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Title: Thought-Culture
or Practical Mental Training
Author: William Walker Atkinson
Release Date: November 30, 2012 [EBook #41519]
Language: English
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THE
New Psychology Series
_By_ WILLIAM WALKER ATKINSON
In the past few years a widespread mental and spiritual awakening has
taken place among the people of this country. And this new awakening has
been very aptly called THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY MOVEMENT, because it has to do
with the development and expression of the mind, or soul, of both the
individual and the nation.
The New Psychology
The Will
Memory
Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion
The Subconscious and Superconscious Planes of Mind
The Psychology of Success
The Art of Logical Thinking
Thought-Culture
The Psychology of Salesmanship
The Art of Expression
Mind and Body
Human Nature
Although each book stands alone as an authority on the subject treated,
yet one theme runs through the series, binding them together to make a
complete whole.
The uniform postpaid price of each volume is $1.00
We are making a special price of $10.00 for the entire set
THE PROGRESS COMPANY :: CHICAGO
THOUGHT-CULTURE
OR
PRACTICAL MENTAL TRAINING
By WILLIAM WALKER ATKINSON
L.N. FOWLER & COMPANY
7, Imperial Arcade, Ludgate Circus
London, E.C., England
1909
THE PROGRESS COMPANY
CHICAGO, ILL.
COPYRIGHT, 1910
BY
THE PROGRESS COMPANY
P.F. PETTIBONE & CO
Printers and Binders
Chicago
CONTENTS
I. The Power of Thought 9
II. The Nature of Thought 19
III. Phases of Thought 27
IV. Thought Culture 37
V. Attention 47
VI. Perception 57
VII. Representation 76
VIII. Abstraction 85
IX. Association of Ideas 95
X. Generalization 106
XI. Judgment 130
XII. Derived Judgments 138
XIII. Reasoning 152
XIV. Constructive Imagination 175
CHAPTER I.
THE POWER OF THOUGHT
In other volumes of this series we have considered the operations of the
human mind known as Will, Memory, etc. We now approach the consideration
of those mental activities which are concerned with the phenomena of
_thought_--those activities which we generally speak of as the operation
of the intellect or reason.
What is thought? The answer is not an easy one, although we use the term
familiarly almost every hour of our waking existence. The dictionaries
define the term "Thought" as follows: "The act of thinking; the exercise
of the mind in any way except sense and perception; serious
consideration; deliberation; reflection; the power or faculty of
thinking; the mental faculty of the mind; etc." This drives us back upon
the term, "to think" which is defined as follows: "To occupy the mind on
some subject; to have ideas; to revolve ideas in the mind; to cogitate;
to reason; to exercise the power of thought; to have a succession of
ideas or mental states; to perform any mental operation, whether of
apprehension, judgment, or illation; to judge; to form a conclusion, to
determine; etc."
Thought is an operation of the intellect. The intellect is: "that
faculty of the human soul or mind by which it receives or comprehends
the ideas communicated to it by the senses or by perception, or other
means, as distinguished from the power to feel and to will; the power or
faculty to perceive objects in their relations; the power to judge and
comprehend; also the capacity for higher forms of knowledge as
distinguished from the power to perceive and imagine."
When we say what we "think," we mean that we exercise the faculties
whereby we compare and contrast certain things with other things,
observing and noting their points of difference and agreement, then
classifying them in accordance with these observed agreements and
differences. In _thinking_ we tend to classify the multitude of
impressions received from the outside world, arranging thousands of
objects into one general class, and other thousands into other general
classes, and then sub-dividing these classes, until finally we have
found mental pigeon-holes for every conceivable idea or impression. We
then begin to make inferences and deductions regarding these ideas or
impressions, working from the known to the unknown, from particulars to
generalities, or from generalities to particulars, as the case may be.
It is this faculty or power of thought--this use of the intellect, that
has brought man to his present high position in the world of living
things. In his early days, man was a much weaker animal than those with
whom he was brought into contact. The tigers, lions, bears, mammoths,
and other ferocious beasts were much stronger, fiercer, and fleeter than
man, and he was placed in a position so lacking of apparent equal chance
of survival, that an observer would have unhesitatingly advanced the
opinion that this weak, feeble, slow animal must soon surely perish in
the struggle for existence, and that the "survival of the fittest" would
soon cause him to vanish from the scene of the world's activities. And,
so it would have been had he possessed no equipment other than those of
the other animals; viz., strength, natural weapons and speed. And yet
man not only survived in spite of these disadvantages, but he has
actually conquered, mastered and enslaved these other animals which
seemed likely to work his destruction. Why? How?
This feeble animal called _man_ had within him the elements of a new
power--a power manifested in but a slight degree in the other animals.
He possessed an intellect by which he was able to deduce, compare,
infer--reason.
His lack of natural weapons he overcame by borrowing the idea of the
tooth and claw of the other animals, imitating them in flint and shaping
them into spears; borrowing the trunk of the elephant and the paw of the
tiger, and reproducing their blow-striking qualities in his wooden club.
Not only this but he took lessons from the supple limbs and branches of
the trees, and copied the principle in his bow, in order to project its
minature spear, his arrow. He sheltered himself, his mate and his
young, from the fury of the storm, first by caves and afterwards by rude
houses, built in inaccessible places, reached only by means of crude
ladders, bridges, or climbing poles. He built doors for his habitations,
to protect himself from the attacks of these wild enemies--he heaped
stones at the mouth of his caves to keep them out. He placed great
boulders on cliffs that he might topple them down on the approaching
foe. He learned to hurl rocks with sure aim with his strong arm. He
copied the floating log, and built his first rude rafts, and then
evolved the hollowed canoe. He used the skins of animals to keep him
warm--their tendons for his bowstrings. He learned the advantages of
cooperation and combined effort, and thus formed the first rudiments of
society and social life. And finally--man's first great discovery--he
found the art of fire making.
As a writer has said: "For some hundreds of years, upon the general
plane of self-consciousness, an ascent, to the human eye gradual but
from the point of view of cosmic evolution rapid, has been made. In a
race large-brained, walking-erect, gregarious, brutal, but king of all
other brutes, man in appearance but not in fact, was from the highest
simple-consciousness born the basic human faculty, self-consciousness
and its twin, language. From these and what went with these, through
suffering, toil and war; through bestiality, savagery, barbarism;
through slavery, greed, effort, through conquests infinite, through
defeats overwhelming, through struggle unending; through ages of aimless
semi-brutal existence, through subsistence on berries and roots; through
the use of the casually found stone or stick; through life in deep
forests, with nuts and seeds, and on the shores of waters with mollusks,
crustaceans and fish for food; through that greatest, perhaps, of human
victories, the domestication and subjugation of fire; through the
invention and art of bow and arrow; through the training of animals and
the breaking of them to labor; through the long learning which led to
the cultivation of the soil; through the adobe brick and the building of
houses therefrom; through the smelting of metals and the slow birth of
the arts which rest upon these; through the slow making of alphabets
and the evolution of the written work; in short, through thousands of
centuries of human life, of human aspiration, of human growth, sprang
the world of men and women as it stands before us and within us today
with all its achievements and possessions."
The great difference between thought as we find it in man, and its forms
among the lower animals lies in what psychologists have called
"progressive thought." The animals advance but little in their thinking
processes but rest content with those of their ancestors--their thought
seems to have become set or crystallized during the process of their
evolution. The birds, mammals and the insects vary but little in their
mental processes from their ancestors of many thousand years ago. They
build their nests, or dens, in almost precisely the same manner as did
their progenitors in the stone-age. But man has slowly but steadily
progressed, in spite of temporary set-backs and failures. He has
endeavored to progress and improve. Those tribes which fell back in
regard to mental progress and advancement, have been left behind in the
race, and in many cases have become extinct. The great natural law of
the "survival of the fittest" has steadily operated in the life of the
race. The "fittest" were those best adapted to grapple with and overcome
the obstacles of their environment, and these obstacles were best
overcome by the use of the intellect. Those tribes and those individuals
whose intellect was active, tended to survive where others perished, and
consequently they were able to transmit their intellectual quality to
their descendants.
Halleck says: "Nature is constantly using her power to kill off the
thoughtless, or to cripple them in life's race. She is determined that
only the fittest and the descendants of the fittest shall survive. By
the 'fittest' she means those who have thought and whose ancestors have
thought and profited thereby. Geologists tell us that ages ago there
lived in England bears, tigers, elephants, lions and many other powerful
and fierce animals. There was living contemporaneous with them a much
weaker animal, that had neither the claws, the strength, nor the speed
of the tiger. In fact this human being was almost defenceless. Had a
being from another planet been asked to prophesy, he would undoubtedly
have said that this helpless animal would be the first to be
exterminated. And yet every one of those fierce creatures succumbed
either to the change of climate, or to man's inferior strength. The
reason was that man had one resource denied to the animals--the power of
progressive thought. The land sank, the sea cut off England from the
mainland, the climate changed, and even the strongest animals were
helpless. But man changed his clothing with the changing climate. He
made fires; he built a retreat to keep off death by cold. He thought out
means to kill or to subdue the strongest animals. Had the lions, tigers
or bears the power of progressive thought, they could have combined, and
it would have been possible for them to exterminate man before he
reached the civilized stage.... Man no longer sleeps in caves. The smoke
no longer fills his home or finds its way out through the chinks in the
walls or a hole in the roof. In traveling, he is no longer restricted to
his feet or even to horses. For all this improvement man is indebted to
_thought_. That has harnessed the very vibrations of the ether to do his
bidding."
And thus we see that man owes his present place on earth to his
Thought-Culture. And, it certainly behooves us to closely consider and
study the methods and processes whereby each and every man may cultivate
and develop the wondrous faculties of the mind which are employed in the
processes of Thought. The faculties of the Mind, like the muscles of the
body, may be developed, trained and cultivated. The process of such
mental development is called "THOUGHT-CULTURE," and forms the subject of
this book.
CHAPTER II.
THE NATURE OF THOUGHT
It was formerly considered necessary for all books on the subject of
thought to begin by a recital of the metaphysical conceptions regarding
the nature and "thingness" of Mind. The student was led through many
pages and endless speculation regarding the metaphysical theories
regarding the origin and inner nature of Mind which, so far from
establishing a fixed and definite explanation in his mind, rather tended
toward confusing him and giving him the idea that psychology was of
necessity a speculative science lacking the firm practical basis
possessed by other branches of science. In the end, in the words of old
Omar, he "came out the door through which he went."
But this tendency has been overcome of late years, and writers on the
subject pass by all metaphysical conceptions regarding the nature of
Mind, and usually begin by plunging at once into the real business of
psychology--the business of the practical study of the mechanism and
activities of the mind itself. As some writer has said, psychology has
no more concern with the solution of the eternal riddle of "What is
Mind?" than physics with the twin-riddle of "What is Matter?" Both
riddles, and their answers, belong to entirely different branches and
fields of thought than those concerned with their laws of operation and
principles of activity. As Halleck says: "Psychology studies the
phenomena of mind, just as physics investigates those of matter." And,
likewise, just as the science of physics holds true in spite of the
varying and changing conceptions regarding the nature of matter, so does
the science of psychology hold true in spite of the varying and changing
conceptions regarding the nature of Mind.
Halleck has well said: "If a materialist should hold that the mind was
nothing but the brain, and that the brain was a vast aggregation of
molecular sheep herding together in various ways, his hypothesis would
not change the fact that sensation must precede perception, memory and
thought; nor would the laws of the association of ideas be changed, nor
would the fact that interest and repetition aid memory cease to hold
good. The man who thought his mind was a collection of little cells
would dream, imagine, think and feel; so also would he who believed his
mind to be immaterial. It is very fortunate that the same mental
phenomena occur, no matter what theory is adopted. Those who like to
study the puzzles as to what mind and matter really are must go to
metaphysics. Should we ever find that salt, arsenic and all things else
are the same substance with a different molecular arrangement, we should
still not use them interchangeably."
For the purposes of the study of practical psychology, we may as well
lay aside, if even for the moment, our pet metaphysical conceptions and
act as if we knew nothing of the essential nature of Mind (and indeed
Science in truth does _not_ know), and confine ourselves to the
phenomena and manifestations of Mind which, after all, is the only way
in which and by which we can know anything at all about it. As Brooks
says: "The mind can be defined only by its activities and
manifestations. In order to obtain a definition of the mind, therefore,
we must observe and determine its various forms of activity. These
activities, classified under a few general heads and predicated of the
unseen something which manifests them, will give us a definition of
mind."
The act of consciousness determines the existence of Mind in the person
experiencing it. No one can be conscious of thought and, at the same
time, deny the existence of mind within himself. For the very act of
denial, in itself, is a manifestation of thought and consequently an
assertion of the existence of mind. One may assert the axiom: "I think,
therefore, I have a mind;" but he is denied the privilege of arguing: "I
think, therefore, I have no mind." The mind has an ultimate and final
knowledge of its own existence.
The older view of Mind is that it is a something higher than matter
which it uses for its manifestation. It was held to be unknowable in
itself and to be studied only through its manifestations. It was
supposed to involve itself, to become involved, in some way in matter
and to there manifest itself in an infinitude of forms, degrees, and
variations. The materialistic view, which arose into prominence in the
middle of the Nineteenth Century, held, on the contrary, that Mind was
merely an activity or property of Matter--a function of matter akin to
extension and motion. Huxley, voicing this conception said: "We have no
knowledge of any thinking substance apart from an extended substance....
We shall, sooner or later, arrive at a mechanical equivalent of
consciousness, just as we have arrived at a mechanical equivalent of
heat." But, Huxley, himself, was afterwards constrained to acknowledge
that: "How it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness
comes about by the result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as
unaccountable as the appearance of the _jinnee_ when Aladdin rubbed his
lamp."
The most advanced authorities of the day, are inclined to the opinion
that both Matter and Mind are both differing aspects of some one
fundamental Something; or, as some of the closest thinkers state it,
both are probably two apparently differing manifestations or emanations
of an Underlying Something which, as Spencer says: "transcends not only
our reason but also our imagination." The study of philosophy and
metaphysics serves an important purpose in showing us _how much we do
not know_, and why we do not know--also in showing us the fallacy of
many things we had thought we did know--but when it comes to telling us
the real "why," actual cause, or essential nature of _anything_, it is
largely a disappointment to those who seek fundamental truths and
ultimate reasons. It is much more comfortable to "abjure the 'Why' and
seek the 'How'"--if we can.
Many psychologists classify the activities of the mind into three
general divisions; _viz._, (1) Thinking; (2) Willing; (3) Feeling. These
divisions, which result from what is known as "the tri-logical
classification," were first distinctly enunciated by Upham although Kant
had intimated it very plainly. For many years before the favored
division was but two-fold the line of division being between the
_cognitive_, or knowing, activities, and the _conative_, or acting,
activities, generally known as the Understanding and the Will,
respectively. It took a long time before the authorities would formally
recognize the great field of the Feelings as forming a class by
themselves and ranking with the Understanding and the Will. There are
certain sub-divisions and shadings, which we shall notice as we proceed,
some of which are more or less complex, and which seem to shade into
others. The student is cautioned against conceiving of the mind as a
thing having several compartments or distinct divisions. The
classification does not indicate this and is only intended as a
convenience in analyzing and studying the mental activities and
operations. The "I" which feels, thinks and acts is the same--one
entity.
As Brooks well says: "The mind is a self-conscious activity and not a
mere passivity; it is a centre of spiritual forces, all resting in the
background of the ego. As a centre of forces, it stands related to the
forces of the material and spiritual universe and is acted upon through
its susceptibilities by those forces. As a spiritual activity, it takes
the impressions derived from those forces, works them up into the
organic growth of itself, converts them into conscious knowledge and
uses these products as means to set other forces into activity and
produce new results. Standing above nature and superior to its
surroundings, it nevertheless feeds upon nature, as we may say, and
transforms material influences into spiritual facts akin to its own
nature. Related to the natural world and apparently originating from it,
it yet rises above this natural world and, with the crown of freedom
upon its brow, rules the natural obedient to its will."
In this book, while we shall fully and unquestionably recognize the
"tri-logical classification" of the activities of the Mind into the
divisions of Thinking, Willing and Feeling, respectively, nevertheless,
we shall, for convenience, use the term "Thought" in its broadest,
widest and most general sense, as: "The power or faculty of thinking;
the mental faculty; the mind," rather than in its narrower and
particular sense of: "the understanding or cognitive faculty of the
mind." Accordingly, we shall include the cultivation of the mental
activities known as Attention, Perception, Imagination, etc., together
with the strictly cognitive faculties, under the general term of
Thought-Culture.
CHAPTER III.
PHASES OF THOUGHT
We have seen that the Mind is that something within us which Thinks,
Feels and Wills. There are various phases of these three forms of
activity. These phases have often been called "the faculties of the
mind," although many authorities decry the use of this term, holding
that it gives an impression of _several parts or divisions_ of the mind,
separate and distinct from each other, whereas these phases are merely
the several _powers or forms of activity_ of the Mind. Every
manifestation of mental activity falls under one of the three
before-mentioned general forms, i.e., Thinking, Feeling and Willing,
respectively. Every manifestation of mental activity is either that of
the Intellect, the Feelings, or the Will. Let us consider the first of
these three general forms of mental activity--the Intellect.
The _Intellect_ is defined as: "That faculty or phase of the human mind
by which it receives or comprehends the ideas communicated to it by the
senses or by perception, or other means, as distinguished from the power
to feel and to will; the power or faculty to perceive objects in their
relations; the power to judge and comprehend; also the capacity for
higher forms of knowledge as distinguished from the power to perceive
and imagine." The term itself is derived from the Latin term
_intellectus_, the primary meaning of which is "to choose between,"
which primary meaning will give the true essential meaning of the term
in its present usage; namely, the faculty or phase of the mind by which
we "choose between" things or by which we _decide_.
The phase or faculty of Intellect concerns itself with Thinking, in the
particular and narrower sense of that term. Its products are _thoughts_,
_mental images_ and _ideas_. An _idea_ or _mental image_ is a mental
conception of anything, as for instance our conception which we express
by the terms, _man_, _animal_, _house_, _etc._ Sometimes the word _idea_
is used to express merely the abstract or generalized conception of the
thing, as, for instance, _Man_ in the sense of "all men;" while _mental
image_ is used in the sense of the mental conception of some one
particular thing, as a "_a man_;" it being held that no mental image can
be had of a generalization. A _thought_ is held to be a mental product
arising from a combination of two or more ideas or mental images, as for
instance: "A horse is an animal;" "a man is a biped;" etc.
The Intellect is held to embrace and include a number of minor phases or
faculties, such as Perception, Understanding, Imagination, Memory,
Reason and Intuition, which are explained as follows:
_Perception_ is that faculty of the Mind which interprets the material
presented to it by the senses. It is the power whereby we gain our
knowledge of the external world, as reported to us by the channels of
sense. Through Perception we are able to form ideas and mental images,
which in turn lead to thoughts. The objects of which we become conscious
through Perception are called _percepts_, which form the bases of what
we call _concepts_, or ideas.
_Understanding_ is that faculty of the Mind by the means of which we are
able intelligently to compare the objects presented to it by Perception,
and by which we separate them into parts by analysis, or to combine
them into greater classes, or wholes, by synthesis. It produces ideas,
both abstract and general; also concepts of truths, laws, principles,
causes, etc. There are several sub-phases of Understanding, which are
known as: Abstraction, Conception or Generalization, or Judgment and
Reasoning, respectively, which are explained as follows:
_Abstraction_ is that faculty of the Mind which enables it to abstract,
or draw off, and consider apart from an object, a particular _quality_
or _property_ of an object, thus making of the quality or property a
distinct object of thought apart from the original object. Thus are the
_abstract ideas_ of _sweetness_, _color_, _hardness_, _courage_,
_beauty_, etc., which we have abstracted or _drawn off_ from their
original associations, either for the purpose of putting them out of
sight and consideration, or else to view and consider them by
themselves. No one ever tasted "sweetness" although one may have tasted
_sweet things_; no one ever saw "red," although one may have seen _red
things_; no one ever saw, heard, tasted or felt "courage" in another,
although one may have seen _courageous people_. Abstract ideas are
merely the mental conception of _qualities_ or _properties_ divorced
from their associated objects by Abstraction.
_Conception_ or Generalization is that faculty of the Mind by which it
forms and groups together several particular ideas in the form of _a
general idea_. By the processes of Conception we form _classes_ or
_generalizations_ from particular ideas arising from our _percepts_.
First, we _perceive_ things; then we _compare_ them with each other;
then we abstract their particular qualities, which are not common to the
several objects; then we _generalize_ them according to their
resemblances; then we _name_ the generalized concept. From these
combined processes we form a Concept, or _general idea_ of the class of
things to which the particular things belong. Thus from subjecting a
number of cows to this process, we arrive at the general Concept of
"Cow." This general Concept includes all the qualities and properties
_common to all cows_, while omitting those which are not common to the
class. Or, we may form a concept of Napoleon Bonaparte, by combining his
several qualities and properties and thus form a _general idea_ of the
man.
_Judgment_ is that faculty of the Mind whereby we determine the
agreement or disagreement between two concepts, ideas, or objects of
thought, by comparing them with each other. From this comparison arises
the judgment, which is expressed in the shape of a logical
_proposition_: "The horse is an animal;" or "the horse is not a cow."
Judgment is also used in forming a concept, in the first place, for we
must _compare qualities_ before we can form a _general idea_.
_Reasoning_ is that faculty of the Mind whereby we compare two
Judgments, one with the other, and from the comparison deduce a third
Judgment. This is a form of indirect or mediate comparison, whereas the
Judgment is a form of immediate or direct comparison. From this process
of Reasoning arises a result which is expressed in what is called a
Syllogism, as for instance: "All dogs are animals; Carlo is a dog;
therefore, Carlo is an animal." Or expressed in symbols: "A equals C;
and B equals C;" therefore, "A equals B." Reasoning is of two kinds or
classes; _viz._, Inductive and Deductive, respectively. We have
explained these forms of Reasoning in detail in another volume of this
series.
_The Feelings_ are the mental faculties whereby we experience emotions
or feelings. Feelings are the experiencing of the agreeable or
disagreeable nature of our mental states. They can be defined only in
their own terms. If we have never experienced a feeling, we cannot
understand the words expressing it. Feelings result in what are called
emotion, affection and desire. An emotion is the simple feeling, such as
joy, sorrow, etc. An affection is an emotion reaching out toward another
and outside object, such as envy, jealousy, love, etc. A desire is an
emotion arising from the _want_ of some lacking quality or thing, and
the inclination to possess it.
_Memory_ is the faculty of the Mind whereby we retain and reproduce, or
consciously revive any kind of past mental experience. It has two
sub-phases; _viz._, Retention and Recollection, respectively. It
manifests in the storing away of mental images and ideas, and in the
reproduction of them at a later period of time, and also of the
recognition of them as objects of past experience.
_Imagination_ is the faculty of the Mind whereby we represent
(_re-pre-sent_) as a mental image some previously experienced idea,
concept or image. Its activities are closely allied and blended with
those of the Memory. It has the power not only of reproducing objects
already perceived but also another power of _ideal creation_ whereby it
_creates_ new combinations from the materials of past experience. It is
a faculty, the importance of which is but little understood by the
majority of men. Inasmuch as the mental image must always precede the
material manifestation, the cultivation of the Imagination becomes a
matter of great importance and worthy of the closest study.
_Intuition_ is the faculty of the Mind whereby it evolves what have been
called Primary Truths or Primary Ideas. By Primary Ideas are meant the
ideas of Space, Time, Cause, Identity, etc. By Primary Truths are meant
the so-called "Self-Evident Truths" of geometry, mathematics and logic.
Under the head of Intuition are also sometimes included the activities
of the Subconscious or Superconscious regions of the mind, of which we
have spoken in detail in a volume under that name of this series. Some
authorities hold to the older idea of "Innate Ideas" by which is meant
that every human being is born with the knowledge of certain fundamental
truths, unconnected with any experience. Others hold that these ideas
are simply the result of the experience of the race, transmitted to us
as "germ ideas" which must grow by experience and exercise.
* * * * *
That each and every faculty of the Mind may be strengthened and
developed by Culture and Exercise is now held to be a fact by nearly
every authority worthy of that name. Just as the physical muscle may be
cultivated by the proper methods, so may the mental faculties be
strengthened and cultivated by the appropriate methods and means.
Inasmuch as the majority of the race are deficient in the development of
one or more of the leading mental faculties, it becomes a matter of
great interest and importance that all should acquaint themselves with
the means whereby their deficiencies may be corrected and remedied. We
shall now proceed to the consideration of Thought-Culture in general,
and then to the consideration of the culture of each particular general
faculty, in detail.
CHAPTER IV.
THOUGHT-CULTURE
Thought-Culture is based upon two general scientific facts which may be
stated as follows:
I. The brain centres of thought may be developed by exercise. While we
do not assert that the brain and the mind are identical, it is
nevertheless a scientific truth that "the brain is the organ of the
mind" and that one of the first requisites for a good mind is a good
brain. It has been proven by experiment that the brain-cells concerned
in special mental activities multiply in proportion to the active use of
the special faculties employed in the mental operation. It has also been
ascertained that disuse of special faculties of the mind tends to cause
a process akin to atrophy in the brain-cells concerned in the particular
activity, so that it becomes difficult to think clearly along those
particular lines after a long period of disuse. Moreover, it is known
that the education and mental culture of a child is accompanied by an
increase and development of the brain-cells connected with the
particular fields of thought in which the child is exercised.
There is a close analogy between the exercise of the brain-cells and the
exercise of the muscles of the body. Both respond to reasonable
exercise; both are injured by overwork; both degenerate by disuse. As
Brooks says: "The mind grows by its own inherent energies. Mental
exercise is thus the law of mental development. As a muscle grows strong
by use, so any faculty of the mind is developed by its proper use and
exercise. An inactive mind, like an unused muscle, becomes weak and
unskilful. Hang the arm in a sling and the muscle becomes flabby and
loses its vigor and skill; let the mind remain inactive and it acquires
a mental flabbiness that unfits it for any severe or prolonged activity.
An idle mind loses its tone and strength like an unused muscle; the
mental powers go to rust through idleness and inaction. To develop the
faculties of the mind and secure their highest activity and efficiency,
there must be a constant and judicious exercise of these faculties. The
object of culture is to stimulate and direct the activity of the mind."
Experiments conducted by scientists upon dogs have shown that in the
case of dogs specially trained to unusual mental activity, there has
been a corresponding increase of the number of active brain-cells in the
particular parts of the brain concerned with those mental activities.
Microscopic examination of the brain tissues showed the greatest
difference between the brain structure of the trained dogs and untrained
ones of the same brood. So carefully were the experiments conducted that
it was possible to distinguish between the dogs trained in one set of
activities from those trained in another. Biologists have demonstrated
the correctness of the brain-cell development theory beyond reasonable
doubt, and ordinary human experience also adds its testimony in its
favor.
In view of the above, it will be seen that by intelligent exercise and
use any and all faculties of the mind may be developed and cultivated,
just as may any special muscle of the body. And this exercise can come
only from actual use of the faculties themselves. Development must come
from within and not from without. No system of outward stimulation will
develop the faculties of the mind--they may be cultivated only by an
exercise in their own particular field of work. The only way to exercise
any particular faculty of thought is to _think_ through that faculty.
II. Not only are the brain-cells developed by exercise, but it also
appears to be a fact that the mind appears actually to be _nourished_ by
knowledge of the outside world of things. The raw material of thought is
taken into the mind and there is digested by the thought-processes, and
is afterward actually _assimilated_ by the mind in a manner strikingly
similar to the processes of the physical organs of nutrition. A mind to
be at its best must be supplied with a normal amount of mental
nourishment. Lacking this, it tends to become weak and inefficient. And,
likewise, if its owner is a mental glutton and furnishes too much
nourishment, particularly of a rich kind, there is a tendency toward
"mental dyspepsia" and indigestion--the mind, unable to assimilate the
mental food furnished it, is inclined to rebel. Moreover, if the mind be
supplied with mental food of only one kind--if the mind is confined to
one narrow field of thought--it weakens and the mental processes become
impaired. In many ways is this curious analogy apparent.
Not only does the mind need development, but it also needs intelligent
cultivation. For it may be _developed_ by improper objects of thought
just as well as by the proper ones. A rich field will grow tares and
weeds as well as good grain or fruit. Thought-culture should not be
confined to the _development of a strong and active mind_, but should be
also extended to the _cultivation of a wise and intelligent mind_.
Strength and Wisdom should be combined. Moreover there should be sought
a harmonious and normal development. A one-sided, mental development is
apt to produce a "crank," while a development in unhealthy mental fields
will produce an abnormal thinker tending dangerously near to the line of
insanity. Some "one-idea" men have great mental power and development,
but are nevertheless unbalanced and impractical. And insane persons
often have strongly developed minds--developed abnormally.
Some authorities, holding special theories regarding the nature of mind,
hold that Thought-Culture is merely a _training_ of the faculties
rather than a _creation_ of new mental power, inasmuch as the mind
cannot be built up from the outside. This is a curious combination of
truth and error. It is true that the mind cannot be built up from
outside material, in the sense of creating _new mind_, but it is also
true that in every mind there is the potentiality of growth and
development. Just as the future oak is said to be in the acorn, so are
the potentialities of mind-growth in every mind waiting for nourishment
from outside and the proper cultivation. Brooks has well stated this, as
follows: "The culture of the mind is not creative in its character; its
object is to develop existing possibilities into realities. The mind
possesses innate powers which may be awakened into a natural activity.
The design of culture is to aid nature in improving the powers she has
given. No new power can be created by culture; we can increase the
activity of these powers, but cannot develop any new activities. Through
these activities new ideas and thoughts may be developed, and the sum of
human knowledge increased; but this is accomplished by a high activity
of the natural powers with which the mind is endowed, and not by the
culture of new powers. The profound philosopher uses the same faculties
that the little child is developing in the games of the nursery. The
object of culture is to arouse the powers which nature has given us into
a normal activity and to stimulate and guide them in their unfolding."
In connection with the objection above mentioned, it may be said that
while the development of the mind must come from within itself, rather
than from without, nevertheless, in order to develop, it must have the
nourishing material from the outside world in order to grow. Just as the
body can grow from within only by the aid of nourishment from outside,
so the mind, while growing from within, needs the material for thought
which can come only from without itself. Thought requires "things" upon
which to exercise itself--and upon which it is nourished. Without these
outside objects, it can have no exercise and can receive no nourishment.
Thought consists in the perception, examination and comparison of
_things_, and the consequent building up new combinations, arrangements
and syntheses. Therefore, the perceptive faculties are most necessary to
Thought, and their culture is most necessary in the general work of
Thought-Culture.
It must not be lost sight of that in Thought-Culture there is necessary
a variety of exercises and forms of nourishment. What will develop one
faculty will exert but a faint effect upon others. Each needs its own
particular kind of exercise--each its particular kind of mental
nourishment. While it is true that there is a certain benefit gained by
the entire mind from an exercise of any of its parts, this effect is but
secondary in importance. A man well developed mentally has been
developed in each faculty, each in its own way. The faculty of
perception requires objects of perception; the faculty of imagination
requires objects of imagination; the faculty of reasoning requires
objects of reasoning; and so on, each requiring objects of exercise and
nourishment of its own kind--in its own class. In some persons some of
the faculties are well developed while others are deficient. It follows
that in such a case the weak faculties should be developed first, that
they be brought up to the general standard. Then a further general
development may be undertaken if desired. Moreover, in general
development, it will be found that certain faculties will respond more
readily to the cultivation given, while others will be slow to respond.
In such cases wisdom dictates that a greater degree of exercise and
nourishment be given to the slower and less responsible faculties, while
the more responsive be given but a lighter development. In
Thought-Culture as in physical culture, the less developed and slower
responding parts should be given special attention.
* * * * *
In the following chapters we shall point out the methods and exercises
calculated to develop the several faculties of the mind to the best
advantage, in each case giving general advice along the lines of the
cultivation of the particular faculty which will serve as general
instruction regarding its culture. The student should carefully study
the entire work before he attempts to specialize in the development of
any particular faculty. The particular work may be aided by an
acquaintance with the entire field of Thought-Culture for many of the
faculties shade into each other in their activities and are always more
or less interdependent. For, be it remembered, the mind is a _whole_,
and not a mere aggregation of many parts. To understand the parts, one
must study the whole--to understand the whole, one must study the
parts.
CHAPTER V.
ATTENTION
Attention is not a faculty of the mind in the same sense as perception,
abstraction, judgment, etc., but is rather in the nature of an act of
will concerned in the focusing of the consciousness upon some object of
thought presented or represented to the mind. In some respects it bears
a resemblance to Abstraction, inasmuch as it sets aside some particular
object for the consideration of the consciousness, to the exclusion of
other objects. Wayland explains attention as a condition of mind in
which the consciousness is excited and directed by an act of the will.
Hamilton says: "Consciousness may be compared to a telescope; Attention
is the pulling out and pressing in of the tubes in accommodating the
focus of the eye;" and also that: "An act of attention, that is an act
of concentration, seems thus necessary to every exertion of
consciousness, as a certain contraction of the pupil is requisite to
every exertion of vision.... Attention then is to consciousness what
the contraction of the pupil is to sight, or to the eye of the mind what
the microscope or telescope is to the bodily eye.... It constitutes the
better half of all intellectual power."
Brodie says that: "It is Attention, much more than any difference in the
abstract power of reasoning, which constitutes the vast difference which
exists between minds of different individuals." Butler says: "The most
important intellectual habit that I know of is the habit of attending
exclusively to the matter in hand.... It is commonly said that genius
cannot be infused by education, yet this power of concentrated
attention, which belongs as a part of his gift to every great
discoverer, is unquestionably capable of almost indefinite augmentation
by resolute practice." And Beattie says: "The force wherewith anything
strikes the mind is generally in proportion to the degree of attention
bestowed upon it."
Realizing the importance of attention, the student will naturally wish
to cultivate the power of bestowing it when necessary. The first role in
the cultivation of the attention is that the student shall carefully
acquire _the habit of thinking of or doing but one thing at a time_.
This first rule may seem easy, but in practice it will be found very
difficult of observance, so careless are the majority of us in our
actions and thinking. Not only will the trouble and care bestowed upon
the acquiring of this habit of thought and action be well repaid by the
development of the attention, but the student will also acquire a
facility for accomplishing his tasks quickly and thoroughly. As Kay
says: "There is nothing that contributes more to success in any pursuit
than that of having the attention concentrated on the matter in hand;
and, on the contrary, nothing is more detrimental than when doing one
thing to have the mind taken up with something else." And as Granville
says: "A frequent cause of failure in the faculty of attention is
striving to think of more than one thing at a time." Kay also well says:
"If we would possess the power of attention in a high degree, we must
cultivate the habit of attending to what is directly before the mind, to
the exclusion of all else. All distracting thoughts and feelings that
tend to withdraw the mind from what is immediately before it are
therefore to be carefully avoided. This is a matter of great importance,
and of no little difficulty. Frequently the mind, in place of being
concentrated on what is immediately before it, is thinking of something
else--something, it may be, that went before or that may come after, or
something quite alien to the subject."
The following principles of the application of the attention have been
stated by the authorities:
I. The attention attaches more readily to interesting than to
uninteresting things.
II. The attention will decline in strength unless there is a variation
in the stimulus, either by a change of object or the developing of some
new attribute in the object.
III. The attention, when tired by continuous direction toward some
unvarying object, may be revived by directing it toward some new object
or in allowing it to be attracted and held by some passing object.
IV. The attention manifests in a two-fold activity; _viz._ (1) the
concentration upon some one object of thought; and (2) the shutting out
of outside objects. Thus, it has its positive and negative sides. Thus,
when a man wishes to give his undivided attention to one speaker in a
crowd of speaking individuals, he acts positively in focusing his
consciousness upon the selected individual, and negatively by refusing
to listen to the others.
V. The attention is not a faculty, but a means of using any faculty with
an increased degree of efficiency.
VI. The degree of attention possessed by an individual is an indication
of his power of using his intellect. Many authorities have held that, in
cases of genius, the power of concentrated attention is usually greatly
developed. Brooks says: "Attention is one of the principal elements of
genius." Hamilton says: "Genius is a higher capacity of attention."
Helvetius says: "Genius is nothing but protracted attention."
Chesterfield says: "The power of applying our attention, steady and
undissipated, to a single object is a sure mark of superior genius."
The attention may be cultivated, just as may be the various faculties of
the mind, by the two-fold method of Exercise and Nourishment; that is,
by using and employing it actively and by furnishing it with the proper
materials with which to feed its strength. The way to exercise the
attention is _to use it frequently_ in every-day life. If you are
listening to a man speaking, endeavor to give to him your undivided
attention, and, at the same time, to shut out from your consciousness
every other object. In working, we should endeavor to use the attention
by concentrating our interest upon the particular task before us to the
exclusion of all else. In reading, we should endeavor to hold our minds
closely to the text instead of hastily glancing over the page as so many
do.
Those who wish to cultivate their attention should take up some line of
study in which it is necessary to fasten the attention firmly for a
time. A half-hour's study in this way is worth more than hours of
careless reading so far as the cultivation of the attention is
concerned. Mathematics is most valuable in the direction of developing
the power of attention. Gibbon says: "After a rapid glance on the
subject and distribution of a new book, I suspend the reading of it
which I only resume after having myself examined the subject in all its
relations."
Some writers have held that the attention may be developed by the
practice of selecting the voice of one person speaking among a crowd of
speakers, and deliberately shutting out the other sounds, giving the
whole attention to the particular speaker; or, in the same manner,
selecting one singer in a church choir or band of singers; or one
musical instrument in an orchestra; or one piece of machinery making
sounds in a room filled with various machines, etc. The practice of so
doing is held to strengthen one's powers of concentration and attention.
Draper says: "Although many images may be simultaneously existing upon
the retina, the mind possesses the power of singling out any one of them
and fastening attention upon it, just as among a number of musical
instruments simultaneously played, one, and that perhaps the feeblest,
may be selected and its notes exclusively followed." And as Taylor says:
"In a concert of several voices, the voices being of nearly equal
intensity, regarded merely as organic impressions on the auditory
nerve, we select one, and at will we lift out and disjoin it from the
general volume of sound; we shut off the other voices--five, ten and
more--and follow this one alone. When we have done so for a time, we
freely cast it off and take up another." Carpenter says: "The more
completely the mental energy can be brought into one focus and all
distracting objects excluded, the more powerful will be the volitional
effort."
Many authorities hold that the attention may be best applied and
exercised by analyzing an object mentally, and then considering its
parts one by one by a process of abstraction. Thus, as Kays says: "An
apple presents to us form, color, taste, smell, etc., and if we would
obtain a clear idea of any one of these, we must contemplate it by
itself and compare it with other impressions of the same kind we have
previously experienced. So in viewing a landscape, it is not enough to
regard it merely as a whole, but we must regard each of its different
parts individually by itself if we would obtain a clear idea of it. We
can only obtain a full and complete knowledge of an object _by analyzing
it and concentrating the attention upon its different parts, one by
one_." Reid says: "It is not by the senses immediately, but rather by
the power of _analyzing and abstraction_, that we get the most simple
and the most distinct notions of objects of sense." And, as Brown says:
"It is scarcely possible to advance even a single step in intellectual
physics without the necessity of performing _some sort of analysis_." In
all processes requiring analysis and examination of parts, properties or
qualities, the attention is actively employed. Accordingly, it follows
that such exercises are best adapted to the work of developing and
cultivating the attention itself. Therefore, as a parting word we may
say: _To develop and cultivate the power of attention and concentration,
(1) Analyze; (2) Analyze; and (3) Analyze. Analyze everything and
everybody with which or whom you come in contact._ There is no better or
shorter rule.
The student will also find that the various directions and the advice
which we shall give in the succeeding chapters, regarding the
cultivation of the various faculties, are also adapted to the
development of the attention, for the latter is brought into active
play in them. And, likewise, by developing the attention, one may
practice the future exercises with greater effect.
CHAPTER VI.
PERCEPTION
In preceding chapters we have seen that in the phase of mental activity
in which the Intellect is concerned, the processes of which are known as
"Thought" in the narrower sense of the term, there are several stages or
steps involving the use of several faculties of the mind. The first of
these steps or stages is called _Perception_.
Many persons confuse the idea of Sensation and Perception, but there is
a clear distinction between them. Sensations arise from nerve
action--from the stimulation of nerve substance--which gives rise to a
peculiar effect upon the brain, which results in an elementary form of
consciousness. An authority says: "Sensation is the peculiar property of
the nervous system in a state of activity, by which impressions are
conveyed to the brain or sensorium. When an impression is made upon any
portion of the bodily surface by contact, heat, electricity, light, or
any other agent, the mind is rendered conscious of this by sensation.
In the process there are three stages--reception of the impression at
the end of the sensory nerve, the conduction of it along the nerve trunk
to the sensorium, and _the change it excites in the sensorium itself,
through which is produced sensation_."
Just why and how this nerve action is translated into consciousness of
an elementary kind, science is unable to explain. Our knowledge is based
in a great part, or entirely, upon impressions which have been received
over the channel of the senses--sensations of sight, hearing, tasting,
smelling and touch. Many authorities hold that all of the five senses
are modifications of the sense of touch, or feeling; as for instance,
the impression upon the organs of sight is really in the nature of a
delicate touch or feeling of the light-waves as they come in contact
with the nerves of vision, etc. But, although sensations give us the raw
materials of thought, so to speak, they are not _knowledge_ in
themselves. Knowledge arises from the operation of Perception upon this
raw material of Sensation.
But yet, Sensation plays a most active part in the presentation of the
raw material for the Perceptive faculties, and must not be regarded as
merely a physiological process. It may be said to be the connecting link
between the physical and the mental activities. As Ziehen says: "It
follows that the constitution of the nervous system is an essential
factor in determining the quality of sensation. This fact reveals the
obvious error of former centuries, first refuted by Locke, though still
shared by naive thought today, that the objects about us themselves are
colored, warm, cold, etc. As external to our consciousness, we can only
assume matter, vibrating with molecular motion and permeated by
vibrating particles of ether. The nervous apparatus selects only certain
motions of matter or of ether, which they transform into that form of
nerve excitation with which they are familiar. It is only this nerve
excitation that we perceive as red, warm or hard."
Passing from Sensation to Perception, we see that the latter interprets
the reports of the former. Perception translates into consciousness the
impressions of Sensation. Perception, acting through one or more of the
mental faculties, gives us _our first bit of real knowledge_. Sensation
may give us the impression of a small moving thing--Perception
translates this into the thought of _a cat_. Sensation is a mere
_feeling_--Perception is the _thought_ arising from that feeling. A
Percept is the product of Perception, or in other words, our _idea_
gained through Perception. The majority of our percepts are complex,
being built up from a number of minor percepts; as for instance, our
percept of _a peach_ is built up from our minor percepts of the form,
shape, color, weight, degree of hardness, smell, taste, etc., of the
peach, each sense employed giving minor percepts, the whole being
combined in the conscious as the whole percept of that particular peach.
Brooks says: "All knowledge does not come directly from perception
through the senses, however. We have a knowledge of external objects,
and we have a knowledge that transcends this knowledge of external
objects. Perception is the _immediate_ source of the first kind of
knowledge, and the _indirect_ source of the second kind of knowledge.
This distinction is often expressed by the terms _cause_ and
_occasion_. Thus perception is said to be the _cause_ of our knowledge
of objects, since it is the immediate source of such knowledge.
Perception is also said to be the _occasion_ of the ideas and truths of
intuition; for, though in a sense necessary to these ideas, it is not
the source of them. Perception also furnishes the understanding with
materials out of which it derives ideas and truths beyond the field of
sense. As thus attaining a knowledge of external objects, affording
material for the operations of the understanding, and furnishing the
occasion for the activity of the intuitive power, _perception may be
said to lie at the basis of all knowledge_."
Perception is of course manifest in all persons. But it varies greatly
in degree and power. Moreover, it may be developed and cultivated to a
great degree. As Perception is an interpretation of the impression of
the senses, we often confuse the cultivation of Perception with the
development of the senses themselves. Two persons of equally perfect
sense of sight may vary greatly in their degree of Perception of sight
impressions. One may be a most careless observer, while the other may
be a very close observer and able to distinguish many points of interest
and importance in the object viewed which are not apparent to the first
observer. Cultivation of Perception is cultivation of the _mental
background of the senses_, rather than of the sense organs themselves.
The Perception accompanying each sense may be developed and cultivated
separately from that accompanying the others.
The majority of persons are very careless observers. They will _see_
things without _perceiving_ the qualities, properties, characteristics,
or parts which together make up those things. Two persons, possessed of
equal degrees of eyesight, will walk through a forest. Both of them will
_see_ trees. To one of them there will be but trees perceived; while to
the other there will be a perception of the different species of trees,
with their varying bark, leaves, shape, etc. One perceives simply a
"pile of stone," which to the perception of another will be recognized
as granite, marble, etc. Brooks says: "Very few persons can tell the
difference between the number of legs of a fly and of a spider; and I
have known farmers' boys and girls who could not tell whether the ears
of a cow are in front of her horns, above her horns, below her horns, or
behind her horns." Halleck says of a test in a schoolroom: "Fifteen
pupils were sure that they had seen cats climb trees and descend them.
There was a unanimity of opinion that the cats went up head first. When
asked whether the cats came down head or tail first, the majority were
sure that the cats descended as they were never known to do. Anyone who
had ever noticed the shape of the claws of any beast of prey could have
answered that question without seeing an actual descent. Farmers' boys,
who have often seen cows and horses lie down and rise, are seldom sure
whether the animals rise with their fore or hind feet first, or whether
the habit of the horse agrees with that of the cow in this respect."
Brooks well says: "Modern education tends to the neglect of the culture
of the perceptive powers. In ancient times people studied nature much
more than at present. Being without books, they were compelled to depend
upon their eyes and ears for knowledge; and this made their senses
active, searching and exact. At the present day, we study books for a
knowledge of external things; and we study them too much or too
exclusively, and thus neglect the cultivation of the senses. We get our
knowledge of the material world second-hand, instead of fresh from the
open pages of the book of nature. Is it not a great mistake to spend so
much time in school and yet not know the difference between the leaf of
a beech and of an oak; or not be able to distinguish between specimens
of marble, quartz, and granite? The neglect of the culture of the
perceptive powers is shown by the scholars of the present time. Very few
educated men are good observers; indeed, the most of them are sadly
deficient in this respect.... They were taught to think and remember;
but were not taught to use their eyes and ears. In modern education,
books are used too much like spectacles, and the result is the blunting
of the natural powers of perception."
The first principle in the Cultivation of Perception is the correct use
of the Attention. The intelligent control of voluntary attention is a
prerequisite to clear and distinct perception. We have called your
attention to this matter in the preceding chapter. Halleck says: "A body
may be imaged on the retina without insuring perception. There must be
an effort to concentrate the attention upon the many things which the
world presents to our senses.... Perception, to achieve satisfactory
results, must summon the will to its aid to concentrate the attention.
Only the smallest part of what falls upon our senses at any time is
actually perceived."
The sense of sight is perhaps the one of the greatest importance to us,
and accordingly the cultivation of Perception with regard to impressions
received through the eye is the most important for the ordinary
individual. As Kay says: "To see clearly is a valuable aid even to
thinking clearly. In all our mental operations we owe much to sight. To
recollect, to think, to imagine, is to see internally,--to call up more
or less visual images of things before the mind. In order to understand
a thing it is generally necessary to see it, and what a man has not seen
he cannot properly realize or image distinctly to his mind.... It is by
the habitual direction of our attention to the effects produced upon
our consciousness by the impressions made upon the eye and transmitted
to the sensorium that our sight, like our other senses, is trained."
Bain says: "Cohering trains and aggregates of the sensations of sight
make more than any other thing, perhaps more than all other things put
together, the material of thought, memory and imagination." Vinet says:
"The child, and perhaps the man as well, only knows well what is shown
him, and the image of things is the true medium between their abstract
idea and his personal experience." This being the case, advice
concerning the Cultivation of Perception must needs be directed mainly
to the cultivation of the perception of sight-impressions.
Brooks says: "We should acquire the habit of observing with attention.
Many persons look at objects with a careless, inattentive eye. We should
guard against the habit of careless looking. We should fix the mind upon
the object before us; we should concentrate the attention upon that upon
which we are looking. Attention, in respect to Perception, has been
compared to a burning glass; hold the sun-glass between the sun and a
board and the concentrated rays will burn a hole through the latter. So
attention concentrates the rays of perceptive power and enables the mind
to penetrate below the surface of things."
The best authorities agree in the idea that the Perception may be best
cultivated by acquiring the habit of examining things in detail. And,
that this examination in detail is best manifested by examining the
parts going to make up a complex thing, separately, rather than
examining the thing as a whole. Halleck says regarding this point: "To
look at things intelligently is the most difficult of all arts. The
first rule for the cultivation of accurate perception is: Do not try to
perceive the whole of a complex object at once. Take the human face for
example. A man holding an important position to which he had been
elected offended many people because he could not remember faces, and
hence failed to recognize individuals the second time he met them. His
trouble was in looking at the countenance as a whole. When he changed
his method of observation, and noticed carefully the nose, mouth, eyes,
chin and color of hair, he at once began to find recognition easier. He
was no longer in danger of mistaking A for B, since he remembered that
the shape of B's nose was different, or the color of his hair at least
three shades lighter. This example shows that another rule can be
formulated: Pay careful attention to details.... To see an object merely
as an undiscriminated mass of something in a certain place is to do no
more than a donkey accomplishes as he trots along."
Brooks says regarding the same point: "To train the powers of
observation we should practice observing minutely. We should analyze the
objects which we look at into their parts, and notice these parts.
Objects present themselves to us as wholes; our definite knowledge of
them is gained by analysis, by separating them into the elements which
compose them. We should therefore give attention to the details of
whatever we are considering; and thus cultivate the habit of observing
with minuteness.... It is related of a teacher that if, when hearing a
class, some one rapped at the door, he would look up as the visitor
entered and from a single glance could tell his appearance and dress,
the kind of hat he wore, kind of necktie, collar, vest, coat, shoes,
etc. The skillful banker, also, in counting money with wondrous
rapidity, will detect and throw from his pile of bills the counterfeits
which, to the ordinary eye, seem to be without spot or blemish."
One of the best methods of developing and cultivating the faculty of
Perception is to take up some study in which the perceptive faculties
_must be_ employed. Botany, physics, geology, natural history give
splendid exercise in Perception, providing the student engages in actual
experimental work, and actual observation, instead of confining himself
to the textbooks. A careful scientific study and examination of _any
kind of objects_, in a manner calculated to bring out the various points
of resemblance and difference, will do most to develop the Perception.
Training of this kind will develop these powers to a high degree, in the
case of small children.
Drawing is also a great help to the development of Perception. In order
to draw a thing correctly we must of necessity examine it in detail;
otherwise we will not be able to draw it correctly. In fact, many
authorities use the test of drawing to prove the degree of attention and
Perception that the student has bestowed upon an object which he has
been studying. Others place an object before the pupil for a few
minutes, and then withdraw it, the pupil then being required to draw the
object roughly but with attention to its leading peculiarities and
features. Then the object is again placed before the pupil for study,
and he is then again required to draw from memory the additional details
he has noticed in it. This process is repeated over and over again,
until the pupil has proved that he has _observed_ every possible detail
of interest in the object. This exercise has resulted in the cultivation
of a high degree of perception in many students, and its simplicity
should not detract from its importance. Any person may practice this
exercise by himself; or, better still, two or more students may combine
and endeavor to excel each other in friendly rivalry, each endeavoring
to discover the greatest number of details in the object considered. So
rapidly do students improve under this exercise, that a daily record
will show a steady advance. Simple exercises in drawing are found in
the reproduction, from memory, of geography maps, leaves of trees, etc.
Similar exercises may be found in the practice of taking a hasty look at
a person, animal or building, and then endeavoring to reproduce in
writing the particular points about the person or thing observed. This
exercise will reveal rapid progress if persisted in. Or, it may be
varied by endeavoring to write out the contents of a room through which
one has walked.
The majority of our readers remember the familiar story of Houdin, who
so cultivated the faculty of Perception that he was able to pass by a
shop-window and afterward state in detail every object in the window. He
acquired this power by gradual development, beginning with the
observation of a single article in the window, then two, then three and
so on. Others have followed his method with great success. Speaking of
Houdin's wonderful Perception, Halleck says: "A wide-awake eagle would
probably see more of a thing at one glance than would a drowsy lizard in
a quarter of an hour. Extreme rapidity of Perception, due to careful
training, was one of the factors enabling Houdin and his son to astonish
everybody and to amass a fortune. He placed a domino before the boy, and
instead of allowing him to count the spots, required him to give the sum
total at once. This exercise was continued until each could give
instantaneously the sum of the spots on a dozen dominoes. The sum was
given just as accurately as if five minutes had been consumed in
adding." Houdin, in his Memoirs relating the above facts regarding his
own methods, states with due modesty, that many women far excel him in
this respect. He says: "I can safely assert that a lady seeing another
pass at full speed in a carriage will have had time to analyze her
toilette from her bonnet to her shoes, and be able to describe not only
the fashion and quality of the stuffs, but also say if the lace be real
or only machine made."
There are a number of games played by children which tend to the
cultivation of the Perception, and which might well be adapted for the
use of older people. These games are based on the general principle of
the various participants taking a brief view of a number of objects
displayed in one's hand, on a table, in a box, etc., and then stating
what he or she has seen. There will be noticed a wonderful difference in
the degree of Perception manifested by the various participants. And,
equally interesting will be the degrees of progress noted after playing
this game over several times, allowing time for rest between the series
of games. It is a fact well known in police circles that thieves often
train boys in this way, following this course by another in which the
lads are expected to take in the contents of a room, the windows, locks,
etc., at a glance. They are then graduated into spies looking out the
details of the scenes of future robberies.
In our volume of this series, devoted to the consideration of the
Memory, we have related a number of exercises and methods, similar to
those given above, by which the Perception may be cultivated. Perception
plays a most important place in memory, for upon the clearness of the
percepts depends to a great degree the clearness of the impressions made
upon the memory. So close is the connection between Memory and
Perception that the cultivation of one tends to develop the other. For
instance, the cultivation of the Memory necessitates the sharpening of
the Perception in the direction of obtaining clear original impressions;
while the cultivation of Perception naturally develops the Memory by
reason of the fact that the latter is used in testing and proving the
clearness and degree of Perception. This being the case, those who find
that the exercises and methods given above are too arduous may
substitute the simple exercise of remembering as many details as
possible of things they see. This effort to impress the memory will
involuntarily bring into action the perceptive faculties in the
acquirement of the original impressions, so that in the end the
Perception will be found to have developed.
Teachers and those having to do with children should realize the great
value of the cultivation of Perception in the young, and thus
establishing valuable habits of observation among them. The experience
and culture thus acquired will prove of great value in their after life.
As Brooks well says on this subject: "Teachers should appreciate the
value of the culture of the perceptive powers, and endeavor to do
something to afford this culture. Let it be remembered that by training
the powers of observation of pupils, we lead them to acquire definite
ideas of things, enable them to store their minds with fresh and
interesting knowledge, lay the foundation for literary or business
success, and thus do much to enhance their happiness in life and add to
the sum of human knowledge."
CHAPTER VII.
REPRESENTATION
Sensation and Perception, as considered in the preceding chapter, are
what are called by psychologists "Processes of Presentation." By
Presentation is meant the direct offering to the consciousness of mental
images or objects of thought. If there were no faculty of the mind
capable of retaining and _re_-presenting to the consciousness the
impression or record of Perception, we could never progress in
knowledge, for each percept would be new each time it was presented and
there would be no recognition of it as having been previously perceived,
nor would there be any power to voluntarily recall any percept
previously acquired. In short, we would be without that power of the
mind called Memory.
But, fortunately for us as thinkers, we possess the power of
Representation; that is, of reproducing past perceptions and experiences
in the shape of _mental images_ or pictures, "in the mind's eye," so to
speak, which relieves us of the necessity of directly and immediately
perceiving an object each time we desire or are required to think of it.
The processes whereby this becomes possible are called the processes of
Representation, for the reason that by them past experiences of
Perception are _re_-presented to the consciousness.
The subject of Representation is closely bound up with that of Memory.
Strictly speaking, Representation may be said to be one phase of Memory;
Association of Ideas another; and the authorities prefer to treat the
whole subject under the general head of Memory. We have written a work
on "Memory" which forms one of the volumes of the present series, and we
have no intention, or desire, to repeat here the information given in
that work. But we must consider the subject of Representation at this
point in order to maintain the logical unity of the present general
subject of Thought-Culture. The student will also notice, of course, the
close relation between the processes of Representation and those of the
Imagination, which we shall consider in other chapters of this work.
Memory has several phases, the usual classification of which is as
follows: (1) Impression; (2) Retention; (3) Recollection; (4)
Representation, and (5) Recognition. Each phase requires the operation
of special mental processes. _Impression_ is the process whereby the
impressions of Perception are recorded or stamped upon the subconscious
field of mentality, as the impress of the die upon the wax. _Retention_
is the process whereby the subconsciousness _retains_ or holds the
impressions so received. _Recollection_ is the process by which the mind
_re-collects_ the impressions retained in the subconsciousness, bringing
them again into consciousness as objects of knowledge. _Representation_
is the process whereby the impressions so re-collected are _pictured or
imaged_ in the mind. _Recognition_ is the process whereby the mind
_recognizes_ the mental image or picture so re-presented to it as
connected with its past experience.
As we have stated, we have considered the general subject of Memory in
another volume of this series and, therefore, shall not attempt to enter
into a discussion of its general subject at this place. We shall,
accordingly, limit ourselves here to a brief consideration of the phase
of Representation and its cultivation.
Representation, of course, depends upon the preceding phases of Memory
known as Impression, Retention and Recollection. Unless the Impression
is clear; unless the Retention is normal, there can be no
Representation. And unless one _recollects_ there can be no
Representation. Recollection (which is really a re-collection of
percepts) must precede Representation in the shape of mental images or
pictures. Recollection re-collects the mental materials out of which the
image is to be constructed. But, as Brooks says: "It is not to be
assumed that knowledge is retained as a picture; but that it is
_recreated_ in the form of a picture or some other mental product when
it is recalled." The process is analogous to the transmutation of the
sound-waves entering the receiver of a telephone, into electrical-waves
which are transmitted to the receiver, where they are in turn
re-transmuted to sound-waves which enter the ear of the listener. It
will be seen at once that there is the closest possible relation between
the processes of Representation and those of Memory--in fact, it is
quite difficult to draw a clear line of division between them. Some make
the distinction that Representation furnishes us with an exact
reproduction of _the past_; while Imagination combines our mental images
into _new products_. That is, Representation merely _reproduces_; while
Imagination _creates_ by forming new combinations; or Representation
deals with a reproduction of the Actual; while Imagination deals with
the Ideal.
Wundt speaking of this difficult distinction says: "Psychologists are
accustomed to define _memory images_ as ideas which _exactly reproduce_
some previous perception, and _fancy images_ as ideas consisting of a
combination of elements taken from a whole number of perceptions. Now
memory images in the sense of this definition simply do not exist....
Try, for instance, to draw from memory some landscape picture which you
have only once seen, and then compare your copy with the original. You
will expect to find plenty of mistakes and omissions; but you will also
invariably find that you have put in a great deal which was not in the
original, but which comes from landscape pictures which you have seen
somewhere else."
While we generally speak of Representation _picturing_ the recollected
percepts, still, we must not make the mistake of supposing that it is
concerned with, or limited to, only mental pictures. We are able to
_represent_ not only visual percepts but also sounds, smells, tastes or
feelings, often so vividly that they appear as almost actually existent.
We may also even _represent_, symbolically the processes of reasoning,
mathematical operations, etc. In short nearly, if not all experiences
which are possible in Presentation are also possible in Representation.
The phase of Representation, in the processes of Memory, is of course
subject to the general laws of the Cultivation of Memory which we have
stated in detail in our previous volume on that subject. But there are
some special points of development and cultivation which may be
considered briefly in this place. In the first place the importance of
Attention and clear Perception, as necessary precedents for clear
Representation, may be emphasized. In order to form clear mental images
of a thing we must have perceived it clearly in the first place. The
advice regarding the use of the Attention and Perception given in
preceding chapters need not be repeated here, but special attention
should be directed toward them in connection with the processes of
Representation. If we wish to cultivate the Representative faculties, we
must begin by cultivating the Presentative faculties.
Then again we must remember what we have said elsewhere about the facts
of development through (1) Use; and (2) Nourishment, in all mental
faculties. We must begin to _use_ the faculties of Representation in
order to exercise them. We must give them _nourishment_ in the shape of
objects of mental food. That is to say we must furnish these faculties
with _materials_ with which they may grow and develop, and with exercise
in order to strengthen the mental-muscle and also to give the faculties
the opportunity to "acquire the knack." The exercises and methods
recommended in our chapter on Perception will furnish good _material_
for the Representative faculties' growing requirements. By _perceiving_
the details of things, one is able to reproduce clear mental images of
them. In studying an object, always carry in your mind the fact that you
wish to _reproduce_ it in your mind later. In fact, if you have the
opportunity, let your mind "repeat it to itself" as soon as possible
after the actual occurrence and experience. Just as you often murmur to
yourself, or else write down, the name of a person or place which you
have just heard, in order that you may recollect it the better
thereafter, so it will be well for you to "mentally repeat" to yourself
the experiences upon which you wish to exercise your Representative
faculties.
As to the matter of development and cultivation by Use, we would advise
that you begin gradually to train your mind to _reproduce_ the
experiences of the day or week or month, at intervals, until you feel
that you are developing a new power in that direction. Tonight, if you
try you will find that you can reproduce but a very small part of
today's happenings with any degree of clearness. How clearly can you
image the places you have been, the appearances of the people you have
met, the various details of persons and things which you perceived
during the experiences of the day? Not very clearly, we dare say. Try
again, and you will find that you will be able to add new details. Keep
it up until you feel tired or think that you have exhausted all the
possibilities of the task. Tomorrow, try it again, and you will find
that the second day's experiences are more clearly reproduced in your
mind. Each day should find you a little more advanced, until you get to
a place where the normal degree of power is attained, when the advance
will be slower.
Then, at the end of the week, review its experiences. Do the same the
following week. At the end of the month, take a hasty mental trip over
the month's experiences. And so on. Exercise, in moderation, along these
lines will work wonders for you. Not only will it develop the
Representation, but your powers of observation and your general memory
will be found to be improved. And, moreover, in "chewing the mental cud"
you will think of many things of interest and importance in connection
with your work, etc., and your general mental efficiency will be
increased for the faculties of the mind are interdependent and share
benefits with each other.
CHAPTER VIII.
ABSTRACTION
As we have seen, the first stage or step in the process of Thought is
that called Perception, which we have considered in the preceding
chapter. Perception, as we have seen, is the process by which we gain
our first knowledge of the external world as reported to us by the
channels of sense. The Perceptive faculties interpret the material which
is presented to us by the senses. Following upon Perception we find the
processes resulting from the exercise of the group of faculties which
are classified under the general head of Understanding.
Understanding is the faculty, or faculties, of the mind by means of
which we intelligently examine and compare the various _percepts_,
either separating them by analysis, or else combining them by synthesis,
or both, and thus securing our general ideas, principles, laws, classes,
etc. There are several sub-phases of Understanding which are known to
psychologists and logicians as: (1) Abstraction; (2) Conception or
Generalization; (3) Judgment, and (4) Reasoning, respectively. In this
chapter we shall consider the first of these sub-phases or steps of
Understanding, which is known as "Abstraction."
Abstraction is that faculty of the mind by which we abstract or "draw
off," and then consider apart, the particular qualities, properties, or
attributes of an object, and thus are able to consider _them_ as
"things" or objects of thought. In order to form _concepts_ or general
ideas, from our _percepts_ or particular ideas, we must consider and
examine two common points or qualities which go to make up _differences
and resemblances_. The special examination or consideration of these
common points or qualities result in the exercise of Abstraction. In the
process of Abstraction we mentally "draw away" a quality of an object
and then consider it as a distinct object of thought. Thus in
considering a flower we may _abstract_ its qualities of fragrance,
color, shape, etc., and think of these as things independent of the
flower itself from which they were derived. We think of _redness_,
_fragrance_, etc., not only in connection with the particular flower
but as _general qualities_. Thus the qualities of redness, sweetness,
hardness, softness, etc., lead us to the abstract terms, _red_, _sweet_,
_hard_, _soft_, _etc._ In the same way courage, cowardice, virtue, vice,
love, hate, etc., are abstract terms. No one ever saw one of these
things--they are known only in connection with objects, or else as
"abstract terms" in the processes of Thought. They may be known as
qualities, and expressed as predicates; or they may be considered as
abstract things and expressed as nouns.
In the general process of Abstraction we first draw off and set aside
all the qualities which are _not common_ to the general class under
consideration, for the concept or general idea must comprise only the
qualities common to its class. Thus in the case of the general idea of
horse, size and color must be abstracted as non-essentials, for horses
are of various colors and sizes. But on the other hand, there are
certain qualities which _are common to all horses_, and these must be
abstracted and used in making up the concept or general idea.
So, you see, in general Abstraction we form two classes: (1) the unlike
and not-general qualities; and (2) the like or common qualities. As
Halleck says: "In the process of Abstraction, we draw our attention away
from a mass of confusing details, unimportant at the time, and attend
only to qualities common to the class. Abstraction is little else than
centering the power of attention on some qualities to the exclusion of
others.... While we are forming concepts, we abstract or draw off
certain qualities, either to leave them out of view or to consider them
by themselves. Our dictionaries contain such words as purity, whiteness,
sweetness, industry, courage, etc. No one ever touched, tasted, smelled,
heard, or saw purity or courage. We do not, therefore, gain our
knowledge of these through the senses. We have seen pure persons, pure
snow, pure honey; we have breathed pure air, tasted pure coffee. From
all these different objects we have abstracted the only like quality,
the quality of being pure. We then say we have an idea of _purity_, and
that idea is an abstract one. It exists only in the mind which formed
it. No one ever saw _whiteness_. He may have seen white clouds, snow,
cloth, blossoms, houses, paper, horses, but he never saw _whiteness_ by
itself. He simply abstracted that quality from various white objects."
In Abstraction we may either (1) abstract a quality and set it aside and
apart from the other qualities under consideration, as being
non-essential and not necessary; or we may (2) abstract a quality and
hold it in the mind as essential and necessary for the concept which we
are forming. Likewise, we may abstract (1) all the qualities of an
object _except one_, and set them aside that we may consider the _one_
quality by itself; or we may (2) abstract the one particular quality and
consider it to the exclusion of all its associated qualities. In all of
these aspects we have the same underlying process of considering a
quality apart from its object, and apart from its associated qualities.
The mind more commonly operates in the direction of abstracting one
quality and viewing it apart from object and associated qualities.
The importance of correct powers of Abstraction is seen when we realize
that all concepts or general ideas are but combinations of abstract
qualities or ideas. As Halleck says: "The difference between an
_abstract idea_ and a _concept_ is that a concept may consist of a
bundle of abstract ideas. If the class contains more than one common
quality, so must the concept; it must contain as many of these
abstracted qualities as are common to the class. The concept of the
class _whale_ would embody a large number of such qualities." As Brooks
says: "If we could not abstract, we could not _generalize_, for
abstraction is a condition of generalization." The last-mentioned
authority also cleverly states the idea as follows: "The products of
Abstraction are _abstract ideas_, that is, ideas of qualities in the
abstract. Such ideas are called _Abstracts_. Thus my idea of some
particular color, or hardness, or softness, is an abstract. Abstract
ideas have been wittily called 'the ghosts of departed qualities.' They
may more appropriately be regarded as the spirits of which the objects
from which they are derived are the bodies. In other words, they are,
figuratively speaking, 'the disembodied spirits of material things.'"
The cultivation of the faculty of Abstraction depends very materially,
in the first place, upon the exercise of Attention and Perception. Mill
holds that Abstraction is primarily a result of Attention. Others hold
that it is merely the mental process by which the attention is directed
exclusively to the consideration of one of several qualities,
properties, attributes, parts, etc. Hamilton says: "Attention and
Abstraction then are only the same process viewed in different
relations. They are, as it were, the positive and negative poles of the
same act." The cultivation of Attention is really a part of the process
of the cultivation of the faculty of Abstraction. Unless the Attention
be directed toward the object and its qualities we will be unable to
perceive, set aside, and separately consider the abstract quality
contained within it. In this process, as indeed in all other mental
processes, Attention is a prerequisite. Therefore, here, as in many
other places, we say to you: "Begin by cultivating Attention."
Moreover, the cultivation of the faculty of Abstraction depends
materially upon the cultivation of Perception. Not only must we _sense_
the existence of the various qualities in an object, but we must also
_perceive_ them in consciousness, just as we perceive the object itself.
In fact, the perception of the object is merely a perception of its
various qualities, attributes and properties, for the object itself is
merely a composite of these abstract things, at least so far as its
perception in consciousness is concerned. Try to think of _a horse_,
without considering its qualities, attributes and properties, and the
result is merely _an abstract horse_--something which belongs to the
realm of unreality. Try to think of _a rose_ without considering its
color, odor, shape, size, response to touch, etc., and you have simply
_an ideal rose_ which when analyzed is seen to be a _nothing_. Take away
the qualities, properties and attributes of anything, and you have left
_merely a name_, or else a transcendental, idealistic, something apart
from our world of sense knowledge. Thus it follows that in order to
_know_ the qualities of a thing in order to classify it, or to form a
general idea of it, we _must_ use the Perception in order to interpret
or translate the sense-impressions we have received regarding them.
Consequently the greater our power of Perception the greater must be
the possibility of our power of Abstraction.
Beyond the cultivation, use and exercise of the Attention and the
Perception, there are but few practical methods for cultivating the
faculty of Abstraction. Of course, _exercise_ of the faculty will
develop it; and _the furnishing of material for its activities_ will
give it the "nourishment" of which we have spoken elsewhere. Practice in
distinguishing the various qualities, attributes and properties of
objects will give a valuable training to the faculty.
Let the student take any object and endeavor to analyze it into its
abstract qualities, etc. Let him try to discover qualities hidden from
first sight. Let him make a list of these qualities, and write them
down; then try to add to the list. Two or more students engaging in a
friendly rivalry will stimulate the efforts of each other. In children
the exercise may be treated as a game. _Analysis of objects into their
component qualities, attributes and qualities--the effort to extract as
many adjectives applicable to the object_--this is the first step. The
second step consists in _transforming these adjectives into their
corresponding nouns_. As for instance, in a rose we perceive the
_qualities_ which we call "redness," "fragrance," etc. We speak of the
rose as being "red" or "fragrant"--then we think of "redness," or
"fragrance" as abstract qualities, or things, which we express as nouns.
Exercise and practice along these lines will tend to cultivate the
faculty of Abstraction. By knowing qualities, we know the things
possessing them.
CHAPTER IX.
ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS
Having formed general ideas, or Concepts, it is important that we
associate them with other general ideas. In order to fully _understand_
a general idea we must know its associations and relations. The greater
the known associations or relations of an idea, the greater is our
degree of understanding of that idea. If we simply know many thousands
of separated general ideas, without also knowing their associations and
relations, we are in almost as difficult a position as if we merely knew
thousands of individual percepts without being able to classify them in
general concepts. It is necessary to develop the faculty of associating
ideas into groups, according to their relations, just as we group
particular ideas in classes. The difference, however, is that these
group-ideas do not form classes of a genus, but depend solely upon
associations of several kinds, as we shall see in a moment.
Halleck says: "All ideas have certain definite associations with other
ideas, and they come up in groups. There is always an association
between our ideas, although there are cases when we cannot trace it....
Even when we find no association between our ideas, we may be sure that
it exists.... An idea, then, never appears in consciousness unless there
is a definite reason why this idea should appear in preference to
others." Brooks says: "One idea or feeling in the mind calls up some
other idea or feeling with which it is in some way related. Our ideas
seem, as it were, to be tied together by the invisible thread of
association, so that as one comes out of unconsciousness, it draws
another with it. Thoughts seem to exist somewhat in clusters like the
grapes of a bunch, so that in bringing out one, we bring the entire
cluster with it. The law of association is thus the tie, the thread, the
golden link by which our thoughts are united in an act of reproduction."
The majority of writers confine their consideration of Association of
Ideas to its relation to Memory. It is true that the Laws of Association
play an important part in Memory Culture, but Association of Ideas also
form an important part of the general subject of Thought-Culture, and
especially in the phase of the latter devoted to the development of the
Understanding. The best authorities agree upon this idea and state it
positively. Ribot says: "The most fundamental law which regulates
psychological phenomena is the Law of Association. In its comprehensive
character it is comparable to the law of attraction in the physical
world." Mill says: "That which the law of gravitation is to astronomy,
that which the elementary properties of the tissues are to physiology,
the Law of Association of Ideas is to psychology."
There are two general principles, or laws, operative in the processes of
Association of Ideas, known as (1) Association by Contiguity; and (2)
Association by Similarity, respectively.
Association by Contiguity manifests particularly in the processes of
memory. In its two phases of (1) Contiguity of Time; and (2) Contiguity
of Space, respectively, it brings together before the field of
consciousness ideas associated with each by reason of their time or
space relations. Thus, if we remember a certain thing, we find it easy
to remember things which occurred immediately before, or immediately
after that particular thing. Verbal memory depends largely upon the
contiguity of time, as for instance, our ability to repeat a poem, or
passage from a book, if we can recall the first words thereof. Children
often possess this form of memory to a surprising degree; and adults
with only a limited degree of understanding may repeat freely long
extracts from speeches they have heard, or even arbitrary jumbles of
words. Visual memory depends largely upon contiguity of space, as for
instance our ability to recall the details of scenes, when starting from
a given point. In both of these forms of association by contiguity the
mental operation is akin to that of unwinding a ball of yarn, the ideas,
thus associated in the sequence of time or place, following each other
into the field of consciousness. Association by Contiguity, while
important in itself, properly belongs to the general subject of Memory,
and as we have considered it in the volume of this series devoted to the
last mentioned subject, we shall not speak of it further here.
Association by Similarity, however, possesses a special interest to
students of the particular subject of the culture of the Understanding.
If we were compelled to rely upon the association of contiguity for our
understanding of things, we would understand a thing merely in its
relations to that which went before or came after it; or by the things
which were near it in space--we would have to unwind the mental ball of
time and space relations in order to bring into consciousness the
associated relations of anything. The Association of Similarity,
however, remedies this defect, and gives us a higher and broader
association. Speaking of Association of Similarity, Kay says: "It is of
the utmost importance to us in forming a judgment of things, or in
determining upon a particular line of conduct, to be able to bring
together before the mind a number of instances of a _similar_ kind,
recent or long past, which may aid us in coming to a right
determination. Thus, we may judge of the nature or quality of an
article, and obtain light and leading in regard to any subject that may
be before us. In this way we arrange and classify and reason by
induction. _This is known as rational or philosophical association._"
Halleck says: "An eminent philosopher has said that man is completely at
the mercy of the association of his ideas. Every new object is seen in
the light of its associated ideas.... It is not the business of the
psychologist to state what power the association of ideas _ought_ to
have. It is for him to ascertain what power it _does_ have. When we
think of the bigotry of past ages, of the stake for the martyr and the
stoning of witches, we can realize the force of Prof. Ziehen's
statement: 'We cannot think as we _will_, but we _must_ think as just
those associations which happen to be present prescribe.' While this is
not literally true, it may serve to emphasize a deflecting factor which
is usually underestimated."
Locke says: "The connection in our minds of ideas, in themselves loose
and independent of one another, has such an influence, and is of so
great force, to set us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural,
passions, reasonings, and notions themselves, that, perhaps, there is
not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after." Stewart says:
"The bulk of mankind, being but little accustomed to reflect and to
generalize, associate their ideas chiefly according to their more
obvious relations, and above all to the casual relations arising from
contiguity in time and place; whereas, in the mind of a philosopher
ideas are commonly associated according to those relations which are
brought to light in consequence of particular efforts of attention, such
as the relations of cause and effect, or of premises and conclusion.
Hence, it must necessarily happen that when he has occasion to apply to
use his acquired knowledge, time and reflection will be requisite to
enable him to recollect it."
This Association by Similarity, or the "rational and philosophical
association of ideas," may be developed and cultivated by a little care
and work. The first principle is that of _learning the true relations of
an idea_--its various logical associations. Perhaps the easiest and best
method is that adopted and practiced by Socrates, the old Greek
philosopher, often called "the Socratic method"--the Method of
Questioning. By questioning oneself, or others, regarding a thing, the
mind of the person answering tends to unfold its stores of information,
and to make new and true associations. Kays says: "Socrates, Plato, and
others among the ancients and some moderns, have been masters of this
art. The principle of asking questions and obtaining answers to them may
be said to characterize all intellectual effort.... The great thing is
to ask the right questions, and to obtain the right answers." Meiklejohn
says: "This art of questioning possessed by Dr. Hodgson was something
wonderful and unique, and was to the minds of most of his pupils a truly
obstetric art. He told them little or nothing, but showed them how to
find out for themselves. 'The Socratic method,' he said, 'is the true
one, especially with the young.'"
But this questioning must be done logically, and orderly, and not in a
haphazard way. As Fitch says: "In proposing questions it is very
necessary to keep in view the importance of arranging them in the exact
order in which the subject would naturally develop itself in the mind of
a logical and systematic thinker." A number of systems have been
formulated by different writers on the subject, all of which have much
merit. The following System of Analysis, designed for the use of
students desiring to acquire correct associations, was given in the
volume of this series, entitled "Memory," and is reproduced here because
it is peculiarly adapted to the cultivation and development of the
faculty of discovering and forming correct associations and relations
between ideas:
SYSTEM OF ANALYSIS
When you wish to discover what you really _know_ regarding a thing, ask
yourself the following questions about it, examining each point in
detail, and endeavoring to bring before the mind _your full knowledge_
regarding that particular point. Fill in the deficiencies by reading
some good work of reference, an encyclopedia for instance; or consulting
a good dictionary, or both:
I. Where did it come from, or originate?
II. What caused it?
III. What history or record has it?
IV. What are its attributes, qualities or characteristics?
V. What things can I most readily associate with it? What is it most
like?
VI. What is it good for--how may it be used--what can I do with it?
VII. What does it prove--what can be deduced from it?
VIII. What are its natural results--what happens because of it?
IX. What is its future; and its natural or probable end or finish?
X. What do I think of it, on the whole--what are my general
impressions regarding it?
XI. What do I know about it, in the way of general information?
XII. What have I heard about it, and from whom, and when?
The following "Query Table," from the same volume, may be found useful
in the same direction. It is simpler and less complicated than the
system given above. It has well been called a "Magic Key of Knowledge,"
and it opens many a mental door:
QUERY TABLE
Ask yourself the following questions regarding the thing under
consideration. It will draw out many bits of information and associated
knowledge in your mind:
I. What?
II. Whence?
III. Where?
IV. When?
V. How?
VI. Why?
VII. Whither?
Remember, always, that the greater the number of associated and related
ideas that you are able to group around a concept, the richer, fuller
and truer does that concept become to you. The concept is a _general
idea_, and its attributes of "generality" depend upon the associated
facts and ideas related to it. The greater the number of the view points
from which a concept may be examined and considered, the greater is the
degree of knowledge concerning that concept. It is held that everything
in the universe is related to every other thing, so that if we knew
_all_ the associated ideas and facts concerning a thing, we would not
only know that particular thing _absolutely_, but would, besides, know
_everything_ in the universe. The chain of Association is infinite in
extent.
CHAPTER X.
GENERALIZATION
We have seen that Sensation is translated or interpreted into
Perception; and that from the Percepts so created we may "draw off," or
separate, various qualities, attributes and properties by the analytical
process we call Abstraction. Abstraction, we have seen, thus constitutes
the first step in the process of what is called Understanding. The
second step is called Generalization or Conception.
Generalization, or Conception, is that faculty of the mind by which we
are able to combine and group together several particular ideas into one
general idea. Thus when we find a number of particular objects
possessing the same general qualities, attributes or properties, we
proceed to _classify_ them by the process of Generalization. For
instance, in a number of animals possessing certain general and common
qualities we form a concept of a class comprising those particular
animals. Thus in the concept of cow, we include _all cows_--we know
them to be cows because of their possession of certain general class
qualities which we include in our concept of _cow_. The particular cows
may vary greatly in size, color and general appearance, but they possess
the common general qualities which we group together in our general
concept of _cow_. Likewise by reason of certain common and general
qualities we include in our concept of "Man," _all men_, black, white,
brown, red or yellow, of all races and degrees of physical and mental
development. From this generic concept we may make race concepts,
dividing men into Indians, Caucasians, Malays, Negroes, Mongolians, etc.
These concepts in turn may be divided into sub-races. These
sub-divisions result from an analysis of the great concept. The great
concept is built up by synthesis from the individuals, through the
sub-divisions of minor concepts. Or, again, we may form a concept of
"Napoleon Bonaparte" from the various qualities and characteristics
which went to make up that celebrated man.
The product of Generalization or Conception is called a _Concept_. A
Concept is expressed in a word, or words, called "A Term." A Concept is
more than a mere _word_--it is _a general idea_. And a Term is more than
a mere word--it is _the expression of a general idea_.
A _Concept_ is built up from the processes of Perception, Abstraction,
Comparison and Generalization. We must first perceive; then analyze or
abstract qualities; then compare qualities; then synthesize or classify
according to the result of the comparison of qualities. By perceiving
and comparing the qualities of various individual things, we notice
their points of resemblance and difference--the points wherein they
agree or disagree--wherein they are alike or unlike. Eliminating by
abstraction the points in which they differ and are unlike; and, again
by abstraction, retaining in consideration the points in which they
resemble and are alike; we are able to group, arrange or classify these
"_alike things_" into _a class-idea_ large enough to embrace them all.
This class-idea is what is known as a General Idea or a Concept. This
Concept we give a general name, which is called a Term. In grammar our
particular ideas arising from Percepts are usually denoted by proper
nouns--our general ideas arising from Concepts are usually denoted by
common nouns. Thus "John Smith" (particular; proper noun) and "Man"
(general; common noun). Or "horse" (general; common), and "Dobbin"
(particular; proper).
It will be seen readily that there must be lower and higher concepts.
Every class contains within itself lower classes. And every class is,
itself, but a lower class in a higher one. Thus the high concept of
"animal" may be analyzed into "mammal," which in turn is found to
contain "horse," which in turn may be sub-divided into special kinds of
horses. The concept "plant" may be sub-divided many times before the
concept "rose" is obtained, and the latter is capable of sub-division
into varieties and sub-varieties, until at last a particular flower is
reached. Jevons says: "We classify things together whenever we observe
that they are like each other in any respect and, therefore, think of
them together.... In classifying a collection of objects, we do not
merely put together into groups those which resemble each other, but we
also divide each class into smaller ones in which the resemblance is
more complete. Thus the class of _white substances_ may be divided into
those which are solid and those which are fluid, so that we get the two
minor classes of solid-white, and fluid-white substances. It is
desirable to have names by which to show that one class is contained in
another and, accordingly, we call the class which is divided into two or
more smaller ones, the _Genus_; and the smaller ones into which it is
divided, the _Species_."
Every Genus is a Species of the class next higher than itself; and every
Species is a Genus of the classes lower than itself. Thus it would seem
that the extension in either direction would be infinite. But, for the
purposes of finite thought, the authorities teach that there must be a
Highest Genus, which cannot be the Species of a higher class, and which
is called the _Summum Genus_. The _Summum Genus_ is expressed by terms
such as the following: "Being;" "Existence;" "The Absolute;"
"Something;" "Thing;" "The Ultimate Reality," or some similar term
denoting the state of being _ultimate_. Likewise, at the lowest end of
the scale we find what are called the Lowest Species, or _Infima
Species_. The Infima Species are always _individuals_. Thus we have the
_individual_ at one end of the scale; and _The Absolute_ at the other.
Beyond these limits the mind of man cannot travel.
There has been much confusion in making classifications and some
ingenious plans have been evolved for simplifying the process. That of
Jevons is perhaps the simplest, when understood. This authority says:
"All these difficulties are avoided in the _perfect logical method of
dividing each Genus into two Species, and not more than two, so that one
species possesses a particular quality, and the other does not_. Thus if
I divide dwelling-houses into those which are made of brick and those
which are not made of brick, I am perfectly safe and nobody can find
fault with me.... Suppose, for instance, that I divide dwelling-houses
as below:
Dwelling-House
|
--+------+-------+-------+-------+--
| | | | |
Brick Stone Earth Iron Wood
"The evident objection will at once be made, that houses may be built of
other materials than those here specified. In Australia, houses are
sometimes made of the bark of gum-trees; the Esquimaux live in snow
houses; tents may be considered as canvas houses, and it is easy to
conceive of houses made of terra-cotta, paper, straw, etc. All logical
difficulties will, however, be avoided _if I never make more than two
species at each step_, in the following way:--
Dwelling-House
|
+----+----+
| |
Brick Not-Brick
|
+----+----+
| |
Stone Not-Stone
|
+----+----+
| |
Wooden Not-Wooden
|
+----+----+
| |
Iron Not-Iron
"It is quite certain that I must in this division have left a place for
every possible kind of house; for if a house is not made of brick, nor
stone, nor wood, nor iron, it yet comes under the species at the right
hand, which is not-iron, not-wooden, not-stone, and not-brick.... This
manner of classifying things may seem to be inconvenient, but it is in
reality the only logical way."
The student will see that the process of Classification is two-fold. The
first is by Analysis, in which the Genus is divided into Species by
reason of _differences_. The second is by Synthesis, in which
individuals are grouped into Species, and Species into the Genus, by
reason of _resemblances_. Moreover, in building up general classes,
which is known as Generalization, we must first _analyze_ the individual
in order to ascertain its _qualities, attributes and properties_, and
then _synthesize_ the individual with other individuals possessing like
qualities, properties or attributes.
Brooks says of Generalization: "The mind now takes the materials that
have been furnished and fashioned by comparison and analysis and unites
them into one single mental product, giving us the general notion or
concept. The mind, as it were, brings together these several attributes
into a bunch or package and then ties a mental string around it, as we
would bunch a lot of roses or cigars.... Generalization is an
_ascending_ process. The broader concept is regarded as higher than the
narrower concept; a concept is considered as higher than percept; a
general idea stands above a particular idea. We thus go up from
particulars to generals; from percepts to concepts; from lower concepts
to higher concepts. Beginning down with particular objects, we rise from
them to the general idea of their class. Having formed a number of lower
classes, we compare them as we did individuals and generalize them into
higher classes. We perform the same process with these higher classes
and thus proceed until we are at last arrested in the highest class,
that of Being. Having reached the pinnacle of Generalization, we may
descend the ladder by reversing the process through which we ascend."
A Concept, then, is seen to be a _general idea_. It is a general thought
that embraces _all the individuals_ of its own class and has in it all
that is common to its own class, while it resembles _no_ particular
individual of its class in _all_ respects. Thus, a concept of _animal_
contains within itself the minor concepts of _all animals_ and the
animal-quality of all animals--yet it differs from the _percept_ of any
one particular animal and the minor concepts of minor classes of
animals. Consequently a concept or general idea cannot be _imaged_ or
mentally pictured. We may picture a percept of any particular thing, but
we cannot picture a general idea or concept because the latter does not
partake of the _particular_ qualities of any of its class, but embraces
all the general qualities of the class. Try to picture the general idea,
or concept, of Man. You will find that any attempt to do so will result
in the production of merely _a man_--some particular man. If you give
the picture dark hair, it will fail to include the light-haired men; if
you give it white skin, it will slight the darker-skinned races. If you
picture a stout man, the thin ones are neglected. And so on in every
feature. It is impossible to form a correct general class picture unless
we include every individual in it. The best we can do is to form a sort
of _composite_ image, which at the best is in the nature of a symbol
representative of the class--an ideal image to make easier the _idea_ of
the general class or term.
From the above we may see the fundamental differences between a Percept
and a Concept. The Percept is the mental image of a real object--a
particular thing. The Concept is merely a _general idea_, or general
notion, of the common attributes of a class of objects or things. A
Percept arises directly from sense-impressions, while a Concept is, in a
sense, a pure thought--an abstract thing--a mental creation--an ideal.
A Concrete Concept is a concept embodying the common qualities of a
class of objects, as for instance, the concrete concept of _lion_, in
which the general class qualities of all lions are embodied. An Abstract
Concept is a concept embodying merely some one quality generally
diffused, as for instance, the quality of _fierceness_ in the general
class of lions. _Rose_ is a concrete concept; _red_, or _redness_, is an
abstract concept. It will aid you in remembering this distinction to
memorize Jevons' rule: "_A Concrete Term is the name of a Thing_; _an
Abstract Term is the name of a Quality of a Thing_."
A Concrete Concept, including all the particular individuals of a class,
must also contain all the common qualities of those individuals. Thus,
such a concept is composed of the ideas of the particular individuals
and of their common qualities, in combination and union. From this
arises the distinctive terms known as the _content_, _extension_ and
_intension_ of concepts, respectively.
The _content_ of a concept is _all that it includes--its full meaning_.
The _extension_ of a concept depends upon its _quantity_ aspect--it is
its property of including numbers of individual objects within its
content. The _intension_ of a concept depends upon its _quality_
aspect--it is its property of including class or common qualities,
properties or attributes within its content.
Thus, the _extension_ of the concept _horse_ covers all individual
horses; while its _intension_ includes all qualities, attributes, and
properties common to all horses--class qualities possessed by all horses
in common, and which qualities, etc., make the particular animals
_horses_, as distinguished from other animals.
It follows that the larger the number of particular objects in a class,
the smaller must be the number of general class qualities--qualities
common to all in the class. And, that the larger the number of common
class qualities, the smaller must be the number of individuals in the
class. As the logicians express it, "the greater the extension, the less
the intension; the greater the intension, the less the extension." Thus,
_animal_ is narrow in intension, but very broad in extension; for while
there are many animals there are but very few qualities common to _all_
animals. And, _horse_ is narrower in extension, but broader in
intension; for while there are comparatively few horses, the qualities
common to all horses are greater.
The cultivation of the faculty of Generalization, or Conception, of
course, depends largely upon _exercise_ and _material_, as does the
cultivation of every mental faculty, as we have seen. But there are
certain rules, methods and ideas which may be used to advantage in
developing this faculty in the direction of clear and capable work. This
faculty is developed by all of the general processes of thought, for it
forms an important part of all thought. But the logical processes known
as Analysis and Synthesis give to this faculty exercise and employment
particularly adapted to its development and cultivation. Let us briefly
consider these processes.
* * * * *
_Logical Analysis_ is the process by which we examine and unfold the
meaning of Terms. A Term, you remember, is the verbal expression of a
Concept. In such analysis we endeavor to unfold and discover the
_quality-aspect_ and the _quantity-aspect_ of the content of the
concept. We seek, thereby, to discover the particular general idea
expressed; the number of particular individuals included therein; and
the properties of the class or generalization. Analysis depends upon
division and separation. Development in the process of Logical Analysis
tends toward clearness, distinctness, and exactness in thought and
expression. Logical Analysis has two aspects or phases, as follows: (1)
_Division_, or the separation of a concept according to its _extension_,
as for instance the analysis of a genus into its various species; and
(2) _Partition_, or the separation of a concept into its component
qualities, properties and attributes, as for instance, the analysis of
the concept _iron_ into its several qualities of color, weight,
hardness, malleability, tenacity, utility, etc.
There are certain rules of Division which should be observed, the
following being a simple statement of the same:
I. _The division should be governed by a uniform principle._ For
instance it would be illogical to first divide men into Caucasians,
Mongolians, etc., and then further sub-divide them into Christians,
Pagans, etc., for the first division would be according to the principle
of race, and the second according to the principle of religion.
Observing the rule of the "uniform principle" we may divide men into
races, and sub-races, and so on, without regard to religion; and we may
likewise divide men according to their respective religions, and then
into minor denominations and sects, without regard to race or
nationality. The above rule is frequently violated by careless thinkers
and speakers.
II. _The division should be complete and exhaustive._ For instance, the
analysis of a genus should extend to every known species of it, upon the
principle that _the genus is merely the sum of its several species_. A
textbook illustration of a violation of this rule is given in the case
of the concept _actions_, when divided into _good-actions_ and
_bad-actions_, but omitting the very important species of
_indifferent-actions_. Carelessness in observance of this rule leads to
fallacious reasoning and cloudy thinking.
III. _The division should be in logical sequence._ It is illogical to
skip or pass over intermediate divisions, as for instance, when we
divide _animals_ into _horses_, _trout and swallows_, omitting the
intermediate division into _mammals_, _fish and birds_. The more perfect
the sequence, the clearer the analysis and the thought resulting
therefrom.
IV. _The division should be exclusive._ That is, the various species
divided from a genus, should be reciprocally exclusive--should exclude
one another. Thus to divide _mankind_ into _male_, _men and women_,
would be illogical, because the class _male_ includes _men_. The
division should be either: "_male and female_;" or else: "men, women,
boys, girls."
The exercise of Division along these lines, and according to these
rules, will tend to improve one's powers of conception and analysis.
Any class of objects--any general concept--may be used for practice. A
trial will show you the great powers of unfoldment contained within this
simple process. It tends to broaden and widen one's conception of almost
any class of objects.
There are also several rules for Partition which should be observed, as
follows:
I. _The partition should be complete and exhaustive._ That is, it should
unfold the full meaning of the term or concept, so far as is concerned
its several general qualities, properties and attributes. But this
applies only to the qualities, properties and attributes which are
_common_ to the class or concept, and not to the minor qualities which
belong solely to the various sub-divisions composing the class; nor to
the accidental or individual qualities belonging to the separate
individuals in any sub-class. The qualities should be _essential_ and
not _accidental_--general, not particular. A famous violation of this
rule was had in the case of the ancient Platonic definition of "Man" as:
"A two-legged animal without feathers," which Diogenes rendered absurd
by offering a plucked chicken as a "man" according to the definition.
Clearness in thought requires the recognition of the distinction between
the general qualities and the individual, particular or accidental
qualities. Red-hair is an accidental quality of a particular man and not
a general quality of the class _man_.
II. _The partition should consider the qualities, properties and
attributes_, according to the classification of logical division. That
is, the various qualities, properties and attributes should be
considered in the form of genus and species, as in Division. In this
classification, the rules of Division apply.
It will be seen that there is a close relationship existing between
Partition and Definition. Definition is really a statement of the
various qualities, attributes, and properties of a concept, either
stated in particular or else in concepts of other and larger classes.
There is perhaps no better exercise for the cultivation of clear thought
and conception than Definition. In order to define, one must exercise
his power of analysis to a considerable extent. Brooks says: "Exercises
in logical definition are valuable in unfolding our conception. Logical
definition, including both the genus and the specific difference, gives
clearness, definiteness and adequacy to our conceptions. It separates a
conception from all other conceptions by fixing upon and presenting the
essential and distinctive property or properties of the conception
defined. The value of exercises in logical definition is thus readily
apparent."
If the student will select some familiar term and endeavor to define it
correctly, writing down the result, and will then compare the latter
with the definition given in some standard dictionary, he will see a new
light regarding logical definition. Practice in definition, conducted
along these lines, will cultivate the powers of analysis and conception
and will, at the same time, tend toward the acquiring of correct and
scientific methods of thought and clear expression.
Hyslop gives the following excellent Rules of Logical Definition, which
should be followed by the student in his exercises:
"I. A definition should state the essential attributes of the species
defined.
"II. A definition must not contain the name or word defined. Otherwise
the definition is called _a circulus in definiendo_ (defining in a
circle).
"III. The definition must be exactly equivalent to the species defined.
"IV. A definition should not be expressed in obscure, figurative or
ambiguous language.
"V. A definition must not be negative when it can be affirmative."
_Logical Synthesis_ is the exact opposite of Logical Analysis. In the
latter we strive to separate and take apart; in the former we strive to
bind together and combine the particulars into the general. Beginning
with individual things and comparing them with each other according to
observed points of resemblance, we proceed to group them into species or
narrow classes. These classes, or species, we then combine with similar
ones, into a larger class or genus; and then, according to the same
process, into broader classes as we have shown in the first part of this
chapter.
The process of Synthesis is calculated to develop and cultivate the mind
in several directions and exercises along these lines will give a new
habit and sense of orderly arrangement, which will be most useful to
the student in his every-day life. Halleck says: "Whenever a person is
comparing a specimen to see whether it may be put in the same class with
other specimens, he is _thinking_. Comparison is an absolutely essential
factor of thought, and classification demands comparison. The man who
has not properly classified the myriad individual objects with which he
has to deal, must advance like a cripple. He, only, can travel with
seven-league boots, who has thought out the relations existing between
these stray individuals and put them into their proper classes. In a
minute a business man may put his hand on any one of ten thousand
letters if they are properly classified. In the same way, the student of
history, sociology or any other branch, can, if he studies the subjects
aright, have all his knowledge classified and speedily available for
use.... In this way, we may make our knowledge of the world more
minutely exact. We cannot classify without seeing things under a new
aspect."
The study of Natural History, in any or all of its branches, will do
much to cultivate the power of Classification. But one may practice
classification with the objects around him in his every-day life.
Arranging things mentally, into small classes, and these into larger,
one will soon be able to form a logical connection between particular
ideas and general ideas; particular objects and general classes. The
practice of classification gives to the mind a constructive turn--a
"building-up" tendency, which is most desirable in these days of
construction and development. Regarding some of the pitfalls of
classification, Jevons says:
"In classifying things, we must take great care not to be misled by
outward resemblances. Things may seem to be very much like each other
which are not so. Whales, porpoises, seals and several other animals
live in the sea exactly like fish; they have a similar shape and are
usually classed among fish. People are said to go whale-fishing. Yet
these animals are not really fish at all, but are much more like dogs
and horses and other quadrupeds than they are like fish. They cannot
live entirely under water and breathe the air contained in the water
like fish, but they have to come up to the surface at intervals to take
breath. Similarly, we must not class bats with birds because they fly
about, although they have what would be called wings; these wings are
not like those of birds and in truth bats are much more like rats and
mice than they are like birds. Botanists used at one time to classify
plants according to their size, as trees, shrubs or herbs, but we now
know that a great tree is often more similar in its character to a tiny
herb than it is to other great trees. A daisy has little resemblance to
a great Scotch thistle; yet the botanist regards them as very similar.
The lofty growing bamboo is a kind of grass, and the sugarcane also
belongs to the same class with wheat and oats."
Remember that analysis of a genus into its component species is
accomplished by a separation according to _differences_; and species are
built up by synthesis into a genus because of _resemblances_. The same
is true regarding individual and species, building up in accordance to
points of resemblance, while analysis or separation is according to
points of difference.
The use of a good dictionary will be advantageous to the student in
developing the power of Generalization or Conception. Starting with a
species, he may build up to higher and still higher classes by
consulting the dictionary; likewise, starting with a large class, he may
work down to the several species composing it. An encyclopedia, of
course, is still better for the purpose in many cases. Remember that
Generalization is a prime requisite for clear, logical thinking.
Moreover, it is a great developer of Thought.
CHAPTER XI.
JUDGMENT
We have seen that in the several mental processes which are grouped
together under the general head of Understanding, the stage or step of
Abstraction is first; following which is the second step or phase,
called Generalization or Conception. The third step or phase is that
which is called Judgment. In the exercise of the faculty of Judgment, we
determine the agreement or disagreement between two concepts, ideas, or
objects of thought, by comparing them one with another. From this
process of comparison arises the Judgment, which is expressed in the
shape of a logical Proposition. A certain form of Judgment must be used,
however, in the actual formation of a Concept, for we must first compare
qualities, and make a judgment thereon, in order to form a general idea.
In this place, however, we shall confine ourselves to the consideration
of the faculty of Judgment in the strictly logical usage of the term,
as previously stated.
We have seen that the expression of a concept is called a Term, which is
the _name_ of the concept. In the same way when we compare two terms
(expressions of concepts) and pass Judgment thereon, the expression of
that Judgment is called a Proposition. In every Judgment and Proposition
there must be two Terms or Concepts, connected by a little word "is" or
"are," or some form of the verb "to be," in the present tense
indicative. This connecting word is called the Copula. For instance, we
may compare the two terms _horse_ and _animal_, as follows: "A horse is
an animal," the word _is_ being the Copula or symbol of the
_affirmative_ Judgment, which connects the two terms. In the same way we
may form a _negative_ Judgment as follows: "A horse is not a cow." In a
Proposition, _the term of which something is affirmed_ is called the
Subject; and _the term expressing that which is affirmed of the subject_
is called the Predicate.
Besides the distinction between affirmative Judgments, or Propositions,
there is a distinction arising from _quantity_, which separates them
into the respective classes of _particular_ and _universal_. Thus,
"_all_ horses are animals," is a _universal_ Judgment; while "_some_
horses are black" is a particular Judgment. Thus all Judgments must be
either _affirmative_ or _negative_; and also either _particular_ or
_universal_. This gives us four possible classes of Judgments, as
follows, and illustrated symbolically:
1. Universal Affirmative, as "All A is B."
2. Universal Negative, as "No A is B."
3. Particular Affirmative, as "Some A is B."
4. Particular Negative, as "Some A is not B."
The Term or Judgment is said to be "_distributed_" (that is, extended
universally) when it is used in its fullest sense, in which it is used
in the sense of "each and every" of its kind or class. Thus in the
proposition "Horses are animals" the meaning is that "_each and every_"
horse is an animal--in this case the _subject_ is "distributed" or made
universal. But the _predicate_ is _not_ "distributed" or made universal,
but remains particular or restricted and implies merely "some." For the
proposition does not mean that the class "_horses_" includes _all_
animals. For we may say that: "_Some_ animals are _not_ horses." So you
see we have several instances in which the "distribution" varies, both
as regards the subject and also the predicate. The rule of logic
applying in this case is as follows:
1. In _universal_ propositions, the _subject_ is distributed.
2. In _particular_ propositions, the _subject_ is _not_ distributed.
3. In _negative_ propositions, the _predicate_ is distributed.
4. In _affirmative_ propositions, the _predicate_ is _not_ distributed.
A little time devoted to the analysis and understanding of the above
rules will repay the student for his trouble, inasmuch as it will train
his mind in the direction of logical distinction and judgment. The
importance of these rules will appear later.
Halleck says: "Judgment is the power revolutionizing the world. The
revolution is slow because nature's forces are so complex, so hard to be
reduced to their simplest forms, and so disguised and neutralized by
the presence of other forces. The progress of the next hundred years
will join many concepts, which now seem to have no common qualities. If
the vast amount of energy latent in the sunbeams, in the rays of the
stars, in the winds, in the rising and falling of the tides, is
treasured up and applied to human purposes, it will be a fresh triumph
for judgment. This world is rolling around in a universe of energy, of
which judgment has as yet harnessed only the smallest appreciable
fraction. Fortunately, judgment is ever working and silently comparing
things that, to past ages, have seemed dissimilar; and it is constantly
abstracting and leaving out of the field of view those qualities which
have simply served to obscure the point at issue." Brooks says: "The
power of judgment is of great value to its products. It is involved in
or accompanies every act of the intellect, and thus lies at the
foundation of all intellectual activity. It operates directly in every
act of the understanding; and even aids the other faculties of the mind
in completing their activities and products."
The best method of cultivating the power of Judgment is the exercise of
the faculty in the direction of making comparisons, of weighing
differences and resemblances, and in generally training the mind along
the lines of Logical Thinking. Another volume of this series is devoted
to the latter subject, and should aid the student who wishes to
cultivate the habit of logical and scientific thought. The study of
mathematics is calculated to develop the faculty of Judgment, because it
necessitates the use of the powers of comparison and decision. Mental
arithmetic, especially, will tend to strengthen, and exercise this
faculty of the mind.
Geometry and Logic will give the very best exercise along these lines to
those who care to devote the time, attention and work to the task.
Games, such as chess, and checkers or draughts, tend to develop the
powers of Judgment. The study of the definitions of words in a good
dictionary will also tend to give excellent exercise along the same
lines. The exercises given in this book for the cultivation and
development of the several faculties, will tend to develop this
particular faculty in a general way, for the exercise of Judgment is
required at each step of the way, and in each exercise.
Brooks says: "It should be one of the leading objects of the culture of
young people to lead them to acquire the habit of forming judgments.
They should not only be led to see things, but to have opinions about
things. They should be trained to see things in their relations, and to
put these relations into definite propositions. Their ideas of objects
should be worked up into thoughts concerning the objects. Those methods
of teaching are best which tend to excite a thoughtful habit of mind
that notices the similitudes and diversities of objects, and endeavors
to read the thoughts which they embody and of which they are the
symbols."
The exercises given at the close of the next chapter, entitled "Derived
Judgments," will give to the mind a decided trend in the direction of
logical judgment. We heartily recommend them to the student.
The student will find that he will tend to acquire the habit of clear
logical comparison and judgment, if he will memorize and apply in his
thinking the following excellent _Primary Rules of Thought_, stated by
Jevons:
"I. _Law of Identity_: The same quality or thing is _always_ the same
quality or thing, no matter how different the conditions in which it
occurs.
"II. _Law of Contradiction_: Nothing can at the same time and place
_both_ be and not be.
"III. _Law of Excluded Middle_: Everything must _either_ be, or not be;
there is no other alternative or middle course."
Jevons says of these laws: "Students are seldom able to see at first
their full meaning and importance. All arguments may be explained when
these self-evident laws are granted; and it is not too much to say that
_the whole of logic will be plain to those who will constantly use these
laws as their key_."
CHAPTER XII.
DERIVED JUDGMENTS
As we have seen, a Judgment is obtained by comparing two objects of
thought according to their agreement or difference. The next higher
step, that of logical Reasoning, consists of the comparing of two ideas
through their relation to a third. This form of reasoning is called
_mediate_, because it is effected through the _medium_ of the third
idea. There is, however, a certain process of Understanding which comes
in between this mediate reasoning on the one hand, and the formation of
a plain judgment on the other. Some authorities treat it as a form of
_reasoning_, calling it _Immediate Reasoning_ or Immediate Inference,
while others treat it as a higher form of Judgment, calling it Derived
Judgment. We shall follow the latter classification, as best adapted for
the particular purposes of this book.
The fundamental principle of Derived Judgment is that ordinary Judgments
are often so related to each other that one Judgment may be derived
directly and immediately from another. The two particular forms of the
general method of Derived Judgment are known as those of (1) Opposition;
and (2) Conversion; respectively.
In order to more clearly understand the logical processes involved in
Derived Judgment, we should acquaint ourselves with the general
relations of Judgments, and with the symbolic letters used by logicians
as a means of simplifying the processes of thought. Logicians denote
each of the four classes of Judgments or Propositions by a certain
letter, the first four vowels--A, E, I and O, being used for the
purpose. It has been found very convenient to use these symbols in
denoting the various forms of Propositions and Judgments. The following
table should be memorized for this purpose:
_Universal Affirmative_, symbolized by "A."
_Universal Negative_, symbolized by "E."
_Particular Affirmative_, symbolized by "I."
_Particular Negative_, symbolized by "O."
It will be seen that these four forms of Judgments bear certain
relations to each other, from which arises what is called opposition.
This may be better understood by reference to the following table called
the Square of Opposition:
A CONTRARIES E
+------------------------+
|\ / |
| \ /S |
| C\ /E |
| O\ /I |
| N\ /R |
| T\ /O |
S| R\ /T |S
U| A\ /C |U
B| \ /I |B
A| \ /D |A
L| \ / |L
T| / \ |T
E| / D\ |E
R| / I\ |R
N| /A C\ |N
S| /R T\ |S
| /T O\ |
| /N R\ |
| /O I\ |
| /C E\ |
| / S\ |
|/ \ |
+------------------------+
I SUB-CONTRARIES O
Thus, A and E are _contraries_; I and O are _sub-contraries_; A and I,
and also E and O are _subalterns_; A and O, and also E and I are
_contradictories_.
The following will give a symbolic table of each of the four Judgments
or Propositions with the logical symbols attached:
(A) "All A is B."
(E) "No A is B."
(I) "Some A is B."
(O) "Some A is not B."
The following are the rules governing and expressing the relations above
indicated:
I. Of the Contradictories: _One must be true, and the other must be
false_. As for instance, (A) "All A is B;" and (O) "Some A is not B;"
cannot both be true at the same time. Neither can (E) "No A is B;" and
(I) "Some A is B;" both be true at the same time. They are
_contradictory_ by nature,--and if one is true, the other must be false;
if one is false, the other must be true.
II. Of the Contraries: _If one is true the other must be false; but,
both may be false_. As for instance, (A) "All A is B;" and (E) "No A is
B;" cannot both be true at the same time. If one is true the other
_must_ be false. _But_, both may be _false_, as we may see when we find
we may state that (I) "_Some_ A is B." So while these two propositions
are _contrary_, they are not _contradictory_. While, if one of them is
_true_ the other must be false, it does not follow that if one is
_false_ the other must be _true_, for both _may be false_, leaving the
truth to be found in a third proposition.
III. Of the Subcontraries: _If one is false the other must be true; but
both may be true_. As for instance, (I) "Some A is B;" and (O) "Some A
is not B;" may both be true, for they do not contradict each other. But
one or the other must be true--they can not both be false.
IV. Of the Subalterns: _If the Universal (A or E) be true the Particular
(I or O) must be true_. As for instance, if (A) "All A is B" is true,
then (I) "Some A is B" must also be true; also, if (E) "No A is B" is
true, then "Some A is not B" must also be true. The Universal carries
the particular within its truth and meaning. But; _If the Universal is
false, the particular may be true or it may be false_. As for instance
(A) "All A is B" may be false, and yet (I) "Some A is B" may be either
true or false, without being determined by the (A) proposition. And,
likewise, (E) "No A is B" may be false without determining the truth or
falsity of (O) "Some A is not B."
But: _If the Particular be false, the Universal also must be false_. As
for instance, if (I) "Some A is B" is false, then it must follow that
(A) "All A is B" must also be false; or if (O) "Some A is not B" is
false, then (E) "No A is B" must also be false. But: _The Particular may
be true, without rendering the Universal true_. As for instance: (I)
"_Some_ A is B" may be true without making true (A) "_All_ A is B;" or
(O) "Some A is not B" may be true without making true (E) "No A is B."
The above rules may be worked out not only with the symbols, as "All A
is B," but also with _any_ Judgments or Propositions, such as "All
horses are animals;" "All men are mortal;" "Some men are artists;" etc.
The principle involved is identical in each and every case. The "All A
is B" symbology is merely adopted for simplicity, and for the purpose of
rendering the logical process akin to that of mathematics. The letters
play the same part that the numerals or figures do in arithmetic or the
_a_, _b_, _c_; _x_, _y_, _z_, in algebra. Thinking in symbols tends
toward clearness of thought and reasoning.
_Exercise_: Let the student apply the principles of Opposition by using
any of the above judgments mentioned in the preceding paragraph, in the
direction of erecting a Square of Opposition of them, after having
attached the symbolic letters A, E, I and O, to the appropriate forms of
the propositions.
Then let him work out the following problems from the Tables and Square
given in this chapter.
1. If "A" is true; show what follows for E, I and O. Also what follows
if "A" be _false_.
2. If "E" is true; show what follows for A, I and O. Also what follows
if "E" be _false_.
3. If "I" is true; show what follows for A, E and O. Also what follows
if "I" be _false_.
4. If "O" is true; show what follows for A, E and I. Also what happens
if "O" be _false_.
CONVERSION OF JUDGMENTS
Judgments are capable of the process of Conversion, or _the change of
place of subject and predicate_. Hyslop says: "Conversion is the
transposition of subject and predicate, or the process of immediate
inference by which we can infer from a given preposition another having
the predicate of the original for its subject, and the subject of the
original for its predicate." The process of converting a proposition
seems simple at first thought but a little consideration will show that
there are many difficulties in the way. For instance, while it is a true
judgment that "All _horses_ are _animals_," it is not a correct Derived
Judgment or Inference that "All _animals_ are _horses_." The same is
true of the possible conversion of the judgment "All biscuit is bread"
into that of "All bread is biscuit." There are certain rules to be
observed in Conversion, as we shall see in a moment.
The Subject of a judgment is, of course, _the term of which something is
affirmed_; and the Predicate is _the term expressing that which is
affirmed of the Subject_. The Predicate is really an expression of an
_attribute_ of the Subject. Thus when we say "All horses are animals" we
express the idea that _all horses_ possess the _attribute_ of
"animality;" or when we say that "Some men are artists," we express the
idea that _some men_ possess the _attributes_ or qualities included in
the concept "artist." In Conversion, the original judgment is called the
Convertend; and the new form of judgment, resulting from the conversion,
is called the Converse. Remember these terms, please.
The two Rules of Conversion, stated in simple form, are as follows:
I. Do not change the quality of a judgment. The quality of the converse
must remain the same as that of the convertend.
II. Do not distribute an undistributed term. No term must be distributed
in the converse which is not distributed in the convertend.
The reason of these rules is that it would be contrary to truth and
logic to give to a converted judgment a higher degree of quality and
quantity than is found in the original judgment. To do so would be to
attempt to make "twice 2" more than "2 plus 2."
There are three methods or kinds of Conversion, as follows: (1) Simple
Conversion; (2) Limited Conversion; and (3) Conversion by
Contraposition.
_In Simple Conversion_, there is no change in either quality or
quantity. For instance, by Simple Conversion we may convert a
proposition by changing the places of its subject and predicate,
respectively. But as Jevons says: "It does not follow that the new one
will always be true if the old one was true. Sometimes this is the
case, and sometimes it is not. If I say, 'some churches are
wooden-buildings,' I may turn it around and get 'some wooden-buildings
are churches;' the meaning is exactly the same as before. This kind of
change is called Simple Conversion, because we need do nothing but
simply change the subjects and predicates in order to get a new
proposition. We see that the Particular Affirmative proposition can be
simply converted. Such is the case also with the Universal Negative
proposition. 'No large flowers are green things' may be converted simply
into 'no green things are large flowers.'"
_In Limited Conversion_, the quantity is changed from Universal to
Particular. Of this, Jevons continues: "But it is a more troublesome
matter, however, to convert a Universal Affirmative proposition. The
statement that 'all jelly fish are animals,' is true; but, if we convert
it, getting 'all animals are jelly fish,' the result is absurd. This is
because the predicate of a universal proposition is really particular.
We do not mean that jelly fish are 'all' the animals which exist, but
only 'some' of the animals. The proposition ought really to be 'all
jelly fish are _some_ animals,' and if we converted this simply, we
should get, 'some animals are all jelly fish.' But we almost always
leave out the little adjectives _some_ and _all_ when they would occur
in the predicate, so that the proposition, when converted, becomes
'_some_ animals are jelly fish.' This kind of change is called Limited
Conversion, and we see that a Universal Affirmative proposition, when so
converted, gives a Particular Affirmative one."
In Conversion by Contraposition, there is a change in the position of
the negative copula, which shifts the expression of the quality. As for
instance, in the Particular Negative "Some animals are not horses," we
cannot say "Some horses are not animals," for that would be a violation
of the rule that "no term must be distributed in the converse which is
not distributed in the convertend," for as we have seen in the preceding
chapter: "In Particular propositions the _subject_ is _not_
distributed." And in the original proposition, or convertend, "animals"
is the _subject_ of a Particular proposition. Avoiding this, and
proceeding by Conversion by Contraposition, we convert the Convertend
(O) into a Particular Affirmative (I), saying: "Some animals are
not-horses;" or "Some animals are things not horses;" and then
proceeding by Simple Conversion we get the converse, "Some things not
horses are animals," or "Some not-horses are animals."
The following gives the application of the appropriate form of
Conversion to each of the several four kind of Judgments or
Propositions:
(A) _Universal Affirmative_: This form of proposition is converted by
Limited Conversion. The predicate not being distributed in the
convertend, it cannot be distributed in the converse, by saying "all."
("In affirmative propositions the _predicate_ is _not_ distributed.")
Thus by this form of Conversion, we convert "All horses are animals"
into "Some animals are horses." The Universal Affirmative (A) is
converted by limitation into a Particular Affirmative (I).
(E) _Universal Negative_: This form of proposition is converted by
Simple Conversion. In a Universal Negative _both terms are distributed_.
("In universal propositions, the _subject_ is distributed;" "In
negative propositions, the _predicate_ is distributed.") So we may say
"No cows are horses," and then convert the proposition into "No horses
are cows." We simply convert one Universal Negative (E) into another
Universal Negative (E).
(I) _Particular Affirmative_: This form of proposition is converted by
Simple Conversion. For _neither term is distributed_ in a Particular
Affirmative. ("In particular propositions, the _subject_ is _not_
distributed. In affirmative propositions, the _predicate_ is _not_
distributed.") And neither term being distributed in the convertend, it
must not be distributed in the converse. So from "Some horses are males"
we may by Simple Conversion derive "Some males are horses." We simply
convert one Particular Affirmative (I), into another Particular
Affirmative (I).
(O) _Particular Negative_: This form of proposition is converted by
Contraposition or Negation. We have given examples and illustrations in
the paragraph describing Conversion by Contraposition. The Particular
Negative (I) is converted by contraposition into a Particular
Affirmative (I) which is then simply converted into another Particular
Affirmative (I).
There are several minor processes or methods of deriving judgments from
each other, or of making immediate inferences, but the above will give
the student a very fair idea of the minor or more complete methods.
_Exercise_: The following will give the student good practice and
exercise in the methods of Conversion. It affords a valuable mental
drill, and tends to develop the logical faculties, particularly that of
Judgment. The student should _convert_ the following propositions,
according to the rules and examples given in this chapter:
1. All men are reasoning beings.
2. Some men are blacksmiths.
3. No men are quadrupeds.
4. Some birds are sparrows.
5. Some horses are vicious.
6. No brute is rational.
7. Some men are not sane.
8. All biscuit is bread.
9. Some bread is biscuit.
10. Not all bread is biscuit.
CHAPTER XIII.
REASONING
In the preceding chapters we have seen that in the group of mental
processes involved in the general process of Understanding, there are
several stages or steps, three of which we have considered in turn,
namely: (1) Abstraction; (2) Generalization or Conception; (3) Judgment.
The _fourth_ step, or stage, and the one which we are now about to
consider, is that called Reasoning.
_Reasoning_ is that faculty of the mind whereby we compare two
Judgments, one with the other, and from which comparison we are enabled
to form a third judgment. It is a form of indirect or mediate
comparison, whereas, the ordinary Judgment is a form of immediate or
direct comparison. As, when we form a Judgment, we compare two concepts
and decide upon their agreement or difference; so in Reasoning we
compare two Judgments and from the comparison we draw or produce a new
Judgment. Thus, we may reason that the particular dog "Carlo" is an
animal, by the following process:
(1) _All_ dogs are animals; (2) Carlo is a dog; therefore, (3) Carlo is
an animal. Or, in the same way, we may reason that a whale is not a
fish, as follows:
(1) _All_ fish are cold-blooded animals; (2) A whale is _not_ a
cold-blooded animal; therefore, (3) A whale is _not_ a fish.
In the above processes it will be seen that the third and final Judgment
is derived from a comparison of the first two Judgments. Brooks states
the process as follows: "Looking at the process more closely, it will be
seen that in inference in Reasoning involves a comparison of relations.
We infer the relation of two objects from their relation to a third
object. We must thus grasp in the mind two relations and from the
comparison of these two relations we infer a third relation. The two
relations from which we infer a third, are judgments; hence, Reasoning
may also be defined as the process of deriving one judgment from two
other judgments. We compare the two given judgments and from this
comparison derive the third judgment. This constitutes a single step in
Reasoning, and an argument so expressed is called a _Syllogism_."
The _Syllogism_ consists of three propositions, the first two of which
express the grounds or basis of the argument and are called the
_premises_; the third expresses the inference derived from a comparison
of the other two and is called the _conclusion_. We shall not enter into
a technical consideration of the Syllogism in this book, as the subject
is considered in detail in the volume of this series devoted to the
subject of "Logic." Our concern here is to point out the natural process
and course of Reasoning, rather than to consider the technical features
of the process.
Reasoning is divided into two general classes, known respectively as (1)
_Inductive Reasoning_; (2) _Deductive Reasoning_.
_Inductive Reasoning_ is the process of arriving at a general truth, law
or principle from a consideration of many particular facts and truths.
Thus, if we find that a certain thing is true of a great number of
particular objects, we may infer that the same thing is true of _all_
objects of this particular kind. In one of the examples given above, one
of the judgments was that "all fish are cold-blooded animals," which
general truth was arrived at by Inductive Reasoning based upon the
examination of a great number of fish, and from thence assuming that
_all_ fish are true to this general law of truth.
_Deductive Reasoning_ is the reverse of Inductive Reasoning, and is a
process of arriving at a particular truth from the assumption of a
general truth. Thus, from the assumption that "all fish are cold-blooded
animals," we, by Deductive Reasoning, arrive at the conclusion that the
particular fish before us must be cold-blooded.
Inductive Reasoning proceeds upon the basic principle that "_What is
true of the many is true of the whole_," while Deductive Reasoning
proceeds upon the basic principle that "_What is true of the whole is
true of its parts_."
Regarding the principle of _Inductive Reasoning_, Halleck says: "Man has
to find out through his own experience, or that of others, the major
premises from which he argues or draws his conclusions. By induction, we
examine what seems to us a sufficient number of individual cases. We
then conclude that the rest of these cases, which we have not examined,
will obey the same general law. The judgment 'All men are mortal' was
reached by induction. It was observed that all past generations of men
had died, and this fact warranted the conclusion that all men living
will die. We make that assertion as boldly as if we had seen them all
die. The premise, 'All cows chew the cud,' was laid down after a certain
number of cows had been examined. If we were to see a cow twenty years
hence, we should expect to find that she chewed the cud. It was noticed
by astronomers that, after a certain number of days, the earth regularly
returned to the same position in its orbit, the sun rose in the same
place, and the day was of the same length. Hence, the length of the year
and of each succeeding day was determined, and the almanac maker now
infers that the same will be true of future years. He tells us that the
sun on the first of next December will rise at a given time, although he
cannot throw himself into the future to verify the conclusion."
Brooks says regarding this principle: "This proposition is founded on
our faith in the uniformity of nature; take away this belief, and all
reasoning by induction fails. The basis of induction is thus often
stated to be _man's faith in the uniformity of nature_. Induction has
been compared to a ladder upon which we ascend from facts to laws. This
ladder cannot stand unless it has something to rest upon; and this
something is our faith in the constancy of nature's laws."
There are two general ways of obtaining our basis for the process of
Inductive Reasoning. One of these is called Perfect Induction and the
other Imperfect Induction. Perfect Induction is possible only when we
have had the opportunity of examining every particular object or thing
of which the general idea is expressed. For instance, if we could
examine every fish in the universe we would have the basis of Perfect
Induction for asserting the general truth that "all fishes are
cold-blooded." But this is practically impossible in the great majority
of cases, and so we must fall back upon more or less Imperfect
Induction. We must assume the general law from the fact that it is seen
to exist in a very great number of particular cases; upon the principle
that "What is true of the many is true of the whole." As Halleck says
regarding this: "Whenever we make a statement such as, 'All men are
mortal,' without having tested each individual case or, in other words,
without having seen every man die, we are reasoning from _imperfect_
induction. Every time a man buys a piece of beef, a bushel of potatoes
or a loaf of bread, he is basing his action on inference from imperfect
induction. He believes that beef, potatoes and bread will prove
nutritious food, although he has not actually tested those special
edibles before purchasing them. They have hitherto been found to be
nutritious on trial and he argues that the same will prove true of those
special instances. Whenever a man takes stock in a new national bank, a
manufactory or a bridge, he is arguing from past cases that this special
investment will prove profitable. We instinctively believe in the
uniformity of nature; if we did not we should not consult our almanacs.
If sufficient heat will cause phosphorus to burn today, we conclude that
the same result will follow tomorrow if the circumstances are the
same."
But, it will be seen, much care must be exercised in making
observations, experiments and comparisons, and in making
generalizations. The following general principles will give the views of
the authorities regarding this:
Atwater gives the two general rules:
_Rule of Agreement_: "If, whenever a given object or agency is present,
without counteracting forces, a given effect is produced, there is a
strong evidence that the object or agency is the cause of the effect."
_Rule of Disagreement_: "If when the supposed cause is present the
effect is present, and when the supposed cause is absent the effect is
wanting, there being in neither case any other agents present to effect
the result, we may reasonably infer that the supposed cause is the real
one."
_Rule of Residue_: "When in any phenomena we find a result remaining
after the effects of all known causes are estimated, we may attribute it
to a residual agent not yet reckoned."
_Rule of Concomitant Variations_: "When a variation in a given
antecedent is accompanied by a variation of a given consequent, they
are in some manner related as cause and effect."
Atwater says, of the above rules, that "whenever either of these
criteria is found, free from conflicting evidence, and especially when
several of them concur, the evidence is clear that the cases observed
are fair representatives of the whole class, and warrant a valid
universal inductive conclusion."
We now come to what is known as Hypothesis or Theory, which is an
assumed general principle--a conjecture or supposition founded upon
observed and tested facts. Some authorities use the term "theory" in the
sense of "a verified hypothesis," but the two terms are employed loosely
and the usage varies with different authorities. What is known as "the
probability of a hypothesis" is the proportion of the number of facts it
will explain. The greater the number of facts it will explain, the
greater is its "probability." A Hypothesis is said to be "verified" when
it will account for all the facts which are properly to be referred to
it. Some very critical authorities hold that verification should also
depend upon there being no other possible hypotheses which will account
for the facts, but this is generally considered an extreme position.
A Hypothesis is the result of a peculiar mental process which seems to
act in the direction of making a sudden anticipatory leap toward a
theory, after the mind has been saturated with a great body of
particular facts. Some have spoken of the process as almost _intuitive_
and, indeed, the testimony of many discoverers of great natural laws
would lead us to believe that the Subconscious region of the mind is
most active in making what La Place has called "the great guess" of
discovery of principle. As Brooks says: "The forming of hypotheses
requires a suggestive mind, a lively fancy, a philosophic imagination,
that catches a glimpse of the idea through the form, or sees the law
standing behind the fact."
Thomson says: "The system of anatomy which has immortalized the name of
Oken, is the consequence of a flash of anticipation which glanced
through his mind when he picked up in a chance walk the skull of a deer,
bleached and disintegrated by the weather, and exclaimed, after a
glance, 'It is part of a vertebral column.' When Newton saw the apple
fall, the anticipatory question flashed through his mind, 'Why do not
the heavenly bodies fall like this apple?' In neither case had accident
any important share; Newton and Oken were prepared by the deepest
previous study to seize upon the unimportant fact offered to them, and
show how important it might become; and if the apple and the deer-skull
had been wanting, some other falling body, or some other skull, would
have touched the string so ready to vibrate. But in each case there was
a great step of anticipation; Oken thought he saw the type of the whole
skeleton in a single vertebra, whilst Newton conceived at once that the
whole universe was full of bodies tending to fall."
Passing from the consideration of Inductive Reasoning to that of
Deductive Reasoning we find ourselves confronted with an entirely
opposite condition. As Brooks says: "The two methods of reasoning are
the reverse of each other. One goes from particulars to generals; the
other from generals to particulars. One is a process of analysis; the
other is a process of synthesis. One rises from facts to laws; the
other descends from laws to facts. Each is independent of the other; and
each is a valid and essential method of inference."
_Deductive Reasoning_ is, as we have seen, dependent upon the process of
deriving a particular truth from a general law, principle or truth, upon
the fundamental axiom that: "What is true of the whole is true of its
parts." It is an analytical process, just as Inductive Reasoning is
synthetical. It is a descending process, just as Inductive Reasoning is
ascending.
Halleck says of Deductive Reasoning: "After induction has classified
certain phenomena and thus given us a major premise, we proceed
deductively to apply the inference to any new specimen that can be shown
to belong to that class. Induction hands over to deduction a ready-made
major premise, _e.g._ '_All scorpions are dangerous_.' Deduction takes
this as a fact, making no inquiry about its truth. When a new object is
presented, say a possible scorpion, the only troublesome step is to
decide whether the object is really a scorpion. This may be a severe
task on judgment. The average inhabitant of the temperate zone would
probably not care to risk a hundred dollars on his ability to
distinguish a scorpion from a centipede, or from twenty or thirty other
creatures bearing some resemblance to a scorpion. Here there must be
accurately formed concepts and sound judgment must be used in comparing
them. As soon as we decide that the object is really a scorpion, we
complete the deduction in this way:--'_All scorpions are dangerous_;
_this creature is a scorpion_; _this creature is dangerous_.' The
reasoning of early life must be necessarily inductive. The mind is then
forming general conclusions from the examination of individual
phenomena. Only after general laws have been laid down, after objects
have been classified, after major premises have been formed, can
deduction be employed."
What is called _Reasoning by Analogy_ is really but a higher degree of
Generalization. It is based upon the idea that if two or more things
resemble each other in many particulars, they are apt to resemble each
other in other particulars. Some have expressed the principle as
follows: "Things that have some things in common have other things in
common." Or as Jevons states it: "The rule for reasoning by analogy is
that if two or more things resemble each other in many points, they will
probably resemble each other also in more points."
This form of reasoning, while quite common and quite convenient, is also
very dangerous. It affords many opportunities for making false
inferences. As Jevons says: "In many cases Reasoning by Analogy is found
to be a very uncertain guide. In some cases unfortunate mistakes are
committed. Children are sometimes killed by gathering and eating
poisonous berries, wrongly inferring that they can be eaten, because
other berries, of a somewhat similar appearance, have been found
agreeable and harmless. Poisonous toadstools are occasionally mistaken
for mushrooms, especially by people not accustomed to gather them....
There is no way in which we can really assure ourselves that we are
arguing safely by analogy. The only rule that can be given is this,
_that the more things resemble each other, the more likely is it that
they are the same in other respects, especially in points closely
connected with those observed_."
Halleck says: "In argument or reasoning we are much aided by the habit
of searching for hidden resemblances. We may here use the term _analogy_
in the narrower sense as a resemblance of ratios. There is analogical
relation between autumnal frosts and vegetation on the one hand, and
death and human life on the other. Frosts stand in the same relation to
vegetation that death does to life. The detection of such a relation
cultivates thought. If we are to succeed in argument, we must develop
what some call a sixth sense for the detection of such relations....
Many false analogies are manufactured and it is excellent thought
training to expose them. The majority of people think so little that
they swallow false analogies just as newly-fledged robins swallow small
stones dropped into their open mouths.... The study of poetry may be
made very serviceable in detecting analogies and cultivating the
reasoning powers. When the poet brings clearly to mind the change due to
death, using as an illustration the caterpillar body transformed into
the butterfly spirit, moving with winged ease over flowing meadows, he
is cultivating our apprehension of relations, none the less valuable
because they are beautiful."
There are certain studies which tend to develop the power or faculty of
_Inductive Reasoning_. Any study which leads the mind to consider
classification and general principles, laws or truth, will tend to
develop the faculty of deduction. Physics, Chemistry, Astronomy, Biology
and Natural History are particularly adapted to develop the mind in this
particular direction. Moreover, the mind should be directed to an
inquiry into the _causes_ of _things_. Facts and phenomena should be
observed and an attempt should be made not only to classify them, but
also to discover general principles moving them. Tentative or
provisional hypotheses should be erected and then the facts re-examined
in order to see whether they support the hypotheses or theory. Study of
the processes whereby the great scientific theories were erected, and
the proofs then adduced in support of them, will give the mind the habit
of thinking along the lines of logical induction. The question ever in
the mind in Inductive Reasoning is "_Why?_" The dominant idea in
Inductive Reasoning is the Search for Causes.
* * * * *
In regard to the pitfalls of Inductive Reasoning--the fallacies,
so-called, Hyslop says: "It is not easy to indicate the inductive
fallacies, if it be even possible, in the formal process of
induction.... It is certain, however, that in respect to the
subject-matter of the conclusion in inductive reasoning there are some
very definite limitations upon the right to transcend the premises. We
cannot infer anything we please from any premises we please. We must
conform to certain definite rules or principles. Any violation of them
will be a fallacy. These rules are the same as those for material
fallacies in deduction, so that the fallacies of induction, whether they
are ever formal or not, are at least material; that is they occur
whenever equivocation and presumption are committed. There are, then,
two simple rules which should not be violated. (1) The subject-matter in
the conclusion should be of the same general kind as in the premises.
(2) The facts constituting the premises must be accepted and must not
be fictitious."
One may develop his faculty or power of _Deductive Reasoning_ by
pursuing certain lines of study. The study of Mathematics, particularly
in its branch of Mental Arithmetic is especially valuable in this
direction. Algebra and Geometry have long been known to exercise an
influence over the mind which gives to it a logical trend and cast. The
processes involved in Geometry are akin to those employed in Logical
reasoning, and must necessarily train the mind in this special
direction. As Brooks says: "So valuable is geometry as a discipline that
many lawyers and others review their geometry every year in order to
keep the mind drilled to logical habits of thinking." The study of
Grammar, Rhetoric and the Languages, are also valuable in the culture
and development of the faculty of Deductive Reasoning. The study of
Psychology and Philosophy have value in this connection. The study of
Law is very valuable in creating logical habits of thinking deductively.
But in the study of Logic we have possibly the best exercise in the
development and culture of this particular faculty. As Brooks well
says: "The study of Logic will aid in the development of the power of
deductive reasoning. It does this first by showing the method by which
we reason. To know how we reason, to see the laws which govern the
reasoning process, to analyze the syllogism and see its conformity to
the laws of thought, is not only an exercise of reasoning, but gives
that knowledge of the process that will be both a stimulus and a guide
to thought. No one can trace the principles and processes of thought
without receiving thereby an impetus to thought. In the second place,
the study of logic is probably even more valuable because it gives
practice in deductive thinking. This, perhaps, is its principal value,
since _the mind reasons instinctively without knowing how it reasons_.
One can think without the knowledge of the science of thinking, just as
one can use language correctly without a knowledge of grammar; yet as
the study of grammar improves one's speech, so the study of logic cannot
but improve one's thought."
The study of the common _fallacies_, such as "Begging the Question,"
"Reasoning in a Circle," etc., is particularly important to the
student, for when one realizes that such fallacies exist, and is able to
detect and recognize them, he will avoid their use in framing his own
arguments, and will be able to expose them when they appear in the
arguments of others.
The fallacy of "Begging the Question" consists in assuming as a proven
fact something that has not been proven, or is not accepted as proven by
the other party to the argument. It is a common trick in debate. The
fact assumed may be either the particular point to be proved, or the
premise necessary to prove it. Hyslop gives the following illustration
of this fallacy: "_Good institutions should be united_; Church and State
are good institutions; therefore, Church and State should be united."
The above syllogism seems reasonable at first thought, but analysis will
show that the major premise "Good institutions should be united" is a
mere assumption without proof. Destroy this premise and the whole
reasoning fails.
Another form of fallacy, quite common, is that called "Reasoning in a
Circle," which consists in assuming as proof of a proposition the
proposition itself, as for instance, "This man is a rascal, _because he
is a rogue_; he is a rogue, _because he is a rascal_." "We see through
glass, _because it is transparent_." "The child is dumb, _because it has
lost the power of speech_." "He is untruthful, _because he is a liar_."
"The weather is warm, _because it is summer_; it is summer, _because the
weather is warm_."
These and other fallacies may be detected by a knowledge of Logic, and
the perception and detection of them strengthens one in his faculty of
Deductive Reasoning. The study of the Laws of the Syllogism, in Logic,
will give to one a certain habitual sense of stating the terms of his
argument according to these laws, which when acquired will be a long
step in the direction of logical thinking, and the culture of the
faculties of deductive reasoning.
In concluding this chapter, we wish to call your attention to a fact
often overlooked by the majority of people. Halleck well expresses it as
follows: "Belief is a mental state which might as well be classed under
_emotion_ as under thinking, for it combines both elements. Belief is a
part inference from the known to the unknown, and part feeling and
emotion." Others have gone so far as to say that the majority of people
employ their intellects merely to _prove_ to themselves and others that
which they _feel to be true_, or _wish to be true_, rather than to
ascertain what is _actually true_ by logical methods. Others have said
that "men do not require _arguments_ to convince them; they want only
_excuses_ to justify them in their feelings, desires or actions."
Cynical though this may seem, there is sufficient truth in it to warn
one to guard against the tendency.
Jevons says, regarding the question of the culture of logical processes
of thought: "Monsieur Jourdain, an amusing person in one of Moliere's
plays, expressed much surprise on learning that he had been talking
prose for more than forty years without knowing it. Ninety-nine people
out of a hundred might be equally surprised on hearing that they had
long been converting propositions, syllogizing, falling into
paralogisms, framing hypotheses and making classifications with genera
and species. If asked if they were logicians, they would probably
answer, No. They would be partly right; for I believe that a large
number even of educated persons have no clear idea of what logic is.
Yet, in a certain way, every one must have been a logician since he
began to speak. It may be asked:--If we cannot help being logicians, why
do we need logic books at all? The answer is that there are logicians,
and _logicians_. All persons are logicians in some manner or degree; but
unfortunately many people are bad ones and suffer harm in consequence.
It is just the same in other matters. Even if we do not know the meaning
of the name, we are all _athletes_ in some manner or degree. No one can
climb a tree or get over a gate without being more or less an athlete.
Nevertheless, he who wishes to do these actions really well, to have a
strong muscular frame and thereby to secure good health and personal
safety, as far as possible, should learn athletic exercises."
CHAPTER XIV.
CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION
From the standpoint of the old psychology, a chapter bearing the above
title would be considered quite out of place in a book on
Thought-Culture, the Imagination being considered as outside the realm
of practical psychology, and as belonging entirely to the idealistic
phase of mental activities. The popular idea concerning the Imagination
also is opposed to the "practical" side of its use. In the public mind
the Imagination is regarded as something connected with idle dreaming
and fanciful mental imaging. Imagination is considered as almost
synonomous with "Fancy."
But the New Psychology sees beyond this negative phase of the
Imagination and recognizes the positive side which is essentially
constructive when backed up with a determined will. It recognizes that
while the Imagination is by its very nature _idealistic_, yet these
ideals may be made real--these subjective pictures may be materialized
objectively. The positive phase of the Imagination manifests in
planning, designing, projecting, mapping out, and in general in erecting
the mental framework which is afterward clothed with the material
structure of actual accomplishment. And, accordingly, it has seemed to
us that a chapter on "Constructive Imagination" might well conclude this
book on Thought-Culture.
Halleck says: "It was once thought that the imagination should be
repressed, not cultivated, that it was in the human mind like weeds in a
garden.... In this age there is no mental power that stands more in need
of cultivation than the imagination. So practical are its results that a
man without it cannot possibly be a good plumber. He must image short
cuts for placing his pipe. The image of the direction to take to elude
an obstacle must precede the actual laying of the pipe. If he fixes it
before traversing the way with his imagination, he frequently gets into
trouble and has to tear down his work. Some one has said that the more
imagination a blacksmith has, the better will he shoe a horse. Every
time he strikes the red-hot iron, he makes it approximate to the image
in his mind. Nor is this image a literal copy of the horse's foot. If
there is a depression in that, the imagination must build out a
corresponding elevation in the image, and the blows must make the iron
fit the image."
Brodie says: "Physical investigation, more than anything else, helps to
teach us the actual value and right use of the imagination--of that
wondrous faculty, which, when left to ramble uncontrolled, leads us
astray into a wilderness of perplexities and errors, a land of mists and
shadows; but which, properly controlled by experience and reflection,
becomes the noblest attribute of man, the source of poetic genius, the
instrument of discovery in science, without the aid of which Newton
would never have invented fluxions nor Davy have decomposed the earths
and alkalies, nor would Columbus have found another continent."
The Imagination is more than Memory, for the latter merely reproduces
the impressions made upon it, while the Imagination gathers up the
material of impression and weaves new fabrics from them or builds new
structures from their separated units. As Tyndall well said:
"Philosophers may be right in affirming that we cannot transcend
experience; but we can at all events carry it a long way from its
origin. We can also magnify, diminish, qualify and combine experiences,
so as to render them fit for purposes entirely new. We are gifted with
the power of imagination and by this power we can lighten the darkness
which surrounds the world of the senses. There are tories, even in
science, who regard imagination as a faculty to be feared and avoided
rather than employed. But bounded and conditioned by cooperant reason,
imagination becomes the mightiest instrument of the physical discoverer.
Newton's passage from a falling apple to a falling moon was, at the
outset, a leap of the imagination."
Brooks says: "The imagination is a creative as well as a combining
power.... The Imagination can combine objects of sense into new forms,
but it can do more than this. The objects of sense are, in most cases,
merely the materials with which it works. The imagination is a plastic
power, moulding the things of sense into new forms to express its
ideals; and it is these ideals that constitute the real products of the
imagination. The objects of the material world are to it like clay in
the hands of the potter; it shapes them into forms according to its own
ideals of grace and beauty.... He, who sees no more than a mere
combination in these creations of the imagination, misses the essential
element and elevates into significance that which is merely incidental."
Imagination, in some degree or phase, must come before voluntary
physical action and conscious material creation. Everything that has
been created by the hand of man has first been created in the _mind_ of
man by the exercise of the Imagination. Everything that man has wrought
has first existed in his mind as an _ideal_, before his hands, or the
hands of others, wrought it into material _reality_. As Maudsley says:
"It is certain that in order to execute consciously a voluntary act we
must have in the mind a conception of the aim and purpose of the act."
Kay says: "It is as serving to guide and direct our various activities
that mental images derive their chief value and importance. In anything
that we purpose or intend to do, we must first of all have an idea or
image of it in the mind, and the more clear and correct the image, the
more accurately and efficiently will the purpose be carried out. We
cannot exert an act of volition without having in the mind an idea or
image of what we will to effect."
Upon the importance of a scientific use of the Imagination in every-day
life, the best authorities agree. Maudsley says: "We cannot do an act
voluntarily unless we know what we are going to do, and we cannot know
exactly what we are going to do until we have taught ourselves to do
it." Bain says: "By aiming at a new construction, we must clearly
conceive what is aimed at. Where we have a very distinct and
intelligible model before us, we are in a fair way to succeed; in
proportion as the ideal is dim and wavering we stagger and miscarry."
Kay says: "A clear and accurate idea of what we wish to do, and how it
is to be effected, is of the utmost value and importance in all the
affairs of life. A man's conduct naturally shapes itself according to
the ideas in his mind, and nothing contributes more to his success in
life than having a high ideal and keeping it constantly in view. Where
such is the case one can hardly fail in attaining it. Numerous
unexpected circumstances will be found to conspire to bring it about,
and even what seemed at first hostile may be converted into means for
its furtherance; while by having it constantly before the mind he will
be ever ready to take advantage of any favoring circumstances that may
present themselves."
Simpson says: "A passionate desire and an unwearied will can perform
impossibilities, or what seem to be such, to the cold and feeble."
Lytton says: "Dream, O youth, dream manfully and nobly, and thy dreams
shall be prophets." Foster says: "It is wonderful how even the
casualities of life seem to bow to a spirit that will not bow to them,
and yield to subserve a design which they may, in their first apparent
tendency, threaten to frustrate. When a firm decisive spirit is
recognized it is curious to see how space clears around a man and leaves
him room and freedom." Tanner says: "To believe firmly is almost
tantamount in the end to accomplishment." Maudsley says: "Aspirations
are often prophecies, the harbingers of what a man shall be in a
condition to perform." Macaulay says: "It is related of Warren Hastings
that when only seven years old there arose in his mind a scheme which
through all the turns of his eventful life was never abandoned." Kay
says: "When one is engaged in seeking for a thing, if he keep the image
of it clearly before the mind, he will be very likely to find it, and
that too, probably, where it would otherwise have escaped his notice."
Burroughs says: "No one ever found the walking fern who did not have the
walking fern in his mind. A person whose eye is full of Indian relics
picks them up in every field he walks through. They are quickly
recognized because the eye has been commissioned to find them."
Constructive Imagination differs from the phases of the faculty of
Imagination which are akin to "Fancy," in a number of ways, the chief
points of difference being as follows:
The Constructive Imagination is always exercised in the pursuance of _a
definite intent and purpose_. The person so using the faculty starts out
with the idea of accomplishing certain purposes, and with the direct
intent of thinking and planning in that particular direction. The
fanciful phase of the Imagination, on the contrary, starts with no
definite intent or purpose, but proceeds along the line of mere idle
phantasy or day-dreaming.
The Constructive Imagination _selects its material_. The person using
the faculty in this manner abstracts from his general stock of mental
images and impressions those particular materials which fit in with his
general intent and purpose. Instead of allowing his imagination to
wander around the entire field of memory, or representation, he
deliberately and voluntarily selects and sets apart only such objects as
seem to be conducive to his general design or plan, and which are
logically associated with the same.
The Constructive Imagination operates upon the lines of _logical
thought_. One so using the faculty subjects his mental images, or ideas,
to his _thinking faculties_, and proceeds with his imaginative
constructive work along the lines of Logical Thought. He goes through
the processes of Abstraction, Generalization or Conception, Judgment and
the higher phases of Reasoning, in connection with his general work of
Constructive Imagination. Instead of having the objects of thought
before him in material form, he has them represented to his mind _in
ideal form_, and he works upon his material in that shape.
The Constructive Imagination is _voluntary_--under the control and
direction of the will. Instead of being in the nature of a dream
depending not upon the will or reason, it is directly controlled not
only by reason but also by the will.
The Constructive Imagination, like every other faculty of the mind, may
be developed and cultivated by Use and Nourishment. It must be exercised
in order to develop its mental muscle; and it must be supplied with
nourishment upon which it may grow. Drawing, Composing, Designing and
Planning along any line is calculated to give to this faculty the
exercise that it requires. The reading of the right kind of literature
is also likely to lead the faculty into activity by inspiring it with
ideals and inciting it by example.
The mind should be supplied with the proper material for the exercise of
this faculty. As Halleck says: "Since the imagination has not the
miraculous power necessary to create something out of nothing, the
first essential thing is to get the proper perceptional material in
proper quantity. If a child has enough blocks, he can build a castle or
a palace. Give him but three blocks, and his power of combination is
painfully limited. Some persons wonder why their imaginative power is no
greater, when they have only a few accurate ideas." It thus follows that
the active use of the Perceptive faculties will result in storing away a
quantity of material, which, when represented or reproduced by the
Memory, will give to the Constructive Imagination the material it
requires with which to build. The greater the general knowledge of the
person, the greater will be his store of material for this use. This
knowledge need not necessarily be acquired at first hand from personal
observation, but may also be in the nature of information acquired from
the experience of others and known through their conversation, writings,
etc.
The necessity of forming clear concepts is very apparent when we come to
exercise the Constructive Imaginative. Unless we have clear-cut ideas of
the various things concerned with the subject before us, we cannot focus
the imagination clearly upon its task. The general ideas should be
clearly understood and the classification should be intelligent.
Particular things should be clearly seen in "the mind's eye;" that is,
the power of visualization or forming mental images should be cultivated
in this connection. One may improve this particular faculty by either
writing a description of scenes or particular things we have seen, or
else by verbally describing them to others. As Halleck says: "An attempt
at a clear-cut oral description of something to another person will
often impress ourselves and him with the fact that our mental images are
hazy, and that the first step toward better description consists in
improving them."
Tyndall has aptly stated the importance of visualizing one's ideas and
particular concepts, as follows: "How, for example, are we to lay hold
of the physical basis of light since, like that of life itself, it lies
entirely without the domain of the senses?... Bring your imaginations
once more into play and figure a series of sound-waves passing through
air. Follow them up to their origin, and what do you there find? A
definite, tangible, vibrating body. It may be the vocal chords of a
human being, it may be an organ-pipe, or it may be a stretched string.
Follow in the same manner a train of ether waves to their source,
remembering at the same time that your ether is matter, dense, elastic
and capable of motions subject to and determined by mechanical laws.
What then do you expect to find as the source of a series of ether
waves? Ask your imagination if it will accept a vibrating multiple
proportion--a numerical ratio in a state of oscillation? I do not think
it will. You cannot crown the edifice by this abstraction. The
scientific imagination which is here authoritative, demands as the
origin and cause of a series of ether waves a particle of vibrating
matter quite as definite, though it may be excessively minute, as that
which gives origin to a musical sound. Such a particle we name an atom
or a molecule. I think the seeking intellect, when focused so as to give
definition without penumbral haze, is sure to realize this image at the
last."
By repeatedly exercising the faculty of Imagination upon a particular
idea, we add power and clearness to that idea. This is but another
example of the familiar psychological principle expressed by Carpenter
as follows: "The continued concentration of attention upon a certain
idea gives it a dominant power." Kay says: "Clearness and accuracy of
image is only to be obtained by repeatedly having it in the mind, or by
repeated action of the faculty. Each repeated act of any of the
faculties renders the mental image of it more clear and accurate than
the preceding, and in proportion to the clearness and accuracy of the
image will the act itself be performed easily, readily, skillfully. The
course to be pursued, the point to be gained, the amount of effort to be
put forth, become more and more clear to the mind. It is only from what
we have done that we are able to judge what we can do, and understand
how it is to be effected. When our ideas or conceptions of what we can
do are not based on experience, they become fruitful sources of error."
Galton says: "There is no doubt as to the utility of the visualizing
faculty where it is duly subordinated to the higher intellectual
operations. A visual image is the most perfect form of mental
representation wherever the shape, position and relation of objects in
space are concerned. It is of importance in every handicraft and
profession where design is required. The best workmen are those who
visualize the whole of what they propose to do before they take a tool
in their hands."
Kay says: "If we bear in mind that every sensation or idea must form an
image in the mind before it can be perceived or understood, and that
every act of volition is preceded by its image, it will be seen that
images play an important part in all our mental operations. According to
the nature of the ideas or images which he entertains will be the
character and conduct of the man. The man tenacious of purpose is the
man who holds tenaciously certain ideas; the flighty man is he who
cannot keep one idea before him for any length of time, but constantly
flits from one to another; the insane man is he who entertains insane
ideas often, it may be, on only one or two subjects. We may distinguish
two great classes of individuals according to the prevailing character
of their images. There are those in whose mind sensory images
predominate, and those whose images are chiefly such as tend to action.
Those of the former class are observant, often thoughtful, men of
judgment and, it may be, of learning; but if they have not also the
active faculty in due force, they will fail in giving forth or in
turning to proper account their knowledge or learning, and instances of
this kind are by no means uncommon. The man, on the other hand, who has
ever in his mind images of things to be done, is the man of action and
enterprise. If he is not also an observant and thoughtful man, if his
mind is backward in forming images of what is presented to it from
without, he will be constantly liable to make mistakes."
Galton says of the faculty of visualization: "Our bookish and wordy
education tends to repress this valuable gift of nature. A faculty that
is of importance in all technical and artistic occupations, that gives
accuracy to our perceptions and justness to our generalizations, is
starved by lazy disuse, instead of being cultivated judiciously in such
a way as will, on the whole, bring the best return. I believe that a
serious study of the best method of developing and using this faculty
without prejudice to the practice of abstract thought in symbols, is
one of the many pressing desiderata in the yet unformed science of
education."
This consideration of the faculty of, and culture of, the Imagination,
may appropriately be concluded by the following quotation from Prof.
Halleck, which shows the danger of misuse and abuse of this important
faculty. The aforesaid well-known authority says: "From its very nature,
the imagination is peculiarly liable to abuse. The common practices of
day-dreaming or castle-building are both morally and physically
unhealthful. We reach actual success in life by slow, weary steps. The
day-dreamer attains eminence with one bound. He is without trouble a
victorious general on a vast battlefield, an orator swaying thousands, a
millionaire with every amusement at his command, a learned man
confounding the wisest, a president, an emperor or a czar. After
reveling in these imaginative sweets, the dry bread of actual toil
becomes exceedingly distasteful. It is so much easier to live in regions
where everything comes at the magic wand of fancy. Not infrequently
these castle-builders abandon effort in an actual world. Success comes
too slow for them. They become speculators or gamblers, and in spite of
all their grand castles, gradually sink into utter nonentities in the
world of action.... The young should never allow themselves to build any
imaginative castle, unless they are willing by hard effort to try to
make that castle a reality. They must be willing to take off their
coats, go into the quarries of life, chisel out the blocks of the stone,
and build them with much toil into the castle walls. If castle-building
is merely the formation of an ideal, which we show by our effort that we
are determined to attain, then all will be well."
It will be seen that, in reality, the Cultivation of the Imagination is
rather the training and intelligent direction of that faculty, instead
of the development of its power. The majority of people have the faculty
of Imagination well developed, but to them it is largely an untrained,
fanciful self-willed faculty. Cultivation is needed in the direction of
bringing it under the guidance of the reason, and control by the will.
Thought-Culture in general will do much for the Imagination, for the
very processes employed in the development and cultivation of the
various other faculties of the mind will also tend to bring the
Imagination into subjection and under control, instead of allowing it to
remain the wild, fanciful irresponsible faculty that it is in the
majority of cases. Use the faculty of Imagination as a faculty of
_Thought_, instead of a thing of _Fancy_. Attach it to the _Intellect_
instead of to the _Emotions_. Harness it up with the other faculties of
Thought, and your chariot of Understanding and Attainment will reach the
goal far sooner than under the old arrangement. Establish harmony
between Intellect and Imagination, and you largely increase the power
and achievements of both.
FINIS.
THE
Pathway of Roses
_By_ CHRISTIAN D. LARSON
Who would so live that the dreams of the night shall rise with the
morning but shall not depart with the setting sun--it is to men and
women such as these that we recommend THE PATHWAY OF ROSES.
The thinking world of today is being filled with a phase of thought that
has exceptional value. True, some of it is in a somewhat chaotic
condition, but most of it is rich, containing within itself the very
life of that truth that is making the world free. But in the finding of
this truth, and in the application of its principles, where are we to
begin? What are we to do first? And after we have begun, and find
ourselves in the midst of a life so large, so immense and so marvelous
that it will require eternity to live it all, what are the great
essentials that we should ever remember and apply? What are the great
centers of life about which we may build a greater and a greater life?
These are questions that thousands are asking today, and the answer may
be found in THE PATHWAY OF ROSES.
Beautifully and substantially bound in silk cloth
Contains about 400 pages
Price, postpaid, $1.50
THE PROGRESS COMPANY--CHICAGO
TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE:
Obvious typos and printer errors have been corrected without comment.
In addition to obvious errors, the following corrections have been made:
1. Page 140: Italics were added for consistency in the phrase, "E and O
are _subalterns_."
2. Page 144: In order to preserve the meaning, "E" was changed to "I"
in the phrase, "Also what follows if "I" be _false_."
3. Page 161: The word "is" was added to maintain the sense of the
phrase, "... the Subconscious region of the mind is most active...."
Other than the above errors, no attempt has been made to correct common
spelling, punctuation, grammar, etc. The author's usage is preserved as
printed in the original publication. Unconventional spelling which has
been preserved includes, but is not limited to the following:
minature
synonomous
Spelling of the name "Kay" appears twice in the text as "Kays".
End of Project Gutenberg's Thought-Culture, by William Walker Atkinson
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