridge’s force was not such as to warrant ordering them
on any hazardous service.
After Lockridge retired from Castillo the men began to discuss plans
for the future, and all appear to have agreed on the propriety of
abandoning the river. It was clear that the effort to re-open the
Transit had entirely failed, and the leader of the enterprise drawing
up the men informed them that he proposed to try to reach Rivas by the
Isthmus of Panama, and called on all who wished to follow him to step
from the ranks. Near a hundred persons agreed to take this course; and
the remainder of the men were deprived of their arms and virtually
discharged. Then the disarmed men sought means to reach the mouth of the
river. Not waiting for the steamer they took the boats they could put
their hands on, and some floated on logs to the harbor of San Juan del
Norte. The panic-stricken crowd thought the Costa Ricans were hot in
pursuit; and each over-anxious for his own safety added to the fright of
his fellows.
The men who had agreed to go with Lockridge to Rivas descended the
river more leisurely than the fugitives; but ill luck pursued them to
the last. On the way to San Juan del Norte, the steamer J. N. Scott was
blown up, and several of those proposing to go to Panama were killed and
others were painfully and dangerously scalded. This accident entirely
discouraged the men who yet adhered to Lockridge, and forthwith the idea
of crossing the New-Granadian Isthmus was abandoned by them. It was an
absurd plan at any rate; for it was folly to suppose, under the existing
circumstances, that known enemies of Costa Rica, either armed or unarmed,
would be permitted in numbers to cross the territory of a neutral State,
or rather of a Republic, hostile to those called “filibusters.”
Of course the English were glad to furnish means to all the men who
reached San Juan for leaving Central America. Accordingly a large number
of the destitute and disappointed expeditionists were sent to New-Orleans
on H. B. M.’s steamer, Tartar; and the passages of others were paid with
drafts drawn by Capt. Erskine who held the arms of Lockridge’s command
to secure himself against the loss on the drafts. In a few days nearly
all the remains of Lockridge’s force had left the shores of Nicaragua;
and most were bitter in their expressions concerning the weakness and
incapacity of the man who attempted to lead them up the river. It may
not be amiss, however, while concluding the narrative of Lockridge’s
operations on the San Juan to say that Walker refused to listen to the
censure passed on the unfortunate commander until he heard fully the
facts of the case; and it was not until he heard from Lockridge himself
the story of his undertaking that Walker formed an opinion as to the
merits of the leader of the San Juan expedition.
During the attempt of Lockridge to open the Transit the efforts of the
friends of Nicaragua in the United States were more active and fruitful
than at any previous period. The Southern States, satisfied of their
inability to carry slavery into Kansas, were then prepared to concentrate
their labors on Central America; and not only were the men who went to
the San Juan of good quality, but they were also furnished with excellent
supplies and equipments. Had the same effort and expenditure been made
three months earlier, the establishment of the Americans in Nicaragua
would have been fixed beyond a peradventure.
Since the failure of Lockridge numerous agencies have been employed to
re-establish the line of American travel across the Isthmus of Nicaragua:
but all without avail. At the very time American youth was engaged in
the attempt to force open the Transit for the benefit of those holding
the Rivas grant of the 19th of February, 1856, these parties were
treacherously dealing with the government of Costa Rica and attempting
to secure the franchise from a power having no shadow of a right to
bestow it. There have been rumors of grants from Costa Rica and grants
from Nicaragua; and the authorities of the latter republic have actually
made bargains with several different companies to re-open the Transit.
The persons in Nicaragua who desire to keep the Americans out of the
country are well aware of the importance to them of keeping the “highway
of filibusterism” closed; and all their negotiations for transit grants
are “a delusion and a snare.” Often, too, it has been semi-officially
announced that the United States government was determined to force open
the road across Nicaragua; but as no justification for so violent an act
on the part of the United States has been presented, it must be presumed
that such declarations are intended merely for popular effect. In fact
the American authorities, by an arbitrary act of force, interrupted the
only effort which, since December, 1856, has promised successfully to
restore the passage across Nicaragua to citizens of the United States. In
December, 1857, Col. Anderson, at the head of forty-five men, took the
river boats and one lake steamer from the Costa Ricans and restored them
to the agent claiming for the American owners; and but for the acts of
the United States naval forces the transit across the Isthmus might have
been re-established in thirty days. It was the enemies of the naturalized
Nicaraguans who closed the Transit; and it is they also who keep it
closed.
But it is time for us to return to Rivas, and follow the course of events
on the Pacific side of the Isthmus.
Chapter Twelfth.
THE DEFENCE OF RIVAS.
On the 20th of December, 1856, nearly the whole body of Americans in
Nicaragua was concentrated at Rivas, and the health and moral condition
of the troops were favorably affected by the movement thither. The
hospital was established in a large building, situated on a slight
elevation near the edge of the town, known as the house of Maleaño. Under
the efficient administration of Dr. Coleman, acting surgeon-general, the
wards were kept clean, and the surgical attendance was good. The diet of
the patients was of the best sort, and although the number of wounded was
large, no disagreeable results followed from placing them all in the same
building. The supplies of medicine and surgical instruments were ample,
and the strength of the surgical staff was far greater than usual in any
armies either of the eastern or western continent. The fictions which
have been published concerning the want of medical and surgical attention
to the inmates of the hospital were created for the purpose of pandering
to a morbid public opinion, and of excusing the faults and crimes of
those who deserted their countrymen in Central America. The quarters of
the troops were comfortable, the subsistence varied and abundant, and the
spirits of the force were cheerful and buoyant.
The reports from the enemy also tended to increase the confidence of
the Americans. After the retreat of Henningsen from Granada was so
triumphantly achieved, Belloso sullenly retired to Masaya, and there
attempted to gather the remains of the shattered force which had
attempted to cut off the troops charged with the destruction of the
Legitimist stronghold. But the other Allied generals were no longer
willing to act under Belloso. Defeated in their efforts to destroy
Henningsen, the chiefs of the Allied army were naturally inclined to
throw the responsibility of their discomfiture on the Salvadorian
general. They accused Belloso not only of want of skill, but also of want
of courage; and they intimated that his hasty withdrawal toward Masaya,
soon after Waters reached the Guadalupe, was due to an over-anxiety for
his own personal safety. The dissensions which thus arose in the Allied
camp promised in a short time to dissolve the whole force, and the
charges then made against Belloso were afterward examined by a military
commission in his own State of San Salvador.
These dissensions were also increased by the disheartening effects on the
Allied officers of the great losses they had sustained in the campaign
against the Americans. It is difficult to estimate the numbers the Allies
had actually brought into the field before the retreat from Granada was
accomplished, but it is certainly no exaggeration to place the troops
they had employed from the beginning of October to the middle of December
at seven thousand. In addition to the losses at Granada on the 12th and
13th of October, on the Transit road, by the affairs of the 11th and
12th of November, and at Masaya, during the three days fighting there,
the Allies must have lost near two thousand men by the attack they made
on Henningsen. Reports concur in the fact that Belloso had not more than
two thousand under his command after he retired to Masaya. Thus, even
placing the deserters at fifteen hundred—and you must place these at a
high figure, considering the forced character of the service in Central
America—the enemy must have lost thirty-five hundred in killed and
wounded during the ten weeks immediately succeeding their march from Leon.
Nor did Belloso entirely escape the cholera after he reached Masaya.
Hence fear of the pestilence as well as of the deadly rifles of the
Americans, stimulated desertion among the Allies. So disorganized
did Belloso’s force become, that the propriety of a retreat on Leon
was discussed among the chiefs of the several contingents; and the
Salvadorian troops, particularly, were disposed to withdraw from the
contest. The Salvadorian cabinet were, it seems, not well pleased with
the censures some of the generals of the other States had passed on the
commander-in-chief; and a large portion of the Liberal party of that
State, unmoved by the passions which prompted Cabañas’ friends to revenge
themselves on the Americans for the refusal to re-establish his power
in Honduras, consistently refused to support the war waged against the
naturalized Nicaraguans.
Such was the general condition of the respective parties on the 2d of
January, 1857, when the steamer San Carlos, as heretofore narrated,
crossed the lake with the passengers from California to the Atlantic
States. The morning report of the troops at Rivas on the 3d will give an
accurate idea of the American force at that time. The total, including
those employed in the several departments, is reported at 919. Of these,
25 were employed in the ordnance department; 15 in the quartermaster’s
department; 20 in the commissary’s and 12 in the band; thus leaving
an aggregate in the line of 847. Of the aggregate 8 were of the post
and division field and staff, while 1 captain and 29 privates were on
detached duty; 3 captains, 3 lieutenants, and 2 privates, on furlough;
and 2 privates absent without leave. Thus the aggregate present was
reduced to 788; and of these 60 were on extra duty, and 197 sick. The
number for duty, officers and men, was 518; but many of those reported
sick had only chigoës in their feet, and were fully able to aid in the
defence of the town. Laziness and a disposition to shirk duty placed many
on the sick list, who in an emergency might have proved among the best
fighting men in the garrison.
Henningsen had been promoted to the rank of major-general, and Sanders
to that of brigadier; so that O’Neal had command of the First Rifles,
with Leonard as lieut.-colonel, and Dolan as major, while Jaquess was in
command of the Infantry, and Lewis of the Second Rifles. The Artillery,
as well as the Rangers were very much thinned by the hard service
through which they had passed; and Col. Schwartz, being in bad health,
soon after reaching Rivas, obtained leave of absence to visit California.
Col. Waters kept the small companies of Rangers under his command, riding
constantly in search of supplies and information.
In a few days after the San Carlos left Virgin Bay with the passengers,
uneasiness was felt on account of the non-arrival of the steamers from
the river. There were several causes which might be assigned for their
detention, one being the misunderstanding between the two agents of
the company, Scott and Macdonald. The improbabilities, too, of all the
steamers falling into the hands of the Costa Ricans were so many, that
in the event of the enemy’s appearance on the river, it was supposed
some news of the fact would soon reach Rivas. It was many days before
the steamers finally appeared on the lake, and then their movements
indicated that they were in the hands of the Allies. In the meantime, the
steamer Sierra Nevada, which had been waiting at San Juan del Sur for
the passengers, sailed for Panama; and it was not until her return on
the 24th of January, that Walker heard definitely the events which had
transpired on the river, and of Lockridge’s presence at Punta Arenas,
with a body of immigrants for Nicaragua.
Previous to the return of the Sierra Nevada from Panama, Capt. Finney
had been sent with about fifty Rangers as far as Nandaime, in order
to ascertain what news the people near Masaya had in reference to the
steamers; and also to learn whether or not the enemy were making any
movements of importance. Finney returned, reporting that he had gone as
far as Nandaime without seeing the enemy or hearing any news indicating
either an advance of Allies or a knowledge on their part of the capture
of the steamers. The country between Nandaime and Rivas was quiet; the
people were engaged in their usual domestic pursuits, and had not been
troubled by detachments of the Allies.
In the meantime Rivas was prepared for defence. Soon after occupying the
place, in December, Walker had given orders to Henningsen to strengthen
the natural advantages of the position, so that a small garrison might
be left there without risk to the military and other stores gathered in
the town. In fulfilment of these orders, Henningsen had burnt most of the
small huts on the edges of the town, and had cut away the thick tropical
undergrowth which might conceal and protect an attacking foe. The nature
of the ground in and about the place was well ascertained, and the
numerous trails and by-paths of the neighborhood were examined. Strobel
was, at the same time, engaged in surveying a more direct road than the
one usually travelled from Rivas to Virgin Bay; and for this service he
principally employed natives, who, with their machetes, are able to clear
away rapidly the dense brushwood of that luxuriant soil and climate.
A small schooner, which had once belonged to the chief of the Mosquitos,
was brought up the river and across the lake during the month of
December; and having been purchased by the government, this vessel was
undergoing repairs at the time the steamers made their appearance at
Omotepe. On the 16th of January, Walker sent for Fayssoux to come to
Rivas, in order to have his opinion as to the feasibility of using the
schooner for re-taking the steamers. Fayssoux, although suffering at
the time from fever, reached Rivas a few hours after he received the
message; and on his arrival he said he thought the schooner would be of
very little use for such a purpose. Afterward the vessel was burned, to
prevent her from falling into the hands of the enemy; to hold the vessel
securely it would have been necessary to keep a strong garrison at Virgin
Bay.
Of course, the knowledge that the enemy held the river and the lake,
diminished greatly the spirits and confidence of the troops at Rivas.
But, although difficulties appeared to gather about the Americans in
Nicaragua, they never for a moment relaxed their resolution to maintain
strict order and discipline wherever they held sway. An extract from the
log of the Granada for the 19th of January, shows the assistance her
commander gave to a vessel of the very power which in a few short weeks
manifested its gratitude for such services by capturing the Nicaraguan
schooner. The log reads: “Crew employed on ship’s duty. Sent five men and
an officer to assist the civil authorities to place the mutinous crew
of the Narraganset (an American ship) on board of her. Lent her four
hand-cuffs to iron them.” The fact may appear trifling, but, when read by
the light of after events, it becomes instructive and characteristic.
After Mora had secured the San Juan river and the lake steamers, he
established his headquarters at Fort San Carlos. Some days elapsed before
he communicated with the Allies across the lake. His object, probably,
was to get all the force he could command to the river, and so secure
his communications between San Carlos and San José, previous to taking
any step which might give Walker an opportunity of ascertaining the
occurrences on the San Juan. When, however, he had, as he supposed, put
the river in a proper state of defence, he crossed to Granada, and there
met the chiefs of the allied forces. By the success of Costa Rica on the
San Juan, she had obtained a preponderating influence in the counsels of
the confederates, and hence there was little difficulty in having Cañas
placed in command of the army at Masaya. The possession of the lake and
river, and the closing of the Transit, gave new life to the leaders of
the allied troops, and they determined to advance into the Meridional
Department.
On the 26th of January Walker received news of the advance of the Allies
toward Obraje, a small village on the south side of the Gil Gonzales,
and about three leagues distant from Rivas. The same afternoon O’Neal
with his Rifles, about 160 strong, and with a twelve-pound howitzer
and a small four-pound brass piece, went to meet the enemy, reported
as numbering 800 or 1,000 men. A company of Rangers also accompanied
O’Neal; and Finney riding to the edge of Obraje came suddenly on a strong
picket of the Allies and received their fire, himself mortally wounded,
almost before he was aware of their presence. When O’Neal ascertained
that the enemy held Obraje he halted for the night about a mile from the
village. The next morning he sent forward a skirmishing party to feel the
strength of the Allies, and the latter came out to meet the skirmishers
in such force that O’Neal judged it prudent to recall his riflemen. In
the skirmishing with the enemy O’Neal lost several men; and when his
report of the apparent strength and confidence of the Allies reached
Rivas, Henningsen was sent to Obraje to reconnoitre the position of the
enemy. After a short time Henningsen reported the Allies occupying the
principal square of the village, strongly barricaded and also protected
by earthworks; and that the place could not be carried without a loss
entirely disproportionate to its value and importance. On the receipt of
Henningsen’s report Walker ordered the Rifles to fall back to Rivas.
The enemy remained in Obraje during the morning of the 28th; but about
nightfall of that day some Americans from San Jorge brought the news of
small bodies of the Allies being seen in the outskirts of this village,
situated near the lake shore and about two miles to the east of Rivas.
By eight o’clock in the evening Cañas was in San Jorge, and his force
was busily engaged in building barricades and other defences. The
rapidity with which Central American troops throw up barricades is almost
incredible, and long practice has made them more expert at such work than
even a Parisian mob. Hence, in a few hours, all the streets leading into
the square of San Jorge, as well as the houses around the Plaza, were
strongly barricaded. The secrecy, however, of the march from Obraje, no
less than the rapidity with which the barricades at San Jorge had been
built, showed that the Allies were not disposed to meet the Americans
in the open field or to come to a decisive action. It was clear that
they desired to hold San Jorge in order to communicate with Mora on the
lake, and thus to secure more strength for future offensive operations.
Therefore, Walker determined to attack them at once.
On the morning of the 29th, Henningsen marched to San Jorge with the 1st
and 2d Rifles, Jaquess’ Infantry, some Rangers, a twelve-pound howitzer,
and a six-pounder. Next in command to Henningsen was Sanders. They soon
succeeded in driving the enemy behind the barricades of the Plaza; but
by some misunderstanding of Henningsen’s orders, Sanders, with a part of
Lewis’ Rifles, became separated from the rest of the command, and reached
a position to the north of the main square and near the road leading to
the lake. Confusion ensued; and as the Americans had suffered rather
severely from the enemy’s fire, they were drawn off to gain time for new
dispositions. It appears that several of the officers had taken too much
liquor during the morning, and did not apprehend clearly the purport of
the orders they received. Besides this, there was a jealousy on the part
of Sanders toward Henningsen, and the latter averred that the former
afterward admitted he had done all in his power to frustrate the attack
on San Jorge. It is certain Sanders was of a jealous disposition; and
though he denied having made the admission above referred to, there can
be little doubt that he was not altogether displeased at any incidents
which tended to diminish the confidence of the general-in-chief and of
the army in the skill and capacity of Henningsen.
After getting his force as far as possible out of the enemy’s fire,
Henningsen reconnoitred more exactly the position of the Allies with a
view of another attempt to carry their defences. Early in the afternoon,
and before Henningsen had prepared for a second attack, the enemy sallied
in strength from the barricades and made a vigorous effort to drive the
Americans out of some plantain patches they were occupying. The number of
riflemen among the plantains was not large at the time the Allies came
suddenly and rather unexpectedly upon them; but the 12-pound howitzer was
on the spot, and its discharges of cannister were very destructive to the
enemy. Nothing can be more effective than this arm for brushing away a
harassing foe from the plantain fields scattered around the edges of the
towns and villages of Central America. On the occasion of the sortie the
enemy made at San Jorge, the howitzer did the service—to make a moderate
estimate—of at least fifty riflemen.
The repulse of the enemy among the plantains raised the spirits of the
men; and late in the afternoon Henningsen again attacked the barricades.
Lewis was to attempt to get a foothold on the north and east side of
the Plaza, near the church, where the enemy kept its ordnance and other
stores, while Jaquess with the Infantry was to try to effect a lodgment
on the south side near the road leading toward Virgin Bay. Lewis’ men
could not be brought to advance nearer than within eighty or a hundred
yards of the barricades; but the Infantry made a gallant effort, though
an unsuccessful one, to perform the part assigned it in the general
assault. The Infantry had hitherto lacked opportunities for meeting the
enemy; and some jests had been passed at their expense among the other
corps of the army. Therefore Jaquess was now put on his mettle. He,
followed by Major Dusenberry, led the men up toward the barricade with
more courage than conduct; and for several seconds the Infantry received,
without wincing, a most galling fire from the Allies. Jaquess was struck
down by a ball in the loins, while Dusenberry fell at about the same
moment mortally wounded. Thus losing their chief officers, the Infantry
were checked at a critical moment and were obliged to retire, leaving
several killed near the barricades and bringing off a number of wounded.
From the reports Walker received he was led to suppose that the ill
success of the attack on San Jorge might be due in some degree to the
want of cordial co-operation on the part of Sanders and other officers
with Henningsen. There was always some little prejudice against the
latter because of his European birth and education; and it is impossible
even with the aid of long military habits to conquer or destroy such
prejudices. Therefore Henningsen was recalled; but as Walker had little
confidence in the capacity of Sanders for independent command, Waters
was sent to San Jorge with orders which gave him the real control of
the troops there. Soon, however, Waters reported that he thought it
impossible to carry the place with the force then before it; and Sanders
was accordingly ordered to return to Rivas.
The loss of the Americans on the 29th January was about eighty killed
and wounded. Captains Russell and Wilkinson, both valuable officers,
were killed; while Major Dusenberry died in a short time after he was
brought to Rivas. Jaquess’ wound made him unfit for duty for many
weeks; and Lieut. Col. Leonard was confined to his bed for months from
the effects of that day at San Jorge. The loss of the enemy was also
large, especially in the plantain patches where they met the howitzer.
But it was difficult to get even an approximative report of the losses
of the enemy. They kept their wounded carefully out of sight, sending
them to Omotope and other points, and scattering them so as to make the
numbers seem less than they were. So, too, when inquiries were made for
men who disappeared, instead of letting it be known they were killed,
the officers would represent that they had been ordered to some distant
point. Thus the lake steamers were very serviceable to the Allies by
enabling them to keep their wounded out of sight, and to prevent their
large losses from affecting the spirits of those who escaped the American
rifles.
On the afternoon of the 30th, Walker marched with the 1st and 2d
Rifles (about 250 men in all) and a 12-pound howitzer to San Juan del
Sur, with the double view of inspiring the troops with confidence by
showing them that the Allies feared to meet them in the open field and
of communicating with the steamer Orizaba, expected in port about the
first of February. The march to San Juan was made in good time and with
cheerful spirits, and no signs of the enemy appeared on the road. On the
evening of the 1st of February the Orizaba arrived from San Francisco,
bringing Captain Buchanan and some forty others for Nicaragua. The vessel
was coaled, as usual, by men in the service of the State; and without
aid from the government it might have been difficult for the steamers to
get labor at reasonable rates. A marginal note in the log of the schooner
Granada, written by Captain Fayssoux, shows whether or not American
commerce had reason to be thankful to the authorities then at San Juan.
In the body of the schooner’s log for the 2d of February we read, “Eleven
of the crew employed coaling the Orizaba;” while in the margin we find
the note: “M. Mars being drunk on board the Orizaba, and urging our crew
to strike for higher wages, which they did, the captain and he got into a
fight; I separated them, and sent Mars on shore, and persuaded the men to
go on coaling.”
About 4 o’clock in the afternoon of the 2d, Walker marched from San Juan
to Virgin Bay. At the latter place he ascertained that Cañas had been
there with some four or five hundred men, and had retired as soon as he
heard of the approach of the Americans. Early on the morning of the 3d
the steamer La Virgen appeared off Virgin Bay, and the troops then in the
village were carefully concealed, with the hope that the steamer might
come up to the wharf. When, however, she got within a few hundred yards
of the wharf, she stopped her engines, yet did not drop anchor, as if
regarding the aspect of affairs on shore. After a while several tried to
strike her pilot-house with the Minié musket; but their efforts were not
very successful; and in a short time the steamer turned away from the
wharf and proceeded toward San Jorge. Then the Americans resumed their
march and reached Rivas about midday of the 3d.
On their return to Rivas the Rifles were ordered to get as much rest as
possible during the afternoon and the early part of the night, since
their services might be required before daybreak of the 4th. Not long
after midnight of the 3d, Walker marched with about 200 of the Rifles
toward San Jorge; and near a mile from Rivas, taking a road to the left,
he entered the village, where the enemy lay, at 4 o’clock on the morning
of the 4th of February. The Allies were taken entirely by surprise, and
a select corps of volunteers, led on by Dr. McAllenny, penetrated to one
of the main barricades of the Plaza and fired over its top at the enemy,
running hither and thither across the square. But the main body could
not be brought to sustain the advancing party before the enemy recovered
from their surprise. Then it was too late to carry the barricades without
great loss, and the Americans were drawn off to the edge of the village
beyond the reach of the enemy’s small-arms. During the assault on the
barricade Lieutenants Blackman and Gray were mortally wounded; and
while the Americans were on the edge of the village O’Neal received his
death-wound. By eight o’clock A.M. on the 4th, the Americans had returned
to Rivas.
During this attack on San Jorge, Jerez was wounded in the face, and
for some days there were reports of his death; but the hurt was less
dangerous than represented, and he soon recovered from its effects. The
loss of O’Neil was a more severe blow to the Americans than any they
inflicted on the Allies. Young and enthusiastic, he was not without
the quick perception and rapid decision which fit a man for command in
moments of danger. He was almost a boy in age, not twenty-one, at the
time of his death; but the mind matures rapidly on the battle field,
and he had by nature the true sentiment of the soldier which tells him
that it matters little whether death comes soon or late, so it finds
him in the performance of duty. He lingered for several days after he
was carried back to Rivas, and probably his gallant spirit would have
preferred to go forth from the world amid the storm of battle. But
anxious eyes watched over his last agonies, and there was none in camp
who was not saddened when the news of his death spread through the town.
It was while Walker was at San Juan del Sur that printed proclamations
from Rafael Mora—promising deserters protection and free passage to
the United States—were first scattered in the suburbs of Rivas. At the
same time letters were addressed to Americans, signed by those who
had deserted from Granada and elsewhere, urging officers and men to
desert Walker and go over to the enemy. This was an entire change in
the policy of Costa Rica. Not a year before, Mora had declared a war of
extermination against the “filibusters;” now he attempted to make the
war one against a single person, and besought the Americans to desert
their leader. This change of policy, while it tacitly admitted that the
war had failed in its objects, was also indicative of new counsellors in
the cabinet of Costa Rica; it proved that other than Central American
heads were busy in plotting the removal of the naturalized Nicaraguans
from their adopted country. All Americans, however, are interested in
having the names of these counsellors remain in the obscurity their deeds
deserve.
While barricades were being built at Rivas and the town was more
thoroughly prepared for defence, Col. Swingle was engaged in labors which
added much to the efficiency of the artillery. The mechanical genius
of Swingle was extraordinary. Besides the well-organized work-shops he
established at Rivas, he got a small engine from San Juan del Sur and
succeeded in producing a blast of air which enabled him to smelt iron,
and thus he cast the first cannon-balls ever made in Central America. The
scanty supply of balls had been a serious obstacle to the employment of
the artillery, and for some time it was necessary to use such as could
be moulded with lead. As the supply of lead was limited, it would not do
to put a great deal of it into the shape of cannon balls. A number of
bells had been gathered from the towns and villages of the Meridional
Department, and from these Swingle cast round shot, more effective,
though also dearer, than those made of iron.
On the morning of the 7th of February, a supply of round shot having been
procured, Henningsen, supported by the Rifles, proceeded to San Jorge
to give the enemy a cannonade. He prepared some empty musket-boxes in
order to construct a breastwork rapidly and without annoyance from the
enemy. While it was yet dark he reached a point about six hundred yards
from the lines of the Allies, and before daybreak his work was so far
complete as to enable the men to proceed without interruption by the fire
from the Plaza. The breastwork being finished, the six-pounders were
fired rapidly and with much accuracy. The impression made on the Allies
was apparent, though they affected to say that the balls did small
damage. None of the Americans was hurt, and they returned to Rivas in
good spirits at the work which had been done with so little expense. The
object of these frequent attacks on the enemy was to keep them in a state
of constant alarm, and besides the actual loss of the Allies in killed
and wounded, the confusion into which they were thrown by the appearance
of the Americans always enabled a few of the soldiers to desert. It was
important, also, for Walker—while waiting the result of Lockridge’s
effort to open the Transit—to let his troops see that they were not
thrown entirely on the defensive.
It was necessary to inspire the Americans with confidence in their own
strength, and to show them the weakness of the enemy in order to cure,
if possible, the fearful epidemic—for it is a disease—of desertion which
had begun to demoralize the force at Rivas. Early in February a number
of Rangers, with a commissioned officer, deserted and took the road to
Costa Rica, carrying off their horses, saddles, and arms. The morning
report of the 6th of February shows twenty desertions in twenty-four
hours; that of the 8th of the same month shows six. Desertions at that
time were the result of pure fright and restlessness; for the subsistence
was unexceptionable, a large supply of flour and other provisions having
been received from California during the month of January. Besides, the
Rangers were then passing in bodies of ten and twelve through most parts
of the Meridional Department and were able to bring in supplies of corn,
tobacco, and sugar, for the troops. The spirit of desertion was rifest
among those who had been in California; and the wandering habits there
engendered made them restive under the restraints of military life.
Americans, too, are accustomed to discuss public affairs with entire
freedom; and it is difficult to cure them of the habit—most dangerous
in camp—of expressing their opinions about public acts and events. Such
discussions may often be fatal to the safety of an army; and thus, the
habits of freedom, while they add to the courage of the citizen, may also
diminish the fortitude unlicensed speech too often shakes. Foolish speech
and the spread of absurd reports did more to foster desertion among the
troops at Rivas than all the promises of the enemy or any privations to
which they may have been subjected. Unfortunately, many officers were not
much wiser than the men in this respect, and their discouraging remarks
produced most pernicious effects. Such military faults, too, on the
part of officers are hard to deal with; for the punishment of them may
increase the evils they produce.
On the 6th of February, the United States sloop-of-war St. Mary’s,
Commander Charles Henry Davis commanding, cast anchor in the port of
San Juan del Sur; and a few days thereafter, on the 10th, Her Britannic
Majesty’s steamer Esk, Commander Sir Robert McClure commanding, also
anchored in the same harbor. On the 11th the log of the Granada reads:
“At 9 A.M. the commander of the English ship sent on board to know my
authority for flying a flag. He was answered by the authority of our
government. At 6 P.M. he again sent on board using threats that he would
take me prize or sink me if I did not proceed on board of him with my
commission, which I refused to do. After making me three visits and
threatening everything, the lieutenant insisted on my making a friendly
visit to the commander, which I did.” As soon as the conduct of Sir
Robert McClure was known at Rivas, orders were sent to Fayssoux not to
hold or allow any of his officers or men to hold communication with
the English commander, his officers or crew, and not in any manner to
notice the presence of the Esk in port. In a few hours Sir Robert was in
Rivas; and when informed that his conduct should be properly reported
and brought to the attention of Her Majesty’s government, he was profuse
in his apologies, saying he had not intended any insult to Fayssoux or
his flag. After his apology, the order to Fayssoux was revoked. In the
schooner’s log for the 13th we find: “At 11 A.M. Capt. Davis of the
American sloop-of-war paid us an official visit. At 12 M. Capt. McClure
returned my friendly visit.” The course of Sir Robert McClure illustrates
the conduct of the British naval officers toward Nicaragua. Whenever they
were properly met and resisted in the first instance they would draw
back from their arrogant demands; but if they found only hesitation and
concessions they pressed their interference with more determination after
each successful act. On the 19th the Esk left for Punta Arenas.
Commander Davis, having sent word that he desired to visit Rivas on
business, an escort was ordered to conduct him to the town, and on the
18th he arrived at headquarters. He spent the afternoon and night in
Rivas, and in his conversations with Walker studiously addressed him
as President. During his stay the officers who accompanied him passed
freely through the camp, and seemed surprised at the cheerful aspect
of the place. The commander stated to Walker that the captain of the
Narraganset, a coal-ship at San Juan, would require her small boats, then
in Rivas, before going to sea. These boats had been brought from the
Transit some weeks previously, with a view of using them on the lake,
but as they were now useless for this service, Walker told Davis he did
not object to return them to the Narraganset. At the same time Walker
mentioned to Davis that the lake and river steamers, belonging to the
American owners of the ocean steamships between Nicaragua and the United
States, were precisely analogous to the boats of the Narraganset, and
if he asked for the latter he should also demand the former from the
Allies. Morgan and Garrison could no more carry on their business of
transporting passengers between the Atlantic and Pacific ports of the
United States without the property then in the hands of the Allies, than
the Narraganset could go to sea without her small boats. Davis appeared
to see the analogy of the cases, and said he would visit San Jorge after
leaving Rivas, and speak with the Allied general on the subject.
From Rivas Davis went to San Jorge; but if he mentioned the lake and
river steamers it must have been casually, and it was certainly without
any result. He demanded to know from the Allied general whether the
Americans on the small steamers were held against their will, for such
was the current report through the country at the time. But he was
satisfied with the simple assurance that these men served the Allies
voluntarily. Of course any one familiar with the character and morals
of Spanish-American officers, know that such assurances are readily
given and really mean nothing. Davis, however, took no farther steps
to ascertain the facts in relation to the Americans on the steamer,
and this, with other facts, led Walker to see that the United States
commander was more desirous of pressing demands against him than against
the Allies. Hence, when the lieutenant of the St. Mary’s came up for the
Narraganset’s boats, Walker told him he could not give them up unless
Davis treated both parties to the war alike, and pressed his demands
against the Allies with as much vigor as those he might make on the
Nicaraguans.
During the latter part of February there were several encounters between
the Rangers and small parties of the enemy. A few riflemen, too, would go
out at night and alarm the camp of the Allies by firing on their pickets,
and the enemy would, in the same manner, scatter small parties through
the plantain patches and fire up the streets of Rivas. The Rangers in the
employ of the commissary (of whom at one time there were about thirty)
had some skirmishes with the Allies while the former were collecting
subsistence for the Americans, and on the afternoon of the 4th of March
the enemy took two wagons, several carts, and a number of oxen which had
been sent out, in charge of the Rangers, for corn. This capture was made
not more than a mile from Rivas, and on an estate belonging to the family
of an officer in the Allied army.
On the evening of the 4th of March, Caycee, with some forty Rangers, was
sent to San Juan del Sur as an escort to Col. Jaquess, Mrs. Dusenberry,
the widow of the major mortally wounded at San Jorge, and others going
to the United States. They arrived at San Juan without seeing the enemy;
but on the 5th, as Caycee was returning to Rivas, he found himself
unexpectedly in the presence of 200 of the Allies, just after he passed
the Half-way House, and was about to leave the Transit road. The enemy
took Caycee by surprise, and he lost six of his men, four killed and
two wounded, before he was able to extricate himself from the fire of
the Allies. He fell back to San Juan, and remained there until the 7th.
In the meantime, Walker having learned, through a native boy, that a
Costa Rican force had left San Jorge, and was on the way to the Transit,
ordered Sanders to get the Rifles ready for marching. The boy who brought
the information to Walker had seen the Costa Ricans pass along the
hill-side while he lay hid in the bushes, and he had thus been able to
count almost every man. He reported them about 200 strong, and Sanders
was sent out to join Caycee with 160 of the Rifles. In the afternoon of
the 5th, Sanders, while on the march toward the Transit, met the enemy
near a league from the Jocote farm. The Rifles were much scattered when
the Costa Ricans first appeared, and Captains Conway and Higley were
engaged in deploying their companies on either side of the road when
they received the enemy’s attack. The Costa Ricans came on briskly and
with confidence; the Rifles, on the contrary, hesitated, and in spite of
the efforts of their officers began to give way. Waters, who was with
Sanders, made several ineffectual attempts to check the disorder into
which the Americans fell, but he could not get the Rifles to make head
against the Costa Ricans, and the latter continued to press the rear of
the Americans until they reached the point where the road forked—one
fork leading to Rivas, the other to San Jorge. The enemy took the road
leading to San Jorge; and no doubt the idea that they were cut off from
their main body, and the necessity of forcing their way back to Cañas,
increased the vigor of their attack, and made them fight with more
appearance of courage than was usual to them. Sanders’ loss was 28, of
which there were 20 killed and 8 wounded. The large proportion of killed
is explained by the fact that a number of the wounded were left on the
field, and the enemy killed these when they came up. Higley and Conway,
both excellent officers, were among the killed. For many hours there were
numbers both of men and officers missing, but the most of these came into
Rivas during the next day.
The Allies, elated by the result of the conflict with Sanders, marched a
strong body into the plantain patches, to the east of Rivas and near the
Plaza, about ten o’clock P.M. of the 5th. A deserter, who was with them,
called out to the sentry not to fire as “they were Rangers;” but the
fellow’s over-anxious tone betrayed his plans and the alarm was given.
Some rounds of canister fired among the plantains soon scattered the
allied force stationed there; and though the bugles continued to sound
the charge, the spirit of the enemy did not seem equal to the attempt.
The fire into the town had been short and rambling; but a musket-ball
struck Dulaney, of the Artillery, in the throat, inflicting a painful
though not dangerous wound.
On the afternoon of the 7th Caycee returned to Rivas with his Rangers
and 70 footmen from California, in charge of Capt. Stewart. Arms had
been furnished to the new men from the supply aboard of the Granada;
and the steamer which brought these immigrants from California, also
bore a quantity of arms and ammunition for the service of Nicaragua.
Stewart’s men were formed into a corps called the Red Star Guard, and
they were put under the command of Major Stephen S. Tucker, formerly
of the U. S. Mounted Rifles. Tucker was an excellent officer, punctual
in the discharge of his duties, and rigid in exacting from others
the performance of theirs. The captain of the Guard, Stewart, was
a noisy, talkative man, whose ideas about public affairs had been
derived principally from grogshop assemblies in the mining villages
of California; and Tucker’s ideas of discipline and duty were quite
distasteful to a man whose habit it was to fawn on people in order to
secure their good-will and favor. From the beginning, Tucker was strict
with his men, and aspired to make them the best soldiers in Rivas. For a
time he succeeded admirably; and it is probable he might have done more
with the Guard in the end, had it not been for the foolish talkativeness
of its captain.
The day after Stewart and his men arrived, the whole force in Rivas was
paraded on the Plaza, and Walker addressed them with a view of raising
their spirits after the depression of Jocote, and Caycee’s mishap on the
Transit. He reviewed the course the Costa Ricans took in the opening of
the war, and contrasted it with the policy the Allies had since adopted,
thereby showing that they had been humbled in their conflict with the
Americans. He also alluded to the efforts made to seduce the troops from
their allegiance to the flag, by representing their chief as selfish and
ungrateful. It was, he said, an insult to Americans to suppose, that they
served a chief; they served a cause and not a man; and when the Allies
asked, what reward they had received or what thanks had been bestowed for
the sufferings at Rivas, at Masaya, and at Granada, they recalled names
that should fill the souls of soldiers with devotion and enthusiasm to
the cause in which they were engaged. The address was brief; but it had
an effect on those who heard it, and for several days the spirit of the
garrison was better than it had been.
On the 13th, Caycee, with his Rangers, went to San Juan for the purpose
of bringing to Rivas the letters and papers brought by the Sierra
Nevada from Panama. Titus was a passenger on the steamer, and had been
intrusted, so Lockridge afterward said, with the official report of
events on the river; but Walker did not get this report until many days
after Titus’ arrival at Rivas, and then in the shape of duplicates by the
next vessel with mails from San Juan del Norte. Hence, for some time, the
chief information as to affairs on the San Juan was derived from Titus,
and this, as may be readily imagined, was of very inaccurate character.
This person, Titus, had not been at Rivas long, before his reports were
regarded as wholly worthless; for, during the sickness of one of Walker’s
aides, Titus was requested to act, for the time, on the staff of the
general-in-chief. The first duty on which he was sent, required him to
approach a point where the Allies and Americans were in presence of
each other; and Titus, not venturing within range of the enemy’s fire,
received a statement from a soldier and brought it to headquarters as
a report of facts. A moment after Titus’ return, Henningsen rode up,
and reported to Walker a state of facts entirely the reverse of Titus’
report. Of course, the services of Titus were immediately dispensed with.
From the first, Walker placed no confidence in the statements of Titus
about affairs on the river. No commission was given to Titus; on the
contrary, when he requested to be sent to the United States with
authority to act for Nicaragua, his application was refused. Although
possessed of some plausibility, he could lead only superficial observers
astray as to his real character. He had too much the air of the bully, to
gain credit for either honesty or firmness of purpose. His future conduct
will hereafter be related; and from it may be learned something of the
man who, when he left New-Orleans, boasted that in not many days the San
Juan river would be open to the Americans.
At two o’clock on the morning of the 16th, Walker marched for San Jorge,
with about 400 effective men, two iron six-pounders, one twelve-pound
howitzer, and four small mortars. Henningsen accompanied the force with
the view of directing the operations of the artillery. The force of the
enemy had been swelled to upward of 2,000 men, by fresh troops from
Guatemala and Costa Rica; and only the day before a body of 400 or 500
had been carried on the lake steamer from Tortugas, about ten leagues
south of Virgin Bay, to the camp at San Jorge. By daybreak, however, the
Americans had possession of a small church, about six hundred yards from
the Plaza, where the enemy lay. Soon after the position was secured, the
six-pounders opened on the Allies, men being stationed in the trees so
as to watch where the balls struck; for the dense vegetation about the
town made it impossible to get an open view of the square, and thus the
pointing of the guns was to some extent conjectural. Twelve-pound shells
were also thrown from the mortars; and had there been a larger supply of
shells, the fire of the mortars would have accomplished much. Even the
small number of shells thrown were not without effect on the enemy. As
one of the characteristic incidents of the day, it may be mentioned, that
while the artillery firing was going on, Col. Henry, who had been left in
bed at Rivas, rode up on his mule, and received another bullet from the
enemy before the day was over.
While the artillery was engaged in pouring round shot and shell into the
Plaza, Tucker, with the Red Star Guard, was throwing up a breastwork some
seventy or eighty yards to the left, and in advance of the church Walker
occupied. The ground where Tucker was at work touched the road leading
straight into the Plaza; and he was preparing it for the reception of
a gun which might thence have told with much effect on the Allies. The
enemy, however, observed Tucker’s men, and before the breastwork was
complete, several hundred of the newly-arrived Costa Ricans sallied from
the Plaza, and advancing through the plantain walks, fell with fury on
the Red Star Guard. Tucker fought fiercely for several minutes, his men
showing fine spirit, and doing good work with their Minié muskets. But
the strength of the enemy was such, as to force him to retire to the
church, after the loss of several killed and wounded.
The several roads and bye-paths in the rear, and on the flanks of the
American main position at the church, were well watched and guarded
by the Rangers, as well as by some companies of Infantry and Rifles.
Captain Northedge’s company on the left, was assailed about the same
time with Tucker; but he held his position, and the enemy retired. There
was more or less skirmishing on the flanks and rear, while the Artillery
was exhausting its supplies of shot; after some three hundred and fifty
rounds had been fired, it was clear that few of the enemy remained in the
Plaza, and that they were taking positions on the road between San Jorge
and Rivas, with a view of harassing, if not of preventing the return of
the Americans to the latter place. The delay in the re-appearance of some
Rangers sent to Rivas to ascertain whether the road to that place was
open, showed that the Allies were attempting to occupy it. The enemy thus
having almost entirely deserted San Jorge, and offering action along the
road to Rivas, Walker decided to accept the offer.
Placing, then, Waters with the Rangers in front, and Henningsen with the
twelve-pound howitzer in the rear, while the wounded and the six-pounders
occupied the centre of the column, Walker took the main road from San
Jorge to Rivas. As he approached a small rise in the road, near a mile
from San Jorge, the general-in-chief found Waters engaged with the enemy,
posted some hundred and fifty or two hundred yards in advance, on each
side of a deep cut in the road. The Rangers had been engaged for several
minutes when the general-in-chief came up; and when Walker saw how the
Allies were posted, taking the nearest company, which happened to be that
of Captain Clark of the Infantry, he made a detour to the right, and
coming suddenly on the enemy’s left flank, drove them across the road,
and then from their whole position. Thus sweeping the road as they passed
over it, the Americans reached the point known as Cuatro Esquinas, near
half a mile from Rivas, without further serious interruption from the
Allies. Several times they tried to close on the rear but the resolute
and defiant air of Henningsen, kept them at a safe distance.
While Walker was at San Jorge, Swingle remained in command at Rivas; and
the enemy had once during the day approached the barricades, thinking
they might enter the town with small risk. But Swingle was not a man
to be trifled with; and the Allies soon gave up their efforts to get a
foothold in the place. Then they occupied a house some six hundred yards
from the Plaza of Rivas, and near the road between the town and the
Cuatro Esquinas. The enemy had, during the afternoon, strongly barricaded
this house, and as the head of the American column approached it, the
Allies opened a sharp fire of musketry from the loop-holes they had cut
through the walls of the building. The Americans were, to some extent,
protected by the shelving ground between the house and the road, and
many of them thus passed without much danger from the enemy’s fire; but
several were hurt before they got under a steep bank which entirely
screened them from the balls of the Allies. Walker himself pushed on to
Rivas, and ascertaining that the road to the left from Cuatro Esquinas
was clear of the enemy, sent orders to Henningsen to have the wounded
brought in by that road. He also sent orders to have the guns brought
in the same way; but before these orders reached Henningsen, the guns
were already on the narrow road the main body had taken, and could not
be withdrawn. After the general-in-chief passed the house the Allies
occupied, Dolan, coming up with his Rifles, rode almost on to the
muskets of the enemy, calling to his men to follow. His characteristic
impetuosity carried him too far; he fell bleeding and apparently nigh
dead, from several severe wounds; and he is indebted to a remarkably
tough body for his recovery from the effects of that day’s rashness. Soon
after dark nearly all the American force had reached the Plaza of Rivas;
but it was not before morning of the 17th that the guns and mortars were
safely within the barricades.
The loss of the Americans on the 16th of March was thirteen killed and
sixty-three wounded, four of the latter mortally. Among the mortally
wounded was Lewis, of the Second Rifles. He received a musket-ball
through the chest as he rode into the midst of the enemy near San Jorge;
and among his last words were, “Tell my mother that I died as I have
always wished to die.” Tucker was wounded in the sword hand; but not so
seriously as to prevent him from reporting for duty a few days afterward.
The Red Star Guard suffered severely, they reporting on the 17th two
killed, four mortally wounded, and nearly half their number more or
less hurt. The loss of the Allies was, according to the reports of their
own officers, five hundred killed and wounded. An Italian, acting as an
officer with the Allies, and afterward taken prisoner, put their loss at
this figure; and a Costa Rican officer, who arrived at San Jorge on the
17th, and was made prisoner by the Americans on the 11th of April, stated
that the sight of the numerous wounded being carried to the lake steamer,
as the new men from Tortugas landed, made a deep and gloomy impression on
the minds of the latter.
On the 19th, Colonel Waters, with fifty Rangers, marched to San Juan del
Sur to communicate with the steamer Orizaba, which arrived that day from
San Francisco. The steamer brought Captain Chatfield, with twenty others,
for Nicaragua, and also some arms and five hundred 6lb. shot. Waters had
three hundred of the shot carried to Rivas; and Chatfield, with his men,
accompanied the Rangers on their return. By the Orizaba, Walker also
received letters from his California correspondents, more than intimating
doubts of Garrison’s fidelity to his contracts and compromises. The
regular day for the sailing of the Orizaba was the 20th of March; and
the friends of Nicaragua in San Francisco had made their arrangements
expecting she would sail at that time. Two or three days, however, before
the 5th of March, letters were received from Morgan and Garrison by their
agents at San Francisco, ordering the Orizaba to be despatched two weeks
in advance of her regular day. The change was damaging to the plans of
Walker’s friends in California; and the inference was that the Transit
contractors were about to play false with the men who had risked much to
advance their interests.
The day after the action at San Jorge and along the road between that
town and Rivas, the Allies received fresh troops, and also brought
across the lake one of the old 24-pound pieces the Spaniards left in the
country. They took a position on a slight eminence, about 1,200 yards
from Rivas, just beyond the Cuatro Esquinas; and, on the 22d of March,
planting the twenty-four pounder there, they opened a scattering and
irregular fire on the town. The 24-pound balls were, at long intervals,
sent into the place, doing, however, little or no damage. They were
picked up by the men and carried to the arsenal; and Swingle afterward
melted them into 6-pound balls and sent them back to the enemy. But the
cannonade—if such it might be called—of the 22d, was preliminary to an
attack the Allies made early on the morning of the 23d.
On Monday, the 23d, just before daybreak, a body of some four or five
hundred of the enemy crept under the thick shades of the cacao walks,
behind the Maleaño house, and getting almost to the back gate of the
hospital before they were discovered, made a vigorous attempt to get
within the building. But Dr. Dolman, with a few half-sick men, resisted
the enemy with such firmness and composure, that time was afforded Dr.
Callaghan, who had charge of the point, to get the hospital ready for
defence. The Allies thus foiled in their efforts to surprise the Maleaño
house, were driven back with much loss and more disgrace: for they had
unsuccessfully, no less than cruelly, attacked a building occupied
almost exclusively by the sick and wounded.
The attack on the hospital was, however, part of a general assault on
the positions held by the Americans. On the north side of the town,
Cañas, with some six or seven hundred men, tried to get up to the houses
near the barricades, but his men were driven back by the deadly fire of
the riflemen stationed behind the adobe defences. Finding the efforts
of the infantry to approach the barricades ineffectual, Cañas had a
four-pounder, in charge of an Italian, pushed within less than two
hundred yards of the American lines. This was a bolder movement than the
enemy were in the habit of making with their artillery, and it was the
result of a mistake rather than of design. The gun was fired two or three
times; but when it got within range of the Mississippi Rifles the men at
the piece began to fall rapidly, and finally abandoned it. The Italian
commanding the piece was dangerously wounded and made prisoner; and
Rogers, with a few of the native Nicaraguans, took the gun and dragged it
into the town. Cañas was forced to retire, leaving many of his wounded,
as well as a large number of his dead, on the field.
The south side of the town was attacked by Fernando Chamorro with some
six hundred men. He succeeded in getting possession of some empty houses
not more than a square from the Plaza, and commenced with the usual
rapidity to raise barricades at the points he occupied. The Red Star
Guard was defending the portion of the town attacked by Chamorro, and
Tucker was kept busy in repelling the advances of the enemy. At one time
a company of the Allies actually got possession of a house which had been
occupied by the Guard; but though a bold, it was a mistaken movement on
their part, for the Guard cut them off from their main body, and killing
several, and wounding others, as they attempted to leave the house,
Tucker’s men took the rest of the company prisoners. With some difficulty
Henningsen succeeded with the six-pounders in driving Chamorro from the
houses he had occupied early in the day, and after this was accomplished
the fire of the enemy almost entirely ceased.
The loss of the Americans on the 23d was slight; three killed and six
wounded was the report made immediately after the action. The loss of the
enemy must have been near 600. They left between 40 and 50 dead on the
field; and the wells about the houses Chamorro occupied were filled with
freshly-slain bodies. The wounded taken by the Americans were sent to the
hospital, and received the same attentions as the other patients. The
other prisoners were set to work burying the dead of the enemy, building
barricades, and doing the police duty of the town.
After the action of the 23d, the Allies took possession of the house of
D. José Maria Hurtado, a fine large building, less than half a mile from
Rivas, on the road to Granada; and on the morning of the 24th, a body of
the enemy, probably belonging to the troops stationed at Hurtado’s house,
attempted to set fire to the building of Santa Ursula, occupied by some
of the Infantry. They used for this purpose some combustibles covered
with resinous matter, and stuck on a bayonet fixed to the end of a long
pole. Approaching the rear of the building, the enemy thrust the bayonet
between the tiles of the roof into the cane on which they are placed, and
thus the fire partially caught. But the Infantry drove off the troops
which applied the fire, killing several and wounding others, and the
flames were soon extinguished.
During the afternoon of the 25th Henningsen used a safer and more
effectual method for setting fire to the enemy’s barricades, made partly
of wood and plantain stalks. He threw a number of hot shot from one of
the six-pounders into the wood-work of the barricades, and the smoke
which arose showed that the shot had been effectual. As a supply of
round shot had been received from California, and Swingle was engaged
in casting others, the Americans could afford to reply with their
six-pounders to the fire of the enemy’s guns, and yet retain a reserve
of balls for any pressing emergency. This, of course, much increased the
effectiveness of the artillery, and enabled it to keep the Allies at a
safe distance from the lines of Rivas. After the repulse of the 23d, the
enemy evidently aimed to invest the town and cut off its supplies; and,
in addition to the occupation of Hurtado’s house, they took a position
on the San Juan road. This last position was taken on the morning of the
26th, and in an unsuccessful effort made by some Infantry and Rifles,
Capt. E. H. Clark was unfortunately lost. With their ranks already
thinned by desertion, the Americans could ill afford to spare the lives
necessarily lost in driving the Allies from their barricaded positions
with small arms; and the artillery, forcing the enemy to extend their
lines, thereby prevented the investment from becoming complete. Hence
Walker had no difficulty in constantly sending native couriers through
the allied lines, in order to get the news circulating in the country.
The Allies were, however, strong enough to prevent detachments from
bringing cattle and other supplies from a distance into the American
camp. Col. Natzmer, who acted as commissary-general after Walker occupied
Rivas in December, had been actively employed during January and
February, and had brought in a supply of subsistence which, considering
the means at his disposal, was creditable to his skill and efficiency.
The post commissary, also, Capt. J. S. West, had much aided his chief
in the duties of the commissariat; and even after the enemy had cut off
supplies from a distance, West, by his cool, deliberate courage, did
much to gather rations of plantains from the debateable and dangerous
ground between the American and Allied lines. But on the 27th of March,
it became necessary for the commissary to have two quartermaster’s oxen
killed; and these, with a slight mixture of mule meat, furnished the
rations for the next morning. The mule meat was eaten by the troops as
beef; and in two or three days none but horse or mule flesh was issued as
the meat ration. The large number of horses and mules belonging to the
Rangers and to the quartermaster, furnished full rations to the whole
camp for more than a month, and the leaves of the mango trees, many of
which grew around Rivas, furnished excellent forage for the animals.
In order not to place Lockridge in a false position, should he succeed
in reaching Rivas from the river, Walker was determined to hold the
town as long as his provisions lasted. Besides this, although Cañas, in
return for the care taken of his sick and wounded, after his retreat in
April, 1856, had been placed under obligations to see that the Americans
were treated in the same manner, Walker was averse, unless in the last
extremity, to leaving his hospital to the tender mercies of the Allied
generals.
During the last days of March and the first ten days of April, the
enemy, having brought up another twenty-four-pound gun and placed it on
the south side of the town, kept up an irregular fire with their large
pieces, and from time to time they would fire volleys of musketry at
random, the balls dropping on the houses and in the streets of the place.
Few men were hurt by this irregular fire. Two officers, Capt. Mann and
Lieut. Moore, were killed by twenty-four pound balls, and the officer of
the day, on the 29th of March, Lieut. Graves, had his arm broken by a
Minié ball, while he was visiting on horseback the several points on the
edge of the town. The aides of the general-in-chief, Hooff and Brady,
who were constantly, day and night, passing through different exposed
quarters of the place—Brady, too, on a fine spirited white horse, which
necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy—escaped untouched. Every
now and then, small parties of Americans were sent beyond the lines, and
getting close to the enemy’s pickets would drive them in, nearly always
killing or wounding some of the sentries of the Allies. So, too, the
enemy would sometimes meet the Americans when they ventured outside to
gather plantains, and skirmishes, with more or less loss to each side,
would ensue.
But it was not the scanty rations or the fire of the Allies which did
most injury to the American force; it was the shameful desertion which
most affected the spirits and the strength of the defenders of Rivas.
As long as the desertion was confined principally to those of European
birth, it did not so seriously sap the confidence men had in each other;
but when the fatal infection spread among the Americans, it wrung bitter
tears of agony from every true-hearted man who witnessed the shame and
dishonor of his countrymen. Sometimes the deserters left in bodies of ten
or twelve, and the sentries and pickets would leave with the countersign
for the night. Let us pass the names of these with sorrow for the
weakness of human nature, nor taint the air with the narration of their
crimes and degradation. There is shame and infamy enough in the world
without seeking for them on fields where glory should be won and honor
achieved.
A day or two before the 10th of April the Allies received a body of
fresh troops from Guatemala, and the quiet of the enemy on the 10th led
to the surmise that they might select the anniversary of the action at
Rivas, in April, 1856, for another general attack on the American lines.
They supposed that the force in Rivas, weakened by its unusual food and
disheartened by desertions might yield readily to a vigorous assault made
on all sides at the same moment. But they underrated the spirit of their
adversaries. The Nicaraguans really hoped that the Allies would find
courage to attack them, and they were vigilant and well prepared during
the night of the 10th and on the morning of the 11th.
As expected, the enemy came up a little before daybreak of the 11th, and
made their first dash at a house on the south side of the Plaza, occupied
by a couple of American ladies. The latter had been frequently warned of
the danger of their position, but they persisted in remaining where they
were against the remonstrances of several officers. This attempt of the
enemy to gain a foothold on the Plaza was made by a body of Costa Ricans,
and guided by a Legitimist, Bonilla, familiar with the ground, they got
close to the house and were within it before the alarm was given. But as
they opened the door fronting on the Plaza, with a view of getting to
the house next on their right, and held by some of the quartermaster’s
men, Sevier, of the Artillery, ran out a twelve-pound howitzer, not
thirty yards from the Costa Ricans, and one round of canister drove the
enemy behind the adobes. Thus the advance of the Allies was checked on
the south side, and the company in the house, fronting the Plaza, was
completely cut off by the quartermaster’s men on one flank, Williamson
with his company on the other, and by Pineda with Buchanan’s Rangers in
the rear. In a few moments Henningsen began to riddle the house with
six-pound shot, and the Costa Ricans, crouching on the ground, knew
not how to escape the danger which surrounded them. Finally Pineda,
addressing them in Spanish, called on them to surrender, and those who
escaped death were taken prisoners.
But while the round shot were riddling the house held by the Costa
Ricans, the fresh Guatemalan troops, half drunk with aguardiente, were
driven up by their officers close to the American lines. These soldiers,
probably never before in action, and not aware of the danger from rifles,
exposed themselves without reason, at a distance of sixty or seventy-five
yards from the positions held by McEachin and McMichael. The men under
these two officers poured a deadly fire into the foolish and ignorant
Indians Carrera had sent to Nicaragua; and it was with a feeling almost
of pity for these forced levies that the Americans were obliged to shoot
them down like so many cattle. The Guatemalan officers cared no more for
their men than if they were sheep; and when they finally drew off their
troops the ground was thickly strewn with the dead and the wounded.
The third point of attack on the 11th was the house of Santa Ursula.
Martinez directed the Allies on that side; but he was not more fortunate
than Mora—for José Joaquin Mora was now commander-in-chief of the
Allies—on the south or than Zavala on the north. The men Martinez sent
against Santa Ursula did not make as bold a dash as did the Costa
Ricans at the house on the south side of the Plaza, nor did they expose
themselves as unnecessarily as the Guatemalans in front of McMichael
and McEachin; but the number of dead they left on the field when they
retired showed that Chatfield and the men at Santa Ursula had not missed
opportunities for weakening the enemy. The repulse of the Allies was
complete on all sides; and when they fell back, it was clear that they
were much exhausted and demoralized.
The loss of the Americans on the 11th of April was small, being the same
as on the 23d of March three killed and six wounded. The loss of the
Allies was even greater than at the previous attack. After the enemy
retired 110 of their dead were buried by the Americans; the wounded
prisoners were sent to the Allied camp under a flag of truce, and upward
of 70 unhurt prisoners retained. In addition to the dead found by the
Nicaraguans, nearly one hundred bodies were seen the day after in the
Allied camp, so that the killed exceeded 200. The whole loss must have
amounted to 700 or 800; and the weakness of the enemy for several days
was very apparent to the troops in Rivas. In addition to the prisoners
taken by the Americans, 250 small arms, many of them Minié muskets, and
some ammunition, were picked up on the field. The Minié muskets were
those which had been taken from the steamer La Virgen at the time of her
capture by Spencer; and the ammunition also was of that the Costa Ricans
had got with the Minié muskets.
The night of the 11th, Capt. Hankins, with two native boys, was sent to
San Juan del Sur to get the correspondence brought from Panama by the
Orizaba. On the night of the 14th he returned to Rivas, and added to the
commissary stores by riding in on horseback. The letters from the San
Juan river gave the news of the arrival of Capers and Marcellus French
with their respective commands; while those from New-York too well
confirmed the surmises of Walker’s friends in California, for they gave
notice of the intention of Garrison and Morgan to cease running their
steamers. It is unnecessary to go into the reasons which induced these
men to the course they took; for it would involve an investigation into
transactions uninteresting if not positively distasteful. Suffice it
to say that their conduct was the result of weakness and timidity. As
to their treachery, Walker had expected them to remain faithful to the
Americans in Nicaragua only as long as their interests required fidelity;
he expected them, however, to show more commercial nerve and sagacity
than they displayed. Their course evinced as much folly as timidity,
and jeoparded their reputation of skilful merchants fully as much as it
damaged their character for honesty and integrity.
From the 14th to the 23d, a number of skirmishes took place between
parties of the enemy and small bodies of the Americans who went out to
gather plantains; but none of these was serious or deserving of special
notice. One of these skirmishes occurred on the morning of the 23d;
and in the afternoon of the same day, a flag of truce brought letters
to Walker announcing that Lieut. Huston, of the St. Mary’s, was at the
headquarters of the Allies, and was ready, under the United States
flag, to conduct the women and children in Rivas to San Juan del Sur. A
letter from Mora to Walker proposed to send two of his aides with Lieut.
Huston to a convenient-point between the camps, where the United States
officer might be met by two of Walker’s aids, and be thus conducted into
Rivas. In accordance with this proposition, Hooff and Brady accompanied
the native boy who bore the letters from Mora to a point about half way
between the camps, and there halted, waiting the approach of Lieut.
Huston. While these two officers waited, a couple of deserters approached
and attempted to address them; but Hooff, drawing his pistol, warned the
fellows off under peril of their lives. Then, indignant at the Allies
for permitting such an insult as the approach of deserters to officers
bearing a flag of truce, Hooff and Brady returned to Rivas without
waiting longer the arrival of Lieut. Huston. Soon after, however, Lieut.
Huston entered the town, accompanied by a corporal of marines.
Immediately after Lieut. Huston entered the Nicaraguan camp, he was told
to forbid his corporal to speak with the soldiers about facts or events
at San Juan del Sur. In spite of this injunction the marine told the
most exaggerated stories about the number of men the Allies had at San
Juan, and about their strength generally. Lieut. Huston remained in Rivas
during the night of the 23d, and he frequently expressed his surprise at
the cheerful and confident aspect of affairs in the place. Before leaving
with the women, he informed Walker that Commander Davis had ordered him
to say any communications he had to make to Macdonald, the agent of
the Transit contractors at San Juan, should be faithfully delivered.
Walker replied, “he did not desire to write to Macdonald”; but added
that Lieut. Huston might say to Commander Davis—and as a communication
for Macdonald—“he considered his position at Rivas impregnable to the
force at the disposal of the enemy so long as his provisions lasted; if
Lockridge did not join him in Rivas by the time his commissary stores
were exhausted, he would abandon the place and join the force on the
San Juan; and he considered himself wholly able to carry out such a
movement.” Macdonald afterward told Walker that he never received this
message. From this fact, it would appear that Davis’ offer was a mere
effort to entrap Walker into writing something which might seem to
justify the former in the course he afterward took.
On the morning of the 24th the women and children left Rivas in charge of
Lieut. Huston and under the protection of the United States flag. Among
them were several ladies who had encountered the dangers and privations
of the camp with a courage and fortitude which might have made many
of the men blush. Their departure was a great relief to Walker, as it
removed one of the most serious obstacles to a movement from Rivas; and
it was reasonable to suppose that their absence would inspire new spirit
and resolution into the troops thus relieved of an anxious burden. Far
from this, however, desertions, which had almost ceased since the 11th,
re-commenced after the 24th; and by the 26th Johnson and Titus and
Bostwick had disappeared from Rivas. Late in the afternoon of that day
it was reported to Walker that Bell, commanding at Santa Ursula, had
not been seen for several hours; and when he did re-appear, his orders
in regard to the change of the sentries’ post, were suspicious. He was
ordered to headquarters; but soon after the aid communicated the order,
Bell mounted his mule, and riding hastily past the sentries, fled to the
Allied camp.
But while Americans were thus proving false to themselves and false to
their countrymen, the native Nicaraguans in Rivas were giving an example
of fidelity and fortitude worthy the race which had been naturalized
in their midst. The natives in Rivas were mostly Democrats from San
Jorge, and they were there by families—fathers and sons fighting together
against the Allied foes who had violated their fields and their homes.
They bore the scanty fare of the camp with patience and cheerfulness,
saying they had not as much need of meat rations as the Americans,
who were accustomed to have beef every day. During the frequent
conversations, too, which occurred between the men at the barricades
of the respective forces, Pineda reminded the native Nicaraguans who
were with the Allies that he saw the flag of his country flying on the
walls of Rivas, while only the Costa Rican colors floated over the camp
without. Some of the soldiers would reply to Pineda that they were
“agarrados”—caught up—and were tied to their barricades; and it was
noticed that the Americans were never annoyed by the fire from the points
at which the Leoneses were stationed. On the 27th, Pineda threw among
the Leoneses an address which, while it indicates the loftiness of his
character, also shows his opinion as to the conduct of the Americans in
Nicaragua. “Born,” so the address read, “a citizen of Nicaragua like
yourselves, fond of liberty, and desirous of seeing its flag waving over
our country, I early enlisted under that standard. All the hardships
tyranny can heap upon a man, all the horrors of the civil war, which for
so many years has been our plague, I have suffered without complaint.
The scars I bear with pride are the best proof of what I say. I feel my
enthusiasm yet more strengthened by the testimony I find in my heart
that none of the heavy sacrifices I have made were made for low or
selfish interest. Never, I believe, never have I been found guilty, at
your hands, of any misconduct; and I call upon you to bear witness to
the correctness of my words. You were my fellow-soldiers, and bestowed
upon me your confidence. Under these circumstances, what other object
than your happiness and welfare could nerve me? My own happiness, my
reputation, my private feelings, and all that is mine, are involved in
this struggle for liberty. Yes, and I call upon those leaders who drag
you into this murderous war of extermination, to say if they have not
been indemnified, if they have not accumulated profits by it, while
you and I have received nothing. The flag of Nicaragua waves over this
city, and it is a painful disgrace to see it besieged by the armies of
Costa Rica and Guatemala, and you, my fellow-countrymen, assault it
with them.” Then, reminding them of the services they had received at
the hands of Walker, the address adds: “How is it that you, my friends,
should fight against him, thus giving a most striking instance of perfidy
and ingratitude? No: it cannot be. My heart is filled with gloom, and,
fellow-soldiers, believe me when I say that tears fell from my eyes on
hearing the voices of those who used to take my hand with heartfelt
demonstrations of friendship. When I see you where you are, I dare tell
you to awake from your slumber, and fly from the enemy’s ranks to the
only man who will bring us in safety to the bosom of peace and happiness,
by putting an end to this desolating war. But if you continue in your
present course, and remain the tools of barbarism, you will meet reproof,
though war may last some time and your own acts obstruct its termination.”
Little occurred between the 27th and 30th to change the condition of the
respective parties. In order, however, to understand the events of the
30th, it will be necessary to relate occurrences at San Juan del Sur
previous to that date. Then may we perceive how efficiently the U. S.
naval forces, on the Pacific side, co-operated in the policy the British
ships pursued toward parties on the San Juan river.
For the facts which transpired at San Juan del Sur, the log of the
schooner Granada will be principally relied on, and full extracts from
the log will furnish the clearest and most accurate narrative. On
Wednesday, the 8th of April, the schooner lying in the port of San Juan,
we find: “At 9 A.M., 100 of the enemy came into the town and fired some
few shots at the schooner and at one or two of the citizens, doing no
damage; we did not return their shots, on account of the steamer being in
range full of passengers, but slipped our chain and dropped out of reach.
Through the intercession of Captain Davis, of the U. S. sloop-of-war
St. Mary’s, we agreed to not fire upon each other, as we might endanger
American life and property. At 2 P.M. the Orizaba left for California. At
9 P.M. the enemy left San Juan.” Then, on the margin of the log for April
15th, we find: “At 9 A.M. one of the enemy came in and met Gottell.” This
Gottell was a German, claiming to be a naturalized citizen of the United
States. On the margin for the next day Fayssoux remarks: “In conversing
with Gottell he acknowledged that the above man came from the enemy’s
camp on Tuesday.” On the 17th, in the body of the log: “Made a formal
charge to Captain Davis, of the U. S. sloop-of-war, St. Mary’s, against
Gottell, for his violating his neutrality, and received his assurance
that Gottell should be punished if it occurred again. Mora requested
Davis to go up and speak to the troops at Rivas, to get them to desert
General Walker.” Then in the margin for the same day: “Captain Davis
read to me letters from Mora. Later in the day we heard that about 150
of the enemy were in and about town. Lieutenant McCorkle, of the St.
Mary’s, came on board and said that Colonel Estrada wished the former
truce continued.” On the 18th, the log says: “At 10 P.M. received a
communication from shore, to the effect that Jerez was coming in with
200 more troops, and that they were going to fire on the schooner at
daylight; slipped my chain and dropped out of their reach.” In the
margin, for the same day: “The enemy offered Michael Mars $2,000 to place
the schooner in their hands.” On the 21st: “The enemy negotiating with
Thomas Edwards to deliver up the schooner.”
On the 22d Fayssoux notes in the log: “I met Col. Estrada, the commander
of the enemy, on board of the U. S. sloop St. Mary’s; he expressed
great gratitude for my treatment of his countrymen that I had taken
prisoners, and offered his services to me.” On the 23d: “Saw a letter
from ex-Captain James Mullen, in which he stated that Roman Rivas wished
him to see me, and offer $5,000 if I would deliver the schooner to the
enemy. Colonel Garcia, second in command, requested an interview with
me on board of the U. S. sloop, St. Mary’s, to communicate something
of importance—I suppose another attempt to bribe.” Then, on Friday,
the 24th, we have an account of a most singular scene aboard of the St.
Mary’s. Fayssoux’s object in permitting the interview may be readily
imagined, but it is more difficult to divine why Davis should permit his
ship to be made the theatre of an attempt to seduce an officer from his
allegiance. But to the log: “I met Colonel Garcia on board of the St.
Mary’s. He stated that Jerez had written to him (by order of General
Mora), to see me and try to make some arrangement to bring the war to a
speedy close; that the schooner being in port, under General Walker’s
orders, she was much dreaded and might delay the close of the war. He
asked if I had any proposition to make; I told him that he had sought the
interview, and that I was waiting to hear for what purpose. He then said
that they wished the schooner taken from the port or given up to them.
I asked upon what terms: he said that he was not prepared to offer any,
but that a commissioner would be appointed for that purpose; that his
object was to see if I could be approached. I said that I would listen
to any proposition from General Mora; that the present interview had not
effected anything; that he had not proposed any mode of closing the war;
that we stood as we had done previously. I acted on the above occasion
with the knowledge and approval of Captain Davis and Colonel Macdonald,
and at no time lost command of my temper, although seeing the full extent
of the dishonor offered me, and the insult of their sending such a noted
thief and traitor to confer with me.”
For the 25th, we find: “Sent word by Capt. Charles H. Davis to Col.
Estrada that if he did not discontinue erecting barricades which could
be commanded by my guns that I would fire upon him; he agreed to do so
until Lieut. Huston of the St. Mary’s should arrive from Rivas, where he
had gone to escort the American ladies who were there, to San Juan. Col.
Estrada said that in erecting barricades he had nothing in view against
this schooner, but put them up to prevent the landing of troops; that he
did it in ignorance, not meaning to violate the agreement between him and
myself. At 4 P.M. some thirty women and children arrived at the Pacific
hotel. The barricades not worked upon.” Then on the 26th: “Capt. Davis
spoke again to Col. Estrada in regard to the barricades; he said he would
not do anything on them until he heard from Rivas. Capt. Davis wrote to
General Mora asking him to confirm the truce, as the number of women
had largely increased, and that I felt it my duty to fire upon their
barricades, if in reach of my guns. The enemy mounted and brought to the
beach an old gun that they found lying in the street Capt. Davis says
that General Mora has written to him several times, appearing anxious for
him to come to him and open a treaty with General Walker.” And in the
margin: “I had to urge Capt. Davis at all times to interfere about the
barricades.”
On the 27th: “At 10ʰ 45′ saw the enemy erecting a barricade in the
Columbia hotel; I immediately prepared to haul in shore. At the same
time I sent to Capt. Davis, and said that as the enemy were acting in
bad faith I would fire upon them. He sent First Lieut. Maury to me to
ask if I would not wait until he heard from Rivas. I replied that I
would if Capt. Davis would then go on shore and destroy them (meaning the
barricades). Lieut. Maury could not answer that question. I then told
him that if they did not stop that in half an hour I would fire. Lieut.
Maury then went to Colonel Estrada and said that Capt. Davis looked on
the truce as at an end, and that I would fire in half an hour. Colonel
Estrada wished to debate the question, and again pleaded ignorance; but
Lieut. Maury said that he had nothing more to say, that I would fire.
Estrada then agreed to let the barricade alone, and that the truce should
be observed. The first note was sent to Col. C. J. Macdonald, and shown
by him to Capt. D., who said that he would take me if I did fire, as he
thought it would be his duty. Macdonald was asked to come on board and
say that I must not fire, as Davis would take me; Macdonald asked for
that threat in writing; Davis offered to give it, but after some more
conversation on the subject, he sent the above message to Estrada. Capt.
D. acknowledged to Macdonald that it would be my duty to fire if the
enemy did not desist; his reasoning was entirely incomprehensible to me.”
And the reasoning is incomprehensible to any one, on the supposition
of Davis’ neutrality. The marginal note on the log for the 27th, says:
“Although being perfectly aware of the treachery of the enemy at all
times, and their violation of the truce in building barricades in reach
of my guns, I permitted them to go to a certain extent, hoping to turn
them to our advantage. And thinking it policy, I did not urge upon Capt.
Davis his duty to destroy those already started or completed, though I
took occasion to let his officers know my views on the subject, and that
I thought he was easily satisfied with promises which were constantly
broken; that I had had opportunities of gaining advantages, but had
scrupulously kept the truce.”
Tuesday, April 28th: “Saw the enemy putting up a barricade on the
Transit road. Although the fact was mentioned to Capt. Davis, he did
not take any action upon it, but told me that General Mora, in reply to
a letter from him, said that though he looked upon it as a matter of
great importance to fortify San Juan, as Davis requested it, he would
not put up barricades under my guns. Lieut. McCorkle visited the enemy’s
camp, to ascertain if reports brought by a man by the name of Titus from
General Walker’s camp were true, he, Titus, being thought a traitor.” On
the 29th: “At 2 P.M. Lieut. McCorkle returned from the Allied camp. He
reports our men deserting in large bodies; that General Mora says that
General Walker will not be included in any treaty that may be made.” Then
on the 30th: “Capt. Davis visited the camp of the Allies for the purpose
of treating between them and General Walker.”
The facts plainly and simply told by the log of the schooner show that
Davis was in constant communication with Mora, and that he was fully
aware of the value of the Granada to Walker, and of the importance the
Allies attached to her presence at San Juan del Sur. It was with a full
and thorough knowledge of the ineffectual efforts Mora had made to get
the schooner that Davis reached the headquarters of the Allies, whence on
the afternoon of the 30th, he sent a letter to Walker by an aide-de-camp
of the Costa Rican general-in-chief. The latter proposed that Walker
should abandon Rivas and go aboard of the St. Mary’s to Panama, Davis
undertaking to guarantee his personal safety. Although the tone of the
letter was offensive, Walker, thinking Davis might have some information
he did not possess, and unwilling to let slip an opportunity of gaining
knowledge as to what was passing between Davis and the Allies, replied
that the proposition of the United States commander was vague, and
suggested a visit on his part to Rivas. Davis answered that he was sorry
Walker found his proposition vague; that he proposed the latter should
“abandon the enterprise and leave the country;” that Walker might rely
on the fact of Lockridge having left San Juan river; and finally that he
had maturely considered the invitation to enter Rivas, and had decided,
unreservedly, not to take such a step. Thus did the United States
commander refuse to see for himself the state of the force in Rivas
before he determined on the course he should pursue. In reply to the
second letter of Davis, Walker proposed to send two officers, Henningsen
and Waters, to confer with the United States commander, provided they
had safe conduct from Mora. The required safe conduct was forthwith
sent, and with a short note in the handwriting of Zavala, but signed
by Davis, saying that Henningsen and Waters should proceed at once to
the headquarters of the Allies, as the commander of the St. Mary’s was
obliged to return speedily to San Juan del Sur.
Accordingly, Henningsen and Waters proceeded to the headquarters of the
Allies, and what there passed may be best told in the words of the
written report Henningsen made to Walker on the 2d of May. The report
says:—
“In conformity with your instructions on the night of the 30th of April,
I proceeded with Col. Waters to the enemy’s camp at Cuatro Esquinas, to
confer on your behalf with Capt. Davis of the U. S. sloop-of-war St.
Mary’s. Capt. Davis remarked that he was in possession of information,
which, in his opinion, rendered your position at Rivas untenable, and
that he had, therefore, with the view of saving further useless effusion
of blood, opened negotiations with the Allies for the evacuation of that
place, in the event of his being able to obtain your concurrence.
“This information was, firstly, that Col. Lockridge had retired with all
your forces to the United States, leaving the enemy in possession of
the San Juan river; secondly, that the Transit Company intended to send
no more steamers to San Juan del Sur; thirdly, that you were reduced to
a few days’ provisions, and that your ranks were being rapidly thinned
by desertion. Under these circumstances, considering your position as
desperate in Rivas, he had to propose that you should surrender Rivas to
him, that you and your staff should accompany him to San Juan del Sur,
to be transported by the St. Mary’s to Panama; that the rest of the army
and citizens should be likewise transported via Tortugas and Punta Arenas
to Panama, after surrendering their arms to him, the officers retaining
their side-arms. I replied that your entertaining such a proposition
would depend on your being satisfied with regard to the evacuation of
the river by Col. Lockridge and his command, as your principal motive for
holding Rivas to the last moment was the fear that he might arrive and
find it occupied by the enemy: that with regard to your position being
desperate, it was true that you could not, from want of provisions, hold
Rivas much longer, but that you could break through the enemy’s lines
and march in any direction at present: that, if further enfeebled, you
could always cut your way to the Pacific, and embark either at San Juan
or at some other point on the coast, on your schooner Granada, which
had on board two six-pounders and a store of arms, cartridges, cannon
ammunition, powder and lead. On this Capt. Davis remarked, that he must
at once inform me that it was his unalterable determination not to allow
the schooner Granada to leave the port, and to take possession of her
previous to his sailing from San Juan del Sur, which must take place in
a few days; that he was acting on instructions from his superior—from
his commander-in-chief;[6] that, since the outgoing of the late
administration at Washington, instructions had been received from the
new, which contained nothing to induce him to alter the course which
he intended to pursue; but that he preferred I would consider all this
as unsaid, and that you would regard him as acting on his own and sole
responsibility. I remarked, that his resolution was a most important one
and would probably prove a determining fact, and therefore asked him
deliberately to repeat whether it was his fixed determination to seize
the schooner Granada. He replied that it was his unalterable resolution
not to allow the Granada to leave the harbor of San Juan, and to take
possession of her before he sailed. With regard to the evacuation of the
San Juan river by Col. Lockridge and his command, he said, that he had
entirely satisfied himself of the fact, both by the investigations of his
Lieut. McCorkle, and by perusal that morning of a contract for passage
to the United States, signed by Scott and by officers of the British
squadron, besides other corroborative evidence. I observed that he might
have been imposed upon by a forgery, and asked whether his conviction was
shared by C. J. Macdonald, agent of the Transit Company, whose experience
rendered his opinion valuable. Capt. Davis replied that Mr. Macdonald
had been satisfied of the fact by Lieut. McCorkle’s report, but that he
(Capt. Davis), fully aware of the responsibility he was assuming, pledged
himself for the authenticity of this statement. I thereupon agreed to
communicate to you this conversation, and to submit the following offers
from Capt. Davis, as the only propositions likely to be admissible, viz:
That, under the guarantee of the American flag, you should, with sixteen
officers of your selection, with their arms, horses and effects, leave
Rivas to embark at San Juan for Panama; that Rivas with its garrison,
should be surrendered to Capt. Davis; that the privates should deliver up
their arms, and, together with the officers, employees and citizens, be
transported by another route to Panama, accompanied by a United States
officer, and under guarantee of the United States flag. At 2 o’clock,
A.M., 1st May, I returned to Rivas, promising your answer at 10 o’clock,
and personally to come back, if the negotiation was not broken off.”
In the offers thus submitted by Henningsen, nothing was said of the
native Nicaraguans then in Rivas. Walker, therefore, informed Henningsen
that he would sign nothing, or agree to nothing, unless ample guarantees
were given for the safety, both in person and property, of the native
Nicaraguans. Hence, when Henningsen returned at 10 o’clock, A.M., on the
first of May, with the draft of an agreement to be signed by Walker and
Davis, it contained a clause protecting all natives of Central America
then in Rivas. The convention submitted to Davis, and signed by him,
reads as follows:
“RIVAS, May 1, 1857.
“An agreement is hereby entered into between Gen. William
Walker, on the one part, and Commander H. Davis, of the U. S.
Navy, on the other part, and of which the stipulations are as
follows:
“Firstly, Gen. Wm. Walker, with sixteen officers of his staff,
shall march out of Rivas with their side-arms, pistols, horses,
and personal baggage, under the guarantee of the said Capt.
Davis, of the U. S. Navy, that they shall not be molested by
the enemy, and shall be allowed to embark on board the U. S.
vessel-of-war, the St. Mary’s, in the harbor of San Juan del
Sur, the said Capt. Davis, undertaking to transport them safely
on the St. Mary’s to Panama.
“Secondly, The officers of Gen. Walker’s army shall march
out of Rivas with their side-arms, under the guarantee and
protection of Capt. Davis, who undertakes to see them safely
transported to Panama, in charge of a United States officer.
“Thirdly, The privates and non-commissioned officers, citizens,
and employees of Departments, wounded or unwounded, shall be
surrendered with their arms to Capt. Davis, or one of his
officers, and placed under his protection and control, he
pledging himself to have them safely transported to Panama, in
charge of a United States officer, in separate vessels from
the deserters from the ranks, and without being brought into
contact with them.
“Fourthly, Capt. Davis undertakes to obtain guarantees, and
hereby does guarantee that all natives of Nicaragua, or
of Central America, now in Rivas, and surrendered to the
protection of Capt. Davis, shall be allowed to reside in
Nicaragua, and be protected in life and property.
“Fifthly, It is agreed that such officers as have wives and
families in San Juan del Sur, shall be allowed to remain there
under the protection of the U. S. Consul, till an opportunity
offers of embarking for Panama or San Francisco.
“Gen. Walker and Capt. Davis mutually pledge themselves to each
other that this agreement shall be executed in good faith.”
It will be noticed that this agreement was made entirely between Walker
and Davis, and the Allies were not mentioned in it except as “the enemy.”
Nor would it be necessary, unless for the singular conduct of Commander
Davis afterward, to say that no other agreements were made or entered
into, except the one which was signed by the respective parties.
After Davis had agreed to the terms of the convention, Henningsen
returned to Rivas, and ordered the cannon, foundry, and ammunition to be
destroyed, by breaking the trunnions, and sawing through the carriages
of the former, by breaking up the steam-engine, fan, and cupola of the
foundry, and throwing the ammunition and powder into the arsenal-yard
wells. “In this manner were destroyed,” according to Henningsen’s report,
“in the arsenal, two twelve-pounder brass howitzers, three six-pounder
iron guns, four light iron twelve-pounder mortars, four brass guns
taken from the enemy, viz.: one four-pounder, and three five-pounder
guns; in the ordnance office, fifty-five thousand cartridges, three
hundred thousand caps, fifteen hundred pounds of powder. There remained
undestroyed: fifty-five shell, three hundred and twenty twenty-four-pound
shot—fired into Rivas by the enemy—two hundred and forty six-pound shot,
of iron cast from the enemy’s shot, from bell-metal, or from lead.”
While Swingle and Potter were, under Henningsen’s direction, executing
the orders for the destruction of the articles in the arsenal and
ordnance, Walker sent for the surgeon-general, Coleman, and informing
him of the agreement made with Davis, instructed him to remain in charge
of the hospital, and see that the sick and wounded were properly cared
for. He then made out a list of the officers who were to accompany him
on board the St. Mary’s, and notified them to prepare forthwith to
proceed to San Juan del Sur. The officers thus selected were, Henningsen,
Hooff, Brady, Natzmer, Waters, Henry, Swingle, Rogers, Tucker, Kellum,
McAllenny, West, Williamson, McEachin, McMichael, Hankins, and Bacon.
About five o’clock in the afternoon, Commander Davis, with Zavala,
arrived at Walker’s quarters; and Henningsen and Davis repaired to the
Plaza, where all the troops of the garrison were formed. The order of the
day, containing the agreement between Walker and Davis, was then read to
the troops, and the garrison was delivered to the commander of the St.
Mary’s. The state of the garrison, when given over to the United States
officer, was: Wounded and sick in and out of hospital, surgeons, and
hospital attendants, 173; prisoners, 102; officers, non-commissioned,
and privates, exclusive of the 16 going to San Juan, 148; employees of
departments and armed citizens, 86; native troops, 40. While Henningsen
was turning over the garrison to Davis, Walker, accompanied by the
officers he had selected, and by Gen. Zavala, rode out of Rivas, and took
the road for San Juan del Sur. On the night of the first of May, a few
hours after leaving Rivas, the Nicaraguan officers were aboard the St.
Mary’s.
Commander Davis did not reach the St. Mary’s until the morning of the
2d. Soon after he came aboard the sloop he proposed to Walker that the
schooner Granada should be given into his hands without the use of force.
Of course the proposal was rejected. He then said to Walker that the
latter might keep the arms and ammunition on the schooner if he would
give up the vessel. This was a proposition to sell the Granada, with all
the glories of the 23d of November, for the paltry cargo aboard of her;
and there was not a lieutenant in the service of Nicaragua who would
not have rejected it, with scorn and contempt for the officer, so far
forgetful of his own honor as to utter the proposal. Just before dinner,
on the 2d, Davis went ashore, leaving written orders with his first
lieutenant to take the schooner. The log of the Granada, for the 2d,
says: “At 4 P.M. Lieut. Maury came on board the schooner, and requested
me to turn over the schooner to Capt. Davis. I asked why I should do
so. He answered that Capt. Davis considered it his duty to seize her if
I did not give her up, as he looked upon her as included in the treaty
between himself and Gen. Walker. I refused to give her up.” Then Maury
returned to the St. Mary’s, and requested Walker to give an order to
Fayssoux to turn over the schooner to him. Walker replied he would not
give the order, unless there was a demonstration of overwhelming force
on the part of the St. Mary’s. Maury brought the broadside of the sloop
to bear on the Granada, and then he received the order of surrender.
The log continues: “He (that is Maury) returned in half an hour, with
an order from Gen. Walker to turn her over to the United States; he was
accompanied by 100 armed men and a howitzer. At 4.30 P.M. the Nicaraguan
flag was hauled down, and the United States’ run up in its place, and my
crew sent on shore.” Finally, on the 4th of May, the Granada was turned
over to Costa Rica, and the person who received her for that republic was
an aid of Cañas, a Jamaica negro, known by the name of Captain Murray.
This was a fit conclusion to the combined efforts of the British and
United States naval forces to get the Americans out of Nicaragua. The
descendant of revolutionary ancestors,[7] bearing, in his own name of
Irvine that of a grandsire who was a general officer in the war of
Independence—himself fitted by the purity and integrity of his character
to adorn the service of any power on either continent—was forced to give
way to a negro subject of Her Britannic Majesty holding a commission from
the Republic of Costa Rica. The poet could not have imagined aught more
striking or more characteristic.
Thus have I, during a leisure thrust on me against my will, tried to tell
clearly and concisely the story of the rise, progress, and close, for a
time, of the War in Nicaragua. Doubtless many brave deeds and some worthy
names have escaped the notice they deserve, for I have been obliged
to write almost entirely from memory, with few papers or documents to
refresh my recollection of events now some time past. My main effort has
been to trace as distinctly as I could the causes of the war, the manner
in which it was waged, and the circumstances attending its conclusion.
As I said in the last general order published at Rivas: “Reduced to our
present position by the cowardice of some, the incapacity of others,
and the treachery of many, the army has yet written a page of American
history which it is impossible to forget or erase. From the future,
if not from the present, we may expect just judgment.” That which you
ignorantly call “Filibusterism” is not the offspring of hasty passion or
ill-regulated desire; it is the fruit of the sure, unerring instincts
which act in accordance with laws as old as the creation. They are but
drivellers who speak of establishing fixed relations between the pure
white American race, as it exists in the United States, and the mixed
Hispano-Indian race, as it exists in Mexico and Central America, without
the employment of force. The history of the world presents no such
Utopian vision as that of an inferior race yielding meekly and peacefully
to the controlling influence of a superior people. Whenever barbarism and
civilization, or two distinct forms of civilization, meet face to face,
the result must be war. Therefore, the struggle between the old and the
new elements in Nicaraguan society was not passing or accidental, but
natural and inevitable. The war in Nicaragua was the first clear and
distinct issue made between the races inhabiting the northern and the
central portions of the continent. But while this contest sprang from
natural laws, I trust the foregoing narrative shows that the stronger
race kept throughout on the side of right and justice; and if they so
maintained their cause in Central America let them not doubt of its
future success. Nor kings nor presidents can arrest a movement based on
truth and conducted with justice; and the very obstacles they place in
the way merely prepare those who are injured for the part they are to
play in the world’s history. He is but a blind reader of the past who has
not learned that Providence fits its agents for great designs by trials,
and sufferings, and persecutions. “By the cross thou shalt conquer” is
as clearly written in the pages of history as when the startled emperor
saw it blazing in letters of light athwart the heavens. In the very
difficulties with which the Americans of Nicaragua have had to contend
I see the presage of their triumph. Let me, therefore, say to my former
comrades, be of good cheer: faint not, nor grow weary by the way, for
your toils and your efforts are sure in the end to win success. With us
there can be no choice; honor and duty call on us to pursue the path we
have entered, and we dare not be deaf to the appeal. By the bones of
the mouldering dead at Masaya, at Rivas, and at Granada, I adjure you
never to abandon the cause of Nicaragua. Let it be your waking and your
sleeping thought to devise means for a return to the land whence we were
unjustly brought. And, if we be but true to ourselves, all will yet end
well.
THE END.
[Illustration: COLTON’S NICARAGUA
GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, SAN SALVADOR & COSTA RICA.
_Revised, Enlarged_ AND PUBLISHED BY S. H. GOETZEL & Co. Mobile, Ala.]
FOOTNOTES
[1] It may be proper to say that these passages were written before Mr.
Seward delivered in the Senate, his masterly speech of the 29th February,
1860. However much a person may differ from the Senator’s views, it
is impossible not to approve the force and vigor of his thoughts and
language. The writer deems it a great error, on the part of Southern men,
to attempt to belittle the intellect, or depreciate the motives of the
leaders of the anti-slavery party. The higher their intellects, the purer
their motives, the more dangerous are they to the South.
[2] The resolutions were written by Hon. P. Soulé.
[3] Hon. A. H. Stephens was among the few public men of the South who
clearly perceived the full importance of the Nicaraguan movement.
[4] The writer is principally indebted for the incidents of the
operations at Granada between the 24th November and 12th of December to
the “_Personal Recollections of Nicaragua,” by Gen. C. F. Henningsen,
author of “Recollections of Russia,” and “Twelve Months’ Campaign in
Spain_.”
[5] His Excellency James Buchanan.
[6] The commander-in-chief referred to was probably Commodore Mervine.
The latter was an old and intimate friend, as the author has been told,
of Secretary Marcy; and both he and Davis were sent to the Pacific in
January, 1857. Undoubtedly both of them received verbal instructions far
more precise and definite, than their written orders. Soon after Davis
reached Panama, direct from New-York, he took command of the St. Mary’s
and sailed for San Juan del Sur.
[7] The paternal grandfather of Captain Fayssoux was chief surgeon of the
Carolina forces during the war of Independence; his maternal grandfather
was General Irvine, who commanded a division under Washington at the
crossing of the Delaware.
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