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Title: The Waterloo Campaign 1815
Author: William Siborne
Release Date: November 11, 2018 [EBook #58268]
Language: English
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THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN
THE
WATERLOO CAMPAIGN
1815
WILLIAM SIBORNE
Captain, Half Pay, Unattached,
Constructor of the
Waterloo Model
FIFTH EDITION
WESTMINSTER
ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE AND CO., LTD.
1900
PREFACE.
By common consent, this Work is regarded as the best comprehensive
account in the English language of the Waterloo Campaign. Even those
who differ from the Author upon particular points, most cordially admit
the general accuracy and fulness of his History. It is charmingly
written, is graphic yet precise, and abundantly witnesses to the
Author's most strenuous endeavour to do justice to every one who took
part in that great Conflict.
This Work will henceforth be a household book amongst the Teutonic
race; and all who read it will gain a very clear insight into the
methods of Military Strategy as they were practised by the great
Captains of that Age.
It is impossible to repress one's admiration of the heroic bravery
displayed in this brief Campaign: whether amongst the Allies at Quatre
Bras and Waterloo, or by the Imperial Guard at Planchenoit, or by the
Prussians at Ligny, Wavre, and Le Chesnay.
The reader must be good enough to observe that a Prussian Brigade then
equalled in numbers a French or an English Division.
This Work has extended to such great length that one half of the
_Appendix_ (see pages 42 to 44) and nearly all the Notes have been,
most unwillingly, omitted. Only those Foot Notes have been inserted
which are absolutely essential to the Text. Room has however been
found, at pages 798 to 826, for the Nominal Lists of Officers at
Waterloo, &c.
One would most earnestly wish that Wars may cease until the end of
Time; but if that may not be, then may they be as bravely fought as
was this War of Twenty Days: from the 15th June, when NAPOLEON crossed
the Sambre; to the 4th July 1815, the day on which the Allies took
possession of Paris.
EDWARD ARBER.
_Edgbaston,
Birmingham._
THE TITLE PAGE OF THE THIRD EDITION.
_History
of the
War in France and Belgium
in 1815:
Containing Minute Details of the
Battles of Quatre Bras, Ligne, Wavre, and
Waterloo._
_By
Captain W. Siborne_,
H.P. Unattached; Constructor of the Waterloo Model.
_Third and Revised Edition
with
Remarks[1] upon the Rev. G.R. Gleig's_ Story of Waterloo.
_London.
T. and W. Boone, New Bond Street.
1848._
TO THE
QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
MADAM,
In graciously deigning to accept the Dedication of these pages, Your
Majesty has afforded the greatest possible encouragement to my humble
endeavours to record, with simplicity, impartiality, and truth, the
incidents of an eventful War, resulting in a long enduring Peace; a War
which shed a new and brighter lustre on the valour and discipline of
the British Army, and once more called forth the consummate sagacity
and far-extending prescience of that illustrious Chief, whom Your
Majesty, with wise appreciation and a just pride, retains at its head.
Earnestly hoping that the result of those endeavours may prove not
altogether undeserving of Your Majesty's approbation,
I have the honour to be,
With profound respect,
MADAM,
Your Majesty's most humble
And most devoted servant,
WILLIAM SIBORNE,
Captain Unattached.
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.
In offering to the Public this Third Edition, I feel called upon to
state, by way of explanation, in what respect it differs from the two
former Editions. During the interval which has elapsed, I have not
failed to avail myself of every opportunity to correct and improve any
points which further investigation rendered desirable; and I have been
much gratified in finding that the general plan and arrangement of the
Work, together with the elucidation of the military operations, and the
views of their tendency and effect, have been generally borne out and
approved; and that, consequently, in these respects little alteration
has been required.
The exceptions, which consist principally in details, and amount in
number to only four or five, have been rectified in this edition.
They are chiefly the result of discussions which have appeared in the
pages of the _United Service Magazine_; and relate to a portion of the
proceedings of Sir COLIN HALKETT'S and Sir DENIS PACK'S Brigades at
Quatre Bras and Waterloo.
Through the kindness of His Excellency the Prussian Ambassador,
Chevalier BUNSEN, and of the Prussian Generals VON CANITZ and VON
KRAUSENECK, and of Major GERWIEN of the Prussian Head Quarters Staff;
I have obtained additional interesting details connected with the
Prussian operations; more especially as regards the opening of the
Campaign.
A Dutch work published, apparently under authority, by Major VAN
LÖBEN SELS, Aide de Camp to his Royal Highness Prince FREDERICK of
the Netherlands, and entitled _B dragen tot de Kr gsgeschiedenis van
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE_, of which I was not previously in possession, has
enabled me to give additional particulars respecting the movements and
dispositions of the most advanced portion of the Dutch-Belgian troops,
on the first advance of the Enemy; and also to explain particular
circumstances and qualify some observations respecting those troops
which appeared in former Editions.
The Editor of an Article in _The Quarterly Review_, No. CLI., entitled
_Marmont_, _Siborne_, and _Alison_, having, in his comments upon this
Work, denied the accuracy of one or two important facts therein stated;
I have, in notes at pages 57 and 152,[2] entered into more minute
details, which explain the grounds that warrant me in adhering to the
original statements.
The observations made in the Preface of a Volume of "MURRAY's Home
and Colonial Library," entitled _The Story of Waterloo_, and the
palpable embodiment of the present Work into the pages of the latter,
have been such as could scarcely fail to attract attention; and I
have accordingly appended to this Edition, in a separate form, some
remarks upon that publication.[3] Public opinion (if I may judge by the
unanimous consent of the press) having so distinctly pronounced its
acknowledgment of the value of my Work, as one of History; I could not
disregard the conduct of a Writer, who, in the first place endeavours
to depreciate that value, and then unblushingly makes the most ample
and unlicensed use of it for his own purposes.
W. SIBORNE.
_18th June 1848._
[Illustration: THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.]
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: _Omitted in this Fourth Edition.--E.A._]
[Footnote 2: Omitted in this Fourth Edition.--E.A.]
[Footnote 3: Omitted in this Fourth Edition.--E.A.]
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.
The circumstance of the First Edition having been sold off within a
very few days, combined with the highly favourable notices taken of the
Work by professional as well as other critics, and, I may be permitted
to add, the very flattering encomiums which have been pronounced upon
it by so many who, from their position, are the most competent to
form an opinion on its merits, cannot fail to afford proofs, the most
satisfactory to the Public, and, at the same time, the most gratifying
to the Author, that, in the production of these Volumes,[4] upon a
subject of such stirring national interest, neither the expectations of
the former have been altogether disappointed, nor the labours of the
latter bestowed in vain.
The present Edition contains corrections on one or two points of
trivial importance, to which my attention has been directed; and I
shall be happy to receive further information from surviving Eye
Witnesses who may discover any instances in which the facts related
appear either inaccurately or insufficiently explained.
W. SIBORNE.
_August 23rd, 1844._
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 4: The First and Second Editions of this Work were each
published in Two Volumes.--E.A.]
PREFACE.
Some years ago, when constructing a Model of the Field of Waterloo,
at a particular period of the Battle; I found it necessary to make
great exertions to procure that detailed information for which I had
sought in vain in the already numerous _published_ accounts of the
military transactions of 1815. Anxious to ensure the rigorous accuracy
of my work, I ventured to apply for information to nearly all the
surviving Eye Witnesses of the incidents which my Model was intended
to represent. In every quarter, and among Officers of all ranks, from
the General to the Subaltern, my applications were responded to in a
most liberal and generous spirit; and the result did indeed surprise
me, so greatly at variance was this historical evidence with the
general notions which had previously prevailed on the subject. Thus
was suggested the _present_ Work. I was induced by the success of this
experiment to embrace a wider field, and to extend my enquiries over
the entire Battle; and, ultimately, throughout the Campaign itself,
from its commencement to its close.
Having become the depository of such valuable materials, I felt it a
duty to the honourable profession of which I am a humble member, to
submit to it, and to the World, a true and faithful account of this
memorable epoch in the history of Britain's military greatness.
Though not so presumptuous as to imagine that I have fully supplied
so absolute a desideratum; yet I consider myself fortunate in being
the instrument of withdrawing so far the veil from Truth. One of my
Waterloo correspondents has humorously remarked, that "if ever truth
lies at the bottom of a well, she does so immediately after a great
Battle; and it takes an amazingly long time before she can be lugged
out." The time of her emerging appears to have at length arrived; but,
while I feel that I have brought to light much that was involved in
obscurity, I cannot but be sensible that I may have fallen into errors.
Should such be the case, I shall be most ready, hereafter, to make any
corrections that may appear requisite, on my being favoured, by _Eye
Witnesses_, with further well authenticated information.
I take this opportunity of returning my sincere thanks to the numerous
Officers of the British Army, who have so kindly committed to my
keeping their recollections of the events which I have attempted to
describe. Similar thanks are likewise due to the Officers of the King's
German Legion and Hanoverian Subsidiary Corps; as also to the General
Officers who respectively furnished me with such information as related
to the troops of Brunswick and Nassau.
I beg also to express my obligations to the Prussian Minister of War,
and the Officers of the Prussian General Staff in Berlin, for the
readiness and liberality with which they have supplied me with such
details concerning the dispositions and movements of the troops of
their Sovereign, as were essential to me in prosecuting the task I had
undertaken.
Having briefly explained the circumstances that led to the construction
of the Work which I thus venture to place before the Public, I have now
only to express a hope that my labours may be crowned with usefulness.
Should such a result occur, I shall then have obtained the only fame I
seek.
W. SIBORNE.
_March 1844._
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
Landing of NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE in France after his escape from
Elba 47
Flight of LOUIS XVIII. 47
Decision of the Congress of Vienna 48
Preparations on the part of the Allied Powers for opening
a Campaign against NAPOLEON 49
Great Britain and Prussia occupy Belgium 49
Advance of the Russians towards the French frontier 51
Advance of the Austrians 52
The troops of Bavaria, Baden, Würtemburg, and of Hesse,
assemble upon the Upper Rhine 52
Preparations on the part of NAPOLEON 53
General aspect of France 57
Spirit of the French Army 58
Public Opinion and state of Parties in France 59
CHAPTER II.
Belgium again destined to become the Theatre of War 62
The British Army 62
The Duke of WELLINGTON 63
The Prussian Army 67
Prince BLÜCHER VON WAHLSTADT 67
The King's German Legion; the Hanoverian, Brunswick, Dutch,
Belgian, and Nassau troops 67
NAPOLEON and the French Army 68
Prospect of a severe struggle 69
CHAPTER III.
Strength, composition, and distribution of the
Anglo-Allied Army under WELLINGTON 71
Its projected concentration in the event of NAPOLEON's advance 75
Strength, composition, and distribution of the Prussian Army
under BLÜCHER 76
Its projected concentration in the event of NAPOLEON's advance 79
The line on which WELLINGTON's Left and BLÜCHER's
Right rested, selected by NAPOLEON for the direction of
his attack 82
Strength, composition, and distribution of the French
Army under NAPOLEON 82
Necessity under which the French Emperor is placed of
opening the Campaign without awaiting the further
development of his resources 87
Slight retrospect of the Campaign of 1814 88
NAPOLEON's prospect of success 88
His preparations for the commencement of hostilities 90
WELLINGTON receives information from his Outposts in
front of Tournai, of the assembling of French troops on
the frontier; but delays the concentration of the Anglo-Allied
troops until certain of the object and direction of
NAPOLEON's main operation 91
Concentration of the French Army 91
NAPOLEON joins the latter in person 92
_Ordre du Jour_ of the 14th of June 93
CHAPTER IV.
ZIETEN ascertains and communicates to the Allied Commanders
the assembling of French troops in his front, and that there
is every probability of an attack by the Enemy on the 14th
or 15th of June 94
BLÜCHER's dispositions 96
Extent of information gained by WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER
immediately previous to the commencement of hostilities 97
Position of the First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ under ZIETEN 97
Advance of the French Army into Belgium on the 15th of June 98
The French force the Prussian Outposts; cross the Sambre,
and gain possession of Charleroi 98
Retreat of the different Brigades of ZIETEN's Corps upon Fleurus 104
Affair at Gilly 106
ZIETEN's Corps concentrates in position between Ligny and
St Arnaud 110
Losses experienced by this Corps on the 15th 111
The Second and Third Prussian _Corps d'Armée_, under PIRCH and
THIELEMANN, concentrate and bivouac on the night of the 15th;
the former between Onoz and Mazy not far from Sombref, the
latter in and around Namur 111
BÜLOW is desired to concentrate the Fourth Prussian
_Corps d'Armée_ at Hannut 112
Cause of this operation being deferred until the 16th 113
NEY joins the French Army, and receives from NAPOLEON the
command of a detached Corps destined to operate by the
Brussels road from Charleroi 114
The Advanced Post at Frasne, upon the extreme Left of
the Duke of WELLINGTON's Army, receives intelligence of
the French attack 115
Consequent movements of DE PERPONCHER's Dutch-Belgian Division 115
The Anglo-Allied Post at Frasne is driven in by the Advanced
Guard of NEY's Corps; the progress of which is checked by Prince
BERNHARD of Saxe Weimar's Dutch-Belgian Brigade in front of
Quatre Bras 116
Disposition of NEY's forces in the night of the 15th of June 118
WELLINGTON is informed of NAPOLEON's advance, and makes his
dispositions accordingly 119
Order of the movements of the Anglo-Allied Army 120
Disposition of the Centre and Right Columns of the French Army
during the night of the 15th 123
Remarks on the result of NAPOLEON's operations on the 15th
of June 123
CHAPTER V.
On the morning of the 16th, WELLINGTON's troops are in
movement upon Nivelles and Quatre Bras 129
The Dutch-Belgian Detachment at the latter point is
reinforced, and becomes engaged with the French Advanced Guard 129
The Prince of ORANGE arrives, and succeeds in forcing
back the French upon Frasne 131
NEY's views and dispositions 131
WELLINGTON arrives in person at Quatre Bras 134
He proceeds to the Prussian Head Quarters for the
purpose of holding a conference with BLÜCHER 134
Adopted Plan of Operations 135
Instructions received by NEY from NAPOLEON 135
NEY's advance 143
The Prince of ORANGE's dispositions to meet it 143
Relative strength 143
The Prince of ORANGE retires towards Quatre Bras,
occupies the Wood of Bossu, and endeavours to maintain the
Post of Gemioncourt 144
Arrival of PICTON's Division 145
Conspicuous gallantry of the Prince of ORANGE 147
Arrival of VAN MERLEN's Light Cavalry Brigade 148
VAN MERLEN advances in support of PERPONCHER's Infantry 148
Both are driven back: the former to Quatre Bras; the
latter into the Wood of Bossu, which is now attacked
by the French 148
The latter occupy Gemioncourt and Piermont 148
NEY's position 149
Arrival of the principal portion of the Brunswick troops 149
Relative strength 150
Part of the Brunswick Corps posted between the Charleroi
road and the Wood of Bossu 151
French attack 152
WELLINGTON decides on meeting it 153
Advance of PICTON with the Fifth British Division 153
The French Infantry gallantly repulsed by the British 154
Attack upon the Brunswickers 155
The Duke of BRUNSWICK makes an ineffectual charge at
the head of his Lancers 157
Retreat of the Brunswickers 157
Fall of the Duke of BRUNSWICK 158
Conspicuous gallantry of the 42nd and 44th British Regiments 159
The French Cavalry advances as far as Quatre Bras 162
Is checked by the 92nd Highlanders 162
KELLERMANN joins NEY with L'HERITIER's Cavalry Division 163
The French Cavalry attacks the British Squares 164
PICTON advances his Infantry into the midst of the
French Cavalry 166
Remarkable steadiness of the British Squares 167
Manner in which the charges of the French Cavalry
were executed 167
The French are rapidly gaining possession of the entire
Wood of Bossu, are reinforcing their Light Troops in
Piermont, and are preparing to renew their attack upon
Quatre Bras 172
ALTEN joins WELLINGTON with two Infantry Brigades of the
Third Division 173
NEY is joined by the remaining Division of KELLERMANN's
Corps of Heavy Cavalry 173
Relative strength 173
NEY, after despatching an Order to D'ERLON to join
him without delay, commences another general attack 174
Two French Foot Batteries suddenly open a fire from
the edge of the Wood of Bossu upon the Brunswick Infantry 174
Gallant conduct of LLOYD's British Foot Battery 174
Advance of HALKETT's British Infantry Brigade posted
between the Wood of Bossu and the Charleroi road 175
KIELMANSEGGE's Hanoverian Infantry Brigade advances along
the Namur road to reinforce and support PICTON's Division 175
Advance of French Infantry against Quatre Bras 176
The latter gallantly charged and pursued by the 92nd
Highlanders 176
HALKETT's Brigade posted between the Wood of Bossu and the
Charleroi road 177
The 69th British Regiment is attacked and dispersed by French
_Cuirassiers_ 178
Vigorous assault along the whole of the Anglo-Allied Line 180
Arrival of British and German Artillery 181
French _Cuirassiers_ driven back in confusion from Quatre Bras 182
NEY receives intelligence that D'ERLON's Corps has been
ordered by NAPOLEON to march towards the Prussian Extreme
Right on the Field of Ligny; and shortly afterwards a despatch
reaches him, requiring him to attack and repulse whatever Enemy
may be in his front, and then to fall upon the Prussian Right 182
Vigorous attack upon the Left of WELLINGTON's Line
successfully repelled 184
The French Cavalry continues its attacks upon the central
portion of the Anglo-Allied Army 184
NEY receives a further despatch from the Emperor, urging
him to comply immediately with the instructions previously given 185
Arrival of Brunswick reinforcement 185
Also of the First British Division under COOKE 186
Relative strength 186
HALKETT is again attacked by French Cavalry, after which
he makes a further advance of his Brigade 187
The British Guards succeed in forcing the French out of
the Wood of Bossu 188
Signal defeat of French Cavalry by the British Guards and the
Brunswick Guard Battalion 189
WELLINGTON's victorious advance 191
NEY withdraws the whole of his forces to the Heights of
Frasne, on which they bivouac for the night 191
D'ERLON joins NEY after the termination of the action 191
Losses in killed and wounded 193
Remarks upon the Battle 193
CHAPTER VI.
BLÜCHER decides upon accepting battle in the position in
rear of Fleurus 199
The position of Ligny strategically considered 200
The position itself described 201
Distribution of ZIETEN's Corps on the morning of the 16th
of June 201
At eleven o'clock PIRCH's Corps is posted as a Reserve
to ZIETEN's 203
THIELEMANN's Corps reaches Sombref about noon 204
Its distribution on the Field 204
General view of BLÜCHER's dispositions 204
About ten o'clock the foremost of the French troops debouch
in two Columns from the Wood of Fleurus, and draw up in
front of this town 204
NAPOLEON's views and dispositions 205
At two o'clock he communicates to NEY his intention to
commence his attack upon the Prussians, and desires that
Marshal also to attack the Enemy in his front 206
The French Light Troops gain possession of Fleurus 206
The Cavalry of ZIETEN's Corps falls back upon the position
of Ligny 206
The French Army advances and takes up a position preparatory
to its attack 207
Strength of the French forces under NAPOLEON 208
Strength of the Prussian forces under BLÜCHER 209
BLÜCHER's arrangements 209
He moves THIELEMANN's Corps into his Front Line, of
which it then forms the Left Wing 210
BLÜCHER's views and dispositions 211
Tactical defects of the position of Ligny 213
NAPOLEON commences the Battle with an attack by VANDAMME's
Corps upon St Amand 213
GÉRARD's Corps attacks Ligny 214
Contest in these Villages 215
The French carry St Amand 216
Renewed attack upon Ligny 217
Nature of the contest between THIELEMANN's and GROUCHY's Corps 217
GIRARD's Division gains possession of St Amand la Haye 218
BLÜCHER's dispositions for retaking this Village,
securing Wagnelé, and impeding any further advance from the
French Left 218
Failure of the Prussian attack upon St Amand la Haye 219
BLÜCHER decides on a renewed attack upon this Village, as
a diversion in favour of his projected movement against
the French Left 219
NAPOLEON reinforces this Flank 220
The Prussians retake St Amand la Haye 220
BLÜCHER reinforces his extreme Right with Cavalry 221
Prussian attack upon Wagnelé unsuccessful 222
The French regain St Amand la Haye 223
Continued contest at Ligny 223
BLÜCHER reinforces his troops employed in the defence
of this Village 224
Long and desperate struggle in the Villages of
St Amand la Haye, Wagnelé, and the Hameau de St Amand 227
NAPOLEON, perceiving that BLÜCHER has scarcely any Reserve
remaining at his disposal, resolves upon attacking the
Prussian Centre 230
He suspends his meditated attack in consequence of a large
Column advancing apparently from Frasne towards his Left Rear 231
This Column is discovered to be D'ERLON's _Corps d'Armée_ 234
This circumstance explained 234
THIELEMANN detaches a portion of his Cavalry with some guns
across the Ligny, along the Fleurus road 237
They are attacked and driven back by part of GROUCHY's Cavalry 237
Disposition and state of the Prussian troops at the
moment NAPOLEON advances with a formidable Reserve across
the Ligny 239
The Prussian Infantry forced to evacuate Ligny 242
Failure of Prussian Cavalry attacks upon the advancing
Column of French Infantry 243
BLÜCHER's horse is killed, and the Prince thrown under him 245
Critical situation of the Prussian Commander 246
He is removed from the Field 246
Retreat of Prussian Infantry upon Bry 247
Contest at Sombref 249
Retreat of the Prussians from St Amand and St Amand la Haye 250
ZIETEN's and PIRCH's Corps retire by Marbais and Tilly 251
THIELEMANN's Corps retains its position 252
Close of the Battle 253
Distribution of the French troops 254
Disposition of the Prussian troops 254
BÜLOW's Corps reaches Gembloux during the night 255
Losses sustained by both Armies 255
Consequences of the Prussian defeat 255
Remarks upon the Battle 256
CHAPTER VII.
An engagement of short duration, and originating accidentally,
takes place between the French and Anglo-Allied Picquets on
the Field of Quatre Bras, about an hour before daylight of
the 17th June 259
WELLINGTON detaches a Patrol to his Left for the purpose of
gaining intelligence concerning BLÜCHER's movements 261
The Patrol finds the Prussians at Tilly 262
Upon its return WELLINGTON decides on retrograding his
forces to the position in front of Waterloo 263
Order of Movement 263
Communications between BLÜCHER and WELLINGTON 264
Retreat of the Anglo-Allied Infantry; masked from the Enemy 264
NEY's views and dispositions 266
NAPOLEON communicates to NEY the result of the Battle of
Ligny; and proposes, should the Enemy's force at Quatre
Bras advance against him, to co-operate with the Marshal
in a combined attack upon the Anglo-Allied Army 267
Tardiness of NAPOLEON's movements 267
Simultaneous advance of NAPOLEON and NEY against WELLINGTON 268
UXBRIDGE's dispositions for the retreat of the British Cavalry 270
Brilliant Cavalry Affair at Genappe 281
Retreat continued to the Waterloo position 282
NAPOLEON's advance checked on his reaching La Belle Alliance 282
Remarks on the retreat 283
BLÜCHER's promised support 285
WELLINGTON's disposition of his detached troops under Sir
CHARLES COLVILLE and Prince FREDERICK of Orange 285
The French and Anglo-Allied Armies establish their respective
bivouacs for the night 286
CHAPTER VIII.
At daybreak of the 17th, the Prussian Army commences its retreat
upon Wavre 287
ZIETEN's Corps retires by Mont St Guibert, and reaches Wavre about
mid day 287
PIRCH's Corps follows the same route, and takes post upon
the right bank of the Dyle 287
THIELEMANN, having collected together the Brigades of his
Corps, begins to retire from the Field of Ligny at two o'clock
in the morning 288
He halts in rear of Gembloux 289
BÜLOW retires by Walhain and Corbaix to Dion le Mont, near
which he takes up a position 290
THIELEMANN resumes his march at two o'clock in the afternoon,
and arrives at the position of Wavre late in the evening 290
Prussian Head Quarters established at Wavre 291
BLÜCHER receives a message from WELLINGTON 291
While the Prussians are effecting their retreat during
the early part of the morning, the French continue quietly
in their bivouac 292
PAJOL, with the Light Cavalry Division, seeks the Prussians
along the Namur road; followed by Lieutenant General TESTE's
Infantry Division, in support 292
Other troops detached towards Gembloux, near which traces
of the Prussian retreat are discovered 293
Remarks upon the extraordinary degree of inactivity on the
part of NAPOLEON 293
About noon, NAPOLEON proceeds to collect, in advance of
Marbais, on the high road to Quatre Bras, a portion of the
troops that had fought at Ligny; and detaches the remainder,
under GROUCHY, in pursuit of the Prussians 296
NAPOLEON's instructions to Grouchy 297
The troops assembled near Marbais advance upon Quatre Bras,
which they reach about two o'clock 298
The Corps of VANDAMME and GÉRARD do not reach Gembloux until
late in the evening 299
GROUCHY's dispositions 300
Disposition of the Prussian troops during the 17th 302
Influence of the defeat at Ligny upon the _morale_ of the
Prussian Army 305
BLÜCHER is informed of the position of the Anglo-Allied Army 306
His instructions to BÜLOW 306
On the 18th, VANDAMME's and GÉRARD's Corps commence the march
from Gembloux, at nine o'clock, upon Wavre, preceded by the
Heavy Cavalry under EXCELMANS, and supported on their left
by MAURIN's Light Cavalry 307
At half past ten o'clock, EXCELMANS' Advanced Guard comes
in contact with the Prussian Rear Guard 307
At Sart à Wallain GROUCHY's attention is called to the
sound of a heavy cannonade in the direction of Mont St Jean 308
GÉRARD suggests to GROUCHY the expediency of marching towards
the cannonade 308
GROUCHY's reasons for rejecting this proposal 309
The march upon Wavre continued 309
At daybreak on the 18th, BÜLOW quits his position near Dion
le Mont to march through Wavre upon St Lambert, and thus
commences the flank movement of the Prussians in support of the
Anglo-Allied Army at Waterloo 310
BLÜCHER communicates to WELLINGTON his intention of immediately
attacking the Enemy's Right Flank 311
Dispositions made for giving security to this movement 312
BLÜCHER directs that as soon as BÜLOW's Corps has proceeded
beyond Wavre, ZIETEN's Corps is to commence its march by
Fromont and Ohain to join the Left Wing of WELLINGTON's Army 312
PIRCH's Corps to follow BÜLOW's in the direction of
St Lambert; and THIELEMANN's to follow ZIETEN's as soon as
its presence at Wavre is no longer essential 312
The march of BÜLOW's Corps through Wavre delayed by an accident 313
BÜLOW's Advanced Guard crosses the Defile of St Lambert,
and halts in the Wood of Paris 313
PIRCH, having strengthened his Rear Guard in consequence
of the approach of the French, effects the passage of his
Corps across the Dyle at Wavre 314
BLÜCHER's instructions to THIELEMANN 316
Remarks upon GROUCHY's movements during the 17th, and
the early part of the 18th 316
Their influence upon the Battle of Waterloo 321
CHAPTER IX.
The French and Anglo-Allied Armies break up their bivouacs
early on the morning of the 18th of June, in front of Waterloo 324
Preparations for Battle 325
The Field 325
WELLINGTON's position 326
Distribution of the Anglo-Allied Army 327
Front Line: with the Advanced Posts of Smohain, La Haye,
La Haye Sainte, and Hougomont 327
Second Line 347
Reserves 348
Detached forces in observation near Hal, and at Tubize;
the former under Prince FREDERICK of Orange, the latter under
Sir CHARLES COLVILLE 350
Braine l'Alleud and Vieux Foriez occupied 350
Distribution of the Anglo-Allied Artillery 351
General view of the disposition of WELLINGTON's forces 353
NAPOLEON's position 355
Distribution of the French Army 355
Front Line 355
Second Line 359
Reserves 362
General view of the disposition of NAPOLEON's forces 363
Remarks on the Emperor's delay in commencing the Battle 364
Strength of the Anglo-Allied Army in the Field 367
Strength of the French Army 368
The French Columns moving into position 368
Intense interest excited in both Armies when drawn up
in presence of each other, and on the point of commencing
the Battle 368
CHAPTER X.
NAPOLEON's instructions to GROUCHY previously to the Battle of
Waterloo 370
A Prussian Officer joins the extreme Left of the
Anglo-Allied Army, and reports that BÜLOW's Corps has
reached St Lambert 371
NAPOLEON passes along the French Lines 372
The Battle commences about half past eleven o'clock, with
an attack upon the Wood of Hougomont, by part of Prince JEROME's
Division 375
The cannonade is opened by the guns of SANDHAM's Foot Battery in
front of COOKE's Division 375
The French gain possession of a portion of the Wood and other
inclosures of Hougomont 376
They are driven out 377
The French reconnoitre the Anglo-Allied Left 377
JEROME renews his attack, supported by part of FOY's Division 378
Fire opened upon the attacking troops by the Batteries posted
with CLINTON's Division 378
The French gain the Wood 378
Signal service rendered by BULL's Howitzer Battery 379
The French Skirmishers succeed in turning the Right of
Hougomont, and in forcing the great Gate; which, however,
is soon closed against the assailants 380
They then press forward against the Right of the Allied
Front Line, and force WEBBER SMITH's Horse Battery to retire
into a hollow way to refit 381
They are charged and driven back by four Companies of the
Coldstream Guards, under Lieutenant Colonel WOODFORD, which
force then joins the defenders of Hougomont 381
The French, on debouching from the Wood into the Great
Orchard, are gallantly charged and driven back by Lieutenant
Colonel Lord SALTOUN with the Light Companies of the First
Brigade of Guards 383
The latter, being attacked in both front and flank, are
compelled to fall back upon the hollow way in rear of the
Great Orchard 383
On being reinforced by two Companies of the 3rd Regiment of
Guards; they resume the offensive, and clear the Orchard of
the Enemy 383
NEY's dispositions for a grand attack upon the Left Wing
and Centre of the Anglo-Allied Army 384
NAPOLEON perceives troops in motion at some distance on his right 385
He detaches DOMON's and SUBERVIE's Light Cavalry Brigades in that
direction 386
He ascertains that the troops he has seen belong to the Prussian
_Corp's d'Armée_ of Count BÜLOW 386
His Orders to GROUCHY 387
NAPOLEON neglects to adopt effectual measures for securing his
Right Flank 389
CHAPTER XI.
Commencement of the grand attack upon the Left Wing and Centre of
the Anglo-Allied Army 392
On the right of the attack the French gain possession of the
Farm of Papelotte; which, however, is soon retaken by the
3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau 393
Retreat of BYLANDT's Dutch-Belgian Infantry Brigade 395
PICTON's dispositions 397
Attack by the French Left Central Column 399
Gallant charge by KEMPT's Brigade 401
Death of PICTON 402
Contest between _Cuirassiers_ and the 2nd Life Guards in
front of the Right of KEMPT's Brigade 403
Attack upon La Haye Sainte by the Left Brigade of DONZELOT's
Division 404
Advance of ROUSSEL's Cavalry Brigade by the French left of
La Haye Sainte 405
UXBRIDGE decides upon charging the Enemy's attacking force
with SOMERSET's and PONSONBY's Cavalry Brigades 406
Charge by the French _Cuirassiers_ and Carabiniers 408
It is met by that of SOMERSET's Cavalry Brigade 409
Advance of PONSONBY's Cavalry Brigade 411
Advance of ALIX's and MARCOGNET's French Infantry Divisions 411
They reach the crest of the Anglo-Allied position 412
Advance of the 92nd Highlanders 413
Their attack upon the head of MARCOGNET's Column 413
Charge by PONSONBY's Cavalry Brigade 413
Complete overthrow of the French Columns 414
The Greys capture the Eagle of the 45th French Regiment 415
They also charge and defeat a supporting Column of MARCOGNET's
attacking force 415
The Royals capture the Eagle of the 105th French Regiment 418
The Inniskillings defeat and disperse the Columns to which
they are opposed 419
Continuation of the charge by SOMERSET's Brigade 419
Disordered state of the two British Cavalry Brigades 420
They crown the Enemy's position, and cut down the Gunners and
horses of the French Batteries 421
At length they retire 421
The Left of their Line suffers severely from a charge by
JAQUINOT's Light Cavalry Brigade 421
VANDELEUR's Light Cavalry advances in support upon the left 422
Charge by the 12th and 16th British Light Dragoons 422
The French Cavalry is driven back 423
Advance of GHIGNY's Light Cavalry Brigade 423
VIVIAN moves his Brigade to the right, and opens a fire
from two guns of his Horse Artillery 424
The British Cavalry engaged in this affair sustains a heavy loss 425
Disposition of the troops on the Anglo-Allied Left and Centre 426
Tableau of the Battle at this period 427
CHAPTER XII.
Continuation of the contest at Hougomont 434
Attempted flank attack upon this Post completely defeated
by Captain CLEEVES's Foot Battery of the King's German Legion 436
The principal buildings of Hougomont, including the Château,
set on fire by the French 437
NAPOLEON prepares a grand Cavalry attack upon WELLINGTON's
Right Wing 439
Renewed attack upon La Haye Sainte 439
Tremendous cannonade along the French Heights 441
French grand Cavalry attack 443
Its failure 446
Its renewal 448
Second failure 449
NEY, on being reinforced by KELLERMANN's Corps of Heavy Cavalry,
and GUYOT's Heavy Cavalry Division of the Guard, renews his
attack 452
This is most successfully resisted 455
NEY directs another attack upon La Haye Sainte, and advances
a heavy Column of BACHELU's Infantry against the Centre
of the Anglo-Allied Right Wing 458
WELLINGTON draws CHASSÉ's Dutch-Belgian Division from Braine
l'Alleud towards the principal scene of action, and moves
CLINTON's Division into the Front Line 458
Contest at La Haye Sainte 459
The 5th and 8th Line Battalions of the King's German Legion, on
advancing to charge French Infantry in rear of La Haye Sainte,
are suddenly assailed in flank by French Cavalry, and the 8th
Battalion is almost entirely destroyed 460
Artillery in the Anglo-Allied Front Line reinforced 461
Attack by a Column of French Heavy Cavalry upon the Anglo-Allied
Right completely defeated by Major MERCER's Battery of British
Horse Artillery 461
A strong Column of French Infantry, supported by Cavalry,
advances against the Centre of the Anglo-Allied Right Wing 462
It is charged by SOMERSET's Heavy Cavalry Brigade 463
Conduct of TRIP's Dutch-Belgian Carabinier Brigade 463
Gallant charge by the 3rd Hussars of the King's German Legion 464
Renewed attack by the Column of French Heavy Cavalry in front of
Major MERCER's Horse Battery 466
It is repulsed as before 466
WELLINGTON reinforces the right of his Front Line by DU PLAT's
Infantry Brigade of the King's German Legion, accompanied by
Captain SYMPHER's Horse Battery of the same Service 467
It is attacked by French _Cuirassiers_ 467
These are driven off by the Battalions of du PLAT's Brigade 468
Renewed charge by the _Cuirassiers_ equally unsuccessful 468
Failure of the French Cavalry attack upon the Right Centre
of the Anglo-Allied Line 469
ADAM's British Light Infantry Brigade advances into the Front
Line, on the right of MAITLAND's Brigade; crosses the ridge,
and takes up a position on the exterior slope 470
Here it is repeatedly attacked by French Cavalry 471
Advance of HALKETT's Hanoverian Brigade 472
The French assail the Post of La Haye Sainte with the utmost
vigour 474
It falls into their possession 478
NAPOLEON directs NEY to follow up this advantage with a vigorous
attack upon the Centre of the Anglo-Allied Line, and at the same
time to renew the assault upon Hougomont 478
NEY's views and dispositions 479
Attack upon ALTEN's Division 481
The 5th Line Battalion of the King's German Legion, led by
OMPTEDA, gallantly charges French Infantry; but is furiously
assailed in flank by a Regiment of _Cuirassiers_, and nearly
destroyed. OMPTEDA is killed 482
Gallant repulse of an attack made upon portions of MAITLAND's and
ADAM's Brigades 483
British Squares in advance of the Duke's Line 484
Renewed but unsuccessful attack upon Hougomont 485
ADAM's Brigade withdrawn to the reverse slope of the main
position 487
General view of the Anglo-Allied Line 487
CHAPTER XIII.
Advance of the Prussians towards the Field of Waterloo 490
Difficulties and impediments attending their march 491
The Fifteenth and Sixteenth Prussian Brigades reach the Wood
of Paris 492
At half past four o'clock, BLÜCHER decides upon attacking the
Right Flank of the French Army with these Brigades, without
waiting for the arrival of more of his troops 493
Prussian Cavalry driven back by DOMON 494
Three Prussian Battalions attack the Extreme Right of the
French general Front Line, near Smohain; but are compelled to
retire into the Village 495
NAPOLEON detaches LOBAU's Corps in support of DOMON 495
The French Regiments of the Old and Middle Guard take up the
position, in reserve, on the Heights of La Belle Alliance,
vacated by LOBAU's Corps 495
BLÜCHER's dispositions 496
LOBAU becomes engaged with BÜLOW 496
The remainder of BÜLOW's Corps reaches the Field 496
BLÜCHER's dispositions 496
Relative strength of BÜLOW's and LOBAU's forces 497
NAPOLEON detaches the Young Guard to Planchenoit, in support of
LOBAU's Right 498
At about six o'clock, BLÜCHER is informed that THIELEMANN is
attacked by a superior force at Wavre 499
He does not allow this circumstance to deter him from his
present purpose 499
BÜLOW attacks Planchenoit 500
Contest in the Village 500
The Prussian troops driven out 500
Having rallied, they renew their attack 501
NAPOLEON detaches two Battalions of the Old Guard to
Planchenoit 501
The Prussians are again driven out of the Village, and
pursued as far as their main position 501
French and Prussian Cavalry become engaged 501
NAPOLEON, perceiving preparations on the part of the
Prussians for renewing the attack upon Planchenoit, detaches
General PELET with another Battalion of the Old Guard to that
Village 502
Critical situation of NAPOLEON 503
He resolves on making a renewed and formidable attack upon
WELLINGTON's Line 503
WELLINGTON despatches Lieutenant Colonel FREMANTLE to
the Left, to seek for the Prussian forces expected on
that Flank 505
Situation of the Duke, and state of the Anglo-Allied Troops 505
NAPOLEON's dispositions for the attack 507
The Advanced Guard of ZIETEN's Corps approaches the
Extreme Left of the Anglo-Allied Line 508
VIVIAN's and VANDELEUR's Light Cavalry Brigades are removed
from that Flank to the Centre 509
WELLINGTON's dispositions 510
Centre of the Duke's line vigorously assailed by the
French troops collected in and about La Haye Sainte 511
Sudden and destructive fire opened upon KIELMANSEGGE's
Brigade from French guns brought up to the very crest of
the Allied position 513
The Prince of ORANGE is wounded whilst leading forward the
Nassau Troops to repel the French attack upon that part of
the Line 514
WELLINGTON reinforces the latter with five Battalions of
Brunswick Infantry 514
These, together with KIELMANSEGGE's, OMPTEDA's, and KRUSE's
Brigades, are compelled to fall back a short distance 514
The Duke rallies the Brunswickers, who maintain their ground;
as do also the before mentioned Brigades 515
VIVIAN's Hussar Brigade draws up in rear of these troops 515
KIELMANSEGGE, on whom the command of the Third Division has
devolved, succeeds in establishing the latter upon its former
position 516
CHAPTER XIV.
Commencement of NAPOLEON's last grand attack upon WELLINGTON's
Line 518
NAPOLEON stations himself so that the Guard may pass by him as it
advances to the attack 519
Disposition of D'ERLON's and REILLE's Corps 520
The leading Column of the Imperial Guard suffers severely
from the fire of the Allied Artillery, as it approaches the
Duke's Line 521
Contest between the leading Column of the French Imperial
Guards and MAITLAND's Brigade of British Guards 523
The former completely defeated and dispersed 523
Contest between HALKETT and the Imperial Guards 524
Conduct of D'AUBREMÉ's Dutch-Belgian Brigade 526
Advance of the second attacking Column of the Imperial Guard 527
Charge upon French _Cuirassiers_ by a Squadron of the
23rd Light Dragoons 530
The second Column of the Imperial Guard charged in flank
by the 52nd Regiment and 2nd Battalion 95th Regiment 532
Its defeat and dispersion by this charge 532
ADAM's Brigade continues its forward movement, supported on its
Right by a Battalion of Lieutenant Colonel HALKETT's Hanoverian
Brigade 535
State of D'AUBREMÉ's Dutch-Belgian Brigade 537
Upon the extreme Left of the Anglo-Allied Line, the
Skirmishers of DURUTTE's Division endeavour to establish
themselves in the houses and inclosures in the valley on that
Flank, and become engaged with the Prussians in and about Smohain 538
BLÜCHER's dispositions 539
Formation and advance of BÜLOW's Left Wing for the Third attack
upon Planchenoit, and of his Right Wing for a simultaneous
attack upon LOBAU 539
Junction of the Advanced Guard of ZIETEN's Corps with the
troops constituting the Extreme Left of the Anglo-Allied Army 541
General view of the disposition of the Prussian forces
relatively with that of the Anglo-Allied troops 542
General view of the state of the Anglo-Allied Army at the
period of the attack and defeat of the French Imperial Guard 542
Prompt decision and admirable skill evinced by WELLINGTON in
seizing upon the advantage presented by the discomfiture of
the French Guards 542
Advance of VIVIAN's Hussar Brigade to the attack of NAPOLEON's
Reserves near La Belle Alliance 546
Disposition of these Reserves 548
Brilliant charge by the 10th British Hussars 549
Charge by the 2nd Light Dragoons of the King's German Legion 551
ADAM's Brigade, continuing its advance, reaches the nearest
French Height, intersected by the Charleroi road, and on
which three Squares of the Imperial Guard are posted 552
General advance of the Anglo-Allied Line 553
The Duke orders ADAM to attack the Squares of the Imperial
Guard 555
The Earl of UXBRIDGE falls, severely wounded 556
The Imperial Guard retires from the charge by ADAM's Brigade 557
Gallant charge by the 18th British Hussars near La Belle
Alliance 559
Charge by a Squadron of the 10th British Hussars upon a
Square of the Grenadiers of the Old Guard; which retires,
and eventually disperses 560
The Left and Centre Squadrons of the 10th Hussars, continuing
their pursuit, after the first charge, make another charge
upon both Infantry and Cavalry, on the right, and beyond
La Belle Alliance 561
A party of the 18th Hussars makes a dashing but ineffectual
charge upon a Square, still further in advance 562
Lieutenant Colonel HALKETT, with the Osnabrück Landwehr
Battalion, pursues a Column of the Old Guard; and captures
General CAMBRONNE 563
Singular situation of the Duke of WELLINGTON 565
CHAPTER XV.
Advance of VANDELEUR's Light Cavalry Brigade 566
It charges and disperses a large Column of French Infantry,
and captures a Battery 566
ADAM's Brigade continues driving the Enemy before it along
the left side of the Charleroi road 567
Effect produced upon the Right Wing of the French Army
by the advance of ADAM's, VIVIAN's, and VANDELEUR's Brigades 568
Its effects also upon the French Left Wing 569
NAPOLEON takes shelter within a Square of the Imperial Guard 569
Continuation of the advance of the Anglo-Allied Army 570
In the Centre, La Haye Sainte is retaken: on the Right,
Hougomont is cleared of the Enemy: on the Left, DURUTTE's
Division, forming the Right of the French Front Line, takes
to flight 570
The Left Wing captures the opposite line of Batteries 571
Disorder and flight of the whole of D'ERLON's Corps along the
rear of LOBAU's Corps; which, being at the same time assailed
by part of BÜLOW's Corps, partakes of the panic, and mingles
with the fugitives 571
The British troops near La Belle Alliance fall into the line of
fire from a Prussian Battery, to which WELLINGTON sends
directions to cease firing 572
French Infantry dispersed, and a Battery captured, by the
52nd British Regiment 572
Capture of a Battery by the 71st British Regiment 573
Last French gun fired by ADAM's Aide de Camp 573
A Battery captured by the Osnabrück Hanoverian Battery, under
HALKETT 573
The British Advanced Cavalry is in the midst of crowds of
defeated French soldiers 574
Remarkable steadiness of the French _Grenadiers à Cheval_ 575
Contest in Planchenoit 576
Gallant conduct of PELET and a portion of the _Chasseurs_
of the Guard 579
The French Troops that have been engaged at Planchenoit, retire
in disorder and confusion towards the high road between Rossomme
and Maison du Roi; the former of which points the British
Advanced Brigades have already reached 580
Partial collision between the 18th British Hussars and a
Prussian Regiment of Cavalry 580
The 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion narrowly escape
coming into serious collision with the 11th and 16th British
Light Dragoons 580
WELLINGTON halts the main body of his Army upon the original
French position 581
BLÜCHER undertakes the pursuit 581
WELLINGTON having satisfied himself, by his observations
from the high ground beyond Rossomme, that the victory is
secured beyond a doubt, returns towards Waterloo 581
On reaching La Belle Alliance, he meets BLÜCHER 582
Dispositions made by the latter for effecting a vigorous pursuit 583
The Prussian troops headed in advance by GNEISENAU, reach
Genappe; where they capture a quantity of baggage, including
NAPOLEON's travelling carriage 584
NAPOLEON at Quatre Bras 584
Direction of the retreat of the French troops 585
NAPOLEON proceeds to Charleroi; whence he despatches
JEROME with Orders to rally the troops between Avesnes
and Maubeuge 585
GNEISENAU continues the pursuit, passing through Quatre Bras,
and not resting until he arrives beyond the Heights of Frasne 585
Losses sustained by the respective Armies 587
Remarks upon the Battle 588
Relative numerical strength of the Combatants 589
Relative proportions in which the troops of the Anglo-Allied
Army were actively engaged 589
Conduct of these troops 592
Extent of the actual share taken in the Battle by the Prussians 594
CHAPTER XVI.
Upon the appearance of VANDAMME's Corps in front of Wavre;
THIELEMANN decides on maintaining the position at that point
instead of following the remainder of the Prussian Army towards
the Field of Waterloo 601
The Field of Wavre 602
Disposition of the different Brigades of THIELEMANN's Corps 603
Disposition of GROUCHY's forces 605
The Light Troops of VANDAMME's Corps gain possession of that
part of the town of Wavre which lies on the right bank of the
Dyle 606
GÉRARD makes an unsuccessful attack upon the Mill of Bierge 607
VANDAMME fails in his efforts to carry the Bridge of Wavre 608
GROUCHY, in person, leads another attack upon the Bridge of
Bierge; which proves as fruitless as the former attempt, and
on which occasion GÉRARD falls severely wounded 609
PAJOL gains possession of the Bridge of Limale by a Cavalry attack 610
GROUCHY, having pushed a portion of GÉRARD's Corps across the
Dyle by Limale, disposes these troops so as to turn the Right of
THIELEMANN's Corps 610
They are attacked by the Prussians, who are defeated; and forced
to fall back upon the Wood near Point du Jour 611
The contest for the possession of the Bridges and Town of Wavre
is continued until late in the night; the Prussians sustaining
and repelling thirteen assaults 612
Disposition of the contending Forces on the morning of the
19th of June 616
Contest between THIELEMANN's Right, and GROUCHY's Left, Wing;
during which the French gain possession of part of the Wood of
Rixansart 617
TESTE's Division makes another attack upon Bierge 619
THIELEMANN takes up a second position 619
About eight o'clock he hears of the overthrow of NAPOLEON's
Army at Waterloo 619
He renews the attack, which is attended with complete success;
and retakes the Wood of Rixansart 619
The Wood again falls into the possession of the French 619
The latter capture the Village of Bierge 619
THIELEMANN decides upon effecting a retreat 620
The Prussians abandon the Town of Wavre 620
The French cross the Dyle, both at Wavre and at Bierge 621
The retreat is covered by Cavalry under Colonel VON DER MARWITZ 621
Proceedings of General VON BORCKE, who had marched his Brigade on
the previous evening to St Lambert 622
THIELEMANN retires along the road to Louvain, and takes up a
position at St Achtenrode 622
Losses sustained by the Prussians and French 623
Remarks upon the Battle and its results 623
GROUCHY decides on retiring upon Namur 625
CHAPTER XVII.
Retreat of the French Army from the Field of Waterloo 627
On the 19th of June, the Prussian Army pursues in the
direction of Charleroi, Avesnes, and Laon; the Anglo-Allied
Army, in that of Nivelles, Binche, and Peronne 628
BÜLOW's Corps reaches Fontaine l'Evêque; and ZIETEN's Corps
halts for the night at Charleroi 628
THIELEMANN continues during the night of the 19th at
St Achtenrode 629
PIRCH's Corps proceeds, on the evening of the 18th, in the
direction of Namur; for the purpose of intercepting
GROUCHY's retreat 629
On the 19th, it halts at Mellery 629
The Anglo-Allied Army occupies Nivelles and its vicinity
during the night of the 19th 631
NAPOLEON's flight through Charleroi 631
He desires SOULT to collect the troops and march them to Laon 632
GROUCHY retires upon Namur 632
Disposition of the respective Armies on the evening of the 19th 632
The Duke of WELLINGTON's views on entering the French territory;
and his General Order to the troops on the 20th of June 633
The Saxon _Corps d'Armée_ is placed under his Grace's command 635
The Anglo-Allied Army reaches Binche and Mons 635
GROUCHY's retreat to Namur 637
He is pursued by THIELEMANN and PIRCH 638
Contest at Namur 641
The Prussians gain possession of this place 643
Remarks upon THIELEMANN's and PIRCH's proceedings in
connection with GROUCHY's retreat to Namur and Dinant 645
Disposition of the respective Armies on the evening of the 20th 649
WELLINGTON crosses the French frontier on the 21st 650
BLÜCHER places PIRCH's Corps under Prince AUGUSTUS of Prussia,
to be employed in besieging the Fortresses left in rear of
the main Army 651
Avesnes captured by ZIETEN's Corps 652
BLÜCHER's farewell Address to the Belgians
Disposition of the respective Armies on the evening of the 21st 654
WELLINGTON's Proclamation to the French people 654
Contrast between the conduct of the Prussian troops and that
of the Anglo-Allied Army towards the inhabitants of the country
through which they pass, attributable to the dissimilarity of
views entertained by their Chiefs 656
Influence of WELLINGTON's measures upon the cause of LOUIS XVIII. 657
CHAPTER XVIII.
On the 22nd of June, the Anglo-Allied Army reaches Le Cateau 659
The Corps under Prince FREDERICK of the Netherlands is
destined to be employed in besieging the Fortresses 659
BLÜCHER, in order to bring his First, Fourth, and Third Corps
into closer communication, moves the two former only half
a march on the 22nd: the latter reaches Beaumont 659
Disposition of the Second Corps 660
Decline of the political influence of NAPOLEON 661
His arrival in Paris on the 21st 661
His consultation with his Ministers 662
Policy of FOUCHÉ 663
Debates in the Chamber of Deputies 665
Speech of LA FAYETTE 665
Resolutions adopted by the Chambers 666
Their effect upon NAPOLEON 667
His Message to the Chambers 668
Renewed debates 668
A Commission appointed 669
Its Report 670
Sensation produced by the speeches of Monsieur DUCHESNE and
General SOLIGNAC 671
NAPOLEON abdicates the Throne in favour of his son 674
Independent character of the French Parliament 675
On the 23rd, WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER give their troops a halt 676
Force detached under COLVILLE to attack Cambray 676
The Allied Commanders have an interview at Catillon, and arrange
their Plan of Advance upon Paris 677
On the 24th, WELLINGTON reinforces the troops under COLVILLE 678
Capture of Cambray 679
Proposals are made at the Outposts of the Allied Armies for a
Suspension of Hostilities 679
These are rejected 680
LOUIS XVIII. arrives at Le Cateau 680
Guise surrenders to ZIETEN's Corps 681
The Prussians are one day's march in advance of the
Anglo-Allied Army 682
Disposition of the respective Armies on the evening of
the 24th 682
Proclamation issued by the Provisional Government in Paris 683
Surrender of the Citadel of Cambray 684
On the 25th, the Anglo-Allied Army reaches Joncour 684
The Fortress of La Fère on the Oise invested by part of
ZIETEN's Corps 684
The Advanced Guard and Cavalry of the Right Prussian
Column reach Montescourt 686
The main body of BÜLOW's Corps arrives at Essigny le Grand 686
BLÜCHER's reply to an application by the Commissioners from the
French Chambers for a Suspension of Hostilities 686
The French troops collected at Laon march to Soissons, towards
which point GROUCHY's force is also approaching 687
SOULT, finding himself superseded in the command, quits the Army 687
Disposition of the respective Armies on the evening of the 25th 687
NAPOLEON quits Paris 688
His Address to the Army 688
CHAPTER XIX.
On the 26th, the main body of the Anglo-Allied Army moves to
Vermand 689
Capture of Peronne 689
COLVILLE's Division rejoins the main Army 690
WELLINGTON's reply to the French Commissioners 690
La Fère holds out against the Prussians 692
The First and Fourth Prussian Corps advance by forced marches
towards Compiegne and Pont St Maxence 694
Disposition of the respective Armies on the evening of the 26th 695
Early on the morning of the 27th, the Advanced Guard of ZIETEN's
Corps secures the Bridge and Town of Compiegne; when the French,
under D'ERLON, are within half an hour's march of that point 695
The latter, after an unsuccessful attempt to take the place,
retire upon Soissons 696
Movements of ZIETEN's and THIELEMANN's Corps upon Soissons,
Villers Cotterets, and Crespy 697
BÜLOW secures the Bridge over the Oise at Creil 699
Affair at Senlis 700
BLÜCHER succeeds in securing the line of the Oise 701
GROUCHY endeavours to effect his retreat to Paris by
forced marches 702
The main body of WELLINGTON's Army crosses the Somme and
marches to Roye 702
The Duke's anger and indignation excited by the conduct of the
Dutch-Belgian troops on the march 703
Disposition of the respective Armies on the evening of
the 27th 704
Affair at Villers Cotterets between the Advanced Guard of ZIETEN's
Corps and the French Troops under GROUCHY and VANDAMME 705
Affair at Nanteuil between part of ZIETEN's Corps and
REILLE's Corps 708
REILLE succeeds in effecting a junction with D'ERLON 709
Direction of the retreat of the Imperial Guard and Sixth Corps;
also of the Third and Fourth French Corps 709
The Advanced Guard and the Reserve Cavalry of ZIETEN's Corps,
under Prince WILLIAM of Prussia, fall upon REILLE's troops in
full retreat, attack them, and make 2,000 prisoners 709
The main body of THIELEMANN's Corps moves on to Crespy in support
of ZIETEN 710
The Prussian operations have the effect of cutting off the
retreat of the French troops to Paris by the great Soissons
and Senlis roads 711
The French Provisional Government sends another Deputation to
request the Allied Commanders to agree to a Suspension of
Hostilities 711
Disposition of the respective Armies on the evening of the 28th 713
On the 29th, BÜLOW's and ZIETEN's Corps take up a position
in front of Paris 714
The remains of the French Grand Army of the North retire
within the lines of the capital 714
The Anglo-Allied Army reaches different points between Gournay and
Pont St Maxence 715
Positions of the respective Armies on the evening of the 29th 715
Composition of the garrison of Paris 716
Its means of defence 717
Policy of the Provisional Government 718
NAPOLEON quits Paris for Rochefort 720
His narrow escape from falling into the hands of the Prussians 720
New Commissioners appointed by the Government to wait upon the
Duke of WELLINGTON for the purpose of negotiating a Suspension
of Hostilities 720
Sound judgment and extraordinary foresight evinced in his
Grace's Reply to their Proposals 721
CHAPTER XX.
BLÜCHER directs BÜLOW to make an attack upon Aubervilliers in the
night of the 29th 725
He is joined by WELLINGTON in person, when the two Commanders
agree not to suspend their operations so long as NAPOLEON
remains in Paris 725
The Prussians carry the Village of Aubervilliers, and drive
the French back upon the Canal of St Denis 726
The Allied Commanders decide upon masking the fortified Lines of St
Denis and Montmartre with one Army; whilst the other should
move to the right, and cross to the opposite bank of the Seine 727
Projected Plan of Operations 727
On the 30th, ZIETEN's and THIELEMANN's Corps move off to the right,
while BÜLOW's continues in its position 729
Disposition of the respective Armies on the evening of the 30th 731
Policy of FOUCHÉ 732
Letter from DAVOUST (Prince of ECKMÜHL) to WELLINGTON and
BLÜCHER, demanding a Suspension of Hostilities 733
WELLINGTON's reply 734
BLÜCHER's reply 735
Address to the Chamber of Deputies from DAVOUST and other
Generals of the Army 736
Proclamation issued by the Chambers 738
On the morning of the 1st of July, BÜLOW's Corps moves off
to the right, towards Argenteuil 739
The Anglo-Allied Army reaches Le Bourget, and takes up the
position vacated by the Prussians 739
The French attack Aubervilliers, and gain possession of half
the Village 739
The British Light Troops of COLVILLE's Division retake the
greater part of Aubervilliers 740
Lieutenant Colonel VON SOHR's Prussian Light Cavalry
Brigade reaches Versailles 741
He is attacked by the French Cavalry under EXCELMANS 742
Affairs at Rocquencourt, Versailles, and Le Chesnay 743
Remarks upon the detaching of SOHR's Brigade 744
Positions of the respective Armies on the evening of the
1st of July 747
On the 2nd of July, the Prussian Army moves towards the
Heights of Meudon and Chatillon, on the south side of Paris 748
Affairs at Sèvres, Moulineaux, and Issy 748
The Anglo-Allied Army continues in position in front of
St Denis 750
WELLINGTON establishes a Bridge at Argenteuil, and keeps open the
communication with the Prussian Army 750
Critical situation of the French Army 750
The Provisional Government directs the Commissioners to wait
again upon the Duke of WELLINGTON 751
His Grace's reply to their request 751
Position of the respective Armies during the night of
the 2nd of July 751
Affair at Issy on the morning of the 3rd of July 752
Cessation of Hostilities 753
Convention of Paris 754
Conclusion 758
SUPPLEMENT 761
APPENDIX. 781
I. Declaration, on the 13th of March 1815, of the Allied Powers,
upon the return of NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE to France [5]
II. Treaty of Alliance of the 24th of March 1815, concluded between
Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain [5]
III. Proclamation of the King of Prussia to his Army [5]
IV. Address of the Emperor ALEXANDER to a numerous body of
Russian troops which he reviewed on the 5th of April 1815 [5]
V. The Convocation of the _Champ de Mai_ [5]
VI. Effective strength and composition of the Anglo-Allied Army,
under the command of Field Marshal the Duke of
WELLINGTON 783
VII. Orders for the defence of the towns of Antwerp, Ostend,
Nieuport, Ypres, Tournai, Ath, Mons, and Ghent [5]
VIII. Effective strength and composition of the Prussian Army, under
the command of Field Marshal Prince BLÜCHER VON
WAHLSTADT 790
IX. Effective strength and composition of the French Army, under
the command of NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE 794
X. Strength of the French Army, according to information received
at the Prussian Head Quarters, shortly before the commencement
of hostilities [5]
XI. _Ordre du Jour: le 13 Juin 1815_ [5]
XII. Orders given by Lieutenant General VON ZIETEN, Commanding
the First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_, on the
2nd May 1815, to be acted upon by his Brigadiers, in
case of the Enemy's attack [5]
XIII. _Ordre du Mouvement: 14 Juin 1815_ [5]
XIV. Memorandum for the Deputy Quartermaster General of
the Anglo-Allied Army, on the 15th June [5]
XV. Movement of the Anglo-Allied Army: 15th of June [5]
XVI. Despatch from NAPOLEON to Marshal NEY: 16th of June [5]
XVII. Order of Movement for Marshal NEY: 16th of June [5]
XVIII. Order of Movement for Count REILLE: 16th of June [5]
XIX. Despatch from Count REILLE to Marshal NEY: 16th of
June [5]
XX. Orders from NAPOLEON to Marshal NEY: 16th of June [5]
XXI. Orders from NAPOLEON to Marshal NEY: 16th of June [5]
XII. Orders from NAPOLEON to Marshal NEY: 16th of June [5]
XXIII. Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the British
troops, at the Battle of Quatre Bras [5]
XXIV. Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the Brunswick
troops, at the Battle of Quatre Bras [5]
XXV. Effective strength of the French Army at the Battle of Ligny [5]
XXVI. Effective strength of the Prussian Army at the Battle of
Ligny [5]
XXVII. Orders from NAPOLEON to Marshal NEY: 17th of June [5]
XXVIII. Orders from NAPOLEON to Marshal NEY: 17th of June [5]
XXIX. Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the British
troops, and King's German Legion, on the retreat
from Quatre Bras to Waterloo [5]
XXX. Effective strength of the Anglo-Allied Army at the Battle
of Waterloo [5]
XXXI. Effective strength of the French Army at the Battle of
Waterloo [5]
XXXII. List of Officers of the King's German Legion, who were
present at the Defence of La Haye Sainte 798
XXXIII. Effective strength of the Prussian troops on the Field of
Waterloo [5]
XXXIV. Lines descriptive of the part taken in the Battle of
Waterloo by the Sixth Brigade of British Cavalry,
upon the repulse of the last attack by the French;
with the death of Major the Hon. FREDERICK
HOWARD [5]
XXXV. List of British Officers who were present at the Defence
of Hougomont 799
XXXVI. Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the British
troops, at the Battle of Waterloo [5]
XXXVII. Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the King's
German Legion, at the Battle of Waterloo [5]
XXXVIII. Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the Hanoverian
troops, on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June
1815 [5]
XXXIX. Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the Brunswick
troops, at the Battle of Waterloo [5]
XL. Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the troops of
the Nassau Contingent (1st Regiment), at the Battle of
Waterloo [5]
XLI. List of Officers of the British Army who were present in
the Actions on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June
1815, including those posted near Hal on the 18th;
and distinguishing such as were killed, wounded, or
missing 800
XLII. List of the Officers of the King's German Legion, killed,
wounded, or missing, in the Actions of the 16th, 17th,
and 18th of June 1815 820
XLIII. List of the Officers of the Hanoverian troops, killed,
wounded, and missing, in the Actions of the 16th,
17th, and 18th of June 1815 822
XLIV. List of the Officers of the Brunswick troops killed in the
Actions of the 16th and 18th of June 1815 823
XLV. Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the Dutch-Belgian
troops, on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June
1815 [5]
LVI. Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the Prussian
troops, at the Battle of Waterloo [5]
XLVII. List of the Officers of the Prussian Army, killed,
wounded, and missing, at the Battle of Waterloo 824
XLVIII. Letter from the Duke of WELLINGTON to Earl BATHURST,
being his despatch after the Battle of Waterloo 827
XLIX. Proclamation of LOUIS XVIII. to the French people [5]
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 5: Omitted in this Fourth Edition.--E.A.]
MAPS AND PLANS.
PAGE
Belgium and Part of France 70
The Field of Quatre Bras at 3 o'clock P.M., June 16 142
The Field of Quatre Bras at 9 o'clock P.M., June 16 192
The Field of Ligny at a quarter past 2 o'clock P.M.,
June 16 198
The Field of Ligny at half past 8 o'clock P.M., June 16 240
The Field of Waterloo at a quarter past 11 o'clock
P.M., June 18 328
[Plan of La Haye Sainte 334]
[Plan of Hougomont 338]
[The Field of Waterloo at a quarter to 2 o'clock P.M.,
June 18 394]
The Field of Waterloo at a quarter to 8 o'clock P.M.,
June 18 528
The Field of Waterloo at five minutes past 8 o'clock
P.M., June 18 550
The Field of Wavre at 4 o'clock P.M., June 18 600
The Field of Wavre at 4 o'clock A.M., June 19 614
Part of France, Section I. 626
Part of France, Section II. 764
[The Three Plans within brackets have been specially prepared for this
Fourth Edition.--E.A.]
PORTRAITS.
PAGE
The Duke of WELLINGTON 64
Engraved from a Medallion by E.W. WYON
The reverse 5
From a Medal by J. HENNING, Esq.
Prince BLÜCHER VON WAHLSTADT 80
From a Medal struck in honour of the Prince
by the citizens of Berlin
The reverse 81
From a Medallion by W. FOSTER, Esq.
NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE 89
The Prince of ORANGE 146
The Duke of BRUNSWICK 156
Sir THOMAS PICTON 165
Count Sir CHARLES ALTEN 333
Lord HILL 344
Marshal SOULT, Duke of DALMATIA 373
The Marquess of ANGLESEY 433
Marshal NEY, Prince of the MOSKWA 442
HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM IN 1815.
CHAPTER I.
The history of Europe records but few events so universally and
so intimately involving the policy and interests of her component
States, as the escape of NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE from the island of Elba,
on the 26th of February 1815--his landing in France, and his again
ascending, unopposed, that throne from which LOUIS XVIII. had fled
with precipitation, upon learning the triumphal approach towards the
capital of his successful and formidable rival. With the rapidity of
lightning the intelligence spread itself over the whole Continent,
and with all the suddenness and violence of an electric shock did
it burst amidst the delegates from the different States, who were
then assembled in Congress at Vienna. This important Assembly, so
unexpectedly interrupted, had been called together to deliberate upon
measures of international security and prosperity; and to solve those
intricate questions of policy necessarily arising out of the various
combinations, which, in the course of a general War, carried on with
unmitigated violence, and but little intermission, for nearly a quarter
of a century, had so fatally unhinged and dismembered the previously
existing social order and polity of Europe. With one accord, a fresh
appeal to the sword was decided upon; the military resources of every
nation were again called into requisition. From State to State the cry
"To arms!" was responded to with cheerfulness and alacrity, and immense
Armies were put in motion towards the French frontier: all animated
with the sole object and fixed determination of annihilating, for ever,
the common foe whom they had already conquered; but whom, as it would
then appear, they had but ineffectually humbled.
The openly declared project of the Allied Sovereigns to employ all
their means, and combine all their efforts, towards the accomplishment
of the complete overthrow of the resuscitated power of NAPOLEON, with
whom they had determined, thenceforth, to enter into neither truce
nor treaty, was singularly favoured by the circumstance of their
Armies being still retained upon a war establishment. The forces of
the several Powers were continued on that scale, in consequence of
the difficulties experienced in the Congress in dealing with and
settling many perplexing questions of international policy, and
moderating the warmth of the discussions that took place upon them.
It was considered expedient to keep up powerful reserves, available
both for home service, and for any contingencies that might arise out
of combinations and revolts among those minor States, whose aversion
to the new political arrangements was more than suspected. Thus it
had been found necessary to detach bodies of troops from the main
bulk of the forces, in consequence of the state of the Poles placed
under the protection of Russia, and of the Saxons inhabiting that
portion of their country which had been ceded to Prussia; as also, in
consequence of the powerful diversion, as regarded Austria, caused by
the sudden irruption of MURAT, King of Naples, into the north of Italy.
Notwithstanding these necessary deductions, however, it was found
practicable to assemble, by the end of May, an efficient force of not
less than 500,000 men, upon different points contiguous to the French
frontier, with all the supplies necessary for the prosecution of a
vigorous Campaign.
* * * * *
The most important portion of this extensive line of frontier was
undoubtedly that which fronted the Netherlands; for although it had
been planned by the Allies that no advance was to be made by the
troops in Belgium until the remainder of their forces had reached a
line of connecting points along the French frontier, when all their
Armies were to march, in combined movement, upon the capital: still
it was reasonably to be expected that NAPOLEON would not wait for
the completion of this plan, but rather that he would endeavour, by
a decisive effort, if not to frustrate its accomplishment, at least
to diminish its efficacy. It required no great exercise of military
sagacity or political foresight to predict, that after having adopted a
maturely considered disposition of force on the most important points
along his general line of defence, and placed his frontier Fortresses
upon a respectable footing, NAPOLEON would open the tremendous game,
upon which his crown, his political existence, and the fate of France,
were now fairly staked, by a bold, sudden, and resolute advance into
Belgium--straining every nerve to vanquish, in detail, the Allied
forces in that densely populated country; of which a vast portion
was already prepared to declare in his favour. His authority once
established in Brussels, through the means of some great and signal
triumph, the accession to his moral influence over the entire mass of
the French nation would be immense; and then, flying to the succour of
his nearest Corps menaced from the banks of the Rhine by the approach
of hostile forces (upon which his possession of Belgium would operate
as a powerful check by the facilities thus afforded for a combined
attack in front and flank), a series of brilliant successes, supported
by fresh levies from the interior, might enable him even to dictate
terms to the Allies, who had indignantly rejected all his overtures.
Hence the importance of narrowly watching the Belgian frontier, and
of making due preparations for meeting any attack in that quarter,
was too obvious not to form a principal feature in the general plan
of the Allies. Its defence was assigned to an Army under the Duke of
WELLINGTON, comprising contingent forces from Great Britain, from
Hanover, the Netherlands, Brunswick, and Nassau; and to a Prussian
Army, under Field Marshal Prince BLÜCHER VON WAHLSTADT.
At the moment of the landing of NAPOLEON on the French shore, the
only force in the Netherlands consisted, in addition to the native
troops, of a weak Anglo-Hanoverian Corps, under the command of His
Royal Highness the Prince of ORANGE; but the zeal, energy, and activity
displayed by the Government of Great Britain, in engrafting upon this
nucleus a powerful Army, amounting at the commencement of hostilities,
to about 100,000 combatants, notwithstanding the impediments and delays
occasioned by the absence of a considerable portion of its troops in
America, were truly surprising. At the same time, the extraordinary
supply of subsidies furnished by the British Parliament, without which
not one of the Armies of the Allied Sovereigns could have commenced
operations, and by means of which England thus become the great lever
whereby the whole of Europe was set in motion towards the attainment
of the one common object, was admirably illustrative of the bold,
decided, and straightforward policy of the most determined, the most
indefatigable, and the most consistent, enemy of NAPOLEON.
Within the same period, the Prussian forces, originally limited to
a corps of 30,000 men, under General Count KLEIST VON NOLLENDORF,
occupying the Prussian territories bounded by the Rhine, the Meuse,
and the Moselle, were augmented to an effective Army of 116,000
combatants, with all the rapidity and energy which a keen sense of the
wrongs and miseries their country had endured under the ruthless sway
of their inveterate foe, and a salutary dread of a repetition of such
infliction, could not fail to inspire.
Great Britain and Prussia thus occupied the post of honour, and formed
the vanguard of the mighty masses which Europe was pouring forth to
seal the doom of the NAPOLEON dynasty.
* * * * *
A Russian Army, under Field Marshal Count BARCLAY DE TOLLY, amounting
to 167,000 men, was rapidly traversing the whole of Germany, in three
main Columns: of which the Right, commanded by General DOCHTEROW,
advanced by Kalisch, Torgau, Leipzig, Erfurt, Hanau, Frankfort, and
Hochheim, towards Mayence; the Centre, commanded by General Baron
SACKEN, advanced by Breslau, Dresden, Zwickau, Baireuth, Nuremberg,
Aschaffenburg, Dieburg, and Gross Gerau, towards Oppenheim; while the
Left Column, commanded by General Count LANGERON, took its direction
along the line of Prague, Aube, Adelsheim, Neckar, and Heidelberg,
towards Mannheim. The heads of the Columns reached the Middle Rhine,
when hostilities were on the point of breaking out upon the Belgian
frontier. The intimation to these troops of another Campaign in France,
and of a probable reoccupation of Paris, had imparted new life and
vigour to the spirit of inveterate hatred and insatiable revenge which
they had so thoroughly imbibed against the French; and which had so
invariably marked their career since the memorable burning of MOSCOW.
An Austrian army of about 50,000 men, commanded by Field Marshal Prince
SCHWARTZENBURG, and the Army of Reserve under the Archduke FERDINAND,
amounting to 40,000 men, were gradually occupying the most important
points along the right bank of the Rhine, between Basle and Mannheim.
In addition to this force, about 120,000 men were then assembling on
the plains of Lombardy, upon the termination of the decisive Campaign
against MURAT; which secured the deposition of the latter, and the
restoration of King FERDINAND to the throne of Naples. Vigorous and
energetic measures such as these on the part of Austria, clearly
indicated that her Government, discarding alike the circumstance of a
family alliance with NAPOLEON, and the views which had once induced it
to enter into a league with him and with the Southern German States,
as a security against its formidable northern neighbours, still
adhered with inflexible resolution to its subsequently adopted policy
of entering into, and fostering, a general European compact, having
for its object the complete annihilation of the despotic sway of the
ambitious Soldier Sovereign of the French.
The assembling also, on the Upper Rhine, of a Bavarian Army, commanded
by Prince WRÈDE, of the Contingents of Baden and Würtemberg, under the
hereditary Prince of WÜRTEMBERG, and of the troops of Hesse, amounting
altogether to about 80,000 men, offered a sufficient guarantee for the
line of policy espoused by the Confederated States of the Rhine.
* * * * *
Formidable as was the attitude assumed by the Allies towards France,
and imposing as was their array of Armies assembling upon her frontier;
they nevertheless found their great antagonist prepared, on learning
that they had determined on an irrevocable appeal to the sword, to
throw away the scabbard. He assumed a bold and resolute posture of
defence--armed at all points, and prepared at all hazards, either
to ward off the blows of his adversaries, or to become himself the
assailant. The indefatigable exertions of NAPOLEON in restoring the
Empire to its former strength and grandeur were really astonishing;
and never, perhaps, in the whole course of the extraordinary career of
that extraordinary man, did the powerful energies of his comprehensive
mind shine forth with greater brilliancy and effect, than in his truly
wonderful and incredibly rapid development of the national resources of
France on this momentous occasion.
The truth of this assertion will be best confirmed by briefly
enumerating some of the most important objects accomplished within the
limited interval of three months--from his landing at Cannes, to his
taking the Field against the Allies. Among them were--the complete
overthrow of all obstacles in the way of his reascending the throne;
the reconciliation, to a very considerable extent, of the several
factions whose discordant views and interests had distracted the whole
nation; the suppression of the insurrectionary movements in La Vendée,
and the establishment of his authority over every part of the Empire;
the projection of various public measures, laws, and ordinances; the
remodelling of the civil and military administrations; the restoration
of the Army to its previous organisation under the Imperial Regime;
the placing of the numerous Fortresses of the kingdom in an efficient
state; the erection of fortified works around Paris, Lyons, and
other important points; the reorganisation of the National _Guard
d'élite_, to the extent of 112,000 men, divided into 200 Battalions,
and destined principally for garrisoning the Fortresses; the adoption
of the most active operations in all the arsenals, and the employment
of vast numbers of additional workmen in the manufacture of arms and
ammunition. Before all these we ought to place the raising, clothing,
arming, drilling, and organising of 410,000 men (including the National
_Guard d'élite_), which, in addition to the 149,000 men of which the
Royal Army consisted on the 1st of March, formed, on the 1st of June,
an effective force of 559,000 men, available for the national defence.
Of this number, the effective force of the troops of the Line
amounted to 217,000 men, and the Regimental Depôts to 146,000 men:
the remainder, consisting of 200 Battalions of the National _Guard
d'élite_, of 20 Regiments of Marines, of 10 Battalions of Marine
Artillery, of Coast Guards, Veterans, and Organised Pensioners, and
amounting to 196,000 men, constituted the _Armée extraordinaire_, to be
employed in the defence of the Fortresses and of the coast.
NAPOLEON having calculated that an effective force of 800,000 men would
be requisite to enable him to oppose the Allies with full confidence of
success, had given orders for the formation, at the Regimental Depôts,
of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Battalions of every Regiment of Infantry, and
of the 4th and 5th Squadrons of every Regiment of Cavalry; also for
the additional formation of 30 Battalions of Artillery Train, of 20
Regiments of the Young Guard, of 10 Battalions of Waggon Train, and
of 20 Regiments of Marines. These and other measures he anticipated
would furnish the force desired, but not until the 1st of October. The
movements of the Allies, however, and his projected plan of active
operations, precluded the possibility of his waiting for their full
accomplishment. To augment the means of local defence, instructions
were also issued for the reorganisation of the National Guard
throughout the Empire, by which it was divided into 3130 Battalions,
and was to form, _when complete_, no less a force than 2,250,000 men!
* * * * *
Out of the disposable force of the troops of the Line, and partly also
out of the National _Guard d'élite_, were formed seven _Corps d'Armée_,
four Corps of Reserve Cavalry, four Corps of Observation, and an Army
of the West or of La Vendée.
The Army of the North, generally designated the Grand Army, was to be
considered as acting under the immediate orders of the Emperor. It
consisted of five _Corps d'Armée_ (the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
and Sixth), all the Reserve Cavalry, and the Imperial Guard. Its total
force amounted to nearly 120,000 men; and its distribution, in the
early part of June, was as follows:--
The First _Corps d'Armée_ commanded by Count D'ERLON, had its Head
Quarters at Lille; the Second, under the orders of Count REILLE, was
cantoned in the environs of Valenciennes; the Third, under Count
VANDAMME, was assembled in the environs of Mézières; the Fourth,
under Count GÉRARD, in the environs of the Metz; and the Sixth Corps,
commanded by Count LOBAU, was stationed at Laon. The four Corps of
Reserve Cavalry under the chief command of Marshal GROUCHY, were in
cantonments between the Aisne and the Sambre. The Imperial Guard was in
Paris.
The Fifth _Corps d'Armée_, commanded by Count RAPP, formed the basis
of an Army of the Rhine, and consisted of about 36,000 men. Its Head
Quarters were at Strasburg, and it occupied the principal points along
that part of the frontier between Landau and Hagenau; communicating
with the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_ on its left, as also with the First
Corps of Observation on its right.
The Seventh _Corps d'Armée_, commanded by the Duke of ALBUFERA,
formed the basis of the Army of the Alps. It did not at that time
amount to more than 15,000 men; but arrangements were made for its
augmentation, by the end of June, to 40,000 men. It held the passes
along the Italian frontier--was strongly posted at Grenoble, and
at Chambery--communicating on its left with the First Corps of
Observation; and covering the approach to Lyons, where very extensive
works were carried on with the utmost vigour and activity.
The First Corps of Observation, called the Army of the Jura, commanded
by Lieutenant General LECOURBE, guarded the passes along the Swiss
frontier; had its Head Quarters at Altkirch, and occupied the line
between Huningen and Belfort--communicating on its right with the Army
of the Alps, and on its left with the Army of the Rhine. It did not, at
that time, consist of a larger force than 4,500 men; which, however,
was to be augmented to 18,000 on the arrival of additional Battalions
from the National _Guard d'élite_ then in course of active organisation.
The Second Corps of Observation, called the Army of the Var, commanded
by Marshal BRUNE, had its Head Quarters at Marseilles; occupied Toulon
and Antibes, and watched the frontier of the Maritime Alps. Its
force, which then amounted to 5,300 men, was to be joined by sixteen
Battalions of the National _Guard d'élite_; and, in this way, increased
to 17,000 men.
The Third Corps of Observation, called the Army of the Eastern
Pyrenees, commanded by Lieutenant General Count DECAEN, had its Head
Quarters at Perpignan. It did not then consist of more than 3,000 men;
but was to be augmented by thirty-two Battalions of the National _Guard
d'élite_ to 23,000 men.
The Fourth Corps of Observation, called the Army of the Western
Pyrenees, or of the Gironde, was commanded by Lieutenant General
CLAUSEL; had its Head Quarters in Bordeaux; consisted of the same force
as that of the Third Corps; and was to be augmented in a similar manner.
The Army of La Vendée, commanded by General LAMARQUE, was occupied in
restoring tranquillity to that part of the Empire. It consisted of
about 17,000 men, including Detachments supplied temporarily from the
Third and Fourth Corps of Observation.
Arrangements had also been made for reinforcing, at the end of June,
the two Armies of the Rhine and the Alps, with 50,000 men from the
troops of the Line organised in the Regimental Depôts, and with 100,000
men from the National _Guard d'élite_; and with a view to afford a
Second Line and Support to the Grand Army, commanded by NAPOLEON in
person, the latter was to be augmented by 100,000 men of the National
Guard, and by 60,000 men of regular troops taken from the Depôts, where
the additional Battalions and Squadrons of Regiments were in course of
daily organisation.
* * * * *
The general aspect of France at that moment was singularly warlike. It
was that of a whole nation buckling on its armour; over the entire
country armed bodies were to be seen in motion towards their several
points of destination: every where the new levies for the Line, and
the newly enrolled National Guards were in an unremitting course
of drill and organisation: the greatest activity was maintained,
day and night, in all the arsenals, and in all the manufactories of
clothing and articles of equipment: crowds of workmen were constantly
employed in the repair of the numerous Fortresses, and in the erection
of entrenched works. Every where appeared a continued transport of
artillery, waggons, arms, ammunition, and all the material of war;
whilst upon every road forming an approach to any of the main points
of assembly in the vicinity of the frontiers, might be seen those
well-formed veteran bands, NAPOLEON's followers through many a bloody
field, moving forth with all the order, and with all the elasticity
of spirit, inspired by the full confidence of a renewed career of
victory--rejoicing in the display of those Standards which so proudly
recalled the most glorious Fields that France had ever won, and
testifying by their acclamations, their enthusiastic devotion to the
cause of the Emperor, which was ever cherished by them as identified
with that of their country.
The sentiments which so generally animated the troops of the Line,
must not, however, be understood as having been equally imbibed
by the remaining portion of the Army, or indeed by the major part
of the nation. There was one predominant cause, which, though its
influence acted as an additional stimulus to the Army, was, to a
very considerable extent, the sole incentive to exertion with the
civil portion of the community. It was the general prevalence of
that unconquerable aversion and undisguised contempt entertained by
the French for the mass of their foreign invaders, whose former
humiliation and subjection, the result of an almost uninterrupted
course of victory and triumph to which the history of France presented
no parallel, had served to flatter and to gratify the national vanity.
It was this feeling, combined with a dread of that retributive justice
which would inevitably follow in the train of a successful invasion,
that operated so powerfully upon the mass of the nation, with whom the
cry of "_Vive l'Empereur!_" merged into that of "_Vive la France!_"
To the above cause may also be traced the temporary reconciliation
of the different factions which it was one of the main objects of
NAPOLEON's celebrated _Champ de Mai_ to establish. This Convocation
of the Popular Representatives, which had in a measure been forced
upon the Emperor by the political vantage ground the people had gained
during even the short constitutional reign of LOUIS XVIII., and of
which they had begun to feel the benefit, did not in any degree
fulfil the expectations of its projector. The stern Republicans were
dissatisfied with the retention of a Chamber of Peers, which, in the
late reign, they had regarded as an English importation; and the
Royalists were no less disgusted with the materials out of which such a
Chamber had been constructed; while both parties felt it to be a mere
semblance of a constitutional body, destined to be composed of the
willing slaves of the despot, his ready instruments for counteracting
and paralysing the effects of any violent ebullition of the popular
will.
When it is considered that an overwhelming majority of the members of
the new Chamber of Deputies were men of avowed Republican principles,
and that in their very first sittings, they evinced by the tone of
their debates, and by the tenor of their measures, a determination to
uphold the authority vested in them by the people, and to make even
the military power of the Emperor subservient to their views of Popular
Government; when, also, it is considered that the two predominant
Parties in the State, the Republicans and the Royalists, relied upon,
and awaited but, the issue of events, for the ultimate success and
realisation of their respective principles: it need not excite surprise
that NAPOLEON, on quitting the capital to take the Field, should have
appeared to feel that he left behind him a power even more dangerous to
the stability of his authority, and more destructive of his ambitious
projects, than that which he was going personally to confront. He
naturally calculated largely upon the enthusiasm of his troops and
their devotion to his cause: but he must have entertained serious
doubts as to whether this spirit was shared by the great majority of
the nation; and must have foreseen that it would only be by means of a
successful result of the approaching contest, that he could possibly
avert the dangers to which his sovereignty was exposed, as much by the
machinations of political opponents at home, as by the combinations of
hostile forces abroad. He was now made painfully sensible of the vast
change which the result of all his former Wars, the restoration of the
legitimate Monarch, and the newly chartered Liberty of the Subject,
had gradually wrought in the political feelings and sentiments of the
Nation.
In short, he found that he had to contend with a mighty, and
an uncontrollable, power--the great moral power of Public
Opinion--compared with which, the Military Power, centred in a single
Individual, however brilliant the latter in genius and in conception,
however fertile in expedients, and however daring and successful in
enterprise and in execution, can acquire no permanent stability, when
not based upon, and emanating from, the broad and comprehensive moral
energies of the Nation; and even a succession of dazzling triumphs,
when gained through the instrumentality of an arbitrary drain upon
the national resources, and in opposition to the real interests and
welfare of the State, tends but to hasten the downfall of the Military
Dictator: whose career may be aptly likened to a Grecian column
erected upon a loose foundation, displaying around its lofty capital
an exuberance of meretricious ornament, which, by its disproportionate
weight, destroys the equilibrium of the ill-supported shaft, and
involves the entire structure in one confused and irretrievable ruin.
Its fall may startle the world with its shock; the fragments may strew
the earth in a wreck as gigantic as were its proportions when it drew
the gaze of admiring or trembling nations: but they are but the more
striking proofs of the destruction that has overtaken it;--it is a ruin
still.
CHAPTER II.
Belgium, the frequent battle-ground of Europe, whose every stream and
every town is associated with the memory of bygone deeds of arms,
was destined, in 1815, to witness another and a mighty struggle--a
struggle in which were arrayed, on the one side, the two foremost of
the confederated Armies advancing towards the French frontiers; and, on
the other, the renowned _Grande Armée_ of Imperial France, resuscitated
at the magic call of its original founder--the great NAPOLEON himself.
During the months of April and May, troops of all arms continued to
enter upon, and spread themselves over, the Belgian soil.
Here might be seen the British soldier, flushed with recent triumphs
in the Peninsula over the same foe with whom he was now prepared once
more to renew the combat; and here the Prussian, eager for the deadly
strife, and impatiently rushing onward to encounter that enemy whose
ravages and excesses in his Fatherland still rankled in his memory.
The Englishman was not fired by the desire of retribution; for it had
pleased Divine Providence to spare Great Britain from the scourge of
domestic war, and to preserve her soil unstained by the footprint of
a foreign enemy. The Prussian soldier looked forward with a sullen
pleasure to the prospect of revenge: vengeance seemed to him a sacred
duty, imposed upon him by all the ties of kindred, and by all those
patriotic feelings, which, in the hour of Prussia's need, had roused
her entire people from the abject state to which they had been so
fatally subdued; which, when the whole country lay prostrate at the
conqueror's feet, so wonderfully, so powerfully, and so successfully
prompted her sons to throw off the yoke. History will mark this
deliverance as the brilliant point in Prussia's brightest era,
affording as it does, a clear and beautiful parallel to that in which
an equally forcible appeal to the energies of the nation was made with
similar success by that illustrious Statesman and General, FREDERICK
THE GREAT, when opposed single-handed to the immense Armies and
powerful resources of surrounding States. France was about to expiate
by her own sufferings the wrongs she had wrought upon his country and
his kind, and the Prussian panted for an opportunity of satiating his
revenge.
The Briton, if he had no such spur as that which urged the Prussian
soldier forward, did not want a sufficiently exciting stimulus; he
cherished, in an eminent degree, that high feeling and proud bearing
which a due sense of the obligations imposed on him by his country, and
of her anxious expectations of his prowess, could not fail to inspire;
determined resolutely and cheerfully to discharge the former, and, if
possible, to more than realise the latter.
[Illustration: Wellington]
[Illustration]
These feelings and dispositions of the soldiery in the two most
advanced of the Allied Armies were concentrated with remarkable
intensity in the characters of their respective Chiefs.
* * * * *
With peculiar propriety may it be said of the illustrious WELLINGTON,
that he personified, as he ever has done, the pure ideal of the
British soldier--the true character of his own followers. Resolute,
yet cool, cautious and calculating in his proceedings; possessing
a natural courage unshaken even under the most appalling dangers
and difficulties; placing great yet not vain reliance upon physical
and moral strength, as opposed to the force of numbers;--it was not
surprising that he should have inspired with unbounded confidence,
soldiers who could not but see in his character and conduct the
reflection and stamp of their own qualities, the worth of which he
so well knew, and which he had so often proved during the arduous
struggle that had been brought to so brilliant and so glorious a
conclusion. But besides these traits in his character, which so
completely identified him with a British Army, there were others which
peculiarly distinguished him as one of the greatest Captains that his
own or any other nation ever produced, and which might well inspire
confidence as to the result of the approaching contest, even opposed
as he was to the hero of a hundred fights, with whom he was now, for
the first time, to measure swords. The eagle glance with which he
detected the object of every hostile movement and the promptitude with
which he decided upon, and carried into effect, the measures necessary
to counteract the Enemy's efforts; the lightning-like rapidity with
which he conducted his attacks, founded as they frequently were upon
the instantaneously discovered errors of his opponents; the noble and
unexampled presence of mind with which he surveyed the battlefield, and
with which he gave his orders and instructions; unaffected by merely
temporary success, unembarrassed by sudden difficulties, and undismayed
by unexpected danger; the many proofs which his operations in the
Peninsula had afforded of his accurate knowledge, just conception,
and skilful discrimination, of the true principles of the Science of
Strategy--all tended to point him out as the individual best fitted by
his abilities, his experience, and his character, to head the military
array assembled to decide the all-important question whether the Star
of NAPOLEON was to regain the ascendant, or to set in darkness; whether
his iron despotism was again to erect its mighty head, or to be now
struck down and crushed--finally and effectually crushed.
* * * * *
The character of the Commander of the Prussian Army in this memorable
Campaign, the veteran Marshal Prince BLÜCHER VON WAHLSTADT, was, in
like manner, peculiarly adapted for concentrating within itself all
those feelings and emotions already adverted to as animating this
portion of the enemies of France--possessing, to a degree bordering
on rashness, a high spirited daring in enterprise; distinguished, on
critical occasions in the field, when the unrestrained feelings and
nature of the _ci-devant_ bold Hussar started forth in aid of the
veteran Commander, by a personal display of chivalrous and impetuous
bravery; ever vigilant for an opportunity of harassing his Enemy;
and fixedly relentless in the pursuit, so long as he retained the
mastery; qualities, which, in his own country, had acquired for him the
sobriquet of _Marschall VORWÄRTS_--he was eminently fitted to be both
the representative and the leader of the Prussians.
* * * * *
Here, too, in close alliance and amity with the British soldier, were
seen the German Legionary, the Hanoverian, and the Brunswicker, who had
so nobly shared with him, under the same Chief, all the toils and all
the glories of the War in the Peninsula; and who were now prepared to
defend the threatened liberties of their respective countries, the very
existence of which, as independent States, hung upon the issue of the
impending struggle.
Although the British were but little acquainted with their other
Allies, the Dutch, the Belgians, and the Nassau troops in the service
of the King of the Netherlands, still the fact that it was upon their
own soil the brunt of the coming contest was to fall, and in all
probability to decide the question whether it should become a portion
of Imperial France, or continue an independent State, coupled with the
knowledge which the British troops possessed of the character of the
Prince at their head, who had gained his laurels under their own eyes,
and who had thus ingratiated himself in their favour, encouraged great
hopes of their hearty exertions in the common cause.
* * * * *
It was naturally to be expected that NAPOLEON, from the moment he
reascended the throne of his former glory, would devote the utmost
energies of his all-directing mind to the full development of whatever
military means France, notwithstanding her recent reverses, yet
retained; but the rapidity and the order with which so regular and
so well organised a force as that which was now concentrating on the
French side of the Sambre, had been collected and put in motion, were
truly wonderful. The speedy and almost sudden reappearance of the old
Army in all its grandeur, with its Corps and Divisions headed by men,
who, by a series of daring and successful exploits, had proved their
just titles to command, and endeared themselves to the old campaigners,
was such that it seemed as if the French had realised the fable of the
dragon's teeth, which it might be said they had sown as they crossed
their frontiers in the previous year, when retreating upon the capital
before the victorious Allies. Never did any Army contain within itself
so much of that necessary essence in the composition of a military
force,--unbounded enthusiasm, combined with the purest devotion to
its leader. The oft-told tale of the veteran of so many a hard-fought
field, indulging in the hope of aiding by his exertions, at any
sacrifice, in again carrying the Eagles to the scenes of their former
triumphs, excited the ardour of many a youthful aspirant to share with
him the glory of wiping out the stain which had dimmed the lustre of
his country's fame, and darkened a most eventful page in her annals.
* * * * *
Such being the nature of the elements ready to rush into collision, it
was easy to foresee that the shock which that collision would produce,
would be both violent and terrible; but no one could have anticipated
that within the short space of four days from the commencement of
hostilities, the die would be irrevocably cast, annihilating for ever
the imperial sway of NAPOLEON, and securing to Europe one of the
longest periods of peace recorded in her history.
[Illustration]
CHAPTER III.
By the middle of June, the Anglo-Allied Army which had been gradually
assembling in Belgium, under the command of the Duke of WELLINGTON,
amounted to about 106,000 men, and was composed in the following
manner:--
INFANTRY.
British 23,543
King's German Legion 3,301
Hanoverian 22,788
Brunswick 5,376
Nassau (1st Regiment) 2,880
Dutch and Belgian 24,174
------
82,062
CAVALRY.
British 5,913
King's German Legion 2,560
Hanoverian 1,682
Brunswick 922
Dutch and Belgian 3,405
------
14,482
ARTILLERY.
British 5,030 102 guns.
King's German Legion 526 18 "
Hanoverian 465 12 "
Brunswick 510 16 "
Dutch and Belgian 1,635 56 "
------ ----
8,166 204 guns.
ENGINEERS, SAPPERS AND MINERS, WAGGON-TRAIN, AND STAFF CORPS.
British 1,240
TOTAL.
Infantry 82,062
Cavalry 14,482
Artillery 8,166
Engineers, Waggon-Train, &c. 1,240
--------
105,950 men and 204 guns.
The Infantry was divided into two Corps and a Reserve.
The First Corps, commanded by General His Royal Highness the Prince of
ORANGE, was composed
of the First Division, under Major General COOKE;
of the Third Division, under Lieutenant General Sir CHARLES ALTEN;
of the Second Dutch-Belgian Division, under Lieutenant General DE
PERPONCHER;
and of the Third Dutch-Belgian Division, under Lieutenant General
Baron CHASSÉ.
The Left of this Corps rested upon Genappe, Quatre Bras, and Frasne,
on the high road leading from Brussels to Charleroi on the Sambre,
and communicated with the Right of the First _Corps d'Armée_ of the
Prussian Army, the Head Quarters of which Corps were at Charleroi. DE
PERPONCHER's Dutch-Belgian Division formed the extreme Left, having its
Head Quarters at Nivelles, on the high road from Brussels to Binche. On
its right was CHASSÉ's Dutch-Belgian Division, more in advance, in the
direction of Mons and Binche, and quartered principally in Roeulx, and
in the villages between the latter place and Binche. The next Division
on the right was ALTEN's, having its Head Quarters at Soignies, on
the high road from Brussels to Mons, and occupying villages between
this town, Roeulx, Braine le Comte, and Enghien. The Right Division,
COOKE's, had its Head Quarters at Enghien.
The Second Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Lord HILL, consisted
of the Second Division, under Lieutenant General Sir HENRY CLINTON;
of the Fourth Division, under Lieutenant General the Hon. Sir CHARLES
COLVILLE;
of the First Dutch-Belgian Division, under Lieutenant General
STEDMANN;
and of a Brigade raised for service in the Dutch Colonies, called the
Indian Brigade, under Lieutenant General Baron ANTHING.
The Second Division, which formed the Left of this Corps, communicated
with ALTEN's Right; its Head Quarters were at Ath, on the Dender, and
upon the high road leading from Brussels to Tournai, and one Brigade
(the Third), occupied Lens, situated about midway between Ath and Mons.
The Fourth Division was the next on the right, having its Head Quarters
at Audenarde on the Scheldt, and occupying also Renaix. One Brigade
of this Division (the Sixth Hanoverian) garrisoned the fortress of
Nieuport on the coast. The First Dutch-Belgian Division was cantoned in
villages bordering upon the high road connecting Grammont with Ghent;
and the so-called Indian Brigade occupied villages between this line
and Alost.
The Reserve consisted
of the Fifth Division, under Lieutenant General Sir THOMAS PICTON;
of the Sixth Division, under Lieutenant General the Hon. Sir LOWRY
COLE;
of the Brunswick Division, under the Duke of BRUNSWICK;
of the Hanoverian Corps, under Lieutenant General VON DER DECKEN;
and of the Contingent of the Duke of NASSAU, which comprised the 1st
Regiment of Nassau Infantry, containing three Battalions, and forming
a Brigade under the command of General VON KRUSE.
The Fifth and Sixth Divisions, and the Brunswick Division, were
quartered principally in and around Brussels, excepting the Seventh
Brigade, which together with VON DER DECKEN's Corps, the 13th Veteran
Battalion, the 1st Foreign Battalion, and the 2nd Garrison Battalion,
garrisoned Antwerp, Ostend, Nieuport, Ypres, Tournai, and Mons; and VON
KRUSE's Nassau Brigade was cantoned between Brussels and Louvain.
Of the fortresses already mentioned, those which had not been destroyed
by the French when they gained possession of the country in 1794,
namely, Antwerp, Ostend, and Nieuport, were strengthened, and each
rendered capable of holding out a siege. By taking every possible
advantage offered by the remains of the old fortifications, and by
the continued employment of 20,000 labourers, through requisitions on
the country, in addition to the military working parties, and by the
accession of artillery and stores from England and Holland, the towns
of Ypres, Tournai, Mons, Ath, and the Citadel of Ghent, were placed
in a state of defence, and a Redoubt was constructed at Audenarde to
protect the Sluice Gates, which afforded the means of inundating that
part of the country.
* * * * *
The Cavalry of the Anglo-Allied Army, commanded by Lieutenant General
the Earl of UXBRIDGE, consisted of seven Brigades, comprising the
British and the King's German Legion; of a Hanoverian Brigade; of five
Squadrons of Brunswick Cavalry; and of three Brigades of Dutch-Belgian
Cavalry.
The British and King's German Legion Cavalry, with the Hanoverian
Brigade, were stationed at Grammont and Ninove, and in villages
bordering upon the Dender. The Brunswick Cavalry was dispersed in
the vicinity of Brussels. The First Brigade of Dutch-Belgian Cavalry
was cantoned in the neighbourhood of Roeulx; the Second Brigade, in
villages between Roeulx and Mons; and the Third Brigade, partly on the
south side of Mons, in the direction of Maubeuge and Beaumont, and
partly between Binche and Mons.
* * * * *
The wide dissemination of the Duke of WELLINGTON's forces which the
advanced line of cantonments presented--a line forming a considerable
portion of a circle, of which Brussels was the centre, and the Tournai,
Mons, and Charleroi roads were the marked radii--tended greatly to
facilitate the means of subsisting the troops, and to render that
subsistence less burthensome to the country; while, at the same time,
it offered to the Duke, in conjunction with the interior points of
concentration, and with the efficient Reserve stationed around the
capital, full security for his being prepared to meet any emergency
that might arise. The main points of interior concentration were
(commencing from the right) Audenarde, Grammont, Ath, Enghien,
Soignies, Nivelles, and Quatre Bras. From whatever point, therefore,
offensive operations might be directed against that portion of the
Belgian frontier occupied by the Army under WELLINGTON--whether from
Lille, by Courtrai, or by Tournai, between the Lys and the Scheldt;
from Condé, Valenciennes, or Maubeuge, by Mons, between the Sambre
and the Scheldt; or from Maubeuge, Beaumont, or Philippeville, by
Charleroi, between the Sambre and the Meuse--the Duke, by advancing to
the threatened point with his Reserve, and placing the remainder of
his troops in movement, had it in his power to concentrate at least
two-thirds of his intended disposable force for the Field, upon the
line of the Enemy's operations, within twenty-two hours after the
receipt of intelligence of the actual direction and apparent object of
those operations.
* * * * *
The Prussian Army, under the command of Prince BLÜCHER VON WAHLSTADT,
amounted to nearly 117,000 men, and was thus composed:--
Infantry 99,715
Cavalry 11,879
Artillery, Waggon-Train, and Engineers 5,303
-------
116,897 men & 312 guns.
It was divided into four _Corps d'Armée_.
The First Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General ZIETEN,[6] consisted
of the First Brigade, under General STEINMETZ;
of the Second Brigade, under General PIRCH II.;[7]
of the Third Brigade, under General JAGOW;
of the Fourth Brigade, under General Count HENKEL;
of a Cavalry Reserve, under Lieutenant General RÖDER;
and of an Artillery Reserve, under Colonel LEHMANN.
The Right of this _Corps d'Armée_, the Head Quarters of which were at
Charleroi, communicated with the Left of the First Corps of the Duke
of WELLINGTON's Army. Its Right Brigade, the First, was cantoned in
and around Fontaine l'Evêque, which lies midway between Charleroi and
Binche; the Second Brigade, in Marchienne au Pont, on the Sambre; the
Third Brigade, in Fleurus; the Fourth Brigade, in Moustier sur Sambre;
the Reserve Cavalry in Sombref, and the Reserve Artillery in Gembloux.
The line of Advanced Posts of this Corps extended from Bonne Esperance
(two miles south-west of Binche) along the frontier of Lobbes, Thuin,
and Gerpinnes, as far as Sossoye.
The Second _Corps d'Armée_, commanded by General PIRCH I., consisted
of the Fifth Brigade, under General TIPPELSKIRCHEN;
of the Sixth Brigade, under General KRAFFT;
of the Seventh Brigade, under General BRAUSE;
of the Eighth Brigade, under Colonel LANGEN;
of a Cavalry Reserve, under General JÜRGASS;
and of an Artillery Reserve, under Colonel RHÖL.
The Head Quarters of this Corps were at Namur, situated at the
confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse, where also its first Brigade
(the Fifth) was stationed; the Sixth Brigade was cantoned in and
around Thorembey les Beguignes; the Seventh Brigade in Heron; the
Eighth Brigade in Huy; the Reserve Cavalry in Hannut; and the Reserve
Artillery along the high road to Louvain. The line of Advanced Posts
of this Corps extended from Sossoye as far as Dinant on the Meuse,
about midway between Namur and Givet.
The Third _Corps d'Armée_, commanded by Lieutenant General THIELEMANN,
consisted
of the Ninth Brigade, under General BORKE;
of the Tenth Brigade, under Colonel KÄMPFEN;
of the Eleventh Brigade, under Colonel LUCK;
of the Twelfth Brigade, under Colonel STÜLPNAGEL;
of a Cavalry Reserve, under General HOBE;
and of an Artillery Reserve, under Colonel MOHNHAUPT.
The Head Quarters of this Corps were at Ciney: the Ninth Brigade was
stationed at Asserre; the Tenth Brigade at Ciney; the Eleventh Brigade
at Dinant; the Twelfth Brigade at Huy, on the Meuse; the Reserve
Cavalry between Ciney and Dinant; and the Reserve Artillery at Ciney.
The line of Advanced Posts of this Corps extended from Dinant as far as
Fabeline and Rochefort.
The Fourth _Corps d'Armée_, commanded by General Count BÜLOW VON
DENNEWITZ, consisted
of the Thirteenth Brigade, under Lieutenant General HACKE;
of the Fourteenth Brigade, under General RYSSEL;
of the Fifteenth Brigade, under General LOSTHIN;
of the Sixteenth Brigade, under Colonel HILLER;
of a Cavalry Reserve, under General His Royal Highness Prince
WILLIAM of Prussia;
and of an Artillery Reserve, under Lieutenant Colonel BARDELEBEN.
The Head Quarters of this Corps were at Liege, where was also stationed
the Thirteenth Infantry Brigade; the Fourteenth Brigade was cantoned
in and around Waremme; the Fifteenth Brigade at Hologne; the Sixteenth
Brigade at Liers; the First Brigade of Reserve Cavalry at Tongern; the
Second Brigade at Dalhem, and the Third Brigade at Lootz; the Reserve
Artillery was cantoned in and about Gloms and Dalhem.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Namur.
The points of concentration for the respective Corps were therefore
Fleurus, Namur, Ciney, and Liege. The four Corps were so disposed that
each could be collected at its own Head Quarters within twelve hours;
and it was fully practicable to form a junction of the whole Army at
any one of these points within twenty-four hours from the time of such
collection. At Namur, the most central point, it would of course be
accomplished in much less time.
BLÜCHER had decided, in the event of an advance by the French across
the line of the Sambre, by Charleroi, upon concentrating his Army in a
position in front of Sombref, a point upon the high road between Namur
and Nivelles, above fourteen miles from the former place, and only
seven miles and a half from Quatre Bras, the point of intersection of
this road with the one leading directly from Charleroi to Brussels, and
at which WELLINGTON had agreed, in that case, to concentrate as large
a force as time would admit, in order to check any advance in this
direction, or to join BLÜCHER's Right Flank, according to circumstances.
[Illustration]
[Illustration]
Should the Enemy advance along the left bank of the Meuse towards
Namur, this place would become the point of junction of the First,
Second, and Fourth Corps of the Prussian Army, whilst the Third,
collecting at Ciney, would, after presenting a stout resistance at
Dinant, operate as effectively as circumstances would admit, against
the Right of the line of attack; and should he advance by the right
bank of the Meuse towards Ciney, the Army would concentrate at this
point, with the exception of the Fourth Corps, which would assemble at
Liege as a Reserve, for the better security of the Left Flank and of
the communications with the Rhine.
* * * * *
Such were the dispositions of the Allied Commanders, who contemplated
no change in their arrangements until the moment should arrive of the
commencement of hostile demonstrations of a decided character, for
which they were perfectly prepared, and for which a vigilant look-out
was maintained along the general line of the Advanced Posts.
From the foregoing, however, it would appear that the concentration
of WELLINGTON's Army on its own Left, and that of BLÜCHER's Army on
its own Right, required longer time than that in which they could have
been respectively accomplished on other points; and further that the
distribution of the former was better calculated to meet the Enemy's
advance by Mons, and that of the latter to meet it by Namur, than to
oppose a line of attack by Charleroi. This peculiar feature in the
dispositions of the two Commanders did not escape the vigilance of
NAPOLEON, who, as will be seen in the sequel, made it subservient to
his hopes of beating their Armies in detail.
* * * * *
The French troops destined to constitute the Grand Army with which
NAPOLEON had decided upon taking the field against the allied forces in
Belgium, comprised the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth _Corps
d'Armée_; four Corps of Cavalry; and the Imperial Guard: amounting
altogether to 116,124 men:--
Infantry 83,753
Cavalry 20,959
Artillery, Waggon-Train, and Engineers 11,412
-------
116,124 men and 350 guns.
The First _Corps d'Armée_, commanded by Lieutenant General Count
D'ERLON, consisted
of the First Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General ALIX;
of the Second Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Baron
DONZELOT;
of the Third Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Baron
MARCOGNET;
of the Fourth Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Count
DURETTE;
and of the First Light Cavalry Division, under Lieutenant General
JAQUINOT;
with 5 Batteries of Foot, and 1 of Horse, Artillery.
In the beginning of June, this Corps was stationed in and around Lille.
The Second _Corps d'Armée_, commanded by Lieutenant General Count
REILLE, consisted
of the Fifth Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Baron
BACHELU;
of the Sixth Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Prince
JEROME NAPOLEON;
of the Seventh Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Count
GIRARD;
of the Ninth Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Count
FOY;
and of the Second Light Cavalry Division, under Lieutenant General
Baron PIRÉ;
with 5 Batteries of Foot, and 1 of Horse, Artillery.
This Corps was stationed in and around Valenciennes.
The Third _Corps d'Armée_, commanded by Lieutenant General Count
VANDAMME, consisted
of the Eighth Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Baron LE
FOL;
of the Tenth Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Baron
HABERT;
of the Eleventh Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General
BERTHEZENE;
and of the Third Light Cavalry Division, under Lieutenant General
Baron DOMON;
with 4 Batteries of Foot, and 1 of Horse, Artillery.
This Corps was assembled in and around Mézières.
The Fourth _Corps d'Armée_, commanded by Lieutenant General Count
GÉRARD, consisted
of the Twelfth Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Baron
PECHEUX;
of the Thirteenth Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Baron
VICHERY;
of the Fourteenth Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General DE
BOURMONT;
and of the Sixth Light Cavalry Division, under Lieutenant General
MAURIN;
with 4 Batteries of Foot, and 1 of Horse, Artillery.
This Corps occupied Metz, Longwy, and Thionville, and formed the basis
of the Army of the Moselle; but it was now decided that it should
approach the Sambre, and unite itself with the Grand Army.
The Sixth _Corps d'Armée_, commanded by Lieutenant General Count LOBAU,
consisted
of the Nineteenth Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Baron
SIMMER;
of the Twentieth Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Baron
JEANNIN;
of the Twenty-First Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Baron
TESTE;
with 4 Batteries of Foot, and 1 of Horse, Artillery.
This Corps was assembled in and around Laon.
The four Corps forming the Reserve Cavalry were placed under the
command of Marshal Count GROUCHY.
The First, commanded by Lieutenant General Count PAJOL, consisted
of the Fourth Cavalry Division (Hussars), under Lieutenant General
Baron SOULT;
and of the Fifth Division (Lancers and _Chasseurs_), under Lieutenant
General Baron SUBERVIE;
with 2 Batteries of Horse Artillery.
The Second Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count EXCELMANS,
consisted
of the Ninth Division (Dragoons), under Lieutenant General
STROLZ;
and of the Tenth Division (Dragoons), under Lieutenant General Baron
CHASTEL;
with 2 Batteries of Horse Artillery.
The Third Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count DE VALMY
(KELLERMANN), consisted
of the Eleventh Division (Dragoons and _Cuirassiers_), under
Lieutenant General Baron L'HERITIER;
and of the Twelfth Division (Carabiniers and _Cuirassiers_), under
Lieutenant General ROUSSEL D'HURBAL;
with 2 Batteries of Horse Artillery.
The Fourth Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count MILHAUD,
consisted
of the Thirteenth Division (_Cuirassiers_), under Lieutenant General
WATHIER;
and of the Fourteenth Division (_Cuirassiers_), under Lieutenant
General Baron DELORT;
with 2 Batteries of Horse Artillery.
The principal portion of the Reserve Cavalry lay in cantonments between
the Aisne and the frontier.
* * * * *
The Infantry of the Imperial Guard consisted
of the 1st and 2nd Regiments of Grenadiers, under Lieutenant General
Count FRIANT;
of the 3rd and 4th Regiments of Grenadiers, under Lieutenant General
Count ROGUET;
of the 1st and 2nd Regiments of _Chasseurs_, under Lieutenant General
Count MORAND;
of the 3rd and 4th Regiments of _Chasseurs_, under Lieutenant General
Count MICHEL;
of the 1st and 3rd Regiments of _Tirailleurs_, under Lieutenant
General Count DUHESME;
and of the 1st and 3rd _Voltigeurs_, under Lieutenant General Count
BARROIS.
The Cavalry of the Guard consisted
of two Regiments of Heavy Cavalry (_Grenadiers à Cheval_ and
Dragoons), under Lieutenant General Count GUYOT;
and of three Regiments of Light Cavalry (_Chasseurs à Cheval_ and
Lancers), under Lieutenant General LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTES.
Attached to the Guard were 6 Batteries of Foot, and 4 Batteries of
Horse, Artillery, with 3 Batteries of Reserve Artillery; comprising
altogether 96 pieces of cannon, under the command of Lieutenant
General DESVAUX DE ST. MAURICE.
These troops were principally in Paris.
* * * * *
The French Emperor having, upon the grounds explained in a former
Chapter, determined to take the Field against the Allied Armies in
Belgium, the commencement of active operations could no longer be
deferred. When we reflect upon the disparity of force with which he was
going to contend against two such Generals as WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER,
we are bound to acknowledge that it was an undertaking daring and
perilous in the extreme, even for an individual of the dauntless and
adventurous character of NAPOLEON. A delay of only a few weeks would
have secured for him, by means of the vast organisation which was in
constant and rapid progress, a sufficient accession of disposable
troops to have enabled him to effect a powerful diversion upon either
WELLINGTON's Right, or BLÜCHER's Left, Flank, and thus to impart
an infinitely greater degree of weight and stability to his main
operations; but then, on the other hand, this delay would also have
brought the powerful Armies of the confederated Sovereigns across the
whole line of his eastern frontier, and have led to the consummation of
that combined movement upon the capital, the execution of which it was
his great aim to frustrate.
But it was not the first time that NAPOLEON had advanced against such
fearful superiority of numerical strength. In the previous year, when
nearly surrounded by the victorious forces of Prussia, Austria, and
Russia, when apparently overwhelmed by a succession of disasters, and
when his Army was daily diminishing by the desertion of newly raised
conscripts, and presenting the mere wreck of its former self, he was
at the very _acme_ of his mental energy, and in the full possession
of his determinate and all subduing will. His great genius seemed
to acquire additional vigour and elasticity, with the increasing
desperation of his position; and darting with electric suddenness and
rapidity, now upon one adversary and then upon another, maintaining
with the renowned leaders of his detached forces, a combination of
movements developing the highest order of strategy, he succeeded by his
brilliant triumphs at Champaubert, Montmirail, and Monterau, not only
in stemming the torrent of invasion, but in causing the resumption of
the diplomatic preliminaries of a Peace. This Peace, however, these
very triumphs induced him, as if by a fatality, to reject with scorn
and indignation, although the terms were honourable in the highest
degree under his then existing circumstances.
Hence, with such a retrospect, NAPOLEON might well indulge in
hope and confidence as to the result of the approaching Campaign,
notwithstanding the want of sufficient time for a greater development
of his resources. A finer or a more gallant Army, or one more complete
and efficient in every respect, than that which he was going to lead in
person, never took the Field.
[Illustration]
He had selected for the line of his main operations the direct road
to Brussels, by Charleroi, that being the road, as before remarked,
on which WELLINGTON's Left, and BLÜCHER's Right respectively rested,
and which he designed to maintain by first overcoming the Prussian
Army, which was the most advanced on that line, and then attacking
the Anglo-Allied troops before they could be collected in sufficient
strength to prevent his further progress; his grand object being to
impede the junction of the two Armies; to vanquish them in detail; to
establish himself in Brussels; to arouse the dense population in
Belgium, of which a vast proportion secretly adhered to his cause; to
reannex the country to the French Empire; to excite the desertion of
the Belgian soldiery from the service of Holland; to prevent a check
by these means to the operations of the invading Armies crossing the
Rhine; perhaps also to enter into negotiations; and, at all events, to
gain, what was to him of vital importance, _time_ for the advance and
co-operation of further reinforcements from France.
* * * * *
The necessary Orders were now despatched for the concentration of the
Grand Army; and in order to mask its movements as much as possible,
the whole line of the Belgian frontier was studded with numerous
Detachments of the National Guards furnished by the garrisons of the
fortresses, more especially along that part of the frontier which
passes in advance of Valenciennes, Condé, Lille, and even as far as
Dunkirk; all the _debouchés_ of which line were strongly occupied, the
Outposts tripled, and there was every apparent indication that either
the principal attack, or at least a formidable diversion, was in course
of preparation in that quarter.
These measures had the effect of strengthening the anticipations which
WELLINGTON had previously formed of offensive movements from the side
of Lille and Valenciennes, and consequently of placing him still more
upon his guard against any hasty and incautious junction of his forces
with those of BLÜCHER, until fully satisfied as to the true direction
and object of NAPOLEON's main operations.
* * * * *
On the 12th of June, Lieutenant Colonel WISSELL, whose Regiment,
the 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion, formed an extensive
line of Outposts in front of Tournai, reported to Major General Sir
HUSSEY VIVIAN, to whose Brigade the Regiment belonged, that he had
ascertained, from information on which he could rely, that the French
Army had assembled on the frontier, and was prepared to attack. VIVIAN
desired him to report upon the subject to Lord HILL, to whose Corps his
Regiment was attached while employed on this particular service.
The next morning, VIVIAN repaired in person to the Outposts, and found
that a French Cavalry Picquet which had previously been posted opposite
to Tournai, had a short time before marched to join the main Army,
and had been relieved by _Douaniers_. These, upon being spoken to by
VIVIAN, did not hesitate to say that their Army was concentrating,
and that if the Allies did not advance, their troops would attack.
On returning to his Quarters, VIVIAN communicated what he had seen
and heard both to Lord HILL and the Earl of UXBRIDGE, by whom the
circumstances were made known to the Duke of WELLINGTON. His Grace,
however, for reasons before stated, did not think the proper moment had
arrived for making any alteration in the disposition of his forces.
* * * * *
GÉRARD's Corps quitted Metz on the 6th of June, with Orders to reach
Philippeville by the 14th. The Imperial Guard began its march from
Paris on the 8th, and reached Avesnes on the 13th, as did also LOBAU's
Corps from Laon. D'ERLON's Corps from Lille, REILLE's Corps from
Valenciennes, and VANDAMME's Corps from Mézières, likewise arrived at
Maubeuge and Avesnes on the 13th. The four Corps of Reserve Cavalry
concentrated upon the Upper Sambre.
The junction of the several Corps on the same day, and almost at the
same hour (with the exception of the Fourth, which joined the next
day), displayed the usual skill of NAPOLEON in the combination of
movements. Their leaders congratulated themselves upon these auspicious
preparations, and upon finding the "Grand Army" once more assembled
in "all the pomp and circumstance of glorious war:" the appearance of
the troops, though fatigued, was all that could be desired; and their
enthusiasm was at the highest on hearing that the Emperor himself, who
had quitted Paris at three o'clock on the morning of the 12th, and
passed the night at Laon, had actually arrived amongst them.
Upon the following day, the French Army bivouacked on three different
points.
The Left, consisting of D'ERLON's and REILLE's Corps, and amounting to
about 44,000 men, was posted on the right bank of the Sambre at Solre
sur Sambre.
The Centre, consisting of VANDAMME's and LOBAU's Corps, of the Imperial
Guard, and of the Cavalry Reserves, amounting altogether to about
60,000 men, was at Beaumont, which was made the Head Quarters.
The Right, composed of GÉRARD's Corps and of a Division of Heavy
Cavalry, amounting altogether to about 16,000 men, was in front of
Philippeville.
The bivouacs were established in rear of some slight eminences, with a
view to conceal their fires from the observation of the Enemy.
The Army, while thus assembled, on the eve of opening the Campaign,
received through the medium of an _Ordre du Jour_ the following
spirit-stirring appeal from its Chief:--
"NAPOLEON, by the Grace of God, and the Constitutions of the Empire,
Emperor of the French, etc., to the Grand Army,
"At the Imperial Head Quarters,
Avesnes, June 14th, 1815.
"Soldiers! this day is the anniversary of Marengo and of Friedland,
which twice decided the destiny of Europe. Then, as after
Austerlitz, as after Wagram, we were too generous! We believed in
the protestations and in the oaths of Princes, whom we left on
their thrones. Now, however, leagued together, they aim at the
independence, and the most sacred rights of France. They have
commenced the most unjust of aggressions. Let us, then, march to meet
them. Are they and we no longer the same men?
"Soldiers! at Jena, against these same Prussians, now so arrogant,
you were one to three, and at Montmirail one to six!
"Let those among you who have been captives to the English, describe
the nature of their prison ships, and the frightful miseries they
endured.
"The Saxons, the Belgians, the Hanoverians, the soldiers of the
Confederation of the Rhine, lament that they are compelled to use
their arms in the cause of the Princes, the enemies of justice and
of the rights of all nations. They know that this Coalition is
insatiable! After having devoured twelve millions of Poles, twelve
millions of Italians, one million of Saxons, and six millions of
Belgians, it now wishes to devour the States of the second rank in
Germany.
"Madmen! one moment of prosperity has bewildered them. The oppression
and the humiliation of the French people are beyond their power. If
they enter France they will there find their grave.
"Soldiers! we have forced marches to make, battles to fight, dangers
to encounter; but, with firmness, victory will be ours. The rights,
the honour, and the happiness of the country will be recovered!
"To every Frenchman who has a heart, the moment is now arrived to
conquer or to die!
"NAPOLEON."
"THE MARSHAL DUKE OF DALMATIA,
Major General."
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 6: In order to avoid the constant repetition of the prefix
"von" to the names of the German Officers, I have omitted it altogether
in the present edition; an omission, however, which I feel persuaded
those Officers will not consider as involving any breach of courtesy or
respect.]
[Footnote 7: Prussian General Officers bearing the same family name,
are usually distinguished by the addition of the Roman numerals.
General VON PIRCH I. is named on the next page.]
CHAPTER IV.
NAPOLEON, by his precautionary measures of strengthening his Advanced
Posts, and of displaying along the whole line of the Belgian frontier
an equal degree of vigilance and activity, had effectually concealed
from his adversaries the combined movements of his several _Corps
d'Armée_, and their concentration on the right bank of the Sambre.
During the night of the 13th, however, the light reflected upon the
sky by the fires of the French bivouacs, did not escape the vigilant
observation of ZIETEN's Outposts, whence it was communicated to the
Rear that these fires appeared to be in the direction of Walcourt and
of Beaumont, and also in the vicinity of Solre sur Sambre; further,
that all reports received through spies and deserters concurred in
representing that NAPOLEON was expected to join the French Army on
that evening; that the Imperial Guard and the Second Corps had arrived
at Avesnes and Maubeuge; also that, at one o'clock in the afternoon
of that day, four French Battalions had crossed the river at Solre
sur Sambre, and occupied Merbes le Château; that late in the night
the Enemy had pushed forward a strong Detachment as far as Sart la
Bussière; and lastly, that an attack by the French would certainly take
place on the 14th or 15th.
On the 14th of June, the Dutch-Belgian General VAN MERLEN, who was
stationed at St Symphorien, near Mons, and who commanded the Outposts
between the latter place and Binche which formed the extreme Right
of the Prussians, ascertained that the French troops had moved from
Maubeuge and its vicinity by Beaumont towards Philippeville, that there
was no longer any hostile force in his front, except a Picquet at
Bettignies, and some National Guards in other villages. He forwarded
this important information to the Prussian General STEINMETZ, on his
left, with whom he was in constant communication, and by whom it was
despatched to General ZIETEN at Charleroi.
The Prussian General PIRCH II., who was posted on the left of
STEINMETZ, also sent word to ZIETEN that he had received information
through his Outposts that the French Army had concentrated in the
vicinity of Beaumont and Merbes le Château; that their Army consisted
of 150,000 men, and was commanded by General VANDAMME, JEROME
BUONAPARTE, and some other distinguished Officers; that since the
previous day all crossing of the frontier had been forbidden by the
French under pain of death; and that a Patrol of the Enemy had been
observed that day near Biercée, not far from Thuin.
During the day, frequent accounts were brought to the troops of
ZIETEN's Corps, generally corroborative of the above, by the country
people who were bringing away, and seeking some place of safety
for, their cattle. Intelligence was also obtained of the arrival of
NAPOLEON, and of his brother, Prince JEROME.
ZIETEN immediately transmitted the substance of this information to
Prince BLÜCHER and to the Duke of WELLINGTON; and it was perfectly
consistent with that which the latter had received from Major General
DÖRNBERG, who had been posted in observation at Mons, and from General
VAN MERLEN (through the Prince of ORANGE) who, as already mentioned,
commanded the Outposts between that place and Binche. Nothing,
however, was as yet positively known concerning the real point of
concentration, the probable strength of the Enemy, or his intended
offensive movements, and the Allied Commanders therefore refrained from
making any alteration in their dispositions, and calmly awaited the
arrival of reports of a more definite character concerning the Enemy's
designs.
* * * * *
ZIETEN's troops were kept under arms during the night, and were
collected by Battalions at their respective points of assembly.
Later in the day ZIETEN ascertained, through his Outposts, that strong
French Columns, composed of all Arms, were assembling in his front, and
that every thing portended an attack on the following morning.
ZIETEN's communication of this intelligence reached BLÜCHER between
nine and ten o'clock on the night of the 14th.
Simultaneous Orders were consequently despatched by eleven o'clock for
the march of PIRCH's Corps from Namur upon Sombref, and of THIELEMANN's
Corps from Ciney to Namur. An Order had already, in the course of the
day, been forwarded to BÜLOW at Liege, desiring him to make such a
disposition of his _Corps d'Armée_ as should admit of its concentration
at Hannut in one march; and at midnight a further Order was despatched,
requiring him to concentrate his troops in cantonment about Hannut.
ZIETEN was directed to await the advance of the Enemy in his position
upon the Sambre; and, in the event of his being attacked by superior
numbers, and compelled to retire, to effect his retreat as slowly as
circumstances would permit, in the direction of Fleurus, so as to
afford sufficient time for the concentration of the other three Corps
in rear of the latter point.
The vigilance which was thus exercised along both the Anglo-Allied
and Prussian line of Outposts, obtained for WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER
the fullest extent of information which they could reasonably have
calculated on receiving respecting the dispositions of the Enemy
immediately previous to an attack. They had been put in possession of
the fact that considerable masses of French troops had moved by their
right, and assembled in front of Charleroi. Still, this baring of the
frontier beyond Tournai, Mons, and Binche, of the troops which had
previously occupied that line, and their concentration in front of
Charleroi, might be designed to mask the real line of operation, to
draw the Anglo-Allied troops towards Charleroi, upon which a feigned
attack would be made, while the real attack was intended to be by
Mons. Hence no alteration was made by the Duke in the disposition of
his forces; but the Prussian Field Marshal immediately ordered the
concentration of his own troops at a point where they would be at hand
in case Charleroi should be the real line of attack, and whence they
could far more readily move to the support of WELLINGTON, should that
attack be made by the Mons road.
* * * * *
ZIETEN's position, and his line of Advanced Posts, have already been
described. His Right Brigade (the First), having its Head Quarters at
Fontaine l'Evêque, held the ground between Binche and the Sambre; his
Centre Brigade (the Second) lay along the Sambre, occupying Marchienne
au Pont, Dampremy, La Roux, Charleroi, Châtelet, and Gilly; a portion
of his Third Brigade occupied Farciennes and Tamines on the Sambre,
while the remainder was posted in reserve between Fleurus and the
Sambre; and his Left Brigade (the Fourth) was extended along this river
nearly as far as Namur. The Reserve Cavalry of the First Corps had
been brought more in advance, and was now cantoned in the vicinity of
the Piéton, having Gosselies for its point of concentration.
In this position, ZIETEN, without making the slightest alteration,
remained fully prepared for the expected attack on the morrow.
* * * * *
While NAPOLEON was occupied in prescribing his intended order of
attack, he received a despatch from Count GÉRARD announcing that
Lieutenant General DE BOURMONT, and Colonels CLOUET and VILLOUTREYS,
attached to the Fourth Corps, had deserted to the Enemy--a circumstance
which induced the Emperor to make some alteration in his dispositions.
The morning of the 15th had scarcely broken, when the French Army
commenced its march towards the Sambre, in three Columns, from the
three bivouacs already mentioned as having been taken up during the
previous night. The Left Column advanced from Solre sur Sambre, by
Thuin, upon Marchienne au Pont; the Centre from Beaumont, by Ham sur
Heure, upon Charleroi; and the Right Column from Philippeville, by
Gerpinnes, upon Châtelet.
As early as half past three o'clock in the morning, the head of the
Left Column came in contact with the Prussian troops in front of
Lobbes, firing upon, and driving in, the Picquets of the 2nd Battalion
of the 1st Regiment of Westphalian Landwehr, commanded by Captain
GILLHAUSEN. This Officer who was well aware that the French troops that
had assembled, the night before, in great force in his front, intended
to attack him in the morning, had posted his Battalion so as to afford
it every advantage to be derived from the hilly and intersected ground
it occupied. The French, however, inclined more to their right, and
joined other troops advancing along the road to Thuin, which lay on
his left. Shortly after, they drove back an advanced Cavalry Picquet;
and, at half past four, commenced a fire from four guns upon the
Outpost of Maladrie, about a mile in front of Thuin.
This cannonade, which announced the opening of the Campaign by the
French, was heard by the Prussian troops forming the Left Wing of
STEINMETZ's Brigade; but the atmosphere, which was extremely thick and
heavy, was most unfavourable for the conveyance of sound; so much so,
that the greater portion of the Right Wing of the Brigade remained for
a considerable time in ignorance of the Enemy's advance.
The firing, however, was distinctly heard at Charleroi; and ZIETEN,
who, by the reports which he forwarded on the 14th to WELLINGTON and
BLÜCHER, had fully prepared these Commanders to expect an attack, lost
no time in communicating to them the important fact, that hostilities
had actually commenced.
Shortly before five o'clock, he despatched _Courier Jägers_ to their
respective Head Quarters, Brussels and Namur, with letters containing
the information that since half past four o'clock, he had heard several
cannon shots fired in his front, and at the time he was writing, the
fire of musketry also, but that he had not yet received any report
from his Outposts. To BLÜCHER he at the same time intimated that he
should direct the whole Corps to fall back into position; and, should
it become absolutely necessary, to concentrate at Fleurus. His report
to the Duke of WELLINGTON arrived in Brussels at nine o'clock in the
morning; that to Prince BLÜCHER reached Namur between eight and nine
o'clock. The former, while it placed the British Commander on the _qui
vive_, did not induce him to adopt any particular measure--he awaited
further and more definite information; but the latter satisfied the
Prussian Field Marshal that he had taken a wise precaution in having
already ordered the concentration of his several Corps in the position
of Sombref.
The Prussian troops at Maladrie checked, for a time, the advance of
the French upon Thuin, and maintained their ground for more than an
hour, with the greatest bravery. They were overpowered, and driven back
upon Thuin. This place was occupied by the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd
Westphalian Landwehr, under Major MONSTERBERG, who, after an obstinate
and gallant resistance, during which the Battalion suffered an immense
loss, was forced to retire, about seven o'clock, upon Montigny, where
he found Lieutenant Colonel WOISKY, with two Squadrons of the 1st West
Prussian Dragoons.
The French succeeded in taking this village, and the retreat was then
continued in good order, under the protection of WOISKY's Dragoons,
towards Marchienne au Pont; but before reaching this place, the latter
were attacked, and completely overthrown by the French Cavalry; and the
Infantry getting into disorder at the same moment were partly cut down,
and many were taken prisoners. Indeed so severe was the loss which the
3rd Battalion of the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr suffered in this retreat,
that the mere handful of men which remained could not possibly be
looked upon as constituting a Battalion in the proper meaning of the
term. It was reduced to a mere skeleton. Lieutenant Colonel WOISKY was
wounded on this occasion; but continued, nevertheless, at the head of
his Dragoons.
Captain GILLHAUSEN, who, as before stated, commanded the Prussian
Battalion posted at Lobbes, as soon as he had satisfied himself that
Thuin was taken, saw the necessity of effecting his own retreat, which
he did, after the lapse of half an hour, drawing in his Picquets, and
occupying the Bridge over the Sambre with one Company. He then fell
back, and occupied the Wood of Sar de Lobbes, where he received an
Order, as soon as the Post of Hoarbes was also taken by the Enemy, to
continue his retreat, taking a direction between Fontaine l'Evêque and
Anderlues.
The Post at Abbaye d'Alnes, occupied by the 3rd Battalion of the 1st
Westphalian Landwehr, under the temporary command of Captain GROLLMANN,
also fell into the hands of the French, between eight and nine o'clock.
As soon as the Commander of the First Prussian Brigade--General
STEINMETZ--was made acquainted with the attack upon his most Advanced
Posts along the Sambre, he despatched an Officer of his Staff--Major
ARNAULD--to the Dutch-Belgian General VAN MERLEN at St Symphorien,
situated on the road between Binche and Mons, to make him fully
acquainted with what had taken place, and with the fact that his
Brigade was falling back into position. On his way, Major ARNAULD
directed Major ENGELHARDT, who commanded the Outposts on the right, to
lose not a moment in withdrawing the chain of Picquets; and on arriving
at Binche, he spread the alarm that the French had attacked, and that
the Left of the Brigade was warmly engaged, which rendered it necessary
that the Right should retire with the utmost expedition. Until this
Officer's arrival, the Prussian troops in this quarter were wholly
ignorant of the attack; the state of the atmosphere, to which allusion
has already been made, having prevented their hearing the slightest
sound of any firing. They had a much greater extent of ground to pass
over in retreat than the rest of the Brigade, and yet, by the above
unfortunate circumstance, they were the last to retire.
ZIETEN, having ascertained, about eight o'clock, that the whole
French Army appeared to be in motion, and that the direction of the
advance of its Columns seemed to indicate the probability of Charleroi
and its vicinity being the main object of the attack, sent out the
necessary Orders to his Brigades. The First was to retire by Courcelles
to the position in rear of Gosselies; the Second was to defend the
three Bridges over the Sambre, at Marchienne au Pont, Charleroi, and
Châtelet, for a time sufficient to enable the First Brigade to effect
its retreat towards Gosselies, and thus to prevent its being cut off
by the Enemy, after which it was to retire behind Gilly; the Third and
Fourth Brigades, as also the Reserve Cavalry and Artillery, were to
concentrate as rapidly as possible, and to take up a position in rear
of Fleurus.
The three points by which the First Brigade was to fall back, were Mont
St Aldegonde, for the troops on the right, Anderlues for those in the
centre, and Fontaine l'Evêque for the left. In order that they might
reach these three points about the same time, ZIETEN ordered that those
in front of Fontaine l'Evêque should yield their ground as slowly as
the Enemy's attack would admit. Having reached the line of these three
points, about ten o'clock, the Brigade commenced its further retreat
towards Courcelles, having its proper Left protected by a separate
Column consisting of the 1st Regiment of Westphalian Landwehr and two
Companies of Silesian Rifles, led by Colonel HOFFMANN, in the direction
of Roux and Jumet, towards Gosselies.
At Marchienne au Pont stood the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Prussian
Regiment, belonging to the Second Brigade of ZIETEN's Corps. The Bridge
was barricaded, and with the aid of two guns, resolutely maintained
against several attacks; after which these troops commenced their
retreat upon Gilly, by Dampremy. In the latter place were three
Companies of the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Westphalian
Landwehr, with four guns. These also retired about the same time
towards Gilly, the guns protecting the retreat by their fire from the
Churchyard; after which they moved off as rapidly as possible towards
Gilly, while the Battalion marched upon Fleurus; but the 4th Company,
which defended the Bridge of La Roux until Charleroi was taken, was too
late to rejoin the latter, and therefore attached itself to the First
Brigade, which was retreating by its Right Flank.
* * * * *
Lieutenant General Count PAJOL's Corps of Light Cavalry formed the
Advanced Guard of the Centre Column of the French Army: it was to have
been supported by VANDAMME's Corps of Infantry, but by some mistake,
this General had not received his Orders, and at six o'clock in the
morning had not quitted his bivouac. NAPOLEON, perceiving the error,
led forward the Imperial Guards in immediate support of PAJOL. As the
latter advanced, the Prussian Outposts, though hard pressed, retired,
skirmishing in good order. At Couillet, on the Sambre, about a mile and
a half below Charleroi, the French Cavalry fell upon a Company of the
3rd Battalion of the 28th Prussian Regiment, surrounded it, and forced
it to surrender.
Immediately afterwards, the French gained possession of Marcinelles,
a village quite close to Charleroi, and connected with this town by a
dike 300 paces in length, terminating at a Bridge, the head of which
was palisaded. Along this dike the French Cavalry ventured to advance,
but was suddenly driven back by the Prussian Skirmishers, who lined the
hedges and ditches intersecting the opposite slope of the embankment;
a part of the village was retaken, and an attempt made to destroy the
Bridge. The French, however, having renewed the attack with increased
force, succeeded in finally carrying both the dike and the Bridge, and
by this means effected their entrance into Charleroi. Major ROHR, who
commanded this Post, now felt himself under the necessity of effecting
his retreat with the 1st Battalion of the 6th Prussian Regiment,
towards the preconcerted position in rear of Gilly, which he did in
good order, though hotly pursued by Detachments of PAJOL's Dragoons.
By eleven o'clock, the French were in full possession of Charleroi, as
also of both banks of the Sambre above the town, and REILLE's Corps was
effecting its passage over the river at Marchienne au Pont.
The right Column of the French Army, commanded by Count GÉRARD, having
a longer distance to traverse, had not yet reached its destined point,
Châtelet on the Sambre.
* * * * *
The Fourth Brigade of ZIETEN's Corps, as also the advanced portion of
the Third, continued their retreat towards Fleurus; General JAGOW, who
commanded the latter, having left the two Silesian Rifle Companies and
the Fusilier Battalion[8] of the 7th Prussian Regiment at Farciennes
and Tamines, for the purpose of watching the points of passage across
the Sambre, and of protecting the Left Flank of the position at Gilly.
But, from the moment the French made themselves masters of Charleroi,
and of the left bank of the Sambre above that town, the situation of
the First Brigade under General STEINMETZ became extremely critical.
ZIETEN immediately ordered General JAGOW, whose Brigade was in
reserve, to detach Colonel RÜCHEL with the 29th Regiment of Infantry
to Gosselies, for the purpose of facilitating General STEINMETZ's
retreat. The Colonel found that General RÖDER (commanding the Reserve
Cavalry of the Corps) had posted there the 6th Regiment of Prussian
Uhlans (Lancers) under Lieutenant Colonel LÜTZOW, to whom he confided
the defence of Gosselies, which he occupied with the 2nd Battalion of
the 29th Regiment, while he placed himself in reserve with the other
two Battalions.
As soon as the French had assembled in sufficient force at Charleroi,
NAPOLEON ordered Count PAJOL to detach General CLARY's Brigade towards
Gosselies, and to advance with the remainder of the First Corps of
Reserve Cavalry towards Gilly. General CLARY, with the 1st French
Hussars, reached Jumet, on the left of the Brussels road, and only
but little more than a mile from Gosselies, before the First Prussian
Brigade had crossed the Piéton. He now advanced to attack Gosselies,
but was met by Lieutenant Colonel LÜTZOW and his Dragoons, who defeated
and repulsed him, and thus secured for General STEINMETZ time to
pass the Piéton; and as soon as the latter had turned the Defile of
Gosselies, Colonel RÜCHEL with the 29th Regiment moved off to rejoin
the Third Brigade.
The check thus experienced by General CLARY led to his being supported
by Lieutenant General LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTES, with the Light Cavalry
of the Guard and the two Batteries attached to this force; and a
Regiment from Lieutenant General DUHESME's Division of the Young Guard
was advanced midway between Charleroi and Gosselies as a Reserve to
LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTES. The Advanced Guard of REILLE's Corps, which had
crossed the Sambre at Marchienne au Pont, was also moving directly upon
Gosselies, with the design both of cutting off the retreat of ZIETEN's
troops along the Brussels road, and of separating the Prussians from
the Anglo-Allied Army. D'ERLON's Corps, which was considerably in the
rear, received orders to follow and support REILLE.
General STEINMETZ, upon approaching Gosselies, and perceiving the
strength of the Enemy and the consequent danger of being completely
cut off, with the utmost promptitude and decision directed the 2nd
Battalion of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr to march against the Enemy's
Left Flank, with a view to divert his attention and to check his
advance, while, protected by the 6th Lancers and the 1st Silesian
Hussars, he continued his retreat towards Heppignies. This plan was
attended with complete success; and STEINMETZ reached Heppignies
with scarcely any loss, followed by General GIRARD at the head of
the Seventh Division of the Second French _Corps d'Armée_, with the
remainder of which REILLE continued his advance along the Brussels
road. Heppignies was already occupied by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions
of the 12th Prussian Regiment, and with this increase of strength
STEINMETZ drew up in order of battle, and upon GIRARD's attempting to
force the place, after having previously occupied Ransart, he advanced
against him, and drove him back in the direction of Gosselies. A brisk
cannonade ensued, which was maintained on the part of the Prussians,
only so long as it was deemed necessary for covering their retreat upon
Fleurus.
* * * * *
In conformity with ZIETEN's Orders, General PIRCH II., when forced to
abandon Charleroi, retired to Gilly, where, having concentrated the
Second Brigade, about two o'clock, he took up a favourable position
along a ridge in rear of a rivulet; his Right resting upon the Abbey
of Soleilmont, his Left extending towards Châtelineau, which Flank
was also protected by a Detachment occupying the Bridge of Châtelet,
GÉRARD's Corps not having as yet arrived at that point. He posted the
Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Regiment in a small Wood which lay in
advance on the exterior slope of the ridge; four guns on the right,
upon an eminence commanding the valley in front; two guns between this
point and the Fleurus road, as also two guns on the right of the road,
to impede as much as possible the advance of any Columns towards Gilly.
The Sharp Shooters of the Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Regiment, by
lining some adjacent hedges, afforded protection to the Artillery. The
2nd Battalion of the 28th Regiment was stationed beyond the Fleurus
road, near the Abbey of Soleilmont, in such a manner as to be concealed
from the Enemy. The 1st Battalion of this Regiment stood across the
road leading to Lambusart; and its Fusilier Battalion was posted more
to the left, towards Châtelet. The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Westphalian
Landwehr was posted in support of the Battery in rear of Gilly. The
1st Battalion of this Regiment, previously mentioned as on the march
from Dampremy to Fleurus, passed through Lodelinsart and Soleilmont,
and rejoined the Brigade in rear of Gilly, before the affair had
terminated. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 6th Regiment formed the
Reserve. The 1st West Prussian Dragoons were posted on the declivity
of the ridge towards Châtelet: they furnished the Advanced Posts, and
patrolled the valley of the Sambre, maintaining the communication with
the Detachment at Farciennes, belonging to the Third Brigade.
General PIRCH, foreseeing that in the event of the Enemy succeeding
in turning his Right, a rapid advance along the Fleurus road would be
the means of greatly molesting, if not of seriously endangering, his
retreat upon Lambusart, took the precaution of having this road blocked
up by an _abatis_ in the Wood through which it led.
VANDAMMME did not reach Charleroi until three o'clock in the afternoon,
when he received Orders to pursue the Prussians, in conjunction with
GROUCHY, along the Fleurus road. It was, however, a considerable
time before any advance was made. In the first place, the whole of
VANDAMME's Corps had to cross the Sambre by a single Bridge; secondly,
both Generals were deceived by exaggerated reports concerning the
strength of the Prussians in rear of the Fleurus Woods; and GROUCHY
who had gone forward to reconnoitre, returned to the Emperor with
a request for further instructions. Upon this, NAPOLEON undertook
a reconnaissance in person, accompanied by the four Squadrons _de
Service_; and having formed an opinion that the amount of force in
question did not exceed 18, or 20,000 men, he gave his Orders for the
attack of General PIRCH's Brigade.
The French Generals having directed their preparatory dispositions
from the Windmill near the Farm of Grand Drieu, opened the engagement
about six o'clock in the evening, with a fire from two Batteries. Three
Columns of Infantry advanced in echelon from the right, the first
directing its course towards the little Wood occupied by the Fusilier
Battalion of the 6th Prussian Regiment; the second passing to the right
of Gilly; and the third winding round the left of this Village. The
attack was supported by two Brigades of General EXCELMANS' Cavalry
Corps, namely, those of Generals BOURTHE and BONNEMAIN; of which one
was directed towards Châtelet, thus menacing the Prussian Left Flank,
and the other advanced along the Fleurus road.
The Battery attached to the Second Prussian Brigade was in the act
of replying with great spirit to the superior fire from the French
Artillery, and the Light Troops were already engaged, when General
PIRCH received ZIETEN's Orders to avoid an action against superior
numbers, and to retire by Lambusart upon Fleurus.
Perceiving the formidable advance and overwhelming force of the
Enemy, he did not hesitate a moment in carrying those Orders into
effect, and made his dispositions accordingly; but the retreat had
scarcely commenced when his Battalions were vigorously assailed by the
French Cavalry. NAPOLEON, in the hope of profiting by this retrograde
movement, sent against the retreating Columns the four Squadrons _de
Service_ of the Guard, under General LETORT, a distinguished Cavalry
Officer attached to his Staff. The Prussian Infantry withstood the
repeated attacks of the French Cavalry with undaunted bravery, and
aided by the gallant exertions of Lieutenant Colonel WOISKY, who
boldly met the Enemy with the 1st West Prussian Dragoons, and checked
his progress, the greater part of it succeeded in gaining the Wood of
Fleurus. The Fusilier Battalion of the 28th Regiment (of which it will
be recollected, one Company had previously been captured on the right
bank of the Sambre) was the only Column broken on this occasion. It had
been ordered to retire into the Wood by Rondchamp, but before it could
complete the movement, it was overtaken by the Enemy's Cavalry, by
which it was furiously assailed, and suffered a loss of two thirds of
its number.
The Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Regiment was more fortunate. When
about five hundred paces from the Wood, it was attacked by the Enemy's
Cavalry on the plain, but forming Square, and reserving its fire until
the French horsemen had approached within twenty or thirty paces, it
gallantly repelled several charges. As the vigour with which these
attacks were made began to slacken, the Battalion cleared its way with
the bayonet through the Cavalry that continued hovering round it. One
of its Companies immediately extended itself along the edge of the
wood, and kept the French Cavalry at bay. The latter suffered severely
on this occasion, and General LETORT who led the attacks was mortally
wounded.
The Brandenburg Dragoons had been detached by ZIETEN in support of
PIRCH's Brigade, and opportunely reaching the Field of Action, made
several charges against the French Cavalry, which they repulsed and
compelled to relinquish its pursuit.
PIRCH's Brigade now took up a position in front of Lambusart, which
was occupied by some Battalions of the Third Brigade, and General
RÖDER joined it with his remaining three Regiments of Cavalry and a
Battery of Horse Artillery. At this moment, the French Cavalry, which
was formed up in position, opened a fire from three Batteries of Horse
Artillery, and thus brought on a cannonade, with which, however, the
affair terminated.
The First Prussian Brigade having safely executed its retreat from
Heppignies, towards Fleurus, reached St Amand about eleven o'clock at
night.
The Detachments left by the Third Brigade at Farciennes and Tamines,
had been previously called in, and effected their retreat without
any molestation, as did also, subsequently, the Second Brigade from
Lambusart, by Boulet, towards Fleurus, protected by the Reserve Cavalry.
ZIETEN's Corps, at three o'clock in the morning had possessed a line
of Advanced Posts, from Dinant on the Meuse, crossing the Sambre
at Thuin, and extending as far as Bonne Esperance, in advance of
Binche; thus stretching along a space of from forty to fifty miles in
length: its main force occupied the Sambre from Thuin as far as its
confluence with the Meuse, an extent of, at least, thirty six miles,
exclusive of the numerous windings throughout the whole course of the
river between those two points. The men had, since daybreak, been
constantly under arms, in motion, and almost as constantly engaged,
pursued, and assailed upon all points by an overwhelming superiority
of force, headed by the _élite_ of the French Cavalry; and it was
not until about eleven o'clock at night that the Corps effected its
concentration in position between Ligny and St Amand, at a distance
varying from fourteen to twenty miles in rear of its original extended
line of Outposts; after having successfully and gloriously fulfilled
the arduous task imposed upon it of gaining sufficient time for the
concentration, on the following day, of all the Prussian Corps, by
stemming, as well as its scattered force would admit, the imposing
advance of the whole French Army.
The loss of the First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ on the 15th of June,
amounted to 1200 men. The Fusilier Battalions of the 28th Regiment
and of the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr, reduced to mere skeletons, were
united, and formed into one Battalion.
Before ten o'clock on the morning of the 15th, a further Order was
despatched from the Prussian Head Quarters to the Third _Corps
d'Armée_, to the effect that after resting during the night at Namur,
it was to continue its march upon the morning of the 16th, towards
Sombref.
At half past eleven o'clock in the forenoon a despatch was forwarded to
BÜLOW, announcing the advance of the French, and requesting that the
Corps after having rested at Hannut, should commence its march upon
Gembloux by daybreak of the 16th, at the latest.
By three o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th, the Second _Corps
d'Armée_ had taken up the position assigned to it between Onoz and Mazy
in the immediate vicinity of Sombref, with the exception, however, of
the Seventh Brigade, which, having been stationed in the most remote of
the Quarters occupied by the Corps, did not reach Namur until midnight.
Here the latter found an Order for its continuance in Namur until the
arrival of the Third _Corps d'Armée_; but as this had already taken
place, the Brigade, after a few hours' rest, resumed its march, and
joined its Corps at Sombref about ten o'clock in the morning of the
16th June.
THIELEMANN passed the night at Namur, which he occupied with the Tenth
Brigade; the Ninth Brigade bivouacked on the right, and the Eleventh
on the left, of Belgrade, a village at a short distance from the town,
on the road to Sombref; the Twelfth Brigade in rear of the Ninth; the
Reserve Cavalry at Flavinne, between that road and the Sambre; and the
Reserve Artillery on the left of the road.
* * * * *
It has already been explained that on the 14th, BLÜCHER sent off a
despatch to BÜLOW desiring him to make such a disposition of his Corps
as should enable his troops to reach Hannut in one march; and that at
midnight of the 14th, a second despatch was forwarded, requiring him to
concentrate the Fourth Corps at Hannut. The first of these despatches
reached BÜLOW, at Liege, at five o'clock on the morning of the 15th;
when he issued the necessary Orders with an instruction that they
should be acted upon as soon as the troops had dined, and forwarded a
report of this arrangement to Head Quarters. These Orders to his troops
had been despatched some hours, and the consequent movements were for
the most part in operation, when, towards noon, the second despatch
arrived. BÜLOW, considering the effect which the change required by
this new Order would have upon the troops, inasmuch as their reception
was prepared in quarters to which, in this case, they would no longer
proceed, and they would have nothing provided for them in the destined
bivouac near Hannut, also as a great proportion of them could not
receive the Orders for the change in the direction of their march until
evening, decided upon deferring the new movement until daybreak of the
16th. The despatch, moreover, did not require him to establish his
Head Quarters at Hannut, but merely suggested that the latter appeared
the most suitable for the purpose. The General was, besides, perfectly
unconscious of the commencement of hostilities, which, indeed, he
had expected would be preceded by a Declaration of War; and he had
also good grounds for an opinion which he had formed that it was in
contemplation to assemble the whole Army at Hannut.
He made a report to Head Quarters of his reasons for deferring the
execution of the Order, with the intimation that he would be at Hannut
by midday of the 16th. Captain BELOW, on BÜLOW's Staff, who carried
this despatch, arrived at nine o'clock in the evening of the 15th at
Namur, where he discovered that the Head Quarters of the Army had been
transferred to Sombref.
At half past eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 15th, another
despatch was forwarded to BÜLOW from Namur, announcing the advance
of the French, and requesting that the Fourth Corps, after having
rested at Hannut, should commence its march upon Gembloux, by daybreak
of the 16th at latest. The Orderly who carried it was directed to
proceed to Hannut, the presumed Head Quarters of BÜLOW's Corps on that
day. On reaching that place, the Orderly found the previous despatch
lying in readiness for the General, and, mounting a fresh horse,
he then went on with both despatches to Liege, where he arrived at
sunrise. The Orders which they contained had now, however, become
impracticable, in consequence of BÜLOW's not having immediately carried
into effect the _first_ Order to collect at Hannut; and thus by one
of those mischances, which, in war, occasionally mar the best planned
operations, the opportune arrival of the Fourth Prussian Corps at the
Battle of Ligny, which would, in all probability, have changed the
aspect of affairs, was rendered a matter of impossibility.
Late in the evening, and after Prince BLÜCHER had established his Head
Quarters at Sombref, Captain BELOW arrived with the before mentioned
report from Count BÜLOW; on receiving which his Highness was made
sensible that he could no longer calculate with certainty upon being
joined by the Fourth Corps on the following day.
* * * * *
It was seven o'clock in the evening of the 15th, when Marshal NEY,
who had just arrived, joined the Emperor near Charleroi, at the point
where the road to Fleurus branches off from the one to Brussels. Having
expressed the pleasure he felt at seeing him, NAPOLEON gave him the
command of the First and Second _Corps d'Armée_; explaining at the same
time that REILLE was advancing with three Divisions upon Gosselies;
that D'ERLON would pass the night at Marchienne au Pont; that he would
find under his orders PIRÉ's Light Cavalry Division; as also the two
Regiments of _Chasseurs_ and Lancers of the Guard, of which, however,
he was not to make use except as a Reserve. "Tomorrow," added the
Emperor, "you will be joined by the Reserve Corps of Heavy Cavalry
under KELLERMANN. Go and drive back the Enemy."
* * * * *
It has already been shown in the preceding Chapter, that the extreme
Left of the Duke of WELLINGTON's Army, composed of DE PERPONCHER's
Second Dutch-Belgian Division, rested upon the Charleroi road to
Brussels. The Second Brigade of this Division, under Colonel GÖDECKE,
was thus located:--1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau, at
Hautain le Val; the 2nd Battalion, at Frasne and Villers Peruin;
the 3rd Battalion, at Bezy, Sart à Mavelines, and Quatre Bras; both
Battalions of the Regiment of Orange-Nassau, at Genappe. There was also
at Frasne a Dutch Battery of Horse Artillery, under Captain BYLEVELD.
Early on the morning of the 15th, these troops were lying quietly in
their cantonments, perfectly unconscious of the advance of the French
Army, when they heard a brisk cannonade at a distance in the direction
of Charleroi; but not having received the slightest intimation of the
Enemy's approach, they concluded that the firing proceeded from the
Prussian Artillery practice, which they had frequently heard before,
and to which they had therefore become accustomed. Gradually towards
noon, however, the cannonade became more distinctly audible; and, in
the afternoon, the arrival of a wounded Prussian soldier completely
set at rest all doubt as to the advance of the French. An Orderly was
immediately despatched with the intelligence to the Regimental Head
Quarters, whence it was also communicated to General DE PERPONCHER's
Head Quarters at Nivelles.
In the meantime, Major NORMANN, who commanded the 2nd Battalion of the
2nd Regiment of Nassau, drew up the latter with the Battery in position
in rear of Frasne, and upon the road to Quatre Bras, after having
posted a Picquet of observation in advance of the village.
PERPONCHER lost not a moment in ordering both Brigades of his Division
to hasten towards their respective points of assembly; the 1st Brigade,
under General BYLANDT, to Nivelles, and the 2nd, under Colonel GÖDECKE,
to Quatre Bras.
Before this Order, however, could possibly reach these troops, Prince
BERNHARD of Saxe Weimar, who commanded the Regiment of Orange-Nassau,
at Genappe, having been informed by the Officer of the Dutch-Belgian
_Maréchaussées_, who had been compelled to quit his post at Charleroi,
that the French were advancing from that place, took upon himself to
move forward with the above Regiment from Genappe to Quatre Bras,
and despatched a report of such movement to the Head Quarters of
the Brigade at Hautain le Val, as also, subsequently, to General DE
PERPONCHER at Nivelles, by Captain GAGERN, of the Dutch-Belgian Staff,
who happened to be just then at Genappe, for the purpose of collecting
information.
About six o'clock in the evening, parties of Lancers belonging to
PIRÉ's Light Cavalry Division of REILLE's Corps appeared in front of
Frasne, and soon drove in Major NORMANN's Picquet.
This Officer placed a Company on the south or French side of Frasne,
for the purpose of preventing as long as possible the entrance of the
French into the Village. BYLEVELD's Battery took post on the north side
of the Village, and the remaining Companies of the 2nd Battalion of
the 2nd Regiment of Nassau drew up in its support. Two guns were upon
the road, and three on each side of it. After some time, the Lancers,
having been reinforced, compelled the Company before mentioned to
retire through the Village and fall back upon the main body, which
then opened a vigorous fire, by which this front attack by the French
Cavalry was defeated. The latter then made a disposition to turn the
Left Flank of these troops; on perceiving which Major NORMANN and
Captain BYLEVELD resolved upon falling back to within a short distance
in front of Quatre Bras. The retreat was conducted in excellent order,
the Battery continuing to fire along the high road.
Quatre Bras was the _rendezvous_ of the Second Brigade; and the 3rd
Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau, which was cantoned in its
immediate vicinity, had already, without waiting for the receipt of
superior Orders, assembled at that point. Prince BERNHARD, on arriving
there with the Regiment of Orange-Nassau, and learning the particulars
of the engagement at Frasne, assumed the command as Senior Officer,
and being fully impressed with the importance of securing the point of
junction of the high road from Charleroi to Brussels, with that from
Namur to Nivelles, came to the resolution of making a firm stand at
Quatre Bras. This decision accorded entirely with the spirit of the
Orders which had in the meantime been despatched from Braine le Comte,
the Dutch-Belgian Head Quarters, on the receipt of intelligence of the
French having crossed the Sambre. General DE PERPONCHER, who commanded
the Division, had also approved of the Prince's determination, and
Colonel GÖDECKE who was at Hautain le Val, and who had hitherto
commanded the Second Brigade, now tendered his command to his Serene
Highness, who immediately accepted it.
The Prince pushed forward the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of
Nassau, in Column, upon the high road towards Frasne, detached two
Companies of the 1st Battalion, and the Volunteer _Jägers_, to the
defence of the Wood of Bossu, and the remaining Companies on the high
road towards Hautain le Val; and posted the remainder of the Brigade at
Quatre Bras, along the Namur road. Of BYLEVELD's Horse Battery, four
guns were posted in advance in the direction of Frasne, two on the road
to Namur, and two in rear of the main body.
By the determined show of resistance which his Serene Highness
displayed, as well as by the vigorous cannonade which he maintained,
PIRÉ's Advanced Guard, the Left Flank of which became endangered by the
Dutch occupying the Wood of Bossu, was forced to retire in its turn,
which it did unmolested, and brought back intelligence that Quatre Bras
was occupied by ten Battalions with Artillery, and that WELLINGTON's
troops were moving to concentrate at this important point.
At ten o'clock at night, NEY's forces were thus disposed:--PIRÉ's Light
Cavalry Division and BACHELU's Infantry Division occupied Frasne, a
village situated upon the Brussels road, about two miles and a half on
the French side of Quatre Bras; the two Regiments of _Chasseurs_ and
Lancers of the Guard were in reserve in rear of Frasne; REILLE was with
two Divisions, and the Artillery attached to them, at Gosselies: these
Divisions ensured the communication until the arrival of D'ERLON's
Corps, which was to remain that night at Marchienne au Pont. The
remaining Division of REILLE's Corps (GIRARD's) was at Heppignies,
and thus served to maintain the communication with the Main Column
under NAPOLEON. The troops were greatly fatigued by having been kept
constantly on the march since three o'clock in the morning; the
strength of the different Regiments, the names of their Colonels, and
even of the Generals, were unknown to the Marshal, as also the number
of men that had been able to keep up with the heads of the Columns at
the end of this long march.
These circumstances, combined with the information brought in from
Quatre Bras, induced NEY to decline risking a night attack upon that
point; and he contented himself with taking up a position in advance of
Frasne. Having issued such Orders as he deemed essential, and enjoined
the most vigilant look out, he returned to Charleroi, where he arrived
about midnight; partook of supper with NAPOLEON (who had just arrived
from the Right Wing of the Army), and conferred with the Emperor upon
the state of affairs until two o'clock in the morning.
* * * * *
The first intimation which the Duke of WELLINGTON received on the 15th,
of hostilities having commenced, was conveyed in the report already
alluded to, as having been forwarded by General ZIETEN, shortly before
five o'clock in the morning, and as having reached Brussels at nine
o'clock. It was not, however, of a nature to enable the Duke to form an
opinion as to any real attack being contemplated by the Enemy in that
quarter. It simply announced that the Prussian Outposts in front of
Charleroi were engaged. It might be the commencement of a real attack
in this direction, but it might also be a diversion in favour of an
attack in some other direction, such as Mons. In fact, until further
information was received, it could only be considered in the light of
an affair of Outposts.
Not long after three o'clock in the afternoon, the Prince of ORANGE
arrived in Brussels, and informed the Duke that the Prussian Outposts
had been attacked and forced to fall back. His Royal Highness had
ridden to the front at five o'clock in the morning, from Braine le
Comte, and had a personal interview at St Symphorien, with General VAN
MERLEN, whose troops were on the immediate right of the Prussians,
who had retired. After having given to this General Verbal Orders
respecting his Brigade, the Prince left the Outposts between nine and
ten o'clock, and repaired to Brussels to communicate to the Duke all
the information he had obtained respecting the Enemy's attack upon the
Prussian Advanced Posts.
This, however, was not sufficiently conclusive to induce his Grace to
resolve upon any immediate step; but, in about an hour afterwards,
that is, about half past four, General VON MÜFFLING, the Prussian
Officer attached to the British Head Quarters, waited upon the Duke
with a communication which had been despatched from Namur by Prince
BLÜCHER at noon, conveying the intelligence that the French had
attacked the Prussian Posts at Thuin and Lobbes on the Sambre, and
that they appeared to be advancing in the direction of Charleroi. The
Duke was fully prepared for this intelligence, though uncertain how
soon it might arrive. The reports which had been made to him from
the Outposts, especially from those of the 1st Hussars of the King's
German Legion, stationed in the vicinity of Mons and Tournai, gave
sufficient indication that the Enemy was concentrating his forces. But,
as observed in the preceding Chapter, his Grace was determined to make
no movement until the real line of attack should become manifest; and
hence it was, that if the attack had been made even at a later period,
his dispositions would have remained precisely the same.
The Duke at once gave Orders for the whole of his troops to assemble at
the Head Quarters of their respective Divisions and to hold themselves
in immediate readiness to march. At the same time an express was
despatched to Major General DÖRNBERG, requiring information concerning
any movement that might have been made on the part of the Enemy in the
direction of Mons.
The following were the movements ordered by the Duke. Upon the
Left of the Army, which was nearest to the presumed point of
attack--PERPONCHER's and CHASSÉ's Dutch-Belgian Divisions were to
be assembled that night at Nivelles, on which point ALTEN's British
Division (the Third) was to march as soon as collected at Braine le
Comte; but this movement was not to be made until the Enemy's attack
upon the Right of the Prussian Army and the Left of the Allied Army had
become a matter of certainty. COOKE's British Division (the First) was
to be collected that night at Enghien, and to be in readiness to move
at a moment's notice.
Along the central portion of the Army--CLINTON's British Division (the
Second) was to be assembled that night at Ath, and to be in readiness
also to move at a moment's notice. COLVILLE's British Division (the
Fourth) was to be collected that night at Grammont, with the exception
of the troops beyond the Scheldt, which were to be moved to Audenarde.
Upon the Right of the Army--STEDMANN's Dutch-Belgian Division, and
ANTHING's Dutch-Belgian (Indian) Brigade were, after occupying
Audenarde with 500 men, to be assembled at Sotteghem, so as to be ready
to march in the morning.
The Cavalry were to be collected that night at Ninhove, with the
exception of the 2nd Hussars of the King's German Legion, who were
to remain on the look out between the Scheldt and the Lys; and of
DÖRNBERG's Brigade, with the Cumberland Hussars, which were to march
that night upon Vilvorde, and to bivouac on the high road near to that
town.
The Reserve was thus disposed--PICTON's British Division (the Fifth),
the 81st British Regiment, and BEST's Hanoverian Brigade (of COLE's
Division), were to be in readiness to march from Brussels at a moment's
notice. VINCKE's Hanoverian Brigade (of PICTON's Division) was to be
collected that night at Hal, and to be in readiness at daylight on the
following morning to move towards Brussels, and to halt on the road
between Alost and Assche for further orders. The Duke of BRUNSWICK's
Corps was to be collected that night on the high road between Brussels
and Vilvorde. KRUSE's Nassau Brigade was to be collected at daylight on
the following morning upon the Louvain road, and to be in readiness to
move at a moment's notice. The Reserve Artillery was to be in readiness
to move at daylight.
* * * * *
It was ten o'clock at night when the first intelligence of the attack
made by the French in the direction of Frasne, was received at the
Prince of ORANGE's Head Quarters, at Braine le Comte. It was carried
by Captain GAGERN, who, as previously mentioned (see page 70), had
been despatched by Prince BERNHARD of Saxe Weimar, with his Serene
Highness's report of the affair, to General PERPONCHER at Nivelles,
and who was subsequently sent on by the General, with this information
to the above Head Quarters. Lieutenant WEBSTER, Aide de Camp to the
Prince of ORANGE, started soon afterwards for Brussels, with a report
from the Dutch-Belgian Quartermaster General, DE CONSTANT REBECQUE,
stating what had taken place, and detailing the measures which he had
thought proper to adopt. These measures did not entirely coincide with
the instructions above given, as issued by the Duke, because they
were consequent upon the affair at Frasne, with which his Grace at
that time was unacquainted; but they were perfectly consistent with
the spirit of those instructions, inasmuch as they were not adopted
"until the Enemy's attack upon the Right of the Prussian Army, and the
Left of the Allied Army had become a matter of certainty." The Enemy's
advance along the Charleroi road had already been successfully checked
at Quatre Bras, and the necessity of immediately collecting at this
important point, the troops ordered by the Duke "to be assembled that
night at Nivelles" was too obvious to be mistaken.
* * * * *
A little before ten o'clock on the same evening, a further
communication reached the Duke from Prince BLÜCHER, announcing the
crossing of the Sambre by the French Army, headed by NAPOLEON in
person; and the required intelligence from other quarters having
arrived almost at the same moment, and confirmed him in the opinion
"that the Enemy's movement upon Charleroi was the real attack," he
issued, at ten o'clock P.M., the following Orders for the march of his
troops to their Left:--ALTEN's Division to continue its movement from
Braine le Comte upon Nivelles. COOKE's Division to move from Enghien
upon Braine le Comte. CLINTON's and COLVILLE's Divisions to move from
Ath, Grammont, and Audenarde, upon Enghien. The Cavalry to continue its
movement from Ninhove upon Enghien.
* * * * *
The disposition of the French Left Column, under NEY, during the night
of the 15th, has already been shown. The Centre Column of the French
Army was thus located--VANDAMME's Corps bivouacked in the Wood of
Fleurus; PAJOL's Corps of Light Cavalry at Lambusart; the Third Light
Cavalry Division, under DOMON, on the left, at the outlet of the Wood,
and the Heavy Cavalry Corps of EXCELMANS between the Light Cavalry
and VANDAMME; the Guards bivouacked between Charleroi and Gilly; and
LOBAU's Corps, together with MILHAUD's Heavy Cavalry Corps, lay in
rear of Charleroi. The Right Column, consisting of GÉRARD's Corps,
bivouacked in front of the Bridge of Châtelet, which point it had
reached during the evening.
* * * * *
The result of the proceedings on the 15th was highly favourable
to NAPOLEON. He had completely effected the passage of the Sambre;
he was operating with the main portion of his forces directly upon
the preconcerted point of concentration of BLÜCHER's Army, and was
already in the immediate front of the chosen position, before that
concentration could be accomplished; he was also operating with another
portion upon the high road to Brussels, and had come in contact with
the Left of WELLINGTON's troops; he had also placed himself so far in
advance upon this line, that even a partial junction of the forces
of the Allied Commanders was already rendered a hazardous operation,
without a previous retrograde movement; and he thus had it in his power
to bring the principal weight of his arms against the one, whilst, with
the remainder of his force, he held the other at bay. This formed the
grand object of his operations on the morrow.
But however excellent, or even perfect, this plan of operation may
appear in theory, still there were other circumstances, which, if
taken into consideration, would scarcely seem to warrant a well
grounded anticipation of a successful issue. NAPOLEON's troops had been
constantly under arms, marching, and fighting, since two o'clock in the
morning, the hour at which they broke up from their position at Solre
sur Sambre, Beaumont, and Philippeville, within the French frontier:
they required time for rest and refreshment; they lay widely scattered
between their Advanced Posts and the Sambre; NEY's forces were in
detached bodies from Frasne as far as Marchienne au Pont, the halting
place of D'ERLON's Corps; and although VANDAMME's Corps was in the Wood
of Fleurus, LOBAU's Corps and the Guards were halted at Charleroi, and
GÉRARD's Corps at Châtelet. Hence, instead of an imposing advance, with
the first glimmering of the dawn of the 16th, the whole morning would
necessarily be employed by the French in effecting a closer junction of
their forces, and in making their preparatory dispositions for attack;
an interval of time invaluable to the Allies, by the greater facility
which it afforded them for the concentration of a sufficient force to
hold their Enemy in check, and to frustrate his design of defeating
them in detail.
* * * * *
In taking a calm retrospect of the dispositions made by NAPOLEON on
the night of the 15th of June, we become strongly impressed with a
conviction, that to the laxity of those dispositions, to the absence
which they indicated of that energetic perseverance and restless
activity which characterised the most critical of his operations in
former Wars, may, in a very great degree, be attributed the failure of
the Campaign on the part of the French. The great advantages derived
by NAPOLEON from the result of his operations during the 15th, have
been already set forth; but of what avail were those advantages to
him, if he neglected the requisite measures for effectually retaining
them within his grasp; or if, having secured them, he hesitated in
following them up with the promptitude and energy which their complete
development demanded of him? His position, if judged by that of his
most advanced forces, was all that could be desired; but, by fatally
neglecting to concentrate the remainder of his troops in the immediate
support of that advance, the important advantages which such a position
held forth were completely neutralized. Doubtless the troops required
rest; but, if one portion required it more than another, it was that
which now lay most in advance: they had performed the longest march,
and had withstood, in addition, the whole brunt of the action; so there
was no reason whatever why the remainder of the French Army should not
have been so far advanced as to afford direct support to the important
position taken up by the leading Divisions: that which had been so
successfully effected by the heads of the Columns, might have been
attained with infinitely greater ease and security by the masses which
followed. And even supposing that serious impediments stood in the way
of the full accomplishment of this concentration, such as the usual
delays occasioned by the lengthening out of the Columns of March, to
what did they amount in comparison with so many brilliant instances of
what had been overcome by the noble and heroic efforts of a French Army
headed by NAPOLEON? Had it even required some sacrifice, which at the
most could only have consisted in the temporary diminution of strength,
by the loss of stragglers on the march, what was this when placed in
the balance with the fulfilment of the grand design of NAPOLEON's
invasion of Belgium--preventing the junction of the Allied Armies, and
overthrowing them in detail?
The commencement of this design, in which the essential requisite was
rapidity of movement, had been eminently successful: a vantage ground
had been gained which offered the most encouraging prospect of success:
of BLÜCHER's four Corps, only one, ZIETEN's, had assembled in the
chosen position of Ligny, on the night of the 15th; PIRCH's, which had
arrived from Namur, was in bivouac between Onoz and Mazy, about six
miles from Ligny; THIELEMANN's Corps, which had quitted its cantonments
around Ciney at half past seven o'clock in the morning, passed the
night at Namur, about fifteen miles from Ligny; BÜLOW's Corps, supposed
by BLÜCHER to be then at Hannut, was still at Liege, about sixty miles
distant from Ligny. Between this position of Ligny and that occupied by
the leading Divisions of NAPOLEON's main Army, namely the villages of
Lambusart, Wagnée, and the Wood of Fleurus, there was an interval of
not more than from two to three miles! Hence every thing was favourable
to the French Emperor's plan, which only required to be carried on with
the same vigour and activity that had marked its commencement; the fate
of NAPOLEON, of France, and of Europe, hung upon its issue; not an
hour, not a moment should have been suffered to pass unheeded; and had
the French Right been concentrated during the night in this position,
as also the Left under NEY, between Gosselies and Frasne, and had an
impetuous attack, with overwhelming force, been made not later than
five o'clock on the following morning, upon both ZIETEN's and PIRCH's
Corps, not at that time united, it is very possible that these troops
would have been beaten in detail, that THIELEMANN's Corps, advancing
from Namur, would either have shared the same fate, or have moved off
in the direction of Hannut or Liege to effect a junction with BÜLOW,
whilst NEY would either have been enabled to secure the important point
of Quatre Bras before the arrival of any considerable portion of the
Anglo-Allied troops, or would have held his own force advantageously
disposed for a junction with that of NAPOLEON, on the latter moving to
the left, by the Namur road, for the purpose of bringing the great mass
of his Army against WELLINGTON.
Instead of this, what happened? Of the French Right, its main force
remained the whole night at Charleroi and Châtelet, on the Sambre,
whilst between the Advance of NEY's forces at Frasne and his Rear
at Marchienne au Pont, there was an interval of about twelve miles.
NAPOLEON did not advance towards Fleurus until between eleven and
twelve o'clock on the 16th, by which time ZIETEN's, PIRCH's, and
THIELEMANN's Corps were all concentrated and in position, and he did
not commence the Battle of Ligny until nearly three o'clock in the
afternoon; while NEY, on his side, in consequence of his operations
having been rendered subordinate to those of the Emperor, delayed to
advance with any degree of vigour until between two and three o'clock,
about which time WELLINGTON's Reserve reached Quatre Bras, from
Brussels, and joined the forces then engaged in front of that point!
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 8: The Prussian Regiments of Infantry generally consisted of
three Battalions, of which the Third was the Fusilier Battalion.]
CHAPTER V.
With the early dawn of the 16th of June, the whole of the Duke of
WELLINGTON's forces were in movement towards Nivelles and Quatre
Bras. Previously to starting from Brussels for the latter point, his
Grace despatched an Order for the movement of the Cavalry and of
CLINTON's British Division upon Braine le Comte, as also of the troops
under Prince FREDERICK of the Netherlands, consisting of STEDMANN's
Dutch-Belgian Division, and of ANTHING's Dutch-Belgian (Indian)
Brigade, from Sotteghem to Enghien, after leaving 500 men, as before
directed, in Audenarde.
PICTON's Division quitted Brussels by the Charleroi road about two
o'clock in the morning; and the Duke of BRUNSWICK's Corps somewhat
later. KRUSE's Nassau Brigade received Orders to follow along the
same road, but having been dispersed in extended cantonments between
Brussels and Louvain, it required some considerable time to collect
together, and did not therefore reach Quatre Bras sufficiently early to
take part in the action.
The disposition made by Colonel the Prince BERNHARD of Saxe Weimar
at this point, on the night of the 15th, with the Second Brigade of
PERPONCHER's Dutch-Belgian Division, has already been described.
Soon after ten o'clock on that evening, Major Count LIMBURG STIRUM,
Dutch Aide de Camp to the Prince of ORANGE, left Braine le Comte for
Nivelles, with a Verbal Order from the Dutch-Belgian Quartermaster
General, enjoining General PERPONCHER to hold his ground to the last
extremity, to support his Second Brigade by the First, and even
to ask for aid from the Third Anglo-Allied Division, and from the
Dutch-Belgian Cavalry Division; and, at all events, to send an Officer
to acquaint the Commanders of these Divisions with the state of
affairs. This message appears to have reached Nivelles about midnight.
Previously to this, that is, between nine and ten o'clock in
the evening, Captain CRASSIER's Company of the 27th Battalion
of _Chasseurs_ moved out from Nivelles towards Quatre Bras _en
reconnaissance_. About two o'clock in the morning, PERPONCHER himself
followed with the remainder of the _Chasseurs_, which body reached
Quatre Bras at four o'clock. General BYLANDT, who commanded the First
Brigade, ordered the remaining Battalions of the latter, and his
Artillery, to commence their march from Nivelles at five o'clock. The
7th Dutch Line Battalion was directed to remain at Nivelles until
relieved by ALTEN's Division.
At three o'clock in the morning, PERPONCHER arrived at Quatre Bras,
and after having reconnoitred the position, immediately commenced
operations for recovering the ground lost on the previous evening. Just
at this time a detachment of about fifty Prussian Hussars of the 2nd
Silesian Regiment, under Lieutenant ZEHELIN, who, on the previous day,
had been driven back from near Gosselies, and had retreated towards
Hautain le Val, gallantly advanced to the front, attacked the Enemy's
Outposts, forced them to retire, and then formed a chain of Vedettes.
As soon as the Dutch-Belgian troops had advanced to within a short
distance of these Prussian Hussars, the latter moved off by their left
towards Sombref.
Prince BERNHARD of Saxe Weimar's Brigade penetrated deeper into the
Wood of Bossu, and secured the entrances into it from the French side.
PERPONCHER directed the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau to
take post on an eminence in advance towards Frasne, and stationed the
3rd Battalion of this Regiment more to the left. The latter, however,
was soon relieved by the 27th Chasseurs, which Battalion, on reaching
Quatre Bras, at four o'clock in the morning, had detached two Companies
to the left. These moved steadily forward in extended order towards the
Wood of Delhutte, outside of which the Enemy showed his Light Troops.
They succeeded in forcing back the French into a hollow way bordering
the Wood, where the latter maintained themselves for some little time,
and then retired into the Wood itself. Taking advantage of the cover
afforded by the edge of the Wood, the French now poured a deadly fire
upon their assailants, who retreated to some favourable ground a little
in advance of their Battalion.
The Prince of ORANGE arrived at Quatre Bras about six o'clock, and
immediately reconnoitred the position of the Enemy, and that occupied
by his own troops. Having expressed his perfect satisfaction with
all the arrangements and dispositions which had been made, both on
the previous evening and on that morning, he ordered the troops then
present to take up a position more in advance, for the purpose of
imposing upon the Enemy; enjoining at the same time, all unnecessary
firing, it being desirable under then existing circumstances, to avoid
bringing on prematurely an attack by the Enemy.
* * * * *
NEY, having quitted Charleroi at a very early hour in the morning,
returned to Gosselies, where he communicated with REILLE, whom
he ordered to assemble the force then with him, consisting of two
Infantry Divisions and their Artillery, and to advance upon Frasne:
to which point the Marshal repaired in person. Here he collected all
the information which the Generals and other Officers had been able
to obtain respecting the Enemy; and being naturally anxious to make
himself acquainted with the details of the force placed so suddenly
under his orders, he desired Colonel HEYMÈS, his first Aide de Camp, to
repair to every Regiment, and note down their strength and the names of
the Commanding Officers; after the performance of which duty, Colonel
HEYMÈS laid before the Marshal a return of the troops in the Field.
The uncertainty in which NEY was placed as to the amount of force
concentrated by the Allies during the night in rear of Quatre Bras,
and the conviction which he had reason to entertain that the Prussians
were in strong force at no very great distance on his right, and that
therefore any check experienced by the Main Column under NAPOLEON,
would endanger his Right Flank and even his line of communication,
rendered him cautious in attacking a point so considerably in advance
of the Emperor's Left, without ample means at hand to enable him, in
case of disaster, to maintain that line, or, in the event of success,
to effectually establish himself at Quatre Bras, and derive every
possible advantage from its possession, by checking, if not defeating
in detail, any body of troops that might be approaching it as a point
of concentration from either Nivelles or Brussels.
Hence he became extremely anxious for the arrival of D'ERLON's Corps
and the promised Third Corps of Heavy Cavalry under KELLERMANN; the
more so, as although LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTE's Light Cavalry of the Guard
was nearer at hand, he had been desired by NAPOLEON not to make
use of it. Officers of the _Chasseurs_ and Lancers of the Guard (in
consequence of the deficiency of Staff Officers) were sent to the rear
in the direction of Marchienne au Pont, with Orders to hasten the march
of the First Corps upon Frasne; while NEY himself was busily occupied
in reconnoitring the Enemy's position and movements.
Whilst so employed, a despatch reached him from the Emperor,
acquainting him that he had just ordered KELLERMANN's Dragoons to march
to Gosselies, where they would be at his disposal; stating, at the same
time, his intention to withdraw LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTE's Light Cavalry of
the Guard from the force under his command; and expressing a wish to
be informed of the exact disposition of the First and Second Corps,
and of the Cavalry Divisions attached to them, as also of the probable
strength of the Enemy, and of the particulars which had been obtained
concerning him.
* * * * *
The 5th Battalion of Dutch Militia, which arrived at Quatre Bras about
seven o'clock, was ordered, some time afterwards, to occupy the Farm of
Gemioncourt. The other Battalions of BYLANDT's Brigade, as they arrived
in succession, formed a Reserve, extending itself from the point of
intersection of the two high roads along the Nivelles road, and in rear
of the Wood of Bossu. About nine o'clock, Captain STIEVENAAR's Foot
Battery attached to BYLANDT's Brigade also arrived at Quatre Bras.
Aided by these reinforcements, the Prince of ORANGE made his
dispositions for impeding as much as possible the expected French
attack, and maintaining his ground in front of Quatre Bras until the
arrival of the Allied troops, which he knew were rapidly approaching
from Brussels and Nivelles. The arrival of the First Brigade induced
him to make a further advance, and extension to the right, of the
Second Brigade; retaining a firm hold of the Wood of Bossu.
He disposed of his Artillery in the following manner: upon the high
road, in advance of his Centre and in front of Frasne, he placed two
guns of PERPONCHER's Divisional Horse Artillery; three guns a little in
left rear of these, and three guns towards the left, so as to keep the
road to Namur in view. He also placed six guns of the Divisional Foot
Artillery a little to the right of, and in line with, the advanced guns
of the Horse Battery, and the remaining two guns on the Right Wing of
his First Line.
His Royal Highness had unfortunately no Cavalry in the Field; yet such
was the firm countenance which he displayed in the arrangement of
his nine Battalions and sixteen guns that the Enemy, unaware of this
circumstance, and probably misled by the appearance, at an early hour,
of the chain of Vedettes formed by the Prussian Detachment of Hussars,
to which allusion has previously been made, and also conceiving that
a considerable force had already assembled at Quatre Bras, made no
vigorous attempt, until the afternoon, to dislodge him from his
position.
Between ten and eleven o'clock, the Duke of WELLINGTON arrived in
person at Quatre Bras, where he joined the Prince of ORANGE, of whose
dispositions he fully approved. He reconnoitred the ground; observed
only a few of the Enemy in front, who occasionally fired a shot; saw
that there was a little popping musketry, but that nothing more serious
was at that time threatened in this quarter.
Conceiving that the Enemy was not in any great force at Frasne, while
at the same time, accounts reached him that Prince BLÜCHER, in his
position at Ligny, was menaced by the advance of considerable masses;
the Duke, accompanied by his Staff and a small escort of Cavalry,
shortly afterwards rode off to hold a conference with the Prussian
Commander, whom he found at the Windmill of Bussy, between Ligny and
Bry; whence he had an opportunity of observing the French preparatory
dispositions for attack.
These having led the Duke to conclude that NAPOLEON was bringing the
main force of his Army to bear against BLÜCHER, he at once proposed
to assist the Prince by first advancing straight upon Frasne and
Gosselies, as soon as he should have concentrated sufficient force,
and then operating upon the Enemy's Left and Rear, which would afford
a powerful diversion in favour of the Prussians, from the circumstance
that their Right Wing was the weakest and most exposed, and considering
the object of NAPOLEON's movement, the one most likely to be attacked.
Upon a calculation being made, however, of the time which would
elapse ere the Duke would be able to collect the requisite force for
undertaking this operation, and of the possibility of BLÜCHER being
defeated before it could be carried into effect, it was considered
preferable that WELLINGTON should, if practicable, move to the support
of the Prussian Right by the Namur road. But a direct support of
this kind was necessarily contingent on circumstances, and subject
to the Duke's discretion. The latter having expressed his confident
expectation of being enabled to afford the desired support, as also of
his succeeding in concentrating, very shortly, a sufficient force to
assume the offensive, rode back to Quatre Bras.
* * * * *
It was nearly eleven o'clock when General FLAHAUT, an Aide de Camp of
the Emperor, after passing through Gosselies, arrived at Frasne, with
the following letter from the latter to the Marshal:
"Au Maréchal NEY. "To Marshal NEY.
"MON COUSIN--Je vous envoie MY COUSIN--I send you my
mon Aide de Camp, le Général Aide de Camp, General FLAHAUT;
FLAHAUT, qui vous porte la présente who brings you the present letter.
lettre. Le Major Général a dû vous The Major General [SOULT] will
donner des Ordres; mais vous give you the Orders; but you will
recevrez les miens plus tôt, parceque receive mine sooner, because my
mes Officiers vont plus vite Officers go quicker than his. You
que les siens. Vous recevrez will receive the Order of Movement
l'Ordre du Mouvement du Jour; of the Day: but I wish to write to
mais je veux vous en écrire en you respecting it in detail,
détail, parceque c'est de la plus because it is of the highest
haute importance. importance.
"Je porte le Maréchal GROUCHY "I direct Marshal GROUCHY with
avec les 3e et 4e Corps d'infanterie the Third and Fourth Corps of
sur Sombref. Je porte ma Garde Infantry on Sombref. I direct
à Fleurus, et j'y serai de ma personne my Guard to Fleurus, and I shall
avant midi. J'y attaquerai be there personally before noon.
l'Ennemi si je le rencontre, et I shall attack the Enemy there
j'éclairerai la route jusqu'à Gembloux. if I meet with him, and I shall
La d'après ce qui ce clear the road as far as Gembloux.
passera, je prendrai mon parti There, according to what will
peutêtre à trois heures après midi, happen, I shall make my decision;
peutêtre ce soir. Mon intention perhaps at three o'clock in the
est que, immédiatement après que afternoon, perhaps this evening.
j'aurai pris mon parti, vous soyez My intention is that, immediately
prêt à marcher sur Bruxelles, je after I shall have made my
vous appuierai avec la Garde qui decision, you may be ready to
sera à Fleurus ou à Sombref, et march on Brussels. I will support
je désirerais arriver à Bruxelles you with the Guard which will be
demain matin. Vous vous mettriez at Fleurus or at Sombref; and I
en marche ce soir même si je would desire to arrive at Brussels
prends mon parti d'assez bonne to-morrow morning. You would march
heure pour que vous puissiez en this evening even if I make my
être informé de jour et faire ce decision at a sufficiently early
soir trois ou quatre lieues et être hour that you may be informed of
demain à sept heures du matin à it in daylight, and traverse this
Bruxelles. evening three or four leagues,
and be at Brussels to morrow at
seven o'clock in the morning.
"Vous pouvez donc disposer vos "You may then dispose your
troupes de la manière suivante:- troops in the following manner:-
Première Division à deux lieues First Division at two leagues in
en avant des Quatre Chemins s'il front of Quatre Bras, if in doing
n'y a pas d'inconvénient. Six so there is no inconvenience. Six
Divisions d'infanterie autour des Divisions of Infantry about Quatre
Quatre Chemins, et une Division Bras; and one Division at Marbais,
à Marbais, afin que je puisse so that I may draw it to myself at
l'attirer à moi à Sombref, si j'en Sombref, if I should have need of
avais besoin. Elle ne retarderait it. It would not otherwise retard
d'ailleurs pas votre marche. Le your march. The Corps of the
Corps du Comte DE VALMY, qui a Count DE VALMY, which has 3,000
3,000 Cuirassiers d'Élite, _Cuirassiers d'Élite_, at the
à l'intersection du chemin des intersection of the Roman road with
Romains et de celui de Bruxelles, that of Brussels, in order that I
afin que je puisse l'attirer à moi, may draw it to myself if I should
si j'en avais besoin; aussitot que have need of it: as soon as my
mon parti sera pris, vous lui decision is made, you will send
enverrez l'Ordre de venir vous him the Order to rejoin you. I
rejoindre. Je désirerais avoir avec would desire to have with me the
moi la Division de la Garde que Division of the Guard commanded by
commande le General LEFÈBVRE DESNOUETTES,
Général LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTES, and I send you the two Divisions
et je vous envoie les deux Divisions of the Corps of the Count DE
du Corps du Comte DE VALMY VALMY to replace it. But in my
pour la remplacer. Mais dans mon present design, I prefer to place
PROJET ACTUEL, JE PRÉFÈRE PLACER LE the Count DE VALMY in such a
Comte DE VALMY de manière à le manner as to be able to recall him
rappeler si j'en avais besoin, et ne if I should have need of him; and
point faire de fausses marches au not to make false marches for
Général LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTES; General LEFÈBVRE DESNOUETTES:
puisqu'il est probable que je me since it is probable that I shall
déciderai ce soir à marcher sur decide this evening to march on
Bruxelles avec la Garde. Cependant, Brussels with the Guard. However,
couvrez la Division LEFÈBVRE cover LEFÈBVRE's Division
par les deux Divisions de Cavalrie with the two Cavalry Divisions of
D'ERLON et de REILLE, afin de D'ERLON and REILLE, in order to
ménager la Garde; et que, s'il y spare the Guard; and that, if there
avait quelque échauffourée avec shall be any affray there with the
les Anglais, il est préférable que English, it may be with the Line
ce soit sur la Ligne que sur la rather than with the Guard.
Garde.
"J'ai adopté comme principe I have adopted as a general
général pendant cette Campagne, principle during this Campaign
de diviser mon Armée en deux to divide my Army into two
Ailes et une Réserve. Votre Aile Wings and a Reserve. Your Wing
sera composée des quatre Divisions will be composed of the four
du 2e Corps, de deux Divisions Divisions of the Second Corps,
de Cavalerie Légère, et de deux the two Light Cavalry Divisions,
Divisions du Corps DE VALMY. and the two Divisions of the Corps
Cela ne doit pas être loin de 45 à 50 DE VALMY. That ought not to be
mille hommes. far from 45,000 to 50,000 men.
"Le Maréchal GROUCHY aura à "Marshal GROUCHY will have
peu près la même force, et nearly the same force, and will
commandera l'Aile Droite. La Garde command the Right Wing. The
formera la Réserve, et je me porterai Guard will form the Reserve, and
sur l'une ou l'autre Aile, I shall repair to one or other
selon les circonstances. Le Major Wing according to circumstances.
Général donné les Ordres les plus The Major General is giving the
précis pour qu'il n'y ait aucune most precise Orders that there
difficulté sur l'obéissance à vos may be no difficulty as regards
Ordres lorsque vous serez détaché; obedience to your Orders when
les Commandants de Corps devant you will be detached; the
prendre mes Ordres directement Commanders of Corps must take
quand je me trouve présent. Selon my Orders directly from me, when
les circonstances, j'affaiblirai l'une I am present. According to
ou l'autre Aile en augmentant ma circumstances, I shall weaken the
Réserve. one, or the other, Wing in
augmenting my Reserve.
"Vous sentez assez l'importance "You will sufficiently perceive
attachée à la prise de Bruxelles. the importance attached to the
Cela pourra d'ailleurs donner lieu capture of Brussels. That will
à des accidents, car un mouvement otherwise give occasion to
aussi prompt et aussi brusque incidents: for a movement equally
isolera l'Armée Anglaise de Mons, prompt and abrupt will isolate the
Ostende, etc. Je désire que vos English Army from Mons, Ostend,
dispositions soient bien faites pour &c. I would desire that your
qu'au premier Ordre, vos huit dispositions may be well made
Divisions puissent marcher rapidement, that, at the first Order, your
et sans obstacle sur Bruxelles. eight Divisions may march rapidly
and without obstacle upon Brussels.
"N." "N."
"Charleroi, le 16 Juin, 1815." "Charleroi, 16th June 1815."
This letter, which was intended to convey to NEY a general notion
of NAPOLEON's intentions, prescribed to him, at the same time, as a
principle, that he was to consider his movements subordinate to those
of the Emperor. The latter intimated his purpose of attacking the
Enemy at Fleurus, should he find him there, and of pushing on as far
as Gembloux, where he would decide upon his plan of further operation,
"perhaps at three o'clock in the afternoon, perhaps in the evening;"
immediately _after_ which NEY was to be ready to march upon Brussels,
supported by NAPOLEON with the Guards, it being the Emperor's desire to
reach that capital in the morning.
The idea of advancing upon Gembloux, and of capturing Brussels by a
_coup de main_, which could only be effected by a vigorous repulse
and signal defeat of the Corps of ZIETEN, and by a successful turning
and partial dispersion of those of PIRCH and THIELEMANN, as also by
the rapid march of a closely collected force under NEY, proves that
NAPOLEON had either been insufficiently informed as to the general
dispositions of his opponents, or had greatly miscalculated the degree
of energy and promptitude required in his movements for the execution
of such a design.
Very shortly afterwards, NEY received the official Order of Movement
to which NAPOLEON adverted in his letter as having been sent by SOULT.
It instructed him to put the Second and First _Corps d'Armée_, as also
the Third Corps of Cavalry which had been placed at his disposal, in
movement upon Quatre Bras; to take up a position at that point; thence
to push forward reconnaissances as far as possible on the roads to
Brussels and Nivelles, _d'où probablement l'Ennemi s'est retiré_; to
establish, should he meet with no impediment, a Division with some
Cavalry at Genappe; and to detach another Division towards Marbais, in
order to cover the interval between Sombref and Quatre Bras. He was
also to desire the General Officers commanding the two _Corps d'Armée_
to assemble their troops, collect the stragglers, and order up all the
waggons belonging to the Artillery and to the Hospitals that might
still be in the rear.
In pursuance of these instructions, NEY despatched Orders of Movement
to Counts REILLE and D'ERLON.
The former was desired to put the Second Corps immediately on the
march, for the purpose of taking up the following position:--the Fifth
Division in rear of Genappe, upon the Heights which command that
town, the left _appuied_ upon the high road; one or two Battalions
covering all the _débouchés_ in advance on the Brussels road; the Ninth
Division, following the movement of the Fifth, to take up a position
in second line on the Heights to the right and left of the village of
Bauterlet; the Sixth and Seventh Divisions at Quatre Bras.
It was at the same time intimated to REILLE that the three first
Divisions of D'ERLON's Corps were to take post at Frasne; the Right
Division to establish itself at Marbais along with PIRÉ's Division
of Light Cavalry; that the former was to cover his (REILLE's)
march towards Brussels, and both his Flanks; that two Divisions of
KELLERMANN's Corps were to take post at Frasne and Liberchies; and that
the Regiments of the Guard under Generals LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTES and
COLBERT were to remain in their actual position at Frasne.
This Order had scarcely been sent off to REILLE when NEY received from
the latter a despatch, dated Gosselies, 16th June, a quarter past ten
A.M., announcing his having just received from GIRARD (whose Division
was still at Heppignies) a verbal report by one of his Officers, to the
effect that the Enemy continued to occupy Fleurus with Light Cavalry;
that hostile masses were observed advancing along the Namur road, the
heads of their Columns reaching as far as St Amand; that these troops
were gradually forming, and gaining ground; that as far as could
be judged at that distance, the Columns appeared to consist of six
Battalions each; and that movements of additional troops were perceived
in their rear. REILLE added that General FLAHAUT, in passing through
Gosselies, had made him acquainted with the purport of the Orders he
was conveying to the Marshal, whereupon he had communicated with Count
D'ERLON, in order that the latter might follow the movement which he
(REILLE) had intended to commence as soon as the Divisions were under
arms, but that in consequence of this report from GIRARD he would wait
for the Marshal's further instructions, holding the troops ready to
march.
About the same time, Orders reached NEY from NAPOLEON, desiring him to
unite the Corps under REILLE and D'ERLON, and the Cavalry Corps under
KELLERMANN, which latter, it was stated, was on the point of commencing
its march towards him; remarking also, that with these troops he ought
to be able to destroy whatever forces the Enemy might bring forward;
that GROUCHY was going to advance upon Sombref; and that the Emperor
was setting off for Fleurus, to which place the Marshal was to address
his reports.
[Illustration]
In consequence of these instructions, NEY became anxious for the
speedy concentration of his troops, and again sent Orders to REILLE
and D'ERLON to move up their Divisions. The information which he had
obtained concerning the Enemy in his front, and GIRARD's report of the
assembling of troops in front of Fleurus, induced him to be cautious in
his proceedings, and not to attempt any impetuous onset until he could
have all his force more in hand, instead of the greater portion of
it being, as it then was, lengthened out in Columns of Route along the
Charleroi high road; and, in this respect, his views were in perfect
accordance with the last despatch which he had received from the
Emperor, enjoining him in the first instance, to unite the two Corps of
REILLE and D'ERLON. Hence, in debouching from his position at Frasne,
about one o'clock, his advance was by no means vigorous: it was limited
to a gradual pressing forward of the Light Troops, and amounted to
little more than a reconnaissance.
About two o'clock, NEY, calculating that D'ERLON's Corps could not
be far in his rear, and hoping that the sound of his cannonade
would hasten its march, resolved to attack the Enemy's forces which
intercepted his advance upon Quatre Bras. PIRÉ's Light Cavalry,
constituting a strong line of Skirmishers with well disposed Supports,
covered the advance of the Infantry Divisions of BACHELU and FOY,
whilst that of JEROME followed as a Reserve.
The force with which NEY thus entered the field, consisted of Three
Divisions of REILLE's Corps, of PIRÉ's Light Cavalry, of 4 Batteries of
Foot, and 1 of Horse, Artillery: altogether--
16,189 Infantry
1,729 Cavalry
38 Guns.
The Prince of ORANGE's force consisted of DE PERPONCHER's Division
(with the exception of the 7th Dutch Line Battalion); of 1 Battery of
Foot, and 1 of Horse, Artillery: altogether--
6,832 Infantry
16 Guns.
It was not long after two o'clock when the Duke of WELLINGTON returned
to Quatre Bras from the Prussian Army. He observed attentively, with
his glass, the movements of the French, and told the Prince of ORANGE
he would be attacked directly.
In a few minutes, the French advanced, and the Dutch-Belgian troops
gradually retired; but the Prince, aware of the great advantages
which the position of Quatre Bras would derive from the possession
of the Farm of Gemioncourt, adjoining the Charleroi road, as also of
the Wood of Bossu on the Right, and of the inclosures of Piermont
on the Left Flank, endeavoured, with that view, to make a stand, as
soon as his Centre reached the first named point. The 5th Battalion
of Dutch Militia which occupied this Post, successfully withstood
several attacks, during which NEY drew up his forces along the ridge
which, intersecting the high road in the immediate (French) rear of
Gemioncourt, extends on one side towards the Wood of Bossu, and on the
other in the direction of Piermont.
The vast preponderance of force on the part of the French, was now
quite manifest to the Prince of ORANGE, who found himself compelled
to withdraw the main body of his troops into the Wood of Bossu, still
retaining, however, the Post of Gemioncourt. He gave an Order to
Captain STIEVENAAR's Foot Battery to fall back and take up a flanking
position near the Wood. Here this Officer, who possessed the highest
merit, lost not a moment in reopening his fire, but scarcely had he
done so when he was mortally wounded. At the same moment one gun
was damaged so as to become useless. The Enemy rapidly advanced in
such superior force as to compel the Battery to resume its retreat.
Captain BYLEVELD's Horse Battery retired by the opposite side of
Gemioncourt. One of its limbers blew up, severely wounding an Officer,
and occasioning the gun attached to it to be relinquished. The French
pressed forward with their Light Troops; and part of PIRÉ's Light
Cavalry, seizing a favourable opportunity, gallantly charged the 27th
Dutch Light Infantry, threw it into confusion, and made many prisoners.
At this time a portion of BACHELU's Infantry Division on the right
advanced towards the village of Piermont.
* * * * *
It was about half past two, or perhaps a quarter before three o'clock,
when the Prince of ORANGE, whose situation had become extremely
critical, as he directed his anxious looks towards that point of the
horizon which was bounded by the elevated ground about Quatre Bras,
had the inexpressible satisfaction of recognising, by their deep red
masses, the arrival of British troops upon the field.
These comprised the Fifth Infantry Division, commanded by Lieutenant
General Sir THOMAS PICTON, and consisting of the Eighth British
Brigade, under Major General Sir JAMES KEMPT, the Ninth British
Brigade, under Major General Sir DENIS PACK, and of the Fourth
Hanoverian Brigade, under Colonel BEST. The head of the Column, leaving
Quatre Bras on its right, turned down the Namur road, along which the
Division was speedily drawn up; the British Brigades in Front, and
the Hanoverian Brigade in Second Line. Captain RETTBERG's Battery of
Hanoverian Foot Artillery took post on the right, and Major ROGERS's
Battery of British Foot Artillery on the left, of the Division. The 1st
Battalion of the 95th British Regiment, commanded by Colonel Sir ANDREW
BARNARD, was despatched in haste towards the Village of Piermont, of
which it was to endeavour to gain possession.
[Illustration]
The French, on perceiving the arrival of the British Infantry, opened
a furious cannonade from their Batteries, with a view to disturb its
formation, while NEY, anxious to secure the vantage ground of a Field
which he plainly foresaw, was likely to become the scene of a severe
contest, renewed his attack upon Gemioncourt, still bravely defended
by the 5th Dutch Militia. Hereupon, PERPONCHER, having received an
Order to advance this Battalion along the high road, immediately
placed himself at its head, as did also the Prince of ORANGE himself,
who rode up to it at the same moment. The manner in which His Royal
Highness personally led on his National Militia on this occasion,
was distinguished by the most resolute and conspicuous gallantry.
The Battalion was exposed to a most destructive fire from some guns
which the Prince seemed determined to capture. Placing himself
frequently at its head, and waving his hat, he presented in his own
person so brilliant and heroic an example, that for a considerable
time the Battalion maintained its ground most bravely against the far
superior number of the Enemy. It was composed, however, of young and
inexperienced soldiers, who had not attained sufficient confidence to
fight in anything like deployed order; and, therefore, when, a few
minutes afterwards, a swarm of Cavalry rushed upon it, it soon lost its
compactness, and broke into a confused and hasty retreat; whilst the
French Infantry succeeded in obtaining possession of the Farm, in which
they firmly established themselves.
The Duke of WELLINGTON, who now assumed the command, was so much alive
to the importance of maintaining Gemioncourt and its inclosures, that
he gave directions for its immediate occupation by a British Regiment,
but the one destined for this service having by some accident been
otherwise disposed of, some delay occurred, and the 28th British
Regiment, commanded by Colonel Sir CHARLES PHILIP BELSON, was then
marched down towards that point, under the guidance of Lieutenant
Colonel GOMM, on the Staff of the Fifth Division. As the Battalion
approached the Farm, the latter was discovered to be already occupied
by the French, whereupon it was withdrawn to its Division.
The Third Dutch-Belgian Light Cavalry Brigade, under General VAN
MERLEN, had shortly before this reached the Field, and now advanced to
the support of the Dutch Infantry retiring from Gemioncourt; but they
were met and defeated by PIRÉ's Cavalry, and pursued along the high
road nearly to Quatre Bras, where they arrived in great disorder; a
portion of them coming in contact with the Duke of WELLINGTON himself,
and carrying his Grace along with them to the rear of Quatre Bras. The
latter, however, succeeded in arresting their further flight, and in
bringing them again to the front. The French Cavalry did not, on this
occasion, follow up the pursuit, evidently hesitating to approach very
near to the Allied Infantry, the latter appearing well formed, and
fully prepared to receive them. The Dutch-Belgian Infantry retreated
to the Wood of Bossu, abandoning four guns to the Enemy, who closely
pursued them, and now began to penetrate into the Wood.
Meanwhile, BACHELU, on the French Right, threw a considerable force
into Piermont in sufficient time to secure its possession before the
1st Battalion 95th British Regiment had approached the Village, and
was pushing forward another strong body towards a small Wood that lay
still more in advance, on the opposite side of the Namur high road, the
possession of which along with that of Piermont would have effectually
cut off the direct communication between Quatre Bras and Ligny. Here,
for the first time in this Campaign, the troops of the two nations
became engaged. The Skirmishers who successfully checked the further
advance of the French, and secured the Wood, were the 1st Battalion of
the British 95th Rifles, whom the old Campaigners of the French Army,
at least those who had served in the Peninsula, had so frequently found
the foremost in the fight, and of whose peculiarly effective discipline
and admirable training they had had ample experience.
The possession of Gemioncourt proved of the utmost importance to NEY's
position, which now assumed a definite character, and, in a purely
tactical point of view, offered great advantages. The southern portion
of the Wood of Bossu was occupied by his extreme Left, while his
extreme Right was in full possession of Piermont; and these points were
connected by a narrow valley extending along his whole front, bounded
on either side by a hedgerow, and intersecting the Charleroi road close
to Gemioncourt. The outer fence was strongly occupied by his Light
Troops, ready to cover the formation and advance of his Columns of
Attack, for the support of which by Artillery, the Heights constituting
his main position in rear of Gemioncourt, offered every facility.
Scarcely had PICTON's Division taken up its ground, when the Duke of
BRUNSWICK's Corps arrived upon the field. It was not complete; its
Artillery (under Major MAHN) and the 1st and 3rd Light Battalions
(commanded by Major HOLSTEIN and Major EBELING), having been stationed
in distant cantonments, had not yet joined. The 2nd Light Battalion
(under Major BRANDENSTEIN) was immediately detached to the Wood near
Piermont on the left of the position, and of which the possession had
already been secured by the 1st Battalion of the British 95th Regiment:
the two Rifle Companies of the Advanced Guard Battalion (under Major
RAUSCHENPLATT) were moved into the Wood of Bossu; on the right of which
some detachments of Cavalry were posted for the purpose of observing
the Enemy's dispositions in that quarter. The remainder of these
troops, by a movement to their left, when close upon Quatre Bras,
deployed in rear of, and in a direction parallel to, the Namur road,
thus forming a Reserve to PICTON's Division. The absent portion of the
Corps reached the field in the course of the action, as will hereafter
be explained.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's force in the Field at this moment was as
follows:--
+------------------------------------------------+--------+-------+----+
| |Infantry|Cavalry|Guns|
+ +--------+-------+----+
|British {|Eighth Infantry Brigade | 2,471| | |
| {|Ninth do. do. | 2,173| | |
| | | | | |
|K.G. Legion |Battery of Foot Artillery | | | 6|
| | | | | |
|Hanoverians {|Fourth Infantry Brigade | 2,582| | |
| {|Battery of Foot Artillery | | | 6|
| | | | | |
|Brunswickers {|Advanced Guard Battalion | 672| | |
| {|2 Battalions of the Light | | | |
| {| Infantry Brigade | 1,344| | |
| {|Line Infantry Brigade | 2,016| | |
| {|Regiment of Hussars | | 690| |
| {|Squadron of Lancers | | 232| |
| | | | | |
|Dutch-Belgians {|Second Infantry Brigade | 6,832| | |
| {|Third Cavalry Brigade | | 1,082| |
| {|Half Battery of Horse Artillery| | | 2|
| {|Battery of Foot Artillery | | | 8|
| {| Do. Horse do. | | | 8|
| | +--------+-------+----+
| | | 18,090| 2,004| 30|
+----------------+-------------------------------+--------+--------+----+
The following is the amount of force which Marshal NEY had actually in
the Field:--
+-----------------------------+---------+--------+-----+
| |Infantry.|Cavalry.| Guns|
| +---------+--------+-----+
|Fifth Infantry Division | 5,003| | |
|Sixth do. do. | 6,591| | |
|Ninth do. do. | 4,595| | |
|3 Divisional Foot Batteries | | | 24|
|1 Reserve Foot Battery | | | 8|
|Second Cavalry Division | | 1,729| |
|1 Battery of Horse Artillery | | | 6|
| +---------+--------+-----+
| | 16,189| 1,729| 38|
+-----------------------------+---------+--------+-----+
The cannonade which had opened against the Fifth British Division as it
took up its ground, continued with unabated vigour. The French Light
Troops were now observed advancing from the inclosures that skirted
the foot of their position, and to meet them the Light Companies of
the different Regiments of PICTON's Division were immediately thrown
forward. On the French extreme Right all further progress was checked
by the gallant manner in which the 1st Battalion 95th British Regiment,
though opposed by a much superior force, retained possession of the
Namur road, which they lined with their Skirmishers, while the Wood
in rear was occupied by the Battalion Reserve and the 2nd Brunswick
Light Battalion. On the French Left, however, the incessant rattle of
musketry in the Wood of Bossu plainly indicated by its gradual approach
in the direction of Quatre Bras, that the Dutch-Belgian Infantry were
yielding to the fierce onset of the Enemy in that quarter.
The protection which the French would derive from the possession of
the eastern portion of this Wood for the advance of their masses
over the space between it and the Charleroi road, instantly became
apparent to the British Commander; in fact, the previous pursuit of
the Dutch-Belgian Cavalry along this road proved the expediency of
establishing some restraint to such facility for a hostile advance
in that direction; and he therefore requested the Duke of BRUNSWICK
to take up a position with a part of his Corps between Quatre Bras
and Gemioncourt, so as to have his Left resting upon the road, and
his Right communicating with PERPONCHER's Division, part of which was
deployed along the skirt of the Wood.
The Duke of BRUNSWICK immediately ordered forward the Guard Battalion
(under Major PRÖSTLER), the 1st Line Battalion (under Major METZNER),
and the two Light Companies of the Advanced Guard Battalion, which
he posted in Close Columns upon, and contiguous to, the road, on the
ground indicated, and threw out a line of Skirmishers connecting these
Columns with the two _Jäger_ Companies in the Wood. As an immediate
Support to the Infantry, he stationed the Brunswick Hussars (under
Major CRAMM) and Lancers (under Major POTT) in a hollow in their rear;
while as a Reserve to the whole, the 2nd and 3rd Line Battalions (under
Major STROMBECK and Major NORRMANN) were posted _en crémaillère_
contiguously to the houses of Quatre Bras, which important point they
were to defend to the last extremity.
Whilst this disposition on the Anglo-Allied Right was in progress,
two heavy French Columns were observed descending into a valley below
Gemioncourt, where, under cover of the strong line of Skirmishers,
which had been for some time engaged with those of PICTON's Division,
they were divided into separate smaller Columns of Attack. The
cannonade from the French Heights, which now sensibly quickened, was
telling fearfully amidst the Fifth British Division; and a fresh
impulse having been given to the Enemy's Light Troops by the near
approach of their own attacking Columns, the British Skirmishers,
overpowered by numbers only, were seen darting, alternately and at
short distances, to the rear, through the line of smoke that had been
raised midway between the contending Armies.
At this critical moment, when the rapid progress of the French in
the Wood of Bossu, and their imposing advance against his Left Wing,
threatened to compromise his disposal of the Brunswick troops on the
right of the Charleroi road, WELLINGTON, by one of those electric
inspirations of his master mind with which he had been wont in former
Campaigns to frustrate the best devised plans of his opponents,
resolved not to await the attack, but to meet it. He instantly ordered
the advance of KEMPT's and PACK's Brigades, with the exception of the
92nd Regiment, which (under the command of Lieutenant Colonel CAMERON)
was to continue at its post on the Namur road, close to Quatre Bras.
During the advance of these two Brigades, which was made with admirable
steadiness and in the best order, the Skirmishers fell back upon
their respective Battalions, all of which now presented a clear front
to the Enemy. From the heads of NEY's Columns, as well as from the
thick lines of Skirmishers by which they were connected, a severe and
destructive fire was opened and maintained against the British line,
along which the gallant PICTON, the far famed Leader of the no less
renowned "Fighting Division" of the British Army in the Peninsular
Campaigns, was seen galloping from one Regiment to another, encouraging
his men, and inciting them by his presence and example. The troops
significantly responded to his call by those loud and animating
shouts with which British soldiers are wont to denote their eagerness
to close with their enemies. The interval between the adverse lines
was rapidly diminishing: the fire from the French suddenly began to
slacken; hesitation, quickly succeeded by disorder, became apparent in
their ranks; and then it was, that, animating each other with redoubled
cheers, the British Regiments were seen to lower their bristling
bayonets, and driving everything before them, to pursue their opponents
down to the outer fence of the valley, whence the French line had
advanced in the full confidence of triumph.
KEMPT's Brigade, in consequence of the greater proximity of its
original position to that of the Enemy, was the first to overthrow
the French Infantry. The 79th Highlanders, on the left of the line
(commanded by Lieutenant Colonel DOUGLAS), made a gallant charge down
the hill, dashed through the first fence, and pursued their opponents,
who had advanced in two Battalion Columns, not only across the valley,
but through the second fence; and, carried on by their ardour, even
ventured to ascend the Enemy's position. By this time, however, their
ranks were much broken: they were speedily recalled, and as they
retraced their steps across the valley, they derived considerable
support from the adjoining Battalion in the line, the 32nd Regiment
(commanded by Lieutenant Colonel MAITLAND), which was keeping up from
the first hedge a vigorous fire against the French, who now lined the
second fence. The remaining Regiments of both Brigades had all in like
manner charged down as far as the nearest hedge, whence they inflicted
a severe loss upon their Enemies as these precipitately retired, with
their ranks completely broken and disordered on passing through the
inclosure.
On the right of the line, the 42nd Highlanders (commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Sir ROBERT MACARA), and 44th Regiment (commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel HAMERTON), had advanced to within a very short distance of
Gemioncourt, in which, and behind the hedges lining the valley, the
French were seeking shelter.
During the progress of this contest on the Anglo-Allied left of the
Charleroi road, the Brunswick troops were not permitted to remain
in quiet possession of their advanced position on the right, which
indeed was well calculated to attract NEY's attention. A Battery was
immediately drawn up on the opposite Height westward of Gemioncourt,
from which, as also from the incessant fire maintained by the Enemy's
Skirmishers posted at no great distance from the front of the
line, a very destructive fire was maintained against the Brunswick
troops. The Regiment of Hussars particularly suffered, standing in
line, and frequently receiving an entire discharge from the Battery.
The Brunswickers were, for the most part, young and inexperienced
soldiers--in every sense of the word, _raw_ troops: and the numerous
casualties which befel their ranks in this exposed situation might have
produced a fatal influence upon their discipline, but for the noble
example of their Prince, whose admirable tact and calm demeanour were
most conspicuous on this trying occasion. Quietly smoking his pipe in
front of his line, he gave out his Orders as if at a mere field day;
and was only restrained from taking offence at the representations made
to him by some of his Staff of the imminent danger to which he was
exposing himself, from a consciousness of the kindly motives by which
they were dictated.
At length, the continued havoc created amongst his devoted followers by
the fire from the French Heights, excited the impatience of the Duke
himself for at least the means of retaliation; and as his own Artillery
was still upon the march from its cantonments, he sent to the Duke of
WELLINGTON a request to be furnished with some pieces of cannon.
[Illustration]
This was immediately acceded to, and four guns were moved forward and
posted on the right of the Brunswick Infantry; but they had scarcely
fired a few rounds when the Enemy's cannonade was redoubled; two of the
guns were quickly disabled, and several of the horses attached to the
limbers were killed. At the same time, two Columns of French Infantry
were seen advancing in succession along the edge of the Wood of Bossu,
preceded by a Battalion in line, and supported by some Cavalry, of
which description of force there also appeared to be a considerable
mass advancing along the Charleroi road. As the French Infantry rapidly
approached the right of the line of the Brunswick Skirmishers, the
latter were forced to retire, as were also the Dutch-Belgian Infantry
that lined the Wood at this part of the field. The Duke of BRUNSWICK,
perceiving that the bend of the wood in rear of his Regiment of Hussars
was likely to impede the freedom of its movements, immediately ordered
the latter to proceed to the opposite side of the Charleroi road,
and retire towards Quatre Bras, there to remain in readiness to act
according to circumstances. Then, placing himself at the head of his
Lancers, he gallantly charged the advancing Infantry, which, however,
received them with so much steadiness and good order, and opened upon
them so destructive a fire, that the attack completely failed, and the
Regiment withdrew to Quatre Bras.
Finding the strength of the Enemy's forces to be so overpowering, the
Duke now ordered the Infantry posted contiguously to the Charleroi
road, also to retire upon the main position. The 1st Line Battalion
moved hastily along the road, while the Guard Battalion, with which
the Duke himself was at this time present, retired across the fields
eastward of the isolated House upon the Charleroi road, towards the
Allied line, posted upon the road to Namur. Major PRÖSTLER, who
commanded the Guard Battalion, rendered himself conspicuous by his
exertions to execute this movement in as orderly a manner as possible,
but the eager and close pursuit by the French Light Troops, now
emboldened by success, a shower of round shot upon the Column, and
the approach of the Enemy's Cavalry, spread such a panic among these
young troops that they fled in confusion, some through Quatre Bras,
and others through the Anglo-Allied line on the left of that point;
and it was in the moment of attempting to rally his soldiers, not far
from the little garden of the House before mentioned, that the Duke
of BRUNSWICK was struck from his horse by a shot which terminated the
career of this gallant Prince.
In the mean time the Brunswick Hussars were ordered forward to cover
the retreat of the Infantry, and repel the advance of the French
Cavalry, which was now seen in rapid motion along the Charleroi
road, as if incited and emboldened by the loud shouts of triumph
sent forth by their Light Troops in front. The Hussars, whose order
while advancing, was quickly disturbed by a straggling fire from the
French Infantry, to which their Right Flank became exposed, failed in
producing the slightest check upon the Cavalry, and were soon seen
wheeling about and in full flight, closely pursued by their opponents.
To the 42nd Highlanders and 44th British Regiment, which were posted on
a reverse slope, and in line, close upon the left of the above road,
the advance of French Cavalry was so sudden and unexpected, the more so
as the Brunswickers had just moved on to the front, that as both these
bodies whirled past them to the rear, in such close proximity to each
other, they were, for the moment, considered to consist of one mass of
Allied Cavalry. Some of the old soldiers of both Regiments were not
so easily satisfied on this point, and immediately opened a partial
fire obliquely upon the French Lancers, which, however, Sir DENIS PACK
and their own Officers endeavoured as much as possible to restrain;
but no sooner had the latter succeeded in causing a cessation of the
fire, than the Lancers, which were the rearmost of the Cavalry, wheeled
sharply round, and advanced in admirable order directly upon the rear
of the two British Regiments.
The 42nd Highlanders having, from their position, been the first
to recognise them as a part of the Enemy's forces, rapidly formed
Square; but just as the two Flank Companies were running in to form the
rear face, the Lancers had reached the Regiment, when a considerable
portion of their leading division penetrated the Square, carrying
along with them, by the impetus of their charge, several men of
those two Companies, and creating a momentary confusion. The long
tried discipline and steadiness of the Highlanders, however, did not
forsake them at this most critical juncture: these Lancers, instead of
effecting the destruction of the Square, were themselves fairly hemmed
into it, and either bayoneted or taken prisoners, while the endangered
face, restored as if by magic, successfully repelled all further
attempts on the part of the French to complete their expected triumph.
Their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sir ROBERT MACARA, was
killed on this occasion, a lance having pierced through his chin until
it reached the brain; and within the brief space of a few minutes,
the command of the Regiment devolved upon three other Officers in
succession: Lieutenant Colonel DICK, who was severely wounded, Brevet
Major DAVIDSON, who was mortally wounded, and Brevet Major CAMPBELL,
who commanded it during the remainder of the Campaign.
If this Cavalry attack had fallen so unexpectedly upon the 42nd
Highlanders, still less had it been anticipated by the 44th Regiment.
Lieutenant Colonel HAMERTON, perceiving that the Lancers were rapidly
advancing against his rear, and that any attempt to form square would
be attended with imminent danger, instantly decided upon receiving
them in line. The low thundering sound of their approach was heard
by his men before a conviction they were French flashed across the
minds of any but the _old_ soldiers who had previously fired at them
as they passed their Flank. HAMERTON's words of command were, "Rear
rank, right about face!"--"Make ready!"--(a short pause to admit
of the still nearer approach of the Cavalry)--"Present!"--"Fire!"
The effect produced by this volley was astonishing. The men, aware
of their perilous position, doubtless took a most deliberate aim
at their opponents, who were thrown into great confusion. Some few
daring fellows made a dash at the centre of the Battalion, hoping to
capture the Colours, in their apparently exposed situation; but the
attempt, though gallantly made, was as gallantly defeated. The Lancers
now commenced a flight towards the French position by the Flanks of
the 44th. As they rushed past the Left Flank, the Officer commanding
the Light Company, who had very judiciously restrained his men from
joining in the volley given to the rear, opened upon them a scattering
fire; and no sooner did the Lancers appear in the proper front of the
Regiment, when the front rank began in its turn to contribute to their
overthrow and destruction.
Never, perhaps, did British Infantry display its characteristic
coolness and steadiness more eminently than on this trying occasion.
To have stood in a thin two deep line, awaiting, and prepared to
receive, the onset of hostile Cavalry, would have been looked upon at
least as a most hazardous experiment; but, with its rear so suddenly
menaced, and its flanks unsupported, to have instantly faced only one
rank about, to have stood as if rooted to the ground, to have repulsed
its assailants with so steady and well directed a fire that numbers of
them were destroyed--this was a feat of arms which the oldest or best
disciplined Corps in the world might have in vain hoped to accomplish;
yet most successfully and completely was this achieved by the gallant
2nd Battalion of the 44th British Regiment, under its brave Commander,
Lieutenant Colonel HAMERTON.
In this attack occurred one of these incidents which, in daring, equal
any of the feats of ancient chivalry, which makes the wildest fables
of the deeds of the knights of old appear almost impossible; which
cause the bearing of an individual to stand out, as it were, in relief
amidst the operations of the masses; and which, by their characteristic
recklessness, almost invariably insure at least a partial success.
A French Lancer gallantly charged at the Colours, and severely
wounded Ensign CHRISTIE, who carried one of them, by a thrust of his
lance, which, entering the left eye, penetrated to the lower jaw.
The Frenchman then endeavoured to seize the Standard, but the brave
CHRISTIE, notwithstanding the agony of his wound, with a presence of
mind almost unequalled, flung himself upon it--not to save himself,
but to preserve the honour of his Regiment. As the Colour fluttered in
its fall, the Frenchman tore off a portion of the silk with the point
of his lance; but he was not permitted to bear the fragment beyond the
ranks. Both shot and bayoneted by the nearest of the soldiers of the
44th, he was borne to the earth, paying with the sacrifice of his life
for his display of unavailing bravery.
In the mean time, the leading portion of PIRÉ's Light Cavalry, from
which the Lancers that attacked the 42nd and 44th British Regiments had
been detached, as already described, continued its advance along the
high road towards Quatre Bras, driving in the Brunswick Hussars, who
were now galloping confusedly upon the 92nd Highlanders then lining
the ditch of the Namur high road contiguous to Quatre Bras. Pursued by
the _Chasseurs à Cheval_, and finding no opening for their passage,
they made for the Right Flank of the Regiment: and, as they were flying
past, the Grenadier Company was wheeled back upon the road so as to
oppose a front at that point to the flank of the pursuing Cavalry, upon
which the Highlanders now poured a most destructive volley. The shock
thus occasioned to the French Cavalry was immediately perceptible; but
though thrown into confusion, the main body soon reformed, and retired
with much steadiness and regularity.
The front of the Column, however, impelled by the furious ardour with
which it had advanced, or, perhaps, imagining itself still followed
and supported by the main body, dashed in amongst the houses of Quatre
Bras, and even advanced to some distance beyond them, cutting down
several stragglers whom they found there, principally belonging to
the routed Brunswick Infantry, as also groups of wounded. Many of
them rushed through the large opening into the Farm Yard of Quatre
Bras, which was situated immediately in rear of the Right of the 92nd.
A few daring fellows finding they had proceeded too far to be able
to retire by the same direction in which they had advanced, wheeled
round suddenly at the point where the high roads intersect each other,
and galloped right through the Grenadier Company of the Highlanders,
shouting, and brandishing their swords, and receiving a fire from some
of the rear rank of the Regiment as they dashed along the road. None of
them escaped: one, an Officer of the _Chasseurs à Cheval_, had already
reached the spot where the Duke of WELLINGTON was at that moment
stationed in rear of the Highlanders. Some of the men immediately
turned round and fired: his horse was killed, and at the same moment
a musket ball passed through each foot of the gallant young Officer.
Those of the French _Chasseurs_ who had entered the Farm Yard, finding
no other outlet, now began to gallop back, in small parties of two or
three at a time, but few escaped the deadly fire of the Highlanders.
About this time, KELLERMANN reached the Field, with the Eleventh Heavy
Cavalry Division under Lieutenant General L'HERITIER. This augmented
NEY's forces to the following amount:
+-----------------------------+----------+-----------+-----+
| |Infantry. | Cavalry. |Guns.|
| +----------+-----------+-----+
|Force already in the Field | 16,189| 1,865| 38|
|Eleventh Cavalry Division | | 1,743| |
|1 Battery of Horse Artillery | | | 6|
| +----------+-----------+-----+
| | 16,189| 3,608| 41|
+-----------------------------+----------+-----------+-----+
The French Infantry upon the extreme Left had by this time possessed
themselves of the greater portion of the Wood of Bossu, from the Allied
rear of which numerous groups of wounded and runaways were now seen
to emerge; indeed, it soon became evident that no dependance could be
placed on the continued occupation of the Wood by the Dutch-Belgian
forces, and that the whole brunt of the Battle would have to be borne
by the British, Hanoverian, and Brunswick forces. Upon the extreme
French Right, all attempts to turn the opposite Flank of the Allies
were successfully checked by the steadiness and gallantry of the 95th
British Regiment, supported by the 2nd Brunswick Light Battalion.
NEY, although he had failed in his first general attack upon the
Anglo-Allied line, had fully ascertained that the raw troops of which
the Dutch-Belgian and Brunswick Cavalry in the Field were composed,
were totally incapable of competing with his own veteran warriors of
that Arm, and he therefore determined to take advantage of KELLERMANN's
arrival for the execution of a vigorous Cavalry attack. Retaining
General PIQUET's Brigade in reserve, he combined, for this purpose,
General GUYTON's Brigade, consisting of the 8th and 11th _Cuirassiers_,
with PIRÉ's Light Cavalry Division; and also taking advantage of his
greatly superior Artillery force, he caused the attack to be preceded
and covered by a tremendous cannonade, occasioning great havoc in the
ranks of the Anglo-Allied Infantry, the range for which the French
Gunners had by this time ascertained with fearful precision.
It was not long before the British Battalions most in advance were
warned of the approach of hostile Cavalry by the running in of their
Skirmishers; and scarcely had they formed their Squares when the
Batteries respectively opposed to them having ceased their fire,
a rushing sound was heard through the tall corn, which, gradually
bending, disclosed to their view the heads of the attacking Columns;
and now began a conflict wherein the cool and daring intrepidity with
which British Infantry are accustomed to defy the assaults of Cavalry
was exemplified in a manner that will ever reflect honour and glory
upon the Regiments to whose lot it fell, on this memorable Field, to
assert and maintain their country's prowess. A rolling fire from the
muskets of the 42nd Highlanders and 44th British Regiment, given at a
moment when the Enemy's horsemen were almost close upon their bayonets,
though most destructive in its effects upon their own immediate
opponents, checked not the ardour and impetuosity of the general
attack. These two diminutive Squares, now completely surrounded by the
French Cavalry, seemed destined to become a sacrifice to the fury with
which a rapid succession of attacks was made upon them; no sooner was
one Squadron hurled back in confusion, than another rushed impetuously
forward upon the same face of a Square, to experience a similar fate;
and sometimes different faces were charged simultaneously.
[Illustration]
A strong body of _Cuirassiers_ now passed the Right Flank of the two
Regiments, along the high road, with an evident intention of making
another attempt upon Quatre Bras.
PICTON, who had been watching with intense anxiety the contest
maintained by the 42nd and 44th British Regiments in their exposed
situation, and who had become convinced of the utter hopelessness of
obtaining any efficient support from the Allied Cavalry then in the
field, could no longer restrain his impatience to fly to the rescue
of the devoted Squares; and, as a substitute for Cavalry, he decided
upon immediately assailing that of the Enemy with his own oft tried
Infantry. With this view, he united the Royals (under Lieutenant
Colonel COLIN CAMPBELL) and the 28th Regiment, both of which Corps were
at that moment standing in Column at quarter distance. Led on by both
PICTON and KEMPT, the united Column, with loud shouts, boldly advanced
into the midst of the Enemy's Cavalry; the whole extent of ground along
its front appeared to swarm with Lancers, _Chasseurs à Cheval_, and
_Cuirassiers_, a considerable portion of whom were now seen rapidly
forming for an attack upon the Column; but PICTON constantly on the
alert, and at the same time desirous of arriving at such a distance
as would enable him to present an efficient flank fire in support of
the 44th Regiment, continued advancing until the last moment, when he
suddenly formed it into Square.
The repeated and furious charges which ensued, were invariably repulsed
by the Royals and the 28th, with the utmost steadiness and consummate
bravery; and although the Lancers individually dashed forward and
frequently wounded the men in the ranks, yet all endeavours to effect
an opening, of which the succeeding Squadron of Attack might take
advantage, completely failed. The ground on which the Square stood
was such that the surrounding remarkably tall rye concealed it in
a great measure, in the first attacks, from the view of the French
Cavalry until the latter came quite close upon it; but to remedy this
inconvenience, and to preserve the impetus of their charge, the Lancers
had frequently recourse to sending forward a daring individual to plant
a lance in the earth at a very short distance from the bayonets, and
they then charged upon the lance flag as a mark of direction.
The advance of the Royals and the 28th had been almost immediately
followed, under the same form, by that of the 32nd Regiment, which,
having reached a convenient distance, halted, and formed Square so as
to support, at the same time, by a flank fire, the Royals and 28th, and
the Square of the 79th Highlanders, which latter Regiment constituted a
connecting link with the 95th British Regiment upon the extreme Left.
Upon the advance of the Regiments belonging to KEMPT's and PACK's
British Brigades, BEST's Hanoverian Brigade occupied the Namur road in
their rear, along which the Landwehr Battalions Lüneburg, Osterode, and
Münden (respectively commanded by Lieutenant Colonel RAMDOHR, Major
REDEN, and Major SCHMID) were deployed, while the Landwehr Battalion
Verden (under Major DECKEN), also in line, was posted somewhat in
advance.
In this position, PICTON's Division sustained repeated assaults of the
French Cavalry, which attacked the Squares simultaneously, and in every
direction: as a portion rushed upon one Square, other Squadrons passed
on to assail the next; some parties, taking advantage of sinuosities
of the ground, awaited, like birds of prey, the favourable moment
for pouncing upon their victims; no sooner was one attacking Squadron
driven back and dispersed by a stream of musketry from the face of a
Square, than a fresh party would rush from its cover upon the same
ranks, in the vain hope that the means of breaking its onset had been
expended; but a reserved fire never failed to bring down upon it a
similar fate. Viewed from a little distance, the British Squares could
at times be scarcely discerned amidst the surrounding Cavalry; and as
the latter was frequently observed flying back from sudden discharges
of musketry, a spectator might easily have imagined the Squares to
be so many immense bombs, with every explosion scattering death and
confusion among the masses that rushed so daringly into their fatal
vicinity.
The French Cavalry, by its repeated failures to make any impression
on the British Infantry by the manner in which it had passed through
and through the intervals between the Squares, and in which the
charging Squadrons when dispersed had got intermingled, was now in
great disorder--Lancers, _Chasseurs_, and _Cuirassiers_, were mixed
together and crossing one another in every direction, seeking out their
respective Corps. To retire and reform had therefore become with them
an absolutely necessary measure; but this afforded no respite to the
devoted Squares, against which the Batteries upon the French Heights
now played with terrific effect.
* * * * *
During the French attack of the British Squares on the eastern side
of the Charleroi road, a considerable body of _Cuirassiers_ advanced
along the latter, with the evident design of making another attack upon
the Anglo-Allied Centre at Quatre Bras. The Belgian Cavalry, which was
again ordered forward, endeavoured to check this movement, but with
no better effect than that which attended its former attempt; in fact,
it retired sooner, charged and pursued by the _Cuirassiers_, against
whom a rapid fire was now opened from the 92nd Highlanders, who still
lined the ditch of the Namur road, close to Quatre Bras, a fire so
destructive in its effects that the steel clad warriors were completely
staggered, and the order of their advance so thoroughly shaken that
they were compelled to retire in confusion.
* * * * *
In addition to the furious cannonade to which they were subjected, the
foremost of PICTON's British Battalions, more especially the 42nd and
44th Regiments, were exposed to a rapid and destructive fire, which, as
soon as the Enemy's Cavalry had been withdrawn, was opened upon them
by the French troops advancing from the inclosures of Gemioncourt.
To check this, Skirmishers were thrown forward, but from the want of
sufficient ammunition, they could reply but very feebly to the fire of
their opponents, who, not suffering the same disadvantage, were picking
them off as fast as they could load. Their line soon became fearfully
thinned, and finally their ammunition was totally exhausted, to which
circumstance the Officer on whom the command of them had devolved
(Lieutenant RIDDOCK, 44th Regiment) called the attention of Sir DENIS
PACK, who ordered him to close his men to their centre and to join his
own Regiment.
He had just executed the first part of the Order, when the French
Cavalry having rallied and reformed, renewed their attacks upon the
British Squares. Squadrons of _Cuirassiers_ and Lancers, in their
onward course, swept past Lieutenant RIDDOCK and his party, while
others intercepted his direct line of retreat. He instantly formed four
deep, and with his front rank at the charge, he made good his way
through the Enemy's Cavalry, as far as the south face of the Square
formed by the 44th Regiment; which, however, was so hotly pressed at
the moment as to be unable to receive him, whereupon he ordered his men
to lie down close to their bayonets, until a favourable opportunity
should offer for their admission within the Square.
A repetition of the former scene on this part of the Field now took
place, and the attacks, which were conducted with similar impetuosity,
were met by a resistance equally undaunted. As if to overawe the Square
formed by the Royals and 28th British Regiments, the French Cavalry now
made a simultaneous attack upon three of its faces, and these consisted
mainly of the latter Corps. PICTON, who was again in the Square, upon
perceiving the approach of this apparently overwhelming force, suddenly
and emphatically exclaimed, "28th! remember Egypt!" They answered him
with a loud cheer, and reserving their fire until the Cavalry had
approached within a few yards of the Square, their muskets were coolly
and deliberately levelled at their assailants, who in the next moment
were hurled back in wild disorder, horses and riders tumbling over
one another, and creating indescribable confusion. Similar in their
results were all the attacks made upon the other British Squares, which
maintained their ground with the same unshaken steadiness and gallantry.
These repeated charges by the French Cavalry, though conducted by
veteran soldiers, with admirable order and compactness, and though
affording innumerable instances of individual gallantry and daring,
were certainly not carried on in a manner calculated to ensure success
over Infantry distinguished by such high training and such undaunted
bravery as the British proved themselves to possess on this memorable
occasion. There was no indication of a systematic attack upon any
particular point by a rapid succession of charging Squadrons--no
_forlorn hope like_ rush upon the opposing bayonets by the survivors of
a discharge of musketry levelled at a leading Squadron, and that rush
followed up with lightning-like rapidity by the next Squadron, which,
in spite of the intervening space encumbered with the bodies of men and
horses overthrown in the first charge, would thus obtain the greatest
chance of effecting by its own weight and compact order, a breach in
the Square at the point originally selected for the assault.
No such system of attack was attempted; but, on the contrary, it almost
invariably happened that the leading Squadron no sooner received the
fire from the point attacked, than it either opened out from the centre
to the right and left, and retired, or, it diverged altogether to one
flank, leaving the succeeding divisions, in both cases, to observe the
same movement; and, in this manner, the whole of the attacking force
exposed itself to a far more extended range of fire and consequent
loss, than if it had pursued the more daring, and at the same time,
more decisive, mode of attack just described.
* * * * *
Whilst a considerable portion of the French Cavalry was thus
fruitlessly assailing the British Squares, a body of Lancers, which
had advanced considerably in the rear of those Squares, made a sudden
and unexpected charge upon the Hanoverian Landwehr Battalion Verden,
which was then, as previously explained, deployed a short distance in
front of the Namur road: it was completely successful, and the greater
part of the Battalion was cut down by the Lancers, who, emboldened by
this triumph, were preparing to cross the Namur road, where a well
directed fire opened upon them by the Landwehr Battalions Lüneburg and
Osterode, lying concealed in the ditch by which it was lined, threw
them into disorder, and forced them to a precipitate retreat.
The whole of the French Cavalry was now withdrawn for the purpose of
reforming its broken and disordered ranks, leaving the Anglo-Allied
Infantry to be again assailed by a vigorous cannonade from the Heights
above Gemioncourt. The only movement on the part of the Anglo-Allied
forces was the advance of the Brunswick Guard Battalion and 2nd Line
Battalion in front of Quatre Bras, by the right of the Charleroi
road, as a precautionary measure against any flank attack that might
be attempted from the Wood of Bossu upon the advanced Battalions of
PICTON's right.
* * * * *
It was long past five o'clock. The French Infantry in the Wood of
Bossu was continually making progress towards the Namur road, across
which increased numbers of the Dutch-Belgian troops, to whom the
defence of the Wood had been entrusted, were seen hastily retiring.
In Piermont, the French Light Troops had been reinforced, and they
were now evidently preparing for a more vigorous attack upon the
extreme Left of WELLINGTON's forces; whilst certain movements in the
vicinity of Gemioncourt gave intimation of an intended renewal of the
attack upon Quatre Bras. All prospect of the Anglo-Allied Cavalry
encountering NEY's veteran Dragoons with any chance of success had
entirely vanished; whilst, on the other hand, the latter were on the
point of being reinforced by the arrival of another Cavalry Division.
PACK's Brigade had expended nearly the whole of its ammunition; its
exposed position, and the continued Cavalry charges in its rear having
precluded the transmission of the necessary supply. The Brunswickers
had been greatly discouraged by the death of their gallant Prince; and
the losses sustained by all the troops engaged had already been truly
frightful.
It was at this very moment, when WELLINGTON's situation had become so
extremely critical, that two Infantry Brigades of the Third Division,
under Lieutenant General Sir CHARLES ALTEN, most opportunely reached
the Field of Action by the Nivelles road. They were the Fifth British
Brigade, commanded by Major General Sir COLIN HALKETT, and the First
Hanoverian Brigade, under Major General Count KIELMANSEGGE; and were
accompanied by Major LLOYD's Battery of British Foot Artillery, and by
Captain CLEEVES's Battery of Hanoverian Foot Artillery.
By the arrival of these troops WELLINGTON's force was augmented as
follows:--
+------------------+---------------------------+--------+-------+----+
| | |Infantry|Cavalry|Guns|
| | +--------+-------+----+
| |Force already in the Field | 18,090| 2,004| 30|
| | | | | |
|British { |Fifth Infantry Brigade | 2,254| | |
| { |Battery of Foot Artillery | | | 6|
| | | | | |
|K.G. Legion | Do. do do. | | | 6|
| | | | | |
|Hanoverians |First Infantry Brigade | 3,189| | |
| | | | | |
|Dutch-Belgians |7th Dutch Line Battalion | 731| | |
| | +--------+-------+----+
| | | 24,264| 2,004| 42|
+------------------+---------------------------+--------+-------+----+
About the same time, NEY's troops were reinforced by the remaining
Division of KELLERMANN's Corps of Heavy Cavalry, so that his whole
force was constituted as follows:--
+-----------------------------+----------+-----------+-----+
| |Infantry. | Cavalry. |Guns.|
| +----------+-----------+-----+
|Force already in the Field | 16,189| 3,472| 44|
|Eleventh Cavalry Division | | 1,502| |
|1 Battery of Horse Artillery | | | 6|
| +----------+-----------+-----+
| | 16,189| 4,974| 50|
+-----------------------------+----------+-----------+-----+
NEY, on perceiving the arrival of this reinforcement to the
Anglo-Allied troops, despatched a peremptory Order to D'ERLON to hasten
to his support and join him without a moment's delay; and having well
calculated the advantages he still retained, he resolved upon a bold
and vigorous effort to secure the victory.
The greater portion of the Wood of Bossu was now in his possession; and
this circumstance appeared to him to present the means of establishing
himself at Quatre Bras, and of thus enabling him effectually to
turn WELLINGTON's Right Flank, and cut off his line of retreat upon
Brussels. With this view he had already greatly reinforced his
Infantry in the Wood through which he had even ordered the advance of
two Batteries, in a direction parallel to, and within a very short
distance of, its eastern boundary, so that they might be prepared to
act upon the plain, as soon as circumstances rendered such a proceeding
advisable or expedient. He now also threw forward additional Light
Troops to strengthen his extreme Right in the vicinity of Piermont;
whilst his Cavalry, so vastly superior, both in numbers and in
efficiency, to that which the British Commander had brought into the
Field, constituted his main central force, and compensated in a great
measure for the deficiency created in this point of his line by the
drawing off of the Infantry to the Flanks.
The two French Batteries above alluded to as having advanced along the
interior of the Wood of Bossu, suddenly opened a destructive fire from
the edge of the latter upon the Brunswick troops posted on the right of
the Charleroi road, just as LLOYD's Battery arrived at Quatre Bras. The
Duke instantly ordered the advance of this Battery into the open space
between the Charleroi road and the Wood, for the purpose of silencing
the French guns; but before the British Artillerymen could unlimber,
several horses of the Battery were killed, wheels were disabled, and,
from the proximity of the Enemy's guns, some of the Gunners were
literally cut in two by the round shot with which they were so closely
assailed. Nevertheless, the Battery succeeded, not only in silencing
its opponents, but also in forcing back into the wood a French Column
of Infantry, which, advancing directly towards the Brussels road, had
endeavoured to turn its Right Flank: after which brilliant services,
LLOYD, perceiving no adequate Support, judged it prudent, in the then
crippled state of his Battery, to retire to his former Post, abandoning
two guns for which he had not a sufficient number of horses remaining,
and which consequently could not be recovered until the termination of
the action.
HALKETT's Brigade, shortly after passing Quatre Bras, was ordered to
bring up its left shoulders; and, entering the rye fields in front
of the Namur road, it proceeded some little distance in advance, and
halted.
KIELMANSEGGE's Brigade continued its march along the Namur road, and
received Orders to strengthen the extreme Left, as also to support,
and, where necessary, to relieve the exhausted British Battalions,
which had so bravely withstood the fiercest onsets of a most daring and
well organised Cavalry, and had so unflinchingly endured the incessant
cannonade maintained against them by the well served Batteries on the
French Heights.
It was during the advance of the Third British Division to take up its
ground--HALKETT proceeding directly to the front, and KIELMANSEGGE
moving along the Namur road to the left--and under cover of the heavy
cannonade which was maintained against the Allied line at this time,
that again a Column of French Infantry advanced from out of the Wood,
towards the Brussels road, and entering the latter by the isolated
House southward of Quatre Bras, established itself in and about that
building and its inclosures.
Shortly afterwards, another Column advanced in support of the former
one, which then emerged from its cover, and began to ascend that part
of the Anglo-Allied position occupied by the 92nd Highlanders. On
perceiving this, Major General BARNES, Adjutant General to the British
forces, who had just ridden up to the right of the Regiment, placed
himself very conspicuously at the head of the Highlanders, waving his
hat, and exclaiming, "92nd, follow me!" In an instant the latter sprang
out of the ditch in which they had hitherto been posted, and with great
gallantry and steadiness charged down the slope. The French Infantry
hastily fell back, until having gained the partial shelter afforded
them by the isolated House and its inclosures, they opened a most
destructive fire upon the Highlanders, who nevertheless slackened not
their pace, but drove the French out of their cover. Their Commanding
Officer, Colonel CAMERON, here received his death wound, and having
lost the power of managing his horse, the latter carried him at its
utmost speed along the road until he reached Quatre Bras, where his
servant was standing with his led horse, when the animal, suddenly
stopping, pitched the unfortunate Officer on his head. The supporting
Column, however, securing the garden opposite to the House and on the
right of the road, seemed resolved to make a stand against the further
advance of the Highlanders; but the latter, by a judicious disposition
of their force in three divisions--one towards each flank of the
garden, and the other directly to the gate in front--and again uniting
as soon as these points were secured, once more rushed upon their foes
with the bayonet, displaying, under a terrific fire, the most undaunted
bravery.
As soon as the French turned their backs, the 92nd poured upon them
a volley which proved most destructive, and continued their advance,
pursuing the Enemy along the edge of the Wood, into which they finally
retired upon perceiving a disposition on the part of the French Cavalry
to charge, and finding themselves exposed to a heavy cannonade which
was rapidly thinning their ranks to a fearful extent. Subsequently, in
consequence of their very severe loss, they were withdrawn through the
Wood to Quatre Bras.
Again the French Skirmishers were creeping up the slope from the
Gemioncourt inclosures, and PACK, who had united the remains of the
42nd and 44th Regiments into one Battalion, made the best show of
resistance in his power to their teazing _tiraillade_; but being aware
how very small a quantity of ammunition remained in his men's pouches,
his anxiety on this point became extreme, the more so as he had good
reasons for apprehending fresh attacks of Cavalry. His advanced
position in the immediate proximity of the formation of the Enemy's
Columns of Attack, naturally kept him on the look out for effective
British support; and on observing the head of HALKETT's Brigade, as
the latter was advancing from Quatre Bras, he instantly despatched an
Aide de Camp to that General, with a message, that his own Brigade
had expended nearly the whole of its ammunition, and that if he did
not offer him a Support, he would be under the necessity of almost
immediately abandoning his position. HALKETT at once acceded to the
proposal by sending forward the 69th British Regiment, and desiring its
Commanding Officer, Colonel MORICE, to obey any Orders he might receive
from General PACK.
In pursuance of Orders received from the Duke, HALKETT moved the
remainder of his Brigade into the space between the Wood of Bossu and
the Charleroi road, fronting the French Left Wing. Here he found
the Brunswick Infantry retiring with precipitation: he immediately
put himself in communication with their Commanding Officer, Colonel
OLFERMANN, and by aid of the support which his Brigade presented to
their view, he succeeded in bringing them up under cover, in the ditch
which, traversing the space between the Wood and the high road, ran
nearly parallel with the Enemy's line.
Leaving his Brigade in the position he had taken up, in support of the
Brunswickers and of PACK's Brigade, and pending the arrival of further
instructions from the Duke, HALKETT galloped to the Front, nearly
beyond the Farm of Gemioncourt, for the purpose of ascertaining, if
possible, the disposition and intentions of the Enemy. He was not kept
long in suspense, NEY's arrangements for another general attack having
been concluded; and, observing the Cavalry destined to advance against
the Allies on both sides of the Charleroi road in motion, he turned
round his horse and hastened to dispose his Brigade in such a manner
as to render it fully prepared to brave the coming storm. On his way,
he sent an intimation to PACK of his discovery, and Orders to the 69th
Regiment to prepare forthwith to receive Cavalry.
A sudden and heavy cannonade had already opened from the French
Heights--a sure prelude to the attack which was about to take
place--and the 69th Regiment was in the act of forming Square, when the
Prince of ORANGE rode up to it and asked what it was doing. Colonel
MORICE explained that he was forming Square in pursuance of the
instructions he had received; upon which His Royal Highness, remarking
that he did not think there was any chance of the Cavalry coming on,
ordered him to reform Column, and to deploy into line. During this
last movement a strong body of French _Cuirassiers_, taking advantage
of the surrounding high corn, and of the circumstance of the Regiment
lying in a hollow, approached unperceived quite close to the spot, and
rushing suddenly and impetuously upon a Flank, succeeded in completely
rolling up the Regiment, riding along and over the unfortunate men, of
whom great numbers were cut down, and in the midst of the confusion
thus created, captured and carried off one of the Colours; in defence
of which Major LINDSAY, Lieutenant PIGOT, and Volunteer CLARKE,
highly distinguished themselves, and were desperately wounded. Some
Officers and men took shelter in the Square formed by the 42nd and 44th
Regiments; the mounted Officers gained the other side of the road,
pursued by about twenty of the Enemy, and escaped by riding through one
of the Hanoverian Battalions lining the Namur road.
The 30th Regiment, which had also been deployed into line by the Orders
of the Prince of ORANGE, most fortunately discovered, in sufficient
time, the approach of Cavalry (notwithstanding the extraordinary height
of the rye, which greatly impeded all observation), formed Square
with remarkable rapidity, and, reserving their fire until the very
last moment, they completely dispersed and drove off a body of PIRÉ's
Lancers, and a portion of KELLERMANN's _Cuirassiers_, which troops had
made a charge upon them, enveloping two faces of their Square. PICTON,
who, from the opposite side of the high road, was an eye witness of
this scene, was so much pleased with the perfect steadiness of the
Regiment, that, seizing a favourable opportunity of galloping up to
it, he called for the Commanding Officer, and told Lieutenant Colonel
HAMILTON that he should report to the Duke the gallant conduct of
his Corps. Indeed the steadiness and gallantry of the 30th in this
Battle were so conspicuous as also to draw upon them the well merited
commendations of the Prince of ORANGE, and Generals ALTEN, HALKETT, and
KIELMANSEGGE.
The 73rd Regiment (under Colonel HARRIS), and the Brunswickers, were
equally on the alert; but the French Cavalry, on finding them prepared,
diverged towards the high road.
The 33rd Regiment (under Lieutenant Colonel ELPHINSTONE), had formed
Square upon its leading Company (the Grenadiers) at the moment the
latter had reached some rising ground; in which position it became a
conspicuous mark for the fire, at point blank distance, of a French
Battery which opened upon it with great spirit. It was deemed advisable
to deploy it into line, in which formation the Regiment advanced
towards the two Brunswick Battalions then fiercely engaged with the
Enemy's Light Troops near the skirt of the Wood; but upon approaching
the latter, a report was spread along the line that French Cavalry was
in its rear, whereupon the Regiment rushed precipitately into the Wood,
within which it was speedily reformed.
* * * * *
Whilst that portion of KELLERMANN's Dragoons which had dispersed the
69th Regiment, were sweeping gallantly onwards in their bold career
along the high road towards Quatre Bras, the greater body of this
Corps advanced into the open space on the right of that road. Here
PICTON's gallant little bands found themselves again involved in one
general onset of Cavalry, made with a violence and fury which seemed
to betoken a desperate resolve to harass the devoted Squares to the
last extremity, and to carry every thing by main force. At the same
time a dense cloud of Skirmishers, bursting forth from the inclosures
of Piermont, threatened to turn the extreme Left of the Anglo-Allied
Army; whilst the French Infantry in the Wood of Bossu, close upon the
northern boundary of the latter, equally endangered its extreme Right.
At this moment, NEY's prospects were bright enough to justify his hopes
of success, and he hailed the captured Colour, presented to him by the
_Cuirassier_ LAMI of the 8th Regiment, as the harbinger of victory.
In fact, on whatever point of his line NEY now directed his view, his
operations were full of promise as to the result.
It was certainly a most anxious moment to the British Chief: but
frightfully crippled as were his resources by the failure and hasty
retreat of the great bulk of the Dutch-Belgian Infantry, by the
evident inferiority and utter helplessness of his Cavalry, and by the
dreadfully severe losses already inflicted upon his British Regiments,
he calmly surveyed the field of slaughter, and deliberately calculated
upon the extent to which the heroic valour and admirable spirit so
unequivocally displayed by the British and German Infantry would
enable him to bear up against the storm that now spread its fury along
his whole line, until his eagle glance might detect some favourable
opening, seize some critical moment, to deal the stroke that, by a
combination as sudden as the launching of the thunderbolt of the storm
itself, should avert its fury, or oppose to it a barrier that might
exhaust its strength.
The arrival of LLOYD's British, and CLEEVES's German, Batteries,
attached to ALTEN's Division, had already made a most important
addition to the Duke's Artillery force; the former took post in front
of Quatre Bras on the right, the latter on the left, of the Charleroi
road.
Almost immediately afterwards, Major KUHLMANN's Battery of Horse
Artillery of the King's German Legion, belonging to the First
Division, which it had preceded on the Nivelles road, reached the
Field, and moved rapidly to the point of intersection of the Brussels
and Nivelles road, where it came into action, at the very moment the
_Cuirassiers_ who had fallen upon HALKETT's Brigade were advancing
in mass along the former road towards Quatre Bras. Two guns under
Lieutenant SPECKMANN were posted so as to bear directly upon the French
Column, and completely to enfilade the road; and as the Cuirassiers
approached with the undaunted bearing that betokened the steadiness
of veterans, and with the imposing display that usually distinguishes
mailed Cavalry, a remarkably well directed fire was opened upon them:
in an instant the whole mass appeared in irretrievable confusion; the
road was literally strewed with corses of these steel clad warriors and
their gallant steeds; KELLERMANN himself was dismounted, and compelled
like many of his followers to retire on foot.
* * * * *
It was at this moment that Colonel LAURENT, who had been despatched
from the Imperial Head Quarters, reached NEY, with a pencilled note
requiring the Marshal to detach the First Corps towards St Amand.
Having fallen in with the head of the Column of that Corps, he had
taken upon himself to alter the direction of its march; and, on coming
up with Count D'ERLON, who had preceded his Corps, and was then in
front of Frasne, he showed him the note, and explained to him where
he would find the head of his Column. Shortly afterwards, General
D'ELCAMBRE, Chief of the Staff to the First Corps, arrived to report
the movement which was in course of execution.
NEY now saw clearly that at the very moment he required the aid
of D'ERLON's Corps, not only to counterbalance the arrival of
reinforcements which had joined WELLINGTON, but to give an efficient
support to the renewed general attack he had projected, that Corps had
been placed beyond his reach, and that he must, in all probability,
continue to fight the battle without any addition to the force he had
already in the Field. Nevertheless, he did not allow the circumstance
to suspend the execution of his operations; and, with the hope of
yet securing the assistance of the First Corps, he sent back General
D'ELCAMBRE, with a peremptory Order for its return towards Quatre Bras.
It was soon after this that NEY received another despatch from
NAPOLEON, dated at two o'clock. From its general tenor it was evidently
written previously to the departure of Colonel LAURENT with the Order
for the flank movement of D'ERLON's Corps, and therefore the bearer
of it must have taken longer time than was necessary in conveying it
to the Marshal. It announced that the Prussians were posted between
Sombref and Bry, and that at half past two GROUCHY was to attack
them with the Third and Fourth _Corps d'Armée_, and expressed the
Emperor's wish that NEY should also attack whatever Enemy might be in
his front, and, after having repulsed the latter, fall back in the
direction of Ligny, to assist in enveloping the Prussians. At the same
time it stated, that should NAPOLEON succeed in defeating the latter
beforehand, he would then manoeuvre in NEY's direction, to support
in like manner the Marshal's operations. It concluded by requesting
information both as to NEY's own dispositions and those of the Enemy
in his front. This despatch reached NEY at a moment when he was most
seriously engaged, when the issue of the battle was extremely doubtful,
and the probability of his being enabled to afford the support required
by NAPOLEON most questionable.
Upon the extreme Left of the Anglo-Allied forces, the advance of the
French Light Troops from Piermont and its vicinity was met in a most
determined and gallant manner by the head of KIELMANSEGGE's Hanoverian
Brigade (which after having moved along the Nivelles road, exposed to
the continued fire from the Batteries on the French Heights, had just
reached that part of the field), in conjunction with the 1st Battalion
95th British Rifles, and the 2nd Brunswick Light Battalion. The most
determined efforts were made by the Enemy to turn the Anglo-Allied
Flank. The French Infantry had already gained the high road, and were
boldly pressing forward, when the British Rifles, the Brunswick Light
Infantry, and the Hanoverian Field Battalion Lüneburg (under Lieutenant
Colonel KLENCKE) dashed in amongst them. The contest was obstinate
and severe; but the Allied Light Troops having been reinforced by
the Hanoverian Field Battalion Grubenhagen (under Lieutenant Colonel
WURMB), gradually obtained the ascendancy, and, dislodging their
opponents from one inclosure after another, continued steadily
advancing, and gaining ground.
Along the whole front of the central portion of the Anglo-Allied
Army, the French Cavalry was expending its force in repeated but
unavailing charges against the indomitable Squares. The gallant, the
brilliant, the heroic, manner in which the remnants of KEMPT's and
PACK's Brigades held their ground, of which they surrendered not a
single inch throughout the terrific struggle of that day, must ever
stand pre-eminent in the records of the triumphs and prowess of British
Infantry.
To relieve them as much as possible from the severe pressure they
experienced, now that their ammunition was almost entirely exhausted,
some of the Hanoverian Battalions were judiciously thrown forward so
as to afford them a close, immediate, and efficient, support, while
others continued to line the Namur road; a disposition for which the
arrival of KIELMANSEGGE's Brigade had presented the ready means, and
which imposed an impregnable barrier to any further advance of the
French Cavalry, whose ranks were now thoroughly disordered, and their
numbers greatly diminished, by their perseverance in a contest the
hopelessness of which began to appear but too evident.
* * * * *
During that part of the Battle just described, NEY received a further
despatch from the Emperor by Colonel FORBIN JANSON. It was dated a
quarter past three, and announced to the Marshal that NAPOLEON was at
that moment seriously engaged. It desired NEY to manoeuvre immediately
so as to turn the Right of the Prussians and fall upon their Rear, and
contained the remark that the latter would thus be taken _en flagrant
délit_ at the moment they might be endeavouring to join the English.
The impossibility of NEY's complying with these directions was already
sufficiently apparent.
* * * * *
At this time, WELLINGTON received an addition to his forces by the
arrival of the 1st and 3rd Brunswick Light Battalions, and the
Brunswick Brigade of Artillery under Major MAHN, consisting of a
Battery of Horse, and another of Foot, Artillery. The guns were
immediately posted close upon the Namur road, at a short distance to
the left of Quatre Bras; and their fire, combined with that of the
British and German Batteries, soon produced a very perceptible effect
upon the French Artillery. The Infantry reinforced the 1st and 3rd
Brunswick Line Battalions occupying the houses of Quatre Bras.
The most important reinforcement, however, was the arrival, at nearly
the same moment--about half past six o'clock--of the First British
Division, under Major General COOKE, consisting of the First Brigade of
Guards, commanded by Major General MAITLAND, and the Second Brigade of
Guards, commanded by Major General Sir JOHN BYNG.
Their line of march having been by the Nivelles road, they came very
opportunely upon the most critical point of the Anglo-Allied position,
namely, its extreme Right, just at the moment when the French Light
Troops, having driven out the Dutch-Belgian Infantry, showed themselves
in force along the northern boundary of the Wood of Bossu, and some of
their Skirmishers had almost gained the high road.
WELLINGTON's force was still further augmented by the recently arrived
troops as follows:--
+-------------+-----------------------------+---------+--------+-----+
| | |Infantry.|Cavalry.|Guns.|
| | +---------+--------+-----+
| |Force already in the Field | 24,264 | 2,004 | 42 |
| | | | | |
|British {|First Infantry Division | 4,061 | | |
| {|Battery of Foot Artillery | | | 6 |
|K.G. Legion | Do. Horse do. | | | 6 |
| | | | | |
|Brunswick {|1st and 3rd Light Battalions | 1,344 | | |
| {|Battery of Foot Artillery | | | 8 |
| {| Do. Horse do. | | | 8 |
| | +---------+--------+-----+
| | | 29,669 | 2,004 | 70 |
+-------------+-----------------------------+---------+--------+-----+
NEY's force actually present continued as before:--
+---------+--------+-----+
|Infantry.|Cavalry.|Guns.|
+---------+--------+-----+
| 16,189 | 4,974 | 50 |
+---------+--------+-----+
The Prince of ORANGE, who had galloped along this road to meet the
Guards, immediately ordered the Light Companies under Lieutenant
Colonel Lord SALTOUN, to enter the Wood. They rushed forward with a
loud cheer, and commenced a brisk fire on their opponents, who were
soon made sensible of the superior description of force now brought
against them. The remainder of the Brigade speedily followed, and the
loud, sharp, animated rattle of musketry, which was progressing rapidly
into the very heart of the Wood, plainly indicated that even in this
quarter, where the French had hitherto been the most successful, and
whence they might not only have molested the Anglo-Allied troops on
the eastern boundary of the Wood, but have most seriously endangered
the Right of the British position, they were now encountering a most
vigorous and determined resistance.
* * * * *
HALKETT's Brigade, with the Brunswickers, resolutely maintained the
ground on which they had been charged by the French Cavalry. As the
latter retired, the Light Companies of the Brigade, with a portion
of the Brunswickers on the right, and some Hanoverian Riflemen on
the left, advanced in pursuit. The French threw forward a line of
_Tirailleurs_ to check them, and a brisk fire was maintained on both
sides. The cannonade on this side of the field was also kept up with
great spirit. At length the French Cavalry advanced, forcing back
HALKETT's Skirmishers upon their respective Columns, on which they then
charged. Their attack, however, was not made with much energy, and,
upon their being uniformly repulsed, the Light Troops resumed their
former ground. HALKETT pushed forward his Battalions to the line of his
Skirmishers, and then moving towards his right, in the direction of the
ravine, which descends from the Wood, drove across the rivulet a body
of French Infantry, from which a portion of his Brigade had suffered a
severe fire. In this part of the affair one of PICTON's Battalions--the
Royals--co-operated. The two Brunswick Battalions continued boldly to
advance even beyond this line, resting their right close upon the Wood.
* * * * *
In the meantime, BYNG's Brigade had closely followed up MAITLAND's
in support, having previously sent forward its Light Companies under
Lieutenant Colonel MACDONELL round by Quatre Bras, skirting the
eastern border of the Wood. The spirited and determined nature of the
advance of the British Guards not admitting of that restraint which,
considering the many intricate parts of the Wood, was essential for the
preservation of order, led to great confusion in their ranks by the
time they reached the southern extremity, after having fairly driven
out the French; and in this state they ventured to pursue the Enemy on
the open ground, but were quickly repulsed by his Reserves; and the
French Artillery poured so destructive a fire into this portion of the
Wood, that MAITLAND deemed it advisable to withdraw the 2nd Battalion
(under Colonel ASKEW) to the rivulet, where it was immediately joined
from the rear by the other Battalion of his Brigade (the 3rd, under
Colonel the Hon. WILLIAM STUART).
The time which would have been occupied in restoring the order and
regularity that had been so completely lost during the progress of
these Battalions through the Wood, was considered too precious for
that purpose at such a moment, and the Brigade was ordered to form
line to its left, outside the Wood, the men falling in promiscuously
as fast as they emerged from their cover, and extending the line into
the plain between the Wood and the Brussels road. Thus formed, the line
advanced, though but for a short distance, when it opened and continued
a brisk fire, under which the French Infantry, in its immediate
front, deployed with the utmost steadiness and gallantry. This advance
had been followed by the Brunswick Guard Battalion, which was now
manoeuvring to form on the left of MAITLAND's Brigade.
The French Cavalry, which had been watching for an opportunity to
charge the Brigade, now made a dash at its Left Flank. When the
irregular formation of the latter, which has been already explained,
is considered, it is evident that any attempt to form Square at
that moment would have involved the British Guards in inextricable
confusion, and have rendered them an easy prey to the French horsemen.
Rapid as was the advance of the latter, its object was frustrated
in a manner which testifies the extraordinary discipline of the men
of that Brigade. Mere discipline it was not; it was an instinctive
momentary impulse, which seemed to animate the whole Corps with the
sole conviction, that the only step to be taken, the only chance left
for safety, consisted in a general and instantaneous movement to the
ditch which bounded the Wood on their right. This was accomplished
with complete success, and the French Cavalry, which had advanced in
full confidence of an easy triumph, were hurled back in confusion by a
volley from the ditch, which the Brigade had lined with a rapidity, a
dexterity, and a precision, quite wonderful; while at the same moment,
the Brunswick Battalion threw itself into Square, and received the
Cavalry with a degree of coolness, steadiness, and gallantry, which
won for it the warmest admiration and encomiums of the British who
witnessed the manoeuvre. The flanking fire which was thus brought to
bear so suddenly on the French Cavalry by the Brunswickers, and the
destructive front fire so deliberately poured in amongst them by the
British Guards from the ditch, fairly drove them out of this part of
the Field.
* * * * *
More to the left, the French were retiring before HALKETT in perfect
order, covered by their Skirmishers. As that General's Brigade neared
the Farm House of Gemioncourt, Major CHAMBERS of the 36th Regiment, an
experienced Officer, incited by the desire of capturing a Post which
had been throughout the day a _point d'appui_ to the French Centre, led
on two Companies of his Corps towards it. They made a gallant rush into
the courtyard, but were met by a smart fire which forced them back.
Major CHAMBERS, however, rallied his men in the orchard; and having
instructed them how to proceed in their attack, the place was instantly
carried.
The further advance upon the Anglo-Allied Left had, in the meantime,
kept equal pace with that on the Right. NEY had been compelled to
yield the strongholds by aid of which he had hoped to force the
Duke's position: his Infantry had been driven out of Piermont and the
inclosures in front of his Right, as also out of the Wood of Bossu on
his Left: Gemioncourt, also, in front of his Centre, had been captured;
while the plain between the two positions, over which his Cavalry
had executed innumerable charges--charges that were occasionally
suspended merely that the scattered bands might rally afresh to renew
the onslaught with redoubled vigour, and that his Artillery might pour
upon the devoted Squares its destructive missiles, by which each was
shattered to its very centre,--was now completely cleared from the
presence of a single horseman.
It was long after sunset, and darkness was sensibly approaching, when
WELLINGTON, now that his Flanks and Centre were relieved, in the
manner already described, from the severity of a pressure of such
long duration, led forward his victorious troops to the foot of the
French position. The loud shouts which proclaimed the triumphant
advance of his forces on either Flank were enthusiastically caught up
and responded to by those who constituted the main central line, and
who had so nobly and so resolutely withstood and defied the impetuous
battle shock by which they had been so repeatedly and so pertinaciously
assailed.
NEY, convinced of the utter futility, if not imminent hazard, of
protracting the contest, withdrew the whole of his forces, and
concentrated them on the Heights of Frasne, throwing out a strong
line of Picquets, to which WELLINGTON opposed a corresponding line,
having the southern extremity of the Wood of Bossu on the Right, the
inclosures south of Piermont on the Left, and Gemioncourt in the
Centre, for its main Supports.
The French Picquets manifested an extraordinary degree of vigilance;
the slightest movement on the side of the Anglo-Allied Picquets
instantly attracted attention, and was noticed by a concentrated fire
from the watchful Sentries of the Enemy. No movement, however, of any
consequence was made on either side during the night. The wearied
combatants sought that rest of which they stood so much in need, and
the silence in which the Anglo-Allied bivouac soon became hushed, was
only disturbed by the arrival of additional reinforcements, consisting
principally of British Cavalry.
* * * * *
NEY was joined by the First Corps, after the termination of the action.
At nine o'clock, D'ERLON presented himself to the Marshal for the
purpose of reporting to him his proceedings, and of receiving his
Orders, after which the Corps was bivouacked in the rear of Frasne;
with the exception, however, of DURUTTE's Division (the Fourth), and
JAQUINOT's Light Cavalry Brigade, which D'ERLON had left on the Field
of Ligny; in front of the extreme Right of the Prussian Army; a measure
which he had deemed advisable in order to prevent the Enemy from
debouching into the plain between Bry and the Wood of Delhutte.
[Illustration:
BATTLE OF
QUATRE BRAS
at 8 o'clock, p.m.]
It is singular that NAPOLEON, who at Fleurus held so powerful a Reserve
as that consisting of the Imperial Guard and the Sixth Corps, and who
was in perfect ignorance of the true state of affairs at Quatre Bras,
should have ventured to withdraw from NEY a force amounting to more
than one half of that which he had originally placed at his disposal.
It was decidedly a false step, from which no advantage resulted on his
own Field of Battle, whilst there can be very little doubt that it lost
him that of Quatre Bras.
* * * * *
The losses sustained in this Battle by the Anglo-Allied Army in killed,
wounded, and missing, were as follows:--
British 2,275
Hanoverians 369
Brunswickers 819
------
3,463 men.
To these must be added the loss of the Dutch-Belgian troops, amounting
probably to about 1,000 killed and wounded, which makes the entire loss
of the Anglo-Allied Army equal to about 4,463 men.
The French loss amounted to about 4,000 killed, wounded, and missing.
* * * * *
Such was the Battle of Quatre Bras: a battle in which the British,
the Hanoverian, and the Brunswick, Infantry, covered itself with
imperishable glory; to estimate the full extent of which we must
constantly bear in mind, that the whole brunt of the action fell upon
that Infantry; that throughout the greater part of the day it was
totally unaided by any Cavalry, that Arm of the Allies in the field
having, at the outset, proved itself incompetent to engage with the
French; and, lastly, that it was completely abandoned in the latter
part of the action by the Second Dutch-Belgian Infantry Division,
amounting to no less than 7,533 men.
When the imagination dwells upon that which constitutes one of the
most prominent features of the Battle--the manner in which the gallant
PICTON, on finding there was no Cavalry at hand wherewith to charge
effectively that of the Enemy, led on the British Infantry, and dashed
into the midst of the French masses, stoutly maintaining his ground in
defiance of their oft repeated assaults, invariably scattering back
their charging Squadrons in confusion, and this, too, in the face
of a splendid Cavalry, animated by the best spirit, and headed by a
KELLERMANN, whose fame and merit were so universally acknowledged--with
what exulting pride and heartfelt gratitude must not the British nation
reflect on the heroic valour displayed by her sons in their noble
fulfilment of the desires and expectations of her Cambrian Chief!
The zealous and cordial support which the Hanoverians and the
Brunswickers afforded to their British brethren in arms, the devotion
with which they commingled with them in the thickest of the fight, are
indelibly engraven in the grateful memory of every true German, and
remain recorded as a lasting theme of admiration in the history of
their fatherland.
The defeat sustained by the French was certainly not attributable,
in the slightest degree, to any deficiency on their part, of either
bravery or discipline. Their deportment was that of truly gallant
soldiers, and their attacks were all conducted with a chivalric
impetuosity, and an admirably sustained vigour, which could leave no
doubt on the minds of their opponents as to the sincerity of their
devotion to the cause of the Emperor.
* * * * *
In a strategical point of view, both parties gained certain important
advantages, and lost others which had been comprised within their
respective plans of operation.
NEY had succeeded in preventing the junction of the Anglo-Allied Army
with the Prussians, and might have obtained still more important
results, had he not been deprived of the services of D'ERLON's Corps,
the arrival of which he had been so fully led to expect.
WELLINGTON, though he had been compelled to relinquish all hope of
being enabled to afford that aid to BLÜCHER which, in the morning, he
had proffered to him, yet, by maintaining his ground at Quatre Bras
sufficiently long to admit of the arrival of reinforcements which
enabled him to obtain a brilliant victory, he completely succeeded in
frustrating the grand object of NEY's movements, which had been to
defeat the Anglo-Allied troops thus advancing, in detail, and also
to operate upon BLÜCHER's Right Flank. The Duke's success gave ample
and convincing evidence of the sagacity and foresight with which his
plans had been devised and matured, as also of the soundness of those
calculations by which he had for some time previously placed himself,
with the confident security of a master of his art, in a posture of
defence, fully prepared to meet every emergency, from whatever point,
or however suddenly, the coming storm might arise. And now that he
had gained the Battle, and secured the important point of Quatre Bras,
upon which the remainder of his troops were advancing, and where the
greater portion of them would arrive in the evening and during the
night, he was perfectly ready and willing, should the Prussians prove
victorious at Ligny, to renew the contest on the following morning, by
attacking NEY with his collected force; and then, if successful (of
which little doubt could be entertained), by a junction with BLÜCHER's
Right, to operate upon NAPOLEON's Left, so as to bring the great mass
of the combined Armies to bear directly upon the main body of the
French; or, in case of a defeat of the Prussians, to make good his
retreat along his principal line of operation, in such a manner, as
to secure a position between Quatre Bras and Brussels, favourable for
a co-operation of BLÜCHER's forces with his own, and for presenting a
bold and determined stand against the further advance of the French
Emperor.
Orders were now forwarded for the movement of CLINTON's Division on the
following morning, at daybreak, from Nivelles to Quatre Bras: and of
COLVILLE's Division, at the same hour, from Enghien to Nivelles. The
Reserve Artillery was directed to move at daybreak, on the following
morning, to Quatre Bras, there to receive further orders; and the Tenth
Infantry Brigade, under Major General Sir JOHN LAMBERT, was directed to
march, at the same hour, from Assche to Genappe, there to remain until
further orders.
* * * * *
The tremendous roar of Artillery in the direction of Ligny gave a
sufficient intimation to the Duke that a great Battle had taken place
in that quarter, but as it seemed to continue stationary, and only
ceased as night set in, he was doubtful of the result, and remained
in this state of suspense and uncertainty until the following morning;
the Officer who had been despatched in the night to Quatre Bras from
the Prussian Head Quarters with the expected communication, having been
surprised in the dark, and made a prisoner by the French.
[Illustration:]
CHAPTER VI.
Prince Blücher having ascertained, on the morning of the 16th, that his
communication with the Left Division of the Duke of WELLINGTON's forces
by Quatre Bras continued uninterrupted, resolved upon accepting battle
in the position in rear of Fleurus, which had been previously fixed
upon as the one most eligible, in the event of the Enemy's adoption of
that line of operations respecting which all doubt and uncertainty had
now ceased. Its importance in a strategical point of view, apart from
tactical considerations, was manifest. WELLINGTON having, on his part,
selected Quatre Bras as the point whereon to concentrate his forces,
the position in question, connected as it was with the latter by a
paved road over an extent of not more than six or seven miles, offered
great facility for co-operation and mutual support upon whichever point
the great mass of the French Army might be directed.
Should it prove tenable, then, considered in conjunction with the
advance of the Russians from the Rhine, the whole line of the Meuse
below Namur, and the communications with Aix la Chapelle and the
Prussian States, were effectually secured. If, on the other hand,
either position should be forced by the Enemy, then Mont St Jean and
Wavre, upon parallel lines of retreat towards Brussels and Louvain,
would likewise offer the means of co-operation on the south side of
the Forest of Soignies; and supposing BLÜCHER willing to risk for a
time his communication with the right bank of the Meuse, concentric
lines of retreat upon Brussels would bring the two Armies in combined
position in the immediate front of that capital.
Supposing also that NAPOLEON's plan had been to advance by Mons, the
concentration of the Prussian forces could not have been effected upon
a more favourable point than that of Sombref, whence they could have
advanced in support of their Allies, leaving a sufficient portion of
ZIETEN's Corps to watch the approaches by Charleroi: and, finally,
had the French Emperor directed his main attack by Namur, the retreat
of THIELEMANN's Corps would have secured time for effecting the
concentration of the First, Second, and Third Prussian _Corps d'Armée_,
if not also of the Fourth, while the Duke of WELLINGTON's forces might
have assembled at Quatre Bras, for the purpose of meeting any secondary
attack from the Charleroi side, and of forming a junction with the
Prussian Army.
The position itself comprises the Heights of Bry, Sombref, and
Tongrines, contiguous to the high road connecting Namur with Nivelles,
by Quatre Bras, and to the point of junction of that road with the
one from Charleroi, by Fleurus. These Heights are bounded upon the
south-west and western sides, or right of the position, by a ravine,
through which winds a small rivulet along the Villages of Wagnelé,
St Amand la Haye, and St Amand, near the lower end of which last, it
unites with the greater rivulet of the Ligny; and, along the whole
of the south side, or front of the position, by a valley, through
which flows the Ligny, and in which lie, partly bordering the stream
itself, and partly covering the declivities, the Villages of Ligny,
Mont Potriaux, Tongrenelles, Boignée, Balatre, and Vilrets. At the last
named point, another small rivulet falls into the Ligny on quitting
a deep ravine, which commences northward of the Village of Botey,
and thus tends to the security of the extreme Left of the position.
The extreme Right, however, resting upon the Namur road, in the
direction of Quatre Bras, was completely _en l'air_. The Heights in
rear of St Amand, Ligny, and Sombref, are somewhat lower than those on
the opposite or Fleurus side of the valley; and, from the nature of
the ground, troops, particularly Artillery, are more exposed on the
former than on the latter, where the undulations afford better cover.
The descent from either side into the Villages of Wagnelé, St Amand
la Haye, and St Amand, is gentle: between the latter point and Mont
Potriaux the sides of the valley descend more rapidly: and below that
Village they become steep, particularly about Tongrines, Boignée, and
Balatre: while the ground above commands alternately from side to side.
Above Mont Potriaux, the bed of the valley is soft, and occasionally
swampy: below that point it partakes still more of this character.
The buildings in the Villages are generally of stone, with thatched
roofs, and comprise several farm houses with courtyards, presenting
great capabilities for defence. St Amand and Boignée are the most
salient points of the position, the central portion of which retires
considerably, particularly near Mont Potriaux.
In the morning of the 16th, the First Corps (ZIETEN's) occupied that
portion of the position which is circumscribed by the Villages of
Bry, St Amand la Haye, St Amand, and Ligny. The four Brigades of
this Corps had been very much mixed up together when occupying these
Villages during the night, which will account in some measure for the
promiscuous manner in which their several Battalions appear to have
been distributed during the Battle. The main body of the Corps was
drawn up on the Height between Bry and Ligny, and upon which stands
the Farm and Windmill of Bussy, the highest point of the whole
position. Seven Battalions of the Second Brigade (General PIRCH II.)
were formed immediately in rear of this Farm; the 28th Regiment and
2nd Westphalian Landwehr in the First, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions
of the 6th Regiment in the Second, Line; while the 3rd Battalion of
the latter Regiment occupied the Farm itself, which was put into a
state of defence. Two Battalions of the Fourth Brigade (General Count
HENKEL), namely, the 2nd Battalions of the 19th Regiment and of the 4th
Westphalian Landwehr, stood on the slope between the Second Brigade and
Ligny; while the remaining four Battalions of the Brigade--the 1st and
3rd of the 19th Regiment, and the 1st and 3rd of the 4th Westphalian
Landwehr--were charged with the defence of Ligny. The Village of Bry
was occupied by the 3rd Battalions of the 12th and 24th Regiments,
belonging to the First Brigade (General STEINMETZ); and the 2nd
Battalion of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr was posted in rear of the
Village in support. The 1st and 3rd Companies of the Silesian Rifles,
attached to this Brigade, were distributed about the intersected ground
between Bry and St Amand la Haye. The remainder of the First Brigade
was posted on the Height in the rear of St Amand, its Right resting
on St Amand la Haye; the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 12th Regiment
on the right, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 24th Regiment
on the left, forming a First, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the
1st Westphalian Landwehr forming a Second, Line. The defence of St
Amand was confided to three Battalions of the Third Brigade (General
JAGOW)--the 1st and 2nd of the 29th Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion
of the 3rd Westphalian Landwehr. The remaining six Battalions of this
Brigade were posted in reserve northward of Ligny, and near the Bois
du Loup. The 2nd and 4th Companies of the Silesian Rifles were thrown
into Ligny. The Reserve Cavalry of ZIETEN's Corps continued in advance,
upon the Fleurus high road, watching the movements of the Enemy.
* * * * *
It was eight o'clock when these dispositions were completed; and about
eleven o'clock, PIRCH's Corps, which more than an hour before had
quitted its bivouac near Mazy, was formed up in reserve to ZIETEN. The
Fifth Brigade (General TIPPELSKIRCHEN) stood across the high road, near
its intersection with the old Roman road, in the customary Prussian
Brigade order of three lines of Columns of Battalions at deploying
intervals, and had in its front the two Batteries, Nos. 10 and 37.
The Sixth Brigade (General KRAFFT) was posted in similar order in
the rear of the Farm of Bussy, and in left rear of Bry. The Seventh
Brigade (General BRAUSE) stood more to the left: it had only the 14th
Regiment then present, for the 22nd Regiment and the Elbe Landwehr
did not rejoin it until one o'clock in the afternoon. The Eighth
Brigade (Colonel LANGEN) was ordered to remain upon the high road
leading from Sombref to Fleurus, until the arrival of the Third Corps
(THIELEMANN's). One of its Battalions--the 3rd of the 21st Regiment--as
also two Squadrons of the Neumark Dragoons attached to this Corps,
had been left in the line of Outposts beyond the Meuse, towards
Philippeville; and did not rejoin it until the 20th of June.
The Reserve Cavalry of PIRCH's Corps, under General JÜRGASS, was
stationed in rear of the high road, and on the west side of Sombref.
The twelve pounder Batteries, Nos. 4 and 8, and the Horse Batteries,
Nos. 5 and 18, remained in reserve, near Sombref.
THIELEMANN's Corps, which had quitted Namur about seven o'clock in the
morning, had reached Sombref before twelve. It was immediately assigned
its position in that part of the Field which lies between Sombref and
Balatre, and was posted in Columns upon both high roads, here to remain
available for either a movement to the right, or for the occupation of
the position in Left Front of Sombref, along the Heights in rear of the
Ligny rivulet.
Such were the dispositions made by BLÜCHER previously to NAPOLEON's
advancing from Fleurus. The occupation of Ligny and St Amand--the most
salient part of the position--by ZIETEN's Corps, and the posting of the
Reserve Cavalry of the latter in the intervening space between those
Villages and Fleurus, were justly calculated to secure for the Prussian
Commander ample time for further developing his Line of Battle in such
a manner as the direction and mode of his opponent's attack might
render most expedient.
* * * * *
In the morning of the 16th, the French troops which lay along the
Sambre, and which belonged to that main portion of the Army which was
more immediately under the orders and guidance of NAPOLEON, quitted
their bivouacs, and marched to join their leading Columns, the position
of which in front of Fleurus was described in the Fourth Chapter.
It was past ten o'clock when these troops debouched in two Columns from
the Fleurus Wood--the one along the High road, the other more to the
right--and drew up in two lines within a short distance of Fleurus. In
the First Line PAJOL's Light, and EXCELMANS' Heavy, Cavalry, formed
the Right, and VANDAMME's Corps, the Left, Wing; while GÉRARD's Corps
which had not received the Order to march until half past nine o'clock,
arrived much later, and occupied the Centre. GIRARD's Division was
detached some little distance on the extreme Left. The Imperial Guard
and MILHAUD's Corps of _Cuirassiers_ constituted the Second Line. More
than an hour was passed in this position before the arrival of the
Emperor, who then rode along the line of Vedettes, and reconnoitred the
Enemy's dispositions.
It appeared to NAPOLEON that BLÜCHER had taken up a position
perpendicular to the Namur road, and had, in this way, completely
exposed his Right Flank; whence he inferred that the Prince placed
great reliance upon the arrival of auxiliary forces from the Duke of
WELLINGTON's Army.
A single glance at the Prussian position, as it has been described,
will suffice to prove that the French Emperor was in error as regarded
BLÜCHER's assumed Line of Battle, and that so far from its having
been perpendicular to, it was, in the general military acceptation
of the term, parallel with, the Namur road. At the same time it is
proper to remark, that he may have been misled by the massing of the
Prussian troops between the salient point of the position, St Amand,
and the road in question, as well as by the direction of the line of
the occupied Villages of St Amand, Ligny, and Sombref. It must also
be acknowledged that although the inference was incorrectly drawn, it
accorded in substance with the real fact, that BLÜCHER did rely upon
the arrival of a portion of WELLINGTON's forces by the Namur road from
Quatre Bras.
NAPOLEON having returned from his reconnaissance, immediately gave his
Orders for the advance of the Army, and for the disposition of each
individual Corps in his intended Line of Battle.
Impressed with the important advantage which, according to his assumed
view of BLÜCHER's position, might accrue from a vigorous and well timed
attack upon the Right and Rear of the Prussians, while vigorously
assailing them himself in their Front, he directed SOULT to address
to NEY the despatch, dated two o'clock, to which reference was made in
the preceding Chapter, acquainting the Marshal that in half an hour
thence he proposed attacking BLÜCHER, posted between Sombref and Bry,
and desiring that he would, on his part, also attack whatever might be
in his front, and that after having vigorously repulsed the Enemy, he
should move towards the Emperor's Field of Battle, and fall upon the
Right and Rear of the Prussians; adding, at the same time, that should
the Emperor be first successful, he would then move to the support of
the Army at Quatre Bras.
The French Light Troops moved forward against Fleurus, of which place
they gained possession between eleven and twelve o'clock, and then
opened from their Light Artillery a cannonade upon the Prussian Cavalry
Posts taken up by the 6th Uhlans. The latter immediately retired,
and formed upon the left of the Brandenburg Dragoons, which Regiment
had been placed in front of the Tombe de Ligny, along with the Horse
Battery No. 2, in support. The Brandenburg Uhlans were also in support,
but more to the rear, and on the left of the high road.
At this time, NAPOLEON was on the Height of Fleurus, again
reconnoitring the Prussian position; and it was also about the same
period that WELLINGTON joined BLÜCHER in person near the Mill of Bussy.
As soon as RÖDER perceived the imposing array of the French Columns in
full advance, he ordered the immediate retreat of his Cavalry, which
he covered with the 6th Uhlans and the Brandenburg Dragoons, together
with two pieces of Horse Artillery. He sent the main body, which he
had stationed in a hollow, in rear of the Tombe de Ligny, as also the
remainder of the Artillery, across the Ligny, with directions to take
post between the Village of that name and Sombref. He himself continued
with the above two Regiments, and the two guns, near the Tombe de
Ligny, until he received Orders also to retire.
* * * * *
In the mean time, the main body of the French Army advanced in great
regularity in Columns of Corps. The Left Column, consisting of the
Third _Corps d'Armée_ under VANDAMME, to which was attached the
Infantry Division under Lieutenant General GIRARD belonging to REILLE's
Corps (then with NEY), being destined to advance against St Amand, the
most salient point of the Prussian position, and therefore having the
shortest distance to pass over, was the first to take up its ground,
preparatory to attack. Whilst thus engaged in making its preliminary
dispositions for this purpose, it was cannonaded by the Prussian
Batteries posted on the Heights in rear of the Village. GIRARD's
Division took post on the left of VANDAMME's Corps, and DOMON's Light
Cavalry Division on the left of GIRARD.
The Centre Column, consisting of the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_, under
GÉRARD, advanced along the Fleurus high road, and took up, somewhat
later, a position upon the Heights fronting Ligny, and parallel to the
general direction of that Village; its Left being near the Tombe de
Ligny, and its Right resting on an eminence southward of Mont Potriaux.
The Right Column, under GROUCHY, comprising the Cavalry Corps of
PAJOL and EXCELMANS, moved by its right, and took post, as did also
the Light Cavalry Division under Lieutenant General MAURIN, belonging
to the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_, on the right of GÉRARD, and showing
front towards the Villages of Tongrines, Tongrenelle, Boignée, and
Balatre. GROUCHY disposed this Cavalry so as to protect GÉRARD from
any attempt which the Prussians might make to debouch in his rear from
Mont Potriaux or Tongrenelle; as also to watch any hostile movements
on their Left, and to divert their attention from the Centre. PAJOL's
Corps, which was formed on the Right, detached along the cross road
which leads to Namur. The Villages of Boignée and Balatre being
situated on the French side of the valley, and occupied by Prussian
Infantry, GROUCHY was supplied with two Battalions from GÉRARD's Corps.
The 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry belonging
to THIELEMANN's Corps, which had been posted in advance, upon the
Fleurus road, retired skirmishing until they reached the barrier at the
Bridge, whither they were pursued by the French Cavalry. Here, however,
the latter were checked and driven off by the 3rd Battalion of the 4th
Kurmark Landwehr, belonging to Colonel Luck's Brigade.
The Imperial Guard and MILHAUD's _Cuirassiers_ were halted in reserve,
the former on the left, and the latter on the right, of Fleurus.
The numerical strength of the French Emperor's forces prepared to
engage with the Prussian Army amounted to:--
Infantry, 43,412
Cavalry, 12,614
Artillery, 6,856
------
Total, 62,882 men, with 204 guns.
If to this we add LOBAU's Corps, which was on the march from Charleroi,
the total amount of available force was:--
Infantry, 51,564
Cavalry, 12,614
Artillery, 7,788
------
Total, 71,966 men, with 242 guns.
The Prussian Army in the Field amounted to:--
Infantry, 73,040
Cavalry, 8,150
Artillery, 3,437
------
84,617
Deduct loss of first Corps on 15th June, 1,200
------
Total, 83,417, with 224 guns.
As soon as the direction of the Enemy's movements for attack became
sufficiently manifest, BLÜCHER made such further disposition of his
force as appeared to him requisite to meet that attack.
He ordered the Batteries of the First _Corps d'Armée_ (ZIETEN's) to
be suitably posted for impeding the Enemy's advance. The three Heavy
Batteries of the Corps were immediately drawn up on the Height between
Ligny and St Amand. They were supported by the Battery of the First
Brigade, posted in rear of St Amand. Somewhat later, when the direction
of attack by GÉRARD's Corps became more developed, the Battery of the
Third Brigade was placed on the right of Ligny, near a quarry, and the
Battery of the Fourth Brigade on the left of the Village, upon the
declivity descending to the rivulet. The Battery of the Second Brigade,
the Foot Battery No. 1, and the Horse Battery No. 10, remained in
reserve. Of the remaining Horse Batteries of the Corps, one continued
with the Cavalry under General RÖDER (which was posted in a hollow, as
before stated, between Ligny and Sombref), and the other was with the
1st Silesian Hussars, which Regiment had been detached in observation
on the Right Flank of the Army, and posted between the northern
extremity of the village of Wagnelé and a large pond contiguous to the
old Roman road.
By the time the action commenced in front of St Amand and Ligny--half
past two o'clock--BLÜCHER was satisfied that no necessity existed
for any movement of his Third _Corps d'Armée_ to the right; and he
therefore ordered it to proceed from the position it had hitherto held
in Columns upon the two high roads near Sombref, and form the Left Wing
of his line of battle; resting its Right upon Sombref, and occupying
the Heights, at the foot and on the declivities of which are situated
the Villages of Mont Potriaux, Tongrines, Tongrenelle, Boignée,
Balatre, Vilrets, and Botey.
The Ninth Brigade (General BORKE) was formed in Brigade order in rear
of Sombref and northward of the Namur high road, having detached one
of its Battalions (the 3rd of the 8th Regiment) with the Foot Battery
No. 18, to Mont Potriaux, where the former posted itself on the north,
and the latter took up a favourable position on the south, side of the
Church. The Eleventh Brigade (Colonel LUCK) with the twelve pounder
Battery No. 7, stood across the Fleurus high road, in front of the
junction of the latter with the Namur road upon the Height of Le
Point du Jour, having detached the 3rd Battalion of the 4th Kurmark
Landwehr into the valley, where it occupied the houses in its immediate
vicinity. Four Battalions of the Tenth Brigade (Colonel KÄMPFEN) were
drawn up on the Height of Tongrines, resting their Right on this
Village, and having in their front the Foot Battery No. 35, and at a
short distance from their Left, the Horse Battery No. 18. The remaining
two Battalions of the Brigade were detached, the 3rd Battalion of the
27th Regiment, to occupy Tongrines and the Castle of Tongrenelle, and
the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Kurmark Landwehr, to hold the Villages of
Boignée and Balatre. The 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr,
belonging to the Brigade, as also two Squadrons of the 6th Kurmark
Landwehr Cavalry, and two Squadrons of the 9th Hussars, attached to
this Corps, still continued in the line of Outposts in the vicinity of
Dinant, to observe Givet; and rejoined on the morning of the 17th of
June. The Twelfth Brigade (Colonel STÜLPNAGEL) with the Horse Battery
No. 20, was formed in Brigade order, in reserve, near the Windmill,
on the Height of Le Point du Jour. The Reserve Cavalry of this Corps,
with the Horse Battery No. 19, was posted on the extreme Left of the
position between Botey and Vilrets, whence it detached the 3rd Squadron
of the 7th Uhlans to Onoz, in observation.
This position and the order of battle which was thus developed, were
well calculated to answer the object which BLÜCHER had in view, namely,
to hold his ground long enough to gain sufficient time for the arrival
of at least a portion of WELLINGTON's forces, expected to join the
Prussian extreme Right by the Namur road; as also, perhaps, for the
arrival and co-operation of BÜLOW's Corps, in rear of THIELEMANN, by
the Gembloux road. In either of these cases, if not previously favoured
by the circumstances of the general battle about to take place, such
a marked accession to his strength would enable him to assume the
offensive; whilst, in the first mentioned, WELLINGTON would effectually
prevent a junction between NAPOLEON's and NEY's forces.
The position had been long before selected, and the whole of the ground
had even been surveyed, with a view to meet the contingency which
had now actually occurred; but then it must be remembered, that in
this design the co-operation of the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_ was fully
contemplated, whereas the latter had now become a doubtful question:
and hence it was that BLÜCHER was led to place more reliance upon a
direct support from WELLINGTON, than would otherwise have been the case.
To accept a battle, notwithstanding the absence of BÜLOW's Corps, was
undoubtedly the wisest course. The Enemy's force in the field did not
appear to exceed that of the Prussians; and therefore, considering
the nature of the position, the contest would, in all probability,
become protracted, perhaps until the arrival of BÜLOW; perhaps, also,
until the close of day, without any distinct advantage being gained
by either party. In the former case, the required preponderance might
instantly give a decidedly favourable turn to the scale; in the latter,
the junction of the Fourth Corps during the night would enable BLÜCHER
on the following morning to attack his opponent with every prospect
of success, and either to relieve WELLINGTON, if necessary, from any
pressure in his front, or so to combine his further operations with
those of the British Commander, should the latter have held his ground
and concentrated his Army, as to lead to the complete overthrow of both
NAPOLEON's and NEY's forces.
To have declined the contest, and retired so as to effect a junction
with his Fourth Corps, he must still, if he wished to act in close
concert with WELLINGTON, have abandoned his direct communication with
the Meuse and the Rhine, whence he drew all his supplies; a result
which might as well be trusted to the chances of a battle.
These considerations were also, in all probability, strongly seconded
by a desire on the part of the Prussian Commander, and one perfectly in
keeping with his ardent character, to take every possible measure which
was at all warranted by the actual posture of affairs, for vigorously
opposing NAPOLEON's advance.
In a tactical point of view, the position was undoubtedly defective.
Nearly the entire of the ground situated between the line of Villages
of Ligny, St Amand, and Wagnelé, and the great Namur road, was
exposed to the view of the Enemy; and as there was every probability
of a protracted village fight along the front of the position, the
Supports and Reserves required to maintain a contest of that nature,
would necessarily be subjected to the full play of the Batteries on
the opposite heights. Upon the space above mentioned every movement
could be detected from the French side; where, on the contrary, the
undulations were such as to admit of the concealment of the disposition
of considerable masses of troops. The defect in this respect was
subsequently made strikingly manifest by the fact that the gradual
weakening of the Prussian Centre for the purpose of reinforcing the
Right, was closely observed by NAPOLEON, who took advantage of the
insight thus obtained into his opponent's designs, by collecting in
rear of the Heights of Ligny that force with which, when he saw that
the Prussians had no Reserve remaining, he so suddenly assailed and
broke the Centre of their line.
* * * * *
NAPOLEON's dispositions having been completed, the Battle commenced,
about half past two o'clock, with an attack upon the Village of St
Amand, by Lieutenant General LEFOL's Division of VANDAMME's Corps.
The attack, which was made in three Columns, proved successful; the
three Battalions of the 29th Prussian Regiment which defended it,
were compelled, after a stout resistance, to yield to greatly superior
numbers, and were driven out of the Village. General STEINMETZ,
whose Brigade was posted in rear of St Amand, pushed forward all the
Sharpshooters of the 12th and 24th Regiments to their support.
These, however, being unable to make head against the Enemy, who
already made a disposition to debouch from the village, the 12th and
24th Regiments were led forward to renew the contest. In the mean time,
just as the French appeared at the outlet of the Village, a shower of
grape and canister was poured right down amongst them from the Foot
Battery No. 7. Immediately upon this, both Battalions of the 12th
Regiment descended into the ravine, rushed upon the inclosures, and,
driving the Enemy's shattered Infantry before them, regained possession
of the Village. The 24th Regiment advancing by Wings of Battalions--the
one in line and the other in column of reserve respectively--supported
this attack upon the left, and established itself in the lower part of
St Amand.
In the course of this short prelude, the Batteries ranged along the
little eminences which rose on either side of the valley of the Ligny,
opened a furious cannonade along the whole extent of the Front Lines
of the contending Armies. Ligny, as also St Amand (when repossessed by
the Prussians), both of which lay so directly under the French guns,
seemed devoted to destruction. Their defenders, sheltered in a great
degree by stone walls, hollow ways, and banked up hedges, appeared
perfectly motionless while the deluge of shot and shell poured fast and
thick around them; but no sooner did those in Ligny discover a dusky
mass emerging from the clouds of smoke which enveloped the Heights
above them, and wending its course downwards upon the lower portion
of the Village, than they rushed out of their concealment, and lining
with their advanced Skirmishers the outermost inclosures, prepared to
meet the onset which would probably bring them into closer contact with
their Enemies, and lead to a struggle in which physical strength and
innate courage, combined with individual skill and dexterity, might
effect a result unattainable by a recourse to projectiles alone. It was
the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Prussian Regiment, which, issuing from
its cover, where it had stood in column, rapidly deployed, and, by a
well directed volley, shook the advancing mass, which it then threw
into disorder by following up this advantage with a well sustained fire.
Twice was this attack repeated on the part of GÉRARD's troops, but with
a similar result. A second Column now advanced against the centre of
the Village, and shortly afterwards a third was launched against the
upper part of it, near the old Castle; but their attempts to penetrate
within its precincts proved equally futile, and the four Prussian
Battalions of HENKEL's Brigade gallantly maintained the post of Ligny.
As the French Column withdrew, their Batteries played with redoubled
energy upon the Village, and fresh Columns prepared for another assault.
The troops of VANDAMME's Corps renewed the attack upon St Amand
with the utmost vigour; and forcing back the 12th and 24th Prussian
Regiments, which suffered most severely, penetrated into the Village,
where the fight became obstinate, and the fire most destructive.
STEINMETZ had only two more Battalions of his Brigade remaining at
his disposal--the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Westphalian
Landwehr--and these he pushed forward into the Village, to restore
confidence to the defenders, whose numbers were so fearfully reduced,
and, if possible, to stem the progress of the assailants. They had
scarcely got fairly into action, however, when their Commanding
Officers were wounded, and both Battalions gave way before the furious
onset of the French, the 3rd Battalion leaving numbers of its men
killed, along the outlets of the Village. The whole Brigade, which,
within a short period, had suffered a loss of 46 Officers and 2,300
men, having rallied in rear of St Amand, retired into position between
Bry and Sombref, and the three Battalions which had first occupied the
Village, marched to rejoin the Third Brigade; whilst the loud shouts of
"_Vive l'Empereur!_" which immediately followed the cessation of the
sharp rattle of the musketry, heard even amidst the incessant thunder
of the Artillery, proclaimed the triumph of the French Infantry.
In the meantime, another assault was made upon Ligny, whose defenders
had been reinforced by the two remaining Battalions of HENKEL's
Brigade. The French now changed their mode of attack. They advanced
simultaneously against the centre with the view of gaining the
Churchyard, and against the lower end of the Village in order to turn
the Left Flank of the defenders; and taking advantage of the unusually
great height of the corn, their line of Skirmishers, strengthened by
whole Battalions so as to give it a decided superiority over that of
the Prussians, approached so cautiously and silently as to continue
unperceived until they suddenly possessed themselves of the outermost
hedges and gardens. A hand to hand contest ensued, and the Prussians,
pressed in front by superior numbers, and taken in flank at the same
time, were forced to yield. Presently, however, stimulated by the
combined exertions of the Commanding Officers, Majors Count GRÖBEN,
KUYLENSTIERNA, and REX, they recovered themselves, rallied, and again
faced their Enemies.
The Battle, on this part of the Field, now presented an awfully grand
and animating spectacle, and the hopes of both parties were raised
to the highest state of excitement. Intermingled with the quick but
irregular discharge of small arms throughout the whole extent of the
Village, came forth alternately the cheering "_En avant!_" and exulting
"_Vive l'Empereur!_" as also the emphatic "_Vorwärts!_" and the wild
"_Hourrah!_" whilst the Batteries along the Heights, continuing their
terrific roar, plunged destruction into the masses seen descending
on either side to join in the desperate struggle in the valley, out
of which there now arose, from the old Castle of Ligny, volumes of
dark thick smoke, succeeded by brilliant flames, imparting additional
sublimity to the scene.
The Prussians gradually gained ground, and then pressing forward upon
all points of the Village, succeeded in clearing it of the French; who,
in retreating, abandoned two guns which had been moved close down to
the principal outlet on that side. General JAGOW's Brigade (the Third)
had made a change of front to its left, and approached the Village; the
3rd Battalions of both the 7th and 29th Regiments had been detached to
the right, to protect the Foot Batteries Nos. 3 and 8, and to remain in
reserve; the four remaining Battalions descended into the Village as a
reinforcement.
* * * * *
Beyond an occasional cannonading, the action on the eastern side
of the Field, between the Corps of GROUCHY and of THIELEMANN, was
comparatively languid: being limited to a contest, varied in its
results, for the possession of the village of Bognée, and subsequently,
of those houses of Tongrines which were situated along the bottom of
the valley; as also to some skilful manoeuvring on the part of GROUCHY
with his Cavalry, with a view of menacing the Prussian Left.
In the mean time, the French maintained possession of St Amand, but
ZIETEN's twelve pounder Batteries, which were now moved forward,
presented a formidable obstruction to their debouching from that
Village.
NAPOLEON directed General GIRARD, on the extreme Left, to take
possession, with his Division, of St Amand la Haye; and this operation
having been successfully accomplished, gave the French the advantage of
outflanking from thence any attack upon St Amand itself.
BLÜCHER ordered General PIRCH II. to retake this Village; whereupon the
latter advanced with his Brigade from the Height of Bry, and withdrew
the 1st Battalion of the 6th Regiment from the Windmill of Bussy, which
was then occupied by the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment (Eighth
Brigade), and near to which the 1st Westphalian Landwehr Cavalry
remained during the whole of the action.
At the same time, the Prussian Chief, fully sensible of the very
critical position in which he would be placed, were the French,
following up the advantages they had already gained upon his right,
to debouch from St Amand and St Amand la Haye in sufficient force to
overpower ZIETEN's Corps, and thus cut off his communication with
WELLINGTON; he decided upon occupying the Village of Wagnelé, whence
repeated attacks might be directed against the Enemy's Left Flank;
and, with this view, he desired General PIRCH I., who commanded the
Second Corps, to detach the Fifth Brigade (General TIPPELSKIRCHEN's)
to the latter Village, and to place it under the orders of General
JÜRGASS, who was also sent to that part of the Field, with Lieutenant
Colonel SOHR's Brigade of Cavalry (consisting of the 3rd Brandenburg,
and 5th Pomeranian, Hussars), together with two Squadrons of the 6th
Neumark Dragoons, and the Horse Battery No. 6. Colonel MARWITZ, of
THIELEMANN's Corps, was also ordered to join these troops with two
Regiments of his Brigade, the 7th and 8th Uhlans. The Brigade of
General BRAUSE (the Seventh), which had been rejoined by detached
Battalions, was pushed forward as far as the Roman road, to occupy the
position vacated by the advance of General TIPPELSKIRCHEN's Brigade, to
which it was to act as a Support in case of necessity.
It was four o'clock when General PIRCH II. who had formed his Brigade
for the attack of St Amand la Haye, having his Left Flank protected by
the 12th Regiment, which had reassembled in rear of St Amand, moved his
Front Line against the former Village. As it advanced, however, its
ranks were dreadfully shattered by the fire from the French Artillery,
nor were they less thinned by that of the musketry as they entered
the Village; and such was the determined resistance on the part of
the French, that they were unable to penetrate beyond the centre of
the Village; and though reinforced by the 1st Battalion of the 6th
Regiment, from the Second Line, they found it quite impracticable
to drive the Enemy out of a Large Building which was surrounded by
a stone wall, and which formed the point of connection between the
two Villages. The Prussians having got into great disorder, and
being closely pressed by the French, were compelled to abandon the
Village, in order to collect their scattered remnants, and to reform.
General GIRARD, whose Division had, under his own immediate guidance,
so gallantly maintained the Village, fell mortally wounded on this
occasion.
BLÜCHER now decided on a renewed attack upon St Amand la Haye, in
order to occupy the front of GIRARD's Division, while he should carry
into effect his previously projected movement against the Enemy's Left
Flank; and, anxious to ensure the due execution of his instructions
and to direct the attacks himself, he repaired in person to this
part of the Field. General TIPPELSKIRCHEN's Brigade, having advanced
along the Roman road, was already formed in Brigade order, in rear of
Wagnelé, while JÜRGASS had posted his Cavalry more to the left, and
opposite to the interval between that Village and St Amand la Haye,
whence he could with considerable advantage fall upon the Enemy, should
the latter venture to debouch in that direction.
These movements did not escape the watchful eye of NAPOLEON, who
detached a Division of the Young Guard and a Battery of the same Corps
in support of his Left Wing, as also General COLBERT's Brigade of
Lancers from Count PAJOL's Corps, to reinforce the Cavalry on the Left,
and to preserve the communication with NEY.
When all was ready for the attack, BLÜCHER, who felt how much depended
on its result, galloped up to the leading Battalions, and thus
earnestly and impassionately ordered the advance:--"Now, lads, behave
well! don't suffer the _Grande Nation_ again to rule over you! Forward!
In God's name--forward!" Instantly his devoted followers rent the air
with their re-echoing shouts of "_Vorwärts!_"
Nothing could surpass the undaunted resolution and intrepid mien
which PIRCH's Battalions displayed as they advanced against, and
entered, St Amand la Haye, at a charging pace; they completely swept
the Enemy before them; while Major QUADT, who commanded the 28th
Regiment, supported by some Detachments of the 2nd Regiment (from
TIPPELSKIRCHEN's Brigade) gained possession of the great building. The
1st Battalion of the 6th Regiment, after having forced its way right
across the Village, sallied forth from the opposite side, in pursuit
of the Enemy, with a degree of impetuosity which its Officers had
the utmost difficulty in restraining, while numbers of the men were
on the point of plunging into the very midst of the French Reserves.
The Cavalry on the right of the Village seemed to have caught up the
intrepid spirit and enthusiastic devotion of the Infantry; and, as
if impatient to join in the struggle, a Squadron of the Brandenburg
Uhlans supported the attack of the Village by a charge upon the
Enemy's Cavalry: after which, the remainder of this Regiment, with
the 1st Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, advanced under General TRESKOW,
into the plain on the left of the Village, of which the whole contour
now bristled with the bayonets of the 46th Regiment, while the 28th
Regiment held the Post of the Great Building, which it had so gallantly
carried, and the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr stood in Second Line, as a
Reserve.
So completely absorbed was the attention of the twelve pounder Battery
No. 6, which stood in a somewhat isolated position, by the contest in
St Amand la Haye, which it covered by its fire, that it had not noticed
the stealthy advance of a Troop of the Enemy's horsemen, wearing the
uniform of the Light Artillery of the Guard, and most unexpectedly
found itself attacked in flank by these bold adventurers. This give
rise to a curious scene, for the Prussian Gunners, in the first
moment of surprise, could only defend themselves with their rammers
and handspikes; but with these they plied the intruders with so much
adroitness and resolution as to hurl their leaders to the ground, and
force the remainder to betake themselves to a hasty flight.
Prince BLÜCHER had, in the meantime, on perceiving COLBERT's French
Lancers hovering upon, and stretching out beyond, his extreme Right,
ordered General PIRCH to detach two more Cavalry Regiments--the Queen's
Dragoons and the 4th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry--as a reinforcement to
the Cavalry of ZIETEN's Corps.
The nearly simultaneous attack upon Wagnelé by TIPPELSKIRCHEN's
Brigade, previously mentioned as having taken post in rear of that
Village, was not attended with an equal degree of success. The 1st
and 2nd Battalions of the 25th Regiment advanced in Column through
the centre of Wagnelé; but on debouching, the 2nd Battalion, which
led the advance, was suddenly assailed by a fire from the French
Skirmishers who lay concealed in the high corn. Although its order was
thus considerably disturbed; it succeeded, nevertheless, in effecting
its deployment. The 1st Battalion also deployed, but, in doing so, its
Left Wing covered the right of the 2nd Battalion; and while executing
a second movement, intended to clear the front of the latter, the
French Battalions pressing forward, drove in the Prussian Skirmishers
upon the Regiment, which consisted mostly of young soldiers; when,
notwithstanding the conspicuously meritorious exertions of all their
Officers, they were overthrown and dispersed in such a manner that
it became impracticable to lead them back into action in any other
way than by separate Detachments. The 3rd Battalion of this Regiment
shared nearly the same fate; for, having plunged into the high corn,
it received a volley which disordered its ranks, and killed its three
senior Officers; and although it maintained for some time a fire in
return, it was eventually compelled to retire, as were also the 1st and
2nd Battalions of the 5th Westphalian Landwehr, under precisely similar
circumstances. The Brigade was reformed, under the protection of the
2nd Prussian Regiment, which now advanced from the Reserve, boldly
encountered the Enemy, and aided by the efficacious fire of the Foot
Battery No. 10, stemmed the further progress of the French, and thus
gained time for the remaining Battalions to reform in rear of Wagnelé.
Upon the advance, however, of a French Column towards its Left Flank,
it fell back as far as the entrance into the Village.
The French now renewed their attacks upon St Amand la Haye, and made
their appearance simultaneously in front and in both flanks of that
Village. The fight again became desperate. PIRCH's Brigade had,
however, exhausted both its ammunition and its strength, when BLÜCHER
pushed forward the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment (from the Eighth
Brigade--Colonel LANGEN's), and soon afterwards the 3rd Battalion of
the 9th Regiment, together with the whole of the 26th Regiment (from
the Sixth Brigade--General KRAFFT's); whereupon General PIRCH withdrew
his Battalions, which had suffered so severely, to the rear of Bry. The
Foot Battery No. 3, belonging to PIRCH's Brigade, had at an earlier
period moved to its left, and had taken up a position near the quarries
on the right of Ligny, by the side of the Foot Battery No. 8, of
JAGOW's Brigade.
* * * * *
While the struggle in the Villages in front of the Right of the
Prussian position continue to wear an indecisive and unsettled aspect;
let us return for a moment to Ligny, which we left in possession of
Count HENKEL's Fourth Prussian Brigade, supported by the Third Brigade
under General JAGOW.
The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 7th Regiment (of JAGOW's Brigade)
were ordered to traverse the Village, and to advance in column against
the Enemy. Just as they debouched, they found in their immediate front,
several French Battalions, in Close Column, moving directly against the
village. Both parties at once came to a halt; the Prussians without
being able to deploy in the defile, and the French without attempting
to do so, probably unwilling to lose the time which such a movement
would require. A fire of musketry commenced which lasted half an hour,
and caused much loss. Other Battalions now hastened across the village,
but all at once, a rumour flew rapidly among them, that the French
were in possession of the Churchyard, and in a moment several muskets
were aimed in that direction, and either thoughtlessly or nervously
discharged. Those Battalions that were in front, at the outlet of the
village, became alarmed by this unexpected firing in their rear. At
the same time, a discharge of grape, from some guns suddenly brought
forward by the French, in their immediate front, augmented their
confusion, and forced them to a retreat. They were closely pursued
by the Enemy, whose Skirmishers made a dash at the Colour of the 2nd
Battalion of the 7th Regiment, which they would have captured but for
the noble and determined gallantry with which it was defended.
General KRAFFT, from whose Brigade (the Sixth) five Battalions had
already been detached, namely, four for the defence of St Amand la
Haye, and one in aid of that of Ligny, now received BLÜCHER's Order
with his remaining four Battalions (the 1st and 2nd of the 9th, and
the 1st and 3rd of the 1st Elbe Landwehr), to drive the Enemy out of
the latter Village. The Foot Battery No. 15, was posted between the
left of Ligny and the Bois du Loup, and the Foot Battery No. 37, was
directed towards St Amand. The other Batteries posted between Ligny and
St Amand received Orders to retire accordingly as they expended their
ammunition, for the purpose of refitting; and they were successively
relieved by the Foot Battery No. 1, the Horse Battery No. 10, and the
twelve pounder Batteries Nos. 4 and 8. The Horse Battery No. 14 was
advanced across the stream between Ligny and Sombref, and took post on
the other side of the valley, where it was much exposed to the Enemy's
fire, and lost 19 Gunners and 53 horses.
General KRAFFT moved forward, in the first instance, only two
Battalions, and kept the others in reserve; but all of them soon
became engaged; for the French, though driven back at first, received
considerable reinforcements.
The fight throughout the whole Village of Ligny was now at the hottest:
the place was literally crammed with the combatants, and its streets
and inclosures were choked up with the wounded, the dying, and the
dead: every house that had escaped being set on fire, was the scene of
a desperate struggle: the troops fought no longer in combined order,
but in numerous and irregular groups, separated by houses either in
flames, or held as little forts, sometimes by the one, and sometimes
by the other party; and in various instances, when their ammunition
failed, or when they found themselves suddenly assailed from different
sides, the bayonet, and even the butt, supplied them with the ready
means for prosecuting the dreadful carnage with unmitigated fury. The
entire Village was concealed in smoke; but the incessant rattle of the
musketry, the crashing of burning timbers, the smashing of doors and
gateways, the yells and imprecations of the combatants, which were
heard through that misty veil, gave ample indication to the troops
posted in reserve upon the Heights, of the fierce and savage nature
of the struggle beneath. In the meantime, the relieving Batteries
on the Prussian side, which had arrived quite fresh from the rear,
came into full play, as did also a reinforcement, on the French side,
from the Artillery of the Imperial Guard. The earth now trembled
under the tremendous cannonade; and as the flames, issuing from the
numerous burning houses, intermingled with dense volumes of smoke,
shot directly upwards through the light grey mass which rendered the
Village indistinguishable, and seemed continually to thicken, the scene
resembled for a time some violent convulsion of nature, rather than a
human conflict--as if the valley had been rent asunder, and Ligny had
become the focus of a burning crater.
Long did this fierce and deadly strife continue without any material
advance being made on either side. At length the French gained
possession of a large House, as also of the Churchyard, into which they
brought forward two pieces of cannon. General JAGOW vainly endeavoured
with the 7th Regiment to retake this House. The 1st Battalion of the
3rd Westphalian Landwehr displayed the most inflexible perseverance in
its endeavours to drive the French out again from the Churchyard: it
made three unsuccessful attempts to cross an intervening ditch, and
subsequently tried to gain a hollow way, which lay in the flank of that
post, but falling upon the French reinforcements that were advancing
towards it, they were compelled to abandon the enterprise.
Fresh victims were still required to satiate the "King of Terrors," who
might be said to hold a gala day in this "Valley of Death." BLÜCHER had
ordered Colonel LANGEN's Brigade (the Eighth) to follow in succession
that of General KRAFFT. The position vacated by the former, in front of
Sombref, was taken up by Colonel STÜLPNAGEL's Brigade (the Twelfth) of
THIELEMANN's Corps, and the chain of Skirmishers of the latter Brigade
extended along the rivulet as far as Ligny. As soon as Colonel LANGEN
had reached the immediate vicinity of Ligny, he posted the 1st and 2nd
Battalions of the 21st Regiment upon an eminence near the Village, and
the Foot Battery No. 12, covered by two Squadrons of the 5th Kurmark
Landwehr Cavalry, upon the left of the road leading to Ligny. The
21st Regiment made no less than six different attacks, partly in
conjunction with the other troops that fought in Ligny, and partly
isolated, without succeeding in disturbing the position of the Enemy in
that portion of the village which lies on the right bank of the Ligny.
Colonel LANGEN, observing the increased fury and obstinacy of the fight
in Ligny, detached thither also the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Regiment,
and the 2nd of the 3rd Elbe Landwehr: he then took up a position, with
the remainder of his Brigade, near the Mill of Bussy, into which he
threw the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment. The 1st Battalion of this
Corps, having formed two Columns, rushed into the Village, and, after
crossing the stream, received a sharp fire from the windows of the
houses on the opposite side. The Left Column of the Battalion stormed a
farm house, of which, after it had burst in the gates with hatchets, it
gained possession, and thus protected the advance of the Right Column.
* * * * *
At this moment, NAPOLEON's final and decisive attack commenced on this
point; but previously to entering upon an account of it, it will be
necessary to resume the narrative of the contest along the remainder of
the Line of Battle.
On the Right, TIPPELSKIRCHEN's Brigade (the Fifth) was ordered to
renew the attack upon St Amand la Haye; and, as an auxiliary movement,
a bold push was to be made upon the group of houses in rear of that
village, and of Wagnelé, called the Hameau de St Amand. Both of the
3rd Battalions of the 2nd and 25th Regiments, under Major WITZLEBEN,
advanced against the latter point, while the 1st and 2nd Battalions of
the 2nd Regiment, the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Westphalian Landwehr,
and a Battalion of the 25th Regiment made a direct attack upon St
Amand la Haye. Both movements were supported by the Foot Batteries
Nos. 10 and 37, and Colonel THÜMEN was detached, with the Silesian
Uhlans, and the 11th Hussars, to cover the Right of the Brigade: the
1st and 2nd Squadrons of the 5th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry were posted
in reserve. The 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment opened the attack
upon the Hameau de St Amand, and being well protected on their right by
the 11th Hussars, carried it by storm. The French appeared determined
to regain this point, which from its position, was, in fact, the key
to the defence of the three Villages of St Amand, St Amand la Haye,
and Wagnelé; and the struggle for its possession was most obstinate
and sanguinary. All the Battalions of TIPPELSKIRCHEN's Brigade became
successively engaged. Four times was St Amand la Haye lost and retaken
by the 2nd Regiment, which suffered severely. General JÜRGASS ordered
forward the Horse Battery No. 6, on the right of which the Foot Battery
No. 10 then took post. The Silesian Uhlans and the 11th Hussars
suffered considerably from their exposure to the Enemy's Artillery.
Colonel THÜMEN was killed at their head, by a cannon shot, and was
succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel SCHMIEDEBERG, who ordered both these
Regiments to make a change of front to the right; when the Prussian
Lancers dashed forward to meet the advance of a French Regiment, which
they completely defeated, and having followed up the attack with a
vigorous pursuit, fell all at once among the Enemy's Reserves; but they
immediately recovered themselves, and rallied with great celerity,
order, and precision.
About this time, the Light Cavalry Brigade of Colonel MARWITZ, already
mentioned as having been ordered from the Left, reached the Right
Flank, and was formed up in two lines: also the four Battalions that
had been detached from General KRAFFT's Brigade, arrived upon the right
of St Amand la Haye, and came into action. The Battle on both sides
on this part of the Field continued to rage with unabated violence,
and with such indefatigable ardour did the Prussians continue the
struggle, that when the fire of their Infantry Skirmishers was observed
to slacken, from the men having expended their ammunition, the soldiers
of the 11th Hussars rushed into the midst of them, and supplied them
with such cartridges as they had of their own; an act of devotion to
which many of them fell a sacrifice. General JÜRGASS ordered forward
the Brigade (Seventh) of General BRAUSE in support of that of General
TIPPELSKIRCHEN, which had suffered a very severe loss. When General
BRAUSE had, at an earlier period, taken post at the Trois Burettes,
upon TIPPELSKIRCHEN advancing from that point to Wagnelé (as previously
explained), he stationed both the 3rd Battalions of the 14th and 22nd
Regiments upon an eminence on the left of the high road, for the
purpose of keeping up the communication with TIPPELSKIRCHEN; and he
pushed on the other two Battalions of the 14th Regiment towards Bry,
that they might be nearer at hand, if required, for the contest in the
Villages of Wagnelé and St Amand la Haye, while the two Squadrons of
the Elbe Landwehr Cavalry, attached to his Brigade, kept a look out
upon both sides of the road. These two Battalions, thus posted, caught
the eye of BLÜCHER as he looked round for the nearest available force,
and he immediately ordered them to advance, and join in the contest;
and General BRAUSE, on being made acquainted with this disposition,
led forward the 3rd Battalions of the 14th and 22nd Regiments, and
the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Elbe Landwehr, while the four remaining
Battalions of his Brigade, making a change of front to their left,
formed up, in reserve, in rear of the Namur road. On approaching the
more immediate scene of the action, General BRAUSE came upon the 3rd
Battalion of the 9th Regiment, which had expended all its ammunition:
he procured for it a fresh supply, and ordered it to return into the
Village, along with the 2nd Battalion of the 14th Regiment; while the
1st Battalion of this Regiment threw itself into St Amand la Haye, and
relieved the 2nd Regiment, which now retired, as did also the remainder
of TIPPELSKIRCHEN's Brigade to the rear of Wagnelé, where it reformed.
Here, in these Villages on the Right, as well as at Ligny, the fight
never slackened for a moment: fresh masses, from both sides, poured in
among the burning houses as often as the fearfully diminished numbers
and dreadfully exhausted state of the combatants rendered relief
imperatively necessary; partial successes on different points were
constantly met by corresponding reverses on others; and so equally were
the courage, the energies, and the devotion of both parties balanced,
that the struggle between them appeared, from its unabated vigour,
likely to continue until the utter exhaustion of the one should yield
the triumph to the greater command of Reserves possessed by the other.
The anxiety at that time on the part of BLÜCHER for the arrival of
either a portion of WELLINGTON's forces, or BÜLOW's Corps, was extreme;
and frequently, as he cheered forward his men in their advance to
take part in the contest, did he address them with the exhortation,
"Forward, lads! we must do something before the English join us!"
In fact, his only Reserve remaining was the Ninth Brigade (General
BORCKE's), the withdrawal of which would greatly expose his Centre; and
NAPOLEON, who had already entertained a suspicion that such was the
case, resolved upon terminating the sanguinary combat in the valley, by
boldly advancing a portion of his own intact Reserves, consisting of
the Guard and LOBAU's Corps (which had just arrived and was posted on
the right of Fleuras) against the Prussian Centre.
* * * * *
For the execution of his project the French Emperor destined the
Imperial Guard, with MILHAUD's Corps of _Cuirassiers_ in support. He
wished to conceal this movement as much as possible from the Enemy,
and caused it to be made to the right, along the rear of the Corps of
GÉRARD, a portion of whose Batteries were ordered to be withdrawn, for
the purpose of affording greater protection to the Guard, by diverting
the Enemy's fire to other points, and of deceiving him as to the real
object of the movement, if observed previously to the actual execution
of the Emperor's design.
This far-famed band of veteran warriors, and MILHAUD's splendid Corps
of mailed _Cuirassiers_, were in full march towards the lower extremity
of Ligny, where they were to cross the stream, when, all at once, they
were halted by an Order direct from the Emperor, who had decided upon
suspending the movement, until he should ascertain the result of an
incident that had occurred upon his extreme Left, and which had placed
him for the time in considerable doubt and anxiety respecting its real
nature.
He had received a message from VANDAMME, informing him that a strong
Column, composed of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, was advancing
towards Fleuras; that it had at first been looked upon as the Corps
detached from NEY's forces, until it was discovered that it moved by a
different road from that along which those troops had been expected,
and in a direction towards the French Left Rear, instead of the
Prussian extreme Right; that GIRARD's Division had been consequently
induced to fall back, and take up a position to cover Fleurus; and
that the effect produced upon his own Corps by the sudden appearance
of this Column was such, that if his Majesty did not immediately move
his Reserve to arrest its progress, his troops would be compelled to
evacuate St Amand and commence a retreat.
This intelligence could not fail to create alarm in the mind of the
French Emperor, who concluded that the Corps in question had been
detached against his Rear, as a diversion in favour of BLÜCHER, from
the Army of WELLINGTON, who had probably obtained some signal triumph
over NEY. Another Officer arrived from VANDAMME, reiterating the
account previously given. NAPOLEON instantly gave the Order for the
halt of the Imperial Guard; and despatched one of his Aides de Camp to
reconnoitre the strength and disposition of the Column, and to discover
the object of its movement.
* * * * *
The commencement of the march of the Imperial Guard and MILHAUD's
_Cuirassier_ Corps towards Ligny, had been conducted with so much
skill, and the manoeuvring of these troops at one point in their line
of march to shelter themselves from the fire of the Prussian Batteries,
to which they had become suddenly exposed, bore so much the appearance
of a retrograde movement, accompanied as it was by the withdrawal
of a portion of the guns of GÉRARD's Corps, that the Prussians were
completely deceived by it. Intelligence was hastily conveyed to BLÜCHER
that the Enemy was retreating; whereupon he ordered the march of
all the remaining disposable Battalions of Colonel LANGEN's Brigade
(the Eighth) upon St Amand, to enable him to take advantage of the
circumstance by pressing upon the Enemy's Left.
In the mean time, Colonel MARWITZ had been menaced by the advance of a
considerable line of Cavalry and a Battery, which latter annoyed him
but little. This Cavalry did not, however, seem much disposed to risk a
close encounter: once it put forward a Detachment, which was overthrown
by two Squadrons of the 7th and 8th Uhlans, and then a Regiment of
French _Chasseurs à Cheval_ fell upon the Skirmishers of the 2nd
Regiment of Infantry, but was driven back by two Squadrons of the 5th
Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry. Colonel MARWITZ had been ordered by General
JÜRGASS to send out Patrols in different directions from the Right
Flank, for the purpose of seeking out the communication with the Duke
of WELLINGTON's forces. These brought in prisoners, from whom it was
ascertained that a whole French Corps, the First, under Count D'ERLON,
was in that vicinity.
Subsequently, French Cavalry were perceived between Mellet and Villers
Perruin; whereupon Colonel MARWITZ, who had been reinforced by two
Squadrons of the Pomeranian Hussars, ordered a change of front of his
Brigade in this direction, then deployed his eight Squadrons in two
lines, with considerable intervals, and withdrew them, alternately,
towards the high road; followed, though not vigorously, by three French
Regiments of Cavalry and a Battery, comprising JAQUINOT's Light Cavalry
Brigade, attached to d'Erlon's Corps. As he approached the _chaussée_,
the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 2nd Elbe Landwehr, as also the 3rd
Battalion of the 22nd Regiment, advanced to his support.
Until about six o'clock the action along that part of the line which
extended from Sombref to Balatre, had not been carried on with any
degree of energy, and the occupation of the opposing forces was
generally limited to mutual observation. Now, however, the French
Infantry (of which only a small portion was attached to GROUCHY's
Cavalry), penetrated as far as the precincts of the Village of
Tongrines; but Colonel KÄMPFEN's Brigade (the Tenth), having been
successively reinforced by all the Battalions of Colonel LUCK's Brigade
(the Eleventh) excepting one which was left in reserve, the French were
easily repulsed, and the Prussians maintained full possession of all
this portion of their original position.
* * * * *
It was about seven o'clock when the Aide de Camp returned from his
reconnaissance, and reported to NAPOLEON that the Column in the
distance which had caused so much uneasiness proved to be D'ERLON's
Corps; that GIRARD's Division, upon being undeceived, had resumed
its position in the Line of Battle; and that VANDAMME's Corps had
maintained its ground.
This movement of D'ERLON's Corps admits of being satisfactorily
explained. NAPOLEON, having received information that D'ERLON had
been left in reserve in front of Gosselies, and inferring, perhaps,
from this circumstance that NEY was sufficiently strong to be able to
hold his ground at Quatre Bras, without further aid than what he had
at hand, resolved upon employing this Corps upon the Prussian Right
Flank; but in the meantime, D'ERLON had, in pursuance of instructions
from NEY, continued his march towards Quatre Bras; and having himself
proceeded in advance, had reached Frasne, at which place Colonel
LAURENT found him, and communicated to him the Emperor's Order for the
march of his Corps upon St Amand; adding that on coming up with the
head of his Column, he had taken upon himself to change its direction
of march into that of St Amand. D'ERLON hastened to comply with
NAPOLEON's wishes, and despatched General D'ELCAMBRE, his Chief of the
Staff, to make known the movement to Marshal NEY.
His route from Frasne towards St Amand, the point prescribed by the
Order, lay through Villers Perruin, and the movement was altogether
one of a retrograde nature. Hence the direction of the Column, as seen
in the distance, was well calculated to alarm the troops of the French
extreme Left; as also to excite surprise in the mind of NAPOLEON,
who having formed no expectation of the arrival of any French troops
in the Field by any other direction than that from Gosselies upon St
Amand, or perhaps from Quatre Bras upon Bry, also participated in the
opinion that the Column in question, under its attendant circumstances
and general disposition, could be no other than that of an Enemy.
As D'ERLON debouched from Villers Perruin, and advanced upon the
prescribed point, St Amand, he threw out his Cavalry (JAQUINOT's) to
his Left, for the protection of this Flank; and it was before this
Cavalry that the Prussian Brigade, under Colonel MARWITZ, retired
in the manner already explained, a movement which fully restored
confidence to GIRARD's Division.
All at once this Column was observed to halt, to indicate an indecision
in its intentions, and finally to withdraw from the Field. D'ERLON had
in fact just received from NEY a peremptory Order to join him without
delay, with which he resolved to comply, probably concluding that he
was bound to do so from the circumstance of his having been in the
first instance placed under the Marshal's immediate command; having
ascertained also from the Emperor's Aide de Camp that he was not the
bearer of any instructions whatever from NAPOLEON as to his future
movements, and that the appearance of his Corps upon that part of the
Field of Battle had been quite unexpected. This pressing Order had
been despatched by NEY immediately previous to the arrival of Colonel
LAURENT on the Heights of Gemioncourt.
If the first appearance of this Column had caused alarm and perplexity
among the troops of the French Left Wing, the apprehensions it excited
on the Prussian Right, when its Cavalry was observed to advance and to
drive back Colonel MARWITZ' Brigade, which had been sent towards it _en
reconnaissance_ (as already explained), were still greater; and its
equally unexpected disappearance (with the exception of its Cavalry,
and a portion of its Infantry), at a moment when it was felt that
its vigorous co-operation must have rendered the issue of the Battle
no longer doubtful, was looked upon as a particularly fortunate turn
of affairs; and BLÜCHER's hopes revived as he prepared to carry into
effect his meditated attack upon the French Left Flank.
There did not appear on the part of NAPOLEON any eagerness to resume
the movement of the Imperial Guard towards the lower extremity of
Ligny, but rather an anxiety to await calmly the most favourable moment
for his projected attack. Doubtless he had discovered the march of
the remaining Battalions of Colonel LANGEN's Brigade, from Sombref
towards St Amand, as a further reinforcement to the Prussian Right,
and calculated upon paralysing the attack which BLÜCHER was evidently
preparing against his Left Flank, by executing a sudden and vigorous
assault on the Prussian Centre, with a preponderating mass of fresh
troops.
* * * * *
At length, towards eight o'clock, the Emperor gave the Order for the
Guard and MILHAUD's Corps of _Cuirassiers_ to resume their march. The
same precautions were observed as before for masking the movement as
much as possible, and so successfully, that THIELEMANN, on observing a
French Battery opposite Tongrines entirely withdrawn, and GROUCHY's
lines of Cavalry presenting a diminished extent of front, and
conceiving, at the same time, that the contest in Ligny was assuming
a change favourable to the Prussians, concluded that the moment had
then arrived in which an attack might be made with every probability
of success, upon the Right Flank of the Enemy. He had only one Brigade
remaining of the Cavalry of his Corps, namely that of Colonel Count
LOTTUM; the other Brigade, under Colonel MARWITZ, having been, as
already explained, for some time detached to the extreme Right of the
Prussian Army. General HOBE, who commanded this Cavalry Division, had
previously moved forward Count LOTTUM's Brigade and posted it in rear
of Colonel KÄMPFEN's Infantry Brigade. THIELEMANN now desired him to
advance with LOTTUM's Brigade and the Horse Battery No. 19, along the
Fleurus high road.
In carrying this Order into effect, General HOBE posted the Battery,
in the first instance, close to the twelve pounder Battery No. 7,
which stood across the Fleurus high road, about midway between the
junction of the latter with the Namur road and the Bridge over the
Ligny. A cannonade was opened from this point upon the French guns on
the opposite Height, to which the latter replied with great spirit, and
one of the guns of the Battery was dismounted. The remaining guns were
now advanced rapidly along the high road, preceded by two Squadrons of
the 7th Dragoons: on getting into position, two of the guns continued
upon the road itself, on which the French had also posted two pieces,
but scarcely had the Squadrons formed up, and the Battery fired a few
rounds, when they were furiously attacked by the 5th and 13th French
Dragoons of EXCELMANS' Cavalry Corps: in an instant they were thrown
into confusion; the two guns upon the road escaped, while the remainder
fell into the hands of the French Dragoons, who closely pursued the
Prussians.
General BORCKE (commanding the Ninth Brigade) observing this _mêlée_
upon the Fleurus road, immediately pushed forward the 1st and 3rd
Battalions of the 1st Kurmark Landwehr, and posted them in rear of the
hedges and walls running parallel with the high road, so as to flank
the Enemy's Cavalry; the 2nd Battalion of the same Regiment followed
the movement, and was finally stationed upon the road. In order to
support these Battalions, and to preserve the communication with
Colonel STÜLPNAGEL's Brigade (the Twelfth) on his right, he occupied
Mont Potriaux and its outlets with the remainder of his Brigade,
excepting the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 8th Regiment, which he held
in reserve.
The 5th and 13th French Dragoons finding themselves likely to be
thus seriously impeded both in front and on their left, and finally
experiencing on their right a cannonade from the two Batteries attached
to Colonel KÄMPFEN's Brigade, which had moved forward from the Height
above Tongrines to the rise of ground south of Tongrenelle, retired
from this part of the Field.
It will be recollected that Colonel STÜLPNAGEL's Brigade, on relieving
that of Colonel LANGEN in front of Sombref, had extended a chain of
Skirmishers along the stream as far as Ligny: these were now reinforced
by both the 3rd Battalions of the 31st Regiment and the 6th Kurmark
Landwehr, with the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Kurmark Landwehr in
reserve. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the Kurmark Landwehr were posted
on the Height between Sombref and Bois du Loup, having on their right
and somewhat in advance, two Squadrons from each of the 5th and 6th
Regiments of Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, together with two guns from the
Foot Battery No. 12. The remaining four Battalions of the Brigade were
in reserve immediately in front of the inclosures of Sombref.
It was nearly eight o'clock, when General KRAFFT despatched an Aide de
Camp to the rear with a message stating, that it was only by dint of
extraordinary efforts that the troops in Ligny could hold out against
the Enemy, who was continually advancing with fresh reinforcements.
General Count GNEISENAU (the Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army),
in the absence of the Prince, sent word that the Village must be
maintained, at whatever sacrifice, half an hour longer.
About the same time, General PIRCH II. sent word to BLÜCHER that his
Brigade, in defending St Amand la Haye, had expended the whole of its
ammunition, and that even the pouches of the killed had been completely
emptied. To this the Prince replied, that the Second Brigade must,
nevertheless, not only maintain its Post, but also attack the Enemy
with the bayonet.
In fact, the exhaustion of the Prussian troops was becoming more
manifest every moment. Several Officers and men, overcome by long
continued exertion, were seen to fall solely from excessive fatigue.
No kind of warfare can be conceived more harassing to the combatants
than was the protracted contest in the Villages which skirted the
front of the Prussian position. It partook also of a savage and
relentless character. The animosity and exasperation of both parties
were uncontrollable. Innumerable individual combats took place. Every
house, every court, every wall, was the scene of a desperate conflict.
Streets were alternately won and lost. An ungovernable fury seized
upon the combatants on both sides, as they rushed wildly forward to
relieve their comrades exhausted by their exertions in the deadly
strife--a strife in which every individual appeared eager to seek out
an opponent, from whose death he might derive some alleviation to the
thirst of hatred and revenge by which he was so powerfully excited.
Hence no quarter was asked or granted by either party.
[Illustration:
BATTLE OF LIGNY
at 1/2 past 8 o'clock p.m.]
When it is considered that a very great portion of the Prussian Army
consisted of young soldiers, who were under fire for the first time,
their bravery and exertions in maintaining so lengthened a contest of
this nature, with the veteran warriors of the French Army, cannot fail
to be regarded with the highest admiration.
* * * * *
Such were the distribution and the state of the Prussian troops
throughout their Line, when NAPOLEON arrived near the lower extremity
of Ligny, with a formidable Reserve. This consisted of eight Battalions
of the Guard, of MILHAUD's Corps of Heavy Cavalry, comprising eight
Regiments of _Cuirassiers_, and of the _Grenadiers à Cheval_ of the
Guard. It was not, however, his sole Reserve; for most opportunely
LOBAU's Corps had just arrived and taken post on the right of Fleurus.
The troops which the French Emperor held thus in hand ready to launch
as a thunderbolt against the weakened Centre of the Prussian Line
of Battle, were perfectly fresh, not having hitherto taken any part
whatever in the contest, and they might justly be styled the flower
of his Army. It was this consciousness of the vantage ground he then
possessed which, upon his perceiving the comparatively unoccupied
space in rear of Ligny, called forth from him the remark to Count
GÉRARD, "They are lost: they have no Reserve remaining!" He saw that
not another moment was to be delayed in securing the victory which was
now within his grasp, and gave his last Orders for the attack at the
very time when BLÜCHER, whose Right had just been strengthened by the
arrival of the remaining three Battalions of Colonel LANGEN's (the
Eighth) Infantry Brigade, was making his dispositions for vigorously
assailing the French Army in its Left Flank.
The projected movement that was to decide the Battle was preceded,
at about half past eight o'clock, by the rapid advance of several
Batteries of the Guard, which opened a most destructive fire upon
the Prussians posted within, and formed in the immediate rear of,
Ligny. Under cover of this cannonade, GÉRARD, with PECHEUX's Infantry
Division, reinforced the troops that still maintained that half of
the Village which lay on the right bank of the rivulet, and pushed
forward with a determination to dislodge the Enemy from the remaining
portion on the left bank. While the Prussian Infantry in rear of Ligny
were in movement for the purpose of relieving their comrades who were
already giving way before this renewed attack, they suddenly perceived,
on the French right of the Village, a Column issuing from under the
heavy smoke that rolled away from the well served Batteries which had
so unexpectedly opened upon them, and, which continued so fearfully
to thin their ranks; and, as the mass rapidly advanced down the slope
with the evident design of forcing a passage across the valley, they
could not fail to distinguish both by its well sustained order and
compactness, and by its dark waving surface of bearskins, that they
had now to contend against the redoubted Imperial Guard. Ligny being
thus turned, the Prussian Infantry, instead of continuing its advance
into the Village, was necessitated, by its inferiority of numbers, to
confine its operations to the securing, as far as possible, an orderly
retreat for the defenders of the place.
Notwithstanding their dreadfully exhausted and enfeebled state, and
their knowledge that a body of fresh troops was advancing against
them, a body, too, which they knew was almost invariably employed
whenever some great and decisive blow was to be struck, they evinced
not the slightest symptom of irresolution, but, on the contrary,
were animated by the most inflexible courage. The sun had gone down,
shrouded in heavy clouds, and rain having set in, the battlefield would
speedily be enveloped in darkness; hence the Prussians felt that it
required but a little more perseverance in their exertions to enable
them to counterbalance their deficiency of numbers upon any point of
their Line by a stern and resolute resistance, sufficient to secure for
the entire of their Army the means of effecting a retreat, unattended
by those disastrous consequences which a signal defeat in the light of
day might have entailed upon them.
The 21st Regiment of Infantry boldly advanced against the French
Column, with a determination to check its further progress; but soon
found itself charged in flank by Cavalry that had darted forward
from the head of a Column which, by the glimmering of its armour,
even amidst the twilight, proclaimed itself a formidable body of
_Cuirassiers_. It was, in fact, MILHAUD's whole Corps of that
description of force, which had effected its passage on the other side
of the village. The 9th Regiment of Infantry fought its way through
a mass of Cavalry, whilst Major WULFFEN, with two weak Squadrons of
the 1st Westphalian Landwehr Cavalry, made a gallant charge against
the French Infantry, which received it with a volley at a distance
of twenty paces. The Prussian Infantry compelled to evacuate Ligny,
effected its retreat in Squares, in perfect order, though surrounded by
the Enemy, bravely repelling all further attacks, made in the repeated
but vain attempts to scatter it in confusion.
BLÜCHER, who had arrived upon the spot from his Right, having, in
consequence of this sudden turn of affairs, been under the necessity
of relinquishing his meditated attack upon the French Left, now made
a last effort to stem the further advance of the Enemy, and, if
possible, to force him back upon Ligny. The rain having ceased, it
became lighter, and the Enemy's Columns being more clearly discernible,
the Prince immediately ordered the advance of three Regiments of the
Cavalry attached to the First _Corps d'Armée_, namely, the 6th Uhlans,
the 1st West Prussian Dragoons, and the 2nd Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry.
These Regiments, which constituted the only Cavalry force immediately
at hand, had for some time been posted in reserve, and had suffered
severely from their exposure to the fire from the French Artillery.
Lieutenant General RÖDER directed the 6th Uhlans to make the first
charge. The Regiment was led on by Lieutenant Colonel LÜTZOW, to
whose Brigade it belonged. In the charge which was directed upon the
Enemy's Infantry, LÜTZOW and several of his Officers fell under a
volley of musketry. The Regiment, which was about 400 strong, lost on
this occasion 13 Officers and 70 men. A second attack, made by the
1st West Prussian Dragoons, and supported by the 2nd Kurmark Landwehr
Cavalry, seemed to offer a fair prospect of penetrating the French
Infantry, when the former Regiment was unexpectedly charged in flank by
the Enemy's _Cuirassiers_, and completely dispersed. The Westphalian,
and 1st Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, with several other Squadrons of the
Landwehr, were collected together, and formed a mass of twenty four
Squadrons, with which a further attack was made upon the Enemy, but
without success.
The cause of this failure is to be attributed not to the want of
sufficient Cavalry, for indeed there was an ample number for the
purpose, but to the confusion and disorder consequent upon the surprise
which the Enemy's attack had occasioned, and which was augmented by
the darkness that had set in upon the Field. Nor was the failure
caused by the absence of that most essential requisite in a charge of
Cavalry, good example on the part of the Officers who lead the well set
Squadrons into the midst of an Enemy's ranks.
* * * * *
BLÜCHER himself, seeing that the fate of the day depended solely on the
chance of the Cavalry at hand succeeding, while there was yet light,
in hurling back the French Columns into the valley which they had so
suddenly and so resolutely crossed, rallied his routed horsemen; and
placing himself at their head, charged, in his old Hussar style, with
the full determination of restoring, if possible, that equal footing
with the Enemy which had hitherto been so gallantly maintained. The
French firmly stood their ground, and the charge proved ineffectual.
As BLÜCHER and his followers retired to rally, they were rapidly
pursued by the French _Cuirassiers_. At this moment, the Prince's
fine grey charger--a present from the Prince Regent of England--was
mortally wounded by a shot, in its left side, near the saddle girth. On
experiencing a check to his speed, BLÜCHER spurred, when the animal,
still obedient to the impulse of its gallant master, made a few
convulsive plunges forward; but on feeling that his steed was rapidly
losing strength, and perceiving at the same time the near approach of
the _Cuirassiers_, he cried out to his Aide de Camp:--"NOSTITZ, now I
am lost!" At that moment the horse fell from exhaustion, rolling upon
its right side, and half burying its rider under its weight. Count
NOSTITZ immediately sprang from his saddle, and holding with his left
hand the bridle of his own horse, which had been slightly wounded, he
drew his sword, firmly resolved to shed, if necessary, the last drop
of his blood in defending the precious life of his revered General.
Scarcely had he done so, when he saw the _Cuirassiers_ rushing forward
at the charge. To attract as little as possible their attention,
he remained motionless. Most fortunately, the rapidity with which
the _Cuirassiers_ advanced amidst the twilight, already sensibly
obscured by the falling rain, precluded them from recognising, or even
particularly remarking, the group, although they swept so closely by
that one of them rather roughly brushed against the Aide de Camp's
horse. Shortly afterwards, the Prussian Cavalry having rallied, and
reformed, in their turn began to drive back the French. Again the
thunder of their hoofs approached, and again the flying host whirled
past the Marshal and his anxious friend; whereupon the latter, eagerly
watching his opportunity as the pursuers came on, darted forward, and
seizing the bridle of a Noncommissioned Officer of the 6th Uhlans,
named SCHNEIDER, ordered him and some Files immediately following, to
dismount and assist in saving the Prince. Five or six powerful men now
raised the heavy dead charger, while others extricated the fallen hero,
senseless and almost immoveable. In this state they placed him on the
Noncommissioned Officer's horse. Just as they moved off, the Enemy was
again pressing forward with renewed speed, and NOSTITZ had barely time
to lead the Marshal, whose senses were gradually returning, to the
nearest Infantry, which gladly received the party, and, retiring in
perfect order, bade defiance to the attacks of its pursuers.
The Horse Battery No. 2, which had supported these Cavalry attacks by
directing its fire against the Left Flank of the Enemy, became, all at
once, surrounded by French Dragoons. These vainly endeavoured to cut
the traces, and the Prussian Artillerymen defended themselves so well
that they succeeded in effecting the escape of the Battery through an
opening in the inclosures of Bry. The Foot Battery No. 3, however, was
overtaken in its retreat by the Enemy's Cavalry, between the Windmill
and Bry, and lost one of its guns.
During these Cavalry attacks, the Prussian Infantry, already exhausted,
and broken up into separate divisions by the desperate contest in
the valley, had collected together at the outlets of the villages.
Some of the Regiments presented a remarkable degree of steadiness
and good order. At length the Cavalry Brigade of General TRESKOW,
then comprising the Queen's and the Brandenburg Dragoons, and the
Brandenburg Uhlans, were brought forward, and made several attacks upon
the French Infantry and _Cuirassiers_. Colonel LANGEN advanced, at
the same time, from near the Windmill, with the only Battalion of his
Brigade remaining at his disposal, the 2nd of the 23rd Regiment, under
the guidance of General PIRCH I., and covered by the Cavalry of General
TRESKOW; but all his efforts proved unavailing. He himself was wounded,
and then driven over by a gun. The Battalion, however, by continuing
in admirable order, enabled General PIRCH I., on whom, at this time,
the defence of Ligny had devolved, to effect the retreat of the troops
from the Village. General JAGOW retired, with a part of his Brigade to
Bry, and immediately occupied this point. Some Battalions of General
KRAFFT's Brigade (the Sixth) fell back from Ligny, towards the high
road, leaving Bry on their left; others still more to the left towards
Bry.
General PIRCH II., whose Brigade (the Second) had been posted by the
Prince in rear of St Amand la Haye, preparatory to a renewed attack,
was upon the point of proceeding to support the Seventh and Eighth
Brigades, then seriously engaged, when he observed the retreat towards
Bry. He immediately withdrew his Brigade to this point, where he
supported and facilitated the retreat of the troops from the Village,
with the assistance of the twelve pounder Battery No. 6, and the Foot
Battery No. 34, as also of the Westphalian Landwehr Cavalry, under
Major WULFFEN, to which latter Corps several Dragoons that had become
separated from their own Regiments, attached themselves.
General GROLMAN, the Quartermaster General of the Prussian Army,
foreseeing the consequences of the Line having been thus broken by
the Enemy, hastened to Bry, and desired General PIRCH II. to cover
the retreat by means of the troops here collected together. He then
proceeded in the direction of Sombref, and finding near this place two
Battalions of the 9th Regiment (Sixth Brigade) he posted them in rear
of a hollow road, leading from Bry towards Sombref. These Battalions
had, in their retreat from Ligny, defeated several attempts on the part
of the Enemy's Cavalry to break them. GROLMAN, on perceiving a twelve
pounder had stuck fast in this hollow road, ordered the Battalions to
advance again in front of the latter, to assist in extricating the
Battery, and to protect its retreat; which was immediately accomplished
within view of the French Cavalry.
It was at this critical period of the battle, that the 2nd Battalion
of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr, which still continued in reserve, in
rear of Bry, under the command of Captain GILLNHAUSSEN, appeared upon
the Height in front, where it particularly distinguished itself. In the
first place it succeeded in effectually checking, by its vigorous fire,
the French _Cuirassiers_, who were in pursuit of the Prussian Infantry.
Then it drove back French Cavalry which was on the point of making a
fresh attack upon the Prussian Dragoons. Afterwards it successfully
withstood three charges by the French Cavalry of the Guard. General
GROLMAN now ordered this Battalion to join the 9th Regiment near
Sombref; and, with the latter, to take up a position at the junction of
the cross road from Ligny with that from Bry to Sombref. This position,
which was in rear of the before mentioned hollow road, was maintained
until past midnight.
* * * * *
Such were the circumstances resulting from the French having forced
the Prussian Line at Ligny, and pursued in the direction of Bry: it is
now necessary to explain what occurred at that time, at, and in the
vicinity of, Sombref.
The First Brigade, which had been placed in reserve, was ordered to
take post, in Squares, upon the high road to Sombref, to check the
pressure of the Enemy's Cavalry. Subsequently, when the direction of
the retreat was decided upon, it fell back upon Tilly. The Fourth
Brigade, with the exception of one or two Battalions, advanced again
through Sombref towards Ligny, just as the French Cavalry pushed
towards the high road. The Battalions of the Brigade formed Squares,
and fell back upon the high road, whence they continued their further
retreat.
At the time the French troops were debouching from Ligny, Colonel
STÜLPNAGEL's (the Twelfth) Brigade was posted in front of Sombref;
and Colonel ROHR had just pushed forward towards Ligny with the 2nd
Battalion of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr, when he perceived three French
Cavalry Regiments advancing against the Right Wing of the Brigade;
whereupon he gradually retired, and the whole Brigade threw itself into
Sombref, just as the French Cavalry made an attack at the entrance of
the Village, and captured the two guns of the Battery No. 12, which
had been posted there. Major DORVILLE faced about the rear division of
the 6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, and gallantly attacked the French
Cavalry, in the hope of checking their progress; but the lances of his
brave followers were shivered against the cuirasses of their opponents,
and for a moment the former could only defend themselves with their
broken poles. The Prussian Infantry, however, hastened forward in
support; the French were driven out of the Village; and one of the lost
guns was retaken.
Every exertion was now made to secure the possession of Sombref.
General BORCKE (Ninth Brigade) sent thither two Battalions of the 1st
Kurmark Landwehr; which, during this movement, fired upon the flank
of the Enemy's Cavalry as the latter fell back. The defence of the
entrance into the Village from the side of Ligny was confided to the
2nd Battalion of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr, under Colonel ROHR.
About this time, General JÜRGASS received Orders to cover with his
Cavalry (of the Second Corps) the retreat of the Prussian Infantry
from St Amand la Haye and Wagnelé. General BRAUSE, perceiving that the
Enemy had attacked Colonel MARWITZ' Cavalry Brigade, on his right, and
endangered his communication with the rear, hastened with the Fusilier
Battalions of the 22nd Regiment (which had continued in reserve in rear
of St Amand la Haye) towards the high road, upon which the greater part
of the Seventh Brigade had by this time been collected. The Prussians,
on retiring from St Amand la Haye, were closely followed by the French.
The 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment was still in the Hamlet of St
Amand when it received the Order to retire. During its retreat it was
attacked whilst in a hollow way. It immediately showed a front on each
flank, and succeeded in driving back the Enemy. General JÜRGASS now
sent forward the 4th Squadron of the Brandenburg Hussars to attack
the Enemy's _Tirailleurs_, who were beginning to advance from out of
St Amand la Haye. The latter were immediately forced back upon the
Village. Somewhat later, however, the French _Tirailleurs_ poured forth
in greater numbers from out of Wagnelé, and threw themselves upon
the Right Flank of the retreating troops. A _mêlée_ ensued, in which
General JÜRGASS was shot in the shoulder.
* * * * *
When the Centre of the Prussian Army had been broken by the French
Cavalry, and the Prussian Commander had been placed so completely _hors
de combat_, Lieutenant General Count VON GNEISENAU, the Chief of the
Staff, having undertaken the direction of affairs, ordered the retreat
of the First and Second Corps upon Tilly; and despatched Colonel THILE
with directions to THIELEMANN, that if he could not effect a direct
retreat upon Tilly, he was to retire upon Gembloux, there to unite with
BÜLOW, and then effect a junction with the rest of the Army.
The occupation of Bry by General PIRCH II. offered a safe point of
retreat to the disordered Prussian Battalions; and, now that it had
become quite dark, PIRCH led all the troops from this post towards
Marbais, where they reformed, and whence, soon afterwards, under the
command of Lieutenant General RÖDER, they continued the retreat upon
Tilly. MARWITZ' Cavalry Brigade, which was not pursued with much vigour
by the Enemy, fell back to the rear of the Battalions formed up to
cover its movement, and now joined the rest of the Cavalry of the Right
Wing, in the general retreat.
The Fifth Infantry Brigade was in full retreat upon Marbais when the
1st and 2nd Battalions of the 22nd Regiment still continued posted on
the high road, not far from the Trois Burettes. The good order and
perfect steadiness of these Battalions, which were commanded by Major
SACK, completely checked the further advance of the French Cavalry,
and greatly facilitated the retreat of the Prussian troops.
After General JÜRGASS was wounded, the command of the Rear Guard
devolved upon Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, of whose Brigade (the
Brandenburg and Pomeranian Hussars) it consisted. He executed this duty
with great success, falling gradually back upon the Cavalry posted in
advance of Tilly by Lieutenant General ZIETEN; who then took command of
the whole of the Cavalry employed in protecting the retreat.
* * * * *
During the retreat of the Centre of the Prussian Army, which had been
effectually broken, and of its Right from St Amand and Wagnelé, which,
in consequence of BLÜCHER's previous dispositions for his contemplated
attack upon the French Left, was better prepared to sustain a reverse
of this kind; the Left Wing, under THIELEMANN, maintained its position,
and contributed not a little, by its firm countenance, in diffusing a
considerable degree of caution into the French movements in advance.
This was strikingly exemplified by the conduct of the 1st and 2nd
Battalions of the 30th Prussian Regiment. They were posted at Mont
Potriaux, and although their knowledge of what was passing on other
points of the Line was very imperfect, still it sufficed to prompt
their Commander to cross the rivulet, and undertake, if not a vigorous
attack, at least a demonstration, which, now that darkness had almost
covered the Field, would tend to impede, perhaps to paralyze, the
French movements against the Prussian Centre. Having effected their
passage, they met at first but a feeble opposition from a line of
Skirmishers: a French Regiment of Dragoons then advanced very close
upon the 2nd Battalion, but was driven off; whereupon both these
Battalions pushed forward, and gained a Height which was occupied in
force by the Enemy. Here they sustained two more Cavalry attacks, which
proved equally unsuccessful. A mass of Infantry belonging to LOBAU's
Corps, having its Flanks covered by parties of Cavalry, now advanced
against the 1st Battalion; but having, in the dark, exposed a Flank to
the Battalion, it was also repulsed.
Major DITTFURTH, however, finding himself in too isolated a position,
did not deem it prudent to advance further upon ground which he knew to
be in full possession of the Enemy, and therefore retraced his steps.
A renewed attempt was made, at the same time, by the French Light
Cavalry Brigade under General VALLIN, to push forward along the high
road towards Sombref, and gain possession of the barrier; but the
attack was as abortive as had been the former one upon this point.
* * * * *
With the darkness of night, now rapidly deepening, the din of battle,
which had been terrific and incessant until the last faint glimmering
of twilight, became gradually hushed: its expiring sounds still issuing
from the Heights in front of Bry, whence the flashes from the fire of
Artillery, and from that of Skirmishers along the outskirts of this
village (held by General JAGOW with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the
9th Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr),
indicated to the French Army the extreme verge of its advance; while
the still more vivid flashes emitted from the rattling musketry fire of
the two Battalions of the 30th Regiment, which had so gallantly sallied
forth out of Mont Potriaux, under Major DITTFURTH, as previously
described, as also from the Prussian guns which defended the approach
to Sombref, and frustrated the renewed attack along the high road
towards that point, plainly intimated that the Prussian Left Wing
(THIELEMANN's Corps) still firmly maintained itself in a position
whence it might seriously endanger the Flank of any further movement in
advance against the Centre.
VANDAMME's Corps (the Third) bivouacked in advance of St Amand,
GÉRARD's Corps (the Fourth) in front of Ligny, the Imperial Guard
upon the Heights of Bry, GROUCHY's Cavalry in rear of Sombref, and
LOBAU's Corps (the Sixth) in rear of Ligny. This possession of the
Field of Battle, and the capture of 21 pieces of cannon, were the only
advantages of which the French could boast as the immediate result of
so severe a struggle. With these, however, it would seem that their
Emperor was fully satisfied: if he had entertained any idea of pursuit,
it was now abandoned; he took no measures for watching the movements
and prying into the designs of his adversary: but left his troops
resting in their bivouacs, offering no molestation whatever to the
Prussians, whilst he in person returned to Fleurus, where he passed the
night.
* * * * *
The contrast between the circumstances of the two Armies during the
night was very striking; for whilst the victors were indulging in
perfect repose, the vanquished were completely on the alert, seizing
every possible advantage which the extraordinary quietude of their
Enemies afforded during the precious hours of darkness; and never,
perhaps, did a defeated Army extricate itself from its difficulties
with so much adroitness and order, or retire from a hard fought field
with so little diminution of its moral force.
The Prussian Commander was carried to Mélioreux, about six miles in
rear of Ligny, and the Head Quarters were established there for the
night.
THIELEMANN still retained possession of his original position in the
Line of Battle; and General JAGOW, with several detached Battalions
belonging to ZIETEN's Corps, occupied Bry and its immediate vicinity.
From this position the latter General quietly effected his retreat
about an hour after midnight, taking the direction of Sombref, and
thence proceeding to Gembloux, presuming, in all probability, that the
general retreat would be towards the Meuse. It was not until three
o'clock in the morning, when the Field of Battle had been completely
evacuated by the remainder of the Prussian Army, that THIELEMANN
commenced his retreat, which he conducted slowly, and in perfect order,
to Gembloux; near which BÜLOW's _Corps d'Armée_ (the Fourth) had
arrived during the night.
The loss of the Prussian Army on the 15th and 16th of June, amounted in
killed and wounded to about 12,000 men: that of the French to between
7,000 and 8,000. But few prisoners were taken on either side.
* * * * *
In consequence of this defeat, BLÜCHER was compelled, in order to
maintain and secure his close communication with WELLINGTON, to abandon
the line of the Meuse between Namur and Liege; but his orderly and
unmolested retreat afforded him sufficient time to remove all his
stores and material from these points to Maestricht and Louvain, which
now constituted his new base of operations.
It was not, however, a defeat which involved the loss of every
advantage previously gained. BLÜCHER was not _driven_ from the Field:
but, on the contrary, he maintained it during the night, with the
exception of the Villages of Ligny and St Amand in his front; thus
facilitating the orderly retreat of his own Army, and, at the same
time, affording a considerable degree of security to the direct line of
retreat of the Duke of WELLINGTON.
The defeat certainly compelled the latter to retire on the following
morning, whatever might have been his success at Quatre Bras; but so
long as BLÜCHER had it in his power to fall back in such a manner as to
effect his junction the next day with WELLINGTON, the advantage which
accrued to the common object of the two Commanders was of the highest
importance. They would then unite after the concentration of each Army
had been accomplished; hitherto, they had been compelled to meet their
opponents before they had succeeded in collecting their respective
forces. If, however, WELLINGTON had been unable to maintain his ground
against NEY, and NAPOLEON had in this manner succeeded in beating both
Armies in detail; or, if the Prussian defeat had been followed up by
a vigorous pursuit, the loss of the Battle of Ligny might have placed
both Armies in a critical position.
The struggle at Ligny was undoubtedly of a most desperate and
sanguinary character. It was, almost throughout, one continued village
fight; a species of contest which, though extremely harassing and
destructive to both parties engaged, was that most likely to prove of a
long duration, and consequently to afford a better prospect of relief
by the promised support from WELLINGTON, or by the hoped-for junction
of BÜLOW.
* * * * *
It remains a question whether BLÜCHER, had he confined himself during
the latter part of the action to the same defensive system he had so
successfully carried on up to that time, instead of detaching his
Reserves to the Right, and preparing for an attack upon the Enemy's
Left, might not have fully maintained his original position until
dark, and thus have saved his Army from defeat. By the arrival of
BÜLOW's Corps during the night, he would then have been prepared
to meet his opponent on the following morning with a greatly
preponderating force; whilst, on the other hand, WELLINGTON, having
concentrated a considerable portion of his Army, would have been placed
in an equally advantageous position as regards the already vanquished
Enemy in his own front. When it is considered that along the whole
extent of BLÜCHER's line, the French had not gained any material
advantage upon one single point, and that the Prussians continued to
hold their ground with most exemplary firmness; the circumstance of his
not having delayed the collecting of his Reserves, for a grand attack
upon the Enemy's Left, until actually joined by either the British
or BÜLOW's troops, can scarcely be explained except by a reference
to the peculiar character of the Prussian Chief, whose natural fiery
temperament led him, in all probability to seize with avidity the
first prospect which opened itself of a favourable opportunity of
aiming a deadly thrust at his hated foe, rather than to adhere to that
comparatively passive kind of warfare which so ill suited his own
individual inclination and disposition.
* * * * *
NAPOLEON had undoubtedly gained the victory from the moment he
succeeded in penetrating the Prussian Centre; but it was not
distinguished by that brilliant success, or by those immediate and
decisive advantages, which might have been anticipated from the
admirable manner in which the attack had been prepared, and the care
with which it was concealed from the Prussians, at a moment when they
had no Reserve remaining, and when the co-operation of the British on
their Right, or the arrival of BÜLOW's Corps from Hannut, had become
quite impracticable. This appears the more surprising when we reflect
that he had a considerable Corps of Cavalry under GROUCHY at hand to
support this attack, and that the whole of LOBAU's Corps was in the
Field, fully prepared for active operations.
The consequences resulting from the absence of energetic measures on
the part of the French Emperor, in following up the defeat of the
Prussians, on the evening of the 16th and morning of the 17th, will be
fully developed in subsequent Chapters.
CHAPTER VII.
The bivouac on the Field of Quatre Bras, during the night of the 16th,
continued undisturbed until about an hour before daylight, when a
Cavalry Patrol having accidentally got between the adverse Picquets
near Piermont, caused an alarm in that quarter that was quickly
communicated to both Armies by a rattling fire of musketry, which,
rapidly augmenting, extended itself along the line of the Advanced
Posts. Among the first who hastened to ascertain the origin and nature
of the engagement was PICTON, who, together with other Staff Officers,
as they arrived in succession, on discovering that no advance had been
attempted or intended on either side, soon succeeded in restoring
confidence. Similar exertions were successfully made on the part of
the French Officers, and as day began to break upon the scene, both
parties resumed their previous tranquillity. In this untoward affair,
the Picquets furnished by KIELMANSEGGE's Hanoverian Brigade, and by the
3rd Brunswick Light Battalion were sharply engaged, and a Picquet of
the Field Battalion Bremen suffered considerably.
It was not long before WELLINGTON, who had slept at Genappe, arrived
at Quatre Bras, where he found Major General Sir HUSSEY VIVIAN, whose
Brigade of Light Cavalry, consisting of the 10th British Hussars (under
Colonel QUENTIN), of the 18th British Hussars (under Lieutenant Colonel
the Hon. HENRY MURRAY), and of the 1st Hussars of the King's German
Legion (under Lieutenant Colonel VON WISSELL), was posted on the left
of that point with two strong Picquets thrown out; one, of the 18th
Hussars, under Captain CROKER, on the Namur road, and the other, of the
10th Hussars, under Major the Hon. FREDERICK HOWARD, in front--with a
Picquet from the latter, under Lieutenant ARNOLD, on the right of the
Namur road.
VIVIAN, on being asked what account he could give of the Enemy,
communicated to the Duke the result of his observations, which were
necessarily very limited, as, with the exception of the firing that
had taken place, as before mentioned, along the line of Picquets,
the French had continued perfectly quiet, and had as yet given no
indication of any offensive movement.
The Duke then took a general survey of the Field, and while sweeping
the horizon with his telescope, he discovered a French Vedette on
some rising ground, in the direction of Fleurus, and a little to the
right of the high road leading to Namur, apparently belonging to some
Picquet thrown out from NEY's extreme Right on the previous night,
after the battle had ceased; or to some detached Corps placed in that
quarter for the purpose of observation, and for the maintenance of
the communication between NAPOLEON and NEY. The Duke had received no
intelligence of BLÜCHER; and, probably, judging from the advanced
position of the Vedette in question that whatever might have been
the result of the Battle of Ligny, the Prussians could not have made
any forward movement likely to endanger NEY's Right, he came to the
conclusion that it was quite possible that, on the other hand, NAPOLEON
might have crossed the Namur road, and cut off his communication with
BLÜCHER, with the design of manoeuvring upon his Left and Rear, and
causing him to be simultaneously attacked by NEY. His Grace therefore
desired VIVIAN to send a strong Patrol along the Namur road to gain
intelligence respecting the Prussian Army.
A Troop of the 10th Hussars, under Captain GREY, was accordingly
despatched on this duty, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel the Hon.
Sir ALEXANDER GORDON, one of the Duke's Aides de Camp. As the Patrol
advanced along the road, the Vedette before mentioned began to circle,
evidently to give notice of the approach of an Enemy, and then retired.
This induced the Patrol to move forward with great caution, so as
to guard against the possibility of being cut off. Nevertheless it
continued, but with all due precaution, advancing along the road, until
after passing a few scattered cottages, comprising a hamlet called
Petit Marbais, it reached, about a mile and a half further on, some
rising ground, about five miles from Quatre Bras, and beyond which was
another height. A Vedette was observed posted upon the latter, but who
had evidently not yet discovered the approach of Captain GREY's Troop.
Down in the intervening hollow was an isolated house, at the door of
which stood a dismounted Sentry, and some horses were standing in an
adjoining yard.
Captain GREY directed Lieutenant BACON to patrol towards the house,
while he remained with the remainder of the Troop, concealed from the
Enemy's view, a disposition favoured by the nature of the ground, and
the trees in the hedges, on both sides of the road. When Lieutenant
BACON's party moved forward, it was discovered by the Vedette, who
began circling, and fired his carabine. The French Picquet posted in
the house instantly rushed out; several of the men had their jackets
and accoutrements off; and the Post could easily have been captured,
had the special duty on which the British Patrol was engaged admitted
of an attack. The French turned out very quickly and galloped to the
rear along the high road, while BACON's party was recalled. A few
French Cavalry galloped up to the Vedette on the Heights, but evinced
no disposition to advance.
It had now become sufficiently evident that, commencing from this
point, the French were in possession of the Namur road; but the
principal object which Sir ALEXANDER GORDON had in view was yet to be
attained. The Patrol now retired a little until it reached a cross
road, which a peasant pointed out as the Prussian line of retreat.
Pursuing this track, the Patrol, within an hour, reached Tilly; where
General ZIETEN, who had been placed in temporary command of the
Cavalry, was covering the retreat of the Prussian Army.
After remaining here about a quarter of an hour, during which
Sir ALEXANDER GORDON obtained from General ZIETEN the most ample
information respecting the movements of the Prussians, the Patrol
commenced its return, at a quick pace, striking into a cross road,
which joined the high road at a point nearer to Quatre Bras than the
one whence it had quitted it. The Patrol reached Quatre Bras at about
half past seven o'clock; and Sir ALEXANDER GORDON immediately reported
to the Duke that the Prussians had retreated towards Wavre, that the
French occupied the ground on which the Battle had been fought; but
that they had not crossed the high road, along which the Patrol had
proceeded almost into the immediate vicinity of their Advanced Posts.
This latter circumstance was very remarkable, and served to satisfy
WELLINGTON that, either NAPOLEON's victory had not been followed up
with a vigour and an effect, by which the safety of his own Army
would have been perilled, or, that it had not been of a character
sufficiently decisive to have enabled the French Emperor to avail
himself of such a vantage ground.
Having ascertained that the contingency for which, as has already
been explained, he was fully prepared, had actually taken place; he
instantly decided upon retrograding his troops to a position in front
of the point of junction of the roads leading from Charleroi and
Nivelles upon Brussels, in which he might rely upon the co-operation of
a sufficient portion of BLÜCHER's forces from Wavre with his own, by
which he would be enabled to confront NAPOLEON and his main Army with
ample means, and thus attain that great aim and end of all strategy, of
"operating with the greatest mass in a combined effort upon a decisive
point."
Hence, a change in the direction of the previously ordered movements
became necessary, and the following instructions were issued:--
"To General Lord HILL.
"17th June 1815.
"The Second Division of British Infantry to march from Nivelles on
Waterloo, at 10 o'clock.
"The Brigades of the Fourth Division, now at Nivelles, to march from
that place on Waterloo, at 10 o'clock. Those Brigades of the Fourth
Division at Braine le Comte, and on the road from Braine le Comte to
Nivelles, to collect and halt at Braine le Comte this day.
"All the baggage on the road from Braine le Comte to Nivelles to
return immediately to Braine le Comte, and to proceed immediately
from thence to Hal and Bruxelles.
"The spare Musket Ammunition to be immediately parked behind Genappe.
"The Corps under the command of Prince FREDERICK of Orange will move
from Enghien this evening, and take up a position in front of Hal,
occupying Braine le Château with two Battalions.
"Colonel ESTORFF will fall back with his Brigade on Hal, and place
himself under the orders of Prince FREDERICK."
Shortly after the departure of the before mentioned Patrol of the 10th
Hussars, along the Namur road, the Duke received some despatches from
England, to which he gave his attention; and now that he had satisfied
himself as to the real state of things, and issued his Orders for the
movements of his distant troops, as also for the retreat of those
present in the Field, he laid himself down on the ground near Quatre
Bras, covered his head with one of the newspapers he had been reading,
which had accompanied those despatches, and appeared to fall asleep.
After remaining some time in this state, he again rose, mounted his
horse, and rode a little distance down the Field in front of Quatre
Bras. He then looked about through his telescope, and expressed to
those about him his astonishment at the perfect stillness of the Enemy,
remarking at the same time, "What if they should be also retiring? It
is not at all impossible."
A second Officer, Lieutenant MASSOW, had been despatched from the
Prussian to the Anglo-Allied Head Quarters; and it was about this
time that he reached the Duke, with a verbal communication respecting
the retreat upon Wavre, and the position intended to be assumed in
that quarter. It was of a nature which, taken altogether, was so far
satisfactory, that WELLINGTON immediately sent a verbal message by
this Officer to BLÜCHER, acquainting him with his intended retrograde
movements, and proposing to accept a battle, on the following day, in
the position in front of Waterloo, provided the Prince would detach two
Corps to his assistance.
* * * * *
The following is the manner in which the retreat of the Anglo-Allied
Infantry, then in full operation, was executed. It was an important
matter to mask the retreat as much as possible, so as to gain time
for the free and unimpeded movement of the Army along the high road
leading to the position in front of Waterloo. For this purpose, the
Light Troops continued to maintain the line of Outposts, until their
respective Supports, which had remained stationary sufficiently long to
conceal the retreat of the troops in their rear, began also to retire.
The First and Fifth British Divisions, and the Second Dutch-Belgian
Division, as also the Brunswick Corps, effected their retreat in
excellent order, notwithstanding the delay that was created by the
narrowness of the bridge and street of Genappe. Their retreat was
covered by ALTEN's Division, to which were added for this purpose, the
1st Battalion of the 95th British Rifles, the 2nd and 3rd Brunswick
Light Battalions, the Brunswick Advanced Guard Battalion, and the Light
Companies of BYNG's Brigade of Guards.
The main body of ALTEN's Division commenced its retreat about eleven
o'clock. OMPTEDA's Brigade of the King's German Legion was withdrawn
to Sart à Mavelines, which it immediately occupied, as also the Wood
of Les Censes in its front. HALKETT's British Brigade then retired
secretly until it reached some favourable ground, a little distance
in rear of OMPTEDA's Brigade, upon which it was immediately drawn
up. KIELMANSEGGE's Hanoverian Brigade was withdrawn still further to
the rear, and occupied a third position. Thus posted, the Division
was ordered, in the event of being attacked, to retire by Brigades
alternately.
It was a little before midday when the Light Troops of ALTEN's Division
began to retire. They occupied the advanced line, commencing from
the southern extremity of the Wood of Bossu on the right, extending
along Gemioncourt and the inclosures of Piermont, and crossing the
Namur road on the left: from which line they gradually and slowly fell
back upon OMPTEDA's Brigade, in a manner evincing admirable skill,
steadiness, and regularity.
In order more effectually to mask the movements on the Allied side of
the Namur road, the whole of the Cavalry was drawn up in two lines
immediately contiguous to, and in rear of, that road; the Heavy Cavalry
forming the Second Line, and Picquets being thrown out from the First
Line, to relieve those of the retiring Infantry.
The main body of ALTEN's Division now commenced its further retreat;
but not by alternate Brigades, this mode having been directed only in
the event of an attack; the latter retired successively in the order
in which they stood, preserving their relative distances, so that
they might commence the alternate system of retreat, if attacked. To
facilitate the passage of other portions of the Army through the narrow
defile of the bridge and town of Genappe, this Division retired by
Bezy, and crossed the Genappe, lower down the stream, by the bridge of
Wais le Hutte.
* * * * *
In the early part of the morning, NEY had, like his opponent, been
ignorant of the result of the Battle of Ligny; but he was aware that
the Anglo-Allied Army had been considerably reinforced during the
night, principally by the arrival of its Cavalry.
The Marshal calculated that if NAPOLEON had gained a victory, and
crossed the Namur road, the longer WELLINGTON remained in the position
of Quatre Bras, the greater the danger he incurred of having not only
his communication with BLÜCHER effectually cut off, but also his main
line of retreat upon Brussels intercepted; and that in such a case it
was wiser not to advance against the British General, as the latter
might then retire, and thus elude the effect of a combined operation
between NAPOLEON's and his own forces. He also judged that if, on the
other hand, the French Emperor had been defeated, an attack made on his
own part, upon the Anglo-Allied Army, might subject himself to the risk
of having to contend against a combined operation between WELLINGTON
and BLÜCHER; and thus expose both his own and NAPOLEON's forces to the
probability of being defeated in detail.
In this uncertainty, NEY sent a message by General Count FLAHAUT,
who happened to be still with him, and who was returning to rejoin
the Emperor wherever he might be found, expressive of his anxiety to
learn the result of the action of the preceding day. In the mean time,
he kept his troops in a state of perfect quietude; his main body was
posted in reserve on the Heights of Frasne, between which and the
Outposts there were intermediate Columns of Support; but no movement
whatever was attempted.
NEY at length received the information he had solicited, in a despatch
from SOULT, wherein the result of the Battle of Ligny was briefly
described. It also stated that NAPOLEON was proceeding, with the
principal portion of his forces, to the Mill of Bry, close to which the
high road leads from Namur to Quatre Bras, and that therefore it would
not be practicable for the Anglo-Allied Army to act against him (NEY);
but that, should such a case happen, the Emperor would march directly
upon it by that road, while NEY should attack it in front, and in this
manner that Army would at once be destroyed. The despatch required from
NEY a report of the exact position of his forces, and an account of all
that was going on in his front.
Hence it is evident that NEY's opinion, that a victory at Ligny ought
to be followed up by a combined attack upon WELLINGTON, perfectly
coincided with NAPOLEON's views; but while NEY was thus justified
in remaining inactive during the early part of the day, the fact of
the Emperor's not moving directly upon Genappe with the morning's
dawn, and his excessive delay in breaking up his bivouac at Ligny,
are inexplicable. A glorious opportunity had presented itself for the
attainment of his original design of defeating both Armies in detail,
but which was completely lost by a most extraordinary and fatal want of
energy and vigour in seizing upon the advantages which the victory of
Ligny had placed within his reach.
NEY, having ascertained that NAPOLEON's forces were in motion, had
commenced the advance of his own troops, when a second despatch reached
him, dated, "in front of Ligny, at noon," intimating that the Emperor
had just posted a Corps of Infantry and the Imperial Guard in advance
of Marbais, that he wished him to attack the Enemy at Quatre Bras, and
force him from his position; and that his operations would be seconded
by the Corps at Marbais, to which point his Majesty was proceeding in
person.
Upon discovering that the Anglo-Allied Infantry had retired, and that
the troops around, and in rear of, Quatre Bras, consisted of Cavalry
covering the retreat, NEY brought forward his own Cavalry in advance,
and appeared to regulate its movements so that its attack might be
directed against the Front of the British simultaneously with that
of the Cavalry which he now perceived advancing along the Namur road
against its Flank.
About this time, the 10th Hussars were moved across the Namur road,
and down the slope in front where they were halted, in _echelon_
of Squadrons; and while they were thus posted, WELLINGTON and his
Staff came to the front of the Regiment. From this spot the Duke was
attentively watching, through his telescope, the dispositions and
movements of the French, whom he could discover as soon as they reached
the Quatre Bras side of Little Marbais; when all at once at a distance
of about two miles, masses were seen forming on the side of the Namur
road, conspicuously glittering in the sun's rays; by which the Duke was
at first induced to believe that they were Infantry, whose bayonets
were so brilliantly reflected; but it was soon discovered that they
were _Cuirassiers_.
After a short time, these were observed to advance, preceded by
Lancers, and it was not long before the Picquet of the 18th British
Hussars, posted on that road, began skirmishing, as did also the
Picquet of the 10th British Hussars, more in the front of the position,
and likewise, still further to the right, in front of Quatre Bras, a
Picquet consisting of a Squadron of the 11th British Light Dragoons,
detached from Major General VANDELEUR's Brigade, which comprised the
11th Light Dragoons (under Lieutenant Colonel SLEIGH), the 12th Light
Dragoons (under Colonel the Hon. FREDERICK PONSONBY), and the 16th
Light Dragoons (under Lieutenant Colonel HAY). The 10th Hussars then
fell back again into their proper place in the line. VIVIAN now took up
a new alignment, throwing back his Left so as to present a front to the
Enemy's advance, and to protect the left of the position. VANDELEUR's
Brigade was then in Right Rear of VIVIAN's and close to Quatre Bras.
The Anglo-Allied Infantry having, some time previously, entirely
crossed the Genappe, with the exception of the Light Companies of the
Second Brigade of Guards on the right, and of the 1st Battalion 95th
British Regiment (Rifles), on the left, which troops had been directed
to remain until the last moment, and were now retiring to Genappe
(where they were subsequently drawn up at the entrance of the town),
and the Duke having satisfied himself that a formidable body of the
French Cavalry was endeavouring to fall upon him and to molest his
retreat, it became a question with his Grace, at that moment, how far
it might be advisable to offer any serious resistance to the advance of
the Enemy; but Lieutenant General the Earl of UXBRIDGE, the Commander
of the Anglo-Allied Cavalry, having remarked that, considering the
defiles in the rear, and the distance to which the great mass of the
Infantry had already retired and from which it could offer no immediate
support, he did not think the Cavalry was favourably situated for
making such an attempt, the Duke assented to the correctness of this
view, and requested his Lordship at once to carry into effect the
retreat of the Cavalry.
UXBRIDGE immediately made the following dispositions for this purpose.
The First or Household Brigade of Heavy Cavalry commanded by Major
General Lord EDWARD SOMERSET, and consisting of the 1st Life Guards
(under Lieutenant Colonel FERRIOR), of the 2nd Life Guards (under
Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. EDWARD P. LYGON), of the Royal Horse
Guards, or Blues (under Lieutenant Colonel Sir ROBERT CHAMBRE HILL),
and of the 1st (or King's) Dragoon Guards (under Colonel FULLER),
together with the Second Brigade of Heavy Cavalry, commanded by Major
General the Honourable Sir WILLIAM PONSONBY, consisting of the 1st, or
Royal Dragoons (under Lieutenant Colonel CLIFTON), of the 2nd Royal
North British Dragoons, or Scots Greys (under Colonel HAMILTON), and
of the 6th, or Inniskilling Dragoons (under Colonel MUTER), formed the
Centre Column, which was to retire by the Brussels high road.
VANDELEUR's and VIVIAN's Brigades constituted the Left Column, which
was to effect its retreat by a Bridge over the Genappe at Thuy, still
lower down the stream than that by which ALTEN's Infantry Division had
crossed.
The Right Column was formed of part of the Third Light Cavalry Brigade,
commanded by Major General Sir WILLIAM DÖRNBERG, the 1st and 2nd Light
Dragoons of the King's German Legion (under Lieutenant Colonels BÜLOW
and DE JONQUIÈRES), while the remaining Regiment, which was the 23rd
British Light Dragoons (under Colonel the Earl of PORTARLINGTON), was
employed as a portion of the Rear Guard of the Centre Column. The 15th
British Hussars (under Lieutenant Colonel DALRYMPLE), belonging to the
Fifth Cavalry Brigade, under Major General Sir COLQUHOUN GRANT, was
also attached to the Right Column; while of the two remaining Regiments
of the Brigade, the 2nd Hussars of the King's German Legion (under
Lieutenant Colonel LINSINGEN), and the 7th British Hussars (under
Colonel Sir EDWARD KERRISON), the former had been left in occupation
of a line of Posts on the French frontier, extending from Courtrai,
through Menin, Ypres, Loo, and Fürnes, to the North Sea, and the latter
formed a part of the Rear Guard of the Centre Column. This Right Column
was to pass the Genappe by a ford higher up the stream than the town of
Genappe.
These skilful dispositions had scarcely been arranged, when the
Picquet of the 18th Hussars, on the left, came in at a good round
trot, followed by two or three Squadrons of French Cavalry, upon which
VIVIAN's Battery of Horse Artillery, opened a fire whereby their
advance was checked. The Enemy, however, was observed to be very
active in bringing up his Artillery, which soon opened upon the Hussar
Brigade. VIVIAN, having received the Earl of UXBRIDGE's instructions
to retire, accompanied with an intimation that he would be supported by
VANDELEUR's Brigade, then in his rear, and observing that the French
Cavalry was pressing forward in great numbers, not only in his front,
but also on his flank, he put his Brigade about, and retired in line,
covered by the Skirmishers. The French followed, with loud cries of
"_Vive l'Empereur!_" and just as the Brigade reached a sort of hollow,
their guns again opened, throwing shells, which mostly flew over the
heads of the 18th Hussars, against which Regiment they appeared to
be principally directed. In the mean time, VANDELEUR's Brigade had
been drawn up in support, on rather a commanding position, and VIVIAN
approached it in the full expectation that it would open out for the
passing through of his own men, and take the Rear Guard in its turn;
but on the Hussars arriving within fifty or sixty yards of the Fourth
Brigade, VANDELEUR put it about, and retired--VIVIAN not being aware
that VANDELEUR had previously received Orders to retire and leave
the road clear for the retreat of the Cavalry in his front. VIVIAN
immediately occupied the ground thus vacated, and, with a view to check
the Enemy's advance more effectually, ordered the 18th Hussars to
charge, as soon as the French approached within favourable reach.
The weather, during the morning, had become oppressively hot; it was
now a dead calm; not a leaf was stirring; and the atmosphere was close
to an intolerable degree; while a dark, heavy, dense cloud impended
over the combatants. The 18th Hussars were fully prepared, and awaited
but the command to charge, when the Brigade guns on the right commenced
firing, for the purpose of previously disturbing and breaking the order
of the Enemy's advance. The concussion seemed instantly to rebound
through the still atmosphere, and communicate, as an electric spark,
with the heavily charged mass above. A most awfully loud thunder
clap burst forth, immediately succeeded by a rain which has never,
probably, been exceeded in violence even within the tropics. In a very
few minutes the ground became perfectly saturated; so much so that it
was quite impracticable for any rapid movement of the Cavalry. The
Enemy's Lancers, opposed to the Sixth British Brigade, began to relax
in their advance, and to limit it to skirmishing; but they seemed more
intent upon endeavouring to envelope, and intercept the retreat of, the
Hussars. VIVIAN now replaced the 18th Hussars by the 1st Hussars of
the King's German Legion, as Rear Guard, with Orders to cover well the
Left Flank and Left Front of the Brigade. He had already sent off his
Battery of Horse Artillery, to cross the Genappe by the Bridge of Thuy,
and despatched an Aide de Camp to VANDELEUR, to request he would move
his Brigade as quickly as possible across that Bridge, so that he might
meet with no interruption in his retreat, in the event of his being
hard pressed.
Of the Centre Column, the Heavy Brigades of Lord EDWARD SOMERSET and
Sir WILLIAM PONSONBY had retired along the Charleroi road, and were
taking up a position on some high ground, a little in rear of Genappe,
on either side of that road. The detached Squadron of the 11th Light
Dragoons (under Captain SCHREIBER), was withdrawn and directed to
retire through the above town. The 23rd Light Dragoons were also
withdrawn, and posted upon the ascent between Genappe and the position
occupied by the two Heavy Brigades. The 7th Hussars continued on the
south side of Genappe, as Rear Guard.
Neither the Centre, nor the Right, Column experienced any serious
molestation in its retreat while on the French side of the Genappe:
large bodies of Cavalry were seen in motion, but their Advanced Guards
limited their attacks to skirmishing.
At length the 7th Hussars retired through Genappe, after having
thrown out their Right Squadron, commanded by Major HODGE, as Rear
Guard, to cover the retreat of the Centre Column, regulating its
proceedings in conformity with such Orders as it might receive from
Major General Sir WILLIAM DÖRNBERG, who had been desired to superintend
the movements of the Skirmishers. Major HODGE led out the Right Troop,
under Captain ELPHINSTONE, to skirmish, while Lieutenant STANDISH
O'GRADY, who commanded the Left Troop, held the high road, from which
he had occasionally to send assistance to the former, and frequently
to advance, to enable the Skirmishers to hold their ground, as their
movements were difficult, through ploughed fields so soft that the
horses always sank up to their knees, and sometimes to their girths. In
this manner, every inch of ground was disputed, until within a short
distance of Genappe.
Here DÖRNBERG informed Lieutenant O'GRADY that he must leave him; that
it was of the utmost importance to face the Enemy boldly at this spot,
as the Bridge in the town of Genappe was so narrow that the Squadron
would have to pass it in file; that he was to endeavour as much as
possible to obtain time for drawing off the Skirmishers, but not to
compromise his Troop too much. Lieutenant O'GRADY then called in his
Skirmishers, and advanced with his own Troop boldly up the road at a
trot. The Cavalry immediately opposed to him, went about, followed by
him for some distance; and he thus continued alternately advancing
and retiring, until he saw all the Right Troop safe on the road in
his rear. He then began to retire at a walk, occasionally halting and
fronting, until he turned the corner of the town of Genappe: when he
filed the men from the left, and passed through the place at a gallop.
Upon the arrival of the Squadron at the opposite entrance of Genappe,
it was posted between this point and the main body of the 7th Hussars,
which had been drawn up on the road in a column of divisions, prepared
to check the advance of the Enemy on his debouching from the town.
The British Left Cavalry Column continued its retreat, which was
towards the little Bridge of Thuy, by deep narrow lanes, converted
by the tremendous pour of rain into perfect streams. VIVIAN withdrew
the 10th and 18th Hussars from the position he last occupied, but on
their approaching the Genappe an interruption occurred in consequence
of VANDELEUR's Brigade not having effected its passage across the
Bridge; and the delay became so great that he was induced to put about
the 18th Hussars, with a view to their affording a Support to the 1st
German Hussars, should they require it. In a short time after this,
VANDELEUR's Brigade resumed its progress: the 10th Hussars followed;
and, as the 1st Hussars, with which Regiment VIVIAN himself was at the
moment, continued to maintain a vigorous and effective skirmish, he
ordered the 18th to resume its retrograde movement; having previously
directed that some men of the 10th Hussars should be dismounted on
reaching the opposite bank of the Genappe, and be prepared with their
carbines to defend the passage, should the retreat of the remainder of
the Brigade be severely pressed. After skirmishing some time, VIVIAN
despatched a Squadron of the 1st German Hussars to the Bridge, and the
moment he began to do so, the French Cavalry again pushed forward with
so much boldness and rapidity as to interpose between the Left Squadron
and the main body of the Regiment, and to compel that Squadron to
pass the Genappe lower down than the Bridge over which the Brigade
passed the little stream. Having ascertained that all was ready, VIVIAN
galloped down the road to the Bridge with the remainder of the 1st
German Hussars. The French followed them, loudly cheering, but as soon
as the Hussars cleared the Bridge, and the Enemy's Dragoons reached it,
some of the dismounted men that had been formed along the top of the
opposite bank, in rear of a hedge, overlooking the Bridge and a hollow
way, through which the road led from it up the ascent, opened a fire
upon the foremost of the French Lancers that had come up to the other
end of the Bridge, while the remainder of the 10th, and the whole of
the 18th Hussars, were drawn up along the rising ground or bank. The
good countenance here shown by VIVIAN's Brigade, combined with the
soft and miry state of the ground after the thunderstorm had set in,
completely checked the pursuit by the Enemy's Cavalry, which now turned
towards the high road.
The Left Cavalry Column, after VIVIAN's Brigade had remained in its
position for some little time, continued its retreat without further
molestation (the Enemy having contented himself with merely detaching
a Patrol to watch its movements) along a narrow cross road, running
nearly parallel with the Charleroi high road, and leading through
the Villages of Glabbaix, Maransart, Aywiers, Frischermont, Smohain,
and Verd Cocou. Here VIVIAN's Brigade arrived in the evening, in the
vicinity of the Forest of Soignies, and bivouacked; while VANDELEUR's
Brigade passed the night somewhat nearer to the ground which had been
selected for the position to be taken up by the Anglo-Allied Army.
The Right Cavalry Column, consisting only, as previously stated, of the
1st and 2nd Light Dragoons of the King's German Legion, and of the 15th
British Hussars, effected its retreat in good order, protected by its
Skirmishers, as far as the ford, which it crossed above Genappe. At
this point, the French Cavalry suspended its pursuit, and proceeded,
in like manner as that on the right had done, to join the main body on
the high road; while the British Right Cavalry Column continued its
retreat unmolested towards the position of Waterloo, in rear of which
it bivouacked.
A large body of French Cavalry, consisting of from sixteen to eighteen
Squadrons, was now entering Genappe by the Charleroi road, followed by
the main body of the French Army under NAPOLEON.
The Earl of UXBRIDGE, who was desirous of checking the Enemy's
advance, so as to gain sufficient time for the orderly retreat of the
Anglo-Allied Army, and to prevent a compromise of any portion of the
rearmost troops, decided upon embracing the advantage which the narrow
Defile of Genappe seemed to present in aid of his design. The town
consists mainly of houses lining the high road, on the Brussels side of
the Bridge. The road then ascends a ridge, the brow of which is about
six or seven hundred yards distant, and here Lord UXBRIDGE had halted
the Heavy Brigades of Lord EDWARD SOMERSET and of Sir WILLIAM PONSONBY,
and posted them so as to cover the retirement of the Light Cavalry. At
first, he formed them in line; SOMERSET's on the right, and PONSONBY's
on the left, of the high road; but observing by the Enemy's formidable
advance, that the Light Cavalry would soon be compelled to fall back,
his Lordship drew up SOMERSET's Brigade in a Column of half Squadrons
upon, but close to, the right of the road itself, so as to admit of
troops retiring by its left; and formed PONSONBY's Brigade into a
Column of Half Squadrons upon the left of the high road, and somewhat
to the rear. The 7th Hussars were formed at some little distance in the
rear of Genappe, and the 23rd Light Dragoons were drawn up in support
of that Regiment, and about midway between it and the Heavy Cavalry on
the Height. The Squadron of the 7th Hussars, under Major HODGE, it will
be recollected, was halted between the main body of that Regiment and
the town of Genappe.
Thus posted, the Centre retiring Cavalry Column remained about twenty
minutes, when loud shouts announced that the French had entered the
town. Presently a few horsemen appeared galloping out of the street,
and dashed at speed into Major HODGE's Squadron. They were found, on
being taken, to be quite inebriated. In a few moments afterwards,
the French Column showed its head within the town; the leading Troop
consisted of Lancers, all very young men, mounted on very small horses,
and commanded by a fine looking, and, as it subsequently appeared, a
very brave man. The Column remained about fifteen minutes within the
town, its head halted at the outlet facing the British Rear Guard, and
its flanks protected by the houses. The street not being straight,
and the rear of the Column not being aware that the front had halted,
continued pressing forward, until the whole mass became so jammed that
it was impossible for the foremost ranks to go about, should such a
movement become necessary.
Their apparent hesitation and indecision induced Lord UXBRIDGE, who
stood upon some elevated ground adjoining the right of the road, to
order the 7th Hussars to charge. The latter, animated by the presence
of the Commander of the Cavalry, who was also their own Colonel, rushed
forward with the most determined spirit and intrepidity; while the
French, awaiting the onslaught, opposed to them a close, compact, and
impenetrable phalanx of lances; which, being securely flanked by the
houses, and backed by a solid mass of horsemen, presented a complete
_chevaux de frise_. Hence, it is not surprising that the charge should
have made no impression upon the Enemy; nevertheless, the contest
was maintained for some considerable time; the Hussars cutting at
their opponents, and the latter parrying and thrusting, neither party
giving way a single inch of ground; both the Commanding Officer of
the Lancers, and Major HODGE, commanding the leading Squadron of the
Hussars, were killed, gallantly fighting to the last.
The French had by this time established a Battery of Horse Artillery
on the left of Genappe and upon the opposite bank of the river, from
which they opened a brisk fire upon the British Cavalry in support, and
several shot struck the main body of the 7th Hussars, upsetting men
and horses, and causing great impediments in their rear. The French
Lancers now advanced, and drove the 7th Hussars upon their Reserve; but
here the 7th rallied, renewed their attack, and forced back the Lancers
upon the town. The latter having been reinforced, rallied, in their
turn, and drove back the Hussars. These, however, again rallied, and
resolutely faced their opponents, with whom they gallantly continued
a fierce encounter for some time longer, when to terminate a conflict
which was most obstinate and sanguinary without being productive of
any favourable result, but in which the bravery of the 7th Hussars
shone most conspicuously, and became the theme of admiration of all
who witnessed it, Lord UXBRIDGE decided upon withdrawing that Regiment
and charging with the 1st Life Guards. As soon as the Hussars went
about, in pursuance of the Orders received, the Lancers followed them.
In the _mêlée_ which ensued, the French lost quite as many men as did
the Hussars; and when at length the latter were able to disengage
themselves, the former did not attempt to follow them. The 7th retired
through the 23rd Light Dragoons, took the first favourable turn off
the road and reformed in the adjoining field.
During this contest, the French, having become sensible of the evil
that might arise from the closely wedged state of the Cavalry in the
town, began to clear the rear of the most advanced portions of the
Column, so as to admit of more freedom of movement in case of disaster.
A Battery of British Horse Artillery had taken post close to a house on
the Height occupied by the Heavy Cavalry, and on the left of the road;
and it was now replying to the French Battery on the opposite bank of
the river.
So exceedingly elated were the French with having repulsed the 7th
Hussars in this their first serious encounter with the British Cavalry,
that immediately on that Regiment retiring, the whole Column that
was in Genappe raised the war cry, and rent the air with shouts of
"_En avant!_--_En avant!_" evincing the greatest impatience to follow
up this momentary advantage, and to attack the Supports; for which,
indeed, the opportunity appeared very favourable, as the ranks of the
latter were suffering considerable annoyance from the well directed and
effective fire of the French guns on the opposite bank of the river.
They now abandoned the secure cover to which they had been indebted
for their temporary success, and were advancing up the ascent with all
the confidence of a fancied superiority, when the Earl of UXBRIDGE,
seizing upon the advantage presented for attacking them while moving
up hill, with their Flanks unsupported, and a narrow Defile in their
rear, and being also desirous of affording the 1st Life Guards an
opportunity of charging, brought forward that Regiment through the 23rd
Light Dragoons, who opened out for its passage to the front. The Life
Guards now made their charge, most gallantly headed by Colonel Sir
JOHN ELLEY, Deputy Adjutant General, who, at the moment of contact
with the Enemy, began by cutting down two men right and left. It was
truly a splendid charge; its rapid rush down into the Enemy's mass,
was as terrific in appearance as it was destructive in its effect; for
although the French met the attack with firmness, they were utterly
unable to hold their ground a single moment, were overthrown with
great slaughter, and literally ridden down in such a manner that the
road was instantaneously covered with men and horses, scattered in all
directions. The Life Guards, pursuing their victorious course, dashed
into Genappe, and drove all before them as far as the opposite outlet
of the town.
This brilliant and eminently successful charge made a deep impression
upon the Enemy, who now conducted his pursuit with extreme caution. The
23rd Light Dragoons, which had supported the 1st Life Guards in their
charge, became again the last Regiment in the Rear Guard, and continued
so during the remainder of the retreat. PONSONBY's Brigade had deployed
to the right of the high road, and the guns were so disposed as to take
advantageous positions, retiring _en échiquier_.
The Enemy, after quitting Genappe, tried to get upon the Flanks of the
Centre retiring Column, chiefly upon the Right Flank; but the Royals,
Greys, and Inniskillings, manoeuvred beautifully; retiring by alternate
Squadrons, and covered by their own Skirmishers, who completely beat
the French Light Cavalry in that kind of warfare. Finding that from
the deep state of the ground, there was not the least danger of his
being turned by the Enemy, Lord UXBRIDGE gradually withdrew PONSONBY's
Brigade to the high road. He kept the Light Cavalry, protected by the
Household Brigade, as the Rear Guard, and slowly retired into the
chosen position in front of Waterloo, the guns and rockets constantly
plying the Enemy's Advance, which, although it pressed forward twice
or thrice, and made preparations to attack, never ventured to come to
close quarters with its opponents; and the Column received from it no
further molestation.
On arriving at the foot of the Anglo-Allied position, the 23rd Light
Dragoons moved off to the (Allied) right of the high road, and into
the hollow in which lies the Orchard of the Farm of La Haye Sainte.
Here they were drawn up, prepared to meet the French Advanced Guard,
should it follow them, or to fall upon its Flank, should it venture to
continue its march along the road. The latter, however, halted upon the
Height which intervenes between La Haye Sainte and La Belle Alliance,
and opened a fire upon the Centre of the Duke of WELLINGTON's Line,
above the former Farm, from two Batteries of Horse Artillery.
PICTON, who was then upon the rising ground in rear of La Haye Sainte,
and who was intently watching the Enemy's advance along the high road,
perceived Columns of Infantry advancing from La Belle Alliance. He
immediately took upon himself to unite the two Batteries nearest at
hand, which were those under Major LLOYD of the British Artillery, and
Major CLEEVES of the King's German Legion (although not belonging to
his own Division), and to place them in position on the high ground
close to the Charleroi road. The guns immediately opened a brisk
cannonade upon the French Columns, of which they had obtained a most
accurate range just as their leading Divisions had entered the inclosed
space between the high banks which line the high road where it is cut
through the Height before mentioned as intervening between La Belle
Alliance and La Haye Sainte. This mass of the Enemy's Infantry suffered
severely from the fire, to which it stood exposed about half an hour:
for the head of the Column having been unable to retrograde, in
consequence of the pressure from its rear, and prevented by the high
bank on either side of the road from filing off to a flank, could not
readily extricate itself from so embarrassing a situation.
During the whole of this fire, the Allied Batteries were replied
to, though very ineffectually, by the two Batteries of French Horse
Artillery posted on the Height in question.
It was now twilight: the approaching darkness was greatly accelerated
by the lowering aspect of the sky. Picquets were hastily thrown forward
by both Armies, and to so great a height had the mutual spirit of
defiance arisen, that the near approach of opposing parties, advancing
to take up their ground for the night, led to little Cavalry affairs,
which, though unproductive of any useful result to either side, were
distinguished, on different points of the Lines, by a chivalrous
bravery which seemed to require a prudent restraint.
In one of these affairs, Captain HEYLIGER of the 7th Hussars, made a
very brilliant charge with his Troop; and when the Duke of WELLINGTON
sent to check him, his Grace desired to be made acquainted with the
name of an Officer who had displayed so much gallantry. A very spirited
charge was also made by the Right Troop of the 2nd Light Dragoons of
the King's German Legion, under Lieutenant HUGO; who was allowed by his
Commanding Officer to volunteer for that service, and who, from the
vicinity of Hougomont, boldly rushed up the Height intervening between
that point and Mon Plaisir, and gallantly drove back a portion of the
French Advanced Guard of Cavalry; recapturing at the same time three
carriages filled with British sick and wounded.
* * * * *
The manner in which the Duke of WELLINGTON withdrew his Army from the
position of Quatre Bras to the one of Waterloo, must ever render that
retreat a perfect model of operations of this nature, performed in the
immediate presence of a powerful Enemy. Those dispositions which have
been described as having been made by him for the purpose of masking
the retirement of the main body, of affording perfect security to
the passage of the Defile in his rear, and of ensuring the orderly
and regular assembly of the several Corps on the ground respectively
allotted to them in the new position, evince altogether a degree of
skill which has never been surpassed.
In such operations, the covering of the Army by its Cavalry and Light
Troops necessarily forms an important feature; and a glance at the
manner in which this duty was fulfilled by the Earl of UXBRIDGE,
with the Cavalry, Horse Artillery, and a few Light Battalions, at
his disposal, is sufficient to show that the exemplification of such
feature on this occasion was exceedingly beautiful. Indeed, so orderly
and so perfect were all the arrangements connected with this retreat,
from its commencement to its close, that the movements partook more of
the appearance of a Field Day upon a large scale, than of an operation
executed in the actual presence of an Enemy; and this was particularly
observable as regarded the protection afforded by the Cavalry and
Horse Artillery, which manoeuvred to admiration, and in a style that,
combined with the brilliant charge by the 1st Life Guards at Genappe,
evidently impressed the Enemy with a due sense of the efficiency of the
gallant troops immediately in his front. It may here also be remarked,
that the judicious dispositions made by Lord UXBRIDGE in covering this
retreat, and the high degree of confidence with which he inspired the
Cavalry, afforded well grounded anticipations of the success likely to
attend his measures when conducting that Cavalry in the open battle
field, on which, it was foreseen, its prowess would so very soon be
tested. The British and German portion of the Cavalry was in excellent
order, and seemed already to have imbibed, in a high degree, that
gallant bearing and chivalrous spirit, which it beheld and admired in
its distinguished Chief.
In the course of the evening, the Duke received from Prince BLÜCHER a
reply to the request he had made for his support in the position he was
now occupying. It was highly characteristic of the old man, who had
written it, in the following terms, without previously conferring with,
or addressing himself to, any one:--"I shall not come with two Corps
only, but with my whole Army; upon this understanding, however, that
should the French not attack us on the 18th, we shall attack them on
the 19th."
* * * * *
The Duke, who, as has already been explained, had, from the
commencement of the Campaign, considered it very possible that NAPOLEON
would advance by the Mons road, still entertained apprehensions of
an attempt on the part of his opponent to turn him by Hal, and seize
Brussels by a _coup de main_. For this, however, he was fully prepared,
having made his dispositions for the security of that Flank, in the
manner pointed out in the following instructions, which he issued to
Major General the Hon. Sir CHARLES COLVILLE:--
"17th June 1815.
"The Army retired this day from its position at Quatre Bras to its
present position in front of Waterloo.
"The Brigades of the Fourth Division, at Braine le Comte, are to
retire at daylight tomorrow morning upon Hal.
"Major General COLVILLE must be guided by the intelligence he
receives of the Enemy's movements in his march to Hal, whether he
moves by the direct route or by Enghien.
"Prince FREDERICK of Orange is to occupy with his Corps the position
between Hal and Enghien, and is to defend it as long as possible.
"The Army will probably continue in its position in front of Waterloo
tomorrow.
"Lieutenant Colonel TORRENS will inform Lieutenant General Sir
CHARLES COLVILLE of the position and situation of the Armies."
The respective lines of Picquets and Vedettes had scarcely been taken
up along the low ground that skirted the front of the Anglo-Allied
position, and the last gun had just boomed from the Heights, when
"heaven's artillery," accompanied by vivid flashes of lightning, again
peeled forth in solemn and awful grandeur; while the rain, pouring down
in torrents, imparted the utmost gloom and discomfort to the bivouacs,
which the opposing Armies had established for the night, upon the
ground destined to become celebrated in history, even to the remotest
ages.
CHAPTER VIII.
It was not until the night of the 16th, after ZIETEN's and PIRCH's
_Corps d'Armée_ had retired to Tilly and Gentinnes, that it was
decided the Prussian Army should retreat upon Wavre. This decision was
communicated in the Orders then transmitted from the Prussian Head
Quarters to the First and Second _Corps d'Armée_ (ZIETEN's and PIRCH's)
directing them to bivouac at Bierge and St Anne, in the vicinity of
Wavre; as also in the Orders forwarded, on the next morning, to the
bivouacs of the Third and Fourth Corps (THIELEMANN's and BÜLOW's), at
Gembloux and Basse Bodecée, directing them to fall back, and bivouac at
La Bavette and Dion le Mont near Wavre.
ZIETEN's and PIRCH's Corps retired by Mont St Guibert, in rear of which
Defile the latter Corps remained a considerable time as Rear Guard,
while the former marched on to WAVRE, where it arrived about midday,
crossed the Dyle, and took up its position at Bierge. PIRCH followed
the same route, but took post on the right bank of the Dyle, between St
Anne and Aisemont.
With the first glimmering of daylight the troops, which, under the
command of General JAGOW, had continued in full possession of Bry and
its immediate vicinity during the night, began to retire, firstly, in
the direction of Sombref, and thence to Gembloux, which they reached
before the arrival of THIELEMANN's Corps. After the receipt of the
Order pointing out the direction of the retreat, JAGOW conducted these
troops, in the course of the 17th, towards their respective Brigades.
Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, whose Cavalry Brigade with half a Horse
Battery, formed the Rear Guard of the line of retreat of ZIETEN's and
PIRCH's Corps, received Orders to take up a concealed position between
Tilly and Gentinnes, thence to watch the movements of the Enemy; and,
as soon as he found himself pressed by the latter, to fall back upon
the Defile of Mont St Guibert.
THIELEMANN, who, it will be recollected, had received a message from
GNEISENAU, leaving it optional with him to retire by Tilly or Gembloux,
according to circumstances, decided on falling back upon the latter
point; being well aware that the Enemy was in possession of the
Villages of St Amand and Ligny, and of the Field of Battle to within a
very short distance from Sombref.
He had collected together his widely disseminated Brigades, and drawn
in his Advanced Posts; an operation which, executed in the darkness of
the night, retarded his departure so much that it was two o'clock in
the morning before the Reserve Artillery, which formed the head of the
Column, struck into the road which at Point du Jour, leads from the
Namur _chaussée_ to Gembloux. The Rear Guard of this line of retreat,
which consisted of the Ninth Infantry Brigade, under Major General
BORCKE, and the Reserve Cavalry, under General HOBE, and was drawn
up along the Namur road, having in its front the Fleurus _chaussée_,
leading directly towards the Enemy, did not commence its march until
after four o'clock, when the sun had risen. The main body of the Corps
reached Gembloux at six o'clock in the morning.
On approaching this place, THIELEMANN learned that BÜLOW had posted
the Fourth Corps about three miles in rear of Gembloux, upon the old
Roman road; whereupon Major WEYRACH, Aide de Camp to Prince BLÜCHER,
who had continued with THIELEMANN during the night of the 16th, set off
to seek out the Field Marshal, and to report to him the position and
attendant circumstances of the Third and Fourth _Corps d'Armée_. He
soon succeeded in discovering the Prussian Head Quarters at Mélioreux,
and communicated the above important information to Count GNEISENAU.
THIELEMANN gave his own Corps a halt on the other side of the town, in
order that his troops might obtain rest and refreshment.
* * * * *
The Advance of BÜLOW's Corps had reached Basse Bodecée, upon the old
Roman road, at nightfall of the 16th of June. Here that General became
acquainted with the loss of the Battle of Ligny: whereupon he ordered
the Brigades of his Corps to be posted at intervals along this road,
with the exception of the Thirteenth (under Lieutenant General HAKE),
which was directed to bivouac more to the rear, near Hottoment, where
the same road is intersected by that which conducts from Namur to
Louvain.
Both Corps remained for some hours in a state of uncertainty as to the
direction to be taken for forming a junction with the First and Second
Corps. THIELEMANN wrote to BÜLOW that he had received no Orders from
Prince BLÜCHER, but that he presumed the retreat was upon St Trond. He
also stated that he had not been followed by the Enemy, but that he had
heard distant firing on the right, which he concluded was connected
with the Duke of WELLINGTON's Army.
At length, about half past nine o'clock, Prince BLÜCHER's Aide de Camp,
Major WEYRACH, arrived at BÜLOW's Head Quarters, and brought the
Orders for the retreat of the Fourth Corps to Dion le Mont, near Wavre,
by Walhain and Corbaix. The Orders also required that BÜLOW should post
the main body of his Rear Guard (which consisted of the Fourteenth
Brigade) at Vieux Sart; as also that he should send a Detachment,
consisting of one Regiment of Cavalry, two Battalions of Infantry, and
two guns of Horse Artillery, to the Defile of Mont St Guibert, to act,
in the first instance as a Support to Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, who was
at Tilly, and then, upon the latter falling back, to act as Rear Guard
in this direction. Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR was accordingly detached
upon this duty with the 10th Hussars, the Fusilier Battalions of the
11th Regiment of Infantry and 1st Regiment of Pomeranian Landwehr,
together with two guns from the Horse Battery No. 12. The Corps itself
moved directly upon Dion le Mont, and on reaching the Height near that
town, on which is situated the public house of _A tous vents_, took up
a position close to the intersection of the roads leading to Louvain,
Wavre, and Gembloux.
* * * * *
At two o'clock in the afternoon, THIELEMANN commenced his march upon
Wavre; where the Corps arrived late in the evening, and took up its
position at La Bavette, leaving the Ninth Infantry Brigade (General
BORCKE) and the Cavalry Brigade of Colonel Count LOTTUM, on the right
bank of the Dyle. In this position the Corps was now rejoined by
Colonel MARWITZ' Cavalry Brigade, which had retired by Tilly; as also
by the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr, and the two Squadrons
of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, which troops had been left at
Dinant. The Squadron of the 7th Uhlans that had been detached to Onoz,
also joined, but having fallen in with a superior force of the Enemy's
Cavalry, had experienced a great loss. The two Squadrons of the 9th
Hussars, belonging to this Corps, had not yet arrived from Ciney.
* * * * *
The Prussian Head Quarters were established, early on the 17th, at
Wavre. The veteran Field Marshal, who was still suffering considerably
in consequence of his fall, was obliged to seek rest the moment he
arrived there, and did not quit his bed during the remainder of the day.
In the course of the forenoon, Lieutenant MASSOW, who had been
despatched with a message to the Duke of WELLINGTON, returned with the
one from his Grace, communicating the intention of the latter to fall
back upon Waterloo and accept a battle there, provided he received
the support of two Prussian Corps. (See page 264.) There was every
disposition to enter into this proposal, but some degree of uncertainty
existed as to whether BÜLOW's Corps would join the Army on the 17th,
as also a certain misgiving respecting the Park of Ammunition of both
ZIETEN's and PIRCH's Corps, which had been directed upon Gembloux,
a circumstance that excited apprehensions as to the possibility of
furnishing the much needed supply of ammunition to these Corps which
were at hand. In this state of uncertainty, no other resolution could
be adopted than that of holding the position in front and in rear of
the Dyle (with the Advanced Guard of the Fourth Corps as far forward
as Mont St Guibert), until the required ammunition should be obtained;
and BLÜCHER deferred replying to WELLINGTON's communication, in the
hope that his Army would very soon be relieved from the unpleasant
circumstances above mentioned.
* * * * *
While the Prussians were thus effecting their retreat in good order,
along the cross roads of that part of the country (high road there was
none), no corresponding activity manifested itself on the part of the
French, whom the morning's dawn found still lying in their bivouac.
Their Vedettes stood within half a mile of the Columns of THIELEMANN's
Rear Guard; the retreat of which, not having commenced until after
sunrise, might have been easily remarked: and had the French detached
but the smallest Patrol, they could not have failed to discover the
direction of that retreat--whether towards Namur or Gembloux.
It was not until after THIELEMANN had retired a sufficient distance
to escape further notice that any disposition for movement occurred
to disturb the perfect quietude of their repose. Then, PAJOL with a
Division of his Light Cavalry Corps, under Lieutenant General Baron
SOULT, consisting of the 1st, 4th, and 5th Hussars, was detached in
pursuit of the Prussians. He struck into the Namur road, and shortly
afterwards Lieutenant General Baron TESTE's Infantry Division of
LOBAU's Corps (the Sixth), followed in support, and took up a position
on the Heights of Mazy.
PAJOL had not proceeded very far when he perceived a Prussian Battery
retiring upon Namur, which he lost no time in capturing and forwarding
to Head Quarters; where the circumstance strengthened the belief that
BLÜCHER had retreated by that road. It was the Prussian Horse Battery
No. 14, belonging to the Second Corps, which, having towards the end
of the Battle expended every shot, had driven off the Field to procure
a fresh supply of ammunition, but had not succeeded in falling in with
the Reserve Ammunition Waggons. The Battery neither returned to its
own Corps, nor did it comply with THIELEMANN's express Order to march
upon Gembloux, but consumed much time in uselessly driving first in
one direction, and then in another. It was accompanied at this moment
by a Squadron of the 7th Prussian Uhlans, which the Third Corps had
neglected to recall from Onoz. The Squadron retired on the approach of
the French Cavalry, and escaped with a loss of 30 men; but all the guns
fell into the hands of the Enemy.
PAJOL, feeling at last some reason to doubt that Namur was a point in
the Prussian retreat, diverged from the high road, and proceeded to St
Denis, where he was joined by TESTE's Division. A Brigade of EXCELMANS'
Cavalry Corps had been detached to offer support to PAJOL, should
the latter require it; but in consequence of certain information,
gained upon the road, it was subsequently directed to proceed towards
Gembloux, on approaching which it discovered traces of the Prussian
retreat.
GROUCHY, who commanded the Right Wing of the French Army in NAPOLEON's
absence, repaired early in the morning to the Emperor's Quarters at
Fleurus, for instructions, according to an Order he had received
to that effect on the previous evening. He was desired to wait and
accompany the Emperor, who was going to visit the Field of Battle. The
latter, however, did not start from Fleurus until between eight and
nine o'clock, and on reaching St Amand, he examined the approaches by
which this Village had been attacked the day before; then, he rode
about the Field, gave directions for the care of the wounded; and, as
he passed in front of different Regiments, that were falling in without
arms on the ground where they were bivouacked, he was received with
loud cheers. He addressed himself to nearly all the Corps, and assured
them of the lively satisfaction he had felt on witnessing their conduct
in the battle. Having dismounted, he conversed freely, and at great
length, with GROUCHY and GÉRARD, on the state of public opinion in
Paris, the different political parties, and on various other subjects
quite unconnected with those military operations upon the successful
issue of which depended the stability of his present power.
That NAPOLEON should have neglected to follow up the advantages which
fortune had thrown in his way on the morning of the 17th of June, is
quite incomprehensible. With the exception of a Prussian Picquet at
Gentinnes, his whole front as far as Gembloux, was perfectly clear of
an Enemy. WELLINGTON was still in position at Quatre Bras, where his
Left had become exposed by the retreat of the Prussians, and in rear
of which point was the Defile of Genappe. There was nothing to prevent
NAPOLEON from marching directly upon that Defile; and supporting, by
a vigorous attack upon the Anglo-Allied Left and Rear, a simultaneous
movement against the Front by the force under NEY. Whither had fled
the mighty spirit which had shone forth with such dazzling brilliancy
in former Wars, and which had never displayed the energy of its powers
of combination, and activity in following up successes, more eminently
than in the Campaign of the previous year? When before did he omit
pressing every advantage to the utmost, or neglect to seize that moment
of time, in which, having defeated one portion of his Enemies, he was
enabled to fall with combined force upon another? His Army was not more
fatigued than was that of WELLINGTON, which had arrived at Quatre Bras
by forced marches. The troops which he subsequently did lead upon that
point, when it was too late, consisting chiefly of the Imperial Guard
and the Sixth Corps, were comparatively fresh. The former had not been
engaged at Ligny until towards the termination of the action, when
they suffered scarcely any loss; the latter, which arrived later, had
remained intact. The idea of forming a junction with NEY, with a view
of attacking WELLINGTON, was certainly entertained; but its execution
was most unaccountably and unnecessarily delayed until its intended
effect could not but fall powerless upon a vigilant Enemy, fully
prepared, by having improved the precious moments of time, thus lost,
to detect the purpose of the movement, and to ward off the intended
blow.
With an Army greatly inferior in numbers to the united forces of
his adversaries, NAPOLEON's prospects of success rested exclusively
upon his utmost skill and address, not only in preventing that union
of force, but also in so planning, arranging, and executing his
combinations, that having succeeded in defeating one opponent with
a superior mass, he might then precipitate himself in like manner
upon another, at the very moment when the latter might be occupied
or engaged with one of his Marshals. This would have exacted of him
the most untiring energy, the application of all his great resources
in strategical science, a lightning-swift decision, and a daring
resolution both in adopting and in executing all his movements. It
was by the exercise of such powerful mental resources as these, that,
unaided by a sufficiently corresponding amount of physical force, he
had conducted the Campaign of 1814; but the spirit by which they were
conceived, and the genius which instinctively seized the means of their
execution, seemed to have abandoned him in this, his last, Campaign:
a faint gleam of the old spirit was visible in its opening movements,
but it was now rather a wildfire, dazzling him for a moment, on the
downward path to his destiny, than the Star which had so often led
him to victory. The last flash of his genius was brief, and, on the
memorable plains of Fleurus, seemed to disappear, and leave him in
utter darkness.
The same fatal inactivity which had marked the French Emperor's
proceedings on the evening of the 15th, and during the morning of
the 16th, again manifested itself upon the 17th of June: and it was
not until nearly noon of this day, upon receiving a report of a
reconnaissance, made in the direction of Quatre Bras, and upon learning
that a considerable body of Prussians had been discovered at Gembloux,
that he made any disposition for the movement of his troops, beyond the
previous detaching of PAJOL's Light Cavalry in pursuit of the Prussians
along the Namur road.
He now ordered the following troops to proceed to occupy a position in
advance of Marbais, across the Namur road, facing Quatre Bras:--
LOBAU's Infantry Corps (the Sixth), with the exception of the Twenty
First Division, under Lieutenant General TESTE, which had already
been detached in support of PAJOL;
MILHAUD's Corps of Heavy Cavalry (_Cuirassiers_), Lieutenant General
Baron SUBERVIE's Light Cavalry Brigade, from PAJOL's Corps;
the Third Light Cavalry Division (belonging to the Third Corps),
under Lieutenant General Baron DOMON; and the Imperial Guard, both
Cavalry and Infantry.
To Marshal GROUCHY he confided the pursuit of the Prussians, and for
this purpose he placed at his disposal as great an extent of force as
his limited means would admit: a force, certainly not sufficient to
enable that Marshal to confront the whole Prussian Army, should the
latter, after having rallied and concentrated its strength, make a
stand against him, but quite so to enable him to watch its movements,
and to manoeuvre so as to maintain his communication with the main
Army, and, if pressed by superior numbers, to effect a junction with
NAPOLEON.
The following were the troops thus detached under GROUCHY:--
+---------------------------------------+--------+-------+---------+----+
| |Infantry|Cavalry|Artillery|Guns|
+---------------------------------------+--------+-------+---------+----+
|Third Corps, General Count VANDAMME | 14,508 | | 936 | 32|
| | | | | |
|Fourth Corps, General Count GÉRARD | 12,589 | 2,366 | 1,538 | 38|
| | | | | |
|Twenty first Division (Sixth Corps), }| | | | |
| Lieutenant General Baron TESTE }| 2,316 | | 161 | 8|
| | | | | |
|Fourth Division (First Cavalry Corps),}| | | | |
| Lieutenant General Count PAJOL }| | 1,234 | 154 | 6|
| | | | | |
|Second Cavalry Corps, Lieutenant }| | | | |
| General Count EXCELMANS }| | 2,817 | 246 | 12|
| +--------+-------+---------+----+
| | 29,413 | 6,417 | 3,035 | 96|
|Deduct loss on 16th, | 3,900 | 800 | 400 | |
| +--------+-------+---------+----+
| Total | 25,513 | 5,617 | 2,635 | 96|
+---------------------------------------+--------+-------+---------+----+
33,765 men and 96 guns.
The Seventh Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General GIRARD
(belonging to the Second Corps) having suffered very severely in the
Battle, was left upon the Field.
NAPOLEON's instructions to GROUCHY were extremely simple and concise:
"Pursue the Prussians, complete their defeat by attacking them as soon
as you come up with them, and never let them out of your sight. I am
going to unite the remainder of this portion of the Army with Marshal
NEY's Corps, to march against the English, and to fight them if they
should hold their ground between this and the Forest of Soignies. You
will communicate with me by the paved road which leads to Quatre Bras."
No particular direction was prescribed, because the Emperor was totally
ignorant of the real line of the Prussian retreat. At the same time
he was strongly impressed with the idea that BLÜCHER had retired upon
Namur and Liege, with a view to occupy the line of the Meuse, whence
he might seriously endanger the Right of the French Army, as also its
main line of operation, should it advance upon Brussels.
GROUCHY did not hesitate to remark to the Emperor, that the Prussians,
having commenced their retreat at ten o'clock the previous night, had
gained several hours' start of the troops with which he was to follow
them; that although the reports received from the Advanced Cavalry
conveyed no positive information as to the direction in which the great
mass of the Prussian Army had effected its retreat, appearances as yet
seemed to justify the supposition that BLÜCHER had fallen back upon
Namur; and that as he would thus have to pursue in a direction contrary
to that which NAPOLEON was himself going to take, with very little
chance of being able to prevent the execution of any dispositions the
Prussians might have resolved upon when quitting the Field of Battle,
he begged to be allowed to follow the Emperor in his projected movement
upon Quatre Bras.
NAPOLEON declined to entertain this proposition, repeated the Order
he had already given to him, adding that it rested with him (GROUCHY)
to discover the route taken by the Prussians, whose defeat he was to
complete by attacking them the moment he came up with them; while he
himself would proceed to fight the English.
* * * * *
The Order was immediately given for the advance of the troops
previously assembled near Marbais, preceded by SUBERVIE's Division of
Light Cavalry, as Advanced Guard. By the time they reached Quatre Bras,
which was about two o'clock, the whole of WELLINGTON's Infantry had
crossed the Genappe, and was retiring along the high road to Brussels,
protected by the Cavalry, which was now pressed by the French, in the
manner described in the preceding Chapter.
The march of the French troops through Bry, in the direction of Quatre
Bras, became known to the Prussians through Lieutenant Colonel SOHR,
who still held his Cavalry Brigade, even at this time, posted in
rear of Tilly. Shortly afterwards, some of the French Cavalry having
approached, he began to retire slowly towards Mont St Guibert, and, as
he frequently formed up, in wait for the Enemy, he did not reach that
point until the evening of the 17th. Here he found Lieutenant Colonel
LEDEBUR, who had arrived with his Detachment, and had received Orders
to maintain the Defile.
* * * * *
Upon the departure of NAPOLEON, GROUCHY ordered VANDAMME and GÉRARD to
get their Corps under arms, and to move them, in the first instance,
to the junction of the Gembloux road with that to Namur; and having
subsequently received intelligence that a considerable body of
Prussians had passed through the former town, he desired that those two
Corps should continue their movement upon that point. In the mean time,
he repaired to the Advanced Posts of EXCELMANS' Dragoons, which were by
this time beyond Gembloux. It was part of this Cavalry which followed
Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, on the left. They merely threw out Skirmishers
against him; and, as night set in, they abandoned the pursuit in this
direction.
The Corps of VANDAMME and GÉRARD did not reach Gembloux until very late
in the evening. The former was posted in advance, the latter, in rear,
of the town; near which also, and on the right bank of the Ormeau,
was stationed the Sixth Light Cavalry Division, under General VALLIN,
who succeeded to the command, upon Lieutenant General MAURIN being
wounded at the Battle of Ligny. The First Brigade of Lieutenant General
CHASTEL's Tenth Cavalry Division, consisting of the 4th and 12th
Dragoons, under General BONNEMAIN, was pushed on to Sart à Wallain,
and the 15th Dragoons (from General VINCENT's Brigade of the Ninth
Cavalry Division, under Lieutenant General Baron SOULT), were detached
to Perwès. From both these points, reports were sent into Gembloux that
the Prussians had retired upon Wavre.
PAJOL, with his Light Cavalry and TESTE's Infantry Division, had
returned from St Denis, between Namur and Gembloux, to the original
position occupied by the latter in the morning, at Mazy, in the
immediate vicinity of the Field of Ligny; a movement for which no
satisfactory cause has ever been assigned.
The extent of information obtained by GROUCHY concerning the Prussian
retreat, and the nature of the dispositions which he adopted in
consequence, will be best explained by the following despatch which he
addressed to the Emperor:--
"Gembloux, le 17 Juin, "Gembloux, 17th June,
à dix heures du soir. at ten o'clock in the evening.
"Sire,--J'ai l'honneur de vous "Sire,--I have the honour to report
rendre compte que j'occupe to you that I occupy Gembloux,
Gembloux et que ma Cavalerie est à and that my Cavalry is at
Sauvenières. L'Ennemi, fort d'environ Sauvenières. The Enemy, about thirty
trente mille hommes, continue thousand men strong, continues his
son mouvement de retraite; movement of retreat. We have seized
on lui a saisi ici un parc de 400 here of his, a pen of 400 horned
bêtes à cornes, des magasins et des cattle, magazines and baggage.
bagages.
"Il paraît d'après tous les rapports, "It would appear according to
qu'arrivés à Sauvenières, les all the reports, that, on arrival at
Prussiens se sont divisés en deux Sauvenières, the Prussians divided
Colonnes: l'une a dû prendre la themselves into two Columns: one
route de Wavre, en passant par of which took the road to Wavre,
Sart à Wallain, l'autre Colonne passing by Sart à Wallain; the
paraît s'être dirigée sur Perwès. other Column would appear to have
been directed on Perwès.
"On peut peutêtre en inférer "It may perhaps be inferred from
qu'une portion va joindre WELLINGTON, this that one portion is going to
et que le Centre, qui est l'Armée join WELLINGTON; and that the
de BLÜCHER, se retire sur Liège: Centre, which is the Army of
une autre Colonne avec de BLÜCHER, is retiring on Liege.
l'Artillerie ayant fait son mouvement Another Column with Artillery having
de retraite par Namur, le Général made its retreat by Namur, General
EXCELMANS a Ordre de pousser ce EXCELMANS has the Order to push this
soir six Escadrons sur Sart à Wallain evening six Squadrons on to Sart à
et trois Escadrons sur Perwès. Wallain, and three Squadrons on to
D'après leur rapport, si la masse Perwès. According to their report,
des Prussiens se retire sur Wavre, if the mass of the Prussians is
je la suivrai dans cette direction, retiring on Wavre, I shall follow
afin qu'ils ne puissent pas gagner them in that direction, so as to
Bruxelles, et de les séparer de prevent them from reaching Brussels,
WELLINGTON. and to keep them separated from
WELLINGTON.
"Si, au contraire, mes renseignemens "If, on the contrary, my enquiries
prouvent que la principale prove that the principal Prussian
force Prussienne a marche sur Perwès, force has marched on Perwès, I
je me dirigerai par cette ville shall proceed by that town in
à la poursuite de l'Ennemi. pursuit of the Enemy.
"Les Généraux THIELEMANN et "Generals THIELEMANN and
BORSTEL faisaient partie de BORSTEL formed part of the Army
l'Armée que Votre Majesté a that your Majesty defeated yesterday.
battue hier; ils étaient encore ce They were still here at 10 o'clock
matin à 10 heures ici, et ont this morning, and have announced
annoncé que vingt mille hommes des that twenty thousand of their men
leurs avaient été mis hors de combat. have been disabled. They
Ils ont demande en partant asked, in leaving, the distances of
les distances de Wavre, Perwès Wavre, Perwès, and Hannut.
et Hannut. BLÜCHER a été BLÜCHER has been slightly wounded
blessé légèrement au bras, ce qui in the arm; which, however, has not
ne l'a pas empêché de continuer hindered him from continuing to
à commander après s'être fait command after having his wound
panser. Il n'a point passé par dressed. He has not passed by
Gembloux. Gembloux.
"Je suis avec respect, de "I am with respect,
Votre Majesté, "Sire,
"Sire, le fidèle sujet, "The faithful subject of
"Le Maréchal Comte DE "YOUR MAJESTY,
GROUCHY." "Marshal Count DE GROUCHY."
Although the information conveyed in this despatch was incorrect on
some points, and imperfect on others, inasmuch as it represented that
Prussian Columns had retired upon Namur and Perwès, which was not the
case, and gave no account of the Columns (First and Second Corps) which
had retreated by Tilly and Gentinnes, still it was well calculated to
satisfy NAPOLEON, that at least the spirit of his instructions had been
understood by the Marshal. The latter had stated that he suspected
a portion of the Prussian troops was proceeding to join WELLINGTON,
and that, should he ascertain, through his Cavalry detached to Sart à
Wallain and Perwès, that the great mass of the Prussians was retiring
upon Wavre, it was his intention to pursue them in that direction, "so
as to prevent them from reaching Brussels, and to keep them separated
from WELLINGTON."
Four hours afterwards (that is, at two o'clock on the morning of the
18th) he sent off another despatch to the Emperor, reporting that he
had decided on marching upon either Corbaix or Wavre.
* * * * *
The retreat of the Prussian Army, after its defeat at Ligny on the 16th
of June, was conducted with great skill, and executed in very good
order. By detaining THIELEMANN's Corps upon the Field of Battle until
the morning of the 17th, ample security was afforded to the line of
retreat by Gembloux; and by not withdrawing BÜLOW's Corps from that
town until THIELEMANN drew near to it, the distance between the main
bodies of these two Corps became so limited as to present the ready
means of opposing their combined force to a vigorous pursuit should
such be attempted.
By the evening of the 17th, the entire Prussian Army (with the
exception of the Ninth and Thirteenth Brigades, and the Reserve
Cavalry of the Third Corps, which arrived by six o'clock on the
following morning) had assembled in the immediate vicinity of
Wavre--two Corps on the right, and the remaining two Corps on the left,
bank of the Dyle--in perfect order, and fully prepared to resume the
offensive. Upon the two lines of retreat, the Rear Guards were well
disposed at Vieux Sart and Mont St Guibert; where they continued during
that night, and whence they retired leisurely on the following day.
On the Prussian Left, Patrols were despatched towards the main road
leading from Namur to Louvain. On the Right, a Detachment was sent
from ZIETEN's Corps to Limale, on the left bank of the Dyle, to cover
the Flank, and Patrols were pushed higher up the river, to communicate
with the Post of Mont St Guibert. Major FALKENHAUSEN had been detached,
during the day, to Seroulx for the purpose of reconnoitring the country
in the vicinity of Genappe, and of the high road to Brussels; and he
succeeded in discovering, from the wooded tracts beyond Seroulx, the
advance of the French Army along the _chaussée_. Patrols were also
detached towards Lasne, Couture, and Aywiers, to observe the Defiles
along the rivulet of the Lasne.
Such were the dispositions of the defeated Prussians on the evening of
the 17th, while the victorious French had not advanced beyond Gembloux.
The former had fallen back, in good order, upon a line with, and a
short distance from, the Anglo-Allied Army on their Right; while their
opponents, though encountering no obstacle of importance, had made but
little progress, and were widely diverging from, instead of closely
co-operating with, the main Army from which they had been detached.
These dispositions, so ably planned and so efficiently performed,
were well calculated to facilitate the grand operation of the morrow,
namely, BLÜCHER's flank movement to the right, to effect a junction
with WELLINGTON.
The retreat to Wavre did not in any way incapacitate the Prussian Army
for the resumption of actively offensive operations. With respect
to its material, it so happened that the Park of Reserve Ammunition
Waggons had, in the first instance, been directed upon Gembloux; and
Colonel RÖHL, who superintended the Ordnance Department of the Army,
sent his Aide de Camp during the night of the 16th to conduct this
Reserve to Wavre; whilst he himself hastened to the latter town,
for the purpose of putting the whole of the Artillery, accordingly
as it arrived there, again in a fit state for action. The supply of
ammunition, however, was necessarily incomplete; but in order to
prevent any failure in this respect, should some mishap occur to
the Park of Reserve Ammunition Waggons, a Courier was despatched to
Maestricht, with directions for the speedy transport of a supply of
ammunition from thence to the Army, by means of the common waggons
of the country. Similar Orders were conveyed to Cologne, Wesel, and
Münster: and, by way of precaution, an express was sent to Liege for
the removal of the Battering Train to Maestricht; as also for the
destruction, in case of danger, of the iron foundry in the Arsenal of
the former place.
Fortunately, however, the Reserve Ammunition Waggons reached Wavre
safely at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th. The Corps and
Batteries were furnished with a complete supply of ammunition, and the
Army was thus placed in a perfectly efficient state for commencing
another battle. This turn of affairs was most encouraging, and BLÜCHER
delayed not another moment in despatching to WELLINGTON the reply to
which allusion has already been made. (See page 285.)
As regards the influence which the defeat at Ligny exercised over
the _morale_ of the Prussian Army, its injurious effects were made
manifest amongst the newly raised drafts from the Rhenish and
Westphalian Provinces, and from the Duchy of Berg. Of these troops,
8,000 men betook themselves to a flight which admitted of no check
until they reached Liege and Aix la Chapelle. Among the Rhenish
troops, particularly those from Provinces which had formerly belonged
to France, there were many old French soldiers; and although several
of them fought with great bravery, others evinced a bad disposition,
and there were instances in which they passed over to their former
companions in arms. Such, however, was not the case with the troops
from the other western districts of the Prussian State: there was
scarcely a single man amongst the missing, who belonged to any of the
old Westphalian Provinces, Mark, Cleve, Minden, and Ravensberg, whilst
several came from that of Münster.
But the _morale_ of the great mass of the Prussian Army continued
unshaken. The spirit of the troops was neither tamed nor broken; and
their enthusiasm, though damped, had not been subdued. Unbounded
confidence was placed in the firm decision and restless energy of
their aged and venerated Chief; who, though suffering from the effects
of his fall, by which his whole frame had sustained a severe shock,
evinced not the slightest apprehension of fatal consequences to the
Campaign resulting from this defeat. His unbending nature led him
to cast aside for the moment those purely political interests and
theoretically strategical principles, by which a more cautious and less
enterprising Commander might have been induced to secure the line of
the Meuse, and to preserve his direct communications with the Prussian
States, and thus afford but a doubtful and an inefficient support to
his Ally. Placing full reliance on the resources of his own mind, and
on the stern, warlike character of his troops; he devoted his whole
energies to the attainment of the one grand object--that of crushing
NAPOLEON by combining with WELLINGTON. This confidence in himself and
in his soldiers was strikingly and characteristically manifested in
the concluding words of a General Order which he issued to the Army
on the morning of the 17th. "I shall immediately lead you against the
Enemy;--we shall beat him, because it is our duty to do so."
Towards midnight of the 17th, a communication reached BLÜCHER from
General MÜFFLING (already mentioned as having been attached to the
British Head Quarters) to the following effect. "The Anglo-Allied Army
is posted with its Right upon Braine l'Alleud, its Centre upon Mont St
Jean, and its Left near La Haye; having the Enemy in its front. The
Duke awaits the attack, but calculates upon Prussian support."
This intelligence was forwarded, at midnight, to General Count BÜLOW,
accompanied by the following Order:--"You will therefore, at daybreak,
march with the Fourth Corps from Dion le Mont, through Wavre, taking
the direction of Chapelle St Lambert, in which vicinity you will keep
your force concealed as much as possible, in case the Enemy should
not, by that time, be seriously engaged with the Duke of WELLINGTON;
but should it be otherwise, you will make a most vigorous attack upon
the Enemy's Right Flank. The Second Corps will follow you as a direct
Support: the First and Third Corps will also be held in readiness to
move in the same direction if necessary. You will leave a Detachment in
observation at Mont St Guibert; which, if pressed, will gradually fall
back upon Wavre. All the Baggage Train, and everything not actually
required in the Field of Action, will be sent to Louvain."
Instructions, in conformity with the above, were also forwarded to
the Commanders of the other Corps; and a communication of these
arrangements was despatched to General MÜFFLING, with an explanation
that the fatigue of the troops could not possibly admit of earlier
support. This General was, at the same time, requested to forward
timely intelligence of the attack upon the Duke, and of the nature of
that attack, that measures might be adopted accordingly.
* * * * *
At five o'clock on the morning of the 18th, PAJOL started from Mazy,
with SOULT's Cavalry Division and TESTE's Infantry Division, marching
by St Denis and Grand Lez, to Tourinnes; where he was to await further
Orders. At about eight o'clock, EXCELMANS' Corps of Heavy Cavalry,
consisting of eight Regiments of Dragoons, was put in motion; and at
nine o'clock, VANDAMME's and GÉRARD's Infantry Corps began their march
along one and the same road, by Sart à Wallain, upon Wavre. The Left of
this Column was protected, towards the Dyle, by the advance of MAURIN's
Division of Light Cavalry, under General VALLIN.
It was about half past ten o'clock, when EXCELMANS' Advanced Guard came
up with the Prussian Rear Guard, on the road to Wavre. He immediately
formed his troops in position, resting their Left upon the wooded
ravine near the Farm of La Plaquerie, and their Right in the direction
of Neuf Sart. While his Skirmishers were engaged with those of the
Enemy, he sent the _Chef d'Escadron_ D'ESTOURMEL, to inform Marshal
GROUCHY of what was going on in front, and also to make known to him
that the Prussian Army had continued its retreat upon Wavre during a
part of the night and that morning, for the purpose of forming a closer
communication with the Duke of WELLINGTON's forces.
The march of the Third and Fourth Corps was greatly retarded by the
bad state of the roads, and frequent halts were occasioned by the
narrowness and miry nature of the Defiles. GÉRARD, having preceded
the Column, reached Sart à Wallain at eleven o'clock, where he found
GROUCHY breakfasting in the house of M. HOLLAËRT, a Notary. In about
half an hour after his arrival, Colonel SIMON LORIÈRE, who was acting
as his Chief of the Staff, suddenly heard, while walking in the garden
of the house, a distant but violent cannonade, of which he immediately
went to apprise his General. GROUCHY repaired at once to the garden,
accompanied by GÉRARD, VANDAMME, EXCELMANS, and several other Officers.
He immediately called for M. HOLLAËRT, and asked him in what part of
the country he considered this tremendous cannonade to be going on. The
latter, pointing to the Forest of Soignies, replied that it must be in
the direction of Planchenoit, Mont St Jean, and that vicinity.
GÉRARD then declared his opinion to be in favour of the expediency
of marching in the direction of the cannonade, in order to connect
the movements of the detached force more closely with NAPOLEON's
operations; and offered to lead his own Corps towards the Battle. This
measure was opposed by the Marshal, as also by General BALTUS, of the
Artillery, who represented the difficulties of a march in which this
Arm might be compromised. On the other hand, General VALAZE, Commanding
Engineer of GÉRARD's Corps, after having coincided in the opinion
expressed by the latter, observed that he had three Companies of
Sappers, by aid of which he could remove many obstacles. GÉRARD then
gave his assurance that he could at all events move on with the gun
carriages and limbers.
GROUCHY, however, stated his determination to act in conformity with
his instructions; which were, to pursue and attack the Prussians, and
never to lose sight of them. It had just been intimated to him that
his troops had come up with a Rear Guard of the Enemy's Infantry, and
he did not consider his information was sufficient to warrant the
conclusion that BLÜCHER was drawn up, in expectation of being attacked
by him at Wavre; or that he would continue his retreat upon Brussels;
or, that if, in manoeuvring to effect his junction with WELLINGTON, he
would do so in front, or in rear, of the Forest of Soignies.
He has since declared, that he did not deem it his duty to follow the
counsel given by GÉRARD, but to attack the Prussians; that to effect
the proposed movement with the whole of his forces would have been
acting contrary to his Orders; that to have detached only a portion of
those forces in the direction of the Forest of Soignies, would have
been to separate the two Corps of his Army by a river, whose waters
were swollen by the rain, and whose banks were swampy, and thus have
rendered their mutual support impossible, however essential it might
have become; finally, that a war of inspiration appertains alone to the
General in Chief, and that his Lieutenants must confine themselves to
that of execution. Hence the march to Wavre was continued.
Whilst proceeding to the Advanced Guard, GROUCHY received the despatch,
dated from the Farm of Caillou, the 18th of June, at ten o'clock in
the morning, acquainting him that the Emperor was going to attack the
Anglo-Allied Army, in its position at Waterloo; desiring him to direct
his movements upon Wavre in such a manner as to draw his forces nearer
to those of NAPOLEON, and, especially, to keep up a close communication
with the latter.
The receipt of these instructions was not followed by any immediate
change in GROUCHY's dispositions. He despatched no Cavalry force--not
even a single Patrol--to watch any movements that might be attempted,
or actually then in course of execution, by the Prussians, towards
the Field on which the Emperor had intimated to him his intention
of attacking the force under WELLINGTON; and hence it is almost
needless to add, that he neglected to establish that close and active
communication with the main Army which was so essentially important for
the accomplishment of the object of the general plan of operations, and
to which NAPOLEON had especially directed his attention in the before
mentioned despatch. His sole aim seemed to be a direct advance upon
Wavre; and this he carried into execution without at all detaching to,
or in any way manoeuvring by, his left. On the contrary, upon arriving
in person at the position occupied by EXCELMANS, he desired the latter
to move to his right, and take post at Dion le Mont; and the ground
thus vacated was shortly afterwards taken up by VALLIN's Light Cavalry
Division.
* * * * *
At daybreak of the 18th of June, BÜLOW, in conformity with the
Order which he had received during the previous night from BLÜCHER,
quitted his position near Dion le Mont, to march through Wavre to St
Lambert. This was the commencement of the important flank movement
of the Prussians in support of the Anglo-Allied Army in position in
front of Waterloo; and every measure of precaution was adopted with
a view to its being carried into effect with certainty and safety.
The sun had not yet risen when Major WITOWSKY was despatched with a
Detachment of the 2nd Silesian Hussars, to Maransart, for the purpose
of closely reconnoitring the Defiles of the Lasne, which had already
been patrolled the evening before, and to observe the country in front
of those Defiles, in the direction of the Enemy's position. Major
FALKENHAUSEN, previously mentioned as having pushed a reconnaissance
beyond Seroulx on the 17th, was now directed also to reconnoitre the
Lasne. Scouring parties were sent out, which kept up the communication
that had been opened the previous day with Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR
at Mont St Guibert: the whole country between the Dyle and the
Charleroi high road was carefully explored; and correct intelligence
was continually sent to the rear concerning the French Army.
By means of this vigilant look out, the Prussians secured the important
advantage of retarding the communications between the French Emperor
and his Marshal, since it compelled the bearer of despatches to pursue
a very circuitous route.
At half past nine o'clock, on the morning of the 18th, whilst BÜLOW's
Corps was on the march to St Lambert, the following additional despatch
was forwarded to General MÜFFLING:--
"Wavre, 18th June 1815, at half past nine o'clock.
"I request you will say to the Duke of WELLINGTON, in my name, that
even ill as I am, I shall, nevertheless, put myself at the head of my
troops, for the purpose of immediately attacking the Enemy's Right
Flank, should NAPOLEON undertake anything against the Duke. If,
however, the day should pass over without a hostile attack, it is my
opinion that we ought tomorrow, with our combined forces, to attack
the French Army. I commission you to communicate this as the result
of my inward conviction, and to represent to him that I consider this
proposal to be the best and most suitable in our present position.
"BLÜCHER."
The Prussians very soon discovered that the French had made no
disposition whatever for the protection of their Right Flank. Major
WITOWSKY had proceeded as far as Maransart before he fell in with an
Enemy's Patrol; and Major FALKENHAUSEN found the Defiles of the Lasne
perfectly free and unobserved. Upon receiving this intelligence,
BLÜCHER decided upon supporting the Anglo-Allied Army, by directing the
march of his whole force, or at least of three Corps, towards the Wood
of Paris, and debouching from thence upon the Flank and Rear of the
Enemy; and Major LÜTZOW was immediately despatched for the purpose of
narrowly watching, from the other side of the above Wood, the French
movements directed against the position of the Anglo-Allied Army.
No report as yet had been received from the Rear Guard, concerning
GROUCHY's advance, and as BLÜCHER's object was now to gain the Defiles
of the Lasne without interruption, and to occupy in force the Wood of
Paris, he determined to avail himself of the time and opportunity which
offered for the projected movement. Being, however, uncertain as to the
amount of GROUCHY's force, the Prince deemed it advisable that Wavre
should not be abandoned until the greater part of the Army had passed
the Defiles of St Lambert; and with this view, he directed that as soon
as BÜLOW's Corps should have proceeded beyond Wavre, ZIETEN's Corps
was to commence its march by Fromont and Ohain to join the Left Wing
of WELLINGTON's Army near La Haye. PIRCH's Corps was ordered to follow
BÜLOW's in the direction of St Lambert; and THIELEMANN's Corps, after
retaining possession of the Defile of Wavre sufficiently long to render
the general movement of the Army secure, was then gradually to follow
ZIETEN's Corps upon Ohain.
An unfortunate incident occurred during the passage of BÜLOW's Corps,
through Wavre, which materially impeded the march of the troops. The
Advanced Guard, consisting of the Fifteenth Brigade (under General
LOSTHIN), with the 2nd Silesian Hussars, and a twelve pounder Battery,
had scarcely passed through the town when a fire broke out in the
main street, and extended itself with great rapidity. This not only
caused a suspension of the march of the main body of the Corps, but
created much alarm, in consequence of the great number of ammunition
waggons in the place. Every exertion was made to extinguish the fire.
The 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment, under Major LÖWENFELD, and the
7th Pioneer Company, were ordered upon this duty; and after they had
encountered considerable difficulty, their efforts were crowned with
success.
In the mean time the Advanced Guard of BÜLOW's Corps had continued its
march, and reached St Lambert by eleven o'clock. The Sixteenth, and
then the Thirteenth, Brigade arrived much later; and the Fourteenth
Brigade, which formed the Rear Guard, was a long way behind. The
Advanced Guard did not wait the arrival of the other Brigades, but
proceeded forthwith to cross the Defile of St Lambert. Having effected
the passage, which was attended with great difficulty, in consequence
of the soft and miry state of the valley, it halted in the Wood of
Paris, where it continued a considerable time, waiting for the approach
of the main body. Patrols, however, from the 2nd Silesian Hussars, were
immediately sent forward to feel for the Anglo-Allied Left, and to
reconnoitre the French Right.
ZIETEN's Corps (the First) commenced its march, upon the left bank of
the Dyle, towards Ohain, about noon.
Whilst BÜLOW's Reserve Cavalry, following the Thirteenth Infantry
Brigade, was passing through Wavre, French Cavalry had penetrated
between the Rear Guard of this Corps, at Vieux Sart, and the Detachment
under Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR at Mont St Guibert. The 2nd
Pomeranian, and the 1st Silesian, Landwehr Cavalry were immediately
detached from the Reserve Cavalry of the Corps, to aid in checking the
advance of the Enemy.
The Prussian Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR, who was still at Mont St
Guibert, having received intelligence of the approach of the French,
decided on commencing his retreat towards Wavre. Lieutenant Colonel
SOHR, who had fallen back early in the morning from Mont St Guibert,
sent 150 Cavalry and two guns of Horse Artillery as a reinforcement to
LEDEBUR. The latter now succeeded in forming a junction with the two
Cavalry Regiments detached from the Reserve, as also, subsequently,
with the Cavalry Brigade under SOHR, after a slight affair with the
Third French Corps (VANDAMME's), whilst making good his retreat to
Auzel.
PIRCH's Corps (the Second) broke up from its position between St Anne
and Aisemont, on the right bank of the Dyle, about noon, for the
purpose of passing the Defile of Wavre. The 1st Battalion of the 14th
Regiment, which occupied this town, was relieved by a Battalion of
the 30th Regiment, belonging to the Third Corps (THIELEMANN's). PIRCH
had just put his Corps in motion, with a view to cross the Dyle by
the town of Wavre, when the approach of the Enemy was announced. The
Defile was crowded with the troops; the progress of their march could
not be otherwise than slow; and at this moment Lieutenant Colonel SOHR,
whose Brigade formed the Rear Guard of the Corps, sent in word, that
the Enemy presented a force of six Regiments of Cavalry, ten pieces of
Artillery, and two strong Columns of Infantry.
The Wood of Sarats, close to the Farm of Auzel, was now occupied
by some Battalions of the Eighth Brigade, the command of which had
devolved upon Colonel RECKOW. PIRCH placed the whole of the Rear Guard
under the Orders of General BRAUSE, the Commander of the Seventh
Brigade, and reinforced Lieutenant Colonel SOHR with the 11th Hussars
and four pieces of Horse Artillery. BRAUSE posted the remaining
Battalions of the Eighth Brigade in rear of the Wood, and the three
Regiments of Cavalry on the right, with the Foot Battery No. 12 in
their front. The Seventh Brigade, deployed into line, remained in
reserve.
Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR retired slowly before the Enemy, and
formed a junction with the Eighth Brigade, under Colonel RECKOW; who
maintained his position until three o'clock in the afternoon, against
the Advanced Guard of VANDAMME's Corps. Between three and four o'clock,
General BRAUSE ordered the retreat. Lieutenant Colonel SOHR crossed the
Bridge at the Mill of Bierge, which was occupied by two Companies of
the 2nd Battalion of the 14th Regiment; and then followed the Reserve
Cavalry of PIRCH's Corps, to which his Brigade belonged, but which he
did not overtake until he reached the Field of Waterloo. The Enemy did
not advance with much vigour; the retreat was conducted with perfect
order, and the Fusilier Battalion of the 1st Pomeranian Landwehr, under
Major KRÜGER, distinguished itself on the occasion. After the passage
of the river had been effected, the 1st Battalion of the Elbe Landwehr
remained at Bierge until the Bridge was destroyed and the Mill set on
fire. The 11th Hussars and the 2nd Battalion of the Elbe Landwehr were
posted in observation of the passages across the Dyle, and did not
rejoin the Corps before the following day.
BLÜCHER had quitted Wavre before eleven o'clock in the forenoon, and
repaired to the vicinity of Limale, in order to make himself acquainted
with the nature of the country in the direction of St Lambert. Whilst
here, he received intelligence of the approach of the Enemy towards
Wavre. Colonel CLAUSEWITZ, Chief of the Staff of the Third Corps, was
immediately made the bearer of an Order for THIELEMANN to defend the
position at this place, in the event of the Enemy advancing in force;
but, should the latter cross the Dyle higher up the stream, or not
appear in great strength (a point concerning which nothing positive
was then known), he was to leave only a few Battalions in position at
Wavre, and to follow the main Army, with his Corps, as a Reserve, in
the direction of Couture.
* * * * *
GROUCHY's movements, on the 17th and 18th, form so striking a feature
in the history of this Campaign, and exercised so important an
influence upon the fate of the decisive Battle of Waterloo, that it
becomes an essential point in the study of that history, to examine
how far he complied with, and carried into effect, the instructions
received from his Master, and to what degree his proceedings,
consequent upon his ascertaining the direction of the Prussian retreat,
coincided with the general plan and object of NAPOLEON's operations. On
a reference to the account of his transactions during the 17th, given
in the despatch written at ten o'clock on that night, it appears he
was completely ignorant of the line by which the principal mass of the
Prussian Army had retreated, namely, that of Tilly and Gentinnes, by
ZIETEN's and PIRCH's Corps, although his Cavalry had driven back the
Prussian Detachment from the latter place to Mont St Guibert, but from
whence it appears to have been withdrawn in the night. His attention
seems to have been much less devoted to this quarter than it was to his
Right, in which direction he detached as far as Perwès. The main body
of his forces did not proceed further than Gembloux on the 17th, that
is, about five miles from the Field of Ligny.
Upon a first consideration, we are strongly impressed by the striking
contrast between this march, in pursuit of a defeated Army, which had
commenced its retreat on the previous night, and which presented no
check to the advance, and the march of NAPOLEON from the same Field,
by Quatre Bras and Genappe, as far as La Belle Alliance, in front of
the Waterloo position, a distance of about sixteen or seventeen miles;
and this, too, in rear of a victorious Army, with a Cavalry Rear Guard
boldly and successfully impeding the advance of its pursuers. It must,
however, be taken into account, that in one most important respect
NAPOLEON possessed a decided advantage over GROUCHY--an advantage,
the magnitude of which increased with every moment that elapsed after
the wet weather had set in; for while the former moved the whole
distance along a paved high road, the latter had to proceed entirely
by cross roads, which may more properly be designated common field
roads. It is to this particular point that both GROUCHY and GÉRARD
refer in justification of the late arrival of the Infantry at Gembloux.
Nevertheless, GROUCHY detached considerably to his Right, with his
Cavalry, misled by the same idea which had prevailed with NAPOLEON,
that BLÜCHER had retreated upon the Meuse; and the very circumstance
of his Dragoons having reached Perwès on the night of the 17th,
proves that had he organised a more extended, more combined, and more
energetic reconnaissance, with the sixty five Squadrons of Cavalry
which had been placed under his orders, he might have connected his
operations on the right of the Dyle with those of NAPOLEON on the left
of that river, by occupying the line of Nil St Vincent, Corbaix, Mont
St Guibert, and the Bridge of Moustier. The only check he would have
experienced would have been at the Prussian Post of Mont St Guibert;
which, however, in the case of an active reconnaissance, as above,
might have been attacked by a strong Detachment in front, and turned by
Corbaix on its left.
To show the connection which this disposition would have secured with
NAPOLEON's movements, it is only necessary to state, that the Third
Cavalry Division, under Lieutenant General DOMON, had been detached
from the Emperor's Column to reconnoitre the country between the Dyle
and the high road to Brussels; and that the 4th Regiment of _Chasseurs
à Cheval_ pushed as far as the Bridge of Moustier, on which line its
Skirmishers exchanged a few carabine shots with some Prussian Dragoons,
who did not, however, appear willing to engage further with them. It
was by means of this reconnaissance that NAPOLEON ascertained the
retreat, through Tilly and Gentinnes, of the principal Prussian Column,
consisting of ZIETEN's and PIRCH's Corps, although the line by which
they retired was undiscovered by GROUCHY, in whose immediate sphere of
operations it was situated.
But if such good grounds exist for inferring that, on the 17th, an
earlier and a clearer insight into the Enemy's movements might have
been obtained by the Corps detached in pursuit of the Prussians, and
that when obtained, it would have rendered the communication with the
operations of the main Army on the left of the Dyle, a matter not only
important in the highest degree, but also perfectly practicable; and if
a failure in this respect be attributable to the absence of sufficient
energy and vigour on the part of GROUCHY, how much more forcibly does
it not expose the extraordinary, the unaccountable, dilatoriness of
NAPOLEON himself during the whole of the precious morning of the 17th!
How striking a view it unfolds of what might have been accomplished,
had the bivouac at Ligny been broken up a few hours earlier! Then,
WELLINGTON's Army was still between Quatre Bras and the narrow Defile
of Genappe, open to an attack in front by NEY, simultaneously with one
in flank by the force collected at Marbais (a part of which might have
been detached across the Genappe, towards the rear of the Anglo-Allied
Army, by Villers la Ville and Bousseval, masked by the Wood of Berme);
and the rearmost Corps of the Prussian Army (THIELEMANN's), which was
retreating through Gembloux, might have been attacked with effect, by
the superior force of all Arms under GROUCHY.
As regards GROUCHY's movements during the early part of the 18th, it
is very remarkable, that although he had in his despatch, written at
ten o'clock the previous night, communicated to NAPOLEON his surmises
of an intended junction of a portion of BLÜCHER's forces with those of
WELLINGTON, and his consequent intention of following the Prussians in
the direction of Wavre, _afin qu'ils ne puissent pas gagner Bruxelles,
et de les séparer de WELLINGTON_, and although he must or ought to have
been aware that Wavre was only twelve miles distant from NAPOLEON's
main line of operations, whereas Gembloux was about fifteen miles
distant from Wavre, he not only delayed his departure from Gembloux
until between seven and eight o'clock in the morning, but manoeuvred by
his right; taking the more circuitous line, through Sart à Wallain, and
rendering his operations still more dilatory by moving both VANDAMME's
and GERARD's Corps along one and the same road. Had he not, from want
of sufficient vigilance, continued ignorant of the fact, that the
principal Prussian Column, consisting of the First and Second Corps,
had retired upon Wavre, at so short a distance from his left as by the
line of Tilly, Gentinnes, and Mont St Guibert, there can be very little
doubt that he would have marched upon the latter point, which the
Prussians, aware of its importance, had occupied with a Rear Guard; but
even with the amount of information which he possessed, and with the
inference justly impressed upon his mind that a co-operation between
BLÜCHER and WELLINGTON was projected, we are at a loss to account for
his not having moved upon Mont St Guibert, and manoeuvred by his left.
In his despatch, written at two o'clock in the morning, he mentioned to
the Emperor his design of marching upon Corbaix or Wavre; a movement
of which NAPOLEON, in his reply, expressed his approval; and if he
had directed one of his Infantry Corps along the line of Corbaix and
La Baraque, and the other by that of Mont St Guibert and Moustier,
there can be no doubt that, even late as was the hour at which he
started from Gembloux, he would, in a great measure, have fulfilled the
expectations of his Imperial Master. In this case, he would naturally
have so divided his Cavalry, that one portion would have scoured the
country along the Front and Right of the Column marching by Corbaix
and La Baraque, and the other portion would have been employed in a
similar manner along the Front and Left of the Column moving upon Mont
St Guibert and Moustier. Both at this point and at Ottignies, about
eight hundred yards lower down the stream, there is a stone bridge
across the Dyle. There is a direct road from Moustier to St Lambert,
scarcely five miles distant, and another to the Field of Waterloo.
The Cavalry in advance of the Left Column could not have failed to
discover the Prussian troops in march to join the Left of WELLINGTON;
for they were then passing slowly, and with extreme difficulty, through
the Defiles of St Lambert and Lasne. This discovery would have led to
the Right Column being moved by its left, from La Baraque to Moustier;
the Cavalry attached to it masking the movement as long as possible.
The Left Column would then, in all probability, have followed its
advanced Cavalry to St Lambert; and the Right Corps have either moved
upon the same point as a reinforcement, or have diverged upon Lasne as
a Support, upon which the former might have fallen back, if compelled
to effect its retreat towards Planchenoit.
In this manner might GROUCHY have so far realised the anxious
expectation of NAPOLEON as to have fallen upon BÜLOW _flagrante
delicto_, and have materially procrastinated the co-operation of
BLÜCHER with WELLINGTON on the 18th of June; a co-operation which a
contrary proceeding, originating in fatal tardiness of movement, and
exhibiting useless manoeuvring in a false direction, could not fail
to render easy in execution and successful in result. But beyond such
procrastination of the meditated junction of BLÜCHER's and WELLINGTON's
forces, GROUCHY could have effected nothing. The junction itself could
not have been prevented. The tendency of GROUCHY's movements had been
too narrowly watched; the country between the Dyle and the Charleroi
road to Brussels had been too vigilantly explored; and the movements,
in succession, of the different Prussian Corps had been too nicely
calculated and determined; to admit of the possibility of a failure, as
regarded the arrival of a considerable portion of the Prussian forces
on the Left of the Anglo-Allied Army.
BLÜCHER had made so admirable a disposition of his four _Corps
d'Armée_, that two of them could at any time have combined, and
therefore have presented a superior force to GROUCHY, at any point
between Wavre and Planchenoit; whilst the remainder of the Army might
have continued its march to the Field of Waterloo. Had Grouchy moved
by St Guibert and Moustier upon St Lambert, THIELEMANN's Corps would
then have been on the march towards Couture, according to his original
instructions; and finding BÜLOW engaged with the Enemy, would have
joined him. GROUCHY might then have contrived to hold both these Corps
at bay, and thus have reduced the co-operating Prussian force at
Waterloo to the two Corps under ZIETEN and PIRCH, besides considerably
retarding that co-operation; since without having experienced the
effects of any such interruption to the progress of the other Corps, as
we have here supposed, these two Generals did not reach the Field of
Battle until seven o'clock in the evening of the 18th.
Such is the extent of the advantage which, under the circumstances,
GROUCHY would have gained by a march from Gembloux upon St Lambert; a
most important one, no doubt, as time for pushing the struggle with
WELLINGTON, with the whole force at his immediate disposal, before
the arrival of the Prussians, was of the most vital consequence to
NAPOLEON; and this advantage GROUCHY entirely lost by his march upon
Wavre--a march which enabled BLÜCHER to appear with three, out of his
four, _Corps d'Armée_, on the great and decisive Field of Action; and
that in sufficient time to render the victory as complete as could
reasonably be desired.
No exertions, however, on the part of GROUCHY, after he broke up from
Gembloux on the morning of the 18th, could have effectually frustrated
the junction of WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER. Two great errors, for which
that Marshal was not accountable, reduced the contemplated junction
from a measure of calculation to one of certainty. The first and
principal of these has already been adverted to at some length, and
cannot be too closely kept in view--the fatal neglect of a vigorous
pursuit of the defeated Prussians, on the night of the 16th and morning
of the 17th, by a detached Corps; combined with the extraordinary
delay in the attack upon WELLINGTON at Quatre Bras, on the latter day.
The second error arose from the want of a strong reconnaissance and
vigilant look out on the right of the main French Army, on the morning
of the 18th, followed up by the occupation of the Defiles of the Lasne.
* * * * *
It was nearly four o'clock when VANDAMME's Corps arrived in front of
the position which THIELEMANN was in the act of quitting, with a view
to follow and support the remaining three Prussian Corps that were at
that moment on the march towards the Field of Waterloo; and, with a
fire that was opened from the French Batteries, commenced the Battle
of Wavre, which will be described in its proper place in a subsequent
Chapter.
CHAPTER IX.
It rained incessantly during the night of the 17th, occasionally in
torrents; whilst loud and frequent peals of thunder fell ominously
on the ear of the toil-worn soldier, startling him from the fitful
slumber, which was all the rest the chill and comfortless bivouac on
the Field of Waterloo could afford him in that tempestuous night.
Scarcely had the morning dawned when the numerous groups, stretched
around the smouldering remains of the bivouac fires, or couched in
the hollows, or lying under such slender cover as the few trees and
brushwood within range of the positions of their respective Regiments
afforded, were seen gradually in motion; and as the eye of an observer
wandered along the space which lay between the main bodies of the
hostile Armies--a space varying in no greater width than from one
thousand to fifteen hundred yards--the Officers in command of the
several Picquets might be seen, on either side, withdrawing their
Vedettes and Sentries from the very limited and almost conversational
distance that had separated them from their opponents during the night,
concentrating their Detachments, and establishing their Main Posts more
within the immediate range of the respective positions occupied by the
grand Armies.
As the morning advanced, the dense vapoury masses which had so long
rolled slowly and heavily over the plain, gradually began, as if
relieved by the constant discharge of their contents, to soar into
a higher region, where, during the whole day, with little or but
imperceptible motion, they hung spread out into a broad expansive
vault, through which the rays of the sun were unable fully to
penetrate, until just at the moment of its sinking from the scene of
strife, when it shed the full blaze of its setting splendour upon the
victorious advance of the Anglo-Allied Army. The drying and cleaning of
firearms soon became general, and the continuous discharge of muskets,
at rapid and irregular intervals, fell upon the ear like the rattle of
a brisk and widely extended skirmish.
All at once, the scene became more animated and exciting. Drums,
bugles, and trumpets were heard over the whole Field, sounding the
"Assembly"; and never was the call to arms, in either Army, responded
to with greater zeal, alacrity, and cheerfulness. While the Regimental
inspections, tellings off, and preparatory arrangements of detail were
proceeding, Staff Officers were seen galloping in various directions;
and, shortly afterwards, the different Brigades, which, by their
bivouacs had but faintly and irregularly traced the Line of Battle
taken up by each Army, were moved and distributed in the precise order
prescribed by the illustrious Chiefs who had on that day, and for the
first and only time, met to measure swords.
* * * * *
The Field of Waterloo is intersected by two high roads (_chaussées_)
conspicuous by their great width and uniformity, as also by the
pavement which runs along the centre of each. These two roads, the
eastern one leading from Charleroi and Genappe, and the western from
Nivelles, form a junction at the Village of Mont St Jean, whence their
continuance, in one main road, is directed upon the capital of Belgium.
In front of the above junction; and offering, as it were, a natural
military position for the defence of this approach to Brussels, a
gentle elevated ridge of ground is intersected, at right angles, by
the Charleroi road, about 250 yards north of the Farm called La Haye
Sainte, and follows a westerly direction until about midway between the
two high roads: whence it takes a south-westerly course, and terminates
abruptly at its point of intersection with the Nivelles road, about
450 yards north of Hougomont, a Country Seat, with Farm, Offices,
Gardens, Orchards, and Wood. On the east side, the ridge extends itself
perpendicularly from the Charleroi road until it reaches a point,
distant about seven hundred yards, where, elevating itself into a Mound
or Knoll, it overlooks the Hamlet of Papelotte; and thence, taking a
north-easterly course, expands into an open plateau.
This ridge constituted the position of the First Line of the Duke of
WELLINGTON's Army, which Line is more distinctly defined by a road,
entering on the east side, from Wavre, by Ohain, and winding along the
summit of the ridge until it joins the Charleroi high road just above
La Haye Sainte; from which point of junction a cross road proceeds
along the remaining portion of the ridge, and thus connects the two
high roads with each other.
The undulations of the ground in rear of this position were admirably
adapted to the disposition of the Second Line and Reserves, presenting
a gently inclined reverse slope along nearly the whole extent of the
ridge, with fine open and convenient stations for Cavalry, perfectly
concealed from the Enemy's observation.
The Right of the main position is bounded by a valley, which has its
source very considerably in rear of the Centre of the French position,
by which it is intersected; and thence, sweeping round the southern
and western inclosures of Hougomont, proceeds in the direction of
Merbe Braine. Into this valley a ravine directs its course in rear
of, and parallel with, the principal portion of the Right Wing of the
Anglo-Allied position, at a distance from the latter varying from 200
to 250 yards; and between this ravine, which is intersected by the
Nivelles road, and Merbe Braine, rises a sort of plateau, upon which
was posted a portion of the Second Corps, commanded by Lieutenant
General Lord HILL, destined to act, as circumstances might require,
either in reserve to the First Line, or _en potence_ to it in repelling
any attack upon that Flank of the Anglo-Allied Army.
* * * * *
Upon the extreme Left of the First or main Line was stationed VIVIAN's
Light Cavalry Brigade, comprising the 10th and 18th Hussars, and the
1st Hussars of the King's German Legion. The two former Regiments were
in Line, in rear of the Wavre road, and withdrawn a little from the
crest of the ridge: the Right of the 10th resting upon a lane, which,
leading up from Smohain, crossing over the position, and descending
along its reverse slope, proceeds in the direction of the Village of
Verd Cocou. The 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion were also in
Line, and formed in reserve. The Left of the Brigade was completely
_en l'air_, upon high, open, and flat ground; the main ridge widening
considerably in that direction, as previously explained. A Picquet,
consisting of a Squadron of the 10th Hussars (under Captain TAYLOR),
occupied the Village of Smohain, down in the valley which, having its
source a little to the westward of La Haye Sainte, takes an easterly
and therefore parallel course with that part of the ridge which formed
the Left Wing of the British position. The Advanced Post of this
Picquet was on the further side of the Village, and its Vedettes formed
a chain on the rising ground beyond, within half-carbine shot of some
French Cavalry, standing dismounted in Close Columns. A party was
detached from the Picquet as a Patrol on the road to Ohain.
[Illustration:
BATTLE OF WATERLOO
at 3/4 past 11 o'clock a.m.]
The Village of Smohain, as also the Farms of La Haye and Papelotte,
with adjacent houses and inclosures, were occupied by a portion
of the Second Brigade of PERPONCHER's Division of the troops of
the Netherlands. The Regiment of Orange Nassau, consisting of two
Battalions, held Smohain and La Haye: while the Farm of Papelotte was
occupied by the Light Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment
of Nassau, which, together with the 2nd Battalion of this Regiment,
and four guns of Captain BYLEVELD's Dutch-Belgian Battery of Horse
Artillery, were posted upon the exterior slope, immediately under
the brow of the main ridge, and a little to the westward of the lane
leading directly up the slope from the Farm of Papelotte.
The Advanced Posts of these troops were at the foot, and their Line of
Sentries extended along the brow, of the opposite slope of the valley;
this Line receded towards the western limit of the Hamlet of Papelotte,
where it joined the general Line of Picquets along the bottom of the
exterior slope of the position of the Anglo-Allied Left Wing.
On the right of VIVIAN's Brigade, and having its own Right resting upon
a narrow lane, forming a slight hollow way, lined with hedges, stood
VANDELEUR's Brigade of Light Cavalry, consisting of the 11th, 12th, and
16th British Light Dragoons, in Columns of Squadrons, by Regiments,
Left in front. The lane on which its Right rested descending the
interior slope of the position, joined the other lane which led from
VIVIAN's Right to Verd Cocou.
* * * * *
The extreme Left of the Infantry of the main Line of the position was
formed by the Fifth Hanoverian Brigade, under Colonel VINCKE, belonging
to PICTON's Division. It was formed in Columns of Battalions, those of
Hameln and Hildesheim (under Majors STRUBE and RHEDEN) in First, and
those of Peine and Gifhorn (under Major Count LUDOLPH VON WESTPHALEN,
and Major HAMMERSTEIN) in Second, Line; and was posted somewhat under
the crest of the ridge, upon the reverse slope, and in rear of the
junction of a lane leading up from Papelotte, with the Wavre road.
On the immediate right of VINCKE's Brigade, and having its own Right
upon the Knoll which presents the highest and most commanding point
along the position of the Left Wing of the Anglo-Allied Army, the
Fourth Hanoverian Brigade, under Colonel BEST, was drawn up. It formed
part of the Sixth Division, and was composed of the Landwehr Battalions
of Lüneburg, Verden, and Osterode, which were deployed in Front Line;
and of Münden, which was in reserve. A Battery of Hanoverian Foot
Artillery, under Captain RETTBERG, was attached to this Brigade, and,
from the peculiarly favourable circumstances of the ground, which
formed a sort of natural fieldwork, was most advantageously placed.
Upon the exterior slope of that portion of the ridge which lies between
the before mentioned Knoll and the Genappe high road, BYLANDT's Brigade
of PERPONCHER's Division of the troops of the Netherlands was deployed
in Front Line. It consisted of the 27th Battalion of Dutch Light
Infantry, the 7th Battalion of the Belgian Line, and of the 5th, 7th,
and 8th Battalions of Dutch Militia. Of the above, the 5th Battalion
of Dutch Militia was posted in reserve, along with the remaining four
guns of Captain BYLEVELD's Battery of Horse Artillery attached to this
Brigade, in rear of the straggling hedge which lines the Wavre road,
between the Knoll and the Charleroi high road.
Upon the interior slope of the ridge, and at a distance of about two
hundred yards from the Wavre road, was posted the Ninth Brigade of
British Infantry, under Major General Sir DENIS PACK, in a Line of
Battalion Columns, at deploying intervals. It consisted of the 3rd
Battalion 1st Royal Regiment, the 1st Battalion 42nd Royal Highlanders,
2nd Battalion 44th Regiment, and of the 92nd Highlanders. The Left
Regiment, the 44th, was stationed on the Knoll, in rear of the Right
of BEST's Hanoverian Brigade; and on the right of the 44th stood, in
succession, the 92nd, 42nd, and 1st Royals.
Upon the right, but more in advance, of PACK's Brigade, and at a
short distance in rear of the hedge along the Wavre road, stood the
Eighth Brigade of British Infantry, under Major General Sir JAMES
KEMPT, also in Line of Battalion Columns, at deploying intervals, and
comprising the 28th Regiment, the 32nd Regiment, the 1st Battalion 79th
Highlanders, and the 1st Battalion 95th Rifles. The Right of the 32nd
Regiment rested upon a high bank of the Charleroi road; on its left
stood the 79th Highlanders, and the 28th formed the Left Regiment of
the Brigade.
In the immediate front of the Right of the Brigade, and at a distance
from the Wavre road of about 120 yards, there was a Knoll having on its
right a large Sand Pit, adjoining the Charleroi road; and partially
facing the small Garden in rear of La Haye Sainte. On the Allied side
of the Knoll was a single hedge, extending about 150 yards from the
Charleroi road in a direction parallel to the Wavre road. In the Sand
Pit were posted two Companies of the 1st Battalion 95th British Rifles;
the Knoll and hedge were occupied by another Company of the same
Regiment. These Advanced Companies had placed an _abatis_ across the
high road, near that part of it which is joined by the hedgerow. The
remaining Companies lined a portion of the Wavre road, commencing from
the point of its intersection with the Charleroi road.
These two Brigades, namely, the Eighth and Ninth British, together with
the Fifth Hanoverian Brigade, constituted the Fifth Division, under
Lieutenant General Sir THOMAS PICTON.
* * * * *
Along the continuation of the ridge on the right of the great Charleroi
road, the Third Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Sir CHARLES
ALTEN, was disposed in the following order:--
The Second Brigade of the King's German Legion, commanded by Colonel
OMPTEDA, which formed the Left of the Division, consisted of the 1st
and 2nd Light Battalions (under Lieutenant Colonel VON DEM BUSSCHE, and
Major BARING), and of the 5th and 8th Line Battalions of the King's
German Legion (under Lieutenant Colonels LINSINGEN and SCHRÖDER).
The 1st Light Battalion was formed in Column of Companies at quarter
distance, Left in front. It stood a little in rear of the cross road
which unites the great Nivelles road with that of Charleroi, on which
last its Left Flank rested. To the right of this Column stood the
5th Line Battalion, formed in Column at quarter distance upon one of
its centre Companies. In rear of these two Columns, and fronting the
deploying interval between them, stood the 8th Line Battalion, in
Second Line, in Column of Companies, at quarter distance, upon one of
its centre Companies.
[Illustration]
[Illustration:
LA HAYE SAINTE]
The 2nd Light Battalion, under the command of Major BARING, occupied
the Farm of La Haye Sainte.
The buildings of this Farm are so disposed as to form three sides of a
square, the north side comprising the Farm House itself, with a portion
of the stabling; the west side the remainder of the stables and cow
houses; and the south side principally a large Barn: a brick wall,
extending along the great road, unites the north and south buildings,
and thus forms the fourth boundary of the large quadrangular farm yard.
On the south, or French, side of the Farm, and down in the valley,
which here separates the Allied and French positions, lies an Orchard,
about 240 yards long and 80 wide, having for its eastern boundary, the
great road, in direct prolongation of the wall which incloses the farm
yard on that side. This Orchard is inclosed within a hedgerow; as is
also a Kitchen Garden, on the north side of the Farm, excepting the
boundary of the latter along the road side, which is a continuation of
the eastern wall.
A large gate and a doorway, the former almost facing the east end of
the Barn, and the latter quite close to the east end of the dwelling
house, lead from the yard into the great road; another gate, at the
south end of the stabling which forms the western side, as also a large
door from the west end of the Great Barn, lead both into a small narrow
portion of the Orchard, whence there is an outlet into the open fields
on the right. From the front door of the dwelling house, which faces
the farm yard, there is a passage to the back or north side of the
house, whence a door opens into the Kitchen Garden.
Since daybreak, the little garrison, amounting to scarcely 400 men,
had been busily engaged in strengthening their Post to the fullest
extent of the means within their reach, which, however, were extremely
limited. Among the difficulties which they had to overcome, it may
be remarked that, on the preceding evening, immediately after taking
possession of the Farm, the soldiers had broken up the Great Barn door,
on the west side, for firewood; and that, about the same period, the
Carpenters of the Regiment were detached to Hougomont, in compliance
with an Order received to that effect. Unfortunately, also, the mule
laden with the Regimental trenching tools had been lost the day before,
so that not even a hatchet was forthcoming. Loop holes were pierced
through the walls; and a barricade was thrown across the high road,
in prolongation of the south wall. The Battalion was composed of six
Companies, of which Major BARING posted three in the Orchard, two in
the Buildings, and one in the Garden.
On the right of OMPTEDA's Brigade stood the First Hanoverian Brigade,
under Major General Count KIELMANSEGGE, consisting of the Field
Battalions of Bremen, Verden, Duke of York, Grubenhagen, and Lüneburg.
The last mentioned Battalion was formed in Column, at quarter distance,
upon one of its centre Companies; the head of the Column in line with,
and at a deploying interval from, that of the Right Column of OMPTEDA's
Brigade. Next, on the right, at the proper interval for deployment,
stood the two Battalions Verden and Bremen, in Contiguous Columns of
Companies, at quarter distance; the former Right in front, the latter
Left in front. The two Battalions York and Grubenhagen were formed
in Second Line, in rear of the centre of the interval between the
Battalions Lüneburg and Verden, in Contiguous Columns of Companies, at
quarter distance, York Right, and Grubenhagen Left, in front.
On the right of KIELMANSEGGE's Hanoverian Brigade, was posted the
Fifth British Brigade, commanded by Major General Sir Colin HALKETT,
and comprising the 2nd Battalion 30th, the 1st Battalion 33rd, 2nd
Battalion 69th, and 2nd Battalion 73rd, British Regiments. Its position
was more forward than that of the other portion of ALTEN's Division,
with which its front was in an oblique direction, its right shoulders
having been brought forward so as to preserve the parallelism between
the general Line and the crest of the main ridge. The 2nd Battalions
73rd and 30th Regiments formed Contiguous Columns of Companies, at
quarter distance, the former Right, the latter Left, in front; and at
a deploying interval for two Battalions from the head of the Column
formed by the Bremen Battalion. The other two Battalions of this
Brigade, the 1st Battalion 33rd and 2nd Battalion 69th Regiments, were
formed in Contiguous Columns of Companies, at quarter distance, in
Second Line, and in right rear of the 73rd and 30th Regiments; the 33rd
Right, and the 69th Left, in front.
In rear of the centre of the interval between the Right of
KIELMANSEGGE's, and the Left of HALKETT's Brigade, was posted, in
Second Line, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Regiment of Nassau, forming
part of the Nassau Brigade, commanded by Major General KRUSE. The
Battalion was in Column on a central Company. The remainder of this
Brigade, consisting of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the same Regiment,
was formed in Contiguous Columns, in a Third Line, as a Reserve.
* * * * *
On the right of HALKETT's Brigade, the First British Division,
commanded by Major General COOKE, was posted. It consisted of the
First and Second Brigades of Guards, and was disposed in the following
manner:--
The First Brigade commanded by Major General MAITLAND, and comprising
the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards, formed
the Left Brigade of the Division. The 3rd Battalion stood in Columns of
Companies, at quarter distance, on the crest of the ridge; and between
it and the head of the Right Column of HALKETT's Brigade, there was
a deploying interval for one Battalion. The 2nd Battalion was placed
in Right Rear of the 3rd, also in Column of Companies, at quarter
distance: it was on the reverse slope, and immediately under the crest
of the ridge.
[Illustration:
HOUGOMONT]
The Second Brigade, comprising the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd or
Coldstream Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of Foot
Guards, and commanded by Major General Sir JOHN BYNG, was posted on the
crest of the ridge, between the First Brigade and the Nivelles road.
The 2nd Battalion 3rd Foot Guards was on the left, the 2nd Battalion of
the Coldstream Guards on the right, and more in advance on the brow of
the hill; and the disposition was such, that the four Battalions of the
Division were placed _en échiquier_.
The Buildings of Hougomont, its Gardens and Orchards, were completely
overlooked from the commanding ground occupied by the Second Brigade,
which formed the Reserve to the troops therein posted, consisting
(including those in the Wood) of the four Light Companies of the
Division, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau, a Company of
Hanoverian Field Riflemen, and a Detachment of a hundred men from the
Field Battalion Lüneburg of KIELMANSEGGE's Brigade.
The principal dwelling house or Château of Hougomont was a substantial
brick building, of a square form. Adjoining its north-east angle was
the Farmer's House, the east end of which abutted on the Great Garden;
and in the angle between this house and the Château was a narrow
tower, of the same height as the latter, to which its interior served
as a staircase. At the south-east corner of, and communicating with,
the Château stood a very neat little Chapel.
On the north, or British, side of the Château, was a spacious Farm
yard, bounded on the west by a large Barn and a Shed, and on the
east by Cow Houses and Stabling adjoining the Garden. There was a
continuation of the Stabling along the north side, and a gateway;
and near the centre of the yard there was a drawwell of which the
superstructure formed a dovecot.
On the south, or French, side of the Château, and inclosing the latter,
was the Court yard; of which a Barn on the west, the Gardener's House,
some Stables and other Offices on the south, and the Garden Wall on
the east, formed the boundaries. There was a communication between the
Court and the Farm yard, by means of a doorway in the small portion of
wall connecting the Château with the great Barn; and through the whole
length of the latter building there was also a carriage way leading
from the one Court into the other. A gateway, passing through a portion
of the Gardener's House, led out from the Court yard to the south, or
French, side; and from this gate a narrow road conducted across the
open space between the Buildings and the Wood, through which it took
its course in the same direction until it gained the fields beyond the
inclosures. There was also a pathway from this road, commencing at the
corner of the little Garden, and traversing the Wood in the direction
of the south-east angle of the general boundary of the inclosures,
whence it continued towards La Belle Alliance.
The approach to Hougomont from the Nivelles road was lined, nearly as
far as the Château, by fine tall elms: it conducted to the gate of
the Farm yard facing the British Line; and, sweeping along the west
side, it led also to the South Gate of the Court yard. On the east side
of the Buildings was a large Garden, laid out with all the formality
which characterises the Flemish style. It was inclosed on the south
and east sides by a high brick wall, and on the north side, facing the
British Line, by a hedge. Adjoining the east side of the Garden, but
considerably wider and longer than the latter, was the Large Orchard,
and along the north side was the smaller Orchard--the latter bounded by
a hedge and hollow way, and the former inclosed within high and compact
hedges, partially lined by a ditch on the inner side. A prolongation of
the southern hedge of the Great Orchard formed the boundary of the Wood
facing the south Garden Wall, and in the narrow space between these two
boundaries was a row of apple trees, which, together with the hedge,
served to conceal, in a great measure, the Garden Wall from the view
of an Enemy, approaching through the Wood. There was a small Garden in
front of the Gardener's house, formed by the continuation of the south
Garden Wall until it met another wall issuing perpendicularly from the
South Gateway leading out of the Court yard. There were two inclosures
on the west side, of which one served as a Kitchen Garden.
The Wood extended in length, southwards, about 350 yards, and its
greatest width was about 280 yards. It was bounded on the west by
another Orchard; and on the east by two large inclosures, of which the
one nearest the Great Orchard was a grass field fenced with hedges, and
lined by a ditch on the inner side.
Although the site of the buildings of Hougomont was but slightly
elevated above the valley, which, as already remarked, winds along
the south and west inclosures, there was a gradual but uninterrupted
ascent of the ground from thence as far as the eastern portion of the
fence which divides the two inclosures, beyond the great Orchard; where
it attained a height not much inferior to that of either the French
or Allied Front Lines, between which it was centrically situated. On
the south, or French, side of that hedge, the ground inclined at first
gently, and then rapidly, into the valley; but on the west, throughout
the extent of the Wood, and on the north of the Allied side, across the
Great Orchard, the descent was everywhere very gradual.
Such was Hougomont--a decidedly important point in the Field of Battle,
from its prominent position in the immediate front of the Right of
the British line; and rendered ever memorable by the truly heroic and
successful stand maintained throughout the day by the troops allotted
for its defence.
* * * * *
From the first moment of the occupation of this Post, measures were
concerted and adopted for strengthening the means of defence which
it presented. During the night, the Garden Walls were pierced with
numerous loopholes; and, in order to enable the men to fire down from
the tops of the Walls upon their assailants, platforms constructed out
of such materials as the place afforded were raised wherever the depth
of the wall on the inner side rendered such a measure desirable. In
many places, however, and especially on the eastern side, the ground
formed embankments against the wall, sufficiently elevated to obviate
the necessity of any additional aid for such purpose. The outer gates
were closed up, with the exception of the one from the Farm yard, which
faced the Anglo-Allied position, and which was left open in order to
facilitate the communication with the latter. The different flanking
fires which were offered by the relative situations of the Garden
Walls, and the fences of the Orchards, Woods, and other inclosures,
imparted to the Post a strength, of which, in the course of the action,
due advantage was taken. In short, every precaution was adopted which
the means at hand suggested for contributing to the security of the
place; and the preparations that were in progress indicated, on the
part of the troops stationed in this quarter, an intention to give the
Enemy a warm reception, and a resolution to maintain a vigorous defence.
When, on the previous evening, the Light Companies of the Division were
thrown into Hougomont, it was so arranged that those of the Second
Brigade, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel MACDONELL, should
occupy the Buildings and the Gardens: and that those of the First
Brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel Lord SALTOUN, should hold the Great
Orchard and the Wood; in which latter the Hanoverians and Nassauers
were principally stationed.
* * * * *
The abrupt termination of the ridge along which the Allied Front Line
was posted, at its point of junction with the Nivelles road, was in the
direct rear of the buildings of Hougomont.
On the other side of the road, this termination presented a sudden
and bold, though short, slope down into the long valley which, after
sweeping by Hougomont, proceeds in the direction of Merbe Braine. A
portion of the slope, including the summit, was covered with brushwood,
and its base was bounded by a horse path, partially lined with a
stunted hedge; forming, altogether, excellent cover for Light Infantry.
On the other side of the valley, the ground ascends, at first abruptly,
and then gradually, to the summit of that portion of the main ridge
upon which the Left of the French Army rested; and from the point of
junction of the Avenue conducting to Hougomont with the great Nivelles
road, a narrow road leads directly up the opposite slope, and stretches
across the ridge or plateau in the direction of Braine l'Alleud.
[Illustration]
Along a portion of this road, principally consisting of a hollow
way, were posted in advance, some Light Troops of the Anglo-Allied
Army. They formed a part of the Fourth Brigade of the Fourth Division
(under Colonel MITCHELL), attached to the Second Corps, commanded
by Lieutenant General Lord HILL. The Brigade consisted of the 3rd
Battalion of the 14th British Regiment (under Lieutenant Colonel TIDY),
of the 23rd Fusiliers (under Colonel Sir HENRY ELLIS), and of the 51st
British Light Infantry (under Lieutenant Colonel RICE), which troops
were disposed in the following manner.
Along that portion of the Hougomont Avenue which is nearest to the
Nivelles road was extended the Light Company of the 23rd Regiment.
On its right was an _abatis_, which had been thrown across the great
road; and close upon the right of this artificial obstacle, a Company
of the 51st Regiment was posted. Four more Companies of this Regiment,
and the Light Company of the 14th, were extended along the hollow
way alluded to as stretching across the ridge, on the extreme Left
of the French position. The remainder of the 51st stood in Column of
Support, about two hundred yards in rear of the hollow way. The 23rd
Regiment was stationed on the left of the Nivelles road, on the reverse
slope, and immediately under the crest of the main ridge, in rear of
the Second Brigade of Guards. The 14th Regiment was posted in Column
on the southern descent from the plateau, on which was assembled the
Second British Division; and from the view which it possessed of
the ground occupied by the 51st, it was well placed as a Reserve to
the Light Infantry. In a ravine, descending from the immediate Right
of the Skirmishers of the Brigade down into the valley, was posted a
Squadron of the 15th British Hussars (under Captain WODEHOUSE), from
which a Picquet was detached to the right of the _abatis_, as also an
intermediate one for keeping up the communication; and some Vedettes
were thrown out to the right, having in their front a continuation of
the ravine, possessing a more marked and distinct character.
* * * * *
The troops posted upon the plateau already described as situated on the
west of the Nivelles road and in front of the Village of Merbe Braine,
and which, together with Colonel MITCHELL's Brigade, constituted the
extreme Right of the Anglo-Allied Army, under the command of Lord
Hill, were available either as a Reserve to the main Line of Battle,
or as a defence against any hostile attempt upon the Right Flank. They
consisted of the main body of the Second Infantry Division, commanded
by Lieutenant General Sir HENRY CLINTON. This was composed of the Third
British Light Brigade, under Major General Sir FREDERICK ADAM; of the
First Brigade of the King's German Legion, under Colonel DU PLAT; and
of the Third Hanoverian Brigade, under Colonel HALKETT.
ADAM's Brigade, consisting of the 52nd Regiment (under Colonel Sir
JOHN COLBORNE), of the 71st Regiment (under Colonel REYNELL), of the
2nd Battalion of the 95th Regiment (under Lieutenant Colonel NORCOTT),
and two Companies of the 3rd Battalion of the latter Corps (under
Lieutenant Colonel Ross), was, previous to the commencement of the
Battle, posted between the Village of Merbe Braine and the Nivelles
road, near where the latter is intersected by the cross road leading
to Braine l'Alleud: but as soon as the first attack was made upon
Hougomont (with which the Battle opened), it was advanced beyond this
cross road, and stood, in Battalion Columns of Companies, at quarter
distance, on the plateau; whence it overlooked the Nivelles road, and
had a full view of that portion of the main Front Line to which the
troops of CLINTON's Division formed a Reserve.
DU PLAT's Brigade of the King's German Legion, consisting of the
1st Line Battalion (under Major ROBERTSON), of the 2nd (under Major
MÜLLER), of the 3rd (under Lieutenant Colonel WISSELL), and of the 4th
(under Major REH), stood in Open Column, near the foot of the slope
descending towards the Nivelles road.
HALKETT's Brigade, consisting of the Landwehr Battalions Bremervörde
(under Lieutenant Colonel VON DER SCHULENBURG), Salzgitter (under Major
HAMMERSTEIN), Osnabrück (under Major Count MÜNSTER), and Quackenbrück
(under Major VON DEM BUSSCHE HÜNEFELD), was posted in Contiguous Close
Columns of Battalions, on the north side of the plateau, near the
village of Merbe Braine.
* * * * *
The Second general Line of the Anglo-Allied Army consisted entirely of
Cavalry, British and German. Posted partly on the reverse slope of the
main ridge, and partly in the hollows in rear, it was entirely screened
from the Enemy's observation. The Brigades were formed, for the most
part, by Regiments, in Close Columns of Squadrons, at deploying
intervals.
Commencing from the right, near to the Nivelles road, stood the Fifth
Brigade, under Major General Sir COLQUHOUN GRANT, consisting of the
7th and 15th Hussars, and of the 13th Light Dragoons (under Colonel
DOHERTY.)
On the left of GRANT's Brigade was posted the Third Brigade under Major
General Sir WILLIAM DÖRNBERG, consisting of the 23rd Light Dragoons,
and of the 1st and 2nd Light Dragoons of the King's German Legion.
The Cumberland Hanoverian Hussars (under Lieutenant Colonel HAKE)
were attached to, and formed in rear of, this Brigade. They properly
belonged to Colonel ESTORFF's Hanoverian Cavalry Brigade: as did also
the Prince Regent's Hussars (under Lieutenant Colonel FERDINAND Count
KIELMANSEGGE), and the Bremen and Verden Hussars (under Colonel AUGUST
VON DEM BUSSCHE); which Regiments were detached with the force at Hal.
Still more to the left, and in rear of the Right of ALTEN's Division,
stood the 3rd Hussars of the King's German Legion, under Colonel Sir
FREDERICK VON ARENTSSCHILDT.
Immediately on the right of the Charleroi road, and in rear of ALTEN's
Division, the First or Household Brigade, under Major General Lord
EDWARD SOMERSET, was drawn up. It comprised the 1st and 2nd Life
Guards, the Royal Horse Guards (Blue), and the 1st Dragoon Guards.
On the left of the Charleroi road, and in rear of PICTON's Division,
stood the Second Brigade, under Major General Sir WILLIAM PONSONBY;
consisting of the 1st Dragoons (Royals), the 2nd Dragoons (Scots
Greys), and the 6th Dragoons (Inniskillings).
The Fourth and Sixth Brigades, under Major Generals Sir JOHN VANDELEUR
and Sir HUSSEY VIVIAN, were posted upon the extreme Left of the main
Line of the position, as previously explained.
* * * * *
The Reserves consisted of the Dutch-Belgian Cavalry Division, under
Lieutenant General Baron COLLAERT; of the Brunswick Corps, comprising
both Cavalry and Infantry, the command of which, since the fall of the
Duke, had devolved upon Colonel OLFERMANN; and of the Tenth British
Brigade, under Major General Sir JOHN LAMBERT. The latter formed part
of the Sixth Division, commanded by Lieutenant General the Hon. Sir
LOWRY COLE; and had only just reached the Field, after having performed
forced marches from Ghent.
COLLAERT's Division was stationed in rear of the Centre, and within the
angle formed by the junction of the high roads leading from Charleroi
and Nivelles. It comprised the First Brigade, commanded by Major
General TRIP, and consisting of the 1st Dutch Carabiniers, the 2nd
Belgian Carabiniers, and the 3rd Dutch Carabiniers; the Second Brigade,
commanded by Major General GHIGNY, and consisting of the 4th Dutch
Dragoons, and the 8th Belgian Hussars; and the Third Brigade, commanded
by Major General VAN MERLEN, and consisting of the 5th Belgian Light
Dragoons, and the 6th Dutch Hussars.
The Brunswick Corps was posted between the northern portion of the
Village of Merbe Braine and the Nivelles road, on which its Left
rested; and comprised the following troops:--a Regiment of Hussars, a
Squadron of Lancers, the Advanced Guard Battalion (which was at this
time detached to the right of Merbe Braine); a Light Infantry Brigade,
under Lieutenant Colonel BUTTLAR, consisting of the Guard Battalion,
and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Battalions; and an Infantry Brigade,
under Lieutenant Colonel SPECHT, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
Line Battalions.
LAMBERT's Brigade was posted near the Farm of Mont St Jean; and
consisted of the 4th Regiment (under Lieutenant Colonel BROOKE), of the
27th Regiment (under Major HARE), and of the 40th Regiment (under Major
HEYLAND).
In order to afford greater security to the Right Flank of the
Anglo-Allied Army, and also to keep open the communication with the
detached forces near Hal, and at Tubize, namely, the Corps of Prince
FREDERICK of Orange, and the Sixth British and Sixth Hanoverian
Brigades, under Lieutenant General Sir CHARLES COLVILLE; it was deemed
essential to occupy the small town of Braine l'Alleud, about three
quarters of a mile westward of Merbe Braine: and whence a road leads to
Tubize, which is distant between eight and nine miles.
With this view, the Third Division of the Netherlands, commanded by
Lieutenant General Baron CHASSÉ, was placed under the orders of General
Lord HILL; a part of whose Corps, as previously explained, formed
the extreme Right of the Anglo-Allied position. The First Brigade,
under Colonel DITMERS, occupied the town itself. It consisted of the
35th Battalion of Belgian Light Infantry, the 2nd Battalion of the
Dutch Line, and of the 4th, 6th, 17th, and 19th Battalions of Dutch
Militia. The 17th Battalion, detached a little to the left, kept up
the communication with CLINTON's British Division. The Second Brigade,
under Major General D'AUBREMÉ, occupied a good position about half a
mile in advance of Braine l'Alleud, upon a height on which stood the
Farm of Vieux Foriez.
* * * * *
It was at a very early hour of the 18th, that Lieutenant Colonel
TORRENS, Deputy Quartermaster General, reached Braine le Comte, and
delivered to Sir CHARLES COLVILLE the Order (see page 285), for his
falling back upon Hal. That General immediately put in motion his
two Brigades. These consisted of the Sixth British Brigade, under
Major General JOHNSTONE, and the Sixth Hanoverian Brigade, under
Major General Sir JAMES LYON, accompanied by Major BROME's British
Foot Battery. The remaining Brigade (the Fourth British, under
Colonel MITCHELL), as also the other Foot Battery, belonging to the
Fourth Division (Captain RETTBERG's Hanoverian), were on the Field
of Waterloo. On reaching Tubize, COLVILLE fell in with the Advance
of Prince FREDERICK's Corps: and as that was the point of junction
with the road leading by Braine le Château and Braine l'Alleud to
the position in front of Waterloo; he halted there, and despatched
Lieutenant Colonel WOODFORD, Assistant Quartermaster General to the
Division, to report his proceedings to the Duke. His Grace expressed
himself perfectly satisfied; and desired Lieutenant Colonel WOODFORD
to remain upon the Field of Waterloo, in order that he might be
prepared to return to Sir CHARLES COLVILLE with any instructions which
circumstances might induce the Duke to transmit to him.
* * * * *
The Artillery of the Anglo-Allied Army, commanded by Colonel Sir GEORGE
WOOD, was distributed in the following manner:--
On the extreme Left was a British Horse Battery[9] of six guns, under
Lieutenant Colonel Sir ROBERT GARDINER, with VIVIAN's Hussar Brigade.
Upon the exterior slope of the main ridge, and above the Hamlet of
Papelotte, were four guns of Captain BYLEVELD's Dutch-Belgian Horse
Battery, attached to PERPONCHER's Division. The remaining four guns
of this Battery were on the crest of the main ridge, in rear of that
Division. On the highest point of the position of the Left Wing, and in
front of the Right of BEST's Hanoverian Brigade, was posted Captain
RETTBERG's Hanoverian Foot Battery of six guns. In front of KEMPT's
Brigade stood Major ROGERS's British Foot Battery of six guns. Major
LLOYD's British, and Captain CLEEVES's King's German, Foot Batteries,
of six guns each, were with ALTEN's Division. Major KUHLMANN's King's
German Horse Battery, and Captain SANDHAM's British Foot Battery,
of six guns each, were attached to COOKE's Division. All the above
Batteries were posted in Front Line; as was also Lieutenant Colonel Sir
HEW ROSS's British Horse Battery (from the Reserve), of six guns, which
was posted on the height immediately in rear of La Haye Sainte, and
near the intersection of the Wavre road with the Charleroi high road,
in which latter two of its guns were stationed. Major SYMPHER's King's
German Horse Battery, and Captain BOLTON's British Foot Battery, of six
guns each, were attached to CLINTON's Division.
The remaining Horse Batteries were with the Cavalry. They were
(exclusive of Lieutenant Colonel Sir ROBERT GARDINER's already
mentioned) Major BULL's of six howitzers; Lieutenant Colonel WEBBER
SMITH's of six guns; Major WHINYATES's of six guns, and provided
with rockets; Captain MERCER's of six guns; and Major RAMSAY's of
six guns. Captain PETTER's Dutch-Belgian Horse Battery of eight
guns, was attached to COLLAERT's Cavalry Division. The Dutch-Belgian
Horse Battery under Captain VAN DER SMISSEN, and Foot Battery under
Captain LUX, of eight guns each, were with CHASSÉ's Division at Braine
l'Alleud. The Brunswick Horse Battery, under Captain HEINEMANN; and
Foot Battery, under Major MOLL, of eight guns each, were with the
Brunswick Corps. The British Horse Battery under Major BEANE, and Foot
Battery under Captain SINCLAIR (belonging to the Sixth Division), as
also the Hanoverian Foot Battery under Captain BRAUN, all three having
six guns each, were in reserve near Mont St Jean.
The whole of the Batteries were engaged in the Front Line, more or
less, during the course of the Battle.
* * * * *
This disposition of WELLINGTON's forces, so completely in accordance
with the general features of the ground which he had selected with
consummate judgment as the Field on which he was prepared to give
battle to his imperial rival in the great art of war, was admirably
calculated for either offensive or defensive measures. The opposite
line of Heights, which the Enemy would naturally crown with the main
Line of his forces, was fully within the effectual range of cannon
shot; and no hostile movement could be made against any part of the
position, that would remain undiscovered within the range of musketry.
The formation of the ground in rear of the ridge, along the brow of
which his Front Line was posted, was such as effectually to screen from
the Enemy's observation any movements of the Supports and Reserves,
preparatory to either a contemplated attack, or to the assembling of
the necessary means of resistance at any threatened point. In rear
of the main Front Line the ground was practicable for the movements
of all Arms, the country was perfectly open, and the two high roads
added still further to the facility of communication between the front
and rear. The occupation of the Posts of Hougomont and La Haye Sainte
presented important advantages in aid alike of offensive and defensive
operations.
The Right Flank was rendered secure, not only by the position of
CLINTON's Division, commanding the valley skirting the Village of Merbe
Braine, but also by the occupation of the Town of Braine l'Alleud,
whence CHASSÉ's Division could co-operate so as to render any attempt
of the Enemy to turn that Flank a most hazardous experiment.
Although the Left of the main Front Line rested upon an open plain
or elevated plateau, and was therefore completely _en l'air_: yet
the Village of Smohain, the Farms of La Haye and Papelotte, together
with the scattered houses and numerous enclosures on the abrupt slope
descending into the valley in front, by being well garnished with
Infantry, offered the means of protracted resistance; while Cavalry was
at hand, on the high ground, to cover the latter if forced to retire,
and to frustrate the complete development of the Enemy's disposition
of attack. The latter description of force was also available in
maintaining a vigilant look out for any direct flank attack; which,
however, was the less to be apprehended in consequence of the
preconcerted Prussian co-operation in that quarter.
* * * * *
The position also afforded ample security for a retreat. The two
broad high roads uniting at a point in rear of the centre, greatly
facilitated the retirement of unbroken masses upon Mont St Jean; while
the Village itself, and the numerous buildings and inclosures which
lined the great road as far as the Forest of Soignies, presented the
ready means of securing the further retreat of those masses, which, it
may be assumed, would have constituted a main Central Column.
On the right, the Villages of Merbe Braine, Le Mesnil, and L'Estraye,
connected with Braine l'Alleud and with one another, as also with the
Forest, by several cross roads, and intersected by numerous inclosures,
were well calculated for the retirement of the extreme Right of the
Army, by the advantages which they afforded for covering such retreat
with Light Troops.
On the left, the ground was more open, but the distance between the
position and the Forest was infinitely less, the latter stretching
southward to the Village of Verd Cocou; and the troops retiring in
this direction, being much closer to the high road, would have their
Right in a great measure protected by the well defended retreat of the
Central Column.
The Forest itself, consisting almost entirely of tall trees,
unaccompanied by underwood, was passable for all Arms; it was
intersected by numerous roads and lanes in every direction; and its
southern extremity, adjoining the high road, was thickly skirted with
houses and gardens, adding considerably to its capabilities for a
vigorous stand against the further advance of an Enemy.
The retrograde march of the detached forces from Tubize and Hal upon
Brussels, and their junction with the remainder of the Anglo-Allied
Army in the position of Uccle, between that capital and the Forest of
Soignies, will readily present itself to the minds of military men
studying the dispositions and movements to which a retreat would have
probably given rise; but this is a subject which, embracing as it
naturally would, the consequent operations of the Prussians, opens a
wide field for discussion, into which it is unnecessary to enter.
* * * * *
The general direction of the Front Line of the French Army was nearly
parallel with that of the Anglo-Allies. The high road from Charleroi
to Brussels, which intersected the Allied position near its Centre,
also passed through the Centre of the French line. The point of this
intersection was La Belle Alliance, a small Farm house and Inn; and the
distance from the one position to the other, taken along the high road
between these two points, was 1400 yards.
About two hundred yards in the French rear of this house is a summit,
the altitude of which exceeds, by about thirteen feet, that of any
point along the Anglo-Allied position. A ridge issuing from it, and
extending in a north easterly direction towards Frischermont, formed
the position of the Right Wing of the Front Line of the French Army.
On the west side, a road leading from the summit, descends rather
rapidly as a hollow way down into and across the long valley that takes
its course towards Hougomont, then ascends until it reaches another
ridge, along which it winds round that Post, at a distance varying from
300 to about 440 yards, until it joins the Nivelles _chaussée_; and
that winding road indicates pretty nearly the ground occupied by the
Left Wing of the French Front Line.
* * * * *
The Right Wing of this Line consisted of the First _Corps d'Armée_,
commanded by Lieutenant General Count D'ERLON, comprising four
Divisions of Infantry, and one of Light Cavalry.
Its Left Division, which was the Second, commanded by Lieutenant
General Baron DONZELOT, rested its Left upon La Belle Alliance. The
First Brigade of this Division, under General Baron SCHMITH, consisted
of the 13th Regiment of Light Infantry and the 17th Regiment of the
Line; the former comprising three, and the latter, two, Battalions. The
Second Brigade, under General AULARD, consisted of the 19th and 51st
Regiments of the Line, each comprising two Battalions. These Brigades
were deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in
rear of the first.
On the right of the Second Division was the First, commanded by
Lieutenant General ALIX. Its First Brigade, under General Baron QUIOT,
consisted of the 54th and 55th Regiments of the Line, each comprising
two Battalions. Its Second Brigade under General Baron BOURGEOIS,
consisted of the 28th and 105th Regiments of the Line, each comprising
two Battalions. The Brigades were deployed in two Lines, the second at
a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.
On the right of the First Division stood the Third, commanded by
Lieutenant General Baron MARCOGNET. Its First Brigade, under General
NOGUÈS, consisted of the 21st and 46th Regiments of the Line; and its
Second Brigade, under General GRENIER, of the 25th and 45th Regiments
of the Line; all four Regiments comprising two Battalions each. These
two Brigades were, in like manner, deployed in two Lines, the second at
a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.
On the right of the Third Division, nearest to the extremity of the
ridge, and immediately opposite the Farms of Papelotte and La Haye,
was posted the Fourth Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Count
DURUTTE. Its First Brigade, under General Chevalier PEGOT, consisted of
the 8th and 29th Regiments of the Line; and its Second Brigade, under
General BRUE, of the 85th and 95th Regiments of the Line; all four
Regiments comprising two Battalions each. These two Brigades were also
deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear
of the first.
The Cavalry attached to this Corps, which was the First Division,
commanded by Lieutenant General Baron JAQUINOT, was posted in a
valley on the right of the Infantry: having in its front the Village
of Smohain, which it held in observation, as also the Château of
Frischermont, on the right of the valley; at the same time throwing
out Patrols in the direction of Ohain. It was deployed in three Lines.
Its First Brigade, under General BRUNO, consisting of the 3rd and 7th
_Chasseurs_; and its Second Brigade, under General GOBRECHT, of the
3rd and 4th Lancers.
The Artillery attached to the Infantry Corps, consisting of five
Batteries of eight guns each (including a Reserve Battery of eight
twelve pounders), was ranged along the front of the different Divisions
respectively; and the Battery of Horse Artillery--six guns--attached to
the First Division of Cavalry, was posted on the right of the latter.
* * * * *
The Left Wing of the Front Line of the French Army was formed by the
Second Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count REILLE, comprising
three Divisions of Infantry and one of Light Cavalry.
Its Right Division, which was the Fifth, commanded by Lieutenant
General Baron BACHELU, rested its Right upon La Belle Alliance, and was
ranged along the descent from thence down into the valley, which, more
westward, winds past Hougomont. The First Brigade of this Division,
under General HUSSON, consisted of the 2nd Regiment of Light Infantry
and the 61st Regiment of the Line, the former comprising two, and
the latter, three, Battalions; and the Second Brigade, under General
Baron CAMPY, of the 72nd and 108th Regiments of the Line, the former
comprising two, and the latter, three, Battalions. The Brigades were
deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear
of the first.
On the Left of the Fifth Division, and upon the Height facing the
southern boundary of Hougomont, stood the Ninth Division, commanded
by Lieutenant General Count FOY. Its First Brigade, under General
Baron GAUTHIER, consisted of the 92nd and 93rd Regiments of the Line,
comprising two Battalions each. Its Second Brigade, under General
Baron JAMIN, consisted of the 4th Regiment of Light Infantry, and of
the 100th Regiment of the Line, each comprising three Battalions. These
two Brigades were, in like manner, deployed in two Lines, the second at
a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.
On the left of the Ninth Division, and along the ridge of the western
boundary of Hougomont, stood the Sixth Division, commanded by Prince
JEROME NAPOLEON. Its First Brigade, under General Baron BAUDUIN,
consisted of the 1st Regiment of Light Infantry and of the 3rd
Regiment of the Line, the former comprising three, and the latter two,
Battalions. Its Second Brigade, under General Baron SOYE, consisted
of the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the Line, comprising three Battalions
each. These two Brigades were also deployed in two Lines, the second at
a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.
On the left of the Infantry, was posted the Light Cavalry attached to
the Corps, namely, the Second Cavalry Division, commanded by Lieutenant
General Baron PIRÉ. Its First Brigade, under General Baron HUBERA,
consisted of the 1st and 6th _Chasseurs_; and its Second Brigade,
under General MATHIEU, of the 5th and 6th Lancers. It stood across the
Nivelles high road, in three deployed Lines, rather under the crest
of the ridge, on its reverse slope; and threw out Picquets in the
direction of Braine l'Alleud, as also more to its left, thus keeping up
a vigilant look out around this Flank of the Army.
* * * * *
The Second general Line of the French Army was formed in the following
manner:--
In the Centre, close along the west side of the Charleroi high road,
stood the Sixth Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count LOBAU.
Only two of its Divisions, the Nineteenth and Twentieth, were present;
the Twenty First was with the Army under Marshal GROUCHY. Each of the
two Divisions formed a Close Column of Battalions by Grand Divisions;
the head of the Column of the Nineteenth Division being distant about
a hundred yards in rear of the right of the Second Corps, and an
interval of about two hundred yards was preserved between the rear of
the Nineteenth Division and the head of the Column of the Twentieth
Division.
The former was commanded by Lieutenant General Baron SIMMER; and its
First Brigade, under General Baron DE BELLAIR, consisted of the 5th
and 11th Regiments of the Line, the former comprising two, the latter,
three, Battalions. Its Second Brigade, under General SIMMER, consisted
of the 27th and 84th Regiments of the Line, comprising two Battalions
each.
The Twentieth Division was commanded by Lieutenant General Baron
JEANNIN: its First Brigade, under General BONY, consisted of the 5th
Regiment of Light Infantry, and of the 10th Regiment of the Line; and
its Second Brigade, under General TROMELIN, of the 107th Regiment of
the Line; all three Regiments comprising two Battalions each.
There were three Batteries of Foot Artillery, of eight guns each,
attached to the Divisions, including one of reserve; as also a Horse
Battery of six guns. They were posted on the Left Flank of the Corps.
On the right of these two Divisions of the Sixth Corps, and separated
from them by the high road only, were stationed the Third Light Cavalry
Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron DOMON, and the Fifth
Light Cavalry Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron SUBERVIE
(belonging to the First Cavalry Corps, commanded by General Count
PAJOL). They were formed in Close Column of Regiments by Squadrons.
The First Brigade of the former, under General Baron DOMMANGET,
consisted of the 4th and 9th _Chasseurs_; and the Second Brigade, under
General Baron Vinot, of the 12th _Chasseurs_. The First Brigade of the
Fifth Division, under General Count COLBERT, consisted of the 1st and
2nd Lancers; and the Second Brigade, under General MERLIN, of the 11th
_Chasseurs_.
The two Batteries of Horse Artillery attached to these two Divisions,
comprising six guns each, were posted on the Right Flank of the Column.
The Right Wing of the Second French general Line was composed of the
Fourth Cavalry Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count MILHAUD,
which was posted on a parallel ridge, in rear of the two central
Divisions of the First Infantry Corps, and distant from them about two
hundred yards. It was deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance
of sixty yards in rear of the first.
The Corps consisted of two Heavy Cavalry Divisions--the Thirteenth,
commanded by Lieutenant General WATHIER ST ALPHONSE, and the
Fourteenth, under Lieutenant General Baron DELORT. The First Brigade
of the Thirteenth Division, under General DUBOIS, consisted of the 1st
and 4th _Cuirassiers_; the Second, under General Baron TRAVERS, of
the 7th and 12th _Cuirassiers_. The First Brigade of the Fourteenth
Division, under General Baron FARINE, consisted of the 5th and 10th
_Cuirassiers_; and the Second, under General Baron VIAL, of the 6th and
9th _Cuirassiers_.
The two Batteries of Horse Artillery attached to this Corps, comprising
six guns each, were stationed, one in the Centre, and the other on the
Left Flank.
The Left Wing of the French Second general Line, composed of the Third
Cavalry Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General KELLERMANN (Count DE
VALMY), was posted about two hundred yards in rear of the Centre of the
Second Infantry Corps. It was deployed in two Lines, the second at a
distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.
The Corps consisted of two Heavy Cavalry Divisions: the Eleventh,
commanded by Lieutenant General Baron L'HERITIER; and the Twelfth,
under Lieutenant General ROUSSEL D'HURBAL. The First Brigade of the
Eleventh Division, under General Baron PICQUET, consisted of the 2nd
and 7th Dragoons; and the Second, under General GNITON, of the 8th and
11th _Cuirassiers_. The First Brigade of the Twelfth Division, under
General Baron BLANCARD, consisted of the 1st and 2nd Carabiniers; and
the Second, of the 2nd and 3rd _Cuirassiers_.
The two Batteries of Horse Artillery attached to this Corps, comprising
six guns each, were posted one upon each Flank.
* * * * *
The Third general Line, forming the Grand Reserve of the whole Line of
Battle, and comprising the entire force of the Imperial Guards, Cavalry
and Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant General Count DROUOT, was
thus formed.
The Infantry of the Imperial Guard constituted the Centre of the
Reserve. It consisted of four Regiments of Grenadiers, four Regiments
of _Chasseurs_, two Regiments of _Tirailleurs_, and two Regiments of
_Voltigeurs_; each Regiment divided into two Battalions. The 1st and
2nd Regiments of Grenadiers, and the 1st and 2nd of _Chasseurs_, formed
the Old Guard, under Lieutenant General Count FRIANT; the 3rd and 4th
Regiments of Grenadiers, and the 3rd and 4th of _Chasseurs_ formed the
_Moyenne_, or Middle, Guard, under Lieutenant General Count MORAND;
the four Regiments of _Tirailleurs_ and _Voltigeurs_ constituted the
Young Guard under Lieutenant General Count DUHESME. This force was
posted somewhat in advance of the Farm of Rossomme, in six Lines of
four Battalions each, at a distance of twenty yards from one another,
and so disposed that the Charleroi high road alone separated the two
Right, from the two Left, Battalions of each Line. To each description
of the Infantry of the Imperial Guard; the Old, the Middle, and the
Young, Guard, two Batteries, of eight guns each, were attached. These
were stationed on either Flank; and the Reserve Artillery of the Guard,
consisting of twenty four guns, was posted in rear of these Lines.
The Right Wing of the Third Line, or Reserve, consisted of the Light
Cavalry of the Imperial Guard, commanded by Lieutenant General LEFÈBVRE
DESNOUETTES, namely, the _Chasseurs_ and Lancers of the Guard. It was
posted at a distance of about two hundred yards in rear of the Fourth
Cavalry Corps and deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of
sixty yards in rear of the first. The two Batteries of Horse Artillery
belonging to the Corps, comprising six guns each, were posted in its
centre.
The Left Wing of the Third Line, or Reserve, consisted of the Heavy
Cavalry of the Imperial Guard, commanded by Lieutenant General Count
GUYOT, namely, the Grenadiers and Dragoons of the Guard. It was
stationed in rear of the Third Cavalry Corps, and deployed in two
Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.
Its two Batteries of Horse Artillery, comprising six guns each, were
posted in the centre.
This admirable order of battle, at once grand, simple, and imposing,
and presenting to its skilful designer the most ample means of
sustaining, by an immediate and efficient support, any attack, from
whatever point he might wish to direct it, and of possessing everywhere
a respectable force at hand to oppose any attack upon himself, from
whatever quarter it might be made, was no less remarkable for the
regularity and precision with which the several masses, constituting
thirteen distinct Columns, advanced to their destined stations, than
for the unusual degree of warlike pomp and high martial bearing with
which the Lines drew up in this mighty battle array. The movements
throughout were executed under the cheering and spirit stirring sounds
of bugles, drums, and trumpets, sending forth the long cherished
national military airs of the Republic and of the Empire. The weather
had cleared up a little, and to the Anglo-Allied Army, the crowning of
the opposite Heights by the French Lines, with all its accompanying
circumstances, presented a magnificent spectacle.
* * * * *
NAPOLEON has frequently been blamed for having thus consumed some very
precious time in a mere ostentatious display of his forces. Public
opinion, however, should not suffer itself to be too easily influenced
by the apparent justness of such censure, and it would be ungenerous to
the established renown of the French Leader not to attach due weight to
the following circumstances. In the account of the Battle attributed
to the Emperor's own dictation, one cause of delay in commencing
offensive operations is represented to have been the soft and miry
state of the ground after the excessive rain which had fallen during
the night; in consequence of which it was found impossible to manoeuvre
the Artillery and the Cavalry, and it was considered advisable to wait
until the ground had, in some degree, resumed its natural consistency.
When, therefore, the manoeuvring of these two Arms was pronounced to
be practicable, though attended with some difficulty, which, however,
it was added, would gradually disappear; the employment of the
interval in an orderly and a deliberate formation of a well-defined
order of battle, was a measure scarcely questionable _at the moment_,
however much the _subsequent_ course of events may have proved that it
militated against the chances of success on the part of the French.
The additional impulse which this imposing spectacle was calculated
to impart to the moral force of his troops, is also well worthy of
consideration. His soldiers, as they contemplated the extended double
Front Line of Infantry, disposed as if about to enfold the Enemy in
a deadly embrace, and the fluttering of gay lance flags on either
extremity, indicating that its Flanks were duly protected; as they
glanced at the Second general Line, a double one of Cavalry, superbly
mounted, and proudly mailed in glittering helmet and cuirass; and,
as they scanned the well disposed Reserves and serried Centre; their
reliance on their own strength and in the resources of their Leader
was unbounded, their anticipations of success were heightened, and
their eager longing for the contest was greatly augmented. And while
adverting to the grand spectacle in a moral point of view, it would be
well to consider whether it may not have also been designed to exert
a powerful influence on that portion of the Anglo-Allied forces with
which the Emperor was tampering, in the full expectation of seeing
them again range themselves under his victorious Eagles: but which
WELLINGTON, with judicious foresight and prompt address, broke up as a
united body, and distributed among his British troops; thus securing
himself against the possible enactment of a scene similar to that which
so powerfully contributed to NAPOLEON's disaster on the plains of
Leipzig.
But supposing it to be admitted upon these grounds that the delay
of the attack, having once been determined, was judiciously and
advantageously employed, we ought also to consider whether the delay
itself may not have been superinduced by motives of far higher import.
Although the miry state of the ground has been put forward as the
ostensible cause, can we for a moment imagine that NAPOLEON was the
man to have allowed himself to be deterred by such an obstacle from
commencing the attack at an earlier hour; had he, at the moment, been
sufficiently acquainted with the actual state of things to foresee that
the delay, together with the possibility of a lengthened contest, and
of the approach of aid to the British General from the Prussian side,
tended to render his situation one of extreme peril?
May we not rather be justified in inferring, that his object was
to gain time for the due execution and successful development of
GROUCHY's operations! The despatch which the Emperor had received from
GROUCHY, dated Gembloux, 17th June, at 10 P.M. (see page 300), clearly
explained that General's intentions, which were, that should the mass
of the Prussian forces retire upon Wavre, he would follow them in that
direction, so as to prevent them from either reaching Brussels or
forming a junction with WELLINGTON; but that if, on the other hand,
they should fall back upon Perwès, he would advance towards that town
in pursuit of them. In the former case, NAPOLEON's delay was likely
to facilitate the combined operation; because in order to prevent the
junction with WELLINGTON, GROUCHY required sufficient time to throw
himself between the Prussians and the Emperor: and, in the latter case,
the delay would be immaterial, because then the Prussian co-operation
with WELLINGTON was not to be apprehended; and the battle with the
Anglo-Allied Army would have to be fought by the Emperor, unsupported
by GROUCHY.
It may, perhaps, be argued that NAPOLEON, by commencing his attack
much earlier, would not have been under the necessity of employing
a considerable portion of his Reserve against the Prussians in
defence of his Right Flank, at a time when he so urgently needed
them for following up and strengthening his attacks upon the Duke
of WELLINGTON's line. There existed, however, no such striking
disparity, in point of numbers, between WELLINGTON's forces, and his
own, as to warrant his throwing away a chance amounting, according to
the information he had already received, almost to a certainty, of
being enabled to bring his greatest mass to bear against each Army
separately: and which would doubtless have been the case as regards
the Anglo-Allied Army, had GROUCHY, by the adoption of more vigorous
and energetic measures, manoeuvred in such a manner as to sufficiently
impede the Prussian co-operation by posting one of his Corps so as to
command the Defiles of St Lambert and Lasne, and holding the other in
reserve, to be employed by either the Emperor or himself, according to
circumstances.
Whether NAPOLEON was really actuated by any such motives, must
remain a doubtful point. These remarks, however, are offered for the
consideration of those who censure him for his delay in commencing the
Battle of Waterloo.
* * * * *
The strength of the Anglo-Allied Army in the Field was as follows:--
+--------------------+---------+--------+----------+-----+
| |Infantry.|Cavalry.|Artillery.|Guns.|
| +---------+--------+----------+-----+
|British | 15,181 | 5,843 | 2,967 | 78 |
|King's German Legion| 3,301 | 1,991 | 526 | 18 |
|Hanoverians | 10,258 | 497 | 465 | 12 |
|Brunswickers | 4,586 | 866 | 510 | 16 |
|Nassauers | 2,880 | -- | -- | -- |
|Dutch-Belgians | 13,402 | 3,205 | 1,177 | 32 |
| +---------+--------+----------+-----+
| Total | 49,608 | 12,402 | 5,645 | 156 |
+--------------------+---------+--------+----------+-----+
GRAND TOTAL.
Infantry 49,608
Cavalry 12,402
Artillery 5,645
-------
Total 67,655 men, and 156 guns.
* * * * *
The French Army consisted of:--
Infantry 47,579
Cavalry 13,792
Artillery 7,529
-------
Total 68,900 men, and 246 guns.
* * * * *
The martial sounds already adverted to as having accompanied the march
of the French Columns into position, had scarcely been wafted towards
the Anglo-Allied Army, when mounted Officers were discerned galloping
along the opposite Heights, and taking up the necessary alignments;
and, presently, the simultaneous flashing of bayonets over dark masses,
on various points, and the roll of drums, now become more distinctly
audible, announced the arrival of the heads of the Columns destined to
constitute the Front Line. As this gradually developed itself, and was
seen extending on either side, from La Belle Alliance, and apparently
almost overlapping both Flanks of the Allies, the scene became truly
imposing and highly exciting. The two Armies were now fairly in
presence of each other; and their mutual observation was governed by
the most intense interest, and the most scrutinizing anxiety.
In a still greater degree did these feelings actuate their Commanders,
while watching each other's preparatory movements, and minutely
scanning the surface of the arena on which tactical skill, habitual
prowess, physical strength, and moral courage, were to decide, not
alone their own, but in all probability, the fate of Europe. Apart
from national interests and considerations, and viewed solely in
connection with the opposite characters of the two illustrious Chiefs;
the approaching contest was contemplated with anxious solicitude by
the whole military world. Need this create surprise when we reflect
that the struggle was one for mastery between the far famed Conqueror
of Italy, and the victorious Liberator of the Peninsula; between the
triumphant Vanquisher of Eastern Europe, and the bold and successful
Invader of the South of France! Never was the issue of a single Battle
looked forward to as involving consequences of such vast importance--of
such universal influence.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 9: For the sake of uniformity, and to prevent misconception,
I have adopted, throughout this work, the terms "Horse Battery" and
"Foot Battery," employed in all the Continental Armies, although in the
British service the distinction is better known by the terms "Troop"
and "Brigade."]
CHAPTER X.
While the preparatory dispositions, alluded to in the preceding
Chapter, were in progress, NAPOLEON ordered the following despatch to
be forwarded to Grouchy:--
"En avant de la Ferme "In front of the Farm de Caillou,
de Caillou, le 18 Juin, 18th June,
à 10 heures du matin. at 10 o'clock in the morning.
"Monsieur le Maréchal, "Monsieur Marshal,
"L'Empereur a reçu votre "The Emperor has received
dernier rapport daté de Gembloux. your last report dated from
Vous ne parlez à sa Majesté que des Gembloux. You only speak to His
deux Colonnes Prussiennes qui ont Majesty of the two Prussian
passé à Sauvenières et Sarra Walin; Columns and Sarra Walin; however
qu'une troisième Colonne, qui the reports say that a third
était assez forte, a passé à Gery Column, which was pretty strong,
et Gentinnes, se dirrigeant sur has passed by Gery and Gentinnes,
Wavres. directing itself on Wavre.
"L'Empereur me charge de vous "The Emperor charges me to
prévenir, qu'en ce moment S.M. va inform you, that at this moment
faire attaquer l'Armée Anglaise qui His Majesty is going to attack the
a pris position à Waterloo, près de English Army which has taken up
a pris position à Waterloo, près de a position at Waterloo, near the
a pris position à Waterloo, près de Forest of Soignies; so His Majesty
la Forêt de Soignes; ainsi S.M. desires that you would direct your
désire que vous dirigiez vos movemens movements on Wavre in such a
sur Wavres, afin de vous manner as you may approach us, so
rapprocher de nous, vous mettre en as to put yourself in touch with
rapport d'opérations et lier les the operations and to knit up the
communications, poussant devant vous communications; pushing before
les Corps de l'Armée Prussienne you the Corps of the Prussian
qui ont pris cette direction et qui Army which has taken that
auraient pu s'arrêter à Wavres, ou direction, and which may have
vous devez arriver le plus tôt halted at Wavre, where you should
possible. arrive at the earliest possible
moment.
Vous ferez suivre les Colonnes You will cause the Enemy's
Ennemies qui ont pris sur votre Columns which have taken (the
droite par quelques Corps Légers, road) on your right to be
afin d'observer leur mouvements followed by some Light Corps, in
et ramasser leurs fuyards; instruisez order to observe their movements
moi immédiatement de vos and to collect their fugitives.
dispositions et de votre marche, Instruct me immediately of your
ainsi que des nouvelles que vous dispositions and of your march, as
avez sur les Ennemis, et ne négligez well as of the news you may have
pas de lier vos communications avec of the Enemy, and do not neglect to
nous; l'Empereur désire avoir très knit up your communications with
souvent de vos nouvelles. us. The Emperor desires to receive
news from you very frequently.
"Le Major Général "The Major General
DUC DE DALMATIE." DUKE DE DALMATIA."
It will thus be seen that GROUCHY's report, despatched from Gembloux
on the previous night, was well calculated to inspire the Emperor with
great confidence as to the result of his present plan of operations,
notwithstanding the very little progress that had hitherto been made
in that quarter; and which, as already remarked, must be ascribed
principally to his own inactivity during the early part of the 17th. He
approved of the movement upon Wavre, in pursuit of the great mass of
the Prussian Army: but at the same time expressed his desire that it
should be executed in such a manner as to draw the Detached Force more
within the sphere of the operations of the main French Army; and above
all, he enforced the necessity of maintaining a close communication
with the latter.
Some time before the Battle commenced, a Prussian Patrol reached
the Village of Smohain, in which was posted the Picquet of the 10th
British Hussars, under Captain TAYLOR; whom the Officer accompanying
the Patrol desired to report to the Duke of WELLINGTON that General
Count BÜLOW was at St Lambert, and advancing with his _Corps d'Armée_.
Captain TAYLOR immediately despatched Lieutenant LINDSEY, of the 10th,
with the intelligence to Head Quarters, as directed. The Prussian
Officer was certainly ignorant of the very slow progress made by the
main body of BÜLOW's Corps; and the information which he thus conveyed
to the Duke, before the Battle had commenced, naturally led the
latter to calculate upon a much earlier arrival of the Prussians than
could possibly take place: for, in point of fact, it was only BÜLOW's
Advanced Guard which had then reached St Lambert.
* * * * *
The formation of the French Lines was scarcely completed when the
magnificent and animating spectacle which they presented was heightened
in an extraordinary degree by the passing of the Emperor along them,
attended by a numerous and brilliant Staff. The troops hailed him
with loud and fervent acclamations. There was depicted on their brows
a deep rooted confidence in his ability, with such an Army, to chain
victory to the car in which he had already advanced in triumph to
within a few miles of the capital of Belgium. They exulted in the idea
that they were now fairly ranged in battle array, under the Chief of
their choice, and the idol of their devotion, against the Army of that
nation which of all others had proved the most inveterate and the most
enduring in its hostility to France; a nation which had not only by its
wealth cemented and held together the great European league which had
once precipitated that idol from the throne, but had also flung into
the scale her own native strength and valour, by which the Fleets of
the Empire had been destroyed, its Armies driven out of the Peninsula,
and the sceptres of Spain and Portugal wrested from its grasp. They
appeared as if excited by the assurance, that the hour had arrived
in which the disasters of the Nile and Trafalgar, of Salamanca and
Vittoria, were to be cast into the dark shade of oblivion, by the
dazzling splendour of the triumph about to be achieved.
[Illustration]
Never throughout the whole of his career had NAPOLEON received from his
soldiers more unequivocal demonstrations of attachment to his person,
of unlimited confidence in his power, of complete devotion to his
cause, and of absolute submission to his will, than were manifested in
this short and fatal Campaign by which that career was terminated. With
an Army thus animated by one sentiment, and presenting in appearance
and material all that his practised eye could desire, it may readily
be conceived that he fully participated in the general confidence of a
signal victory.
* * * * *
WELLINGTON's dispositions remained as previously described. Shortly
before the action commenced, he rode down to Hougomont, and, proceeding
by the Lane which crosses the Wood in the direction of La Belle
Alliance, remained a few minutes at the point where the Lane reaches
the eastern boundary of the Wood. Having made his observations upon
that portion of the Enemy's Line which came under his view, he ordered
the Light Companies of the British Guards that were in the Wood to be
relieved by the Nassau Battalion and the Hanoverian Light Infantry.
The former were then withdrawn to the Great Orchard, where the Light
Companies of the First Brigade remained, while those of the Second
Brigade moved on, along the rear of the inclosures, to the Lane which
passes between the right of the Buildings and the Kitchen Garden, and
leads into the Wood on that side.
The Duke next rode up to the high ground on the Nivelles road,
unaccompanied by his Staff, to reconnoitre the Enemy's Left. He then
rode along to the Left of his own Line as far as La Haye. When the
action began, he was in front of the Left of the First Brigade of
Guards.
* * * * *
NAPOLEON, having completed the inspection of his troops, proceeded to
take up his own station upon the Height in rear of La Belle Alliance,
which afforded him a commanding view of the whole Field. The Infantry
Brigades speedily formed Lines of Battalion Columns respectively. The
state of the ground was reported practicable for the movements of
Artillery. All was in perfect readiness.
The anxiously looked for moment had now arrived.
The Emperor sent an Order to REILLE to begin the Battle by an attack
upon Hougomont; and it was about half past eleven o'clock when, from
the right of Prince JEROME's Division, a Column, advancing towards
the south-western boundary of the Wood, rapidly extended itself into
a strong line of Skirmishers. As they approached the Wood, a few
straggling shots from behind the outermost trees and hedges gave
warning that the defenders were prepared for resistance, and announced
to both Armies that the Battle had actually commenced. The French,
hastening their advance to obtain a better view of their opponents,
began to single them out; and the shots from both sides, quickening in
succession, speedily increased into a brisk and well sustained fire of
musketry.
JEROME's supporting Columns had not advanced far when the Duke of
WELLINGTON, with his Staff, galloped up to the spot on which the
Coldstream Guards were formed; and having directed his glass upon the
French Columns, the guns of Captain SANDHAM's Foot Battery, attached to
COOKE's Division, were ordered to the front. They instantly unlimbered
and opened the cannonade from the Anglo-Allied position. The first
discharge was from a howitzer, the shell of which burst over the head
of a Column moving towards the Hougomont inclosures. The shots from
the remaining guns in succession also took effect; and the Battery was
soon in full play. It was immediately followed up by an equally well
directed fire from Captain CLEEVES's Foot Battery of the German Legion,
in front of ALTEN's Division.
The Batteries of REILLE's Corps now opened in their turn, to draw off
the fire from their Columns. NAPOLEON sent an Order to KELLERMANN to
push forward his twelve pieces of Horse Artillery into the Front Line,
facing Hougomont. The intervals between the reports from the guns on
either side rapidly diminished: in a brief space of time no intervals
could be distinguished; and the cannonade, increasing in violence every
moment, now thundered forth in one continual roar.
"----deep throated engines belch'd, whose roar
Imbowel'd with outrageous noise the air."
The French Columns, as they moved towards Hougomont, were twice
checked by the fire from the British Batteries; which, having been
given with remarkable precision, appeared to cause considerable loss
and disorder among them. At length they effected their advance. The
French Skirmishers, followed by fresh Supports, had, in the mean time,
made good their entrance into the Wood; and such was the boldness of
their advance that they soon drove the Nassau Battalion and Hanoverian
Riflemen before them. They were also pushing forward in considerable
force across the inclosures adjoining the left of the Wood.
At this moment, WELLINGTON gave Orders, in person, to Major BULL's
British Howitzer Horse Battery, which had just been drawn up on that
part of the main ridge which was immediately in rear of the Great
Orchard of Hougomont, to dislodge the Enemy's Infantry from those
inclosures by means of shells. This service, which, considering the
proximity of the Allied troops in the Wood, was of a very delicate
nature, was executed with admirable skill, and attended with the
desired effect. The Enemy was forced to abandon the fields in front of
the Great Orchard; from which the Light Companies of the First Brigade
of Guards now moved on, as did also those of the Second Brigade, from
the Lane and Kitchen Garden on the right, to relieve the Nassauers and
Hanoverians in the Wood. They dashed forward with the most determined
resolution, blazing away in the very faces of their opponents, whose
further advance they completely checked; and then gallantly pressing
on, they gradually succeeded in clearing the Wood of the French
Skirmishers.
With the exception of the cannonade maintained between the French Left
and the Anglo-Allied Right Wing, and which was gradually extending
towards the opposite extremities of the hostile Lines, the action was
as yet confined to the Post of Hougomont.
About this time, a body of French Cavalry, issuing from the low ground
near Papelotte, approached that part of the Anglo-Allied Left Wing
which was occupied by BEST's Hanoverian Infantry Brigade, and Captain
RETTBERG's Hanoverian Foot Battery. It was a strong _reconnaissance_,
made by the French to ascertain whether the summit on which the above
Battery was posted had really been intrenched, its appearance, as
viewed from the opposite Heights, having induced a supposition that
such was the case. BEST, expecting to be attacked, immediately formed
his Brigade into Battalion Squares; but the French Cavalry speedily
retired.
JEROME now moved down fresh Columns to reinforce his Skirmishers. They
were directed more against the Allied Right of the Wood, while a part
of FOY's Division was ordered to support the attack by a simultaneous
advance against the front. The descent of JEROME's troops was observed
from the position of the extreme Right of the Allied Second Line,
which afforded a partial view up the valley on that side of Hougomont.
Two guns were therefore detached, under Captain NAPIER, from Captain
BOLTON's Battery, to open a fire upon the advancing Columns; but they
were instantly cannonaded by the Batteries on the French Extreme Left,
particularly by the Horse Battery of PIRÉ's Light Cavalry, on the
Height intersected by the Nivelles road. The remaining guns of the
Battery were brought into action, as were also those of Major SYMPHER's
Hanoverian Horse Battery; and a vigorous fire was now maintained
against both the attacking troops and the French guns. Lieutenant
Colonel WEBBER SMITH, whose British Horse Battery was also with
CLINTON's Division, but lower down the slope, commenced firing up the
valley, across the Nivelles road, at one of JEROME's Columns; but on
ascertaining that the latter was somewhat beyond the effectual range of
his six pounders, he detached an Officer to the right of the Front Line
in rear of Hougomont, to discover whether a more commanding position
could be obtained for his Battery on that part of the Field.
In the mean time, JEROME's Skirmishers, having been very strongly
reinforced, renewed their attack upon the Wood, in conjunction with
FOY's Infantry on their right. The Light Companies of the British
Guards presented a stout and desperate resistance, but were forced to
yield to an overwhelming superiority of numbers. Retiring from tree
to tree, and frequently hazarding a bold and obstinate stand, by
which they suffered most severely, they at length withdrew from the
unavailing contest: those of the Coldstream and 3rd Regiment seeking
shelter partly in the Lane adjoining the right of the Château, and
partly behind a Haystack which fronted the Wood near the south-west
angle of the buildings; while those of the 1st Regiment fell back into
the Great Orchard, on the left.
The French Skirmishers, finding themselves relieved for the moment from
any immediate pressure upon their front, now rapidly advanced towards
the Buildings and Garden. The hedge which lined the Wood on this side
appeared to them, as it gradually presented itself to their view, to
form also the boundary of the Great Garden. In the full confidence that
this important post was now within their grasp, they rushed forward
at the _pas de charge_ to force an entrance. They were instantly and
fatally undeceived. A deadly fire bursting forth from the loop holes
and platforms along the Garden Wall, which was parallel to, and about
thirty yards distant from, the hedge, laid prostrate the leading Files.
Those which came up in rapid succession were staggered by the sudden
and unexpected appearance of this little fortress. Not venturing upon
an escalade, they were forced to take advantage of such cover as was
afforded by the hedge and trees; whence they kept up a popping fire,
though at fearful odds, with opponents so well concealed by the wall,
as also by a row of apple trees which ran along its exterior.
The French Infantry were pushing forward through the Wood in support
of this attack, when Major BULL's Horse Battery recommenced its fire;
and a shower of howitzer shells fell amongst them, causing the greatest
destruction and confusion in their ranks.
Again the defenders dashed forward from the Flanks, and regained a
considerable portion of the Wood; whereupon Major BULL ceased firing
in that direction, and pointed his guns on strong Columns of French
Infantry in support, which he succeeded in causing to retrograde;
notwithstanding the very galling fire to which he was himself at that
time exposed, not only from the Batteries in his front, but also from
PIRÉ's Horse Battery on the French Height adjoining the Nivelles road,
by which his own Battery was completely enfiladed.
The French that were in the Wood having rallied, and obtained a vast
preponderance of force, now advanced in a most determined manner
against the Light Infantry of the British Guards, and compelled the
latter to retire to their former posts on the Flanks of the Château
and Gardens. At the same time, JEROME's Light Troops were advancing
rapidly, and in great force, against the right of the Buildings. That
portion of the Light Companies of the Coldstream and 3rd Regiment of
Guards which was outside the Farm made a gallant stand, under cover of
the Haystack, and from the Lane before mentioned. The Haystack itself
was set on fire by the French in one of their attacks, and was now in
full blaze. These Guardsmen held their ground with the greatest bravery
until they saw themselves completely outflanked, and in danger of being
cut off from all retreat.
They then hastily withdrew into the great Court Yard by the Gate
which faces the Allied position; and which they instantly closed and
endeavoured to block up with ladders, posts, barrows, or whatever was
nearest at hand. The French, however, succeeded in forcing the Gate;
but the defenders betook themselves to the nearest cover, whence they
poured a fire upon the intruders, and then rushing forward, a struggle
ensued which was distinguished by the most intrepid courage on both
sides. At length, Lieutenant Colonel MACDONELL, Captain WYNDHAM,
Ensigns GOOCH and HERVEY, and Sergeant GRAHAM, of the Coldstream
Guards, by dint of great personal strength and exertions, combined with
extraordinary bravery and perseverance, succeeded in closing the Gate
against their assailants. Those of the latter who had entered the Court
Yard fell a sacrifice to their undaunted and conspicuous gallantry.
The remainder of the French Skirmishers, passing on by the Left and
to the Rear of Hougomont, and, crossing the Avenue leading to it from
the Nivelles road, and the adjacent rivulet, spread themselves over
some broken ground partially covered with brushwood. They were now
immediately under the position to which Lieutenant Colonel SMITH had
moved his Battery from its former station on the other side of the
Nivelles road, and which was in front of the Extreme Right of the
First Line of the Anglo-Allied Army. This Battery had just been hotly
engaged with, and had suffered severely from, the Horse Battery posted
in front of PIRÉ's Light Cavalry Brigade; which had previously directed
its fire upon BULL's guns, and which maintained the cannonade with
Lieutenant Colonel SMITH's Battery for the purpose of covering the
advance of these Light Troops. SMITH had succeeded in silencing the
fire of his opponent; when the French Skirmishers, taking advantage of
both the broken ground and the high corn beyond it, suddenly opened
upon his Battery a popping fire so destructive in its effects, that in
a few moments several of the Gunners and horses were killed, and so
much damage was sustained by the limbers, that it became absolutely
necessary to withdraw the guns into a little hollow way that led
from the rear of the Battery into the Nivelles road, and in which it
remained some time for the purpose of refitting and getting into order.
This daring onset of the French Skirmishers was checked by the advance
of four Companies of the Coldstream Regiment of Guards, under
Lieutenant Colonel WOODFORD. They then fell back to the wall of the
Farm yard, near which they collected a considerable force, when Colonel
WOODFORD charged them. They gave way immediately, and withdrew from the
contest; which afforded Colonel WOODFORD an opportunity of entering the
Farm with a part of the reinforcement by the side door in the Lane. The
remainder of the detached force occupied the inclosures between the
Château and the Nivelles road.
During this advance of the French Skirmishers against the extreme
Right of the Allied Front Line, the troops which formed their Support
attempted again to force open the rear Gate of Hougomont. The
individuals before mentioned as having closed the Gate, were, at the
time, occupied in rendering it more secure by placing against it some
pieces of ash timber that lay in the yard. The French failing in their
endeavours to push in the Gate, a brave Grenadier volunteered to climb
over and open it from the inside. Captain WYNDHAM, on perceiving the
latter at the top of the gate, instantly desired Sergeant GRAHAM,
whose musket he was holding whilst the latter was bringing forward
another piece of timber, to drop the wood, take his firelock, and
shoot the intruder. The Order was instantly obeyed; and the intrepid
assailant, who, for any useful result, ought to have been accompanied
by a score of his comrades, fell beneath GRAHAM's deadly aim. It was at
this moment that the French Skirmishers who had advanced against the
main position, were falling back upon their Support; and the whole of
these troops were driven off by the advance of the four Companies of
the Coldstream Guards, detached from the main position, as previously
described.
In the mean time, the French Infantry in the Wood, finding their
advance against the Garden so suddenly checked, endeavoured to turn it
by its Left. With this view they were debouching through a large gap
in the fence, forming an outlet from the Wood into the Orchard; when
Lieutenant Colonel Lord SALTOUN, seizing the favourable opportunity,
made a most gallant charge upon the head of the Column with the Light
Companies of the First Brigade of Guards, and succeeded in driving the
Enemy back into the Wood.
Shortly afterwards, a large body of the Enemy's Light Troops began to
advance stealthily along the eastern hedge of the Hougomont inclosures,
communicating at the same time with the Infantry in the Wood on their
Left. This was immediately followed by a direct front attack upon the
Orchard; which compelled Lord SALTOUN gradually to withdraw his greatly
reduced force, from tree to tree, until he reached the hollow way in
rear of that inclosure.
The Light Troops in front of ALTEN's Division, having perceived the
French creeping along the hedge so as to turn the Left Flank of
Hougomont, were on the point of forming to oppose them; but on the
latter being pointed out to the Prince of ORANGE, who had just come to
the front to make his observations, he coolly remarked:--"No, don't
stir--the Duke is sure to see that movement, and will take some step to
counteract it." He had scarcely spoken, when two Companies of the 3rd
Regiment of British Guards, detached from the Allied Line, were seen
advancing along the same hedge, in an opposite direction, to meet them.
Lord SALTOUN being thus reinforced upon his Left, and the French
Skirmishers in his front having become exposed to a sharp flanking
fire from the Guards lining the eastern Garden Wall, he resumed the
offensive; cleared the Orchard of the Enemy, and reoccupied its front
hedge: while the Detachment on the Left drove the French along the
outer hedge, and down into the hollow whence they had debouched; and
then joined the troops in the Great Orchard. The front Hedge of the
Orchard, the front Wall of the Garden, with the Lane and Avenue on
the right, constituted at this time the Outer Line of the defence of
Hougomont.
* * * * *
During the progress of the contest of Hougomont, NEY had been occupied
in making his preparatory dispositions for carrying into execution
NAPOLEON's intended grand attack upon the Centre and Left of the
Anglo-Allied line. The troops destined for this service consisted of
the whole of D'ERLON's _Corps d'Armée_, and of ROUSSEL's Division
of KELLERMANN's Cavalry Corps. Their advance was to be covered and
supported by no less than ten Batteries, which were now brought forward
and posted along a ridge that intervened between the French Right and
the Allied Left Wing, affording the guns a range of from six hundred
to eight hundred yards of the Duke's Line. These Batteries consisted
of the three twelve-pounder Batteries of the First, Second, and Sixth
Corps, drawn up with their Left close upon the Charleroi road; of the
four Divisional Foot Batteries; of the Horse Battery belonging to
JAQUINOT's Light Cavalry Brigade; and of the two Horse Batteries of
MILHAUD's Corps of _Cuirassiers_, which stood in Second Line, in rear
of D'ERLON's Corps--altogether seventy four guns.
This imposing force of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, exclusive of
the ample Cavalry Reserves at hand, was not more than commensurate with
the importance of the object which NAPOLEON had in view. His aim was
not only to turn the Allied Left, but also to force the Centre of the
position; and, by gaining possession of the Farms of La Haye Sainte
and Mont St Jean, to cut off WELLINGTON's main line of communication
by the high road to Brussels, and, at the same time, to prevent any
contemplated junction of the Prussian and Anglo-Allied Armies.
This appeared to him preferable to any plan of operation against the
Allied Right, where the skilful dispositions made by the Duke would
require such a plan to embrace the attack and repulse of the troops
occupying Braine l'Alleud, and the Post of Vieux Foriez, as well
as the forcing of the position, _en potence_, held by Lord HILL; a
consideration which, combined with a knowledge of the existence of a
considerable body of Allied troops near Hal, and the fear of allowing
himself to be induced into too great an extension of his own force
towards his Left, caused him to resign all idea of attempting any
movement of importance in that quarter.
He felt, moreover, that even a successful attack upon the Right would,
in all probability, induce the Duke to fall back upon the Prussians;
and thus effect that junction which it was his great object to
frustrate: whereas, an attack upon the Anglo-Allied Left, which was not
so strong, if successful, held out to him the prospect of his being
enabled, by aid of the presumed vigorous co-operation on the part of
GROUCHY, and the momentarily expected arrival of a portion of that
Marshal's forces on his own Right, to defeat both Armies in detail.
The Batteries had been regularly posted and fully prepared for
action, and the Infantry Columns had advanced to the inner brow of
the intervening ridge, when NEY sent word to the Emperor that the
preliminary arrangements were completed, and that he only waited His
Majesty's Orders to commence the attack. NAPOLEON immediately took a
general view of the Field of Battle, and continuing his observations
beyond his Right, in order to discover, if possible, any indication of
the approach either of GROUCHY or of a hostile force, he perceived in
the direction of St Lambert an indistinct mass, having the appearance
of a body of troops; and pointing out the object to SOULT, who was near
him at the time, asked his opinion; whereupon the Marshal observed,
that he really conceived it to be a Column on the march, and that there
was great reason to believe it was a Detachment from GROUCHY. All the
Staff directed their telescopes upon the point indicated; and, as the
atmosphere was not very clear, different opinions were entertained:
some asserting that what had been taken for troops were trees; others
that they were Columns in position; whilst several agreed with SOULT,
that they were troops on the march.
In this state of uncertainty and suspense, the Emperor sent for General
DOMON, and desired him to proceed instantly with a strong reconnoitring
party to the right, and procure correct intelligence; to put himself
quickly in communication with the troops approaching from St Lambert;
to effect a junction with them, if they belonged to Marshal GROUCHY,
and to impede their advance if they proved to be Enemies. At the same
time, the two Light Cavalry Divisions of DOMON and SUBERVIE proceeded
some distance in the direction of the Wood of Paris; and were then
drawn up _en potence_ to the Right of the French Army.
Not long after DOMON's departure, NAPOLEON's impatience to ascertain
the precise character of the distant Column was relieved by the arrival
of an Officer of _Chasseurs_ with a Prussian Hussar, who had just
been taken prisoner; and who was the bearer of a letter, addressed
by the Prussian General BÜLOW to the Duke of WELLINGTON, to acquaint
the latter with his arrival at St Lambert. The prisoner stated that
the Column which was perceptible in the vicinity of this Village, was
the Advanced Guard of BÜLOW's Corps, which had not been engaged at
Ligny; that he had been in the morning at Wavre; that the three other
Prussian Corps were stationed close to that town, and had passed the
previous night there, without perceiving any indication of an Enemy in
their front; and that a Patrol of his own Regiment had advanced, during
the night, as far as two leagues from Wavre without encountering any
body of French troops.
SOULT who had just at that moment written the following letter to
GROUCHY, in reply to his Second Report from Gembloux, immediately added
a postscript, referring to the above intelligence, and sent off the
despatch, accompanied by the intercepted communication and the Hussar's
report.
"Du champ de Bataille "On the Field of Battle
de Waterloo, le 18, à at Waterloo, the 18th, at
une heure après midi. one o'clock in the afternoon.
"Monsieur le Maréchal, "Monsieur Marshal,
"Vous avez écrit ce matin, à "You wrote at two o'clock this
deux heures, à l'Empereur que vous morning to the Emperor that you
marcheriez sur Sart à Wallain; would march on Sart à Wallain;
donc votre projet était de vous consequently your plan was to
porter à Corbaix ou à Wavres: ce proceed to Corbaix or to Wavre. This
mouvement est conforme aux movement is in accordance with the
dispositions qui vous ont été dispositions which have been
communiquées: cependant l'Empereur communicated to you: however the
m'ordonne de vous dire que vous Emperor orders me to say to you
devez toujours manoeuvrer dans that you ought always to manoeuvre
notre direction; c'est à vous à voir in our direction. It is for you to
le point où nous sommes pour vous consider our present position in
régler en conséquence et pour lier order to guide yourself accordingly,
nos communications, ainsi que pour and to knit up our communications
être toujours en mesure pour in such a way as to be always
tomber sur quelques troupes within limits to fall upon some
Ennemies qui chercheraient à inquiéter of the Enemy's troops which would
notre Droite, et les écraser. endeavour to annoy our Right, and
En ce moment la bataille est engagée to crush them. At this moment
sur la ligna de Waterloo. the Battle has commenced on the
Le Centre de l'Armée Anglaise est line of Waterloo. The Centre of the
à Mont Saint Jean, ainsi manoeuvrez English Army is at Mont St Jean,
pour joindre notre Droite. so manoeuvre to join our Right.
"Le Duc DE DALMATIE. "The Duke of DALMATIA.
"P.S.--Une lettre qu'on vient "P.S.--A letter which has just
d'intercepter porte que le Général been intercepted states that General
BÜLOW doit attaquer notre Flanc. BÜLOW is about to attack our Flank.
Nous croyons apercevoir ce Corps We believe we see this Corps on
sur les Hauteurs de Saint Lambert; the Heights of Saint Lambert;
ainsi ne perdez pas un instant pour therefore lose not an instant in
vous rapprocher de nous et nous coming nearer to us and joining us,
joindre, et pour écraser BÜLOW and in crushing BÜLOW whom you
que vous prendrez en flagrant délit." will take in the very act."
The above letter is of much historical importance. Although conveying
NAPOLEON's approval of GROUCHY's movement upon either Corbaix or Wavre,
it clearly indicates the commencement of that anxiety and uneasiness
of mind which the Emperor experienced through the fear of even the
possibility of a want of just conception on the part of the Marshal, of
the true spirit in which the combination of his movements with those of
the main Army should be carried on. He draws the Marshal's attention to
the necessity of his manoeuvring so as to prevent the execution of any
hostile design against the Right Flank of the main Army, which is then
engaged with WELLINGTON's forces, and names Mont St Jean, the Centre
of the Duke's position, as a guiding point. This anxiety was naturally
augmented very considerably by the discovery of BÜLOW's troops, and the
postscript accordingly enjoins still more urgently the necessity of a
close and active co-operation.
Very shortly after the Officer who was the bearer of this despatch had
started, a message was sent in by General DOMON to the effect that his
Scouts had fallen in with Detachments from the Enemy in the direction
of St Lambert; and that he had just sent out Patrols towards other
points to obtain intelligence of Marshal GROUCHY, and to communicate
with him, if practicable.
It is to be observed, however, that the troops discovered by the French
Cavalry did not belong to BÜLOW's main body, but merely to his Advanced
Guard. The former was the mass first seen from La Belle Alliance,
when it was moving across the Heights of St Lambert, on the right or
opposite bank of the Lasne; but as explained in a preceding Chapter, it
encountered great obstruction and much delay during its march towards
the Field: whilst the latter, awaiting its arrival, rested concealed in
the Wood of Paris, near Lasne.
Thus it appears that both Commanders were deceived as to the proximity
of any considerable body of Prussians at this period of the day.
Nevertheless, the conviction of such a proximity, while it imparted
increased confidence to WELLINGTON, in regard to the speedy execution
of the plan of combined operation which he had preconcerted with
BLÜCHER, compelled NAPOLEON to employ additional vigilance and
circumspection upon his Right Flank.
Great, however, as was the necessity for such vigilance; the measures
that were adopted were lamentably deficient in energy, vigour, and
judgement. Considering that the main body of BÜLOW's Corps was on the
point of entering the Defile of St Lambert, in which it had to overcome
the greatest difficulties; it appears unaccountable that the Officer
employed in reconnoitring and patroling beyond the extreme Right of
the French Army should not have urged the occupation of the Wood of
Paris with a detached body of Infantry, with a view to impede BÜLOW's
advance, and compel him to take a more circuitous route. In this manner
the Prussian co-operation might have been so far obstructed or delayed
as to secure to NAPOLEON the power of advancing against WELLINGTON with
almost the entire of his force; and of thus, perhaps, accomplishing his
grand object of defeating both Armies in detail.
No disposition of this kind was made; but, in place of it, DOMON's
and SUBERVIE's Light Cavalry Divisions were moved to the right, _en
potence_ to the Front Line, their Picquets not extending beyond the
plateau in front of the Wood of Paris. Whether this culpable neglect
arose from the want of due penetration and foresight on the part of
General DOMON; or from this Officer having been instructed not to act
as if in command of a detached Corps, but only to take up a position,
within a prescribed distance, _en potence_ to the general Front Line;
or, from an over confident expectation on the part of NAPOLEON of
approaching aid from GROUCHY; are points not easily determined: but
there can be no doubt that the error of not occupying the Wood of
Paris with a strong body of Infantry, flanked and supported by the
Cavalry, was fatal to the development of NAPOLEON's original design.
One Infantry Division, combined with Domon's and SUBERVIE's Cavalry
Divisions, would have sufficed for obstructing the debouching of
BÜLOW's Corps from the almost impassable Defile of St Lambert; and
compelling it to move by its right, into the line of march of ZIETEN's
Corps, which did not reach the field before seven o'clock in the
evening. To move by its left, along the deep and miry valley of the
Lasne, would have been impracticable so long as the Wood of Paris and
its vicinity continued to be occupied by the French.
In short, the importance of seizing upon the means that presented
themselves for materially retarding, if not of completely frustrating,
the co-operation of the principal portion of the Prussian forces,
was of so vital a nature, that the French Emperor would have been
justified in detaching the whole of LOBAU's Corps, along with the
Cavalry already mentioned, under an experienced and enterprising
General, such as LOBAU himself, to operate against the Prussians whilst
these were occupied in passing the Defiles which led to his Right
Flank. None of those troops were engaged with the Anglo-Allied Army
during any part of the day; so that, without diminishing the numbers
actually opposed to the latter, they might have been detached in the
manner suggested: instead of remaining, as was the case, drawn up
_en potence_ on the immediate Field of Action, to be attacked by the
Prussians, who were permitted to pass the Defiles without interruption,
to collect their forces under cover of the Wood of Paris, to debouch
from the latter successively and at their leisure, and to organise
their movements of attack in perfect security, and with the most
systematic order and regularity.
CHAPTER XI.
NAPOLEON, having taken the precaution of posting a Cavalry Corps of
Observation upon his Right Flank, no longer delayed sending the Order
to NEY for the commencement of the Grand Attack upon the Centre and
Left Wing of the Anglo-Allied Army. About the same time, WELLINGTON,
considering that some of the Battalions along the Right Wing of his
Front Line were too much exposed to the Enemy's cannonade, which had
from the commencement been principally directed against them, and which
was now conducted with increased vigour, withdrew them more under
shelter of the crest of the ridge. It might then be about half past
one, or perhaps a quarter before two o'clock.
The simultaneous advance of D'ERLON's four Divisions of Infantry,
amounting to more than 16,000 men, was grand and imposing. As the
heads of the Columns cleared their own line of Batteries ranged along
the crest of the intervening ridge, and as the points on which they
were directed for attack opened out to their view, loud and reiterated
shouts arose from their ranks of "_Vive l'Empereur!_" which, as the
masses began to descend the exterior slope of their position, were
suddenly drowned in the roar produced by the discharge of seventy four
pieces of French cannon over their heads. The effects of the latter
upon PICTON's Division, and upon BYLANDT's Dutch-Belgian Brigade,
which, as before stated, was deployed upon the exterior slope of the
Anglo-Allied position, were severely felt.
Light Troops now issued forth from each Column, and soon spread out
into a line of Skirmishers extending the whole length of the valley.
As DONZELOT's Division, which was on the left, approached La Haye
Sainte, one of its Brigades moved out to attack that Farm, while the
other continued its advance on the right of the Charleroi road; and
it was not long before a sharp fire of musketry along and around the
hedges of the Orchard of La Haye Sainte announced the first resistance
to D'ERLON's formidable advance. Shortly afterwards a dropping fire
commenced among the hedges and inclosures of Papelotte, La Haye, and
Smohain; which were occupied by the Nassau Battalions under Prince
BERNHARD of Saxe Weimar. The Right Brigade of DURUTTE's Division was
thrown out against the troops defending these inclosures; while the
Left Brigade continued to advance across the valley, so as to form a
Support to MARCOGNET's Division on its left, and, at the same time, to
connect this attack with the advance of the latter against the main
Front Line of the Allied Right Wing.
DURUTTE's Skirmishers pressed boldly forward against those of Prince
BERNHARD's Brigade; and it was not long before they succeeded in
gaining possession of the Farm House of Papelotte, driving out the
Light Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau,
commanded by Captain RETTBERG; but the latter, on being reinforced with
four additional Companies, resumed the offensive, and gallantly retook
the Farm. The contest in this quarter was now limited to a persistent
skirmish; which extended itself along La Haye and Smohain, occupied by
the Regiment of Orange Nassau. With this _tiraillade_ on either Flank
of D'ERLON's Corps, the central Columns pursued their onward course,
and began to ascend the exterior slope of the Allied position.
[Illustration]
Immediately on the departure of D'ERLON's Corps from the French
position, BACHELU's Infantry Division, which constituted the Right
of REILLE's Corps, was moved forward to the immediate Height between
La Belle Alliance and La Haye Sainte (where it is intersected by the
hollow way formed by the Charleroi road), in order to maintain that
point, to be at hand as a Reserve to the attacking force, and to keep
up the connection between the Right and Left Wings of the Front Line of
the French Army.
The three central Columns continued their Advance up the exterior slope
of the Allied position. The nature of the ground still admitted of the
play of the French Batteries over their heads, and great was the havoc
produced by this fire upon PICTON's devoted ranks. As the heads of
the Columns neared the deployed Line of BYLANDT's Brigade, the shouts
of "_Vive l'Empereur!_" were renewed. The Skirmishers in advance had
scarcely opened their fire upon the Brigade, in order to prepare for,
and give increased effect to, the succeeding charge of the Columns;
when the Dutch-Belgians, who had already evinced a considerable degree
of unsteadiness, began firing in their turn, but with very little
effect: immediately after which they commenced a hurried retreat, not
partially and promiscuously, but collectively and simultaneously--so
much so, that the movement carried with it the appearance of its having
resulted from a word of command. The disorder of these troops rapidly
augmented; but, on their reaching the straggling hedge along the crest
of the position, an endeavour was made to rally them upon the 5th
Battalion of Dutch Militia. This attempt, however, notwithstanding the
most strenuous and praiseworthy exertions on the part of the Officers,
completely failed. The reserve Battalion and the Artillerymen of
Captain BYLEVELD's Battery, though they seemed to stem the torrent for
a moment, were quickly swept away by its accumulating force. As they
rushed past the British Columns, hissings, hootings, and execrations
were indignantly heaped upon them; and one portion, in its eagerness
to get away, nearly ran over the Grenadier Company of the 28th British
Regiment, the men of which were so enraged, that it was with difficulty
they could be prevented from firing upon the fugitives. Some of the
men of the 1st, or Royal Scots, were also desirous of shooting them.
Nothing seemed to restrain their flight, which ceased only when they
found themselves completely across and covered by the main ridge
along which the Anglo-Allied Army was drawn up. Here they continued,
comparatively under shelter, during the remainder of the battle, as a
Reserve; in which capacity alone, considering their losses and their
crippled state, they could now be rendered serviceable.
PICTON, who had been calmly watching the French movements, and whose
quick and practised eye detected the increasing unsteadiness and
wavering disposition of the Dutch-Belgians, appeared to expect but a
feeble resistance on their part; and upon his Aide de Camp, Captain
TYLER,[10] remarking to him that he was sure they would run, he
said, "Never mind; they shall have a taste of it, at all events." He
had certainly not anticipated the possibility of their retiring so
precipitately as they did the moment the French came within musket
range of their ranks.
Now, however, that these troops had completely cleared away to the
rear, and left him no other means wherewith to brave the coming storm
than could be afforded by the shattered remnants of KEMPT's and PACK's
Brigades which had survived the sanguinary Fight of Quatre Bras, PICTON
immediately deployed his force, and assumed an attitude of patient
but determined resistance. When the disparity in relative numbers of
the assailants and defenders is considered, the attempt to make head
with such odds, against the advancing masses of an Enemy elated by his
triumphant progress, was, it must be admitted, a daring and critical
undertaking. Each Brigade presented a thin two deep Line. Their united
strength did not amount to more than about 3,000 men; whilst of the
French force, the central attacking Columns alone, which were now
advancing directly upon these two Brigades, consisted of nearly 12,000
men. PICTON had, moreover, no Infantry Reserve whatever, from which he
could obtain support in case of success, or upon which he could fall
back in case of disaster.
He was not, however, one to be daunted by the approach of heavy
Columns, formidable as they might appear in point of numbers, when he
could meet them with a well trained British Line, though it should be
but two deep, and present but a fourth of the numerical force of its
opponents. It is true, that nearly all the Regiments in KEMPT's and
PACK's Brigades had lost half their numbers in the Battle of the 16th;
but PICTON well knew that they had not lost that indomitable spirit,
which, under his guidance, had immortalised them on that memorable
Field of Battle. There, he had triumphantly led them both in Line
against heavy Columns of Infantry, and in Squares against charging
Squadrons of Cavalry. What, then, might not be achieved by such innate
valour--by such consummate discipline? The entire confidence which he
reposed in his men was warmly reciprocated on their part. With such
a Chief to lead them, they would have bravely confronted the whole
French Army, had it been moving in mass against them. The flight of the
panic-stricken Dutch-Belgians produced no effect upon them beyond that
of exciting their derision and contempt.
The 28th, 32nd, and 79th Regiments of KEMPT's Brigade, when deployed,
occupied a Line parallel to, and about fifty yards distant from, the
hedge along the Wavre road, its Right resting on a high bank lining
the Charleroi road, and its Left terminating at a point in rear of that
part of the Wavre road which begins to incline for a short distance
towards the left rear. In their right front, immediately overlooking
the intersection of the Charleroi and Wavre roads, stood (as before
stated) the Reserve of the 1st Battalion 95th Rifles; they had two
Companies, under Major LEACH, posted in the Sand Pit adjoining the left
of the Charleroi road; and one Company, under Captain JOHNSTON, at the
hedge on the Knoll in rear of the Sand Pit. Their Commanding Officer
Colonel Sir ANDREW BARNARD, and Lieutenant Colonel CAMERON, were with
these Advanced Companies, watching the Enemy's movements.
PACK's Line was in left rear of KEMPT's Brigade, and about 150 yards
distant from the Wavre road. Its Left rested upon the Knoll between the
Wavre road and a small coppice on the reverse slope of the position;
but the Centre and Right extended across a considerable hollow which
occurs on the right of that coppice. The front of the interval between
the two Brigades became, after the retreat of the Dutch-Belgians,
completely exposed and uncovered.
The French Left central attacking Column had continued its advance in
a direction contiguous to, and parallel with, the high road, until the
Skirmishers in front were suddenly checked by the Companies of the 95th
British Rifles posted in the Sand Pit; which obstacle had hitherto
been in a great measure concealed from their view by the particular
formation of the ground, combined with the height of the intervening
corn. Influenced by the discovery of this impediment, and by the
appearance of the _abatis_ upon the high road, the Column inclined
to the right so as to clear the Sand Pit; and as their Skirmishers
were pressing on in that direction, the Companies of the 95th became
turned, and were forced to fall back upon the other Company stationed
along the little hedge in rear of the Pit. So vigorous and effective
was the fire maintained from this hedge by the British Riflemen, both
upon the Skirmishers and upon the Column itself, that the latter was
induced to swerve still further to the right, out of its original
direction.
The retreat of BYLANDT's Brigade having removed all impediment to the
advance of the central attacking Columns, the three Companies of the
95th soon found themselves outflanked by the French Skirmishers, and
gradually retired upon their Reserve. The Light Companies of the other
Regiments of KEMPT's Brigade, which had moved out to skirmish, fell
back in like manner, accordingly as the French Columns advanced. With
a view to secure the Left Flank of the attacking force, and at the
same time to connect the movements with those on the opposite side of
the high road, the French presented a strong Line, or rather a mass,
of Skirmishers, in the interval between that road and the Left central
Column.
As the Columns now rapidly approached the crest of the Anglo-Allied
position, the greater part of the Batteries along the French
ridge--that is, all those which had been cannonading that portion of
the Line embraced by the attack--gradually suspended their fire. The
partial cessation of their thunder was immediately succeeded by loud
and reiterated shouts from the Columns of "_Vive l'Empereur!_"; whilst
at short intervals were heard the cheering exhortations of "_En avant!
en avant!_" mingled with the continued roll of drums beating the _pas
de charge_.
The Left central Column was advancing in a direction which would have
brought it in immediate contact with the Right of the 28th British
Regiment and the Left of the 79th Highlanders, and had arrived within
about forty yards of the hedge lining the edge of the Wavre road, when
PICTON moved forward KEMPT's Brigade close to the hedge; where it was
joined by its Light Companies, who came running in, followed by some of
the most daring of the French Skirmishers, who, however, were quickly
driven back. Suddenly the Column halted, and commenced a deployment to
its right, the rear Battalions moving out rapidly to disengage their
front.
PICTON, seizing upon the favourable moment, ordered the Brigade to
fire a volley into the deploying mass; and its brief but full and
condensed report had scarcely died away, when his voice was heard
loudly calling "Charge! charge! Hurrah!" Answering with a tremendous
shout, his devoted followers burst through the nearest of the two
hedges that lined the Wavre road. In doing this their order Was in
some degree broken; and, when making their way through the further
hedge, a fire was poured into them by such of their opponents as had
their front uncovered. The Enemy's Skirmishers that had previously
fallen back upon the Flanks of the Column instantly darted forward;
and by their rapid and close telling fire assisted in the endeavour to
augment the apparent disorder of KEMPT's line. The 79th Highlanders
suffered greatly, and experienced some delay in clearing the hedges.
The Ensign (BIRTWHISTLE) carrying the Regimental Colour of the 32nd,
was severely wounded. Lieutenant BELCHER, who commanded the left centre
subdivision, took the Colour from him. In the next moment it was
seized by a French Officer, whose horse had just been shot under him.
A struggle ensued between him and Lieutenant BELCHER; but, while the
former was attempting to draw his sword, the covering Colour Sergeant
(named SWITZER) gave him a thrust in the breast with his halbert, and
the right hand man of the subdivision (named LACY) shot him, just as
Brevet Major TOOLE, commanding the right centre subdivision, called
out, though too late (for the French Officer fell dead at Lieutenant
BELCHER's feet), "Save the brave fellow!" The delay in crossing the
hedges was but momentary; order was speedily restored: and then,
levelling their bayonets, the Brigade disclosed to view the glorious
sight of a British Line of Infantry at the charge.
It was during this brief struggle that a severe and irreparable blow
was inflicted upon the entire British Army, and a whole nation plunged
into grief and mourning for the loss of a Chief; the brilliancy of
whose career had so excited her admiration, and the fame of whose
exploits had so exalted her pride. The truly brave and noble PICTON
was struck by a musket ball on the right temple. His death, which was
instantaneous, was first observed by the Earl of UXBRIDGE's Aide de
Camp, Captain HORACE SEYMOUR; whom he was, at the moment, desiring
to rally the Highlanders. Captain SEYMOUR, whose horse was just then
falling, immediately called the attention of PICTON's Aide de Camp,
Captain TYLER, to the fact of the General having been wounded; and, in
the next moment, the hero's lifeless corpse was, with the assistance of
a private soldier of the nearest Regiment, borne from off his charger
by that Officer. Thus fell the gallant soldier, who, as the Leader of
the Third or "Fighting Division" in the Peninsular War, had already
acquired an imperishable renown in the history of the British Army. As
his life was spent in fighting the battles of his country, his death
was an end suited to his stirring career. His brave spirit passed away
amidst the roar and din of the bloody conflict, and his eyes closed on
his last of Fields in the very moment of the advance of his troops to
victory.
The French Column, surprised in the midst of its attempted deployment,
and appalled by the bold and determined onset of KEMPT's Line, appeared
as if struck by a panic, fell into irremediable confusion, and fled
with precipitation from its pursuers. Just as the British Brigade
bore down the slope, its front was partially crossed from the right
by French _Cuirassiers_, followed by the 2nd British Life Guards;
the former, dashing in amongst their own thickly scattered Infantry
Skirmishers; who threw themselves down to allow both fugitives and
pursuers to ride over them, and then, in many cases, rose up and fired
after the latter. But although the greater part of the _Cuirassiers_
turned about and boldly faced their opponents, whereby several isolated
individual contests occurred; the 2nd Life Guards soon obtained the
mastery, and compelled them to resume their flight: whilst the 95th
Rifles speedily closed upon the disordered mass of Infantry through
which this portion of the Cavalry had passed, and amongst which the
greatest confusion and consternation prevailed. Many flew wildly they
scarcely knew whither; others delivered themselves up; and several were
seized as prisoners.
On its right, the Brigade was supported in the charge by the 1st Light
Battalion of the King's German Legion; which crossed over for that
purpose from the opposite side of the high road.
Immediately after passing through the hedge, the extreme Left of the
28th Regiment had unexpectedly found itself almost in contact with a
well formed French Column still advancing against the Allied position.
The Right Wing of the Regiment was too deeply engaged with the Column
directly before it to admit of its attention being drawn off to any
other quarter; but the Left Wing, having a clearer front, boldly
brought forward its right shoulders, thus detaching itself from the
Right Wing, and fired into the Left Flank of the advancing Column at
the very moment when the head of the latter was charged by the Right
Regiment (the Royals) of PONSONBY's Brigade of Heavy Cavalry. KEMPT,
becoming aware of the prolongation of the French attack along the Line
to his left, and of the consequently exposed state of this Flank; and
possessing no Infantry Support or Reserve of any kind, felt himself
under the necessity of restraining his men from further pursuit, and
ordered the Brigade to halt and reform. The Left Wing of the 28th,
however, having its whole attention fixed upon the Column charged by
the Royals, followed these Dragoons some distance down the slope, and
assisted them in securing a great number of prisoners; after which it
fell back, and rejoined the Right Wing of the Regiment. The 95th Rifles
continued advancing, and driving the French Skirmishers before them
beyond the Knoll by the Sand Pit.
* * * * *
From this extremely gallant and most decisive attack by KEMPT's
Brigade, we must proceed to describe the no less brilliant charges
performed by both SOMERSET's and PONSONBY's Cavalry Brigades; but to
afford a more ready comprehension of this period of the action, it
will be necessary, in the first instance, to revert, to the attack and
defence of La Haye Sainte.
The French Skirmishers thrown out by the Left Brigade of DONZELOT's
Division advanced boldly and resolutely against the Orchard of La Haye
Sainte. The first shot tore away the bridle of Major BARING's horse
close to his hand, and the second killed Major BÖSEWIEL, the next in
command. The three Companies of the 2nd Light Battalion of the King's
German Legion, which, as before stated, were posted in the Orchard,
together with two Companies of the 1st Light Battalion of the King's
German Legion under Captains WYNECKEN and GOEDEN, and a Company of
Hanoverian Riflemen under Major SPÖRKEN, which were extended on the
right of the Farm, presented a gallant resistance to the Enemy; but the
latter continued to press forward with superior force, and the main
body of the French Brigade having formed two Columns of Attack, which
were rapidly advancing, one into the Orchard, and the other towards the
Buildings, Major BARING fell back with his men upon the Barn.
At this moment, Colonel KLENCKE reached the Farm with the Lüneburg
Field Battalion; which WELLINGTON, on observing the French advance, had
detached from the Left of KIELMANSEGGE's Brigade as a reinforcement to
the troops of La Haye Sainte. BARING immediately endeavoured to recover
the Orchard; and had already made the Enemy give way, when he perceived
a strong Line of _Cuirassiers_ forming in right front of the inclosure.
At the same time, Lieutenant MEYER came to report to him that the Enemy
had surrounded the Garden in which his Company was posted, and that it
had become no longer tenable. BARING ordered him to fall back into the
Buildings, and to assist in their defence. The Skirmishers upon the
right, on the sudden appearance of the Cavalry, ran in upon the Orchard
to collect together: but coming in contact with the newly arrived
Hanoverians, the latter got into disorder; and the effect produced
by the sight of the advancing Line of _Cuirassiers_ in their front,
as also by the shouts of the French Infantry gaining possession of
the Garden in their rear, was such, that notwithstanding all BARING's
exertions to halt and collect his men, the whole of these troops betook
themselves to an indiscriminate flight towards the main position of
the Allied Army, a course which they seemed to imagine constituted
their only chance of safety.
They were speedily undeceived. The Cavalry overtook them in the midst
of their confused retreat, rode over, sabred, and still further
dispersed them; whilst, to add to the severity of their loss, they
became exposed, after the Cavalry had passed on, to a flank fire from
the Enemy's Infantry lining the hedge of the Garden. A portion of
them succeeded in gaining the main position; whilst the remainder,
securing themselves in the Buildings, augmented the little garrison
under Lieutenants CAREY and GRÆME, and Ensign FRANK, who bravely and
successfully maintained possession in defiance of the vigorous attacks
on the part of the French Light Troops. The Lüneburg Hanoverian
Battalion, however, suffered most severely: many were killed and
wounded; among the latter was the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant
Colonel KLENCKE, and among the prisoners taken was Major DACHENHAUSEN.
Some on the left saved themselves by a precipitate retreat into the
high road. The few that were collected together again during the
remainder of the day constituted but a very insignificant portion of
the original strength of the Battalion.
The Earl of UXBRIDGE, on perceiving the advance of the French Cavalry
by La Haye Sainte, on the British right of the Charleroi road (the
same alluded to as having dispersed the Hanoverian Lüneburg Battalion
and BARING's Skirmishers of the Legion), as also the approach of the
Infantry Columns which constituted the attack upon the Allied Left Wing
on the opposite side of that road, decided upon a simultaneous charge
by the Heavy Cavalry Brigades of Lord EDWARD SOMERSET and Sir WILLIAM
PONSONBY; the former against the Enemy's Cavalry, the latter against
his masses of Infantry. The resolution was scarcely formed when he
proceeded to carry it into instant execution. Riding up to Lord EDWARD
SOMERSET, he ordered him to prepare to form Line, keeping the Blues in
support: and galloping on to PONSONBY's Brigade on the opposite side of
the high road, he ordered that Officer to wheel into Line as soon as he
saw the other Brigade do so, and to hold the Scots Greys in support. He
then returned to the Household Brigade, and immediately put the whole
in motion.
As this was the first grand attack made by the French on that day in
fair open Field, Lord UXBRIDGE felt very desirous, in meeting it, to
establish, if possible, the superior prowess of the British Cavalry;
and thus to inspire it with confidence, and cause it to be held in
respect by its opponents. He, therefore, with a view to excite the
courage and heighten the enthusiasm of his followers, led the advance
in person, placing himself in front of the Left of SOMERSET's Brigade,
so as to be at about the centre of the Line when the Brigades should
unite, on the continuation of the advance, in front of the Allied
position. Nobly and faithfully did these brave Dragoons fulfil his
anxious expectations.
For the purpose of ensuring efficient support to his Cavalry attacks,
Lord UXBRIDGE had, before the commencement of the Battle, intimated
to the Generals of Brigade that as he could not be present everywhere
to give Orders, he expected they would always take upon themselves to
conform to, and support, offensive movements in their front; and having
on this occasion Light Cavalry Brigades on either Flank of the charging
force, he felt in a great degree justified in placing himself in Front
Line, particularly as he had assigned to each of the advancing Brigades
its own immediate Support.
Though greatly palliated by the adoption of these precautionary
measures, this was perhaps not altogether a prudent act on the part
of the Commander of the entire Cavalry of an Army; since, in the
charge of an extended Line of Cavalry against an Enemy close at
hand, the _carrière_ once begun, the Leader becomes so completely
identified and mixed up with that Line itself, that his virtual command
is rapidly limited to that of a Squadron Officer; whereas, when
accompanying a _Second_ Line, he is enabled to draw off, or reinforce,
as circumstances may render expedient. His eager desire, however, to
render this first charge a brilliant affair, combined with his own
chivalric nature, led him to assume the post of honour and of danger,
in order to animate by his example as a bold and determined soldier. At
the same time, he trusted to the dispositions he had already made, and
to the alertness of his Brigadiers, for due support to his attack; but
which, from fortuitous circumstances, as will be seen by the sequel,
was not forthcoming at the moment it was most urgently required.
The French Line of Cavalry, as it advanced, presented an imposing
appearance. These veteran warriors bore with them an air of confident
superiority and anticipated triumph, joined with a sort of _gaieté de
coeur_, inspired no doubt by the reflection that they were about to
encounter and overthrow their most implacable Enemies, the British.
Their advance, like that of the Infantry on their right, had been to a
certain extent triumphant; and, as the flight of the Dutch-Belgians had
led that Infantry to imagine that victory was already within its grasp,
so the dispersion of the Hanoverians was hailed by these Dragoons as
a happy prelude to their grand attack. They had now ascended the brow
of the ridge on which the Anglo-Allied Infantry was posted, prepared
for their reception: a vigorous fire was opened upon them by the four
guns of Ross's British Horse Battery on the right of the high road, as
also by LLOYD's British Foot Battery still further to the right; but
a few seconds sufficed to restore the order of their advance: in the
next moment their trumpets sounded the charge; when, amidst shouts of
"_Vive l'Empereur!_" this gallant Line, glittering in all the splendour
reflected from burnished helmet and cuirass, rushed on to the attack.
On the other hand, the British Household Brigade, presenting a
beautiful Line, and animated by an equal degree of enthusiasm, had
already been put into charging speed; and just as the _Cuirassiers_
came close upon the Squares, and received a fire from their front
faces, the two Lines dashed into each other with indescribable
impetuosity. The shock was terrific.
The British, in order to close as much as possible upon the
_Cuirassiers_, whose swords were much longer, and whose bodies were
encased in steel, whilst their own were without such defence, seemed
for a moment striving to wedge themselves in between the horses of
their infuriated antagonists. Swords gleamed high in air with the
suddenness and rapidity of the lightning flash, now clashing violently
together, and now clanging heavily upon resisting armour; whilst with
the din of the battle shock were mingled the shouts and yells of the
combatants. Riders vainly struggling for mastery quickly fell under
the deadly thrust or the well delivered cut. Horses, plunging and
rearing, staggered to the earth, or broke wildly from their ranks. But
desperate and bloody as was the struggle, it was of brief duration. The
physical superiority of the British, aided by transcendant valour, was
speedily made manifest; and the _Cuirassiers_, notwithstanding their
most gallant and resolute resistance, were driven down from off the
ridge, which they had ascended only a few minutes before with all the
pride and confidence of men accustomed and determined to overcome every
obstacle. This first collision at the charge did not occur, however,
throughout the entire extent of the opposing Lines. SOMERSET's Line was
not parallel to that of the _Cuirassiers_, and as its Right was thrown
somewhat forward, this came first in contact with the Enemy, and the
collision, in consequence of the rapidity of the charge on both sides,
followed in instantaneous succession in the direction of the Allied
Left until intercepted in its further progress by a natural obstruction
consisting of the hollow way through which the cross roads lead into
the Charleroi road. The _Cuirassiers_ on the right of the French Line
were suddenly thrown out of their speed by coming unexpectedly on
this hollow way, into which they consequently descended abruptly and
confusedly; and as they began to urge their horses up the opposite
bank, they beheld the 2nd British Life Guards, which formed the Left of
SOMERSET's Brigade, in full speed towards them. All idea of resistance,
in such a situation, was abandoned as hopeless. They immediately
filed away down this hollow way to their right, and struck across the
Charleroi road into the field in front of the 95th British Rifles;
followed by the 2nd Life Guards, who were in equal disorder from having
to pick their way as they best could down the steep banks adjoining the
intersection of the two roads.
These _Cuirassiers_, after having rushed in upon the French Infantry
Skirmishers thickly and confusedly congregated in that quarter, reined
in their steeds, and fronting their pursuers, engaged them individually
in hand to hand combat. They were soon, however, made sensible of
their inferiority in this species of contest, and either submitted
to the victors, or fled with precipitation; whilst at the same time,
KEMPT's Brigade was charging gloriously down the exterior slope of
the Allied position, and closing upon the Infantry with which these
horsemen had become intermingled, in the manner previously described.
No sooner did PONSONBY perceive the Household Cavalry in motion,
than in pursuance of the Orders he had received, he led on his own
Brigade; but not being sufficiently aware of the state of affairs
on the opposite side of the Wavre road, and not wishing to launch
his Line against the Enemy's masses until the favourable moment had
arrived, he commanded a temporary halt, and rode up to the hedge in
order that he might, by personal observation, ensure the correct timing
of the charge. He was accompanied by Colonel MUTER, commanding the
Inniskilling Dragoons; whom he desired to return and place himself in
front of the Centre Squadron, and to order and conduct the movement,
the moment he should observe him hold up his cocked hat as a signal.
It is necessary to remark that the Scots Greys, who stood in support
some short time previously to this advance, just where the Enemy's
round shot, after passing over the ridge in front, descended in quick
succession and occasioned some losses in their ranks, were ordered to
some lower ground in left rear of the other two Regiments; which new
position they had scarcely reached when the latter were advanced as
above, and the Greys immediately conformed to this movement.
During the advance of ALIX's French Division (the First), its rear
Brigade, which consisted of the 54th and 55th Regiments, inclined
to its right, moved out of the mass, and formed two Columns, of two
Battalions each, in support, _en échelon_ to the leading Brigade,
consisting of the 28th and 105th Regiments. In like manner, the rear
Brigade of MARCOGNET's Division (the Third), consisting of the 21st
and 46th Regiments, broke into two Columns, of two Battalions each, in
support, _en échelon_ to, but more immediately in rear of, the leading
Brigade, consisting of the 25th and 45th Regiments.
While KEMPT's Brigade was bravely charging down the slope on the right,
the heads of the leading Brigades of ALIX's and MARCOGNET's Divisions,
with conspicuous gallantry, and amidst shouts of triumph, crowned the
crest of the Allied position on the left, crossing the Wavre road and
the straggling hedge, by which their order had been in some degree
disturbed. ALIX's leading Brigade, having passed clear of KEMPT's
Left, found itself unopposed by Infantry, in its front; but the head
of MARCOGNET's Column, after passing close by the right of Captain
RETTBERG's Hanoverian Foot Battery, from which it had received a very
destructive fire, during its advance, beheld a short but compact line
of Highlanders directly in its front.
This was the remnant of the 92nd Regiment which had so gallantly
fought, and so greatly suffered, at Quatre Bras. It did not at that
moment consist of more than 230 men, whilst the opposing Column
numbered about 2,000. PACK, who was in front of the 92nd, on seeing the
head of the French Column making its way through the hedge, resolved in
his own mind that not a moment must be allowed to it for observation
and reflection, as otherwise the French would succeed in establishing
themselves in great force on the summit of the British position. He
instantly decided upon a measure, which, in daring and determination,
was fully commensurate with the emergency of the occasion. Addressing
himself to the Highlanders, he said, in an energetic tone, "92nd, you
must charge--all in front of you have given way!" With loud cheers,
and under the animating sounds of their native pibroch, the 92nd moved
steadily on with the noble mien and gallant bearing of men bent upon
upholding, at any sacrifice, the honour and glory of their country.
That portion of the French Column which had by this time crossed the
hedge was in perfect order, and presented a bold and determined front.
As the 92nd approached the Column, it received from it a fire; which,
however, it did not return, but continued to advance steadily until
it had arrived within twenty or thirty yards distance, when the head
of the French Column appeared panic struck, and facing about in the
greatest confusion, endeavoured to escape; the Highlanders, at the same
moment, throwing into the mass a concentrated fire, most destructive
in its effects. The 92nd immediately charged; but at this very moment
PONSONBY's Brigade came up.
Colonel MUTER had just before perceived the raised cocked hat, when he
instantly ordered and conducted the advance of the Brigade. It will
be recollected that the Scots Greys had been ordered to support the
Royals and Inniskillings; but having as was before explained, moved
down into lower ground on the left, to get more under cover from the
Enemy's cannonade, and subsequently advanced in left rear of those two
Regiments, they beheld in their direct front the head of MARCOGNET's
Division establishing itself on the height. Their course from that
moment was obvious. They soon got up into Line, or nearly so, with the
remainder of the Brigade, and joined in the general charge.
Upon PONSONBY's Brigade coming up with the Infantry, it passed through
the latter as well, and as quickly as it could: in some instances
intervals were made for the Dragoons by the wheeling of companies;
in others, by that of subdivisions or of sections: but generally the
passage was effected in rather an irregular manner; and under the
circumstances this was unavoidable. Of the remaining Regiments of
PACK's Brigade, the 44th, which formed the Left, having its front
covered by BEST's Hanoverians, remained in support, on the summit or
Knoll immediately above, and on the left of, the hollow in which the
rest of the Brigade had been posted. The 1st Royal Scots, and the 42nd
Highlanders on the right of the 92nd, moved forward immediately after
the advance by the latter, and crossing the hedge, assisted PONSONBY's
Cavalry in securing prisoners.
As the Scots Greys passed through, and mingled with, the Highlanders;
the enthusiasm of both Corps was extraordinary. They mutually cheered.
"Scotland for ever!" was their war shout. The smoke in which the
head of the French Column was enshrouded had not cleared away, when
the Greys dashed into the mass. So eager was the desire, so strong
the determination, of the Highlanders to aid their compatriots in
completing the work so gloriously begun, that many were seen holding on
by the stirrups of the horsemen; while all rushed forward, leaving none
but the disabled in their rear. The leading portion of the Column soon
yielded to this infuriated onset; the remainder, which was yet in the
act of ascending the exterior slope, appalled by the sudden appearance
of Cavalry at a moment when, judging by the sound of musketry fire in
front, they had naturally concluded that it was with Infantry alone
they had to contend, were hurled back in confusion by the impetus of
the shock. The Dragoons, having the advantage of the descent, appeared
to mow down the mass; which, bending under the pressure, quickly
spread itself outwards in all directions. Yet, in that mass were many
gallant spirits, who could not be brought to yield without a struggle;
and these fought bravely to the death: not that they served to impede,
but only to mark more strongly the course of the impetuous torrent
as it swept wildly past them, presenting to the eye of the artistic
observer those streaks which, arising incidentally from such partial
and individual contests, invariably characterize the track of a charge
of Cavalry.
Within that mass too, was borne the Imperial Eagle of the 45th
Regiment, proudly displaying on its banner the names of Austerlitz,
Jena, Friedland, Essling, and Wagram--Fields in which this Regiment
had covered itself with glory, and acquired the distinguished title
of "The Invincibles." A devoted band encircled the sacred Standard,
which attracted the observation, and excited the ambition of a daring
and adventurous soldier, named EWART, a Sergeant of the Greys. After
a desperate struggle, evincing on his part great physical strength
combined with extraordinary dexterity, he succeeded in capturing the
cherished trophy. The gallant fellow was directed to proceed with it to
Brussels, where he was received with acclamations by thousands who came
forward to welcome and congratulate him.
Without pausing for a moment to reform, those of the Greys who had
forced their way through, or on either Flank of, the mass, rushed
boldly onward against the leading supporting Column of MARCOGNET's
right Brigade. This body of men, lost in amazement at the suddenness,
the wildness, of the charge; and its terrific effects upon their
countrymen on the higher ground in front, had either not taken
advantage of the very few moments that had intervened, by preparing an
effectual resistance to Cavalry; or, if they attempted the necessary
formation, did so when there was no longer time for its completion.
Their outer Files certainly opened a fire which proved very destructive
to their assailants; but to such a degree had the impetus of the
charge been augmented by the rapidly increasing descent of the slope,
that these brave Dragoons possessed as little of the power as of the
will to check their speed, and they plunged down into the mass with
a force that was truly irresistible. Its foremost ranks driven back
with irrepressible violence, the entire Column tottered for a moment,
and then sank under the overpowering wave. Hundreds were crushed to
rise no more; and hundreds rose again but to surrender to the victors;
who speedily swept their prisoners to the rear, while the Highlanders
secured those taken from the leading Column.
Along the remainder of the Line, the charge of the "Union Brigade" was
equally brilliant and successful. On the right, the Royal Dragoons, by
inclining somewhat to their left, during the advance, brought their
Centre Squadron to bear upon the head of the leading Column of ALIX's
Division, which had crossed the hedges lining the Wavre road, and
being unchecked, was rapidly advancing across the crest of the ridge.
Suddenly its loud shouts of triumph ceased as it perceived the close
approach of Cavalry up the interior slope of the Anglo-Allied position.
Whether it was actuated by a consciousness of danger from the disorder
necessarily occasioned in its rear by the passage through the banked
up hedges, by a dread of being caught in the midst of any attempt to
assume a formation better adapted for effective resistance, or of being
entirely cut off from all support, it is difficult to decide, but the
head of this Column certainly appeared to be seized with a panic.
Having thrown out an irregular and scattering fire, which served only
to bring down about twenty of the Dragoons; it instantly faced about,
and endeavoured to regain the opposite side of the hedges. The Royals,
however, were slashing in amongst them before this object could be
effected. The rear ranks of the Column, still pressing forward, and
unconscious of the obstruction in front, now met those that were hurled
back upon them down the exterior slope by the charge of the Royals,
who continued pressing forward against both Front and Flanks of the
mass. The whole was in a moment so jammed together as to have become
perfectly helpless, Men tried in vain to use their muskets, which were
either jerked out of their hands, or discharged at random, in the
attempt. Gradually, a scattering flight from the rear loosened the
unmanageable mass, which now rolled back helplessly along its downward
course. Many brave spirits, hitherto pent up in the midst of the
throng, appeared disposed to hazard a defiance; and amongst these the
swords of the Royals dealt fearful havoc: many threw down their arms,
and gave themselves up in despair; and these were hurried off by the
conquerors to the rear of the British Line.
The 28th French Regiment, which formed a direct Support to the 105th
Regiment, comprising the Column thus attacked, though astounded by
the scene before it, and almost driven back by the panic stricken
fugitives, still retained a considerable semblance of order.
Amidst the crowd that was now precipitating itself on this supporting
Column, to seek its shelter and protection, was an Officer, the bearer
of the Eagle of the 105th Regiment. This Standard, on which were
inscribed the victories of Jena, Eylau, Eckmühl, Essling, and Wagram,
was accompanied at the moment by a party apparently forming a guard
for its defence. Captain CLARK, commanding the Centre Squadron of the
Royals, on discovering the group, instantly gave the Order, "Right
shoulders forward--attack the Colour!" and led directly upon the Eagle
himself. On reaching it, he ran his sword through the body of the
Standard Bearer who immediately fell, and the Eagle dropped across the
head of Captain CLARK's horse. He endeavoured to catch it with his
left hand, but could only touch the fringe of the Colour, and it would
probably have fallen to the ground, and have been lost in the confusion
of the moment, had it not been saved by Corporal STILES; who, having
been Standard Coverer, and therefore posted immediately in rear of the
Squadron Leader, came up at the instant, on Captain CLARK's left, and
caught the Colour as it struck, in falling, against his own horse's
neck.
So great were the confusion and dismay created in the second Column by
the rush towards it of the disorganised remnant of the leading body,
mixed up as it were with the Dragoons still pressing eagerly forward,
as also by the signal overthrow of the Columns on their right by the
Inniskillings, that the entire mass speedily yielded to the pressure,
and commenced a disorderly flight, pursued by the Royals to the foot of
the valley by which the two positions were divided.
The Inniskillings, forming the Centre Regiment of the Brigade, did
not come quite so soon into contact with the French Infantry as did
the Flank Regiments. The Columns in their immediate front were the
two formed by the 54th and 55th French Regiments, of two Battalions
each; which, as previously explained, advanced in support, and in
right rear, of ALIX's leading Brigade. Only the Left, and part of the
Centre, Squadron of the Inniskillings had to pass through British
Infantry as they advanced; the front of the Right Squadron was clear.
The Irish "_hurrah!_" loud, wild, and shrill, rent the air as the
Inniskillings, bursting through the hedge and bounding over the road,
dashed boldly down the slope towards the French Columns, which were
about a hundred yards distant; an interval that imparted an additional
impetus to their charge, and assisted in securing for it a result
equally brilliant with that obtained by the other two Regiments. The
Right and Centre Squadrons bore down upon the 55th French Regiment;
while the Left Squadron alone charged the 54th Regiment. These two
Columns, like those on their right and left, were not allowed time to
recover from their astonishment at the unexpected, sudden, and vehement
charge of Cavalry launched against them. A feeble and irregular fire
was the only attempt they made to avert the impending danger. In the
next instant the Dragoons were amongst them, plying their swords with
fearful swiftness and dexterity, and cleaving their way into the midst
of the masses; which, rolling back, and scattering outwards, presented
an extraordinary scene of confusion. In addition to the destruction
effected by this Regiment, the number of prisoners which it secured was
immense.
The Household Brigade continued its charge down the slope on the right,
and partly on the left, of La Haye Sainte, with the most distinguished
gallantry and success; and bringing their right shoulders forward, the
1st Life Guards pressed severely on the rear of the _Cuirassiers_, as
a very considerable portion of them rushed tumultuously towards that
part of the high road beyond the Orchard of La Haye Sainte which lies
between high banks, and which was thus completely choked up with the
fugitives. Many of those who found their retreat so seriously impeded,
again faced their opponents, and a desperate hand to hand contest
ensued; which, however, was suddenly terminated by a destructive fire
poured down upon the 1st Life Guards, from the top of the banks, by the
Light Troops of BACHELU's Division that crowned the Heights through
which the road has been excavated. The King's Dragoon Guards, leaving
this struggle on their right, and rattling across the _pavé_, boldly
ascended the Enemy's position. They were joined on their left, by the
2nd Life Guards, whose course had been by the left of La Haye Sainte.
With these were now mingled Royals and Inniskillings, while further to
the left were the Greys--the whole Line, without even any semblance of
regularity, madly pursuing their wild career, as if intoxicated with
the excess of triumph.
Then it was that Lord UXBRIDGE, who had so gallantly led the charge in
person, and incited all by his example, eagerly sought for the Support
on which he had confidently calculated; when, to his great surprise and
mortification, he discovered that there was none at hand. PONSONBY's
own immediate Support, which Lord UXBRIDGE himself had ordered to be
formed by the Greys, had necessarily been employed in Front Line on the
left, in the manner described; a fact of which, from his own position
as Leader of that Line, he had been quite unaware. The direct Support
of SOMERSET's Brigade, consisting of the Blues, had, during the charge,
come up with, and joined, the Front Line. The Regiment was kept well
in hand; and, by its comparatively good order, facilitated the drawing
off of the remainder of that Brigade from further pursuit. But it was
on the left of the high road, in rear of PONSONBY's Line, that support
was most needed. His Lordship could not account for the circumstance
of neither of the Light Cavalry Brigades, posted on the extreme Left,
having come up in support of PONSONBY's advance, in conformity with
the general instructions conveyed to his Brigadiers on the subject
of affording mutual support. The fact is, that VANDELEUR's Brigade,
which was the nearest, was then in motion for the purpose of affording
its aid; but its progress was unfortunately impeded by its having
previously to make a retrograde movement in order to pass a hollow
way which separated it from the troops on the right. In vain did Lord
UXBRIDGE sound to halt and rally--neither voice nor trumpet was heeded.
In a few seconds more, the Advanced Line was seen crowning the Enemy's
position. The King's Dragoon Guards were suddenly exposed to a severe
fire from the Batteries and from BACHELU's Columns of Infantry on their
right; and perceiving a strong and well formed body of _Cuirassiers_
on the point of advancing from the hollow beyond the ridge they had so
rashly ascended, they, with such of the Royals and Inniskillings as had
joined them, at length commenced a hasty retreat. The Greys, along with
many of the Royals and Inniskillings, dashed in amongst the Batteries,
and then, wheeling sharply to their left, rode along the line of cannon
in that direction, sabring the Gunners and stabbing the horses, until
they became sensible of the approach of a body of French Lancers moving
down obliquely from the left upon the arena of this memorable conflict.
They now fell back; but, with their horses blown and exhausted, it
was not long before they were overtaken by the Lancers. These formed
the Advance of JACQUINOT's Light Cavalry Brigade, which had been
unaccountably remiss in not having afforded a prompt and close Support
to the attacking Columns of Infantry.
Both the British Heavy Cavalry Brigades were now in full retreat.
SOMERSET's regained the position without any serious molestation: but
PONSONBY's Dragoons, particularly the Greys, who were upon the extreme
Left, suffered severely from JAQUINOT's Lancers and _Chasseurs_, the
greater part of them being in a state of the utmost confusion and
exhaustion; whilst the latter were infinitely superior in numerical
force, were in good order, and mounted on horses perfectly fresh.
On their right the Lancers charged in Open Column; the remainder,
extending in open Lancer order towards their left, rapidly spread over
the plain, darting upon the stragglers and wounded of the British
Cavalry who came within their reach; and, at the same time, giving
confidence to such of their own scattered Infantry as were still
retreating in disorder and confusion.
At length, the Support so greatly needed by PONSONBY's Brigade arrived
upon its Left Flank. VANDELEUR, having passed the hollow way and ravine
which intercepted his progress towards the scene of action, had reached
that part of the crest of the position occupied by BEST's Hanoverian
Brigade, through which it now advanced to the front in Open Column
of divisions. The 12th Light Dragoons, being the leading Regiment,
moved quickly down the slope: the 16th Regiment remained higher up the
acclivity; while the 11th were drawn up in reserve upon the brow of the
hill. The 12th and 16th wheeled into Line to their right. Lieutenant
Colonel the Hon. FREDERICK PONSONBY, who commanded the 12th, perceiving
the confusion that prevailed amidst the French Infantry in the valley,
as also the extremely critical situation of a great number of scattered
red coated Dragoons nearly on the crest of the French position,
instantly charged a mass of unsteady Infantry which intervened between
him and these Dragoons. This Infantry comprised the rearmost supporting
Column of MARCOGNET's Division, and was the only one of the attacking
Columns yet intact. It was now destined to share their fate. Already
alarmed by the disorder into which the entire of the Infantry on its
left had been thrown, and now attacked so suddenly and unexpectedly on
its right, it was penetrated by the charge of the 12th.
These Dragoons having forced their way through the Column, whereby
their order was naturally much broken, came upon the Right Flank of
the Lancers who were in pursuit of PONSONBY's Brigade. Quickening
their speed, they dashed in amongst the French Cavalry, and acting
almost perpendicularly upon their Flank, they "rolled up" such as were
immediately in their front. The 16th Light Dragoons, with VANDELEUR
at their head, very gallantly charged obliquely upon the front of the
Lancers, whose further advance was completely checked by this double
attack. On their extreme Right, the 16th rather clashed with some of
the retiring Dragoons: but the two Regiments, carrying every thing
before them, succeeded in driving the French Light Cavalry down again
to the foot of the valley; which they had been ordered, previously to
their charge, not to pass.
Some few of both the 12th and 16th did, nevertheless, madly rush up the
opposite Height; where, by this time, fresh troops had arrived, who
made them suffer for their temerity.
GHIGNY's Dutch-Belgian Light Cavalry Brigade, which had, at the
commencement of this Cavalry attack, crossed the Charleroi road, came
up, in the mean time, to the brow of the main position, on the left
of VANDELEUR's Brigade. One of its Regiments, the 4th Light Dragoons,
went down the slope, following the 12th Light Dragoons; and after
experiencing the effects of a brisk fire which was kept up by DURUTTE's
Skirmishers from behind a bank and hedge, low down the slope, and from
which the 12th Light Dragoons had previously suffered, it assisted in
completing the dispersion of the French Infantry. The other Regiment
(the 8th Hussars) remained a few minutes upon the Height, and then
advanced to draw off the retiring Cavalry.
VIVIAN, who had come forward in person from the extreme Left, and
proceeded some way down the slope for the purpose of making his
observations, upon perceiving PONSONBY's Brigade charging in disorder
up the French Heights, immediately sent back word for the 10th and
18th British Hussars to move through the hollow way to their right,
leaving the remaining Regiment of his Brigade, the 1st Hussars of the
King's German Legion, to keep a look out to the left. Very shortly
afterwards, two guns detached in advance from his Horse Battery, drew
up on the brow of the main ridge; but had scarcely opened a fire when
a well directed shot from one of the French Batteries passed through
the ammunition boxes of one of the limbers, causing an explosion, which
drew forth a shout of triumph on the part of the French Artillerymen.
The charge of VANDELEUR's Brigade having succeeded, without the active
aid of even its own immediate Support, the 11th Light Dragoons; the
further advance of the 10th and 18th Hussars was not required, but they
continued in their new position, on the right of the lane leading to
Verd Cocou, and the two guns rejoined their Battery.
Major WHINYATES's Rocket Troop, having been brought up to the crest
of the main ridge, from its previous position in reserve near Mont St
Jean, its Rocket Sections were moved down to the foot of the exterior
slope, whence they discharged several rockets at the French troops
then formed, or in the act of reforming, upon the opposite heights.
Immediately after the execution of this service, which was gallantly
and skilfully conducted, the Troop rejoined its guns on the crest of
the position.
In the general _mêlée_ which resulted from the charge of the British
Heavy Dragoons, and the overthrow of such masses of Infantry, augmented
as it was by the subsequent charges of, firstly, the French Lancers,
and, then, the two Regiments of British Light Cavalry, severe losses
were sustained on both sides; and the British Army was deprived of some
of its brightest ornaments.
The gallant Leader of the "Union Brigade," when endeavouring to return
to the Allied position, after using the most strenuous but fruitless
exertions to restrain his men in their wild pursuit, and to withdraw
them from a contest in which they had already gained undying fame,
became a sacrifice to his chivalrous and patriotic zeal. Intercepted by
a party of the Lancers in the soft ground of a newly ploughed field,
out of which his exhausted steed had not the power to extricate itself,
he fell beneath their deadly thrusts. Sir WILLIAM PONSONBY had highly
distinguished himself as a Cavalry Officer in Spain; and, independently
of his merits as a soldier, which were justly appreciated by the whole
Service, his amiable disposition and private virtues endeared him to
all his brother Officers.
His equally gallant namesake, Colonel the Hon. FREDERICK PONSONBY,
immediately after his brilliant charge with the 12th Light Dragoons,
first through a Column of Infantry, and then upon the Right Flank of
the Lancers, was endeavouring to withdraw his Regiment from further
pursuit, when he was disabled in both arms, and carried by his horse up
to the crest of the French position; where, receiving a sabre cut, he
was struck senseless to the ground; and it was very generally supposed
at the time that he had been left dead on the field.
Lieutenant Colonel HAY, who commanded the 16th Light Dragoons, was
desperately and dangerously wounded. Colonel HAMILTON, the Commanding
Officer of the Scots Greys, after gallantly leading his Regiment
through the Enemy's Columns, across the valley, and up the opposite
Heights, was last seen far in advance; where it is presumed, from
his never having again appeared, he fell in the midst of the French
lines, a sacrifice to his distinguished but indiscreet valour. Colonel
FULLER, who commanded the 1st, or King's, Dragoon Guards, was killed
when pursuing the _Cuirassiers_: he boldly led his Regiment up the
French Height immediately upon the Allied Left of the Charleroi road.
In addition to the above mentioned, the British Cavalry engaged in this
affair sustained a very heavy loss in both Officers and men.
With the exception of the bodies of the slain; of such of the wounded
as were too far from their respective Lines to be removed; of loose
horses, some wildly careering about, others quietly grazing, and many
staggering, plunging, or convulsively pawing the ground around them,
from the agony of their wounds; the arena of this terrible conflict,
which had ceased but a few minutes before, was now perfectly clear. The
retiring crowds of French Infantry had disappeared behind the foremost
ridge of their position, to collect and reform their scattered remnants.
The British Cavalry were similarly employed--SOMERSET's Brigade on the
right of the Charleroi road, near the Orchard of the Farm of Mont St
Jean; PONSONBY's on the opposite side of the road, in rear of a coppice
bordering the hollow below that Farm; and VANDELEUR's on the interior
slope of the position, more to the right than where it had been posted
during the earlier part of the day.
PACK's and BEST's Brigades closed to their right upon KEMPT's, so
as to fill up the interval occasioned by the retreat of BYLANDT's
Dutch-Belgian Brigade; and the Knoll in front of KEMPT's Brigade was
again occupied by three Companies of the 95th Regiment; as was also the
Farm of La Haye Sainte by the 2nd Light Battalion King's German Legion,
reinforced by two Companies of the 1st Light Battalion of that Corps.
Major General Sir JOHN LAMBERT's Infantry Brigade, which had been kept
in reserve near Mont St Jean, was put in motion at the time PONSONBY's
Dragoons advanced to the charge; and it was now placed on the left of
the Charleroi road, in Column, at quarter distance, in rear and in
support of the Fifth Division.
The importance of the result of this signal defeat of the French
attack was fully commensurate with the glory by which its achievement
was distinguished. The object of that attack, which was to force the
Centre and Left Wing of the Anglo-Allied Army and to establish a very
considerable body of troops in the vicinity of Mont St Jean, was
completely frustrated: 3,000 prisoners were taken; two Eagles were
captured; and between thirty and forty pieces of cannon were put _hors
de combat_ for the greater part of the remainder of the day.
Thus terminated one of the grandest scenes which distinguished the
mighty drama enacted on the ever memorable plains of Waterloo; a
scene presenting in bold relief, genuine British valour crowned with
resplendent triumph; a scene, which should be indelibly impressed upon
the minds as well of living British warriors as of their successors in
ages yet unborn.
* * * * *
Britons! before other scenes are disclosed to your view, take one
retrospective glance at this glorious, this instructive, spectacle.
Let your imagination carry you to the rear of that celebrated
position, and a little to the left of the Charleroi road. Behold, in
the foreground, on the right, a British Line of Cavalry advancing
to the charge, exulting in the consciousness of its innate courage,
indomitable spirit, and strength of arm. Whilst you are admiring
the beautiful order and perfect steadiness of their advance, your
eyes are suddenly attracted by the glittering splendour of a Line
of horsemen in burnished coats of mail, rising above the brow,
and now crowning the summit of the ridge. They are the far famed
_Cuirassiers_ of France, led on by a KELLERMANN; gallant spirits
that have hitherto overcome the finest troops that could be brought
against them, and have grown grey in glory. Trumpets sound the
charge; in the next instant your ears catch the low thundering
noise of their horses' hoofs, and your breathless excitement is
wound to the highest pitch as the adverse Lines clash together with
a shock which, at the moment, you expect must end in their mutual
annihilation. Observe the British, how they seem to doubt, for a
second, in what manner to deal with their opponents. Now they urge
their powerful steeds into the intervals between the necks of those
of the _Cuirassiers_. Swords, brandished high in air, gleam fitfully
in rapid succession throughout the Lines, here clashing together,
there clanging against helmets and cuirass which ring under their
redoubled strokes. See! the struggle is but a moment doubtful--the
_Cuirassiers_, seemingly encumbered by their coats of mail, are
yielding to superior strength, dexterity, and bravery combined--men
and horses reel and stagger to the earth--gaps open out in their
Line--numbers are backing out--others are fairly turning round--their
whole Line now bends, and breaks asunder into fragments--in the next
moment they appear, as if by a miracle, to be swept from off the
crest of the position, and being closely and hotly pursued by the
victors, the whole rushing down the other side of the ridge, are
snatched from your view.
Your attention is now irresistibly drawn to that part of the
foreground immediately facing you; where you have barely time to
catch sight of a Line of British Infantry just as it forces its way
through the hedge that runs along the crest of the ridge, to charge
a Column advancing up the other side. At the moment the shouts that
proclaim its triumph reach your ear, you are struck by the majestic
advance, close to your left, of another Line of British horsemen.
These halt just under the brow of the ridge. In their Left Front
your eye now also embraces a Line of British Infantry; whilst at
the same time you see the heads of two hostile Columns, issuing
through the hedge, and crowning the ridge amidst shouts of "_Vive
l'Empereur!_" The one nearest to you, finding no immediate opposition
to its further advance, is rapidly establishing itself on the Height:
the other is instantly met by a small but daring band of Scotch
Highlanders. A struggle ensues; the furthest Column is concealed
from your view by the smoke in which it is suddenly enshrouded; but
at the very moment when doubts arise in your mind as to the result,
the Cavalry rushes forward, and, passing through intervals opened
out for it by the Infantry, which immediately follows in pursuit,
charges both these heads of Columns, cutting them up, as it were,
root and branch; and then bounding through the hedge, the whole
disappear as if by magic. Now let your imagination, keeping pace with
the intensity of feeling excited by such a scene, carry you up to the
summit of the ridge.
Behold, at once, the glorious spectacle spread out before you! The
Dragoons are in the midst of the Enemy's Columns--the furious
impetuosity of their onslaught overcomes all resistance--the terror
stricken masses, paralyzed by this sudden apparition of Cavalry
amongst them, have neither time nor resolution to form Squares, and
limit their defence to a feeble, hasty, straggling fire from their
ill cemented edges--a flight, commencing from the rearmost ranks,
is rapidly augmented by the outward scattering occasioned by the
continually increasing pressure upon the front--the entire slope is
soon covered with the dispersed elements of the previously attacking
force--parties of Infantry are hurrying over the brow of the ridge to
aid others of the Cavalry in securing the prisoners--3,000 of these
are swept to the rear, and two Eagles are gloriously captured.
From the momentary contemplation of these trophies, your eyes
instinctively revert to the course of the victors, whom you now
perceive in the middle distance of the view--a broken Line of daring
horsemen, rushing up the opposite Heights. Their intoxicating
triumph admits of no restraint. They heed not the trumpet's call to
halt and rally; but plunging wildly amidst the formidable Line of
Batteries ranged along the French position, they commence sabring the
Gunners, stabbing the horses, and seem to clear the ground of every
living being. But physical efforts, however powerfully developed and
sustained, have their limit: exhausted nature yields at length; and
their fiery steeds, subdued, not by force but by exhaustion, retire
with lagging faltering pace. You look in vain for a Support--there
is none--but your eye is suddenly caught by the fluttering lance
flags of a Column of the Enemy's Cavalry, approaching from the left,
and you become nervously alive to the danger that awaits the valiant
band of heroes, who are only now made sensible of the necessity
of retiring to collect and rally their scattered numbers. Seeing
no Support ready to receive them, and becoming aware of the near
approach of hostile Cavalry, they make a last and desperate effort.
Those who are best mounted, and whose horses are least blown, succeed
in regaining the Allied position unmolested; but a very considerable
number are overtaken by the Lancers, with whom they now contend under
a fearful disadvantage in point of speed and order.
But mark! a rescue is at hand--a gallant line of friendly Cavalry
throws itself against the Right Flank of the Lancers, the further
portion, or Left, of that Line first dashing through and scattering
an unsteady mass of Infantry, the sole remaining Column out of the
entire attacking force that has yet kept together. The tide of
destruction now sets in strongly against the Lancers. Their pursuit
is checked. The Heavy Dragoons are relieved from the pressure. A
_mêlée_ ensues; but you are not kept long in suspense; for in another
moment this newly arrived force, making good its way, succeeds in
driving the Lancers in confusion down to the foot of the valley. The
arena in your front is speedily cleared of both friends and foes--the
discharge of rockets, which now attracts your attention, appears like
a display of fireworks in celebration of the glorious triumph--the
affair has terminated.
But stay to witness the concluding part of the scene. Observe the
splendidly attired group entering upon the right, just above La Haye
Sainte. It is headed by one whom you cannot for a moment mistake--the
illustrious WELLINGTON. Lord UXBRIDGE, returning from his brilliant
charge, now joins the Duke, while the whole _Corps Diplomatique et
Militaire_ express in the strongest terms their admiration of the
grand military spectacle of which they have been spectators. Among
them are representatives of nearly all the continental nations, so
that this glorious triumph of your valiant countrymen may be said
to have been achieved in the face of congregated Europe. Honour,
imperishable honour, to every British soldier engaged in that never
to be forgotten fight! When Britain again puts forth her strength in
battle, may her Sovereign's Guards inherit the same heroic spirit
which animated those of GEORGE, Prince Regent, and inspire them with
the desire to maintain in all their pristine purity and freshness
the laurels transmitted to them from the Field of Waterloo; and
when the soldiers of the three United Kingdoms shall again be found
fighting side by side against the common Enemy, may they prove to
the world that they have not degenerated from the men of the "Union
Brigade,"[11] who by their heroic deeds on that great day, so
faithfully represented the military virtues of the British Empire!
[Illustration]
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 10: The Dutch-Belgians having been posted in Line on the
exterior slope, where, from the circumstance of their having been
the only Troops of the Anglo-Allied Left Wing so distinctly visible
to the Enemy, they became exposed in an especial manner to the
destructive effects of the formidable array of French Batteries,
which continued playing over the heads of the attacking columns. The
losses of BYLANDT's Brigade on the 16th had already thinned, and in
a measure disorganised, its ranks; but those which it suffered on
this occasion were terrific, and the numerous gaps that so rapidly
presented themselves along the Line, as well as the number of superior
Officers that were observed to fall, could scarcely fail to produce a
prejudicial effect among these raw troops. Their confidence in their
own power of resistance had also been very considerably shaken, by the
circumstance of their having been deployed in a two-deep Line; instead
of having been allowed to assume the three-deep formation to which they
had previously been accustomed. In this affair, PERPONCHER had two
horses shot under him. BYLANDT was wounded, as were also Colonel VAN
ZUYLEN VAN NYEFELT, Lieutenant Colonel WESTENBERG who commanded the 5th
Battalion of Dutch Militia, and several other Officers.
Had the British soldiers been fully aware of all these circumstances,
their feelings would assuredly not have been so greatly roused against
the Dutch-Belgians as they were on this particular occasion. But they
had neither time nor opportunity for reflection. They only saw the
hurried and confused retreat; and this, at such a moment, would have
equally exasperated them, had the troops so retiring been British.
That PICTON, who could perceive all that was passing along the exterior
slope, should have given vent to his irritation in the remark he made
to Captain TYLER, is more surprising; but it must be borne in mind,
that his habitual reliance upon his own British infantry, with which he
felt that he could attempt anything, usually led him to make but little
allowance for the failure or discomfiture of troops in general under
almost any circumstances.]
[Footnote 11: Sir WILLIAM PONSONBY's Brigade was thus designated from
the circumstance of its having consisted of an English Regiment, the
Royals; a Scotch Regiment, the Greys; and an Irish Regiment, the
Inniskillings.]
CHAPTER XII.
Much as the attention of both Commanders had been absorbed by the
contest described in the last Chapter, the attack and defence of
Hougomont had nevertheless been renewed and maintained with unabated
vigour.
The assailants, who continued in possession of the Wood, having been
strengthened by powerful reinforcements from both JEROME's and FOY's
Divisions, now opened so rapid and indiscriminate a fire upon the
Garden Wall that it might almost be supposed they entertained the hope
of battering it down with their shower of bullets. They failed to make
any impression upon the little garrison; though they obtained partial
successes on the Flanks, which again were counteracted on the part of
the defenders by the aid of Detachments from the main body of BYNG's
Brigade of Guards, as also by the natural advantages of the localities.
Thus, upon the right, a retreat of the Guards from the hedge which
lines the Avenue and road leading to the Château, if followed up by the
French, would draw upon the latter a murderous fire from the banks,
brushwood, and other cover, in rear of the Avenue, together with a
flank fire from behind the Buildings: and, upon the left, if they
succeeded in forcing back the defenders from the front to the rear
hedge of the Orchard, their Left Flank became exposed to a severe fire
from the troops lining the eastern Garden Wall, while they suffered at
the same time from the new fire directed against their front by the
retreating party, formed under cover of the hollow way by which that
rear hedge is bounded.
It was about two o'clock when BYNG, perceiving the increased pressure
upon the troops in the Orchard, and the great diminution which had
taken place in their numbers, desired Colonel HEPBURN, who commanded
the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Foot Guards, to move down the slope
with the remainder of his men as a reinforcement. Colonel HEPBURN on
reaching the hollow way found it occupied by Lord SALTOUN with a very
small force; and his Lordship having scarcely a man remaining of his
own Battalion, gave over to the Colonel the command of that part of
Hougomont, and rejoined MAITLAND's Brigade.
After a short time, HEPBURN and his Battalion made a sudden and
vigorous rush into the Great Orchard from the hollow way in its rear.
The French Skirmishers gave way; and, as they crowded together while
retreating through the gap that leads into the Wood, they suffered
severely from the concentrated fire poured upon them by the Guards; who
quickly established themselves along the front hedge of the Orchard.
This happened nearly at the same time in which the French were
repulsed in their grand attack upon the Centre and Left of the Duke of
WELLINGTON's Line. It might be about half past two o'clock.
The Battle was then limited to a general cannonade, the roar of which
was incessant; and its effects, now that the range on both sides had
been very accurately obtained, were most galling and destructive to the
troops posted along the interior slope of either position.
ALTEN's Light Troops again spread themselves out to the front as soon
as KELLERMANN's _Cuirassiers_ had been swept from off the exterior
slope of the Anglo-Allied position. They had not been out long before
their attention was directed to a heavy Column of Infantry, apparently
advancing from the vicinity of La Belle Alliance towards La Haye
Sainte. It was BACHELU's Division, which had fallen back a little
after the failure of D'ERLON's attack, to which it had acted as a
Reserve. Lieutenant Colonel VIGOUREUX, of the 30th British Regiment,
who commanded these Light Troops of ALTEN's Division, immediately threw
them forward to meet the Column. They poured a well concentrated and
most galling fire upon the mass; which immediately brought its right
shoulders forward, and took the direction of Hougomont, either in
consequence of that fire, or in accordance with Orders previously given.
The ground over which it wound its course descended sufficiently
to render the movement indistinct to the British Batteries on the
position; but the circumstance having been communicated to Captain
CLEEVES, whose Foot Battery of the King's German Legion was posted on
the most commanding point of the ridge on the right of the Charleroi
road, this Officer lost not a moment in making his arrangements. He
permitted the Column to continue its march unmolested until it reached
a point immediately in his front, on which he had directed his guns
so as to concentrate upon the mass, at the proper moment, the whole
fire of his Battery. The Column continued its march, and had cleared
more than two-thirds of the distance between La Belle Alliance and
Hougomont, when, having well entered within Captain CLEEVES's line of
fire, three rounds from each gun were thrown into it with astonishing
rapidity, and awful effect. In a moment the greater portion of the
Column appeared to be dispersed, and flying back in confusion towards
the lower ground for shelter; leaving an immense number of dead and
dying to attest the fatal accuracy of the fire from the Battery.
As no hostile force of either Cavalry or Infantry appeared in its
immediate vicinity, BACHELU soon succeeded in rallying his Division and
renewing the advance. A similar result followed; whereupon all further
attempt to effect the contemplated movement was abandoned: and thus a
most serious flank attack upon Hougomont was completely frustrated by
the skilfully managed fire of a single Battery.
BACHELU now took post again, upon the right of FOY, leaving a
considerable interval between his Division and the Charleroi road.
Foiled in his varied and repeated attacks upon Hougomont, NAPOLEON
had now recourse to incendiary projectiles. For this purpose he had
ordered a Battery of Howitzers to be formed, from which shells were
thrown so as to descend into the Buildings. The Great Barn, the
outhouses on the north side of the Château, the Farmer's House, and
finally the Château itself, were speedily set on fire. Dense volumes
of smoke, enveloping the whole Post and its defenders, were wafted
slowly towards the Anglo-Allied Line; the roofs of the Buildings soon
fell in; and, shortly before three o'clock, the flames burst forth
with great brilliancy. Many of the wounded had been carried, or had
crawled, into the Buildings; but although their comrades entertained
the most distressing apprehensions for their safety, the stern sense
of duty and of honour prescribed that of the Post itself as paramount
to every other consideration. Invested as the place was by an Enemy so
overwhelmingly superior in numbers, and so unceasingly on the alert to
seize upon any advantage that might offer; not a man could be spared
to assist in extricating the sufferers from their perilous situation.
Obedience to the natural dictates of humanity was necessarily
sacrificed to that which was due to the severe demands of discipline.
Thus several perished in the flames.
Others, who had contrived to crawl into the open Courts, could scarcely
breathe in the scorching and suffocating atmosphere. Many who had
sought shelter, or had been laid, in the Chapel, and whose terrors
were excited as they heard the crashing fall of burning timbers, or
the frequent explosion of shells around them, at length beheld the
flames penetrating the door of the sanctuary. The prayers that had been
fervently, though silently, offered up from that holy place, had surely
been accepted--the fire, reaching the feet of the wooden image of the
Saviour of Mankind, that stood above the entrance, seemed to feel the
sacred presence; for here its progress terminated; and this, without
the aid of human efforts.
The conflagration did not occasion a moment's relaxation in the
heroic exertions of the brave defenders of Hougomont. The courage and
devotedness of the men kept pace with the zeal and intelligence of
their Officers; and no sooner did new difficulties arise than they were
met and overcome by the most judicious arrangements, combined with the
most consummate gallantry.
* * * * *
It was now about half past three o'clock. The Anglo-Allied Line
continued compact and unshaken in its original position. Its Advanced
Posts of La Haye Sainte and Hougomont had successfully resisted the
most formidable assaults.
The Left Wing had sustained considerable loss in meeting and repelling
the French Right Wing, but the losses endured by the latter in that
attack were infinitely more severe: whole Columns of Infantry had
been completely overthrown and dispersed; Squadrons of the most
splendid and most devoted Cavalry had shared a similar fate; whilst
from thirty to forty pieces of cannon had been rendered useless for
nearly the remainder of the day. Hence, the French Emperor did not
deem it advisable to renew, at least so soon, an attack upon the Left
of the Anglo-Allied Army. He decided on forming a grand attack upon
its Right and Centre: and since REILLE's Infantry had already suffered
very considerably in its assaults upon Hougomont, he determined upon
employing his Cavalry for that purpose; more especially as the ground
in front of that part of the Allied Line appeared well adapted for the
movements of this description of force.
To gain possession of La Haye Sainte and Hougomont, as a preliminary
step, was undoubtedly the most judicious course: but hitherto his
endeavours to obtain that vantage ground had altogether failed, and
he was now compelled to limit his plan; combining with the projected
attack, renewed assaults against those Posts; which, even if again
unsuccessful, would at least serve to divert in some degree, the
Enemy's attention.
NAPOLEON also contemplated a more important diversion, by causing a
demonstration to be made with PIRÉ's Light Cavalry against WELLINGTON's
Right Flank.
In pursuance of this plan, renewed efforts were made by the attacking
force against Hougomont; and two Columns from DONZELOT's Division
descended upon La Haye Sainte.
Meanwhile, Major BARING having applied for a reinforcement, two
Companies were detached to his Post from the 1st Light Battalion of
the King's German Legion. To these and a part of his own Battalion,
he intrusted the defence of the Garden; and, abandoning altogether
the Orchard, he placed the remainder of his force in the Buildings,
distributing their defence among the three Officers who had so
courageously maintained them during the previous attack.
The French Columns advanced against this Post with the most undaunted
resolution and the most conspicuous gallantry. The well aimed bullets
of the German rifles, though they told quickly and fearfully amidst
their masses, arrested not their progress for a moment. They rushed
close up to the walls; and, seizing the rifles as they protruded
through the loop holes, endeavoured to wrest them from the hands of the
defenders. They also made a most furious assault against the gates and
doors, in defence of which many lives were sacrificed. The greatest
struggle was at the western opening to the Large Barn, the door of
which was wanting. The French, determined to make good an entrance,
encountered the brave Germans equally resolute to prevent them. The
foremost Frenchmen, dashing boldly on to force their way, were struck
down by the deliberate fire from the rifles the instant they reached
the threshold; and seventeen of their dead bodies already formed a
rampart for those who continued to press forward to carry on the
struggle.
It was nearly four o'clock when certain movements made by the Lancers
on the French extreme Left, led the Duke to suspect an attack from
that quarter; and which, considering the almost isolated position of
his detached force at Braine l'Alleud and Vieux Foriez, might, if
successful, be attended with very serious consequences to himself.
He drew Lord UXBRIDGE's attention to that point; and the latter
immediately despatched GRANT, with the 13th Light Dragoons and the 15th
Hussars of his Brigade to attack the Lancers, detaching at the same
time the 2nd Light Dragoons of the King's German Legion from DÖRNBERG's
Brigade, towards Braine l'Alleud, for the purpose both of facilitating
the attack, by manoeuvring on the left of the Lancers, and of watching
the Enemy's dispositions in that direction.
The fire of Artillery along both Lines had been maintained with the
utmost vigour. At this moment, however, a most furious cannonade was
directed against that part of the Anglo-Allied Line which was situated
between the two high roads. While some of the French Light Batteries
took post in advance, others of the Imperial Guard, comprising twelve
pounders, opened a fire from the Heights in rear of, and above, La
Belle Alliance; and as the Batteries upon the main French Line were
ranged along the arc of the chord formed by the Allied Line, the French
Artillery was enabled by its very great numerical superiority in
guns to concentrate an overwhelming fire upon any part of the Duke's
position.
The Allied Infantry posted in Columns along the interior slope of the
ridge, were entirely screened from the observation of the French, who
could not distinguish any portion of their Enemies beyond the devoted
British and German Artillerymen at their guns; which, despite the
severity of the fire from their opponents, were worked with the most
admirable coolness and intrepidity, and with a precision beyond all
praise.
The thunder of the Artillery continued pealing forth in an
uninterrupted roll, and the scene became awfully grand. The guns having
once obtained the required range, were fired without intermission.
Instantaneous flashes met the eye, all along the Heights, succeeded
by volumes of smoke bounding forth along the ground in front, and
enveloping the Batteries in clouds. The earth trembled beneath the
dread concussion. The oldest soldiers had never witnessed a cannonade
conducted with such fury, with such desperation.
[Illustration]
The Allied Columns of Infantry were lying down upon the ground to
shelter themselves as much as possible from the iron shower that fell
fast and heavily--round shot, tearing frightful rents directly through
their masses, or ploughing up the earth beside them; shells, bursting
in the midst of the serried Columns, and scattering destruction in
their fall, or previously burying themselves in the soft loose soil to
be again forced upwards in eruptions of iron, mud, and stones, that
fell among them like volcanic fragments.
During this terrible conflict of Artillery, NEY was making his
preparatory dispositions with the Cavalry which NAPOLEON had desired
him to launch against the Anglo-Allied Right Wing.
He first formed for attack, MILHAUD's Corps of _Cuirassiers_,
consisting of twenty four Squadrons; and directed LEFÈBVRE DESNOUETTE's
Light Cavalry Division of the Guard, comprising seven Squadrons of
Lancers and twelve Squadrons of _Chasseurs_, to follow and support--in
all forty three Squadrons--constituting a magnificent array of gallant
horsemen. As they began to advance, the First Line, of _Cuirassiers_,
shone in burnished steel, relieved by black horse hair crested helmets;
next came the Red Lancers of the Guard, in their gaudy uniform, and
mounted on richly caparisoned steeds, their fluttering lance flags
heightening the brilliancy of their display; whilst the Third Line,
comprising the _Chasseurs_ of the Guard, in their rich costume of green
and gold, with fur trimmed pelisses _à la hussard_, and black bearskin
shakos, completed the gorgeous, yet harmonious, colouring of this
military spectacle. Though formed in successive Lines of Columns in the
hollow space on the immediate left of La Haye Sainte, where they were
sheltered in some degree from the cannonade that raged so furiously
above them, the Rear Lines obliqued to the left on the advance, and
became _echelonned_ to the First Line, so as to present a general front
extending from the Charleroi road on their right to the Hougomont
inclosures on their left.
As they ascended the ridge, the French Artillery suspended their fire;
and the Allied Batteries commenced pouring a destructive shower of
grape shot amidst their devoted ranks. Fiercely and fatally did this
iron hail rattle against the helmed and steel clad _Cuirassiers_,
here glancing off, there penetrating the armour; wounding or laying
prostrate many a gallant warrior at the very moment when the brightest
visions of glory had opened on his ardent imagination. This iron
sleet, however, caused no perceptible check to their progress; and,
with shouts of "_Vive l'Empereur!_" they accelerated their pace until,
having arrived within about forty yards of the guns, they received the
last and well prepared discharge. Its effects were terrific: but though
their order was somewhat broken, their courage was not shaken. The
charge was sounded; a cheer followed; and, in the next instant, they
rushed up to the very cannon's mouth.
In accordance with previous instructions given by the Duke of
WELLINGTON himself, the Artillerymen withdrew, upon the close approach
of the Cavalry, and sought shelter either beside, or in rear of, the
Infantry Squares; or, where occasion required, they threw themselves
under the projecting bayonets of the outer kneeling ranks for
protection. The _Cuirassiers_, on crowning the crest of the ridge;
and finding themselves so unexpectedly in possession of a Line of
Batteries, shouted loudly forth their triumph; and, then renewing their
onward charge, were, in a moment, lost to the view of the Lancers and
_Chasseurs_ of the Guard. These troops, carried away by the enthusiasm
of the moment and the eager desire to share in the fancied victory,
advanced with the same fiery impetuosity, and the whole force was now
fairly across the ridge.
The Allied Infantry, distributed in chequered Squares along the
interior slope, were fully prepared to meet the attack. Some little
apprehension had been entertained for the safety of the Right of the
Front Line, where the Brunswickers, who, as before remarked, were
mostly young, raw troops, had taken up the ground previously occupied
by BYNG's Brigade of Guards, which had been entirely absorbed by the
defence of Hougomont, with the exception of two Companies which, with
the Colours, had been withdrawn, as a Reserve, to a more sheltered
position on the right of the Nivelles road. As the French Cavalry
advanced, the 23rd British Regiment of Infantry was led up to the Front
Line, and into an interval between the Brunswick Squares. This Regiment
had nearly reached the brow of the ridge when it was suddenly ordered
to halt and prepare to receive Cavalry; and the _Chasseurs_ of the
Guard appearing the next moment in its front, a fire from this face
was opened so hastily that scarcely a shot could have told upon the
Enemy. It instantly recovered this somewhat nervous precipitation, and
presented a bold and determined stand; as did also the Brunswickers,
who acted on this occasion in a manner that would have reflected credit
on the most experienced veterans.
The cannonade had necessarily ceased along the Right Wing of the
Anglo-Allied Front Line, and along the French Batteries to which it was
opposed. Hence the vehement cheering on the part of the French Cavalry
became the more distinctly audible and the more highly exciting. A
sullen silence was maintained throughout the Allied Squares, which were
all at the "prepare,"--front ranks kneeling, and the second at the
charge,--thus forming a _chevaux de frise_, over which the rear ranks
were ready to fire, as occasion might demand.
As the Cavalry now rushed down upon the Squares, the front faces of
the latter opened their fire when the former had approached within
about thirty paces of them. The effect of this fire was to create
disorder and confusion in the leading Squadron or Half Squadron (as
the case might be), which would then open out from the centre, and
obliquing to the right and left respectively, pass on by the Flanks
of the Square attacked, to the fire from which it would consequently
become completely exposed. The succeeding repeated the manoeuvre of the
leading divisions; and their disorder became greater and greater as the
continually augmenting obstacles in their front, the upset riders and
horses, increased in multitude.
Here, as at Quatre Bras, the French Cavalry did not rush to the shock
against a single British Square. The horsemen of the leading divisions
who escaped the opposing fire, failed to maintain the direction of
their speed with unabated vigour, and to dash against the Square,
heedless of personal danger, and intent only upon securing the sole
chance that offered for the success of their immediate followers. That
portion of the Cavalry which passed through the intervals between
the foremost Squares, directed their advance upon those that were in
rear; and the Squares being generally _en échiquier_, the opening out
and dividing of the attacking Squadrons in the manner described, soon
commingled the horsemen of different Regiments, and added considerably
to the disorder already caused by the dropping fire which assailed them
in all directions.
The Anglo-Allied Cavalry, having the advantage of perfect order, now
advanced to the charge; and after encountering some little resistance
on different points, speedily succeeded in relieving the Squares from
the presence of the Enemy, whom they pursued over the crest of the
ridge and down the exterior slope.
No sooner was NEY's Cavalry driven from the position, than the Allied
Artillerymen flew from their shelter to their guns, and the French
Batteries recommenced their fire. The former dealt destruction amidst
the retiring masses as soon as, and wherever, they were uncovered by
the Allied Cavalry; but some of the British Regiments, giving too
much rein to their ardour, carried their pursuit rather too far;
particularly the 23rd British Light Dragoons; who, having attacked the
Flank of a Column of _Cuirassiers_ whilst the latter was advancing
against the 1st Regiment of Dutch Carabiniers, by which it was then
attacked in front--TRIP himself leading--drove both the _Cuirassiers_
and a body of Lancers across the hollow on the right of La Haye Sainte,
back upon their own Batteries on the Heights beyond, and thus created
confusion amongst the French Gunners; who, however, made them pay for
their temerity as they withdrew again towards their own position.
Towards the Allied Right, the Lancers, pursued by the 1st Light
Dragoons of the King's German Legion, instantly reformed, and, resuming
their charge, became themselves the pursuers; but on advancing over
the ridge, they were not only exposed again to the fire from the
Squares, but were at the same time most unexpectedly assailed by a
brisk discharge of round shot from Captain BOLTON's British Foot
Battery, which had just been rapidly advanced to its left front, and
very judiciously posted on some favourable ground close to, and on the
right of, the Nivelles road, and in direct rear of the main ridge.
Its fire was directed with great precision at the French Cavalry in
the intervals between the Squares in its front, and by its valuable
assistance the Enemy was soon compelled to retire again across the
ridge.
It will be readily conceived that such assistance was most essential,
when it is recollected that, at this time, the 7th Hussars, the 1st
Light Dragoons of the King's German Legion, the Brunswick Hussars, and
the Squadron of Brunswick Lancers, were the only Cavalry Regiments
posted in rear of that portion of the Front Line extending from the
Nivelles road on the right, to the position of HALKETT's British
Infantry Brigade on the left, in rear of which latter stood the
23rd Light Dragoons. The manner in which those Regiments charged
and repelled the French Cavalry opposed to them, merits the highest
commendation.
The French Cavalry evinced the greatest alacrity, nay, impatience,
in again getting into order--actuated, no doubt, by a sense of shame
and indignation at finding its efforts frustrated, and its valour
fruitless; although in possession of the Enemy's guns, and at liberty
to act at its own discretion against his Squares.
The advance was speedily renewed; but evidently conducted with more
caution, though not with less enthusiasm. Again did this brilliant
array of horsemen boldly face the iron shower of grape, and gallantly
crown the crest of the Anglo-Allied Right Wing. But now, instead of
attacking indiscriminately as before, one portion was allotted to that
service; whilst the remainder was kept in more compact order to stem
the onset of the Allied Cavalry, by which, on the former occasion,
they had been so signally repulsed. The charges were repeated against
the Squares, in the same style, and upon the same system, as before;
and with an equally fruitless result. This portion of the attacking
force became gradually exhausted and out of order: but the remainder
appeared well formed up, and moving forward to charge the Second Line
comprising Allied Cavalry; which, however, did not wait for the attack,
but instantly advanced to meet it. The latter consisted of SOMERSET's
Brigade on the left (greatly diminished by the effects of its former
charge, on the occasion of the French attack of the Allied Left and
Centre); of the 23rd British Light Dragoons, in rear of HALKETT's
British Infantry Brigade; of TRIP's Dutch-Belgian Carabinier Brigade,
in rear of the 23rd; of the Brunswick Hussars and Lancers, more to the
right; of the 1st Light Dragoons of the King's German Legion, close
to the Nivelles road; and of the 7th British Hussars, on the interior
slope of that portion of the ridge which was immediately in left
rear of Hougomont--a force scarcely amounting to half the number of
Squadrons with which the French Cavalry had commenced this attack.
The charge was executed under great excitement, and with the utmost
steadiness and gallantry. The struggle was desperate and sanguinary:
but the French Cavalry, assailed in front by the same description of
force, and on their flanks by the fire from the Squares, at length
went about; and were followed, as before, over the ridge and down the
exterior slope.
In rear of the Right of the Anglo-Allied Line, where, as previously
observed, the Cavalry was then so very weak in numbers, the 1st Light
Dragoons of the King's German Legion had deployed into Line, in order
to occupy more ground and show a greater front. As the French Lancers
were attacking the Squares, and advancing through the intervals between
them, notwithstanding the renewed fire from BOLTON's Battery, the
Regiment hastened forward to charge them.
The Germans had not proceeded far when it was discovered that a body
of the Enemy's Cavalry had penetrated to the open space on their
left. With great presence of mind and admirable promptitude, Major
REIZENSTEIN, who perceived the danger to which the Regiment was exposed
by the already meditated attack upon its Left Flank, drew off a great
part of it, and, with a right-shoulder-forward movement, advanced to
meet these new assailants who were now coming on at full speed. The
mutual impetuosity of the charge, and violence of the shock, were
terrific. The two Lines dashed at and through each other, and those
of the horsemen that were yet firm in their saddles, wheeling sharply
round, again rushed to the fierce encounter with the most resolute
bravery; and the dispersed riders, after rapidly exchanging cuts and
thrusts, _en passant_, sought out their respective Corps.
As the Cavalry retired, the Infantry that had attacked La Haye Sainte
desisted from their fruitless endeavours to force the gallant little
garrison. Not long afterwards, Major BARING, on finding that the
ammunition of his men had, by the constant firing, been reduced to
less than one half, became apprehensive of its speedy exhaustion;
and despatched an Officer to request a supply, which was promised to
him. In the mean time, the Germans set about diligently repairing the
injuries they had sustained, and making the best preparation in their
power to meet the next attack.
Upon the first advance of the French Cavalry, by the Allied left of
Hougomont, a body of Infantry Skirmishers crept along the boundary
hedge of the Great Orchard on that side, and by thus turning the Flank
of the 3rd Guards, who were at the same time assailed with renewed
vigour in front, compelled them to retire into the hollow way in rear
of the inclosure; but, as the Cavalry withdrew, so did the Light Troops
on the left of the Orchard, and Lieutenant Colonel HEPBURN, advancing
his men from their cover, drove back the French Skirmishers in the
Orchard, and again occupied its front hedge.
The contest at this time, between the Allied Left, and the French
Right, Wing was limited to a continued cannonade, with Light Troops
skirmishing in the valley which separated the two positions. The Nassau
troops, under Prince BERNHARD of Saxe Weimar, maintained their ground
with great spirit along the Villages and inclosures upon the extreme
Left of the Anglo-Allied Army.
GRANT, who, it will be recollected, had been detached with the 13th
Light Dragoons and the 15th Hussars, to attack the 5th and 6th French
Lancers, upon the extreme Left of the French Line, in consequence of
certain menacing dispositions on their part, was first made aware that
these had been merely a diversion to draw off a portion of the Allied
Cavalry from the real point of attack, by the shouts which suddenly
proceeded from their ranks; when, on turning round to ascertain the
cause, he perceived the French in possession of the Batteries along the
crest of the position, and charging the Squares posted on the interior
slope. Observing a repetition of the attack, and the want of Cavalry
on that part of the position which he had quitted; he most judiciously
took upon himself to return to it with both Regiments: and, as will
appear in the sequel, he arrived there at a most critical moment, when
his absence might have produced the most fatal consequences. As a
precautionary measure, the Right Squadron of the 15th Hussars, under
Captain WODEHOUSE, was left in its original position, to observe the
extreme Left of the French line; and the 2nd Light Dragoons of the
King's German Legion continued to keep a look out between that point
and Braine l'Alleud.
NAPOLEON, perceiving the necessity of affording an immediate Support
to NEY's attack, sent an Order to KELLERMANN to advance for that
purpose, with his Corps of Heavy Cavalry, consisting of the two
Divisions commanded by L'HERITIER and ROUSSEL D'URBAL, and comprising
(at the commencement of the Battle) seven Squadrons of Dragoons,
eleven Squadrons of _Cuirassiers_, and six Squadrons of Carabiniers.
In the mean time, NEY, with a similar object in view, had ordered
forward GUYOT's Heavy Cavalry Division of the Guard, comprising six
Squadrons of Horse Grenadiers, and seven Squadrons of Dragoons. These
thirty-seven Squadrons, combined with the force which had already
attacked, and which had originally consisted of forty-three Squadrons,
constituted a stupendous array of Cavalry, in comparison with that
which was then posted in rear of the Right Wing of the Anglo-Allied
Army; and which received no accession beyond the five Squadrons that
GRANT was in the act of withdrawing, as before explained, from the
extreme Right.
GUYOT's Division of the Guard having been placed by NAPOLEON at NEY's
disposal, when he first desired him to form the grand Cavalry attack,
the Marshal was entitled to employ it if he thought proper; but it
is doubtful whether NAPOLEON, after having sent forward KELLERMANN's
Corps, was desirous that the combined force should be thus prematurely
engaged, since it would deprive him of his only Cavalry Reserve.
Still, when we consider the limited extent of the Field of Battle,
and the consequent facility with which he might have either suspended
the employment of the Heavy Cavalry of the Guard, or countermanded
KELLERMANN's advance, it is reasonable to infer that the French Emperor
was not altogether displeased with the grand experiment which was about
to be made, and which encouraged the most sanguine expectations of a
glorious triumph.
The coming attack was, like the former one, preceded by a violent
cannonade. As before, the French Batteries concentrated their fire upon
the Allied Artillery and Squares. The entire space immediately in rear
of the crest of the ridge that marked the Front Line of the Duke's
Right Wing, was again assailed with a tempest of shot and shell. Again
were whole Files torn away, and compact Sections rent asunder.
But the extraordinary skill and the untiring energies of the British
and German Gunners, combined with the heroic forbearance and the
admirable steadiness of the Squares, fully impressed upon the mind of
WELLINGTON the conviction that, however formidable and disproportionate
the force that his powerful adversary could wield against him, it might
yet be made to suffer an exhaustion, moral as well as physical, that
would render it totally unavailable and helpless at the moment when
its extremest tension and fullest application would be so urgently
required to extricate the Emperor from that perilous crisis which,
by his Grace's masterly arrangements, was gradually approaching its
consummation. To act exclusively on the defensive, to maintain his
ground in defiance of every assault and every stratagem; and yet to
harass and weaken his Enemy to the extent of his power, constituted
the grand point on which hinged the practical development of those
arrangements. A defeat and dispersion of his Army before the arrival
of the Prussian troops, would lead to new measures, to additional
sacrifices--perhaps to irretrievable disasters. But his resolve was
fixed and irrevocable; for he knew that he could fearlessly rely upon
the devotion, the endurance, and the valour of his British and German
soldiers. And this implicit confidence was nobly reciprocated; for as
the troops remarked the serenity of his countenance and demeanour when
rectifying any confusion or disorder, or felt as if spellbound by the
magic influence of a few simple and homely words from his lips, they
entertained no doubts as to the result of their glorious exertions.
When the tremendous Cavalry force, which NEY had thus assembled, moved
forward to the attack, the whole space between La Haye Sainte and
Hougomont appeared one moving glittering mass; and, as it approached
the Anglo-Allied position, undulating with the conformation of the
ground, it resembled a sea in agitation. Upon reaching the crest of the
ridge and regaining temporary possession of the Batteries, its very
shouts sounded on the distant ear like the ominous roar of breakers
thundering on the shore. Like waves following in quick succession,
the whole mass now appeared to roll over the ridge; and as the light
curling smoke arose from the fire which was opened by the Squares, and
by which the latter sought to stem the current of the advancing host,
it resembled the foam and spray thrown up by the mighty waters as they
dash on isolated rocks and beetling crags; and, as the mass separated
and rushed in every direction, completely covering the interior slope,
it bore the appearance of innumerable eddies and counter currents,
threatening to overwhelm and engulf the obstructions by which its
onward course had been opposed. The storm continued to rage with the
greatest violence; and the devoted Squares seemed lost in the midst of
the tumultuous onset. In vain did the maddening mass chafe and fret
away its strength against these impregnable barriers; which, based upon
the sacred principles of honour, discipline, and duty, and cemented by
the ties of patriotism and the impulse of national glory, stood proudly
unmoved and inaccessible. Disorder and confusion, produced by the
commingling of Corps, and by the scattering fire from the faces of the
chequered Squares, gradually led to the retreat of parties of horsemen
across the ridge; these were followed by broken Squadrons, and, at
length, the retrograde movement became general.
Then the Allied Dragoons, who had been judiciously kept in readiness
to act at the favourable moment, darted forward to complete the
disorganisation and overthrow of the now receding waves of the French
Cavalry.
The Allied Artillery had barely time to fire a few rounds into the
retiring masses, when the Enemy's formidable Support rapidly advanced
to renew the attack; and, as if it had been made aware that the Right
of the Anglo-Allied Line was the weakest part, from the want of a
sufficient Cavalry Support, its efforts appeared particularly directed
to that point. A body of Heavy Dragoons was drawn up in Line, and
advanced up the ridge leaving the Hougomont inclosures immediately on
its left.
At this moment, however, GRANT had most opportunely returned with
the 13th Light Dragoons and 15th Hussars from the extreme Right; and
instantly forming the 13th, which was the leading Regiment, in Line
to the front, moved it up to the crest of the ridge, over which it
gallantly charged and routed the French Dragoons, driving them about
three hundred yards down to the low ground near the north-east angle
of the Great Orchard of Hougomont. The 15th Hussars were also formed
to the front, on the left of the 13th Light Dragoons, and charged a
mass of _Cuirassiers_, which was driven back a like distance, upon
large bodies of Cavalry. As these were observed commencing offensive
operations, both in front and on the flank, the two Regiments, first
the 13th, and then the 15th; were compelled to retreat to the main
position, and take post in rear of the Squares; but this they did with
so much order and regularity that their presence and example imparted
new life and confidence to the young Brunswickers; whose steadiness, on
the Right of the Line, had been severely tested in the course of the
grand Cavalry attack.
Notwithstanding these reverses, and the decided failure of their former
attempts, the French horsemen most gallantly and resolutely renewed
their advance, and again plunged in masses amidst the Allied Squares.
Failing in their direct attack, they rode through the intervals between
the Squares in all directions, exhibiting extraordinary coolness and
intrepidity. Some of the most daring approached close up to the ranks,
to draw forth the fire from a Square; and thus secure a better chance
of success for the Squadron prepared to seize the advantage and to
charge. Small parties of desperate fellows would endeavour to force an
opening at some weak point, by cutting aside the bayonets and firing at
the defenders with their pistols. But the Squares were proof against
every assault and every stratagem.
More Cavalry crossed over the summit of the ridge; and the greater part
of the interior slope occupied by the Allied Right Wing seemed covered
with horsemen of all kinds--_Cuirassiers_, Lancers, Carabiniers,
_Chasseurs_, Dragoons, and Horse Grenadiers. The French, enraged at
their want of success, brandishing their swords, and exciting one
another by shouts of "_Vive l'Empereur!_" reiterated their attacks
with redoubled but fruitless vigour. Like the majestic oaks of the
forest, which are poetically said to strike their roots deeper and more
tenaciously into the earth as the fury of the storm increases, so stood
the Anglo-Allied Squares, grand in the imposing attitude of their
strength, and bidding defiance to the tempestuous elements by which
they were assailed on every side.
At length, the attack evinced symptoms of exhaustion; the charges
became less frequent and less vigorous; disorder and confusion were
rapidly augmenting; the spirit of enthusiasm and the confidence of
superiority were quickly yielding to the feeling of despondency and
the sense of hopelessness. The Anglo-Allied Cavalry again advanced,
and once more swept the mingled host, comprising every description of
mounted troops, from off the ground on which they had so fruitlessly
frittered away their strength.
On this occasion, a body of _Cuirassiers_, having been intercepted in
its direct line of retreat by a party of British Light Dragoons, was
induced to surrender; but taking advantage of the weakness of their
escort, they suddenly broke away, and galloped down the Nivelles road,
by which they hoped to return to the French Lines. They were fatally
deceived. As they passed the high bank, covered with brushwood, on
the right of the road, where a Detachment of the 51st Regiment was
stationed as one of the Supports to the Light Troops extended in front
of the extreme Right, they were fired upon, though but partially,
in consequence of their close pursuit by the Light Dragoons. This
attracted the attention of Captain Ross of that Regiment, who was
posted with his Company more in advance, and close to the _abatis_
which had been thrown across the road near the head of the Avenue
leading to Hougomont. Captain Ross, being thus prepared, also fired
upon the _Cuirassiers_; whereupon their Commanding Officer, finding
all further retreat effectually cut off by the _abatis_, surrendered
to Captain Ross, declaring that he would not give himself up to the
Dragoons. At this spot eighty of the _Cuirassiers_ and twelve of their
horses were killed; and the remainder, about sixty, were dismounted,
taken, or dispersed.
* * * * *
Shortly before this, NEY, perceiving the ill success of his Cavalry
attacks, determined on combining them with such Infantry as he had
at his disposal. Between D'ERLON's and REILLE's Corps there was now
a great interval, and the only troops of which he could make use for
the above object, consisted of BACHELU's Division, on the right of the
latter, as DONZELOT's Division, on the left of the former, was still
required for the attack upon La Haye Sainte, which he now ordered to
be vigorously renewed, whilst he advanced a heavy Column of BACHELU's
Infantry towards the Centre of the Allied Right Wing.
WELLINGTON, who had, from the first, anticipated that the attacks of
Cavalry would be followed up by others, in which that Arm would be
combined with Infantry, was fully prepared to meet this contingency,
having as soon as he had ascertained that the Enemy was not disposed
to attempt any serious movement against his Right Flank, despatched an
Order to CHASSÉ to evacuate Braine l'Alleud and its vicinity, and to
proceed with his Dutch-Belgian Division, towards the principal scene
of action, along the low ground through Merbe Braine. By this means,
his Grace, who contemplated reinforcing his First Line with troops
from his Second, would be enabled to supply their place in the latter
with others of equal strength. CHASSÉ's movement, executed with much
judgement, was in a great measure, if not entirely, concealed from the
Enemy's observation; and was very skilfully covered by the 2nd Light
Dragoons of the King's German Legion, who continued hovering near the
Left Flank of the French Army.
In the mean time, the attack upon La Haye Sainte had been renewed
with the same fury as before. Major BARING on perceiving the advance
of the Enemy's Columns, sent an Officer to the position with this
intelligence, and repeated his request for ammunition. The Light
Company of the 5th Line Battalion of the King's German Legion was sent
to his assistance; but the supply of ammunition, of which he stood so
much in need, was not forthcoming: and he therefore, after waiting half
an hour longer, during which the contest was uninterrupted, despatched
another Officer on the same errand. This application proved equally
unsuccessful. He received, however, a reinforcement of two Flank
Companies from the 1st Regiment of Nassau.
The great struggle was again at the open entrance to the Barn; and the
French, finding all their efforts to force an entrance so obstinately
and successfully frustrated, had recourse to the expedient of setting
the place on fire. A thick smoke was soon observed issuing from the
Barn. The greatest consternation pervaded the little garrison; for
although there was a pond in the yard, there were no means at hand for
conveying the water to the point of danger. Major BARING, whose anxiety
was extreme, glancing his eye at the large camp kettles borne by the
recently arrived Nassauers, instantly pulled one from off a man's back:
several Officers followed his example, and filling the kettles with
water, carried them in the face of almost certain death, to the fire.
The men hesitated not a moment. Every kettle was instantly applied to
the same good office, and the fire was fortunately extinguished; though
at the sacrifice of many a brave soldier. Several of the men, although
covered with wounds, rejected all persuasion to retire. Their constant
reply was, "So long as our Officers fight, and we can stand, we will
not stir from the spot." At length the Enemy, wearied out by this most
resolute and gallant defence, once more withdrew.
At the commencement of this attack, while one portion of the Enemy's
force was principally directed against the western entrance of the
Great Barn; the other, leaving the Buildings on its right, advanced
higher up the slope, as if intending either to penetrate the Farm by
the Garden, or to cut off its communication with the main position.
The Prince of ORANGE, conceiving this to be a favourable opportunity
for attacking the French Column, ordered the 5th and 8th Line
Battalions of OMPTEDA's Brigade of the King's German Legion to deploy
and advance. The Line was quickly formed; and the Battalions, bounding
across the narrow sunken road, rushed forward, at a charging pace,
driving the Enemy before them. But a body of _Cuirassiers_, that had
unsuccessfully charged the Left Squares of KIELMANSEGGE's Hanoverian
Brigade, whilst those Battalions were advancing, came upon the Right
Flank of the latter, unexpectedly for both parties. The 5th Line
Battalion, which was on the right, having been supported in sufficient
time by SOMERSET's Heavy Cavalry Brigade, suffered little loss; but
the 8th Line Battalion--being on the left, and more in advance, in
the act of charging when the _Cuirassiers_ appeared--was completely
surprised, and its Right Wing cut down and dispersed. The Commanding
Officer of the Battalion, Colonel SCHRÖDER, was mortally wounded:
several other Officers fell: Ensign DE MOREAU, who carried and defended
the King's Colour, having been severely wounded, as also the Serjeant
who afterwards held it, the Enemy succeeded in carrying off the prize.
Major PETERSDORF, the next in command, collected the scattered remnant
of the Battalion, and posted it in rear of the hollow way.
The moment the Anglo-Allied Right Wing became cleared of the presence
of the French Cavalry, it was again exposed to a furious cannonade.
Several of the guns along the main ridge were by this time disabled.
Major BULL, who had been obliged at an earlier period to withdraw
his Howitzer Battery to the Second Line for the purpose of repairing
casualties and completing ammunition, advanced again to his former post
in the Front Line, along with Major RAMSAY's Horse Battery, during the
Second general Charge of the French Cavalry. These Batteries suffered
severely from PIRÉ's guns, stationed on the extreme Left of the French
Line. BULL directed Lieutenant LOUIS to turn his two right guns towards
them, and it was not long before this Officer succeeded in silencing
them; a service which, as they enfiladed the Allied Right Flank, was of
considerable advantage, during the remainder of the Battle, to all the
Batteries and troops in this part of the Field.
The Duke, considering that a reinforcement of Artillery was
particularly required in front of COOKE's Division and the Brunswick
Infantry against which the Enemy was evidently preparing fresh attacks,
ordered up Lieutenant Colonel DICKSON's British Horse Battery,
commanded by Major MERCER, and Major SYMPHER's Horse Battery of the
King's German Legion, into the Front Line: the former, to the left of
Lieutenant Colonel SMITH's Horse Battery, in front of the Brunswickers;
and the latter further to the left.
Major MERCER's Battery had barely time to get into action, when a heavy
Column of Cavalry, composed of Horse Grenadiers and _Cuirassiers_,
was seen ascending the ridge, and advancing at a rapid rate directly
towards the spot upon which it had taken post. The guns, which were
nine pounders, were each loaded with a round and a case shot; and were
run close up to a bank of two or three feet in height, which descended
from the narrow cross road along the ridge, and which thus formed a
sort of _genouillère_ to the Battery. In front, the summit of the
ridge consisted of a flat surface, of forty or fifty yards in width,
whence the ground descended rapidly towards the plain that divided the
two Armies. The Column continued to advance until it came quite close
upon these guns, the muzzles of which were nearly on a level with the
cross road; when it suddenly recoiled from the very destructive fire
with which it was received. The horsemen of the leading Squadrons
faced about, and endeavoured to force their way to the rear; confusion
ensued, and the whole mass broke into a disorderly crowd. Several
minutes elapsed ere they succeeded in quitting the summit of the ridge,
during which the fire from the Battery was incessant; and, from the
shortness of the distance, the size of the objects, and the elevation
of the ground on which they stood, the consequent carnage was truly
frightful. Many, instead of seeking safety in retreat, dashed through
the intervals between the guns, and surrendered: but the greater part,
rendered desperate at finding themselves held, as it were, in front of
the Battery, actually fought their way through their own ranks; and, in
the struggle, blows were exchanged on all sides. At length, the wreck
of this formidable Column gained shelter under the slope of the ridge,
leaving the summit encumbered with its killed and wounded.
About the same time, a strong Column of French Infantry, supported
by Cavalry, was advancing against the Centre of the Anglo-Allied
Right Wing. Whilst the opposed Batteries were concentrating upon it a
vigorous fire, Lord UXBRIDGE brought forward SOMERSET's Heavy Cavalry
Brigade from its position on the right of the Charleroi road, for the
purpose of attacking this Column; and also ordered up, in support,
TRIP's Dutch-Belgian Carabinier Brigade. The attack was made with great
gallantry by the Household Cavalry, which succeeded in checking the
advance of the Enemy; but, having been so much reduced in numbers, it
was unable to penetrate the Column, which received it with a heavy
fire. As SOMERSET retired; the French Cavalry by which the Column had
been supported, prepared to advance.
TRIP's Dutch-Belgian Cavalry was now at hand. UXBRIDGE, pleased with
their fine appearance, and desirous of exciting in them a courageous
enthusiasm, placed himself conspicuously in their front, and ordering
the "Charge," led them towards the Enemy. He had proceeded but a very
short distance, when his Aide de Camp, Captain HORACE SEYMOUR, galloped
close up to him, and made him aware that not a single man of them
was following him. Turning round his horse, he instantly rode up to
TRIP, and addressed himself to this Officer with great warmth. Then,
appealing to the Brigade in terms the most exhorting and encouraging,
and inciting them by gestures the most animated and significant, he
repeated the Order to charge, and again led the way in person. But this
attempt was equally abortive; and UXBRIDGE, exasperated and indignant,
rode away from the Brigade, leaving it to adopt any course which its
Commander might think proper: and as the French Cavalry, to which this
hesitation was but too manifest, was now advancing rapidly to the
attack, the Dutch-Belgians went about, and retired in such haste and
disorder that the two Right Squadrons of the 3rd Hussars of the King's
German Legion experienced the greatest difficulty in maintaining their
ground, and avoiding being carried along to the rear by these horsemen
in the wildness of their flight.
The 3rd Hussars had just moved up into the Second Line, in rear of
KRUSE's Nassau Brigade, when this occurred; and the Left Squadron,
being free from any interruption of the kind, gallantly charged
and completely overthrew that portion of the _Cuirassiers_ which
was in its immediate front. As soon as the other two Squadrons had
recovered their order, which had been so unexpectedly disturbed by
the fugitive Dutch-Belgians, the whole Regiment advanced to the crest
of the position; where it received from Lord UXBRIDGE, in person, the
Order to charge a Line of French Cavalry, distant about 150 yards,
and consisting of about three Squadrons of _Cuirassiers_ and three
Squadrons of Heavy Dragoons. Commencing the charge with a steady trot,
and then plunging into a gallop, they broke through the Enemy's Line,
which was advancing at a short trot, or almost at a walk; but became so
completely turned and hemmed in upon their flanks and rear, that a vast
proportion of them was cut off. The remainder, dispersed, and pursued
by the French Cavalry, rode back to the Infantry Squares, in rear of
which the Regiment reformed. Here the great loss which it had suffered
in these two attacks become manifest. It was reduced to between sixty
and seventy Files, which were formed into two Squadrons, and posted in
rear of KIELMANSEGGE's Hanoverian Brigade.
About this time, the Earl of UXBRIDGE, on examining the state of his
Cavalry, perceived the Cumberland Regiment of Hanoverian Hussars at
some distance in the rear, on the Brussels road. He immediately ordered
them forward; and on their coming up, he posted them where they were by
no means much exposed, but where they would at least _appear_ to fill
a gap occasioned by the severe losses experienced by SOMERSET's and
PONSONBY's Brigades: for the manner of their Commanding Officer, whilst
being thus posted, rendered his Lordship doubtful of their continuing
there if attacked.
That he had reason to apprehend something of this kind, was
subsequently proved; for Colonel HAKE, on finding the shot flying
about him a little, took himself and his Regiment out of the Field:
on discovering which, Lord UXBRIDGE despatched his Aide de Camp,
Captain HORACE SEYMOUR, with an Order for his return. When Captain
SEYMOUR delivered this Order, the Colonel remarked that he had no
confidence in his men, that they were Volunteers, and that their horses
were their own property. The Regiment continued moving to the rear;
notwithstanding Captain SEYMOUR's repeating the Order to halt, and
asking the Second in Command to save the honour and character of the
Corps, by placing himself at its head and fronting the men. Finding his
remonstrances produced no effect, he laid hold of the bridle of the
Colonel's horse, and commented upon his conduct in terms such as no man
of honour could have been expected to listen to unmoved. This Officer,
however, appeared perfectly callous to any sense of shame; and far more
disposed to submit to those attacks upon his honour than he had been
to receive those of the Enemy upon his person and his Regiment. Upon
rejoining the Earl of UXBRIDGE and relating what had passed; Captain
SEYMOUR was again directed to proceed to the Commanding Officer, and
to desire that, if he persevered in refusing to resume his position in
the Line, he would, at least, form the Regiment across the high road,
_out_ of fire. But even this Order was disregarded, and the Corps went
altogether to the rear, spreading alarm and confusion all the way to
Brussels.
In front of the Right of the Anglo-Allied Line, the French Column of
Horse Grenadiers and _Cuirassiers_, which had met with so disastrous
a repulse from Major MERCER's Horse Battery, was reformed for another
attack; to meet which the British Gunners were fully prepared: for the
French horsemen had not retired so far down the hill but that the high
caps of the Horse Grenadiers of the leading Squadrons, were visible
above the brow of the exterior slope. The second attempt was preluded
by a cloud of Skirmishers, who, advancing to within a very short
distance of the front of the Battery, did considerable mischief to the
Gunners with their carbines and pistols; but their intention being
evidently to draw forth their fire, no notice was taken of them.
Then the Column again ascended the ridge, and advanced to attack the
Battery; but on this occasion their pace scarcely exceeded a walk, or
at most a gentle trot, too many obstacles lying in their way to admit
of more rapid movement without confusion. Experience having shown the
Gunners the destructive effects of a close fire, they allowed the
leading Squadrons to attain about half the distance between the brow
of the slope and the narrow road in their front before they commenced.
The result, as may be readily imagined, was precisely similar to that
of the former attack, which has already been detailed. Again the French
horsemen fell into confusion, and again for several minutes were they
exposed to a deliberate and an unerring fire of case shot, within a
distance of not more than twenty yards, so that the pile of killed and
wounded, left on the ground immediately in front of the Battery, before
great, was now enormous.
Other Batteries along this part of the position were equally successful
in repelling the attacks of the Enemy's _Cuirassiers_, who were
assembling in considerable numbers at the foot of the exterior slope,
close to the Hougomont inclosures, apparently with the object of
cutting off the direct communication with that Post, and forcing the
Right of the Allied Front Line. The moment seemed favourable for such a
project. Several of the Allied guns had by this time become completely
disabled; the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd British Guards, awfully
reduced, had been driven into the hollow way in rear of the Orchards
of Hougomont; the young Brunswick Infantry had suffered severe losses;
and the supporting Cavalry had become greatly exhausted by its repeated
charges.
But WELLINGTON, foreseeing the probability of a serious attempt upon
this weakened point of his Line, and perceiving the approach of
CHASSÉ's Division (see page 458), supplied the required remedy by
desiring Lord HILL to bring forward troops from the Second Line. The
zeal, intelligence, and activity which had ever characterized the Hero
of Almaraz and Arroyo del Molino when carrying out the designs of the
Chief under whom he had acquired a lasting fame, seemed but to wait
this summons to the more immediate scene of action, to appear again in
all their accustomed vigour. He immediately put in motion DU PLAT's
Infantry Brigade of the King's German Legion. As the latter advanced
across the Nivelles road, from its left, the 2nd Line Battalion became
the leading Column. It was followed by the 4th, then by the 3rd, and
lastly by the 1st Line Battalion. As the 2nd approached the crest
of the ridge, several Gunners ran in upon it for shelter from the
Enemy's _Cuirassiers_, whose main body was now advancing against this
Battalion. The four Light Companies of the Brigade, however, had just
posted themselves close to the three small trees near this part of the
crest of the ridge; and being armed with rifles, they delivered so
destructive a fire into the Cavalry as to compel it to withdraw.
Some of the Allied Cavalry then moved forward in pursuit, and DU
PLAT's Brigade continued its advance until the 2nd Line Battalion had
approached close to the hedge of the Great Orchard of Hougomont, whence
a dropping fire was opened upon the Germans by the French Skirmishers.
The Dragoons made a sudden and rapid retreat through the intervals of
the Columns, in left front of which a fresh Line of hostile Cavalry
now presented itself. Captain SYMPHER, who, with his Horse Battery of
the Legion, had accompanied DU PLAT's advance, instantly unlimbered;
and poured round shot through the intervals of the Columns, the latter
maintaining, at the same time, a very effective independent file fire.
The _Cuirassiers_ gallantly advanced, notwithstanding this formidable
resistance. They first became exposed to a flank fire from the left
face of the 4th Line Battalion Square, and then again to that from the
left face of the 3rd Line Battalion: nevertheless, they resolutely
attacked the Battery, the Gunners of which either flew to the last
mentioned Square for protection, or sought shelter under the carriages.
At length, after having suffered severe losses by the unremitting fire
from the nearest Squares, the French Cavalry retired in disorder;
receiving a renewed discharge from the Battery, which was again in full
play.
When DU PLAT's Brigade moved down the slope, the 2nd and 3rd Light, and
2nd Line, Battalions of the Brunswickers, advanced a short distance
over the crest of the ridge, in left rear of the former. Here they
became exposed to a destructive fire of both artillery and musketry,
the latter from the French Skirmishers that had crept from along the
eastern hedge of Hougomont, close under the brow of that part of the
Anglo-Allied position. They withstood this heavy fire, as also the
subsequent charges of Cavalry, with great steadiness and courage; but
as soon as the French horsemen were driven back by a portion of the
Allied Cavalry (consisting of the 23rd British Light Dragoons, the 1st
Light Dragoons of the King's German Legion, and the Brunswick Hussars
and Lancers), the above mentioned Battalions withdrew from their
exposed situation to the interior slope.
The French Skirmishers, who had, during this last attack by their
Cavalry, pushed forward a very considerable force through the Great
Orchard of Hougomont, and along its eastern boundary, now concentrated
a most galling fire upon the Squares of the Legionary Brigade, whose
Commander, DU PLAT, was mortally wounded; several Officers fell, and
all those that were mounted had their horses shot under them. The fire
ceased; and in the next moment the _Cuirassiers_, having rallied,
renewed their charge: but with no greater success than before; and a
third charge proved equally ineffectual against the determined bravery
and patient endurance of the soldiers of the Legion.
About the time that DU PLAT's Brigade moved into the First Line, a
considerable body of French _Cuirassiers_, which still remained in
the hollow westward of La Haye Sainte, exposed to a fire from one
or two of the Allied Batteries, advanced at a walk, to make another
effort to break the Right Centre of WELLINGTON's Line. This proved as
unsuccessful as the previous attacks. The Squares, reserving their fire
until the close approach of the hostile Cavalry, and then directing it
against the latter in the most cool and deliberate manner, which the
absence of all impetus in an attack at a walk enabled them to do with
unerring effect, soon compelled the shattered Squadrons once more to
withdraw from a contest which the unexampled steadiness of the Allied
Infantry had rendered almost hopeless on their part.
The French Cavalry that attacked the Squares of DU PLAT's Brigade,
immediately in rear of Hougomont, had no sooner been driven off by the
gallant resistance of the Germans, than the Skirmishers, who, as before
observed, had advanced in such numbers along the eastern inclosures of
that Post, crept close up under the brow of that part of the ridge on
the interior slope of which was posted the main body of the Brunswick
Infantry.
At this time, however, Lord HILL was bringing forward ADAM's British
Light Infantry Brigade, having directed it to cross the Nivelles road,
and to advance in Columns up the slope, in rear of the Brunswickers.
(The Brigade had, some time before, been moved from the plateau on the
right, close to the edge of the Nivelles road, in which position it
had continued in immediate reserve.) Suddenly the summit in its front
was crowded with the French Skirmishers, who were almost as quickly
concealed by the smoke from the rattling fire which they opened upon
the Allied Artillery and the Squares. The Gunners, whose numbers were
fearfully diminished, were speedily driven back from their crippled
Batteries upon the nearest Infantry; upon which the concentration of
this galling fire threatened the most serious consequences.
But succour was at hand. WELLINGTON, in the midst of the shower of
bullets, had galloped to the front of ADAM's Brigade, ordered it to
form Line, four deep; and then, pointing to the daring Skirmishers on
the Height, called out, with perfect coolness and unaffected assurance,
"Drive those fellows away!" With loud cheers, the Brigade moved rapidly
up the slope, eager to obey the Duke's command. From the want of
sufficient space, the 52nd Regiment was not formed in Line with, but
in rear of, the 71st and 2nd Battalion of the 95th Regiment, to which
it consequently served as a Support. The French Skirmishers began to
give way as the firm and intrepid front of the Brigade presented itself
to their view. ADAM continued his advance, driving the French Infantry
before him. On crossing the ridge, the Brigade brought forward its
right shoulders, and, when halted, it stood in a slight hollow; which,
commencing in front of the right of the position occupied by MAITLAND's
Brigade of Guards, descends towards the north-east angle of the Great
Orchard of Hougomont. At the former point the 2nd Battalion of the 95th
Regiment formed the Left; and at the latter, the 71st Regiment with
the two Companies of the 3rd Battalion of the 95th Regiment formed
the Right, of this Line. The Enemy's Cavalry having been perceived
preparing for attack, the Battalions of the Brigade formed Squares:
and as the interval between the 71st and the 2nd Battalion 95th
Regiment, in this new position, was larger than was desirable; Colonel
Sir JOHN COLBORNE moved down the 52nd Regiment, in Squares of Wings
of Battalions, to fill up the space; which he reached just in time to
throw a most effective oblique fire upon the Cavalry which was in the
act of attacking the 71st Regiment.
The French Carabiniers and Horse Grenadiers of the Guard made some
gallant attacks upon the Brigade. They generally advanced by _their_
right of the Hougomont inclosures, then fell upon the 71st Regiment, by
which their charge was invariably broken; when such portions of them as
continued in any degree of order, rushed onward in apparent infatuation
upon the Right Wing Square of the 52nd Regiment; from the front and
right faces of which they received a close, well directed fire, which
completed their disorder and confusion.
In one of these attacks, Major EELES, whose Company of the 3rd
Battalion 95th Rifles was attached to the 71st Regiment, upon observing
the approach of the Carabiniers towards the right angle of the front
face of the Square, moved his Company to the right, in line with the
rear face, and, placing himself in its front, prevented his men from
firing until the Carabiniers approached within thirty or forty yards
of the Square; when he ordered a volley, which, combined with a cross
fire from the 71st, brought down so many horses and men to the ground,
at the same moment, that the further progress of the charge was most
effectually frustrated. In an instant, one half of the attacking force
was on the ground; some few men and horses were killed; more were
wounded; but by far the greater part were thrown down over the dead,
the dying, and the wounded. These, after a short interval, began to
extricate themselves from the mass, and made the best of their way back
to their Supports; some on horseback but most of them on foot.
ADAM's Brigade, by means of the advanced position which it thus
occupied, along the space between the Hougomont inclosures and the
right front of MAITLAND's Brigade, presented an effectual barrier to
the advance of the French Cavalry against that portion of the Allied
Front Line which was situated upon the right of the latter point. In
the intervals between the charges of Cavalry, it suffered severely from
the Enemy's Artillery; more particularly the 71st Regiment, and 2nd
Battalion 95th Rifles, the position of these Regiments being somewhat
more exposed than that of the 52nd.
HALKETT's Hanoverian Brigade had moved from its present position, near
Merbe Braine, into the space within the angle formed by the Nivelles
road and the hollow way which leads from the Right of the Front Line
down into the low ground below Hougomont; and it was shortly after
ADAM moved into his forward position, that HALKETT advanced, with the
Landwehr Battalions Osnabrück and Salzgitter, and took post on the
exterior slope of the main ridge, in rear of DU PLAT's Brigade.
* * * * *
It was now about six o'clock. The formidable attacks made by the French
along the entire Line of the Anglo-Allied Army had been productive
of no positive advantage; the Advanced Posts of Hougomont and La
Haye Sainte had successfully resisted the furious assaults which had
hitherto been directed against them: and the forward position taken
up by ADAM's British Brigade, made it manifest to the French Emperor
that, notwithstanding the gallantry, enthusiasm, and devotion displayed
in those attacks by the finest troops he had ever assembled together,
headed, too, by Generals of the highest celebrity; still greater
efforts, and still greater sacrifices must be made if he hoped to drive
the British lion from the position which it yet proudly retained with
so firm a footing, before the Prussian eagle, which for some time past
had hovered over, and was at this moment darting at, his extreme Right,
should alight, in the plenitude of its force, to satiate its thirst for
vengeance in the fierce and sanguinary struggle.
NAPOLEON sent an Order to NEY to renew the attack upon the Centre. To
execute this with effect, however, fresh Infantry was requisite; and
the Marshal had none at his disposal. He therefore despatched his first
Aide de Camp, Colonel HEYMÈS, to represent to the Emperor the exhausted
condition of his troops: half of which were placed _hors de combat_,
and the other half overcome by fatigue, and failing in ammunition; and
to request he would send him reinforcements. At this moment, however,
LOBAU's Corps and the Young Guard were required for the security of the
French Right Flank against the offensive operations of the Prussians;
consequently, the Battalions of the Old Guard, which constituted the
only remaining Reserve of Infantry, could not be spared. To NEY's
demand for fresh troops, NAPOLEON therefore replied,--"_Ou voulez vous
que j'en prenne? Voulez vous que j'en fusse?_"
NEY, on being made acquainted with the manner in which his request
had been received, saw very plainly that the Battle was far from
being gained: and darted off to animate, by his presence, the attack
which was now renewed upon La Haye Sainte; and which was covered by a
vigorous fire from the French Artillery against that portion of the
Anglo-Allied Line immediately in rear of this Post, in order to disturb
any attempt to relieve or assist its defenders.
The united remains of SOMERSET's and PONSONBY's Brigades, which were
on the reverse slope, behind OMPTEDA's Brigade of the King's German
Legion, and which were extended in Single File for the purpose of
making a _show_ of force, suffered much from this cannonade. On
perceiving its effects, Lord UXBRIDGE sent an Aide de Camp to recommend
Lord EDWARD SOMERSET to withdraw his men from the range of the
Enemy's guns. The latter sent back word that, were he to do so, the
Dutch-Belgian Cavalry, who were in support, would immediately move off
the Field! SOMERSET retained his position until the end of the Battle.
Shortly before the Columns from DONZELOT's Division advanced to this
attack of La Haye Sainte, a party of Horse Artillery, which had been
detached from WHINYATES's Rocket Battery, proceeded, under Captain
DANSEY, along the Charleroi road, to the front of the Centre of the
Anglo-Allied Line, and came into action with rockets, near that Farm,
leaving its two guns in the rear, under Lieutenant WRIGHT.
Captain DANSEY very soon received a severe wound, which obliged him to
retire; and the party, after firing a few rockets, fell back a little,
to where its horses were standing. It was then commanded by a Serjeant
(DANIEL DUNNETT), who, on perceiving the advance of the nearest French
Column towards the Farm, dismounted his men as coolly and deliberately
as if exercising on Woolwich Common, though without any Support
whatever; laid rockets on the ground, and discharged them in succession
into the mass--every one of them appearing to take effect. The advance
of the Column was checked, and was not resumed until Sergeant DUNNETT,
having expended all his rockets, retired with his party to rejoin the
guns in rear.
Major BARING's Detachment, after its extraordinary and successful
exertions in repelling the previous assaults, was fearfully reduced
in numbers; but its excellent spirit and conspicuous bravery remained
unshaken. One circumstance, however, could not fail to render
unavailing all their efforts, their courage, and their endurance.
Notwithstanding Major BARING's urgently repeated applications for a
supply of ammunition, his men were still left without the means of
adequately defending their Post against the host of enemies by which
they were successively assailed.[12] They cheerfully repaired, as far
as practicable, the gaps made in the walls by the French Artillery,
and betrayed no despondency as they looked upon the sad and numerous
proofs that lay around them of the immense sacrifices they had already
made. But when, upon counting the cartridges, they discovered that they
had not, upon an average, more than from three to four each, their
consciousness of the desperate situation to which they were reduced,
and of the impossibility of holding out under such circumstances, led
to remonstrances, which their gallant Commander could not but admit
to be reasonable. Yet no sooner did the latter, upon perceiving two
French Columns again advancing towards the Farm, exhort them to renewed
courage, and also to a careful economy of the ammunition, than he
received the unanimous reply,--"No man will desert you,--we will fight
and die with you!"
The French, exasperated by the protracted resistance of this handful
of brave defenders, now came on with redoubled fury. The open end of
the Great Barn was first assailed. Again they succeeded in setting
the building on fire; but the Germans, having recourse to the same
expedient as on the previous occasion, again contrived to extinguish
the flames. BARING's anxiety and uneasiness increased with every
shot that was fired by his men; and he again sent to the rear for
ammunition, coupling his demand with a distinct report, that he
must and would abandon the place should no supply be forthcoming.
This message, however, proved equally ineffectual. The fire of
the garrison was gradually diminishing: perplexity was depicted
in every countenance: many of the men now called out urgently for
ammunition,--"We will readily stand by you, but we must have the means
of defending ourselves!" Even their Officers, who during the whole day
had displayed the greatest courage, represented to their Commander the
impossibility of retaining the Post under such circumstances.
The French, who failed not to observe the distressing situation to
which the defenders were reduced, now boldly broke in the door at that
end of the long western building which is nearest to the entrance of
the Great Barn, already so frequently assailed. The passage from the
door through the building into the Farm yard having been barricaded,
but few of the Enemy could enter at a time. These were instantly
bayoneted, and the rear hesitated to follow. They now climbed up the
outer wall of the long building, and mounted the roof, from which they
easily picked off the defenders; who, not possessing the means of
retaliation, were completely at their mercy. At the same time, they
pressed in through the open Barn, which it was impossible to defend any
longer. BARING was now reduced to the painful necessity of abandoning
the place, and gave the Order to retire through the Dwelling House
into the Garden. Many of the men were overtaken in the narrow passage
through the House by the victors, who vented their fury upon them in
the lowest abuse and most brutal treatment.
BARING having satisfied himself that the possession of the Dwelling
House by the Enemy must render the Garden quite untenable; and finding
that his Officers fully agreed with him on this point, he made the
men retire, singly, to the main position. The greater part of them,
accompanied by their brave but disconsolate Commander, descended into
the high road by an opening in the bank adjoining the north-east angle
of the Garden, and retired along the opposite side of the _chaussée_.
BARING sent back to their respective Regiments the remains of the
reinforcements he had received; and, with the few men that were left
of his own Battalion, he attached himself to two Companies of the 1st
Light Battalion of the King's German Legion, which were then posted in
the hollow way close to the right of the high road.
The surrender of La Haye Sainte, under the circumstances which have
been described, was as purely honourable, as its defence against
an overwhelming and furious host had been heroically brave. A
thorough conviction that further resistance must have been marked
by the sacrifice of the entire remnant of his courageous band at
once suggested to the mind of a Commander like BARING, gifted with
the requisite discernment and forethought of a true soldier, the
reservation of such gallant spirits for some other part of the great
contest; in which they might yet face their enemies, if not on equal
terms, at least in a manner that would render their bravery and
devotion not altogether unavailable in the general struggle for victory.
* * * * *
Loud and reiterated shouts of triumph having announced to the French
Emperor the capture of La Haye Sainte; he immediately ordered it to be
followed up by a vigorous attack upon the Centre of the Anglo-Allied
Line, and by a simultaneous renewal of the assault upon Hougomont.
It was quite evident to NEY, that without an additional force of
Infantry, it would be impossible for him to follow up, with effect, the
advantage which he anticipated from the capture of La Haye Sainte. The
Cavalry, which NAPOLEON had placed at his disposal, had been nearly
annihilated in the course of its numerous attacks upon the Anglo-Allied
Line,--attacks executed throughout with the greatest gallantry, but
unproductive of any solid or decisive result upon a single point of
that Line. If this Arm, comprising the flower of the chivalric Cavalry
of France, had failed him when it sallied forth, gaily exulting in the
freshness of its vigour, proudly conscious of the imposing attitude of
its masses, and unrestrainedly impatient for the onslaught which was to
exalt still more its already high renown; how could he calculate upon
its efficacy, now that it was comparatively paralyzed?
The state to which his Infantry was reduced presented a prospect almost
as cheerless. D'ERLON's Corps, severely crippled by its signally
unsuccessful attack upon the Anglo-Allied Left Wing and Centre, had
still further exhausted its force by repeated assaults against La Haye
Sainte, on its left; and, since the arrival of BÜLOW, it had been
compelled to resort to active precautionary measures on its right.
On the other hand, REILLE's Corps had suffered immense losses in its
incessant, yet unavailing, efforts to gain possession of the important
Post of Hougomont.
But NEY, _le plus brave des braves_, in whose character resolution
and perseverance were pre-eminent, was not to be deterred by this
discouraging aspect, from fulfilling, to the best of his abilities,
the task imposed upon him by his Imperial Master. There can be but
little doubt that at the time he made his urgent demand upon the
Emperor for a fresh supply of Infantry, he had projected an assault
upon the Anglo-Allied Right Wing, in accordance with that prominent
feature in the tactics of the Empire,--the Column of Attack in mass
of Battalions--to be supported by his Cavalry, whilst this Arm still
continued vigorous and effective. Now, however, his exhausted means
precluded the execution of such a plan of attack; and he therefore had
recourse, as far as was practicable with his reduced extent of force,
to another system, which had been attended with so much success in the
time of the Republic, and which had always found great favour with
the French soldiery--the grand attack _en Tirailleurs_. In this way
he would be better enabled to conceal the weakened condition of his
troops; and he might also succeed in making such an impression upon
some important point of the Allied Line, as would induce the Emperor
to seize upon the advantage gained, and, launching forth his Reserve,
strike the decisive blow.
The whole of DONZELOT's Division, supported by a part of ALIX's
Division, as also a considerable body of _Cuirassiers_, forming the
gallant remnants of entire Regiments, were put in motion against the
Centre of the Anglo-Allied Line; whilst fresh reinforcements were
poured down from REILLE's Corps into the Hougomont inclosures.
The first disposition made by the captors of La Haye Sainte, was to
avail themselves of the advantage which the possession of the Farm
House, the Garden, and the adjacent high bank, afforded them for
pouring a commanding fire upon the two Companies of the 95th British
Rifles which occupied the Knoll by the Sand Pit on the opposite side of
the road; when these, being at the same time pressed in front, finding
their Post no longer tenable, retreated upon their main body in the
Wavre road.
The French at the same time contrived to push two guns round by the
Garden hedge to the bank of the high road, and immediately opened
a fire of grape upon KEMPT's Brigade posted along, and in rear of,
the Wavre road, on the opposite side of the _chaussée_; but this was
speedily silenced by the 1st Battalion of the 95th British Rifles, who,
taking a deliberate aim at the Artillerymen, destroyed them before they
could discharge a second round.
There then issued from under cover of the Farm, a large body of
Infantry, which, as it ascended the main ridge, spread out into a very
close Line of Skirmishers, who pressed boldly forward against the Left
of ALTEN's Division. Their concentrated fire was telling fearfully upon
the devoted Squares. ALTEN sent an Order to OMPTEDA to deploy one of
his Battalions, if practicable, and advance against the Enemy.
OMPTEDA, as brave and high minded a soldier as ever graced the
profession of arms, was quite prepared to execute the Order: but being
fully aware, from previous observation, that in the hollow behind the
curtain formed by the _Tirailleurs_ there lay in wait a body of the
Enemy's Cavalry; he felt it his duty to represent the imminent risk
which was likely to attend such a movement.
At this moment of hesitation, the Prince of ORANGE rode up to OMPTEDA
and ordered him to deploy. The latter respectfully submitted the
same opinion he had before expressed to ALTEN's messenger; whereupon
his Royal Highness became impatient, repeated the Order, and forbade
further reply. OMPTEDA, with the true spirit of a soldier, instantly
deployed the 5th Line Battalion, placed himself at its head, and
gallantly led it against the mass of _Tirailleurs_, who had continued
to crowd forward; and under whose teazing fire the Germans displayed
the greatest steadiness and bravery. The French gave way as the Line
advanced at the charge; and as it approached the Garden of La Haye
Sainte, they suddenly and rapidly sought shelter along the hedges. In
the next moment, the Battalion was furiously assailed by a Regiment of
_Cuirassiers_; who, taking the Line in its Right Flank, fairly rolled
it up. This Cavalry charge, preconcerted with great skill, and executed
with amazing rapidity, proved awfully destructive to the courageous but
unfortunate Germans; and fully, and fatally, confirmed the truth of the
unheeded prediction of their intrepid Commander. So severe was the loss
sustained, that out of the whole Battalion, not more than about thirty
men with a few Officers were gradually collected in the hollow way
that lay along the front of the Left of the Brigade. Amongst the slain
was OMPTEDA himself, who with his followers, thus fell a sacrifice to
the absence of that precaution, the necessity for which he had vainly
endeavoured to impress upon his superior Officer.
Whilst the French _Cuirassiers_ were cutting and stabbing in all
directions, and completing their work of destruction amidst the
unfortunate Germans; the 95th British Rifles, who, from the other
side of the high road, had been attentive observers of the scene, had
already taken aim at the _Cuirassiers_, but had refrained from firing,
fearing to injure their friends, at length poured in amongst them a
terrific volley, just at the very moment when the 3rd Hussars of the
King's German Legion advanced to the rescue of their compatriots: which
sent both sides flying, and completely cleared the front of OMPTEDA's
Brigade.
Shortly afterwards the 3rd Hussars again advanced: but the Support of
the _Cuirassiers_ having, in the mean time, ascended the slope: the
former, so inferior in numbers, were brought to a stand; and, after a
brief struggle, were compelled to withdraw.
A mass of _Tirailleurs_ now ascended by their left, from the hollow
westward of La Haye Sainte (in which hollow they could assemble in
comparative security since the capture of that Post by the French),
and pushed forward with great boldness against the Advanced Square of
MAITLAND's British Brigade, formed by the 3rd Battalion of the 1st
Foot Guards. Their fire, concentrated upon the Square and maintained
with astonishing rapidity and vigour, was most galling to the British
Guards. Also upon their left, another portion of their numbers poured a
destructive fire upon the Left Square of ADAM's Brigade, formed by the
2nd Battalion of the 95th Rifles.
MAITLAND, perceiving the serious annoyance which his 3rd Battalion
experienced from the fire of the French Skirmishers, directed
Lieutenant Colonel D'OYLEY, who commanded it, to advance for the
purpose of dislodging them; and being well aware that some of the
Enemy's Cavalry were drawn up near the foot of the slope, he threw the
flank faces of the Square into sections, in which order the Battalion
moved forward, being thus prepared to reform Square with the greatest
expedition. Under a tremendous fire from the opposite French Batteries,
which had perceived this movement, the Guards gallantly drove the
Skirmishers down the slope; and so marked was their steadiness on
this occasion, that a body of French Cavalry, which was now observed
approaching, struck with the promptitude and precision with which the
gaps caused in their ranks by the round shot were closed, neither
assaulted them in their advance nor molested them in their retreat to
their position on the brow of the hill, which was effected in perfect
order. The Cavalry, though it refrained from attacking, received the
fire of the Guards; and then, dashing along the front of the 52nd
Regiment, it exposed itself to another vigorous fire by which it was
nearly destroyed.
Of all the troops comprising the Anglo-Allied Army at Waterloo, the
most exposed to the fierce onslaught of the French Cavalry and to the
continuous cannonade of their Artillery, were the two British Squares
posted, during a very great portion of the Battle, in advance--at
times, considerably so--of the narrow road which ran along the crest
of the Duke's position. They consisted of the 3rd Battalion of the
1st Guards, belonging to MAITLAND's Brigade; and of the 30th and 73rd
Regiments acting together as one Corps, belonging to HALKETT's Brigade.
It was upon these troops that fell the first burst of the grand Cavalry
attacks; and it was upon these troops, also, that the French Gunners
seldom neglected to pour their destructive missiles, so long as they
continued to constitute, by their exposed position, such prominent
marks for their fire.
An attack upon the Square of the Guards by Skirmishers has just been
described; and it was not long after this that the Square of the 30th
and 73rd was attacked by some French Artillery, which trotted boldly up
the slope directly in front of those Regiments, and having approached
within a fearfully short distance, unlimbered two of its guns, from
which several rounds of grape were discharged in rapid succession,
into the very heart of the Square. Awful gaps were made in its devoted
ranks; but the readiness and alacrity with which they were filled up,
at the commands of their Officers, by men prepared to share the same
fate as that which had befallen their predecessors, was truly heroic.
That an occasional murmur broke forth, cannot be denied--not, however,
at their exposed situation, but at the stern refusal to allow them to
charge the guns; near which the French Cavalry was hovering, ready to
take advantage of any such attempt.
The Duke was frequently an eye witness of this devotedness of his
soldiers; but when asked for support, his reply was that there was
none to spare; or, if for permission to attack, that this could not be
granted; and, if any intimation were made to him that it might become
necessary to fall back a little out of fire, it was met, in a cool and
decided tone, that every man must stand his ground, and that there must
not even be a semblance of retreat.
* * * * *
The reinforcements from REILLE's Corps having moved to Hougomont,
the Skirmishers in and around this Post were relieved upon all
points. The Wood, as also the fences on either flank, soon swarmed
with _Tirailleurs_; and the brisk rattle of musketry that followed,
intermingled with shouts of "_En avant!_", seemed to betoken a
determination on the part of the French that the capture of La Haye
Sainte should not be their only triumph achieved in front of the
Anglo-Allied Army. Everywhere the assault was bravely met by the
gallant defenders of the Post. The Flank Companies of the Guards,
within the walls and buildings, held at defiance every attempt of
their assailants to dislodge them from their cover. By this time, all
the outhouses were on fire, with the exception of those that fronted
the Wood. The roof and upper storey of the Château had fallen in, and
flames continued bursting forth on all sides with the greatest fury.
The heat had become so intense as to produce upon the men whose duty
brought them within its influence, a feeling of suffocation; while the
frequently emitted volumes of thick smoke gave an indistinctness to
every object around them. Yet so admirable was the system of defence,
so perfect were the discipline and the order, maintained throughout
this trying scene by the devoted garrison, that the Enemy completely
failed in forcing an opening at any one point. The well maintained
fire from the walls was such as to deter the French from attempting an
escalade.
Whilst the central portion of the TIRAILLEURS kept up an incessant
fire from behind the hedge and trees facing the south buildings and
the Gardens, the remainder pressed on in crowds against the inclosures
by which the Post was flanked. On the right, the 2nd Battalion of the
Coldstream Guards, lining the hedge that bordered the main approach to
the Château, successfully withstood this furious onset. On the left,
the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Guards, in the Orchard, having suffered
such frightful losses, found it impossible to stem the overwhelming
torrent, and speedily fell back upon its friendly hollow way. The
French _Tirailleurs_, pushing forward in pursuit, were staggered by
the sudden and vigorous fire opened upon them by the troops within the
eastern Garden Wall; and the 3rd Guards having, in the mean time, been
reinforced by the 2nd Line Battalion and the Light Companies of du
Plat's Brigade, drove the Enemy back to the front hedge of the
Orchard; whence they were shortly, in their turn, compelled to retire.
Again the flank fire from the eastern Garden Wall, combined with that
in front from the defenders of the Orchard, as they reached the rear
hedge, compelled the Enemy to fall back. The 3rd Guards once more lined
the front hedge; and also, in conjunction with the Light Troops of DU
PLAT's Brigade, and the remains of both the Brunswick Advanced Guard
Battalion, and the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau, forced
the entrance into the Wood near the south-east angle of the Garden
Wall, and firmly established themselves in that quarter.
At the commencement of this last mentioned attack upon Hougomont, the
Right of ADAM's Brigade was considered too near the inclosures of that
Post, and exposed to be taken from thence in flank. It was therefore
withdrawn further up the slope, towards the crest of the main position;
and after a brief interval, it retired to the reverse slope in order to
be covered from the Enemy's cannonade which had been directed against
it.
* * * * *
It was now nearly seven o'clock. The troops defending Hougomont and
its inclosures had succeeded in repelling the last assault; and the
contest in and around this Post again degenerated into a _tiraillade_
kept up with more or less vigour on all points. Along the front of the
extreme Right of the Anglo-Allied Line, the Skirmishers from MITCHELL's
British Infantry Brigade maintained their ground with great steadiness
and gallantry. The main body of the Brunswick Infantry stood on the
interior slope, in rear of ADAM's Brigade; and CHASSÉ's Dutch-Belgian
Infantry Division, which had arrived from Braine l'Alleud, was deployed
along, and in rear of, the Nivelles road, its Centre intersected by the
narrow road leading from the _chaussée_ to the Village of Merbe Braine,
which position it had taken up on the advance of ADAM's Brigade to the
general Front Line. In front of the Anglo-Allied Left, the Skirmishers
of both Armies were continually engaged; and upon the extreme Left
the troops in Smohain, La Haye, Papelotte, and adjacent inclosures,
successfully resisted all attempts of the Enemy to dislodge them.
The attack upon the Centre of the Anglo-Allied Line had been incessant
from the moment La Haye Sainte fell into the possession of the French.
On their left of the Charleroi road, they debouched from that Farm and
ascended the position in clouds of Skirmishers. One portion of them
crowded upon the artificial mound which abutted upon the high bank
of the road, and was situated about sixty yards only in front of the
hollow way occupied by OMPTEDA's Brigade. On the opposite side of the
Charleroi road, the fire from the French troops on the Knoll above the
Sand Pit was maintained with remarkable rapidity and perseverance. They
continued, as before, to conceal themselves as much as possible under
the brow of the Knoll, exposing only so much of their bodies as was
necessary to enable them to fire over its crest in a kneeling position.
This fire was replied to with the greatest spirit and determination on
the part of KEMPT's and LAMBERT's Brigades. On the Allied right of the
high road, the exhausted remnant of OMPTEDA's Brigade was no longer a
match for the daring _Tirailleurs_ that crowded together in its front.
Its stock of ammunition had begun to fail; many who had not a cartridge
left fell to the rear, and more than the usual number assisted the
wounded out of action.
Exposed as ALTEN's Division had been to the most furious assaults of
Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry; the British and German Brigades of
which it was composed had become awfully diminished; and the facility
which the possession of La Haye Sainte now afforded the French for
continuing their desperate endeavours to force that part of the Allied
Line, rendered the situation of these troops extremely critical. ALTEN,
who had throughout the day displayed the same coolness, intrepidity,
and skill, which had characterised his career in the Peninsular War;
and who, by his presence and example, had so powerfully sustained the
energies of his men, was not permitted to witness the closing scene
of their glorious exertions: for about this time he was wounded, and
compelled to quit the Field; leaving the command of the Division to his
gallant countryman KIELMANSEGGE.
At a short distance in rear of LAMBERT's Brigade stood that of PACK
(with the exception of the 1st Royal Scots, then in Front Line), in
Contiguous Columns at quarter distance, its Right resting on the high
road; while further to the rear, as a Reserve, was posted VINCKE's
Hanoverian Brigade, having two of its Battalions, Hameln and Gifhorn,
in contiguous Close Columns on the left of the road, and the other
Battalions, Piene and Hildesheim, in a similar formation, on the right
of the road, near the Farm of Mont St Jean.
The pertinacity and zeal displayed by the French in their attacks upon
the Centre of the Anglo-Allied Line, and the indications now manifested
of following them up with increased force, were in accordance with
NAPOLEON's great object of breaking that Centre, and overthrowing the
Right Wing of the Duke's Army: and for the execution of this latter
part of his plan, he was preparing to strike another formidable blow;
even now that the Prussians were fairly _aux prises_ with the troops
constituting the extreme Right of his Army in and around Planchenoit.
But previously to entering into the subject of the concluding scene
of the struggle between the Anglo-Allied and French Armies, it will
be necessary to revert to the operations of the Prussian Forces,
in order to arrive at a full and comprehensive development and due
interconnection of all the leading features and various bearings of the
great Battle, the result of which was to determine the issue of the
Campaign in Belgium.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 12: Two different causes have been assigned for the
non-compliance with Major BARING's requisitions for ammunition;
namely, the interception of the communication between the Post and
the main Line and the difficulty in procuring _rifle_ ammunition. The
first appears scarcely tenable; for, although the communication was
frequently cut off by the French, as they passed by the Farm when
attacking the main position, it was as frequently open and available.
This is sufficiently proved by the different reinforcements that were
sent into the Farm: ammunition might have been escorted thither with
equal facility; and yet BARING had made three distinct applications for
a supply _before_ the Nassau Detachment was added to his force. The
difficulty of procuring _rifle_ ammunition certainly appears a more
probable cause; but, even in this case, it is impossible to overlook
the circumstance that the Post in question was immediately in front of
the Brigade to which its defenders belonged, and of which two out of
the four Battalions composing it were armed with rifles.
Since the above was written it has been communicated to me from
Hanover, upon excellent authority, that the cause of Major BARING not
having been supplied with ammunition arose from the circumstance, that
there existed only one cart with rifle ammunition for the two Light
Battalions of the King's German Legion; and that this cart was involved
in the precipitate retreat of a great part of the baggage, &c., and
thrown into a ditch.]
CHAPTER XIII.
Blücher's dispositions for the grand Flank movement of his Army towards
the Field on which WELLINGTON had announced to him his intention
of accepting Battle from NAPOLEON, provided he might calculate on
the Marshal's assistance, were fully described in Chapter VIII.
Reconnoitring parties and Patrols had been pushed forward, early in the
day, to feel for the Left of the Anglo-Allied Army, the communication
with which was successfully established. It then became desirable to
explore the ground that lay more to the Right Front of the Prussians,
in the direction of the Right Flank of the main French Army, in
order to ascertain the nature of any precautionary measures adopted
by NAPOLEON to impede the junction of the Allied Commanders. Major
LÜTZOW, of the Staff, was sent upon this duty, with a Detachment of the
2nd Silesian Hussars; and on reaching the Wood of Paris, he not only
found this unoccupied, but discovered that no steps whatever had been
taken by the French to cover and secure their Right Flank. A Prussian
Troop of Hussars advanced beyond the Wood of Paris, to a point near
Frischermont, whence it had a good view of both the French and Allied
dispositions and movements; and where it was not even menaced by the
approach of any hostile party.
As Major LÜTZOW, fully alive to the importance of speedily occupying
the Wood of Paris, was returning to communicate the above intelligence
to the Prince, he met General GROLMAN, the Quartermaster General of
the Army, to whom he immediately represented how matters stood: when
this Officer directly pushed forward the Silesian Hussars and two
Battalions of Infantry from BÜLOW's Advanced Guard, to take possession
of the Wood; these troops having fortunately just crossed the Defile
of St Lambert. GROLMAN at the same time sent a message to the Prince,
suggesting that the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Brigades should be ordered
to follow the Advanced Guard as soon as they should be collected on the
French side of the Defile.
Great as had been the difficulties hitherto encountered along the
Prussian line of march, the passage of the Defile of St Lambert seemed
to present an almost insurmountable obstacle. The rain which had set in
during the afternoon of the 17th, and had continued without cessation
the entire night, had transformed the valley of the Lasne into a
perfect swamp. The miry and watery state of the roads between Wavre and
St Lambert had caused so many stoppages and breaks in the Columns that
they were frequently lengthened out for miles.
BLÜCHER showed himself on every point of the line of march, encouraging
his exhausted soldiers, and inciting them to renewed efforts. The
troops, after a short halt to collect their scattered ranks, entered
the Defile. As the ground yielded to their pressure, both Cavalry and
Infantry became dispirited; and when the Artillery were fairly checked
by the guns sinking axle deep, and the men, already worn down by
fatigue, were required to work them out, their murmurs broke forth in
exclamations of--"We _cannot_ get on."
"But we _must_ get on," was old BLÜCHER's reply; "I have given my word
to WELLINGTON, and you will surely not make me break it: only exert
yourselves a few hours longer, children, and certain victory is ours."
This appeal from their venerated Chief was not made in vain: it served
to revive the drooping energies of the wearied, and to stimulate still
further to successful exertion the more robust and able bodied.
At length, after considerable delay and constant difficulty, the
passage of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Brigades, as also of the Reserve
of both Cavalry and Artillery, was accomplished; and by four o'clock
these troops had ascended the opposite slope of the valley, and reached
the plateau of the ridge which, constituting the narrow interval
between the Lasne and the Smohain, with a rapid fall on either side
towards those streams, presented a comparatively dry and firm soil
favourable for the further operations of the Prussian forces in this
direction.
As the troops reached the Wood of Paris, they were disposed, with a
considerable front, and in a close compact order, on each side of the
road leading from Lasne towards Planchenoit. The Artillery kept the
road itself; and the Cavalry was drawn up in rear of the Wood, ready to
follow the Infantry.
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Brigades were expected to join in a short
time; and PIRCH's Corps was following along the same line. It had been
BLÜCHER's intention to await the arrival of these troops, and then
to debouch with the assembled force; but having watched the progress
of the Battle, he became apprehensive, on perceiving the tremendous
cannonade, and the renewed attack after four o'clock, that the Enemy
might direct a still greater force against WELLINGTON's Line, and
succeed in breaking the latter before he commenced the attack on his
side of the Field. He could clearly distinguish NAPOLEON's Reserves,
in rear of La Belle Alliance, evidently prepared for being launched
against the Anglo-Allied Line, which had already sustained the most
desperate attacks. The frequent and pressing communications he had
received from the Duke also showed how anxiously the latter relied on
his support. These considerations satisfied the Prince, that the moment
had arrived in which his appearance on the Field would be productive of
consequences the most favourable to the views of his Ally, and the most
influential on the development of their combined exertions; and he now
gave the Order for the attack to commence, even with the small amount
of force then at his disposal, as also for the hastening of the march
of the troops still in the rear.
* * * * *
It was half past four o'clock when the Fifteenth and Sixteenth
Brigades debouched from the Wood of Paris; the former on the right,
the latter on the left; and each in the usual Brigade formation for
advance peculiar to Prussian tactics. The direction of the attack was
perpendicular to the Right Flank of the French Army; and consequently,
also, to the Charleroi road, which constituted the French main line of
operation.
In order to cover the Left Flank, Colonel HILLER, commanding the
Sixteenth Brigade, detached both the 3rd Battalions of the 15th
Regiment and the 1st Silesian Landwehr, under Major KELLER, to keep a
look out in that direction as far as the rivulet of the Lasne; beyond
which, Major FALKENHAUSEN was scouring the country with one hundred
Horsemen of the 3rd Regiment of Silesian Landwehr Cavalry.
General LOSTHIN, commanding the Fifteenth Brigade, detached three
Battalions towards Frischermont and Smohain, to cover the Right
Flank. They were the 2nd Battalion of the 18th Regiment, and the 3rd
Battalion of the 3rd Silesian Landwehr, followed by the 1st Battalion
of the former Regiment.
DOMON's Cavalry continued drawn up _en potence_, and was at a
considerable distance from the Prussian Advance, when BLÜCHER ordered a
cannonade to open upon it; more with a view to make known his arrival
to the Anglo-Allied Army, and to induce the French to withhold the
employment of a still greater force against the latter, than from any
motive affecting his own immediate operations at the moment.
DOMON now sent forward a Regiment of _Chasseurs à Cheval_ to attack the
Prussian Column, whilst he followed with his whole Line. Hereupon the
2nd Silesian Hussars and the 2nd Neumark Landwehr Cavalry moved through
the intervals of the Infantry, and formed up in front; the Hussars to
the left, and the Landwehr to the right. They then advanced, followed
by the 3rd Silesian Landwehr Cavalry in support, and drove back the
French _Chasseurs_; but becoming menaced in flank, and observing
DOMON's whole Line advancing, they were, in their turn, compelled to
retire. This movement was covered by the Horse Battery No. 11; and
more particularly by Captain SCHMIDT's Foot Battery of the Fifteenth
Brigade, which drew up to oppose the pursuit of the French Cavalry. The
vigorous fire which continued to be maintained by both these Batteries,
combined with the advance of the Prussian Infantry Columns, induced
DOMON to decline following up his attack at the moment.
The three Battalions already mentioned as having been detached to
the right, had, by this time, reached Smohain. Their advance in that
direction had been conducted with so much caution, that they debouched
from the south-eastern inclosures of the Village most unexpectedly for
both the Allied troops in that vicinity, and the Infantry forming
the extreme Right of the French Front Line. The Prussians continued
to advance; crossed the principal fence which separated them from the
French extreme Right, and drew up in Line almost at right angles with
the direction of the Enemy's front--two Battalions in Line, with the
third in support. It was half past five o'clock when this took place.
The French at once advanced against them; whereupon the Prussians
retired, and after regaining the hedges in the valley, lined the latter
as Skirmishers, and maintained a vigorous and successful _tiraillade_
with their opponents.
In the mean time NAPOLEON, judging from the boldness of the Prussian
Advance, that considerable support was at hand; and apprehensive, no
doubt, of the evil consequence likely to arise from that Advance, if
not promptly and effectually checked, had ordered the Sixth Corps,
under Count LOBAU, to move forthwith to the right from its reserve
station in rear of La Belle Alliance; and, in conjunction with DOMON's
Cavalry, to take up a position favourable for repelling the attack by
which he was menaced on that side of the Field.
BLÜCHER, observing this disposition, the execution of which was
effected with great rapidity and in good order, proceeded to give a
broader and more imposing front to his own troops. He extended his
Right Flank to the wooded Heights of Frischermont, and rested his Left
upon a ravine descending to the Lasne, close to the Wood of Virère. The
Reserve Cavalry, under Prince WILLIAM of Prussia, was put in motion,
in two Columns, towards the Left Flank; on which it was subsequently
formed up.
When LOBAU's Corps moved off to the right, the Regiments of the Old and
Middle Guard advanced and took up the position, in reserve, which it
had occupied on the Heights in rear of La Belle Alliance.
As LOBAU's Corps advanced and passed DOMON's Cavalry, the latter was
disposed as a Support. Having crossed the valley which, commencing from
the ridge above Planchenoit, on the north side of the Village, descends
towards Smohain, he opened a brisk fire from his guns upon BÜLOW's
Line. A spirited cannonade ensued, in the course of which the Prussian
Foot Battery No. 14 had three guns disabled.
It was not long, however, before the remaining Brigades of BÜLOW's
Corps, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth, came up. Their Batteries hastened
to the front, and materially increased the force of the Prussian fire.
BLÜCHER, who had now the whole of BÜLOW's Corps at his disposal, was
bent upon following up his original intention of directing his attack
against the Enemy's Rear. With this view he made the Sixteenth Brigade
take ground to its left, and brought up the Fourteenth Brigade in its
rear, as a Support; whilst at the same time he supplied the place of
the former in the Line by posting the Thirteenth Brigade on the left
of the Fifteenth. General HACKE, who commanded the Thirteenth Brigade,
detached the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the Second Neumark Landwehr
to the right, in support of the troops in Smohain. A portion of this
Detachment occupied Frischermont, thus obtaining an _appui_ for the
Prussian Right Flank, and securing the communication with the Prince
of SAXE WEIMAR's Brigade, posted along the inclosures in front of the
extreme Left of the Anglo-Allied Army. This Flank was also covered by
the West Prussian Uhlans and the 2nd Neumark Landwehr Cavalry, that
had been detached from the Reserve Cavalry of the Fourth Corps under
Prince WILLIAM of Prussia; which was following, as a Support, the Left
Wing of BÜLOW's Line, now advancing in the direction of Planchenoit.
The Artillery along the Prussian Line had by this time assumed a
formidable appearance, the following Batteries of the Corps having
come successively into action,--the twelve pounder Batteries Nos. 3
and 5, the six pounder Batteries Nos. 2, 13, 14, and 21, and the Horse
Batteries Nos. 11 and 12--comprising altogether sixty four guns.
The ground over which BÜLOW's Corps was now in the act of advancing,
was highly favourable for the development of a force destined to attack
the Flank of an Army, the Front of which was so completely _aux prises_
with the Enemy as was that of the French at this moment. Nearly at
all points it commanded the position occupied by the French Right _en
potence_; the Line was remarkably well _appui'd_ on the Flanks; and its
Front was parallel with the Enemy's main line of operation.
* * * * *
The force which LOBAU had at his disposal was greatly inferior to that
of the Corps he was sent to oppose. The former amounted to fifteen
Battalions, twenty one Squadrons, and forty two guns--the latter
(exclusive of the six Battalions and eight Squadrons detached to the
right) consisted of thirty Battalions, twenty seven Squadrons, and
sixty four guns. He could not present a Front sufficiently extensive
and compact that would secure him from being turned in either Flank.
Hence, when he perceived that the principal force in this well planned
attack was advancing from the Prussian Left, in the direction of
Planchenoit, which then lay in his right rear, unoccupied by any French
troops; he felt the necessity of retiring towards the Charleroi road,
which he did by withdrawing his Brigades _en échiquier_.
It was not long before several round shot from the Prussian Batteries
reached the Charleroi road; some of them falling both in front and rear
of La Belle Alliance, where NAPOLEON was then stationed. It was evident
to the latter that, unless reinforcements were despatched in support of
LOBAU, his Right Flank, already so seriously menaced, would speedily
be turned. His trusty Guard with which, in former Campaigns, he had
so frequently succeeded in stemming the current that had suddenly set
in against him from some previously hidden source and threatened to
overwhelm him, constituted the sole Reserve at his disposal. Engaged
during so many hours in carrying on a desperate attack along his whole
Front, without having as yet secured one single point of vantage
ground; he clearly foresaw that without some vigorous effort, by aid of
a powerful Reserve, no ray of victory would ever gleam upon his arms on
that side of the Field. But now that he was also engaged in defensive
operations along his Right, against another Enemy, by whom even his
Rear and the main line of his retreat became endangered; the necessity
of employing a portion of this Reserve in a direction different from
that which he had contemplated, was alike obvious and urgent.
The appearance of BÜLOW's Left bearing down upon Planchenoit, turning
LOBAU's Right; and the powerful Batteries along the Prussian Front
admirably disposed in accordance with the favourable nature of the
ground, over which the whole Line was gradually approaching; distinctly
indicated the immediate possession of that Village in force, as the
true and only measure that could be adopted for averting the impending
danger. The two Divisions of the Young Guard, posted on the plateau on
the right of the _chaussée_ close to Rosomme, and consisting of four
Battalions of _Voltigeurs_, and four Battalions of _Tirailleurs_, were
the nearest at hand for the occupation of Planchenoit; and NAPOLEON
accordingly desired General DUHESME instantly to march thither with
that force, accompanied by twenty four pieces of cannon of the Guard,
and place himself on the right of LOBAU's Corps.
It was about this time (six o'clock) that NAPOLEON replied to NEY's
demand for fresh Infantry, _Ou voulez vous que j'en prenne? Voulez
vous que j'en fasse?_ an expression, the force of which is rendered
sufficiently obvious by the critical circumstances of his position.
* * * * *
It was also at this period that BLÜCHER received intelligence that
THIELEMANN was attacked by a superior force at Wavre, and that it was
doubtful whether he would be able to maintain his ground. But the
determination of the Prince to carry out his present plan of attack
was fixed and irrevocable. He saw clearly that it was on the Field
where he himself stood that the fate of the Campaign must be decided;
and that by giving the fullest effect in his power to the combined
operation which he had preconcerted with WELLINGTON, and which was
already developing itself with so fair a prospect of success, he was
pursuing the right and only course by which the main Army of NAPOLEON
could be overthrown--a course founded upon the leading principle of all
strategy, that of bringing the greatest mass to bear upon the decisive
point. He immediately gave Orders that THIELEMANN should be directed
to hold out as well as he could, and to dispute every inch of ground
with his opponents. At the same time, he desired BÜLOW to continue
pressing forward with his Left, and to gain possession of the Village
of Planchenoit.
Colonel HILLER, who commanded the Sixth Brigade, formed the latter
into three Columns of Attack. Two Battalions of the 15th Regiment,
under Major WITTIG, marched on the right against the Village; two
Battalions of the 1st Silesian Landwehr, under Major FISCHER, in
the centre; and two Battalions of the 2nd Silesian Landwehr, under
Lieutenant Colonel BLANDOWSKY, formed the Left Column. The Fourteenth
Brigade followed as a Reserve, sending forward the 1st Battalions of
the 11th Regiment and 1st Pomeranian Landwehr as a Support to the
Columns of Attack.
In the mean time the troops of the Young Guard had occupied
Planchenoit, and made their dispositions for its defence. As the
Skirmishers that preceded the Prussian Columns approached the eastern
inclosures of the Village, they were received with a most destructive
fire by the French _Tirailleurs_. Some pieces of Artillery were also
brought to bear directly upon the Columns; which, nevertheless,
advanced with great bravery and steadiness, captured a howitzer and
two guns, and gained possession of the Churchyard. The occupation of
this spot, which is naturally strong, being inclosed within a low
stone wall, strengthened nearly all round by a steep outer bank, and
commanding by its elevated position a very considerable portion of the
Village, appeared to offer great security to the Prussian troops; but
the Young Guard, evidently prepared for this contingency, flew to the
surrounding houses and gardens, whence they opened a concentrated fire
upon the possessors of the Churchyard. To this the latter replied with
great spirit; and as the distance by which the hostile parties were
separated was extremely limited, numbers fell in rapid succession on
both sides. At length the French Supports having come up and joined in
this contest, and one of the Columns having shown itself in rear of
the Prussians; the latter were compelled to abandon the advantages they
had acquired, and to withdraw altogether from the Village.
They were followed by some of LOBAU's Cavalry; which, however, having
fallen into the line of fire of the Prussian Battery, No. 2, was forced
to retire.
The Prussian troops that had been driven out of Planchenoit immediately
rallied and reformed. The 2nd Battalions of the 11th Regiment and 1st
Pomeranian Landwehr now joined their respective 1st Battalions, which
had previously acted in support of the attacking Columns, and advanced
to a second assault, followed by the 15th Regiment.
NAPOLEON, perceiving the determination of the Prussian Commander to
persevere in his attack upon Planchenoit, as also his dispositions for
completely turning the French Right, ordered General MORAND, Colonel
in Chief of the _Chasseurs à pied_ of the Old Guard, to march to the
Village with a Battalion from each of the 2nd Regiments of Grenadiers
and _Chasseurs_. These Battalions reached the scene of action just
as the Prussians had re-entered the Village; and taking the lead in
the contest, succeeded in driving them out of the place, pursuing
them as far as their main position on the opposite Heights. Here the
French Skirmishers penetrated amongst the Prussian Batteries; but were
overthrown and cut up by the 4th Squadron of the 2nd Silesian Hussars.
The French Cavalry now showed a disposition to advance; and it was not
long before a Regiment of Lancers, which took the lead, was attacked
and defeated by the 8th Prussian Hussars. In following up the pursuit,
however, after their charge, the Hussars were suddenly involved in
the fire from a Battalion of French Infantry, and were forced to fall
back. On the other hand, a Regiment of French _Chasseurs à Cheval_ was
driven off in a similar manner by a Prussian Battalion.
By the advance of the Sixteenth and Fourteenth Brigades against
Planchenoit, a vacant space had been created in the Prussian Line
between those troops and the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Brigades, which
still maintained their ground with great gallantry, in the open Field
on the right. This vacant space was now covered by the main body of
the Reserve Cavalry of BÜLOW's Corps, commanded by Prince WILLIAM of
Prussia; which by its perfect steadiness and good countenance, not only
induced the Enemy to confine himself to the defensive, but advanced in
support of the Prussian Infantry, even in the midst of the opposing
musketry fire, and here occupied the place which, had the Line been
complete, would have been held by Infantry. On this occasion, the loss
of the Prussian Cavalry was considerable. The Brigadiers, Colonel Count
SCHWERIN, and Lieutenant Colonel WATZDORF, were killed. The latter
although previously wounded, would not quit the Field; and was soon
afterwards struck by a shot which deprived the Prussian Army of a very
distinguished Officer.
NAPOLEON, observing preparatory dispositions for a renewal of
the attack on Planchenoit by BÜLOW, who was only waiting for the
co-operation and support of PIRCH's Corps which was now rapidly
approaching, deemed it advisable to send a further reinforcement to
the troops in the Village. This consisted of the 1st Battalion of the
2nd Regiment of the _Chasseurs_ of the Guard, under General PELET; to
whom he represented the great importance of maintaining possession of
Planchenoit. At the same time, Orders were sent to the 1st Battalion of
the 1st Regiment of the _Chasseurs_ of the Guard, which was with the
Emperor's baggage at Caillou, to march to the Wood of Chantelet, for
the purpose of covering the right of Planchenoit, and securing the
Village from being turned.
The situation of NAPOLEON had become critical in the extreme. The
Prussian attack seemed to be checked for the moment; and the occupation
of Planchenoit in sufficient force held out the prospect of a
protracted, if not a successful, struggle in that quarter, should the
attack be renewed. Still it must have appeared sufficiently evident
to the Emperor that BLÜCHER was but awaiting either the arrival of an
additional portion of his Army, or the favourable moment when he might
combine his attack with a simultaneous one by WELLINGTON. Should the
Prussian General succeed in defeating the troops comprising the French
Right _en potence_, NAPOLEON's line of retreat by the Charleroi road
would be completely intercepted, and his main Front Line being thus
taken in Flank and Rear, would become an easy prey to the Anglo-Allied
Army. He might yet attempt a skilful retreat upon Nivelles; but with
an Army so exhausted by its repeated and ineffectual attacks upon
WELLINGTON's unshaken Line, this would have been a hazardous operation.
It is, moreover, very questionable whether the idea of retreat ever
entered into his views; for a retreat, after such sacrifices had been
made, harassed and interrupted as it undoubtedly would be by the two
hostile Armies which had succeeded in effecting a junction, must
prove no less disastrous than a signal defeat, and equally involve
the downfall of his military and political power. Hence his desperate
resolve to peril the fate of his brave Army and of his resuscitated
Empire upon another and a final struggle for victory over WELLINGTON;
whose troops had, with such truly heroic courage and such inflexible
endurance, successfully withstood the most furious attacks which
he had repeatedly launched against them during the whole day. By
a victory alone, no matter how dearly purchased, could he hope to
keep alive the national enthusiasm which he had again awakened: but
which would assuredly relapse into irrecoverable apathy, should the
_prestige_ of returning glory be torn from the idol of the military
portion of his subjects, and the Empire become again exposed to be
overrun by those foreign legions that had once more taken up arms with
a firm resolve finally to crush a power, the existence of which was
incompatible with the security and independence of the States of Europe.
As the prospect of the consequences of failure thus flashed across his
mind; NAPOLEON, like a desperate gambler, driven to his last stake,
determined to risk his all upon another venture. The meditated blow was
to be struck against his bold antagonist, WELLINGTON; whose Line was to
be attacked along its entire Front by a simultaneous effort, while its
Right and Centre were to be forced at all hazards.
He immediately ordered General Count DRUOT to collect all his
Battalions of the Guard that were still in reserve, in front of La
Belle Alliance. These were accordingly moved forward from their
position near the house of DE COSTER; and the two Battalions of the
1st Regiment of Grenadiers, which had previously been stationed on
the Height in rear of La Belle Alliance, were now destined to form a
Reserve to the attacking Columns.
D'ERLON and REILLE were at the same time ordered to advance the
whole of the remaining disposable force against the Enemy, with a
view to second the main attack. The Centre of the Anglo-Allied Line,
immediately in rear of La Haye Sainte, was not to be allowed a moment's
respite from the attacks which continued to be made against it by the
troops occupying, and debouching from, that Farm. These were also to
carry the Centre by assault, as soon as the Guard should reach the
Height.
WELLINGTON, who seemed to have acquired a thorough insight into his
opponent's designs, having satisfied himself that his position was
destined shortly to be again assailed by a formidable force, became
anxious for the arrival of the Prussian troops expected on his extreme
Left. He desired his Aide de Camp, Lieutenant Colonel FREMANTLE, to
proceed immediately in that direction, to hasten the advance of any
Corps he might fall in with, and to represent to its Commander that if
he would supply him with the means of strengthening those points along
his Line which had been so seriously weakened by repeated attacks, he
entertained no doubt of not only maintaining his ground, but of also
gaining the victory.
Although the Duke was fully aware that BÜLOW's Corps was in active
operation against the extreme Right of the French Army, the ground upon
which that operation was mainly carried on was too remote from his own
immediate sphere of action to admit of his calculating upon support
from it, beyond that of a diversion of the Enemy's forces; and it was
only from the high ground on which the extreme Left of the Anglo-Allied
Line rested, that a general view could be obtained of the Prussian
movements. As regards, however, the Village of Planchenoit itself, the
spire of the church was all that could be seen even from the point
alluded to; so that it was scarcely possible to distinguish which was
the successful party in that quarter. NAPOLEON might (as he really did)
present an efficient check to the Prussian attack, and at the same
time retain sufficient force wherewith he might make another vigorous
assault upon the Anglo-Allied Army.
When, therefore, the Duke beheld his Line so fearfully reduced in
numbers, which he had no means of replacing, and which the indomitable
courage of his British and German troops alone had hitherto been able
to supply, it is not surprising that he should have manifested some
little impatience for the arrival of that portion of the Prussian
forces which was to co-operate more immediately with his own Army. The
latter, with the exception of the Dutch-Belgian troops, which still
continued in reserve, for it was useless to place them where they would
be exposed to the brunt of the battle shock, presented but a mere
wreck of that proud array which it had displayed in the morning. But,
if the vain confidence of strength had departed, the more noble pride
of unflinching bravery still remained unshaken. Exposed, however, as
they had been for so many hours to a tremendous cannonade, which only
ceased at times but to give place to attacks of Cavalry and musketry;
their exemplary passive forbearance seemed, in some instances, to be
approaching its utmost limits. Frequent messages reached the Duke from
Commanding Officers, soliciting reinforcements and support since their
Corps were reduced to skeletons; but the only reply they received was,
that no reinforcements could be granted, and that they must hold their
ground to the last man. Occasionally too, as he rode along the Line, a
murmur would reach his ear, indicative of impatience to be led against
the Enemy. This would draw from him some encouraging appeal, such as
"Wait a little longer, my lads; and your wishes shall be gratified."
In all three Arms of the Service the losses had been awfully severe.
Battalions, dwindled to mere handfuls of men, were commanded by either
Captains or Subalterns. A vast number of guns along the whole extent of
the Line had been disabled. The British and German Cavalry Brigades,
with the exception of VIVIAN's and VANDELEUR's on the Left, were
reduced to less than the ordinary strength of Regiments--SOMERSET's
and PONSONBY's Brigades united did not comprise two Squadrons. Many,
it is true, had quitted the ranks to assist the wounded, and to convey
prisoners to the rear; but if amongst these were to be found the weak
and faint hearted, the brave spirits that remained nobly represented
the valour and devotion which, under the guidance of a master hand,
were destined to be crowned with lasting triumph. Familiarised as the
men had become with scenes, in rapid succession, of violent death
under almost every variety of aspect, from the sudden gush of life
to the slow and lingering anguish--from the calm and tranquil sleep
"that knows no waking," to the ghastly writhings of convulsive death
throes--the short and frequent command of "Close up!" as their comrades
fell around them, was as mechanically obeyed as would have been any
common parade order in a Barrack Square.
Such was the situation of the troops against which NAPOLEON was
meditating an assault with all the force he could collect, in the
hope--his last and only hope--of seeing his Eagles soaring in triumph
over those Heights upon which the British Standard continued to wave in
proud defiance.
* * * * *
The Battalions of the Imperial Guard which had been collected in front
of La Belle Alliance, and which were to constitute the leading feature
in the general attack upon the Anglo-Allied Line, consisted of nine
Battalions, exclusive of the two Battalions of the 1st Regiment of
Grenadiers, destined, as previously observed, to remain as a Reserve.
These nine Battalions were formed into Two Columns of Attack. The First
comprised four Battalions of the Middle Guard, namely, the 1st and
2nd Battalions of the 3rd Regiment of Grenadiers, and the 1st and 2nd
Battalions of the 3rd Regiment of _Chasseurs_. It was formed in mass
of Battalions, and destined to advance against the Centre of the Right
Wing of the Anglo-Allied Army.
The Second Column of Attack consisted of the three remaining Battalions
of the Middle Guard--namely, the 1st Battalion of the 4th Regiment
of Grenadiers, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 4th Regiment of
_Chasseurs_--and of two Battalions of the Old Guard, namely, the 1st
and 2nd Battalions of the 1st Regiment of _Chasseurs_. These five
Battalions were moved down into the hollow adjoining the south-eastern
angle of the inclosures of Hougomont, and there formed into a Column in
mass, which was to support the First Column, and to direct its advance
somewhat more to the left.
In rear, and on the right and left, of these Columns, stood the remains
of that splendid Cavalry, with which WELLINGTON's Line had been so
furiously and so perseveringly assailed, occupying the interval that
had been continually augmenting between D'ERLON's and REILLE's Corps.
They formed the last and only Cavalry Reserve remaining at NAPOLEON's
disposal, for following up the attack by the Guard, should the latter
prove successful; or for covering its retreat, in the event of failure.
* * * * *
It was shortly before the Columns of Attack were put in motion that
VIVIAN, whose Hussar Brigade it will be recollected, was posted upon
the extreme Left of the Anglo-Allied Line, was informed by Patrols
which he had detached to look out to his left for the expected arrival
of the Prussians, that the latter were advancing in force along
the road from Ohain. Having satisfied himself as to the fact, and
perceiving their Advanced Cavalry coming on, VIVIAN felt that there
could be no longer any apprehension of the Left of the Army being
turned: and having previously understood from Sir WILLIAM DELANCEY and
other Staff Officers, that fresh Cavalry was much wanted in the Centre;
he proposed to VANDELEUR, who was on his right, and who was his senior
Officer, that the two Brigades should move towards the Centre, where
they might be of service. VANDELEUR declined to act without Orders:
whereupon VIVIAN put his own Brigade in motion, passing along the rear
of VANDELEUR's, and soon after having commenced his march he met Lord
UXBRIDGE; who was much pleased to find that the Duke's wishes had thus
been anticipated, and sent Orders to VANDELEUR to follow, accompanying
the former Brigade himself towards the Centre, passing along the
foot of the slope in rear of the position of the Left Wing of the
Anglo-Allied Line.
The Prussian troops, whose advance had thus induced VIVIAN to quit the
extreme Left, were the Advanced Guard of ZIETEN's Corps: and consisted
of a part of the First Infantry Brigade, namely, the 3rd Battalion 12th
Regiment, the 1st and 2nd Battalions 24th Regiment, the 3rd Battalion
1st Westphalian Landwehr, and the 1st and 3rd Silesian Rifle Companies;
as also of a part of the Reserve Cavalry, namely, the 1st Silesian
Hussars, the Brandenburg Uhlans, the Brandenburg Dragoons, and the 2nd
Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry.
They had already been joined by Lieutenant Colonel FREMANTLE, who
delivered to ZIETEN the Duke's message: in reply to which that General
remarked that he did not feel himself authorised to detach his Corps
in the manner proposed; adding, however, that the great mass of the
Prussian Army was arriving upon the Field.
The remainder of the Reserve Cavalry which was commanded by Lieutenant
General RÖDER, together with the main body of the Corps, were still
considerably in the rear. They were met by Captain JACKSON of the
British Staff Corps, who had been sent to look for them. These troops
did not reach the Field of Battle until after the victory had been
decided.
WELLINGTON, finding that there was no chance of his shattered Line
being strengthened by the arrival, in sufficient time, of a Prussian
force from his left, to support his weak points of defence; and that
he must therefore depend solely on his own resources for the means of
warding off the desperate blow which NAPOLEON was about to strike,
immediately made such dispositions as the circumstances of the moment
appeared to him to demand. The incessant attacks made by the French
Light Troops debouching from La Haye Sainte, from the moment that Farm
fell into their possession, had caused great havoc in the Centre of his
Line, where the want of reinforcement became most apparent. To meet
this deficiency, he ordered the Brunswick Battalions, which stood at
this time in rear of MAITLAND's and ADAM's Brigades--namely, the 2nd
and 3rd Light, and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Line, Battalions, to move by
their left into the interval between HALKETT's British, and KRUSE's
Nassau, Brigade.
To occupy the ground thus vacated by the Brunswickers, he put in
motion D'AUBREMÉ's Dutch-Belgian Infantry Brigade from its recently
assumed position in rear of the Nivelles road; whence the other Brigade
of CHASSÉ's Dutch-Belgian Division, under Major General DITMER, was
shortly afterwards ordered to move in the direction of the left of
MAITLAND's British Brigade.
The remains of his Cavalry stood in rear of the Centre; towards which
VIVIAN's and VANDELEUR's Brigades were now moving from the Left, as
previously explained.
Whilst the Imperial Guard was forming for attack, the French troops
in possession of La Haye Sainte and its inclosures, now consisting of
the entire of DONZELOT's Division, from the Left of D'ERLON's Corps,
renewed, with redoubled vigour, their assault upon the Centre of the
Allied Line: the object being evidently either to force that point
previously to the arrival of the Guard on its left, and thus facilitate
the assault to be made by the latter; or to harass it in such a manner
that, should the effort of the Guard prove successful, they would
be enabled completely to overthrow the Allied Centre. The fire from
the Skirmishers that had located themselves between the Farm and the
position, and from those on the Knoll by the Sand Pit on the opposite
side of the high road, had been incessant since the capture of that
Post.
OMPTEDA's Brigade of the King's German Legion, which had hitherto
occupied the hollow way that descends into the _chaussée_, was reduced
to a mere handful of men: the two Squares in which KIELMANSEGGE's
Hanoverian Brigade, the next on the (Allied) Right, had stood its
ground so many hours, were fearfully diminished; KRUSE's Nassau
Brigade, still further to the right, formed in three Contiguous Columns
(two in front and one in rear), began to evince symptoms of hesitation;
and the interval between this and HALKETT's British Brigade had become
much greater than was consistent with the due security of this part
of the Line. So weakened indeed was the latter at this period, that,
to remedy the evil in some degree, it had been deemed advisable, with
a view rather of giving it the appearance of greater strength than
of affording any very active support, to draw close up in its rear,
the skeleton remains of the Scots Greys and of the 3rd Hussars of the
King's German Legion.
On the Allied left of the high road, an unremitting fire was maintained
against their opponents by the 95th and 4th British Regiments in
extended order along the front hedge of the Wavre road, commencing from
the Charleroi _chaussée_, as also from the 40th, 79th, 1st, and 28th
British Regiments, deployed behind the embanked hedge on the rear side
of that road. The 27th British Regiment had been brought up by LAMBERT,
and posted, in Square, in the angle formed by the junction of the above
roads: having one face parallel with, and close to, the _chaussée_,
for the purpose either of throwing a flank fire upon the French troops
on the opposite side, should these succeed, as appeared very probable,
in compelling OMPTEDA's and KIELMANSEGGE's Brigades to retire; or,
of pouring a close, deadly volley upon any Column endeavouring to
penetrate along the high road itself. The Artillery on the Allied
right of the high road, in front of these Brigades, was at this moment
completely disabled. Two British Artillerymen were observed vainly
endeavouring to serve a couple of guns, but were compelled to desist
from the want of all material for loading.
Such was the state of things in the Centre of the Anglo-Allied Army,
when the continued popping fire from the French Skirmishers suddenly
quickened into a fierce _tiraillade_ which threatened to bear down
every thing opposed to it. The bank along the high road, beyond the
Garden of La Haye Sainte, and the mound adjoining it, which latter was
quite close to the Allied position, became all at once thickly crowded
with Skirmishers. Those that lined the banks seemed intent upon keeping
down the fire from the British Regiments of KEMPT's and LAMBERT's
Brigades, along the Wavre road; while those under cover of the little
mound in advance, as if aware of the object of the formation of the
27th British Regiment, and sensible of the necessity of securing their
Right Flank in their meditated forcing of the position, opened such a
close, sharp, fire upon that Regiment that, within the brief space of a
few minutes, it lost more than half of its numbers.
At the same time, taking advantage of the crippled state of the Allied
Artillery in this quarter, the French brought up two guns in advance
of the north-western angle of the Garden of La Haye Sainte, in which
position they were covered from any fire from the opposite side of
the high road by the Skirmishers occupying the bank and the mound.
From these guns a smart fire of grape was opened, and maintained
without intermission, upon the Left Square of KIELMANSEGGE's Brigade
(consisting of the Field Battalions Grubenhagen and York), at the short
distance of one hundred and fifty, and afterwards of scarcely one
hundred, paces. The Square manifested the most exemplary submission and
forbearance, notwithstanding the ravages that continued to be made in
its ranks; not venturing to reply to the fire, by the apprehension of
Cavalry being under the brow of the position, prepared to take instant
advantage of any favourable opportunity for a charge. The Right Square
(consisting of the Field Battalions Bremen and Verden) also suffered
most severely.
Some other guns, which had accompanied the Columns in rear of the
French Skirmishers, were suddenly brought forward, and opened so
destructive a discharge of grape upon this latter Square, that one of
its sides was literally completely blown away; the remainder being
left standing in the form of a triangle. The Commander, and many
other Officers, were wounded. The ammunition was failing rapidly. The
combined fire of grape and musketry continued to increase in violence;
and the Square finally dwindled into a mere clump of men. The French
_Tirailleurs_ continued pressing forward in a very compact line, whilst
the sound of drums beating the _pas de charge_ announced the advance of
the Columns immediately in their rear.
The Prince of ORANGE, perceiving the probability of the Centre of the
Allied Line being forced, unless some great effort were made to check
the Enemy's advance, ordered the 1st and 2nd Nassau Battalions of
KRUSE's Brigade to charge, gallantly placing himself at their head.
His Royal Highness was soon struck by a bullet in the left shoulder;
the attack failed; and the Nassauers were falling back, when the
reinforcement which WELLINGTON had provided for this part of the Line,
consisting of five Battalions of Brunswick Infantry, moved rapidly into
the interval between KRUSE's Nassau, and HALKETT's British, Brigades.
But so unexpectedly did the Brunswickers find themselves placed under a
most destructive fire, and so suddenly were the heads of their Columns
assailed, that they were unable, in the midst of the thick smoke in
which they became involved, to recover from the partial irregularities
by which, under such circumstances, their advance was accompanied,
and to form up in sufficient order, before they came in close contact
with the Enemy: whose vigorous attack compelled them, as also KRUSE's,
KIELMANSEGGE's, and OMPTEDA's Brigades, to fall back about a hundred
paces.
At this critical moment, WELLINGTON hastened to the spot in person, to
avert so alarming a catastrophe as that of having his Centre broken,
at a time, too, when he was preparing to receive a formidable attack,
directed against another point of his Line, situated at but a short
distance on the right of that Centre. He addressed himself to the
Brunswickers; and succeeded, by the electrifying influence of his
voice, gesture, and presence, in rallying the discomfited Columns.
The 3rd Line Battalion, under Major NORMANN, was the first to reform
in good order: it then boldly stood its ground; and, when the Enemy's
Infantry approached, received it with so destructive a fire as
completely to check its further advance.
By dint of example and encouragement on the part of all the Commanding
Officers, the Brigades on the left of the Brunswickers were also
rallied and formed up: upon seeing which, the Duke galloped off to the
right.
Just at this time, VIVIAN's Hussar Brigade drew up immediately in rear
of these troops--relieving the exhausted remains of the Scots Greys
and 3rd Hussars of the King's German Legion--the 10th and 18th British
Hussars in Front, and the 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion in
Second, Line. The presence and appearance of this fresh Cavalry tended
very considerably to restore confidence to that part of the Line. The
Brigade had previously, in consequence of a mistake in the transmission
of Orders, been halted on the left of the high road about midway
between the Front Line and the Farm of Mont St Jean; whence, however,
it was speedily brought forward, and posted as above, by Lord UXBRIDGE.
The Prince of ORANGE, ALTEN, and almost all the superior Officers
of the Third Division, had been wounded. But KIELMANSEGGE, who now
commanded in this part of the Field, was fully alive to the critical
circumstances under which the Third Division was placed; and exhibited
great ability, coolness, and determination, by the manner in which
he succeeded in restoring it to order. Still, the persevering and
incessant _tiraillade_ kept up against these troops by the French
was such that the fire thrown out from their shattered and enfeebled
ranks was quite inadequate to repress it. The French Skirmishers again
crowded close up to the Line; maintaining a most rapid and destructive
fire.
The Allied Infantry was once more on the point of giving way. One
Battalion of the Brunswickers was retiring in Close Column, but in
good order; having totally exhausted its ammunition. The Nassauers
were falling back _en masse_ against the horses' heads of the 10th
Hussars; who, keeping their Files closed, prevented further retreat.
VIVIAN and Captain SHAKESPEARE of the 10th (acting as his extra Aide
de Camp), rendered themselves conspicuous at this moment by their
endeavours to halt and encourage the Nassauers. The Hanoverians and
the German Legion on the left, led by KIELMANSEGGE, now resolutely
dashed forward, at the double quick--their drums rolling. The Enemy
fell back. The Brunswickers took up the movement, as then did also
the Nassauers--VIVIAN and his Aide de Camp cheering them on; whilst
the Hussars followed in close support. In this manner, KIELMANSEGGE
succeeded in leading back the shattered remnants of the Division to the
place they had so long and so honourably occupied on the ridge.
VIVIAN's Brigade, by its proximity to these troops, against which so
close and unremitting a fire of musketry was maintained, was placed in
a very trying situation for Cavalry, and suffered much in consequence.
As soon, however, as the Infantry had rallied and resumed their former
position in the Line, VIVIAN withdrew his Brigade under the crest of
the ridge, a distance of not more than thirty yards, to place his men
a little out of fire; and when thus posted, he was better prepared to
make an attack if required.
The fire from the Enemy's Infantry in front of this part of the Line
suddenly slackened; and it was soon manifest that they were falling
back: the change arose out of occurrences on their left, which will be
explained in the next Chapter.
CHAPTER XIV.
It was during the fierce and desperate conflict just described as
having taken place in the Centre of the Anglo-Allied Line, that the
French Imperial Guard moved forward to the attack; and this was the
signal for the simultaneous advance of all the disposable Battalions of
D'ERLON's and REILLE's Corps.
In the preliminary pause which occurred in the fire from the French
Batteries, from the first moment of the advance until the Columns had
sufficiently descended from the Heights to be below the range of their
guns, the thunder of BÜLOW's Artillery upon the French extreme Right,
and of the guns brought to bear against it, was so distinctly audible
that NAPOLEON, apprehending its evil effects upon the troops on whose
bravery, discipline, and devotion, his fate now hung, despatched Aides
de Camp along the Line to spread the false intelligence of the arrival
of GROUCHY; and to declare that it now required but a little firmness
to secure the victory to which they were advancing. The loud shouts
with which this announcement was received by the troops, who had then
descended below the range of the guns, were speedily drowned in the
roar that burst forth from the entire Line of the French Batteries.
The effects of this terrific cannonade upon the skeleton ranks of the
Allied Front Line, combined with the aspect of the advancing hosts,
tended not in the slightest degree to shake that noble and unequalled
courage with which the British and German troops had hitherto sustained
every assault. The scene of havoc and devastation which met their view
as they looked around them, the constant ravages which they had been
destined passively to endure for so many hours, their ranks repeatedly
torn open and their Files scattered asunder, as shot and shell plunged
in amongst them,--all conduced to excite in the breasts of men of such
impenetrable mould a feeling of exultation and relief, as they observed
the approach of the Enemy's Infantry, and panted for the long wished
for moment when they might grapple with their deadly foe at close
quarters, in a hand to hand encounter. Most fully did they realise the
expectations entertained of them by their Enemy, but admirer, the brave
General FOY; who had felt it his duty, prior to the commencement of the
Battle, to declare to the Emperor, that His Majesty had an Infantry
opposed to him which he had never known to yield.
The French troops, perceiving their whole Front Line in motion, felt
conscious that the final struggle was at hand, and assured that the
varied fortunes of the day were to be wound up by some splendid
triumph. The Guard proudly took the lead in this grand attack--that
sacred cohort, whose glory had ever shone conspicuously when a
great crisis summoned forth those energies by which its valour and
its prowess had acquired for it imperishable renown. The greatest
enthusiasm reigned amidst the devoted defenders of the Imperial
diadem; which was now to be strengthened by the fame of their renowned
successes, and adorned with fresh wreaths of never fading laurels.
NAPOLEON, nervously anxious to strain to its utmost tension, the
daring spirit and high resolve which animated his troops, galloped
forward to the inner gentle slope of the eminence on the left of the
Charleroi road, which, overlooking the Farm of La Haye Sainte, formed
the most prominent point of his whole Line, and by which was to pass
the leading Column of the Guard, there to strengthen, by the magic
spell of his immediate presence, the link which bound their fortunes
to his own fate, and to the destiny of the Empire. As they approached,
he pointed significantly to the Allied position; a gesture which drew
forth renewed shouts of "_Vive l'Empereur!_" The fond regards which he
seemed to cast upon these, his old and tried campaigners, and the air
of confidence he assumed, as he contemplated their advance; rivetted
upon him the affectionate gaze of the devoted band, to hundreds of whom
it proved the last look upon the idol for whom they were to sacrifice
their lives.
At this time, D'ERLON's Corps presented an advance of Columns in
_echelon_ between the Charleroi road and its Right Flank which was
engaged with the Prussians: whilst REILLE's Corps, descending in
Columns, some into the Wood, others into the inclosures on the right,
and some also still more to the right, outside of Hougomont, and close
upon the Centre of the Line, seemed bent upon carrying that Post by
main force; and upon seconding, with one mighty effort, the main attack
by the Imperial Guard. This general advance of Columns was preceded by
a host of Skirmishers, whose Line spreading along the valley in front
of D'ERLON's Corps, gradually became engaged with the Light Troops of
the Left Wing of the Anglo-Allied Army; and the sudden impulse given
to the rattle of musketry in the Wood of Hougomont betokened that the
brave defenders of this Post were already engaged in a renewed and
desperate struggle for the maintenance of its possession.
The French Skirmishers between the Wood of Hougomont and the extreme
Left of their Army, continued to maintain a desultory warfare with
the Allied Light Troops in the front, consisting of the 3rd Regiment
of British Guards, the Light Companies of the 14th and 23rd British
Regiments, and six Companies of the 51st British Regiment.
PIRÉ's Light Cavalry Brigade was still in the position it had occupied
upon the extreme Left of the French Front Line, having a few Vedettes
thrown out; which were narrowly watched by those belonging to Captain
WODEHOUSE's Squadron of the 15th British Hussars.
* * * * *
As the leading Column of the Imperial Guard began to ascend the
slightly inclined tongue of ground that projects from that part of the
ridge of the Duke's position in rear of the crest of which MAITLAND's
Brigade of Guards was lying down at the time, it became very much
exposed to the concentrated fire from nearly all the Batteries of the
Anglo-Allied Right Wing, by which the most frightful havoc was dealt
amidst its devoted ranks. The Line of Skirmishers which preceded it,
now pushed rapidly and boldly forward up to the very summit of the
Duke's position; for the purpose both of concealing by their veil of
smoke the precise direction of the advance of the Columns, and of
driving away the Artillerymen from their guns by the fire of which the
Guard was suffering so severely.
Notwithstanding the terrible havoc made in the ranks of the leading
Column of the Imperial Guard, it continued its advance in admirable
order and with the greatest enthusiasm. Several of its superior
Officers placed themselves at its head. NEY's horse having been
shot under him; he drew his sword, and chivalrously led the way on
foot, sustaining to the last his appropriate and well earned _nom
de guerre--le plus brave des braves_. General FRIANT, who commanded
the Grenadiers, fell severely wounded. General MICHEL, Colonel _en
second_ of the _Chasseurs_, was killed a few moments afterwards. The
fall of the latter occasioned some hesitation--the 1st Battalion of
the 3rd Regiment of Grenadiers halted; but at the call of General
PORET DE MORVAN, who commanded it, it renewed its advance at the _pas
de charge_, amidst loud shouts of "_Vive l'Empereur!_" As the Column
neared the rise of ground which constituted the highest point of the
ridge occupied by the Right Wing of the Duke's Line, it gradually
passed the line of fire hitherto directed upon it by the greater
portion of the Batteries on the British right of that point.
WELLINGTON rode up to the British Foot Battery posted on the immediate
right of MAITLAND's Brigade of Guards, with its own Right thrown
somewhat forward, and addressing himself to an Artillery Officer
(Lieutenant SHARPIN), hastily asked who commanded it. The latter
replied that Captain BOLTON having just been killed, it was now under
the command of Captain NAPIER. The Duke then said, "Tell him to keep
a look out to his left, for the French will soon be with him." The
message had scarcely been communicated when the bearskin caps of the
leading divisions of the Column of the Imperial Guard appeared just
above the summit of the hill. The cannonade hitherto directed upon
this point from the distant French Batteries, now ceased; but a swarm
of Skirmishers opened a sharp and teasing fire among the British
Gunners. In the next moment, however, they were scattered and driven
back upon the main body by a sudden shower of canister, grape, and
shrapnel shells, poured forth from NAPIER's guns; which now kept up
a terrific fire upon the Column, within a distance of forty or fifty
yards. Nevertheless the French Guards continued to advance. They had
now topped the summit. To the astonishment of the Officers who were
at their head, there appeared in their immediate front no direct
impediment to their further advance. They could only distinguish dimly
through the smoke extending from NAPIER's Battery, the cocked hats
of a few mounted Officers; little imagining, probably, that the most
prominent of these was the great Duke himself. Pressing boldly forward,
they had arrived within fifty paces of the spot on which the British
Guards were lying down, when WELLINGTON gave the talismanic call--"Up,
Guards; make ready!" and ordered MAITLAND to attack. It was a moment of
thrilling excitement. The British Guards springing up so suddenly in a
most compact four deep line, appeared to the French as if starting out
of the ground. The latter, with their high bonnets, as they crowned the
summit of the ridge, appeared to the British, through the smoky haze,
like a Corps of giants bearing down upon them.
The British Guards instantly opened their fire with a tremendous
volley, thrown in with amazing coolness, deliberation, and precision.
An oblique fire was also poured in among them from the 33rd and 69th
British Regiments, which HALKETT had most promptly and judiciously
pushed forward to the immediate Left of the Guards at this critical
moment. The head of the Column became, as it were, convulsed by the
shock, and nearly the entire mass staggered under the effect. In
less than a single minute more than three hundred of these brave old
warriors fell, to rise no more. But the high spirit and innate valour
which actuated the mass were not to be subdued by a first repulse.
Its Officers, placing themselves conspicuously in its Front and on
its Flanks, called aloud, waved their swords; and, by encouraging
words and gestures, commenced a deployment in order to acquire a more
extended front. But the head of the Column being continually shattered
and driven back upon the mass, by the well sustained and rapidly
destructive fire by which it was assailed within so extremely limited
a space, this attempt altogether failed. The Front of the Column was
becoming momentarily more disordered and broken up; men were turning
round and disappearing by the Flanks, whilst others in the rear began
firing over the heads of those before them.
The confusion into which the French Guards had now been thrown became
manifest. The Duke ordered MAITLAND to charge; whilst, at the same
instant, the gallant Lord SALTOUN, equally alive to the real situation
of the Column, called out, "Now's the time, my boys!" The Brigade
sprang forward, with a loud cheer, to the charge. Numbers of the French
Guards nearest to the British, threw down their arms and knapsacks, and
dispersed. The Flanks began rapidly to spread out; and then the mass
partaking more generally of the panic, appeared as if rent asunder by
some invisible power.
During the advance of the attacking Column of the Imperial Guard, one
of its Battalions had moved out from the mass to its right (probably
for the better security of that Flank from any attempt that might be
made to molest it from the dip or hollow on that side of the projecting
tongue of ground along which the main attack had proceeded), and
took a direction which brought it immediately in front of HALKETT's
Left Wing, consisting of the shattered remnants of the 30th and 73rd
British Regiments, formed in a four deep line, scarcely exceeding,
if equalling, in extent (such had been their losses), the front of
the approaching Column. The order in which this Column advanced was
admirable. Its formation was undisturbed by the fire of Artillery,
of which Arm there was none in this part of the Field in working
condition; and, as it pressed on with the compactness and regularity of
a parade movement, it appeared at the same time to be animated with
the best spirit. Presently the Column halted and fired; and, in return,
received a well directed volley; after delivering which, the 30th and
73rd Regiments ported arms, and, with a loud cheer, dashed forward at
the charge. On reaching the ground where they expected to meet the
French Guards, they were greatly astonished at discovering, through the
clearing smoke, that their recent opponents were flying in a mass.
At this moment, Major VAN DER SMISSEN's Dutch-Belgian Horse Battery,
which had just come up by the right of HALKETT's Brigade, opened upon
them a terrific fire from which they suffered immensely.
The British Guards had continued their charge some distance down the
slope of the hill; when MAITLAND perceived the Second attacking Column
of the Imperial Guard advancing on his right, and exposing his Brigade
to the imminent risk of being turned on that flank. He accordingly
resolved to face about the Right Wing of his Brigade, and to give the
words, "Halt, front," as soon as he had got his Line parallel with the
front of the advancing Column. This manoeuvre was executed with great
regularity and precision by the Right Wing, with which MAITLAND was
immediately present, and which he had well in hand. But amidst their
victorious shouts, and the noise of the firing of cannon and other
arms, the command was imperfectly understood by the Left Wing: and the
first sense of danger led to a cry of "Form Square" being passed along
their Line, it being naturally assumed that the Enemy's Cavalry would
take advantage of their isolated position; which, however, was not the
case. The Flanks of the 3rd Battalion, of which this Left Wing was
composed, gave way as if to form Square. SALTOUN conspicuously exerted
himself in endeavouring to rectify the mistake, but in vain; and the
whole of the Battalion went to the rear.
The confusion in which they retired was unavoidable; but it was not
the confusion consequent upon either defeat or panic: it resulted
simply from a misunderstanding of the command; and no greater or more
distinguished proof could be afforded of the excellent order, cool
self-possession, and admirable discipline of these troops, than the
steadiness, alacrity, and intelligence with which, upon regaining
the crest of the ridge, they obeyed the command then given of "Halt,
front, form up;" mechanically resuming their four deep formation, and
instantly darting forward at the double quick, to their proper place
on the left of the 2nd Battalion, so that the whole Brigade was now in
one steady and compact Line; parallel with the front of the advancing
Second attacking Column of the Imperial Guard.
How marked a contrast did such conduct on the part of the British
Guards, who thus, in the Battle's front, so gloriously upheld their
country's honour, offer to that of a considerable body of the Allied
troops then posted in Second Line as their Support! D'AUBREMÉ's
Infantry Brigade of CHASSÉ's Dutch-Belgian Division, which, as before
stated, had been moved into the space in rear of MAITLAND's Brigade,
previously occupied by the Brunswickers, was now formed into three
large Squares, of two Battalions each. These troops, on hearing the
loud shouts of the Second advancing Column of the French Imperial
Guard--of that very Column which had been moving in rear of the British
Guards while the latter were retiring from their triumphant charge
towards their original position--became so unsteady, and evinced so
decided a disposition to quit their ranks, that VANDELEUR, whose
Brigade of British Light Dragoons was at this time drawn up in their
rear, deemed it advisable to close his Squadron intervals, the better
to impede their contemplated retreat; and was induced, along with his
Major of Brigade, Major CHILDERS of the 16th Light Dragoons, Captain
TOMKINSON of the same Regiment, and several of his Officers, on
perceiving that the Squares were on the point of giving way, to dart
forward and endeavour, partly by menaces, and partly by exhortations,
to induce them to maintain their ground. The Dutch-Belgian Officers
exerted themselves in restoring order and confidence; but their men
were evidently bent upon abandoning their position in this part of the
Field. Between them and the attacking Column intervened the crest of
the main ridge, occupied by the Duke's First Line; the latter holding
out to them a bright example of perfect discipline, of unflinching
steadiness, and patient endurance. Of the attacking Column itself they
could see absolutely nothing; but its shouts alone seemed sufficient
to scare them off the ground! Besides, they had but just entered the
immediate Field of Action, and had not hitherto been engaged with the
Enemy; whereas the British Brigade of Guards had been exposed during
eight hours to an incessant cannonade, and to numerous and desperate
attacks of both Cavalry and Infantry. Of such materials was composed
the Duke's Second Line in rear of the main point of attack by the
French Army at this, the most critical moment of the whole Battle!
* * * * *
The Second attacking Column of the French Imperial Guard, which,
as before explained, had been formed in the hollow adjacent to the
south-east angle of the Hougomont inclosures, advanced in a line
parallel with, and at a very short distance from, the hedge forming
the eastern boundary. On reaching the foot of the British position,
however, the Column diverged a little to its right, either to take
advantage of a slight undulation of the ground which seemed to offer
a partial cover from the tremendous fire of Artillery that continued
to pour upon it, or solely for the purpose of directing its advance
upon the point at which it perceived the First attacking Column
was engaged, and at which it might be better enabled to follow up
any success that Column might obtain. Between the heads of the two
attacking Columns there was a distance, during their advance, of from
ten to twelve minutes' march. Whether this difference in the time of
their movement was intentional, or arose from a misunderstanding in the
conveyance of Orders, or from any other accident, is uncertain; but it
is quite evident that, by forming two separate attacks, they subjected
themselves to the imminent risk of being defeated in detail--a risk
which, as will be presently shown, was speedily converted into a
reality.
[Illustration]
The Second, like the First, Column of Attack, advanced with great
boldness, and in excellent order, and appeared animated by the best
possible spirit. Its Left Front was covered by a cloud of Skirmishers,
in order to conceal its movement as much as possible from the view
of the British Line. The Battalions of ADAM's Brigade threw out each
a Company for the purpose of checking them. During the advance of
the Column, and more especially as it descended the gentle declivity
eastward of the Great Orchard of Hougomont, it suffered severely from
the British cannonade. So destructive indeed had been the fire from
some of the British Batteries on the right of MAITLAND's Brigade,
from the commencement of the advance of the Imperial Guard, that
the French were at length induced suddenly to push forward a body
of _Cuirassiers_ to endeavour to silence these guns. In this they
partially succeeded; the _Cuirassiers_ having gallantly charged one of
the Batteries, and forced the Gunners to seek shelter in the rear of
the Infantry--driving in, at the same time, the Skirmishers of the 2nd
Battalion of the 95th Regiment, and those of the 52nd Regiment. They
were checked, however, by the to them sudden and unexpected appearance
of ADAM's Brigade, which had just been moved, in its four deep line,
close up to the narrow road that runs along the summit of the ridge.
The 52nd Regiment, which was more directly opposed to them, came down
to the "Prepare for Cavalry!"
As a renewal of the attack seemed probable, a Squadron of the 23rd
British Light Dragoons, under Captain Cox, was detached across the
ridge, down the outer slope, towards the Great Orchard; from the rear
of which it charged the _Cuirassiers_ as they advanced again towards
the guns, overcame them, and pursued them across the plain, far in rear
of the Second attacking Column of the Imperial Guard, until it fell
into a fire thrown out upon it from the head of a French Column of
Infantry, by which its Files were scattered, and the whole compelled to
make a hasty retreat towards the Allied position.
Had the Second Column of Attack continued in the original direction
of its advance, it would have come upon the centre of ADAM's Brigade:
but having, as it began to ascend the exterior slope of the main
ridge of the Allied position, slightly diverged to its right, as
before observed, by following the direction of a very gentle hollow,
constituting the re-entering angle formed by the tongue of ground
that projected from the front of MAITLAND's Brigade, and that part of
the ridge occupied by ADAM's Brigade, it, in some degree, lent its
Left Flank to the latter. This circumstance was not only observed,
but had been in a great measure anticipated, by Lieutenant Colonel
Sir JOHN COLBORNE, commanding the 52nd Regiment, an Officer of great
repute in the British Army. He had been watching with intense anxiety
the progress of the Enemy's Column; and, seizing the most favourable
moment, he, without Orders, and upon his own responsibility, wheeled
the Left Company of the 52nd to the left, and then formed the remainder
of the Regiment upon that Company, for the purpose of bringing its
front nearly parallel with the Flank of the French Column. At this
moment ADAM rode up, and asked COLBORNE what he was going to do; to
which the latter replied, "to make that Column feel our fire." ADAM,
approving of this, ordered COLBORNE to move on; and galloped off to
bring up his Right Regiment, the 71st.
The Duke, who had just seen MAITLAND's Brigade reformed and posted in
the best order, parallel with the front of the attacking Column, was at
this moment stationed on the right of NAPIER's Battery. He despatched
an Aide de Camp (Major the Hon. HENRY PERCY) to direct Sir HENRY
CLINTON to advance and attack the Imperial Guard: but a single glance
at COLBORNE's forward movement satisfied him that his intention had
been anticipated; and he immediately pushed forward the 2nd Battalion
of the 95th Regiment to the left of the 52nd.
The head of the French Column had by this time nearly reached the brow
of the ridge, its front covering almost the whole of NAPIER's Battery,
and a portion of the extreme Right of MAITLAND's Brigade. It was still
gallantly pressing forward, in defiance of the most galling fire
poured into its front by the Battery and by the British Guards, when
the sudden and imposing appearance of the four deep line of the 52nd
Regiment bearing directly towards its Left Flank in the most admirable
and compact order imaginable, caused it to halt. In the next instant,
wheeling up its Left Sections, it opened a rapid and destructive fire
from the entire length of its Left Flank against the 52nd Regiment.
COLBORNE, having brought his Line parallel to the Flank of the Imperial
Guard, also halted, and poured a deadly fire into the mass; and, almost
at the same moment, the rifles of the 2nd Battalion 95th Regiment, then
coming up on the left, were levelled and discharged with unerring aim
into the more advanced portion of the Column. The 71st Regiment was,
at this time, rapidly advancing on the right, to complete the Brigade
movement.
COLBORNE, eager fully to carry out his projected Flank Attack upon
the Enemy's Column, caused his men to cease firing, and then gave the
command, "Charge! charge!" It was answered by three hearty British
cheers that rose distinctly above the shouts of "_Vive l'Empereur!_",
and the now straggling and unsteady fire from the Column. The 2nd
Battalion 95th Regiment hastened to join in the charge on the left.
The movement was remarkable for the order, the steadiness, the
resoluteness, and the daring, by which it was characterised. The Column
of the Imperial Guard, which already seemed to reel to and fro under
the effect of the front and flank fire which had been so successfully
brought to bear upon it, was evidently in consternation as it beheld
the close advance of ADAM's Brigade. Some daring spirits--and it
contained many within its ranks--still endeavoured to make at least
a show of resistance; but the disorder, which had been rapidly
increasing, now became uncontrollable: and this Second Column of the
Imperial Guard, breaking into the wildest confusion, shared the fate of
the First; with this difference, however, that in consequence of the
combined front and flank fire in which it had been so fatally involved,
and of the unrestrained pursuit which deprived it of the power of
rallying its component parts, it became so thoroughly disjointed
and dispersed that, with the exception of the two rear Battalions
which constituted the 1st Regiment of _Chasseurs_ (Old Guard), it
is extremely doubtful whether any portion of it ever reunited, as a
regularly formed military body, during the brief remaining period of
the Battle--certainly not on the Allied side of La Belle Alliance,
towards which point it directed its retreat.
It is necessary to remark that this Regiment of the Old Guard, which
was commanded by General CAMBRONNE, formed a separate Column of Support
in _echelon_ to, and immediate left rear of, the three Battalions of
the Middle Guard: but so close to each other were the two Columns, that
although an interval was observed between them by ADAM's Brigade when
the latter stood in the general Front Line of the Allied position,
they appeared to it but as one Column, when charged in flank; and
may, to all intents and purposes, be considered as having formed one
general Column of Attack. CAMBRONNE's Battalions, however, forming the
rear of the Column, did not become exposed to the fire from ADAM's
Brigade; inasmuch as neither the 71st Regiment nor the 2nd Battalion
95th Regiment could complete the Brigade flank movement in time to open
a fire upon the mass before the actual charge was commenced. Hence,
although they turned, along with the rest of the Column; yet, unlike
the latter, they retained a considerable degree of order.
Troops could scarcely be placed in a more critical situation than was
this Second attacking Column of the Imperial Guard from the moment it
came to a halt. With its Front immediately facing a Battery within
sixty or seventy yards' distance, the double shotted guns of which
continued ploughing through the mass, and tearing up its ranks; with
its Left Flank faced outwards to repel a formidable attack on that
side, and its Right Flank partially exposed to the oblique fire from
the greater portion of the Line of British Guards; the interior of the
mass, enveloped in smoke, feeling a pressure from both Front and Flank,
and yet perceiving no indication of the means of extricating itself
from so perilous a position, it was truly a most trying moment even to
such veteran warriors as those which constituted the renowned Imperial
Guard of France.
Any attempt at deployment to its right, while thus attacked on its
left, was of course out of the question. Had it continued to advance
until ADAM's Brigade had approached quite close to its Left Flank, the
charge of the latter must have brought it to a stand, and rendered the
efforts of the head of the Column abortive. If, on the other hand,
after having faced altogether to the Left, and converted that Flank
into a compact Line, it had advanced to meet the 52nd Regiment when it
first became aware of this attack, it would still have been exposed on
the right (its previous Front) to the havoc created by NAPIER's guns,
as also to a charge by MAITLAND's Brigade; which by bringing forward
its left shoulders, might have rendered the situation of the Column
so hopeless, as probably to have led to its immediate and unqualified
surrender on the spot.
The dilemma into which these veterans were thus thrown was mainly
attributable to the fatal neglect of not accompanying the Column with
an effective Support of Cavalry. A strong body of the latter on each
Flank, or in its immediate rear, would have secured the Column from
any such Flank Attack as that which so successfully arrested its
progress, and so completely effected its dispersion.
The direction given to ADAM's Line by its "right shoulder forward"
movement having brought it perpendicular to the general front of the
French position, that Officer became naturally anxious for support upon
his Right Flank, to secure the latter from the Enemy's Cavalry; which,
it was to be presumed, would now be brought forward from his Reserve,
since none of it had been employed in immediate support of the last
attack. He urgently requested for this purpose, the aid of troops from
the other part of CLINTON's Division; and Lieutenant Colonel HALKETT,
seeing what was required, immediately advanced with the nearest
Battalion of his Hanoverian Brigade, the Osnabrück Landwehr, in Column
at quarter distance, and close up in right rear of the 71st Regiment.
Thus ADAM's Brigade, maintaining its four deep line, and being flanked
by the Hanoverian Battalion which could form Square at any moment, was
secured against Cavalry.
The confused and disordered mass of the Imperial Guard, from the
first impulse given to it by the flank charge, hastened a short
distance in a direction parallel with that of the Anglo-Allied Line,
and then naturally inclining towards the French position, it fell
into nearly the same track of retreat as that pursued by the First
attacking Column, namely towards the first rise of ground intersected
by the Charleroi road, a little beyond the southern extremity of the
Orchard of La Haye Sainte. As it approached the rear of those Columns
of D'ERLON's Corps, which had been so desperately opposing ALTEN's
Division; the latter became infected with the panic, and commingled
with the flying Guard.
ADAM's Brigade continued its triumphant advance, at first parallel,
for a short distance, to the Allied Line; and then, bringing forward
its left shoulders, swept proudly onward in the direction of the
French Height before mentioned; crowds of fugitives hurrying along and
striving to escape from the pursuing wave that seemed every instant on
the point of engulfing them.
During its advance, the front of ADAM's Brigade was partially crossed
by the Squadron of the 23rd Light Dragoons, under Lieutenant BANNER,
retiring in disorder from its charge. Mistaken for hostile Cavalry,
these Dragoons were unfortunately fired upon by the 52nd Regiment;
and it was not until the foremost of them had fallen close upon the
bayonets, that the error was discovered.
Immediately after this incident, a fire of grape was opened upon the
52nd by three French field pieces in the prolongation of its Right
Flank. This enfilading of the Regiment in its four deep line was
a judicious measure on the part of the French Artillery, and well
calculated to derange the advance of ADAM's Brigade. It was, however,
very gallantly and speedily checked by the wheeling up and advance of
the Right Section of the 52nd, under Lieutenant GAWLER; who succeeded
in driving off the guns, whilst the rest of the Regiment continued its
pursuit.
WELLINGTON, as soon as he saw that the success of the charge by ADAM's
Brigade was so decisive, requested UXBRIDGE immediately to launch
forward some fresh Cavalry to check the probable advance of that of the
Enemy; and to second the efforts of the Infantry in front, by boldly
attacking the French Reserves, which appeared collected in front of La
Belle Alliance, the critical point of NAPOLEON's Line.
Lieutenant Colonel Lord GREENOCK, Assistant Quarter Master General
of the Cavalry, was despatched to VIVIAN with Orders for him to move
his Hussar Brigade to its right from its position in rear of ALTEN's
Division, so as to get clear of the Infantry, and then to advance
directly to the front by the right of MAITLAND's Brigade of Guards.
At the same time, the Duke turned round to order up the nearest
Supports to the space which had been vacated in his Front Line by the
advance of ADAM's Brigade. But what a spectacle met his view! The three
Dutch-Belgian Squares, into which D'AUBREMÉ's Brigade had been formed,
and whose unsteadiness, previously described, had greatly augmented as
the firing and shouting on the exterior slope of the ridge, of which
they could see nothing, became more continuous and intense, were now
in a state bordering on dissolution. The faces of the Squares were
already broken at intervals by groups in the act of abandoning their
ranks; whilst several Officers of VANDELEUR's Brigade, which, as
before observed (see pages 526-527), was drawn up in their rear, were
zealously exerting themselves in endeavouring to induce these troops to
stand fast.
The Duke, observing this, called out, "That's right; tell them the
French are retiring." This intelligence, quickly caught up and spread
through their ranks, had the desired effect of restoring them to order.
They shortly afterwards formed into Columns, and advanced to the Front
Line.
* * * * *
In order to preserve a distinct and connected view of the combined
operations against NAPOLEON, it will be necessary, previously to
describing the General Advance of the Allied Line, consequent upon the
failure of the attack by the French Imperial Guard, to revert to the
movements of the Prussians.
It will be recollected that VIVIAN's, and subsequently VANDELEUR's,
Brigade, quitted the Left of the Anglo-Allied Line, on the approach
of the Advanced Guard of ZIETEN's Corps towards that point. Shortly
before the arrival of these troops, the French Skirmishers in front
of DURUTTE's Division, which constituted the angle of the _potence_
on which stood the extreme Right of NAPOLEON's Army, having been
considerably reinforced, were pushed forward for the purpose of
establishing themselves in the houses and inclosures in the valley
below them; and of impeding, by this means, the connection between
BÜLOW's Corps and the Anglo-Allied Left. The Nassauers, of Prince
BERNHARD of Saxe Weimar's Brigade, fell back from the houses of the
Hamlet of Papelotte; but firmly maintained their ground on the Allied
side of the valley, retaining possession of the Farms of Papelotte
and La Haye. The French Skirmishers, passing further to their right,
pressed on to the Village of Smohain; where they became warmly engaged
with the Prussian troops that had been so judiciously posted in that
quarter.
BLÜCHER, perceiving the Infantry of the Advanced Guard of ZIETEN's
Corps upon the Height above Smohain, sent an Order for its moving
by the shortest way to engage the Enemy in the valley. The Prussian
General MÜFFLING, attached to the Headquarters Staff of the Duke of
WELLINGTON, was at that moment in this vicinity, and gave the requisite
instructions to the Staff Officer sent forward from ZIETEN's Corps.
About this time, the Fifth and Sixth Infantry Brigades, as also the
Reserve Cavalry of PIRCH's Corps, reached the Field, in rear of
BÜLOW. PIRCH, placing himself at the head of his leading Brigade (the
Fifth), immediately conducted it in the direction of Planchenoit;
and, on coming up with the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Brigades, he
began, in conjunction with Colonel HILLER, to make the necessary
dispositions for the Third attack upon that Village. The Sixth Brigade
was ordered to follow as a Reserve; and the attack was to be supported
by a simultaneous advance of the Right Wing of BÜLOW's Corps against
LOBAU's Line, which was exceedingly well drawn up, and exhibited every
indication of making a determined stand. BLÜCHER had despatched an
Order to the Seventh Brigade (of PIRCH's Corps) to move together with
the 4th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, upon Maransart, on the south side of
the Lasne, for the purpose of covering his Left Flank. The remaining
Brigade (the Eighth) of PIRCH's Corps, which had been detained in
consequence of the Rear Guard affair near Wavre, received Orders from
PIRCH to quicken its advance.
The Reserve Cavalry of PIRCH's Corps was deployed in three Lines on the
right of the Cavalry of the Fourth Corps. The First Line consisted of
the Pomeranian Hussars and the Brandenburg Hussars; the Second, of the
Silesian Uhlans, two Squadrons of the 6th Neumark Dragoons, and the
Queen's Dragoons; and the Third, of the 5th Kurmark and Elbe Landwehr
Cavalry. These Lines of Cavalry thus occupied the interval between the
Wings of BÜLOW's Corps; and, at the same time, served to impose, by
their display of force, upon the French Cavalry, under DOMON, which was
then in reserve.
BLÜCHER, judging the recapture of Planchenoit to be a most essential
aid in the general operations against the French, as affording the
means not only of turning the Right of LOBAU's Corps, but also of
molesting the Rear of the French Army, and of endangering its main line
of retreat, ordered the immediate advance of the troops destined for
the Third attack upon that Village.
They were formed in the following order:--The 2nd and 3rd Battalions
of the 2nd Regiment (Fifth Brigade) made the attack in the direction of
the Church; the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 5th Westphalian Landwehr,
formed into one, were directed upon the French left of the Village; the
1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment followed in rear of the central space
between these two Columns; Major WITZLEBEN led the 3rd Battalion of
the 25th Regiment (Fifth Brigade) towards the Heights on the (French)
right of the Village; and the remainder of this Regiment, which had
occupied the outer edge of the Wood of Virère on the left, also
advanced. The 11th Regiment and the 2nd Pomeranian Landwehr, belonging
to the Fourteenth Brigade, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 15th
Regiment, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 1st Silesian Landwehr,
belonging to the Sixteenth Brigade, followed in support of this attack.
The whole force was disposed in chequered Columns, preceded by a strong
Line of Skirmishers, and covered by the Prussian Batteries on the
Heights in rear.
The Horse Battery, No. 6, posted on the high ground upon the right of
the Wood of Virère, was principally occupied in diverting the fire from
a Horse Battery of the Reserve Artillery of the French Imperial Guard,
which had one half of its guns above the hollow way formed by the road
leading down into Planchenoit from La Maison du Roi, and the other half
detached to an elevated spot in the south part of the Village, whence
it had a commanding view of a considerable portion of the advancing
Columns.
Simultaneously with this Third attack upon Planchenoit, the Thirteenth
and Fifteenth Brigades, which constituted BÜLOW's Right Wing, advanced
against LOBAU's Line, covered by a force of Artillery much superior
to that which the French could bring to bear against them. They
were disposed in chequered Columns of Battalions, in the following
manner:--In Front Line were the 2nd Battalion of the 18th Regiment and
the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Silesian Landwehr; in the Second Line
were the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 18th Regiment, the 1st and 2nd
Battalions of the 3rd Silesian Landwehr, and the 1st Battalion of the
10th Regiment; in the Third Line were the three Battalions of the 4th
Silesian Landwehr, and the 2nd Battalion of the 10th Regiment. The
three Battalions of the 3rd Neumark Landwehr followed in reserve.
The Right of this advance was supported by the West Prussian Uhlans and
the 2nd Neumark Landwehr Cavalry.
In the mean time, the First Infantry Brigade of ZIETEN's Corps, having
continued its descent into the valley, passing HACKE's Infantry in
and about Smohain on its left, advanced upon La Haye and Papelotte,
and mistaking the Nassauers for French, through the similarity of
uniform, opened a sharp fire upon them, and drove them from their
Post. The latter at first replied to this fire, which was kept up for
some minutes, killing and wounding on both sides, until the error was
discovered. These troops then began pressing forward, conjointly with
those from Smohain, against the French Skirmishers.
The Advanced Cavalry of ZIETEN's Corps, which had been seen approaching
the Left of WELLINGTON's Line, had now joined. The Brandenburg Dragoons
and Brandenburg Uhlans, drew up in Line in rear of the Wavre road, and
on the immediate Left of BEST's Hanoverian Infantry Brigade. The 1st
Silesian Hussars formed upon the outer slope of the ridge, in rear of
the lane leading from the Wavre road down to Papelotte. The 2nd Kurmark
Landwehr Cavalry drew up in the hollow in the rear of the interval
between the Landwehr Battalions Osterode and Verden of BEST's Brigade.
It was on the ground immediately in front of this interval that
Captain RETTBERG's Hanoverian Foot Battery had been posted throughout
the day: and as the latter had expended the whole of its ammunition, it
withdrew to the rear as the Prussian Horse Battery, No. 7, came up, by
which it was then relieved; and the Prussians opened a cannonade from
this point upon the opposite Heights. The Prussian Foot Battery, No. 7,
quitting the Wavre road, proceeded some way down the outer slope of the
ridge to seek a favourable point whence it could by its fire cover the
advance of the Infantry in the valley.
Such was the general disposition of BLÜCHER's forces relatively with
that of WELLINGTON's Army at the time when the latter had defeated the
attacking Columns of the French Imperial Guard; and was following up
its triumph by boldly assailing the very Centre of NAPOLEON's position,
at which point the latter had collected his sole remaining Reserves.
Perhaps a more comprehensive view of this relative disposition of the
Prussian troops may be afforded by simply stating, by way of a summary,
that the advanced portion of ZIETEN's Corps had joined the Left of
the Allied Line, that part of PIRCH's Corps (including his Reserve
Cavalry) had joined BÜLOW; and that the latter was on the advance--his
Right to attack LOBAU, and his Left to make a Third assault upon
Planchenoit--the French opposed to them evincing, at all points, every
indication of making a firm and determined stand.
* * * * *
We must now resume the detail of the brilliant and decisive
dispositions of the Duke of WELLINGTON, whom we left triumphantly
defeating the French Imperial Guard, and requesting the Earl of
UXBRIDGE to bring forward fresh Cavalry, to aid the advancing Infantry
in taking immediate advantage of the disorder and confusion into which
the Enemy had been thrown by the failure of his last grand attack.
There is not, perhaps, an instance in modern history, in which the
threatening tide of battle, has, through the lightning-like promptitude
of decision, and the energetic application of yet remaining resources,
been so suddenly and powerfully controlled, and so majestically and
irresistibly hurled back, overwhelming all and everything that, in
the previous plenitude of its force it had borne aloft with buoyant
hopes, and carried along exultingly in its course, as it was by the
immortal WELLINGTON in this his last, his crowning, victory. Never did
a battle field present so complete, so magical, a transition of scene
as that which succeeded the defeat of the Imperial Guards of France by
the Guards of the Sovereign of England and the British Light Infantry
Brigade.
The state of the Duke's Army at the time of NAPOLEON's last grand
attack has already been adverted to; but let us glance again, for
a moment, at the awfully diminished numbers, and almost exhausted
energies, of those heroic bands which, in Front Line, had been exposed
to the incessant and concentrated cannonade from a range of Batteries
forming almost the entire arc of which that Line was the chord [_or
rather_ forming the chord of which that Line was the arc]; subjected
to repeated and vigorous attacks of all Arms during so many hours; and
now called upon to resist "to the death" another assault more fierce
and determined than any they had yet encountered--look at the rear
of that Line, and observe the palpable defection in the ranks of an
Ally; whose Contingent, whilst it constituted so great a proportion
of the Duke's entire force, had already afforded too evident proofs
that in a calculation of available resources, its services must be
thrown entirely out of the scale--see, too, at increased intervals,
the wrecks of the British and German Cavalry, with, however, the
fortunate exception of the two Light Brigades so opportunely brought
from the extreme Left to the rear of the menaced point of attack--how
discouraging an aspect, when compared with that of the French Army
advancing to its last grand attack! Is it to be wondered that, at
that moment, doubts as to the issue of the great contest should have
prevailed in the minds even of those who were prepared to support their
noble Chief to the last drop of their blood?
And yet, with such apparently inefficient elements, the bare
contemplation of which might have both weighed down the energies, and
altered the purpose, of another General, did the British Chief not only
successfully defeat this most formidable assault, but finally gain a
signal and resplendent victory. It would, however, be unjust to the
abilities, and to the fame of the Duke, to ascribe such victory solely
to his defeat of the attacking Columns of the Imperial Guard upon his
own position; though such, no doubt, was the foundation upon which he
erected the structure of his final triumph. The nine Battalions of the
Guard, of which the attacking Columns had been composed, were defeated;
but these, it must be borne in mind, constituted but the _Van_ of the
attacking force, which comprised no less than the whole Front Line of
the French Army. D'ERLON's Corps from the right, and REILLE's Corps
from the left, were pouring forth their numerous Columns, the principal
portion of which had already reached more than midway towards the
Allied position, and presented a formidable array; whilst from the
Heights which they had quitted, their Artillery thundered forth as
vigorously, over their heads, upon the exhausted Line of the Allies, as
at any previous period of the Battle.
The four Battalions of the First attacking Column of the Guard
had been rallied with great rapidity by NAPOLEON; and posted on a
commanding eminence, intersected by the Charleroi road in front of
his Centre. Near La Belle Alliance, Reserves had been collected,
principally of Cavalry; and though the latter consisted entirely of
the remains of Corps that had previously suffered great losses, they
might have been wielded with powerful effect against any point at which
the advancing Infantry should succeed in making an impression. Besides
these, there stood on the French extreme Left, a Brigade of Light
Cavalry which had not been engaged during any part of the day, and had
never yet moved out of its position.
On the other hand, too, however glorious the result of the struggle
with the Imperial Guard, it could not but tend to cripple still further
the slender physical means which the Duke yet retained at his disposal.
Victory, hovering over the brave Conquerors of the Imperial Guard,
alighted for a moment at the feet of WELLINGTON; and ere the Goddess
could be scared away by the still threatening countenance of the Enemy,
Britain's Hero secured her favour by the display of that extraordinary
foresight, prompt decision, and unflinching determination which, though
at all times his distinguishing characteristics, now shone forth with
more than ordinary brilliancy. His perfect knowledge of the character
and composition of the French Army plainly told him that a signal
defeat of the Imperial Guard, a force employed only on occasions of
great and critical emergency, would be certain to exercise a powerful
influence upon the _morale_ of the Enemy's troops; but it also told
him that, unless instant advantage were taken of that defeat, unless
it were followed up in such a manner as to render the incipient panic
which it had created, general and uncontrollable, that same Army might,
through the powerful influence and indefatigable exertions of such
men as NAPOLEON and NEY, rapidly recover the shock; D'ERLON's and
REILLE's Columns, although faltering for a moment, might pursue their
advance with determined efforts to regain the footing which the Guard
had lost; the veterans composing the latter force, resolved to avenge
their defeat, might speedily rally, and, with desperate resolution,
renew their attack, aided by a more direct and effective support by the
Cavalry Reserves collected in front of La Belle Alliance.
This view had scarcely passed across the mind of the Duke, when his
decision was fully made. With those critically slender means, to which
allusion has more than once been made, and which in the hands of
many a Commander would have been deemed totally inadequate for even
the maintenance of the position, at such fearful odds, WELLINGTON
determined to compensate for the awfully reduced and exhausted state of
the fighting portion of his troops, and the utter want of confidence
in the remainder, by one of those bold and daring acts, which,
when hazarded at the right moment, carry with them the _prestige_
of conscious superiority, and allow an Enemy no time to discover
deficiencies, or to calculate mischances.
No sooner was the Second attacking Column of the Imperial Guard
defeated and dispersed, than he ordered it to be vigorously pursued,
and the rallied force of the First Column to be attacked, by ADAM's
Brigade; whilst at the same moment he launched forth VIVIAN's Hussar
Brigade against the Cavalry Reserves near La Belle Alliance, before
these had made their dispositions for attack, and even before they had
recovered from the surprise and hesitation which prevailed amongst them
on witnessing the discomfiture of the Guard.
VIVIAN, the moment he received the Order to advance, wheeled his
Brigade, Half Squadrons to the right. Thus the 10th Hussars became
the leading Regiment, the 18th Hussars followed, and the 1st Hussars
of the German Legion, which had stood in Second Line, moved off, as
soon as its front was clear, in rear of the latter Corps. The Brigade
proceeded, at a trot, a short distance in rear of the Infantry, and
parallel to the crest of the position; and, as it approached the
right of MAITLAND's Brigade of Guards, VIVIAN, ordering the leading
Half Squadron to wheel to the left, through NAPIER's Battery, led it
perpendicularly to the front. As the Column thus advanced across the
ridge, in Left Front of VANDELEUR's Light Cavalry Brigade, it was
saluted by the latter with cheers of encouragement; and in a similar
manner by MAITLAND's Brigade of Guards as it passed their Flank. The
smoke lay heavily along the entire position; and especially, at this
moment, over that part of the exterior slope of the ridge on which the
struggle with the French Imperial Guard had taken place, and across
which VIVIAN was now leading his Brigade.
On advancing further, and getting clear of the smoke, he obtained a
more distinct view of the dispositions of the Enemy's forces in his
direct front. A very considerable portion appeared in great confusion;
disordered Columns of Infantry were hurrying back to the main position,
up the slope, on which were numerous stragglers of all Arms, and in
various uniforms, mixed together and retiring in crowds. Guns were
firing from different points to cover the retreat, and the discharge of
musketry in and about Hougomont continued very brisk.
On arriving about midway towards the Enemy's position, well formed
bodies of troops were observed on the French left of La Belle Alliance,
posted as if fully prepared to resist the threatened attack. They
consisted of two Squares of Infantry, with Cavalry and guns formed on
the Flanks and between them. The Cavalry on their left was somewhat
advanced, comprising separate bodies, partially covering one another,
but presenting a general front, and posted on some rising ground about
two hundred yards on the Allied left of the south-east angle of the
Hougomont inclosures. The two Squares here alluded to were the two
Battalions of the Grenadiers of the Old Guard, which had been placed
in reserve of the main attack by that force as previously explained.
The Cavalry on the left was thus disposed--first, on the slope of the
little eminence, a portion of the Lancers of the Imperial Guard; then,
in left rear of the latter, on lower ground, were two Squadrons of the
Dragoons of the Guard, and, in their right rear, two more Squadrons
of the same Corps; in right rear of these again, and on the summit of
the eminence, stood the Brigade of Carabiniers. In rear of these, and
of the Squares themselves, as also on the right of the latter, were
collected the remainder of that portion of the French Cavalry which
had made such repeated attacks upon the Duke's Line during the day.
All these different bodies of Cavalry were but mere wrecks of their
former selves--Regiments, and, in many instances, entire Brigades, were
diminished to less than Squadrons. In the morning, as they came fresh
into the Field, they constituted the flower of the French Cavalry; now,
so severe had been their losses, they presented a mere phantom of their
former splendour.
VIVIAN, as soon as he perceived this disposition of the Enemy's forces
in his immediate front, decided upon forming a Front Line with the
10th and 18th British Hussars, and upon holding the 1st Hussars of
the German Legion in Second Line, in support. For this purpose, and
also with a view to oppose, and, if possible, to turn, the Left of
the Enemy's Cavalry, he made the leading Regiment, the 10th Hussars,
incline to its right.
Shortly afterwards, VIVIAN was joined by Colonel Sir COLIN CAMPBELL
of the Staff, who brought him an Order from the Duke that he was not
to attack before the Infantry came up, unless he felt confident of
success. VIVIAN remarked that as the Allied Infantry in its anxiety
to get on, was probably not in compact order, its safety might be
seriously endangered should it be exposed to a Cavalry attack; and
that, in his opinion, it would be better that not a moment should be
lost on his part in driving off the Cavalry which appeared in his
front. Sir COLIN CAMPBELL coincided in this opinion, and returned to
the Duke.
After the very short pause at the head of the Column, consequent upon
this little discussion, VIVIAN, continuing the advance, ordered the
10th Hussars to form Line on the front Half Squadron, and, at the same
time, sent Orders to his two other Regiments also to form Line on their
leading Half Squadrons respectively, but then to remain in support.
The rapid pace which had been maintained by the head of the Column,
and the incline to the right which had been given to it, required
great activity on the part of the Left Half Squadrons to get up into
Line; and as VIVIAN ordered the charge as soon as the first Squadron
was formed, it was executed not in Line but rather in _echelon_ of
Squadrons, which, under the circumstances of the moment, as will
presently be seen, was the preferable and more desirable formation.
Just as the charge was ordered, the 2nd Light Dragoons of the King's
German Legion, in a Column of Squadrons, which had been detached
from the main position, almost simultaneously with the advance of
VIVIAN's Brigade, came up on the right of the 10th Hussars, and in
a direction rather crossing the front of the latter Regiment, which
had its left thrown somewhat forward whilst the Germans were moving
straight to their front, and directly upon the French Dragoons of the
Guard before mentioned as posted in the hollow on the Allied right of
the eminence on which stood the French Cavalry about to be charged by
VIVIAN's Brigade. The Dragoons at first appeared disposed to resist
the Germans, and received them with a tolerably effective carbine fire
from their rear ranks; but the former charged home, cut down several
of the Enemy's horsemen, and made some prisoners. In following up the
charge, however, the Regiment exposed its Right Flank to a body of
_Cuirassiers_, by which it was thrown into disorder. Lieutenant Colonel
DE JONQUIÈRES, the Commanding Officer, ordered the halt and rally to be
sounded; but in the next moment he was wounded, as was also Lieutenant
Colonel MAYDELL.
[Illustration]
Major FRIEDRICHS, who was next in command, highly distinguished himself
on this occasion by the spirited manner in which he rallied several
of his men together; and as those that had been dispersed, rapidly
placed themselves on his flanks, and thus extended his new Line, he
made another charge, which sent the Enemy's Cavalry about, and put it
to flight. The Regiment then continued moving forward, with proper
caution, along the base of the higher ground on the left, over which
the 10th British Hussars were also charging and advancing.
In the mean time, the latter Regiment made its charge: the Right,
Centre, and Left Squadrons, in rapid succession, dashed in amongst
the French Cavalry posted as before mentioned. The Left Squadron of
the 10th had scarcely closed with the Enemy, before the whole of the
Cavalry on the (French) left of the Squares of the Guard, was in full
flight. VIVIAN, perceiving the complete success of this brilliant
charge, ordered a halt; and then returned as quickly as possible to the
18th Hussars.
After the 10th Hussars had pursued the French Cavalry about two hundred
yards, a body of _Cuirassiers_ charged their Right Squadron, on its
Right Flank, and forced it about a hundred yards away to the left,
whilst the Centre and Left Squadrons not being aware of VIVIAN's Order
to halt continued their pursuit, inclining to their right, under
Lieutenant Colonel Lord ROBERT MANNERS, then commanding the 10th.
Previously to describing the subsequent proceedings of this Brigade, it
is necessary to revert to other matters in order to connect them with
the general disposition of the main Army.
* * * * *
ADAM's Light Infantry Brigade had, in the mean time, been steadily
advancing from the moment of its charge upon the Left Flank of the
Second attacking Column of the French Imperial Guard, sweeping along
the front of the Right Centre of the Anglo-Allied position, and
bringing forward its left shoulders as it neared the Charleroi road, so
that its Left skirted the Orchard of La Haye Sainte. It had now reached
the hollow immediately under the nearest French Height which was
intersected by that road, and upon which the troops that had composed
the first attacking Column of the Guard had been rallied by NAPOLEON,
and formed into three Squares. The 2nd Regiment of _Chasseurs_ of the
Old Guard having formed the extreme Left of the attacking force had
been closely observed by Lieutenant Colonel HALKETT, who continued to
follow it very steadily with the Osnabrück Landwehr Battalion as it
retired towards the high road, inclining to La Belle Alliance.
WELLINGTON, perceiving the confusion in which the Columns of the French
Imperial Guard fell back after the decided failure of their attack--a
confusion which was evidently extending itself with wonderful rapidity
to a vast portion of the troops in their vicinity who witnessed their
discomfiture; remarking also the beautiful advance of VIVIAN's Hussar
Brigade against the French Reserves posted close to La Belle Alliance,
and in the very heart of NAPOLEON's position; as well as the steady and
triumphant march of ADAM's Brigade, which, driving a host of fugitives
before it, had now closely approached the nearest rise of the French
position contiguous to the Charleroi road; finally, observing that
BÜLOW's movement upon Planchenoit had begun to take effect, perceiving
the fire of his cannon, and being also aware that part of a Prussian
Corps had joined his own Left by Ohain,--he ordered a General Advance
of the whole of his Line of Infantry, supported by the Cavalry and
Artillery.
As this long wished for command rapidly passed along the Line, loud
and joyous were the shouts with which it was received. The passive
endurance, not unaccompanied by murmurs, with which the Allied troops
had, during so many hours, withstood the incessant attacks of Cavalry,
Infantry, and Artillery, to which so vast, so awful, a proportion of
their comrades had fallen a sacrifice, now gave place to feelings of
intense exultation, of intoxicating triumph. At the same time, when
they saw that the Advance was general, that the Enemy had retired in
confusion from his last grand attack, and that the Brigades detached
to the front were boldly assailing his Reserves, the conviction
flashed across their minds that if the Duke had hitherto resisted
their demands to be led to the attack, his consummate and unerring
judgement had caused him to defer the advance until that attack could
be undertaken with every probability of success.
Just at this decisive moment, the faint rays of the setting sun shone
forth, and as they struggled to penetrate the almost universal haze
created by the hitherto unremitting volumes of smoke which a close
dense atmosphere appeared incapable of altogether dissipating, they
cast upon the varied and multitudinous objects on the Field, a lurid
light, imparting to them a colouring so strikingly impressive, as
can never be effaced from the memories of those who witnessed that
magnificent Battle scene.
In front of the Line, on the rise occupied by MAITLAND's Brigade of
Guards, stood prominently in view, the great and noble Duke himself,
his hat raised high in air, as the signal for the commencement of the
General Advance; leaders in front of their Divisions and Brigades,
appearing, by their animated gestures, to take their tone from their
great Chieftain; unfurled Colours raised aloft, proudly displaying
their shattered remnants; drums, bugles, trumpets, sending forth their
warlike sounds to commingle with the enthusiastic and tumultuous
cheering of the troops; Artillerymen occupied in working out their
guns from the soft soil in which they had become so deeply imbedded;
Squadrons and Supports pressing forward to gain the ridge, as this
became vacated by the First Line, to behold, and participate in, the
glorious triumph; numerous isolated Soldiers, hurrying on, wherever
they could be spared from attending the wounded, to join their ranks,
and share in the inspiring excitement of such a moment; in the
distance, in front, the retiring masses of the French, intermingled
with crowds of fugitives of all Arms, mounted and dismounted; far
away to the left, the dark Columns of the Prussians, and the smoke
ascending from their Batteries; on the right, and somewhat in advance,
the dense vapour still slowly circling upwards from the glowing embers
of Hougomont, assuming a reddish glare as it floated over the heads of
the brave defenders of that Post of Honour;--all appeared to the eyes
of the beholder illumined, as it were, by a light partaking rather of
the supernatural, than of the ordinary effects of sunshine. It was of
brief duration. The sun sank rapidly below the horizon, and if the
gorgeous colouring which departed with it had been congenial to the
exhilarated feelings of the victors; so, in an equal degree, must the
succeeding twilight, rendered still more gloomy by a clouded sky, have
toned in with the dejected and gloomy spirits of the vanquished. With
these there prevailed no other sentiments than those of a vexed and
mortified perplexity, or an extreme dismay. The panic which had set
in was extending itself wildly and speedily throughout the Line, and
despondency was depicted in every countenance.
The Duke galloped off to ADAM's Brigade, which was then in the valley
immediately below the Height on which the three Squares of the French
Guard were posted; and as these appeared inclined to make a stand,
he ordered ADAM to attack them. The latter, however, suggested to
his Grace that as the Brigade, in consequence of its rapid advance
over the heavy soil in the valley, encumbered as the latter was with
dead and dying men and horses, both singly and in heaps, had become
somewhat loose in its formation, it might be advisable to halt it, to
allow the Files to close in. This was accordingly done. But after a
few moments only had elapsed, the Duke said, "They won't stand--better
attack them;" and being at the time close to the Colours of the centre
Regiment (the 52nd), he called out, "Go on, COLBORNE, go on!"
* * * * *
Colonel Sir COLIN CAMPBELL now rejoined the Duke, and explained the
grounds upon which VIVIAN had decided upon attacking the French Cavalry
Reserves: on learning which Lord UXBRIDGE, who was present, determined
upon personally leading the attack with the Hussars, and participating
in the final and decisive triumph of the British Cavalry; and was on
the point of darting off to that part of the Field, when his intentions
were suddenly frustrated by a grape shot from a Battery on the Height
above him striking and severely wounding his right leg.
Reluctantly compelled to desist from further exertion, this gallant and
noble warrior, who had so bravely, so chivalrously, so skilfully, and
so successfully, led the British Cavalry throughout the day, had still
the satisfaction of feeling and knowing that although not permitted to
witness the closing triumph of that branch of the Service of which he
was at once the Chief, the ornament, and pride, he had well and truly
performed his duty to his Sovereign and his country. He was supported
for some moments by Sir COLIN CAMPBELL, and shortly afterwards, with
the assistance of a party of the 23rd Light Dragoons, carried into the
high road, along which he was borne to Waterloo; and, when subsequently
undergoing, at that Village, the necessary operation of amputation,
so great were the satisfaction and contentment which had been wrought
in his mind as he calmly reflected on the brilliant exploits that had
marked the arduous and varied struggle, that observing the anxious and
compassionate looks of his friends around his couch, he exclaimed, "Who
would not lose a leg for such a victory?"
Seldom indeed has a Cavalry Chief more distinguished himself in the
Field than did the Earl of UXBRIDGE on this great day. As he flew from
one point to another, now boldly rushing into the fight at the head
of a glorious charge, then skilfully covering a retreat under the
pressure of overpowering numbers; here zealously endeavouring by his
own personal example to stimulate and rouse into action the lukewarm
energies of an Ally; there collecting and rallying, for further
high emprize, the remnants of the devoted bands of his own nation;
restlessly vigilant in watching and preparing for the manoeuvres of a
renowned and powerful Cavalry, admirably appointed and equipped, and
led by a KELLERMANN, a GUYOT, and a LEFÈBVRE DESNOUETTES; evincing the
most cool and resolute confidence in the prowess of his followers, as
he dashed forward either to break asunder the combined advance of the
Enemy's masses, or to follow up the advantage already gained by the
Allied Infantry--he seemed to blend and embody in his own character, in
a pre-eminent degree, the heroic valour of ancient chivalry with the
skilled address of modern Cavalry tacticians.
* * * * *
As ADAM's Brigade ascended the hill, in compliance with WELLINGTON's
Orders, to charge the French Squares, it was received with a heavy
fire from their Front and Flanks. The Duke being at this time close to
the centre of the advancing Line, against which point this fire was
principally directed, incurred great personal risk; and as the shot
flew fast and thick about him, Sir COLIN CAMPBELL said to him, "This is
no place for you--you had better move."
To this the Duke replied, "I will when I see those fellows off." On the
near and imposing approach of the Brigade, in the attitude of charging,
the Imperial Guard ceased firing, faced to the rear, and commenced a
retreat by word of command.
As they withdrew, his Grace rode up the valley in the direction of his
right front, and came upon the plain, on which VIVIAN was successfully
attacking the French Reserves.
* * * * *
The gallant charge made by the 10th Hussars upon the French Cavalry
posted in its right front, has already been described.
After ordering the halt and rally, VIVIAN galloped towards the 18th
Hussars, which Regiment he found well formed in Line, and in perfect
order. In its front stood the two Squares of the Grenadiers of the Old
Guard: in its left front, and much nearer to it, were posted Artillery
and Cavalry, in advance of the proper Right of the Squares. This
Cavalry consisted principally of _Cuirassiers_--the wrecks of entire
Brigades. Nearer to, and partly in rear of, the Squares, stood the
_Chasseurs_ and _Grenadiers à Cheval_ of the Imperial Guard, greatly
reduced in numbers.
It was immediately evident to VIVIAN that the attack must in the first
instance be directed against the Advanced Cavalry and Artillery; and
having put the Line in motion, he placed himself in front of the
Centre, beside Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. HENRY MURRAY, the Commanding
Officer, for the purpose of putting the Regiment into the required
direction. This having been effected, he ordered the charge; when the
Hussars dashed forward with the greatest impetuosity, and, at the
same time, with as much steadiness and regularity as if they had been
at Field Day exercise on Hounslow Heath. Thus, the direction of the
charge by the 18th diverged as much to the left, as that by the 10th
had inclined to the right. Just as the charge commenced, some French
Artillery coming from their right and slanting towards the right
of the 18th, made a bold push to cross the front of the latter at a
gallop. But the attempt failed, and the Hussars were instantly among
them, cutting down the Artillerymen and Drivers, and securing the guns.
In the next moment they fell upon the Advanced Cavalry, which they
completely dispersed; and then, bringing forward their left shoulders,
they attacked the Cavalry and guns that stood more to the right front,
and near to the Right Square, which was now retiring. This Cavalry
appeared, at first, determined upon making a stand; and an Officer in
its front dashed forward, and fired at Lieutenant Colonel MURRAY; but,
in another moment, the 18th were fiercely and dexterously plying their
swords amongst them. They were forced to give way, the Artillerymen
were driven from their guns, and the whole fled in disorder.
The charge then ceased to be compact, for the assailants and the flying
were intermingled pell mell; all riding as fast as the confusion of
the _mêlée_ would permit; a part of them along the high road, but
the principal portion on the Allied right of the latter; the whole,
however, passing by La Belle Alliance, and leaving the two Squares of
the Guard on their right.
VIVIAN, satisfied with the complete success of the charge, ordered the
Regiment to halt and reform; whilst he proceeded himself to bring up
the 1st Hussars of the Legion, which Corps he had left in reserve.
On his way he found Major the Hon. FREDERICK HOWARD, with the Right
Squadron of the 10th Hussars, which, as before stated (see page 552),
had been driven to the left by a charge of _Cuirassiers_. This Squadron
stood forward within a short distance of the Left Square of the
Grenadiers of the Guard, from the fire of which it was losing men fast.
VIVIAN doubted for a moment how far it might be advisable to attack
the Square; but perceiving an Infantry Regiment in red advancing on his
left, and calculating on its immediately charging the face and angle
of the Square next to it, he ordered Major HOWARD to charge the face
and angle to which he was opposed. This was executed with the greatest
gallantry and determination. VIVIAN himself joined in the charge, on
the right of the Squadron. The Hussars charged home to the bayonets of
the French Guard, and a fierce conflict ensued. Major HOWARD was killed
at the head of his men. He was shot in the mouth, and fell senseless
to the ground; when one of the Imperial Guard stepped out of the
ranks, and brutally beat his head with the butt end of his musket. Two
other Officers, Lieutenants ARNOLD and BACON, were wounded. Lieutenant
GUNNING was killed immediately previous to the attack. The Regiment
of Infantry, however, did not charge, as VIVIAN had expected; but
continued pursuing a separate Column in its own immediate front on the
high road.
Although the Square, a very strong one, cannot be said to have been
broken by the shock, for the veteran Soldiers of whom it was composed
knew too well their power of resistance against such a handful of
horsemen; still the manner in which the latter, notwithstanding the
rapid diminution of their number, continued cutting at the ranks,
parrying bayonet thrusts, and pertinaciously pressing on, reflects
the highest credit on the 10th British Hussars. The men fought with
desperation; maddened probably by the fall of their Officers.
The Square, yielding to the pressure, continued to fall back until it
reached the hollow way formed by the narrow road that leads from the
_chaussée_ in rear of La Belle Alliance, towards the Left of the French
position. Into this the Guard hastily descended in confusion, and
escaping by either outlet, mingled with the host of fugitives hurrying
along the general line of retreat of the French Army.
In the mean time, the remainder of the 10th Hussars, consisting of
the Left and Centre Squadrons, that had, in the course of the first
charge, crossed over to the right of the rise of ground on which the
French Reserve Cavalry had been posted, had continued its course,
under Lord ROBERT MANNERS, down into the valley, south-east of the
Hougomont inclosures. The routed Cavalry spread out in the utmost
confusion--_Cuirassiers_, of an almost gigantic size, galloped as hard
as they could; and numbers tumbled off their horses to save themselves.
The Hussars now came upon retiring Infantry that appeared seized with
a panic as their routed Cavalry dashed past them--the large bearskin
caps, worn by several of them, betokened a portion of the Imperial
Guard--they commenced throwing down their arms, numbers of them loudly
calling out "_Pardon!_"
Then crossing the same narrow road, before mentioned as leading from La
Belle Alliance to the Left of the French position (but on the Allied
right of the hollow way by which the Square of the Guard effected its
escape), the Hussars brought up their right shoulders, and ascended the
Height in rear of the hollow road. Upon the slope of the Hill, about
half a Battalion of the French Guard had rallied and formed, with some
Cavalry close behind them, and opened a sharp fire upon the 10th. Part
of the 18th Hussars, at this time, reached the hollow way, an obstacle,
however, which rendered _their_ attack wholly impracticable. Lord
ROBERT MANNERS halted for a minute, when within about forty paces from
them, to allow his men to form up. He then gave a cheer and charged;
when the Imperial Guard and the Cavalry instantly turned and fled: the
greater portion of the former throwing themselves down, and many of the
latter tumbling off their horses.
The Hussars pursued up to the brow of the hill: on the further, or
south, side of which was a deep hollow; and beyond this a Knoll (on
the Allied right of the Charleroi road and nearly opposite DE COSTER's
house) upon which another Square of Infantry had formed, and appeared
very steady.
At this time a party of the 18th Hussars--not more than from thirty to
thirty five men--continuing the charge, before described, close along
the right of La Belle Alliance and Trimotion, and crossing the narrow
road near its junction with the Charleroi road, dashed down the hollow,
and ascending the Height above mentioned, charged the Square in most
gallant style; but, as might have been expected, was checked and turned
by the latter.
Lord ROBERT MANNERS and Captain TAYLOR had rallied a party of the 10th
Hussars, with a view to support the 18th, should these be charged in
their turn; which however did not occur.
The two last mentioned Regiments had, by this time, been thrown so much
into disorder by their charges, that it became necessary to check their
further advance, in order to gain time for collecting and reforming
their ranks. Although this measure was supported by the coming up of
the 1st Hussars of the Legion to take post in front of the Brigade, and
was also rendered secure by the advance, on the right, of VANDELEUR's
Brigade (which had come up on VIVIAN's right, and between him and the
inclosures of Hougomont, in Column of Squadrons, at the moment he was
preparing to charge the Square of the Imperial Guard with the party of
the 10th Hussars under Major HOWARD); still the rallying and reforming
of those two Regiments was attended with considerable difficulty,
inasmuch as they had become completely intermingled with the fugitives.
* * * * *
It is now necessary to recur to ADAM's Brigade, which we left
advancing, and driving before it, near the Charleroi road, the three
Squares of the Guard that had retired as it approached to charge them.
It will be recollected that, upon the Brigade first advancing from the
Allied position, Lieutenant Colonel HALKETT followed it in immediate
rear of its Right Flank, with the Osnabrück Battalion of Hanoverian
Landwehr. When ADAM reached the three Squares above mentioned, HALKETT,
having the shortest space of ground to move over, soon came up in
Line with the Brigade, still pursuing the Column formed by the two
Battalions of _Chasseurs_ of the Old Guard. The Osnabrückers having
then become much annoyed by a fire that opened upon them obliquely from
a French Battery within a very short distance of their right, their 1st
Company broke into subdivisions and, supported by the Sharpshooters of
the Battalion, made a dash at the Artillery, and captured six guns.
During the greater part of the advance, they had been in almost close
contact with the Column formed by the two Battalions of _Chasseurs_ of
the Old Guard; and HALKETT frequently called out to them to surrender.
Having for some short time fixed his eye upon an individual whom he
took to be the General Officer in command of the Guard, from his being
in full uniform, and from the animation he displayed in his endeavours
to induce his men to stand their ground; and observing that the Column,
after receiving the fire of the Osnabrückers, left the General with
two Officers in its rear, he ordered the Sharpshooters to dash on,
whilst he, at the same time darted forward at full gallop to attack the
General. When he had come up with him, and was about to cut him down;
the latter called out that he would surrender.
CAMBRONNE, for he it was, then preceded HALKETT as he returned to the
Hanoverian Battalion; but had not gone many paces before HALKETT's
horse was wounded, and fell to the ground. In a few seconds, however,
HALKETT succeeded in getting him on his legs again, when he found that
his prisoner was escaping in the direction of the French Column: he
instantly overtook him, seized him by the _aiguilette_, brought him to
the Battalion, and gave him in charge to a Serjeant of the Osnabrückers
who was to deliver him to the Duke.
ADAM's Brigade had by this time crossed to the opposite side of
the Charleroi road, and, bringing forward its left shoulders, was
continuing its advance, in pursuit of the defeated Squares, in a
direction parallel with that road; whilst HALKETT, by continuing on the
inner flank, and following the Battalions of the _Chasseurs_ of the Old
Guard, had got somewhat in advance, or rather, in right front of that
Brigade; and had, shortly before, reached the immediate vicinity of
that part of the Field on which VIVIAN was in the act of preparing to
charge the Square of the Grenadiers of the Old Guard with the Squadron
of the 10th Hussars under Major HOWARD. The Osnabrückers will here be
recognised as the Regiment of Allied Infantry already alluded to in the
description given of that Charge.
ADAM, after his repulse of the three Squares of the Imperial Guard,
perceiving that he was so much in front of the main Line of the
Anglo-Allied Army, and not being aware of VIVIAN's advance, had become
apprehensive of an attack upon his Right Flank; and he therefore
desired his Brigade Major, Major BLAIR, to proceed in the prolongation
of his Right Flank, and observe whether there was any threatening
appearance of the Enemy's Cavalry in that quarter. The latter, pursuing
his errand, met the Duke of WELLINGTON moving at a quick pace, followed
by a single individual, to whom Major BLAIR addressed himself, but who
immediately checked him by remarking, "_Monsieur, je ne parle pas un
seul mot d'Anglais!_" Major BLAIR then explained to him, in French,
the Order he had received, to which he replied, "_Le Duc lui même a
été voir; il n'y a rien à craindre_;" whereupon the former returned to
ADAM, with this satisfactory information.
Here, then, was the great Chieftain himself, still in the Battle's
front, vigilantly watching, and eagerly seizing advantage of, the
course of events; braving every peril, and acting solely upon his own
personal observation; his Staff, and even Orderlies, almost all killed
or wounded; the very few that remained untouched, carrying messages;
his only attendant, a foreigner (Major Count DE SALES, a Sardinian
Officer), attached to his suite!
It is impossible not to recognise in the extraordinary degree of
security with which this great man so fearlessly exposed himself
throughout the entire day, the protecting interposition of an all wise
and merciful Providence. At this moment, too, he was not only upon
the track of his great antagonist; but, in all probability, within
the shortest distance that ever separated these wonderful men from
each other: the one, alone, and in front of his advancing Line, borne
forward on the wings of victory, and upheld by the knowledge of his
might and the fulness of his glory; the other, seeking shelter amidst
his devoted, yet broken and dispirited, cohorts; abandoning himself to
despair, and flying from the fatal Field on which the sceptre he had
usurped was signally and irrecoverably struck from his iron grasp.
CHAPTER XV.
The very forward movement of VIVIAN's Brigade, and the vigorous attack
which it made against the Centre of the French position, having
rendered obvious the necessity of an immediate Support, VANDELEUR's
Brigade was despatched across the ridge in Column of Half Squadrons,
Right in front, at the moment of the General Advance of the Line.
It proceeded at a smart trot along the east side of the Hougomont
inclosures, and then descended into the valley in rear of the latter,
passing VIVIAN's Brigade on its left. Here it fell in with disordered
Columns of the French Infantry in full retreat; as also Cavalry, of
all kinds mixed together, the _Cuirassiers_ throwing off their armour
to facilitate their flight. In the midst of this confusion, however,
there stood higher up the valley a large Column on the opposite side
of the road which connects the Centre with the Left of the French
position, forming Square, and seemingly determined to oppose the
further advance of the Brigade. The latter, receiving the fire from
the Column, charged; and the French giving way, the whole of them were
taken or destroyed. In this charge the 11th Light Dragoons, forming the
Right of the Brigade, captured a Battery on the Height to which the
before mentioned road ascends. It was the last which had maintained the
cannonade from the French Left Wing.
VANDELEUR's Brigade continued to press forward, driving a host of
fugitives before it. It was by this time in advance, and rather in
Right Front, of VIVIAN. Colonel Sir FELTON HARVEY, of the Staff, came
up to its then Commander, Lieutenant Colonel SLEIGH, of the 11th Light
Dragoons,--VANDELEUR having taken the command of the Cavalry upon the
fall of Lord UXBRIDGE,--and informed him that a French Cavalry Brigade
was moving along the Heights on the right (or western) side of the
Valley. The Cavalry did not, however, venture to descend into the lower
ground, where it might have fallen upon SLEIGH's Right Flank; but
continued its course along the high ground towards some point on the
Charleroi road, quite in rear of the main French Army, apparently with
the intention of protecting the retreat and rallying the fugitives. It
was PIRÉ's Light Cavalry Brigade, that had been stationed throughout
the day on the extreme Left of the French Line.
In this manner, VIVIAN's Brigade, which had not only broken, but
completely pierced, the Centre of the French position, had its Right
effectually protected; and due advantage was promptly taken of the
disorder into which its bold and successful advance had thrown those
French troops that had been moving in that quarter. At the same time,
VIVIAN's Left was secured by the advance of ADAM's Brigade, which
continued to drive before it, along the left side of the Charleroi
road, the Squares of the Guard, as also the _Cuirassiers_ by whom the
latter were supported. These _Cuirassiers_, it should be observed, had
fronted and evinced a disposition to charge as the Brigade crossed the
high road. ADAM, however, feeling secure in his four deep formation,
continued pressing towards them; and when, along that part of his Line
against which the attack was threatened, the British bayonets were
lowered, the _Cuirassiers_ declined the contest.
Having thus detailed the brilliant successes of these three British
Brigades, with which WELLINGTON had so boldly assailed the Centre,
and effectually destroyed the last Reserves, of the Enemy; it is now
time to consider their important consequences in conjunction with the
General Advance of the Anglo-Allied Army; and for this purpose it will
be necessary to take a more extended view of the prominent features
which the Field of Battle presented at this period of the day.
* * * * *
On no part of the French Army, beyond the immediate sphere of action of
the above Brigades, did the advance of the latter exercise so powerful
an influence as on D'ERLON's Corps, which constituted its Right Wing.
The defeat of the Second attacking Column of the Imperial Guard, it
will be recollected, involved in it the retreat of DONZELOT's Division
of that Corps; which, from the cover afforded it by the possession of
La Haye Sainte, and from the hollow on its left of that Farm, had so
furiously assailed the central portion of the Duke's Line, occupied by
ALTEN's Division. On the opposite side of the Charleroi road, from the
Knoll above the Sand Pit, part of ALIX's Division was still maintaining
a most destructive fire upon the remains of PICTON's Division and of
LAMBERT's Brigade posted along the Wavre road. The remainder of this
Division, as well as that under MARCOGNET, were advancing across the
valley which separated the Anglo-Allied Left, from the French Right,
Wing; and presented an array of Columns between the Knoll on the left
of La Haye Sainte and the Left of DURUTTE's Division: which latter was
now operating in concert with LOBAU's Corps in maintaining a defensive
position against the advance of the Prussians.
When, therefore, WELLINGTON so suddenly launched forth VIVIAN's Hussar
Brigade against NAPOLEON's Reserves, then posted close to La Belle
Alliance in the very Centre of the French Army; and also pushed forward
ADAM's Light Infantry Brigade past the Farm and Orchard of La Haye
Sainte towards the eminence on which stood the three rallied Squares of
the Imperial Guard; he completely turned the Left of D'ERLON's Corps:
and by means of the brilliant success which attended these movements,
he gradually established himself in rear both of D'ERLON and of LOBAU;
the latter of whom was still defending himself against BLÜCHER's
advance.
In like manner, the Columns of REILLE's Corps, comprising the Left Wing
of the French Army, and which were advancing through, and contiguously
to, the Hougomont inclosures, were turned in their Right Flank.
Thus, by this bold and masterly manoeuvre, the whole Front Line of the
French Army, which, a short time before, had presented so menacing an
appearance, was thrown into disorder and confusion: and supported as
that manoeuvre was by the advance, at the right moment, of the Duke's
entire Line; any attempt, on the part of the French, to rally and
resume the offensive, was entirely frustrated. The firm, decided, and
determined attitude which WELLINGTON had assumed, had, in fact, struck
terror and dismay into the ranks of his opponent: who, perceiving the
hasty and confused retreat of his troops, as also the extreme pressure
upon his Right by the formidable and now more general attack on the
part of BLÜCHER, became completely paralyzed; and conscious of the
utter futility of attempting to stem the torrent, he threw himself
for temporary shelter into the Square of the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd
Regiment of _Chasseurs_ of the Guard.
The Anglo-Allied Line continued its magnificent Advance; which was in
truth a march of triumph, not of attack, since all fled before its
approach. In the Centre, LAMBERT's Brigade, together with the 1st or
Royal Scots, crossed to the Charleroi road, and took possession of La
Haye Sainte; which was found entirely abandoned to the wounded and the
dying, who constituted its sole but numerous occupants. The troops that
had stood in rear of Hougomont, now poured into its inclosures, aiding
and supporting those who had so bravely maintained that important
Post in completely clearing it of its assailants; as many of the
latter in the Wood, ignorant of what was passing in the open Field,
still endeavoured to hold their ground. The Light Troops on the right
of Hougomont crossed the Nivelles road without opposition: not only
the Infantry in their front having retired, but PIRÉ's Light Cavalry
Brigade, which had formed the extreme Left of the French Army during
the whole day, having been ordered to proceed to the rear of the Centre
to cover the general retreat.
The extreme Left of the Line was flanked by the Prussian Regiments of
Cavalry, belonging to ZIETEN's Corps, previously mentioned as having
joined shortly before the General Advance; and the Battalions of the
First Prussian Infantry Brigade, together with the Nassau Brigade under
Prince BERNHARD of Saxe Weimar, were pressing up the Heights against
the Left of DURUTTE's Division posted at the apex of the angle of
_potence_ on which stood the extreme Right of the French Army. As the
Allied Left descended the outer slope of the position, those Columns of
D'ERLON's Corps which had advanced to attack it, were hastily retiring;
part of them, indeed, along and near the Charleroi road, had already
fallen back in disorder the moment they became aware of the defeat of
the troops on the other side of that road, and of the advance of ADAM's
Brigade, by which their Left Flank was completely turned, and their
rear most seriously endangered. DURUTTE's Division, forming, as before
observed, the Right of D'ERLON's Corps, and posted in the angle of
_potence_, perceiving in its direct rear, the retreat of the Imperial
Guard, followed by British Infantry; as also that of the Columns of its
own Corps on its Left, followed by the Anglo-Allied Line; besides the
attack of the Prussians in its Front and on its Right, and which was
increasing every moment in vigour and effect; at once saw the certainty
of its being cut off if it remained in its present attitude: and hence,
aware of its own helplessness, it took to flight.
In the next moment the renewed cheering along the Anglo-Allied Left
Wing, announced that it had reached and captured the strong Line of
Batteries; by the fire of which, maintained during the entire day,
its ranks had been so awfully diminished. ZIETEN's Battalions took
possession, also, of the Batteries which had protected the apex of the
angle of _potence_, and which had been covered by DURUTTE's Division.
Notwithstanding the confused retreat of the Flank Columns of D'ERLON's
Corps, those which constituted the central portion of his Line had
hitherto retired in some little degree of order: but now they began
rapidly to dissolve as the Allied Line approached; and, soon spreading
out, they broke forth into one general crowd of fugitives.
The flight of these troops immediately along the rear of LOBAU's
Line, at the very moment of its being most vigorously assailed by the
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Infantry Brigades of BÜLOW's Corps, covered
by an overpowering cannonade, involved its ranks in the general panic
which had become uncontrollable. The whole Corps rushed wildly into the
stream of fugitives which, with overwhelming force, had set in towards
Rossomme and Maison du Roi, on the Charleroi road, the direct line of
retreat.
By this time (about a quarter past eight o'clock), ADAM's Brigade,
pursuing its course on the left side of the high road, was ascending
the higher ground in rear of La Belle Alliance. Here it fell into
the line of fire of one of BÜLOW's Batteries; which had immediately
followed up the retreat of LOBAU's Corps, and opened a cannonade from
the previous position of the latter, at a distance of about seven
hundred yards. WELLINGTON, perceiving that this fire might occasion
serious injury to his advancing troops, directed Count DE SALES (who
was still his sole attendant) to proceed to the Prussian Battery,
and cause it to cease firing; its Commanding Officer not being aware
that its shot were falling among British troops. BÜLOW, on becoming
acquainted with this circumstance, immediately checked the fire of his
Artillery; and, at the same time, ordered the Infantry of his Right to
refrain from firing during its forward movement.
The road which leads from the _chaussée_ across the Height in rear of
La Belle Alliance, towards Planchenoit, becomes, after a distance of
about a hundred yards, a complete hollow way. As it was approached by
ADAM's Brigade, a Column of Artillery and Infantry, from the French
Right, was hastily retreating up that part of it which was in front
of the 52nd Regiment, quite unaware of its having fallen into the
immediate vicinity of British Infantry. Astonished by the sudden
appearance of the latter along the bank, the Column hesitated for a
moment what course to adopt. The Infantry at first presented some
little show of defence; but soon threw down their arms, dispersed and
escaped as best they could. The Artillery made a dash at the opposite
bank, but some of the horses of each gun were instantly brought down by
a fire from the British, and the attempt failed. The Commanding Officer
of the Battery, as if in a fit of desperation, standing in the centre
of his guns, waved his sword above his head in defiance. A soldier from
the 52nd Regiment sprang forward, parried his thrust, closed with him,
threw him on the ground, and bayoneted him. The guns were immediately
abandoned.
On the Right of the Brigade, the 71st Regiment having gained the Height
on which a Reserve Battery of the Imperial Guard had been posted the
entire day, and had just made an attempt to draw off into the high
road, it was captured by that Corps; when some men of the Right Flank
Company of the latter (Captain REED's), under Lieutenant TORRIANO,
immediately turned round one of the guns, which was then discharged
into the retiring Columns of the Imperial Guard by Captain CAMPBELL,
Aide de Camp to Major General ADAM, and was, there is reason to
believe, the last French gun fired on that day.
Lieutenant Colonel HALKETT, who, with the Hanoverian Battalion
Osnabrück, had entered the Charleroi road, near La Belle Alliance,
continued to press before him the two Battalions of the _Chasseurs_ of
the Old Guard, under the protection of which, NAPOLEON with several
of his principal Staff Officers were retiring from the Field. HALKETT
soon found himself in the midst of a great but disordered mass of the
Enemy's Cavalry, which menaced the Battalion in a most vociferous
manner; but, after receiving the fire from the latter, it went off in
all directions. Further on, perceiving several guns in full retreat,
he sent the Sharpshooters of the Battalion, supported by a Company,
amongst them; who, by their fire, increased the confusion, and then
made many prisoners, and cut the traces of the horses from the leading
guns.
The Regiments of Prussian Cavalry belonging to ZIETEN's Corps, before
mentioned as having joined the Left of the Anglo-Allied Army, after
crossing the valley and ascending the French position, had got
somewhat in advance of the Left of the Anglo-Allied Infantry, taking
the direction of Rossomme; but they soon found their progress most
seriously obstructed and retarded by the vast crowds of fugitives of
all Arms intermingled in the wildest confusion.
Such was also the case with the much more advanced British Light
Cavalry Brigades under VANDELEUR and VIVIAN on the right of the
Charleroi road. In fact, the Cavalry thus situated in the Van of the
Duke's victorious Army, had now become almost helpless: it seemed as if
carried aloft on the billows of the agitated sea, yielding rather to
its impulses than controlling the angry element.
As might have been expected, there were innumerable instances in which
the rage and disappointment of the conquered foe gave rise to covert
assaults, which, however, were speedily repressed; more especially
by the Prussians, against whom a word or look sufficed to draw down
their vengeance upon an Enemy whom they held in detestation. The 10th
and 18th British Hussars of VIVIAN's Brigade, whilst endeavouring to
reform between La Belle Alliance and Rossomme, found themselves in
the midst of an immense crowd, composed partly of defeated soldiers
of the Imperial Guard; who could but ill conceal their mortification,
and who seized every opportunity that afforded to gratify their hatred
and revenge. Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. HENRY MURRAY, commanding the
18th, was very nearly bayoneted by one of them; and his Orderly was
compelled, for the security of his master, to cut down five or six in
rapid succession.
A remarkable exception to the general disorganisation of the French
Army was manifested about this time in front of VANDELEUR's Brigade,
which was the furthest in advance of any of the Allied troops. In
the midst of the crowd of fugitives which impeded the progress of the
Brigade; there appeared a Regiment of Cavalry, moving at a walk, in
Close Column, and in perfect order, as if disdaining to allow itself to
be contaminated by the confusion that prevailed around it. It was the
_Grenadiers à Cheval_. The 12th British Light Dragoons were the nearest
to it, having got in advance of the rest of the Brigade, and were
opposite the Right Flank of the Column, whence a few pistol or carbine
shots were fired at them. The 12th made a partial attack; but they were
so much inferior in numbers (being very weak at this period), and were
so greatly obstructed in their movements by the crowd, that they were
unable to produce any impression upon so compact and steady a body of
Cavalry; which literally walked from the Field in the most orderly
manner, moving majestically along the stream, the surface of which was
covered with the innumerable wrecks into which the rest of the French
Army had been scattered.
As NAPOLEON and his Staff were at this time retiring along the high
road, on the Right Flank of this Cavalry of the Guard; it is reasonable
to infer that the latter was therefore induced to maintain the
admirable order in which it was thus seen, to secure the Emperor's
retreat.
Whilst the great mass of the French Army, in a state of thorough
disorganisation, was thus driven by WELLINGTON's victorious troops
across the whole extent of ground which had constituted its general
position; as also, on its Right, by that portion of the Prussian troops
consisting of part of ZIETEN's, and of the Right Wing of BÜLOW's,
Corps: the Battalions of the French Imperial Guard in Planchenoit were
maintaining a most desperate and obstinate contest with BÜLOW's Left
Wing, aided by a part of PIRCH's Corps, to which the attack of the
Village had been confided.
The principal force of the Imperial Guard having taken post within the
central portion of the Village, and strongly occupied the Churchyard;
the headmost Columns of this Third Prussian attack met with a most
destructive fire as they pressed forward through the lanes that led
towards the eastern side of the Church. The supporting Columns now
came up, and joined in the _fusillade_ that was maintained with the
French in the Churchyard; the stone wall encircling which, lined with
troops, gave to it the appearance of a little fortress. The Prussians,
extending their front so as to envelope a considerable portion of
the Churchyard, and taking advantage of the houses and inclosures
which they had reached on their own side, maintained a terrific
fire upon their opponents; and as the latter appeared resolved to
keep them at bay to the last, a great loss of life occurred on both
sides. The soldiers of the Imperial Guard fought desperately; and so
greatly was their animosity excited, that some Officers of the 15th
Prussian Regiment and of the Silesian Landwehr, who had been made
prisoners in the previous attack, were with difficulty saved by General
PELET's personal exertions from becoming a sacrifice to their fury.
Reinforcements were moved into the Churchyard from the Reserves on its
western side; and the pertinacity with which the attacks upon it were
repelled showed very plainly that other means than that of a front
assault must be resorted to for forcing the French from a Post which
afforded them such superior advantages in the defence of the Village.
If the Prussians attempted to outflank the Churchyard by advancing
along the low open space on its right; they became exposed to the
commanding fire from its walls, to that from the opposite houses, and
in front, to the Reserves. If they ventured to pass close by its left
they had but a narrow road open to them, bounded by the Churchyard
wall on one side strongly lined by the defenders, and by houses on
the other which the Enemy still occupied, and presenting also at its
further extremity a Farm House and its offices in flames, situated
so close to the Churchyard as to conceal by its smoke any Column of
Reserve that might be posted in that quarter.
Hence it was determined to act upon a broader extent of Front, and
to turn the entire Village on both Flanks; so as either to force, or
to intercept, the retreat of the Enemy from his stronghold in the
Churchyard. On the Prussian Left, Major WITZLEBEN, with the Fusilier
Battalion of the 25th Regiment, had already crossed the rivulet which
divides the Village into two nearly equal parts, and was attacking
that portion of the French Guard which was posted upon the narrow
ridge which lies between that rivulet and the Lasne. His Skirmishers
were joined upon their left by those that had preceded the 1st and 2nd
Battalions of this Regiment; and which latter having pushed through the
Wood of Virère, were now following close up in support of the attack
on this part of Planchenoit. These Skirmishers were also connected
on their left with those of the Fusilier Battalions of both the 15th
Regiment and the 1st Silesian Landwehr, under Major KELLER, who was
advancing along the right bank of the Lasne. Along the crest of this
ridge runs a narrow road, with several cottages on either side of the
latter: the ground is throughout intersected with hedges and studded
with trees; and altogether admirably adapted for a protracted defence
by Light Troops. Every house, every lane, and every hedge was gallantly
contested.
The Prussians not only boldly attacking in front; but skilfully
and gradually turning the ridge upon both sides, at length gained
possession of all this portion of the Village, and thus outflanked
the troops in the Churchyard, who maintained to the last a most
desperate defence. In the mean time, the houses and inclosures on the
left of the Church had also been turned on that side by the Right of
the Prussian attack: and principally by the 5th Westphalian Landwehr,
the Skirmishers of which had beaten back their opponents close under
the walls of the burning buildings; the bright flames from which,
gleaming upon the combatants, who rent the air with their shouts, gave
a peculiar wildness to this scene of mortal strife. But still more wild
and awful must have been the scene within the Church, as the red flood
of light which they poured through the windows of the aisles, fell upon
the agonised and distorted features of the wounded and the dying with
which that sacred edifice was at this moment filled.
The Prussians continued pressing forward along both Flanks of the
Village, driving the Imperial Guard from house to house, from hedge
to hedge, and from tree to tree, until at length it became obvious to
the French that their rear would soon be intercepted. The latter were
also by this time fully aware of the _déroute_ of the main Army; and,
giving up all for lost as they fell back upon the western portion of
the Village, they made a hasty and disorderly retreat towards Maison du
Roi.
The _Chasseurs_ of the Old Guard were the last to quit the Churchyard,
and suffered severely as they retired. Their numbers were awfully
diminished; and PELET, collecting together about 250 of them, found
himself vigorously assailed by the Prussian Cavalry from the moment
he quitted the confines of Planchenoit and entered upon the plain
between the latter and the high road. At one time, his ranks having
opened out too much in the hurry of their retreat, some of the Prussian
troops in pursuit, both Cavalry and Infantry, endeavoured to capture
the Eagle, which, covered with black crape, was carried in the midst
of this devoted little band of Veterans. PELET, taking advantage of
a spot of ground which afforded them some degree of cover against
the fire of grape by which they were constantly assailed, halted the
Standard Bearer, and called out "_A moi, Chasseurs! sauvons l'Aigle ou
mourons autour d'elle!_" The _Chasseurs_ immediately pressed around
him, forming what is usually termed the Rallying Square; and, lowering
their bayonets, succeeded in repulsing the charge of Cavalry. Some
guns were then brought to bear upon them, and subsequently a brisk
fire of musketry: but notwithstanding the awful sacrifice which was
thus offered up in defence of their precious charge, they succeeded in
reaching the main line of retreat, favoured by the universal confusion,
as also by the general obscurity which now prevailed; and thus saved
alike the Eagle and the honour of the Regiment.
The Reserve Cavalry of the Second and Fourth Prussian Corps received
Orders to pass to the front through the Infantry: that of the Fourth
Corps, under Prince WILLIAM of Prussia, moved by the right of
Planchenoit, as also through the Village itself; but its progress was
greatly impeded by the fugitives that crowded towards Maison du Roi.
In the mean time, the Prussian Battalions that had been detached for
the protection of the Left of the attack upon Planchenoit, namely the
Fusilier Battalion of the 15th Regiment, and that of the 1st Silesian
Landwehr, under Major KELLER, as also that of the 25th Regiment, under
Major WITZLEBEN, had turned the Village, and followed the Enemy nearly
in the direction of Maison du Roi. They met with some resistance on the
part of the Battalion of the Grenadiers of the Imperial Guard, which
had advanced from Caillon, in pursuance of the Orders it had received,
into the Wood of Chantelet; but they soon forced their way to the high
road, and by their presence added greatly to the disorder in which the
Enemy was flying from the Field.
Major FALKENHAUSEN, having remarked the retreat of the French, as he
stood on the Height of Seroulx, to which he had been detached with one
hundred Horsemen of the 3rd Silesian Landwehr Cavalry, also moved down
upon the high road, and charging the Flank of the flying Foe, tended
still further to augment the alarm and confusion that prevailed.
When the French Imperial Guard was falling back from Planchenoit
in disorder and confusion towards the high road between Rossomme
and Maison du Roi, WELLINGTON's Advanced Brigades had reached the
former place. It was about half past eight o'clock--perhaps somewhat
later--and the darkness, which had been rapidly setting in, had become
so great as to render it difficult to distinguish one particular body
of troops from another.
Some little time before this, one of the Prussian Advanced Regiments of
Cavalry, suddenly entering the high road between La Belle Alliance and
Rossomme, came into partial collision with the 18th British Hussars;
who, not anticipating the presence of any other foreign troops in that
vicinity than those of the French Army, commenced an attack upon them:
cuts were exchanged, and some few lives lost, before the error was
corrected.
The 1st Hussars of the German Legion, while advancing along the right
of the high road, came upon the rear of VANDELEUR's Brigade, and were
all but in collision with the 11th and 16th British Light Dragoons;
which Regiments, having previously ascertained that a Brigade of
French Cavalry (PIRÉ's) was on their right, and perceiving, though
but dimly, in the dark, the approach of a strong body of horsemen
towards their rear, concluded that an attempt was made to intercept
their retreat. They immediately went "threes about," and struck into
a charge. On the other hand, the 1st German Hussars, not being aware
that any British Cavalry was in their front, and misled in a great
measure by the sudden clamour of French voices proceeding from the
numerous fugitives, who, taking the alarm, were endeavouring to get out
of their way, prepared to charge, and gave a loud cheer. This cheer
was fortunately recognised by the British Dragoons, when in the act of
charging, as that of the 1st German Hussars; and was thus the means
of preventing a rencontre that might have been productive of the most
fatal consequences to the parties concerned.
WELLINGTON had, previously to this, given Orders that the main body
of his Army should halt upon what had been the French position, in
the Line of La Belle Alliance; having arranged, by communication with
BLÜCHER, that the latter, whose troops were comparatively fresh, should
take up the pursuit: and, as the Prussians continued moving forward
in great force towards the high road, he directed his own troops to
proceed to the right of the latter, so as to leave it clear for their
advance. The Prussian Regiments, on passing the British, caused their
bands to play the national anthem, _GOD save the King!_ a compliment
which was greeted, on the part of the latter, by hearty and friendly
cheers.
The Duke now stood with his Advance of both Infantry and Cavalry, on
the elevated ground beyond Rossomme, overlooking Maison du Roi. The
moon had risen, and by the light it gradually spread over the Field, as
also by the objects set fire to at intervals along the high road, the
retreating line of his vanquished Foe became sufficiently perceptible
to satisfy him that the brilliant victory he had gained was rendered
secure beyond a doubt. Having ordered his Advanced Brigades to take up
their bivouacs for the night, he returned from this distant part of the
Field, and proceeded leisurely along the Charleroi road back towards
Waterloo.
ADAM's Brigade bivouacked on the spot it had reached; VANDELEUR's on
the right, near the Wood of Callois in which stood the Observatory;
while VIVIAN, inclining somewhat to his right, led his Hussars much
further in advance of the Army, on the French side of the Observatory,
and established his bivouac close to the Hamlet of Hilaincourt.
On approaching La Belle Alliance, WELLINGTON ordered the whole of his
Army to bivouac on the Field of Battle. On reaching that point, he
met BLÜCHER; and mutual congratulations took place between them on
the splendid victory achieved. The latter, taking advantage of the
designation of the House as felicitously applicable to the meeting of
the two Commanders, and considering also that it had constituted the
direction point for the advance of the main portion of his troops,
styled this glorious contest the Battle of La Belle Alliance. With
the promise of vigorously following up the pursuit, and allowing the
Enemy no opportunity of rallying within a march from the Field, he took
his leave of the Duke; who then continued to ride leisurely towards
Waterloo, where he passed the night.
The circumstances of the Duke having established his Head Quarters
in this Village, and the name of the latter being more consonant to
English pronunciation than that of any other place nearer to the Field,
acquired for this ever memorable struggle, the designation, by the
British, of the BATTLE OF WATERLOO.
BLÜCHER, determined to allow no breathing time to the flying Enemy, and
to deprive him of all power of rallying, at least on this side of the
French frontier, gave Orders that BÜLOW's Corps should undertake the
pursuit along the Charleroi road; that ZIETEN's Corps should follow
in support of BÜLOW; and that PIRCH's Corps should march by Aywiers,
and cross the Dyle, for the purpose of intercepting GROUCHY's troops;
which, it was presumed, would soon be retreating from Wavre towards the
Sambre.
The Prussian Battalions, already mentioned as having turned the
Village of Planchenoit, and entered the high road near Maison du Roi,
accompanied by only three Squadrons of Uhlans, formed the Advance of
the pursuing Army. GNEISENAU, placing himself at their head, proceeded
to carry into effect the commands of his veteran Chief and friend. The
Cavalry, under Prince WILLIAM, followed; and then the Infantry of the
two Corps.
At Genappe, the first important Defile through which the main French
Army retired, an immense number of carriages and waggons of all kinds
had been collected together--some having been withdrawn from the Field,
and others, such as those of the Commissariat or Ordnance Departments,
having come up to join, or to follow in the track of, the French Army.
By judicious management, these materials, combined with a suitable
defence, would have afforded the means of seriously impeding the
further pursuit by the victors. Some intention of this kind appeared
to have been entertained, as several waggons had been upset, so as to
obstruct the crossing of the Bridge, a narrow passage only being left
to admit stragglers. But no sooner did the Prussian Advance appear,
in the moonlight, descending from the Heights overlooking Genappe,
with drums beating and bugles sounding, than the rearmost of the
French troops (for Rear Guard there was none to an Army from which all
semblance of order and regularity had vanished), immediately after
firing a few shots, fled from the place. This was at about eleven
o'clock. The quantity of baggage that was collected here presented a
rich booty to the Prussians; but the most valuable and most interesting
object consisted of NAPOLEON's travelling carriage, which, with all its
contents, fell into the hands of the Fusilier Battalion of the 15th
Regiment.
The Infantry of BÜLOW's and ZIETEN's Corps halted at Genappe: but
as soon as the Prussian Advance, including the Cavalry under Prince
WILLIAM, had succeeded in forcing its way through the immense mass of
waggons and carriages of all kinds with which this Defile had been
blocked up, GNEISENAU, moving the Infantry along the road, and flanking
it on each side by the Cavalry, continued the pursuit. He succeeded in
driving the French from not less than seven bivouacs, which they had
taken up in succession; but each of which they abandoned the moment
they heard the sounds of the Prussian drums or bugles.
* * * * *
It was an hour after midnight when NAPOLEON reached Quatre Bras; whence
he despatched several Officers to make known to GROUCHY the loss of the
Battle, and to order him to retire upon Namur. The Officers whom he had
previously detached from Genappe to Ligny, for the purpose of moving
GIRARD's Division, which had been left there, into position at Quatre
Bras, now brought him word that they had not succeeded in finding it.
There appeared to be no possibility of presenting, at this point, any
effectual check to the Prussian pursuit. General NÈGRE of the Artillery
was here with the Parks of Reserve, but accompanied by a very feeble
escort.
The Soldiers of the First and Second Corps, who, during the advance
of the 15th, had crossed the Sambre by the Bridge of Marchiennes, had
quitted the high road, both at Quatre Bras and at Gosselies, to proceed
in the direction of that point; and with so much precipitation that
they could not be halted for the purpose of forming something like a
Rear Guard.
The Sixth Corps, the Imperial Guard, and part of the Cavalry, retreated
upon Charleroi, whither NAPOLEON himself proceeded; after having sent
his brother JEROME to Marchiennes, with Orders to rally the troops
between Avesnes and Maubeuge.
* * * * *
In the mean time, GNEISENAU continued his wild nocturnal chase, which
was truly _LÜTZOW's wilde verwegene Jagd_. His followers, however,
having been on the march or in action, since daybreak, were becoming
weary, especially the Infantry: besides which, several, impelled by
hunger, stopped on the way to plunder provision waggons; so that their
numbers had greatly diminished.
But GNEISENAU, who was the life and soul of the pursuit, and who
seemed bent on pushing forward whilst a man and horse remained, now
had recourse to a stratagem, which, as regarded its effect upon the
Enemy, fully compensated for the exhaustion of his Infantry. Observing
that the fugitives always took alarm at the sound of the drum, which
announced the presence even of Infantry thus far in pursuit, and close
upon their rear; he ordered the last remaining Drummer, who was unable
to proceed further on foot, to mount one of the horses that had been
disengaged from NAPOLEON's travelling carriage, and then to keep up
with the Cavalry, and beat the drum without intermission.
In this manner GNEISENAU passed through Quatre Bras, which had been
abandoned on his approach; and even the Heights of Frasne were
left free to him; whilst the affrighted Foe, completely scattered
and dispersed, endeavoured to escape by Gosselies, Marchiennes, and
Charleroi. Upon reaching the Inn of _à l'Empereur_ on the high road
beyond Frasne, this favoured companion of BLÜCHER halted his followers,
who then consisted but of a few Squadrons and a party of the 15th
Regiment, and allowed them to take rest; satisfied with having thus,
by mere beat of drum and shouts of triumph, succeeded in scaring the
remnant of the French Army across the Sambre.
* * * * *
Such was the termination of this ever memorable Battle--a Battle,
remarkable for the spectacle it afforded, on the one hand, of a bravery
the most noble and undaunted; of a passive endurance, the most calm,
dignified, and sublime; of a loyalty and patriotism, the most stern
and inflexible: and on the other, of a gallantry in assault the most
daring and reckless; of a devotion to their Chief, the most zealous and
unbounded; and, lastly, of a physical overthrow and moral annihilation
unexampled in the history of modern warfare. Such was the consummation
of a victory, the most brilliant in its development, the most decisive
in its operation, and the most comprehensive in its result, of any
that had occurred since the commencement of that Revolution which it
was thus the instrument of bringing to the termination so long and so
ardently desired by the suffering and indignant nations of Europe.
From the contemplation of the triumph, the glory, and the result, of
such a Battle: we are impelled to turn our thoughts upon the melancholy
spectacle of the awfully severe losses sustained by both the victors
and the vanquished; whose heroic exertions and noble endurance could
not but be attended with immense sacrifice.
The following Table shows the losses sustained by the troops composing
the Anglo-Allied Army:--
+--------------------++----------------------------+
| | KILLED. |
| +---------+-----------+-------+
| |Officers.|NonCom. |Horses.|
| | |Officers, | |
| | |Trumpeters,| |
| | |Drummers, | |
| | |and | |
| | |Privates. | |
+--------------------+---------+-----------+-------+
|British | 85 | 1334 | 1319 |
|King's German Legion| 27 | 335 | 194 |
|Hanoverians | 18 | 276 | -- |
|Brunswickers | 7 | 147 | 77 |
|Nassauers | 5 | 249 | -- |
+--------------------+---------+-----------+-------+
| Total | 142 | 2341 | 1590 |
+--------------------+---------+-----------+-------+
+--------------------+-----------------------------+
| | WOUNDED. |
| +---------+-----------+-------+
| |Officers.|Noncom. |Horses.|
| | |Officers, | |
| | |Trumpeters,| |
| | |Drummers, | |
| | |and | |
| | |Privates. | |
+--------------------+---------+-----------+-------+
|British | 365 | 4560 | 719 |
|King's German Legion| 77 | 932 | 144 |
|Hanoverians | 63 | 1035 | -- |
|Brunswickers | 26 | 430 | -- |
|Nassauers | 19 | 370 | -- |
+--------------------+---------+-----------+-------+
| Total | 550 | 7327 | 863 |
+--------------------+---------+-----------+-------+
+--------------------+---------------------+-------+
| | MISSING. |
| +---------+-----------+-------+
| |Officers.|Noncom. |Horses.|
| | |Officers, | |
| | |Trumpeters,| |
| | |Drummers, | |
| | |and | |
| | |Privates. | |
+--------------------+---------+-----------+-------+
|British | 10 | 582 | 708 |
|King's German Legion| 1 | 217 | 54 |
|Hanoverians | 3 | 207 | -- |
|Brunswickers | -- | 50 | -- |
|Nassauers | -- | -- | -- |
+--------------------+---------+-----------+-------+
| Total | 14 | 1056 | 762 |
+--------------------+---------+-----------+-------+
If to this loss be added that of the Dutch-Belgian troops--about
4,000--the total number of Noncommissioned Officers, Trumpeters,
Drummers, and Privates, killed, wounded and missing, amounted to 14,728.
* * * * *
The losses of the Prussian Army in the Battle were as follows:--
+--------------------+-----------------------------+
| | KILLED. |
| +---------+-----------+-------+
| |Officers.|NonCom. |Horses.|
| | |Officers, | |
| | |Trumpeters,| |
| | |Drummers, | |
| | |and | |
| | |Privates. | |
+--------------------+---------+-----------+-------+
|ZIETEN's Corps | -- | 34 | 18 |
|PIRCH's " | 1 | 36 | 9 |
|BÜLOW's " | 21 | 1133 | 259 |
| +---------+-----------+-------+
| Total | 22 | 1203 | 286 |
+--------------------+---------+-----------+-------+
+--------------------+-----------------------------+
| | WOUNDED. |
| +---------+-----------+-------+
| |Officers.|Noncom. |Horses.|
| | |Officers, | |
| | |Trumpeters,| |
| | |Drummers, | |
| | |and | |
| | |Privates. | |
+--------------------+---------+-----------+-------+
|ZIETEN's Corps | 8 | 164 | 21 |
|PIRCH's " | 3 | 192 | 7 |
|BÜLOW's " | 151 | 3869 | 328 |
| +---------+-----------+-------+
| Total | 162 | 4225 | 356 |
+--------------------+---------+-----------+-------+
+--------------------+-----------------------------+
| | MISSING. |
| +---------+-----------+-------+
| |Officers.|Noncom. |Horses.|
| | |Officers, | |
| | |Trumpeters,| |
| | |Drummers, | |
| | |and | |
| | |Privates. | |
+--------------------+---------+-----------+-------+
|ZIETEN's Corps | -- | 111 | 2 |
|PIRCH's " | 4 | 93 | 9 |
|BÜLOW's " | 35 | 1143 | 89 |
| +---------+-----------+-------+
| Total | 39 | 1347 | 100 |
+--------------------+---------+-----------+-------+
Total Under Officers, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Privates, killed,
wounded, and missing, 6,775.
* * * * *
In the absence of all returns it is difficult to estimate the losses of
the French Army. They were, however, immense; besides which, the whole
of their Artillery, Ammunition Waggons, and Baggage, fell into the
possession of the victors. Of the French Generals, MICHEL and DUHESME
were killed; Prince JEROME, FRIANT, and several others were wounded;
and LOBAU, COMPANS, and CAMBRONNE, were taken prisoners.
* * * * *
The minuteness of detail with which the foregoing History of the Battle
of Waterloo has been written, the gradual development which has been
presented of the motives and dispositions of the Commanders, and the
circumstantial description which has been afforded of the movements of
the troops engaged--of the working, as it were, of the machinery in
the hands of the three most renowned Captains of the Age--obviate the
necessity of further comment upon those points; but it would be unjust
to the honour, the fame, and the glory, of the actors in that memorable
scene, to omit putting forth certain important considerations which are
essential to enable an impartial public, and an unprejudiced posterity,
to arrive at correct and satisfactory conclusions upon other points,
hitherto involved in doubt and obscurity.
These refer chiefly to the relative numerical strength of the
Combatants, the relative proportions in which the troops of the
Anglo-Allied Army were actively engaged with the Enemy, the conduct of
these troops respectively while so engaged, and lastly the extent of
the actual share taken in the Battle by the Prussians.
The most simple, and at the same time most rational, mode of computing
the relative strength of Armies is by placing in juxtaposition their
respective numbers of Battalions, Squadrons, and guns. According to
this rule, the Anglo-Allied and French Armies, as they stood in front
of each other at the commencement of the Battle, were constituted as
follows:--
Battalions. Squadrons. Guns.
Anglo-Allied Army 73 98 140
French 103 127 246
NAPOLEON having, about one o'clock, detached the Light Cavalry
Divisions of DOMON and SUBERVIE as a Corps of Observation upon his
Right Flank; the opposed forces, from that hour until about six
o'clock, stood as follows:--
Battalions. Squadrons. Guns.
Anglo-Allied Army 73 98 140
French 103 106 234
During this period of the Battle, the Anglo-Allied Army was thus
composed:--
Battalions. Squadrons. Guns.
British 26 49 78
King's German Legion 8 16 18
Hanoverians. 18 -- 12
Brunswickers 8 5 16
Nassauers 3 -- --
Dutch-Belgians 10 28 16
--- --- ---
Total 73 98 140
Almost all these Battalions were at one time or another in the Front
Line, and all conducted themselves in the most courageous and exemplary
manner, with the exception of five of the Dutch-Belgian Battalions,
which hastily retreated as the French approached, when making their
first grand attack upon the Anglo-Allied Centre and Left Wing, and
took no further active part in the Battle. The remainder of the above
ten Battalions in the service of the King of the Netherlands, were
three Battalions forming the 2nd Regiment of the Nassau Contingent, and
two Battalions of Orange Nassau, under Prince BERNHARD of Saxe Weimar,
and occupied the houses and inclosures in the valley in front of the
extreme Left of the Allied Line. These troops behaved extremely well.
Of the Squadrons above mentioned, a large proportion, nearly one third,
consisted of the Dutch-Belgian Cavalry; but although their numbers
serve to augment the amount of the Anglo-Allied Cavalry _on paper_,
the actual value of their services in the Battle was by no means
commensurate with their display of strength: and hence it was that
the brunt of the Cavalry contest devolved almost exclusively upon the
British and German Dragoons. The same observation applies in an equal
degree to the Artillery.
About six o'clock, the relative strength of the contending forces was
altered, on the part of the French Army, by the detaching of LOBAU's
Corps and the Young Guard to oppose the Prussians; and on that of the
Anglo-Allied Army, though somewhat later, by the bringing into the
Field of CHASSÉ's Dutch-Belgian Division; so that they stood about that
time as follows:--
Battalions. Squadrons. Guns.
Anglo-Allied Army 85 98 156
French Army 80 106 186
Of the assistance derived by the Duke of WELLINGTON from this
augmentation of the twelve Dutch-Belgian Battalions, a sufficient
estimate may be deduced from the foregoing History of the Battle--one
half of them were with great difficulty prevented from abandoning the
Field, although, at the moment, they were not in contact with, nor did
they even see, the Enemy; and the other half only joined the Front Line
(on the left of MAITLAND's Brigade) at the time of the General Advance.
Whatever may have been the cause of the comparative supineness of the
Dutch-Belgian troops; whether produced by dislike entertained towards
recent political arrangements, which alienated each party from its
native country, without, securing to either its national independence;
or, by predilections imbibed for the Chief against whose arms they were
now opposed, and in whose ranks they had formerly served: the fact of
such supineness is too well attested to admit of any doubt respecting
the value to be attached to their co-operation in the great struggle
so courageously and resolutely sustained by the remainder of the
Anglo-Allied Army; and becomes a most important point for consideration
in any calculation of the relative strength of the Combatants, when
taken into conjunction with the actual proportion of the entire
Dutch-Belgian force brought into the Field to that of each of the
Allies, as appears by the following table:--
_Amount of the Effective Strength of the Anglo-Allied Army at the
Battle of Waterloo._
+--------------------+---------+--------+----------+----------+-----+
| |Infantry.|Cavalry.|Artillery.|Total Men.|Guns.|
+--------------------+---------+--------+----------+----------+-----+
|British | 15,181 | 5,843 | 2,967 | 23,991 | 78 |
|King's German Legion| 3,301 | 1,997 | 526 | 5,824 | 18 |
|Hanoverians | 10,258 | 497 | 465 | 11,220 | 12 |
|Brunswickers | 4,586 | 866 | 510 | 5,962 | 16 |
|Nassauers | 2,880 | -- | -- | 2,880 | -- |
|Dutch-Belgians | 13,205 | 3,205 | 1,177 | 17,784 | 32 |
| +---------+--------+----------+----------+-----+
| Total | 49,411 | 12,408 | 5,645 | 67,661 | 156 |
+--------------------+---------+--------+----------+----------+-----+
Hence it appears that the Dutch-Belgian Contingent, compared with the
British troops alone, consisted, in Infantry, as 13,402 to 15,181; in
Cavalry, as 3,205 to 5,843; and, in guns, as 32 to 78.
* * * * *
It is needless now to speculate upon what might have been the result,
had this large proportion of force been replaced by a corresponding
number of either British or German troops. The fact testifies
abundantly, in addition to what has been already related, as to the
heroic firmness and enduring courage with which the brave British and
Germans stood the brunt of that remarkable contest; and this, too, be
it remembered, with unquestionably the finest Army which even NAPOLEON
had ever collected together, formed exclusively of one nation--of that
nation whose legions had at one time subjugated nearly the whole of
Europe--imbued with inveterate hatred against its foes, cherishing the
most enthusiastic devotion to its Chief, and filled with the ardent
desire of restoring the fallen glory of the Empire.
Of the conduct of the British Infantry, of its heroic valour, its
indomitable resistance, its proud defiance, and its admirable
discipline, the History of the Battle affords abundant testimony:
further comment is superfluous.
The superior prowess of the British Cavalry also shone most
conspicuously on this great day. The combined charge of the two Heavy
Brigades against the French Cavalry and Infantry which attacked the
Centre and Left Wing of the Anglo-Allied Army between one and two
o'clock, whether we regard the brilliancy of its execution, or the
magnitude of its success, is perhaps without a parallel in the last
War: and when we consider the preponderance of the Enemy in this Arm,
the frequency of his charges, and the masses with which he advanced, it
is impossible to advert to the heroism of Britain's Cavalry, without
at the same time according the praise so pre-eminently due to the
skill of the noble and gallant Chief who was the life and soul of its
movements throughout the arduous and desperate struggle; and who so
judiciously economised its strength, that when at the critical moment
its services were required for securing the victory, he was enabled to
bring forward two fresh Brigades, which fulfilled those services in
a style the most brilliant that can be conceived, and with a success
which commanded the admiration of all who witnessed it.
The British Artillery, which had to contend against an immense
preponderance of metal, evinced during the whole day, a degree
of bravery, zeal, activity, and intelligence, which can never be
surpassed; and nobly sustained its long and honourably acquired
pre-eminence.
Of the troops of the King's German Legion, whether Cavalry, Infantry,
or Artillery, it is impossible to speak in terms of too high praise;
suffice it to remark that their conduct was, in every respect, on a par
with that of the British.
Of the four Hanoverian Infantry Brigades, that of KIELMANSEGGE, and
a part of HALKETT's, were the most actively engaged: BEST's stood
almost the entire day on the extreme Left of the Front Line of the
Anglo-Allied Infantry; and VINCKE's in Reserve in front of Mont St
Jean. They had been but recently and hastily raised; and yet the manner
in which such raw soldiers withstood, as KIELMANSEGGE's Brigade did,
for so great a length of time, the most furious assaults made by the
gallant and well disciplined troops of France, would have conferred
honour on long tried veterans.
The Brunswickers, who were also composed of young soldiers, performed
a glorious part in the Battle; and amply avenged the death of their
Prince. Some of their Battalions were much shaken at the moment ALTEN's
Division was driven back a short distance; but they speedily rallied,
and resumed their lost ground. Altogether, their bravery, which was
frequently called into action; and their endurance, which was severely
tested, merited the strongest commendation.
The troops constituting the Nassau Brigade under KRUSE (or more
properly the 1st Regiment of the Nassau Contingent), were attached to
ALTEN's Division. They were consequently often in the thick of the
fight; and though, on the occasion above alluded to, they were thrown
into disorder and driven in by a furious onset of the Enemy, they
conducted themselves generally throughout the day with great steadiness
and bravery.
It is impossible to allude in terms of adequate praise to the services
of that most important branch of the Army, the General Staff; the
Officers of which distinguished themselves no less by the zeal, the
daring, and the activity, with which they carried into execution
the commands of their respective Chiefs, than by the alacrity and
intelligence which they evinced in catching and imparting the true
spirit of their instructions. The constant exposure to which their
peculiar duties necessarily subjected them could not but entail upon
them severe losses. Few indeed were those who escaped unhurt throughout
this arduous conflict.
* * * * *
The co-operation of the Prussians in this Battle has been gradually
developed and fully detailed. That the communications which WELLINGTON
received from BLÜCHER led him to expect that co-operation at a much
earlier period, is beyond a doubt; but setting aside all consideration
of the causes of the delay which attended the arrival of the
Prussian forces, it is equally doubtless that the tardiness of that
co-operation had a more decided influence on the general result of the
Battle than if they had reached the Field at an earlier period.
For, supposing the Prussians to have arrived in force before the French
had become so seriously and desperately engaged with the Anglo-Allied
Army, NAPOLEON was too much a Master of his art to have risked a
decisive Battle with the combined forces of his antagonists. In this
case he would, in all probability, have fallen back upon his frontier,
have called in all available Reserves from the interior, and by means
of his Triple Line of Fortresses, as well as by skilful manoeuvring,
have endeavoured to separate once more the opposing Armies, and to
obtain another chance of beating them in detail. As it happened,
however, he was too deeply involved in the contest with WELLINGTON;
he had suffered too severely in his repeated attacks, to admit of a
retreat, under such circumstances, being looked upon, even by his
friends in Paris, in any other light than that of a defeat: and he
knew too well that with a defeat, however it might be produced, would
vanish the only tie which yet bound him to the nation--the implied
belief in his invincibility, and the firm reliance on his ability to
re-establish and maintain the military glory of France. It is to this
conviction alone that we can attribute the desperate resolve with which
he risked the fate of the Empire and his own political existence upon
the issue of his final attack upon WELLINGTON's Line, at a moment when
the Armies opposed to him had effected their junction; and which, by
calling the whole of his force into requisition, deprived him of an
adequate Reserve, by aid of which he might have succeeded in effecting
an orderly and honourable retreat.
Had the Prussians succeeded in driving the French out of Planchenoit
half an hour earlier: such a circumstance, combined with the General
Advance of the Anglo-Allied Line, would no doubt have caused the whole
of LOBAU's Corps, and perhaps also D'ERLON's, to lay down their arms
and surrender at discretion; since their retreat towards Maison du Roi
would thus have been cut off, whilst the British Advance would have
frustrated any attempt to retire across the Charleroi road. On the
other hand, a similar result might have ensued, at least as regards
LOBAU's Corps, had that General Advance occurred half an hour earlier;
while the French Right was engaged with the Prussians at a greater
distance from the Charleroi road.
In the former case, however, the final attack was judiciously
delayed until, by the arrival of the additional force which was fast
approaching, such a simultaneous attack could be made along the
whole of the French Right as would insure most decided success: and
in the latter case, the final attack could not have been made at a
more opportune moment, and with a greater prospect of success, than
immediately after the signal defeat of the French Imperial Guard upon
the Anglo-Allied position. Indeed, contingencies of this kind might
be brought forward with reference to any Battle whatever; and when it
is considered that there exists no example in modern warfare of so
complete a victory, the result must appear as glorious, as decisive,
and as comprehensive, as the most stern and rigid calculator of the
chances of Battle could have desired.
As regards the actual share which the Prussians had in the Battle,
it may be truly affirmed that the contest maintained between BÜLOW's
Corps and LOBAU's troops in conjunction with a portion of the Imperial
Guard, was most obstinate and sanguinary. In the Three successive
struggles for the possession of Planchenoit, especially, the deadly
animosity mutually cherished by the troops of both nations, was
fearfully exemplified; and the losses sustained by the Prussians in the
comparatively brief period during which they were engaged, afforded
ample proof of the value of their co-operation. It is undeniably
true that the blow which decided the victory was that given by
WELLINGTON, when, after having completely defeated the grand attack
by the French Imperial Guard, he instantly followed up that defeat by
boldly attacking and penetrating the Centre of the Enemy's Lines, and
sustaining this movement by the General Advance of his whole Army;
but it is at the same time, equally true, that the powerful diversion
effected by the Prussians diminished the strength of those French
Lines by the Corps of LOBAU which had not hitherto fired a single shot
in this Campaign, by twelve Battalions of the Imperial Guard which
had suffered scarcely any loss at Ligny, and, finally, by eighteen
Squadrons of Cavalry.
The vigorous attack which was made by BÜLOW upon LOBAU's Line,
simultaneously with the last assault upon Planchenoit, contributed most
materially to the general and fatal panic which seized upon the whole
of the French Army. The Prussians too, by the energetic pursuit which
they kept up during the night, under the guidance of the indefatigable
GNEISENAU, rendered the victory still more complete and decisive; and
effectually deprived the Enemy of every opportunity of recovering
himself on the Belgian side of the frontier.
In short, both Armies admirably and honourably performed the parts
respectively assigned to them--the one holding its defensive position
with unparalleled bravery and unmitigated perseverance until the
moment when its Chief, having defeated the last desperate attempt of
his opponent to force his Line, leads it on to victory; the other
operating a powerful diversion, by which the effect of that Advance
is made still more decisive; and rendering the victory complete by a
harassing and vigorous pursuit--and thus was consummated the tactical
solution of the plan which had been, with so much skill and foresight,
strategically preconcerted by the Allied Commanders.
The Duke, when writing his Despatch descriptive of the Battle, in
which he stated that his own Army "never, upon any occasion, conducted
itself better," was not unmindful of the important aid he had derived
from the Prussians. "I should not," he said, "do justice to my own
feelings, or to Marshal BLÜCHER and the Prussian Army, if I did not
attribute the successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and
timely assistance I received from them. The operation of General BÜLOW
upon the Enemy's Flank was a most decisive one; and, even if I had not
found myself in a situation to make the attack which produced the final
result, it would have forced the Enemy to retire if his attacks should
have failed, and would have prevented him from taking advantage of them
if they should unfortunately have succeeded."
On the other hand, the Prince, although, as is manifest upon a
perusal of a similar despatch on his part, he was not aware of the
circumstances under which WELLINGTON had attacked the very Centre of
the French Lines, and had pushed his Advanced Brigades along the rear
of those troops to which he himself had been exposed, nevertheless did
ample justice to the bravery of the British Army, which, he remarked,
"fought with a valour which it is impossible to surpass."
Long may Great Britain and Prussia cherish that mutual amity which was
engendered by the zealous and successful co-operation of the Armies of
these two great nations in bringing to so prompt and satisfactory a
termination a War which (originating in the reassumption of the throne
of France by that ambitious soldier and extraordinary man who had once
already overrun the Continent with his legions, subjugating Emperors
and Kings to the influence of his mighty will) threatened once more
to involve the nations in all the calamities and horrors which before
had followed in the train of his triumphant but desolating career. The
general Peace, which was the ultimate result of their united efforts,
still happily continues; and on every successive anniversary do the
British and German troops commemorate their glorious and crowning
victory; and Europe, grateful for the lasting and inestimable blessings
conferred upon her, emblazons forth in the pages of her history, the
heroic deeds of the defenders of her liberty and independence.
----"thou fatal Waterloo!
Millions of tongues record thee, and anew
Their children's lips shall echo them, and say--
Here where the sword united nations drew,
Our countrymen were warring on that day!
And this is much, and all which will not pass away."
[Illustration]
CHAPTER XVI.
It was explained at the conclusion of the Eighth Chapter that
THIELEMANN, who had been ordered by BLÜCHER to defend the position of
Wavre in the event of the Enemy advancing in force, or, if otherwise,
to follow the main Army in the direction of Couture, was on the point
of fulfilling the instructions appertaining to the latter contingency,
when VANDAMME's Corps arrived in front of that position, about four
o'clock in the afternoon, and its Artillery immediately opened a
cannonade upon the Prussian troops.
All the Brigades (the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth) of
THIELEMANN's Corps, had, at that time, received the Order to commence
the general movement to the right. A Detachment of only two Battalions
(the Fusilier Battalions of the 30th Regiment and of the 1st Kurmark
Landwehr), under Colonel ZEPELIN, from the Ninth Brigade, which had
not yet crossed the Dyle, was to be left in occupation of Wavre. The
Twelfth Brigade was already in full line of march, and the Eleventh had
been just put in motion.
When General BORCKE, who commanded the Ninth Brigade, fell back upon
Wavre, for the purpose of carrying out his instructions, he found the
Bridge already barricaded, and therefore proceeded with his Brigade
to Bas Wavre: and having crossed the Dyle at this point, left a
Detachment there, consisting of the Sharpshooters of the Fusilier
Battalion of the 8th Regiment, and of those of the 1st Battalion of
the 30th Regiment, under Major DITFURTH; whom he directed to destroy
the Bridge immediately. He then detached the 2nd Battalion of the 30th
Regiment and his two Squadrons of the Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, as a
reinforcement to Colonel ZEPELIN at Wavre; and, with the remainder of
his Brigade, continued his march.
In the mean time, French _Tirailleurs_ were observed extending along
the opposite Heights; and, in their rear, considerable masses of the
Enemy's troops appeared advancing. It soon became manifest that they
contemplated forcing the passage of the river.
THIELEMANN, judging by the want of vigour displayed in the French
pursuit; and by the Enemy not having attempted to secure the passage
of the Dyle at Moustier, Limelette, and Limale, that it was only a
weak Detachment of the Enemy that was advancing upon Wavre, confining
itself to the design of creating some little uneasiness by its movement
along this road to Brussels, had hitherto been of opinion that the
occupation of Wavre by a few Battalions, as directed by BLÜCHER, would
be quite sufficient: but he now plainly saw that the moment had arrived
which required him, in pursuance of his instructions, to maintain the
position at Wavre; and he accordingly ordered the halt of his whole
Corps for this purpose.
The town of Wavre is situated on the left bank of the Dyle: having a
suburb on the opposite side of the river, with which it is connected by
two stone Bridges; the principal one leading towards the middle, and a
small one towards the upper end, of the Town. Higher up the stream, at
the Mill of Bierge, at Limale, and at Limelette; as also below the town
at Bas Wavre, there are wooden Bridges. The river is not deep, but at
the period of the Battle it was swollen by the recent heavy rain. The
low range of Heights on either side of the Valley is covered in many
places with wood. The Heights on the right bank are generally more
elevated, but those on the left have steeper declivities, and offer a
greater command of the river and its passages. The shortest road from
Namur to Brussels passes through the town, besides which there are
numerous cross roads practicable for the movement of all Arms. The
great number of hollow ways forms a prominent feature in the vicinity;
and these, being in a miry state from the rain, were unfavourable to
the progress of troops passing through them.
The position was thus occupied:--the Twelfth Brigade (Colonel
STÜLPNAGEL), with the Horse Battery No. 20, was posted on the Height
in rear of Bierge. The Bridge in front of this Village was barricaded,
and the Mill occupied for the defence of the Bridge. The Tenth Brigade
(Colonel KÄMPFEN) stood upon the Height in rear of Wavre, its Right
resting on a Wood which lay between it and the Twelfth Brigade. The
Eleventh Brigade (Colonel LUCK) was formed across the Brussels road.
The Reserve Cavalry was drawn up, near La Bavette, in Columns of
Squadrons. The Artillery was distributed along the Heights. The Horse
Battery No. 18 remained in reserve.
That part of the town of Wavre which lies on the right bank, or,
more properly, the suburb, was occupied by Light Troops only. The
great Bridge was barricaded as well as time and circumstances would
admit. The houses adjoining the left bank of the river were hastily
loopholed. The smaller Bridge was left perfectly open. A Detachment of
two Companies of Light Infantry, under Major BORNSTÄDT was detached to
reinforce the troops at the Bridge of Bas Wavre.
THIELEMANN intended that the Ninth Brigade should be posted in rear of
this general disposition of his troops, so that its services might be
made available according as circumstances might require; but through
some misunderstanding in the transmission of the Order, General BORCKE
was induced, after having moved along the Brussels road until near
La Bavette, thence to turn off to his left, and continue his march,
according to his original instructions, in the direction of Fromont,
Bourgeois, and St Lambert, towards Couture; being under the impression
that the whole Corps had already commenced this march, in pursuance
of the general plan, and that his Brigade was destined to cover the
movement. The departure of the Brigade was not immediately discovered;
and thus, by this misunderstanding, THIELEMANN's force suffered an
unexpected reduction of six Battalions and the Foot Battery No. 18; and
consisted, therefore, of only 15,200 men; with which number he had now
to contend against Marshal GROUCHY's force, amounting altogether to
33,765 men.
THIELEMANN's position was certainly a very favourable one, and the
occupation of it was arranged with great skill. As it was impossible
to foresee in what manner the attack upon it would be conducted;
whether it would be directed against one particular Bridge, or against
all the Bridges, with the design of carrying the whole Line by storm:
THIELEMANN limited the occupation of the town and of the line of the
river to the number of Light Troops which might be sufficient for
sustaining any sudden assault; taking care to have Supports close at
hand for that purpose: but disposing his Reserves, which comprised
his main force, so that they might become available at any point
which might be pressed; or, should the Enemy develop greatly superior
numbers, as was subsequently the case, serve to guard against any flank
attack.
* * * * *
As before explained, it was VANDAMME's Corps which arrived in front
of Wavre between three and four o'clock. Two Batteries, of which
one consisted of twelve pounders, were drawn up on the right of the
road overlooking the valley, and opened the cannonade. These were
subsequently reinforced by a third Battery, posted on the left of the
road. EXCELMANS' Cavalry Corps was posted in right rear of VANDAMME.
GÉRARD, with the Fourth French Corps, was still in the rear on the
march; and PAJOL, with his Light Cavalry, had only just passed through
Tourrines, situated scarcely half way between Gembloux and Wavre.
Marshal GROUCHY sent word to both these Officers to accelerate their
march.
Whilst the French Skirmishers were gradually forcing back the Prussian
Light Troops into the valley, GROUCHY, hearing a powerful cannonade
in the distance to his left, rode off a little way in that direction;
and concluding that NAPOLEON was closely engaged with WELLINGTON,
conceived that as he had now reached the Prussians, he would best
fulfil his instructions by vigorously attacking them, so as to prevent
their detaching reinforcements to the Anglo-Allied Army. He was quite
ignorant as to the strength of the Enemy in his front, and was in doubt
whether the whole Prussian Army was before him, or merely a strong
Detachment. Of the fact that three Prussian Corps were on the march
to co-operate with WELLINGTON's forces, he of course knew nothing.
In this state of uncertainty, and with his troops _aux prises_ with
the Prussians, he was fearful of detaching to his left; since by so
doing, he would expose himself to the risk of his main force becoming
overpowered by superior numbers, and his Detachment cut off.
Independently of other considerations which might have assisted in
dissuading GROUCHY from detaching a portion of his force at this
period, such as the length of time his troops had been upon the
march, along bad and miry roads; he was perfectly justified, under
all the circumstances of his then position, in adopting this course
of proceeding. And even if he had been fully cognisant of the actual
disposition of the Prussian Army, he could at this time have rendered
no essential service to NAPOLEON; the opportunity for doing so had been
suffered to pass by, as was fully explained in Chapter VIII.
His total ignorance, however, of BLÜCHER's proceedings, and of all that
was then taking place between Wavre and the Field of Waterloo, afforded
undeniable proof of his having completely failed in acting up to the
spirit of the instructions he had received, not to lose sight of the
Prussians, and in exercising that degree of enterprise, energy, and
decision, which NAPOLEON had so naturally anticipated from a General
of GROUCHY's note and experience; especially when entrusted with so
important a command, under such highly critical circumstances.
A message having reached GROUCHY from PAJOL, communicating his having
fallen into the Marshal's line of operation, he directed that General
to move upon Limale. His Right Flank, however, continued to be
protected by the 17th Dragoons, detached from General BERTON's Cavalry
Brigade (of EXCELMANS' Corps) _en reconnaissance_, towards the high
road leading from Namur to Louvain.
In the mean time, a vigorous cannonade was maintained between
VANDAMME's and the Prussian Batteries across that part of the valley
in which lay the town of Wavre. Under cover of the French guns, the
Skirmishers pressed down upon that portion of the town situated upon
the right bank of the river, and of which they soon gained possession;
the Prussians having previously decided upon not making any effort
to retain it. On reaching the river, however, they were met by a
most destructive fire of musketry from the opposite houses and the
Bridge. The contest now became desperate, and the defence of the Dyle
was obstinately maintained by the Prussians. The Skirmishers rapidly
extended on either Flank along both banks of the river from Bierge
as far as Bas Wavre. All the Prussian Brigades pushed forward their
Sharpshooters. Those of the 4th Kurmark Landwehr took up the Line
between the Town and Bas Wavre, those of the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr took
post in the Town, between the two Bridges; on the right of the latter
stood the Sharpshooters of the Tenth Brigade; and those of the Twelfth
Brigade formed the Right Wing of the whole Line at Bierge.
This _tiraillade_ had continued about an hour, when General HULOT's
Division of GÉRARD's _Corps d'Armée_ reached the Field; and received
Orders to take possession of the Mill at Bierge, and to cross the Dyle
at that point. A Battalion of VANDAMME's Corps was at the time vainly
attempting to effect a passage. Upon the Height opposite Bierge were
several guns of the Third Corps, endeavouring to keep down the fire
from the Prussian Batteries on the other side of the valley.
GROUCHY desired GÉRARD to relieve the Battalion attacking the Mill at
Bierge by one of his own Corps; whereupon the latter directed General
HULOT to push forward with a Battalion of the 9th Light Infantry for
that purpose. The Battalion descended into the valley, covered by the
fire from the guns on the Height. Its advance was much impeded by the
swampy nature of the ground at the foot of the declivity, and by the
numerous broad and deep drains by which the valley is intersected: and
its order was still further deranged by the fire from the Artillery
on the opposite Heights, as also by that of the Prussian Skirmishers
posted along the left bank of the river, and strongly occupying the
Mill. The banks of the river at this part, more particularly the left
bank, are mostly lined with trees; which tended still further to
increase the means of resistance on the part of the Prussians to the
advance of the French troops. The latter on reaching the Mill, and
relieving VANDAMME's troops, made an attack; but without success.
GROUCHY was on the point of ordering this attack to be renewed, when he
received, between six and seven o'clock, SOULT's despatch, addressed
to him from the Field of Waterloo at one o'clock in the afternoon: and
desiring him to manoeuvre always in that direction, to maintain a close
communication with the main Army, and to lose not a moment in joining
the latter, and attacking BÜLOW's _Corps d'Armée_; which, it added,
could then be seen upon the Heights of St Lambert.
The circumstances in which GROUCHY found himself at the time this
despatch reached him, held out no prospect of his being able to fulfil,
even partially, the instructions which it contained. VANDAMME's efforts
to force the Bridges of Wavre, and to capture the Town, were completely
frustrated by the most gallant defence maintained on the part of the
Prussians. The issue of the attack upon the Mill of Bierge appeared
very doubtful. Neither the main body of GÉRARD's Corps, nor General
TESTE's Division of the Sixth Corps, nor even PAJOL's Light Cavalry,
had as yet arrived.
GROUCHY, becoming impatient, rode hastily towards La Baraque,
accompanied by GÉRARD, to meet the first mentioned force; and on coming
up with the Columns, directed their march upon Limale, his object now
being to turn the Right of THIELEMANN's position, and to prevent the
retreat of the latter upon Brussels, and at the same time open his
direct road to St Lambert. This he might succeed in effecting; but it
is sufficiently evident from the above view of his position, at so late
an hour of the day, that any important diversion on his part in favour
of NAPOLEON, was quite out of the question.
On returning with GÉRARD to Wavre, GROUCHY found that notwithstanding
the furious assaults that were made in rapid succession upon the
Bridges, supported by the vigorous cannonade from the Heights, and the
incessant fusillade along the banks of the river, no further progress
was effected. As if determined that the passage should be forced,
he dismounted from his horse, and placing himself at the head of a
Battalion, led on another attack upon the Mill of Bierge. But the
bravery of the troops, though so strongly excited by the noble example
of the Marshal, could avail nothing against the indomitable resistance
of the Prussian defenders of this important Post. GÉRARD, who had
accompanied the Marshal in this attack, fell severely wounded by a shot
which struck him in the breast.
GROUCHY now decided upon leaving VANDAMME's Corps and EXCELMANS'
Cavalry in front of Wavre and Bierge; and proceeding himself with
that portion of GÉRARD's troops which was at hand, along the right
bank of the Dyle, towards Limale, and uniting them to the remainder
of the Corps which had been ordered to march in the direction of that
point from La Baraque. This movement occupied considerable time, in
consequence of the difficulties opposed to the march of troops along
the side of the river. At length, having, arrived in front of Limale,
and formed a junction with PAJOL's Cavalry, preparations were made for
an attack.
Limale was at that time occupied by Lieutenant Colonel STENGEL with the
three Battalions of the 19th Prussian Regiment, two Squadrons of the
6th Uhlans, and one Squadron of the Westphalian Landwehr Cavalry. It
was the Detachment left by ZIETEN for the purpose of covering the Left
Flank of the Third _Corps d'Armée_. It had unaccountably neglected to
adopt any measures for barricading the Bridge; the defence of which,
if conducted with the same energy and resolution by which that of the
Bridges lower down the stream had been distinguished, might have been
the means of preventing the French from crossing the Dyle at all on
that day.
PAJOL, having reconnoitred the place and discovered his neglect,
succeeded in gaining possession of the Bridge by means of a brisk
Cavalry attack. HULOT's Infantry Division of GÉRARD's Corps reached it
shortly afterwards; and it was soon made manifest to Lieutenant Colonel
STENGEL that he was attacked by a force much superior to his own.
Nevertheless he continued to fall gradually back, in good order, until
THIELEMANN pushed forward the Twelfth Brigade to his support. Three
Battalions of the Tenth Brigade moved into the position thus vacated by
the Twelfth: and a general movement was made to the right by all the
troops that could be spared from the defence of Wavre and Bierge. The
4th Kurmark Landwehr, belonging to the Eleventh Brigade, crossed the
Brussels road. The Reserve Cavalry was ordered to move upon Limale, in
support of the Twelfth Brigade.
When Colonel STÜLPNAGEL was ordered to move his Brigade (the Twelfth)
upon Limale, he left three Battalions for the defence of Bierge.
With the remaining six Battalions he came up close to the Enemy,
who was posted on a Height in advance of Limale, his Left thrown
considerably forward and covered by his Cavalry, and his Right resting
upon some houses which he had occupied with Infantry. This Line,
which was perpendicular to the direction of the original position
of the Prussians, had been taken up with great skill by GROUCHY,
notwithstanding the difficulties with which the movement had been
attended. His troops had to ascend the Heights during the obscurity
of the night, in rear of Limale, by a narrow, rugged road, in the
immediate proximity of the Prussians, whose fire reached the head
of the Defile: and he was fully occupied until a very late hour, in
posting the Battalions in their proper places, as they filed out of the
road, on reaching the Height; whilst, in the mean time, PAJOL's Light
Cavalry pushed rapidly round by the left.
Colonel STÜLPNAGEL posted the Fusilier Battalion of the 5th Kurmark
Landwehr, and his Battery, in reserve, in rear of the small Wood on
the right of Bierge, and advanced to the attack, late as it was, with
his five remaining Battalions, having Lieutenant Colonel STENGEL with
his Detachment on the right. The darkness of the night prevented the
Prussians from correctly ascertaining the position and strength of the
French; but nevertheless it was decided that an attempt should be made
to regain Limale, and drive back the Enemy across the Dyle.
The attack was thus formed. Two Battalions in front, closely followed
by the remaining three Battalions. Both the Brigade Squadrons joined
the three Squadrons under Lieutenant Colonel STENGEL; and the whole
of the Reserve Cavalry formed in support. In this movement, however,
the mutual connection of the advancing troops was greatly impeded by
the darkness of the night. The two Battalions in Front Line were on
the point of passing a hollow way when they received a volley from two
French Battalions on the opposite side, by which their further advance
was checked. The three Battalions of the Second Line had inclined too
much to the left, where they became engaged with French _Tirailleurs_.
Lieutenant Colonel STENGEL's Detachment, in attempting to push forward,
was checked by the French Cavalry; and as the latter made a disposition
which menaced his Right Flank, that Officer fell back with his
Detachment as far as the Wood near Point du Jour.
The decided failure of the attack induced Colonel STÜLPNAGEL to
withdraw all his troops to the Wood, leaving only the 1st Battalion of
the 6th Kurmark Landwehr in support of the chain of Advanced Posts. The
Reserve Cavalry bivouacked in rear of the Wood. Thus ended the contest
on this part of the Field. The Prussian and French Picquets were so
close to one another during the night, that the Patrols were constantly
clashing, and the whole Line kept upon the _qui vive_.
* * * * *
Upon the Prussian Left, the conflict for the possession of the town and
Bridges of Wavre continued to be carried on with unabated fury on both
sides until late in the night. VANDAMME devoted the whole of his Corps
to the attack; constantly pushing forward fresh troops to relieve those
who had failed in their attempts to dislodge the Prussians. The latter,
who exhibited on this occasion an extraordinary degree of bravery and
resolution, succeeded in repelling no less than thirteen different
assaults; and even dislodged, in five instances, the French from the
houses they occupied, from the commencement, on the right bank of the
Dyle. At one time the French had already gained possession of the great
Bridge and some houses on the left bank, when they were driven back
again to their own side of the river by the Prussian Reserves--these
having advanced to the relief of their comrades. The struggle was
desperate, and apparently interminable. When the French attacked the
houses nearest the Bridge they succeeded in bursting open the doors,
and by superiority of numbers, in possessing themselves of the ground
floors. But even this did not induce the heroic defenders to relax
their exertions; on the contrary, with increased fury, they defended
the upper storeys of the houses, and held out most gallantly until
relieved by the arrival of their Supports.
This brilliant defence of Wavre was distinguished, on the part of the
Prussians, not only by the unflinching bravery of the troops, but also
by the judicious disposal of the Reserves; by means of which the Enemy
was foiled in every attempt to gain a permanent footing in the town.
While the Skirmishers and their Supports were posted along the Dyle
and the adjacent houses, the Reserves were concealed in the nearest
streets, that lay in a direction parallel with that of the river:
and at the moment the French Columns of Attack, already crippled by
the fire concentrated from the Skirmishers, endeavoured to force the
Bridge; these Reserves rushed forward from their cover in the side
streets, and presenting themselves in mass before the Enemy, invariably
drove them back with great slaughter.
It was in this manner that the Fusilier Battalion of the 30th Regiment,
under Major SPRENGER, and the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Kurmark
Landwehr, under Major BORNSTÄDT, constantly repulsed, with admirable
bravery, the attacks made with such superior numbers during the earlier
part of the contest. One of these attacks having been attended with a
somewhat favourable result, the 2nd Battalion of the 30th Regiment,
under Major BEAUFORT, was brought forward; and, at a similarly critical
moment, the 1st Battalion of the 4th Kurmark Landwehr, under Major
GROLMAN, came up; when both Battalions succeeded in compelling the
Enemy to retire.
These Battalions then took post in the streets lying parallel with
the river, in the manner before explained; and, with heroic courage,
overcame every renewed attempt on the part of the French to establish
themselves in the town. When, finally, it is considered that from four
o'clock until night, four Prussian Battalions successfully maintained
their ground against a whole _Corps d'Armée_, with which they were
constantly and desperately engaged during the whole of that period; the
merits of Colonel ZEPELIN and his brave troops are beyond all praise,
and present one of the brightest examples of the defence of a town and
of the passage of a river, recorded in military history.
[Illustration]
Both the Bridges of Wavre remained in the possession of the Prussians,
and the smaller one was barricaded during the night.
At a late hour, as the fire on both sides began to slacken, the
combatants bivouacked on their respective sides of the river. Upon
the Prussian extreme Left at Bas Wavre, the French had only shown one
Battalion. This occupied an isolated building, and was supported by
two Squadrons and a piece of artillery. Several unsuccessful attempts
were made to gain the Bridge; which, at nightfall, continued in the
possession of the Prussians.
GROUCHY was occupied late in the night in making his preparations for
renewing the attack on the following morning. General TESTE's Division
of the Sixth Corps having at length arrived, his Left Wing, which was
thus considerably reinforced, bivouacked upon the Height westward of
Bierge; separated by this Village and the Dyle from his Right Wing
which lay in front of Wavre. He had not yet received any intelligence
of NAPOLEON's signal defeat at Waterloo; and was therefore resolved
upon following up, at daybreak, the advantages he had already gained,
by forcing back the Prussian Right Flank.
THIELEMANN, on the contrary, having despatched an Officer of MARWITZ's
Cavalry Brigade _en reconnaissance_ to the right, ascertained through
this means that the Allied Armies had gained a complete victory; and he
therefore fully expected that GROUCHY would be compelled to effect an
immediate retreat.
With the first dawn of the 19th of June, Colonel STENGEL, whose
Detachment was posted on the extreme Right of THIELEMANN's Corps, took
upon himself to march off by St Lambert, to join his _Corps d'Armée_
(the First); the grounds for which proceeding remain to the present
time as unaccountable as his neglect on the previous day to secure the
Bridge of Limale. In consequence of this movement, the Twelfth Brigade
was necessitated to extend its Line too much to the right and to retain
a Reserve of only three weak Battalions upon the road leading through
the Wood to Point du Jour. The Wood to the right was occupied by a
Battalion and two Companies from each of the remaining Regiments of the
Twelfth Brigade. The Left Wing of this Line, which rested upon Bierge,
was formed by six Battalions of the Tenth Brigade.
Colonel LUCK, commanding the Eleventh Brigade, was directed to support
this Division, which was much too weak, with the three Battalions of
the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr; but to leave the two Battalions of the 4th
Kurmark Landwehr, as also the Brigade Squadrons, in rear of Wavre, in a
hollow near the Windmill, where they served to cover the twelve pounder
Battery No. 7.
The Mill of Bierge was occupied by two Battalions of the Twelfth
Brigade: Wavre and Bas Wavre were held by the same troops which
defended those points on the previous day. The barricades and
preparations for defence were rendered more complete.
Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR, whose Detachment, consisting of the 10th
Hussars, a Squadron of Landwehr Cavalry, and two guns from the Horse
Battery No. 12, had formed on the 18th the Advance of the Rear Guard
which THIELEMANN's Corps was considered to constitute, having reached
St Lambert before GROUCHY's attack became so decided, remained there
during the night.
Early on the 19th, GROUCHY sent off three Cavalry Regiments to his
left to watch these troops. They showed no indication of an intention
to attack; and when, later in the day, they retired and disappeared
from LEDEBUR's view, the latter passed the Defile, for the purpose of
proceeding to join his _Corps d'Armée_ (the Fourth), which, however, he
did not reach before the 20th.
This, as well as Colonel STENGEL's Detachment, thus withdrew from the
Field, without any apparent necessity, reducing THIELEMANN's numbers,
already too weak, and taking up a line of march, along which their
services were comparatively useless.
THIELEMANN, concluding from the account that he had received of the
defeat of NAPOLEON, that the French would commence a retreat, renewed
the combat at daybreak by an attack with his Cavalry. Colonel MARWITZ
was sent forward, with the 8th Uhlans and two Squadrons of the 6th
Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, towards the plateau above Limale, occupied
by GROUCHY's Left Wing: whilst General HOBE followed this movement
with the 5th and 7th Uhlans, and formed up on the left of the Advanced
Cavalry. The 5th Uhlans were immediately afterwards advantageously
posted in a hollow in support of Colonel MARWITZ.
The Horse Battery No. 20, subsequently reinforced by the Foot Battery
No. 18, opened a cannonade upon the Enemy's Columns at the plateau;
which displayed a great superiority of numbers, and were supported by a
considerable force of Cavalry. The preponderating number of guns in the
Enemy's Line answered the fire of the Prussians with great vigour; and
as the intervening space was very limited, the numbers of killed and
wounded were very great. The Prussian Artillery lost five guns on this
occasion.
GROUCHY delayed not a moment in making dispositions for an attack
on his part. His force on this side of the Field consisted of the
three Divisions of GÉRARD's Corps, and of TESTE's Division of the
Sixth Corps. The latter and two of the former were posted in Front
Line; the remaining Division, in Reserve. He formed three Columns
of Attack. That on the right consisted of TESTE's Division, and was
directed upon Bierge; the central Column was put in motion against the
Prussian Centre; and that on the left against the Right of the Prussian
formation.
The head of each Column was accompanied by a Battery, and preceded by
a swarm of Skirmishers. At the same time, PAJOL put his Cavalry in
motion, and threatened to turn the Prussian Right.
THIELEMANN resolved upon not only offering to the Enemy a vigorous
opposition; but also upon assuming the offensive himself, and
immediately gave the necessary Orders for that purpose. He also
reinforced his Right with two more Companies, and his Left with an
additional Battalion.
It was soon made manifest, however, that this attack failed to check
the forward movement of the Enemy. The ten Prussian Battalions were
forced to give way to the advance of twenty two French Battalions,
which were followed by six more in support. The French gained
possession of that part of the Wood of Rixansart which was on the right
of the Prussian position, and drove back the Twelfth Brigade. The
Battalions of the latter collected again immediately in rear of the
Wood, under the protection of the three before mentioned Battalions of
the Eleventh Brigade and of a Battery of fifteen guns.
General TESTE's Division had in the mean time attacked Bierge, which
was bravely defended by the two Battalions of the Kurmark Landwehr.
Whilst the engagement continued at this point, THIELEMANN took up a
second position in rear of the first, with four Battalions of the Tenth
Brigade, and occupied the small Wood in rear of Bierge. The Prussian
Cavalry Brigade, under Colonels MARWITZ and Count LOTTUM, comprising
twelve Squadrons, secured the right towards Chambre.
About eight o'clock, just as this position had been taken up,
THIELEMANN received, through General PIRCH, the decisive and authentic
intelligence that a great victory had been gained by the Allies on the
previous day, as also a communication of the fact of the Second _Corps
d'Armée_ having marched to intercept GROUCHY's retreat upon the Sambre.
Advantage was immediately taken of these joyful tidings to raise the
spirits of the troops, and to excite them to a renewed attack. With
loud cheers the Prussian Batteries advanced to the attack; which was
attended with complete success, and even the Wood of Rixansart was
again taken.
The Enemy appeared irresolute, and as if impressed with the idea that
THIELEMANN had received reinforcements; but observing that no further
progress was made, he renewed the attack on his part, and retook the
Wood of Rixansart.
It was not until about this time--towards nine o'clock--that TESTE's
Division gained possession of the Village of Bierge; on which
occasion General PENNE, an Officer of considerable distinction in
the French Army, was killed. The French were prevented for some time
from debouching from the place, by the determined opposition of the
_Tirailleurs_ of the 31st Prussian Regiment, under Major NATZMER.
THIELEMANN had now done all which could possibly have been expected
from any General under similar circumstances--with a force not equal
to one half of that of the Enemy, he had endeavoured, whenever an
opportunity offered, and in defiance of superior numbers, to force
back the French Left Wing upon the Dyle; but now that he had failed in
effecting this object, and that Bierge, the key of his position, had
been taken from him, whilst the French Left was pressing forward with
increased numbers to gain the Brussels road, he saw very plainly that
to attempt to maintain his ground any longer would be to expose himself
to the imminent risk of total overthrow, and that no other course was
left to him but to order a general retreat.
* * * * *
It was about ten o'clock in the morning when the Prussian troops began
to retire from the Field. The Town of Wavre had not been attacked on
the 19th, and Colonel ZEPELIN abandoned it without being much pressed
upon his line of retreat. Colonel MARWITZ was ordered to form the Rear
Guard, which was furnished from the 7th and 8th Uhlans, and the 3rd and
6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry. It was accompanied by three Batteries of
Horse, and one of Foot, Artillery. With these troops Colonel MARWITZ
took Post, at first, in front of the Brussels road; placing three
Batteries on his Left, and the remaining one in Reserve. THIELEMANN
gave the Rear Guard an express Order not to march off until Wavre had
been completely evacuated.
In the mean time, GÉRARD's _Corps d'Armée_ had crossed the Dyle
both at Bierge and at Wavre. The two Battalions of the 4th Kurmark
Landwehr, which had been posted in the hollow in rear of the Town, for
the protection of the twelve pounder Battery, became closely pressed
in consequence of this movement. One of the Battalions under Major
SCHMADE had advanced against an Enemy's Column near the Brussels road;
when it unexpectedly received the fire of three French Battalions,
which were pushing forward under cover of an eminence, and followed
by some Cavalry. The Battalion succeeded in reaching the small Wood
near La Bavette; and as the Enemy attempted to turn the latter, it
suddenly attacked and drove him back, after which it came up with the
Rear Guard. The other Battalion, commanded by Major SCHWERIN, attacked
a French Battalion which was advancing against it, threw it back in
confusion, and then continued its retreat. The gallantry and steadiness
displayed in this affair by the Kurmark Landwehr acquired for the
latter great and well merited renown.
The French Cavalry debouched from the Wood of Rixansart and drew up,
with its Left resting upon Chambre. VANDAMME now advanced the Columns
of his Corps towards the Heights of La Bavette, and pushed forward some
Cavalry along the high road. The latter, however, was driven back by
Colonel MARWITZ.
It has been explained that General BORCKE, instead of posting his
remaining six Battalions in rear of the position at Wavre, as intended
by THIELEMANN, proceeded on his march to Couture, by St Lambert.
This place he reached about nightfall, when he despatched an Officer
to BLÜCHER to report his arrival. The latter, in reply, desired him
to bivouac on the spot where he was, and to await further Orders on
the following morning. The Brigade was still in its bivouac at seven
o'clock the next morning, when Colonel STENGEL passed through St
Lambert with his Detachment. The latter informed General BORCKE that he
had defended the Bridge of Limale, and had been followed by the Enemy's
troops.
BORCKE, on hearing this, immediately broke up his bivouac, and decided
upon securing the Wood which extends from St Rober as far as Rixansart.
He deployed two Battalions of the 8th Regiment along the edge of the
Wood, and held the remaining four Battalions of his Brigade, then
with him, in reserve. Perceiving French Cavalry, at the time of their
first attack, marching into the Wood of Rixansart for the purpose of
advancing through it upon Chambre; he opened a fire upon them from his
Battery, with the hope of checking their movement. The only effect
it produced was that of their detaching three Regiments of Cavalry
towards his Brigade. These, however, contented themselves with watching
his movements. It is curious that the Ninth Brigade, as if bent upon
continuing the blunder committed the previous day of detaching itself
from its Corps, should not have attempted, with its six Battalions,
to effect a more important diversion upon the Enemy's extreme Left,
from which it was not more than three thousand paces distant. It was
then eight o'clock, and the Battle was maintained until about eleven;
and yet General BORCKE allowed the three Cavalry Regiments to move off
and join the remainder of the French Cavalry, towards ten o'clock, at
Chambre, without even attempting to molest their movement.
THIELEMANN effected his retreat, in several Columns, by Ottenburg and
St Achtenrode; at which latter place (about half way to Louvain) he
took up a position. The French Cavalry followed as far as the Brussels
road, and the Infantry occupied the Heights of La Bavette.
Between Wavre and Louvain the country assumes a new character,
being covered with hedges, hollow ways, ditches, and gardens, and is
altogether much intersected. From Ottenburg as far as St Achtenrode,
there is almost one continued defile. In this, Cavalry cannot act with
advantage; and it was therefore fortunate for the Prussian Cavalry that
it was followed but slowly by the French.
The loss experienced by THIELEMANN's _Corps d'Armée_ in this Battle of
the 18th and 19th of June, amounted to 2,476 men. No returns whatever
of the losses sustained by GROUCHY's Army are forthcoming, but they
could not have been less than those of the Prussians.
* * * * *
Such was the Battle of Wavre; a Battle the result of which was of no
advantage to NAPOLEON on the 18th, and of positive disadvantage to him
on the 19th. On the former day it did not prevent the march of the
great mass of the Prussian Army towards the Field of Waterloo; and,
on the 19th, the continuance of the contest, while NAPOLEON was in
full flight, exposed this, the only remaining intact, portion of the
French Army, to the imminent risk of being completely cut off from all
retreat. Nor can this defeat of THIELEMANN be looked upon as having
shed additional lustre upon the French arms, when it is considered how
long and successfully the Prussians battled against them with less than
half their strength.
The errors which led to the circumstance of the force under
GROUCHY--constituting, as NAPOLEON himself has been pleased to term
it, the Right Wing of the French Army--becoming exclusively occupied
in attacking a single Corps of the Prussian Army; whilst the remaining
three Corps of the latter were wending their way unmolested towards the
decisive Field of Battle, have already been sufficiently discussed:
and now that their result has been fully exhibited, it is scarcely
necessary to draw attention to the proof which the latter affords of
the entire ignorance of each other's proceedings which characterised
the conduct of NAPOLEON and GROUCHY, great Generals as they were, in
this memorable Campaign. The former received intelligence, before he
began the Battle with WELLINGTON, that the Right Wing was to follow
the Prussians to Wavre, and to act in such a manner as to prevent
these from detaching towards the Anglo-Allied Army; and therefore
felt satisfied that his general plan of operations was in successful
progress. But in less than two hours from the commencement of the
Battle, the fatal consequence of both Generals having unaccountably
neglected to maintain a vigilant reconnaissance and an uninterrupted
communication, was made manifest; and the first intimation NAPOLEON
received of the advance of the Prussians towards La Belle Alliance was
the distant view which he himself had, from his own Field, of BÜLOW's
Corps descending the Heights of St Lambert, at about one o'clock.
The leading principle of the French Emperor's plan was to endeavour,
by all means in his power, to beat the Armies opposed to him _in
detail_. It was therefore incumbent on him, in order to insure the
success of that plan, to adopt such precautionary measures as should
procure for him the earliest and the clearest information concerning
the movements of his Enemies. If he found it necessary temporarily
to divide his force, and act upon two lines; those measures became
still more indispensable, and at the same time admitted the greater
facility of execution. Several reconnoitring parties, both upon the
Flanks of the Army and in front of the interval between the two lines
of operation, under the guidance of experienced, active and intelligent
Officers, would have obtained for both Generals that insight into the
movements and designs of their opponents which was so essential for
the attainment of their common object: whilst parties detached from
each Wing, for the sole purpose of maintaining a close and direct
communication between them, would have afforded the ready means of
regulating each other's proceedings according to the circumstances
under which they might have found themselves respectively placed.
That there should have been so total a disregard of any measure of the
kind appears almost incredible; yet such was the fact; and hence it
came to pass that the despatch sent to GROUCHY, at one o'clock, from
the Heights in rear of La Belle Alliance did not reach him until seven
in the evening; at which time, as before explained, it was too late
to admit of the instructions it conveyed being fulfilled: and hence,
also, GROUCHY was left battling with his entire force--not less than a
third of the whole French Army--against a single incomplete Prussian
Corps, under THIELEMANN, from daybreak until about eleven o'clock in
the forenoon of the 19th, when he was first made acquainted with the
fact that during the whole of that time the Army under NAPOLEON, having
been most signally defeated and completely scattered on the preceding
evening, was flying across the frontier in the wildest confusion.
On receiving this latter intelligence, GROUCHY's first idea was to
march against the rear of the main body of the Prussian Army: but,
calculating that his force was not adequate for such an enterprise,
that the victorious Allies might detach to intercept his retreat, and
that he should be closely followed by that portion of the Prussians
which he had just defeated; he decided on retiring upon Namur, where he
would regulate his further operations according to the intelligence he
might gain in that quarter concerning the real state of affairs.
[Illustration]
CHAPTER XVII.
It would be difficult to discover, in the whole history of the Wars of
modern times, an instance in which so fine, so splendid, an Army as
that of NAPOLEON, one composed almost exclusively of veterans, all men
of one nation, entirely devoted to their Chief, and most enthusiastic
in his cause, became so suddenly panic stricken, so completely
disorganised, and so thoroughly scattered, as was the French Army when
it lost the Battle of Waterloo. A defeated Army usually covers its
retreat by a Rear Guard, but here there was nothing of the kind: and
hence that Army cannot be said to have retreated; but truly to have
fled, from the Field of Battle. No attempt to rally was made on the
Belgian soil, and it was not until some of the scattered fragments
of the immense wreck had been borne across the French frontier that
their partial junction on different points indicated the revival of
at least some portion of that mighty mass of warriors; who, but three
days before, had marched across this same frontier in all the pride of
strength, and in all the assurance of victory.
The rearmost of the fugitives having reached the Sambre, at Charleroi,
Marchienne, and Châtelet, by daybreak of the 19th, indulged themselves
with the hope that they might then enjoy a short rest from the fatigues
which the relentless pursuit by the Prussians had entailed upon them
during the night; but their fancied security was quickly disturbed by
the appearance of a few Prussian Cavalry, judiciously thrown forward
towards the Sambre from the Advanced Guard at Gosselies. They resumed
their flight, taking the direction of Beaumont and Philippeville.
* * * * *
It had been arranged by WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER, on the Field of
Waterloo, that the Prussian Army, not having been so much crippled and
exhausted by the Battle, should undertake the further pursuit, and
proceed by Charleroi towards Avesnes and Laon; whilst the Anglo-Allied
Army, after remaining during the night on the Field, should advance by
Nivelles and Binche towards Peronne.
On the following morning, the pursuing Cavalry belonging to the First,
Fourth, and partly to the Second, Prussian _Corps d'Armée_, reached the
vicinity of Frasne and Mellet.
The Fourth Corps marched at daybreak from Genappe, where it collected
together the Brigades which had been so much broken up by the continued
pursuit. The 8th Prussian Hussars, under Major COLOMB, were detached
from this Corps towards Wavre, to observe Marshal GROUCHY. They
were supported by the 1st Pomeranian Landwehr Cavalry; and, shortly
afterwards, the 2nd Silesian Landwehr Cavalry, under Lieutenant Colonel
SCHILL, also followed in the same direction.
After some hours' rest, the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_ marched to Fontaine
l'Evêque, where it bivouacked. It had received Orders to communicate
from this place with Mons. The Advanced Guard, under General SYDOW,
was pushed forward, as far as Lermes, on the road to Thuin; it being
intended that this Corps should proceed by the road to Maubeuge, along
the Sambre.
The First _Corps d'Armée_, which had from the beginning followed the
Fourth as a Reserve, now advanced in pursuit of the Enemy by the direct
road to Charleroi. The Light Cavalry at the head of the Column reached
the passages of the Sambre at Châtelet, Charleroi, and Marchienne,
without meeting any sort of opposition or impediment; nor did it
perceive any thing of the Enemy on the other side of the river. The
Corps halted for the night at Charleroi: having its Advanced Guard
at Marchienne, and its Outposts occupying the line from Montigny by
Louveral as far as Châtelet. Detachments from the Reserve Cavalry
were sent in the direction of Fleurus, to secure the Corps from any
molestation on the part of GROUCHY; of whose proceedings nothing
positive was then known at the Prussian Head Quarters.
* * * * *
It was not until nearly five o'clock in the evening of the 19th, that
General BORCKE, whose Brigade, the Ninth, was still in the vicinity of
St Lambert, discovered the retreat of GROUCHY's troops. He immediately
communicated the fact to General THIELEMANN, who ordered him to cross
the Dyle the next day (the 20th) and march upon Namur. The French Rear
Guard of GÉRARD's _Corps d'Armée_ continued to occupy Limale until
nightfall. THIELEMANN remained posted, during the night of the 19th, at
St Achtenrode; having his Advanced Guard at Ottenburg.
On the evening of the 18th, Pirch received Orders to march from
the Field of Waterloo with his _Corps d'Armée_ (the Second) in the
direction of Namur; for the purpose of turning Marshal GROUCHY's Left
Flank and intercepting his retreat upon the Sambre.
PIRCH made this movement during the night, passing through Maransart,
where he was joined by his Seventh Brigade; and crossing the Genappe
rivulet at Bousseval, as also, subsequently, the Dyle, on his way to
Mellery: which place he reached at eleven o'clock in the forenoon of
the following day. His Corps was much divided on this occasion. He had
with him the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Infantry Brigades, and twenty
four Squadrons of Cavalry: but the Fifth Infantry Brigade, and the
remaining fourteen Squadrons, were with that portion of the Prussian
Army which was pursuing the Enemy along the high road to Charleroi.
The Corps being greatly fatigued by the night march and its exertions
on the previous day, PIRCH ordered the troops to bivouac and to betake
themselves to rest.
During this march, Lieutenant Colonel SOHR had pushed on with his
Cavalry Brigade, as an Advanced Guard; and now he was required to
gain intelligence concerning the Enemy's movements, and to seek a
communication with THIELEMANN. He found the Defile of Mont St Guibert
strongly occupied by the Enemy, but could obtain no information
respecting THIELEMANN's Corps.
When it is considered how very near to Mellery GÉRARD's _Corps
d'Armée_ must have passed, in order to fall into the Namur road at
Sombref; it seems extraordinary that PIRCH, who reached that place
at eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 19th,--the same hour at
which GROUCHY, then beyond Wavre, received the first intimation of
the defeat of NAPOLEON,--should have permitted GÉRARD to continue his
retreat unmolested. His troops required rest, it is true; but had he
maintained a good look out in the direction of Gembloux, he would, in
all probability, after the lapse of a few hours, have been enabled
to fulfil his instructions so far as to have completely intercepted
the retreat of a considerable portion of GROUCHY's Army. That part
of the Enemy's force which Lieutenant Colonel SOHR observed at Mont
St Guibert, was probably the Advanced Guard only of GÉRARD's _Corps
d'Armée_; since its Rear Guard remained at the Bridge of Limale until
nightfall. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, more
especially the express object of the detached movement of the Second
Prussian _Corps d'Armée_, it must be admitted that, on this occasion,
there was a want of due vigilance on the part of General PIRCH.
It was on the 19th, also, that Prince BLÜCHER issued, whilst at
Genappe, a Proclamation to his Army; in which he thanked the troops for
their conduct during the recent struggle.
* * * * *
At daybreak of the 19th, that portion of the Duke of WELLINGTON's Army
which had fought the Battle of Waterloo, broke up from its bivouac, and
began to move along the high road to Nivelles. Those troops which had
been posted in front of Hal during the 18th, consisting of STEDMAN's
Dutch-Belgian Division, ANTHING's Dutch-Belgian Indian Brigade, and
Colonel ESTORFF's Hanoverian Cavalry Brigade, under Prince FREDERICK
of the Netherlands; as also of JOHNSTONE's British Infantry Brigade,
and LYON's Hanoverian Infantry Brigade, under Lieutenant General Sir
CHARLES COLVILLE, were likewise directed to march upon Nivelles. The
Army occupied Nivelles and the surrounding villages during the night of
the 19th; in the course of which the Duke arrived from Brussels, and
established his Head Quarters in the town.
* * * * *
An hour's rest was all that the harassing pursuit by the Prussians
permitted NAPOLEON to enjoy at Charleroi; and he was compelled to fly
across the Sambre, without the slightest chance of being enabled to
check that pursuit on the Belgian side of the frontier.
The following inscription, which has been cut over the centre of the
archway of the Charleroi gate, is singularly appropriate to the flight
of NAPOLEON on this memorable occasion:
"ABIIT. EXCESSIT. EVASIT. ERVPIT."
The circumstances, however, under which the flight of CATALINE here
described, and that of NAPOLEON, took place, form a strange contrast.
The former, subdued in the Senate by the indignant philippics and
burning eloquence of CICERO, escaped from Rome to the rebel camp of
MANLIUS, to take up arms against his native city for the purpose of
satisfying the cravings of his profligate ambition; and the latter,
defeated in the battle field, fled to the capital, in the vain hope of
obtaining from the Senate of his country further means of waging war
against the legitimate Sovereign.
From Charleroi, NAPOLEON proceeded to Philippeville; whence he hoped
to be able to communicate more readily with GROUCHY. He continued
here four hours; which he employed in expediting Orders to Generals
RAPP, LECOURBE, and LAMARQUE, to advance with their respective _Corps
d'Armée_ by forced marches to Paris: and also to the commandants of
fortresses, to defend themselves to the last extremity. He desired
SOULT to collect together all the troops that might arrive at this
point, and conduct them to Laon; for which place he himself started
with post horses, at two o'clock in the afternoon.
The general disposition of the respective Armies on the evening of the
19th, was as follows:--
The Anglo-Allied Army, which constituted the Right Wing of the
advancing forces, was at Nivelles and its vicinity.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Nivelles.
Of the Prussian Army, which formed the Left Wing, its First _Corps
d'Armée_ was at Charleroi;
Second Corps on the march to Mellery;
Third Corps at St Achtenrode;
Fourth Corps at Fontaine l'Evêque;
Fifth Brigade of the Second Corps at Anderlues, near Fontaine
l'Evêque.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Gosselies.
The disorganized force of the main French Army was in the vicinity of
Beaumont, Philippeville, and Avesnes.
NAPOLEON was posting towards Laon.
The detached portion of the French Army under GROUCHY was on the
march to Namur.
* * * * *
The Duke of WELLINGTON, in whose character the highest military talents
of the Warrior were so intimately blended with the most comprehensive
views of the Statesman, did not allow the dazzling allurements which
beset the path of a Conqueror to divert him for a single moment from
that fixedness of purpose, or to dim that penetrating foresight which
so peculiarly distinguished his proceedings on all great occasions of
a similar nature, involving the peace, the honour, and the security
of not only his own Sovereign and Country, but also of all the Allied
Powers, in whose interests he was so actively engaged. He did not view
the great Battle he had gained in the light of an event to be followed
up by an irruption into the Enemy's country, conducted in such a manner
as to humble to the dust the national pride of the French people; and
to impose upon them the whole weight and burthen of the oppressions,
ravages, and horrors which generally follow in the train of a
victorious and lawless soldiery over the face of an Enemy's country.
His sole aim was directed to the carrying out of the great object of
the War, which comprised not only the annihilation of the power of
NAPOLEON and of the adherents to his cause, but also the Restoration
of the legitimate Sovereign to the Throne of France. With the latter
Sovereign he had been in constant communication, devising means for his
protection during his temporary exile in the Netherlands; and now that
the Armies were on the point of crossing the frontier, counselling him
to hasten forward and show himself in the midst of his people: in order
that by identifying his cause with the common object of the Allied
Powers he might avail himself of all the influence and advantages to be
derived from the recent victory; and become, as it were, a participator
in the brilliant successes which attended their arms on the glorious
18th of June.
In proof of the sincerity of his intentions, and as a first step
towards securing the good will, if not the friendly disposition, of
the French people, more especially of the Legitimists and the well and
peaceably disposed; the Duke issued the following General Order to the
whole of the troops under his command:--
Nivelles, 20th June, 1815.
_General Order._
1. As the Army is about to enter the French territory, the troops
of the Nations, which are at present under the command of Field
Marshal the Duke of WELLINGTON, are desired to recollect that
their respective Sovereigns are the Allies of His Majesty the King
of France; and that France ought, therefore, to be treated as a
friendly country. It is therefore required that nothing should be
taken, either by Officers or soldiers, for which payment be not
made. The Commissaries of the Army will provide for the wants of
the troops in the usual manner; and it is not permitted either to
soldiers or Officers to extort contributions. The Commissaries will
be authorised either by the Field Marshal, or by the Generals who
command the troops of the respective Nations, in cases where their
provisions are not supplied by an English Commissary, to make the
proper requisitions, for which regular receipts will be given; and
it must be strictly understood that they will themselves be held
responsible for whatever they obtain in way of requisition from the
inhabitants of France, in the same manner in which they would be
esteemed accountable for purchases made for their own Government in
the several dominions to which they belong.
2. The Field Marshal takes this opportunity of returning to the Army
his thanks for their conduct in the glorious action fought on the
18th instant, and he will not fail to report his sense of their
conduct in the terms which it deserves to their several Sovereigns.
WELLINGTON.
On the same day, the Duke, in consequence of a report received by him
from Lieutenant General LECOQ, and of a previous communication made
to him by the King of SAXONY, consented to take command of the Saxon
_Corps d'Armée_, amounting to nearly 17,000 men. He directed the above
General to march these troops to Antwerp, and there await further
Orders.
* * * * *
The Anglo-Allied Army marched this day to Binche and Mons. The British
Cavalry moved into villages between Roeulx and Mons. VIVIAN's Hussar
Brigade took the Outpost duties on the Sambre. The Hanoverian Cavalry
furnished Outposts towards Maubeuge. The Duke fixed his Head Quarters
at Binche.
BLÜCHER, having secured the passage of the Sambre in the neighbourhood
of Charleroi, continued his pursuit of the Enemy, and crossed the
French frontier on the 20th. He directed ZIETEN to march the First
_Corps d'Armée_ from Charleroi to Beaumont, to throw forward his
Advanced Guard as far as Solre le Château, to detach a Party of
Observation to the left towards Florenne, and to watch the road from
Philippeville to Beaumont.
As the First _Corps d'Armée_ advanced, it discovered at every step
fresh proofs of the extreme disorder in which the French Army had
retreated; and found twelve pieces of Artillery which they had hitherto
contrived to save from the great wreck at Waterloo, but had now
abandoned to their pursuers. On arriving at Beaumont, the Corps took up
a bivouac. Its Advanced Guard, under General JAGOW, consisting of the
Third Infantry Brigade, the 1st Silesian Hussars, and a Horse Battery,
reached Solre le Château upon the road to Avesnes.
The Prince, at the same time, ordered BÜLOW to move the Fourth _Corps
d'Armée_ as far as Colleret, where the road to Thuin intersects the
high road from Beaumont to Maubeuge, and to push on the Advanced Guard
to Beaufort. BÜLOW accordingly directed General SYDOW to proceed with
an Advanced Guard, consisting of a Cavalry Brigade, a Horse Battery,
and two Battalions of Infantry, which had the day before reached Lermes
on the road to Thuin, and to ascertain very particularly whether the
French had established themselves on the Sambre, to secure the Bridges
both here and at Lobbes, and further, to restore these passages, should
they have been destroyed by the Enemy. Another Detachment, under
Colonel EICKE, consisting of two Fusilier Battalions, the two Squadrons
attached to the Thirteenth Brigade, and of the 2nd Silesian Hussars,
was sent forward to take possession, in the first instance, of the
passages of the Sambre, and then to join General SYDOW; who, proceeding
by Colleret towards Beaufort, was to form both Detachments into an
Advanced Guard on reaching the latter place. In the mean time, the mass
of the Fourth Corps, headed by the Reserve Cavalry under Prince WILLIAM
of Prussia, followed in one Column.
The progress made by this portion of the Prussian Army on the 20th was
not so rapid as was desirable. Considerable delay arose in consequence
of the degree of caution imparted to the movements by the impression
which BÜLOW entertained that the Enemy would defend the passages, and
endeavour to maintain himself along the opposite side of the river.
Hence the Advanced Guard of the Corps only reached Ferrière la Petite;
part of the main body proceeded as far as Montignies, and the remainder
with the Reserve Artillery, did not get farther than the Bridges
across the Sambre.
The Fifth Brigade (belonging to the Second _Corps d'Armée_) had started
at daybreak from its bivouac at Anderlues, near Fontaine l'Evêque;
and directed its march, by Binche, upon Villers, towards Maubeuge.
The Brigade was reinforced by one hundred Dragoons under Major BUSCH,
and half a Horse Battery; which Detachment arrived at Villers at five
o'clock in the afternoon. This Cavalry was employed in observing the
Fortress of Maubeuge, from the Mons road, as far as the Sambre; and the
Brigade bivouacked at Villers. A Hanoverian Regiment of Hussars also
observed the Fortress on the right of the Prussian Cavalry upon the
Bavay road.
* * * * *
The Left Wing of the Prussian Army, comprising the Third, and part
of the Second, _Corps d'Armée_, came into collision with the Enemy
this day, when pursuing that part of the French Army which was under
GROUCHY. THIELEMANN, having learned that the latter had commenced his
retreat upon Gembloux, marched at five o'clock in the morning from St
Achtenrode to Wavre; where he further ascertained that already on the
afternoon of the 19th, the French had effected their retreat across the
Dyle, leaving only a Rear Guard on the left bank of the river.
GROUCHY, when he decided on retiring upon Namur, ordered General
BONNEMAINS to move on rapidly, by Gembloux, with the 4th and 12th
Dragoons, as an Advanced Guard, and to reach that town as soon as
possible, and secure the passage of the Sambre. They were followed
by the remainder of EXCELMANS' Cavalry, and the Reserve Artillery,
together with the wounded. The Infantry was put in motion in two
Columns: the one, consisting of the Third _Corps d'Armée_, proceeding
by Gembloux; and the other, comprising the Fourth Corps, passing more
to the right, and falling into the Namur road in rear of Sombref.
The Light Cavalry was principally with the Rear Guard. To deceive
THIELEMANN, GROUCHY left his Rear Guard in Wavre and Limale, with
Cavalry Picquets thrown out towards the Prussians, until near evening;
when it followed the main body to Namur.
THIELEMANN, having placed the whole of his Cavalry, with eight pieces
of Horse Artillery, at the head of his Column, now ordered them to
move on at a trot, for the purpose of overtaking the Enemy; but it
was not until they had passed Gembloux that they discovered the Rear
of GROUCHY's force, consisting of a few Regiments of Cavalry. These,
however, now made so rapid a retreat, that it was impossible to bring
them to action.
At length, on arriving near the Village of Fallize, within about three
miles from Namur, the Prussians found VANDAMME's Rear Guard posted on
the brow of the declivity at the foot of which lay the town, in the
valley of the Meuse. It presented about two Battalions of Infantry,
three Regiments of Cavalry, and four guns; and was formed to cover the
retreat of the French troops.
The Prussian Battery immediately opened a fire; during which Colonel
MARWITZ, moving out to the right, with the First Cavalry Brigade, and
Count LOTTUM to the left, with the Second, turned the Enemy in both
Flanks. The latter brought forward a Reserve of Cavalry, when the 8th
Prussian Uhlans, under Colonel Count DOHNA, at the head of the Column
that turned the Enemy's Left, made a most gallant attack upon the
French Dragoons; who met it with a volley from their carbines, but were
overthrown. The 7th Uhlans and a Squadron of the 12th Hussars also
charged on this occasion, and captured three pieces of French Horse
Artillery, which were in the act of moving off, as also fifty Cavalry
horses. The Enemy's Infantry now threw itself into the adjacent Wood,
with which the declivities that here lead down into the valley of the
Meuse are covered, and thus succeeded in preventing the Prussians from
following up their success.
At this moment, intelligence was received that General PIRCH was
pursuing the Enemy with the Second _Corps d'Armée_ upon the high road
leading from Sombref to Namur; whereupon the Cavalry of the Third Corps
was moved into this direction. A French Column, consisting of about
twelve Battalions and two Batteries, but without any Cavalry, was
perceived marching along that road. They belonged to GÉRARD's _Corps
d'Armée_, which had effected its retreat by Limale, through Mont St
Guibert. Upon the Height on which the Château of Flavinnes is situated
was posted a Detachment from VANDAMME's Corps, consisting of from four
to five Battalions with a Battery, and a Regiment of Cavalry, for the
purpose of receiving GÉRARD's Column as it fell back, and of protecting
its retreat. As the Enemy continued its retrograde march in Close
Column and in good order; it was not deemed advisable to undertake an
attack with the two Prussian Cavalry Brigades of the Third Corps, which
were much fatigued: but the Horse Battery was drawn up, and discharged
several rounds of shell and grape at the French troops during their
retreat upon the town. The latter, therefore, quitted the high road,
and moved along the adjacent Heights until they reached the Battalions
which had been drawn up in support, and which now opposed the further
advance of PIRCH's _Corps d'Armée_.
At this time, THIELEMANN's Cavalry withdrew, leaving the further
pursuit of the Enemy to the latter Corps--to the movements of which it
is now necessary to recur.
It was not until five o'clock in the morning of the 20th that PIRCH
received intelligence that the Enemy was retiring by Gembloux upon
Namur. Lieutenant Colonel SOHR was immediately detached, in all haste,
to Gembloux with his Cavalry Brigade, a Battery of Horse Artillery,
and the Fusilier Battalions of the 9th, 14th, and 23rd Regiments, as
an Advanced Guard. On approaching that town, Lieutenant Colonel SOHR
ascertained that THIELEMANN's Cavalry was pursuing the Enemy along the
high road from Gembloux to Namur. He therefore decided upon marching by
the narrow road on the right of the _chaussée_ leading from Sombref,
in full trot, covered by the Wood, to overtake the French troops in
retreat. At Temploux, the latter presented a force of two Battalions,
some Cavalry, and four pieces of Artillery in position, prepared to
cover the retreating Column. Lieutenant Colonel SOHR immediately
attacked with both the Regiments of Hussars, supported by the Battery
of Horse Artillery; and defeated this portion of the Enemy's forces. It
was at this moment, too, that a cannonade was opened upon the latter by
the Horse Battery, before mentioned, of THIELEMANN's Corps; whereupon
it fell back upon the favourable position taken up near Flavinnes, and
in which the Enemy appeared determined to make a stand.
PIRCH immediately ordered the attack, and directed that it should be
supported by Major General KRAFFT with the Sixth Brigade, which had
closely followed the Advanced Guard, and had come up with the latter at
four o'clock in the afternoon. Three Columns of Attack were formed. The
First consisted of the 1st Battalion of the 9th Regiment, the Fusilier
Battalion of the 26th Regiment, and the 1st Battalion of the 1st Elbe
Landwehr. It was under the command of Major SCHMIDT, and detached to
the left of the road, to drive back the Enemy's troops posted in the
Wood and upon the Heights. The Second consisted of the 1st and 2nd
Battalions of the 26th Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion of the 9th
Regiment, under Colonel REUSS, and of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of
the Elbe Landwehr, under Colonel BISMARK. This Column, which advanced
partly on the right, and partly on the left, of the road, was supported
by the Battery No 5, and led by Major General KRAFFT in person. The
Third Column comprised the Fusilier Battalions which had constituted
the Infantry of the Advanced Guard; and was detached more to the right,
towards the Sambre, to support the general advance upon Namur.
General KRAFFT, after having kept up a fire, for a short time, upon the
Enemy with his Artillery, ordered the attack with his Infantry. Colonel
REUSS threw out his Skirmishers, who were quickly followed by the
Columns of Attack. The Enemy, after some little resistance, was fairly
driven into Namur by a charge with bayonets, and suffered much loss.
In the mean time, Major SCHMIDT, with his Column of three Battalions,
had turned the Enemy's Right Flank on the Louvain road; and the French
were now limited to the defence of the suburb, which, however, was
maintained with great obstinacy. The Prussian Columns of Attack,
advancing at the _pas de charge_, drove the Enemy out of the suburb,
and endeavoured to gain possession of the Gates of the town. Colonel
ZASTROW, the second in command of the Sixth Brigade, wished to burst
open the Gate which leads to the Louvain road; but was repulsed by a
most murderous fire of musketry and grape, directed upon the assailants
from the walls of the town.
On repeating the attempt, the Prussian Battalions fought with
distinguished bravery, but with a great sacrifice of life. Colonel
ZASTROW was killed at their head; Colonel BISMARK also fell; Colonel
REUSS was wounded; and the Sixth Brigade alone lost forty four
Officers, and 1,274 Under Officers and Privates.
The main body of GROUCHY's Army was at this time in full retreat upon
Dinant, along the Defile of the Meuse. The troops left in Namur, to
keep the Prussians at bay as long as possible, consisted of General
TESTE's Division. They carefully barricaded all the Gates, lined the
walls facing the Prussians, and made a most gallant resistance. The
Officers, finding that their men continued so perfectly steady as not
to require their attention, armed themselves with the muskets of the
wounded, and assisted in maintaining the fire from the walls. The
greatest order prevailed in the Town. The wounded, the provisions, and
ammunition, had already been removed; and were on the line of march.
General PIRCH was well aware that the French defended the town
solely for the purpose of covering their retreat, and had therefore
no intention of undertaking any serious attack; he simply wished to
possess himself of the suburbs, and to hold the Enemy in check by
detaching troops to the Porte de Fer and the St Nicholas Gate. He
thought that a demonstration against the latter Gate would raise
apprehensions in the minds of the French respecting the security of the
Bridge over the Sambre.
With this view, he ordered General BRAUSE to relieve, with the Seventh
Brigade, the troops then engaged; and together with the Advanced Guard
under Lieutenant Colonel Sohr, to blockade the Town. At the same time
he directed the remainder of the Corps to bivouac near Temploux.
General BRAUSE proceeded to post the Fusilier Battalion of the 22nd
Regiment in the direction of the Porte de Fer, and the Fusilier
Battalion of the 2nd Elbe Landwehr towards the Brussels Gate. The main
body of the Seventh Brigade, under Colonel SCHON, was stationed in
rear of the suburb. The first mentioned Battalion stood, under cover,
at four hundred paces distance from the Porte de Fer, having its
_Tirailleurs_ in the Avenue near the Gate. Just as General BRAUSE rode
up to examine its formation, an alarm was spread in front that the
Enemy was making a sortie. The General desired the Commanding Officer,
Major JOCHENS, to lead his Battalion quickly against the defenders, to
overthrow them, and then, if possible, to penetrate into the town along
with the retreating troops. As Major JOCHENS approached the Gate, he
found in its immediate vicinity the _Tirailleurs_ of the Sixth Brigade,
still maintaining the contest in that quarter. The attacking Column and
the _Tirailleurs_ now rushed towards the Gate and the walls; which the
French, probably not deeming themselves strong enough to resist this
pressure, abandoned in the greatest haste.
General TESTE had, in fact, prepared everything for his retreat; and
had so well calculated the time which the Enemy would require in
forcing an entrance by the Porte de Fer, that he succeeded in filing
his Battalions along the parapets of the Bridge, which had been
barricaded, and thus withdrew them to the south bank of the Sambre. The
Prussians found it impossible to force open the Gate. The windows of
the adjoining house of the _Douaniers_ were therefore driven in, and
a small iron door which led from the interior of the house into the
town was opened, and, in this manner, an entrance was effected for the
assailants; who were conducted by Major JOCHENS, of the 22nd, and Major
LUCKOWITZ, of the 9th Regiment, across the Market Place, and as far as
the Bridge over the Sambre: which the French had barricaded, as before
stated, and behind which they had again established themselves. These
troops were closely followed by Major SCHMIDT, with the 9th Regiment,
and lastly by the 2nd Elbe Landwehr, in Close Column, under Majors
MIRBACH and LINDERN.
The Prussians immediately occupied the captured portion of the town;
posted a Column of Reserve on the Market Place, and with loud cheers,
made themselves masters of the Bridge over the Sambre. An attempt had
been made to gain the Enemy's rear, by means of a ford in this river;
but it proved unsuccessful.
The French were driven with so much impetuosity towards the Gate
leading out to Dinant, that there appeared every probability of a
considerable number of them falling into the hands of the Prussians.
The former, however, had heaped up large bundles of wood, intermingled
with straw and pitch, against the Gate, and set them on fire on the
approach of the Prussian troops. The Gate and the street were soon in
flames, and the pursuit was thus obstructed; but even had this not
occurred, the great fatigue of the troops who, during the previous
sixteen hours, had been either marching or fighting, was sufficient to
deprive them of the power of following the retreating Enemy with any
degree of vigour.
After nine o'clock in the evening, the town was in the possession of
the Prussians. Major SCHMIDT took the command at the Dinant Gate and
Major JOCHENS at the Bridge over the Sambre. The remaining troops of
the Seventh, and some Battalions of the Sixth, Brigade were posted by
General BRAUSE upon the Market Place. The Fusilier Battalions of the
Advanced Guard, which had supported the attack, more to the right, had
also advanced into the town, towards the Bridge over the Sambre. They
had been sharply cannonaded by the Enemy from the right bank of the
Sambre.
A small party of Cavalry, under Captain THIELEMANN, of the Pomeranian
Hussars, was sent forward a short distance on the road to Dinant, to
form the Advance of the troops destined to pursue the Enemy at daybreak.
General TESTE's Division retired slowly, and in good order, by the
Dinant road, as far as Profondeville; where it took up a position
during three hours. At midnight it resumed its march, and arrived at
Dinant at four o'clock on the following morning.
This retreat of GROUCHY by Namur upon Dinant was executed in a skilful
and masterly manner; and the gallant defence of the former town by
General TESTE's Division, unaided by Artillery, merits the highest
commendation.
In this action the Prussians suffered a loss, including that already
mentioned as having occurred to the Sixth Brigade, of 1,500 men; and
the French are supposed to have lost about the same number. In the last
attack, the latter abandoned 150 prisoners they had previously taken
from the Prussians.
The Second Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ occupied Namur during the night.
The Cavalry of the Third Corps bivouacked at Temploux; the Infantry
of the latter (which had been rejoined on the march from Wavre by the
Ninth Brigade), near the town of Gembloux.
* * * * *
The circumstances under which the French Army, generally, was placed on
the 19th of June rendered it sufficiently obvious that GROUCHY would be
compelled to effect his retreat by Namur; and further, that whatever
show of resistance he might offer on that point would be solely
intended to gain time for the security of his troops whilst retiring,
in one Column only by the long and narrow Defile of the Meuse which
leads to Dinant. Aware that NAPOLEON's defeated Army was retiring
along the direct line of operation, the Charleroi road; he immediately
saw the imminent risk of his own retreat becoming intercepted, and
the consequent necessity of his effecting the latter in a parallel
direction, with a view to his rejoining the main Army as soon as
practicable. To retire, therefore, by Gembloux upon Namur, and thence
along the line of the Meuse, by Dinant and Givet, naturally presented
itself as the true and proper course to be pursued.
To Generals in command of _Corps d'Armée_, such as THIELEMANN and
PIRCH, a little reflection upon GROUCHY's critical position must have
led to a similar conclusion. The inactivity of the former, during the
afternoon and evening of the 19th, is probably to be explained by his
having satisfied himself that the longer GROUCHY continued in the
vicinity of Wavre, the greater became the chance of his retreat being
cut off by a portion of the Allied Armies; which, in their advance,
would reach the Sambre much sooner than it would be in the power of
the French Marshal to do: and that, therefore, it would be injudicious
on his part to attempt to force the latter from the position, which
appearances induced him to believe he still occupied with his entire
force, on the Dyle. He may also have been strengthened in this
opinion by the circumstance of his not having received any positive
instructions as to his future dispositions, or any reinforcements to
secure for him a preponderance over GROUCHY.
With PIRCH, however, the case was very different. He received distinct
Orders, on the evening of the 18th, to march at once from the Field of
Waterloo, and continue his movement during that night, so as to cut
off GROUCHY's retreat upon the Sambre. It has already been explained,
that on reaching Mellery, at eleven o'clock on the following morning,
he halted to give his troops rest; that he subsequently ascertained,
through Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, who had been despatched, during the
march, with his Cavalry Brigade to reconnoitre on the left, that
the French occupied the Defile of Mont St Guibert in force. This
intelligence might have satisfied him that GROUCHY had not yet reached
Namur; but, if he entertained any doubts on that point, these could
easily have been settled by means of a reconnoitring party, detached
from Mellery, by Gentinne, and St Gery, to Gembloux, a distance of
seven miles. He would then have learned, that no portion whatever of
GROUCHY's force had hitherto crossed this line, in retreat; that he
had, consequently, gained considerably on his rear, and had it in his
power, after allowing a few hours rest to his troops, to march them by
the high road which leads directly from Mellery into the high road near
Sombref, and to anticipate GROUCHY in the possession of Namur.
In this case, GROUCHY, on approaching the latter place, and finding it
occupied by PIRCH, would, in all probability, have hesitated to risk
the loss of so much time as an attempt to force the town and the Pont
de Sambre would necessarily incur, and have preferred endeavouring to
pass his troops across the Sambre by some of the bridges and fords
between Charleroi and Namur, and retire upon either Philippeville or
Dinant; but with a Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ at each of these points,
and another in his rear, this would have been, to say the least of it,
a most hazardous undertaking; and if he attempted to cross the Meuse
below Namur, his chance of regaining NAPOLEON's Army would have been
still more remote.
But setting aside the circumstance of PIRCH's not having, in this
manner, taken due advantage of the position in which he stood
relatively with GROUCHY during the 19th; and passing to the fact,
that he first learned, at five o'clock on the morning of the 20th,
whilst still at Mellery, that the Enemy was retiring along the high
road from Gembloux to Namur, pursued by THIELEMANN's Cavalry: it seems
strange that, inferring, as he must naturally have done, that GROUCHY
would only endeavour to hold out long enough at Namur to effect his
passage by the Pont de Sambre, and to cover his retreat to Dinant, he
did not immediately move off by his right, and push his troops across
the Sambre by some of the bridges and fords higher up the stream;
and then, marching in the direction of Profondeville, under cover of
the Wood of Villers within the angle formed by the confluence of the
Sambre and the Meuse, intercept GROUCHY's retreat through the long
and narrow Defile in which the road to Dinant winds by the side of
the last mentioned river. The situation in which GROUCHY would have
been placed by a movement of this kind--his troops in a long, narrow,
precipitous Defile, obstructed in front by PIRCH, and attacked in rear
by THIELEMANN--would have been perilous in the extreme.
PIRCH probably felt that his _Corps d'Armée_, part of which was then
attached to the Army pressing the Enemy by the Charleroi road, was not
equal to cope with GROUCHY's troops; but in the case here supposed,
by judiciously disposing his force then present so as to command the
Defile at some favourable point in its course, he would have secured
for himself an advantage which, under such circumstances, would have
fully compensated for his deficiency in regard to numbers.
The scattered remnants of the main French Army continued to be hurried
forward in wild confusion across the frontier. Some of the fugitives
hastened towards Avesnes, others to Philippeville: whilst a very great
proportion of them sought no temporary rest of this kind, but, throwing
away their arms, fled into the interior, to return to their homes; the
Cavalry, in many instances, disposing of their horses to the country
people. Several of the superior Officers hastily collected such of the
troops as appeared better disposed, and conducted them in the direction
of Laon. NAPOLEON reached the latter town in the afternoon of the 20th.
After conferring with the _Préfet_, he desired M. DE BUSSY, one of his
Aides de Camp, to superintend the defence of this important place; and
despatched General DEJEAN to Avesnes, and General FLAHAUT to Guise.
In the mean time, a body of troops had been discerned in the distance,
moving towards the town. NAPOLEON sent an Aide de Camp to reconnoitre
it; when it proved to be a Column of about three thousand men, which
SOULT, JEROME, MORAND, COLBERT, PETIT, and PELET had succeeded in
rallying and preserving in order. NAPOLEON now appeared intent upon
remaining at Laon until the remainder of the Army had reassembled: but
he subsequently yielded to the force of the arguments expressed in
opposition to this determination by the Duke of BASSANO and others who
were present, and took his departure for Paris; purposing, at the same
time, to return to Laon on the 25th or 26th of the month.
* * * * *
The following was the general disposition of the respective Armies on
the evening of the 20th:--
The Anglo-Allied Army had its Right at Mons, and its Left at Binche.
The British Cavalry was cantoned in the villages of Strepy, Thieu,
Boussoit sur Haine, Ville sur Haine, and Coegnies; VIVIAN's Brigade
in those of Merbes Ste. Marie, Bienne le Hapart, and Mons: and the
Hanoverian Cavalry in those of Givry and Croix. The Reserve was at
Soignies.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Binche.
The Prussian Army had its First _Corps d'Armée_ at Beaumont; Fourth
Corps at Collerets: Second Corps at Namur, with the exception of
the Fifth Brigade, which was on the march to blockade Maubeuge, and
bivouacked at Villers: Third Corps was at Gembloux, with its Cavalry
bivouacked at Temploux.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Merbes le Château.
The French Army under NAPOLEON was completely dispersed. A few of the
troops took refuge in Avesnes, others in Guise, and the principal
body of them evincing any kind of order, but not exceeding three
thousand men, reached Laon.
The French forces under GROUCHY were at Dinant. NAPOLEON quitted Laon
for Paris.
* * * * *
On the 21st, the Duke of WELLINGTON crossed the French frontier, moving
the principal portion of his Army to Bavay, and the remainder from
Mons upon Valenciennes, which Fortress was immediately blockaded; and
established his Head Quarters at Malplaquet, celebrated as the scene
of the glorious victory gained by the Duke of MARLBOROUGH and Prince
EUGENE over the French under Marshals VILLARS and BOUFFLERS on the 11th
of September 1709.
Both the Allied Commanders had now reached the Triple Line of
Fortresses, which, until the Campaign of 1814 proved the contrary,
had been considered by so many military men as presenting an
insurmountable barrier to the advance of hostile armies into France
by its north-eastern frontier. It was most essential that some of
the principal Fortresses should be secured; and made to constitute a
new basis whence to direct the operations now contemplated against
the interior. The following, which first presented themselves on the
respective lines of advance of the two Commanders, were destined to
be immediately blockaded:--Valenciennes, Lequesnoy, and Cambray, by
the Anglo-Allied Army; and Maubeuge, Landrecy, Avesnes, and Rocroi,
by the Prussians. The general arrangements for the besieging of the
Fortresses, and the planning of the further operations, above alluded
to, were to form the subject of a conference to be held very shortly
between the Chiefs.
Prince BLÜCHER having, on this day, received reports from PIRCH and
THIELEMANN, detailing their proceedings during the two previous days,
and showing that GROUCHY had succeeded in effecting his escape by
Dinant, immediately ordered that the Second _Corps d'Armée_ should
move upon Thuin, and place itself under the Orders of Prince AUGUSTUS
of Prussia; who was to undertake the besieging of the Fortresses to
be left in rear of the Prussian Army; and that the Third Corps should
march by Charleroi, and follow the First and Fourth Corps as a Reserve.
It will be recollected that Captain THIELEMANN was sent forward from
Namur, with a party of the Pomeranian Hussars, on the night of the
20th, a short distance along the road to Dinant. He was joined at
daybreak of the 21st by Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, with the Fusilier
Battalions of the 14th and 23rd Regiments, the Brandenburg and
Pomeranian Hussars, and five pieces of Horse Artillery; when the whole
force followed the Enemy towards Dinant. The latter had, during his
retreat, seized every favourable opportunity in narrow and rocky parts
of the Defile, to barricade the road, and offer every obstruction to
the pursuit: by means of which precaution, and the previous night
march, the French contrived to gain so considerably in advance, that
Lieutenant Colonel SOHR deemed it prudent, when near Dinant, to forego
all further pursuit; and to endeavour to effect a junction with the
main body of the Prussian Army, by moving upon Florennes and Walcour.
At the former place he halted his Detachment during the night of the
21st; and, in this manner, covered the Left Flank of the main Army.
Anxious to gain intelligence concerning the assembling and marching
of the French troops on the left of the Allied Armies, Prince BLÜCHER
despatched Major FALKENHAUSEN, with the 3rd Regiment of Silesian
Landwehr Cavalry, to scour the country in the vicinity of the road by
Rettel to Laon. A Detachment of fifty Dragoons was posted at Bossule le
Valcourt, in observation of Philippeville.
The Fourth _Corps d'Armée_ was ordered by the Prince to advance, this
day, as far as Maroilles, upon the road from Maubeuge to Landrecies.
Its Advanced Guard, under General SYDOW, was directed to proceed still
further, and to blockade the latter Fortress.
* * * * *
ZIETEN, in pursuance of Orders which he had received the night before,
marched with the First _Corps d'Armée_ upon Avesnes; which Fortress,
the Advanced Guard, under General JAGOW, was directed to blockade
on both sides of the Helpe. The march of the Corps was made in two
Columns: the Right, consisting of the First and Second Brigades,
proceeded by Semonsies, and halted at the junction of the road from
Maubeuge with that from Beaumont to Avesnes; the Left, comprising the
Fourth Brigade, the Reserve Cavalry, and Reserve Artillery, marched
by Solre le Château, towards Avesnes, and bivouacked near the First
and Second Brigades. Two Companies of the Fourth Brigade, with twenty
Dragoons, were left to garrison Beaumont; but after the capture of
Avesnes, they were ordered to move on to the latter place.
It was between three and four o'clock when the Advanced Guard of
the Third Brigade, consisting of the 1st Silesian Hussars, two
Rifle Companies, and a Fusilier Battalion, arrived in front of the
Fortress of Avesnes. The Commandant having rejected ZIETEN's summons
to surrender, the latter ordered the bombardment to be commenced
forthwith. Ten Howitzers, of which six were ten pounders and four seven
pounders, drew up on the Flank of the Cavalry, and fired upon the Town.
The houses of the latter being all strongly built, the shells failed
in setting any part on fire; and a twelve pounder Battery produced
no great effect upon the firm masonry of the works. At nightfall the
bombardment was suspended; with the intention, however, of resuming
it at midnight. When it ceased, a sortie was made by the French
_Tirailleurs_; but these were immediately encountered and gallantly
driven in by the Silesian Rifles, who lost ten men on this occasion.
Immediately after midnight, the Prussian Batteries recommenced their
fire. At the fourteenth round, a ten pounder shell struck the principal
Powder Magazine, when a tremendous explosion ensued, by which forty
houses were involved in one common ruin; but it occasioned no damage
whatever to the fortifications. The panic, however, which it created
amidst the garrison was such as to induce the latter to express its
desire to capitulate. Such a desire could only have proceeded from
the want of sufficient energy on the part of the Commandant, or from
a bad disposition evinced by the garrison; for when the Prussians
subsequently entered the place, they found in it 15,000 cartridges for
cannon, and a million musket ball cartridges. There were also in the
Fortress forty seven pieces of artillery, mostly of heavy calibre;
which were now made available in the besieging of the remaining
Fortresses. The garrison, comprising three Battalions of National
Guards, and two hundred Veterans, were made prisoners of war. The
National Guards were disarmed, and sent off to their respective homes;
but the Veterans were conducted to Cologne.
The possession of Avesnes, gained too with so little sacrifice of life,
and with none of time, was of essential importance to the Prussians;
offering as it did a secure depôt for their material and supplies upon
their new line of operation. It also served for the reception of their
sick, and all who had been rendered incapable of keeping up with the
Army.
* * * * *
On the 21st, the French Army continued collecting its scattered
remnants between Avesnes and Laon.
* * * * *
The following was the general disposition of the respective Armies on
the evening of the 21st:
The Anglo-Allied Army had its principal force at Bavay; and its Right
at Valenciennes, which it blockaded.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Malplaquet.
The Prussian Army had its First _Corps d'Armée_ near Avesnes.
The Fourth Corps at Maroilles; its Reserve Cavalry blockading
Landrecy.
The Second Corps at Thuin, except the Fifth Brigade which blockaded
Maubeuge.
The Third Corps at Charleroi.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Noyelles sur Sambre.
The defeated portion of the French Army lay between Avesnes and Laon.
GROUCHY's force was at Philippeville.
The Duke of WELLINGTON, steadfastly pursuing that line of policy
which led him to constitute as an important feature of his plan, the
practical assurance to the French people, that, although entering
their country as a Conqueror, he did so in hostility to none, save
the Usurper and his adherents, issued the following Proclamation,
previously to his quitting Malplaquet:--
PROCLAMATION. PROCLAMATION.
"Je fais savoir aux Français que "I make known to the French
j'entre dans leur pays à la tête that I enter their country at the
d'une Armée déjà victorieuse, non en head of an Army already victorious,
Ennemi (excepté de l'Usurpateur, not as an Enemy (except of the
prononcé l'Ennemi du Genre Usurper, declared to be the Enemy
Humain, avec lequel on ne peut of Mankind; with whom may be
avoir ni paix ni trêve), mais pour had neither Peace nor Truce), but
les aider à secouer le joug de fer to help them to shake off the Yoke
par lequel ils sont opprimés. of Iron with which they are
oppressed.
"En consequence j'ai donné les "In consequence I have given the
Ordres ci joints à mon Armée, et je annexed Orders to my Army, and
demande qu'on me fasse connaître I request that I may be informed
tout infracteur. of all infringers of them.
"Les Français savent cependant "The French know, however,
que j'ai le droit d'exiger qu'ils se that I have the right to require
conduisent de manière que je that they will conduct themselves
puisse les protéger contre ceux in such a manner that I may be able
qui voudraient leur faire du mal. to protect them against those who
would do them harm.
"Il faut donc qu'ils fournissent "It is necessary, then, that they
aux réquisitions qui leur seront supply the requisitions which will
faites de la part des personnes be made upon them by persons
autorisées à les faire, en échange authorized to make the same, in
pour des reçus en forme et ordre; exchange for the receipts in order
et qu'ils se tiennent chez eux and form; and that they will stay
paisiblement, et qu'ils n'aient at home peaceably; and that they
aucune correspondence ou communication will not have any correspondence
avec l'Usurpateur Ennemi, nor communication with the Enemy
ni avec ses adhérens. Usurper nor with his adherents.
"Tous ceux qui s'absenteront de "All those who will absent
leur domicile après l'entrée en themselves from their homes after
France, et tous ceux qui se the entry in France and all those
trouveront absens au service de who will be absent in the service
l'Usurpateur, seront considérés of the Usurper, will be considered
comme ses adhérens et comme as his adherents and as Enemies;
Ennemis; et leurs propriétés and their properties will be
seront affectées à la subsistance de appropriated to the subsistence of
l'Armée. the Army.
"Donné au Quartier Général à "Given at the Head Quarters
Malplaquet, ce 22 de juin, 1815. at Malplaquet, this 22nd of June
1815.
"WELLINGTON." "WELLINGTON."
No Proclamation of a similar nature was issued by Prince BLÜCHER, nor
were any direct Orders given by the latter to remind his troops that
France was "to be treated as a friendly country," or to forbid them
taking anything "for which payment be not made."
Hence, in the advance to Paris, a marked contrast was observed between
the conduct of the Prussian, and that of the Anglo-Allied, Army: the
troops of the former committing great excesses and imposing severe
exactions along their whole line of march; whilst the British and
German troops under the Duke of WELLINGTON acquired from the outset
the good will and kindly disposition of the inhabitants of the country
through which they passed. The Anglo-Allied troops inspired the people
with confidence: the Prussians awed them into subjection.
Much of the cause of all this may be traced to the different views
entertained by the two great Commanders. BLÜCHER's extreme hatred of
the French would not allow him to modify, still less to abandon, the
opinion which he had imbibed from the first moment he heard of the
escape of NAPOLEON from Elba; that they ought not only to be thoroughly
humbled, but also severely punished. Neither he nor his soldiers could
ever forget the monstrous cruelties and grinding extortions which
their own country had been compelled to endure when overrun by the
French: and now that they were once more brought into the land of their
bitterest Enemies, and another period of retribution had arrived; but
one sentiment pervaded the whole Prussian Army--that those who had not
scrupled to inflict the scourge of War throughout the whole Continent,
should, in their turn, be made duly sensible of its evils. A contrary
train of ideas, or a different course of proceeding, on the part of the
Prussians was scarcely to be expected. Hence the value of the excellent
and orderly conduct of the British troops operating as a salutary
counterpoise to the domineering and revengeful spirit which actuated
the Prussians.
BLÜCHER felt equally with WELLINGTON that the advance upon Paris before
the approach of the Allied Armies, which were then only crossing the
Rhine, was a departure from strictly military principles; and that
this could only be justified by the extraordinary moral effect which
would be produced by the signal defeat of NAPOLEON. But his views
were limited to the military part of the plan, which was to make a
dash at the capital; and, if possible, to intercept GROUCHY whilst
endeavouring to rejoin the routed force under SOULT. WELLINGTON's
admirable policy embraced a wider field. He invariably kept in view the
great object for which the War had been undertaken. The information
which he contrived to obtain relative to the effect which NAPOLEON's
disaster produced upon the minds of the leading men of the great
political Parties by which France was then agitated, and upon the
Members of the two Chambers of Parliament generally, combined with the
knowledge he had already acquired of the disposition of the inhabitants
of the Department of the North, which, in fact, had not evinced that
enthusiasm attendant upon the return of NAPOLEON from Elba that was
manifested throughout the greater part of the nation, convinced him
that by adopting measures calculated to impress upon the French people
that the Allies were friendly towards them, though inveterately
hostile to NAPOLEON, and by seizing every advantage afforded by the
presence and the influence of their legitimate Monarch, he was, by
such means, insuring the security of the operations upon Paris more
effectually than could have been accomplished by additional military
force applied under different circumstances.
The aid which such a line of conduct, on the part of the Duke, gave
to the cause of LOUIS XVIII. was immense. The people of the Northern
Departments, who, in general, were wearied by the continuance of wars
undertaken for the sole purpose of aggrandizing and upholding the power
of NAPOLEON; and who now longed to enjoy the blessings of peace, saw
in the friendly disposition of the Allies, and the support which these
yielded to the King's authority, a pledge of their determination to
crush the War Party, and at the same time, to cement their alliance
with the legitimate Sovereign. The White Flag was soon seen to wave
from countless steeples. The tide of Royalty, favoured in no small
degree by the versatile nature of the French character, was already
setting in fast: and as it rolled steadily on towards the capital, the
Duke's customary foresight and good tact gave it an impulse which not
only bore him along with it in easy triumph; but, when it subsequently
reached the goal, swept away every vestige of the Government usurped by
NAPOLEON and his adherents.
CHAPTER XVIII.
On the 22nd of June, the Second and Fourth British Divisions, as also
the Cavalry, of the Anglo-Allied Army marched to Le Cateau and its
vicinity. The First and Third British Divisions, the Divisions of
Dutch-Belgian Infantry attached to the First Corps, the Nassau troops,
and the Dutch-Belgian Cavalry were encamped near Gommignies. The Fifth
and Sixth British Divisions, the Brunswick Corps, and the Reserve
Artillery, were encamped about Bavay. The Advanced Guard (VIVIAN's
Brigade) was at St Benin. Troops of the Corps under Prince FREDERICK of
the Netherlands blockaded Valenciennes and Le Quesnoy.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Le Cateau.
Prince BLÜCHER being desirous of bringing his different _Corps d'Armée_
into closer connection, moved the First and Fourth only half a march
this day. The former proceeded from Avesnes to Etroeungt, sending
forward its Advanced Guard to La Capelle, and Patrols as far as the
Oise: the latter marched along the road leading from Landrecy towards
Guise, as far as Fesmy; pushing forward its Advanced Guard to Henappe,
and Detachments to Guise. Scouring parties of Cavalry were also
detached from the First Corps in the direction of Rocroi.
The Third Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ advanced from Charleroi to Beaumont;
detaching towards Philippeville and Chimay, for the security of its
Left Flank.
The Second Prussian Corps, which was destined to operate against
the Fortresses, moved from Thuin. It was disposed in the following
manner:--The Fifth and Seventh Brigades, with the Cavalry, blockaded
Maubeuge; the Sixth Brigade was on the march to Landrecy; and the
Eighth Brigade was moving upon Philippeville and Givet.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Catillon sur Sambre.
* * * * *
GROUCHY's troops, on this day, reached Rocroi.
* * * * *
The remains of the vanquished portion of the French Army continued
retiring upon Laon, and collecting in its vicinity. SOULT had
established the Head Quarters at this place. The men and horses of
the Artillery Train were moved on to La Fère, to be supplied with new
ordnance; and every means was adopted to replace this branch of the
service on an efficient footing. GROUCHY was effecting his retreat
upon Soissons, by the line of Rocroi, Réthel, and Rheims; and it was
considered, that as soon as the latter should be able to unite his
force to the remains of the Army collecting under SOULT, it would yet
be found practicable, with the additional aid of Reserves, to stem the
advance of the Allies.
But where was the Chief whose presence had heretofore been the spell
by which a turbulent and restless soldiery was wont, when subdued by
the _fortune de la guerre_, to be restored to its former self, and
to be imbued with new life and renovated strength by the prospect of
acquiring fresh glory in retrieving a great national disaster? Had he
flown towards the nearest _Corps d'Armée_ of RAPP and LECOURBE, to
lead them, along with all the Reserves that he could possibly collect
together, including the Regimental Depôts, the _Gensd'armerie_, and
even the _Douanerie_, against the Flank of the victorious Armies
of WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER, during their hazardous advance upon the
capital; and, in combination with SOULT and GROUCHY, to effect their
separation, perhaps their destruction?
No! The sword by which the Empire had been raised and held in
subjection, by which Europe itself had been enthralled and all but
conquered, had fallen powerless from his grasp. In him were no longer
centred the might and the will of Imperial France. These had been
delegated through the Constitution, to the organs of the nation, the
elected Representatives of the People. He no longer possessed, in
his own person, the Administrative and the Executive; but was under
the control of that power which, as before observed, when he quitted
Paris to join the Army, he dreaded more than the Enemy he was going to
confront--the power of Public Opinion legitimately expressed. If he
had so keenly felt its force before his downfall on the battle field;
how great, nay, how hopeless, must have appeared to him the task of
endeavouring to soothe its excitement, and to obtain its sanction to
renewed sacrifices, when suddenly appearing in Paris on the afternoon
of the 21st of June--but one short week from the time of his assuming
the command of his Army--himself to announce the disastrous result of
his enterprise.
The Imperialists in the capital, who had indulged in the most
extravagant hopes engendered by the news of the victory at Ligny,
had scarcely manifested their exultation when sinister rumours began
to spread of some sudden reverses which had befallen the cause of
NAPOLEON; and presently all doubts and suspense were removed by the
unexpected appearance of the Emperor himself, which gave rise to the
most gloomy anticipations.
NAPOLEON immediately summoned a Cabinet Council. He frankly explained
to his Ministers the critical state of affairs; but, at the same
time, with his usual confidence in his own resources, declared his
conviction, that if the nation were called upon to rise _en masse_,
the annihilation of the Enemy would follow; but that if, instead of
ordering new levies and adopting extraordinary measures, the Chambers
were to allow themselves to be drawn into debates, and to waste their
time in disputation, all would be lost. "Now that the Enemy is in
France," he added, "it is necessary that I should be invested with
extraordinary power, that of a temporary Dictatorship. As a measure
of safety for the country, I might assume this power; but it would be
better and more national that it should be conferred upon me by the
Chambers."
The Ministers were too well acquainted with the general views and
disposition of the Chamber of Representatives to pronounce a direct
approval of this step; but NAPOLEON, perceiving their hesitation,
called upon them to express their opinion upon the measures of public
safety required by existing circumstances. CARNOT, the Minister of
the Interior, conceived it to be essential that the country should
be declared in danger; that the _Fédérés_ and National Guards should
be called to arms; that Paris should be placed in a stage of siege,
and measures adopted for its defence; that at the last extremity the
armed force should retire behind the Loire, and take up an intrenched
position; that the Army of La Vendée, where the Civil War had nearly
terminated, as also the Corps of Observation in the south, should be
recalled: and the Enemy checked until sufficient force could be united
and organised for the assumption of a vigorous offensive, by which he
should be driven out of France. DECRÈS, the Minister of the Marine, and
REGNAULT DE SAINT JEAN D'ANGELY, the Secretary of State, supported
this opinion; but FOUCHÉ, the Minister of Police, and the remaining
Ministers, remarked that the safety of the State did not depend upon
any particular measure which might thus be proposed, but upon the
Chambers; and upon their uniting with the Head of the Government: and
that by manifesting towards them confidence and good faith, they would
be induced to declare it to be their duty to unite with NAPOLEON in the
adoption of energetic measures for securing the honour and independence
of the nation.
This advice on the part of FOUCHÉ was an artful piece of dissimulation.
No man in France possessed so intimate a knowledge of the secret
workings of the public mind; he knew precisely the dispositions and
views of the different factions, as also the character and temperament
of their Leaders. He knew also that the great Parties in the Chambers,
with the exception of the Imperialists, who were in the minority but
whom he secretly flattered with the prospect of a NAPOLEON II., were
fully prepared to depose the Emperor, in favour of full Constitutional
Freedom and Liberal Institutions. This knowledge, obtained with an
adroitness and a precision quite peculiar to this celebrated Minister
of Police, he made completely subservient to his own personal views.
These had been, from the commencement of NAPOLEON's second reign, to
coquet with the factions in such a manner as to induce each to consider
him an indispensable instrument in the realisation of its hopes; and to
exert this extraordinary influence either to support or to undermine
the power of NAPOLEON, according as the fortunes of the latter might
be in the ascendant or on the decline. The resolute attitude assumed
by the Allies soon satisfied him that, although the Emperor might
once more dazzle the world with some brilliant feat of arms, he must
eventually succumb to the fixed determination of the Sovereigns to
crush his usurped authority; and to the overwhelming masses with which
Europe was preparing to subjugate the country. He had been, and was
still, in secret communication with the Ministers and Advisers of LOUIS
XVIII.; and was consequently in full possession of the general plans
and intentions of the Allies.
When, therefore, NAPOLEON's enterprise had so signally failed, and
the reoccupation of Paris appeared to be its necessary consequence:
FOUCHÉ foresaw clearly, that were the proposed Dictatorship to be
assumed by means of a sudden and forced dissolution of the Chambers,
implying that the recent reverses had been produced by treachery on
the part of the Representatives; and were new levies to be raised _en
masse_, in support of the force that yet remained available; the result
would inevitably be anarchy and confusion in the capital, disorder and
excesses throughout the whole country, renewed disasters to the nation,
together with an awful and useless sacrifice of life. To prevent such
a catastrophe, it was necessary to lull NAPOLEON's suspicions of the
intentions of the Chambers; with which, at the same time, FOUCHÉ was
fully acquainted. Hence it was, that to gain sufficient time for the
development of these intentions, FOUCHÉ gave to the Council the advice
before mentioned.
He strongly expressed his disapproval of the projected Dissolution of
the Chambers, and assumption of the Dictatorship; declaring that any
measures of that kind would only tend to create distrust, and, not
improbably, a general revolt. But, at the same time, his agents were
making known throughout Paris the fullest extent of the disasters that
had befallen NAPOLEON, and which had caused his sudden and unexpected
return; and the Deputies were assembling in all haste, and in great
numbers, to take a bold and decided step in this great national crisis.
In thus dissembling from his Master the real disposition of the great
political Parties, and the true state of the public mind, FOUCHÉ,
no doubt, betrayed the trust reposed in him; but, setting aside the
question whether he was really influenced by patriotic motives,
or merely acting upon a system of deep duplicity and time serving
expediency, there can also be no doubt that, by pursuing the line of
conduct which he did on this important occasion, he became the means
of preserving his country from the infliction of a still further
accumulation of evils.
The Cabinet Council continued in discussion; some supporting, and
others disapproving, the propositions of NAPOLEON: who, at length,
yielding to the arguments of FOUCHÉ and CARNOT, declared he would
submit himself to the loyalty of the Chambers, and confer with them as
to the measures which the critical position of the country might render
necessary.
In the mean time, the Deputies had met, and commenced their
deliberations on the existing state of affairs. M. DE LA FAYETTE, the
acknowledged Leader of the Liberal Party, having received intelligence
of the subject of discussion in the Council, and aware that not a
moment was to be lost in averting the blow with which their liberties
were menaced, ascended the tribune, and thus addressed the Chamber,
amidst the most profound silence, and breathless suspense:--
"Representatives! For the first time during many years you hear a
voice, which the old Friends of Liberty will yet recognise. I rise to
address you concerning the dangers to which the country is exposed.
The sinister reports, which have been circulated during the last two
days, are unhappily confirmed. This is the moment to rally round the
National Colours--the Tricoloured Standard of 1789--the Standard of
Liberty, Equality, and Public Order. It is you alone who can now
protect the country from foreign attacks and internal dissensions.
It is you alone who can secure the independence and the honour of
France. Permit a veteran in the sacred cause of liberty, in all
times a stranger to the spirit of faction, to submit to you some
resolutions which appear to him to be demanded by a sense of the
public danger, and by the love of our country. They are such as, I
feel persuaded, you will see the necessity of adopting:--
"I. The Chamber of Deputies declares that the independence of the
Nation is menaced.
"II. The Chamber declares its sittings permanent. Any attempt to
dissolve it, shall be considered high treason. Whosoever shall render
himself culpable of such an attempt shall be considered a traitor to
his country, and immediately treated as such.
"III. The Army of the Line, and the National Guards, who have fought,
and still fight, for the liberty, the independence, and the territory
of France, have merited well of the country.
"IV. The Minister of the Interior is invited to assemble the
principal Officers of the Parisian National Guard, in order to
consult on the means of providing it with arms, and of completing
this Corps of Citizens; whose tried patriotism and zeal offer a
sure guarantee for the liberty, prosperity, and tranquillity of the
capital, and for the inviolability of the national Representatives.
"V. The Ministers of War, of Foreign Affairs, of Police, and of the
Interior are invited to repair immediately to the sittings of the
Chamber."
* * * * *
No one ventured to oppose these bold Resolutions; and, after a brief
discussion, in which their instant adoption was urged in the strongest
manner, they were carried by acclamation, with the exception of the
Fourth, which was suspended on account of the invidious distinction
which it appeared to convey between the troops of the Line and the
National Guards.
They were then transmitted to the Chamber of Peers; where, after a
short discussion, they were adopted without amendment.
The Message from the Chambers, conveying these resolutions, reached the
Council in the midst of its deliberations. NAPOLEON was staggered by an
act which he looked upon as an usurpation of the Sovereign Authority.
To him, who had so long exercised an almost unlimited control in the
State, who had led mighty Armies to victory, and who had subjected
powerful nations to his despotic sway, this sudden and energetic voice
of the people, conveyed through the medium of their Representatives,
aroused him to a full sense of the wonderful change which had been
effected in the public mind, and in his own individual position,
through the intervention of a Constitution. He was alike indignant at
what he conceived to be a daring presumption, and mortified at his own
miscalculation in having convoked the Chambers. _J'avais bien pensé_,
he remarked, _que j'aurais dû congédier ces gens-là avant mon départ_.
After some reflection, he determined, if possible, to temporize with
the Chambers. He sent REGNAULT DE SAINT JEAN D'ANGELY to the Chamber
of Deputies, in his capacity of Member, to soothe the irritation that
prevailed, to relate that the Army had been upon the point of gaining a
great victory, when disaffected individuals created a panic; that the
troops had since rallied; and that the Emperor had hastened to Paris
to concert, with the Ministers and the Chambers, such measures for the
public safety as circumstances seemed to require. CARNOT was directed
to make a similar communication to the Chamber of Peers. REGNAULT
vainly endeavoured to fulfil his mission: the Deputies had lost all
patience, and insisted upon the Ministers presenting themselves at the
bar of the House. The latter at length obeyed the summons; NAPOLEON
having consented, though with great reluctance, to their compliance
with the mandate. He required them, however, to be accompanied by his
brother LUCIEN, as an Extraordinary Commissioner, appointed to reply to
the Interrogatories of the Chamber.
At six o'clock in the evening, LUCIEN BUONAPARTE and the Ministers made
their appearance in the Chamber of Deputies. LUCIEN announced that he
had been sent there by NAPOLEON as a Commissioner Extraordinary, to
concert with the Assembly measures of safety. He then placed in the
hands of the President the Message of which he was the bearer from his
brother. It contained a succinct recital of the disasters experienced
at Mont St Jean: and recommended the Representatives to unite with
the Head of the State in preserving the country from the fate of
Poland, and from the reimposition of the yoke which it had thrown off.
It stated, also, that it was desirable that the two Chambers should
appoint a Commission of five Members, to concert with the Ministers the
measures to be adopted for the public safety, and the means of treating
for peace with the Allied Powers.
This Message was far from being favourably received. A stormy
discussion ensued, in the course of which it was soon made manifest
that the Deputies required a more explicit declaration of NAPOLEON's
opinions and designs: one, in fact, more in accordance with the views
which the majority of them evidently entertained, and was apparently
determined to enforce. One of their number significantly remarked, as
he addressed himself to the Ministers, "You know as well as we do,
that it is against NAPOLEON alone that Europe has declared War. From
this moment, separate the cause of NAPOLEON from that of the Nation.
In my opinion, there exists but one individual who stands in the way
between us and peace. Let him pronounce the word and the country will
be saved!" Several of the Members spoke in a similar strain, and
the debate was kept up with great animation, until at length it was
agreed, that in conformity with the terms of the Imperial Message,
a Commission of five Members should be appointed, consisting of the
President and Vice Presidents of the Chamber, to collect, in concert
with the Cabinet and with a Committee from the House of Peers, the
fullest information upon the state of France, and to propose suitable
measures of safety.
The Committee consisted of Messrs LANJUINAIS, LA FAYETTE, DUPONT DE
L'EURE, FLANGERGUES, and GRENIER.
LUCIEN now presented himself, in the same capacity of Commissioner
Extraordinary, to the Chamber of Peers. After hearing the Message, the
latter also appointed a Committee, which consisted of Generals DROUOT,
DEJEAN, ANDREOSSY, and Messrs BOISSY D'ANGLAS and THIBAUDEAU.
NAPOLEON, being fully informed of the proceedings of the Chamber of
Deputies, and of the general tenor of the debates, hesitated a long
time whether to dissolve the Assembly or to abdicate the Imperial
Crown. Some of his Ministers, on perceiving the direction of his views,
assured him that the Chamber had acquired too firm a hold of the public
opinion to submit to any violent _coup d'état_; and expressed their
opinion, that by withholding the act of abdication, he might eventually
deprive himself of the power of vacating the Throne in favour of his
son. Nevertheless he appeared determined to defer this step to the very
last moment; trusting in the mean time some favourable event might
occur, tending to modify the present disposition of the Chamber.
The Deputies again met, at an early hour on the following morning. The
utmost impatience was manifested for the Report of the Committee. Two
hours having elapsed, the Members became greatly excited. Some of them
proposed that the exigencies of the State were such, that it was their
duty to adopt immediate and decisive measures, without waiting for the
Report.
At length, in the midst of the agitation and tumult which prevailed,
General GRENIER, the Reporter of the Committee, suddenly made his
appearance. He stated that, after a deliberation of five hours, the
Committee had resolved:--
"That the safety of the country required that the Emperor should
consent to the nomination, by the two Chambers, of a Commission,
charged to negotiate directly with the coalesced Powers; stipulating
only that they should respect the national independence, the
territorial integrity, and the right which belongs to every people of
adopting such Constitutions as it may think proper; and that these
negotiations should be supported by the prompt development of the
national force."
This statement excited general murmurs of disapprobation. But the
Reporter, aware of the expectations of the Chamber, proceeded:--
"This Article, gentlemen, appears to me insufficient. It does not
fulfil the object which the Chamber proposes to itself, because it
is possible that your Deputation may not be admitted. I would not,
therefore, urge the adoption of this measure, had I not reason to
believe that you will soon receive a Message in which the Emperor
will declare his wish; that the effect of this should first be tried;
and that, should he then prove an insuperable obstacle to the nation
being permitted to treat for its independence, he will be ready to
make whatever sacrifice may be demanded of him."
This produced an extraordinary sensation in the Assembly. It was looked
upon as an artful design upon the part of NAPOLEON to create delay by
proposing to the Chambers a proceeding which he was well aware would
prove unsuccessful; and to seize the first favourable opportunity of
destroying their independence, and re-establishing his despotism--to
re-enact, in short, the Eighteenth of Brumaire. The tumult had reached
a fearful height. Many Members exclaimed vehemently against the Report.
At length, one of them, M. DUCHESNE, ascended the tribune, and spoke
in the following energetic and decided manner:--
"I do not believe that the project proposed by the Committee is
capable of attaining the desired end. The greatness of our disasters
cannot be denied: they are sufficiently proved by the presence of the
Chief of our Armies in the capital. If there are no bounds to the
energies of the nation, there are limits to its means. The Chambers
cannot offer negotiations to the Allied Powers. The documents which
have been communicated to us demonstrate that they have uniformly
refused all the overtures which have been made to them; and they have
declared that they will not treat with the French, as long as they
shall have the Emperor at their head."
The speaker was here interrupted by the President, who announced that
the Message to which the Reporter had referred would speedily be
received. The interruption, however, at this most important point of
the debate, renewed the tumult in the Chamber. Some exclaimed, "It is a
concerted plan to make us lose time." Others cried out, "Some plot is
concerting;" and the majority vociferated, "Proceed, proceed; there is
no middle course."
DUCHESNE continued:--
"It is necessary that we should be certain of finding in the
development of the national force, a defence sufficient to support
our negotiations, and to enable us to treat with success concerning
our honour and independence. Can that force be developed with
sufficient rapidity? May not circumstances again lead victorious
Armies to the capital? Then, and under their auspices, will reappear
the ancient Family." ("Never! never!" exclaimed several voices.) "I
freely express my opinion. What may be the consequences of these
events? We have only _one_ certain means left, which is, to engage
the Emperor, in the name of the safety of the State, in the sacred
name of a suffering country, to declare his _Abdication_."
No sooner was this word pronounced than the entire Assembly rose; and
amidst the clamour that ensued were heard a hundred voices exclaiming,
"Seconded! seconded!"
When, at length, the President succeeded in restoring some degree of
order, he said:--
"I cannot hope to arrive at any result, unless the agitation of the
Assembly be repressed. The safety of the country depends on the
decision of this day. I entreat the Chamber to wait for the Emperor's
Message."
The proposition of DUCHESNE was instantly supported by General
SOLIGNAC: an Officer who, during the last five years, had been made to
suffer the severest mortifications, arising from the hatred entertained
towards him by NAPOLEON, in consequence of his refusal to be the
servile instrument of his ambition; and, therefore, the curiosity of
the Chamber was naturally excited to hear what course he was about to
adopt.
"And I also," said the General; "I share in the uneasiness of him who
has preceded me at this tribune. Yes! we ought to consider the safety
of the Empire, and the maintenance of our Liberal Institutions; and,
while the Government is inclined to present to you such measures as
tend to this end, it appears important to preserve to the Chamber the
honour of not having proposed an object which ought to be the free
concession of the Monarch. I move that a Deputation of five Members
shall be appointed to proceed to the Emperor, which Deputation shall
express to His Majesty the urgency of his decision. Their Report
will, I trust, satisfy at once the wish of the Assembly, and that of
the Nation."
This proposition was most favourably received, and the President was on
the point of putting it to the vote, when SOLIGNAC again appeared in
the tribune.
"I wish," said he, "to propose an Amendment to my Motion. Several
persons have intimated to me that we shall soon be informed of His
Majesty's determination. I consequently think it necessary that
we should wait for _one hour_, to receive the Message; which it
seems is to be addressed to the Chambers. I therefore move that
we adjourn for that time." (This part of his speech was met with
great disapprobation on the part of the Chamber.) "Gentlemen!"
continued the General, "we all wish to save our country; but can we
not reconcile this unanimous sentiment with the laudable desire that
the Chamber should preserve the honour of the Chief of the State?"
(Cries of "Yes! yes!") "If I requested that we should wait until this
evening or tomorrow, some considerations might be opposed--but, one
hour"--("Yes! yes! To the vote!" was the general exclamation; and the
Chamber adjourned).
In the mean time, NAPOLEON had been made acquainted with the
disposition of the Chamber of Representatives, by REGNAULT DE SAINT
JEAN D'ANGELY; who hastened to warn him that if he did not immediately
abdicate, his deposition would, in all probability, be declared.
He was enraged at the idea of this contemplated violence. "Since that
is the case," he said, "I will not abdicate at all. The Chamber is
composed of a set of Jacobins, impracticables, and intriguers; who are
seeking for disorder, or for place. I ought to have denounced them to
the Nation, and given them their dismissal. The time that has been lost
may yet be recovered."
REGNAULT, however, urged him in the strongest manner to yield to
imperious circumstances, and to renew the noble and generous sacrifice
he made in 1814. He assured him that if he did not take this step,
he would be accused by the Chamber, and even by the whole Nation, of
having, out of personal considerations alone, prevented the possibility
of obtaining peace.
SOLIGNAC and other Deputies were then announced. They boldly declared
to him that he had no other course open to him but that of submission
to the desire entertained by the Representatives of the Nation.
SOLIGNAC described to him the scene in the Chamber of Deputies, and the
difficulty he had experienced in inducing the latter to suspend, even
for one hour, their decision; which, if not anticipated by a voluntary
Abdication, would entail upon him the disgrace of forfeiture. Even his
brothers, LUCIEN and JOSEPH, now gave their opinion that the moment for
resistance had passed.
When the paroxysm of rage, to which these representations gave rise,
had subsided: NAPOLEON announced his determination to abdicate in
favour of his son; and, desiring his brother LUCIEN to take a pen, he
dictated to him the following Declaration:--
"Frenchmen! In commencing the War for maintaining the national
independence, I relied on the union of all efforts, of all desires,
and the concurrence of all the national authorities. I had reason to
hope for success, and I braved all the Declarations of the Powers
allied against me.
"Circumstances appear to be changed. I offer myself a sacrifice to
the hatred of the Enemies of France. May they prove sincere in their
Declarations, and have really directed them solely against my power.
My political life is terminated; and I proclaim my Son, under the
title of NAPOLEON II., Emperor of the French.
"The present Ministers will form provisionally the Council of the
Government. The interest which I take in my Son induces me to invite
the Chamber to form the Regency by a law without delay.
"Unite all for the public safety, in order to remain an independent
Nation.
"NAPOLEON."
This was the last great act of his political life. Defeated and humbled
by foreign Enemies, subdued and controlled by the Representatives of
the Nation; he was forced to descend from a Throne whence he had at
one time swayed the destinies of Sovereigns rendered dependent on
his mighty will. Almost all the previous changes and gradations in
his extraordinary career had been preluded or accompanied by some
magnificent scene of dramatic effect, or a violent _coup d'état_; but,
in this instance, the transition was attended by no circumstance more
remarkable than the quietude with which it was effected. The cessation
of the political existence of such a man would have been most naturally
looked for as an event coincident only with the termination of a life
which, if not closed upon the pinnacle of glory, would be sought for
amidst the shock of battle, or in the vortex of a state convulsion.
That he meditated a second 18th of Brumaire, there can be no doubt;
but the decided tone of the debates in the National Assembly, the
solicitations of his friends, and the hope of securing the Throne to
his family, induced him to abandon all idea of such a project. It is,
besides, more than probable that, aware as he was of the bad feeling
that existed, to a great extent, both in the Chambers and in the
country, towards the BOURBONS; as also of the conflicting principles of
the different factions, he calculated upon the chances of a Revolution
productive of anarchy and confusion, which he yet might be called upon
to reduce to order and submission.
When it is considered that the great mass of the Army of the Line was
devoted to NAPOLEON; that the rallied Army of the North was falling
back upon Paris, where it would concentrate its strength and be
reinforced from Regimental Depôts; and, further, that the Armies on the
Eastern Frontier were still holding their respective positions, and
that even in La Vendée the Imperial troops had succeeded in quelling
the insurrection,--when, in addition to all this, it is considered how
great, how extraordinary, was the influence induced by the _prestige_
of NAPOLEON with the majority of the nation, dazzled as the latter had
been by countless victories that outweighed, in its estimation, those
fatal disasters which it ascribed solely to the united power of the
great European League established against France,--it is impossible
not to be struck by the firm, bold, and determined attitude assumed by
the French Parliament. France, on this critical occasion, displayed
one of the brightest examples the World has yet beheld of the force
of Constitutional Legislation. Under all the attendant circumstances,
it was a remarkable triumph of free institutions over monarchical
despotism.
* * * * *
It is now necessary to revert to the operations of the Allied Armies.
On the 23d of June, WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER gave to the great mass of
their troops a halt; not merely for the sake of affording them rest,
but also for the purpose of collecting the stragglers, and bringing up
the ammunition and the baggage.
The only movement made on the part of the Anglo-Allied Army, on this
day, was that by Major General LYON's Sixth Hanoverian Brigade, which,
together with GRANT's Hussar Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel WEBBER
SMITH's Horse Battery, Major UNETT's and Major BROME's Foot Batteries,
marched, under the personal command of Sir CHARLES COLVILLE, to attack
Cambray, the garrison of which, the Duke had been led to believe,
had abandoned the place, leaving in it at most three hundred or four
hundred men. COLVILLE was furnished with a letter from the Duke to
the Governor, summoning him to surrender; as also with some copies of
his Grace's Proclamation of the 22nd to the French. The 1st Brunswick
Light Battalion was sent forward from the Reserve at Bavay, to watch Le
Quesnoy; which Fortress was still occupied by the Enemy.
The Third Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ was pushed forward to Avesnes, by
which means the Three Corps destined to advance upon Paris were so
placed that they could form a junction, with only half an ordinary
march; and this relative position was maintained throughout the
remainder of the line of advance.
The Allied Commanders had an interview on this day at Catillon, for
the purpose of arranging their plan of combined operations. The
intelligence they had procured having satisfied them that the Enemy
was collecting his forces at Laon and Soissons: they decided upon not
pursuing him along that line, since their progress towards the capital
might, in that case, be impeded by affairs of Advanced and Rear Guards;
but upon moving by the right bank of the Oise, and crossing this river
at either Compiegne or Pont St Maxence. By thus turning the French
Left, they hoped to intercept the Enemy's retreat, or at all events
to reach Paris before him; and in order to deceive him as to these
intentions, he was to be followed by Prussian Cavalry, assuming to be
the Advanced Guard of the Allied Armies.
It was also settled, that as they might find it necessary to throw
bridges across the Oise, the British General should bring forward his
Pontoon Train; that possessed by the Prussians being inadequate for the
purpose.
In order to secure a good base whence to conduct these operations,
it was further arranged that the Corps under Prince FREDERICK of the
Netherlands should remain, for the purpose of besieging the Fortresses
situated on the Scheldt, and between that river and the Sambre:
and that the following Corps should undertake the besieging of the
Fortresses on the Sambre, and between this last river and the Moselle,
namely, the Second Prussian _Corps d'Armée_, commanded by General
PIRCH; the _Corps d'Armée_ of North Germany, commanded at first by
General Count KLEIST VON NOLLENDORF, and subsequently by Lieutenant
General HACKE; as also a portion of the garrison troops of Luxemburg,
commanded by Lieutenant General Prince LOUIS of Hesse Homburg,--the
whole of these German forces being placed under the chief command of
Prince AUGUSTUS of Prussia.
This plan of operations was such as might have been expected from
the combined councils of such Leaders as WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER, and
was undoubtedly the one best calculated to attain the object they
had in view; and it was carried into effect with all that mutual
cordiality and good fellowship which had invariably characterised their
proceedings.
On the morning of the 24th, the Duke of WELLINGTON, in consequence of
a report which he had received from Sir CHARLES COLVILLE, directed
Lord HILL to march the two Brigades of the Fourth Division then at Le
Cateau, towards Cambray, where they would join the other Brigade of the
Division; and also to send with them a nine pounder Battery.
On the arrival of these troops, COLVILLE made his preparations for the
attack; which took place in the evening, in the following manner. Three
Columns of Attack were formed. One commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Sir NEIL CAMPBELL (Major in the 54th Regiment) escaladed at the angle
formed by the Valenciennes Gateway and the Curtain of the body of the
place. A Second, commanded by Colonel Sir WILLIAM DOUGLAS, of the 91st
Regiment, and directed by Lieutenant GILBERT of the Royal Engineers,
escaladed at a large Ravelin near the Amiens road. A Third, consisting
of Colonel MITCHELL's Brigade, and directed by Captain THOMPSON of
the Royal Engineers, after having forced the Outer Gate of the Couvre
Port in the Hornwork, and passed both ditches, by means of the rails
of the drawbridges, attempted to force the main Paris Gate; but not
succeeding in this, it escaladed by a breach on that side, which was in
a state of reparation. The three Batteries of Lieutenant Colonel WEBBER
SMITH, and Majors UNETT and BROME, under the direction of Lieutenant
Colonel HAWKER, rendered the most essential service in covering these
attacks; which having succeeded, the town speedily fell into the hands
of the assailants. The Citadel continued to hold out, but the Governor
solicited a suspension of hostilities; which, however, could not be
granted.
Of the Anglo-Allied Army, the First and Third British Divisions,
the Dutch-Belgian Infantry attached to the First Corps, and the
Dutch-Belgian Cavalry, were moved this day from Gommignies, to Forest,
upon the road to Le Cateau, and then encamped between the villages of
Croix and Bousies.
The Second British Division continued at Le Cateau.
The Duke made no movement in advance; having found it necessary to
afford additional time for the coming up of the Pontoons and supplies.
The Reserve, consisting of the Fifth and Sixth Divisions, of the
Brunswick Corps, and the Reserve Artillery, was moved nearer to the
main body; and cantoned and encamped in and about the villages of Engle
Fontaine, Rancour, and Préau au Bois.
On this day Proposals were made to the Advanced Posts of this Corps
under Prince FREDERICK of the Netherlands near Valenciennes, as also
to those of the First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_, for a Suspension of
Hostilities, upon the grounds that NAPOLEON had abdicated in favour of
his son; that a Provisional Government had been appointed, consisting
of FOUCHÉ, CAULINCOURT, GRENIER, and QUINETTE; and that these persons
had sent Ministers to the Allied Powers to treat for peace.
Both WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER considered that they would not be acting
in accordance with the spirit and intentions of the Alliance of the
Powers of Europe were they to listen to such proposals, and therefore
peremptorily refused to discontinue their operations. Those which were
addressed to the Prussian Commander emanated from General Count MORAND,
who commanded the Rear Guard of the French Army at Laon; and to whom
BLÜCHER replied, that no Armistice could be entered into, except in the
case of NAPOLEON being delivered up, and the Fortresses in rear of the
Armies being abandoned and conceded as guarantees for its fulfilment.
LOUIS XVIII., acting on the advice so urgently tendered to him by the
Duke of WELLINGTON, arrived at Le Cateau late in the evening, followed
by a numerous train; and only awaited the surrender of the Citadel of
Cambray to fix his temporary residence in the latter town.
* * * * *
The Prussian Army renewed its operations on the 24th, according to the
plan agreed upon the day before by the Allied Commanders. At break of
day, Lieutenant Colonel SCHMIEDEBERG was despatched with the Silesian
Regiment of Uhlans, and some Horse Artillery, towards Laon; for the
purpose, in conjunction with the Detachments already sent from the
First _Corps d'Armée_, of watching and deceiving the Enemy. BLÜCHER
disposed his three _Corps d'Armée_ in two Columns. The Left Column,
which was the one nearest to the Enemy, consisted of the First and
Third Corps; and was to move close along the Oise--the Third Corps
remaining half a march in rear of the First. The Right Column, formed
by the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_, was to advance along a parallel road,
keeping on a line with the former, and at the distance of about half a
march. The Left Column moved upon Compiegne, the Right upon Pont St
Maxence.
At nine o'clock, the First _Corps d'Armée_ (ZIETEN's) commenced its
march from Etroeungt towards Guise. The Advanced Guard, under Major
General JAGOW, to which were attached the 8th Foot Battery, and two
ten pounder howitzers, halted when opposite to St Laurent, a suburb of
Guise, in order to observe the Fortress on this side; whilst ZIETEN
sent an Infantry Brigade, a Regiment of Cavalry, together with a Horse,
and a Foot, Battery, by St Germain and La Bussière, across the Oise, to
menace the place from the other side.
The Enemy, on finding himself completely invested, withdrew his troops
into the Citadel; whereupon preparations were immediately made by the
Prussians to open their Batteries against that part: but previously to
giving the Order to commence the cannonade, ZIETEN sent a summons to
the Commandant to surrender; with which the latter did not hesitate to
comply. The garrison, consisting of eighteen Officers and three hundred
and fifty men, laid down their arms on the glacis, and were made
prisoners of war. The Prussians found in the place, fourteen pieces of
cannon, three thousand muskets, two million musket ball cartridges, a
quantity of ammunition, and considerable magazines; and gained, what
was of more importance, another strong point in their new base of
operations, without having fired a single cannon shot.
Major MÜLLER, with the two weak Fusilier Battalions of the 28th
Regiment, and of the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr, remained to garrison the
place.
As soon as the remainder of ZIETEN's Corps arrived near Guise, which
was before the place surrendered; the Advanced Guard, consisting of
the Third Brigade, moved on, but did not reach Origny before nine
o'clock in the evening. The 1st Regiment of Silesian Hussars pushed on
as far as Ribemont. Parties were also detached from the Reserve Cavalry
towards Crecy, Pont à Bussy, and La Fère, to observe the Serre.
THIELEMANN, with the Third _Corps d'Armée_, moved from Avesnes upon
Nouvion; which he reached about four o'clock in the afternoon. The
Detachments of Observation which had been previously sent out to the
left from this Corps, to endeavour to gain intelligence concerning
GROUCHY's Army, reached Hirson and Vervin in the evening. Scouring
parties were also sent towards the road leading from Mézières by
Montcornet towards Laon.
BÜLOW, with the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_, which formed the Right Prussian
Column, marched from Ferny to Aisonville and Bernonville. Parties of
Cavalry, detached from the Corps, reached Chatillon sur Oise, and
found St Quentin unoccupied. This circumstance having been made known
to General SYDOW, upon his arrival at Fontaine Notre Dame with the
Advanced Guard, he pushed on, and took possession of that important
town. A Detachment of from five hundred to six hundred French Cavalry
had marched from this place on the previous day towards Laon. The
troops which had been employed in the investment of Landrecies rejoined
the Fourth Corps on this day.
By means of these movements, and of the halt of the Duke of WELLINGTON
at Le Cateau, the Prussians were a day's march in advance of the
Anglo-Allied Army.
* * * * *
GROUCHY's troops this day reached Réthel.
* * * * *
The positions of the respective Armies on the evening of the 24th were
as follows:--
The First, Second, and Third Divisions of the Anglo-Allied Army were
in and around Le Cateau Cambresis: the Fourth Division at Cambray;
the Fifth and Sixth Divisions, the Brunswick Corps, and Reserve
Artillery, at, and in the vicinity of, Engle Fontaine.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Le Cateau Cambresis.
The First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ was at Guise, the Third at Muvion,
and the Fourth at Aisonville and Bernonville.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Henappe.
The French troops under SOULT were at Laon; those under GROUCHY at
Réthel.
* * * * *
On the 24th, the Provisional Government in Paris, which had been
appointed on the previous day after a stormy discussion in both
Chambers on the subject of the recognition of NAPOLEON II., and which
consisted of the Duke of OTRANTO (FOUCHÉ), Minister of the Police; the
Duke of VICENZA (CAULINCOURT), Minister of Foreign Affairs; CARNOT,
Minister of the Interior; General GRENIER; and M. QUINETTE; issued the
following Proclamation:--
"Frenchmen!
"Within the period of a few days, brilliant successes and dreadful
reverses have marked your destinies.
"A great sacrifice appeared necessary to your peace and that of the
World; and NAPOLEON abdicated the Imperial Throne. His Abdication
forms the termination of his political life. His Son is proclaimed.
"Your new Constitution, which possesses as yet only good principles,
is about to undergo its application; and even those principles are to
be purified and extended.
"There no longer exist Powers jealous of one another. The space is
free to the enlightened patriotism of your Representatives; and the
Peers feel, think, and vote, as they are directed by the public
opinion.
"After twenty five years of political tempests, the moment has
arrived when every thing wise and sublime that has been conceived
respecting social institutions may be perfected in yours. Let reason
and genius speak, and from whatever side their voices may proceed,
they shall be heard.
"Plenipotentiaries have been despatched, in order to treat in the
name of the Nation, and to negotiate with the Powers of Europe
that Peace which they have promised on one condition, which is now
fulfilled.
"The whole World will, like you, be attentive to their reply. Their
answer will make known whether justice and promises are accounted
anything on earth.
"Frenchmen! be united! Let all rally under circumstances of such vast
importance. Let civil discords be appeased. Let dissensions be silent
at this period, in which the great interests of nations are to be
discussed. From the Northern frontier to the Pyrenees, and from La
Vendée to Marseilles, let all France be united.
"Who is the man, that, born on the soil of France, whatever may be
his Party or political opinions, will not range himself under the
National Standard, to defend the independence of the country.
"Armies may in part be destroyed; but the experience of all Ages and
of all nations proves that a brave people, combating for justice and
liberty, cannot be vanquished.
"The Emperor, in abdicating, has offered himself a sacrifice. The
Members of the Government devote themselves to the due execution
of the authority with which they have been invested by your
Representatives.
"THE DUKE OF OTRANTO,
"T. BERLIER, Secretary."
"June 24th, 1815."
* * * * *
On the 25th, LOUIS XVIII., at the suggestion of the Duke of WELLINGTON,
despatched an Officer, Le Comte D'AUDENARDE, with a summons, in His
Majesty's name, for the Governor, Baron ROOS, to surrender the Citadel
of Cambray. The summons was obeyed, and the garrison capitulated; when
the Duke immediately gave over the Fortress entirely to His Majesty.
The main body of the Anglo-Allied Army advanced this day to Joncour.
The Fourth Division continued at Cambray. The Reserve moved on to
Marets.
The First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ marched this day from Guise to
Cérisy, on the road from St Quentin to La Fère: its Advanced Guard
pushed on to Fargnières, near the latter place. An Officer and thirty
Dragoons were detached across the Oise to cut off the communication
between this Fortress and Laon, by which means the investment of the
place was effected. Along the right bank of the Oise, La Fère was
protected by inundations, and no favourable points presented themselves
for the establishment of Batteries. On this account, preparations were
made in the night to cross the river below the place, and gain the
Heights which command the Fortress on the Laon side.
During the march of the Advanced Guard, Major General JAGOW, who
commanded it, sent a Detachment of the 1st Silesian Hussars to Chauny,
which communicated by its left, through St Gobain, with Captain
GOSCHITZKY in Crespy, and by its left, with the Outpost at Jussy of
the Advanced Guard of the Fourth Corps. The parties detached on the
previous day to Crecy, Pont à Bussy, and along the Serre, were now
called in.
The Third Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ marched from Nouvion to Homblières
and its vicinity. Two of its Brigades occupied passages across the
Oise, namely, the Ninth at Origny, and the Twelfth at Neuvillette.
The Eleventh Brigade bivouacked at Marey, and the Tenth at Homblières
and Menil St Laurent. The Detachments sent out from this Corps on the
previous day towards the road leading from Mezières to Laon, brought
in word that at eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 24th, the French
troops had abandoned Aubenton, and marched off to Monternet; also that
GROUCHY's Army had reached Rocroi on the 23rd, and Réthel on the 24th;
and it was presumed that his next march was to be on Soissons. On the
receipt of this intelligence these Detachments were drawn back, and
their observation limited to the ground nearest to the left bank of the
Oise.
The Advanced Guard of the Fourth Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ was closely
followed by the Reserve Cavalry, and all these troops were placed under
the command of Prince WILLIAM of Prussia. The Cavalry marched along the
road leading to Chauny, as far as Montescour, where it bivouacked. The
main body of the Corps reached Essigny le Grand.
At St Quentin, Prince BLÜCHER received a letter from Laon addressed to
the Allied Commanders by the Commissioners sent from the two Chambers
of the French Parliament; in which they communicated the fact of
NAPOLEON's abdication, and of the elevation of his Son to the Throne,
and stated that they had been deputed by the Provisional Government to
negotiate an Armistice.
To this the Prince replied verbally, by an Aide de Camp, that he would
suspend hostilities on arriving at Paris, provided BUONAPARTE was given
up to him, and several Fortresses on the frontiers delivered up as
sureties; and provided, also, that the Duke of WELLINGTON should agree
to what might be proposed.
According to the accounts which were this day received from Lieutenant
Colonel SCHMIEDEBERG it was presumed that the Enemy was still at
Laon. The reports from the Detachments of the Third _Corps d'Armée_
also confirmed this view, and intimated that GROUCHY's troops were
yet two marches distant from Laon. This intelligence, combined with
the attempts made by the French to induce the Allies to enter into
negotiations, clearly showed the importance of endeavouring, by means
of a forced march, to gain the passages of the Oise, and then to
intercept the Enemy's line of retreat by Soissons upon Paris.
In the night of the 25th, however, decided information was received
that the French Army had marched from Laon to Soissons, a fact from
which it was naturally concluded that the Enemy was no longer deceived
as to the advance of the Prussians towards Laon; and that he was
therefore bent upon effecting his further retreat, or, perhaps, even of
anticipating their movements towards the Oise, and detaching towards
Compiegne. Hence, not a moment was now to be lost in securing the
points of passage, particularly that at Compiegne; to which Prince
BLÜCHER attached so much more importance from the circumstance that his
Army had no Pontoons; and that the British Pontoon Train was still far
behind, and not to be calculated upon. The Prince decided upon moving
his Left Column (the First and Third Corps) on Compiegne, and his Right
Column (the Fourth Corps) upon Pont St Maxence; the latter to secure
the passage both at this place, and at Creil lower down the Oise.
* * * * *
SOULT, who had been indefatigable in collecting at Laon the remains
of the defeated portion of the French Army, marched the latter, on
the 25th, to Soissons; where it was to be joined by the force under
GROUCHY: who, having preceded his troops which were yet a march and
a half distant, had arrived in that town, to take the command of
the whole Army, according to instructions conveyed to him from the
Provisional Government.
SOULT, as soon as he found himself thus superseded in the command,
quitted the Army, and repaired to Paris; disgusted with the abrupt and
uncourteous manner in which he had been treated.
* * * * *
The position of the respective Armies, on the evening of the 25th, were
as follows:--
Of the Anglo-Allied Army, the Advanced Guard (VIVIAN's Brigade) was
at Crisour, near St Quentin.
The Second Division, the Nassau troops, and the British Cavalry, were
encamped in the vicinity of Joncour.
The First and Third Divisions, the Dutch-Belgian Infantry attached to
the First Corps, and the Dutch-Belgian Cavalry, were encamped near
Serain and Premont.
The Fourth Division, with GRANT's Light Cavalry Brigade, was at
Cambray.
The Fifth and Sixth Divisions, the Brunswick Infantry and Cavalry,
and the Reserve Artillery, were encamped at, and in the vicinity of,
Marets.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Joncour.
The First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ was at Cérisy; the Third at
Homblières; and the Fourth at Essigny le Grand.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at St Quentin.
The Right Wing of the French Army, led by VANDAMME, was at Rheims;
the Left, with GROUCHY, at Soissons.
* * * * *
On the 25th, NAPOLEON withdrew from the capital to the country Palace
of Malmaison, whence he issued the following Address to the Army:--
"SOLDIERS!
"While obeying the necessity which removes me from the French Army;
I carry with me the happy assurance that it will justify, by the
eminent services which the country expects from it, the praises which
our Enemies themselves have not been able to refuse it.
"Soldiers! I shall follow your steps, though absent. I know all
the Corps; and not one of them will obtain a single advantage over
the Enemy, but I shall give it credit for the courage it may have
displayed. Both you and I have been calumniated. Men, very unfit to
appreciate your labours, have seen in the marks of attachment which
you have given me, a zeal of which I was the sole object. Let your
future successes convince them that it was the Country above all
things, which you served in obeying me; and that if I had any share
in your affection, I owe it to my ardent love for France--our common
mother.
"Soldiers! Some efforts more, and the Coalition will be dissolved.
NAPOLEON will recognise you by the blows which you are about to
strike. Save the honour, the independence, of France! Be, unto the
last, the same men which I have known you for these twenty years; and
you will be invincible.
"NAPOLEON."
"De la Malmaison, le 25 juin 1815."
CHAPTER XIX.
On the 26th, the Duke of WELLINGTON marched the main body of his Army
to Vermand and its vicinity.
Major General Sir JOHN BYNG, who was now in command of the First Corps,
having heard, on passing that village, that the Duke himself was there,
immediately waited upon his Grace for any Orders he might wish to give
him.
The Duke, on seeing him, said, "You are the very person I wish to
see--I want you to take Peronne. You may as well take with you a
Brigade of Guards, and a Dutch-Belgian Brigade. I shall be there almost
as soon as yourself."
BYNG having given the necessary Orders for MAITLAND's Brigade, and a
Dutch-Belgian Brigade of CHASSÉ's Division attached to his Corps, to
proceed on this duty; the former was immediately put in motion.
The Duke, on reaching Peronne just as these troops arrived there,
summoned the garrison, and then proceeded, in person, to reconnoitre
that Fortress: and perceiving the possibility of taking it by storm,
gave Orders to prepare for an assault. His Grace then directed the
attack to be made upon the Hornwork which covers the suburb on the left
of the Somme. Lieutenant Colonel Lord SALTOUN immediately led on the
Light Troops of MAITLAND's Brigade, stormed, and carried the outwork,
with but little loss; on observing which, the Duke, being satisfied
the place would prove an easy capture, returned to Vermand.
Some pieces of Dutch artillery were now brought into the Hornwork, and
a cannonade was opened upon the town; but the fire kept up on both
sides was trifling, and of short duration: for BYNG having sent forward
his Acting Assistant Quartermaster General, Lieutenant Colonel the
Hon. J. STANHOPE, with a white flag, the Civil Authorities interfered,
and urged the garrison to capitulate; whereupon the Maiden Fortress of
Peronne surrendered on the condition that its defenders should lay down
their arms, and be allowed to repair to their homes.
BYNG, on returning to Vermand, to report the capture of the Fortress to
the Duke, met the Dutch-Belgian Brigade, which had been ordered to move
to Peronne at the same time as the Guards, about half way towards that
place!
COLVILLE'S Division rejoined the main body of the Army from Cambray;
which place was handed over to the troops of the King of FRANCE, under
the Duke of BERRY.
The Reserve moved on to Bellicourt and Belle Englise.
Upon returning in the night to his Head Quarters at Vermand, the Duke
of WELLINGTON found a note from Prince BLÜCHER, forwarding to him the
letter from the French Commissioners before referred to, and to which
his Grace immediately replied as follows:--
"Head Quarters, 26th June 1815.--10 P.M.
"As Field Marshal the Duke of WELLINGTON has only at this moment
returned to his Quarters, he has only now received from Marshal
Prince BLÜCHER the letter of their Excellencies, and which their
Excellencies had sent to the Prussian Outposts.
"When the Field Marshal last heard from the Head Quarters of the
Allied Sovereigns, the 21st instant, their Majesties were at
Heidelberg, and they must still be in that direction. It must be
obvious to their Excellencies that the Field Marshal can neither
prevent nor aid their Excellencies in reaching their Majesties; but
if he has it in his power, or if their Excellencies think proper to
pass through the countries in which the troops are under his command,
the Field Marshal begs they will let him know in what manner he can
facilitate their journey.
"The Field Marshal was not aware that any Officer commanding an
Advanced Post had agreed verbally, or in any other manner, to a
Suspension of Hostilities.
"Since the 15th instant, when NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE, at the head of the
French Armies, invaded the dominions of the King of the Netherlands,
and attacked the Prussian Army; the Field Marshal has considered his
Sovereign, and those Powers whose Armies he commands, in a state
of war with the Government of France; and he does not consider the
Abdication of NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE of his usurped authority, under
all the circumstances which have preceded and attended that measure,
as the attainment of the object held out in the Declarations and
Treaties of the Allies, which should induce them to lay down their
arms.
"The Field Marshal cannot consent therefore to any Suspension of
Hostilities, however desirous he is of preventing the further
effusion of blood.
"As the only object on which their Excellencies desired to converse
with the Field Marshal was the proposed Suspension of Hostilities:
they will, probably, after the perusal of his sentiments and
intentions, as above declared, consider any interview with him an
useless waste of time; but, if their Excellencies should still do him
the honour to desire to have an interview with him, the Field Marshal
will be ready to meet them at the time and place they shall appoint.
"The Field Marshal begs their Excellencies will receive the assurance
of his high consideration.
"WELLINGTON."
* * * * *
From the moment that Prince BLÜCHER had become aware of the retirement
of the French troops from Laon upon Soissons, he was most anxious to
secure the passage across the Oise at Compiegne, Verberie, Pont St
Maxence, and Creil.
In the middle of the night of the 25th, he therefore sent an Order for
the Advanced Guard of the First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ to proceed on
the following day, from Fargnières, by forced march, as far as the
first named place. In the afternoon of the 26th, it reached Noyon,
where it halted for a rest, having marched five leagues; and having
nearly an equal distance before it to Compiegne. The twelve pounder
Battery and the four ten pounder Howitzers which had been attached to
this Advanced Guard (the Third Brigade under Major General JAGOW) were,
by ZIETEN's Order, left under the protection of a Battalion, to be
employed with the First Brigade, which was directed to make an attempt
upon the Fortress of La Fère. The Advanced Guard after having sent on a
Squadron of the 1st Silesian Hussars, under Major HERTEL, to Compiegne,
with Orders to push forward a Detachment thence upon the road to
Soissons, resumed its march in the evening.
It was still in movement about midnight, when Major General JAGOW
received a communication from the front that Major HERTEL had, with
his Squadron, entered Compiegne at eight o'clock in the evening; and
had learned from the Mayor that a French Corps was on the march from
Soissons to that town, in which it had already bespoken ten thousand
rations. JAGOW immediately communicated this important circumstance to
ZIETEN, and ordered his troops, after another short but indispensable
halt, to continue their toilsome march.
On the morning of this day, the First Brigade of ZIETEN's _Corps
d'Armée_ completed the investment of La Fère. The troops that had been
previously detached to this point by General JAGOW were moved off to
follow this Officer's Brigade on the road to Compiegne. Notwithstanding
the vigorous bombardment which the Prussians maintained against the
Fortress until noon, and by which several buildings were set on fire,
they failed to induce the garrison to surrender.
As it was not intended, however, to attempt any more serious attack:
the Brigade, after leaving the Fusilier Battalion of the 12th Regiment
and a Squadron of the Brandenburg Uhlans to watch the Fortress,
followed the _Corps d'Armée_, which had marched to Noyon; but it did
not even reach Chauny, scarcely seven miles from La Fère.
ZIETEN, on arriving at Chauny at eight o'clock in the evening, with the
remainder of his Corps--the Second and Fourth Brigades, the Reserve
Artillery, and a Reserve Cavalry Brigade--considered his troops too
much fatigued to fulfil BLÜCHER's intentions that they should march as
far as Noyon; and he therefore ordered them to bivouack at Chauny.
The Third Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ marched from the vicinity of
Homblières to that of Guiscard; partly by Jussy, and partly by St
Quentin and Ham. It was only the Eleventh Brigade, with the greater
portion of the Reserve Cavalry and Artillery, that took the latter
road. These troops on reaching the fortified town of Ham, found it
occupied by the Enemy; who seemed prepared to oppose their passing
through the place. General HOBE, who commanded them, summoned the
Commander of the Garrison to open the Gates and allow the troops to
march through; and on perceiving that this summons was disobeyed, he
tried the effect of a few cannon shot, which quickly procured a free
passage for his force. No further notice was taken, and no further use
was made, by the Prussians of this otherwise insignificant place.
A Detachment of the Reserve Cavalry of this Corps was sent to Chauny,
from which it pushed forward a small party along the road towards
Soissons, which the latter pursued until on arriving at about a league
beyond Coucy, it came upon an Enemy's Outpost, consisting of a
Regiment of Dragoons and a Battalion of Infantry.
The Fourth _Corps d'Armée_ was also required to make a forced march
on this day--namely, from Essigny le Grand as far as Lassigny, and
its Advanced Guard was to reach Gournay, and thence push forward
Detachments to Clermont, Creil, and Pont St Maxence, for the purpose of
securing and examining the Bridges across the Oise, and of preparing
all that was requisite for effecting a passage for the troops. BÜLOW,
in his Brigade Orders, drew the attention of his troops to the
necessity which had arisen for those forced marches on the part of the
Prussian Army with a view to obtain a decisive result.
The Advanced Guard started at four o'clock in the morning from Jussy,
and proceeded by Lassigny to Gournay, situated upon the road from
Peronne to Pont St Maxence; but the Detachments which it sent thence
towards Clermont, Creil, Pont St Maxence, and Verberie, did not reach
those places until the following day. The Reserve Artillery of the
Fourth Corps commenced its march at five o'clock in the morning,
following the Advanced Guard, and reached Ressons late in the evening;
where it bivouacked, as did also, subsequently, the main body of the
Corps, after a march of about twenty five miles.
* * * * *
Whilst the Prussians were thus, on the 26th, hastening towards
Compiegne; the French General, Count D'ERLON, was, on this very day,
also marching upon that point from Soissons, with the remains of his
_Corps d'Armée_--about four thousand men--having succeeded, through
his urgent representations of the expediency of such a movement, in
obtaining GROUCHY's assent to its execution.
The troops of the Third and Fourth French _Corps d'Armée_ moved this
day from Rheims towards Soissons, a distance which they could not,
however, accomplish in one day's march.
* * * * *
The positions of the respective Armies on the evening of the 26th were
as follows:--
Of the Anglo-Allied Army, the Advanced Guard (VIVIAN's Hussar
Brigade) was at Mattignies, near the Somme, having its Picquets on
that river.
The Second Division, the Nassau troops, and the British Cavalry, were
encamped near Beauvois and Lanchy.
The First and Third Divisions, the Dutch-Belgian Infantry attached to
the First Corps, and the Dutch-Belgian Cavalry, were encamped near
Caulaincourt and Martin de Des Près.
The Fourth Division was encamped at Gouay.
The First British Brigade of Guards was at Peronne.
The Reserve, consisting of the Fifth and Sixth Divisions, the
Brunswick troops, and the Reserve Artillery was encamped near
Nourois, Magny, and Belle Englise.
The Pontoon Train was at Estrées.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Vermand.
The Second and Fourth Brigades of the First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_
were at Chauny, not far from which was also the First Brigade. The
Third Brigade, forming the Advanced Guard, was on the march to
Compiegne.
The Third Corps was at Guiscard.
The Fourth Corps was at Ressons.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Genvry, near Noyon.
The French troops under D'ERLON were not far from Compiegne, on
the road from Soissons. Those of the Third and Fourth Corps, under
VANDAMME, were at some point between Rheims and Soissons.
GROUCHY's Head Quarters were at Soissons.
* * * * *
It was half past four o'clock in the morning of the 27th, when the
Advanced Guard of the Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ (the Third Brigade),
after a forced march of about twenty five miles, reached Compiegne.
General JAGOW immediately posted his troops, in the most advantageous
manner, in and about the town, so as to be prepared to meet any attack
that the Enemy might make; and detached three Squadrons of the 1st
Silesian Hussars upon the Soissons road, and the remaining Squadron
upon the Paris road, in observation.
About five o'clock, by which time he had scarcely completed his
arrangements, information reached him from the Hussars on the Soissons
road that the Enemy was advancing. This was, as before remarked,
Count D'ERLON, with the remains of his _Corps d'Armée_; from which
circumstance it will be seen that if ZIETEN's Advanced Guard had
arrived but a single half hour later, the French would have anticipated
the Prussians in securing the Bridge of Compiegne.
From along the edge of the extensive Wood which adjoins this town, a
fire was quickly opened by the French Skirmishers against the Prussian
Picquets. Very shortly afterwards a Column of Infantry appeared
advancing from their rear. A Half Battery of Prussian Horse Artillery,
which had been posted on the Soissons road, in front of the Gate on
that side of the town, having allowed the Column to approach within a
suitable range, directed a fire upon it with such vigour and precision,
that in a few moments more the mass rushed for shelter into the Wood.
Four French guns were now brought forward, and these replied to the
Prussian Artillery; during which the Enemy moved through the Wood
to his left. The Prussians concluded from this movement that he
contemplated abandoning the attack in this quarter, for the purpose
of assailing the lower and weaker side of the town, by the Crespy and
Paris roads: but on renewing his advance, he soon showed that he was
only masking his retreat; whereupon the 1st Silesian Hussars advanced
along the road to Soissons in pursuit.
By the result of this affair, which lasted an hour and a half but was
limited to a cannonade and mutual _tiraillade_, the French were foiled
in their attempt to cover their retreat by securing Compiegne, and
checking the advance of the Prussians along the Oise.
The Third Prussian Brigade, however, which had continually formed
the Advanced Guard of the First _Corps d'Armée_ since the Battle of
Waterloo, was too much exhausted by its efforts during the previous day
and night, to attempt seriously to molest the Enemy during his retreat;
a circumstance of which the latter failed not to take advantage. ZIETEN
decided upon relieving these troops from the duties of an Advanced
Guard by the Second Brigade; which, however, had not yet come up: and
hence the French gained some valuable time.
The main body of ZIETEN's Corps did not reach Compiegne until mid day.
BLÜCHER, who had already arrived there, ordered that the Advanced
Guard (now consisting of the Second Brigade) and the Reserve Cavalry,
preceded by one hundred Riflemen, should march through the Wood towards
Villers Cotterets, followed by the main body of the Corps; it having
been his intention to throw these troops upon the Enemy's line of
retreat, in the event of the Advanced Guard falling in with French
troops at or near that point.
This Order, however, was not strictly followed by ZIETEN, who marched
the main body of his Corps, including the Reserve Cavalry, and the
Reserve Artillery, through the Wood of Compiegne to Gillicourt,
detaching only his Second Brigade, reinforced by the Brandenburg
Dragoons and five pieces of Horse Artillery, towards Villers Cotterets.
The 1st Silesian Hussars were pushed forward upon the road from
Compiegne to Soissons, to cover the Left Flank during this movement.
The Reserve Cavalry, in front of the Column of the main body, reached
Gillicourt just as the Enemy (under Count D'ERLON) had crossed the
Defile formed by a tributary stream of the Oise in which that place is
situated. The 1st West Prussian Dragoons and the Brandenburg Uhlans,
together with a Horse Battery, went on in pursuit; and the Third
Brigade was ordered to follow the latter in support. The Fourth Brigade
was directed to maintain the Defile of Gillicourt.
The Enemy's Rear Guard was overtaken on this side of Crespy by the two
Regiments of Cavalry, which threw it back in disorder upon that town.
The French quickly retired from the place; whereupon the Third Brigade,
with a Cavalry Brigade, bivouacked there, throwing out parties of
Dragoons in the direction of the Enemy's retreat.
The Fourth Brigade, the other Cavalry Brigade, and the Reserve
Artillery, bivouacked at Gillicourt. The Second Brigade, with the
additional force attached to it, as before mentioned, reached Longpré,
not far from Villers Cotterets, in the middle of the night. The long
march which the troops of the First _Corps d'Armée_ made this day
from Noyon, and the probability of their coming into collision with
the Enemy on the following day, rendered a few hours' rest absolutely
necessary.
Separated from one another as ZIETEN's Brigades thus were, a strong
Support was essentially requisite; and this was supplied in good
time by the Third Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ which marched on this day
from Guiscard to Compiegne. Prince BLÜCHER directed its Commander,
THIELEMANN, to detach strongly towards Soissons; for the purpose of
observing the Enemy, and of molesting him should he be retiring. The
Cavalry thus detached presenting the means of covering ZIETEN's Left
Flank; the 1st Silesian Hussars, which had been previously posted on
the Soissons road, were directed to rejoin their own Corps. The Third
Corps bivouacked on the left bank of the Oise, with the exception of
the Twelfth Brigade which remained on the right bank at Venette.
On the same day, the Fourth Prussian _Corps d'Armée_, forming the
Right Column, marched from Ressons and its vicinity, with Orders to
cross the Oise lower down the stream, at Verberie, Pont St Maxence, or
Creil. BÜLOW formed his Advanced Guard with the 3rd Neumark Landwehr,
a Battalion of the 1st Silesian Landwehr, the 8th Hussars, the 1st
Pomeranian Landwehr Cavalry, and half the Horse Battery No. 12, and
desired General SYDOW, who commanded the Advanced Guard, to move off
with a Detachment, at the first break of day, and secure the Bridge
over the Oise at Creil.
This General, aware of the importance of attaining the object in view,
proceeded himself, at the head of a Squadron of the 8th Hussars, and
of one hundred Infantry, the latter being transported in carts, and
reached Creil with his small Detachment just as the French were on the
point of entering the place. The latter were immediately attacked and
repulsed: and the Prussian Infantry occupied the Bridge; which, on
the arrival of the Advanced Guard, was given over to the 1st Silesian
Landwehr, whilst the remainder of the troops, after a short halt,
commenced their march upon Senlis.
Another striking instance was thus again afforded of the vast
importance of a correct calculation of time in military operations. The
Prussians, on this morning, reached the Bridge of Compiegne, only half
an hour before the French approached it; and had they arrived at Creil
but a few minutes later, they would have found the French in possession
of the Bridge at this point.
Major BLANKENBURG was detached in advance, with the 1st Pomeranian
Landwehr Cavalry, from Creil towards Senlis. They had but just reached
this town, and had begun to bivouack on the great market place; when,
towards nine o'clock in the evening, KELLERMANN, with the First
_Cuirassier_ Brigade of French Cavalry, approached on the opposite
side, and made a dash at the very spot occupied by the Prussians. Major
BLANKENBURG had barely time to mount; nevertheless, with such of his
men as were accoutred and prepared, he attacked the French horsemen,
and drove them back to the Gates of the town. The latter, however,
collecting their strength, renewed their attack, overpowered the
Prussians; and forced them to retire along the road to Pont St Maxence.
KELLERMANN's Brigade then resumed its march along the prescribed line
of retreat. In the mean time, his Second _Cuirassier_ Brigade, and
D'ERLON's French _Corps d'Armée_, were retiring along the same road
towards Senlis.
Upon this point also General SYDOW was moving from Creil, with the
Advanced Guard of the Fourth Prussian Corps; following, as it was
supposed, the detached 1st Pomeranian Landwehr Cavalry. On reaching
Senlis at ten o'clock in the evening, with the head of the Column,
consisting of the 8th Hussars and the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Neumark
Landwehr, and finding the place unoccupied, he took possession of it.
The French troops had already approached close to the town, from the
side of Crespy. The Prussian Infantry were immediately posted in the
houses nearest to the Gate: and as soon as the Enemy's Cavalry came
fully within the effective range of musketry, they suddenly opened upon
the latter a sharp fire; which compelled it to go about.
The head of D'ERLON's Corps now came up; but was forced, along with
the Cavalry, to take another direction. SYDOW, having collected the
whole of the Advanced Guard, followed the French some little distance;
and bivouacked, about midnight, somewhat in advance of Senlis. The
latter, however, reached, next morning, the road leading through
Gonesse to Paris.
During the operation of the Advanced Guard of the Fourth Prussian
_Corps d'Armée_, another Detachment of the latter was sent to occupy
Pont St Maxence and Verberie. The French having partially destroyed
the Bridge at the former point, the 2nd Pomeranian Landwehr Cavalry
were ferried to the opposite bank of the river, and Detachments were
immediately pushed on to Verberie and Senlis. The Fourteenth Brigade
followed the Cavalry, and was passed over the river in a similar
manner; after which it occupied the Heights on both sides of the great
Paris road. These troops bivouacked for the night on their position;
whilst the main body of the Corps, on reaching Pont St Maxence,
remained on the right bank of the river. The greatest activity was used
in repairing the Bridge sufficiently for the passage of Artillery.
In this manner BLÜCHER had effectually secured the line of the
Oise; and, by pushing forward his Advanced Troops as far as Villers
Cotterets, had closed so much upon the Flank of the retiring Enemy,
that he had every reasonable expectation of succeeding in cutting off
the line of retreat of the latter upon the capital.
* * * * *
GROUCHY, on discovering that the Detachments he had thrown out to
gain the passages of the Oise, on his left, had been thwarted by the
rapidity of the Prussian movement, and had been compelled to fall
back, now employed them in covering his retreat by means of partial
combats. Hence arose the engagements at Compiegne, Crespy, and Senlis;
but such was the feebleness of the French resistance, and so frequent
were the desertions of the soldiers, who threw away their arms, and
fled to their homes, that it was evident the reorganisation of the
Army, and the reanimation of its former spirit, were far from having
been thoroughly effected. It has been said that a cry of alarm spread
through its ranks of, "Our retreat is cut off!" as soon as it was known
that the Prussians were upon its Right Flank. At all events it appears
tolerably certain that the Army was not in that state which would have
warranted GROUCHY in risking any serious stand against the Prussians.
To succeed in reaching the capital by means of forced marches; and to
secure his troops, as far as practicable, from molestation, was all
that he could hope to accomplish.
* * * * *
On the 27th, the main body of the Anglo-Allied Army, crossing the Somme
at Willecourt, marched through Nesle upon Roye.
The Fourth Division marched through Peronne, towards Roye.
Two Battalions of the Dutch-Belgian Brigade at Peronne were ordered to
remain in occupation of that place: the remainder of the Brigade, and
the Brigade of Guards at Peronne, marched through Nesle to the village
of Crescy, and joined the First Corps.
The Fifth Division, the Brunswick Cavalry, and the Reserve Brigade of
Howitzers, moved upon Ham.
The Sixth Division, the Brunswick Infantry, and the Reserve Artillery,
encamped between the villages of Douilly and Villers.
Notwithstanding the precautions which the Duke of WELLINGTON had taken
to ensure the orderly conduct of his troops, and to conciliate in
their favour the good disposition of the inhabitants along the line of
march, it being his anxious desire that they should be considered as
being on a friendly footing, and as acting on behalf of the legitimate
Sovereign, there was one portion of his Army which committed the
greatest excesses: these were the Dutch-Belgian troops, who set his
Orders on this head completely at defiance. They pillaged wherever they
went, not even excepting the Head Quarters, the house which he himself
occupied: they forced the safeguards, and rescued, at the point of the
bayonet, the prisoners from the _Gensd'armerie_ which the Duke had
formed for the Police of the Army.
Two of the Officers had just rendered themselves conspicuous by
participating in, and actually encouraging, these disorders, which had
arisen to such a height as to arouse his Grace's just indignation and
severe censure. He desired the General Officer then in command of that
part of the Army to put in full force his General Order of the 26th of
June, to cause a Roll Call of Companies to be made every hour, and to
see that every Officer and soldier was present. He also directed him to
place the two Officers before alluded to in arrest, and to send them to
the Hague, to be disposed of by the King of the Netherlands; to whom
he forwarded a copy of the letter containing these instructions. This
letter, which strongly evidenced the feelings of annoyance, under which
the Duke wrote it, concluding with the following cutting reproof:--_Je
ne veux pas commander de tels Officiers. Je suis assez longtemps Soldat
pour savoir que les Pillards, et ceux qui les encouragent, ne valent
rien devant l'Ennemi; et je n'en veux pas_.
The following were the positions of the respective Armies on the
evening of the 27th:--
The First Prussian. _Corps d'Armée_ had its main body at Gillicourt;
its Second Brigade at Longpré, about half a league from Villers
Cotterets; and its Third Brigade at Crespy.
The main body of the Third Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ was at Compiegne;
it had strong Detachments in the direction of Soissons.
The main body of the Fourth Prussian Corps was at Pont St Maxence;
it had its Advanced Guard at Senlis, and Detachments at Creil and
Verberie.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Compiegne.
Of the Anglo-Allied Army, the Second Division, the Nassau troops, and
the British and Hanoverian Cavalry, were in the vicinity of Roye.
The Third Division, one Brigade of the First Division, the
Dutch-Belgian Infantry attached to the First Corps, and the
Dutch-Belgian Cavalry, were encamped near the villages of Crescy,
Billencourt, and Bereuil.
The Fourth Division was at the village of Puzeaux, on the road to
Roye.
The Brigade of Guards was at Crescy.
The Fifth Division and the Brunswick Cavalry were at Ham.
The Sixth Division, the Brunswick Infantry, and the Reserve
Artillery, were between the villages of Douilly and Villers.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Nesle.
The remains of the First and Second French _Corps d'Armée_,
Detachments from which had this day been defeated at Compiegne,
Crespy, Creil, and Senlis, were in full retreat, partly upon the
Senlis, and partly upon the Soissons, road.
The Imperial Guard and the Sixth Corps were at Villers Cotterets.
The Third and Fourth Corps were at Soissons.
GROUCHY's Head Quarters were at Villers Cotterets.
* * * * *
General PIRCH II. having learned, upon his arrival at one o'clock of
the morning of the 28th, with the Advanced Guard of the First Prussian
_Corps d'Armée_, at Longpré, near Villers Cotterets, that the latter
place was not occupied by the Enemy in any force, determined to capture
the place forthwith by a surprise. The troops detached to the front
on this service (the Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Regiment and the
Brandenburg Dragoons), favoured by the darkness (which as yet was
scarcely relieved by the approaching dawn), as also by the Wood through
which they advanced, fell upon a Detachment that was moving by a by
road through the Wood, consisting of a French Horse Battery of fourteen
guns, twenty ammunition waggons, and an escort of one hundred and fifty
men. The whole vicinity of Villers Cotterets was, in fact, filled
with French troops; thus dispersed, that they might sooner obtain
refreshment after the long march, and be prepared to start again at two
o'clock in the morning. Thus they were all in motion at the time of
this capture.
General PIRCH now pushed on to Villers Cotterets, where the Prussians
made many prisoners. GROUCHY himself narrowly escaped being taken as he
was mounting his horse and hastening out of the opposite side of the
town. On reaching the Windmill Height upon the road to Nanteuil, he
succeeded in collecting together and forming his troops. PIRCH, after
detaching Cavalry in pursuit of the Enemy, as also towards Longpré to
cover his Right, and towards Soissons to protect his Left, took up a
defensive position. He deployed his Infantry, with the Foot Battery,
upon the Height at the Garden of the Château, posted two Battalions
at the point of a Wood that jutted out on his right; and was still
occupied in making his arrangements, when a Cavalry Detachment, on
the Soissons road, sent in word that a hostile Corps was to be seen
approaching from Soissons. Another report was received immediately
afterwards, that the Enemy showed much Cavalry on that side, and was
already detaching two Regiments of the latter Arm towards the Prussian
Left Flank; as also another Cavalry force, along with from twenty to
twenty five pieces of artillery against the Right Flank.
In the mean time, the French Marshal had collected about nine thousand
men on the Height before mentioned, near the road to Nanteuil; one
third of whom had already constituted the Rear Guard, and the remainder
was composed of troops that had halted during the night in the
vicinity, as at Vauciennes, Coyolles, and Pisseleux. With these troops,
GROUCHY showed every disposition to accept an engagement.
General PIRCH II., finding himself thus critically situated between
two separate and overpowering hostile forces, prepared to effect his
retreat.
This was facilitated in a peculiar manner. The troops of VANDAMME's
Corps, perceiving the Prussians thus posted on the high road to Paris,
and imagining their force to be greater than it really was, fell into
the greatest disorder, and with loud cries of "Into the woods on the
left, towards La Ferté Milon--we are cut off from Paris!" they all
rushed in that direction; with the exception of two thousand men and
some guns conducted by VANDAMME himself by the way of Pisseleux,
leaving Villers Cotterets on their right, and masking the movement
by a vigorous attack upon this place. The 6th Prussian Regiment was
driven back by the Enemy's superior numbers; and PIRCH, after having
kept up a brisk cannonade, gradually withdrew the Regiment from Villers
Cotterets, for the purpose of moving upon Crespy, the direction
previously laid down for him, with a view to the concentration of the
Corps.
As GROUCHY was moving by the Soissons road towards Nanteuil, PIRCH was
desirous of proceeding in a parallel direction, through Longpré; but
he was subsequently induced, on consideration of the Defiles in that
direction, and which he did not deem it prudent to pass so near to the
Enemy, to prefer retiring along the Compiegne road, as far as where it
is joined by the one leading from Viviers; and where, for the covering
of the Left Flank and Rear, a Squadron of the Brandenburg Dragoons had
already been posted. From this point he struck into the road leading
by Buts, and reached, towards mid day, Frenois la Rivière, where he
gave his troops a few hours' rest; and then proceeded by Crespy to
Nanteuil, which place he reached about nine o'clock in the evening,
having marched twenty one leagues within the last thirty eight hours,
during six of which he had also been engaged with the Enemy. He had
succeeded in creating confusion in one portion of the retiring French
force, and in impeding the retreat of that which was with GROUCHY
himself sufficiently long to enable ZIETEN to anticipate the latter in
his arrival at Nanteuil.
It has already been explained, when describing the proceedings of the
27th, how much separated the Brigades of the First Prussian CORPS
D'ARMÉE were from one another. The First was still on the march from
La Fère (it rejoined on the afternoon of this day); the Second, with
the Brandenburg Dragoons, was near Villers Cotterets; the Third, with a
Cavalry Brigade, was at Crespy; and the Fourth, with the other Cavalry
Brigade was at Gillicourt. Hence ZIETEN was desirous, on the morning
of the 28th, to concentrate his Corps at Crespy; leaving only a strong
Cavalry Detachment at Villers Cotterets. But whilst despatching the
Order to PIRCH to move upon Crespy; he received a report from this
General, that he had fallen upon the French troops retreating through
Villers Cotterets, and was upon the point of being driven back by
superior numbers.
ZIETEN, considering that the Prussian troops at Crespy, the nearest to
Villers Cotterets, were nearly three leagues distant from the latter
point, decided upon not attempting to give any direct support to PIRCH;
but to advance with the Third Brigade, together with the Reserve
Cavalry and Artillery, towards Levignon, on the great Paris road,
between Villers Cotterets and Nanteuil, and, if possible, occupy that
point before the French could reach it. He found the latter in the act
of marching through the village; and immediately ordered a Howitzer
Battery to be drawn up, which commenced throwing shells into the place.
He also ordered the 1st West Prussian Dragoons, and the 1st Silesian
Hussars, with a Horse Battery, to attack the Enemy.
The French, however, retired in such haste, that they were not
overtaken until about midway between Levignon and Nanteuil; when they
halted their Rear Guard, which made front against the Prussians. They
comprised the Second _Corps d'Armée_, under REILLE, who had with him
several Regiments of Cavalry, and continued their march; supporting,
however, the Rear Guard. On coming up with the latter, two Squadrons
of the 2nd West Prussian Dragoons charged; but they were repulsed,
and attacked in flank by a French Regiment of Lancers. The Enemy now
advanced, with the hope of completely routing the Prussian Cavalry.
This attempt failed in consequence of a most successful attack by the
1st Silesian Hussars; by which the French were put to flight, and two
of their guns captured. The Horse Battery drew up, at the same time, on
the left of the high road, and, by its effective fire, committed great
havoc amidst the flying Enemy; who was pursued by the Prussian Cavalry
even beyond Nanteuil.
During the movement upon Levignon, General HOBE came up with a Cavalry
Brigade from the Third _Corps d'Armée_. It advanced by the right, along
the road from Crespy to Nanteuil, with the design of intercepting a
portion of the Enemy's retreating Columns; but the French, in the mean
time, fled in such haste, that only a few prisoners were made.
Notwithstanding the pressure thus made upon the French line of retreat,
Count REILLE succeeded in uniting the remains of his _Corps d'Armée_
with those of Count D'ERLON's Corps which had escaped through Crespy
and by the left of Senlis.
The French Imperial Guards, and the Sixth _Corps d'Armée_, which were
under the more immediate orders of GROUCHY, and had formed the Column
that retired through Villers Cotterets in the morning, reached Levignon
after ZIETEN had passed through it in pursuit of REILLE's troops to
Nanteuil; and becoming acquainted with the danger of their proceeding
further on that road, they turned off to their left, to make their
retreat through Assy, Meaux, Claye, and Vincennes.
General VANDAMME, who, with the Third and Fourth French _Corps
d'Armée_, was most in the rear, and had withdrawn from the high road at
Villers Cotterets on perceiving the Prussian Brigade in possession of
that place, took the direction of La Ferté Milon, Meaux, crossing the
Marne at L'Agny, to Paris.
BÜLOW, who had been directed to move the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_ from
Pont St Maxence to Marly la Ville, on the 28th, deemed it advisable to
augment his Advanced Guard; and therefore added to it the Fourteenth
Brigade and the Reserve Cavalry, and placed the whole under the command
of Prince WILLIAM of Prussia. In the afternoon Prince WILLIAM fell upon
Detachments of D'ERLON's, and also upon REILLE's _Corps d'Armée_,
which latter was retreating from Nanteuil. He immediately attacked the
Enemy, dispersed a great number of his troops, and took more than two
thousand prisoners. It was evening before the Advanced Guard reached
Gonesse, where it bivouacked. Detachments were pushed on to the front
as far as Le Bourget and Stains, which points were occupied by the
Enemy. The main body of the Corps arrived at Marly la Ville in the
evening, and halted there for the night.
THIELEMANN, having been directed to proceed with the Third _Corps
d'Armée_ from Compiegne to Senlis, should its support not be required
by the First Corps, marched his Infantry and Artillery upon Crespy,
and sent the Reserve Cavalry by Verberie; but on hearing that the
First Corps was engaged with the Enemy, he drew in his Cavalry towards
Crespy, from Verberie, as soon as it arrived there. The First Cavalry
Brigade, with six pieces of Horse Artillery, was pushed on from Crespy,
along the road to Nanteuil; where it joined the Reserve Cavalry of
the First _Corps d'Armée_, but not in time to take any active part in
the engagement at that place. The Second Cavalry Brigade was detached
towards Villers Cotterets. The main body of the Third _Corps d'Armée_
bivouacked for the night at Crespy and its vicinity.
Prince BLÜCHER deemed it advisable to send, on this day, a strong
Detachment of Cavalry, consisting of the Queen's Dragoons, under
Lieutenant Colonel KAMECKE, beyond the Left of the First Prussian
Corps, towards the Marne, for the purpose of gaining intelligence of
the Enemy's movements in that direction. Lieutenant Colonel KAMECKE
was instructed to act discretionally; and to proceed, subsequently, by
Meaux, or Château Thierry, and endeavour to open a communication with
the Advance of the Bavarian Army.
Thus it will be seen that, on the 28th, the Prussian Army succeeded in
cutting off the line of retreat of the French troops by the Soissons
high road, compelling the greater portion of them to seek, along cross
roads, the line of the Marne, by Meaux and L'Agny. It had, since it
crossed the Oise, created great disorder and confusion in the French
ranks, captured sixteen pieces of cannon, and made, altogether, four
thousand prisoners. The Prussians now occupied both the high roads
leading from Senlis and Soissons, and had their Advanced Posts (those
of the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_) within five miles of Paris.
The sound of their cannon was already heard in the capital, where the
greatest consternation prevailed amongst the citizens; whose fears had
been previously excited by the most exaggerated reports brought in by
fugitives from the retreating Army. The fortified works that had been
thrown up on the north side, appeared sufficient to check the progress
of the Allied Armies, and to secure Paris from a _coup de main_;
but time was essential for the organisation of the defence, for the
recovery of the exhausted remains of the Army of the North expected
to arrive on the morrow, and for the collection of every available
defensive means. It was only by the assumption of a sufficiently
respectable, if not an imposing, attitude, that they could hope to
succeed in negotiating for the preservation of the capital and the
establishment of their own prescribed form of government--perhaps, by
some extraordinary effort, to disconcert the plans of their Enemies,
and obtain a triumph under the walls of Paris.
Actuated by these considerations, the Provisional Government was
desirous of inducing the victorious Commanders of the Allied Armies to
enter into negotiations. Another Commission was appointed, the members
of which were Messrs ANDREOSSY, VALENCE, BOISSY D'ANGLAS, FLANGERGUES,
and LA BENARDIÈRE. They were directed to proceed to the Head Quarters
of the Allied Field Marshals, again to solicit a Suspension of
Hostilities and to negotiate an Armistice.
During these proceedings in Paris, a renewed application had been
received by Prince BLÜCHER, on the 27th, and by the Duke of WELLINGTON
on the 28th, from the first named Commissioners, for a Suspension of
Hostilities; as also a request that a passport and assurances of safety
might be accorded to NAPOLEON and his family, to enable them to pass
to the United States of America: the Provisional Government having
previously succeeded, through the medium of representations made to the
ex-Emperor by some of his friends, in persuading the latter to consent
to this step.
Prince BLÜCHER declined taking any notice of the application,
conceiving his former verbal reply quite sufficient. The Duke of
WELLINGTON referred the Commissioners to his note of the 26th on the
proposed Suspension of Hostilities; and stated that, with regard to the
passport for NAPOLEON, he had no authority from his Government, or from
the Allies, to give any answer to such demand.
* * * * *
The Anglo-Allied Army advanced this day from Nesle, so as to bring its
Right in rear of St Just, and its Left in rear of La Taulle, where the
high road from Compiegne joins the high road from Roye to Paris.
The Second Corps, under Lord HILL, as also the British and Hanoverian
Cavalry, marched by Montdidier to Petit Crevecoeur.
The First Corps, under Sir JOHN BYNG, marched upon Couchy.
The Reserve, under Sir JAMES KEMPT, marched upon Roye.
* * * * *
The following were the positions of the respective Armies on the
evening of the 28th:--
The Fourth Prussian _Corps d'Armée_, which was the nearest to Paris,
was posted at Marly la Ville; having Detachments pushed forward close
to Le Bourget and Stains.
The First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ stood in rear of Nanteuil; having
its Advanced Guard at Le Plessis, Belleville, and Dammartin.
The Third _Corps d'Armée_ was at Crespy and in its vicinity.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Senlis.
The Anglo-Allied Army had its Right behind St Just and its Left
behind La Taulle.
Its Reserve was at Roye.
The Advanced Guard (VIVIAN's Hussar Brigade) was at Antheuil.
The Second and Fourth Divisions, the Nassau troops, and the
Hanoverian Cavalry, were encamped at Petit Crevecoeur, on the road to
St Just.
The British Cavalry was encamped near La Taulle and Ressons.
The First and Third Divisions, and the Dutch-Belgian troops, were
encamped near Couchy.
The Fifth and Sixth Divisions, the Brunswick troops, and Reserve
Artillery, were encamped near Roye.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Orville.
The remains of the First and Second French _Corps d'Armée_, after
forming a junction at Gonesse, where the high roads from Nanteuil
and Senlis unite, reached the suburbs of Paris. The Imperial Guard
and the Sixth Corps, immediately under GROUCHY, were in full retreat
from Meaux by Claie and Vincennes. The Third and Fourth Corps, under
VANDAMME, having crossed the Marne at Meaux, were retreating by Lagny
and Vincennes.
* * * * *
BLÜCHER having issued Orders, during the night of the 28th, for the
continuation of the advance upon Paris; the Advanced Guard of the
Fourth Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ moved, on the morning of the 29th, from
Gonesse to Le Bourget, which place it found abandoned by the Enemy;
who, however, was strongly posted at St Denis, towards which point
therefore, some Battalions were pushed forward in observation. The
Enemy having been driven out of Stains, this Post was occupied by two
Fusilier Battalions and a Regiment of Cavalry, under Lieutenant Colonel
SCHILL, for the purpose of securing the Right Flank of the Corps. La
Cour Neuve, between St Denis and Le Bourget, was also occupied. The
main body of the Corps broke up from Marly la Ville at seven o'clock in
the morning; and on reaching Le Bourget, bivouacked in its vicinity.
The Advanced Guard of the First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ pushed on, at
daybreak, from Dammartin to Blanc Mesnil; whence, immediately on its
arrival, it sent Detachments beyond the Wood of Bondy, to reconnoitre
the Enemy's preparations of defence. The main body of this Corps took
up a position, having its Right resting on Blanc Mesnil, and its Left
on Aulnay. It sent out Infantry Detachments towards Livry, and along
the Ourcq Canal, towards Bondy and Pantin; and Cavalry parties towards
Grande Drancey and Banbigny. ZIETEN also occupied Nonneville with the
7th Regiment of Infantry; and the 6th Uhlans furnished Outposts at the
Ourcq Canal, communicating with those of the Fourth Corps.
The Third Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ marched from Crespy as far as
Dammartin, in the vicinity of which it was bivouacked.
The Reserve Cavalry was sent forward as far as Tremblay, in direct
support of the First _Corps d'Armée_.
* * * * *
The First and Second French _Corps d'Armée_ had reached the suburbs
of Paris on the Gonesse road, during the night; and held possession
of Le Bourget until the morning of the 29th. The Imperial Guard and
the Sixth Corps, as also the reinforcements that had arrived from the
interior, were, during the forenoon of the 29th, on the high road by
Claie and Pantin, under the command of GROUCHY; and were directed to
occupy several defensive points on that side. The Third and Fourth
_Corps d'Armée_, under VANDAMME, reached Paris at noon on the 29th,
by the Lagny road: they passed through the capital, and occupied the
Heights of Montrouge on the south side.
* * * * *
The Anglo-Allied Army arrived, on the 29th, at different points on the
road between Gournay and Pont St Maxence.
The Advanced Guard, consisting of VIVIAN's Light Cavalry Brigade,
supported by that of ARENTSSCHILDT, crossed the Oise at Pont St
Maxence, and reached Senlis.
The British Cavalry moved from La Taulle to Pont St Maxence.
The Second Corps, under Lord HILL, moved from Petit Crevecoeur to
Clermont.
The First Corps, under Sir JOHN BYNG, moved from its camp near Couchy,
by Estrée St Denis, along the high road to St Martin Longeau.
The Reserve, under Sir JAMES KEMPT, moved from its camp near Roye, to
Gournay, on the road to Pont St Maxence.
* * * * *
The following were the positions of the respective Armies on the
evening of the 29th:--
The First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ had its Advanced Guard and Reserve
Cavalry at Aulnay and Savegny; with Detachments of the latter at
Serran, Livry, Bondy, and Baubigny. The Fusilier Battalion of the 7th
Regiment stood at Nonneville. The 6th Uhlans and the 1st Silesian
Hussars, with two Horse Batteries, were posted along the Ourcq
Canal. The Corps itself rested its Right on Blanc Mesnil, and its
Left on Aulnay.
The Third _Corps d'Armée_ was at Dammartin and in its vicinity. Its
Reserve Cavalry stood at Tremblay, in support of ZIETEN.
The Fourth Corps had its Advanced Guard between Le Bourget and St
Denis, which it invested. Lieutenant Colonel VON SCHILL, with the 1st
Silesian Landwehr Cavalry and two Battalions of Infantry, was posted
at Stains. The Corps itself was at Le Bourget.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Gonesse.
The Advanced Guard of the Anglo-Allied Army was at Senlis.
The British Cavalry was at Pont St Maxence.
The Second and Fourth Divisions, the Nassau troops, and ESTORFF's
Light Cavalry, were at Clermont.
The First and Third Divisions, and the Dutch-Belgian troops, were at
St Martin Longeau.
The Fifth and Sixth Divisions, the Brunswick troops, and the Reserve
Artillery, were at Gournay.
The Pontoon Train and Hawser Bridges were at Estrée St Denis.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Le Plessis Longeau.
The French troops comprising the Army of the North had entered the
capital.
* * * * *
The French force in the capital, after the arrival of the Army that
had been defeated in Belgium, consisted as follows:--The troops under
GROUCHY including the Depôts that had come up from the district
of the Loire and from other parts of the interior, amounted to 60
or 70,000 men. They were reinforced, also, by a very considerable
amount of Field Artillery. One portion of these troops was posted
at Montmartre, at St Denis, and in rear of the Ourcq Canal: the
remainder, under VANDAMME, occupied the Heights of Montrouge, on the
opposite side, with the exception of the Cavalry, which lay in the
Wood of Boulogne. The National Guards amounted to about 30,000 men:
their disposition, however, was very doubtful; and, in general, they
were considered as but little disposed to offer any resistance to
the Allied Armies. There was another description of force called the
Federal _Tirailleurs_, raised in the suburbs, and consisting chiefly
of Veterans: they amounted to 17,000 men. Hence, setting aside the
National Guard, there remained, for the defence of Paris, a disposable
force of about 80 or 90,000 men, besides a numerous Artillery. Marshal
DAVOUST, Prince of ECKMÜHL, was appointed to the chief command of the
French Army, and his Head Quarters were fixed at La Villette.
The measures which had been adopted for taking advantage of the local
capabilities of defence which the capital afforded, consisted in the
intrenchments that had been raised around the Heights of Montmartre,
Monfauçon, and Belleville. An advanced line of defence was presented
by the Ourcq Canal; which, proceeding through the Wood of Bondy and
contiguously to the high road from Meaux, has an arm that branches off
from Pantin towards St Denis. This Canal, which was thirty feet wide
but not entirely completed, had been filled with water. Along its inner
bank ran a high dam, forming an excellent parapet, in which embrasures
were cut to admit heavy ordnance; and St Denis, which formed the _point
d'appui_ of this line of defence on the Seine, was strongly fortified.
The ground on the north side of this town, too, had been inundated by
means of the little rivers Rouillon and La Vieille Mer. The Village of
Aubervilliers, which formed an Advanced Post at musket shot distance
from the line, was occupied: and in rear of it the Canal was covered by
a sort of _tête de pont_, which secured the communication between both
banks. The Barriers to the several approaches to Paris were covered
by works with strong batteries. Vincennes had been strengthened, and
covered by the works which defended La Pissotte. A strong _tête de
pont_ was also constructed upon the left bank of the Marne, to cover
the Bridge of Charenton. All ferries and boats upon the Seine and the
Marne were transported to the left bank. The Bridge of Neuilly had
been partially destroyed; and the wooden Bridge at Bessons, over the
Seine, had been burned. Several villages, parks, and gardens, on the
right bank of the Seine and the Marne, were rendered defensible by
the walls being crenelated, the approaches barricaded, and the gates
blocked up. Upon the left bank of the Seine, on the south side of the
capital, preparations for defence were comparatively neglected; they
were limited to the Heights of Montrouge.
For the defence of the principal works, three hundred guns of large
calibre were supplied; and for the manning of these, twenty Companies
of Marine Artillery, which had been brought into the capital. The line
between St Denis and Vincennes was defended by the First, Second, and
Sixth _Corps d'Armée_. The Imperial Guard formed the Reserve, and
was posted at Menil Montant. The Cavalry was stationed in the Bois
de Boulogne. The Third and Fourth _Corps d'Armée_, under VANDAMME,
defended the south side of Paris, and occupied Montrouge.
In the midst of all these preparations, the Provisional Government, the
majority of which, under the influence of FOUCHÉ, was most desirous of
effecting a cessation of hostilities, though acting ostensibly upon
the grounds of a necessity of gaining time for the completion of the
measures of defence, and of securing the capital from an assault, could
not be otherwise than convinced, from the tenor of the replies made
by the Allied Commanders to all its propositions, that the presence
of NAPOLEON in Paris was the chief obstacle to any satisfactory
arrangement. General BECKER had been appointed to attend the latter at
Malmaison, to watch over his safety, to insure him that respect to
which he was so eminently entitled, and to prevent the ill-disposed
from making use of his name for purposes of excitement and tumult.
Symptoms of a rising among the Buonapartists in Paris had been
manifested on the 28th, a circumstance naturally consequent upon the
re-union in the capital of so many Regiments of the Line, as also of
the Imperial Guard; whose excitement, devotion, and enthusiasm, had
NAPOLEON placed himself once more at their head, might have been such
as to have brought them into hostile and fierce collision with the
other great Parties of the State; and thus have led to scenes of the
wildest anarchy and confusion within the walls, whilst the Enemy was
thundering at the gates from without.
Hence every effort was employed to induce the ex-Emperor to quit the
capital. The fact of the arrival of the Prussians in front of St Denis,
and the possibility of an attempt being made to carry him off from
Malmaison, were explained to him with much earnestness. He immediately
referred to the map, and on perceiving the practicability of this
_coup de main_; he adopted precautionary measures of defence. He also
offered to the Government his services in the capacity of General
only; remarking, that he was prepared to march against the Enemy,
and frustrate his bold and hazardous attempt upon the capital. This
proposal was sternly rejected. FOUCHÉ declared that to accede to it
would be to remove every chance of arrangement with the Allied Powers;
to create fresh troubles and disorders throughout the country; and,
though a temporary success might be gained, to bring down eventually
the concentrated force of the immense European armament upon the
devoted capital.
The Commissioners appointed by the Government to communicate its
wishes to NAPOLEON, no longer hesitated in arranging his departure. The
Minister of the Marine, and Count BOULAY, repaired to his residence,
and explained to him that the Duke of WELLINGTON and Prince BLÜCHER had
refused to give him any safeguard or passport; and that he had now only
to take his immediate departure.
NAPOLEON at length yielded to what he considered to be his destiny; and
the preparations for travelling having been completed, he entered his
carriage about five o'clock in the afternoon of the 29th, accompanied
by Generals BERTRAND, GOURGAUD, and other devoted friends, and took
the road to Rochefort: whither two Frigates had been ordered for the
embarkation of himself and suite for America.
NAPOLEON narrowly escaped falling into the hands of the Prussians,
whilst at Malmaison. BLÜCHER, hearing that he was living there in
retirement, had despatched Major COLOMB, on the 28th, with the 8th
Hussars and two Battalions of Infantry to secure the Bridge of Chatou,
lower down the Seine, leading directly to the house. Fortunately,
however, for NAPOLEON; the Prince of ECKMÜHL, when he ascertained that
the Prussians were nearing the capital, had desired General BECKER
to cause this Bridge to be destroyed. Hence Major COLOMB was much
disappointed at finding there was no passage at this point, which in
fact was not more than eight hundred yards distant from the Palace in
which NAPOLEON was yet remaining at the time of the arrival of the
Prussians.
On the 29th, the new Commissioners appointed by the French Government
waited upon the Duke of WELLINGTON at Estrée, for the purpose of
negotiating a Suspension of Hostilities. In the course of the
discussion which took place on this occasion, the Duke declared that
he had nothing to add to the communication he had made to the former
Commissioners; that he could not but consider the Abdication as a
deception; and would not feel himself justified in suspending his
operations on such a pretext, which was by no means calculated to
fulfil the object the Allies had in view. He explained that, besides
NAPOLEON, there were his adherents, who were the declared Enemies of
the Allies; and stated that before he could agree to any Suspension he
"must see some steps taken to re-establish a Government in France which
should afford the Allies some chance of peace."
Upon this point his Grace was pressed to give some explanation as to
what would satisfy the Allies.
He replied that he had no authority from his own Government, much less
from the Allies, to enter upon the subject; and that all he could do
was to give them his private opinion, which he should certainly urge
upon the Allies with all the influence he might be supposed to possess,
unless otherwise instructed by his own Government.
This opinion was a remarkable illustration of the sound judgment,
straightforward policy, and unerring foresight which are so
pre-eminently characteristic of the career of this great man.
Subsequent events proved its correctness to the letter. It was in
strict accordance with the design traced out and enforced by the united
diplomacy of Europe. It is best expressed in the Duke's own words:--
"I then told them that I conceived the best security for Europe was
the Restoration of the King, and that the establishment of any other
Government than the King's in France must inevitably lead to new
and endless Wars; that BUONAPARTE and the Army having overturned
the King's Government, the natural and simple measure, after
BUONAPARTE was prisoner or out of the way and the Army defeated, was
to recall the King to his authority: and that it was a much more
dignified proceeding to recall him without Conditions, and to trust
to the energy of their Constitutions for any Reforms they wished
to make either in the Government or the Constitution, than now to
make Conditions with their Sovereign; and that, above all, it was
important that they should recall the King without loss of time, as
it would not then appear that the measure had been forced upon them
by the Allies.
"The Commissioners professed, individually and collectively,
their earnest desire to see the King restored in the manner I had
mentioned, which they said was likewise the desire of the Provisional
Government. ---- ---- was, however, of opinion that the two Chambers
could not be brought to recall the King without Conditions: and he
mentioned, as those upon which they would probably insist, and upon
which it was desirable the King should give way; the responsibility
of the Administration, and the alteration of the Constitution so far
as that the Initiative in making the Laws should be vested in the
Assemblies and not in the King.
"I told them regarding the first point, that I had every reason to
believe that the King had determined to form a Ministry which should
be individually and collectively responsible for all the acts of
the Government; and that I did not doubt that His Majesty would not
oppose himself to the wishes of the French people, if it was desired
that the Initiative in framing the Laws should be invested in the
Assemblies: that, however, I had no authority to speak on this
subject; and recommended to them not to look after little points of
difference, and if they really wished to restore the Government of
their King, to do it at once and without any Conditions.
"In the course of this conversation they stated that the Assemblies
had proclaimed NAPOLEON II. as Emperor only to conciliate the
Officers and Soldiers of the Army; who had come into Paris in such
numbers after the Battle, that they had been apprehensive of a Civil
War in Paris if this measure had not been adopted.
"While we were discussing the Conditions to be proposed to the
King; and the evils and inconveniences which the mode of making the
Laws and the want of Responsibility and Power in the Ministers,
had occasioned; I received from Sir CHARLES STUART, the King's
Declaration of the 28th, countersigned by M. DE TALLEYRAND: which I
immediately communicated to the French Commissioners, and pointed
out to them the King's promise to make the alteration in his
Administration which they had proposed to be made in the Constitution.
"They objected to certain paragraphs in the Declaration referable to
the exclusion of certain persons from the King's presence, to the
intention announced to punish some of those concerned in the plot
which had brought back BUONAPARTE, and to that of calling together
the old Houses of Legislature; Upon which, at their desire, I wrote
to M. DE TALLEYRAND, a letter, of which Sir CHARLES STUART will
probably have sent to England a copy, which I communicated to the
Commissioners before I sent it.
"I then told them I could not talk more upon the Suspension of our
Operations, which they urged in the most earnest manner in order to
give them time to take their measures to recall the King, until I
should see Marshal BLÜCHER; to whose Head Quarters I promised to go
that evening.
"Before I set off, the Commissioners asked me Whether the appointment
of a Regency to conduct the affairs of the Government in the name of
NAPOLEON II. was likely to satisfy the Allies, and would be such an
arrangement as would induce me to stop my operations? I answered,
Certainly not; that I conceived the Allies, after their Declaration,
would never treat with NAPOLEON or any of his Family; that the
appointment of NAPOLEON II. was to be attributed to NAPOLEON I.,
and the acknowledgment of him to the desire to conciliate the Army;
and that I should not stop my operations in consequence of such an
arrangement.
"They then asked me What would be the case if any other Prince of a
Royal House were called to the Throne of France? To which I said It
was impossible for me to answer such loose questions; that, as an
individual, I had made them acquainted with my opinion of what it was
best for them to do, and it rested with them either to follow this
opinion or not.
"One of the Commissioners, before I went away, took occasion to tell
me That he wished I had given a more positive answer to this last
question; and I determined to take another opportunity of doing so
before the Commissioners should report this conversation to Paris.
"I left them at Etrées, and went to the Head Quarters at Le Plessis,
to give the Orders for the movement of the troops in the morning, and
I overtook them again in the night at Louvres. I then told them I had
considered their last question since I had last seen them, and that
I felt no objection to give them my opinion on it as an individual:
That, in my opinion, Europe had no hope of peace if any person
excepting the King were called to the Throne of France; that any
person so called must be considered an Usurper, whatever his rank and
quality; that he must act as an Usurper, and must endeavour to turn
the attention of the country from the defects of his title towards
War and Foreign Conquests; that the Powers of Europe must, in such
a case, guard themselves against this evil, and that I could only
assure them that, unless otherwise ordered by my Government, I would
exert any influence I might possess over the Allied Sovereigns to
induce them to insist upon Securities for the preservation of peace,
besides the Treaty itself, if such an arrangement as they had stated
were adopted.
"The Commissioners replied that they perfectly understood me, and
some of them added--_Et vous avez raison_."
CHAPTER XX.
Prince BLÜCHER had satisfied himself, by means of the reconnaissances
made during the 29th, that very considerable pains had been taken by
the Enemy to oppose a serious obstruction to the farther advance of
troops marching against the north side of Paris.
He was now desirous of ascertaining Whether the disposition and spirit
of the Enemy's troops were at all commensurate with the extent of the
Works which he saw before him: and, with this view, he directed BÜLOW
to make an attack, in the night of the 29th, with part of his _Corps
d'Armée_, upon Aubervilliers. He also desired ZIETEN to support this
attack, by raising as much alarm as possible in the Villages of Bondy
and Pontin.
Before the attack commenced, BLÜCHER was joined by WELLINGTON in
person, who communicated to him the Proposals which had been made
by the French Commissioners. Being already engaged in an important
operation, he could not consent to suspend hostilities; and the two
Commanders agreed in opinion that, as long as NAPOLEON remained in
Paris, they could not arrest their operations without insisting upon
his being delivered up to them. Accordingly, the Duke wrote a letter
immediately to the Commissioners to this effect.
BLÜCHER confided the attack upon Aubervilliers to General SYDOW, with
the Thirteenth Brigade (nine Battalions), together with one Battalion
of the Fourteenth Brigade, and two Regiments of Cavalry. The remainder
of the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_ was held under arms, in readiness to
follow up any acquired advantage. Four Battalions advanced in Column,
under Colonel LETTOW, supported by the remaining five Battalions. The
arrangements, being made during the night, occupied some little time,
so that twilight had set in when the attack commenced. Colonel LETTOW
penetrated the extensive Village on three sides, forced the barriers,
and carried every thing before him with the bayonet. The place had
been occupied by one thousand of the Enemy's best troops; of whom two
hundred were made prisoners, and the remainder pursued as far as the
Canal of St Denis.
General SYDOW, accompanied by Major LÜTZOW of the Staff, immediately
made a reconnaissance of the Canal; and soon discovered that its
opposite bank was lined with Infantry in great force, and that the
different points of passage were defended by Batteries. Nevertheless
he made the attempt to advance; but the troops were received with
a vigorous fire of both artillery and musketry; and it soon became
evident, that the Enemy's fortified position could not be taken except
at a great sacrifice of both time and men. SYDOW, therefore, limited
his operations to the occupation of the captured Village.
A simultaneous advance towards the Canal was made, on the left of
Aubervilliers, by the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Pomeranian Landwehr, and
the 10th Regiment of Hussars; which maintained the communication with
the First Corps. A sharp _tiraillade_ took place, which terminated in
the withdrawal of these troops to their former position.
By means of this reconnaissance it was made sufficiently manifest
that the line of the Canal of St Denis could not be carried without
a serious assault, preluded by a heavy cannonade. It then became a
question with the Allied Commanders, who had thus, most fortunately,
the opportunity of concerting measures in person, Whether it would
not be advisable to endeavour to turn the Enemy's strongly fortified
lines of St Denis and Montmartre, by masking those lines with one Army,
whilst the other should move off to the right, and cross to the left
bank of the Seine, lower down the stream.
Although this movement would have the effect of extending and dividing
the Allied forces, and consequently of augmenting the chances of
success on the part of the Enemy: should the latter possess the
disposition and the means, not only of acting determinedly on the
defensive, but also of assuming the offensive, accordingly as
circumstances might favour the attempt; still any defeat of this kind
was fully counterbalanced by the advantages which the plan presented.
It cut off the entire communication with Normandy, from which Paris
derived its chief supplies; whilst the approach of the Bavarian Army
towards the opposite side was gradually limiting the resources of the
capital in that quarter. It enabled the Commanders to present their
forces simultaneously at different points: and thus, by continuing that
display of vigour which had characterised their advance, they were far
more likely to impose upon the _morale_ of both the defeated Army and
the citizens, than by limiting their combined operations to the attack
of the stronghold presented by the lines of St Denis; for to do this,
would, in all probability, require time, and it was evident from the
repeated Proposals made by the French Government for a Suspension of
Hostilities, that time was their great object, whether for the purpose
of facilitating the collection and organisation of their resources, or
in the hope of obtaining more favourable terms from the Allies.
It had also been tolerably well ascertained that, although fortified
works had been thrown up on the right bank of the Seine, the defence of
the left bank had been comparatively neglected. A further inducement
towards the adoption of this plan arose from a Report which was now
received from Major COLOMB, stating that although he had found the
Bridge of Chatou, leading to Malmaison, destroyed: he had hastened
to that of St Germain, on hearing that it had not been injured; and
succeeded in gaining possession of it at the very moment the French
were on the point of effecting its destruction. The Bridge of Maisons,
still lower down the stream, was also taken and occupied.
No time was lost by the Prussian Commander in taking advantage of the
captured Bridges across the Seine.
Lieutenant Colonel SOHR received an Order that night to move, with his
Cavalry Brigade (the Brandenburg and Pomeranian Hussars), from the
vicinity of Louvres, and to regulate his march so that he might cross
the Seine at St Germain on the following morning. Thence he was to
proceed so as to appear, with his Brigade, on the 1st of July, upon the
Orleans road from Paris; where he was to interrupt this communication,
and increase the confusion already produced in that quarter by the
fugitives from the capital. Altogether, he was to act independently and
discretionally; and, as far as practicable, to impede the supplies of
provisions from the Western and Southern Provinces.
It was arranged that the Prussian Army should move to its right for
the purpose of crossing the Seine; and, in order to mask the operation
as much as possible, the Advanced Posts of the First and Fourth CORPS
D'ARMÉE were to remain in their present position until the arrival of
the Anglo-Allied Army, which was expected to take place on the evening
of the 30th.
The Third Corps was directed to resume, at five o'clock in the morning
of the 30th, its march upon Gonesse; and thence to proceed to St
Germain: but in such a manner as to conceal its movements by means of
the valley of Montmorency, and not to reach the more open ground about
Argenteuil until darkness should have completely set in. From the
latter point it would then complete its march to St Germain.
The First Corps was ordered to break up from its bivouac at ten
o'clock in the evening, and march southward of Gonesse by Montmorency,
Franconville, Cormeilles, and Maisons, at which latter point it was to
cross the Seine, and immediately open a communication with the Third
Corps.
The Fourth CORPS D'ARMÉE was directed to move, at daybreak of the 1st
of July, by the right of St Denis, and to bombard this place during its
march to Argenteuil; in which direction it was to effect a junction
with the First and Third Corps. The Advanced Posts of the First and
Fourth Corps were to remain until relieved by the British troops; and
then, in like manner, to follow the rest of the Army.
These movements were punctually directed in the manner described.
As the First and Third _Corps d'Armée_ moved off to the right, Count
BÜLOW considered it necessary to strengthen the Outposts of the Fourth
Corps, so as to be prepared to meet the Enemy should the latter debouch
from St Denis. He therefore ordered Colonel HILLER to take post in
observation of this point, with six Battalions, a Regiment of Cavalry,
half of a six pounder Battery, and two pieces of Horse Artillery.
About three o'clock in the afternoon, the Prussian Outposts reported
that French Columns were advancing from St Denis, and that the Vedettes
were already driven in. Colonel HILLER immediately pushed forward the
Sharpshooters of two Battalions, as also two Squadrons of Cavalry, with
two pieces of Horse Artillery. At the same time, the troops at Stains
got under arms, and were prepared to support. A very brisk _tiraillade_
ensued, although there was no cover for the Skirmishers on the plain,
except the trees along the great road and the high corn, which served
to conceal their approach. The Enemy had also sent Detachments towards
Epinay and Pierrefitte; but at these points, as also in advance of
Stains, the French were compelled to give way and to retire, without
having succeeded in their object of forcing back the Prussian Outposts.
The main body of the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_ remained, during the 30th,
in its position at Le Bourget; its Advanced Guard, under General SYDOW,
was detached to the right, towards Argenteuil, to communicate with the
Third _Corps d'Armée_. As the former was to move off on the following
morning, it became necessary to hold the Outposts strictly on the
defensive. Aubervilliers was the most open to attack. Two Companies
were posted at the outlets, towards the French side; and in rear of
these, two other Companies were formed in support. Still further to the
rear was the main position; on which these troops, if overpowered, were
to fall back. It lay along the Villages of Chantourterelle, Courneuve,
and Merville, connected together by a water course lined with bushes,
and consisting of separate Country Houses and Châteaux, mostly within
walls, which had been loopholed for _Tirailleurs_. Six Battalions,
chiefly extended in skirmishing order, were considered sufficient
to occupy the whole of this line, as far as the high road from Le
Bourget. Partial skirmishing, at a distance, was kept up; though, on
the side of the Prussians, it was more for the purpose of diverting the
attention of the Enemy, and concealing from him the general movement to
the right. Bivouac fires were maintained during the night on the ground
vacated by the different Corps, in order to deceive the Enemy by their
apparent indication of the continued presence of the Prussian Army in
front of the lines of St Denis.
* * * * *
On this day, the Advanced Guard of the Anglo-Allied Army (VIVIAN's
Hussar Brigade) reached Vauderlan. The British Cavalry moved to Louvres.
ESTORFF's Cavalry, attached to the Second Corps, crossed the Oise at
Creil, and proceeded by Chantilly to Luzarches. The Infantry of this
Corps marched from Clermont to Chantilly.
The First Corps moved from its camp near St Martin Longeau, crossed
the Oise at Pont St Maxence, and advanced until the head of the Column
reached La Capelle, and its rear rested upon Senlis.
The Reserve moved from its camp, near Gournay, by Pont St Maxence, the
head of the Column reaching Fleurines on the road to Senlis, and the
rear resting upon Pont St Maxence.
* * * * *
The following were the positions of the respective Armies on the
evening of the 30th:--
The First Prussian _Corps d' Armée_ commenced its march, at half past
ten o'clock in the evening, from Blancmesnil and Aulnay towards St
Germain, passing, during the night, through Gonesse, Montmorency, and
Le Mesnil, to Carrière au Mont, near St Germain--leaving its Outposts
in the position they had hitherto occupied.
The Third _Corps d'Armée_ marched, during the night, from Dammartin
to St Germain, by Gonesse and Argenteuil; at which latter place,
however, its Reserve Cavalry was halted.
The Fourth _Corps d'Armée_ remained in its position at Le Bourget,
to cover the march of the rest of the Army. Its Outposts continued
at Stains, St Denis, and Aubervilliers. Lieutenant Colonel VON SOHR,
with the Brandenburg and Pomeranian Hussars, crossed the Seine at St
Germain, and was advancing towards Versailles.
Major VON COLOMB, with the 8th Hussars, occupied the Bridge of St
Germain.
The Head Quarters of Prince BLÜCHER continued at Gonesse.
The Advanced Guard of the Anglo-Allied Army was at Vauderlan.
The British Cavalry was encamped on the plain about Louvres.
The Hanoverian Cavalry was at Luzarches.
The Second and Fourth Divisions, and the Nassau troops, were upon the
high road between La Capelle and Senlis.
The Fifth and Sixth Divisions, the Brunswick troops, and the Reserve
Artillery, were upon the high road between Fleurines and Pont St
Maxence.
The Pontoon Train and Hawser Bridges were at Senlis.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Louvres.
The French Army remained within the lines of Paris.
* * * * *
Since the departure of NAPOLEON, both the Army and the citizens looked
upon the Parliament as the sole directing power; and, in full reliance
upon its integrity, appeared willingly submissive to its dictates.
FOUCHÉ, who had been in secret communication with the Allies, decided
upon exercising, in accordance with their views, the great influence
he had succeeded in acquiring over a very considerable portion of the
Deputies. It was mainly by means of this influence that he contrived
to remove the principal obstacle in the way of all negotiation--the
presence of NAPOLEON. His next step was to prepare the Chamber for the
return to power of the legitimate Monarch: a measure which he could
only hope to accomplish by holding it forth as the sole alternative to
the destruction of Paris by the vast and overwhelming force of the
Allied Armies marching towards the capital from the north and east
frontiers; and by combining with it the adoption of such modifications
of the Charter as should satisfy the desires of the Constitutionalists
and the moderately disposed of all Parties.
Aware that the Army was animated with a spirit of determined resistance
towards the Allies; he plainly saw that, unless conciliated, the
turbulent Buonapartists, with whom its ranks were filled, might
speedily frustrate the accomplishment of his plans by which the
peace of the capital was to be preserved, and ultimately prevent the
attainment of that extended Constitutional Power for which the Deputies
were contending. He, therefore, with his usual adroitness, addressed
himself to its Chief, Marshal DAVOUST, Prince of ECKMÜHL; and by his
skilful exposition of the political posture of affairs, he succeeded
in gaining over the Marshal to his views. The latter wrote to him on
the evening of the 29th, that he had overcome his prejudices; and had
arrived at the conclusion that the only safe course to be pursued
consisted in entering into an Armistice, and proclaiming LOUIS XVIII.
On the 30th, the Prince, as the Head of the French Army, addressed the
following letter to both WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER:--
"Head Quarters, La Villette, June 30, 1815.
"My LORD,
"Your hostile movements continue, although, according to the
Declarations of the Allied Sovereigns, the motives of the War which
they make upon us no longer exist; since the Emperor NAPOLEON has
abdicated.
"At the moment when blood is again on the point of flowing, I receive
from Marshal the Duke of ALBUFERA a telegraphic despatch, of which
I transmit you a copy. My Lord, I guarantee this Armistice on my
honour. All the reasons you might have had to continue hostilities
are destroyed; because you can have no other instruction from your
Government than that which the Austrian Generals had from theirs.
"I make the formal demand to your Excellency of ceasing all
hostilities, and of our proceeding to agree to an Armistice,
according to the decision of Congress. I cannot believe, my Lord,
that my request will be ineffectual; you will take upon yourself a
great responsibility in the eyes of your fellow countrymen.
"No other motive but that of putting an end to the effusion of blood,
and the interests of my country, has dictated this letter.
"If I present myself on the Field of Battle, with the idea of your
talents, I shall carry the conviction of there combating for the most
sacred of causes--that of the defence and independence of my country;
and, whatever may be the result, I shall merit your esteem.
"Accept, &c.,
"THE MARSHAL PRINCE OF ECKMÜHL,
"Minister at War."
To this the Duke of WELLINGTON replied in the following terms:--
"Head Quarters, July 1, 1815--10 A.M.
"MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,
"I have just received your Excellency's letter of the 30th June, in
which your Excellency communicates to me the intelligence you have
received of an Armistice having been concluded by General FRIMONT
with Marshal the Duke of ALBUFERA.
"I have already made known, in writing, to the French Commissioners
sent to the Allied Powers, and verbally, to the Commissioners sent
to me, the reasons which have prevented me from suspending my
operations; which reasons, I have cause to believe, are fully adopted
by the Allies of my Sovereign, and of those whose Armies I have the
honour of commanding.
"I have every wish to prevent the further effusion of the blood of
the brave troops under my command; but it must be upon the conditions
which shall secure the re-establishment and the stability of the
General Peace.
"I have the honour to be, &c.,
"WELLINGTON."
Prince BLÜCHER, who entertained a great contempt for diplomacy,
attributing as he did the cause of the renewal of the War to the ill
concocted schemes to which that War had given birth, had hitherto
refrained from either receiving in person, or noticing in writing, any
communication addressed to him by the French authorities. He applied
himself solely to the military solution of the Great Problem on which
depended the Peace of Europe.
Upon this occasion, however, tempted probably by the opportunity which
was offered to him of sharply retorting upon the Marshal, under whose
government of Hamburg the greatest excesses had been committed upon
his countrymen; he was induced to pen the following reply, couched in
his rough native German, as if to evince both his disdain of the usual
diplomatic mode of communication, and his dislike of even the very
language of the country he so thoroughly detested:--
"_To the French General DAVOUST._
"Head Quarters, July 1, 1815.
"MARSHAL,
"It is not conformable to truth that, because NAPOLEON has abdicated
the throne, there exists no further motive for War between the Allied
Powers and France. His abdication is conditional; that is, in favour
of his son: but a Decree of the Allied Powers excludes not only
NAPOLEON, but every member of his Family, from the Throne.
"If General FRIMONT has considered himself authorised to conclude an
Armistice with your General opposed to him, that is no motive for
us to do the same. We shall pursue our victory. GOD has given us
strength and resolution to do so. Beware, Marshal, of what you do;
and forbear devoting another city to destruction! for you know what
liberties the exasperated soldiers would take, should your capital
be carried by storm. Do you solicit the maledictions of Paris, in
addition to those of Hamburg?
"We shall enter Paris to protect the respectable inhabitants against
the mob, by whom they are threatened with pillage. An Armistice
can be made with security nowhere but in Paris. This, our relative
position towards your Nation, be pleased, Marshal, not to mistake!
"Let me finally observe to you, Marshal, if you mean to negotiate
with us, it is matter of surprise that, in defiance of the Law of
Nations, you detain our Officers dispatched with Letters and Orders.
"In the usual form of conventional civility, I have the honour to be,
"Marshal,
"Your obedient servant,
"BLÜCHER."
* * * * *
Whilst thus endeavouring to draw the Allied Generals into negotiation;
FOUCHÉ and DAVOUST felt the necessity of carrying out their plans
with the greatest caution, and in such a manner as to prevent any
unfavourable construction being put upon their motives by the Army.
On the evening of the 30th of June, there was an assemblage of General
Officers at the Head Quarters in Villette; at which it was proposed to
send up an Address to the Chamber of Representatives expressive of the
determined spirit of resistance which animated the troops, and of their
hostility to the Bourbons. It was adopted by the majority; and DAVOUST,
though secretly working with FOUCHÉ for the Restoration of LOUIS
XVIII., did not hesitate to attach to it his signature. It was couched
in the following terms:--
"Camp at Villette, 30th June.
"REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE!
"We are in presence of our Enemies. We swear before you and the world
to defend, to our last breath, the cause of our independence and the
national honour.
"It is wished to impose the Bourbons upon us, but these Princes
are rejected by the immense majority of Frenchmen. If their return
could be agreed to, recollect, Representatives, that you would sign
the annihilation of the Army; which for twenty years has been the
Palladium of French honour. There are in War, especially when it has
been long conducted, successes and reverses. In our successes, we
have appeared great and generous. If it is wished to humble us in
our reverses, we shall know how to die.
"The Bourbons present no guarantee to the Nation. We received them
with sentiments of the most generous confidence: we forgot all the
calamities they had caused us in their rage to deprive us of our most
sacred rights. Well! what return did they make for this confidence?
They treated us as rebels and as vanquished. Representatives! these
reflections are terrible, because they are true. History will one
day relate what the Bourbons have done to replace themselves on the
Throne of France; it will also narrate the conduct of the Army; of
that Army essentially national; and posterity will judge which best
deserved the esteem of the World.
"The Marshal Prince of ECKMÜHL, Minister at War,
"Count PAJOL, commanding the First Corps of Cavalry,
"Count D'ERLON, commanding the Right Wing,
"Count VANDAMME, General in Chief."
(And fifteen other Generals.)
The Chambers being thus appealed to, felt it incumbent on them to issue
a Proclamation explanatory of the political situation of France; and
of their own intentions under all the critical circumstances in which
it presented itself to their view. This document, cautiously drawn up
by the Constitutionalists who formed the preponderating party in the
State, and strongly marked by the policy which was pursued throughout
by FOUCHÉ, was framed with great tact. Although it acknowledged the
nomination of NAPOLEON's son to the Empire, it manifested no hostility
to the Bourbons: it expressed a desire to secure a Monarchical and
Representative Government; but, at the same time, declared that the
Head of the Government, whoever he might be, must enter into a solemn
Compact and abide by the Constitutional Charter.
In short, its general tone was sufficiently independent to secure
for it, if not the approbation, at least the acquiescence, of both
the Liberals and the Buonapartists; whilst, on the other hand, it
significantly indicated the terms upon which a Bourbon might re-ascend
the throne, and rally round him the Friends of Constitutional Order and
Civil Rights. With but few exceptions it admitted of being reconciled
with the Proclamation published on the 28th of June by Louis XVIII. It
ran thus:--
"FRENCHMEN!
"The Foreign Powers proclaimed, in the face of Europe, that they were
only armed against NAPOLEON; and that they wished to respect our
independence, and the right which belongs to every Nation to choose a
Government suitable to its habits and its interests.
"NAPOLEON is no longer the Chief of the State. He has renounced the
Throne, and his Abdication has been accepted by your Representatives.
He is removed from us. His son is called to the Empire by the
Constitution of the State. The coalesced Sovereigns are informed of
this; and the War ought to be terminated, if the promises of Kings
have any foundation in truth.
"While Plenipotentiaries have been sent to the Allied Powers to
treat for peace in the name of France; the Generals of two of those
Powers have refused any Suspension of Arms. Their troops have
accelerated their marches under favour of a moment of hesitation
and trouble. They are now at the very gates of the capital, and no
communication has stated for what object the War is continued. Our
Plenipotentiaries will soon declare whether we must renounce Peace.
In the mean time, resistance is not only legitimate, but necessary:
and humanity, in requiring an account of the blood uselessly shed,
will not accuse those brave men who only combat to repel from their
houses the scourges of war, murder, and pillage; and to defend with
their lives the cause of Liberty, and of that Independence the
imprescriptible right of which has been guaranteed to them even by
the Manifestoes of their Enemies.
"Amidst these circumstances, your Representatives cannot forget that
they were not chosen to stipulate for the interests of any individual
Party, but for the whole Nation. Every act of weakness will dishonour
them, and will only tend to endanger the future tranquillity of
France. While the Government is employing all the means in its power
to obtain a solid Peace; or, should that not be obtained without
compromising our honour, to repel the Battalions of Foreigners:
what more advantages to the Nation can be done than to collect and
establish the fundamental rules of a Monarchical and Representative
Government, destined to secure to all citizens the free enjoyment of
those sacred rights which sacrifices so numerous and so great have
purchased; and to rally for ever, under the National Colours, that
great body of Frenchmen who have no other interest, and no other
wish, than an honourable repose and a just independence.
"Meanwhile the Chambers conceive that their duty and their dignity
require them to declare that they will never acknowledge, as
legitimate Chief of the State, him who, on ascending the Throne,
shall refuse to acknowledge the Rights of the Nation, and to
consecrate them by a solemn Compact. The Constitutional Charter is
drawn up; and if the force of arms should succeed in temporarily
imposing upon us a Master--if the destinies of a great Nation are
again to be delivered up to the caprice and arbitrary will of a
small number of privileged persons--then, in yielding to force, the
National Representation will protest in the face of the whole World
against the oppression of the French People.
"Your Representatives will appeal to the energy of the present
and future generations to renew their claim both to National
Independence, and the Rights of Civil and Religious Liberty. For
these Rights they now appeal to the reason and the justice of all
civilized Nations."
Notwithstanding the continued endeavours, on the part of the French
Commissioners appointed by the Chambers, to induce the Allied Generals
to enter upon an Armistice; the military operations were not for a
moment interrupted.
On the morning of the 1st of July, BÜLOW's _Corps d' Armée_ (the
Fourth) moved off to its right, towards Argenteuil. During the
movement, however; the Enemy, as if at length aware, or desirous of
ascertaining the nature, of BLÜCHER's operation, attacked the Village
of Aubervilliers in front, from the Canal of St Denis, and penetrated
as far as the Church situated in the centre of the place. The French
were here met by the Prussian Support; and two Battalions from the main
position arriving immediately afterwards, they were prevented from
making any further progress. Nevertheless, a prolonged _tiraillade_, as
well as a howitzer fire, on the part of the French, were maintained;
during which the march of BÜLOW's Corps continued in operation, the
Fourteenth Brigade being left in support to the Advanced Posts until
the arrival of the Anglo-Allied troops.
* * * * *
In the afternoon, the Duke of WELLINGTON's Army reached Le Bourget; and
took up the position vacated by Prince BLÜCHER, whose Advanced Posts it
immediately relieved. Three Companies of Light Infantry from COLVILLE's
Division were thrown into Aubervilliers. The Prussians who had hitherto
been stationed for the purpose of masking as much as possible the
general movement of their Army to the right, had kept up a desultory
fire from that portion of the Village which was in their possession;
abstaining from making any direct attack, since this might have led
to the advance of the French in great force at the moment the former
were no longer supported by the main Army, and before the Anglo-Allied
troops had arrived.
The British Light Companies, mentioned as having been thrown into
Aubervilliers, were under no restraint of this kind; and Lieutenant
Colonel Sir NEIL CAMPBELL, who commanded them, determined to push
forward, and possess himself, if possible, of the entire Village.
Having first gained two or three of the highest houses, he broke from
the top of these into some that were lower; and thence forcing his way
through the partition walls of others, without much firing, since the
French did not appear disposed to make an obstinate resistance (being
by that time probably aware of the Prussian movement to the right, and
of the arrival of the Anglo-Allied Army), he succeeded in obtaining
possession of one side of a whole street, and of the greater portion of
the Village. The French Officer in command then proposed a truce; which
was accepted, since the Post he occupied lay between the British and a
Battery upon the Canal. The remaining Outposts were taken up from the
Prussians without any molestation on the part of the Enemy; and the
main Anglo-Allied Army occupied a position, having its Right upon the
Height of Richebourg, and its Left upon the Wood of Bondy.
* * * * *
It will be recollected that Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, of the Prussian
Light Cavalry, was directed to pass the Bridge of St Germain on the
morning of the 30th of June, and to show himself on the Orleans road
upon the 1st of July. Starting at daybreak of the 30th, the Brigade
passed through Montmorency and Argenteuil, towards St Germain; where
it fell in with Major COLOMB's Detachment, consisting of the 8th
Hussars and two Battalions of Infantry. It then moved on about a league
further, to Marly, upon the Versailles road; which it reached at
nightfall, and where it bivouacked. On the morning of the 1st of July,
Lieutenant Colonel SOHR resumed his march, and took the direction of
Versailles, which place, however, he did not reach until noon; much
delay having occurred whilst passing through the intersected ground in
that quarter, and in awaiting the Reports from the Detachments sent out
in different directions to gain intelligence of the Enemy.
This bold and hazardous movement of Lieutenant Colonel SOHR's Brigade,
which was acting independently as a Free Corps for the time, did not
escape the Enemy's observation. General EXCELMANS, who commanded the
French Cavalry on the south side of Paris, on receiving information
that two Regiments of Prussian Hussars were advancing by Marly upon
Versailles, resolved to attack them.
For this purpose he proceeded himself with the 5th, 15th, and 20th
Dragoons, and the 6th Hussars, comprising a force of three thousand
men, along the road from Montrouge towards Plessis Piquet, against
the front of the Prussian Brigade. At the same time, the Light Cavalry
Division of General PIRÉ, together with the 33rd Regiment of Infantry,
consisting of three Battalions, were detached against the flank and
rear of the Prussian Brigade. The 5th and 6th Lancers marched by the
Sèvres road upon Viroflay; the 6th _Chasseurs_ proceeded to occupy the
cross roads connecting Sèvres with the northern portion of Versailles;
the 1st _Chasseurs_ moved by Sèvres towards Rocquencourt, about three
miles from Versailles, on the road to St Germain; in which direction
the 33rd Infantry followed. Both the latter Regiments were destined
to cut off the retreat of the Prussian Cavalry, should it be driven
back by EXCELMANS. An exceedingly well planned ambush was now laid in
and about Rocquencourt, and every precaution taken by the detaching of
small parties on the look out.
It was late in the afternoon when Lieutenant Colonel SOHR received
intelligence that the Enemy's Cavalry was approaching, and that his
Advanced Guard was attacked. He immediately advanced with both his
Hussar Regiments, and drove back the Enemy upon Villa Coublai, in the
Defile of which Village a sharp engagement ensued. In this attack the
ranks of the Prussian Hussars had become disordered; and, as the latter
retired, they were fallen upon by the 5th and 6th French Lancers of
PIRÉ's Light Cavalry Brigade, before alluded to as having been posted
in ambush. They then fell back upon Versailles, pursued by the French;
who vainly endeavoured to force an entrance into the Town, at the Gate
of which a gallant resistance was made by the Prussians. The short
time that was gained by this resistance sufficed for collecting the
main body of the Brigade on the open space at the outlet leading to St
Germain, towards which point it might have retreated through the Park;
but, having received information of the advance of THIELEMANN's Corps,
and expecting every moment to derive from it a Support, Lieutenant
Colonel SOHR retired by the more direct road through Rocquencourt.
About seven o'clock in the evening, at which time the Hussars had
collected their scattered force together, and were on the point of
commencing their further retreat upon St Germain: SOHR received
intelligence, upon which he could rely, that he had been turned by
both Cavalry and Infantry; and that his line of retreat had been
intercepted. His decision was instantly formed. He knew his men, their
devotion, and their courage; and resolved upon cutting his way through
the Enemy with the sword.
On quitting Versailles the Prussian Hussars were fired upon by the
National Guard from the Barrier. They had not proceeded far when word
was brought in, that Prussian and English Cavalry were approaching from
the side of St Germain; but they were speedily undeceived. It was the
1st Regiment of French _Chasseurs_. In the next moment they were formed
for attack, and advanced at a gallop. The _Chasseurs_ came on in the
same style; but they were completely overthrown, and their Commanding
Officer lay stretched upon the ground by a pistol shot. As they were
pursued by the Hussars, a fire was unexpectedly opened upon the latter
by two Companies of the 3rd Battalion of the 33rd French Regiment,
posted behind some hedges, near Le Chesnay; whereupon SOHR, with the
greater part of his Hussars, struck into a field road to the right,
in order to turn this Village, which was occupied by the Enemy. This,
however, led them to a bridge, with adjacent houses, occupied by two
more Companies of the above Battalion; from which they also received a
sharp fire. Meeting with this new obstacle, and aware of the proximity
of the great mass of Cavalry under EXCELMANS, in their rear; the
diminished and disordered remnant of the two Prussian Regiments, about
150 Hussars, rallying upon their Chief, dashed across a meadow, with
a determination to force a passage through the Village of Le Chesnay.
Here the _Chasseurs_ again opposed them, but were once more overthrown;
and the Prussians now followed a road which conducted them through the
Village, but which unfortunately led into a large court whence there
was no other outlet. Not only was their further progress thus checked,
but their whole body was suddenly assailed by a fire from Infantry,
already posted in this quarter; whilst the pursuing Cavalry prevented
every chance of escape. Their situation had become truly desperate;
but their bravery, instead of succumbing, appeared incited to the
highest pitch by the heroic example of Lieutenant Colonel SOHR: who
rejected the offer of quarter, and fell, severely wounded by a pistol
shot. Victory favoured the strongest: but it was a victory gained by
immeasurably superior numbers over the dead and dying of a gallant
band of warriors; who fought to the last, and did all that the most
inflexible bravery could accomplish.
The losses incurred by this Brigade during the short Campaign had
already reduced it, previously to this Affair, to between 600 and 700
men: and on the present occasion it suffered a still further loss of
ten Officers, and from 400 to 500 men.
The detaching of these two Regiments so much in advance of the Prussian
general movement to the right; and the Orders given to Lieutenant
Colonel SOHR, to cross the Seine on the morning of the 30th of June,
appear a questionable measure. It is true that this Officer was desired
to consider himself as acting independently, and without reference to
the troops that were to follow in the same direction; but then it
must be recollected that he had to proceed along a very considerable
portion of the circumference of a circle, from the centre of which the
Enemy could detach superior force along radii far shorter than the
distance between the Prussian Brigade and the main Army: so that, with
a vigilant look out, the French possessed every facility of cutting off
his retreat. His Orders were to interrupt the communication with Paris
by the Orleans road, and to spread alarm and confusion on that side
of the capital: but in issuing them the effect likely to be produced
upon the _morale_ of the citizens could have alone been contemplated;
and, in all probability, it was at the same time conceived that, as
no fortified works had been thrown up on the south side, the French
troops intended to direct their attention mainly, if not wholly,
towards the Armies in front of the northern portion of the capital.
The effect thus sought to be produced might have been obtained in the
case of a weak garrison; but that of Paris, comprising as it did about
50,000 troops of the Line, besides the National Guards, was not to be
so lightly treated. In carrying into execution the Order to create
alarm and confusion on the south side of Paris, these two Regiments
of Hussars would naturally draw in that direction the attention of
the French Commanders; and thus lead, as the result proved, not only
to the cutting off of so comparatively weak a force, but also to the
posting of a respectable body of troops at the threatened point, in
anticipation of the Enemy's following up the attack in greater force.
Even previously to obtaining the insight thus afforded into a part
of the plan of the Invaders, the movements of the latter had been
more narrowly watched than was supposed: as may be readily inferred
from the fact of EXCELMANS having been detached, on the 1st, towards
Versailles, with a body of Cavalry; and of the position at Montrouge
having been occupied in considerable force. All circumstances
considered, the preferable course would have been, to have employed
SOHR's Brigade as an Advanced Guard only; having immediate support from
the main Columns in its rear.
It so happened that the Advanced Guard of THIELEMANN's Corps,
consisting of the Ninth Infantry Brigade, under General BORCKE, was
on the march from St Germain (which it had left about seven o'clock
in the evening) to take post at Marly; when it received intelligence
of the two Cavalry Regiments, under Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, having
been completely defeated. BORCKE hastened forward, and it was not
long before his Advance became engaged with the French _Tirailleurs_
proceeding from Versailles. The Enemy was immediately attacked, and
driven back upon Rocquencourt. As darkness was setting in, BORCKE drew
up his force with caution. He pushed forward the Fusilier Battalion of
the 8th Regiment, supported by the 1st Battalion of the 30th Regiment;
and held the remainder in Battalion Columns on the right and left of
the road. The vigour of the attack made by the first named Battalion
was such that the Enemy retired in all haste upon the nearest suburb of
Paris; whilst BORCKE bivouacked at Rocquencourt.
Besides the Cavalry under EXCELMANS, the remains of the Third and
Fourth French _Corps d'Armée_ were detached to the south of Paris; on
which side VANDAMME, who commanded, took up a position, having his
Right upon the Seine, his Left by Montrouge, and his Centre in rear of
Issy. He placed a portion of his troops in the villages of Vanves and
Issy; the houses and walls of which appeared to offer great advantages
for defence. His Advanced Guard occupied Chatillon, Clamord, Meudon,
Sèvres, and St Cloud. In the evening he was joined by the Imperial
Guard, which he posted in support.
* * * * *
The following were the positions of the respective Armies on the
evening of the 1st of July:--
The Second Corps of the Anglo-Allied Army, under Lord HILL,
comprising the Second and Fourth Divisions, the Nassau troops, and
ESTORFF's Hanoverian Cavalry Brigade, was in the position previously
occupied by the Fourth Prussian Corps; having its Right upon the
great road about Pierrefitte, its Left upon the great road of Senlis,
and its Advanced Posts at Aubervilliers and in front of St Denis.
The First Corps, under Sir JOHN BYNG, comprising the First and
Third Divisions, and the Dutch-Belgian troops, were in the position
previously occupied by the First Prussian Corps; having its Right
upon the great road behind Le Bourget; its Left upon the Forest of
Bondy, and its Advanced Posts along the Ourcq Canal.
The Reserve, under Sir JAMES KEMPT, was encamped between Louvres and
Vauderlan.
The Cavalry was encamped and cantoned about the villages of
Groussainville, Vauderlan, and Roissy.
The Pontoon Train and the Hawser Bridges were at Sarcelles, on the
Chantilly road to Paris.
The Head Quarters of the Duke of WELLINGTON were at Gonesse.
The First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ was encamped between the villages
of Le Mesnil and Carrière au Mont, on the left bank of the Seine, not
far from St Germain.
The Third Corps was also on the left bank of the Seine, in the
valley, and near St Germain. Its Advanced Guard (the Ninth Brigade)
was at Rocquencourt.
The Fourth Corps was upon the march to St Germain.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at St Germain.
The Third and Fourth French _Corps d'Armée_ and the Imperial Guard
were on the south side of Paris, their Right upon the Seine, their
Left by Montrouge; with the Advanced Guard at Chatillon, Clamord,
Meudon, Sèvres, and St Cloud.
The remainder of the French Army continued within the capital.
The Prince of ECKMÜHL's Head Quarters were at Villette.
At daybreak of the 2nd of July, BLÜCHER put the whole Prussian Army
in motion towards the south side of Paris, where he purposed taking
possession of the advantageous position comprising the Heights of
Meudon and Chatillon, and their immediate vicinity. THIELEMANN's
Advanced Guard (the Ninth Brigade) immediately proceeded to occupy
Versailles. The Corps itself halted two hours at Rocquencourt to wait
for the arrival of ZIETEN's Corps. As the latter Corps advanced, it
threw out a Detachment to its left, consisting of the 1st Battalion of
the 1st West Prussian Regiment, two pieces of Horse Artillery, and a
Squadron of Cavalry, under Captain KRENSKY: who was directed to proceed
by Malmaison towards St Cloud, communicating with Major COLOMB, who
had already been detached, with the force before mentioned as being
under his command, towards the Bridge of Neuilly; and to keep a look
out to the left of the direct road to Paris. On ZIETEN's Advanced
Guard reaching Ville d'Avray, whence it drove off a French Picquet,
information was obtained that the Enemy was restoring the Bridge of
St Cloud, which he had previously destroyed; and that he occupied the
Bois de Boulogne in considerable force. The Third Brigade was therefore
ordered to proceed by its left towards St Cloud, and to oppose any
movement which might be attempted against that Flank.
It was three o'clock in the afternoon when ZIETEN's First Brigade,
under STEINMETZ, reached Sèvres. Here the French were strongly posted,
occupying the place itself, the Heights of Bellevue; and having their
Light Troops well disposed amongst the adjacent gardens and vineyards.
The First Prussian Brigade was followed in support by the Second and
Fourth Brigades; and, notwithstanding the very gallant defence that was
made, these troops succeeded in forcing the French to abandon their
stronghold, and fall back upon Moulineau. Here the French made another
stand; but were again defeated by STEINMETZ, who had closely pursued
them. Whilst the First Brigade was thus gaining ground; the Second,
together with the Reserve Artillery, advanced towards the Heights of
Meudon. The Reserve Cavalry of the Corps followed the First Brigade,
in support. The Fourth Brigade occupied Sèvres. Major General JAGOW,
who had been detached to the left with the Third Brigade, having
ascertained that the Enemy was not likely to undertake any movement
from the Bois de Boulogne, and that Captain KRENSKY's Detachment was on
the look out in that direction, proceeded to rejoin the Corps; and on
reaching Sèvres, towards evening, he was directed by ZIETEN to take up
a position with his Brigade to the right, on the Heights of Meudon.
In the evening, the French, after having reformed, and collected
their defeated force at Issy, made an attempt to regain possession
of Moulineau; but the attack failed, and they were driven back upon
Issy. Here they were reinforced: fifteen Battalions were posted in
and about Issy, supported by numerous guns and Cavalry: their Light
Infantry occupying the vineyards in front of the Village. About half
past ten o'clock in the night, however, the Prussians, who kept a
sharp look out, heard these troops marching off; and perceived that
their departure was conducted in rather a disorderly manner. Instant
advantage was taken of this circumstance, and a part of the First
and Second Prussian Brigades attacked the French; who fled back upon
the suburb of Vaugirard in such confusion that Paris might have been
entered at this moment, if more force had been at hand.
During the night, ZIETEN posted his Corps in the following manner:--His
Right upon the Height of Clamord, his Centre upon that of Meudon, and
his Left in Moulineau; Sèvres still occupied; the Advanced Guard in
Issy, in the rear of which Village was the Reserve Cavalry in support.
Whilst ZIETEN's Corps had been thus successfully effecting its movement
against the south side of the capital; THIELEMANN's, which formed the
Right Column, proceeded towards Plessis Piquet, and pushed forward its
Advanced Guard to the Heights of Chatillon, which it reached late in
the evening. BÜLOW's Corps, acting as a Reserve, occupied Versailles
and its vicinity during the night.
During the whole of this day, the troops of the Anglo-Allied Army
continued in position in front of the fortified lines on the north
side of Paris. The Duke having established a Bridge at Argenteuil,
Detachments were sent across the Seine: and these, having secured the
Villages of Asnières, Courbevoie, and Suresnes on the left bank of the
Seine, opened a communication with the Prussians.
The Allied Commanders had thus succeeded in shutting up the French
forces within their lines. WELLINGTON was perfectly prepared to attack
the north side of Paris, if circumstances should render such a step
necessary; or if a favourable opportunity should present itself: whilst
BLÜCHER, having secured a strong position in front of the south side,
which was mostly open and defenceless, was equally ready to storm the
capital with his collected force. The effect of this well conceived
and successfully executed plan of operation was to divide the Enemy's
attention between two opposite points of the town. Should he attempt
to assail the one Army with his principal force, he would immediately
find himself attacked by the other Army; without possessing the means
wherewith to carry on the contest with both simultaneously. On the
other hand, should a general and formidable assault be made by those
Armies, on the opposite points, at the same time; the necessary
division of his forces, in arranging his plan of defence, would render
his situation still more desperate.
* * * * *
The Provisional Government, fully alive to this state of things, and
duly aware of the approach of the Bavarian, Russian, and Austrian
Armies, clearly saw the inutility of further resistance to the Allies,
and instructed the Commissioners to wait upon the Duke of WELLINGTON,
and report to his Grace the fact of NAPOLEON having quitted Paris on
the 29th to embark for the United States, and to press the point of a
Suspension of Hostilities.
To this representation the Duke replied that the great obstacle to
the Armistice having thus been removed, there remained only the
question as to the terms; which he thought should be the halting of
the Anglo-Allied and Prussian Armies in their present positions, the
withdrawal of the French Army from Paris across the Loire, and the
placing of the capital in the keeping of the National Guards until the
King should order otherwise. He offered, if they agreed to these terms,
to endeavour to prevail on Prince BLÜCHER to halt his troops, and send
an Officer to settle the details; but, at the same time, he told them
distinctly that he would not consent to suspend hostilities so long as
a French soldier remained in Paris.
Having received this explicit declaration on the part of his Grace, the
Commissioners withdrew.
* * * * *
The following were the positions of the respective Armies during the
night of the 2nd of July:--
The troops of the Anglo-Allied Army continued in position in front of
the lines of St Denis. Detachments were at Asnières, Courbevoie, and
Suresnes, on the left hank of the Seine.
The First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ had its Right on the Height of
Clamard, its Centre on that of Meudon, its Left at Moulineau, and
its Advanced Guard at Issy; in rear of which point was the Reserve
Cavalry of the Corps.
Of the Third Corps, the Ninth Brigade was at Chatillon, the Tenth and
Eleventh Brigades were in front of Vélizy, the Twelfth Brigade was
at Chatenay and Sceaux. The Reserve Cavalry of the Corps bivouacked
about Plessis Piquet.
Of the Fourth Corps, the Sixteenth Brigade was at Montreail, in
advance of Versailles; the Thirteenth Brigade bivouacked near
Viroflay; the Fourteenth Brigade bivouacked at Le Chesnay Bel Air,
not far from Rocquencourt. The Reserve Cavalry of the Corps was
partly in front of Versailles, and partly on the left of Montreail.
The troops composing the Right Wing of the French Army occupied the
lines on the right bank of the Seine, whence they were watching the
British. Some troops were posted in the Bois de Boulogne, and several
Posts were established along both banks of the river.
The Left Wing extended from the Seine as far as the Orleans road. It
held Vaugirard strongly occupied, the main body was posted between
the Barrières de l'Ecole Militaire and de l'Enfer.
At three o'clock on the morning of the 3rd of July, VANDAMME advanced
in two Columns from Vaugirard to the attack of Issy. Between Vaugirard
and the Seine, he had a considerable force of Cavalry, the front of
which was flanked by a Battery advantageously posted near Auteuil
on the right bank of the river. The action commenced with a brisk
cannonade: the French having brought twenty pieces of cannon against
the front of the Village, which was then vigorously assailed by his
Infantry. The Prussians had constructed some barricades, and other
defences, during the night; but these did not protect them from the
sharp fire of case shot which was poured upon them by the French
Batteries, the guns of which enfiladed the streets. The 12th and 24th
Prussian Regiments, and the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr, supported by a
half Battery of twelve pounders, fought with great bravery. There was
much loss on both sides. At length the French withdrew; but only to
advance again, considerably reinforced.
The Second Prussian Brigade was immediately ordered to join the First,
and the whole of the troops of the First Corps stood to their arms.
ZIETEN sent a request to Prince BLÜCHER for the support of two Brigades
of BÜLOW's Corps; and, at the same time, begged THIELEMANN to advance
(in conformity with instructions conveyed to him from Head Quarters)
from Chatillon, and threaten the Enemy's Left Flank.
In the mean time, the French renewed their attack upon Issy; which,
however, again proved unsuccessful. This was followed by a heavy
cannonade and by further assaults, without any decided advantage having
been gained over the defenders. The French did not appear disposed
to venture upon a more general attack, which would have offered them
a much greater chance of forcing back the Prussian Advanced Guard;
probably considering that, if unsuccessful, it might end in the suburbs
of Paris being easily carried by storm: and hence, after four hours'
continued but fruitless attempts upon ZIETEN's Advanced Position, they
fell back upon Paris; the Prussian _Tirailleurs_ following them until
they came within a very short distance of the Barriers.
* * * * *
At a Council of War, which had been held during the previous night
in Paris, it was decided that the defence of the capital was not
practicable against the Allied Armies. Nevertheless, DAVOUST was
desirous that another attempt should be made on the Prussian Army: but
now that this had failed in the manner described, that the two Allied
Armies were in full communication with each other, and that a British
Corps was likewise moving upon the left of the Seine towards Neuilly, a
Capitulation was determined upon.
Accordingly, at seven o'clock in the morning, the fire on the part
of the French suddenly ceased; and General REVEST was deputed to
pass over to ZIETEN's Corps, which of all the Allied troops was the
nearest to the capital, for the purpose of offering a Capitulation,
and requesting an immediate Armistice. BLÜCHER, however, required
from Marshal DAVOUST, the Commander in Chief of the French Army, a
negotiator possessing greater powers, before he would finally agree to
a Suspension of Hostilities; and indicated the Palace of St Cloud as
the place where the negotiations should be carried on, to which point
he then removed his Head Quarters.
During the contest at Issy, the Detachments on the left of the First
Prussian Corps, under Captain KRENSKY, were engaged rather sharply with
the Enemy between St Cloud and Neuilly; which ended in the French being
driven back upon the Bridge at the latter place, towards which point
also a body of British troops was advancing. Thus ZIETEN's Corps, the
same that had opened the Campaign with the actions along the Sambre,
had the honour of closing it with those at Issy and Neuilly on the
Seine.
* * * * *
Officers, furnished with full powers by their respective Chiefs, soon
met at St Cloud; whither the Duke of WELLINGTON had already repaired in
person to join Prince BLÜCHER; and the result of their deliberations
was the following:--
_Military Convention._
This day, the 3rd of July 1815, the Commissioners named by the
Commanders in Chief of the respective Armies; that is to say, the
Baron BIGNON, holding the Portfolio of Foreign Affairs; the Count
GUILLEMINOT, Chief of the General Staff of the French Army; the Count
DE BONDY, Prefect of the Department of the Seine; being furnished
with the full powers of his Excellency the Marshal Prince of ECKMÜHL,
Commander in Chief of the French Army, on one side: and Major General
Baron MÜFFLING, furnished with the full powers of his Highness the
Field Marshal Prince BLÜCHER, Commander in Chief of the Prussian
Army; and Colonel HERVEY, furnished with the full powers of his
Excellency the Duke of WELLINGTON, Commander in Chief of the English
Army, on the other side, have agreed to the following Articles.
ARTICLE I. There shall be a Suspension of Arms between the Allied
Armies commanded by his Highness the Prince BLÜCHER and his Grace the
Duke of WELLINGTON, and the French Army under the walls of Paris.
ARTICLE II. The French Army shall put itself in march tomorrow,
to take up a position beyond the Loire. Paris shall be completely
evacuated in three days; and the movement behind the Loire shall be
effected within eight days.
ARTICLE III. The French Army shall take with it all its _matériel_,
Field Artillery, Military Chest, horses, and property of Regiments,
without exception. All persons belonging to the Depôts shall also
be removed, as well as those belonging to the different Branches of
Administration which appertain to the Army.
ARTICLE IV. The Sick and Wounded, and the Medical Officers whom it
may be necessary to leave with them, are placed under the special
protection of the Commanders in Chief of the English and Prussian
Armies.
ARTICLE V. The Military, and those holding employments to whom the
foregoing Article relates, shall be at liberty, immediately after
their recovery, to rejoin the Corps to which they belong.
ARTICLE VI. The wives and children of all individuals belonging to
the French Army shall be at liberty to remain in Paris. The wives
shall be allowed to quit Paris for the purpose of rejoining the Army,
and to carry with them their property and that of their husbands.
ARTICLE VII. The Officers of the Line employed with the _Fédérés_,
or with the _Tirailleurs_ of the National Guard, may either join the
Army, or return to their homes or the places of their birth.
ARTICLE VIII. Tomorrow, the 4th of July, at mid day, St Denis, St
Ouen, Clichy, and Neuilly shall be given up. The day after tomorrow,
the 5th, at the same hour, Montmartre shall be given up. The third
day, the 6th, all the Barriers shall be given up.
ARTICLE IX. The duty of the City of Paris shall continue to be
done by the National Guard, and by the Corps of the Municipal
_Gensd'armerie_.
ARTICLE X. The Commanders in Chief of the English and Prussian Armies
engage to respect, and to make those under their command respect, the
actual authorities, so long as they shall exist.
ARTICLE XI. Public property, with the exception of that which relates
to War, whether it belongs to the Government, or depends upon the
Municipal Authority, shall be respected; and the Allied Powers will
not interfere in any manner with its administration and management.
ARTICLE XII. Private persons and property shall be equally respected.
The inhabitants, and in general all individuals who shall be in the
capital, shall continue to enjoy their rights and liberties, without
being disturbed or called to account, either as to the situations
which they hold, or may have held, or as to their conduct or
political opinions.
ARTICLE XIII. The foreign troops shall not interpose any obstacles to
the provisioning of the capital; and will protect, on the contrary,
the arrival and the free circulation of the articles which are
destined for it.
ARTICLE XIV. The present Convention shall be observed, and shall
serve to regulate the mutual relations until the conclusion of Peace.
In case of rupture, it must be denounced in the usual forms at least
ten days beforehand.
ARTICLE XV. If any difficulties arise in the execution of any one
of the Articles of the present Convention, the interpretation of it
shall be made in favour of the French Army and of the City of Paris.
ARTICLE XVI. The present Convention is declared common to all the
Allied Armies, provided it be ratified by the Powers on which these
Armies are dependant.
ARTICLE XVII. The Ratifications shall be exchanged tomorrow, the 4th
of July, at six o'clock in the morning, at the Bridge of Neuilly.
ARTICLE XVIII. Commissioners shall be named by the respective parties
in order to watch over the execution of the present Convention.
Done and signed at St Cloud, in triplicate, by the Commissioners
above named, the day and year before mentioned.
THE BARON BIGNON.
THE COUNT GUILLEMINOT.
THE COUNT DE BONDY.
THE BARON DE MÜFFLING.
F.B. HERVEY, COLONEL.
Approved and ratified the present Suspension of Arms, at Paris, the
3rd of July 1815.
THE MARSHAL PRINCE OF ECKMÜHL.
Afterwards approved by PRINCE BLÜCHER and the DUKE OF WELLINGTON; and
the Ratifications exchanged on the 4th of July.
* * * * *
The terms of the Convention were literally fulfilled.
On the 4th, the French Army, commanded by Marshal DAVOUST, quitted
Paris; and proceeded on its march to the Loire: and the Anglo-Allied
troops occupied St Denis, St Ouen, Clichy, and Neuilly. On the 5th, the
latter took possession of Montmartre. On the 6th, they occupied the
Barriers of Paris, upon the right of the Seine; and the Prussians those
upon the left bank. On the 7th, the two Allied Armies entered Paris:
the Chamber of Peers, having received from the Provisional Government
a notification of the course of events, terminated its sittings;
the Chamber of Deputies protested, but in vain. Their President
(LANJUINAIS) quitted his Chair; and on the following day, the doors
were closed, and the approaches guarded by foreign troops.
On the 8th, the French King, LOUIS XVIII., made his public entry into
his capital, amidst the acclamations of the people, and again occupied
the palace of his ancestors.
It was also on the 8th that NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE embarked, at Rochefort,
on board the French Frigate _La Saale_; and proceeded, accompanied by
_La Méduse_, in which was his suite, to the roads of the Isle of Aix,
with the intention of setting sail to America.
On the 10th, the wind became favourable: but a British Fleet made
its appearance; and NAPOLEON, seeing the difficulty of eluding
the vigilance of its Cruisers, resolved, after having previously
communicated with Captain MAITLAND, upon placing himself under his
protection on board the _Bellerophon_, which vessel he accordingly
reached on the 15th. On the following day, Captain MAITLAND sailed
for England; and arrived at Torbay, with his illustrious charge, on
the 24th. The Ex-Emperor was not permitted to land; and the British
Government having decided upon sending him to the Island of St Helena,
he was removed to the _Northumberland_ Man of War, under Rear Admiral
Sir GEORGE COCKBURN, in which ship he sailed for that distant rock; the
final abode on earth of the man whose extraordinary career marks the
most stirring and eventful period in the history of Europe.
* * * * *
The Convention of Paris constituted a basis for the resumption of
negotiations for the General Peace which, a few months before, had
been so unexpectedly interrupted. The celebrated Statesmen of that
remarkable period--CASTLEREAGH, NESSELRODE, METTERNICH, HARDENBERG,
and TALLEYRAND--aided by distinguished Representatives of the minor
European States, now perceived the importance of establishing a more
closely cemented Alliance; reconciling the clashing interests of
emulative Governments, securing the rights of the legitimate Sovereign
of France, and consolidating the re-established order of things in that
country.
The mere engagement of the French Government to a Treaty of Peace and
grateful amity was not considered a sufficient guarantee for the long
desired repose of Europe. France, which dictated laws according to
her own desires and interests to the entire Continent, was now, in
her turn, to be subjected to the most severe conditions. In order to
guarantee her compliance with the demands required of her by the wants
and necessities of the nations panting for that peace which was to
relieve their exhausted means, and to avert the dangers of internal
dissensions; she was destined to witness the occupation of her Frontier
Fortresses by a vast Army, comprising contingent forces from the Allied
Powers, and requiring to be maintained upon a full War Establishment at
her expense: whilst, at the same time, heavy contributions were laid
upon her for the purpose of indemnifying the Sovereigns who had been
compelled again to take up arms against her.
But, notwithstanding these reverses and indemnities, France herself
is, perhaps, the country that has most benefited by that General Peace
which was established on the ruins of her Empire. The rational form
of Government which was secured to her by an enlarged Constitutional
Charter has gradually introduced among her people the most salutary
reforms, and the most liberal institutions; the stimulus given to
her industry by the cessation of harassing wars, of persecuting
conscriptions, and of vexatious imposts, rapidly obtained for her a
commercial prosperity to which she had long been a stranger; whilst
an unusual period of tranquillity has so completely renovated and
invigorated her resources, both moral and physical, as to place her
again in the rank of the highest Powers.
Now that the nation has completely recovered from the effects of the
convulsive throes which attended its dissolution as an Empire, and has
assumed the calm and dignified attitude of repose; in its resuscitated
strength it contemplates the past in a more rational and philosophic
spirit, balancing the evil with the good. If the public mind of
France dwell for a time upon the tyrannical exercise of NAPOLEON's
power upon the people; the sadness of the reflection is palliated by
his flattering, though personally ambitious, desire to render France
the Arbitress of Europe: if it perceive the rights of the citizens
subverted for the furtherance of his designs, the impression thus
produced vanishes at the contemplation of the _Code NAPOLEON_: if it
appear shocked by the general perversion of labour from its natural
sphere to purely military purposes; it is again soothed by the grandeur
in design, and utility in effect, of mighty enterprises, conferring
employment on myriads of artists and artisans: if it be disposed to
disapprove of the spoliation authorized in foreign States; it is
speedily flattered by the grand idea of rendering Paris the centre
of civilization and of the arts: and finally, if it feel pained and
subdued by a contemplation of the disasters of Moscow, Vittoria,
Leipzic, and Waterloo; it revives and rejoices in recounting the
glorious triumphs of Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Wagram.
* * * * *
If one country more than any other required a lasting Peace to enable
her to recover from the effects of the immense sacrifices she had
made, in life and treasure--sacrifices which proved, beyond doubt,
the Salvation of Europe--that country was Great Britain. Through
the intelligence of her Statesmen, the freedom of her Constitution,
the enterprise of her merchants, the industry of her artisans, and
the bravery of her naval and military defenders; she continues to
maintain her lofty position in the scale of nations, and even to
extend her Empire and her sway to the furthermost points of the earth.
But to whom is she mainly indebted for this proud pre-eminence, this
unparalleled grandeur? To such a question every Briton, no matter what
may be the direction of his political feelings or party prejudices,
will unhesitatingly reply--to the rare talent, the untiring zeal,
and practised skill of her Chief who led, as also to the inflexible
courage, extraordinary endurance, and the perfect discipline of her
sons who fought, her last and ever memorable struggle on the Continent
of Europe--the BATTLE OF WATERLOO. It was upon the solid foundation
thus obtained that was raised that well cemented superstructure, the
solemn Compact of Sovereigns and States, constituting the General Peace
of 1815: and although, as time rolls on, symptoms of decay may be
traced in some portions of the edifice, still it stands a monument of
the downfall of an insatiable ambition aiming at universal dominion;
and continues to this day the surest guarantee of the preservation of
that equitable Balance of Power which can alone secure the permanence
of the tranquillity and prosperity of Europe.
SUPPLEMENT.
The Battle of Waterloo, followed as it was by the advance of the
Anglo-Allied and Prussian Armies upon Paris, was so decisive in its
effects, and so comprehensive in its results, that the great object of
the War--the destruction of the power of NAPOLEON and the restoration
of the legitimate Sovereign--was attained while the Armies of the
Upper Rhine and of Italy were but commencing their invasion of the
French territory. Had the successes attendant upon the exertions of
WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER assumed a less decisive character, and, more
especially, had reverses taken the place of those successes; the
operations of the Armies advancing from the Rhine and across the Alps
would have acquired an immense importance in the history of the War:
but the brilliant course of events in the north of France materially
diminished the interest excited by the military transactions in other
parts of the kingdom. Upon this ground it has been considered, that to
enter into any very detailed account of the movements and dispositions
of the Allies, on the eastern frontier, is unnecessary; and that the
completion of the present Work will be sufficiently accomplished by
the addition of a simple outline of the daily progress and attendant
circumstances of the advance of each Army into the interior of the
country.
[Illustration]
_Operations of the German Corps d'Armée._
This Corps, which was composed of contingent forces supplied by the
petty Princes of North Germany, was assembled, in the middle of April,
in the vicinity of Coblentz. It amounted to 26,200 men, divided into
thirty Battalions, twelve Squadrons, and two and a half Batteries; and
was placed under the command of General Count KLEIST VON NOLLENDORF.
At a somewhat later period it crossed the Rhine at Coblentz and
Neuwied, and took up a position on the Moselle and the Sarre; its Right
communicating with the Third Prussian _Corps d'Armée_, and its Left
with the Bavarian troops at Zweibrücken. Its Advanced Posts extended
along the French frontier from Arlon to Mertzig. Its Head Quarters were
at Trier, on the Moselle.
In this position it remained until the 16th of June, when its
Commander, General VON ENGELHARD (in the absence of Count KLEIST, who
was ill), advanced from Trier to Arlon; which it reached on the 19th.
Here it continued until the 21st, when it received an Order from Prince
BLÜCHER to move into France by Bastogne and Neufchâteau; and to gain
possession of the Fortresses of Sedan and Bouillon. On the 22nd, the
Corps commenced its march, in two Columns: the one by Neufchâteau, upon
Sedan; the other by Recogne, upon Bouillon. Sedan, after a few days'
bombardment, capitulated on the 25th of June. An attempt was made to
take Bouillon by a _coup de main_; but its garrison was strong enough
to frustrate this project. The place was not considered of sufficient
importance to render a regular siege expedient, and it was therefore
simply invested, from the 25th of June, until the 21st of August; when
it was blockaded at all points by troops of the Netherlands, under
Prince FREDERICK of Orange.
On the 28th of June, Lieutenant General VON HACKE, who had been
appointed to the command of the German Corps, directed the Advanced
Guard to move upon Charleville, which lies under the guns of the
Fortress of Mézières, and to carry the place by storm. The capture was
successfully made by some Hessian Battalions, and tended greatly to
facilitate the siege of Mézières. Moveable Columns were detached to
observe the Fortresses of Montmédy, Laon, and Rheims. The last named
place was taken by capitulation on the 8th of July; and the garrison,
amounting to 4,000 men, retired behind the Loire.
Lieutenant General VON HACKE finding that, notwithstanding his vigorous
bombardment of Mézières, which he commenced on the 27th of June, his
summons to surrender was unheeded by the Commandant, General LEMOINE,
undertook a regular siege of the place, and opened trenches on the
2nd of August. On the 13th, the French garrison gave up the Town and
retired into the Citadel, which surrendered on the 1st of September.
The efforts of the Corps were now directed upon Montmédy, around which
Fortress it had succeeded in placing twelve Batteries in position by
the 13th of September. After an obstinate resistance, the garrison
concluded a convention on the 20th of September; by which it was to
retire, with arms and baggage, behind the Loire.
After the capture of Montmédy, the German _Corps d'Armée_ went into
cantonments in the Department of the Ardennes; whence it returned home
in the month of November.
_Operations of the Army of the Upper Rhine, under the command of Field
Marshal His Highness Prince SCHWARTZENBERG._
This Army consisted of four _Corps d'Armée_, and Reserves; composed of
troops of Austria, Bavaria, Würtemberg, Saxony, of Hesse Darmstadt, and
of the petty Princes.
Its strength was as follows:--
Battalions. Squadrons. Batteries.
First _Corps d'Armée_ 24,400 men, in 26 16 8
Second " 34,350 " 36 26 11
Third " 43,814 " 44 32 9
Fourth " 57,040 " 46 66 15
Austrian Reserve Corps 44,800 " 38 86 10
Blockade Corps 33,314 " 38 8 6
Saxon _Corps d'Armée_ 16,774 " 18 10 6
---------------------------------------------
Total 254,492 men, in 246 244 65
According to the general plan of operations projected by Prince
SCHWARTZENBERG, this Army was to cross the Rhine in two Columns. The
Right Column, consisting of the Third Corps, under Field Marshal the
Crown Prince of WÜRTEMBERG; and of the Fourth Corps, or the Bavarian
Army, under Field Marshal Prince WRÈDE, was to cross the Rhine between
Germersheim and Mannheim. The Left Column, consisting of the First
Corps, under the Master General of the Ordnance, Count COLLOREDO, and
of the Second Corps, under General Prince HOHENZOLLERN HECKINGEN,
together with the Austrian Reserve Corps; the whole being commanded
by General the Archduke FERDINAND, was to cross the Rhine between
Basle and Rheinfelden. The Column formed by the Right Wing was to be
supported by the Russian Army, under Field Marshal Count BARCLAY DE
TOLLY, which was expected to be collected at Kaiserslautern by the 1st
of July. The object of the operations, in the first instance, was the
concentration of the Army of the Upper Rhine and the Russian Army at
Nancy.
As soon as Prince SCHWARTZENBERG was made acquainted with the
commencement of hostilities in Belgium, he gave his Orders for the
advance of his Army. The Fourth, or Bavarian, _Corps d'Armée_ was
directed immediately to cross the Sarre: and, by turning the Vosgian
Mountains, to cut off the French Corps under General RAPP, collected
in the environs of Strasburg, from its base of operations; and to
intercept its communications with the interior of France.
A Russian Corps, under General Count LAMBERT, forming the Advance of
the Army of Count BARCLAY DE TOLLY, was united to the _Corps d'Armée_
of Prince WRÈDE; who was to employ it principally in keeping up the
communication with the North German _Corps d'Armée_, under Lieutenant
General VON HACKE.
_Fourth Corps d'Armée, Prince WRÈDE._
On the 19th of June, the Bavarian Army crossed the Rhine at Mannheim
and Oppenheim, and advanced towards the Sarre. On the 20th, some
trifling affairs of Advanced Posts occurred near Landau and Dahn.
On the 23rd, the Army having approached the Sarre, proceeded, in
two Columns, to take possession of the passages across the River at
Saarbrück and Saargemünd.
The Right Column, under Lieutenant General Count BECKERS, attacked
Saarbrück; where it was opposed by the French General MERIAGE. The
Bavarians carried the suburb and the Bridge, and penetrated into the
Town along with the retiring French; of whom they made four Officers
and seventy men prisoners, and killed and wounded one hundred men:
suffering a loss, on their own part, of three Officers and from fifty
to sixty men killed and wounded. Count BECKERS occupied the Town,
posted his Division on the Heights towards Forbach: and detached
Patrols along the road to Metz, as far as St Avold; and to the right
along the Sarre, as far as Saarlouis.
The Left Column, consisting of the First Infantry Division, under
Lieutenant General Baron VON RAGLIOVICH, and of the First Cavalry
Division, under His Royal Highness Prince CHARLES of Bavaria, advanced
against Saargemünd; at which point the French had constructed a _tête
de pont_ on the right bank of the river. After some resistance,
this was taken possession of by the Bavarians; whereupon Baron VON
RAGLIOVICH marched through the Town, and took up a position on the
opposite Heights, commanding the roads leading to Bouquenom and
Lüneville.
The Fourth Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Baron ZOLLERN,
advanced towards the Fortress of Bitsch; which, however, the French
Commandant, General KREUTZER, refused to surrender.
The Russian Corps, under Count LAMBERT, attached to the Right Wing of
Prince WRÈDE's Army, advanced as far as Ottweiler and Ramstein.
On the 24th, Prince WRÈDE occupied Bouquenom; and detached the Cavalry
Division under Prince CHARLES towards Pfalzburg, to observe this
place. His Second, Third, and Fourth Divisions, and the Reserve,
were collected at Saargemünd. The Russian troops under Count LAMBERT
occupied Saarbrück; having previously detached the Cavalry, under
Lieutenant General CZERNITSCHEFF, as far as St Avold.
On the 26th, Prince WRÈDE's Head Quarters were at Morhenge; and, on
the 27th, his Advanced Posts penetrated as far as Nancy, where he
established his Head Quarters on the 28th. From St Dieuze the Prince
detached to the left, in order to discover the march of General RAPP;
who, however, was still on the Rhine, and whose retreat had thus become
cut off by the occupation of Nancy.
Prince WRÈDE halted at Nancy, to await the arrival of the Austrian
and Russian _Corps d'Armée_. Upon his right, Lieutenant General
CZERNITSCHEFF crossed the Moselle, on the 29th, within sight of Metz;
and carried by storm, on the 3rd of July, the Town of Chalons sur
Marne. The garrison of this place had promised to make no resistance,
and yet fired upon the Russian Advanced Guard; whereupon the Cavalry
immediately dismounted, scaled the ramparts, broke open the gates,
sabred a part of the garrison, made the remainder prisoners, including
the French General RIGAULT, and pillaged the town.
After remaining four days in the vicinity of Nancy and Lüneville,
Prince WRÈDE received an Order from Prince SCHWARTZENBERG to move at
once upon Paris, with the Fourth, or Bavarian Corps; which was destined
to become the Advanced Guard of the Army of the Upper Rhine. This
Order was given in consequence of the desire expressed by the Duke of
WELLINGTON and Prince BLÜCHER, that the Army of the Upper Rhine should
afford immediate support to their operations in front of Paris. On the
5th of July, the main body of the Bavarian Army reached Chalons; in the
vicinity of which it remained during the 6th. On this day, its Advanced
Posts communicated, by Epernay, with the Prussian Army. On the 7th,
Prince WRÈDE received intelligence of the Convention of Paris; and,
at the same time, directions to move towards the Loire. On the 8th,
Lieutenant General CZERNITSCHEFF fell in with the Enemy between St Prix
and Montmirail; and drove him across the Morin, towards the Seine.
Previously to the arrival of the Corps at Château Thierry; the French
garrison had abandoned the place, leaving behind it several pieces of
cannon, with ammunition. On the 10th of July, the Bavarian Army took
up a position between the Seine and the Marne; and Prince WRÈDE's Head
Quarters were at La Ferté sous Jouarre.
_Third Corps d'Armée, Crown Prince of WÜRTEMBERG._
On the 22nd of June, a portion of the Third _Corps d'Armée_, under the
Crown Prince of WÜRTEMBERG, took possession of the intrenchments of
Germersheim, on the left bank of the Rhine. Lieutenant Field Marshal
Count WALLMODEN was posted, with ten Battalions and four Squadrons, in
observation of the Fortress of Landau, and the line of the Queich. The
main body of the Corps stood between Bruchsal and Philipsburg. On the
23d, the Corps crossed the Rhine at Germersheim, and passed the line of
the Queich without opposition.
The Crown Prince was directed to proceed by Weissenburg and Hagenau,
with a view to complete, in conjunction with the Fourth _Corps
d'Armée_, the plan of intercepting the retreat of General RAPP.
On the 24th, the Corps advanced to Bergzabern and Nieder Ottersbach;
at both of which points it fell in with the Enemy, and drove him
back. Count WALLMODEN left a small Detachment to observe Landau; and
advanced, with the remainder of his force, as far as Rheinzabern. On
the 25th, the Crown Prince ordered the advance towards the lines of
Weissenburg, in two Columns. The first Column assembled at Bergzabern,
and the second moved forward by Nieder Ottersbach. Count WALLMODEN was
directed to advance upon Lauterburg. The Crown Prince advanced his
Corps still further along the Hagenau road. His Advanced Guard pushed
on to Inglesheim, and the main body of the Corps reached the lines of
Weissenburg; which the French abandoned in the night, and fell back
upon the Forest of Hagenau, occupying the large Village of Surburg.
On the 26th, the Crown Prince attacked and defeated the Enemy at the
last mentioned place, with his Right Column; whilst the Left Column,
under Count WALLMODEN, was equally successful in an attack which it
made upon the French General ROTHENBURG, posted, with 6,000 Infantry
and a Regiment of Cavalry, at Selz. On the following day, General RAPP
fell back upon the Defile of Brümath; but this he quitted in the night,
and took up a favourable position in the rear of the Suffel, near
Strasburg. His force comprised twenty four Battalions of Infantry, four
Regiments of Cavalry, and a numerous Artillery, and amounted to nearly
24,000 men.
The Crown Prince of WÜRTEMBERG, whose force amounted altogether to
more than 40,000 men, succeeded, on the 28th, after a smart action, in
forcing General RAPP to retire within the Fortress of Strasburg. The
loss of the Third Corps on this occasion amounted to 75 Officers, and
2,050 men, killed and wounded. That of the French was about 3,000 men.
_Austrian Reserve Corps, Archduke FERDINAND._
The Third Corps remained in front of Strasburg until the 4th of July;
when it was relieved by the arrival of the Second Austrian Corps, under
Prince HOHENZOLLERN, from the vicinity of Colmar. At this last point
the Advanced Guard of the Austrian Reserve Corps, under Lieutenant
Field Marshal STUTTERHEIM, moved upon Remiremont, and the main body
upon St Marie aux Mines. The Austrian Reserve Corps itself reached Raon
l'Etape; whence it subsequently moved (on the 10th) to Neufchâteau. The
Third Corps, under the Crown Prince of WÜRTEMBERG, marched into the
vicinity of Molsheim.
On the 7th of July, the Crown Prince reached Lüneville; but instead
of proceeding to Nancy, according to its original destination, the
Corps, on the 9th, took the road to Neufchâteau. The advance was in two
Columns; the one upon Bayon, and the other upon Rembervillers. These
two Columns moved respectively, the one, by Vaucouleurs, Joinville,
Brienne le Château, Troyes, and Auxonne; and the other, by Neufchâteau,
Chaumont, Bar sur Aube, Vendoeuvres, Bar sur Seine, and Chatillon: at
which points (Auxonne and Chatillon) they halted on the 18th. On the
21st, the Corps entered into cantonments between Montbard and Tonnerre.
_First and Second Corps--Count COLLOREDO and Prince VON
HOHENZOLLERN.--Reserve Corps, Archduke FERDINAND._
The First and Second Austrian _Corps d'Armée_ and the Reserve Corps,
forming the Left Wing of the Army of the Upper Rhine, crossed this
river at Rheinfelden and Basle in the night of the 25th of June. On the
26th, the First, under Count COLLOREDO, was directed upon Belfort and
Montbelliard; and, on the same day, the Austrians invested the Fortress
of Huningen. The Advanced Guard of the First Corps had an affair with
a French Detachment of 3,000 men belonging to the Corps of General
LECOURBE, and repulsed it as far as Donnemarie. On the 28th, the First
Corps fell in with the Enemy near Chabannes, between Donnemarie and
Belfort, when the French force, amounting to 8,000 Infantry and 500
Cavalry, was driven back upon Belfort. Major General VON SCHEITHER of
the First Corps was detached against Montbelliard, a town fortified
and defended by a citadel. After having maintained a most destructive
fire against the place, the Austrian troops carried it by storm; with a
loss, however, of 25 Officers and 1,000 men, killed and wounded.
With the exception of a few sorties of little consequence, General
RAPP remained very quiet in the Fortress of Strasburg. The news of
the capture of Paris by the British and Prussian troops led to a
Suspension of Hostilities; which was concluded on the 24th of July, and
extended to the Fortress of Strasburg, Landau, Lutzelstein, Huningen,
Schlettstadt, Lichtenberg, Pfalzburg, Neuf Brisac, and Belfort.
_The Russian Army._
The main body of the Russian Army, commanded by Field Marshal Count
BARCLAY DE TOLLY, and amounting to 167,950 men, crossed the Rhine at
Mannheim, on the 25th of June; and followed the Army of the Upper
Rhine. The greater portion of it reached Paris and its vicinity by the
middle of July.
_Operations of the Army of Italy._
The Army of Italy, composed of Austrian and Sardinian troops, and
amounting to 60,000 men, was under the command of General Baron
FRIMONT. It was destined to act against the Army of the Alps, under
Marshal SUCHET, posted in the vicinity of Chambery and Grenoble. It is
uncertain what was the amount of force under SUCHET, it having been
estimated from 13,000 to 20,000 men; but the Corps of Observation on
the Var, in the vicinity of Antibes and Toulon, under Marshal BRUNE,
amounted to 10,000, and was not occupied with any Enemy in its front.
Baron FRIMONT's Army was divided into two Corps: the one under
Lieutenant Field Marshal RADIVOJEVICH, was to advance by the Valais
towards Lyons; and the other, which was in Piedmont, under Lieutenant
Field Marshal Count BUBNA, was to penetrate into the south of France,
through Savoy.
Marshal SUCHET had received Orders from NAPOLEON to commence operations
on the 14th of June; and by rapid marches to secure the mountain Passes
in the Valais and in Savoy, and close them against the Austrians. On
the 15th, his troops advanced at all points for the purpose of gaining
the frontier from Montmeilian, as far as Geneva; which he invested.
Thence he purposed to obtain possession of the important Passes of
Meillerie and St Maurice; and in this way to check the advance of the
Austrian Columns from the Valais. At Meillerie the French were met and
driven back by the Advanced Guard of the Austrian Right Column, on the
21st of June. By means of forced marches the whole of this Column,
which Baron FRIMONT himself accompanied, reached the Arve on the 27th
of June.
The Left Column, under Count BUBNA, crossed Mount Cenis on the 24th
and 25th of June. On the 28th, it was sharply opposed by the French at
Conflans; of which place, however, the Austrians succeeded in gaining
possession.
In order to secure the passage of the Arve the Advanced Guard of the
Right Column detached, on the 27th, to Bonneville, on its left; but
the French, who had already fortified this place, maintained a stout
resistance. In the mean time, however, the Austrians gained possession
of the passage at Carrouge; by which means the French were placed under
the necessity of evacuating Bonneville, and abandoning the Valley of
the Arve. The Column now passed Geneva, and drove the Enemy from the
Heights of Grand Saconex and from St Genix. On the 29th, this part of
the Army moved towards the Jura; and, on the 1st July, it made its
dispositions for attacking the redoubts and intrenchments which the
French had thrown up to defend the Passes. The most vigorous assault
was made upon the Pass of Les Rousses; but the Austrians were driven
back. Reserves were then brought up; and the French having quitted
their intrenchments to meet the latter, and a good opportunity having
offered for a flank attack upon them with Cavalry and Artillery, the
Pass was captured by the Austrians: and the French were compelled to
abandon both it and the other Passes of the Jura. The Austrian Advanced
Guard pursued the Enemy, and reached, in the evening, St Claude, on
the road leading to the left from Gex; and St Laurent, in the original
direction of the attack, beyond Les Rousses.
In the mean time, the Austrian Reserve Corps, under Lieutenant Field
Marshal MEERVILLE, was directed to advance, and to throw back the
French upon the Rhone. The latter, in retreating, destroyed the Bridge
of Seyselle; and, by holding the Fort of l'Ecluse, closed the road
from Geneva to Lyons. A redoubt had been constructed in front of the
Fort, and completely commanded the approach. It was gallantly stormed
and carried by the Regiment of ESTERHAZY. The Fort itself was now
turned by the Reserve Corps along the left bank of the Rhone, with the
design of forcing the passage at the Perte du Rhone. Here the French
had constructed a _tête de pont_; which, however, they were forced to
abandon in consequence of a movement made by the First Corps under
Lieutenant Field Marshal RADIVOJEVICH. On retiring, they destroyed
the very beautiful stone bridge then existing; and thus rendered it
necessary for the Austrians to construct temporary bridges over the
extremely narrow space between the rocks which confine the stream at
this remarkable spot. The Advanced Guard of the Reserve Corps, under
General Count HARDEGG, first crossed the Rhone, and found the Enemy
posted at Charix, in rear of Chatillon, on the road to Nantua. Count
HARDEGG immediately attacked him; and, after encountering an obstinate
resistance, forced him to retire.
The troops of the First Austrian Corps, which, in the mean time, were
left in front of the Fort l'Ecluse, had commenced a bombardment; and
this, after twenty six hours' duration, considerably damaged the Fort.
A powder magazine exploded, which caused a general conflagration; to
escape which the garrison rushed out, and surrendered at discretion to
the Austrians: and thus, in three days, the high road from Geneva to
Lyons was opened to the Army of Italy.
On the 3rd July, General BOGDAN, with the Advanced Guard of the First
Austrian Corps, having been reinforced by Lieutenant Field Marshal
RADIVOJEVICH, attacked the Enemy with much impetuosity at Ojanax,
beyond St Claude; where the French General MARANSIN had taken up a
favourable position, with 2,000 men. The Austrians turned his Left
Flank, and forced him to retire. The Corps reached Bourg en Bresse on
the 9th July.
On the 10th July, a Detachment, under Major General VON PFLÜGER, was
pushed on to Maçon on the Saône; and gained possession of the _tête de
pont_ constructed there, and of the place itself.
On the 7th July, the Second Corps, under Count BUBNA, reached
Echelles. A Detachment, consisting principally of Sardinian troops,
under Lieutenant General Count LATOUR, had been directed to observe
Grenoble; in front of which its Advanced Guard arrived on the 4th July.
On the 6th, the suburbs were attacked; and the communication between
this place and Lyons was cut off. The garrison, consisting of eight
Battalions of the National Guard, offered to capitulate on the 9th,
on the condition of being permitted to return to their homes. That a
vigorous defence might have been maintained was evident from the fact
of the Austrians having found in the place fifty four guns and eight
mortars, and large quantities of provisions.
Count BUBNA's Corps and the Reserve Corps, by simultaneous movements,
assembled together in front of Lyons on the 9th. An Armistice was
solicited by the garrison on the 11th July, and granted upon condition
that Lyons and the Intrenched Camp should be evacuated; and that
Marshal SUCHET should retire with his Corps behind the Loire, keeping
his Advanced Posts within a stipulated line of demarcation.
Having secured possession of the line of the Rhone as far down as its
junction with the Isère, as also of that part of the Saône between
Maçon and Lyons; the Army of Italy now proceeded towards the upper
line of the latter river, leaving the Second Corps, under Count BUBNA,
at Lyons, in front of Marshal SUCHET. The First Corps marched upon
Chalons sur Saône, in order to gain the _tête de pont_ at that point.
At this time, the Fourth Division of the Army, under the French General
LECOURBE, was at Salins, between Dôle and Pontarlier: and as Besançon
had not yet been invested, Baron FRIMONT detached a part of the Reserve
Corps, under General HECHT, to Salins; whilst General FÖLSEIS, detached
from the First Corps towards Dôle. The Advanced Guard of the First
Corps had arrived in front of the _tête de pont_ at Chalons, and had
completed its dispositions for attack; when the place surrendered. By
the advance, at the same time, of HECHT upon Salins, and of FÖLSEIS
from Dôle upon Besançon; the retreat of the French General LAPLANE
was completely cut off. This led to a Convention which stipulated the
dissolution of the National Guards, the surrender of all the Officers,
and the abandonment of one of the Forts of Salins to the Austrians.
On the 20th, the First _Corps d'Armée_ advanced from Chalons sur Saône
as far as Autun; and Besançon having in the mean time been occupied
by the Austrian troops of the Army of the Upper Rhine, a junction was
effected with the latter by the Army of Italy by Dijon.
The Sardinian General D'OSASCA, who had been detached to Nice,
concluded on the 9th of July an Armistice with Marshal BRUNE, who
commanded the Army of the Var, in front of the Maritime Alps; and thus
terminated all hostilities on that side of France.
* * * * *
The foregoing Outline will suffice to show the nature, extent, and
interconnection of the operations of the Allied Armies which invaded
France along her eastern and south-eastern frontier; and at the same
time afford a clear proof that amongst the more immediate consequences
of the decisive Battle of Waterloo and speedy capture of Paris must be
ranked that of their having been the means of averting the more general
and protracted warfare which would probably have taken place, had a
different result in Belgium emboldened the French to act with vigour
and effect in other parts of the country.
* * * * *
The reduction of the Fortresses left in rear of the British and
Prussian Armies, adjoining their main line of operations, and which was
confided to Prince AUGUSTUS of Prussia, with the Second Prussian _Corps
d'Armée_, assisted by the British Battering Train, was effected in the
following manner:--
Maubeuge--siege commenced 8th July, capitulated 12th July.
Landrecies do. 19th do., do. 21st do.
Marienberg do. 27th do., do. 28th do.
Philippeville do. 7th August, do. 8th August.
Rocroy do. 15th do., do. 16th do.
Prince AUGUSTUS had made every preparation for commencing the siege
of Charlemont and its connecting Forts, the two Givets and the Mont
d'Hours, on the 8th of September, when the Commandant, General BURCKE,
foreseeing that the occupation of the detached Forts would divide his
force too much, entered into negotiations, and surrendered those works
on the 10th, withdrawing his troops into Charlemont; the bombardment of
which was to have opened on the 23rd of September: but, on the 20th,
Prince AUGUSTUS received information from Paris that hostilities were
to cease throughout the whole of France.
APPENDIX.
[Captain SIBORNE also included in this _Appendix_ a number of State
Papers, Military Orders, and Statistical Returns, in French and
English; of which a List will be found at pages 42 to 44. These are
omitted in this Fourth Edition, simply from want of space.--E.A.]
VI.
_Effective Strength and Composition of the Anglo-Allied Army under the
Command of Field Marshal the Duke of WELLINGTON._
FIRST CORPS.--HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE OF ORANGE.
_First Division_, MAJOR GENERAL COOKE.
Men.
First British Brigade, {2nd Battalion 1st Guards 976
Major General MAITLAND. {3rd do. do. 1,021
Second British Brigade, {2nd do. Coldstream Guards 1,003
Major General Sir JOHN BYNG. {2nd do. 3rd Guards. 1,061
------
4,061
Artillery, {Captain SANDHAM's British Foot Battery.
Lieutenant Colonel ADYE. {Major KUHLMANN's Horse Battery, K.G. Legion.
_Third Division_, LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR CHARLES ALTEN.
{2nd Battalion 30th Regiment 615
Fifth British Brigade, {33rd Regiment. 561
Major General Sir COLIN HALKETT. {2nd Battalion 69th Regiment 516
{2nd do. 73rd do. 562
{1st Light Battalion. 423
Second Brigade K.G. Legion, {2nd do. do. 337
Colonel VON OMPTEDA. {5th Line do. 379
{8th do. do. 388
{Field Battalion Bremen 512
First Hanoverian Brigade, {Do. do. Verden 533
Major General Count KIELMANSEGGE. {Do. do. York. 607
{Do. do. Lüneburg. 595
{Do. do. Grubenhagen 621
{Do. Jäger Corps 321
------
6,970
Artillery,
Lieutenant Colonel {Major LLOYD's British Foot Battery.
WILLIAMSON. {Captain CLEEVES's Foot Battery, K.G. Legion
_Second Dutch-Belgian Division_, LIEUTENANT GENERAL BARON DE
PERPONCHER.
Men
{7th Regiment of the Line 701
{27th Jäger Battalion 809
First Brigade, {5th Militia Battalion 482
Major General Count DE BYLANDT.{7th do. do. 675
{8th do. do. 566
Second Brigade, {2nd Regiment of Nassau, 3 Battalions 2,709
H.S.H. The Prince BERNHARD of
Saxe Weimar. {Regiment of Orange Nassau, 2 do. 1,591
------
7,533
Artillery, {Captain BYLEVELD's Horse Battery.
Major VAN OPSTAL. {Captain STIEVENAAR's Foot Battery.
_Third Dutch-Belgian Division_, LIEUTENANT GENERAL BARON CHASSÉ.
{2nd Regiment of the Line 471
{35th Jäger Battalion 605
First Brigade, {4th Militia Battalion 519
Major General DITMERS. {6th do. do. 492
{17th do. do. 534
{19th do. do. 467
{3rd Regiment of the Line 629
{12th do. do. 431
Second Brigade, {13th do. do. 664
Major General D'AUBREMÉ. {36th Jäger Battalion 633
{3rd Militia Battalion 592
{10th do. do. 632
------
6,669
Artillery, {Captain KRAHMER's Horse Battery.
Major VAN DER SMISSEN. {Captain LUX's Foot Battery.
------
Total FIRST CORPS, men 25,233
and guns 56
SECOND CORPS.--LIEUTENANT GENERAL LORD HILL.
_Second Division_, LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR H. CLINTON.
{1st Battalion 52nd Regiment 1,038
Third British Brigade, {1st do. 71st do. 810
Major General ADAM. {2nd do. 95th do. 585
{3rd do. 95th do. 188
{1st Line Battalion 411
First Brigade K.G. Legion, {2nd do. do. 437
Colonel DU PLAT. {3rd do. do. 494
{4th do. do. 416
------
Carry forward 4,379
{Landwehr Battalion Bremervörde 632
Third Hanoverian Brigade, { Do. do. Osnabrück 612
Colonel HALKETT. { Do. do. Quackenbrück 588
{ Do. do. Salzgitter 622
-------
6,833
Artillery, {Captain BOLTON's British Foot Battery.
Lieutenant Colonel GOLD. {Major SYMPHER's Horse Battery, K.G. Legion.
_Fourth Division_, LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR CHARLES COLVILLE.
{3rd Battalion 14th Regiment 571
Fourth British Brigade, {1st do. 23rd do. 647
Colonel MITCHELL. {51st Regiment 549
{2nd Battalion 35th Regiment 570
Sixth British Brigade, {1st do. 54th do. 541
Major General JOHNSTONE. {2nd do. 59th do. 461
{1st do. 91st do. 824
{Field Battalion Lauenburg 553
{ do. do. Calenberg 634
Sixth Hanoverian Brigade, {Landwehr Battalion Nienburg 625
Major General Sir JAMES LYON. { do. do. Hoya 629
{ do. do. Bentheim 608
------
7,212
Artillery, {Major BROME's British Foot Battery.
Lieutenant Colonel {Captain VON RETTBERG's Hanoverian Foot
HAWKER. { Battery.
_First Dutch-Belgian Division_, LIEUTENANT GENERAL STEDMANN.
{4th Regiment of the Line }
{6th do. do. }
First Brigade, {16th Jäger Battalion }
Major General HAUW. {9th Militia do. }
{14th do. do. }
{15th do. do. } 6,389
}
{1st Regiment of the Line }
{18th Jäger Battalion }
Second Brigade, {1st Militia do. }
Major General EERENS. {2nd do. do. }
{18th do. do. }
Artillery, Captain WYNANDS's Foot Battery.
{5th Regiment, 2 Battalions }
Dutch-Belgian Indian Brigade, {Flankers }
Lieutenant General ANTHING. {10th Jäger Battalion } 3,583
{11th do. do. }
Artillery, Captain RIESZ's Foot Battery.
Detachments from 6th and 7th Line Battalions of the K.G. Legion, }
distributed among the other Battalions, and 2 Orderlies from Foreign} 16
Battalions }
-------
Total SECOND CORPS, men 24,033
and guns 40
RESERVE.
_Fifth Division_, LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR THOMAS PICTON.
Men.
{1st Battalion 28th Regiment 557
Eighth British Brigade, {1st do. 32nd do. 662
Major General Sir JAMES KEMPT. {1st do. 79th do. 703
{1st do. 95th do. 549
{3rd do. 1st do. 604
Ninth British Brigade, {1st do. 42nd do. 526
Major General Sir DENIS PACK. {2nd do. 44th do. 455
{1st do. 92nd do. 588
{Landwehr Battalion Hameln 669
Fifth Hanoverian Brigade, { do. do. Gifhorn 617
Colonel VON VINCKE. { Do. do. Hildesheim 617
{ do. do. Peine 611
------
7,158
Artillery, {Major ROGERS's British Foot Battery.
Major HEISSE. {Captain BRAUN's Hanoverian Foot Battery.
_Sixth Division_, LIEUTENANT GENERAL HON. SIR L. COLE.
{1st Battalion 4th Regiment 669
Tenth British Brigade, {1st do. 27th do. 698
Major General Sir JOHN LAMBERT. {1st do. 40th do. 761
{2nd do. 81st do. 439
{Landwehr Battalion Verden 621
Fourth Hanoverian Brigade, { do. do. Lüneburg 624
Colonel BEST. { do. do. Osterode 677
{ do. do. Münden 660
------
5,149
Artillery,
Lieutenant Colonel {Major UNETT's British Foot Battery.
BRÜCKMANN. {Captain SINCLAIR's do. do.
{Lieutenant Colonel Sir HEW ROSS's Horse
{ Battery.
British Reserve Artillery, {Major BEANE's Horse Battery.
Major DRUMMOND. {Major MORISSON's Foot Battery.
{Captain HUTCHESSON's Foot Battery.
{Captain ILBERT's do. do.
_Seventh Division_.
{2nd Battalion 25th Regiment 388
Seventh British Brigade. {2nd do. 37th do. 491
{2nd do. 78th do. 337
{13th Veteran Battalion 683
British Garrison Troops. {1st Foreign do. 595
{2nd Garrison do. 739
------
3,233
_Brunswick Corps_, H.S.H. THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK.
Men.
Major VON RAUSCHENPLATT. Advanced Guard Battalion 672
{Guard Battalion 672
Light Brigade, {1st Light Battalion 672
Lieutenant Colonel VON BUTTLAR. {2nd do. do. 672
{3rd do. do. 672
{1st Line do. 672
Line Brigade, {2nd do. do. 672
Lieutenant Colonel VON SPECHT. {3rd do. do. 672
------
5,376
Artillery, {Captain HEINEMANN's Horse Battery.
Major MAHN. {Major MOLL's Foot Battery.
_Hanoverian Reserve Corps_, LIEUTENANT GENERAL VON DER DECKEN.
First Brigade, {Field Battalion Hoya }
Lieutenant Colonel VON {Landwehr Battalion Mölln }
BENNIGSEN. { do. do. Bremerlehe }
{Landwehr Battalion Nordheim }
Second Brigade, { do. do. Ahlefeldt }
Lieutenant Colonel VON BEAULIEU. { do. do. Springe }
{Landwehr Battalion Otterndorf }9,000
Third Brigade, { do. do. Zelle }
Lieutenant Colonel BODECKER. { do. do. Ratzeburg }
{Landwehr Battalion Hanover }
Fourth Brigade, { do. do. Uelzen }
Lieutenant Colonel WISSEL. { do. do. Neustadt }
{ do. do. Diepholz }
_Nassau Contingent_, GENERAL VON KRUSE.
1st Regiment--3 Battalions 2,880
------
TOTAL RESERVE, men 32,796
and guns 64
CAVALRY.
_British, and King's German Legion_. Men.
{1st Life Guards 228
First Brigade, {2nd do. 231
Major General Lord E. SOMERSET. {Royal Horse Guards (Blue) 237
{1st Dragoon Guards. 530
{1st, or Royal, Dragoons 394
Second Brigade, {2nd Dragoons (Scots Greys) 391
Major General Sir W. PONSONBY. {6th (or Inniskilling) Dragoons. 396
{1st Light Dragoons, K.G. Legion 462
Third Brigade, {2nd do. do. do. 419
Major General Sir W. DÖRNBERG. {23rd Light Dragoons. 387
{11th do. do. 390
Fourth Brigade, {12th do. do. 388
Major General Sir J. VANDELEUR. {16th do. do. 393
{2nd Hussars, K.G. Legion 564
Fifth Brigade, {7th do. 380
Major General Sir COLQ. GRANT. {15th do. 392
{1st do. K.G. Legion. 493
Sixth Brigade, {10th do. 390
Major General Sir H. VIVIAN. {18th do. 396
Seventh Brigade, {3rd do. K.G. Legion 622
Colonel Sir F.V. ARENTSSCHILDT. {13th Light Dragoons. 390
{1. Major BULL's (Howitzers).
{2. Lieutenant Colonel WEBBER SMITH's.
British Horse Batteries, {3. Lieutenant Colonel Sir ROBERT GARDINER's.
attached to the Cavalry. {4. Captain WHINYATES's (with Rockets).
{5. Captain MERCER's.
{6. Captain RAMSAY's.
_Hanoverian_.
{Prince Regent's Hussars 596
First Brigade, {Bremen and Verden Hussars 589
Colonel VON ESTORFF. {Cumberland Hussars. 497
Brunswick Cavalry. {Regiment of Hussars. 690
{Squadron of Uhlans. 232
_Dutch-Belgian_.
{1st Dutch Carabiniers 446
First Brigade, {2nd Belgian do. 399
Major General TRIP. {3rd Dutch do. 392
Second Brigade, {4th Dutch Light Dragoons. 647
Major General DE GHIGNY. {8th Belgian Hussars. 439
Third Brigade, {5th do. Light Dragoons 441
Major General VAN MERLEN. {6th Dutch Hussars. 641
Artillery, {Captain PETTER's Half Horse Battery.
{Captain GEY's Half Horse Battery.
______
men 14,482
and guns 44
ARTILLERY.
_British._ Guns. Men.
7 Foot Batteries of 6 guns each 42 } 3,630
3 do, do. 4 do. (18 prs) 12 }
8 Horse do. 6 do. 48 1,400
_King's German Legion._
1 Foot Battery of 6 guns 6 }
2 Horse Batteries of 6 guns each 12 } 526
_Hanoverian._
2 Foot Batteries of 6 guns each 12 465
_Brunswick._
1 Foot Battery of 8 guns 8 }
1 Horse do. 8 do. 8 } 510
_Dutch-Belgian._
4 Foot Batteries of 8 guns each 32 968
3 Horse do. 8 do. 24 667
---- ------
204 8,166
Engineers, Sappers and Miners, Waggon Train, and Staff Corps 1,240
TOTAL STRENGTH.
Infantry 82,062
Cavalry 14,482
Artillery 8,166
Engineers, Waggon Train, &c. 1,240
-------
Grand Total. men 105,950
and guns 204
VIII.
_Effective Strength and Composition of the Prussian Army under the
Command of Field Marshal PRINCE BLÜCHER VON WAHLSTADT._
FIRST CORPS D'ARMÉE.--LIEUTENANT GENERAL VON ZIETEN.
First Brigade, General VON STEINMETZ. Batts. Men.
12th and 24th Regiments of the Line. }
1st Westphalian Landwehr Regiment. } 9-1/2 8,647
1st and 3rd Silesian Rifle Companies }
Second Brigade, General VON PIRCH II.
6th and 28th Regiments of the Line }
2nd Westphalian Landwehr Regiment. } 9 7,666
Third Brigade, General VON JAGOW.
7th and 29th Regiments of the Line }
3rd Westphalian Landwehr Regiment. } 9-1/2 6,853
2nd and 4th Silesian Rifle Companies. }
Fourth Brigade, General VON HENKEL.
19th Regiment of the Line.... }
4th Westphalian Landwehr Regiment } 6 4,721
-------
27,887
_Reserve Cavalry of the First Corps._--LIEUTENANT GENERAL VON RÖDER.
Brigade of General VON TRESKOW. Squad.
Brandenburg Dragoons (No. 5) 4}
1st West Prussian Dragoons (No. 2) 4}
Brandenburg Uhlans 4}
} 1,925
Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel VON LÜTZOW. }
6th Uhlans 4}
1st and 2nd Kurmark Landwehr Regiments. 8}
1st Silesian Hussars 4}
1st Westphalian Landwehr Regiment. 4}
_Reserve Artillery of the First Corps._--COLONEL VON LEHMANN.
12 pounder Foot Batteries Nos. 2, 6, and 9 }
6 do. do. Nos. 1, 3, 7, 8, and 15 }
Howitzer Battery No. 1 } 1,019
Horse Batteries Nos. 2, 7, and 10 ... } ------
Total--34 Battalions, 32 Squadrons, 12 Batteries men 30,831
and guns 96
SECOND CORPS D'ARMÉE.--GENERAL VON PIRCH I.
Fifth Brigade, General VON TIPPELSKIRCHEN. Batts. Men.
2nd and 25th Regiments of the Line }
5th Westphalian Landwehr Regiment } 9 6,851
Sixth Brigade, General VON KRAFFT.
9th and 26th Regiments of the Line }
1st Elbe Landwehr Regiment } 9 6,469
Seventh Brigade, General VON BRAUSE.
14th and 22nd Regiments of the Line }
2nd Elbe Landwehr Regiment } 9 6,224
Eighth Brigade, Colonel VON LANGEN.
21st and 23rd Regiments of the Line }
3rd Elbe Landwehr Regiment } 9 6,292
------
25,836
_Reserve Cavalry of the Second Corps._--GENERAL VON JÜRGASS.
Brigade of Colonel VON THÜMEN. Squad.
Silesian Uhlans 4}
6th Neumark Dragoons 4}
11th Hussars 4}
}
Brigade of Colonel Count SCHULENBURG. }
1st Queen's Dragoons 4}
4th Kurmark Landwehr Regiment 4} 4,468
}
Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel VON SOHR, }
3rd Brandenburg Hussars 4}
5th Pomeranian Hussars 4}
5th Kurmark Landwehr Regiment 4}
Elbe Landwehr Regiment 4}
_Reserve Artillery of the Second Corps._--COLONEL VON RÖHL.
12 pounder Foot Batteries Nos. 4 and 8 }
6 do. do. Nos. 5,10,12,34 and 37 } 1,454
Horse Batteries No. 5, 6, and 14 } ------
Total--36 Battalions, 36 Squadrons, 10 Batteries men 31,758
and guns 80
THIRD CORPS D'ARMÉE.--LIEUTENANT GENERAL VON THIELEMANN.
Ninth Brigade, General VON BORCKE. Batts. Men.
8th and 36th Regiments of the Line }
1st Kurmark Landwehr Regiment } 9 6,752
Tenth Brigade, Colonel VON KÄMPFEN.
27th Regiment of the Line }
2nd Kurmark Landwehr Regiment } 6 4,045
Eleventh Brigade, Colonel VON LUCK.
3rd and 4th Kurmark Landwehr Regiments. 6 3,634
Twelfth Brigade, Colonel VON STÜLPNAGEL.
31st Regiment of the Line }
5th and 6th Kurmark Landwehr Regiments } 9 6,180
------
20,611
_Reserve Cavalry of the Third Corps._--GENERAL VON HOBE.
Brigade of Colonel VON DER MARWITZ. Squad.
7th Uhlans 3}
8th do. 4}
9th Hussars 3}
}
Brigade of Colonel Count LOTTUM. } 2,405
5th Uhlans 3}
7th Dragoons 5}
3rd Kurmark Landwehr Regiment 4}
6th do. do. do. 4}
_Reserve Artillery of the Third Corps._--COLONEL VON MOHNHAUPT.
12 pounder Foot Battery No. 7 }
6 do. do. Nos. 18 and 35 } 964
Horse Batteries Nos. 18, 19, and 20 }
------
Total--30 Battalions, 24 Squadrons, 6 Batteries men 23,980
and guns 48
FOURTH CORPS D'ARMÉE.--GENERAL COUNT BÜLOW VON DENNEWITZ.
Thirteenth Brigade, Lieutenant General VON HACKE. Batts. Men.
10th Regiment of the Line }
2nd and 3rd Neumark Landwehr Regiments. } 9 6,385
Fourteenth Brigade, General VON RYSSEL.
11th Regiment of the Line }
1st and 2nd Pomeranian Landwehr Regiments } 9 6,953
Fifteenth Brigade, General VON LOSTHIN.
18th Regiment of the Line }
3rd and 4th Silesian Landwehr Regiments } 9 5,881
Sixteenth Brigade, Colonel VON HILLER.
15th Regiment of the Line }
1st and 2nd Silesian Landwehr Regiments. } 9 6,162
-------
25,381
_Reserve Cavalry of the Fourth Corps._--GENERAL, PRINCE WILLIAM OF
PRUSSIA.
Brigade of General VON SYDOW. Squad.
1st West Prussian Uhlans 4}
2nd Silesian Hussars 4}
8th Hussars 3}
}
Brigade of Colonel Count SCHWERIN. }
10th Hussars 4} 3,081
1st and 2nd Neumark Landwehr Regiments 8}
1st and 2nd Pomeranian Landwehr Regiments 8}
}
Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel VON WATZDORF. }
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Silesian Landwehr Regiments 12}
_Reserve Artillery of the Fourth Corps._--LIEUTENANT COLONEL VON
BARDELEBEN.
12 pounder Foot Batteries Nos. 3, 5, and 13 }
6 do. do. Nos. 2, 11, 13, 14, & 21 } 1,866
Horse Batteries Nos. 1, 11, and 12 } ------
Total--36 Battalions, 43 Squadrons, 11 Batteries men 30,328
and guns 88
TOTAL STRENGTH.
Infantry. Cavalry. Artillery. Guns.
First _Corps d'Armée_ 27,817 1,925 1,019 96
Second do. 25,836 4,468 1,454 80
Third do. 20,611 2,405 964 48
Fourth do. 25,381 3,081 1,866 88
----------------------------------
99,715 11,879 5,303 312
GRAND TOTAL--116,897 men and 312 guns.
IX.
_Effective Strength and Composition of the French Army, under the
Command of NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE._
IMPERIAL GUARD.--MARSHAL MORTIER, DUKE OF TREVISO.
(On the 16th June.) Batt. Men.
Lieutenant General Count FRIANT.
1st and 2nd Regiments of Grenadiers. 4 2,294
Lieutenant General Count ROGUET.
3rd and 4th Regiments of Grenadiers. 3 1,623
Lieutenant General Count MORAND.
1st and 2nd Regiments of _Chasseurs_ 4 2,402
Lieutenant General Count MICHEL.
3rd and 4th Regiments of _Chasseurs_ 4 2,069
Lieutenant General Count DUHESME.
1st and 3rd Regiments of _Tirailleurs_ 4 2,043
Lieutenant General Count BARROIS.
1st and 3rd Regiments of _Voltigeurs_ 4 2,123
Lieutenant General Lefèbvre DESNOUETTES. Squad
--Lancers and _Chasseurs à Cheval_ 19 1,971
Lieutenant General Count GUYOT.
Dragoons and _Grenadiers à Cheval_ 13 1,517
_Gendarmerie d'élite_ 102
Lieutenant General DESVAUX DE ST MAURICE.
9 Foot Batteries }
4 Horse do } 2,995
Marines (104) }
Engineers 109
------
Total--23 Battalions 32 Squadrons, 13 Batteries men 19,428
and guns 96
FIRST CORPS D'ARMÉE.--LIEUTENANT GENERAL COUNT D'ERLON.
(On the 10th June.) Batt. Men
First Division, Lieuyenant General ALIX }
54th, 55th, 28th, and 105th Regiments of the Line 8}
}
Second Division, Lieutenant General Baron DONZELOT. }
13th (Light), 17th, 19th, and 51st Regiments of the Line 9}
} 16,200
Third Division, Lieutenant General Baron MARCOGNET. }
21st, 46th, 25th, and 45th Regiments of the Line. 8}
}
Fourth Division, Lieutenant General Count DURUTTE. }
8th, 29th, 85th, and 95th Regiments of the Line. 8}
First Cavalry Division, Lieutenant General Baron JAQUINOT.
Squad.
3rd and 7th _Chasseurs_ 6}
3rd and 4th Lancers 5} 1,400
Artillery.
5 Foot Batteries }
1 Horse Battery } 1,066
Engineers 330
------
Total--33 Battalions, 11 Squadrons, 6 Batteries men 18,996
and guns 46
SECOND CORPS D'ARMÉE.--LIEUTENANT GENERAL COUNT REILLE.
(On the 10th June.) Batt. Men
Fifth Division, Lieutenant General Baron BACHELU.
2nd (Light), 61st, 72nd, and 108th Regiments of the Line 11}
}
Sixth Division, Prince JEROME NAPOLEON. }
1st (Light), 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Regiments of the Line 11}
}
Seventh Division, Lieutenant General Count GIRARD. } 19,750
11th (Light) and 82nd Regiments of the Line, and 12th} }
Light Infantry } 8}
}
Ninth Division, Lieutenant General Count FOY. }
4th (Light), 92nd, 93rd, and 100th Regiments of the Line 10}
Second Cavalry Division, Lieutenant General Baron PIRÉ.
Squad
1st and 6th _Chasseurs_ 8}
5th and 6th Lancers 7} 1,729
Artillery.
5 Foot Batteries }
1 Horse Battery } 1,385
Engineers 409 ------
Total--40 Battalions, 15 Squadrons, 6 Batteries men 23,273
and guns 46
THIRD CORPS D'ARMÉE.--LIEUTENANT GENERAL COUNT VANDAMME.
(On the 10th June.) Batt. Men.
Eighth Division, Lieutenant General Baron LEFOL.
15th (Light), 23rd, 37th, and 64th Regiments of the Line 11}
}
Tenth Division, Lieutenant General Baron HABERT. }
34th, 88th, 22nd, and 70th Regiments of the Line 12} 14,508
}
Eleventh Division, Lieutenant General BERTHEZENE. }
12th, 56th, 33rd, and 86th Regiments of the Line 8}
Third Cavalry Division, Lieutenant General Baron DOMON. Squad.
4th and 9th _Chasseurs_ 5}
12th _Chasseurs_ 4} 932
Artillery.
4 Foot Batteries }
1 Horse Battery } 936
Engineers 146
------
Total--31 Battalions, 9 Squadrons, 5 Batteries men 16,522
and guns 38
FOURTH CORPS D'ARMÉE.--LIEUTENANT GENERAL COUNT GÉRARD.
(On the 31st May.) Batt.
Twelfth Division, Lieutenant General Baron PECHEUX. }
30th, 96th, and 63rd Regiments of the Line. 10}
}
Thirteenth Division, Lieutenant General Baron VICHERY. }
59th, 76th, 48th, and 69th Regiments of the Line 8} 12,589
}
Fourteenth Division, Lieutenant General HULOT. }
9th (Light), 111th, 44th, and 50th Regiments of the Line 8}
Seventh Cavalry Division, Lieutenant General MAURIN. Squad
6th Hussars 3}
8th _Chasseurs_ 3} 758
Reserve Cavalry Division, Lieutenant General Baron JAQUINOT.
6th, 11th, 15th, and 16th Dragoons 16 1,608
Artillery.
4 Foot Batteries }
1 Horse Battery } 1,538
Engineers 201
------
Total--26 Battalions, 22 Squadrons, 5 Batteries men 16,694
and guns 38
SIXTH CORPS D'ARMÉE.--LIEUTENANT GENERAL COUNT LOBAU.
(On the 10th June.) Batt. Men.
Nineteenth Division, Lieutenant General Baron SIMMER. }
5th, 11th, 27th, and 84th Regiments of the Line 9}
}
Twentieth Division, Lieutenant General Baron JEANNIN. }
5th (Light), 16th, 47th, and 107th Regiments of the Line 6} 8,152
}
Twenty First Division, Lieutenant General Baron TESTE. }
8th (Light), 40th, 65th, and 75th Regiments of the Line 5}
Artillery.
4 Foot Batteries } 743
1 Horse Battery }
Engineers 891
------
Total--20 Battalions, 5 Batteries men 9,084
and guns 38
RESERVE CAVALRY.--MARSHAL GROUCHY.
_First Corps_--Lieutenant General Count PAJOL.
(In June.) Squad.
Fourth Cavalry Division, Lieutenant General Baron SOULT. }
1st, 4th, and 5th Hussars 12}
}
Fifth Cavalry Division, Lieutenant General Baron SUBERVIE. } 2,324
1st and 2nd Lancers 8}
11th _Chasseurs_ 4}
Artillery.
2 Horse Batteries 317
_Second Corps_-Lieutenant General Count EXCELMANS.
(In June.) Squad.
Ninth Cavalry Division, Lieutenant General STROLZ. }
5th, 13th, 15th, and 20th Dragoons 16}
}
Tenth Cavalry Division, Lieutenant General Baron CHASTEL. } 2,817
4th, 12th, 14th, and 17th Dragoons 15}
Artillery.
2 Horse Batteries 246
_Third Corps_--Lieutenant General KELLERMANN (Count DE VALMY).
(In June.) Squad.
Eleventh Cavalry Division, Lieutenant General Baron L'HERITIER. }
2nd and 7th Dragoons 7}
8th and 11th _Cuirassiers_ 5}
}
Twelfth Cavalry Division, Lieutenant General ROUSSEL D'HURBAL. } 3245
1st and 2nd Carabiniers 6}
2nd and 3rd _Cuirassiers_ 6}
Artillery.
2 Horse Batteries 309
_Fourth Corps_--Lieutenant General Count MILHAUD
(On the 9th June) Squad. Men.
Thirteenth Cavalry Division, Lieutenant General WATHIER. }
1st, 4th, 7th, and 12th Cuirassiers 11} 2,556
}
Fourteenth Cavalry Division, Lieutenant General Baron DELORT. }
5th, 6th, 9th, and 10th Cuirassiers 13}
Artillery.
2 Horse Batteries 313
------
Total--103 Squadrons, 8 Batteries men 12,127
and guns 48
TOTAL STRENGTH.
Infantry. Cavalry. Artillery. Engineers, &c. Guns.
Imperial Guard 12,554 3,590 3,175 109 96
First Corps d'Armée 16,200 11,400 1,066 330 46
Second do. do. 19,750 1,729 1,385 409 46
Third do. do, 14,508 932 936 146 38
Fourth do. do. 12,589 2,366 1,538 201 38
Sixth do. do. 8,152 -- 743 189 38
Four Corps of
Reserve Cavalry -- 10,942 1,185 -- 48
------ ------ ------ ----- ---
83,753 20,959 10,028 1,384 350
GRAND TOTAL--116,124 men and 350 guns.
XXXII.
_List of Officers of the King's German Legion who were present at the
Defence of La Haye Sainte._
_2nd Light Battalion._ MAJORS--G. Baring; A. Bösewiel, _killed_.
CAPTAINS--E. Holtzermann, _taken prisoner_; W. Schaumann, _killed_.
LIEUTENANTS--F. Kessler, _wounded_; C. Meyer; O. Lindam, _wounded_; B.
Riefkugel, _wounded_; A. Tobin, _taken prisoner_; T. Carey, _wounded_;
E. Biedermann; D. Græme, _wounded_; S. Earl. ENSIGNS--F. von Robertson,
_killed_; G. Frank, _wounded_; W. Smith; L. Baring. LIEUTENANT and
ADJUTANT--W. Timmann, _wounded_. Surgeon--G. Heise.
_1st Light Battalion._ CAPTAINS--von Gilsa, _wounded_; von Marschalck,
_killed_. LIEUTENANT--Kuntze. ENSIGN--Baumgarten.
_Skirmishers of 5th Line Battalion._ CAPTAIN--von Wurmb, _killed_.
LIEUTENANTS--Witte, _wounded_; Schläger. ENSIGN--Walther, _wounded_.
XXXV.
_List of British Officers who were present at the Defence of Hougomont._
_2nd Battalion of Coldstream, or 2nd, Regiment of Foot Guards._
MAJOR--A.G. Woodford, Colonel. CAPTAINS and LIEUTENANT COLONELS--J.
Macdonell, _wounded_; D. Mackinnon, _wounded_; Hon. J. Walpole; H.
Dawkins; Hon. E. Acheson; H. Wyndham, _wounded_. LIEUTENANTS and
CAPTAINS--G. Bowles; T. Sowerby; W.L. Walton; W.G. Baynes; C.A.F.
Bentinck, Adjutant; J.S. Cowell; E. Sumner, _wounded_; J.L. Blackman,
_killed_; B. Lord Hotham; Hon. R. Moore, _wounded_; T. Chaplin.
ENSIGNS--Hon. J. Forbes; H. Gooch; A. Cuyler; M. Beaufoy; H.F.
Griffiths, _wounded_; J. Montague, _wounded_; G.R. Buckley; J. Hervey;
H. Vane; F.J. Douglass; R. Bowen; A. Gordon; Hon. W. Forbes; C. Short.
ADJUTANT--C.A.F. Bentinck. QUARTER MASTER--B. Selway. SURGEON--W.
Whymper. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--G. Smith; W. Hunter.
_2nd Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of Foot Guards._ MAJOR--F. Hepburn.
Lieutenant Colonel. CAPTAINS and LIEUTENANT COLONELS--H.W. Rooke;
W.C. Master; D. Mercer; C. Dashwood, _wounded_; F. Home; E. Bowater,
_wounded_; C. West, _wounded_. LIEUTENANTS and CAPTAINS--W. Stothert,
Adjutant; W. Drummond; R.B. Hesketh, _wounded_; H. Hawkins; R.H.
Wigston; Hon. J.B. Rodney; C.J. Barnet; J.W. Moorhouse; E.B. Fairfield;
G. Evelyn, _wounded_; Hon. H. Forbes, _killed_; J. Elrington; H.B.
Montgomerie, _wounded_; T. Crawford, _killed_; J. Ashton, _killed_.
ENSIGNS--C. Lake, _wounded_; Hon. E. Stopford; B. Drummond; G.D.
Standen; D. Baird, _wounded_; W. James; W.F. Hamilton; Hon. G. Anson;
T. Wedgewood; W. Butler; A.C. Cochrane; J. Prendergast; C. Simpson,
_wounded_; H.S. Blane; H. Montague. ADJUTANT--W. Stothert, Captain,
_wounded_. QUARTER MASTER--J. Skuce. SURGEON--S. Good. ASSISTANT
SURGEONS--J.R. Warde; F. G. Hanrott.
_1st Regiment of Foot Guards._ CAPTAINS and LIEUTENANT COLONELS--Lord
Saltoun; C.P. Ellis, _wounded_.[13]
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 13: I know not the names of the remaining Officers of
the Light Companies of the First Brigade of Guards detached to
Hougomont.-W.S.]
XLI.
_List of Officers of the British Army who were present in the Actions
on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June 1815, including those posted near
Hal on the 18th; and distinguishing such as were Killed, Wounded or
Missing._[14]
STAFF.
_Commander in Chief_--FIELD MARSHAL HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
K.G., G.C.B., &c.
_Military Secretary_--Lieutenant Colonel Lord FitzRoy Somerset, 1st
Foot Guards, _w._
_Aides de Camp_--Lieutenant Colonels, J. Fremantle, 2nd Foot Guards;
C.F. Canning, 3rd Foot Guards, _k._; Hon. Sir Alex. Gordon, 3rd Foot
Guards, _k._; Lieutenant Lord George Lennox, 9th Light Dragoons;
Hereditary Prince of Nassau Usingen. _Extra Aides de Camp_--Lieutenant
Colonel Hon. Henry Percy, 14th Light Dragoons; Captain Lord Arthur
Hill, half pay; Lieutenant Hon. George Cathcart, 6th Dragoon Guards.
GENERAL H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF ORANGE, _w._ _Aides de Camp_--Lieutenant
Colonel Tripp, 60th Foot; Captains, Lord John Somerset, half pay; Hon.
Francis Russell, half pay. _Extra Aides de Camp_--Captain Earl of
March, 52nd Foot; Lieutenant H. Webster, 9th Light Dragoons.
LIEUTENANT GENERAL THE EARL OF UXBRIDGE, G.C.B., _w._; _Aides de
Camp_--Major W. Thornhill, 7th Hussars, _w._; Captain H. Seymour, 60th
Foot, _w._ _Extra Aides de Camp_--Captains T. Wildman, 7th Hussars,
_w._; J. Fraser, 7th Hussars, _w._
LIEUTENANT GENERAL LORD HILL, G.C.B. _Aides de Camp_--Major R. Egerton,
34th Foot; Lieutenant Colonel C. Hill, Royal Horse Guards, _w._;
Major C.H. Churchill, 1st Foot Guards; Captain D. Mackworth, 7th Foot.
_Extra Aide de Camp_--Captain Hon. O. Bridgeman, 1st Foot Guards, _w._
LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR THOMAS PICTON, G.C.B., _k._; _Aides de
Camp_--Captains, J. Tyler, 93rd Foot, _w._; N. Chambers, 1st Foot
Guards, _k._ _Extra Aide de Camp_--Captain B. Price, half pay.
LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR HENRY CLINTON, G.C.B. _Aide de Camp_--Captain F.
Dawkins, 1st Foot Guards.
Lieutenant General C. Count Alten, K.C.B., _w._ Aide de
Camp--Lieutenant W. Havelock, 43rd Foot, _w._; Major Ch. Heise, 2nd
Battalion King's German Legion.
LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR CHARLES COLVILLE, G.C.B. _Aides de
Camp_--Captain J. Jackson, 37th Foot; Lieutenant F.W. Frankland, 2nd
Foot. _Extra Aide de Camp_--Captain Lord James Hay, 1st Foot Guards.
MAJOR GENERAL V. COUNT ALTEN. _Aide de Camp_--Lieutenant Baron Estorff,
2nd Dragoons, King's German Legion.
MAJOR GENERAL SIR JOHN VANDELEUR, K.C.B. _Aide de Camp_--Captain W.
Armstrong, 19th Light Dragoons. _Major of Brigade_--Major M. Childers,
11th Light Dragoons.
MAJOR GENERAL COOKE, _w._; _Aide de Camp_--Captain G. Desbrowe, 1st
Foot Guards. _Extra Aide de Camp_--ENSIGN A. Cuyler, 2nd Foot Guards.
MAJOR GENERAL SIR JAMES KEMPT, K.C.B., _w._; _Aide de Camp_-Captain
Hon. Charles Gore, half pay. _Major of Brigade_--Captain C. Eeles, 95th
Foot.
MAJOR GENERAL HON. SIR W. PONSONBY, K.C.B., _k._; _Aide de
Camp_--Lieutenant B. Christie, 5th Dragoon Guards. _Extra Aide
de Camp_--Major D. Evans, 5th West India Regiment. _Major of
Brigade_--Major Reignolds, 2nd Dragoons, _k._
MAJOR GENERAL SIR JOHN BYNG, K.C.B. _Aide de Camp_--Captain H.
Dumaresq, 9th Foot, _w._ _Major of Brigade_--Captain W. Stothert, 3rd
Foot Guards, _w._
MAJOR GENERAL SIR DENIS PACK, K.C.B., _w._; _Aide de Camp_--Major E.
L'Estrange, 71st Foot, _k._ _Major of Brigade_--Captain C. Smith, 93rd
Foot, _k._
MAJOR GENERAL LORD E. SOMERSET, K.C.B. _Aide de Camp_--Lieutenant H.
Somerset, 18th Hussars. _Major of Brigade_--Major H. G. Smith, 25th
Foot, _k._
MAJOR GENERAL SIR COLQUHOUN GRANT, K.C.B., _w._; _Aide de
Camp_--Lieutenant R. Mansfield, 15th. Hussars, _w._ _Extra Aide
de Camp_--Captain W. Moray, 17th Light Dragoons, _w._ _Major of
Brigade_--Captain Jones, half pay.
MAJOR GENERAL SIR JAMES LYON, K.C.B. _Aide de Camp_--Lieutenant J.
M'Glashan, 2nd Light Battalion, King's German Legion. _Major of
Brigade_--Captain Richter, 1st Ceylon Regiment.
MAJOR GENERAL P. MAITLAND, _Aide de Camp_--Ensign Lord Hay, 1st Foot
Guards, _k._ _Extra Aide de Camp_--Cornet Lord William P. Lennox, Royal
Horse Guards. _Major of Brigade_--Captain J. Gunthorpe, 1st Foot Guards.
MAJOR GENERAL G. JOHNSTONE, _Aide de Camp_--Captain C.G. Gray, 25th
Foot. _Major of Brigade_--Captain S. Holmes, 78th Foot.
MAJOR GENERAL F. ADAM, _w._; _Aide de Camp_--Lieutenant R.P. Campbell,
7th Foot. _Extra Aide de Camp_--Captain C. Yorke, 52nd Foot. _Major of
Brigade_--Major Hunter Blair, 91st Foot, _w._
MAJOR GENERAL SIR COLIN HALKETT, K.C.B. _w._; _Aides de
Camp_--Captains, H. Marschalk, 1st Light Battalion, King's German
Legion, _k._; A. Holme, 2nd Light Battalion, King's German Legion.
_Major of Brigade_--Captain W. Crofton, 54th Foot, _k._
MAJOR GENERAL SIR HUSSEY VIVIAN, K.C.B. _Aide de Camp_--Captain E.
Keane, 7th Hussars. _Extra Aide de Camp_--Lieutenant C. A. Fitzroy,
Royal Horse Guards. _Major of Brigade_--Captain T.N. Harris, half pay,
_w._
ADJUTANT GENERAL--Major General Sir Edward Barnes, K.C.B., _w._
_Aide de Camp_--Major A. Hamilton, 4th West India Regiment, _w._
_Departmental Adjutant General_--Colonel Sir John Elley, K.C.B., Royal
Horse Guards, _w._
_Assistant Adjutants General_--Lieutenant Colonels, S. Waters,
Unattached, _w._; Sir George H. Berkeley, K.C.B., 35th Foot, _w._; Sir
Guy Campbell, Bart., 6th Foot; Sir Noel Hill, K.C.B., 1st Foot Guards;
D. Barclay, 1st Foot Guards; H. Rooke, 3rd Foot Guards; E. Currie,
90th Foot, _k._; Majors, A. Wylly, 7th Foot; G. Evatt, 55th Foot; W.
Darling, half pay; F. Breymann, 2nd Light Battalion, King's German
Legion.
_Deputy Assistant Adjutants General_--Captains, Hon. E.S. Erskine,
60th Foot, _w._; Lord Charles Fitzroy, 1st Foot Guards; C. Bentinck,
2nd Foot Guards; L. Grant, 78th Foot; H. Blanckley, 23rd Foot; Hon.
W. Curzon, 69th Foot, _k._ Lieutenants, J. Hamilton, 46th Foot, _w._;
J. Harford, 7th Royal Veteran Battalion; E. Gerstlacher, 3rd Hussars,
King's German Legion; J. Rooke, half pay.
_Deputy Judge Advocate_--Lieutenant Colonel S. Goodman, half pay.
DEPUTY QUARTER MASTER GENERAL--Colonel Sir William Delancey, K.C.B.,
_k._
_Assistant Quarter Masters General_--Colonels, Hon. A. Abercromby,
2nd Foot Guards, _w._; F.B. Hervey, 14th Light Dragoons. Lieutenant
Colonels, R. Torrens, 1st West India Regiment; Sir Charles Broke,
K.C.B., Permanent; Sir Jeremiah Dickson, K.C.B., Permanent; Lord
Greenock, Permanent; J. Woodford, 1st Foot Guards; C. Grant, 11th Foot;
Sir William Gomm, K.C.B., 2nd Foot Guards; Sir Henry Bradford, K.C.B.,
1st Foot Guards, _w._; Sir George Scovell, K.C.B., half pay; D. Kelly,
73rd Foot. Majors, W. Campbell, 23rd Foot; Hon. George L. Dawson, 1st
Dragoon Guards, _w._; E. Beckwith, 95th Foot, _w._; J. Shaw, 43rd Foot;
J. Jessop, 43rd Foot, _w._
_Deputy Assistant Quarter Masters General_--Captains, E. Fitzgerald,
25th Foot, _w._; T. Wright, Royal Staff Corps, _w._; H. McLeod, 35th
Foot, _w._; J. Mitchell, 25th Foot, _w._; W. Moore, 1st Foot Guards; G.
Hillier, 74th Foot; J. Fraser, 90th Foot; W. Cameron, 1st Foot Guards;
F. Read, Royal Staff Corps. Lieutenants, P. Barrailler, 33rd Foot; B.
Jackson, Royal Staff Corps; A. Brauns, Royal Staff Corps.
_Commandant at Head Quarters_--Colonel Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., 2nd
Foot Guards.
CAVALRY.
_1st Life Guards._ MAJOR--S. Ferrier, Lieutenant Colonel, _k._
CAPTAINS--J. Whale, _w._; M. Lind, _k._; E. Kelly, _w._; J. Berger,
Major. LIEUTENANTS--G. Randall; W. Mayne; H. Wyatt. SUB LIEUTENANTS--W.
S. Kichardson, _w._; S. Cox, _w._; W. Wombwell; G. Storey. SURGEON--R.
Gough. ASSISTANT SURGEON--J.H. James. VETERINARY SURGEON--F. Dalton.
_2nd Life Guards._ MAJOR--Hon. E.P. Lygon, Lieutenant Colonel.
CAPTAINS--W. Boyce, Major; R. Fitzgerald, Lieutenant Colonel, _k._;
Hon. H.E. Irby; J.P.M. Kenyon. LIEUTENANTS--R. Meares; W. Elliott;
S. Waymouth, _w._ and _m._; C. Barton. SUB LIEUTENANTS--A. Kenyon;
T. Martin; A. M'Innes; J. Clues, Adjutant. SURGEON--S. Broughton.
ASSISTANT SURGEON--T. Drinkwater. VETERINARY SURGEON--J. Field.
_Royal Horse Guards, Blue._ LIEUTENANT COLONELS--Sir John Elley,
Colonel, _w._; Sir R.C. Hill, _w._ Major--R.C. Packe, _k._ Captains--J.
Thoyts; W.R. Clayton; C. Hill, Lieutenant Colonel, _w._; W.T. Drake.
LIEUTENANTS--J.B. Riddlesden; W.C. Shawe, _w._; E.W. Bouverie, _w._;
H.E. Boates; T.B. Tathwell; G. Smith; Hon. G.J. Watson. CORNETS--J. K.
Picard; J. Arnold. SURGEON--D. Slow. VETERINARY SURGEON--J. Seddall.
TROOP QUARTER MASTERS--T. Varley, _w._; P. Watmough; T. Hardy; J.
Varley, _w._; T. Troy.
_1st (or King's) Dragoon Guards._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--W. Fuller,
Colonel, _k._ Captains--H. Graham, Major, _k._; M. Turner, _w._; J.F.
Naylor, _w._; W. Elton; J.D. Brughurst, Major, _k._; J.P. Sweeny, _w._;
R. Wallace; T.N. Quicke; G.E. Battersby, _k._ LIEUTENANTS--J. Leatham;
W. Sterling; R. Babington; F. Brooke, _k._; R.T. Hamley; T.C. Brander;
T. Shelver, Adjutant, k.; E. Hamill; W.D.A. Irvine, _w._; J.E. Greaves;
J.N. Hibbert. CORNETS--G. Quicke; J.F. Middleton; Hon. H.B. Bernard,
_k._; W.W. Huntley. PAYMASTER--J. Webster. SURGEON--J. Going. ASSISTANT
SURGEONS--W. M'Auley; Robert Pearson.
_1st Royal Dragoons._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--A.B. Clifton. MAJOR--P.
Dorville, Lieutenant Colonel. CAPTAINS--C.E. Radclyffe, Major, _w._;
A.K. Clark, _w._; P. Phipps; R. Heathcote; E.C. Windsor, _k._; C. L.
Methuin; C. Foster, _k._ LIEUTENANTS--H.R. Carden; G. Gunning, _w._;
T.R. Keily, _w._; S. Trafford, _w._; S. Windawe, _w._; C. Bridges; C.
Ommaney, _w._; C. Blois, _w._; S. Goodenough, _w._; R. Magniac, _k._
CORNETS--W. Sturges; J.C. Sykes, _k._ ADJUTANT CORNET--T. Shipley, _k._
QUARTER MASTER--W. Waddel. SURGEON--G. Steed. ASSISTANT SURGEON--T.
Prosser.
_2nd, or Royal North British, Dragoons (Scots Greys)._ LIEUTENANT
COLONEL--J.J. Hamilton, Colonel, _k._ MAJOR--J.B. Clarke, Lieutenant
Colonel, _w._; T.P. Hankin, Lieutenant Colonel, _w._ CAPTAINS--E.
Cheney, Major; J. Poole, _w._; R. Vernon, Major, _w._; T. Reignolds,
_k._; C.L. Barnard, _k._; E. Payne. LIEUTENANTS--John Mills, _w._;
F. Stupart, _w._; G.H. Falconer; J Wemyss; J. Carruthers, _w._; A.
Hamilton; T. Truther, _k._; J. Gape; C. Wyndham, _w._; J.R.T. Graham;
H. M'Millan. CORNETS--E. Westby, _k._; F.C. Kinchant, _k._; L.
Shuldam, _k._; W. Crawford. PAYMASTER--W. Dawson. QUARTER MASTER--J.
Lennox. SURGEON--R. Dunn. ASSISTANT SURGEON--J. Alexander. VETERINARY
SURGEON--J. Trigg.
_6th, or Inniskilling, Dragoons._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--J. Muter,
Colonel, _w._ MAJORS--F.S. Miller, Lieutenant Colonel, _w._; H. Madox.
CAPTAINS--W.F. Browne, _w._; W.F. Hadden; Hon. S. Douglass, _w._; E.
Holbech; T. Mackay. LIEUTENANTS--T. Biddulph; A.S. Willett; J. Linton;
H.W. Petre; A. Hassard, _w._; F. Johnson; R. Down; B. Barry; P. Ruffo,
_m._; M. Dames. CORNET--J.D. Allingham. ADJUTANT--M. M'Cluskey, _k._
REGIMENTAL QUARTER MASTER--J. Kerr. SURGEON--J. Bolton. ASSISTANT
SURGEONS--W.H. Rickatts; W. Campbell. VETERINARY SURGEON--R. Vincent.
PAYMASTER--W. Armstrong.
_7th Light Dragoons._ COLONEL--Earl of Uxbridge, Lieutenant General,
_w._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--Sir Edward Kerrison, Colonel. MAJORS--Edward
Hodge, _k._; W. Thornhill, _w._; CAPTAINS--W. Verner, _w._; T. W.
Robbins, _w._; E. Keane; P.A. Heyliger, _w._; T. Wildman; J.J. Frazer,
_w._; J.D. Elphinstone, _w._; E. Wildman, _w._ LIEUTENANTS--S. O'Grady;
W. Shirley; W. Grenfell; R. Douglass, _w._; R. Uniacke; J. R. Gordon,
_w._; Henry Lord Paget; J. Daniel; E.J. Peters, _w._; J. Wildman; F.
Beatty, _w._; S. Rice; F. Towers. PAYMASTER--T. Feltom. LIEUTENANT
ADJUTANT--A. Meyers, _w._; QUARTER MASTER--J. Greenwood. SURGEON--D.
Irwin. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--R.A. Chermside; J. Moffat. VETERINARY
SURGEON--R. Dorville.
_10th Hussars._ LIEUTENANT COLONELS--George Quentin, Colonel, _w._;
Lord Robert Manners. MAJOR--Hon. F. Howard, _k._; CAPTAINS--T. W.
Taylor, Major; H.C. Stapleton; J. Grey, _w._; J. Gurwood, _w._; C.
Wood, _w._; H. Floyd; A. Shakespeare. LIEUTENANTS--J.W. Parsons; C.
Gunning, _k._; W.S. Smith; H.J. Burn; R. Arnold, _w._; W. Cartwright;
J.C. Wallington; E. Hodgson; W.C. Hamilton; A. Bacon, _w._; W.H.B.
Lindsey. PAYMASTER--J. Tallon. LIEUTENANT and ADJUTANT--J. Hardman.
ASSISTANT SURGEON--G.S. Jenks. VETERINARY SURGEON--H.C. Sannerman.
_11th Light Dragoons._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--J.W. Sleigh. MAJOR--A.
Money, Lieutenant Colonel. CAPTAINS--J. Bouchier; B. Lutyens, Major; M.
Childers, Major; J.A. Schreiber; J. Jenkins; T. Binney; J. Duberley.
LIEUTENANTS--G. Sicker; F. Wood, _w._; W. Smith; R. Coles, _w._; B.
Lye; E. Phelips, _k._; J.R. Rotton; J.S. Moore, _w._; B. Des Voeux; R.
Millingan, _w._ CORNETS--B.P. Browne; H. Orme; G. Schreiber, _w._; H.R.
Bullock; P.H. James. PAYMASTER--D. Lutyens ADJUTANT--G. Sicker. QUARTER
MASTER--J. Hall. SURGEON--J. O'Meally. ASSISTANT SURGEON--H. Steel.
_12th, or Prince of Wales's, Light Dragoons._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--Hon.
F.C. Ponsonby, Colonel, _w._; MAJOR--J.P. Bridger. CAPTAINS--S.
Stawell; G.F. Erskine; E.W.T. Sandys, _w._; H. Wallace; A. Barton;
H. Andrews. LIEUTENANTS--W. Heydon; J. Chatterton; J. Vandeleur; W.
Hay; W.H. Dowbiggen, _w._; A. Goldsmid; J.D. Calderwood; L.J. Bertie,
_k._; T. Reed. CORNETS--J.E. Lockhart _k._; J.H. Slade. ADJUTANT--J.
Griffiths.
_13th Light Dragoons._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--P. Doherty, Colonel.
MAJOR--S. Boyse, Lieutenant Colonel, _w._; CAPTAINS--B. Lawrence,
Major; J. Doherty, _w._; J. Macalister, Major; M. Bowers; J. Gubbins,
_k._; C. Gregorie; F. Goulbourn; J. Moss; G. Doherty, _w._; J.H.
Drought; C.R. Bowers, _w._; A.T. Maclean; J. Geale, _w._; R. Nesbitt;
G. Pym, _w._; W. Turner; J. Mill, _w._; G.H. Pack, _w._; H. Acton;
J. Wallace; J.E. Irving, _w._; J. Wakefield. PAYMASTER--A. Strange.
QUARTER MASTER--W. Minchin. SURGEON--T.G. Logan. ASSISTANT SURGEON--A.
Armstrong. VETERINARY SURGEON--J. Coustant.
_15th Hussars._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--L.C. Dalrymple, _w._; MAJOR--E.
Griffith, _k._; CAPTAINS--J. Thackwell, _w._; S. Hancox; J. Whiteford,
_w._; P. Wodehouse; F.C. Philips; W. Booth; J. Buckley, _w._; J.
Carr. LIEUTENANTS--E. Barrett; J. Sherwood, _k._; W. Bellairs; H.
Lane; W. Byam, _w._; E. Byam, _w._; G.A.F. Dawkins, _w._; H. Dixon;
J.J. Douglass; W. Stewart. PAYMASTER--J.C. Cocksedge. LIEUTENANT and
ADJUTANT--J. Griffith. SURGEON--T. Cartan. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--S.
Jeyes; W. Gibney. VETERINARY SURGEON--C. Dalwig.
_16th Light Dragoons._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--James Hay, _w._;
MAJORS--Hon. H.B. Lygon; G.H. Murray. CAPTAINS--J.H. Belli, Major;
C. Swetenham; R. Weyland, _w._; W. Persse; J.P. Buchanan, _k._; W.
Tomkinson; C. King. LIEUTENANTS--J. Barra; W. Osten, _w._; T. Wheeler;
G. Baker; R. Beauchamp; N.D. Crichton, _w._; E.B. Lloyd; W. Nepean;
J.A. Richardson; J. Luard; W. Harris; Hon. C.T. Monckton. CORNETS--W.
Beckwith; W. Polhill; G. Nugent. PAYMASTER--G. Neyland. LIEUTENANT and
ADJUTANT--J. Barra. QUARTER MASTER--J. Harrison. SURGEON--J. Robinson.
ASSISTANT SURGEON--J.M. Mallock. VETERINARY SURGEON--J. Jones.
_18th Light Dragoons._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--Hon. H. Murray. CAPTAINS--A.
Kennedy; R. Croker; R. Ellis; J. Grant, Major; G. Luard; J.R.L. Lloyd.
LIEUTENANTS--C. Heste, _w._; T. Dunkin; J. Waldie; G. Woodberry; Hon.
L.C. Dawson; M. French; T. Prior; R. Coote; J.T. Macbell; D. M'Duffie;
H. Somerset; W.H. Rowlls; J.R. Gordon; C.C. Moller; W. Monins.
PAYMASTER--W. Deane. LIEUTENANT and ADJUTANT--H. Duperier, _w._;
SURGEON--W. Chambers. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--L. Pulsford; J. Quincey.
VETERINARY SURGEON--D. Pilcher.
_23rd Light Dragoons._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--Earl of Portarlington,
Colonel. MAJORS--J.M. Sutcliffe, _w._; P.A. Latour. CAPTAINS--C.W.
Dance, _w._; P.Z. Cox; J. Martin; T. Gerrard, Major, _w._; R. M'Neil;
H. Grove, Major; J.M. Wallace. LIEUTENANTS--G. Dodwell; A. Bolton; S.
Coxen, _k._; C. Tudor; J. Banner; J. Lewis; C. Bacon; B. Disney, _w._;
R. Johnson; T.B. Wall, _w._; G.W. Blathwayte. CORNET--W. Hemmings.
PAYMASTER--T. Dillow. LIEUTENANT and ADJUTANT--H. Hill; QUARTER
MASTER--J. Grouchley. SURGEON--S. Steele. ASSISTANT SURGEON--H. Cowen.
VETERINARY SURGEON--J. Ship.
INFANTRY.
_1st Regiment Foot Guards_ (_2nd and 3rd Battalions_). MAJORS--H.
Askew, Colonel, _w._; Hon. W. Stuart, _w._; CAPTAINS and LIEUTENANT
COLONELS--Hon. H. Townsend, _w._; R.H. Cooke, _w._; E. Stables, _k._;
Sir F. D'Oyly, K.C.B., _k._; L.G. Jones; H. D'Oyly, _w._; G. Fead,
_w._; C. Thomas, _k._; Lord Saltoun; J. Reeve; W. Miller, _w._; Hon.
J. Stanhope; J.G. Woodford; C. Colquett; W.H. Milnes, _w._; Sir
H.W. Bradford, K.C.B., _w._; Sir T.N. Hill, K.C.B.; Sir D. Barclay,
K.C.B.; Sir U. Burgh, K.C.B.; Lord F. Somerset, K.C.B. LIEUTENANTS and
CAPTAINS--R. Adair, _w._; T. Streatfield, _w._; J.H. Davis; Lord James
Hay, _k._; E. Grose, _k._; J. Gunthorpe, Adjutant; Hon. R. Clements,
_w._; Lord C. Fitzroy; J.H. Hutchinson; R. Ellison; H.W. Powell;
George Desbrowe; W.G. Cameron; Lonsdale Boldero; R.W. Phillimore;
C.P. Ellis, _w._; J. Simpson, _w._; A.F. Viscount Bury; E. Clive;
W.F. Johnstone; E.F. Luttrell, _w._; T. Brown, _k._; E.P. Buckley; F.
Dawkins; J. Nixon; C.F.R. Lascelles, _w._; W.G. Moore; S.W. Burgess,
_w._ ENSIGNS--R. Batty, _w._; R. Master; W. Barton, _w._; Hon. H.S.V.
Vernon; E. Pardoe, _k._; J. Butler; T.R. Swinburne; C. J. Vyner; F.D.
Swan; J.P. Dirom, Lieutenant; J.F.M. Erskine; R. Bruce, _w._; Hon.
T.S. Bathurst; Hon. E.A. Edgcumbe; G. Fludyer, _w._; W.F. Tinling; A.
Greville; G.T. Jacob; D. Cameron; L. Hurd; F. Norton; H. Lascelles;
G. Mure; G. Allen; T.E. Croft, _w._; Hon. S.S.P. Barrington, _k._; J.
St. John; D. Tighe; J. Talbot. ADJUTANT--C: Allix, Captain. QUARTER
MASTER--R. Colquhoun. SURGEONS--W. Curtis; W. Watson. ASSISTANT
SURGEONS--J. Harrison; A. Armstrong; J. Gardner; F. Gilder.
_Coldstream, or 2nd Regiment, Foot Guards_ (_2nd Battalion_). MAJOR--A.
G. Woodford, Colonel. CAPTAINS and LIEUTENANT COLONELS--J. Macdonell,
Lieutenant Colonel, _w._; D. MacKinnon, Lieutenant Colonel, _w._; Hon.
J. Walpole; H. Dawkins; H.A. Abercromby, _k._; Sir C. Campbell, K.C.B.;
Hon. E. Acheson; Sir W. Gomm, K.C.B.; H. Wyndham, _w._ LIEUTENANTS and
CAPTAINS--G. Bowles; T. Sowerby; J. Fremantle, Lieutenant Colonel;
W.L. Walton; W.G. Baynes; C. A.F. Bentinck, Adjutant; J.S. Cowell;
E. Sumner, _w._; J.L. Blackman, _k._; Lord Hotham; Hon. R. Moore,
_w._; T. Chaplin. ENSIGNS--Hon. J. Forbes; H. Gooch; A. Cuyler; M.
Beaufoy; H.F. Griffiths, _w._; John Montagu, _w._; G.R. Buckley; J.
Hervey; H. Vane; F.J. Douglas; R. Bowen; A. Gordon; Hon. W. Forbes; C.
Short. ADJUTANT--C.A.F. Bentinck, Captain. QUARTER MASTER--B. Selway.
SURGEON--W. Whymper. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--G. Smith; W. Hunter.
_3rd Foot Guards_ (_2nd Battalion_). MAJOR--F. Hepburn, Colonel.
CAPTAINS and LIEUTENANT COLONELS--H.W. Rooke; D. Mercer; Hon. Sir
A. Gordon, _k._; C. Dashwood, _w._; F. Home; C.F. Canning, _k._; E.
Bowater, _w._; C. West, _w._ LIEUTENANTS and CAPTAINS--W. Stothert,
Adjutant; W. Drummond; R.B. Hesketh, _w._; H. Hawkins; R.H. Wigston;
C.J. Barnet; J.W. Moorhouse; E.B. Fairfield; G. Evelyn, _w._; Hon. H.
Forbes, _k._; J. Elrington; H.B. Montgomerie, _w._; T. Crawford, _k._;
J. Ashton, _k._ ENSIGNS--C. Lake, _w._; Hon. E. Stopford; B. Drummond;
G.D. Standen; D. Baird, _w._; W.F. Hamilton; W. James; Hon. G. Anson;
T. Wedgewood; W. Butler; A.C. Cochrane; J. Prendergast; C. Simpson,
_w._; H.S. Blane; H. Montague. ADJUTANT--W. Stothert, Captain, _w._
QUARTER MASTER--J. Skuce. SURGEON--S. Good. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--J.R.
Warde; F.G. Hanrott.
_1st Regiment Foot, or Royal Scots_ (_3rd Battalion_). MAJOR--Colin
Campbell, Lieutenant Colonel, _w._; CAPTAINS--L. Arquimbau, Major,
_w._; R. Macdonald, Major, _w._; H. Massy, Major, _w._; W. Buckley,
_k._; W. Gordon; R. Dudgeon, _w._ LIEUTENANTS--A. Morrison, _w._; J.
Armstrong, _k._; J.E.O. Neil, _k._; W.J. Rea, _w._; J. Ingram, _w._; W.
Clarke, _w._; G.C. Johnstone; T. Gordon; A. Cameron, Adjutant, _w._;
J. Stoyte, _w._; R.H. Scott, _w._; G. Lane, _w._; J. Symes, _w._;
J. Alstone, _w._; W.G. Young, _k._; J. Mann, _w._; W. Dobbs, _w._;
J.F.W. Millar, _w._; G. Stewart, _w._; J.L. Black, _w._ ENSIGNS--A.
Glen; C. Mudie; J.G. Kennedy, _k._; C. Lewis; C. Graham, _w._; T.
Stephens, _w._; J. MacKay, _w._; A. Robertson, _k._; W. Anderson, _k._;
L.M. Cooper, _w._; W. Thomas. PAYMASTER--J.C. Thompson. ADJUTANT--A.
Cameron, _w._; QUARTER MASTER--T. Griffith, _w._; SURGEON--W. Galliers.
ASSISTANT SURGEONS--W. Finnie; T. Bolton.
_4th Regiment Foot_ (_King's Own_). LIEUTENANT COLONEL--F. Brooke.
CAPTAINS--G.D. Wilson, Major, _w._; C.J. Edgell, _w._; W.L. Wood;
J. W. Fletcher; H.T. Shaw; R. Erskine; D.S. Craig; E.S. Kirwan; J.
Browne, _w._ LIEUTENANTS--G. Vincent; B. Martin; G. Richardson, _w._;
P. Boulby; H. Boyd, _w._; G.H. Hearne; B. Collins, _w._; W. Squire,
_w._; J. Bushel; R. Mulholland; W. Lonsdale; E. Boulby; W. Clarke; W.
Richardson, Adjutant; F. Field; W. Reddock; A. Gerard, _w._; J. L.
Fernandez; W. Blagrave; C. Levinge. ENSIGNS--W. Taylor; E. Newton;
W.H. Matthews, _w._; J.E.H. Holland; I. Beer. PAYMASTER--J. Lansdale.
QUARTER MASTER--T. Richards. SURGEON--F. Burton. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--W.
Morrah; J. French.
_14th Regiment Foot_ (_3rd Battalion_). MAJORS--F.S. Tidy, Lieutenant
Colonel; J. Keightley. CAPTAINS--G. Marley, Major; T. Ramsay;
W. Turnor; W. Ross; R. Adams; C. Wilson; J.L. White; W. Hewett.
LIEUTENANTS--W. Akenside; C.M. Brannan; L. Beachcroft; W. Buckle,
Adjutant; G. Baldwin; J. Nickson; L. Westwood; D. Slocock; J.C.
Hartley; H. Boldero. ENSIGNS--W. Reed; J. Mackenzie; F.R. Fane; R.B.
Newenham; C. Frazer; A.T.E. Adamson; W. Keowen; J.M. Wood; A. Ormsby,
_w._ (24th); J.R. Smith; A. Cooper, _w._; J. Bowlby; J.P. Matthews;
R.J. Stackpoole; R.B. Holmes; Hon. G.T. Keppel. PAYMASTER--R. Mitton.
QUARTER MASTER--A. Ross. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--A. Shannon; Henry Terry.
_23rd Regiment Foot_ (_Royal Welsh Fusiliers_). LIEUTENANT COLONEL--Sir
H.W. Ellis, K.C.B., Colonel, _w._; MAJORS--T. Dalmer, Lieutenant
Colonel; J.H.E. Hill, Lieutenant Colonel, _w._ CAPTAINS--J. Hawtyn,
Major, _k._; P. Brown, Major; F. Dalmer, Major; H. Wynne; T.
Strangeway; W. Campbell, Major; C. Jolliffe, _k._; T. Farmer, _k._;
H. Johnson, _w._; H.S. Blanckley. FIRST LIEUTENANTS--F. O'Flaherty;
J. Milne; W. Walley; E.M. Brown; F.L.G. Cowel; G. Hensham, _k._;
R. Smith; H. Palmer; J.W. Harris; J. Enoch, Adjutant; G. Philips;
J. Macdonald; G. Fielding; R.P. Holmes; C. Fryer; W.A. Griffiths,
_w._; J. Clyde, _w._; A.A. Brice; A.D. Sidley _w._; A. Clayhills; E.
Methold. SECOND LIEUTENANTS--T. Lilly; G. Dunn; G. Stainforth; G.
FitzGibbon; W. Leebody, _k._ (24th); T. Towers; T. Allan. PAYMASTER--R.
Julian. LIEUTENANT and ADJUTANT--J. Enoch. QUARTER MASTER--G. Sidley.
SURGEON--J. Dunn. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--T. Smith; J. Williams.
_27th_ (_Inniskilling_) _Regiment Foot_. CAPTAINS--J. Hare, Major,
_w._; J. Tucker, _w._; G. Holmes, _k._ LIEUTENANTS--G. Macdonald, _w._;
W. Henderson, _w._; R. Handcock, _w._; E.W. Drewe, _w._; J. Betty;
W.F. Fortescue, _w._; W. Talbot; J. Millar, _w._; C. Manley, _w._; T.
Craddock, _w._ ENSIGNS--W. Kater; T. Handcock, _w._; T. Smith, _w._; S.
Ireland. _k._; J. Ditmas, _w._ QUARTER MASTER--T. Taylor. ASSISTANT
SURGEONS--T. Mostyn; G. Fitz Gerald.
_28th Regiment Foot._ LIEUTENANT COLONELS--Sir Charles Philip Belson,
K.C.B., Colonel; B. Nixon, _w._; MAJORS--W.P. Meacham, _k._; W. Irving,
_w._; R. Llewellyn, _w._; CAPTAINS--C. Cadell; R. Kelly, _w._; J.
Bowles, _w._; T. English, _w._; C. Teulon, _w._ LIEUTENANTS--J.H.
Crumner; J.F. Wilkinson, _w._; M. Semple; R.P. Gilbert, _w._; R.P.
Eason, _w._; W. Irwin, _w._; H. Hilliard, _w._; S. Moore; J. Coen,
_w._; C.B. Carruthers, _w._; J.T. Clarke, _w._; J.W. Shelton, _w._;
J. Deares, _w._; E.E. Hill; G. Ingram, _w._; T.W. Colleton; J. Parry.
ENSIGNS--R. T. Stewart; W. Serjeantson; R. Martin; J. Simpkin; W.
Mountsteven, _w._; W. Lynam. LIEUTENANT and ADJUTANT--T. Bridgeland,
_w._; PAYMASTER--J. Dewes. QUARTER MASTER--R. Reynolds. ASSISTANT
SURGEON--P.H. Lavens.
_30th Regiment Foot_ (_2nd Battalion_). LIEUTENANT COLONEL--A.
Hamilton, _w._ MAJORS--N.W. Bailey, _w._; C.A. Vigoureux, _w._; T.W.
Chambers, _k._; CAPTAINS--A. M'Nab, _k._; R. Howard; A. Gore, _w._;
M. Ryan; D. Sinclair-Finneane. LIEUTENANTS--B.W. Nicholson; J. Gowan;
R. Mayne; M. Andrews; R. Heaviside; R.C. Elliot, _w._; A.W. Freear;
J. Rumley, _w._; R. Daniells, _w._; P. Neville; J. Roe, _w._; T.O.
Halloran; R. Hughes, _w._; P. Lockwood, _w._; J. Pratt, _w._; H. Beere,
_k._; E. Prendergast, _k._; W.O. Warren, _w._; T. Moneypenny, _w._; R.
Harrison; J. Roe; F. Tincombe. ENSIGNS--R.N. Rogers; J. James, _k._;
E. Macready; J. Bullen, _k._ PAYMASTER--H.B. Wray. LIEUTENANT and
ADJUTANT--M. Andrews, _w._; QUARTER MASTER--Williamson. SURGEON--J.G.
Elkington. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--J. Evans; P. Clarke.
_32nd Regiment Foot._ MAJORS--J. Hicks, Lieutenant Colonel; F. Calvert.
CAPTAINS--C. Hames, Major; H.R. Lewen; W.H. Toole, Major, _w._; J.
Crowe, _w._; J. Boyce, _k._; T. Cassan, _k._; E. Whitty, _k._; H.
Harrison, _w._; C. Wallett, _w._; S. Cane. LIEUTENANTS--H.W. Brookes,
_w._; G. Barr, _w._; M.W. Meighan, _w._; S.H. Lawrence, _w._; T.
Butler; J. Boase, _w._; T. Ross Lewin, _w._; H. Butterworth, _w._;
J.S. M'Culloch; J.R. Colthurst, _w._; B. Hill; J. Harvey; J. Robinson,
_w._; G. Brock; R.T. Belcher; J. Fitzgerald, _w._; T.J. Horan, _w._;
E. Stephens, _w._; H. Quill, _w._; J. Jagoe, _w._; G. Small; B.R.
O'Connor; H. Newton; J. Peyton. ENSIGNS--J. Lucas; J. M'Conchy; H.
Metcalf, _w._; J. Birtwhistle, _w._; A. Stuart, _w._; G. Brown; W.
Bennet, _w._; C. Dallas, _w._; LIEUTENANT and ADJUTANT--D. Davis,
_w._; PAYMASTER--T. Hart. QUARTER MASTER--W. Stevens. SURGEON--W.
Buchanan. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--R. Lawder; H. M'Clintock.
_33rd Regiment Foot (2nd Battalion)._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--W.K.
Elphinstone. MAJORS--G. Colclough; E. Parkinson, _w._; CAPTAINS--W.
M'Intyre, _w._; C. Knight, _w._; J. Haigh, _k._; J.M. Harty, _w._; R.
Gore; J. Longden. LIEUTENANTS--T. Reid, _w._; G. Barrs; H.R. Buck,
_k._; A.H. Trevor; J. Boyce, _k._; A. Gore, _k._; J. Hart; J. Markland,
_w._; T.H. Patterson; R. Westmore, _w._; T.D. Haigh, _w._; G. Whannel;
J.G. Ogle, _w._; S.A. Pagan, _w._; E. Clabon; J. Lynam; J. Archibald;
J. Forlong, _w._; J. Cameron, _w._ ENSIGNS--H. Bain, _w._; J. Alderson,
_w._; J.A. Howard, _w._; A. Watson; C. Smith; W. Hodson; G. Blackall;
G. Drury, _w._; W.H. Grote. PAYMASTER--E. Stoddart. ADJUTANT--W. Thain,
_w._ QUARTER MASTER--J. Fazakerly. SURGEON--R. Learer. ASSISTANT
SURGEONS--W. Fry; D. Finlayson.
_35th Regiment Foot (2nd Battalion)._ MAJORS--C. Macalister; J.
Slessor, Lieutenant Colonel. CAPTAINS--C.W. Wall; W. Rawson; H.
Rutherford; T. M'Niell; R. Cameron; N. Dromgoole. LIEUTENANTS--S. S.
Scarfe; J.W. Amos; J. Osbourne; T. M'Donough; R. Thobourne; W. Farrant;
A. Barnwell; J. Hildebrant; P. Murdock; J. Wilder; N.R. Tompkins; E.
Shewell; W. Rainsford; G. Wilkins; J. Middleton. ENSIGNS--J.M. Bliss;
W.L. Hedding; J. Hewetson; W. Macalister; J.B. Wyatt; Lord S. Ker; N.
M'Donnell; R. Pottenger; A.D. Hamilton; J. Thomas. PAYMASTER--W. Bury.
ADJUTANT--C. S. Brearey. QUARTER MASTER--R. Foot. SURGEON--C.S. Doyle.
ASSISTANT SURGEONS--W. Keoghoe; J. Purcell.
_40th Regiment Foot._ MAJORS--A.R. Heyland, _k._; F. Browne.
CAPTAINS--S. Stretton, Major; R. Turton; C. Ellis, _w._; J.H. Barnet,
_w._; R. Philips; W. Fisher, _k._; E.C. Bowen; P. Bishop; J.D.
Franklyn; W. Kelly. LIEUTENANTS--J. Thoreau; M. Chadwick; R. Moore,
_w._; W.O. Sandwith; J. Butler; H. Millar; J. Richardson; J. Anthony,
_w._; C. Gorman; J. Mill, _w._;--Glynne; W. Neilly; R. Hudson; H.
Wilkinson; J. Foulkes; T. Campbell, _w._; H.B. Wray; R. Jones; Hon. M.
Browne, _w._; D. M'Donald; F. Fort; G. Hibbert; R. Rudd. ENSIGNS--H.
Helmsley; J.L. Wall; W. Clerke; G. Atkinson; R. Thornhill; J.
Murphy; W.J. M'Carthy. PAYMASTER--F.H. Durand. ADJUTANT--W. Manning,
Lieutenant. SURGEON--W. James. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--W. Barry; G. Scott.
_42nd Regiment Foot_ (_Royal Highlanders_). LIEUTENANT COLONELS--Sir
Robert Macara, _k._; R.H. Dick, _w._; Major--A. Menzies, _w._
CAPTAINS--J. Campbell, Lieutenant Colonel; G. Davidson, Major, _w._;
M. Macpherson, _w._; D. M'Donald, _w._; D. M'Intosh, _w._; R. Boyle,
_w._; LIEUTENANTS--D. Chisholm, _w._; D. Stewart, _w._; D. M'Kenzie,
_w._; H.A. Frazer, _w._; J. Malcolm, _w._; A. Dunbar, _w._; J. Brander,
_w._; R. Gordon, _k._; R. Stewart; J. Robertson; K. M'Dougall; D.
M'Kay; A. Innes; J. Grant; J. Orr, _w._; G.G. Munro, _w._ ENSIGNS--G.
Gerard, _k._; W. Fraser, _w._; A.L. Fraser, _w._; A. Brown; A.
Cumming. ADJUTANT--J. Young, _w._, QUARTER MASTER--D. M'Intosh, _w._;
SURGEON--S. M'Leod. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--D. M'Pherson; J. Stewart.
_44th Regiment Foot (2nd Battalion)._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--J.M.
Hamerton, _w._ MAJOR--G. O'Malley, Lieutenant Colonel. CAPTAINS--A.
Brugh, _w._; D. Power, _w._; W. Burney, _w._; M. Fane, _w._
LIEUTENANTS--R. Russell, _w._; R.J. Twinberrow; R. Grier, _w._; W.
Tomkins, _k._; W.B. Strong, _w._; J. Campbell, _w._; N.T. Kingsley; J.
Burke, _w._; H. Martin; W.M. Hern, _w._; A Reddock. ENSIGNS--Christie,
_w._; B. Whitney, _w._; G. Dunlevie; P. Cooke, _k._; T. M'Cann, _w._;
J.C. Webster, _w._; A. Wilson, _w._ PAYMASTER--J. Williams. ENSIGN
and ADJUTANT--T. M'Cann, _w._; QUARTER MASTER--H. Jones. SURGEON--O.
Halpin. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--J. Collins; W. Newton.
_51st Foot._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--H.H. Mitchell, Colonel. MAJOR--S.
Rice, Lieutenant Colonel. CAPTAINS--J.T. Keyt, Major; J. Campbell;
W. Thwaits, Major; R. Storer; J.H. Phelps; James Ross; J. Ross; S.
Beardsley, _w._; E. Frederick. LIEUTENANTS--T. Brook; B.B. Hawley; F.
Minchin; W. Mahon; W.H. Hare; O. Ainsworth; H. Read; F. Kennedy; J.
Dyas; J.J. Flaman, _k._; W.H. Elliott; W.D. Simpson; F. Mainwaring;
C.W. Tyndall, _w._; H. Martin; H.H. Roberts; E. Isaacson; E.J. Taylor;
T. Troward; J. Lintott. ENSIGNS--G.F.B. St John; F. Percy; W.K. Krause;
R.B. Walton; W. Johnstone; A. Fraser; J. Blair; H. Lock. PAYMASTER--J.
Gibbs. LIEUTENANT and ADJUTANT--W. Jones. QUARTER MASTER--T. Askey.
SURGEON--R. Webster. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--J.F. Clarke; P. Fitzpatrick.
_52nd Foot._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--Sir John Colborne, K.C.B., Colonel.
MAJOR--C. Rowan, Lieutenant Colonel, _w._; CAPTAINS--P. Campbell,
Major; W. Chalmers, Major; W. Rowan, Major, _w._; J.F. Love, Major,
_w._; C. Earl of March, Major; C. Diggle, Major, _w._; J. Shedden;
G. Young; J. M'Nair; E. Langton; J. Cross; C. Yorke. LIEUTENANTS--C.
Dawson, _w._; M. Anderson, _w._; C. Kenny; G.H. Love; W. Ripley; J.C.
Barrett; W.H. Clerke; G. Hall; W.R. Nixon; G. Gawler; G. Whichcote;
W. Ogilvy; E.R. Northey; Hon. W. Browne; E. Scoones; G. Campbell,
_w._; W. Austin; J. Snodgrass; J.S. Cargill; W. Hunter; W.C. Yonge;
T. Cottingham, _w._; C. Holman; G. Moore; E. Mitchell; C. Shawe; J.
Hart; G.E. Scott; H.T. Oakes; J.R. Griffith; J. Burnett; R. Steward; G.
Robson; F.W. Love. ENSIGNS--J. Jackson; T. Massie; W. Nettles, _k._;
J. Macnab; J. Montagu; J.F. May; E. Monins; W. Leeke. PAYMASTER--J.
Clarke. LIEUTENANT and ADJUTANT--J. Winterbottom, _w._ QUARTER
MASTER--B. Sweeten. SURGEON--J.B. Gibson. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--P. Jones;
W. Macartney.
_54th Regiment Foot._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--J. Earl Waldegrave.
MAJORS--Sir Neil Campbell, Colonel; A. Kelly. CAPTAINS--T.C. Kirby; R.
Blakeman; W. Crofton, Brigade Major, _k._; J. Leslie; G.J. Tappenden;
G. Black, Brigade Major; T. Chartres. LIEUTENANTS--G. Fraser; G.
Bromhead; E.A. Evanson; J. Pillon; R. Woodgate; W. Claus; R. Kelly; J.
Grey; P. Mandilhon; J.H. Potts; R. Seacroft; F. Taylor; E. Marcon; J.
Reid; R. Stacpoole; F. Burgess; W. Pilkington; W. Persse; D. Denham;
F. Hutchinson; M.S.H. Lloyd. ENSIGNS--E. Nugent; T. Fraser; C. Hill;
J. Clark; C.W. Thomas; A. Mathewson; P. Clarke. PAYMASTER--H. Irwin.
ADJUTANT--J. Dowdell. QUARTER MASTER--W. Coates. SURGEON--G. Redmond.
ASSISTANT SURGEONS--M.F. Finan; G. Leech.
_59th Regiment Foot (2nd Battalion)._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--H. Austen.
MAJORS--F.W. Hoysted, Lieutenant Colonel; C. Douglas. CAPTAINS--F.
Fuller; J. Cockburn; A. Pilkington; J.A. Crawford; J. M'Gregor; J.
Fawson. LIEUTENANTS--R. Preedy; W.F. Mayne; A. Dent; J. Cowper; H.
Brown; A. Macpherson; E. Duncan; N. Chadwick; L. Carmichael; H.
Hartford; P. O'Hara; W. Veall; W. Pittman; W.H. Hill; G. Robinson; R.
Scott. ENSIGNS--A.C. Ross; H.K. Bloomfield; R.F. Hill; C. Makepeace.
PAYMASTER--C. Marr. ADJUTANT--A. Campbell, Lieutenant. QUARTER
MASTER--W. Baird. SURGEON--J. Hagan. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--P.K. Lambe; A.
Calvin.
_69th Regiment Foot (2nd Battalion)._ COLONEL--C. Morice, _k._;
MAJOR--G. Muttlebury, Lieutenant Colonel. CAPTAINS--J.L. Watson,
Major, _w._; H. Lindsay, Major, _w._; G.S. Cotter; C. Cuyler; B.
Hobhouse, _k._; H.W. Curzon, _k._; R. Blackwood, _k._; G.W. Barlow.
LIEUTENANTS--W. Harrison; R. Franklyn; S. Parke; B. Pigot, _w._; C.
Busteed, _w._; N. Ray; C.W. Ingle; J. Hill; H. Oldershaw, Adjutant;
C.L. Dickson; E.M. Wrightwick, _k._; H. Anderson, _w._; J. Stewart,
_w._; ENSIGNS--E. Hodder, _w._; W. Bartlett; C. Seward; H.D. Keith;
G.S.H. Ainslie; Volunteer Clarke, _w._; PAYMASTER--P. Vyvyan. QUARTER
MASTER--M. Stevens. SURGEON--C. Bancks, M.D. ASSISTANT SURGEON--J.
Bartlet.
_71st Light Infantry_ (_Glasgow Highlanders_). LIEUTENANT COLONEL--T.
Reynell, Colonel, _w._; MAJORS--A. Jones, Lieutenant Colonel, _w._; L.
Walker. CAPTAINS--S. Reed; J.T. Pidgeon; A. Armstrong; D. Campbell,
_w._; E. L'Estrange, Major, _k._; W.A. Grant, _w._; J. Henderson, _w._;
A.J. M'Intyre; C. Johnstone, Major, _w._; A. Grant. LIEUTENANTS--J.
Baraillier, _w._; L. Richards; J.R. Elwes, _k._; C. Stewart; R.
Baldwin; W.C. Hanson, _w._; R. Lind, _w._; J. Roberts, _w._; J. Coates;
J. Fraser; E. Gilborne; J. Whitney; W. Long; R. Lawe, _w._; C.T. Cox;
C. Lewin, _w._; W. Woolcombe; W. Torriano; G.W. Horton; J. Coote, _w._;
C. Moorhead; D. Soutar; H. Mamro; N. Campbell. ENSIGNS--A. Moffit;
W. Smith; H.W. Thompson; J. Todd, _k._; J. Barnett; A. M. Henderson;
J. Spalding; J. Impett; A. L'Estrange. PAYMASTER.--H. Mackenzie.
ADJUTANT--W. Anderson, Lieutenant, _w._; QUARTER MASTER--W. Gavin.
SURGEON--A. Stewart. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--J. Winterscale; L. Hill.
_73rd Regimen Foot_ (_2nd Battalion_). COLONEL--G. Harris, _w._;
MAJOR--A. J. Maclean, _w._; CAPTAINS--H. Coane, _w._; A. Robertson,
_k._; W. Wharton, _w._; J.M. Kennedy, _k._; J. Garland, _w._
LIEUTENANTS--R. Leyne; J.W.H. Strachan, _k._; J.R. M'Connell, _w._; M.
Hollis, _k._; J. Acres, _w._; J. Dowling; T. Reynolds, _w._; D. Browne,
_w._; J.Y. Lloyd, _w._; R. Stewart. ENSIGNS--R.G. Hesilrige, _w._;
W. MacBean, _w._; T. Deacon, _w._; C.B. Eastwood, _w._; G.D. Bridge,
_w._; G. Hughes; W.S. Lowe, _k._; A. Blennerhasset; C. Page, _k._
ADJUTANT--J. Hay, _w._; PAYMASTER--J. Williams. SURGEON--D. M'Dearmid.
ASSISTANT SURGEONS--J. Riach; F.B. White.
_79th Regiment Foot_ (_Cameron Highlanders_). LIEUTENANT COLONEL--Neil
Douglas, _w._; MAJORS--A. Brown, Lieutenant Colonel, _w._; D. Cameron,
Lieutenant Colonel, _w._; CAPTAINS--T. Mylne, Major, _w._; P. Innes;
R. Mackay, _k._; J. Campbell, _w._; N. Campbell, _w._; W. Marshall,
_w._; M. Fraser, _w._; ---- M'Kay, _k._; W. Bruce, _w._; J. Sinclair,
_w._; LIEUTENANTS--A. Cameron, _w._; D. Cameron, _w._; T. Brown, _w._;
W. Maddocks, _w._; W. Leaper, _w._; J. Fraser, _w._; D. M'Pherson,
_k._; D. M'Phee, _w._; F. Robertson; E. Cameron, _w._; A. Forbes,
_w._; C. M'Arthur, _w._; K.J. Leslie; J. Powling, _w._; J. Cameron; E.
Kennedy, _k._; W.A. Riach, _w._; J. Thompson; G. Harrison. ENSIGNS--J.
Mackenzie; C.J. Maclean; J. Nash, _w._; J. Robertson, _w._; A. Cameron;
A.S. Crawford, _w._; J. Campbell; Volunteer Cameron, _w._ ADJUTANT--J.
Kynock, Lieutenant, _k._; PAYMASTER--J. M'Arthur. QUARTER MASTER--A.
Cameron. SURGEON--G. Ridesdale. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--W.G. Burrell; D.
Perston.
_91st Regiment Foot._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL--Sir W. Douglas, K.C.B.,
Colonel. CAPTAINS--J. Walsh, Major; T.H. Blair, Major; W. Steuart;
A. Campbell; D. Campbell; J.C. Murdoch; A.J. Collender, Major; A.
Campbell; R. Anderson. LIEUTENANTS--J. Campbell; J. Russell; A.
Campbell; R. Stewart; A. M'Lochlan; C. Egan; A. Cathcart, _w._ (24th);
J. M'Dougall; J. Hood; A. Smith; T.L. Hemmick; T. Murray; R.S. Knox;
C. Stuart; J. M'Donald; E. Brown; A. Campbell; G. Scott, Adjutant;
W. Smith; J. Black, _w._ (24th); A. Sword. ENSIGNS--N. Lamont; W.
Trimmer; J. Paton; D. Ducat; A. Smith; L. Lind. PAYMASTER--D. Campbell.
ADJUTANT--G. Scott, Lieutenant. QUARTER MASTER--J. Stewart. SURGEON--R.
Douglass. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--G. M'Lachlan; W.H. Young.
_92nd Regiment Foot_ (_Highlanders_). LIEUTENANT COLONEL--J. Cameron,
_k._ MAJORS--J. Mitchell, Lieutenant Colonel, _w._; D. Macdonald.
CAPTAINS--G.W. Holmes, _w._; D. Campbell, w.; P. Wilkie, _w._; W.C.
Grant, _k._; W. Little, _k._; A. Ferrier, _w._; LIEUTENANTS--C.
Alexander, Adjutant; J.J. Chisholm, _k._; R. Winchester, _w._; T.
Hobbs, _w._; T. Macintosh, _w._; D. Macdonald, _w._; A. Will; J.K.
Ross, _w._; R. Macdonald, _w._; T. Gordon; H. Innes, _w._; G. Logan,
_w._; E. Campbell; R. M'Donald; J. Mackinlay, _w._; R. Peat; G. Mackie,
_k._; A. M'Pherson, _w._; E. Ross, _w._; J. Hope, _w._; Ensigns--J.
Branwell, _w._; R. Logan, _w._; J. Clarke; A. M'Donald, _w._; A.
Becher, k.; R. Hewit; R. M'Pherson, _k._; J.M. M'Pherson. PAYMASTER--J.
Gordon. ADJUTANT--C. Alexander, Lieutenant. SURGEON--G. Hicks.
ASSISTANT SURGEON--J. Stewart, _w._
_95th Regiment_ (_Rifle Corps,--1st and 2nd Battalions, and two
Companies 3rd Battalion_). LIEUTENANT COLONEL--Sir A.F. Barnard,
K.C.B., Colonel, _w._; MAJORS--A.G. Norcott, Lieutenant Colonel, _w._;
G. Wilkins, Lieutenant Colonel, _w._; J. Ross, Lieutenant Colonel,
_w._; A. Cameron, Lieutenant Colonel, _w._; Captains--J. Leach, Major;
F. Glasse; G. Miller, Major, _w._; C. Beckwith, Major; J. Logan; C.G.
Gray; J. Fullerton, Major; H. Lee; H.G. Smith, Major; E. Chawner,
_w._; W. Johnston, _w._; T. M'Namara; J.G. M'Cullock, _w._; W. Eeles,
Major; C. Eaton; C. Eeles, _k._; F. Le Blanc; J.R. Budgen. FIRST
LIEUTENANTS--W. Humbley, _w._; J.C. Hope; T. Cochrane; J. Layton; J.
Molloy, _w._; T. Smith, Adjutant; J. Cox; F. Bennett; A. Stewart; F.
Dixon; W. Chapman; C. Coxon, _w._; R.B. Freer; J. Gardiner, _w._; D.
Cameron, _w._; J. Kincaid, Adjutant; G. Simmons, _w._; J. Stilwell; R.
Cochran, _w._; J.A. Ridgeway, _w._; J. Fry, _w._; J.P. Gardner, _w._;
W. Haggup; G. Vickers; T.T. Worsley, Adjutant; J.G. Fitzmaurice, _w._;
G. Drummond; E. Madden; V. Webb, _w._; G.H. Shenley; C.C. Urquhart;
J. Lynam, _w._; O. Felix, _w._; G. Drummond. SECOND LIEUTENANTS--D.
Macfarlane; A. Stewart; C. Rochfort; W. Wright; J. Church; R. Fowler;
A. Milligan; T.B. Sheean; C. Probart; W. Shenley; R.C. Eyre, _w._;
J.P. Walsh, _w._, PAYMASTERS--J. Mackenzie; A. M'Donald. ADJUTANTS--T.
Smith; J. Kincaid. QUARTER MASTERS--D. Ross; J. Bagshaw. SURGEONS--J.
Burke; F. Scott. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--J. Robson; R.H. Hett; J.
Armstrong; T.P. M'Cabe; R. Scott.
ARTILLERY.
_Staff._ COLONEL Sir George A. Wood, Knight, Commanding. LIEUTENANT
COLONEL Sir Augustus Frazer, K.C.B., commanding British Horse
Artillery. LIEUTENANT COLONEL A. Macdonald, commanding under
Sir Augustus Frazer. LIEUTENANT COLONEL Sir John May, K.C.B.,
Assistant Adjutant General. CAPTAIN H. Baynes, _w._, Brigade Major.
LIEUTENANTS--J. Bloomfield, G. Coles, F. Wells, Staff Adjutants to
Sir George Wood. LIEUTENANT W. Bell, Staff Adjutant to Sir Augustus
Frazer. FIELD OFFICERS commanding two Batteries of Foot Artillery
attached to each Division of the Army--LIEUTENANT COLONELS--S. G. Adye,
C. Gold, J.S. Williamson, J. Hawker. FIELD OFFICER commanding Reserve
Artillery--MAJOR P. Drummond. Commanding Battering Train--LIEUTENANT
COLONEL Sir Alexander Dickson, K.C.B.
_Troops of British Horse Artillery._ 1. MAJOR R. Bull, _w._
CAPTAINS--R. M. Cairnes, Major, _k._; M. Louis. LIEUTENANTS--W. Smith,
_w._; J. Townsend. (Heavy 5-1/2 inch Howitzers).
2. LIEUTENANT COLONEL Webber Smith. CAPTAINS--E.Y. Walcott; D.
Crawford, _w._ LIEUTENANTS--D.J. Edwards; H. Foster, _w._ (Light six
pounders).
3. LIEUTENANT COLONEL Sir Robert Gardiner, K.C.B. CAPTAINS--T. Dyneley,
Major; R. Harding. LIEUTENANTS--W. Swabey; W.B. Ingleby. (Light six
pounders).
4. CAPTAIN E.C. Whinyates, Major, _w._; CAPTAINS--C.C. Dansey, _w._; A.
Wright. LIEUTENANTS--T. Strangways, _w._; A. Ward; R.H. Ord. (Light six
pounders and Rockets).
5. CAPTAIN A.C. Mercer; CAPTAIN R. Newland. LIEUTENANTS--H. M.
Leathers; J. Hincks; J. Breton. (Nine pounders).
6. CAPTAIN W.N. Ramsay, Major, _k._ CAPTAINS--A. Macdonald, Major;
W. Brereton, _w._ LIEUTENANTS--P. Sandilands; W. Robe, _k._ (Nine
pounders).
_Troops in Reserve._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL Sir Hew D. Ross, K.C.B.
CAPTAINS--J.B. Parker, Major, _w._; R. Hardinge. LIEUTENANTS--J. Day,
_w._; F. Warde; P.V. Onslow. (Nine pounders).
CAPTAIN G. Beane, Major, _k._; CAPTAINS--W. Webber, _w._; J.E.
Maunsell. LIEUTENANTS--J.R. Bruce; M.T. Cromie, _k._; (Light six
pounders).
_Batteries of British Foot Artillery._ CAPTAIN C.F. Sandham;
CAPTAIN W.H. Stopford. LIEUTENANTS--G. Foot; G.M. Baynes; D. Jago.
(Nine pounders). CAPTAIN S. Bolton, _k._; CAPTAIN C. Napier, _w._;
LIEUTENANTS--G. Pringle; W. Anderson; C. Spearman, _k._; W. Sharpin;
B. Cuppage. (Nine pounders). CAPTAIN W.I. Lloyd, Major, _k._; CAPTAIN
S. Rudyerd. LIEUTENANTS--S. Phelps; W. Harvey, _w._; (Nine pounders).
Captain J. Brome, Major; CAPTAIN J.J.G. Parker. LIEUTENANTS--R. J.
Saunders; T.O. Cater; A.O. Molesworth. (Nine pounders). CAPTAIN G.W.
Unett; CAPTAIN G. Browne. LIEUTENANTS--D. Lawson; W. Montagu; C.G. Kett.
_Battery in Reserve._ CAPTAIN J. Sinclair; CAPTAIN F. Macbean.
LIEUTENANTS--J.A. Wilson; W.H. Poole, _w._; R.B. Burnaby.
_Subaltern Officers present but unattached._ LIEUTENANTS--W. Lemoine,
E. Trevor, E.W. Wood, G.S. Maule, T. Watkis, G.T. Hume.
_Attached to Captain CLEEVES's Foot Battery, King's German Legion._
LIEUTENANT R. Manners, _k._
ROYAL ENGINEERS.
_Staff._ LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. Carmichael Smyth, Commanding Engineer.
MAJOR Sir George Hoste, Bart., K.F.M., Commanding Engineer to
First Corps. MAJOR J. Oldfield, Major of Brigade. LIEUTENANT J.
Sperling, Adjutant. CAPTAINS--F. Stanway, A. Thomson, _w._; (26th).
LIEUTENANTS--J.W. Pringle, _w._; M.A. Waters; F.B. Head; F.Y. Gilbert;
A.D. White.
ROYAL STAFF CORPS.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL W. Nicolay, Colonel. CAPTAINS--T. Wright, _w._; W.
Staveley; F. Read. LIEUTENANTS--G.D. Hall, _w._; B. Jackson; A.C.G.
Brauns. ENSIGNS--T.W. Colleton; J.S. Sedley; J. Milliken.
ROYAL WAGGON TRAIN.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL--T. Aird. CAPTAINS--T. Pardoe, B. Jackson.
LIEUTENANTS--W. Aitkin, W. Smith, J. M'Dowall, H. O'Neill, W. Dean,
R. Parkinson, C. Bott, R. Kerr. Cornets--T. Glendening, J. Fenn.
SURGEON--T. Wynne. VETERINARY SURGEON--F. Cherry.
MEDICAL STAFF.
INSPECTOR--J.R. Grant, M.D. DEPUTY INSPECTORS--W. Taylor, J. Gunning
(_Surgeon in Chief_), S. Woolriche, J.R. Hume, M.D. PHYSICIAN--G.
Denecke, M.D. SURGEONS--H.G. Emery, M.D.; M.A. Burmeister, R. Grant, J.
Maling, J.G. Van Millingen, S.B. Bruce. ASSISTANT SURGEONS--J. Dease,
W. Twining. APOTHECARY--W. Lyons.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 14: The names of those killed, wounded, or missing are marked
_k_, _w_, and _m_, respectively.]
XLII.
_List of the Officers of the King's German Legion, Killed, Wounded, and
Missing, in the Actions on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June 1815._
KILLED.
_Staff._ Captain C. von Bobers, Brigade Major. (Attached to Seventh
Brigade of Cavalry.)
_Artillery._ First Lieutenant C. von Schultzen. (Attached to 1st
Battery of Hanoverian Artillery.)
_1st Dragoons._ Captain F. Peters. Lieutenants, F.C. von Levetzow, 0.
Kuhlmann.
_2nd Dragoons._ Captain F. von Bülow. Cornet H. Drangmeister.
_3rd Hussars._ Lieutenant Colonel F.L. Meyer. Captains, A. von
Kerssenbruch, G. Janssen. Lieutenant H. Brüggemann. Cornet W. Deichmann.
_1st Light Battalion._ Captains, P. Holtzermann, H. von Marschalk, A.A.
von Goeben. Lieutenant A. Albert.
_2nd Light Battalion._ Major A. Bösewiel. Captains, F.M.W. Schaumann,
H. Wiegmann (Acting Brigade Major to First Infantry Brigade, King's
German Legion). Ensign F. von Robertson.
_1st Line Battalion._ Captains, C. von Holle, A. von Saffe. Ensign H.
von Lücken.
_2nd Line Battalion._ Lieutenant Colonel J.C. von Schröder. Captain G.
Tilee.
_3rd Line Battalion._ Captain F. Didd. Lieutenants, F. von Jeinsen, F.
Leschen.
_4th Line Battalion._ Colonel G.C.A. du Plat (Commanding First Infantry
Brigade, King's German Legion). Majors, G. Chüden, G. Lewis Leue.
Captain G. Heise. Ensign E.T. von Cronhelm.
_5th Line Battalion._ Colonel C. von Ompteda (Commanding Second
Infantry Brigade, King's German Legion). Captain E.C.C. von Wurmb.
Lieutenant J.L. Schuck.
_8th Line Battalion._ Captains, A.W. von Voigt, T. von Westernhagen.
Lieutenant W. von Marenholtz.
WOUNDED.
_Staff._ Brigade Majors, Captain G. von Einem (Attached to Second
Infantry Brigade, King's German Legion); Captain M. von Cloudt
(Attached to Third Cavalry Brigade).
_Artillery._ Major A. Sympher. Second Captains, W. Braun, F.
Erythropel. First Lieutenants, W. von Goeben, H. Hartmann. Second
Lieutenant L. Heise.
_1st Dragoons._ Major General Sir William von Dörnberg. Lieutenant
Colonel J. von Bülow. Major A. von Reizenstein. Captains, P. von
Sichart, G. von Hattorf, B. von Bothmer. Lieutenants, W. Mackenzie, W.
Fricke, 0. von Hammerstein, H. Bosse. Comets, S.H. Nanne, E. Trittau.
_2nd Dragoons._ Lieutenant Colonels, C. de Jonquières, C. von. Maydell.
Captains, C.T. von Harling, L. Lüderitz. Lieutenant H.H. Rittor. Cornet
F. Lorentz.
_1st Hussars._ Lieutenant G. Baring.
_3rd Hussars._ Captains, Q. von Goeben, W. von Schnehen. Lieutenants,
H. True, C. Oehlkers. Cornets, F. Hoyer, C. von Dassel, H. von
Hodenberg.
_1st Light Battalion._ Major Hans von dem Bussche. Captains, F. von
Gilsa, C. Wynecken. Lieutenants, A. Wahrendorff, C. Heise, H. Wollrabe,
E.F. Koester, H. Leonhart, N. de Miniussir, E. Gibson. Ensigns, G.
Best, A.A. von Gentzkow, C. Behne, A. Heise.
_2nd Light Battalion._ Captain E.A. Holtzermann. Lieutenants, G. Meyer,
F.G.T. Kessler, O. Lindham, B. Riefkugel, M.T.H. Tobin, G. D. Græme, W.
Timmann, T. Carey. Ensigns, G. Frank, A. Knop.
_1st Line Battalion._ Major W. von Robertson. Captain G. von Schlütter.
Lieutenants, F. Schnath, A. Müller, D. von Einem, H. Wilding, jun.
Ensign C.A. von. der Hellen.
_2nd Line Battalion._ Captain F. Purgold. Lieutenants, C. von der
Decken, C. Fischer, F. la Roche, A.F. Ziel.
_3rd Line Battalion._ Major A. Boden. Lieutenants, A. Kuckuck, H.E.
Kuckuck.
_4th Line Batt._ Capt. W. Heydenreich. Lieutenants, C. von Both, A. von
Hartwig, W.L. de la Farque, A. von Langwerth. Ensign A. Appuhn.
_5th Line Batt._ Captain F. Sander. Lieutenants, C. Berger, G.
Klingsöhr.
_7th Line Battalion._ Lieutenant G. Klingsöhr.
_8th Line Battalion._ Captain C.E.W. Rougemont. Lieutenants, F.
Brinckmann, C. Sattler. Ensign W. von Moreau.
MISSING.
_2nd Light Batt._ Capt. E.A. Holtzermann. Lieutenant M.T.H. Tobin.
XLIII.
_List of the Officers of the Hanoverian troops, Killed, Wounded and
Missing in the Actions of the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June 1815._
KILLED.
_Cumberland Hussars._ Captain F.S. von Winterstedt.
_Field Battalion Bremen._ Lieutenant Colonel W.L. von Langrehr.
_Field Battalion Duke of York._ Captain R. von Pawel. Ensign A.C.
Müller.
_Field Battalion Lüneburg._ Captains, F. Bobart, C.T. Korfes. Ensign
C.B. von Plato.
_Field Battalion Grubenhagen._ Lieutenant Colonel F.L.A. von Wurmb.
_Landwehr Battalion Bremervörde._ Lieutenant C.C. Löper. Ensign T. von
Holt.
_Landwehr Battalion Osnabrück._ Captain C.H. Quentin. Lieutenant G.F.
Uffel. Ensign H. Bergtroff.
_Landwehr Battalion Quackenbrück._ Major C.W. von dem Bussche Hünefeldt.
_Landwehr Battalion Verden._ Lieutenants, C.E. Wegener, C.E. von
Hinüber.
_Landwehr Battalion Osterode._ Lieutenant T. Fenisch. Ensign C.A.
Schanz.
_Landwehr Battalion Gifhorn._ Major G. von Hammerstein. Lieutenant H.C.
Schmidt.
WOUNDED.
_Staff._ Colonel von Berger. Lieutenant and Aide de Camp Hanbury.
_Rifle Corps._ Captain von Reden. Lieutenants, Grote, Schutze.
_Field Battalion Bremen._ Major Müller. Captains, Bazoldo, von Lepel.
Lieutenants, von Quistorp I., von Quistorp II., Welmer. Ensigns, Brüel,
Meyer.
_Field Battalion Verden._ Major von Schkopp. Captain Jacoby.
Lieutenants, Gehrhard, Brandis I., Brandis II., Selig, Suffenplan.
_Field Battalion Duke of York._ Major von Bülow. Lieutenants, Moll, von
Mahrenholz. Ensign Rabius.
_Field Battalion Lüneburg._ Lieutenant Colonel von Klencke.
Lieutenants, Völger, von Plato. Ensigns, Sachse, von Weyhe.
_Field Battalion Grubenhagen._ Captain Bauer. Lieutenants, Westphal,
Marwedel. Ensigns, von Bülow, Ernst, Stieppel.
_Landwehr Battalion Bremervörde._ Lieutenants, Warnecke, Meyer.
Ensigns, Hotthusen, Wilken.
_Landwehr Battalion Osnabrück._ Major Count Münster. Captain Gotthard.
Lieutenants, Winkler, Richers. Ensigns, Nichenke, Meyer.
_Landwehr Battalion Salzgitter._ Captain von Hammerstein. Lieutenant
von Spangenberg.
_Landwehr Battalion Verden._ Captain von Witzendorf. Lieutenants, H.
Wynecken, Hurtzig. Ensign Siegener.
_Landwehr Battalion Lüneburg._ Captains, von Reiche, von Kemps.
Lieutenant von Dassel. Ensigns, Dormauer, Meyer.
_Landwehr Battalion Osterode._ Major von Reden. Captains, von
Ingersleben, Papet. Lieutenants, Greve, Laubrecht.
_Landwehr Battalion Münden._ Captain von Hanstein. Lieutenants,
Wrisberg, Brenning, Schwenke II. Ensigns, Murray, Oppermaun.
_Landwehr Battalion Hameln._ Major von Strube. Captain Blankhard.
Lieutenants, Krable, Kistner.
_Landwehr Battalion Gifhorn._ Captain Wiedenfeld. Lieutenant and
Adjutant Schwake. Ensign Brüggemann.
_Landwehr Battalion Hildesheim._ Major von Rheden.
_Landwehr Battalion Peine._ Captain von Bertrap. Ensign Köhler.
MISSING.
_Field Battalion Lüneburg._ Major von Dachenhausen.
_Landwehr Battalion Bremervörde._ Lieutenant Ehlers. Ensign Ress.
_Landwehr Battalion Verden._ Lieutenant von der Horst. Ensigns, Plati,
Kotzebue.
XLIV.
_List of Officers of the Brunswick troops, Killed in the Actions of the
16th and 18 th of June 1815._
_16th of June._ His Serene Highness the Reigning Duke FREDERICK
WILLIAM; Major von Cramm, commanding the Regiment of Hussars; Captain
von Pawel, of the Hussars; Ensign Hercher, of the 1st Line Battalion;
Major von Strombeck, commanding 2nd Line Battalion; Captain von Bülow,
of the 2nd Line Battalion.
_18th of June._ Lieutenant Colonel von Heinemann, of the Staff;
Lieutenant Lambrecht, of the Hussars; Lieutenant Diedrich, of the Horse
Artillery; Ensigns, Bruns and Sensemann, of the 2nd Line Battalion;
Captain von Praun, of the 3rd Light Battalion; Ensign von Vechelde, of
the 2nd Line Battalion.
XLVII.
_List of the Officers of the Prussian Army, Killed, Wounded, and
Missing, at the Battle of Waterloo._
KILLED.
SECOND CORPS. _2nd Regiment of Infantry_--First Lieutenant von Mirbach.
FOURTH CORPS. THIRTEENTH BRIGADE. _2nd Neumark Landwehr_--First
Lieutenant von Stoberts. _3rd Neumark Landwehr_--Second Lieutenant von
Norrmann.
FOURTEENTH BRIGADE. _11th Regiment of Infantry_--Major von Aulok.
Second Lieutenant von Dewette. _1st Pomeranian Landwehr_--Second
Lieutenants, von Lindner, von Kuhfass.
FIFTEENTH BRIGADE. _18th Regiment of Infantry_--Second Lieutenants, von
Schlemmer, von Wehlermann. _3rd Silesian Landwehr_--First Lieutenants,
von Treutter, von Teiminger, von Becker.
SIXTEENTH BRIGADE. _15th Regiment of Infantry_--Captain von Seidlitz.
Second Lieutenant von Quanstedt. _1st Silesian Landwehr_--Major von
Seidlitz. Captains, von Wittich, von Geisler. Second Lieutenants, von
Hildebrandt, von Briesen, von Gregor. _2nd Silesian Landwehr_--Second
Lieutenant von Zimmermann.
RESERVE CAVALRY. Colonel and Brigadier Count von Schwerin. Lieutenant
Colonel and Brigadier von Watzdorf.
WOUNDED.
FIRST CORPS. _Brandenburg Dragoons_--Captain von Puttkammer.
_Silesian Rifle Battalion_--Lieutenant von Hotten. _12th Regiment of
Infantry_--Captain von Wenkstern. _24th Regiment of Infantry_--Major
von Lowenklau. Captain von Blankenstein. Lieutenants, von Maller, von
der Golz, Lampresch.
SECOND CORPS. _2nd Regiment of Infantry_--Second Lieutenant von
Stempel. _3rd Elbe Landwehr_--Captain von Bülzingslöwen. Second
Lieutenant von Scholmer.
FOURTH CORPS. THIRTEENTH BRIGADE. Colonel and Brigadier von Lettow.
_10th Regiment of Infantry_--Major von Marsigli. First Lieutenants, von
Doringkowski, von Torzilowsky, von Nordhausen. Second Lieutenants, von
Barth, von Kretschmer, von Marguardt, von Witzleben, von Bartke. _2nd
Neumark Landwehr_--Captain von Solta. Second Lieutenant von Liebich.
_3rd Neumark Landwehr_--Major von Osten. Captain von Zamori. Second
Lieutenants, von Münchow, von Szandahelly, von Moritz, von Alter, von
Achterberg.
FOURTEENTH BRIGADE. _11th Regiment of Infantry_--Captains, von
Niesemauschel, von Kuensberg, von Morgenstern. First Lieutenant
von Aulock. Second Lieutenants, von Biederstein, von Ciriacy, von
Rahden, von Podewil, von Bentivigni, von Egloffstein, von Koepke, von
Bender, von Walter. _1st Pomeranian Landwehr_--Lieutenant Colonel
von Brandenstein. Majors, von Nettelhorst, von Toll. Captains, von
Andrees, von Spalding, von Loeper, von Wolter. Second Lieutenants,
von Zirkel, von Nehring, von Hoepfner, von Doebke. _2nd Pomeranian
Landwehr_--Majors, von Katt, von Stojenthin. Captains, von Steinwehr,
von Pauly, von Wedell. Second Lieutenants, von Stricker, von
Preussendorf, von Barth, von Ewald, von Dolist, von Hagemann, von
Schmidt, von Ludwig, von Heinze.
FIFTEENTH BRIGADE. _18th Regiment of Infantry_--Captains, von Pogursch,
von Gluschinsky. First Lieutenants, von Wedelstädt, von Bursche,
von Elsner, von Kurstein, von Wallenroth, von Taubenheim. Second
Lieutenants, von Arnim, von Bath, von Lutermann, von Alberti, von
Koeppen, von Bindemann, von Wiedermauth, von Broene, le Blanc, von
Schömfeldt, von Kerzieg. _3rd Silesian Landwehr_--Major von Zischwitz.
Captains, von Austen, von Loepell. First Lieutenant von Krause. Second
Lieutenants, von Pari, von Lützow, von Büttseher, von Pietsch, von
Schreiber, von Wende, von Platius. _4th Silesian Landwehr_--Captain von
Schirche. First Lieutenant von Stemler. Second Lieutenants, von Wagner,
von Liebich, von Schedelbach.
SIXTEENTH BRIGADE. _15th Regiment of Infantry_--Major von Boek,
commanding. Captains, von Jutrzenka, von Bionstierna, von Cawizinsky.
First Lieutenant von Redeker. Second Lieutenants, von Preuss (and
Adjutant), von Nadler, von Mousers, von Hering, von Frohreich, von
Hassenstein, von Luck, von Hülsen, von Sinel, von Lindenhöfer, von
Wittke, von Fittscherini, von Helm. _1st Silesian Landwehr_--Captains,
von Maistre, von Salisen, von Schrötter. First Lieutenants, von
Herzberg, von Vogt, von Laubak. Second Lieutenants, von Louve, von
Bemda, von Stürmer. _2nd Silesian Landwehr_--Major von Schwemmler.
Second Lieutenants, von Richter, von Brandt, von Krickmuth, von Arnim,
von Beyer, von Sack.
RESERVE CAVALRY. _Staff_--Major von Drigalsky. _2nd Silesian
Hussars_--Captain von Wander. _West Prussian Uhlans_--Lieutenant
von Knobelsdorf. _8th Regiment of Hussars_--Captain von Erichson.
Second Lieutenants, von Bauhöfen, von Möllendorf, von Plieth, von
Dieringsfeldt, von Winterfeldt, von Genny. _2nd Neumark Landwehr
Cavalry_--Lieutenant Colonel von Hiller. Captains, von Goerz, von
Preussendorf. Lieutenants, von Braun, von Oestreich. _2nd Silesian
Landwehr Cavalry_--Lieutenant von Schweinitz. _3rd Silesian Landwehr
Cavalry_--Captain von Altenstein. _Horse Artillery_--Captains, von
Zinken, von Pfeil.
MISSING.
FOURTH CORPS. _1st Silesian Landwehr_--Second Lieutenant von Siegberg.
_11th Regiment of Infantry_--Captain von Riesemenschel. Second
Lieutenant von Bieberstein. _2nd Silesian Landwehr_--Second Lieutenant
von Koeszegy. _2nd Silesian Hussars_--N---- R.
XLVIII.
_Despatch from the Duke of WELLINGTON to Earl BATHURST._
Waterloo, June 19, 1815.
My Lord,--Bonaparte having collected the First, Second, Third, Fourth
and Sixth Corps of the French Army and the Imperial Guards, and nearly
all the Cavalry, on the Sambre, and between that river and the Meuse,
between the 10th and 14th of the month, advanced on the 15th, and
attacked the Prussian Posts at Thuin and Lobez, on the Sambre, at
daylight in the morning.
I did not hear of these events till the evening of the 15th, and I
immediately ordered the troops to prepare to march; and afterwards to
march to their left, as soon as I had intelligence from other quarters,
to prove that the Enemy's movement upon Charleroi was the real attack.
The Enemy drove the Prussian Posts from the Sambre on that day; and
General ZIETEN, who commanded the Corps which had been at Charleroi,
retired upon Fleurus; and Marshal Prince BLÜCHER concentrated the
Prussian Army upon Sombref, holding the Villages, in front of his
position, of St Amand and Ligny.
The Enemy continued his march along the road from Charleroi towards
Bruxelles, and on the same evening, the 15th, attacked a Brigade of the
Army of the Netherlands, under the Prince DE WEIMAR, posted at Frasne,
and forced it back to the Farm House on the same road, called Les
Quatre Bras.
The Prince of ORANGE immediately reinforced this Brigade with another
of the same Division, under General PERPONCHER, and in the morning
early regained part of the ground which had been lost, so as to have
command of the communication leading from Nivelles and Bruxelles, with
Marshal BLÜCHER's position.
In the mean time I had directed the whole Army to march upon Les Quatre
Bras; and the Fifth Division, under Lieutenant General Sir THOMAS
PICTON, arrived about half past two in the day, followed by the Corps
of troops under the Duke of BRUNSWICK, and afterwards by the contingent
of Nassau.
At this time the Enemy commenced an attack upon Prince BLÜCHER with
his whole force; excepting the First and Second Corps, and a Corps of
Cavalry under General KELLERMANN, with which he attacked our Posts at
Les Quatre Bras.
The Prussian Army maintained their position with their usual gallantry
and perseverance, against a great disparity of numbers, as the Fourth
Corps of their Army, under General BÜLOW, had not yet joined, and I was
not able to assist them as I wished, as I was attacked myself, and the
troops, the Cavalry in particular, which had a long distance to march,
had not arrived.
We maintained our position also, and completely defeated and repulsed
all the Enemy's attempts to get possession of it. The Enemy repeatedly
attacked us with a large body of Infantry and Cavalry, supported by
a numerous and powerful Artillery; he made several charges with the
Cavalry upon our Infantry, but all were repulsed in the steadiest
manner. In this affair His Royal Highness the Prince of ORANGE, the
Duke of BRUNSWICK, and Lieutenant General Sir THOMAS PICTON, and Major
General Sir JAMES KEMPT, and Sir DENIS PACK, who were engaged from the
commencement of the Enemy's attack, highly distinguished themselves,
as well as Lieutenant General CHARLES BARON ALTEN, Major General Sir
C. HALKETT, Lieutenant General COOKE, and Major Generals MAITLAND and
BYNG, as they successively arrived. The troops of the Fifth Division,
and those of the Brunswick Corps were long and severely engaged, and
conducted themselves with the utmost gallantry. I must particularly
mention the 28th, 42nd, 79th, and 92nd Regiments, and the Battalions of
Hanoverians.
Our loss was great, as your Lordship will perceive by the enclosed
return; and I have particularly to regret His Serene Highness the Duke
of BRUNSWICK, who fell fighting gallantly at the head of his troops.
Although Marshal BLÜCHER had maintained his position at Sombref, he
still found himself much weakened by the severity of the contest in
which he had been engaged; and as the Fourth Corps had not arrived, he
determined to fall back, and concentrate his Army upon Wavre; and he
marched in the night after the action was over.
This movement of the Marshal's rendered necessary a corresponding one
on my part; and I retired from the Farm of Quatre Bras upon Genappe,
and thence upon Waterloo the next morning, the 17th, at ten o'clock.
The Enemy made no effort to pursue Marshal BLÜCHER. On the contrary,
a Patrol which I sent to Sombref in the morning, found all quiet, and
the Enemy's Videttes fell back as the Patrol advanced. Neither did he
attempt to molest our march to the rear, although made in the middle of
the day; excepting by following with a large body of Cavalry, brought
from his Right, the Cavalry under the Earl of UXBRIDGE.
This gave Lord UXBRIDGE an opportunity of charging them with the 1st
Life Guards, upon their debouch from the Village of Genappe; upon which
occasion his Lordship has declared himself to be well satisfied with
that Regiment.
The position which I took up in the front of Waterloo, crossed the high
roads from Charleroi and Nivelle, and had its Right thrown back to a
ravine near Merke Braine, which was occupied; and its Left extended to
a Height above the Hamlet Ter la Haye, which was likewise occupied.--In
front of the Right Centre, and near the Nivelle road, we occupied the
House and Garden of Hougomont, which covered the return of that Flank;
and in the front of the Left Centre we occupied the Farm of La Haye
Sainte. By our left we communicated with Marshal Prince BLÜCHER at
Wavre through Ohaim; and the Marshal had promised me, that in case we
should be attacked he would support me with one or more Corps, as might
be necessary.
The Enemy collected his Army, with the exception of the Third Corps,
which had been sent to observe Marshal BLÜCHER, on a range of Heights
in our front, in the course of the night of the 17th and yesterday
morning: and at about ten o'clock he commenced a furious attack upon
our Post at Hougomont. I had occupied that Post with a Detachment
from General BYNG's Brigade of Guards, which was in position in its
rear; and it was for some time under the command of Lieutenant Colonel
MACDONEL, and afterwards of Colonel HOME; and I am happy to add, that
it was maintained throughout the day with the utmost gallantry by these
brave troops, notwithstanding the repeated efforts of large bodies of
the Enemy to obtain possession of it.
This attack upon the Right of our Centre was accompanied by a very
heavy cannonade upon our whole Line, which was destined to support
the repeated attacks of Cavalry and Infantry occasionally mixed, but
sometimes separate, which were made upon it. In one of these the Enemy
carried the Farm House of La Haye Sainte; as the Detachment of the
Light Battalion of the Legion which occupied it, had expended all its
ammunition, and the Enemy occupied the only communication there was
with them.
The Enemy repeatedly charged our Infantry with his Cavalry, but these
attacks were uniformly unsuccessful; and they afforded opportunities
to our Cavalry to charge, in one of which, Lord E. SOMERSET's Brigade,
consisting of the Life Guards, Royal Horse Guards, and 1st Dragoon
Guards, highly distinguished themselves, as did that of Major General
Sir W. PONSONBY, having taken many prisoners and an Eagle.
These attacks were repeated till about seven in the evening, when the
Enemy made a desperate effort with the Cavalry and Infantry, supported
by the fire of the Artillery, to force our Left Centre near the Farm
of La Haye Sainte, which after a severe contest was defeated: and
having observed that the troops retired from this attack in great
confusion, and that the march of General BÜLOW's Corps by Euschermont
upon Planchenoit and La Belle Alliance had begun to take effect, and as
I could perceive the fire of his cannon, and as Marshal Prince BLÜCHER
had joined in person, with a Corps of his Army to the left of our Line
by Ohaim; I determined to attack the Enemy, and immediately advanced
the whole Line of Infantry, supported by the Cavalry and Artillery.
The attack succeeded in every point; the Enemy was forced from his
position on the Heights, and fled in the utmost confusion; leaving
behind him, as far as I could judge, one hundred and fifty pieces of
cannon, with their ammunition, which fell into our hands. I continued
the pursuit till long after dark, and then discontinued it only on
account of the fatigue of our troops, who had been engaged during
twelve hours, and because I found myself on the same road with Marshal
BLÜCHER, who assured me of his intention to follow the Enemy throughout
the night; he has sent me word this morning that he has taken sixty
pieces of cannon belonging to the Imperial Guard, and several
carriages, baggage, &c., belonging to BUONAPARTE, in Genappe.
I propose to move, this morning, upon Nivelles, and not to discontinue
my operations.
Your Lordship will observe, that such a desperate action could not be
fought, and such advantages could not be gained, without great loss;
and I am sorry to add that ours has been immense. In Lieutenant General
Sir THOMAS PICTON, His Majesty has sustained the loss of an Officer
who has frequently distinguished himself in his Service, and he fell
gloriously leading his Division to a charge with bayonets, by which
one of the most serious attacks made by the Enemy on our position was
defeated. The Earl of UXBRIDGE, after having successfully got through
this arduous day, received a wound by almost the last shot fired; which
will, I am afraid, deprive His Majesty for some time of his services.
His Royal Highness the Prince of ORANGE distinguished himself by his
gallantry and conduct till he received a wound from a musket ball
through the shoulder, which obliged him to quit the Field.
It gives me the greatest satisfaction to assure your Lordship, that the
Army never, upon any occasion, conducted itself better. The Division
of Guards, under Lieutenant General COOKE (who is severely wounded),
Major General MAITLAND, and Major General BYNG, set an example which
was followed by all; and there is no Officer nor description of troops,
that did not behave well.
I must, however, particularly mention, for His Royal Highness's
approbation, Lieutenant General Sir H. CLINTON, Major General ADAM,
Lieutenant General CHARLES BARON ALTEN, severely wounded; Major General
Sir COLIN HALKETT, severely wounded; Colonel OMPTEDA, Colonel MITCHELL,
commanding a Brigade of the Fourth Division; Major General Sir JAMES
KEMPT and Sir DENIS PACK, Major General LAMBERT, Major General Lord E.
SOMERSET, Major General Sir W. PONSONBY, Major General Sir C. GRANT,
and Major General Sir H. VIVIAN; Major General Sir O. VANDELEUR; Major
General Count DÖRNBERG. I am particularly indebted to General Lord HILL
for his assistance and conduct upon this as upon all former occasions.
The Artillery and Engineer departments were conducted much to my
satisfaction by Colonel Sir G. WOOD and Colonel SMYTH; and I had every
reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Adjutant General Major
General BARNES, who was wounded; and of the Quartermaster General
Colonel DELANCY, who was killed by a cannon shot in the middle of the
action. This Officer is a serious loss to His Majesty's Service and to
me at this moment. I was likewise much indebted to the assistance of
Lieutenant Colonel Lord FITZROY SOMERSET, who was severely wounded; and
of the Officers composing my personal Staff, who have suffered severely
in this action. Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. Sir ALEXANDER GORDON, who
has died of his wounds, was a most promising Officer, and is a serious
loss to His Majesty's Service.
General KRUSE of the Nassau Service, likewise conducted himself much to
my satisfaction; as did General TRIP, commanding the Heavy Brigade of
Cavalry, and General VANHOPE, commanding a Brigade of Infantry of the
King of the NETHERLANDS.
General POZZO DI BORGO, General Baron VINCENT, General MÜFFLING, and
General ALAVA, were in the Field during the action, and rendered me
every assistance in their power. Baron VINCENT is wounded, but I hope
not severely; and General POZZO DI BORGO received a contusion.
I should not do justice to my feelings, or to Marshal BLÜCHER and the
Prussian Army, if I did not attribute the successful result of this
arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them.
The operation of General BÜLOW upon the Enemy's Flank was a most
decisive one; and even if I had not found myself in a situation to
make the attack which produced the final result, it would have forced
the Enemy to retire, if his attacks should have failed; and would
have prevented him from taking advantage of them, if they should
unfortunately have succeeded.
I send, with this despatch, two Eagles taken by the troops in this
action; which Major PERCY will have the honour of laying at the feet of
His Royal Highness.
I have the honour, &c.,
WELLINGTON.
THE END.
[Transribers Note:
Inconsistent spelling, including possible errors in names and places,
has been retained.]
ADVERTISEMENTS
RUPERT PRINCE PALATINE.
By EVA SCOTT.
Late Scholar of Somerville College, Oxford.
With Photogravure frontispiece.
_New and cheaper Edition._ Large Crown 8vo, 6s.
"The book is well written in a good style, is throughout most moderate
and accurate, and is a worthy record of the gallant and true-hearted
Rupert of the Rhine."--_Literature._
"This well-illustrated and well-printed book is a very distinct
addition to our historical biographies. It is strange that no serious
life of the gallant Prince Rupert should have been written till now,
but no one could have written with fuller knowledge or more genuine
enthusiasm than Miss Eva Scott. She has ignored few if any of the
manifold sources of information, printed and manuscript, from which the
chequered history of the great soldier can be gleaned, and the result
of work which must have been both assiduous and intelligent is a really
admirable and complete historical study."--_Guardian._
"A final word as to this book itself. It is well got up, well indexed,
and well illustrated. There is a preface which gives a general view of
the material used, and a series of careful footnotes that will aid the
student."--Prof. Yorke Powell in the _Morning Post._
"Miss Scott, on the other hand, has not only made herself familiar
with Rupert and his surroundings, but is possessed of--what is seldom
to be found--a rare talent for biographical presentment. Not only is
there no overburdening of the narrative with documentary evidence, but
everything of that nature which is introduced strengthens the author's
argument instead of distracting the attention of the reader."--Mr. S.R.
Gardiner in the _English Historical Review._
"Though she properly makes a hero of Rupert, she is never blind to
his failings nor does she extol his virtues without the warrant of
documentary evidence. In brief, her monograph is a well-considered,
impartial piece of work."--_Spectator._
ARCHIBALAD CONSTABLE & CO., WESTMINSTER.
THE HOUSEHOLD
OF THE LAFAYETTES.
By EDITH SICHEL.
With Photogravure frontispiece.
_New Popular Edition._ Large Crown 8vo, 6s.
"In the 'Household of the Lafayettes' Miss Sichel has given a very
vivid and picturesque study of French life during the revolutionary
period, mainly from the political and social point of view. Her
style is on the whole well suited to her subject.... The book is a
fascinating one, and of far greater interest than the majority of
novels. We are carried along from chapter to chapter in very good
company, and on very easy wings."--_Morning Post._
"Miss Sichel possesses a lively and agreeable style, characterized
by a refreshing absence of stock phrases. She does not disgust us
with the obvious, or harass us with the unexpected; and her general
observations--always a good test of an author's wits--are shrewd and
happily expressed."--_Pall Mall Gazette._
"The conversations between the First Consul and the General reproduced
in this most interesting chapter of an interesting book shed the most
instructive light on the character of two of the greatest, probably the
greatest Frenchmen that either century had produced. In her laborious
and sympathetic biography of the lesser of the two Miss Sichel has
evolved a work which for picturesque yet faithful detail, should
rank highly among the records of the most eventful period in French
History."--_Observer._
"We should have liked to quote many passages, picturesque touches of
daily life, remarks of real political insight, clear views of the
people and the tendencies of the age. But we must reserve space for
a few words about Miss Sichel's introduction, which is one of the
best and truest pieces of writing that we have met with for a long
time."--_Spectator._
The Kingdom of the Yellow Robe
Being Sketches of the Domestic and Religious Rites and Ceremonies of
the Siamese.
By ERNEST YOUNG.
Fully Illustrated by E.A. NORBURY, R.C.A. and from Photographs.
_New Popular Edition._ Large Crown 8vo, 6s.
"A pleasantly written little book, popular and light in style. The
author, who was connected with the Siamese Education Department, is at
his best in the first few chapters, wherein he describes the scenes of
the city and the domestic life of the people. His educational duties
enabled him to note some specially interesting facts with regard to the
extraordinary aptness and intelligence which Siamese children as a rule
display...."--_Times._
"Of the quaint courtship customs in the strange land where there are
no old maids, and of many other curious things, we have, alas! no
room to tell. It is with a feeling of regret that we put down this
pleasant book, and take leave of so charming and interesting a people
as that which inhabits the land of the Yellow Robe. The book is fully
illustrated by Mr. E.A. Norbury and from photographs, which add greatly
to its interest. It is a book to be read both for entertainment and
instruction."--_St. James's Budget._
"Here is a book of which I can speak with unstinted praise. It is not
often that I find myself longing to get back to any book, unless it be
a novel of extraordinary power; but I had this sensation with regard to
this volume. It is a book difficult to drop from the first moment it is
taken in hand, and one to which the reader returns with real delight.
It is partly, one must admit, because there is much fascination in the
subject, but it is also because the narrative is so simple, lucid,
satisfying."--T.P. O'Connor in the _Graphic._
THE ALPS FROM END TO END.
By SIR WILLIAM MARTIN CONWAY.
With a Supplementary Chapter by the Rev. W.A.B. COOLIDGE.
With 52 Illustrations by
A.D. M'CORMICK.
_New and revised Edition._ Large Crown 8vo, 6s.
"We are glad to see that Messrs. Constable have just reissued Sir
William Conway's charmingly written and beautifully illustrated volume.
It is a book which all climbers have read with pleasure."--_Daily News._
"A high place among these books of climbing which appeal to many who
cannot climb, as well as to all who can, will be taken by the very
pleasant volume 'The Alps from End to End.'"--_The Times._
"There is, perhaps, not another living Alpinist--unless we except Mr.
Coolidge who contributes a valuable précis of the topography--who could
have combined the requisite knowledge with physical capacity for the
task.... Sir William Conway's book is as vivid as it is charming....
Mr. M'Cormick's illustrations are, indeed, so vivid that many will be
tempted to follow 'The Alps from End to End.'"--_Standard._
"The amount of variety Mr. M'Cormick can secure in a series of
pictures, whose component parts of sky, snow, rock, and ice, must be
seen to be believed."--_Daily Chronicle._
Among the Himalayas.
By MAJOR L.A. WADDELL, L.L.D.
(_Author of "The Buddhism of Tibet."_)
With over 100 Illustrations. Large Crown 8vo, 6s.
_New and Cheaper Edition._
"The book is moderate in size, beautifully printed on unloaded paper,
rich in illustrations exceedingly well reproduced from photographs,
conveying an impressive conception of the scenery and people which form
their subjects."--_The Times._
"This book, in which Major Waddell sets forth the results of his
investigation of the Himalayas, will be appreciated by geographers as
a valuable contribution to our limited knowledge of a little-explored
region. With the exception of Hooker, no European has got nearer
to Mount Everest than the author, and his observations of this and
the adjacent peaks, in combination with the admirable photographs
that he provides, form a feature of the work that deserves special
attention."--_Morning Post._
The Waterloo Campaign, 1815.
By CAPTAIN WILLIAM SIBORNE.
_New Edition._ Large Crown 8vo., 6s.
This Work is the most exact, complete, and authoritative account
in our language of what is sometimes called The Hundred Days' War,
and sometimes The Twenty Days' Campaign; including the Battles of
Ligny, Quatre Bras, Waterloo, and Wavre. It is written with great
impartiality, being as fair to the French as to the Allies.
Every movement is clearly described; and the name of every Commander
and every Regiment engaged, on both sides, is given.
The Work also includes, Regiment by Regiment, the names of all the
Officers of the British Army who were at Waterloo; distinguishing such
as were Killed, Wounded, or Missing.
All who read it will gain a very clear insight into the Methods of
Military Strategy as they were practised by the great Captains of that
Age.
The volume concludes with the Duke of Wellington's celebrated Waterloo
Despatch.
The Ascent of Mount St. Elias.
By DR. FILIPPO DE FILIPPI.
Member of the Expedition organized and conducted by H.R.H. the Duke
of the Abruzzi. Translated from the Italian by Linda Villari. With 33
Photogravure Plates, 4 large Panoramic Views, 1 Lithographic Plate and
2 Maps, together with some 112 Illustrations in the Text.
Imperial 8vo, 31s. 6d. net. Ed. de Luxe, limited to 100 copies, 63s.
net.
Travels and Life in Ashanti and Jaman.
By RICHARD AUSTIN FREEMAN.
Late Assistant-Colonial Surgeon, and Anglo-German Boundary Commissioner
of the Gold Coast.
With about One Hundred Illustrations by the Author and from
Photographs, and Two Maps.
Royal 8vo, 21s.
"He writes with a clearness, liveliness, and amount of solid but most
readable matter to the square inch which make this an exceptionally
desirable book of its kind. From the Colonial Secretary, down to the
holiday-maker in search of entertaining reading, no one who invests in
it will be disappointed."--_Pall Mall Gazette._
A Russian Province of the North (Archangel).
By H. ENGELHARDT.
Governor of the Province of Archangel.
Translated from the Russian by HENRY COOKE.
With 90 Illustrations after Photographs and 3 Maps.
Royal 8vo, 18s.
"For commercial and for other reasons, one should have an eye on
what is being done in this 'Russian Province of the North', where
Mr. Engelhardt has already made so notable a mark. Apart from the
solid information and the masses of statistics the book contains,
the 'Wayside Sketches' of life, manners and scenery around the
fringes of the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean will be found pleasant
and profitable reading. The volume is admirably illustrated from
photographs by Archangel artists."--_Scotsman._
A Northern Highway of the Tsar.
By AUBYN TREVOR-BATTYE, F.R.G.S.
(_Author of "Ice-bound on Kolguev," etc._)
With numerous Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 6s.
"Such a journey may therefore be regarded as quite exceptional and
almost unique, and on that account alone it is well worthy of permanent
record. Though Mr. Trevor-Battye tells his story with a light heart and
unflagging spirit, it is an unbroken record of hardship, difficulty,
exposure, privation, discomfort and incessant peril."--_The Times._
War and Labour.
By MICHAEL ANITCHKOW.
Demy 8vo, 18s.
"Discusses ... the whole question of the relation of war to industry
with great thoroughness and acumen."--_Outlook_.
"A book whose logical force and incisive analysis of the problem with
which it deals should do a great deal to turn public thought on this
vital question into the right direction."--_Review of the Week_.
England and America after Independence.
By EDWARD SMITH.
Demy 8vo, 14s.
"An able and serious study in diplomatic history which reviews the
international intercourse between this country and the United States
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events concerning which more popular works are generally content to
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The Story of the (American) Revolution.
A complete History of America's struggle for liberty.
By HENRY CABOT LODGE.
2 Vols. Fully illustrated. Demy 8vo, 32s.
"The most powerful and eloquent piece of interpretative history we have
read for many a day. Learning, impartiality, clear vision, generosity,
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CHALMERS ON CHARITY.
A Selection of Passages and Scenes to illustrate the Social Teaching
and Practical Work of THOMAS CHALMERS, D.D.
Arranged and Edited By N. MASTERMAN, M.A.
Eighteen years Member of the London Charity Organisation Society, and
some time Guardian in the Parish of Kensington.
414 pages, 7s. 6d. net, with a frontispiece.
BY THE VICEROY OF INDIA.
Problems of the Far East--Japan, China, Korea.
By the Rt. Hon. LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTONE.
_New and revised Edition._
With numerous Illustrations and Maps. Extra Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.
"We dealt so fully with the other contents of Mr. Curzon's volume at
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in the light of which they are revised."--_Glasgow Herald_.
Below the Surface.
By MAJOR-GENERAL FENDALL CURRIE.
Crown 8vo, 6s.
Sketches of civil and native life in India.
The Rise of Portuguese Power in India 1497-1550.
By R.S. WHITEWAY. Bengal Civil Service (Retired).
With Bibliography, Index and a large Map. Demy 8vo, 15s. net.
The Chronology of India.
From the earliest times to the beginning of the Sixteenth Century.
By C. MABEL DUFF (MRS. W.R. RICKMERS).
Demy 8vo, 15s. net.
Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi.
Translated from the Originals By the late CHARLES THEOPHILUS METCALFE,
C.S.I. (Bengal Civil Service.)
With large Map. Demy 8vo, 12s.
IMPERIAL RULE IN INDIA.
By THEODORE MORISON, M.A.
Of the Mahamadan College, Aligarh, N.W.P. India.
Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.
PORTRAITS.
A Series of Portraits of Distinguished Men and Women of the day,
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By THE MARCHIONESS OF GRANBY.
£2 2s. net.
"One of the most artistic and spirited of modern collections of
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National Worthies.
A Selection from the National Portrait Gallery.
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About 150 Illustrations. Crown 4to. £2 2s. net.
Only 750 copies printed, of which 260 have been reserved for America.
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"To Messrs. A. Constable & Co. has come the happy thought of issuing
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Ornament in European Silks.
By ALAN S. COLE.
With One Hundred and Sixty-nine Illustrations.
Crown 4to. Bound in half vellum, gilt. 32s. net.
Art-Enamelling upon Metals.
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The History of the Belvoir Hunt.
By T.F. DALE.
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Demy 8vo, 21s. net.
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The Game of Polo.
By T.F. DALE.
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A Book of Bachelors.
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The Life and Times of Richard Badiley.
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A Biography of a great Puritan Seaman.
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A Royal Rhetorician.
(James VI. I).
Edited with introduction and notes By R.S. RAIT. Fellow of New College,
Oxford. Fo. cap 8vo, 3s. 6d. net.
The Idea of Tragedy.
Three Lectures delivered by W.L. COURTNEY.
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E.L. GODKIN'S WORKS ON DEMOCRACY.
Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy.
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Reflections and Comments.
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The Commune of London and other Studies.
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SPENSER WILKINSON'S WORKS.
The Nation's Awakening.
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Contents:--
Our Past Apathy.
The Aims of the Great Powers.
The Defence of British Interests.
The Organisation of Government.
for the Defence of British Interests.
The Idea of the Nation.
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Lessons of the War.
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The Brain of an Army.
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The Volunteers and the National Defence.
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The Command of the Sea and the Brain of the Navy.
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Imperial Defence.
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DANTE'S TEN HEAVENS.
A Study of the Paradiso.
By EDMUND G. GARDNER, M.A.
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DANTE'S MINOR POEMS.
By EDMUND G. GARDNER, M.A.
(_Author of "Dante's Ten Heavens."_)
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THE CHRONICLE OF VILLANI.
Translated by Edited by
ROSE E. SELFE. Rev. P.H. WICKSTEED.
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The Principles of Local Government.
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Statistical Officer to the London County Council.
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Some Observations of a Foster Parent.
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Debateable Claims.
A Series of Essays on Secondary Education.
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The Daughter of Peter the Great.
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ENGLISH REPRINTS.
Edited by Prof. EDWARD ARBER, F.S.A.
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TWO HANDY REFERENCE BOOKS ON INDIA
Constable's Hand Atlas of India.
A new series of Sixty Maps and Plans prepared from Ordnance and other
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UNIFORM WITH THE ABOVE.
Constable's Hand Gazetteer of India.
Compiled under the Direction of J.G. BARTHOLOMEW, F.R.G.S. And Edited
with Additions by JAS. BURGESS, C.I.E., L.L.D., etc. Crown 8vo, Half
Morocco, 10s. 6d.
Botanical Microtechnique.
A Handbook of Methods for the Preparation, Staining and Microscopical
Investigation of Vegetable Structures.
By DR. A. ZIMMERMANN.
(_Privat-docent in the University of Tübingen._)
Translated from the German. Demy 8vo, 12s. net. With over 60
Illustrations and Diagrams.
The True Grasses.
By EDUARD HACKEL.
Translated from the German.
With over Ninety Illustrations and Diagrams and a Voluminous Glossary
of Technical Terms.
Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d. net.
The Surgical Anatomy of the Lymphatic Glands.
By CECIL H. LEAF, M.A., F.R.C.S.
With Numerous Coloured Plates.
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ACETYLENE.
A Handbook for the Student and the Manufacturer.
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(Professor of Chemistry R.N. College, Greenwich). About 1000 Pages and
228 Illustrations. Price 32s. net.
Motor Vehicles and Motors.
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The Discharge of Electricity through Gases.
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"An epitome of all that has been done in investigation of the effect
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Electricity in Town and Country Houses.
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Fully Illustrated. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d.
"A volume well worth reading, and if any one is not sure how to light
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The Internal Wiring of Buildings.
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With many Illustrations and Diagrams.
Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.
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LABORATORY NOTE BOOK.
For Chemical Students. By VIVIAN B. LEWES.
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and J.S.S. BRAME.
(_Demonstrator in Chemistry, Royal Naval College; and Assistant
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Interleaved throughout with Writing Paper. 4s.
BARTHOLOMEW'S PHYSICAL ATLAS.
A Series of Maps illustrating the Natural Phenomena of the Earth.
Prepared under the Direction of J.G. BARTHOLOMEW, F.R.S.E., F.R.G.S.
Revised and edited by
_Geology_: SIR ARCHIBALD GEIKIE, D.SC., LL.D., F.R.S., etc.
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_Orography_: PROF. JAS. GEIKIE, D.C.L., LL.D., F.R.S., etc.
_Meteorology_: ALEXANDER BUCHAN, LL.D., F.R.S., etc.
_Botany_: PROF. BAYLEY BALFOUR, D.SC.
_Zoology_: P.L. SCLATER, D.SC., LL.D., F.Z.S.
_Ethnography_: PROF. A.H. KEANE, F.R.G.S.
_Demography_: PROF. ELISÉE RECLUS.
_Cosmography_: PROF. RALPH COPELAND, F.R.A.S., Astronomer Royal, for
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_Magnetism_: PROF. C.G. KNOTT, D.SC., F.R.S.E.
Dedicated to her Majesty the Queen, under the patronage of the Royal
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Vol. I. Geology.
" II. Orography, Hydrography, and Oceanography.
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" IV. Botany.
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" VI. Ethnography and Demography.
" VII. General Cosmography and Terrestrial Magnetism.
The Volumes may be purchased singly. Price £2 12s. 6d. net. per volume.
Vol. III., containing 400 maps, is now ready; the other volumes will
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The Romance of our Ancient Churches.
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With nearly 200 Illustrations by ALEXANDER ANSTED. Crown 8vo, 6s.
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London City Churches.
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London Riverside Churches.
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Chosen by H.D. MADGE, LL.M.
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THE NEW HOME.
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CONSTABLE'S REPRINT OF
THE WAVERLEY NOVELS.
The Favourite Edition of SIR WALTER SCOTT.
With all the original Plates and Vignettes (re-engraved). In 48 vols.
Foolscap 8vo. Cloth, paper label title, 1s. 6d. net. per Volume;
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IN 6 VOLUMES
BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON.
Edited by AUGUSTINE BIRRELL.
With Frontispieces by ALEX. ANSTED, a reproduction of Sir JOSHUA
REYNOLDS' Portrait. Six Volumes. Foolscap 8vo. Cloth, paper label, or
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James's Budget._
IN 2 VOLUMES
UNIFORM WITH "BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON"
Boswell's Tour to the Hebrides with Samuel Johnson, LL.D.
With Notes by SCOTT, CROKER, CHAMBERS, and others.
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CONSTABLE'S LIBRARY
OF
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AND ROMANCES.
Edited by
G. LAURENCE GOMME, F.S.A.
3s. 6d. per volume. Cloth. After a design by A.A. TURBAYNE.
Volumes already issued:--
Harold, the Last of the Saxons. --LORD LYTTON.
The Camp of Refuge. --CHARLES MACFARLANE.
Westward Ho! --CHARLES KINGSLEY.
Reading Abbey. --CHARLES MACFARLANE.
"A good historical novel bears much the same relation to the study of
history that a pleasure trip does to that of geography."--_Glasgow
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"May be described as an Edition de luxe."--_Catholic Times._
THE CENTENARY EDITION OF
The Stories of Samuel Lover.
A complete uniform Edition of the Stories of Samuel Lover. Edited, with
an Introduction and Notes
By J.T. O'DONOGHUE.
Large Crown 8vo, 6s. per Volume. Sold separately or in sets.
Order of Volumes:--
Vol. 1. HANDY ANDY.
" 2. RORY O'MORE.
" 3. TREASURE TROVE; OR, "HE WOULD BE A GENTLEMAN."
" 4. LEGENDS AND STORIES OF IRELAND.
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" 5. LEGENDS AND STORIES OF IRELAND.
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" 6. FURTHER STORIES OF IRELAND.
The last Volume includes Stories which have never been previously
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SPENSER'S FAERIE QUEENE.
Edited by KATE M. WARREN.
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THREE INSTRUCTIVE AND BEAUTIFUL HISTORICAL BOOKS
THE KING'S STORY BOOK.
Edited by G. LAURENCE GOMME.
Illustrated by HARRISON MILLER.
Being Historical Stories collected out of English Romantic Literature
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Bound in red cloth. Gilt. Crown 8vo, 6s.
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THE QUEEN'S STORY BOOK.
Edited by G. LAURENCE GOMME.
Illustrated by W.H. ROBINSON.
Bound in blue cloth gilt. Crown 8vo, 6s.
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The Stories are as good as the arrangement is ingenious, and the
arrangement is a pageant of historic romance which it would be
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Mall Gazette._
Also
THE PRINCE'S STORY BOOK.
Edited by G. LAURENCE GOMME.
Illustrated by H.S. BANKS.
Bound in green cloth gilt. Crown 8vo, 6s.
"The book is an ideal prize book for young people, as it is
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history."--_Daily Chronicle._
PLANTATION PAGEANTS.
By JOEL CHANDLER HARRIS (Uncle Remus).
Fully illustrated by E. BOYD SMITH. 6s.
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SISTER JANE.
By JOEL CHANDLER HARRIS (Uncle Remus).
Crown 8vo, 6s.
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FATE THE FIDDLER.
By HERBERT C. MACILWAINE.
Crown 8vo, 6s.
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"Every page is enriched with delightful descriptions of Australian
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"It proclaims its author as a serious and promising literary artist who
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BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
DINKINBAR.
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THE OLD DOMINION.
By MARY JOHNSTON.
_Third Edition._ Crown 8vo, 6s.
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_Over 200,000 copies sold._
BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
BY ORDER OF THE COMPANY.
_Fifth English Edition._ Crown 8vo, 6s.
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Circular._
"There is not a dull page in the book."--_The Sphere._
The Taming of the Jungle.
By C.W. DOYLE.
The Cover specially designed by J.T. NETTLESHIP.
3s. 6d.
"'The Taming of the Jungle' is one of the most striking books of
Indian life that we have seen since Mr. Kipling produced his 'Plain
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"One needs no previous knowledge of this folk of the Terai, away
there under the Himalayas, to appreciate the insight and observation
which characterise every stroke of the charming sketches. It would
be altogether unfair to say that the author owes his inspiration to
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story out of the good stuff with which his memory is stored."--T.P.
O'Connor in _M.A.P._
The Shadow of Quong Lung.
BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.
SUNNINGWELL.
By F. WARRE CORNISH.
_Second Edition._ Crown 8vo, 6s.
"No more agreeable picture of a clergyman has been drawn since 'The
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"This is a scholarly, well-written, and interesting book, not without a
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"The views put forward throughout the volume, whether or not the
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The Catacombs of Paris.
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The Quest of Mr. East.
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WORKS BY FIONA MACLEOD.
THE DOMINION OF DREAMS.
_Fourth Edition._ Crown 8vo, 6s.
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"Of the extreme beauty and subtlety of Miss Fiona Macleod's writing
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Green Fire.
A Story of the Western Islands.
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Gazette._
The Laughter of Peterkin.
A Re-telling of Old Stories of the Celtic Wonder-world.
Illustrated by SUNDERLAND ROLLINSON.
Crown 8vo, 6s.
"The writing is full of beauty and passion."--_St. James Gazette._
Caleb West.
By F. HOPKINSON SMITH.
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_Second Edition._ Crown 8vo, 6s.
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In the Shadow of the Crown.
By M. BIDDER.
With an introduction by MAURICE HEWLETT.
_Second Edition._ Crown 8vo, 6s.
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JANICE MEREDITH.
A Story of the American Revolution.
By PAUL LEICESTER FORD.
Crown 8vo, 6s.
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"Janice and her girl friends are delightful."--_Literature._
"Mr. Ford has the right feeling for romance; he knows how to bring
his reader into the thick of the excitement and give him the right
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BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
The Story of an Untold Love.
Crown 8vo, 6s.
"You must by all means read 'The Story of an Untold Love.'"--_Truth._
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BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
Tattle Tales of Cupid.
Crown 8vo, 6s.
"There is not one of them that is not dainty and
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"A very attractive and highly entertaining book by the clever author
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DRACULA.
By BRAM STOKER.
_Sixth Edition._ Crown 8vo, 6s.
"In seeking a parallel to this weird, powerful and horrible story,
our minds revert to such tales as 'The Mysteries of Adolpho,'
'Frankenstein,' 'Wuthering Heights,' 'The Fall of the House of
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THE WORKS OF
GEORGE MEREDITH.
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6s. each.
THE ORDEAL OF RICHARD FEVEREL.
EVAN HARRINGTON.
SANDRA BELLONI.
VITTORIA.
RHODA FLEMING.
THE ADVENTURES OF HARRY RICHMOND.
BEAUCHAMP'S CAREER.
THE EGOIST.
DIANA OF THE CROSSWAYS.
ONE OF OUR CONQUERORS.
LORD ORMONT AND HIS AMINTA.
THE AMAZING MARRIAGE.
THE SHAVING OF SHAGPAT.
THE TRAGIC COMEDIANS.
SHORT STORIES--
THE TALE OF CHLOE--THE HOUSE ON THE BEACH--FARINA--THE CASE OF GENERAL
OPLE AND LADY CAMPER.
POEMS. 2 Volumes.
Uniform with the above, without Frontispiece.
An Essay on Comedy and the Use of the Comic Spirit.
_Printed at the Motley Press, 18 Eldon St., E.C._
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