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Title: Gordon at Khartoum
being a personal narrative of events
Author: Wilfrid Scawen Blunt
Release date: July 2, 2026 [eBook #78995]
Language: English
Original publication: London: Stephen Swift and Co., 1911
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/78995
Credits: Galo Flordelis (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/University of Toronto)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GORDON AT KHARTOUM ***
GORDON AT KHARTOUM
[Illustration: _Charles George Gordon 1882_]
GORDON AT
KHARTOUM
BEING A PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF
EVENTS
IN CONTINUATION OF “A SECRET HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT”
BY
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT
“_We are an honest nation, but our diplomatists
are conies, and not officially honest._”—GORDON.
LONDON: PUBLISHED BY
STEPHEN SWIFT AND COL., LTD.
MCMXI
CHISWICK PRESS: CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO.
TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.
PREFACE
IN the present volume, which is a continuation of my “Secret History of
the Occupation of Egypt,” I take up once more the task of chronicling
the events of my time. Lord Cromer’s recent book, “Modern Egypt,” makes
this a duty to the truth which I feel ought not to be postponed, while
there is also the hope that by insistence it may still be possible to
direct those in power with us to adopt an attitude towards the
Mohammedan World less antagonistic than in the past to its thoughts and
feelings.
The period treated here, between 1882 and 1886, is the darkest of the
whole Anglo-Egyptian record, a monument indeed of perverse unwisdom
recognized by all. But I doubt if it is yet fully understood how immense
a wrong was inflicted by our English mismanagement of affairs at Cairo,
not only on Egypt and the Upper Nile, but on all Mohammedan lands
hindered by it in their work of liberal enlightenment, and thrown back
for a whole generation on lines of fanatical reaction. This I hope to
make clear. Lord Cromer would have us believe that it was contrary to
our Government’s desire that we remained on in Egypt in spite of
repeated declarations of an intention to withdraw. It will here be shown
that there was never any such intention at the Foreign Office, and that
if it existed in Mr. Gladstone’s mind it was of that barren kind which
refuses to take the means which alone can lead to the desired result.
With regard to the Soudan and the series of barbarous campaigns which
signalized those three disastrous years, the explanation, too, has been
made that these were forced by circumstances upon our Government, as was
also the separation of the Upper from the Lower Nile, a separation
brought about under conditions of violent disruption, which made it a
permanent injury to Egypt and absolute ruin to the Soudan, with the
depopulation of whole provinces through famine and disease and chronic
warfare. It will be shown that European action alone was the initial
cause of the trouble, that the fanatical character of the Soudanese
revolt was due solely to the intervention of the Christian Powers at
Cairo and that its extent and violence were increased by each successive
step of English intervention, also that to the refusal to make peace
with the Mahdi, either before or after the fall of Khartoum, may fairly
be ascribed all that subsequently happened of misfortune to the tribes
of the Upper River. These were realities that needed placing in their
proper perspective, and I have endeavoured in this volume to present
them as they to my knowledge were.
My personal position while the chief tragedy of the time, Gordon’s fatal
mission to Khartoum, was being enacted was one singularly advantageous
for my present purpose of accurate narration. Occupying no official
post, I nevertheless found myself a deeply interested spectator behind
the official scenes in London, as well as behind those of the Oriental
world, and from time to time playing a small part myself in the drama,
close enough to the chief personages to observe the details of their
action, and in near view of the machinery used for their stage effects.
The diary, which with an instinct of its future importance I kept
carefully written at the time, remains with me as a sure guide on which
I can rely for each day’s happenings, and this, in spite of its many
crudities of thought and expression, and much in it that I am conscious
is to my own disadvantage, I have decided to print almost uncensored as
it stands. It is the strongest evidence I can offer of the accuracy of
my narrative, and the best refutation of the pseudo-history which has
grown up about the mission. On many points I am very conscious that my
diary needs apology. It was written with no thought of publication, and
contains harsh judgements of men and things with many of which I have
since come to disagree, violences of language of which I am now ashamed,
and expressions of feeling softened since by years and by that tolerance
of view taken in old age of human insanities. Much in it I would
willingly not have written, or written otherwise, and much recording my
own sayings and doings I would suppress in publishing if it were not for
the feeling that to do so would impair its entire sincerity. In telling
things disadvantageous to others I could not in fairness be sparing of
my own mistakes. Therefore I leave all unexplained to its own
justification and the indulgence of my readers.
On one point only have I thought it necessary to reconsider at any
length my attitude of the time. This is in respect of the blame laid by
me on Gordon for the failure of his mission on lines of peace. As will
be seen from my diary I was one of the few Englishmen who, with a strong
feeling of esteem and affection for Gordon, disapproved from the first
of his mission, suspecting what was indeed the fact, that there was in
it a political intrigue connected with the continued occupation of
Egypt, and I was one of the very few who rejoiced at the failure of the
relief expedition and the fall of Khartoum. My belief, however, at the
time, that Gordon was himself through his soldier’s obstinacy mainly
responsible for the failure, and that he did, as was being pretended by
Ministers, exceed his instructions, wantonly changing the character of
his mission from a peaceful one to one of war, was unjust, and I
recognize the necessity of correcting my misjudgement. The publication
of Lord Cromer’s book four years ago, with its exaggerated attack on
Gordon on these very heads, roused my suspicion and caused me to re-
examine the evidence connected with the whole matter, and I speedily
discovered that, though Gordon made without doubt many mistakes in its
discharge, the prime responsibility of the mission as one necessarily of
war was certainly not his, but that of those who sent him; also, on
further examination, that in spite of Lord Cromer’s denial the failure
of the mission was principally due to no other than Lord Cromer’s self.
I have consequently devoted several chapters of the present volume to
clearing up this much vexed matter, and I have added to them, for the
special benefit of Egyptian readers ignorant of Gordon’s superlative
moral merit and regarding him only as a too zealous agent of the British
Government, and so their enemy, a memoir of this great man’s life and
character, gathered in part from his published letters scattered through
many works now out of print and notably from those wonderful letters to
his sister collected by Dr. Hill, in part from my own recollection of
him, and that of others who knew him personally. In this, which has been
to me a labour of love as well as of reparation, I have been powerfully
assisted by Gordon’s nephew and literary heir, Colonel Louis Gordon, by
his sole surviving sister, Mrs. Moffitt, and by his niece, Miss Gordon,
who are the chief living authorities on all things concerning him. These
have not only put me on the track of all published knowledge, but have
been good enough to entrust to me many important documents not hitherto
printed, which will be found either in the text of this volume or the
Appendix. One of these is of deciding value to the case, a letter which
Lord Cromer in his _apologia_ seems to have forgotten, and which fixes
on himself the responsibility of the mission as one far wider in scope
than has hitherto been admitted.
If I have anything to add to these few words of preface it is this—I
have been reproached with lack of patriotism in that I have made it my
business of late years to denounce the errors and political misdeeds of
my fellow countrymen in Egypt. In answer to this I can only say that I
belong to a generation of Englishmen holding an idea of patriotism
entirely different from that now accepted, and one that I think saner.
According to the teaching of my youth the patriotic idea was essentially
connected with the love of the land of one’s birth, the passion of
courage which prompted Thermopylae and Bannockburn and the thousand and
one battles where men have stood up in defence of their homes against
invading strangers; also with that other moral courage which
strengthened a man to oppose in speech the folly of his fellow men whom
he saw doing dishonour to that land. It had nothing whatever to do with
the modern idea, now prevalent among Englishmen, of solidarity with the
enterprises, often criminal, of the cosmopolitan finance of London and
Liverpool and Manchester, which has usurped control over our lives and
honour in its dealings with our national affairs abroad, which controls
our press, manipulates our parliament, and uses our ancient and
honourable English name for its base un-English purposes. There is no
lack of patriotism in refusing to bow to this new leadership in evil, or
in denouncing its ungodly doings.
I am by instinct of birth a conservative to my inmost fibre, that is to
say a believer in tradition and the value of all that is ancient in our
national institutions and creeds and moralities. I remember the disgust
of my older Tory friends when, under Semitic influence thirty-five years
ago, the new-fangled style of Empress was proposed to be added to the
time-honoured title inherited by our Sovereign Lady Queen Victoria, and
when the British Empire first began to be talked about as an improvement
in nomenclature on our long sufficing Kingdom of England. What was good
enough for the “spacious days of great Elizabeth” was surely, we
protested, good enough for us. We wanted none of the imperial nonsense.
As to a transfer of our patriotic loyalty from our good island realm of
England to a colonial monarchy beyond the seas, it seemed not only a
vulgarity but a contradiction in physical terms. We did not spare our
mockery and contempt for the whole “Brummagem” innovation.
This is my sentimental view of British imperialism still, nor is it a
matter of sentiment alone with me. My reading of history has taught, and
practical experience has confirmed to me the fact that the task
undertaken by a nation of ruling other nations against their will is the
most certain step for it upon the road to national ruin. It is
impossible to exercise tyrannical authority abroad and retain a proper
respect for the dignity of liberty at home. The two things are not
permanently compatible. The virus of lawlessness in foreign lands
infects the body politic at home by a gradual process of contempt for
human brotherhood and equal right, which are the basis of all law and
the only guarantee of freedom in free nations. Nor, on the other hand,
can a community afford to distribute its energies in a hundred different
directions without injury to its mental balance and danger of
intellectual decay. The British Empire of the present day is being run
on lines of speculation which is often sheer gambling. It has lost the
sense of all economy in its finances, and all moderation in its
spendthrift ways. How can it be moderate with a thousand speculative
ventures to uphold in all four quarters of the globe? Moreover—and this
is perhaps the most dangerous feature of it all—the vanity of
imperialism, of being members of an imperial caste, is rapidly teaching
Englishmen to rely, wherever possible, for their living upon the labour
of others rather than their own. The great Crown Colonies, the Indian
Empire, and the South African federation are all slave communities in
disguise, where white men do not work themselves but live by “native”
labour. The example of their sloth is gaining rapid ground at home, and
soon all will be too proud to do any manual service. The virile part of
the community is flocking already to lands where they can live in less
laborious ways; the feebler part remains to propagate and starve at
home. Who shall say that England is not on a perilous downward path?
What moves me most to anger is to note how, just as four hundred years
ago the Spanish race, urged by the speculative lust of gold and a belief
in their own supreme imperial and Christianizing mission, rushed out
upon the innocent New World and enslaved and slew its primitive peoples
happier far than they, so we English-speaking men enslave and slay in
the name of civilization—here, there, and everywhere—races less well
armed, but in other respects more fit for survival in the spaces they
have primitively occupied than ourselves. The work of subjugation goes
on under a score of false pretences; and these, officially recorded,
remain for the misleading of posterity in the pages of our printed Blue
Books. History thus comes to be written in a sense suited to the self-
satisfaction of those who would like to think themselves God’s
messengers to an unenlightened heathendom, while in reality they are
only gathering in its wealth, and their crimes of conquest are
concealed. In the days of Spain’s madness there was a single honest monk
who denounced his fellow countrymen for their misdeeds, and dared to
love the Indians more than his own people, because he saw these
suffering atrocities of injustice at their conquerors’ hands. He was not
popular in Castile for his plain speaking. Yet where—among the
nations—is imperial Spain to-day? And which has the better title now to
be called a patriot, Las Casas or Pizarro?
There will be found at the end of the volume an Appendix containing a
selection of papers forming the _pièces justificatives_ of this portion
of my history. Some of these are of considerable intrinsic value, others
of less importance but needed for the refutation in detail of the
historic inaccuracies of Lord Cromer’s book, and in answer to certain
remarks found in it concerning myself. Such especially are the
additional evidence here brought forward of the Khedive Tewfik’s
connection with the riots at Alexandria and Tantah in 1882, which,
without reason given, Lord Cromer has pronounced to be unproved; and my
correspondence with 10, Downing Street, which he has in a few sentences
attempted to discredit. The correspondence makes my position towards Mr.
Gladstone absolutely clear, as does, in another direction, my more
generally interesting correspondence with my Oriental friends.
The pencil drawing of Gordon, reproduced as frontispiece to the volume,
is by Edward Clifford, and is now in the collection of the National
Portrait Gallery. Though inadequate as displaying Gordon’s more
popularly heroic attitude, it is the only one that at all reveals his
inner and more mystic mind, or which I recognize as a true presentment
of the man as I personally remember him.
W. S. B.
_13th September_ 1911.
Twenty-ninth anniversary
of Tel-el-Kebir.
CONTENTS
PAGE
GENERAL GORDON _Frontispiece_
PREFACE v
CHAPTERS
I. THE DUFFERIN SETTLEMENT 1
II. SIR EVELYN BARING ARRIVES AT CAIRO 38
III. GORDON’S WORK ON THE WHITE NILE 87
IV. GORDON IN PALESTINE 122
V. GORDON’S LAST MISSION 144
VI. WAS GORDON DISOBEDIENT? 181
VII. EXCITEMENT ABOUT GORDON IN LONDON 207
VIII. MY EXCLUSION FROM EGYPT 245
IX. CONSTANTINOPLE IN 1884 284
X. GORDON’S DEATH. CHAOS 344
XI. RANDOLPH CHURCHILL AND THE FOURTH PARTY 412
XII. THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1885—RANDOLPH AT THE 471
INDIA OFFICE—DRUMMOND WOLFF’S MISSION
NOTE ABOUT THE MAHDI’S DEATH 505
APPENDICES
A. UNPUBLISHED GORDON PAPERS 509
B. MR. BLUNT’S ORIENTAL CORRESPONDENCE 539
C. CORRESPONDENCE WITH DOWNING STREET 568
D. CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL 608
E. ARABI’S PROGRAMME OF 1883, AND MOHAMMED ABDU’S 617
VIEWS
F. EXTRACTS FROM LADY ANNE BLUNT’S DIARY 627
G. LETTERS TO MR. BLUNT ALLUDED TO IN, AND 630
EXEMPLIFYING, THE TEXT
INDEX 645
GORDON AT KHARTOUM
CHAPTER I
THE DUFFERIN SETTLEMENT
I TAKE up my narrative of Egyptian events where I left them at the end
of 1882.
The restoration of the Khedive Tewfik at Cairo had been accomplished by
Lord Wolseley’s army, and Egypt, prostrate and dumb, lay like a woman
betrayed waiting the fate to be allotted to her at the hand of her
despoiler. Arabi’s trial over, it became a matter of supreme interest
for all of us who had interested ourselves in the National movement as
one of progress and reform to speculate on what was to be the ultimate
fortune or ill-fortune of the Egyptians meted out to them by Mr.
Gladstone’s Government—whether they would return to their ancient
slavery under the Circassians, or whether, as we hoped, Gladstone would
make good his promises of favouring the development of their political
institutions, and helping them on their road to self-government—or
whether, again, they would meet the fate of so many other nations of the
East, and become permanently incorporated in the British Empire.
For this last course all the Imperialists of England, headed by “The
Times,” were crying out, and it was generally believed that Bismarck,
then Lord Paramount of Europe, would consent to it, while France, though
sullen and vexed with herself for having missed an opportunity of
acquisition she had long marked out as her own, was not prepared for
effectual remonstrance. Her seizure of Tunis the year before, under
circumstances of even less legality, closed her mouth for any moral
preaching, as did the avowed selfishness of her attitude towards Egypt
which had been even more blatantly than ours that of advocate there of
financial and foreign commercial interests.
I do not think, however, that it was really within the power of our
Liberal Government all at once and so entirely to falsify their pledges.
A protocol of disinterestedness had been signed by Lord Dufferin at
Constantinople at the meeting of the Conference the previous summer,
which in the most public manner possible engaged England to make her
intervention one for the general European good, and not merely for
British advantage. Lord Granville, too, was bound over and over again by
his declarations to the theory that the English army had been sent to
Egypt solely to restore order and maintain the _status quo_, while both
the Khedive’s authority and the Sultan’s had been invoked to give the
intervention a colour of legality, and Sir Beauchamp Seymour in a solemn
document, published a fortnight after the bombardment of Alexandria and
before landing troops, had engaged the faith of England not to attempt
conquest or in any way injure either the religion or the liberties of
the Egyptians. To annex or proclaim a protectorate would consequently
have been a huge moral lapse Gladstone was not prepared for, though a
certain section of the Cabinet, headed by Hartington and Chamberlain,
were pushing hard in that direction, while the Foreign Office, refusing
to accept the evidence of the new facts revealed at the trial, clung to
its false theory of the causes of the war, which it needed as an excuse,
and hardened its heart against all repentance for its past mistakes.
Moreover—and for this I think I may claim to have helped to avert from
Egypt the supreme disaster of annexation—the non-conformist conscience
of the old-fashioned Liberals of England was now awake to the iniquity
of the war, and was indignant at the betrayal by Gladstone of his
Midlothian principles, and was insisting with him that liberty should
not be altogether suppressed on the Nile. This was a consideration which
could not but affect a politician of Gladstone’s temperament; and there
was yet another reason perhaps stronger than all the rest with him,
though I as yet only half suspected it, his economic prudence as ex-
Chancellor of the Exchequer, which made him shrink from incurring full
responsibility for England for the liabilities of a country then
believed to be on the point of bankruptcy. Egypt from that point of view
might be a burden involving money expenditure for many years as well as
international trouble, and this consideration in all probability decided
him. It is certain that, in subsequent years, his scruples about
retaining Egypt became less and less imperative in almost exact
correspondence with the revival of the financial credit.
Be this as it may, the opportunity of English annexation was,
fortunately for the Egyptians, let slip in 1882, and did not again recur
in Mr. Gladstone’s lifetime; nor, let us hope, will another be found in
the still less scrupulous future reserved for the British Empire. Egypt,
though wounded almost to death, did not die as a nation with the
destruction of her national army at Tel-el-Kebir, and still preserves
her historic identity as a legally self-governing State, technically
dependent on no European Power. The settlement of her future as such was
the outcome of the divergent ideas and motives and pledges and interests
just enumerated, and, as all the world knows, was entrusted to Lord
Dufferin, already in Egypt, in the opening months of the year 1883.
Dufferin’s task, it may be admitted, was a difficult one. It was to
effect a compromise which should at the same time satisfy Europe, keep
nominal faith with the Khedive, and have at least an appearance of
giving back to the Egyptians the political liberties they had for a
moment won and were now once more deprived of. At the time of his
appointment I had considerable confidence in Dufferin. I had known him
personally for more than twenty years, from the time indeed when, as an
attaché to the Legation at Athens, I had made his acquaintance on his
return from his Nile tour in the winter of 1859-60, and I knew that his
sympathy with the fellahin had then been great. He was in those days an
interesting and very charming young man of not much more than thirty,
and he had spent most of his time at Athens with us at the Legation,
joining our rides and excursions, and taking part in our mounted paper-
chases which took place twice a week, as well as in such social
amusements as the Corps Diplomatique at Athens afforded. His mother,
herself the most charming of women, was travelling with him, and both
had been especially kind to me in a way I did not forget, and I am glad
to think that during the whole of Lord Dufferin’s long life the pleasant
relations thus begun between us were maintained as often as we met.
In the year following he had received his first public appointment, that
of Commissioner to Syria at the time of the Maronite massacres, and he
had returned to Athens after them, and I remembered the details of the
settlement he had so successfully arranged for the Lebanon. By this he
had pledged himself to the principle of provincial autonomy under
Ottoman sovereignty, while a little later the weight of his opinion had
been given to our Government when it insisted with the French that they
should withdraw their army of occupation from Syria. It is curious how
closely parallel were, in fact, the two cases of intervention—the French
intervention in Syria in 1860 and the English intervention in Egypt in
1882. It seemed to me, therefore, that he might be trusted to oppose
anything like a renewal of the old Turco-Circassian tyranny, and also to
respect the independent administrative rights of the Egyptian people.
His task, however, as I have said was a difficult one, indeed almost
impossible. In order to give back their liberty to the fellahin, or
indeed to introduce any of the reforms advocated by Arabi and his
friends, it would have been necessary to reinstate, if not Arabi
himself, at least a Nationalist Ministry, for the Turco-Circassian
clique, which Wolseley had put back into power, were the enemies of all
reform, while the Khedive himself, who had betrayed his constitutional
pledges, could no longer be trusted to work honestly with a
constitutional Government. He would need to be replaced by some other
prince who had not forfeited the confidence of his people.
Such a course, though difficult from the Foreign Office point of view,
would have met with little obstacle in Egypt itself. Indeed, it would
have been a quite simple affair. Tewfik, at that time, had absolutely no
friend in the country outside the circle of his own small palace clique,
and hardly a voice would have been raised for him if his retirement had
been insisted on as a political necessity, not even in all probability
his own. Pensioned, he would not unwillingly have returned to private
life, for his experience of the Khedivial dignity had not been such as
to cause him to be enamoured of it. Two courses would then have been
open in regard to his successor. Either the recognized order of
succession might have been followed, which would have placed the present
Khedive Abbas, still a child, upon the throne, under a Regency; or the
older order of succession might have been reverted to, which would have
given it to Prince Halim. In neither case would there have been
difficulty in restoring a constitutional regime. Probably the best
arrangement, if our Foreign Office could have been got to consent to it,
would have been the first, with Arabi for Regent. Arabi was still, in
spite of his defeat and the poor fight of it he had made at Tel-el-
Kebir, most widely popular, and could have been trusted to work honestly
with those plans of material and moral reform which England professed to
have at heart, not indeed as Minister, for he lacked the administrative
ability, but as exercising by delegation the duties of a constitutional
head of the State. For that no Egyptian could have been better fitted,
he being a large-minded man as well as a good Moslem. Nor would
England’s legitimate influence have been a loser by it. Arabi, in spite
of the quarrel forced upon him by the Foreign Office, had always refused
to see an enemy in the English people. He had nursed himself to the last
in the belief that, if only the British public could be got to know the
truth, it could not fail to sympathize. England, it must be remembered,
was traditionally believed in Egypt, prior to 1882, to be the universal
patron of liberal and national movements throughout the world, and in an
especial manner the friend of Islam. Arabi had been bred in that
tradition, and had to the last moment, in common with most Egyptians,
imagined that the quarrel was due to a mistake as to facts. The
rectification of it would therefore have seemed natural to him and to
all, and would have restored the general Egyptian goodwill.
For a moment we thought that Dufferin, whom the disclosures connected
with the trial had made acquainted with the true history of the war,
would have recommended this enlightened course, and it would have saved
him and his employers at the Foreign Office much subsequent trouble had
he had the courage to insist on it. He was perfectly aware of Tewfik’s
real character, and he was aware also of Arabi’s merits. Indeed, so far
had his confidence gone in the honesty and patriotism of the defeated
National leader that he had got him at the moment of his leaving for
Ceylon to draw up a Memorandum of Reform for Egypt, the text of which,
though doubtless existing at the Foreign Office, has never been
published. It will be found at the end of this chapter, a copy of it
having been furnished to me by Arabi from Ceylon the following summer.
Also I had learned from General Charles Gordon, in a conversation I had
had with him, while Arabi was still in prison, in December 1882, that
the idea of Arabi’s rehabilitation and recall to Egypt was at the time
contemplated in Downing Street; while, as will be seen further on, I
received additional confirmation of it as being in Gladstone’s mind in a
message received from him as late as the summer of 1883. We were
therefore not without justification in the hope we reposed in Dufferin,
though it is improbable that the Foreign Office, obstinate and deeply
compromised, was ever converted from its hostility to the National
leader. Indeed it is pretty certain that, whatever representations of
the truth Dufferin may have made or whatever new suggestions offered,
the policy he was instructed by Lord Granville to pursue remained
unyielding; and the publication a few months later of Dufferin’s famous
despatch of 7th February did but register a foregone conclusion.[1]
Nevertheless, it is worth while to put on record what evidence we
possess of a wiser and more liberal policy having been contemplated at
least for a moment by some of those in power. Not to lay too much stress
on the hopes held out to us by Dufferin at the time of the compromise of
Arabi’s trial, which may have been dictated by an unauthorized desire to
persuade us, it is certain that Arabi’s early return to Egypt was
believed in not only at Cairo at the end of the year 1882, but also in
London. Gordon’s evidence on this head is decisive, and shows that it
was entertained in official quarters. Though looked upon in Downing
Street as “not clothed in the rightest of minds,”[2] Gordon’s opinion on
Egyptian affairs was considered worth taking. He was in occasional
correspondence with Lord Northbrook, and he was intimate[3] with
Reginald Brett (the present Lord Esher), just then transferred with Lord
Hartington, whose private secretary he was, to the War Office, while
Wolseley also was his friend. There was talk, too, already at the time,
as we shall presently see, of Gordon’s possible return as Governor-
General to the Soudan, and he was in an excellent position to hear and
know. What therefore he told me in the conversation referred to cannot
but be convincing of the fact. The circumstances under which it took
place were these.
It will be remembered by readers of my first volume, “A Secret History
of the English Occupation of Egypt,” that while the campaign of Tel-el-
Kebir was still in progress I received a letter from General Gordon
dated Cape Town, 3rd August 1882, the text of which is there given,
expressing to me the strongest sympathy with my view of the iniquitous
causes of the war, and ending with the words, “As for Arabi, whatever
may become of him individually, he will live for centuries in the
people; they will never be ‘your obedient servants’ again.” A copy of
this letter I had forwarded to Gladstone, and it had not been without
effect on him in what had happened subsequently in Egypt. To Gordon I
had sent in reply a printed copy of my private correspondence with
Downing Street, and the article on the Egyptian Revolution, published in
the September number of the “Nineteenth Century Review,” and had
received a second letter from him which I here print.
“En route to England 21 _Oct._ 1882.
“MY DEAR MR. BLUNT,
“THANK you for your kind letter Sept. 7, received as I was leaving
Cape Town. Sorry you have been abused, but you are not the worse because
the world does so, neither are you better when it praises you. You are
as you are. Thanks for XIX century and pamphlet, which I read with
interest. I have a conviction that things will turn out well for the
Egyptian people in the long run, and though our people may suffer, it
will be for welfare of the human race. I cannot now write on the
subject, for I have an idea that things are ruled for the best, by an
overruling Power, and that to put any say in what He does seems
presumptuous on my part; in fact if one took up the cudgels for the
oppressed every-where, one would have too much to do. I may meet you
some day, and perhaps can enlighten you on some subjects, such as why
the Joint Note 9 Janry was written, from _my_ point of view. As for
Dilke I think he is an impostor in a great measure. With kind regards.
Believe me, Yrs. sincerely,
“C. G. GORDON.
“_P.S._—I have seen papers up to 26 Oct. and it seems H. M. G. have just
fought to reinstate the Parasite ring of Pachas. As for Raouf and Ismail
[Eyoub] Pachas’ being on Arabi’s trial, it means simply the condemnation
of Arabi. I know both these two men well, they would shrink at nothing,
and are the representative men of the Pacha clique.”
It was therefore natural that, on his return to England in November I
should be one of the first persons upon whom the General called. My
diary, which at the time I had unfortunately interrupted, fails me in
regard to the exact details of the visit paid me; and I have no more
than a memorandum to the effect that Gordon called at my house in James
Street, Buckingham Gate, on 5th December, and that not finding me at
home he left his name with my servant at the door characteristically
thus: “General Gordon or Gordon Pasha. I daresay you have heard of him
before”; and with it a note written on a sheet of my own paper. But this
I have preserved and it fixes the date. It says: “I will call at
Buckingham Gate 9 a.m. Friday, if you could be in. I sincerely hope you
can recover the £4,000 you spent on Arabi [alluding to the costs of the
trial]. I will give £5 a year till you are repaid. It would be a
pleasure to do it and no risk, for Arabi will be back in Egypt within
two years, and he will repay it. I hope that the inferior prisoners will
not be forgotten, for Riaz and Co. will do their best to crush them, for
Riaz’ fate depends on their extinction. My address, 68, Elm Park Road,
Chelsea.”
It must have been therefore on Friday the 8th December that Gordon
called again, and, as I remember well, breakfasted with us and spent the
whole forenoon in talk, mainly on Egypt and the Soudan, but also on
India and the relations generally between Europe and the East. With
regard to Egypt my recollection is distinct that we were in entire
agreement in our sympathy with the “rebellion,” and our condemnation of
Tewfik. In my “Nineteenth Century” article I had engaged myself to write
a sequel to it, but I remember that he advised me to leave this promise
for the present unfulfilled. “You do not require it,” he said, “for your
own justification, and, as for the Government, they are resolved now to
do justice. You may have perfect faith in Mr. Gladstone, and I know that
he intends to restore Arabi as soon as public opinion shall have cooled
down, and he can do it without too sudden a reversal of his policy.
Arabi will be back in Egypt in a couple of years, and you can then write
your history far more effectively than now.”
This is my recollection of the visit, and it is confirmed to me on the
point in question by a second note received from him at the close of the
year bidding me farewell just before his leaving England for Jerusalem,
which letter I have also preserved.
“5 Rockstone Place, Southampton 2, 26, 12, 82.
“MY DEAR MR. BLUNT,
“THANK you for your kind note. I am sorry not to have seen you and
Lady Blunt before I left. I go tomorrow and will do my best about the
Sheiks.[4] Above is my safe address. I will write you from Palestine.
“I have to a small degree tried to use the verse: ‘If thou seest the
violent oppression of the poor, or the subversion of justice, marvel not
at it, for the Higher than the Highest regardeth it.’ Ecc. v, 8.
“Not that I am inclined to be silent on these matters if I think I can
do any good, but it comforts me to feel that one can get access to a
Higher than they.
“Arabi will be back in a couple of years, say in 18 months.
“I think things are very critical in Cairo, and the day I called on you,
I went to Brett and begged him to urge Government to assemble the
Notables at once. Napoleon I suffered far more from the revolts of Cairo
than from the troops. Colvin is to be recalled.
“Believe me with kindest regards to Lady Blunt and yourself, and with
hopes for the future thro’ your efforts, Yours sincerely,
“C. G. GORDON.”
This taken with the rest is, I think, decisive. As to the Soudan, my
recollection of Gordon’s talk is that he expressed himself at the time
in entire sympathy with the Mahdi as the popular leader of a revolt
against an iniquitous Government, but that, whereas I, sharing the views
of many Egyptian Nationalists in 1882, was for giving the Soudanese
complete independence, Gordon insisted on the retention of Khartoum as a
necessity for Egypt in connection with the Nile water-supply, and as an
outpost to be held politically. On this point alone we disagreed.
Arabi’s memorandum, drawn up for Lord Dufferin, is another important bit
of evidence. It shows that at least the question of a change of Khedive
had been presented to, and must have been considered by, him; nor is it
to be supposed that the intention of a complete pardon for the writer
can have been absent from the diplomatist to whom it was addressed. It
is certain, at any rate, that Dufferin was influenced by it in his
scheme of reforms, and was then favourably impressed, and to this I can
testify of my own knowledge, for I more than once had opportunities in
after years of learning the high opinion Dufferin entertained of the ex-
National leader. The passage in the memorandum of immediate importance
to the point we are considering is this:
“The question,” says the memorandum, “of appointing a new ruler (Waly)
is an important one, and I will lay before you my own views and those of
my comrades. I say: that the family of Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mohammed
Ali, is absolutely worthless for the sovereignty; no matter how they
might be controlled by a Constitution, for they are of notoriously
corrupt principles. In my opinion there is a choice of two courses. 1.
To appoint Halim Pasha, son of Mohammed Ali Pasha, Waly of Egypt, under
the conditions before laid down [_i.e._, those of a Constitution]. He is
a man who has been tried by misfortune, and has tasted the bitterness of
injustice, and has reached the age of about fifty-five years, and I
believe that such a man might try to win the sympathy of the people by
justice and kindness. 2. The other course is to appoint as Waly for
Egypt one of her own men of the National Party whose deeds have borne
witness to their goodness of disposition and peaceful character. But, as
to any idea of appointing a foreign ruler, I say that, as the mass of
the Egyptians are Moslems, with the exception of the Coptic section (and
these are the same as the Egyptians in their dealings and ways of life),
I believe that the appointment of a foreign Waly would not suit the
temper of the Egyptians, but would perhaps lead to trouble among them.”
This, though not conforming to strict official phraseology, goes to the
root of the matter, and is full of common sense. Let us consider how it
would have been if Dufferin had made the idea of such a change of ruler
his own, as he made other recommendations of the memorandum his own, and
had pressed it as a necessity of the Egyptian case upon the Foreign
Office if an honest settlement was to be made and the British troops
withdrawn from Egypt. As regards Egypt proper, the appointment of Halim
would have solved the whole difficulty of popular disaffection. Halim,
who was a really estimable man, bore a good repute in Egypt. His
domestic life was a blameless one. His wife, a woman of high distinction
with a good European education, would have helped him in his relations
with the resident foreign element, and he himself was sufficiently
Europeanized to play the part needed of a modern Egyptian ruler. He had
none of the vices of the elder branch of the family of Mohammed Ali. He
was neither a spendthrift nor a voluptuary, nor a coveter of his
neighbour’s goods, nor on any point a law breaker. Moreover there would
have been no difficulty in obtaining the Sultan’s consent to the
appointment. Halim was in some sort the Sultan’s own candidate, as also
the candidate of most of the European Powers. He could have worked
easily with the National Party and the Constitution, and thus the
British garrison could have been at once withdrawn. If to this had been
added, what was talked of at the time, the appointment of Sir Charles
Wilson as Malet’s successor at the British Agency, even a preponderance
of English influence in Egypt could have been secured. Wilson was a
strong sympathizer with the Nationalists, and his advice would have been
followed. The suggestion of Halim was an entirely wise one, suited to
every necessity of the case, as would have been the other of Abbas with
Arabi for Regent.
Above all it would have saved Egypt and England from those terrible
disasters which beset both countries with a pursuing curse in regard to
the Soudan during the next three years. That the intervention in Egypt
was the direct cause of the revolt in the Soudan is certain. One of the
most fatal acts of the Dual Control had been to give to the Soudan in
1880, as Gordon’s successor, a reactionary and wholly corrupt Circassian
Governor-General, Raouf Pasha, and it had been through his tyranny and
incapacity that the country had fallen into disorder and the Mahdi had
gained his first adherents. Two years later Arabi’s first administrative
act when he became War Minister at Cairo had been to recall Raouf,[5]
and send a really competent man, Abd-el-Kader Pasha, to replace him.
Under Abd-el-Kader the rebellion had been localized, Khartoum
scientifically fortified, and order restored everywhere but in the
western provinces. Moreover Arabi had put himself into epistolary
communication with the Mahdi, and had established a _modus vivendi_
between him and the National Government in view of the common menace of
European and Christian aggression in Lower Egypt. It was the landing of
English troops at Alexandria that gave its fanatical character to the
Mahdist rebellion, while it also denuded the Soudan of its best troops
recalled to Egypt to repel the menace of invasion. But for Tel-el-Kebir,
the utmost misfortune that could have befallen Egypt in that direction
would have been the loss of the Bahr el Ghazal province and Kordofan.
Even now, after the defeat of Tel-el-Kebir, all could have been repaired
had the change of Khedive been resolved on according to Arabi’s
suggestion, with a recall of the Nationalist leaders, and an end put to
the tyrannical Circassian regime at Cairo. Terms could easily have been
come to with the Mahdi which would have secured Khartoum and the Eastern
Soudan from attack. The Christian army withdrawn from Cairo, the Mahdi’s
rebellion would have lost its fanatical _raison d’être_. It will be seen
later that Arabi, even before the defeat of Hicks, was quite ready to
abandon Kordofan and the Equatorial provinces, while there would have
been no difficulty in retaining Khartoum, where the chief weakness of
the garrison in 1883 lay in the fact that the troops composing it were
Arabi’s ex-soldiers devoted to him and wholly disaffected to Tewfik. For
the issue of bloodshed and destruction witnessed for a generation in the
Soudan, the obstinacy of our Foreign Office in retaining Tewfik was
directly responsible. It was one of those fatal mistakes which statesmen
make and persist in because they are too proud to own their error.
Was there ever a greater tragedy of errors? And all for what? It is
probable that the real reason why Tewfik was maintained in his place as
Khedive, instead of being pensioned and sent to join his father in an
exile more or less honourable, was neither a consideration of Egypt’s
interests nor that of England’s interests, nor yet of the interests of
Europe, nor so much as those of the bondholders. None of the upholders
of these interests had any belief or trust in Tewfik as a prince capable
of maintaining order at Cairo, or of restoring Egyptian credit, or even
of efficiently serving British interests. He was known to have none of
the qualities of a strong ruler, and he was popular with no one, native
or European. As a puppet prince he might have his uses, but the
situation demanded something more than a puppet prince, and he was good
for no other purpose, political or financial. No. The probability is
that the real reason with Gladstone’s Cabinet was that Tewfik’s
retirement would have entailed the retirement also of Lord Granville,
and Lord Granville was too popular a member of the Cabinet to be forced
into such a step against his will; also that Lord Granville, a needy
man, much in debt, and dependent on his official salary to eke out an
insufficient income, was not prepared for the personal sacrifice. The
fiction of Tewfik’s loyalty and of Arabi’s rebellion had therefore to be
persisted in and upheld. It could not be contemplated that a Minister
should admit an error which had been accompanied by the slaughter of
thousands of peasants, and the expenditure of millions, and a war which
had been boasted of as one undertaken as a “duty of honour.” Granville
must have resigned if his Cabinet had belied him. There was no
“political” way out of it, except for the Foreign Office to harden its
heart and persevere in its accomplished wrong. This, I say, was the
tragedy of the situation, and for this Egypt was sacrificed. As for
Dufferin, he doubtless argued, being an old diplomatist with a career to
maintain, that he had been sent to Egypt by the Foreign Office to get
them out of an all but impossible scrape, but that his instructions did
not include the duty of proving them fools. He therefore made his
settlement on the lines prescribed. It may be said of him with truth
that he missed, unwillingly, an heroic opportunity, and I think also
with truth that it left him with occasional qualms of conscience which
troubled him through the rest of his long and eminently successful life.
For these reasons nothing in the way of an efficient new policy was
insisted on by Dufferin, or adopted by the Government, and all the rest
of the programme so elaborately drawn up by him of councils and
assemblies, and dignified with the name of a Constitution, was rendered
impotent from the outset by being entrusted to hands the least desirous
of its success and the least competent to deal with it.
We, who were watching, were not long in being undeceived in our hopes.
The new year 1883 began badly. Although its actual first act at Cairo
was the issuing of the decree promised us by Dufferin of a general
amnesty for all connected with the “Rebellion,” and though I had
received from him a private letter announcing to me the good news of the
release of 450 political prisoners, for which I had duly thanked him, it
soon appeared that the operation of the decree was being evaded in
practice where the Khedive needed to be indulged in acts of unsatisfied
vengeance on those who had specially offended him. But for this, I had
intended that with the issue of the amnesty my political intervention in
Egypt should end. I felt that I had done my whole duty by salvaging, as
far as I could, the wreck of the National Party; I had so far succeeded
in saving the lives, if not the liberty, of all concerned, and it was my
thought to rely, as Gordon had advised me, on Gladstone for the rest,
and to turn my energies into other channels. A very few days, however,
passed before it became evident that things were going less fairly in
Egypt than they seemed. About the 15th of January Napier,[6] having
finished his work at Cairo, returned to London, and from him I learned
that, notwithstanding the amnesty and the clearing of the prisons
announced by Dufferin, a certain number of the political prisoners had
been detained while others were being arrested and put on trial before
special courts on charges connected with the past year. The charges
brought were so-called “criminal charges” against persons implicated in
the riots at Alexandria, Tantah, and other places, before or during the
war, and on this pretence vengeance was being taken on political enemies
by the Khedive and the Court Party. What made these prosecutions the
more infamous was the fact that innocent men were being indicted for the
very crimes their accusers had been themselves guilty of, and, to make
the injustice of it the more glaring, some of them were being tried
before military courts appointed by the very man, Omar Pasha Lutfi, now
Minister of War, who with the Khedive’s connivance and suggestion had
prepared the Alexandria riot not a year before. It was a “judicial
atrocity” of the most shameless kind.
I therefore wrote to Dufferin a letter, the full text of which will be
found in the Appendix at the end of this volume, complaining of the
exceptions that had been made to the amnesty. “It would seem,” I said,
“most unfair that the leaders of the ‘rebellion’ having foregone their
right of being publicly defended, any of their followers or associates
should be punished for rebellion. . . . I cannot understand how it can
be the wish of our Government to make scapegoats of the rank and file of
those charged with the criminal acts of June and July, while the chief
offenders enjoy immunity. If one thing has been proved to the
satisfaction of the Government more than another, it is that Omar Lutfi
was responsible for the murderous character of the riots of the 11th of
June, yet we read still of executions at Alexandria for crimes committed
on that day by others, the chief culprit himself being the while at
large, in honour, and even holding high office under the Khedive. I say
nothing of the Khedive himself, though you doubtless know how little his
conduct on that day would have borne investigation.”
Dufferin’s answer to this, while personally amiable, was the reverse of
satisfactory. It referred me to a report drawn up by Sir Charles Wilson
about the discharge of political prisoners, but ignored the real point
of my remonstrance, the breach of the amnesty of which I had complained.
The monstrosity of the prosecutions’ being carried on in the Khedive’s
name for acts due to the Khedive’s own instigation was too delicate
ground to be ventured on, and Dufferin was diplomatically silent. In the
meanwhile men were being hanged, and among them, on the 5th of February,
a young officer charged with being responsible for the riot at Tantah in
July 1882.
The riots of Tantah, which took place a few days after the bombardment
of Alexandria, were the work of the Alexandrian mob which had fled from
that city. They were permitted and encouraged by the then governor of
the province, Ibrahim Pasha Adhem, an adherent of the Khedive, who
sought to emulate the conduct of Omar Pasha Lutfi in the Alexandrian
case. The Tantah massacre would have attained very large proportions but
for the intervention of Ahmed Bey Minshawi, a neighbouring fellah
proprietor of great local authority, aided by Yusuf Abu Diab, one of
Abd-el-Aal Pasha’s aides-de-camp, who had been sent by Arabi to protect
the Christians. The governor, Ibrahim Adhem, had then been arrested by
Arabi’s order, and sent a prisoner to the citadel, but on the return of
the Khedive to Cairo had been reinstated in his office at Tantah and had
inverted the _rôle_ of guilt in the affair. Early in the year 1883 Abu
Diab had been singled out and tried for the other’s crime, and now while
I was still in correspondence with Dufferin hanged at Tantah. His
execution, where the truth of the affair was known to every one and
where Abu Diab was highly esteemed, struck terror through the whole
province. I did not hear of the case until too late to intervene; but
when, a few days later, Dufferin’s unsatisfactory answer came, I
resolved not to allow such another injustice to go by without public
remonstrance. It is impossible that Dufferin who, though he had refused
to examine into the history of the Alexandrian riot, knew in a general
way how the case really lay as between the Khedive and the Nationalists,
should not have suspected that this and other trials on similar charges
were a perversion of justice. Also it is certain that there was a strong
political interest to serve, if the Khedive was to be rehabilitated and
supported, in providing him with a scapegoat for his own and his agents
crimes. Nor can it be left out of view that the theory of the
Nationalists’ responsibility for the riot had been made the pretext and
excuse throughout by our diplomacy, and by Dufferin himself at the
Constantinople Conference, for its intervention. Dufferin was no
sentimentalist in politics, and could at times be hard. In this case, as
in others which preceded and followed it, he contented himself with
directing the formal presence of an Englishman at the trial, one
unacquainted with the language, to watch it, and thus allowed the
Khedive to have practically his own way.
The next case that occurred was that of the vengeance taken on a number
of unfortunate Bedouins charged with the murder of Professor Palmer
during the war. Palmer (see “Secret History”) had been sent by our
Government, and especially by Lord Northbrook, to bribe the Bedouin
tribes east of the Suez Canal, and with him Gill and Charrington, two
English officers, had met their deaths in its performance. They had all
three, travelling disguised, been taken prisoners and shot in the desert
by order of the Egyptian governor of Nakhl, an act not of common murder
but clearly of warfare, and one which should certainly have been covered
by the amnesty, the business the disguised officers were on giving them
the character of spies. But our Government had special reasons for
resenting their death; and after the war was over an English officer,
Colonel Warren, was despatched to the Sinai peninsula to “do justice” on
the tribes. This duty he performed by driving in to Suez some scores of
Bedouins, men, women, and children, and selecting out of them five for
hanging, while the rest were retained for many months in prison as
hostages for more important persons still at large. This was the same
Warren who afterwards figured so lugubriously at Spion Kop in the Boer
war. The true facts of the case had been brought to my knowledge by
Palmer’s widow, who came to me incensed against the Government, and
holding them, and especially Lord Northbrook who had sent him,
responsible for her husband’s death. She now laid the whole particulars
before me; and we had questions put about it in Parliament, and
eventually a debate raised on the Address, and another in the House of
Lords, in which Her Majesty’s Ministers rose, one after the other, and,
like Ananias and Sapphira, lied valiantly in the public cause. It is a
curious feature of our parliamentary conventions that so worthy and
straightforward a man as the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman should
have consented on this occasion to deny absolutely facts of which there
was the clearest possible written proof, and of which he could not have
been ignorant, in Palmer’s own handwriting, while also it concerned a
sum of public money no smaller than £20,000. Lord Northbrook was the
Minister really responsible and Bannerman was his Under-Secretary at the
Admiralty, and to him the work of denial was given by his chief. We
failed to save the Bedouins but obtained for the lady a handsome
pension, and for Palmer sepulture in St. Paul’s. The whole story is
instructive but has been told in my “Secret History,” and its sequel
does not sufficiently concern Egyptian history to detain me here.
A third still more important case among the political hangings of the
year was that of Suliman Bey Sami, the Nationalist Colonel of the
Alexandria garrison, who, at the time of the riots, had come down with
his regiment and put an end to the massacre in spite of the conniving
civil Governor, Omar Pasha Lutfi. Omar Lutfi was a strong partisan of
the Khedive, and the resentment of the Court party was, for this reason,
especially keen against Sami. It was a case precisely on the same lines
as that of Abu Diab, except that the charge brought against Sami was not
in regard to his conduct at the time of the riot, but for having set
fire to Alexandria during the bombardment a month later. It is
especially disgraceful to our Government that this man should have been
hanged with their connivance, and by a court-martial appointed by this
very Omar Lutfi, because the charge brought against him concerned one of
their own political fictions, namely, that Alexandria was set fire to
not at all by the guns of the British fleet, but solely by the
Egyptians, a fiction in which they had not only a political but also a
pecuniary interest, involving responsibility for the three millions
sterling indemnity claimed by the victims of the bombardment. The
hanging, moreover, was the clearest possible breach of the amnesty, for
Suliman’s act had the perfectly legitimate excuse of warfare, as one
designed to cover the retreat of the Egyptian army. Here the case was so
strong a one against the Government that I was able to secure the help
of that really efficient fighter in the House of Commons, Lord Randolph
Churchill, an occasion memorable to me as the beginning of a valuable
political friendship long preserved.
Randolph Churchill was an extraordinarily interesting young man, the
most attractive at that time in English public life, the head of the
little group of four Tories in the House of Commons which went by the
name of the Fourth Party. Until the spring of 1883 I had not come across
him personally. He had been kept away from the House during the whole
earlier session of 1882 by illness, and I had not had the good fortune
of securing his help. I have often thought that but for the accident of
his illness that spring, when the Egyptian crisis occurred, the whole
trouble and discredit of the bombardment and the war might have been
prevented, for it needed nothing but a powerful and persistent voice on
the Opposition side in Parliament to deter Mr. Gladstone from an
enterprise so strangely at variance with his life-long teaching.
Unfortunately, such a voice had not been available. The members of Mr.
Gladstone’s own party did not dare, with the single exception of Sir
Wilfrid Lawson, to reproach him with the necessary courage, and as for
the Tory Opposition, not one of them had the wisdom to take with him a
humanitarian line, the only one which could have convinced him of his
folly.
In the short autumn session, Churchill had reappeared and had given
courage to his followers, and they had helped us in getting a fair trial
for the vanquished “rebels,” Churchill himself generously subscribing to
the Arabi defence fund. But so far we had not personally met. Now,
however, in my anger at the barbarities which were being committed in
Egypt, and by the advice of my friends, especially Lady Gregory and my
cousin, Algernon Bourke, who was still on the staff of the “Times” (see
“Secret History”) I turned to Churchill as the one man capable of
dealing in Parliament effectively with the case. Dufferin, his mission
ended, had turned his back on Egypt, and the small local protection
given by his presence was no more to be had. It was an urgent necessity,
if these black doings were to be stopped, that the home Government
should be at once subjected to vigorous and even violent remonstrance,
and that Gladstone should be attacked individually as the responsible
author of the atrocities due to his intervention. In his younger days
Gladstone had denounced the State crimes of Bourbon rule in Naples with
its arrests, imprisonments, and sanguinary political punishments, and it
was urgent now that some one should stand up in the House and remind him
of his more reputable past, and shame him from the countenance his
agents were giving to the same State crimes in Egypt. Churchill in his
place below the gangway was the man for this. He was “spoiling,” I was
told, “for a fight,” and to him in my new need I turned as the one
knight errant on whom I could quite rely.
I like to remember Lord Randolph as I then first saw him one afternoon
in May when, by appointment, I met him to discuss the situation at some
rooms in the Strand where a chess tournament was going on. Chess was one
of his few hobbies, and he had asked me to meet him there. At the time
of which I speak he was, with no very regular features, a distinctly
good-looking young man, smartly dressed and with a certain distinction
of manner which marked him from the common herd. He was of ordinary
height—by no means the dwarf his caricatures suggest—well built and well
set up, his face a pleasant one, eyes full of intelligence, though
rather _à fleur de tête_, while his mouth, overhung with a strong
moustache curling up above his cheeks, gave an aggressive tone to his
countenance it would not otherwise have had. In colour he was then, as
always, rather pale, with a look of ill-health which later increased
from year to year, a symptom of the constitutional weakness of which he
so prematurely died. There was no lack, however, as yet of virility in
his movements or gestures. On the contrary, it was just the vital force
in him which was the chief attraction and the frank irresponsibility in
all he did and said. Indeed, it was difficult when conversing with him,
even after he had become a Cabinet Minister, to regard him as a quite
serious statesman—a glorified schoolboy rather, ready still to rob an
orchard or tie a cracker to the head master’s coattail. This simplicity
of speech and pleasant humour, joined to a high-bred courtesy with
strangers, made him a favourite, especially with young men nor only of
his own class in England, while, as I afterwards found, it opened to him
no less the doors of confidence in the minds of the many Orientals whom
I brought to see him—minds usually suspicious of Englishmen, and slow to
reveal their thoughts. He had none of that arrogant coldness that so
much repels these, nor again of that abruptness of address which is apt
to frighten them, as birds are frightened at any too sudden movement.
Such visitors never failed after an interview with Churchill to speak to
me enthusiastically in his praise. To myself he was invariably charming.
My somewhat romantic view of politics, so little like his own, attracted
him, and my knowledge of the East, of which he was as yet ignorant; and,
being some ten years his senior in age, I was able to inspire him almost
from the beginning of our intercourse with new ideas, enlarging his
political horizon, and as I have always been glad to think, encouraging
him in the humaner paths of public virtue. To these he was already in a
vague way inclined, and on the occasion of our first meeting I had no
difficulty in persuading him to take up the Egyptian patriotic case, the
more so because it gave him an opportunity for immediate action in
Parliament most damaging to the Government. He found it a pleasant
fancy, when I suggested it to him, that he should array himself in the
Grand Old Man’s Midlothian garments, left as it were outside a tavern
door, and preach to him to his face of “righteousness and temperance and
a judgement to come.”
With Churchill’s assistance I was able to enlist other strong helpers,
Drummond Wolff, who was the member of the Fourth Party specially
affected to foreign affairs, and Gorst (Sir John) its legal adviser—both
men of great ability and political courage. Outside their radius, too, I
had for friends in the House of Commons Robert Bourke,[7] who
represented foreign affairs on the Opposition front bench; Sir Wilfrid
Lawson, the most honest man in Parliament; and Labouchere, whom I had
known in my old diplomatic days as a fellow attaché, and who was now
leader of the extreme Radical division below the gangway. All these were
good men and true in a parliamentary fight, and, working together, could
be counted on to force the official entrenchments of the Government, and
make the Grand Old Man the object of daily attacks which should convince
him of his shame. We had good help, too, from the Irish party, and it
had been O’Donnell who had opened the campaign for us with the Palmer
case.
Thanks especially to Churchill’s energy that summer, and to the great
publicity he was able to give to the Khedive’s connection with the
riots, I have the satisfaction of remembering that we succeeded at last
in putting a stop to the worst barbarities of the restored regime at
Cairo, nor was any further political hanging after that summer permitted
as long as Gladstone remained in office. The experience of the past
year, however, left me wholly sceptical of the good faith of either our
Cairo diplomacy or the London Foreign Office, and permanently estranged
me from that vast official machinery of the British Empire which, I now
came to see, maintained its power in the East only by a system of
mingled lying, force, and fraud repellent to common honesty and equally
demoralizing to the governors and those it governed. It was in this mood
that Dufferin’s famous “Charter” of Egypt’s liberty found me when at
last I read it in the pages of a new Blue Book.
I reproduce from among my papers the following interesting letter from
Lady Gregory[8] which admirably describes our common feeling about the
charter at the time we read it. It was written just when I was seeking
to bring forward the charges against the Khedive, and when Dufferin,
having returned to England, was using his influence with the press to
get the charge hushed up. It is too good and instructive a letter not to
be printed here in full.
(Undated but written at the beginning of May 1883.)
“I am curious to hear what you think of Lord Dufferin’s despatch. It
reminds me of what someone of the ancients said of human life, ‘a comedy
to those who think, a tragedy to those who feel.’
“I am very sorry I did not know you had not seen Lord Dufferin’s
despatch. I read it, and sent it off yesterday to Sir William, but would
have sent it to you first if I had known. It would not, however, do much
to put you in good spirits. There are some good suggestions in it, taken
from Arabi’s programme, such as a National Bank to come between the
people and the usurers, and a reform in the working of the Cadastre. But
for all evils his remedy is: Put in more Europeans. Of course when the
country is well stocked with English surveyors and judges and engineers
it will be necessary to keep English troops there to protect them. I
would rather they annexed at once. There would be less hypocrisy about
it. He winds up with a panegyric on Nubar, Sherif and Riaz and alludes
in terms of admiration to Sultan Pasha and calls the Khedive amiable and
benevolent. So you may imagine the style of the document, in which there
are poetic allusions to Memnon and Pactolus and a great flourish about
putting the house-tax on Europeans, and this ridiculous Parliament which
is to have no hold on the purse strings and will be of course useless,
but sounds well. I don’t blame Lord Dufferin so much. Of course the
Government told him what was expected of him, but he might just as well
have drawn up this prose poem at Therapia without going to Egypt at all.
“I enclose copy of your statement which I am keeping for the present. I
have seen Chenery[9] to-day and talked the matter over with him, but
Lord Dufferin has been beforehand with me! having already interviewed
him and, as if he knew what was coming, persuaded him that any attack on
the Khedive would add immense difficulty to the action of the Government
just now—that, whatever his faults may be, he has promised to support
English policy, and that for the interests of the Empire it is much
better to let bygones be bygones—and that the ‘Times’ is such a very
important paper that anything that appeared in it against Tewfik would
at once be made use of by the French, and within two hours be
telegraphed to the Khedive, who would believe the Government and the
‘Times’ were the same thing—that this is a time of change in Egypt, a
new man being sent there and a new start made and the less stir made
about what had already occurred there the better. This is also Lord
Granville’s view!
“Poor Chenery had then to listen to my appeal as to whether Arabi’s
character was never to be cleared from the slurs cast upon it by
Gladstone and Dilke in the House, and never withdrawn, just to save the
Khedive whom no one has any opinion of, and he became agitated after
reading your statement and said that if it were true the Khedive ought
to be hanged—but that at the same time, for the reasons given before, he
is very doubtful whether he ought to publish it, even in a letter from
you. In the end he said that, if you would modify as far as possible the
_personal_ attack on the Khedive and add a paragraph laying the crime
more on the Palace party than on him and make it as much as possible a
defence of Arabi rather than an indictment of Tewfik, he would see if he
could publish it, though not binding himself by a promise, and if he
could not would return it to you in time to publish it elsewhere, as I
told him it must be out by the 11th. He was very kind and I think was
really anxious to be amiable, and spoke most affectionately of you, and
I really don’t blame him for not wishing to quarrel with the Government.
Indeed I was hopeless from the time I heard Lord Dufferin had taken him
in hand. What are we against him?
Don’t seek to hinder him
Or to bewilder him
Sure he’s a pilgrim
From the Blarney stone!
“I told Sir William all this and he is pretty sure Chenery will be
afraid to print it in any form, and I should be very unwilling to take
away any of the force of the accusation against Tewfik. I thought all
the more of its importance from Chenery being so afraid of the effect it
might have. Sir William and I both think that if you could get Lord
Randolph to make the statement in the House it would be your best
course, as it would thus gain publicity, and the Tories at all events
might take it up. Do you think this will be possible? I should not like
you to publish it in any paper but the ‘Times.’ Chenery talked
cheerfully of a ‘little pamphlet,’ but that was of course to prevent the
little foundling being laid on his own doorstep.”
My own impression of Dufferin’s charter, and his famous dispatch
expounding it, was little different from that here quoted. It was
obvious to all of us who knew anything of Egypt that in the present
condition of things there, under the restored regime of Tewfik and the
Turco-Circassian Pashas maintained in power by a British army and
allowed to imprison and hang whom they would, where there was neither
freedom of speech nor of the press, and where all political society was
honeycombed with spies, the talk of giving back liberty to the Egyptians
was in the nature of a sorry jest. The Queen’s speech which had ushered
it in on the opening of Parliament had been a mere repetition of all the
old Foreign Office platitudes of the previous years. Her Majesty had
been made by Gladstone’s Cabinet to say: “The reconstitution of Egypt
and the reorganization of its affairs under the authority of the Khedive
have in part been accomplished, and will continue to receive my earnest
attention. It will be my endeavour to secure that full provision shall
be made for the exigencies of order, for a just representation of the
wants and wishes of the population, and for the observance of
international obligations,” a programme more meagre than that of the
previous year, in which “the prudent development of Egyptian
institutions” had been promised, with the result of Egypt’s parliament
having been crushed and abolished six months later by a British army.
What was it possible to hope from the liberalism of a government which
had restored the absolute power of a Prince so detested by his subjects
that it needed British bayonets to keep him on his throne? Dufferin’s
charter, to be made a reality, called for a change of Khedive as a first
condition of its success, and of this no sign whatever had been given.
To talk of granting a Constitution, as a novelty, to a people who had
just been robbed of their Constitution, and whose constitutional leaders
had been ruined and driven into exile, could be only a mockery; and as
such it appeared to us. Dufferin had indeed been a “pilgrim from the
Blarney stone.”
MEMORANDUM OF REFORMS FOR EGYPT DRAWN UP AT LORD DUFFERIN’S REQUEST BY
AHMED ARABI PASHA, DECEMBER 1882 (EXACT DATE NOT GIVEN)
1. The Constitution granted to the Egyptian Nation of 7th February 1882
should be confirmed.
2. Rules should be laid down as to the limiting of the power of whoever
may be appointed Ruler of Egypt, so that he shall no longer be an
absolute Ruler.
3. Rules should also be laid down as to the Ministers and Heads of
Departments, so that each should have conditions imposed on him which he
could not transgress.
4. A Mejlis or Council of Elders should be formed as a Body of Appeal on
important questions where differences shall have occurred between the
Government and the Chamber of Representatives.
5. New regulations should be issued for the reorganization of the
various administrative departments, so that each Department or Province
or Office should have so many officials of assigned rank belonging to
it, at fixed salaries liable neither to increase nor to decrease, with
regulations as to promotion according as vacancies occur through
resignation or death or for any other natural reason.
_Remark._—Public offices in Egypt have hitherto been conducted on no
fixed rule, but every Minister or Governor or Chief of Police has done
with his administration as he pleased, dismissing or promoting all under
him without inquiry, and removing officials from post to post according
to his fancy, so that the budget has always exceeded what was right, and
increased from year to year without sufficient reason; this it is which
has caused yearly deficits in the budget.
6. Rules should be made to control the action of the police so that they
should cease to interfere with the judicial inquiry into cases, as now
is done, but each police station should have a small Council to deal
with cases in its own district and refer them to the tribunals of First
Instance for decision. The police should appear in the character of
prosecutors only.
7. Municipalities should be formed in Cairo, Alexandria, and other
considerable Egyptian towns, as may be suited to each town, and the
funds raised by dues in each town should be kept in the treasury of each
Administration to be spent on improvements for that town only, such as
mending roads, repairing public buildings, lighting the town with gas,
supplying water, erecting slaughter-houses, hospitals, and public
markets for the sale of whatever produce is brought in from the country,
and on whatever else may be of advantage to the town or prevent its
injury.
8. Rules shall be laid down to control the transactions of the small and
the large banks, and to fix the maximum rate of interest all over Egypt.
_Remark._—The banks themselves are at present the cause of the ruin and
destruction and misery which have fallen upon the indigent fellah.
9. Tribunals shall be instituted all over Egypt with the formation of
the High Courts, one of them at Cairo, the other at Alexandria, the
members of both of which shall be chosen from among the Native and
Foreign Notables; and it shall be their function to pronounce final
decisions. Rules shall be laid down for the guidance of these Courts
suitable to the country.
10. The Consular jurisdictions shall be abolished, and all suits
concerning foreigners inhabiting Egypt shall be tried before the
abovementioned tribunals.
11. All foreigners inhabiting Egypt shall be on an equal footing with
the natives in paying taxes and customs duties, and all such imposts as
are incumbent on the natives.
12. The Mixed Tribunals shall be abolished, the Courts abovementioned
being sufficient.
13. The official language in all parts of the country shall be Arabic.
14. Egypt shall remain dependent on the Ottoman Porte as she is now,
inasmuch as we know that the hearts of the Egyptians are in sympathy
with the Porte. But inasmuch as the shoulders of Egypt are burdened with
debts, and as the situation demands such a diminution of the debt, as
will be mentioned below, so also it becomes necessary to diminish and
limit the yearly tribute paid to the Porte to the amount imposed upon
Egypt in the time of Mohammed Ali Pasha, considering, too, that at that
time Egypt had no debt.
15. The Suez Canal shall be under the protection of the European powers
generally and jointly.
16. Slavery shall be abolished absolutely and permanently.
17. The Sudan ought to remain a dependency of Egypt, and that because it
has a fertile climate; and, if a railway were made to Khartoum, it would
become the great centre of commerce for the Sudan and the East, and it
would begin to be gradually civilized.
18. A rule should be made determining the conditions according to which
everyone, whether native or foreign, is employed in the Egyptian public
administration, and the term of his service and retirement and promotion
and dismissal shall be fixed.
19. The assessment of taxes in general must be reformed, and the customs
duties, because they are based at present on inequitable principles.
20. All these administrations, of which the revenues are mortgaged for
the Egyptian debt, such as railways, ports, Governorships, the
Municipality in Cairo, and the Administrations of the Domains and the
Daira Sanieh, shall revert to the Government, in order that they (the
Government) may administer these revenues as they think best, and may
refund the surplus to the Treasury of the Malieh, inasmuch as the
continuance of those administrations under present conditions is a
yearly loss to the Egyptian Treasury.
21. The Caisse de la Dette shall be abolished, the Treasury of the
Malieh being sufficient.
22. The Egyptian Debt must be unified and diminished to 50 millions
sterling, at an interest of 3 per cent. yearly, so that the Egyptian
Government shall be itself a guarantee for the payment of the
instalments when due, and those instalments shall be paid at the dates
fixed, and those dates shall be fixed at the end of the harvest, winter
and summer.
23. A commission shall be formed of eminent engineers and men of science
and art to repair ancient Arab buildings which have begun to decay, and
to restore them to their original condition, taking care to preserve the
hieroglyphics and temples and monuments of ancient Egypt, and to examine
them and put them in order, and to build a large museum to receive the
Egyptian and Arab antiquities.
24. The native schools in the towns and villages shall be put in order
and made accessible for the education of children of both sexes and the
spread of knowledge and civilization.
25. A real Budget shall be drawn up each year with great accuracy, so
that the Government may know its exact revenue, as also its expenses.
These should be reckoned each year, after the necessary reforms shall
have been decided on. Three months before the end of each financial year
there shall be an inspection of the surplus cash in the Treasury of the
Malieh remaining after payment of all expenses; and this sum shall be
divided into two portions, according to circumstances—one of them to be
applied to paying off a part of the original capital of the Debt, and
the other to reclaiming lands suitable for cultivation.
26. The question of appointing a new Ruler (Waly) is an important one,
and I will lay before you my own views and those of my comrades. I say:
That the family of Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mohammed Ali, is absolutely
worthless for the sovereignty, no matter how they might be controlled by
a constitution, for they are people of notoriously corrupt principles.
In my opinion there is a choice of two courses:
1. To appoint Halim Pasha, son of Mohammed Ali Pasha, as Waly for Egypt
under the conditions above laid down. He is a man who has been tried by
misfortunes, and has tasted the bitterness of injustice, and has reached
the age of about 55 years, and I believe that such a man may try to win
the sympathy of the people by justice and kindness.
2. The other to appoint as Waly for Egypt one of her own men of the
national party, whose deeds have borne witness to their goodness of
disposition and peaceful character. But as to any idea of appointing a
foreign Ruler, I say that, as the mass of the Egyptians are Moslems,
with the exception of the small section of Copts, and these also are the
same as the Egyptians in their dealings and ways of life, I believe that
the appointment of a foreign Waly would not suit the character of the
Egyptians, but that it would perhaps cause trouble among them. As to the
regard to be had for the interests of foreigners, I say that when
equitable tribunals shall have been formed, with the High Courts
previously mentioned, those Courts will themselves guarantee the
interests of natives and foreigners together, for it has hitherto been
unheard of that any Egyptian should wrong a foreigner.
CHAPTER II
SIR EVELYN BARING ARRIVES AT CAIRO
THE events briefly narrated in the last chapter will explain the
bitterness of heart with which in the late summer of 1883 I once more
prepared to leave England for Egypt on my road to India. What little
belief I may have retained in the honour or indeed the common honesty of
Mr. Gladstone’s Government in its relations with the unfortunate people,
which it had first passed under the harrow of its arms and then mocked
with the jibes of its diplomacy, had given place in me to a resentment
which seemed to impose it as a duty henceforth of my life to take sides
with the poor Nile dwellers against their European betrayers, and to do
my utmost to counterwork the financial and Foreign Office rogues in
their design of perpetuating their subjection.
In Egypt itself there seemed little for the present to accomplish. With
Churchill’s help I had succeeded in putting a stop to the worst excesses
of the restored regime. Malet and Colvin were both being removed to less
dangerous spheres of official activity, and the appointment of Major
Baring in their place at Cairo seemed a guarantee against any violent
renewal. Baring, who was afterwards to be Lord Cromer, had a reputation
at that time for large-mindedness which imposed upon the public, in
spite of his financial connections, and caused it to be believed that he
would do his best to hasten, not delay, the evacuation of Cairo. He was
supposed to represent Mr. Gladstone’s policy of a reconstruction of the
Khedivial autonomy on a basis of free institutions as declared in his
famous speech of 9th August, when he promised that “having given Egypt a
fair start England would wish her God speed.” It is worth recalling
this, and also John Morley’s testimonial to Major Baring’s sound Liberal
ideas, published at the time of his appointment in the “Pall Mall
Gazette,” if only for the contrast of his prediction with the notorious
sequel of Lord Cromer’s career. This is how Morley announced the event:
“Major Evelyn Baring is now semi-officially announced to have been
appointed Consul-General in Egypt in place of Sir Edward Malet. The
selection is a good one. Major Baring is something more than an eminent
Anglo-Indian; he is an experienced Anglo-Egyptian, familiar both with
men and affairs in the Nile Valley. His appointment will help to
reassure the public both at home and abroad as to the tendency of
English policy in Egypt, for it is well understood both at Cairo and in
London that Major Baring is not an advocate of a forward policy, and
that he is free from any delusions as to the possibility of inaugurating
a millennium in Egypt by placing it under ‘the masterful hand of a
British Resident.’ It is not in that direction that Major Baring will
lead the country in which he will be the accredited representative of
England.”
I had disburdened my mind to a certain extent of its anger by writing my
diatribe in verse (see “Secret History”) “The Wind and the Whirlwind,”
but I felt that a more active campaign was required of me, and Egypt
being, as it seemed for the present, closed to me, I had made up my mind
before publishing what I still had in view, a true history of the
Egyptian revolution and the intrigues which had ruined it, to pay a
visit to Arabi and his fellow exiles in Ceylon, and from there to go on
northwards and make good my knowledge of the Islamic situation by
visiting Mohammedan India. In this last design I had been encouraged by
that early apostle of Mohammedan reform, Seyd Jemal-ed-Din Afghani, a
sketch of whose biography has been given elsewhere, and whose
acquaintance I had made that spring in London. Since the time of his
having been expelled from Egypt in 1879 by the Anglo-French control,
Jemal-ed-Din had wandered through many lands both east and west, in
India first, whence he had been driven by the persecution of the
political police; and then in the United States, where he had
endeavoured to qualify by residence as an American citizen; and then,
after passing through London, lastly at Paris, where he had gathered
around him a group of Nationalist exiles banished from Egypt after Tel-
el-Kebir. I had talked my intended visit to India over with him, and he
had thought it might be of use; and it had been fixed that I was to
leave England at the beginning of September for the East, when the
incident occurred to which allusion has been made in my “India under
Ripon,” and which sent me once more to Egypt. As it relates to a point
which has been challenged by Lord Cromer in his “Modern Egypt,” I will
give some further account of it here, and it will serve as yet another
proof of the half intention there was still in Downing Street to recall
Arabi.
A few days before the date fixed for my departure an unexpected message
reached me from Mr. Knowles, the editor of the “Nineteenth Century
Review,” who, an old friend of Gladstone’s, had once before been used by
the Prime Minister to convey a message to me, and whom I knew to be
interested in Arabi’s case, begging me to call on him before starting on
my journey; and I consequently went to breakfast with him at his house
at Clapham on the morning of the 29th August. Knowles then informed me
that he had recently seen the Prime Minister, and that it was in
Gladstone’s mind, notwithstanding all that had occurred during the past
year, to recall Arabi to Egypt, and that he only needed an excuse of
some public kind to do so. His idea was that according to the new
Constitution decreed in harmony with Lord Dufferin’s despatch, Arabi
might be elected to one of the two consultative bodies which were to
form the basis of Egyptian self-government. Elections to the General
Assembly were about to be held, and, if it could be arranged that Arabi
should be returned as a member of it, it would serve as a reason for
urging his pardon on the Egyptian Government, and his recall from exile.
It was thought, too, that during my passage through Egypt I might
usefully suggest such a course to my friends there and so arrange the
matter. This plan, with its parliamentary device so characteristic of
Gladstone’s mind, was one which I could not refuse to fall in
with—though I knew how difficult it would be to carry out. It would, of
course, be impossible to do anything at all without our Government’s
help at Cairo. Knowles, however, told me that Malet, already for some
time appointed to Brussels, was to leave for his new post in a few days,
and that Baring, who was to succeed him at the Agency, was expected to
inaugurate the new regime in full accordance with Liberal principles.
Colvin, too, was on the point of leaving Egypt to resume his place in
India as before in the Civil Service. The field was therefore open, and
anything might be expected. I have a record of this conversation in
letters which I wrote at the time to Mrs. Howard, whose guest at Nawarth
I had recently been, and to Lady Gregory. These say:
“_30th August_, 1883.
“At James Street I found many important letters, among others a note
from Knowles, asking me to breakfast at Clapham; there he gave me the
news. He had seen Mr. Gladstone lately, and is assured he will both stay
in office, and, if he can find some way for his pride, restore the
National Party in Egypt. It appears they are quite aware the present
state of things cannot be made to go on, and Sir Evelyn Baring has been
appointed with _carte blanche_ to devise a new policy in place of
Malet’s and Dufferin’s, which have proved failures. Baring has written
an article for the ‘Nineteenth Century’ on Lord Ripon’s policy in India,
full of the most Liberal ideas, which will come out in October, and
Knowles thinks he will receive me with open arms. So he advises me to be
there soon after he arrives, and thinks the Government will be delighted
if we can get Arabi returned for Cairo, and other Nationalists for other
places.”
Lord Cromer’s article here referred to, and which will be found in the
October number of the “Nineteenth Century Review” of 1883, though not a
very striking one, is of importance in connection with the view taken of
it at the time in the minds of those who appointed him and with his
later views. It is a somewhat feeble plea for local self-government in
India and a free press. He declares himself to be on the side of those
“who have established a free press, who have promoted education, who
have admitted natives more and more largely to the public services in
various forms, and who have favoured the extension of Local Self-
Government.” The most forcible passage in the article says: “No one who
watches the signs of the times in India with even moderate care can
doubt that we have entered upon a period of change. The spread of
education, the increasing influence of a free press, the substituting of
legal for discretionary administration, the progress of railways and
telegraphs, the easier communication with Europe, and the more ready
influx of European ideas, are beginning to produce a marked effect upon
the people. New ideas are springing up. New aspirations are being called
forth. The power of public opinion is growing daily. Such a condition of
affairs is one in which the task of Government, and especially of a
despotic Government, is beset with difficulties of no light kind. To
move too fast is dangerous, but to lag behind is more dangerous still.
The problem is how to deal with this new born spirit of progress, raw
and superficial as in many respects it is, so as to direct it into a
right course, and to derive from it all the benefits which its
development is capable of ultimately conferring upon the country, and at
the same time to prevent it from becoming, through blind indifference or
stupid repression, a source of serious political danger. It is only what
ought to be expected by every thoughtful man, that after fifty years of
a free press, and thirty years of expanding education, with European
ideas flowing into the country on every side, and old indigenous
customs, habits and prejudices breaking down, changes should be taking
place in the thoughts, the desires and the aims of the intelligent and
educated men of the country, which no wise and cautious Government can
afford to disregard, and to which they must gradually adapt their system
of administration, if they do not wish to see it shattered by forces
which they have themselves called into being, but which they have failed
to guide and control.”
Again, in a second letter a week later, I wrote:
“_8th Sept._, 1883.
“We have taken our places for Suez by the French steamer which leaves
Marseilles on the 16th, and so hope to arrive at Cairo about the 25th.
By that time Malet and Colvin will have gone their ways, let us hope for
_ever_, and if there is anything in Knowles’s argument I shall find the
field open for me with Baring. At the same time I confess I am far from
sanguine. In the first place I do not trust Mr. Gladstone as you do, and
then I _know_ the difficulties; these will be immense, and without
really cordial co-operation from Baring I could do nothing at all that
would be any good. I rather suspect, too, that the Foreign Office may be
trying to make use of me by encouraging just so much opposition to the
elections as to make them appear spontaneous. But we shall see; half an
hour’s talk with Baring will probably be enough to show me whether it is
worth my while staying in Egypt or whether I should not rather go on to
India. . . . I had a very interesting talk with an Oriental yesterday
who tells me . . . that there are still strong influences about the
Sultan in favour of Arab independence in Egypt, and that, if the English
Government chooses, the party can be restored, but it all depends upon
the action of our Government.”
Parliament at the date of this letter had not long been prorogued, and
all the world was out of town. Gladstone, among the rest, was away; he
had gone yachting with Sir Donald Currie, his host on the occasion, Sir
Algernon West, and a party of his other friends, and was actually, I
believe, on the coast of Norway, and I could not wait for his return, my
own departure from England being fixed for the 12th of September.
Nevertheless, while I was considering the matter I received a note from
Sir Edward Hamilton, Gladstone’s private secretary, asking to see me
before I went, and the morning before I was to start I heard again from
him that he wished to see me. I went therefore to him the same morning
to Downing Street, and talked the matter of the restoration of the
National Party over with him, as described in “India under Ripon,” and
it was agreed between us that I was to call on Baring while passing
through Cairo, and that if Baring would help I would try to get the
Nationalist leaders elected at the elections; but all depended on the
co-operation of our officials. He asked me whether I was going to take
anybody with me to Egypt, and I said I had been thinking of taking
Sabunji, my Oriental secretary,[10] but that as he was looked upon with
so much suspicion by the Foreign Office I had resolved not to do so.
Later, however, I found it necessary to take him, and I let Hamilton
know my change of plan. The next day I started with my wife for Paris,
where, as I have explained in my other volume, I saw Sheykh Jemal-ed-
Din, and arranged with him the details of my Indian journey.
It was on this occasion that I first made acquaintance with James Sanua,
better known as Sheykh Abu Naddara, who was living in a little lodging
in the Avenue de Clichy, where he edited his paper and gained a
precarious livelihood as a master of languages. About this very worthy
Egyptian patriot, who has resided now in Paris for upwards of thirty
years and has gained a considerable position in the French journalistic
world, I will here say a few words. James Sanua was one of the earliest
sufferers for liberty on the Nile. An Egyptian Jew by birth, and a man
of considerable wit and education, he had become acquainted with Sheykh
Jemal-ed-Din, Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, and others of the Mohammedan
reformers, who with their wide ideas of religious tolerance received him
into their circle in the Azhar, and put him in the way of literary work.
They then, seeing that he had a pleasant wit, encouraged him in a plan
he had of starting a puppet show, which, under the guise of amusement,
was to spread political ideas among the lower class. This had an
immediate success, the butt of Sanua’s wit being, under various
disguises, always the Khedive Ismaïl. The Polichinelle of the puppet
show was a personage in spectacles, called _Abu Naddara_, Father of
Glasses, from whom Sanua took his adopted name—he was himself half blind
with a neglected ophthalmia. From this commencement he went on to
publishing a small newspaper, at first in manuscript, and then
lithographed, which was distributed by hand at Cairo and Alexandria. In
it the same tone of nonsense was kept up, and with good political
effect, among the people of the streets. It was continued for two or
three years; Ismaïl himself, who came to hear of it, joining, it is
said, in the laughter, until at last it overstepped the bounds of what
his despotism considered allowable, when it was suppressed and its
author summarily exiled. Sanua, however, was not to be beaten so easily,
and with the help of his friends found a refuge in Paris, and there
continued to print his “Abu Naddara” as a monthly sheet, and to get it
distributed as regularly as before in Egypt. At one time it had
considerable political importance, and was of sufficient interest to
induce the British Museum to desire a complete series of its numbers,
which I helped them to obtain. (See also Appendix E.)
About the actual condition of things in Egypt Sanua told me there were
two parties, the clerical, which looked to Constantinople for help, and
the lay, which was powerless because it had no leader. He and Jemal-ed-
Din were at that time on intimate terms with each other, and we spent
most of our time with them during the few days we were at Paris. On the
17th we left for Marseilles; and from this point I am able to take up my
narrative by transcription from my journal.
“_16th Sept._—On board the Pei Ho. Sat at dinner next a well-known
Syrian merchant of Alexandria, Naghib Zogheb, and learned his views,
which, no doubt, represent those of the commercial class generally. He
is all for continued occupation, annexation, or anything else that shall
secure commercial stability. He looks upon the English policy as ‘_très
fin_. It says little, and does a great deal.’ All posts are being filled
up with Englishmen. The low class Europeans do not like this, as it
takes the bread out of their mouths, but he and all respectable men are
pleased. He believes Egypt to be perfectly solvent, but the English have
been persuading the fellahin not to pay their debts to the usurers.
Zogheb is too great a man to be a usurer with the fellahin himself, so
as to assist the collection of the revenue, and thinks the English will
end by being not unpopular except with the ‘fanatics.’ The Khedive and
his Ministers are only dummies. Tewfik is _un homme nul_, disliked by
the _indigènes_, and despised by the Europeans.
“_17th Sept._—My Syrian neighbour is amusingly naïve. It appears that he
does lend money, but only in hundreds and thousands; indeed Sabunji
tells me he is the greatest of all the Alexandrian usurers, and at
dinner to-day he detailed to me some of his transactions. ‘To get money
from the Arabs,’ he says, ‘_il faut de la ruse_. They owe you £100; they
have not the money; you take produce from them worth £200, or you lend
them another £100 on the value of £200. Yet there are some of them who,
when brought before the Court, are so shameless as to deny their
signatures.’ I asked him at how much he reckoned the private debts of
the fellahin, and he told me to guess. I said, ‘Our Government pretends
they owe ten millions.’ He said, ‘Say twelve or fifteen, but their
creditors would be content with eight millions, if it was secured or
paid off and they could leave the country. The whole thing could be well
settled for ten millions.’ ‘There is no difficulty,’ he added, ‘in Egypt
except what is to be done with the _indigènes_. All the rest is simple.
Egypt should be colonized by Europeans, by Englishmen, and made to pay
all her debts.’ But the soil was getting worked out by overcropping,
losing about 15 per cent. yearly, set off by about 15 per cent. more
land being cultivated. He was again eulogistic of English cunning in
getting hold of Egypt. ‘They spent a deal of money in buying the
Bedouins, but it was money well spent. At Port Said they had had the
face to say when they disembarked that they came as friends to help the
Khedive; but all is fair when one’s own interest is concerned.’ For
himself he was glad they came and hoped they would remain.
“_18th Sept._—I have a new neighbour at table, another moneylender, a
Greek of Cairo. His views are not very different from the other’s, and
he thinks that the English Government is really serious about
withdrawing the troops.” [_N.B._—It was intended at the time to withdraw
the Cairo garrison at the end of the year, leaving only 3,000 men at
Alexandria as an “army of observation.”] “‘The misfortune is,’ he says,
‘that Mr. Gladstone is too loyal. He promised not to annex, and he
thinks it necessary to keep his promise. But you will see, the day the
English troops go, there will be another massacre of Europeans. The army
under Sir Wood will join the Arabs; they are all savages together. To
know the Arabs you must have lived with them. They are like beasts. You
take an Arab servant, you treat him well, he poisons you on the first
opportunity; you beat him, perhaps he loves you. The English have
destroyed respect for the Khedive. He will be the first person killed.
There is no government in Egypt. The Khedive hates the English. The
Arabs hate the Khedive. The poor Europeans join the Arabs against the
English. Every one who is interested in the country prays for Mr.
Gladstone’s retirement from office. Then the country will be annexed.’ I
asked him about Arabi, whether the Arabs still talked of him. He said:
‘They talk of him only as a vagabond. They do not love any one except a
man to beat them. Lord Dufferin was told by his Government to give them
a Constitution. He has given them one. But if you ask him what he thinks
of the Arabs, he will tell you the same as I do. Commerce is ruined in
the country because we are all waiting to see what will happen. Business
does not go on. We keep our money in our pockets for fear. The
uncertainty destroys our confidence.’ Poor usurers!
“_19th Sept._—Another talk with Zogheb. He says: ‘The whole question in
Egypt is this—to what extent could the fellah be replaced by other
labour? If he alone can dig and plough Europe _must_ come to terms with
him.’ I have written out my programme for the restoration of a National
Government in Egypt carefully, and have given it to Sabunji to
translate. He is also translating the ‘Wind and the Whirlwind.’
“_20th Sept._—Sabunji has made acquaintance with a young Circassian, a
naval officer. In common with the rest of the Egyptian navy he took no
part in the war, and detests the English cordially. The Circassians, he
said, were all against Tewfik because he was a fool, and because he had
betrayed the country to the English. If it had not been for Tewfik and
Sultan Pasha, the English would have been driven out of Egypt with the
courbash. Tewfik gave all the plans of Tel-el-Kebir and the Wady to
Wolseley, and Sultan Pasha helped them with the Bedouins. He was very
wroth with Sultan Pasha, ‘a dog, the son of a Coptic dog.’ Asked about
possible substitutes for Tewfik, he said, ‘Nobody thinks of Halim. A few
would like Hassan but he is not so popular as his father. Ismaïl is the
man we all want.’ He was with Dervish Pasha when he was arrested on his
return to Constantinople. He says Dervish was condemned to three years
imprisonment, but is now at large. He is young and a sailor, and has
probably spoken the truth as regards the general feeling of the
Circassians. They were all with Arabi in the last days and during the
war, just as the Sultan was. They hate the Arabs, but they hate the
English more.
“About three o’clock we sighted the P. and O. homeward mail, with Malet
probably on board.
“_21st Sept._—I asked my moneylending friends to-day at breakfast their
opinion of our various officials in Egypt. Colvin they said was a stupid
fellow, quite ignorant of finance. He had come as an officer of the
Cadastral Survey, and had been pushed on by influence into positions he
was quite unfit for. Blignières was really a financier, but Colvin, oh
no! Baring? That was quite a different thing. He was a man in a million.
He and Blignières had done everything between them that had been done
for Egypt. Baring was a master of finance, a man who knew his mind, and
was as firm as a rock. His appointment had made Egyptian stock go up
already. Malet was a diplomatist; he knew nothing of finance, he was
neither liked nor disliked; he was neither capable nor incapable.
Dufferin had been a great success; he was charming, gave parties, went
to the theatre, played cricket with the officers, conciliated everybody,
even the foreign Consuls. His report on Egypt was founded on the truth,
but it was full of _plaisanteries_. Wood[11] was an able man; he knew
how to manage the natives. The Arabs were like machines; they obeyed
their officers. Zogheb is of opinion they will continue to obey them,
even after the Army of Occupation is withdrawn.
“_22nd Sept._—Arrived at Port Said during the night, and sent Sabunji
like a raven from the Ark to get intelligence. He came back with the
news that Ibrahim Tewfik is governor of the place, the same agent of the
Khedive who got up the trouble with the Bedouins in Boheyra. He has, of
course, been promoted and rewarded. Sabunji got hold of a fellah and
went the round of the shops with him, looking in at the windows. In one
of them there was a picture of Arabi, and the man asked him if he knew
it. Sabunji feigned ignorance, and when the man told him it was Arabi,
asked if the people still thought of him. The man answered ‘Some do.’
‘How many?’ asked Sabunji, ‘the greater or the smaller number?’ ‘Perhaps
the greater,’ said the man.
“_24th Sept._—Landed about midday at Suez, and spent the remainder of
the day with the Wests (the British Consul and his wife). Senior wrote
about them thirty years ago that they were ‘looking forward daily to
their final departure from Suez,’ and here they still are. West is a man
who knows Egypt as well as, if not better than, any Englishman in the
country. His knowledge, however, is a little out of date, though he
spent three weeks as acting Consul at Alexandria between the riots and
the bombardment last year. I had a long discussion of the financial
position with him. He was surprised when I told him of Colvin’s opinion
of its hopelessness. Colvin was here only the day before yesterday on
his way to India, but did not talk to him about finance. With regard to
the elections, he said that people would elect the man in the district
they were most afraid of. At Suez they had chosen the Sub-Governor. In
most places they would choose the chief of the police.
“I asked him about the riots at Alexandria. He was of opinion that they
were planned. He could not say who planned them. If it was Omar Lutfi it
must have been also the Khedive, for Omar Lutfi was, and had always
been, a devoted partisan of Tewfik. But he had been of opinion when at
Alexandria that it was Arabi. If it was in fact the Khedive, the Foreign
Office did quite right not to enquire into it. Tewfik was our king in
our game of chess, and our business was to defend him. If anybody upset
him we must put him on his legs again. It didn’t do to enquire too
closely into those things. He had never seen Arabi, so could not judge
of his character.
“West talked a good deal about the Palmer expedition; thought Palmer had
much overrated his power of bringing the Bedouins over to the English
side. Palmer had not seen the Terrabin Arabs or the Howeytat. He, West,
had thought his second expedition with Gill and Charrington a very
foolish one. All the Bedouins believed that the Sultan had given Arabi
the sword of Islam and that he must be victorious. Of Colonel Warren’s
method of examining the ‘guilty ones’ he gave a graphic account. He used
to pretend friendliness with them, and drink coffee and smoke cigarettes
and endeavour through his interpreters—for he knew no word of Arabic—to
trip them up in conversation, and make them contradict each other. On
this kind of evidence he satisfied himself as to the identity of five
Bedouins as the men who had been actually told off to shoot Palmer and
his companions, but they were only the executioners. Ibn Mershid was the
Sheykh who gave the order, but Ibn Shedid, the Howeytat Sheykh at Cairo,
was afraid of him, and let him go. They had got Ibn Mershid’s wife and
children still in prison at Suez, and twelve Bedouins in all charged
with the affair. This is monstrous. I shall apply to Baring for an order
to see them, and get them released.
“_25th Sept._—To Cairo by the morning train. On the road there are still
some traces of the war, at Shaluf some human bones and a skull or two
lying about, but less than one would expect. The principal remains are
the iron hoops of packing cases, and broken tins of preserved meat. The
celebrated lines of Tel-el-Kebir are, after all, but a low bank and a
very shallow dry ditch. They would hardly stop a hunting field. Cairo
looks absolutely unchanged, but by reason of the time of year there are
hardly any foreigners in the town. The hotels are empty; we have the
Hôtel du Nil almost entirely to ourselves. The only sign of English
occupation that I have seen since landing in Egypt has been three men in
English uniform.
“At dinner to-day I sat next Colonel Kelly, who is working the police
and constabulary under Baker Pasha. He gives an absurd account of their
functions, which are restricted to paying and clothing the men, and
ordering their promotion. They take all their orders from the Prefect of
police, who unites the functions of chief constable, judge, jury, and
framer of the laws. The Prefect has under him a private service of
spies, and neither Baker nor this Colonel have any right to enquire
either why people are arrested, or what becomes of them afterwards. The
Englishmen are supposed to have a right of inspecting the prisons, but
out of Cairo and Alexandria they are prevented from really doing this by
the Mudirs who refuse them all access. Amongst the constabulary are two
battalions, 500 men each, one mounted, the other on foot, composed
entirely of Turks from Turkey. [This constabulary corps was sent three
months later with Baker to Souakin, where all composing it were routed
and slain by the Mahdists under Osman Digna.]
“_26th Sept._—Sent a note to Baring early, asking for an interview to
talk over the political situation, and got a very amiable answer,
inviting me to breakfast. Baring, who looks about fifty [he was really
forty-two], imposes on one a good deal as a man of sense and integrity,
and, without being exactly brilliant, seems capable of original ideas.
He breakfasted with his suite, among whom I found Aranghi, Malet’s Greek
dragoman, still in his same office, and from the circumstance I did not
augur well of any change of policy. We talked about India, the Rajputs,
Salar Jung, and other interesting topics. Baring said that Salar Jung
was the finest looking Oriental he had ever met, with admirable manners,
and great dignity. The present state of things at Hyderabad was much
‘mixed’ since his death, as all had depended on his personal character.
“After breakfast we went down to his room, which I knew so well as
Malet’s, and he asked me my views about the state of things in Egypt. I
gave him a sketch of the position two years ago, of the parties in the
Azhar, and the manner in which the Liberal party there had been
alienated from England, and the triumph of the fanatical party on the
restoration of the Khedive. He seemed to agree with me that a reform
should have a religious basis, but would not admit that the Turks and
Circassians were incapable of this. He explained that he had come to
Egypt originally as representative of the Bondholders, and that he had
always held the interests of these and of Egypt to be identical. The
Control had, in fact, done great good. While Controller he had always
refused to act in too close concert with the Consul-General, as he held
himself to be above all things one of the Khedive’s officers. He had
found that by showing the chief personages, even Riaz, that he only
wished their good he had generally succeeded in making them do as he
wanted. I objected that he had not prevented Riaz’s cruelty, his
arbitrary arrests and persecutions. He said that Riaz’s fault was that
he saw things too _couleur de rose_, he would not believe that
neglecting the just claims of the soldiers would raise a rebellion. With
regard to finance, which we next discussed, I was glad to find that
Baring held sound views on the point of the fellahin’s debts. He was for
settling them down to date, and restoring the old state of the law,
making mortgage impossible. He quite understood the evils attending the
mixed tribunals, as similar to those of the Civil Courts in India. He
said that they should be his first care. He did not, however, seem at
all hopeful of Egypt’s solvency. With the introduction of a new system
of government and the abolition of the courbash, the financial prospect
was a very doubtful one. He talked about the elections as a novel
experiment, which, if it had not succeeded this time, might another. I
explained to him that there was no such novelty in it whatever, and that
two years ago there had been elections which _had_ succeeded, and if
these last had not, it was because all liberty had been crushed. How
could a man vote independently as long as there was nothing in the
nature of _habeas corpus_ to secure him from arbitrary arrest? These
arbitrary arrests were, with the debts, the reason of the rebellion, and
would be again. He promised to have this provided against though
‘perhaps _habeas corpus_ was too much to give _all at once_.’ What the
country wanted above all was order and peace. I asked him if he did not
think of restoring the National Party, at least the civilian exiles; but
he said this was quite out of the question. They could not restore the
National Party without another revolution, and another revolution could
not be. He asked me whether the Nationalists had no leader in Egypt; I
said none that I knew of, the Reign of Terror had crushed all courage
out of the few who had not been exiled or imprisoned. In conclusion he
said, that as far as he was concerned, he should support the Khedive and
the Circassians with all his power. I saw that it was useless talking
further. Whatever Gladstone may dream of, or pretend to dream, it is
clear the Foreign Office has not changed its mind.”
This conversation, which I transcribe as it stands in my diary, is
extremely interesting as showing the ideas with which Lord Cromer
started on his long career as Resident in Egypt. The last part of it had
been carried on in rather a heated tone, for I had spoken my mind
strongly on the impossibility of any attempt either at carrying out the
promised constitution, or even of introducing practical reforms for the
emancipation of the fellahin, through the instrumentality of the
Circassian ruling class. At the time Baring refused to believe me, but
he afterwards acknowledged the truth of my view, though it was not till
many years later, by practically discarding all the Circassian Pashas
from active participation in the government. I did not speak to him of
the part Gladstone had had in my coming to consult him, saying only that
I had come from Downing Street, and that I understood that something in
the nature of a restoration of the National Party was there desired. I
should have spoken more plainly had he shown any indication of sharing
that idea, but it was clear from the outset that our views on this
subject were at a hopeless disaccord, and I left him much disappointed.
“This is an end therefore,” I wrote, “to any plans we may have had in
Egypt, and I have decided that we shall sail in the British India boat
on the 3rd.”
As this was the first occasion on which I met the present Lord Cromer of
the many meetings of which mention will be made in these memoirs, I will
here, for the benefit especially of Egyptian readers, attempt a sketch
of his very remarkable personality, not merely as I saw him first, but
as it revealed itself to me in after years. A member by birth of the
well-known London banking family, Baring Brothers, of Dutch, it is
generally said of Jewish, origin, Lord Cromer belonged from the
beginning of his career to the inner ring of the high finance of Europe,
and owed to it the cosmopolitan character, along with the energy for
work, and the clear business head distinguishing those who compose it.
Several members of the Baring family have in the last hundred years
entered English political life, and have been raised to the peerage, and
this with their great wealth has given the family an influence in the
official world, wider perhaps than that of any other that can be named.
Evelyn Baring himself was sixth son of the head of the firm, and having
but a younger son’s portion was given the army as a profession. He made
his education at Woolwich, and served for fourteen years in the
artillery, without however seeing any active service, and then in 1872
when his cousin, Lord Northbrook, also a Baring, was appointed Governor-
General of India, went to India with him as his private secretary. Thus
removed to civil employment, and having left the army with the rank of
Major, he found himself more in his true element than as a soldier, and
was able for the first time to prove his administrative worth, and he
did so with such credit that, on Northbrook’s term of office in India
coming to an end in 1876, a well-paid financial post was found for him
in Egypt, first as Commissioner of the Public Debt, and then as
Comptroller-General of Finance. This was the beginning of Lord Cromer’s
Egyptian career.
In 1880, the Whigs having once more come into office, Baring got further
advancement and returned to India with Lord Ripon, as his Finance
Minister. In all these posts he showed his family aptitude, having
precisely the qualities which money-dealing on a large scale demands. He
was a man of integrity and prudence, with sufficient imagination, and no
more, to foresee events likely to affect the financial situation, and he
had the promptitude of will and ready self-reliance required to deal
with each as it arose successfully. The same qualities served him,
though in a less degree, as administrator. Incapable, as I judge him, of
any very original conceptions, and with small powers of sympathy outside
the narrow school of English or rather European political thought in
which he was bred, he spent half a life time in the East without
understanding it or attempting to understand; also his judgement of
individuals was very fallible. Like all business men of practical
ability, his views were necessarily short ones, and he judged men rather
by a rapid calculation of averages, than by any clear individual
insight. Time in his busy life was too valuable to waste in long
deliberation, or in reconsidering a course once resolved on; a judgement
pronounced, whether on men or things, was always with him the _chose
jugée_, which was not worth further discussion. It must stand or fall on
the merits assigned to it, and could not block the way to new cases.
Personally I liked Lord Cromer. He had a reputation for rudeness, but I
do not think it was justified; at least he was never rude to me. On the
contrary, I found it a pleasure to talk with him, as I often did in
later years at Cairo on public business. He was always so concise and to
the point. He did not affect the mystery diplomatists mostly indulge in,
nor care to deceive or flatter, unless it might be a travelling
journalist or a too inquisitive M.P., whom he had an object in cajoling.
In talk with me he was generally sincere, whether in agreement or
disagreement; our views were not often the same, but when they differed
he did not resent speech in me as plain as his own. Above all he was
quick to understand, and as quick to decide; it was the secret of his
long success on his own lines in Egypt. His failure, when it came, was
due, I think, to what the French call the defect of his qualities, his
excessive economy of time which limited his view to work immediately in
hand, and his lack of the larger imagination which once or twice at
critical moments left him blind.
Such I found him personally. With a pen in his hand, however, and when
writing with a view to publicity, Lord Cromer was by no means the plain
direct man I found him in his private talk. His yearly reports, so far
from being straightforward, are models of insincerity, especially those
written in his later years, when the habit of political make-believe had
grown upon him with the double part he was daily called to play in the
“Veiled Protectorate.” No one knew better than he how, with a show of
frankness, to conceal an inconvenient truth, and how by the admission of
a minor error of judgement a larger mistake could be left undealt with.
He understood, too, in great perfection the art, through praise of his
subordinates, to praise, without seeming it, himself. Year after year
his reports used to be published, making an impression on the public
mind of being the simple record of great things performed by one
careless of personal fame, and at the same time so superior to his
readers in his knowledge of his subject as to have the right to say:
“This, I and those with me did; that we left undone; the result is what
you see.” To me, who knew more of Egypt than the public knew, his
reports revealed themselves as less candid, and very much less modest.
Reading them, they always reminded me of those first chapters of the
Book of Genesis in which at the end of each day of Creation “The Lord
saw all the work that he had done, and found it very good.” Yet, if we
turn to the same reports now in the light of later experience, we
recognize easily enough how vain-glorious and how fallacious most of
them are. As to his value as a historian, his book, “Modern Egypt,” is
not history at all in any sense of being a dependable record of things
which actually happened as they happened. It is a long piece of special
pleading in regard to his own administrative achievements, in which the
defects concealed at the time have latterly become very visible. Lord
Cromer never seems to have taken the trouble to consult any native
authority, or to have gone further afield than the Blue Books for his
knowledge of events unconnected with his own special work. Even about
these he is occasionally inaccurate, and seldom quite sincere. As a
diagnosis of the land he lived in for so many years without really
seeing it—for his mornings were spent at his desk, and his evenings in
the European society of Cairo—his final judgements are fallacious
through ignorance, the work of a stranger to Egypt rather than of one so
long resident there. His prediction of the future of Islam is a fallacy
already proved; and his adoption of Lord Milner’s foolish phrase about
Egypt being the “Land of Paradox,” a confession of ignorance inexcusable
in one with such long experience, and not a trifle absurd.
But to resume my journal.
The few days that I still spent in Egypt before taking steamer for
Colombo showed me only too clearly how hopeless the political position
was. On the 27th I called on Sir Benson Maxwell, who had recently been
appointed Adviser to the Egyptian Government in the Department of
Justice, which it was designed to reform. “He received me with great
cordiality, saying that, although rowing in a different boat from mine,
he had great sympathy with my ideas. He is a most liberal-minded man,
but, like Baring, he thinks he has discovered a vein of liberal feeling
among the Turks. Tewfik, Sherif, and Fakri, he believes, are opposed to
Constantinople and jealous of Egypt’s independence. He thinks the Turks
born to rule, the Arabs to obey. The Turks could be taught justice under
English guidance; they wished the English to stay and help them. Ali
Mubarak (but he is an Egyptian) had besought him not to desert them till
their scheme of justice was in working order. He had a great respect for
Sherif (the then Prime Minister) as an honest and good man. I told him
the first thing he ought to do was to abolish arbitrary arrest, and he
explained that something of the sort was included in his plan, but
nothing will be so much as begun before Christmas. I told him of the
case of the Bedouin women and children in prison at Suez, which moved
his indignation. It was military law, he said, not justice. We will see
if anything comes of it. Maxwell is an honest man and really believes
what he says, which is more than most of them do, but I am afraid the
Turks are making a fool of him. He will do his best and fail, and go
home, as many another has done before him. He goes home on leave in a
couple of days; his business of reforming justice being at a standstill.
He thought very little of Dufferin’s charter, but the odd thing is, they
all imagine it to be the first suggestion in the direction of free
government ever made in Egypt.”
The prediction I have just quoted of Sir Benson Maxwell’s failure in
Egypt was amply verified the following year, when, failing to get his
reforms adopted by the Khedive’s Government, and being ill-supported by
Baring, he finally retired from Egypt.
“Met Lionel Moore (formerly Oriental secretary at the Embassy at
Constantinople) and went shopping with him in the Bazaar. He was very
communicative, and told me amusing stories connected with the events of
June and July at Alexandria. He was staying with Cookson on the day of
the riot, and had been out driving in the direction of Ramleh. On coming
in to the Consulate at 3, Cookson asked him to go to the Governor’s,
Omar Lutfi’s, because he, Cookson, had been wounded, and might not
survive the day. He was to deliver this message: he was to ask Omar
Lutfi if he could put down the riot with the soldiers, or whether he,
Cookson, should ask help from the ships. He had accordingly gone to the
Governor’s house, and had found him sitting with Tulba at about 3.30,
and, on delivering his message, Omar Lutfi had referred him to the
officers, who rudely answered that there would be safety for all ‘_Amàn
li jamia_’; he had accordingly gone up to Tulba and called him a rascal,
and bade him provide for the safety of the town. On this Tulba, who had
his sword across his knees, half drew it, and Moore, who had provided
himself with a heavy stick, put himself in a defensive attitude, and
defied him to come on and he would take his sword from him, whereupon
Omar Lutfi and the rest had pushed him out of the room, and downstairs,
and out of the house. Another story was that he had gone with Beresford
to help him to sketch one of the forts, and had detained the soldiers
talking while the other made his drawing. Then he had gone away to
Syria, and did not come back till after the war. We talked about Malet.
He said he was the most incapable man in diplomacy. He knew how to turn
a dispatch so as to please the Foreign Office, but he was absolutely
ignorant of everything that went on in Egypt. I reminded him of what he
had told me last year of the arrangement made at that time (January
1882) between the English and French Governments, whereby it was agreed
that in case of intervention, a French force should land, and the
English fleet should watch the seaports. The agreement held good till
Gambetta’s fall. Going up the Mouski he told me that Tewfik had not a
single friend in the country. The Circassians and all were against him.
Halim would be a better man. He thought Arabi honest, but Tulba and
Mahmud Sami were poor scoundrels. He did not believe in the Arabs.
Baring had promised him a place, because he was the only Englishman in
Cairo, with Rogers, who knew Arabic.” [N.B.—An entire libel on Mahmud
Sami, who was a very distinguished man. But Tulba was of small account.]
This Lionel Moore was an Irishman by birth, a man of ability, much wit,
and a great knowledge of the East and Eastern languages. He had been
born in Syria, his father having been Consul at Jerusalem, and he spoke
Arabic almost as his mother tongue, so that he was commonly known in
diplomacy as the Irish Arab. He was brother of the Colonel Moore
mentioned in my “India under Ripon” as A.D.C. to the Duke of Connaught;
and he himself, as Oriental secretary at Constantinople, had accompanied
the then Prince of Wales in his tour in Palestine, and had remained a
favourite with the Prince. He was one of the _habitués_ of Marlborough
House when in England. He had, however, been obliged to leave the
diplomatic service on account of a mysterious illness which had attacked
him, and kept him, if I remember rightly, for two years semi-unconscious
at the Buckingham Palace Hotel. On recovery he was a changed man, and
had never fully regained the use of his wits, though he remained
talkative and amusing. But for this weakness, he would undoubtedly have
been given the re-employment he sought, for there was no man in Egypt
who could speak Arabic as he did of the purest kind and with a knowledge
of its literature, and a power of quotation such as he possessed. He
lived on for several years after this, and died some time in the
eighties.
“Anne went yesterday to see Arabi’s wife, and has gone to-day to see
some of the other ladies. They tell her that all the people here have
the idea that the exiles will soon come back, that they are protected by
a high personage in England, and that Tewfik is to go away. The
soldiers, too, think this.
“_28th Sept._—To breakfast with Moore, who told us much what he had told
me yesterday. He said most emphatically that Tewfik had not a single
friend in the country, and could not stay when the English were gone.
Then to Ali Fehmy’s house, a sad visit. Last time I was there I sat with
him and Arabi in the garden talking about the Sultan; now all is empty.
The old porter was full of tears and thanks, and told us how happy the
world would be if his master returned. We went on to another small house
to see Ali Fehmy’s daughter, a nice little Egyptian girl with a pleasant
voice, who talked sensibly about things. She is not married yet, and I
went upstairs with Anne to see her. I have written to Eddy Hamilton
telling him of my disappointment at the state of things here, and to
Sanua. I have also applied to the Domains Commissioner for the title-
deeds of my property at Sheykh Obeyd.
“_29th Sept._—Hotter than ever. Started at 5.30 for our garden (Sheykh
Obeyd) and stopped at Matarieh to meet Sabunji and his friend Count
Gerouais, with whom he had been staying at Ramleh. The Gerouais are
Syrians, ennobled some generations back by the Papal Court, and, what is
strange, they are ardent Nationalists. We found Sabunji disguised in his
proper dress of an Abbé, which gives him a most respectable appearance.
They brought us news, though less than we expected, the most important
being that Gerouais had sent his black servant to Damanhur to look for
Sheykh Mohammed Khalil, and had returned with the tale that he had died
a month before of cholera. His account showed the suspicion and terror
of the country districts, for the people he enquired of besought him one
and all to depart out of their coasts, an account which exactly
corresponds with one brought me yesterday, in answer to enquiries I had
made for other friends, of the Boab (gate-keeper) of the Azhar.”
The news of Khalil’s death distressed me much, as it was that of my
earliest friend at the Azhar, Mohammed Abdu’s most devoted disciple.
Poor man! as I afterwards learnt, he had been driven out of the Azhar on
the Khedive’s restoration on account of his connection with me, and had
wandered about afterwards with a heart broken over the misfortunes of
his country. He was of the salt of the earth, and his persecution shows
how relentlessly the best men of the Liberal Party were tracked and
punished by the reactionaries whom we had replaced in power.
“We found our garden undamaged, and gathered a dozen large pomegranates
to take to Arabi. During the war the Mudir of the district had had the
house broken into and had taken some of our things, including 17 rifles,
some pistols, and the small brass cannon I had bought two years ago for
Ibn Rashid (the Emir of Hail), an act which formed the basis of the
French fiction of my having bought a house and stored it as a ‘veritable
arsenal’ before the war. The things were taken to the citadel.[12] We
returned at half-past twelve, entertained Moore at breakfast, and
afterwards went with him to the Boulac Museum. After dinner Gerouais
came with old Salim Basalim and his son. From the old man we learnt a
good deal about the feeling of the people at Cairo. All classes, high
and low, hate Tewfik, but are in terror of their lives. His spies are
everywhere, but, where two or three are gathered together, they long for
the return of the exiles. I asked him what the people thought about me,
and he said: ‘Out of four two would be delighted to see you, and would
say so, one would be delighted but would not say so, and one would not
care.’ At first, after the war, people said: ‘What has Mr. Blunt been
doing that we hear nothing of him,’ and they were angry, saying he had
deserted them, but when Napier and Broadley came they knew that he was
still their friend. I explained the political situation in England as
far as it affected Egypt, the difference of ideas between the two
parties, the one which would annex, the other which would leave Egypt,
Lord Granville’s illiberal ideas, and Mr. Gladstone’s character. I bade
him tell his friends not to lose heart, that it was impossible the
present _régime_ could last, that with patience they would see the
exiles back, and the party of liberty restored. He promised to spread
this opinion everywhere, and said: ‘There are many in this town who, if
they knew you had passed down the street, would kiss the dust of your
footsteps.’ Then he looked about him in a frightened way, and said he
must go. They are all in terror of their lives.
“_30th Sept._—In the morning came Ali, our head gardener, who finished
his narrative of the seizure of our property. I told him the people were
donkeys, seeing I was the only friend they had had in England during the
war. He said they did not know what they were doing. They had wanted to
cut the water and take the coals of the engine, but fortunately were
prevented, or the garden would have been ruined.
“Next came a nephew of Arabi’s, who had been living on what was left of
the family estate near Zagazig. I asked him about the elections. He said
the fellahin were frightened at being put down on the register, and
understood it as a device for enlisting them in the army, but he was
afraid of talking. He was followed by Suliman Nashaat, a brother of Abd-
el-Aal’s, who was more courageous. He confirmed what the other had told
about the elections. In the towns the Governor or the Prefect of police
had sent round privately to tell the people who they were expected to
choose, and there was no opposition possible. Dufferin’s Constitution
would be well enough if they had an honest ruler, one who desired
liberty, but under Tewfik it was quite useless. There had never been
such tyranny in Egypt before, not even under Ismaïl Pasha. Ismaïl had
taken people’s money, but they were not molested as now by the police.
They were imprisoned now, and put to death on false charges, so that
there were many who wished Ismaïl back. Many of the Circassians were now
of the party of liberty, and wished a return of the exiles. The party of
liberty did not wish ill to the Europeans, and were at one with the
Copts and the Coptic Patriarch, while Boutros[13] and other rich Copts
were on the side of Tewfik. As soon as the English troops went the
people would rise against Tewfik and kill him. The soldiers would kill
their English officers—they were all ready. I told him that would be
very foolish. He reproached Arabi with having run away from Tel-el-
Kebir; Arabi, he said, used to take three hours saying his prayers
instead of attending to his business. It was not the place of a
commander to pray so much and run away so soon, and many complained that
he had thus lost his honour. Still the people liked him because he was
good, but he was more of an _alem_ than a soldier. His own brother, Abd-
el-Aal, would not have run away. Abd-el-Aal had written over and over
again to ask to be sent to Tel-el-Kebir, and he had been the last to
surrender. This is quite true. He then gave a touching picture of the
death of Yusuf Abu Diab, his brother’s aide-de-camp, who was hanged at
Tantah by the Khedive for saving the lives of Christians. Anne has
written the account down in full. He, Suliman Nashaat was in prison with
Yusuf, and afterwards went with him to the gallows, and received his
last words. Suliman Sami he had known well. It was true that Suliman had
burned Alexandria against Arabi’s orders, but he was hanged because he
would not give up certain papers. Kandil had had papers, and he was
promised his life if he would hold his tongue about the riots of June.
There were plenty of people who would give witness if the case was gone
into against the Khedive. In the Azhar every one was frightened. El
Abbasi, the new Sheykh El Islam, hated liberty. El Edwi, one of the most
courageous Sheykhs, had been exiled to his village, but the Khedive
thought now of sending him to the Mahdi to find out what his views were.
Suliman evidently sympathizes with the Mahdi, and half believes in him.
He said the issue would show whether he was sent by God. Anne has gone
to see Princess Inja Hanum.
“_1st Oct._—Last night a young man looked in who explained that he was a
friend of Wahby Bey’s, and that he had been arrested with twenty-five
others on a charge of having been connected with a Frenchman who went by
the name of Mohammed Said, and had formed or pretended to form a society
against the English called ‘Les Vengeurs.’ His only connection with him
was that the Frenchman had come to lodge in his house, and would not go
away. They had all been brought before a mixed commission, on which two
Belgians had sat, and their release was ordered. But Osman Pasha Ghaleb,
the Prefect of police, had detained most of them by superior orders from
the Palace on suspicion. The man Husseyn Bey brought me a letter from
one of them, Abd el Razak Bey, F.R.G.S., ex-director of the Naval
College, written in very good English, and asking me to come and see him
in the Zaptieh prison. Accordingly I wrote this morning to Sir E.
Baring, asking permission to pay the visit, but as no answer came, and
as we are going away to-morrow, I went with Husseyn Bey to try and get
in. The discipline of the prison is so lax that this was easy enough.
The man at the door brought a key for the asking, but they only let us
stay a few minutes. I got out of Razak, however, a most valuable piece
of information. He was in prison with Kandil, and knows he had papers
connecting the Khedive with the riots of June. Omar Lutfi got them from
Kandil on a promise of saving his life, but they meant all the same to
hang him, as they did Suliman Sami, who also had compromising documents.
I found with Abd el Razak in the prison four others, Mohammed Effendi
Fenni, late chief interpreter of the Council of Ministers, Mustafa Bey
Sidki, a brother of Husseyn Bey, a landed proprietor at Shubra, Huseyn
Sagr, and Saad-el-Zagloul, assistant editor of the ‘Wakaya’ under
Mohammed Abdu.[14] All these gave me messages to Arabi, and begged me to
look after their interests. Then we were hurried away.
“Went with Suliman to pay some visits to distinguished members of the
Party of Liberty as the National Party is now called. The first house we
called at was Emin Bey Shemsi’s, late deputy for Zagazig, and chairman
of a section; he had with him three friends, one whom he introduced as a
philosopher, another a tall vigorous young fellow, and a third, an old
fellah Notable from his own town. Shemsi used to be a country neighbour
and personal friend of Arabi’s. He is a very intelligent man, and of
some courage too, or he would not have received us, for he was only let
out of prison a few months ago, and is still watched by spies. I asked
him to tell the history of the two crises in which the Notables were
concerned last year. In the first, that which resulted in Sherif’s fall,
there was, he told us, very little difference of opinion. Sultan Pasha
alone supported Sherif. In the second, when Mahmud Sami summoned the
Chamber, they were more divided. They met at Sultan Pasha’s house before
the whole of their number had arrived at Cairo, and Sultan at first got
thirty to side with him, leaving forty-five in favour of the Ministry.
But on the occasion of the second meeting, when the windows were broken
by the mob and Arabi made his famous speech after the receipt of my
telegram, Sultan was left alone. There was no doubt in the world that
all Cairo, deputies, Ulema, merchants, and mob, insisted on Arabi’s
return to power.
“They then asked me to explain how it had come about, that with Mr.
Gladstone and the Liberal Party in power, there had been a war against
liberty, and I explained to them the financial conditions on which the
matter hinged, and the divergence between Mr. Gladstone and Lord
Granville. They were full of gratitude to me for the attempt I had made
to get them justice, and asked me what they were to do now to get
themselves out of the hands of their tyrants. I said it was first
necessary to prove to the world that they detested Tewfik, and desired
the return of Arabi, and I asked Shemsi about the possibility of
electing Arabi for the Chamber at Cairo. They laughed lugubriously, and
explained how the elections were managed. The voting took place in the
police station, under the superintendence of the police, and at each
station there were men in plain clothes to watch the voting and direct
the election on the part of the Government. A man who should have the
courage to write Arabi’s name on his paper would at once be hustled
away, and he and his family would be ruined. ‘You don’t understand,’ he
said, ‘how these things are done with us. It would be impossible that
any one should so much as speak of Arabi. If the election were free,
every one in Cairo would vote for him.’ I said: ‘If this is so, you have
nothing to do but to make a new revolt; the English troops are to be
withdrawn in the spring, and you must then get the Egyptian army on your
side. People must be ready to revolt once and twice and thrice for
liberty. Then they obtain it.’ There was a division of opinion as to the
probability of the soldiers joining. But they seemed to think the
English officers had them under their thumbs, and they next proposed to
go as a committee to London to lay their distress before the English
Government. I said I would do what I could to help them in this. But if
things are thus, their case is nearly hopeless. The revolt, to be of any
use, should be immediately on the departure of our troops, for with Lord
Salisbury in power it would only serve as a pretext for annexation.
Shemsi and the philosopher seemed to dread the departure of the English
troops. As long as Lord Dufferin had been here there was a check, but
Malet aided and encouraged Tewfik in his vengeance. We were to have met
at their house the telegraph clerk, Mustafa Bey, who sent the message
from Tewfik to Omar Lutfi ordering the riot at Alexandria, but he was
too frightened to come.
“Our next visit was to an ex-Mudir, a man of superior education and good
manners. We asked him about the reception recently given to Tewfik in
the provinces. His answer was, ‘If Riaz Pasha, who is my worst enemy,
were to come to see me, what should I do? I should meet him with a band
of music at the door. When we fear a man we meet him with a smile; dark
looks would bring endless trouble on our heads.’ He seemed less
timorous, however, than Shemsi, though he too had been in prison, and
came in the evening to repay our visit.
“Sabunji has got tired of being at Matarieh, and has come into the town.
This is foolish of him as he may get into trouble, but I have told him
we must all be off back to Suez to-morrow. Husseyn Bey came again at
nightfall to say that my visit to the prison is known, and that the
sentries have been put under arrest. He wants me to write to Baring to
ask his protection. If I do, I must of course tell Baring that I went
without his permission. It is curious that of all the people I have seen
not one will hear of English annexation, even as an escape from
imprisonment and persecution. They all declare they would then revolt
against any odds.
“_2nd Oct._—This morning Baring’s answer has come. He regrets that he
‘cannot give me the order asked for to visit the prison, such matters
being settled by the Egyptian Government, etc.’ Rot! I shall write and
tell him I have seen the prisoners, and recommend them to his
protection.” I did so in a letter dated 3rd October, with the speedy and
satisfactory result that on the 6th October Sir Evelyn Baring wrote the
following short dispatch to Lord Granville:
“I have the honour to inclose a copy of an important circular issued to
the Mudirs of the several provinces by the Minister of the Interior. It
is to be hoped that the issue of this circular will have the effect of
clearing the gaols of all persons who are improperly or unnecessarily
detained in prison.” And again 10th October: “I have the honour to
inclose herewith, extracted from the ‘Moniteur Egyptien’ of the 9th
inst., a decree granting a general amnesty to all offenders accused of
crimes connected with the rebellion, except to those accused of murder
or rape.”
Saad Zagloul and the rest of those with him in prison were consequently
released. I learned the news a few weeks later in Ceylon, and that it
was due to my intervention, though I cannot remember that any of the
prisoners wrote personally to thank me. My action on their behalf was, I
believe, a chief reason for my exclusion from Egypt during the following
three years, for Baring resented my interference with what ought to have
been his sole business. There is a passage in his “Modern Egypt” which
displays his displeasure and makes complaint of my correspondence with
Mr. Gladstone through Hamilton. His representations, however, to the
Foreign Office that it should be discontinued did not have the full
effect he supposes, though it made Hamilton cautious. Gladstone’s answer
to Granville, which Cromer with somewhat puerile malice quotes, proves
nothing more than that the two Ministers were in different camps about
Egypt, and that Gladstone was anxious to minimize to his colleague the
attention he paid to my opinion. Granville never forgave my action in
Egypt in 1882, but Gladstone knew that I had been right, though he did
not dare avow it publicly. He allowed Hamilton still to remain in touch
with me, as will be seen in the course of the present volume, as long as
he was in office. All that Cromer was able to effect when he discovered
that I had told the Prime Minister the truth, was that having shortly
after assumed the _rôle_ of masterly Resident he decreed my exclusion
from Egypt, and induced the Foreign Office to support him in continuing
it till 1886. My relations, however, with the other side of Downing
Street continued on a friendly footing as long as Gladstone remained in
power, while Cromer himself some years afterwards came round to my views
and tried to get up a native Egyptian Ministry favourable to England out
of the _débris_ of the Nationalist Party, going even to the length of
consulting me about those capable of composing it; but it was then too
late, and English policy in Egypt has floundered ever since in a
Serbonian bog of irreconcilable native hostility. He would have done
better to have taken my advice in 1883.
“The ‘Phare d’Alexandrie’ has a long article describing the displeasure
of the Khedive at my arrival, and at the visits paid me by relations of
the exiles, and there is also rather a nice paragraph in an Arabic paper
saying that I had returned to Cairo, and that feasts would have been
prepared for me, but those who should have been my hosts were no longer
there—strangers had come to eat up the banquet. We have left Cairo for
Suez. Gerouais was at the station to see us off with Sabunji, who, thank
God, has not been arrested.”
This is my last entry while in Egypt that year. From Cairo and again
from Suez I wrote two long letters to Hamilton for Mr. Gladstone’s
reading, one on 28th September, two days after I had seen Baring, and a
second on 3rd October, immediately before embarking for Ceylon. These
will be found in the Appendix.
The next six months, following on this brief visit to Cairo, were spent
by me in Ceylon and India, an account of which will be found already
published in my volume, “India under Ripon.” The only thing I did that
winter of importance for Egypt more than is there recorded was to obtain
from Arabi and his companions in exile at Colombo a clear statement of
the policy they would recommend, drawn up more or less on the lines of
Arabi’s memorandum of the year before, with such additions to it as the
events of the intervening twelve months might have suggested, especially
in regard to the Soudan and Dufferin’s unworkable charter. The document,
embodied in a letter I sent to the “Times” on 5th November and published
13th December, is one of historical importance, and will be found in the
Appendix.
It reiterates the truth which underlay the whole Egyptian position,
namely, that the supposed necessity of maintaining Tewfik on the
Khedivial throne at Cairo must, if persisted in, vitiate any attempt to
restore self-government to the Egyptians, or to free England from the
prolonged responsibility of protecting him with an occupying force. It
suggests in what way Constitutional Government could be restored, and
enumerates a variety of reforms, most of which have been subsequently
made part of English policy. About the Soudan, too, the affairs of which
were about to become a main subject of interest for those responsible
for Egypt’s welfare, it contains a remarkable paragraph, which may be
taken as the text of what will be found in the following few chapters of
this volume. And be it noted that at the time it was written, 3rd
November, no one at Cairo, still less in London, had begun to perceive
the truth that other than military means were necessary to deal with the
situation created by the Mahdi’s rebellion, if a great misfortune, both
for Egypt and for the Soudan, was to be avoided. Arabi, who as
Nationalist Minister of War in 1882, had been responsible for the
appointment of Abd-el-Kader Pasha to the post of Governor-General at
Khartoum, and who in the common interests of the two countries had put
himself into communication with the Mahdi, and was to a certain point in
sympathy with the cause Mohammed Ahmed represented as being that of a
revolt against the Turco-Circassian tyranny they had alike suffered
from, was in a far better position to understand how the difficulty
should be dealt with than any of those in whose hands its solution now
lay, and it is certain that, had he been able to maintain himself
against Wolseley at Tel-el-Kebir, no difficulty whatever would have
arisen in regard to retaining Khartoum, or even eventually of recovering
the lost provinces, had such been in the designs of nationalized Egypt.
The passage is as follows:
“Although he (Arabi) is of opinion that a certain connection will always
be necessary between the lower and upper waters of the Nile, he holds
that in the present military and financial position of Egypt it is
unwise to attempt the reconquest of all or, perhaps, of any of the lost
provinces. He believes that the movement of the so-called Mahdi is not
one merely of fanaticism, or that it is only a revolt of the slave-
dealers. He thinks that Mohammed Ahmed commands the goodwill of the
inhabitants, and that it would be far wiser for the Egyptian Government
to come to terms with him than to continue their military operations
against him. The Soudan brings nothing into the Cairo treasury, and if
Egypt is to enjoy liberty at home she should avoid ideas of conquest
abroad. The terms that could be made with the Mahdi Arabi has been too
long out of Egypt to judge; but from the communications which reached
him while in power he does not believe a friendly arrangement admitting
Egypt’s suzerainty impossible. The suzerainty of Egypt the Soudanese
would probably be glad to admit, for it would protect them against
European aggression.”
This question of the Soudan was being already much discussed among the
exiles while I was in Ceylon, though the defeat of Hicks was not yet
known. And, as it was to become a main subject of interest to us all
during the next two years, I may as well here present the general case
of it as it appeared to Nationalist eyes, for it will enable readers
better to understand both my own point of view and that prevalent at the
time in Egypt. It will serve, too, as a corrective to the false light in
which it is seen and described by nearly all European writers, who fail
to understand that Europe itself was the sole responsible cause of the
trouble. This is how I, looking at the matter, so to say, with Oriental
eyes, saw and see it.
The revolt in the Soudan stood in close analogy with that in Lower
Egypt. Both had a double character, beginning as the natural rebellion
of a people against long misgovernment, and taking later a religious
complexion when Christian Europe had intervened in support of the
tyrannical ruler against the people. The only difference between the two
cases lay in the fact that, whereas in Egypt the reformers were
enlightened men, representing the humaner and more progressive side of
Islam, the Soudanese reformers were reactionary and fanatical. It cannot
be too strongly insisted on that the great, the capital wrong committed
by our English Government in 1882 was less the destruction of the hopes
of free government in Egypt as a nation, than the treacherous blow its
armed intervention struck everywhere at the aspirations of liberal
Islam. Arabi, a devout but the least fanatical of Moslems, had come in
1882 to represent not Egypt only, but every Mohammedan land alarmed at
the encroachment of Christendom and looking to constitutional reform as
its surest safety. And it was just this leader of reform that
constitutional and Liberal England chose to strike down. What wonder
then that the defeat at Tel-el-Kebir should have been taken through all
Mohammedan lands as a set back to reform, an impulse to reaction? At
Constantinople it had the immediate effect of putting all power into the
hands of the Sultan Abdul Hamid’s fanatical following, and of enabling
him to crush what remained of the constitutional party and the party of
religious liberalism. In Persia it had consequences of much the same
reactionary nature, and throughout North Africa it determined the whole
character of religious thought on lines of fiercely bitter hatred of
Christendom. The French invasion of Tunis had been answered by the
counter-move of the fighting fraternity of the Senussia. The English
invasion of Egypt was answered by Mohammed Ahmed’s appearance in the
Soudan as Mahdi. It made it therefore imperative in 1883, if the Soudan
was not to be lost to the fanatics, that without delay a liberal
Mohammedan Government should be restored at Cairo capable of attracting
to it the humaner elements of Islam, and pitting them against the less
humane. Had this been done by the end of the year 1882, and the English
army withdrawn from Cairo, the situation at Khartoum could have been
saved without recourse to arms. Otherwise an English occupation of
Khartoum was the sole alternative to an immediate and complete
abandonment of the whole of the Upper Nile.
What was done, as we know, was to take neither one course nor the other.
It was decided that Tewfik was to be maintained at Cairo, propped up by
British bayonets; and at Khartoum that his authority was to be restored
without any military propping whatever—the authority of Tewfik, who had
come to be regarded as a renegade to Islam, almost as a _Kafr_, the
docile servant of a Christian Power! Was it to be expected that the
Soudanese, a fiercely Mohammedan population, proud of their Arab descent
and of their anti-crusading ancestry, should accept the domination of
one so contemptible, re-imposed on them by a Christian general and
without a Christian army at his back? Naturally and inevitably, no!
There was, besides, a special reason for anger against Tewfik, which I
do not find recorded in any history of the time, but which largely
contributed to the detestation in which he was held among the Soudanese.
One of the first acts of the restored regime at Cairo had been to arrest
the supreme head of the Malekite rite, which is that prevalent in the
Soudan and throughout North Africa, Sheykh El Aleysh, a venerable and
highly revered personage, who was treated with the utmost indignity,
and, as was currently reported, was done to death in prison by the
Khedive’s order. The news of this impiety was to the Soudanese a new
proof of Tewfik’s apostate character, and made a reconciliation between
him and them doubly impossible. Add to it the folly of recalling Abd-el-
Kader, and replacing him with the corrupt and incapable Court favourite
Ala-ed-Din Pasha, and giving him Hicks, an Englishman, but without an
English military backing, as his Chief of the Staff, and we see the full
madness from a Moslem point of view of the attempt made in the spring of
1883 to retain the Soudan; while perhaps the crowning folly of all was
to reinforce the Khedivial garrison at Khartoum with the broken remnants
of Arabi’s army disbanded after Tel-el-Kebir, and recruited afresh for
Tewfik’s service. Colonel Stewart, who was sent by Dufferin that winter
of 1882-83 to report on the condition of things in the Soudan, describes
the army Hicks was about to command as a congregation of raw
undisciplined recruits mixed with others on the point of mutiny. “The
question,” he says, “is whether they will remain faithful or desert,
knowing as they will that the Mahdi will not harm them. . . . At one of
the late skirmishes they were heard complaining, ‘O Effendina Arabi! If
you knew the position Tewfik has placed us in.’”
Certain historians have laid stress on the distinction to be drawn
between the policy of sending Hicks to hold Khartoum and the insanity of
sending him, with an army so disaffected and so ready to mutiny, against
the Mahdi in Kordofan. Hicks, they say, might have held his own at
Khartoum if the Egyptian Government had been content to leave him there.
I see no warrant for believing this. Hicks did his best and was a
gallant officer, but he was from the first a doomed man, as Gordon after
him was doomed. The fact of their Christianity, and of their holding
Tewfik’s commission, made it impossible for either of them to succeed in
stemming the rebellion; and, though both were able to hold out for a
while, nothing but a backing of European troops could have saved them
from failure. Hicks, just as Gordon did, gained at the outset an
ephemeral advantage, but only to be replied to by the revolt of the
Eastern provinces in favour of the Madhi; and, left without English
help, he would have been beleaguered at Khartoum, as Gordon was, and
compelled, as Gordon was, to surrender. His advance into Kordofan only
accelerated his ruin.
As to this expedition, for which Tewfik and his Ministers and Malet were
jointly responsible, it has been the fashion to consider it an act of
reckless folly on the part of the Egyptian Government, of lack of
intelligent prescience on the part of Malet. It was in my opinion
something more criminal than this. On the part of the Khedive and
Sherif, and especially of Omar Lutfi, the Minister of War, it was a
deliberate scheme to rid themselves of the last remnant of Arabi’s rebel
army and of an English officer obnoxious to their plans. They wanted, or
at least Tewfik wanted, a vengeance on the regiments which had headed
the revolt against him in 1881, a vengeance which had been denied him by
the amnesty after Tel-el-Kebir; while none of them wanted English
interference in the affairs of the Soudan. Be it remembered that Hicks’s
soldiers included Arabi’s own regiment of the Guard, or what was left of
it, and that Omar Lutfi, who had contrived with Tewfik the Alexandria
riots, had sent them to the Soudan in chains. Hicks and his regiments of
old Arabists, we may be quite sure, were ordered deliberately to their
death at Obeid. All Tewfik’s attitude towards Gordon later was in
accordance with this reading of the Hicks expedition, and it is the only
reading that explains what otherwise would remain an inexplicable act of
madness. As to Malet, he was, in this, as in all else, the Khedive’s too
facile dupe, his unconscious accomplice, just as he had been his dupe in
the case of the Alexandria massacre. He believed what Tewfik told him,
and did not look beyond. Nothing is more remarkable than the easy
indifference displayed by Malet in his published correspondence of that
summer as to all that was going on in the Soudan. Hicks saw the danger
and everybody else saw it. Malet saw nothing or saw only what the
Khedive told him. He did not care to see more.
An additional proof of this, if any be needed besides that of the Blue
Books, is supplied to me, though a negative one only, by my own talk
with Baring at Cairo in September, and the record of it already given. I
remember that in it, though our discussion ranged over the whole field
of his Egyptian difficulties, he did not so much as allude to the Soudan
as being one of those he had immediately to face—a remarkable omission
when it is considered that he had just been spending ten days with Malet
at his elbow, who must have had full time to bring his knowledge of
every branch of the Egyptian question up to date. Like Malet, Lord
Cromer’s lack of foresight during the whole of the first two months of
his arrival is most noticeable in the Blue Books. These show that his
sole anxiety in those last months before the storm broke in the Soudan
was the financial difficulty. His only reference to danger in that
quarter is where he records a conversation on 26th October with an
unnamed gentleman, who described the finance of the Soudan to him as
“_un trou inconnu_.” Of other than the financial danger there is not a
word. In his “Modern Egypt,” Cromer excuses himself from all
responsibility in regard to Hicks, by saying that Hicks had already
started on his campaign three days before his, Cromer’s, arrival. But
this is not strictly true.
Hicks, though he left Khartoum on the 8th September, remained on in camp
on the Nile bank at Duem till the 26th, and could have been still
recalled by telegraph had Cromer so insisted. What is true is that
Cromer did not foresee the consequences, as Malet did not foresee them.
Otherwise how is it possible to account for the optimism of his dispatch
of 6th October, where, in complete ignorance of the perils threatening
the restored regime, he wrote his confident dispatch reporting that
order having been now completely restored “the British garrison of Cairo
might with safety be withdrawn”? A small force of 3,000 men, to be
retained at Alexandria not as an army any longer of occupation but of
observation only, would, he assured Lord Granville, be “amply sufficient
to maintain the honour of Her Majesty’s arms against any force that it
may be supposed with any degree of probability it may have to
encounter.” I, as a stranger spending a week at Cairo, had found out
more than this; and Granville had hardly agreed to the evacuation before
the storm broke, and it was already too late to apply any remedy short
of the dispatch to Khartoum of a British army.
To bring my narrative back to the historical date at which I left it.
The rapid sequence of events was startling. On the 1st November news
reached Cairo that Captain Moncrieff, British Consul at Suakin, with 500
Egyptian troops in garrison there, having gone forth to give battle to
the rebels at Tokar on the Red Sea littoral, had been surprised and
slain. On the 19th November the first rumour of Hicks’s defeat was
received, and two days later, the 21st, knowledge came of the full
disaster. The whole of the Soudan west and south of Khartoum was
reported to be in insurrection, as well as the Eastern provinces; and
Colonel Coetlogon, the English officer left by Hicks in charge of the
Khartoum garrison, was telegraphing that Khartoum itself could not be
held “unless immediately succoured.” All then was for some weeks in
confusion at the Cairo War Office, and hardly less in London. Cromer, on
the very first news, one can hardly say otherwise than in a panic, had
advised the abandonment of the whole Soudan, and by return of telegraph
Lord Granville had agreed, and the necessary order of evacuation had
been given to the Egyptian Government. Some more weeks had then been
wasted in distracted counsels, and, on the 14th January 1884, Gordon was
dispatched on his mission to Khartoum. It was in this brief order that I
learned the events while travelling in India, and that the news about
Gordon reached me at Delhi. It was then that I wrote him that too
prophetic letter, the text of which is given in my “India under Ripon,”
warning him of the treachery of those who were sending him on his
mission and foretelling his defeat and death. For the convenience of my
present readers, I reprint it here in the Appendix.
CHAPTER III
GORDON’S WORK ON THE WHITE NILE
AND here, before I go further, it will, I think, make matters still
clearer in regard to the history of the next twelve months in Egypt,
including, as it must, Gordon’s heroic defence of Khartoum, if I break
off my personal narrative and devote a chapter or two to a critical
examination of that truly wonderful man’s character. I propose to do so
not in the spirit of mere hero-worship, though I hold him to have been
by far the most chivalric figure among Englishmen of our generation; and
still less of belittlement; but in the spirit of a sane historian,
reconstructing from the many records we have of his inner spiritual life
no less than of his public actions, and from some sources, too, of
private knowledge and my own recollection of him, a picture of the
living man he was.
To appreciate Gordon’s character at all accurately, and thereby to judge
his career at its true value, it is essential to recognize him as a man
of many contradictions and a singularly complex character. He himself,
in one of those intimate letters which through life he was in the habit
of writing to his sister, and which form the most complete self-
revelation made in any letters that have been published in our time,
says: “Talk of two natures in one! I have a hundred, and none think
alike and all want to rule”; and, again: “No man in the world is more
changeable than I”—an exaggeration of the truth yet no less strictly
true. Gordon had at least two distinctly antagonistic features in his
nature—the one, that of a man of action, with an imperative need of
strong practical work, the instinct of a soldier who saw the thing he
had it in his mind to do with absolute clearness of vision, and as
clearly the way to do it—the other, that of a religious mystic, occupied
not with this world but with spiritual forces in a world unseen;
perplexed perpetually, and perpetually in doubt as to the precise will
of God with him, a fatalist, a disbeliever in his own free will, and
consequently liable to sudden changes of plan; a seeker of omens and
supernatural directions; at times (as he also himself says) a “religious
fanatic,” perhaps hardly on this one point sane. Not that Gordon was in
the smallest degree a fanatic in the sense of one who hated another for
his creed. His mind was large on this as on all other matters; but he
was imbued with the belief in God’s direct dealings with man and with
his own interpretation of them, as suited to his own spiritual and
temporal case, and with the nothingness of worldly affairs or of life
and death for himself and others in view of a life to come.
Entering the army early he saw service for the first time at the siege
of Sebastopol, and remained on in Turkey when the war was over as one of
the officers on the Commission of frontier delimitation in Bessarabia
and Armenia. This gave him his first experience of the Mohammedan East.
In 1860 he joined the British forces in China, where he took part in the
capture of Pekin, and again stayed on, specially employed. Shanghai, one
of the Treaty Ports, was just then threatened by the Taiping rebellion,
and for its protection an Imperial Chinese force had been raised under
European officers, and the command of it was given to Gordon. With the
permission of his superiors he thus entered a foreign service, and found
himself, at the early age of twenty-nine, commanding an army of Asiatics
under the Chinese Emperor. His military authority was practically
absolute, and by a display of strategy of the highest order and lavish
personal courage he succeeded in breaking the Taiping rebellion, and
restoring one of the richest provinces of China and some of its most
populous cities to the Imperial Government. The Emperor, in gratitude
for so great a service, loaded him with honours, and would have enriched
him if Gordon had been willing. But with a fine contempt for wealth he
would take nothing but his stipulated pay, and, the work done, returned
to his ordinary duties in England without further remark or claim on his
own Government.
This stamps him as a man entirely above the rank of the common soldier
of fortune. That he was also a man of immense natural military genius
cannot be doubted, with a power of exerting influence over the soldiers
he commanded, and turning the rawest material into good fighting stuff,
and in this he compares favourably with any of the great European
leaders of Asiatics that can be named in history. It is by no means
certain, however, to my mind that in this first brilliant episode of
Gordon’s life, any more than in his latest at Khartoum, he was fighting
on what I should consider the right side, the side that is of those who
had the better right in justice. Indeed the Taipings, though the methods
of their insurrection were barbarous in the extreme, represented what
was more probably the juster cause of the Chinese people than that of
the Man Chu Emperors, in whose service Gordon was. Gordon, however, did
not often stop to consider points like these when he accepted foreign
employment, and only discovered his mistake when it was too late to
retire from it. This was the case with him, as he found to his cost,
when serving the Khedive Ismaïl, and so, too, he discovered and would
have avowed it if he had survived his last campaign against the Mahdi.
What is important about the Chinese episode is the strong effect it had
upon his character. The terrible sights which he there witnessed in the
lands laid waste by the Taipings, the appalling incidents of an Eastern
civil war, the cruelties inflicted on the weak, the outraged women and
the starving children, famine, pestilence, and death spread over
immensely populous areas, joined with the almost miraculous victories
achieved by the army he commanded, the huge personal risks daily run,
and his unvarying success, bred in him a conviction that he was under
immediate divine direction, and had for his special mission in life the
redressing of wrongs and the protection of the helpless. His attitude
thenceforth, though he made mistakes, was that of the Christian knight
errant, seeking service through the world wherever there were dragons of
iniquity to fight, or distressed persons to be rescued by feats of arms.
It is necessary to remember this if we are to understand rightly the
spirit of his early Egyptian service.
For a while, however, Gordon’s humanitarian impulse was to be turned
into more peaceful channels. In 1865 he returned to England and was
given a command at Gravesend with the engineering task of fortifying the
entrance to the Thames. Here he had much spare time, and devoted it to
works of mercy among the poor, especially to the rescuing of the waifs
and strays of the London streets, boys for whom he found employment, and
whom he befriended with money and advice. Gordon had, from his youth up,
been deeply religious. He belonged to no church or sect, unless it were
that of what is called Bible Christianity, a form of belief based solely
on the Old and New Testaments as interpreted, each man, by the light of
his own spiritual conscience. He owed this to his mother. It is a little
difficult, now in the twentieth century, when the higher criticism has
permeated all theology and when science has accepted evolution as its
recognized basis, to realize how at the beginning of Queen Victoria’s
reign the great body of educated Englishmen were brought up to believe
with an implicit faith in the text of the authorized English version of
the Holy Scriptures as the literal word of God containing all direction
needed for the spiritual wants of man. This was specially the case in
the middle rank of society, that of Gordon’s mother, which for the most
part had nonconformist traditions and had remained equally unaffected by
the scepticism of the eighteenth century and by the Oxford Church
movement of the nineteenth in the direction of authority. Nor was it
till some years after Gordon’s education was over, and he was well
launched on his military career, that the publication of Darwin’s
“Origin of Species” prevailed at last in dissociating scientific
training from the simpler English creeds.
Gordon therefore carried with him untouched into his active life the
Biblical foundation of his childhood. He held the text of Scripture from
the first verse of Genesis to the last of Revelations to be God’s
written word, and that it was given to every man by faith and prayer and
constant study to find in it all necessary direction both for his
temporal and his eternal needs. He spent a certain portion of every day
in studying the Book, and, being of a logical mind, in seeking counsel
in its pages for each morrow as it came. His certainty that the text was
inspired induced him by a further logic to believe that, relying on it,
he, too, was inspired. This is the real key to much that otherwise would
be inexplicable in his public career.
In his moral life Gordon stood on the highest possible plane. Apart from
a few boyish escapades at school—and he was all his life high-
spirited—there is no record of his ever having transgressed the
straitest rules of exemplary conduct. He seems never to have been in
love, or to have indulged even for a moment in any dream of earthly
happiness to be found in domestic joys. These he regarded as not
intended for him, and he was as far from the thought of marriage as
though he had renounced the possibility of it by vow. “What a blessing,”
he exclaims in one of his letters to his sister, “one was never married!
Marriage spoils human beings.” Even the sentimental regard in which many
women held him was distasteful to him. “What I dislike,” he says, “in
——’s letters is the sentimental part; it is to me quite painful; she is
so impressive. I do hope you will try and quiet her. I am torn in two
with the wish not to be unkind, and yet I wish her not to bother me.”
That was his general attitude toward women other than the old and
helpless. Dr. Barnes, who was in some measure Gordon’s spiritual adviser
in the last five years of his life, says of him: “Gordon was much less
at ease in talking to women than in talking to men. While conversing
with women he seemed to exercise even more than his usual self-control
in the expression of his thought and feeling. His sympathy, geniality,
and attractiveness became as it were veiled, and he was ‘himself again’
only when the restraint was removed. He was seen at his best in the
society of young children, his keen interest for whom had not been
dulled either by solitude or by the necessity—which had often been
imposed on him in other relations—for strictly-guarded intercourse. With
children he was quite at home.”
In all things he was abstemious. Even the poor pleasures of the table
were generally denied. He hated feasts and entertainments, and at
Greenwich allowed his uncomfortable meals to be freely interrupted by
any caller on however trifling a business. “His meals,” says his brother
of him, “were of the most frugal kind, and his arrangements were such
that no one was ever prevented seeing him in consequence of his being
engaged at any of them, for he had a table with a deep drawer in which
when drawn out, the food was deposited, and so if any one came the
drawer was shut and there were no signs that he had been engaged
otherwise than at his ordinary work.” In his evenings, instead of
enjoying rest or talk, he would go out to ragged schools or on some
other work of mercy. His money he would give away as long as he had any
available, and he would even borrow to give, this not in small driblets,
but in considerable sums of £50 and £100 and £200 at a time. On himself
he would spend nothing. Speaking to Sir Rivers Wilson about him in 1878,
the Catholic Bishop of Khartoum explained the wonderful influence he
then enjoyed among the Soudanese as due to his alms-giving and his
chastity. It astonished all men that he should care nothing for the two
things those in power mostly indulged in, the love of money and the love
of women. In all this Gordon was a saint.
Seven years of his life were passed in this way at Gravesend, and there
grew up around him a little band of religious admirers which gradually
made for him a name in the English humanitarian world. He was willing
always to talk on the things of the spirit with the spiritually-minded,
and to write to those who sought his opinion or counsel by letter,
whether it was on a public or a private matter. It was with the poor and
unimportant that he preferred to correspond rather than with those in
high places, though among these also he had friends. Thus on a
foundation of general esteem gradually acquired, the power came to him
which he was to wield in public affairs, and was steadily built up. His
worth in his own profession was acknowledged, for he had done mighty
deeds in war,—that could not be denied, though by many of his fellow
soldiers he was accounted “insubordinate,” by others mad. It seemed
enough to them to prove his insanity that he did not ask promotions or
rewards and that he was careless of his pay.
The only failing I can really find in him—for that of drink with which
he has been charged was not a serious one—was a certain tendency to
court publicity, which he himself acknowledged as a snare to his
generally humble attitude. His sister seems at one time to have pointed
this out to him, and his reply shows that he felt her reproach as true.
“Newspapers,” he says in answer to her, “feed a passion I have for
giving my opinion . . . You drew a bow at a venture with your full
strength and you have done for your brother; the arrow has gone in up to
its feathers! He that speaketh of himself seeketh his own glory! Why,
you have knocked down the work of years; what have I ever been talking
of but self? . . . I have a sort of wish that I could get rid of
_Colonel Gordon_.” He called this craving for publicity “Agag; a
catering for notice and praise; hailing the tram of the world!” a thing
which must be “hewn in pieces before the Lord”—and yet he yields over
and over again to it, while he torments himself for his weakness, a
point in his character which he shares with many saints who have been
canonized by popular acclaim, and which must not be missed, for it, too,
explains much.
Such was Gordon at the time of his first entrance on the Egyptian scene
in 1874, and it is with the Egyptian period only of his life that we
need concern ourselves in any detail. His connection with the Khedivial
service came about in this way. In 1871 he was sent on special service
once more to Turkey, and finding himself at Constantinople in connection
with the Danube commission, to which he had been appointed, it chanced
that he met Nubar Pasha at the English Embassy and had a talk with him,
which determined his after life. The Egyptian Government was in search
of an engineer officer who would undertake, in succession to Sir Samuel
Baker, the administration of the Equatorial Province of the Upper Nile,
and Nubar consulted him as to the securing of such an officer; and this
led a year later to Gordon’s agreeing to go there himself as the Khedive
Ismaïl’s servant. What tempted him to the work was, I think, a certain
natural restlessness and a desire for useful professional employment.
English military life at home, with its constant round of unreal duties
and of social inanities, was thoroughly distasteful to him, and the
freedom of an independent command abroad in however wild a region was
always preferred by him to ordinary employment at home. Also he had
become interested in the suppression of the slave trade on the Nile and
Congo, which was being much discussed at the time, and this was probably
what decided him. Be this as it may, he visited Cairo on his way back
from the Danube in 1873 and, having received permission from the War
Office in London, was named Governor of the Equatorial Province at the
beginning of the following year, his instructions on leaving Cairo for
the seat of his new government at Gondokoro being to open a trade route
by river to the Equatorial Lakes, to establish the Khedive’s authority
on these to the Nile sources, and also to put a stop to the slave
raiding in the upper provinces, which had become a scandal in Europe,
and was injuring the Khedive’s credit. Gordon’s idea at starting on his
mission was that the first half of his instructions would, when
accomplished, bring about the second half. “Open out the country,” he
says in one of his letters of the time, “and it [the slave trade] will
fall of itself.” It was the general idea held by English humanitarians
of the day, but one which Gordon found reason to distrust later.
There are two ways of looking at this question. The slave raiding which
prevailed along the whole border line between Equatorial Africa and the
waterless northern deserts which extend from the White Nile to the
Atlantic had for many centuries been a terrible scourge upon the
indigenous black race. It was carried on by the Bedouin tribes, more or
less Arab in their origin and Mohammedan in their religion, who had
invaded and conquered North Africa in the early centuries of Islam.
These considered the Pagan negroes their lawful booty wherever they
could capture them, and made a trade of bringing them with other
equatorial produce to the sea coasts of Morocco and the rest of the
Mohammedan States bordering the Mediterranean and Red Seas. It was a
yearly tithe of many thousands taken from the unwarlike agricultural
villagers, and may justly be likened to the depredation inflicted on the
antelope herds of the same borderland by lions living on the desert
outskirts. At first sight, and from a humanitarian point of view, it
would seem that the destruction of these human lions was the beneficent
duty of any one who would undertake it, and the extirpation of the slave
raiders by force of arms the surest way of bringing prosperity to the
negro inhabitants. And such was the view taken by most of our European
explorers of the nineteenth century, Schweinfurth, Baker, Stanley, and
the rest, who were in correspondence with the anti-slavery association
in London and were constantly urging the duty of the penetration and
civilizing of Central Africa by the states of Europe. Africa once
Europeanized, they argued, slave-raiding must necessarily be made to
cease and the negroes be freed from an immemorial misfortune. The
reasoning harmonized well with the commercial ideas of the day, which
saw in Central Africa new fields for its enterprise; and the civilized
occupation of the two lines of waterway by which the Soudan could most
easily be reached, the Nile and the Congo, was pushed on by the
societies as a duty of humanity. I remember attending a meeting of the
Royal Geographical Society under Sir Roderick Murchison, to which I had
just been elected in 1862, in which our then Consul Petherick at
Khartoum was praised for his exploration of the White Nile, as yet an
unknown region, on this very ground, that benefit must necessarily
accrue to the negroes from the opening up of their country through
Englishmen acting in conjunction with the Viceroy of Egypt. Yet this
very exploration of Petherick’s turned out to be the beginning of far
worse evils to the negroes of the White Nile than any they had during
all the centuries of their unexplored history experienced, even to the
total destruction of some of their communities.
The truth is—and this Gordon came to understand at Khartoum, as we to-
day are coming to understand it on the Congo—though European
civilization is able to deal with certain evils incidental to
uncivilized life, it brings with it other evils ten times more
destructive than those it cures. It destroys the lions, but the
antelopes are not found thereby to increase. On the contrary they become
a prey, all of them, to the newcomer, their far more scientific and
unsparing friend. And so it is also with the negroes who are ten times
worse ruined by European conquest. Of the reality of this truth Gordon
gained at least occasional glimpses during the years he served the
Khedive Ismaïl in the Soudan. For myself I have never been in any doubt,
since I have had an opinion at all on the matter, that the only true
humanity towards the negroes of Equatorial Africa would have been to
leave them unvisited, uncivilized, and severely alone with their own
local troubles. The alternative policy to that of force applied to the
slave raiders was that of the encouragement of Mohammedan reform in the
Mediterranean Moslem states, and with it to secure the abolition of
slavery as a legal institution and so the demand of slaves from the
interior. This policy, however, was never one at all popular with the
anti-slave-trade associations. Our professional humanitarians were no
more anxious to abolish slavery altogether than masters of foxhounds are
anxious to abolish foxes; and Mohammedan reformers were generally
discouraged by the societies and reminded that slavery was recognized by
the Koran, and so could not be legally condemned by any reformers
professing themselves Moslems. This was certainly the case in 1882 when
Sheykh Mohammed Abdu and Arabi included the complete abolition of
slavery in their programme of national reform. Sir William Muir and
Allen, the anti-slavery secretary, at once took up the cudgels against
them in the “Times,” and their anger knew no bounds. It was an unheard-
of thing, they said, that a Mohammedan reformer should dare to strike at
the roots of a time-honoured Oriental institution to which their English
society owed its _raison d’être_.
Yet the Egyptian reformers of that day were perfectly sincere in their
intention. They were poor men, representing a community too humble to be
slave owning itself, arrayed against a wealthy ruling class possessed of
slaves. Their interests did not warp their judgement, and their
judgement on this, as on other things, was humanitarian. The Khedive and
the Turkish Pashas, however, were infinitely preferred by Allen and the
agents of the society in Egypt, whose salaries would have ceased had
slavery and slave dealing really disappeared from the Nile. As to our
diplomatic representatives, at Cairo as elsewhere, they hated the worry
of the whole slavery question and resented anything that raised its
abolition in practical form. It meant for them the tiresome duty of
presenting remonstrances to Mohammedan princes who all possessed slaves
and who wished to keep them and not to be deprived of the means of
getting new ones when required. I remember well the disgust with which
dispatches from the Slave Trade department of the Foreign Office were
regarded in our Chancelleries. All the same, the method of dealing with
them as I have just indicated would have been the true line for our
humanitarians to take if the interests of the raided black villagers of
the Upper Nile had been alone in question. A pronouncement against
slavery at Cairo by a Nationalist Sheykh el Islam, would have been worth
more to them than a whole army of civilized protectors sent to guard
their desert frontier against _jellabat_.
It will be interesting to give some extracts from Gordon’s letters to
his sister and others bearing on these points, letters written while in
Ismaïl’s service, for they are infinitely instructive, and as human
documents unsurpassed in the political history of our time. They were
begun immediately on his arrival at Cairo at the beginning of 1874, and
continued without interruption during the whole period of his Soudan
service. It must be remembered that the official world of Cairo of that
day represented a society as pecuniarily corrupt and as destitute of all
public virtue as could well be found upon the face of the globe. The
Khedive Ismaïl, who had all the vices of the East overlaid with a veneer
of Western civilization, plausible, unscrupulous, and profoundly
immoral, had gathered round him a gang of European speculators whose one
object was to extract money from his coffers by contracts, loans, and
services rendered at extravagant rates in every branch of the
administration. Among the highest paid were those that took service in
the Soudan and ministered to Ismaïl’s ambition of conquering the Upper
Nile to its sources, and on the pretence of putting down the slave trade
adding province after province to his African empire. Gordon’s
predecessor as Governor of the Equatorial Provinces, Sir Samuel Baker,
had been paid at the extravagant rate of £10,000 a year, exclusive of
all his expenses, and had left Egypt at the close of his four years’
engagement with a solid sum of £40,000 untouched at his banker’s. The
arrival therefore of Gordon with his unself-seeking ways was a wholly
disturbing element for the official mind, and made him enemies from the
beginning not only among his fellow Europeans who considered that he was
underselling them in the administrative market, but by the Turco-
Circassian and Armenian Pashas who were amassing large fortunes in the
general reign of extravagance. The allusion made in one of the first
extracts given is to an interview between Gordon and Sherif Pasha, then
Prime Minister, in which there had been a characteristic
misunderstanding between the two, Gordon refusing the £10,000 salary of
his predecessor, and protesting that £2,000 would be ample, Sherif
imagining that his refusal was only the coyness of a rogue who wanted a
still huger sum. It was difficult, too, for any one at Cairo to
understand that Gordon had the suppression of the slave trade really at
heart or that his acceptance of the mission to the Equatorial Nile would
be followed by any practical result in a humanitarian direction. Ismaïl,
as little as the rest, was sincere in this, but affected a zeal in
suppressing the slave trade, which at first took in the not very
discerning mind of Gordon, who with all his power of managing Orientals
_en masse_ was far from being a good judge of individual character,[15]
thinking to gain thereby a prop in humanitarian England to his failing
commercial credit. The process of Gordon’s undeception both as to Ismaïl
and as to the reality of the good he was doing or could possibly do in
the Soudan is to me the most interesting feature of the letters, and I
will give such extracts from them as seem to bear most directly on this
feature of his character, with others exemplifying the strange religious
mysticism which was to play so important a part in the drama of his
later exploits at Khartoum. Incidentally, too, the extracts will explain
much of the official ill-will manifested towards Gordon in 1884 not only
by Nubar and the Court clique of ministerial Pashas, but by our own
English diplomatists at the British Consulate-General, including Lord
Cromer. These are my quotations:
“I believe if the Soudan was settled the Khedive would prevent the slave
trade; but he does not see his way to do so till he can move about the
country. . . . My object is to show the Khedive and his people that gold
and silver idols are not worshipped by all the world. They are very
powerful gods, but not so powerful as our God; so if I refuse a large
sum you will not be angry at my doing so. From whom does all the money
come? From poor miserable creatures who are ground down to produce it.
Of course these ideas are outrageous. ‘Pillage the Egyptians’ is still
the cry. . . .
“I remember that God has at all times worked by weak and small means.
All history shows this to be His mode, and so I believe if He will He
may work by me. . . . I paid a visit to Sherif Pasha, the Minister of
Justice, and let him understand that your brother was not an hireling. I
did this rather sharply. . . . I think I can see the true motive now of
the expedition, and believe it to be a sham, to catch the attention of
the English people. As Baker said: I think the Khedive is quite innocent
(or nearly so) of it, but Nubar is the chief man. Now what has happened?
There has been a mutual disappointment. Nubar thought he had a rash
fellow to deal with, who could be persuaded to cut a dash, etc., etc.,
and he found he had one of the Gordon race. This latter thought the
thing real, and found it a sham and felt like a Gordon who has been
humbugged. . . . Though I do not credit myself with anything, it cannot
be denied but that your brother’s conduct [in wishing to cut down
expenses] is a silent reproach to the usual mode of doing things in this
country and is the more cutting from its silence. It is Greek and Hebrew
to them to reason that all the coin one takes is wrung out of poor
people. . . . Nubar and your brother do not hit it off, and the other
evening So-and-so said foolishly, ‘Do not make an enemy of Nubar. He
will or may do you mischief.’ It was too much, and your brother replied,
in the midst of a circle of guests, that there was no one living who
could do him the slightest injury which he could feel, and that he would
not shape his face to suit any one beyond acting loyally. . . . I think
they think me very queer, and I am, I dare say. . . . You have no idea
of the intrigues here; it is a regular hot bed, and things cannot last
long like this. They are paying 36 per cent. for money. . . . I think
the Khedive likes me, but no one else does; and I do not like them—I
mean the swells whose corns I tread on in all manner of ways. I saw so
and so at Suez. He agrees with me in our opinion of the rottenness of
Egypt: it is all for the flesh, and in no place is human nature to be
studied with such advantage. Duke of This wants steamer—say £600. Duke
of That wants house, etc. All the time the poor people are ground down
to get money for all this. Who art thou to be afraid of a man? If He
wills, I will shake all this in some way not clear to me now. Do not
think I am an egoist. I am like Moses who despised the riches of Egypt.
We have a king mightier than these, and more enduring riches and power
in Him than we can have in this world. I will not bow to Haman.”[16]
Arrived at the seat of his labours and engaged in the work set him by
the Khedive of opening up the White Nile to the Equatorial Lakes, we
find him speedily disgusted with the methods in use for the spreading of
civilization in those remote regions, the petty warfare waged by the
troops he was given to command against the primitive negro tribes which
were living happily without him, and whose only wish was to be left
alone. Baker had been brutal with these poor blacks; Gordon’s heart went
out towards them. He speedily saw the fallacy of the pretence that he
was sent there to do them good.
“They (the native blacks) have had no communication with the world. They
would seem to get on well without any regular laws and to live out their
span in comparative quiet. . . . No country presents such a field for a
philosopher as this country does with its dense population quite
innocent of the least civilization. I should say that they are
singularly free from vice; their wars are generally very harmless
affairs and seldom cause bloodshed. . . . Is it not remarkable that you
never find anything like ambition in a native sheikh? They will readily
agree to plunder their neighbour, but would never think of annexing his
tribe to theirs. . . . They are in tribes of 100 or 300 families, and I
expect have been so for ages. . . . The natives suffered in their attack
to-day and I do not think they will trouble us again. . . . If they are
to be put down it is better I should do it than an exterminating pasha
who would have no mercy. . . . I wish the whole of this business was
over. I do not want to hurt these people, but we must defend ourselves.”
And later, a detachment of his soldiers having been surprised by the
blacks and destroyed: “We derided the poor blacks who fought for their
independence, and now God gave them the victory. I declare, in spite of
the expressions you may note in my letters, I truly sympathize with
them. They say, ‘We do not want your cloth and beads; you go your way
and we will go ours; we do not want to see your chief. . . . This land
is ours, and you shall not have it, neither its bread nor its flocks.’
Poor fellows! You will say I am most inconsistent, and so I am, and so
are you. We are dead against our words when it comes to action. . . . I
have a number of Niam-Niam soldiers. . . . The Niam-Niam warriors are
fearful objects; they do look very fierce. They are thick set, sturdy
fellows, and they look brave and fearless. I declare it is rather a
trial to me to set them on the satin-skinned Baris, but these latter
will not leave me alone. . . . Did I not mention the incantations made
against us by the magicians on the other side, and how somehow, from the
earnestness that they made them with, I had some thought of misgiving on
account of them? It were odd their repulse was so soon to follow. These
prayers were earnest prayers for celestial aid in which the prayer knew
he would need help from some unknown power to avert a danger. That the
native knows not the true God is true, but God knows him and moved him
to pray and answered his prayer. ‘The horse is prepared for the day of
battle, but the victory is of the Lord.’ . . . The tax-gatherers are out
and there is immense excitement among the natives on the other side. Six
or seven hundred are collected on the hill tops. . . . We cannot see
what the tax-gatherers are doing. . . . The taxes are in sight . . . 200
cows and 1,500 sheep. . . . The daughter of the Sheykh was taken: I have
now sent to him to say if he will submit I will leave him alone and that
he is to come for his daughter. I hope sincerely to make friends with
him and end this miserable work, for it is just that.
“I wish they would submit now and save any more of these wars or rather
miserable cattle raids; but it is no use wishing—you must take their
cows, otherwise they will never give in. . . . To-day on a bare rock a
mile off stood a man with two attendants. He held his hands clasped
together at the back of his head, and turned to all quarters, putting
them down sometimes straight to his sides. I watched him with my glass.
‘Come, curse me this people: for they are too mighty for me.’ I can
quite enter into these poor people’s misery at their impotency. ‘We do
not want beads. We do not want the Pasha. . . . We want our own lands
and you to go away.’ Their poor minds never conceived such a trial as
this before. Rain was their only care, now _civilization_ (?) is to
begin with them. They are to be brought into the family of nations. . .
. There are a great number of natives on Balak’s hill to-day. . . .
Balaam is there with his hands in the same position; the kings and
princes of Midian are sitting like apes behind him. . . . How I hate
this country and all the work. . . . I am thoroughly disgusted. These
(the Khedive’s) people are unfit to acquire the country . . . incapable
of civilizing the natives. . . . They are conies, a feeble race. . . . I
cannot help it, but I have taken such a dislike to these blacks that I
cannot bear their sight. I do not mean the natives, but these soldiers.
They are nothing but a set of pillagers, and are about as likely to
civilize these parts as to civilize the moon. Though it tells against my
operations, I am glad in my heart that they are afraid of the natives.
God permits me to open the road to the interior, but, humanly speaking,
I see nothing to encourage the hope that this occupation of their lands
will be of any advantage towards civilizing them. In excuse for taking
this employ I can only say that I think I have accomplished a work with
the nearly minimum amount of suffering to natives and soldiery which
would have been done by an Arab Pasha with a great amount of suffering
to soldiery and natives. . . . Some philanthropic people write to me
about ‘noble work,’ ‘poor blacks,’ etc. I have I think stopped their
writings by acknowledging ourselves to be a pillaging horde of
brigands.”
Such, as seen in these intimate letters, was Gordon’s own opinion of his
work down to the end of his two years as Governor of the Equator. He
reconciled it to his conscience only by the reflection that, if another
had been entrusted with it than himself, the injury inflicted on the
negro tribes would have been greater than it was.
At this time, October 1876, he was so little in love with his exhausting
and thankless work, and in so great despair of doing real good in the
Soudan, that he resolved to throw it up. “I want to see my way clear
first,” he writes. “Comfort of the body, a very strong gentleman says,
‘What is the use of opening more country to such a Government? There is
more now under their power than they can ever manage. Retire now.’ But
Mr. (I do not know what) says, ‘Shut your eyes to what may happen in
future; leave that to God, and do what you think will open the country
thoroughly to both lakes. Do this not for His Highness or for his
Government, but do it blindly and in faith.’” And a few days later, “To-
day Reason says strongly, ‘Do not stay and aid such a Government.’ But I
do not like to be beaten, which I am if I retire; and by retiring I do
not remedy anything. By staying I keep my province safe from injustice
and cruelty in some degree. . . . When a house gives ominous cracks
prior to a fall one’s desire is—the rule in ships—to leave it. . . . But
I do not like the idea, even if the cracks are serious. Why should I
fear? Is man more strong than God? Things have come to such a pass in
these Mussulman countries that a crisis must come about soon.”
He had come, too, to persuade himself that he was an instrument in God’s
hands for purposes, obscure at present, but ultimately to be made
manifest, which would more than counterbalance the immediate evil. The
idea recurs perpetually in his letters, joined with that of a fatalism
as absolute as that of any Moslem. Indeed, it is evident that the long
years spent with none but Moslems on the Upper Nile, where he was cut
off from all communication with men of his own Christian creed,
heightened, if it did not initiate, the predestinarian tone of his
religious thought. It is a point in his character of the highest
importance if we are to understand his action when later he was called
upon to rescue the Soudan garrisons. It seems to have grown upon him
that he was one pre-ordained to do God’s work as was Joshua when leading
the armies of Israel as conquerors into the promised land. The
uncompromising logic of his mind made him accept this inference from
results, and he refused to acknowledge that the same faith which had
inspired Joshua and Moses to deeds that were miraculous should be
lacking to his own as absolute faith. All were but instruments in the
hands of the same God—all were under equal direction. It will be worth
while to collect the passages in his letters which most clearly
illustrate this belief, a belief founded on Bible teaching, and
intensified in the Soudan by the solitude in which he lived. What the
Koran was to his Moslem companions, that the Bible was to him, with the
Islamic doctrine of submission to God’s providence for good and for
evil, the fatalism which believes in all things as pre-ordained. Each
year spent in the Soudan added to the illusion of his divine
instrumentality, especially in the suppression of the slave trade, which
signalized the second period of his work when he had become Governor-
General, a position to which he was promoted in 1877.
“Has it ever struck you,” he writes from Kordofan to his sister, “that
if man’s birth and death are predetermined by God to happen at certain
epochs, so every intervening event must be also predetermined? Few are
atheistical enough to say either man’s birth or death are things of
chance; and how can they therefore dispute that the intervening events
are not preordained. In governing these countries I wish I could realize
this truth more than I do. . . . The more I live in this country and the
more God prospers me, the more I despise myself and feel despicable;
some of the _coups_ I have made, and which have been successful, have
been such flukes, or chances, as the world calls them, as to astonish me
quite as much as they have astonished others, and I cannot feed myself
with the thought of ‘How clever I am,’ for impressed on my mind is the
fact, ‘You know you had no idea of what would happen on your so acting.’
. . . I have really no troops with me, but I have the Shekinah (the
Lord) and I do like trusting to Him and not to man. . . . Had I not got
this Almighty Power to back me, with His infinite wisdom, I do not know
how I could even think of what is to be done. . . . I do not believe in
man’s free will; therefore, if my actions are right they are His
actions; if evil, they are the inevitable produce of the corrupt body in
which I am placed by Him. . . . Those who hold by man’s free will must
consequently be more or less elated if they do well. Now, if you
accepted what I think the truth, namely, that man has no free will, you
would never be elated, for you would not arrogate to yourself your
actions; neither would you be depressed by your evil acts. . . . I own I
feared to trust God in this slave dealer’s business; I was tossed up and
down. Perhaps physical fatigue may have been the cause. I hold to ‘Trust
in the Lord and lean not on thine own understanding.’ And He has brought
me through. . . . You and I are flies on the wheel; try and realize
this, that you do not move the wheel. . . . All this points to the
absolute rule God has over events, good or evil. As I said before ‘Be a
fool’ in the world’s language.”
And again: “I wonder if I look ambitious in your eyes. Do you think I
sought this place? You should know more than most people, for you have
all my thoughts in my letters. Judging myself, I fear it was so when I
took the work in hand; not that I cared for the money or the honours to
come from it. I think, however, my main idea was a quixotic one—to help
the Khedive, mixed with the feeling that I could with God’s direction
accomplish this work. . . . If God puts ten pounds on a man He will give
him strength to bear twenty pounds. And if He puts twenty tons on a man
He will (if He wills) give him power to carry sixty tons. This He has
done for me; and I in saying this do not seek the praise of any man or
society, or king or power. I would have your prayers—they will be
heard—but no praise, for He is the GOVERNOR-GENERAL, and I am only His
useless agent, by whom He deigns to work His will. . . . I feel I am
only a straw, yet God gave the men in Darfour courage under me. I cannot
look back or forward to ever having done or to ever doing anything
worthy of commendation. . . . I do not and cannot chew the cud of self-
complacency. . . . I no more believe in the foresight of Napoleon or the
Duke. People made out their talent as foresight after the thing was
done. God gives the thought, man carries it out, for the thought is
given so strongly as to force him to act thus.”
“I am now, thank God, so far from the least thought of man’s free will
that it never enters into my calculation in these thoughts, however it
may guide me as Governor-General or as fellow-man. . . . I feel so
strongly that death is not an evil to man that, if I thought the
shooting of any number of slave dealers would be of avail in stopping
the slave trade, I would shoot them without the least compunction,
though if a slave dealer was ill and it was in my power to cure him I
would do my best to do so. . . . I believe entirely in the Old and New
Testaments as being inspired by God. . . . I base my belief on the
Scripture entirely; it is there distinctly laid down that God rules all
things. . . . To accept the doctrine of man having no free will we must
acknowledge his utter insignificance. For my part I can give myself no
credit for anything I ever did; and further I credit no man with
talents, etc., etc., in anything he may have done. Napoleon,
Luther—indeed, all men—I consider were directly worked on and directed
to work out God’s great scheme. Everything that happens to-day, good or
evil, is settled and fixed. . . . No comfort is equal to that which he
has who has God for his stay, but believes, not in words but in fact,
that all things are ordained to happen and must happen.”
Again, when worn out with work and loneliness: “Long before you get this
I shall be out of my troubles; so do not pity me, for I have the
Almighty to guide me and death is no terror. I only wish you to know how
worn I am through having to lean on GOD ALONE. It seems odd but it is
diametrically opposed to our flesh to do so, and it is very trying. My
flesh says, ‘I should like 1,000 good, trustworthy soldiers, and not His
promise.’ It is utterly wrong, but a widow would prefer £15,000 in the 3
per cent. consols to the promise that God will provide for her. After my
spirit I prefer the promise; after my flesh I prefer the 1,000 soldiers;
not having them my spirit lords it over my flesh and conquers; but the
flesh suffers all the same, and I see the deep lines in my face getting
deeper and deeper day by day. _Why did you go?_ Well, He sent me, for I
went on a toss up. He is the GOVERNOR-GENERAL, I am only His agent.”
All these are passages from Gordon’s letters written to his sister
during his service under the Khedive Ismaïl between 1874 and 1879. They
explain the man. With regard to its results from a humanitarian point of
view he was, as I have said, conscious of failure, even when his friends
in England were loudest in their praise of his success. He knew it had
no permanence.
The work indeed that he had undertaken was one which could not be
achieved under the circumstances which then ruled the Soudan. At
Khartoum and throughout the whole country slavery was the recognized
basis of social and industrial life. The slave was as much property as
the ox or the sheep, and though his lot was less hard than it had been
in Christian lands a few decades before—for the slave was not put to
field labour, as in the West Indies, and was admitted to a certain
filial position in the household of his master—the thought of his having
any natural right to freedom had not yet penetrated the humanest local
brain. The Egyptian officials at Khartoum were, as a rule, the very
worst section of their class, men exiled for their misdemeanours from
the lower Nile, while the army was, to a large extent, recruited from
convicted criminals. The native Soudanese of Arab origin were wholly
disaffected to the Government, and many of them, driven from their homes
by its exactions, had formed themselves into bands of robber slave
hunters, and were in revolt against it. No real help was to be had from
Cairo. Gordon had some nine or ten Europeans with him in all, scattered
through the country, and the Christian population of Khartoum, mostly
Greeks, were hardly less interested in the slave trade than their Moslem
neighbours, many of them being themselves slave owners. There were a few
Catholic missionaries, and a bishop, but they exercised little
influence, and Gordon, as an Englishman determined to stop the trade,
was practically alone. The Soudan was an immense territory with no
natural frontiers, few means of communication, and a population of
several warlike millions, unamalgamated except by the tie of a somewhat
fanatical anti-Christian creed. He thus describes the western regions,
where the raids were chiefly organized: “These countries are very
curious; they seem to be peopled with huge tribes of Bedouin Arabs, with
a small nucleus of more settled people who congregate in the larger
villages. . . . Some of them can put from 2,000 to 6,000 horse or camel
men into the field. . . . Now these tribes raid on the negro tribes to
the south, or else exchange cloth for slaves with the Bedouin tribes
beyond even the pretended boundary of Egypt. . . . The tribes sell the
slaves to the little merchants, _jellabat_, of all kinds, who flock into
these lands. The merchants, who come from all parts of Egypt, then come
down to the more populous places . . . and sell them to others. Even
with the British Government in possession, I do not know how this slave
trade could be stopped.”
Nevertheless, as a soldier, and he was a dogged one, Gordon fought on,
though conscious of its being morally a losing battle. As a soldier he
was successful and accomplished the work given him of subduing the
revolted slave dealers; though the slave trade itself he could not stop,
much less slavery in the Soudan. The caravans were too intangible on the
open western frontier, and he had no means of setting the recaptured
slaves at liberty. In order at all to deal with the case he was obliged
himself to purchase slaves, for which he accuses himself thus to
imaginary humanitarians sitting in their easy chairs at home: “The
slaves I buy are already torn from their homes, and whether I buy them
or not they will remain slaves. . . . It is not as if I encouraged raids
for the purpose of getting slaves as soldiers. But people will say, ‘By
buying slaves you increase the demand and indirectly encourage raids.’ I
say, ‘Yes, I should do so, if after buying them I still allowed the
raids to continue.’ . . . This slave question is most troublesome and
difficult to manage. A number of slaves taken in the last raid made near
here (in Darfour) refuse to go back, for they find they are better fed
with their new masters than they were with the old. . . . Darfour is a
regular cockpit. One thing troubles me. What am I to do with the two or
three thousand slaves that are now at Shaka, if we take it? I cannot
take them back into their own country; I cannot feed them. Solve this
problem for me. I must let them be taken by my auxiliaries, or by my
soldiers, or by the merchants. There is no help for it. If I let them
loose they will be picked up in every direction, for an escaped slave is
like an escaped sheep, the property of him who finds him or her. . . .
If I let the slaves be taken by my soldiers, by the tribes, or by the
merchants, instead of there being a cessation of the slave caravans
there will be a great increase of them for two or three months and a
corresponding outcry against me. But at any rate the slaves will go by
frequented routes and will not die on the road. . . . Shall I be
cowardly for fear of what ill-informed Europe may say?”
This was written in the early days of his Darfour campaign. As it
proceeded, the horrors of the midsummer warfare in a waterless
wilderness oppressed him as a nightmare, the necessity of reducing all,
tribes, slave raiders, and slaves alike, by thirst and hunger, seizing
the wells and the hidden supplies of corn. “The men find the corn by
probing the ground, and by the ‘question’ applied to captives, which I
cannot prevent. The detachment of the Leopard tribe are without water,
and have been so for a day. I am sorry for it. Consider it as we may,
war is a brutal, cruel affair. . . . You see the people coming over the
sand, like flies on a wall. The poor fugitives cannot stand the thirst,
and are coming down one by one to water. You have not the very least
idea of the fearful effect of want of water in this scorched-up country.
. . . Hunger is nothing to thirst; the one can be eased by eating grass,
the other is swift and insupportable.”
And all—though he succeeded with the help of his Italian Lieutenant,
Gessi, in breaking up the chief slave trading band under Suliman
Zebehr—for almost nothing. He finds he cannot solve the problem. “There
are some 6,000 more slave dealers in the interior who will obey me now
they have heard that Zebehr’s son and the other chiefs have given in.
You can imagine what a difficulty there is in dealing with all these
armed men. I have separated them here and there, and in course of time
will rid myself of the mass. Would you shoot them all? Have they no
rights? Are they not to be considered? Had the planters no rights? Did
not our Government once allow slave-trading? Do you know that cargoes of
slaves came into Bristol Harbour in the time of our fathers? . . . I
must notice to you one thing which is very different among the society
here and that of the planters in the Colonies. One never hears of owners
of slaves keeping gangs of them for field labour, or for cultivation.
They are kept for slave servants, or by the slave dealers as slave
troops. . . . Certain Greeks are now at Katarif on whom I have my eye,
who have gangs of slaves cultivating cotton. I mean to make a swoop on
them. In fact the condition of the negro is incomparably better in these
lands than ever it was in the West Indies, and I therefore claim for my
people a greater kindness of heart than was possessed by the planters,
with all their Christian profession and civilization. You speak of
Mohammedanism being imperilled [he means in peril of damnation]. Not so.
I find the Mussulman quite as good a Christian as many a Christian, and
do not believe he is in any peril. All of us are more or less pagans. I
like the Mussulman; he is not ashamed of his God; his life is a fairly
pure one. Certainly he gives himself a good margin in the wife line, but
at any rate he never poaches on others. Can our Christian people say the
same?”
It is of importance to consider these sayings of Gordon’s in connection
with his subsequent action, which so surprised and shocked his English
friends six years later.
“This morning I came on a caravan of slaves which is accompanying
me—some sixty or eighty men, women and children chained. What am I to do
with them? Their homes are too far off to send them to; so I decided to
make the slave merchant take off their chains as scandalous, and then to
leave them with him. He, looking on them as valuable cows, will look
well after them. Don Quixote would have liberated them, and made an
attempt to send them back some forty days march through hostile tribes
to their homes—which they would have never reached. The only remedy is
to stop slave raids on the frontier. . . . You must stop it at its
source. Once the slaves have left the source it is useless to try. . . .
In all previous emancipations, either there has been a strong government
to enforce obedience, or a majority of the nation wished it. Here in
this country there is not one that wishes it, or who would aid it even
by advice. . . . _No one_ is uninterested in the matter.” And he could
not stop the trade. It was like the hydra with a hundred heads. As soon
as he cut off one band another took its place. As soon as he closed one
entrance to the slave caravans another entrance was discovered. What he
achieved was a miracle, for all depended on himself and his one European
Lieutenant, Gessi. No one else either in the Soudan or Cairo cared for
or wished to see the traffic stopped.
The last year of Gordon’s Governor-Generalship was one of harassing
disappointments. The Khedive had failed him. He received no more
support. There was a new regime at Cairo, the Nubar-Wilson one. He was
at loggerheads with it, and talks of it in his letters as a
“Hermaphrodite government.” They did not understand him, and he had no
respect for them. It was a constant exchange of telegrams between Cairo
and Khartoum in which Cairo made impossible demands for money, and
Khartoum responded with bitter refusals. He was left quite unaided in
regard to the slave trade. “I have no belief,” he wrote, “in the Cairo
Government acting against slavery. . . . Nubar never helped me at the
equator, though I wrote to him frequently, waste of time as it was!” It
was the same with the Khedive, though he still pitied him, for Ismaïl
was now at bay surrounded by the financial wolves that were on the point
of devouring him.
“I can say truly,” he writes in 1879; “that my life is one long series
of flesh-vexing telegrams, of rows, of disputes—a regular Ishmaelite
existence—I am at war with nearly every one at Cairo, and my crest is a
thistle.” “I am exceedingly weary, and wish with a degree of bitterness
that it was all over. I am cooped up here (at Khartoum) now, and am much
occupied with the finances, which are in a very low state. . . . I am
striking daily deadly blows against the slave trade, and am establishing
a sort of Government of Terror about it.” “I am stronger than ever in my
belief that if H. H. had taken my advice he would be in a better plight
than he is now, and at any rate would have fallen with dignity. Now I
see by the paper he is offering to abdicate. This sort of thing cannot
last, and I fear for him. He cannot go straight—even his dispatches to
me are all evasive. . . . The continual wars that I carry on, and cannot
help, are very wearisome; and I feel more and more daily ‘How long? how
long?’”
It was in this state of despair, and weary of his life that Gordon threw
himself into the excitement of his last campaign against the Darfour
slave raiders, a campaign he was not destined to finish, for he was
recalled in the midst of it once more to Cairo, and had to leave the
final capture of the chief raider, Suliman Zebehr, to his Lieutenant
Gessi. He had lost, however, his zest for fighting. “I no longer delight
in war,” he writes, “or fights like this one before me. I look on the
accounts one reads of wars as so much romance writing, and, somewhat
like the Chinese people, I have rather a contempt for the warrior. . . .
Eminent services, etc., are eminent nonsense.” His iron health, too, was
breaking down. “I have almost entirely given up smoking, for I am much
affected in my circulation. If I had gone on with it much longer I
believe my heart would have stopped altogether. I may indeed say that I
have lost every desire in a material way for the things of this life,
and I have no wish for eating, drinking, or comforts. If I have a wish
for anything, it would be for a dreamless sleep.” It was a terrible
oppression to him, too, to find that in spite of all he could do the
slave trade was only “scotched not killed.” Indeed it flourished still,
despite the cost. “I have just made a calculation of the loss of life in
Darfour during the years 1875-1879. It comes to 16,000 Egyptians, and
some 50,000 natives of Darfour—add to this the loss of life on the Bahr
Gazelle some 15,000, and you will have a fine total of 81,000; and this
exclusive of the slave trade which one may put down for three years at
from 80,000 to 100,000. Upwards of 470 slave dealers have been driven
out of this place since I came here two days ago. This evening we were
surprised at a caravan coming in. The slave dealers had come on here
with them, and hearing I was here, and having no water, they abandoned
their slaves and fled. The slaves were sadly distressed by thirst,
thirty had died on the road. Though the water here is putrid, and
everything is wretched enough, I am revived when I make these captures.
You must count them up. From Oomchanga to Toashia, during, say, a week,
we must have caught from 500 to 600. I suppose we may consider that
nearly that number must have been passing every week for the last year
and a half or two years along this road!!! and this during my tenure of
office!!!—which is very creditable to me. These slaves just captured
have been four to five days without water. They were in the most
terrible distress.” A few days later, 21st July, he takes what was to be
his final leave of Khartoum, till his last fatal return to it in 1884.
“I shall D.V. leave for Cairo in ten days. . . . I am a wreck, like the
portion of the ‘Victory,’ towed into Gibraltar after Trafalgar; but God
has enabled me, or rather has used me, to do what I wished to do—that is
to break down the slave trade.”
It was his last word of comfort to his sick soul. At Cairo, when he
arrived there, he found a new order of things established still less to
his mind than the old one had been. The Khedive Ismaïl had made his exit
from the scene, and his place was occupied, not filled, by the poor
dummy Tewfik, with the Anglo-French financial control for tutor and
guardian. He did not long consent to serve it. After finding himself
sent on a fool’s errand to Abyssinia, where he nearly met his death, he
folded his tent and, shaking the dust of Egypt from his feet, once more
returned to England. Nothing then was further from his mind than that he
should ever see the Nile again. Body and soul he had been overwrought.
The British surgeon who examined him at Alexandria before he left found
him suffering from “symptoms of nervous exhaustion and alteration of the
blood.” He recommended “several months of complete rest and quiet,” and
insisted strongly on his “abstaining from all exciting work, especially
such as implies business or political excitement.”
CHAPTER IV
GORDON IN PALESTINE
SUCH is the history of Gordon’s first service in the Soudan under Ismaïl
Pasha, from 1874 to 1879, in its principal features as gathered from his
own letters. At this time of his life, 1880, there is no question that
to the official world in England as in Egypt, except among his intimate
friends who knew him well, Gordon was considered mad; nor wholly,
perhaps, without excuse. He had quarrelled in his last two years with
nearly every official person at Cairo, including the new Viceroy Tewfik,
Nubar Pasha, and most of the Khedivial ministers, as well as with M. de
Lesseps and Lord Cromer. There is an interesting memorandum drawn up by
himself relating the circumstances which led to his collision with the
last of these, and, as it throws light on their later relations, as well
as giving a lively picture of the writer, it will be worth epitomizing
here.
The memorandum tells us that in the spring of 1878 Ismaïl Pasha, being
in financial difficulties, sent for him (Gordon) to come from Khartoum
to Cairo, and help him in making an arrangement with the representatives
of his creditors. “I arrived,” says Gordon, “on the 7th March, at 9.30
p.m. His Highness sent his equerry to meet me at the terminus and was
waiting dinner. Dirty as I was, after a railway journey of 350 miles, I
had to obey, but before dinner His Highness took me aside and asked me
to be President of an Inquiry into the state of the finances of the
country. . . . I said I would accept the Commission of Inquiry as
President. His Highness said, ‘You will see Lesseps, who will act with
you.’ I said ‘Yes,’ and accepted the mission with the agreement that the
Commissioners of the Dette were not to be on the Inquiry. I was angry
with these Commissioners because I thought they had been too hard on His
Highness. The next day I saw Mr. Vivian, the English Consul-General, and
he said, ‘I wonder you could accept the Presidency without the
Commissioners of the Dette.’ I said I was free to accept or to refuse. I
then called on the German Consul-General, and when there the French and
Austrian Consuls-General and also Vivian came in, and attacked me for
having accepted the post of President. They said I was risking His
Highness his throne, if he formed the Commission of Inquiry without the
creditors’ representatives. I said, ‘Why do you not tell him so?’ They
said, ‘You ought to do so.’ I said, ‘Well, will you commission me to do
so from you with any remarks I like to make as to the futility of your
remarks?’ They all said, ‘Yes, we authorize you to do so in our names.’
I did so that evening, and told His Highness just before dinner at
Abdin. I said, ‘I have seen the four Consuls-General to-day, and they
told me to tell your Highness from them that you run a serious personal
risk if you have a Commission of Inquiry without the Commissioners of
the Dette being upon it.’ His Highness did not seem to care a bit, and
said he was only afraid of England, who he was sure would not move. He
said, ‘You will see Lesseps to-morrow and arrange the Enquête with him.’
The next day Lesseps came with Standen, now Resident Commissioner for
the British Government Suez Canal Shares at Paris, an old friend of
mine. Lesseps began, ‘We must have the Commissioners of the Dette on the
Enquête.’ I said, ‘It is a _sine qua non_ that they are not to be upon
it.’ Lesseps replied, ‘They must be upon it.’ Then in came Cherif Pasha
and said, ‘Are you agreed?’ I left Lesseps to speak and he said ‘Yes,’
at which I stared and said, ‘I fear not.’ Then Lesseps and Cherif Pasha
discussed it, and Lesseps gave in and agreed to serve on the Commission
without the Commissioners, but he must ask permission from Paris. Cherif
Pasha was pleased, but I instinctively felt old Lesseps was ratting, so
I asked Cherif Pasha to stop a moment and said to Standen, ‘Now see that
Lesseps does not make a mess of it, let him say at once will he act
without the Commissioners of Dette or not, do this for my sake, take him
into that corner and speak to him.’ Standen did so while I took Cherif
Pasha into the other corner, much against his will, for he thought I was
a bore raising obstacles. I told him that Lesseps had declared before he
came he would not act unless with the Commissioners. Cherif was huffed
with me and turned to Lesseps, whom Standen had already dosed in his
corner of the room, and he and Lesseps had a close conversation again
for some time, and then Cherif came to me and said, ‘Lesseps has
accepted without the Commissioners of the Dette. I disgusted Cherif as I
went downstairs with him by saying, ‘He will never stick to it.’ When
downstairs in one of the many antechambers to the Palace His Highness
gave me (shall I ever lodge in palaces again? I hope not) I found
Baring. Now Baring is in the Royal Artillery, while I am in the Royal
Engineers. Baring was in the nursery while I was in the Crimea. He has a
pretentious grand patronizing way about him. We had a few words
together. I said I would do what His Highness asked me. He said it was
unfair to the creditors, and in a few moments all was over. When oil
mixes with water we will mix together! I went upstairs.”
This is interesting as a record of the incompatibility of temper and
ideas existing between Gordon and Cromer six years before 1884. It
explains indeed what would otherwise be inexplicable, the quarrel that
broke out at once between them when Gordon returned to Cairo on his
final mission.
It is not necessary to continue Gordon’s story of how he was played with
on the earlier occasion by our Cairo diplomatists, but one scene which
gives us an amusing glimpse of Lesseps, and at the same time of Gordon’s
character, I will add: “The next morning,” he continues, “the 8th March
at 9 I went to Lesseps en route to His Highness. Lesseps said, ‘See what
Cherif Pasha has written to me.’ ‘Mon cher Vicomte, son Altesse le
Khedive m’a chargé de vous présenter ses grands remerciments pour avoir
accepté d’être sur la Commission d’Enquête et elle me prie d’ajouter que
c’est ce qu’elle a toujours attendu d’un si ancien ami de Mehemet Ali et
ses fils.’ This letter had been written before I saw Lesseps, and of
course His Highness thanked him for being upon the Enquête _without_ the
four Commissioners of the Dette, which Lesseps declined to do except
under certain conditions, so the letter was written to Lesseps thanking
him for services which the Khedive was furious about. Lesseps said,
looking at his pretty young wife of twenty-two, ‘I am off to Halowan and
shall not be back until night. I have telegraphed to my Government to
ask permission to be on the Enquête with you. Here is a copy of the
telegram, will you give it to His Highness?’ He gave it over to me to
read. I read it, it was thus: ‘Son Altesse le Khedive m’a prié de me
joindre avec M. Gordon et les Commissionaires de la Caisse pour faire
une Enquête sur les finances d’Egypte, je demande permission.’ I said,
‘Oh! my dear old fellow M. Lesseps, this will never do.’ He said, ‘Well,
anyway it is off, and I am off to Halowan and shall not be back to-
night.’ Well, off I had to go with this telegram to Abdin. Cherif and
Riaz Pasha were in the antechamber, drowsy and happily smoking. As I
went in I saw a bald-headed ‘coot,’ the Consul-General of the Pays Bas,
going in to His Highness. Cherif drowsily said, ‘Well, any news?’ I
said, ‘No, only I have a telegram for His Highness from Lesseps.’ So
Riaz and Cherif chatted away in Turkish till I saw the ‘coot’ go out and
Cherif was called in. Suddenly Cherif came flying out, all drowsiness
gone, and said, ‘Where is the telegram of Lesseps?’ I gave it him and
then in came flying Pharaoh (the Khedive) with Cherif. Pharaoh threw
himself on the sofa and said, ‘Je suis tout à fait bouleversé avec ce
télégramme de Lesseps. C’est tout à fait contre mes désirs. Barrat!
(l’esclave écrivain de son altesse) venez ici, dites à quelqu’un d’aller
à Halowan et de dire à Lesseps de ne pas télégraphier à Paris,’ and then
turning to me His Highness said, ‘I put the whole affair into your
hands.’ Then, calling Barrat, he said, ‘Telegraph to Goschen, Gordon is
charged with the whole affair, arrange with him.’ Consequently I
telegraphed to Goschen, ‘I have recommended His Highness to suspend the
payment of the next Coupon in order to pay the employés and meet
pressing claims. I will arrange with you for the Commission of Inquiry
into the finances.’ Goschen answered, ‘I will not look at you, the
matter is in the hands of Her Majesty’s Government.’ I then wrote to His
Highness and proposed that he should suspend the payment of the Coupon
and pay the employés and pressing claims, that he should do it by decree
and quote me. Throw all the blame upon me, saying if he did not like to
do this I would myself write to Lord Derby, to say I had recommended His
Highness to do so-and-so; that I did not ask Her Majesty’s Government to
give any acquiescence to it, but merely to tell them if the Khedive did
this, it was my fault. The Khedive hesitated and did not answer me, and
shut himself up in his harem for two days and the game was lost. (There
would have been no risk in this.) Vivian (English Consul-General), of
course, was on the _qui vive_; he knew that some strong measure was in
prospect, and telegraphed to Her Majesty’s Government, begging the same
to authorize him to join the French Consul-General, to stop His Highness
taking any sharp measures. Of course Vivian pointed out the Red
Republican nature of your humble servant. Lord Derby, against anything
abrupt, telegraphed to Vivian, who came to me and said, ‘I have a
telegram; I will read it to you; but you are not to say anything about
it until I have communicated it to His Highness, for it would not be
proper.’ The telegram ran thus: ‘You are authorized in conjunction with
your French colleague, to inform His Highness that Her Majesty’s
Government trusts His Highness will do nothing without accordance with
his creditors, and that Her Majesty’s Government are willing to send
Rivers Wilson out to help him, and that Her Majesty’s Government think
that Baring ought to be on the Inquiry.’ Vivian then said, ‘What will
you recommend His Highness to do?’ I said, ‘I would recommend him to bow
to Her Majesty’s Government.’ Vivian said, ‘What will he do?’ I said,
‘He might say I am sovereign and will do as I will.’ Vivian (who was a
pretty black-eyed boy, and was put by General Fox under my care at the
Royal Military Academy, and whom Ruck Keene kicked on the ankle when he
was removed from that rough school) went home, and on the morrow went in
great pomp to His Highness with the French Consul-General, saying on
leaving, ‘C’est tout ce que nous avons à dire à votre altesse pour le
moment.’ Of course my tongue was tied; but before they (the two Consuls-
General) went to His Highness I wrote to Cherif Pasha, and said, hoping
to take the wind out of their sails, ‘Tell His Highness if he is
troubled, to ask Her Majesty’s Government for Rivers Wilson to come out
and help me’; and I added (for I had begun to see, with Pharaoh
wavering, it was necessary for _me_ to look to _my retreat_), ‘I will
not act with any of the four Commissioners of the Dette.’ This also gave
His Highness a reason for refusing Her Majesty’s Government’s
recommendation, that Baring should be on the Commission of Inquiry,
because he could quote my objections.
“Now, would you believe it? Vivian never gave His Highness the true
telegram. He and the French Consul-General gave him a paper: ‘Our
Governments authorize us to inform your Highness, that they trust you
will only act in accord with your creditors.’ Unimportant as this paper
was, it sickened him for two days, during which he only spoke of the
Soudan; till at last I took an opportunity, as the moment of secrecy was
over, to tell him what the true telegram was. He looked quite surprised
and said, ‘Why, they never told me that!’ The fact, however, was that
the paper the Consuls-General gave him was so vague, and the solemnity
of their manner was so great, that His Highness got frightened; and when
I did tell him, after these two days, he had already given in, and had
agreed to have the Commissioners of the Caisse (or Dette) upon the
Inquiry, and as a sequel to call for Rivers Wilson. He never told me he
had given in; but four days after I heard of it, and on my seeing him he
said (for it was no longer a secret that he had ceded), ‘Have you any
news?’ I said, ‘Yes, I hear your Highness has agreed to the four
Commissioners of the Dette being on the Inquiry.’ He said ‘Yes’ and the
subject dropped. Five days after that I left Cairo with no honours by
the ordinary train, paying my passage. The sun which rose with such
splendour, set in the deepest obscurity. I calculate my financial
episode cost me £800. His Highness was bored with me after my failure,
and could not bear the sight of me, which his surroundings soon knew. I
dare say I may have been imprudent in speech. I have no doubt it is
better as it is. His Highness and I would have fallen out about the
composition of the Commission of Inquiry, for I feel sure it was meant
to be packed, and that I was only to be the figure head; but the
families of the Ameer of Afghanistan will never change their natures;
peace be to them.”
After this things had only gone from bad to worse in Gordon’s relations
with the official world. His last act at Cairo, just before leaving it
as he thought for ever at the end of 1879, was to have a serious quarrel
with Nubar Pasha. He held Nubar responsible for much of Ismaïl’s
indebtedness to Europe, and for the international pressure which had
been put upon him, and had led to his deposition; and at their leave-
taking he had spoken his opinion of him so strongly to his face that he
considered it necessary to offer the Armenian ex-Minister
“satisfaction.” There are letters extant referring to this and to
Nubar’s answer declining the hostile invitation.
There are some curious letters, too, which Gordon wrote about the time
of his arrival in London to Lady Burton, wife of Sir Richard Burton,
who, like himself, had quarrelled with the Foreign Office, giving his
opinion on the chief official personages at Cairo, and of those at home.
In one of these he says, 4th February 1880: “You write to an orb which
is setting or rather is set; I have no power to aid your husband in any
way. I went to F. O. to-day and, as you know, Lord Hammond is very ill.
Well, the people there were afraid of me, for I have written hard things
to them, and though they knew all, they would say nought. I said, ‘Who
is the personification of Foreign Office?’ They said, ‘Currie is.’ I saw
Currie, but he tried to evade my question, _i.e._, ‘Would F. O. do
anything to prevent the Soudan falling into chaos?’ It was no use. I
cornered him, and then he said, ‘I am merely a clerk to register letters
coming in and going out.’ So then I gave it up and marvelled. I must say
I was surprised to see such a thing, a great Government like ours
governed by men who dare not call their souls their own. Lord Hammond
rules them with a rod of iron. If your husband would understand that F.
O. is at present Lord Hammond, and he is ill, he would see that I can do
nothing. I have written letters to F. O. that would raise a corpse; it
is no good. I have threatened to go to the French Government about the
Soudan; it is no good.”
Again, from Lausanne, 12th March 1880: “Of course your husband failed
with Tewfik. I scent carrion a long way off and felt that the hour of my
departure from Egypt had come, so I left quietly. Instead of A (Ismaïl),
who was a good man, you have B (Tewfik), who may be good or bad as
events will allow him. B is the true son of A, but has the inexperience
of youth and may be smarter. The problem working out in the small brains
of Tewfik is this: ‘my father lost his throne because he scouted the
creditors; the Government only cared for the creditors; they did not
care for good government, so if I look after the creditors I may govern
the country as I like.’ No doubt Tewfik is mistaken, but these are his
views backed up by a ring of Pashas.”
And a month later from Paris: “I do not like or believe in Nubar. He is
my horror; for he had led the old ex-Khedive to his fall, though Nubar
owed him everything. When Ismaïl became Khedive, Nubar had £3 a month;
he now owns £1,000,000. Things will not and cannot go straight in Egypt;
and I would say, ‘Let them glide.’ Before long time elapses things will
come to a crisis. The best way is to let all minor affairs rest, and to
consider quietly how the ruin is to fall. It must fall ere long. United
Bulgaria—Austria; Syria—France; and Egypt—England. France would then
have as much interest in repelling Russia as we have. Supposing you got
out Riaz, why you would have Riaz’s brother; and if you got rid of the
latter, you would have Riaz’s nephew. _Le plus on change, le plus c’est
la même chose_. . . . Egypt is usurped by the family of the Sandjak of
Salonique, and (by our folly) we have added a ring of Circassian pashas.
The whole lot should go.”
These letters show what Gordon’s attitude was towards the Khedive Tewfik
and the regime of the Dual Control, and are useful as explaining how
impossible it seemed two and three years later at Cairo that he should
ever again be employed in the Khedivial service, or accept such were it
offered him. It was hardly better as between him and the Foreign Office.
His final quarrel with our diplomacy will be found narrated in an entry
of my diary of 1880 quoted in my “Secret History,” which tells the story
of Gordon’s correspondence with Lord Lyons at the Paris Embassy on his
way home to England. It was in regard to what he considered ought to be
done in the matter of appointing his successor at Khartoum, and this was
repeated at the Foreign Office on his arrival in London. Talking over
this episode of Gordon’s career with Sir Rivers Wilson recently (1910),
he repeated to me the story with more circumstantial details. At that
time, the spring of 1880, Wilson was in the habit of being consulted at
the Foreign Office on Egyptian matters; and he told me that on one
occasion he was sent for by Lord Salisbury, who was then Foreign
Secretary, and asked his opinion of Gordon in connection with some
proposals that had been made at the War Office for his re-employment.
Wilson, while Finance Minister at Cairo the year before, had come into
collision with Gordon, not personally but officially, and a number of
violent telegrams had passed between the two, Gordon being at Khartoum,
Wilson at Cairo. They had never met, and now both had left Egypt, and
both under an official cloud. Wilson, in spite of their quarrel and
though he considered Gordon wrong-headed and perverse, entertained a
high personal respect for him, and hearing of his arrival in London,
left a card on him at the hotel where he was lodging, and Gordon
returned the visit next morning, as he explained, “to apologize for the
rudeness of his telegrams.” Wilson on this occasion was much taken with
“the strange little unpretending man with eyes like blue diamonds,” and
had much conversation with him about the affairs of Egypt, in which both
were interested; he knew the common talk at the Foreign Office, where
Gordon was considered mad, and when a few days later Salisbury asked his
opinion about him, he understood at once what was in question, Gordon’s
sanity, and answered that though Gordon for all ordinary Foreign Office
work was officially “impossible,” nevertheless, if there were anything
exceptionally astonishing to do in a wild country, he was the man to do
it, as, for instance, to settle matters with Cetewayo, the Zulu
chieftain who was giving trouble in South Africa.[17] Nevertheless, the
idea of Gordon’s madness persisted at the Foreign Office, and he
remained unemployed either there or at the War Office as long as the
Tories were in power.
Gordon’s life for the next year was a series of abortive undertakings,
accepted in haste and repented of at leisure. On the formation of
Gladstone’s ministry of May 1880, Lord Ripon, having been appointed
Viceroy of India, offered him the post, a very important one, of going
with him as his official private secretary. The offer was made to him
through the instrumentality of Lord Northbrook, who had been in
correspondence with him about various matters during his own
Viceroyalty, and Gordon, under the idea that an entirely new departure
was about to be taken in India, according to those principles of justice
and self-government of which he approved, without well considering his
own unfitness for a post whose principal duties were essentially those
of conciliation, self-effacement, and the disguising of unpleasant
truths, in an ill-considered moment accepted. An interesting memorandum
will be found in the Appendix giving the true story of Gordon’s ideas at
starting with Lord Ripon, and the reason of his resignation within a few
days of their arrival at Bombay. It has never before, I believe, been
published. He had held the post barely a month.[18]
Three days later, 7th July, we find him embarked on a new adventure in
consequence of a telegram received from China, whither he had been
called by Sir Robert Hart to advise on a threatened quarrel between the
Chinese Emperor and the Emperor of Russia; and without delay he proceeds
thither, gives his advice for peace, which is sound and good, but
refuses to stay more than two days at Pekin, and, having come into
collision with our diplomacy at Tientsin, as he had before at Cairo, he
leaves once more for England, which he reaches 21st October. His
restless energy at this period seems to have had no bounds.
The same autumn saw him in the west of Ireland, whither he had gone “to
have a little shooting and satisfy himself on the state of the lower
classes.” Here again he was bent upon good work, and from Glengariff
addressed a memorandum to Lord Northbrook on the subject of settling the
land question on lines identical with those adopted in 1886, but so far
in advance of what Gladstone’s Government was as yet prepared for that
Downing Street became more than ever convinced that, as Sir E. Hamilton
wrote to me about it, “the writer did not seem to be clothed in the
rightest of minds.”[19] In February 1881 we find him offering his views
(quite sound ones) about Afghanistan to the “Times,” and about the art
of irregular warfare to the “Army and Navy Gazette.” In April he offers
his services to the Cape Government to assist in terminating the Basuto
war, and soon after, in May, wishing to serve a friend, he volunteers
for Mauritius. In July and September he addresses the Government on the
question of the Suez Canal, the route to India by the Cape, and the
uselessness of Malta and Gibraltar; and on the 24th of March 1882,
having received his promotion to the rank of General, he leaves
Mauritius for the Cape, where he accepts new service in Basutoland and
does good work. But again not for long; and the 14th of October sees him
once more in England—having again quarrelled with the Cape authorities.
The year had been one of constant activity and constant change, and of
that unconscious self-advertisement he reproached himself with later to
his sister as “Agag” or “hailing the tram of the world.”
It was at this time, during his short stay in London at the close of
1882, that I had the talk with him described at the beginning of this
volume. His personality, as I saw him then, remains very clear with me.
It is that of a little, quite unmilitary man, not specially
distinguished except for his clear gray-blue eyes, and his singularly
frank, unconventional manner. There was nothing in the smallest degree
assertive about him, or which could give a stranger the idea of his
being a leader of men, or a man accustomed to authority and importance
in the world. His conversation was pleasant without any special grace of
manner, and he impressed me principally with an appearance of extreme
natural goodness and honesty of speech. He had, what is often the case
with men of very superior understanding, a great humility in expressing
his opinion even about those things he knew the best. At the same time
he was quite able to maintain his own in argument, and had much wit and
pleasant humour in discussion. He seemed to take it for granted that the
person he was talking to was as good and honest as himself, and with as
good a right to an opinion. At that time, as far as my recollection
goes, he had no thought of ever returning to Egypt. He had quarrelled
too entirely with Tewfik and the Pashas, who composed the Khedivial
Court party under the restored regime, to think it possible. His mind
was set on a religious retreat in the Holy Land, and, if he had any
other plan beyond, it was to take service under King Leopold on the
Congo. It was one of his aberrations of intelligence to be constantly
deceived as to character, and he looked upon Leopold as an enlightened
prince, and his Congo scheme as a humanitarian enterprise for the
suppression of the slave trade.
Thus at the end of the year 1882, instead of going to Egypt he left
England for Jerusalem, and stayed on in its neighbourhood for nearly the
whole of 1883. This was the most mystical part of his life, and has been
fully dealt with in various semi-religious works. I confess that it is
difficult for any one who is not himself a mystic to read these without
a suspicion that on this one point Gordon was at this time less than
entirely sane. His great object in visiting the Holy Land was to re-read
the Bible, which had been his constant study all his life, on the spot
where so many of the events recorded in it happened. He had convinced
himself that by prayer and study every riddle contained in the Book
could be made clear down to the smallest historical and geographical
allusions, hence his time was devoted to localizing the various biblical
events, and reconciling difficulties by solutions, which he considered
to be inspired as he read. This led him sometimes into a labyrinth of
impossibilities, which he nevertheless clung to and expounded in his
letters to his friends, and not to his religious friends only, or to his
sister, though these were the chief recipients of his confidences, but
to some whom one would have thought entirely outside the category of
those to whom such could possibly be made. One of them may be quoted as
showing how far he was from the track of ordinary reason about the
physical facts of the modern world we know. It might have been written
by a recluse of the sixth century, while it was addressed to one no less
a Gallio about spiritual things than the late Sir Richard Burton. Gordon
had been trying to identify the respective sites of the Garden of Eden
and of Ararat, where Noah’s Ark rested, with other points of biblical
geography, which he thought might interest Burton as a geographer and
Oriental scholar. “My idea,” he says, writing from Jerusalem, June 3,
1883, “is that the Pison is the Blue Nile, and that the sons of Joktan
were at Harrar, Abyssinian Godjam, but it is not well supported. The
rock of Harrar was the platform Adam was moulded on out of clay from the
Potters’ Field. He was then put in Seychelles, Eden, and after the Fall,
brought back to Mount Moriah to till the ground in the place he was
taken from. Noah built the ark twelve miles from Jaffa at Aïn Judeh; the
Flood began, the Ark floated up and rested on Mount Baris, afterwards
Antonia; he sacrificed on the Rock (Adam was buried on Skull Hill, hence
the skull under the Cross). It was only 776 A.D. that Mount Ararat of
Armenia became the site of the Ark’s descent. Koràn says El Judi
(Ararat) is holy land. After the Flood the remnants went East to plain
of Shimar. Had they gone East from El Judi, near Mosul, or from Armenian
Ararat they could never have reached Shimar. Shem was Melchizedek.” Was
ever serious letter written to so mocking a reader?
The question of Gordon’s religious monomania is a difficult one to
handle. In treating it, it is hardly possible not to do violence to what
is sacred to us all, our beliefs, avowed or unavowed, in the
supernatural. There are very few who in their hearts do not hold and
cling to beliefs quite contrary to reason, and who do not attach to
their own personalities an importance in the immensity of things they
cannot at all deserve. Who then of us has a right to say of his fellow
that he is less than reasonable because he believes this or that
doctrine of his relations with the unseen more strongly than the rest?
Gordon was not singular among Englishmen, even in our unbelieving day,
in his thought that God had created him for a special purpose in the
world—it is indeed the foundation of all Christian doctrine—nor is it
easy to argue that the logical deduction he drew from it that God,
having so created him, was also in constant communication with him,
inspiring him with a daily knowledge how to fulfil that purpose, was
other than a sane one. Nevertheless we cannot leave out of account this
feature of the position if we are to consider the public case, which we
are now fast approaching. The truth would seem to be that his year at
Jerusalem was for him, if I may use an expression theologians would not
I think condemn, a complete religious debauch which left him more than
ever the prey of his own visions, a puppet in the hands of his imagined
duty to do this or that for God, he knew not what, which God should
presently reveal to him. He was waiting for a call. His letters that
year to his sister and to Doctor Barnes, a friend of the same school of
pietism as his own, give indications of this. Under Doctor Barnes’
influence he had during the past two years shifted somewhat his position
in regard to the Church of England, of which he was not before a
professed member. He had never been confirmed, but he now became a
regular communicant, even adopting the doctrine of transubstantiation,
or at any rate of there being supernatural elements in the sacrament of
bread and wine. His letters are full of this. He corresponded, too,
while at Jerusalem with English Church dignitaries, and through Doctor
Barnes became intimate with Bishop Temple, and in this way the aspect of
his religious mind, which before had been extremely eclectic, became
more definitely that of orthodox English Christianity.
Of what the future was to bring him he wrote little, but there are
several letters of his about Egypt which are of interest and may be
given here.
These are to his sister:
“28 _February_ 1883.—Wonderful are the works of God in the Soudan! Look
at His work. He has upset the Egyptian people thoroughly, and they will
get their liberty from the oppressing Pachas. He has permitted this
revolt, which will end, I believe, in the suppression of the slave trade
and slave-holding, and He has humbled _me_. I will speak about myself
for one moment. I foresaw the Egyptian and Soudan affair, and was not
listened to. I am glad I was humiliated, for the things of this world
will pass away. I expect Laurence Oliphant will go to the Soudan; there
will be no end of trouble to reconquer it, and I am sorely tempted to
write Lord Dufferin my ideas; but I will not, for Jesus is Lord and He
knows what to do.”
“3 _March_ 1883.—I have great comfort in thinking that our Lord rules
every petty and great event of life both on a small and large scale.
Therefore He governs the Soudan now through A., B., and C., as much as
he did when I was there, and neither I, nor A., B., and C., have or had
anything to do with the Government, as far as others were concerned.
With respect to the motives of our actions, it is another matter; they
are the permanent residues—the things unseen. This comforts me, for I
feel that their welfare, and the course of events that takes place, are
being conducted by the same hand, whether I am there or not.”
“13 _March_.—. . . I am quite quiet about the Cape and the Soudan; my
sympathies are with the people of those countries and not with the
Turkish Pashas whom our Government will try and replace. Good will come
of it.”
To me he wrote: “_April_ 3, 1883.—I am living quietly enough here and do
not hear anything from Egypt. I expect Arabi will be back there in a
year or so. Some of the officers from Egypt have been here. I do not
think that it will be a favourite station for the army. I expect that
the only man who can, humanly speaking, give quiet to Egypt and some
hope of our benefiting the people is Nubar. He is the sort of man who
could work with Arabi, and I think the trials he has gone through have
benefited him. It is very quiet here, and one can live undisturbed,
which is a great comfort. Government ought to get Tewfik’s deposition
cancelled by the new House, for it has not been so at present.”
Again to his sister:
“16 _April_ 1883.—I am at work from morning to night. As for Egypt and
the Cape, I no more care for them; and Lord Dufferin’s despatch shows
that, even had I gone out, it would have been another fiasco.”
“7 _May_ 1883.—. . . I had a letter from Egypt which is not very
sanguine about the state of affairs, all because our Government will not
say they will stay; yet stay they must, whether they like it or not.”
On the 15th August, when the difficulty of General Hicks’ position in
the Soudan became known to him, he wrote: “If they do not make Nubar
Pasha prime minister or regent in Egypt they will have trouble, as he is
the only man who can rule that country. . . . Unless Hicks is given
supreme power he is lost, it can never work putting him in a subordinate
position, recent events at Cairo show what dependence can be placed upon
the Pashas. . . . Hicks must be made Governor General, otherwise he will
never end things satisfactorily.” On 2nd September he writes to Laurence
Oliphant, then at Haifa: “Her Majesty’s Government right or wrong will
not take a decided line in re Egypt and the Soudan, they drift but at
the same time cannot avoid the onus of being the real power in Egypt
with the corresponding advantage of being so. It is undoubtedly the fact
that they maintain Tewfik and the Pashas in power against the will of
the people. This alone is insufferable from disgusting the people, to
whom also Her Majesty’s Government have given no inducement to make
themselves popular. Their present action is a dangerous one, for without
any advantage over the Canal or to England, they keep a running sore
open with France and are acting in a way which will justify Russia to
act in a similar way in Armenia, and Austria in Salonica. Further than
that, Her Majesty’s Government must eventually gain the odium which will
fall upon them when the interest of the debt fails to be paid, which
will soon be the case. Also, Her Majesty’s Government cannot possibly
avoid the responsibility for the state of affairs in the Soudan, where a
wretched war drags on in a ruined country, at a cost of half a million
per annum, at least.
“I say therefore to avoid all this, if Her Majesty’s Government will not
act firmly and strongly and take the country (which, if I were they, I
would not do), let them attempt to get the Palestine Canal made and quit
Egypt to work out its own salvation. In doing so lots of anarchy will
take place. This anarchy is inseparable from a peaceful solution; it is
the travail in birth. Her Majesty’s Government do not prevent anarchy
now; therefore, better leave the country and thus avoid a responsibility
which gives no advantage and is mean and dangerous.”
“15 _September_ 1883.—If the Palestine canal is made we shall abandon
Egypt, which will then get self government, and will succeed under God’s
blessing, for He has a blessing for it.”
“28 _September_ 1883.—. . . Graham (Sir Gerald) writes from Egypt that
he is likely to go there at the end of the year: that looks as though we
should evacuate it. I like watching how God governs all things there; He
acts to us as we act to others.”
“25 _November_ 1883.—. . . As for the Soudan, I am much interested, but
should feel repugnance to going back there; and that is a great gain,
for I had a sneaking desire to return there, when I first came out here.
As for the Congo, I have not much choice left me.”
The Palestine Canal, to which he alludes, was a somewhat fanciful scheme
much talked of at the time by which the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea
were to be inundated and transformed into a long narrow lake, united at
the one end with the Mediterranean by a cutting at Haifa, and at the
other end with the Red Sea at Akabah. It interested Gordon principally
because he looked upon it as the possible fulfilment of Ezekiel’s
prophecy, “Their fish [_i.e._, of the Dead Sea] shall be according to
their kinds as the fish of the great sea [Mediterranean] and it shall
come to pass that the fishers shall stand upon it from En-Gedi even unto
En-Eglaim; they shall be a place to spread forth nets.” He also looked
upon it as a possible alternative route to the Suez Canal, which was the
excuse of our having occupied Egypt. “Anything,” he says about the
scheme, “is better than the wretched want of sympathy between us and the
Egyptians, which is now daily increasing into a deadly hate. We must
have a nemesis unless we show more sympathy. What single good thing have
we done the people? . . . Our Government will never get out of Egypt,
for the Europeans there will thwart any reform.”
These quotations are of some value as an indication of what his policy
was for Egypt as well as the Soudan, immediately previous to his
employment by the British Government there. As will be seen in the next
chapter, they must already to some extent have had their influence at
the Foreign Office. His thoughts, however, were but little connected
with Egypt. It was not to Egypt but to the Congo that he intended to
proceed, and it was in obedience to a summons from King Leopold at the
end of the year that, waking out of his long religious trance, he
returned to Europe. His first visit was to Brussels, and only after he
had arranged things there with Leopold did he go on, on the 7th of
January 1884, to his sister’s house at Southampton.
CHAPTER V
GORDON’S LAST MISSION
THE problem of how, notwithstanding Gordon’s well-known views about the
Soudan and Egypt, and the recollection of his past conflicts with our
diplomacy both at Cairo and in Downing Street, and the belief
entertained there of his madness, he came to be once more employed by
Gladstone’s Government, and sent to Khartoum on a mission ostensibly not
of his own choosing, and then left to perish, is one of perennial
interest, which history has not yet finally solved. It has been
variously dealt with by official apologists as well as by Gordon’s
friends. Morley has given an authoritative version of it in his “Life of
Gladstone,” Fitzmaurice another in his “Life of Granville,” and Cromer
yet a third in his “Modern Egypt”; but they none of them agree; while
opposed to them we have Sir Henry Gordon’s and Egmont Hake’s narratives,
supplemented by Stead’s account of his own part in it, and no few other
annalists who each has added his contribution to the general knowledge.
Above all we have Gordon’s own diary at Khartoum, and we have the Blue
Books, a body of official information bulkier, perhaps, than that
concerning any individual ever employed by the British Government since
Blue Books were first published. Nevertheless I doubt if the whole truth
has yet been told, or the real reasons given, or the responsibility of
failure placed quite on the right shoulders. I will endeavour to supply
the lacking evidence and reconcile the various narratives.
The first official suggestion of Gordon’s re-employment in Egypt seems
to have been due to Sir Charles Wilson, that excellent engineer officer
who, it will be remembered (see “Secret History”) did such good service
to Egypt and the cause of justice at the time of Arabi’s trial. Wilson
was at that time very closely in Lord Dufferin’s confidence, having
served under him as perambulating Consul-General for some years in Asia
Minor; and, being a personal friend and fellow officer of Gordon’s and
better acquainted than any Englishman then at Cairo with Soudanese
affairs, he was consulted by Dufferin on the subject as soon as the
latter arrived in Egypt. The result was a despatch, dated 18th November
1882, in which, after repeating Wilson’s opinion, Dufferin adds: “It can
be understood that the Khedive should be unwilling to abandon a country
with such possibilities of development; and it is probable that, if only
some person like Colonel Gordon could be found to undertake its
administration, fairly good government might be maintained there without
drawing upon Egypt either for men or money. Colonel Gordon I believe has
already broken up and disorganized in a great measure the former centres
of the slave traffic, and the same energy and ability which has gone so
near to effecting this difficult task ought to be sufficient to keep the
country in order.”
Although, as already explained, I do not believe that at that date, and
apart from a change of Khedive and a reconstruction of the National
party at Cairo, Gordon could have effected any permanent settlement of
the Soudan trouble unsupported by an adequate military force from
without, there was still a chance that something of the sort might have
succeeded.
It is just possible that, if Gordon had been sent at once to Khartoum,
and that if, as was being talked of at the end of the year 1882, Wilson
had succeeded Malet at Cairo, and a Nationalist Ministry been
reinstated, even under Tewfik, Gordon might have succeeded in
reconstituting an effective government at Khartoum in opposition to the
Mahdi, though I doubt it for the reasons already given. At any rate the
suggestion was not adopted—it is probable that Riaz and the other Pashas
of the restored regime opposed it[20]—and nothing more came of it than
the sending of Colonel D. H. Stewart to Khartoum “to report,” and a
little later, January 1883, to an offer made by Dufferin to Wilson that
he should himself go to Khartoum as Governor-General. Wilson, I think,
wisely declined this, for it was already too late; and on his refusal
Hicks was entrusted with the thankless task, with the result we have
seen.
Stewart’s report of affairs on arrival at Khartoum proved of the most
pessimistic kind. He placed the Mahdi’s followers at 338,000 men, and
recommended the abandonment of the southern and eastern provinces to
their own chiefs, and Darfour to its original Royal Family. He
pronounced the Egyptians “quite unfit in every way to undertake such a
trust as the government of so vast a country with a view to its
welfare”—and in opposition to Wilson, who believed in the Soudan as a
country of great prospective wealth, he pronounced it to be a financial
burden on Egypt hardly worth retaining.
While mentioning the names of these two distinguished officers, Wilson
and Stewart, who were destined to play each of them a tragic part in the
coming drama of Gordon’s defence of Khartoum, I will say what I remember
of them personally, for it so happened that I met them both at Aleppo in
the summer of 1881. They were travelling together at the time, employed
on special service as consuls in Asia Minor, under the terms of the
Cyprus Convention, and they were both staying, as I was, for some days
in the house of the British Consul. They were men of very different
types and characters. Wilson shared many of Gordon’s characteristics. He
was a serious man, with a large knowledge of the East, and much sympathy
with its peoples, altogether humane and lovable. Like Gordon, he was a
biblical scholar and greatly interested in the topography of such of the
lands in which he travelled as were connected with the Old and New
Testaments. He had served with Palmer and others on the Palestine
Exploration Staff, and was full of learning on the subjects that
interested him. After our meeting at Aleppo he travelled with us to
Scanderoon, and on by sea as far as Smyrna, where we parted company. I
have always retained a very pleasant recollection of him and a high
respect for his character. Stewart, on the other hand, though also a
hard worker and a man of ability, was of a quite different type. He was
a smart young cavalry captain of Hussars, the 11th, with all the
ordinary English officer’s contempt for “natives” and inability to deal
courteously with them. Though I found him an excellent fellow in other
ways, our ideas on the East differed entirely. He was all for the
extension of English authority, and had little sympathy with Orientals.
He was desirous, at the moment, of visiting the Anazeh tribes, from some
of which I had just come, and I gave him letters to two or three of the
leading Anazeh Sheykhs, my friends. But he, after gallopping about the
desert for some weeks with a Turkish escort, gave up his attempt, having
failed to get into pleasant relations with any of them; they “were all,”
he explained to me, “such rogues and liars.” I judge his character by
this. He was a good, active, fearless young Englishman, with all our
English virtues, but too little fellow feeling with ways not English to
succeed in inspiring Eastern confidence. In one of his dispatches from
Khartoum he expresses his “contempt and disgust” for what he holds to be
the “cowardice” of the poor exiled Arabist soldiers at Khartoum, sent to
die in a cause they abhorred. He could not understand their
unwillingness as soldiers to fight.
Lord Cromer’s high opinion of Stewart was justified by the fact that
both in their separate ways were typical of our English intolerance of
Oriental character, and one needs no other explanation than this to
understand how it was that Stewart and Gordon failed to pull together.
Stewart’s death by treachery at Arab hands was one of the minor
tragedies of the Nile campaign. His report, nevertheless, of February
1883, was an able one, and had considerable influence on Soudanese
policy. Dufferin, in his own report, written about the same time as
Stewart’s, adopts more than one of his ideas, and though Dufferin takes
a far more cheerful view of the situation, as was natural in a man of
his hopeful Irish nature, he recommends with Stewart the abandonment of
the western provinces. “Some persons,” says Dufferin, “are inclined to
advise Egypt to withdraw altogether from the Soudan and her other
acquisitions in that region. But she can hardly be expected to acquiesce
in such a policy. Possessing the lower ranges of the Nile, she is
naturally inclined to claim dominion along its entire course; and when
it is remembered that the territories in question, if properly
developed, are capable of producing inexhaustible supplies of sugar and
cotton, we cannot be surprised at her unwillingness to abandon them.
Unhappily, Egyptian administration in the Soudan has been almost
uniformly unfortunate. The success of the present Mahdi . . . is a
sufficient proof of the Government’s inability either to reconcile the
inhabitants to its rule or to maintain order. The consequences have been
most disastrous.” He then goes on to say that he places high hopes on
General Hicks, who has just been appointed Chief of the Staff at
Khartoum, and to suggest the construction of a Souakin to Berber
railway, which would “change all the elements of the problem. . . . The
finances of the Soudan once rehabilitated . . . commerce would
eventually extend the blessings of civilization for some distance
through the surrounding region. I apprehend, however,” he concludes,
“that it would be wise upon the part of Egypt to abandon Darfur, and
perhaps Kordofan, and to be content with maintaining her jurisdiction in
the provinces of Khartoum and Senaar.”
This part of the report, we know from Wilson’s biographer, was
practically Wilson’s own; and we know also that Wilson and Gordon were
at one on the subject, and there can be little doubt that, if Dufferin
had had full power at the date of his report to deal with the Soudan,
and if Wilson had gone there, such would have been his instructions. As
it was, the Foreign Office resolved on doing nothing, and Hicks was left
unaided and undirected. It was not till nine months later that the
question of either Wilson or Gordon was brought forward by Lord
Granville. It came about in this way.
In the fortnight immediately following the news of Hicks’s disaster,
Gordon, who had powerful friends both at Cairo, in Sir Charles Watson
and Sir Evelyn Wood, and at the War Office, in Lord Wolseley and
Reginald Brett (Lord Esher), had his name brought forward, whether
consciously or unconsciously I am not sure, in official circles as a
possible saviour of what was now an almost hopeless situation at
Khartoum. At the War Office it was known that Gordon, though he
considered himself engaged to King Leopold for the Congo, would not in
his secret heart be otherwise than glad to take the affairs of the
Soudan once more in hand. He was beginning to chafe at his long inaction
in the Holy Land, and had a longing for his old life of active
employment; and, at the suggestion probably of Hartington, and perhaps
also of Northbrook, with whom Gordon was in occasional correspondence,
Lord Granville, so we are informed by Fitzmaurice, wrote to Gladstone,
27th November: “Do you see any objection to using Gordon in some way? He
has an immense name in Egypt, he is popular at home, he is a strong but
very sensible opponent of slavery, he has a small bee in his bonnet. If
you do not object I could consult Baring by telegraph.” To this
Gladstone consented, and the telegram, which appears in the Blue Books,
was dispatched to Cromer, 1st December: “If General Charles Gordon were
willing to go to Egypt would he be of any use to you or to the Egyptian
Government, and if so in what capacity?” Cromer, however, without
ceremony refused the offer. He explains in “Modern Egypt” that his real
reason for refusing was that he knew Gordon to be an entirely unfit
person for the task, and that the reason he gave at the time of the
Egyptian Government’s being unwilling to send a Christian to Khartoum,
in view of the religious feeling there, was not the true one; and he
proceeds to give his reasons, founded on his knowledge of Gordon’s
character, for his belief in the unfitness, though he says nothing of
their personal quarrel in 1878, or of the ill-relations in past years
between Gordon and Tewfik.
It is certain all the same that Gordon’s status as a Christian was a
perfectly sound reason with Sherif for refusing his appointment, as
Gordon himself discovered when it was too late, three months afterwards.
And I cannot help suspecting that the whole plea of personal
“unfitness,” put forward in “Modern Egypt,” has been an afterthought on
Cromer’s part, devised to screen his own share in Gordon’s mission and
its failure. That Cromer and Gordon were personally antipathetic we
know. But, except as a Christian, it is nonsense to talk of Gordon as an
“unfit” person for such a duty as was then proposed. It had not at that
time been as yet decided that Khartoum was to be evacuated, and no
Englishman could have possibly been more fit than Gordon to hold it, if
that was possible, against the Mahdi, and restore the Khedive’s lost
authority. What Gordon was really unfit for, was to be the obedient
agent of a shifty and treacherous diplomacy, nominally a servant of
Egypt, but ready to execute any order of the British Agency at Cairo,
and to defend or betray his Egyptian employers at English bidding.
Cromer’s idea of loyalty and fitness for service in Egypt was always
that of loyalty to himself. Gordon’s was a quite different idea. He held
that an Englishman, accepting employment and receiving pay from a
foreign prince, was bound in honour to do the best he could, not for his
own country’s diplomatic interests, but for the advantage of the prince
and people he served. If Cromer had told us the whole of his thought in
“Modern Egypt,” we should have found it to be this, and that it was in
this sense only, and of his own personal dislike that his objection to
Gordon on the ground of “unfitness” must be understood.
Still less is there any truth in what he goes on to say that at this
time, December 1883, his hand was forced about Gordon by the London
press, and especially the “Pall Mall Gazette”; for such is the reverse
of fact and easily disproved. Any one who will take the trouble of
looking through the files of the chief London newspapers of that date
will find hardly any mention in them at all of Gordon. Indeed, the press
seems to have been quite ignorant of the proposal made regarding him.
During the whole of that year, 1883, Gordon had been all but ignored by
the English public; and, with the exception of two “headed articles” in
the “Times,” written early in the year while Dufferin was still
considering the appointment of Hicks, and one or two references to
Gordon in the “St. James’s Gazette,” I can find absolutely nothing about
him. As to the “Pall Mall,” that paper was on all matters where Egypt
was concerned run strictly on Gladstonian lines, advocating the
evacuation of the country at the earliest possible date, and with regard
to the Soudan complete abstention. All the earlier part of the year
Morley had been still its editor; and he, having experienced a revulsion
of feeling in regard to the attitude his paper had taken in bringing
about the war of 1882, was now in a mood of anti-Imperialist repentance,
nor had the “Pall Mall” changed its tone when Morley, having entered
Parliament, left his desk in Northumberland Street at the end of August.
William Stead, the new editor, who four months later was to run Gordon
for the Soudan, and be the chief advocate of accepting responsibility in
Egypt, was still in October reproving the Tory press for this very
advocacy, and indignant with the “Times” for its protest against the
withdrawal of the troops. As to Gordon, the only mention of him is one
rather of depreciation, written at the time of the first news of Hicks’
defeat, and the article might have emanated from the pen of Lord Cromer
himself; “Sir Samuel Baker,” says Stead in a leading article, 20th
November, on the disaster in Kordofan, “fought and conquered in the same
region, and it was also the scene of the labours of Colonel Gordon, but
although we should have lamented the fate of either of these daring
adventurers, no one dreamed that their defeat and death would have
entailed any responsibility upon the English Government. The fact that
since Gordon’s resignation we have occupied the Delta makes no
difference in our relation to the officers in command of the Egyptian
forces in the Soudan. Whether Hicks falls, or whether he conquers is not
our business. _Not a single British soldier will be ordered to Khartoum
if the Mahdi were to rout the whole force under the orders of the
Khedive’s officers_. . . . The question arises whether Sir E. Baring
ought not to tell the Egyptian Government that this kind of folly has
gone on long enough, and that there would be no chance of the re-
establishment of its prestige, credit, and independence, until its
ambition in the Soudan is restricted within a manageable compass.”
This article, be it noted, was published just a week before Granville’s
proposal to send Gordon, and, while it stands in strange contrast with
Stead’s pronouncements of two and three months later, it contradicts
absolutely Lord Cromer’s excuse that the sending of Gordon was forced on
the Government by Stead. It is a mere juggling with the issue to shift
the date of the pressure exercised by the press in January and February,
1884, back to November and December 1883. I will return to this matter
of the “Pall Mall” and the London press later. What is of more
historical importance is to show, as can easily be done by a reference
to the Blue Books and to his own avowals, that Cromer, in spite of his
attempt to shift the responsibility of the Gordon mission from his own
on to the back of the London public, was himself, in all but the
individual choice of Gordon as its instrument, the responsible proposer
of the mission. The facts are these:
Lord Cromer tells us that his first anxiety about Hicks and the Soudan
was in consequence of a talk with Giegler Pasha on 19th November, the
day before the article last quoted. Giegler seems to have infected
Cromer with something of the panic at that time beginning to prevail at
Khartoum; and, taking as he did a purely financial view of the
situation, he straightway telegraphed to Granville that, if Hicks should
be beaten, “the wisest course for the Egyptian Government to adopt would
be to accept defeat and fall back on whatever point of the Nile they
could hold with confidence.” There is nothing, however, to show that at
that time he meant more by this advice than to repeat Dufferin’s
recommendation of a withdrawal from the southern and western provinces,
and a concentration on Khartoum and Suakin. Indeed I think it is pretty
clear that it was so understood at the Foreign Office when Granville the
next day replied, “If consulted, recommend the abandonment of the Soudan
_within certain limits_.” It was then that the idea of Gordon’s being
sent was suggested; and certainly if an Englishman was to go in order to
carry out the abandonment Gordon was the obvious man. There was, indeed,
nobody else to do it with anything like as good a chance of success. The
only English officer then at Khartoum was Colonel Coetlogon, an
acknowledged incapable, who had telegraphed that Khartoum could not hold
out two months against the Mahdi, while Gordon, though not dispatched
till January, and though ultimately unsuccessful, managed by his great
energy and military genius to keep the Egyptian flag flying at Khartoum
for nearly twelve months after Coetlogon’s date. Yet Cromer in his
“Modern Egypt” says he judged Gordon for this purpose, “an unfit
person.” The next stage in the affair is that, the panic at Khartoum
still continuing, Cromer on the 3rd December writes a long dispatch,
still under the influence of the panic, recommending a withdrawal of the
Egyptian garrisons, not only to Khartoum or Berber, but even as far as
to Wady Halfa, thus abandoning the Soudan in its entirety. It was
probably Coetlogon’s continued telegrams that suggested it, and the
unwillingness of the English Government to give any material assistance.
And to this proposal Granville, on 13th December, at once assents,
explaining that all the English Government is prepared to do is to
“assist in maintaining order in Egypt proper, and in defending it as
well as the ports in the Red Sea.”
By the 22nd December, however, we find Cromer in a different mood. He
had found the Egyptian Government unable to “agree to the abandonment of
the territories which they consider absolutely necessary for the
security and even for the existence itself” of Egypt, and they were for
invoking the aid of the Sultan and of Turkish troops. Moreover, the
reports from Khartoum had begun to be less alarming; the Mahdi had not
advanced to attack the place, and was lingering on at El Obeyd. Although
Cromer does not say so precisely in his despatch of that date (22nd
December), it is easy to read between the lines of it that the idea had
occurred to him that, while insisting upon the abandonment of the whole
Soudan by Egypt, it might be possible not to surrender it to the Mahdi,
but to build up some other form of native self-government, under English
direction at Khartoum, which should constitute a semi-civilized buffer
state between Egypt and the Mahdi’s fanatical rule. The idea of this is
to be found in the last sentences of his despatch, where, after
recounting the difficulties attendant on the proposed withdrawal and the
objections raised by Sherif Pasha, he goes on, in contradiction of his
first alarmist dispatches: “The immediate position is not, I think, so
alarming as appears to be thought in England. Dissensions seem to be
rife among the tribes of the Soudan, some of the most important being
opposed to the Mahdi. It is quite possible that by a judicious
expenditure of money and by good management the Government of the
Khedive may succeed in maintaining its authority northwards from
Khartoum. They will not, however, be able to hold that country except on
sufferance, and I believe them to be perfectly incapable of governing it
properly.” Therefore they must be coerced into abandoning it, and he
asks for power to coerce them. “The only way,” he says, “in which it can
be carried out, will be for me to inform the Khedive that Her Majesty’s
Government insist on the adoption of this course, and that if his
present Ministers will not carry out the policy others must be named who
will consent to do so.” Then he adds, disclosing here his thought: “_It
would also be necessary to send an English officer of high authority to
Khartoum with full power to withdraw the garrisons and to make the best
arrangements possible for the future government of that country_.”
I recommend this dispatch to the renewed attention of historians, for in
it lies not only the demand for new absolute powers to be undertaken by
England in Egypt, but also in regard to the Soudan, the germ of that
claim, afterwards enforced upon the Khedive in 1899, that Egypt should
abandon the Soudan, leaving it to England to decide what later should be
its status. The Egyptian Government was to withdraw its troops, but “an
English officer of high authority” was to be sent to Khartoum, not only
to insist upon the withdrawal, but also to provide the Soudan with a new
government. One cannot help thinking that Cromer may have already
contemplated what he afterwards carried out, the appropriation of the
great Nile provinces to England herself.
At any rate it is quite certain that we see in this dispatch of 22nd
December clearly set forth what was to be the Gordon mission, though
Gordon himself is not named in it. An English officer was to go to
Khartoum not only to bring away the garrison, as was afterwards
pretended, but to re-establish order and set up a new political regime.
It is characteristic of Cromer’s lack of scruple as a historian that, in
order to evade admitting his initial responsibility for the mission and
for its failure, he should have omitted, in quoting the concluding
sentence of this dispatch in “Modern Egypt,” the essential word
“English,” and should have altered it into “an officer of high
authority,” thereby enabling him to make it appear that it was not
Gordon or any Englishman, but an Egyptian officer he had in his mind
when writing it. The omission can hardly have been an accident in a
passage so important. Yet none of his critics so far have noticed the
manœuvre.[21]
This brings us to the end of the year 1883, and almost to the date, 7th
January 1884, of Gordon’s arrival from Palestine in England; and again I
beg the attention of historians to what I am now going to say.
The particular choice of Gordon for the mission Cromer had proposed,
though as we have seen his name had been more than once talked of at the
Foreign Office, would probably never have been actually made and
insisted on but for a combination of chances closely connected with a
Cabinet intrigue just then coming to a head in London. Down to the end
of the year 1883 nobody was thinking at all of Gordon in connection with
actual circumstances in the Soudan, nor was anything known of Cromer’s
proposal. Gordon had been away close on a year in Palestine, and had
kept silence, an unusual thing with him, during the whole of it as far
as the press was concerned. Not a dozen persons in England knew of his
being on his way back to Europe, and his few friends at head-quarters
looked upon him as being engaged to King Leopold for service on the
Congo, and so out of the question for Khartoum—this although they knew
also that the idea of the Soudan was once more present to his mind,
since the defeat of Hicks, as a possibility and a temptation for his
ambition. He had written to Wolseley to get him leave at the War Office
to enter Leopold’s service, and on landing at Genoa had gone straight to
Brussels, there to arrange terms with the King about the Congo. Except
for a few reviews of Hake’s book “Chinese Gordon,” which had been
published at Christmas time, I can find nothing about him in any of the
London newspapers. And so things stood at the end of the year.
It would be a curious matter to speculate what might have been the
respective fates of the Nile population and those of the Congo if
Gordon’s contract, then all but signed, with Leopold had been carried
into effect. It would probably have been for the welfare, or, let us
say, the lesser suffering of both. It is difficult to think of the Congo
venture taking the inhuman shape it did had Gordon ever had personally
to do with it, and had he been left alive to protest against a violation
of human rights so monstrous; while, on the other hand, the Egyptian
Soudan might have been spared the destruction of four-fifths of its
inhabitants at the blundering hands of our Government, and its present
melancholy subjection to European rule. Chance, however, or whatever
directs the destinies for good and evil in the world, ruled it
otherwise, and Gordon, turned aside from the Congo, was to meet his
fate, not there, but upon the Upper Nile, while the Congo was to become
the scene of still greater horrors. Whose the hands were exactly that
pulled the strings in the affair and sent him to his doom, and what was
the relative amount of responsibility assignable to each of the chief
actors, with the mystery of their secret motives, I have been at great
pains to ascertain. This is how the thing, when carefully examined,
appears to have come about.
Gordon’s return to Europe, as I have said, coincided very exactly with a
crisis both in London and at Cairo closely connected with the mission he
was a few days later to be entrusted with. Gladstone’s Cabinet had, at
Cromer’s suggestion, agreed that the Khedive’s Government should be
advised to evacuate the whole Soudan as far north as Wady Halfa, and the
Khedive and Sherif Pasha, his Prime Minister, had refused, and Cromer
had asked permission to add threats to advice, and to insist upon the
advice being taken. The request involved an entire change in Gladstone’s
Egyptian policy, which had, so far, been to assume a minimum of
governing responsibility in Egypt proper, and none at all in the Soudan.
On this point, however, he no longer could count upon a clear majority
in his Cabinet, and parties within it were so evenly balanced that, as
is usual in such cases, the London press was being called in to add
weight to opinion on either side.
Moreover, the press being largely in the hands of capitalists and City
financiers, it was happening, as is also usual in such cases, that the
balance of journalistic opinion, directly it came to understand the
position in the Cabinet, was as largely on the side where money
interests were involved. These lay strongly with the continuation of the
British occupation of Egypt, and with the undertaking by England, where
the chance should be given, of new responsibilities. The house of
Rothschild still held half the Domains Loan of £9,000,000 in its own
hands, and the “Times” was its obedient organ. It needed therefore only
a slight impulse from the War Office, which was the head-quarters of the
faction opposed to Gladstone, to set the press in motion on the Soudan
question; and on the first day of the year 1884, we find the “Times”
publishing a strong letter from Sir Samuel Baker protesting against the
abandonment of the Soudan by civilization, and urging the employment of
British or Indian troops for the purpose of recovering it from the
Mahdi. It was a powerful letter, and we find it supported by a leading
article, as strongly recommending the assumption of full authority by
England at Cairo and citing with regard to the Soudan the Dufferin
recommendation of the year before, namely that, while Darfour and
Kordofan might be abandoned, Khartoum and the northern and eastern
provinces should be retained, that troops should be sent to Assouan, and
that communication with the Red Sea should be reopened by the
construction of a railway from Berber to Souakin. This was not only the
Dufferin but also the Gordon policy, as was well known both to Samuel
Baker and to those who inspired the “Times.” Baker was interested in the
Soudan both by his former connection with it and by the fact that his
brother Valentine (Baker Pasha) had just been ordered to Souakin to
defend the Red Sea coast against Osman Digna the new Mahdist leader. In
Baker’s letter to the “Times” occurs the first public suggestion I can
find of Gordon’s being employed by the Government to solve the
difficulty at Khartoum. It is not repeated in the “Times” article, nor
is it more than a question “Why should not General Gordon Pasha be
invited to assist the Government?”
Two days later, a Cabinet meeting being about to be held where the fate
of the new policy of Egypt was to be decided, we find the “Pall Mall
Gazette” yielding to the same influence and announcing its sudden
conversion from the evacuationist Gladstonian view of Egyptian policy,
of which it had been so stout and consistent a supporter, to that of
Gladstone’s political opponents in the Cabinet. It opened its campaign
by publishing the first of a series of leading articles on the crisis,
issued on consecutive days and headed respectively, “Facing a Crisis,”
“The Alternatives,” “Downing Street and Cairo,” and “The Drift of Events
in Egypt.” All were sensational articles, and all in favour of the full
authority in Egypt Cromer was demanding, namely, that of enabling him to
coerce the Khedive, take the supreme power at Cairo into his own hands
and assume sole responsibility in regard to the Soudan.
No one, I think, with any knowledge of journalism can doubt that a
conversion so sudden and so violent can have been due to anything less
than a Ministerial hint of the very directest kind. The decision of the
Cabinet to undertake the new responsibility at Cairo was come to on the
3rd January, the date of the first “Pall Mall Gazette” article, but it
was not known to the general public till the 7th, the date of the fourth
article, and so must have been the result of private information from
within the Cabinet, probably from the War Office and communicated by
Brett, who was Hartington’s private secretary and his usual intermediary
with the press, besides being an old member of the “Pall Mall”
staff.[22] There is, however, as yet no mention in any of the “Pall Mall
Gazette” articles of Gordon, nor can I find his name in any London paper
except in the one phrase I have quoted from the “Times,” during that
first week of the year, the reason doubtless being that Gordon’s few
friends knew that on landing at Genoa he had gone straight to Brussels,
_en route_ for the Congo. The only allusion to Gordon in the “Pall Mall
Gazette” of that week is not in the articles, but in an “occasional
note,” and again in the form of a query, “Chinese Gordon is to undertake
the administration of the Congo. . . . Is it not a pity that at a time
when so much other work is urgently wanting to be done in Egypt and
elsewhere the ablest leader of irregular forces England has produced
should be told off to the service of an International Association amid
the swamps of the Congo?”
This was all that had been said about Gordon before his arrival at
Southampton on the 7th. He had spent the best part of the week at
Brussels before proceeding to England, and had found there on 2nd
January a communication awaiting him from Wolseley, with whom he had
been in correspondence, telling him that the permission he had asked for
at the War Office to take service under King Leopold was refused him by
the British Government. This had brought him in haste to England, and he
had arrived at his sister’s house at Southampton so angry about the
refusal that his first act had been to sign and send in his papers to
the War Office resigning his commission in Her Majesty’s army. His
brother Sir Henry tells us that the refusal was “more a Foreign Office
than a War Office question, and the refusal emanated from the former.”
Gordon took it to be due to a Foreign Office prepossession against him.
It is possible, however, to read the refusal in another sense, and that
Granville, who had already once proposed him to Cromer, and who was
considering Cromer’s demand for an English officer, still wished to
retain a hold over Gordon for the contingency of his being required at
Khartoum; and this is how I am inclined to interpret it. It is difficult
indeed to understand it otherwise, seeing that the Foreign Office must
have just then received Cromer’s telegram asking for an officer to carry
out a duty precisely such as Gordon was most fitted, indeed the only man
fitted, to perform.
For these reasons, too, I refuse to accept as entirely reliable Mr.
Stead’s claim to absolute independence of official inspiration in the
matter of his celebrated interview with Gordon at Southampton, which
took place on the day following the general’s arrival there. Mr. Stead’s
genius may very well have conceived the idea of the visit as the
particular form in which Gordon was to be advertised; but in view of the
series of articles just alluded to, and knowing as I do the ways of
journalism and the close connection there was that year between the
“Pall Mall Gazette” and the War Office through Lord Esher, and having,
moreover, been myself more than once interviewed by Mr. Stead, I find it
impossible not to recognize in the sudden entrance of Gordon into the
intrigue one of those manœuvres worked from time to time in the “Pall
Mall” columns through Lord Esher’s agency.
We know from Fitzmaurice’s “Life of Granville” that the antagonism
between Hartington and Gladstone did actually exist at the time, and
that it had just then reached a critical stage; and we know that
Hartington, as Secretary for War, must have been the Minister to whom
the choice of an officer for Khartoum had been referred, and who, in
fact, did a few days later decide it, and we know Lord Esher’s position
at the War Office, and we know his connection with the “Pall Mall
Gazette.” Lord Esher was Gordon’s friend, Mr. Stead at the time was not.
Lord Esher was conversant with his movements, with his application for
leave to serve King Leopold, with the refusal of his leave, and I
decline to believe that there was no hint given on which Mr. Stead
acted. In every newspaper office there are scores of such journalistic
secrets never divulged and easily forgotten, and it seems to me vastly
more probable that the Gordon “boom” was one of them.
What is quite certain is that, from the moment of the publication of the
interview, the “Pall Mall” became avowedly the organ of that section of
the Cabinet which was working for intervention in the Soudan, if
necessary, by force of arms. If any one doubts this he needs to go no
further than to the files of the “Pall Mall” for proof. There is among
the rest a perfectly plain confession of the fact in a leading article
of 14th February, where Stead thus excuses himself as the Liberal editor
of a Liberal journal for his advocacy of the Gordon mission at a time
when many Liberals were far from approving it. “From a mere party point
of view,” Stead writes, “it is often the most useful thing a true
Liberal can do to oppose the immediate policy of his party, for it is
only by that means that he can secure the adoption of the policy which
will give victory to his own side. _Cabinets, it must never be
forgotten, are composite bodies, and the outsider who advocates a new
departure is often the exponent of the views of those who in the secrecy
of the council chamber have been hitherto unsuccessfully striving for
the policy_ that makes for righteousness and peace. There are times when
the most loyal followers may find it necessary to indicate to his
leaders the path of safety which they may hitherto have been too
preoccupied to perceive or too evenly divided to adopt.” The whole
passage, and especially those words which I have italicized, is a very
candid avowal of the position of things as between the “Pall Mall
Gazette” and the section of the Cabinet represented by Hartington, and
it was explained to me in this way on my return to England by those in a
position to know.
With regard to the interview itself, perhaps the most important part of
it in this regard are the phrases used in the leading article
recommending the interview. It is a repetition and amplification of the
question put by Sir Samuel Baker in his “Times” letter of a week before.
“Why not,” asks Stead, “send Chinese Gordon with full powers to Khartoum
to assume absolute control of the territory, to relieve the garrisons,
and do what can be done to save what can be saved from the wreck in the
Soudan? . . . No one can deny the urgent need in the midst of that
hideous welter of confusion for the presence of such a man with a born
genius for command and unexampled capacity for organizing ever-
victorious armies and a perfect knowledge of the Soudan and its people.
Why not send him out with _carte blanche_ to do the best that can be
done?”
Here we have the Gordon mission exactly as it was sent, in fact if not
nominally, by Her Majesty’s ministers nine days later, almost exactly as
it had been proposed by Cromer in December, namely, the sending of “an
English officer of high authority to Khartoum with full power to
withdraw the garrisons and to make the best arrangements possible for
the future government of that country.” Seeing that nothing as yet was
known outside the public offices of Cromer’s dispatch or of his having
made any such demand, and the extreme improbability of an identity of
ideas between Stead and Cromer by mere journalistic inspiration, I think
we may fairly conclude that the description by Stead of what Gordon was
to effect at Khartoum was due to a War Office suggestion rather than
mere accident. At any rate, it is absurd that Cromer, of all persons,
should complain as he does in his “Modern Egypt” of the idea of the
mission having been forced upon him by the “Pall Mall Gazette.” All that
can fairly be said is that Stead, having got an inkling that such a
mission had been demanded, put the dots promptly and powerfully on the
_i_’s and named the only man capable of carrying it out effectually. It
is difficult indeed to understand, notwithstanding all we know of
Cromer’s dislike of Gordon and his recent protestations, that Gordon was
absent from his mind when he penned his telegram of 22nd December. Lord
Cromer has a convenient way of forgetting things when it suits him to
forget, and it has probably suited him to forget this among the rest. At
any rate, it is impossible to suggest another name.
Neither, I think, can it be pretended that Stead’s recommendation of
Gordon for the post was so potent and instantaneous an influence at the
Foreign Office as to have forced Granville’s hand unless Granville had
been already willing. Between the publication of the “Pall Mall”
interview and Lord Granville’s second proposal to Cromer of sending
Gordon there was an interval of less than twenty-four hours, and it is
far more likely that those in the Cabinet who wanted to send Gordon
should have made use of Stead to popularize their plan than that Stead
should have been able by his few words, however powerful, so suddenly to
force it on them. Gordon’s views, publicly and forcibly stated in the
“Pall Mall Gazette,” may possibly have quickened the pace, and this is
all that can reasonably be affirmed about it. The real object of the
press campaign of the past week, it is essential to understand, had been
to force not Granville’s hand, but Gladstone’s. Granville needed no
convincing. He was already of the Hartington faction in regard to Egypt.
But Gladstone, it was known, would be difficult to persuade. Gladstone,
unlike the rest, really wanted to get out of Egypt, he really wanted to
have nothing to do with the Soudan, and he had only consented to the new
responsibility undertaken at Cairo a fortnight before of making and
unmaking ministries on its being explained to him that thus alone could
he escape being involved in the further responsibility of Khartoum. It
was necessary now to force his hand to the idea of sending up an
“English officer of high authority” not only to withdraw the garrisons,
but also to stay on at Khartoum and to “arrange a future government.”
Gladstone could hardly be made to swallow this second dose of
responsibility, except through pressure from outside the Cabinet, the
pressure of public opinion, and this it was that was put upon him by
Hartington through Stead and the magic of Gordon’s name. The “Pall Mall
Gazette” had more than once been used to coerce Gladstone. It was the
paper that he chiefly read.[23]
Granville’s position was quite different. It was an intermediate one
between Gladstone’s and Hartington’s. A Whig by birth and tradition and,
as Foreign Secretary in 1881-82, the member of the Cabinet most directly
concerned in the aggression on Egypt, he needed no conversion at all to
the idea of remaining on at Cairo or of a further commitment to
responsibility in the Soudan, and he was certainly at one with
Hartington on these points; but, on the other hand, Gladstone was his
chief, with whom he could not afford to quarrel. He was poor and in
debt, and dependent on Gladstone for his continuance in office. What
made him of value in the Cabinet was his amiability. He was friends with
both factions,[24] and was used by them both as go-between. In the
present instance it was necessary to get Gladstone to go with Hartington
the way the Whigs wanted. They had used the press, and precisely the
“Pall Mall Gazette” under Morley, against him in the spring of 1882 when
they wanted his consent for the sending of the fleet to bombard
Alexandria. They were using the same “Pall Mall Gazette” under Stead now
that they wanted his consent to the sending of an “English officer” to
Sarawak the Soudan. They had pretended to Gladstone in 1882 that the
mission of the fleet would be one of moral pressure only, to protect
British subjects, and give moral support to the Khedive—no actual firing
of guns, nothing at all like an armed intervention in Egypt, still less
like a permanent occupation. They pretended to him now that Gordon’s
mission was to be an entirely peaceful one, a tour of inspection, to
withdraw the garrisons by peaceable means and return at once in a few
weeks. Of course it was nothing really of the sort; it could not really
be anything of the sort, and they knew it; it was to arrange a new
government at Khartoum, and this could only be done by reorganizing a
fighting force under Englishmen, and thus indirectly by an English
occupation of Egypt indefinitely prolonged.
Any one who will take the trouble to go through all the documents of the
case with an open mind will, I think, inevitably agree with this reading
of the facts. It is the only one that accounts rationally for
Gladstone’s position afterwards or for that of any one of those
principally concerned. Morley, in his “Life of Gladstone,” would have
one believe that Granville and Hartington, and Dilke and Northbrook,
four level-headed English politicians, at least as much rogues
politically as fools, went suddenly mad on Stead’s persuading them that
Gordon was a miracle man. Cabinet Ministers, however, do not go mad in
this way; their madnesses have much more method than that. Nor are they
thus carried off their legs in twenty-four hours by a newspaper
interview. It is they that inspire the newspapers, not the newspapers
them; and, though Heaven knows they are guided at times by little enough
wisdom, it is seldom to the press they go for their folly, especially at
the Foreign Office. For the rest of the situation it is necessary to
consider that Granville does not seem to have understood all when on the
9th, the evening of the day after Stead’s interview was published, he
telegraphed to Cromer, “Would General Charles Gordon or Sir Charles
Wilson be of assistance under altered circumstances in Egypt?”—the
“altered circumstances” being of course Cromer’s assumption of all
power. Stead’s _ballon d’essai_ had been well received in London by the
morning papers, and Granville doubtless felt surer of his ground with
Gladstone. The circumstances, however, had not been favourable to either
Gordon or Wilson. Nubar hated Gordon, and the Khedive hated Wilson, who
had baulked him in his intention of hanging Arabi;[25] and Cromer, who
only wanted now an obedient agent at the end of a wire, and who knew
Gordon was not the man implicitly to obey any of them, willingly joined
Nubar and the Khedive in their refusal. Once more, therefore, Gordon was
found to be “quite unfit,” and Cromer’s reply, 12th January, was, “I
have consulted Nubar Pasha and I do not think that the services of
General Gordon or Sir Charles Wilson can be utilized at present.”
Cromer in his “Modern Egypt” says that the man they had in view then was
after all no Englishman, but an Egyptian, Abd-el-Kader Pasha, an
excellent man doubtless for a job in the Soudan, but he does not explain
Nubar’s objection to Gordon, and in order to avoid the difficulty of
doing so, and of reconciling his refusal of either Englishman now
offered him with his special request a few weeks before for an English
officer, he drops, as we have seen, the word “English” out of his
earlier telegram. The attempt to get Abd-el-Kader to undertake their
work occupied another several more days in the final decision, and it
was not till Gladstone’s and Cromer’s and Nubar’s consent had all been
obtained, by the 16th, that the actual sending on the 18th was carried
into effect. How this was engineered in London, and on what conditions,
we will now examine, following Gordon’s steps from day to day in
accordance with his recorded movements.
Stead’s interview with Gordon took place at Southampton on the 8th
January, and was published on the afternoon of the 9th. It reached
Gordon at Southampton on the morning of the 10th, and had on him a very
disturbing influence. In the interview itself he had been careful not to
suggest that he was himself willing to undertake the task proposed to
him; on the contrary, he had suggested Sir Samuel Baker as the proper
man for it. He looked upon the Soudan as a temptation to vain glory, and
Stead’s suddenly thrusting him forward into the glare of publicity as a
candidate for the duty troubled his conscience. In his heart he was
tempted to go, if only the Government would send him, yet it was what he
called his “Agag,” the thing he must “hew in pieces,” his besetting sin
of “hailing the tram of the world.” It was in this double mood that he
fled the same evening to the vicarage of his religious friend, Dr.
Barnes, at Heavitree, near Exeter, there to take spiritual counsel, and
also to see Baker, who lived in the neighbourhood, and consult with him
as to what was to be done. Barnes’ story of this visit is brief, but
enlightening and most characteristic of the man Gordon was. The worthy
vicar thus records it:
“He [Gordon] found time to spend a night at Heavitree Vicarage, and on
the morning of Friday the 11th of January, he received Holy Communion in
the parish church. This, so far as I can trace his course, was, with one
exception, his last communion. On the same morning he visited Bishop
Temple, with whom, as we have seen from a letter already quoted, he had
wished to ‘talk about those things’—the only things which seemed to him
to be of really vital interest and importance.
“Later in the day he went on to Sandford Orleigh, Sir Samuel Baker’s
house; and to those who accompanied him it was pleasant to see the
meeting between the two ex-governors of the Soudan. While we were
driving from Newton Abbot Station to Sandford Orleigh, Sir Samuel Baker
pressed on Gordon the expediency of his again going to the Soudan as
Governor-General, if Her Majesty’s Government should require it. Gordon
was silent, but his eyes flashed, and an eager expression passed over
his face as he looked at his host. Late at night, when we had retired,
he came to my room, and said in a soft voice, ‘You saw me to-day?’ ‘You
mean in the carriage?’ ‘Yes; you saw _me_—that was _myself_—the self I
want to get rid of.’”
The same evening he wrote a letter to Baker—it was probably agreed
between them that he should do so—in which he again urged Baker to
accept the task, and gave him his idea of what would be necessary for
successfully carrying it out. This letter Baker sent to the “Times,” and
it appeared in that paper on the morning of the 14th. We will return to
what he said in it later, when we consider precisely what those who sent
him on his mission intended him to do. It had the effect of causing
Granville to write that same day privately (note the humanitarian
appeal) to Gladstone: “If Gordon says he believes he could by his
personal influence excite the tribes to escort the Khartoum garrison and
inhabitants to Suakin, a little pressure on Baring might be advisable.
The destruction of these poor people would be a great disaster.” Also on
the morning of the 15th, Gladstone’s consent having been obtained,
Wolseley, who had already sent for Gordon, was commissioned to sound him
as to his willingness to go, and found him to be so under certain
conditions.
What these were, and what exactly passed between the two on the 15th, it
is very difficult to disentangle from the conflicting evidence, for
little of it was put in writing at the time, and the chief testimony
regarding it rests upon the recollections of persons, or rather of
partisans, all concerned in excusing themselves many years after the
event. Thus Lord Esher (Brett) tells us that on that occasion, besides
Wolseley, Gordon saw Hartington and Granville, but I think there must be
some confusion of memory here in which the interview of the 15th has
been mixed up with that of three days later, the 18th. Esher’s words
are: “In January 1884, after his interviews with Lord Hartington and
Lord Granville, Gordon came for the last time to Tilney Street. He was
leaving for Brussels. I can see him now with his muffler and his warm
coat walking about the nursery with my eldest son in his arms.” Now
Gordon, in a letter from Brussels dated the 17th, says: “Brocklehurst is
here with me. Government and authorities have been exceedingly kind and
I have every reason to be grateful to them for I have often worried them
and they have decided to let me stay on in H. M. S. (Service?).” This,
as Brett was certainly in the best position to know, would seem
conclusive as to the date, for Gordon left for Brussels the next
morning, the 16th, but I feel sure that the visit described at Tilney
Street was on the 18th, when Gordon certainly saw both Hartington and
Granville. About the 15th, writing soon after the event, Sir Henry
Gordon says very clearly, “on the 15th January General Gordon came up to
London in accordance with a telegram from Lord Wolseley and had an
interview with him of over two hours, during which time although Lord
Wolseley saw some members of the Cabinet General Gordon did not.” And
Sir Henry goes on to say that his brother that same evening came to dine
with him, and next morning went with Brocklehurst to Brussels. As to
what took place between Wolseley and Gordon, nothing very precisely is
known, as Gordon seems to have kept his own counsel about it.
Fitzmaurice says briefly: “Lord Wolseley met General Gordon, then on his
way to Brussels, and discussed the situation in Egypt with him. Having
asked the General what under the circumstances of the hour he would do,
Lord Wolseley received the reply ‘I would send myself.’ The brief
conversation suggested that General Gordon, stirred by the thought of
the threatened collapse of the edifice which he had helped to raise,
through the very dangers he had foreseen, and believing that he alone
was the man of the situation, was prepared to cancel his existing
engagements and return to the Soudan.”
The text of Granville’s telegram of the same evening to Cromer, using
the gentle pressure which Gladstone had agreed to, is given in “Modern
Egypt,” dispatched, doubtless, on Wolseley’s report of the conversation.
“I hear indirectly that Gordon is ready to go straight to Suakin without
passing through Cairo on the following rather vague terms, his mission
to be to report to Her Majesty’s Government on the military situation in
the Soudan and to return without any further engagement towards him. He
would be under you for instructions and will send letters through you
under flying seal. You and Nubar Pasha to give him all assistance and
facilities as to telegraphing, etc. Egyptian Government to send Ibrahim
Fowzi to meet him at Suez with a writer to attend on him. He might be of
use in informing you and us of the situation. It would be popular at
home but there may be countervailing objections. Tell me your real
opinion with or without Nubar Pasha.” The word “indirectly” would seem
to mean that Granville had not himself seen Gordon that day. The phrase
about the mission being to “report” only seems to have been the gentle
way of putting things calculated to gain Cromer’s acquiescence, and it
is on this initial account of the mission communicated also to
Gladstone, with the design to allay his suspicions as well, that the
legend was based to which Gladstone always adhered, that Gordon had
received no other instructions, and had disobeyed them by understanding
that they covered wider ground. It is quite impossible, however, that
this should have been all that passed between Wolseley and Gordon during
the two hours their conference had lasted, or that it was in this sense
that Gordon understood the proposal made to him by the War Office.
Gordon’s letter to Baker had been published the morning of the day
before in the “Times,” and it was very explicit about what ought to be
done in the Soudan, and the minimum of outside support needed to
accomplish it successfully.
Cromer, in his “Modern Egypt,” makes light of the interview with Stead
at Southampton as being only talk, but he cannot say the same of the
published letter which, according to his usual controversial practice,
he passes by in silence. Gordon in the interview had declared in the
plainest possible words not only that Khartoum ought to and must be held
against the Mahdi, but that the evacuation of its garrison, with the
garrisons of Darfur and the Upper Nile, was a physical impossibility; he
lays this down in language as to which there can be no conceivable
mistake: “Whatever you decide about evacuation you cannot evacuate
because your army cannot be moved; you must either surrender absolutely
to the Mahdi or defend Khartoum at all hazards, the latter is the only
course which ought to be entertained. There is no serious difficulty
about it, the Mahdi’s forces will fall to pieces of themselves, but if
in a moment of panic orders are issued for the abandonment of the whole
of the Eastern Soudan, a blow will be struck against Egypt and the peace
of the East which may have fatal consequences. . . . Nubar should be
left untrammelled by any stipulations concerning the evacuation of
Khartoum; there is no hurry. The garrisons can hold their own at
present, let them continue to hold on until disunion and tribal
jealousies have worked their natural result in the camp of the Mahdi.
Nubar should be free to deal with the Soudan in his own way. How he will
deal with the Soudan I cannot profess to say, but I should imagine that
he would appoint a Governor-General at Khartoum with full powers, and
furnish him with 2,000,000 sterling. . . . Sir Samuel Baker might be
appointed Governor-General, he might take his brother as Commander-in-
Chief.” This was a strong fighting policy, and, _mutatis mutandis_,
precisely how he afterwards understood his instructions. In his letter
to Baker he had been even more explicit. “To my mind,” he says,
“patience and diplomacy are far more needed than arms. Still to some
degree you must have the latter. . . . I would recommend (1) permission
to be got from the Sultan to engage 4,000 of his reserved troops, both
officers and men, which will be under your brother’s command, and be
volunteers with the promise of remuneration at the end of their service;
(2) that some 2,000 Belooches under the native officers should be
enlisted in India, who have been soldiers of Her Majesty, old sturdy
warriors; for your cavalry you can horse them in the Hedjaz, Palestine,
and Syria; (3) that Her Majesty’s Government will allow you to purchase
from Her Majesty animals, paying a percentage upon all purchases; (4)
that Her Majesty’s Government should allow military store officers to
aid you but not to go into the field”—another fighting programme.
With these two pronouncements of what was to be done hot before them—and
Hartington and Granville and Wolseley must all have read them—it is
ludicrous to suppose that the real object of the mission, as it was
certainly understood by Gordon, and afterwards, to the best of his
power, put in execution by him, was not discussed between Gordon and
Wolseley, or by Wolseley as go-between with Hartington and Granville, or
that these did not understand it in an active sense. Cromer scouts the
idea of Gordon having been sent to him only to report, and in this
Cromer is right. The talk of reporting was only make-believe, gently to
propitiate him, Cromer, and to propitiate Gladstone; it never had any
reality. Hartington, describing the mission some weeks later in the
House of Commons, while attempting to excuse the Government, admits that
the mission had a larger and more important scope than either reporting
or a withdrawal of the garrisons. “Gordon’s mission,” he says, 20th
February 1884, was “to attempt the rescue of 28,000 men contained in
Khartoum and the other portions of the Soudan, and not only these
garrisons, but also to make some arrangement for the better government
of those provinces.” He was clearly quoting Cromer’s original words of
the previous December, which had all along remained the basis of the
mission as understood by himself and his own section of the Cabinet at
the War Office.
If Gordon was not sent at once on the 15th to Khartoum it was because
Cromer had not yet answered Granville’s latest telegram. While waiting
for it he consequently went back to Brussels to excuse himself with King
Leopold for breaking his Congo agreement. The War Office had already
refused to accept his resignation of his commission, and on the 17th,
Cromer and Nubar having capitulated on the 16th declaring now that
Gordon was the best man, Gordon was telegraphed for and returned to
London.[26] Here on the 18th the same process of interviewing took place
at the War Office; first, a talk between Gordon and Wolseley; then, in
the afternoon, with four members of the Cabinet, who had been hastily
got together, all of them members of the Hartington faction and without
Gladstone, who was still away invalided at Hawarden. The discussion that
day seems to have been little more than formal, for Gordon was already
in his train by eight o’clock to catch the Brindisi mail for Egypt, and
the instructions had had to be drafted and written out and signed at the
Foreign Office, and a search made for Stewart, who was to go with him,
and good-byes to be said. Gordon was brought into a room where the four
Ministers, Hartington, Granville, Dilke, and Northbrook,[27] were, and
exchanged a few words with them, and that seems to have been all. The
whole of the details clearly had been arranged with Wolseley. Gordon’s
own account of the interview is given in a letter he wrote to Barnes in
the train, and posted at Brindisi on the 22nd.
“I saw Wolseley at 8 a.m. He said nothing was settled, but Ministers
would see me at 3.30 p.m. No one knew I had come back. At noon he,
Wolseley, came for me and took me to Ministers. He went in and talked to
the Ministers and came back and said: ‘Her Majesty’s Government want you
to understand this—Government are determined to evacuate Soudan, for
they will not guarantee future government. Will you go and do it?’ I
said, ‘Yes.’ He said, ‘Go in.’ I went in and saw them. They said, ‘Did
Wolseley tell you our orders?’ I said, ‘Yes.’ I said, ‘You will not
guarantee future government of Soudan, and you wish me to go up and
evacuate now.’ I said ‘Yes,’ and it was over, and I left at 8 p.m. for
Calais. Very little passed between us. The Duke [of Cambridge] and
Wolseley came to see me off, so that is over.”
CHAPTER VI
WAS GORDON DISOBEDIENT?
IT is said that Gordon drafted his own instructions at the Foreign
Office, but I find it hard to believe this, for, if true, it would go
near to proving him as great a diplomatic rogue as those who sent him.
The instructions are a very crafty document. They begin with a manifest
insincerity about Gordon’s going to Egypt “to report on the measures it
may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons and
the European population in Khartoum,” and he is also “to consider and
report upon the best mode of effecting the evacuation of the Interior
and upon the manner in which the safety and good administration of the
Red Sea Ports can be secured.” Then there is a paragraph about the slave
trade as manifestly insincere, introduced for the satisfaction of the
Anti-Slavery Association in London, and he is to send his reports on
these subjects under flying seal through Cromer. In all this it is
impossible to find more than a hint of the true object of the mission.
It is contained in the document, but hidden away in the two unobtrusive
concluding paragraphs. These are: “You will consider yourself authorized
and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government
may desire to entrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir
E. Baring. You will be accompanied by Colonel Stewart, who will assist
you in the duties thus confided to you.” (Gordon afterwards described
Stewart as having been sent with him as his dry nurse to keep him out of
mischief.) “On your arrival in Egypt you will at once communicate with
Sir E. Baring, who will arrange to meet you and will settle with you
whether you should proceed direct to Suakin, or should go yourself or
dispatch Colonel Stewart to Khartoum _via_ the Nile.”
These instructions, I say, are a model of how to conceal an intention,
and have the true Foreign Office ring. They really amount to _carte
blanche_ to propose or do anything that the missioner could get Cromer
to consent to, and, in fact, cover all and more than all that Gordon
eventually tried to perform. “Such other duties as the Egyptian
Government might entrust to you” would have included either his handing
over the whole Soudan to the Mahdi, or his determination to smash the
Mahdi, or again to Sarawak the Soudan on his own account or King
Leopold’s or the Queen’s. Cromer was made responsible for all, and the
Government at home retained the ordinary parliamentary privilege of
disavowing their own responsibility for things if things went wrong.
Above all, it enabled Granville to telegraph to Gladstone with a free
conscience that Gordon had been sent by the War Office simply “to
report.”
I confess that, though I have blamed and still blame Gladstone for
nearly all the misfortunes that have happened since 1882 in Egypt, I
here feel some sympathy with him as with a man duped and deceived. He
certainly would never have consented to the Gordon mission in its full
sense if he had been allowed to understand the full meaning of the
instructions. He would have known, not only that the sending of Gordon
“to report” would make it very difficult not to accept and act upon his
report—this point he noticed in a letter written by him at the time—but
also that sending Gordon, who was a fighter born, on a merely peaceful
mission to carry out a military plan which he had himself declared to be
impossible except with the aid of a large body of troops, would make the
sending of troops also a certainty. Gordon was in the eyes of the
British public a Christian hero starting on a crusade, and it was
inconceivable that he should be left to perish for want of Christian
help. It is true that, when Gladstone arrived three days later in
London, a Cabinet was held, where the thing was more or less explained
to him, and that he consented to what had been done; but it was by this
time a _fait accompli_, and too late to stop Gordon, who had already
reached Brindisi and was on the high seas on his way to Port Said. His
mission could no longer be cancelled. All the religious press of England
had risen like one man to the occasion, and were rejoicing over Gordon
as the champion of Christendom. It was too late to recall him.
What the choice of such a missioner meant for the Government in the way
of new astonishing responsibilities may be gathered from Stead’s scream
of triumph printed in the “Pall Mall Gazette” on the day after his
departure. It is headed “At Last.” It began: “The whole Egyptian
question has been revolutionized in an hour. At yesterday’s informal
meeting of the Ministers at the War Office there was taken one of those
decisive steps that make or mar the destinies of Empires. . . . The
question called for immediate decision. After some consultation
Ministers determined to accept General Gordon’s conditions. The decision
was arrived at between 3 and 4 yesterday afternoon. At 8 General Gordon
had left London for Khartoum. The die was cast. Henceforth we have the
full and undivided responsibility for affairs in the Soudan. Whether we
evacuate the country or whether we retain it, as soon as General Gordon
takes command, and for so long as General Gordon’s commission holds,
England is directly responsible for whatever is done in the name of the
Egyptian Government between the third Cataract and the Equatorial Lakes.
That is an enormous extension of our responsibilities, but vast as it is
it is not all. Whether the public realizes it or not, the dispatch of
General Gordon to the Soudan, exercising practically unlimited powers
not as Governor-General of the Khedive, but as the accredited
representative of the British Government, must entail as a natural and
inevitable corollary the assumption sooner or later of a similar
responsibility as direct and as unlimited for the affairs of Egypt
proper.”
Gladstone after this was powerless to draw back, and, putting a good
face on the matter as long as the sun shone, he went in for the gamble
with the rest. An immense gamble it certainly was, and one for which he
was destined to pay heavily.
As for Gordon himself he started in the highest possible spirits. He had
got the secret wish of his heart thrust upon him without his seeking it;
he had not “hailed the tram of the world”; it was “the tram of the
world” that had hailed him, and his conscience was at rest. He was
certain now that God was with him and that the service imposed on him
was God’s service, and so could not but succeed. His very first act
after seeing the Ministers was to telegraph to Barnes from the War
Office at five o’clock: “I go to the Soudan to-night; if He goes with me
all must be well.” And in a letter to the same Barnes on his way to
Brindisi, he says: “I am quite restored to my peace, thank God, and in
His hand He will hide me. . . . The Hosts are with me. Mahanaim.” He
counted much upon the prayers that were being offered for him in every
church and chapel in England. “If people ask after me, tell them they
can greatly help me with their prayers, not for my earthly success, but
that my mission may be for God’s glory, the welfare of the poor and
wretched, and for me what He wills, above all for a humble heart.” And
again, 26th January: “I leave for the Soudan to-night. I feel quite
happy for I say if God is with me who can or will be hurtful to me? May
He be glorified, the world and people of the Soudan be blessed, and may
I be the dust under His feet.”
That Gordon was absolutely sincere in this estimate of his mission we
cannot doubt. Yet what a self-delusion! What a blindness! He did not
perceive that those who were sending him on this last great adventure of
his life were no angels of the Lord, but four wily statesmen doing the
work mainly of the London Stock Exchange, and interested far more in
perpetuating England’s robber hold on Egypt than in any humanitarian
scheme which might be imagined for the Soudan—he himself a useful pawn
in their not very noble game, and some of them ready enough already to
sacrifice and betray him. He did not perceive this or understand that,
if it were a question of God being on one side or the other, it could
hardly be with these, but with the poor fanatic Soudanese who really did
believe in Him and counted on Him to hear their vociferous prayers and
praises, and give them the victory. He did not understand that all the
men of good in the Soudan would be found on the Mahdi’s side, and all
the men of Belial, the scoundrel refuse of the corrupt city of Khartoum,
on his own, leaving him with only the least godly weapons of the flesh
wherewith to fight, some modern superiority of weapons, money to buy a
faithless fidelity, and his own skill and courage as a fighting man.
It was an instinct of his self-delusion and a knowledge of the base ends
of those that sent him that caused me to write to him as I did from
Delhi. I knew that this time he must be wrong, that he was being sent on
a fool’s errand, and that he would be betrayed and defeated.
Of the many things with which Gordon has been reproached officially in
the conduct of his mission by those who would shift the blame of his
failure from their own backs on to his, I will endeavour to deal with
the chief and especially with those brought against him by Lord Cromer,
only premising once again that the mission itself was according to my
ideas a bad one and doomed from the first to failure. Lord Cromer, his
chief assailant, has reproached him with a constant change of plan, with
insubordination, with failure to do his duty, and with being the cause
of his own defeat. I will endeavour to set these matters in their true
light.
Gordon’s idea when he left London seems to have been a clear one as to
the general lines of what he was to do. He was to make his way to
Khartoum as he best could, take over the military command of the place
from Coetlogon, withdraw the Egyptian garrisons from their outlying
posts in the interior, and make what arrangements he could for a
government at Khartoum to take the place of the Khedive’s. It was to be
a government which was not to be an Egyptian Government, and for which
Her Majesty’s Government was not to be responsible. These two conditions
had been imposed on him, and he had accepted them. All the rest was left
to his discretion, subject only to Cromer’s official approval.
A point he on his side had insisted on at the outset was that he should
go under orders from his own Government, and not merely as taking
foreign service with his Government’s permission. His insistence about
this was, I believe, primarily with him a matter of honour. He had
engaged himself to King Leopold, and he could not with any decency throw
him over to enter the service of another foreign prince unless it was in
compliance with an order he as a soldier was bound to obey from his own
Government. Also it would ease his conscience, as signifying to him more
clearly the command of God, and not the gratification of his own secret
wish. This is how I read the matter. It could not have been with him a
rooted objection to re-entering a foreign service or in particular the
Khedive’s service, for as we have seen he recommended Baker, if he went
to the Soudan, to go there as the Khedive’s Governor-General. What would
have been the right course for Baker must have been the right course
also for himself. As a matter of fact he would have found himself even
more powerless than he proved to be at Khartoum if he had gone there
simply as a British officer. Stewart had gone there as such, but his had
been no executive mission. Gordon’s was to be essentially executive, and
it was imperative with him to have local authority from the local
sovereign, if only to treat with the tribes for the withdrawal of the
garrisons. The English Government could not give him this—it must of
necessity be given him by the Khedive. It argues therefore no change of
plan that Gordon, on his way to Egypt, should have proposed that if he
went to Khartoum it should be in his old capacity as Governor-General.
He had gained all that he wanted for his soldier’s honour once he had
received his own Government’s order to undertake the service. The
Governor-Generalship was a means to an end, and in his view the only
means.
A more reasonable reproach which might be made to him—but it has not
been officially made—is that he abandoned the idea he certainly had at
the outset of going straight on a peaceful errand to the Mahdi at El
Obeyd and treating with him personally for the withdrawal of the
Egyptian garrisons. I have always been of opinion that that would have
been his wisest course; and it certainly was in his mind when he started
from London, for passing through Paris the next morning he saw Sheffield
at the Embassy and told him of his intention so to do. There was, of
course, considerable risk in the matter, but it was just one of those
risks Gordon had over and again run successfully in the Soudan, and
there is good reason to believe that, properly accompanied, he would
have been courteously received at El Obeyd, and that, if he had
negotiated on the basis of withdrawing the garrisons peaceably and
handing over Khartoum at once to the Mahdi, the Mahdi would have
provided the necessary escorts. At any rate, it was his best chance. But
that was not what either our Government or the Government at Cairo
wanted; and, once at Cairo and in the Khedive’s service, this course was
formally forbidden him, nor did Gordon persist in it. It cannot be too
strongly repeated that what Gordon was intended to do was not merely to
evacuate the Soudan, but to establish a Government at Khartoum and in
the eastern provinces which should take the place of the Khedive’s
Government and serve as a barrier between Egypt proper, including the
Red Sea coast, and the Mahdi’s fanatical advance. To hand over Khartoum
to the Mahdi was not, at that time, whatever Lord Cromer may now
pretend, in his more than in the Khedive’s plan. I think, nevertheless,
that if Gordon had understood the full political power and religious
position acquired by Mohammed Ahmed since the fall of El Obeyd and the
destruction of Hicks’s army, he would have held to the idea of treating
with the Mahdi personally. Unfortunately he throughout underrated his
opponent and allowed himself to be persuaded that through the power of
money and a display of vigour, joined with reforms in the way of more
freedom, less taxation, and better justice, he could build up a counter
popularity to that possessed by the Mahdi. It was a snare into which he
too easily fell.
Another sudden change of plan, which Lord Fitzmaurice says surprised and
disturbed the Government soon after Gordon had been despatched upon his
mission, and in regard to which he is severe, calling it a plan
“fantastic in the extreme,” is that which Gordon announced of re-
establishing the family of the Sultans of Darfur in their hereditary
possessions. It was, perhaps, not a very practical idea, but that the
Foreign Office should have been surprised at it only shows its ignorance
of its own records, for it is to be found in no less conspicuous a
document than Stewart’s Soudan Report of February 1883, to say nothing
of its having been repeatedly put forward unofficially by Gordon in
print and officially by Abd-el-Kader Pasha in December at Cairo. The
whole conception of the re-establishment of independent native states in
opposition to the Mahdi was, in my opinion, one unsuited to the
circumstances of the case, however desirable in itself; but, at any
rate, there was nothing new in it nothing to “surprise or disturb” Lord
Granville. Gordon had hardly arrived at Khartoum before he found the
whole scheme impracticable, and it was heard of no more. Even under the
most favourable circumstances it would have been very difficult of
accomplishment, and, as a move counter to the Mahdi, could not possibly
have succeeded.
Much the same may be said about the idea of employing Zebehr. Here, too,
the “surprise and disturbance” of the Foreign Office were entirely
gratuitous. When Gordon arrived at Cairo Zebehr had already been engaged
there for some weeks recruiting and drilling a black force from among
the Soudanese, and had got together 200 ex-soldiers and ex-slaves
impressed in Egypt proper. These were destined to be sent with Zebehr
for service in the Soudan, and had been regularly enlisted by Zebehr for
the Government. It was therefore gratuitous on the part of the Foreign
Office to affect surprise that it should be proposed by Gordon to take
Zebehr and his men with him. There was, of course, reason for comment
that it should have been Gordon, and no other, who made the request, for
Gordon had quarrelled with Zebehr and had been responsible for his son’s
death, and Zebehr had been the head and front of the slave trade
rebellion in the Soudan. But Gordon was no longer on an anti-slavery
war-path. He had lived long enough to understand that battling in the
Bahr el Gazal against the slave-hunters was not the surest way of
dealing with the evil of slavery or stopping the trade. And his present
mission was of an entirely different kind, one which needed Zebehr’s
help, not a continuance of his hostility. Gordon was a man who never
pursued his resentments far, and he was always ready to forget a quarrel
and to believe once more in the man’s friendship who had wronged him or
whom he had wronged. He had buried the hatchet with Tewfik and Nubar and
Cromer. Why not also with Zebehr? There was nothing really to be
surprised at, nothing to blame or to forbid.
As to the policy of enlisting Zebehr as an ally I am not of opinion that
it would have led to much profit in the way of helping Gordon to
establish a buffer state against the Mahdi. Zebehr had been too long
absent from the Soudan to be of use to him in that way. His influence
was dead, and it is all but certain that he would have yielded to the
new influence abroad among his people and thrown in his lot with the
Mahdi. I do not think he would have betrayed Gordon. He was a man of old
Arab nobility and chivalrous traditions, and he had no actual blood feud
with Gordon, for it was Gessi, not Gordon himself, who had had Suliman
Zebehr shot. In after years I have talked these matters over with
Zebehr, and am convinced that he would not have betrayed Gordon, only
that he could not have stemmed the tide which was then so strongly
flowing in the Mahdi’s favour. All that he could have done would have
been to serve as intermediary between Gordon and the Mahdi, and to warn
Gordon against some of the worst mistakes he made.
The great weakness of Gordon’s position at Khartoum was that, being
almost ignorant of Arabic and without any dependable native interpreter
(for his old secretary Berzati had accompanied Hicks on his fatal
campaign and there lost his life), he was left to the tender mercies of
Greek merchants and other Christian informants as to what was going on.
Zebehr would, at any rate, have supplied him with reliable news and a
correct interpretation of the letters he received from the Mahdi. As it
was, with no one near him to explain the exact truth, Gordon was as a
blind man at Khartoum and became the tool of rogues who betrayed him
with false tales and prevented him from seeing what otherwise he could
not but have recognized, the sincerity and high character of the Mahdi.
With Zebehr at his side he could not have committed his last crowning
mistake of offering Mohammed Ahmed a tarboosh and a Sultanate, an insult
which more than any other sealed his doom.
Lastly, as to Gordon’s pretended insubordination and disobedience to his
instructions, the case against him is really not maintainable. Even
admitting that his instructions on leaving London, and the free hand
accorded him, were nothing more than are contained within the four
corners of the written memorandum drawn up at the Foreign Office, he
must stand personally absolved. The paragraph, “You will consider
yourself authorized and instructed to perform such other duties as the
Egyptian Government may desire to intrust to you and as may be
communicated to you by Sir E. Baring,” covers him entirely from any
blame there might be in the extension of his duty in Egypt. Lord Cromer
tries in his “Modern Egypt” to evade his own responsibility in regard to
such extensions of duty by pleading that it was Gordon himself who
initiated them; thus he instances a telegram he received from Granville
dated the 18th: “Gordon suggests that it may be announced in Egypt that
he is on his way to Khartoum to arrange for the future settlement of the
Soudan for the best advantage of the people.” This telegram, Cromer
points out, says nothing of his duty of reporting, and he adds, “if
General Gordon was to arrange for the future settlement of the Soudan, I
fail to see how he could do so without exercising some executive
authority.” On this ground he protests that “the idea of Gordon’s going
as Governor-General to the Soudan did not emanate from any one in Cairo,
it was made by General Gordon himself.” Lord Cromer seems, however, to
have forgotten that the suggestion about the future settlement of the
Soudan was, in fact, his own of 22nd December, and he has also forgotten
that, if Gordon was sent in order to arrange such a settlement, his
appointment as Governor-General was a necessary part of what he himself
had approved before ever Gordon arrived at Cairo. Lord Cromer’s answer,
23rd January, to the telegram of the 18th, says distinctly: “All
Gordon’s suggestions are excellent and quite in harmony with the lines
on which we have been working. A message was sent by the Khedive some
while ago to the leading men at Khartoum which was in the sense and
almost in the words suggested by Gordon.” This proves that all that had
not at that time been contemplated at Cairo was that the English officer
expected to arrange the new settlement was to be Gordon and not another,
and that he was to go to Khartoum with the full authority of Governor-
General.
If, however, there remains any doubt as to Cromer’s initiative in the
extension of Gordon’s duties, I am in a position to supply an important
link of evidence by giving the text of a hitherto unpublished letter
written by Cromer to Gordon the day before he landed at Port Said.
Though a most important letter in the controversy, it is not to be found
in any Blue Book, and Cromer in his “Modern Egypt” ignores it entirely.
The circumstances under which it was written were these. Gordon’s idea
in leaving London had been to go straight through the Suez Canal without
visiting Cairo, and to proceed at once to Suakin, where he expected to
be able to put himself into communication with certain Sheykhs of the
Hadendowa tribe to whom he had formerly rendered a service while he was
Governor-General, and through whom he counted on being able to reach
Khartoum, and eventually El Obeyd, for his proposed visit to the Mahdi.
In the Mahdi himself he thought he had recognized the uncle of a young
man who had been formerly in his service, and who had been kindly
treated by him, and so hoped to establish initial good relations with
him. He had come, however, to see that authority from the Khedive was a
necessity of the case, and he expected his Firman of appointment to be
delivered to him by Cromer on his passage through the Canal. Such a
course, however, was not exactly in Cromer’s plan, who wished to get
Gordon to Cairo, and so have him from the start more closely under his
authority, and to talk over with him and Nubar the further instructions
he was to receive. He pretexted, therefore, an inability to spare time
for a journey to Port Said (there was no railway further than Ismailia
at that time) and instead of going himself, he wrote this letter and
sent it by the hand of Sir Evelyn Wood to be delivered to Gordon on
landing, with instructions to intercept him and bring him on to Cairo.
“Cairo, _22nd January_, 1884.
“MY DEAR GORDON,
“I was exceedingly glad to receive Lord Granville’s telegram informing
me that you and Stewart were coming to Egypt. I feel confident that you
may both render very great services as regards Soudan affairs. I need
hardly assure you that you can rely on my most cordial support and
assistance.
“Wood, accompanied by Watson, is going to Port Said to meet you. He is
thoroughly acquainted with all the most recent facts of the situation
and with the views entertained by myself and others. Under these
circumstances I will not dwell at any length on the course of action
which, as it appears to me, had better be adopted. I will only say
briefly that I think you had better go to Khartoum and arrange for the
withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons etc. as rapidly as is consistent
with (1) the saving of life and so far as is possible, property; (2) the
establishment of some rough form of Government which will prevent, so
far as is possible, anarchy and confusion arising on the withdrawal of
the Egyptian troops. The task, though very difficult, will not I believe
in your hands be impossible.
“I hope very shortly to discuss the whole question with you personally
and my views are of course liable to modification by the light of your
greater experience in Soudan matters.
“Lord Granville told me that you were unwilling to come to Cairo. It is
not, on public grounds, desirable that I should leave Cairo at present,
although of course I would do so for a very short time if it were
absolutely necessary. I hope, however, to convince you that it is
absolutely necessary that you should come to Cairo. The valley of the
Nile is indeed at present the only route by which you can reach
Khartoum. The Souakin-Berber route is closed and, so far as our latest
information goes, there does not appear to be much prospect of its being
opened. It is also, I think, very desirable that before you start you
should discuss the whole situation not only with myself, but with Nubar
and others, so that we may arrange a common plan of action and prevent
any risk of working at cross purposes. For these and other reasons I am
very strongly of opinion that you should come to Cairo. I need hardly
say that I should not propose a course of action, which I believe to be
personally distasteful to yourself, unless I thought that there were
strong public grounds for doing so. Wood has arranged about Ibrahim Bey
Fowzi.
“Believe me very truly yours,
“EVELYN BARING.”
It will be noted in this letter, which was written before Cromer had
seen Gordon and therefore entirely on his own initiative, that he
suggests a new course of action to be adopted far in advance of anything
the original written instructions drawn up at the Foreign Office
contained. In the first place, there is no mention whatever of
reporting; secondly, Gordon is to go to Khartoum by way of Cairo and the
Nile instead of by Suakin. He is also to go himself and not merely to
send Stewart. Thirdly, he is to withdraw the Egyptian garrisons as
rapidly as is consistent with the saving of _property_ as well as life,
an entirely new condition to be found in no previous suggestion
connected with the mission and one necessarily entailing far greater
time and labour to effect. Lastly, he is to establish “some rough form
of government which will prevent anarchy and confusion arising on the
withdrawal of Egyptian troops.” This, although as we have seen it was in
the spirit and intention of the instructions, was an immense extension
of anything that had been actually written or telegraphed, of which we
have any knowledge; and the writer of the letter could hardly have
contemplated, in proposing such an extension, a work which would occupy
less than many months to execute, if not a whole year. It is, moreover,
absolutely at variance with the pretence afterwards made at the Foreign
Office that Gordon’s mission was simply to withdraw the Khartoum
garrison. And lastly, its date proves the idea to be Cromer’s and not
Gordon’s.
As we know, Sir Evelyn Wood met Gordon at Port Said with this letter in
his hand, and its effect was an entire change of plan on Gordon’s part.
Instead of going on to Suakin, he went back with Wood and Watson to
Cairo, saw Cromer, who took him to Nubar and later to the Khedive both
of whom received him graciously. Cromer then obtained the necessary
Firman (he probably drew it up himself) assigning to Gordon his new
duties. This Firman, be it observed, although it is by far the most
important document of the whole case, is suppressed by Cromer in his
“Modern Egypt;” and instead of it he gives a letter he wrote to Gordon
containing not the instructions themselves but certain remarks about the
way in which the instructions were understood by himself. The
instructions themselves are to be found in Blue Book, Egypt, No. 12,
1884. They amount practically to a _carte blanche_ commission to do
whatsoever Gordon would with the Soudan without restriction of time and
without limit to his authority. They run as follows:
“HIS HIGHNESS THE KHEDIVE TO GORDON PASHA.
“_January_ 26, 1884.
“EXCELLENCY,
“HAVING confidence in your tact and experience, and being aware that the
excellent services rendered by you in the Soudan have endeared you to
the people of those provinces, and made them acknowledge the good
derived from your efforts to introduce among them tranquillity and good
government; and seeing that the present state of affairs in those
territories requires a person capable of grappling with the difficulties
of the situation, and of ameliorating the condition of the inhabitants
by restoring public tranquillity on a sure basis, as it is our earnest
desire to do what is just and right, to remove all sources of discontent
and to observe equity towards the native populations, we do hereby
appoint you Governor-General of the Soudan by reason of your perfect
knowledge of that country, and we trust that you will carry out our good
intentions for the establishment of justice and order, and that you will
assure the peace and prosperity of the peoples of the Soudan by
maintaining the security of the roads open to commerce.
“Now by these presents we make known to you our desire, and urge upon
you a speedy departure for those provinces, so that good government may
be restored by your tact and experience.”
This document, which is of the widest conceivable scope, covers
absolutely all that Gordon did at Khartoum, all that he designed to do
and all that he might have done. It included his decree permitting
slavery; it included all his military operations; it included his
refusals to retire before the accomplishment of his full work unless his
Firman were revoked; it included his attempt to smash the Mahdi, and it
would have included, if he had succeeded in so doing, his remaining on
at Khartoum and “Sarawaking” the Soudan to the end of his days; or he
might have ceded the whole Soudan to the Mahdi, or, as far as I can see,
made any other arrangement for its future he might think fit. I repeat
that thus enlarged I do not approve of the mission. Also it was one
bound to fail. But I affirm that Cromer, who was the man responsible for
the enlargement of the mission, who procured the Firman’s signature
authorizing it, and who almost certainly dictated the instructions it
contained, should have been of all men the last to blame Gordon because
he held these instructions binding on him and refused to obey anything
less direct than a counter-firman ordering him not to carry them out.
Cromer’s dispatch to the Foreign Office, enclosing the Firman, admits
his responsibility and the largeness of its scope. “It was thought
desirable,” he says, “after full discussion here that the widest
discretionary powers should be given to General Gordon as regards the
manner of carrying out the policy and as to the best time and mode for
announcing it at Khartoum. . . . Although he takes his instructions from
me, the widest discretionary power has been left to him. His visit to
Cairo was most useful as it will enable the Egyptian authorities to be
of much greater service to him than would have been otherwise possible.
His views differ in no sort of way from those entertained by Nubar Pasha
and myself.”
Yet Lord Cromer to-day has the face now to come forward and charge
Gordon with overstepping his authorized programme! That he was so
understood to have overstepped them in the summer of 1884 I know, for I
myself thought he had done so, but the full facts had not yet been made
public, and we knew only what the Government chose to tell us. But the
Government itself already knew all, and yet it accused him; and Cromer,
who knew and knows the truth better than any one, accuses him still!
As to what happened after the mission left Cairo the history is too well
known for there to be any necessity for my recapitulating it here. All
now depended on Gordon’s being able to inspire such confidence in the
Khartoum garrison as to hold the fort till succour should come. This was
expected to be, if at all, from Valentine Baker at Souakin, Sir Samuel’s
brother. The position at Souakin was this. The sending of Hicks to
Khartoum to take command of the Khedivial troops in the spring of 1883
had been answered by the Mahdi by the dispatch of emissaries into the
provinces between the Nile and the Red Sea to preach a religious war
against the infidel; and the war broke out early in the autumn under the
afterwards celebrated leader Osman Digna, who, with the fighting tribe
of the Hadendowa, set themselves to occupy the caravan road from Berber
to Souakin and lay siege to that seaport and to the fortified places
near it. In October a force of 500 Egyptian troops sent to relieve one
of these last was surprised and routed, and the English Consul,
Moncrieff, a young naval officer who had gone with them, was killed by
the Mahdists. The defeat of Hicks in Kordofan speedily followed, and
Khartoum began to be threatened. The Souakin-Berber route was at that
time the speediest mode of communication between Cairo and Khartoum, and
after one or two more misadventures near the Red Sea coast it became
completely blocked, and it was found necessary to attempt to reopen it,
and thus towards the end of the year, there being no more regular
Egyptian troops to send, Baker Pasha, who had been organizing a corps of
military police at Cairo, was entrusted with the duty, his police
accompanying him, strengthened with the scratch force of Turks and
negroes impressed by Zebehr in Lower Egypt. Baker’s duty, as defined in
the Khedive’s Firman appointing him, was to “take command of the
operations which have for their object the pacification of the regions
lying between Berber and Souakin and the maintenance of communication
between these two points. . . . You should use every means of
conciliation and diplomacy, with a view to secure the obedience and
submission of the Sheikhs of the different tribes before having recourse
to force.”
Valentine Baker’s character was one that in this double duty inspired
confidence at the War Office. I remember him as long ago as the winter
of 1860-61, when he was in command of the 10th Hussars at York, the
hard-riding popular Colonel of a hard-riding popular cavalry regiment,
the smartest in the British army, hunting, every officer of them, four
days a week with the York and Ainsty or the Bramham Moor hounds—the
ideal man of his cavalry type. Then he fell into trouble, and in the
midst of a promising career had to leave the British army. The campaign
of Plevna was just beginning in the Balkans, and he took service with
the Turks and greatly distinguished himself in the famous retreat after
the fall of that fortress, and thus he had become a Pasha in the
Sultan’s service. But, on receiving the news of Tel-el-Kebir, nothing
would satisfy him but an attempt to get back into the British army, and
he unceremoniously left Constantinople and came to Cairo, where he was
made welcome by his former fellow soldiers and obtained from Sir Evelyn
Wood the command of the _gens d’armerie_, a quasi-military duty under
the Khedive. Valentine Baker was essentially a soldier of fortune and a
fighting man, and was burning with the desire of distinguishing himself
by some action of _éclat_ and so being restored to Her Majesty’s
service. That was his position and that the service he had been sent on,
and he had taken command at Souakin on the last day of the year.
Gordon was expected to co-operate with him and do the same at Khartoum,
and his original plan of passing through Souakin was in order that they
might make their plans together. Gordon was to help Baker to conciliate
and buy up the Souakin tribes, and he was himself to make his way to
Khartoum and re-establish order there and hold the fort till the
communications were free for both of them between the two places. It was
a plan in which common action was essential; and then the Egyptian
garrisons of the interior were to be sent down to the sea coast and
Gordon was to organize his new government at Khartoum.
The success of the whole plan as a military one of evacuation depended
on the possibility of a double success in reopening the Souakin-Berber
route and keeping it open, the other line of retreat down the Nile to
Egypt being too long and too difficult, in face of the disturbed state
of the country and the absence of transport, for it to have been
possible to convey the garrisons and the civilians who were to accompany
them in safety northwards. It was an essential part of Gordon’s mission
of evacuation that the road to the coast should be cleared, and, as we
have seen, Gordon, in his letter to Sir Samuel Baker, had made co-
operation between him and Sir Samuel’s brother a first necessity of the
position. No soldier could have been blind to this.
I am inclined therefore to think that Gordon’s original plan of going to
Souakin to take counsel with Baker would have given Gordon a better
chance of ultimate success than by changing it, as Cromer insisted on
his doing, to the Nile route. Also Gordon had a perfect soldier’s right
to expect that, if according to the new plan he was to play his own part
unassisted at Berber and Khartoum, the Government that sent him should
at least have helped Baker at the other end of the evacuating line, that
between the sea and the Nile, to keep this line open. There is a passage
indicative of the acknowledgement of such an obligation on the part of
the Foreign Office in Fitzmaurice’s “Life of Granville,” to which I
shall return later, a passage which would show that the British
Government at the time of their dispatch of Gordon intended to defend
not only the Red Sea coast against the Mahdi, but also the whole of the
eastern provinces as far inland as the Nile. Had they adhered to this
intention the necessary support would have been given to Gordon, and it
was thus that Gordon understood the position.
The whole plan, however, lost any chance of success it might have had by
the total and inglorious defeat of Baker at Teb on the 5th February.
Gordon ought then, according to all strategic rule, either to have been
recalled or troops of some sort ought to have been provided to reinforce
him and open the road which Baker had failed to open, the road now more
than ever closed for his retreat. It should have been done at once, if
at all, for on the 19th of May Berber declared for the Mahdi and the
chance was gone. The Government at home, however, could not make up its
mind either to recall Gordon or to send the assistance needed. There was
a conflict of feeling in the Cabinet which prevented anything being
decided. General Graham was sent indeed to Suakin with a British force
in February, but after fighting a battle or two with Osman Digna he was
forbidden to go further and his force was withdrawn. Hartington and
Wolseley at the War Office wanted Gordon supported, but Gladstone stuck
to it that he had always understood Gordon’s mission to be a mission of
peace and would not consent to Graham’s advance. On the other hand,
nobody in the Cabinet or at Cairo seems to have had his wits
sufficiently about him to get Gordon’s Firman revoked, or to have
understood that without such revocation he could not in honour abandon
his mission. Had he been released from his instructions, Gordon could
have left the garrisons to make the best terms they could with the
Mahdi, and gone on, as was his original intention, by way of the White
Nile to the Congo. This would have been, if not a very glorious, at
least a simple solution of the difficulty, and indeed, if troops were
not to be sent, it was the only rational one.
Lastly, as to the English help promised Gordon which he is blamed for
having counted on, I think it cannot be doubted that when he left London
in February some such promise was made him, or at least that there was
an understanding to that effect between him and the War Office. It may
be gathered from his speeches that Hartington so considered it, and it
is notorious that such was Wolseley’s view. Gordon was to go to
Khartoum, in the first place, to try his luck single-handed, but
Wolseley always counted on helping him if his luck should fail. Whether
the full conclave of the four Ministers who dispatched him on his
mission so understood the case is open to doubt; certainly Gladstone was
not a party to any such promise; and yet it must necessarily have been
present in their minds if not upon their lips. The contrary is
inconceivable.
Also the Queen, who cannot but have been informed of all at the time,
unquestionably considered her Ministers to have promised Gordon armed
support. Her view of the obligation is to be found in the letter she
wrote to Gordon’s sister a few days after the news of his death reached
England, and which has been published. Queen Victoria’s letter begins
thus:
“How shall I write to you or how shall I attempt to express _what I
feel_! To _think_ of your dear noble heroic brother, who served his
country and his Queen so truly, so heroically, with a self-sacrifice so
edifying to the world, not having been rescued; that the promises of
support were not fulfilled—which I so frequently and constantly pressed
on those who asked him to go—is to me _grief inexpressible_!”
This letter, drafted by no secretary, but written with the Queen’s own
royal hand, seems to me conclusive. Its very indignation is the best
proof of its truth, its anger at a betrayal known by the writer to have
been such. It is impossible that the Queen should have used the words
“the promises of support were not fulfilled” without any such having
been understood by her at the time to have been made. There is, of
course, no written record of them in any of the papers presented to
Parliament, and the promises probably were verbal only, as indeed were
all the details of the mission treated departmentally between Wolseley
and Gordon. But it makes it almost certain that the War Office, if not
the Government as a body, had intended military support, if such should
be required, and had spoken of it to Gordon. Gordon certainly counted on
military help, for he alludes to it repeatedly in his diaries.
Who then, if not her Ministers, can have conveyed to the Queen the idea
of a promise having been given? Who gave or implied an assurance that
the mission would, if necessary, have outside help? Between Wolseley and
Gordon it was certainly understood that the War Office would do its best
to see that he was properly backed when the time came. It might be
difficult to get Gladstone to consent, but pressure would be put. The
Duke of Cambridge also, in all probability, said more than this. He saw
Gordon off at the station, and cannot but have recounted all to Her
Majesty afterwards. However silent Granville and the rest may have been,
these two, Wolseley and the Duke of Cambridge, must have promised. The
Queen’s letter remains its certain proof.
For the rest of the incidents of Gordon’s tragic mission, having said my
say on the principal points in dispute regarding it, I will now return
to my interrupted diary. It will show how I at the time regarded the
mission, not in the light of my now better knowledge, but as it was
presented to me in part by the public voice, in part by what I learned
privately from those that knew.
CHAPTER VII
EXCITEMENT ABOUT GORDON IN LONDON
MY Indian journey over I left Bombay for England on the 1st March 1884,
and arrived at Suez on the 12th, and going on by Naples to Paris reached
London on the 27th, altogether too late to be of any avail in the matter
of Gordon. He was already at Khartoum.
The only noticeable incident on this homeward journey was that passing
through the Suez Canal we found that vessels arriving from Bombay were
subject to quarantine, and so that any intention I might have had of
going ashore was necessarily abandoned. Nevertheless, while I was
standing with other passengers on deck, a Government boat drew alongside
our ship, remaining just outside the prescribed quarantine limit, and I
heard my name called with inquiry whether I was on board, and going to
the gangway was accosted from the boat by an Englishman in the Khedivial
uniform, who informed me that he was Lieutenant-Colonel Gibbons in the
Egyptian service, and that he had been instructed on behalf of the
Government to notify to me that if I attempted to land I should be
subjected to arrest. The announcement mattered little to me under the
circumstances, though it proved afterwards to be the first step in a
course of prohibition and exile which shut me out from Egypt for the
next three years, and which, as will be seen, was maintained against me
as long as Lord Granville continued at the Foreign Office.
At Paris we spent a few hours in the society of our refugee friends,
Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, Seyyid Jemal-ed-Din and James Sanua. The first I
had not seen since the war, for he had spent the first year of his exile
at Damascus, where the sons of Abd-el-Kader had befriended him, and
where he had lived poorly but in security with a number more of the
Egyptian Nationalist exiles. We found him somewhat Europeanized already
by a two months’ stay in Paris. He had left off shaving his head, and
wore a fez instead of a turban, which rather detracted from his dignity
as Sheykh, though he was still dressed in a respectable fur pelisse. “He
talks now openly against the Sultan and the Turks, complains of the
tyranny in Syria, and argues of the Sherif Own as the coming Caliph. The
Mahdi, he says, is the forerunner of the Arabian Caliph who will soon
be.” To him and to Jemal-ed-Din I related all that I had done in India,
and my thought of going to Constantinople, but they warned me this would
be of no use; I might try, but they expected no good to come of it. All
the power there was in the hands of Osman Pasha of Plevna, who cared
only to fill his own purse. Syria was becoming indoctrinated with ideas
of liberty in spite of the tyranny of spies and police. At
Constantinople nothing could be done. We talked of the Mahdi, who was
now the chief subject of interest with Moslems, and of Gordon, who was
at Khartoum. Jemal-ed-Din entirely approved of the letter I had written
to Gordon, and agreed that he would perish now that he had taken the
wrong side. The following occurs in my diary of
“_27th March._—We found Jemal-ed-Din in a little room eight feet square
at the top of a house in the Rue de Seize, where he and Abdu edit a
newspaper called the ‘Indissoluble Link.’ Almost at the same time came
in a very curious party of strangers who quite filled the room—a Russian
lady, an American philanthropist, and two young Bengalis who announced
themselves as Theosophists, come, they said, to consult the great
Sheykh. They talked an extraordinary jargon about humanity, but seemed
kind-hearted people, and so full of their cause as to take no notice
whatever of our presence. The main object of their visit was to inquire
about the Mahdi, whom they were all most anxious to believe in as a
humanitarian, but their minds were perplexed about the slave trade, and
they cross-questioned the Sheykh as to the Mahdi’s principles on that
head. The Sheykh had great difficulty in satisfying them, but explained
how much slaves gained among Mohammedans in exchange for their freedom.
This sent them away happy, but the poor Sheykh was put to his last
shifts to hide his amusement. When they were gone we had a good talk
about India, and all that we had done, which pleased him much.”
I called also at the Embassy, and had an hour with Sheffield, who told
me Gordon’s idea had been to go straight to the Mahdi and make peace
with him, but he had been prevented at Cairo. Now he considered his case
hopeless. Lord Lyons, whom I also saw, acknowledged that we had got into
an inextricable mess in Egypt. The same night we went on to England,
arriving in London. Here I found myself once more in the thick of a
political crisis, of which the main feature was the interminable
Egyptian imbroglio, made more than ever acute by Gordon’s peril at
Khartoum. My journal deals principally with this, and indeed it occupied
for ten months to come almost the whole public thought of Englishmen.
My first visits on arrival were to Button and Knowles, my threatened
arrest in Egypt being upper-most in my mind. “Button still maintains his
connection with the ‘Times,’ though poor Chenery is dead and his place
as Editor has been taken by a young man, Buckle. He gave me a pathetic
account of Chenery’s death. He had suffered great pain for years from a
cancer, of which he told no one of the ‘Times’ staff, though sometimes
it would make him groan aloud. He was very forlorn, being without
intimate friends while knowing every one. But he had an affection for
Button. Then he had suddenly gone away alone and died. Button’s
political report was that the life of Gladstone’s Cabinet was very
precarious—hardly likely to last through the Session. I stood well now,
he thought, with the public, as every one saw I had been right about
Egypt.
To Knowles I told what had happened to me in Egypt in consequence of the
encouragement given me. “Mr. Gladstone?” he said, “I should not be
surprised to see him any day order our troops back and clear bodily out
of Egypt; I have known him for years, and as long as he can twist his
conduct into an apparent consistency of words, he will change his
opinions without scruple. But he will not endure being brought face to
face with a flat contradiction. It has always been the same, about art
and literature and everything else. As yet, he has maintained a certain
verbal consistency, but he cannot do it much longer.”
A third visit was to my sister-in-law, Lady Wentworth, from whom I
learnt that my exclusion from Egypt had been ordered by the Foreign
Office. She knew of this from George Leveson Gower, Granville’s nephew
and Gladstone’s private secretary. Lastly, I saw Randolph Churchill.
“_30th March._—I found Randolph in bed in a little room at the top of
his house in Connaught Place. We had a long talk about Arabi and my
visit to India. He was curious to know what I had been doing with the
Mohammedans there, for Gorst had given him the idea that I had started
the university at Hyderabad for revolutionary purposes. I told him I
considered a revolution in India certain if changes in the system of
government were not introduced. He said, ‘It is hopeless to try and get
the Conservatives to take up the idea of any sort of change.’ He seemed
taken, however, with the notion I suggested to him of playing the part
of champion of the Mohammedans. I proposed that we should go together to
Constantinople in the recess, but he said he was canvassing Birmingham
and could not possibly find time. About my having been prevented from
landing in Egypt he was especially interested, and thinks it could be
made a capital point of attack on the Government. I told him the history
of Knowles’s message to me from Gladstone, without however mentioning
Knowles’s name. But he said at once: ‘Oh, I know, that’s Knowles,
because he has told lots of people the same thing.’ He advises the whole
of my correspondence about it being lumped at once into the ‘Times,’ and
that Drummond Wolff should be set at the Foreign Office to make the most
of it in Parliament.
“He told me also that overtures had been made him from the Khedive for a
withdrawal of the charges he had brought forward implicating him in the
massacres of Alexandria, notably through the Prince of Wales, who had
had a quarrel with him, nine years before, and had not spoken to him
since. Now, however, the Prince had dined with him at a select dinner of
people interested in Egypt, and had talked highly of the Khedive to him.
‘The thing, however,’ he said, ‘has served its purpose, and we must go
on to something fresh. I look upon the charge as proved, and I know it
smashed up the Khedive and the Government policy at the time.’ Wentworth
has made a really good speech on the Soudan battles, and may, I think,
help us much in our new campaign.
“_31st March._—Gordon has been defeated outside Khartoum, his army of
2,500 flying from sixty of the Mahdi’s men. What a hideous comedy it all
is. He is now calling for English troops, he who went out to give
freedom to the Soudan, peace on earth and goodwill towards men. [This is
how I regarded his mission at the time.] Called on Sir Wilfrid Lawson,
the only honest man in Parliament. He urges that we should make some
move for the restoration of Arabi, but I doubt whether the time has
come. At the present time the Mahdi is the one popular man in Egypt. Saw
Lyulph Stanley.[28] He is now for a Protectorate in Egypt, and I can
find nobody in favour of a Nationalist restoration. They all say now
that I was right and Arabi was an honest man, but they treat it as a
matter of history, and rather old history too. Button advises my getting
a legal opinion on the case of my exclusion from Egypt before going any
further. Lawson sends me some doggerel verse about the war, not so good
as the last he wrote, but to the point.
“_3rd April._—Lunched with Button at the Carlton, who tells me the Jews
were never in such a fright about Egypt as they were two days ago. The
Rothschilds have still four millions invested there and are working the
press all they can. Lady Rosebery is nearly the only person who is
allowed to see Gladstone. But they are in a terrible fright of his doing
something violent, _e.g._, withdrawing the troops from Egypt. He,
Button, sees the Rothschilds nearly daily, for the ‘Times’ is in their
hands. To-day, however, they are more confident, and people are buying
Egyptian stock. While we were talking, Burnaby[29] came in with
Churchill and Gorst, and I had some talk with them. Burnaby looks weak
and wears his arm in a sling. [He was just back from Souakin, where he
had taken part in Graham’s expedition and the battle of Tamanieb as a
volunteer.] And I felt some disgust at shaking hands with a man who has
been murdering the Arabs with his shot gun as he seems to have done. I
have never liked him, for he has the most evil countenance one can
imagine. I like Churchill far the best of the three. He has a light
cheery manner like a boy at school.
“In the Park, where I sat for a few minutes and saw the two Lytton girls
looking like roses. Their father starts for Sorrento to-night.
“_4th April._—To Auberon Herbert at the Langham Hotel. He highly
approves of the idea of letting the Egyptians choose their own ruler,
and waiting for a spontaneous movement to bring back Arabi. If the
British Government recalled Arabi now and proposed him, he would be
looked upon with suspicion by the people. Thence to Lawson’s, whom I
found in high delight at having got a declaration out of the Government
that they do not intend to send troops to Khartoum.
“Lunched with Labouchere. He is more practical, and we have discussed
every detail of the policy to be suggested to Gladstone. He will feel
the ground through Herbert Gladstone, which is his way of consulting the
oracle. He told me the history of Gordon’s mission. Gordon’s idea had
been to go out and make friends with the Mahdi, and to have absolutely
nothing to do with Baring or the Khedive, or with anybody in Egypt. He
was going to Souakin straight, where he counted upon one of the
neighbouring Sheykhs, whose sons’ lives he had saved or spared, and his
mission was to be one entirely of peace. But the Foreign Office and
Baring caught hold of him as he passed through Egypt, and made him stop
to see the Khedive, and so he was befooled into going to Khartoum as the
Khedive’s Lieutenant. Now he had failed altogether in his mission of
peace, and the Government had recalled him more than once in the last
few days, but he had refused to come back. Gladstone had decided
absolutely to recall all the troops from Egypt when Hicks’s defeat was
heard of, and was in a great rage. The expedition to Souakin had been
forced on him by the Cabinet, and Hartington had taken care to give
Graham no special instructions, so that he might fight without orders.
This Graham of course had done, and Gladstone more angry still had gone
down to sulk at Coombe. [Bertram Currie’s villa in Coombe Wood.] Now he
would stand it no longer, and he had let Hartington in by coming up and
making the speech he did last night. Nobody expected it. Labouchere
thought the moment most favourable for a new move.
“_7th April._—Button tells me the Rothschilds are still in a great state
of anxiety about their money, and Button is for the Government
guaranteeing a loan of £8,000,000. It appears that the French are quite
ready to put in their oar and themselves guarantee if allowed to
protect. There is a split between Nubar and Clifford Lloyd. Nubar has
threatened to resign. This will bring things to a crisis.
“_8th April._—At Crabbet, dawdling about among the horses, and going to
see the Vardon property, which is for sale, and which I must buy if I
can. This property has for the best part of a century been a thorn in
our flesh, running like a wedge into Crabbet. There is an entry in the
shooting diary of 1824 in which complaint is made of ‘old Vardon’s
poaching.’ Now is the time to rectify our frontier. An estate is a
kingdom, with its wars and intrigues and ambitions and thirst for new
territory, and, though I have no personal wish to increase mine, I
consider this purchase a duty of my reign.
“I have written to Abdu a statement of my views about India, and to
Selim Faris asking him what chance I should have of being able to
influence people at Constantinople, if I went there, in favour of an
effort at Mohammedan regeneration.
“_9th April._—Called on Mrs. Howard. We had a tremendous argument, I
defending the Mahdi, she attacking him as a fanatic, and begging me not
to talk in that way in England. She said: ‘It is so stupid of you,
because you have so much sense, and if you would be moderate you might
have great influence.’ I said: ‘My influence will never be great in
England, because English people care nothing for principle and
everything for party, and I am not a party man. My influence lies in the
East, where all understand and accept me.’ We talked about Baring, and
their refusal to let me land in Egypt, and she declared the Foreign
Office had had nothing to do with it. But George said it was the only
sensible thing they had done yet. We went on to Gladstone, and she
described how he had become a political gambler. He had gambled with me
by sending me to Egypt, just as he had since gambled with Gordon. If we
succeeded he won; if we failed he did not intend to pay. This, I doubt
not, is the position exactly.
“Lunched at the Carlton with Button. He intends to stand for Dorchester
at the General Election, which may be anywhen now. But it will depend on
events in Egypt. Gordon’s death would precipitate matters, but anyhow
Egypt must go bankrupt in a month or two. He asked me why I did not look
out for a constituency, but I said there was none in England would elect
me. I could only conscientiously stand as a Home Ruler, and the Irish
would not have me because I am an Englishman. Besides, I could not
belong to a Party. He agreed that I was not meant for Parliament and had
a stronger position outside. I had some talk with Miltown, who believes
in the Sultan’s Caliphal prestige. I fancy the Tories, when they find
they cannot annex Egypt, will hand it over to the Sultan. Anything would
be better than the present state of things. I care little now who goes
to Egypt so long as the English leave and no other European Power takes
their place. But things are in the most extraordinary muddle; I find
people here more cordial and respectful of my opinion than they were
last year.
“_10th April._—My letter proposing a new settlement for Egypt is in the
‘Times,’ with a leading article in disparagement. It is all very well to
bluster, but I cannot see how they are to carry on their game of brag
with no soldiers to send to Egypt and the French getting angry, and
bankruptcy staring them in the face.
“_11th April._—Dined with Eddy Hamilton at the St. James’s Club. He has
been wanting to see me, and has written four times since I came home. In
spite of his declaration that we were not to talk politics, nothing else
was talked of. He began by saying that he had read my letter to the
‘Times,’ and agreed with most of it, but he thought it a pity that I had
mentioned the Khedive’s abdication as a possible thing. I must know that
the English Government was committed to his support. It was committed
before Mr. Gladstone came into office, and such pledges could not be
withdrawn from. He himself had always regretted this, and had considered
the Joint Note of January, 1882, a great mistake. But the thing was done
now and there was no help for it. He was sick of the whole thing and
wished Egypt at the bottom of the sea. But they could not get out of it
till there was a prospect of peace. I said: ‘You will never have peace
as long as you insist on keeping Tewfik, and you are only at the
beginning of your troubles. We will plague you in turn with all the
plagues of Egypt until you let the people go. This year you will have
the Mahdi, next year you will have a flood, and the next a famine.’ He
said: ‘It is impossible to do anything for the Egyptians. They will not
help themselves, they are such miserable cowards, and there is not an
honest man among them.’ I said: ‘As for their cowardice, you have taken
peasants from the fields and have sent them to fight for a man they hate
against a man they love. As for their dishonesty, you have driven the
honest men out of Egypt or frightened them into holes and corners. There
are plenty of honest Egyptians, and I could guarantee an honest
government if you would let me, only not with Tewfik, and not with the
class of men you now employ.’ He said: ‘The rest are too stupid.’ I
said: ‘Egypt is the easiest of all lands to govern, and it does not
require cleverness to do it. It requires honesty and the consent of the
people. In all Arab societies the character of the Ruler is reflected in
the Ministers, and, with a ruler whom they respected, and who had the
qualities they respected, you could reform the whole mass. But Tewfik
they never can respect, and the Circassians are opposed to all reform.’
We talked about Gordon and the Mahdi. Gordon it appears has written to
say that the Mahdi has no power in the Soudan, and Eddy thinks the whole
thing a myth. He does not want to send an army to Khartoum, but trusts
to the desert frontier as Egypt’s best defence. In this he is right, but
I told him he must expect raids such as the Wahhabis used to make in the
last century on Bagdad and Syria; they used to make desert marches of a
thousand miles. I warned him against employing Indian troops, and told
him my view of the danger of mixing India up with the troubles of Egypt.
He said: ‘I hope there may be no occasion.’ But from his tone I should
judge they have the possibility of employing Indian troops in their eye,
in spite of their public declarations. He said they had no reason to
believe these otherwise than loyal.
“We then talked about my exclusion from Egypt, and he was glad I had not
attempted to force a landing on my way home, which he had feared. He
assured me the Foreign Office had nothing whatever to do with the matter
(which is not true), and trusted I would let the matter rest. I told him
that was out of the question, and as a public duty, if for no other
reason, I must bring it before the Foreign Office. He seemed much taken
aback by this, and I am sure it was to find out my intentions, amongst
other things, that he proposed this dinner. We then talked about India.
. . . While we were talking the Duke of Marlborough came up and talked
also about India, and my success there with the Mohammedans. He knows
India well, and is a cleverer man than people give him credit for,
cleverer than his brother Randolph. [I ought rather to have said more
intellectual, for he could not compare with Randolph in readiness of wit
or those qualities which made his brother a leader of men. But his mind
was a broad one, and if he had lived for anything else but pleasure he
might have gained a high public position in the world.]
“I am satisfied with the conversation with Eddy. It is clear they are at
their wits’ end for a policy. They are waiting at present upon
Providence, but Providence will not help them.
“_12th April._—An important move is noticed in to-day’s telegrams.
Germany and Austria have presented identical notes pressing the claims
of their subjects on the Egyptian Government. This will force a
financial crisis and bring all Europe into the matter.
“_13th April, Easter Sunday._—An anxious letter from Sir Wilfrid Lawson.
He is as angry as I am about Egypt. He would clear out of it bag and
baggage. I would stay long enough to do justice and make reparation, no
matter at what cost to England.
“_15th April._—Abdu and Sanua have both written, delighted with my
letter in the ‘Times.’ The French papers have taken it up and reprinted
it, and I expect it will cause some trouble to Baring.
“_16th April._—Met Button at the Carlton and talked over plans. Drummond
Wolff, whom I met the other day, asked me whether it was true that
Button meant to break with the Fourth Party, and I mentioned this to
Button, and he said that it was so; Randolph was becoming more
unscrupulous than ever, and Gorst was still worse. Not long ago they had
tried to play a trick upon the ‘Times,’ and had all but succeeded. Gorst
had written to Buckle, who is young and new to his work, to say that Sir
Stafford Northcote had decided to retire after the Easter recess from
the leadership of the Opposition, and Buckle had actually got the
article in print, when at twelve o’clock at night the article writer had
suggested that he (Button) should be consulted. Button was in bed, but
he got up and succeeded in finding his uncle, Robert Bourke, who told
him the whole thing was a plant, he having been with Northcote that very
afternoon devising plans for the coming Session. So the article was
stopped just in time. Wolff, Button thinks, is the only honest one of
the lot. I expect Robert Bourke has advised him to have nothing more to
do with them. Young Hamid Ullah is here.
“_18th April._—Lunched with Colonel Osborn[30] to talk over plans
connected with India. He thinks I have done a great work there, and
agrees with nearly every point of my programme. But he says it is
useless bringing it forward this year, as Parliament is entirely
occupied with the prospect of a dissolution, and it would be impossible
to get members to commit themselves to vigorous action. He is probably
right.
“At three Mr. Stead, the new ‘Pall Mall’ Editor, called, and I had a
long conversation with him about the prospects in Egypt. He tried to
make me commit myself to some approval of annexation as better than the
present state of things, but I would not do this, and I think he went
away with the impression that I was impracticable. He is by way of
knowing a great deal of the opinions of the various European Cabinets,
and assured me that Germany would not interfere with anything that might
be done or proposed to be done in Egypt, that Bismarck did not care what
happened to the Suez Canal, and that the question would have to be
settled between France and England. He did not believe in the Mahdi
having any real power in the Soudan, and Gordon ought to be reinforced.
Mr. Stead is a smart intelligent pressman, very different indeed from
his predecessor Morley. I do not think we are likely to agree or that he
will make any use of my opinions. We are too wide apart. At any rate he
promised to publish nothing as mine without letting me see what he had
written.
“As he was going, Jack and Mark Napier rushed in to ask if I would help
them to save Gordon.[31] They had an idea, which was to get together a
thousand sportsmen, men they explained who would be ready ‘to go a
thousand miles to shoot a lion,’ and try to force a passage from Suakin
to Berber and carry off Gordon on the true principles of a rescue. They
thought I might like to join them and show them the way. But I told them
the scheme was nonsense, and even if it wasn’t I would have nothing to
do with armed operations against the Arabs. Much as I liked Gordon
personally, I considered him to be in the wrong and the others in the
right, and I would rather see him perish than cause the death of one of
his opponents. If it came to sending an Embassy to the Mahdi, I might be
able to help them, and I advised them to put this idea forward, rather
than the other. I have written to Jemal-ed-Din to ask him what he thinks
of it.
“_19th April._—At Crabbet. Count Alfred Potocki came down with his son
Roman, and Mr. Marcowski, manager of Count Branicki’s stud, all Poles
and breeders of Arab horses, to see our horses. They have come over to
England on purpose to see them, and are in raptures. Count Potocki is a
very distinguished man. Forty years ago he was attaché to the Austrian
Embassy in London and knew everybody worth knowing, and he still keeps
up a marvellous acquaintance with English politics. We talked over the
whole situation with regard to Egypt. He ridicules the idea of the
French being able to fight over the matter, and he considers Gladstone
the most dangerous man England has ever had as minister. He tells me the
new Russian Ambassador in London who has just been appointed is the same
Staal[32] who was my friend twenty-five years ago at Athens. It is
singular how many men whom I was with there, and knew intimately as
colleagues, have since distinguished themselves. Haymerlé, whom I
remember lamenting that he never on account of his birth could rise
higher than the rank of Secretary, died Prime Minister of Austria;
Nelidoff is Ambassador to the Porte; Staal is Ambassador in London;
Malzen Grand Chamberlain at Munich, and Dufferin, who however was only a
visitor at Athens in 1859, holds first European rank as a Diplomatist
after Bismarck. We talked about Lytton, who Potocki declares will be the
next Tory Foreign Secretary, and we talked about India.
“Button telegraphs that a Conference has been called!
“_20th April._—The ‘Observer’ announces that the Conference will be held
in London, but will confine itself to financial matters. Baring has been
summoned to England. My only fear now is the re-establishment of the
Dual Control, which is evidently on the cards.
“_21st April._—Twiss has given his opinion on the case of my being
prevented landing in Egypt. It is wholly adverse to my legal position as
having a right to land. I must now treat the case diplomatically.
“_22nd April._—Parliament met yesterday, and Gladstone has at last
admitted that Gordon is ‘hemmed in,’ though he denies that he is
‘surrounded.’ The Governor of Berber[33] telegraphs that he must make
friends with the Mahdi, and the French are writing violent articles. The
‘Pall Mall’ this evening predicts a war with France.
“_23rd April._—To London. Things worse than ever in Egypt. Baring is on
his way home to be hauled over the coals, and about time; Nubar talking
again of resigning if Berber is not relieved; and Topsy Egerton,[34] who
is in charge at Cairo, recommending a mixed English and Egyptian
expedition of relief.
“Jack and Mark Napier came again, and I read them the draft of a letter
I have written to Gladstone, proposing to act as mediator for the relief
of Gordon.[35] This was suggested by one I received this morning from
Jemal-ed-Din to the effect that for my sake he would do what he could
with the Mahdi to save Gordon’s life. Button advised me to take it
myself to Downing Street and ask to see Gladstone. But the Prime
Minister was busy with a Cabinet Council, and I was obliged to entrust
it to Eddy Hamilton in the hope of getting an answer. Button says it is
too late, and that they decided yesterday to send a relief expedition to
Berber. But as yet they have announced no such intention. Lord De la
Warr,[36] too, approves of the letter, and I think at least it will be
an advantage to put it on record that the offer was made. I told Eddy
briefly the nature of my proposal, and he said he was entirely for
peace, but he could not promise me Mr. Gladstone would see me, because I
was looked upon as an opponent of their Egyptian policy.[37]
“My idea of a solution would be either to go myself or get some one else
to go, Jemal-ed-Din or Abdu or young Abd-el-Aal, first to Dongola, and
thence to Obeyd. There ought not to be much difficulty about this. The
condition, I fancy, which might be accepted would be the evacuation of
the fortified places by Gordon and such Europeans, Turks, Copts, and
others as might wish to go back to Egypt; a treaty of peace, or rather
an engagement on the part of the Mahdi that he would fix his frontier at
Berber and Dongola, and the Egyptian Government theirs at Assouan; a
guarantee of the Red Sea from Foreign European attack; an indemnity to
the Hadendowas as blood money for those slain at Teb, Tamasi, and
elsewhere. For myself I should stipulate that no military operation was
to be begun during my mission, that no revenge should be taken for my
death, or expedition be sent for my release in case of capture, and that
it should be recorded in writing that the terms of the agreement should
be kept. I should also mention that I should expect Arabi to be restored
in Lower Egypt should my mission prove successful. But it is extremely
unlikely they will let me go.
“At the Carlton Club I met Seymour FitzGerald,[38] with whom I talked
about India. He wonders I do not stand at Horsham for the next
elections, or as a Tory Home Ruler in Ireland. Major Napier,[39] too,
was there, and old Ranalagh with whom I have always had a sympathy as
having been once a rebel. He fought with the Carlists in Spain. De la
Warr is expecting the ex-Khedive at Buckhurst.
“Later to Button’s, where I met Brocklehurst, Gordon’s chief friend and
correspondent, and had a long talk with him about Gordon. It appears
that Gordon asked repeatedly for me when he was starting for Egypt, and
it is a thousand pities I did not see him (being away in India), as I
could have prevented his making the mistake of going to Tewfik and
neglecting to go to the Mahdi. Brocklehurst declares that Gordon, from
first to last, has refused to believe in the Mahdi’s influence, and does
not believe in it now. He says that if he had done so he would certainly
have made friends with him. But he is very angry with Baring. He does
not trust much to the relief expedition, though he is in favour of
trying it, and I think he is inclined to support my plan of negotiation
instead. The only thing is, is it not too late?
“Dined at Pembridge Crescent to meet Arthur Godley, who has always been
sympathetic with my ideas. He is now at the India Office, and can afford
to talk more openly than formerly when he was Gladstone’s Private
Secretary. He is all for peace in Egypt, and thinks Gordon mad, which I,
too, begin to think may be the real explanation of it. About India he
was very ready apparently to take my views. But he considered the ill-
feeling between Englishmen and natives was confined to Bengal. I am to
go to him again in a day or two at the India Office to talk over Indian
affairs. He agreed with me when I said that the end of it all would be
that we should leave Egypt and only keep possession of her debt.
“_24th April._—No answer from Downing Street, but Button says that at
the Cabinet Council yesterday afternoon they changed their minds in
favour of peace. Wolseley was there, and there was to be no expedition
after all. He thinks perhaps my letter may have had something to do with
it. Lunched at the Carlton and met Jem Lowther,[40] who talked about
Egypt, and Robert Bourke, who is asking the question about the dispatch
of troops to Berber and Khartoum. It is the opinion of both these Right
Honourable Gentlemen that the Government would give its ears to learn
that Gordon was dead.
“To the House of Commons and heard Gladstone make his explanation about
Gordon. It is certainly most audacious. But I am convinced it means no
troops, though nearly everybody seemed to understand the contrary. What
he said was that ‘All human means would be taken.’ Button, who was in
the gallery with me, whispered ‘Human means means you.’ Rivers
Wilson[41] was also in the gallery, and proposes to come and see me to-
morrow, a thing he has not done for the last two years. Gladstone is
looking thin and old. To my mind he does not show to advantage in the
House of Commons. He is argumentative, short tempered, and insincere;
the reverse in fact of what he is at home. And to-day he looked like a
fraudulent bankrupt trying to make his creditors believe he was paying
them twenty shillings in the pound. One wonders how he can inspire
confidence in his supporters, but I have never heard him on a really
great occasion.
“I have written to Jemal-ed-Din, sending extracts from the ‘Pall Mall,’
which has my letter to Gordon, the one written from India, in it, and a
leading article recommending that I should be sent to Obeyd to treat
with the Mahdi.” [It says: “If everything—Khartoum, arsenals, steamers,
and munitions of war—if all these are to be handed over to the Mahdi and
the garrisons are to trust their lives to his tender mercies, our proper
agent in the Soudan is not General Gordon, but Mr. Wilfrid Blunt.
General Gordon was prepared to go a great length in order to conciliate
the Mahdi. Mr. Blunt is prepared to go all lengths. General Gordon, as a
last resort, and being a man of war from his youth up, has always avowed
his readiness to fight rather than see his men cut to pieces. Mr.
Wilfrid Blunt would not injure the hair of an Arab to save the lives of
General Gordon and all his men. Mr. Blunt, then, is obviously the man to
whom the Government should turn in this the hour of their need. He
represents their policy to a nicety. If they will not relieve Berber,
and if they can do nothing to assist Gordon to hold Khartoum, let them
at least send Mr. Blunt in hot haste to El Obeid to arrange with the
Mahdi for the escape of the abandoned garrisons. Mr. Blunt is not less
brave than General Gordon, and he could be sacrificed at least as
safely.”]
“At Button’s, where I looked in again to ask his advice about an answer
which has come from Downing Street. Reginald Brett, Hartington’s
Secretary, called, and Button saw him in the other room. He states
positively that the Government has decided not only not to send troops
to Berber, but to forbid the Egyptian Government sending any. They mean
to do nothing at all, and have telegraphed to Egypt to say so. He thinks
they will certainly come to me. Eddy Hamilton’s note is to the effect
that Mr. Gladstone will answer later, but is now laying my proposal
before the Cabinet. He writes, however, another private note suggesting
that I should talk it over with Brand.[42] This, however, Button
recommends me not to do, so I have written to say I can only talk to Mr.
Gladstone, and will wait his convenience. What they want is, evidently,
that I should take all the responsibility of the negotiation on myself,
and offer terms which they might afterwards repudiate. But they won’t
catch me again doing this, and, if I go to Obeyd, I go as British envoy.
Otherwise I should only be waylaid by the Khedive on my road. Button is
in high delight at the upshot of it all. He tells me it was Wolseley
himself who told him what had been decided in the Cabinet.
“Dined at Pembridge Crescent to meet Captain Abney, a friend of
Gordon’s.
“_25th April._—To Button’s early, to talk matters over again. But there
is nothing new, except that the Bisharin Arabs have joined the Mahdi,
and the desert of Korusko is blocked. The telegrams in the papers don’t
say this. But Button had it from Wolseley, and I have written again to
Jemal-ed-Din, asking him about the terms which we might ask. The
Government won’t say anything to me till Baring arrives; that is to say
on Monday.
“Wrote a number of letters, to Jemal-ed-Din especially, and to Arabi,
asking the latter whether it would be possible for him to work with
Ismaïl in case such a solution should be proposed. He is to answer by
telegram, the words ‘Content,’ or ‘Refuse.’ This because I think the
time is come when a new settlement _must_ be made; and this is not the
most unlikely of the many proposals that will be brought forward.
“_26th April._—Called on Button. He tells me the Cabinet are again
wavering about sending troops to Berber, or rather Khartoum, for they
would probably start from Massowa if at all. The reason of this is that
the Liberal M.P.s understood Mr. Gladstone’s declaration yesterday in a
sense exactly opposite to his real meaning, that is to say as a promise
of sending troops, and half a dozen of their leaders went to him and
explained how much they approved of it, and Mr. Gladstone had been
unable to satisfy them by saying that all he had meant was that Gordon
should be ordered home. So, to please these people, there is to be more
slaughter. But we shall know when I get the answer to my letter. Button
tells me that several members of the Cabinet would be glad to go out of
office, notably Harcourt,[43] who is afraid of dynamite and is tired of
being watched by the police. Three or four days ago, talking of the
Conference with Natty Rothschild, Harcourt said: ‘Our hope is that the
Powers will refuse our proposals, which will give us an excuse for
coming straight out of Egypt.’ Button advises me not to send in my
papers about my being refused entrance to Egypt until I get my answer
about the Soudan. My own idea was to do so at once, as it is a rule of
strategy to fight stronger than ever when you are negotiating for peace.
“Then to Rivers Wilson whom I found in bed with a cold and a fox
terrier. He is of opinion that the Conference will meet and that it will
be impossible to exclude politics. ‘Ferry,’[44] he said, ‘is beginning
to feel his legs, and he means to restore the Dual Control, and will
insist on dragging in everything if he is asked to make a concession of
French financial rights. You talk about altering the Law of Liquidation,
but that is out of the question, and whatever happens, Egypt must pay
the interest on the debt. If this was not so I should be very happy to
see you set up Arabi or anybody you liked at Cairo. But what there must
be is a strong Government, which can collect the taxes and pay the
interest.’ He believes Egypt still able to raise £9,000,000 of revenue
and pay away half of it. But he spoke less positively than in former
days. We talked about Ismaïl. He would never have anything to do with
his coming back. Ismaïl was no longer any good, as he had lost all his
prestige, and though clever could not maintain himself. Tewfik was good
as an instrument. He himself had chosen him in preference to Halim as
being the more absolutely servile of the two—but of course he could not
rule. Arabi had lost all sympathy in England by his personal cowardice.
Rivers in fact is all for annexation if annexation is allowed by the
other Powers, which he doubts. I then told him my views for Egypt. He
has a good deal of influence with the Rothschilds, and if we could get
them at all on our side we should win the game.
“Then on to Labouchere, who has just written a capital letter about
Egypt in the ‘Times.’ He wants me to get Arabi to write him a letter
from Ceylon, giving his view about a possible restoration of the
National Party. He considers Gordon to be a stark lunatic, and is for
leaving him to his own devices.
“_28th April._—Berber is being abandoned, the garrison having gone over
to the Mahdi. Khartoum will follow.
“_29th April._—The ‘Standard’ has a telegram, saying that certain troops
and tribes from Khartoum have joined the Mahdi. If so, Gordon’s end has
come. The ‘Daily News’ has a letter from O’Kelly[45] at Dongola,
describing the Mahdi and his system in almost the same language that
these were described to me at Cairo seven months ago. I wonder whether
Eddy Hamilton would still maintain that the Mahdi was nobody.
“To London and found a letter from Jemal-ed-Din, giving me in detail his
idea of the Mission of Peace that might be sent to the Mahdi.[46] Button
tells me that the Government have decided _pour tout potage_ to send
Curly Knox to Khartoum! The idea is that he, knowing the country as a
sportsman, and something of the language, could smuggle himself into the
town, where he could deliver to Gordon the Government’s order that he
should return. The Government think that this will absolve them from all
further responsibility, and that, if Gordon—as he probably would—should
refuse to come back, his blood would be on his own head. I remember
Curly Knox ever since the days of the Crimean war. Now he is a somewhat
decayed blood, a rabid damned-nigger guardsman. And I would not be in
his shoes when the Mahdi has got hold of him—only he will never go.
Baring has been to the ‘Times’ people, which is always a sign with
officials that they feel their position shaky; and Button is sure he
won’t go back to Egypt. He has made too absurd a hash of it there.
Colvin, he said, was a clever fellow to get out of it when he did.
“Called on Hill, the Editor of the ‘Daily News,’ who has been asking me
to write for him. He agreed as to re-establishing a National Government
in Egypt, but it was necessary to find some formula for Mr. Gladstone
which could reconcile him to it; Mr. Gladstone changed his principles
constantly—but every time he needed a fresh formula, by which he could
satisfy his mind that he was consistent; he had nailed his colours to
Tewfik, and it would require management to get him to abandon him. As
for Gordon, they were going to do nothing now except perhaps get ready
for moving a small column of relief in July.
“Luncheon at the Carlton with Burnaby, whom I especially dislike. He
said he did not care a rap what happened to Gordon or Khartoum, and why
should he? So long as he has something to tell his electors, it will be
enough. He is a dull heavy fellow in my opinion, with a dash of cunning
and more than a dash of brutality. Afterwards to the House of Commons,
where I had a long talk with Lawson and John Morley,[47] whom Mrs.
Howard has written advising me to take into my councils. We three
discussed the whole thing. First, about Gordon, who we agreed was past
praying for. Morley said the Government were willing to bite their
tongues out now for having sent him; they were very angry with him, for
he had done everything he said he wouldn’t do, and done nothing that
they told him to do. He thought if his death had happened two months
ago, it would have turned out the Ministry. Now people were tired of
Gordon, and, though there would be a row, it would blow over. He thought
the Government would rather do anything than accept my help, it would be
very unpopular, and, with the failure of Gordon before their eyes, they
would be doubly disinclined. Still the necessity might be so great as to
force them.
“About Egypt I explained my views at length, Morley insisting that I
should put aside all moral arguments, and treat the case only as it
might appear to regard English interests. I said, therefore, that I
recognized two undoubted interests—(1) the Suez Canal, and (2) the
friendship of the Mohammedan world. Both these he admitted, and said you
may add a third. If things go on as they are now, we shall be at war
with France in less than five years. I then explained that as regards
the Suez Canal, we must either make an arrangement with Europe or with
France, and secure our interest in it by sharing it with them. The
friendship of the Mohammedan world could be best secured by establishing
a Mohammedan Government in Egypt and withdrawing our troops. But France
would only be satisfied with the establishment of a strong Government,
which could keep order. This could be done by allowing the people to
choose their own ruler—a ruler who would be supported by the troops.
Egypt was the easiest country in the world to govern, but you must have
the troops on your side. This seemed to please Morley as practical and
businesslike. He asked me, however, to explain how it was that last
August Sherif Pasha had declared to the Government that he was satisfied
with the loyalty of the troops and begged them to withdraw; it was then
decided that all the English troops should leave Egypt in the spring,
except a Corporal’s guard to be stationed at Alexandria, not to protect
the Khedive, but to prevent interference from the French. I told him the
reason was this, that the Egyptians then had no leader, and were
hopeless in the hands of the Circassians. But now the Mahdi had appeared
as a champion, and the army would serve him rather than Tewfik. It was
necessary therefore now to consider the Mahdi, and find a ruler who
could act on friendly terms with him. He asked about Arabi, saying he
was out of the question now. But I told him I still considered Arabi a
valuable man, as a good Mohammedan and one who would take advice. But he
must not be recalled as our nominee, which would spoil his influence.
‘Yes,’ Morley said, ‘the Egyptians must choose, and we must leave the
country—but we must not make it over to France.’
“_1st May._—Mr. Gladstone’s answer has come. Her Majesty’s Government
cannot make use of my offer to act as mediator in the Soudan, ‘in as
much as it must already be known throughout that region that they in
common with the Government of Egypt have no other desire than to promote
the evacuation of the country—and the restoration of its liberties.’
This is as pure a specimen of Gladstonese as can be found in Hansard.
And the ‘promotion of an evacuation’ is as funny as anything since the
French were reported to have ‘evacuated Spiders and Worms’ [an old
Napoleonic joke].
“To a Peace Conference, where I arrived just in time to prevent two
annexationists, Villiers Stuart and McCoan from carrying a resolution
calling on England to ‘take a determined course with regard to reform in
Egypt,’ specifying the reforms suggested by Arabi. I exposed this
manœuvre as meaning the dispatch to Egypt of fifty more Clifford Lloyds
and twenty more Evelyn Barings, and got an amendment passed that ‘reform
in Egypt should be entrusted to the only hands capable of effecting it,
those of the Egyptians themselves.’ McCoan went away in a huff, and
Stuart talked of resigning the chair.
“To the House of Commons, where I had a talk in the tea room with old
Donald Currie.[48] He told me that Gladstone had it all his own way
still in the Cabinet, and was at last anxious about Gordon. ‘His one
idea now,’ he said, ‘is to avoid more bloodshed.’ Both he and Sir George
Campbell,[49] who joined our conversation, talked of Gordon as having
gone off his head. I showed him that terms must be come to at once with
the Mahdi if we were not to have another bloody war. He promised to
speak to Gladstone in this sense.
“Spent the evening with Button looking through the Gordon Blue Book. It
is most damaging for the Government. Donald Currie and Campbell talked
of Gordon as having gone off his head. But this Blue Book shows the
Government went off theirs too.
“_2nd May._—Went to see Lady C. who talked about the Prince of Wales and
his political ideas. She says he is coming round a bit to Arabi.
“_3rd May._—There has been a great split between Randolph Churchill and
Lord Salisbury; and Churchill has resigned the Chairmanship of the
Conservative Union. This will probably save the Government, who were
threatened with a dissolution, nominally on the Reform Bill, but really
on their Egyptian policy.
“_5th May._—Sent in my case of exclusion from Egypt to Lord Granville.
It is certainly a strong one, and I think it must harass them if it does
no other good.
“_6th May._—An extraordinary set of Parliamentary Papers published
relating to Gordon. Reading these and the others carefully through, I
have come to the conclusion that Gordon is a very self-willed man,
without fixed rule of action. In any case he has clearly lost his head,
and, having failed to exercise the influence he expected over the
Soudanese, has turned against them, and is now the bitterest enemy of
everything he supported as good last year. He is fighting for his own
hand as simply and solely as any adventurer of them all. It will lead to
a new war, if he has not his head cut off and sent to Obeyd before the
summer is over.
“_7th May._—Called on Percy Wyndham,[50] who is much exercised against
the Government, as is natural, but at the same time is reasonable about
Gordon. I find most people inclined in private to think him out of his
mind. Percy has acted very straight in all this Egyptian business. He
was one of the minority of nine, and the only Tory who voted against the
war in 1882, and he has never made a mistake on any essential point. I
told him about my being refused a landing in Egypt, and he has promised,
when the time comes, to take the matter up in Parliament. As my nearest
relation, he is the right man to do it.
“Lunched with Dr. Leitner.[51] He shows great sympathy with the
Mohammedans, but is one of the Conservative school, loving the Turks,
and desiring no change. He wants me to make it up with the Sultan, and
urges me to go to Constantinople, and thinks I might gain influence
there.
“_8th May._—Button also thinks I had better go to Constantinople and
that Dufferin would be glad to see me. He, Button, has seen Wolseley,
who assures him no preparations are yet made for a Soudan expedition.
But he thinks, all the same, they will send a small force when the Nile
rises and will have a large force in Egypt. He wants me to call on him,
but I don’t think I will do this, as anything I could tell him would
only make him more anxious to send troops. I wrote yesterday to Jemal-
ed-Din, telling him I washed my hands of Gordon, that he had proved
himself a friend neither to liberty, nor to the Arabs, nor yet to Islam.
“A long talk with Mrs. Howard. She says people will never forgive me for
having given Arabi information before the war, especially about his
being attacked from the Suez Canal. Lord Granville is very angry still
and F. Leveson,[52] but she thinks not Mr. Gladstone. She says the
Government could never recognize the Mahdi as a religious personage.
“_9th May._—Mrs. Howard, talking yesterday of my article in the
‘Nineteenth Century’ on the proposed Arab race at Newmarket, said that
Freddy Leveson had asked Rosebery the other day why he continued on the
turf, and he had answered because it was the easiest way in England to
be accepted as a statesman, and he had appealed to Gladstone, who quite
agreed with him. She tells me that her husband, who represents the ideas
of the rank and file of the Liberal Party, is infinitely disgusted with
the Egyptian Policy, and says that half the party would vote against the
Government but for Home Questions.
“Called on Hugh Wyndham[53] in Dover Street, he having asked to see me.
He is Secretary of the Constantinople Embassy. We talked the Eastern
Question thoroughly through, and he seemed disposed to think my policy
might be adopted eventually as far as allowing the Arabs to set up a
Caliphate was concerned. Constantinople, he says, is crumbling to
pieces, the Turks of Europe emigrating in a continuous stream to Asia
Minor. The Germans are still supporting the Sultan. The Government of
the Porte is defunct, and the Sultan rules everything through a changing
set of Ministers who are all opposed to each other. The Sultan himself
is a mono-maniac, fancying himself in constant danger of assassination.
Hugh had seen him when Dufferin was on leave, and the Sultan had talked
to him for three-quarters of an hour about a certain Armenian doctor who
had been found dead in the Bosphorus, and he could be got to think of
nothing else. He thought Dufferin would wish to see me if I went to
Constantinople.
“_10th May._—To Button’s. He tells me the Government scheme was to offer
a remission of the English interest on the Suez Canal shares, for a
reduction of interest on the bonds. This had been proposed to France,
and at first was well received, but later Alphonse Rothschild had put
pressure on the French Government, and now they would do nothing unless
there was an international control.
“_11th May._—The ‘Observer’ announces that a relief expedition under
Wolseley will be dispatched to Khartoum in October. Jemal-ed-Din writes
expressing his great confidence in me, which is satisfactory,[54] for it
is of course difficult they should understand how I can remain on
confidential terms with our officials here and yet be true to Islam. It
is a strange position, but its strangeness is its strength.
“_12th May._—Met Churchill at the Carlton. He said: ‘Well, we shall have
Arabi back very soon now.’ I said: ‘I am afraid they will hand over
Egypt to the Conference—and the Conference will hand it over to Italy,
and Italy will hand it over to Ismaïl.’ He said they would like to do it
perhaps, but they would be prevented. I asked him about his own affairs,
saying: ‘You have been in the wars since I saw you.’ ‘Yes, as usual,’ he
said, ‘and I am not out of it yet.’ Thence to the India Office, where I
had it out with Godley about the Patna case.[55] I told him there had
been a compact that if I did not publish the case it would be inquired
into and redressed; and nothing had been done. I did not wish to annoy
Lord Ripon, but I should have to bring it before Parliament before the
end of the Session. He promised to write to Primrose and represent this
to him, which he admitted was fair. We talked about Hyderabad affairs.
Cordery, he told me, was in London, and I explained, for his private
information, the whole history of the intrigue against Salar Jung and
the Nizam.[56] He did not seem at all surprised and said everything was
going on right now. And I presume Cordery is not to return there. He
approved very heartily of the University scheme. Godley is a good
fellow, and I hear he always speaks of me in high terms. I have always
believed he left Gladstone partly because of the Egyptian war.
“After this to the House of Commons, where there was a tremendous crush
to hear the debate on the Vote of Censure, the Duke of Cambridge and
many another bigwig being left out in the cold. I got in through Harry
Brand, who entrusted me to Ponsonby, who squeezed me into the
Ambassadors’ Gallery, where I had a capital place. Hicks Beach’s[57]
speech was an excellent one, very well prepared and arranged, and rising
at certain points to eloquence. His best hits were when he asked if ever
a British Government received such a telegram as one of General
Gordon’s, and when he pointed to Mr. Gladstone and repeated, ‘You will
incur indelible disgrace.’ It was a dignified speech, almost in the old-
fashioned style, with a Latin quotation, and without the modern
Parliamentary violence, and will increase Beach’s reputation. Mr.
Gladstone was to my mind not so happy. While Beach was speaking he had
been taking notes in pen and ink, and rose to answer him more as a man
might in a debating club, than as a statesman arraigned on a
dishonourable charge. He was argumentative, sarcastic, petulant, but in
the course of speaking he became angry, and then he spoke with effect. I
was immensely pleased of course at the line he took of declining to make
war on the Mahdi’s followers who were ‘men fighting for their country’s
freedom’ [‘rightly struggling to be free’], and Scott Holland,[58] who
was near me in the Gallery, was equally excited. But he did not state
his case quite frankly, and constantly spoilt it by drawing fine
distinctions and quibbling as is his wont with words. In a speech of
this sort, it was surely a mistake of oratory ever to suggest a laugh.
His argument, however, was a strong one, that the Opposition had never
during all the Egyptian troubles formulated an alternative policy, and
he was powerful when he challenged Hicks Beach to say that he would send
an army to Khartoum. Having said this he waited a moment, and then
pointing to Beach, turned to the House and screamed ‘Look! Dumb!’ This
was a great oratorical success. But as I have said before, oratory under
the circumstances was rather out of place. I have been unfortunate in
never hearing Gladstone quite at his best, though Lawson called this one
of his best.
“_13th May._—Talked things over with Button. He advises me certainly to
go to Constantinople, but to tell nobody about it. It seems there is
some chance of the Vote of Censure being carried, and all now depends on
the Irish members. If they can turn the Government out, they will do so,
for the sake of a dissolution. But if they doubt their power they will
vote for Government. They will only make up their minds at the last
moment. If the Government is not beaten on the division, the
Conservatives will bring forward an address to the Crown to restrain the
Ministers from sacrificing British interests in Egypt. Button says this
is a quite Constitutional course.
“Called on Harry Brand, who thinks the Government will be beaten on the
division. He would vote against them himself if he was not in the
Government. ‘There is one man.’ he said, ‘who will be happy if it goes
against us, and that is Hartington. He is sick of office, and wants to
be away amusing himself. As things go worse for the Government, his
spirits rise.’ We walked together in the Park. I then went on to Stanley
of Alderley.[59]
“Stanley is quite reconciled to me now, and talks to me as Mohammedan to
Mohammedan, though he warns me still not to speak evil of the Turks.
‘There is a maxim,’ he says, ‘among Catholics, that whoever speaks ill
of the Jesuits, speaks ill of the Church, and so it is with the Turks.
They are the race which has carried out the teaching of the prophet in
its purity more than any other.’ I told him I had no quarrel with the
Turks except in their relations with the Arabs, whom they always managed
to corrupt, and I was come to ask his advice about going to
Constantinople. I had been through India, and was charged by the Indian
Mohammedans to see the Sultan and lay before him the need of a social
and moral reform for Islam, and to urge him to take the matter up, as
Emir el Mumenin, and to warn him that, if he neglected this duty, the
Indian Mohammedans would fall off from him. He thought the idea a good
one, and that I would be listened to, and he has promised to come to
James Street on Monday at noon, with letters he will write to Vefyk and
Khair-ed-Din Pashas on the subject. I intend, if the Government is not
turned out on the Vote of Censure, to leave for Paris and Constantinople
on Monday evening. Stanley is a good fellow, and I have known him now
for twenty-five years. He knows a great deal about Islam, but his ideas
are all confused, and he has no knowledge of the Arabs. He tells me he
was never in India—only in Ceylon and Siam, and knows so little of
modern ideas in India, that he had not heard of Seyd Ahmed being charged
with rationalism nor of the rivalry between Abd-el-Latif and Amir Ali at
Calcutta.
“Lunched at the Gregorys. Later to the House of Commons. Lymington, whom
I met there, said: ‘I am coming to think after all we should have done
better to stick to Arabi.’ Lymington was one of Gladstone’s strongest
supporters at the time of the war.[60]
“_14th May._—The Government are not turned out. The Irish waited, as
Button said they would, till the last minute, and then voted against the
Government, but nevertheless there remained a majority of twenty-eight.
I don’t know whether to be glad or sorry, but I think on the whole I am
glad. The measure of their iniquity is not yet full. Called on Button.
Natty Rothschild is selling Egyptian stock. He sold £150,000 Preference
Stock yesterday. Button thinks it will end by a partial repudiation when
the Conference meets.
“Met Lascelles[61] in the evening at St. James’s Club. Talking about
Gordon, he said he had always been a man of violent temper, and what he
had done lately at Khartoum was nothing more than what he had always
done. Nubar said of him long ago: ‘He reads the Bible all the
morning—and then gets up and orders a man to be hanged.’ Gordon’s idea
on leaving England had been to convert the Soudanese to Christianity.
His (Lascelles’) brother-in-law, the Bishop of Exeter (Dr. Temple), had
told him that Gordon had called on him to ask whether he considered that
the Soudanese converts might be allowed to keep three wives. The Bishop
had thought this would be uncanonical.[62] Lascelles has been in
Bulgaria several years superintending the growth of liberty there, and
we might do worse than have him Consul General at Cairo. He says he has
been much disappointed in Nubar. Sherif, he says, is a good companion,
but without ideas. Riaz, when he first came into office, was under the
influence of Gabriel Charmes, who when he wanted him to do anything used
to tell him M. Thiers would have done it in his place. But they
quarrelled at last, Charmes wanting something which Riaz would not give,
and Riaz answering that M. Thiers would have said no.
“_17th May._—Went down to Crabbet with Tommy Bowles, the Editor of
‘Vanity Fair.’[63] He is thinking of starting a new political newspaper
to be called ‘The Statesman,’ or, ‘The Précis Writer,’ and wants me to
assist him, but I would not promise. He told a good story about
Disraeli, who, having ventured some more than usually daring lie in
Parliament, was walking home afterwards with Monty Corry.[64] Monty
congratulated him on nobody having found him out, and called it a
special interposition of Providence. ‘Yes,’ said Dizzy, ‘God is great,
and He seems to me to get greater and greater every day.’
[N.B.—With regard to my offer of mediation, through Jemal-ed-Din, with
the Mahdi—an offer which I still believe might at that date, May, have
saved the disaster of Gordon’s death—it is worth noting that the
decision of the Government refusing it was delayed until after Lord
Cromer’s arrival from Egypt in London, which seems to fix on Lord Cromer
the departmental responsibility of the refusal, and with it of the loss
of whatever chance there was of a peaceful solution. It was then already
too late in the season to send an English army up the Nile before the
rising of the river.]
CHAPTER VIII
MY EXCLUSION FROM EGYPT
“_19th May_, 1884.
“I WAS to have gone to Paris to-day, but, besides that I am far from
well, Lord Granville’s answer has come, shortly refusing to interfere.
This will oblige me to take action, and so I have put off my journey.
Perhaps it is as well.
“_20th May._—To London, and saw Stanley, who has given me good letters
of introduction to Vefyk and Khair-ed-Din Pashas. In them he says he was
not able to approve my ideas of two years ago about Egypt, but that I
have returned now from India with saner ones, and that we are agreed as
to the residence of Europeans in Africa and Asia; also that I have been
prevented by the English authorities from landing in Egypt.
“Tried to find Churchill about bringing my case forward in Parliament,
but he was out, and I think now I will first write to Gladstone, giving
him warning of what I intend, and so leaving a last loophole for peace.
Lady Gregory is all for this. She tells me Layard told Sir William that
a high official of the Foreign Office had said quite recently that
though it would be a bitter pill they would have to restore Arabi before
long. But I doubt it while Gladstone remains in office.
“To Mrs. S.’s, a garden party. Mme. de Novikoff was there. She has been
in communication with the ex-Khedive Ismaïl, who has got her to advocate
his return to Egypt.
“_21st May._—To Button’s, and arranged our plan of campaign. If my
letter to Gladstone comes to nothing, the ‘Times’ will print one from me
telling the story of my exclusion from Egypt. He thinks it should be
brought forward in the Lords instead of the Commons, and we think
Marlborough would be a good man to do it. Then I went to Knowles and
fortunately found him at home. I told him I was going to bring the case
forward in Parliament, and might be obliged to quote Gladstone’s
intention last year of restoring Arabi. He did not like this, and backed
out of having told me more than that it had been his impression that Mr.
Gladstone had such an idea, or that he might have had it if it had
become popular. This is nothing more than I had expected of Knowles; he
is evidently in a great fright of being compromised. I promised not to
bring his name in if I could help it—but I might be driven into doing
it.
“To Crabbet with Admiral Tryon, a lovely day spent among the horses.
“_22nd May._—Crabbet. Knowles must have gone straight to Eddy Hamilton,
for by this morning’s post I get a letter from Eddy evidently in a great
fright, saying he cannot believe I am going to bring him into the
matter, that his conversation with me last year went no farther than
wishing me _bon voyage_, and that he is quite innocent of representing
Mr. Gladstone in any way. I must expect both him and Knowles to swear
hard. But I have got the substance of my conversation with Eddy in this
journal, and of that with Knowles in my letters of the time. Moreover, I
have Eddy’s letter received at Bombay, speaking of himself as ‘conduit
pipe,’ between me and head-quarters. He must have forgotten this last.
Eddy won’t be injured by it. They will give him a fat permanent post
when they have made a scapegoat of him, but I have written to him to say
that if he likes I will refer the whole thing to Mr. Gladstone instead
of to Parliament. I hope they will accept this as I don’t want to break
with Mr. Gladstone if I can help it, and I should be grieved to have a
row with Eddy.
“_25th May._—Crabbet. Eddy accepts a reference to Mr. Gladstone, and I
think nothing could be better. Harry Brand came down; we rode in the
forest and talked politics all day. Talking about Gordon, he told me
that Gladstone had not seen him before he was sent out, nor was there
any Cabinet Council; the thing was settled by a committee of the
Cabinet, consisting of Hartington, Northbrook, and Dilke. Gladstone was
only told that an engineer officer had been sent to Khartoum to report.
Harry had expostulated with Hartington about the mission, and had urged
that Gordon should be stopped at Korusko, but was told it was too late.
Baring was unfriendly to Gordon, having quarrelled with him four years
ago when he was Controller; they had called each other names. He says
nothing has been decided yet at the War Office about an expedition. They
will decide nothing till they hear from Gordon. He thinks the Souakin
route impossible for an army. A contractor has offered to run water in
pipes, to be condensed at the sea-side.
“_26th May._—Lunched with Lady Gregory. Gladstone has been saying that
he can’t understand why people find fault with the Turks, who are very
good people. The ‘Pall Mall Gazette’ publishes ‘Mr. Wilfrid Blunt on the
crisis in Egypt.’
“_27th May._—Wrote a long letter to Gladstone, giving a full account of
the Knowles and Hamilton interviews last year (see Appendix).
“_28th May._—Crabbet. Derby Day. Drove to Epsom. Harry Brand joined us
in the evening. He says it is quite untrue that any arrangement has been
made with the Turks for their help in the Soudan, also I ought to have
come and seen him about Gordon, as he would have brought me to speak
with Hartington, who is mainly responsible for Gordon’s having gone out,
and so is most concerned in getting him back.
“_29th May._—Frederic Harrison came down. We had a pleasant discussion
at dinner and afterwards about the situation, only he takes the English
instead of the Egyptian point of view. He said he was not averse to war
under _all_ circumstances, and thought England would lose morally if she
left Egypt ruined to the French or to Europe. He says, however,
annexation is the only logical result of our Egyptian policy. He
approves my letter to the ‘Times.’
“_30th May._—The Oaks Day. Drove Harry Brand and Harrison to Epsom, an
odd party, in an odd turn out—the phaeton and four Arabs. We did the
sixteen and a half miles from the Lodge Gate at Crabbet to the top of
Epsom Hill in one hour and thirty-two minutes, our best record yet. And
one hour and thirty-three minutes coming home. Bozra had been only in
harness three times before, and never in the team.
“_31st May._—To London and saw Button, who says that, whatever Harry
Brand may say, the Sultan proposed not long ago to send troops to the
Soudan, and that his offer was accepted—but coupled with the condition,
that as a proof of his sincerity he should send a thousand men to Suakin
in ten days. This he declined. Gladstone has published an article signed
G. in the ‘Fortnightly,’ which, if really his, seems dangerously like
handing over Egypt to the French, or to a European administrative
control, the very worst thing that could happen. Button highly approves
of my letter to Gladstone, and I have sent it in. I went, however, first
to Palace Green to get my letters to Mrs. Howard for reference. They are
quite satisfactory as to my interview with Knowles. I am now in a
position, if necessary, to prove my account of what he said, and I think
I have them all in a wonderful fix.
“Lunched at the Club with Edward Sartoris, and passed through St.
James’s Square, where there was a considerable crowd looking at the
effects of the dynamite explosion. [A series of dynamite explosions
attributed to the Fenians.] Nothing more than a few broken windows as
the material effect, but the moral ones are great. Harry was very
indignant this morning when he read the account of it, and with me for
saying that it was due to the wickedness of the Government.
“_1st June._—Crabbet. Began a letter to the ‘Times.’ The gist of it is,
that if Mr. Gladstone really hands over Egypt unconditionally to Europe,
it means handing it over to the bondholders, and handing it over to the
bondholders means the driving out of the Egyptians in favour of European
colonists. I cannot believe Mr. Gladstone, after all his protestation of
giving the Egyptians their liberty, would do this. I imagine, instead,
he must be contemplating the securing of terms for them first from
Europe, and establishing a Government at Cairo, strong because supported
by the people, and then withdrawing his troops. I put forward the rival
claims of Ismaïl, Halim, and Arabi. One thing is clear in Egypt. The
legend of Tewfik’s loyalty has been spoilt. He is loyal still
perhaps—but no longer _to us_.
“_2nd June._—Began a series of articles for the ‘Fortnightly,’ called
‘Ideas about India.’
“_3rd June._—Button has given me the whole history of the G. article in
the ‘Fortnightly.’ It appears that Escott, the ‘Fortnightly’ Editor,
sent it to Buckle directing his attention to it, and saying it was from
the pen of one of our most prominent statesmen, and that it represented
Mr. Gladstone’s views. Buckle gave it to his article writer, who, before
committing himself, wrote to Escott saying he concluded the author of
the article to be Mr. Gladstone, and that if so, he should be happy to
give it all prominence, but wished to know whether he was correct. To
this Escott replied that the author was out of town, and that the
article might be accepted as representing Mr. Gladstone’s views. Button
thinks it is Godley, but I am nearly certain it is Herbert Gladstone,
who is often used to air his father’s most advanced ideas. Button tells
me that an expedition is to start shortly for Khartoum, as the military
authorities are of opinion that it will be less dangerous now than
later, when the Nile rises. They are to go from Suakin to Berber, and
will lose about half their force.
“Dined with Admiral Tryon, and had a talk with Owen Burne about India.
He is the head of the Secret Department at the India Office, and I fancy
had his eye on me during my late journey. We talked about everything,
however, very pleasantly. He expressed his opinion that the native
armies ought to be made more use of than they have hitherto been. He
knew Scindia and Holkar well, and they had repeatedly proposed to lend
their troops on condition of being given rank in the Imperial Army. We
also talked about Hyderabad. He takes Cordery’s view about things there,
of course. Like every one here, he is astonished to learn that Lord
Ripon is a success or popular with anybody.
“_4th June._—Down to Crabbet. The Frederic Harrisons and John Morley
came and we had a long political discussion till midnight. Morley says
it is a necessity of the English commercial system that the field of
their enterprise should be constantly enlarged. For this reason he
thinks we shall not leave Egypt, and he thinks something new must be
devised there. He is for a strong Government no matter what—Riaz, if you
can get no better—and he would allow the cutting off of heads or
anything. Marat, he says, is his idea of a man for revolutionary times.
He does not see his way to Arabi, does not understand his merits as a
statesman. But I think he wishes me well. He said: ‘Why don’t you
persuade Gladstone to send you to Egypt?’ I said: ‘I would do so if I
could get to see him.’ He and Harrison had an interesting talk about the
various statesmen of the day. Chamberlain, Morley thinks, is the man of
the future—a true Radical and one who would never change; he would ‘put
Burt[65] in office, if he had the chance,’ he had a strong will and
ideas. Dilke was only a sham Radical; Dilke was too much a man of the
world, wanted to please everybody; he had seen his best political day,
and would be merged in Chamberlain’s individuality. The danger was that,
when a Radical Cabinet came to office, the two would divide Home and
Foreign policy between them, when Dilke would play every kind of Jingo
prank. Morley has a great opinion of Parnell, who, he says, is a
powerful man and a patriot. Gladstone thinks highly of him too. When the
Phoenix Park murders took place, Parnell wrote to Gladstone to say that
if he, Gladstone, thought it would do any good or relieve the situation,
he would retire from public life; he was disgusted at the murders. This
Mr. Gladstone told Morley himself. Dillon too was a patriot. Healy had
only a blind hatred of England. The rest were second rate men. Dillon
had written to Morley lately from California as follows: ‘Dear Morley.
You said a year ago that English troops would be out of Egypt. Yours
truly.’ Salisbury would be a great force if he was in the House of
Commons; he would like to abolish the House of Lords so as to get into
the other House. Hicks Beach was much the best man the Opposition had in
the front bench; he always reasoned out his arguments. Plunket was their
best speaker. Gibson was tiresome, Northcote a noodle. Gladstone had a
supreme contempt for Northcote. Morley has a high opinion of Churchill;
thinks he may come over yet to the Radicals; he had the talent of
interesting, was industrious, kind-hearted, and wonderfully quick.
Hartington was weak, had no fixed opinion or power of will or decision;
he was an excellent critic, but with no initiative. He thinks Lawson and
Labouchere have ruined the Egyptian cause by their jokes—people were
afraid of seeming to agree with them. Trevelyan was a success, and
deservedly so. Lefevre would always be unpopular. For Granville Morley
has a ‘supreme contempt’—he can find no other word.
“_5th June._—I drove Morley to the station in the morning. He seems much
in agreement with me about Egypt, and I hope he may make his agreement
known to others. I gave him Lyall’s letter[66] to read and my two
letters from Egypt to Eddy Hamilton, and explained to him something of
my idea how to govern Egypt. He said he was all for strong measures now,
hanging if necessary. If we could only get Morley to declare himself it
would be most important, but he says the weak part of our programme is
Arabi. Perhaps it is.
“Lady Gregory came down in the afternoon, and the Harrisons stayed on.
Harrison interests me, being a thoroughly honest good fellow. Morley
told us this morning a great deal about Stead, his successor in the
‘Pall Mall Gazette.’ Stead was only a clerk at so many shillings a week
to start with, and came straight to the ‘Pall Mall’ from a small
northern paper. He was a man of entire belief in himself, a good deal of
imagination, and not a little superstition; a believer in dreams and
inspirations. On one occasion in the autumn of 1882 he sent Morley a
message, saying he wanted to see him on important business. This was to
tell him that, having gone for a cruise round the Isle of Wight, he had
had a sudden inspiration just off the Needles to the effect that Morley
would be in Parliament and have left the ‘Pall Mall’ by the following
March. When it happened, Stead had taken it entirely as a matter of
course; he has boundless ambition, and has it as a maxim that a
newspaper Editor is stronger than any Minister. Morley looks upon him as
a political quack. He, Morley, eschews the ‘Pall Mall’ now and all its
works.
“_6th June._—My letter is in the ‘Times’ and reads well, and I have
written to Arabi to warn him that perhaps he will be proposed to shortly
to return, and to ask him whether he would be prepared to serve as
Regent for a term of years with Tewfik’s son in minority. Harrison went
away and has promised to write in support of me to the ‘Times.’
“_7th June._—The ‘Times’ has some polite words about my letter in its
leading article. Button writes that the letter has been a great
success—the best I have ever written. It will have made one or two
people at the Foreign Office angry. But Mrs. Gladstone asks us to her
party next week, the first time since the war.
“_9th June._—Harrison’s letter is in the ‘Times,’ and one from Edwin
Arnold in something the same sense. On the other hand, Morley publishes
a letter to his constituents, which may read any way about Egypt. It
does not leave a good impression.
“Button tells me that an agreement was come to on Friday between
Granville and Waddington about Egypt to the following effect: (1) That
an International Control Audit should be established; (2) That English
troops should remain in Egypt for three years; and (3) That England
should advance eight million sterling. Hartington, Dilke, and
Chamberlain are violently opposed to the arrangement; and it is from
Hartington that the ‘Times’ has lately been receiving its information as
to the negotiations.
“Dined with Frank Lascelles, who has been staying at Chatsworth, and he
confirms what Button says of Hartington’s dislike of the arrangement.
According to Button, Hartington would have left the Government but for
his father, who declared that it was the boast and glory of his family
that no member of it had ever voted with the Tories. Fidelity to party
was his first principle. Lascelles has seen Baring lately, who tells him
he is going back to Egypt after the Conference, to go on trying to prove
that ‘two and two make something more than four.’ Lascelles was at some
pains to prove to me that Arabi might yet act with Tewfik. Eddy was at
the club dining at another table, and we agreed, whatever happened in
the matter of my exclusion from Egypt, we would not quarrel. I am to
have an answer from Mr. Gladstone to-morrow. The ‘Pall Mall’ published
late in the evening a special edition giving the terms of the agreement
with France pretty much as Button gave them.
“_10th June._—The ‘Daily News’ contradicts in vague language the terms
of the agreement. But Button declares they are true all the same, and,
what is more, that Bismarck has refused to allow any diminution on the
interest of the unified debt. This he had from Natty Rothschild. He says
the Government will certainly be turned out. The Opposition are doing
all they can to hasten the Franchise Bill, which they will pass through
the Lords, and then bring on the Egyptian Question in the form of an
Appeal to the Crown. Then there will be a dissolution, and the Tories,
if in office, will be able to have a redistribution of seats exactly as
they like to supplement the Bill; it would be a mistake in tactics to
throw out the Bill. Once passed, the Liberals would have no cry at all
to go to the country on. But I fancy their cry would be the fear of an
European war.
“Called on Lawson and persuaded him to oppose the Government
arrangement, about which he was in doubt, I hope, successfully. There is
nothing now but to turn out the Government. Lord Salisbury will not dare
annex. Harry Brand writes ‘Annexation and war are in the possible
future.’
“Went to see Mrs. Howard. She tells me George is furious against the
Government. And he has told the Government whip that, if any terms have
been agreed to with France at all like those just published, he and many
of his friends will vote against the Government, adding that for himself
he would not present himself for re-election in case of a dissolution.
She is entirely in agreement with my last letter to the ‘Times,’ and so
it seems is George. We discussed Morley and Harrison. Morley I expect
found the arrangement with France concluded when he got back to London,
and has probably been told that a defeat of the Government would mean
war. Hence his letter, but he is evidently a trimmer. The letter reads
both ways, and they will probably give him office if they ride out the
storm.
“Gladstone’s answer has come. He says that ‘in his opinion it is
impossible that any friend of his could without the grossest error of
judgement have given me any ground for the supposition that he was
favourable to any restoration of the exiles to Egypt.’ This is not a
denial. He goes on to say that ‘without questioning in any way my
intentions or my honour, he has deplored my proceedings in Egypt, as
alike injurious to Egyptian and British interests.’ I am writing to
thank him for the courteous tone of his answer, and do not propose to
bring the matter before Parliament until after the present crisis.
Harrison is much disgusted with Morley for backing out of his agreement
with us.
“_11th June._—To Mrs. Gladstone’s party. The Grand Old Man came forward
in a hearty manner, and shook me warmly by the hand, saying with
emphasis, ‘How do you do, Mr. Blunt. I am very glad indeed to see you.’
He has a hand which reminds me of Cardinal Newman’s, when seven years
ago the Cardinal cured my toothache with its touch, soft, warm, and
nervous. He is looking uncommonly well, and as alert and cheerful as if
he was going to heaven instead of head over heels into perdition before
the end of next week. I had some words with Mr. Forster,[67] who said he
had read and agreed with my letter in the ‘Times.’ He talked over the
chances, too, of turning out the Ministry, evidently hoping to do so. He
is an ugly roughish-looking man, but I can imagine may have power. I am
glad to have had these few words with him, but the crowd was too great
for much talk. Lady Gregory overheard Dilke saying, ‘The Arabi Party is
strong here to-night. I have seen both Blunt and Gregory.’ Baring was
there.
“_12th June._—Saw Lascelles at the Club. He does not expect to get sent
to Egypt, and thinks Baring will go back there. But it all depends on
the Ministerial crisis. Dined at Lord De la Warr’s. I had rather
expected to meet Ismaïl, the ex-Khedive, but found only his
representative, Broadley, who tells me that Ismaïl is hurt at my
description of him in my ‘Times’ letter, but wants to see me. I have no
objection, though it cannot lead to anything. Arabi will have nothing to
do with him, and Ismaïl has hardly any chance at all of getting back to
Egypt.
“_13th June._—Called on Button. He tells me the Government mean to stand
to their guns about the arrangement with France, and will be beaten.
With him was a man Gordon’s friends are sending to Khartoum to carry
letters and newspapers. He is to have £500 and go in disguise as a
Morocco merchant by way of Korosko. I cross-questioned him a good deal
about his plans, which are all based on the notion that the Mahdi’s
movement is a ‘trumpery insurrection’; so he will come to grief, unless
indeed he is wise enough to put the £500 in his pocket and go off and
amuse himself with it at Monaco, a result far from unlikely, to judge by
his looks.
“_16th June._—Lytton writes answering my proposal to go for a night to
Knebworth. He says my political ideas about Egypt and India disgust him,
but hopes to see me all the same. So I am going, under promise to say
nothing about politics. This is quite fair. Lytton’s position is a
perfectly logical one, and I cannot expect him either to sympathize or
tolerate.
“To Knebworth. Nobody staying in the house but Miss Lyall and Sinnett,
the Apostle of Theosophy. Politics being barred, our talk has been
almost all on occult sciences. Sinnett seems a worthy, if not a very
wise, man, with considerable humility and naïvety. He was formerly
Editor of the ‘Pioneer’ in India, and there became acquainted with
certain Oriental mystics. Practically, however, his system is
undistinguishable from ordinary spiritualism, and the real manager is
Madame Blavatsky. In this lady he has a profound belief, and told us of
various trifling miracles she is in the habit of working. She can make
bells ring in the air—and, by holding her hand to a pane of glass, can
produce tapping noises. She discovered once a cup and saucer in the
ground at a picnic, and can make electric sparks pass through his head.
He is distinctly of opinion that she has lived in other forms, before
her present life, and that she knows her own past history. But she has
not told him of it, and, such is the secrecy of these sublime adepts,
that if he were to ask her about it, she would be obliged to tell him an
untruth. He gave us a recipe, which he called a very simple one, for
obtaining the services of a _genius_. You must make acquaintance with a
sick man near his end, and persuade him that you are his best friend,
and get him to entrust to you his last wishes, as also some article of
property—such as a ring to which he is attached, and you must promise
him to perform his wish. He must then die, with anxiety regarding it and
regarding you upon his mind, and you must be careful to deceive him and
leave his wish unperformed. Then he will return to you through the
instrumentality of the ring in hope of urging you to fulfil your
promise, and will do all your bidding. This is a black and immoral art,
but he assured us exceedingly simple of execution. The high adepts scorn
to practise it.
“_19th June._—A capital speech of Churchill’s to-day reported from
Aylesbury. I have written to congratulate him, and exhort him to take up
the mantle of honesty let drop by Mr. Gladstone.
“_20th June._—Lunched with the Howards. George is quite converted now
from his belief in Gladstone, and looks upon him as completely
dishonest. He dined at Downing Street two days ago with other M.P.s, and
says the party, notwithstanding all, will vote solid for the Ministry,
all but a few members, himself among them. But even he is not, as I
understand, going to vote against them. The fact is there is no
opposition which can undertake the Government, and the Government can do
as it likes.
“_22nd June._—Our annual Lawn Tennis Tournament at Crabbet. There were
there Godfrey Webb, Eddy Hamilton, Button, Sandys, Nigel Kingscote,
Harry Brand and his brother Artie, Frank Lascelles, Mallock, Elcho, and
others. We had a merry evening with songs. Eddy, who sat next me, talked
pretty freely about Egypt, and I gather they would give a good deal to
find some excuse there for getting rid of the Khedive. ‘He has been
cunning enough,’ Eddy said, ‘to stick to us, and we are bound to him.’
“_23rd June._—To London, and lunched with Lawson, and went down with him
afterwards to the House. Churchill, whom I met in the lobby, says that
Arabi’s only chance lies in the agreement with France being upset. He is
pleased with the letter I wrote him. Morley still professes not to have
made up his mind. Ponsonby got me into the Gallery. Gladstone was in
good form, as I believe he always is when he has a statement to make,
and he did it with dignity if not with any great eloquence. He talked a
good deal about France’s interests in Egypt, and our own interests, and
Europe’s interests, but never a word for good or evil of the Egyptians’
interests, never a word but one, and that sounded like an afterthought,
and passed without remark. But there was a great deal about the
principle which would be decided at the Conference, by which I suppose
he meant the principle of the European concert—for every other has been
thrown to the winds. My programme has been followed on every point,
except that of doing justice to the Egyptians. Egypt is to be
neutralized, the Suez Canal neutralized, the Soudan separated from
Egypt—all as I recommended, but no lowering of the interest on the debt,
no re-establishment of popular government. Morley tells me all that it
is proposed to do is to lower the interest one half per cent., and even
that is not certain.
“Button declares that Bismarck will not allow any reduction. His
position is this. He had a quarrel some time ago with the Frankfort
Rothschilds, and he is glad now to be able to prove to them that he is
real arbiter on the Nile, and they have come to him on their hands and
knees, and he will support their demand for the whole pound of flesh
because they demand it, caring of course nothing about the results to
them, and glad to break down the Anglo-French agreement. Therefore there
is good chance of the Conference collapsing as soon as it meets. The
Opposition was feebler in the Debate than anything I could have
imagined. Northcote was like an old woman afraid of responsibility, and
Randolph played into Gladstone’s hands by making a violent and foolish
speech against France. When I say foolish, I mean foolish under the
circumstances, for it had some good hits, as when he compared Gladstone
to Charles II kept on the throne by Louis XIV as his servant. But it was
not in harmony with the feeling of the House; and Lascelles, who dined
to-night with Forster, tells me they consider Churchill’s speech to have
gained votes for the Government. But they look to no vote being taken
till after the Conference as their best chance of upsetting the
agreement. Goschen made this point good.
“_24th June._—Went down home to Crabbet. There is nothing more I can do
now in Egyptian matters, and for the moment I had better pay attention
to my horses. If we win the Arab race at Newmarket it will do more for
my ideas than half a dozen victories of the Mahdi. Lord Bradford comes
down this week with Ebrington to see the stud. He wants mares to put to
his horse Chippendale.
“_25th June._—To a party at Devonshire House where I talked principally
to Mrs. Howard. She has been converted back to Gladstone by hearing the
debate the other night. George, however, holds out and is likely to be
alone in the cave with Forster when it comes to a division.
“_26th June._—I hear from Button that the Opposition has decided on a
new Vote of Censure before the Conference, or rather while the
Conference is sitting, being moved thereto by Randolph, who had
threatened to move one himself. Labouchere tells me the Government, or
at least certain members of the Cabinet, are riding for a fall, and that
Randolph wants to make it impossible for the Conservatives to come in.
He wants me to get Abdu over from Paris as a sort of representative of
the National Party during the Conference. Bismarck, Button tells me,
will agree to a reduction of the Unified if Ferry agrees, but only ½ per
cent., and it is doubtful whether they can get even this. The Unified
Stock is held in France, Germany, and Italy, the Preference in England.
It is a hopeless state of things whichever way one looks.
“_28th June._—Lunched at the Carlton with Churchill and Wolff. Churchill
is very angry about something or another, and says he is going away, and
shall have nothing more to do with Parliament this Session. He talked of
Northcote as ‘an old blackguard.’
“_30th June._—To Newmarket for Lord Falmouth’s sale. His brood mares
were magnificent, the finest according to my ideas being Palmflower,
Spinaway, Chevisaunce, and Jeannette. Wheel-of-Fortune is less taking.
Of the stallions the one I should have chosen to breed from is
Kingcraft. We dined with the Clay Seymers, Lord Wolverton and young
Leigh there.[68]
“_1st July._—First day of the July meeting. The racing did not interest
me. After it we went to Lord Calthorpe’s paddocks, and saw Petrarch, the
handsomest horse in the world. We are staying with Button in St. Mary’s
Square. He tells me the Vote of Censure has been shelved.
“_2nd July._—The long looked for day of the Arab race, but somehow I
felt less excited about it than when years ago we ran Yellow Boy at
Gibraltar. The weather was perfect, and all the world and his wife were
there. They say the July course was never so crowded, and there was
quite a mob to see the Arabs stripped, so that Geheimniss, who was
walking over for the July Cup, passed absolutely unnoticed through the
crowd. I was satisfied with the look of all the horses—and especially of
Halfa, my own entry, who was much admired, but I did not see Admiral
Tryon’s horse at all, for he was brought in quite at the end, and as
soon as they had started on their canter, we rode to the corner to see
the race. Jem Lowther was there also on horseback, very genial, and,
while we were waiting, we talked about the ‘awful mess’ in Egypt. Then
we saw the horses coming in a cluster at a tremendous pace over the
hill, beyond the fir trees, and we cantered back towards the paddock.
They overtook us at the bottom of the hill, and to my grief and surprise
I saw it was all over with Halfa, and what seemed to be the Indian
horses going on alone, with Rataplan well up. I felt that I had suffered
a disastrous defeat, but was a little consoled by finding that after all
a home bred three year old, though not mine, had won. This was Admiral
Tryon’s Asil; Dictator second; Rataplan, who had been making the running
for Halfa, third.
“I fear, nevertheless, the race will be considered a failure as most of
the young ones were left behind, and there are suspicions with regard to
Tryon’s horse, whether he is really an Arab. After the race, Jousiffe,
Dictator’s trainer, came to me as representing his owner, and wanted me
to raise an objection to Asil on this score, but I refused point blank
to listen to anything of the sort. I was at Aleppo when Henderson, the
Consul there, bought Asil’s dam for Tryon, and though I did not see her,
nor can vouch for her pedigree, I think there can be no conceivable
doubt she was an Arab; she stood 15.2, but such a height is possible,
though I never saw it in the desert. She was in foal, Tryon says, to
Henderson’s Abeyan Sherrak horse, whom I know well, and the colt was
dropped a few days after landing in England. Besides, Asil is in the
Stud Book as an Arab and so is legally an Arab, whatever he may be in
fact. It would in any case be fatal to have a dispute on such a question
this first race, and I am glad my horse, or rather Abd-el-Rahman’s, was
second, so as to prevent other action—but I will see the horse.
“Dined with Button and two of the Paulets, and George Wyndham.[69] A
very young man’s party.
“_3rd July._—The sporting papers are down on the race as childish,
because the Arabs did not beat English horses, and I fear the Jockey
Club will not have the courage to repeat it; but Hawfa Williams, the
manager of Sandown, has promised a race there for the 22nd. We called
this morning at Hopper’s stables and saw Asil. Anything less like an
Arab horse I never saw. He is long, low, strong, rather coarse, and very
slack over the loins—like an English horse—his head plain but well set
on, great hocks and arms. I don’t wonder at Jousiffe wanting me to
object to him.”
This failure at Newmarket was a great disappointment to me at the time.
I had counted on proving, by a practical demonstration, that Arab horses
bred in England, and properly trained, would greatly improve in speed as
compared with those bred in the desert. The race, however, seemed to
show the contrary, as, with the exception of Tryon’s colt, the two Arab
horses brought from India had it all their own way. Moreover, a little
later, Tryon matched his colt against an inferior English thoroughbred,
and was handsomely beaten. The ultimate result, however, was not I
think, as far as Arab breeding in England was affected by it, wholly a
misfortune. It convinced me that I was on wrong lines in breeding Arabs
for speed, and not for those more valuable qualities in which their true
excellence lies. Had I continued with my original purpose, I should have
lost time and money, and probably have also spoiled my breed, producing
stock, taller perhaps and speedier, but with the same defects found in
the English thoroughbred. Politically, however, I no doubt lost
something through the publicity of my Newmarket experience. For success
on the turf seems always to have been held in England as in some measure
connected with political capacity, and if I had been able to prove my
point with the sporting world, my opinion on Eastern affairs generally
would have gained in credit.
“There seems every prospect of the Conference breaking down.
“_4th July._—Lunched with Lady Gregory and on to the Howards. Mrs.
Howard asked me why I thought that England would be obliged to see
decent Government given to Egypt if we acknowledged a Protectorate, and
I said, ‘If you invite a young lady to dine with you at Greenwich you
don’t look too closely how she behaves—but when you have married her you
take care she dresses respectably.’
“_7th July._—Another letter from me in the ‘Times,’ and also one from
Benson Maxwell (both about Egypt), and there is a leading article
sufficiently polite to me. Called on Bruce,[70] who is expected to move
the Vote of Censure—a fairly sensible man, but without go or plan of
action, like all the rest of the Tories; yet he is the best man they can
find for it. No wonder Randolph has his way with them. He is occupied
over head and ears with his National Association and is tired of Egypt.
“_8th July._—Dined at Wentworth House. Percy and Madeline were there,
and Henry Cowper, and Millais grown very prosy and as dull as a breeder
of cattle. I sat between Lady Wharncliffe and Sir Wilfrid Lawson, the
latter very amusing, with a fire of good stories, kept up all dinner-
time. He is going to hold an open air meeting in Hyde Park against the
Lords—and asked me to join in it. But the Lords to my mind are a very
respectable institution, and I care nothing at all for the Franchise
Bill which they are throwing out.
“_9th July._—The Lords threw the Bill out last night, and there is
likely to be a row, but no dissolution. Marlborough’s first speech the
other night was a failure. People were interested to hear him, but found
his speech dull, and after the first ten minutes began to talk.
“_11th July._—The Mudir of Dongola, it seems certain now, has joined the
Mahdi, and Berber is as certainly taken, while there are rumours, too,
of the fall of Khartoum. I have written to Hyndman, in answer to a
letter of his asking me to join the Democratic Socialists. This of
course I cannot do.
“_12th July._—Luncheon with the Gregorys, where I met Rowsell, the
Domains Commissioner just from Cairo. His view of the situation there is
that the Mahdi will be at Cairo in the autumn. I asked him about Tewfik,
and he said: ‘Tewfik has intelligence enough to know that he has no
friends, and is fatalistic enough to let things take their course. He
will sit twiddling his thumbs from right to left, till he is told to
begin twiddling them from left to right.’ I asked him what he would
himself do when the Mahdi came to Cairo. He said: ‘Turn Mussulman of
course.’
“To Mrs. Buxton’s, near Weybridge, to meet George Trevelyan. The place
is prettily situated on the edge of Wisley Heath, now grown over with
fir trees. I remember it thirty years ago, absolutely bare, when we used
as boys to go to the Hut Pond from Horsley to fish. At Waterloo Station
was George Howard. He has seen Goschen, who would like to talk to me in
the morning about Egypt, or rather to hear me talk. Goschen says I am an
imprudent person who, if you tell anything to him, and he has reason to
be dissatisfied with you afterwards, repeats what you tell him. I will
go to him, but I trust him as little as he trusts me.
“George Trevelyan[71] is a capital fellow—very lively and amusing. I had
a long talk with him after dinner. He made me explain to him the whole
history of the Revolution in Egypt, and especially of the Joint Note of
January, 1882, as he wanted, he said, to arrive at a knowledge of the
exact moment where our policy made a mistake. He was of course quite
ignorant even of the general outline of the story, but seized the points
with great intelligence. He is a man of energy, wit, and sympathy. I
asked him if he could tell me whose idea it was sending Clifford Lloyd
to Egypt, and he said: ‘It was ours, in Ireland. We would have sent him
anywhere to get rid of him.’ His description of Lloyd was amusing. He
was an energetic man of great self sufficiency. To talk to him you would
think him a Clive or a Warren Hastings. But his whole thought was to
advertise himself by his vigour. On one occasion he had telegraphed to
Vernon Harcourt, begging him to send him a couple of bloodhounds to aid
his police operations in Ireland. At first they had thought the telegram
a hoax, but it was nevertheless true. Besides, he was very greedy of pay
and allowances, and was always bothering Lord Spencer to increase these.
In the smoking room we had a general discussion about Ireland, and the
possibility of its independence. Trevelyan has a mean idea of the Irish,
and thinks they could not govern themselves respectably or solvably, but
would relapse into barbarism. I cited the instance of Greece as at least
as hopeless at starting as that of Ireland, and yet it had settled down
and become prosperous. We all agreed anyhow that Ireland in its present
condition was ruining England, and especially the English Parliament—but
Trevelyan does not believe in any true middle term between coercion and
separation.
“_13th July, Sunday._—Had some interesting conversation with Trevelyan
and Sir James Carmichael.[72] The latter is Childers’ private secretary
at the Conference, and he says that he has had to go over the public
accounts of Arabi’s time, and finds them in a great mess. He complains
that, whatever Arabi’s honesty may have been, great peculation took
place under him. He is, however, wholly opposed to the Turks and
Circassians, and also to English administration in Egypt. He would like
to keep on Tewfik, and give him an Egyptian administration. He described
Nubar well for what he is, and said: ‘His days of office are numbered.’
Trevelyan described Lord Spencer as the ablest administrator he had come
across, an administrator born, for he had had no training, a man of
sense and very high integrity.
“_14th July._—Dined at the Travellers. Next table to me sat with others
Staal, the new Russian Ambassador. It is twenty-three years since we
met, but I knew him again directly. We were great friends in those days
at Athens, and I think he was really glad to see me when I explained
after dinner who I was. ‘Are you any relation,’ he enquired, ‘to the
Blunt who is a friend of the Mahdi?’ He asked me to come and see him,
which I shall do. Staal is an old man now, but has something of the kind
honest manner of former days. This has given me great pleasure.
“_15th July._—Button tells me that the Lords are determined to fight on
the Franchise Bill. They dare not let the Bill pass, as it would mean
the absolute defeat of the Conservative Party at the next elections, and
Mr. Gladstone’s stay in office for the rest of his natural life. They
mean to hold on then till a Dissolution of Parliament, trusting to Egypt
to get them a majority at the elections.
“Then to call on Goschen, whom I found much as two years ago, that is to
say, very intelligent and receptive, though I do not trust him. We
discussed Egypt thoroughly, agreeing on most points, and I gave him a
sketch of a plan of operations. First, we must make peace with the
Mahdi—we must either make peace or fight, there was no middle term. It
would not be necessary for the English Government to acknowledge the
Mahdi. Secondly, we must accept Egypt’s debt, or a composition of the
debt. If we did not want to fight France, we had better pay. This done,
we could establish what Government we liked in Egypt, leave it to manage
its own affairs, and withdraw our troops to Alexandria. Goschen thought
it very likely would end in our accepting the debt, but I fancy he would
like to administer the country according to Indian methods. I cannot
boast, however, of having got anything very distinct out of him.
“Dined with Broadley and Marriott, M.P. for Brighton, who is anxious to
take up my case of exclusion from Egypt. I do not like Marriott, but he
may help in the Debate, if we can get one on it. Broadley declares that
Parnell and the Irish brigade will also support me, and that Parnell
wants particularly to see me. I shall be glad to make his acquaintance,
as I believe him to be a man of very high calibre, and I wholly
sympathize with his cause.
“_16th July._—To Blenheim, a lovely day. The Duke very agreeable. I care
for few of the pictures, but the Raphael is about the finest I have
seen. The ‘Charles the First’ Vandyke is also splendid, and other
Vandykes are good—and there are two excellent Mytens, but of all the
pictures the one I should care most to have is a Reynolds, ‘The Fortune
Tellers.’ The Rembrandts are not Rembrandts, and the Rubens are less
than first rate, nor do I care for the large Reynolds. On the whole the
Duke does well to sell his pictures. The house is very fine, in the
style I like best.
“_21st July._—Mohammed Abdu has just arrived from Paris. His ideas are
rather changed since we last saw him. The dominant feeling now is hatred
for England; and in this is merged the hatred of the Circassians. It is
the old story over again. When Europe presses and threatens, they all
join their ranks just as they did at the time of the Joint Note and the
Ultimatum. He has not, however, abandoned Arabi, though he seems to
think him played out as a political personage in Egypt, and this is
probably the case.
“I have arranged with Percy Wyndham and Sir Wilfrid Lawson that they
shall bring on my case of exclusion in connection with the Vote of
Supply in the Diplomatic Estimates. Lawson was much engaged with his
procession to Hyde Park to protest against the Lords, and again asked me
to join it, but I refused. As it happened, however, I did join it
unintentionally, for I happened to be going their way, and walked with
them from Pall Mall to Hyde Park Corner. They were respectable looking
men, most of them, not roughs. The procession was orderly, not to say
dull. I had been at the Carlton, where I had found Churchill. He
promises to take up my case of exclusion when the estimates come on, and
so I have written to Buckle to explain all the circumstances, and
enclosing a letter about it for the ‘Times.’ Broadley and Marriott came
to James Street very anxious to have all the fat in the fire at once,
and the stoking to do themselves, but I don’t mean to trust my case to
them. At the corner of Hyde Park, when I arrived with the procession, I
found Passmore Edwards,[73] and we discussed the situation. He thinks
the Lords will give in at once, overwhelmed by the majesty of the
people—but I don’t believe this, and I extremely doubt whether the House
of Lords is not as popular an institution as there is in the country. It
is certainly so with the middle class in the South of England. I have
arranged with Labouchere that I should bring Abdu to see the House of
Commons to-morrow afternoon. He also will support me in the affair of my
exclusion from Egypt.
“_22nd July._—The Arab race at Sandown. More successful than the
Newmarket one, though Halfa did not win. She ran creditably, and I am
glad to say Hadramaut (a colt of my breeding) beat Asil on the post, and
the Indian horses were all left behind.
“With Abdu to the House of Commons. We missed Labouchere but found
George Howard, who showed us all over the place. I had made Abdu dress
in his blue jibbeh and white turban, and he created quite a sensation in
the lobby. Chesson came to us directly, and asked us to a public dinner
there was to be given to Indians and other Orientals next week, and the
photographer insisted on taking the Sheykh’s portrait.[74] He was
introduced to several M.P.s, and we listened to an Irish member, Sexton
I think, declaiming on the wrongs of Ireland. From the terrace by the
river we showed Abdu the police boat cruising around to prevent dynamite
attempts, a sight which edified him, and we pointed out to him Mr.
Bright talking on a bench to Nathaniel Rothschild.
“Parnell was walking up and down at the far end in solitary gloom, and I
got George Howard to introduce us. He was really charming, having a
sympathetic manner, at least to us, as fellow rebels; wanted Abdu to
come and see him and give him information, and said: ‘We have one of
ourselves now in Egypt, Mr. O’Kelly. But we are afraid he may be kept
away a long time.’ I told him that it had been Abdu and Jemal-ed-Din who
had given O’Kelly the letters which had enabled him to go to the Mahdi,
and he seemed surprised at my knowing this. Parnell’s manner of gloom
and reserve seems unnatural to him, and every now and then there is a
twinkle in his eye and a smile which seemed to show the real man better.
I should say he was a good fellow, and I am sure I could get on well
with him. At parting his manner was _empressé_, and he made us a little
speech, saying that he had had much honour in making the acquaintance of
the Egyptian patriot and with emphasis much _pleasure_ in making my own.
He promised to write and propose a day for seeing the Sheykh. In
appearance Parnell is tall, good-looking, pale, and with the least
little touch of weakness about the mouth, such as one often sees in
Irishmen, enough to show that he is more Irish than English, and enough
to add a certain charm to his countenance. Altogether I was much taken
with him.
“_23rd July._—Mirza Bakir, a Persian Sufi (living in exile in London)
came to breakfast, and went with Abdu and me after it to Sir Wilfrid
Lawson’s. The visit was not so successful as I had hoped. Lawson put his
questions to Abdu rather too abruptly, and I think a little frightened
him, at any rate he would not speak quite out, except on the point of
its being absolutely necessary the English troops should be withdrawn as
a first step towards re-establishing peace in Egypt. Much the same
conversation took place afterwards with Labouchere, to whom we next
went. Labouchere tried to convince Abdu that Mr. Gladstone wanted to get
the troops out of Egypt, and that the best way to do it was for the
Egyptians to refuse to pay any taxes as long as they remained there. But
Abdu argued with some point that Mr. Gladstone had been talking about
withdrawing for a long time, but that instead of taking troops away, he
was sending more and filling the country with English officials. He
complained that, were the taxes to be refused, it would be taken as an
excuse for annexation. It was impossible to convince him that this was
not so. Neither Lawson nor Labouchere affected Abdu with any sense of
their sincerity. This is because they do not know how to talk to
Orientals; their abruptness appears like hostility.
“Dinner at home with Abdu and Bakir, who had a long discussion as to
whether it was permitted by the traditions (hawadith) to talk at meals,
a point which they solved _ambulando_; also as to whether the Koran was
originally a book, or only a compilation of oral sentences. Abdu holds
the latter opinion, and I am quite with him, but the old Mirza is stiff
as to its being a miraculous _book_. This is curious considering how
very latitudinarian he is on most points.
“_24th July._—My letter about my exclusion is in the ‘Times,’ with a
splendid leading article supporting it, and demanding an inquiry. I have
arranged with Lawson that he should bring it forward—and he has put down
a notice regarding it. Percy Wyndham will say something if he finds
something to say, and Churchill will push it to an issue. We called on
Churchill and had a much more satisfactory conversation with him than
with the others yesterday. Churchill’s manner was just right, and Abdu
came away highly delighted. ‘That young man,’ he said, ‘has more sense
than the other two’—meaning Lawson and Labouchere—‘and he has a better
heart.’ As I am going to write the whole of this conversation for the
‘Pall Mall,’ I will not repeat it here. Churchill promised to speak to
Chamberlain about Abdu and try to get him an audience through him of
Gladstone. I am sure that if Abdu were to see Gladstone it would go far
towards a settlement. Went down to the House at question time and
arranged things definitely with Lawson about bringing my case forward. I
do not intend anything to be said about Eddy Hamilton or Knowles, or
Gladstone, unless my hand is forced—but if I am attacked I shall know
how to defend myself. My letter in the ‘Times’ has evidently been a
success, and I am sure the Government, when it decreed my exclusion,
thought me too friendless to be a danger; they cannot have been prepared
for the ‘Times’ taking it up.
“_26th July._—The day of our Arab horse sale at Crabbet. There were
quite three hundred people there.
“_27th July._—Dined at Sambourne’s, a party of jocose literary people
connected with ‘Punch’—Burnand, Du Maurier, Boughton, Black, Boehm, and
Reed. Burnand is amusing, but Du Maurier told a story three times over
during the dinner, and I cannot remember it now, although it was also
told once again on rather different lines by Boughton. During the fourth
telling I went to sleep, much to Sambourne’s distress, who is one of
those excellent hosts whose care and pride it is that their guests
should be amused, but I find it difficult now that I drink no wine to
keep my spirits up long to the level of a convivial occasion. After
dinner Cumberland, the thought reader, and others came, but I went home
to bed, drunk for the want of wine. [I had been a tea-totaller since
1883.]
“_28th July._—Talking to Abdu, he told me the names of the three men
who, bought by Sultan Pasha, betrayed the army at Tel-el-Kebir. They
were Ali Yusuf, a Turk in command of a division, the middle division of
the three, who had retired and so let Wolseley in; secondly, Abd-el-
Rahman Hasan in command of the cavalry scouts, an Egyptian, who had
neglected to give notice of the English approach; and thirdly, Ragheb
Nashid, a Circassian Caimakam, who held the position in advance. These
were the only traitors. Nadim fled to the Soudan. Ali Fehmy was beaten
at Kassasin because Mahmud Sami failed to keep his rendezvous. In
reconstructing a Nationalist Government, he says Ali Fehmy should be
Minister of War, Yakub Sami Minister of the Interior, and Arabi
President of the Chamber, Abd-el-Aal to command the army. I have engaged
Mirza Bakir as Secretary at £1 a week.
“Called on Churchill and found him in bed. He will take up my case with
Lawson, and I gave him a copy of my private correspondence for use if we
are pushed to it, but I explained to him my position towards Downing
Street, and that I did not wish to quarrel with Gladstone. He has
already bestirred himself about Abdu, and will take him to see
Hartington to-morrow. Robert Bourke will also take up my case. Mrs.
Howard gives me leave to quote my letters to her as written to a
political friend.
“_29th July._—Took Abdu and Bakir to the Carlton where we met Churchill,
and I handed them over to him, and he took them to see Hartington. They
came back highly delighted. Hartington had shown them great politeness
and intelligence, and Abdu thinks he has created a good impression.
“Spent a couple of hours at Hammersmith with Mrs. Morris and her
husband, who is a democratic socialist. We discussed the merits of his
scheme of the universe, but I cannot make it fit in with my ideas.
Still, we agree on many points. He calls Gladstone a confirmed Tory, too
old to change. The Morris’s house has a nice old-fashioned garden full
of flowers, pinks especially. I like these suburban gardens, they have
more character than others, and the space is all made use of. [This was
the first time I saw William Morris. I had made Mrs. Morris’s
acquaintance the summer before, 1883, at Naworth, for she was a friend
of Mrs. Howard’s, but, though I had been once or twice to see her at
Hammersmith, I had not before met him.]
“_1st August._—To a party at Mrs. S.’s, where I found the ex-Khedive,
Ismaïl Pasha. She asked me whether I should like to be introduced to
him, but I would not make any advance in that direction, though I have
no special quarrel now with Ismaïl. He is a repulsive-looking man, a
worthy son of the butcher Ibrahim. Philip Currie was there, more amiable
than the last time we met, also Malkum Khan. I reminded Malkum of our
first meeting in Grosvenor Place four years ago, when he suggested to me
the ideas I have since worked out. I asked him what he thought of
Ismaïl. He said: ‘He has learned much during his exile, and might carry
out reforms now.’ I said: ‘He is without belief. He could not help us.’
‘He is without belief,’ he said, ‘but not an unbeliever. He has not
strength of mind enough for that.’ Another old acquaintance there was
Madame de Novikof.
“_2nd August._—Interviewed Abdu for the ‘Pall Mall Gazette.’[75]
“_3rd August, Sunday._—Crabbet. De Winton is here, who has been in Egypt
for the last fifteen years. Among other things he told me of interest,
was that he was present when the twenty thousand pounds were paid over
by Gill to Palmer at Suez, and he says that Palmer had unlimited credit
over and above this sum. Lionel Moore came in the afternoon. He says he
always suspected the Khedive must have had something to do with the
Alexandria riots.
“_4th August._—A ‘great day of milling.’ My case came up in the House of
Commons this afternoon. I went with Abdu, and Anne went with Lady
Wentworth. The F.O. had published a Blue Book in the morning on the
case, from which it appears that I am charged by Sherif Pasha with
various things, every one of which I am fortunately able to deny. The
Government in fact had not a word to say, and as far as the debate went,
it was altogether a victory for us, though it leaves things where they
were. The most satisfactory point is that the Government were afraid to
attack me, although Randolph blurted out the whole story of my
conversations with Knowles and Hamilton. Mr. Gladstone had gone out of
the House after Lawson had finished his opening speech, thinking no
doubt that the thing was over, but when Churchill got up they sent for
him back. I was afraid at first the attack would set his back up, but he
took the thing very good humouredly, spoke of me handsomely, and told
his little story without wincing. Knowles he said had persuaded me ‘in
the interests of his review.’ I don’t suppose he feels equivocation at
all, and he had got a paper from Eddy, which he read out, declaring our
conversation had been wholly exclusive of politics, so I hope no harm
has been done for I can’t afford to quarrel with him yet, and I have
written to Eddy to explain that I did not intend Churchill to mention
him or Knowles, _unless I was attacked_. Robert Bourke came in well at
the end on the legal aspect of the case, and Sir Henry James’s defence
of the Government was a very lame one. On the whole I think it has
strengthened my position, not only with the public, but with the
Government. The House was decidedly favourable to me in the debate.
“_5th August._—The collapse of the Conference occupies all minds. It was
announced on Sunday in the ‘Observer,’ and of course we are delighted.
It puts everything back into its old impossible groove, and I shall
continue to hope as long as England remains solely responsible in Egypt.
Egyptian Stocks have all gone up, for they take the failure of the
Conference to mean some sort of Protectorate and guarantee by England.
Button telegraphs that Northbrook goes to Egypt.
“_6th August._—Broadley writes proposing an accidental interview with
Ismaïl Pasha at Escott’s house, and I shall go to it, though I feel sure
I shall not like Ismaïl, but it is time I should know him, and Broadley
promises _monts et merveilles_ for the National cause if he ever gets
back to Egypt. Abdu went to see him last week, but they did not talk
politics.
“_7th August._—A political breakfast given by Indians at the Westminster
Palace Hotel, Sir Wilfrid Lawson presiding. I had not expected to make a
speech, but made one to the satisfaction of the Indians and the wrath of
the newspapers, ‘St. James’s’ and ‘Globe.’
“_8th August._—The ‘Times’ correspondent at Cairo, Moberly Bell,
telegraphs that I am looked upon there as leader of a powerful party
opposed to the Khedive, etc.
“In the afternoon by appointment to tea at Escott’s, to meet the ex-
Khedive ‘by accident’ because neither Ismaïl nor I have been willing to
make first advance towards acquaintance. He was there when I arrived,
with his secretary Lavison. The tone of our interview throughout was
polite and even friendly. Disagreeable subjects were avoided, such as
the evils of Turkish and Circassian rule, and Ismaïl’s past dealings
with the Jews. Ismaïl’s is certainly a repulsive countenance, and I fail
to find in him that charm of conversation I have always heard him
credited with. Nor did he show any special shrewdness of observation. He
uttered the usual platitudes of progress and civilization, the necessity
of considering the religious prejudices of the people, and the influence
which could be exercised by a good ruler—but in no original way. As to
practical matters, the fellahin, he said, if well governed were quite
able to pay the interest on the Egyptian debt. The Soudan was a rich
country which should be developed by extending the railway from Wady
Halfa to Khartoum. He asked about India and the peasantry there, and
seemed pleased to learn my opinion that they were worse off than in
Egypt. On my side, I explained my views of Mohammedan regeneration, and
especially that of the Arabs. I told him of my conversation with Nubar
[at Paris in 1878], and how he had tried to persuade me that the English
was the only Government which was likely to befriend them. This amused
him. We had been speaking in French, but now he talked a little Arabic
to see what I knew of the language, and he said: ‘At least you speak it
better than Nubar.’ He himself speaks Arabic with a strong Turkish
accent, and he complimented me on mine. But we soon went back to French,
where I fancy he is more at home. He threw a fly over me twice as if to
begin more special matters, saying that he intended spending next summer
also in London. I did not however respond by any hope that next summer
would see him in Egypt. We spoke a little of Mohammed Abdu, but Arabi
was not mentioned. My impression of Ismaïl decidedly is, that he is not
the saviour of our society. There is nothing different in him from the
common run of Europeanized Turks. I am glad, nevertheless, to have seen
the old despot, if only to assure myself once more that he is not our
man.
“This has been the hottest and driest summer I ever spent at home. From
the 28th of March till now there has not been one really rainy day,
though a few attempts at such. The ground has always been like iron and
the ponds are half empty. But Sussex is at its best in such weather, and
the corn is splendid, most of it already cut.
“_10th August._—Broadley writes that Ismaïl is enchanted with me.
“To Scotland in the evening, and found in the same carriage our friend
Eddy, who is going to Taymouth Castle for grouse shooting. We talked
about the Debate. He said he had met Randolph Churchill the next day at
dinner and seemed quite satisfied with the turn things had taken. It is
evident we need not quarrel.”
From the 11th to the 16th of August I stayed at Lude House near Blair
Atholl, which had been rented by my country neighbour in Sussex, Mrs.
Montefiore. On the 17th, my birthday of 44, I went on to Naworth Castle
to stay with the Howards, Frank Lascelles among others being there. I
stayed at Naworth till the 23rd, but my journal contains almost nothing
political. The only entries worth transcribing are:
“_19th August._—A letter has come from Arabi approving the scheme of
Abbas and a protectorate. I shall send this to Gregory to show to
Gladstone, with whom he is invited to stay next week at Dalmeny.
“_20th August._—It is announced that Sami-Ullah of Aligarh is to join
Lord Northbrook’s staff in Egypt, recommended for the post by Sir
Auckland Colvin; also that there is talk of Tewfik’s abdication in
favour of Abbas and a protectorate.
“_21st August._—George is away at Newcastle, staying at Sir William
Armstrong’s with the Prince of Wales. The Prince, it appears, has been
frightened by the agitation against the House of Lords and thinks the
Throne, too, is in danger, and he wishes to dissociate himself from Lord
Salisbury’s tactics. For this reason he went to see the procession to
Hyde Park last month and now is paying a visit to the Radicals of
Sheffield and making himself generally agreeable. He asked to have
George Howard and his wife invited to the Festival, and Morley and Cowan
have both made speeches and joined in the loyalty. It was Lord
Shaftesbury who long ago warned the Prince never to separate himself
from the people. The Newcastle Festival has been a great success. It is
wonderful how these democrats of the north love a king.
“_22nd August._—I have written to Gregory, who is to be at Dalmeny for
Gladstone’s campaign in Midlothian, to post him up to the latest phase
of the Egyptian situation. I have told him that Arabi will have nothing
to do with Ismaïl or Tewfik, but could return to Egypt with Abbas or any
one else.
“_24th August, Sunday._—I spent the day at Sir Wilfrid Lawson’s at
Brayton, and on the 25th went on to Lord Stanley at Alderley. Alderley
is the sort of place I like. It reminds me somewhat of Crabbet, but is
altogether larger. The house, though comfortable, is unworthy of the
rest, having been built early in the present century, when the original
house was burnt down. The best thing is the kitchen garden, which is the
quaintest and most beautiful I ever saw, sloping down on three sides to
a large square pond or tank, on the fourth side a high wall overgrown by
a great copper beech. There is also a very fine beech wood overhanging
another pond of, I should say, sixty acres.[76] Many fine trees in the
park, but terribly undermined by rabbits. Stanley and I fished in the
wood and caught two little trout. He is a thoroughly honest good fellow,
and works all he can for the Mohammedans.
“_27th August._—To London, where I saw Button for a few minutes and
heard from him of Wolseley’s appointment to command the troops in Egypt.
They are really going to Khartoum at last, having persuaded the Grand
Old Man that Gordon is in danger.
“_2nd Sept._—We have settled to go to Constantinople on the 12th or
15th. Button has just got a letter from Wolseley, who says that he hopes
to get everything done at Khartoum without fighting, perhaps without an
expedition—more bloodshed would be unpopular, and so must be avoided.
Dined with Bertram Currie at Coombe. He has put up a temple in his
garden to the Grand Old Man, containing his bust, in honour of a visit
paid to him by the Prime Minister.
“_8th Sept._—Saw Lady C. She told me about the Prince of Wales, that
although he is pretending to join the Radicals over the Franchise Bill,
he really hates Gladstone worse than poison.
“_9th Sept._—I have engaged young Hope as my private secretary at £80 a
year. He is to do all that Button’s private secretary does for him, keep
my correspondence, newspaper cuttings, etc., etc., etc. I go to Paris on
Saturday.
“_11th Sept._—It is announced that Lord Ripon comes home from India in
December, and is succeeded by Lord Dufferin.”
CHAPTER IX
CONSTANTINOPLE IN 1884
“_13th Sept._ 1884.
“LEFT London in low spirits, aggravated by the announcement of Lord
Northbrook having presented a complimentary letter from the Queen to
that miserable Tewfik. I am on my way to Constantinople to try and urge
the Sultan to take a lead in reform. He must do so now, or he will lose
his hold over Islam for ever, but I do not expect to succeed; all is too
rotten there for any solid building.
“I arrived late at the Hotel St. Romain, and dined as in old days at
Bignon’s with Bitters.[77] Bitters is looking older, and we are all
sinking into the grave, whether we have worked or whether we have
played. Only Henri the fat waiter is unchanged, the same tremulous
mountain of flesh as of yore.
“_14th Sept., Sunday._—After breakfasting with Bitters in the Rue
Mazarine, I went to the races of Longchamps and saw Archiduc win a race
in fine style, galloping like a machine all the way. A beautiful day,
but few people, it being September. The only soul I knew there to speak
to, the Duke of Fernan Nuñez. At the Embassy there is no one, even
Atlee[78] gone to Dieppe, Lyons in England, and Sheffield and all of
them.
“Abdu and Sanua came to dinner—both despondent about affairs in Egypt.
“_15th Sept._—To the Wagrams at Gros Bois. I had intended only to spend
the afternoon, but have been asked to stay on. This is a most
interesting place. Gros Bois was built and enclosed with a wall by
Francis I’s mother, but the present house, or at least the inside of it,
is of much later date. The decorations are wholly _Empire_ as befits its
owners, and it forms a fine monument of the Bonapartist episode. I was
taken over the gallery and state rooms and shown the pictures and
relics, Napoleon’s bed from St. Helena and the rest, and driven out
afterwards in the great wood which surrounds the house—a delightful day.
All is on a large scale, but nothing is kept up. The grass grows where
it wills, and there are no flowers in the vases. The servants are
ancient, almost decrepit; in the stables are no fine horses. The little
Princess would change all this if she could, but her father-in-law will
not hear of having a chair altered. He and all the rest of the family
are away, only Prince Alexander and his wife and a little son and heir a
year old; they are in mourning, as his mother died this summer.
“_16th Sept._—The Prince is the best fellow in the world and the best
sportsman. He inherits his love of sport from his father, who, he tells
me, goes out shooting every day of the year, hunting the woods with dogs
for roe, even during the nesting season, and so doing endless damage to
game. Gros Bois is a place, however, which can stand a deal of
disturbance, and he took me out for a by-day with two old huntsman
keepers and a slow hound. It was an absolutely lovely morning and as hot
as July, and waiting in the green rides for roe to pass was delightful.
I shot two and missed a third. The second was hunted well by the dogs
and crossed a clearing twice before he came within shot, and I got him
at last with a snap shot across a ride, the dog close behind. We also
killed as many hares, a few rabbits, and a pheasant or two. There are in
the wood a number of _faisans venérés_, the sacred pheasants of China,
which have bred and multiplied since they first escaped from the
_faisanderie_, when the Prussians were here. The Prussians occupied the
Château and took a good many things, but on the whole did less damage
than might have been expected, the property being recommended to them by
the King of Bavaria, whose relative the Prince is. Altogether two most
delightful days, and it was like a douche to come back to this wretched
little Hotel St. Romain, with its drunken waiters. Dined and sat till
late at a café on the Boulevard with Abdu and Jemal-ed-Din.
“_17th Sept._—Anne arrived from England in the early morning; she tells
me Malet has been appointed Ambassador at Berlin. Malet did all Lord
Granville’s dirty work two years ago, let them suppress his dispatches,
ate dirt for them, told stories for them; and this is his fair reward.
Though not a man to command, he is a good servant, and if they want a
docile one at the end of a telegraph wire, they could not do better than
take him. He is not likely to let his imagination run away with him, or
make any scholar’s mistakes on points of detail. Bismarck no doubt has
asked for him, as a safe man, and because he (Bismarck) was a great
friend of Malet’s parents in old days at Frankfort. The only time I ever
met Bismarck[79] was at Lady Malet’s, or rather at old Lord Brougham’s,
where she was staying, in Dover Street some twenty years ago. Edward
Malet was at Frankfort when I first went there in 1860, not actually
_attaché_, but doing his father’s work with us in the chancery, always a
good boy but a dull one. We neither liked him nor disliked him,
Schomberg Kerr and I, and I don’t remember that we ever saw much of him
except in the chancery—a mouldy place it was, smelling of apples.
“Breakfasted with Bitters, and played tennis in the afternoon with
Leigh, winning three sets out of four. Biboche was there looking aged,
and Sérafin.
“_18th Sept._—To the Embassy, and saw Walsham, the first secretary, now
in charge.[80] There is a telegram from Gordon at Khartoum which sounds
as if he were in great straits and very wild. He says the Government is
responsible for all that has happened, that he expects two hundred
thousand Turkish soldiers, and wants £300,000; is going to destroy
Berber and send Stewart to relieve the garrisons on the White Nile and
Dongola. He wants an expedition quick.
“To Vienna by evening train.
“_20th Sept._—Vienna. Called at the Embassy and on Victor Drummond,[81]
whom I had not seen since we were at Athens together. With him I found
Hadji Petros, King George’s _aide-de-camp_, son of the original of
About’s ‘Hadji Stavros’ in the ‘Roi des Montagnes.’ How things have
marched since then, and they say people cannot govern themselves.
“Dined at the Embassy. Sir Augustus Paget very amiable. We talked about
Egypt. He remembers Nubar when Nubar was Abbas Pasha’s Dragoman, etc.
(as already given in my ‘Secret History’). Lady Paget talked about Mrs.
Howard and the Stanley family, especially about Lady Amberley and her
son.” This was the present Lord Russell, whom I had known from a child,
and had met a little while before at Naworth and liked. He had had a
strange bringing up of an almost Spartan kind. I remember finding him
once lying in the fender when I came to call upon his mother, his head
almost under the grate. I asked whether she did not think it dangerous;
she answered: ‘It will be useful to him. If a coal falls out it will
teach him not to lie there again.’ On the other side of me was the
Comtesse De la Torre, an old friend of Gobineau’s, of whom we talked
much.”
I had known Count Gobineau well, having made his acquaintance in 1870
through Lytton. It was during the Prussian war, and Gobineau was in
extremities for money, the Prussians being in occupation of his country
house. He had written to Lytton about some Oriental manuscripts he was
desirous of selling, and Lytton, who was at Vienna, had written to me
asking me to help him. I had done what I could for him, and had earned
much gratitude. After the war I went to stay with him at Trye and we
became close friends. I have some thirty or forty of his letters,
chiefly on literary subjects, and his own private copy of his celebrated
book “Sur l’inégalité des Races Humaines.” This book was, I think, the
first to protest against the old doctrine of the essential brotherhood
of man, and, as the author of it, Gobineau gained a great posthumous
renown in Germany, and became the founder of a school of thought there
called _Das Gobinismus_. He was a very agreeable man with much
imagination, a bit of a poet and a bit of an artist, besides being an
excellent talker on all subjects. He had been French Minister in Persia,
and in 1870 was Minister in Brazil, and an intimate friend of the
Brazilian Emperor.
“Dufferin was here only yesterday, and we have therefore just missed
him, which is most provoking.
“_21st Sept._—By night train to Lançut, Count Alfred Potocki’s country
place beyond Crakow, arriving on the 22nd. The Château is only a couple
of miles from the station, a very handsome building, partly of the last
century, partly older. It is very large, with one of the handsomest
suites of rooms I ever saw, the furniture having been brought from
Paris, at the time of the great Revolution, by the wife of the Potocki
of the day. Lançut was inherited from a Princess Lubomirska, who in turn
inherited it from an ancestor of the fourteenth century. These Potockis
are allied to, but of a different branch from, the Potocki who with
Branicki betrayed Poland to Catherine of Russia. They are very
patriotic. Their family has been distinguished in Poland for many
centuries, and in the long gallery there are portraits, most of them
badly restored, of some dozen of them. Four were Generalissimos or
Hetmans of the Polish army, and one, Stanislas, was killed before Vienna
in the last siege by the Turks, 1683. The present Count is about sixty,
a most distinguished man. Forty years ago he was _attaché_ in London,
and has since been Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior at
Vienna, and for eight years Governor of Gallicia. The Countess was a
Princess Sanguscko from Russian Poland, where she has large estates.
There are two sons, Roman, whom we met in Egypt three years ago, and
Joseph, who bought our horse Pharaoh, and two daughters; one of them is
here, Madame Tyschkiewicz, a charming person, as they all are.
“_23rd Sept._—This is an old-fashioned place. The Countess has two
dwarfs, who follow her about wherever she goes, of the size of children
of six or seven years old, but really of twenty-two and twenty-five, not
misshapen or ugly, children of a Polish peasant on the estate, the
father not being particularly small; the dwarfs’ two brothers are tall
enough to be in the army. It is the fashion with the nobility to keep
these little people; they get three florins a month, everything found,
and presents.
“Drove in the afternoon to a horse fair, I with Count Roman in a little
carriage with four ponies—three white and a spotted one. It used to be
the Polish fashion to have all spotted horses. From the high plain one
can see the Russian frontier to the north ten miles away, and to the
south the last ripple of the Carpathian Hills. This is a great country
for Jews, Gallicia containing nearly eight hundred thousand of them.
They wear long gowns, with felt hats and long curls. They are disliked
as moneylenders, but have not been persecuted here as they are in
Russia. The rest of the population is half Polish, half Ruthenian, three
millions of each. The Ruthenians are Slavs; they are Catholic, but use
the Greek Ritual and have married priests. In Russian Poland the
Ruthenians have been compelled to join the Orthodox Church. The Poles
are all Catholic. Roman tells me the estate here is about twenty
thousand hectares—forty thousand acres—none of it let, but cultivated
under intendants. They are suffering from the same thing here as
elsewhere, the low price of wheat. We met and overtook a number of Jews
upon the road, nine and ten in a cart. It is a joke here to laugh at the
Jews for going about so many together, and to count them with the
fingers. This makes them angry, as they think the last one counted will
die. At the fair the horses, for common horses, seemed pretty good,
better than you would see anywhere else out of England. The ponies of
the country are like the Asiatic ponies, and were brought here they say
by the Tartars. After this we drove in the forest, a great fir wood, and
got home in the dark.
“The young men, Tyschkiewicz and Roman, have been talking about the
meeting of the three Emperors; they declare it to have been directed
entirely against the anarchists, and to have no relation either to Egypt
or to England. When the Russian Emperor came through Warsaw, he received
a letter from the Nihilists telling him he had nothing to fear while in
Poland, as Poland had suffered too much already, and they would not
bring more trouble on its people. Half the Poles in Warsaw were
nevertheless arrested as a precaution. The Empress would not leave the
Emperor, but followed wherever he went. The Emperor had tried to speak
Polish, which is a finable offence at Warsaw.
“_24th Sept._—We went out, Roman and I, to the forest to try and get a
roebuck, but saw none but does. There was a part fenced off in which are
red and fallow deer, all too tame. A stag followed us about, butting at
the carriage. I was asked to shoot two young fallow deer, but missed
them, and not sorry. The forest is a great fir wood, with a sprinkling
of oak and birch on a sandy soil. We drove the four ponies again in a
little carriage like a sledge of the date of Napoleon the First. Joseph
has gone away to Antonin, their place in Russian Poland, where we are to
follow him to-morrow.
“_25th Sept._—Before going away, went over the house again. It is really
magnificent, with splendid Louis-Seize furniture, china, and bronzes. A
grand vase with brass mounts by Goutière, a whole service of Oriental
china on a large scale, a Sèvres stand valued at a hundred thousand
francs, and much else, a dozen rooms _en suite_, a theatre, a chapel and
a ball-room, all splendidly furnished. Of pictures some excellent
Bouchers, Dutch pieces in Snyders’ style, and a quantity more,—almost
all good. I liked especially a woman by Vincent, a small picture, but
first rate. The family lives in a corner of the house.
“To Lemberg with Countess Potocka, four hours by train, a handsome
country town of four thousand inhabitants. The Diet is sitting, and
Roman and his father are members. They have a house here at which we
dined, and went afterwards to the Governor Zalewski’s reception.
“_26th Sept._—Father Lubienski called, and told me much about politics.
He looks upon the Polish case as hopeless in Russia till there is a war,
but it is probable there may be some slight change for the better in
consequence of the meeting of the Emperors. The Austrian Government
succeeded in conciliating the Poles, so why not the Russian? Only the
Russians are altogether inferior intellectually and morally to the
Poles.
“Went to see the Museum of Natural History, which is the best of the
sort I ever saw. There are no fewer than twenty eagles, and every kind
of bird natural to Galicia is represented with nest and young, all well
stuffed. The beasts less well, but interesting. The elk is still found
in some of the forests, and the aurochs, or bison, just beyond the
frontier—but the last is almost extinct. There was a white roe in the
collection, shot last year by Count Arthur Potocki. This young man was
at dinner last night. He told me about the roe, and about the Branicki
stud—which he helps its owner to manage—also of some wonderful trout
fishing he had had, twelve hundred killed with the fly in a week, and
weighing four hundred pounds. Afterwards we were driven to the top of a
hill where there are public gardens with a fine view in the direction of
Russia.
“_27th Sept._—Started for Antonine, Father Lubienski seeing us to the
station. The fine weather is gone, and we had a disagreeable journey,
first by rail crossing the Russian frontier to Czerny Ostrov, a small
station in Volhynia, an eight hours’ journey, then by road. We were met
by two carriages and four, and drove fifty versts over fearfully muddy
roads to Antonine. The country here is like Salisbury Plain or the
Pampas, great rolling downs of black earth without a stone or pebble for
hundreds of miles, all under plough, no fences, no trees, except where
there are plantations of oak or birch. These are rare, but Antonine
itself is nearly surrounded by a very handsome oak wood of about eighty
years’ growth—fortunately no firs. The house is not a very large one and
without pretence, a good squire’s residence with pleasure grounds and
gardens of about forty acres. There is a large pond let to Jews at £200
a year for pike. Round this the village stands, and there are a dozen
respectable houses like bungalows occupied by the administrators of the
estate. This used to be a principality, and is still of thirty-five
thousand acres of land in hand, but the greater part now belongs to the
peasantry, who, thanks to their enfranchisement by Alexander II, are
well off. All the land they cultivated was by that act given them, the
Government paying the Lord of the Manor a small price for it. Their land
taxes are very low, not more than a tenth of what it is in Galicia. The
peasants are Ruthenians by race, but were forcibly converted a hundred
years ago to the Greek church, and are now to all intents and purposes
Russian. Industry thrives under protection, and the estate sugar mill
pays well.
“_28th Sept._—As far as I can make out, all is very well managed in this
part of Russia to the advantage of the Russian peasants, but the Polish
landlords are vexatiously treated. Poles in Russia are not allowed to
buy land, or to make wills, and are liable to confiscation at the
pleasure of the Emperor. They are, in fact, outlaws, and it is the
avowed policy to get rid of them. For this reason they stick closer to
the lands they have, and some of them are still very rich—the richest
being the Branickis, and next to them the Sangusckos. The Polish nobles
were originally granted their lands when these were uninhabited steppes
on the frontier liable to incursions from the Tartars, and the peasantry
were their feudal retainers, but of a different race, Ruthenian, living
under shelter of their castles. There are still some Catholic villagers,
but these are not Ruthenians; they are the descendants of impoverished
Polish nobles, and are still proud of their rank. The late Prince
Sanguscko, the owner of Antonine, took part in the Polish rising of
1830, and was exiled for ten years to Siberia and to serve as a common
soldier against the Circassians. He distinguished himself in the war,
and so was restored to his country. Afterwards he made several journeys
in the East, and brought back horses and mares from Aleppo, Damascus,
and Egypt, to add to his Arab stud already existing at Slavuta since
1803. He died three years ago, leaving half his lands to his daughter,
Countess Alfred Potocka, and half his stud to her son Joseph, now our
host. The half of the stud was then removed here, and there are now
forty-two brood mares.
“We went over the stud to-day. First, the stallions, of which Palatine
is about the handsomest horse imaginable. His fault is that he is rather
shallow in girth, but his head, neck, and carriage are superb, and he
has fine action, a gray with dark mane and tail. Artiste, a bay, fifteen
hands two, with beautiful action and carriage and a fine head, came
next. And after him Cyprian, a chestnut, of far more substance that
either of the other two. They like him, however, here the best and are
very likely right. Lastly, there was Pharaoh, looking more beautiful
than ever, and he gave me a pang of regret. He is fully appreciated
here, and has got some good colts this year of his own gorgeous dark bay
colour. Colour, it appears, is a very important point here at the sales,
gray being at a discount, and chestnut the favourite. The sales take
place in May, but the prices are small. A lovely team of four gray
stallions, fifteen hands, is now for sale at two hundred pounds, and a
team of gray mares, fourteen two, for a hundred and forty; all young
animals and perfectly broken. Twenty years ago Arabs were much more the
fashion, but now young Austria goes in for English blood.
“The brood mares are splendid, hardly a bad one among them, and a dozen
of the best are absolutely perfect. You could not find such a dozen
mares together anywhere in Arabia.
“_29th Sept._—There was Mass this morning in a funny little chapel in
the garden. Afterwards we went hunting with slow hounds and greyhounds,
and found two foxes in a marsh, which was drawn by black and tan hounds
of the dachshund sort, but bigger. Got the old one away, a fine old gray
fox, but the greyhounds were on the wrong side, and we had no run. Then
we coursed three hares, a greyhound I gave Joseph Potocki running well,
but the fastest was a brindled Circassian dog. The hares had no chance.
The country is a great open plain, but enclosed here and there with
banks and ditches.
“_30th Sept._—Another day among the horses and the brood mares at
pasture beside an oak wood, a very beautiful sight. Then to the sugar
mill, which brings in a profit of £250 a day for nearly three months
every year; that is £20,000, consuming 1,400 acres of beetroot, each
acre thus giving about £15, but the land can only grow it once in seven
years; still the profit is enormous, and they have other mills
elsewhere. The director of the stud, and the late Prince’s secretary,
worthy men, dine with us every evening, observing, however, much
etiquette with Count Joseph, after the manner of courts.
“_1st Oct._—Again out coursing, and drew a cover for a fox blank, and
then had some good runs after hares, getting four. I had a fall at one
of the banks. They are dangerous fences to ride fast at as the ditches
are ten feet wide.
“_2nd Oct._—We went to-day to see the cellars. There is one bottle of
Hungarian wine labelled 1683, and perhaps a thousand bottles of the last
century, as well as mead of the same date, which the Poles used to get
drunk on. To become intoxicating the honey must have been kept for
twenty-five years. There are also many dozens of brandy a hundred years
old or more, and all sorts of curious liquors and burgundies, and
ancient Spanish wines. The 1683 bottle was reserved to be drunk by the
King of Poland.
“Among the letters which came yesterday was one from Primrose; it
contained a copy of an apology written by Dr. Kerr to Villayet Ali (the
Patna case), a rather lame one. But as Primrose says, ‘it is a very
unusual thing to get an apology at all from an Englishman to any
native,’ so I suppose we must be content.[82]
“_3rd Oct._—We were to have gone to-day to the Branickis, but a telegram
came in the night altering our plan. This sends us straight to Odessa.
We started from Szepetovka station, thirty-two miles off, which we did
in four hours twenty minutes; this country has fine woods of oak and
birch, infested with swine, as in ancient Europe. These are spotted, as
are sometimes the cows and as were the mediaeval horses of Poland. At
Szepetovka we found that the Odessa express went in the morning, so we
stayed the night at the Potocki factory.
“_4th Oct._—To-day we have been travelling by train across ‘the unwise,
unjust, unmerciful Ukraine’ as far as Kasjatin. Our way lay through fine
forests, for the forest country begins here, and we are close to the
great bog of the Dnieper, a marsh as large as Ireland, and one of the
largest in the world.
“Further on, the country is open, and closely resembles the ‘campo’ of
Buenos Ayres.
“_5th Oct._—All night in the train, very dirty and stuffy. Russian
generals with spurs on. Fat women, half undressed, eating apples.
Windows nailed up for the winter.
“Found letters at Odessa, one from Rajah Emir Hassan which talks of a
Madrasa being opened on my plan at Lucknow. This looks as if the scheme
of a general university had been abandoned. Called on Consul-General
Perry, who hates Russia and Odessa, and every country but Spain.
“_6th Oct._—To the Odessa Exhibition, and saw the out of doors fair.
Here horses were exhibited, Russian trotters—a poor lot, and _soidisant_
Arabs, a poorer. The best horse was a large Russian dray stallion—white,
short legged, very strong, and with extraordinary good short limbs.
“_9th Oct._—After a disagreeable passage arrived in the Bosphorus and
anchored off the Asiatic shore in quarantine, near a pretty village with
two mosques, near enough to see the Mueddin in his tower, and the women
who come out in the evening to sit on the beach. The weather is heavenly
and consoles us for much. The quarantine is an act of reprisal by the
Ottoman Government against Europe. They have been pestered with advice
and remonstrance for the last hundred years about sanitary arrangements,
and now they are turning the tables. This has its excuse. I remember the
fiendlike action of the European Sanitary Board at Alexandria towards
the unfortunate Mecca pilgrims at Wej, and how the fat Greek Sinadino
boasted that they had been kept for I don’t know how many days without
water. Numbers died there, and it was one of the causes of the
revolution of 1882.
“_10th Oct._—I have been reading Madame de Crequy’s memoirs, a
delightful volume, lent me by Madame Coumarof, wife of a Russian
Secretary of Embassy, on her way to her husband’s post, a clever and
well informed woman. She believes in dreams and that she will be
crucified some day at Kief. She has told me a good bit about the Russian
peasantry, which is much what I found in Volhynia; they are well off,
eat meat daily, have good houses, and are able to live on their own
land. It is difficult to get labour for wages, hence land is cheap, this
in great Russia on the Volga.
“Hugh Wyndham came off to within speaking distance of our ship. He
brought the news that one of Gordon’s two steamers had gone ashore
somewhere near Berber, and the crew with Stewart had been killed by the
Arabs. I made Stewart’s acquaintance at Aleppo in 1881. He was a good
straightforward man, very enthusiastic about his work, but strangely
unsympathetic with the Eastern people he worked amongst. I gave him
letters of introduction to some of our desert friends near the
Euphrates, and he made a flying journey through the Sebaa and Shammar
tribes on a camel, but he distrusted the Bedouins and disliked them. I
put the violent line Gordon has taken against them down to his account.
I expect Gordon will be killed next—I wish it could be Wolseley or
Northbrook; it would disgust people with their unjust wars.
“_12th Oct._—Among our fellow passengers is an American named Howe, of
the romantic globe trotting sort, who is in ecstasies at all things, and
his fellow traveller, a Swede, Mr. Claes Lagergren, Chamberlain to the
Pope. The latter is the more interesting, as with a _doucereux_
ecclesiastical manner he is really well informed and sympathizes with
those things in the world which are right. These two have been
travelling together through Algeria, Spain, Sweden, and Russia, an oddly
assorted pair. Lagergren has been at Damascus and in Egypt. There was
also a Mohammedan on board from Kazan, who comes yearly to
Constantinople to trade. In the third class are some thirty Jew pilgrims
going to Jerusalem, very interesting people, very dirty, very devout.
They read their Bibles all day long, and say their prayers turning to
the east, and clothed in striped chasubles.
“_14th Oct._—Our five days’ quarantine over, we were landed in the
Embassy launch at Therapia, and went to see Hugh, and dined with him at
the Embassy. Count Corti was there, an ugly little man but sensible and
clever. Anne has had a good deal of conversation with him. I am more
than ever sorry to have missed Dufferin, who has left the best
reputation behind him in the Embassy, and would probably have been glad
to see us. We intend to stay a few days here at Therapia to make
acquaintance with the Ambassadors, especially Nélidof, whom I knew so
well at Athens.
“_15th Oct._—At Madame Petala’s Hotel, where I was in 1860; spent the
morning writing, and then by steamer to Buyukdereh to call on Madame
Coumarof, and also on the Russian Ambassador. Nélidof received me very
cordially, reminding me of many instances of our old life at Athens,
which I had forgotten, jokes I had made, the name of my dog, the paper
chases in the olive woods, Lady Dufferin’s visit, and twenty other
things which it gave me a pang to remember. He told me that Madame
Ozerof had died some years ago at Athens and Ozerof, his former chief,
had a post now of Grand Chamberlain at St. Petersburg, but was old and
lived with his married daughter in the Crimea, and that he had kept up
his intimacy with Haymerlé till the day of his death. Of Haymerlé he
said that his end was caused to a certain extent by chagrin. He was a
great worker and master of detail, and had made himself so necessary to
everybody that at last he had become Prime Minister of Austria. But,
once in power, he was unable to cope with the situation. He had married
a little _bourgeoise_ of Frankfort, and this had emphasized his own want
of birth; and Viennese society had given him the cold shoulder. He was
worried into his grave. We talked a little about politics, about the
possibility of reforming Mohammedan society, which he naturally does not
believe in. He said: ‘What will always prevent any reform is the
Caliphate.’ He then talked of a movement there had been in favour of the
Konieh branch of the Sultan’s family, being under the impression that
these were descended from the Koreysh; but I explained to him that this
was a mistake, and that the Konieh people represented only an elder
phase of the Turkish Sultanate, the Seljukian, not at all the Caliphate.
His ideas, like those of nearly every one, are quite vague on this
point. I was very much pleased with my visit.
“Later I met another old friend, Madame de Radowitz, the Prussian
Ambassadress, whom I had known at Berne in 1867. She, too, reminded me
of things which gave me a pang. The third old acquaintance was Mrs.
Goschen. Called with Hugh on Count Corti, who is most agreeable. He
remembers Constantinople in Bulwer’s time, and how his Excellency got
his island from the Sultan, and sold it afterwards for £20,000 to Ismaïl
Pasha. This little transaction was the ruin of Bulwer’s career. There is
an _entente cordiale_ between Corti and the English Embassy. We are to
lunch with him on Sunday.
“Later to the French Embassy. Monsieur de Noailles is not unlike Lord
Salisbury on a small scale. His wife is a Pole by birth, and acquainted
with all our Polish friends, has been a beauty, and is still a _femme
d’esprit_; has a salon; we found her agreeable and the house agreeable.
It is an old Turkish country house, with a single fine room, comfortable
and dignified—a great contrast to our own Therapia Embassy, which was
built by Sir Henry Elliot, in the Swiss Gothic style one sees at Bombay,
an eye-sore to the Bosphorus.
“_17th Oct._—With the Wyndham children to see the Palace of Belabeg on
the Asiatic shore; a modern building in very moderate taste, with a vast
deal of paint and gilding and marqueterie work and sham marble. It makes
one ill to think of the millions it must have cost, and the meanness of
the result. The views, however, from the windows are splendid, and in
the garden there are two fine tigers and some healthy looking ostriches.
We then steamed down the Bosphorus. Nothing in Stamboul is changed,
except that a railway has been run through the Seraglio gardens, and the
bridge of boats has become an iron one. But at Pera and Galata there are
marks of time, gaps where wooden houses have been burned, and a
multiplicity of tall new stucco houses.
“At Pera we are at the Hotel Royal. My first care has been to send
Stanley’s two letters of introduction to Achmet Vefyk and Khair-ed-Din
Pashas. They are away in their villas. Next I called on Hobart
Pasha;[83] he told us a great deal about the Sultan, who never goes out
now from Yildiz Kiosk, a small palace between Pera and Hissar, and has
not been in Stamboul for years. He says he likes him, that he is very
intelligent and well intentioned, but the Government is as bad as ever.
“The Sultan won’t hear of anything like independent administration in
the Provinces, which Hobart thinks with me would be the best cure for
the Empire. He talked a great deal about Halim Pasha, whose cause in
Egypt he has been pleading with Gladstone. Halim is supported strongly
by the Sultan. The Sultan told Hobart only the other day that if he
could do anything towards getting Halim back to Egypt, he would be
rendering him a great service. He urges me to see him and has promised
to let Halim know I am here. Dufferin, he says, has entirely destroyed
English influence by the violent line he has taken against the Sultan,
and the strong language he used about him. He had ended by ceasing to
have any communication at all with the palace, and had not seen the
Sultan for seven months when he was recalled. He escaped from all
business: whenever a message came on any matter he used to slip off in
his yacht and pretend he was too short-sighted to see the boats they
sent out after him. He had a yacht called the ‘Hermione,’ ingeniously
arranged so that he could be quite alone in her, managing the sails
himself by a system of ropes and pulleys, his own invention. Thus he put
off troublesome affairs.
“Henderson, the Consul at Aleppo, who is here, tells us the state of the
Provinces is much as it always was, or worse, the Pashas eating up the
people. Jamil Pasha at Aleppo has made £300,000 in the four years he has
been there. He is a great favourite with the Sultan, sending him horses
constantly.
“Just before sunset we rode out on hired ponies to the Okmaidan and saw
the Golden Horn in its glory. There is nothing like it, or near to it,
in the world.
“_18th Oct._—Whittaker, the Editor of the ‘Levant Herald,’ called. He
gave me much the same account of what is going on here. The Sultan is
played upon by the palace intriguers, who frighten him with stories of
plots. He is a timid man. The other day his horse reared with him in the
street, and he will not ride an Arab horse again. He rides, however,
‘pretty well for a Sultan,’ on trained horses, and shoots at a mark in
the old Turkish fashion. Khair-ed-Din he calls a wind-bag, and Vefyk a
man of crotchets. Of Saïd Pasha, the Vizier, he said: ‘He is an honest
man but quite ignorant of European affairs; knowing that he is ignorant
he tries to make up by reading, and he is now in a complete muddle. He
belongs to the old Turkish school, blindly hating all that is foreign;
he is personally honest, but has no power, for the Sultan always
interferes.’
“In the afternoon we rode round Stamboul: it is wonderfully shrunk and
depopulated since I first remember it, many houses abandoned and the
streets empty. The Seraglio point has been turned into a new semi-
European quarter of the most wretched kind, with roads and tramways and
stucco houses everywhere. The Mohammedan population seems scarcer,
turbans have almost disappeared, and it is difficult to distinguish
between Nazarene and Moslem. An interesting ride, but sad. Hobart called
again in the evening, keen that I should see Halim without delay. Khair-
ed-Din’s secretary has also called, fixing my visit to that Highness for
Monday morning.
“_19th Oct._—By the half-past nine boat to Therapia. Selim Faris joined
us as agreed at Ortakeui (he was afraid of being seen with me), and we
travelled on with him. His information was interesting. Of the Sultan he
gives much the same account as the rest, that is to say he speaks of him
as a good man, sincerely anxious to further the prosperity of Islam, and
immensely jealous of his position as Emir el Mumenin and Khalifa, but
quite ignorant of the means through which to act, a prey to charlatans
and intriguers of every kind, except the European kind. Faris has
friends at the palace, and declares that the Sultan shall see me,
although he tells me my name is in bad odour there. The Sultan was at
one time much pleased at my letters in the ‘Times,’ when I defended the
Egyptians before the war, but he was angry at my sticking to Arabi after
he himself had abandoned him; and Tewfik’s envoy, Sabit Pasha, is
constantly telling him that I am head of a party in England bent on
restoring the Arabian Caliphate. The Sultan, he assured me, supported
Halim, but there would be danger in making Halim an English candidate.
Arabi is quite out of favour. Faris’s paper, the ‘Jowaib,’ was stopped
last year because he had been to see Lord Granville in London, but he is
forgiven now. He thought the Sultan would take an interest in Indian
education, but the whole Turkish State was dying. The Caliphate would
some day return to Arabia. The Sultan knew it and was doing all in his
power to prevent it, but it must come. He charged me to keep this
conversation secret. Lunched with Count Corti, the Italian Ambassador,
agreeable but ugly, with the ugliness of Socrates, a great Anglomane and
friend of Dufferin’s. He told me he had been at one time favourite
Ambassador with the Sultan, who had given him beautiful horses, but he
once said something favourable about Dufferin in conversation, and from
that time the Sultan would have nothing more to do with him. Dufferin
was not generally liked here, Hugh tells me, and seems to have been a
fiasco politically. On to the French Embassy in Corti’s steam launch.
Everybody here is most amiable to us, I suppose because strangers are
rare.
“_20th Oct._—To call on Khair-ed-Din Pasha at Kurujesme. He has a
handsome house there, being very rich, a man of about fifty-five, tall,
not very agreeable in countenance, and with dyed hair. He received me
well, talked sensibly, explaining his ideas with considerable clearness,
and has the manner of a man used to State affairs. He had retired, he
told me, from these, but the Party he had represented was for progress
on Eastern lines, not in imitation of Europe. He asked me to explain to
him the British policy in Egypt, which I did, and I asked him in turn to
explain to me how it was that with a Sultan, who was admittedly a good
man and well meaning, things only got worse in the Empire. At this he
laughed, and excused himself from answering, he being he said a Tunisian
born, and a stranger. ‘But go to Vefyk Pasha,’ he said. ‘He knows
everything, and will tell you.’ He then gave me two volumes of
‘Controversial Theology,’ which he had had translated into French, and
one for Stanley. And we talked about India, and the danger there was for
the English of a quarrel with Islam. ‘But they don’t mind,’ he said.
‘They say the Mohammedans in India are so happy and so fond of them
there is no fear.’ We parted the best of friends.
“Then on to Achmet Vefyk’s. This is the most remarkable Turk I have ever
met, and one of the most remarkable men. He reminds me a little of old
Ragunath Rao,[84] having the same keen intelligence, power of vivid
expression, and bursts of wit. He is equally outspoken. Like the old
Rajah, he is a man of the past age. He lives in a little wooden cottage,
a kind of hermitage on the hill, to get to which you have to climb an
almost impossible path, and he affects an extreme simplicity of life. He
was out in his garden when I arrived, and I was shown upstairs to a
meanly furnished ante-room, but sunny and cheerful, where I sat on the
divan till he came in. He came upstairs slowly, like a man bent with
rheumatism, an old man in an old-fashioned dress, a gown and slippers,
with a large square fez of the time of Sultan Mahmoud. He took me into
an inner room a little better furnished, with some old-fashioned painted
chairs, covered with Broussa velvet. He talked about the decay of
Turkey. ‘The beginning of our ruin,’ he said, ‘was the Commercial Treaty
of 1832. Before that, our people had trades and industries. Now there
are one hundred and fifty thousand beggars in Stamboul alone. Look at
these chairs, the velvet on them is from a manufactory that supplied all
Europe. Now we buy our velvets, when we can afford to buy them, from
Lyons. They forced tariffs on us, which gave all the advantage to the
foreigner and broke up our trade corporations, which were the life of
the people. This is what has principally ruined us. Then we have had bad
luck. Our Sultans have been worthless. Formerly we should have deposed
them all, till we got a good one—but Europe interferes with our rights
now. You must not suppose that the deposition of a Sultan is a lawless
act. It is our right. The Sultan Khalifa Emir el Mumenin is not a
religious teacher, he is only the chief of the Moslems, and each of us
is as good as he, and better if he observes the law better. It is for us
to tell the Sultan what he is to do and not to do; and when I was young
there were ten thousand men ready to tell him this. Now there are only
myself and four or five others—old men; the rest have no courage except
to ask for money. You have just been to Khair-ed-Din. He came here as
leader of a party of reform—he has made himself rich, and he stops here
to get a place or a pension. He will do any dirty work the Sultan may
bid him do. I had refused to do that, and I live in this old tumble-down
house. The Sultan sends for me every now and then to beg me to be his
minister, but I will not be minister unless I have power. When the
Russians were at the gates of Constantinople I was made Vizier, and sent
to treat with them. The Grand Duke Nicholas wanted the Sultan to come
out and pay him a visit, that he might see how large his army was. But
the Sultan shut himself up, declaring that they wanted to make him
prisoner, and carry him away to Russia. I refused Nicholas point blank,
and said he must come first to the Sultan, and I succeeded. The Sultan
refused for twenty days, and for twenty days I put the Grand Duke off,
on one pretext or another, and in the end I got the Sultan to receive
him, and to pay him the return visit. The Grand Duke Nicholas was a man
altogether brutal and corrupt.’
“He then talked about India. ‘The English,’ he said, ‘have lost their
political senses. Formerly I remember many men who had correct ideas
about the East, and he named several, Alison and Lord Napier. Now they
seem deprived of reason. What did they mean by sending that young man
Bulwer to be Viceroy of India? I remember him here very many years ago,
a pretty little young man he was, fond of saying pretty things to the
ladies. A man with such a talent for writing poetry, how could he make a
Viceroy to sit on the throne of Sultan Akbar?’ I told him about the
misfortunes of the Indian Mohammedans, and how they had charged me to
speak to the Sultan if possible and enlist his sympathy. But he said: ‘I
advise you to be very cautious about this. If the Sultan was a man
worthy of his position, it would be well—but in confidence I tell you,
and do not repeat this even to Lord Stanley—he is mad. His is a peculiar
madness. He is clever and agreeable, and all who see him go away
convinced that he agrees with them, and so he does. For three days he
pays attention to what he has been told. Then he begins to suspect, and
then he sees a new person who tells him the other thing, and all his
ideas are changed. He is a man of fixed and violent ideas, which he
changes every week.’ ‘He is not then,’ I asked, ‘the good man people say
he is?’ ‘Do not believe it. The Sultan is _un misérable et un fou_. He
is out of his mind with fear and jealousy. Sometimes, when the fit is on
him, he will walk round and round in his palace for four days and
nights, never sleeping, hardly sitting down, hardly eating, and all for
fear of assassination. If you came to him to tell him such a thing as
you propose, he would listen to you and be delighted, then he would
suspect a plot, and be in a fever till you had left Stamboul. Already he
is probably asking himself why you have come, and when you mean to go. I
advise you to be very cautious. People will come to you from him telling
you this and that. He has an army of 4,000 spies, and you must not stay
long in Constantinople. Besides, if you gave him any such message from
India, it is possible he might take it up and make an intrigue of it,
and spoil it as he spoiled the movement in Egypt. He cares only for
intrigue and for being cleverer than all those he meets, and for
outwitting them—intrigue, and saving money, and fear of what is coming.
You had better wait. It will come in five or six months. The movement in
Bulgaria and East Roumelia will bring on the crisis, and he will be
deposed. Then with the new Sultan something might be done, but with this
one never. Do not forget that he is a madman and do not trust him.’ I
asked him what prince there was who could succeed him. ‘The prince next
in succession,’ he said, ‘is calm and reasonable. It is possible we may
have better luck with him—but our State is ruined through the men of the
present day, who are all corrupt. Look at the young Turkey Party, what
fools they are! Which of them cares for anything but folly, pleasure,
and money?—and we are all becoming paupers.’
“We talked about Egypt. Vefyk has an old grudge against the Turks of
Mehemet Ali, ‘who were every one of them worthless.’ The Egyptians he
despises; ‘Arabi may have been an honest man, but he was an ignorant one
who did not know what Europe’s power was. A couple of Turkish regiments
would have settled the matter at any moment. Arabi thought that he could
stand alone, without the support of the Sultan. He was a fool.’ I asked
him about Halim. ‘Halim,’ he said, ‘is like them all. He is an
intriguer, a man of no sense.’ Then we went on to talk about Stanley,
and it was agreed that I should come back with Anne and breakfast with
him on Wednesday. In going out he stopped me and said in a mysterious
way: ‘I must tell you something which I beg you will not forget. You are
going to see Halim Pasha. He is the best sportsman we have in
Constantinople, he has killed more bears and more wolves than any other.
Remember this, and when he asks you what I said of him, you will be able
to answer with a clear conscience that I told you something to his
credit.’ And the old man burst into a roar of laughter at his conceit,
and so I went away.
“I met Anne outside, who had come by the steamer, and we went on to
Prince Halim’s, which is close by—a fine house by the water side. We
were received at the door by a man whom I did not recognize, but who
turned out to be Ismaïl Jowdat, who had been Prefect of Police for the
foreigners at Cairo during the war, and who, having kept order and saved
much European life there, was exiled by Malet after Tel-el-Kebir. At the
top of the stairs we were met by Halim, who in looks is not remarkable,
and who, if he had not said ‘_c’est moi_,’ I should have taken for a
servant. He is short and fat, but is younger looking and less obese than
Ismaïl, and is more active and alert. His features are rough and without
defined expression, his eyes small and restless, and his manner, though
far from bad, is without grace or special charm. He is in fact a very
plain man, made plainer by his beard being dyed. There is something
frank, however, in his way of talking, and it is difficult not to see
that he is far more respectable than any of his cousins. He did not ask
me about Vefyk, so I was not obliged to make use of Vefyk’s little
stratagem, and we talked at once about Egypt.
“‘There is no solution,’ he said, ‘of the Egyptian question except
through the Sultan. Egypt at the present moment is on strike, and so
will remain as long as the Sultan is not invited to establish a new
order of things. If England were to annex the country outright, she
might perhaps manage it, but short of annexation she cannot get on
without help—help from Europe, and help from Constantinople. The Sultan
is the true solver of the riddle now, as he was in 1878, and whoever
undertakes to manage Egypt must reckon with him. The simplest solution
would be for the European Powers to beg the Sultan to name a new
Khedive. Anyone whom the Sultan named would meet with a good reception.
If the Sultan were to name Ismaïl once more I should bow to his
decision, although I should consider it a great misfortune for Egypt.
Ismaïl’s partisans are the capitalists and speculators of Europe; all
those who want the reign of pillage to begin again. The people do not
wish for them, and would not long endure him. But they would accept him
from the Sultan, and I too. Ismaïl was always false from a child. We
were at school together; he never quarrelled, but if a boy insulted him,
he went quietly and stole his exercises out of his desk so as to bring
him into trouble. We are both fifty-four years old, he being two months
younger than me, but he is old from the life he has led. I have all my
life been fond of sport, riding, moving about. This keeps a man
vigorous. It is a mistake to say I do not care to go back to Egypt; I do
care, and I feel sure it is my destiny, but I do not wish to make a
fiasco. They say I might have come forward before the war. I was twice
asked, but not through the intermediary of any one I could depend upon.
Once it was through Monsieur Ninet. He is very likely a good man, but I
ask you, was he a proper person to represent Egypt in a serious matter?
I tried hard to get into direct relations with Arabi, but never
succeeded. I will come forward if asked to do so by the Egyptians, or if
named by the Sultan.’ I asked him what he thought should be the form of
Government for Egypt. He said: ‘No constitution as yet. Egypt wants a
strong Government just now. She should be ruled by a Liberal despot, a
council if you will, but absolute power in the ruler. Eastern nations
understand this, not the other. As to finance, I see no difficulty. I do
not believe in Egypt’s exhaustion. She could pay all her debts with
economy. Certainly, if the interest on the debt could be lowered for a
few years, she would recover. But the peasants’ debts must be settled at
once. As to the Soudan, my policy would be that of my father, to hold
the whole Nile Valley as a trade route, as far as the Equator if
necessary, but not to leave the river banks. The Upper Nile is quite
necessary to Egypt; it must be reconquered.’ I understood him to expect
this to be done by Turkish troops.
“On the whole my impression of Halim is favourable. He is outspoken,
practical, and seems gifted with common sense. I should say he was
honest; he has very little of the prince about him, much more of the
_bourgeois_. Perhaps this is what Egypt requires. Ismaïl Jowdat and
Mustafa Bey, Arabi’s doctor, who are apparently living dependent on
Halim, accompanied us to the door and thanked me very warmly for having
saved their lives after the war.
“_21st Oct._—Went to see the Yeni-Jami and St. Sophia’s. In the latter
the _Asr_ was going on. Perhaps a hundred persons present. I wished I
could have joined in this, but only looked on from the gallery.
“Miss Laing called, who had been Princess Nazli’s governess, and is now
living with Princess Halim. She told us much that was interesting. She
had been very intimate with Arabi, and is very grateful to him for
having protected her during the war. She has no doubt in the world about
the Khedive’s complicity in the Alexandria riot. It was never intended
to go as far as it went, but was certainly planned. Dufferin extracted a
promise from her not to correspond with Arabi after his exile. Arabi was
a quite honest man, but no administrator, and not quite _à la hauteur de
la situation_. He would have carried the revolution through, however, if
Egypt alone had been concerned. The fellahin would certainly support
Halim, especially if he came back with Arabi.
“_22nd Oct._—Rode to Roumeli Hissar again, and breakfasted with Vefyk.
He gave us eleven Turkish dishes, a very good repast, and entertained us
with much historical disquisition. The word Arab and Europe he told us
are identical, and signify the Unknown Land. The first Arabs, the
Himyarites, were Hamites, and are the same people with the Abyssinians.
Queen Belkis was an Himyarite, but they were later invaded from Chaldea
by a Semitic race under Adnan. The Himyarites are the same with the
Phoenicians, as their names denote, both meaning red.[85] Perseus and
Andromeda were the Persians and the Medes, and he, Vefyk, had been
shocked to find Grote, in his ‘History of Greece,’ repeating the old
fables. He assured us that history, as he was explaining it to us, had
always been taught in the Oriental schools. Abraham was a new man, and
only got his nobility by marrying a daughter of the Himyarite king. From
that he went on to the modern history of his own doings on the
Euphrates, how he had divided the tribes, and built forts on the river
and starved out the Anazeh. On Midhat he was very severe as a make-
believe reformer. He himself, on the contrary, had done real good; he
had rebuilt the ruins of Nissa and the Baths of Broussa, and had made
roads as short cuts from village to village across the hills. Midhat
only made plans, and was in the hands of adventurers. He also gave us a
history of his doings with Nejd and the Ibn Rashids and the
Montefiks—and repeated what he had told me before about the Sultan.
“After breakfast we went on to Halim’s, and made acquaintance with his
wife and son. The Princess is certainly a superior person, and took part
in our conversation. The son is very like himself; they are at their
best on the subject of Bedouin life, horses, and sport. He told us about
the eighty-four mile race between his horse and the English mare in
1864. His horse was a bay Hadban from the Anazeh, but bought by a
dealer. The English mare’s name was Alabama, which seems to have
belonged to several owners, of whom the principal was Mr. Smart. After
about sixty miles, Alabama stopped, and Hadban came in gaily. An
objection was raised on the score of the jockey having lost five pounds
in weight, but eventually the money was paid. The race was run from Suez
to Cairo in seven hours fifty minutes. This is not very different from
the account given me by Hetherington, who trained Alabama, except that
according to him Alabama was some way ahead of Hadban when she stopped,
and nearer home. Hetherington said that he had ridden out to meet the
horses coming in, and stopped the mare to give her some gruel, after
which she could not move, but it is evident he would not have stopped
her if she had not been pretty nearly done. Halim assured us that he had
ridden one of his Arab horses once, at trot and canter, for twenty-four
hours, another for eighteen hours.
“Coming in after dark, Count Corti came. He has a poor opinion of Vefyk,
whom he calls mad. Of Halim, however, his opinion is high, and he had
reported it so to his Government when they had enquired about him. But
the Italian Government was all for Ismaïl.” The reason of the patronage
given by the Italian Government to the ex-Khedive was, that at the time
when Ismaïl could command money in plenty, he had lent a large sum to
the King of Italy.
“We have a fancy for taking a house at Bebek, just under Roumeli Hissar.
“_23rd Oct._—Went across the water to Kadikeui to see the Polish patriot
Langiewitz and his horses, for he has a small Arab stud. He was at the
head of the revolt of 1863, an unfortunate affair, which was not fully
joined in by the nobles, and was disapproved by the Potockis and others.
He is a very little man, with big beard and spectacles, more like a
Professor than a General, with an English wife—worthy people, very. He
has got a nice old-fashioned Turkish house, with large grounds, for
which he pays a rent of £160, and one might do worse than end one’s days
in such a retirement. He talked sympathetically of Arabi and the
Egyptian war. About Constantinople, he told us that a census of the
population had recently been taken, which showed the Mohammedans already
in a minority there. Here at Scutari and Kadikeui the decaying number
was equally noticeable. His wife had been thirty years in the country,
he nearly twenty. The state of things was wholly hopeless for the Turks.
“On coming in I found the Russian Ambassador, with whom I discussed the
same point, but he would not admit the population to be diminishing,
though he agreed that all lands habitable by Europeans would sooner or
later be possessed by them. He talked of the progress made by the
Germans in Asia Minor. We were talking about the Egyptian Revolution, as
to which he was anxious to hear the truth, when we were interrupted.
“Whittaker, who came in next, told some amusing stories of the Sultan
and his dealings with the Ambassadors. To avoid talking business with
them, he arranges to have inconvenient people present, or to be
interrupted, and when hard pressed a band of music strikes up. None of
the Ambassadors are on confidential terms with the Sultan. The last who
was so was Layard, and he had disgusted the Sultan with all foreign
intimacy. Layard, when he was Ambassador here, had his breakfast table
supplied daily by the Sultan—butter, milk, bread, and the rest—and dined
with him constantly; and there was a constant flow of presents,
sometimes of value. This while Disraeli was in power; but when Gladstone
came into office, Layard, who had hitherto supported the Sultan at the
Foreign Office, had, in the hope of keeping his place, written the
dispatch against him which Granville so treacherously published. Since
which the Sultan has trusted nobody. He treats his own ministers as
slaves, and, when one of his Viziers wrote on some occasion resigning
his office, all the answer he got was, ‘When I want you to leave me, you
dog, I will let you know.’
“_24th Oct._—Selim Faris called with great talk about my being received
at the palace, and advising me to write to Munir Pasha asking an
audience. I asked Faris to tell me frankly all his opinion of the
Sultan’s character and of the chance of my interview having some good
effect, and I think he was sincere in what he told me. He said: ‘The
Sultan is a man who has really good intentions and who really wishes to
serve the interests of the Mohammedans and of religion generally, and
especially of the Caliphate. But he is quite ignorant of the world, and,
to tell the whole truth, he is crazy. He cannot keep to any plan or line
of conduct, and he is ruining the Mohammedans and religion, and his own
Caliphate. The question of the Caliphate is one which is coming on now
very rapidly. The English Government, from its connection with India,
must eventually become its protector, whether it intends it or not, and
will guard the shores of the Red Sea, for the Caliphate must return to
Arabia. I should advise you nevertheless to see the Sultan if possible.
You might gain an influence over him, though there is nothing certain in
his conduct, and things cannot be worse than they are now. There is a
foundation of good in his character on which to work, and you need not
believe the stories of his caring only for money. He cares rather to
spend it. Send in your letter to Munir, and when the audience is agreed
to we will talk over what you should say to the Sultan, or rather what
you should not say.’ This decides me to stay on another week here in the
chance of succeeding. He also talked about Dufferin and the work
Mackenzie Wallace had done for him here, and how he had written most of
his Egyptian report for him. Wallace has now gone as Dufferin’s regular
secretary to India at £3,000 a year.
“At noon we went to the Selamlik to see the Sultan go to mosque, just
outside his palace walls. It was a very simple affair, a couple of
companies of rather ill-groomed soldiers, a few men on seedy horses,
half a dozen dust carts filled with sand to sprinkle the road, two
carriages full of ladies who did not enter the mosque, about fifty
officials in uniform, including Tahir Pasha, a Grand Chamberlain, and
Hafiz Behram-Agha, the Sultan’s chief Eunuch. This last is a grave,
respectable-looking person in black clothes, with considerable dignity
of manner. He stood on the doorstep outside during prayer with the rest
of the courtiers. Last of all the Sultan drove up in a victoria with the
hood up, two white horses of nondescript breed, two elderly officials on
the back seat, and a driver in a handsome Eastern dress. The Sultan got
out immediately the carriage stopped, turned an instant to salute the
people, and disappeared inside the mosque door. He is small and slight,
but being well shaped looks taller than he is. His face is handsome,
very black eyes, beard, and eyebrows, a nose of prodigious length and a
calm passionless expression—a dignified apparition. But I saw it all
from a considerable distance, and only for two seconds each time, going
in and coming out. As he drove away there was a melancholy attempt at
cheering, the hood was put down, and the Emir el Mumenin was rapidly
driven away from men’s sight. We occupied a little pagoda opposite the
mosque, with a couple of score of sight-seers and officials. Next me
were Ismaïl Jowdat and Husseyn Pasha, one of the Sultan’s aides-de-camp.
“Afterwards Ismaïl Jowdat came to the hotel, and spent three hours
giving me an account of the events of 1882 in Egypt.” These are embodied
in my “Secret History” and need not be repeated.[86]
“_25th Oct._—Rode to the Okmaidan and found the Jews keeping Sabbath in
their best clothes. Some of them were catching goldfinches in a net, and
we had the satisfaction of letting a bird go. These Jews talk Spanish;
one of them told me that their families had come four hundred years ago
from Spain.
“_26th Oct._—Count Corti came to take us in a steam launch to Therapia.
We had luncheon with the Wyndhams and called on the Noailles. The
arrangements of the French Embassy at Constantinople depend neither on
the Sultan nor on the Ambassador, but on the fancy of his son, a youth
of fifteen. Monsieur Doudou, as he is called, makes the rain and fine
weather on the Bosphorus, goes out sailing in a boat by himself to the
terror of his parents, who have him accompanied by another boat to pick
him up. When he goes out riding two negroes run beside him for the same
purpose, and when he goes out walking, he is surrounded by an Oriental
retinue. If Monsieur Doudou stays out late there is no dinner at the
Embassy, and the Ambassador cannot return to Pera until his son
consents. They are very anxious just now to gain his consent to this
necessary autumnal move, but Monsieur Doudou is out of humour, having
styes in his eyes, and will not be cajoled. A few nights ago, his
parents being out dining, he gave a ball at the Embassy to the
housemaids, and ended by smashing all the bells. When the Ambassador
returned, he enquired the meaning of the rumpus, and was told that it
was his son; ‘Rien, que cela!’ said M. de Noailles, and went off pleased
to his bed.
“On our way back to Constantinople Count Corti entertained us with
stories of the Berlin Congress, and of Lord Salisbury’s antics there.
Disraeli and Salisbury had gone there quite on their high horse to curb
the territorial ambition of Russia, and the publication of the secret
convention for the acquisition of Cyprus was a great shock to everybody.
Salisbury broke it gently to Waddington before the news was published;
and Waddington consulted his colleagues, it being generally agreed that
there was no middle course between going to war and saying nothing. ‘_Il
faut la guerre ou se taire_.’ But the publication was a great blow to
Disraeli, who took to his bed, and did not appear for four or five days.
Lord Salisbury, however, brazened it out and came to the Congress with
an air of defiance. There was no rupture between him and Waddington, and
they remained on apparently friendly terms—but Waddington had his
revenge. He was sitting one day with Salisbury, and, the conversation
leading that way, Waddington asked what the English Government would say
to France taking Tunis, and Salisbury said he did not see the harm.
Whereupon Waddington communicated this to Paris, and on his return the
French Ambassador in London was instructed to write to Lord Salisbury
reminding him of his words. Thus Salisbury was caught; ‘But,’ said
Corti, ‘if he had known anything of his business, he would have declined
to answer the note officially and would have pleaded a private
conversation.’ He did not believe that any arrangement of condominion
was come to between Salisbury and Waddington at that time, though I told
him, without mentioning names, of the letter Lytton had shown me.[87]
Count Corti is interesting diplomatically, as he has been to more
Congresses than any man in Europe. He said it was a pity the Sultan kept
up his feud with the English Government, but seemed inclined to agree
with me that our Government would have to come to terms with him about
Egypt. He spoke very strongly in favour of Halim, and of the Sultan’s
wish to make him Viceroy in Tewfik’s place. If it is true that Dufferin
holds this view, our chances look brighter than I have imagined. There
is a talk of Evelyn Baring as Ambassador here, a not unlikely thing
considering what a failure his policy in Egypt has been. He, like Malet,
has served the Government by holding his tongue, and letting his
dispatches be mutilated and suppressed. So he will be rewarded.
“_27th Oct._—Selim Faris called to ask whether I had received any answer
from the Sultan, but none has come. He said it was quite necessary the
English Government should come to terms with the Mohammedans for both
their sakes. This must eventually happen, as England would be obliged,
whether she liked it or not, to make herself their protector. With
regard to the Sultan he might be pacified by being allowed to appoint a
new Viceroy in Egypt, but it would be most dangerous to allow him to
administer the country. What he cared about most was to give the world
some striking proof of his power. He would jump at the idea. At the same
time Faris is convinced that he will never really forgive England, but
will take his revenge whenever the opportunity offers. I asked him if
the Sultan was on good terms with any of the foreign Ambassadors, and he
said: ‘Yes, with the German—and quite lately with the Russian.’ There
seems to be an alliance for the moment with Russia against England.
“Whittaker came in next, and I asked him the reason of Dufferin’s ill
success here. He explained that he had begun badly. The Sultan was
wanting in politeness to him, and he resented it, and Lady Dufferin was
shown no attention. During the whole of her stay at Constantinople she
was only once asked to the palace, and then the Sultan did not see her.
But it was almost impossible to deal with Abdul Hamid. In the
negotiation about Egypt he had changed his mind constantly, telegraphing
orders and counter orders to Musurus after he had agreed with Dufferin.
This made Dufferin say he lied. Then Dufferin with all his outside
amiability was a very hard man. Whittaker says he might be cruel if
occasion offered, and the transitions between the velvet and the iron
were too abrupt. The Turks did not like this. For the last eight months
he was neither invited to, nor went near, the Palace. Goschen was much
more successful, though he, too, gave offence by going to the Palace in
a shooting jacket; but Whittaker thinks that if he had stayed longer he
would have been liked on account of his frank manner.
“Henderson also called. He said we had been very near war over the
Dulcigno business. Goschen had given him orders at one time to pack and
be ready to leave the Aleppo Consulate. Next Ismaïl Jowdat. I read him
over the account of what he had told me on Friday about the events of
1881 and he corrected it on many points (see Appendix).
“_28th Oct._—Mustafa Bey, Arabi’s doctor, breakfasted with us. He is the
most satisfactory man of all I have yet met, and, having been with Arabi
throughout the war, he is excellent evidence. Arabi’s character, he
said, was quite distinct from that of all those who surrounded him. He
was the only one of those in high command who had real patriotism or
real religion, who did not seek his personal interest, and who saw
things clearly. His fault was that he was too confiding, too humane, and
too little censorious of others. He, Mustafa, was with Arabi at Tel-el-
Kebir to the last moment. No attack was expected, as Ali Yusuf, who
commanded the _avant-garde_, had been bought by Sultan Pasha, and Saoud
el Tehawi, who managed the scouting business, was also in the pay of
both sides. Arabi was asleep still in his tent when they heard a sound
of shots (not cannon he says) and presently soldiers running away
accompanied by Bedouins. Arabi drew his sword and tried to rally them,
begging them to fight for their country and their religion, but they
shouted to him ‘_Ya ibn el kelb_’—‘Why should we have ourselves killed
for you?’ The Bedouins, too, fired at him. It was the doctor who got
Arabi to mount and ride off. He himself, after having got into a train
which was stopped by the English, made his way to Zagazig on foot. He
says I am quite correct in my estimate of the characters of the six
exiles in Ceylon. Mahmud Fehmy and Abd-el-Aal are honest men. Mahmud
Sami and Yakub Sami joined the movement from personal motives of spite
against the Khedive; and Toulba was never anything but a worthless
_gamin_. Arabi was wrong to trust them, but he had few good men to
choose from, and when men swore oaths to him he trusted them. Thus he
trusted the Khedive. Ali Fehmy was only half-hearted. He was certainly
acting in concert with the Khedive in the affair of Abdin, but Arabi was
not in their confidence. The thing had been arranged as long before as
July, and Sherif was in the plot. Riaz wanted to make himself regent,
just as Sultan Pasha afterwards expected to be made regent when Tewfik
was to abdicate after Arabi’s trial. Sultan, at least, had told his
friends this, showing them the Order of Michael and George he had
received, ‘The same as had been given to the Sultan of Zanzibar.’
“He then gave us the whole history of the Tantah massacre in detail,
which he knew first from the official enquiry made before Arabi when it
happened, and at which he assisted, and secondly from Ahmed Minshawi
with whom he had lived afterwards at Beyrout, and who came here with
him, and who had repeatedly told him the story. The true facts were
these:
“The Mudir of Tantah, Ibrahim Adhem, with Osman Rafaat, excited the
populace against the Christians, as Ismaïl Jowdat related, telling them
that Arabi had ordered it; and the Mudir shut himself up also as
related. Minshawi lived at a village called Koreyshiyeh, and happening
to come in that day by train with Abd-el-Aal Pasha’s son, Emir Bey, and
Husseyn Wasif, a magistrate, they found Christians being killed, and
Minshawi interfered. They, the populace, called out to him that Arabi
had ordered it, but Minshawi had said to the effect of ‘Damn Arabi,’ and
insisted on their stopping. He had then gone with Abu Diab, who had also
been trying to stop the massacre, to the Mudirieh, and had kicked in the
door of his room and expostulated with him for letting the thing go
on—Abu Diab using strong language, for he was very angry. Then they
telegraphed to Arabi at Kafr Dawar to send soldiers to stop the
massacre, but the telegram had to go round by Ramleh, and was delayed.
But at last the massacre was stopped. The whole thing was enquired into
at Kafr Dawar immediately, and the Mudir was sent to Cairo and there
imprisoned till the end of the war, Darwish Pasha replacing him. After
the war Adhem was reinstated, and when the commission was sent to
Tantah, Ismaïl Yusri, the President, who was a comparatively honest man,
ascertained the truth and informed the Khedive that he should be obliged
to find him, Adhem, guilty, and so begged to be replaced by another on
the Commission. This was done, and an officer less scrupulous was
appointed who accepted the false evidence Ibrahim Adhem was allowed to
trump up against Abu Diab. Ibrahim Adhem, however, was deposed, and
Husseyn Wasif (a Circassian, not the same as the magistrate) was
appointed. He it was who was made a scape-goat of for Ibrahim Adhem’s
sake, and was deprived by Clifford Lloyd and sent to the Soudan. Mehariz
Bey, formerly sub-Mudir, is now Mudir of Boheyra. Minshawi is the son-
in-law of Abdallah Pasha, the English renegade, and his son Emir still
goes by the name of the Englishman.
“Mustafa Bey confirms all Ismaïl’s statements of the Khedive’s
connection with the Alexandrian massacres. He was at Alexandria at the
time, and was the doctor employed to examine the bodies. There were
fifty-one Christian bodies, twenty-three Mohammedan, of which eight were
_mustafezzin_, all the latter killed by pistol shots. The English doctor
wanted to make out the Christian bodies had wounds made by _des armes
blanches_, but this was not the case. Omar Lutfi certainly gave orders
to the mustafezzin to come unarmed. I like the worthy doctor much. In
face and figure he is not unlike Lord Lyons.
“We rode in Stamboul past the bazaars and the tower and the horse
market, and dined with Whittaker. Sat next to Mr. Laing, Director of the
_regie_, who seems a sensible man, and had a talk with a certain
Mohammed Bey, more or less of a spy I believe of the palace. I told him
a good deal of what I intend him to repeat there. Sinadino has gone
bankrupt at Cairo, so there is still justice in the world!
“_29th Oct._—The Egyptian Princes, Osman and Kiamyl, came to see us. I
never thought to like them so well, but they talked patriotically about
the late war, and were really improved by the part they played. [Here
follows the conversation I have recorded with Prince Kiamyl in my
‘Secret History.’] About Arabi’s trial Kiamyl said: ‘If you had only
gone on, Tewfik would have been broken. He was in a terrible fright,
knowing that his crimes would have been laid bare. It is a pity you
allowed the compromise.’ The Sultan, the Princes told us, was mad with
fear; the disease had begun fifteen years ago when a little girl he had
was burned to death. The least mention in praise of any man was
sufficient to arouse his suspicion. He had never received them except in
public audience. To ask for a private audience was enough to ensure his
displeasure. With them was Aarif Bey, who had been the Princes’ tutor,
the same who came with them two years ago to Crabbet. He is a Kurd of
Arab origin and a man of very superior education.[88] We have decided to
go by French boat to Marseilles on Wednesday, as there is small chance
of my getting an audience with the Sultan.
“_30th Oct._—With Count Corti to the Bazaars. Selim Faris came at five.
He gave an amusing account of the Sultan’s manœuvres to set every one by
the ears, which is his system, according to the _divide et impera_ rule.
‘You see the palace,’ he said. ‘The Sultan sits here with a plan before
him, showing the rooms occupied by each of his household. If he finds
two together making friends, he puts them far off each other. His whole
object is to put next each other those who hate each other most. His
chief chamberlain and his second chamberlain would poison each other if
they could; they are lodged together in this corner. There is Ghazi
Osman with Deli Nuzret whom he hates, and there again Abdallah Ibn Saoud
and Sheykh Ahmed Assad, both Arabs and bitter enemies. Thus the Sultan
comes to know everything, and there cannot be any plot against him he
thinks. It was just the same in Egypt; when he sent Dervish Pasha, he
also sent Sheykh Ahmed Assad, his greatest enemy, to watch, and, after
them, Kadri Bey, his secretary, to watch them both, and even that was
not enough, for they had not been there a fortnight when he sent a
fourth, Ahmed Bey, one of his aides-de-camp. Kadri wrote to the Sultan
complaining that this last was laughing at him, and insulting him
publicly, but the Sultan rewarded the aide-de-camp, and Kadri has been
in disgrace ever since. The Sultan has never seen him since his return
to Constantinople. The others told him he was bribed, but Kadri took
nothing but a few jewels. Dervish took money. He got £40,000 in
_consolidés_ from Tewfik, besides jewels and articles of value, but he
was clever enough to send presents by every post to the various members
of the household. Kadri didn’t. I know everything that goes on in the
palace through Zaffir Bey, the Sultan’s private secretary, the same who
wrote to Arabi. He and his father have been friends with my father for
forty years, and I have one other friend in the palace. It does not do
to have more, and even these I am obliged to pretend not to know. I
shall go to-morrow at six o’clock, before it is light, to find out about
your letter to Munir Pasha. I will let you know at breakfast time. I
should like you to see the Sultan for the sake of your friends in Ceylon
and India. But the Sultan cannot help you, he is so busy and has no
memory. He writes down everything that is told him in a diary, but he
has no memory. He has always been very kind to me, but I have been in a
mess with him several times. First because I would not write against
Ismaïl when they were going to depose him, and for other things. But I
am protected by Zaffir Bey, and he always intercedes till the Sultan
forgives me and makes me presents. I have three jewelled boxes from him,
and when I went to England last year he gave me £300; but I got into
disgrace by dining with Lord Granville, and my newspaper was suspended.
Now I am in favour again, and the _Jowaib_ is to go on next month as
before, I am very fond of the Sultan. He is so kind, but he is a child.
He does not understand, though he wants to know everything. He has spies
in every house, either the cook or a slave. When he wants particularly
to know about any of the Pashas, he makes them a present of one of his
women, and then he hears everything. I was offered one once, but I would
not have her. The Sultan has not so many women as some of the Sultans
have had—perhaps twenty-five or thirty at a time, but there are several
hundred more in the palace, servants and slaves of these. Abdul Hamid
has never been married legally. I knew him long before he came to the
throne. I never heard the story about his daughter being burnt, but it
was Abdul Aziz’s death and Murad’s dethronement that have driven him
mad.’
“Faris has promised to help me with all details in my History of the
Egyptian Invasion. He tells me he can tell me everything that went on
between the Sultan and Egypt, but I think I know all pretty well as it
is. Faris also gave a curious account of the dethronement of Ismaïl in
1879. Ismaïl had written to Abdul Hamid to say that he was threatened
with dethronement by the Powers, and to ask whether he should abdicate.
But the Sultan would not hear of this, and sent him word that he was
never to give in and that he would support him. At the same time he
called a council to discuss the matter, and hid himself in the council
room behind a curtain. Khair-ed-Din was Vizier, and spoke strongly in
favour of yielding to the Powers, saying that if they did not the Powers
would act without them, and the prestige of the Sultan would be lost.
Abdul Hamid, hearing this, changed his mind, and the Ministers were sent
at once to the telegraph office, and there wrote out the order deposing
Ismaïl. This tallies closely with what Lascelles told me of Ismaïl’s
surprise at the order. Faris was in the palace and heard everything as
it happened. ‘And I could have cried my eyes out,’ he said, ‘with
vexation, for Ismaïl was then my patron.’
“_31st Oct._—Stayed indoors. Our first visitor was Aarif Bey, and he and
Ismaïl Jowdat, who came later, stayed to luncheon. Aarif is more
interesting than I at all suspected in spite of his distinguished
appearance and pretensions to Arab descent. He told me his history and
that of his family. They are a family of Seyyids settled 700 years ago
in Kurdistan, where, until sixty-five years ago, they were hereditary
rulers, their capital being Mardin. But the centralization of the Empire
destroyed them, and his grandfather was brought away to live at
Constantinople by Sultan Mahmud. It is clear, however, that they have
preserved their descent pure, and he spoke in scorn of the mongrel Turks
of modern times. After lamenting the dangers and misfortunes of Islam he
communicated to me the secret that all was arranged for a Kurdish rising
next May, and that he was going to put himself at the head of it. They
would be able to put 80,000 men under arms,—this without the help of
Russia, which had offered them arms, but whose alliance they refused.
They did not wish to quarrel with the Sultan, but to stand to their arms
and demand the right of local self-government. Their country was
abominably misruled by ignorant and corrupt Stamboulis, and they felt
that if they did nothing they would one day be engulfed in the common
ruin of the Empire. Every year they were becoming poorer and weaker, but
the Kurds were a nation still of three millions, and warlike men. He
asked me whether I thought the English Government would give them its
moral support. He had seen Dilke when in London two years ago, and had
asked him about it, and Dilke had told him that, though the idea was not
discouraged, he considered the time an unfavourable one. This must have
been about a month before the bombardment of Alexandria, and it tallies
curiously with what Eddy Hamilton wrote to me about the projected Syrian
rising a little more than a year earlier.[89]
“I told Aarif in return the history of my correspondence with Downing
Street on just these points, and warned him not to trust to Mr.
Gladstone or to England, which was far too busy in all parts of the
world just now to attend to Kurdistan. Russia, too, would be sure to
prevent anything like Mohammedan Nationalism on her frontier. The
Russian design was to take possession of the Euphrates and the head of
the Persian Gulf. To this he said that the Kurds were willing to risk a
quarrel with Russia, that, if they waited, their fate would be only more
certain afterwards, and that at present Russia favoured them. And he
asked me to plead their cause in England. I promised him to do this, but
told him very frankly that it would be almost impossible to attract
sympathy in England for the Kurds. A Kurdish question would not be
understood there, and all that was known with us of the Kurds was taken
from the tales of travellers who had been robbed by them. I advised him
therefore strongly to put his case forward as part of the Armenian
question, which was already understood in England, and had attracted
sympathy, and was even provided for in the Treaty of Berlin. As an
Armenian rising, it would be understood, and would have a kind of legal
standing. He told me that the Armenians were with the Kurds in this
matter, but that there was the difficulty as to who should be their
chief, for the Armenians would want a Christian, while the Kurds would
have none but a Mohammedan. Anne suggested, however, that there might be
two chiefs, and we looked out the position on the map and found that in
fact the country might be divided into two districts. The north with Van
as capital would be Christian. The south with Diarbekr would be
Mohammedan. He assured us the Arabs, too, were with them, the Shammar,
the Taï, and the Jibouri—and the rising would begin for certain next
May.
“Aarif’s father is Seyyid Yusuf Sidki. His brother-in-law was one of the
leaders of the last Kurdish revolt with Sheykh Obeidallah. They would
have conquered Persia but for the Sultan’s intervention.
“Selim Faris also looked in. He has been to the Palace and finds that
Munir Pasha has not dared mention my name to the Sultan or forward my
letter. They are all afraid.
“_1st Nov._—Aarif Bey came again to tell me that he had arranged with
Ahmed Bey, the Sultan’s _Chef de Cabinet politique_, that we should meet
to-night at the theatre and have a talk, and he thinks that then Ahmed
Bey, who sees the Sultan every day, will arrange for an audience Monday
or Tuesday, and I have told him that I cannot and will not stay past
Wednesday, when the French steamer starts. Aarif, in spite of his
revolutionary projects in Kurdistan, is on confidential terms with the
Sultan’s Cabinet, and sends them reports on political subjects. When we
saw him in England in 1882 he seems to have had something of a private
mission, and has clearer ideas of English political parties than is
usual with foreigners. His estimates of Gladstone, Salisbury, and Dilke
were correct, and he described how, after an interview with Salisbury,
in which he, Salisbury, had held language entirely favourable to the
Sultan’s rights in Egypt, he had gone the next day to hear him speak
exactly in the opposite sense in the House of Lords. I asked him about
the relations existing between the Sultan and Russia, and he told me
that all the advances at present were on the side of Russia, that the
Sultan only trusted the Germans, who, he remarked, could not possibly
help him; that he still had some trust in Lord Salisbury with regard to
Egypt, if he should come into power again, but that he knew perfectly
well that there was no material help to be expected from England any
more. I told him I was quite of that opinion. Whatever else we might do,
we were quite certain never to send any more troops to help the Sultan
against a European Power, and that, if I had to advise for his good, it
would be to make an alliance with Russia. Russia, of course, never could
be a friend, but if they could tide over the next twenty-five years,
there might well be a revolution there, a European war, or heaven knew
what. But Russia was the greatest danger Turkey had, for it menaced it
in Asia, and the conquest of Asia Minor would be an end of all things.
Aarif quite agreed with this and said that if England continued in her
present line of policy, an alliance with Russia was inevitable. The only
thing that prevented it was that the Russian Government was _tellement
canaille_, that the Sultan would not trust them, but he would be driven
to it.
“Aarif also gave us a capital account of the way Lord Dufferin had
tricked the Sultan in the matter of the proclamation of Arabi’s
rebellion. The Sultan, he assured me, still had a kindly feeling for
Arabi, and it was entirely against the grain that he had issued the
proclamation. But Dufferin had bullied him by threatening to leave
Constantinople, or acknowledge Abd-el-Mutalleb, the Sherif of Mecca,
Caliph. Afterwards, when the Sultan wanted to sign the convention for
sending troops, Dufferin went off to the Princes Islands and could not
be got at. There had been a great debate among the Ulema as to the
legality of the proclamation, and he, Aarif himself, had pronounced
strongly against it on the ground of a certain _hadith_ which declared
every Mohammedan justified in defending Mohammedan interests against the
infidel, whether with the Caliph’s sanction or without it. He also told
us about his visit to the Oxford and British Museums, and the Arabic
documents he had found there.
“Next we went to tea successively at the German and Russian Embassies.
At the latter we made acquaintance with M. Onou, the Chancellier, who
knows Syria well and something of the desert. We talked about Arabia,
and I think I made some impression on Nélidof by the warmth of my
pleadings. His wife has a great hatred for Lord Dufferin. She was a
Princess, and her brother was the owner of that stud of 150 horses which
was burnt last year.
“At half past six Aarif returned and took us to dine at a restaurant,
and we went on to the theatre, but Ahmed Bey Jellal-ed-Din was not
there, and had sent us a message by Ahmed Pasha, another aide-de-camp,
to say that the Sultan had kept him on service. The play was, I forget
what—the ‘Princess Something.’ I hate these things.
“I have forgotten the principal event of the day, the visit of Ahmed
Minshawi. He came early in the morning, having been sent by the Syrian
banker. It is clear that Ismaïl Jowdat did not intend him to see us, and
they have quarrelled about something, as they all do. Minshawi is a true
fellah of the Arabi type, but altogether inferior to him, a large,
nervous, heavy-handed man, with his eyes rather too close together, and
a general heaviness relieved by occasional flashes. He was very
difficult at first to reassure, and explained that he had been so hunted
for the last two years by the police that he had lost all his courage.
It is not given to every one, he said, to be courageous, and he lamented
his fallen fortunes. ‘I used to be a man of large wealth. I lived like a
prince at home, respected by all, surrounded by friends, and confident
in myself. Now I am treated as a _fakir_. The Turks have no bowels of
compassion. They have no charity. With us the stranger is respected.
Here he is watched by the police,—and he asked nervously whether there
was any one listening, as the door creaked. ‘I used to have four
thousand acres of good land worth £60 or £70 each (I am not sure of the
figures), and half a dozen steamers on the river. Now I receive not £20
a year from my property. I am driven out of my home and live as I can on
what remains to me of the ready money I took with me.’ The tears rolled
down from his eyes as he spoke, and he sat for some minutes silent on
the sofa weeping.
“I asked him to tell me how it all came about, and he said it was from
his having interfered to save the lives of the Christians at Tantah. He
had gone into Tantah that morning thinking of nothing, and when he saw
the people being killed he had lost his temper and laid about him with
his stick to stop them, and he had expostulated with the Mudir, and he
had taken 150 of the people, Syrians, Jews, or Greeks, to his country
house, and had kept them at his own cost during the war. The people who
had got up the riot were Ibrahim Adhem and his wakil, Mehariz, who is
now Mudir. These two were solely answerable for it. He had heard of
Osman Rafaat’s coming to Tantah, but had not seen him. I asked him about
Abu Diab. ‘_Wallah!_’ he said, ‘if there was one innocent in the world
it was Abu Diab.’ I then tried to get out of him what his political
views were. But he was very cautious, after the manner of his people.
‘If,’ he said, ‘you were to take an ox or a camel or an ape, or even a
hare, and give it to the Egyptians as their Governor, they would be
grateful and loyal to it. Before the war we loved the English, but we do
not love them now. They have destroyed us, and they have given us to
those who have no mercy.’ After much pressing, I got out of him that he
would like Abbas with a regent, Riaz, or, if it were possible, Arabi. He
said Riaz because he would keep order, but Arabi the people would like
far better. He did not wish Ismaïl. He should have no objection to
Halim. But any one would be acceptable so long as Tewfik went away. I
urged him to come to England to give evidence, and he said he would, but
what was he to do with the family? His family was here, and he had no
friend to leave them with. I fear he is a rather helpless ally. Still we
must make what use of him we can, and he is to come again on Monday.
“_2nd Nov., Sunday._—By steamer to Roumeli Hissar to have luncheon with
Halim Pasha, and take leave. But we unfortunately missed the boat, and
did not get there till nearly two o’clock. The Princess is certainly a
very charming person, and still a pretty woman. She gave us luncheon in
the kiosk in the garden, a very handsome room. Some Turkish dishes,
among others one of chicken with walnut sauce. Afterwards I had a long
talk with Halim. Explained to him how the war had been brought about,
and Mr. Gladstone’s desire to be rid of Egypt, and begged him to further
my design of bringing forward now the charges against the Khedive, by
sending Ismaïl Jowdat and Mustafa Bey to England. And he promised to
send them and to get them to agree with Minshawi not to quarrel. At
going away I said to the Prince: ‘I suppose it is understood between us
that if Your Highness returns to Egypt, Arabi is to return too.’ He
said: ‘You may count upon it. I have never had any other idea, and I
only regret that I have not been able sooner to put myself in direct
communication with him. All the exiles shall be recalled.’ I like Halim
more the more I see him. He is plain spoken and direct in all he says.
“His Beatitude Stephen Peter X, Monseigneur Azarian, Patriarch of the
Catholic Armenians, called on us. He is a dignified and intelligent man,
to whom we had brought letters from Madame Volodkowich; and he told us
in detail the Armenian situation. The desire of the Catholic Armenians
was to have such a government as that of the Lebanon. They did not want
to be separated from the Porte, as their greatest danger was absorption
by Russia. But the administration had become worse than it had ever
been, and the people would bear it no longer. With regard to the Kurds,
he said they were much less fanatical than the Turks, and the accounts
of their misdeeds were very much exaggerated. He was sure that, if they
had a government like that of the Lebanon, they would all live together
very peaceably. The Turkish Government favoured the Catholics, as they
did not conspire with Russia, which the Orthodox did. But even these did
not wish Armenia to be absorbed by Russia.
“Of the Sultan he gave the most favourable account I have yet heard. He
says that he has known personally four Sultans, and Abdul Hamid is far
the best of them, and perhaps the best Sultan there ever was. He is a
good man, and works hard to know everything concerning his country, and
is most intelligent. He has no vices, has few women, neither drinks nor
amuses himself, and is severely economical. He has no debts, paying
everything, down to the last detail of his household, every Thursday. He
knew this as the Sultan’s accountant is an Armenian Catholic. Only, all
his servants are bad, and he trusts no one. The Government of the Porte
is worse than it ever was, a mere den of corruption, and it is
impossible that a catastrophe is not impending. The Greeks in Roumelia
are all members of secret societies, and so are the Syrians, and one of
these days it will occur. The finance will break down, for nobody is
paid and the people are all coming to beggary. Everything can be bought.
The new Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem is a man whose name stands first on
the list of those dangerous to the Empire, as he is a head centre of
Pan-slavism. Yet he procured his nomination by spending money. All was
going to ruin, and would go to ruin. He, the Patriarch, was sorry for
it. A worthy old man. Peace be with His Beatitude.
“_3rd Nov._—Our first visitor was Ahmed Minshawi, from whom we got
additional details, and I have drawn up a statement of the evidence he
is prepared to give, which will be most valuable.[90] As he gets more
confidence his face lights up, and he acquires even a certain eloquence.
He reminds me every now and then of Arabi, typical fellahin both. He was
driven away by the arrival of Doctor Dickenson. [Here follows Doctor
Dickenson’s account of the death of Abdul Aziz, which has been related
previously in my ‘Secret History,’ see pages 52 to 55.] Dr. Dickenson is
a very precise old gentleman, and the sort of witness whose evidence
would be accepted by any jury in the world. I therefore entirely believe
his account. Midhat and Damad, he told us, died in chains at Taïf, some
months ago, having been starved to death. Midhat’s end was hastened by a
carbuncle, but he was none the less made away with. The Sheykh el Islam
has also recently died there who gave the fetwa authorizing Abdul Aziz’s
deposition. This act of terror has given Abdul Hamid the absolute power
he now holds.
“We went to the Russian Embassy again to say good-bye, and see some
horses given by the Sultan to Nélidof. The horses are of no great
account, a chestnut and a gray worth £50 or £60 a piece.
“Coming back we found Mustafa Bey, and we have arranged that he is to
encourage Minshawi, and when we telegraph come with him to England and
give his evidence. Ismaïl Jowdat also came in. We wrote out a _procès
verbal_ for Minshawi to sign. What I intend to do is to invite Mr.
Gladstone to examine the evidence privately, or appoint Trevelyan or
somebody of equivalent integrity to examine it. If he refuses I shall do
it publicly. Ismaïl Jowdat will come at once with us to England.
“While we were talking, Aarif Bey came in with a message from Ahmed Bey
to the effect that they had been afraid to present my request of an
audience to the Sultan; but that they had spoken of my wish to see the
horses, etc., and that the Sultan had been most gracious, and would send
an aide-de-camp to-morrow to show us over the stables and the palace. I
confess the story did not sound to me quite coherent, and Selim Faris,
who looked in later, tells me that he has just been to the palace, and
that the true account of it is that Munir did give my letter to the
Sultan, but that he wishes to put off on others the responsibility of
not answering it, that he is as usual undecided, and would like to find
out a little more about me first, and he will probably send an aide-de-
camp on purpose to report concerning me to-morrow. He will see me later
if I will only wait. But I can’t wait. The Sultan asked Zaffir about me
on Friday, but Zaffir pretended he had never heard of me. This
invitation to the palace and stables is at any rate a proof that he is
not ill-disposed, and we must make the most of it. The idea of the
palace at present is that nothing new will come on in Egypt till next
summer, and he thinks if I come back then I shall be able to do a great
deal. Perhaps he is right. In any case we shall not have wasted our time
here.
“Our last visitor was Mr. de Leon, formerly American Consul-General at
Cairo, now agent of a company for making a ship-railway over the isthmus
of Akaba. The scheme seems to me chimerical from the fact that Suez is a
far easier, shorter, and more direct route.
“_4th Nov._—Ismaïl Jowdat came in the morning, having written out the
evidence given us by Minshawi in Arabic for him to sign. But Minshawi
did not appear till too late, for we had to go out at a quarter to one
to the old Seraglio, where the Sultan had appointed an aide-de-camp to
meet us and show us everything. This _Serai_ is a delightful old place,
and the position the finest, without exception, in the world. By good
luck the aide-de-camp on duty was old Vefyk Pasha’s son, an extremely
nice, intelligent young man, who knew the history of the various Sultans
well, and so was able to explain us everything. We were received in
State and conducted round by the whole staff of the Palace. The Treasury
is full of interesting things which belong to the domain of Murray. But
what was to me most attractive was the series of effigies of the Sultans
dressed in their actual clothes. This recalls past glories better than
anything else could do. Mahmud’s miserable hussar jacket closes the
series, but there are lower depths still since, left unrepresented. The
young man confessed himself ashamed of his wretched uniform and fez, a
rare instance of good taste in a modern Oriental. In the kiosk we drank
the Sultan’s coffee, which I confess I only sipped, remembering its
fatal name. The Dolmabakji to which we were next taken is without
interest inside, and we were disappointed of our promised visit to the
stables, as the Sultan was having the horses paraded at the Yildiz
Palace in order to choose one for an Ambassador. At least such was the
excuse given—but I half suspect they were afraid of our criticism. The
visit to the palaces is, however, a proof of the Sultan’s goodwill, and
when I thanked the young man and gave him a message of thanks to the
Sultan he told me that they all knew of me as a defender of Islam and a
friend.
“Selim Faris, who came in the evening, tells me it was Musurus (the
Turkish Ambassador in London) who set the Sultan against me, telling him
that I was seeking to found an Arabian Empire; but he is now undeceived.
He advises me to write a memorandum of my ideas to the Sultan.
“_5th Nov._—Ahmed Minshawi came and signed his evidence (see Appendix).
Mustafa Bey Nejdi also called, and then Count Corti, to wish us goodbye,
and we went on board the French steamer, having spent three weeks at
Constantinople, an interesting visit, though our main object of seeing
the Sultan remained unachieved. It was a dark evening with a huge bank
of black clouds to the north, signs of winter in the Black Sea, when we
steamed out of the Golden Horn and passed Seraglio point and the city
walls on our way home. Ismaïl Jowdat goes with us.
“_6th Nov._—Really there never was such good fortune. On board there is
an acquaintance of Ismaïl’s, Mohammed Assad Bey, Muteserif of Candia, on
his way to his post, uncle-in-law of our friend Aarif Bey. He is by
birth one of the hereditary Kurdish chiefs, but exiled at the age of
seventeen (he is now fifty-seven) on account of his father’s rebellion—a
most interesting man. He has been many years in Crete, and has seen many
changes in the Empire, all for the worse. He lamented the quarrels
between England and Islam, which he attributed to its true causes,
first, the obstinacy of the Porte in effecting no reforms, and secondly,
the dishonesty of England in regard to Egypt. In regard to the latter,
he said what they all say and to which there is no answer, that the
English caused misgovernment in Egypt so as to have an excuse for taking
it. He said that all his life he had been accustomed to respect
Englishmen as men of just dealing, but they were changed and he
respected them no more. If he had not seen Ismaïl Jowdat with us, he
should not have cared to make our acquaintance. From having the best
reputation in the East the English had now the worst. About his own
country, Kurdistan, he talked much in the sense that Aarif had done—only
he seemed to see less hope in the trouble which was coming. The Russians
he said were very busy stirring up the Christian Armenians, and the
thing would break out in the spring. It would begin with the Armenians,
then the Kurds would take up arms in self-defence. There would be
stories of bloodshed and massacre greatly exaggerated, and the Russians
would take it as a pretext for intervention. The Turks had about 150,000
Nizams in Asia Minor, and the Kurds could put a far greater number under
arms. But he augured ill for the result. The Russians wanted Mesopotamia
and Bagdad and Bussora. The Turks could fight well, but they had no
leader. All the Turkish commanders were corrupt and selfish, and they
would be bribed again by the Russians. I asked him who was the natural
Kurdish leader, and he said: ‘There are several hundred Kurds in the
Custom House at Galata. Yesterday, when I passed through, they all
bowed.’ His elder brother, however, would seem to be the man, and this
agrees with Aarif’s account. Obeidallah is the religious chief only. In
the evening Ismaïl Jowdat gave a full account of all he knew in
connection with Arabi and the events of 1881. [The substance of what I
learned from him is embodied in his statement (see Appendix).]
“_12th Nov._—We arrived without incident at Marseilles and went on
immediately to Paris.”
CHAPTER X
GORDON’S DEATH. CHAOS
“_13th Nov._ 1884.
“I HAVE been away from home just two months—it seems like six, and I
shall be glad when it is over. I called to-day on Lord Lyons but found
him uncommunicative. We talked a while about things at Constantinople,
as to which he affected to know very little, and I told him I thought
the Government would be well advised to make its peace with the Sultan.
He thought this would be easy now that Dufferin had left Constantinople,
and discussed possible or rather impossible appointments of a successor.
Layard, he said, has been put out of all chance by the publication of
his last despatch. He asked me about Goschen, though saying he certainly
would not go back, as he wanted to remain in England. He also talked a
little about Dufferin’s chances of success in India, but said nothing
that was of the least importance.
“There is a report again to-day that Khartoum is taken, and this time it
seems better founded.
“_14th Nov._—We breakfasted with the Wagrams at Voisin’s. They had come
in on purpose from Gros Bois. Afterwards I called on Sheffield, who as
usual told me a great deal. Northbrook and Baring have been concocting a
report to please Gladstone. It will say that everything is going on for
the best in Egypt, and propose some temporary financial arrangements,
the reduction of the Egyptian army, a loan of eight millions, and a
speedy evacuation; all the administration to be in Egyptian hands, and
nothing at all in the shape of a protectorate. On the contrary, Egypt is
to be put under international control as before proposed. This has
throughout been Mr. Gladstone’s policy. Baring has insisted on all
English employés in Egypt reporting in this sense, and refuses to
forward their views if in contradiction. He only wants to flatter
Gladstone and hopes to be transferred to an Embassy. He will very likely
go to Constantinople. Hartington and Dilke, on the other hand, are
determined on a Protectorate, and on pushing on to Khartoum and
establishing a Government there with an English Governor—on staying in
Egypt and treating the whole thing like an Indian principality.
Sheffield says, however, that the Powers won’t stand this. Bismarck is
now hand in glove with the French and will give our Government a slap in
the face. He has given them one about the Congo, and he means to give
another about Egypt. He will probably propose to settle the Egyptian
question over the head of England. He was very angry at the stopping of
the sinking fund having been done without consulting him. It was not
Northbrook’s plan, who had no idea but that of conciliating the European
Powers and the Europeans in Egypt. But when he telegraphed that money
must be had, and proposed that the English Government should supply
£300,000 for immediate necessities, Gladstone settled the matter the
other way, saying that he had promised Parliament that no money should
be expended without their leave. Granville, in all he does, only
consults Mr. Gladstone’s fancies, knowing that his only hold on office
is through him. He has no policy of any kind except to obey the Old Man;
he likes office and he likes his pay, and hangs on. He knows he will
never be in office again. Gladstone only consults the electors. Between
them the whole thing is going to indescribable pot.
“Malet’s appointment to Berlin is simply Bismarck’s nomination. He
refused Morier on the ground that he was an intriguer, and insisted on
having Malet, and our Government, being on their knees to him,
consented. Sheffield is of opinion that we shall have the whole of
Europe on our back in a very short time.
“Now we start to-night for England.
“_15th Nov._—Arrived in London by the early train from Paris. My first
visit as soon as it was light was to Button, who gave me all the news.
Northbrook has come back from Egypt, a more complete failure than any of
his predecessors. He was taken hold of there by the Greeks and other
commercial residents, and wrote a report, recommending a policy of
financial disinterestedness on the part of England. The coupons of the
Suez Canal shares were to be cut, England was to pay the Army of
Occupation, and finally to advance £20,000,000 without security. But
none of his colleagues will hear of such an arrangement, and he has been
made to suppress his Report—and there is some talk even of his retiring
from the Cabinet. He is delighted with the Khedive and the whole gang,
as was sure to be the case. Hartington and Dilke, when he came home,
told him he was an ass, and Button thinks they will get their way in the
end. This way is to guarantee three per cent. on all the debts, and
assume a Protectorate. He says that Gladstone will certainly not listen
to a word against Tewfik, but thinks I may as well write to him, and
propose to bring my new evidence against him. The style of argument we
may expect to be met with is that all Oriental evidence is worthless. At
the time when Churchill was bringing on the case against the Khedive
last year, he, Button, was staying with Northbrook in the country, and
he told him how important it was that the matter should be hushed up.
With regard to native evidence Northbrook said: ‘I have always made it a
rule to listen to all that can be produced, but I do not let it
influence me, I judge by the antecedent probabilities of the case.’ ‘You
refer I suppose to the Baroda case,’ said Button maliciously. ‘Well,
yes,’ he answered—‘that was my method, and I think it the safest one.’
“Then to Gregory’s. Sir William was at Dalmeny with Gladstone, and had a
great deal of talk there with Eddy Hamilton about Egypt, and about me.
Eddy talked nicely about me, but Gregory confirms what Button says, that
Gladstone is as wrapped up in Tewfik as ever. This is our great
difficulty. To Crabbet in the evening.
“_19th Nov._—Again to London. Wolseley is in a mess. The Nile Expedition
can’t get on, and Gordon writes that he can only hold out to a certain
date. Wolseley is going to make a rush for Khartoum with a few hundred
men, but it is thought doubtful whether he will succeed. My letter
offering to re-open the evidence against the Khedive in the matter of
the Alexandrian riot has gone in to Gladstone, having been looked over
by Gregory, and a sentence altered.[91]
“Dined at the Carlton, where I found the big-wigs of the Party very busy
over the compromise of the Franchise Bill. I felt rather like a spy
among them, though heaven knows I care nothing whatsoever about their
politics. Only I fancy they look upon me as a damned Radical. Leconfield
was there and we talked a little about horses.
“_20th Nov._—Called on Stanley of Alderley, who lives in a garret,
leaving all the rooms of his house empty. He says the Ottoman Empire
will outlive the British. _Inshallah!_
“Luncheon with Lady C., who assured me the Prince of Wales is coming
round to my view of things in Egypt, but he is not Prime Minister and
can do nothing. Dined at the Gregorys’, and sat between Layard and the
Servian Minister. The latter assured me the Servian Government was doing
all it could to retain the Mohammedan population, while orderly and law-
abiding, but they would not stay.
“_21st Nov._—Amir Ali, who is in London and whom I saw to-day, tells me
that Cordery is going on as ill as ever at Hyderabad. He talked of a
dinner at the Northbrook Club, at which Dufferin had made a speech and
explained to the Indian Mohammedans present what a great advantage it
was for him, now he was to be Viceroy of India, to have resided so long
at Constantinople, and to be in such cordial relations with the head of
their religion! The Sultan was a most admirable man, and they were the
greatest of friends! There never was a greater humbug than Dufferin.
“_22nd Nov._—Saw Button in the City. He tells me Gordon has sent word to
say he can only hold out six weeks from the fourth of November. This not
on account of provisions, which are plentiful, but of ammunition.
Wolseley consequently intends to make a rush across the desert from
Debbeh, and expects to be at Khartoum with the New Year. All the
telegrams published about Gordon’s recent successes are military lies.
The ‘Times’ is very angry with Northbrook for what he said yesterday in
the House of Lords, and is seeking an occasion to waylay him.[92] Buckle
is not a revengeful man, but it is the ‘Times’ tradition not to forgive.
Chenery used generally to do this himself, waiting his occasion
patiently, and then himself writing the article, which he could do
better than anybody else.
“_25th Nov._—Wrote to Eddy to hasten on an answer from Mr. Gladstone.
Called on Gregory to consult what was to be done. Churchill is going
away to India and Ceylon next week, and I hardly know how to act in
regard to him.
“_26th Nov._—Khartoum is again surrounded by twenty-five thousand men,
and the Mahdi holds the passes between that and Debbeh. If so,
Wolseley’s rush will be a dangerous proceeding. Button tells me he means
to take three thousand men with him and artillery, but I doubt his
getting through and back with so few.
“Mr. Gladstone’s answer has come: ‘In view of my inhibition to refer me
to the Foreign Office, he can only acknowledge the receipt of my
letter.’ My proposal had been that he should himself examine the fresh
evidence against the Khedive Tewfik.
“_27th Nov._—To Robert Bourke’s. We talked over affairs at
Constantinople, which he understands. He is all for coming to terms with
the Sultan about Egypt. ‘If I had anything to do with it,’ he said, ‘it
is the first thing I should do.’ About renewing the charges against the
Khedive, Bourke was very adverse to anything being done. ‘If you proved
the case to demonstration, it could only do harm, for Tewfik is
necessary for English policy in Egypt. Besides, the case is dead now,
and you could not get any one to take interest in it.’ About India he
was curious to know whether Lord Ripon had really _promised_ Salar Jung
to restore the Berar provinces, and seemed to think the Foreign Office
at Calcutta quite right in resisting it.[93] There is little to choose
between the two parties as to these things.
“Next to Randolph Churchill. He is going to India on Wednesday, and I
found him in so open a frame of mind as to Indian politics, that I
agreed to give him letters to some of my friends there so that he may
hear the native side of the case. I think it quite possible he may take
a right view, and if so he will be an invaluable ally. He has just
published in the ‘Pall Mall Gazette,’ a sort of manifesto which is
wildly democratic, and as popularity is his guide in politics it may
well be that he will look to it in India also. He is fond of large and
novel conceptions, and Tory democracy might easily be made a cry there,
too. So I risk it. Nothing can be worse for India than the Whigs.
Talking about Egypt, Randolph told me he had just seen Rothschild who
had news from Berlin that Bismarck had declared his intention of
supporting France in any answer she might give to the English finance
proposals, and Randolph seemed to consider that all the fat would be in
the fire. Button told me yesterday that Rothschild held an Egyptian bill
for a million sterling, and had made up his mind to present it at date,
that is to say about Christmas, and so make the Egyptian Government
bankrupt. I said nothing to Randolph about our new evidence against
Tewfik, as he is so imprudent. He is going to Ceylon, and I have
promised to announce his arrival, and have warned him of the little
split there is among the exiles. In spite of his faults it is impossible
not to like Churchill. He has so much _bonhomie_ and so little
pretension. This is the secret of his success. I am depressed all the
same at the aspect of things. I see no prospect now of getting back to
Egypt. Randolph told me even he dared not go there as the Government
would make it too disagreeable for him, not to say dangerous. He had
thought of spending the winter at Cairo, but he had decided not to risk
it.
“_30th Nov._—Stead writes that he is ‘hungering and thirsting’ to see
me, as he hears I have all the latest news of the Mahdi, and he has an
idea of sending me to make peace with him, and asks for an interview.
“_1st Dec._—Stead came at one, and we had two hours of it. I told him
peace could easily be made with the Mahdi, but it must be through the
Sultan and not Tewfik. He understood, he said, that I was in constant
communication with the Mahdi, and thought that when Wolseley got to
Khartoum I might go and open negotiations, and a deal more which, as he
is going to develop it into an interview for the ‘Pall Mall,’ I need not
write. I heard later from Button that it was he who had suggested the
thing through Reginald Brett, and it appears that he, Button, has all
along been putting it about that I have communications with the Mahdi.
He says that the French will accept the English financial proposals for
Egypt. Malet has been a great success at Berlin. Bismarck has been
pacified by concessions on the Congo. Lord Granville is to make peace
with the Chinese for Mr. Ferry, who in return will accept the proposals.
Italy is to be compensated in Tripoli, and the general portioning of
plunder to begin. I don’t believe the French will accept, as their game
in Egypt is too good a one. Button tells me the proposals were drafted
by Hartington and only accepted by the Cabinet on the distinct
understanding that if they broke down we were to clear bodily out of
Egypt. It is a toss up which way it goes.
“_11th Dec._—(After several days’ shooting in the country, and a visit
to the Wyndhams at Wilbury.) To London and saw Button. He tells me a
deal of news. The French and other Governments, he is sure, will accept
the financial proposals for Egypt. Should this fail there will be a
split in the Cabinet, and Gladstone will go out of office. Hartington,
Northbrook, Dilke and the rest are for guaranteeing the debt. Gladstone
will not do this. They will try to carry things on by letting Egypt go
bankrupt, then if Europe won’t stand this Mr. Gladstone will resign,
Lord Salisbury will pass the Redistribution Bill, and Dissolution will
follow at the end of the year. Button himself is off to Tunis for six
weeks with his brother Mayo—a sporting trip.
“Dined with Bertram Currie. Bertram has the same idea as Button about
the financial proposals; can’t understand the French being such damned
fools as to refuse them. His only wish as an Englishman is to get out of
Egypt; his only fear that we may be trapped into staying. We are the
only thing that stands between Egypt and anarchy, etc., etc. He is not
quite so confident, however, as he used to be, and talked of Northbrook
as having made a fool of himself; Northbrook is so jealous of Dilke or
anybody else going to Egypt that he had insisted on going himself.
“_15th Dec._—Dinner of the National Arbitration and Peace Association in
honour of Hodgson Pratt. I was asked to return thanks on behalf of the
visitors, and I brought forward the question of peace with the Mahdi,
which was very well received. It is arranged I am to write a letter to
Pratt, stating my views, and to have it published. There were about two
hundred people at the dinner, which was given at the Criterion. Pratt is
a most estimable man, and his Association has a laudable object, but I
doubt its succeeding in the face of the growing brutality of the world,
and I am not at all sure that if it did it would not be a bad thing for
the East. The best chance for the East is, that the nations of Europe
should destroy each other.
“_17th Dec._—Broadley called with a long story about presents made by
Ismaïl Pasha to the King of Italy. He, Broadley, is in Ismaïl’s pay in
respect to a lawsuit pending in Egypt. He talked also a good deal about
Rochefort and the Communist party, with whom he is intimate in Paris.
There is a scheme for annexing Morocco, and the Communists are doing all
they can to prevent it.
“At the dinner to Pratt there was some talk of my standing for Greenwich
as Home Ruler at next elections. This is the only platform I could stand
on.
“_19th Dec._—Stead and Appleton (Secretary of the Peace and Arbitration
Society) came to see me, and we had two hours’ discussion. Stead has
just been staying with Auberon Herbert, and was in high feather—a man of
genius in his way—very anxious to expound my whole plan in the ‘Pall
Mall.’ But I would not let him do this if it was to have a chance of
succeeding. It was a brilliant talk, and resulted in our deciding that a
deputation should wait upon the G.O.M. with which I am to be smuggled in
so as to get at him. My letter to Pratt about peace with the Mahdi is
published in the ‘Times’ and ‘Daily News,’ so I am committed to action
if called upon.
“Lunched at the Carlton with Wynford. That noble Lord has his own
explanation of our failure in Egypt. ‘You may take my word for it,’ he
said, ‘it all comes of our officials there working on Sundays, it is a
breach of the decalogue which leads to other breaches.’
“_20th Dec._—Crabbet. Hunted in a snow storm on the Downs. On our return
found a Mr. Wheeler come to interview me for the Press Association. I
declined to let him print anything of my plans. He is an Irishman and an
amusing fellow, and had some good stories about people he had
interviewed. He had had to hunt officially with the Empress of Austria
one season in Cheshire, the Press Association keeping three horses for
him for the purpose. She rode well—but did not choose her own line. Lady
Rock-Savage rode much better. If Middleton, Bay Middleton, who piloted
the Empress, got a fall, the Empress always stopped.
“_22nd Dec._—The ‘Times’ has a leading article on my proposal of going
to the Soudan, politer than is usual with them, but of course not
favourable. Wrote an answer going up in the train, and went to the ‘Pall
Mall’ office and gave Stead leave to write an interview, and then
lunched at the Gregorys’. The only possible way to pull this thing
through is by the press; not that I want at all to go to the Soudan. I
have other things far more important to do. But the Soudan is the thin
end of the wedge and we must drive it in if possible.
“At six o’clock to a meeting of the Arbitration and Peace Committee,
where I found them quite prepared to let things alone. But Karl Blind
backed me up, and it was voted ‘unanimously and enthusiastically,’ that
Mr. Gladstone should be requested to employ my services. Afterwards I
had an interview with a so-called agent of the Mahdi, whom Ismaïl Jowdat
has brought to England. There is a kind of committee here in London of
Oriental sympathizers with the Mahdi, consisting of thirty persons, who
meet every night at a room they have hired for the purpose. Ibrahim Bey
is not an attractive man, an Arabic speaking Egyptian, with the true
Egyptian eyes, but with a curl in his hair and a very low forehead. In
Oriental dress I daresay all this would be concealed, but he wears
French clothes and has discarded even the fez. He is not attractive. His
conversation was more interesting than his face: he assured me there
would be no difficulty in my going to the Mahdi. The best route would be
by Massowa, as the road that way would be open, and he promised to send
word at once, that some of the Mahdi’s men should be on the look out
that way for my coming. Mohammed Obeyd, he said, Arabi’s right-hand man,
is now the Mahdi’s General, and of course would receive me well. He made
his escape after Tel-el-Kebir to Tripoli, and thence to the Soudan.[94]
The Mahdi also knows me well by name. I should have to go by
Constantinople, but arrangements would be made so as to assure me a
quick reception there. The whole thing would take just six weeks.
Ibrahim Bey will go with us, if I like, on Wednesday as part of the
Peace Deputation to Hawarden, but he is hardly a presentable man.
“_23rd Dec._—My ‘Times’ letter is published, and in the morning Stead
sent me a proof of his interview to correct, a ridiculous thing which I
had to rewrite. [The proof was brought by an office boy, with a message
that it was to go to press in an hour, and it was a mere accident that I
was at home and able to stop it. It contained, among other extravagances
put into my mouth, that Egypt would be better annexed than continue ill-
governed as it was, an idea which, if Stead’s, was certainly not mine.
When I saw Stead later in the day and expostulated with him about this,
his answer was characteristic. ‘Well,’ he said, ‘if you did not say it,
it is just what you ought to have said.’]
“_24th Dec._—Christmas Eve. By the 10.10 train to Chester with the Peace
Deputation to see Mr. Gladstone. It was to have consisted of three
persons, but Karl Blind and Dr. Clark missed the train, so I had Martin
Wood to myself. I never had much idea that Gladstone would see any of
us, and I was certain he would not see me. So we first sent a telegram
from Chester to say that ‘Mr. Wood had been deputed by the Arbitration
Society to wait on Mr. Gladstone, and that he had brought two gentlemen
conversant with Soudan affairs with him’—Jowdat, who had come with me,
and me. I made Wood add something about Christmas Eve to give us a
countenance, and, without waiting for an answer, we set off in a fly to
Hawarden. The only chance was to rush Mr. Gladstone before he knew who
we were, and we almost succeeded. We were evidently not expected, and
were received at the door by a young footman new to his work, who said
Mr. Gladstone was at home, and if Wood had had the presence of mind to
go in all might have been well. But he fumbled about for a card, and the
footman disappeared, only to be succeeded by the butler, an old hand,
who promptly said ‘Deputation,’ and with very little ceremony turned us
out. Wood weakly argued and appealed to the man’s feelings. But Mr.
Gladstone was ‘finishing his letters for the post, and then would have
his dinner,’ and we were shown the door. Going back to Chester we
plucked up courage, and drafted a letter, in which we endeavoured to
turn the tables, or at any rate to conceal our defeat. We consoled
ourselves by thinking that we were fighting in a good cause, that Mr.
Gladstone must feel ashamed of himself turning away a deputation of
peace on Christmas Eve. It was the climax of all. Here he was making a
senseless war for no object he dared avow, and afraid to look honest
people in the face. Shade of Midlothian! We sat on at the Chester Hotel
till two, and then took the Irish mail back to London—arriving in the
gray of Christmas morning, and bitter cold.
“_25th Dec._—Down early to Crabbet, feeling ‘the satisfaction of a good
conscience.’ The ‘Pall Mall’ has published my revised interview, but of
course the Government won’t accept my offer.
“_26th Dec._—Martin Wood’s letter, the one we wrote to Mr. Gladstone at
Chester, is in all the papers in the largest type, and the ‘Daily News’
has an inspired letter, placing all the blame of the situation on
Bismarck.
“Hunted with Leconfield’s hounds, the meet at Drungwitch, and had a good
old-fashioned run of two hours, through Plaistow into Sydney wood. Kars
carried me capitally. Anne rode Queen of Sheba.
“_30th Dec._—Hunted with Leconfield at New Bridge, a run of an hour and
twenty minutes, I on Rataplan, Anne on Proximo (two Arabs we had brought
from India). It was a very rough bit of country, and it is really
astonishing that these horses who have never been across half a dozen
fences in their lives, should have gone as they did. Jowdat and Ibrahim
Bey at Crabbet.
“_1st Jan._, 1885.—Jowdat and Ibrahim went away to London after I had
shown Ibrahim the horses. Ibrahim is by way of being an Arab by
birth—that is to say, his family was from Moeyla on the Red Sea, and he
turns out to be no other than that Ibrahim Bey Moeylhy who was Ismaïl’s
private secretary, and who was expelled from Paris by Ferry’s Government
a month ago in deference to the Sultan’s wishes. He is an agreeable man,
and extremely clever. It is arranged that we are to have a Conference
with Jemal-ed-Din at Boulogne, and they explained to me the nature of
the Franco-Russo-Indian Conspiracy, of which Jemal-ed-Din is the head.
If the Sultan does not work with him, they say they can depose him. But
he will work with them. They want to force terms of peace on England.
Otherwise they say there will be a revolt in India. [N.B.—This Ibrahim
El Moelhy, brother to Abd-el-Salam Pasha El Moelhy, was a well-known
character who subsequently played a variety of parts in many notable
intrigues both at Yildiz and Abdin. Besides his talent in this
direction—and he used to remind me of Fakredin in Disraeli’s novel
‘Tancred’—he was acknowledged to be the finest chess player in the East.
His pretence of being an ‘agent of the Mahdi’ had however very little
reality, Jemal-ed-Din alone having influence in that direction.]
“_3rd Jan._—A letter from Selim Faris this morning which disquiets me.
It says that Hassan Pasha Fehmy’s mission from the Sultan, which has
been recently talked of, has for its object to make terms with the
English Government, but that it is intended to support Tewfik, and that
the only alternative is the restoration of Ismaïl, who is patronized now
by Bismarck. Jowdat has got a letter from Halim Pasha’s son, ordering
him back to Constantinople, and warning him against mixing himself up
with Irishmen or Hindus, as such a course might compromise the Prince.
“_4th Jan._—Dined at the Club, where I had a long talk with Marlborough,
who is writing an article on the evils wrought by Christianity. He is
more intellectual than his brother Randolph, but less attractive.
“_6th Jan._—Wolseley’s column has reached Gakdul without accident, and
people are again cock-a-hoop. Leonard Courtney tells me Gladstone is ill
with anxiety about Egypt. The departure of Hassan Fehmy’s mission from
Constantinople is announced.
“_11th Jan._—Button came back last night from Tunis, which he says the
French have ruined,—trade gone, Arab peasantry gone, caravans gone, no
new colonists, old ones in despair. Passing through Paris on his way
home he had seen somebody belonging to the Embassy (Sheffield?), who had
told him that Lord Lyons was furious at the want of policy in Egypt. He
had a policy of his own which it would seem included Arabi’s return, for
Button had been asked whether it would not be possible to get up some
popular demonstration in favour of Arabi. From what he heard at Paris
the difficulty in Egypt is that the rich people evade paying their taxes
and are forty per cent short this year, the peasantry only five per
cent. Lord Lyons’ idea is that Arabi could force the rich to disgorge.
This is exactly in harmony with Knowles’s suggestion to me last year.
“_12th Jan._—A letter from me in the ‘Times,’ in the best place, and a
leading article upon it.” This explained my position towards the Sultan.
“Saw Button. He says the Government has decided nothing. Gladstone does
not mean to retire, or Granville, or Northbrook, or any of them. They
have no policy, except to wait on events. They mean nothing by
coquetting with the Sultan. Hassan Fehmy’s mission will lead to nothing.
They look on the Khartoum expedition as a walk over. But my friends
Ibrahim and Ismaïl are quite sure Khartoum has been taken long ago, and
that the steamers at Shendy are in the Mahdi’s hands.[95]
“_15th Jan._—I have dispatched a letter to the Sultan through Halim
Pasha.
“_17th Jan._—Button tells me the fate of Egypt will be settled this
week. The French counter-proposals have arrived, and Gladstone means to
clear bodily out of Egypt as well as the Soudan. He will not hear of
resigning alone, and Dilke and Hartington have caved in. The ‘Times,’
however, does not give up its policy of staying on in Egypt for lost,
and a campaign is being organized of defiance to Europe. ‘Dilke,’ said
Button, ‘always said the only policy was a policy of bounce, and we are
going to bounce it, at a risk of a war with France. But nobody will move
a finger.’ ‘If you want to bounce,’ I said, ‘bounce behind the Sultan,
and I will go with you.’ Certainly I do not want to see Egypt handed
over to Europe. Mr. Gladstone must remain responsible, and must do
justice before he goes. Met Wolff at the Club, who urged me to bring
forward the case now against Tewfik.
“_18th Jan._—Prepared a memorandum about Tewfik, and tried to find Wolff
to concert measures. Saw Stanley, who will put me in communication with
Hassan Fehmy. Stanley tells me Musurus talks of Tewfik as ‘incapable but
harmless.’
“Lady C. tells me the Prince of Wales is now well disposed towards me,
but says I am to be attacked as soon as Parliament meets. She does not
say by whom, or for what.
“_19th Jan._—There is a telegram in the ‘Daily Telegraph,’ explaining
that Hassan Fehmy’s mission to England is to show an autograph letter
written by the Czar to the Sultan, offering him an alliance. This is
what I have suspected to be Russia’s game. Presided at a meeting of the
East India Association at Exeter Hall, the thing discussed being the age
of entrance to the Civil Service. The meeting was a small one; Stanley
spoke, and Connell, and Tom Hughes, an old twaddler of the first water.
“_20th Jan._—Button’s bouncing article is in the ‘Times.’ He says the
Government will reject the French proposals, at least of a multiple
control in Egypt.
“_21st Jan._—Called on Hassan Fehmy, and found Stanley there. We had a
long talk with the Sultan’s Envoy. Stanley explained who I was, and gave
me every help, for he is entirely without that small jealousy which
besets most men, and cares only for ‘the cause.’ We both urged on Hassan
Fehmy to be firm in his dealing with Lord Granville, showing him in how
much need the English Government stood of the Sultan’s help, as regarded
both Egypt and India, and I promised to keep him informed of all that
goes on. He seemed pleased at finding friends, for he is quite a
stranger here, being a good Turk of the old-fashioned sort, knowing
little French and no English, and never having played before at
diplomacy. His face is most sympathetic, and I like him extremely. He
seems honest and good, but without backbone enough for our Foreign
Office rogues.
“To Bowles at the ‘Vanity Fair’ Office. He advises me to stand for
Parliament, and has suggested Salford, where he says they want a
Conservative Home Rule candidate. He has been nursing the constituency
for two years, but now under the new regulations would not get in
without the Irish vote. With it he says I should certainly be returned.
It is perhaps worth thinking about.
“_22nd Jan._—News of the battle of Abu Klea—Burnaby killed, as it serves
him right, for he was a mere butcher, and eight other officers including
young De Lisle. Here the bloody work begins again. But this time the
butchery will not be all on one side. They have been pretending for the
last four months that the Mahdi had no men with him, and behold 10,000
at the first battle; that the Western Soudanese would not fight like
those of the East, and behold the British square broken by their charge
and 800 men throwing their lives away! They must be under good
discipline too, or they would not have waited so long without attacking.
Now Stewart’s[96] army will at any rate not attempt to reach Khartoum
till Wolseley comes up, and then it will be too late.
“These English soldiers are mere murderers, and I confess I would rather
see them all at perdition than that a single Arab more should die. What
are they? A mongrel scum of thieves from Whitechapel and Seven Dials,
commanded by young fellows whose ideal is the green room of the
Gaiety—without beliefs, without traditions, without other principle of
action than just to get their promotion and have a little fun. On the
other side men with the memory of a thousand years of freedom, with
chivalry inherited from the Saracens, the noblest of ancestors, with a
creed the purest the world ever knew, worshipping God and serving him in
arms like the heroes of the ancient world they are. It is over the death
of these that we rejoice. No, I desire in my heart to see their blood
avenged, and every man of Stewart’s butchering host butchered in their
turn and sent to hell. Gladstone! Great God, is there no vengeance for
this pitiful man of blood, who has not even the courage to be at the
same time a man of iron? What is he that he should have cost the world a
single life? A pedant, a babbler, an impotent old fool.
“Button tells me the idea at the War Office is that Stewart will send
back his camels to Korti, and that then Wolseley will reinforce him with
2,000 men. Omdurman, Gordon’s outpost, is taken, and they will push on
for Khartoum at all risks.
“My idea is that Khartoum has fallen already, and that the whole thing
will end as it deserves in disaster.
“They seem to have come to terms with the Sultan, at any rate about the
Soudan, which they will hand over to him—when they have got it. I hope
Hassan Fehmy will stand firm. He was to see Lord Granville to-day.
“Dined again at Pembridge Crescent, where John Pollen has just returned
from India. Lord Ripon seems fully to have enjoyed his triumph and John
with him. Stanley called in the evening in James Street. He is a good
friend and a good ally, and shares all my bitter feelings against
Wolseley and his cut-throats.
“_23rd Jan._—A long list of killed and wounded published, but no more
news of Stewart. Got down home to Crabbet where there is bright sun
instead of the London fog. The ‘Pall Mall’ publishes ‘from an exalted
source’ (Ismaïl’s?), a fanciful programme of Hassan Fehmy’s terms. I
wish there was any chance of their being the true ones.
“I met Hardinge[97] yesterday at the Club, and talked with him about
Constantinople. I said that Hugh Wyndham deserved great credit for
having brought about a reconciliation between England and the Sultan,
but he laughed at this. ‘Between ourselves,’ he said, ‘Wyndham had
nothing at all to do with it. He had a quarrel with the Sultan two years
ago, and has not been on speaking terms with the Palace since.’ I said:
‘I suppose our little friend Corti managed it for him.’ To this Hardinge
did not answer. Of course it was Corti.
“_24th Jan._—There is no news from General Stewart, except a ‘bazaar
rumour’ that he is surrounded, and the British public is beginning to
get alarmed. Now we shall hear crying and lamentation. Great God! what a
stupid dull beast the world is. It sends an army out to fight against an
innocent people, and an innocent people destroy that army. One would
think that not a single M.P. from Mr. Gladstone downwards had ever read
a word of the history of Greece or heard of Marathon. This stupidity is
more hideous even than their cruelty and lying. But if there is a God
upon the earth He will this time do justice.
“The evening papers announce Hobart’s arrival in London.
“_25th Jan._—Went up to London by the early train to see Hobart. But
first I saw Button, who detailed to me the military situation. It
appears that on the 28th of last month [N.B.—There is a confusion here
as to date. The dispatch referred to is doubtless that of 4th November]
Gordon wrote to Wolseley a long dispatch, in which he said he could not
hold out more than a certain number of days, and for this reason General
Stewart’s expedition was sent. Wolseley would have made it more numerous
than it was if he could have got transport, but he sent every camel he
could lay his hands on. The dispatch was a long one, and stated that
Gordon had steamers at a certain point, about fifteen miles above
Shendy, and proposed that naval officers should be sent to man them. It
particularly mentioned Charlie Beresford as the man to take charge of
them, and for this reason the naval brigade was sent. Gordon had also
written to explain that his reason for dispatching Colonel Stewart and
the rest by river to Dongola was that he understood from Mr. Gladstone,
or rather Lord Granville’s telegram, that no expedition would under any
circumstances be sent to relieve him. All this will be published when
Parliament meets. Button thinks, all the same, that it won’t turn out
the Ministry. He said that the War Office were expecting news hourly,
and that if it did not come to-day, they should consider things had gone
wrong with Stewart. With regard to the diplomatic position, the
Government had accepted the French proposals after all, only protesting
against a Multiple Control; and the French Government had accepted the
acceptance. This is unfortunate, as they may now think they can do
without the Sultan’s help. But our position is still an immensely strong
one, and Button promised to help all he could in the ‘Times’ if we
attacked Tewfik. Buckle is fortunately away, and Button will have things
much more in his own hands till Parliament meets. It won’t be my fault
if we don’t play trumps.
“Luncheon with the Gregorys. Lady Gregory has arranged with Stead that
Layard shall be interviewed in support of the Sultan. At the Clubs
people are in a great state of excitement, waiting news from Metemmeh
which does not come. I found Godfrey Webb among others. We went together
to call on George Currie, who has just bought the little Gothic House in
Park Lane, a really charming one, Gothic though it be, where we found
Alfred Montgomery. Then to 27 Grosvenor Street, where Hobart has taken a
house. With Hobart I had a long conversation; he had seen the Sultan
before he left, and the Sultan’s idea was by hook or by crook to get a
footing in Egypt. The English Government, he said, were ready to
withdraw their troops to Alexandria and Port Said, and to admit Turkish
troops to Cairo. And the Sultan was thinking of sending a contingent to
help Wolseley in the Soudan, under the belief that half the Mahdi’s
people would lay down their arms at the command of the Caliph. I
exhorted Hobart not to let the Sultan do anything so foolish. I know the
situation, and if the Sultan were to join the English the Sultan would
become as Tewfik has become. They would pay no attention to him, and he
would lose all his influence. With the stream he can ride on the top of
the wave; against it he can only be drowned. I urged him to get Hassan
Fehmy to play a strong game and insist as a preliminary to all
assistance that Tewfik should be deposed. He then told me in confidence
that the Sultan had told him in confidence, that he hated Tewfik, but
that he considered it politic to get a foothold in Egypt first on any
terms. Hobart thought that Hassan Fehmy would not be bold enough to
depart from this plan, or propose Tewfik being replaced. However, he
would try, and as he had a private cypher with the Sultan, he could
telegraph to him all my ideas. I asked him how I was regarded at the
Palace, and he said: ‘At first they could not understand what you were
driving at, but now they see you are a friend and accept you as such.’
“Lady C. is making an active propaganda in my favour and in favour of my
ideas. She tells me old Lucan[98] has been with her to-day, and has told
her that the War Office has got news that Stewart is in fact surrounded,
and he will have to capitulate. The news is not exactly official, but
they seem to believe it.
“_26th Jan._—To see Button. He says the acceptance of the French
proposals has stopped the negotiations for the present with the Sultan,
but they will come on again, and he strongly advises that Hassan Fehmy
should declare himself against Tewfik, and promises that if he does the
‘Times’ will bring the matter forward. Buckle is away on his honeymoon
till the 19th February, and Button will have things pretty much his own
way in Printing House Square, so I have drawn up a memorandum for Hassan
Fehmy of the language he should use, and shall try and get him to send
in a dispatch to Lord Granville without delay.
“_27th Jan._—Stanley came to me in the morning, and highly approves my
draft memorandum, and we went together to call on Hassan Fehmy, but he
was out, and I have left the memorandum with Stanley to read to him.
Lady A. sent a message by him to say she wished to see me, and I had
luncheon at her house in Grosvenor Street. She is very anxious about her
son, who is with General Stewart, but I had little to say to comfort
her. She would naturally, she told me, sympathize with the Arabs, and
her son, too, had sympathized with them after the Suakin campaign. But
such is the desire of military glory he had volunteered nevertheless. I
also saw Pembroke yesterday, who has grown a beard, and is looking twice
the man he was. He, too, is in a state of anxiety, for Reggie Talbot and
Heale Phipps, both members of the Wilton Club, are with Stewart. Such
are the glories of war.
“_28th Jan._—The evening papers announce Stewart’s arrival at last at
Metemmeh after more slaughter, another hundred men or so killed and
wounded on the English side, and two thousand they say on the side of
the Arabs. This is infinitely disgusting, and the only thing which seems
to mitigate the evil is, that being now in communication with Gordon by
steamer they may be willing to rescue him, and retire as they said it
was their intention to do. They can perfectly well do this by river,
without any more battles, and the Mahdi has still a large army on the
river bank, between Metemmeh and Khartoum. The Arbitration Association
have elected me to their executive Committee, and have called a meeting
for to-morrow.
“_29th Jan._—Had a long talk with Ibrahim Bey. I asked what could be
done in the way of getting up a demonstration in Egypt against Tewfik.
He said petitions might be addressed to the British Government asking
for his deposition. The Ulema of the Azhar would sign it, except El
Abbasi, the Sheykh el Islam, who is Tewfik’s creature. Some of the
Notables might and a number of village Sheykhs, but not the Mudirs, as
these are Government officials paid by Tewfik. If the English Government
would give the least encouragement every man in Egypt would sign it. As
to Arabi, he said all the poor are for him, but the rich won’t hear of
him. He urged me to go to Paris and talk things over with Jemal-ed-Din.
“Hobart, Whittaker tells me, has just been staying at Sandringham. The
Prince of Wales said to him: ‘I suppose we shall have to get rid of
Tewfik.’ Hobart’s instructions from the Sultan are nothing but a
programme of conciliatory language, and compliments to the Queen and
Prince of Wales. He is only here to advise Hassan Fehmy. Hassan Fehmy’s
audience at Osborne was not a success. The Queen would not talk on
important matters, and was not particularly gracious. I am afraid his
mission will lead to nothing. His only chance was to speak out loudly
and firmly, and insist on Tewfik’s deposition. I have got the peace
people to vote a resolution urging Gladstone to retire from Khartoum,
and make peace with the Mahdi. I drafted a letter for them to Gladstone.
“_30th Jan._—Bowles has published my caricature in ‘Vanity Fair.’ Saw
Brett with Button, he and his master, Hartington, are all for smashing
the Mahdi and keeping Khartoum and Eastern Soudan. If I wanted
evacuation he advised me to send in a memorandum to Chamberlain who has
just been declaring that the Soudan is to be handed over ‘to its own
noble savages.’ Brett is a clever, but unprincipled[99] young man, and
manages all Hartington’s intrigues for him with the press. Button and
Stead are the two he works through most, and their latest achievement
has been getting Temple, who married Hartington’s first cousin
(Lascelles’ sister) made Bishop of London. The ‘Pall Mall’ has been
urging it for the last three weeks, and now it is done. The stupid
public fancies that Stead is a wonderful prophet, when he insists on
this and that policy, and when the policy is adopted. But Hartington
pulls all the strings and gives him the information, and so the campaign
against the Grand Old Man goes on. I am not sure whether Dilke is still
in with them, but I fancy he is. Chamberlain has broken away. Brett,
though of course an enemy to my ideas, sometimes gives useful hints. I
asked him to-day what they were going to do in Lower Egypt. He said:
‘You are going to have English Administration.’
“_1st Feb._—Dined with George Currie in Park Lane; Alfred Seymour was
there, and Newton, the Police magistrate, also Walter Seymour, who is
just starting on another venture to Venezuela, this time with a cargo of
arms to make a revolution. Alfred Seymour has a story of Sir Peter
Lumsden having resigned his mission in Afghanistan rather than carry out
the Government’s concessions on the frontier.
“_2nd Feb._—Wrote the draft of a letter to Chamberlain, urging an
immediate evacuation of Khartoum, but shall keep it till Wilson returns
from Metemmeh with news of Gordon.
“Old Lord Mark Kerr[100] called in the morning, ‘out of neighbourly
feeling’ he said, as he lives almost next door (in James Street). I had
correspondence with him two years ago about Arabi.
“Lunched with Button. He has told me more particulars of the Hartington
intrigue. He says that not only was Gordon sent to Khartoum without a
Cabinet Council, but Wolseley also was sent without one. The whole
expedition has been an executive measure, which not all the members of
the Cabinet have ever agreed to. Similarly the financial proposals for
Egypt have never been agreed to by Lord Northbrook, and the Cabinet has
been going on in this way for a year, each minister running his own
hare. Now, however, Chamberlain will break off and leave the rest,
hoping to come in on the top of the wave with the new elections.
“Letters have come from India showing that Randolph, thanks to my
letters, has been well received, and there is one I am specially glad to
get from Seyd Huseyn at Hyderabad.[101] Salar Jung has invited Randolph,
and he has accepted the invitation.
“_4th Feb._—Button says there are great things brewing all over Europe.
The French Government, although it promised an answer on the Egyptian
finance question last Wednesday, has remained silent. There is a hitch
somewhere in the negotiations. There is a row between Germany and Russia
on account of the King of Bulgaria’s proposed marriage. The Portuguese
have seized both banks of the Congo, being in league with France, etc.
Bismarck is furious because the Congo Conference seems likely to break
up as the London one did. If we have any luck, there may be a good
general European war all round.
“Dinner at Lady C.’s, who is anxious I should go into Parliament as a
follower of Churchill’s. She says the Prince of Wales is angry with me
because I only care about the Arabs in this infernal war. Afterwards to
a party at Lady Stanley of Alderley’s (Lord Stanley’s mother), where I
had some talk with Frederic Harrison, and hope to get him to take part
in a peace meeting. Lady Stanley talked about the war, as to which they
are all very cock-a-hoop now. They can’t take any interest, they say, in
the Arabs, because there are so many of them; when a thousand are
killed, there are always thousands more to take their place. Dilke was
there.
“_5th Feb._—Went to see Lord Mark Kerr, whom I found at breakfast,
walking uneasily round, and eating a mouthful from time to time. He is a
good, excellent man, but vague in his ideas to the verge of insanity.
His instincts are admirable, and he has glimmerings of great thoughts
about the East. He sympathizes with the Arabs as he does with the Indian
natives, and is very angry just now at the Duke of Connaught being
recalled from India instead of being made Commander-in-Chief. ‘The Duke
is not clever,’ he said, ‘but he understands how to talk to a gentleman
in the East—and they should have made him Commander-in-Chief.’ Lord Mark
will help us at any meeting we may get up.
“Then to see Stanley, who urges me to call again on Hassan Fehmy and on
Staal, the Russian Ambassador, who wants to see me. He, too, will help.
On my return I found Mark Napier, who announced the unexpected and
glorious news of the fall of Khartoum. This turns all our plans topsy-
turvy, but to our great advantage, and I rushed off at once to see
Hassan Fehmy, and had the pleasure of being the first to give him the
news. There was another Englishman with him when I arrived, and the
Ambassador put on a _figure de circonstance_ when he heard what had
happened. But as soon as the Englishman was gone he took me by both
hands, and a smile of pleasure broke out over all his face. He promised
me to have nothing to do with ideas of helping with Turkish troops
against the Mahdi, and seemed quite disposed to follow all my advice. I
left him to seek Button, and fortunately found him just come from the
War Office. It seems that Wilson[102] was delayed by the shallowness of
the river, and took four days getting up to Khartoum from Metemmeh. On
arrival he found the citadel dismantled, no flag flying, and the whole
place full of Arabs, who opened fire on him, and then he turned tail,
and by another accident all three steamers ran aground, and there they
still are, Wilson planted on an island, and the news brought in a boat,
as I understand, by Stuart-Wortley. Button says that Stewart’s force at
Metemmeh runs no risk, as it has abundance of provisions, but I can’t
believe this. In any case the expedition has come altogether to grief,
and the outside of what there is to hope Button says, is that Stewart
can be relieved, and the British Forces concentrated for the summer at
Metemmeh. There is no question of an advance now on Khartoum. It is
unknown what has become of Gordon. Indeed, the whole thing is
conjecture, as Wilson did not land. Button tells me that the Rothschilds
got a telegram this morning from their agents saying that there was no
truth at all in the story. But this cannot be, as Button has seen
Wolseley’s dispatches at the War Office.
“Lunched with Mark Napier at St. James’s Club, and have agreed to take
him with me if I am sent to make peace with the Mahdi. This seems not
altogether impossible. I met Austin Lee[103] and reminded him how I had
told him they would have to come to me after all. Also Philip Currie
sent me a note in the afternoon asking me to dinner for Saturday, a
thing he has not done for long. I had just time to run in and see Lady
Gregory that we might rejoice together, and then I was interviewed by
Wheeler for the Press Association, and got away by train home to Crabbet
where young Hardinge has come down to hunt. This has been a day of
consolation, and I could not help singing all the way down in the train.
Why had I so little faith?
“_6th Feb._—A beautiful morning, and we went down to Shoreham, had a
capital run of six miles quite straight over the Downs without a check,
and killed in Newtimber Holt. Hardinge was with us, riding Proximo, and
went all the way close behind the hounds. Harry Brand was out, and we
had a long talk about the Soudan. He says the Government are all for
going on with the war. He himself had been in favour of sending me out
to make peace. But the country would never stand anything now but war. I
told him, if he had any influence with the Cabinet, to use it for the
recall of Wolseley’s expedition, which would certainly suffer great loss
if it stayed. I am strongly of the opinion that Gordon is alive, and
equally of opinion that Wolseley is the worst man in the world to
negotiate for him if he is a prisoner.
“Had a good deal of talk in the evening with Hardinge. He agreed with me
that Dufferin was too fond of humbugging people to succeed in the East.
He had been very idle, too, at Constantinople, leaving all the work of
the Embassy to Wyndham. The Turks, however, were afraid of him, and he
had got a good deal out of them in the way of claims and such like,
though his main policy had failed. Dufferin was sore about Egypt, where
he considered himself to have been a failure. He thought he could have
carried out his programme if he had been left at Cairo longer. Wyndham
had quarrelled with the Sultan by accusing him of intriguing in Egypt.
He had done this in a fit of temper, but the Sultan never forgave.
Hardinge knew all about how Dilke had worked up the Egyptian war, and of
the dirt Malet had been made to eat. He has a poor opinion of Baring.
“_7th Feb._—To London early and saw Hassan Fehmy, whom I found in a
state of entire perplexity to know what to do. I therefore had no
difficulty in persuading him to write a formal dispatch to Lord
Granville, protesting against what was going on in Egypt and Soudan. He
asked me to write the draft for him, and I promised to do so. He gave me
a long account of all that he had said to Lord Granville, which seems to
have been very little to the point. A more hopelessly muddled old
gentleman I think I never met, honest though and anxious to do his duty,
which is far better than to be a clever rogue. However, we will remedy
it all by a dispatch that will make old Granville rub his eyes. Button
is of opinion that Wolseley will not be at all anxious to carry on the
campaign at a great expense, but will rather be for negotiating. His
only idea in this direction is to offer money. Harry reproached me
yesterday with having gone over to the Sultan, but I said: ‘If your
hounds change their fox what is the huntsman to do? Is he to go on by
himself or to go with them?’ Down in the afternoon to Wilbury, a day of
wind and rain. Percy Wyndham is staunch in opposition to the war. Wrote
the draft dispatch for Hassan Fehmy.
“_9th Feb._—At Wilbury. Hunting from Elbarrow, I enjoyed the day more
than any this season.
“_10th Feb._—Button telegraphed to me last night to come to London as
there was something important going on in connection with Hassan Fehmy’s
mission, so I went up. He has seen Brett who tells him some new and
unexpected departure is about to be taken with regard to Egypt. The
Sultan’s mission is once more in favour. But it may mean many things.
The Sultan ought to offer mediation in the Soudan. Lunched with Lady
Gregory, and in the afternoon went with Stanley to take part in the
Indian Reform Association’s deputation to Lord Ripon. After it was over
Stanley and I had a private talk with Lord Ripon, and we begged him to
expostulate with the Government against sending Indian troops to the
Soudan. He said he would certainly use any influence he had in that
direction, but assured us it was not necessary, as no troops would be
sent. Nevertheless it is announced to-night in all the papers.
“Dined with Button at the Marlborough Club. It is announced that Gordon
is certainly dead, and there are sensational accounts of the sack of
Khartoum. I am inclined to think it just as well, in the cause of peace,
that the worst should have happened. It will take away the excuse of a
further advance. Button says they all mean war to the knife, but I am
convinced that in six weeks Gordon will be forgotten, and there will be
a strong reaction against the war; then the Government will slip out of
it. If Gordon was alive and a prisoner, then the excitement would be
kept up till he was released.
“_11th Feb._—George Wyndham is ordered with the Guards to Suakin, and I
have asked Jemal-ed-Din to give him a talisman in case of his being
taken prisoner by the Mahdi. But it is on condition that he does not use
it for any _ruse de guerre_.
“Saw Hassan Fehmy, who described to me a visit he paid yesterday to
Gladstone. Mr. Gladstone had been most charming, but had not, it seems,
committed himself to anything definite. He, the Pasha, was very angry
about the Italian occupation of Massowa, but I could not get out of him
exactly what proposals he had made on the Sultan’s behalf. Button
declares that it was arranged positively three weeks ago that Turkish
troops should occupy Cairo, but the acceptance by France of the
financial proposals stopped this. Now, however, he tells me, as a great
secret, that the proposals have again broken down. And that is the
reason why they are anxious again to arrange matters with the Sultan.
Hassan Fehmy was very cordial, and promised to come down to Crabbet as
soon as these worries are off his hands. I gave him my draft of his
dispatch to Lord Granville which Stanley had translated into French, but
it was written on Sunday when we thought still that no arrangement could
be come to with the Foreign Office. He said, however, that he would keep
it to use in case the present negotiations broke down. Speaking of
Ismaïl Pasha, he said I might trust him not to compromise himself in
that direction, that the Sultan knew very well that Ismaïl was his worst
enemy.
“_12th Feb._—Down again to Wilbury, another day’s hunting from Vernham
Gate, and had a hard run of an hour across very steep hills, and killed
in a wood. Kars carried me well, and I was again in front all the way.
“There is news of another bloody battle in the Soudan. General Earle
killed this time. Morley and Courtney have come out well in favour of
peace, and I am sure the Government will not be allowed to go on with
this butchery. To-night’s ‘Pall Mall’ has an article strongly for
Ismaïl.
“_14th Feb._—Hunted in Savernake Forest.
“_15th Feb._—Wilbury. Major Poore, an old disciple of Urquhart’s,
called, and I had some interesting conversation with him. Urquhart
doubtless was the founder of a remarkable school of political morality,
but his eccentricities injured its effect, and much of his practical
teaching is now old-fashioned.
“_17th Feb._—To London early. I find everybody very angry with Gladstone
for having been to the play the very night the news of Gordon’s death
was received, and I hear that he was hissed in St. James’s Street.
“To Lymington’s wedding with Miss Pease, the Quaker heiress. We may hope
soon to get the Quakers on the side of peace. Hitherto they have been
dead against it.
“Talked with Hobart Pasha at his Club, the Army and Navy. He saw
Gladstone yesterday, who told him that he had never had any ill-feeling
towards the Turks, indeed had rather liked them than otherwise. Harcourt
told him that the Government knew that the Sultan’s only wish was to
restore Ismaïl.[104] As to this Hobart expressed to me his great anger.
They have had nothing to do with Ismaïl, who has spoiled Hassan Fehmy’s
mission.
“_18th Feb._—Button is very anxious to find out what is in the air. I
went accordingly to Hassan Fehmy, and had a few words with him—but he is
a hopeless man. Lord Granville complains of him that he, Hassan,
understands nothing that he says, and that he, Lord Granville,
understands very little of what Hassan says. I can well believe it. He
seemed vexed at being questioned about Ismaïl.
“Dined with Mrs. S., where Philip Currie was. His special business now
at the Foreign Office is the Afghan frontier. This he flattered himself
he knew thoroughly. ‘The Russians,’ he said, ‘have the strongest hand,
but we hold half a dozen good cards which we may play well.’ It will
take better playing than he gave his cards in Egypt to prevent a war.
“_19th Feb._—Looked in at Gregory’s. He is writing a plea for Arabi’s
recall to Egypt in the ‘Nineteenth Century.’ It is generally admitted
now in the light of the Soudan rebellion that the Egyptian war was a
mistake, and Arabi an honest man. Jem Lowther, whom I met to-day, says
the Opposition have decided on a Vote of Censure, and the declaration of
an alternative policy in Egypt. It must be either Arabi or annexation.
He said he himself was for annexation. There is a sensational account in
the ‘Pall Mall’ of a retreat from Metemmeh and the recall of Wolseley. I
hope Buller will get his force back without fighting, as defeat might
now injure the cause of peace. People are much agitated about this at
the Carlton, among others Pembroke. While at a meeting of the Peace
Committee we heard Gladstone hooted on his way to Westminster.
Parliament met to-day, and it must have been a gloomy business for the
Grand Old Man to announce his policy of blood, especially as it will
mean a policy of defeat. General Stewart is dead of his wounds.
“Labouchere sent word to say he wanted to know Ismaïl Jowdat’s address,
and I called on him to-day. He tells me Herbert Gladstone has been at
him to try and find out a way of communicating with the Mahdi. We had a
long talk on the subject. Herbert Gladstone is used by his father as a
go-between, and communicates with the Irish through Labouchere.
Labouchere assures me that many Parliamentary arrangements have in this
way been made up between the Grand Old Man and Mr. Parnell. And he says
it is delicious to hear Mr. Gladstone afterwards denying them in the
House of Commons. I promised him to put the Government in communication
with the Mahdi’s agents whenever they like.
“_20th Feb._—Labouchere writes that he has seen Herbert Gladstone again,
and wants me to advise the Mahdi to constitute some one his regular
agent by sending him credentials. I had already thought of doing this,
and I had another long talk with him about it. The essential, he says,
is that the thing should not be known, as the Government could never
carry a proposal through the House to employ me in treating. But all the
same they would like to treat, and we agreed that the base of
negotiation might be the complete evacuation of the Soudan by the
English and Egyptians, and a restoration of the Wady Halfa frontier.
Suakin might be given to the Sultan, and in any case must be evacuated
by us. On this basis a peace or truce might be effected and Wolseley’s
troops withdrawn. Labouchere was very amusing about the various little
intrigues he had helped to carry on for Mr. Gladstone, and I hope this
one may succeed as well as the others. He says that on one occasion
Gladstone got his own side to vote against him.
“Lady Gregory has told me the whole of her husband’s conversation with
Mr. Gladstone (which he had not told me). It was after dinner on
Tuesday. Mr. Gladstone insisted on talking to Sir William in spite of
friends who tried to interrupt. He began by asking him what he would do,
and Gregory said he would certainly not go to Khartoum. To this Mr.
Gladstone replied: ‘Oh, I think, from all the information in our
possession, that the taking of Khartoum will not be a very difficult
matter.’ ‘The difficulty you think,’ said Sir William, ‘will be after?’
‘Ah, yes,’ said Mr. Gladstone, ‘a twenty times greater difficulty. If I
only knew what was then to be done my mind would be easy.’ He then asked
Sir William whether he thought it would be possible to treat with the
Mahdi. ‘How can we approach such a man? Through what channel and on what
terms?’ ‘There is,’ said Sir William, ‘but one man who could help you
there.’ ‘And who is that? You don’t mean Blunt?’ ‘No,’ said Sir William,
‘not Blunt. I am thinking of Arabi.’ ‘Ah,’ said Mr. Gladstone, ‘that is
a point on which you and I differ. You think Arabi an honest man. I
think him a _consummate blackguard_. Why, I have had in my hands letters
signed by that man in which he offers to barter the liberties of his
country to the Sultan!’ Sir William asked him at what date these had
been written, and Mr. Gladstone said about three weeks before the
bombardment of Alexandria. ‘At that time,’ said Sir William, ‘I suppose
all the Egyptians had been driven into the Sultan’s arms. I do not alter
my opinion of him, which is what it has always been, that he is an
honest man and a patriot.’ ‘Ah,’ said Mr. Gladstone, ‘what would I not
give to believe it with you! If I could only believe him honest _I would
jump at him_.’ This we think rather hopeful, but I fear the old man’s
pride will be too strong for him.
“Ibrahim Bey called again, and I told him I thought it better he should
not come back to James Street for the present, as it might compromise
us, that the Government were in a fair way to treat and that it would
not do to frighten them. He expressed his willingness to go to Suakin on
a mission if required; and perhaps some day we may use him in this way.
“M. Taschaud, a Belgian dignitary, called. He is the promoter of
arbitration and peace abroad, and especially I fancy of his own glory.
He is the author of a pamphlet called the ‘Future of Egypt, by an ex-
plenipotentiary,’ and seems to know people about. He assured me that he
had written this pamphlet as an article for the ‘Fortnightly,’ but that
after it was in print Escott had substituted for it the famous article
signed ‘G.’ This, M. Taschaud says, was certainly written with Mr.
Gladstone’s consent, though not by himself. His ideas of Egypt I do not
share, as they seem to consist of internationalizing it for the profit
of Europe.
“Stanley writes that he has seen Hassan Fehmy, and that it is all right
about the ex-Khedive Ismaïl. So I am satisfied. But I am glad all the
same that they are not thinking now of employing the Sultan to mediate
in the Soudan. He would only make a mess of it. Lunched at the Carlton.
Dined at St. James’s Club with Walter Seymour. Saw Eddy Hamilton looking
pale and harassed. He acknowledged himself pretty near dead beat. I
said: ‘When Wolseley is a prisoner, you will know where to find me.’
“_21st Feb._—Nebbi Ullah[105] called and I urged him to come to the
Soudan Conference and protest against the employment of Indian troops
against the Mahdi. He promised to do so and to get others to speak among
the Indians now in London. I think that will have a good effect. After
this came one Johnstone, who is getting up a large meeting in St.
James’s Hall for the week after next, and who has asked me to preside.
He represents himself as having command of the working men’s
association, and says he can get together a good number of popular
working men speakers. I have promised to preside as he wishes, and it
certainly can do no harm, especially as the meeting is to ask for
Arabi’s recall to Egypt as well as for an abandonment of the Soudan
campaign.
“Then Drummond Wolff called, who wants materials for his speech on the
Vote of Censure. I gave him the text of my letter to Gladstone of last
April proposing to mediate in the Soudan; and urged him strongly to get
the Fourth Party to take up the cause of peace. It was sure to be the
winning cause.
“After him John Morley, who came for the same purpose and stopped to
luncheon. He wanted particularly an argument against the Slave Trade
cry, and to know whether the Mahdi could be induced to treat on a
civilized basis. He told me that Dilke had told him yesterday that Mr.
Gladstone’s speech on Monday in answer to the motion of censure would be
pitched in quite a different key and far more peaceable. He, Morley, is
to follow immediately after Northcote, and then Mr. Gladstone will reply
to both. It is all very well Morley coming forward now as the champion
of peace, but it was his defection from Frederic Harrison and me last
year that decided the Government to send the expedition. If he had
spoken out then as he does now, he would have prevented it. But he
wished to please his constituents at Newcastle with whom the legend of
the Grand Old Man still survives. I did not, however, reproach him with
the past, as it would have done no good.
“At the Carlton I coached a third M.P., Robert Bourke, who seems coming
round now to Arabi. I should not be surprised if the Conservatives took
him up after all.
“Then I called on Cardinal Manning and sat with him an hour in his
private room in which he certainly looks very much in character. It is a
large room, but he has made it habitable with a tall screen lined with
bookcases running round the fire, and ensconced in which he sits. I
never saw him looking better, and complimented him on the effect of his
abstinence. This pleased him. I wanted him to take an active part in
favour of peace, but he would not do this, as he said he was forbidden
by his rulers to take part in politics. But he sympathizes much with my
views, as he has always done, though not very understandingly. Talking
of the English Catholic Laity, he said they were hopelessly dull—most of
them—very old-fashioned Conservatives, and he did not think I should get
much support out of them. The Irish, of course, supported me, but that
was out of hatred to England—and it would not advance my cause. Cardinal
Manning is a link for me with the extreme past, for I have known him
nearly forty years, and I think it is a pleasure for him to see me for
the same reason. He leads a very lonely life, out of harmony with those
about him, and clinging to old recollections. He talked warmly about old
Sussex days and the kindly relations existing there between all classes.
He is very hopeless about England’s prospects, and indeed the news to-
day is enough to make Englishmen gloomy, for Buller and his force seem
surrounded at Abu Klea, and it may well be that even Wolseley may have
to capitulate before the summer is over.
“_22nd Feb._—The ‘Sunday Times’ has a sensational ‘victory’ at Abu Klea,
but it is evidently not worth much, as Buller is still tied by the
leg—‘want of camels.’ This is just what will make all these campaigns
impotent. Then, being unable to move, they will run short of provisions,
and then the hot weather will come. They will be ‘hemmed in’ by the
Arabs, and unless they make peace will have to capitulate. Button tells
me the Government are ready to treat with the Mahdi on almost any terms
he could ask, and advises me to go to Paris and start negotiations
there. I shall go, but must first hear the opening of the Debate of
Censure. With regard to that, Button tells me some of the Cabinet are
very anxious to get beaten. Chamberlain told a friend of his last night
that he would far rather go to the country and explain peace than have
to explain war. If Morley would only accept Mr. Gladstone’s speech on
Monday as a peace speech and withdraw his motion, many of the Whigs
would go over to the Tories and turn the Government out. I have written
an article on Hassan Fehmy’s mission for Button for the ‘Times,’ and I
took it to him to-day. It is against my rule to do this, as I have only
once written an unsigned thing for them, namely, the article on the
Palmer expedition. But this is an exceptional case. Button says the
Conservatives are all talking now of Arabi and are half disposed to take
him up. They would certainly make terms with the Sultan if they came
into office.
“Ferid Bey, the First Secretary of the Turkish Embassy, called. He is
very much against the Mahdi, and believes that but for him the English
would long ago have left Egypt. I did my best to persuade him to take a
broad view, and suggested that if they wanted to treat with Lord
Granville effectively they should mass 20,000 men at Gaza.
“To Crabbet by late train.
“_23rd Feb._—Wrote to Morley repeating what Button had suggested about
his withdrawing his amendment, so as to turn the Government out and have
a good honest opposition to the war, and also about Ibrahim Bey’s
statement published on Thursday. Beta, who I hear is Morier, mentions it
and challenges me to say whether it is authentic, and I have begged
Morley to say from me that it is so.
“We hunted with the Crawley and Horsham hounds from Patching, and had a
pretty run across the down to Steyning, whence we came home, Kars having
cut his fetlock with a flint.
“Up to town in the evening and dined at Lady C.’s. She says all her
friends now are speaking well of me. Met Henry Chaplin at the Carlton,
who thinks Wolseley’s army is lost.
“_24th Feb._—To Button early. He tells me Philip Currie, with whom he
talked, is anxious to get into communication with the Mahdi, but of
course not through me or anybody who can really help him. The Censure
Debate came on last night, and, though Mr. Gladstone was not of course
outspoken, his speech was nevertheless distinctly more peaceable than
the first. It seems, however, to have been a miserable exhibition of the
old hair-splitting arguments, like all the rest he has made on the
Egyptian business. I cannot understand his reputation as an orator. He
certainly has an extreme facility and power of statement, but he neither
touches nor convinces. It is a lawyer’s eloquence, not a statesman’s—at
least this is the impression his speeches have always made on me. Button
thinks nevertheless he will get his majority, but that the Government
will go to pieces on some smaller issue during the Session.
“Called on Stanley to tell him something of my plans, and then went by
the tidal train to Paris.
“_25th Feb._—At the Hotel Wagram. Sanua called last night and we talked
affairs over, and this morning I had two hours with Jemal-ed-Din. I find
there will be more difficulty in treating with the Mahdi now than I
thought, or than would have been the case last year, for the taking of
Khartoum has altered the situation considerably. Also they are much
elated at having killed five English generals, a thing never heard of,
they say, in any war. These they count to be Hicks, Baker, Stewart,
Earle, and now Gordon—and the Mahdi’s terms will be correspondingly
high. Still, Jemal-ed-Din says distinctly that peace can be made if the
English are willing, _first_, to abandon the Soudan, _second_, to hand
over Suakin to the Sultan, _third_, to use their good offices to get the
Italians out of Massowa, and _fourth_, to arrange with the Sultan for
the establishment of Mohammedan Government in Egypt. The recall of Arabi
would much facilitate matters, but any popular Government in Egypt could
be on friendly terms with Mohammed Ahmed. With regard to the method of
treating, Jemal-ed-Din says it is essential that the English Government
should make the first move. The Mahdi could not under present
circumstances send an Embassy to England, or even appoint him (Jemal-ed-
Din) his _wakil_ for that purpose. The Embassy must be sent by England,
and all he can do is to forward it to its destination and recommend it
as a _bona fide_ mission. I asked him about Gordon’s bible, which Mrs.
Allnatt has been very anxious I should try and get back; but Jemal-ed-
Din declines to hold out hopes of its restoration until peace is made. I
begged him, however, to try to obtain it, as if he succeeded it would be
a great proof to our Government of his power. There was an article on
Jemal-ed-Din in yesterday’s ‘Times,’ which is correct as far as it goes,
but Jemal-ed-Din is angry at their having left out all that he said
against Ismaïl Pasha and Prince Hassan’s appointment to the Soudan.
“Had a long talk at the Embassy with Bungo Herbert[106] on the Mahdi
question, but I don’t know that it will do any good, as Lord Lyons they
say has left off expressing any opinion on Egyptian affairs, as his
advice has never been taken. Herbert is his private secretary now,
Sheffield being away.
“_26th Feb._—Jemal-ed-Din and Sanua to breakfast. I read them my letter
to the Sultan, which they highly approve of. About Afghanistan, Jemal-
ed-Din assured me that the talk of a quarrel between Russia and the Amir
was all nonsense; that the quarrel, whenever it came off, would be
against us; that the Amir would give free passage to Russia for the
invasion of India, but neither were ready yet for this.
“There is a telegram in the papers that the Nizam has offered troops for
the Soudan, and at this, too, he laughed. He said they always offered
troops, as they knew they would not be accepted. When Sanua was gone he
told me privately that he had thought over my proposals of negotiations
with the Mahdi, and was sure it could be done. But he would have nothing
to do with it unless the English Government would show its sincerity by
employing me or someone else he could trust to represent them. Then he
would introduce the mission, which must also be accompanied by a
Mohammedan, to a man of high station in Egypt who was in a position to
speak as to terms. He himself was not in such position, and he could do
no more than indicate the way to others who would give the necessary
introductions and safe-conducts to the English agent. It must, however,
be distinctly arranged beforehand that the English Government should
engage itself to protect the persons through whose agency the
negotiations should be carried on. They must not be allowed to suffer at
the hands of the Khedive. He was of opinion that not only a peace might
be made, but also a treaty of commerce, and perhaps even a slave trade
convention—the latter to the extent of guaranteeing the Abyssinians from
slave raids inasmuch as these were illegal. He declined, however, to
enter into communication with any English official on the subject until
I should be first convinced that their intentions were serious, and that
the protection was guaranteed to the Mahdi’s _wakils_. I am well
satisfied with this view of the case, and all the more so from finding
Jemal-ed-Din so cautious in his promises. He does not think it would be
judicious to apply for Gordon’s bible just now.
“Gladstone to-day recants his declaration of abandoning the Soudan. But
all this debate is selling the bear’s skin before it is killed. My
opinion is that the Berber railroad will never be made, except perhaps a
few miles of it, and that as soon as the Nile rises Wolseley will run
for it down the river to Egypt.
“_27th Feb._—Hassan Fehmy’s mission it seems is to be recalled, the fall
of Khartoum having altered the situation. Prince Halim writes again, but
this time not about politics, asking me to get him a pair of horses for
the Sultan to drive. In his letter the other day he mentions having
delivered my letter to His Majesty. The horses must be above all things
‘very quiet,’ as the Sultan wishes to drive them himself.
“Saw Lady Gregory, and had breakfast at the Blounts.[107] Afterwards to
call on Lesseps, but he was not at home. Then to the Embassy, where I
found Walsham, Herbert, Leigh, and another, and talked nonsense with
them for an hour in the Chancery as in old days—also old Atlee, a relic
of the past. Malet is dining to-night at the Embassy. I am dining with
the Wagrams.
“_28th Feb._—Came over to London by the tidal train and went at once to
see Button. The Government have escaped the Vote of Censure again by the
skin of their teeth—a majority of fourteen only. Button was in the House
to the end, and he says the Old Man was quite overcome when the result
was announced. This is the only thing in the world that can make him
feel. The most hideous failure abroad, war with every nation, India in
revolt, the Empire breaking up, the colonies lost—all these things could
not touch him or make him sleep a wink less sound. But an adverse vote
in the House—that was a very much more serious thing. It is a defeat he
is able to understand. It will be the end of him, though Button thinks
he will not immediately resign. The debate, he says, was in its latter
part of a high order. The first two days the Opposition made nothing of
it, and Northcote was miserably weak, and John Morley a mere
opportunist, but Goschen’s speech was the turning point, and from that
point it was brilliant. By far the best defence, curious to say, of the
Government was made by Lord Derby in the House of Lords. It was Harcourt
who did most damage to them, as he was put up on Thursday to explain
their explanations, and did so entirely on peace principles. But this
was probably arranged, as Dilke and Hartington followed suit. The great
question is—will they resign? We discussed the probabilities of a new
Cabinet, and agreed that Lytton ought to have a seat at one of the
administrative departments. Button says public opinion would hardly
stand him at the Foreign Office or India Office, though I am of opinion
that for the former he is just the man. Churchill will have the India
Office, he says; possibly Hicks Beach the Foreign Office; Lytton more
likely the Admiralty. But I rather doubt his taking office at all. The
Ministry will, however, not resign till the Vote of Supply, when they
will be beaten again.
“_1st March._—To the Carlton, where I saw Drummond Wolff. He has put a
question about my peace negotiations last year, and drew an answer from
the Grand Old Man which seems to have been very mixed. Mr. Gladstone
excused himself for having refused to see me at Hawarden on the ground
that I ‘should have had him there at my mercy.’ There is more truth in
this than he perhaps meant.
“_2nd March._—To Button’s, who told me all that had happened on Saturday
at the Cabinet Council. It appears that, Granville having explained that
it was absolutely impossible for him to get on any longer with Bismarck,
and in view of the other complications, all the Cabinet but two had been
in favour of resignation. Mr. Gladstone had quite made up his mind to
this, but Spencer and Trevelyan explained that if they resigned now Lord
Salisbury would dissolve Parliament, and that Parnell would then have
his seventy Home Rule members, and the result would be a revolt in
Ireland; this was the true reason of the Government’s decision to stay
in office. The only thing that does not sound credible in the account is
that it represents the Ministry as having sacrificed party interest for
duty to the country. But it is perhaps easier patriotically to stay in
office than patriotically to resign. The thing moreover cannot last
long, and it will only end by their being kicked out on the Vote of
Supply. It is thought, however, that if Salisbury found himself with a
majority only of one he would carry on the Government without
dissolving. Stead has been persuaded by Dilke not to publish Gordon’s
letters to me. The Government are helping now to get up a memorial to
Gordon and it would not do to publish his private ideas about them.
“_3rd March._—Went down to the India Office, where I had a talk with
Godley about an attack made on me by Lepel Griffin in connection with my
visit to India. He begged me to give him an account of my offer of
negotiation made last year to Gladstone. He said: ‘You know I have for
three years past disapproved of the course that has been taken in
Egypt.’ Nobody knows better than Godley how easily Mr. Gladstone might
have prevented the whole thing if he had listened to me.
“Lady C. tells me that the Prince of Wales is going over to Ireland, as
I understand her, on a mission of pacification. I fancy the idea is to
settle the Irish question eventually on the lines of the Austro-
Hungarian settlement; and the idea might work. I don’t suppose the
Parnellites have any grudge against the Crown, though they have against
the Castle, certainly not against the Prince of Wales. But we shall see.
“Dined at the Carlton next to Jem Lowther, and talked about Egypt and
the Soudan. It is astonishing what crude ideas these Tory leaders have.
People are not wrong in calling them the stupid Party. If I can get into
Parliament I may be able to help them to new notions on Foreign
politics.
“_4th March._—Refused Escott and Bunting and Alfred Austin to write
articles for them respectively in the ‘Fortnightly,’ ‘Contemporary,’ and
‘National Reviews,’ on the Mahdi. I think it best not to write on
current politics in monthly magazines. These magazines are beginning to
get past their best day as organs of publicity. There are too many of
them, and nobody reads them.
“The Wentworths came to dinner, and we went on with them to a meeting in
Westminster Town Hall. It was poorly attended, but the speeches were
decidedly good. Wentworth spoke with something approaching to eloquence,
and Harrison made a really admirable oration. My own speech was
descriptive of the Mahdi and Gordon’s mission. It was well received. The
meeting then was invaded by some Socialists and became very noisy. I
confess my sympathies are with them, as they speak the truth, however
brutally, about governments and financiers. I have been asked to repeat
my speech as a lecture at Cambridge. It was as usual quite different
from the speech I had prepared.
“Met Edward Malet to-day in St. James’s Park. We nodded.
“_5th March._—Button says about the Soudan expedition that Wolseley
would have to come home, first, on account of his eyes, which were
suffering, and they could not afford that he should go blind, as he does
all the work at the Horse Guards, even now that he is in the Soudan,
telegraphing instructions daily—and, secondly, in view of war
complications. The expedition is breaking up rapidly, and it will be as
I said, not a regiment will remain south of Wady Halfa by midsummer’s
day.
“Labouchere, on whom I called, tells me the same story. He had it from
one of the Government that there was no intention at all to make the
railway to Berber. They would make it a few miles out from Suakin,
perhaps to a hill station. But even that I doubt. We discussed the
subject of the negotiations, about which he had written to me. His idea
was that I might send the Mahdi a message from the Radical Party,
advising him to send an agent to propose peace, and asking him what
terms he would accept. But I told him this would never do. The Mahdi
would require to be acknowledged, and would only treat with the
Government. All they could expect of him was that the two
plenipotentiaries should meet in Egypt. He said the difficulty was, that
to do so would be to snub Baring and Wolseley. We finally agreed that I
should once more write to Mr. Gladstone, and place a renewal of my offer
on record. This I must do before the 20th, when new battles are expected
with Osman Digna. I look, however, on the Mahdi as quite safe now, with
the summer before him, and the certain change of public opinion here and
foreign complications for our arms elsewhere.
“_6th March._—Bismarck seems to be interfering once more as honest
broker, and has sent his son Herbert to London; and I notice at the same
time that the telegrams announce Hassan Fehmy as instructed to use
stiffer language to Lord Granville. He is to say that the English
explanations are vague and unsatisfactory. They are at their wits’ ends
at the Foreign Office to know what to do. But their first step will be
to recall Wolseley and his army to Cairo.
“_7th March._—To see Stanley. He has heard that Bismarck has promised
Granville to use his good offices with Russia to prevent any further
advance on the Afghan frontier. Talked the same matter over with Button,
who is very full of the subject, and who gave me a full account of the
position as it has been told him—in the greatest secrecy. It appears
that Bismarck has recently come forward ostensibly to make peace. This
is always the avowed motive of his interventions, but his offers
generally cover some objects of his own. In the present instance he
wants Zanzibar, and Button has it on his ‘best authority’ that in a very
short time the Zanzibar question will be brought forward. The Sultan of
Zanzibar has long wished the English Government to guarantee his son’s
succession to the throne, but we have refused, and now he is appealing
to Bismarck. There is therefore likely to be question of a German
protectorate, and its declaration will coincide with claims by Germany
to other places on the East Coast of Africa. Bismarck’s mode of action
with Lord Granville is to bully him through Malet, for whom he professes
the greatest possible affection, and whom he charges with his explosives
to hurl at Granville’s head. Granville replies, not through Malet, but
through the German Ambassador. Malet is not thought man enough to beard
the lion, though they are pleased with him for the information he gives
them. He is in fact very much in the position of a ‘Times’ correspondent
at Berlin, obliged to make himself agreeable as a condition of his
receiving news.
“Herbert Bismarck’s mission was suggested at New Court [the Rothschilds’
house of business in the City] and carried out through Rosebery, who is
Rothschild’s representative in the Cabinet. At first it was proposed by
the Jews that some one should be sent from London to Berlin, but failing
this they suggested Herbert Bismarck’s visit. The Rothschilds are very
anxious that German influence should predominate as they see in it a
guarantee for England’s remaining in Egypt, and Granville seems to have
given in to the idea, as this morning there is published an abject
apology he made last night in the House of Lords. Button thinks very
likely Bismarck may have promised his good offices with Russia, but does
not think they are sincere, and his real object is Zanzibar and the East
Coast of Africa. On the other hand the Foreign Office, as apart from
Lord Granville, is for a renewal of the Anglo-Franco-Turco Alliance of
1854, with a self-denying clause regarding Egypt. This would enable us
to evacuate Egypt without the fear of French occupation succeeding ours.
They would also mutually oppose Germany’s arrangement with Zanzibar. I
am not sure that this would not be the best solution of the difficulty.
I told him in return about Bismarck’s old scheme of renewing claims to
the Dutch Colonies. [This refers to a principle of German policy, the
details of which I had learned as long before as the late autumn of
1866, when I was staying with Count d’Usedom, then Prussian Envoy at
Florence, at the Villa Capponi outside that city. Usedom was a man of
great enlightenment, and had been the trusted friend of the old King
Frederick William in his Liberal days, and the chief of Bismarck’s
rivals, being especially obnoxious to him on account of his English or
rather Scotch wife, Olympia Malcolm, and his suspected Anglomania. I was
very intimate with both of them, and as they were both very indiscreet I
got to know a great deal of the inner designs of Prussian diplomacy,
making, however, no use at all of my knowledge. Amongst other things
that Usedom told me was this, that it was a settled plan at Berlin to
bring about, in connection with the proposed revival of the German
Empire, also a union with Holland, when Germany, having become a
maritime power, would reassert against England, on Holland’s behalf, a
claim to the old Dutch Colonies.]
“We then talked about the Afghan complication. He said the whole
difficulty came from an absurd habit the Foreign Office had of asking a
great deal more than they were willing to take. This place, Penjdeh, was
outside the real boundary of Afghanistan, but the Foreign Office had
asked for it meaning to yield it later as a concession. But the Russians
in the meanwhile had seized it, and the concession was rendered ten
times more difficult. Button has it (but he made me promise not to
repeat it as he was not even to allude to it in the ‘Times’) from a
certain source that in view of possible accidents, or at the Amir’s
request, Lumsden has received orders to occupy Herat and put it in a
state of defence. I told him, however, that the Russians did not really
mean war, certainly not war with the Amir, but were making a
demonstration in order to detach the Amir from our alliance. This
incident will not lead to war.
“In the afternoon attended a deputation to Lord Ripon given by the
Indians resident in London. Anne was seated on the daïs next Lord Ripon.
The noble Lord made a humbugging speech in which he praised the Nizam
for offering to send troops against the Soudanese. He is already
corrupted by association with his Whig friends in office. Lady Ripon has
asked us to her party next week.
“_8th March._—Down to Crabbet, marking trees in Heathy Ground and
Burley’s Wood, and laying out a new gallop in the Upper Park. This has
been a quiet day, and has done me good, for the excitement of the last
week has made my heart ache. We went to see Pompey, who is very ill and
cannot last long now. His illness gives him a dignity which is touching,
and which I hope we may all have before we die. [Pompey was my black
servant who had been with me for eighteen years.]
“_9th March._—To London, and called on Lady A., whose son now I hope is
safe, at least for the present, as the Buller Division is on its way
back to Korti. I did not like to call on her before.
“_10th March._—Leonard Courtney[108] writes proposing that I should
breakfast with him on Thursday, to talk over possible negotiations with
the Mahdi. From all I hear, the Government are ready to jump at any
possible arrangement, so it is through anybody else but me. Called on
Button, who says war is nearly certain with Russia. But I cannot bring
myself to think Russia means to quarrel with the Amir—with us very
likely, but not with him. I expect it will blow over. Button advises me
to call on Staal.
“_11th March._—Saw Hobart at his club. He tells me the Sultan has
telegraphed to him expressly forbidding him to do anything about sending
troops against the Mahdi. He wanted to know whether the Mahdi was really
opposed to the Sultan, and I satisfied him on that point, and we agreed
to act together in any negotiation of peace that might be arranged.
“_12th March._—Had a long talk at the Russian Embassy with Staal, for
whom I have a great affection. We talked the whole political situation
over, on my part very frankly, and I told him he must not expect a
revolt in India. He of course deplored the prospect of war, which he
seemed to think imminent, though I do not. I told him all about the
Egyptian War and the Mahdi and Gordon, and the absurdities of our
Ministers. He described having been at Walmer, and how he had found Lord
Granville surrounded by dispatch boxes, tied up with different coloured
string, according as they were pressing or not; the very immediately
pressing were tied up with red tape. A proof that the Czar does not mean
war is that the Emperor of Germany has written to him asking him to
preserve peace, which he certainly would not have done unless he knew
the Czar to be willing. For my own purposes I should like there to be a
war with Russia, or at least an alarming demonstration. But my
conversation with Staal will not have had an otherwise than deterring
effect. I told him very plainly that England meant fighting. Nélidof, he
said, had been very nearly recalled from Constantinople, but had now
been sent back there with renewed favour.
“Breakfasted with Leonard Courtney at 15, Cheyne Walk, and discussed
with him and his wife the prospects of negotiating with the Mahdi. I had
brought with me the draft of a new letter I was proposing to write to
Gladstone. He said it was not definite enough, and urged me to recast
it, stating the exact terms which I thought might be accepted as a basis
of negotiation. We also talked over the whole situation and the
relations of the Mahdi with the Sultan, with the National party in
Egypt, and with the Mohammedans of India. His wife is a nice woman and
more enthusiastic than he is, and at leaving I urged her to use her
influence with him to keep him up to the mark. These Parliament people
are absurdly pusillanimous, and though Courtney is the boldest of them
he is only half-hearted to speak his mind. Button tells me that he used
for years to be on the staff of the ‘Times,’ having only left them when
he took office three or four years ago. He was considered one of their
very smartest leader writers, but of very dictatorial ways. He is
evidently a very able man. When I came home I re-wrote my letter to
Gladstone in the sense agreed upon, and, saying _bismillah_, sent it
in.[109] In my covering note to Eddy, I said: ‘The fate of several
empires depends upon the reception it receives’—the Russian, the
Turkish, the Mahdi’s, and our own—also it is the ‘Ides of March.’
“To a party at Mrs. Earle’s and had some talk with Lytton. He is
bringing out his novel in verse, ‘Glenaveril.’ It is to come out in
parts, published by Murray.
“_13th March._—The Gregorys are back from Paris. He approves of my
letter to Gladstone. Then to Labouchere, who tells me the Government are
dying to get out of their Soudan campaign. They decided on going to
Khartoum in the first excitement of their disappointment about relieving
Gordon, and hardly knowing whether he was dead or alive, and they have
ever since been repenting. Lately they have been hoping to get out of
the Suakin campaign by some pretext of sending on the troops to
Afghanistan instead, but they can’t quite get up a case for it. They
have never intended making the Berber railway, but only a few miles of
it, as far, perhaps, as Sinkat. Now Osman Digna is stronger than ever,
and insists upon making raids on Suakin.
“_14th March._—Lady Gregory came to tea, and afterwards I walked home
with her. On my return I found an answer from Downing Street. Eddy
writes that ‘Mr. Gladstone is obliged to me for my letter, but why does
not the Mahdi send a representative to England?’ This looks more like
business than I had expected.
“Dined with Professor Hunter and half a dozen Radicals at the Reform
Club, where it was proposed to me to make a tour of lectures in
Scotland. Hunter engaged to get me good audiences at Aberdeen,
Edinburgh, Glasgow, and other places. There was also much talk about my
going into Parliament with them, but my connection with the Carlton Club
naturally stands in my way.
“_15th March._—Zebehr has been arrested at Alexandria by Wolseley’s
order, just as Button told me he would be six months ago. This is really
too bad.
“The Prince of Wales is going to Berlin to try and effect a
reconciliation with Bismarck. He considers war with Russia inevitable,
‘and a damned good thing too.’ At least such is Lady C.’s account of
what he told her. He had also said that Wolseley was to come back from
Korti, and that the Soudan campaign would come to a natural end in a
very short time. He was all for making peace with the Mahdi.
“_16th March._—To Button, who confirms this news.
“_17th March._—An idle day at Crabbet, except that I attended my
neighbour Sir Curtis Lampson’s funeral. He was always an excellent
neighbour to me, and I sincerely regret him, as I believe most do. I met
the funeral just as it was coming through the Rowfant covers, where I
have so often shot with him. He was a very good sportsman, and, though
seventy-nine, held his gun remarkably straight to the end. He was an
American, a member of the Hudson Bay Company, and bought the Rowfant
estate from the Bethunes some forty years ago to breed silver rabbits on
for his firm. He was made a Baronet in connection with the Atlantic
Cable and the Peabody Trust, whose executor he was. R.I.P.
“_20th March._—The Mudir of Dongola has been joined by the Kababish and
Shaghiyeh tribes, and is going to attack Berber. This is the last we
shall hear of him as Wolseley’s ally, but they are such geese they
suspect nothing. Ibrahim Bey told me a week ago: ‘You will see that in
about ten days the Mudir of Dongola will go over openly to the Mahdi.’
He thought Zebehr’s arrest a stupid move, as he was not really a friend
of the Mahdi’s.
“_22nd March._—Eddy Hamilton writes, giving a message from Mr.
Gladstone, to the effect that, ‘If it is thought the Mahdi is not aware
of the instructions to Wolseley about receiving offers of peace, it
might possibly be arranged that the Arab gentleman should be passed
through the British lines.’ This in answer to a question made on the
sixteenth as to whether he would facilitate Ibrahim’s going to Khartoum
to arrange a mission of peace from the Mahdi.
“The ‘Observer’ announces severe fighting, and that Graham has retired
to Souakin.
“_23rd March._—To Courtney, to try to get him to take a lead against the
Soudan war, but he said he had left the Ministry too short a time to do
this. He thought Morley was the man for it.
“At five to Mrs. Howard. She is of opinion that they mean to treat, and
treat through me, but of course want it to be supposed the desire is all
on the Mahdi’s side. She has seen Leveson, Lord Granville’s brother, who
is decidedly for getting out of the Soudan. So I believe is everybody.
George, however, is all for war; he means to leave Parliament after this
Session. There was news of another battle this morning, in which the
English forces were surprised by Osman Digna.
“_24th March._—The fighting of yesterday has been a very serious affair,
and I think settles Graham’s campaign at Suakin, not on account of the
proof it has given of the courage, skill, and numbers of the Arabs so
much as on account of the destruction of the camels, and especially of
the camel drivers. No native will now dare go outside Suakin, and the
English soldiers will be left to shift for themselves. Whatever else
they can do, they certainly cannot manage camels without help. This will
stop Graham just as it stopped Wolseley.
“Button, whom I saw to-day in the City, tells me they certainly will
send me to treat with the Mahdi. Matters, he says, stand in this way:
the Government has sent in an ultimatum to Russia on the Afghan boundary
question, and the answer will be given in four or five days—Button
thinks it will be refused—and then the Government has made up its mind
to clear straight out of the Soudan, and even out of Lower Egypt, except
Alexandria, handing over Cairo to the Sultan who will send troops in. In
return for this the Sultan will open the Dardanelles and Bosphorus to
the British Fleet, which will attack Batoum, with the idea of advancing
to Baku and so cut off the Caspian communications. This, however, would
not be at once, the campaign being commenced in Afghanistan. They are
ready to fight Russia, if necessary, for three years. The chief
difficulty will be to prevent Austria from advancing on Salonica; but it
has been ascertained that Bismarck will use all his influence to
localize the war and prevent Austria from taking part in it. Bismarck is
not ready for a solution of the Ottoman question. They will then be only
too happy to employ me in making peace with the Mahdi, and my employment
would now, Button says, be a popular thing, and it would not much matter
whether I succeeded or not. At the end of the summer, having evacuated
the Soudan, it would be out of the question their going back there. Only
will Russia fight? I doubt it.
“Ibrahim has explained to us Zebehr’s position. The real reason of his
arrest, he said, was not so much that he had corresponded with the
Mahdi, as his connection with the Senoussis. He has latterly been very
intimate with Ibrahim el Senoussi, Senoussi’s relative and agent at
Alexandria, and in conjunction with Huseyn Pasha, the Tunisian, he has
been engaged in working upon the Senoussi brotherhood to get them to
join the Mahdi, and in his name to attack the French in Tunis. Ibrahim
Bey says, though he naturally sympathizes with Zebehr, it is
nevertheless just as well that this plan has been stopped, as the result
would have been to bring about a community of interests between the
French and English in smashing the Mahdi.
“_25th March._—It appears that our troops lost over three hundred men on
Sunday, besides seven hundred camels and a number of mules and horses,
and one hundred and fifty camp followers. Osman Digna is wielding the
sword of the Lord this time in earnest, and if there is a God in Heaven
he will prevail against the hosts of Mammon.
“Hunted from Barcombe, and had the best run of the season from a wood
north of the Chailey brook to Lewes race-course without a check. There
the fox was headed, and it took us another twenty minutes to kill him in
a gorse cover; I was riding Queen of Sheba, and, though I did not get a
very good start, I was first up at the check. There was some good
fencing which the mare did admirably, including one very stiff timber
jump with ditch beyond, which she raced over. Up the hills she passed
them all but four or five, and once on top of the down she had no
difficulty in going quite to the front; Anne on Dahma was also well up.
“When we came home we heard that Pompey was dying. Thus is pleasure
mingled with grief; Pompey has been nearly eighteen years in my service.
He was an admirable servant.
“_26th March._—There are signs of the Suakin campaign being near an end,
and I feel certain another month will see the whole thing abandoned.
This will be the greatest victory of the Faith since the siege of
Vienna. Arabi writes very _à propos_ about the weak things of the world
confounding the strong, and the triumph of justice in the Soudan.[110]
“To London and lunched with the Howards and sat on talking politics.
George is all for war, but he thinks that Lorne, whom he had just been
with, would willingly put himself forward in an agitation for peace, and
Mrs. Howard will approach him to that effect. Then I walked down with
George to the House of Commons to hear Gladstone make his statement
about the Egyptian Finance Convention. This he did so lamely and tamely
that I went to sleep over it, as I observed others also did.
“Halim Pasha has written to Ibrahim to say that Ismaïl Jowdat, on his
arrival at Constantinople, was met by a message that he was to come to
the Palace. There he was kept twelve days and made to draw up a report
of everything he had seen, heard, or done while in London, and then was
sent home and kept there under arrest. Such is the Sultan’s way.
“Dined at Sydney Buxton’s,[111] where I sat next Mrs. Courtney. She
talked about her work in the east of London, and said she had succeeded
because she had no system. She did not seem clear that it was possible
to improve the condition of the lowest class of people by anything but
individual effort. She thought education might help them to help
themselves; wasn’t sure whether teatotalism was a good thing. To me all
these matters are absolutely hopeless; system has interfered with the
natural law of society, and unnatural misery is the result. Mrs. Buxton,
on the other side of me, told me a story of Hartington having lately
written to a friend to say he could not make out why they were fighting
the Mahdi, as he, the Mahdi, seemed to be the only man who was carrying
out the policy of Her Majesty’s Ministers. Francis Buxton was there, and
we talked about Dilke’s connection with the Joint Note of January, 1882,
and he cited, _à propos_ of it, a conversation he had had with Dilke at
the end of the previous year. He had told Dilke that the Liberal party
would never consent to the annexation of Egypt; to which Dilke had
replied that Egypt might be annexed without calling it at all by that
name. There is no doubt he played all through for annexation.
“_27th March._—Gave Wheeler a translation of Arabi’s letter; I think its
publication will do good. Dined at Mrs. Charles Buxton’s, and had some
talk with Lord Chancellor Selborne. He was ready to admit they ought
never to have gone into Egypt, but thought them bound now to stay and
repair the wrong done. I told him, certainly, they had wounded the man,
and must now take care he was not left to be robbed by every passer-by.
This _à propos_ of the Financial Convention being debated to-night.
“_28th March._—To Button, who showed me a letter he had just got from
Wolseley, dated ‘Camp Korti, March 2,’ narrating his vexation at being
forty-eight hours too late to save Gordon, and his anger with Mr.
Gladstone. He then recounted how his plan had been upset by Burnaby’s
death. He had intended Burnaby to succeed Stewart if anything happened
to Stewart, and had told him his plan, but both of them got killed; and
the rest of ‘our London captains,’ Wolseley said, were good for nothing
to take command of the expedition, so the whole thing had broken down.
History, he said, would judge where the fault lay. He was evidently
sorry for himself and down on his luck. Button tells me it was all in
reality Wilson’s fault, as he wasted three days bombarding Metemmeh and
Shendy; also he ought certainly to have sent in a man with the flag of
truce offered him by the Mahdi. But Wolseley did not mention Wilson’s
name in the letter I saw. Button said he wished he could show me one
Wolseley had written to Gordon about the Government. Wolseley was very
angry now with them all. Button considers the campaign over. They can’t
possibly get further than Tamaï, and war with Russia is almost certain.
“On to Stanley, whom I found in bed, and gave him the news; and then to
Hassan Fehmy, who did not seem aware of all that was happening. But when
I explained he was of course delighted. ‘When we get the Ottoman troops
to Cairo,’ he said, ‘it will be time to proclaim the Mahdi a rebel, but
we have refused to have anything to do with it from Constantinople. That
would not have looked well, and one should never threaten unless one can
execute. We will put down the Mahdi when we are at Cairo.’ This was not
of course my idea, but I left him to his plans, feeling quite sure the
Mahdi would be able to take care of himself.
“_30th March._—A letter has come from Downing Street in explanation of
the offer already made, and I have sent my answer to Eddy. Went to bury
Pompey at Crawley and then to London, and heard Hartington announce the
news of a peaceful character from Russia. This is unfortunate for our
plans.
“_31st March._—Eddy now writes that Mr. Gladstone has left London for
Easter, and so it is impossible I should see him—he is really at
Brighton—and proposes to communicate the substance of my last letter to
Hartington, his _locum tenens_.
“Hunting again, a wonderful scent. The fox took us from Danny to the top
of the hill near the Wind Mills, and along the edge of the downs to the
Dyke, a very severe run, as we went up and down the downs fairly three
times, the last pull up the Dyke Hill stopped every horse but Queen of
Sheba and a thoroughbred carrying eleven stone and Payne the huntsman.
Rode into Brighton and so up to London in time to dine at the Howards.
William Morris was there in morning dress, for he eschews tail coats,
and did most of the talking on his own special subjects—socialism, the
evil of capital, and the rest. This he does excellently well. Mrs.
Howard advises me strongly to see Hartington if I get the chance. He is
quite honest, she says, being a Cavendish, and no Cavendish was ever
able to lie. Humph!
“_1st April._—Button promises to find out Hartington’s ideas about peace
from Brett, in case I hear any more from him.
“Lunched at the Carlton, in the vicinity of members of the Fourth Party.
Wolff tells me that Randolph is expected home on Tuesday.
“_2nd April._—Went to see Lord Lorne at Kensington Palace. I find him
very pleasant, and sufficiently intelligent about Egyptian affairs, and
we talked for an hour. My object was to get him to take the lead in
demonstrations against the Soudan war, but I could not get him to
promise anything definite. He is going to stand for a Metropolitan
Borough, however, and says he will lose no occasion to oppose the war in
his electioneering. This kept me so late that I almost missed my train
for Birmingham, where I had to attend a meeting on the same subject. But
I just hit it off, made my speech, and was back in London by midnight.
“_3rd April._—A letter came yesterday, while I was away, from Downing
Street, and I went to ask Button’s advice about it. It said that the
policy of the Government was one of freedom for the Soudan, and I was
inclined to take it as a mere phrase, but Button strongly advised me to
accept it in all seriousness, so as to pin the Government down to their
declaration, and dispatch Ibrahim to carry the news to the Mahdi. So I
have written my answer in Button’s sense, and shall go to Paris to-
morrow to set things going. _Bismillah!_
“To-day being a Bank Holiday, Button and I, like two clerks, rode out to
Putney and Coombe and back again. The day was fine and enjoyable. We are
expecting a great battle to be fought to-day at Tamaï.
“_4th April._—Osman Digna has made an April fool of Graham, who marched
his whole army of twelve thousand men ‘to the top of the hill,’ and then
found no enemy, and marched them down again. They will have to evacuate
Suakin without a victory. This is just what we most want.
“To Paris by the tidal train, and travelled as far as Dover with Lord
Lorne and his sister (Lady Constance Campbell), who are also going
abroad. We talked on many subjects besides Egypt, such as the Crofter
question in Scotland, the Land question in England, Riel’s revolt in
Canada, and the Irish question. Lord Lorne was very sympathetic on
Eastern matters, advising me only not to mix up Arabi with the Soudan
peace agitation.
“I forgot to say that Button told me yesterday that the Russian answer
about the Afghan frontier is, after all, far from satisfactory. Dufferin
has been given _carte blanche_ to treat with the Amir, who demands a
guarantee for his dynasty, as well as for his dominions.
“Dined at the Hotel Wagram with Jemal-ed-Din, to whom I read the whole
of my correspondence with Downing Street. He approved the line taken,
but insists that the English Government must write a letter to the Mahdi
for Ibrahim to carry. He will think the matter over, however, and decide
in a day or two. There is no hurry just now, as the Mahdi can much
better afford to wait than Mr. Gladstone.
“_5th April, Easter Sunday._—Breakfast with Bitters in the Rue Mazarine,
and in the afternoon coming home I stopped at the Embassy and had a talk
with Sheffield, who was communicative as usual. Among other things, he
told me that Gladstone had been very much in favour of having the
Turkish Pashas in Egypt made to pay up the arrears of taxation. But
Baring and Northbrook had persuaded him that government would be
impossible if they offended these gentry, so they have gone on screwing
the money out of the fellahin, and have raised this ridiculous joint
loan.
“_6th April._—Breakfasted again with Bitters and Godfrey Webb. The
French have been without a Ministry for the last week, but to-day
Monsieur Brisson has formed one; I know too little about French politics
to guess what it portends. Everybody, however, is very angry with Ferry,
the late minister, on account of the Tonquin defeats. The lesson given
to Ferry will not be lost on Gladstone, and will be in favour of peace
in Africa.
“_7th April._—Jemal-ed-Din and Sanua breakfasted with me.
“_8th April._—Breakfasted once more with Bitters, and once more to the
Jeu de paume, where there was a great gathering: old Villeplaine,
Brinquant, O’Connor, and the Henneseys, besides Elcho, Arthur Balfour,
and Bungo Herbert. The Elchos are at the Hotel Mirabeau with Godfrey
Webb and the Miss Tennants, Laura and Margot.
“_9th April._—Breakfasted with the Wagrams. They say peace has been
arranged between France and China. Then to the Hotel Mirabeau. Arthur
Balfour was there, and we talked about the Afghan and Soudan questions,
and while we were talking Elcho came in, having been at the Embassy and
having heard there of the Battle of Penjdeh. We all agreed that this
means war. The newspaper boys on the Boulevard were calling out this
evening, ‘Guerre Russo-Anglaise—grande Victoire Russe.’
“_13th April._—Jemal-ed-Din came early, and I read him a new and
unsatisfactory letter I received last night from Downing Street. He
insists that the Government must write a letter to the Mahdi if they
want him to treat; and he says he will come over to England if necessary
to arrange about it, if only I will guarantee his not being arrested
there. I told him there was no danger of arrest, but his experience in
India has made him suspicious of the English Government. He says there
is no reason whatever now that Arabi should not come back to Egypt if
the opportunity offered of a reconciliation with Tewfik. Tewfik is so
feeble and discredited as to be no longer dangerous, and Arabi would
rapidly regain all his lost influence.
“Back by the tidal train to England.”
N.B.—My correspondence with 10, Downing Street of this date will be
found in Appendix C, and is worth reading. It would have been still
possible that spring to arrange terms of peace directly with the Mahdi,
who was not the impracticable personage he has been represented to be by
our official historians. Under his successor, the Khalifa Abdullah el
Taïshi, all negotiation became much more difficult. But, unfortunately
for both Egypt and the Soudan, the opportunity was let slip and became
final through the Mahdi’s death in July. It was probably Lord Cromer’s
influence, as in the previous year, that decided it.
CHAPTER XI
RANDOLPH CHURCHILL AND THE FOURTH PARTY
“_14th April_, 1885.
“TO see Button. He tells me there will not now be war with Russia.
Jemal-ed-Din told me the same thing yesterday and I believe it, for
Russia is now in the position of a man who having had an altercation
with another has boxed his ears. He can afford to apologize. Button
tells me Randolph has returned from India quite in harmony with my
ideas. Lord Ripon’s, Randolph thinks, was the only policy, though
clumsily carried out, and if he had not made reforms when he did we
should be now in the position of having them forced from us as the price
of native loyalty. He is also wholly against the Soudan war. This
accords with a letter from him I got last night.
“I asked Button his advice about my going into Parliament, and told him
I was intending to ask Churchill to support me as a Fourth Party
candidate. But he strongly advised me not to do so. He said, in the
first place, it was doubtful whether I should get in; and, in the
second, Churchill would be sure afterwards to throw it in my teeth.
‘Take his advice if you like,’ he said, ‘but don’t commit yourself as
his supporter.’ I said: ‘Then there is nothing for me but to go to
Parnell.’ This Button thought would be much better. He said: ‘As a
Nationalist you will have a great position, and there will always be
sixty or seventy members who will believe in you on Foreign affairs; I
advise you to do this and have nothing to do with Randolph. Remember how
O’Connell always threw it in Disraeli’s teeth that he had once applied
to him to get him into Parliament. About my correspondence with Downing
Street, he thought they would not give any written message to the Mahdi,
but advised me to continue to treat their assurances as serious, and to
express our readiness to send the messenger.
“At eleven I called on Randolph and found him very glad to see me, and I
really like him better than any of them personally. He told me about
India pretty much what Button had told me of his opinions, and he
entirely took my view of the Hyderabad intrigue. He said if Lord Ripon
had not appointed Salar Jung they would certainly have annexed the
country, and there were still intrigues at work of the old sort. He also
spoke strongly of the great intelligence and good sense of the
‘natives,’ especially of the Mohammedans and Mahrattas. He had seen
Rajah Amir Hassan of Mahmudabad and shared my views about the Mohammedan
university, and he had stayed with Lyall and talked about me with
him.[112] The only thing he had disagreed with was my having said that
Salar Jung had been poisoned; for he said that young Salar Jung had
expressed his disbelief in anything of the sort, and he had talked to
him very confidentially. He then asked me to write a poem for the
Conservative party for Sir Arthur Sullivan to set to music. I asked:
‘With something about the primrose in it?’ He said: ‘Yes, if you
like—but it does not matter so much what it is, so long as it is
patriotic.’ I told him I would think about it, but feared I couldn’t
manage the primrose.
“Then Wolff came in and we talked about Lepel Griffin. Churchill said
that he, Griffin, had shown him his article against me in proof at
Indore, and he had expostulated with him about publishing it, and
Griffin would have stopped it if he could, but it was too late. We also
talked about the Soudan. Churchill promised to write a letter to be read
at the Birmingham meeting if I liked. Next about Zebehr’s arrest and
Tewfik’s intrigues. ‘We must get Tewfik deposed,’ he said, ‘as soon as
Abbas comes of age, and have Arabi back.’ Then I asked to talk with him
in private and Wolff went away. I said I was going to consult him about
getting into Parliament; I wanted to push my ideas, but hardly knew how
to set about it. He said: ‘Oh! I can do that for you whenever you like.
If you will come forward as my supporter you can’t do better, and I am
asked almost every day to recommend candidates.’ I said: ‘What will this
bind me to? You know my foreign politics, but at home I am a Catholic
and a Tory as regards the land question and education, and in Ireland I
am a Nationalist.’ He made a face at the word ‘Nationalist.’ He said:
‘You could not come forward as an avowed Nationalist, but you need not
say much about that. If you say that you have wide opinions on the Irish
question it will be enough, and when you are once in Parliament you can
take your own line.’ ‘But what,’ I said, ‘is Tory democracy? Tell me in
two words, for I don’t think I quite understand it.’ He said: ‘That is a
question I am always in a fright lest some one should put it to me
publicly. To tell the truth I don’t know myself what Tory democracy is.
But I believe it is principally opportunism. But say you are a Tory
democrat and that will do.’ I said: ‘You know me well enough to be sure
that I would not be paid to be in Parliament if I was not free to take
my own line. I had thought of standing as an Irish Home Ruler with
Parnell, but I was in doubt, and thought I would consult you.’ He said:
‘You would lose your influence if you did this. Parnell would require
you to join in his policy of obstruction and you would be discredited.
You had better not commit yourself to that, though you might vote with
him on purely Irish questions. But you should write me out a programme
of your ideas, and I will see if there is a constituency that will
accept them.’ I said: ‘I will think it over and let you know.’ Now I
shall consult Mrs. Howard, who will advise me to go in as a Radical, but
that I can’t and won’t do. I think perhaps, after all, I shall be freest
with Randolph; and certainly his conversation to-day binds me to
nothing.
“F. P. [a young lieutenant R.N. who had been serving with the Naval
Brigade in the Nile campaign] gives me some good accounts of forced
labourers courbashed and chained, under British officers. Four thousand
forced labourers were supplied for the Nile Expedition, half from
Dongola, half from Esneh. They were put to twelve and thirteen hours
labour in the extreme heat of August, only allowed half an hour in the
day to rest; they were small, weak men, and would work only under the
whip. Colonel Grant, in command of the Dongolese, expostulated against
their being so employed. F., who was with the naval contingent, did not
have the men under his own command beaten by English sailors. His remark
was: ‘They did not give it them so thoroughly, but they seemed to mind
it more.’ Many ran away, but were brought back with chains round their
necks. He had found five men one night lying flat with their mouths full
of sand; they would have died if he had not kicked them up and made them
eat. They were kept once five days without food. Colonel Inglefield, in
command of the Esneh men, blew his brains out in a fever in the next
tent to F. He says when Wolseley came up he was quite taken aback at
sight of what the river was. Hammill had surveyed it all and told him of
its being impracticable, and so had every one else who had seen it. He
is very bitter against Wolseley.[113]
“_15th April._—Wrote draft letters to Mr. Gladstone and Eddy Hamilton in
answer to Eddy’s last, and took them to Mrs. Howard, with whom and with
whose daughter Mary I spent four hours talking. She thinks Gladstone is
serious about negotiating with the Mahdi, and that it is paying me a
great compliment to discuss affairs so delicate with me. I am not sure.
She won’t hear of my having anything to do with Randolph, still less
with Parnell, and says that I should be doing no good going into
Parliament at all. If I should render some signal service to the
Government by helping them to make peace or otherwise, they would give
me a seat in the House of Lords; but I should only lose my influence by
going into the House of Commons.
“_16th April._—There is a remarkable letter in to-day’s ‘Daily News,’
giving the account of an Egyptian soldier who had been with Gordon in
Khartoum. According to this, the Mahdi distinctly offered Gordon to
evacuate, and Gordon refused. There are also tales of the capture of
women and children by General Graham, and of his having sent them
prisoners to Massowa. F. P. tells me that, when he was at Suakin last
June, rewards of £1 were offered for the right hands of Arabs brought by
friendly ‘natives’ into the British camp.
“Went to see Stanley, and arranged with him to bring forward the case of
the Massowa prisoners, and then to Labouchere about a series of
questions to be put on Monday as to military barbarities, forced labour,
etc. He tells me that Chamberlain has proposed to him, as representing
the Radical opposition to the Soudan War, that the Radicals should not
object to the Government’s making their railway as far as Sinkat on
condition it goes no further. They would then hand it over to a company
and retire, boasting that they had civilized Eastern Soudan. They want
to be out of the thing, but must have something to show for the money
they have spent.
“Hobart tells me that the arrangement being made with the Sultan is that
there should be a joint English and Turkish occupation of Egypt; the
Turkish general to be provided with an English staff.[114]
“F. tells me stories of how the English soldiers are insulted in the
streets of Cairo. They all hate the Egyptians now, being hated by them.
But the Egyptian soldiers are devoted to their English officers.
“_17th April._—A letter came last night from Downing Street which seems
to ask for direct communication with the Mahdi’s agent. But Button
assures me that an agreement was come to the day before yesterday with
the Sultan of the kind spoken of by Hobart, and thinks the letter means
that they want nothing more of me. It may very likely be so. George
Howard thinks the whole correspondence merely humbug on Gladstone’s
part, and that he has never had any really serious intentions. He has
become an utter unbeliever in Gladstone, and speaks more bitterly
against him than any one I know out of the Carlton Club. He was for
annexation, but says I prevented it by stirring up the Radicals and I
have not done any good to Egypt instead. Mrs. Howard is disgusted at the
arrangement with the Sultan, and half agreed that I was justified now in
making any arrangement I liked with Randolph. Button is angry with
Buckle for not making full use of the news he brings him, and talks of
leaving the ‘Times.’
“_19th April._—Had luncheon at the Carlton Club, where they were going
through the absurdity of Primrose Day. I sat with Randolph, Wolff, and
Borthwick; they wanted me to put one of these flowers in my buttonhole,
but I said I must draw the line somewhere. This worship of an old Hebrew
gentleman under the form of a primrose is certainly one of the most
ridiculous ever imagined. Randolph talked about the arrangement just
made with the Sultan for sending Turkish troops into Egypt, and was all
for an attack on the Government. But I persuaded him not to make any
move against the Sultan. He has made an excellent beginning with the
Indian Mohammedans, and this would not be understood by them. He told me
of his having taken up the cause of the native water carriers at
Benares, who were being impressed for the Soudan campaign, an incident
which shows he has a true instinct with Orientals. I am writing him a
letter stating my political views, and asking him to what extent they
are in harmony with Tory democracy. It will be the manifesto of my
political opinions.
“Down to Crabbet.
“_21st April._—A telegram from Button in the evening saying that the
Khartoum expedition is abandoned, and eleven millions asked for Russian
and Soudan wars.
“_22nd April._—The eleven millions seem to have taken everybody’s breath
away, and war with Russia is considered certain, the garrisons to be
withdrawn from the Soudan.
“Finished a letter to Churchill, giving my political views, home and
foreign, and proposing them as compatible with Tory democracy, and took
it to London to show to Mrs. Howard. Of course she is much against my
sending it; but as I left said: ‘Well, it will be amusing, anyhow, to
see how you get on with him. But I call it an intrigue.’ Button, whom I
saw afterwards, objected on other grounds. He said I could not count on
Randolph that he would not throw me over, and he could not get me into
Parliament. Nobody would believe me sincere in my Home Conservativism,
and Conservatives would not support me. He strongly advised me again to
join Parnell rather than Randolph, people would understand that; I
should have more influence, and besides be quite certain of a seat in
Parliament. He is to meet Randolph, however, on Friday, and will try to
find out what he really means; and in the meanwhile I withhold my
letter.
“_23rd April._—George Wyndham has written home accounts of the enormous
number of the Hadendowas who have been killed. Some of these Hadendowas
had shaved their heads and wore the Mahdi’s uniform, ‘a wonderful
instance of fanaticism.’ They (the English officers) are all sick,
however, of the war.
“Rode in the Park with Sullivan (Sir Edward Sullivan), who tells me Mr.
Gladstone dined with Bertram Currie on Tuesday after the announcement of
the eleven millions war vote. He was in high spirits, and said the
announcement of eleven millions was received by the House ‘with
solemnity.’ He is to give a breakfast to Miss Mary Anderson to-day.
Pembroke was also riding, and came and talked about the Soudan. He could
wish, he said, that after having killed the Arabs ‘we could leave them
some substantial benefit in the shape of a railway.’ What fools the best
of them are.
“A letter has come from Eddy, giving a new opening, it seems, for
correspondence. Consulted Ibrahim about it; he tells me the French are
sending a secret mission to the Mahdi, _via_ Tripoli, and thinks I might
hint this to Downing Street.[115]
“_24th April._—It appears that a dynamite explosion took place yesterday
morning during Mr. Gladstone’s breakfast party with Mary Anderson.
Everybody talks now of war as certain, but Button says it will only be a
withdrawal of Ambassadors for the present. The Turkish arrangement has
fallen through, if it ever existed, through Bismarck’s prohibition to
the Sultan of opening the Dardanelles to our fleet. This, perhaps,
accounts for Eddy’s renewal of correspondence.
“To the House of Commons and saw John Morley and Leonard Courtney, and
urged on them to press the Government to withdraw _immediately_ from the
Soudan, as otherwise the Mahdi may again advance. They said they
understood the Government was intending certainly to do so, but they
would endeavour to get some assurance from them during the debate.
Morley, however, would have nothing to do with urging negotiations with
the Mahdi, whom the Government intended to leave to ‘stew in his juice.’
“Bertram, whom I called on later, tells me that Mr. Gladstone told him
at dinner on Tuesday that his idea was still to neutralize Egypt under a
government of its own, and that he counted on the French to aid in doing
this. Bertram, who doubtless repeats Mr. Gladstone’s tone on these
matters, complained of the _unfair_ conduct of the French. ‘If they go
on much longer,’ he said, ‘Mr. Gladstone will throw the whole thing on
their hands and clear bodily out of Egypt.’ He also talked of perhaps
handing it over to the Sultan, who after all was the legal owner; things
were in a deadlock all round.
“_25th April._—Lady Wentworth came to luncheon, and took me to the
Grosvenor Gallery, private view. The exhibition is not nearly as good as
last year, but there is a fine portrait of Gladstone by Millais, one of
his best, with his eye fixing you like some bird of prey.
“_26th April._—To Mark Napier’s at Fulham for lawn tennis. He showed me
a letter he had received from Sir Charles Wilson, saying it was Awwam
who betrayed Gordon at Khartoum. This is a fine piece of retributive
justice, for it was Awwam whom Colvin persecuted because he had
complained of the rogueries in the Cadastral service. Colvin had him
arrested and put in irons after the bombardment of Alexandria, and tried
by a mock tribunal and exiled to Khartoum. I wrote, when the amnesty was
promised, to Dufferin to complain especially of Awwam’s treatment, and
he referred my letter to Wilson, who did nothing. So Awwam remained at
Khartoum, and now this very Wilson writes complaining that he betrayed
Gordon. Thus is injustice sometimes requited.[116]
“At dinner last night at the Denbighs’ Hobart was very warlike, and
talked of commanding the Turkish Fleet in the Black Sea; the Turks might
at first pretend neutrality, and refuse a passage to English ships, but
would join later. I sat next to Lady Dorothy Nevill, certainly the
pleasantest old woman in London. She is a friend, she tells me, of
Chamberlain’s, who tells her the electors care nothing for foreign
politics; she has also seen Gladstone lately, who is in the highest
spirits at the prospect of a new war. On my other side was Lady Brett,
Reginald Brett’s mother, who says she hears from Berlin that Bismarck
treats Malet like a little boy. Of course he does, he has always known
him as such. Lord Salisbury was also there, but I had no opportunity of
speaking to him.
“The Prince of Wales has written to Lady C., saying he is delighted with
his Irish tour, and is to be back, I think, on Tuesday. I hear, however,
from others, that it has been in reality a fiasco.
“_27th April._—Called on Justin McCarthy, who has a small lodging with
his son in Ebury Street, but he was not up. The Irish girl who opened
the door told me he never got up till the middle of the day, but I could
see him between two and three. Then to Percy Wyndham in Belgrave Square,
who deplores all that is going on in public affairs. He is an upright,
honest man, with ideas too—but just short of the power to lead, so he
has achieved nothing, and will retire after this Parliament. Back to
McCarthy in the afternoon, whom I found with his son. My object in
calling was to propose an alliance with Parnell, but we talked first
about the Mahdi, and I asked to be put in communication with O’Kelly.
This they promised to do, and, as I found them sensible and sympathetic,
I broached the real subject with them. Young Huntley was most cordial;
the elder, Justin, however, had had some experience of English
alliances, and said they had several times been disappointed, as notably
with Lord Robert Montagu. He also was cordial but more cautious; he said
my connection with Arabi was well known; Arabi was a great hero in
Ireland; so was the Mahdi. He thought Mr. Parnell would be very glad to
talk the matter over with me, and he would arrange a meeting. They asked
had I property in Ireland, and they were glad to hear I had none. What
did I think about coercion? Could they count on me to turn out the
Government? I told him that I was quite prepared to follow Parnell’s
lead on all Irish questions short of dynamite; that in England I should
expect to be free. I was a friend of Churchill’s, and should probably
support him. On foreign politics they knew my opinions, and those of
course I could not give up. As a Nationalist I could take up the cause
of Ireland with my heart in it. Also I was a Catholic and opposed to the
present Government. On all these matters they expressed themselves
satisfied, saying that I had given too many proofs of having the courage
of my opinions for them to have any doubt about me. But the first thing
would be to see Parnell.
“I am sure these two are very honest fellows, whatever the others may
be, and they said they had no quarrel with England if they got self-
government. They did not want separation; they did not ask me to be
unloyal to my country. But they were sure to succeed. They would have a
great addition of strength in the next Parliament, and counted on
several English constituencies. They counted, too, on Churchill, who was
in favour of Home Rule, and my being a friend of his would be a
recommendation in Irish eyes. On the whole I think the thing will work,
and I am highly satisfied with my visit. I feel more at home with these
people than in the Carlton Club.
“Down to the House of Commons to hear Mr. Gladstone’s statement about
the war, and on the Vote of Credit. There was a previous debate
connected with it, in which Arthur O’Connor proposed an amendment,
speaking moderately and well. Arthur Balfour, too, spoke with some
eloquence, and there was a division which the Government won by a small
majority. Then Gladstone spoke, a really fine speech, the first fine one
I have heard him make. At the beginning he was not felicitous, as he
involved himself in one of his hair-splitting arguments about his own
consistency, and Harcourt had to pull him vigorously by the coat tails
to get him in hand again. But afterwards he was very clear, to the
point, and impressive. His speech was generally taken in the House as a
declaration of war against Russia; but I think he will try to arbitrate
first. About the Soudan he admitted everything I had been urging for the
past year, and condemned himself most emphatically; the people at
Khartoum had been really against Gordon, they really liked the Mahdi,
and the Mahdi was really establishing a Government; why should they be
disturbed? Why indeed! I am glad to have heard this speech, as I am sure
it is one of the best he ever made—perhaps his last great speech. The
delivery was very remarkable and so dramatic as to suggest the
impression that he must have got it up carefully beforehand with Irving
and Mary Anderson. The effect on the House was decisive, so that the
eleven millions were voted without a dissentient voice. It was a scene
to be remembered. But as a matter of fact, the unanimity was due, I
hear, to the accident of Labouchere and Randolph Churchill being away at
dinner. Both had intended to move amendments. The effect of the speech,
however, was very apparent, for at the beginning the sense of the House,
both on his own and the other side, had been distinctly against Mr.
Gladstone. The triumph was due solely to his eloquence.
“Dined at the Carlton Club.
“_28th April._—Rode early. Then to Mrs. Howard, to tell her my ideas
about Ireland. She does not much approve.
“_29th April._—Button tells me that Wolseley is very angry at the idea
of abandoning the Soudan campaign, says the Mahdi will be up again
shortly and wants to finish him off. To a party at Mrs. T.’s, where I
met Lessar, the Russian agent. He looks his character all over, being a
little, inquisitive, dark, furtive man; but in conversation he talks
frankly enough. I had a few words with him about the collision between
East and West. ‘But what are we to do,’ he asked, ‘when the East won’t
be quiet and we come into collision?’ I said, ‘The West should retire.’
“_30th April._—Things already look more like peace with Russia, and I am
inclined to think the whole thing has been got up by Gladstone in order
to get himself out of the Soudan. I met that great man this afternoon in
Pall Mall; he was nearly run over by a cab crossing in front of the
Athenaeum, and I followed him down the steps, past the Duke of York’s
Column, and along Whitehall to Downing Street. He did not see me, but
walked on, black and gloomy, in black, ill-fitting clothes, like a
schoolmaster or an undertaker. He was followed at a distance of twenty
yards by a detective in plain clothes, who eyed me suspiciously,
especially when I crossed between him and his charge, who, taking out
his latchkey, let himself in at the garden gate and disappeared.
“_1st May._—Button says it is all off with the Turks now, and Hassan
Fehmy wants to be away back to Constantinople. Two days ago I wrote a
violent letter to the ‘Times’ about the atrocities in the Soudan, and I
have arranged with Labouchere that when it appears he shall follow it up
in the House of Commons. I alluded in my letter to the story of the
reward offered at Suakin for human hands. F. P. tells me it was C. who
paid the money for them.
“Button tells me that Mr. Gladstone writes every day to Stead refuting
his advocacy of Russia. But I am not sure the Government has not put
Stead up to it, so as to prepare for a withdrawal from the quarrel.
“_4th May._—My letter was printed in the ‘Times’ this morning. To the
House of Commons, and saw Morley walking with Brett. I had begged him to
put a question to Government about a plan which has been announced for
surrounding and capturing Osman Digna. He told me he had not put the
question publicly, but had received a private assurance that no attack
on Osman Digna was intended; so I hope we have put a spoke in Wolseley’s
wheel. Brett told me the same thing.
“_5th May._—It is announced that Wolseley’s expedition is postponed, and
so my letter seems to have succeeded. Mr. Gladstone made a statement
last night entirely backing out of his quarrel with Russia, and during
the debate that followed Randolph made a remarkable speech, the most
important I have heard him make. It was well prepared and considered,
and was very well received; but it was not oratory of the first water.
As to the matter, it was a violent attack on Russia, with jingo talk
about India. I did not wholly sympathize with this, but it will
certainly have put him on a higher platform with his party.
“Lady C. sees old Lucan very frequently, and he tells her all the War
Office secrets, and she told me they intended a _coup_ at Suakin. But I
hope we have put a stop to that. The Prince of Wales has been to see
her, and she asked him about my going to the Levee and what uniform I
should wear. He said that, as I had been five years in diplomacy, I was
entitled to wear the diplomatic. So I shall go to it, as I am coming out
as a Home Ruler. It seems he is quite pacified about me now, but is only
urgent that I should attend a levee. Old Lucan is very warlike, would
like—‘By God!’—to go at the Russians again himself. He is the last at
the Horse Guards who was a general in the Crimean War. He is eighty.
“_6th May._—General Graham has bungled the whole campaign at Suakin.
Alan Charteris, who has come home from there, says all the troops are
disgusted and want the thing to end. There have been letters in the same
sense from up the Nile, where the men are living, or rather dying, in
bell tents. George Wyndham is enthusiastic about the Arabs, I am glad to
hear. Wolseley keeps on board ship at Suakin, pretending he is unwell.
“Saw Labouchere, who was starting to lay the foundation stone of a
Primitive Methodist Chapel. ‘To such things,’ he said, ‘we are reduced
at election time.’
“Met Parnell by appointment at the House of Commons, and walked up and
down the central lobby with him. He told me that it would not do my
standing for an Irish constituency; there were too many jealousies, and
an Englishman would be looked upon as an interloper, whoever he was.
Everybody was wanting to be in Parliament, and he was afraid of giving a
cause of disunion. ‘My countrymen,’ he said, ‘have the weakness of
quarrelling with each other; it is their national defect.’ ‘Like the
Arabs,’ I remarked. Then he corrected himself, as if he had said too
much. ‘Besides,’ he said, ‘we have always been betrayed by all the
English who have gone with us—every one. Sometimes by our own people,
but always by the English.’ I said: ‘I think you need not fear that in
my case.’ ‘No,’ he said, ‘I do not doubt you; but it would be difficult
to make the others understand. For this reason I do not propose that you
should come forward in Ireland. But if you choose an English
constituency I can promise you, wherever it is, the solid Irish vote.
You would vote with us on all Irish questions, but we should not ask
what you thought on other matters. Get Lord Randolph to nominate you
where there are Irish, and I will do all I can for you.’ I was struck by
Parnell’s frankness and straightforwardness in this conversation, and he
has a special charm of manner which doubtless gives him his power.
“_7th May._—An inordinately busy day, caused by the announcement of a
new ‘victory’ of Graham’s at Suakin. It is a very bad case, the worst
that has happened, for they have surrounded a Bedouin camp, with women
and children and cattle, and have fired into the lot, killing a hundred
and fifty, and intending to exterminate. This has made me so angry I
have not been able to eat all day, and have been galloping over the town
getting up an agitation. My first act was to write to Morley. I reminded
him of his share in the Alexandrian Bombardment, and called upon him to
behave like an honest man and join me. I took the letter to Courtney and
showed it to him and his wife, who took the matter up warmly. And they
sent me on to Burt, the working-man member; he, too, promised me all
assistance. Then I went to Randolph, who was delighted to join in the
fray, and who arranged with Northbrook to support any motion for
adjournment the Radicals might move. And then to Labouchere and the
House of Commons, where I talked to O’Shea[117] and others, so that I
got some of all parties to join me. The upshot of it was that at
question time Morley asked for explanations, and a nice little
discussion followed, and Hartington promised a definite statement of
military policy for Monday. This is very satisfactory, but from all I
hear we shall have to work hard to stop the war, for Wolseley and
Baring[118] are moving heaven and earth to get the campaign renewed, and
Hartington and Northbrook are with them. They fancy they can still make
something commercially profitable out of the Berber railway, and, what
is more important, save their own precious bacon. Gladstone in one of
his answers made a quibble which looks specially ominous. He
acknowledged his statement of policy made last Monday week, but
qualified it by explaining that it was made in connection with the
Russian imbroglio. They certainly have it in their minds to renew the
war, but Button assures me nothing is yet absolutely decided.
“Randolph, when I saw him, talked over the matter of my going into
Parliament. I told him of my conversation yesterday with Parnell, and
showed him the paper I drew up a little while ago, headed ‘Am I a Tory
Democrat?[119] of which he approved as a possible basis of my joining
his party, though he said of course he did not pledge himself to go with
me on all points. He objected a little to my using the word Home Rule.
‘I know, of course,’ he said, ‘it must come to this, but we haven’t
educated the Party up to it yet, and it would have been better to use
some vaguer expression.’ Also he thought the allusion to Midlothian was
unnecessary, or I might have said: ‘If there was anything good in the
Midlothian doctrines.’ Nevertheless he was pleased with the paper as a
whole, and promised me all his support and gave me Middleton’s[120]
address at St. Stephen’s Chambers, and authorized me to tell him that he
had sent me to arrange for a constituency, and that I should be of very
great value to the Conservative Party. This is, perhaps, the very best
combination I could have, for it leaves me absolutely free, and I come
in as an independent Member on all points on which I care to be
independent. The only question is, ‘Shall I come in?’ Randolph also
showed me a letter he had received from Sir Frederic Roberts[121] about
the state of the army in India, which was interesting. It urged, of
course, a large increase of forces if we were to fight the Russians; but
it was a sensible letter. It said that the native army was less good
than it looked; some regiments were very good, but not by any means all.
I feel confident I shall get on with Randolph; all his instincts are
right ones, and he has courage and is absolutely the reverse of a prig.
“_8th May._—Morley has written a line, saying he will bring on the
question of Graham’s victory [over the women and children] again to-
night, and has appointed to meet me at one on Monday. I have decided to
go to the Levee that day, as it will be necessary if I am to stand as a
Conservative, especially as a Home Rule Conservative.
“Had some conversation with Frederic Harrison in the Park. At two I went
to the Peace Association, and arranged for a special meeting to-morrow
to protest against a renewal of the Soudan War. There I learned that
there was to be a great meeting at the Town Hall, Birmingham, and I made
up my mind to go down there and move a resolution. This I did. The
meeting was a fairly large one, perhaps 2,000 people, nearly all
enthusiastic Gladstonians, and the object was to congratulate Mr.
Gladstone on his adhering to principle in settling the Russian quarrel
by arbitration. I asked the Chairman to let me move my resolution
against the Soudan War, and with some difficulty he consented, for it
was not in the order of the day, and he thought it might disturb the
harmony of the occasion. But my speech was a great success, and I
carried my resolution almost unanimously. It was as follows: ‘That this
Meeting deplores the renewal by Lord Wolseley of the war in the Soudan,
and calls upon Mr. Gladstone to fulfil his promise of peace by recalling
Lord Wolseley without delay, and opening friendly negotiations with the
Soudanese leaders.’ It was a bold move, but it succeeded, and I was much
congratulated after it; and several persons expressed to me their
sympathy with Arabi and their desire to have him back in Egypt. I came
back to London by the night train.
“_9th May._—Rode in the park, where Frederic Harrison introduced me to
Lord Dalhousie, with whom I talked about the possibility of negotiating
with the Mahdi. It seems he has Mr. Gladstone’s ear, and it may do some
good. I forgot to say that yesterday I called on Middleton, the
Conservative agent, and arranged with him that I should stand for one of
the Liverpool wards, if he could arrange it with the Conservatives
there. I told him my ideas freely, and he seemed quite reasonable;
Randolph had seen him and explained the whole position to him. So that
thing is settled. I don’t know whether I shall gain most or lose most by
being in Parliament, but I am determined, if I do get there, to lead the
Party in their foreign politics and about India.
“_10th May._—Randolph at the Carlton Club talked again about my
parliamentary prospects, and suggested Southwark as a likely
constituency. I hear, through John Pollen and Ripon, that it is settled
to evacuate the Soudan.
“_11th May._—A great and memorable Monday. The ‘Daily News’ gave a hint
this morning that things stood as John said yesterday, and that the
Government had resolved on a surrender. I went early to Wentworth to
arrange with him to move an amendment to a motion Lord Wemyss is
bringing on in the Lords about the Berber Railway, and then to the
Courtneys’. They seemed ignorant of any pacific intention on the
Government’s part; as also was, or pretended to be, Morley, whom I met
at half past twelve by appointment at the House of Commons. I coached
him in the speech he was intending to make against a continuation of the
war. But I think now he must have been prepared for what was coming,
though probably not for all. Then at half-past four I went again to the
House, and was fortunate enough to find Edward Ponsonby, who gave me the
very best seat in the distinguished strangers’ gallery. From this point
of vantage I listened to every word. We were all prepared for a
surrender, but nobody dreamed of its being so complete. Hartington had
written his speech out beforehand and delivered it plainly, even baldly,
and I don’t know but what the effect was better than if he had used
eloquence. At any rate we believed him, as we should not have believed
Mr. Gladstone. They are to clear out of the Soudan, bag and baggage, at
the very first rising of the Nile; they are to abandon the Berber
Railway and everything, except just Suakin, till such times as they can
make other arrangements with a ‘civilized Power.’ Percy Wyndham asked a
question about this, and whether Suakin was not part of the Ottoman
Empire; and Gladstone gave him one of his roundabout answers: he thought
that Suakin was generally ‘conceived’ to belong to Turkey. However,
Hartington’s declaration was a great ministerial success, and I went
home feeling that at last I had won a real victory.
“Dined with Lady C., who told me that Mr. Gladstone had been to see her
on Saturday, and she had attacked him on his wickedness in killing the
Arabs, and told him a number of home truths. He took it all in good part
however. She asked him what he thought of me, saying we were friends. He
answered that I was ‘personally a charming person, but on politics mad.’
Mad people think others mad.
“_12th May._—What Lady C. told me yesterday gave me the fortunate
inspiration to write to Downing Street to congratulate Mr. Gladstone on
the abandonment of the war, and to add a copy of the new edition of my
sonnets; and two hours later I got a reply from Eddy, evidently in great
good humour, saying that the gift was appreciated, and Mr. Gladstone
‘would turn with pleasure from the Soudan to Proteus.’ These little
interchanges of courtesy in war time are agreeable, and the Old Man
appreciates them, looking on all politics as he does in the light of a
debating club.
“Went to the Levee to-day for the first time for fifteen or sixteen
years. When it was over Staal ran out after me and warmly entreated me
to come and see him. Down to Crabbet in high spirits.
“_13th May._—Ibrahim informed me yesterday that he had received an
invitation from the Sultan, conveyed to him through Jowdat, to go to
Constantinople and be one of his secretaries, and he asked my advice
about accepting. He said he was afraid of what might happen, it was such
a very risky thing, Court favour. I said that, if he looked to his own
interest he had better go and take the chance, but that if he really had
ideas of patriotism he had better stay and be ready to carry a message
when required to the Mahdi. I could not advise him: he must judge for
himself. He says for the present he will stay.
“To London, and called on Mrs. Howard, who is very angry at my
arrangement with Randolph. ‘You must expect no more sympathy,’ she said,
‘in this house.’ However, we parted friends. George, whom I met
yesterday at the Levee, had told her about it. George says I am right
and rejoices, and says I shall ruin the Tory Party.
“_15th May._—Went down with Percy Wyndham to Hampton Court to see the
last day of the great tennis match between Lambert and Petitt. It was
worth any trouble to see, being quite a unique occasion, and I suppose
the tennis court at Hampton Court has not for a hundred years seen such
an assembly. Not only were the dedans and side galleries filled, but the
other galleries over the pent houses had been fitted up with double rows
of seats, all crammed. The play, too, was probably the strongest, if not
the best, ever seen since tennis was invented. Curiously enough the
young man’s play, which has been described as more Lambertish than
Lambert’s, struck me as the less unclassic of the two. I have never
admired Lambert’s style, and Petitt has a really splendid stroke on the
floor when he chooses. In return Lambert was throughout over-matched,
Petitt having an astonishing judgement and precision. The game, however,
to eyes used to the French style, is spoilt by the perpetual underhand
service, which gives no scope to the first stroke; it consisted in a
succession of these with a boasted return—boasted from the gallery wall.
This is and must be ugly, but no other return is possible. Arthur
Balfour, Alfred Lyttelton, Heathcote, and all the players and amateurs
were there, and we came back in the train with the little American who
brought Petitt over, and who told us Petitt’s history. He was a Sussex
boy, perhaps Kent, and had been merely engaged at fifteen to sweep out
the court under one Hulse at Boston. Hulse would not even let him play,
and he taught himself at odd moments. He never played with any one who
could take less than thirty from him till he came to England. All which
makes his success more miraculous. He is now twenty-four.
“Dined with Settna and some Indians and Indian sympathisers, Clark,
Digby, Wood, Foggo, etc., at the National Liberal Club, where we
indulged in some rather wild talk about Indian reform.
“_16th May._—Button has come back from Ireland, and I am glad of it, as
I find it difficult to get on without him. He tells me the Russian
difficulty is not yet over. Randolph Churchill’s violent letter,
published yesterday in the ‘Times,’ was not a mere hasty ebullition, but
Randolph showed it about to his friends before sending it in. These
advised him to cut out the offensive passages, but he deliberately left
them in as he considered they would tell with the electors.
“Harrison tells me that Gladstone explains his rejection of my offers of
negotiation by saying he does not believe those who made them through me
are really in communication with the Mahdi. Called on Staal and talked
the whole situation over with him. He tells me his Government seems to
be making new difficulties, more than he himself thinks justified.
“_17th May, Sunday._—In my conversation with Staal yesterday we
discussed the Egyptian situation. He was very curious to know if Mr.
Gladstone was serious at last about evacuating the Soudan; and I told
him that he was,—as serious, that is, as he ever is. ‘He is a great
comedian,’ Staal said, ‘but I was shocked, when he made his speech on
Monday week, at his extraordinary statement of the position on the
Afghan frontier. And I don’t know what to believe now about his
intentions in Egypt. There are the three questions of the Soudan, Egypt,
and the Suez Canal. About Egypt, I understand that it will eventually be
neutralized; and so will the Canal. But what will become of the Soudan?’
I said: ‘They will certainly end by coming to terms with the Mahdi;
there is no other course.’ ‘But will not the Mahdi invade Egypt?’ ‘No,
if you will establish a popular government.’ He said he believed the
European Governments would be quite willing. About the Canal, he
remarked, the principal difficulty was who should garrison it. The
Sultan insisted upon doing this. I said it required no garrison more
than the Canal Company’s police; and as for the Sultan, ‘_On pourrait
passer outre_.’ This, to which he agreed, is certainly how it will be
arranged sooner or later.
“Luncheon at Lady Dorothy Nevill’s. Drummond Wolff, Lord Haddington,
Jeune, and Ford, just named Minister at Madrid. Randolph came in late.
Afterwards I looked in on Lothian,[122] and tried to get him to take an
interest in negotiations with the Mahdi. His mind, however, is all in a
muddle, though he is well disposed on the main points; and as he is
rather a close friend of Lord Salisbury’s we may perhaps get something
from him in the debate in the Lords to-morrow. It seems odd to me to be
talking seriously with him on serious political questions after all
these years.
“_18th May._—Anne went to the Drawing Room. In the afternoon Lord Wemyss
brought on his Soudan motion in the House of Lords, and Wentworth
opposed it. Wentworth’s speech was good in substance, but it rather
unnecessarily jarred in tone upon the noble Lords it was addressed to,
and called down a thunderbolt from the Duke of Argyll who followed. The
Duke’s oration was splendid as a work of art, well reasoned, eloquent in
every mood, and most impassioned. Though I did not agree with a word of
the argument, I could not help admiring him; but the whole discussion
was, as Wentworth said, academical, and will have no effect whatever on
public opinion. There is no possibility now of a conquest of Africa, in
the interests of civilization, being undertaken by England; the only
danger is from a commercial company, to support which a promoter called
upon me this afternoon. He thought I might use my influence with Osman
Digna to get him to help a railway to Berber as a commercial
speculation, but I of course declined to have anything at all to do with
it.
“I dined after the debate, which we had listened to together, with Percy
Wyndham at the Travellers. He encourages me much to go into Parliament
in support of Randolph, of whom he has a high opinion. ‘You two,’ he
said, ‘if you will stick to your principle of telling the truth at all
cost, may yet save England.’ Only can I get into Parliament really on my
own terms? Philip Currie was dining at another table, and I had some
conversation with him about Egypt and the Afghan question. He is very
polite to me now, and urges me also to go into Parliament. He is very
scornful about the Government, but I believe a good deal of the trouble
has been due to his own mismanagement at the Foreign Office.
“_19th May._—George Wyndham, I am glad to say, is ordered home again
from Suakin, and there is every reason to believe nothing more will be
done against the Arabs. Down to Crabbet and dined with Locker at
Rowfant. Harrison advises me to write what I have to say about
negotiation to Mr. Gladstone—and publish it.
“_20th May._—Dined at Francis Buxton’s, a Radical I like particularly.
He was very urgent I should stand for Parliament; Cyril Flower said he
could put me into a safe seat as a Radical. I am like a donkey between
two bundles of hay—very like the donkey.
“_21st May._—Yesterday we had an Indian meeting in my house to present
Mr. Settna with an address on his return to India, and it was turned
into an address to myself by the Indians present. I made them a speech
in reply which was well received, and advised them to agitate
continually till they got their rights, as there was no party in England
which would do anything for them from any other motive than fear. Some
of them complained that Randolph Churchill, whom I had been extolling as
a sympathiser, had not said a word yet of his desire to help them. And I
wrote to him this morning, _à propos_ of a speech he made last night
declaring for freedom in Egypt and Ireland, and begged him to take an
opportunity soon of saying a word for India; and I met him this
afternoon at the Carlton Club, and he promised me to second Slagg’s
motion for an inquiry into the Indian Government. This is capital, and
encourages me to go on with him in earnest. Sir Robert Peel was there,
very amusing, both of them cutting their jokes at the old Tories. ‘There
won’t be half a dozen of them,’ Randolph said, ‘in the next Parliament.’
He also declared he would contest Birmingham at all hazards, and
expressed his certainty of turning the Government out at the elections.
Now he is off to Paris for a run and to find out what the new French
policy is. The House adjourns to-morrow. Wagram has arrived from Paris,
looking for a house for the summer. We dined together at St. James’s
Club.
“Mr. Egmont Hake called to-day to consult me on various points connected
with the ‘Gordon Diaries’ he is publishing. He admits that Gordon made
great mistakes at Khartoum, both as to men and things. I have promised
him a narrative of my efforts at negotiation for his book.
“_22nd May, and later._—Spent the day with Wagram looking for houses at
Ascot and Windsor. We drove through Windsor Park, which is certainly the
finest thing of its sort in the world. Then down with him to Crabbet,
where he spent Whitsuntide with us. During the week there was absolutely
no move on the political chess-board except that the evacuation of
Dongola is being hurried on, and the evacuation of Suakin stayed—both in
accordance with my programme. Randolph has gone to Paris, where Victor
Hugo is dead; and Hartington and Dilke to Ireland, where Healy is very
much alive. There is an absolute calm after the storm, and the only rock
ahead is a threat by Chamberlain of resignation on the Crimes Act.
“_31st May._—To London to get news. Button was away, and London nearly
empty, but by great luck I hit upon Gregory just returned from Ireland,
and Churchill just returned from Paris. I met Gregory in the street, and
we sat together for half an hour in Hyde Park. He has seen Morley
lately, and finds him quite ready to go against Tewfik, and has put him
in favour of Halim and Arabi’s return. Morley quite admits now that it
would have been possible to get on with Arabi three years ago, and
regrets the part he took against him, which he excuses on the ground of
wanting information.
“Churchill, whom I found at the Carlton Club, approves of a move now in
favour of Arabi, and advises me to make war on Ismaïl, whom the ‘Pall
Mall’ is working for. He also tells me Middleton, the Conservative
agent, is very keen about my joining the Party, and promises to see that
the matter of my candidature is settled soon. He will come to Crabbet
for a symposium I am proposing for one of the Sundays of June or July.
The persons to be invited are Staal, Churchill, Morley, Lothian,
Harrison, George Howard, Burt, Parnell, Pembroke, Gregory, Stanley of
Alderley, Percy Wyndham, Hobart, and Morris. [This imagined party never
came to anything on account of the political upset which immediately
afterwards happened. If I remember rightly I did not even issue all the
invitations.]
“_2nd June._—To London again for the day, but it is like a city of the
dead. The only person I saw was Mrs. Howard. She is half inclined now to
forgive me my political errors, and has invited me to Castle Howard for
next month. She has been seeing something lately of Chamberlain, whom
she attacked about his orchid mania. But he defends himself by saying he
has had an horticultural passion all his life; when he was a little boy
he used to spend his pennies in the market buying pots of daisies.
“_4th June._—Randolph has made a capital speech, with a declaration of
Conservative policy, including an inquiry into the Government of India
and a sort of Home Rule for Ireland. As regards Egypt, he is for
arranging matters with the Sultan, and retaining with his consent the
protection of Egypt. He is educating the Tory Party, and I am educating
him.
“_5th June._—Called on Middleton, the Conservative agent, and told him I
could accept Randolph’s programme almost as it stood, and would write in
that sense. He tells me there is a difficulty about finding me a
Conservative seat with my views on Irish Home Rule. But he asked me to
give him a little longer to make inquiries. He still thinks there may be
an opening at Liverpool, or he might find me a place where I could stand
as an independent candidate with a Tory vote.
“Dined with Whittaker at the Salisbury Club in St. James’s Square.
Hobart and his wife were there, and Villiers the correspondent of the
‘Illustrated London News,’ just back from the Nile campaign. Villiers
gave me much interesting information. He considers the campaign redounds
greatly to Wolseley’s credit, and the credit of all concerned. Like most
correspondents he is more warlike than any soldier, would have eaten the
Arabs’ livers if he could, and has been in all the battles. At the same
time he says the power of the Mahdi is quite unbroken. The Mahdi is a
man of genius and has never made a mistake, and his movement is the most
important there has ever been in Africa. I asked him about the reported
losses of Arabs in battle, and he said they had been absurdly
exaggerated. He knew how generals liked to make big things out of small
ones, and he was quite sure, from first to last and including both
campaigns at Suakin and the Nile, the total Arab loss was under 5,000.
This has consoled me much. He was at Tamaï last year when the British
square was broken, and he is sure there were not above 600 Arabs who
made the charge, nor more than 5,000 altogether opposed to Graham.
“About Sir Charles Wilson’s delay in reaching Khartoum, he said that
Wilson’s fault, if any, was in not pushing home the attack on Metemmeh.
He had attacked Metemmeh, meaning to take it, but found the place too
strong, and after the repulse it would have been very imprudent to send
the steamers away directly, as it would have invited attack on the camp.
Metemmeh, therefore, and Shendi had to be shelled; Khartoum could have
been taken by the Arabs at any time. The Intelligence Department had
been wrong throughout. Villiers seems an intelligent fellow, and, as I
have said, a fire-eating warrior. So his evidence goes for much. He told
me it was certainly true that a reward of £50 had been offered for
Olivier Pain, dead or alive. It was Wolseley issued it, ‘and quite right
too, the man being a soldier of fortune.’ He himself would have been
‘delighted to put a bullet through him, and drag him into camp by the
heels.’ Such are the amenities of ‘war which is not war.’
“_6th June._—Luncheon in Belgrave Square. George Wyndham has written
from Suakin, very angry with me for saying in the ‘Times’ that money had
been paid for dead Arabs’ hands. Only one hand had been brought in, and
it was not of a dead but of a live Arab whom they had gone out and
brought in alive to camp, and nothing was paid for the hand. But that
does not prevent C. from having done the thing last year. Met Harry
Brand in Piccadilly and walked with him up Bond Street. I told him I
thought Randolph the only man who would push reform. But he said the
Government would be in for ever, they would get a majority of fifty more
than they had now after the elections. To a great party at the Foreign
Office for the Queen’s birthday.
“_8th June._—Crabbet. I have finished my letter to Randolph (the one
intended for publication as a manifesto of my opinions), and have
written to him to say I will bring it him to-morrow. He has made another
wonderful speech at Cambridge. I am convinced he will carry the Tory
Party through at the elections.
“_9th June._—This morning the astonishing news came of the Government’s
defeat on the Budget. Nobody at all expected it, and it looks very like
a put-up business. People in London, however, say the reason is that the
Whigs and Radicals have got rusty about voting, having been sent for so
often to defend motions of censure, and now they did not believe in the
danger. Anyhow, the Government are out, and the Carlton Club is agog
with delight.
“I went up by the early train to London, and my first visit was to
Randolph, the hero of the moment (whom I found still in bed). I must say
there never was a man with his head turned less by success than he. We
talked for half an hour, and he read me a very curious letter which
arrived while I was with him from Lepel Griffin. It contained a scheme
of policy for Afghanistan which was briefly this: The Amir’s reception
at Rawal Pindi has been a failure and a mistake; too much fuss had been
made with him, and it had offended the other native princes. Scindia had
said it was ridiculous, and the Maharajah of Cashmere had refused to
come. None of the princes of India were really loyal, except the
Punjabis. The rest disliked us, ‘though,’ said Griffin, ‘I made the most
of their loyalty in my article to encourage them.’ His article was one
about the native army. His scheme for Afghanistan was this: he would
come to an understanding with Russia for its partition, making over to
her the Turcoman provinces and keeping Candahar and Kabul with the
Hindoo Kush for a frontier. This was, I remember, exactly Lytton’s
scheme of securing a ‘scientific frontier.’ Griffin, however, would give
Constantinople to Russia. To this Randolph objected, but he approved of
keeping Candahar, or rather of taking it. I dissuaded him, however,
strongly from meddling with the Afghans, and offered to find out from
Jemal-ed-Din in what way we could make friends with them, and who would
be the most popular Amir to succeed Abd-el-Rahman, if, as Randolph said
was likely soon, he should die.
“We then talked about the prospects of a change of Government, and he
told me the Conservatives would take office and that all had been
arranged. But they did not wish it known, and had sent word to the ‘Pall
Mall’ that they did not mean to come in. Randolph counts on having a
voice in Foreign Affairs, and he asked me whether I would go on a
mission to the Mahdi. I said I would if sent as a regular envoy. Also
there will be no coercion in Ireland. He read my letter, which I had
brought with me, and approved of it all. ‘I agree with it all,’ he said;
but he asked me to leave out the words ‘Home Rule’ in what I said about
Ireland, and insert the words ‘than you _apparently_ are _yet_ prepared
for.’ He also assured me he was keeping Middleton up to the mark about
my candidature, and again recommended Southwark. We agreed that I should
send my letter to the ‘Times’ to-night for publication.
“Then to Button in the City, and arranged about publishing the letter;
and then to Mrs. Howard. She dined last night with Hartington and
Granville and Bright, and assured me they had been all as merry and
unconscious of danger as men could be. Bright told her he was at the
Cabinet which decided on the bombardment of Alexandria; but Lord
Granville had assured him that it would not really take place, and it
had long ago been settled that he was to leave the Cabinet on the first
shot fired in any war. It had been a cause of grief and tears with him
to watch the slaughter which had since occurred, but he had not had the
heart to stand up and denounce his former friends. He had, however,
written to Mr. Gladstone after the war to say that if he allowed Arabi
to be tried by the Egyptian Government it would be a ‘lasting infamy.’ I
am asked to Castle Howard for 21st July.
“Back to Crabbet. We have arranged two parties: one for Staal on the
27th, the other for Randolph on the 4th. Staal did not fancy meeting
Randolph, so we have asked them for separate days. Also a third for the
Club on the 11th of July.
“_11th June._—Anniversary of the Alexandria riots. Arabi is very nearly
now avenged. I shall send a copy of my letter to Randolph to Lothian,
that he may show it to Lord Salisbury, who will probably have the
Foreign Office. Barring accidents, we must win now; at least we have
gained this—Granville will _never_ be in office again till time shall be
no more.
“To London. Harry Brand professes himself in high delight at being out
of office, and I fancy there was a little hocus-pocus in the Government
defeat. To Coombe, where we saw ‘As You Like It’ acted in the open air.
I cannot call it a success; I dislike Shakespeare on the stage, and
especially his comedies. His long-winded Elizabethan jokes after these
three hundred years are inexpressibly flat, and this ‘As You Like It’ is
full of them. Then the open-air representation gave only the forest
scenes, and was a bit monotonous. I doubt if anything is gained by its
being out of doors. The _coup d’œil_ was pretty enough, but in no way
reminded one of a forest, and the actors looked even less real than on a
regular stage. The place chosen was no part of Coombe Wood, but a
suburban garden with lime trees, pretty but tame. The ground, littered
with dry fern, looked like a farmyard, and the actors, wading about in
it, out of place and a trifle absurd. The acting was ordinary English
acting, that is to say bad—mostly professional. Lady Archie’s[123] was
certainly the best; she is a tall, graceful woman, with a good stage
voice, and made herself well heard. These are my criticisms, but the day
was perfect—chequered sunlight and shade, with birds singing, and I
enjoyed it very much.
“Dined with Anne at the Russian Embassy. A pleasant family dinner,
nobody there but ourselves, a secretary, and Monsieur de Lessar. We
talked the political situation over freely, and my impression is that
Lord Salisbury will have trouble in finishing the Afghan frontier
dispute. Staal is evidently much roughed up, especially against
Randolph; and when I asked him whether he would like to meet him at
Crabbet he said he would rather not. He would, however, like to meet
some Conservatives of position; so I have asked Lothian and Pembroke. We
talked about Madame de Novikof, and he acknowledged that she had been
very useful to Russian diplomacy. There was talk also about Ismaïl in a
tone which convinces me that Ismaïl is the Russian candidate. There is a
Christian conspiracy against Islam here in England, consisting of Madame
de Novikof, Stead, and Ismaïl as the Sultan’s chief enemy. Staal said to
me: ‘What they reproach you with is that having been against the Sultan
you have now gone over to him.’ He must have got this from these three.
“_12th June._—My letter to Randolph is in the ‘Times.’ I have sent
copies of it to Lucknow, Bombay, Colombo, and Constantinople; also to
Sanua and Jemal-ed-Din.[124]
“_14th June, Sunday._—Crabbet. The ‘Observer’ has a list of the new
Cabinet, which, if true, would suit me well. Randolph at the India
Office, Northcote, Foreign Affairs; no mention of Pembroke, however,
whom I met on Friday looking very mysterious, as people do who have been
talked to about a place but are not sure of getting it.
“_16th June._—Randolph has made a new row, voting against Northcote with
Beach and others. I suppose Lord Salisbury has not recognized the claims
and policy of the Fourth Party; it is unfortunate, as it seems to
jeopardize the Conservative chance. But I daresay Randolph is right; he
is the only man capable of leading the Tories to victory. Lady C. writes
that the Prince of Wales is highly pleased with my letter to Randolph.
“_17th June._—Randolph was right and he has won, and nothing he has done
yet has given me so high an idea of his genius as a leader. He has
brought Lord Salisbury to his own terms. Stafford Northcote is to go to
the Lords, and Beach is to lead the Commons as Randolph’s lieutenant.
All the old generals are to be put on the pension list, and the young
fellows to command the battle. This will give the Tory Party a chance at
the elections: it would have had none under Northcote. With Randolph at
the India Office and, who knows, Drummond Wolff Under-Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, I ought to be able to pull through my programme. At the
Radical meeting last night, at St. James’s Hall, Vernon Harcourt
incautiously mentioned Arabi’s name, and it was received with vociferous
cheering.
“_18th June._—In London. Just saw Randolph at the Carlton Club and
congratulated him. But he said: ‘It is not a case for congratulations
yet. Nothing is settled.’ The old fogies at the Carlton are in a great
taking about Lord Salisbury having accepted office, and are putting
pressure on him to back out of it. It seems there are negotiations going
on with Gladstone to know whether he will support the Conservatives on
the Budget and other matters, and it is doubtful which way it will go. I
had a long talk with Leconfield, who expressed the usual idea—rather
frightened at Randolph—would sooner not come into office. Pembroke the
same. I am all for a bold course, the only one to win the elections.
“Back to Crabbet; I shall stay here till the crisis is over.
“_22nd June._—Had a talk with Ferid Bey, first secretary of the Turkish
Embassy, who came down to Crabbet. He is very anxious to find out what
Lord Salisbury’s policy is likely to be. I sketched to him my idea of a
settlement for Egypt; but it is clear the Turks have but one notion, to
get Egypt back ‘after the manner of Syria,’ which, Ferid says, is ‘so
well governed.’ I explained to him, however, that, unless they could get
rid of the debt, they could not get rid of European influence, and for
that reason the Sultan must act in concert with some solvent Power,
which could guarantee the interest of the loans, and so undertake a
joint protection. This could only be England. Acting together, peace
could easily be restored in Egypt by the Sultan’s appointment of a new
Viceroy.
“Lord Salisbury is to come into office. Lothian, whom I met at the
Carlton Club, told me it was settled this afternoon. I talked to him
about Eastern policy and Lord Salisbury’s foreign policy. He tells me
the great difficulty with Lord Salisbury is that he is a very shy man,
and hardly ever mixes with people out of his own set, so that he does
not know the real turn opinion is taking. Also, with regard to Egypt, it
will be difficult to get him to go against his words. He was strongly
against Arabi before the war, and has always taken the line that the
Government’s fault was that it did not put him down soon enough. There
will be the difficulty. Lothian is coming down to Crabbet next Sunday
and we shall then know more about it. In the meanwhile I have written to
Jemal-ed-Din, begging him to hold himself in readiness to come over here
should he be wanted. The Wagrams have arrived in London.
“_23rd June._—Sure enough Lord Salisbury is in office. There is talk of
Drummond Wolff going to Egypt in Evelyn Baring’s place. At the Carlton I
found Middleton, who tells me the Conservatives of Southwark will
probably ask me to stand for their division at the elections, and if I
can make sure of the Irish vote I shall certainly be elected. This
sounds well. To a party at Lady Ripon’s, where I met divers
Radicals—Lyulph Stanley, the Courtneys, Sir George Campbell, and others,
all very angry at Randolph’s success. There were Indians there too, but
these were quite willing to take him as an acquisition; he would be
better in any case than Kimberley. The great advantage Randolph has as a
reformer is that he has no respect at all for any one older than
himself; and I expect when he gets strong in his seat after the
elections he will turn the old Indian Council into the street. They say
now at the India Office that they know how to manage him, but we shall
see. Amongst others at the party was the Duke of Argyll, to whom I was
introduced. I began at once with him about his Soudan speech in the
House of Lords, and we had a quarter of an hour’s argument, during the
course of which I told him that the only civilization he was likely to
bring to the Arabs was brandy and venereal diseases. It is difficult to
keep one’s temper with the Duke of Argyll, he is so dictatorial and
_cassant_ in his manner—the very rudest man I ever talked to. Forster
joined us, and I went away without finishing the conversation.
“_25th June._—Robert Bourke is appointed Undersecretary for Foreign
Affairs, and I have written to congratulate him. This is a very distinct
gain. Also Drummond Wolff goes to Egypt, and Baring is to be recalled.
Thus I have many friends in office, for Arthur Balfour also gets a place
and Sidney Herbert.
“Called on Button in his new rooms in Northumberland Avenue. He is
standing for Clapham. He tells me the Conservatives mean now to pay no
attention at all to votes in the House, to be silent in face of
resolutions, and if supply is refused to carry on the Government without
it till the elections. They will keep quiet about their foreign policy
till the recess, and then they will act vigorously. Drummond Wolff is
being sent out as a stop-gap, ‘to report.’ Baring will certainly be
recalled. Eventually the Egyptian question will be settled in accord
with the Sultan. Bismarck will support England. They are talking of
Lytton for Constantinople, but I advised his going to Vienna and sending
Paget to Constantinople. Called also on Percy Wyndham, who is much
interested in the way things are turning and my election prospects. I
regret immensely that he should be leaving Parliament at the very moment
when the outlook is brighter and he likely to be appreciated.
“Lunched at the Alfred Lytteltons—George Curzon, Godfrey Webb, and
others there. Met Eddy Hamilton in fine feather coming out of Lord
Granville’s. He has been made a C. B., which he acknowledges, and given
Welby’s place at the Treasury, which he does not acknowledge.
“To Drummond Wolff’s daughter’s wedding; the bridesmaids in yellow,
representing the Primrose League. Then to Fulham Palace, where Bee
Lascelles, now Mrs. Bishop Temple, was holding a clerical levee, the
garden ‘crawling alive’ with parsons like an ant’s nest. I escaped to a
side alley, feeling out of my element, and ran up against Frederick
Leveson, who had fled there from the same motive. We had not met since
the bombardment of Alexandria, but he was glad to find any one to say
‘How do you do’ to. ‘You are the first layman I have met here,’ he said;
‘it is like a scene out of Trollope.’
“Dined at Frederic Harrison’s and sat next Lord Justice Bowen, and
talked over Lord Randolph’s character. I think I can see the Radicals
are getting a bit uneasy at Randolph’s leadership. If he can succeed in
striking terror in the enemy, confidence will come to our people and we
shall carry the day. Randolph has written, asking me to call on him at
the India Office early next week, which is a sign of good things. They
all say he will change now he is in office, but we shall see. His note
was in answer to one of mine, telling him that Godley was a friend, and
asking him to look up the cases of the Civil Service examinations and
Holkar’s claim. Both these requests were suggested to me by Pollen on
Lord Ripon’s behalf. Lord Ripon supported both cases, but was thrown
over by Lord Kimberley.
“Gordon’s Diaries are out. They are excellent reading, and he pitches
into Malet and Colvin and Dilke to my heart’s content.
“_27th June._—A party at Crabbet—the Staals and Wagrams, Harry Brand,
Stanley of Alderley, and Lothian. I have had much talk with Lothian
about the new Conservative policy in Egypt, and have urged him to press
on Lord Salisbury the necessity of very careful dealing with the matter,
as it is one which might very easily be bungled. It is curious having
Lothian down here for the first time after so many years that we have
known each other intimately. I find Staal much more peaceably inclined
towards the present Ministry. He quite understands Churchill’s
irresponsibility. He seems to distrust Salisbury the more of the two.
‘Now they are in office,’ he said, ‘I shall have to be friends with
them.’
“_28th June, Sunday._—Button came down, riding from London, and we
played lawn tennis. Button rather disquiets me in what he says of Lord
Salisbury’s intention in Egypt. He has counter-ordered the evacuation of
Dongola, and Harry Brand talks of an expedition to Khartoum as an easy
matter. I am afraid they may be tempted to humour Wolseley.
“I have been reading Gordon’s journals, and find him perpetually calling
for Turkish troops. To the last he seems to have underrated his enemy,
both physically and morally. What strikes me most in these journals is
Gordon’s inability to see the far higher moral standing ground of his
opponents. I doubt if he understood the letters sent him; they were
probably not translated to him fairly, and he never would see any of the
Mahdi’s men himself. If he had gone to the Mahdi he could not have
blinded himself to the elevation of the position the Mahdi claimed as
socialistic reformer, and he is content to repeat tales, told him by
Greeks and other scoundrels, of the Mahdi putting pepper under his nails
to promote tears, and other like absurdities. If ever right triumphed in
the world it was at the fall of Khartoum. At the same time the journals
make out a far stronger case for Gordon as against the Government than I
could have expected.
“_30th June._—To London, to see Randolph at the India Office. He had
just been attending his first council and seemed a little oppressed at
the weight of work before him. But he soon cheered up, and talked with
his old frankness and fun about his plans: ‘I am doing all I can now,’
he said, ‘of course to humour the people in the Office and get them
friendly. But they are very slow, and I can see will prove obstructive.
The Secretary of State, however, can always insist, if he chooses, on
having his own way; and I mean to have mine. We must do things by
degrees. If I was to offer to re-open the question of the Civil Service
examinations straight off there would be a howl all over the Office. But
I mean to carry the Queen’s Proclamation into practice, and see that the
natives get admitted into the services. I can tell them that through
you, but can do no more for the present.’
“I asked him about Holkar’s claim. This he professed himself quite ready
to support. ‘Dufferin has promised me,’ he said, ‘not to put the
settlement of this matter into Durand’s hands. All my sympathies are
with Holkar.’ I told him about Staal’s visit and the prospects of peace
with Russia, and advised him to have as little to do with the Afghans as
he could help. But we did not discuss the subject at length. Then we
went on to Egypt, and he said: ‘I am very anxious you should see
Drummond Wolff without delay. Drummond Wolff is very keen to work in the
way we want, and I am beginning to get Lord Salisbury round to our
ideas. Lord Salisbury and I are on the best possible terms; like father
and son,’ he said with a queer smile. Also he went on: ‘I told Lord
Salisbury we should have to get rid of Tewfik the other day, and it
quite startled him. He never seems to have thought of it before, but I
think he will come to it; we must do it little by little. My idea about
Egypt is—only you must promise me you will not repeat it, for if it was
to get about it would spoil everything—that Tewfik should be deposed by
the Sultan, and his son put up under English guardianship. We would then
recall Arabi, at first as a simple citizen,—afterwards, when we saw how
it did, as Minister. But there must be a protectorate.’ I said: ‘Why not
call it something else, an alliance?’ ‘No,’ he said, ‘I think it best to
call a spade a spade. We will call it what it is, a protectorate.’ I
said: ‘You will require very delicate handling to get the Sultan to do
exactly what you want. He is difficult to deal with and a little mad;
and whatever is done should be through his initiative.’ To this he
entirely agreed.
“He then asked about Dongola and Suakin, whether it would not be best to
get the Sultan to occupy them with his troops. With regard to Suakin, I
said: ‘Certainly, yes; but not Dongola. Any troops left at Dongola would
certainly be attacked.’ And I strongly advise him to accept Lord
Granville’s line of Wady Halfa as the boundary of Egypt. If he did so
there was very little chance of Egypt being invaded this year. A joint
occupation with the Turks in Lower Egypt would be a smaller risk, but I
would not advise it. The Sultan’s intervention should be a moral one.
Randolph is keen also to make peace with the Mahdi, which he said would
be a feather in their caps before the election. And he approved the idea
of Ibrahim going as forerunner to prepare my way before me. I am to talk
all this over, however, with Drummond Wolff when he returns from
Woodstock on Saturday, and afterwards see Lord Salisbury. ‘You need not
mind,’ he said, ‘putting yourself forward in this matter; you are an
authority on Egypt and have a right to be heard.’ Nothing could have
been more satisfactory than all this conversation. With regard to
Ismaïl, Randolph spoke very strongly: ‘I will never consent,’ he said,
‘to his restoration. I should consider it a personal disgrace to be
connected with the restoration of such a scoundrel. As to Halim I know
nothing, and I prefer Tewfik’s boy with a Regency.’ I promised to be
secret on all he had told me, and to act in concert with him and
Drummond Wolff, and I have written to Wolff to propose seeing him Monday
or Tuesday.
“_1st July._—The ‘Times’ opens fire at Drummond Wolff, and I fear may
spoil our sport, so I have written a short letter about the charges
against the Khedive, and have sent it to Churchill to know whether he
approves its publication. I am for attacking Tewfik now; if they commit
themselves with him they will never get rid of him. The ‘Morning Post’
has an article in favour of Ismaïl. Randolph has sent back word, through
Hope (my private secretary), that if I had written my letter a fortnight
ago he would have approved it; now he cannot approve it. So I have kept
back the letter; it is useless fighting the battle by myself.
“To Argyll Lodge, where I had another talk with the Duke, but in more
amicable terms. All the same, it is an uncomfortable house to visit,
through the absurd pride of its inhabitants.
“_3rd July._—Wrote to Robert Bourke giving an account of my
correspondence with Downing Street about the Mahdi.
“_4th and 5th July, Sunday._—Our annual Lawn Tennis meeting; those
present were Eddy Hamilton, Wentworth, Frederic Harrison, Elcho, Jack
Napier, Mark Napier, Kingscote, Sandys, Seymour, Mallock, Farquhar,
Button, and George Dallas.
“Button tells me Randolph has been a great success at the India Office;
he has also won his election at Woodstock most triumphantly, and the
party prospects are good. Not so I fear those of Egypt. Button talks of
their keeping on Tewfik there ‘for a year.’ If so, he will be kept on
altogether.
“_6th July._—Saw Drummond Wolff at the Carlton Club. He tells me he is
going to Constantinople before he goes to Cairo, which is as it should
be. He is annoyed at the set made at him in the ‘Times,’ and I explained
to him that ‘a Twenty Years’ Resident’ was none other than our friend
Moberly Bell. He asked me about the possibility of treating with the
Mahdi, and I have agreed to bring Jemal-ed-Din from Paris to talk things
over with him. We are to have another and more serious discussion of the
Egyptian business as soon as he has seen Lord Salisbury.
“Saw Middleton, the Tory agent, who tells me my name is the only one
before the Conservatives of Southwark, and they will probably choose me
as their candidate. But there are certain ‘fossilized Tories’ who are
suspicious of me.
“Down to Coombe Wood to see Mrs. Batten act Amaryllis in ‘The Faithful
Shepherdess.’ As a _féerie_ it was pretty, much prettier than ‘As You
Like It.’ Mrs. Batten looked very well, but the best was a little Indian
lady, calling herself the Princess Helen of Kappartalla, very pretty,
very graceful, and clever. The piece, like the other, was spoilt by the
professionals. When it was over I stopped to dine with Bertram Currie
[N.B.—He was member of the Indian Council], whose house was close by.
Bertram gave me an account of Randolph’s first council at the India
Office, which took place on Tuesday just before I saw him. Bertram’s
account was that he was much frightened and said nothing, absolutely
nothing. To him, Bertram, he was very humble in a private interview
afterwards: ‘There is one thing,’ Randolph had said, ‘of which I am
profoundly ignorant, and that is finance.’ And so he will be humble till
the day he feels his legs and can strike them. According to Button, he
has held the same language with Ashley Eden and Rawlinson and all of
them.
“_7th July._—Lord Salisbury has made his statement about Egypt, which is
far from satisfactory, inasmuch as he engages himself to support Tewfik.
It makes a true settlement once more impossible. Nothing, however, can
be done but to accept the position, and I shall not move further in the
matter till I am in Parliament. There are difficulties at Southwark,
which wants a ‘fossilized Tory’; still, Middleton thinks it all right.
If I don’t get in this time I shall leave English politics alone, as I
am too old to wait for another chance. Perhaps it will be better so, and
in any case I leave it to God’s providence for good or for evil.
“_8th July._—To a political meeting at East Grinstead, where I made my
maiden speech as a Conservative. This commits me to party politics, a
thing I have avoided all my life.
“_9th July._—Ibrahim has received a letter from Jemal-ed-Din hinting
that, if nothing is done in Egypt in the sense we hope for from
Randolph, he will go off to Afghanistan to raise up trouble against
England. I have consequently written to Wolff, urging him to get Lord
Salisbury to commence negotiations with the Mahdi and sending him my
correspondence with Downing Street.[125]
“Dined at the Gaskells with Anne, and took in Lady Iddesleigh, late Lady
Northcote,[126] and she questioned me closely about the Mahdi and the
Sultan and Arabi; and afterwards I had some conversation, and Anne had
more, with her husband, who is now Foreign Secretary. Lady Iddesleigh
professed great sympathy with Arabi, and with my ideas generally of a
settlement. She also said she thought it would be a good thing to get
Tewfik to retire on an honourable pension. She is a chatty old woman of
the old-fashioned sort, and talked nicely and simply of her pleasure in
Sir Stafford’s being made an earl. His relations had always looked for a
peerage for him, and an earldom of Iddesleigh had long been an extreme
ambition. His lordship seems to have talked in much the same strain to
Anne about Egypt, and I augur well of their willingness to converse. My
taking Lady Iddesleigh in to dinner was evidently pre-arranged, as it
was not properly my place.
“The Mahdi’s death is reported, and the arrival of Huseyn Khalifa at
Alexandria to tender submission to Tewfik. But Ibrahim says he must have
brought a summons to the Khedive to become a Moslem.
“_13th July._—Went to see Wolseley arrive from Egypt at Victoria
Station. There was no great crowd, perhaps two hundred persons on the
platform and three hundred outside. There was a feeble attempt at
cheering from his friends, and I heard a few hoots, certainly no
enthusiasm. Wolseley looked older than when he went away, and rather
careworn. Last time he came back from Egypt it was for a ridiculous
triumph down Pall Mall, with the Grand Old Man waving his handkerchief
like a madman from a window, fresh from Tel-el-Kebir. Now he drives away
from the station with half a dozen little boys running after his
carriage. I like him better as he is. I should like best of all to see
him hanged.
“_14th July._—To Middleton’s at twelve o’clock to hear my fate at
Southwark. I don’t think it has been Middleton’s fault, but the
Southwark electors at a meeting last night were told I was an out and
out Home Ruler, and that frightened them out of their wits, and they
have selected another candidate. I see nothing for it but to put up with
the disappointment. My failure to get into Parliament will put an end to
my political career, as I have pretty well exhausted the good I can do
with letter writing in the ‘Times,’ and require a new weapon.
“_16th July._—A deputation has come to me from Camberwell, which has
been offered to me instead of Southwark. I told them very frankly what
my position and views were: that I was a Roman Catholic and Home Ruler
in Ireland, but a devout believer in Randolph and Church and State in
England. They asked me whether I was in favour of Fair Trade and duties
on imported manufactures. And I said that if the Conservative Government
proposed such duties I would support them; but I was not clear how Fair
Trade would work. They asked next about Sir Wilfrid Lawson’s Local
Option. I said I had no intention of voting for it. This is the only
point on which I have had a doubt, but I think I am not called upon to
vote for this particular Bill. After all, England is a Christian country
and must have its beer.
“On Ireland they were at first a little staggered by my using the word
‘Home Rule,’ but I said I preferred to call a spade a spade; and I
believed the Irish were right in asking a separate Parliament; they did
not wish for a complete separation. But I was an advocate for the right
of nations to govern themselves, and I could make no exception about
Ireland. On the School Board quarrel I was entirely with them; and I
think it a real good fortune for me to have this particular cause to
defend of religious education, for it is one I wholly sympathize with,
and it is of a piece with my Mohammedan teaching in India. Finally,
after an hour and a half’s talk, we parted mutually satisfied, and I am
to attend a local meeting this day week and give my final answer. I am
to pay my own expenses, but they have promised me an easy time of it in
the way of work.
“This settled, I went at once to Randolph at the India Office and told
him all, and agreed with him that he should write a letter to the
Camberwell Committee congratulating them on their choice of me as
candidate. I found Randolph very cheerful: ‘They will never make an
official of _me_,’ he said, with a funny smile. We talked about Egypt:
‘Tewfik,’ I said, ‘will be a terrible handicap to Lord Salisbury’s
programme; but I suppose you are obliged to keep him.’ ‘We shall see
about that,’ he answered; ‘only we must have patience. Drummond Wolff is
the man to get it done through.’ Then he asked about Arabi, whether I
would answer for him as honest, and he would work with us in an honest
way; and I said ‘he would for the good of the country, but not to
prepare the way for annexation.’ About his own department he told me he
was in great trouble to know what sort of game the Amir was playing in
Afghanistan, and he asked me to try and get him information. And I
offered to bring Jemal-ed-Din from Paris, and talk that matter and Egypt
over with him. He was much pleased at this, and said he would see him at
my house. I expect the India Office people are a bit frightened at my
coming to see Randolph, but they are extremely polite to me.
“Later I met Wolff at the Carlton Club. He wanted to know whether Arabi
would come back to serve under Tewfik, and whether he would serve with
Sherif or Nubar. I said I would find out, and I have written to Arabi
asking him, and begging him to telegraph ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ Wolff also
wanted to hear about the Mahdi. ‘Lord Salisbury will hear what Wolseley
and Baring have to say,’ he said, ‘but he won’t necessarily do what they
advise; and if he wishes, he will make peace with the Mahdi in spite of
them.’ I promised Wolff to introduce some people at Constantinople who
could be of use there. All this sounds well. Then I saw Huntley McCarthy
and arranged with him about the Camberwell Irish, of whom there seem to
be a thousand or so. [N.B.—This was a great exaggeration.] And then to
Cardinal Manning, who gave me his best wishes and promised to write to
the Camberwell priest.
“_18th July._—To Castle Howard, travelling in company with Mrs. Morris.
In the carriage with us were the Speaker, his wife, and daughter. We
arrived at Castle Howard in floods of rain, which made it look gloomy
enough. But the site of the house is good, the chief block quite
perfect, and the inside a gem. Since the house has been built, however,
I suppose it has never been treated in such a way as it is now;
everything is cut down to the barest necessity of existence: no one to
open the gates at the lodges, not a servant to be seen except at meals,
and no footman with the carriage. The gardens are neglected—they look
the better for it; and the park has been railed off and is being mown
for hay. On the other hand, I doubt if the house ever was cheerfuller.
There were some twenty children and young persons under twenty in it,
and there was a deal of boating on the large pond and tennis on the
lawns. The only person to receive us at the door was Mrs. Howard. She
has made up some rooms for herself in one of the wings, but the whole
house is occupied from one end to the other. The men staying here are
tutors or undergraduates, friends of Charley’s, and all is essentially
_bourgeois_ and communistic. I like it the better.
“_19th July, Sunday._—George took me round the house and showed me the
pictures. They are an admirable collection, good specimens of every
school. The Velasquez of two children, an Infanta and a Dwarf, is, I
think, the most remarkable; and there is a very interesting picture of
Newmarket in the reign of Queen Anne, which shows the horses of the day
to have been big sixteen hand horses, with heads of the Spanish type.
There are some good marbles too, and the rooms are finely decorated.
Mrs. Howard talks of doing away with the formal parterres in front of
the house, but I have persuaded her that this would be sacrilege. She is
very angry with me for having put on Tory armour for the election, or
rather Radical armour for the Tory cause, and especially for going
against the School Board, of which she and her mother and brother Lyulph
are fierce champions.
“_20th July._—Mary Howard’s birthday, and I wrote her a sonnet. She is a
wonderful child with her philanthropies, and has been founding a society
of girls in the neighbouring villages for their mutual good and the
furtherance of virtue. She preaches to them for an hour and an hour and
a half at the time, and has got together about a hundred of them. She
has genius and beauty and a blameless heart, and is of the sort which
might convert a world. The sonnet has pleased the child, who is ready
for all martyrdom. In the afternoon she entertained her village friends
with a concert, and made them a little speech afterwards, very simply
and nicely. I know nobody else who could do this without ridicule.
“I have been avenging myself for the political anger I have aroused in
the house by writing my Tory democratic electoral address, and by
threatening to date it from Castle Howard.
“_21st July._—A bright day at last, and the place has changed as if by
magic, for it is dependent on the sun for its charms. Mrs. Howard took
me for a drive of four hours, visiting village parsons, in pursuance of
a scheme she has for giving holidays in the country to three or four
hundred girls from Leeds. While in the carriage I read her my address,
and she was so angry I thought she would have stopped the carriage and
put me down to walk home. Old Lady Stanley, her mother, came in the
evening; she is a valiant old lady, and fought the cause of the School
Board at dinner and the cause of Gladstone and her party, which she
loves above principle.
“_22nd July._—Back to London. Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din is expected in James
Street, and I went down at once to the India Office where I was
fortunate enough to find Randolph just coming from the House. I met him
at the door of the Office and walked with him up to his room. He looked
fagged and ill and complained of the stairs, though in truth it was only
one flight and not a steep one. He promised to meet Jemal-ed-Din at my
house to-morrow at half-past ten, and I explained to him exactly who he
was, with the history of his doings in Egypt and India. ‘He is in the
black book,’ I said, ‘of every one here, and an enemy of England. But if
he was not he would be of no use to us.’ I asked him about the Civil
Service examinations for India in reference to a report in yesterday’s
‘Pall Mall’ of his having decided to take the matter up. But he told me
this was not true; he intended to meddle very little with details, but
to push on a general inquiry into the state of the Indian Government.
‘Everything here,’ he said, ‘is at a deadlock, owing to the uncertainty
of Afghanistan and Egypt.’ I did not stay with him for more than a few
minutes for he seemed quite exhausted.
“_23rd July._—Jemal-ed-Din arrived in the night, and at half-past ten
punctually Randolph came to James Street; he was all right again and in
his usual spirits. Before introducing the Afghan I read Randolph over my
Electoral Address, of which he highly approved, correcting only a few
words, that is to say, making me leave out the qualifications about the
_South_ of England in speaking of my belief in Tory popularity, and the
allusion to Lord Salisbury having made ‘an alliance with the Irish
leaders.’ He was also doubtful about my saying anything regarding an
Irish Parliament. All the rest he approved, and said it was original and
good. He said he was in favour of import duties on manufactured goods. I
asked him whether he had any special scheme himself for ameliorating the
condition of the poor, and he said ‘No, but Lord Salisbury has.’
“Then I showed him Pollen’s letter, communicating Lord Ripon’s message
about agricultural banks in India and the Oxford examinations. He said
that I might tell Lord Ripon that he was favourable about both matters,
and especially about the agricultural banks, and that if he would draw
him up a scheme on paper he would support it. But he had not the
necessary knowledge on either subject to push it without assistance, nor
the time to get the questions up. He seemed pleased at Lord Ripon’s
having communicated with him. I also mentioned the case of Suchait Singh
and the Pundit of Vizianagram, and he told me to send the details to
Moore, his secretary. About Lepel Griffin he said he could not quarrel
with him, but he was writing to him by this mail, and would suggest to
him that he should make me some apology.
“Then we sent for Jemal-ed-Din, whom Randolph received with great
politeness and made him sit by him on the sofa. They talked in French,
but I soon perceived that Randolph knew very little of the language, and
I had to translate for them. Randolph first asked about the Mahdi’s
death, whether it was true, and Jemal-ed-Din said he thought not, but
even if true it would make little difference, as the Soudanese would
choose a successor. Randolph asked who that would be. _Jemal-ed-Din_:
‘It would not be Osman Digna, but one of the Mahdi’s companions, a man
of religion; Osman Digna would be the General but not the Khalifa. All
would be done as on the occasion of Mohammed’s death, when the most
religious man was chosen.’ Randolph then asked about Afghanistan, what
the Amir’s position was. And Jemal-ed-Din’s account was briefly this:
Abd-el-Rahman, he said, was a good general but he was not a great
politician, though neither was he a fool. He had the majority of the
Afghans with him, but nothing would be easier than to get up revolts
against him. The Afghans were simple-minded people—_peuple
naïf_—ignorant of politics and always ready to fight. The Russians might
make a revolt through Ishak Khan or a dozen others of the sons of Shere
Ali and the princely house. Nothing would be easier. The Russians had no
intention of fighting the Afghans this year, but would make friends with
some of these princes and raise disturbances. They would represent
themselves as allies against the English and would promise the provinces
of Cashmere and Peshawar if India revolted. The Afghans would believe
them. _Randolph_: ‘Do the Afghans hate us more than the Russians?’
_Jemal-ed-Din_: ‘The Russians have done no harm to the Afghans. The
English have made three wars on them.’ _Randolph_: ‘But do not you
consider that the Russians have done more harm to Islam than we have
done?’ _Jemal-ed-Din_: ‘The Russians have swallowed up a few
principalities, the Crimea, Circassia, and among the Turcomans, but
England has destroyed the great empire at Delhi, it has invaded Egypt,
the Soudan.’ _Randolph_: ‘It was the Mahrattas that destroyed the Mogul
Empire.’ _Jemal-ed-Din_: ‘The Mahrattas came and went. Nadir Shah
invaded India, but he was a Moslem. You remained and you destroyed the
Empire. There are three reasons why the Mohammedans of India have hated
you more than the Russians: Firstly, because you destroyed the Empire of
Delhi; secondly, because you give no salaries to the _imams_ and
_muezzins_ and keepers of the mosques, which the Russians are careful to
do; and you have resigned the Wakaf property and do not repair the
sacred buildings.’ _Randolph_: ‘We repair some of the mosques.’ _Jemal-
ed-Din_: ‘Only when they are works of art, not for the sake of religion.
And, thirdly, because you give no high offices of rank in the army to
Mohammedans. The Russians do this.’ _Randolph_: ‘There are many
Mohammedans in the highest offices in the Native States of India.’
_Jemal-ed-Din_: ‘The Native States are not British India. What the belly
has not swallowed it does not digest.’ (Here we laughed.) _Randolph_:
‘Then you think England a greater danger to Mohammedans than Russia?’
_Jemal-ed-Din_: ‘I do not say so; I have spoken of the past. England has
done more harm to us than Russia, but Russia is now more dangerous. If
the Russians remain, I do not say at Penjdeh or Tulfikar or Merushak,
but at Merv still five years, there will be no more Afghanistan and no
more Persia and no more Anatolia and no more India. All will have been
swallowed. They will leave Penjdeh and the rest, but it will matter
nothing; they will remain in Merv.’ _Randolph_: ‘This is true. But what
would you have us do?’ _Jemal-ed-Din_: ‘You must make an alliance with
Islam, with the Afghans, the Persians, the Turks, the Egyptians, the
Arabs; you must drive the Russians back out of Merv to the Caspian Sea.
To make friends with the Mohammedans you must leave Egypt. There is no
danger for Egypt from foreign nations. You hold Cyprus, you hold Aden,
what do you fear? Nor from the Mahdi. With a Mohammedan government in
Egypt the Mahdi is not a danger. Then you must make alliance with the
Mohammedans, who would believe you their friend.’ _Randolph_: ‘Could we
send troops or officers to Afghanistan to help the Afghans against
Russia?’ _Jemal-ed-Din_: ‘If you send troops, as for instance to
Candahar, even with the Amir’s consent, it will be the right of any
Moslem to go to the top of a hill and raise a revolt against you. He
would say you were come under pretence of a friendship to take
possession; and all would believe him. You might, however, send
officers, a few officers, for these could not take possession. They
would be servants of the Amir. But remember, if the Russians stay five
years at Merv it will be too late; you should attack them not through
Afghanistan but by the other side; then the Mollahs would preach a
_jehad_ to join you against the Russians.’
“The conversation lasted about three-quarters of an hour, and Randolph
then went away. He did not say much to Jemal-ed-Din, but to me he
expressed himself, as I went with him to the door, much pleased with the
Seyyid’s frankness and the justness of his views. He promised to send
Wolff to see him. Also he recommended me to write to Lord Salisbury,
asking to be supported in my claim to return to Egypt this autumn. I am
cited to appear before a Court there (in connection with my property) in
October, and this gives me a good excuse.
“I then saw Justin McCarthy at the House of Commons, and asked him about
that portion of my Electoral Address which related to Ireland. He
approved. Thence I went to Cardinal Manning, who warmly approved my
address which I read to him. But he objected to my declaration in favour
of an Irish Parliament, assuring me that the Irish did not want one. He
had just seen six Irish bishops, who all declared this to be the case;
he, the Cardinal, had written to Rome in this sense. He wanted local
self government for Ireland,—not a Parliament which he considered would
be a prelude to separation. He has given me a card of introduction to
Canon McGrath of Camberwell, who will tell me what it is the Irish of
Camberwell want.
“Partly on this account, partly through what Mr. Palmer, the secretary
of the Camberwell Association told me, I altered this part of my
programme, making it more vague and leaving out the word ‘parliament.’
Palmer came while we were at dinner, and frightened us by announcing
that two new Conservative candidates had been started, and complaining
that Randolph had not sent the letter he promised. It was almost time
for the meeting, but I sent Hope to Randolph’s house and then to the
House of Commons, where he saw him but could not get the letter from
him, as he said my allusion to the Irish Parliament would be a Cabinet
question. This very nearly upset our coach, but fortunately I had made
my speech before Hope arrived at the meeting, and had won the confidence
of the delegates. There was some close questioning about my Irish ideas,
and I reduced my policy to one of ascertaining Irish wishes and giving
Home Rule as far as possible in accordance with them. Also one old
gentleman declared he could not be party to selecting a Roman Catholic.
But the rest were strongly for me. We, that is the two other candidates,
local people, and myself were turned out into the street for twenty
minutes while the voting was going on (a rather ridiculous proceeding,
during which we compared notes as to our chances), and at the end of it
I was called back and was declared selected by sixteen to one. Three had
not voted, having gone round the corner to allay thirst, but they were
also held to be my supporters. So I may consider it a considerable
triumph.”
CHAPTER XII
THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1885—RANDOLPH AT THE INDIA OFFICE—DRUMMOND
WOLFF’S MISSION
FOR the next four months I was busy carrying on the work of my
candidature in Camberwell, over the details of which I shall pass
lightly. The constituency was a new one, having only just been created
by the Redistribution Bill, and it was politically a chaos. My chief
supporters were men of no position, character, or intelligence, the most
active of my committee being a sweating tailor; and I had to create
everything in the way of organization, and educate the voters from the
first A B C of instruction on public matters. This was an advantage and
a disadvantage; on the one hand there was little prejudice to overcome,
and on the other extreme difficulty in getting the voters to take any
interest in the matters they were called upon to decide. I began with
very small meetings to very degraded audiences, sometimes in rooms
obtained for the purpose, but oftener mounted on a wagon in the streets,
where I found that nothing much short of pure socialism would be
listened to. The division was supposed to be strongly Radical, but as
time went on my Tory democracy became popular, at least in the streets;
and, as will be seen, I very nearly succeeded in winning the election.
Had I been properly supported from the Conservative head-quarters I have
no doubt I should have succeeded altogether. But the declarations I felt
bound to make in favour of Irish Home Rule, joined to the fact of my
Roman Catholic status, told against me, and in the end I was defeated,
but by only one hundred and sixty-two votes. I will give only such
extracts from my journal as take my candidature out of the ordinary rut
of commonplace experience. My journal was too hastily written at this
time of stress to have much interest apart from the election.
“_27th July._—There is something exceedingly absurd in this
electioneering business; one hundred frowsy fellows in a stuffy
schoolroom talking nonsense to each other about things they none of them
understand, or care about a straw. It is an experience, however, like
another, and we must go through it if we are to achieve anything of
large importance in the world. Yet it is a terrible come-down after the
politics of the golden East, or even of an Arab tribe.
“_28th July._—I have been in trepidation the last few days, for the
report of the Mahdi’s death seems confirmed. Went to see Lothian, who
has just been staying at Hatfield. He complains that Lord Salisbury is
less free spoken on affairs now than when he was out of office, but he
gathers from what he heard that there is no danger at all of a new
campaign. A reconciliation will be effected with Turkey, but no further
alliance will be entered into for the defence of Persia or Afghanistan.
‘Lord Salisbury,’ Lothian said, ‘still holds to his old illusion of
believing the Russian advance to be geographically impossible. He still
looks at the map and calls it a great way from the Caspian to the
Persian Gulf.’ Talking of past events, he told me that when the news
came of the fall of Khartoum Hartington actually resigned office, and
was out of office three days; he would not resume his position until the
absurd determination of advancing still on Khartoum was agreed to. This
is curious. [I believe it is also true that the pretence made by
Gladstone of fighting Russia over the Penjdeh incident was nothing more
than a manœuvre to persuade Hartington to agree to an evacuation of the
Soudan.]
“_29th July._—Wolff, whom I met at the Carlton Club, talked pretty
freely about his plans in Egypt. ‘I wish I knew,’ he said, ‘how to set
up an independent Government at Dongola.’ I said, ‘You had much better
leave it to the Mahdi.’ They will end by doing this.
“To Crabbet with Nebbi Ullah, who is going back shortly to India to
start a newspaper. He, like all the rest, has become spoilt by his
English life. Jemal-ed-Din and I have done our best to persuade him to
purge himself of it by making the pilgrimage and never to put on
European dress again. But he has not the backbone for this. Indians who
have lived in England are taken by our life and ways, and find it
difficult to return. They generally fall in love with some English woman
and abandon the ways of their people. I spoke strongly to him, but it
will be of no use. ‘If a man,’ said Jemal-ed-Din, ‘wishes to do good to
himself, nothing is easier. But if he wishes to do good to his country
he must deny himself.’ ‘I do not wish to be a martyr,’ said Nebbi Ullah,
‘I wish to keep my English clothes and be able to ride and play lawn-
tennis and get refreshment at refreshment rooms when I travel.’ I said,
‘You may put on your best English clothes and go to church if you like
on Sundays, the English in India will not receive you, and you will lose
all influence with your fellow countrymen.’
“_30th July._—Wolff came to James Street as agreed at half-past ten.
Before he saw Jemal-ed-Din I had a talk with him on the general question
of Egypt, the Soudan, and Turkey. With regard to Egypt he told me they
would have to keep on Tewfik for the present, and that Lord Salisbury
could not be got as yet to consent to Arabi’s recall. In the Soudan they
had no idea of any new expedition, Turkish or English. They had rather
make peace with the Soudanese, but had some idea of setting up an
independent government at Dongola. They were resolved to renew the
alliance with the Sultan. The points Wolff principally discussed with
Jemal-ed-Din were as to a possible acknowledgement by the Mahdi of the
Sultan’s Caliphate. This Jemal-ed-Din declared to be impossible, either
for the Mahdi or his successors, but they might be got to accept each
other, as the Ottoman Sultan and the Sultan of Morocco had done, if
Egypt were evacuated by the English and a legal Mohammedan Government
restored there. There would then be no danger from the Soudanese. The
Mahdist movement was religious and the Ulema of Cairo would not permit
him to invade Egypt. There ensued a long discussion about the
evacuation, Wolff declaring that Bismarck had announced in writing to
the Foreign Office that he should approve the French entering Egypt if
we abandoned it. The French would never allow Turkish troops, and it
must be occupied somehow. So it would be by the French. This the Seyyid
refused to believe, as he knew from Ferry and others in France that
nothing of the sort would happen. In the end, however, it was agreed
between Wolff and the Seyyid that, if England consented to fix a date
for evacuation, an arrangement with the Sultan might be come to. There
followed the Slave Trade question in the Soudan. Jemal-ed-Din said it
was impossible to stop the capture of idolatrous tribes in Central
Africa, but the seizure and sale of Abyssinians might be prevented by
the Mahdi. He could arrange that matter and commercial relations with
England and Egypt. It would not be difficult to get the Sultan to
consent to reasonable arrangements for Egypt, and Jemal-ed-Din would go
if necessary to Constantinople—this was my suggestion—nor would it be
difficult to get the Sultan to propose Arabi’s return. Wolff, however,
said distinctly that nothing definite could be settled till after the
elections. His present mission was to feel the ground and prepare for a
policy. The elections would decide whether it could be carried out.
Their talk lasted an hour and a half.
“Lunched with Meynell and Cox, editors of the ‘Weekly Register’ and
‘Tablet.’ They will go with me to-night to a meeting at Camberwell. Cox
is to see Cardinal Manning and get a message of approval from him.
Meynell told me among other things that Colonel Butler, his brother-in-
law, could give evidence that the bombardment of Alexandria was forced
on by Beauchamp Seymour, that they had tried to bribe the Egyptians to
fire the first shot, or something of the sort. Egmont Hake was there and
promised to give a lecture on Gordon at Camberwell in the interests of
my candidature. Meynell tells me that Lord Salisbury has engaged Hake to
lecture in all the large towns in England preparatory to the elections.
Lord Salisbury is to pay the expenses.
“_4th Aug._—Randolph, whom I met at the Carlton Club, has promised that
Lewisham and Folkestone shall support me at a meeting at Camberwell, as
the working men insist upon having a lord—‘no M.P.s for us’ they say.
Drummond Wolff talked to me again about Jemal-ed-Din going to
Constantinople. ‘He is too stiff in his ideas, however,’ he said, ‘about
the Mahdi not accepting the Sultan’s Caliphate.’ Wolff will send for
Jemal-ed-Din if he wants him, and will communicate with me through
Randolph, with whom, he tells me, he shall have a private cipher—a new
feature, this, in our diplomacy. Gregory, who called to-day, says that
Wolff told him he should explain to Tewfik that he had acted in the
matter of the massacres on wrong information, and that he considered him
a very honest man.
“_5th Aug._—I have read over my Electoral Address to McCarthy as far as
it relates to Ireland, and he highly approves it, suggesting only that I
should put in the words ‘Representatives of the Irish Nation,’ so as to
show that I accepted the Irish Parliamentary Party as being the real
national leaders. This I was quite willing to do. He assured me of the
Irish support at Camberwell; they all meant to vote with the Tories. He
warned me not to pay attention to anything they might say about being
indifferent to both parties. It was the _mot d’ordre_ just now to say
this, but the elections would prove which way their predilections
turned. Drummond Wolff has telegraphed from Portsmouth, asking once more
to see Jemal-ed-Din.
“_6th Aug._—Up to London early with Jemal-ed-Din, and had another long
talk with him and Drummond Wolff. Wolff is quite favourable to a Turco-
Perso-Afghan alliance, but says he shall not be able to talk of this
with the Sultan, except incidentally, as that would be the ambassador’s
business, but shall have to keep to Egypt. He was very anxious to know
how an accord could be made between the Sultan and the Mahdi. Would the
Mahdi acknowledge the Caliphate? Jemal-ed-Din said it would not be
necessary to decide or even raise that point just yet. The thing the
Sultan would really care for was a fixing of a limit of time for the
English occupation. Wolff said that that could be done; and that what
would be proposed would be that the Sultan should co-operate in the
establishment of a permanent order of things preparatory to English
evacuation. On this Jemal-ed-Din said that all could be satisfactorily
arranged, and that it mattered little whether it was Turkish or English
troops which would compose the _ad interim_ garrison. Next there was a
good deal of talk as to whether Jemal-ed-Din should go to Constantinople
while Wolff was there, the principal point being as to whether the
Sultan would understand it rightly. Jemal-ed-Din said that the Sultan
knew him only as an enemy of English policy, and, unless Wolff explained
the position, he would fancy Jemal-ed-Din had come to Constantinople to
counteract Wolff. Wolff, however, said that it would be difficult for
him to protect Jemal-ed-Din, or seem to have anything to do with him.
There was the question, too, of money, but I offered to advance the
Seyyid any money that might be wanted so that no inconvenient questions
should be raised. Wolff explained that he should not tell Lord Salisbury
anything about the Seyyid or his arrangements with me. ‘The reason I am
sent,’ he said, ‘is that I am ready to take responsibilities of this
sort on my shoulders which other men might refuse. I shall have a cipher
with Randolph, and if I want the Seyyid, or have anything else to tell
you, it will be through him.’ He told us, however, again very
distinctly, that he did not expect to be able to settle anything
definitely till after the elections. The French were very adverse to
Turkish troops going to Egypt, and Bismarck would give no firm support
till after the elections.
“We also talked about the recall of Arabi, and Jemal-ed-Din said it
would be quite easy to get the Sultan to propose it, two words from him
would effect that. I repeated this to Wolff, after he had left my house,
at the Carlton Club, but he said: ‘It would never do to raise the
question of Arabi yet; after the elections we may do it, but not now.’
Lord Salisbury requires educating to that as to other things.
“To a meeting at Camberwell with Napier, Meynell, and Lady Colin
Campbell. Randolph sent down Lord Folkestone and Sir Henry Fletcher, as
members of the Government, to support me with a message to the effect
that my presence in Parliament was necessary to the party and they must
get me elected.
“_7th Aug._—Mr. Cotton,[127] of the Indian Civil Service, came to
breakfast. He is a very enlightened man, and one with whom one can talk
openly. Speaking of the late Durbar, he said that the Amir Abd-el-
Rahman’s unwillingness to allow English troops into Afghanistan came
like a clap of thunder on Lord Dufferin, who, with the rest of the
officials, was under the idea that the Afghans loved us and sought our
help.
“Randolph made his statement on the Indian Budget last night in a very
masterly speech; but he attacked Lord Ripon in it, as I thought, most
foolishly. I met him at the Carlton Club, and told him I was sorry he
had done it. And he said it was quite necessary on party grounds in view
of the election. But he felt sure native opinion in India would be
satisfied with his promise of inquiry into the Indian Government.
Drummond Wolff was also at the Club, and we talked again about Jemal-ed-
Din’s visit to Constantinople. His last words were that he would write
or telegraph to Randolph, who would communicate his ideas to me.
“Lunched with Button and Sidney Herbert. Button’s candidature is going
badly at Clapham, and his brother’s at Southwark has, after all, broken
down completely. Now he says the people all say I shall get in for
Camberwell.
“_9th Aug._—To Windsor with the Wagrams, and called on the Ponsonbys,
who showed us over the Castle, including the Queen’s private rooms. The
long gallery in which she walks is full of interesting pictures. The
series of daubs by Winterhalter of royal marriages and christenings are
daubs certainly, but already interesting through time. I don’t think we
were intended to go into the Queen’s bedroom, but I looked in and was
very nearly locked in by the housekeeper for my curiosity. She had
already turned the key, and thoughts of the Tower and a trial for high
treason crossed my mind, but fortunately I was remembered and released.
“_13th Aug._—Crabbet. To Newbuildings to spend the day, which, like all
the rest of this summer, was heavenly. Coming home I found an important
communication from Churchill enclosing a deciphered telegram from Wolff,
saying that he wants the Seyyid to join him at Constantinople. The
Seyyid has been in great force here for the last ten days, and has given
us most valuable information about the past history of his own and other
countries. ‘Nadir Shah,’ he says, ‘was the son of a tradesman in Kelaat.
He rose against the Afghan rule, and, having driven the Afghans out of
Persia, conquered Afghanistan and Upper India. It was he who gave Arab
horses to the Turcomans, the breed they now possess.’ [We had staying
with us my cousin, Arthur Chandler, an Oxford divine, who has since
become a colonial bishop, and I arranged that they should have a dispute
together on the fundamental grounds of religion. This was carried on in
very indifferent French but with much spirit by the Seyyid, who
certainly got the best of the argument.]
“_14th Aug._—To London with the Seyyid. I went at once to the India
Office, where I found Randolph very dull and tired with the end of the
Session, which is to-day. He will be off, however, to Scotland to-
morrow. I told him the Seyyid would start at once, but that he insisted
Wolff should give the Sultan a hint directly or indirectly that he had
ceased to be an enemy of England; also that he hoped Wolff would not
open negotiations till he arrived, or attempt to treat the Egyptian
question separately from that of the Mohammedan alliance. Randolph with
his usual quickness seized the points at once, and wrote a telegram to
Wolff something as follows: ‘Jemal-ed-Din starts for Constantinople on
Sunday. He says, however, he is known to the Sultan only as the enemy of
England, and it would be necessary to give the Sultan a hint that he is
now our friend. He hopes also that you will not enter on the Egyptian
question with the Sultan separately from the larger question of a
Mohammedan alliance. With regard to this last he believes he can be of
great service to you.’
“I also saw Ibrahim and wish I had seen him before, for he is a great
support to me with the Seyyid, and is bolder than he is. I am for their
starting together at once, and not waiting for an answer from Wolff. One
never knows what changes of mind may take place, and the ball is at our
foot now and we must play with courage. My fear is lest Wolff should be
scared by the telegram which the Seyyid insisted on. If I had had my
way, he should have started without conditions; Wolff could not refuse
him protection when he arrived. But we shall see.
“Down again to Crabbet for the night, and for a meeting of the Primrose
League at the Worth School. Young Montefiore was put in the chair, to
practise him for a Parliamentary candidature in London. He had learnt
his little opening speech by heart and recited it nicely. My own speech
dealt principally with the possibility of peasant proprietorship. It
gave satisfaction to the Radicals at the end of the room.
“_15th Aug._—There is a telegram from Pesth, saying that Wolff has
delayed his departure till Tuesday. This will give Jemal-ed-Din time to
join him there, and they will go on by the same train. Ibrahim is to go
as far as Varna and there wait further orders. To London for this
purpose. Parliament was adjourned yesterday and London is empty. To my
horror I found a letter in James Street from Moore, Randolph’s
secretary, enclosing a telegram from Wolff—just what I expected—to say
he had changed his mind about Jemal-ed-Din; he had better not start till
he telegraphed again from Constantinople. I went first to Moore at the
India Office and talked the matter over, and he agreed with me that it
seemed a pity the Seyyid should not start, and that we might telegraph
that it was too late to stop him. But he would not do anything without
Randolph’s order. So I went on to Connaught Place and saw Randolph. He
has been ill with a slight congestion of the lungs, but says that he is
better to-day, and we discussed the point fully. But I could not
persuade him to let me send the Seyyid, so the whole thing is off. The
tiresome part of it is that it is just at starting that Jemal-ed-Din
would have been of most use. But there is no help. The Seyyid’s ticket
and Ibrahim’s were already taken, and I had given them £100 for their
journey, all for nothing. [I have always been of opinion that Wolff’s
change of mind on this occasion cost him the success of his mission, and
that its ultimate failure was due to his having commenced it on the
common lines of English diplomacy without that moral support which
Seyyid Jemal-ed-Din could have given him both at Constantinople and
elsewhere with the secret societies.]
“_17th Aug._—My birthday of forty-five, which I spent pleasantly enough
with the children and Anne. Mrs. Sellwood[128] and Cowie had tea with
me. Mrs. Sellwood told me the history of my father’s death, how she had
disliked the hounds coming to Crabbet, and how they had howled, and how
he had caught cold cub hunting and died. Thus the day passed.
“When I look at my life, I see that it is still progressing, and while
there is progress there is happiness. I look forward to Parliament as
the beginning of a new phase. I shall be Cabinet Minister in five years’
time; head of my party, perhaps, in ten. But shall I get in? I think it
is in my fate. [I feel some shame in transcribing these vain-glorious
words, but they had more justification at the moment they were written
than they can possibly seem to have now. At that date Randolph Churchill
was certainly the coming man in English public life, and my position
with him was one which, if I had succeeded in obtaining a seat in the
House of Commons, would have made me one of his most trusted
lieutenants. I may say more: I exercised over him a very considerable
influence, precisely in the direction in which he needed most support. I
think I could have prevented him from making some of the larger mistakes
he made, and which eventually caused his ruin. I have sometimes thought
that I could even have maintained him faithful to Irish Home Rule, and
that together we might have persuaded Lord Salisbury to adopt it as the
Tory policy. It would have saved the Tories their present disaster at
the hands of the Irish party. My defeat left Churchill without any
adviser in the ways of political virtue.]
“_18th Aug._—The Prince of Wales has sent me a message through Lady C.
congratulating me on my standing for Parliament.
“_19th Aug._—Down to Brocket, where Auberon Herbert, his wife and
children are staying with Henry Cowper. Etty Fane is here, grown to be a
very pretty and clever girl after one London season. Of all people I
like Henry Cowper best as companion. He represents the Whig tradition in
its most attractive form, that of the cultured politician of a hundred
years ago, partly humane, partly sceptical, full of dignity and
profoundly immoral. He told me innumerable stories connected with
Brocket. It was outside the park at Brocket, on the high road, that Lady
Caroline Lamb and her husband were riding when they met Lord Byron’s
funeral, and she fell straightway off her horse. There is a portrait of
Lady Melbourne here, as a young woman, which is charming.
“_20th Aug._—After luncheon we went to Hatfield, Herbert and I on foot,
Henry and his niece, Miss Fane, in a pony chaise. On the way we
discussed social questions, on which Herbert has very distinct and
original ideas. He is against all State intervention, either against
drink or prostitution, believing in free trade in both as the best cure;
he is against State education, rates, or any kind of taxes, which should
all be voluntary. He trusts to a kind of natural selection to bring
about improvements with as little interference as may be by Government.
“Hatfield is quite the most perfect thing I have seen, there being none
of those great waste places common in most parks. We drove home all
together in the pony carriage. I am glad to have been here at Brocket,
as it has cleared my ideas on certain points very misty to me; not that
I altogether agree with Herbert, for anarchism is certainly outside the
range of practical politics, but his views are large and elevated and do
one good.
“_22nd Aug._—To London for Stead’s social demonstration. The procession
was entirely of the rag-tag and bobtail, with banners of the most
curious devices: one represented the Minotaur, a princely personage in a
blue uniform, and his victim; another a van full of middle-aged females,
labelled ‘Protection for Girls.’ Also there were political badges; one
banner stated that its bearer had refused taxes because he had no vote;
and there were socialistic and temperance vans, with ‘John Bright’ and
‘Sir Wilfrid Lawson Associations.’ In the Park I went the round of the
platforms, each with male and female speakers, and was fortunate enough
to hear Stead speak. This he did well, with a good deal of dramatic
action, but a certain self consciousness which occasionally marred the
effect. Besides the regular platform speakers, there were volunteer
orators, who held forth to groups on the ground. One I listened to
attacked Randolph fiercely through his brother Blandford, with whose
history the speaker professed to be well acquainted. The best speech I
heard, however, was from a democratic socialist; he hit the
demonstration hard when he expostulated against all parties in the
state, and especially against the Radical capitalists. Samuel Morley, he
said, had subscribed £2,000 for the protection of girls, but when had he
ever given £5 to a girl of the 5,000 in his own factories to save her
from perdition? It was the capitalists who were the cause of all crime
and misery, and who ground the faces of the poor. What we wanted was not
social reform, but social revolution. And he took his hat and showed on
its brim how a revolution should be made. When the poor, he said, have
got the rich under them they will know how to keep them there. I could
not help cheering.
“_27th Aug._—A note from Moore asking me to come and see him. Randolph
had told him to read me an extract from a letter of Wolff’s. It was to
the effect that he was in such a delicate position in regard to his
mission that he dared not appear to know Jemal-ed-Din. Jemal-ed-Din, he
said, was opposed to the Sultan’s Caliphate in the Soudan, and if he
acknowledged him as a friend, the Sultan might think that he had some
design on his spiritual pretensions. For this reason he dared not
mention his name. This is all nonsense. The question of the Sultan’s
Caliphate need never be raised, and Jemal-ed-Din is not known as its
opponent. On the contrary his newspaper was always loud on the Sultan’s
rights. The Seyyid, however, declined to go to Constantinople without
some acknowledgement from Wolff, because he says it would ruin his
influence everywhere if the Sultan were to shut the door in his face.
But I am to see Randolph to-morrow.
“_28th Aug._—At half-past one I called on Randolph at the India Office;
he is looking fagged and ill, and is still obliged to stay in town, but
talks of going to Scotland next week. I feel convinced he will not live
two years, or will be obliged to give up public life. We talked over the
Jemal-ed-Din affair, but as Jemal-ed-Din refuses to go to Constantinople
without Wolff’s support, and as Wolff refuses to commit himself with
Jemal-ed-Din, we agreed the matter must remain so. Then we talked about
Olivier Pain, and I told Randolph the whole story, and how Hartington
had denied the proclamation issued by Wolseley offering £50 for him,
dead or alive. This delighted him, and he offered to send my letter
about it to Lord Salisbury at Dieppe, and I gave it to him. Lastly, I
told him I had heard things were going badly at Hyderabad, and asked him
to write to the Nizam and warn him. But he said that to do so would be
against all rules, and that he could only communicate through the
Government of India. He told me, however, but as an absolute secret,
that he had already written to Lord Dufferin to suggest that Cordery
should be removed from Hyderabad. I then asked him to get Moore sent
there, Colonel Moore, who is now with the Duke of Connaught, and he
seemed to like the idea. Poor Randolph! I fear that the attainment of
his ambition, like the wasps with the honey-pot, will be his death.
“Lady Gregory sends me a sonnet on the Mahdi’s death, which is very
good.
“_3rd Sept._—Last night I made my declaration about Ireland. It is the
first public declaration made, since Parnell’s speech, in favour of Home
Rule.
“_4th Sept._—Ibrahim Bey has received a letter from Ismaïl Jowdat once
more pressing him to come and see the Sultan. It has been decided he
shall go. The Sultan has heard of Jemal-ed-Din having seen one of the
Ministers, and has sent for Ibrahim to find out what it is all about. He
wants Jemal-ed-Din too, but the Seyyid says he will wait till the Sultan
sends for him. For Ibrahim there will be no danger, and I will put him
in communication with Wolff and let Randolph know.
“_6th Sept._—Ibrahim left last night for Constantinople. Jemal-ed-Din
will stay on in London.
“_12th Sept._—Lord Salisbury has answered my letter as to my being
allowed to return to Egypt with great politeness. He says he thinks it
can be arranged. George Wyndham has come back from the wars, I am glad
to say, with a sound skin.
“_15th Sept._—Went to the ‘Pall Mall’ office and saw Milner,[129] the
acting editor in Stead’s place, about a letter I had written for them
but wished to withdraw, and explained to him how the case stood. He
agreed with me that it might be well to defer the publication, and
admitted that I was fully justified in withdrawing the letter under the
circumstances in which Stead was placed. He tells me that from the first
he did not approve of Stead’s “revelations.” He was very amiable about
it all. I like Milner.
“_16th Sept._—Mr. Tebbutt from St. Ives is here, at Crabbet, and I took
him to Newbuildings, to talk over the question of establishing small
holders there on small rents. But, though a strong Liberal, he does not
advise it; thinks it will not answer.
“_19th Sept._—Gladstone has published a manifesto, and I have been
writing to him protesting against his repetition of the plea of _honour_
in excuse of the bombardment of Alexandria. George Wyndham is just back
from Cyprus and the Soudan. He spoke with great admiration of the Arabs.
“_20th Sept._—There has been a revolution in Roumelia. This is Russian
doing in answer to Wolff’s mission, or rather in anticipation of the
elections here. Jemal-ed-Din always said they would make a move two
months before the elections, and here it is. My feeling is that it is
useless attempting to retain any part of Europe for the Turks except
just the city of Constantinople. I am certain Lord Salisbury will do
nothing to protect them anywhere out of Asia Minor.
“_21st Sept._—I have written to Mr. Gladstone proposing to meet him on a
platform and discuss the question of Egypt with him as a ‘question of
honour.’
“_22nd Sept._—William Morris was arrested two days ago at a socialist
trial for hissing the magistrate, and I have written to congratulate
him.
“_23rd Sept._—A letter has arrived from Ibrahim giving an account of
himself. He is staying with Jowdat, has been to the Palace, and is to
see the Sultan after Beiram. They are only angry with him for not coming
before. The Sultan is sending a man to Jemal-ed-Din for consultation.
“_24th Sept._—Talked the whole question of Roumelia over with Jemal-ed-
Din, and we are agreed that it is not Russia but Austria that has
encouraged the movement at this moment. I told the Seyyid it was useless
trying to save European Turkey for the Sultan; Lord Salisbury would not
dare guarantee it. He does not like this, but seems to think me right
all the same. There is a memorandum of Gordon’s of 1880 recommending the
partition of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt to England, Syria to France,
Armenia to Russia, and European Turkey to independent Christian States.
Jemal-ed-Din thinks Wolff must have had a hand in the Roumelian
movement. I don’t.
“I have been asked to deliver the inaugural address at the Tyneside
lectures at Newcastle on 1st October. I have chosen for my subject
‘Egyptian Aggression, an answer to the Plea of Honour.’
“_25th Sept._—Chamberlain has been down in South London speaking. Of his
three proposals, taxing the rich, free schools, and dividing the land I
do not greatly quarrel with any.
“_28th Sept._—Munif Pasha is in London and has seen the Seyyid. He wants
to see Churchill. I have written about it.
“_30th Sept._—A great Tory demonstration at Crabbet held in a large tent
in the Park. Sir Walter Bartelot, Gregory, M.P., and Grantham spoke. I
was chairman. Bartelot is a really good speaker.
“Mr. Gladstone has answered my letter. He declines meeting me in
Midlothian and blames me for my action in Egypt.
“_3rd Oct._—The Hugh Wyndhams, the two Hardinges, and the Wentworths are
here (at Crabbet). I had a good deal of talk with Hardinge about
Egyptian diplomacy. He was with Dufferin in Egypt after the war.
“_6th Oct._—Ferid Bey has written to ask to see me, and he came to
luncheon to-day. Jemal-ed-Din was there, and, as long as he was present,
Ferid dealt only with generalities; but, luncheon over, we went upstairs
and, after much beating about the bush, he disclosed to me his real
object. The state of things, he told me, at Constantinople was hopeless,
and the discontent so general that important events might be looked for.
The empire was crumbling to pieces, and not only the empire but the
Turkish nation too would perish if nothing was done to save it. There
were therefore people who thought, and he himself was one, that the only
safety lay in an attempt to restore the constitutional scheme of Midhat,
and to take the absolute power out of the Sultan’s hands. The present
Sultan was incapable of action, and yet he had absorbed all power to
himself, and the government was carried on by a gigantic system of
espionage, which alone hindered a revolt. A revolt, however, might now
be expected, and the power might be put into the hands of some capable
general acting for the nation, while the Sultan might be deposed in
favour of some other person, a member of his family or another—he would
not commit himself to say exactly whom. What made men hesitate was only
this: that they feared a disturbance of any sort at Constantinople would
be taken as a pretext by Russia for military intervention. Bismarck, he
told me, would oppose all idea of constitutional government, but he
thought Lord Salisbury might not be opposed to it. He wanted me to find
out whether the English Government would allow Russian intervention, and
whether a change of Sultan would be acceptable to them. Abdul Hamid
might throw himself into Russian hands and ask protection against his
people. Would the English Government countenance a revolution? He asked
whether I thought it any good his consulting any one out of office, Sir
Henry Elliot for instance. I told him I thought Sir Henry Elliot would
be very little good with Lord Salisbury, but that if he liked I would
speak to Churchill about it. Wolff’s mission was at a standstill because
it was impossible to deal with the present Sultan, and perhaps they
might be willing to find a government with which they could deal. He
begged me to do this, only urging caution as the idea might be
frustrated if the English Government took it badly; also as regards
himself that I should not divulge his part in the affair. ‘The state of
espionage is such,’ he said, ‘at Constantinople that the son is spy on
the father, the brother on the brother, and though I know every man of
note there, there are not two I would trust as I do in talking with
you.’ I told him he need fear nothing on either head, that I would tell
Churchill the position only if I found they were at a standstill in
their negotiations, and that I would be silent as to himself. I asked
him whether Musurus, the ambassador, knew of this. ‘How should he?’ he
said. ‘Musurus is a traitor.’ He also forbade me to speak of it to
Jemal-ed-Din, who was imprudent and also a poor man, who might some day
be tempted by necessity. I have arranged with Moore to see Randolph to-
morrow.
“_7th Oct._—At twelve saw Randolph at the India Office, and finding
things as I supposed at a standstill with Wolff, told him what I had
heard. I, of course, did not say who had told me, only that it was a
person of high position, in no way connected with Jemal-ed-Din or any
other of my friends. He answered most decidedly that there was not the
remotest danger of Russia being allowed to intervene, and seemed quite
disposed to look favourably on the idea of a change of _régime_ at
Constantinople as favourable to the prospects of an arrangement. He
promised me absolute secrecy about it, and told me something of Wolff’s
progress. Wolff had come to the conclusion that it was very necessary to
take the Arab party at Constantinople into account, and was surprised
that Ibrahim had not been to see him yet. I said he had probably been
forbidden by the Sultan; and to-day a letter came from Ibrahim saying he
had sent in a full report of his doings in England to the Sultan, and
about myself among the rest. But the Sultan had forgotten all about
Wolff and England and everything but Roumelia. Randolph also promised to
send Gorst down to support me at Camberwell, and asked me to speak with
him at a meeting on Indian social reform at the Mansion House. Yesterday
a letter had come from Lord Salisbury telling me that the Egyptian
Government decidedly refused to allow my return to Cairo, and Randolph
encouraged me to insist. I had undertaken not to meddle with political
questions or projects during my stay. Randolph is looking better, and is
very hearty and pleasant. He is the most agreeable and least pedantic of
official men; office has not spoilt him, nor will it.
“Tea at Lady Gregory’s, where I met Kinglake.
“_8th Oct._—A long talk with Jemal-ed-Din about prospects at
Constantinople and about the Caliphate. He is for the Mahdi or the
Mahdi’s successor taking the Sultan’s place, or the Sherif Own, or the
Imam of Sanaa—any of these he thought might now take the lead. But
Constantinople must remain the seat of the Caliphate, as Arabia or
Africa would be mere places of exile. Amongst other things, he told me
that it was he himself who had suggested to the Sherif el Huseyn to
claim the Caliphate, but El Huseyn had said it was impossible without
armed support, and the Arabs could never unite except in the name of
religion. Now, Jemal-ed-Din is very anxious to be away again to the
East. He will not go, he says, to Constantinople unless the Sultan sends
for him, and we have agreed that if I do not win my election at
Camberwell we will go together to the Imam of Sanaa in Yemen and raise
the standard of the Caliphate, as I intended to do four years ago. I
asked him whether he thought the Sultan had had El Huseyn assassinated;
and he said, ‘No, but perhaps some pasha had it done.’
“Ferid Bey came at twelve, and I told him of the answer I had received
from Churchill, and that I felt very sure our Government would not be
much displeased with a change of _régime_ at Constantinople. At the same
time I told him I thought it would be useless to kick against the union
of Roumelia and Bulgaria. This had been part of his plan. He was of a
different opinion, and said if they could only get free of the present
hindrance in the Sultan’s apathy they were quite ready to carry the war
to the Danube, Turkey’s true frontier. I asked him if they were ready to
fight Russia alone, and he said ‘Yes.’ I told him, ‘If so, go on, I have
nothing to say; but you must not count on assistance from Lord
Salisbury, or any other English Minister; public opinion in England
would not allow it.’ He told me that, without actually deposing Abdul
Hamid, they might put pressure on him to force him to constitutional
courses and a defence of the Empire. I think, nevertheless, he will
discourage his friends from their plan.[130]
“_9th Oct._—Lord Salisbury has pronounced himself in an admirable speech
in Wales. It will do the Party good, for it is straightforward and
strong.
“_11th Oct._—I came to Newcastle last night, and made my promised speech
at the theatre to about three thousand people, explaining to them the
intrigues which had brought on the Egyptian War. It is the most
important speech I have ever made, and it lasted two hours. Though most
of the audience were devoted admirers of Gladstone, I succeeded in
carrying them with me, and it was altogether a great success. What a
difference between these north country men and the miserable Camberwell
rabble! I am ashamed of my late electioneering; it is a degrading
business.
“_12th Oct._—Back to London. Drummond Wolff’s mission is announced as
having succeeded; the Sultan is to send a commissioner with Wolff to
Egypt. I expect Ibrahim Bey has been instrumental in bringing this
about. I hear no more of the threatened revolt at Constantinople. Lord
Salisbury writes to tell me he has forced the Egyptian Government to
receive me in Egypt.
“The old Cashmiri, Abd-el-Rasul, called and showed me a letter from
Zebehr Pasha at Gibraltar and a correspondence he had had with Lord
Granville, and I promised to ask Churchill to intercede. Also two Indian
delegates with a letter from Ragunath Rao.
“Down to dine and sleep at Milford (my cousin Robert Webb’s house in
Surrey), and found them all in a barn hearing young Brodrick[131]
orating on Church and State. One cannot escape meetings anywhere now. It
was an absurd business: Bob in the chair, young Brodrick deadly dull;
the crowd cutting their country jokes, and from time to time outside the
bellow of a cow, which set all the meeting off in roars.
“_13th Oct._—Back to London. Saw Randolph at the India Office at three,
and told him of the success of the Newcastle meeting. He approves of my
going on to another at Edinburgh if it can be arranged. Also he agrees
to see Rama Swami and the other Indian delegates, who called on me a day
or two ago to ask my assistance at the India Office. He has asked me to
bring them to him on Thursday. Moore’s face was a picture when he told
him of this decision, but in his light-hearted way Randolph would hear
of no objection, and so it is settled. Then I laid before him a letter I
had received from Calcutta, about a native woman ravished on a
steamer—the Webb case—and he sent Moore to look it up. Lastly, I asked
him to intercede for the release of Zebehr Pasha at Gibraltar. This,
too, he promised to see to, and said he thought it could easily be
managed. There had already been talk of releasing Zebehr, because the
Colonial Office and the War Office could not agree which was to pay the
expense of keeping him. But Egerton had objected at Cairo—this he told
me confidentially. Randolph is looking decidedly better than he did, and
nothing could be nicer than our relations at present. He volunteered the
information that the Austrian and Russian Governments were both backing
up the Sultan to claim his rights in Roumelia.
“A letter came to-day from Lord Salisbury, saying that I should go to
the Foreign Office and arrange with Pauncefote[132] the details of my
affairs in Egypt; and I did so. Pauncefote was exceedingly polite to me,
and I spoke pretty frankly to him about Baring and Granville in relation
to my exclusion from Egypt. It is a great triumph to have forced this
matter on the Foreign Office, and to be at last invited back to the
official sanctum after all our quarrels. I met Frank Villiers[133] later
at the club, and laughed about it with him. Rivers Wilson made a third
with us, and we had a grand discussion about the advantage of truth-
telling in politics. They would neither of them hear of it; but I said:
‘Look at me, if I had not made it a rule to speak the exact truth and
have no secrets where should I be to-day? I have been engaged for the
last four years in every kind of intrigue and yet my name stands clear.’
They laughed at this. Rivers is still bitter about Arabi, but we drove
home together, good friends as of old.
“_15th Oct._—After luncheon at the Morrises, I took the three delegates
to the India Office, giving them a good sermon first about the folly it
would be for them to hoist a Radical flag here in England. Anyhow, I
think Randolph has converted them, for he was quite charming to them,
putting them at their ease at once. There was nobody present but
ourselves, and the face of the office messenger when he showed us in was
even more comic than Moore’s had been two days ago. The expression on it
was exactly that of the old steward’s in the ‘Mariage à la Mode.’ Mon
Mohun Ghose did most of the talking; he asked Randolph about the
Parliamentary inquiry into the Government of India and what subjects it
would include. Randolph said it would depend on them to make it a useful
one; they must send over their very best men to give evidence, and take
care they were absolutely accurate about their facts, as there were
plenty of old-fashioned people who did not want existing things
disturbed, and who would pick holes where they could. He said Siva
Prasad had informed him that a royal order to come to England would
override caste difficulties, and that the Benares divines would decide
it in this sense. But Chandar Varkar objected to this, that Benares
could not lay down the law for the whole of India; still he hoped it
might have some effect. Mon Mohun Ghose wanted to know whether the
inquiry would include the judicial system, as that was what was giving
rise just now to most ill feeling. And Randolph said that if it depended
on him it should. His colleagues had been most amiable about this
inquiry, and if the Conservatives were in office the inquiry would be a
full and impartial one. He was against members of the Government sitting
on it, but those should be chosen who had most title to consider Indian
affairs, independent men of all parties. He should support the inquiry,
whether he was in office or not. The inquiry would also include the
revenue question, and Rama Swami explained to him the enhancement of the
land revenue grievance. He begged them to address him again on any
special points they required to make known connected with their
respective Presidencies, and at the end of three quarters of an hour
they went away highly delighted. He told me, at leaving, that I might
publish the result, and I have sent a few lines to the Press
Association, epitomizing the interview. The delegates will also
telegraph to India. This is a great move, and will do excellent work in
every way.
“_18th Oct._—An ultimatum has been sent by Lord Dufferin to King Thebaw
of Burmah. There is a long _communiqué_ in the ‘Observer’ showing how
rich Burmah is, and the wickedness of Thebaw; this has decided me to
write to Churchill and ask explanations. He is unfortunately out of
town. [This ultimatum led to the iniquitous annexation of Upper Burmah.]
“Delivered an address in the evening at Islington Hall, Frederic
Harrison in the chair, on ‘Reform in Foreign Policy.’ [This was an
appeal against secrecy and other evils in Foreign Affairs.]
“_20th Oct._—Randolph telegraphs he has been to my house, and is sorry
to miss me. He is just leaving for Lynn, but refers me to Moore. I
travelled up from Crabbet with Frederick Locker, who says it will be
unfair if I succeed in Parliament, seeing that I lived idly and amused
myself for forty years, and that I have succeeded too as a poet.
“A meeting at the Mansion House for Lady Dufferin’s Indian Female
Doctors’ Fund, for which Randolph had invited me to speak. I was put up
to second Sir Richard Temple; the Anglo-Indians will be very angry at
this. There has been a great row about the Indian delegates, who have
been sat upon by their Radical friends here for having promised to
support me at a meeting in Camberwell, and they are frightened out of
their wits. The Radicals say they won’t allow them to have anything to
do with a Conservative candidate.
“_21st Oct._—Saw Moore at the India Office, who spoke frankly enough
about Burmah. He said that the India Office had been opposed to
intervention for a long while, that Bernard, the Resident, especially
had opposed it, but now saw its necessity, that great commercial
pressure had been put on the Calcutta Government to take action, and
that perhaps Lord Dufferin was not sorry for so good an excuse at last
to settle the matter. ‘An important point,’ Moore said (and he thought
it would convince me), ‘was that _it would pay_.’ I told him this was
precisely the point which disturbed me. I asked him with whom the
responsibility rested. And he said, entirely with Lord Dufferin; he has
had _carte blanche_ given him in the matter. I said I hoped they would
not imitate the late Government by starting military operations without
declaration of war, and suggested they might wait till Parliament met.
He told me no papers had been published during the last two years. At
leaving he said: ‘I think you may make your mind comfortable as to there
being as much justice and reason in the case as there ever is in cases
of the kind.’ I shall attend the Peace and Arbitration Committee to-
morrow.
“In the evening we had a grand meeting of the Indian Delegates at Oakley
Hall. We got Jemal-ed-Din to deliver a discourse in Arabic, which no
soul in the room understood, but which was much applauded. Another
followed in Persian from Mirza Bakir; and Rama Swami and Chandar Varkar
spoke also. [It shows the absurdity of London audiences that this was by
far the most successful meeting we had during the canvass.]
“_24th Oct._—Dinner with Hancock and a nest of Radicals at the Reform
Club. I found them all less liberal than I am, especially about Ireland.
“_25th Oct._—To Hammersmith, where I found Morris laid up with the gout.
He thought things were going wonderfully well for his ideas, and only
hoped the Whigs would not get in with any large majority. He was
inclined to vote for the Tories, but all voting was against socialistic
principles.
“_28th Oct._—Wrote a letter to the ‘Times,’ in protest against the
Burmese War, but shall keep it a day or two to see how Lord Salisbury
answers my appeal to him for the recall of Arabi.
“_1st Nov._—Called on Lady C. yesterday, who said the Prince of Wales
had told her they were discussing the question of recalling Arabi at the
Foreign Office.
“Also saw Cardinal Manning. He was sitting very feeble in his arm-chair,
before the fire, with a book screen behind him. It would make a fine
picture. Truly, the only old age worth having is the old age of
religion. He talked to me about Urquhart, who, he said, had made great
efforts to enlist him among his disciples—‘a man of great personal charm
and genius, but mentally not quite sound’; also about Gladstone, ‘who
has gone altogether off the track.’ I told him I had hopes about Arabi’s
return under Lord Salisbury but none whatever under Gladstone, he was
too obstinate. ‘He was always like that,’ the Cardinal said, ‘the most
obstinate man in the world; he never would admit he had ever made a
mistake. To understand Gladstone you must remember he is a Scotchman on
his father’s and mother’s side, only by accident an Englishman, born at
Liverpool.’
“_2nd Nov._—Randolph writes that Lord Salisbury will certainly not give
me an encouraging reply about Arabi: ‘Even if he was disposed, as I
should be, to favour your views, he would not dare take such a step on
the eve of the election.’ This is bad.
“Jemal-ed-Din, who had been mysteriously absent for two or three days
from James Street, turned up again this morning. He had left the house
in consequence of a noisy disturbance that occurred in his room on
Thursday between two of his Oriental friends, Wahbi Bey and Abd-el-
Rasul; they seem to have quarrelled over politics or religion and ended
by beating each other over the heads with umbrellas. I had to beg them
both to leave the house, and the Seyyid followed them. One must draw the
line somewhere, and I have now suggested to the Seyyid that he should
take up his quarters elsewhere; he has been three months with me in the
house, the full term of Arab hospitality. [N.B.—This was the last I saw
of the good Seyyid that year; he took huff at my treatment of his
friends, and still more at the disappointment he had had in connection
with Drummond Wolff’s mission, and he left England a few days later in
anger against everything English and, shaking its dust from his feet,
went away to Moscow, where he joined himself with Katkoff, the well-
known Panslavist leader in a campaign against the British Empire. From
Russia he moved on to Persia and Afghanistan with the same object, and,
after much preaching and much persecution from the governments of all
these countries, drifted back at last to Constantinople, where I found
him many years later established in the precincts of the Yildiz Palace,
half pensioner, half prisoner of the Sultan. He died of cancer there,
some think of poison, in 1902, nursed, as I have heard, for sole
attendant, by a Christian servant. Jemal-ed-Din was a man of genius
whose teaching exercised an influence hardly to be overrated on the
Mohammedan reform movement of the last thirty years. I feel highly
honoured at his having lived three months under my roof in England; but
he was a wild man, wholly Asiatic and not easily tamed to European ways.
An account of my subsequent visit to him at Constantinople will be given
in its place.]
“_4th Nov._—There is a telegram from Cairo to-day which threatens a new
expedition against Dongola. I don’t like a speech Randolph has made on
the subject; he also talks nonsense about fighting for new markets in
connection with the Burmese quarrel. I don’t know what to do; one party
is as bad as the other. Lord Salisbury spoke last night at the Victoria
Hall (where I was present on the platform as one of his chief
supporters), and among other crudities he proposed this remedy of new
markets as a relief for the depression of trade. What nonsense it is
when men talk of ‘creating’ wealth by trade. English trade with Oriental
nations means only the transference of Oriental money into English
pockets; trade creates nothing, and one might parody the French axiom
and say, _Le commerce c’est le vol_. Lord Salisbury’s speech was a poor
affair; he does not come out well on occasions like these, having no
sympathy whatever with the people and being unable to pretend it. He was
evidently aware of his false position, and blundered on from one mistake
to another; even in form he was bad, and it was only towards the end of
his speech that he attained to anything approaching eloquence. Most of
it was a House of Lords reply to his fellow lords, Granville and
Hartington, about whom the South Londoners care less than for the man in
the moon. A few good hits he made, and his audience were quite prepared
to applaud anything, but it fell flat enough considering how great an
occasion it was. The rest of the proceedings were poor, but mercifully
curtailed, as his lordship was anxious to get home to Hatfield.
“_5th Nov._—Guy Fawkes’ Day, the guy this year being King Thebaw, a sad-
looking black monarch in a turban. This Burmese War is of a piece with
all these wars: hungry commercial speculators making contracts with a
dishonest prince, European intrigues, British remonstrances, official
interference, tales to the prince’s discredit, his subjects praying for
British intervention, threats from Calcutta, appeal of the prince to his
people, who strangely take his side in the quarrel, ultimatum issued,
arrival of fleet, massacre of Europeans, bombardment, slaughter of
natives, triumph of British arms, annexation of territory, pay, prize
money, pensions, peerages all round, and so _da capo_.
“_6th Nov._—Sent my letter about Burmah to the ‘Times,’ after calling at
the India Office to see if Randolph had any further explanation to make,
but he is out of town. He has stupidly, as I think, identified himself
with Lord Dufferin’s policy of war. But I cannot keep silent on an
occasion of this kind.
“_11th Nov._—We have decided to have a large meeting at Camberwell in
favour of Arabi’s recall to Egypt, and I went to see Randolph to ask him
about it and other things. He made a first-rate speech the other day at
Manchester, but looks fagged and several years older than when he took
office. I talked to him first about the Soudan, and asked him if
anything had been done in the way of negotiations. And he said that
Mukhtar, the Ottoman commissioner, and Wolff were going to do what they
could to pacificate; that already something had been begun; that Wolff
quite understood the necessity of dealing through Arab channels; that he
had discovered that if the Sultan was influenced by anybody it was by
the Arab Sheykhs, and, finally, that Mukhtar was the man Wolff himself
had wished for, and that all would be done that could be done. All the
same, there was imminent prospect of more fighting. I told him of the
papers I had sent in to Lord Salisbury, and of the meeting we are
getting up for the recall of Arabi. And he highly approved. He said: ‘I
am doing all I can with Lord Salisbury to get him to recall Arabi. But
his prejudices are strong and I shall be glad to have support from
outside.’ About the Burmese war I said that I hoped he did not
disapprove of my letter to the ‘Times,’ but I was obliged to write it,
as I could not afford not to be true to my principles, which were to me
what her virtue is to a woman. He said he thought it quite right, and
hoped I should pull my election through.”[134]
This proved to be my last talk with Churchill on our familiar and
intimate footing as political allies. In another fortnight the elections
had been fought and lost and won; then came Gladstone’s unexpected
pronouncement in favour of Home Rule, and we followed different paths,
and I saw Churchill no more that year, or at all as friends politically.
To end the story of the Camberwell election briefly: on the 12th
November I finally declared for Home Rule in its full sense, avowing my
intention in so many words of supporting Parnell in his demand for an
Irish Parliament. I felt bound to do this, but I believe it cost me my
election. All the last fortnight was occupied in heavy work, of which my
wife, with her maid Cowie and my private secretary Hope, an excellent
young man, took the lion’s share, and I was helped by many personal
friends from outside, notably by the Meynells and Pollens, and by an
excellent old-fashioned Radical banker from St. Ives, Mr. Tebbutt, who
came on principle to canvass for me because of my views on foreign
policy, and the Rev. Hugh Chapman of St. Luke’s, now chaplain to the
Savoy. But their devoted labours proved of no avail, and I lost the
election by 162 votes out of 6,112 votes polled.
THE END.
NOTE ABOUT THE MAHDI’S DEATH
THE policy finally decided on by Lord Salisbury in July, 1885, of
completing the evacuation of the Soudan and leaving it to “stew in its
own juice” till such time as it could be reconquered in English
interests, was a Macchiavellian one, and resulted successfully from the
point of view of imperial ambition. The decision was come to
simultaneously with Mohammed Ahmed’s death, which I thought at the time,
and still think, was not wholly a natural one. His death was due,
according to the official account, to small-pox, but there were too many
interests engaged at Cairo and Constantinople just then not to make it
extremely probable that there was another agency at work to procure a
solution so simple and so timely. The Mahdi’s was a great personality,
commanding unbounded respect in the Soudan, and inspiring the religious
hopes of Mohammedan Egypt as that of a possible deliverer from Christian
domination, while beyond Egypt it had become a rival influence obnoxious
to the Ottoman Caliphate. There are too many examples of such deaths
procured for political ends in the time of Sultan Abdul Hamid and of the
Khedivate to make the suspicion in the present instance unreasonable;
and it must be remembered that with the Drummond Wolff mission a new
opportunity was presenting itself at Constantinople, to which the life
of the Mahdi was a chief obstacle. Be this as it may, it is certain that
the blow dealt by Mohammed Ahmed’s death was fatal to the future of the
Soudan as that of a permanently powerful theocracy. The Khalifa Abdallah
el Taishi, who succeeded him in supreme rule, was a man wholly inferior
intellectually and politically to his master, and under him religious
enthusiasm waned and tribal rivalries took the place of a united front
against the enemy, while also the wisdom was lacking for the conclusion
of an effective peace on lines of commercial intercourse with Egypt.
There was always the excuse at Cairo that the Khalifa was impracticable
to treat with. The story, however, of the reconquest of Khartoum twelve
years later is beyond the scope of the present volume, as is any
appreciation of the actual condition of the Soudan under English rule,
and I leave both reluctantly for another occasion.
W. S. B.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
UNPUBLISHED GORDON PAPERS
COLONEL DONNELLY’S CONVERSATION WITH COLONEL C. G. GORDON, 30TH OCTOBER
1880 (FROM AMONG SIR HENRY GORDON’S PAPERS)
THIS was the first time I had seen Colonel Gordon since he left England
as Lord Ripon’s private secretary. I asked him what was the real reason
of his giving up. He gave me to understand a number of things made him
feel that he was _de trop_. “For instance,” he said, “just after we
started, Lord Ripon gave me the minutes and evidence in the inquiry into
Yakub Khan’s connection with Cavagnari’s murder, and asked me to make a
_précis_ and give him my opinion. This was difficult. But after sitting
up the greater part of two nights I was able to give them back with my
remarks all over them in red and black ink. He asked me what I thought
of it. I said I did not see any evidence to prove Yakub guilty; he very
likely was glad Cavagnari was murdered, but I could see nothing to show
that he was implicated in the crime, and you know (to me, Donnelly)
three out of five of the Council (mentioning their names) were of that
opinion.
“Lord Ripon looked into it and told me to telegraph from Aden to his,
Yakub’s, keepers to meet him at Bombay. I said: ‘My Lord, I think that
will hardly do as you have not yet been sworn in and Lord Lytton is
still Governor General and may make a great fuss.’ Lord Ripon agreed,
thought I was right and said the telegram was not to be sent. When we
got to Bombay Lord Ripon again asked me to telegraph to Yakub’s keepers
to meet him at some station on the way to Simla. I had to ask White
(military secretary) as I did not know the route sufficiently to fix on
a station. He was awfully taken aback. Did I know what the consequences
would be? Every one in India would be staggered and so on. Begged me to
persuade Lord Ripon not to take such a step. I told him that it did not
seem to me it would make any difference one way or the other, but as he
was so very strong on the point, I said I would let Lord Ripon know
before I did anything. I wrote a note and sent it in early in the
morning to Lord Ripon, saying that I myself did not think it would
matter, but, as White was so very anxious on the subject, believing the
end of the world would come if such a step were taken, I thought it as
well to let him know before I carried out his, Lord Ripon’s,
instructions. This was just before breakfast, and he came out in a few
minutes very indignant that any one should have ventured to overrule his
orders; he had no intention of being controlled, and so on. All
breakfast time he looked quite hurt, and injured, and indignant. After
breakfast I left White talking with him in a beseeching way, and
presently he (Lord Ripon) came and asked me if I had sent the telegram.
I said No, I was waiting to see White to settle the place. ‘Well,’ he
said, ‘perhaps after all it was as well not to send it.’
“Now this is only one instance,” Gordon said. “There were lots of snubs
of this kind. You know I shouldn’t have minded getting snubbed, if there
was any use in it—but I saw it was only sure to get worse. Lord Ripon
was being surrounded and guided by the very people from whom Lord
Northcote had begged me to keep him clear. When he got to Simla I was
sure he would be completely in the hands of the Lytton party. I felt I
was _de trop_ and could do no good, and that it was as well to give up
as soon as possible. I told Lord Ripon so. He was very nice about it,
said that his regard for me had only been increased by what had
happened, but he saw it was advisable I should resign, was much obliged
to me for doing so, was only afraid of the awkwardness. I showed him the
letter I had written. He said I was giving him too great praise and
taking all the blame on myself—did not wish me to publish it. But I said
I had written it; it was too much trouble to write it again. And so I
sent it. We parted on the best of terms. He said he had a greater regard
for me than ever, and so on. In fact I have no doubt he was much
relieved by being rid of me.”
The opinion Gordon gave Lord Ripon on the Afghan question was this. He
said either Yakub Khan was guilty or not. If he was not, and there was
no reason for saying he was (_vide_ secret papers, Court of Enquiry on
Yakub Khan), he ought in justice to be restored. And moreover he was the
only man who was likely to be able to hold the country who had any
following. “‘Take him back yourself, my Lord. You can easily do it with
3,000 cavalry. If you succeed, you will be looked upon as the greatest
Governor-General India ever had, and if you fail and are killed you will
have a splendid marble monument put up to you.’ But Lord Ripon did not
seem to see the monument. I offered to do it myself with Yakub and some
lakhs of rupees. But they would not have it. What was the use of my
being there? There was no one who cared to look forward and have a
policy, only to let things drift.”
As to Candahar, Gordon’s opinion was that we ought to give in to the
Ruler of Afghanistan if we wished him to hold the country. The position
of Candahar with relation to Herat and Cabul was such [here a diagram is
given] that it was impossible for any man to really rule the country
unless he held Candahar. But he thought we had managed our withdrawal
from Cabul very badly. We had been in such a hurry as to look like
running away. Our prestige in India had been much shaken by the Maimand
disaster, and Roberts had only been able to get at Ayoub Khan’s
rearguard. As an illustration of our loss of prestige in India, he gave
an incident which occurred lately. When the Russian gunboats were in the
harbour of Bombay, the Parsees brought their children to see them and to
be introduced to the Russian officers.
Things were constantly happening which must have made his presence—to
say the least—irksome with a man of Lord Ripon’s calibre of mind. For
instance, the day before they started [from London], Lord Houghton was
lunching with Lord Ripon, Gordon kept away till after lunch was over.
But Lord Houghton was still there when he came in. On being introduced
by Lord Ripon, Lord Houghton said he was delighted to hear he was going
as private secretary; he could not congratulate Lord Ripon too highly on
his great good luck in having such a secretary; he was very glad Lord
Ripon was going as Governor-General, but almost more glad that Gordon
was going as his secretary.
EARL OF NORTHBROOK TO GENERAL C. G. GORDON
_Private._
_Jan._ 18, 1884.
MY DEAR GENERAL,
I enclose a letter to Sir William Hewett. We have written officially to
him by this mail announcing your mission, and authorizing him to meet
your demands up to £1,000 upon your receipts. I am sure you will like
Hewett. As there is no telegraphic communication with Suakin we shall
arrange for the Helicon to be at Suez from Malta to take you to Suakin.
If she should not be available you will have to put up with the Cygnet,
but she is not nearly so comfortable as the Helicon.
I will telegraph to you to Port Said to say which arrangement has been
made, to the care of the senior officer.
I was very glad to see you in such good heart about affairs this
afternoon, and I trust that by God’s blessing you will succeed in
arranging them as satisfactorily as circumstances admit.
Yours very sincerely,
NORTHBROOK.
GENERAL C. G. GORDON TO MISS GORDON
19. 1. 84.
MY DEAR AUGUSTA,
I arrived in town very tired at 6 a.m. yesterday, went with Brockenhurst
to Barracks, washed and went [to] Wolseley, he said Ministers would see
me at 3 p.m. I went back to Barracks and reposed. At 12.30 p.m. Wolseley
came for me. I went with him and saw Granville, Hartington, Dilke and
Northbrook; they said had I seen W. and did I understand their ideas. I
said yes, and repeated what W. had said to me as to their ideas, which
was “_they would evacuate Soudan_.” They were pleased and said, “that
was their idea. Would I go?” I said “yes.” They said “when?” I said “To-
night.” And it was over. I started at 8 p.m. H.R.H. [Cambridge] and Lord
W. [Wolseley] came to see me off. I saw Henry [Sir H. Gordon] and Bob
[R. F. Gordon], no one else except Stokes, all very kind. I have taken
Stewart with me, a nice fellow, we are now in train near Mont Cenis. I
am not moved a bit, and hope to do the people good. Will you tell Sir J.
Cowell all this. Lord Granville said Ministers were very much obliged to
me. I said I was much honoured by going. I telegraphed King [of
Belgians] at once, and told him to wait a few months. Kindest love Mina,
Helen and yourself, A. Burton, and Hayter and Ellen [these two were
servants at Rockstone Place].
Believe me, my dear Augusta, yr. affect. brother
C. G. GORDON.
_Address_—Care H.M. Consul Suez.
MEMORANDUM AS TO GENERAL GORDON’S DOINGS IN CAIRO, JANUARY 1884, BY
COLONEL [SIR CHARLES] WATSON (FROM SIR HENRY GORDON’S PAPERS)
On Saturday the 19th January when I went into Sir Evelyn Wood’s room at
the War Office he said, “Embrace me.” I said, “What has happened?” He
said, “The English Government is sending General Gordon out to settle
the affairs of the Soudan, and he started from London last night with
Colonel Stewart by the Brindisi Mail.” I said, “That is the best thing I
have heard for the last year. Is it to be made public, or is it still a
secret?” He said, “It is to be made as public as possible, tell
everybody.” Then we did some ordinary business, and I went to my own
office. Colonel Bruce Campbell was there, having come as usual for the
latest information. He said, “What news have you for me?” I replied,
“The newest and best is that General Gordon is coming out to settle the
Soudan, and is now on his way.” He said, “I don’t believe it. The
English Government will never let him come.” “Well,” I said, “I think
you’ll see it’s true.” Then he went away.
That evening I had to take some papers to Nubar’s house for him to sign.
Soon after I went in he said, “I am to be congratulated. The weight of
the Soudan is off my shoulders. If any one can manage it, Gordon can.”
He really did seem glad that Gordon was coming out, which was good of
him considering the abusive way in which Gordon had both written and
spoken of him.
The next day Nubar stopped me in the street to talk about Bashi Bazouks,
who had come to Cairo and were troubling him about their pay, and he
again repeated how glad he was that Gordon was coming out. The following
day every one was talking about it; several Egyptians said, “Finished
with the Mahdi.” But that was too hopeful a view. I had to see Major
Vincent about the War Office budget, in which he was very eager to make
more economies, and he asked how much money was Gordon likely to want
for taking all the people out of the Soudan and settling up the affairs
there. I said that Gordon couldn’t answer that question himself, that
there was no doubt that he would do the job better and cheaper than any
one else. Sir Evelyn Baring seemed hopeful and said, “That it was
specially understood that Gordon was under the English and not under the
Egyptian Government, and that therefore he would be under him [Baring]
and not under Nubar. But,” he added smiling, “not that it is very likely
that Gordon will take orders from me or any one else.”
The next day, the 22nd, Sir Evelyn Wood said to me, “Gordon is coming
out with the intention of going straight through the Canal and on to
Suakin, without coming to Cairo; I can quite understand his not liking
to come to Cairo, but it is very important he should see Baring before
going to the Soudan, and it would look badly if he did not call on the
Khedive. I shall therefore go down to Port Said to-morrow to meet and
try to bring him up to Cairo, and I want you to come with me. Nubar has
arranged for a boat and train to bring him up here.”
That day there was a telegram from Slatin Bey in Darfour, stating that
he was constantly being attacked by the Mahdi’s people, that his
ammunition was running out, his soldiers were getting demoralized, and
he had had to shoot several of them, and he could not hold out much
longer unless ammunition and reinforcements were sent him. It was
arranged to send a telegram to Dongola to be sent to him as soon as
possible, telling him that General Gordon was going to the Soudan to
withdraw all the Egyptian troops, and everybody else who wished to
leave. This message was to be sent to the Mudir of Dongola with orders
to send it on by several different messengers, so as to make sure of
Slatin Bey getting it.
In the afternoon Sir E. Wood asked me to see Nubar to make sure that the
necessary arrangements had been made for bringing Gordon quickly up from
Port Said. Nubar looked very tired and spoke French, said he was too
tired to talk in English. He sent for Tigrane who looked very sulky, but
it was not clear whether it was because Gordon was coming out, or
because he was not so important a man as in Cherif’s time. Nubar gave
him orders to see that everything was ready for Gordon’s journey, and
said that no expense would be spared to send him to Khartoum in the
shortest possible time, as the sooner he got there, the sooner things
would be settled. That night we dined at Sir E. Baring’s, a regular
Consular dinner—Austrian, Russian, Netherlands, etc. I was sitting next
Tigrane, who would hardly say a word; he does not seem quite to approve
of the advance of English ideas. Nubar on the contrary, who was also
there, seemed very cheerful. It will be curious to see whether Tigrane
will continue to work with Nubar or not. Other people came in after
dinner for dancing.
The next morning Sir E. Wood sent to me to say that he was unhappy about
Slatin Bey and the people in Darfour, and asked me to ask Nubar not to
send the message to Dongola until Gordon had arrived. Nubar was not in
his office, and I waited a good while in Tigrane’s room, who was much
more talkative than the night before. He said he was not let to do
anything now, and that Nubar and Sir E. Baring managed everything. He
seemed rather doubtful of the success of Gordon’s mission to the Soudan,
on account of the power that the Mahdi had up there.
At 11.30 Sir E. Wood and I started for Ismaïlia, and arrived there about
5 p.m. Sir Evelyn was rather uneasy in his mind about Gordon, as he
thought it might be difficult to persuade him to come to Cairo. At
Ismaïlia we were met by the Governor and other Notables, and went
straight over to the pier, where a steam launch was waiting to take us
to Port Said; among others who were there was Khalil Agha, an Albanian
policeman, who had been with me in the campaign, and who had now charge
of the roads and gardens at Ismaïlia. A little French red faced doctor
begged for a passage as he had been telegraphed for from Port Said. We
started at once and reached Port Said at 11.30 p.m. A lot of people met
us, and accompanied Sir Evelyn to the Hôtel des Pays Bas, where rooms
had been engaged for him by the Governor.
Next morning I went to the P. and O. Office and saw Mr. Roy, who said
that the “Tanjore” from Brindisi would not be in till the afternoon, but
he was proved to be wrong, for half an hour afterwards she was in sight,
and, by the time we had finished breakfast, and Sir Evelyn had inspected
the company of the 8th Battalion stationed at Port Said, the “Tanjore”
was in the harbour close to H.M.S. “Carysfort,” which had been sent from
Malta to take General Gordon to Suakin, and was now waiting for him with
steam up ready to start. Our steam launch was at the pier, and we went
out to the “Tanjore” at once. General Gordon was on the poop talking to
Col. Stewart. A minute served to make him and Sir E. Wood acquainted
with one another, and at the same moment the English Consul put into
General Gordon’s hands a bundle of cipher telegrams from Lord Granville
and Sir E. Baring, and Col. Stewart and I went down at once into the
saloon to decipher them. The Captain of the “Carysfort” came on board to
report his ship ready, and Sir E. Wood seemed at first a little doubtful
how to break the intelligence to General Gordon that he was expected to
come to Cairo instead of going to Suakin as he intended, but the latter
proved quite amenable, and as soon as he was told that the steam launch
was alongside to take him to Ismaïlia, said he was ready to start at
once; so their baggage was put in, and in five minutes we were steaming
to Ismaïlia somewhat to the astonishment of the Captain of the
“Carysfort,” who expected to have taken the General with him. Stewart
and I continued deciphering the telegrams, which were all to the same
effect, that General Gordon had better go to Cairo while he and Sir
Evelyn Wood were becoming acquainted with one another. It was curious to
think that Gordon had sent Sir Evelyn to Egypt, while Sir Evelyn had
really been the means of getting Gordon sent to the Soudan.
Although Gordon had started so readily for Cairo, he at first seemed of
opinion it would have been better if he had gone to Suakin to make
friends with the chief of the tribes who were fighting against Baker. He
seemed to have little doubt of the practicability of the scheme, but, as
he might not have been able to get by that road to Khartoum, and as the
main thing was to get him to that place as soon as possible, there is
little doubt it was better for him to go by the Nile valley. The five
hours to Ismaïlia were employed by Sir E. Wood making Gordon fully
acquainted with the state of affairs in Egypt and the Soudan. At five
o’clock we reached Ismaïlia and went at once to the station, where a
special train was ready to take Gordon to Cairo. In the carriage was
Mahommed Bey Tuhami, who had formerly been Gordon’s secretary in the
Soudan, and who had been sent down by Gordon’s request to meet him. He
is jet black and now quite blind, having lost his sight on the White
Nile, whither Gordon sent him for taking bakshish to the extent of
£3,000. This did not prevent his being very glad to see his old master
again, and his pleasure was increased when Gordon put £100 into his
hands. He is a wonderful old man, very clear-headed about the Soudan,
knowing nearly every chief by name. He said that Mousa, the chief of the
Hadendowa, whom Gordon had hoped to meet at Suakin [was away] and that
his son Mohammed was at Kassala with part of the tribe, while the rest
of it had left him, and with the Halega tribe under Osman Digna were
fighting against Baker at Suakin. It is possible, therefore, that Gordon
might not have found it as easy as he thought to get through that way.
Tuhami was of opinion that a great many people in the Soudan would be
very glad to hear of Gordon’s arrival, and that many of those who had
joined the Mahdi on account of their hatred of the Egyptian Government
would leave him. He repeatedly insisted that the rebellion was rather
against bad Government than a religious revolt.
The train reached Cairo at 9 o’clock, but there were not many waiting to
receive the General as we were not due till half an hour later. Gordon
went off with Sir E. Wood. After he had started Nubar Pasha and the
Khedive’s first aide-de-camp came up just too late to receive him.
The next morning Mohammed Tuhami came to our house with a clerk, Abo El
Melik Shai, and at once set to work to write telegrams to a number of
the Notable people in the Soudan, informing them that Gordon was going
up to bring peace to the country. During the morning one Arab after
another came in until there were seven or eight at work. Gordon looked
in for a few minutes, but spent most of the time with Sir E. Baring, Sir
E. Wood and Nubar. He also went to see the Khedive, and said he had been
very humble and made it up with him. He arranged with him that Abd el
Shakoor, the son of Abd el Kader, one of the late Sultans of Darfour,
was to be sent back to that country. This had been proposed by Gordon
years ago. The Khedive would never agree to it before. In the afternoon
Abd el Shakoor looked in, and the meeting between him and Tuhami was
very interesting. It should be remembered that Tuhami was secretary to
Ismael Pasha Ayoub when he as Governor-General of the Soudan conquered
Darfour, or to speak more correctly when Zebehr Rahama conquered it for
him and killed the Sultan. The young man, Abd el Shakoor, seems
intelligent, but at first sight does not show the strength of character
which he would require. Gordon came in and told him he was to start with
him the next night. The young man asked for a few days delay to collect
his family, but Gordon cut him short, saying, “Look, you want a throne,
throne first, family afterwards.” Tuhami and the other clerks did not
finish their work until late.
After dinner I went over to Sir E. Wood’s to see Gordon, who had just
gone; Sir E. was sitting with Slade, and was very low. Gordon, who
before he left London had protested in the strongest manner against
sending Zebehr to the Soudan, had that evening written a paper to show
why it would be a good thing to take Zebehr with him. Sir E. said he had
a great respect for Gordon, but he really could not change his opinion
entirely in twelve hours. I said it was not the least surprising, as it
was very usual for Gordon to change his opinion on the smallest
provocation; but in this case I was sure it would all come right, and
that Zebehr would not go. In the same paper he expressed a wish that
Zebehr and he might be confronted with one another in order that the
former might bring any accusation against him he thought fit.
Leaving Sir E. I went home and found Gordon, who seemed equally low. He
said he had been talking all day and was quite done. Speedy was also at
our house, and he and Gordon had been having an argument about King John
of Abyssinia. He rather took King John’s part, while Gordon said he was
a man on whom no reliance could be placed. Gordon said King John had
never stated what he wants, and that if he had a port he wouldn’t know
what to do with it. He said, however, he might have Senheit and
Gallabat, and free trade at Massowah.
The next morning Tuhami came again and wrote a proclamation for Gordon
to distribute in the Soudan. Gordon stopped at our house for a couple of
hours, during which time a great many people, principally Egyptians,
came to see him. The majority were persons whom he had known before, and
who wished to go up to the Soudan with him. He refused all the
applications, and the only two he agreed to take with him were Ibrahim
Bey Fawzi, who had formerly been with him in the Soudan, and Ibrahim
Effendi Ruchdi, whom he took as clerks. Ibrahim Bey Fawzi had been
promoted by Gordon to every grade from Lieutenant to Colonel, and
regarded Gordon as his Father. He had also at one time been in disgrace
with Gordon, and had been put in chains. During the Egyptian campaign
Ibrahim Fawzi had been with the rebels at Abou Kir, and had been without
employment since the disbandment of the old Egyptian army. Ibrahim
Ruchdi was a Khartoum clerk, who had been temporarily employed in the
Soudan office in Cairo. Gordon took him back to the Soudan at an
increased rate of pay, _i.e._, £20 a month. A little later in the
morning a deputation of merchants interested in the Soudan commerce came
to present Gordon with an address, and to beg that he would do what he
could to protect the interests of Soudan merchants. He replied to them
that he had been sent out from England by the English Government with a
definite object, viz., to withdraw the Egyptian Government from the
Soudan; that they all knew that the Egyptian Government in the Soudan
was bad, and had been used to oppress the people; that the present state
of affairs could not continue, but that he would do his best to set up
some system of self-government in the Soudan. After the deputation
retired, General Gordon went out, and I went to the War Office and
arranged for lithographing the proclamation alluded to above.
General Gordon and Colonel Stewart lunched with us. Giegler Pasha came
in afterwards and we all went to Sir E. Baring’s, with whom were Nubar
Pasha and Sir Evelyn Wood. Sir Evelyn Baring said that General Gordon
had expressed a wish that certain matters between him and Zebehr Pasha
might be discussed, and Zebehr Pasha was called in. Gordon and Zebehr
sat near one another, with an interpreter between, and Zebehr Pasha was
asked what he had to say. He said that Gordon without cause had
confiscated his property, had put his people in chains, and had caused
his son to be killed, that when Gordon had gone to the Soudan he
(Zebehr) had put his hand on his (Gordon’s) hand and had asked him to
consider his son as his own son. Then General Gordon said that he had
confiscated the property of Zebehr because he had been convicted by a
court of enquiry at Khartoum of having instigated his son to revolt
against the Government, that the conviction was to a certain extent
based upon a letter written from Zebehr to his son and found among the
latter’s (Suliman’s) papers. _Zebehr_: “I never wrote such a letter. You
should produce it as proof of what you say.” _General Gordon_: “I cannot
produce the letter as it was attached to the proceedings of the court
and sent with the latter to his Highness the Khedive. If the proceedings
can be found the letter should be found with them.” _Zebehr_: “If the
letter can be found I deserve to lose my head,” and he drew his hand
across his throat. _Gordon_: “If the letter was not written, I was not
justified in what I did.” Then Sir Evelyn Baring said that he would see
that the “proceedings” were looked for, and he directed Sir E. Wood to
endeavour to find them. Then _Zebehr_ said to Gordon: “And you killed my
son, although I had specially entrusted him to your care.” _Gordon_: “I
did take care of your son and I had him promoted to the rank of Bey, and
then afterwards he treacherously killed 200 Egyptian soldiers in the
Bahr Gazal.” _Zebehr_ fenced with the question for some time and at last
said: “I was no longer responsible for my son, you had made him a Bey,
you were responsible.” Then _Sir E. Baring_ said that “apparently there
were two questions between Zebehr and Gordon, the first concerning
Zebehr himself which turned on the existence of a certain letter which
would be searched for, that if Zebehr was proved not to be guilty he
would see that compensation was made to him for his losses; the second
question concerned Zebehr’s son, for whose action it now appeared Zebehr
did not hold himself responsible.” Zebehr stood up and made a speech
mainly to the effect that the name of England and the justice of England
were known to all nations, and that he would leave all in the hands of
his Excellency. Zebehr then left the room. Sir E. Baring said that the
next point to discuss was whether Zebehr Pasha was to go to the Soudan
or not, as General Gordon had suggested the advisability of his going.
General Gordon said: “I had better not be here while you are discussing
that. Hear what Watson has to say.” And he went out. Sir E. Baring asked
me what I had to say, and I answered that I considered it would be the
greatest possible mistake to let Zebehr go to the Soudan with Gordon,
and that, if my own opinion was of no value, I had been requested by one
who knew the Soudan well to do all I could to prevent his going, as it
was almost certain that one or the other would not come back alive. Sir
E. Wood also said that he did not think it advisable for Zebehr to go,
and Nubar Pasha expressed the same opinion, but more mildly. Nubar gave
me the idea that for some reason or other he was annoyed at having
Zebehr’s affairs stirred up again and wanted it to relapse into oblivion
as soon as possible. Gordon and Zebehr were then called in again, and
Sir E. Baring informed the latter that it was considered desirable he
should not at present go to the Soudan, but that the question of his
return and of his position generally would be discussed as soon as
General Gordon had returned in safety. Soon after, every one went away.
That evening there was a large dinner at Sir E. Wood’s, Nubar Pasha, Abd
el Kader, etc., etc. At 9 o’clock we drove to Boulac Dakrour station to
see Gordon off, his train was to start at 9.30, but at the last minute
it appeared that Abd el Shakoor, the Sultan of Darfour, in place of
coming with two or three people as Gordon had arranged, had brought all
his family and followers, nearly fifty in number. Gordon did not like to
leave them behind, so fresh carriages were put on, and the people and
baggage were tumbled into the train, which started at 10.30. During the
following days Tuhami brought me several papers respecting affairs in
the Soudan, which he asked me to send to General Gordon for his
guidance.
Cairo, _10th Feb._, 1884.
GENERAL SIR GERALD GRAHAM TO SIR HENRY GORDON
Saxon, _Feb. 4th_, 1884.
MY DEAR SIR HENRY,
I have been accompanying your brother as far as Korusko and seen him
start off on his journey across the desert. He is much more cheery and
confident than he was when he left Cairo, and looks forward to
constructing a government and army out of native materials as if it were
the simplest thing in the world. He has certainly an extraordinary
influence over the natives, the secret of which seems to me to be that
he is really fond of them and enters into their feelings, while he at
the same time shows an energy that must appear to them superhuman. . . .
GERALD GRAHAM.
GENERAL C. G. GORDON TO MONSIEUR DE MOUTARDIN, RUE ROGATE, NO. 7, PARIS
(FROM SIR HENRY GORDON’S PAPERS)
(_Apparently translated from the French._)
Khartoum, 5 _Novr._ 84.
MY DEAR SIR,
Thank you for your letter 25 August received yesterday by a spy, and
also for your good wishes for our security. The Arabs are tranquil
enough, they are at the South and S.W. and East, but otherwise they are
not. We are in much vicissitude. I regret sensibly that your Consul, Mr.
Harbin, who went down in a steamer with Colonel Stewart, and Mr. Power,
English Consul, after an uproar were killed _en route_ with the other
M.M. I do not understand, for the steamer had been blinded, had a gun
and a good force. They left here the 10th of September. I had them
escorted below Berber, and they ought to have been at Dongola the 20th
September, but an officer has informed me that on the 14th October they
had not arrived there. It is very grievous. Excuse a longer letter, for
I have so many things to do.
Believe me my dear M. de Moutardin, Yours sincerely,
C. G. GORDON.
P.S. You say to me, “Expedition for my relief,” thank you,
no,—“Expedition for the relief of the garrisons of the Soudan,” _that is
the title_ you understand, is it not? I was sent to succour the
garrisons of the Soudan, I have failed, they sent the Troops to make up
for the failure on my part. Slatin Bey is with the Mahdi 8 miles distant
from here, he is well and has become Muslim, as they say is the case
with all the Europeans! The time of Martyrs for the faith is ended!
SIR CHARLES WATSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON
War Office, Cairo, 24. 2. 1885.
MY DEAR SIR HENRY,
Since posting my letter to you I have had forwarded to me from Korti a
letter from your brother dated 14. 12. 84. It is sad to get it, but I
thought you would like a copy, so send one. He evidently knew there was
treachery at work in Khartoum some time before it fell. The last
paragraph concerns some small commissions I did for him, it is of no
consequence. The letter was given to Sir Charles Wilson at Gubat by
Kashim el Moos, who commanded the steamers. So Wilson must have had an
anxious time going up. He would have done anything to save your brother,
and must have felt there was no hope before he left Khartoum behind him.
It is a sad story, but I cannot help envying your brother,
Ever yours sincerely,
C. M. WATSON.
I have shown the letter to Sir F. Stephenson and Sir E. Baring. The
latter took a copy of it.
_Enclosure._
Khartoum, 14. 12. 84.
MY DEAR WATSON,
I think the game is up and send Mrs. Watson, you and Graham my adieux.
We may expect a catastrophe in the town in or after 10 days time. This
would not have happened (if it does happen) if our people had taken
better precautions as to informing us of their movements. But this is
“spilt milk,” good bye. Mind and let my brother (68, Elm Park Road,
Chelsea) know what I owe you.
Yours sincerely,
C. G. GORDON.
The above was received at Gubat by Sir C. Wilson on the 22 January 1885.
SIR CHARLES WATSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON
War Office, Cairo, 10. 3. 1885.
MY DEAR SIR HENRY,
Since last writing to you I have had a second letter from your brother,
but of earlier date than the one of which I sent you a copy. I am so
often asked for copies of it that I have had it lithographed in
facsimile, and enclose you a copy of it. You will see he speaks strongly
about the government, and he had reason. Why was not General Graham
allowed to go on last year? But it is not much use talking about it now.
I only hope that the government will at last realize that the Soudan
business is a large one that will take years to settle. I have seen
young Anderson of the artillery. He started for Souakim yesterday with
General Graham.
I hope you are all well,
Yours very sincerely,
C. M. WATSON.
_Enclosure in Facsimile._
Kartum, 26. 11. 84.
MY DEAR WATSON,
Thanks for your letter which I received yesterday, the steamer which
brought it, had to run the gauntlet of no end of rifle fire and of 6
guns, she was struck 3 times by shells, but only 7 were wounded. I hope
you and Mrs. Watson are well. I am not ill-treated I consider, but the
Cairo people up here they are the ill used. I will accept _nothing
whatever_ from Gladstone’s Government. I will not even let them pay my
expenses. I will get the King to pay them. I will never put foot in
England again—but will (D.V. if I get out) go to Brussels and so on to
Congo. How is Miss Arnott, the lady who was with me? I greatly fear for
Stewart, Power and Herbin, French Consul. With kindest regards, believe
me yours sincerely, with kindest regards to Mrs. Watson,
C. G. GORDON.
LAST TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL GORDON (FROM AMONG MRS. MOFFITT’S PAPERS)
Junior United Service Club,
London, S.W.
8 _June_ 1886.
An Egyptian Clerk, who was taken prisoner by the rebels at the fall of
Khartoum, and at last succeeded in effecting his escape from Omdurman,
gave me a copy of an Arabic telegram of which he said the following was
the story.
On or about the 29th December 1884, General Gordon dictated this
telegram to him. It was written on a small piece of paper. General
Gordon then took a cartridge, took out the bullet and shook the
gunpowder out of it. He then folded up the telegram, put it in the
cartridge in place of the powder, and replaced the bullet, so that the
cartridge looked as if it had not been touched. General Gordon then gave
it to a messenger who put it with his other cartridges and started for
Dongola.
I have never heard that he arrived, neither have I any means of
confirming the truth of the clerk’s story. It seems, however, very
unlikely that he should have invented such a tale, or have written the
telegram himself.
The translation of the telegram is as follows:
“To the Sovereign of the Kingdom.
“After salutations. I would at once, calling to mind what I have gone
through, inform their Majesties the Sovereigns of the actions of Great
Britain and the Ottoman Empire, who appointed me as Governor-General of
the Soudan for the purpose of appeasing the rebellion in that country.
“During the twelve months that I have been here, these two Powers, the
one remarkable for her wealth and the other for her military force, have
remained unaffected by my situation, perhaps relying too much on the
news sent by Hussein Pasha Khalifa who surrendered of his own accord.
Although I personally am too insignificant to be taken into account, the
Powers were bound nevertheless to fulfil the engagement upon which my
appointment was based, so as to shield the honor of the Governments.
“What I have gone through I cannot describe. The Almighty God will help
me.”
I would observe that the fact of General Gordon speaking of having been
“twelve months” in the Soudan would lead to the supposition that the
telegram was written later than the clerk stated. This is quite possible
as Egyptians are not good at remembering dates.
C. M. WATSON.
SIR CHARLES WILSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON
Mountjoy Barracks, Phœnix Park, Dublin,
_Sep._ 9 1885.
MY DEAR GORDON,
There has never been any doubt in my mind as to the manner of your
brother’s death. He was killed before sunrise, apparently before it was
quite daylight, a short distance outside the Palace gates, where he met
a party of Arabs. He fell at the first discharge, but whether killed, or
severely wounded, we do not know; his body when seen afterwards had
several lance wounds, and his head was cut off by a Dugaini Arab and
exposed on a pole in the open space between the Mahdi’s two camps at
Omdurman. I tried to keep these details from the correspondents in the
Sudan, knowing how painful they would be to you and his family, but as
you have asked for them I give them now. The body was left on the ground
some time, and then appears to have been buried with others in the ditch
south of Khartum. One account was that the body was buried under a large
cairn of stones, where it fell, by people throwing stones at it as they
passed, a common Arab custom. The decapitation is also Arab and what one
might naturally expect; on the other hand the Arabs never mutilate the
dead as the Ethiopic tribes do. Our dead were untouched except by lance
thrusts, whilst those on the Sawakin side were horribly mutilated. You
may therefore be certain that no insult was offered to your brother’s
body.
My view is that your brother was roused up, just before daylight, by the
news that the Arabs had entered the town, that he hastily collected his
cavasses (armed servants) and left the Palace with the intention of
reaching the stone church, where the ammunition was stored, and then of
blowing up the magazine or trying to hold out till we arrived. He
probably intended picking up the Austrian Consul on his way, but
unfortunately was met by a party of Arabs just after he left the Palace
gates. The Arabs apparently did not know it was your brother when they
fired; they only saw the cavasses in their Egyptian uniform. Your
brother, if he had chosen, might have made an attempt to save his own
life by going on board the steamers which always had steam up; but you
know as well as I do he would never have done that. The steamers tried
to get down the river, but turned back when fire was opened upon them
from Omdurman; had a European been on board they might have run the
gauntlet. My account of your brother’s death is based on two independent
reports made not very long after the fall of Khartum and before the wild
stories which so rapidly grow out of such an event, in semi-civilised
countries, had time to obscure the truth. In all essential particulars
these reports have been confirmed by later ones. The two reports I
allude to were one by a cavass of Ibrahim Bey Rushdi’s, whose master was
killed with your brother and who was present when they were killed. This
man was of Turkish origin, and bribed some Arabs to bring him across the
desert; from Khartum he went down to Cairo with the Mudir of Dongola.
The other was by a leading Sheikh of the Shagiyeh, whom we had sent to
Khartum with letters for your brother; this man was in Khartum when it
fell, and saw your brother’s body not long after he had been killed; he
came down to us by the Wady Bishara road. The two men were unknown to
each other, of different race, and came by different roads, at an
interval of a few days; there could not therefore have been any
collusion.
Watson is collecting all he can about the last days at Khartum; have you
written to him?
Yours sincerely,
C. W. WILSON.
NOTES FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH A REFUGEE WHO CAME FROM KHARTOUM ON OR
ABOUT THE 3RD NOVEMBER 1887 TO SUAKIN (FROM AMONG MRS. MOFFITT’S PAPERS)
Rank, _Sergt. Major_.
Nationality, _Turk_.
Was formerly in the Garrison at Berber, but escaped at its fall to
Kartoum, where he was one of four Sergeants Orderlies to Gordon. He was
“on duty” on the 26th, and was with Gordon in the “look out” on the top
of the Palace. Gordon the evening before warned the people that he had
seen a great deal of extra excitement going on in the rebel camp, and
that unless a “good resistance was made that night the town would fall.”
The soldiers were in a starving state and many left the lines in search
of food, the civilians armed themselves and went on to the lines. As the
morning star rose the rebels made a feint at the portion of the defence
under Ferag Pasha (with the black troops), but at the same time they
directed their full attack at the defence commanded by Hassan Bey
Benassawie (with the 5th Regt., fellaheen) and succeeded in getting into
the town. Gordon, when he heard the rebels in the town, said: “It is all
finished; to-day Gordon will be killed (“enhardeh Gordon cassoora”), and
went downstairs, followed by the four sergeants, who took their rifles
with them. He took a chair and sat down on the right of the Palace door,
the four sergeants standing on his left; all at once a sheikh galloped
up with some Baggara Arabs; the sergeants were on the point of firing
when Gordon, seizing one of their rifles, said: “No need of rifles; to-
day Gordon is to be killed” (as before). The Sheikh told Gordon that he
had been ordered by the Mahdi to bring him alive. Gordon refused to go,
saying that he would die where he was, and adding that no harm was to be
done to the four sergeants who had not fired on the rebels. The Sheikh
repeated the order three times, and each time Gordon gave the same
answer. After a few words the Sheikh drew his sword and rushing up to
Gordon cut him in a slanting direction over the left shoulder, Gordon
looking him straight in the face and offering no resistance of any kind.
His head was cut off and taken to the Mahdi at Omdurman, and his body
was buried close to the door of the Palace and a tomb built over it. The
four sergeants were not hurt, but taken prisoners, and two have already
managed to escape. The sergeant, on being questioned about the report
made by Colonel Kitchener, states that food was so scarce that Gordon
himself lived on a handful of doura, which was made into a thick soup,
the people living chiefly on the fibre of the palm-tree made into cakes.
All the animals were killed, with the exception of a donkey, over which
there was a guard. Finally an officer stole it and sold its flesh at any
price he asked. A fish was caught and sold in a similar manner.
Ibrahim Bey Fowsi is now at Omdurman, Farag Ullah Bey is at Galabat.
SIR CHARLES WATSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON
Cairo, 2 _July_ 1885.
MY DEAR SIR HENRY,
Very many thanks for sending me the “Journals,” which have reached me
this afternoon. I have only just had time to glance at them, but write
at once to catch the Italian mail. They seem most interesting. What a
pity it is that he did not keep them all from the beginning of the siege
instead of sending them down by Stewart, but of course he thought it
safer to do the latter.
I was very glad to read your paper in the introduction about Sir Charles
Wilson, who seems to be unjustly blamed. Have you seen him since he came
to England? I was a little sorry to see the footnote on page 121 about
Abd-el-Kader Pasha, as it does not quite convey the truth about his
refusal to go to the Soudan. He agreed to go on certain conditions, the
most important of which was that the abandonment of the Soudan was not
to be announced, but in the instructions which were drawn up for him the
abandonment was a leading feature. I made this note upon them at the
time.
“N.B. Abd-el-Kader did not agree to these instructions on the ground
that an immediate abandonment of Khartoum was inexpedient, and that to
go to the Soudan with such an intention would lead to certain failure.
The proposal to send him therefore fell through (16 Jan. 1884).”
Abd-el-Kader always remained of the same opinion that to proclaim the
abandonment of the Soudan was to make the removal of the garrisons
impossible. He is one of the best Pashas I have met with, _one who has
not got rich_.
I shall write again when I have read the Journals.
Yours very sincerely,
C. M. WATSON.
SIR CHARLES WILSON’S ACCOUNT OF HIS EXPEDITION TO OMDURMAN SENT TO SIR
H. GORDON
Mountjoy Barracks, Dublin, 27 _July_ 1885.
1. The force under Sir H. Stewart was sent across the desert to occupy
Matammeh, open up communication with General Gordon’s steamers, and
through them with Khartum. It was hoped that the presence of this force,
which was not much larger than a battalion at war strength, on the Nile
at Matammeh would withdraw some of the pressure on Khartum, but it was
not sent to relieve that place.
2. My mission was to communicate with General Gordon; to deliver Lord
Wolseley’s letters to him; to ascertain from him the exact position of
affairs at Khartum; to inform him that the forces advancing for the
relief of Khartum would be concentrated at Matammeh and Shendy by the
first week in March, and to have three officers in Khartum to assist
General Gordon in the defence until relief came. I was then to return to
Korti, bringing the English soldiers down the river with me. There was
never any question of my attempting the relief of Khartum.
3. No one at Gubat, no one on the steamers of General Gordon’s flotilla
had the slightest suspicion that a crisis would occur at Khartum within
a few days of our arrival at Matammeh. The first time that the officers
and men on the steamers expressed a doubt as to the safety of Khartum
was when we came under fire of the guns at Halfiyeh. There was therefore
no urgent necessity for an immediate start without consideration for the
position of the little force which had been more than decimated on its
march to the Nile.
4. The steamers left Gubat at 8 a.m. on the 24th, and arrived off
Omdurman at 2 p.m. on the 28th; they were heavily laden with grain, yet
they made better time up the river as far as times can be compared, than
Lord C. Beresford in the “Safieh,” manned by officers and men of the
Second Division of the Naval Brigade who had come across after the
steamers left; this shows when once started there was no delay. Had the
steamers started at 3 p.m. On the 21st, the day of their arrival, they
would on the evening of the 25th have been some distance below Halfiyeh,
out of sight of Khartum and unable to exert any influence over the
events which occurred at Khartum at dawn on the 26th. It is absurd to
suppose the Mahdi’s plans would have been altered by his knowing the two
steamers were coming up; he probably believed, as General Gordon did,
they could not pass the batteries.
5. The steamers were under fire from both banks, in action with the
Mahdi’s army, for four hours; it was impossible to land in the face of
such a strong force; they came out of action a little after 4, and about
5 or soon after hauled into the bank to obtain information. We
ascertained then, _i.e._ on the evening of the 28th, that Khartum had
fallen through the treachery of Faraj Pasha at dawn on the 26th, and
that General Gordon had been killed. These were the two capital facts
which it was necessary the Government and Lord Wolseley should know; all
we have learned since is matter of detail. There was frequent
communication with natives on the way down; they all told essentially
the same story, and there was never any doubt in my mind as to the truth
of the main points.
6. It may be interesting to know that General Gordon’s last great sortie
was on the 17th January, the day of Abu Klea; and that it is almost
certain he and his garrison had heard of the fight at Abu Klea, and
possibly Gubat before the end came.
C. W. W.
MR. EDWARD HAMILTON TO SIR HENRY GORDON
10, Downing Street, _20th July_ 1884.
DEAR SIR,
I beg to return to you Lord Wolseley’s letter, of which I have retained
a copy.
Mr. Gladstone is much obliged for your further note of to-day on the
subject of the position of affairs at Khartoum. He admits the force of
what you say; but he was under the impression that there was a known
route to the South and to the sea from Khartoum, and that there must be
persons, perhaps many persons, who are acquainted with it from the
course of trade or otherwise. He would be glad to know whether he is
right or wrong in this impression. Faithfully yours,
E. W. HAMILTON.
MEMORANDUM BY SIR HENRY GORDON, DATED _22nd July_ 1884. FORWARDED TO MR.
GLADSTONE, _23rd July_ 1884. GENERAL GORDON’S PRESENT POSITION
There is no proof that Khartoum is invested upon the South—on the
contrary there is presumptive evidence that it is not, since the Rebels,
if in position there, would find it difficult to keep up their
communications for supplies of Food, while their flanks would be exposed
on either side to constant attacks—by means of steamers from Khartoum.
All communications that have come to hand, whether true or not, point to
the country to the South as being open, and as of supplies coming in.
There is no question but what if General Gordon wished to leave with
Colonel Stewart he could do so at any time, he could go to the Bahr-el-
Gazelle—or he could move to the Equator (see General Gordon’s own
statement that he could get away to the Congo, also Sir Samuel Baker’s
letter to the “Times” of 30th April, and to the fact, according to Dr.
Hill’s book, “Colonel Gordon in Central Africa,” that he was travelling
to and fro on a “low Nile,” in March and April 1874).
But it is equally certain that General Gordon would not desert the
people who have been faithful to him.
It is not a question of the safety of the garrison, but it is one of the
protection of the traders at Khartoum.
The former might be moved to Sennaar and thence transported further to
the South, the latter would not leave—to do so would be worse than death
(see enclosure in No. 3, Egypt, dated Khartoum, 8th April 1884, showing
that General Gordon had traded with the people whom he would not
desert).
The question would be the same if a force were at Khartoum.
No doubt General Gordon at this time is doing all he can to secure the
safety of the inhabitants, and would not care how he accomplished it.
It is believed that he is conferring with the Mahdi, having this object
in view, although he has no faith in his (the Mahdi’s) power. If General
Gordon could secure the safety of the people of Sennaar and Khartoum he
would retire, since it may be assumed that Kassala is safe.
It seems probable that the Rebels to the North of Khartoum are
instigated by Zebehr, and that the money at Berber has been too great a
temptation to the Governor of that Station. It is doubtful whether
Berber was not quietly given over to the rebels, and that it did not
fall by assault.
The Tribes to the North of Khartoum rose in rebellion for the reasons
stated in the “Times” of the 10th March, under date of Khartoum 7th
March; “this is not owing to disaffection, but to fear caused by the
pronounced policy of the abandonment of the Soudan, which policy has
been published by sending down the widows and orphans and Cairo
employees from Khartoum. We cannot blame them for rising when no
definite sign is shown of establishing a permanent Government here. The
Mahdi is a nonentity as to any advance on Khartoum, but all-powerful
through his emissaries when backed with pronounced policy of abandonment
without establishing a permanent Government.”
On the other hand while General Gordon may not, at this time, be in
actual personal danger more than that incidental to disaffection at
Khartoum, or from the daily contingencies which present themselves in
time of war, yet the time is approaching when some steps must be taken
to prove that he, as the agent of the British Government, is not to be
abandoned, and to this must be coupled the fact that his ammunition is
running short, and that he has not been heard of for so long a period.
It was hoped that the outbreaks among the tribes to the North of
Khartoum would long ago have been put down, and that the country would
have been quiet: such an expectation, however, has not been realized,
and when General Gordon’s ammunition fails he will be at the mercy of
the Rebels.
In the absence of a Government that could secure the safety of the
inhabitants, matters could not improve, it is therefore necessary,
imperatively so, to reconsider General Gordon’s application to have
Zebehr sent up (see “Times,” 5th March, dated Khartoum, 3rd March).
“It is now admitted that Zebehr Pasha is the only man connected with the
Soudan, who is endowed with the ability and firmness necessary to head
any Government here.
“It is out of the question that General Gordon should leave Khartoum
without first having formed a Government which would in some measure
stem the wave of fearful anarchy that must eventually sweep over the
Soudan. The arrival of Zebehr Pasha would draw off to his side the bands
of rebels which are now scattered over the Soudan, and his great
knowledge of the tribes fits him more than any other man to take the
place of the Egyptian Government. He would, of course, come here under
certain stringent conditions. General Gordon had foreseen this ever
since he left Cairo.” I mentioned to Lord Granville in consequence of
confidential information from Cairo, to the effect “that if Zebehr went
up to Khartoum his first act would be to hang General Gordon,” that it
would be dangerous to send Zebehr up, and to this opinion I have adhered
up to the present time.
As, however, the rebels remain in force to the North of Khartoum, and as
matters have not improved, and cannot improve unless some future in the
way of Government is made clear (bearing also in mind that General
Gordon will not desert the people at Khartoum, unless he can leave them
in safety), the time has now arrived that Zebehr should be sent up. It
would be in compliance with General Gordon’s own request, and Zebehr
might be offered a sum of money provided he established an independent
Government and so enabled General Gordon to leave Khartoum. The payment
might be withheld until the object in view, viz., General Gordon’s
absence from Khartoum, had been secured.
It is believed that if Zebehr was sent up all danger to the peoples at
Khartoum, Sennaar and Kassala would cease, and the country would be
quieted.
At the same time it is necessary that other precautions should be taken
the more especially as General Gordon’s ammunition is daily decreased by
expenditure. It would therefore seem desirable that a force should be
sent to Suakim in order to open the road from that place to Berber (one
of General Gordon’s suggestions), but of course if Zebehr agrees to go,
and is successful, then this force would not be called into action,
although no delay should take place in its preparation.
It would be out of place my making any remarks upon any expedition
advancing by the Nile, nevertheless I do not believe it to be
practicable.
Any movement of Abyssinia upon Kassala and Sennaar would raise the whole
of the Soudan, and would do an amount of harm that cannot be
contemplated.
H. W. GORDON.
THE RT. HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P., TO SIR HENRY GORDON
10, Downing Street, 22 _Feb._ 1885.
DEAR SIR HENRY GORDON,
As long as a hope could in any way be entertained that your
distinguished and excellent brother had survived the betrayal of
Khartoum, I was unwilling to forgo the slender consolation it might
afford; and I have also been delayed in writing this note for two or
three days by an inquiry on a kindred subject. But I cannot longer
forbear from addressing to you my humble tribute to his memory,
insignificant as that tribute must be when rendered to one, whose fame
has not only become a national possession, but gone forth throughout the
world.
Though I had not the privilege of his personal acquaintance, yet his was
a character of which I think many features could be plainly read even
from a distance. The judgement of mankind has pronounced him a hero; and
the application of that lofty name is specially marked in his case by
the fact that it applies not only to his public acts, but to the man; to
the spirit of self-sacrifice, such as distinguished martyrs and
apostles, to a simplicity of character not less remarkable than his
profound enthusiasm and his boundless courage. I cannot but add, though
it is perhaps presumptuous, my admiration of his astonishing command,
under circumstances so difficult of military resource, and of that
inexhaustible strength of will which formed the crown of his powers, it
is difficult to wish any of his virtues had been in any respect
restrained; yet I reflect with pain, now that catastrophe has come, how
ill his generous confidence was requited by some of those for whose
welfare, though they were of a foreign race, it was his desire to live
or die. I congratulate you on your close and intimate association with
General Gordon, and I trust that among us there are and will be many who
will strive to learn lessons in their several places from this noble
example of Christian heroism. Believe me with much respect, faithfully
yours,
W. E. GLADSTONE.
SIR HENRY GORDON TO MR. GLADSTONE
_23rd February_ (1885).
DEAR MR. GLADSTONE,
I am very much obliged for your very kind note of sympathy, and for the
very handsome manner in which you speak of General Gordon’s character
and services. It is not for me to dwell upon them, and the subject is a
very painful one, and therefore I hope you will forgive the brevity of
my reply.
Yours faithfully,
H. W. GORDON.
H.M. QUEEN VICTORIA TO MISS GORDON
Osborne, _17th Feb._ 1885.
DEAR MISS GORDON,
_How_ shall I write to you, or how shall I attempt to express _what I
feel_! To _think_ of your dear, noble, heroic Brother, who served his
Country and his Queen so truly, so heroically, with a self-sacrifice so
edifying to the World, not having been rescued. That the promises of
support were not fulfilled—which I so frequently and constantly pressed
on those who asked him to go—is to me _grief inexpressible_! indeed it
has made me ill! My heart bleeds for you his Sister, who have gone
through so many anxieties on his account, and who loved the dear Brother
as he deserved to be. You are all so good and trustful, and have such
strong faith, that you will be sustained even now, when _real_ absolute
evidence of your dear Brother’s death does not exist—but I fear there
cannot be much doubt of it. Some day I hope to see you again, to tell
you all I cannot express. My daughter Beatrice, who has felt quite as I
do, wishes me to express her deepest sympathy with you. I hear so many
expressions of sorrow and sympathy from _abroad_: from my eldest
daughter the Crown Princess, and from my cousin the King of the
Belgians—the very warmest. Would you express to your other Sisters and
your elder Brother my true sympathy, and what I do so keenly feel, the
_stain_ left upon England, for your dear Brother’s cruel, though heroic,
fate.
Ever
Dear Miss Gordon,
Yours sincerely and sympathizingly,
V. R. I.
MISS AUGUSTA GORDON TO QUEEN VICTORIA
Rockstone Place, Southampton.
MADAM,
The letter which your Majesty has so graciously honoured me with has
deeply touched and gratified me. I am so thankful to know of your
sympathy for, and the endeavours you so very kindly made to save my dear
Brother, though _others dared_ to prevent your supporting him in his
just demands. Never can I cease to be deeply grateful to your Majesty
for the great kindness you have shown towards him. I think he received
the gracious message you sent him through me as in one of the Volumes of
his Diaries he returns a little letter in which I told him of your
Majesty’s message. If permitted I should like to bring over the Original
Diaries when I have the great honour to wait on your Majesty next month.
I am your Majesty’s devoted subject and servant,
M. AUGUSTA GORDON.
MISS AUGUSTA GORDON TO MR. BLUNT
Rockstone Place, Southampton, _11th September_ 1882.
Will you kindly give me a copy (two if you can spare them) of your
letter on Egypt written to Mr. Gladstone and others. I am sending on by
the first mail your letters and the 19th Century to my Brother at the
Cape. Strange you were not listened to by those in authority. I fancy
there are many of your way of thinking and there would be many more if
they knew the rights and wrongs done to Egypt.
A. GORDON.
MR. BLUNT TO GENERAL C. G. GORDON
Delhi, _24th January_, 1884.
MY DEAR GENERAL,
I feel obliged to write to you about your mission to the Soudan. I see
it announced to-day by telegraph without explanation of its object, but
I cannot wait till more definite news arrives, and I desire to warn you.
It may be you are going there to make peace between the Mahdi and our
troops in Egypt, to acknowledge his sovereignty in the Soudan, and
arrange terms for the evacuation of Khartoum. If so, I can only wish you
God speed. It is a good work, and you will accomplish it. But if, as I
fear it may be, from the tradition of some of those in power, the object
of your mission is to divide the tribes with a view to retaining any
part of the country for the Khedive, to raise men for him and scatter
money, it is bad work, and you will fail. It must be so. Neither your
courage, nor your honest purpose, nor the inspiration which has hitherto
guided you, will bring you success. I know enough to be able to assure
you that every honest Mohammedan in Egypt and North Africa and Arabia
sympathizes with the Mahdi’s cause, not necessarily believing him to
have a Divine mission, but as representing ideas of liberty and justice
and religious government which they acknowledge to be divine. For this
reason you will only have the men of Belial on your side, and these will
betray you. I beg you be cautious. Do not trust to the old sympathy
which united Englishmen with the Arabs. I fear it is a thing of the
past, and that even your great name will not protect you with them. Also
consider what your death will mean: the certainty of a cry for vengeance
in England, and an excuse with those who ask no better than a war of
conquest. I wish I could be sure that all those who are sending you on
your mission do not foresee this end. Forgive me if I am wrong in my
fears; and believe me yours, very gratefully, in memory of last year,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MRS. SURTEES-ALLNATT TO MR. BLUNT
134, St. Owens, Hereford, _Dec._ 27, 1884.
DEAR SIR,
Will you allow me, personally a stranger, to tell you how interested I
am in the result of your application to Mr. Gladstone respecting your
mediation with the Mahdi.
You will the more readily understand my great interest, when I mention
that I was in London for some weeks last spring for the purpose of
devising some means for the rescue of General Gordon, and that I was
about the first (I believe) to suggest the Volunteer Expedition of which
I see by the “Pall Mall Gazette” you had heard.
I saw Captain Brocklehurst, having called upon him though a stranger,
but knowing his friendship for General Gordon. My own scheme was in the
first place to have raised a “Khartoum Fund,” for which I had many
promises, and would have had no difficulty in raising from £80,000 and
upwards. My idea was to pay the safe conduct for General Gordon and his
garrison (in fact for all his people at Khartoum) from Khartoum to
Cairo, a certain sum to be paid to the chief of each tribe, the amount
to be in proportion to the extent of territory over which the safe pass
would be given. I saw many members of the House of Commons and other
influential persons, but after discussion, though my plan was approved
by many, it was waived in favour of the Volunteer Expedition, to which I
promised to transfer the £100 I should have subscribed to the “safe
conduct” scheme.
But the Government negatived decidedly the Volunteer movement, and my
plan had fallen through. It was with much regret that I returned here,
having after much anxiety and trouble effected nothing of that on which
my heart was set.
If I had known you were in London I would have ventured to have called
on you. I have a strong personal regard for General Gordon, and with
many members of his family I am on terms of friendship. Now, I am
perplexed whether to wish you success in your application to the
Premier—if it would save General Gordon I would pray for it—but if you
should be frustrating plans for his safety I could not. I write to you
freely though a stranger, and I hope you will forgive me, but the one
great interest which I think we both have in common, General Gordon,
will plead my excuse.
Believe me, dear Sir, yours faithfully,
ELIZABETH SURTEES-ALLNATT.
MR. BLUNT TO MRS. ALLNATT
Crabbet Park, _Dec._ 29, 1884.
MY DEAR MADAM,
I am sorry that I did not know of your plans for rescuing General Gordon
by peaceful means last year, as your support and that of friends so
liberal and sincere in their efforts would have given great weight to my
plea with Mr. Gladstone, and might perhaps have turned the scale with
him in favour of negociation. This course would, I am convinced, have
been an infinitely surer and better one than that of war which our
Government have chosen.
My point of view in the matter is of course rather a different one from
yours, for you look only to General Gordon’s safety, whereas I look
also, and indeed primarily, to the well-being of the Nile populations;
but I see no reason that our efforts should not even now be made in
common.
From all the accounts I receive, Lord Wolseley’s expedition will meet
with determined opposition, and it is quite possible that it may be
several months yet on the road—in which case the time will shortly come
when necessity will compel the Government, if they would not fail
altogether in their object of saving Gordon’s life, to have recourse to
our ideas if not to our help. My principal fear indeed is that, going to
work through ignorance of the conditions before them in a blundering
way, their attempts to treat will be so protracted that Khartoum will in
the interval have fallen. I will not, however, be a prophet of evil,
only I would urge you not to relax your efforts. Any independent appeal
made just now to Mr. Gladstone would, I believe, have at least this good
effect, that it would force on his attention the daily increasing
gravity of Gordon’s situation.
Very faithfully yours,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MRS. SURTEES-ALLNATT TO MR. BLUNT
134, St. Owens, Hereford, _Febry._ 17, 1885.
MY DEAR SIR,
I thank you for your letter just received. I have given up (as you see)
all hope of the precious life having been saved. But how cruel has been
the martyrdom of his, during weeks and months, owing to the Government,
of which one cannot speak with aught but the greatest contempt and
indignation. Knowing the faith of the devoted Christian soldier, I have
the hope or rather the consolation of thinking that as he was deserted
by man so his God was nearer to him day by day.
I go tomorrow (Wednesday) till Saturday to Mr. Egmont Hake, the
Biographer of “Chinese Gordon.” I should like very much to talk over one
or two matters with you now, respecting the recovery of his bible and
journal, etc., and also of the proposed additional expedition. Is it not
madness to send one of the Khedive’s sons as Governor General of the
Soudan? I thought the Egyptians were hated by the poor Soudanese.
Unhappy land! What will be the outcome of all this? God, who created the
world out of chaos, can bring order out of the Egyptian confusion.
Believe me, My dear Sir, Yrs. sincerely,
ELIZABETH SURTEES-ALLNATT.
MRS. SURTEES-ALLNATT TO MR. BLUNT
38, Montpellier Terrace, Cheltenham, _Feb._ 21, 1885.
MY DEAR SIR,
I am staying here till Wednesday, when I shall D.V. return to Hereford,
where I shall anxiously await the result of your kind effort to procure
for me the bible of dear General Gordon.
In the train to-day I read in the papers, with dismay, the reply of the
Government to the questions respecting the important and precious
records of Khartoum kept by its devoted Defender. They decline to say
what course they will take regarding them. I have just written to Sir
Henry Gordon most earnestly beseeching him, out of regard to his
brother’s memory, to apply for the possession of the journal, 6 volumes,
on their arrival. One dreads such important and deeply interesting
records getting into the hands of men so unscrupulous as those
comprising the present Government. The papers would probably be cruelly
mutilated before leaving their hands, if there were aught in them that
would condemn those who sacrificed their devoted Envoy to paltry party
devices.
I am my dear Sir, Yrs. sincerely,
ELIZABETH SURTEES-ALLNATT.
EXTRACT FROM EDITH, LADY LYTTON’S DIARY
_June_ 7, Simla, 1880.—In the evening, while we were at dinner under the
Shemiana on the lawn, Lord William [Beresford] arrived, having left Lord
Ripon at Umballa and come on very quickly to reach us for our last
evening. He says the heat has been tremendous and worse than he has ever
felt it, and he and Major White had to put ice on their heads one night,
expecting every minute to succumb. But Lord Ripon and party have not
complained or been ill. Lord William told us about Colonel Gordon being
so odd; he says the world is not big enough for him, and that there is
no king or country big enough. He hit Lord William on the shoulder,
saying, “Yes, that is flesh, that is what I hate, and what makes me wish
to die.” He resigned the Private Secretaryship, to the Viceroy’s great
inconvenience, because he was asked to answer an address at Bombay
saying that Lord Ripon had read it with interest and would write again
at some time, and he said: “You know perfectly that Lord Ripon has never
read it, and will not write, and I can’t say those sort of things, so I
shall resign, and you take in my resignation.” Colonel Gordon received a
telegram from China asking him to go and fight the Russians there, so he
has gone off to do so, and his last word to Lord William was, “Everyone
will say I am mad, but you say I am not.”
COLONEL LOUIS A. GORDON TO MR. BLUNT
Carpenters, Horsham, Sussex, _Sept._ 4, 1911.
DEAR MR. BLUNT,
I am glad to see that you, in your new book “Gordon at Khartoum,” are
undertaking the vindication of my uncle’s memory against an attack on
it, which Lord Cromer thought fit to make in his “Modern Egypt” so many
years after the death of General Gordon and my father Sir Henry Gordon.
I know that nothing that Lord Cromer could write would in the least
affect General Gordon’s memory; but the remarks he makes leave a nasty
taste in the mouth and it is very desirable that they should be
responded to in detail.
In “Modern Egypt,” page 43, Vol. I, I observe a note which affects my
father, Sir Henry Gordon; Lord Cromer says: “At the instance however, of
General Gordon’s friends and family, a good deal of violent and very
foolish abuse of Lord Granville—and if I remember rightly, of others—was
omitted. It is in my opinion to be regretted that this was done. The
publication of the Journal, as it was originally written, would have
enabled the public to judge more accurately of the value of General
Gordon’s criticisms, than was possible when only an expurgated edition
was issued.” This contains an accusation of tampering with the Journals
which the facts do not warrant.
As far as Sir Henry Gordon is concerned, expurgation of the kind
referred to by Lord Cromer was certainly not authorised. In his
“Description of the Journals,” page lxv, my father says: “I have
arranged . . . for their issue in a very nearly entire state, only some
6 or 7 pages being omitted which contain, in my opinion, no matter of
public interest; while with regard to names those who are well
acquainted with the affairs of Egypt can fill in the blanks without
difficulty.” That no fraud has been exercised on the public in the
matter, and that the public has not been deprived of the opportunity of
reading the Journals in full, is sufficiently plain by the fact that the
Journals were deposited by my family in the British Museum plain for all
folk to see; so that anyone, caring to do so, can satisfy himself on the
subject.
Yrs. sincerely,
L. A. GORDON.
APPENDIX B
MR. BLUNT’S ORIENTAL CORRESPONDENCE
I. AS TO HIS PROPOSED MEDIATION WITH THE MAHDI
MR. BLUNT TO SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU AT PARIS
London, _April_ 7, 1884.
To my noble and dear friend, the learned Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, the
martyr of liberty, may God continue to enlighten him.
Your letter, which Her Ladyship has now translated to me in full, has
given me much pleasure except in what you say of your not being able yet
to come to England; but I send you by this post the money needful for
your journey and trust that you will acknowledge to me its safe arrival.
I wrote four days ago to M. Sanua telling him something of the state of
opinion here, and since that time I have written a letter which will be
published in the ‘Times’ of to-morrow or Wednesday in which I have
proposed a solution of the present difficulties and misfortunes in
Egypt. I trust that it may meet with your approval, for in it I propose
that the Egyptian question shall be referred to an European Congress,
that the English army shall retire from the country and that Egypt shall
be placed under the joint protection of the Powers, and so govern
herself according to her own will.
I propose also that peace shall be made with the Mahdi, and General
Gordon be recalled from Khartoum—nor have I forgotten to recommend that
the decrees of exile against the patriots of Egypt shall be reversed.
With regard to Egypt and Syria and the Arabian Caliphate you know well
my views, for they are published in the book which I wrote three years
ago founded on your learned instructions and your views conveyed to me
through our dear friend (peace be with him) Mohammed Khalil. But with
regard to the Mohammedans of India these are my views, and I beg that
you will communicate them to the noble prince the Seyyid Jemal-ed-Din
(to whom also I send my best compliments) that he may know them himself
and communicate them to the Nawab Rasul Yar Khan and the Ulema of
Hyderabad, though I have already told them of my thoughts, having spoken
freely to all the Mohammedans of India whom I met. My thoughts therefore
about India are these. According to the principles which I hold in
political affairs I desire to see liberty and self government
established everywhere, and in India no less than in other countries of
the world now held in subjection, and I am not prejudiced by the fact
that I was born an Englishman into wishing for other advantage there
than to the Indians, nor should I hesitate to approve of any wise plan
which should hasten their freedom. At the same time my journey in India
has convinced me that the people of that country are not yet
sufficiently united to form an independent nation, unprotected by some
external Power. If all Indians were of one creed and one language and
one race, as was the case in Egypt, I would say to them as I said to
you, “Bismillah,” in the name of God go forward and fear nothing. But it
is not so. I see that though they might free themselves from the English
domination, which is hateful to them, they are not yet prepared to set
anything of profit to them in its place. I see that they must be
educated and prepared for self government. Otherwise their effort would
not prosper. For this reason I have said to them, and I say it again,
take patience for a few years and work out your political education
under a government which allows you this privilege of education, and
later the moment will come when you shall be able to unite and form a
Nation. To the Mohammedans I say this especially, for they are but as
one to five of the population of India, and at the present moment they
are also inferior to the Hindus and Parsis in education, so that it is
possible their condition would be worse under native than under English
rule. By advising them to found an University I desired first to give
them a centre of unity which should add to their strength, for strength
is in union,—and secondly to prepare them to take their full part in the
regeneration of their country. At present, by standing aloof from public
affairs and by remaining in ignorance of English, which is the official
language, they are putting themselves at a disadvantage with the other
races and religions of India. I trust therefore that the learned Seyyid,
when he writes to Hyderabad will encourage them to proceed in this good
work, and not to spare their efforts in the direction I have pointed
out.
With regard to your newspaper I shall be happy to do what I can to help
you. But I advise you strongly to be moderate in your language about the
English Government—not that anything you can say about its action in
Egypt can surpass my own anger and impatience,—but because I see in the
friendship of England still the best hope for Islam. Believe me, though
England has acted through all this matter as an enemy of religion, there
are still more Englishmen who sympathise with our hopes for the nations
of the East than you will find amongst all the rest of the Europeans.
You cannot trust the French or the Russians or the Austrians or the
Italians to act with you sincerely as friends—and the English being
stronger at sea than all others, must always be counted with, and if
possible secured as friendly. This may yet come about, and I should be
sorry to see an irreconcilable breach made between the party of reform
in Islam and the English people. Think this matter fairly over. For
centuries England was the friend of Islam, and I find very many
Englishmen now who regret and condemn the change of policy.
You see I have spoken openly all that is in my heart.
Your friend in good and bad fortune,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU TO MR. BLUNT
(_Translation from the Arabic._)
Paris, _April_ 11, 1884.
To H. E. my dear friend, friend of the Moslems, helper of the Arabs and
defender of the Egyptian nation, etc.
After salutation to you and to the well-instructed Lady Anne
Blunt—yesterday your letter reached us, and reading it we found it full
of wisdom and useful counsels to the Moslems, and it confirmed our trust
in you that you are their friend.
The Seyyid Jemal-ed-Din presents you his salutation and will certainly
write to the people of India in Hyderabad and elsewhere, and will advise
them to be quiet, and will tranquillize their minds as you suggested;
and he will expound to them the idea you have so clearly set forth in
your letter, and will put the details before them in the best and most
lucid manner.
Next, we rejoiced at the admonition you were kind enough to give us, and
at your promise to help our newspaper (the Indissoluble Link), and this
was our hope in you. And indeed God the Most High created you to do
good, and to assist the cause of right, and to defend the oppressed. And
the true character of our newspaper is only this, and to serve those
views for which you are labouring, namely, the preservation of the
independence of the Eastern peoples, and the admonishing of the English
Government that it may abandon its action troubling the minds of Moslems
and make fast their friendship, and that so it shall have them with it
on its side. And indeed we do not love those other Powers referred to in
your letter, nor go with the policy of any one of them.
And so may peace be with you and the mercy of God. Your sincere friend,
MOHAMMED ABDU.
SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN TO MR. BLUNT
_Privée._
Paris le 21 _Avril_, 84.
MON CHER MONSIEUR,
J’ai eu l’honneur de recevoir votre aimable lettre dont je vous remercie
et à laquelle je m’empresse de répondre.
Quoique je n’ai nullement appris pendant les dix années que j’ai passées
en Egypte que M. Gordon fût, à l’époque où il était Gouverneur du
Soudan, ami de la liberté et défenseur de l’Islam, je n’hesite pas
cependant, étant donnée la pleine confiance que j’ai en votre parole, à
plaindre son malheureux sort et à regretter qu’il soit tombé dans une
situation qui devient de plus en plus critique.
Je ne vous cache pas, cher Monsieur, qu’il m’aurait été facile, vu la
confiance que le Mahdi parait vouloir avoir en moi ainsi que celle de
ses principaux partisans dont un grand nombre sont de mes élèves
Soudanais, de prévenir ce désastre qui ménace Gordon Pacha si les
dernières batailles entre Graham et Osman Digna ne s’étaient pas
engagées; mais après ces batailles sanglantes qui ont coûté tant de sang
Arabe, je crois que le Mahdi et ses partisans sont réduits à voir que le
seul moyen de ratrapper le terrain perdu et de consolider leur prestige
serait de s’emparer de Khartoum et d’arrêter M. Gordon sinon de lui
arracher la vie.
Cependant, si vous voulez, cher Monsieur, m’écrire avec plus de détails
et _en français_ sur les bases de la paix que vous voudriez conclure et
avec qui désireriez vous qu’elle soit faite pour qu’elle soit acceptable
et en règle, je ne manquerais pas alors de vous fixer sur tout ce que je
pourrais faire dans cette circonstance et sur les moyens efficaces dont
on pourrait se servir pour sauver la vie à ce malheureux Gordon.
En attendant le plaisir de vous lire, je me mets à votre entière
disposition et vous prie d’agréer mes salutations distinguées.
JEMAL-ED-DIN HUSEYNI AFGHANI.
MR. BLUNT TO SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN AFGHANI
10, James Street, le 24 _Avril_, 1884.
NOBLE ET CHER AMI,
La bonne réponse que vous avez bien voulu me faire à mes questions sur
le sort de Gordon me touche profondément. Je sais combien il a dû vous
coûter de prendre ainsi part à un projet qui aurait pour bût de prêter
aide à un homme qui malgré ses principes avoués a fait tant de tort à la
cause que nous aimons; mais je vois dans cette affaire une occasion
puissante pour obtenir du Gouvernement Anglais l’abandon de sa politique
actuelle en Egypte. Je viens d’adresser formellement à M. Gladstone une
lettre où je lui fais savoir qu’il serait encore possible pour lui non
seulement de sauver la vie à Gordon mais d’amener la pacification de
toute la vallée du Nil. Hier encore on était résolu d’envoyer une
nouvelle expédition Anglo-Egyptienne au Soudan, mais il parait que déjà
ma lettre aurait produit quelque effet et qu’on soit maintenant de
nouveau à la paix. Je compte donc sous peu de jours recevoir quelque
communication du Gouvernement qui ménerait à un tentatif de négociations
et je voudrais vous prévenir que je pourrais à tout instant vous prier
de vouloir bien venir à Londres où bien d’envoyer le Sheykh Mohammed
Abdu me parler.
Je vous prie de regarder d’un bon œil mes idées pacifiques. Comme je
vous ai déjà dit, je vois dans l’Angleterre la seule puissance qui
pourrait redevenir un ami sincère de l’Islam; et je vois dans la
nécessité où est dans ce moment notre Gouvernement un puissant lévier
pour amener l’abandon de sa position actuelle d’hostilité. Quant aux
conditions de paix je ne suis pas encore en position de vous les
formuler. Mais selon moi elles devraient s’étendre jusqu’à la cession du
Soudan entier au Mahdi. Je vous envoie copie d’une lettre qui j’ai eu de
Gordon il y a près de deux ans qui vous sera preuve de son bon
caractère.
Bien votre dévoué,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MR. BLUNT TO SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN
10, James Street, le 25 _Avril_, 1884.
NOBLE ET CHER AMI,
Depuis ma lettre d’hier je l’ai d’une source certaine que notre
Gouvernement s’est décidé absolument contre l’expédition, pour le
moment, de toute force militaire Anglaise ou Egyptienne à Berber. Or il
est presque sûr qu’on se prépare à une négociation, et déjà on me fait
entendre que je recevrai sous peu une réponse définitive à ma lettre.
Que pensez vous, pourrai je aller en personne à Obeyd en qualité
d’Envoyé Britannique traiter avec le Mahdi en lui reconnaisant la
souverainté du Soudan? Et croyez vous qu’à ces conditions les tribus qui
assiègent Khartoum permettraient à Gordon et aux Chrétiens de la ville
de retourner sous sauf-conduite en Egypte? Ou bien, si je ne pourrai pas
aller en personne, croyez-vous qu’il se trouverait quelque autre envoyé
capable de mener la négociation à bonne fin? Je vous prie de vouloir
bien me répondre à ces questions.
En même temps je compte persuader le Gouvernement de restaurer le parti
National en Egypte. Mais dîtes moi franchement votre idée. Qui devrons
nous proposer en place de Tewfik? Serait ce Arabi ou un autre? Les
Circassiens, si je ne me trompe, voudraient Ismaïl. Les autres
voudraient encore peut-être Halim. Mais l’opinion change si vite que je
n’ose dire absolument à qui on donnerait les votes si la chose était
remise à l’election. Surtout qui pourrait agir en Egypte de concert avec
le Mahdi?
Inshallah! nous mènerons l’affaire cette fois ci à bonne fin.
Votre bien dévoué,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MR. BLUNT TO ARABI PASHA
(_Sent in Arabic._)
10, James Street, _April 26th_, 1884.
To my noble and dear friend Arabi Pasha, may God strengthen his
patience.
After saying that it has given us extreme pleasure to have news of you
and the rest of the noble Egyptian exiles—this is to inform you that the
hopes of your return to Egypt are, as I think, greater now than at any
previous time since you first went away in Exile. The reason of this is
(after the will of Providence that truth should prevail) that the
English Government has fallen into great trouble in Egypt, first on
account of the finance and secondly with regard to the Mahdi. They are
therefore entirely anxious to leave Egypt, and they see that it is
necessary in order to do this that a stable Government should be set up
at Cairo, and a prince established who should be able to live in
friendship with the Mahdi.
Therefore it is probable that they will abandon Tewfik inasmuch as he is
incapable of governing and will entrust the government to other hands
before they withdraw their troops. And in these last days the danger to
General Gordon at Khartoum obliges them to come to terms quickly, and I
have proposed (with the permission of God) to go as Envoy to the Mahdi
in order to make peace and to save the life of General Gordon; and, if
they should accept my offer, I do not fear but that they will also
accept my plan for the restoration of good government in Egypt. Now
therefore tell me clearly, on what terms could you and your companions
return to Egypt? I know that you could serve with Halim Pasha. But tell
me, is it impossible that you could serve with Ismaïl? I have several
times received messages from Ismaïl, and his friends tell me that he
promises to act with you if he is restored. But do you think it would be
possible to trust him? I should propose that in any case the command of
the army should be in your hands. Or is there any other prince among the
Princes of Islam whom you would serve and who could live at peace with
the Mahdi; I ask you these things because the aspect of politics
continually changes, and what is true to-day is not true to-morrow, and
what was rejected yesterday may once again be accepted.
Also a conference is assembling at which it will be necessary that your
opinion should be heard. Therefore write to me your full mind and the
mind of your companions, and, if you should resolve that you could
return to Egypt as Minister to Ismaïl, telegraph to me then one word
“content,” and I shall understand. If you consider that it will be
impossible for you to serve under Ismaïl, telegraph the word “refused.”
For the rest all things are going well. There are many Englishmen now
who recognize your services to Egypt and I am hopeful of your return
there.
Your friend,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
You must not suppose from my writing in this sense that I want you to
make friends with Ismaïl. What I want is that you should tell me your
real opinion as to whether it will be possible for you to work with him.
SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN TO MR. BLUNT
_Privée._
Paris, _April_ 28, 1884.
MON CHER MONSIEUR,
J’ai eu l’honneur de recevoir votre lettre que j’ai lue avec beaucoup
d’attention et à laquelle je m’empresse de répondre.
Vous ne devez pas ignorer l’importance que les Mohamétans attachent à la
mission divine avec laquelle le Mahdi a paru et qu’ils comprennent par
ce mot, Mahdi: le sauveur de l’Islam des mains de ceux qui ne sont pas
de leur religion. Or je ne vois pas qu’on puisse conclure un traité de
paix avec le Mahdi et par consequent arrêter sa marche tant que celui-ci
voit les Anglais en Egypte. Mais si les bases de la paix stipulent que
l’Egypte sera aux Egyptiens et que Gordon Pacha sera sauvé avec tous les
Chrétiens qui sont avec lui et que, enfin, les troupes Anglaises seront
retirées de l’Egypte, je vois qu’il serait possible sinon facile de
mener cette affaire à bonne fin et d’arrêter l’invasion du Mahdi jusqu’à
un certain point et jusqu’à un certain temps. Dans ce cas il faudrait
envoyer une commission de paix composée en grande partie de Mussulmans
et de quelques Anglais. Quand aux Mussulmans ils auraient pour
instruction de dire qu’ils viennent de la part de la Nation Egyptienne
Mussulmane car si ils seraient envoyés de la part du Gouvernement
Egyptien, je ne crois pas qu’ils réussissent dans leur mission étant
donné l’aversion dont le Mahdi est animé à son égard, et de la part du
Gouvernement Anglais, ils ne seront pas écoutés. Nous en avons acquis
une preuve par le Cheick El Morghani. Quant aux quelques Anglais qui
feront partie de la mission, il est bien entendu qu’ils iront de la part
de leur Gouvernement; quoique, par le fait, tous, Mussulmans et
Chrétiens seront des missionaires Anglais.
Dans le cas qu’on décide à envoyer cette commission, et dans les
conditions que je me suis permis de vous exposer, je crois que vous,
cher Monsieur, vous devez être le premier nommé parmi les missionaires,
car les Mussulmans ne peuvent pas trouver beaucoup de défenseurs comme
vous. Pour les Mussulmans qu’il faudrait envoyer, je les désignerai et
vous en ferai connaître les noms quand le moment serait venu et qu’on se
serait décidé d’une façon definitive.
Vous me demandez en qui faut-il remplacer Tewfik? Je réponds que quand
le moment serait venu il ne serait difficile ni à vous ni à moi ni à qui
que ce soit de le savoir. Il faudrait se prononcer pour celui que la
_nation Egyptienne_ veut et pas pour un autre.
Votre bien dévoué,
JEMAL-ED-DIN HUSEYNI AFGHANI.
MR. BLUNT TO SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN
10, James Street, le 2 _Mai_, 1884.
NOBLE ET CHER AMI,
Je vous remercie bien de vos instructions sur la manière de négocier qui
sont absolument d’accord avec mes idées personnelles. Pour le moment le
Gouvernement se retire du tentatif proposé, mais je suis toujours en
rélation indirecte avec eux, et je pense bien qu’ils se trouveront
encore dans la nécessité de recourir à nos bons offices. Seulement
l’hésitation pourra bien coûter la vie à Gordon. Pour le moment le
Gouvernement est toujours dans l’intention d’abandonner Khartoum, Berber
et Dongola, mais je prévois que dans le cas que Gordon soit encore
debout à Khartoum à l’époque du cru du Nil le public anglais pourra
exiger une opération militaire.
Quant au général il se pourra que son intention serait de se retirer
vers le Congo, quand il trouvera qu’il ne pourra plus se tenir à
Khartoum, et je crois que le Mahdi serait bien avisé de lui laisser le
passage libre. L’idée de Gordon au Congo parait avoir toujours été d’y
fonder un Etat indigène qui pourrait faire face à l’envahissement de
l’Europe, et en tant il mériterait votre sympathie. Faites un pont d’or
pour l’ennemi qui s’en fuit. Je suis cependant pleinement de votre avis
qu’il soit nécessaire au Mahdi de s’emparer sans delai de Khartoum. Je
vous prie de me croire bien votre ami.
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN TO MR. BLUNT
Paris, le 7 _Mai_, 1884.
MON CHER MONSIEUR,
Je viens d’arriver de l’Italie. J’ai été à l’exposition de Turin et ce
n’est que ce matin que l’on m’a remis vos deux lettres que j’ai lues
avec beaucoup d’attention.
Votre dernière lettre m’a d’autant plus appris que vous ne vous
intéresserez plus au sort de Gordon qu’il m’a édifié encore une fois sur
la loyauté et la grandeur d’âme qui vous caractérisent. Tout en vous
remerciant d’avoir bien voulu m’envoyer le livre bleu contenant
certaines correspondances relatives au Général Gordon, des quelles vous
avez pu constater qu’il n’était nullement ami de la liberté ni défenseur
de l’Islam, j’ai la ferme conviction que votre nom sera gravé dans le
cœur de chaque musulman en particulier et de chaque Arabe et Oriental en
général à cause de l’intérêt immense que vous prenez pour eux et dont il
ne sauraient vous être trop reconnaissant. J’espère, cher Monsieur, que
vous continuerez à suivre cette voie digne d’un caractère aussi loyal
que le vôtre et que le bon Dieu vous aidera à récolter les fruits du
travail dur que vous faites.
Veuillez, je vous prie, me faire rappeler au bon souvenir de Madame
Blunt tout en lui présentant mes respectueux hommages et soyez persuadé
que je me mets à votre entière disposition pour tout ce que je pourrais
faire pour vous.
Votre bien dévoué,
JEMAL-ED-DIN HUSAYNI AFGHANI.
ARABI PASHA TO MR. BLUNT
(_Sent in English._)
Colombo, _2nd June_ 1884.
To my lord Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, may God preserve him.
It is with the greatest pleasure that I acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 26th April 1884. I must strongly insist on the fact that
Ismaïl Pasha is a treacherous person who is notorious for his
untrustworthiness, being the causer of the destruction of Egypt. The
national Debt of our country is the work of his hands. There is no one
of the prince’s family who possesses the requisite qualifications for
the throne but Halim Pasha. He is, besides, the direct descendant of the
first Khedive, being the son of Mohammed Ali. Tewfik (the present
Khedive) and the others are members of a third branch, so that Halim
Pasha, who is directly the ancestral representative, is the real owner
of the throne. To add to his right he has the voice of all the Egyptians
in Egypt to hail him, and he has for a long time undergone trials of a
very grave nature, having been subjected to tyranny. Also he would be
able to make a treaty between the Mahdi and the Government of Egypt,
inasmuch as those whom the Mahdi trusts are able to effect this for him.
If you are resolved to go to the Mahdi, I must most earnestly entreat
you to secure beforehand some letters stamped with my seal, in order
that they may serve as the proof that you are a faithful friend of the
Moslem world, and that you have been instrumental in saving our lives.
May God preserve you. Your most faithful friend,
AHMED ARABI.
ARABI PASHA TO LADY ANNE BLUNT
(_Translated from the Arabic._)
Colombo, _March_ 2, 1885.
To the noble and exalted lady, Lady Anne Blunt; may God protect her.
Amen.
After presenting my best salutations to your distinguished self and your
illustrious husband, and in response to your two letters with inclosures
relating what Mr. Blunt had written in the “Times” on Egypt and England
and the Sultan, with the remarks made thereon, permit me to assure you
that all that Mr. Blunt has stated in the “Times,” and declared publicly
in many utterances, and all that he described in his poem (kasid) “The
Wind and Whirlwind,” of the disasters and calamities that must ensue,
all these are true, and we see them happening now, as it was necessary
they should happen, and truly the Most High God inspired him with truth
to speak these things, and with a just understanding. For the time has
come now when God shall choose his servants, and shall deliver the weak
and oppressed and abase the mighty and oppress the oppressor, and shall
manifest His power and His strength to the unjust. And thus in times
past He confounded men’s reasoning by His wonderful judgements on the
nations that are gone. Thus He destroyed Babylon the adulterous, the
violent city, and thus the empires of Persia and of Rome; and I grieve
with a great grief over the decline of the star of England caused by her
misdeeds in Egypt and in the Soudan. But God has heard the cry of the
oppressed and the voice of the blood which has been shed, and the
terrible cry of the widow and of the young children, and surely He has
taken His vengeance on the covetous. Yet, believe me, the people of
Egypt used to believe good of the English nation. It was they of all
others that they trusted, as the foremost among nations, and as the
chief hope of those who sought to obtain their freedom; and they grieve
now seeing their belief a deception, and their trust a delusion.
And what has England gained by her invasion of Egypt, and what in the
Soudan? Rather let us say, what has she lost? For God knows she has
gained nothing. She has lost her good name, the friendship of all
Moslems, and of our Lord the Sultan. She has lost, too, Gordon Pasha,
through acting on false counsels, and Hicks and Earle, and how many
other officers; and she has lost the respect of all hearts by this war
against free men in the Soudan. When will she cease to rush forward on
her course, to send armies of revenge on men who are themselves avenging
their Egyptian brothers; on men defending their country, and who delight
to drink the cup of death rather than that they should see an enemy left
within its borders. I tell you, _fifteen_ millions of such as these
occupy at this moment the Soudan country and Darfur, and all of them are
partisans of the Mahdi, having made a convention with him unto death,
and in accordance with the precepts of our noble Koran. Thus the Mahdi
increases in strength with the English aggression, and this is God’s law
with his creatures, with all who have been given intelligence to see and
reflect and understand.
“A decree has come forth from God. There is no escape from the judgement
of God. God shall exalt whom He will, and abase whom He will. The
oppressor shall repent when repentance shall not avail him. And God is
not unmindful of the deeds of the unjust.” (Quotations.)
My son Mohammed Bey and the family send you a thousand thousand
greetings. From your friend and servant,
AHMED ARABI.
SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN TO MR. BLUNT
(_Translated from the Arabic._)
Paris, _May_ 12, 1885.
After salutations, etc. I say; I am not alone in gratitude for your
distinguished efforts which have forced the Government to evacuate the
Soudan. No, be certain that all Moslems, especially the Arabs, will be
grateful for this your action to the end of time and they will write
your name on tablets inlaid with precious stones and titles of glory and
honour for your zeal and courage.
But there is left one thing still to be done and that is that you should
say to the Government, “How can you leave this land thus without a
treaty with the Mahdi and whose will be the duty of repelling the
Mahdi’s attacks? how also can the Government leave the roads of commerce
blocked? or does it desire the destruction of trade? Is it not incumbent
on the Government when it has determined to evacuate the Soudan to send
a man of trust, a Moslem, to the Mahdi that he may discuss with him as
to a peace and secure Egypt from his attacks and to close the gates of
conflict and reopen those of Commerce.” I think that if this question
were presented to parliament all opinions would agree with it.
I see too that this would be easy, even apart from your own action and
that when the cost has been decided on you will be only needed to
complete it. But without a treaty of peace with the Mahdi the situation
cannot be brought to a final conclusion. This is what I have thought it
necessary to say to you.
With salutations to you and your consort,
Your friend,
JEMAL-ED-DIN HUSEYNI AFGHANI.
ARABI PASHA TO LADY ANNE BLUNT
(_Translated from the Arabic._)
Colombo, _August_ 14, 1885.
To my lady, dear Lady Anne Blunt. May God preserve her.
After best salutations to yourself and Mr. Blunt I was happy to receive
your letter dated July 17th, and thanked God that you are in good
health, of which I hope for the continuance. I sent you a telegram the
same day as to my willingness to serve the country even with Tewfik and
Sherif, and I now write this in confirmation.
I can assure you that I am prepared to serve my country, to work hard at
reforms in it, and to labour for its advancement to the highest pitch of
honour and prosperity.
Therefore I should not mind whether I served with Tewfik or another, my
one only object being the establishing of just law for all men alike,
giving to all security for their persons and for their civil and
religious rights, and putting an end to wrong and injustice between
class and class of (Egyptian) subjects, always bearing in mind the
claims on me of the English people (_nation_) to whom I shall be
grateful as long as I live.
I have, too, a firm trust that the English Government would aid me in
carrying out reforms, and that, after establishing a strong, just, and
equitable Government, it will leave Egypt to the Egyptians, thus
fulfilling its promise and completing what it has commenced.
As to Sherif, he is well disposed and anxious for the good of the
country, but Nubar is not really interested in the welfare of Egypt, and
the Egyptians are weary at his holding high office in the country.
Now, therefore, since you and your friends, and my friends, are of
opinion that it would be fitting for me to take office even with Tewfik,
I would agree also to that. I should hope for success in making those
reforms of which we have already sown the seeds—notwithstanding Tewfik’s
remaining—if supported by the English Government, and in surmounting
those difficulties, both home and foreign, which have beset Egypt in
these latter times.
And God is our Helper, and in Him our trust.
Your sincere friend,
AHMED ARABI THE EGYPTIAN.
II. EVIDENCE AS TO THE MASSACRES AT ALEXANDRIA, TANTAH, AND ELSEWHERE,
IN 1882
SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU TO LADY ANNE BLUNT
(_Translated from the Arabic, received 5th August_, 1883, _from
Beyrout._)
To the Lady Anne Blunt. May God show us her countenance, etc.
Next, among those persons who have information about the riot in
Alexandria in particular, there is Mustafa Abd el Rahim, who was present
at the riot and stopped its rage with the regular soldiers with Suleyman
Sami (may God have mercy on him). And he is prepared to bear witness on
being requested to do so, as he has informed me this night.
And of those who have complete information of the conduct of the Khedive
Tewfik and of his endeavours and the endeavours of his assistants to
disturb the peace and tranquillity of Egypt, and to excite the Muslems
against the Christians, and vice versa, there is here Ahmed Bey
Minshawi, one of the Notables of Egypt, a man of wealth and of
determination and of extreme straightforwardness. It was he who
protected Christians in the riots of Tantah, and in other massacres in
the province of Gharbiyeh, which Ibrahim Pasha Adhem, the Khedive’s
protégé, got up after the bombardment of Alexandria; and he is prepared
to bear witness against the Khedive and against his agents before any
Court or in any Tribunal—even in the Egyptian Tribunals—and he has no
fear of anything, and is not alarmed by any danger. He has been
intending to write a letter to Mr. Blunt, of his own accord, to express
his readiness and his earnest wish to put before Englishmen, and before
everyone inclined to justice and equity, the things known to him; and he
is now with us in Beyrut, and if you wish to summon him he is ready.
Convey my salutations to Mr. Blunt and present to him on my behalf and
on behalf of every Egyptian—indeed of every Englishman—exceeding thanks
for his energy and noble deeds. And salute for me Mr. Sabunji. May God
protect you in his keeping.
MOHAMMED ABDU.
_13th Ramadan_, 1300.
AHMED BEY EL MINSHAWI TO MR. BLUNT
(_Translated from the Arabic, received August_ 5, 1883.)
To the high-minded Mr. Blunt. May God preserve him!
After presenting salutations and praise and thanks:
Also, I beg you will be my representative in presenting thanks from me
and from all Egyptians—indeed from all Eastern people, to Lord
(Randolph) Churchill and his companions—though they are all dependent on
you for what they accomplished in Parliament.
Also I am prepared, with all preparation, to bear witness against the
Khedive and the men of his government as to their plan, which they
carried out, of shedding the blood of Christians and others. In so doing
I fear not the blame of any blamer, nor do I dread the authority of any
ignorant ruler in whatsoever country I may be, or before whatsoever
tribunal I may appear; and whenever the indictment against Tewfik is
officially brought forward and witnesses are wanted I am ready in
Beyrut, and if I went elsewhere I would let you know. And I pledge
myself in the name of God that I will also bring witnesses of the
Egyptians who will bear witness to the crimes of the Khedive and his
wicked accomplices.
And my friend the Sheykh Mohammed Abdu knows that perfectly well, and
sends you salutations. Remain in God’s protection.
AHMED MINSHAWI.
_Beyrout, 15th Ramadan_, 1300.
TRANSLATION OF REMARKS BY SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU ON MAJOR MACDONALD’S
STATEMENT (RECEIVED _Aug._ 13, 1884)
We have read a statement by Major MacDonald, published in the Blue Book
(Egypt, 1884), in refutation of Mr. Blunt’s letter to the “Times”
newspaper, and have noticed in it certain things calling for remark.
I do not know whether a ten weeks’ residence with Mr. Cameron at Tantah
could have enabled him to understand the true state of matters he has
written about, or not.
I shall not here discuss the history of Ibrahim Adhem’s dismissal from
his office as Governor; but I assert that Ibrahim Adhem was in fact, on
the upper storey of the prefecture on the day of the massacre at Tantah,
and that he was looking on from the window of that upper storey at the
murderers and the murdered; and that these persons were murdered in the
court of the Mudirieh while he looked on at them; and that he himself
ordered the water carriers to wash the blood from the ground at the
Government House (of which evidence was given by the water carriers
before the Court of Inquiry).
As to what Macdonald says about many of the Europeans finding safety in
the prefecture of police, it is true; only the person who protected them
was the chief of the city police, Ali effendi Lebîb, who saved many
lives, but was arrested after the war and kept in prison until the end
of the Inquiry, when the Court sentenced him to hard labour for a year,
after much intercession. Now what plea was there for the arrest of this
Zabit, a person worthy of confidence; whose protection of Christians is
testified to by Major Macdonald (who understood the whole truth in ten
weeks).
Ibrahim Adhem is a Kurd—not a Circassian—and a man who, each time that
they gave him a post, stipulated with the Government that he should be
authorized to make use of the kurbaj on the fellahin and the omdehs of
the district. Ay, when he was Mudir of Mansourah at the time of Riaz
Pasha’s first Ministry, Riaz learned that he was ill-treating people
with the kurbaj, and wrote to him as follows: “You are bound to act
according to law, governing mercifully; if you use the kurbaj you will
incur the censure of the law.” On receiving this communication he chose
to resign his post rather than rule mercifully and according to law.
His resignation under the Mahmud Samy Ministry took place for that
reason also; and when the Khedive reappointed him as Mudir of the
Gharbieh, after the war, he carried on his government with his habitual
severity; afterwards, when the number of his enemies increased and the
patience of the people of his province was so exhausted that they could
no longer bear with him, the Government disgraced him, and, dismissing
him, appointed Husseyn Pasha Sarai in his place.
Ibrahim Adhem was one of the supporters of the first movement of Arabi,
but when the massacre occurred at Tantah, Arabi learned that he had
participated in it either by instigation or by deed, and ordered him to
be arrested. He was not arrested for not joining in the rebellion, in
fact he was arrested on the third day from the massacre, before it was
known whether he would give or refuse his support. Indeed, Ibrahim
Adhem’s sworn official despatches to the Ministry of the Interior
indicate sufficiently that he did not deserve the praises lavished on
him by Major Macdonald. Possibly some of the officers of the English
army may have praised him, but I do not consider this enough to
exculpate him from his deeds of violence. Let anyone who would like to
learn what measure of savagery Ibrahim Adhem attained, inquire of his
son—Ibrahim Hafzy Bey.
As to the unhappy Yusuf Abu Diab—he arrived at the railway station on
the day of the massacre about three hours after the disturbance had
begun. He did not instigate riot (anything or any one), but saved a
Christian girl and took her to the Mudirieh; and reprimanded the Mudir,
taking him to task for sitting in the Mudirieh while he allowed people
to be massacred. And for this reason the unfortunate man was hanged.
Those Europeans of whom Macdonald testifies were in such consternation
that they did not even distinguish their own children, and were running
into every hole—how then could they know Yusuf Abu Diab, and distinguish
his face or his words?
The chief of the station and telegraph at the first bore witness to the
innocence of Yusuf Abu Diab, but the Mudir Ibrahim Adhem threatened all
the people with arrest and death unless they bore witness according to
his desire; thus they altered their testimony under coercion. The
statements made by people subsequently have all been under fear. But
those Courts of Inquiry and their acts are part and parcel of the acts
of the Anglo-Egyptian Government after the war, into which it is
permissible to examine and investigate. We know indeed what has been its
course and its acts. No man in his senses will believe in it, for it has
been of that species in which the enemy sits in judgement on his enemy;
and if we would speak of it we would have to recount the whole of the
conduct of the Government after Tel-el-Kebir, and this would lead us
into too great length—without profit.
Yusuf Abu Diab’s innocence was confessed by the blood relations of the
people massacred, and they begged his pardon from Lord Dufferin, who
asked it from the Khedive—and the pardon was granted, but the order was
issued secretly to hang him before the time fixed for the execution. The
news of the pardon did not arrive till after the execution.
Possibly Macdonald can testify to the Europeans—French, English, and
others—but we know the value of such testimony, and if we had a free and
fair Government it would learn the truth through a different set of
people.
Seyyid Osman has published a long article in the “Intransigeant” (French
newspaper), stating all the facts. It is also well known to a number of
people that the first President of the Court of Inquiry at Tantah wanted
to carry out the investigation equitably, and to interrogate the Mudir
Ibrahim Adhem on his culpability as to the riot, but the Government
perceiving him to be upright, dismissed him and appointed in his stead
Mahmud Pasha Fellaky, who was nominally at Tantah while his
administration was at Cairo.
Thus the Mudir was saved from trial, while Yusuf Abu Diab was hanged in
his stead.
I could show the object of silence as to past deeds, to speak of which
would open the door wide to censure on the Government of England, which
desires to establish justice in Egypt.
MR. BLUNT’S NOTE OF A CONVERSATION WITH ISMAÏL BEY JOWDAT AT
CONSTANTINOPLE, _Oct._ 24, 1884
Ismaïl Jowdat spent 3 hours with me telling the events of the Egyptian
Revolution, much of it new, and very interesting. With regard to the
Khedive’s responsibility for the massacres he was very explicit. His
official position at the time of the war, as Chef du Bureau Européen de
la police du Caire, gave him every opportunity of knowing the facts, and
he knew them. The following is the account he gave me which I shall
transcribe from notes taken while he was speaking:
The first intrigue that he knows of in which the Khedive was concerned
was in Boheyra where the Khedive employed Ibrahim Bey Towfik—he lived in
the house of Hassaneyn Abu Hamza at Damanhour, Governor of the
province—in the spring of 1882 to purchase the alliance of certain
Sheykhs of the Oulad Ali Bedouins against the National Ministry, to make
a civil war between the Bedouins and the army. They were engaged to make
disturbance, and a regular agreement was drawn up in which the Arabs
promised to support the Khedive against the army in the case of civil
war. For this they were to receive, and actually did receive £E13,000,
the signatories to the document being Ibrahim Bey Towfik, the Mudir, and
Mahmud abu Ismaïl el Aluani, Mahareb abu Keshik, Abd ed Dayim Hoteiteh,
Abu Shayib, Hassaneyn abu Hamza and five others (Sheykhs of the Oulad
Ali).
Ismaïl Jowdat was sent down to Boheyra semi officially by Arabi to
inquire into this matter, and saw the Sheykhs and the document, and
persuaded them to rescind their promise to the Khedive, and obtained
from them an oath of allegiance to the National Government in Arabi’s
room at Cairo. This same Ibraham Tewfik was sent by the Khedive during
the war to Mansourah to stir up trouble, but did not succeed there.
There was a report made against him signed by all the Notables of
Dakhalieh under Mohammed Bey el Hantour sub Mudir of the province, after
which he was imprisoned by order of the National Assembly.
With regard to the riots of the 11th June at Alexandria the details did
not come under Ismaïl Jowdat’s official notice. But he heard the main
facts at the time. He heard of the riots at 5 o’clock on the 11th, and
went at once to the Palace, and heard how it had been ordered, and about
the telegram sent by the Khedive, as we know them, viz.: that the
disturbance was arranged by Omar Pasha Lutfi with Seyd Kandil, who,
however, took to his bed to avoid being connected with its execution. He
also heard at the time of a telegram having been sent by the Khedive in
cypher to Omar Lutfi giving him his orders. But he did not see a copy of
the telegram.
Of what happened during the war he had more certain knowledge, as he was
responsible for the safety of all the Europeans in the country, and had
spent some £E3,272 of his own money in finding and keeping them—sums
which have never been repaid him, though he has the highest testimonials
from M. de Martino the Italian Consul at Cairo of the care taken by him.
The Khedive’s chief agent during the war was a certain Osman Raafat,
intendant des Ecuries, who is still employed by him on various secret
missions. Immediately after the evacuation at Alexandria he sent him in
disguise to the house of his brother-in-law, Mohammed Bey Hellál, to
concert measures with Ibrahim Pasha Adhem the Mudir; and they concerted
together the riots against the Christians in order to force on an
English intervention. Ismaïl Jowdat confirms my account given in my
letter to the “Times” with regard to Ibrahim Adhem’s conduct, except
that the Christians killed were killed at the Mudirieh, not at the
Prefecture; and Ibrahim shut himself inside the house and let the
killing continue. His words were: “Il était dans une chambre en bas de
la Mudirieh pendant le massacre. Les Chrétiens se sont réfugiés dans la
Moudirieh. Il s’est enfermé dans sa chambre et a laissé faire. Les
vagabonds et galériens d’Alexandrie ont fait le massacre.” Abu Diab did
his best to stop the trouble, and protested with the Mudir, and saved
many lives. He was condemned on false testimony produced by Ibrahim
Adhem, who afterwards, moved with remorse, asked his pardon before he
suffered, but Abu Diab refused to forgive him. The only other mistake
made by me is that I called Ibrahim a Circassian. He is a Kurd, son of
the head employée of Mohammed Ali’s stables.
Osman Raafat also came to Giseh during the war to raise troubles again
with the Mufettish Feridun Bey. The details of this affair are known to
M. de Martins. Sir Charles Wilson took notes of the Tantah affair from
Ismaïl Jowdat. Osman Raafat then went to the Fayoum to stir up the
Herabi Bedouins under their chief Abd el Kawi el Jibali and Saadawi el
Jibali.
Ismaïl Jowdat knew these affairs at the time of their happening; but he
gained positive proof of the Khedive’s connection with them in the
following manner: Not long ago Osman Raafat came to see him at
Constantinople, and he asked him to breakfast with Husseyn Pasha Ghaleb,
one of the Sultan’s A.D.C’s., the same who called on me yesterday; and
then having plied him with wine he told them the whole story. He went on
from Constantinople to Vienna, where he had a commission from the
Khedive to invest certain sums of money and dispose of certain jewels.
Osman Raafat was arrested at Wasta by a soldier, but was let go by a
Circassian official, and thence fled to Helouan and Suez. After the war
Osman Raafat was sent by the Khedive to get back the money taken from
Palmer by the Bedouins, and he kept £2,000 out of the £3,000.
NOTES OF CONVERSATION WITH DR. MUSTAFA BEY NEGDI. EXTRACT FROM JOURNAL,
_Oct._ 27, 1884
He (Mustafa) then gave us the whole history of the Tantah massacre in
detail, which he knew first from the official inquiry made before Arabi
when it happened, and at which he assisted, and secondly from Ahmed
Minshawi, with whom he had lived afterwards at Beyrout, and who came
here with him, and who had repeatedly told him the story. The true facts
were these:
The Mudir of Tantah, Ibrahim Adhem, with Osman Raafat, excited the
populace against the Christians, as Ismaïl Jowdat related, telling them
that Arabi had ordered it—and the Mudir shut himself up also as related.
Minshawi lived at a village called Koreyshiyeh, and happening to come in
that day by train with Abdallah Pasha’s son, Emin Bey, and Husseyn
Wasif, a magistrate, they found Christians being killed; and Minshawi
interfered. They called out to him that Arabi had ordered it, but
Minshawi had said to the effect of “damn Arabi,” and insisted on their
stopping. He had then gone with Abu Diab, who had also been trying to
stop the massacre, to the Mudirieh, and had kicked in the door of his
room, and expostulated with him for letting the thing go on, Abu Diab
using strong language, for he was very angry. Then they telegraphed to
Arabi at Kafr Dowar to send soldiers to stop the massacre, but the
telegram had to go round by Ramleh and was delayed. But at last the
massacre was stopped. The whole thing was inquired into at Kafr Dowar
immediately, and the Mudir was sent to Cairo and there imprisoned till
the end of the war, Dawish Pasha replacing him. After the war he was
reinstated, and when the Commission was sent to Tantah, Ismaïl Yusri,
the President, who was a comparatively honest man, ascertained the truth
and informed the Khedive that he should be obliged to find him guilty,
and so begged to be superseded on the Commission. This was done, and an
officer less scrupulous was appointed who accepted the false evidence
Ibrahim Adhem was allowed to trump up against Abu Diab. Ibrahim Adhem,
however, was deposed—and Huseyn Wasif (a Circassian, not the same as the
magistrate) was appointed. He it was who was made a scapegoat of for
Ibrahim Adhem’s sake, and was deprived by Clifford Lloyd and sent to the
Soudan. Mehariz Bey, formerly sub-Mudir, is now Mudir of Boheyra.
Minshawi is the son-in-law of Abdallah Pasha the English renegade, and
his son Emin still goes by the name of the Englishman.
Mustafa Bey confirms all Ismaïl’s statements of the Khedive’s connection
with the Alexandrian massacres. He was at Alexandria at the time and was
the Doctor employed to examine the bodies. There were 51 Christian
bodies, 23 Mohammedan, of which 8 Mustafezzin, all the latter by pistol
shots. The English doctor wanted to make out that the Christian bodies
had wounds made by “des armes blanches,” but this was not the case. It
was certainly Omar Lutfi and Seyd Kandil (a blackguard he calls him),
who got up the riot, and Mustafa states his conviction that Cookson also
was concerned in it. About Malet he does not know—nor about Dervish. But
he feels sure of Cookson. His evidence will be most valuable, and he
will come to England to give it. He also says that Omar Lutfi certainly
gave orders to the Mustafezzin to come unarmed. I like this worthy
doctor much. In face and figure he is not unlike Lord Lyons.
DR. MUSTAFA BEY NEJDI’S FURTHER STATEMENT OF _Nov._ 5, 1884
“Peu de jours après le bombardment nous avons appris à Kafr Dowar qu’il
y a eu des Chrétiens tués à Tantah; et Toulba Pacha, d’après l’ordre
d’Arabi, a envoyé chercher Ahmed Minshawi pour témoigner sur ce qui y
était arrivé. Celui-ci est venu avec un autre notable nommé El Arabi au
camp, et Arabi Pacha lui a demandé ce qui en était. J’étais présent avec
Toulba Pacha et quelques Colonels. Ahmed Minshawi a répondu qu’il était
venu à Tantah et qu’il y avait sauvé la vie à un Chrétien à la gare du
chemin de fer, et qu’après il a fait venir ses gens de son village et
qu’il a pu étouffer les massacres. Il nous a racconté que le Mudir
Ibrahim Adhem et Meheriz son adjoint s’étaient enfermés dans la
Moudirieh pendant qu’on tuait le monde, même chez le Mudir. Il nous a
aussi dit qu’il avait télégraphié au Khedive et à Arabi Pacha, et Arabi
a fait venir le télégraphiste de Kafr Dowar qui n’en savait rien mais il
a expliqué la chose en disant que les télégrammes de Tantah à Kafr Dowar
devaient d’abord passer à Alexandrie avant d’être remis à destination.
C’était la règle du service. Sur ce Arabi a fait une station nouvelle au
camp, pour que les dépêches pourraient lui venir directement de
l’intérieur. Arabi a remercié Minshawi de ce qu’il avait fait et il est
retourné chez lui.”
MINSHAWI’S EVIDENCE AS GIVEN BY HIM _Nov._ 3, 1884
On the day of the massacre of Tantah I came in to Tantah by train from
my own village, Koreyshiyeh, two hours distant (half-hour by train)
partly to see my brother-in-law Emin Bey on his road to Cairo, partly to
learn the news; and while at the station we heard a great noise and were
told that it was the Christians being killed by the mob in Tantah; and
I, wishing to end this, telegraphed to the Khedive at Ramleh and to the
Ministry (that is to say Arabi at Kafr Dowar) asking an order to
interfere. I also telegraphed to my village for men to come and help me,
and I waited four hours (during that time Abu Diab arrived from
Damietta) for an answer and no answer came. And while we were there
waiting the tumult came near us, and a man, a Syrian Christian, the
cashier of Zananiri the interpreter of the Greek Consulate, ran towards
me pursued by a soldier of the Mudirieh and called to me for protection;
and taking a stick from one of the bystanders I drove the soldier away,
and with the help of others put a stop to what was happening at the
station. Then I went with these to the door of the Mudirieh to inquire
what the Mudir was doing, and to call upon him to interfere and put an
end to the bloodshed. And on my way I met Abu Diab at the door of the
Mudirieh who had come from Damietta and was also restoring order, and
who had under his protection a young Christian girl whom he was leading
by the hand, and we went together to the Mudirieh, and when we arrived
there we found in the courtyard three corpses of Christians who had just
been killed there; and we asked for the Mudir and were told that he was
in his room, one of the rooms adjoining the courtyard. And we called to
him, but there was no answer. Then Abu Diab kicked the door in, and we
found Ibrahim Adhem, the Mudir, with his wakil, Meheriz, sitting there.
And Abu Diab in a loud voice asked them what they were doing there
allowing these murders to be done in his house by his own men. And when
they made no answer he called to Ibrahim Adhem, calling him a dog and a
coward. I heard this with my ears. Next I went to the Khan where I heard
the Christians had shut themselves up, and I found a mob trying to force
the door, and my men having come an hour afterwards from Koreyshiyeh we
drove them away and found inside a large number of Christians, Syrians,
Jews, and others, huddled together like frightened sheep. And I put
guards, and the next day brought them out and took them to my village,
and after some days those that wished to leave the country I took by
train to Port Said, two trains full; and those (about 120) that chose to
remain I took to my own house and fed them there during the whole time
of the war.
Some days later I went to Kafr Dowar and gave evidence as I now give it
before Arabi Pasha when he made an inquiry into the affair, and Ibrahim
Adhem was sent a prisoner to Cairo and another man (Dawish Pasha)
appointed by the Government in his place. I also gave my evidence after
the war when the first Commission came to Tantah (there was no
Englishman on this Commission), and afterwards they gave me a paper to
sign, purporting to be my evidence, but it was not what I had said but
the contrary, and I refused to sign it. Much pressure was put upon me to
make me do this; and one day in the Khedive’s palace at Cairo, on his
fête day, Bairam el Kebir, Takla Bey Bishara warned me that if I did not
sign I should suffer for it. I also refused Ahmed el Sherif, sent by
Sultan Pasha, when he came round the villages to take money for the
sword given to Wolseley.
When a new Commission under Ismaïl Yusri and the English came to Tantah
they did not ask me for my evidence (Ismaïl Yusri warned me in private
not to mention that I had sent a telegram to the Khedive, of which the
copy has been found in the telegraph office, to ask for an order to
interfere) of what had happened at Tantah but only as to those killed at
Santah. They therefore did not take my evidence.
I declare that Abu Diab was entirely innocent, and that of those hanged
at Tantah for this matter only 2 were guilty, Abu Salaam of Santah, and
a soldier of the Mudirieh. Ibrahim Adhem and Mehariz were the cause of
the bloodshed. The killing was done by the vagabonds from Alexandria and
the soldiers of the Mudirieh. The same thing happened at three other
places—at Tantah 49 killed; at Santah 3 were killed; at Mehallet el
Kebir 6 or 7; at Mehallet abu Ali jem el Suk 2 or 3. Also the same thing
would have happened at Dumanhour but for the Wakil Abd el Razak whom the
Khedive has sent in chains for 15 years to the Soudan. I heard of Osman
Raafat being at Tantah on the day of the massacre in the house of one of
his brothers-in-law. He has two brothers-in-law at Tantah, Mohammed
Hellal and Ibrahim Hellal.
Ibrahim Adhem was restored as Mudir after the war, and he got up the
evidence against Abu Diab in revenge for the words spoken by him on the
day of the massacre. Abu Diab died an innocent man. He was not
discouraged to the last, but told his father not to weep and told the
executioner to make haste. At the last moment Ibrahim Adhem asked his
pardon. But Abu Diab said, “God will judge between us to-night, to-day
for me, to-morrow for you.” I assure you, Sir, by God, that Abu Diab
died unjustly.
Before the Commission had left Tantah Ibrahim Adhem came one day to my
village with 4 English officers, and summoned all the notables of the
neighbourhood and declared to them that I was in disgrace with the
Khedive and the English, and warned them to have no dealings with me,
and that if any had a quarrel against me the Khedive would support him
against me, and four months passed and no one came. Until the day of the
massacre I was respected by all men. I had no quarrel with Ibrahim Adhem
nor any one; but my action that day has been the cause of my ruin. When
Ibrahim Adhem was removed from Tantah, Husseyn Pasha Wasif was appointed
in his place. He received me into favour, but the Khedive wrote to him
by his own secretary not to see me. Husseyn Pasha shewed me this
letter—I saw it with my eyes—and begged me to excuse him if he asked me
to come no more to his house. This drove me from my country. It is clear
that by saving the lives of the Christians that day I have gained only
anger from the Khedive and trouble.
PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT
Balta-Liman, 15 _Décembre_, 1884.
MON CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT,
Je vous remercie d’avoir pensé à m’écrire; j’aurais voulu en vous
répondant vous donner des nouvelles de chez vous; malheureusement
heureusement dans notre paresseux Orient les choses ne changent pas
aussi souvent que dans votre actif Occident. Ici les jours se suivent et
se ressemblent, il n’y a donc rien qui vaille la peine de vous être
rapporté. Depuis quelques jours j’aperçois des signes non équivoques
d’une tendance de rapprochement avec l’Angleterre; des communications
ont eu lieu entre Monsieur Wyndham et la Porte en vu de trouver un
terrain propice qui permettrait aux deux partis de traiter les affaires
égyptiennes. Je crains que cette fois encore la Turquie et l’Angleterre
n’aient, par leur lenteur, manqué le moment favourable de pouvoir en
finir entre elles. Les puissances signataires du traité de 1841-42
paraissent vouloir se mêler de la question; elles trouveraient peut-être
mauvais que la Porte traitât directement avec l’Angleterre; dans ce cas
le nouvel ambassadeur d’Angleterre, quel qu’il fût, il est très douteux
qu’il puisse réussir dans le sens du désir de son Gouvernement. Tout
dépend de la pression plus ou moins grande qu’exercera l’Europe.
Je porterai à la connaissance du Sultan ce que je croirai lui être
utile, sans cependant m’illusioner sur le résultat, car il est inutile
de chercher de la vigueur, de la précision, dans les actes du
Gouvernement Impérial. La peur, plus que l’intérêt même, présidera à
toutes ses actions, quoiqu’on fasse. La bienveillance de Musurus Pacha
pour Tewfik est sans doute le resultât du mariage de son fils avec la
fille d’un certain Antoniadis, partisan d’Ismaïl, comme tous les
voleurs.
A propos d’Ismaïl, je vous dirai qu’il dépense beaucoup d’argent ici, et
j’en sens les effets. Le brave homme donne son or contre de la parole
qu’emporte aussitôt le vent. Avant que cette lettre vous parvienne
Monsieur Whittaker sera à Londres, il vous communiquera une proposition
qui je crois aura votre pleine approbation.
Recevez etc.,
HALIM.
PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT
Balta-Liman, 6 _Janvier_, 1885.
CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT,
C’est le 4 janvier seulement que j’ai reçu votre lettre du 19 Décembre.
Je suis avec intérêt dans les journaux les péripéties de vos démarches,
tant près de l’association international d’arbitrage et de paix, que
près du Premier Ministre. Je suis tout à fait de votre opinion et je
dirai qu’une terminaison à l’amiable et sans violence de la question
égyptienne ne peut se faire sans le concours du Sultan parce qu’il est
la légalité, le droit; mais, si on veut passer outre, alors c’est
l’inconnu et on ne peut savoir comment et où on aboutira. Je trouve que
l’Angleterre a perdu comme la Turquie un temps précieux; ces deux
puissances pouvaient l’arranger à l’amiable entre elles sans laisser de
place à l’ingérance des autres puissances peut-être même de la France;
l’Angleterre aurait beaucoup gagné et la Turquie aurait eu aussi sa part
de bénéfice. Maintenant que les Puissances font mine de vouloir prendre
en main la question égyptienne sous prétexte qu’elle est internationale,
je crois que l’Angleterre et la Turquie ont perdu, toujours dans la
prévision que les Puissances s’occuperont sérieusement de la question.
Recevez, etc.,
HALIM.
PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT
Balta-Liman, 19 _Janvier_, 1885.
CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT,
Votre lettre du 8 janvier m’est parvenue, je veux remercier pour les
nouvelles que vous voulez bien me donner.
Il est probable que Hassan Fehmi Pacha sera à Londres avant que vous
receviez cette lettre. Je considère la mission de l’envoyé Ottoman comme
une preuve patente de la bonne volonté de sa Majesté le Sultan de relier
les bonnes vieilles rélations des deux gouvernements que les évènements
d’Egypte ont un peu terni. En tout cas, c’est un pas fait vers un
arrangement, mais je doute que Hassan Pacha puisse arriver à une
solution définitive.
Les dernières nouvelles reçues du Soudan se montrent par l’état critique
de l’expédition anglaise, si les troupes qui traversent le désert entre
Korti et Mutamma arrivent sans encombre à cette dernière ville la ⅘ de
la besogne serait faite sans doute. Alors seulement le Gouvernement
Anglais pensera peut-être sérieusement à donner une solution à la
question égyptienne. Je ne serais pas étonné si Souakin et Masaoua ou
tout au moins un de ces deux ports resta définitivement entre les mains
de l’Angleterre.
Recevez, etc.,
HALIM.
PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT
Balta-Liman, 13 _Février_, 1885.
CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT,
Selon votre désir j’ai remis la lettre en arabe adressée par vous à Sa
Majesté Impériale le Sultan; je l’ai fait accompagner par votre lettre
adressée à moi; aussitôt que j’aurai une réponse je ne manquerai pas de
vous le faire connaître immédiatement. Je n’ai pas jugé nécessaire de
présenter au Sultan votre rapport à Hassan Pacha Fehmi—Sa Majesté aimant
les primeurs en tout. Je n’ai pas reçu la pièce que vous m’annonciez
m’être envoyé par votre secretaire.
Rien de nouveau ici si ce n’est l’entrée en scène de l’Italie d’une
manière extravagante, il en sera de même tant que la Turquie se bornera
à protester chaque fois qu’on lui marchera sur le pied.
A vous, etc.
HALIM.
P.S. Personne ne peut répondre de la fermeté du Gouvernement Ottoman.
LETTER TO H.M. THE SULTAN OF TURKEY (ABDUL HAMID)
(_Sent also in Arabic._)
Crabbet Park, Three Bridges, Sussex, _January_ 3, 1885.
SIR,
The grave perils which on every side menace the Mohammedan nation and
which cannot but distress Your Majesty in the discharge of your high
duties towards your people must be my excuse if I venture to address you
on certain points which appear to me of vital moment in the present
conjuncture of affairs for Islam.
It will not be unknown to Your Majesty that for some years past I have
travelled widely in Mohammedan lands and that circumstances have placed
me in a position to learn the thoughts, the fears, and the aspirations
of those who under various governments acknowledge Your Majesty as their
chief, the supreme Head and Prince of their religion; and Your Majesty
also doubtless knows the active part I took three years ago in
endeavouring to prevent the great misfortune of the invasion of Egypt by
my countrymen, and afterwards to set in a true light the injustice of
their action and the supreme miseries which they have caused. I trust
therefore that Your Majesty will accept as the ideas of one devoted in
all his heart to Mohammedan interests and Your Majesty’s, the view of
policy which I now presume to lay before you.
1. With regard to those Mohammedans who live under other rule than Your
Majesty’s,—I can assert without fear of mistake that at no other period
of modern history has the Caliphal authority exercised so powerful an
influence on their imagination as now. In all parts of the world
Mohammedans are conscious of the danger to them as a nation; and the
sacred office held by Your Majesty is regarded by them as the only
safeguard remaining of their political existence. Especially within the
last four years have they learned the necessity of closer union under
Your Majesty’s command, if they would not become altogether lost and
scattered; and they are willing as they never were before to put aside
the differences of opinion which have so long divided them and to accept
Your Majesty as the fountain for them of authority. On this subject I
have conversed with many learned men in many countries, and I find that
what they practically desire is this. The evils of which they complain
are a decay of sound education, a decay of morals and a decay of wealth;
and they attribute these misfortunes not indeed to a defect of the
sacred law, which they all hold to be sufficient, but to a defect of the
power to interpret it in accordance with modern necessities, and of the
authority which should enforce that interpretation and make it binding
on men’s practice. They desire therefore that Your Majesty should be
pleased to consider in what way it would be possible to encourage the
meeting of some general assembly of Ulemas of various lands under Your
Majesty’s supreme appointment to discuss all these matters, and devise
remedies for their very urgent needs. They think that by a common
agreement alone of the faithful of all lands under Your Majesty a true
result could be obtained.
This they desire and also that Your Majesty should take a more open part
in the exercise of your high office by issuing from time to time and
publishing authoritative statements of your views regarding the many
public events which arise, gravely interesting to Mohammedans at large,
in order that these may be kept in closer sympathy with Your Majesty on
matters concerning all. Thus it seems to me that it would be of supreme
advantage at the present moment that Your Majesty should take the whole
Mohammedan world into your confidence with regard to the English
occupation of Egypt. The strength of Your Majesty’s position lies in the
moral influence you possess over the vast populations outside Your
Majesty’s own Empire, and this can only be exercised to its full extent
by making your wishes public. Advantage has too long been taken by
European Governments of Your Majesty’s silence to spread false reports
regarding Your Majesty’s ideas; and in these modern days no Power can
afford to dispense with publicity as a spiritual weapon.
2. With regard to Your Majesty’s own dominions I am encouraged by the
high character Your Majesty bears as a sincere Reformer, to urge upon
you to take cognizance of the many abuses and breaches of the law which
afflict the remoter provinces of your Empire. These to my sorrow I have
noted on my many journeys; and I know that they are a scandal to the
world and a cause of National weakness. I could, if Your Majesty would
permit, explain in what way I think they could be remedied; and Your
Majesty may trust me not to recommend those European remedies which Your
Majesty rightly judges to be unsuited to the genius of Eastern lands and
subversive of the principles of their religion. I should ask Your
Majesty neither to grant concessions to Europeans, nor to employ
Europeans in your Government, nor to adopt European forms of
Administration. The reforms I would advocate are different from these,
and are on the contrary designed to establish Mohammedan Government on
its true national basis and in stricter accordance with its religious
law. In this way I am confident that, God aiding Your Majesty, a sound
political and financial basis could be secured for Your Empire.
Lastly—I would urge upon Your Majesty a certain course of policy towards
the Great European Powers, who one and all covet your dominions. It is
essential for any plan of reform and recuperation that an interval of
peace should be secured you. The two Governments which most threaten the
Mohammedan nation at this moment are the Russian and I grieve to say my
own, and they must be dealt with vigorously each in its own manner. The
present is an opportunity of the most favourable for making terms with
England, but these can only be secured advantageously for Islam by
courage and determination. Your Majesty must declare yourself in clear
language according to certain terms as to which I could advise Your
Majesty; and I think that I can assure you of success. But I venture to
warn Your Majesty against any concession of principle which might
separate you from the full approval of Mohammedans in various lands. The
part which is yours to play in your dealings with our Government is that
of the fearless exponent of the Mohammedan will. As Sultan of Turkey
Your Majesty has undoubted rights in Egypt, but in this age of lawless
aggression it is necessary that sovereign rights should be backed by the
popular will and in Your Majesty’s instance by that full exercise of
your Caliphal authority which is yours as Prince of the Faithful.
If Your Majesty on the perusal of this letter will deign to hear me
further I will make it my duty to lay my plan in detail before Your
Majesty.
I am, with profound respect, Your Majesty, Your most faithful servant.
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT
Constantinople, 17 _Juillet_ 1885.
CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT,
J’ai reçu votre lettre du 3 courant qui m’annonce l’achat des chevaux.
Je vous remercie pour la peine que vous vous êtes donnée pour cela.
Mr. Whitaker n’est pas encore de retour. En attendant, ce que je vois
dans le journaux ne me parait pas être très différent du passé. Lord
Salisbury dans l’exposé de la politique du nouveau cabinet, fait à la
chambre des Lords le 6 courant, déclare que l’Angleterre est liée
d’honneur au Khedive. Un premier Ministre ne s’engage au fond comme
cela, s’il avait l’intention de suivre une autre voie que ses
prédécesseurs. Le lien d’honneur n’est pas facile à briser, comme par
exemple le lien d’intérêt, où on a la faculté de se montrer désintéressé
même magnanime en le brisant. Lord Salisbury donne pour raison du lien
d’honneur, l’honêteté du Khédive, vis-à-vis du gouvernement Anglais et
il n’y a que quelques jours que Tewfik Pacha protestait de son dévoument
et de son inaltérable attachement à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, en
jettant sur la pression irrésistible des Anglais tout le passé. Ces
protestations du Khédive sont prises ici pour ce qu’elles valent et pour
la forme on se montre content. Le grand cordon du Schafcate à été envoyé
à sa femme comme preuve de la satisfaction Impériale,
Je vous renouvelle, cher Monsieur Blunt, l’expression, etc.
HALIM.
APPENDIX C
AUTHOR’S CORRESPONDENCE WITH DOWNING STREET
THE EARL OF DUFFERIN TO MR. BLUNT
_Private._
Cairo, 16 _December_ ’82.
MY DEAR BLUNT,
Many thanks for your letter of December 8th, and especially for having
sent me the pamphlet, of which I had heard, and which I have studied
with the attention it seems to deserve.
I am quite alive to the importance of the question you refer to of the
indebtedness of the peasantry. It is one of those evils which meet us
both in India and in Ireland, and you may depend upon my doing my best
to discover a remedy if any such there be.
We have induced the Government to let out of prison at once, something
like 450 of those who have been shut up in jail.
Yours sincerely,
DUFFERIN.
MR. BLUNT TO THE EARL OF DUFFERIN
_January 23rd_, 1883.
MY DEAR LORD DUFFERIN,
I have delayed thanking you for your letter of the 16th December
informing me of the release of 450 of the political prisoners, until I
had seen Napier and learned from him a little more clearly than I could
by letter what were the terms of agreement come to with regard to them
when the trial was compromised. I had understood from Broadley that the
terms would include an amnesty, and I had hoped it would have been a
general one, and that the whole of the unfortunate people detained in
the prisons on charges rising out of the “rebellion” would have been set
free. Now, however, it seems that, though an amnesty has been decreed,
many exceptions to it have been made, that while some have been
released, others are being arrested, and that the Courts are still
trying and executing men on criminal charges connected with the events
of June and July. I trust that the interest I take in opposing this
particular form of injustice will excuse me with you if I say a few
words on the matter. The world, it is true, is full of injustice which
we cannot remedy, but here the remedy would seem within our hands, and
the injustice is one for which every Englishman who knows the facts is
responsible.
First, as regards the exceptions made to the amnesty, it would seem most
unfair that the leaders of the “rebellion” having foregone their right
of being publicly defended, any of their followers or associates should
be punished for rebellion. Arabi’s defence included the defence of every
man in Egypt, and with the commutation of his sentence every other
sentence should have been commuted. The two strongest cases I have heard
of, of persons excepted from the amnesty, are Akkad’s and Awwam’s, men
charged with no crime, but who have nevertheless been exiled, the one to
Massowah and the other to the White Nile, punishments which Malet has, I
think, explained in his despatches to be equivalent to death. These two
cases I also recommend to your special attention from the fact that the
sufferers are men whose quarrel was originally with English, not
Egyptian, officials, and whose exception from the amnesty has
consequently a rather compromising appearance for them. Akkad’s original
offence lay in his having protested in 1879 against Rivers Wilson’s
confiscation of the Moukabalah claims, a thing he was perfectly
justified in doing, which, moreover, he had been invited to do by a
notice published by Wilson in the papers. For this he was sent by Riaz
on a false charge to the White Nile; the details, Napier tells me, he
has laid already before you.
Awwam’s case is still stronger, and it affects Colvin. Awwam was an
employé under Colvin on the Cadastral survey, and was dismissed for
having drawn up a report showing the incapacity of the officers
conducting the survey and their waste of public money—all which is now
admitted. The wrong done him made a martyr of him with the Nationalists,
and when Arabi came into office in February he was appointed his
secretary. For this, and presumably at Colvin’s suggestion, he was
arrested by the English authorities on their landing at Alexandria in
July, and put in irons. He then wrote a letter to the Khedive demanding
to know the reason of his arrest, and was transferred, still in irons,
to the Borgho prison, where Ninet saw him seventy-four days afterwards.
Then, when the disclosures relating to that prison began to be made,
Awwam would seem to have been sent without trial to Khartoum, and is
probably there at the present moment. These are strong cases, but I have
little doubt there are many others quite as strong.
Secondly. It is surely a mockery to decree an amnesty affecting only
persons who happen to be actually in prison, and omitting from its
operation both men already dealt with and men to be dealt with in the
future on charges connected with the past. From all I hear the reign of
terror has not been diminished in the provinces by the decree—whatever
may be the case at Cairo—the prisons are still full and men are being
arrested daily.
Lastly. I cannot understand how it can be the wish of our Government to
make scapegoats of the rank and file of those charged with the criminal
acts of June and July while the chief offenders enjoy immunity. If one
thing has been proved to the satisfaction of the Government more than
another, it is that Omar Lutfi was responsible for the murderous
character of the riots of the 11th of June. Yet we read still of
executions at Alexandria for crimes committed on that day by others, the
chief culprit himself being the while at large, in honour, and holding
high office under the Khedive. I say nothing of the Khedive himself,
though you doubtless know how little his conduct on that day would have
borne investigation.
Having thus discharged my conscience of what I consider a duty, let me
now allude to the other part of your letter, that relating to the debts
of the fellahin. It was the scheme of Arabi and the Nationalists last
February to solve the difficulty by making it illegal to lend money on
mortgage of land except with the consent of an officer to be appointed
for the purpose in the chief town of each district, and then only to an
amount small in proportion to land value. Thus the only borrowers would
have been persons able and intending to repay. I quite understand that
such a regulation might have checked the flow of capital into the
country and in consequence have reduced the public revenue, but the
object of the Nationalists was to prevent at all costs the passing of
the land into the hands of strangers; and I repeat that this _must_ be
prevented if there is to be a cessation of the popular discontent in
Egypt. This seems to me a far more vital matter than the form of
government of the country, or even the reform of the administration. But
probably it can only be effected by a reduction of the revenue, and
consequently of the rate of interest on the debt. The Nationalists also
intended to form a National Bank to make the required advances. But I
feel that very likely it is useless my saying anything on this head, for
I fear the Government at home has no serious desire to effect anything
but a makeshift arrangement agreeable to the European public, and strong
enough to last their time. I wish you could have seen Mohammed Abdu or
some others of the Nationalist leaders before they left Egypt. They
would have told you in an hour more than you could learn from all the
English officials at Cairo in a fortnight. Nevertheless I beg you to
believe that I still look confidently for a solution compatible with
Egyptian aspirations at your hands, and I remain yours truly,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
THE EARL OF DUFFERIN TO MR. BLUNT
_Private and Confidential._
Cairo, _12th Feb._ ’83.
MY DEAR BLUNT,
I hasten to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd of
January. It must have been delayed en route.
You are really under a wrong impression as to what is going on here, as
you will see by the enclosed memorandum from Sir Charles Wilson, to whom
I referred your letter.
As for el Accad, he is quite unworthy of the interest you take in him.
His complicity with Arabi is beyond doubt, and he misappropriated some
funds which Halim Pasha entrusted to him for the purpose of bribing
Arabi to support his, Halim’s, candidature.
I have sent home a report on the reorganization of Egypt, from which you
will see that I am doing what I can to promote the establishment of just
principles of Government in this country.
Believe me, my dear Blunt, yours sincerely,
DUFFERIN.
P.S.—I need not remind you that there is no man who has done more to
prevent this Government from exercising undue severity in the case of
the rebels than Sir Charles Wilson.
MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON
10, James Street, _January_ 16, 1883.
MY DEAR EDDY,
I think you will admit that the despatches published to-day, taken in
connection with Colvin’s reappointment as Controller in Egypt, absolve
me from any duty of reticence I may have had toward Mr. Gladstone on the
events of the past year. In spite of all that has been said and promised
and avowed, annexation stares us in the face as unmistakably as if the
word had been written. I am sorry, more than for Egypt, that it should
have come to this.
Yours affec.,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
_Private._
10, Downing Street, _12th March_ ’83.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
As Campbell Bannerman has to answer a question this afternoon founded on
your letter which will (I understand) amount to what he could tell you,
were he to see you, perhaps an interview would be of little good. He
tells me that every piece of fresh information they get at the Admiralty
(_e.g._ from Lord Alcester) fully confirms his account in the House of
Commons; and therefore it seems to resolve itself into a question of the
known intentions of the authorities in Egypt as well as of the
Government at home against what Gill and Palmer _fancied_ their mission
to have been.
I apologize for having perhaps expressed myself too strongly yesterday.
But the Government have nothing in the world to conceal; and the
organisers of the Expedition surely ought to know better the objects of
it than the unfortunate men charged with the mission.
Yours as always affec.,
E. W. HAMILTON.
MR. BLUNT TO MR. EDWARD HAMILTON
Paris, _Sep._ 14, 1883.
DEAR EDDY,
When I saw you on Wednesday I told you that I had thought of taking
Sabunji with me, but had given up the idea. Since then, however, I have
heard that the man I counted on to help me in Egypt is no longer there,
and I have consequently determined to take Sabunji. The fact is I should
be very helpless without him, and if it should so happen that I could be
of any good it would be as well to have him at hand.
I shall leave him at Port Said or Suez till I have seen Baring, and as I
told you, I have no intention of doing anything without Baring’s
countenance. If Baring will not listen to anything I have to propose I
shall not waste any time in Egypt, but shall go on to Ceylon and India.
I shall caution Sabunji to get into no mischief, and he has always acted
as far as I am aware squarely in his service with me. We start to-night
for Marseilles, and so farewell. I will write to you from Egypt.
Yours affec.,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON
Cairo, _September 28th_, 1883.
MY DEAR EDDY,
I promised to write to you, and I will keep my promise, but you must not
expect me to say anything pleasant or flattering. I found Baring
extremely amiable and willing to listen to all I had to say, and I
believe he told me his own views frankly. Our ideas on many of the
reforms wanted in Egypt were the same. His scheme for relieving the
debts of the peasantry seemed a sound one—and he struck me generally as
being a man of sympathy and courage. But when I have said this I have
said all. On the main point of giving Egypt back her liberty we are
worlds apart. He neither wishes it, nor has the least idea of attempting
it. “What Egypt wants,” he told me, “is peace and order, not another
revolution; we have restored the Khedive and the Circassians to power,
and I shall do my best to keep them there.”
With regard to Dufferin’s famous Charter I find neither he nor any one
else look upon it as in the least serious or in the least important—and
they are right. The elections are not serious, nor were ever intended to
be by those who drafted the Charter. The electoral lists are drawn up by
the Government, the voting takes place under the eye of the Governor and
in the Prefecture of Police—and in most instances the Governor or the
Prefect of Police are the candidates chosen. It could not have been
otherwise. The Circassians have been encouraged to re-establish their
rule by a reign of terror. There is no protection of any kind against
arbitrary arrest, arbitrary confiscation of property, and imprisonment
without trial. The prisons in the country districts are still full of
untried men. There is no liberty of speech, or of the press—and at
Alexandria they began the elections by hanging two more men charged with
instigating the riots of last year. How should any one but the Prefect
of Police be chosen? Mr. Gladstone, who knows everything, doubtless
knows that in India, where the people have been crushed for ages, they
worship Siva the god of destruction. Here they worship the Prefect of
Police. Yet less than two years ago there were both freedom of speech
and of the press, elections fairly representative, and the beginning of
a real Constitution. It may have been necessary for Imperial or
international reasons to destroy this and to revert to a system of
“peace and order” as Baring calls it, but it cannot be necessary to talk
of having given the Egyptians liberty!
Baring himself is too honest to pretend that his system is anything but
“Egypt for the Turks.” But he fancies he can manage Tewfik and the half
dozen men who form his party, and give Egypt a mitigated and not
altogether inhuman despotism. If he succeeds in this he will have
accomplished something, but I cannot believe that he will at all
succeed. Tewfik and Sherif have no following in this country beyond the
palace walls, and, even supposing them to be the absolutely supple tools
Baring believes them to be, they have no kind of moral influence and
very little energy. The minor English officials tell me they are unable
to redress the least wrong or introduce the simplest reform in the
departments in which they serve; and that Baring and Maxwell should be
able, through the weak medium of Tewfik, and Sherif, and Fakri, to do
more than obtain a shadow of justice and compassion for the people I
cannot understand. You know how different this is from my own idea of
reforming the people through men of their own race whom they respect,
and are ready to work with, and you may imagine my disappointment at
getting from Baring nothing better than poor Malet’s stale idea of Egypt
for the Turks.
I spoke to Sir Benson Maxwell, who is a really good man, about getting
some kind of protection for the people from arbitrary arrest, and he has
promised to do so. But he is going away on leave and nothing will be
even begun before Christmas. On the whole it seems to me that no fate
could possibly have been devised for Egypt more sad or more hopeless
than what I see before me, and it would have been far more merciful to
have put the Egyptians at once out of their misery by annexing their
country last year than to play at giving them “_native_ rule,” under
conditions which through much suffering will lead to exactly the same
result a year or two years hence. I consequently leave Egypt a sadder
and a wiser man than I came. I shall publish my poem—and make my protest
and set out “to-morrow for fresh fields and pastures new.”
Yours, etc.,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
PS.—I wonder whether Mr. Gladstone knows that there are still twelve
Bedouins in prison at Suez arrested for the Palmer murder and untried.
Among them a woman and two or three children kept as hostages!!
MR. BLUNT TO SIR EVELYN BARING
Cairo, _Oct._ 1, 1883.
MY DEAR SIR EVELYN,
I have received a letter from Abd el Razak Bey, F.R.G.S., ex-director of
the Naval College, who with some four others has been in prison here for
the last three months on a charge originally of connection with a
political plot. He was, however, ordered to be dismissed by the
Commission appointed to inquire into the matter, but was nevertheless
retained by Osman Pasha Ghaleb through superior orders “on suspicion,”
and is still in the Zaptieh prison. He now asks me to come and see him,
and as I am leaving Cairo to-morrow I shall be much obliged to you if
you can kindly obtain me an order to enter the prison.
Since seeing you on Wednesday I have had opportunities of ascertaining
the feelings of the people here, and I am convinced that unless
something is speedily done to relieve their sufferings you will have
trouble.
I am, dear Sir Evelyn, yours truly,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
SIR EVELYN BARING TO MR. BLUNT
Cairo, _Oct._ 1, 1883.
DEAR MR. BLUNT,
I regret that I am unable to accede to the request contained in your
letter. The decision as to permission being given to prisoners to
receive visits lies entirely within the competence of the Egyptian
Government. I must decline to interfere in the manner in which they
exercise their discretion in dealing with the subject.
Very truly yours,
E. BARING.
MR. BLUNT TO SIR EVELYN BARING
_Private._
Suez, _October 3rd_, 1883.
MY DEAR SIR EVELYN,
Your note by some accident was posted by your cavass instead of being
sent by hand, and so did not reach me till just as I was leaving Cairo
yesterday morning, and I think it is right you should know that
receiving no answer I had already gone to the prison, and seen Abd el
Razak Bey and the others. I found them comfortably lodged and in good
health, with the exception of Mustapha Bey Sidki, who seemed seriously
ill, and I received from them all the same account, that their release
had been ordered by the Commission (which included two of the Belgians
who came here as judges) more than three months ago, since which time no
further inquiries had been made into their case. Abd el Razak had
written to the Khedive, but without reply, and they believe themselves
to be detained by the order of Osman Pasha Ghaleb. No English inspector
had been to see them, and no inquiry had been made into their case. Now,
however, that I have got your letter I fear that, should my visit become
known to the Prefect of Police, or the fact that they wrote to me, the
prisoners might be made to suffer from their and my imprudence. They
believe themselves likely to be sent without further trial to the
Soudan, and, as so many have suffered that fate during the past year, I
trust that you will give them your protection. They were arrested on a
charge which would seem to have been false, for their release was
ordered by the court which examined it, and in any other country in the
world they would be now at liberty.
As far as I can learn, Lord Dufferin interfered with these matters as
long as he was here, for he had promised a political amnesty at the time
of Arabi’s trial, but after his departure arrests were again made, and I
understand on very high authority that there are at the present moment
several thousand untried prisoners in the various towns of the Delta and
Upper Egypt. I can speak from experience of the terror in which
respectable people, in no way connected with the army, but known to have
sympathized with the Liberal party, are now living in Cairo, and, as I
said before, the excessive tyranny of the police and the Mudirs is
goading men to new disquiet. Trusting that you will forgive me for not
having waited for your answer, and that as far as the prisoners are
concerned the fact of their having written to me and of my having seen
them may be kept a secret, I remain, dear Sir Evelyn,
Yours very truly,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON
Suez, _October 3rd_, 1883.
MY DEAR EDDY,
You will have perceived that when I wrote the other day I was very
angry, and I think that I had cause. But that is no reason why I should
not write again. When I saw Baring I had not had any conversation with
my own political friends, and I could not guess the condition of
affairs. Now I have seen and talked to a great number of them, and I can
speak with certainty as to their feelings and, I believe, with equal
certainty as to the general feeling of the country.
The first and only obstacle that I see to a peaceable settlement of the
country is the present Khedive. It is absolutely impossible he should
remain, unless it is intended to occupy the country permanently with our
troops—and I doubt if even that would altogether protect him. I have
asked people of every class about him and I have not found one that did
not despise him. The Circassians and the rest of the fanatical class
look upon him as a traitor to his religion, and the liberals as a
traitor to his country. You know that till the bombardment I supported
him with the National party as against Halim or Ismaïl or other
pretenders, but I am certain that no reconciliation is possible. You do
not believe in his culpability in the matter of the riots of June, but
all the Egyptians here do, and within the last three days I have had
very important evidence on that head offered me. Now, I don’t wish to
make too much of this—it was a stroke of party politics. But what the
Nationalists will never forgive is that he has had innocent men as well
as men who acted at his instigation hanged for these very acts. I have
now the evidence of two men of the highest respectability, one of whom
is Ahmed Bey Minshawi, the Sheykh who is so honourably mentioned in the
Blue Books as having saved the lives of several hundred Christians at
Tantah, to the effect that the riots there were equally the work of the
Khedive’s friends, and that Yusuf Abu Diab, who was hanged for the
affair, was not only innocent but did his best to save lives. Innocent
men have everywhere been arrested and imprisoned on charges connected
with these things to gratify the spite of the Khedive and his few
partisans. You will say perhaps that these tales are not true, but they
are certainly believed in—and in the belief lies all the difficulty of
reconciliation. For myself I believe so strongly in the Khedive’s
treachery that I would certainly not advise Arabi to return to Egypt,
were the option given him, under Tewfik’s rule.
The Circassians of course do not quarrel with him on this account (for
they look on the fellahin as their proper scapegoats), but for his
conduct during the war and his feebleness of character. As you know,
they are very few in numbers in the country, only a few thousand, and
they say they want a _man_ not a woman to protect them against Europe
and against another rising of the fellahin. I believe there is a strong
party among them for Ismaïl Pasha, a few for Husseyn on account of his
extreme bigotry, and a few for Hassan, his brother. Among the more
liberal-minded Halim is a favourite, as he is among many of the
Egyptians through Abu Nadara’s advocacy, though very few people know
him. His enemies say he is not a politician and cares only for cats and
birds. Nobody will hear at all of Ibrahim on account of his letter to
the Duke of Cambridge. The Khedive of course has a party, though he has
no friends. This consists first of the Ministers who have come into
power through his restoration—though all these cannot be counted
on—secondly of Butros Pasha and other rich Copts, and I believe the
Coptic money-lenders of the Said. The Patriarch and the mass of the
Coptic clergy belong to the “Hesbu el Horiye,” the party of liberty,
which now occupies the place of the National party of two years ago.
Also, thirdly, of the financiers, bankers, and rich Syrian and Greek
merchants of Alexandria. It is, however, safe to say that there is
nobody of the Khedive’s party, except the Ministers, who do not support
him as a natural stepping-stone to annexation.
The fellahin of the Delta, as far as I can gather, are divided in
opinion, those of the remoter districts caring nothing for politics, and
having still a traditional respect for Effendina—whoever he may be—the
other part believing that Arabi will return. Of this there has grown up
within the last few months a very strong belief in Cairo and the
towns—and there is no doubt in the world that he is popular in spite of
his misfortunes. I have heard people complain of him for his conduct in
the war, for his neglect of blocking the Suez Canal, for his praying
when he ought to have been fighting, and for his running away at Tel-el-
Kebir. But they talk kindly of him and are proud of him as the first
_fellah_ who ever held supreme power in Egypt, and I had abundant proofs
of their goodwill to myself as his friend. Except the Khedive I see no
obstacle to his recall. Sherif might, I believe, work with him again as
far as the Nationalists are concerned, and Ismaïl Eyoub certainly could.
But Ali Mubarak Pasha, Khairi Pasha, Omar Lutfi Pasha, and Osman Ghaleb,
the Prefect of Police, and Sultan Pasha would have to retire from power.
I cannot conceive their being any loss—and there are certain Mudirs,
too, in the provinces, who have been exceptionally bloodthirsty and
tyrannical, whose position would be incompatible with a return of the
liberal party to office. I am of opinion that the only prince of the
family of Mehemet Ali who could unite parties is Halim. But I think you
would do far better to make Arabi himself the chief of the state—Halim
after all is a Turk and the people only look to him as the alternative
to the present regime.
The more I have seen of the people the more convinced I have become that
the present reign of terror cannot continue. If you withdraw the troops
without establishing something and somebody that the people like, you
must have trouble. The army may be as fond of Sir Evelyn Wood as he is
said to think, but that will not prevent them owning the first resolute
man who proposes to dethrone the Khedive—he is too unpopular with the
people to be popular with the army—and, if the Nationalists are too
crushed to turn on him yet awhile, the Circassians certainly will. You
will then find yourselves with some really unscrupulous adventurer at
the head of a revolution, and you or your successors will annex the
country. I am writing in the belief that you do not intend or wish for
such a result, but to persist in thrusting Tewfik on the Egyptians is to
invite annexation.
I had intended to write this to the “Times,” but I write it instead to
you, hoping that you may show it to Mr. Gladstone. I would rather you
did not show it to the F. O., for they would only use it to my friends’
disadvantage. The whole thing depends now on Mr. Gladstone. If he
insists on restoring liberty to Egypt nothing is easier—but not on the
present lines.
Yours affectionately,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
Haddo House, Aberdeen,
_21st October_, 1883.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Your two interesting letters written from Egypt, for which many thanks,
have both reached me while I am holiday making in Scotland; but I have
taken steps to secure their being seen by Mr. Gladstone. Your account of
affairs in Egypt is, to say the least of it, depressing. I won’t make
any comments on what you say. I will content myself with being the
receptacle of bad news and the conduit pipe of it to headquarters. I
will only say that I can’t conceive how it would be possible, without
the grossest breach of faith, for the English Government to countenance
the ousting of Tewfik, whatever sort of fellow he may be.
Holiday making is neither conducive to letter writing, I find, nor to
the catering of news, so I am afraid I shall, as far as being a
correspondent is concerned, make a poor return for your budgets. Good
luck to you and a pleasant trip to India.
Yours affectionately,
E. W. HAMILTON.
SIR EVELYN BARING TO MR. BLUNT
Cairo, _December_ 31, 1883.
SIR,
I have received a letter from Chérif Pasha informing me that the
Egyptian Government intends to forbid your disembarkation in Egypt on
your return journey from India—His Excellency adds: “Par courtoisie, et
en vue d’empêcher tout incident facheux de se produire dans le cas où il
entrerait dans les intentions de Monsieur Blunt de s’arrêter en Egypte,
à son retour des Indes, je crois devoir vous demander Monsieur le
Ministre, de vouloir bien informer d’avance votre compatriote de cette
interdiction.”
In compliance, therefore, with the request of the Egyptian Government, I
beg to communicate their decision to you.
I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,
E. BARING.
MR. BLUNT TO SIR EVELYN BARING
Delhi, _January_ 26, 1884.
MY DEAR SIR EVELYN,
I have to acknowledge the receipt, under flying seal from Mr. Primrose,
of your letter of the 31st December, which reached me yesterday. I
confess that the contents surprised me, not merely on account of the
nature of the message your letter contained for me from the Khedive’s
late Prime Minister, but still more from the fact that you should have
transmitted it in an official form without comment, explanation, or
expression of disapproval.
That the Government of which Sherif Pasha was the head should have
disliked my presence in Egypt I can well understand, for I have been
more than once, as you know, instrumental in bringing their abuse of
power to official ears; but I am ignorant of having offended against any
law which should authorize my exclusion, as the subject of a friendly
Power, from Egypt; and still less am I conscious of having done what
should forfeit me my right to your diplomatic protection. Indeed, the
circumstances of my recent visit to Egypt would seem to entitle me to
this last in an especial manner; for you will not have forgotten that I
came there last September with special recommendation to you from the
highest official quarter, and that my renewed interest in Egyptian
politics was authorized by suggestions emanating from the same high
source. But for this, I believe I may say with truth that I should not
have stopped in Egypt at all on my way eastwards, and most certainly
that I should not have encouraged hopes there which the sequel might
fail to justify.
With equal truth I can assure you that, had you informed me in a less
formal manner that the interests of Egypt would be best served by my not
returning to Cairo this spring, I would have willingly consented
inasmuch as at the moment of my receiving your letter I had all but
abandoned my intention of so doing, partly on account of quarantine
difficulties, partly because I recognized in Nubar Pasha’s accession to
office an adjournment by our Government of the special hopes which
interested me.
Now, however, in face of your official communication, I feel myself
obliged to do something towards asserting the right, which is mine as a
British subject, of residing where I will abroad under British
protection, and especially, because I hold property there, in Egypt.
Nubar Pasha is an enlightened man, with whom I have the pleasure of
being personally acquainted, and he is not likely of his own motion to
renew his predecessor’s threat of excluding me from the country, but I
fear I must ask you, as I do most formally ask you, to be good enough to
give me your written assurance either that the prohibition forwarded by
you has ended with Sherif Pasha’s dismissal, or that you are prepared,
should I be so disposed as to wish to land in Egypt, to take all
necessary measures to protect me from annoyance. Less than this would be
equivalent to my abandoning a right which, as a matter of principle as
well as of convenience, I am not prepared to forego.
I will only add that letters from you in this sense will reach me, if
addressed to the Rubattino Steamer “China,” at Aden on the 8th of March
or at Suez on the 12th, and will prevent further misunderstanding.
I am, my dear Sir Evelyn, yours faithfully,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
_Private._
Bombay, _January_ 30, 1884.
MY DEAR EDDY,
What, in the name of all that is blunder-headed, does Baring mean by
sending me _in official form_ and without explanation a threat of the
late Sherif Pasha’s that he would prevent my landing in Egypt? You
surely explained to him the meaning of my last visit and the
encouragement which had been given me (I don’t mean merely through
yourself) to make a move in Egyptian politics. Or what is the history of
it? Of course I have been obliged to answer, but as yet have done so
semi-officially only, and without putting all the dots upon the I’s, and
have left him a door of retreat from what you must see is quite a false
position. Please don’t let him force me to go any further.
Seriously, would it not be better to work with me frankly at last by
telling me exactly what it is you want in Egypt. Unless you really mean
annexation, you will need every honest man’s help to get you out of your
difficulties, and the day will come when you will not despise mine. It
is only two years ago if I remember rightly that you told me Gordon was
mad. But you must not drive me too far. I have a serious work to do in
the East, a work of which the establishment of good government in Egypt
is only a small part, and one way or other, with God’s help, I mean to
do it. It is a good work and you could further it greatly in Downing
Street if you chose to trust me, but I am sure you cannot hinder it,
certainly not by shutting me out of Egypt. I had nearly given up the
idea of going back there this spring, for my thoughts were in another
direction, when I got Baring’s letter. But I shall most certainly fight
the matter out if he insists. Only I beg of you think it carefully over
and if possible let Baring be advised to send me a sensible reply.
We leave Bombay on the 1st of March.
Yours affectionately,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
SIR EVELYN BARING TO MR. BLUNT
Cairo, _Feb._ 26, 1884.
DEAR MR. BLUNT,
On receipt of your letter of January 26th I placed myself in
communication with Nubar Pasha. I enclose for your information a copy of
my letter and of Nubar Pasha’s reply.
You will observe that Nubar Pasha’s views are identical with those
entertained by Cherif Pasha.
Very truly yours,
E. BARING.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
10, Downing Street, 28 _Feb._, 1884.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Thanks for writing to me. I know nothing whatever of the steps which the
Egyptian Government have taken with regard to yourself; and I am
certainly not aware that they were taken at the instance of the English
Government or of its representative at Cairo.
I am afraid—and my fears are confirmed by what you say in your last
letter—that you have considered the fact of your corresponding with the
Prime Minister’s Private Secretary on Egyptian matters as an
encouragement, however intentionally guarded the correspondence may have
been on my side. This may lead to misunderstanding; and I feel bound to
consider not so much myself (for that matters little) as my master.
Moreover it is difficult for me in writing to show exactly how far I
write on my own account—a difficulty which is enhanced by the
impossibility of my devoting the time and care necessary for
corresponding on important subjects.
Having regard then to these considerations I think it my duty not to
attempt to write about such subjects, and that it will be better for you
and me if we drop writing to one another on public questions. I daresay
I am to blame in this matter, as it has always been an interest and
pleasure to me to hear your views which you have the power of expressing
so well, and I have been tempted to egg you on. I hope you will not
misunderstand what I have said. I don’t think I need have any fear on
this account, for I am sure our friendship is strong enough not to be
affected by anything I may do from a sense of public and official duty.
I have been awfully busy of late, busier than ever. Whenever not wholly
absorbed in work, my thoughts have of late been mainly occupied by the
long and very serious illness of poor Pembroke. . . . I wish I had time
to send more news; but that is not possible.
For the sake of your friends, if not for your own sake, I hope you won’t
act in the matter of the order of the Egyptian Government in such a way
as to bring yourself into trouble. I hope I have said nothing which will
annoy you, and you will make due allowance for the difficulties and
delicacy of my position.
Yours affectionately,
E. W. HAMILTON.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
10, Downing Street, _April_ 4, 1884.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Welcome back. I am truly glad to hear of your and Lady Anne’s safe
return. I shall like of all things to arrange an early meeting, etc.
Thanks for taking my remarks in such good grace.
Yours affectionately,
E. W. HAMILTON.
MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.
Crabbet Park, _April_ 23, 1884.
MY DEAR SIR,
A few days ago some gentlemen of the many interested in the fate of
General Gordon called on me to ask my advice as to the best means of
extricating him from the imminent peril in which he lies, and they
suggested the formation of a band of volunteers which should endeavour
to run the gauntlet of their besiegers and having forced their way to
Khartoum should bring him back with them in safety by the same road. The
idea seemed to me a generous but wholly impracticable one, and I told
them so, frankly adding that much as I should wish to join in any
reasonable attempt to save General Gordon’s life, I could not with the
principles I hold, be a party to an armed attempt against the Arabs whom
I hold to be in the right as I hold General Gordon to be in the wrong. I
promised however that should anything in the shape of peaceful
negotiation be proposed I would willingly aid them to the full extent of
my power.
Since then I have most opportunely received information which leads me
to feel certain that if properly approached not only could terms be
obtained from the besiegers of Khartoum which should include General
Gordon’s safe return with such of his companions as might choose to
accompany him, but that a general pacification of the Upper Nile might
at the same time and by the same means be effected. In view therefore of
the urgency of the situation (for believe me, Sir, it is urgent), I deem
it a duty to offer through you my services to H. M.’s Government as
mediator in this matter. I say to H. M. Government, because it is clear
that no merely private negotiations could be effectual in a case where
such large public interests are involved. But I do not apprehend that
any absolute departure from the general principles of policy announced
by the Government would be required in conducting them to a successful
termination.
With regard to my own part in the matter I will only add that, although
I believe it would not be necessary for me to go myself to the Soudan, I
should be ready to do so if the circumstances of the case should
absolutely require it.
I am, my dear Sir, yours faithfully,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
_Private._
10, Downing Street, Whitehall.
_24th April_, 1884.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Mr. Gladstone is obliged for your letter. He must to-day confine himself
to saying that he is communicating its contents to his colleagues in the
Cabinet.
Yours,
E. W. HAMILTON.
_Private._
Same date.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
I add a private line. Considering all that has gone before, I can’t help
thinking you would do well to approach the Government by other means
than those in Downing Street. Could you not take Harry Brand into
confidence with a view to your viewings sifting through him to Lord
Hartington?
Yours aff.
E. W. H.
MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON
10, James Street, Buckingham Gate,
_April_ 24, 1884. 7 o’clock p.m.
MY DEAR EDDY,
If it was a matter concerning my own wishes or one of small importance I
would willingly consult Harry Brand, who would do all he could I know to
serve me. But this is the most serious step I have taken in my life and
one which involves consequences not to me only but to this country and
to many besides, and I dare not treat it except with those wholly
responsible. If Mr. Gladstone cannot see me now, perhaps he may be
willing to do so later. I was in the House this afternoon and listened
attentively to his declarations, and I gathered from them that he has
not yet closed the door to negotiations by any absolute decision of an
immediately warlike nature. So that I will wait his time, confident that
if I can be of use he will not scruple, on a point of formality in
connection with past events, to give me timely notice. Only I fear that
perhaps the time given us all may be shorter than he thinks, for already
according to my latest advices the tribes are gathering from every side
in arms, and though I still think it not too late it may well be so
soon. I shall be in London till Saturday when I go back to Crabbet but
shall be always within reach if required.
Yours affectionately,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MR. HORACE SEYMOUR TO MR. BLUNT
10, Downing Street, 30 _April_ 1884.
MY DEAR BLUNT,
Mr. Gladstone desires me to thank you for your offer to act as mediator
in the Soudan, of which, however, Her Majesty’s Government are not able
to make use, inasmuch as it must already be known throughout that region
that they, in common with the Government of Egypt, have no other desire
than to promote the evacuation of the country and the restoration of its
liberties.
Believe me, yours truly,
HORACE SEYMOUR.
SIR PHILIP CURRIE TO MR. BLUNT
Foreign Office, _May_ 17, 1884.
SIR,
I am directed by Earl Granville to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 1st instant in which you complain of the refusal of the
Egyptian Government to allow you to land in Egypt on your return from
India, which refusal was communicated to you through Her Majesty’s Agent
and Consul-General at Cairo.
I am to inform you that the decision not to permit you to visit Egypt is
one with which Her Majesty’s Government are not prepared to interfere.
I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,
PHILIP W. CURRIE.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
_Private._
10, Downing Street, _21st May_ 1884.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Rumours have reached me that you are about to found your complaint
against the Government for being excluded from Egypt partly on the
ground of certain “interviews” which you had with me last autumn.
I feel bound to notice these rumours by writing you a line; but I may
say at the outset, knowing you as I do, that I wholly and entirely
discredit them for more than one reason.
In the first place, I unfortunately saw so little of you before you left
England that I know we had no “interviews” with the solitary exception
of your coming to say good-bye to me, when I recollect that our
conversation was limited to wishing you “bon voyage,” adding as I
believe I did that letters from you abroad would continue to interest me
as they always had.
In the second place, I studiously avoid ever attempting to quote Mr.
Gladstone’s views—(and his views alone have weight)—which I have no
title whatever to represent.
In the third place, had I committed any indiscretions—as to which my
conscience is absolutely clear—any use of them by yourself could only
have one result; and that would be, to show that I was quite unfit for
my present post of confidence. Of doing this I am sure you have not the
smallest intention.
You will I know excuse my bothering you on this matter. All that I want
is the shortest authority from yourself to deny the truth of the
rumours. For this purpose only do I ask for such an assurance, and not
for my own satisfaction, because I am convinced that you would be the
last person in the world to take at a disadvantage one of your oldest
and sincerest friends, who occupies a place of great trust and delicacy.
Yours affectionately,
E. W. HAMILTON.
I hope if fortune favours me to see you again soon.
MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON
Crabbet Park, _May_ 22 1884.
MY DEAR EDDY,
I have no wish to make a scandal of this or any other matter, unless
absolutely forced into it, and still less to do you an injury; and so I
have decided, before going further, to lay the whole facts privately
before Mr. Gladstone. He will then be able to decide whether I have or
have not cause to complain. You may rely upon me to be scrupulous in not
exaggerating anything that passed between us, but I have a memorandum of
the circumstances written at the time, imperfect indeed but sufficient
to prove to me, if I had any doubt of the accuracy of my recollection,
that our conversation in Downing Street the day I saw you there before I
went abroad was by no means limited, as you suppose, to “wishing me bon
voyage.” I do not however rely wholly upon this for what I have all
along asserted, namely that I was encouraged to stop in Egypt on my way
Eastwards. Unless I was altogether deceived by another person, whom you
probably know, Mr. Gladstone was at that time desirous of a reasonable
excuse for restoring the Exiled Nationalists, and I went to Egypt and
called on Baring distinctly under this impression. You will say that I
have been the subject of a mystification, but I find this very difficult
to believe, and at any rate the doubt should be cleared up. I repeat, I
have no wish to have it done in public, if I can have it done in
private. I do not wish to make a scandal. I look upon Mr. Gladstone as
in reality a friend to most of my ideas, and I would far rather not be
driven into a position of antagonism to him. But the withdrawal of my
right of protection in Egypt is a violent proceeding and one that I
cannot accept without protest. The notice was served on me formally,
publicly and I may say brutally, and Lord Granville has refused me even
a reason. This is not fair, and my only resource is to force an answer
through Parliament, when the whole matter will be sifted. I have
fortunately made it a rule to have no political secrets as regards my
own acts, and so am prepared to argue it out. But I quite understand
that others are not in my free position; and, if you can assure me that
Mr. Gladstone will give the matter his serious private attention and not
merely put me off with an official reply I will write to him on the
subject. With regard to my really going to Egypt I have no wish in the
present position of affairs to do so. I could do no good there
politically nor could I even if I wished it make matters worse; and I am
far from well and want rest and not a new campaign. But my right to
protection is a matter of principle and I have certain real, if not very
large, material interests in Egypt which I may at any time require to
see to. Indeed Baring’s action in withdrawing his protection and
preventing my landing has already cost me perhaps a couple of hundred
pounds. This is exactly how things stand, and I await your answer,
before taking further steps.
Yours ever,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
_Private._
10, Downing Street, _24th May_ 1884.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Thanks for your letter.
I am very sorry that your recollection of what took place last autumn
should be so entirely at variance with my own recollection of it. But I
cannot conceive that any private conversation between friends, whatever
complexion you may put upon it, can be construed into what you call “a
scandal”; and I recognize the kindness of your desire not to cause me
bother.
Mr. Gladstone never fails to give his personal attention to every
communication made to him; so I need hardly assure you that a statement
coming from you will be fully considered by him.
I am very sorry to be the cause of adding at all to your labours, etc.
Yours as always,
E. W. H.
MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.
Crabbet Park, _May_ 31, 1884.
MY DEAR SIR,
The privilege you have, at various times during the last three years,
accorded me of addressing you on public matters must be my excuse if I
now appeal to you on a matter mainly personal, namely my recent
exclusion from Egypt on my return from India, and the still more recent
refusal of H. M.’s Government to afford me protection there invariably
given to British subjects. The circumstances of my case are briefly as
follows:
Towards the close of last session I received a visit from a gentleman
well known to yourself but not otherwise connected with political life
or at all with Egypt, during which he urged upon me the desirability of
my “making a new move” in Egyptian politics. His idea was that public
opinion in England had sufficiently changed during the previous twelve
months for it to be possible to propose with some chance of success a
restoration of the National party before the British troops were
withdrawn from Egypt; and he furthermore suggested that the matter might
best be brought forward if a popular demonstration should occur on the
occasion of the Elections under Lord Dufferin’s Charter. He thought that
the leaders of the liberal party if such there still were at Cairo might
be advised to propose Arabi as their Candidate and, if his election were
secured, that there would afterwards be no difficulty in bringing about
his recall from exile. The idea was a new one to me, and I confess that
at first it seemed to me a quite impracticable one; and I did not
encourage it, especially as at the time I had abandoned all immediate
thoughts of again taking an active part in Egyptian politics. It seemed
to me that, without the concurrence of H. M.’s Government, it would only
result in failure, and I knew how little real liberty of choice the
Electors would have and how certain would be the punishment imposed upon
the leaders in any such movement. I nevertheless on this suggestion
wrote to an intelligent friend at Cairo, on whom I believed I could
rely, to inform me what chance of success the plan would offer, and I
received his answer towards the end of August. He informed me that
“though there was no _party_ in favour of Arabi’s return, it was because
it was not thought of as possible. Many regretted him, but the
punishment inflicted on him and the spite wreaked on all who were mixed
up with his revolution, which continued daily to be exercised, prevented
any one from attempting to follow his example. There was a big party
which thought of him with regret, but until quite lately my
correspondent had hardly heard a word about his return at Cairo. Lord
Dufferin’s parliament had always been a mere toy and a thing to laugh at
by all who knew Egypt. With the existing system of Palace and
Ministerial supremacy, where no man dared do right because he instantly
made himself a marked man, the Parliament would be a convenient tool for
the Government. The bare idea of its showing independence under the
existing regime would be ridiculous. At the same time if Arabi returned
to Egypt, any constituency would return him, unless pressure were put on
the Electors. If the elections were left alone, pressure would certainly
be put on any constituency for which Arabi might present himself as
Candidate. But, if Englishmen watched the ballot, he might get returned,
although that constituency would most certainly be made to suffer in a
hundred ways for its temerity. . . . If the people thought that a new
era was dawning and they might vote fearlessly, of course Arabi would be
returned by any constituency in Egypt, but they had had a severe lesson
and ‘a burnt child dreads the fire.’”
This letter, dated the 20th of August 1883, reached me if I am not
mistaken on the 29th; and on the same day, I again called, by his
invitation, on the gentleman already referred to, and he then told me
that since his last talk with me he had seen you and that he could now
assure me that it was your personal wish to find an excuse for restoring
the exiles, and he advised me strongly to go to Cairo, where I should be
well received by Sir Evelyn Baring and where I could talk the matter
over with him. “Sir Evelyn Baring,” he said, “will arrive in a few days
at Cairo and he had _carte blanche_ to begin a new policy in place of
Sir Edward Malet’s which had failed.” This put the matter in a more
hopeful light, and I at once determined to stop in Egypt on my way to
India, and, if I found Sir Evelyn Baring in reality favourable to the
idea, to propose Arabi’s Election to the Liberals of Cairo. Although I
will not say that the communication was delivered to me in terms as a
message from you, I certainly accepted it as in some sort such, and I
find it difficult to believe that it was wholly unauthorised by you or
at least that you were unaware that it would be made. Nor can I doubt
that a restoration of the National Party was a most natural and wise
resolve, for it was only by such a course that the promised evacuation
of Egypt could with any prudence have been effected, or the Charter of
Egyptian liberty been made a reality.
I therefore began to prepare my plans of action, as well as it was
possible to do so beforehand, and arranged to leave England on the 12th
of September, for Suez, whence I could visit Cairo and learn how matters
really lay and whether my stay there could with any advantage be
prolonged.
Moreover on the day of my departure I received a note from Mr. Hamilton,
your private secretary, asking to see me before I left, and I went to
call on him in Downing Street and talked the matter of my visit to Egypt
over with him. I told him of my plan with regard to the Cairo Elections,
and he approved of it or seemed to approve, and assured me of Sir Evelyn
Baring’s readiness to confer with me, and we discussed certain details
regarding my visit and he gave me advice on other political matters.
Although Mr. Hamilton and I are old friends, I had not seen him for some
time previously to this visit and we did not talk, as far as I am aware,
at all on private matters; nor had I been to Downing Street for nearly a
year, and, notwithstanding his reserve which I noticed as to yourself, I
remained distinctly under the impression that his language on the
occasion was authorised by you. You had left England some days before
for Norway; and Mr. Hamilton, if anyone, was there to represent you.
Thus I was and still am convinced that my journey was made with your
sanction, and that on that account I had special claims on Sir Evelyn
Baring for his protection in case my visit should give rise to
annoyance.
As a matter of fact I only stayed ten days in Egypt, and meddled in no
way at Cairo with the Elections. I found them half over when I arrived;
and on calling on Sir Evelyn Baring found him with quite other views
from what I had been led to expect. He received me indeed most amiably
and discussed with me the whole situation; but when I talked of a
Nationalist restoration we no longer agreed. I spoke my mind perhaps
rather too freely to him about his policy which I felt certain must end,
as it has ended, in failure; but I have nothing else to reproach myself
with in my communications with him, and beyond giving some advice and a
very qualified encouragement to the friends and relations of the Exiles
as to their eventual return and ascertaining some valuable facts with
regard to the history of the previous two years, I did little while
there that had a political significance. It was therefore with real
surprise that I received Sir Evelyn’s notice delivered officially and
without explanation excuse or remark four months later that I was not to
disembark in Egypt on my return from India.
This, Sir, is the principal point in the case which I would lay before
you. A second is that the decision to exclude me from Egypt seems to
have been come to simultaneously with a determination to inflict certain
petty annoyances on me in regard to a small property I have in Egypt,
annoyances which, reckoned only in money value, will represent a loss to
me of perhaps a couple of hundred pounds. It is equally difficult to
understand that these should have been entered on with or without Sir
Evelyn Baring’s knowledge, _with_, because they are an act unworthy of a
public servant towards a political opponent, _without_, because they
occurred precisely at the extreme plenitude of Sir Evelyn’s power, when
hardly a sparrow fell to the ground in Egypt without his knowledge.
A third point is the refusal of the F.O. to _assign me any reason_ for
declining to support my demand of admission as a British Subject into
Egypt. Although I am advised that the Egyptian Government has a
technical right to refuse entrance into Egypt, as far as I have been
able to ascertain, it is a right which has never before been enforced
there against a British Subject; and the British Government have never
before refused protection _without assigning reason_. It seems to me
therefore that it is a public duty with me not to let this pass without
protest, for if it be admitted in my case that it depends upon the
arbitrary goodwill and pleasure of the Foreign Minister of the day to
decide who among British Subjects shall and shall not be protected
abroad, it surely establishes a dangerous precedent, limiting criticism
on foreign affairs to agreement with the Government. I have ventured to
disagree with Lord Granville on his policy in Egypt. _Without assigning
reason_ he excludes me from Egypt, the inference seems clear that I am
subjected to pains and penalties for my free speaking, a thing
altogether out of accordance with English political practice. Nor can I
think that the immediate convenience of excluding me from Egypt, which I
presume is the unavowed motive, can be worth so very new and
questionable a departure.
Under all these circumstances I am induced to believe that by a personal
appeal to you I shall be best consulting the general interests as well
as my own. I have been advised that my remedy lies with Parliament and
the publicity which should oblige the Foreign Office to give me a fair
answer; but I have no wish, in the presence of such large public
questions as are at the present moment being debated with regard to
Egypt, to bring a personal grievance of my own in connection with that
country unnecessarily before the public; and I feel sure that you will
admit the soundness of my reasoning, and will so far favour me as to
place before Lord Granville my unofficial request that he will
reconsider his decision with regard to my recent application.
I am, my dear Sir, yours very faithfully,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
P.S.—I may add that should you feel any doubt as to the accuracy of my
recollection of the two conversations here recorded, I possess
reasonable proof of it in the shape of memorandums written at the time.
These I should be happy if you required them to show you privately.
[N.B.—Sir Evelyn Baring subsequently, 1891, assured me that the
annoyances complained of in this letter in regard to my property were
none of his instigation, and I accepted and accept his assurance
implicitly.
My correspondent in Egypt quoted in the letter was Mr. Ardern Beaman,
late official interpreter to the British Agency, and one well qualified
to give the opinion quoted. The friend of Mr. Gladstone referred to was
of course Sir James Knowles.]
MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON
St. James’ Club, Piccadilly, W., _May_ 31, 1884.
DEAR EDDY,
I send you my letter to Mr. Gladstone, which I have very carefully drawn
up, so as to be within the limit of things which I am quite sure of, and
which I could, if necessary, support by reasonable evidence. With regard
especially to my conversation with you, I have kept myself well within
the limit of things written. I am convinced that the little I quote will
remind you of much more that was said. As to the main fact of Mr.
Gladstone’s having last year the thought of restoring the Nationalist
party and of allowing it to be helped through my instrumentality, the
more I think it over the less I doubt it. Please then forward my letter
to him without delay, and let me have his answer before Parliament meets
again so that I may lose no further time, which in the present critical
position of affairs is becoming valuable. I am sure you cannot say that
I have shewn impatience.
Yours affectionately,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MR. HORACE SEYMOUR TO MR. BLUNT
10, Downing Street, 10 _June_ 1884.
DEAR BLUNT,
Mr. Gladstone has received and considered your letter of the 31st ult.,
and he desires me to say in reply that it is, in his opinion, impossible
that any friend of his could, without the grossest error of judgment,
have given you any ground for the suppositions that he was favourable
(_a_) to the restoration of the exiles to Egypt, and the election of
Arabi under Lord Dufferin’s scheme; or (_b_) to your stopping in Egypt
on your way to India for the purpose of promoting Arabi’s candidature.
With regard to your account of your interview with Hamilton on the day
you started for Egypt, Mr. Gladstone is convinced that you entirely
mistook Hamilton.
Without, however, questioning in any way your intentions or your honour,
Mr. Gladstone has deplored your proceedings in Egypt as alike injurious
to Egyptian and British interests, and he has entirely concurred in the
course which has been taken by the Foreign Office in reference to
yourself.
I am, yours truly,
HORACE SEYMOUR.
MR. BLUNT TO MR. SEYMOUR
James Street, _June_ 11, 1884.
DEAR SEYMOUR,
I beg you to thank Mr. Gladstone for me for the courteous form of his
answer to my letter, and to say that I do not propose bringing the
matter of my exclusion from Egypt before Parliament until after the
present crisis.
Yours truly,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
10, Downing Street, 5 _Aug._ 1884.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Thanks for your friendly note. I did not, however, need to be assured
that, so far as you were yourself concerned, any allusion to our
conversation last September had no unfriendly intent towards me. I am
only sorry that our memories should not be more in accord; but I can
honestly say two things. One that my asking you to come and say good-bye
was merely the impulse of a friend who values the friendship of another.
The other, that I have no recollection whatever of any announcement of
your intentions in Egypt, and that the strictly private nature of our
goodbye meeting is confirmed by my own diary, and by my not having
reported any part of it to Mr. Gladstone.
If I was incautious, I shall try to amend my ways in future.
I am going off to Scotland almost immediately; and whatever your
movements may be, pray be assured that they will always carry with them
the best wishes of
Yours affectionately,
E. W. HAMILTON.
MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.
Crabbet, _Novr._ 18, 1884.
MY DEAR SIR,
I venture once again to address you on a matter of very large importance
connected with past events in Egypt, and which is still exercising a
powerful influence for evil on the prospects of Government in that
country and our own good name throughout the East.
You will not have forgotten the charges brought by Lord Randolph
Churchill last year against the Khedive of complicity in organizing the
riots of Alexandria, or the opinion which I have more than once
expressed that they were well founded. My original knowledge of the
matter came through my connection with Arabi’s trial, and when I found
that in spite of the promised amnesty men were still being tried and
executed on accusations connected with that affair I did not hesitate to
put in Lord Randolph’s hands the few facts then at my command. At the
same time I took no leading part myself in bringing the matter before
the public. Since that time, however, a variety of accidents have put me
into possession of a complete chain of new evidence, giving me the right
to speak at last with absolute certainty on all the great events of that
time. I am able now not only to trace the history of the Alexandrian
riots with a sure hand, but to produce full evidence of the Khedive’s
orders having been given for the riots of Tantah, Dumanhour, and other
towns of the Delta a month later. Moreover (and this I consider the most
important feature of the case) I have ascertained and am prepared to
prove that there was a total miscarriage of justice under the Commission
instituted to try cases connected with these massacres after the war.
The chief offenders were not punished; in many instances innocent men
were put forward by the Khedive’s officers to suffer for the guilty; and
in others those condemned were not only innocent, but had taken an
active part in saving Christian life. In the case of Lord Randolph
Churchill’s indictment, the written statements it was objected were
unsigned. But the witnesses I can now bring forward are men of
acknowledged character, and much of their evidence was officially
acquired, while they are ready to appear in person either publicly or in
private in support of their assertions.
Such being the case I feel that I cannot do better than lay the facts
privately before you, and request that you will personally examine the
value of my new evidence. I have as yet communicated it to none of my
political friends; and I can assure you that I had far rather keep it
remote from public dispute. It is a question of justice to be done and
reparation made; for there are innocent men still in prison, and the
families of others who have suffered death are in distress; and it is
you alone who can adequately repair the wrong or restore the honour of
English justice where it has been compromised.
At the same time I am aware of the many calls upon your time, and should
you consent to an inquiry I should be satisfied if you would allow
yourself to be represented by deputy in all the details, begging you
only to retain the responsibility in your own hands, and not to refer me
to the Foreign Office, which has been throughout deaf to my
representations, also as it is a question of evidence and witnesses I
would suggest that persons of judicial training would best discharge the
duty of representing you in an inquiry. I should ask no better than that
the case should be referred for decision to ordinary English judges.
Having said this, I need hardly add that I am myself absolutely certain
of all the main facts of which I propose to produce evidence, as certain
as I am of any in history; nor need I assure you that I have a perfect
confidence that when you too shall have been convinced of the deceptions
practised upon our agents in Egypt, you will hasten to do justice. It is
not too much to affirm that this initial failure of justice after the
war has been the cause of all subsequent failures, and that there is
little prospect of renewing honest life in Egypt through our
intervention as long as so great and notorious a treachery remains
unpunished.
I am, my dear sir, yours very faithfully,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
10, Downing Street, _21st Nov._ 1884.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Your note was most welcome as it gave me tidings of your whereabouts, as
to which in spite of many inquiries of friends I could ascertain
nothing. I send this half line in anticipation of any reply Mr.
Gladstone may send you when he has been able to read your letter—which
was not feasible for him to do to-day.
You don’t say where you have been betaking yourself; but I hope we may
soon meet.
Yours affectionately,
E. W. H.
MR. HORACE SEYMOUR TO MR. BLUNT
10, Downing Street, 25 _November_, 1884.
MY DEAR BLUNT,
Mr. Gladstone desires me to say in reply to your letter of the 18th of
this month, that under your inhibition to communicate with the Foreign
Office, he cannot do more than acknowledge its receipt.
Yours faithfully,
HORACE SEYMOUR.
MR. BLUNT TO MR. GLADSTONE
(_Précis._)
London, _March_ 12, 1885.
A letter saying that since the fall of Khartoum he has put himself once
more in correspondence with those in Europe who are in correspondence
with the Mahdi, with the result that he has ascertained that the road to
peaceful negotiation is open. He is authorized by them to say that a
preliminary discussion might be opened in Egypt, but not through the
ordinary diplomatic or military channels—the basis of negotiation to be:
1. Release of captives. 2. Immunity for the tribes involved in the war.
3. Retirement of British or Egyptian forces to Wady Halfa and Souakin.
4. Evacuation of Souakin and Massowah in favour of the Sultan. 5.
Recognition of the Mahdi as sovereign within these limits. 6.
Establishment of diplomatic relations with England. 7. Freedom of
commercial intercourse. 8. Possibly a convention limiting the Slave
Trade. He is further authorized, in order to save further bloodshed, to
offer the services of an Arab gentleman to convey an immediate message
explaining the attitude of the English Government towards the Soudan.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
_Confidential._
10, Downing Street, _March_ 14, 1885.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Mr. Gladstone is obliged to you for your letter, which he wishes me to
acknowledge on his behalf.
You imply that the Mahdi would not deal with Lord Wolseley and Sir E.
Baring, our accredited representatives in Egypt. But why then does not
the Mahdi send either some representative of his own with his views
ready to be presented to the Government here, or some communication of
those views, which might come to head-quarters at once? One may almost
say that anything short of this is paltering with the case.
Yours always,
E. W. HAMILTON.
MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON
(_Précis._)
London, _March_ 16, 1885.
Explains the difficulty in the way of a representative being sent, the
road not being open and the Mahdi being unaware whether his
representative would be well received. Suggests sending an Arab
gentleman under a safe conduct to Khartoum. Will Mr. Gladstone be
disposed to facilitate the journey of such a gentleman, giving him a
sufficient knowledge of the disposition and ideas of the British
Government to enable him to arrange a formal embassy on the part of the
Mahdi?
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
_Private._
10, Downing Street, _March_ 19, 1885.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Many thanks for your note. It did not occur to me to connect Drummond
Wolff’s Question with your letters. It is not my fault that you have not
had a further letter from me on the subject of your last communication.
All I can for the moment say is that it is the subject of consideration.
I am aware of what you consider the urgency of the matter to be.
Yours affectionately,
E. W. H.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
_Confidential._
21 _March_, 1885.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Your letter to me of the 16th has been taken into consideration. I am to
remind you that Lord Wolseley has been instructed to forward any
overtures which may be made by the Mahdi, for the immediate
consideration of the Government. If it is thought that the Mahdi is not
aware of these instructions, it might possibly be arranged that the Arab
gentleman should convey the information through the British lines. But
the Government would require to be satisfied as to the gentleman’s
character and intentions.
Yours always,
E. W. HAMILTON.
MR. BLUNT TO MR. GLADSTONE
(_Précis._)
_March_ 24, 1885.
Thanking for message received through Mr. Hamilton, which, however, is
not sufficiently definite to be acted on, but holds himself in readiness
to give any further explanations, and suggests doing it by word of
mouth.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
_Confidential._
10, Downing Street, _March_ 28, 1885.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Mr. Gladstone cannot perceive that the last letter I wrote to you by his
direction was really indefinite. It practically conveyed to you an
intimation that, if the Government could be assured of the Arab
gentleman’s character and intentions, a passage through the British
lines might be arranged for him. Mr. Gladstone is afraid that he cannot
suggest any other mode of proceeding.
Yours always,
E. W. HAMILTON.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
_Private._
10, Downing Street, _March_ 28, 1885.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
I am sorry I cannot say more; but I must adhere to instructions.
Yours affectionately,
E. W. H.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
10, Downing Street, _March_ 30, 1885.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Mr. Gladstone went out of town on Saturday night; and according to
present arrangements he will not return to London before the 9th of
April. Under these circumstances I am afraid any interview is out of all
question.
All I can do for the moment is to communicate on the subject of your
letter received this morning with Lord Hartington, who is not only Mr.
Gladstone’s locum tenens, but who is now more directly concerned as War
Minister than any other member of the Cabinet in matters affecting the
Soudan.
Yours affectionately,
E. W. H.
MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON
_March_ 30.
Saying it would not be worth while sending a special messenger to say
that Lord Wolseley would forward communications. What is required is an
explanation of what the terms might be if a mission was sent. While Mr.
Gladstone says there is no intention of restoring Egyptian rule in the
Soudan, Wolseley is appointing Prince Hassan Governor-General, Graham is
pounding the “rebels” at Souakin, and Baring is arresting Zebehr at
Cairo. Mr. Blunt is going abroad and will see those in communication
with the Mahdi, and will ascertain their further views.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
_Confidential._
10, Downing Street, Whitehall,
_April 2nd_, 1885.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
All that I am at liberty further to say to you, before you go abroad, is
to remind you that H.M. Government have again and again declared their
objects to be the security of Egypt and the freedom of the Soudan; and
to point out to you that the Mahdi has indicated to them nothing
whatever. If it is thought that the objects of the British Government
are not known to the Mahdi, why cannot steps be taken to communicate
them to him? If they are known to him, surely it is for him then to make
some declaration upon them in return?
Yours always,
E. W. HAMILTON.
Bon voyage and au revoir.
MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.
Paris, _April_ 8, 1885.
MY DEAR SIR,
Yesterday the Mahdi’s principal agent in Europe met me here, and I went
through the whole subject of our recent correspondence carefully with
him, and especially the draft of terms suggested in my first
communication, and read to him Mr. Hamilton’s last letter containing the
declaration that the Government policy is that of freedom for the Soudan
and security for Egypt. Of the draft of terms I am glad to say he fully
approves, as a possible basis of negotiation with the Mahdi, and he is
willing to accept the declaration of policy as generally compatible with
that basis. Also he is prepared to send the Arab gentleman as bearer of
a communication stating that England’s policy is one of “freedom for the
Soudan and security for Egypt,” and he assures me that the Mahdi will in
turn despatch a mission of peace to England, which may be expected to
arrive not later than September. The Arab gentleman will, moreover, if
the Government is willing, arrange in the interval for an armistice, for
the better treatment of captives, and for immunity for such tribes as
may have joined the English arms.
The Mahdi’s agent also begged me to say that he trusted the Government
would not be deceived by the reports recently circulated of defection
from the Mahdi’s standard, and so delay despatching the messenger to
Khartoum. There was no truth at all in these reports, but on the
contrary, there was every certainty that as soon as the agricultural
season was over on the Upper Nile, hostilities would be resumed, nor
would these permanently cease as long as a British or Egyptian army
remained in the Soudan. With regard, however, to an advance upon Egypt
proper, he made the remark that the Mahdi was a reformer, not a
conqueror; that he had no quarrel with the Egyptians either there or
elsewhere, many thousands of them being actually gathered under his
flag; and that the establishment of a just and legal Egyptian Government
at Cairo would at once end any danger of such an advance by depriving it
of excuse in popular sympathy. The Mahdi was popular with the fellahin
of Egypt, because he had rid their brethren, the Soudanese, of an
intolerable tyranny, and they would continue to look on him as a
possible deliverer as long as their wrongs remained unredressed. If
through the means now placed at the Government’s disposal a truce of two
or three years was concluded, England would have time to do justice, and
it would be her fault if at the end of it the war was renewed. The Mahdi
had no mission of conquest in Egypt.
Finally he requested me to explain that Ministerial declarations made in
England are not understood in the Soudan, and that there is a great
mistrust of all military communications. If the Mahdi had understood
General Gordon as having a really friendly mission towards the Soudanese
he would certainly have entered into friendly communications with him.
But, up to the present moment, it has been the universal belief in the
Soudan that England has no other object than to conquer and retain the
country. For this reason it is essential that the communication of a
contrary policy should be made through some one known to them and
promising credit with the people.
From all I heard yesterday I am satisfied that it depends wholly now
upon the Government to prolong the Mahdi’s hostility, or change it into
friendship; and I therefore await with much hope your answer to this
letter.
Believe me, my dear Sir, yours very faithfully,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
_Confidential._
10, Downing Street, _April_ 11, 1885.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Mr. Gladstone is obliged for your letter, written from Paris on the 8th,
which I duly delivered to him.
He does not well see how he can add anything material to the letter
which I wrote to you on the 2nd, and of which he himself was cognisant,
though he was away from London. In that letter there were reiterated the
declared objects of the British Government in the Soudan, objects which
they are as desirous as ever of securing, and which hardly need to be
enlarged upon.
Let me add a word on my own account. I cannot help thinking you must
understand the delicacy and difficulty which the Government must feel
about holding communications with you, on matters relating to Egypt,
directly or indirectly, when it is believed that you mistrust and are
opposed to the Ruler of that country whom they are bound and likewise
intend to support.
Yours always,
E. W. HAMILTON.
MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.
10, James Street, _April_ 14, 1885.
MY DEAR SIR,
I returned yesterday from Paris, and hasten to answer your last letter.
The Mahdi’s agent is ready now to send the messenger whenever it suits
you to give him the necessary facilities. But he has impressed very
strongly and repeatedly upon me the necessity there is of his having a
_written_ message in Arabic to deliver. This need not go beyond the
sense of the words Mr. Hamilton has already used in writing to me, but
it must be in a form intelligible to the Mahdi and others whom it
concerns. Without this, he says, it will be impossible to convince the
Mahdi that the message is quite sincere on the Government’s part, or at
any rate that his followers should be so convinced. My knowledge of Arab
ideas leads me to feel sure that in this he is only reasonable, nor do I
conceive that the Government, which has already sent written
communications through their Generals to Osman Digna and other chiefs,
would now find a difficulty in writing this message to their supreme
chief Mohammed Ahmed. It will not be necessary that the title “el Mahdi”
should be employed towards him in the letter, and I could, if desired,
suggest a form of address which would be considered friendly without
acknowledging this special pretension. The strictest secrecy would be
maintained by the messenger until his delivery of the letter at the
Mahdi’s camp.
Thus the suggestion made in Mr. Hamilton’s first letter to me, that the
Mahdi should send a mission to England, can be conveyed to him in a way
he will understand as being sincerely offered; and all that need further
be done will be to instruct the military authorities to receive with
scrupulous courtesy the Envoys on their arrival at the British lines.
I am, my dear Sir, yours very faithfully,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON
St. James Street, _April_ 15, 1885.
MY DEAR EDDY,
I have replied to the first part of your letter in the enclosed to Mr.
Gladstone, and I add a few words in answer to your own remarks, as I
should be sorry there should be additional difficulty through
misunderstanding. For reasons which you know, and for others which you
do not know, I have of course, as you say, “mistrust” of the Khedive,
but the extent of my “opposition” to him you probably exaggerate. I have
had very little correspondence with Egypt since my last visit there
under circumstances which you will remember, and the failure of Baring’s
policy since has been due to its inherent weakness far more than to the
action of his opponents, certainly than to mine. I believe still what I
have always believed, that there is no course open to the Government, if
it would keep its pledges and have peace in Egypt, but to restore the
National party; and, if that is impossible, then annexation by Europe,
if not by England, is the only end. Tewfik has seemed to me up to the
present to stand in the way of such a possible arrangement, and on this
ground especially I have from time to time opposed him; but, if it could
be shown to me that the peace and happiness of Egypt was compatible with
his rule, I should not surely out of obstinacy refuse to be reconciled.
The questions, however, of the Soudan and Egypt may for the immediate
present perfectly well be kept apart; and I see no reason why the
Government should hesitate to communicate with me on the former if not
on the latter. They have publicly declared the Soudan to be independent
of Egypt, and Mr. Gladstone has recently assured me through you that he
earnestly desires to maintain its freedom.
Yours affectionately,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
_Confidential._
10, Downing Street, _April_ 16, 1885.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Mr. Gladstone is afraid that he cannot draw a distinction for present
purposes between Egypt and the Soudan; and so I am obliged again to
point out the difficulty of his holding communications with yourself on
the subject of your correspondence with him.
It is to be observed that H.M. Government has received no application
from any agent of the Mahdi to be allowed a pass through the British
lines to enable him to deliver a message. I cannot say with what
response such an application might meet.
Yours always,
E. W. HAMILTON.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
_Private._
10, Downing Street, 25 _April_, 1885.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
My last note was not intended to invite further remarks. It aimed rather
at hinting that under altered circumstances the correspondence should
close. I am afraid this must be the case. I have no authority to
communicate further with you on the matter.
Yours always,
E. W. H.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
10, Downing Street, 12 _May_, 1885.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Mr. Gladstone is much pleased by your kind gift. The little volume will
much interest him; and he hopes you will accept his best thanks. He says
it will be a pleasure to him to turn from the Soudan to Proteus.
Yours affectionately,
E. W. HAMILTON.
MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT
10, Downing Street, Whitehall, 11 _June_ 1885.
MY DEAR WILFRID,
Many thanks for your kind note. I hope we have never met but as friends;
and that the only difference which pending changes will make will be
that I may see more of you in relations of “greater freedom and less
responsibility.” I am afraid for some little time to come I shall be
awfully pressed by the ordeal of packing. I have to turn out not only of
office, but of home.
In haste.
Yours affectionately,
E. W. H.
MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. ROBERT BOURKE, M.P.
10, James St., _July_ 3, 1885.
MY DEAR BOURKE,
As you are doubtless considering the Soudan question just now at the
F.O. I think it may be of assistance to you to know briefly what has
passed between me and the late Government in regard to possible
negociation with the Mahdi.
It began in April, 1884, when I wrote to Mr. Gladstone in connection
with schemes then on foot for rescuing Gordon, and offering my services
as mediator. Mr. Gladstone seems himself to have had some inclination to
accept, but on reference to the rest of the Cabinet my offer was
declined.
Secondly I made an attempt in December, through one of the Peace
Societies, to gain a hearing. I had ascertained that the Mahdi would be
accessible to offers of withdrawal for Gordon and the garrison from
Khartoum; and I went to Hawarden with the hope of seeing Mr. Gladstone
and explaining the position to him. But I was not received.
Thirdly, after the fall of Khartoum, I again wrote to Mr. Gladstone
delivering a message I had received from a religio-political personage
in correspondence with the Mahdi proposing to open negociations for
peace or truce. It was just before Graham’s second campaign in March;
and this time Mr. Gladstone responded, and a correspondence followed
which led to my being authorised to give certain messages to the
personage in question, and I went abroad at Easter to deliver them. It
was then proposed to send a messenger through the British Lines to
explain the pacific views of the Government, and arrange for the opening
of more formal negociations, and it seemed as if the matter would be
arranged; when for some reason which I do not exactly know the thing
collapsed. I fancy it was on account of the news spread just at that
time of a rival Mahdi having sprung up in Kordofan and the idea that
Mohammed Ahmed was no longer in full power at Khartoum, but I am not
sure. In any case the correspondence suddenly came to an end.
Although all this was more or less confidential as between myself and
Downing Street, there is no reason I think now that I should make any
mystery about it to you, especially as it would probably be open still
to Lord Salisbury if he liked to take the negociation up at the point
where Mr. Gladstone dropped it—and I should be glad if you would show
this letter to Lord Salisbury and offer him the confidential perusal of
the papers I have relating to it. I will not say more at present than
that I still think it would be possible as it would certainly be most
desirable to come to terms with the Mahdi.
Yours very truly,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
[N.B.—I cannot find any answer to this letter, nor do I remember its
purport. It led to nothing, the Mahdi’s death being shortly after
announced. But for this it is probable that Lord Salisbury would have
negotiated.]
MR. BLUNT TO THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
_September_, 1885.
MY LORD,
I have the honour to lay before your Lordship the fact that I have
received a summons through the Lords of H. M. Treasury to present myself
before the Tribunal of First Instance at Cairo on the 19th of October
next on a matter connected with a property I hold in Egypt, and to beg
your Lordship to inform me whether I shall receive there the protection
usually accorded to British subjects. I make this request in consequence
of a notification served on me two years ago by Sir Evelyn Baring with
Earl Granville’s approval to the effect that I should not then be
allowed to land at Suez on my passage from India.
For further particulars regarding the case of my exclusion from Egypt by
the late Government I beg to refer your Lordship to Blue Book, Egypt,
No. 27, of 1884, containing my correspondence with the Foreign Office;
to the report of a debate in the House of Commons of the 4th August of
the same year; and to the enclosed memorandum.
Your Lordship will observe that Sir Evelyn Baring’s action against me
seems to have been based originally upon a misstatement of Sherif Pasha
regarding a visit paid to Egypt in 1883, and afterwards to a fear
entertained by the late Government that my influence there would be
prejudicial to their policy. But I venture to hope that your Lordship
will not regard me with the same apprehension, and that, having inquired
into the facts, you will restore to me the protection generally accorded
to British subjects abroad. I may mention that my prolonged absence from
Egypt has occasioned and is occasioning me considerable money losses.
I am, my Lord, your obedient humble servant,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY TO MR. BLUNT
Foreign Office, _Oct._ 5, ’85.
MY DEAR MR. BLUNT,
We have applied to the Egyptian Government to obtain permission for you
to return—but we have received the most decided negative. Of course it
is in our power to apply pressure to the Egyptian Government. But if we
do so, we shall make ourselves responsible for the consequences. It is
therefore a matter of duty to us, first to ask you, whether you will
undertake not to meddle in any sense with political questions or
projects while you are there? If you will give us this undertaking we
will telegraph to Egerton to do his best.
Yours very truly,
SALISBURY.
MR. BLUNT TO THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
10, James St., _Oct._ 6, 1885.
MY DEAR LORD SALISBURY,
I most readily undertake not to meddle with political questions or
projects while in Egypt, my object in going there being first to look
after my property and secondly to assert the right I possess as an
Englishman of claiming the protection of my Government while travelling
abroad.
Nor do I wish, if it can be arranged that the case I am cited to appear
on can be postponed so long as till December or January, to complicate
Sir Henry Drummond Wolff’s diplomacy by appearing at Cairo during his
special mission. I quite understand that my arriving there with him on
whatever errand might cause embarrassment. But, if I do not now insist
upon my right, I run the risk of being perpetually excluded from a
country where I have property and where I may one day desire to reside.
I therefore hope that you will insist with the Egyptian Government on
the necessity of permitting my visit unmolested.
Yours very truly,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY TO MR. BLUNT
Châlet Cécil, _September 10th_, ’85.
DEAR MR. BLUNT,
I am much obliged to you for your letter. We are in communication with
Egypt upon the subject matter of it. I have no wish to cause you any
inconvenience, and I hope it will be possible for us to accede to your
wishes. Supposing, however, that we can do so, it will be necessary to
interpose some delay in the manner you suggest, because I am afraid that
your appearance and that of Sir Drummond Wolff at the same moment in
Egypt might lead to unauthorised and wholly exaggerated rumours upon
questions of future policy.
Yours very truly,
SALISBURY.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY TO MR. BLUNT
Foreign Office, _October_ 10, ’85.
DEAR MR. BLUNT,
I did not get your note till my return from Newport. I telegraphed
immediately and have received to-night the answer that the Khedive, as a
matter of deference to H. M. G. is willing to permit you to come to
Egypt, freely for the purpose of looking after your private affairs. The
permission is evidently given with much apprehension. I need only add
that now my honour as well as yours are involved in your abstaining from
any political action—but that I feel assured we may confidently count
upon.
Believe me, yours very truly,
SALISBURY.
APPENDIX D
AUTHOR’S CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL
Gastein, _August_ 3, 1883.
MY DEAR BLUNT,
Many thanks for your letter, also for the Cairo papers which amused me.
I am sorry to tell you I have not received your book, “The Future of
Islam.” I hope it will reach me as I have every opportunity of reading
so interesting a work with the care and attention which it deserves.
Have you done anything yet about getting into Parliament. Northcote has
come to awful grief over the Canal which has been much more fatal to him
than to Gladstone. I hope Gorst and Wolff will make long and damaging
speeches against the Khedive on Baring’s vote; Mind you egg them on.
This is a horrid dull place and we are badly lodged. I wish I had done
with it.
Yrs. most sincerely,
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.
LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., TO MR. BLUNT
Gastein, _August_ 14, 1883.
MY DEAR BLUNT,
I have to thank you for your two very interesting letters and
enclosures. I cannot see my way to doing anything myself in the matter,
for I am too far off to communicate effectually with you and secondly it
is a sine qua non of these baths that one should do absolutely nothing.
I hope you will write to the Times just to keep the thing alive, and in
the winter by one or two speeches in the country I shall try to rub it
all in. The awkward fact remains that the Government has made no answer
to my indictment and in all probability cannot make one. You appear to
have given up your intention of going to Ceylon to see Arabi which I am
sorry for. This a desperately dull place and time hangs heavily. The
Baths are lowering I think and one feels quite indisposed for any
exertion. I shall hope to be back in London by the 2nd week in September
in case you should still be there. We leave this on the 29th.
Yrs. most sincerely,
RANDOLPH S. C.
P.S. I have to thank you for your most interesting book which reached me
safely. When is Ninet’s book coming out?
LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., TO MR. BLUNT
Innspruck, (end of) _August_ 1883.
MY DEAR BLUNT,
I arrived here this morning from Ischl and found your letter for which
many thanks. I have read your poem with pleasure and I need not say with
perfect sympathy. Publish it. Poetry often makes converts where prose
fails. I have no doubt that you are a Cassandra and that we shall pay
dearly for our freaks in Egypt. But it is a despairing task to try and
right the wrong. But I mean to do what I can in my little way when the
proper season for extra Parliamentary utterances may arrive. I have a
horrid idea that the advent of the opposition to office might be worse
for Egypt than any conceivable eventuality. I imagine from your last
letter that you are still decided on your journey to India, and I wish
you a safe and speedy return.
The idea of having Arabi elected to the new Senate is ingenious, but to
be effective he should be elected in many districts. Otherwise it might
turn to ridicule.
Believe me Yours most faithfully,
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.
LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., TO MR. BLUNT
Blenheim Palace, _Dec._ 26, 1883.
MY DEAR BLUNT,
I have to thank you for three long and highly interesting letters. I
have not written before because I really did not know whether letters
had much chance of reaching you. However if I do not write you will
think I do not value your letters which would be a great error on your
part. I have not much to tell you. I hope by the time you get this that
you will have seen the speech I made at Edinbro’ on Egypt which is fully
reported in the Times of the 19th. I cannot tell you what effect it
produced as you would think me very conceited. All I can say is that I
am more than satisfied. Tewfik’s position grows more hopeless every day.
There is no Government in Egypt at all. I think we shall be able to make
it very hot for the G. O. M. when Parliament meets. Your poem was very
highly praised in the reviews. Gorst is in India at Hyderabad on legal
business of the Nizam. Please remember me most kindly to Lady Anne and
accept for her and yourself from me the warmest wishes of the season. Do
not delay your return too long. We must have stirring times in the
spring.
Yours ever,
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.
WRITTEN BY MR. BLUNT AND APPROVED BY LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL
“AM I A TORY DEMOCRAT?”
_May_ 1885.
With regard to English Home Politics I am prepared to support the
Conservative party. That is to say, I desire no change in the existing
Constitution or in the relations between Church and State. I am opposed
to merely secular Education. I am a strong supporter of the House of
Lords. On the land question I should like to see any measure introduced
which should make the acquisition of land easier for the man of the
people, believing this would be a popular, and in the truest sense, a
Conservative measure. I consider, however, that the principles of
liberty and property are closely connected, and I am altogether opposed
to the Radical views of State ownership in land.
I am inclined to favour the idea of special commercial advantages being
given to the British Colonies and India; and I am anxious to see the
union between the Colonies and the Empire preserved.
In India I am for large reforms in the direction of self-government,
believing these to be absolutely necessary on financial and political
grounds if India is to remain loyal.
So, too, in Ireland I am in favour of Home Rule. I consider it urgent to
accept the principle of Nationalism, both for Ireland’s sake and for
England’s. My motto would be “Ireland for the Irish and England for the
English.” The plan has succeeded in Hungary and Galicia in reconciling
the Hungarians and Poles to the Austrian Crown. Why not, therefore, in
Ireland?
Foreign politics are my strongest ground. With regard to these I am
quite clear in my opinion that what is required for England is a return
to plain dealing and respect for international law. These have been
grossly outraged during the last four years by Mr. Gladstone’s
Government, and it is we with our complicated commercial interests in
every part of the globe that will eventually suffer from the example
given. Our relations with the States of Europe should be based upon a
recognition of the fact that our system of parliamentary and popular
government makes special alliances and secret treaties impossible. Our
old-fashioned diplomacy, with its tortuous dealings, its equivocations
and its concealments, is out of date and needs reform; and I would have
the contrary to all these things introduced as a cardinal point of
policy. As towards Europe we should make the most of our insular
position, increase our navy and protect our shores. But in Asia we
cannot be insular, and we must submit to the conditions of Empire as
long as India remains in our charge. In this view we need the alliance
of the Mohammedan nations against Russia, and I am in favour of England
accepting the full responsibility of her position, as the heir of a
great Mohammedan Empire. My quarrel with Mr. Gladstone’s action in Egypt
was not based on any principle of non-intervention, for I am not a non-
interventionist, but because he intervened unjustly, unwisely and in
such a way as to alienate Mohammedan sympathies. I consider that a duty
of reparation is required of England for the wrong done to the Egyptians
and I advocate a reconciliation with the Sultan and a restoration of the
Egyptian National party. I need hardly say that I am in favour of
immediate peace with the Soudan.
Lastly, I consider that justice, not mere expediency, should be the
determining law of our conduct towards all nations. I am strongly averse
to the Manchester doctrine which allows injustice to weaker nations in
the interests of finance and trade, though not of military glory. I
believe, on the contrary, that it is England’s duty to protect weaker
nations from injustice where they come in contact with her. Nor can I
convince myself that a high standard of national morality is
incompatible with the extremest Conservative principles. I believe, on
the contrary, that much of what was best in the so-called “Midlothian”
doctrines has more real affinity to Tory than to Whig instincts; and I
should be glad to see these adopted, now they have been discarded by the
Radicals, as part and parcel of Conservative ideas. Truth, justice,
liberty—these are great names, going at this moment in beggars’ weeds
about the world. Can these find an asylum in the new temple of Tory
Democracy?
WILFRID BLUNT TO LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL
_June_ 8, 1885.
MY DEAR CHURCHILL,
I am glad you have stated so clearly the Conservative policy, in nearly
all of which I heartily agree, though on some points, such as Ireland, I
have larger views than you are prepared for of Home Rule. The necessity
for an inquiry into the working of the Indian Government is very urgent,
and the fact that you should have included it in your programme, and are
to support Mr. Slagg’s motion, gives me more hope than any thing else
which has happened regarding India during the past year. The truth is
that if India had to trust solely to the Whigs for reform it might wait
till eternity, or rather till that crash came which certainly will come
if the rigidity of the present bureaucratic system is not modified. The
Whigs are bureaucrats born and bred and will not stir a finger to help
us.
With regard to Egypt too, I think you are right. The day for such a
policy as Mr. Chamberlain’s, which he has just announced, has gone by,
and the only agreement which France is likely to come to with Mr.
Gladstone is one which will put Egypt practically into France’s hands.
Two years ago, or even perhaps a year ago, before the conference and the
Nile campaign, Egypt’s complete independence, under a strong and popular
government might have been secured, but Mr. Gladstone would not hear of
it then, and by persisting in keeping Tewfik as the corner stone of his
policy he has thrown away his chance. Now France will not be content
with anything from him less than her own protectorate, or Europe with
anything less than the letter of her bond. To get back our right to give
Egypt liberty, the first condition will be that we guarantee her debt;
the second that we make peace with the Sultan and act under his
authority. Here, again, therefore, I look rather to you than to the
Whigs for practical help. One knows by experience so exactly what Mr.
Chamberlain’s arrangement would come to—an independent Egypt would be an
Egypt separated from the rest of the Mohammedan world, but governed
really in the sole interests of France and the bondholders. The form of
a “native” government would be preserved, perhaps, but the form only.
Egypt’s “independence by arrangement with Europe” means Egypt for the
bondholders, with France for their protector and Ismail for their king.
If Mr. Chamberlain had said a word about repentance for past errors I
could have better believed him; but we heard all the promises and
declarations he now makes, two years ago, and in far stronger language
from Mr. Gladstone himself, and with what result? No; I prefer your
programme for Egypt, though it seems to promise less.
I will take this opportunity of giving you my view of what a
Conservative Government might do for Egypt and generally for Western
Asia. The Whigs will never do anything but harm, because they are Whigs
and because they hate the Mohammedans, and the Radicals will never do
anything at all, because they are Radicals and will undertake no
responsibility. You know that the Mohammedan faith is in solution—that
it is seeking to place itself on a new basis—to regenerate its political
and social life. Enormous abuses exist everywhere, enormous injustices.
The poor are ground down by the rich, the weak by the strong. The whole
earth, as Arabi used to say, is famished for justice, and calls out for
a deliverer. The recognition of this was the secret of his own
influence. It is the secret of the Mahdi’s. It may any day be the secret
of England’s. But in Mohammedan lands it is not sufficient to administer
an equal law for it to be accepted by the people even for their own
good. The law must be connected with their religious beliefs and
sanctioned by their religious authority. I am not arguing whether it is
best so—though I believe it is best—but am stating a fact. And it is the
perverse refusal to acknowledge facts which has made of Lord Granville’s
policy in Egypt so piteous a failure. His idea would seem to have been,
and Sir Evelyn Baring’s with him—if idea at all they had—that the
people’s faith and social traditions were a “negligeable quantity,” and
that, no matter what the law and no matter who administered it, it would
be accepted with thanks. For this reason, though Tewfik was notoriously
regarded as a traitor to his faith and nation, they placed him in
authority, and men with him for Ministers whose only merit was that they
had preferred their interests to their beliefs and were without moral
principle or religious prejudice. Even these, however, in later times
have refused to serve them, and they have been forced to take up with
Nubar and his speculating crew of Armenians as the element supple enough
to do their bidding. This has had its effect. The whole of the religious
forces of the country are against them, and the whole of the people.
Their reforms have remained sterile, their attempts to pacify, impotent.
The people have refused their friendship and their justice, and will
have none of their advice. The Liberal party of Mohammedan reform have
been driven out of the country, the honest men have been driven from the
Administration, and the mass of the people into the arms of the Mahdi.
It is in the power of England, and England alone, to repair the evil
done—and, what is more, it is England’s duty. But it cannot be effected
except at the cost of assuming Egypt’s sole protection, and the
protection also of general Mohammedan interests. The Sultan must be
taken into confidence, peace must be made with the Mahdi, and Arabi must
be recalled. Europe, too, must be bought out by accepting Egypt’s debt.
These conditions observed, all difficulty, it will be found, will
disappear, and the regeneration of Egypt may at last be begun, and with
it gradually of all the Mohammedan East.
It seems to me, therefore, that the Conservative Party, if it acts on
your idea, has a great and satisfactory work before it, which, if
honestly performed, and avoiding the snare of turning Egypt’s protection
into a means of providing Englishmen with places and pay, may yet redeem
the past and give reality to the dreams of reformers. You especially,
with your sympathy for popular causes, will know that the only
foundation of success in the East, as in the West, is the consent of the
people. Get the Egyptian people on your side, and all Mohammedans will
follow you, and with hardly an effort you will transform the world.
I wish you, therefore, all success in your electoral campaign. You have
given too many proofs of your sincerity and steadfastness in this matter
of Egypt for me to doubt you, and I know that you will do your best for
her. Of the present Government I have long ceased to have any hope.
[N.B.—This letter was read to and approved by Lord Randolph Churchill
for publication in the “Times,” with the alteration of a single phrase
concerning Ireland, the words “than you are prepared for of Home Rule”
being changed into “than you are apparently yet prepared for.”]
LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL TO MR. BLUNT
_Most Private._
India Office, _Aug._ 13, 1885.
DEAR BLUNT,
The enclosed explains itself. Will you see to it?
Yours ever,
RANDOLPH S. C.
COPY OF TELEGRAM FROM SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF
(_Enclosure._)
Dated Vienna, 12 _August_, 1885.
Received at London Office, 5.10 p.m.
“I think it would be well for Jemal-ed-din Afghani to come. Have you
(any objection?),[135] if involving no responsibility or complicity on
my part, and if it can be done without his coming into collision with
Turkish authorities. I leave this probably to-morrow evening or Friday
morning.”
MR. A. W. MOORE TO MR. BLUNT
_Private._
India Office, 15 _August_ /85.
DEAR MR. BLUNT,
I have just deciphered the enclosed from Sir H. Wolff. Lord Randolph is
unwell and in bed, but I shall see him during the afternoon. I think it
is best however to send you the telegram at once, as I understand the
present arrangement is that Jemal-ed-deen leaves to-morrow.
Please let me hear from you what I am to reply to Sir H. Wolff.
Yours very truly,
A. W. MOORE.
COPY OF A TELEGRAM FROM SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF
(_Enclosure._)
“Buda Pest, 15 _August_.
“From something I have heard it would be well for Jemal-ed-deen not to
leave England till I can telegraph to you from Constantinople.”
LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., TO MR. BLUNT
India Office, _November_ 1, 1885.
DEAR BLUNT,
Many thanks for your letter and enclosures which I return. I feel sure
that your lecture on Egypt at Newcastle must have been profoundly
interesting and instructive to the audience and a little more
circulation of such facts would do much good. You will certainly not
receive an encouraging reply from Lord Salisbury about Arabi. Even if he
was disposed (as I should be) to favour your views he would not dare
take such a step on the eve of the Elections.
Yours ever,
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.
MR. BLUNT TO LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL
Crabbet Park, _Dec._ 24, 1885.
MY DEAR CHURCHILL,
I am obliged to come to an immediate decision about continuing my
connection with Camberwell or indeed in any active form with party
politics, my pressing difficulty being Ireland. About this, now that Mr.
Gladstone has taken up Home Rule, it is necessary for me to speak and at
once to my Electors; and, unless I hear from you that there is still
hope of an agreement between Lord Salisbury and Mr. Parnell on a really
solid basis, I shall conclude, as everybody tells me it is, that
Conservatism and Home Rule are for the present incompatible terms and
give up trying to make them agree. I fear I have not in me the spirit of
a good party man, but I thought at one time I could help you
individually in the pursuit of better things. Egyptian affairs seem in
the same deadlock they were a year ago, and altogether I am far from
hopeful or disposed for further combat.
Yours very truly,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL TO MR. BLUNT
_Private._
India Office, _Dec._ 26, 1885.
MY DEAR BLUNT,
There is no question or doubt about the matter. If you want Home Rule
you must go to Gladstone for it. We cannot touch it.
Yours ever,
RANDOLPH S. C.
APPENDIX E
ARABI’S PROGRAMME OF 1883 AND MOHAMMED ABDU’S VIEWS
I. MR. BLUNT’S LETTER REPRINTED FROM THE “TIMES” OF 13TH DECEMBER 1883
Colombo, _5th Nov._, 1883.
SIR,
I am sure the “Times” has many readers who will be interested to receive
an account from an authentic source of the manner of life and present
views of Arabi Pasha and his fellow exiles in the place of residence
which nearly a year ago was assigned to them by the British Government.
I have been staying with them now for over three weeks, as their guest,
and am therefore able to speak with some authority as to their ideas;
and I think the time has come when these may be of service to the
public, and, if I may be allowed to suggest it, perhaps even to those
all-wise authorities who are still seeking to regenerate Egypt by
putting round men into square holes, and square into round from their
official chairs in Downing Street.
With regard to the material welfare of the exiles, I am glad to have an
excellent account to give. Although some of them suffered at first from
the extreme dampness of the climate, all are now acclimatized; and even
Toulba Pasha, who six months ago was pronounced by the doctors to be
incurable with asthma, is enjoying perfect health.
They are all, too, I think, contented in mind and grateful for the
treatment they receive from the Colonial authorities, which has been
throughout most courteous to them; and except for certain inequalities
in the amount of their allowances, with which I will not here trouble
you, they would have nothing to complain of beyond the unavoidable
bitterness which mingles with the bread of all exiles.
The way of life of the exiles is simple. Each family occupies a separate
dwelling, and most of them have chosen to reside in a rather remote
suburb of Colombo, which has ceased to be fashionable, and where house
rent is proportionately low. They send their children to school, attend
the local mosques, pay visits to each other or to their neighbours, and
attempt, with more or less success, themselves to learn a little
English. Their society they find in the numerous Mohammedan community at
Colombo, which, unlike such communities in many parts of India, is
entirely mercantile, and possesses not a few men of substance, whose
commercial establishments the more practical of the exiles hope that
some day their sons will enter, and thus be enabled to earn an
independent livelihood.
The Mohammedan community regard their Egyptian guests with feelings of
the highest respect, as martyrs to their religion, and especially Arabi,
as its late most famous champion; and so strong is this feeling
regarding him among the lower class in Colombo that on Fridays, whatever
mosque Arabi may choose to attend is sure to be thronged with a special
crowd of worshippers. Besides this, however, there are certain English
houses where the exiles are well received; and, on the whole, I think I
may say that they are as popular as their ignorance of English will
allow with the official community and the official residents.
I have naturally had constant conversations with the exiles on political
matters, and more especially with Arabi, and have learned from him and
unlearned much as to the events of last year. We have spoken, too, not a
little of the future, and of the hopes which the national leader still
cherishes of being one day recalled to Egypt, there to work out to its
accomplishment the plan of reform he had conceived, and which I firmly
believe that he alone possesses the genius to realize. For, whatever may
have been his faults and failings (and they were doubtless great and
many in his conduct both of the political and of the military campaigns
of last year), I have been more than ever impressed during my present
visit with the reality of Arabi’s claim to be considered a patriot and a
man of genius. By a man of genius I understand one who is capable of
large and new ideas, who has the passion to impress these strongly upon
others, and who above all possesses the courage and persistence required
to work them to their end. These qualities Arabi certainly has, and I
know of no other Egyptian of whom anything corresponding can be said.
His view of the present situation in Egypt is worth quoting:
“The English Government is attempting,” he says, “an impossible task.
They wish to make Tewfik popular and they wish to introduce reforms. But
Tewfik will only remain popular as long as he is supported by the
English troops; and when these are withdrawn he will fall. Personally,
Tewfik is without a friend in Egypt. The Egyptians hate him for having
betrayed his country, and the Circassians despise him for having
betrayed his religion. The better friend he is to the English the less
chance he has of conciliating his countrymen. In one way or other he
will disappear. Then it will be for the Powers finally to decide what it
is they really intend for Egypt. If they mean to annex it, one or other
of them will do so at the cost of a new revolt. If not, they must allow
the Egyptians to choose their ruler and to work out their freedom for
themselves.”
The choice of a ruler should be made, Arabi thinks, by the Notables. The
fellahin are not sufficiently instructed yet for a plebiscite. But the
Sheikhs of the villages with the Notables of the towns would form a
reasonable elective body. They would choose whom they would, a
Mohammedan, a man of mark, Arabi hopes an Egyptian. But before investing
him with power they would bind him by some Constitutional form which
should prevent the recurrence of mere arbitrary rule, the rule which has
ruined Egypt. Lord Dufferin’s charter, Arabi considers, is insufficient
for that purpose. It is a make believe, too weak to restrain the abuse
of power, and liable through its weakness to become itself an instrument
in the hands of despotism. Egypt, however, under a leader elected by the
Notables, would find Notables capable of asserting and maintaining their
rights; and a Constitutional Chamber would form itself without the need
of any more foreign assistance. The Liberal Party, it is true, is now
crushed and in hiding; but it would start from the ground with the least
encouragement and find life again. Arabi does not at all despair of his
countrymen, could the present unnatural regime be replaced by one
sanctioned by public approval. The approval of the people is the basis
of all stable government; and, whoever the new ruler of Egypt is, he
must be made to understand that Egypt is not given him as a property but
as a trust. Ismaïl Pasha thought all Egypt was his private garden.
Tewfik Pasha is being taught to think that there is no law but what
rests on his decree. This must not be in the future; the Prince must
obey the law, not make it.
Again, the English Government is trying to introduce reforms, but
through what instruments? It has driven away all the real reformers.
They are in exile or in prison, or have been fined and otherwise
frightened by police persecution to live “underground.” The men who are
left are either those who are too timid or too indifferent to join the
party of liberty, or else the very men against whom the reformers rose.
“How,” asks Arabi, “can the English Government expect to establish
justice through the Pashas who served Ismaïl, or liberty for the
Egyptians through those very Turks and Circassians who have always hated
liberty, and who look upon the Egyptians as their natural servants?”
With regard to finance, Arabi is of opinion that the best chance of
permanently saving the solvency of the country lies in a new arrangement
with the creditors. He says that the calculations of the Budget in
recent years have been made without reference to the periodical
recurrence of seasons of scarcity. There have been now five good Niles
in succession, and there must come soon a bad one, which will upset the
estimates. Also no allowance has been made for the recent great loss of
capital by the fellahin, the murrains which have destroyed their oxen,
the debts they have incurred, their now universal poverty. Unless the
burdens of the fellahin are made very light for them for several years
to come, they will never recover their prosperity and the land will
become deteriorated and impoverished. Arabi is of opinion that in the
interest of the creditors themselves it would therefore be prudent to
lower the rate of interest for a fixed number of years, full payment to
be resumed only at the end of the term when the country would be able to
afford it. He thinks this, with great economy everywhere, is the best
means of averting bankruptcy. The private debts of the fellahin should
be settled also without delay by an arrangement to be made with the
creditors by the Government; and I may say here that while I was
recently in Egypt I ascertained from some of the leading money lenders
that a composition would probably be accepted by them at from eight to
ten millions, the total debts being valued by the same persons at about
fifteen millions.
The future of the Suez Canal we have thoroughly discussed together, and
it is Arabi’s opinion, as it has long been mine, that the Canal is
certain, sooner or later, to be internationalized. Arabi considers that
it would be far better for Egypt that she should abandon as soon as
possible all sovereign rights over it. The Isthmus of Suez, he says, is
not necessary to Egypt, and the connection as long as it exists will
form a pretext with Europe for intervention. If ceded to Europe this
danger would cease, and Egypt might even claim a money indemnity for the
rights yielded and so relieve herself of part of her financial
difficulties.
Another important point on which the late national leader has distinct
views is the Soudan question. Although he is of opinion that a certain
connection will always be necessary between the lower and the upper
waters of the Nile, he holds that in the present military and financial
position of Egypt it is unwise to attempt the reconquest of all, or
perhaps any of the lost provinces. He believes that the movement of the
so-called Mahdi is not one merely of fanaticism, or that it is only a
revolt of the slave dealers. He thinks that Mohamed Ahmed commands the
goodwill of the inhabitants, and that it would be far wiser for the
Egyptian Government to come to terms with him than to continue their
military operations against him. The Soudan brings nothing into the
Cairo treasury, and if Egypt is to enjoy liberty at home she should
avoid ideas of conquest abroad. What terms could be made with the Mahdi
Arabi has been too long out of Egypt to judge; but from the
communications which reached him while in power, he does not believe a
friendly arrangement acknowledging Egypt’s suzerainty to be impossible.
The suzerainty of the ruler of Egypt the Soudanese would probably be
glad to acknowledge, for it would protect them against European
aggression.
Lastly, Arabi suggests the following as the most urgent matters
requiring reform in his country:
“1. That a settlement should be made by the Government of the existing
debts of the peasantry, accompanied with a return to the old laws
affecting the mortgaging of land and the recovery of debt so that the
peasantry shall be thenceforth protected against usury.
“2. That the mixed tribunals should be abolished.
“3. That there should be a reformed common law in Egypt for all who
reside there, placing Europeans and Egyptians on an equal footing in
civil and in criminal matters.
“4. That there should be security against arbitrary arrest and
imprisonment (habeas corpus).
“5. That the village Sheykhs should be chosen by the villages, not
appointed as now by the Mudirs.
“6. That the abuses connected with forced labour should be reformed.
“7. That education should be extended to girls as well as boys in Egypt.
“8. That domestic slavery should be completely abolished.
“9. That the position of officials in public offices should be made
independent of ministerial caprice.
“10. That taxes should be made equal to all, foreigners alike with
Egyptians.
“11. That a settlement should be made as soon as possible of the
Moukabala claims.”
Such are Arabi’s ideas. I believe many of his reforms will be found
identical with those contemplated by Sir Evelyn Baring, but I fear their
realization will have to wait the advent of a more enlightened policy
than any which now prevails at Cairo. As Arabi says, schemes of reform
are of value only when in the hands of reformers, and there is no sign
as yet in Egypt of any such being employed. Still, common sense will in
the long run assert itself over political experiment, and there is an
old proverb about the stone which the builders rejected, which may well
in the present instance prove itself a true one; and I cannot help
thinking that the day will come when the man who first proclaimed
Egyptian wrongs will be called upon to right them, and when Arabi, the
first fellah who ever gloried in the name “Egyptian,” will be brought
back with something more than his old prestige to Egypt.
A rather severe attack of fever, from which I am hardly yet recovered,
prevents me from continuing this train of thought. But I hope on a
future occasion to renew it, and in the meanwhile I am sure that Arabi’s
friends may make themselves happy as to his present lot. He is not yet
forty-five years of age, and can well afford to wait a while for the
hour of his restoration, and till it comes he could hardly have a
pleasanter home or a more secure abode than that which Providence and
the humanity of the British public have chosen for him.
I am your obedient servant,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
II. INTERVIEW WITH SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU, AS PUBLISHED IN THE “PALL MALL
GAZETTE,” AUGUST 17TH, 1884
Sheykh Mohammed Abdu is, we are inclined to believe, the first real
Egyptian who has visited this country. We have had among us false
Egyptians in plenty—Turks, Circassians, Syrians, Armenians, Jews—all
claiming the nationality of the Nile; but a true son of the Ahl el Ful,
“the Race of Beans,” never. Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, however, is an
undoubted fellah. He wears a blue gown and a white turban, talks neither
French nor English nor even Turkish, but only his mother tongue, Arabic,
and is without the least varnish of western manners. He is a man of
middle height, dark-skinned, black-bearded, and keen-eyed, grave in his
general demeanour, but possessed of a pleasant smile, and, when excited,
speaking with much modest eloquence and cheerful vigour. His countenance
is decidedly an agreeable one, and brimful of intelligence. His father
was and is still a peasant of the Delta, cultivating forty acres of land
at Mehallet Nasr, and laying no claim to nobility of birth other than
that given by countless generations of peasant ownership on the same
plot of ground. But the son is far more now than a peasant. Sent twenty
years ago as a promising boy to Cairo, he received his education in the
ancient religious seminary of El Azhar, and is now one of the most
distinguished of its Ulema, or rather was, for, in common with the rest
of the Liberal religious party in the university, he is in disgrace with
the powers that be, and is now an exile both from it and from Egypt.
Although by temperament a moderate man, he joined Arabi and the popular
movement before the war, became one of its chief leaders, and was
involved in its ruin; and after Tel-el-Kebir he was singled out by his
eloquence no less than by his liberalism as a dangerous man, and having
narrowly escaped hanging was glad to reach Syria with his head safe upon
his shoulders, but condemned to three years’ exile and its attendant
penury. Now he is on his first visit to Europe, to see with his own eyes
the country which has been the ruin of his own. These particulars our
representative, who called two days since on the Sheykh at Mr. Wilfrid
Blunt’s house in James Street, learned from his lips, and being
acquainted with Arabic he was able to hold with him the following
conversation:
_Our Representative_: Without discussing past history, which we all
admit to have contained fearful mistakes, what is your opinion of the
present state of Egypt and of the policy now to be pursued?
_Sheykh Mohammed Abdu_: Since I have been in England all have asked me
the same question. Every Englishman says he wishes Egypt well; but which
of your statesmen has tried to prove his declarations? We Egyptians of
the Liberal party believed once in English Liberalism and English
sympathy; but we believe no longer, for facts are stronger than words.
Your liberality we see plainly is only for yourselves, and your sympathy
with us is that of the wolf for the lamb which he designs to eat. You
have ruined everything that was good in us so that you may have an
excuse for keeping possession of our country.
_O. R._: Believe me, this is not true. It may appear to you so; but it
is not so. Neither Mr. Gladstone, nor any of the Ministers, wish
otherwise than to leave Egypt as soon and as absolutely as possible. No
one wishes to annex your country.
_Sheykh_: If so, why not leave it at once? The only thing that the
English Government has taught us is to be united in the wish to see you
gone. Before the war and during the war we quarrelled with each other.
We wished to break down the tyranny of our rulers; we complained of the
Turks as foreigners; we wished to improve ourselves politically, and to
advance as the nations of Europe have advanced in the path of liberty.
Now we know that there are worse evils than despotism, and worse enemies
than the Turks. We see in them our brothers in religion, if not in race;
and if you would only leave us alone with them we should know how to get
on in peace. There is no Mohammedan in Egypt so oppressed as to wish for
any more of your help. We ask only one thing of you, and that is that
you will leave us at once and for ever.
And Tewfik, do you include him in your forgiveness of the Turks?
_Sheykh_: Tewfik Pasha did us a great wrong in bringing you into our
country. He joined the enemies of his religion at the time of the war,
and it is impossible he can command our respect. But if he should
repent, and especially if he should get rid of you, we might yet forgive
him. Only we desire no traitors with Egyptian faces and English hearts.
And the French? Our leaving Egypt now would surely mean that they would
occupy your country in our place.
_Sheykh_: We do not think so. The French know that they could not gain
our consent to their rule any more than you have gained it for your own.
We should resist them, as we have resisted you. We want no foreign
rulers from any country, and we know how to make all such rule
impossible. The French could not in any case do us more harm than you
have done.
And the Mahdi?
_Sheykh_: Mohammed Ahmed is only dangerous to Egypt through your
presence there. Were you to leave Egypt he would neither wish to attack
us nor would his doing so be any danger. At present he has the sympathy
of the masses, because they see in him a deliverer from Christian
aggression, and they will join him when he comes to them.
And when will this be?
_Sheykh_: The partisans of Mohammed Ahmed are already in the Saïd (Upper
Egypt), but he will only himself advance when Khartoum is taken. Your
Government are doing all they can to strengthen him.
How so?
_Sheykh_: By the treaty they have made with the King of Abyssinia. This
has made every man a fanatic, for it is written in our traditions, and
is known to all, that through the Abyssinians our Holy City, Mecca, will
be one day attacked and destroyed. The people everywhere see in this a
new danger to their religion. How can your statesmen have made an
alliance with this barbarous people? How can they have added this new
trouble to the rest?
But were not all the Soudan people fanatics already?
_Sheykh (laughing)_: The Soudani are no more fanatics than I am. When I
taught philosophy at Cairo many of the Egyptian students were afraid to
come to my lectures; but there were eighty-four students from the
Soudan, and every one of them came. When, however, they are threatened
with a foreign invasion they become fanatical, just as you would be if a
Mohammedan army were in the streets of London.
And has this anything to do with the news of a rising in Arabia?
_Sheykh_: The news is true. We had been expecting it for a long while;
and I do not doubt that your treaty with the Abyssinians has hastened
it. When they are threatened, the Moslems take up arms. The people of
Yemen are not fanatics more than the Soudani; but they love their
liberty, as all the Arabs do.
And what ought we to do to allay the storm?
_Sheykh_: Cease to threaten us, and leave our country.
But what would become of the Christians in Egypt were our troops to
leave? Would there not be new massacres?
_Sheykh_: There have been no massacres in Egypt except those caused by
yourselves. The arrival of your fleet at Alexandria made the riots there
begin. The landing of your troops brought on the riots at Tantah. There
was no loss of Christian life until you came; nor will there be any when
you go away. We have no quarrel with Christians as long as they abide by
our laws and do not attempt to interfere with our Government.
There is then, you think, no obstacle to peace and prosperity in Egypt
except our presence there? Would you not wish to see the National party
restored before we go? Would you not like yourself to return to Egypt?
_Sheykh_: If I believed that your Government had any serious wish for
our good I would propose a policy. But what is the use of my wasting
words?
Speak, nevertheless. Whatever the Government may mean or wish, there are
many in England who would see justice done to Egypt at any cost.
_Sheykh_: If England wanted to repair the wrong she has done us she
would, as I have said, give us a first proof of her sincerity by
ordering back her troops from Egypt. Next she would agree with the
Powers of Europe and his Majesty the Sultan, with regard to a new ruler
for us. It is not for me to say who this ruler should be. But whoever
may be chosen, he should be some one not distasteful to the people and
approved by the Sultan, and he should be named for a term of years, say
seven or ten, at the end of which term the people should be allowed to
elect their rulers finally for themselves. If he proved an honest man he
might then retain office. But if dishonest, the people would have the
comfort of thinking that he would not be there for ever, and so would
take patience.
But how could we ascertain the wishes of the people? By what form of
election?
_Sheykh_: Any new ruler now who should be a Moslem, and should come into
office as the deliverer of Egypt from the English troops, would be loved
by the Egyptians. Only he must be a Mohammedan, and, if possible, an
Egyptian by birth. It is essential, however, that he should be content
with limited power. What we want is not a new king, but a chief of our
Egyptian nation, acting under the religious sovereignty of the
caliphate. This kind of ruler the Egyptians understand, and they do not
want a king.
And under such a ruler you and your fellow exiles could return to Egypt?
What do you say about Arabi?
_Sheykh_: I should like to see his return. If he holds office Arabi’s
place is in the Council, which must always supplement and control the
ruler of Egypt. He speaks well. His ideas are noble. He is an honest
man. His influence would all be on the side of good. But he is too
careless of details to be a good administrator or a good general. Let
him return as President, if they choose him, of the Mejliss—that is his
place.
And the Ministry? What our Government complains of is that they cannot
get a working set of men to rule the country.
_Sheykh_: It is their fault if they have failed. Egypt is not wanting in
honourable men, or men of capacity. But you insist on having those who
will do your work; and no honest man in Egypt will work for the English
Government. Again, you insist that they must rule your way and speak
your language. The honest men generally do not speak English. They do
not love English ways. Let us have a ruler we like, and we will all join
to help him. We all want reform. We all want justice. We all want
instruction. But there is an old proverb which says that “if the fish
stinks at the head there is no freshness in the tail,” and we want a
ruler we can respect. Give us an honest chief for our nation, get him
the sanction of our Sovereign the Sultan, and leave us to ourselves.
With God’s blessing we will have peace. We will even try to pay our
debt.
But do all the Egyptians think as you do? I am inclined to believe that
nine out of ten of the fellaheen would sooner have their taxes lessened
by a Christian Government than raised by a Mohammedan.
_Sheykh_: Do not delude yourself. The fellaheen are overtaxed, but at
the present moment they do not complain of their taxes. They think first
of how to deliver their country from the stranger; and, if it were
possible, they would willingly pay more to see this end accomplished. I
know it, as I have correspondents everywhere in Egypt. You might abolish
all taxation, and they would not bless you if at the same time you took
it as an excuse to stay. No, no. Leave us now, and we will call on God
to reward you as our benefactors. But do not attempt to do us any more
good. Your good has done us too much harm already.
APPENDIX F
EXTRACTS FROM LADY ANNE BLUNT’S DIARY
_Dec._ 8, 1882, _Friday_ [10, James Street].—General C. G. Gordon came
to breakfast at 9. I am only sorry, now I have made his acquaintance,
not to have known him sooner. He does not appear to be otherwise than in
perfect possession of perfect common sense. So much has been said to
imply his being “touched” in the head that I put this down as a very
distinct impression. But he is a man of ideas and in a prominent
position, and as such it is convenient to find his ideas utopian or
“mad.” He staid about two hours talking to Wilfrid—told us he believed
the Government now “sincerely” (because it suits them) intend to carry
out liberal policy—Chamber of Notables, etc.—in Egypt. Wilfrid replied
that he would believe it when he saw that on the Budget question they
act in such a manner, and he will judge them by what they settle about
taxation. If they lighten the taxes of the fellahin it will be a proof
of their sincerity. Nothing short of that will do, as the condition of
the poor people is too desperate to be otherwise mended. General Gordon
would not allow that any _party_ in Egypt could really abolish slavery.
It was in their nature to keep slaves—they could not change their
nature. He does not, I think, quite know the state of feeling in the
Mohammedan world or make allowance for the growth of a determination to
reform on the part of those who, not having great possessions of slaves
or anything else, will not be making great sacrifices in joining to
suppress it.
He is going out to “Palestine,” he says, next week. He must be being
sent, though he did not say it, to inquire into the state of the
Mussulman world there. Wilfrid promised to send the papers about the
Sheykhs in Jerusalem to him (copies) and asked him to occupy himself
with their case, which he said he would inquire into.
And so we parted. I hope we shall see him again.
_August_ 18, 1883 [London].—At 1 o’clock Colonel [D.H.] Stewart came to
luncheon. He has become very official in his views, though not in his
manners. He spoke of the hanging of the Bedouins at Tantah, and said
that a friend of his who saw it remarked how easily they died; they had
hardly to be touched by the rope before they were dead. There would be
no fear of any Englishman being attacked in the desert, he thought, for
a long time owing to the terror spread by these executions. He seemed
surprised when I said on the contrary that anywhere in the Arabian
desert it would be very unsafe in consequence. Wilfrid added, of course
in the Sinai peninsula it would be safe—there it always was safe (the
danger had been from the war). In the end Colonel Stewart exclaimed,
“Ah, well, I see we shall never agree, I wish England to be successful,
justly if possible, and unjustly if it cannot be justly.” He went away
at 3.
_Sept._ 30 [Cairo].—List of persons arrested in connection with the
pretended “Société des Vengeurs”:
Huseyn Bey Fehmy
Mustafa Bey Sidky
Abd el Razak Bey
Abd el Rahman Bey Hoja
Mohammed Bey Fenni
Ali Bey Fauzi
Sheykh Ahmed Nur
Mohammed Bey Shami
Huseyn Eff. Sagr
Saad Eff. Zaghloul
Mustafa Eff. Nashaat
Mahmud Eff. Soudani
Mohammed Bey Tahir
Osman Bey (his son)
Ahmed Eff. Rashaat
Mohammed Said (the French doctor)
also one Iskander and five servants.
_Sept._ 30.—Suleyman’s account of Yusuf Abu Diab’s death: Yusuf was a
great friend of his (Suleyman’s), and of Abd el Aal whose A.D.C. he was,
a very good fellow, and all that had been said against him was false. On
the day of the Tantah massacre Yusuf abu Diab arrived from Damietta at 4
of the day. The massacre had begun at 1 of the day and was still going
on, for it lasted twelve hours or more. At the station on getting out of
the train Yusuf saw a poor Christian woman from Alexandria whom the
people were about to kill. Yusuf saved her and taking her by the hand
conducted her to the Governorat, to the Mudir Ibrahim Adhem, who was
sitting in his room. Yusuf placed her in the Mudir’s charge, and
afterwards reproached the Mudir for sitting still there while the
massacre was going on. He said, “You are Mudir and all the troops and
police are under your orders. You must take soldiers and go out and stop
this. I shall inform Arabi Pasha of what you have allowed to happen.” He
took the next train and went to inform Arabi. A few days after, Ali
Pasha Fehmi was sent to Tantah to arrest the Mudir and bring him to
Cairo where he was imprisoned in the Kasr en Nil for a few days and then
sent to his house and ordered to remain there.
After the war Suleyman (the narrator) was for a month in prison with
Yusuf. He had been arrested with Abd el Aal saying, “If you are to die I
will die with you,” and he was with Abd el Aal in prison at Cairo. In
the meantime Ibrahim Adhem was reinstated by Tewfik at Tantah, and
hearing Yusuf was in prison at Cairo he had him sent for to be tried
before the Commission of Inquiry at Tantah. On his arrival Ibrahim came
to visit Yusuf. Suliman was present in the courtyard of the prison.
Ibrahim Adhem took Abu Diab by the moustache and said, “The day of the
massacre here you came and brought a _Nasranieh_ to me; you abused me
and you said you would inform Arabi Pasha. Was it you who did this?” “It
was I.” “_Inshallah_, you shall not come out of this but to be hanged.”
This was just outside the room in the courtyard. Ibrahim Adhem then
brought half-a-dozen men, Copts and Muslims, from the station and Abd er
Rahman the zabit of Tantah, and said to them, “You will go before the
_Mejliss Tahkik_, and say that on the day of the massacre I saw Yusuf
abu Diab saying to the people, “Kill the Christians,” and also that he
often told Arabi Pasha that he ought to “kill Tewfik or let me do so,”
but he was not willing. A certain Mahriz Bey of Alexandria also bore
witness against him falsely; these men swore through fear. The
Commission sent Yusuf back to the Court Martial at Cairo with the
_procès-verbal_, and the Court-Martial sentenced him to be hanged. Three
days later he was sent to Tantah and executed. He was brave. Suleyman
remained with him to the end. His last words to the people standing
round him were “O my brothers, I suffer injustice. But God grant you may
not see a day the like of this again and that I may be the last of those
unjustly condemned.” Then Ibrahim Adhem came up and said, “O Yusuf
Effendi, forgive me.” And Yusuf answered, “I do not forgive with my
tongue, for if I should forgive with my tongue my heart would not
forgive, and if my heart should forgive my children here would not
forgive, and if my children should forgive, our Lord (God) would not
forgive, for you are the cause of my being unjustly destroyed.” Then he
said, “Give me some water.” And they give it him and he drank a few
mouthfuls and said, “Put the rope on me.”
APPENDIX G
LETTERS TO MR. BLUNT ALLUDED TO IN, AND EXEMPLIFYING, THE TEXT
I. FROM SIR WILLIAM AND LADY GREGORY (EXTRACTS)
(_From Lady Gregory._)
Coole, _Sep._ 20, 1883 (received in Egypt). I am very glad you will stay
in Egypt, even long enough to let in a little ray of light on what is
going on. Moberly Bell is really excelling himself just now. I don’t
know if you have missed his accounts of the triumphal progress of the
“amiable and virtuous” (Tewfik). I am delighted at it, because, as I
wrote to Chenery, no one can say it is necessary to keep troops in the
country to keep up so popular a ruler! The account of the prisons also
would have been entertaining if they were not revolting—so many poor
wretches kept there for months and years, and then the door is opened
and they are shut up again, after having been allowed to kiss Moberly’s
boots! I am afraid Clifford Lloyd, the new “Adviser,” won’t be an
acquisition. I don’t know him, but by all accounts he is ambitious,
pretentious, and autocratic. He kept the country quiet here by driving
the whole population of a town into prison, on suspicion, and his
photograph reminds me of Colvin. There is not much to say of Ireland,
for there is a strange lull in the agitation of the last few years. The
people for the moment are busy with the harvest, and I fancy Parnell is
trying to keep things as quiet as possible until the next session, when
Gladstone has, I believe, promised him a very large measure of Home
Rule, much more than his colleagues approve of . . . I hope Arabi’s
election will take place, so that we may put M.P. after his name in
future. I hope they will think also of electing you, and that you will
become the Randolph of debate in the Cairo House of Commons. What a
farce the whole thing is! It will be as before. The wretched Notables
will be left alone until they speak of the Budget, and then will be
gagged.
_Oct._ 4. Sir William writes to me from London that you are credited
with having gone to India with the intention of overturning English
supremacy and establishing Mohammedan rule and rapine throughout the
Peninsula. So I think you have still a chance of Tower Hill! Kinglake
especially has been lamenting over you.
_Oct._ 17. Thank you for your letter from Suez. It gave me great
pleasure to hear of the success of your visit (to Cairo), for I call it
a success having seen so many of your friends, and learned that the
Khedive’s state is so hopeless. I was pretty sure Baring would not do
much for you; he has only just begun, and has not yet realized the
difficulty of his position, and I am sure the Government here are
trusting to him now as their last hope of helping them out of their
mess, and won’t take any new line till he fails. I am glad the poem
(“The Wind and the Whirlwind”) is to be published. It will make a more
lasting impression than any prose could do, and ever since it was
written I have felt it was pure waste of steam power keeping it shut up.
Sir William is very much struck with it, and I feel it must convert the
world. If this should reach you in Ceylon do homage to Arabi for me.
_Nov._ 13. I see Moberly Bell takes Gladstone’s announcement of the
withdrawal of the troops calmly, as they will be quite as effective at
Alexandria, and easy to bring back at a moment’s notice. None the less,
I shall be glad when they are out of Cairo. I hate the idea of ever
seeing them there, and perhaps the Khedive may think they are really
going to let him be his own master, and commit some atrocity which
Gladstone will have to notice, and which will give England an excuse to
let him topple over.
_December_ 18. Your letter in the “Times” (from Colombo) appeared the
same day I heard from you. Sir William tells me to say how extremely
good he thinks it. The time has nearly come when you will be appealed
to, the mess is so great, and the bankruptcy of the country seems within
measurable distance, and, indeed, is the first thing to hope for, and
every one is so much at sea about the Soudan, and all the
philanthrophists will be down on the Government for allowing Zebehr, the
king of the slave-dealers banished by Gordon, to be sent back at the
head of an army. It will be just the thing for those benevolent
beings—Randolph and Labouchere—to take up.
_Jan._ 10, 1884. I saw in the “Times” that you had arrived and been
warmly received at Calcutta. I wonder how Colvin received you. I think
the time has come when you are wanted in Egypt. Dicey goes there to-day,
a fellow passenger of Sir William’s (on his way to Ceylon), evidently to
help to form the Nubar-Dicey Ministry, which I have always looked
forward to as the last possible combination before Arabi’s return. I am
glad old Sherif has gone. We shan’t hear much more of his enlightened
policy! If you could find any Nationalists in Egypt who would dare to
lift up their voice and call for Arabi’s return, I believe the English
Radicals would take up the cry. Both Labouchere and Randolph are
speaking out like men, but they must have some support from Egypt. Sir
William sails to-day for Colombo. He writes from London that Hayward is
very ill, shut up in his room and hardly expected to recover. Kinglake
says of him: “He is too weak to hold his cards at whist, but not too
weak to d—— his partner.” I am sorry Chinese Gordon goes to the Congo
instead of the Nile.
_August_ 1. Many thanks for the printed correspondence, which is full of
interest. I have been looking over your letters to me of last year, and
have copied the only passage relating to Mr. Hamilton or Knowles, which
I enclose. I would lay as little stress as possible on the encouragement
you had from Downing Street, as the G.O.M. is capable of denying
everything, and as much as possible on the incontrovertible fact of your
threatened arrest. I hope the debate will come on soon. I was sure
Mohammed Abdu would create a good impression, between his graceful dress
and his graceful manner, which recalled Arabi’s. Mind you cultivate
Parnell, now you have broken the ice. He will be a great power in the
next Parliament, and his support will be worth a good deal.
(Extract enclosed.) “_Sep._ 3, 1883. Both Knowles and Button encourage
me to try the elections, and say that Baring is sure to be delighted to
see me, and will perhaps help. It appears he has _carte blanche_ to make
another new policy for the Government, and as he is one of Lord Ripon’s
strongest supporters in India, it is supposed that he will favour
Arabi’s return, or, at any rate, the restoration of a National Party in
some form or other.”
(Second extract enclosed) _Sep._ 21. “Everything up to the moment has
gone most prosperously. The morning we left I got a note from Mr.
Hamilton asking to see me before I went, and I accordingly went, after
nearly a year’s absence to Downing Street, and found him very amiable. I
told him exactly what I was going to do, and he approved and said he was
sure Baring would be very pleased to see me, and that he would write to
Lord Ripon’s private secretary to do all he could for me in India. About
Egypt I told him I should try and get Baring to restore the National
Party, but unless he would help me it was quite useless my trying, and I
should not stay in Egypt. So I shall know as soon as I get to Cairo
whether it is possible or not. I am certain Gladstone wants to restore,
but wants to have his hand forced by a manifestation of popular desire
in Egypt.”
(_From Sir William Gregory._)
Coole, _Aug._ 24, 1884. I have read with great interest Mohammed Abdu’s
replies to his interviewer. They are very valuable, and would be ten
times more so if anything could pierce the crust of our English
stupidity and self-complacency. But we have made up our minds that the
Egyptians whom we have been bombarding and slaughtering ought to love
us, and that if they don’t it is their perversity, which only time and
subjection can remove. I shall be at Dalmeny on the 27th, and I daresay
Gladstone will speak to me about Egypt, but he has made up his mind
about it, that all the troubles of Egypt are due to military mutineers
of whom Arabi was the instigator; that Tewfik is a virtuous and
enlightened young prince to whom the honour of England is pledged, and
that to secure him as Khedive the exile of Arabi and his friends must be
maintained. You know how intolerant he is of a difference of opinion. So
I daresay he will not allow me even to make an observation from a
different point of view. I do not see how Arabi is to return, but I am
of opinion, were he permitted to do so, it would be possible to
establish a fairly decent Government in Egypt, a far better one than
ours has been, and which would, at all events, suit the governed.
(_From Sir William Gregory._)
Coole, _Oct._ 5. Your second Indian article (on Race Hatred) is
admirable, and I fear too true. I had no idea things were as bad as you
describe, and I much fear there is little hope of improvement. The only
chance is the personal character of the Viceroy and publicity. I wish
our newspapers would take up the subject. The English second and third-
class women are, as you say, the worst offenders. They are generally
below their husbands, who are elevated by education and responsibility,
and make themselves odious by their vulgarities and pretentions. The
treatment of natives in Ceylon is very different. There the civil
servants are generally very courteous and friendly with them, and there
is no doubt that a most kindly feeling subsists between the races. It is
not so, however, universally; in Colombo and Kandy the planters and
merchants’ clerks give themselves most offensive airs to natives, but in
the purely native districts the relations are excellent. I hear from
Indians that the contrast is remarkable, like going into another
hemisphere. Still things are not as they ought to be. A young man of
high native family constantly goes to Oxford and Cambridge, and is there
received as a friend and an equal, is asked to all parties, and shares
in all amusements. When he returns to Ceylon he is not tabooed, it is
true, but he knows he is looked down upon as an inferior by merchants’
clerks and planters, probably sons of pastrycooks and ladies’ maids.
This I always endeavoured to combat, and Sir Arthur Gordon is doing the
same. Mere civility and want of rudeness is not enough. A native
gentleman should be made to feel that you regard him as your equal, in
short, as an Englishman. He thoroughly understands and resents
condescending civility. I am going to write to Dufferin, and to
recommend your article to him.
The chances for Arabi and his friends are not encouraging. I should like
to see National bankruptcy proclaimed as an answer to French threats.
(_From Lady Gregory._)
Coole, _March_ 29, 1885.—I wish a better fight could have been made on
the Egyptian Convention. My only hope for Egypt now is in the Mahdi.
Osman Digna seems to be profiting by all the good advice the “Times” has
been giving him as to the best mode of fighting.
_April_ 14. We came here a little too soon and the landscape looked as
hard and dry as a Hobbema, but it is now as soft and mysterious as a
Corot. We spent last week in Dublin to manifest our loyalty. The Royal
visit has been so far a “great success”—that is to say, the “foreign
invaders” and also Lord Spencer were cheered through the streets all
through Dublin. Whether that means much I can’t say; it is an excitable
population and I saw a man who walked through the cleared space carrying
two large band boxes cheered as much as anyone. “St. Patrick’s Day,”
when played at the laying of a foundation stone, was cheered more than
all; but the Prince was equal to the occasion and waved his hat as if it
was meant for him. The Princess looked very pretty and not more than
five-and-twenty at the ball in her white dress and diamonds. The ball
the prettiest sight I ever saw. . . . I feel as if I had seen a
crystallization of the pomps and vanities of the wicked world. Enough of
that for a long time.
As an antidote I spent to-day in visiting some of our own poor people.
It is the best part of living in Ireland that they are always bright and
amusing and intelligent and witty. One old woman asked me to come and
see an old man. “He was a real gentleman,” she said, “if I asked him for
five or seven shillings he never said, ‘I haven’t it,’ and if he went
out to cut his corn he never raised his back till the sun went down.”
She also told me, “If I had a little pig, I’d be in Heaven.” Another, I
hope meaning a compliment, said she had at first sight taken me for the
priest’s sister and was going to say, “How’s Father Considine?” Then,
when she recognized me, “Aren’t we happy to have such a plain lady?” You
will be tired of Ireland if I write any more.
_May_ 5.—What a terrible indictment your letter is against the
Government, and how well deserved! Sir William desires me to say he goes
with you in every word of it, which he does not always do. How
ignominiously the whole affair is ending! It’s a comfort to think
Wolseley won’t have a triumphal procession down Piccadilly this time. I
am very anxious to know what Randolph advises you and what you make up
your mind to about Parliament. I believe you would get in as a Tory
Democrat easily enough. You could hit hard enough at the Government to
please an English mob which enjoys hard-hitting as a substitute for
prize fights. The only good thing that has reached me about the Prince’s
visit is that one spectator at his entry was heard to say to his
neighbours, “I see a good many Radical hats in the crowd.” “I suppose,”
said the other, “a Radical hat is a hat without a crown.”
_May_ 15. Very many thanks for the sonnets and your long letter. I knew
you would be jubilant at the retreat and guessed you had been working
for it. What pleases me most is thinking of Lord Wolseley having to eat
his speech about the “hundred years,” and also to think what a “cheer-
up” this ignominious campaign must be to Arabi in Ceylon. It was
delightful your sending the sonnets to Gladstone.
_June_ (?). I suppose any change must be good (alluding to the change of
Government), and yet I don’t think the G. O. M. has been sufficiently
punished for his evil deeds. I hope Randolph will hold to his present
principles, as far as the East is concerned, but the politician in and
out of power is generally as different as the patient Turkish peasant
and the tyrannical Turkish Pasha. As for you, you will never be able to
support any Government, but will always be in opposition.
_June_ 19. Randolph for India! I can think of nothing else; it amuses me
so much the idea of Colvin’s face when he hears it, and Lord Dufferin
taking his orders from him, and Lord Reay, who went out in the strength
of Gladstone’s name. Will he be able to do any good, I wonder? One must
never expect too much of people in office. Was it not delightful Arabi
being cheered at St. James’s Hall? It is rather hard being so far away
from all the excitement.
_July_ 21. I thought I recognized B.’s hand in the account of Wolseley’s
reception. What a parade would have been made if he had brought Gordon
back! Lord Wolseley and Baring have told a friend of mine that they look
on Drummond-Wolff’s appointment as disastrous for Egypt, which makes me
hopeful, as do the letters (in the “Times”) of the “Twenty years
Resident in Egypt,” in which one finds the flavour of Moberly Bell—“only
the old sea-serpent done up again.”
_August_ 14. I think you ought to write a sonnet on the Mahdi’s death.
The central idea about him to me is that he is the only man of the
nineteenth century who is known by his deeds and not at all by his
words. I wrote some lines myself, with which I herewith present you, but
not expecting compliments:
SONNET ON THE MAHDI’S DEATH
The Guide of Islam, silent, strong, world-known,
Looked for peace won through battle’s bloody fame,
His brave, rash adversary now o’erthrown
Who blindly in the tyrant’s livery came.
His ally, his foe’s enemy, the Sun
Had struck as if in scorn the parting host,
The task that made a nation almost done,
A people freed but at most cruel cost.
But hardly had he viewed the promised land
When blasting sickness came and struck him low,
And a scarred face was his and failing hand
Who was so mighty but an hour ago,
And a hushed army round the dim tent stood
Wherein their Chief gave up his sword to God.
Write the sonnet yourself and use my last two lines, which I confess to
thinking good, and publish it in your name. I have a feeling that
something ought to be done to dignify the Mahdi’s memory, such efforts
have been made to vulgarize it.
II. FROM SIR ALFRED LYALL
Nainee Tal, _May 21st_, 1883.
MY DEAR BLUNT,
I must send a reply to your letter from Knebworth, though people in
England do not usually set much store by letters from India, which is
beyond the civilized world. What I want to say is that I am very glad
you are coming out to India to study the country—this time; and that I
much hope you will pay me a visit. I have some rather extensive
knowledge of Upper India, and of the leading natives, so that I may be
able to put you in the way of seeing things as they are. In regard to
the very curious point mentioned in your letter, why Rajputs are (to use
the technical words) exogamous and Arabs endogamous, I can’t offer an
explanation; save only by saying that Islam overrides and sweeps away
all the obsolete prejudices of blood or caste that are at the bottom of
exogamy. Read McLennan, Morgan, and Maine—but none of them will tell you
exactly whence comes the idea lying at the root of the term “incest,”
_i.e._, the offence of marrying within certain prohibited degrees.
When you come out we will talk of Local Self-Government and the native
magistrates’ jurisdiction over Europeans. I am myself a consistent
liberal in these matters: I think, with you, that our best chance of
consolidating an Anglo-Indian empire out here lies in abolishing
privileges and bringing forward the leading natives to political
equality with ourselves. But we have been going so long on the other
tack that the operation of changing our course has to be managed with a
steady hand, and not too suddenly. Now there has been a lack of
political seamanship in high quarters; and the vessel has got broadside
to the wind, and has shipped a sea or two; I think we shall get right
soon, and I hope we shall not alter our policy. But it must be always
remembered that the whole business of governing India is an experiment
on a very large scale. I always maintain that it has not been attempted,
on this scale, since the days of the Romans; and no one can yet decide
whether the policy of taking the natives into our confidence, or of
keeping them out of all real power, is the better for the _English_. For
myself, having to choose between two risks, I would select the risk of
letting in the native; though if we do this in a hurry we may spoil
everything, and provoke confusion, with a sanguinary reaction—just as
things went too fast and led to a premature crisis in Egypt.
Sincerely yours,
A. C. LYALL,
Camp, _January 16th_, 1884.
MY DEAR BLUNT,
The foolish and violent article about you in the “Pioneer” of this
morning moves one’s indignation for more reasons than one. These attacks
all emanate, to my knowledge, from Calcutta.
I have hitherto written nothing whatever to officials in these provinces
regarding your movements, as I believed you would prefer this. But I
shall now send word to Allygarh, and to the Commissioner of Rohilcund,
who is in political charge of Ranpore, that it would be a total mistake
to suppose that in these provinces the Government takes any sinister
view of your proceedings. I am taking every opportunity of declaring
that I know you to have no intention whatever of propagating or
encouraging disloyalty.
I hope you will keep me informed of your fortunes.
Very sincerely yours,
A. C. LYALL.
Lieut.-Governor’s Camp, N.W. Provinces,
_November 8th_, 1884.
MY DEAR BLUNT,
I am certainly doing what is possible on my part, to aid Amir Hassan’s
University project; but I fear he is beginning to discover sundry
difficulties, especially in the way of lukewarmness and jealousies among
his co-religionists. For myself, I am glad to assist any measure that
may tend to uplift the heads of the Mohammedans of these parts. I am not
at all afraid politically of Islam in India; if they were at any time
disposed to make themselves troublesome, they would have to take the
Hindus into very serious account. I mention this because people are
inclined to have fits of vague panic about the Mussulmans. If the
Russians ever find it worth while to make a strong demonstration against
India, they would make a mistake in letting loose the Affghans upon us,
for that would throw into our hands all the fighting power and
enthusiasm of the Hindus. But I doubt the Affghans being so shortsighted
as to help the Russians across the Indus, as the subjugation of
Affghanistan would be the inevitable result of Russian success. The “St.
James’s Gazette” makes a great cry over Macgregor’s “confidential”
memorandum, which seems to have been very freely circulated. I totally
dissent from the notion that we are on the brink of some great
catastrophe; though it is certain that our army is far too weak, and
that we could not enter upon a campaign against a European invader.
These military chiefs know little or nothing of the real state and
temper of the Indian people, or of the elements of internal trouble with
which we have to deal. And the articles in the “Times” upon the armies
of Native States are written upon second-rate information, and are
likely to be very mischievous if they have influence in high quarters.
So much of Indian politics. I took no personal offence whatever at your
articles in the “Fortnightly.” They are not intended to be pleasant to
the Anglo-Indian official; and I may perhaps venture to say that here
and there they are unnecessarily unpleasant. But I do not conceal my
opinion, in discussing them out here, that there is truth in much of
what you say, though to my mind the paper on race hatred is rather
overstrained, and wants the strength of moderation. I wish you had given
your readers some momentary glimpse of the other side of the shield.
Nevertheless you have, as I tell the folk here, given us much that is
salutary criticism, and there is no doubt that we Anglo-Indians are
often a rough unpicturesque development of the contact between East and
West; some of us finding ourselves rather too suddenly placed in
unfamiliar situations, and having emerged unexpectedly into the fierce
light that beats upon office. On the other side, the Indians themselves
do see both sides of the shield, and do not object to abate much in the
matter of high politefulness, in consideration of a strong and
intelligent sort of administration, impartial among jarring races and
creeds. They are themselves not yet ready to supply this kind of
government, and they know its value. Also they know, much better than
most English, what a bad government, by exceedingly courteous Asiatics,
means. Moulvi Sami-ullah is just back from Egypt. I can see that he is
considerably impressed by the badness of administrative institutions in
Egypt; is rather inclined to ridicule them. As for such very
discreditable incidents as that of Patna, they _must_ occur now and then
until the natives themselves pluck up courage to hit back or otherwise
violently resent any personal insult. Laws and magistrates can do much,
but can never protect a whole people that does not stand up for itself.
Our magistrates are very fairly impartial between the two races in
Court; and the people are rather too fond of airing their grievances in
a helpless manner.
However, Lord Ripon has done a good deal towards stirring up the natives
to a sense of independence and a desire to look after themselves—they
now begin to see that if they will only come forward the English nation
will meet them half way. Lord Dufferin has but to let the leaven work,
and not to give countenance to a reaction.
In Egypt I can anticipate nothing but complications. I cannot see how we
can possibly stand balancing as we do at present, keeping everything in
suspense, without some final stumble; and yet it is becoming too late to
withdraw. Probably our abandonment of the Soudan (which I think is
necessary) will heighten the comparison and accelerate some crisis—the
Soudan is just the country that entangles the forces of a civilized
State, and where expeditions are as water poured into the sand.
Yours sincerely,
A. C. LYALL.
Lieut.-Governor’s Camp, North-West Provinces, India.
_February 23rd_, 1885.
MY DEAR BLUNT,
I am very sorry that my prediction as to the Soudan, quoted in your
letter to me of Jan. 23rd, seems likely to be verified, as well as many
predictions made by you. Never was such a demented policy followed so
blindly to inevitable failure and disrepute, in open disregard of all
the warnings of our Oriental experience, as that we see still being
pursued in Egypt. However, I find, to my great relief, that the _contre
coup_ of our Egyptian blunders is not much felt in India, where they are
mostly indifferent to the Mahdi and to our proceedings generally, though
of course there is much talk of our unlucky adventures in that country.
The Mahomedan generally is mainly interested in the Sultan; and Upper
India keeps its eyes fixed on Affghanistan and on Russia’s doings in
Central Asia.
I have just read your “Fortnightly” article on Hyderabad affairs, which
article will, you fear, entirely finish Lord Lytton’s regard for you. I
think, on the contrary, that he ought to be very much obliged to you;
for instead of laying upon the Viceroy the whole burden of your
displeasure at Salar Jung’s treatment in 1876-77-78, you have discharged
all your wrath upon that anonymous bureau that you call the Calcutta
Foreign Office. Not Lord Lytton, it appears, but poor little Tommy
Thornton, who acted as Foreign Secretary at that time, and whom Lord
Lytton treated with scant ceremony, was the author of the policy of
curbing Salar Jung. I observe that throughout your paper you denounce
and convict of the highest crimes the Calcutta Foreign Office, and that
the Viceroys and Governor-Generals are represented as sinning mainly by
inadvertence. This peculiar tactic was introduced by the “Statesman”
newspaper, and is intelligible in a journal that selects an antagonist
who cannot hit back when attacked; for of course the Foreign Office,
being impersonal and bound to secrecy, is dumb. I tried to induce Lord
Ripon to let me roll over the “Statesman” when it once libelled me
directly, but he wouldn’t let me use confidential papers. I should
hardly have expected, however, that so fearless and honourable an
adversary as yourself would have adopted the same method.
I suppose I ought not to see anything comic in being accused of being
“even more absolutely without moral scruple than” an English Foreign
Secretary, or in reading that the history of the doings of the Calcutta
Foreign Office, with which I was long connected about the time of which
you are treating, is one of the most scandalous in diplomatic annals;
that the Calcutta Foreign Office deliberately encouraged the Nizam in
vice and dissipation in order to retain power in his state; and,
finally, that it is indirectly responsible for Salar Jung being
poisoned; but the situation is so novel that its ridiculous side most
moves me. It seems clear to me that you are _not_ behind the scenes, or
you would see the thing in the same comic light; for it is quite in my
power to prove that all these wild accusations against gentlemen who are
just like yourself in honour and integrity, are unfounded and erroneous.
You must not reply that you are attacking a system, or a department, not
individuals; the policy of the Indian Foreign Office is distinctly
directed by the individuals, the Viceroy and his Foreign Secretary, from
time to time in office. And when you write that the policy of the
Calcutta Foreign Office is one of organized aggression with a view to
annexation—a policy carried on, you imply, in despite of well-meaning
Governors-General—you are not only wrong, but the reverse is far nearer
the truth. Take the instance of Berar, it is demonstrable by published
papers that the attempt to annex and the whole policy of seizure was
entirely Lord Dalhousie’s own. With Lord Dalhousie’s departure the whole
process of annexation (except for rebellion) ceased some thirty years
ago; his annexations were rather opposed than supported by the local
officials: and I challenge you to bring an instance in which the
Calcutta Foreign Office has since advocated Indian annexations. In
regard to the assertion for which, to my amazement, you vouch on your
personal testimony, that the Calcutta Foreign Office is responsible for
attempts made to corrupt the Nizam’s youth, I am quite sure you could
not prove it, for I know I could prove the contrary.
I hope you will ponder these words, and consider whether such very
serious charges ought to be made, except when you are face to face with
men who can answer, or except when you actually produce, as you do
nowhere in your article, the evidence on which you rely.
Lord R. Churchill stayed with me two days. I liked him much: he seemed
reasonable and moderate, and open-minded upon all Indian questions.
India is moving forward very fast—whither, the gods alone know; or
perhaps the gods are moving forward themselves too fast to have much
time for speculation on anything but their own future. The Russian scare
acts as a drag upon Indian radicalism; the advanced party does not want
to let in Russia, and is beginning to perceive that only the English can
keep her out long.
I am yours sincerely,
A. C. LYALL.
Lieut.-Governor’s Camp, N.W. Provinces, India.
_May 4th_, 1885.
MY DEAR BLUNT,
I was very glad to see from your letter of March 25th, that you are
quite ready to exchange explanations upon the disputable points in your
article to which our correspondence refers. I will not go farther into
the entangled questions of Hyderabad politics, except to say that I am
prepared, if necessary, absolutely to prove all that I have averred. For
example, I will prove that I, as Foreign Secretary, wrote letters
insisting that greater care should be taken of the young Nizam’s
training and education, and that I pressed the point orally and by
writing much more closely than Sir Salar Jung quite liked. Also I can
prove, undeniably, that at my instance the Government of India proposed
to bring to an issue the “Statesman” attacks upon Sir R. Meade by
authorizing, indeed ordering, Sir R. Meade to prosecute the “Statesman”
in London. It was the _India Office_ which refused to allow the
prosecution; the Calcutta Foreign Office and Meade were quite ready and
resolute. But I cannot quote documents, much less publish them, without
the consent of the Foreign Office and the India Office, so I cannot
answer public attacks.
As you write in such friendly strain you will perhaps excuse me for
expressing regret that the force and benefit of your articles on Indian
affairs should be so much diminished (as they really are) by incautious
use of unverified information. I have nothing whatever to say against
the position you take up as an advanced Liberal and a Reformer in Indian
politics, though I may not agree with all your views, or as to ways,
means, and opportunities of reform: but it seems to me that your ends
would be more likely to be met if you assumed a more impartial attitude.
You will never persuade the English nation that Anglo-Indian officials
are all fools or knaves. You were quite right to quote my letter in
writing to the India Office. I intended it as a manifesto on your side,
but I should guess you could afford to pass by Lepel Griffin. He is down
on his luck just now, having lost the Foreign Secretaryship, and having
been excluded from Raoulpindi Durbar, and he is consequently very sore
indeed after such a tumble. I am inclined to be sorry for him as he is
an able fellow in his way; but never did man more completely write
himself down. He has a vaunting and exaggerated style that irritates
people generally, and alarms the cautious officials in high places. His
letter in the “Times” (early in April) for instance, about his having
been intimately acquainted with one hundred ruling princes of India, is
absurd grandiloquence; he only knows half a dozen worth mention
politically.
It is hardly worth while that I should write to you about the present
state of Indian feeling; for I fear you agree with Lord R. Churchill’s
dictum that the English official knows less than nothing about what the
natives think. Nevertheless, I may say that to me the Indian people at
large appears to have come out wonderfully well during the critical
suspense we have been going through as to war or peace with Russia. If
war came, I believe we should have the country well behind us, and
supporting us against the Russians, and I have little fear of internal
tumults or disorders so long as we hold our own beyond or on the North-
West frontier. The Russians are, I think, entirely mistaken in their
notion that they could stir up any trouble against us in India, where,
on the contrary, they have a very bad reputation; and I fancy the
natives do not worry themselves so much as you imagine about our
bureaucratic manners and blunders, so long as they feel they have a
strong and honest government to keep the peace and keep out invaders.
This is not, of course, the view of the advanced Liberal native, who
naturally wants to rise, but the great Conservative propertied classes
have this feeling just now.
I thought war was coming. Russia gave us a fair challenge by seizing
Panjdeh; but now I suspect that Gladstone is only easing us down, and
had never any intention of incurring more bloodguiltiness. His foreign
policy has been most unlucky. He evidently has no head for this part of
government, and his dealings with the Soudan have been lamentable.
Apparently he will fulfil your prediction that “it will end by their
absconding without making any arrangements at all.”
I wish you would stand for a good Radical constituency and join John
Morley. I believe you are at heart much nearer the extreme left than the
extreme right; and you could arrange to say nothing about the game laws
until you had saved your common country, abolished the Foreign Office
and the Indian Council, and given India a dozen provincial parliaments.
Sincerely yours,
A. C. LYALL.
III. LIEUT.-GENERAL GLOAG TO MR. BLUNT
2, Tanfield Court, Inner Temple, E.C.
_August 19th_, 1886.
DEAR SIR,
I read your letter in the “Times” of yesterday with great satisfaction,
on the subject of Burmah. As I have been all over that country, I know a
great deal about it, and will not fail from time to time, as heretofore,
to do my best to expose those who have befooled Lord Dufferin.
1. Inquiry must be held into the real causes of the Annexation.
2. I long ago pointed out that Young Thibô, reputed son of the late King
Mengdom Meng, was neither a drunkard nor a debauchee, nor yet cruel. Sir
Grant Duff can tell now what he is, as he has had him in charge.
3. An inquiry must be held into the method of making the Contracts
entered into by Mengdom Meng with the Bombay Burmah Trading Company _in
re_ the Teak Forests; and maps and plans of the forests furnished, as
also the number of trees cut down, and the number of young trees
planted.
4. A general inquiry into the conditions of trade in force between us
and the late Mengdom Meng, for the present King Thibô is a mere youth,
crassly ignorant of most things.
I fully anticipate that independent members will take the question up in
the House, and you should do your utmost to help them as I also will do.
I wrote long ago (1878) that annexation was wrong commercially and
morally, as well as quite unnecessary. A strong Resident, well
supported, with a well-appointed establishment should have been located
at Mandalay in 1879 when Mengdom Meng died, the slave question for ever
settled, and order made to prevail, and the laws remodelled and
respected—quietly; if not, under gentle but strong means. I shall be
glad to see you continuing along the paths of reason, truth, honesty and
justice in this matter.
Yours sincerely,
A. K. GLOAG, Lieut.-General, late Comr. R.A. in British Burmah.
National Liberal Club, _August 25th_, 1886.
* * * * * *
The whole affair has been a monstrous wicked thing _ab initio_. I did
write to the “Times,” but probably my letters were more truthful than
they would have been agreeable to the mercantile bodies at Calcutta and
Rangoon who I believe have been in the main the sole cause of our policy
in Burmah. Yours truly,
A. K. GLOAG.
INDEX
_For the convenience of readers the public position of each principal
person here named is given with a biography in brief._
AARIF, MOHAMMED BEY, 326, 330, 332, 333, 334, 339.
Abbas, Khedive, the present, proposal of appointing him still a minor
with a Regency, 6, 8, 15, Appendix B.
Abbasi, Sheykh Mohammed el, Sheykh-el-Islam at Cairo, 70.
Abd-el-Aal Pasha, fellah Colonel, exiled with Arabi, 21, 68, 69, 276,
323, Appendix F.
Abd-el-Kader Pasha, Governor of the Soudan in 1882, reason of his
refusing to return there in 1884, Appendix A. _Also_ 15, 16, 77, 81,
170, 171, 189, 208.
Abd-el-Mutalleb, Sherif of Mecca, 333.
Abd-el-Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan, 264, 396, 397, 409, 444, 466.
Abd-el-Rasul, of Cashmere, 494, 500.
Abd-el-Razak Bey, F.R.G.S., ex-director of Naval College, imprisoned
at Cairo in 1883, 70, 71, Appendix F.
Abdallah-el-Taishi, the Khalifa, successor to the Mahdi, 505.
Abdallah Ibn Saoud, Nejdi, living at Constantinople, 327.
Abdu, Sheykh Mohammed, religious reformer, afterwards Egyptian Grand
Mufti, living in exile at Paris in 1884, 208, 284, 286; in England in
1884, 270; interviewed for “Pall Mall Gazette,” 277, Appendix E;
author’s correspondence with, 219, 277, 279, 284, 286, Appendix B; at
the House of Commons, 272; his talk with Labouchere and Lawson, 273;
with Churchill, 274. _Also_ 66, 71, 98, 207, 208, 215, 219, 224, 270,
271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 278.
Abdul Aziz, Ottoman Sultan, 329, 339.
Abdul Hamid, Ottoman Sultan, his character, 238, 302, 308, 309, 317,
318, 326, 327, 328, 337, 338; he favours Halim, 302, 321; his spies,
309; “un misérable et un fou,” 309; his horses, 303, 305, 341, 389;
his Selamlik, 318; his attitude towards the Grand Duke Nicholas, 308;
he only trusts the Germans, 322, 333; his relations with Dufferin,
302, 303, 305, 322, 348; with other ambassadors, 305, 316, 317, 322;
his manœuvres, 327; his women, 329, 337; his dislike of the ex-Khedive
Ismaïl, 378, 447; author’s letter to, 360, 389, Appendix B; proposed
revolt against in 1885, 490, 491, 493. _Also_ 15, 44, 50, 53, 80, 155,
177, 208, 238, 242, 248, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309,
310, 311, 312, 314, 321, 322, 329, 332, 333, 338, 339, 340, 341, 358,
361, 363, 365, 366, 367, 368, 375, 378, 387, 398, 399, 403, 405, 417,
418, 434, 436, 441, 449, 451, 454, 455, 474, 475, 476, 477, 480, 485,
486, 487, 488, 492, 501.
Abu Diab, Yusuf Bey, aide-de-camp to Abd-el-Aal, unjustly hanged at
Tantah, 21, 24, 69, 325, 335, Appendices B and F.
“Abu Naddara,” an Arabic journal published at Paris. _See_ Sanua.
Adhem, Ibrahim Bey, adherent of Tewfik and Mudir of Tantah, his
responsibility for the massacres at Tantah, 21, 324, 325, 335. _Also_
Appendices B and F.
Ahmed Assad, Sheykh, secret agent of the Sultan sent to Egypt in 1882,
327.
Ahmed, Mohammed. _See_ the Mahdi.
Ala-ed-Din Pasha, adherent of Tewfik, appointed Governor-General of
Soudan in 1883, 81.
Aleysh, Sheykh Mohammed el, Sheykh of the Malekite rite at Cairo,
imprisoned by Tewfik in 1882, and died in prison, 81.
Alexandria, bombardment of, 2, 24, 63; riots at, 19, 20, 21, 52, 73,
83. _Also_ Appendix B.
Amir Ali, Mr. Justice, now member of Privy Council, 242, 348.
Ali Fehmi Pasha, fellah Colonel of the Guards, A.D.C. to Khedive,
exiled with Arabi, 65, 276, 324.
Ali Yusuf Bey, traitor at Tel-el-Kebir, 275, 323.
Allnatt, Mrs., 387; correspondence with, Appendix A.
Amir Hassan, Rajah of Mahmudabad, 297, 413.
Amnesty promised by Dufferin in 1882, but broken in 1883, 19, Appendix
C.
Anderson, Mary, Miss, 419, 420.
Appleton, Mr., 353.
Arab race at Newmarket, 262, 263, 264, 265, 272; at Cairo, 315.
Arab studs in Poland, 221, 295, 296.
Arabi, Ahmed Pasha, leader of the Egyptian revolution of 1882, his
recall to Egypt contemplated, 7, 8, 11, 12, 41, 42; Gordon’s opinion
of, 9; his memorandum sent to Dufferin, 13, 33, 76, 77, Appendix B;
his views on the Soudan, 16, 35, 77, 78, Appendix E; author’s
correspondence with, Appendix B; account of his behaviour at Tel-el-
Kebir, 69, 323. _Also_ 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 21, 29,
31, 40, 41, 42, 49, 51, 52, 53, 61, 68, 69, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79, 83,
98, 140, 170, 211, 212, 213, 224, 228, 230, 234, 235, 237, 238, 242,
245, 246, 249, 251, 253, 254, 257, 260, 268, 270, 276, 281, 305, 310,
313, 323, 325, 379, 381, 387, 440, 454, 461, 477, 503.
Argyll, Duke of, 437, 450, 456.
Armenia, 337, 338, 342.
Atlee, Mr. Falconer, Consul at Paris, 284, 289.
Austin, Alfred, Poet Laureate, friend of the author, 392.
Awwam, Effendi, Arabi’s secretary, said to have betrayed Gordon, 421,
Appendix C.
Azarian, Monseigneur, Patriarch of the Catholic Armenians at
Constantinople, 337; his opinion of Sultan Abdul Hamid, 338.
Baker, Sir Samuel, well-known traveller, preceded Gordon as Governor
of Equatorial Province of the Nile, 95, 97; his high salary, 100; his
letter to the “Times” of 1st January, 1884, 161; Gordon’s visit to, in
1884, 172. _Also_ 100, 102, 104, 153, 161, 171, 172, 176.
Baker, Valentine Pasha, brother of Sir Samuel, head of Egyptian
gendarmerie, formerly Colonel of the 10th Hussars, 201; his defeat at
Teb, 5th February, 203. _Also_ 54, 161, 177, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203,
386; author’s personal recollection of, 201.
Bakir, Mirza, exiled Persian Sufi living in London, 273, 274; engaged
as Oriental secretary to author, 276, 499.
Balfour, Arthur, Rt. Hon., M.P., afterwards Prime Minister, 410, 424,
435, 450.
Bannerman, Henry Campbell-, Rt. Hon. Sir, M.P., Undersecretary at the
Admiralty, afterwards Prime Minister, his strange denial in the Palmer
case, 23.
Barnes, Rev. Dr., vicar of Heavitree, Gordon’s religious adviser, 138,
139, 171, 172.
Baring, Sir Evelyn. _See_ Cromer.
Barttelot, Sir Walter, M.P., 489.
Belkis, Queen, 314.
Bell, Moberly, Mr., “Times” correspondent at Alexandria, 348; same as
“Twenty Years’ Resident,” 456. _Also_ Appendix G.
Beresford, Charles, Admiral Lord, M.P., 63, 365.
Berzati, Gordon’s secretary in the Soudan, afterwards killed with
Hicks, 191.
Bible, Gordon’s, correspondence about the recovery of, 387, 389,
Appendix A.
Bilgrami, Seyd Huseyn, afterwards member of the Indian Council, 371.
“Bitters,” Francis Gore Currie, author’s cousin living in Paris, 284,
287, 410.
Bismarck, Prince, author’s recollection of, 286; his connection with
the Rothschilds, 260, 350, 395. _Also_ 1, 220, 222, 255, 260, 262,
345, 350, 357, 371, 391, 394, 395, 400.
Bismarck, Count Herbert, 395.
Black Art, the, 259.
Blignières, M. de, French Financial Controller in Egypt, 51.
Blind, Karl, German revolutionist living in exile in London, 354, 356.
Blount, Sir Edward, formerly British Consul at Paris, 389.
Bourke, Rt. Hon. Robert, M.P., Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, afterwards Lord Connemara, Governor of Madras, 28, 220, 226,
278, 349, 388, 450.
Bowen, Lord Justice, 451.
Bowles, Thomas Gibson, M.P., editor of “Vanity Fair,” 343, 361, 369.
Brand, Hon. Henry, M.P., Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, 1883-1885,
afterwards 2nd Viscount Hampden and Governor of New South Wales,
friend of the author, 228, 239, 241, 247, 248, 249, 255, 259, 374,
443, 446, 452.
Brett, Hon. Reginald, M.P., private secretary to Lord Hartington,
afterwards Lord Esher, his friendship with Gordon, 8, 12, 150; his
connection with the press, 162, 164. _Also_ 173, 174, 227, 351, 369,
375.
Broadley, Mr. A. M., Arabi’s Counsel in 1882, 67, 257, 270; his
connection with the ex-Khedive Ismaïl, 353.
Brocklehurst, General, intimate friend of Gordon, 173, 174; author’s
talk with, 225.
Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John, M.P., afterwards Lord Midleton and Chief
Secretary for India, 494.
Buckle, Mr. G. E., editor of the “Times” in succession to Mr. Chenery,
210, 219, 220, 250, 271, 348, 367.
Buller, General Sir Redvers, 379, 384.
“Bungo,” the Hon. Sir Michael Herbert, of the Paris Embassy,
afterwards Ambassador at Washington, friend of the author, 387.
Burmese War, 497, 498, 499, 501, 502, 503. _Also_ Appendix G; author
protests against, 502.
Burnaby, Colonel Fred, author of “The Ride to Khiva,” 213, 232; killed
at Abu Klea, 362, 406.
Burne, Sir Owen, head of the Secret Department at India Office, 250.
Burt, Rt. Hon. Thomas, M.P., working man member, 248, 428.
Burton, Sir Richard, the well-known explorer, 101; Gordon’s letter to,
137.
Burton, Lady, Gordon’s letter to, 130.
Butler, General Sir William, in command of the garrison at Alexandria,
his testimony about the bombardment of Alexandria, 475; as to Gordon’s
being refused permission to land in Egypt, 146.
Butros Pasha Ghali, Coptic Notable, afterwards Prime Minister in
Egypt, assassinated in 1910, 69.
“Button,” Hon. Algernon Bourke, on the staff of the “Times,” cousin
and friend of the author, 25, 209, 210, 212, 214, 216, 219, 220, 222,
223, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 235, 236, 238, 241, 242, 243, 245,
248, 249, 250, 254, 255, 257, 259, 260, 261, 262, 264, 269, 283, 352,
359, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 367, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 375, 376,
384, 385, 389, 391, 393, 394, 395, 397, 402, 406, 409, 412, 418, 425,
445, 450, 452, 478.
Buxton, Mr. Francis, M.P., 405, 438.
Buxton, Rt. Hon. Sydney, M.P., 405.
Camberwell Election, Chapter XII, 471, 472; author is defeated at,
504, Appendix D.
Cambridge, H.R.H. George, Duke of, 180, 205, 206, 239.
Campbell, Sir George, M.P., Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, 235.
Campbell, Lady Archibald, 446.
Campbell, Lady Colin, 478.
Carmichael, Sir James, M.P., private secretary to Gladstone, 268.
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, M.P., President of the Board of Trade in
Gladstone’s Cabinet, 2, 251, 254, 274, 369, 370, 384, 440, 441, 489.
Chandler, Rev. Dr. Arthur, Bishop of Blomfontein, cousin of the
author, 479.
Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry, M.P., 386.
Chapman, Rev. Hugh, Vicar of St. Luke’s, Camberwell, afterwards
Chaplain of the Savoy, 504.
Charmes, Gabriel, French journalist, his legends about the author, 67;
reason of his quarrel with Nationalist Government in 1882, 67. _Also_
243.
Charter, Lord Dufferin’s, 29, 32, 33, 62, 76; letter to author,
Appendix C.
Chenery, Mr., editor of the “Times,” 30, 31, 32, 210, 349; account of
his death, 210.
Cherif Pacha. _See_ Sherif.
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Lord Randolph, M.P., Chief Secretary for India
under Salisbury, afterwards Chancellor of the Exchequer, personally
described, 26, 213; his indictment of Tewfik, 28, 29, 211, Appendix B;
Morley’s opinion of, 252; his popularity with Orientals, 274, 276,
465, 468, 496; his ideas about India, 211, 350, 370, 412, 413, 439,
444; would recall Arabi, 238, 260, 414, 454; his ideas about Egypt,
414, 444, 454, 455, 461, 486; on Tory Democracy, 429; he promises to
support a Parliamentary inquiry into the Indian Government, 439, 496,
497; at the India Office, 452, 453, 456, 457, 460, 461, 464, 485, 491,
494; his views on Irish Home Rule, 445, 465, 469, 483; his connection
with the Drummond Wolff mission, 454, 461, 475, 478, 480, 481, 485,
486, 487, 491, 503; his discussion with Jemal-ed-Din, 466; on a
proposed revolution at Constantinople, 491, 493; his share in the
annexation of Burmah, 497, 498, 501, 503. _Also_ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
32, 38, 210, 211, 213, 218, 219, 235, 238, 245, 259, 262, 266, 278,
349, 350, 370, 371, 390, 408, 412, 413, 418, 419, 424, 429, 432, 435,
438, 440, 441, 443, 446, 447, 448, 450, 452, 453, 464, 466, 467, 468,
469, 479, 480, 481, 482, 492, 494, 495, 496, 500; author’s
correspondence with, Appendix D.
Clark, Dr., M.P., 356, 435.
Coetlogon, Colonel, in command of Khartoum garrison, 1883, 85, 155,
186.
Colvin, Sir Auckland, Anglo-Indian official, English Financial
Controller in Egypt, afterwards Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West
Provinces of India, 12, 38, 41, 44, 51, 52, 282, 421, 452.
Connaught, H.R.H. the Duke of, 372.
Cookson, Sir Charles, British Consul at Alexandria, 63.
Coptic Patriarch, 69.
Cordery, Mr., Anglo-Indian official, resident at Hyderabad, 239, 250,
348, 486, Appendix G.
Corti, Count, Italian Ambassador at Constantinople, 300; author’s
conversations with, 301, 305, 315, 320, 321, 327; his account of the
Berlin Congress, 320. _Also_ 319, 341, 364.
Cotton, Sir Henry, M.P., 478.
Courtney, Rt. Hon. Leonard, M.P., now Lord Courtney of Penwith, 359,
377, 397, 399, 402, 420, 428, 432.
Cowper, Hon. Henry, friend of the author, 483, 484.
Cromer, Earl of, formerly Sir Evelyn Baring, his appointment to Cairo
in 1883, 38; his “Nineteenth Century” article, 42; his views in 1883,
42, 59, 60; his reputation in Egypt, 51, 55, 57; his character, 54,
59, 60, 61; his early career, 58; author’s talks with in 1883, 58, 60,
61; his connection with Lord Northbrook, 58; his untrustworthiness as
an historian, 61, 151, 152, 157; his responsibility for Hicks, 84; his
quarrel with Gordon in 1879, 124, 125, 247; his “Modern Egypt,” v,
viii, 144, 152, 155; his antagonism to Gordon, 151, 152, 167; his
misquotation of a dispatch, 157, 171; his complaint as to the “Pall
Mall Gazette,” 152, 153, 154, 161, 162, 166, 167, 176; his
responsibility for Gordon’s failure, 157, 192, 193, 197, 198, 199,
202, 214; his unpublished letter to Gordon (date, 22nd January 1884),
194; is considered a failure, 223, 231, 344, 410; Lord Hardinge’s
opinion of, 374; to be recalled, 449, 450, 451. _Also_ 38, 39, 40, 42,
43, 44, 45, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 70, 74, 75,
76, 83, 84, 85, 102, 122, 124, 125, 144, 148, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155,
156, 157, 158, 160, 162, 163, 166, 167, 170, 171, 174, 175, 176, 177,
178, 182, 186, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 214, 215, 219,
222, 223, 224, 225, 228, 231, 247, 254, 257, 321, 344, 345, 374, 393,
410, 429, Appendices A and C.
“Curly,” Colonel George Knox, 231.
Currie, Mr. Bertram, banker, member of the Indian Council, cousin of
the author, and friend of Gladstone, 214, 352, 419, 420, 421.
Currie, Sir Donald, M.P., ship-owner, friend of Gladstone, 44, 235.
Currie, Mr. George, cousin of the author, 365, 370.
Currie, Sir Philip, afterwards Lord, private secretary to Lord
Salisbury, head of Foreign Office and Ambassador, cousin of the
author, 130, 227, 373, 378, 386, 438, Appendix C.
Curzon, Rt. Hon. George, M.P., afterwards Lord Curzon of Kedleston,
friend of the author, 451.
Dalhousie, Earl of, 431.
De la Warr, Earl of, political ally of author, 223, 225, 257.
Deli Nuzret, 327.
Dervish Pasha, the Sultan’s envoy to Egypt in 1882, he accepted
bribes, 327, 328.
Dickenson, Dr., of the Constantinople Embassy, 338.
Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles, M.P., Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs
in Gladstone’s Ministry, 10, 31, 169, 179, 247, 251, 254, 257, 330,
345, 346, 352, 360, 369, 371, 374, 383, 391, 390; his saying that
Egypt would be “annexed under another name,” 406. _Also_ 440, 445,
452.
Dillon, John, M.P., his letter to Morley, 252.
Disraeli, Benjamin, Lord Beaconsfield, story of, 244. _Also_ 412.
Drummond, Sir Victor, K.C.M.G., afterwards Her Majesty’s Minister at
Munich, friend of the author, 287.
Dufferin, Earl of, Ambassador at Constantinople, afterwards Viceroy of
India, author’s personal recollection of, 4; his Egyptian settlement,
4, 7, 18, 29, 30, 31, 32, 49, 62, 68, 141; his opinion of Arabi, 7, 8,
13; author’s correspondence with, 20, Appendix C; his relations with
Sultan Abdul Hamid, 303, 305, 322, 333, 344, 348; his responsibility
for Burmah, 497, 498. _Also_ 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21,
22, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 41, 49, 62, 68, 73, 76, 81, 141, 145, 146,
148, 149, 152, 161, 222, 236, 238, 283, 302, 305, 318, 322, 333, 344,
409, 454, 486, 497, 498.
Earle, General, killed in the Soudan, 377, 386.
Earle, Mrs., 399.
Egerton, Sir Edwin, _chargé d’affaires_ at Cairo, afterwards
Ambassador at Madrid, 223, 495.
Elections, Egyptian, how managed, 52, 56, 68, 72, 73.
Elliot, Sir Henry, formerly Ambassador at Constantinople, 301.
Escott, Mr. T. H. S., editor of “Fortnightly,” 392.
Europe, responsible for the ruin of the Soudan, 79, 80.
Exclusion from Egypt, the author’s, 75, 207, 218, 222, 245, 246, 247,
256, 274, 275, 278, 487, 492, 495. _Also_ Chapter VIII and Appendix C.
Executions at Alexandria and Tantah, 22, 24, 26, 29, 53. _Also_
Appendix B.
Faris, Selim Effendi, journalist at Constantinople, author’s talks
with, 304, 305, 317, 321, 327, 329, 332, 339, 341, 358, 489, 490, 493.
Fehmy, Hassan Pasha, Sultan’s envoy to London in 1885, 358, 359, 360,
361, 363, 366, 367, 368, 372, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 382, 389, 394,
407, 425.
Fenni, Mohammed Effendi, 71.
Ferid Bey, first Secretary of Turkish Embassy, 385, 448; his
communication as to proposed revolution in Turkey, 489. _Also_ 493.
Ferry, M. Jules, French Prime Minister, 229, 262, 351.
Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmund, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
afterwards Lord Fitzmaurice, 144, 150, 164, 174, 189, 203.
Flower, Mr. Cyril, M.P., afterwards Lord Battersea, 438.
Ford, Sir Clare, afterwards Ambassador at Constantinople, 436.
Forster, Rt. Hon. W. G., M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland 1880-1882,
257, 261.
Fowzi, Ibrahim Bey, with Gordon in the Soudan, Arabist in 1882,
accompanies Gordon to Khartoum in 1884, 175, 196, Appendix A.
Gessi Pasha, served in the Soudan under Gordon, 116, 117, 119, 191;
Suliman Zebehr shot by, 191.
Ghose, Mr. Lal Mohun, Indian delegate, 496, 497.
Giegler Pasha, German official in the Khedivial service, 154.
Gladstone, Rt. Hon. Herbert, M.P., afterwards Lord Gladstone, made use
of by his father politically, 213, 250, 379.
Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., M.P., Prime Minister, his intention of
restoring Arabi, 7, 11, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 57, 381; author’s
correspondence with through Sir E. Hamilton, 75, 76, 223, 228, 234,
246, 247, 249, 256, 347, 349, 393, 399, 400, 408, 433, 487, 489,
Appendix C; Hartington’s intrigue against, 160, 161, 164, 167, 168,
169, 177, 205, 352; was he responsible towards Gordon? 175, 182, 183,
184, 203; he uses his son Herbert, 213, 250, 379; a political gambler,
215; his speeches, 226, 240, 278, 385, 386, 405, 425; at Hawarden on
Christmas Eve, 356; violent language about, 362; at the play, 377; his
defeat in the House, 9th June 1885, 443; Bright’s letter to, 445;
Cardinal Manning’s opinion of, 500; he pronounces for Home Rule, 504.
_Also_ 1, 2, 3, 9, 17, 19, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 38, 40, 49, 56, 67, 72,
134, 171, 173, 179, 210, 212, 214, 217, 222, 224, 226, 227, 228, 229,
232, 235, 237, 239, 242, 245, 249, 251, 252, 255, 259, 260, 261, 269,
273, 276, 283, 345, 346, 357, 359, 360, 364, 369, 378, 379, 380, 389,
390, 391, 392, 407, 424, 425, 426, 431, 436, 445, 472, 488, and
Appendices A and C.
Gobineau, Count, author of “Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines,”
friend of the author, 288.
Godley, Sir Arthur, K.C.B., Under-Secretary of State for India, 225,
239, 250, 391, 392.
Gordon, General Charles George, Pasha, “Chinese Gordon,” vii, viii;
his letters to author, 9, 10, 11, 12, 140; he calls on author, 10,
135; his testimony about Arabi, 9, 11, 12, 140; his character
examined, 87, 88-94; his early work in the Soudan, 87-121; his Bible,
Christianity, 91; his chastity, 93; “Hailing the tram of the world,”
94; he enters Ismaïl’s service, 95; his interview with Sherif, 101; he
is considered mad, 8, 94, 103, 122, 132, 136; his fatalism, 108-112;
on the financial inquiry, 123; his quarrel with Cromer in 1878, 124,
151; Gordon and Lesseps, 125; his quarrel with Nubar, 129, 131; at the
Foreign Office, 130; Rivers Wilson’s recollection of, 132; in India,
133, Appendix A; at Jerusalem, 136-143; his religious monomania, 136,
138; his last mission to Khartoum, 144-206; “an unfit person,” 151; he
resigns his commission, 163; interviewed by Stead, 164; to have _carte
blanche_, 166; to Sarawak the Soudan, 169; he visits Barnes, 171; his
fighting plan, 177; Gordon and the Ministers, 179; was he disobedient?
181-206; his Foreign Office instructions, 182; his mistake about the
Mahdi, 185, 191; Gordon and Zebehr, 190; the change of plan at Cairo,
188, 194; his mission extended by Cromer, 194-199; was help promised
him? 204-206; at Khartoum, 207-209, 212. _Also_ 213, 214, 216, 218,
221, 223, 224, 225, 226, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 240, 243, 247,
248, 283, 287, 299, 348, 364, 370, 373, 374, 376, 387, 389, 392, 416,
452, 453.
Gordon Papers, Appendices A and C.
Gordon, Sir Henry, brother of General Gordon, 174; his correspondence
with Gladstone and others, Appendix A.
Gordon, Colonel Louis, viii, Appendix A.
Gorst, Rt. Hon. Sir John, M.P., 28, 211, 213, 219.
Goschen, Rt. Hon. George Joachim, M.P., afterwards Lord, 126, 261,
267, 269, 270, 322, 375, 390.
Gower, Mr. George Leveson, private secretary to Mr. Gladstone,
1880-1885, friend of the author, 210.
Gower, Hon. Frederick Leveson, M.P., Lord Granville’s brother and
private secretary, 237, 451.
Graham, General Sir Gerald, 203, 213, 214, 402, 416, 427, 428, 430;
his letters about Gordon, Appendix A.
Granville, Earl, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1880-1885,
chief obstacle to an honest settlement in Egypt, 17, 18, 31; his
position in Gladstone’s Cabinet, 168; his letters to Gladstone and
Baring proposing Gordon, 150, 173, 175; confirms author’s exclusion
from Egypt, 245; Morley’s opinion of, 252; Staal’s description of,
398; his assurance to Bright about Alexandria, 445; out of office,
445. _Also_ 2, 8, 17, 31, 67, 72, 74, 75, 85, 150, 154, 155, 163, 167,
168, 169, 170, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 182, 189, 192, 194, 195, 206,
207, 235, 237, 254, 351, 359, 361, 365, 367, 374, 375, 378, 385, 391,
394, 395, 455, and Appendix G.
Gregory, Sir William, friend and political ally of author, 29, 32,
242, 245, 266, 282, 347, 349, 378, 440, 476; his letters to author,
Appendix G.
Gregory, Lady, friend and political ally of author, 25; letter from,
29. _Also_ 30, 31, 32, 242, 245, 247, 253, 257, 265, 266, 373, 380,
389, 400, 486; extracts from her letters, Appendix G.
Griffin, Sir Lepel, high Anglo-Indian official, 391, 413, 414, 444,
465.
Gros Bois, 285.
Hafiz Behram Agha, Sultan’s chief eunuch, 318.
Hake, Mr. Egmont, author of “Chinese Gordon,” 159, 439; employed to
lecture on Gordon by Lord Salisbury, 475.
Halim Pasha, Prince, legitimate successor to the Khedive Ismaïl,
Pretender to Khedivate, his conversation with the author, 337; his
correspondence with the author, 389, Appendix B. _Also_ 6, 13, 14, 15,
36, 50, 230, 249, 302, 310, 313, 315, 321, 336, 440.
Halim, Princess, 314, 336.
Hamilton, Sir Edward, Gladstone’s chief private secretary, 1880-1885,
friend of the author, his correspondence with the author, 278, 331,
340, 400, 401, 407, 420, 433, Appendix C. _Also_ 45, 65, 75, 76, 134,
216, 217, 218, 223, 224, 227, 228, 231, 246, 247, 252, 254, 259, 275,
451.
Harcourt, Rt. Hon. Sir William Vernon, M.P., Home Secretary in
Gladstone’s Cabinet, 229, 378, 390, 448.
Hardinge, Hon. Charles, of the Diplomatic Service, private secretary
to Lord Dufferin at Constantinople, afterwards Ambassador at St.
Petersburg and Viceroy of India, 363, 364, 374, 489; his opinion of
Baring, 374.
Harrison, Mr. Frederic, Head of the Positivist Society, and friend of
author, his conversations with the author, 248, 371, 431, 436; his
speech at Westminster Town Hall, 4th March, 392. _Also_ 251, 253, 254,
256, 383, 451, 497.
Hartington, Marquess of, afterwards Duke of Devonshire, Secretary of
State for India in Gladstone’s Cabinet, his responsibility for the
Gordon mission, 247, 248; his intrigue against Gladstone, 164, 165,
167, 369, 370. _Also_ 2, 8, 150, 162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 173,
177, 178, 179, 203, 204, 214, 241, 252, 254, 276, 345, 390, 407, 408,
429, 432, 440, 445, 472, 473, 486.
Haymerlé, Baron, Prime Minister of Austria, early friend of author,
300.
Henderson, Consul at Aleppo, 303, 323.
Herbert, the Hon. Auberon, friend of the author, 213, 353; his
individualist ideas, 483.
Herbert, Hon. Sir Michael, friend of author. _See_ “Bungo.”
Herbert, Hon. Sidney, M.P., afterwards Earl of Pembroke, friend of
author, 450.
Hicks Pasha, General, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 141, 146, 149, 150, 152,
153, 154, 159, 191, 200, 214, 386.
Hicks Beach, Sir Michael, M.P., afterwards Lord St. Aldwyn, 239, 240,
252, 390.
Hill, Mr., editor of “Daily News,” 232.
Hobart Pasha, Admiral the Hon. Augustus, in the Turkish service,
author’s conversations with at Constantinople, 302; sent as Sultan’s
private envoy to London, 364. _Also_ 304, 366, 368, 378, 398, 416,
417, 441.
Holkar, Maharajah, 454.
Holland, the Rev. Scott, Canon of St. Paul’s, 240.
Hope, Edward, author’s private secretary, 283, 469.
Howard, George, M.P., afterwards Earl of Carlisle, friend of author,
237, 255, 259, 261, 267, 272, 404, 417, 462.
Howard, Mrs. George, afterwards Countess of Carlisle, friend of
author, 42, 215, 232, 237, 246, 249, 255, 259, 261, 265, 282, 402,
405, 415, 416, 418, 419, 425, 434, 440, 445, 462.
Hughes, Tom, author of “Tom Brown’s Schooldays,” 361.
Hunter, Professor, 400.
Husseyn Pasha, aide-de-camp to the Sultan, 319, 403.
Ibrahim Adhem Bey, Mudir of Tantah, partisan of Khedive Tewfik, 324;
his connection with riots at Tantah. _See_ Tantah.
Ibrahim-el-Senoussi, Sheykh, 403.
Ibrahim Bey. _See_ Moelhy.
Inglefield, Colonel, 415.
Ismaïl, ex-Khedive, his connection with Gordon, 89, 96, 98-104, 112,
118, 120, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130; his intrigues in London,
245, 257, 277, 279, 377, 447; author’s talk with, 279, 280; Ismaïl as
a boy, 311, 312; he lends money to the King of Italy, 315; his
deposition in 1879, 329; is patronized by Bismarck, 358; Arabi refuses
to have anything to do with, Appendix B. _Also_ 50, 230, 239, 249,
281, 301, 359, 378.
Jamil Pasha, 303.
James, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry, M.P., afterwards Lord James of Hereford,
278.
Jemal-ed-Din Afghani, Seyyid, well-known Moslem reformer living in
exile at Paris, proposed mediation with the Mahdi through, 224, 226,
228, 286, 287, 338, 389, 409, 410, 411, Appendix B; his correspondence
with author, Appendix B; in England, 464; his talks with Churchill,
465-468; his talks with Drummond Wolff, 473, 478; he is to help Wolff
in his mission, 480, 481, 482, 486, 487; he leaves England angry, 500,
501; his death in 1902, 501. _Also_ 40, 45, 46, 47, 208, 237, 272,
358, 368, 376, 386, 387, 388, 412, 444, 449, 457, 458, 461, 473, 474,
475, 476, 477, 479, 485, 488, 489, 491, 492, 499.
Jews in Poland, 290, 293.
Jowdat, Ismaïl Bey, head of Cairo police during the war, in exile at
Constantinople in 1884, 310, 313, 319; his evidence on the Alexandria
and Cairo massacres, 319, 323, 330, 339, 340, Appendix B; in London,
342, 343, 356, 357; ordered to Constantinople, 358. _Also_ 434, 486,
487, 488.
Jung, Nawab Salar, Prime Minister to the Nizam, 55, 239, 371, 413.
Kandil, Seyd, Chief of Police at Alexandria in 1882, condemned to
prison for asserted connection with Alexandria riot, 69, 71. _Also_
Appendix B.
Khalil, Sheykh Mohammed, disciple of Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, 66.
Kerr, General Lord Mark, 370, 371, 372.
Khair-ed-Din Pasha, ex-Vizier, 242, 245, 302, 303, 305, 307, 329.
Kiamyl, Prince, cousin of the Khedive, 326.
Kimberley, Earl of, Chief Secretary for India in the Gladstone
Cabinet, 452.
Knowles, Sir James, editor of the “Nineteenth Century Review,” friend
of Gladstone, 40, 41, 42, 44, 209, 210, 246, 247, 249, 275, 359.
Kurds, proposed rising of, 330, 342, 343.
Labouchere, Rt. Hon. Henry, M.P., friend of author, 28, 213, 214, 230,
252, 261, 271, 272, 273, 274; his conversations with the author, 379,
380, 393, 399, 424, 427, 429.
Lagergren, Mr., Swedish traveller, 299.
Laing, Mr., Director of the Regie at Constantinople, 326.
Laing, Miss, formerly companion to Princess Nazli, 313.
Lamb, Lady Caroline, 483.
Lambert, professional tennis player, 434.
Lampson, Sir Curtis, Bart., neighbour and friend of author, 401.
Langiewitz, General, Polish patriot, 316.
Lascelles, Sir Frank, G.C.B., Acting Diplomatic Agent in Egypt,
afterwards Ambassador at Berlin, friend of author, 243, 254, 257, 259,
261, 281.
Lavison, Mr., secretary to ex-Khedive Ismaïl, 279.
Lawson, Sir Wilfrid, Bart., M.P., 28, 212, 213, 219, 232, 240, 252,
255, 259, 266, 271, 273, 274, 275, 276, 279, 282.
Layard, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry, ex-Ambassador at Constantinople, 317, 365.
Leconfield, Henry, Lord, cousin of author, 347, 357, 448.
Lee, Sir Henry Austin, K.C.M.G., private secretary to Lord E.
Fitzmaurice at the Foreign Office, afterwards English representative
on the Suez Canal Committee, 373.
Leigh, Mr., of the Diplomatic Service, afterwards Lord Newton, 287.
Leitner, Dr., Orientalist, 236.
Leopold, King of the Belgians, 101, 136, 143, 150, 158, 159, 163, 164,
178, 182, 187.
Lesseps, Count Ferdinand de, his connection with Gordon, 122, 123,
124, 125, 126.
Lloyd, Mr. Clifford, Chief of Police in Ireland, employed in Egypt in
1884, 14, 267, 325.
Locker-Lampson, Mr. Frederick, poet and friend of the author, 498.
Long, Colonel Chaillé, American Colonel, served with Gordon in the
Soudan, 178.
Lords, the House of, 266, 271.
Lorne, Marquess of, afterwards Duke of Argyll, 404, 408, 409.
Lothian, Schomberg, 9th Marquess of, Chief Secretary for Scotland in
Salisbury’s Cabinet, friend of author, 437, 449, 452, 472.
Lowther, Rt. Hon. James, M.P., 226, 263, 379, 392.
Lucan, Field-Marshal Lord, 426, 427.
Lubienski, Rev. Father, a Polish priest, 292, 293.
Lumsden, Sir Peter, 370, 396.
Lyall, Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred, Lieutenant-Governor of North-West
Provinces of India, afterwards member of Indian Council, friend of
author, 252; his letters to author, Appendix G.
Lymington, Lord, M.P., now Earl of Portsmouth, 242, 377.
Lyons, Lord, Ambassador at Paris, 132, 209, 344, 359.
Lytton, Earl of, ex-Viceroy of India, afterwards Ambassador at Paris,
friend of the author, 133, 222, 257, 258, 390, 399, 451.
Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmed, the, 13, 15, 16, 70, 77, 78, 80, 82, 86, 149,
153, 155, 156, 161, 176, 182, 185, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 198,
200, 203, 204, 208, 209, 212, 215, 217, 218, 221, 223, 224, 225, 227,
230, 231, 234, 235, 237, 240, 257, 261, 266, 267, 269, 272, 348; his
character, 351, 442; his death, 459, 472, 505. _Also_ 355, 362, 368,
369, 373, 379, 380, 384, 386, 387, 388, 393, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402,
403, 411, 413, 416, 434, 438, 442, 444, 455, 466.
Malet, Sir Edward, Consul-General at Cairo, afterwards Ambassador at
Berlin, 15, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 50, 51, 63, 73, 82, 83, 84, 146, 286,
374, 393, 422; his position with Bismarck, 346, 395.
Malkum Khan, Prince, Persian Ambassador in London, 277.
Manning, Cardinal, 383, 384, 462, 469, 497.
Massowa, 376, 387.
Maxwell, Sir Benson, Adviser to the Egyptian Government in the
department of Justice, 62, 63, 265.
McCarthy, Mr. Huntley, M.P., 422, 423, 461.
McCarthy, Mr. Justin, M.P., author’s conversations with, 422, 423,
469, 476.
McGrath, Canon, 469.
Mediation proposed by author in the Soudan, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228,
234, 352, 354, 355, 356, 384, 386, 387, 388, 389, 444, 455, Appendices
B and C.
Mehariz Bey, Deputy Mudir at Tantah, his part in the riots, 325, 335.
_Also_ Appendix B.
Merv, the Russians at, 467, 468.
Metemmeh, 365, 368, 372, 373. _Also_ Appendix A.
Meynell, Mr. Wilfrid, friend of the author, 475, 478, 504.
Midhat Pasha, his character, according to Vefyk Pasha, 314; his death,
339.
Milner, Alfred, journalist, afterwards Governor of South Africa and
Lord, 61, 487.
Minshawi, Ahmed Bey, afterwards Minshawi Pasha, 21; his visits to the
author, 334, 338; his evidence as to the Tantah massacre, 335, 336,
339, 340, 341; his letter to author, Appendix B.
Mirza Bakir. _See_ Bakir.
“Modern Egypt,” v, viii; its unreliable character as history, 61.
Moelhy, Ibrahim Bey, at one time private secretary to ex-Khedive
Ismaïl, living as an exile in London in 1885, 354, 355, 357, 358, 359,
368, 381, 385, 401, 403, 408, 409, 434, 458, 459, 480, 487, 488, 491,
494.
Moffitt, Mrs., Gordon’s sister, viii, Appendix A.
Mohammed Assad Bey, Muteserif of Candia, uncle-in-law of Aarif Bey,
342.
Moore, Mr. A. W., Lord Randolph Churchill’s private secretary, 485,
495, 498.
Moore, Mr. Lionel, Oriental secretary at Constantinople, and friend of
the Prince of Wales, his conversations with the author, 63, 64, 65,
67.
Morier, Sir Robert, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 346, 385.
Morley, Rt. Hon. John, M.P., formerly editor of the “Pall Mall
Gazette,” afterwards Cabinet Minister and Lord, his prediction about
Lord Cromer, 39; his repentance for bringing about the war of 1882,
152; his “Life of Gladstone,” 169; his conversations with the author,
232, 233, 234, 251, 260, 383, 420; his opinion of certain public men,
251, 252, 253; he is for “strong government, the cutting off of
heads,” 251. _Also_ 144, 221, 252, 254, 256, 377, 385, 390, 402.
Morocco, French plan to annex, opposed by Communists, 353.
Morris, William, poet and friend of the author, 408, 488, 496, 499.
Munir Pasha, Chamberlain to the Sultan, 328, 332, 339.
Mustafa Bey Nejdi, Arabi’s doctor, living in exile at Constantinople,
313; his account of Tel-el-Kebir, 323; as to Alexandrian riots, 325.
_Also_ 336, 339, 341, Appendix B.
Musurus Pasha, Turkish Ambassador, 322, 341, 491.
Nadir Shah gives Arab horses to the Turcomans, 479.
Napier, Major, now Lord Napier of Magdala, 225.
Napier, Hon. Mark, Counsel with Broadley at Arabi’s trial, friend of
author, 221, 372, 373, 456, 478; proposes with others to rescue
Gordon, 221.
Naworth Castle, 288.
Nazleh, Princess, cousin of Khedive Tewfik, 42.
Nebbi Ullah, Seyd, Khan of Lucknow, 382, 473.
Nélidoff, M. de, Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, early friend of
author, 300, 316, 339, 398.
Neville, Lady Dorothy, 436.
Nicholas, Grand Duke, commanding the Russian army before
Constantinople in 1878, 388.
Ninet, Swiss patriot who sided with the Egyptian Nationalists in 1882,
313.
“Nineteenth Century Review,” author’s article on Egyptian Revolution
in, 9, 11; article by Sir E. Baring on Lord Ripon’s policy in India,
42, 43; author’s article on proposed Arab race at Newmarket in, 237.
Nizam, the, of the Deccan, 388, 397, Appendix G.
Noailles, M. de, French Ambassador at Constantinople, 301, 320.
Northcote, Sir Stafford, afterwards Earl of Iddesleigh, leader of the
Opposition, Chief Secretary for Foreign Affairs under Salisbury, 219,
220, 252, 261, 262.
Northbrook, Earl of, First Lord of the Admiralty in Gladstone’s
Cabinet, his financial proposals, 344, 345, 346, 352, 370; with regard
to native evidence, 347; his letter to Gordon, Appendix A. _Also_ 8,
22, 23, 58, 133, 134, 150, 169, 179, 247, 278, 284, 299, 359, 410,
429, 447, 458.
Novikoff, Madame de, 245, 277, 373, 447.
Nubar Pasha, Armenian Prime Minister in Egypt, 30, 95, 102, 103, 118,
122, 129, 131, 140, 141, 170, 171, 175, 176, 178, 190, 194, 195, 197,
199, 214, 223, 243, 268, 287; his quarrel with Gordon in 1878, 129,
247.
Obeyd, Mohammed Bey, fellah officer killed at Tel-el-Kebir, 355.
Odessa, 297.
O’Kelly, James, M.P., Parnellite member, correspondent of the “Daily
News” during Dongola Expedition, 231, 272.
Omar Pasha Lutfi, partisan of ex-Khedive Ismaïl, Governor of
Alexandria, later War Minister, his connection with the Alexandrian
riots, 19, 20, 21, 24, 52, 63, 71, 73, 83, Appendices B and C.
Omdurman taken by the Mahdi, January 1885, 363.
Osborn, Colonel, friend of Native India, 220.
O’Shea, Captain William, M.P., 429.
Osman, Prince, cousin of the Khedive, 326.
Osman Digna, the Emir, Mahdist leader, 54, 161, 200, 203, 394, 400,
426, 437.
Paget, Sir Augustus, Ambassador at Vienna, and Lady Paget, 287.
Pain, Olivier, French Socialist, reward offered for him dead or alive,
442, 486.
“Pall Mall Gazette,” the, 152, 154; its change of front about Egypt,
161. _Also_ 162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 183, 223, 227, 247, 253,
255, 274, 350, 351, 353, 354.
Palmer, Mr. Edward, Professor of Arabic at Cambridge, vengeance taken
on Bedouins for his death, 22, 23; debates in Parliament, 28; Consul
West on the Palmer case, 53; Northbrook’s responsibility for, 179.
Parnell, Mr. Charles Stuart, M.P., 251, 270, 272, 273, 379, 412, 414,
415, 422, 423, 429; author’s talk with, 427, 428.
Pauncefote, Sir Julian, permanent Under-Secretary of State, afterwards
Ambassador in America, 495.
Peace and Arbitration Association, 352, 353, 354, 356, 431.
Penjdeh, 467.
Petitt, match between Lambert and, professional tennis player, 435.
Poles and Ruthenians, 290, 294.
Policy, Prussian, of claiming the old Dutch colonies, 396.
Pollen, Mr. John Hungerford, secretary to Lord Ripon, friend of the
author, 363, 432, 465.
Poore, Major R., disciple of Urquhart, 377.
Potocki, Count Alfred, at Crabbet, 221, 222; author’s visit to him at
Lançut, 289, 290, 291, 292; at Antonine, 293, 294; his Arab stud, 295,
296.
Pratt, Mr. Hodgson, philanthropist, organizer of the Peace and
Arbitration Society, 352, 353.
Press, use made of by Governments, 117, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 250,
369.
Primrose Day with Churchill, 418.
Proteus, Love sonnets of, “Mr. Gladstone turns to with delight,” 433.
Punch Dinner, 275.
Quakers against peace, 378.
Queen. _See_ Victoria.
Ragheb Nashid, 276.
Ragunath Rao, Rajah, a letter from, 494.
Rafaat, Osman Bey, secret agent of the Khedive, 324, Appendix B.
Rama Swami, Indian delegate, 494, 499.
Raouf Pasha, Governor-General of Soudan in succession to Gordon, 10,
15.
Red Sea, origin of the name, 314.
Reform in _Foreign Policy_, author’s lecture on, 497.
Reign of Terror at Cairo, 66.
Riaz Pasha, Prime Minister in Egypt, 11, 30, 55, 73, 126, 131, 146,
243, 251, 336.
Ripon, Marquess of, Viceroy of India, 58, 133, 134, 239, 251, 349,
363, 375, 397, 412, 413, 432, 450, 452, 465.
Roberts, General Sir Frederic, now Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, 430.
Rosebery, Earl of, afterwards Prime Minister, his connection with the
Rothschilds, 395; his connection with the Turf, 237.
Rothschild, Nathaniel Lord, 229, 242, 255, 272.
Rothschilds, Messieurs, their connection with the “Times,” 213;
Bismarck’s quarrel with, in Frankfort, 260; holders of Egyptian Stock,
160, 212, 214, 350.
Russia and Afghanistan, 444, 466.
Russia and India, 444, 466, 467.
Saad-el-Zaglool Effendi, assistant editor of the “Wakaya” under
Mohammed Abdu, Minister of Public Instruction under Cromer, 1906, now
Minister of Justice, in prison, 71; author procures his release, 74,
75.
Sabit Pasha, Tewfik’s agent at Constantinople, 305.
Sabunji, Rev. Louis, editor of “Nahlek,” Oriental secretary to author,
45, 50, 51, 52, 66, 74, 76, Appendix B.
Salisbury, Marquess of, 73, 132, 235, 252, 255, 320, 321, 332, 391,
446, 452, 465, 468, 472, 478, 486, 487, 493, 495, 501, 502, 503, 505;
takes office, 448, 449; engages to support Tewfik, 457; author’s
correspondence with, Appendix C.
Sami, Mahmoud Pasha, el Barodi, Nationalist ex-Prime Minister, exiled
with Arabi, 64, 72, 276, 324.
Sanguscko, Prince, 294.
Sanua, James (Sheykh Abu Naddara), Egyptian Nationalist living in
exile at Paris, and editor of “Abu Naddara,” author visits him at
Paris, 45; his puppet show and newspapers, 46. _Also_ 47, 65, 208,
219, 387, 388.
Saoud el Tihawi, Sheykh, Bedouin Sheykh, his action at Tel-el-Kebir,
“in the pay of both sides,” 323.
Saracens, Arab chivalry inherited from, 362.
Selborne, Lord Chancellor, 406.
Seljukian Sultans, descendants of, at Konia, 301.
Seymour, Admiral Sir Beauchamp, Lord Alcester, his proclamation after
bombarding Alexandria, 2, 475.
Seymour, Mr. Walter, friend of the author, 370, 382, 456.
Shaftesbury, Lord, his warning to the Prince of Wales, 282.
Shakespeare, “As You Like It” in open air, 446.
Sheffield, Mr. George, private secretary to Lord Lyons at Paris,
considers Gordon’s case hopeless, 209; author’s conversations with,
344, 345, 346, 410. _Also_ 284, 359.
Shemsi, Emin Bey, Nationalist deputy in 1882, 71, 72, 73.
Sherif Pasha, Prime Minister in 1883, 30, 62, 71, 72, 101, 102, 124,
125, 126, 128, 151, 156, 160, 233, 243.
Sidki, Mustafa Bey, landed proprietor at Shubra, imprisoned in 1883,
71.
Sinadino, M. Ambroise, Greek banker at Alexandria and agent of the
Rothschilds, “Mecca pilgrims kept without water,” 298.
Sinnett, Mr. A. P., well-known Theosophist, he explains the black art,
258, 259.
Siva Prasad, Rajah, says a royal order would override caste
difficulties, 496.
Slavery, two ways of dealing with, 96-99.
Slagg, Mr., M.P., his motion for an inquiry into Indian Government,
439.
Souakin, 376, 380, 400, 402, 409, 416, 426, 427, 455.
Spencer, Earl, 391; a born administrator, 268.
Staal, M. de, Russian Ambassador in London, friend of author, 222,
269, 298, 436, 445, 446, 452, 454.
Stanley of Alderley, Henry, Lord, friend of the author, 24, 242, 245,
302, 308, 310, 342, 345, 361, 367, 372, 377, 394, 407, 416, 452.
Stanley, Lady, of Alderley, 364, 371.
Stanley, Hon. Lyulph, M.P., afterwards Lord Sheffield, friend of
author, 212.
Stead, Mr. William, editor of the “Pall Mall Gazette,” 1883-1885,
Gordon’s mission unjustly attributed to by Cromer in “Modern Egypt,”
152, 153, 162, 165, 166, 167, 168; he interviews Gordon at
Southampton, 164, 171; used by the Whigs, 169; his “scream of
triumph,” 183; author interviewed by, 220, 221, 351, 353, 354, 355;
described by Morley, 253. _Also_ 158, 170, 176, 369, 426, 447, 484.
Stewart, Colonel D. H., 81, 146, 147, 148, 179, 181, 187, 189, 196,
365; author’s recollection of, 287, 299, Appendix F.
Stewart, General Sir Herbert, in command of the relief column, killed
at Abu Klea, 362, 364, 367, 368, 379, 406.
Suliman Sami Bey, Nationalist Colonel of the Alexandria garrison,
hanged by the Khedive, 23, 24; refused to give up certain papers
incriminating the Khedive, 69, Appendix B.
Sullivan, Sir Arthur, musical composer, 413.
Sullivan, Sir Edward, Bart., 419.
Sultan, the Ottoman. _See_ Abdul Hamid.
Sultan Pasha, fellah Notable and Constitutionalist, betrayed the
Nationalists to the Khedive in 1882, and accompanied Wolseley on the
campaign of Tel-el-Kebir; received £10,000 and a knighthood from the
British Government, 46, 50, 71, 72, 275, 324, Appendix B.
Talbot, General the Hon. Sir Reginald, 367.
Tamai, battle of, 409.
Tantah, riots at, evidence in regard to, 19, 21, 28, 324, 325, 334.
_Also_ Appendices B, C, F.
Taschaud, M., 381.
Tebbutt, Mr. Charles, banker of St. Ives, political friend of author,
504.
Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 3, 6, 16, 36, 46, 49, 65, 74, 75, 77, 79,
201; traitors at, 275; described by Arabi’s doctor, 323.
Temple, Dr., Bishop of Exeter, afterwards Bishop of London, Gordon’s
visit to, 172; party at Fulham, 451. _Also_ 139, 172, 243.
Temple, Sir Richard, ex-Indian official, afterwards M.P., 498.
Tennis at Hampton Court, 434, 435.
Tewfik, Khedive, an impediment to an honest settlement in Egypt, 5, 7,
8, 17, 32, 56, 65, 68, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 141, 217, 369, 414, 454,
457; his connection with the riots, 28, 31, 52, 211, 347, Appendices
B, C; his weak and treacherous character, 49, 50, 249, 411; Gordon’s
quarrel with, 122; he makes peace with Gordon, 197; his firman to
Gordon, 197; Arabi’s attitude towards, Appendix B. _Also_ 1, 4, 11,
13, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 30, 33, 47, 48, 51, 55, 62, 64, 67, 69,
70, 71, 72, 73, 76, 120, 122, 130, 131, 140, 151, 153, 156, 157, 160,
162, 169, 170, 187, 189, 190, 194, 201, 212, 214, 218, 225, 228, 230,
232, 234, 253, 254, 266, 268, 284, 328, 336, 349, 360, 365, 366, 456.
Thebaw, King of Burmah, 497, 502; General Gloag’s letters about,
Appendix G.
“Times,” the, 1, 25, 30, 32, 76, 99, 153, 160, 161, 162, 166, 172,
175, 211, 213, 216, 219, 230, 231, 246, 248, 249, 253, 254, 257, 265,
274, 275, 354, 360, 361, 365, 367, 385, 397, 399, 426, 435, 445, 447,
455, 459.
Tory Democracy, “Am I a Tory Democrat?” 429, 443, 444, 445, Appendix
D; old Tories, 439. _Also_ 414, 441, 463, 465.
Trevelyan, Rt. Hon. George, Bart., M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland,
his description of Clifford Lloyd in Ireland, 268. _Also_ 267, 391.
Tulba Pasha, commander of garrison at Alexandria in 1882, afterwards
at Kafr Dawar, exiled with Arabi, 63, 64, 324.
Turkey, dying, 305; ruined by commercial treaties, 307; in Asia, 342;
intended revolution in, 490, 491, 493.
Urquhart, David, author of “Spirit of the East,” 377; Cardinal
Manning’s opinion of, 500.
Varkar, Mr. Chandra, 496, 499.
Vefyk Pasha, ex-Grand Vizier, 242, 245, 302; “a man of crotchets,”
303; author’s visit to “a most remarkable man,” 306; “our Sultans
worthless,” 307; “the English have lost their political sense,” 308;
on the Sultan, 309; on Egypt, 310, 311; author breakfasts with him,
313; on Arabian history, 314; Count Corti’s opinion of, 315; his son,
340.
“Vengeurs, Les,” 70, Appendix F.
Victoria, Queen, speech on opening Parliament, 32; her letter to Miss
Gordon, 204, 205, 206, Appendix A; Hassan Fehmy’s audience with, 369.
Villayet Ali, Nawab, 296.
Villiers, Hon. Frank, Lord Salisbury’s private secretary, afterwards
Sir Francis Villiers, Ambassador at Lisbon, 495.
Vivian, Hon. Crespigny, afterwards Lord, and Ambassador at Rome, 123,
127, 128.
Volhynia, condition of peasantry in, 298.
Waddington, M., French Ambassador in London, 254; at the Congress of
Berlin, 320, 321.
Wagram, Prince, friend of author, author’s visit to, at Gros Bois,
284, 285; visits Windsor, 479.
Wales, Prince of, afterwards King Edward VII, 211, 235, 347, 348, 360,
368, 371, 392, 427, 447.
Wallace, Sir Mackenzie, 318.
Walsham, Sir John, Bart., of the Diplomatic Service, 287, 289.
Warren, Colonel, 22, 23; his method of dealing with Bedouins, 53.
Watson, General Sir Charles, friend of Gordon, 150, 194, 197; his
letters about Gordon, Appendix A.
Webb, Mr. Godfrey, clerk of the House of Lords, cousin of the author,
410.
Wentworth, Lord, afterwards Earl of Lovelace, brother-in-law of
author, 432, 456.
West, Mr., British Consul at Suez, 52, 53.
Whittaker, Mr., editor of the “Levant Herald,” conversation with
author, 303, 304; on the Sultan’s method of dealing with Ambassadors,
316; he explains Dufferin’s failure, 322. _Also_ 368, 441.
Wilson, General Sir Charles, Consul in Asia Minor, afterwards at Cairo
and Khartoum, 15, 20, 146, 170, 416; author’s recollection of, 147,
149; his letters relating to Gordon, Appendix A.
Wilson, Sir Rivers, Finance Minister in Egypt, friend of author, 93,
127, 128, 129, 132, 226, 229, 230, 495, 496; his recollection of
Gordon, 132.
Windsor Park, 439.
Winton, Mr. De, Anglo-Egyptian official, his talk with the author on
Egypt, 277.
Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond, afterwards Ambassador, 28, 211, 219, 220,
262; his mission to Constantinople and Egypt, 456; his plans in Egypt,
473; his conversations with Jemal-ed-Din, 474, 475, 476, 477. _Also_
360, 382, 390, 408, 413, 418, 436, 448, 449, 451, 454, 455, 458, 461,
480, 481, 488, 489, 490, 491, 494, 504.
Wolseley, Sir Garnet, afterwards Lord, 1, 4, 5, 8, 50, 78, 150, 159,
173, 174, 177, 203, 204, 205, 226, 228, 236, 238, 275, 299, 342, 346,
347, 348, 349, 363, 364, 366, 374, 375, 386, 394, 400, 461; his
position at the Horse Guards, 393; his plan of campaign, 406; is angry
with the Government, 406; and the Nile Expedition, 415, 416; wants to
renew Soudan campaign, 425, 429; resolution for recall of, 431; his
return from Soudan, 459.
Wood, General Sir Evelyn, in command of the army of occupation, 49,
51, 150, 194, 197, 201.
Wood, Mr. Martin, of the Arbitration and Peace Society, he accompanies
author to Hawarden, 356, 357; at the National Liberal Club, 435.
Wortley, Stuart, Colonel, 373.
Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George, M.P., afterwards Chief Secretary for
Ireland, cousin of author, 376, 419, 438, 442.
Wyndham, Sir Hugh, K.C.B., Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople,
298, 299, 301, 363, 364, 374.
Wyndham, Hon. Percy, M.P. for Cockermouth, cousin of the author, 236,
266, 271, 274, 298, 299, 363, 364, 375.
Wynford, Lord, 353.
Yildiz Palace, the Sultan at, 327; horses paraded at, 341.
Yusri, Ismaíl, President of the Commission on the Tantah massacres,
325.
Zanzibar, Bismarck’s designs on, 394, 395.
Zebehr Pasha, chief of the slave traders, 116, 119; recruits a
Soudanese force, 190, 200; would he have betrayed Gordon? 191; would
have saved Gordon many mistakes, 192; real reason for his arrest, 403.
_Also_ 200, 494, 495.
Zogheb Naghib, Syrian merchant of Alexandria, conversations with the
author on board ship, 47, 49, 50, 51.
* * * * *
CHISWICK PRESS: PRINTED BY CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO.
TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: I find the following in my diary of 11th December 1891:
“Anne called on Princess Nazleh who told her that she did not think the
Khedive Abbas would hear of Arabi’s return. Others say the contrary. She
repeated what we already knew from her that after Tel-el-Kebir Tewfik
ordered two guillotines from France for the execution of the ‘rebels.’ .
. . Dufferin told Princess Nazleh once in an unguarded moment that, if
he had earlier known the kind of man Tewfik was, he would have made the
other (meaning Arabi) Khedive.”]
[Footnote 2: See “Secret History.”]
[Footnote 3: See Lord Esher’s “To-day and To-morrow.”]
[Footnote 4: This is an allusion to certain Sheykhs of the Teaha and
Terrabin tribes in whom I was interested and who were in prison at
Jerusalem.]
[Footnote 5: Raouf was afterwards named, in contempt of equity, one of
the judges on Arabi’s trial.]
[Footnote 6: The Hon. Mark Napier, who, with Mr. A. M. Broadley, had
been counsel for Arabi at the trial.]
[Footnote 7: The Rt. Hon. Robert Bourke, M.P., afterwards Lord
Connemara.]
[Footnote 8: For Sir William and Lady Gregory see “Secret History.”]
[Footnote 9: Mr. Chenery, then Editor of the “Times.”]
[Footnote 10: See “Secret History” and Appendix C.]
[Footnote 11: Sir Evelyn Wood in command of the Army of Occupation.]
[Footnote 12: Gabriel Charmes, the well-known French journalist, was the
propounder of most of the fictions current about my action before and
during the war. He was angry with the Nationalists for having knocked
off the subsidies formerly allotted to the foreign press at Cairo. The
rifles were Winchester rifles intended in reality for a new journey we
thought of making to Nejd but never set out on. The Reuter’s telegrams
of the day mentioned them as “seventeen _cases_ of arms.” Several years
afterwards, while being shown over the citadel at Cairo by the then
English Commandant, I found my brass cannon and the rest of the things
that had been taken out of my house in store in the arsenal, and having
identified them got them restored to me.]
[Footnote 13: Butros Pasha Ghali, the same who, having served English
interests in Egypt for many years, became in 1908 Prime Minister, and
was assassinated on the 20th of February 1910. (See Appendix as to the
Patriarch.)]
[Footnote 14: This is the same Saad Zagloul who was made Minister of
Public Instruction by Cromer in 1906, and is now (1911) Minister of
Justice.]
[Footnote 15: Examples of Gordon’s little judgement of individuals he
came personally in contact with may be found in Samuel Baker, King
Leopold, Henry Stanley, and Richard Burton, in all of whom Gordon
thought he had discovered elements of unselfish humanitarian zeal akin
to his own.]
[Footnote 16: The “Duke of This,” who wanted a steamer, and the “Duke of
That,” who wanted a house, are not difficult of recognition by those who
remember the Egypt of that day. The Duke of Sutherland especially, with
his house speculations, must have been in Gordon’s mind.]
[Footnote 17: At one moment there was an idea of Gordon’s going to
Zanzibar, where there were points of difficulty needing solution. I
recollect something of this, and that a question had been raised by the
Sultan of Zanzibar in regard to the abolition of slavery in his
dominions. The Sultan was a very enlightened prince, and would have
willingly emancipated the whole of his slaves could he have replaced
them with free labourers, and he had made application to the India
Office for their consent to employ coolies from Bombay to take their
place, and I had some correspondence at the time with Lord Lytton on the
matter, though it led to no result.]
[Footnote 18: See Appendix.]
[Footnote 19: See “Secret History.”]
[Footnote 20: The MS. of Sir William Butler’s Autobiography, recently
published, contained, I am told, a passage which was struck out of the
printed volume in the editing, to the effect that not only did the Cairo
Government of the day reject the proposal of Gordon’s services, but that
he was to have been refused permission to land in Egypt had he proposed
to do so on his way to Jerusalem.]
[Footnote 21: M. Biovès, in absolving our diplomacy of the charge made
against it by most Egyptian writers that the abandonment of the Soudan
was forced on the Khedive by Cromer with an intention of taking the
abandoned provinces for England later, missed this point. The idea in
1883 was not perhaps of a full acquisition by England of the Soudan, but
certainly of a region ruled by Englishmen in English interests, what
Stead called “Sarawaking the Soudan” after the model of Rajah Brooke’s
government in Borneo.]
[Footnote 22: Compare “Secret History,” and also later page.]
[Footnote 23: See “Secret History.”]
[Footnote 24: See Fitzmaurice.]
[Footnote 25: See “Secret History.”]
[Footnote 26: Colonel Chailé-Long, who served under Gordon on the White
Nile from 1874 to 1877, maintains with some show of probability that it
was arranged at this time between Gordon and King Leopold that, although
he was to go as Queen’s officer to sever the Soudan from Egypt, he was
ultimately to make over Khartoum and the Upper Nile Provinces to the
King as part of the King’s Congo State.]
[Footnote 27: It is worth noticing that these four Ministers were
precisely the four that had had most to do with the original armed
intervention in Egypt in 1882. Northbrook’s name is especially ominous
when we recollect that he was at the head of the Admiralty at the time
of the bombardment of Alexandria, and that it was he who had dispatched
Palmer, as he was now dispatching Gordon, on his fatal mission, a
mission which, like Gordon’s, was to begin with an attempt to bribe
Bedouin tribes, and was to lead to the betrayal of the missioner and his
repudiation by those who sent him. There is extant a letter from
Northbrook to Gordon (see Appendix), written just as he was starting,
telling him that he had ordered a man-of-war to carry him to Souakin,
and that there were £1,000 for his purposes which were being entrusted
for him to Admiral Hewett at Souakin, the very same Admiral to whom
Palmer had been sent, and from whom he had received the money for buying
up the tribes east of the Suez Canal.]
[Footnote 28: The Hon. Lyulph Stanley, now Lord Sheffield.]
[Footnote 29: Colonel Burnaby, M.P., author of “The Ride to Khiva,”
afterwards killed at Abu Klea.]
[Footnote 30: A retired Indian official and well-known friend of native
India, but out of favour with the India Office.]
[Footnote 31: The Hon. John and Mark Napier (see “Secret History”). Also
see Mrs. Allnatt’s letters in Appendix A.]
[Footnote 32: M. de Staal, for twenty years Russian Ambassador in
London.]
[Footnote 33: Berber surrendered to the Mahdi on 19th May; after this
Gordon had no chance of extricating himself from Khartoum.]
[Footnote 34: Edwin Egerton of the diplomatic service, afterwards Sir
Edwin Egerton, G.C.M.G., His Majesty’s Ambassador at Madrid.]
[Footnote 35: See Appendix C.]
[Footnote 36: A political ally during the Arabi trial (see “Secret
History”).]
[Footnote 37: Compare Lord Cromer’s “Modern Egypt” as to my position
with the Foreign Office and at 10, Downing Street.]
[Footnote 38: M.P. for Horsham.]
[Footnote 39: The present Lord Napier of Magdala.]
[Footnote 40: The Right Hon. James Lowther, M.P.]
[Footnote 41: Sir C. Rivers Wilson (see “Secret History”).]
[Footnote 42: The Hon. Henry Brand, M.P., Surveyor-General of the
Ordnance, afterwards 2nd Viscount Hampden.]
[Footnote 43: The Right Hon. Sir William Harcourt, M.P., Home Secretary,
always a good friend to Egypt.]
[Footnote 44: M. Jules Ferry, French Prime Minister.]
[Footnote 45: Mr. O’Kelly, M.P., one of the Parnellite members who had
gone to Dongola as correspondent to the “Daily News.” His article, “The
Mahdi and his Men,” was much the best account of the Mahdist movement
yet published.]
[Footnote 46: See Appendix B.]
[Footnote 47: John Morley, M.P., now Lord Morley of Blackburn.]
[Footnote 48: Sir Donald Currie, an intimate friend of Gladstone.]
[Footnote 49: Sir George Campbell, M.P., had been formerly Lieutenant-
Governor of Bengal, a Liberal, and a strong friend of native India.]
[Footnote 50: The Hon. Percy Wyndham, M.P. for Cockermouth.]
[Footnote 51: The well-known Orientalist and friend of Islam.]
[Footnote 52: The Hon. Frederick Leveson-Gower, M.P.]
[Footnote 53: Of the diplomatic service, now Sir Hugh Wyndham, K.C.B.]
[Footnote 54: See Appendix.]
[Footnote 55: See “India Under Ripon.”]
[Footnote 56: See _ibid._]
[Footnote 57: Sir Michael Hicks Beach, now Lord St. Aldwyn.]
[Footnote 58: The Rev. Scott Holland, Canon of St. Paul’s.]
[Footnote 59: Henry, 2nd Lord Stanley of Alderley (see “Secret
History”).]
[Footnote 60: Lord Lymington, M.P., now Earl of Portsmouth.]
[Footnote 61: Afterwards Sir Frank Lascelles, G.C.B., ambassador at
Berlin (see “Secret History”).]
[Footnote 62: Compare page 172.]
[Footnote 63: Thomas Gibson Bowles, M.P.]
[Footnote 64: Montague Corry, Lord Beaconsfield’s private secretary,
afterwards Lord Rowton.]
[Footnote 65: Thomas Burt, M.P., the first Labour Member in the House of
Commons.]
[Footnote 66: See Appendix.]
[Footnote 67: The Right Hon. W. G. Forster, M.P.]
[Footnote 68: Leigh of Lyme, in the diplomatic service, now Lord
Newton.]
[Footnote 69: The Right Hon. George Wyndham, M.P.]
[Footnote 70: A Conservative M.P.]
[Footnote 71: The Right Hon. Sir George Trevelyan, Chief Secretary for
Ireland. He had been Under Secretary to the Admiralty during the
bombardment of Alexandria.]
[Footnote 72: Sir James Carmichael, M.P.]
[Footnote 73: The well-known philanthropist.]
[Footnote 74: This is the portrait which forms the frontispiece of my
“Secret History,” a very excellent likeness.]
[Footnote 75: See Appendix.]
[Footnote 76: This is where Lord Stanley was afterwards buried.]
[Footnote 77: My cousin, Francis Gore Currie.]
[Footnote 78: Consul and keeper of the Embassy archives.]
[Footnote 79: My recollection of Bismarck on this occasion is of a tall
thin man making himself very agreeable to Lady Malet and me—there was no
one else present—and talking excellent English.]
[Footnote 80: Sir John Walsham, Bart.]
[Footnote 81: Sir Victor Drummond, K.C.M.G., afterwards Her Majesty’s
Minister at Munich.]
[Footnote 82: See “India Under Ripon.”]
[Footnote 83: Admiral the Hon. Augustus Hobart, for many years in the
Sultan’s service.]
[Footnote 84: See “India under Ripon.”]
[Footnote 85: So, too, the Red Sea, or Phoenician Sea, as to the meaning
of which there have been so many conjectures. The name Bahr el Ahmar was
formerly applied both to the Red Sea and to the Persian Gulf, both of
them originally the homes of the Phoenicians, whose Arabic tribe name,
Beni Himyar, Children of the Red, was turned by the Greeks into
Phoenicians from the Greek word _phoenix_, red. I offer this solution of
the name puzzle to philologists, having no pretension to be one myself.]
[Footnote 86: Also see Appendix.]
[Footnote 87: Compare Appendix to “Secret History” (Second edition).]
[Footnote 88: Mohammed Aarif Bey, afterwards well known at Cairo where
he played many parts, among others that of private secretary to Mukhtar
Pasha Ghazi.]
[Footnote 89: See “Secret History.”]
[Footnote 90: See Appendix.]
[Footnote 91: See Appendix C.]
[Footnote 92: This relates to a personal explanation made by Lord
Northbrook on the 19th, in which he had treated the “Times”
correspondent in Egypt, Moberly Bell, with the greatest severity, and
the “Times” also as a publisher of false news.]
[Footnote 93: See “India under Ripon.”]
[Footnote 94: The report of Mohammed Bey Obeyd’s having escaped to the
Soudan was long prevalent. But it is certain now that he was killed at
Tel-el-Kebir.]
[Footnote 95: Khartoum fell on 26th January. The news reached London on
5th February; Gordon’s death not known till the 10th February.]
[Footnote 96: General Sir Herbert Stewart in command of the relief
column.]
[Footnote 97: The Hon. Charles Hardinge, of the diplomatic service,
private secretary to Lord Dufferin at Constantinople, now Lord Hardinge
of Penshurst, Viceroy of India.]
[Footnote 98: Field Marshal Lord Lucan, an ancient Crimean hero.]
[Footnote 99: I leave this epithet as it stands in my diary, explaining
only that of course it does not apply to Lord Esher’s private character,
but only to his official intrigues as Lord Hartington’s private
secretary.]
[Footnote 100: General Lord Mark Kerr.]
[Footnote 101: Seyd Huseyn Bilgrami, afterwards Member of Council.]
[Footnote 102: General Sir Charles Wilson, who on the death of General
Stewart had taken command of the relief expedition.]
[Footnote 103: Sir Henry Austin Lee, K.C.M.G., private secretary to Lord
E. Fitzmaurice at the Foreign Office, now English representative on the
Suez Canal Committee.]
[Footnote 104: The Sultan at no time wished to restore Ismaïl; but
Ismaïl had come to London to push on the interests of his restoration to
Egypt in the English press. He was helped in this by Broadley, Stead,
and Madame de Novikof.]
[Footnote 105: Seyd Nebbi Ullah Khan of Lucknow.]
[Footnote 106: The Hon. Sir Michael Herbert, of the Paris Embassy,
afterwards Ambassador at Washington.]
[Footnote 107: Sir Edward and Lady Blount of Paris.]
[Footnote 108: Now Lord Courtney of Penwith.]
[Footnote 109: See Appendix.]
[Footnote 110: See Appendix B.]
[Footnote 111: The Right Hon. Sydney Buxton, M.P.]
[Footnote 112: See Appendix G.]
[Footnote 113: Compare Sir Charles Wilson and also Sir William Butler.]
[Footnote 114: This is interesting as showing that the idea of what was
afterwards Wolff’s Convention was already being thought of in
Gladstone’s time.]
[Footnote 115: Compare the Marchand mission of a dozen years later.]
[Footnote 116: Compare Gordon’s diary at Khartoum and my letter to Lord
Dufferin in Appendix C.]
[Footnote 117: Captain William O’Shea, M.P., of lugubrious memory. I had
been at school with him.]
[Footnote 118: Compare his book “Modern Egypt.”]
[Footnote 119: See Appendix.]
[Footnote 120: The Conservative Party agent.]
[Footnote 121: Field-Marshal Lord Roberts.]
[Footnote 122: Schomberg, 9th Marquess of Lothian. I had been with him
as his fellow _attaché_ at the Frankfort Legation in 1861-2, when we had
been close friends.]
[Footnote 123: Lady Archibald Campbell.]
[Footnote 124: See Appendix.]
[Footnote 125: See Appendix.]
[Footnote 126: Stafford Northcote had just been created Earl of
Iddesleigh.]
[Footnote 127: Afterwards Sir Henry Cotton, K.C.S.I., Chief Commissioner
in Assam and M.P.]
[Footnote 128: Sally Shackle, daughter of the Duke of Somerset’s
warrener at Bulstrode, entered my father’s service at Crabbet in 1823 as
cook and housekeeper, having just married Henry Sellwood, my father’s
valet, and lived on at Crabbet, with the exception of the few years of
my elder brother’s minority, till 1894, when she died, after seventy
years of honourable service spent, almost all of it, in one house.]
[Footnote 129: Alfred Milner, now Lord Milner. He was at that time
assistant editor to Mr. Stead, who was for the moment in prison in
connection with the “Purity Campaign” he had been carrying on in the
“Pall Mall Gazette.” My letter, if I remember rightly, was on Tory
Socialism.]
[Footnote 130: These entries about Ferid Bey are extremely interesting
now in connection with what happened on precisely the same lines in
Turkey twenty-three years later in 1908.]
[Footnote 131: Afterwards the Right Hon. St. John Brodrick, M.P., now
Lord Midleton.]
[Footnote 132: Permanent Under-Secretary of State, afterwards ambassador
in America.]
[Footnote 133: Lord Salisbury’s private secretary, now Sir Francis
Villiers, ambassador at Lisbon.]
[Footnote 134: See Appendix.]
[Footnote 135: This is necessary to the sense, but the group or some
equivalent has been omitted in cyphering.—A. W. M. 12/8]
Transcriber's note:
Some minor orthographic and punctuation changes have been done silently.
Spelling inconsistencies have been left unchanged.
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